diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f97ce927c9d232ed20e772af53eedc95c088175c3e17ca01a4040dc574626f23.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f97ce927c9d232ed20e772af53eedc95c088175c3e17ca01a4040dc574626f23.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f7dbdc30e09cd7c21acb27c0b3091909021b0392
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f97ce927c9d232ed20e772af53eedc95c088175c3e17ca01a4040dc574626f23.md
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From: Paul Cassell <cassellp@law.utah.edu>
+To: Paul Cassell <cassellp@law.utah.edu»
+Subject: RE: CVRA Case -- Epstein -- Moving Things Along
+Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 20:27:00 +0000
+Importance: Normal
+Dear L
+Brad and I are writing to express our serious concern about how things are progressing on this CVRA case.
+This note is prompted by the fact that it has now been nearly a month since we proposed a new, specific statement of
+facts to you (a full draft was e-mail to you on October 23) - and, indeed, more than two years since we proposed a set of
+facts to you ... all without any answers.
+This latest letter is also required by the fact that I hadn't heard from Dexter for some time about how the
+Government's response to our proposed statement of facts was coming. We had hoped to reach agreement with you on
+the facts in advance of the October 27 filing date. We were advised, at the last minute, that was not possible. We have
+continued the last several weeks to try and achieve a statement of facts, all the while being put off. Finally, I called Dexter
+on the morning on November 15, and Dexter told me that I should have something by the end of that day. But here we
+are - six days later - no statement of facts... and, more troubling, not even the courtesy of a call letting Brad and me
+know what the status is or what the plans are and what caused the delay. (And remember that you were prepared to
+argue back in October - before Judge Marra peremptorily struck down the argument - that we had somehow delayed too
+long in moving the case forward!)
+In the mean time, our clients continue to be very eager to move forward with this case and reach a resolution. One
+of our clients is constantly asking for the status on this case and we have had to tell her that the U.S. Attorney's Office is
+putting us off and has not given us any roadmap or time table for a resolution.
+In light of all this, Brad and I cannot have this case delayed any further. Accordingly, we are writing to give you
+notice now that we will be filing our motion for finding of a violation of the CVRA no later than Friday, December 17,
+2010.
+Before we are forced to file, we would like to meet with someone there who has the authority to try and reach a
+resolution - specifically the U.S. Attorney. Brad and I are free between December 9 and December 17. However, as
+indicated repeatedly before, we do not believe a meeting would be productive if we are still haggling over the details of
+what happened. Therefore, before we would take the time for a meeting (and I would fly across the country), we need to
+have the statement of facts nailed down.
+Most of our proposed facts are now supported by hard, documentary evidence - specifically e-mails written by the
+U.S. Attorney's Office. We continue to ask you to simply stipulate to all those facts. In a few instances, we have proposed
+our interpretation of the facts. If you disagree, we propose proceeding as follows: "The victims believe the reasonable
+inference is xxxxx; the Government believes the reasonable inference is yyyyy."
+We are also wondering about the best way to get access to any documents that you are reviewing in connection
+with preparing the facts. Given the length of time it has taken you to get back to us, we assume that you are reviewing
+many documents. We would like to see all those documents, and are prepared to enter any appropriate protective order
+or other agreement that would facilitate this. In particular, we would like to see all documents regarding our three clients
+any discussion of providing victim notification to them specifically or all victims collectively,
+and all documents regarding the underlying criminal case against Epstein and the Government's decision to enter into a
+non-prosecution agreement three years ago. These events took place several years ago. Our understanding is that there
+
+
+is no pending criminal case against Epstein - at least with regard to our three clients - so there should be no basis for
+resisting production of these documents at this time.
+Finally, as you know, back in October, there was the suggestion that we had to file some kind of civil complaint to
+move our case forward. I have been involved in CVRA litigation around the country, and have not seen that device used
+before. But - again - it has been more than a month now and we have not heard back from you on our request to be told
+precisely what procedures you think should be put in place to resolve our dispute.
+This case has been pending for far too long. Brad and I believe an expeditious resolution would be best for all
+concerned. We would like to work with you to achieve this. But if we have to go it alone, our obligation to zealously
+represent our clients requires us to do no less.
+Thank you for your prompt attention to these issues.
+Sincerely,
+/s/ Paul Cassell
+Brad Edwards
+Civil Justice Attorney
+an, P.L.
+te 2
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f97ce927c9d232ed20e772af53eedc95c088175c3e17ca01a4040dc574626f23.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f97ce927c9d232ed20e772af53eedc95c088175c3e17ca01a4040dc574626f23.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a9b749caa73889298dfba05eb967de4c33d7ab8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f97ce927c9d232ed20e772af53eedc95c088175c3e17ca01a4040dc574626f23.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -24,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "f97ce927c9d232ed20e772af53eedc95c088175c3e17ca01a4040dc574626f23",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 2,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "46bf30702b69680ec28690e111d32566db09f17b9fdfda07fe6122b5985284e6",
+  "output_sha256": "98f62badd11adc9e68e1564a2db4bd625fb16f9f682e7af56c527093039485b0",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f9f059bd82c232743b68c9e67d18ee98c3786300bafa3b5d1c5551e0f8f50b4e.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f9f059bd82c232743b68c9e67d18ee98c3786300bafa3b5d1c5551e0f8f50b4e.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d12a1101b7405ee98b01937f6d7bbe199bc54baa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f9f059bd82c232743b68c9e67d18ee98c3786300bafa3b5d1c5551e0f8f50b4e.md
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+From:
+(USAFLS)" L
+To:
+| (USAFLS)" <
+Subject: RE: FORMAL NOTICE of Office-wide Recusal of Southern District of Florida (GCO File No.
+REC-11-4159)
+Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2011 18:27:48 +0000
+Importance: Normal
+• we aren't permitted to take our laptops into the FBI's offices, are we?
+From:
+- (USAFLS)
+Sent: Friday, October 21, 2011 2:23 PM
+(USAFLS);
+Cc:
+(USAFLS);
+(FBI)
+(USAFLM)
+(FBI); L
+(FBI);
+.. (FBI);
+Subject: RE: FORMAL NOTICE of Office-wide Recusal of Southern District of Florida (GCO File No. REC-11-4159)
+Hi everyone - I am back from court. Sorry about that.
+, I hope that your trial went well.
+On Monday, we will be meeting at the FBI Office in West Palm Beach with Supervisory Special Agent
+,, and case agents
+and
+Former case agent
+be available.
+The address for the FBI is
+telephone number is
+The office
+also will
+There is plenty of parking.
+You said that you would arrive at 9:30, is that right? The agents and I need to get all of my boxes over to the FBI
+before you arrive, so I just need to reconfirm your arrival time.
+Assistant U.S. Attorney
+Fax
+From:
+(USAFLS)
+Sent: Friday, October 21, 2011 2:09 PM
+To:
+(USAFLM);
+1. (USAFLS)
+Cc:
+(USAFLS)
+Subject: RE: FORMAL NOTICE of Office-wide Recusal of Southern District of Florida (GCO File No. REC-11-4159)
+I believe that you and
+will be meeting at the FBI's offices in West Palm Beach with the FBI agents
+who have been working on the matter so that they can all fill you in on the history and facts of the criminal
+investigation. Assuming that it fits within your travel timetable, I was also planning to drive up from Miami to
+
+
+meet with you and
+_ in the early afternoon to discuss how our office's continued handling of the Crime
+Victims' Rights Act litigation brought by two of Epstein's victims impacts upon the criminal investigation and
+vice versa. (Unfortunately,
+, who has long been handling the CVRA litigation along with |
+,, and
+who is also our district's Ethics Officer and one of our Professional Responsibility Officers, will not be able to
+participate.) Will that plan work for you?
+Can you provide L
+Thanks,
+and me with directions to the location of the meeting in West Palm Beach?
+(USAFLM)
+Sent: Friday, October 21, 2011 1:55 PM
+(USAFLS)
+Subject: RE: FORMAL NOTICE of Office-wide Recusal of Southern District of Florida (GCO File No. REC-11-4159)
+Can you direct someone to give me directions for our meeting, and please let me know who all will be there.
+Thanks,
+From:
+(USAFLS)
+Sent: Friday, October 21, 2011 11:44 AM
+To:
+(USAEO)
+Cc:
+(USAFLS);
+(USAFLS);
+(USAFLM)
+• (USAFLS);
+(USAFLS);
+Subject: RE: FORMAL NOTICE of Office-wide Recusal of Southern District of Florida (GCO File No. REC-11-4159)
+I neglected to tell you in my previous email that we are scheduled to meet on Monday with AUSA |
+MDFL, who has been assigned to the Epstein criminal matter by the MDFL, in furtherance of the transfer of the criminal
+matter to the MDFL.
+From:
+To:
+Cc:
+(USAFLS)
+(USAFLS)
+Sent: Friday, October 21, 2011 11:35 AM
+(USAEO)
+(USAFLS); |
+• (USALS);
+(USAFLS);
+Subject: RE: FORMAL NOTICE of Office-wide Recusal of Southern District of Florida (GCO File No. REC-11-4159)
+In transferring the criminal matter involving Jeffrey Epstein to the MDFL, while retaining responsibility for the
+related CVRA litigation, our district has encountered a potential problem. The district court has ordered
+discovery in the CVRA litigation, and the Petitioners have served us with a discovery request. See attached
+files. The underlying criminal case file is thus pertinent to both the CVRA litigation handled by the SDFL and the
+criminal investigation that has been transferred to the MDFL. USAP 3-2.170.001, the pertinent USAP, does not
+appear to contemplate this bifurcated need for the criminal case file:
+
+
+Transfer of the Matter or Case
+Once the recusal has been approved and the matter or case assigned to either a new USAO or the
+Criminal or Civil Division, the United States Attorney of the recused USAO should take steps to ensure
+that the matter is closed and management, supervisory and reporting responsibilities, and all case files
+for the particular matter or case are transferred to the new USAO or the Criminal or Civil Division. This
+includes all administrative, ministerial, and financial litigation actions normally completed by the
+recused USAO, including input into LIONS and TALON. Thereafter, the recused USAO can only provide
+limited administrative support to the new USAO or the Criminal or Civil Division, such as furnishing
+copies of local rules, advising of local practice, assisting with scheduling, providing time before the grand
+jury, providing local information for grand jury and victim/ witness support services, or providing
+facilities for depositions. The recused USAO, however, should not make any decisions or take any
+substantive actions in the matter or case. The intent of this section is to make clear that once recusal of
+the matter or case has been approved by the ADAG and the matter or case has been transferred to a
+new USAO or the Criminal or Civil Division, the matter or case no longer belongs in any sense to the
+recused USAO.
+When a new USAO assumes responsibility for the recused case, it should process the case from the
+investigatory stage through and including any post-judgment actions, including any appellate work or
+actions required by the Financial Litigation Unit (FLU). The Special Attorney assigned the matter or case
+should sign any pleadings or documents using the signature block of the newly assigned USAO, with the
+addition of the Attorney General's name preceding that of the United States Attorney. Any
+administrative or ministerial support and any decisions should be provided by the Special Attorney's
+USAO and supervisory chain. In the event that the Special Attorney has substantive questions that the
+recused USAO is precluded from answering, the Special Attorney should contact EOUSA GCO for
+consultation and advice.
+When the Criminal Division or other litigating component assumes responsibility for the recused case, it
+should process the case from the investigatory stage through and including any judgment actions. When
+any post-judgment actions normally conducted by a USAO FLU become necessary, and the Criminal
+Division or other litigating component is unable to handle such actions, the Trial Attorney handling the
+matter should contact EOUSA GCO, which will assist the component in obtaining a USAO FLU section to
+conduct the post-judgment FLU actions.
+USAP 3-2.170.001(6)(C)(2)(b)(3).
+Can EOUSA provide any guidance on how we are expected to handle the transfer of the case file under these
+circumstances? Although we will be seeking to dismiss the CVRA proceedings and will seek relief from the
+discovery that was ordered, the district court is unlikely to look kindly upon a government position that we
+cannot respond to discovery because we transferred the case file to the MDFL after our office was recused from
+the criminal matter involving Jeffrey Epstein. And the criminal case file will clearly be needed to respond to the
+contemplated discovery in the CVRA litigation.
+Thanks for your help,
+United States Attorney's Office
+
+
+Telephone:
+E-mail:
+Sent: Monday, August 29, 2011 2:00 PM
+(USAFLS)
+Subject: Fw: FORMAL NOTICE of Office-wide Recusal of Southern District of Florida (GCO File No. REC-11-4159)
+Re: the Epstein question.
+From:
+(USAEO)
+Sent: Monday, August 29, 2011 01:57 PM
+To: 1
+(USAFLS)
+Subject: RE: FORMAL NOTICE of Office-wide Recusal of Southern District of Florida (GCO File No. REC-11-4159)
+Hello |
+Yes, that is correct. The investigations concerning Epstein, personally, are the matters your office is recused.
+The CVRA matters, while stemming from matters involving Epstein, are matters brought be other individuals
+and those matters may remain with your office.
+Please let me know if you would like to further discuss or if you have any questions,
+Thank you,
+General Counsel's Office
+Executive Office for United States Attorneys
+Phone:
+Fax:
+Email:
+- New Phone Number
+- New Fax Number
+From:
+(USAFLS)
+Sent: Monday, August 29, 2011 12:26 PM
+To:
+(USAEO)
+Subject: RE: FORMAL NOTICE of Office-wide Recusal of Southern District of Florida (GCO File No. REC-11-4159)
+Hi
+
+
+I hope the storms and Irene haven't affected you too badly. I wanted to make sure 1 am correct that this recusal
+from any new criminal investigation into Epstein does not affect SDFL's handling of the CVRA civil case pending
+before Judge Marra. I believe that L
+had discussed the potential for recusal in the CVRA matter with
+GC a while back and I am fairly certain that I discussed this with Jay earlier this year at the NAC. In both
+instances, the resolution was that our Office could and should handle the CVRA matter. I wanted to make sure
+that is still the case. Thanks
+From:
+To:
+Cc:
+(USAEO)
+Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2011 3:32 PM
+1. (USAFLS);
+(ODAG) (JMD);
+(USAFLM);
+(USAEO);
+(USAFLS);
+(USAEO);
+(USAEO)
+Subject: FORMAL NOTICE of Office-wide Recusal of Southern District of Florida (GCO File No. REC-11-4159)
+MEMORANDUM FOR:
+Wifredo A. Ferrer
+United States Attorney
+Southern District of Florida
+L (USAFLM)
+(USAEO); L
+First Assistant United States Attorney
+Southern District of Florida
+Robert E. O'Neill
+United States Attorney
+Middle District of Florida
+First Assistance United States Attorney
+Middle District of Florida
+THROUGH:
+General Counsel
+Executive Office for United States Attorneys
+FROM:
+RE:
+Executive Office for United States Attorneys
+Office-Wide Recusal of Southern District of Florida from the Investigation
+
+
+and Potential Prosecution of Mr. Jeffery Epstein (GCO File No. REC-11-4159)
+THIS IS FORMAL NOTICE that David
+,. Associate Deputy Attorney General (ADAG), approved the
+office-wide recusal of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (SDFL) from all
+matters, to include the investigation and potential prosecution, relating to Jeffrey Epstein's alleged sexual
+activities with minor females. The ADAG authorized this recusal in accordance with United States Attorney's
+Manual (USAM) 3-2.170 and United States Attorney's Procedures (USAP) 3-2.170.001 based upon existing
+conflicts of interest or the appearance of conflicts of interest pertaining to the matter.
+ADAG
+has assigned this matter to the United States Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Florida
+and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 515(a), has directed and authorized United States Attorney Robert E. O'Neill to
+conduct any kind of legal proceeding, civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings and proceedings before
+committing magistrate judges, which the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida is authorized
+by law to conduct regarding this matter. See USAP 3-2.170.001(6)(C)(2)(b).
+Each office should communicate directly with each other concerning the investigations related to this matter in
+accordance with the procedures outlined in USAP 3-2.170.001(6)(C)(2)(b)(3). The point of contact for the
+Middle District of Florida is Criminal Chief
+who can be contacted at
+The point of
+contact for the Southern District of Florida is First Assistant United States Attorney
+. who
+can be reached at
+All Assistant United States Attorneys subsequently assigned to this matter must be appointed as Specia
+Attorneys in order to appear on behalf of the government in the Southern District of Florida. See USAM, 3
+2.300 and USAP 3-2.170.001(Q.(C)2)(b). Please contact
+, EOUSA Personnel Staff, Policy and
+Special Programs Division, at
+to obtain the appointments.
+In accordance with USAP 3-2.170.001(6)(C)(2)(b)(3), any Special Attorney assigned the matter or case should
+sign any pleadings or documents using the signature block of the Middle District of Florida, with the addition of
+the Attorney General's name preceding that of the United States Attorney.
+If you have any questions relating to this recusal matter, please contact
+• General Counsel's Office, EOUSA, at
+Thank you.
+Thank you,
+General Counsel's Office
+Executive Office for United States Attorneys
+Phone:
+Fax:
+Email:
+- New Phone Number
+- New Fax Number
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f9f059bd82c232743b68c9e67d18ee98c3786300bafa3b5d1c5551e0f8f50b4e.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f9f059bd82c232743b68c9e67d18ee98c3786300bafa3b5d1c5551e0f8f50b4e.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ad28a7764b30ac71ad4abea04182b6cf80f24c8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f9f059bd82c232743b68c9e67d18ee98c3786300bafa3b5d1c5551e0f8f50b4e.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -72,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "f9f059bd82c232743b68c9e67d18ee98c3786300bafa3b5d1c5551e0f8f50b4e",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 6,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "dbc9609f408a259e913e1398dde92df92fcee990e80a788f85e36068a8f87044",
+  "output_sha256": "a521bed8a5095ca1c3dfaee45cb0187a400e6e7daf7cc7f4cfb7403be68b7e50",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f9fcb0dcc5f26cefc7e2b01813d7b0b74d230d3e9b71270cfde17ddd0de7e594.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f9fcb0dcc5f26cefc7e2b01813d7b0b74d230d3e9b71270cfde17ddd0de7e594.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1bc037557b1574842a71396671c9b1bb49f39a6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f9fcb0dcc5f26cefc7e2b01813d7b0b74d230d3e9b71270cfde17ddd0de7e594.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+From: "
+To:
+Subject: Transcripts
+Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2007 18:36:41 +0000
+Importance: Normal
+(USAFLS)"</O=USA/OU=FLS/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=
+HiL
+I - I talked tol
+1. and we would like to get the transcripts of
+you very much for interceding on our behalf.
+Have a very good weekend.
+and
+if possible. Thank
+Assistant U.S. Attorney
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f9fcb0dcc5f26cefc7e2b01813d7b0b74d230d3e9b71270cfde17ddd0de7e594.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f9fcb0dcc5f26cefc7e2b01813d7b0b74d230d3e9b71270cfde17ddd0de7e594.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5ef66417f60005f0413b0bdec096d35a63c31e01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/f9fcb0dcc5f26cefc7e2b01813d7b0b74d230d3e9b71270cfde17ddd0de7e594.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -12,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "f9fcb0dcc5f26cefc7e2b01813d7b0b74d230d3e9b71270cfde17ddd0de7e594",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "68b104f643f28c292ec4183da8e06f5e0e3590befca7c54dd6b5ae13cb6d2bb3",
+  "output_sha256": "52ceb4b69c2b08a1bdfe423fbd41512e442ed04df8e0e1967b31ffc5cf51867a",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fac39aabf3108747591bd7677fd44c2ca795d5e905bbf6e3bae0dfca58faa082.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fac39aabf3108747591bd7677fd44c2ca795d5e905bbf6e3bae0dfca58faa082.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..529af40ca090a1140d67c649177cfa2e6e27d6bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fac39aabf3108747591bd7677fd44c2ca795d5e905bbf6e3bae0dfca58faa082.md
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From: "emecfautosender@flsd.uscourts.gov" <cmecfautosender@flsd.uscourts.gov>
+To: "flsd_cmecf_notice@flsd.uscourts.gov" <flsd_cmecf_notice@flsd.uscourts.gov»
+Subject: Activity in Case 9:08-cv-80893-KAM Doe |. Epstein Order
+Date: Thu, 01 Apr 2010 18:45:00 +0000
+Importance: Normal
+This is an automatic e-mail message generated by the CM/ECF system. Please DO NOT RESPOND to this
+e-mail because the mail box is unattended.
+***NOTE TO PUBLIC ACCESS USERS*** Judicial Conference of the United States policy permits
+attorneys of record and parties in a case (including pro se litigants) to receive one free electronic copy of
+all documents filed electronically, if receipt is required by law or directed by the filer: PACER access fees
+apply to all other users. To avoid later charges, download a copy of each document during this first
+viewing. However, if the referenced document is a transcript, the free copy and 30 page limit do not apply.
+U.S. Distriet Court
+Southern District of Florida
+Notice of Electronic Filing
+The following transaction was entered on 4/1/2010 at 2:44 PM EDT and filed on 4/1/2010
+Case Name:
+Doe | Epstein
+Case Number:
+9:08-cv-80893-KAM
+Filer:
+Document Number: 136
+Docket Text:
+ORDER staying consideration of [135] Defendant's MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs Based
+on Dismissal With Prejudice of Plaintiff's RICO Claim filed by Jeffrey Epstein. Signed by Judge
+Kenneth A. Marra on 4/1/2010. (ir)
+9:08-cv-80893-KAM Notice has been electronically mailed to:
+
+
+Document description:Main Document
+Original filename:n/a
+Electronic document Stamp:
+[STAMP dcecfStamp_ID=1105629215 [Date-4/1/2010] [FileNumber=7426939-0]
+[0ef2f48baac657eddc701bb390201ala34cd348c908679ad47ffd413122128dedf9d
+2311497f187def20e881621f5845c7a717fef133d51aa3c69138ff5f672e]]
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fac39aabf3108747591bd7677fd44c2ca795d5e905bbf6e3bae0dfca58faa082.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fac39aabf3108747591bd7677fd44c2ca795d5e905bbf6e3bae0dfca58faa082.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dddf8a4dccb03b7f44fb31b1a5955c96cbb6122d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fac39aabf3108747591bd7677fd44c2ca795d5e905bbf6e3bae0dfca58faa082.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -24,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fac39aabf3108747591bd7677fd44c2ca795d5e905bbf6e3bae0dfca58faa082",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 2,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "ebfdb666e95ff6276d2b58810be4151a556144e9e44d330945ce171ba7d73bdf",
+  "output_sha256": "1b7336a60ebc49934fa3105dc4b4bfbda69adc1832b56ab179e72a5e461d1628",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fbb4dcd5ff963cf9b2dce8525646b05661972b2a74f027c59e3c85743d91a947.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fbb4dcd5ff963cf9b2dce8525646b05661972b2a74f027c59e3c85743d91a947.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3ed2a0e995a78c3713c65350f5b95cc3423a5645
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fbb4dcd5ff963cf9b2dce8525646b05661972b2a74f027c59e3c85743d91a947.md
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+From:
+(USAFLS)"
+To
+(USAFLS)"
+Subject: Letter
+Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2007 18:14:47 +0000
+Importance: Normal
+Attachments
+Target_Letter.wpd
+Hi Hon - Sorry to bother you. Can you take a look at this - just the bold portion towards the end of the letter -
+and let me know if you have any concerns about it?
+Thank you.
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fbb4dcd5ff963cf9b2dce8525646b05661972b2a74f027c59e3c85743d91a947.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fbb4dcd5ff963cf9b2dce8525646b05661972b2a74f027c59e3c85743d91a947.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..44383c34ca6ad21fa549dd70d088276d740c8760
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fbb4dcd5ff963cf9b2dce8525646b05661972b2a74f027c59e3c85743d91a947.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -12,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fbb4dcd5ff963cf9b2dce8525646b05661972b2a74f027c59e3c85743d91a947",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "2fcf9e5a8099948257836d08044f1855918b319e483b39fc09304f0fc84d050e",
+  "output_sha256": "ab41c4c46723e9a58886421245da2461bd1aabf46d94203d381b10a4a639e4b4",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc1fb08ccf8d88664c88453ddf69ddbd87ecf1c8c74b2748ba262ace8e3cf4ec.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc1fb08ccf8d88664c88453ddf69ddbd87ecf1c8c74b2748ba262ace8e3cf4ec.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9d33e07530552e820b409310ae2099e164d05851
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc1fb08ccf8d88664c88453ddf69ddbd87ecf1c8c74b2748ba262ace8e3cf4ec.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+Subject: Victims Rights Suit
+Date: Wed, 27 Oct 2010 23:34:05 +0000
+Importance: Normal
+Rather than throw myself over the ledge, I responded to an email from Brad Edwards. As of this particular
+moment, he has convinced Judge Cassell that the only thing they should file today is the response to the order to
+show cause. They will cool off tomorrow, get together dates when Judge Cassell can come to the District to
+leet, and will give us dates on Friday. Iknow Willy will be up here on Friday before I leave on vacation (since
+had to write part of his speech!), and kn
+and I can show him the documents that we have in storage here c
+the Epstein matter and maybe we can do another conference call as a group?
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc1fb08ccf8d88664c88453ddf69ddbd87ecf1c8c74b2748ba262ace8e3cf4ec.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc1fb08ccf8d88664c88453ddf69ddbd87ecf1c8c74b2748ba262ace8e3cf4ec.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..13c7793e76b344edce3ea412f8cfdb4ba0791dd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc1fb08ccf8d88664c88453ddf69ddbd87ecf1c8c74b2748ba262ace8e3cf4ec.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -12,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fc1fb08ccf8d88664c88453ddf69ddbd87ecf1c8c74b2748ba262ace8e3cf4ec",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "454d1081a0ec9e67673846b929696e47b3bcfcbc214e4da42a4d827d532e8588",
+  "output_sha256": "e75564cefc237b73789e9d485675481ec6381bf6a97057fff072d5fdc8c87f57",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc7c0dd74fec0417d32b1545d7689f87408b64bf2e9e6d2baa2f4c75a46ad2c4.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc7c0dd74fec0417d32b1545d7689f87408b64bf2e9e6d2baa2f4c75a46ad2c4.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7d518d347eac27d7e30dcc1afaf2c0a8442dba9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc7c0dd74fec0417d32b1545d7689f87408b64bf2e9e6d2baa2f4c75a46ad2c4.md
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+From: "
+To: "
+BCc: "
+(USAFLS)" <
+• (USAFLS)" <
+subject:
+Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2007 20:47:51 +0000
+Importance: Normal
+￾(USAFLS)"</O=USA/OU=FLS/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=[
+-I just spoke with
+- They are going to give me nothing. I just get to listen to the pitch and hear about
+how the girls are liars and drug users. And the earliest that they can come to see me is the week after our "goal
+Assistant U.S. Attorney
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc7c0dd74fec0417d32b1545d7689f87408b64bf2e9e6d2baa2f4c75a46ad2c4.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc7c0dd74fec0417d32b1545d7689f87408b64bf2e9e6d2baa2f4c75a46ad2c4.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cacefd9e5f6238069ce399f332ea0c354ad58a76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc7c0dd74fec0417d32b1545d7689f87408b64bf2e9e6d2baa2f4c75a46ad2c4.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -12,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fc7c0dd74fec0417d32b1545d7689f87408b64bf2e9e6d2baa2f4c75a46ad2c4",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "c3308abae0094a3d09ddfd3a27349e8ca5d6f643510bead2c5fd48aa359a8501",
+  "output_sha256": "bf419abbeb4cc9803053f658da5594b69c746fe661bf75d9eb2d67a916045563",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc865bb701b5dda86a3e20a3d3a637ee5b7526c5f1e6acaea8bda6f52497d42d.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc865bb701b5dda86a3e20a3d3a637ee5b7526c5f1e6acaea8bda6f52497d42d.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ddd33158de593e977e6e35d8d3c171303789754c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc865bb701b5dda86a3e20a3d3a637ee5b7526c5f1e6acaea8bda6f52497d42d.md
@@ -0,0 +1,723 @@
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 1 of 27
+UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
+Case No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson
+JANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2
+V.
+UNITED STATES
+JANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2'S RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING IN
+SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE OF ROY BLACK, MARTIN WEINBERG.
+AND JAY LEFKOWITZ
+COME NOW Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 (also referred to as "the victims"), by and
+through undersigned counsel, to respond in opposition to the supplemental briefing of defense
+attorneys Roy Black, Martin Weinberg, and Jay Lefkowitz to intervene in this case under Fed. R.
+Civ. P. 24(a) (DE 94) ("supplemental briefing").
+The victims continue to oppose the defense attorneys' motion to intervene in this civil
+CVRA enforcement action (DE 56) for all the reasons that they have articulated in their previous
+opposition (DE 78). Yet even though the defense attorneys have not been permitted to intervene,
+they have proceeded to brief the merits of arguments that they would present if the Court were to
+grant intervention, including most recently new "supplemental" briefing on the discoverability of
+plea negotiation correspondence.
+While the victims continue to believe that their arguments
+against the defense attorneys intervening are meritorious, out of an abundance of caution and to
+expedite this case, the victims now respond to the defense attorneys' new claims on the merits.
+1
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 2 of 27
+The defense attorneys claim that the victims cannot use at trial (or even discover
+preliminarily) correspondence between them and the U.S. Attorney's Office arranging a highly
+unusual and secretive non-prosecution agreement. The victims have already explained at length
+why the correspondence between Epstein's lawyers and government prosecutors is simply not
+confidential material to which any kind of privilege or other protection could attach. See Jane
+Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's Response to Motion to Intervene (DE 78) at 4-6. Perhaps
+recognizing the strength of the victims' response, the defense attorneys now raise a new
+"supplemental" argument that a privilege somehow follows from either (1) Federal Rule of
+Evidence 410 or (2) a purported "common law privilege" for "plea negotiations" that the
+attorneys ask the Court to create under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. The defense arguments
+are meritless for multiple, independent reasons.
+With regard to Rule 410, the defense attorneys' efforts to invoke Rule 410 is simply
+premature. The rule bars only admissibility of information at trial, not collection of information
+through discovery. Accordingly, discovery is proper now and admissibility issues can be sorted
+out later.
+Second, this Court previously ruled in the civil case against Epstein that Rule 410 does
+not bar discovery of the correspondence. Epstein is collaterally estopped from re-litigating this
+same issue.
+Third, in any event, Rule 410 is simply inapplicable. The plain language of the rule
+covers admissibility into evidence of "any statement made in the course of plea discussions with
+an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty." Fed. R. Evid.
+2
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 3 of 27
+410(4) (emphasis added). Epstein's plea discussions did result in a plea of guilty, and
+accordingly the rule does not apply.
+Fourth, the victims intend to use the correspondence to prove that the Government
+violated the CVRA violations and that various remedies are accordingly appropriate. Because
+Rule 410 only bars evidence from being admitted into evidence "against the defendant" who
+participated in plea discussions, the victims are (at the very minimum) entitled to obtain and use
+the correspondence in litigation with the Government.
+Fifth, Rule 410 makes plea bargaining statements admissible "in any proceeding wherein
+another statement made in the course of the same plea discussions has been introduced and the
+statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it." Fed. R. Evid. 410. The
+Government has made clear that it intends to introduce considerable evidence about the course of
+plea discussions in this case in support of its position. As a matter of fairness, the victims are
+therefore entitled to discover evidence from the Government that might support their position.
+In addition to their Rule 410 argument, the defense attorneys quickly advance a fallback
+argument - that the Court should create a heretofore unrecognized "common law privilege"
+under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. This claim also lacks merit.
+First, the Court cannot create a "common law" plea bargaining privilege that would
+overturn limits that Congress crafted in Rule 410. Congress extended protection only to plea
+discussions "which do not result in a plea of guilty." Fed. R. Evid. 410(4) (emphasis added).
+Whatever the Court's "common law" rulemaking authority maybe, it certainly does not extend to
+trumping specific language in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 4 of 27
+Second, no such "common law" privilege exists. While the defense attorneys frequently
+allude to "constitutional considerations" that supposedly undergird plea bargain, the simple fact
+remains that "there is no constitutional right to plea bargain." Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S.
+545, 561 (1977). The Court should not exalt to privileged status negotiations that merely serve
+the administrative convenience of the parties over the important value of truth seeking.
+The Government has also filed a response to the supplemental briefing of the defense
+attorneys (DE 100), in which it claims that its plea bargaining correspondence with Epstein's
+lawyers is confidential work product material. The Government's arguments are without merit
+for three reasons. First, as the victims have previously explained, all the correspondence is
+discoverable because the CVRA requires the Government to makes its "best efforts" to support
+the victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1). Second, the CVRA bars the Government from erecting an
+adversarial work product privilege against the victims when they are attempting to secure
+information to protect their CVRA rights. Third, entirely apart from the CVRA, work product
+protections only extend to confidential materials. If the Government wishes to litigate this issue,
+it must prepare a privilege log. But the correspondence with defense attorneys is simply not
+confidential and therefore not protected by the work product doctrine.
+I.
+THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND
+EPSTEIN IS NOT PROTECTED FROM DISCOVERY BY FEDERAL
+RULE OF EVIDENCE 410.
+The defense attorneys claim that, under Fed. R. Evid. 410, the victims cannot seek
+discovery of plea bargaining correspondence between them and the Government. Their
+arguments are unavailing.
+A.
+RULE 410 DOES NOT BAR DISCOVERY OF THE CORRESPONDENCE.
+4
+EFTA00205731R
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 5 of 27
+The defense attorneys' reliance on Rule 410 is simply premature. By its plain terms, the
+rule bars only admissibility of information at trial against the defendant who made the plea - the
+Rule does not apply to the discovery phase at all. See Fed. R. Evid. 410 (barring use of certain
+"evidence" in a "civil or criminal proceeding"). Accordingly, the victims can discover the
+correspondence now and the court can sort out trial admissibility issues later.
+B.
+EPSTEIN IS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM RELITIGATING
+THE APPLICABILITY OF RULE 410.
+As the Court is well aware, the issue of whether the correspondence was somehow
+protected by Rule 410 was thoroughly litigated by the defense attorneys' client (Jeffrey Epstein)
+more than a year ago, and Epstein's arguments were more appropriate in the previous case
+(where he was actually a party to the litigation and the information discovered would likely be
+admitted against him). This Court rejected Epstein's arguments against disclosure in that case as
+well, including his argument that Rule 410 blocked disclosure. See, e.g., Jane Doe v. Epstein,
+doc. #462 at 10, Case No. 9:08-CV-80119-KAM (Feb. 4, 2010).
+The defense attorneys now propose to relitigate the very same issue of Rule 410's
+applicability in this case. Their effort to revisit the issue is barred by the doctrine of collateral
+estoppel because: "(1) the issue at stake is identical to the one involved in the prior proceeding;
+(2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the determination of the issue was
+critical and necessary to the earlier judgment; and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel
+is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding." In re
+MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 644 F.3d 1160, 1202 (11" Cir. 2011).
+5
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 6 of 27
+C.
+RULE 410 DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE PLEA
+DISCUSSIONS LEAD TO A GUILTY PLEA.
+In any event, at any ultimate proceeding in this case, Rule 410 will simply be
+inapplicable. Because "Rule 410 is an exception to the general principle that all relevant
+evidence is admissible at trial, see Fed.R.Evid. 402, its limitations are not to be read broadly."
+United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 2005). The plain language of the rule is
+narrowly written to cover only a "statement made in the course of plea discussions with an
+attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty." Fed. R. Evid.
+410(4) (emphasis added). Obviously, a prerequisite to applying the rule is a case where no plea
+of guilty resulted. See, e.g., United States v. Ruhkowsi, 814 F.2d 594, 596 (11" Cir. 1987)
+(discussing application of the rule in situations where "plea negotiations ... broke down" and
+case went to trial); United States v. Gonzalez, 608 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S.
+Ct. 952 (2011) (allowing use of plea discussions against a defendant who pleaded guilty because
+Rule 410(4) "makes admissions in plea bargaining inadmissible only if the plea bargaining either
+does 'not result in a plea of guilty''); United States v. Kerik, 531 F.Supp.2d 610, 618 (S.D.N.Y.
+2008) (Rule 410 "only excludes statements made in plea discussions that do not result in a plea
+of guilty. As such, the rule does not apply here because Mr. Kerik eventually pleaded guilty.").
+Here, of course, Epstein's plea discussions did result in a plea of guilty. As the Court is well
+aware, Epstein engaged in extensive discussions with the U.S. Attorney's Office in an effort to
+obtain a non-prosecution agreement. And ultimately he did obtain such an agreement - in
+exchange for pleading guilty to two state offenses.
+6
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 7 of 27
+The terms of the non-prosecution agreement the victims are challenging make it quite
+clear that Epstein's plea discussions "resulted] in a guilty plea." The agreement recites that
+"Epstein seeks to resolve globally his state and federal criminal liability and Epstein understands
+and acknowledges that, in exchange for the benefits provided by this agreement, he agrees to
+comply with its terms, including undertaking certain actions with the State Attorney's Office."
+Non-Prosecution Agreement at 2. The agreement goes on to specifically provide Epstein shall
+plead guilty to two offenses:
+"Epstein shall plead guilty ... to the Indictment as currently pending against him
+in the 15" Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County (Case No. 2006-cf-
+009495AXXXMB) charging one (1) count of solicitation of prostitution, in
+violation of Fl. Stat. § 796.07. In addition, Epstein shall plead guilty to an
+Information filed by the States Attorney's Office charging Epstein with an offense
+that requires him to register as a sex offender,, that is, the solicitation of minors to
+engage in prostitution, in violation of Florida Statutes Section 796.03."
+Id. at 3 (emphases added). And, as the Court knows, Epstein did ultimately plead guilty to those
+two Florida offenses pursuant to the agreement.' Accordingly, Rule 410 gives Epstein no ability
+to block the victims from discovery and use of his attorneys' plea discussions because those
+discussions "result[ed] in a guilty plea."2
+• Rule 410 draw no distinction between pleas in federal court and pleas in state court.
+See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 954 F.2d 1352, 1360 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying rule to
+discussions over "withdrawn state plea"); United States v. Kerik, 531 F.Supp.2d 610 (S.D.N.Y.
+2008) ("Rule 410 applies in federal proceedings to statements made in connection with prior
+state pleas"); see also United States v. Holmes, 794 F.2d 345, 349 (8th Cir.1986) (permitting the
+admission of a guilty plea from state court in a federal proceeding).
+" Because Epstein's lawyers are claiming that the correspondence is protected by Rule
+410, they bear the burden of establishing all necessary facts for the application of the rule. If
+Epstein's lawyers claim that the plea discussions somehow did not result in a plea of guilty, the
+victims request a hearing under Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) to dispute this preliminary question of fact.
+7
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 8 of 27
+Rather than address this obvious point, Epstein's lawyers engage in subterfuge. In their
+supplemental pleading, the lawyers claim that the correspondence with the U.S. Attorney's
+Office is protected by "the express language of Rule 410." DE 94 at 3. Yet, they cleverly
+paraphrase the "express language" of the rule in a way that avoids quoting the critical limiting
+language that restricts Rule 410 to discussions "which do not result in a plea of guilty." Fed. R.
+Evid. 410(4). See DE 94 at 4-5 (discussion of Rule 410 that fails to discuss the limitation of the
+rule to negotiations "result[ing] in a plea of guilty"). The express language of the Rule does not
+prevent the victims from introducing the correspondence in support of their claims about plea
+discussions concerning Epstein because he pled guilty.?
+D.
+RULE 410 DOES NOT APPLY HERE BECAUSE THE VICTIMS WILL
+USE THE CORRESPONDENCE AGAINST (IF ANYONE) THE
+GOVERNMENT.
+Rule 410 is also inapplicable here because it would, at most, bar admissibility of the
+correspondence into evidence "against the defendant who made the plea" - i.e., against Jeffrey
+Epstein. But the victims intend to obtain and use the correspondence to seek relief from the
+Government. Accordingly, the Rule cannot be used to bar the victims from obtaining discovery
+of this information.
+By its plain terms, Rule 410 only bars the admission of evidence "against the defendant
+who made the plea." The purpose underlying this rule to "promote negotiations by permitting
+defendants to talk to prosecutors without sacrificing their ability to defend themselves if no
+disposition is reached." United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir.2005) (emphases
+3 The express language of Rule 410 also makes clear that "derivative evidence" is never
+excluded from a proceeding. See United States v. Ruhkowsi, 814 F.2d 594, 599 (11' Cir. 1987).
+8
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 9 of 27
+added). Thus, the Rule has no application where the discussions are being used not against a
+defendant but rather against the Government. See United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 691 (2d
+Cir. 1990).
+Here, the victims intend to use the correspondence against any argument the Government
+may make in this civil action seeking to enforce their CVRA rights.* They intend to use the
+correspondence to prove initially that the Government violated their rights. Having proven a
+violation of their rights, they will then seek various remedies concerning the Government. To
+provide a straightforward example, one (quite modest) remedy that they will ask the Court to
+impose on the Government is an order directing the U.S. Attorney's Office write a letter of
+apology to the victims for deliberately violating their rights. Clearly the victims' use of the
+correspondence to prove that the Government did not afford them their rights and that such a
+remedy is appropriate lies outside Rule 410's ambit.
+Of course, the victims in this case seek far more than a letter of apology from the
+Government. As they have made clear throughout this litigation, they also intend to ask for the
+Court to impose (among other things) the one remedy that will most directly respond to the
+Government's violation of their rights: invalidation of the non-prosecution agreement so that
+they can confer with the Government about the possibility of actually prosecuting Epstein for the
+sex offenses he committed against them. Epstein's lawyers claim that any such use would be a
+use "against" the defendant and therefore covered by this language in Rule 410.5 This claim,
+* As explained in Section III.B below, the victims do not believe they stand in an
+adversarial posture with the Government, as Congress has obligated the Government to use its
+"best efforts" to protect the CVRA rights of crime victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1).
+5 Notably, the Government does not argue in its pleading that any use of the information
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 10 of 27
+however, assumes that the Rule 410 bars every court action that might ultimately have some
+collateral, harmful effect on a defendant. But Rule 410 is much more narrowly drafted -
+forbidding not uses that may eventually harm the defendant, but instead more narrowly
+admissibility of plea negotiations into evidence "against" the defendant in a "civil or criminal
+proceeding." At this point, Epstein is not a party to the CVRA proceeding, and therefore it is
+not possible for any use of this correspondence to equate to forbidden admissibility of evidence
+"against" him. For this reason as well, the rule is inapplicable.
+E.
+RULE 410 DOES NOT APPLY HERE BECAUSE OTHER STATEMENTS
+WILL BE INTRODUCED AND, IN FAIRNESS, THE
+CORRESPONDENCE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS WELL.
+Rule 410 will also ultimately be inapplicable at trial because it contains a "completeness"
+exception. Even for plea bargain discussions protected by Rule 410, a plea bargain statement is
+admissible "in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the same plea
+discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered
+contemporaneously with it." Fed. R. Evid. 410. The Government has already made it quite clear
+in its pleadings that it will introduce certain statements about the course of the plea negotiations.
+Rule 410 thus entitles the victims to respond by introducing other aspects of the plea
+negotiations.
+Rule 410's completeness rule requires the court to determine whether, when one
+statement about plea discussions is introduced, other statements ought to in fairness be
+introduced as well. While it is too early to say for certain what arguments the Government will
+make at any ultimate proceeding to determine whether it violated the victims CVRA rights, from
+against it would somehow violate Rule 410. See U.S. Response to Supplemental Briefing at 3.
+10
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 11 of 27
+all indications the Government intends to introduce many statements about the timing and course
+of plea discussions. For example, in its response to the victims" summary judgment motion, the
+Government makes clear that it intends to argue that it properly conferred with the victims over
+an 18 month period of time. See U.S. Response to Jane Doe #1 and #2's Motion for Finding
+Violations of the CVRA at 37 (arguing that between August 2006 and January 2008 government
+prosecutors and agents "went above and beyond the minimum statutory requirements" in
+conferring with victims about plea negotiations). Similarly, the Government intends to dispute
+that it sent false notices to the victims about the case being "under investigation" because plea
+discussions had not reached a final conclusion at that time. Id. at 41 (arguing that "[d]uring the
+time that Epstein was challenging the NPA, the investigation continued and agents were able to
+conduct" witness interviews).
+The Government also intends to take the position that it
+reasonably stopped making notifications to the victims, because if Epstein did not plead guilty
+and there was a trial, Epstein would cross-examine the victims about payments they would have
+received pursuant to the non-prosecution agreement. Id. at 42.
+It is simply unfair for the Government to be able to pick and choose from all the events
+surrounding the plea negotiations only those that support its case, while depriving the victims of
+the opportunity to even discover information that might bolster their case. See Frontier Ref., Inc.
+v. Gorman-Rupp Co., Inc., 136 F.3d 695, 704 (10th Cir. 1998) (a litigant cannot use privilege "as
+both a sword and shield by selectively using the privileged documents to prove a point but then
+invoking the privilege to prevent an opponent from challenging the assertion."). And Rule 410
+in particular blocks such a one-sided approach. Instead, under the Rule, the victims are entitled
+to show the full course of plea discussions at any ultimate hearing in this case about whether the
+11
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 12 of 27
+Government violated their CVRA rights. And the victims are certainly entitled, at this earlier
+juncture in the case, to obtain all relevant information that they might ultimately be able to use to
+disprove the Government's defenses. °
+Il.
+THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND
+EPSTEIN IS NOT PROTECTED FROM DISCOVERY BY SOME KIND
+OF "COMMON LAW" PLEA BARGAINING PRIVILEGE.
+For all the reasons just given, Rule 410 does not bar the victims from discovering
+correspondence about how the non-prosecution agreement was reached. Perhaps recognizing the
+weakness of this argument, Epstein's lawyers present the fallback claim that some sort of
+"common law" privilege for "plea bargaining" bars discovery into the correspondence. This
+argument, too, lacks any merit.
+A. The Courts Cannot Create a "Common Law" Privilege That Overrules the Specific
+Contours of Rule 410.
+Epstein's lawyers ask the Court to invent some sort of new "common law" privilege
+under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. Rule 501 does allow federal courts some opportunity to
+" Additionally, the correspondence may become important if the Court allows Epstein to
+make a belated entry into the case and raise various defenses. Epstein's legions of lawyers car
+be expected to advance all manner of legal and factual arguments - even claims that are simply
+untrue. For example, in a desperate attempt to avoid registering as a convicted sex offender in
+New York, Epstein recently had his attorneys represent to the New York County Supreme Court
+that "the prosecutor in Florida conducted a full investigation ... and determined that the only
+case that she could present to the grand jury was this [single] indictment for a non registrable
+offense …..." People of New York v. Epstein, No. 30129/2010 (N.Y. Cnty. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18,
+2011), hearing transcript at 9 (transcript attached to his pleading as Exhibit A). Epstein's
+attorneys also - quite astonishingly - stated "there are no real victims" in Florida. Id. And in
+what can only be described as a false statement to the New York court, Epstein's lawyers stated:
+"there has been through the course of the last few years some civil ligation ... involving these
+matters and we now have sworn testimony in evidence from the complainants themselves
+disclaiming much of what appears in the [Florida] police report." Id. at 14. Given Epstein's
+penchant for bending the truth, the victims are entitled to all the correspondence as a safeguard
+against him advancing similar inaccurate arguments in this case.
+12
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 13 of 27
+create new privileges. The Supreme Court has been clear, however, that courts must "not create
+and apply an evidentiary privilege unless it "promotes sufficiently important interests to
+outweigh the need for probative evidence.
+Inasmuch as testimonial exclusionary rules and
+privileges contravene the fundamental principle that the public has a right to every man's
+evidence, any
+such privilege must be strictly construed." University of Pennsylvania v.
+E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (internal quotations omitted).
+While Epstein's lawyers do not cite the controlling legal standard for creating a privilege
+in this Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit has strongly cautioned that "the rule in this circuit is that a
+new privilege should only be recognized where there is a 'compelling justification.''
+International Horizons, Inc. v. The Committee of Unsecured Creditors, 689 F.2d 996, 1004 (11th
+Cir. 1982) (quoting In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.1981)). The Eleventh Circuit has
+explained that this stringent rule arises from the federal courts' disfavor of privileges and from
+the policy of construing privileges narrowly, so as to protect the "search for truth." 689 F.2d at
+1003 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
+Here the Court has strong reason to be skeptical of a new plea bargaining privilege. The
+transparent purpose behind Epstein's lawyers' "common law" effort is to avoid the specific
+limitations contained in Rule 410. See Sections I.C through I.E, supra (discussing language in
+Rule 410 requiring that the negotiations not have "result[ed] in a plea of guilty," that the
+negotiations be introduced "against" the defendant in a "proceeding." and that fairness not
+require "contemporaneous" introduction of all aspects of the negotiations). But the Supreme
+Court has made clear that courts must be "especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area
+where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns but has not
+13
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 14 of 27
+provided the privilege itself. The balancing of conflicting interests of this type is particularly a
+legislative function." University of Pennsylvania v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (internal
+quotation omitted). The Court should not use the general provisions of Rule 501 to effectively
+supersede the detailed limitations in Rule 410.
+B. No "Common Law" Privilege for Plea Bargaining Exists.
+Even if the Court were willing to entertain the idea that it should embark on an exercise
+of "common law" privilege making, no common law privilege exists for plea bargaining. While
+the defense attorneys frequently allude to "constitutional considerations" that supposedly
+undergird plea bargaining, the simple fact remains that "there is no constitutional right to plea
+bargain." Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977); accord United States v. Barrentine,
+591 F.2d 1069, 1078 (5" Cir. 1979). To be sure, the courts tolerate plea bargaining because it
+helps reduce the workload of congested criminal dockets. But common law rulemaking should
+not be used as an excuse to exalt negotiations that merely serve administrative convenience over
+the far more important search for truth.?
+Perhaps recognizing that tenuousness of raising plea bargaining over truth-seeking
+values, Epstein's lawyers attempt to repackage their proposed privilege as a "common law
+mediation" privilege. Supplemental Briefing at 16. There is no need for such a privilege in the
+Southern District of Florida to protect true mediation. A local rule already protects
+confidentiality in court-annexed mediation. See Local Rule 16.2(G)(2). Epstein's lawyers,
+To be sure, as the Government points out, effective defense counsel should always
+explore plea bargaining opportunities. See Gov't Resp. at 7 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130
+S.C.t 1473, 1485 (2010)). But this is a far cry from proving there is a "right" to plea bargaining
+or that protecting plea bargaining opportunities is more important than, for example, protecting
+congressionally-mandated crime victims' rights conferred in the CVRA.
+14
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 15 of 27
+however, do not cite this rule, because they know their plea bargaining discussions with
+government attorneys fall outside its protections.
+Epstein's lawyers also implicitly concede that there is no well-established "common law"
+support for a mediation privilege, as they are able to cite only a smattering of cases (three in total
+over the last 32 years) recognizing such a privilege. None of these cases are from the Eleventh
+Circuit, which (unlike other jurisdictions) requires a strong showing of "compelling" justification
+before a new privilege can be created. International Horizons, Inc. v. The Committee of
+Unsecured Creditors, 689 F.2d 996, 1004 (11th Cir. 1982) ("compelling" justification required to
+interfere with the search for truth in federal cases). Moreover, none of the three cases cited
+involve plea bargaining in criminal cases - presumably because that subject is already directly
+covered in detail in Rule 410. Finally, these cases involve situations where a court thought it
+important to create "confidentiality and trust between participants in a mediation proceeding."
+Epstein's Supplemental Briefing at 17 (citing Folb v. Motion Picture Ind. Pension & Health
+Plans, 16 F.Supp.2d 1164, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (emphasis added)). Here, of course, the parties
+to the plea discussion (Epstein and the Government) are attempting not to create a privilege
+between themselves, but rather to block third parties harmed by their actions from discovering
+what they have done.
+Make no mistake about the sweeping position that Epstein's attorneys are advancing:
+They claim that the defense attorneys and the Government can conspire between themselves to
+arrange for secret plea discussions in violation of congressionally-mandated crime victims' rights
+in the CVRA and then block the crime victims from obtaining the information that would prove
+the violation that has happened. Such a privilege would, among other things, directly conflict
+15
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 16 of 27
+with the statutory command of Congress that crime victims must be "treated with fairness," 18
+U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8), a statute which obviously trumps any claim by a convicted sex offender that
+his efforts to work out a secret plea deal with the Government is somehow entitled to greater
+protection. For all these reasons, the Court should reject the defense attorney's suggestion that it
+should invent a new "mediation privilege" to apply to the plea bargaining discussions in this
+case.
+III.
+CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SECTORS ANDERSE
+ATTORNEYS.
+The Government's response to the defense attorney's supplemental briefing (DE 100)
+itself raises new issues about whether the victims will be able to obtain the correspondence (or,
+indeed, any information from the Government). After the Court ruled that the victims were
+entitled to discover relevant information (DE 99 at 10), the victims asked the Government to
+voluntarily provide them with at least some documents. In response, however, the Government
+told the victims that all of the relevant information — including presumably the correspondence
+— is privileged from production and that the Court will need to determine, "on a document-bydocument basis" (Gov't Resp. at 1) whether any of the materials in the Government's possession
+falls outside the work product doctrine. The Court should reject the Government's sweeping
+claim that all correspondence (and other information) is protected by the work product doctrine.
+A. The Court Should Now Grant the Victim's Still-Pending Motion for an
+Order Directing the U.S. Attorney's Office Not to Suppress Relevant
+Evidence.
+In its order allowing discovery, the Court "reserve[d] ruling" (DE 99 atll) on the
+victims' Motion for an Order Directing the U.S. Attorney's Office Not to Withhold Relevant
+16
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 17 of 27
+Evidence. The vietims respectfully renew their motion (DE 50). Of course, if the Court decided
+to grant this motion, it would obviate the need for any kind of "document-by-document" review
+of the relevant information that the Government continues to withhold.
+B. The CVRA Requires the Government to Work Cooperatively to Protect the
+Victims' Rights and Thus Bars the Government from Interposing an
+Adversarial Work Product Defense.
+The Government argues that the work-product doctrine it is asserting prevents the victims
+from obtaining any information relevant to their CVRA claim. In doing so, the Government
+fundamentally misunderstands its role under the CVRA. The Government seems to believe that
+it stands in an adversarial posture to the victims and therefore it can simply interpose the same
+sorts of litigation barriers it would deploy against a criminal defendant seeking discovery of
+Government documents. But the CVRA does not place victims and the Government on opposite
+sides of CVRA enforcement. Instead, the Act obligates the Government to work together with
+victims to enforce CVRA rights. In such a cooperative world, the Government cannot erect a
+"work product" barrier to CVRA enforcement.
+The CVRA specifically directs Justice Department prosecutors to make their "best
+efforts" to protect victims' rights. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) commands that "[olfficers and
+employees of the Department of Justice and other departments and agencies of the United States
+engaged in the ... prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims
+notified of, and accorded, the rights described in [the CVRA]" (emphases added). Underscoring
+this "best efforts" obligation, the CVRA even allows prosecutors to bring their own actions to
+enforce victims' CVRA rights.
+Title 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(1) provides: "The crime victims ...
+and the attorney for the Government may assert the rights described in [the CVRA]" (emphasis
+17
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 18 of 27
+added). Of course, the attorney for the Government can never bring an action on behalf of a
+criminal defendant. Thus, unlike when they prosecute criminal defendants, Justice Department
+prosecutors are statutorily obligated to work with crime victims.
+In light of the fact that Congress requires prosecutors and victims to cooperate to protect
+CVRA rights, in cases (such as this one) seeking to enforce CVRA rights the Government cannot
+raise adversarial work-product objections under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Those
+rules govern the antagonistic relationship inherent in a criminal prosecution. With regard to
+discovery, the rules only cover discovery "upon a defendant's request." Fed. R. Crim. P.
+16(a)(1) (emphasis added). The discovery rules allow a criminal defendant to obtain limited
+information from the Government, including specifically his confession, his prior criminal
+record, tangible objects (i.e., contraband or other evidence), and reports of scientific tests. Fed.
+R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A)-(F). Against that backdrop, the rule cited by the Government - Fed. R.
+Crim. P. 16(a)(2) - prevents a criminal defendant from forcing disclosure of "internal
+government documents made by an attorney for the government or other government agent in
+connection with investigating or prosecuting the case." In this case, though, it is not a criminal
+"defendant" trying to obtain information in an effort to obtain an acquittal, but rather plaintiff
+crime victims seeking information to enforce their CVRA rights. Accordingly, by its plain terms,
+Rule 16 simply doesn't apply. And even if it somehow did apply, it only covers documents
+made "in connection with investigating or prosecuting the case" - i.e., documents about the
+"case" in which the discovery request is made (here Jane Doe #1 and #2 v. United States). Here,
+the victims are seeking (among other things) correspondence about an earlier case - i.e.,
+documents related to the Jeffrey Epstein investigation and non-prosecution in which the
+18
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 19 of 27
+Government violated their CVRA rights. For this reason as well, the criminal rule simply
+doesn't apply.
+Perhaps recognizing that it will not be able to avoid producing documents under the
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Government immediately cites the Federal Rules of
+Civil Procedural as well. Gov't Resp. at 5 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B)). But if the
+Government is going to seek the civil rules" protections, it also needs to satisfy those rules'
+burdens.
+For example, despite repeated requests from the victims spanning several years, the
+Government has yet to even make any initial disclosures under the civil rules. See Fed. R. Civ.
+P. 26(a)(1)(A) ("a party must, without await awaiting a discovery request, provided to the other
+parties" various things relevant to the case). The victims long ago made their initial disclosures
+to the Government under the civil rules, but the Government continues to refuse to reciprocate.
+If the Government is going to maintain that the civil rules operate to give it certain discovery
+protections, it must satisfy all of its discovery obligations as well.
+In any event, as with the criminal rules, the civil rules are designed to create protections
+in an adversarial setting. The rule cited by the Government - Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A) -
+provides that "ordinarily ... a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are
+prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative...."
+This privilege "does not exist to protect a confidential relationship, but rather to promote the
+adversary system by safeguarding the fruits of an attorney's trial preparations from the discovery
+attempts of the opponent." U.S. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir.
+1980) (emphasis added).
+While the victims have listed the government in the caption of this
+enforcement action, they certainly do not regard the Government as their "opponent" - and under
+19
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 20 of 27
+the regime created by the CVRA, prosecutors and victims are not "opponents" that would create
+the proper circumstances for a work product privilege. As explained above, the CVRA requires
+the Government to use its "best efforts" not to oppose crime victims but rather to "accord" them
+their rights under the CVRA. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1).
+Underscoring the conclusion that work product does not apply is the nature of the
+correspondence at issue in these pleadings. The correspondence is between prosecutors and
+defense attorneys negotiating a plea arrangement. It was, at most, prepared in anticipation of a
+criminal prosecution being filed by the Government against Epstein - in other words, a
+contemplated criminal prosecution that would have been styled United States v. Epstein.
+Whatever work product claim would exist in that case, it does not extend to this - entirely
+separate - civil case.
+See Hendrick v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 916 F.Supp. 256,
+259 (W.D.N.Y.,1996) (no work product existed because "the documents sought "were not
+prepared in anticipation of this particular litigation'" (citing Bartley v. Isuzu Motors, 158 F.R.D.
+165, 167 (D.Colo. 1994) (emphasis added)). For all these reasons, the Court should give effect to
+the cooperative structure created in the CVRA and flatly reject the Government's suggestion that
+it can interpose an adversarial work product claim to block the victims from discovering
+correspondence with Epstein's defense attorneys.
+C. If the Court Allows the Government to Raise Work Product Claims, then the
+Government Must Prepare a Detailed Privilege Log and Bear the Burden of
+Establishing Its Position on a Document-by-Document Basis - a Burden It
+Cannot Meet With Regard to the Correspondence.
+If the Government is allowed to raise a work product claim, the procedures associated
+with such claims are familiar. As the Government concedes, it would be required to prove
+20
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 21 of 27
+protection on a "document-by-document" basis. Gov't Resp. at 1. The way such documentspecific issues are litigated is through a privilege log. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 26(b)(5)(A)(ii). The
+Court's Local Rules spell out requirements for a privilege log. The Government should describe
+(among other things) the type of document, the general subject matter of the document, the date
+of the document, and the author and addressee of the document or correspondence. Local Rule
+26(g) (3).
+The privilege log must be detailed enough to allow the victims to respond to the
+Government's assertion of privilege. See, e.g., Avgoustis v. Shinseki, 639 F.3d 1340, 1345-46
+(Fed. Cir. 2011) ("privilege logs were insufficiently detailed when they merely stated "Fax:
+Whistleblower article" or "Summary of Enclosures" and justified the privilege by characterizing
+the documents as "attorney-client communication[s]" without explanation.") (citing United
+States v. Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996)).*
+Once the Government has cataloged the documents in its privilege log, it then bears the
+burden of proving the applicability of the privilege. See In re Professionals Direct Ins. Co., 578
+F.3d 432 (6" Cir. 2009); Boogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003). The victims
+will, of course, later respond in detail to any specific assertions the Government makes.? But it
+is obvious that the Government cannot assert a valid work product privilege for any of the
+correspondence it carried on with defense attorneys for Epstein.
+& Similarly, if the defense attorneys are allowed to intervene in this case to assert
+privilege, they must then provide a privilege log on a document-by-document basis.
+" In briefly responding here to arguments raised by the Government, the victims are not
+waiving any responses they might later make to specifically-asserted work product claims. In
+particular, on a document-by-document basis, the victims reserve their right to argue that the
+documents are not work product materials and, in any event, that they have a "substantial need
+for the materials to prepare [their] case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain thel]
+substantial equivalent by other means." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii).
+21
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 22 of 27
+For starters, the issue of whether the correspondence was somehow protected against
+discovery was thoroughly litigated by Epstein more than a year ago. This Court rejected
+Epstein's arguments against disclosure. Jane Doe v. Epstein, doc. #462, Case No. 9:08-CV-
+80119-KAM (Feb. 4, 2010).'° That ruling by the Court then is, to say the least, persuasive
+authority on the Government's identical argument here.
+Moreover, correspondence with an adversary in a criminal prosecution is not the kind of
+confidential information that is even arguably covered by work product. Work product covers
+only "reports, memoranda, and other internal government documents made by an attorney for
+the government ... in connection with ... prosecuting the case." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2)
+(emphasis added); see also Fed. R. Civ. 26(b)(3)(A). Correspondence between prosecutors and
+defense attorneys is simply not an "internal" matter that is subject to a work product protection.
+Correspondence with an adversary also waives any work-product coverage.
+"The
+privilege derived from the work-product doctrine is not absolute. Like other qualified privileges,
+it may be waived." United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975). "Disclosure to an
+adversary waives the work product protection as to items actually disclosed, even where
+disclosure occurs in settlement." In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program
+Litigation, 860 F.2d 844, 846 (8'" Cir. 1988). Thus, "[clourts will imply waiver when a party
+1'' In Jane Doe v. Epstein, doc. #462, Case No. 9:08-CV-80119-KAM (Feb. 4, 2010)
+(denying defense objection to Request for Production #10), the Court ordered Epstein to produce
+"all correspondence between you and your attorneys and state or federal law enforcement or
+prosecutors." It now appears to the victims that, in clear contravention of this Court's discovery
+orders, Epstein's attorneys secretly withheld significant correspondence involving plea
+discussions by several of Epstein's attorneys, including Lillian Sanchez, Jay Lefkowitz, and Ken
+Starr. If this is true, as part of any privilege log they file, the defense attorneys should explain
+why they secretly and improperly withheld this information.
+22
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 23 of 27
+claiming the protection has voluntarily disclosed work product to a party not covered by the
+work-product doctrine." United States v. Ary, 518 F.3d 775, 783 (10th Cir. 2008).
+Perhaps recognizing the difficulty inherent in its position under these well-recognized
+general principles, the Government claims that the court cases have been "inconsistent" on
+whether communications during plea bargaining waive work product privilege. Gov't Resp. at 8.
+This is simply untrue, as a review of the relevant cases quickly demonstrates.
+The Government concedes that there is circuit court authority that defendants' disclosure
+of work product materials to the government during plea bargaining waives all work product
+protection.
+The Government acknowledges, for example, that Westinghouse Electric Corp. v.
+Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991), explicitly adopts this position. That
+case concluded that Westinghouse's disclosure of work product materials to the Justice
+Department during
+an investigation "waived the work-product doctrine as against all other
+adversaries." Id. at 1429. This holding makes sense, because it is hard to understand how a
+litigant can claim confidentiality in materials it has otherwise disclosed.
+The Government claims, however, that this common sense conclusion has been rejected
+by the First Circuit, which (according to the Government) has "held that a company may
+maintain even its ... work-product privilege in materials that it discloses to the U.S. Attorney's
+Office during pre-indictment presentations and ongoing plea negotiations." Gov't Resp. at 8
+(citing In re Keeper of the Records (Grand Jury Subpoena Addressed to XYZ Corp.), 348 F.3d
+16, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2003)).
+But the case the Government cites stands for no such broad
+proposition. Rather, that case involved a situation where for two years the Government had been
+demanding that XYZ Corporation should waive its privileges and produce various documents
+23
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 24 of 27
+relevant to a government investigation; the company "steadfastly had refused." Id. at 26. The
+company ultimately proffered some of the documents that the Government had been seeking.
+But the company's counsel voluntarily produced those documents under a "clear and explicit"
+reservation of all privileges. Id. at 27. And the reservation was "accepted by the government's
+consistent course of conduct," id. at 28, which included treating the documents as protected.
+Thus, in that case, there was simply no conduct from which a waiver could be inferred, as the
+Government had agreed through its course of conduct that the protection existed. Here, of
+course, there is not such course of conduct and, in any event, the victims have never "accepted"
+that the correspondence is protected.
+Moreover, in an effort to show the Courts of Appeals are inconsistent, the Government
+pretends to have universally surveyed caselaw with its citations to just these two allegedly
+"inconsistent" cases. In fact, the clear bulk of circuit authority has clearly and straightforwardly
+rejected arguments that the U.S. Attorney's Office advances here (and has frequently done so at
+the request of the Government). See, e.g., In re Owest Communications, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179,
+1192-1201 (10th Cir. 2006) (company's disclosure of documents to the SEC during criminal
+investigation waived work product protections); Grace United Methodist Church v. City of
+Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 668 (10th Cir. 2005) ("any work product objection was waived by
+[party] via production" of the documents in question): In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.
+Billing Practices Litigation, 293 F.3d 289, 302 (6th Cir. 2002) (attorney client/work product
+privilege was "never designed to protect conversations between a client and the Government —
+i.e., an adverse party — rather, it pertains only to conversations between the client and his or her
+attorney... purpose [of attorney-client privilege] is to encourage full and frank communication
+24
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 25 of 27
+between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
+observance of law and administration of justice. Nowhere amongst these reasons [for protection]
+is the ability to talk candidly with the Government.""); United States v. M.I.T., 129 F.3d 681,
+687 (Ist Cir. 1997) ("the prevailing rule that disclosure to an adversary, real or potential, forfeits
+work product protection"); In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2nd Cir. 1993)
+("voluntary disclosure of work product to an adversary waives the privilege as to other parties");
+In re Chrysler Motors Overnight Evaluation Litigation, 860 F.2d 844, 846-47 (8" 1988)
+(defendant company's disclosure of computer tape to class counsel during settlement negotiated
+waived work product when tape sought by government as part of criminal case); In re Sealed
+Case, 676 F.2d 793, 824-25 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (production of documents during settlement
+discussions
+with
+the SEC waived work product protection as to grand jury).
+For all these reasons,
+the Court should reject the Government's claim that its
+correspondence with Epstein's attorneys during plea negotiations somehow is confidential work
+product immune from discovery.
+CONCLUSION
+For all the foregoing reasons, if the Court allows the defense attorneys to intervene in this
+case, the Court should rule (1) that Rule 410 does not prevent discovery of plea negotiation
+correspondence; (2) there is no basis for inventing a new "common law" privilege preventing
+discovery of the correspondence; and (3) the correspondence is not confidential "work product"
+of the Government and is discoverable by the victims in this case.
+DATED: October 10, 2011
+25
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 26 of 27
+Respectfully Submitted,
+s/ Bradley J. Edwards
+Bradley J. Edwards
+FARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING,
+EDWARDS, FISTOS & LEHRMAN, P.L.
+Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
+and
+Paul G. Cassell
+Pro Hac Vice
+S.J. Quinney College of Law at the
+University of Utah
+Salt Lake City, UT 84112
+Attorneys for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2
+26
+
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 27 of 27
+CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+The foregoing document was served on October 10, 2011, on the following using the
+Court's CM/ECF system:
+Assistant U.S. Attorneys
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+Attorneys for the Government
+Roy Black, Esq.
+Jackie Perczek, Esq.
+Black, Srebnick, Kornspan & Stumpf, P.A.
+Miami, FL 33131
+27
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc865bb701b5dda86a3e20a3d3a637ee5b7526c5f1e6acaea8bda6f52497d42d.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc865bb701b5dda86a3e20a3d3a637ee5b7526c5f1e6acaea8bda6f52497d42d.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6bc85b7d6cbca00389bdbaeda55f6326499b24d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fc865bb701b5dda86a3e20a3d3a637ee5b7526c5f1e6acaea8bda6f52497d42d.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -316,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fc865bb701b5dda86a3e20a3d3a637ee5b7526c5f1e6acaea8bda6f52497d42d",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 28,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\", \"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "47cca281ae3e05f76cb5d0266f8a0d36eb75eb784548ee912cd428685f9c744b",
+  "output_sha256": "888a10b61ca139fac20241cb9f10c5aada10d22a03e09dfa722393142d5059a1",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fcd4a43665e4fe01107bae92fe8b5a5b96054a5916be7da0b18e2521374f57fa.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fcd4a43665e4fe01107bae92fe8b5a5b96054a5916be7da0b18e2521374f57fa.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d7d8579d13457097708acdd4d3eabe13bd5f500f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fcd4a43665e4fe01107bae92fe8b5a5b96054a5916be7da0b18e2521374f57fa.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2526 @@
+xcingular®
+Questions or Changes?
+• Toll Free 1 866 293-4634
+:
+611 from your wireless phone
+TTY users - 1 866 4-AWS-TTY
+SUMMARY OF MONTHLY CHARGES FOR ACCOUNT 0031035751
+Previous
+Balance
+100.06
+Payments
+Received
+0.00
+Late Payment
+1.50
+Account
+Adjustments
+0.00
+Your billing cycle began on November 15, 2004 and ended on December 14, 2004
+Current Monthly Charges
+Subscriber Adjustments
+Monthly Service
+Monthly Usage
+Charges
+Credits
+Government Fees and Taxes
+Total Current Monthly Charges DUE UPON RECEIPT
+TOTAL AMOUNT DUE
+Date of Invoice: December 15, 2004
+Balance
+Forward
+100.06
+0.00
+59.96
+11.75
+3.33
+0.00
+12.67
+87.71
+Current Monthly
+Charges
+87.71
+Total
+Amount Due
+187.77
+187.77
+WE ARE PROUD TO ANNOUNCE THAT AT&T WIRELESS IS NOW
+PART OF CINGULAR WIRELESS. IN THE COMING MONTHS YOU
+WILL RECEIVE EXCITING INFORMATION ABOUT HOW THE
+COMBINED STRENGTH OF THESE TWO COMPANIES WILL BENEFIT
+YOU. THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE TO HOW YOU ARE BILLED OR
+HOW YOU PAY YOUR BILL. HOWEVER, YOU WILL NOTICE A FEW
+CHANGES TO THE PHYSICAL APPEARANCE OF YOUR BILL.
+WELCOME TO THE CINGULAR WIRELESS FAMILY!
+xcingular
+IRELESS
+ease Return This Portion With Your Payme
+se of service or payment of this invoic
+Indicate contin or wires seral terms.
+Account Name: MARTIN GOLICK
+(see reverse - signature required).
+#BWNHNGB
+#0000000310357512# w
+2006752 02 AT 0.517 AUTO T2 0 1214 33411.5.52.02.1034.5000
+Note:
+We Print on
+Front and Back
+Service # 5613797824
+Account # 0031035751
+Crack he (se crease.
+Date Due
+UPON RECEIPT
+Total
+Amount Due
+187.77
+Amount
+Paid
+AT&T WIRELESS
+PO BOX 8229
+AURORA IL 60572-8229
+
+
+
+Recurring Electronic Fund Transfer (REFT): To enroll: sign below, check the REFT box on the reverse side and
+remit with this month's payment. Keep paying your bill until your statement indicates "Do Not Pay". REFT
+Agreement: I authorize my financial institution to deduct the amount of my monthly wireless phone bill from the
+account associated with the enclosed check and remit payment to AT&T Wireless. This authority will be effective
+until I notify AT&T Wireless to terminate it. I agree that I may be assessed a service charge (up to $20) or late fee
+or both if a payment is returned by my bank. For more information visit attwireless.com/ocs or call 1 866 293-4634.
+Please keep a copy of the form below and this REFT Agreement for your records or retain a copy of the blank form
+from next month's invoice.
+Questions? We can help: AT&T Wireless appreciates your business and welcomes the opportunity to assist you.
+As part of our commitment to you, we are always adding new calling plans and promotions to match your individual
+needs. Visit our website at attwireless.com or contact Customer Care by dialing 611 from your wireless phone or 1
+866 293-4634. ¿ Sabias que también ofrecemos servicio al cliente en tu idioma? Marca 611 desde tu teléfono
+inalámbrico ó 1 866 293 4634 desde cualquier teléfono y oprime el *.
+Driving Wireless Safety: Your wireless phone gives you the freedom and flexibility to stay in touch when you
+travel, but don't let a phone call distract you from driving safely. Use hands-free device if allowed or required by
+law. Call Carefully, Arrive Safely.
+AT&T Wireless Processing Fees: Accounts suspended for non-payment will be subject to a $25 reactivation fee
+per line and may be assessed a security deposit prior to reinstatement. Checks returned for non-sufficient funds will
+be charged up to a $20.00 fee.
+Local Tax: Local taxes are based on local government boundaries, the address information you provide for your
+may also use the form below to notify us of any change to your taxing address. Thank you for your cooperation.
+Early Termination Fee (ETF): If you cancel service before your contract end date (including if you switch your
+wireless number to another carrier), you will be charged an Early Termination Fee of up to $200.
+Please Send Correspondence To:
+AT&T Wireless Next Generation Correspondence
+P.O. Box 68056
+Anaheim Hills, CA 92817-8056
+2006752.000022150.6
+count ame and ranse an espress clearly and check the box on the reverse side. Please contact Customer Care to change the
+Name and transfer Financial Responsibility.
+New Billing Address
+City
+State
+Zip
+Home Phone (
+Work Phone (.
+If your billing address is NOT your Tax Address*, please enter the Tax Address below. (Multi-line accounts should attach a list of each wireless number
+and the respective Tax Address.)
+New Tax Address*
+Wireless Number (
+City
+State
+Zip
+Inder Federal laws, your Tax Address must be: your primary place of use, your residential or business address, and located within AT&T Wireless
+ensed service area. Non-business customers on AT&T Digital One Rate, Regional Advantage or Shared Advantage plans must use their resident
+address as their tax address.
+Recurring Electronic Fund Transfer (REFT) Enrollment. Please read the agreement on the top portion of this page, sign below and check
+the "REFT Registration" box on the reverse side.
+Financial Account Holder Signature
+6.1 - 3G
+• • I do not wish to receive email notilication of special ofers avalable to AT&T Wireless customers.
+
+
+ACCOUNT DETAILS
+Detail of Other Account Charges
+Item Description
+1 LATE PAYMENT CHARGE
+Total of Other Account Charges
+Detail of Account Government Fees and Taxes
+Item Description
+1 FEDERAL TAX
+Total Account Government Fees and Taxes
+Current Subscriber Monthly Charges and Credits
+Subscriber Number
+Subscriber Name
+
+Total Current Subscriber Monthly Charges and Credits
+Total Current Monthly Charges
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY
+Monthly Service Charges
+Item Description
+1 CALL WAITING
+2 AT&T TEXT MESSAGING
+3 CALLER ID
+4 AT&T VOICEMAIL
+5 DETAIL BILLING
+6 COM EQP 1.99EW/3.00INS $4.99
+7 CALL FORWARDING
+8 WORLDCONNECT
+9 THREE WAY CALLING
+10 $39.99 CHARTER OFFER
+11 1000 NIGHT AND WEEKEND MINUTES
+Total Monthly Service Charges
+Monthly Usage Charges
+Item Description
+1 1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+2 500 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+2 MECCAGE RETRIEVAL
+4 CALL WAITING
+5 100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+6 411 INFO
+7 INCLUDED MINUTES
+8 500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+9 ADDITIONAL MINUTES
+Total Monthly Usage Charges
+
+Service Dates
+11/15/04 - 12/14/04
+11/15/04 - 12/14/04
+11/15/04 - 12/14/04
+11/15/04 - 12/14/04
+11/15/04 - 12/14/04
+11/15/04 - 12/14/04
+11/15/04 - 12/14/04
+11/15/04 - 12/14/04
+11/15/04 - 12/14/04
+11/15/04 - 12/14/04
+11/15/04 - 12/14/04
+Onty Used
+809 MIN
+267 MIN
+27 EVT
+14 EVT
+31 EVT
+3 EVT
+500 MIN
+250 MIN
+29 MIN
+0.05
+0.05
+86.16
+87.71
+0.00
+4.99
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+4.99
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+39.99
+9.99
+59.96
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+4.50
+0.00
+0.00
+7.25
+11.75
+Account Name
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY - CONTINUED
+Other Subscriber Charges
+Item Description
+1 UNIVERSAL CONNECTIVITY CHARGE
+Total Other Subscriber Charges
+Subscriber Government Fees and Taxes
+Item Description
+1 SALES TAX
+: STATE COMM SERVICE TA
+I LOCAL COMM SERVICE TA:
+4 COUNTY 911 TAX
+5 FEDERAL TAX
+Total Subscriber Government Fees and Taxes
+TOTAL CHARGES FOR (561)379-7824
+DETAIL OF CURRENT ACTIVITY
+VOICE USAGE FOR (561)379-7824
+Item Date Time
+Called
+2 11/05 06:410
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+11/15 06:41A (561)714-5714
+11/15 06:54A
+611714-571
+11/15 08:46A
+61714-571
+11/15 08:47A (561)714-5714
+1/15 08:49A
+61)714-571
+1/15 08:50A
+61)715-630
+11/15 08:53A (561714-5714
+1115 09-06А (561/715-6303
+09:06A
+150027581262-8391
+11/15 09:28A
+11/15 09:29A (561)715-6303
+11/15 91 37A (561)790-3459
+DELRAY
+11/15
+11/15 12:49P
+(561 790-3459
+/15 12:50F
+VAS 12395981676-270
+WPALM
+WPALME
+11/15 12:55P (772)219-4743
+11/5 02.00P
+1/15
+/15 02:04P (561)676-4062
+(561)714-5714
+11/15 08 2Р
+(561 309-137
+954)776-419
+11/15 08:36P (561)714-5714
+
+11/15 10:24P (561)792-6375
+11/16
+11/16
+• 08-184
+11/16
+08:32A
+11808-348
+(881353-7822
+37 11/16 03:07P (561)792-6375
+WPALMBEACH FL
+Qnty
+Used
+2MIN
+вашинтивни
+Rate Description
+1000
+NIGH
+500 AD
+D'L
+Bm8828388888888388888888888888888888
+
+1,83
+1.83
+0.30
+6.29
+3.50
+1282
+86.16
+
+
+
+
+
+Item Date Time
+Called
+Onty
+Calls To
+Used Rate Description
+38 11/16 03:08P (561)379-7824
+WPALMBEACH FL
+3 MIN
+500 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+1 EVT
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+39 11/16 03:11P (561)379-7824
+WPALMBEACH FL
+O ADD'L ANYTME M
+ESSAGE RETRIEV
+40 11/16 03:50P (610)269-5895
+DOWNINGTN PA
+500 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+11/16 05:40P (561)723-8702
+WPALMBEACH FL
+2 MIN
+0O ADDL ANYIME MI
+11/16 06:13P
+43
+11/16 06:13P
+INCOMING
+DO ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+561)676-4062
+NPALMBEACH Fl
+44
+500 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+45
+1116 8636Р
+(561)714-5714
+NPALMBEACH FI
+I MIN
+INCOMING
+2 MIN
+SOO ABBEANYME MIN
+46
+11/16 06:43P
+47
+(561)324-1517
+WPALMBEACH FL
+500 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+11805:44
+48
+6 06:458
+2MIN
+500 BLANTME MIN
+11/16 06:49P
+(561)792-6375
+:17P
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+11/16 07:24P
+(561)512-5976
+WPALMBEACH FL
+6MIN
+2 MIN
+16 07:28P
+INCOMING
+16 08:17P
+(561)767-0654
+FL
+SMIN
+(561)714-5714
+2 MI
+(561)801-3590
+(561)801-3590
+(561)714-5714
+1561/676-1062
+676-4062
+(561)379-7824
+(561)818-3331
+FL
+MI
+2MIN
+2 MIN
+888888888888888888 8888888888899
+#888839080898808 #0009926299$
+69
+(917)855-
+-3363
+3088
+78
+(561)383-8392
+(561)676-4062
+WPA
+1 EV
+1M
+Мітинавнии
+Account Name
+Item Date Time Called
+100 11/17 06:14P (561)333-7978
+101 11/17 06:15P
+(561)281-0170
+103 11117 06139
+104 11/17 06:23P (561)676-4062
+• 11/17 06:2
+(561)329-4741
+107 11/17 06:27P
+(561)333-7978
+109 11117 0632Р
+(561)281-0170
+110 11/17 06:54P (561)792-6375
+112 1117 87:13P
+113 1117 87:30P (561)333-7978
+Calls To
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+NCOMINC
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+VPALMBEACH FI
+WPALMBEACH FL
+VPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NOOMING
+NCOMINC
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+115 11/17 08:34P
+119
+11/17 09:181
+61)Z14-571
+1/17 09:18P
+61)715-630
+Nộ0888888=6508
+61
+5714
+
+8839 ANNA
+
+88
+P
++ =88888988888
+8489438993899฿
+38888
+--
+30000
+(561)714-5714
+(561)753-4045
+Onty
+Used
+Rate Description
+500 AD
+D'L
+ANYTME
+500 AD
+D'L
+ANYTME
+AMIN
+JD ADD'L ANYIM
+JD ADD'L ANYTM
+500 ADD'L ANYTME
+IMIN
+DO ADD'L ANYTM
+DO ADD'L ANYTM
+500 ADD'L ANYTME
+500 ABB'L ANYTME
+500 AD
+2MN
+500 ADD'L ANYTME
+TMIN
+ANYTME
+500 ADD'L ANYTME
+00 ABBL ANYTME
+DO A
+500 ADD'L ANYTME
+1000
+IGHT/WKEN
+1.50
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+2MIN
+2 Mir
+IMIN
+
+1.50
+
+
+Item Date Time
+Called
+Calls To
+162 11/19 10:09A (561)202-7395
+WPALMBEACH FL
+163 11/19 10:36A (561)324-1517
+WPALMBEACH FL
+165 11/18 12:404
+(561)676-4062
+NCOMING
+MPALMBEACH FI
+166 11/19 12:49P (561)512-3286
+WPALMBEACH FL
+167 11/19 12:50P
+INCOMING
+168 11/19 12:51P
+(561)333-7978
+WPALMBEACH FL
+169 11/19 01:00P
+170 11/19 01:03P
+(5611801-3590
+VPALMBEACH F
+561)512-3286
+VPALMBEACH
+171 11/19 01:08P
+INCOMING
+173 11/18 81:13P 1581309-8686
+309-8686
+PALACE
+135 1118 02 3P 1561 202-1995
+PALMBEAI
+11202-7395
+WPALMBEACH EL
+176
+177
+11/19 02:44P
+(561/202-7395
+1/19 02:45
+178
+329-4741
+WPALMBEACH FL
+11/19 02:46
+11/19
+811753-8592
+WPALMBEACH EL
+(561|714-5714
+5611324-1391
+324-1517
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMIN
+(561)202-7395
+IG
+WPALN
+BEACH
+ACH FL
+NGOMIN
+561)329-4741
+COMING
+EACH FL
+INCOMING
+NCON
+ING
+8808
+NCON
+MING
+676-4062
+WPALMBEACH
+329-6775
+WPALME
+333-7978
+NCOMIN
+561)324-1517
+PALME
+
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+2MIN
+500 ADD'L ANYTME
+500 ADD'L ANYTME
+500 ADD'L ANYTME
+2MIN
+2MIN
+500 ADD'L ANYTN
+500 ADD'L ANYTME
+MIl
+500 ADD'L ANYTME
+CALL WAITING
+3MIN
+500 ADD'L ANYTME
+2MIN
+2MIN
+2MIN
+50
+500 ABBL
+500 ADD'L
+2MIN
+BBE
+BBE
+50
+500 ADD'L
+500 ADD'L
+WPALM
+PALI
+(561)714-5714
+WPALM
+EACH FL
+ICON
+CO
+90008
+
+Account Name
+Item Date Time Called
+Calls To
+227 11/20 12:04A
+228 11/20 12:31A (561)309-1375
+==
+12-38A
+8841273-1290
+11/20 01:13A (561j856-2974
+1/20 01:38A (561 676-4062
+1/20 07:12A (561)818-3331
+11/20 07:30A
+112009:014
+11/20 09:46A
+D 10:14A (561)714-571
+0 10:18A 1954 680-560
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+2MIN
+1000 NIGHT/KEND MIN
+1000 NIGHT/KEND MIN
+3 MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND
+2MIN
+1000 NIGHT/KEND
+1000 NIGHT/KEND
+THIN
+1000 NIGHT/KE
+1000 NIGHT/WKE
+1000 NIGHT/KEI
+1000 NIGHT/WKE
+000 NIGHT/WK
+1000 NIGHT/KEI
+2 MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKE
+2 MIN
+1000 NIGHT/KE
+
+M
+aaaaaaaaaaaa
+SEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
+10:20A
+10-254
+(954)445-1490
+1 10:36A (561)301-6368
+10:46A (561)715-6303
+11:09A
+5611333-9727
+58E8E
+NARA
+00 c0
+
+(954)433-0878
+(954)433-0878
+2889
+(561)204-5207
+(561)714-5714
+(561)715-6303
+(561)792-6375
+(561)714-5714
+6303
+2 MIN
+2MIN
+2MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKE
+000 NIGHTWK
+1000 NIGHT/KEI
+1000 NIGHT/WK
+10%
+2006752.000022152
+22299292222222929222222992929222 392929222222222222922222229
+
+888
+88 5855
+
+
+
+
+Item Date Time Called
+291 11/21 10:17P
+292 11/21 10:50P
+11/22
+10:56A
+(561)281-0170
+11/22
+2 10:58A (954)776-4192
+11/22 11:07A (561)714-5714
+11/22
+11-22A 0541675-4802
+2 12:4P
+251225-0052
+11655-0995
+122 01:05P (561|689-9131
+12z 01:07P
+541610-580
+541435-776
+8137P (561/689-9131
+11.
+02:51P
+CEBEBEEEEESEEEE
+B11818-333
+541435-7760
+(561|856-2974
+(561)792-6375
+(561)714-5714
+(561)715-6303
+5611715-6303
+333 38833333:
+561/734
+-5710
+(561 379-7824
+(561)676-4062
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+FTLAUDERDL FL
+COMING
+VPALMBEACH FI
+DEERFLDBCH FL
+WALMBEACH AL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+ILAUDERD
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+наращен
+FL
+BCH
+BEACH
+WPALMBEACH
+WPALMB
+INCOMING
+EACH
+IN
+3
+IMIN
+(MIN
+IN
+
+08
+-7531
+5-4802
+(561)722-B423
+(954)649-1334
+792
+181S
+(954)776-4192
+FL
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+8MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+IMIN
+INCLUBEB MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+CLUBED MINUTE
+INUTE
+2MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+2MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+2 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+4 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+ED
+NU
+UL
+Account Name
+
+Item Date Time
+Called
+355 11/23 06:50P
+(561)792-6375
+356 11/23 06:51P
+(561)281-0170
+Calls To
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+353 11/23 87 13P (561)309-1375
+359 11/23 08:04P
+368 11/23 09:08P
+362 11/23 09:10P
+364 11/23 10:01P (561)856-2974
+365 11/23 10:34P
+(561)792-6375
+369 11/24 08:02A
+(561)379-7824
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NCOM NC
+INCOMING
+OMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+PALMBEACH |
+368 11/24 10:43А (561)676-4062
+369 11/24 11:19A 561676-4062
+O 11/24 11:42
+WPALMBEACH |
+INCOMING
+11124 12 43P 5611753-78
+2MIN
+I MIN
+(561)309-1375
+(561)333-9106
+(561)714-5714
+(561)714-5714
+(561)715-6303
+(561)714-5714
+(561)792-6375
+(561)792-6375
+397-0253
+379-7824
+592
+)379-7824
+561)714-5714
+(954)675-4802
+
+TEACHEL
+FL
+WPALMBEA
+JPAI MRFACI
+WPALMBEA
+WALMBEACH
+VPALME
+INCOMIN
+INCOMING
+Onty
+Used
+Rate Description
+2MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+MIl
+CLUDED MINUTE
+MIT
+CLUDED MINUTE
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+2 MIN
+GHT/WKEND MIN
+1000 NIGHT/KEND MIN
+IT/KEND MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+CLUBER MINUTE
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+IN
+I MIN
+MIT
+2MIN
+10MIN
+іниді
+
+
+
+Account Name
+
+Item Date Time
+Called
+418 11/25 06:38P
+419 11/25 09:07P
+21 11/26 1
+422 11/26 12:31A
+423 11/26 12:40A (561)379-7824
+424 11/26 09:34A
+425 11/26 11:07A
+(561)333-4073
+11/26 11:10A
+333-4072
+427 11/26 11:11A
+561)333-4031
+129 11/26 02:30P (561)306-2142
+139 11/26 07:31P
+(561)715-6303
+432 11/26 07:35P
+(561)306-2142
+138
+26 07:54F
+11/26 08:01P
+561 306-2142
+561j306-2142
+435 11/26 08:06P
+436 11/26 09:03P
+437
+11/26 09:12P
+438
+11/
+126
+09:1
+3P
+440
+11/26
+09:14P
+61)714-571
+61)753-859
+(561
+714-5714
+(561)252-8897
+09:158
+441
+11/26 09:16P
+442 11/26 09:17P
+443
+11/26 09:26P
+444
+11/26 09:31P
+26 09:36P
+/26
+09:39P
+09:42P
+118
+111
+11/
+1V/26
+09:44P
+09:48P
+561)252-8897
+5811775-6062
+676-4062
+561)715-6303
+561)792-6375
+450 11/26 09:57P
+451 11/26 09:59P
+153 11/28 11 29P 1561)715-6303
+454 11/27 12:47A (561)252-8897
+156 11/27 1239A 1961715-6303
+457 11/27 01:06A
+561)715-6303
+158 11/27 12:238
+(561)792-6375
+460 11/27 12:40P
+(561|792-6375
+162 11/27 134TP (561/676-4062
+11/27 0290
+(561)252-8897
+11/27 02:33P
+165 11127 0547P (561)856-2974
+468 11/27 03:51P (954)776-4192
+490 11/27 08:30P
+(561)792-3772
+471 11/27 06:02P
+472
+11/27 06:14
+473
+73 11/27 09:10
+(561)792-3772
+474 11/27 09:12P
+(561|324-1517
+475 11/27 09:16P
+476 11/27 09.26P
+(561)324-1517
+477 11/27 09:27P
+478 11/27 09:27P
+Calls To
+NOOMING
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+PALMBEACH F
+IPALMBEAC
+WPALMBEACH FL
+DELMAN BOHEL
+DELRAY BCH FL
+DELRAY
+DELRAY BCH FL
+JELRAY B
+BELRAY BCH FI
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH |
+WPALMB
+FL
+WPALMBEACH
+FL
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH
+DELRAY BI
+DI
+FL
+FL
+DELRAY BCH
+WPALMR
+FL
+WPALMBEAC
+FL
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+RENCH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+BELRAY BEH FL
+INCOMING
+WALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+VPALMBEACH F
+ICOMINO
+COMINI
+VPALMBEACH F
+INCOMING
+PALM BEACH FL
+NCOMING
+FTLAUDERDL FL
+COMIN
+PALMRFACH i
+INCOMING
+NOOMING
+WPALMBEACH FI
+WPALMBEACH FI
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FIl
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+Onty
+Used
+Rate Description
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+2MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+2MIN
+19MIN
+4MIN
+2MIN
+2 MIN
+1MIN
+1MIN
+2MIN
+3MIN
+2MIN
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+1EVT
+EVi
+1EVT
+3MIN
+2MIN
+4MIN
+OMIN
+9MIN
+1EVT
+EMIN
+SMIN
+2MIN
+2MIN
+2 MIN
+EMIN
+2 MIN
+3MIN
+2MIN
+2MIN
+7MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+ICLUDED MINUTE
+CLUDED MINUTE
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+CLUDED MINUTE
+CLUDED MINUTE
+CLUDED MINUT
+LUDED MINUT
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+CLUDED MINUTE
+66.
+2MIN
+1MIN
+3MIN
+1EVT
+Item Date Time Called
+Calls To
+479 11/27 09:29P (561)792-6375
+480 11/27 09.46P (561)324-1517
+482 11/27 09:51P (561|324-1517
+483 11/27 10:43P
+484 11/27 11:10P
+485 11/27 11:13P (561)723-9377
+486 11/27 11:13P
+487 11/27 11:16P
+88 11/27 11:48P (561)676-4062
+89 11/28 12-44A (5611792-637
+490 11/28 12:50A (561)379-7824
+491 11/28 02:02A (561)324-1517
+492 11/28 02:29A (561)379-7824
+195 11728 08 50A (361)790-3459
+128 08:50A
+496
+11
+128
+08:50A
+WPALMBEACH FL
+COMIN
+(PALMBEACH R
+WPALMBEACH FL
+COMIN
+COMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NPALMBEACH F
+VPALMBEACH F
+WPALMBEACH FL
+VPALMBEACH FI
+VPALMBEACH FI
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+1 EVT
+3MIN
+CALL WAITING
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+000 NIGHT/WKEND MI
+000 NIGHT/KEND MI
+2 MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+2MIN
+THIN
+JOD NIGHT/WKEND MI
+100 NIGHT/KEND MI
+2MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WEND MIN
+1 EVT
+CALL WAITING
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+ML
+00O NIGHL/WREND MI
+MIT
+000 NIGHT/KEND MI
+2 MIN
+EVT
+1000 NIGHT/KEND MIN
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+6MIN
+3MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+1 EVT
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaas
+(561
+(561)7
+CO CO
+(561)714-5714
+(561)818-3331
+2006752.000022153
+83333333333333333333333333333333333336 3333
+....
+
+
+C9/Z20000 Z92900Z
+
+Item Date Time Called
+540 11/28 11:39P
+541
+11/29 07:0BA
+543 11/23 12578
+61)714-571
+611676-406
+544 11/29 01:00P (561 676-4062
+545 142 01220
+611676-406
+611309-137
+547 11/29 02:11P
+(561)795-3233
+349 1129 82:12F (385):
+3851553.7212
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+'ALMBEACH
+DAI MRCACH
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FI
+NPALMBEACH
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+689 11/29 8236P (561)333-4072
+11/29 0352P
+11/29 03:57P
+129 04-028 (561)312-5658
+INCOMING
+INC
+OMING
+INCOMING
+(PALMBEACH F
+12830
+(561)601-7888
+(561|333-7978
+676-4062
+-6303
+561)676-4062
+68808
+1290
+1,7958
+561|792-637
+8888848 42883888408
+99999NN0088
+
+(561)792-6375
+(561)714-5714
+
+K$9B39
+-3290
+(561)793-5155
+(561|309-1375
+(561)309-1375
+INC
+OMIN
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+CLUDED MINUTE
+IMIN
+CLUDED MINUTE
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+2MIN
+INCLUBED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+3MIN
+INCLUBED MINUTES
+1EVT
+1.50 411 INFO
+ML
+INCLUBER MINUTES
+2 MIN
+1MIN
+I MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED
+MINUTES
+6MIN
+11 MIN
+zz
+2 MIN
+EMIN
+2MIN
+MI
+4 MIN
+IMIN
+SMIN
+OMIN
+2MIN
+IN
+3MIN
+IMIN
+1MI
+1.50
+Account Name
+Item Date Time Called
+603 12/01 03:41P
+604 12/01 03:43P
+606 1201 0405P (561)309-1395
+607 12/01 04:57P
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+IKE WORTH
+PALMBEACH
+INCOMING
+608 1201 05:11P
+609 12/01 06:44P
+610 12/01 06:45P
+681678-1062
+561)792-6375
+611
+12/01 08:15P
+561/324-1517
+612
+2/01
+08:25P
+613 12/01 08:25P
+614
+615 1201 08 28P
+61)324-151
+611324-151
+(561)676-4062
+10108-568
+618 12/01 09:01P
+(561)714-5714
+19 12/01 09:03
+561252-8893
+20 12/01 09:05
+611385-3290
+(561)753-4045
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+(561)676-4062
+-8526
+61)714-571
+61379-782
+ACI
+INCOMING ACHEL.
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMB
+MPALMB
+INCOMING
+WALMBEACH EL
+INCOMING
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+MIl
+I ANYTIME MINUT
+MIT
+0 ANYTIME MINUT
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+I MIN
+I MIN
+I MIN
+EMIN
+I MIN
+2MIN
+I MIN
+I MIN
+3MIN
+3MIN
+2MIN
+IMIN
+AMIN
+1 EVT
+00 ANYT
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+O ANYTIME
+O ANYTIME MINUTI
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+0O ANY
+500
+O ANYTIME MINUT
+) ANYTIME MINUT:
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+NKEND MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+00 ANYTIME MINUTE,
+00 ANYTIME MINUTE
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+0O ANY
+50O ANYTIME MINUTES
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+50
+50
+8 ANYTIME MINI
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+SO ANYTIME MINUTES.
+SO ANYTIME MINUTES
+SO ANTINE MUES
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+
+
+
+(561)714-571
+(561)714-5714
+7P
+
+(561)385-3290
+(561)767-0654
+511818-33
+61792-631
+-5
+(561)324-1517
+WPALMBEACH FL
+COMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+BOYNTONBCH FL
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+COMIN
+COMN
+WPALMBEACH FL
+COMING
+COMING
+INCOMING
+WPALMBFACH FLI
+INCOMING
+MIl
+2MIN
+OMIN
+IMIN
+MIT
+MIT
+MIl
+MIF
+2MIN
+2MIN
+SOO ANYTIME MINUTES
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+SOO ANYTIME MINUTES
+SOO ANYTIME MINUTES
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+SOO ANYTIME MINUTES
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+O ANYTIME MINUT:
+O ANYTIME MINUTE
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+O0 ANYTIME MINUTE
+OO ANYTIME MINUTE
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+500 ANYTIME MIN
+500 ANYTIME MINU
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+
+
+
+Item Date Time
+Called
+668 12/02 07:21P (561)792-6375
+669 12/02 09:41P
+70 12 02 10:001
+71 12/02 10:30₽
+672 12/03 06:16A
+674 1203 87:584
+675 12/03 07:59A
+676 12/03 08:01A
+12/03 ₫
+19:02A
+678 12/03 09:31A
+(561)801-3590
+'561)792-6375
+561}
+753-4045
+5611801-3590
+561)753-4045
+5611753-4045
+9541234-4460
+(561)379-7824
+679 12/03 11:41A
+680 12/03 11:48A (917]855-3363
+203 12:36P
+682 12/03 12:38P (561)676-4062
+683
+684
+12/
+
+792-6375
+Calls To
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+MPALMBEACH FI
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH
+FL
+WPALMBEACH
+FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+DEERFLDBCH
+FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH
+WPALMBEACH
+WPALMBEACH
+VPALMBEACI
+VPALMBEACI
+WPALMBEACH
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+DONNA
+561)792
+-6375
+(305)555-1212
+8005%
+(561)
+-0300
+(561)
+-4741
+(561)767-0654
+581)550-9103
+961658-4062
+(561)714-5714
+561)753-8592
+5611329-4741
+07
+(561)676-4062
+(561)676-4062
+(561171.
+01
+'SA1
+09:47A
+1753-
+-8592
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+1MIN
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+3MIN
+2MIN
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+OD ANYULME MINUTE
+DO ANYTIME MINUTE
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+OD ANYTIME MINUTE
+DO ANYTIME MINUTE
+500 ANYTIME MINUTES
+1 EVT
+3MIN
+500 ANYTE MINUTES
+IME MINUTES
+HE MINUTES
+AMAl
+IME
+.50
+MI
+TIM
+IN
+COMIN
+INCOMIN
+ITONBCH
+FL
+NCOMIN
+WPALMB
+BEACH
+FL
+INCOMING
+INCOMIN
+NPALMBEACH
+VPALMBE
+FL
+INCOMING
+PALMB
+WALMBEACH
+INCOMING
+FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH
+WPALMB
+EACH
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NOOMIN
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMIN
+MPALMR
+WPALME
+BOYNT
+MPAL
+WPALMB
+MPAL
+WPALI
+§gggg555z590
+
+IME
+MINUT
+MINUT
+TIME
+22
+1.50
+Account Name
+Item Date Time Called
+732 12/04 12:44P (561)281-0170
+733 12/04 12:57P
+35 1204 01:03P (561)385-329
+736
+12/04 01:07P (561)309-1375
+12/04 01:098
+2/04 01:30P (561)714-5714
+739
+12/04 01:43P (561)714-5714
+740
+12/04 01:48P (561)714-5714
+741
+204 01:518
+742
+12/04 02:26P
+1204 03:00Р 1581|309:137
+561)309-1379
+246 1204 04.02P 881790-7866
+12/04 04:14P (561)792-6375
+Calls To
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+WALNBEASH
+WPALMBEACH
+WPALMBEACH
+WPALMBEACH
+WPALMBEACH
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+1000
+GHT/WKEND
+2MIN
+1000 NIGHT/KEND
+2 MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND
+1000 NIGHT/KE
+1000 NIGHT/KEND
+1000 NIGHT/KEI
+1000 NIGHT/KEI
+2MIN
+1000 NIGHT/KEI
+2MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKE
+NO NIGHTWK
+1000 NIGHT/KEI
+2MIN
+NIGHL/WK
+IMIN
+1000 NIGHT/KE
+2 MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKE
+2MIN
+1000 NIGHT/KEI
+426р
+15611714-5714
+1:26P
+(561)714-5714
+:33P (561|252-8897
+1:35P
+A37Р
+(581/790-1794
+5:02P
+30P
+(561)714-5714
+561)309-1375
+-33P
+05:36P (561)676-4062
+071
+•55P
+3:58P
+08:59P
+8A
+11:17A
+(561)252-8897
+40P
+:45P
+(561)333-4072
+02:46P
+(561)790-3459
+03:02P
+03:05P
+03:06P
+(561|252-8897
+(561|385-3290
+03:39P
+05 03:51P
+05 04:09P (561)329-4741
+04:12P
+5611281-0170
+04:13P
+(561|329-4741
+04:31P
+1)281-0170
+32P
+1-47.
+41
+- 13
+144444444444h344h33а404444g1hаа44м
+
+
+
+22
+33333333333333333333333đ333333333333333333333333333333333331
+2006752.000022154
+
+
+Item Date Time
+Called
+798 12/05 07:00P
+(561)792-6375
+799 12/05 07:02P
+5611383-6485
+(561)714-5714
+801 1203 8705Р 98252-3897
+802 12/05 07:07P
+803
+804
+12/05 07:15P
+61)282-63
+12/05 07:21P
+11714-57
+805 12/05 07:59P (5611676-4062
+12/05 08:178
+09:02P
+(561)252-8897
+808 12/05 09:03P (561385-3290
+205 09:16:
+50916 561/252-889
+Calls To
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WALMACH EL
+INCOMING
+WALMBEACH EL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+EACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+VPALMBEACH F
+VPALMBEACH FI
+12/05 10:03P
+10NE
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+2MIN
+1000 NIGHT/KEND
+3MIN
+1000 NIGHT/KEND
+000 NIGHT/WK
+0O NIGHTANK
+66
+8MIN
+1000 NIGHT/KEND
+X00 NIGHT/WKEN
+OD NIGHT™K
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND
+100 NIGHT WREND
+ELLI
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND
+WKE
+NB
+ELE
+1000 NIGHTWKENB
+12/06 07:24A (561)818-3331
+1206 19:414 561796-3459
+MING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FI
+WPALMBEACH
+FL
+2 MIN
+2MIN
+2 MIN
+2MIN
+ML
+4MIN
+1MIN
+3MIN
+8
+IN
+18
+OMIN
+IMIN
+EMIN
+IMIN
+EMIN
+NUTR
+(5811284-7038
+(561|281-0170
+(561|714-7084
+
+
+
+(561)714-7084
+(561)790-7117
+(561)602-5037
+:22P
+(561)602-5037
+561309-1375
+12/06
+06:48P
+(561)602-5037
+12/06
+06:50P
+5611602-5037
+12/06 08:19P
+1208 10.01P
+561)790-3459
+5611818-3331
+12/06 10:43P
+(561)379-7824
+12/06 10:45P
+12/06
+99833
+-
+1670-
+-4062
+11:03P
+(561)676-4062
+11:
+128
+17:32A (561)792-6375
+07:27A
+ACH
+ACH
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+LAKE WORTH FL
+INCOMING
+LAKE WORTH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+ARE WORTH
+LAKE WORT
+WPALMBEACH
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+Account Name
+Item Date Time Called
+861 12/07 08:26A
+862 12/07 08:38A (561)792-6375
+64 1207 09384
+A (561)714-571:
+865 12/07 09:35A
+561)714-5714
+69 1202 09.32
+561 714-5714
+207 09:36
+561676-4062
+868 12/07 10:03A
+369 12/07 10:50A
+70 12/07 10:51A
+871 12/07 11:17A
+873 1207 1118A
+75 1207 1234P 1381 792-637
+61792-6371
+876 12/07 01:15P (917) 855-3363
+877
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+PALMBEACH i
+WPALMBEACH FL
+VPALMBEACH F
+VPALMBEACH FI
+INCOMING
+COMIN
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+PALMBEACH
+›ALMBEAC
+NEW YORK NY
+12/07 02.095
+78 12/07 02:10P
+
+(561)324-1517
+561)324-1517
+12/08 0928A
+886 1208 12:36P
+17,855-336
+61379-782
+INCOMING
+COMIN
+COMIN
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+NPALMBEACH FI
+887 12/08 12:36P (561)379-7824
+888 12/08 12:37P (772)219-4743
+890 1208 1238P
+(561)676-4062
+890
+891
+12/08
+892
+01:00P
+(561)792-6375
+(561)309-1375
+893
+S8888
+
+09N=8888
+
+
+1843-1299
+852-7481
+(561)792-6375
+140P
+(561)379-7824
+904 12/10 07:40A
+(561)753-4045
+905 12/10 10:18A
+561)379-7824
+906 12/10 10:18A/
+(561)379-7824
+907 12/10 10:19A (561)379-7824
+WPALMBEACH FL
+STUART FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+PALMBEACH |
+COMIN
+DOWNINGTN PA
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+MIl
+MIT
+INCLUBEB MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+AMIN
+NELUBEB MINUTES
+-D MINUTES
+3MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUBED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+VIN
+I MIN
+INCLUBED MINUTES
+SMIN
+(MIN
+INCLUBED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUBED MINUTES
+1 EVT
+TEW
+3MIN
+2MIN
+3MIN
+2 MIN
+OMIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+MINUT
+NEED MINUTE
+INCE MINUTE
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+MESSREE RETRIEVAL
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+CLUBEB MINUTE
+INUTE
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+NCLUDER MINUTE
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCOMNEACHFL
+EMIN
+DELRAY BCH FL
+INCOMING ON FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+2 MIN
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUBED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+MESSAGE TETRIEVALIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+I EVT
+ICLUDED MINUTE
+ESSAGE RETRIEVI
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+
+2006752.000022154
+INCL
+ID
+
+105-102
+NEW YORK NY
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NEW WORK PRET
+VPALMBEACH
+/PALMBEACH F
+WPALMBEACH FL
+IMIN
+8MIN
+AMIN
+2MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+CLUDED MINUTE
+CLUDED MINUTE
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+NCLUDED MINUT
+NCLUDED MINUT
+INCLUDED MINUT
+INCLUDED MINUTE:
+CES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+
+
+
+Item Date Time
+Called
+921 12/10 03:43P
+922 12/10 04:07P (561)351-6930
+923 12/10 8499P
+(561)351-6930
+561351-6930
+925 12/10 05:15P
+561)676-4062
+826 1210 08 24P
+561)714-5714
+5611385-3290
+928 12/10 06:06P
+930
+
+5611351-4517
+1818-3331
+931 12/10 06:34P
+(561)252-8897
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WALMBEACH EL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+PALMBEARE
+PALMBEAO
+INCOMING
+WHALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+983 131007.25P 581/313-3831
+(561)252-8897
+985 13/18 87:29P 19811252-8897
+936 12/10 07:35P
+988 1210 0748P
+561)252-889
+611252-889
+PALMBE
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+PALMBEACH E
+IPALMBEACH P
+WP
+(561
+561
+714.
+5714
+:51P
+(561)252-8897
+(561)385-3290
+714
+(561)714-5714
+(561)676-4062
+
+1]
+6.
+-4062
+4741
+-8592
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+3MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1MIN
+INCLUBED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+SMIN
+NCLL
+NCLU
+IDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+3MIN
+NCLU
+3MIN
+NCLI
+BED MINUTES
+2MIN
+MINUT
+INCLU
+DED MINUTES
+ICLUDED MINUTE
+ICLUDED MINUTE
+INCLUDED MINUT
+3MIN
+INCLUDED M
+NCLU
+DED MINUTES
+INCOMING
+W
+FL
+IP.
+EEELELEEEDELLELELEEEEEELEEEEEEELE
+Account Name
+Called
+Item Date Time
+986 12/11 01:58P
+987฿
+12/11 02:16P (561)792-6375
+02:31P
+03:12P
+(561)602-5037
+03:13P
+03:19Р
+:19P
+03:25P
+9611602-303
+02-5037
+03.27P (561)281-0170
+03:32P
+(561)714-7084
+03330
+561281-0171
+611281-017
+03:58P
+1----
+04:09P
+(561)602-5037
+04:21P
+(561)281-0170
+4:25
+5611602-5037
+4:27
+5611281-0170
+11
+(561|333-2711
+)281
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+LAKE
+WORTH FL
+INCOMING
+KE WORT
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+VPALMBEACH FL
+MPALMBEACH FI
+INCOMING
+LAKE WORTH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+AKE WORTH FL
+CH
+FL
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+2MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND MIN
+3 MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND
+5MIN
+1000 NIGHT/KEND
+1000 NIGHT/WKEND
+1000 NIGHTWKE
+4 MIN
+1000 NIGHTAWKE
+3MIN
+1000 NIGHT/WKEI
+1000 NIGHT/WKE
+3MIN
+000 NIGHT/K
+1000 NIGHT/WKEI
+1000 NIGHT/WKE
+1000 NIGHT/WKE
+1000 NIGHT/KE
+2 MIN
+000 NIGHTWK
+1MIN
+100
+100
+100
+1
+8881
+1017
+
+-7824
+09
+39P
+561)379-7824
+B8FN855655889-588888886666688868
+3A22R0013458018268
+(561)329-4741
+(561)801-3590
+(561)714-7084
+:09F
+1868
+15P
+(561)282-8891
+1000
+1000
+lIGHT,
+1000
+FAR 7
+1000
+I NIG
+IN
+N
+1000
+1000
+1000
+ґ
+IN
+INCLU
+ED
+
+
+IN
+
+
+
+
+2006752.000022155
+Onty
+Item Date Time
+Called
+Calls To
+Used Rate Description
+1050 12/13 08:31A (561)282-8891
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1051 12/13 10:05A
+INCOMING
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1053 1213 19:304
+11:30A
+(9.7)955-3752
+W YORK I
+CLUDED MINUTE
+PALMBEACH
+CLUDED MINUTE
+1054 12/13 11:32A
+INCOMING
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+105%
+12/13 11:37A
+PALMBEACH
+PALMBEAO
+: MI
+ICLUDED MINUTE
+ICLUDED MINUTE
+1EVT
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+1056 13/18 12:31P 581732-6373
+IMIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+059 1213 12:378 (561)714-571
+WPALMBEACH FL
+3 12:39
+INCOMING
+INE MINUTES
+1061 12/13 01:37P (561)676-4062
+WPALMBEACH FL
+2MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1063
+12/13 03 26P
+INCOMING
+1064
+(561)793-2053
+INCLUBED MINUTES
+12/13 03:33P (561)818-3331
+1066
+1313
+4:531
+NCOMING
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+E-120
+NCOMING
+INCLUBEB MINUTES
+1067 12/13 05:46P
+INCOMING
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1068 12/13 06:40F
+(561)676-4062
+1070
+06:45P
+(561)818-3331
+NDALBEACH EL
+WPALMBEACH FI
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+12/14 06:45A
+INCOMING
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+214 08:26
+COMING
+COMINC
+SMIN
+INCLUBED MINUTES
+73 12/14 08:50
+COMIN
+14 09:01A (561)790-0672
+PALMBEACH FLI
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1075 12/14 09:06A
+INCOMING
+10:18A
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1079 1214 11:01A (954)806-0286
+ICLU
+VOLUBER MINUTE
+1078 12/14 01:49P
+INCOMING
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1888 1214 02:27P (954)806-0286
+FTLAUDERDL FL
+INCOMING
+SMIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1081 12/14 03:10P
+INCOMING
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+€ 1Z14 U3.1
+22 12/14 09.0
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+CLU
+NGLUBER MINUTE T
+1084 12/14 04:50P (561)792-6375
+WPALMBEACH FL
+14MIN
+8MIN
+1085 12/14 05:12P (561)714-5714
+WPALMBEACH FL
+1086
+1099 1214 83:18P
+(561)753-8592
+WPALMBEACH FL
+1088 12/14 06:15P (5611281-0170
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+SMIN
+089 12/14 06:21
+190 12/14 06:22
+(561)281-0170
+PALMBCACH
+5611714-7084
+DAI MREACH
+1091 12/14 06:36P
+(561)714-7084
+092 12/14 07:04F
+WPALMBEACH FL
+2 MIN
+093 12/14 07:06
+5611792-6375
+I MIN
+1094 12/14 07:53P (561j792-6375
+WPALMBEACH FL
+4 MIN
+1096 1214 08:23P (5611818-3331
+2 MIN
+0.25
+ABBITIONAL MINUTES
+.25
+ADDITIONAL MINUTES
+25
+8.25
+ADDITIONAL MINUTES
+ADDITIONAL MINUTE
+ADDITIONAL MINUTE
+0.25 ADDITIONAL MINUTES
+25 ADBITTONAL MINUTES
+1098 12/14 0829P. (561)714-5714
+NPALMBEACH FI
+INCOMING
+2MIN
+TOTAL VOICE USAGE FOR (561)379-7824
+TEXT/MULTIMEDIA MSGS FOR (561)379-7824
+Item Date
+111/18
+2 11/18
+11/18
+11/21
+11/
+Time
+Sent To/Rcvd From
+07:20A
+09:33A
+(561)676-4062
+09:37A
+(561)715-6303
+0:50P
+61)715-630:
+61676-406
+11:53A
+(561676-4062
+10:18P
+561 676-4062
+125
+03:10P
+06:01P
+5611309-1375
+(561|676-4062
+Charge Description
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+200 NG ME E
+100฿
+100฿
+INCL
+INCL
+E MEET ENE
+SENT
+Account Name
+TEXT/MULTIMEDIA MSGS FOR (561)379-7824 - Continued
+Item Date
+Time
+Sent To/Rovd From
+Charge Description
+9 11/25
+19 11/26
+10:39P
+(561)676-4062
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+19:274
+51)676-40
+1 676-40
+13 11127
+02:05A
+12:09A
+14 11/30
+11:15A
+:21
+(561)676-4062
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+1-08
+17 12/01
+09:12A
+100 IN MES SENT
+8 12/0
+131
+561|676-4062
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+9 12/02
+1-37
+511676-408
+20 12/03
+11:43P
+61)596-35
+00 INCI
+(561)596-3561
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+22 1203
+1130P
+12/
+19:45.
+18-18.
+1551576-5062
+100 INCE MEGS SENT
+25 12/08
+11:32A
+
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+29 1211
+06:238
+01:49A
+(581,676-1062
+100 INCE: MISS SENT
+(561)676-4062
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+8:12
+1:13
+09:48A
+1001974.3974
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+TOTAL TEXT/MULTIMEDIA MSG USAGE FOR (561)379-7824
+0.00
+11.75
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fcd4a43665e4fe01107bae92fe8b5a5b96054a5916be7da0b18e2521374f57fa.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fcd4a43665e4fe01107bae92fe8b5a5b96054a5916be7da0b18e2521374f57fa.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fb2373fd76db7b24efc9e40863f1f7291bc5c21b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fcd4a43665e4fe01107bae92fe8b5a5b96054a5916be7da0b18e2521374f57fa.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -5366,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fcd4a43665e4fe01107bae92fe8b5a5b96054a5916be7da0b18e2521374f57fa",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 67,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\", \"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.page-footer\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "0c8baf87a88052d000a26e859bbd4fbf6e3fa9010a845dd54eff0506d89073a5",
+  "output_sha256": "0cfcfdde94e942a596a1206f8280d175e62cfa4457c1b406dfdbabc37c09c818",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fcda7b73f50fc0bb9387fda97c987c2be6114c10377576a2d35dee8f4fb17f96.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fcda7b73f50fc0bb9387fda97c987c2be6114c10377576a2d35dee8f4fb17f96.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..415669ec444b739252875520cf0fee9d4118318b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fcda7b73f50fc0bb9387fda97c987c2be6114c10377576a2d35dee8f4fb17f96.md
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+From:
+To: "'lewis@lewistein.com'"'
+Bcc:
+Subject: Your phone calls
+Date: Mon, 30 Oct 2006 17:29:35 +0000
+Importance: Normal
+Hi Guy - It was very nice to hear from you. I am starting trial next week, so I will be difficult to catch for the next three
+upsts or a target ordine resistin raist much re del. Tops, veil let you i ovinuing. As I told Mr Lefcourt, Mr.
+Can you confirm whether you are the "lead" attorney for Mr. Epstein? In other words, should I contact you first or Mr.
+Lefcourt?
+Thank you.
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fcda7b73f50fc0bb9387fda97c987c2be6114c10377576a2d35dee8f4fb17f96.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fcda7b73f50fc0bb9387fda97c987c2be6114c10377576a2d35dee8f4fb17f96.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..04c1aaa339fac393a57ff5ab46215e20bd9b76c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fcda7b73f50fc0bb9387fda97c987c2be6114c10377576a2d35dee8f4fb17f96.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -12,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fcda7b73f50fc0bb9387fda97c987c2be6114c10377576a2d35dee8f4fb17f96",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "73764d98199189419f69af5ca95fb88b2f2a2aff5d0b823e2cdfb05de3afe9f9",
+  "output_sha256": "96fe255291199f5ba4c2fa2ac26225ee729dac0ea18727a434bfee14a3ec2a40",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fd01421bbaba8d5597f90145c8c39a7171fd5e70629664e639b954e124f21d61.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fd01421bbaba8d5597f90145c8c39a7171fd5e70629664e639b954e124f21d61.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0fa8a7fed97d8c23c42fb5c115b39b92e027e870
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fd01421bbaba8d5597f90145c8c39a7171fd5e70629664e639b954e124f21d61.md
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+Via E-Mail
+Wifredo A. Ferrer, United States Attorney
+U.S. Department of Justice
+United States Attorney
+Southern District of Florida
+99 N. E. 4 Street
+Miami, FL 33132
+305.961.9290
+Privileged Communication
+Office of the United States Attorney
+Southern District of Florida
+99 NE 4** Street
+Miami, Florida 33132
+Re:
+Litigation Hold re:
+Jane Does #1 and #2 | United States, Case No.: 08-80736-CTV-
+MARRA/Johnson AND Jeffrey Epstein
+As a follow-up to your recent meeting concerning the above-referenced case, 1 write this
+letter in my capacity as the Electronic Discovery Coordinator within the Civil Division of the
+United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (USAO-SDFLA). I write to
+advise you of the USAO-SDFLA's legal obligation to preserve documents and data relevant to
+the lawsuit and to enlist your assistance in this regard.
+The USAO-SDFLA is required by law to take all reasonable steps to preserve all
+documents and data relating to the claims set forth in the Victim's Emergency Petition for
+Enforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 USC Section 3771 (DE 1) ("Victim's Petition")
+in Case No.: 9:08-cv-80736-Marra/Johnson in the Southern District of Florida, filed on July 7,
+2008. Based upon the facts set forth in the Court filings that are unsealed, I recommend that the
+Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) and the Palm Beach Police Department also be requested
+to preserve any documents that they may have that are relevant to the Claims asserted in the
+above-referenced lawsuit.
+I request that you please read and acknowledge your receipt and agreement to the terms
+of this letter. I also ask that you please complete and sign the form accompanying this letter.
+Please return the originals of both documents to me by November 9, 2010.
+With respect to the claims asserted in the litigation, in the Victim's Petition (DE I), Jane
+Doe # 1 brought claims against the United States for alleged violation of her rights under the
+Crime Victim's Rights Act ("CVRA"). The Jane Doe #1 petitioner alleges that she was the
+victim of federal crimes committed by Jeffrey Epstein, including sex trafficking of children by
+fraud in violation of 18 USC § 1591, use of interstate commerce to entice a minor to commit
+
+
+Re: Jane Does #1 and #2 | United States
+Page -2-
+Privileged Communication
+prostitution in violation of 18 USC § 2422 and wire fraud in violation of 18 US §1343. DE 1 at
+11. The Victim's Petition further alleges that in violation of the CVRA, Jane Doe #l was not
+consulted with respect to the USAO-SDFLA's negotiations with Epstein (DE 1 at 193-6). The
+"Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe # 2 Status Report and Response to Court's Order to Show Lack of
+Prosecution" (DE 41) argues that "there [was] an orchestrated decision [between the "U.S.
+Attorney's Office and Epstein] to deny the[] [Jane Doe Petitioners] their rights." DE 41 at l. The
+Status Report alludes to communications between the USAO-SDFLA and counsel for Jeffrey Epstein
+"that [i]s highly relevant to the treatment of Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 in the criminal justice
+system - namely, correspondence between the [USAO-SDFLA] and legal counsel for Jeffrey Epstein
+during the negotiations surrounding the non-prosecution agreement" and the USAO-SDFLA and
+counsel for the Jane Does, on numerous matters related to Jeffrey Epstein, including contacts with
+AUSAs "Marie
+and Dexter Lee." DE 41 at 3.
+The Government's filings frame the issue before the Court as to whether the
+"Government was obligated, under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5), to confer with petitioners prior to
+entering into an agreement with Jeffrey Epstein, which permitted the pending State of Florida
+prosecution to go forward, so long as Epstein agreed to certain conditions." Government's
+Notice To Court Regarding Absence of Need for Evidentiary Hearing. DE 17. The Government
+argues there are two relevant facts which will permit the Court to resolve the legal issue: (1)
+there are no criminal charges in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida,
+filed against Jeffrey Epstein; and (2) Epstein entered pleas of guilty in Florida State Court on
+June 30, 2008, was sentenced, and is now imprisoned in Palm Beach County. DE 17. The
+Government's Response to the Victim's Petition ("Government's Response") notes that in 2006,
+Jeffrey Epstein was charged in the 15" Judicial Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County,
+Florida with felony solicitation of prostitution. DE 13 at 1. The Response further notes that
+Epstein was not charged in the Southern District of Florida. DE 13 at 1-2. The Declaration of A.
+Marie
+indicates that "in the summer of 2007, Mr. Epstein and the [USAO-SDFLA]
+entered into negotiations to resolve the investigation. At that time, Mr. Epstein had been charged
+by the State of Florida with solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Florida Statutes § 796.07."
+DE 14. The Declaration also details the communications that occurred when a victim was
+identified, including notification letters that were sent. DE 14. Attached to that Declaration are
+copies of redacted letters provided to victims "C.W.", "T.M.", and "S.R." by AUSA
+and the FBI's Victim-Witness Specialist Twiller Smith. DE 14. In addition, appended to the
+Declaration are AUSA
+letters to the victim's counsel, Bradley J. Edwards, Esq. DE
+14. Special Agent Nesbitt
+letters and Special
+are referenced in certain letters to Mr. Edwards. DE 14.
+Moreover, Epstein's counsel, Jack Goldberger, Esq. is copied on letters to Mr. Edwards. I also
+note that the Supplemental Declaration of A. Marie
+(DE 35) notes the existence of a
+September 2007 Non-Prosecution Agreement, an October 2007 Addendum and a letter dated
+December 19, 2007 from the U.S. Attorney to Attorney Lilly Ann Sanchez, Counsel to Jeffrey
+Epstein (DE 35 at 93).'
+" I assume those involved in the above-referenced litigation, have copies of the relevant court
+filings, but if you desire any of the unsealed filings, let me know.
+
+
+Re: Jane Does #1 and #2 | United States
+Page -3-
+Privileged Communication
+Included in this preservation order are all Documents and data, including electronically
+stored information ("ESI"), relating to the claims. The Victim's Petition alleges that in July
+2008, negotiations were taking place that led to a Non-Prosecution Agreement. However, it
+appears from AUSA Villafaña's Declaration that during the summer of 2007, negotiations
+between Epstein and the USAO-SDFLA commenced that led to the September 2007 Non-
+Prosecution Agreement. It would therefore appear that the logical time frame to preserve
+evidence is at least May 1, 2007 and/or as early as the commencement of the negotiations
+leading to the September 2007 Non-Prosecution Agreement and through the present.
+"Documents and data" as used herein means not only paper copies of documents, but
+electronically stored information ("ESI"), to include email, audio recordings, videotape, instant
+messages, word processing files, spreadsheets, databases, calendars, telephone logs, contact
+manager information, Internet usage files, and all other electronically stored information
+maintained, created, and/or received by the USAO-SDFLA or any of its employees and/or
+agents.
+"Sources" include all paper documents, computer hard drives and other electronic
+storage media (e.g., CDs/DVDs, thumb drives, etc.), laptop computers, PDAs, Blackberry
+devices, and any other location where paper documents or electronic data is stored. Sources of
+potentially relevant information may also include personal computers or personal email accounts
+you use or have access to at home, or anywhere else. Also, relevant electronic data may be
+located on inaccessible storage media, such as backup tapes, which must be preserved as well, if
+an identical copy is not found elsewhere.
+In order to comply with its legal obligations, the USAO-SDFLA must immediately
+preserve all existing documents and data relevant to the claim/investigation described above and
+suspend deletion, overwriting, or any other possible destruction of unique, potentially relevant
+information.
+Effective immediately, all routine destruction efforts under USAO-SDFLA's
+existing document management and email policies are suspended for all information relevant to
+the above-referenced lawsuit.
+Guidance on how to preserve relevant documents and data should be directed to dacquie
+Vanao, IT-Manager at
+on whom I am copying this letter. If you have
+any questions on how to comply with this directive, please contact Jacquie at extension 9218.
+Electronically stored information is an important and irreplaceable source of discovery
+and/or evidence in this matter. You must take every reasonable step to preserve this information
+until further notice. Failure to do so could result in severe penalties against the USAO-SDFLA
+and you. Intentional destruction or deletion of any document or data relevant to the lawsuit will
+not be tolerated by the USAO-SDFLA and could expose you to criminal sanctions.
+I will contact those of you with more detailed information on the claims to ensure that !
+have the names of all relevant individuals for the Litigation Hold. In addition, in accordance
+with DOJ guidelines, you will be contacted in the future for an update on your preservation
+efforts and to answer any questions you may have. In the interim, if this correspondence is
+unclear, please contact me at extension 9290, for any assistance you may require.
+In accordance with Department of Justice guidelines, please sign and date a copy of
+this letter in the space provided below as an acknowledgment that vou have received, read,
+
+
+Re: Jane Does #1 and #2 |. United States
+Page -4-
+Privileged Communication
+Should you have any questions, please feel free contact me.
+Regards,
+WIFREDO A. FERRER
+UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
+By: 105
+JAW/attachments
+cc:
+Acknowledgment of Receipt of Litigation Hold Letter:
+I acknowledge that I have received and read the Litigation Hold letter dated November 2, 2010
+regarding Jane Does #1 and #2 |. United States, Case No.: 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/Johnson and i have
+taken and agree to continue to take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve the documents and data as
+instructed in the letter and Form appended thereto.
+Dated: the
+day of November, 2010
+Signature
+Printed Name of Signatory
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fd01421bbaba8d5597f90145c8c39a7171fd5e70629664e639b954e124f21d61.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fd01421bbaba8d5597f90145c8c39a7171fd5e70629664e639b954e124f21d61.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5e32794b9e91f908f5512bfc16f2bb69a901a5e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fd01421bbaba8d5597f90145c8c39a7171fd5e70629664e639b954e124f21d61.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -201,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fd01421bbaba8d5597f90145c8c39a7171fd5e70629664e639b954e124f21d61",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 5,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "0f72581b0b7be4aa84b323ff242fdf560e5fb413e82abdee799b21aac0a21d6b",
+  "output_sha256": "9693a9c2ebdd58146ef9d833a61350577e39cef718caed1a9e96fc991093b3cc",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fd7eaaeeff811d6971766980a55c3a392510d24a071fb9b40b1c28b6ac433865.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fd7eaaeeff811d6971766980a55c3a392510d24a071fb9b40b1c28b6ac433865.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d8eb1e2f348e2b4a28d040508a4e68428ec3d1e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fd7eaaeeff811d6971766980a55c3a392510d24a071fb9b40b1c28b6ac433865.md
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+U.S. Department of Justice
+United States Attorney
+Southern District of Florida
+DELIVERY BY ELECTRONIC MAIL
+Roy Black, Esq.
+Black Srebnick Kornspan & Stumpf P.A.
+201 S. Biscayne Blvd, Suite 1300
+Miami, FL 33131
+Re: Jeffrey Epstein
+Dear Mr. Black:
+On July 17, 2011, the Office received a written request from the District Attorney of the County
+of New York for a copy of the signed Non-Prosecution Agreement and the list of identified victims that
+was provided to Mr. Epstein pursuant to the Non-Prosecution Agreement. Pursuant to the District
+Attorney's request, the U.S. Attorney's Office intends to disclose these items tol
+Assistant District Attorney, at 5:00 p.m. on Friday, July 22, 2011. Pursuant to the terms of the Non-
+Prosecution Agreement, the Office is hereby giving you notice of this intended disclosure.
+Sincerely,
+Wifredo A. Ferrer
+United States Attorney
+cc
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fd7eaaeeff811d6971766980a55c3a392510d24a071fb9b40b1c28b6ac433865.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fd7eaaeeff811d6971766980a55c3a392510d24a071fb9b40b1c28b6ac433865.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..601ca542ddb4364ae78dd9307ae3743d08247f2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fd7eaaeeff811d6971766980a55c3a392510d24a071fb9b40b1c28b6ac433865.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -12,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fd7eaaeeff811d6971766980a55c3a392510d24a071fb9b40b1c28b6ac433865",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "d84680e602fcadfb8bcba1f8f690c043d31aa35b8e4c78fc543d84d6598a322b",
+  "output_sha256": "7880b954bbca1b79dcf52fd22d3ebb760f81c54ff2cfd203b83ea1b90a0c2b3f",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fdadb5f2b3def445bb352112f970085c48b4fce3360c720dd06f3582106c9905.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fdadb5f2b3def445bb352112f970085c48b4fce3360c720dd06f3582106c9905.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b0202e9f03182edf4fd25462b8c7789459f9dc19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fdadb5f2b3def445bb352112f970085c48b4fce3360c720dd06f3582106c9905.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1933 @@
+Questions or Changes?
+• attwireless.com
+Toll Free 1 866 293-4634
+611 from your wireless phone
+• TTY users - 1 866 4-AWS-TT
+SUMMARY OF MONTHLY CHARGES FOR ACCOUNT 0035224228
+Previous
+Payments
+Balance
+Received
+-52.54
+0.00
+Account
+Adjustments
+0.00
+Balance
+Forward
+-52.54
+Your billing cycle ended on July 11, 2004
+Current Monthly Charges
+Subscriber Adjustments
+Monthly Service
+Monthly Usage
+Charges
+Credits
+Taxes, Surcharges & Regulatory Fees
+Total Current Monthly Charges DUE UPON RECEIPT
+TOTAL AMOUNT DUE
+Date of Invoice: July 12, 2004
+Current Monthly
+Charges
+52.54
+Total
+Amount Due
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+5.16
+0.00
+0.00
+52.54
+0.00
+ALL MONTHLY CHARGES IN YOUR BILL ARE DUE & PAYABLE FOR
+THE ENTIRE BILLING CYCLE COVERED BY THE BILL. FOR ANY
+TERMINATION (INCLUDING WHEN YOU SWITCH YOUR WIRELESS
+NUMBER TO ANOTHER CARRIER), YOU WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR
+PAYMENT FOR ALL FEES AND CHARGES THROUGH THE END OF THE
+BILLING CYCLE. FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT BILLING AND
+YOUR RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, PLEASE CONSULT THE TERMS
+AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE IN YOUR SUBSCRIBER AGREEMENT.
+AT&T WIRELESS APPRECIATES YOUR BUSINESS
+lease Retum This Portion With Your Paymen
+with to General Terms and Contions for wries serie.
+2 AT&T Wireless
+Account Name:
+ee reversé - signature requires
+Date Due
+UPON RECEIPT
+Note: =>
+We Print on
+Front and Back
+Service # 5613080282
+Account # 0035224228
+Total
+Amount Due
+0.00
+Chack her for change.
+Amount
+Paid
+#BWNHNGB
+#0000000352242283# w
+.S.01.02.0011.0000
+AT&T WIRELESS
+PO BOX 8229
+AURORA IL 60572-8229
+
+
+
+Recurring Electronic Fund Transfer (REFT): To enroll: sign below, check the REFT box on the reverse side and
+remit with this month's payment. Keep paying your bill until your statement indicates "Do Not Pay". REFT
+Agreement: I authorize my financial institution to deduct the amount of my monthly wireless phone bill from the
+account associated with the enclosed check and remit payment to AT&T Wireless. This authority will be effective
+until I notify AT&T Wireless to terminate it. I agree that I may be assessed a service charge (up to $20) or late fee
+or both if a payment is returned by my bank. For more information visit attwireless.com/ocs or call 1 866 293-4634.
+Please keep a copy of the form below and this REFT Agreement for your records or retain a copy of the blank form
+from next month's invoice.
+Questions? We can help: AT&T Wireless appreciates your business and welcomes the opportunity to assist you.
+As part of our commitment to you, we are always adding new calling plans and promotions to match your individual
+needs. Visit our website at attwireless.com or contact Customer Care by dialing 611 from your wireless phone or 1
+866 293-4634. ¿ Sabías que también ofrecemos servicio al cliente en tu idioma? Marca 611 desde tu teléfono
+inalámbrico ó 1 866 293 4634 desde cualquier teléfono y oprime el *.
+Driving Wireless Safety: Your wireless phone gives you the freedom and flexibility to stay in touch when you
+travel, but don't let a phone call distract you from driving safely. Use hands-free device if allowed or required by
+law. Call Carefully, Arrive Safely.
+AT&T Wireless Processing Fees: Accounts suspended for non-payment will be subject to a $25 reactivation fee
+per line and may be assessed a security deposit prior to reinstatement. Checks returned for non-sufficient funds will
+be charged up to a $20.00 fee.
+Local Tax: Local taxes are based on local government boundaries, the address information you provide for your
+account and/or your wireless telephone number. Please review the local tax charges on your bill. If you believe
+there is an error in the local tax charge, please contact us immediately at 1 866 293-4634. Please note that some
+local or state laws may require you to follow special procedures when notifying us about a local tax dispute. You
+may also use the form below to notify us of any change to your taxing address. Thank you for your cooperation.
+Early Termination Fee (ETF): If you cancel service before your contract end date (including if you switch your
+wireless number to another carrier), you will be charged an Early Termination Fee of up to $200.
+Please Send Correspondence To:
+AT&T Wireless Next Generation Correspondence
+P.O. Box 68056
+Anaheim Hills, CA 92817-8056
+0.000025187.6
+Change of Address Only. Please print address clearly and check the box on the reverse side. Please contact Customer Care to change the
+Name and transfer Financial Responsibility.
+New Billing Address
+City
+State
+Zip
+Home Phone (
+Work Phone (.
+If your billing address is NOT your Tax Address*, please enter the Tax Address below. (Multi-line accounts should attach a list of each wireless number and
+the respective Tax Address.)
+New Tax Address*
+Wireless Number (
+City
+State
+Zip
+Inder Federal laws, your Tax Address must be: your primary place of use, your residential or business address, and located within AT&T Wireless
+censed service area. Non-business customers on AT&T Digital One Rate, Regional Advantage or Shared Advantage plans must use their residenti
+address as their tax address.
+Recurring Electronic Fund Transfer (REFT) Enrollment. Please read the agreement on the top portion of this page, sign below and check the
+"REFT Registration" box on the reverse side.
+6.1 - 3G
+Financial Account Holder Signature
+• • I do not wish to receive email notilication of special ofers avalable to AT&T Wireless customers.
+
+
+
+THE CHARGE FOR AT&T WIRELESS 411 INFO IS INCREASING
+$.25. THE NEW COST OF $1.50/CALL WILL BE EFFECTIVE
+8/18/04. GET THE SAME GREAT FEATURES AND SERVICES, SUCH
+AS: DRIVING DIRECTIONS, MOVIE TIMES & RESTAURANT
+LISTINGS. WE WILL CONNECT YOU AT NO ADDITIONAL CHARGE,
+PLUS WE WILL SEND THE NUMBER VIA TEXT MESSAGE! FOR
+MORE INFO ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, CONSULT
+THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS IN YOUR SUBSCRIBER AGREEMENT.
+ACCOUNT DETAILS
+Detail of Other Account Charges
+Item Description
+1 30 DAY BALANCE EXPIRATION
+Total of Other Account Charges
+Current Subscriber Monthly Charges and Credits
+Subscriber Number
+Subscriber Name
+
+Total Current Subscriber Monthly Charges and Credits
+Total Current Monthly Charges
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY
+Monthly Service Charges
+Item Description
+Service Dates
+1 CALL WAITING
+06/12/04 - 07/11/04
+2 CALLER ID
+06/12/04 - 07/11/04
+3 GO PHONE $53.98 REPLENISHMENT
+06/12/04 - 07/11/04
+4 THREE WAY CALLING
+06/12/04 - 07/11/04
+5 GO PHONE UNLIMITED NIGHTS AND WEEKENDS
+06/12/04 - 07/11/04
+6 DETAIL BILLING
+06/12/04 - 07/11/04
+Total Monthly Service Charges
+Monthly Usage Charges
+Item Description
+1 UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+2 CALL WAITING
+3 MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+4 TEXT MESSAGES SENT
+5 AIRTIME MINUTES
+6 411 INFO
+7 MMODE/DATA USAGE
+Onty Used
+1242 MIN
+8 EVI
+26 EVI
+6 EVT
+477 MIN
+3 EVT
+10 KB
+5.16
+5.16
+52.54
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.60
+42.93
+3.75
+0.10
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY - CONTINUED
+Monthly Usage Charges - Continued
+Item Description
+8 DROP CALL CREDIT
+Total Monthly Usage Charges
+1,024 Kilobytes (KB) = 1 Megabyte (MB)
+Onty Used
+I MIN
+TOTAL CHARGES FOR (561)308-0282
+DETAIL OF CURRENT ACTIVITY
+VOICE USAGE FOR (561)308-0282
+Item Date Time Called
+2 06/12 12:17A 15611602-9566
+/12 12:17A 1
+3 06/12 12:22A (954)655-0720
+06112
+12•23A
+: 12:24A
+06/1
+2 12:28A
+06/12
+12:30A 561328-673
+2.384
+06112
+12:45A (561)313-6730
+11
+12•46A
+/12 12:47A (561)346-1086
+14
+06
+NONi
+IN
+• 01:01A
+88
+01:21A (561)255-9697
+17
+/12 02:09A
+19 06/12 03138
+29 0612 0348Р
+3308/12 0458P 381,308-0265
+NPALMBEACH
+NPALMBEACH
+06/12 10:42P (561)252-4753
+/2 11:33P (561)255-9697
+(561|255-9697
+1312:29A 1561/233-9697
+06/13 12:29A
+ИЗ 12474 (381)255-9687
+06/13 12:53A
+06/13 02:45A
+06/13 03:29A
+06/13 05:53A
+613 12.39A
+08h3 07 11₽
+• (561)795-7900
+06/13 07:50P (561/255-9697
+6/13 07:51
+6/13 09:37P (561)255-969
+FL
+OMIN
+OM
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+
+
+0.00
+
+П01010 0 0000100001012
+D.000025188
+
+0.00002518฿
+
+Onty
+Item Date Time
+Called
+Calls To
+Used
+
+09:32Р 361)313-6730
+LAKE WORTH EL
+IMIN
+50 06/13 09:52P (561313-6730
+LAKE WORTH FL
+06/13 00:12F
+COMIN
+D6/13 10:1
+53
+(561)333-0180
+PALMBEACH F
+2 MIN
+06/13 10:20P
+06/13 18:38P (561)324-1018
+2 MIN
+56
+06/13 11:10P
+2 MIN
+06/13
+58
+06
+/14 O1:
+01220
+MPALMBEACH F
+2 MIN
+PALMI
+885
+1681255-9697
+06/14 02:53A
+06/14 03:32A
+114
+61 255-969
+611346-108
+WALMBEACH FL
+I MIN
+06/14 03:444
+06/14
+COMING
+13:49 А
+COMIN
+4 MIN
+06/14 03:57A (561)818-3906
+gN55588888888
+COMIN
+COMIN
+MINC
+OMING
+(561)
+44P
+1541-
+3246
+561 333-0180
+MPALMB
+7p
+(561|667-6898
+SCS
+2 MIN
+
+ALMBEACH FL
+MING
+3MIN
+2 MIN
+(561)333-0225
+PALMBEACH
+13 MIN
+(561/308-0282
+PALMBEACH
+1EVT
+84 06/14 09:21P (561)308-0282
+
+(561)793-9291
+
+3MIN
+5611667-6898
+VPALMBEACH F
+611667-6891
+VPALMBEAC
+1561723-7752
+WPALMBEACH FI
+5MIN
+(561|818-3906
+1MIN
+NPALMBEACH FL
+4MIN
+2MIN
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+2MIN
+4 MIN
+8P
+COMING
+JCOMING
+2 MIN
+2MIN
+(561)723-7752
+08:46P
+NCOMING
+08:49P
+2 MIN
+10:01P (561)308-0282
+TEVT
+104 06/15 10:03P (561)308-0282
+105
+06/15 10:05P
+2 MIN
+8688
+19985
+15
+0:11
+NCOMING
+15
+NCOMING
+18:23P (561)313-6730
+COMIN
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+KE WORTH
+Rate Description
+UNLIMITEB
+UNLIMITED
+N/WKND
+UNLIMITED NWKNO
+UNLIMIT
+NAWKND
+UNLIMITED N/WKND
+NIHITED NAWKN
+LIMITED NAWKN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND
+NUMITED
+N/WKND
+INLIMITED N/WKNI
+UNLIMITED N/WKND
+UNLIMITED NWINE
+N/WKND
+NIMITED N/WENI
+NLIMITED N/WKNI
+88
+ANAT
+UNL
+UNLI
+UNLI
+Godda
+
+9 AIRTIN
+00000000C
+
+Item Date Time
+Called
+119 06/13 19:02 (561)793-9291
+112 06/15 11:15P
+113 06/15 11:36P
+06/16 12 15A
+115 06/16 12:45A
+16 06/16 10:02
+5/16 04-24
+118 06/16 06:49P
+V16 07:58P
+JE
+116 07-59P
+(561)667-6898
+121
+06/16 08:26P
+(561)333-0225
+Calls To
+ICOMING
+COMIN
+COMIN
+COMN
+NCOMING
+NPALMBEACH FL
+Onty
+Used
+Rate Description
+UNLIMITED WIND MIN
+3MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+INLIMITED NIWKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+1 МІГ
+8.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+2 MIN
+1.09 AIRTIME MINUTE
+9 AIRTIME MINUTE
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+8.99
+0.09
+8.18
+0.09
+S880808885888808895997999928000208080808888808825NCE8
+88
+/16 08 28P
+
+08:
+P
+/16
+30.000
+611602-956
+61 602-956
+(561
+561
+)252-4753
+(561)252-4753
+(561)723-7752
+LAKE WORTH FL
+CUMIN
+FL
+EEEEEEE
+FL
+OMIN
+G
+MIL
+0:09 AIRTIME MINUTE:
+L09 AIR
+IN 0.09 A BUME MINUTE
+09 AIRTIME MINUTE
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+750--------==_-
+•!!!
+
+00000
+0000
+B888-898088808-088888888808P88888
+0Ó 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 0o
+C000
+
+
+
+Called
+Item Date Time
+75 06/12 07291
+6/17 08:13r
+178 06/17 08:28P
+179 06/17 08:54P
+180 06/17 09:19P (561)313-6730
+181 06/17 09:20P
+182
+(561)795-7900
+06/17 09:51P
+161333-018
+183
+16/17 10:06P
+1611313-673
+184
+185
+06/17 10:14P (561 667-6898
+186
+88
+06
+17
+17
+10:19P
+187
+10:31P (561)313-6730
+06/17 10:32P
+188
+06/17 18:34P (561)313-6730
+10:45P
+(561)541-3246
+117 10:46P
+5611313-6730
+192 06/17 11:08P (561)308-0282
+193 06/17 11:09P (561)667-6898
+194 06/17 11:16P
+(305)555-1212
+195 06/17 11:33P (561)255-9697
+196 06/17 11:34P
+188 06/18 12:094 881253-0728
+198 06/18 1
+199
+280 06/18 12:30A (561)255-9697
+201 06/18 01:14A /561/308-0282
+202 06/18 03:42A
+203 06/18 08:56P
+(561)333-0225
+204 0618 09:05
+16. 252-963
+205 06/18 09:06P
+206
+06/18 09:35P
+(561)635-3454
+207 06/18 09:37P
+208
+/18
+10:1
+200
+BEERNOONE
+
+F0098
+137P (561)635-3454
+05P
+: (561) 635-3454
+11:26P
+5611667-6898
+(561)433-4525
+11:41P
+12:00A (561)667-6898
+/ 12:01A (561)313-6730
+12.004
+18 202-4733
+561)313-6730
+561)313-6730
+12:26A
+12:27A
+226 06/19 12:40A (561)313-6730
+227 06/19 12:43A
+228 06/19 03:58A
+229
+06/19 04:01A (561)255-9697
+230
+231
+06/18
+06/19
+11:15A
+11:43A
+06/18
+561)255-9697
+5611813-6730
+08/13
+(561)313-6730
+Calls To
+NCOMING
+NOOMING
+NCOMING
+LAKE WORTH FL
+TAKE WORTH FI
+LAKE WORTH FL
+NCOMING
+LAKE WORTH FL
+LAKE WORTH FL
+PALMBEACH F
+TLAUDERD
+COMIN
+PALMBEACH P
+VPALMBEACI
+VPALMBEACH
+FL
+FL
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FI
+WALMBEACH EL
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FI
+LAKE WORTH FL
+AKE WORTH
+UPAI MRFACI
+AKE WORTH F
+AKE WORTH FI
+LAKE WORTH FL
+LAKE WORTH FL
+ICOMINI
+AKE WORTH F
+Qnty
+Used
+Rate Description
+15 MIN 0:09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+UNLIMITED N/WKND
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+UNLIMITED
+N/WKND
+2 MIN
+UNE MITEBI
+3MN
+UNLIMITED
+N/WKND
+2 MIN
+INLIMITED N
+WKND
+INLIMITED
+N/WKNO
+2MIN
+UNLIMITED
+N/WKND
+VLIMITED
+N/WKNO
+NUIMITED
+NAWKNO
+UNEMITEBI
+N/WKND
+1EVT
+2 MIN
+2MIN
+1 EVT
+1.25
+2 MIN
+2MIN
+EV
+0.09
+2MIN
+SMIN
+1 EVT
+CALL
+3 MIN
+JNLIN
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+1EVT
+3MIN
+4 MIN
+0.09
+.35
+0.09
+0.09
+0.09
+
+Called
+Item Date Time
+238 06/19 04:778
+239 06/19 04:21P (561)313-6730
+240 06/19 05:218
+06/19 05:41P (561)346-1086
+242 06/19 05:42P
+243 06/19 05:43P (561)346-1086
+244 06/19 05:53
+245 06/19 06:38P
+247 06/19 07:03F
+06/19 07:03P
+248 06/19 07:15P
+06/19 08:03P
+232 06/19 08:080
+253 06/19 08:13P (561)308-0282
+Calls To
+COMIN
+COMIN
+LAKE WORTH FL
+COMIN
+VPALMBEACH F
+WPALMBEACH FI
+NCOMING
+COMIN
+JCOMIN
+COMIT
+COMIN
+COMIN
+Onty
+Used
+SMIN
+MIL
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+6MIN
+2 MIN
+2MIN
+Rate Description
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITE
+D N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+INLIMITED NWKND MIN
+JNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED NWKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED MAKE MIN
+UNLIM
+NLIMITED NWKND MIl
+NLIMITED N/WKND MIl
+0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 00 00 0 88 88888888
+
+(561)346-1086
+
+(561)31
+3-H
+(561)81
+18-3906
+WPALM
+WPAL
+OMI
+
+- 1338
+D.000025189
+
+
+
+
+Item Date Time Called
+Calls To
+Onty
+Used
+02 06/20 08:03P
+3 06/20 08:06P 561951-778
+304 06/20 08:07P
+305 06/20 08:09P (561313-6730
+306 06/20 08:32P
+88 06/20 09:25P 15611783-829
+08 ÔI
+309 06/20 09:27P
+06/20 10:080 581/23-9695
+312 06/20 10:10P
+314 06/20 18:12P (561)255-9697
+316 06/28 135P
+(561)818-3906
+317 06/20 11:50P
+(561)798-6685
+
+12:
+2:03A
+125A
+=99999
+1:26A
+:7A
+(561)313-6730
+No inca
+1A
+(561)667-6898
+38P
+12.39P
+
+9888898-980
+(561)723-7752
+7:26P
+(561)308-0282
+99N9188888888888
+9:19P
+(561)635-3454
+:47P
+
+611255-969
+611324-101:
+(561)324-1018
+Rate Description
+LAKE WORTH FL
+VPALMBEACH E
+PALM
+/PALMBEACH F
+JCOMING
+COMIN
+PALMBEACH P
+COMING
+NOREACH
+EV
+IMIN
+2 MIN
+EMIN
+OMING
+MING
+COMING
+MING
+MING
+OMING
+ILMBEACH FI
+37MIN
+SMIN
+NIWKND M
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+ALL WAITING
+JNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+INLIMITED WIND MIF
+D N/WKND MIr
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+INLIMITED NWKND MIl
+INLIMI
+NIWKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED NAWKND MIN
+WEND MIN
+NWKND MIN
+0.
+0.
+00
+
+8888 88883888888888
+0000
+8880
+0900
+p000000009900900p099
+
+Onty
+Item Date Time
+Called
+Calls To
+Used
+Rate Description
+367 06/22 0236₽
+RAMIN
+368 06/22 03:09P
+NPALMBEACH FL
+SMIN
+8.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+69 06/22 03:16P (561)255-969
+70 06/22 03:17
+NO EACH FL
+2.09 ARTIME MINUTE:
+ARTIME MINUTE:
+371 06/22 03:56P (561)255-9697
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+72 06/22 03:578
+COMIN
+73 06/22 05:14P
+COMIN
+7MN
+2 MIN
+0:09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+IME MINUT
+374 06/22 05:21P
+3MIN
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+06/22 06:59P
+06/22 08:18P
+COMING
+URTIME MINUTE
+COMIN
+19 AIRTIME MINUTE
+377 06/22 08:19P
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+179 06/22 08:42F
+(561)602-9566
+6/22 08:42R
+61/313-6730
+LAKE WORTHEL
+IMIN
+O.09 ARTME MINUTES
+380 06/22 08AAP (561)793-7719
+06/22 08-44P
+NCOMING
+09 AIRTIME MINUTE
+382 06/22 11:16P (561)308-0282
+
+
+(561
+)255-
+-9697
+ood00
+
+3059
+9697
+UNLIM
+UNLIMIT
+UNLIM
+6900
+86
+-8386
+(561)352-9964
+(561)333-0180
+(561)827-3297
+(561)827-3297
+INC
+OMING
+NCOMING
+000000000000C
+COMING
+
+8.27
+0.09
+0.09
+0.09
+8.58
+0.27
+0.09
+0.09
+009.
+2000
+5000-
+
+
+
+Qnty
+Item Date Time
+Called
+Calls To
+Used
+Rate Description
+430 06/25 09:16P
+131 06/25 09
+18P 1981355-9693
+VPALMBEACH F
+VPALMBEACH F
+UNLIMITE NWIND MIN
+) N/WKND MIN
+432 06/25 09:24P (561)352-9964
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+433 06/25 09:29P
+NCOMING
+2 MIN
+434 06/25 09:39P (561|333-9056
+UNLIMITED
+KND MIN
+UNLIMITED NI
+435 06/25 09:48P
+WKND MIN
+2 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+139 06/25 09 33P 981313-3730
+313-6730
+LAKE WORTHEL
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED NAWKND
+438 06/25 09:53P
+561)313-6730
+LAKE WORTH FL
+UNLIMITED N/WKND
+439 06/25 09:54P (561)313-6730
+LAKE WORTH FL
+440 06/25 09•58P
+NUIMITE
+WKND
+NUMITED N/KN
+441 06/25 10:02P
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+42 06 25 10:50-
+2MIN
+143 06/25 11:05P (561)308-0282
+IMIN
+NLIMITED N/WKND MI
+VLIMITED N/WKND MI
+1 EVT
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+444 06/25 11:06P
+445
+(561)252-4753
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+06
+(561 282-8500
+FL
+·/26
+FL
+
+
+88 23998
+(881)
+96
+4754
+S8829
+
+388: 999999888
+88888
+07
+5.
+
+
+99999
+
+Onty
+Item Date Time
+Called
+Calls To
+Used
+Rate Description
+194 06/26 04:19A (581/255-9697
+495 06
+496 06/26 04:15A (561|255-9697
+497
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+06/26 04:16A (561|255-9697
+498 06/26 04:39A
+PALMBEACH
+COMIN
+SMIN
+INLIMITED NAND MIN
+INLIMITED N/KND MIN
+499 06/26 04:55A
+7MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+501 06/26 08:08A (561)255-9697
+WPALMBEACH FI
+2 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+NCOMING
+1MN
+UNLIMITED NIKND MIN
+502 06/26 01:54P (561)324-1018
+2 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+503 06/26 01:58P (561)308-0282
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+1EVT
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+504 06/26 02:07P (561)324-1018
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+06/26
+02:09F
+COMIN
+3MIN
+5 02:12P (561)667-6898
+(PALMBEACH F
+
+02:29P
+6MIN
+UNLIMITED NINE MIN
+INLIN
+COMIN
+LIMITED NIWKND M
+02:36P
+(561)667-6898
+(PALMBEACH R
+12 MIN
+JLIM
+N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+
+
+WPALMBEACH FI
+LING
+13-
+-6730
+Ot0 U
+C023L
+LAKE WORTH
+WPALMBEACH
+
+GONNAN
+
+$89988
+/INTERPARK F
+COMIN
+BE
+I MIN
+2 MIN
+10MIN
+8888
+NANN
+8888
+2 MIN
+2MIN
+1 EVT
+2880N=0889NN=#E=8888888
+
+1MIN
+2 MIN
+1MN
+SMIN
+LAKE WORTH FL
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+2MIN
+3MIN
+WALMBEACH FL
+UNL
+UNL
+INCON
+слі ці
+-6299
+NOOMING
+ND
+ND
+!!!!!!!
+MPALMBEACH FI
+WPALMBEACH FI
+4 MIN
+(561)753-1938
+VPALMBEACH F.
+1MIN
+3 MIN
+COMIN
+EMIN
+0.
+88888
+ARTIME
+E MINUTES
+AIRTIME MINUTES
+AIRTIME
+: MINUTES
+AIRTIME
+MINUTES
+109 AIRTIME MINU
+009 ARTIME
+MINUTE
+
+
+48888
+061920000:0
+
+0.000025190
+
+Onty
+Item Date Time Called
+Calls To
+Used
+Rate Description
+556 06/28 0$:19P
+COMIR
+SOMIl
+3MIN 0:09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+558 06/28 06:21P
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+9 06/28 06:38P (407)415-131
+VINTERPARK FI
+COMING
+IMIN 00 AIRTIME MINUTES
+561 06/28 07:04P
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+562 06/28 0303P
+NOOMING
+NCÕ
+MING
+1 MIN 0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+IMIN
+564 06/28 08:37P
+3MIN
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+565 06/28 08:57P (561)793-7719
+3 MIN
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+3 MIN
+JNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+566 06/28 09:03P (561)793-9291
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+567 06/28 09:90₽
+5611346-1086
+61/333-022
+A MIN
+9 UDico 09.15
+COMIN
+COMIN
+571 06 28 09:38P
+IMIN
+NEMITE NWKND MI
+VLIM
+4MIN
+572 06/28 09:40P
+
+....
+09:48P
+11:24P
+INCOMINC
+12.26A (561)255-9697
+01:02A
+SS
+2MIN
+:18A
+2MIN
+EACH FL
+88.
+20A
+(5611235-9697
+1MIN
+WPALM
+WPALN
+10:46A
+FL
+0.09
+AIRTI
+01:01P
+1MN
+01
+:04P
+(561)308-0282
+WPAI
+NOALBEACH FI
+3MIN
+01
+:53P
+43P
+(561)793-7719
+•54P
+VCO
+MPAI R
+EACH FL
+•59P
+561 255-9697
+1MIN
+0.09
+AIRT
+0.09.
+AIRT
+AIRT
+0.09 AIRTI
+(561j333-0225
+4 MIN
+IMIN
+4MIN
+PALMBEACH F
+(407)415-1314
+ICOMIN
+WINTERPARK FL
+IMIN
+3 MIN
+IMIN
+(561)753-4896
+(561)503-1875
+BOYNTONBCH FL
+MIl
+(561)793-8839
+2MIN
+09 AIRTIN
+9 AIRTIN
+0.09 AIRTIME
+8:09
+AIRTIM
+0.09
+co
+INCOMINC
+2 MIN
+(561)723-7752
+aMIN
+AIRTIM
+AIRTIME
+(407)415-1314
+0.09
+WINTERPARK FL
+2 MIN
+6MIN
+(561)308-0282
+2 MIN
+1 EVT
+608
+JNLIM
+IESSAC
+(561)308-0282
+TRIEVAL
+06/29 09:48P
+609
+06/
+IFVT
+
+
+10:20P (561)889-3059
+RMIN
+11:06P
+2MIN
+12:18A (407)415-1314
+WINTERPARK FL
+12
+:42A
+1MN
+58:
+IMIN
+39P (561)317-3348
+NOALNBEACH FL
+MINN
+UNLIMIT
+UNLIM
+UNLIMIT
+8.09
+AIRTIME MINUTES
+8.89
+0.09
+0.09
+0.09
+0.09
+0.09
+0.27
+0.27
+
+8:09
+Item Date Time
+Called
+Calls To
+8 06/30 04:41
+06/30 04-41
+620 06/30 06:01P
+121 06/30 06:29P
+22 06/30 06:35F
+623 06/30 06:49P
+24 06/30 07:10R
+25 06/30 07-54P
+626 06/30 08:00P
+627
+06/30 08:02P
+628 06/30 08:10P
+629 06/30 08:11P
+(561)509-1875
+681 06/30 08:29P
+(561)333-0180
+63 06/30 08 33P
+(786)252-2171
+ICOMIN
+ICOMIN
+ICOMIN
+ICOMIN
+NCOMING
+BOMNTONBOH FLE
+ICOMIN
+(PALMBEACH F
+ICOMIN
+IAMI P
+634 06/30 09:16P
+
+(561)379-484
+(561)252-4753
+Onty
+Used
+Rate Description
+EMIN 0:09 ARTME MINUTES
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+I MIN
+0.09 ARTME MINUTE
+RTIME MINUTE
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+2 MIN
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUT
+AMIN
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+IRTIME MINUTE
+9 AIRTIME MINUTE
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+EMIN
+8:09 AIRTME MINUTES
+AR
+09 AIRTIME MINUTE
+
+1.18
+1.09
+0.09
+0.09
+0.09
+0.09
+0.09
+18
+8:09
+0.09
+0.09
+8.92
+(561)308-0282
+647 07/01 01:25A (561)308-0282
+6868
+9990
+(561)676-2917
+(561)308-0282
+WESTPLMBCH FL
+(561)793-7719
+(407)415-1314
+561/503-1875
+-6730
+(561)317-3348
+(561)317-3348
+(561)313-6730
+561j313-6730
+07,
+
+(561|308-0282
+677 07/02 09:42P (561)308-0282
+678 07/02 09:46P (561)255-9697
+ICOMIN
+F/-OF-
+1 EV1
+IMIN
+
+cddddddd
+
+ciciddd
+MESSAGE RETRIEVA
+NLIMITED N/WKND MI
+ETRIEV.
+
+
+
+Item Date Time
+Called
+Calls To
+579 07/02 10:02P (561)313-6730
+5BD 07/02 10:06F
+681 07/02 10:29P
+682 07/02 10:56P
+(561)313-6730
+683 07/02 10:58P
+561
+255-9697
+684 07/02 11:03P
+561)255-9697
+685 07/02 11:04P (561)255-9697
+686 07/02 11:06P
+687 07/02 11:31P
+11:45F
+BB9 87/02 11:18F
+690 07/03 12:13A
+692 07/03 12:304
+693
+694
+12:36A
+87/0312:364
+695 07/03 04:21A
+695 87/03 9922A (561)313-6730
+03 11:36A
+698 07/03 11:59A (561)346-1086
+900 87/03
+12: 8P
+(951 725-0528
+701
+5.
+07/03
+12:12P
+(561)333-0180
+1 87703
+(561)346-1086
+701 0703
+81
+LE8P
+(407)415-1314
+706 07/03 02:01P
+708 07/03 02 88
+786)252-2171
+255-
+-9697
+709 07/03 02:50P
+(561)667-6898
+561
+1346-1086
+6611317-3348
+07/03 03:17P
+(954)655-0720
+712 070301128
+(561)667-6898
+715 07/03 04:38P
+(561)667-6898
+716 07/03 04:40P (561)667-6898
+717 07/03 04:50P (561)333-0180
+718 07/03 04:59P
+719 07/03 07:05P
+728 87/03 09:08F
+AKE WORTH F
+VPALMBEACH F
+NOMING
+MING
+NCOMING
+LAKE WORTH FL
+WPALMBE
+• TLAUDE
+WPALMBEACH
+WPALMBE
+I
+NCOI
+G
+WINTERPARK FL
+MIAMI FL
+WPALMBEACH
+WPALMBEACH
+WPALMBE
+WPALME
+FTLAUDERDL
+NCOMING
+07/03 09:08P (561)317-3348
+722 07/03 09:09P
+23 07/03 09:26
+24 07/03 09:40P (561)723-855
+725 07/03 09:41P (561)255-9697
+726 07/03 98:12₽
+28 07/03 11:02P (561)793-77
+9 07/03 11:04
+730 07/04 10:02A (561)333-0180
+31 07/04 10:09
+32 07/04 10:14A (954 655-072
+733 07/04 10:33A
+4 07/04 10:56
+710
+11:194
+736 07/04 11:21A
+51)346-108
+61)346-100
+738 87/04 11:31A (561)346-1086
+739 07/04 11:32A /
+(561)313-6730
+740 07/04 11:48A
+561)255-969
+741 0704 11:494
+5611308-028
+742 07/04 11:52A
+COMIN
+LAUDERDLI
+WALMBEACH FL
+NOOMING
+LAKE WORTH FL
+VPALMBEACH F
+VPALMBEACH F
+Qnty
+Used
+Rate Description
+UNLIMITEB NWIND MIN
+) N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+2 MIN
+UNLIMITED
+2MIN
+UNLIMITED NI
+KND
+WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND
+UNLIMITED NA
+JNLIMITE!
+3MIN
+INLIMITED
+UNLIMITED
+IN
+LIMITED NWKN
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+NUMITE
+NLIMITED NAWKN
+57 MIN
+3MIN
+3 MIN
+2 MIN
+3MIN
+8 MIN
+2MIN
+2MIN
+2MIN
+6MIN
+SMIN
+3MIN
+2 MIN
+OMIN
+OMIN
+2MIN
+1 EVT
+1 Mil
+:00000000000000000000320000020000000800000@Q00@0@0
+
+Item Date Time
+Called
+13 87/04 12:36P 9511655-072
+745 07/04 01:45P
+Calls To
+MADE HEL
+07/04 01:46P
+07/04 0135P (551653-0720
+07/04 01:58P
+0710402:050 854)655-8720
+07/04 02:05P
+07/04 02:06P (786|252-2171
+07/04 02:49P
+954)655-0720
+07/04 02:55P /954|655-0720
+07/04 02:58P
+FLAUBERBL FL
+MIAMI FL
+FLAUBERBL FL
+87/04 04:18P (561)667-6898
+sal
+04:25P
+04:26P
+9697
+Onty
+Used
+Rate Description
+2 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+2 MIN
+3 MIN
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+4 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+INLIMITEB NWINE MIl
+D NWKND MIl
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+INLIMITED N/WKND MIl
+NLIMITED NWKND MIl
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED NWKND MIF
+JWKND MIN
+N/WKND MIN
+UNL
+770
+07
+saa!
+07
+/04
+8P
+MI LEE
+555-
+1212
+
+(561/255:
+- 9597
+(954)655-0720
+868
+(561)667-6898
+CECRECESS
+OMIN
+INC
+.....
+3333333333-3 333333333333339333333333333333333333
+N/WKND MIN
+1.25
+1.25
+
+
+0.000025191
+
+Item Date Time
+Called
+04:03A
+808 07/05 04:13A
+800 07/05 04:144
+Calls To
+VPALMBEACH F
+JCOMING
+Onty
+Used
+IMIN
+IMIN
+1 EVT
+2 MIN
+Rate Description
+812 87/85 84:28A
+04:28A
+813 07/05 05:05A
+814
+15
+705 05:05A (561)723-855
+15 05:08
+816 07/05 05:23A (561)723-8559
+18
+15-434
+19
+20
+97/05 07434
+51)723-858
+11313-673
+821 07/05 07:43A
+(561)667-6898
+
+61131,
+3-6730
+
+0888888888888 88888888 8 6866866
+863g:ggg=28#31908980332998
+
+(561)856-2204
+56112
+252-47:
+-9053
+(PALMBEACH F
+AKE WORTH F
+EMIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNITE WE MIN
+NAWKND MIN
+CALL WAITING
+SLIM
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+NLIMITED N/WKND M
+VLIMITED NIWKND M
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+LIMITED NWKND M
+JLIMITED N/WKND M
+FF
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+coo
+09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+8.0S AIRTIME MINUTES
+.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+O AIRTIME MINUTES
+09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+O9 ANLIMITED WIND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+9 AIRTIME MINUTES
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+NLIMITED N/WKND MI
+INLIMITED N/WKND M
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNITED WINDIN
+IME MINUTES
+09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+09 AIRTIME MINUTE
+UNLIMITED NIWKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+IN
+D N/WKND MI
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+LIMITED WEND M
+INLIMI
+NAWKND MIN
+óódo
+8888
+0.09
+0.09
+0.0g
+0.27
+8.27
+8.99
+0.18
+8:08
+0.54
+8.27
+0.18
+0.18
+0.09
+0.18
+0.09
+0.09
+0.09
+0.27
+0.09
+0:09
+0.09
+0.18
+
+Onty
+Item Date Time
+Called
+Calls To
+Used
+Rate Description
+879 87/08 04:19P
+3 MIN
+8.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+872 07/08 05:29P
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+3 07/08 09:02
+4 07/08 10:39
+(561)723-7752
+SALMBEACH I
+SMIN
+NUMTER AWA
+AWKND M
+875 07/08 10:50P
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+876 07/08 10-550
+COMING
+COMIN
+EMIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+878 07/08 10:59P (561)313-6730
+LAKE WORTH FL
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+79 07/08 11:428
+NOOMING
+80 07/09 12:02A (561)714-9053
+UNLIMITEB WINB MIN
+JNLIMIT
+881 07/09 08:01A
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+885 07/09 0559Р (561)662-8386
+2 MIN
+Q.09 AIRTME MINUTES
+884 07/09 07:12P
+88
+NOOMING
+0.09 AIRTIME MINUTES
+07/09 09:12P
+(561)433-4525
+NPALMBEACH FL
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+886 07/09 09:13P
+(561)204-3613
+2 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+888 07/09 09:26P 561 333-0688
+WPALMBEACHFE
+EMIN
+INLIMIT
+889 07/09 09:54P (561)798-0695
+4 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+891 87/10 12:
+11:5BF
+ЗА (5611723-7752
+COMING
+VPALMBEACH FI
+UNLIMITED WIND MIN
+892 07/10 12:32P (561)333-0180
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+894 87/18 1234P
+INCOMIN
+UNLIMITED WIND MIN
+896 07/10 0321P (561)433-4525
+COMIN
+SALMBEACH I
+UNLIMITED WON MINU
+897 07/10 04:18P (561)333-0180
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+89 0710 0438P 561233-3623
+1MIN
+UNLIMITED WIND MIN
+900 07/10 04:41P (561)333-0180
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+I/0 04:42P (561)252-475
+12 07/10 06-48
+903 07/10 07:39P (561)333-0180
+EMIN
+NWKND MIN
+UNLIMITEB NIWIND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+905 07/10 08 33P 361 20-3613
+SMIN
+UNLIMITED WIND MIN
+906 07/10 08:54P (561 317-3348
+2MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+908 87/10 0838P (239)580-7297
+909 07/10 09:35P
+NCOMING
+2MIN
+UNLIMITED WIN MIN
+910 07/10 10:53P
+911 07/11 10:47Р (561)308-0282
+COMING
+SMIN
+UNLIMITED WIND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+1EVT
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+TOTAL VOICE USAGE FOR (561)308-0282
+DATA USAGE FOR (561)308-0282
+Item Date
+Onty Used
+1 06/30
+5 KB
+2 07/04
+TOTAL DATA USAGE FOR (561308-0282
+Charge Description
+MMODE DATA SANE
+TEXT/MULTIMEDIA MSGS FOR (561)308-0282
+Item Date
+1 06/14
+Time
+Sent To/Revd From
+03:41A
+(561)312-9561
+3:43/
+: 06/14
+4 06/14
+3:46
+161812-3361
+03:48A
+(561)818-3906
+Charge Description
+TEXT MESSAGES SENT
+TEXT MESSAGES SENT
+TEXT MESSAGES SENT
+0.29
+0.09
+0.09
+0.18
+0.09
+0.09
+46.68
+0.05
+0.10
+
+
+
+TEXT/MULTIMEDIA MSGS FOR (561)308-0282 - Continued
+Charge Description
+5 06/14
+TOTAL TEXT/MULTIMEDIA MSG USAGE FOR (561)308-0282
+
+D.000025192
+
+
+
+
+0.000025192
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fdadb5f2b3def445bb352112f970085c48b4fce3360c720dd06f3582106c9905.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fdadb5f2b3def445bb352112f970085c48b4fce3360c720dd06f3582106c9905.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b5d0e532d4a84b8f066d0a434904af4ac55afab9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fdadb5f2b3def445bb352112f970085c48b4fce3360c720dd06f3582106c9905.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -7268,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fdadb5f2b3def445bb352112f970085c48b4fce3360c720dd06f3582106c9905",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 80,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\", \"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.page-footer\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "637dbd0a9266f90418e748576af0f1c1df2c4881a1bbb5aa701215141cc95f33",
+  "output_sha256": "71d04f1f44a70ae6f1c1b4363c61ee4348f4cf0d8532fc68619a067b3124168e",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fdbc6f57e0757f4dad64816dbea3a37556df2be9873ec9128b63607e426f0dee.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fdbc6f57e0757f4dad64816dbea3a37556df2be9873ec9128b63607e426f0dee.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dcc26e968c3fc52d0eb9680d5b8abc71504ea7d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fdbc6f57e0757f4dad64816dbea3a37556df2be9873ec9128b63607e426f0dee.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2347 @@
+× cingular
+LEFEREY E EPSTEIN
+Questions or Changes?
+cingular.com
+* Toll Free 1/
+:
+611 from your wireless phone
+TTY users - 1 866 429-7TTY
+SUMMARY OF MONTHLY CHARGES FOR ACCOUNT
+Previous
+Balance
+382.24
+Payments
+Received
+-382.24
+Late Payment
+Total
+Adjustments
+Your billing cycle began on May 03, 2005 and ended on June 02, 2005
+Current Monthly Charges
+Monthly Service
+Monthly Usage
+Charges
+Credits
+Government Fees and Taxes
+Total Current Monthly Charges
+TOTAL AMOUNT - Due Upon Receipt
+Date of Invoice: June 03, 2005
+Balanct
+Forward
+300.15
+13.32
+14.69
+-5.00
+38.42
+361.58
+Current Monthly
+Charges
+361.58
+Total
+Amount Due
+361.58
+361.58
+NOW YOU CAN SHARE MORE PICTURE MESSAGES THAN EVER WITH
+YOUR CINGULAR PHONE. SNAP A PICTURE, PERSONALIZE IT
+AND SEND IT TO FRIENDS AND FAMILY WITH A CINGULAR,
+VERIZON OR T-MOBILE PHONE. OR, SEND IT TO ANY
+EMAIL ADDRESS. STANDARD USAGE CHARGES APPLY. FOR
+THE BEST VALUE, SHARE PICTURES WITH A MONEY-SAVING
+MONTHLY PICTURE MESSAGING PLAN. VISIT
+WWW.CINGULAR.COM/MULTIMEDIAMESSAGING FOR MORE INFO.
+Account Name: JEFFREY E EPSTEIN
+Please Return This Portion With Your Paymen
+Jse of service or payment of this invoice
+indicates concions for viteless servilterms
+Note: =>
+We Print on
+Front and Back
+Service #
+Account
+Crackes secretse.
+Total
+Amount Due
+361.58
+Amount
+Paid
+#BWNHNGR
+#0000000
+2000244 02 AT 0.517 *AUTO T20 0602 10022.5.22.01.1034.0000
+Date Due
+UPON RECEIPT
+CINGULAR WIRELESS
+PO BOX 8229
+AURORA IL 60572-8229
+
+
+
+Recurring Electronic Fund Transfer (REFT): To enroll: sign below, check the REFT box on the reverse side and
+remit with this month's payment. Keep paying your bill until your statement indicates "Do Not Pay". REFT
+Agreement: I authorize my financial institution to deduct the amount of my monthly wireless phone bill from the
+account associated with the enclosed check and remit payment to Cingular Wireless. This authority will be effective
+until l notify Cingular Wireless to terminate it. I agree that I may be assessed a service charge (up to $20) or late
+fee or both if a payment is returned by my bank. For more information visit cingular.com/myaccount or call 1
+Please keep a copy of the form below and this REFT Agreement for your records or retain a copy of the
+blank form from next month's invoice.
+Questions? We can help: Cingular Wireless appreciates your business and welcomes the opportunity to assist
+you, Visit our website at cingular.com or contact Customer Care by dialing 611 from your wireless phone or 1 L
+* ¿ Sabías que también ofrecemos servicio al cliente en tu idioma? Marca 611 desde tu teléfono
+inalámbrico ó 1
+desde cualquier teléfono y oprime el *.
+Driving Wireless Safety: Your wireless phone gives you the freedom and flexibility to stay in touch when you
+travel, but don't let a phone call distract you from driving safely. Use hands-free device if allowed or required by
+law. Call Carefully, Arrive Safely.
+Cingular Wireless Processing Fees: Accounts suspended for non-payment will be subject to a $25 reactivation
+fee per line and may be assessed a security deposit prior to reinstatement. Checks returned for non-sufficient funds
+will be charged up to a $30.00 fee.
+Local Tax: Local taxes are based on local government boundaries, the address information you provide for your
+account and/or your wireless telephone number. Please review the local tax charges on your bill. If you believe
+there is an error in the local tax charge, please contact us immediately at 1 |
+1. Please note that some
+local or state laws may require you to follow special procedures when notifying us about a local tax dispute. You
+may also use the form below to notify us of any change to your taxing address. Thank you for your cooperation.
+Early Termination Fee (ETF): If you cancel service before your contract end date (including if you switch your
+wireless number to another carrier), you will be charged an Early Termination Fee of up to $200.
+Please Send Correspondence To:
+Cingular Wireless Next Generation Correspondence
+P.O. Box 68056
+Anaheim Hills, CA 92817-8056
+2000244.000001763.7
+Accoung Name and transier Financial Responsibless clearly and check the box on the reverse side. Please contact Customer Care to change the
+New Billing Address
+City
+State
+Zip
+Home Phone (
+_)
+Work Phone (_
+If your billing address is NOT your Tax Address, please enter the Tax Address below. (Multi-line accounts should attach a list of each wireless number
+and the respective Tax Address.)
+New Tax Address
+City
+Wireless Number (
+State
+Zip
+Recurring Electronic Fund Transfer (REFT) Enrollment. Please read the agreement on the top portion of this page, sign below and check
+he "REFT Registration" box on the reverse side
+Financial Account Holder Signature
+• + I do not wish to receive email notification of special ofter avalable to Cingular Wireless customers.
+
+
+* cingular
+ACCOUNT DETAILS
+Detail of Payments - Thank You!
+Item Description
+1 PAYMENT
+Total of Payments
+Date Applied/Reversed Payment Amount
+05/14/05
+-382.24
+Current Subscriber Monthly Charges and Credits
+Subscriber Number
+Subscriber Name
+Total Current Subscriber Monthly Charges and Credits
+Total Current Monthly Charges
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY
+FOR
+Monthly Service Charges
+Item Description
+1 CALL WAITING
+2 TEXT MESSAGING PLAN - 0 MSGS
+3 CALLER ID
+4 VOICEMAIL
+5 DETAIL BILLING
+6 REGULATORY PROGRAMS FEE
+7 CALL FORWARDING
+8 WORLDCONNECT
+9 THREE WAY CALLING
+10 BLACKBERRY $49.99
+11 NATIONAL PLAN $29.99
+Total Monthly Service Charges
+Service Dates
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+Monthly Usage Charges
+Item Description
+1 100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+2 MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+3 UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+4 INCLUDED MINUTES
+Total Monthly Usage Charges
+Onty Used
+Other Subscriber Charges
+Item Description
+1 MCTD SURCHARGE
+2 TELECOM EXCISE TAX
+3 FEDERAL UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND SURCHARGE
+Total Other Subscriber Charges
+382.24
+-382.24
+238.65
+83.18
+39.75
+361.58
+361.58
+1.75
+49.99
+39.73
+0,00
+0.16
+0.71
+Account Name
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY - CONTINUED
+Other Subscriber Credits
+Item Description
+1 $5 MONTHLY CREDIT
+Total Other Subscriber Credits
+Subscriber Government Fees and Taxes
+Item Description
+1 SALES TA>
+• FEDERAL EXCISE TAX
+3 NY CITY UTILITY G.R. SUR
+Total Subscriber Government Fees and Taxes
+TOTAL CURRENT CHARGES FOR L
+DETAIL OF CURRENT ACTIVITY
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Number
+Item Date Time Called
+1 05/06 01:49P
+2 0506 02:56P
+3 05/06 02:59P
+4 05/06 03:07P
+5 05/06 03:23P
+• 05/07 09:58A
+15/08 11:284
+8 05/10 11:12A
+05/10 01:02
+• 05/10 02:19
+11 05/10 08:20P
+12 05/11 12:41P
+13 05/12 11:19A
+14 05/12 04:52P
+15 05/12 06:30P
+16 05/13 11:40A
+17 05/13 12:16P
+19 05/3 0321P
+20 05A3 06.29P
+22 05/16 04:57P
+200341 06 3P
+25
+05/17 06:37P
+26 05/18 02:08P
+27 05/18 08:23P
+11:46A
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+COLUMBUS OH
+COLUMBUS OH
+NEW
+TR
+00
+OH
+OH
+OH
+OH
+OH
+OH
+33
+coLU
+ALB
+LUMBUS
+INCOMING
+Io
+Qnty
+Used
+2 MIN
+Rate
+Description
+100 ADD'L
+1M
+
+
+-5.00
+-5.00
+2.41
+0.87
+1.51
+4.79
+83.18
+IN
+2000244.000001764
+
+
+2000244.000001764
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Number
+Item Date Time Called
+34 05/23 05:13P
+35 05/24 11:45A
+83/2A 12:24p
+12-24P
+05/24 12:25P
+12:35P
+05
+12-42P
+41
+05/24 01:15P
+42
+| 02-41P
+44 05/24 03:45P
+45 05/24 06:10P
+0525 09252
+48
+05/25 10:49A
+07:03P
+12.088
+12:09P
+12:24P
+01:24P
+-36P
+60
+27 02:39P
+05/2B 09:58A
+61 05/2B 11:04A
+62 05/31 04:51P
+63 06/02 08:46A
+TOTAL VOICE USAGE FOR
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+NEW ALBANY OH
+COLUMBUS OH
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NEW
+YORK NY
+COLUMBUS OH
+INCOMING
+COLUMBUS OH
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NE ALBANY OH
+NEW ALBANY OH
+COLUMBUS OH
+NEW
+YORK NY
+NEW
+CANAAN CT
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+COLU
+MBUS OH
+INCOMING
+COLUMBUS OH
+COLUMBUS OH
+NEW ALBANY OH
+INCOMING
+- Continued
+Qnty
+Used Rate Description
+2 MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+3MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+100 ABB'L ANYTE MIN
+1 MIN
+•MIN
+1 MIN
+4 MIN
+1 MIN
+3 MIN
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+3 MIN
+4 MIN
+3MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+DO ADDL ANTIME MI
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+100 ABBL ANY ME MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+NCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MIN
+NCLUDED MINUT
+NCLUDED MINUTE
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+LUDED MI
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+CLUDED MINUTE
+CLUDED MINUTE
+4 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+INCLUBED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+LIMITED NAWKND M.
+ESSAGE RETRIEV,
+3MIN
+LEVT
+2 MIN
+3 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+IESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+VCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY
+FOR
+Monthly Service Charges
+Item Description
+1 CALL WAITING
+2 TEXT MESSAGING PLAN - 0 MSGS
+3 CALLER ID
+4 EARLY EVENING
+S ENH DISCOUNT INTL DIAL
+6 MULTIMEDIA MESSAGING $2.99
+7 VOICEMAIL
+8 MMODE/DATA SERVICE (4MB)
+9 NATIONAL PLAN $149.99
+10 THREE WAY CALLING
+11 REGULATORY PROGRAMS FEE
+12 VOICEDIAL SERVICE $3.99
+Service Dates
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+4.99
+3.99
+2.99
+12.99
+149.99
+1.75
+3.99
+Account Name
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY - CONTINUED
+Monthly Service Charges - Continued
+Item Description
+13 DETAIL BILLING
+14 DISCOUNTED INTERNATIONAL ROAMING
+Total Monthly Service Charges
+Service Dates
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+Monthly Usage Charges
+Item Description
+1 400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+2 UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+3 100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+4 EARLY EVENING NAW KND
+5 INTL TEXT MSG
+6 CALL WAITING
+7 UNLIMITED N/W KND MIN
+8 411 INFO
+9 CALL FORWARDING
+10 MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+11 INCLUDED MINUTES
+12 ENH DISC INT DL
+13 INCLUDED IN PLAN MB
+14 TEXT MESSAGES SENT
+Total Monthly Usage Charges
+1,024 Kilobytes (KB) = 1 Megabyte (MB)
+Other Subscriber Charges
+Item Description
+1 FEDERAL UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND SURCHARGE
+2 MCTD SURCHARGE
+3 TELECOM EXCISE TAX
+Total Other Subscriber Charges
+Subscriber Government Fees and Taxes
+Item Description
+1 LOCAL WIRELESS SURCHARGE
+2 SALES TAX
+3 ST WIRELESS COMM SURCHARGE
+4 FEDERAL EXCISE TAX
+MY CITY UTILITY G.R.SUA
+tal Subscriber Government Fees and Taxe
+TOTAL CURRENT CHARGES FOR |
+Qnty Used
+359 MIN
+100 EVT
+199 MIN
+2 EVT
+22 EVT
+531 MIN
+4 EVT
+14 MIN
+51 EVT
+665 MIN
+9 MIN
+3 KB
+1 EV
+
+5,99
+186.68
+6.20
+2,50
+0.10
+13.32
+5.08
+1.13
+0.30
+16.37
+1.20
+5.79
+3.94
+27.60
+238.65
+
+
+DETAIL OF CURRENT ACTIVITY
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Number
+Called
+Item Date Time
+1 05/03 08:57A
+2 05/03 09:02A
+05/03 09:03A
+05/03 05:437
+05/03 05:45P
+03 06:09P
+103
+06:16P
+05/03 06:19P
+06:42P
+05/03
+06:54
+08:58P
+U4 07:
+04 07:32P
+05/04 07:337
+05/
+04
+07:48P
+05/04
+07:53P
+08:01P
+05/04
+08:02P
+98085
+8888893888899999g
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+PTWASHIGN NY
+COMING
+INCOMING
+NWYRCYZNO1 NY
+INCOMING
+CHTAMSTTHS VI
+IWYRCYZN01 NY
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+RANDOLPH MA
+RANDOLPH MA
+ING
+MIAMI FL
+MIAMI FL
+INCOMING
+MIAMI FI
+INCOMING
+NEW ALBANY OH
+INCOMING
+INC
+OMING
+TANY
+NEW
+YORK
+NY
+WPALMBEACH FL
+K MY
+22
+W
+IN
+G
+YORK NY
+NEW
+Onty
+Used
+Rate Description
+5 MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+1 MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+5 MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME
+1 MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME
+1 MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MO
+3 MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME
+BL
+1MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME
+3MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME N
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+400 ABB' ANYTE N
+2 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+EARLY EVENING NAVRNB
+IG NAKNO
+1 MIN
+2 M
+EARLY EVENING
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+IANAAANMAMNAMA
+ARLY EVENING N/WKN
+3 M
+1M
+29
+UNLIMI
+D'L
+D'L
+UNLIM MO
+KN
+ND
+MO
+BL
+YT
+888888g
+FL
+лий
+Account Name
+
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Number
+Called
+Item Date Time
+65 05/06 09:42A
+66 05/06 09:47A
+05/06 10:50
+: 05/06 10-53
+69 05/06 10:55A
+05/06 10:55A
+05/06 10:58A
+15/06 11:41A
+D5/06 02:031
+05/06 02:54P
+2/0D 03:04
+5106 04:05
+05/06 04:06Р
+05/06 04:13P
+05/06 04:20P
+05/06 04:20P
+05/06 04:23P
+83 05/06 04:31P
+8898
+05
+988888888888888888888888888888808 8088
+7P
+121 05/07 11:33A
+05/07 12:47P
+05/07 01:20P
+05/07 01:30P
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NEWY ORKZN1 NY
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+HTAMSTTHS V
+CHNSTDSTCR VI
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+- Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+2 MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+1 MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+100 ABB'L ANYTE MIN
+1 MIN
+1EVI
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+WAITING
+40D ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+400ABBL ALANTME MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+EMIN
+JNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+FL
+FL
+NEW
+FL
+NY
+NY
+NEW
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+1.50 411 INFO
+400
+2
+ME
+6000
+
+UNL
+MESSAGE
+UNLIMIT
+UNLIMI
+UNLIMI
+UNLIMITED
+1.50
+0000
+IN
+KN
+IE VAL
+KND
+
+
+592T00000 T+Z000Z
+* cingular
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Number
+Item Date Time Called
+125 05/07 01:37P
+126 05/07 01:57P
+28 85/07 82:261
+2-262
+129 05/07 04:13P
+130 05/07 04:19P
+131 05/07 04:38P
+13
+134 05/07 09:47P
+35 05/07 09:53P
+36 05/07 10:398
+137 05/07 11:03P
+I5/07 11:058
+g5gb555555EE55E5}
+55920 58525395625 552005 3555
+89688 69666383383
+•BEG B36
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NWYRCYZNO1 NY
+Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/KND MIN
+BMIN
+UNLIMITED NO MIN
+2 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+INLIMITED NAKND MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/KND MIN
+INLIMIT
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+ED NAKND MIN
+INLIMITED_NAVKND MIN
+LEVT
+2 MIN
+SMIN
+24 MIN
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+UNLIMITED N/KND MIN
+UNLIMITED
+NAKND
+S688
+IT
+66 1605 (
+M
+IN
+EACH FL
+100
+OH
+RKZN1 NY
+INCO
+388
+G
+ING
+MING
+NEW
+YORK NY
+NEW
+RK NY
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+UNL
+UN
+400
+400
+400
+Account Name
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Number
+Item Date Time Called
+183 05/10 03:50P
+184 05/10 03:53P
+185 05/10 04:11P
+186 05/10 07:46P
+187 05/10 08:12P
+188 05/10 08:31P
+189 05/10 08:40P
+181 05/10 08 378
+192 05/10 08:57P
+193 05/10 09:06P
+194 05/10 09:23P
+195 05/11 08:52A
+09:08A
+09:10A
+Calls To
+W PALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+- Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+1 MIN
+400 ADDL ANYTME MIN
+3 MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+MARION OH
+1 MIN
+EMIN
+3MIN
+EMIN
+3MIN
+EMIN
+1EV
+1 MIN
+IMI
+5 MIN
+2 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+ARLY EVENING NWKNU
+NING N/WKND
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+ARLY EVENING NE
+G NANKN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+LIMITED NAWKND M
+ILL WAITIN
+UNLIMITED MAKE MN
+400 ADDL ANYTME MIN
+0O ADDL ANTIME MI
+
+05/12
+05
+:30P
+NEW
+NEWYORKZN1 NY
+INCOMING
+NWYRCYZN01 NY
+400
+ADDL
+300
+100
+400
+400
+400.
+UNLIM
+400 ADD
+400 ADDL
+400.
+400 ADDL
+400 ADD
+800 AD
+2 MIN
+LM
+IEVT
+1 MIN
+
+
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Number
+Called
+Item Date Time
+245 05/12 05:33P
+246 05/12 05:50P
+7 05/12 05:5.
+18 05/12 05:5
+249 05/12 06:22P
+330 0312 06 278
+252 05/12 07:27P
+3 05/12 07:30
+254 05
+* 07.21
+255 05/12 07:43P
+339 03A 87358
+39 85/12 8358
+59 0
+260 05/12 08:00P
+15/L.
+15/11
+08:04P
+08:08P
+05/12 08:09P
+0312 09.39р
+05/13
+267
+05/L
+08:42A
+268฿
+08:45A
+08:49A
+268
+98:50A
+:50A
+271
+888
+3:53A
+:54A
+: 33A
+274
+275
+09:37A
+5/13
+09:41A
+09:50A
+55
+135A
+1,42P
+1:46P
+1:598
+:03P
+:05P
+:OOF
+:43A
+302
+05/15 10:38A
+SEEP
+Calls To
+NWYRCYZN01 NY
+COMINI
+COMIN
+NEWYORKZNI NY
+IEW YORK NY
+JEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+IY ZONE 1 NY
+INCOMING
+HONOLULU HI
+MIAMI FL
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NWYRCYZNO1
+NWYRCYZNO1 NY
+INCOMING
+NWYRC
+NEW
+ZNO1 NY
+NE
+NEW
+NEW
+ORK NY
+YORK NY
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMIN
+INCOMING
+COMIN
+COMIN
+lEW
+IFL
+NEW
+YORK
+NEW
+NEW
+3333₴
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+N
+OMING
+IEW
+YORK NY
+INCOMING
+IWYRCYZN01 N°
+NCOMING
+NEW
+YORK NY
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+OMIN
+- Continued
+Onty
+Used
+2MIN
+2MIN
+1 MIN
+1MIN
+1 MIN
+10MIN
+1MIN
+3MIN
+2MIN
+2MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+2MIN
+3MIN
+2MIN
+2MIN
+1 MIN
+1MIN
+IMIN
+1 MIN
+5 MIN
+2 MIN
+4MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+2MIN
+SMIN
+SMIN
+4MIN
+LEVT
+1 MIN
+IMIN
+3MIN
+4MIN
+Rat
+NWYRI
+CYZNO1 NY
+TIM r
+00o!
+RK
+1 MIN
+6MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+AMIN
+9MIN
+iMIN
+100
+UNLIM
+UNLIM
+INTIN
+INL
+AD
+400 A
+400
+400
+A
+UNLIM
+UNLIM
+ME
+UN
+ME
+UNLIN
+GROU
+Number
+WKI
+KND
+Account Name
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Number
+Called
+Item Date Time
+307 05/15 01:12P
+03-20P
+05/15 03:458
+05/15 03:50P
+05/15 04:05P
+0515 8432F
+04:42R
+05/15 05:58P
+
+07:18P
+15 07:18P
+10:39P
+09-20A
+Calls To
+W YORK I
+EW YORKI
+W YORK NY
+YORK
+COMIN
+ITAMSTTHS 1
+"COMING
+HTAMS1
+THS VI
+INCOMING
+NY
+- Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+2 MIN
+1EVT
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+MIT
+6MIN
+2MIN
+2MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+3 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+6MIN
+UNLIMTEB NONE MIN
+UNLIMIT
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMIT
+UNINTER
+NO MIN
+ND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMIT
+D NAVKND MIR
+UNLIM
+END MIN
+UNLIMITED N
+WKND MIN
+UNLIMIL
+UNLIMITEB NAVIND MIN
+UNLIMITED NAVKND MIR
+UNLIMITED NAND MIN
+UNLIMITED NAKND MIN
+DO ADD'L ANTIME MI
+
+шш
+UN
+JuNk
+-000
+
+NEW
+2000
+0832 0 0х4
+XXX
+RK
+NY
+VI
+IN
+LI
+M
+2000244.000001766
+
+
+Account Name
+
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Number
+Item Date Time Called
+367 05/17 08:13A
+368 05/17 08:18A
+369 05/17 08:23A
+370 05/17 08:39A
+372
+05/17
+373
+05
+08:49A
+08:51A
+05/17
+08:58A
+05/17
+nE
+08:59A
+19:05A
+376
+05/17
+09:09A
+05/17
+09:38A
+378 05/17
+02:04P
+379 05/17 02:09P
+380
+05/17
+02:35P
+
+38P
+59P
+g÷BBe9º0®9=909839639699
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+Toll Free CL
+Toll Free CL
+WILLOUGHBY OH
+NCOMING
+COMING
+INCOMING
+WILLOUGHBY OH
+Toll
+Free C
+MARION OF
+JEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+• Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+4 MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+6MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+AMIN
+CLOSED CRETES
+2 MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+LIM NOBLTO MOB
+CLUDED MINUTE
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+4 MIN
+1 MIN
+12 MIN
+1 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+NCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+CLUDED ANUE
+NLIM MOBL TO MOB
+EVT
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1.50 ALINDED MINUTES
+INFO
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+ICLUDED MINUTE
+
+
+
+IN
+0000d 60000838}
+33333
+K
+333333 =
+< 83
+NY
+SPREEE
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Number
+Called
+Item Date Time
+429 05/18 05:09P
+430 05/18 05:10P
+31 05/18 05:12
+32 05/18 05:13
+433 05/18 05:54P
+434 05/18 06:02P
+435 05/18 06:06P
+436 05/18 06:18P
+437 05/18 06:19P
+438 05/18 06:26P
+39 05/18 06:328
+40 05/18 06-59P
+441|
+442
+1245A
+01-16A
+443
+01:16A
+444
+445
+399®84:8329203233898028033000902009966391
+
+23A
+Calls To
+NY ZONE 1 NY
+W PALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+mobile UK
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+•PALMBEACH E
+- Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+1 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+LMIN
+IMIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+UNLIM
+1 MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+12MIN
+NCLUDED MINUTES
+JNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+1 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+EMIN 0.28 ENCLODED MINUTES
+1 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+LMIN
+1 MIN
+IMI
+2 MIN
+CLUDED MINUTES
+INUTE
+UNLIMITE NW INB MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+INCLUBED MINUTES
+0.28
+1.50
+
+
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+- Continued
+Number
+Item Date Time
+Called
+Onty
+Calls To
+Used
+Rate Description
+494 05/19 07:37P
+WPALMBEACH FL
+2 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/KND
+495 05/19 10:12P
+2MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+496 05/20 09:05A
+1EVT
+UNLIM NOBL TO MOBL
+INLIM
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+197 05/20 18:33A
+COMIN
+EW YORK N'
+1MIN
+NLIM MOBL TO MOB
+NLIM MOBL TO MOB
+1EVT
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+300 05/20 128A
+INCOMING
+2MIN
+ICLUDED MINUTE
+1 MIN
+NUM MOBL TO MỖB
+501 05/20 12:00P
+1EVT
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+INLIM MOBL. LO MOB.
+ESSAGE RETRIEVA
+202 02/20 12:030
+20 12:02P
+INCORNY
+IMIN
+CLUDED MINUTE
+OMING
+504 05/20 12:13P
+BOCA RATON FL
+6MIN
+CLUDED MINUTE
+1MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+05 05/20 12:141
+NEW
+06 05/20 12:32F
+1 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+2 MIN
+IEVT
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+588 05/20 13:328
+INCOMING
+1 MIN
+NEW
+YORK NY
+1 MIN
+1EVT
+5100512002:080
+1 MIN
+AMIN
+1.50
+1.50
+511 05/20 01:21P
+512 05/20 01:43P
+513 05/20 02:05P
+514 05/20 02:07P
+E15 75
+20 03:42P
+319 05/20
+24:135
+518 05/20 05:24P
+19 05/21 09:54.
+30 05/21 10:11A
+521 05/21 10:45A
+522 05/21 11:02A
+333 03/21 01:07₽
+25 05/21 01:09
+527 05/21 03:14P
+528 05/21 07:18P
+529 05/21 09:09P
+30 05/21 09:12
+31 05/21 09:13
+532 05/21 10:21P
+533 05/21 10:46P
+534 05/22 02:29P
+535 05/22 02:31P
+536 05/22 02:44P
+537 05/22 04:00P
+538 05/22 04:24P
+539 05/22 05:31P
+INCOMING
+ING
+OMING
+EW
+YORK NY
+'ALMBEACH FL
+W YORK NY
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+OMING
+EW YORK NY
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NWYRCYZNO1 NY
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+1EVT
+IMIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1EVT
+1 MIN
+IMIN
+2 MIN
+EMIN
+NCLL
+1MIN
+EMIN
+1EVT
+OMIN
+IMIN
+1 MIN
+MIl
+EV
+Mil
+1EVT
+MIl
+IMIN
+1EVT
+6MIN
+1EVT
+1 MIN
+IEVT
+3MIN
+1 MIN
+IEVT
+3MIN
+24 MIN
+2 MIN
+Account Name
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Number
+Item Date Time Called
+Calls To
+540 05/22 05:45P
+541 05/22 09:32P
+542 05/22 09:48P
+543 05/23 10:08A
+544 05/23 11:30A
+545 05/23 12:04P
+546 03/23 13.24₽
+548 05/23 12:34P
+549 05/23 12:39P
+50 05/23 12:45P
+51 05/23 12:531
+899
+PARAD PERSE
+88888
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+~COMING
+INCOMING
+VEENS N
+ICOMING
+INCOMING
+- Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+1EVT
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+2 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+LIMITED NAWKND M
+ESSAGE RETRIEVA
+1 MIN
+TOMIN
+LMIN
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+4 MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/KND MIN
+NELUBEB MINUTE!
+CLUD
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+NCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+• NOBLTO MOB
+ESSAGE RETRIEVA
+COMING
+EW YORK NY
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+YORK NY
+INCOMING
+INCOI
+YORK NY
+IG
+INCOMING
+NEW TONY
+ORK N
+IF ZONE IN
+NWYRCYZNO1 NY
+INCOMING
+YORK NY
+QUEENS NY
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+mobile UK
+INCOMING
+VY ZONE 1 NY
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+COMING
+INCOMING
+1EVT
+2 MIN
+1MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO
+/T
+EVT
+2 MIN
+1MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+SMIN
+I MIN
+2MIN
+5 MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+76 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+EMIN
+4 MIN
+UNLIM
+NCLUDED
+).28 ENH DISC
+7MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+IMIN
+IEVT
+INLIM MOBL TO MOB
+LUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+CALL WAITING
+
+0.28
+2000244.000001767
+
+
+29200000Z0002
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Number
+Called
+Item Date Time
+596 05/25 10:56A
+597 05/25 10:56A
+598 05/25 10:58A
+599 05/25 11:20A
+60D
+601
+05/25
+05/25
+11:22A
+11-24A
+602 05/25 12:33P
+603 05/25 12:33P
+604 05/25
+12-40P
+01:18P
+:1gP
+
+55P
+:04P
+i00eg030896055
+188
+8889989{885
+
+S CO00080EEEB8SE88
+
+
+
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+MARION OH
+NEWYORKZNI NY
+INCOMING
+NEWYORKZNI NY
+• Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+1 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+3 MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+' ALL WAITING
+3MIN
+EMIN
+1 MIN
+MI'
+EV
+4 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUBED MINUTES
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+WAITING
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+LIM MOBL TO MO
+LUDED MINUTI
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+3MIN
+2 MIN
+L MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED
+UTES
+= = ₴ ą
+UNL
+NV
+IYRI
+UNLI
+IG
+1.50
+Account Name
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Number
+Item Date Time Called
+658 05/26 06:49P
+659 05/26 07:04P
+
+662 05/27 08:26A
+663 05/27 08:52A
+664 05/27 08:54A
+7 09:16
+667 05/27 09:32A
+69 05/27 10:55
+671 05/27 133A
+672 05/27 02:56P
+673 05/27 03:38P
+174 05/27 03:30P
+
+Coo 000 0 00 8 000039009008895895895899838
+• Continued
+Onty
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+Used
+Rate Description
+BMIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+1 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+1 MIN
+3 MIN
+UNLIMITE NAWNB MIR
+JNLIM
+mobile UK
+INCOMING
+INCOMINGK NY
+NY ZONE 1 NY
+7 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+MIl
+0.28 ENH DISC INT DL
+NCLUDED MINUTES
+2 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+10MIN
+SMIN
+CLUDER MINUTE
+INUTE
+1 MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+4 MIN
+1 MIN
+INCLUBEB MINUTES
+NCOMING
+1 MIN
+NCOMING
+MIl
+NELUBEB MINUTES
+MINUT
+INCOMING
+1 MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+1 MIN
+NLIM MOBL T0 MOB
+AACCI CO
+CA
+2 MIN
+ÖBi
+= =ũ
+MINUT
+NY
+/EI
+NING
+UNL
+UNLIM
+N7
+UNL
+UN
+RK
+NL
+UNLIMI
+UNL
+88₴
+ING
+UNL
+UNLI
+UN
+IMI
+UNL
+UNLIMIT
+
+1.96
+D
+EESESEEEESEE
+D
+
+
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Number
+Called
+Item Date Time
+721 05/28 04:26P
+722 05/28 04:32P
+23 05/28 04:56
+24 05 28 05:05
+725 05/28 05:52P
+726 05/28 10:08P
+727 05/28 10:16P
+129 03/28 10%151
+28 10:45P
+730 05/28 11:08P
+733 85/23 13:31A
+734
+: 51A
+735 05/29 12:24P
+136
+05/2-
+7 05/
+12:34P
+12:43P
+738 05/29
+739
+01:03P
+051
+01:30P
+741
+05
+01
+30P
+05/29
+02:08P
+U5/2
+02:33P
+43 05/29 02:411
+45 85/29 82418
+45 0
+745
+52350
+748 05/29 03:36P
+749 05/29 06:29P
+750 05/29 08:52P
+751 05/29 11:13P
+752 05/30 09:51A
+753 05/30 12:13P
+754 05/30 12:42P
+755 05/30 12:47P
+756 05/30 01:09P
+758
+130
+01:110
+05/30
+76005/3001
+22F
+761
+05/
+762
+30
+763 05.
+85381
+
+SOP
+766 05/30
+05/30
+768
+05:30
+769 05/30 06:27P
+770 05/30 06:33P
+771 05/30 09:21P
+772 05/30 09:23P
+773 05/30 09:44P
+775 0388 10:254
+:30A
+:27P
+OP
+:30P
+Calls To
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+OMING
+INCOMING
+VPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+NEWYORKZN1 NY
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+IWYRCYZN01 NY
+NCOMING
+W ANGELES EA
+- Continued
+Qnty
+Used
+Rate Description
+3MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED NAKND M
+3 MIN
+UNLIM
+1 MIN
+UNLIM
+ED
+NAWKND
+ED N/WKND
+UNLIM
+ED
+N/WKND MIN
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+UNLIM
+ED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIM
+KND MIN
+UNLIM
+KND
+UNLIM
+KND
+UNLIM
+UNLIM
+UNLIMIT
+UNLIM
+UNLIM
+UNLIM
+UNLIM
+NAW!
+ND
+KNB
+ED
+ED
+/W
+KND
+KN
+D
+ED
+N/W
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+VPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+WPAI MREACH FIl
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+BROOKLYN NY
+lEVI
+3MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+30|N
+1 MIN
+6MIN
+2 MIN
+2MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+SMIN
+1MIN
+1 MIN
+7MIN
+1 MIN
+3 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+11 MIN
+13MIN
+4MIN
+2MIN
+1EVT
+EMIN
+1MIN
+2 MIN
+2MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+IMIN
+2 MIN
+13 MIN
+IMIN
+2 MIN
+lEVI
+9MIN
+1MIN
+2 MIN
+IEVT
+7MIN
+24 MIN
+SMIN
+1 MIN
+3MIN
+6MIN
+MIl
+INCLU
+VCLU
+IN
+UNLIM
+INCLU
+NCLU
+INLIM
+UNLIM
+Account Name
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Number
+Called
+Item Date Time
+779 05/31 12:35P
+780 05/31 04:06P
+781 05/31 04:08P
+782 05/31 04:09P
+05/31 04:118
+785 05/31 04:20P
+786 05/31 04:26P
+787 05/31 04:26P
+8 05/31 06:30P
+19 05/31 04:32P
+790 0531 05568
+792
+05/31 07:26P
+793
+05/31 07:34P
+194
+05/31 07:37P
+Calls To
+Toll Free CL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+I ANGELES C
+I PALMBEACH F
+QUEENS NY
+QUEENS
+NY
+OMIl
+COMIN
+- Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+6MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+2 MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+NELUDED MINDINAL
+1 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+NIM MOBL TO MOB
+LUDED MINUTE
+6MIN
+LMIN
+LEVT
+4 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+E RETRIEVAL
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+CLUDED MINUTE
+NLIM MOBL TO MOB
+3 MIN
+15 MIN
+2MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBI
+ARLY EVENING N/WKND
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+EARLY
+EVENING
+N/W
+KND
+
+
+"71
+i N/WKND
+LAM
+N/W
+IN
+EAR
+UNLI
+INCL
+UD
+USAGE FOR
+12.72
+89LT00000 t720002
+
+
+B92100000 VAZ0002
+DATA USAGE FOR
+Item Date
+1 05/29
+TOTAL DATA USAGE FOR
+Onty Used
+3 KR
+Charge Description
+INCLUDED IN PLAN MB
+TEXT/MULTIMEDIA MSGS FOR
+Item Date
+Time
+Sent To/Rcvd From
+1 05/03
+06:05P
+3 03/03
+0 360
+4 05/04
+09:05A
+5 05/04
+14:23P
+5 05/04
+07:51P
+7 05/05
+09:05A
+9 03/05
+04:072
+16:24P
+19
+J/U
+5/0
+07:36P
+05/05
+07:45P
+08:01P
+88888882883885588899025888888858008[8882
+Charge Description
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+100 INEL: MEGS SENT
+0O INCL
+INTL TEXT MSG
+LOD INCH.
+G5 SE
+INCL.
+100 INCL.
+MSGS SENT
+INCL
+INC
+3 SENT
+INCL
+INCL.
+100 INCL.
+MS
+ğ§88_88š8š3333358
+12722
+
+88385g
+
+2Q0QQQQ00GG00
+0.25
+0.25
+Account Name
+
+TEXT /MULTIMEDIA MSGS FOR
+Item Date
+Time
+Sent To/Revd From
+61 05/18
+07:08P
+83 0319
+92.134
+64 05/19
+05/2
+10:15P
+10-200
+67 05/20
+09:49P
+68 0329
+10:028
+
+72 05/25
+74 05/25
+75 05/25
+
+78 05/26
+
+05/2
+2 05/2
+: 05/27
+01:54P
+06-050
+07:22P
+07:231
+02:24F
+03:02P
+83178
+07:371
+7:450
+05:31P
+:.30
+86 05/28
+10:08P
+87 05/28
+10:10P
+BB 05/28
+89 05/28
+10:12P
+10:13P
+0 05/28
+1 05/20
+0:35
+2:05
+92 05/29
+11:48P
+13 05/30
+4 05/30
+09:238
+95 05/81
+91:390
+97 06/01
+OB:59A
+18 06/01
+9 06/01
+16:16P
+100 06/01
+10:19P
+101 06/02
+02 06/02
+87:20A
+103 06/02
+07:24A
+TOTAL TEXT/MULTIMEDIA MSG USAGE FOR
+Continued
+Charge Description
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+100 INEL: MEGS SENT
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+100 INEL. M5GS SENT
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+100 INEL: M58S SENT
+100 INCE MESS SENT
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+100 INCL: MSG3 SENT
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+O INCL. MSG
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+100 INCL: MSGS SENT
+100 INEL: MESS SENT
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+100 INCE:
+100
+100 INCL.
+FREEEEEE
+000oo
+NT
+SENT
+INCL.
+MSGS
+SENT
+D INCI
+MEGS SENT
+100 INCE MESS SENT
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+J INCL. MSGS SE
+J INCL MSGS SE
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+LOD INCI
+TEXT MESSAGES SENT
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY
+FOR
+Monthly Service Charges
+Item Description
+1 CALL WAITING
+2 TEXT MESSAGING PLAN - 0 MSGS
+• GSM AMERICA LOCAL $29.99
+6 DOMESTIC LONG DISTANCE FRM SERVICE AREA
+7 CALL FORWARDING
+8 WORLDCONNECT
+Service Dates
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+830303. 0208
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+2.60
+29.99
+
+
+Account Name
+
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY - CONTINUED
+Monthly Service Charges - Continued
+Item Description
+9 REGULATORY PROGRAMS FEE
+10 DETAIL BILLING
+Total Monthly Service Charges
+Service Dates
+05/03/05 • 06/02/05
+05/03/05 - 06/02/05
+Other Subscriber Charges
+Item Description
+1 MCTD SURCHARGE
+2 TELECOM EXCISE TAX
+3 FEDERAL UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND SURCHARGE
+Total Other Subscriber Charges
+Subscriber Government Fees and Taxes
+Item Description
+1 SALES TAX
+2 ST WIRELESS COMM SURCHARGE
+3 FEDERAL EXCISE TAX
+4 NY CITY UTILITY G.R. SUR
+5 LOCAL WIRELESS SURCHARGE
+Total Subscriber Government Fees and Taxes
+TOTAL CURRENT CHARGES FOR
+1.75
+31.74
+0.19
+0.B4
+0,95
+1.98
+2.87
+1.20
+1.04
+0.62
+0,30
+6.03
+39.75
+*THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ***
+2000244.000001769
+
+
+• xcingular
+ng the
+ARE EPSTEN
+
+***THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ***
+***THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ***
+2000244.000001769
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fdbc6f57e0757f4dad64816dbea3a37556df2be9873ec9128b63607e426f0dee.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fdbc6f57e0757f4dad64816dbea3a37556df2be9873ec9128b63607e426f0dee.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1fe1f7fb9c8ff107b2c4a4ab8114173ee7e44537
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fdbc6f57e0757f4dad64816dbea3a37556df2be9873ec9128b63607e426f0dee.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -3978,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fdbc6f57e0757f4dad64816dbea3a37556df2be9873ec9128b63607e426f0dee",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 51,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\", \"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.page-footer\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "506b4ae555def98aafad29eb10a3898e70238428599862594121b9009e2365f2",
+  "output_sha256": "5e44a6e3157537882b4dacb42ba8377d9cb54cf6bc100e7c462cc60d5b12e09b",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fddf9f94cff3370977ec6511f03318bf3fedcfc9d49f72229bf9ed5938e14856.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fddf9f94cff3370977ec6511f03318bf3fedcfc9d49f72229bf9ed5938e14856.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7e6faac7d7b31167258f7ede7a1469b7f4ffdf45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fddf9f94cff3370977ec6511f03318bf3fedcfc9d49f72229bf9ed5938e14856.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From:
+To:
+(USAFLS)" <
+(USAFLS)" ≤
+Subject: Fw:
+Date: Wed, 25 Aug 2010 15:42:29 +0000
+Importance: Normal
+So much for lunch.
+From:
+(USAFLS)
+Sent: Wednesday, August 25, 2010 11:40 AM
+To: L
+1. (USAFLS)
+Subject: Re:
+Can you come up at 12:15? Thanks.
+From:
+- (USAFLS)
+Sent: Wednesday, August 25, 2010 10:54 AM
+To: L
+(USAFLS)
+Subject: RE:
+I am here in Miami today. Are you in your office?
+From:
+To:
+Subject:
+(USAFLS)
+Sent: Wednesday, August 25, 2010 9:31 AM
+I (USAFLS)
+Hi Marie,
+I got your voicemail that said you were in meetings so | figured I'd send you an e-mail. Can you call me when
+you get a chance? I got a strange inquiry from a reporter on Epstein. Thanks.
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fddf9f94cff3370977ec6511f03318bf3fedcfc9d49f72229bf9ed5938e14856.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fddf9f94cff3370977ec6511f03318bf3fedcfc9d49f72229bf9ed5938e14856.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..043de0b5ff290d2345afb1fa925856dd8a2175b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fddf9f94cff3370977ec6511f03318bf3fedcfc9d49f72229bf9ed5938e14856.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -12,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fddf9f94cff3370977ec6511f03318bf3fedcfc9d49f72229bf9ed5938e14856",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "eb637fcddb65c46a244e455a1c54382be14c4b3f454cf22f1990e05640cf4b17",
+  "output_sha256": "f0970a18cfbac3b8a3185a3ec3c542f62a230931cfd885f16f6e4cbea800b6bc",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fe69ff80d2acef5cc3714d017d683339d066839b6f541ecd3cd5d94c197deb6b.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fe69ff80d2acef5cc3714d017d683339d066839b6f541ecd3cd5d94c197deb6b.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e93996b9551f5902a25f14c4e1a9718c17388098
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fe69ff80d2acef5cc3714d017d683339d066839b6f541ecd3cd5d94c197deb6b.md
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+Subject: RE: Jeffrey Epstein
+Date: Fri, 02 Apr 2010 14:59:01 +0000
+Importance: Normal
+GIRL POWER
+Subject: Jeffrey Epstein
+Attached please find our response to your letter of March 29, 2010. Thank you.
+« File: 20100402 Villafana Ltr to Black.pdf >>
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fe69ff80d2acef5cc3714d017d683339d066839b6f541ecd3cd5d94c197deb6b.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fe69ff80d2acef5cc3714d017d683339d066839b6f541ecd3cd5d94c197deb6b.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b4ac04802b9d2ac5b83ca99504523e232fb734ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fe69ff80d2acef5cc3714d017d683339d066839b6f541ecd3cd5d94c197deb6b.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -12,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fe69ff80d2acef5cc3714d017d683339d066839b6f541ecd3cd5d94c197deb6b",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "c740758ff553c98592498e4a2bf0b4cb6973a108c92bf97667874eba7360c066",
+  "output_sha256": "ee37db6ce16baab328f2f9868d02321e7a438ce92c01b2d656983f08627e5fba",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fee5862cb610ea738165bd58a9456db5755048ca88950abe5609eb46a548bf33.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fee5862cb610ea738165bd58a9456db5755048ca88950abe5609eb46a548bf33.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..01c256352ca001f4d7df7a2b39f8dcb54d5566f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fee5862cb610ea738165bd58a9456db5755048ca88950abe5609eb46a548bf33.md
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+From: "
+(USAFLS)" </O=USA/OU=FLS/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=|
+To: "
+• (USAFLS)" <
+Date: Thu, 10 May 2007 13:48:52 +0000
+Importance: Normal
+• Epstein has no doubt told them that there were
+many.
+Thoughts?
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fee5862cb610ea738165bd58a9456db5755048ca88950abe5609eb46a548bf33.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fee5862cb610ea738165bd58a9456db5755048ca88950abe5609eb46a548bf33.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..517681e3538c48582b06125ab7b52cd7e37ed4f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/fee5862cb610ea738165bd58a9456db5755048ca88950abe5609eb46a548bf33.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -12,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fee5862cb610ea738165bd58a9456db5755048ca88950abe5609eb46a548bf33",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "03b3a56120d28a8bbdea6f518b3d55e8a3b8df7844dc25f01f13bf739de5a677",
+  "output_sha256": "294844afb4c59ec33abe16650f32b723e0828fa02a9b4b26d2860c1ad693f120",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff47942e2726998b5ee095c5b36a27537047c218d99283b0f6fbbd2b2191cde7.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff47942e2726998b5ee095c5b36a27537047c218d99283b0f6fbbd2b2191cde7.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6c1d9500269952d676afd8b280359853a69c69c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff47942e2726998b5ee095c5b36a27537047c218d99283b0f6fbbd2b2191cde7.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From:
+To:
+Subject: Activity in Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM C.M.A. L. Epstein et al Stipulation of Dismissal
+Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2010 20:05:43 +0000
+Importance: Normal
+This is an automatic e-mail message generated by the CM/ECF system. Please DO NOT RESPOND to this
+e-mail because the mail box is unattended.
+***NOTE TO PUBLIC ACCESS USERS*** Judicial Conference of the United States policy permits
+attorneys of record and parties in a case (including pro se litigants) to receive one free electronic copy of
+all documents filed electronically, if receipt is required by law or directed by the filer: PACER access fees
+apply to all other users. To avoid later charges, download a copy of each document during this first
+viewing. However, if the referenced document is a transcript, the free copy and 30 page limit do not apply.
+U.S. District Court
+Southern District of Florida
+Notice of Electronic Filing
+The following transaction was entered by Pike, Michael on 1/22/2010 at 3:05 PM EST and filed on 1/22/2010
+Case Name:
+Case Number:
+Filer:
+Document Number: 175
+C.M.A. | Epstein et al
+9:08-cv-80811-KAM
+Jeffrey Epstein
+Docket Text:
+STIPULATION of Dismissal with Prejudice by Jeffrey Epstein. (Attachments: # (1) Text of
+Proposed Order Proposed Order) (Pike, Michael)
+9:08-cv-80811-KAM Notice has been electronically mailed to:
+Bruce Reinhart
+Jack Alan Goldberger
+Jack Patrick Hill
+Katherine Warthen Ezell
+Michael James Pike
+Richard Horace Willits
+Robert C. Josefsberg
+
+
+Robert Deweese Critton, Jr
+9:08-cv-80811-KAM Notice has not been delivered electronically to those listed below and will be provided
+by other means. For further assistance, please contact our Help Desk at 1-888-318-2260.:
+The following documents) are associated with this transaction:
+Document description:Main Document
+Original filename:n/a
+Electronic document Stamp:
+[STAMP dcecfStamp_ID=1105629215 [Date=1/22/2010] [FileNumber=7180960-0
+][3fa0cebe48c2209c46141ебbc71a627d25d854d65a741f18cb9abc0bc4е96c49fcf
+6e9d2620ef0877e5f28a5f9cf67954c996ed9971270042612e27186d8caed]]
+Document description: Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order
+Original filename:n/a
+Electronic document Stamp:
+[STAMP deecfStamp_ID=1105629215 [Date=1/22/2010] [FileNumber=7180960-1
+1[2e6316511cbfe89874db5abba14432fcb6a3581a6319587331b136e6963a5470edc
+7fb5376d9a24f087441f4b429c7ca0бееf7cЗd6f89a8b5a195773dc4efb4a]]
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff47942e2726998b5ee095c5b36a27537047c218d99283b0f6fbbd2b2191cde7.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff47942e2726998b5ee095c5b36a27537047c218d99283b0f6fbbd2b2191cde7.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6163840aaf0107b60e205e0572eea332f5db3ca1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff47942e2726998b5ee095c5b36a27537047c218d99283b0f6fbbd2b2191cde7.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -24,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "ff47942e2726998b5ee095c5b36a27537047c218d99283b0f6fbbd2b2191cde7",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 2,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "09e5b62ba65c0f7cd3695ab08ad7d2fc092e315710a520b1d0d5597d4d49c739",
+  "output_sha256": "3a61831c1c21203fb362ed78850f2faffc578f24d8efa838c3680d95c713a1b8",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff707aab1493c351902c29904affe0bf49b6f71902c4e09fe89b11caf2437b99.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff707aab1493c351902c29904affe0bf49b6f71902c4e09fe89b11caf2437b99.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6e59a4fb4bf5b1e8fa8810fe6a5ed3ad4ab590c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff707aab1493c351902c29904affe0bf49b6f71902c4e09fe89b11caf2437b99.md
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
+Case No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson
+JANE DOES #1 and #2
+UNITED STATES
+DECLARATION OF BRADLEY J. EDWARDS, ESQ.
+1. 1, Bradley J. Edwards, Esq., do hereby declare that I am a member in good standing of the Bar
+of the State of Florida. Along with co-counsel, I have represented Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2
+in civil suits against Jeffrey Epstein for sexually abusing them. I have also represented other
+girls who were sexually abused by Epstein. As a result of that representation, I have become
+familiar with many aspects of the criminal investigation against Epstein and have reviewed
+discovery and correspondence connected with the criminal investigation. I have also spoken to
+Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 at length about the criminal investigation and their involvement in
+it, as well enforcement (or lack their of) of their rights as crime victims in the investigation. I
+also represent Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 in the pending case seeking enforcement of their
+rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act. I am also familiar with the criminal justice system,
+having served as state prosecutor in the Broward County State Attorney's Office.
+2. In 2006, at the request of the Palm Beach Police Department, the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation ("FBI") opened an investigation into allegations that Jeffrey Epstein ("Epstein")
+and his personal assistants had used facilities of interstate commerce to induce young girls
+between the ages of thirteen and seventeen to engage in prostitution, amongst other offenses.
+
+
+The case was presented to the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
+Florida, which accepted the case for investigation. At the time that the investigation was
+opened, the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office was also investigating Epstein. The FBI
+determined that both Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 were victims of sexual assaults by Epstein
+while they were minors beginning when they were approximately fourteen years of age and
+approximately thirteen years of age respectively. These sexual assaults involved use of means of
+interstate commerce (i.e., a telephone) and travel in interstate commerce. Both Jane Does were
+initially identified through the Palm Beach Police Department's investigation of Epstein.
+3.
+On about June 7, 2007, FBI agents hand-delivered to Jane Doe #1 a standard CVRA
+victim notification letter. See Exhibit "A". The notification promises that the Justice
+Department would makes its "best efforts" to protect Jane Doe #1's rights, including "[t]he
+reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the United States in the case" and "to be
+reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving ... plea ...." The
+notification further explained that "[alt this time, your case is under investigation."
+4.
+On about August 11, 2007, FBI agents hand-delivered to Jane Doe #2 a standard CVRA
+victim notification letter. See Exhibit "B."2 The notification promises that the Justice
+Department would makes its "best efforts" to protect Jane Doe #I's rights, including "It]he
+reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the United States in the case" and "to be
+1 This document has previously been made part of the record in this case. See Case No.
+9:08-CV-80736, Doc. #14 (attachment 1). For the convenience of the Court, it is also attached as
+an exhibit here.
+2 This document has previously been made part of the record in this case. See Case No.
+9:08-CV-80736, Doc. #14 (attachment 2). For the convenience of the Court, it is also attached as
+an exhibit here.
+2
+
+
+reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving ... plea ...." The
+notification further explained that "[a]t this time, your case is under investigation."
+Early in the investigation, the FBI agents and the Assistant U.S. Attorney had several
+meetings with Jane Doe #1. Jane Doe #2 was represented by counsel that was paid for by
+Epstein and, accordingly, all contact was made through that attorney.
+6.
+I have reviewed a copy of the non-prosecution agreement signed on about September 24,
+2007, by Epstein and his attorneys and a representative of the U.S. Attorney's Office. What
+appears to be a true and accurate copy of that agreement is attached to this declaration as Exhibit
+"C."
+7. In October 2007, shortly after the initial non-prosecution agreement was signed between
+Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, Jane Doe #1 was
+contacted to be advised regarding the resolution of the investigation. On October 26, 2007,
+Special Agents d
+met in person with Jane Doe #1. The
+Special Agents explained that Epstein would plead guilty to state charges, he would be required
+to register as a sex offender for life, and he had made certain concessions related to the payment
+of damages to the victims, including Jane Doe #1. During this meeting, Jane Doe #1 was not
+represented by legal counsel. During this meeting, the Special Agents did not explain that an
+agreement had already been signed that precluded any prosecution of Epstein for federal charges.
+The agents could not have revealed this part of the non-prosecution agreement without violating
+the terms of the non-prosecution agreement. Whether the agents themselves had been informed
+of the existence of the non-prosecution agreement by the U.S. Attorney's Office is not certain.
+Because the plea agreement had already been reached with Epstein, the agents made no attempt
+
+
+to secure Jane Doe #I's view on the proposed resolution of the case. It appears that an FBI
+"Report of Interview" of this meeting exists. The U.S. Attorney's Office has refused to provide
+a copy of that report to Jane Doe #1.
+8.
+Jane Doe #1's perception of the explanation provided by the Special Agents was that only
+the State part of the Epstein investigation had been resolved, and that the federal investigation
+would continue, possibly leading to a federal prosecution.
+9.
+On about January 10, 2008, my clients Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 received letters
+from the FBI advising them that "It]his case is currently under investigation. This can be a
+lengthy process and we request you continued patience while we conduct a thorough
+investigation." See Exhibit "D" and "E" (emphasis added). 3 The statement in the notification
+letter was false. The case was not currently "under investigation." To the contrary, the case had
+been resolved by the non-prosecution agreement entered into by Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's
+Office discussed previously. Moreover, the FBI did not notify Jane Doe #1 or Jane Doe #2 that a
+plea agreement had been reached previously, and that part of the agreement was a nonprosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida.
+10.
+In early 2008, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 came to believe that criminal prosecution of
+Epstein was extremely important. The also desired to be consulted by the FBI and/or other
+representatives of the federal government about the prosecution of Epstein. In light of the letters
+that they had received around January 10, they believed that a criminal investigation of Epstein
+3 These document has previously been made part of the record in this case. See Case No.
+9:08-CV-80736, Doc. #14 (attachments 3 and 4). For the convenience of the Court, there are
+also attached as exhibits here.
+4
+
+
+was on-going and that they would be contacted before the federal government reached any final
+resolution of that investigation.
+11.
+In about April 2008, Jane Doe #1 contacted the FBI because Epstein's counsel was
+attempting to take her deposition and private investigators were harassing her. Assistant U.S.
+Attorney A. Marie
+- secured pro bono counsel to represent Jane Doe #1 and several
+other identified victims in connection with the criminal investigation. Pro bono counsel was able
+to assist Jane Doe #1 in avoiding the improper deposition. AUSA
+secured pro bono
+counsel by contacting Meg Garvin, Esq. of the the National Crime Victims' Law Center in
+Portland, Oregon, which is based in the Lewis & Clark College of Law. During the call, Ms.
+Garvin was not advised that a non-prosecution agreement had been reached in this matter.
+12. On May 30, 2008, another one of my clients who was recognized as an Epstein victim by
+the U.S. Attorney's Office, received letters from the FBI advising her that "It]his case is
+currently under investigation. This can be a lengthy process and we request your continued
+patience while we conduct a thorough investigation." See Exhibit "F." The statement in the
+notification letter was false. The case was not currently "under investigation." To the contrary,
+the case had been resolved by the non-prosecution agreement entered into by Epstein and the
+U.S. Attorney's Office in September 2007.
+13.
+In mid-June 2008, I contacted AUSA
+(to inform her that I represented Jane Doe
+#1 and, later, Jane Doe #2. I asked to meet to provide information about the federal crimes
+committed by Epstein, hoping to secure a significant federal indictment against Epstein. AUSA
+and I discussed the possibility of federal charges being filed. At the end of the call,
+AUSA
+asked me to send any information that he wanted considered by the U.S.
+
+
+Attorney's Office in determining whether to file federal charges. Because of the confidentiality
+provision that existed in the plea agreement, I was not informed that previously, in September
+2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office had reached an agreement not to file federal charges. I was also
+not informed that any resolution of the criminal matter was imminent.
+14.
+On Friday, June 27, 2008, at approximately 4:15 p.m., AUSA |
+received a copy
+of Epstein's proposed state plea agreement and learned that the plea was scheduled for 8:30 a.m.,
+Monday, June 30, 2008. AUSA
+and the Palm Beach Police Department attempted to
+provide notification to victims in the short time that Epstein's counsel had provided. AUSA
+did not tell me that the guilty pleas in state court would bring an end to the possibility
+of federal prosecution pursuant to the plea agreement.
+15.
+On July 3, 2008, Mr. Edwards sent to AUSA
+a letter. A copy of that letter is
+attached to this declaration as Exhibit "G". In the letter, I indicated my client's desire that
+federal charges be filed against defendant Epstein. In particular, I wrote on behalf of my clients:
+"We urge the Attorney General and our United States Attorney to consider the fundamental
+import of the vigorous enforcement of our Federal laws. We urge you to move forward with the
+traditional indictments and criminal prosecution commensurate with the crimes Mr. Epstein has
+committed, and we further urge you to take the steps necessary to protect our children from this
+very dangerous sexual predator." When I wrote this letter, I was still unaware that a nonprosecution agreement had been reached with Epstein - a fact that continued to be concealed
+from me (and the vietims) by the U.S. Attorney's Office. I first learned of this fact on or after
+July 9, 2008, when the Government filed its responsive pleading to Jane Doe's emergency
+petition. That pleading was the first public mention of the non-prosecution agreement and the
+6
+
+
+first disclosure to me (and thus to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2) of the existence of a document
+called a non-prosecution agreement.
+16.
+On July 9, 2008, AUSA
+• sent a victim notification to Jane Doe #1 through me as
+her attorney. See Exhibit "H." That notification contains a written explanation of some of the
+terms of the agreement between Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office. A full copy of the terms
+was not provided.
+• This was the first time that Jane Doe #2 was told that the plea arrangement
+blocked any possibility of federal criminal charges being filed against Epstein. A notification
+was not provided to Jane Doe #2, apparently because the agreement limited Epstein's liability to
+victims whom the United States was prepared to name in an indictment.
+17. On October 9, 2008, Bradley J. Edwards, counsel for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2, sent a
+letter to counsel for the U.S. Attorney's Office in this case advising that two possibly false
+statements had been made to the Court in the July 9th sworn declaration of AUSA |
+See
+Exhibit "I" to this Declaration.
+18. During the summer of 2008, I attempted along with co-counsel in this case to work with the
+U.S. Attorney's Office to come up with an agreed set of facts regarding the case. For example,
+on July 17, 2008, I sent a letter to AUSAD
+attempting to come up with an agreed
+set of facts. During the course of the summer, however, it became apparent to me that the U.S.
+Attorney's Office was not going to agree to all the facts and events relevant to the CVRA case.
+It also became apparently that the U.S. Attorney's Office was not prepared to provide any
+discovery of materials necessary to building a full factual record of the events surrounding the
+treatment of Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 during the criminal investigation.
+
+
+19. _
+In view of the U.S. Attorney's reluctance to agree to appropriate facts or provide
+information about the plea negotiation process, I made the determination that it was in the best of
+interests of Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 to pursue their civil cases at a faster pace than the
+CVRA case. I believed that the civil cases might produce useful information for their CVRA
+claims and that there was no specific deadline set by the Court for bringing the CVRA case to a
+conclusion.
+20. As one example of the efforts I made to defend my clients' interests, I believed that
+correspondence between the U.S. Attorney's Office and Epstein would contain highly useful
+information for both my clients' civil cases and their CVRA case. To obtain that information, in
+approximately May 2009, I propounded discovery requests in both state and federal civil cases
+against Epstein, seeking to obtain correspondence between Epstein and prosecutors regarding his
+plea agreement - information that the U.S. Attorney's Office was unwilling to provide to Jane
+Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2. Epstein refused to produce that information, and extended litigation to
+obtain the materials followed - litigation that is reflected in the docket sheets of those cases. At
+all times, I proceeded diligently to obtain this correspondence.
+21. As an example of the extended litigation over the correspondence, in the federal case (case
+no. 9:08-CV-80893), on July 20, 2009, Jane Doe filed a motion to compel production of the
+information (case no. 9:08-cv-80119, doc. #210). Epstein obtained an extension of time in which
+to respond and, two-and-a-half months later, on October 6, 2009, Epstein filed an objection to
+producing these items primarily on Fifth Amendment grounds (doc. #339). On October 16,
+2009, Jane Doe filed a reply in support of her motion (doc. #354). On January 22, 2010, Jane
+Doe filed a notice that more than 90 days had elapsed since the filing of her motion (doc. #453).
+8
+
+
+On February 4, 2010, the magistrate judge granted in part and denied in part Jane Doe's motion
+to compel, specifically ruling that Epstein had to produce the discovery provided to him by state
+and federal prosecutors and the requested correspondence, rejecting Fifth Amendment and other
+objections raised by Epstein. Case no. 9:08-cv-80119, doc. #462. Epstein then filed for an
+extension of time in which to appeal (doc. #464), which Jane Doe opposed on grounds of delay
+(doc. #465). On February 11, 2010, the Court granted in part and denied in part the extension of
+time, specifically warning Epstein that "[i]n the event that Magistrate Judge Johnson's February
+4, 2010 Order is affirmed on appeal, Defendant will have three (3) business days from the date of
+this Court's order to produce the documents at issue." (doc. #468). Epstein then ultimately filed
+his appeal/motion for reconsideration of the magistrate decision on February 26, 2010. (doc.
+#477). On March 10, 2010, Jane Doe then filed her response in Opposition to Defendant's
+Motion for reconsideration. (doc. #. 485). On April 1, 2010, the magistrate judge rejected
+Epstein's challenge, reaffirming his earlier order that "compelled production from state and
+federal prosecutors in the criminal case against him." (doc. #513). On May 12, 2010, Epstein
+filed a "Consolidated" Rule 4 Review and Appeal of Portions of the Magistrate Judge's orders
+(doc. #545). On May 27, 2010, Jane Doe filed a "protective" response to the consolidated reply,
+noting that she had previously responded to all of the arguments raised by the appeal and that the
+"consolidated" appeal did not require any new response from her (doc. #551). On Friday, June
+25, 2010, this Court entered an order affirming the magistrate judge's discovery orders in all
+respects (case no. 9:08-cv-80119-KAM, doc. #572) and, as it previously warned Epstein,
+requiring Epstein to produce the discovery materials within three business days. At this point,
+despite having had a year to assemble the requested discovery items and prepare for their
+
+
+production - and more than four months since this Court's warning to be prepared to produce the
+documents on three days notice - Epstein began filing motions to restrict production. On
+Monday evening, June 28, 2010, at approximately 5:11 p.m., Epstein filed a motion for a
+protective order regarding dissemination of the materials (case no. 9:09-cv-80893, doc. #170).
+On Tuesday morning, June 29, 2010, at approximately 9:31 a.m., this Court summarily denied
+the motion (doc. #172). Following these actions by the Court, on about June 30, 2010, Epstein
+made his production electronically to Jane Doe's counsel. However, Epstein also produced only
+correspondence with federal prosecutors - not with state prosecutors. Of course, this
+significantly limited the production he made, as Epstein pled guilty to state sex charges rather
+than federal sex charges - leaving Jane Doe with no correspondence about his guilty plea.
+Second, with regard to his correspondence with federal prosecutors that he did produce, Epstein
+redacted anything coming from attorneys, leaving only the responses from the federal
+prosecutors.
+Jane Doe then filed a motion to have Epstein held in contempt for violating his
+discovery production obligations (doc. #190). The case settled shortly thereafter before the
+Court could rule on the contempt motion.
+22. Because of this extended litigation, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 did not have access to
+important correspondence demonstrating a violation of their rights until June 30, 2010. On that
+day, counsel for Epstein sent to me approximately 358 pages of e-mail correspondence between
+his legal counsel and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida regarding the
+plea agreement that had been negotiated between them. A true and correct copy of that
+correspondence is attached to this declaration at Exhibit "J". These e-mails disclosed for the
+first time the steps that had been taken by the U.S. Attorney's Office to avoid having the victims
+10
+
+
+in the case learn about the non-prosecution agreement that had been reached between Epstein
+and the Government. Litigation continues to this day to obtain the correspondence regarding the
+state prosecution correspondence and regarding what Epstein's attorneys said in the
+correspondence with the prosecutors.
+23. Between July 2008 and September 2010, my co-counsel working on this matter (Professor
+Paul G. Cassell at the University of Utah College of Law) and I had numerous formal and
+informal contacts with the U.S. Attorney's Office regarding Epstein-related matters. In none of
+those contacts did the U.S. Attorney's Office ever indicate that they believed that a deadline was
+approaching in this CVRA case or that Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 were proceeding less than
+diligently on this case. During those contacts, the U.S. Attorney's Office was also made aware
+of on-going discovery efforts to obtain information from Epstein.
+24. At no time while this case was proceeding did I understand that the Court desired for us to
+make expedited filings. To the contrary, it was my understanding that the Court believed that the
+matter was not an "emergency" and therefore could proceed on a slower timetable. The case
+remained open at all times and I had several brief discussions with representatives of the U.S.
+Attorney's Office about the fact that my clients were still working on obtaining evidence to
+support their claims in the case. When on September 8, 2010, the Court entered an
+administrative order closing the case, I promptly filed a notice that additional filings were going
+to made in the case shortly. It has never been the intention of Jane Doe #1 or Jane Doe #2 to not
+pursue this case.
+If at any point they had been notified by the Court of a schedule for filing
+pleadings in this case, they would have made every effort to timely file those pleadings.
+
+
+25. In mid-July 2010, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 settled their civil lawsuits against Mr.
+Epstein. Notice of this fact was promptly provided to the Court. Concluding those civil lawsuits
+consumed a great deal of time for the legal team representing them during the month of July.
+26. At all times material to this statement of facts, it would have been practical and feasible for
+the federal government to inform Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 of the details of the proposed
+plea agreement with Epstein, including in particular the fact that the agreement barred any
+federal criminal prosecution. During the times that I represented them, I stood ready, willing,
+and able to receive that information.
+27. I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true
+and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
+Executed this
+day of October, 2010.
+BRADLEY EDWARDS, ESQ.
+12
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff707aab1493c351902c29904affe0bf49b6f71902c4e09fe89b11caf2437b99.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff707aab1493c351902c29904affe0bf49b6f71902c4e09fe89b11caf2437b99.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f9cc0f77bc94130c3616671be6bc0ce040ff0416
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff707aab1493c351902c29904affe0bf49b6f71902c4e09fe89b11caf2437b99.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -148,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "ff707aab1493c351902c29904affe0bf49b6f71902c4e09fe89b11caf2437b99",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 14,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\", \"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "c3852c0b36241bb1f084a4df23e3f476833bec93be672803d944d38c155a34a9",
+  "output_sha256": "3958730a0b5df778a4d225a83f5334cb32296714dabf3b078f850c241518e417",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff8ec91c99459581768edfaf4ed9167a8f73e880545d418382643e637bb24501.md b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff8ec91c99459581768edfaf4ed9167a8f73e880545d418382643e637bb24501.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c0a8fe87b8ed6223ffea94a56b4f7f9b16d75bfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff8ec91c99459581768edfaf4ed9167a8f73e880545d418382643e637bb24501.md
@@ -0,0 +1,3021 @@
+LEFFREY E EPSTEIN
+Questions or Changes?
+cingular.com
+• Toll Free 1
+:
+611 from your wireless phone
+TTY users - 1 866 429-7TTY
+SUMMARY OF MONTHLY CHARGES FOR ACCOUNT
+Previous
+Balance
+361.58
+Payments
+Received
+-361.58
+Late Payment
+Total
+Adjustments
+Your billing cycle began on June 03, 2005 and ended on July 02, 2005
+Current Monthly Charges
+Monthly Service
+Monthly Usage
+Charges
+Credits
+Government Fees and Taxes
+Total Current Monthly Charges
+TOTAL AMOUNT - Due Upon Receipt
+Date of Invoice: July 03, 2005
+Balanc
+orward
+Current Monthly
+Charges
+692.31
+Total
+Amount Due
+692.31
+300.15
+312.22
+23.24
+-5.00
+61.70
+692.31
+692.31
+PRICELESS PEACE OF MIND
+ROADSIDE ASSISTANCE PROVIDES ASSISTANCE FOR MOST
+ROADSIDE MISHAPS AND THE BEST THING IS THE SERVICE
+FOLLOWS YOUR PHONE! SO NO MATTER WHOSE CAR YOU ARE IN,
+YOU CAN GET ASSISTANCE. AND, FOR A LIMITED TIME, GET A
+FREE 60-DAY TRIAL. YOU CAN SUBSCRIBE RIGHT NOW BY
+CALLING 1-
+AFTER THE FREE TRIAL, ROADSIDE
+ASSISTANCE IS $2.99 A MONTH. SEE ENCLOSED INSERT FOR
+MORE INFORMATION.
+9
+Account Name: JEFFREY E EPSTEIN
+Please Return This Portion With Your Paymen
+Jse of service or payment of this invoice
+indicates concions for viteless servilterms
+Date Due
+UPON RECEIPT
+Note:
+=>
+We Print on
+Front and Back
+Service A
+Account #
+Total
+Amount Due
+692.31
+Crackes secretse.
+Amount
+Paid
+#BWNHNGB
+#000000
+2000258 02 AT 0.517 *AUTO T2 0 0702 10022.5.22.01.1034.0000
+CINGULAR WIRELESS
+PO BOX 8229
+AURORA IL 60572-8229
+
+
+
+Recurring Electronic Fund Transfer (REFT): To enroll: sign below, check the REFT box on the reverse side and
+remit with this month's payment. Keep paying your bill until your statement indicates "Do Not Pay". REFT
+Agreement: I authorize my financial institution to deduct the amount of my monthly wireless phone bill from the
+account associated with the enclosed check and remit payment to Cingular Wireless. This authority will be effective
+until I notify Cingular Wireless to terminate it. I agree that I may be assessed a service charge (up to $20) or late.
+fee or both if a payment is returned by my bank. For more information visit cingular.com/myaccount or call 1
+Please keep a copy of the form below and this REFT Agreement for your records or retain a copy of the
+blank form from next month's invoice.
+Questions? We can help: Cingular Wireless appreciates your business and welcomes the opportunity to assist.
+mu. Visit our website at cinqular.com or contact Customer Care by dialing bll from vour wireless onone or .
+¿ Sabías que también ofrecemos servicio al cliente en tu idioma? Marca 611 desde tu teléfon
+inalambrico ó 1
+desde cualquier teléfono y oprime el *.
+Driving Wireless Safety: Your wireless phone gives you the freedom and flexibility to stay in touch when you
+travel, but don't let a phone call distract you from driving safely. Use hands-free device if allowed or required by
+law. Call Carefully, Arrive Safely.
+Processing Fees: When you pay by check, Cingular Wireless will present the check for payment by your bank
+electronically. Your bank account will be debited in the amount of the check and the transaction will appear on your
+bank statement. Your original check will be destroyed once processed, and you will not receive your cancelled
+check back. If we cannot post the transaction electronically, an image copy of your check will be presented for
+payment. For additional information, please call 1
+Accounts suspended for non-payment will be
+subject to a $25 reactivation fee per line and may be assessed a security deposit prior to reinstatement. Checks
+returned for non-sufficient funds will be charged up to a $30.00 fee.
+Local Tax: Local taxes are based on local government boundaries, the address information you provide for your
+account and/or your wireless telephone number. Please review the local tax chames on vour bill. If you believe
+there is an error in the local tax charge, please contact us immediately at 1|
+local or state laws may require you to follow special procedures when notifying us about a local tax dispute. You
+may also use the form below to notify us of any change to your taxing address. Thank you for your cooperation.
+Early Termination Fee (ETF): It you cancel service before your contract end date (including it you switch your
+wireless number to another carrier), you will be charged an Early Termination Fee of up to $200.
+One Time Checking Account Payment Authorization Agreement (for use with kiosk payment): I authorize
+Cingular Wireless to make this one-time bill payment by debiting my bank account. I can cancel authorization by
+contacting an in-store sales person. If my bank rejects a payment, I may be charged a return fee.
+Please Send Correspondence To:
+Cingular Wireless Next Generation Correspondence
+P.O. Box 68056
+Anaheim Hills, CA 92817-8056
+2000258.000001866.7
+Accoung Name and transier Financial Responsibless clearly and check the box on the reverse side. Please contact Customer Care to change the
+New Billing Address
+City
+State
+Zip
+Home Phone (
+_)
+Work Phone (
+If your billing address is NOT your Tax Address, please enter the Tax Address below. (Multi-line accounts should attach a list of each wireless number
+and the respective Tax Address.)
+New Tax Address
+City
+Wireless Number (
+State
+Zip
+Recurring Electronic Fund Transfer (REFT) Enrollment. Please read the agreement on the top portion of this page, sign below and check
+he "REFT Registration" box on the reverse side
+Financial Account Holder Signature
+• + I do not wish to receive email notification of special oilers avalable to Cingular Wireless customers.
+
+
+LATE PAYMENT CHARGE:
+A 1.5% LATE PAYMENT CHARGE PER MONTH MAY BE APPLIED FOR
+AMOUNTS UNPAID 20 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF INVOICE
+(AK 0.875%, AR 0.085%, NE 1.33%, WI 1.00%).
+THE $1.75 REGULATORY PROGRAMS FEE HELPS TO FUND
+CINGULAR WIRELESS COMPLIANCE WITH VARIOUS GOVERNMENT-
+MANDATED PROGRAMS SUCH AS E911, NUMBER POOLING, AND
+LOCAL NUMBER PORTABILITY WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT YET BE
+AVAILABLE IN YOUR AREA. IT IS AN ADDITIONAL MONTHLY
+CHARGE CREATED, ASSESSED AND COLLECTED BY CINGULAR
+WIRELESS. FOR MORE INFORMATION AND A DESCRIPTION OF
+THESE PROGRAMS PLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE AT
+HTTP://WWW.CINGULAR.COM/RPF
+ACCOUNT DETAILS
+Detail of Payments - Thank You!
+Item Description
+1 PAYMENT
+Total of Payments
+Current Subscriber Monthly Charges and Credits
+Embacriber Number
+Subscriber Name
+Date Applied/Reversed Payment Amount
+06/14/05
+-361.58
+Total Current Subscriber Monthly C
+Total Current Monthly Charges
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY
+FOR
+Monthly Service Charges
+Item Description
+1 CALL WAITING
+2 TEXT MESSAGING PLAN - 0 MSGS
+3 CALLER ID
+4 VOICEMAIL
+5 DETAIL BILLING
+Service Dates
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+- 361,58
+-361.58
+570.06
+82.12
+40.13
+692.31
+692.31
+Account Name
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY - CONTINUED
+Monthly Service Charges - Continued
+Item Description
+6 REGULATORY PROGRAMS FEE
+7 CALL FORWARDING
+8 WORLDCONNECT
+9 THREE WAY CALLING
+10 BLACKBERRY $49.99
+11 NATIONAL PLAN $29.99
+Total Monthly Service Charges
+Service Dates
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 • 07/02/05
+Monthly Usage Charges
+Item Description
+1 100 ADDI ANYTME MIN
+2 UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+Total Monthly Usage Charges
+Onty Used
+54 MIN
+7 MIN
+Other Subscriber Charges
+Item Description
+1 MCTD SURCHARGE
+2 TELECOM EXCISE TAX
+3 FEDERAL UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND SURCHARGE
+Total Other Subscriber Charges
+Other Subscriber Credits
+Item Description
+1 $5 MONTHLY CREDIT
+Total Other Subscriber Credits
+Subscriber Govemment Fees and Taxes
+Item Description
+1 SALES TAX
+2 FEDERAL EXCISE TAX
+3 NY CITY UTILITY G.R. SUR
+Total Subscriber Government Fees and Taxes
+TOTAL CURRENT CHARGES FOR I
+DETAIL OF CURRENT ACTIVITY
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Item Date Time Called
+2 06/04 13-258
+3 06/05 06:15P
+3 06/08 10.532
+06/08 12:12P
+0600 11 434
+INCOMING
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+EMIN
+UNLIMITED NAN MIN
+3 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+COLUMBUS OH
+
+1.75
+49.99
+29.99
+81.73
+0.16
+0.71
+1.59
+15000
+2.41
+0.87
+0,52
+3.80
+82.12
+2000258.000001867
+
+
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Item Date Time
+Called
+B 06/10 01:21P
+9 06/10 01:56P
+06/10 05:06P
+30909
+05:57P
+1122A
+
+2:32P
+09:47A
+/20
+10:46A
+20 10:49A
+20
+1:054
+20
+11:08A
+29 06/30 07:33A
+30 06/30 07:34A
+TOTAL VOICE USAGE FOR
+INCOMING
+COLUMBUS OH
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+JOHNSTOWN OH
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+MORIARTY NM
+NEW
+CANAAN CT
+NEW YORK NY
+CHTAMSTTHS VI
+INCOMING
+COLUMBUS OH
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+• Continued
+Qnty
+Used Rate Description
+8MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+2 MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+_ MIN
+1 MIN
+100 ABB'L ANYTME MIN
+2 MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+100 ABB LANTE MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+MIN
+2 MIN
+3 MIN
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+1MIN
+1 MIN
+4 MIN
+2 MIN
+3MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+100 ABB'L ANY ME MIN
+O0 ADDL ANYTME MIl
+00 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+.00 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY
+FOR
+Monthly Service Charges
+Item Description
+1 CALL WAITING
+2 TEXT MESSAGING PLAN - 0 MSGS
+4 EARLY EVENING
+5 ENH DISCOUNT INTL DIAL
+6 MULTIMEDIA MESSAGING $2 g9
+T VOICEMAIL
+8 MMODE/DATA SERVICE (4MB)
+9 NATIONAL PLAN $149.99
+10 THREE WAY CALLING
+11 REGULATORY PROGRAMS FEE
+12 VOICE DIAL SERVICE $3.99
+13 DETAIL BILLING
+14 DISCOUNTED INTERNATIONAL ROAMING
+Total Monthly Service Charges
+Service Dates
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 • 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+4.99
+3.99
+2.99
+12,99
+149.99
+1.75
+3.99
+5,99
+186.68
+2000258.000001867
+Account Name
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY - CONTINUED
+Monthly Usage Charges
+Item Description
+1 INTL ROAM TEXT MSG
+2 INT'L ROAMING VOICE
+3 100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+4 UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+5 CALL WAITING
+6 MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+7 400 ADDL ANYTME MIN
+8 UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+9 EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+10 411 INFO
+11 ENH DISC INT DL
+12 INTL TEXT MSG
+13 INCLUDED MINUTES
+14 TEXT MESSAGES SENT
+Total Monthly Usage Charges
+Other Subscriber Charges
+Description
+1 FEDERAL UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND SURCHARGE
+2 MCTD SURCHARGE
+3 TELECOM EXCISE TAX
+Total Other Subscriber Charges
+Subscriber Government Fees and Taxes
+Item Description
+1 LOCAL WIRELESS SURCHARGE
+2 ROAMING TAX
+3 SALES TAX
+4 ST WIRELESS COMM SURCHARGE
+5 FEDERAL EXCISE TAX
+6 NY CITY UTILITY G.R. SUR
+Total Subscriber Government Fees and Taxes
+TOTAL CURRENT CHARGES FOR
+DETAIL OF CURRENT ACTIVITY
+Onty Used
+11 EVT
+168 MIN
+100 EVT
+681 MIN
+12 EVT
+30 EVT
+400 MIN
+200 MIN
+227 MIN
+3 EVT
+38 MIN
+1 EVT
+331 MIN
+26 EVT
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Item Date Time
+Called
+2 0610406:138
+3 06/04 06:20P
+06/04 06:26P
+6 06/04 0824₽
+7 06/04 10:34P
+06/04 10:48P
+06/04 10:53P
+Used Rate Description
+INCOMING
+COMIN
+NY ZONE 1 NY
+NEW OR
+MIN
+EMIN
+14 MIN
+MIN
+CALL WAITING
+UNLIMITED MAN MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED WIND MIN
+
+5.50
+283.92
+15.05
+311.82
+13.28
+1.21
+5.22
+19.71
+0.30
+15.12
+16.53
+14.20
+3.92
+51.85
+570.06
+
+
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Called
+Item Date Time
+10 06/04 10:58P
+11 06/05 12:48A
+12 06/05 10:41A
+13
+06/05 10:47A
+10:49A
+05/510394
+06/05 10:52A
+003 17-004
+06/05 01:09P
+biU:
+36/05 05:011
+06/05 06:14P
+06/05 06:49₽
+16/05 07:10
+
+023038e39e0s=00495L
+
+
+
+segsgaza
+
+
+- Continued
+Onty
+Used
+Rate Description
+NEW YORK NY
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+NEW YORK NY
+3 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+RIO GRANDE PR
+UNLMTED NWKND MIN
+INLIMİ
+WWKND
+SAN DIEGO CA
+UNLIM
+ED N/WKND MIN
+NEW YORK NY
+UNLIM
+ED NAWKND MIN
+SLA VERDE PR
+RIO GRANDE PR
+UNLIM
+•DNAVKND
+UNLIM
+ED
+WKND MIN
+LIO GRANDE PR
+UNLIM
+KND
+I0
+GR AR
+IDE PR
+UNLIM
+MIN
+I YORK NY
+UNLIM
+N
+UNLIM
+N/W
+ND
+KNB
+NEW YORK NY
+UNLIM
+UNLIMIT
+UNLIM
+NAW KNB
+MIAMI FL
+UNLIM
+INCOMING
+UNLIM
+TED
+N/WKND MIN
+KND MIN
+NY
+00Smo9000
+UNLIMIT
+ED
+ONOOSO
+3E23 3
+2>022235
+D0Z22<02
+*r0609r5
+NY
+3MIN
+2MN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+MIN
+1 MIN
+L MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+voOTENESTNTOCĞIETETOĞN
+UNLIMI
+Account Name
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Called
+Item Date Time
+72 06/07 09:03A
+73 06/07 09:09A
+06/07 09:14A
+06/07 09:38A
+06/07 09:42A
+06.
+U7 09:58A
+07 10:09A
+07 10:23A
+/07 10:24A
+0:26A
+10:28A
+10:30A
+10:55A
+12:16P
+12-26P
+NEW YORK NY
+QUEENS NY
+COMIN
+COMIN
+TW INCITIES MN
+NCOMING
+TARION OH
+INC OMING
+COMIN
+PALMBEACH I
+WPALMBEACH FL
+PALMBEACH F
+NCOMINÓ
+INCOMING
+NEWYORKZN1 NY
+NEW YORK NY
+RTHAMBOY !
+- Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+SMIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+3 MIN
+1 MIN
+400 ABBL ANYT ME MIN
+5MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+S MIT
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+1 MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+1 MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+2MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+2MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+2 MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+ZMIN
+NLIM MOBL TO MOB
+1 MIN
+00 ADD'L ANYTME MI
+1 MIN
+2 MIl
+A00 AL ANTE MIN
+ME MIN
+3MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+DO ADD'L ANYIME MI
+J uly 03, 2005
+
+8888
+Об/
+
+B99999
+: 00Р
+IN
+
+
+
+
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Called
+Item Date Time
+138 06/0B 06:40P
+139 06/08 06:41P
+140 0608 06:42P
+142
+ОБ/ОВ
+06:44P
+06/DB 06:47P
+06/0В
+07:07P
+06/08 07:27P
+145 06/0B 07:29P
+146
+06/08 07:34P
+147
+06/08
+07.54P
+148
+ОБ/DB 10:34P
+149 06/09 12:11A
+06 19 09:39A
+06M09
+11-05A
+152
+59555฿
+06/09 01-36P
+06/09
+01:42P
+D6/09 01:43P
+06/09 01:4BP
+06
+06/09 02:
+158
+06/09 02:20P
+159
+06/09 02:34P
+06/09 02-35P
+0609 02:35P
+162
+06/09 02:36P
+163
+06/09 02:37P
+166
+06)
+06
+88
+ss339
+02:38P
+02:40P
+03:15P
+03:26P
+04-71 P
+169 06/09 04:35P
+170 06/09 04:55P
+171 06/09 05:41P
+172 06/09 05:43P
+173 05 09 85:998
+06/09 07:33г
+176
+06/00 12-830
+177 06/10 10:16A
+178 06/10 11:05A
+170
+180
+06/18 1223₽
+181
+06/10 12:18P
+06/10
+12.228
+184
+06/10 12:25P
+195
+06/10 12:20P
+196
+06/10|
+187
+12:45P
+06/10 01:09P
+06/10 01:15P
+06/10 01:15P
+06/10 01:30P
+06/10 02:21F
+192
+06/10 03:20P
+193 06/10 03:24P
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+MARION OH
+MARION OH
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+NEWYORKZNI NY
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW
+YORK
+NY
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NEW YORK NY
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NCOMING
+• Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+1 MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+1 MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+HING
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+1 MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+EARLY
+EARLY EVENING
+2MIN
+1 MIN
+3 MIN
+2 MIN
+EV
+1 MIN
+12 MIN
+1 MIN
+_MIN
+1 MIN
+3 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+LEVT
+1 MIN
+IMIN
+IEVT
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+MKN
+UNLIMITED N/KND MIN
+MELTED THE MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+0O ADD'L ANYIME MIl
+DO ADD'L ANYTME MIl
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MI
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MI
+400 ADD'L
+AN
+YT
+MIN
+OBL
+VAL
+INCOMING
+BOCA RATON FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WILLOUGHBY
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+PALM BEACH FL
+NEW YORK NY
+ICOMIN
+IPAIMREACH P
+CHTAMSTTHS VI
+UPTER FATHE
+İNCOMING
+INCOMINE
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+WPALMBEACH FL
+BOYNTONBCH FL
+NY ZONE 1 MY
+NEW
+YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+WPALMBEACH FL
+2MIN
+2 MIN
+MIN
+2 MIN
+2 MIl
+SMIN
+1 MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYT
+CALL WAITING
+MIN
+100 ADD:
+CALL
+DATING ME MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+UNLIM MO
+MOBU
+400 ADD'L
+AN
+YT
+ME
+MIN
+10 AB
+MIN
+UNLIM MO
+BL
+MIN
+MOBL
+VAL
+MIN
+1 MIN
+400 AD
+1 MIN
+NLI
+2 MIN
+ARL
+LYEV
+ME
+MIN
+TO MOBL
+N/WKNO
+LEVT 1.50 411 INFO
+1 MIN
+16MN
+BARM FED IN ON
+NAND MIN
+1 MIN
+400 ADD
+ANYTME MIN
+MOBL
+MI
+MIl
+2 MIN
+MI
+MI
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+25 MIN
+2 MIN
+LEV
+DADDY ANYTM
+AL
+MIN
+DO ADD'L ANYTM
+MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+UNLIM MOBL
+OBL
+400 ADD'L
+ME
+MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME
+MIN
+MIN
+MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+MESSAG
+E RETRIEVAL
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+2MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+ADD
+ANYT
+ME MIN
+MI
+1 MIN
+BLTO
+MOBL
+RETRIEVAL
+UNLIM MO
+BL
+TO MOBL
+1.50
+Account Name
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Item Date Time Called
+194 06/10 03:24P
+195 06/10 03:30P
+96 06/10 04:02
+97 06/10 06:35
+198 06/10 06:59P
+99 06/10 07:09
+JO 06/10 09:16
+201 06/10 09:19P
+2 06/10 09:2.
+3 06/11 05:5
+0s 0611 0030
+1 09-34
+206 06/11 09:49A
+07 06/11 09:534
+08 06/11 10:05A
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+NEWYORKZNI NY
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+V PALMBEACH FI
+DUEENS NY
+ALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+QUEENS NY
+- Continued
+Onty
+Used
+Rate Description
+3MIN
+400 ADDL ANYTME MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+2 MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+1EVT
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+3 MIN
+400 ADDL
+ANYTME MIN
+CARLY EVENING NAKND
+1 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+2 MIN
+IMITED NAWKND MIN
+LEV
+MESSAGE RE
+TRIEVAL
+2 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+IMI
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITEB NAW KNB MIN
+UNLIMITED NWKND MIN
+UNL
+IMI
+ED N
+UNLIMI
+ED N/WKND
+UNLIMITED
+UNLIMITEB NAW KNB MI
+MIN
+
+......
+08
+WP
+AL
+5P
+DA
+SP
+ACH FL
+NY
+G
+NW
+NY
+NEW
+P
+EW
+FL
+IN
+....
+EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE,
+UNL
+UNLI
+IMI
+UNL
+UNL
+UNLIMIT
+UNLIM
+22221
+BL
+1323
+
+
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Called
+Item Date Time
+257 06/13 08:25A
+258 06/13 08:50A
+60 0613 09.26
+60 08
+261 06/13 11:05A
+262 06/13 11:59A
+263 06/13 12:14P
+264 06/13 12:16P
+265 06/13 12:27P
+365 08/3 02:13P
+268 0613 01:651
+169 06
+13 01
+270 06/13 06:31P
+272 06,
+06/13
+06:53P
+:54P
+
+
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+NCOMINI
+CON
+ING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+mobile UK
+mobile UK
+NCOMING
+WINCITIES MN
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+- Continued
+Onty
+Used
+2MIN
+5MIN
+2 MIN
+IMIN
+1 MIN
+IMIN
+2 MIN
+11 MIN
+11 MIN
+4MIN
+4MIN
+1 MIN
+1MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+Rate Description
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+DO ADD'L ANYTME MI
+DO ADD'L ANYTME MI
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+1.28 ENH DISC INT DI
+100 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+0.28 ENH DISC INT DL
+400 ADD'L ANYTME
+400 ADD'L AN
+400 ADD
+VIME
+100 ADD'L
+22
+
+zz
+
+
+
+G
+3.08
+1.12
+NY
+NY
+NY
+IC
+Account Name
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Called
+Item Date Time
+319 06/14 08:06P
+320 06/14 08:41P
+321 06/14 08:45P
+322 06/14 09:00P
+324 06/24 09.26P
+06/14 09:26P
+325 06/14 09:35P
+6 06/14 09:41
+/14 09.51
+328 06/14 09:57P
+:09:57P
+06/14 10:068
+06/14 10:468
+06/15
+12:04A
+08:47A
+1226P
+
+NEW YORK NY
+NY ZONE 1 NY
+NY ZONE 1 NY
+NWYRCYZNO1 NY
+NEW YORK NY
+NWYRCYZNOL NY
+NEW YORK NY
+EW YORK N
+IYORKZN1 N'
+NEW
+YORK NY
+NO MING
+YORK NY
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+LE ELE
+- Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+1 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+4 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+L MIN
+ROP CALL CREDI
+14 MIN
+ARLY EVEN
+NAWKND
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMIT
+MIN
+IND MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED NAVEND MIN
+UNLIM
+MIN
+1 MIN
+VKND
+2 MIN
+MIN
+MIN
+39 MIN
+1 MIN
+MIN
+UNLIMITED NAND MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED NAND MIN
+1 MIN
+400 ADD'L ANYTME MIN
+1 MIN
+400 ADDL
+ANYTME MIN
+1 MIN
+UNI
+8883888888888888338888888=3888
+
+1.50
+698100000 B52000Z
+
+
+69B100000 9SZ000Z
+* cingular
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Item Date Time
+Called
+382 06/16 07:14P
+383
+184
+
+39.
+06/16
+08:45P
+0б,
+06/16
+08:46P
+08:47P
+06/16
+08:48P
+06/1
+08:48P
+08.51P
+06/16
+08:52P
+06/16
+06/16
+08:54P
+10:42P
+06/16
+10:43P
+06/16
+10:48P
+06/17
+10:52P
+08:14A
+09:06A
+
+888S
+
+
+$0033
+36065
+98999
+23388
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+VEW YORKZNI NY
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+NEWYORKZNI NY
+QUEENS
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+NCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+JARION OH
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+• Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+10 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+13 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+EARLY EVENING NWKNO
+N/WKND
+1 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+ARLY EVENING
+N/WKND
+-ARLY EVENING NIKND
+1 MIN
+MIN
+1 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+ARLY EVENING ME
+JING
+NWKND
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+ARLY E
+UNLIMITED NAVKND MIt
+NAW KND
+UNLIMITED N/KND MIN
+UNLIMITED NKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/KND MIN
+ANYTME MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INC
+MI
+ING
+INCOMING
+NY
+NY
+KNy
+IC
+FL
+KNY
+NY
+ZN01 NY
+COMIN
+OMIN
+IK NY
+FL
+MING
+YOR
+N1 NY
+ING
+TYN NY
+EACH FL
+FL
+III
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+. MIN
+1 MIN
+EMIN
+L MIN
+1 MIN
+MIN
+SMIl
+1 MIN
+7 MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+7 MIN
+2MIN
+TIN
+UNL
+400
+UNLI
+INC
+
+33333
+Account Name
+
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Item Date Time
+Called
+445 06/17 07:53P
+446 06/17 07:53P
+47 06/17 07:548
+48 06/17 09 53P
+449 06/17 09:55P
+450 06/17 10:06Р
+451 06/18 07:11A
+452 06/18 07:13A
+453 06/18 10:32A
+454 06/18 10:53A
+155 06/18 10:53A
+156 06/18 10:54A
+458 06/18 11-25A
+459
+11 8
+11:24A
+460
+461
+88 888
+
+491
+06/19
+08:
+:03P
+- Continued
+Onty
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK Y
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+Used
+Rate Description
+1 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+1 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+2 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+UNLIMITED NAND MIN
+2 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED
+NAW KND
+UNLIMITED NAWKND MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+LIMITED NWKND MIN
+EV
+MESSAGE RE
+EVAL
+1 MIN
+UNLIMI
+TED N/WKND MIN
+1 MIN
+PALMBEACH
+UNLIM
+iMIN
+UNLIMITEB NAW KND MIN
+MIAMI FL
+1 MIN
+QUEENS NY
+3 MIN
+UNLIMITE NANKB MIN
+WPALMBEACH FL
+UNI
+1 MIN
+UNL
+COMIN
+L MIN
+UNLIMI
+ED N/W
+KND MIN
+MIN
+PALMBEACH I
+1 MIN
+WPALMBEACH FL
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+NCOMING
+1 MIN
+N PALMBEACH FI
+LMIN
+M
+UNLIMITED NAW IN MIN
+NEW YORK
+NY
+1 MIN
+UNLIMIT
+KN
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+NCOMIN
+NEW YORK NY
+1 MIN
+7 MIN
+2 MIN
+D
+NAWKND
+000
+MI
+CHTAMSTTHS VI
+IN
+CHTAMSTTHS
+VI
+NEW YORK NY
+3 MIN
+1 MIN
+NEW YORK NY
+NY ZONE 1 NY
+NCOMING
+JEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+COMIN
+PAI MASACH
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+Y PALMBEACH FL
+VILLOUGHBY
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+PALMBEACH I
+PALMR-ACH A
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+W PALMBEACH FL
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+2 MIN
+3 MIN
+2 MIN
+22 MIN
+7 MIN
+HENN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+L MIN
+2 MIN
+EMIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+1EVT
+1 MIN
+IEV
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+I MIN
+1 MIN
+IMIN
+1 MIN
+1MIN
+lEV
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+MES
+UNLIMIT
+UNLIMI
+UNLIMIT
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+ND MI
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITEB NIW KNB MIN
+UNLIMITED N/W
+NLIMITE!
+KND MIN
+IN IN MIN
+UNLIMITED NW KND MIN
+UNLIMITED NW KND MIN
+NEMITE NA
+B NW KND MI
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+UNLIMITED
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+22
+VELUBER MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INUT
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINO MES
+TO MOBL
+INCLUDED
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+
+
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Called
+Item Date Time
+503 06/20 03:56P
+504 06/20 04:19P
+505 06/20 04:29P
+506 06/20 07:03P
+508 06/20 83238
+509 06/20 07:58P
+10 06/20 08:04F
+1 060
+20 08:25P
+512 06/20 08:29P
+513 06/20 08:55P
+ELS 06/21 09:03A
+09:03A
+516
+09:064
+- Continued
+Onty
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+EWYORKZNIN
+EW YORK N
+RANDOLPH MA
+EW YORK D
+NEW
+ORK
+INCOMING
+NWYRCYZNO1 NY
+INCOMING
+NEW
+YORK NY
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+·92
+02N
+MIN
+MAR
+Used
+Rate Description
+1 MIN
+2MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+MIl
+2MIN
+IMIN
+4MIN
+1MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+1MIN
+SMIN
+4MIN
+SMIN
+3MIN
+12MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+ARLY EVENING N/WKN
+ARLY EVENING NAVKN
+EARLY EVENING NAKND
+EARLY EVENING INB
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+EARLY EVENING NWKND
+INLIMITED NWKND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+VCLUDED MINUTE
+TINIM
+MOBL
+
+NEW
+NCC
+RK NY
+RKNY
+INC
+ME
+CA
+KNY
+NY
+NE
+W
+NY
+ШІШШІШНІЦЦІІШ
+INCI
+NCLL
+UNLIN
+IN
+Account Name
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Called
+Item Date Time
+567 06/22 09:59P
+56B 06/22 10:00P
+590 06/23 12034
+571 06/23 12:39A
+572 06/23 08:514
+06/23 09:04A
+574 06/23 09:05A
+376 06/23 09:294
+577 06/23 09:33A
+09:51A
+379 06/23 18:194
+581 06/23 10:21A
+582 06/23 01:36P
+183 06 23 02:58
+84 06/23 03:518
+МАМАНИ!
+629
+06/25
+12:59A
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+NEWYORKZN1 NY
+COMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+V YORK NY
+QUEE
+ICELAND
+- Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/KND MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+- MIN
+NLIMITED NAWKND M
+MIN
+NIMITED NAVKND M
+16 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+13 MIN
+NCLUDED MINUTES
+2 MIN
+INLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+2 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+3 MIN
+3MIN
+ICLUBEB MINUTE
+2 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+MIN
+2MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1 MIN
+CLUDED MINUTE
+2 MIN
+CLUDED MINUTE
+3MIN
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+2 MIN
+INLIM MOBL TO MOB
+1MIN
+2
+ІШШ!!!!!!!Ш!!!!
+1.50
+2 MIN
+IMIN
+: MIN
+1EVT
+8MIN
+
+1.50
+IN
+TO
+MCLUDED
+CLUDED MINUTE
+INLIMITED NWKND MIN
+MESSAGE RE
+TRIEVAL
+UNLIMITED NAND MIN
+
+
+
+× cingular
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Item Date Time Called
+30 06/25 01:42P
+31 06/25 01-528
+632 06/25 03:21P
+633 06/25 05:12P
+634 06/25 05:13P
+05/23 0833P
+06:33P
+637
+06/26 12-42A
+0626130A
+640
+541
+06/26 03 53P
+16/28
+642 06/26 03:57P
+643
+6/26 09:08
+14 06/26 11-42
+645 06/27 09:54A
+
+
+føa8s9878888886GGe80068@8@2883@88
+9g: 8988988388388gggggg888
+
+
+COMIN
+ELAN
+• Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+BMIN 0.49 ENH DISC INT DL
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/KND MIN
+NEW YORK NY
+QUEENS NY
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+11AMS LIHS
+ITAMSTTHS
+EW YORK N
+EW YORK N°
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/KND MIN
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+INLIMITED NAVKND MIl
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+MIN
+11 MIN
+4 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N
+ONLINE
+INLIMIT
+UNLIMIT
+UNLIM
+N/WKN
+UNLIMITED N
+0000
+MIN
+WKND
+MIN
+INLIMITED N/KND MIN
+VI
+UNL
+3.92
+6.37
+Account Name
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Called
+Item Date Time
+691 06/28 06:45P
+692 06/28 06:46P
+06/28 07:
+695
+06/28 07:17P
+696
+28
+06/28
+07:17P
+07:18P
+698 06/28
+07:25P
+07
+701
+06/28
+07
+:37P
+703
+00/28
+06/28
+07:4
+06/28
+06/28
+706 06/28 08:04P
+06/28 09:39P
+708 06/28 09:40P
+83883838889888838888888889 388888838888838888888
+
+
+
+GREAT BDG VA
+MARION OH
+ARION O
+ARION O
+NEW YORK NY
+MARION OH
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+COMING
+ICOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+- Continued
+Onty
+Used
+Rate Description
+2 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+2 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+L MIN
+IMIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+EARLY EVENING NIWKND
+1 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+EMIN
+EARLY EVE
+ING N/VIKND
+EARLY EVE
+ING NAWKNO
+2 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+2 MIN
+EARLY
+EARLY
+EVENING NWKNB
+NG
+2 MIN
+L MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+EARLY EVENING
+NING WIND
+EARLY EVENING NWNB
+EARLY EVENING NAWKND
+UNLIMITE NW INB MIN
+UNLIMI
+00
+IN
+NY
+NWYRO
+ZN01 NY
+E.
+zU
+H FL
+PALM BEACH FL
+3MIN
+4 MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+BL
+NCLUD
+ACHIN
+UT
+•ARIY
+NING
+0
+AR
+UNI
+VE
+ND
+UNLIMIT
+MINUT
+INCLUB
+ED
+222
+333
+000
+
+0.28
+
+
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Called
+Item Date Time
+756 06/30 03:09P
+757 06/30 03:11P
+758 06/38 03320
+760 06/30 04:03P
+06/30 04:44P
+762 06/30 0445г
+763 0630 0389₽
+765 06/30 05:51P
+166 06/30 05:520
+67 06/30 05:54P
+768 06/30 05:55P
+760 06/30 06:30P
+771 06/30 07:13P
+12 06/30 07:15
+73 06/30 03:191
+774 06/30 07:25P
+75 06/30 07:35
+76 06/30 10:18
+777
+06/30 10:19P
+778
+06/30
+99
+11:32P
+781
+13S7A
+07/01
+:58A
+02:06A
+783 87/81฿
+02:07A
+02:09A
+784 07/01 09:55A
+785฿
+785 87/81
+09:57A
+787 07/01
+10:03A
+:34P
+788 07:01
+2:35P
+789 07/01 12:52P
+790|
+07/0
+12:58P
+791
+01:01P
+792 07/01 01:07P
+: 8138Р
+95 07/0
+96 07/01
+82:35P
+797 07/01 02:29P
+799 87/81 02321
+12:32
+BOO 07/01
+B02 87/81 83.29P
+802 07/01 03:30P
+B03 07/01 03:32P
+804 07/01
+805
+04:08P
+04:21P
+006 0701 04.30P
+807 07/01 05:09P
+B08 07/01 05:53P
+809 07/01 06:46P
+810 07/01 09:03P
+B11 07/02 07:39A
+812 07/02 07:40A
+813 07/02 09:50A
+814 07/02
+815
+• 87/02 1138A
+816 07/02 11:54A
+- Continued
+Qnty
+INCOMING
+PALM BEACH FL
+IEW YORK N'
+TEW YORK N°
+NEW YORK NY
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+MARION OH
+INCOMING
+UEENS N
+IPALMBEACH F
+MARION OH
+INCOMING
+mobile BRA
+mobile BRA
+Used
+Rate Description
+1MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+7MIN
+2MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INLIM
+MOBL TO MOBL
+2MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+MIl
+VCLUDED MINUTE.
+CLUDED MINUTE
+1MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1MIN
+INCLUDED MINUT
+1MIN
+INCLUDED MINUT
+2MIN
+NCLUDED MINI
+1MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1 MIN
+2MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1MIN
+EARLY EVENING N/WKND
+1 MIN
+EARLY EVENING NAKND
+1 MIN
+NEW YORK NY
+WPALMBEACH FL
+MIAMI FL
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NCO
+IN
+G
+INCOMING
+IMIN
+EARLY EVENING NAKND
+EARLY EVENING NAKND
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+2MIN
+INLIMITED N/WKND MI
+1EVT
+CALL
+ALL WAITINI
+6MIN
+4MIN
+UNLIMITED NAWKND MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIMTER
+IMIN
+UNL
+UNLIMIT
+ED
+N/W
+KND
+2 MIN
+UNI IM
+MIN
+UNLIMITED
+MIN
+MIAMI FL
+2MIN
+INCLUDED MINU
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+NEW
+YORK NY
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+mobile UK
+MARION SE
+MARION OH
+MARION OH
+MARION OH
+MARION OH
+MIAMI FI
+NEWYORKZNI NY
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NEW YORK NY
+1 MIN
+2MIN
+5 MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MI
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIl
+2MI
+2MIN
+1 MIl
+2MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+2MIN
+IEVT
+2MIN
+1 MIN
+6MIN
+2MIN
+1MIN
+IEVT
+7MIN
+1MIN
+1MIN
+UNLIM MOBL
+INCLUDED MINU
+1 TO M9BL
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+NCLUDED MINUTE
+UNLIM MOBL
+TO
+) MOB
+BL
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+INCLUBEB MINUTES
+0.28 ENH DISC INT DL
+NELUBEB MINUTE
+MINUTES
+Laun
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+NEW YORK NY
+NWYRCYZNO NY
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+WPALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+RANDOLPH MA
+PALM BEACH FL
+2MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+IMIN
+INCLUBEB MINUT
+MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+UNLIM MOBL
+TO MOBL
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+UNLIM MOBL TO MOBL
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+UNLIM MOBL
+TO MORL
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+NCLUDED MINUTES
+INLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIM
+ITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMTED
+N/WKND MIN
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+AL
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIN
+UNLIMITED NAMIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+0.28
+Account Name
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Called
+Item Date Time
+817 07/02 11:59A
+818 07/02 12:02P
+9 07/02 12:0.
+0 07/02 12:01
+821 07/02 01:08P
+823
+07/02 01:15P
+07/02 01-48P
+82 07/02 03.21P
+826 07/02 03:22P
+827
+07/02 03:58P
+828 07/02 04:05P
+829 07/02 04:09P
+830 07/02 04:10P
+831 07/02 04:11P
+83 0702 04 120
+834 07/02 04:24P
+835 07/02 04:28P
+836 07/02 05:25P
+837 07/02 05:33P
+07/02 06:27P
+07/02 06:34F
+0702 06:378
+07/02 06:54P
+07/02 06:59P
+845
+DIOZ 0205
+846
+07/02 07:351
+847 07/02 07:41P
+848 07/02 09:25P
+TOTAL VOICE USAGE FOR
+ROAMER USAGE FOR
+Called
+Item Date Time
+06/02
+12:43P
+06/02 13:48P
+06/02 12:49P
+5/02 01:24
+5/02 01:25
+06/02 01:26P
+06/02 03:51P
+06/02 05:53P
+06/02 06:13P
+06/02 06:49P
+06/02 06:501
+16/02 06:58P
+06/02 07:10P
+06/02 07:13P
+D6/02 08-26P
+06/02 08:28P
+06/02 08:32P
+WPALMBEACH FL
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+W PALMBEACH FL
+WPALMBEACH FL
+NEW YORK NY
+UPITER Fr
+V PALMBEACH F
+EW YORK N°
+COMING
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+NWYRCYZNO1 NY
+BOCA RATON FL
+RANDOLPH MA
+NY ZONE 1 NY
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+WPALMBEACH FL
+- Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+1 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+1 MIN
+MIN
+UNLIMITE NUKE MIN
+2 MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMTEBR
+KNB MIN
+MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+MIN
+1 MIN
+LEVT
+IMIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+3MIN
+1 MIN
+EVT
+MIN
+EVT
+9MIN
+ZMIN
+MIN
+2 MIN
+1 MIN
+IMIN
+6MIN
+1 MIN
+EV
+1 MIN
+SMIN
+19 MIN
+UNLIMITED NAWKND MIN
+UNLIMITED NAND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMIT
+CND MIR
+UNLIMITED N/KND MIN
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL N
+UNLIMITED NAKND
+UNLIMITED NAKND MIN
+UNLIMITED NAWKND MIR
+UNLIMITED NAVKND GIR
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+UNLIMITED NAKND MIN
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+UNLI
+ITED
+NAWKND
+MIN
+MESSAGE RETRIEVAL
+UNLIMIT
+ED
+NAND MIN
+UNLIMIT
+UN
+IM
+588
+KND
+MIN
+MIN
+UN
+MIN
+UN
+IN
+EE
+KNB
+UNLI
+UNLIM
+CAL
+557
+ITI
+KND
+MIN
+UNIIM
+ED
+NAU
+END MIN
+UNLIMITED
+MW MIN
+UNLIMITED NAND MIN
+UNLIMITED N/WKND MIN
+INCOMING
+WHILE IN BARBADOS --
+Onty Used
+1 MIN
+Description
+INT'L ROAMING VOICE
+NO ROAMING VOICE
+TOAM
+ROA
+NG
+NEW YORK NY
+BROOKLYN
+NY
+BROOKLYN NY
+BROOKLYN NY
+INCOMING
+YORK NY
+NE
+YORK NY
+YORK
+NY
+YORK NY
+NCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+RO
+ROA
+2222
+INTE
+IN
+IN
+INT
+'L
+ROAM
+OAMIN
+AMIN
+RO
+ROA
+ROAN
+VOICE
+
+19.55
+1.69
+2000258.000001871
+
+
+Account Name
+
+ROAMER USAGE FOR
+Called
+Item Date Time
+23 06/02 08:35P
+24 06/02 08:37P
+0602 08:49P
+06/02
+08-49P
+06/03
+07:12A
+06/03
+06/03
+09:30A
+09:34A
+06/03
+10:01A
+10:04A
+10:09A
+06/03
+D603
+10:10A
+10:32A
+06/03 10:36A
+06/03
+10-54A
+06/03
+06
+10:56A
+D3 10:57A
+06003
+10:58A
+11:04A
+06/03 11:05A
+0660311:07
+06/03
+11:18A
+06/03
+06/03
+1:221
+11.441
+06/03
+06/03
+22 25A
+:23P
+06/03
+03:48P
+8352P
+06/03 04:15P
+88
+12:31A
+19:11A
+06/04 10:44A
+06/04
+12:04P
+06/04 12:41P
+TOTAL ROAMER USAGE FOR
+WHILE IN BARBADOS -. - Cont.
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+NY ZONE 1 NY
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+IEW YORK
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+NEW YORK NY
+MIAMI FL
+NWYRCYZNO1 NY
+BRIDGETOWN BD
+SPEIGHTSTN BD
+INCOMING
+NCOMING
+INCOMING
+NEW YORK NY
+INCOMING
+BROOKLYN N°
+BROOKLY
+INCOMING
+Onty Used
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+2 MIN
+4 MIN
+1 MIN
+1 MIN
+2 MIN
+MIN
+MIN
+L MIN
+19 MIN
+2 MIN
+MIN
+1 MIN
+3 MIN
+3 MIN
+MIN
+3 MIN
+MIN
+2 MIN
+MIN
+3 MIN
+Description
+INT'L ROAMING VOICE
+INT'L ROAMING VOICE
+INT'L ROAMING VOIC
+NT'L ROAMING VOIC
+INT'L ROAMING VOICE
+NI'L ROAMING VOK
+NT'L ROAMING VOIC
+INT'L ROAMING VOICE
+INT'L ROAMING VOICE
+NT'L ROAMING VOIC
+NT'L ROAMING VOICE
+NT'L ROAMING VOICE
+INT'L ROAMING VOICE
+INT'L ROAMING VOICE
+IT'L ROAMING VO
+INT'L ROAMING VOICE
+INT'L ROAMING VOICE
+INT'L ROAMING VOIC
+2
+22
+1 MIN
+NEW
+ORK
+NY ZONE 1 NY
+INCOMING
+INCOMING
+WHILE IN BARBADOS -
+MIN
+27 MIN
+1 MIN
+L MIN
+
+TEXT/MULTIMEDIA MSGS FOR
+Item Date
+06602
+Time
+Sent To/Revd From
+06/03
+06/03
+003
+06/03
+06/03
+06/03
+06/03
+06/03
+8888888)
+5/04
+104
+104
+105
+V05
+88888
+/05
+06/06
+06/06
+07:17A
+18:0BA
+Q-EE.
+10:08A
+5:09
+7:00
+11-45P
+11:50P
+03:00P
+16.07/
+18-371
+08.58P
+12:56A
+01-43A
+01:53A
+09:11A
+10:05A
+04:01P
+04:10P
+12:20P
+12:20P
+Charge Description
+INTL ROAM TEXT MSG
+INTE ROAM TEXT MEG
+INTL ROAM TEXT MS
+INTL ROAM TEXT ME
+INTL ROAM TEXT MS
+• ROAM TEXT MES
+100 INC
+100 INEL: M
+LAU
+unis
+100 INCL. MSG
+8381
+INCL.
+INCI
+G
+INCL.
+MS
+5
+100 INCE:
+SENT
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+100 INCE:
+MS
+MS
+unL
+SENT
+100 INCL.
+1.69
+1.69
+1.58
+38
+69
+38.
+1.69
+32.
+3.
+.69
+1.
+69
+TEXT/MULTIMEDIA MSGS FOR
+Item Date
+Time
+Sent To/Rcvd From
+25 06/06
+26 06/06
+12:26P
+07:1
+08-33P
+06/06
+09:07P
+06/0€
+06107
+09:56P
+06-25P
+06/07
+08:11P
+06/07
+00:70P
+06/07
+09:32P
+06/07
+06/08
+11:38P
+10:44P
+06/08
+10:50P
+06/09
+06/09
+06/09
+06/09
+41
+06/09
+13 06/18
+02:19P
+05:05P
+11:01P
+0932A
+Continued
+Charge Description
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+100 INEL: ME&S SENT
+100 INEL: MESS SENT
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+O INCL. MSGS SEN
+MSGS
+SENT
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+100 INCL. M585 SENT
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+J IN U
+MSGS
+1 IN
+MS SENT
+100 INEL: MESS SENT
+....
+§š8§888888š883§§З888§8З§8885šš33ª§88§83š§šŠšššš3
+220230000003000000000000000106201002002002.000
+22222012222220 20002122220
+
+
+TEXT/MULTIMEDIA MSGS FOR
+Item Date
+Time
+Sent To/Rcvd From
+92 06/20
+09:37P
+09338
+95 06/20
+• U0/2
+7 06/2
+09:58P
+12:29P
+12:32₽
+12:48P
+07:46P
+07:49P
+09:00P
+05:21P
+05:31P
+15:378
+18:06฿
+12:09P
+01:53₽
+12:24P
+09:11P
+03:42P
+83/55
+03:48P
+- Continued
+Charge Description
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+O INCL. MSC
+0 INCE MEGS SEN
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+100 06/21
+01 06/2
+02 062
+103 06/22
+14 06/2
+I5 06/2
+106 06/26
+17 06/2
+18 060
+190 06/27
+111 06/28
+
+114 06/28
+116 06/28
+117 06/28
+H9 08/29
+120 06/29
+122 06/38
+137 06/38
+125 06/30
+139 06/38
+128 06/30
+138 05/30
+131 07/01
+E3 0701
+100 IN: SENT
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+00 INEL MESS SEN
+D0 INCL. MS
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+100 INCL. MSGS SENT
+100 INCL: MSG5 SENT
+100 IN L: MS SENT
+MSGS
+08:09P
+0:371
+7.571
+08:02P
+08:52P
+07:03P
+7:08
+10P
+10:57P
+1:30
+04:11P
+5:31
+07:116
+18: 10 P
+136 07/01
+7 07 1
+09:37P
+9:40
+18 07M
+2:47฿
+TOTAL TEXT/MULTIMEDIA MSG USAGE FOR
+TEXT MESSA
+TEXT MESS/
+TEXT MESS
+TEXT MES
+TEXT MEL
+TEXT MESS
+TEXT MES
+TEXT MESS
+TEXT MES
+TEXT MEE
+I MESS
+TEXT MESS
+TEXT MESS
+TEXT MES
+TEXT MESSA
+TEXT MESSAG
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY
+FOR
+Monthly Service Charges
+Item Description
+1 CALL WAITING
+2 TEXT MESSAGING PLAN - 0 MSGS
+3 CALLER ID
+4 VOICEMAIL
+5 GSM AMERICA LOCAL $29.99
+Service Dates
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+0.10
+000O
+DOOOC
+.10
+8:18
+0.10
+8:18
+0.10
+0.10
+0.10
+0.10
+0,10
+8.35
+29.99
+Account Name
+SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIVITY - CONTINUED
+Monthly Service Charges - Continued
+Item Description
+Service Dates
+6 CALL FORWARDSTANCE FRM SERVICE AREA 06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+7 CALL FORWARDING
+8 WORLDCONNECT
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+9 REGULATORY PROGRAMS FEE
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+10 DETAIL BILLING
+06/03/05 - 07/02/05
+Total Monthly Service Charges
+Monthly Usage Charges
+Item Description
+1 INCLUDED MINUTES
+2 LONG DISTANCE
+Total Monthly Usage Charges
+Onty Used
+32 MIN
+2 MIN
+Other Subscriber Charges
+Item Description
+1 MCTD SURCHARGE
+2 TELECOM EXCISE TAX
+3 FEDERAL UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND SURCHARGE
+Total Other Subscriber Charges
+Subscriber Government Fees and Taxes
+Item Description
+1 SALES TAX
+2 ST WIRELESS COMM SURCHARGE
+3 FEDERAL EXCISE TAX
+4 NY CITY UTILITY G.R. SUR
+5 LOCAL WIRELESS SURCHARGE
+Total Subscriber Government Fees and Taxes
+TOTAL CURRENT CHARGES FOR I
+DETAIL OF CURRENT ACTIVITY
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Item Date Time
+Called
+2 06/20 09:40P
+3 06/23 11:56A
+4 06/23 03:03P
+5 06/24 12:53P
+5 06/24 01:04
+/ 06/26 04:19
+฿ 06/26 04:20P
+9 06/26 04:22P
+10 06/26 04:23P
+11 06/26 04:24P
+NEW YORK
+EL CAJ ON CA
+NEW YORK NY
+Used Rate Description
+§ MIN
+6 MIN
+HAMSTTHS V
+SUEENS NY
+EW YORK I
+ITAMSTTHS
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+1 MIN
+0.20 LONG DISTANCE
+ZMIN
+NELUBEB MINUTES
+1 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+EMIN 0.20 LONG DISTANTES
+
+1.09
+39.74
+0.40
+0.40
+Charle
+0.86
+1.94
+2.87
+1.20
+1.06
+0.62
+0.30
+6.05
+40.13
+0.20
+0.20
+2000258.000001872
+
+
+× cingular
+raising the ba
+Account Name
+
+VOICE USAGE FOR
+Item Date Time
+Called
+12 06/26 04:25P
+TOTAL VOICE USAGE FOR
+NEW YORK NY
+• Continued
+Onty
+Used Rate Description
+1 MIN
+INCLUDED MINUTES
+0.40
+***THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ***
+2000258.000001872
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff8ec91c99459581768edfaf4ed9167a8f73e880545d418382643e637bb24501.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff8ec91c99459581768edfaf4ed9167a8f73e880545d418382643e637bb24501.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d87ea50c9d4982216550aae2686d913878995961
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/ds9-unparsed-06/ff8ec91c99459581768edfaf4ed9167a8f73e880545d418382643e637bb24501.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -3462,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "ff8ec91c99459581768edfaf4ed9167a8f73e880545d418382643e637bb24501",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 62,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.efta-prefixed\", \"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.page-footer\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "65ccf2c84566292ca719dbb1307969a44f176382d2d70a771a572858a13381fe",
+  "output_sha256": "9382f2b82853d75e04467b190ef4245f054de715d40478962fbc61bed70ca00e",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/0ea9fd65590f1e6840c8623f6c212b50ad1124a12f793e08c180c7e3b08c5e42.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/0ea9fd65590f1e6840c8623f6c212b50ad1124a12f793e08c180c7e3b08c5e42.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4b186b6da41284cbbe2e7866c1540cd441160e95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/0ea9fd65590f1e6840c8623f6c212b50ad1124a12f793e08c180c7e3b08c5e42.md
@@ -0,0 +1,3116 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+H
+H
+De
+Q
+LQ
+3,
+3,
+;
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+2,
+3;
+3;
+3,
+3
+3,
+3
+5;
+5;
+b7c
+5;
+5;
+5;
+3;
+b6 - 2,
+06 - 3;
+5;
+5;
+5;
+670 -
+5;
+5; b7C
+5; b7C
+5; b7C
+b7c
+b7C - 3;
+;
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+- 7;
+- 7;
+7;
+7;
+7;
+7;
+7;
+3;
+67E
+7;
+b7E
+7;
+b7E
+7;
+b7E
+- 7;
+b7E
+- 7;
+b7E
+- 7;
+b7E
+- 7:
+b7E
+- 7;
+N
+3;
+5;
+4,
+4,
+4,
+5; b7E - 7;
+5; b7E - 7;
+5; b7E
+- 7;
+5;
+b7E
+- 7;
+4;
+3,
+4, 5;
+4,
+5;
+N
+
+ru
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+5;
+3,
+3,
+5;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+• He
++
+at
+U
+• H
+5,
+5;
+5;
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+- 3,
+6: b7c
+5;
+5;
+4, 7; b7D - 2;
+2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D
+- 2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D -
+2;
+b7D - 2;
+67D - 2:
+b7D - 2;
+b7D
+- 2;
+2,
+3,
+5,
+3,
+5;
+3,
+5;
+6;
+5
+5; b7E - 7;
+5
+b7E
+7;
+b7E
+- 7;
+b7E
+- 7;
+b7E
+- 7;
+5;
+b7E
+- 7;
+3;
+5
+5
+5;
+3
+3
+5; b7E - 7;
+5; b7E - 7;
+3;
+3;
+7;
+5
+b7E
+7;
+b7E
+- 7;
+5;
+b7E
+- 7:
+5;
+b7E
+- 7;
+5;
+b7E
+- 7;
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+3
+3,
+5; b7C -
+1,
+5; b7C
+5; b7C -
+1,
+5;
+1,
+5; b7C - 1,
+
+Page 234 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 235 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 237 - b3 - 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3; b7E - 7;
+Page 238 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page 239 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, 5; b7C -
+3,
+5;
+Page 240 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,
+5; b7C -
+5
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page 241 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,
+5; b7C -
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page 242 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,
+5; b7C -
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page 243 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,
+5; b7C -
+3
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page 244 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,
+; b7C -
+3
+5
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page 245 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,
+5
+; b7C -
+3
+5
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page 246 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,
+5; b7C -
+3,
+5;
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page 247 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3;
+b7C - 3;
+Page 248 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+2,
+3; b7C - 2, 3;
+Page 252 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+2,
+3; b7C -
+2,
+3;
+Page 254 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2, 3; b7C - 2, 3;
+Page 257 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7E - 7;
+Page 258 - b6
+8; b7C - 8;
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page 259 - b6
+5,
+8; b7C
+- 5,
+8; b7E - 7;
+Page 260 ~ b6
+5,
+8; b7C
+5,
+Page 261 ~ b6
+5,
+8; b7C
+8
+5,
+8;
+b7E
+- 7:
+Page 262 ~ b6
+8; b7C -
+8;
+b7E
+7;
+Page 263 ~ b6
+8;
+8;
+b7E
+7;
+Page 264 - b6
+8; b7C - 8;
+b7E
+7;
+Page 265 ~ b6
+5,
+8; b7C - 5,
+8;
+Page 266 ~ b6
+5,
+8; b7C
+5,
+8;
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page 267 - b6
+5,
+8; b7C
+5,
+8;
+Page 268 ~ b6
+Page 269 - b6
+5,
+8;
+5,
+8;
+5,
+8; b7C
+5,
+8;
+67E
+- 7;
+Page 270 ~ b6
+Page 271 ~ b6
+5,
+8; b7C
+5,
+8;
+b7E
+- 7;
+2,
+8; b7C -
+2,
+8;
+Page 275 ~ b6
+8;
+b7C - 8; b7E - 7;
+Page 276 - b6
+8; b7C
+8;
+Page 278
+"b6
+8; b7C
+8;
+Page 279 ~ b6
+8; b7C -
+8;
+b7E
+7;
+Page 281 ~ b6
+- 8; b7C - 8;
+Page 282 ~ b6
+Page 283 - b6
+5,
+8; b7C
+- 5,
+8; b7E - 7;
+5,
+8; b7C - 5, 8; b7E - 7;
+Page 284 ~ b6 -
+5, 8; b7C - 5, 8; b7E - 7;
+Page 285 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7E - 7;
+Page 286 ~ b6 -
+8; b7C -
+8;
+Page 287
+~b6 - 8; b7C -
+8;
+Page 288 ~ b6 - 8; b7C -
+8; b7E - 7;
+Page 289 ~ b6
+8; b7C
+8; b7E - 7;
+Page 290 - b6
+8; b7C
+8; b7E - 7;
+Page 291 ~ b6
+8; b7C - 8; b7E - 7;
+Page 292 ~ b6
+5,
+8; b7C - 5,
+8; b7E - 7;
+Page 293 - b6
+8: b7C -
+5,
+8;
+Page 294 ~ b6
+5,
+8; b7C - 5,
+8; b7E - 7;
+Page 295 - b6
+5,
+8; b7C
+5,
+8; b7E - 7;
+Page 296 - b6
+5,
+8; b7C -
+5,
+8;
+Page 297 ~ b6 -
+5,
+8; b7C - 5,
+8:
+b7E - 7:
+Page 298 ~ b6 - 5,
+8; b7C - 5,
+8;
+Page 299 ~ b6 - 5,
+8; b7C - 5, 8; b7E - 7;
+
+5,
+00
+Q
+00
+00
+8;
+8;
+8;
+8;
+8;
+8;
+8;
+8;
+8;
+8;
+8;
+5,
+5,
+5,
+8;
+7;
+7;
+ru
+00
+• H
+U
+00
+00
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+8;
+8;
+5,
+8;
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+8;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1;
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1;
+1,
+1,
+1,
+8;
+8;
+8;
+8;
+8;
+8;
+8;
+8
+8;
+8;
+- 7;
+7;
+7;
+- 7;
+7;
+- 7;
+3;
+7;
+7;
+2,
+N
+3;
+3;
+2
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3
+;
+• ..
+m
+2,
+3;
+b7C - 2, 3, 4;
+4;
+b70 - 2,
+3, 4;
+
+- 1,
+- 1;
+- 1;
+1,
+W
+W0
+- b3
+b3
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+= b3
+63
+- b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+163
+= b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b 3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+- 1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+~ b3
+- 1;
+- 1;
+3,
+3,
+3;
+b7C - 3;
+5;
+b7C - 3, 5; b7E - 7;
+5; b7C - 3, 5; b7E - 7;
+3,
+5; b7C - 3, 5; b7E - 7;
+5
+3,
+3,
+3,
+5;
+5
+5
+5
+3;
+1,
+- 1,
+1,
+3,
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3,
+3
+3
+3;
+3;
+5
+;
+5;
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+1
+1
+1
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+5; b7E - 7;
+5; b7E - 7;
+5;
+b7E
+- 7;
+5; b7E - 7;
+5; b7E - 7;
+b7E
+7;
+5;
+5
+5
+5
+5;
+b7E
+7;
+b7E
+b7E
+7;
+7;
+b7E
+7;
+b7E
+7;
+7;
+5;
+5;
+5
+5;
+5
+5;
+5;
+5;
+5;
+5
+5;
+b7E
+7;
+b7E
+- 7;
+b7E
+7;
+b7E
+7;
+b7E
+7;
+b7E
+7;
+b7E
+- 7;
+b7E
+7;
+b7E
+7;
+b7E
+7;
+b7E
+7;
+b7E
+7;
+5;
+b7E
+7;
+3
+3;
+3;
+5;
+5;
+7;
+7;
+7
+;
+b7E
+- 7:
+
+Page 430 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,
+5; b7C - 3,
+5; b7E - 7;
+Page 431 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,
+5; b7C -
+3
+5; b7E - 7;
+Page 432 - b3
+1; b6 -
+5; b7C -
+3,
+5; b7E - 7;
+Page 433 - b3
+- 1;
+3,
+5; b7C - 3,
+5;
+Page 434 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E
+7;
+Page 436 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C -
+3;
+b7E
+7;
+Page 437 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C -
+3;
+b7E
+Page 438 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E
+7;
+Page 442 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C; b7E - 7;
+Page 443 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,
+5; b7C -
+3
+5;
+Page 444 ~ b3
+- 1; 66
+3,
+5; b7C -
+3
+5
+Page 445 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,
+5; b7C -
+5
+Page 446 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,
+5; b7C -
+5
+b7E
+- 7;
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page 447 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,
+5; b7C -
+5
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page 448 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E - 7;
+Page 449 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,
+3; b7C -
+3;
+Page 455 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 456 - Duplicate;
+Page 481 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,
+3; b7C - 2,
+3;
+Page 482 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+3,
+5
+; b7C -
+3
+5; b7E - 7;
+Page 483
+~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+5
+; b7C -
+3,
+5;
+b7E -7;
+Page 484 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,
+5; b7C -
+3,
+5; b7E - 7;
+Page 485
+= b3
+- 1; b6
+3,
+5; b7C - 3,
+5;
+Page 489
+= b3
+- 1; b6
+3;
+b7C - 3; b7E - 7;
+Page 490 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,
+5; b7C - 3, 5; b7E - 7;
+Page 491 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 7;
+Page 492 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3;
+b7C - 3; b7E - 7;
+Page 493 - b3
+1;
+Page 494 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,
+5; b7C - 3,
+5;
+3,
+5; b7C -
+3,
+5; b7E - 7;
+Page 495
+~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,
+5; b7C - 3, 5; b7E - 7;
+Page 496 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3;
+b7C - 3; b7E - 7;
+Page 497 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2, 3; b7C - 2, 3;
+Page 502 - Duplicate;
+Page 503 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 504 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2; b7E - 7;
+Page 505 ~ b6 - Z; b7C - Z;
+Page 506 ~ b6 - 1,
+5; b7C - 1,5; b7E - 7;
+Page 510 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, 3; b7C - 1, 3;
+Page
+512 - b3
+1; b6 - 3,
+5; b7C - 3,
+5; b7E - 7;
+Page
+513 ~63
+1;
+3;
+E
+7;
+Page
+514 ~
+b3
+Page
+515
+b3
+1;
+3,
+5
+; b7C
+=.
+1;
+Page
+516 -b3
+- 1;
+66
+3,
+5
+b7E
+- 7:
+3,
+5; b7C
+Page
+517
+~ 63
+1; b6
+3;
+3
+7E
+7
+;
+Page
+518
+~ b3
+1;
+3,
+5; b7c
+3,
+5;
+b7E - 7:
+Page
+519
+= b3
+Page
+520 ~ b3
+1;
+3,
+5;
+5
+1;
+3,
+5
+b7c
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page
+521~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,
+5
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page
+522
+- b3
+1; b6
+3,
+5
+=.
+Page
+523 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,
+b7c
+3,
+=.
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page
+524 ~ b3
+1;
+3,
+W
+5
+Page
+525 -b3
+1;
+Page 526 -
+b3
+1;
+3,
+3,
+5
+b7E - 7:
+5;
+Page 527 - b3
+1;
+3,
+5;
+b7c
+W
+
+Page 528 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+Page 529 ~ b3
+- 1; b6-
+Page
+530
+- b3
+1;
+3,
+3,
+3,
+5; b7c -
+3,
+5
+; b7C -
+Page
+531~
+b3
+1;
+Page 532 ~
+b3
+- 1; b6 -
+Page
+533
+b3
+1;
+3,
+Page 534 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,
+; b7C
+Page 535 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,
+5; b7C
+Page 537 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3;
+3;
+5; b7E - 7;
+b7E
+- 7;
+b7E
+- 7;
+b7E
+- 7;
+b7E
+- 7;
+b7E
+- 7;
+7;
+Page 538 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3;
+3
+;
+Page
+539 - b3
+- 1; 66 - 3; b7C-
+3
+Page 540 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C -
+3;
+Page 541 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3;
+3;
+b7E
+b7E
+b7E
+b7E
+b7E
+=.
+7;
+Page 542 - b3
+1;
+3,
+5; b7C
+5
+Page 543 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,
+5; b7C -
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page 544 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,
+5
+b7E
+- 7;
+Page 545 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+3, 5; b7C - 3, 5; b7E - 7;
+Page 546
+= b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 7;
+Page 548 ~ b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7E - 7;
+Page 549 ~ b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7E - 7;
+Page 551 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 - 3, 5; b7C - 3,
+5; b7E - 7;
+Page 552 - b3
+- 1; b6-
+3,
+5; b7C -
+3,
+5; b7E - 7;
+Page 553 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+5
+; b7C - 3,
+5; b7E - 7;
+Page 554 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+Page 555 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,
+5; b7C - 3, 5; b7E - 7;
+3,
+5; b7C - 3, 5; b7E - 7;
+Page 556 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3;
+b7C - 3; b7E - 7;
+Page 557
+a b3
+1;
+b6 - 2,
+3; b7C - 2,
+3;
+Page
+558~b3
+1,
+3;
+2,
+3; b7C - 2, 3;
+Page 559 ~ b3
+- 1,
+3; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+Page 560 ~ b3 - 1,
+3; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXxXXXXXXXXX
+Deleted Page (s)
+X
+× No Duplication Fee X
+× For this Page
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+
+2007-01-01
+2008-01-01
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/ witness work files to case file.
+253
+{U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+• (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+66 - 2
+b7C - 2
+03956-5728
+3/E-MM- 108042-1A
+
+File Number ...
+31E: MM: 108062-14132-
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+MM PBERA
+Serial # of Originating Document_*
+Date Received
+VArIOUS
+From
+Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+Fune
+2
+By
+A
+To Be Returned
+Yes.
+Receipt Given
+Yes
+ENo
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+Yes
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+7N0
+2
+Title:
+Reference:
+Donation nosing Marita
+Description:
+• Original notes re interview of
+Biogranhical File on
+and My SpAce-In tor MA trENT
+03956-5729
+
+MY SPACE
+(CURRENT)
+03956-5730
+
+In any Emergency Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+Non-Emergency (561) 838-5454
+TIPS Line (561) 835-4738
+03956-5731
+
+
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events *
+Search /
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to Albums
+i photos
+All
+Photos
+b6 - 3.
+5
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID=
+]&kalbumld=0
+03956-5732
+
+
+http:/viewmoropics.myspace.com/index.cfm?/useaction=user.viewPicture&/friendIDalbumId-
+03956-5733
+
+
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Report This Image
+1 Comments)
+Sponsored Links
+Pimp
+Your Video Player!
+Pagefetti.com
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+.:::
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID=
+Stalbumld=0
+03956-5734
+
+
+
+Is per Minute!
+TRYIMONTH FREET-
+Vonage
+MySpace | Peopíe | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events •
+Search l
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+#photos
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to View All Photos
+Photos - View Image
+Previous | Next
+YUADEFORMERS
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID
+BalbumiD=0&imageID=99337
+03956-5735
+
+
+D6 - 3,5
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/indexcfm?fuseaction-viewlmage&tfriendID-+ealbumID-08&imagelD=99337
+03956-5736
+
+
+b7C - 5
+Sponsored Links
+Need New Ringtones?
+et the most popular ringtones. No Credit Card Requir
+nes. DownloadRings.co
+Isic CDs - Top Artis
+eb-Links - Video Presentations Fully Customized - Turnk
+wwww.CustomDiscs.com
+ix Ringtone
+iniones Send to ringtones right nor
+Custom BraCe CuB: DalMusic Prog Ernie Lake Prod. 212
+489 5262
+elrecords.com
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy. | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID=[
+kalbumID=0&imageID=99337
+03956-5737
+
+
+Te per Minute!
+Vonage
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events *
+Search / Google
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+* photos
+Back to Profile
+Back to View All Photos
+Photos - View Image
+Previous | Next
+CUSSFORDERS
+CuSTOmIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+b70 - 3
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID=_
+kalbumID=0&imageID=125557
+03956-5738
+
+"MySpace.com - View Image
+
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction-viewlmage&friendID
+&albumID=0&imageID=125557
+03956-5739
+
+~ MySpace.com - View Image
+
+66 - 5
+b7C - 5
+About | EAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety. Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID=
+&albumID=0&imageID=125557
+56 -
+3°
+03956-5740
+
+* MySpace.com - View Image
+
+MySpace | People | Web
+¡ Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events •
+search | Googles
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Back to Profile
+# photos
+Back to View All Photos
+Photos - View Image
+Previous | Next
+VRANFURTENS
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+b7c - 3
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewlmage&friendID=
+kalbumID=0&imageID=125698
+03956-5741
+
+... "MySpace.com - View Image
+
+Past a Comment
+At home
+E-mailto a Friend
+Report This Iniage
+Listing 1 - 3 of 3
+From
+comment
+b7C - 5
+htt://yewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cim/fusaction-view/mage&friendID albumID=OstimagelID=125698
+03956-5742
+- 3
+
+..: * MySpace.com - View Image
+
+b7C - 5
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy. | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+06 -
+370 - .
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID=
+&album[D=0&imageID=125698
+03956-5743
+
+=
+.MySpace.com - View Image
+MySpace.com | Help | Signout
+
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events r
+Search I
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+photos
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to View All Photos
+Photos - View Image
+Previous | Next
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR FHOTOS
+http://viewmorepics.nyspace.com/index.cfm7fuseaction=view/mage&friendID-albumTD=08imageID=2074253
+03956-5744
+
+MySpace.com-View Image
+
+Post a Comment
+E-mail to a Friend
+Report This Invage
+Listing 1 - 1 of 1
+From
+Comment
+b7C - 5
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=view.Jmage&friendID-[
+_&album]D=0&imageID=2074253
+03956-5745
+- 3
+
+.MySpace.com -View Image
+
+6 -
+7C -
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise / MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewlmage&friendID=
+kalbumID=0&imageID=2074253
+03956-5746
+
+1
+"MySpace.com - View Image
+
+3, Free Animated Cursors!!!
+Click
+Here
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events b
+Search |
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+# photos
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to View All Photos
+Photos - View Image
+Previous | Next
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+htt://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.fim?fuseaction=-viewImage&friendID kalbumID=0&imageID=2200657
+03956-5747
+
+MySpace.com -View Image
+
+Inst a Comment
+E-mail bo a Friend
+Report This Image
+Listing 1 - 2 of 2
+(From
+Comment
+b7C - 5
+This Profile No Longer Exists
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy. | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+htt://iewmorepies.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=view/mage&friendID albumID-0&imageID=2200657
+03956-5748
+
+MySpace.com / Help | SignOut
+
+« Free Animated Cursors!!
+Click
+Here
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos i Blogs | Video | Events *
+Search
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+#photos
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to View All Photos
+Photos - View Image
+Previous | Next
+Tuzy Formers
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID=
+&albumID=0&imageID=2200699
+03956-5749
+
+
+[ Post a Comment
+E-mail to a Friend
+......!
+Report This Image
+About | EAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID-
+SalbumID=0&imageID=2200699
+03956-5750
+
+
+CURSORMANIA D
+Free Cursors!
+MySpace
+Search]
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy |
+Classifieds
+is in your extended network
+atest Blog Entry [Subscribe to this Blog]
+[View All Blog Entries]
+Blurbs
+Contacting
+& Send Message
+*8 Add to Friends
+8° Instant Message
+B Forward to Friend
+E Add to Favorites
+@ Block User
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&.friendID=
+03956-5751
+
+
+*88 Add to Group
+18
+Rank User
+Who I'd like to meet:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-5752
+
+www.myspace.com/J
+b6-3,5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendiD=
+03956-5753
+
+b6 - 3, 5'
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-5754
+
+
+Books
+Heroes
+Details
+Status:
+Here for:
+Body type:
+Zodiac Sign:
+Children:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-5755
+
+6 - 3
+5
+7C - 3, .
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-L
+03956-5756
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-5757
+
+5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-5758
+
+bTC - 3, 5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-5759
+
+66 - 3, 5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-
+03956-5760
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=|
+03956-5761
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-5762
+
+06 - 3,5
+970 - 3, 5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-_
+03956-5763
+
+- 3, 5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-5764
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-5765
+
+670 - 31 5
+3, =
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction-user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-5766
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-5767
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendiD
+03956-5768
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendiD=
+03956-5769
+
+06 - 3.
+5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=L
+03956-5770
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-5771
+
+3,
+5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-5772
+
+b6-3,5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user. viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-5773
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-5774
+
+bic - 3, 5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-5775
+
+5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-5776
+
+b7C - 3,
+5
+
+About | FAQ 1 Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Abuse | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user. viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-5777
+
+
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+. •
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-5778
+
+AGENT
+In any Emergency Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+Non-Emergency (561) 838-5454
+TIPS Line (561) 835-4738
+56 - 21
+b7C - 2
+03956-5779
+
+Page 1 of l
+The Web
+MySpace
+Search 1
+Help | SignUp
+OLD
+Answer an
+18790
+diGettAtkingloner
+
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+This profile is set to private. This user must
+add you as a friend to see his/her profile.
+Contactingl
+M Send Message
+83 Add to Friends
+dD Instant Message
+Cry All to Group
+a Forward to Friend
+EZ Acid to Favorites
+* Block User
+Egg Rank User
+MySpace URL:
+http://www.myspace.com
+About LEAQI Terms| Privacy 1 Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Inappropriate Content | Promote! | Advertise I MySpace International
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-5780
+
+
+The Web O
+MySpace O
+Get he now generation or Smulleya!
+• it.
+- ri
+"Always FREEN
+Search
+Help | SignUp
+*Free
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Biog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+This profile is set to private. This user must
+add you as a friend to see his/her profile.
+b70 - 5
+contacting
+LF Send Message
+Al Asid to Friends
+ER nstant Message
+En Adato Group
+MySpace URL:
+http://www.myspace.com/
+go Forwend to Friend
+• Add to Favorites
+83 Block User
+128 Rank loer
+In any Emergency Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+Non-Emergency (561) 838-5454
+TIPS Line (561) 835-4738
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-5781
+
+
+About | FAQ! Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Inappropriate Content | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+b7C - 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID =
+03956-5782
+
+MYSPACE
+OLD
+03956-5783
+--_+
+
+
+Sponsored Links
+Thrash Music
+100% complimentary ringtones. Fast download, No credit card required.
+www.ringtoneroundup.net
+MySpace
+(search] me Google"
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+This profile is set to private. This user must
+add you as a friend to see his/her profile.
+Contactinal
+If Send Message
+Add to Friends
+8° Instant Message
++88 Add to Group
+MySpace URL:
+http://www.myspace.com
+Forward to Friend
+Add to Favorites
+@ Black User
+*8 Rank User
+About I EAQ I Terms | Privacy I Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Abuse | Promotel | Advertise | MySpace Internationa!
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+::
+03956-5784
+
+MP.
+tP_
+3
+N..
+03956-5785
+
+03956-5786
+
+Y:0
+Grad Terg
+04/24/7607
+!
+03956-5787
+
+*U.S. GPO: 2002-487-337/51259
+FD•125 (Rev. 4-1-93)
+Birth
+• credit # criminal
+To
+Return to
+SA
+Name and aliases of sobyect, appricans, or employee, and spouse
+Addresses
+Residence
+Business
+Former
+Date
+08/01/2006
+• Death OINS O Marriage*
+* Motor Vehicle
+other
+Buded
+file number
+31E-MM- 108062-1A/32
+b6 - 3,2
+b7C - 3,
+2
+*Date and place of marriage
+(if applicable)
+Race
+W
+Birth date
+Arrest Number
+Sex
+• Male
+female
+"Social Security Number™
+Age
+Height
+506
+Birthplace
+FL
+Fingerprint classification
+weight
+Hair
+LEyes
+Criminal specialty
+Drivers License Number
+• D/L Photo
+O other
+Specific information desired
+Resu
+03956-5794
+
+• Birth • Credit
+* Criminal © Death
+To
+ISS
+Retum to
+SA
+Name and aliases ofsubject, applicant, or employée, and spouse
+Date
+06/08/2007
+• INS
+• Marriage*
+'O Motor Vehicle • Other
+Buded
+BIE-MM-108062
+b6 - 2
+b7C - 2:
+Residence
+Business
+Former
+* Date and place of marriage
+(ifapplicable)
+Race
+W
+Birth date
+Sex
+IX Female
+• Male
+L
+Arrest Number "
+Social Security Number
+Age
+Height
+Birthplace
+Fingerprint classification
+Weight
+Hair
+Eyes
+Criminal specialty
+Divers License Number
+• D/L Photo Other
+Specific information desired
+Results of check
+NIC / Mapquest/L
+03956-5805
+::
+
+Driving Directions fiom 505 8 Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+- MAPQUEST.=
+5923, US
+3
+End:
+Notes:
+Only text visible within note field will print.
+coffee
+COBONUS
+Directions
+Distance
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp1
+03956-5819
+76/13/2007
+
+Driving Directions from SOS S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL tol
+
+15:
+03956-5820
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+Jzi kr
+40 m
+670 - 3
+$ 2007NAYTEO
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their
+content, road conditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest
+and its suppliers assume no responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+03956-5821
+
+03956-5825
+
+Strip Club List:: Dancers Royale
+
+CYBERTECH INTERNET
+STRIP CLUB NETWORK
+VIDEO/DUDYS
+STRiP CLUB LIST
+Largest Data Worldwide
+I! HOME PAGE IN ADVERTISING | SEN SITEMAP L SUBMIT YUR CLUB | ADVANCED SEARCH | RECENT COMM
+ADVERTISER
+Home > North America > Florida:: Update Club Listing :: Read Comments
+Dancers Royale - Orlando, Florida
+Club Owners Click Here to View your FREE website!!!
+For more information please call 888-652-3737
+5221 E Colonial Dr
+RI 50 @ Old Cheney Hwy
+Orlando, Florida, USA
+(407) 281-0120
+Read Comments ( 34)
+Post Comment
+View Strip Club Photos
+Pastie Club
+Table Dances
+30 Female Dancers
+Full Bar
+Drinks: $5.50
+Snacks
+Min Age 21
+| Feature Acts
+Everyone Welcome
+Events
+SCN EVE!
+5M MI
+12
+7 8 9
+14 15 16
+21 22 23
+28 29 30
+CLICK HERE
+See EVE
+Click here to sign club guestbook
+10
+*THE STRIP CLUB
+NETWORK:
+EXOTIC DANCERS
+ADULT FILM STARS
+AMATEUR STRIP
+REALITY TOUR
+-AND MUCH MORE!
+JOIN TODAY!
+SCA
+Coptent updated daily
+Click Here to fill out a Dancer Application
+Click Here to fill out a General
+Employment Application
+Open Noon-2am
+Click here to view dancer's schedules for
+this location
+Club Email
+Party Offerings
+V.I.P Card Offerings
+[Join Leave
+SOU7CA
+CLICK HERE
+To vlew map a
+Click here to fill
+out our online
+bachelor party
+form so we can
+et more ir
+out your pal
+| No Clubnews
+Great Fun!
+http://www.stripclublist.com/c.asp?c=7472
+03956-5855
+3/20/2006
+
+31E. MM= 108062-1A833
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence _MM PRCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document_
+Date Received
+VACIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Inerviewce)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+....
+2
+2
+By
+SA
+To Be Returned L. Yes -
+Receipt Given • Yes
+5-NO
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+Yes
+ENO
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+•No-
+T
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+b3 -
+1
+Description:
+• Original notes re interview of
+Boaranhical
+File on
+03956-5671
+
+cell:
+poet
+03956-5863
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+=MAPQUESTA
+5923, US
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE"
+ROADITOUR
+SWEERETAKES
+UUb7C - 3
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP.
+03956-5872
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL toL
+
+Q00
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, road
+conditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest and its suppliers assume no
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp
+03956-5873
+
+- mega
+r
+312-MM: 108062-14134
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+MM/PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _
+Date Received
+VARIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)"
+(Address)
+City and State
+2
+By
+A
+To Be Returned L Yes
+ENo
+Receipt Given • Yes
+•No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+Yes
+L No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+• No
+2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description: E Original notes ze interview of
+Bloarashiel File on
+b3
+56
+1
+3
+3
+and My Space information.
+03956-5875
+
+63
+- 1
+3
+03956-5876
+
+----
+In any Emergency
+Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+Non-Emergency (561) 838-5454
+TIPS Line (561) 835-4738
+03956-5878
+
+wwww.myspace.com
+
+The Web @ Myspace O
+Search
+Help | SignUp
+Get an explosion of Smileys!
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail
+| Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy /
+Classifieds
+is in your extended
+Latest Blog Entry [subscribe to this I
+[View All Blog Entries]
+Blurbs
+About me:
+Last Login:
+9/28/2006
+View My: Pics | Videos
+Contacting
+2: Send Message
+83 Asid to Friends
+d instant Message
+Gy Aid ta Groups
+go Forward to Friend
+To Add to Favorites
+ey Block User
+T& Rank User
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-5879
+
+wwww.myspace.com
+
+Song has been
+deleted by the artist
+Interests
++view+
+General
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-5880
+
+
+Friend Space
+Music
+Viev
+03956-5881
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm/fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+
+Heroes
+Status:
+Details
+In a Relationship
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+
+Friends Comments
+Displaying 45 of 118 comments (Viev
+03956-5882
+
+, www.myspace.com/
+
+5
+Here for:
+Orientation:
+Hometown:
+Body type:
+Ethnicity:
+Religion:
+Zodiac Sign:
+Children:
+Education:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-L
+03956-5883
+
+
+b3 - I
+5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-|
+03956-5884
+
+5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&.friendid=
+03956-5885
+
+
+- 3,
+5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=T
+03956-5886
+
+www.myspace.com.
+
+06 - 3, 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.c.fim?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-5887
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-5888
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfi?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-5889
+
+www.myspace.com/_
+
+T
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=|
+03956-5890
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+03956-5891
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-5892
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+03956-5893
+
+.www.myspace.com
+Page 16 ot 22
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-5894
+
+
+T
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.ofm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-5895
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-5896
+
+.www.myspace.com_
+
+http://proffle.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-5897
+
+5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-L
+03956-5898
+
+56-3,5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfim?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-5899
+
+.www.myspace.com
+
+About | FAQ I Terms / Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Inappropriate Content | Promote! |
+Advertise I MySpace International
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-5900
+
+
+Web | MySpace | People | Music | Biogs | Video •
+Search Web
+The Olsen Twins starred in which show?
+Answer for a FREE Dinner for Two at Olive Garden!®
+o Step by Step
+oFull House
+o Family Ties
+*See effer detal?.
+C2DD0 YourGiftCards.com.
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Pictures of
+Click Picture for Full View & Comments b3 - 1
+- 3,
+5
+03956-5901
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID=&MyToken=8469f199-05b9-4f... 10/3/2006
+
+*View More Pictures
+• Page 2 of 2
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID-
+03956-5902
+T&MyToken=8469f199-05b9-4f. 10/3/2006
+
+Rocord Request
+FD-125 (Rex. 4-1-93)
+Dn_ 06/08/2007
+• Motor Vehicle O Other
+• Birth • Credit * Criminal
+• Death
+• INS
+To
+ISS
+Return to
+SA
+Name and altases of subject, applicant, or emproyee, anu spouse
+• Marriage*
+Buded
+BIE-MM-10806Z
+b6 - 2, 3
+b7C - 2, 3
+Residence
+Business
+Former
+* Date and place of marriage
+(ifapplicable)
+Sex
+/Female
+-O Male
+Race
+W
+Birth date
+Arrest Number
+Social Security Number
+Age
+Height
+Birthplace
+Fingerprint classification
+Weight
+Hair
+Eyes
+- b6 - з
+Criminal specialty
+Divers License Number
+• D/L Photo O Other
+Specific information desired
+Results of check
+NCIC / Mapquest/.
+675 - 7
+03956-5903
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+- MAPQUEST:
+5923, US
+End:
+Notes:
+Only text visible within note field will print.
+$i
+SOUTHWEST,COME
+SUMMER FARE SALE
+$49-$139
+One way, Purchase by June 14th.
+pavel begins July Olsta
+BOOKNOW
+faus. and conditions
+Epply. Only at southuest.com
+..-.
+Directions
+Distance
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp_
+03956-5916
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL toL
+
+67C - 3
+start:
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their
+content, road conditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest
+and its suppliers assume no responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/mainsadp?
+03956-5917
+
+03956-5930
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+=MAPQUEST.=
+5923, US
+* THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE*
+ROADITOUR
+SWEEPSTAKRE
+000
+End:
+56 - 3
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+of2
+Directions
+Distance
+"... 7
+IT :
+a '3
+Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp?[
+03956-5946
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL toL
+Page 2 of2
+of2
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+Endi
+of2
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, road
+conditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest and its suppliers assume no
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+•i.
+http://www.thapquest.com/directions/main.adp?|
+03956-5947
+
+FD-340 (Rev, 4-11-03)
+31E.MM: 108062-1A135
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence _
+MM PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _*
+Date Received
+VARIDISS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+bTC
+SA
+To Be Returned
+Yes.
+E No
+Receipt Given
+Yes
+• NO
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Orily Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+•No
+Title:
+Reference:
+Description:
+• Original notes re interview of
+Binanashial File on
+03956-5950
+2
+2
+8
+8
+1.:
+
+66 - 8
+*b7c - 8°
+03956-5951
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+=MAPQUEST=
+5923, US
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE"*
+ROADITOUR
+SWEERETAKES
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR A
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+Top Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+03956-5967
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL toL
+
+166- 8
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+Ench
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, road
+conditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest and its suppliers assume no
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+..'
+
+
+]USA- Google Maps
+
+Google Ais.
+Maps'
+http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&q=
+03956-5971
+.. 5/13/2008
+
+03956-5995
+
+:..
+..a.
+• = rap..
+8
+!..
+::: 3956-6005 13739
+
+¡TACT
+
+CONTAĞT.US SITEMAP SUPPORT LEARNING CENTER
+TARGUSinfO orsemand Data
+TARGUSinfo.com/ExtranetLog Out
+¡TACT
+• Overview
+• Phone Search
+• Address Search
+• Phone Batch Query
+• User Guide
+Address Search
+Search Type:
+First Name:
+Last Name:
+Address:
+City:
+State:
+*Zip:
+*= required fields
+Florida
+33410
+r Business @ Consumer
+Input Name:
+Input Address:
+Input City:
+Input State:
+Input Zip:
+Output Name:
+Output Address:
+Output City:
+Output State:
+Output Zip:
+Output Phone:
+57C - 8
+© 2007 TARGUSinfo | Privacy Policy | Terms of Use
+https://webapp.targusinfo.com/itact/Index.aspx
+03956-6017
+12/11/2007
+
+b?C.
+03956-6031
+
+31E-MM: 108062-1A/36
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence _
+_ MM PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _
+Date Received
+VArIOUS.
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By.
+A
+To Be Returned
+Yes
+D. No
+Receipt Given
+Yes
+• No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+Yes
+LIto
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+2
+Title:
+Reference:
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+Biancachica l
+Fete on
+b3
+1
+3
+- 03956-6032
+
+JUSA - Google Maps
+
+й G¢
+http://www.google.com/maps?97
+USA&sa=X&oi=map&ct=title
+03956-6037
+6/11/2007
+
+- Google Maps
+Gougle Address
+
+http://www.google.com/maps?q=
+HUSA&sa=X&oi=map&ct-title
+03956-6038
+6/11/2007
+
+USA - Google Maps
+
+..
+02007 Google. - Map data ©2007 NAVTEQ™ - Terms of Use
+http://www.google.com/maps?g=
+03956-6039
+:sa=X&oi=map&ct=... 6/11/2007
+
+Google Maps
+
+b70 - 3
+©2007 Google - Map data ©2007 NAVTEO™ - Terms of Use
+http://www.google.com/maps?q
+03956-6040
++USA&sa=X&oi-map&ct=.. 6/11/2007
+
+- Google Maps
+
+02007 Googe - Map dala ©2037 NAVIEQ™; Te01 51459.......
+http://www.google.com/maps?q/
+03956-6041
+tUSA&sa=X&oi=map&ct=.. 6/11/2007
+
+03956-6074
+
+-3
+03956-6075
+
+D Birth
+• Credit * Criminal
+• Death
+To
+ISS
+Return to
+SA
+Name and aliases ofsubject, applicant, or employée, and spouse
+Date -
+06/08/2007.
+• Marriage* • Motor Vehicle I Other
+Buded
+31E-MM-108062
+b6 - 1, 2
+b70 - 1, 2
+Residence
+Business
+Former
+* Date and place of marriage
+(ifapplicable)
+Race
+W
+Birth date e
+Sex
+ja Female
+• Male
+Arrest Number
+Social Security Number
+Age
+Height
+Birthplace
+Fingerprint classification
+Weight
+Hair
+Eyes
+Criminal specialty
+Divers License Number
+• D/L Photo • Other
+-b3 - 1
+56 - 2, 3
+b7C - 2, 3
+Specific information desired
+INCIC / Mapquest/L
+ComPleD
+on 06/11/67.
+03956-6103
+
+File Number -
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+31E-MM= 108062-1A137
+MM PRCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+VArIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+?
+By
+SA
+To Be Returned l Yes.
+• No-
+Receipt Given • Yes
+• No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)"
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+L3 No-
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+E.No
+2
+2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description: _ L Original notes re interview of
+Binarachical
+Fle on
+b3
+56
+1
+3
+03956-6122
+
+03956-6123
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+=MAPQUESTE
+5923, US
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE**
+ROADITOUR
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+Lip Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+03956-6132
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to_
+
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+!:%i
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, road
+conditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest and its suppliers assume no
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adpl
+03956-6133
+
+56-
+3
+Iwak
+03956-6134
+
+03956-6135
+
+FD-340 (Rev, 4-11-03)
+_BIE-MA- 108062-14138
+Ried orice equiring Evidence _ MM. PBERA
+Serial # of Originating Document.. *
+Date Received
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(Clyand State)
+By -
+A
+To Be Returned • Yes.
+ENo
+Receipt Given • Yes
+ENo
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+- 2
+2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Compiunication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+• . Original notes re interview of
+b3
+1
+and MySpace information.
+3.
+03956-6138
+
+.......
+In any Emergency
+Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+Non-Emergency (561) 838-5454
+TIPS Line (561) 835-4738
+03956-6139
+
+
+yspac
+ayoutgySpace.com / Horr
+The Web O
+MySpace O
+Search
+Make Your Donation Today
+Help Rebuild Lives & Communities in Hurricane Affected States.
+www.BushClintonKatrinaFund.org
+Help | SignUp
+Public Service Ads by Google
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+About me:
+View My: Pics | Videos
+Contacting
+MySpace URL:
+http://www.myspace.com
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-6140
+
+670 - 3,5
+
+Interests
+General
+Music
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-
+03956-6141
+
+
+Movies
+Who I'd like to meati
+'s Friend Space
+Television
+Books
+Heroes
+Groups:
+is Details
+Status:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfin?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendTD
+03956-6142
+
+
+Orientation:
+Hometown:
+Religion:
+Zodiac Sign:
+Smoke / Drink:
+Children:
+Ischools
+Is Companies
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-6143
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-6144
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-6145
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-6146
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfn?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-6147
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-
+03956-6148
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-
+03956-6149
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-6150
+
+5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-
+03956-6151
+
+5
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction-=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-6152
+
+66 - 3, 5
+• Page 14 of 16
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.c.fm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-
+03956-6153
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?.fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=|
+03956-6154
+
+03 - 1
+6 - =
+b70 - 3
+
+Add Con
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Inappropriate Content | Promotel | Advertise | MYSpace International
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-6155
+
+. View More Pictures
+
+Web | MySpace | People | Music | Blogs | Video b
+Free Animated Cursors!!!
+Click
+Here
+Search Web
+Pictures off
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Click Picture for Full View & Comments
+03956-6156
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID=_
+T&MyToken=736db130-adbb-43… 10/3/2006
+
+• View More Pictures
+
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID
+03956-6157
+]&MyToken=736₫b130-adbb-43…. 10/3/2006
+
+b3
+1
+66 -
+3.
+b7c
+3
+03956-6158
+
+!!!
+Das 06/08/2007
+• Motor Vehicle
+• Birth • Credit
+* Criminal
+• Death
+• INS
+To
+ISS
+Retum to
+SA
+Name and aliases ofsubject, applicant, or employée, and spouse
+• Marriage*
+Buded
+31E-MM-10806203-1
+2,
+3
+b7C - 2, 3
+Residence
+Business
+Former
+Date and place of marriag
+fapplicable
+Race
+W
+Birth date
+Sex
+Female
+• Male
+Arrest Number
+Social Security Number
+Age
+Height
+Birthplace
+Fingerprint classification
+Weight
+Hair
+Eyes
+Criminal specialty
+Divers License Number
+• D/L Photo • Other
+-b3 - 1
+Specific information desired
+Results of check
+NSIC / Mapquest/
+03956-6159
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+- MAPQUEST=
+start: Ses paim Beach, FL 33401-
+5923, US
+End:
+coffee he
+3
+Notes:
+Oniy text visible within note field will print.
+LiDONUT
+Directions
+Distance
+03956-6165
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to [
+
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+alrights reserved, gse subjecte bcensey opyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to thei
+ontent, road conditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQues
+and its suppliers assume no responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp.?
+03956-6166
+... 6/13/2007
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL tol
+
+=MAPQUEST.=
+West Palm Beach, FL. 33401.-
+5923, US
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE*+
+ROADITOUR
+SWEEPSTAKEG
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+1 b7C - 3
+012
+Directions
+Distance
+ri.
+Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+03956-6176
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL t0L
+1. Page 2 of 2
+- 3
+1-670 - 3
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, road
+conditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest and its suppliers assume no
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp_
+03956-6177
+
+03956-6178
+
+Title:
+7
+File Number —
+BIE-MM- 108062-1A139
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence _MM
+PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document —
+Date Received
+VACIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+*7
+By -
+A
+To Be Returned
+Yes.
+• No
+Receipt Given O
+Yes
+•NO
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+ENo
+b6 - 2
+2
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+as bit. File on
+1
+03956-6184
+
+b3
+3
+03956-6185
+
+0/04
+03956-6187
+
+. Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Di, West Palm Beach, FL tol
+=MAPQUEST-
+5923, US
+
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE**
+ROADITOUR
+SWEEPETAKEE
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR A
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+o12
+Directions
+Distance
+Lop Printer-friendly page sponsored by. HP
+03956-6234
+
+• Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to [
+_ Page 2 of 2
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+Ence
+b3 -
+1
+- 3
+3
+AlL rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+http://www.mapquest.com/difections/main.adp2
+03956-6235
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/0ea9fd65590f1e6840c8623f6c212b50ad1124a12f793e08c180c7e3b08c5e42.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/0ea9fd65590f1e6840c8623f6c212b50ad1124a12f793e08c180c7e3b08c5e42.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..87ad075b0c7a7c115779bc4b8622a08c4bff2121
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/0ea9fd65590f1e6840c8623f6c212b50ad1124a12f793e08c180c7e3b08c5e42.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -9847,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "0ea9fd65590f1e6840c8623f6c212b50ad1124a12f793e08c180c7e3b08c5e42",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 117,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.page-footer\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "36c4ac45bb0acbabebf0b9863f67c6700ea8138024be391f12875765ec8c6b98",
+  "output_sha256": "bf97b7364e4a55d25fa847fa1ed419603c886c6b2d2759a162cd2fbb62eb6479",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/1300a2498d1631b83863f07d081b0d31b6663d159b64a6f9e65da7473bd65bd9.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/1300a2498d1631b83863f07d081b0d31b6663d159b64a6f9e65da7473bd65bd9.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e13a33b63150e2918e4ab6263ed40042a8c6207f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/1300a2498d1631b83863f07d081b0d31b6663d159b64a6f9e65da7473bd65bd9.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2342 @@
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+H
+P.
+e
+ge
+ge
+g
+De
+ry
+00
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+29
+30
+31
+3
+34
+35
+ru
+36
+37
+38
+39
+40
+41
+42
+43
+44
+45
+46
+47
+48
+;
+;
+;
+;
+;
+;
+=
+;
+;
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+3
+1
+;
+b7C
+b7c
+b7C
+b7D
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7D
+b
+7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7c
+b7C
+5
+5
+b7C
+b7C
+- 4,
+- 4,
+- 4,
+b
+5;
+D
+• 5;
+2;
+2;
+2:
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+3,
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+- 4,
+- 4,
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2
+2;
+2;
+- 5;
+-5;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+b7D
+2;
+b7D
+2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+- 3
+- 4,
+- 5; b7D - 2;
+-3, -5; b7D - 2;
+- 3, -5; b7D
+- 2;
+-3, -5; b7D
+- 2;
+- 3, -5; b7D
+- 2;
+- 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+- 3
+- 4
+-5
+
+P
+51 -b3
+-1;
+b6
+1;
+1;
+b6
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+b6
+b6
+66
+66
+b6
+b6
+66
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+-5;
+ru
+1
+;
+b6
+b6
+-5
+;
+-5;
+2;
+1;
+1
+;
+1
+;
+b6
+b6
+1
+;
+1
+1
+;
+;
+1
+;
+1
+1
+;
+1
+1;
+1
+;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+06
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+4,
+-5,
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+- 1;
+b6
+1;
+66
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+66
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+66
+- 5;
+1;
+1
+7C
+7C
+7C
+1
+1
+1
+1
+2;
+-3
+-3,
+- 3,
+-3,
+3,
+- 3
+- 3,
+-3,
+-3,
+- 3,
+m
+2;
+- 2;
+3
+3,
+3
+- 5,
+1
+1
+1
+-5
+b7
+- 5
+-7; b7D - 2;
+-4
+-7
+b7
+7D
+b7
+b7D
+7D
+bi
+b7
+- 2;
+2;
+2;
+- 2;
+2;
+2;
+- 2:
+- 2;
+2;
+7D
+b7
+b7
+- 2;
+Q
+b7D
+- 2;
+b7D
+- 2;
+b7D
+Z;
+b7D
+2;
+b7D
+2;
+b7D
+2;
+b7D
+2;
+b7D
+2;
+b7D - Z;
+b7
+7D
+-4,
+2;
+2;
+-5
+A
+2:
+b7
+b7
+7D
+- 2;
+b7
+b7
+b7
+- 2;
+7D
+• .
+7D
+- 2;
+7D
+- 2;
+b7
+7D
+2;
+
+Page 102 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+Page 103 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+104
+-b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+105
+b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+106
+b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+107
+b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+108
+b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+109
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+110 - b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+111
+b3
+1;
+b6 -
+Page
+112 -
+b3
+1;
+66
+Page 113 ~
+1b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+114
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+115
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+116
+b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+117
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7C
+- 3,
+5;
+b7C
+- 3,
+5
+b7C
+-3,
+5
+b7C
+-3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7C
+-3,
+-5;
+b7C
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7C
+-3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+- 5
+b7D
+- 3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+- 3,
+-5
+b7C
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7C
+H
+-3
+-3
+- 3
+-3
+-3
+3
+3
+-3
+- 3
+3
+- 3
+5
+b7D
+-5
+b7D
+- 5;
+b7D
+- 5
+;
+b7D
+- 5;
+b7D
+-5
+;
+b7D
+-5;
+b7D
+- 5;
+b7D
+- 5;
+b7D
+-5 ;
+b7D
+-5;
+b7D
+-3,
+- 4
+-5;
+b7C
+- 3
+-4
+- 3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+-3,
+- 4
+-5;
+b7C
+- 3
+1
+-5;
+b7D
+3
+-4,
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7C
+5;
+b
+7D
+2;
+2
+;
+2
+2;
+2
+2;
+2;
+2
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+-5;
+2;
+-5
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+2;
+Page 118 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+-3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 119 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+-3,
+-5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 120 ~ b6 - 5; b7C|
+5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+121 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+122 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,
+-5i 0/C - 3, -5: D/D - 2i
+Page 123 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5;
+67D - 2;
+Page 124 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,
+-5; b7C - 3,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 125 - b6
+- 1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - 1, -3,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+126 - b3
+1;
+b6
+- 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+Page 127 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+128
+- b6 -
+- 4,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-4,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+129 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - 1, -3,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+130
+-b6 - 1,
+- 4,
+-5; b7C - 1, -4, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+131 ~ b7D - 2;
+Page
+132 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 133 ~ b6 - 4,
+- 5; b7C - 4,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 134 - b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 135 ~ b7D - 2;
+Page 136 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+3,
+Page 137 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,
+-5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+-5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 138 ~ b7D - 2;
+Page 139 ~ b7D - 2;
+Page
+140 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page
+141 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+142 ~ b3 -
+1;
+b6 - 1,
+-3, -4, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -4, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+143 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+b7D - 2:
+Page 144 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,
+-5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+145 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 146 - b3
+1;
+b6 - 3,
+-5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+147 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+148 ~ b3 - 1;
+b6 - 1,
+Page 119 - 06 - 5: K7C - 5; BTD - 2i
+-5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 150 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 151 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 152 - b3
+1; b6 - 1,
+-3,
+-5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+153 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+b7D - 2:
+Page 154 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 155 ~ b6 - 4, -5; b7C - 4, -5; b7D - 2;
+
+Page 156 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 157 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,
+-5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 158 - b3
+1; b6 -
+-5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 159 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,
+-5; b7C - 3,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 160 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+Page 161
+= b5
+- 1,
+-2; b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 162 ~ b5
+-1,
+-2; b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 163
+~ b5
+-2; b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 164 - b5
+-2; b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 165
+~ b3
+1;
+b5 - 1, -2; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 166 ~ b5
+1, -2; b7D - 2;
+Page 167 ~ b6
+- 5,
+-8; b7C - 5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 168
+-b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 169 - b6
+-5, -8; b7C - 1,
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 170 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 171 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 172 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+173
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+b7D
+2;
+Page
+174
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+175
+63
+-5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+Page
+176 ~
+163
+Page
+177
+b6
+1;
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7c -
+-5 ;
+b6
+5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2:
+-5;
+b7C
+1, -5;
+b7D
+2;
+Page
+178
+b3
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+Page
+179
+b3
+Page
+180
+b3
+1;
+1;
+b6
+1
+- 5;
+b6
+5
+; b7C -
+aqe
+181
+66
+-5;
+b7C
+-5;
+b7D -
+2;
+b7D
+2;
+b7D - 2;
+1, -5; b7D
+2;
+Page
+182
+b3
+Page
+183
+b3
+Page
+184
+b3
+Page
+185
+66
+Page
+186
+b3
+Page
+187
+b3
+Page
+188
+b3
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+b6
+5;
+b7C - 5: b7D
+- 2;
+b6
+-5;
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+b7C
+-5; b7D
+-2:
+66
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+b6
+-5; b7C -
+-5;
+b7D
+2;
+b6
+5;
+b7C -
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+189
+66
+-5;
+b7C
+1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+190
+63
+66
+-5;
+b7C - 1, -5;
+Page
+191
+b3
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+192
+b6
+Page
+193
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+1, -5; b7D
+- 2;
+- 1,
+-5,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+-5,
+Page
+194 - b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+195 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+196 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page 197
+-b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 198 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5: b7D - 2:
+Page 199 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 200 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 201 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 202 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 203 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 204 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 205 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 206 - b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 207 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 208 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 209 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - Z;
+
+Page 210
+~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 211 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+212 - b6
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+213
+b6
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 214 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 215
+= b3
+- 1; b6
+-3, -5; b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 216 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+-5; b7C - 1, -5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 217
+~ b3
+1; b6
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 218 - b3
+1; b6 -
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 219 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+-5; b7D - 2;
+-5, -8; b7C - 1,
+-5,
+Page 220 ~ b3
+1; b6- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 221 ~ b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 222 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+-5; b7D
+-2;
+Page 223 - b6
+-2,
+-5; b7C - 1, -2,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 224 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 225 ~ b3 - 1;
+66- 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 226 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+227
+= b6
+-5; b7C
+- 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 228 - b3
+1;
+b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+229 ~ b6
+3,
+-5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+230 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3,
+-5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 231 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+5;
+b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+232 ~ b6
+5;
+b7C - 5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 233 - b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 234 ~ b6
+5;
+b7C - 5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 235 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 236 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+237 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+238
+-b6 - 5;b70-
+5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+239
+-b7D -2;
+Page
+240 ~ b6
+- 5,
+-8; b7C -
+5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 241 ~ b6
+5,
+-8; b7C -
+5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 242 - b3
+1;
+b6 - 3,
+-5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+243 -b6
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+244 ~ 63
+1;
+66 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 245 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 - 1,
+-2, -5, -8; b7C - 1, -2, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+246 - b6
+5;
+b7C -
+5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+247- b3 - 1; b6-
+-3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+248 - 63 - 1; 66 - 3,-5, -8; b7C - 3,
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+249 ~ b7D - 2;
+Page
+250 ~ b6 - 5,
+- 8;
+b7C - 5, -8;
+b7D -
+2;
+Page 252 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3, -5,
+-8; b7C - 3,
+-5,
+Page 253 ~ b6 - 1, -5, -8; b7C - 1,
+-5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 254 ~ b6 - 5,
+-8; b7C - 5,
+-8;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page 255 ~ b6 -
+-5,
+-8; b7C -
+1
+-5,
+- 8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 256 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5,
+-8; b7C -
+1
+-5,
+-8:
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+257 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5,
+-8; b7C
+1
+- 5
+- 8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 258 - b6 - 1,
+-5,
+-8: b7C -
+-5
+-8:
+b7D - 2;
+Page 259 ~ b6
+- 1,
+-5,
+-8; b7C -
+1
+-5
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 260 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5,
+-8; b7C -
+1
+-5
+- 8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 261 - b6
+5,
+-8; b7C - 5,
+- 8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 262 ~ b6 -
+5,
+-8; b7C - 5,
+-8:
+b7D
+. 2;
+Page 263 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+-5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 264 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5,
+-8; b7C -
+-5, -8;
+b7D - 2;
+
+- 1,
+= b6
+- 1,
+-1,
+- 1,
+- 1;
+- 1,
+- 1,
+b6
+b3
+= b6
+66
+103
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+- b3
+b6
+b6
+b6
+06
+b3
+b3
+b6
+63
+b3
+b3
+b6
+b6
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+8;
+5,
+1;
+-b6 - 5,
+5,
+3,
+5,
+- 5,
+5,
+-b3
+- 1;
+1
+1
+1
+5
+5
+..
+5
+• 8
+8
+8
+8
+8
+- 8 ;
+00
+2;
+2;
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+-5
+00
+2;
+-5
+00
+2:
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+-5
+00
+=.
+co
+b7D - 2;
+- 2;
+- 8;
+b7D - 2;
+- 2;
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+-8 :
+b7D - 2;
+- 2;
+- 2;
+- 8;
+b7D - 2;
+H
+co
+-5, -8; 67D - 2;
+
+b6
+b6
+~ b3
+~ b6
+06
+b6
+b6
+b3
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+163
+~ b3
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b6
+~ b6
+5,
+3,
+-1,
+00
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+5,
+1;
+5,
+5,
+8;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+- 1,
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+…-
+2;
+5,
+5,
+5,
+-5
+-5
+D
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+2;
+2;
+2
+2;
+•
+2;
+2;
+2;
+;
+2;
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+2;
+-5,
+-5,
+- 5,
+-5,
+-5
+-5,
+- 5
+-5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+-8;
+b7D
+- 2;
+- 8;
+b7D
+- 2;
+-8;
+b7D
+2;
+-8;
+b7D
+- 2;
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+- 8;
+b7D - 2;
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+-5,
+co
+b7D - 2;
+-5,
+-5,
+-8; b7D
+- 2;
+-5,
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+-5,
+
+Page 375 ~ b6 - 1, -5,
+-8; b7C - 1, -5,
+Page 376 ~ b6 - 5,
+-8; b7C - 5, -8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 378
+-b6 -
+8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 380 ~ b6 -
+5,
+-8; b7C - 5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 382 ~ b6
+5,
+-8; b7C - 5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 383 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3, -5, -8; b7C - 3,
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 384 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,
+-31-5,-8: 070-1,-31-5,-8: b70-2;
+Page 385 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 386 - b3 - li bb - 1, -3, -5, -8; b/C - 1, -3, -5, -8; b/D - <;
+Page 387 ~ b6 - 5,
+-8; b7C - 5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 388 ~ b6 - 5,
+-8; b7C - 5,
+Page 389 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5, -8; b7C - 1, -3, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 390
+"b6
+- 1,
+- 5,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+-5,
+Page 391 ~ b6 -
+-5, -8; b7C - 1, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 392 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5, -8; b7C - 1,
+-5,
+Page 393 ~ b3 - 1;
+66 - 1, -3, -5, -8; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 394 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5, -8; b7C - 1, -3, -5, -8; b7D - 2:
+Page
+395
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 3,
+-5,
+- 8;
+b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-5,
+Page
+396 - b6
+Page
+397
+- 5,
+-8;
+b7c
+-5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+~ b6
+-5,
+-8;
+b7C -
+- 5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+398
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 3,
+-5,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+399
+~ b6
+-5,
+-8;
+b7C -
+-5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+400
+= bb
+Page
+401
+-5,
+- 8;
+b7C
+1
+-5
+- 8;
+b7D - 2;
+- b6
+- 5,
+-8;
+b7C
+1
+-5
+- 8 ;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+402 ~ b6
+-8;
+b7C
+- 1,
+- 8
+;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 403 ~ b6
+-5,
+-8; b7C -
+1
+- 5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+404 ~ b6
+- 5,
+- 8;
+b7C -
+-5,
+- 8 ;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+405
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 1,
+-5, -8;
+b7c - 1,
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+406 ~ 66
+-8;
+b7C - 1,
+-8;
+b7D -
+2;
+Page
+407
+b6
+- 5,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+- 5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+408
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+- 1,
+-3,
+-5,
+- 8;
+b7C
+- 1,
+-3, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+409 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 3,
+-5,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+- 3,
+-5,
+Page 410 - b6
+Page
+-5,
+- 8;
+b7C
+1
+5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+411 - b6
+-5,
+-8;
+b7C
+1
+5
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+412 ~ b6
+-8;
+b7C
+- 1,
+-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 413 - b6
+- 8;
+b7C - 1,
+- 8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page
+414 ~ b6
+Page
+415 ~ b6
+- 8;
+b7C -
+-8;
+b7D
+2
+;
+-8;
+b7C -
+-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page
+416 ~ b6 - 1,
+-8; b7C - 1, -8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+417 - b6 - 1,
+-5,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+-5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+418 ~ b6 - 1,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+-8;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+419 - b6 - 1,
+-5,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+-5
+- 8 ;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 420 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5,
+-8; b7C -
+-5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+421 ~ b6 -
+-5,
+-8; b7C -
+- 5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 422 ~ b6 -
+-5,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+-5,
+- 8 ;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 423 ~ b6 - 1,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+-8;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+424 ~ b3 - 1;
+b6 - 1,
+-3,
+-8;
+b7C - 1,
+-3, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 425 - b6 - 1,
+-8: b7C - 1, -8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+426 - b6
+- 1,
+-5,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+-5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 427 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+- 5,
+- 8 ;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 428 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 - 1,
+-3, -8; b7C - 1,
+-3, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 429 ~ b6 -
+-5,
+-8;
+b7C - 1, -5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 430 - b6 -
+-5,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+-5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 431 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5,
+-8; b7C - 1, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+
+- 1,
+- 1,
+- 1,
+- b6
+-1,
+b6
+- 1,
+W0
+- 1;
+- b3
+1;
+~ b6
+b3
+b6
+b3
+103
+63
+b6
+b6
+b6
+• b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+163
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+- b6
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+8;
+5,
+5,
+8;
+00
+00
+~ b3
+5,
+1
+.-
+• 8
+1
+-5,
+-5,
+-8;
+1
+-5,
+5
+-5,
+-5,
+b7
+- 5
+5
+• 5
+b7
+;
+2;
+2;
+D
+2;
+;
+-5,
+-5,
+b7
+D
+2:
+-5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+-5, -8;
+b7D - 2;
+;
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+;
+b7D - 2;
+- 3,
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2:
+- 3
+- 5
+-5,
+-5,
+-5
+co
+
+Page 487 ~ b6 - 1, -5,
+-8; b7C - 1, -5,
+Page 488 ~ b6 - 5, -8; b7C - 5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 489 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5, -8; b7C - 1,
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 490 ~ b6 - 1,
+-8; b7C - 1, -5,
+Page 491 ~ b6 - 1,
+-8; b7C - 1, -8; bD - 2;
+Page 492 ~ b6
+- 5,
+-8; b7C - 5,
+b7D - 2;
+Page 493 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 494 ~ b6 - 1, -5, -8; b7C - 1, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 495 - b6 - 5,
+-8; b7C - 5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 496 ~ b6 -
+-8; b7C - 5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 497 ~ b6 - 5,
+-8; b7C - 5,
+Page 498 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+XXXXX×XXxXXxXXxXxxxxxXXX
+X Deleted Page (s)
+X No Duplication Fee X
+For this Page
+
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 6
+Page 1 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 2 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 3 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+~ 06 - 5: b70 - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 6 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Deleted Page (s)
+No Duplication
+Fee X
+For this Page
+
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = Z
+Page 1 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+Page 2 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+Deleted Page (s)
+* No Duplication Fee X
+For this Page
+
+Civil Action# 17-CV-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 20
+Page 7 ~ b5 - 2; b6 - 1, -2; b7C - 1, -2; b7E - 9;
+Page 8 ~ b5 - 2: b6 - 1, -2; b7C - 1, -2;
+Page 9 ~ b5 - 2; b6 - 1, -2, -5; b7C - 1, -2, -5;
+Page 10 ~ b5 - 2; b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5;
+Page 11 ~ b5 - 2; b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1, -5;
+Page 12 ~ b5 - 2; b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 13
+~ b5 - 2; b6
+- 1; b7C - 1;
+Page 14 ~ b5 - 2; b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5;
+Page 15 ~ b5 - 2; b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5;
+Page 16 ~ b5 - 2; b6 - 1,
+-5, -7; b7C - 1, -5, -7;
+Page 18 ~ b5 - 2; b6 - 2; b7C - 2; b7E - 9;
+Page 19 ~ b3 -
+1;
+b5
+Page 20 ~ b5 - 2; b6 - 2;
+Page 21 ~ b5 - 2; b6 -
+2; b7C - 2; b7E - 9;
+Page 22 ~ b5 - 2;
+06 - 2: b7C - 2: b7E - 9;
+B B BE 3
+-2; b6 - 1, -2; b7C - 1, -2; b7E - 9;
+Page 24
+~ b5 - 2;
+b6 -
+2; b7C - 2; b7E - 9;
+Page 25 ~ b3 -
+1;
+b5 -
+1
+-2; b6 - 1, -2; b7C - 1, -2; b7E - 9;
+Page 26
+=b5 -
+2;
+b6 -
+Page 27
+- b5
+- 2; b6 - 2; b7C - 2; b7E - 9;
+Page 28 ~ b5 - 2; b6 - 2; b7C - 2; b7E - 9;
+X Deleted Page (s)
+× No Duplication Fee X
+× For this Page
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXxXXXXXXXXX
+
+To: Miami
+From: Miami
+PB2/PBCRA
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062 - B|Pending)
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+Date: 08/01/2006
+Attn: IMA/PB2
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: To request the opening of sub-files in captioned case.
+Details:
+It is requested that the following sub-files be opened
+to assist in document management in captioned case.
+SUB - SBP to capture subpoena request.
+SUB - FF to capture forfeiture related materials.
+44
+fir106
+OSA FEET
+63 - 1
+b6 - 1, -2
+b7C -1, -2
+b6 - 2!
+67C - 2
+03956-2966
+316-14-108042-FF1
+
+Date: 11/06/2006
+To: Miami
+From: Miami
+I-1 / PBCRA
+Contact: AFI
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: V31E-MM-108062-FF †Pending)
+Title: GENERAL FORFEITURE MATTERS
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: To update status of forfeiture investigation.
+Details:
+writer met with case agent,
+SA
+who advised that
+the criminal
+activities of Jeffrey Epstein is ongoing.
+investigation into
+It is anticipated
+that
+Florida. 1
+On 9/13/06,
+_writer providedL
+located a patenta Barnes I
+Palm Beach,
+Investigation has revealed that
+b6-21
+b70 - 2
+b5 - 1
+66 -2
+b7C -2
+b6 -1,
+-3
+b7C -1, -3
+b5 -2
+Additional
+56 -1, -2, -3
+b7C -1, -2, -3
+IS b5 - 2
+TAFIT
+fare
+L1
+зоесто,. ес
+(02)
+b6 - 2
+b70 -2
+03956-2967
+3IE-MM-108042-F5-0
+
+To: Miami
+Date: 03/23/2007
+From: Miami
+L-1 / PBCRA
+Contact: AFI
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: V31E-MM-108062-FF
+Title:
+GENERAL FORFEITURE MATTERS
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+56 - 2
+670 - 2
+tending)
+Synopsis: To update status of forfeiture investigation.
+Details: Investigation has revealed that_
+The FBI intends to pursue|
+located at
+| Palm Beach, FL L
+Writer met with case agent, SA
+] on 3/23/07 who advised
+that the criminal
+investigation into activities of Jeffrey Epstein is ongoing.
+It is anticipated that
+On 3/22/07,
+contacted writer and
+66-1, -3
+b7c -1,
+-3
+b5 - 2
+b5 - 1
+66 - 2
+b7C -2
+AUSA Antonia Barnes telephonically
+LAUSA Barnes
+| AFIL
+b5 -2
+56 - 1,
+-2
+b7C -1, -2
+44
+31E 144- 108062-943
+FIle
+82ecтol. ec
+b6 -2
+D7C -2
+
+---•--
+FD-794
+10-11-2005
+PAYMENT REQUEST
+Request Type:
+r. Advance
+Expense
+Payment Type:
+( Commercial
+C Confidential
+DRAFT TYPE
+(Cataiog:
+Forfeiture or Drug Related?:
+F Yes
+Г No
+Official Bureau Name: (Last, First, Middie)
+Division:
+Miami
+Section:
+3460 / 1295
+INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE
+Social Security Number: Date of Request:
+104/05/2007
+unit:
+Squad L-1
+INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE
+Telephone Number:
+File Number:
+31E-MM-108062
+b6 -2
+=b70 - 2
+Pavee Name:
+Social Security or Taxpayer ID Number:
+Justification:
+b6 - 1
+b70 -1
+b5 -2
+DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT
+To be completed by Finance Only...
+Catalog:
+jItem Number:
+Description:
+Title Search
+Amount:
+b7E - 9
+Total:
+APPROVAL
+Signature
+vendor Number
+CHI 3316600
+Center
+3 center squad 3l
+Signature-of Cashier:
+Document Number:
+Supervisor:
+SAC / ASAC / AO / SAS:
+Supply Technician:
+Draft Approval Officer:
+Procurement Authority:
+Group Number:
+OBLIGATION PROCESSING
+Obligation Number:
+Document Number:
+•
+pate:
+EXPENSE PROCESSING
+raft Number:
+Signature of Cashier:
+Follow Up Date:
+Draft Number:
+FD-794 (Revised 10-11-2005)
+Fle
+
+03956-2969
+31E-MM-108062-FF-4
+
+" FD-794
+10-11-2005
+PAYMENT REQUEST
+Request Type:
+• Advance
+C: Expense
+¡Payment Type:
+$ Commercial
+• Confidential
+DRAFT TYPE
+Forfeiture or Drug Related?:
+Catalog:
+E Yes
+CW
+DiNO
+INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE
+Official Bureau Name: (Last, First, Middle)
+Social Security Number:
+Division:
+Miami
+Section:
+Unit:
+Telephone Number:
+3460 / 1295
+Squad L-1
+INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE
+Date of Request:
+05/01/2007
+File Number:
+31E-MM-108062
+Paves Name.
+Social Security or Taxpayer ID Number;
+Justification:
+b5 - 2
+mornin
+DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT
+To be completed by Finance Only
+Catalog:
+Item Number:
+Amount:
+Description:
+Certified Copies of Corporate Records
+b6 - 2
+b7C -2
+66 - 2
+b7C
+-2
+b7E
+-9
+Total:
+Supervisor:
+SAC / ASAC / AO / SAS:
+Supply Technician:
+Draft Approval Officer:
+Procurement Authority:
+Vendor Number:
+Group Number:
+ost Center
+{410T
+15912955 188-2
+Signature of Cashier:
+OBLIGATION PROCESSING
+Obligation Number:
+Document Number:
+Document Number:
+SETTLEMENT OF ADVANCE
+Prior Month Advance Balance:
+This Advance:
+Less: Receipts:,
+Funds Returned and/or Cash on Hand:
+Amount to be Reimbursed:
+EXPENSE PROCESSING
+Draft Number:
+Signature of Cashier:
+371/07
+Follow Up Date:
+Draft Number:
+03956-2980
+FD-794 (Revised 10-11-2005)
+
+3IE-MM-108067-FF-6
+FEDERAL BUREAU-OF INVESTIGATIOL
+
+• FD-794
+10-11-2005
+PAYMENT REQUEST
+Request Type:
+* Advance
+r Expense
+Payment Type:
+• Commercial
+• Confidential
+DRAFT TYPE
+Forfeiture or Drug Related?: • Catalog:
+E. Yes
+CW
+Г. No
+INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE
+Official Bureau Name: (Last, First, Middle)
+Division:
+Miami
+Section:
+3460 / 1295
+Payee Name:
+Social Security Number:
+Unit:
+Telephone Number:
+Squad L-1
+Date of Request:
+05/01/2007
+File Number:
+31E-MM-108062
+INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE
+¡Social Security or Taxpayer ID Number:
+Justification:
+65 - 2
+DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT
+To be completed by Finance Only
+Catalog:
+Item Number:
+Amount:
+Description:
+Certified Copies of Corporate Records
+b6 - 2
+-2
+b6 -2
+670 - 2
+b7E -9
+Total:
+re
+Vendor Number:
+Supervisor:
+SAC / ASAC / AO / SAS:
+Supply Technician:
+Draft Approval Officer:
+Procurement Authority:
+Group Number:
+MBOLTGATION PROCESSiON Numberi
+Document Number:
+Squad or RA
+1295 / PB-7
+Signature of Cashier:
+•
+SETTLEMENT OF ADVANCE
+Prior Month Advance Balance:
+This Advance:
+Less: Receipts:
+Funds Returned and/or Cash on Hand:
+Amount to be Reimbursed:
+Document Number:
+EXPENSE PROCESSING
+Draft Number:
+Signature of Cashier:
+Date
+511/07
+Follow Up Date:
+Draft Number:
+FD-794 (Revised 10-11-2005)
+3EMm-108062-FF-01956-2686
+
+
+(Rev. 06-04-2007)
+Date: 02/11/2008
+Io: Miami
+From: Miami
+PB-1 / PBCRA
+Contact: AFI
+Approved By:
+66-2
+b70-2
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: V31E-MM-108062-FF
+fending)
+Title: GENERAL FORFEITURE MATTERS
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: Report status of forfeiture investigation.
+Details: Investigation has revealed that|
+I AFIL
+b6 -1, -2, -3
+b7c -1, -2, -3
+b5-2
+Palm Beach, FL which is
+AFI L
+]has met with AUSA Antonia J. Barnes on
+several occasions regarding[
+AUSA Barnes|
+b5 - 1, -2
+b6 -1,
+-2
+57C -1, -2
+Writer met with case agent, SA
+] on 2/7/08 who advised that the criminal
+b6 - 1
+investigation into activities of JEFFREY EPSTEIN is ongoing.
+b7C -1
+This case is currently pending a prosecutorial decision at the
+USAO is pis deding abcordengitive investigation; therefore the
+L1
+042ecmOlo. ec
+03956-28956 -2
+3IE-MM-104042-45-8
+b7C - 2
+
+(Rev. 05-01-2008)
+Io: Miami
+Attn:
+Date: 09/18/2008
+SA L
+PB-1, PBCRA
+From: Miami
+PB-1, PBCRA
+Contact: AFI
+Approved By:
+i
+Drafted By:
+ecn
+Case ID #: VIE-MM-108062-FF Pending)
+Title: GENERAL FORFEITURE MATTERS
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: Request closing Of forfeiture subfile FF.
+Details: Investigation has revealed that|
+AFIL
+66 - 2
+670 - 2
+b6 -1, -2,
+- 3
+7b7с -1, -2,
+-3
+b5 - 2
+| Palm Beach,
+FL which is
+On 9/11/08, case agent advised writer that Epstein
+is currently being prosecuted by the State of Florida and is
+complying with all conditions of his plea with the State of
+Florida. Epstein has also provided information to the FBI as
+agreed upon.
+Case agent advised that no federal prosecution
+will occur in this matter as long as Epstein continues to
+uphold his agreement with the State of Florida.
+Case agent
+also advised that no further forfeiture assistance will be
+required for this case.
+Case agent is requested to contact
+writer in the event this matter moves forward on a federal
+In that no further forfeiture related action is
+deemed necessary in this matter, it is requested that subfile
+FF be closed.
+4f17108
+loser
+неэесто. сс
+b6 -2
+b7C -2
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/1300a2498d1631b83863f07d081b0d31b6663d159b64a6f9e65da7473bd65bd9.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/1300a2498d1631b83863f07d081b0d31b6663d159b64a6f9e65da7473bd65bd9.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3f0ed1c07132efc20451a6abd0c8e236c2db0814
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/1300a2498d1631b83863f07d081b0d31b6663d159b64a6f9e65da7473bd65bd9.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -2436,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "1300a2498d1631b83863f07d081b0d31b6663d159b64a6f9e65da7473bd65bd9",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 4,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.page-footer\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "4ea2324660aa5a10a5287fdb406c62efb18eaef2ce438f4dc7f0c62d4418f703",
+  "output_sha256": "8db2aeb60edeffe8cc6ff2f228fe69539a99db04ad57ab33594454072dc15041",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/1deeaeacea9a800a479fdd1207bbca38dd83edfd8f15050d1704c9fc190960fd.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/1deeaeacea9a800a479fdd1207bbca38dd83edfd8f15050d1704c9fc190960fd.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bfd88d97bfcdd53fc3b00375fb07f7dd37febb9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/1deeaeacea9a800a479fdd1207bbca38dd83edfd8f15050d1704c9fc190960fd.md
@@ -0,0 +1,6397 @@
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 232
+Page 5 ~ b3 - 2; b6 - 1, -2, -5; b7C - 1, -2, -5;
+Page 14 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 15 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+16 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3; b7C - 1, -3; b7D - 1;
+Page 21
+~ 66-1,-2,-5, -6: b7C - 1,-2,
+-5,
+-6; b7D - 1;
+Page 22
+~ b3 - 1: b6 - 1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 23
+~ b3 - 1, -2; b6 - 1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 24
+~ b3 - 1, -2; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3,
+-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 27 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,
+- 2, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 28 ~ b6 - 2, -5; b7C - 2, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 30 ~ b3 - 1;
+16 - 2, -3; b7C - 2, -3;
+Page
+31
+b6
+2; b7C - 2;
+Page
+32
+= b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page
+33
+66
+2; b7C - 2;
+Page
+34
+b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page
+35
+~ b6
+2; b7C - 2;
+Page
+36
+~b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page
+37
+= b6
+- 2; b7C - Z;
+Page
+38
+- b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 39
+- b6
+- 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 42
+b3
+1; b6 - 1,
+Page
+44
+b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+-6; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -6; b7D
+- 1;
+-5; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+47
+- b3
+- 1; b6 - 3;
+b7C - 3;
+Page
+48
+~ b6
+2; b7C - 2;
+Page
+49
+~ b3
+- 1;
+66 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page
+50
+b6
+2; b7C - 2;
+Page 59
+b3
+1;
+b6 - 1,
+-2,
+-3; b7C - 1, -2, -3; b7D - 1;
+Page
+60
+b3
+1;
+66 -
+1
+-3;
+b7C - 1, -3; b7D - 1;
+Page
+61
+b3
+1;
+66
+1,
+-3;
+b7C - 1, -3; b7D - 1;
+Page
+62
+= b3
+1;
+b6 - 3;
+b7C - 3;
+Page 64
+~ b6
+3,
+-5; b7C - 3, -5;
+Page 67 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,
+-2,
+-3; b7C - 1, -2, -3;
+Page 69 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -2, -3; b7C - 1, -2, -3; b7D - 1;
+Page 71 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 72 ~ Referral/Consult;
+Page 73 ~ Referral/Consult;
+Page 74 - Referral/Consult;
+Page 75 ~ Referral/Consult;
+Page 76 ~ Referral/Consult;
+Page 77 - Referral/Consult;
+Page 91 ~ b6 - 1, -2, -6; b7C - 1, -2, -6; b7E - 1, -7;
+Page 92 - b6 - 1, -2, -6; b7C - 1,
+-6; b7E - 1,
+-06-1,-2,
+-6; b7E - 1, -7;
+Page 95 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2, -3; b7C - 2, -3;
+Page 96 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 98 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 2, -3, -5; b7C - 2, -3, -5;
+Page 102 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 1, -2, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 103 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 1;
+
+- 1;
+1,
+- 1,
+~ b3
+W
+=.
+WJ
+W0
+66
+=.
+b6
+= b6
+66
+06
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b6
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+ru
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+~b3
+~ 63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+= b3
+b3
+b3
+b
+3
+b
+1;
+1;
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+5;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+N
+1,
+3,
+1,
+1;
+b
+5;
+b
+b
+2,
+•3;
+- 3;
+2,
+-3,
+-3,
+-5;
+-2,
+- 3,
+-3,
+- 3,
+-2,
+-2,
+-2,
+-2,
+-Z,
+-2,
+-3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+-2,
+5;
+2,
+- 3,
+-3,
+3,
+- 3
+-5
+- 5
+6;
+N
+3,
+4,
+H
+- 3
+b7
+-4, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -4, -5; b7D - 1;
+H
+N
+-3
+-5;
+H
+H
+-2, -3; b7D - 1;
+-3,
+-5;
+b7D - 1;
+-3,
+-5; b7D - 1;
+H
+b7D - 4;
+H
+-3
+N
+N
+b7D - 1:
+-3, -5;
+N
+-3
+=.
+-5
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-2,
+-3, -5; b7D - 1;
+-5;
+b7D - 1;
+H
+-3, -5; b7D - 1;
+3,
+b
+1,
+1,
+-2,
+- 3
+-3,
+-3,
+-2,
+1
+1,
+1
+1
+3
+3
+-3
+-2,
+- 3;
+-5;
+-5;
+-5 ;
+- 3;
+-2,
+- 2,
+-2,
+- 2
+- 5;
+5
+-5 ;
+- 3;
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+-3,
+-3
+-3
+-3
+- 3
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+-5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+-5
+;
+- 5;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+- 1;
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+1;
+1;
+1;
+- 1;
+
+Page 217 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -2, -3; b7C - 1, -2, -3; b7D - 1;
+Page 218 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 1,
+-3; b7C - 1, -3; b7D - 1;
+Page 220 - b3
+- 2; b6 - 1,
+-2,
+-5; b7C - 1, -2, -5;
+Page 221 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 222 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 223 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 224 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 225 ~ b3 -
+1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 226 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 227 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 228 ~ 66 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 229 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 230 ~ b6
+- 2; b7C - Z;
+Page 231 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 232 ~ b6 - Z; b7C - 2;
+Page 233 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 234 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 235
+~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 236 - b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 237 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 238 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 239 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 240 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 241 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C -
+3;
+Page 242 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 243 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 244 - b6
+2; b7C - 2;
+Page
+245 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,
+-5; b7C - 3, -5;
+Page
+246- b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page
+247- b3
+- 1; 66 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 248 ~ b6
+- 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 250 ~ b3
+- 2; b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 251 - b3
+- Z;
+Page 253 ~ b3
+Page 254 ~ 63 - 2; b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 256 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,
+-3; b7C - 1, -3;
+Page 257 ~ b3
+-3; b7C - 1, -2, -3;
+Page 258 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3: b7C - 3:
+Page 259 - Duplicate;
+261 ~ 63 - 2; b6 - 2; b7C -
+Page 262 ~ b3 - 2; b6 - 2; b7C -
+Page 264
+= b3
+- 2; b6 - 2; b7C
+2;
+Page 265 ~ 63 - 2; b6 - 2; b7C -
+2;
+Page 267 ~ b6
+- 1,
+-2,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-2, -5;
+Page 270 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -2, -3, -5, -6; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -5, -6; b7D -
+1;
+Page 271 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,
+-3, -5;
+b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 273 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,
+-2, -3;
+b7C - 1,
+-2,
+-3:
+Page 276
+- b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,
+-2, -3;
+b7C - 1,
+-2,
+- 3;
+67D - 1;
+Page 277 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,
+-3,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-3,
+- 5;
+b7D - 1;
+Page 280
+~ b3
+1; b6 - 1,
+-2, -3;
+b7C - 1,
+-2,
+-3;
+b7D
+- 1;
+Page 281 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 283 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 286 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -2, -3; b7C - 1, -2, -3; b7D - 1;
+
+Page 287 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+-3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 289 ~ b3
+1;
+Page
+291 ~ b3
+1;
+Page
+293
+b3
+1;
+Page 297 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+-5; b7C - 3, -5;
+..
+b7C - 3;
+-2, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -5;
+Page
+298
+= b3
+1;
+Page
+299 - b3
+1;
+Page
+314 ~ b3
+1;
+Page
+315 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+316
+b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+317
+1;
+66
+Page
+318
+-b3
+- 1;
+Page
+319
+- b3
+1;
+Page 322 - b3
+1;
+Page 323 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+1,
+1,
+3,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+-2,
+- 3,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+- 2, -3, -5; b7D - 1;
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-5; b7D - 1;
+- 5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 1;
+- 2,
+- 3,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+- 2,
+-3, -5; b7D - 1;
+- 3,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+- 3,
+- 5;
+b7D
+- 1;
+- 3,
+- 5;
+b7C -
+1,
+- 3,
+- 5;
+b7D
+- 1;
+- 3,
+- 5;
+b7c
+1,
+- 3,
+- 5;
+b7D - 1;
+- 3,
+-5; b7C -
+1
+- 3,
+- 5;
+b7D - 1;
+- 3,
+- 5; b7C
+- 3,
+- 5;
+b7D
+- 1;
+- 2,
+- 3; b7C -
+1,
+- 2,
+-3; b7D - 1;
+-3; b7C - 1, -3;
+b7D - 1;
+Page 325 ~ b3
+1;
+- 3; b7C - 1,
+-3; b7D - 1;
+Page 329 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -2, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 330 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3; b7C - 1, -3; b7D - 1;
+Page 333 - OTHER - Sealed per Court Order 08-8068-LRJ;
+Page
+334 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order 08-8068-LRJ;
+Page
+335 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8068-LRJ;
+Page 336 - OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8068-LRJ;
+Page 337 ~ OTHER - Sealed
+per Court Order
+08-8068-LRJ;
+Page 338 - OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8068-LRJ;
+Page 339 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8068-LRJ;
+Page 340 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order 08-8068-LRJ;
+Page 341 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8068-LRJ;
+Page
+342 ~ OTHER - Sealed
+per Court Order
+08-8068-LRJ;
+Page 343 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order 08-8068-RJ;
+Page
+344 ~ OTHER - Sealed
+per Court Order
+08-8068-LRJ;
+Page
+345 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8068-LRJ;
+Page
+346 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8068-LRJ;
+Page 347 - OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8068-LRJ;
+Page
+348 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8068-LRJ;
+Page
+349 - OTHER - Sealed
+per Court Order
+08-8068-LRJ;
+Page 350 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8068-LRJ;
+Page 351 ~ OTHER - Sealed
+per Court Order
+08-8068-LRJ;
+Page 353 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order 08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 354 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order 08-8067-LRJ;
+Page
+355 - OTHER - Sealed
+per Court Order 08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 356 - OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 357 - OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 358 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 359 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 360 - OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 361 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 362 ~ OTHER - Sealed
+per Court Order
+08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 363 - OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 364 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 365 - OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 366 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 367 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order
+08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 368 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order 08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 369 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order 08-8067-LRJ;
+
+Page 370 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order 08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 371 ~ OTHER - Sealed per Court Order 08-8067-LRJ;
+Page 375 ~ b3 - 1, -2; b6 - 1, -2, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -5;
+Page 378 ~ b3 - 1,
+-2; b6 - 1, -2,
+-3,
+-5; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -5;
+Page 379 - b3 - 1,
+-2; b6 - -3; b7C - -3;
+Page 382 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 383 ~ 66 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 389 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 2,
+- 3; b7C - 2, -3;
+Page 390 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 391 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 392 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 393 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 2, -3; b7C - 2, -3; b7E - 3;
+Page 394 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+:bapto 3: 050-3-11S74-s
+Page 395 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,
+Page 396 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 397 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -2, -3; b7C - 1, -2, -3; b7E - 3;
+Rage 390
+Page 398 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -2, -3; b7C - 1, -2, -3;
+-3; b7c = 1, =2, =3;
+= b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 400 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2, -3; b7C - 2, -3;
+Page 401
+- b6
+- 2; b7C - 2;
+Page 402 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -2, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -5; b7D - 3; b7E
+- 3;
+Page 411 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 413 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+33: 160 - 3:3 23 2 3; те - 3,
+Deleted Page (s)
+× No Duplication Fee X
+For this Page
+
+03/06/07 Time: 11:04
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062
+Serial: 71
+Description of Document:
+Type
+: OTHER
+Date
+02/02/06
+To
+From
+: MIAMI
+Topic: EXECUTED FGJ SUBPOENA
+Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:
+transfer to subpoena sub
+Transferred to:
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062-SBP
+Employee:
+63-2
+Serial: 7
+b6-2
+b7C
+03956-824
+BIE-MM-108062-71
+
+Io: Miami
+From: Miami
+PB2/PBCRA
+Contact:
+SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+Date: 03/12/2007
+b6 -1,
+b7C - 1,
+Hendingi
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis:
+Io remove writer as co-case agent.
+Details: Due to writer's transfer from the Miami Division,
+PBCRA,
+to FBIHQ, effective March 16, 2007, it is
+requested
+that
+writer be removed as co-case agent.
+44
+56 -2
+b7C
+5A
+pleish to
+as CO-CaSl
+3/12/0
+071O1.EC
+03956-826
+ЗIE-MM-108062-73
+
+osojrrol.ec
+(Rev. 0I-31-2003)
+To: Tampa
+Date: 03/21/2007
+Attn:
+SSA L
+Orlando RA
+FrOm:
+Miami
+PB-2/PBCRA
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN:
+66-1, -2
+b7C -1, -2
+(Pending)
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis:
+To request travel reference captioned matter.
+Administrative:
+Jand SSA
+Reference telcall between SA
+on 03/21/2007.
+Details:
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation
+(FBI), Palm Beach County Resident Agency (PBCRA), opened an
+investigation involving multi-millionaire Jeffrey Epstein and
+captioned subjects. The investigation involves
+66 - 2
+b70 - 2
+b3 - 1
+b6 -1, -3
+b7C -1,
+-3
+-4
+FBI Miami, PBCRA, request travel concurrence with
+FBI Tampa, Orlando RA for the purpose of interviewing
+Florida.
+SA'SL
+and
+will travel on
+• 03/22/2007 to interview
+b3 - 1
+56 -2, -3
+b7C -2, -3
+03956-827
+3IE-4M-108062-74
+
+To: Tampa From:
+Miami
+Re: 31E-MM-108062, 03/21/2007
+LEAD (s) :
+Set Lead 1:
+TAMPA
+(Info)
+AT ORLANDO, FL
+FBI Miami request travel concurrence Irom FBI Tampa
+to conduct
+interview.
+63 - 1
+b6 -3
+2
+03956-828
+
+FD-302 (Rey. 10-6-95)
+-1-
+Date of transcription
+01/23/2007
+ALFREDO RODRIGUEZ was interviewed in the town of Palm
+Beach, Florida regarding a federal investigation involving the
+| After being advised of the identity
+of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview,
+RODRIGUEZ provided the following information:
+RODRIGUEZ was employed as a Chauffeur/Butler/House
+Jat
+residence, L
+, in August or September 2004.
+RODRIGUEZ worked for |
+Palm Beach, Floriday for approximately six months.
+RODRIGUEZ stated thatT
+b3 -1
+66 - 3
+b7C
+-3
+(A)
+b6 -1,
+b7c -1, -5
+b7D -1
+66 - 1
+b7C - 1
+b7D -1
+According to RODRIGUEZ,
+b6 -1, -5
+b7C -1, -5
+b7D -1
+Investigation on
+01/18/2007
+File # 31E-MM-108062
+at Palm Beach, Florida
+Date dictated 01/18/2007
+b6 -2
+This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your age 08956-8591
+it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
+31E-MM-108042-75
+
+1B / 8B / The Palm Beach Post
+West Palm Beach, FL
+3/13/2007
+03956-839
+Delays in Epstein case unusual, lawyers say
+ell, who has no involvenient in the case.
+A federal probe or a plea deal
+could explain the wait in the
+Palm Beacher's solicitation case.
+"As a general rule, it would be unusual
+for nothing to have happened," agreed
+Michael Dutko, a criminal defense attorney in Fort Lauderdale. He represents
+Haley Robson, 20, of Royal Palm Beach,
+potentially a key witness in the case.
+By LARRY KELLER
+Palm Beach Post Staff Writer
+Nearly eight months after Palm Beach
+tycoon Jeffrey Epstein was charged with
+A routine hearing for Epstein was
+pulled from the court docket last week
+and reset for May 16. The delays and in-
+Indexing;
+action could be due to a potential federal
+probe ot Epstein or because a plea deal is
+in the works, attorneys say.
+case. No witnesses deposed. No trial date
+set. Nothing, save for routine court hearings reset without explanation.
+"Usually that would be unusual," said
+criminal defense attorney Glenn Mitch-
+Unusual is the word that best describes
+everything about the case
+against Ep-
+stein, 54, an enigmatic money manager
+in New York City who counts Bill Clinton
+See EPSTEIN, 8B •
+Delays in Epstein case
+unusual, lawyers say
+Character
+Classification: 31E-MM-108062
+Submitting Office:
+3/4/5
+Epstein
+Money
+manager in
+New York has
+powerful allies.
+FBI: 'We still have a pending case'
+not
+that's
+Marc
+atdefense
+said
+Shiner
+without
+said
+spokesman
+requesting
+a plea deal.
+have
+and
+taking
+for 13 years.
+the charge.
+Krischer
+filed case,
+Teenage girls were
+recruited to visit
+Epstein for massages
+and sex, police say.
+he had
+defense
+case,"
+to
+letter
+7½-bath,
+his friends.
+bluntly
+sionally
+Reiter's
+molestation.
+Epstein
+§ Dershowitz,
+information
+
+To: Miami
+From: Miami
+Palm Beach County RA/PB-2
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN:
+(Pendingt
+Date: 03/13/2007
+Attn: SSRA
+(
+Duke
+b6 - 1, -2
+b7C -1, -2
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: To request assignment of co-case agent.
+Details: It is requested that sA
+co-case agent to above captioned case.
+44
+be assigned as
+b6 - 2
+A35140
+as co-case toge
+072
+101. 83956-850
+ЗІЕ-МН-108062-81
+
+(Rov. 01-31-2003)
+115rrol, Ec.
+To: Criminal Investigative
+Date: 04/20/2007
+Attn: Crimes Against Children Unit
+b6-1, -2
+IA
+b7C -1, -2
+From: Miami
+PB-2/PBCRA
+Contact:
+SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062
+Title: JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+(Pending)
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: To request Intelligence Analyst (IA) L
+travel
+to Palm Beach RA to assist with analysis for captioned case.
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
+Palm Beach County Resident Agency (PBCRA), opened an
+investigation involving billionaire Jeffrey Bostein and captioned
+subjects.
+The investigation involves
+56 -2
+63 - 1
+b6 -3
+b7C -1, -3
+b7E -4
+FBI Miami, PBCRA, requests the travel of IAL
+Crimes Against Children Unit (CACU), for the purpose of
+assisting with
+for captioned case.
+b6 -2
+b70
+-Z
+b7E -1
+03956-853
+315-141-108062-84
+
+Criminal Investiv
+ative
+31E-MM-108062, 04/20/2007
+From: Miami
+LEAD (s) :
+Set Lead I: (Action)
+CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE
+AI WASHINGTON, DC
+Approve the travel of IA
+| to Miami - Palm
+Beach County RA to assist with analysis for captioned case in
+anticipation of an indictment on 05/15/2007
+b6 -2
+2
+03956-854
+
+To: Criminal Investigative
+Date: 05/02/2007
+Attr: Gang/Criminal
+Enterprise Section
+SC Alex Juan Turner
+ASC
+UC
+SSA
+b6 -1,
+b7C -1,
+From: Miami
+PB-2/PBCRA
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:Jm
+Case
+ID
+#: 31E-MM-108062
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN:
+(Pending)
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis:
+To request Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
+• trave, to palm Beach RA Ior the purpose of assisting
+with indictment preparation, document preparation, chart
+finalization and to provide
+testimony at detention hearing.
+Details: On
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation
+(EBI),
+Palm Beach County Resident Agency (PBCRA), opened an
+investigation involving billionaire Jeffrey Epstein and
+captioned subjects. The investigation involves[
+b6 -2
+b7C
+63 - 1
+b6 -1, -3
+b7C -1,
+- 3
+b7E
+-4
+FBI Miami, PBCRA, is anticipating an upcoming
+The USAO and
+Ediction propa 20, cocumen reparation, has ng i o
+finalization and to provide testimony at detention hearing.
+b6 - 2
+1Z2JRROI.EC
+• JIE: 4M-108042-0
+03956-859
+
+1
+Io: Criminal Inves-
+31E-MM-108062,
+gative From: Miami
+05/02/2007
+LEAD (s) :
+Set Lead 1: (Action)
+CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE
+AT WASHINGTON, DC
+Approval request for the travel of SSAL
+to Miami Division, PBCRA from 05/09/2007 to 05/18/2007
+ror the purpose of assisting with indictment preparation,
+document preparation, chart finalization and to provide
+testimony at detention hearing.
+b6 -2
+b7c -2
+2
+03956-860
+
+To: Tampa
+From: Miami
+PB-2/PBCRA
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By: 5f
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+Attn:
+Date: 05/17/2007
+SSA L
+Orlando RA
+66 -1, -2
+b7C -1,
+7Eo/mos
+(Pending)
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis:
+To request travel reference captioned matter.
+Administrative:
+Reference telcall between SA
+and Primary Relief Supervisor
+05/17/2007.
+on
+Details: Onl
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation
+(FBI), Palm Beach County Resident Agency (PBCRA), opened an
+investigation involving multi-millionaire Jeffrey Epstein and
+captioned subjects. The investigation involves|
+b6 - 2
+b70 -2
+b3 - 1
+b6 -1,
+-3
+b7C -1,
+-3
+b7E -4
+!
+FBI Miami, PBCRA, request travel concurrence with
+FBI Tampa, Orlando RA for the purpose of interviewing a
+] SA'SC
+and
+Iwill travel on 05/18/2007 to interview the
+63 - 1
+56 -2, -3
+b7C -2,
+-3
+138JRRO,EU
+31E-1M-108062-88
+03956-861
+
+Tampa From:
+ami
+31E-MM-108062, 05/17/2007
+LEAD (s) :
+Set Lead I: (Info)
+TAMPA
+AT ORLANDO, FL
+FBI Miami requests travel concurrence from FBI Tampa
+to conduct
+interview.
+63-1
+b6 - 3
+67C -3
+2
+03956-862
+
+Date: 02/14/08 Time: 13:28
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062 , Serial: 89
+Description of Document:
+Type : OTHER
+Date
+: 08/02/06
+To
+From
+US DIST COURT
+Topic: SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY BEFORE GRAND JURY
+Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:
+serialized in the wrong file
+Transferred to:
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062-GJ
+Serial: 39
+Employee:
+63-2
+b6 -2
+03956-863
+316-144-108062-89
+
+too. in
+12 jor 01.66
+To: Tampa
+From: Miami
+PB-2/PBCRA
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN:
+Attn:
+SSAL
+Orlando RA
+06/11/2007
+b6 -1, -21
+b7C -1,
+(Pending)
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: To request travel reference captioned matter.
+Administrative: Reference telcall between SA
+and SSA
+on 06/12/2007.
+Details:
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation
+(FBI), Palm Beach County Resident Agency (PBCRA), opened an
+investigation involving multi-millionaire Jeffrey Epstein and
+captioned subjects. The investigation involves|
+66 - 21
+b70 - 2
+63-1
+b6 - 1,
+-3
+b7C -1, -3
+b7E -4
+FBI, Miami, PBCRA, requests travel concurrence with FBI
+Tampa, Orland Rare purpose of interning
+Twill travel on 06/12/2007 to interview the
+b3 -1
+56-2,
+- 3
+b7C-2,
+-3
+BIE +44-1080623098,878
+
+5. a
+Tampa From:
+Miami
+Re: 31E-MM-108062, 06/11/2007
+LEAD (s) :
+Set Lead 1: (Info)
+TAMPA
+conduct
+AT ORLANDO, FL
+FBI Miami requests travel
+concurrence from FBI Tampa to
+interview.
+b3 -1
+b6
+- 3:
+2
+03956-879
+
+Io: Miami
+From: Miami
+PB2/PBCRA
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+•Drafted By:
+Case ID
+,#: 31E-MM-108062
+Title: JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+06/22/2007
+Attn: IMA/PB2
+(Pending)
+63-1
+b6 - 1, -2
+b7C -1,
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: To request the opening of sub-files in captioned case.
+Details: It is requested that the following sub-files be opened
+to assist in document management in captioned case.
+SUB - GJ Federal Grand Jury
+44
+On 3B3i
+03956-880
+31E+111-108062-98
+
+229jrrol.ec
+To: New York
+From: Miami
+PB-2/PBCRA
+contact:
+SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By: SM
+Case ID
+#: 31E-MM-108062
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN:
+Date: 08/17/2007
+Attn: SSA
+b6 - 1, -2
+b70 -1, -2
+(Pending)
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: To request travel reference captioned matter.
+Administrative:
+Reference telcall between SA
+and SA
+on 08/15/2007.
+Details: On
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation
+(FBI), Palm Beach County Resident Agency (PBCRA), opened an
+investigation involving multi-millionaire Jeffrey Epstein and
+captioned subiects. The investigation involves
+JMb6 2
+b7C - 2
+b3 - 1
+56 -1, -3
+b7C -1,
+-3
+b7E -4
+FBI Miami, PBCRA, requests travel concurrence with FBI
+New York for the purpose of interviewing witnesses and serving
+]wilI Eravel to New York from 08/20/2007 to
+08/24/2007.
+No assistance from FBI New York is anticipated at
+this time.
+b6 -1,
+b7C -1,
+BIE-MM-108062-83956-881
+
+To: New York From:
+Miami
+Re: 31E-MM-108062, 08/17/2007
+LEAD (s) :
+Set Lead 1:
+(Info)
+TAMPA
+AT NEW YORK, NY
+FBI Miami requests travel concurrence from FBI New York
+to conduct witness interviews
+serve target letters on
+subjects.
+03956-882
+
+31E-MM-108062
+JRR: jIt
+1
+on 05/10/2007, SA
+] faxed an intelligence
+b6 - 1,
+request to Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office Intelligence
+b7C -1,
+Analyst [
+] Information sought included current
+employment and residences for
+received results from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
+on 05/24/2007 and forwarded the results to SAl
+]via TFO
+J The results are attached to, and become part
+this document.
+- 2,
+-2,
+- 4
+-4
+03956-905
+31E-14-108062-110
+
+MAY-11-2007
+F2440 PACY. 0-4-313
+10:20
+FBI WEST PALM BEACH RA
+P.Ø1/D1
+FBI FACSIMILE
+COVER SHEET
+.:
+PRECEDENCE
+D Immediate
+• Priority
+X Routine
+CLASSIFICATION
+• Top Secret
+• Secret
+• Confidential
+• Sensitive
+* Unclassified
+To: PBSO
+Name of Office
+Facsimile Number: 561-688-3866
+Atm:
+Name
+Room
+Time Transmitted:
+Sender's Initials:
+Number of Pages:
+(including cover sheet)
+Date: 05/10/2007
+Telephone
+b6 - 4:
+bTC -4
+From: FBI
+Subject: Intel request
+Name of Office
+:
+Special Handling Instructions: Please provide any intelligence related to current
+employment and residences for listed subjects. Thanks,
+Originator's Name:
+SA
+....
+Telephone:
+Originator's Facsimile Number: 561-833-7970
+Approved:
+Brief Descrintion of Communication Faxed- L
+:
+b6 -1,
+b7c -1, -2
+WARNING
+Information gttached to the coyer shoot is U.S. Government Proporty, If you are not the intended recipient of this
+information, disclosure, reproduction, distribution, or use of this information is prohibited (18.USC, § 641). Please notify the
+03956+906
+
+Date: 11/07/07
+Time: 11:09.
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062 Serial: 117
+Description of Document:
+Type : FD909
+Date
+: 12/22/06
+To
+From
+MIAMI
+Topic:
+Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:
+TRANSFER IO THE SUBPOENA SUB
+Transferred to:
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062-SBP
+Employee:
+b3 - 2
+Serial: 80
+b6 -2
+03956-926
+31E-11-108062-117
+
+IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEEN ZH JUDICIAL
+CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
+STATE OF FLORIDA
+«VS-
+JEFFREY E EPSTEIN
+Case No: 502006CF009454AXXXMB
+JEFFREY E EPSTEIN
+PALM BEACH GARDENS, FLE
+66 - 1
+b7C -1
+NOTICE OF HEARING
+THE DEFENDANT MUST BE PRESENT AT THIS HEARING
+Failure to appear will result in a Bond Forfeiture or revocation of own recognizance (O.R.) and a Capias being issued for your arrest.
+YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that this case is scheduled for:
+JURY TRIAL
+On JANUARY 07,2008 DIVISION: W in: COURTROOM 11F at: 09:00:00 AM
+At the COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 205 N. DIXIE HWY, WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33401
+**BE PREPARED TO PAY COURT COSTS AND FINES ASSESSED BY THE COURT AT THIS HEARING**
+SHARON R. BOCK, CLERK & COMPTROLLER
+DFELDER
+DATED: NOVEMBER 06, 2007
+BY:
+Deputy Clerk
+STATE OF FLORIDA • PALM BEACH COUNTY
+ce: ASST ST ATTY - DIV W
+I hereby certify that the
+forgoing is a true copy
+of the record in my office.
+THIS L_DAY OF
+SHAD 0K 20.07
+GLENIN& COMPTROLLER
+DEPUTY CLERK
+***If you are a person with a disability who needs any accommodation in order to participate in this proceeding, you are
+entitled, at no cost to you, to the provision of certain assistance. Please contact Mary Jaffe, ADA Coordinator in the
+Administrative Office of the Court., Palm Beach County Courthouse, 205 North Dixie Highway, Room 5.2500, West Palm
+Beach, Florida, 33401, telephone number (561) 355-4380 within two (2) working days of your receipt of this notice of
+hearing; if you are hearing or voice impaired, call 1-800-955-8771.***
+CRC_CAL_NOH
+31E-M1-108062
+03956-9
+=18
+b6 -1, -5
+b70 - 1, -5
+
+To: Miami
+From: Miami
+PB-2, PBCRA
+Contact:
+SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062
+Title: JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+Date: 11/07/2007
+Attn: Third Party Draft
+66 - 1, -2
+b7C -1, -2
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Syptioned To request funds fox expenses associated to the above
+Enclosure (s): Enclosed for the Miami Third Party Draft is an
+Jand
+the associated FD-794.
+Details: SA
+]requests Third Party Draft provide
+63 -2
+63 - 2
+66 - 2
+b7C - 2
+03956-979
+31E-MH-108062-132
+
+Io: New York
+Date: 02/06/2008
+ittn: SSA L
+Squad C-20
+b6 - 1,
+1b7C -1,
+From: Miami
+PB-2/PBCRA
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062V
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+Thank
+(Pendingt
+tep.
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+synopsis: To set leads for captioned investigation.
+Reference: 31E-MM-108062 Serial 125
+Enclosure (s):
+Enclosed for New York is a copy of referenced
+serial, FD-302 of|
+Details: On |
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), b3 -1
+Palm Beach County Resident Agency (PBCRA), began investigating
+Jeffrey Epstein, a part-time resident of Palm Beach, along with
+]PBCRA obtained information from
+the city of Palm Beach Police Department (PBPD) that|
+b3 -1
+b6 - 3
+56 - 1, -3
+b7C -1,
+- 3
+b7E
+-4
+Following the receipt of the case files from the PBPD,
+PBCRA began interviewingl
+b3 - 1
+66 -3
+38-31 00203684001
+
+#(Rev. 06-04-2007)
+FEDERĄL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+Precedence: PRIORITY
+Io: Miami
+Attn:
+Attr:
+Date: 03/05/2008
+Third Party Draft
+SA
+PB-27PBCRA
+66-1, -2
+b7C -1,
+From: Miami
+PB-1/PBCRA
+Contact: AFI
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: \31E-MM-108062
+Title: JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+Lecm
+(Pending) :
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: This EC was originally submitted on 5/1/07 but not
+uploaded or filed and is therefore being resubmitted. Request
+reference captioned case.
+Enclosure(s): Enclosed for Third Party Draft is a copy of a
+b3
+b3 -2
+Details: On 4/27/07, Assistant U.S. Attorney|
+requested that AFI
+lobtain
+b3 -2
+66-2,
+-6
+b7C -2,
+-6
+5/1/07, AFIL
+telephonically contacted the
+63 - 2
+56-2, -5
+b70-2,
+-5
+L1
+lalecmos.ec
+File
+3IE-MM-108062-1353956-98936
+
+(Rex 06-04-2007)
+Precedence: PRIORITY
+To: Miami.
+Attn:
+Attn:
+Date: 03/05/2008
+Third Party Draft
+SA |
+PB-2/PBCRA R
+b6 - 1, -2
+b7C -1, -2
+From: Miami
+PB-1/PBCRA
+Contact: AFI
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 1E-MM-108062
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+leom
+Hending)
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: This EC was originally submitted on 5/1/07 but not
+uploaded or filed and is therefore being resubmitted. Request
+reference captioned case.
+Enclosure (s): Enclosed for Third Party Draft is a copy of a
+b3 -2
+b3 - 2
+Details: On 4/27/07, Assistant U.S. Attorney_
+]requested that AFIL
+obtain
+b3 - 2
+b6-2, -6
+b7C -2, 6
+5/1/07, AFIL
+telephonically contacted the
+63 - 2
+b6 -2,
+-5
+b70-2,
+-5
+L1
+llecmol.ec
+Fire
+03956-99266-2
+31E-MM+1080621330
+
+'This was a typical 14-year-old girl. ... What happened here was despicable.'
+JEFFREY HERMAN, lawyer for parents of girl, now 17, who accuses Jeffrey Epstein of sexual assault
+Palm Beach man faces lawsuit in teen sex case
+Palm Beach Post Staff Writer
+WEST PALM BEACH — The parents of a
+teenage girl sued part-time Palr Beach resident Jeffrey Epstein for more than $50 million
+on Thursday, alleging that the wealthy money
+manager had her brought to his mansion for
+a massage, then engaged in sexual activity
+The girl, identitied only as Jane Doe, was
+14 at the time. She was the youngest of several alleged victims of Epstein,
+according
+to talm Beach police, who spent 11 months
+investigating him.
+The federal lawsuit, filed by Miami at-
+* torney Jeffrey Herman, says "Epstein has a
+sexual preference and obsession for under
+age minor girls." Epstein "gained access to
+orimarily disadvantaged minor girls in his
+nome, sexually assaulted these girls, anc
+then gave them money."
+who specializes in child sex
+abuse litigation, sued on behalt of the girl,
+her father and her stepmother on grounds
+of sexual assault, intentional infliction of
+• emotional distress and loss of parental con-
+"Jane Doe ... fell into Epstein's trap and
+* became one of his victims" the lawsuit says.
+"We're dismayed by the filing of the law-
+• suit, but not surprised," said Jack Goldberger;
+¿one of Epsteins attorneys. "We think ilis
+3IE-HM- 108062-148
+Lawyer Jeffrey Herman (left) conducts
+a news conference
+Thursday with the father and stepmother
+of a giri who claims
+wealthy money manager Jeffrey Epstein
+assaulted her ins
+2005: The parents
+seek more than
+$50 million in their
+lawsuit. Epstein, who
+faces a prostitution
+solicitation charge, is
+scheduled to enter a
+plea March 10.
+LL INGRAS
+aff Photograph
+12X
+shows what this case is all about: money."
+He and another Epstein attorney, Lilly Ann
+Sanchez, launched an immediate counteroffensive, even showing up at Herman's news
+conference outside the federal courthouse in
+West Palm Beach. They distributed copies of
+documents showing that the girl's father and
+stepmother have prior arrests for financial
+crimes the lawyers say show the lawsuit is financially motivated. Another Epstein lawyer,
+Gerald Lefcourt, a prominent New York criminal defense attorney, provided some of those
+See EPSTEIN, 7B *
+ng:
+31E-MM-108062
+Title:
+Palm Beach man faces
+lawsuit in teen sex case
+1B / 7B / The Paim Beach Post
+West Palm Beach, FL
+1/25/2008
+Edition:
+03956-1012
+
+Epstein paid girl $300, suit claims
+• EPSTEIN from IB
+March 10, but ing only a towel, removed it
+he has postand lay naked on the masdocuments to Goldberger,
+poned other
+sage table, the lawsuit says.
+"Jeffrey Epstein did not
+court
+have sex with this woman,"
+dates
+He demanded that Jane Doe
+to resolve the
+remove her clothing, and she
+Sanchez said.
+dia, except for her undersuggested
+wear, the lawsuit alleges. The
+Epstein masturbated in front
+sexual activity followed, the
+of the alleged victim and
+used a vibrator on her after
+exhaustive
+Epstein paid her $300 afshe was brought to his home
+investigation
+terward, and Robson got $200
+in February 2005. The girl is
+by the Palm Beach Police De-
+for bringing the girl to him,
+which concluded
+the lawsuit says.
+"This was a typical 14-
+that Epstein paid underage
+Robson and Kellen helped
+year-old girl at the time she
+girls and young women to be
+Epstein arrange other liaimet Epstein," Herman said.
+brought to his five-bedroom,
+sons with girls, Palm Beach
+What happened here was
+7½-bath Intracoastal home for
+police concluded. Neither
+despicable.
+massages and sometimes sex
+was charged.
+The girl told police invesplay. Much of the language in
+This. is not the first time
+tigators that she informed
+the Jane Doe suit mirrors that
+Epstein has been sued over
+Epstein she was 18 when she
+of police reports in the case.
+purported
+activities
+met him, and she said that
+Herman's client said her
+teenage girls. He was sued
+was her age on her Web page,
+meeting with Epstein was set
+in New York in October by a
+Sanchez said.
+up by Haley Robson of Loxa
+wornan who says she had sex
+The girls father and stepnatchee, who was a Palm
+with Epstein when she was
+mother also attended
+Beach Community College
+16 and had sought his help in
+news conference.
+student at the time. When
+becoming a model.
+very angry" the
+Jane Doe arrived at Epstein's
+The lawsuit filed Thursfather said. "It's not right that
+home, sbe was escorted by an
+day also alleges that Epstein
+this wealthy man can fly into
+Epstein assistant, Sarah Kelhas assaulted girls on his
+town and destroy my daughlen, to a room with a massage
+private island in the Virgin
+ter's innocence." He did not
+table, police reports and the
+Islands. Herman declined to
+take questions.
+elaborate on that assertion.
+Epstein, 55, is a mysteri
+•Epstein walked in wear
+@larry_keller@pbpost.com
+ous New
+York money man-"
+ager who owns a Manhattan
+mansion, as well as homes
+in Palm Beach, New Mexico
+and the Virgin Islands.
+Beach County
+grand jury indicted him in
+July 2006 on one count of
+felony solicitation of prostitution stemming from alleged
+incidents between Aug. 1 and
+Oct. 31, 2005.
+Epstein is scheduled to
+enter a plea in the case on
+03956-1013
+
+FD-350 (Rey. 5-8-81)
+Mount Clipping in Space Beiow)
+1B / 5B/ The Palm Beach Post
+West Palm Beach, FL
+211/2008
+Edition:
+Title:
+Part-time Palm Beacher
+faces another sex suit
+Character
+Classification: 31E-MM-108062
+Submitting Office:
+MM
+Indexing:
+Part-time Palm Beacher
+faces another sex suit
+By LARRY KELLER
+sexually tinged massage at
+Palm Beach Post Staff Writer
+his home.
+WEST
+PALM
+BEACH
+The latest alieged victim
+— For the second time in two
+is identified as
+weeks, part-time Paim Beach
+No. 2." She went to Epstein's
+resident Jeffrey Epstein has
+Palm Beach mansion in 2004
+been sued for more
+than
+or 2005 when she was 16,
+$50 million by a woman who
+the lawsuit alleges. She says
+contends
+that he engaged
+another girl recruited her
+in sexual activity with her
+to go there to give Epstein a
+when she was a minor after
+massage.
+enticing her
+Once there, she alleges,
+to give him
+she was led to an upstairs
+a massage at
+room with a massage table.
+his home.
+Epstein came in
+wearing
+More
+only a towel around his waist
+lawsuits may
+and told her to remove her
+follow, Miami
+clothes: She did, except for
+lawyer
+Jefher bra and panties, accordfrey Herman
+ing to the lawsuit.
+said.
+"I'm
+Epstein
+aware of oth-
+Epstein rem bad, inaster
+rolled onto his back, masturer
+victims,"
+bated and touched Jane Doe
+he said. "I have been con-
+No. 2 sexually, according to
+the lawsuit filed in federal
+court in West Palm Beach on
+See EPSTEIN, 5B»
+03956-1014
+BIE-MM-108062.149
+
+1 plaintiff's parents
+at odds over suit
+• EPSTEIN from 1B
+involving their daughter.
+"The father has sole custo
+$100, according to the lawsuit.
+dy and has the right to make
+The two attended the same
+decisions on his daughter's
+Paim Beach County high
+rights," Herman said.
+school. Jane Doe No. 2 is now
+Epstein is a wealtny New
+19 and living in Virginia, Her
+manager who
+has counted Bill Clinton
+lawsuits contend
+Donald Trump and Britain's
+that Epstein, 55, targeted
+Prince Andrew among his
+"economically disadvantaged
+friends. He was the target of
+western Palm
+a lengthy investigation into
+Beach County"
+his activities with girls by the
+perceived as less likely to Palm Beach Police Departcomplain to autnorities
+ment that resulted in his inwhose credibility would be
+dictment in July 2006 on one
+quectroned if they did.
+count of felony
+solicitation
+"Both complaints are full of
+of prostitution. That case is
+" said Guy Lewis, former
+US. attorney in Miami and
+Epstein has been sued in
+one of Epstein's many attor-
+New York by a woman who
+neys. Jane Doe No. 2's lawsuit
+says he had sex with het
+"is an outrageous, defamatory
+she was 16. Herman
+copycat of the first."
+said he has received calls
+There has been a twist in
+from others making the same
+the first Jane Doe lawsuit. Her
+assertions in that state.
+mother in Georgia contends
+Herman convened a news
+that her former husband
+conference Wednesday on
+— lane. Does tatner — conthe middle bridge connecting
+suited with neither of them
+West Palm Beach and Palm
+before filing the lawsuit. She
+is asking a judge to halt the
+"This is the bridge... these
+litigation until her daughter
+girls were recruited to come
+turns 18 in May and can make
+over and give a massage," he
+her own decisions.
+said. "When they crossed this
+The mother asked in court
+bridge, they had no idea what
+fillings to be added to the lawwas in store for them. This is
+suit, saying she "has suffered
+a bridge of tears."
+and wil continue to suffer
+has described
+severe mental
+anguish and
+both Jane Does as typica
+pain" as a result of Epstein's
+teenage girls Epstein robber
+"reckless conduct."
+Jane Doe "just didn't want
+the lawsuit going
+another Epstein attorney, pro
+vided the state attorney's of
+the mother's attorney.
+wanted to pursue it on her
+own. The father essentially
+did this on his own."
+Jane Doe has been estranged from her father since
+hol and marijuana use.
+Thanksgiving, Leopold said.
+Herman said the girls'
+"That's why it's even stranger
+backgrounds aren't relevant
+what he did," he said.
+• Epsteins purported. be
+a Wee i seir divorce cane
+havior. "Thev don't have th
+mental capacity to consent
+to find the father in contempt
+to something like this with a
+of court for violating their
+grown man," he said
+divorce decree by not con
+ferring with her on a matter
+@larry_keller@pbpost.com
+03956-1015
+
+B/E-MM-108067-150
+Girl drops lawsuit against Palm Beach man
+3у LARRY KELLER
+the litigation be halted
+at his Intracoastal home, a Palm Beach
+Palm Beaci Past Staff Writer
+until
+her
+daughter
+Police Department investigation con-
+A girl who says that wealthy money
+turns 18.
+cluded. He was indicted in July 2006 on
+manager and part-time Palm Beach
+The
+mother
+com-
+a single count of felony solicitation of
+resident Jeffrey Epstein engaged it
+plained that Jane Doe's
+prostitution. The case is pending.
+* sexual activity with her when she was
+father did not consult
+14, has dropped her lawsuit against
+with
+her
+Jane
+Does parents
+separated two
+their
+months after she was born at Good Sa-
+him because her divorced parents are
+daughter before suing
+maritan Medical Center, according to
+squabbling over the litigation.
+Epstein
+'for
+$50 milcourt records. The couples subsequent
+"It has to do with the fact that the
+Epstein
+lion. The lawsuit aldivorce has been contentious. Each has
+parents aren't on the same page right
+Accused of
+leges
+sexual
+assault,
+had primary custody of the girl at various
+• now," said Jeffrey Herman, the attorney
+for the girl, identified in court papers
+sexually
+intentional
+infliction
+times.
+assaulting thenof emotional distress
+The father pleaded guilty to fedonly as Jane Doe.
+14-year-old girl.
+and loss of parental
+eral fraud charges in 2001 and was sen-
+The girl turns 18 in May and can sue •
+consortium.
+Herman
+tenced to 21 months in federal prison,
+• again at that time without her parents'
+also represents a Jane
+plus three years' probation. The US.
+involvement, Herman said.
+Doe No. 2 who, like Jane Doe, claims
+attorney
+overseeing his prosecution
+Herman sued Epstein last month on
+Epstein summoned her to his home for . was Guy Lewis. Now in private practice
+Lewis was hired by Epstein to defend
+near Atlanta, then asked to intervene
+near Atlanta, then asked to intervens sexuatein, Sh, died several under-
+* him against the father's lawsuit filed on
+behalf of Jane Doe.
+on her daughter's behalf and asked that age girls to give him sexual massages
++
+@larry_keller@pbpost.com
+Indexing:
+Classification: 31E-MM-108062
+Submitting Office:
+MM
+Character
+Title:
+Girl drops lawsuit
+against Palm Beach man
+1B / The Palm Beach Post
+West Palm Beach, FL
+
+Edition:
+03956-1016-
+
+Another suit alleges
+sex during massage
+tional distress.
+— Another woman filed a
+federal lawsuit against Jef
+frey Epstein on Wednesday,
+alleging that he turned a
+massage she gave him at his
+Palm Beach mansion into a
+sexual episode when she was
+16 years old.
+Identified as "Jane Doe
+No. 3," she is seeking more
+$50 million, the
+as two other "Jane Does" who
+filed similar lawsuits in the
+past six weeks. All three suits
+were filed by Miami lawyer
+Jeffrey Herman.
+subsequently
+'withdrew the first Jane Doe's.
+lawsuit because of squabbling
+by her parents over the litigation. The girl may refile the
+suit alter sne turns 18 in May
+and can make her own deci-
+SIOnS, Herman said.
+Uther alleged victims also
+have contacted him, Herman
+"I do anticipate more
+cases," he said.
+In the latest litigation, Jane
+Doe No. 3 alleges that she
+was recruited by a former college student, Haley Robson,
+to give Epstein a massage for
+money at his waterfront home
+late in 2004 or early in 2005.
+The lawsuit alleges that,
+while on the massage table,
+Jane Doe No. 3, then masturbated. She iş suing on
+grounds of sexual assault and
+intentional infliction of enolawyer who
+attorneys.
+Herman
+said
+girls," Herman said.
+were sexually assaulted."
+In addition to the civil lawsuits, Epstein was indicted
+on a single count of felony
+solicitation
+of
+prostitution
+in July 2006 after a lengthy
+Palm Beach Police Depart
+ment investigation into
+activities with underage girls
+at his home. A resolution has
+been delayed continualiy. The
+case is on Monday's court
+docket but is expected to be
+rescheduled once again.
+"One of the reasons (Jane
+Doe No. 3) came forward is
+she is tired of waiting for justice," Herman said
+@larry_keller@pbpost.com
+13B / The Paim Beach Post
+_West Paim Beach, FL
+3/6/2008
+Edition:
+Title:
+Another suit alleges
+sex during massages
+Character
+or
+Classification: 31E-MM-108062
+Submitting Office:
+MM
+Indexing:
+i
+03556-1017
+31E-MM-108062-158
+
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062 Serial: 152
+Description of Document:
+Type : FD302
+Date
+To
+: 03/20/08
+From
+: MIAMI
+Topic:
+Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:
+Error in serializing.
+Employeef
+Date: 04/02/08
+Time: 13:21
+]WAS INTERVIEWED AT THE NEW YORK
+b3 - 1
+b6 -2, -3
+b7C -2, -3
+b6 -2
+3959-1011
+Jlemm-108060-150
+
+FD-5a
+(1-5-94)
+Date: 04/02/08 Time: 13:21
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062
+Serial: 153
+Description of Document:
+Type : EC
+Date
+: 03/27/08
+TO
+: MIAMI
+From
+: NEW YORK
+Topic: TO COVER LEAD SET BY THE MIAMI DIVISION, SERIAL 134, LEAD 1
+Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:
+Error in serializing.
+EmpLoyeet
+b7C
+31E-mm-108883512058
+
+To: Miami
+Date: 03/27/2008
+Attn:
+PB-2/PBCRA
+SAL
+From: New York'
+c-20
+Contact:
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID#: 313-M1-108062 fending)
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN:
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION;
+Synopsis: Io cover lead set by the Miami Division, serial 134
+lead 1.
+Enclosure(s): For the Miami Division the following documents
+have been enclosed:
+1. One original and two copies of FD-302 reflecting
+• interview with |
+] dated 03/20/2008 with
+original notes
+in a 1-A envelope.
+2. One original and two copies of FD-302 reflecting
+interview with
+dated 03/25/2008 with
+original notes
+in a 1-A envelope.
+Details:
+was interviewed at the NYO FBI
+office on 03/20/2008.
+then contacted writer
+telephonically after
+the first interview to provide additional
+information on 03/25/2008.
+Some of most salient facts that were discovered during
+these interviews are as
+follows:
+66 - 1, -2
+b70 -2
+b3 -1:
+66-3
+b3 -1:
+56-3;
+b7C - 3
+b3 -1
+66 - 3.
+b3 - 1
+56-1, -3
+b7C -1,
+- 3
+b7D -1
+3IE-MM-1080623956-1028
+
+(REv. 06-04-2007)
+To: Miami
+From: New York
+C41
+Contact:
+SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062-
+Affendingt
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN:
+Date: 04/22/2008
+Attn: SA
+66 - 1, -2,
+b7C -1,
+Synopsis:
+WSTA-CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Response to lead atl
+] New York, to interview
+FD-302 attached. This lead is completed.
+Details:
+]was interviewed regarding above captioned
+matter. Results set forth in attached FD-302.
+63-1:
+b6 - 3
+67C -3
+63 - 1
+b6 - 3
+670 - 3
+LEAD (s) :
+Set Lead 1: (Action)
+MIAMI
+AT PBCRA
+Read and Clear.
+44
+UPLOADED
+WITZUTTEX
+DATE
+
+03956-1030
+318-14-108042-158
+
+3/18/2008
+Edition:
+Title: Girl sues Epstein, two others
+she says conspired in massages
+Character
+or
+Classification: 31E-MM-108062
+Submitting Office
+MM
+Girl sues Epstein, two others ..
+she says conspired in massages
+"These two conspired with
+Jane Doe, 17, sues in state court
+after dropping a federal suit.
+him to help with the criminal
+enterprise," Leopold said.
+Jane Doe, through her
+father and stepmother, filed
+a federal lawsuit against
+By LARRY KELLER
+Epstein in January. She dis-
+Palm Beach Post Staff Writer
+missed it after hier mother
+WEST PALM BEACH — A former Palm
+Beach Community College student who
+said
+she wasn't consulted
+Epstein
+about the litigation and
+police say procured underage girls to give
+sought to intervene. The
+Jeffrey Epstein sexual massages at his Palm
+mother is acting on her daughter's behalf in
+Beach mansion, and Epsteins personal assisthe latest lawsuit.
+tant have been sued along with Epstein over
+Epsteins lawyer has denied the girls altheir alleged conduct.
+legations and said her tamily is simply at-
+The girl behind the lawsuit was 14 years
+tempting to get money from a very rich man.
+old when she contends he engaged in sexual
+Epstein, 55, is a Manhattan money manager
+conduct with her after she went to his waterwho has homes there, in New Mexico and the
+front home in 2005 to give him a massage.
+Virgin Islands, in addition to his $8.5 million
+Her lawsuit, filed under the name Jane Doe,
+Palm Beach mansion.
+seeks unspecified damages from Epstein for
+sexual assault and intentional infliction of in federal court this year, making similar aiemotional distress.
+legations to those of the first Jane Doe. Those
+She also sued Epstein, Haley Kobson of
+cases remain active.
+Loxahatchee and Sarah Kellen of New York
+Also pending against Epstein in state court
+City on grounds of conspiracy and civil rack-
+• is a felony charge of solicitation of prostitueteering.
+tion arising from the same alleged incidents
+'We just want a full measure of justice for
+with several girls, t'hat case is set tor trial in
+this girl," said her attorney, Ted Leopold.
+July, two years after he was indicted.
+Robson, who attended Palm Beach Com-
+• Jane Doe's new lawsuit, filed in Palm Beach
+munity College, was paid by Epstein to bring
+County Circuit Court, is the most explicit in
+girls to his mansion for massages and more,
+detailing Epstein's alleged misconduct, It is
+according to Palm Beach police. "Im like a
+the only suit to include Robson and Kellen
+Heidi Fleiss," they said she told them. Her
+as defendants, and the only one to make conattorney could not be reached immediately spiracy and racketeering allegations.
+for comment.
+Jane Doe will turn 18 in May. She lives with
+Kellen was an Epstein personal assistant
+other family members in Palm Beach County,
+who arranged the encounters, even escortis nearing graduation from high school and is
+ing the girls to his massage room, police
+working part time, Leopold said.
+illeged.
+@larry_keiler@pbpost.com
+03956-1071 p8
+31E-44-108062-161
+
+To: Miami
+Attr:
+PB-2/PBCRA
+SA
+05/31/2008
+From: New York
+C-20
+Contact:
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31B-MM-108062-162
+(Peneting)
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN:
+Synopsis:
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION;
+To document service of Grand Jury Subpoena to
+Enclosure(s): FOr the Miami Division the following documents
+have been enclosed:
+1. One original and two copies of FD-302 reflecting
+interview with
+One original Grand Jury Subpoena return dated
+Jin a 1-A envelope.
+Details: On
+and
+(FBI) met with
+Special Agents (SAs) |
+of
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation
+b6 -1, -2
+b7C -1,
+63-1, -2
+b6 - 3
+b7C - 3
+b3 - 1,
+66 - 3
+b70 - 3
+b3 -1, -2
+b6 -2,
+-3
+b7C -2, -3
+b3 -1,
+b6 -3,
+- 5
+b7C -3, -5
+b3
+-1,
+b6 - 3
+670 - 3
+- 2
+BIE-MM- 08062-
+
+
+Palm
+Beacher
+pleads in
+sex case
+Jeffrey Epstein will
+serve 1½ years on teen
+-solicitation charges.
+y LARRY KELLE
+aim Beach Post Staff Write
+WEST PALM BEACH - He
+lives in a Palm Beach waterfront mansion and has kept
+company with the likes of
+President Clinton, Prince An-
+drew and Donald Trump, but
+investment banker jeffrey Ep-
+stein will call the Palm Beach
+County Jail home for the next
+18 months.
+Epstein, 55, pleaded guilty
+Monday to felony solicitation
+of prostitution and procuring
+a person under the age of 18
+for prostitution. After serving
+18 months in jail, he will be
+under house arrest for a year.
+And he will have a lifelong
+obligation to register as a sex
+offender: He must submit to
+an HIV test within 48 hours;
+with the results being provided to his victims or theit
+parents.
+As part of the plea deal,
+federal investigators agreed
+to drop
+their investigation
+of Epstein, which they had
+taken to a grand jury, two law
+enforcement sources said.
+Epstein was indicted two
+years ago after an 1l-month
+investigațion by Faim Beach
+police,
+They
+received
+a
+complaint trom a relative oi
+a 14-year-old girl who had
+given Epstein a naked massage at his five-bedroom,
+7,234 square-foot, $8.5 million
+Intracoastal home.
+Police concluded that there
+See EPSTEIN, 8A *
+in Space Below).
+TAVBA The Paim Beach Post
+West Palm Beach, FL
+711/2008
+Edition:
+Title:
+Palm Beacher pleads in
+sex case
+Character
+or
+Classification: 31E-MM-108062
+Submitting Office:
+MM
+Indexing:
+UMA SANGHVI/Staff Photographer
+Investment banker Jeffrey
+Epstein waits in court Monday
+before his guilty plea.
+03956-1078
+BIE- MM-108062-165
+
+Epstein faces civil lawsuits;
+more clients may be added
+• EPSTEIN from 1A
+and lewd and lascivious mowere
+several other girls
+brought in 2004 and 2005 to
+an upstairs room at the home
+for similar massages
+and
+sexual touching.
+The indictment charged
+Epstein only with felony so-
+'It's validation
+of what we're saying
+in the civil cases.'
+JEFFREY HERMAN
+Attorney who represents alleged
+victims, commenting on the plea
+lestation, police conciuded.
+The state attorney's of
+fice said questions
+about
+the girls' credibility led it to
+take the unprecedented step
+of presenting the evidence
+against Epstein to a grand
+licitation of prostitution. The
+jury, rather than
+• directly
+state attorney's office later
+charging him.
+added the charge of procur-
+Palm Beach Police Chief
+ing underage girls for that
+The judge was skeptical but
+Michael Reiter was furious
+agreed to it.
+purposecutor Lanna Be. end
+Epstein's legal woes don't
+with State Attorney Barry
+lohlavek said of the plea: "T
+with Monday's plea
+Krischer, saying in a May
+took into consideration the
+There are four pending fed-
+2006 letter that the prosecueral civil lawsuits and one
+tor should disqualify himself.
+length the trial would. have
+"I continue to find
+been and witnesses having
+in state court related to his
+oftices treatment of these
+to testify" about sometimes
+behavior. At least one woman
+embarrassing incidents.
+has sued him in New York,
+cases highly unusual," he
+wrote. He then asked for and
+Epstein may have made
+where he owns a 51,000-
+square-foot Manhattan mangot a federal investigation.
+a serious mistake soon after
+Epstein hired a phalanx of
+he was charged. He rejected
+"It's validation
+high-priced lawyers— includ
+an offer to plead guilty to one
+of what
+ing Harvard law professor
+saying in the civil
+cases," said Miami attorney
+and author Alan Dershowitz
+— and public relations people
+Jeffrey Herman, who repre-
+по a sents the alleged victims in
+who questioned Reiter's com-
+Spry Sules the federal lawsuits. West
+petence and the victims'
+truthfulness.
+Paim Beach attorney lea
+I°S Leopold represents one al
+In addition to mansions
+in Palm Beach and Manhat-
+, leged victim in a civil suit in
+tan, Epstein owns homes in
+state court. He said he antici-
+3 pates amending that lawsuit
+New Mexico and the Virgin
+$ Isa! to add "a few other clients'
+Islands. He's a frequent contributor to Democratic Party
+candidates. He also donated
+•уиази lice went so far as to scour
+In the criminal case, poxemn loj srea jo
+$30 million to Harvard in
+Former New York Gov.
+returned a
+$50,000 campaign contribution from Epstein after his
+indictment,
+then
+. resigned
+this year during his own sex
+ebod queue eat cluded that Epstein paid girls
+$200 to $300 each after the
+massage sessions.
+"I'm like a Heidi Fleiss,"
+scandal. And the same Palm
+Beach Police Department
+that vigorously investigated
+Epstein returned his $90,000
+donation for the purchase of
+a firearms simulator.
+Staff writer Eliot Kleinberg and
+agenese to charge Epstein with unlawful sex acts with a minor
+staff researcher Michelle Quigley contributed to this story.
+@larry_keller@pbpost.com
+03956-1079
+
+* 8A
+THE PALM BEACH POST
+TUESDAY, JULY 1, 2008
+ril
+UMA SANGHVI/Staff Photographer
+Jeffrey Epstein, (left) appears in court Monday, Soon after he was charged two years ago, Epstein rejected a deal that would have given him five years' probation and no criminal record, documents snow.
+03956-1080
+
+(Mount Clipping in Space Below)
+
+Edition: Palm Beach Post
+Rich man fought the law
+- and he mostly won
+Two years after a grand jury
+indicted him on a felony charge of
+Why is Jeffrey Epstein in
+solicitation of prostitution, Jeffrey
+jail, and not prison?
+Epstein finally admitted that he
+lured a teenage girl to his $8.5 mil
+lion, 13,000-square-foot Palm Beach
+home that showed he knew the girls
+mansion for sex. A week ago, the
+were underage.
+Yet Mr. Krischer
+55-year-olå investment banker be- was more swayed by Epstein's lawgan serving 18 months in jail.
+yers, who attempted to impugn the
+But that plea deal — guilty of
+girls_character by showing they
+felony solicitation of prostitution
+had chatted on myspace.com about
+and procuring a person under the
+smoking marijuana and drinking.
+age of 18 for prostitution — does
+He should have let a jury decide
+not account for all five of the girls,
+whether the victims — and Epstein
+one as young as 14, who alleged that
+"Epstein sexually abused them. And
+- were credible.
+why is Epstein serving his
+term in the overcrowded
+Epstein finally
+Palm Beach County
+the age of one victim, and
+the plea agreement left
+and not a state prison,
+Epstein labeled a sex ofwhere inmates are sent if
+fender. With that additional
+their sentences are longer
+charge, if Epstein had been
+than one year?
+convicted at a trial, he
+The
+slow, dissatisfying resolution of the case
+could have been sentenced
+sends a message to the
+to anything from probation
+to 15 years in prison, Assispublic that there's a different system of justice for
+cant state Attorney Lann
+elohlavek said, adding that th
+the wealthy who hire high-powered
+lawyers. Epsteins legal team includ
+recommended guideline sentence
+ed West Palm Beach defense attor
+was 21 months.
+ney Jack Goldberger, Harvard Law
+Epstein also won't have to cer
+School Professor Alan Dershowitz,
+tify to the court that he is receivwho defended O.J. Simpson against
+ing counseling, typically required
+charges,
+of sex offenders, because he has
+Starr, the prosecutor who pursued
+a private psychiatrist. But without
+then-President Bill Clinton for lying
+court supervision, who will ensure
+about sex with young women.
+Epstein is in fact being treated?
+Beach police spent 11
+The plea deal also drops a federal
+months investigating Epstein beinvestigation of Epstein. If a federal
+fore State Attorney Barry Krischer
+investigation was warranted, how
+sent the case to a grand jury, indoes dropping it before completion
+stead of charging Epstein so the
+benefit the public?
+man who once boasted of accepting
+Epstein preyed on girls and de.
+only billionaire clients could face a
+nied it. For three years, his wealth
+trial. The police had taken a high
+and the influence of his lawyers
+school transcript, class schedules
+bought him the protection the state
+and phone messages from Epstein's
+attorney owed to the victims.
+Title: Rich man fought the law and he mostly won
+Character:
+or
+lassification: 31E-MM-10806
+ubmitting Office: Miami (PB2
+Indexing:
+03956-1081
+316-1M-108062-166
+
+THREE WOMEN SUING BILLIONAIRE JEFFREY EPSTEIN FOR SEX ABUSE WANT PLE... Page 2 of 4
+Oblack
+singles.com
+Black Singles
+are Waiting
+to Meet You!
+CLICK HERE
+Huge Shoe
+Sale!
+$69.45
+FREE
+SHIPPING
+BID TO BURN
+EPSTEIN PLEA
+Page
+Six
+Richard
+Johnson
+dichardjohnson @nypostcons
+With Paula Froelich
+Bili Hollmann
+Corynne Stendter
+and Marlanne Garvey
+July 21, 2008+
+SHARE BO:
+•: Digg a
+MOST EMAI
+• PETE & R
+• DEREK'S
+THREE young women suing billionaire Jeffrey Epstein for sex abuse
+at his Palm Beach mansion want a federal judge to quash the plea
+deal he made with the state of Florida to serve 18 months in jail in
+exchange for admitting he solicited a 14-year-old hooker. Their
+lawyer, Brad Edwards, has asked US District Judge Kenneth Marra
+to toss the deal - which included an agreement that Epstein's wouldn't
+face federal prosecution, which could have led to a longer jail term -
+because they weren't consulted on it. Marra has asked for more
+information before he rules. Epstein's rep, Howard Ruben stein,
+said,
+"The lawsuit has absolutely no merit. They're just looking for
+money. These women have lied repeatedly, and in no way shape or
+form were they victims. They were at his place freely and voluntarily.
+And one of them showed Epstein a fake ID."
+Celeb Phi
+Cindy
+Adams
+SCENES FROM AN
+ITALIAN JAUNT
+ITALY used to be beautiful,
+sunny, friendly, delicious.
+Today it is...
+MORE >
+Liz
+Smith
+REVIEW THE
+CONSERVATIVE
+REPLY
+WE THOUGHT she [Hillary
+Clinton] would be a steadier
+hand as...
+MORE >
+• Vote for the Hottest Summer Song
+• Was your best man not on his best behavior? Post your
+bachelor party photos on our new wedding section
+07/25: Par
+Fierce Bra
+Amanda F
+SHARE BOX
+now your suppo
+izz this articie L
+Digg
+. Reddit (Email DLink
+E Prink
+NEXT ITEM >
+TODAY IN PAGE SIX
+http://www.nypost.com/seven/07212008/gossip/pagesix/bid_to_burn_epstein_plea_120770.htm
+31E-mm. 108 062-167
+03956-1082
+7125/2008
+
+VICTIM NOTIFICATION SYSTEM (VNS)
+VNS is a free service that provides victims of Federal crime with
+information and notification regarding the status of the case and
+the offender's custody status, to include dates of court
+hearings, sentencing, parole and release. Information is
+provided in English or Spanish.
+To access this system, your Victim Specialist will provide you
+with a Victim Identification Number (VIN) and a Personal
+Identification Number (PIN). If you have chosen to
+participate in VNS, but have not received these numbers,
+please contact the Victim Specialist at your local FB! field
+office.
+You will receive letters, as updates to your case are
+available. You may also call the VNS Call Center at
+1-866-365-4968 or access VNS on-line at
+http://www.Notify.USDOJ.gov for current case, court or
+custody information. You will be prompted to provide both
+your VIN and PIN when contacting the VNS Call Center.
+The Call Center and VNS is available on the internet during
+the following hours (Eastern Standard Time):
+Mondoy - Friday
+6:00 a.m. - 3:00 a.m.
+Saturdoy
+6:00 a.m. - 12:00 a.m.
+Sunday
+8:00 o.m. - 12:00 o.m.
+LIMITED CONFIDENTIALITY STATEMENT
+As your Victim Specialist, I certainly am here to assist you as
+you go through the criminal justice process. However, you
+should know that I work as part of a team with the FBI Agent
+and personnel from the United States Attorney's Office.
+Discussions that you have with me may not be considered
+completely confidential. As part of the team, there are times
+when I may need to share information you provide with the
+otherteam members. This is especially important if you
+share information regarding your safety, a medical
+emergency, when the information relates to child abuse
+and/or when the nondisclosure of the information could
+interfere with the investigation or prosecution of the case.
+If you have any questions about limited confidentiality, you
+may contact me for clarification.
+Remember, your interests are important to us. Many victims
+have questions and we are here to help provide you with
+answers and practical assistance.
+IMPORTANT CONTACT NUMBERS
+FBI Victim Specialist:
+Name
+Phone
+FBI Special Agent:
+Name
+Phone
+INFORMATION CARD
+Vicum Identification Number (VIN)
+Personal Identification Number (PIN)
+Investigation/Court Case Number
+Department of Justice
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+HELP
+for
+VICTUAS
+OF
+CRIMI
+• TAIRNESS
+BESPECT O
+SPRINAC
+
+INTRODUCTION
+The Federal Boreau oflnvestigation (FBI S
+responsible for invesugating awide rangero
+Federalorimes; Partothe FBI Work involves,
+providing information and assistance tovictims
+ofthose crimes Crime can havera bevasfating
+effect onvictims and their families who may heed
+help coping wih the impact of victimization
+FBI Victim Specialists are highiy trained
+professionals who can assist you and coorbinate
+with other egencles if providing you with the
+upport information, and resources thát can
+rectively meetyourneeds Viotim Specialişts
+are available 24 hours a day days a week
+A Federal investigation can be both
+complex and lengthy it may involve severa
+agencies some Federa and some
+Vocal This brochure provides s
+information to help you deal with the
+needs and questions that often arise
+during an investigation t describes
+our nights under Federallaw and the
+dypes of services that may be avalable to
+you Please contactyour e Victim Specialist
+it you have any questions The Specialist hame and
+humberdan be found at the end of this brochure.
+HELP
+FOR
+VICTIMS
+OF
+CRIME
+AS A CRIME VICTIM, YOU HAVE THE
+FOLLOWING RIGHTS under
+18 United States Code, Section 3771:
+• The right to be reasonably protected from the
+accused;
+• The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of
+any public court proceeding, or any parole
+proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or
+escape of the accused;
+* The right not to be excluded from any such public
+court proceeding, unless the court, after reviewing
+clear and convincing evidence, determines that
+testimony by the victim would be materially altered if
+the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding;
+• The right to be reasonably heard at any public
+proceeding in the district court involving the release,
+plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding;
+• The right to confer with the attorney for the
+Government in the case;
+• The right to fuli and timely restitution as provided in
+law;
+• The right to proceedings free from unreasonable
+delay:
+• The right to be treated with fairness and with respect
+for the victim's dignity and privacy.
+We will make our best efforts to ensure you are
+afforded the rights described. Most of these rights
+pertain to events occurring after the indictment of an
+individual for the crime, and it will be the responsibility
+of the prosecuting United States Attorney's Office to
+ensure you are afforded those rights. You may aiso
+seek the advice of a private attorney with respect to
+these rights.
+IF YOU ARE THREATENED OR HARASSED
+Your safety is paramount. If anyone threatens you or you feel
+that you are being harassed because of your cooperation with
+this investigation, there are available remedies. If you are
+in immediate danger, contact your local law enforcement
+agency mmediately. Also, you should contact your Victim
+Specialist or the Case Agent and inform them of the
+situation, There are penalties for harassment and other
+threats; therefore, it is important that you report any
+incident as soon as possible.
+IF YOU NEED FINANCIAL HELP OR
+SUPPORT SERVICES
+All states have crime victims compensation programs
+that help cover some expenses resulting from violent crimes.
+Your state program may pay for medical and mental health
+care costs, lost wages and support, and funeral and burial
+expenses not covered by insurance or other benefits. Your
+FBI Victim Specialist may be able to help intercede on your
+behalf with employers and creditors, when appropriate. In
+addition, your Victim Specialist can refer you to other types of
+programs and services, such as emergency housing,
+counseling, support groups, and credit counseling. If the
+offender is convicted or pleads guilty, the court may order
+payment by the offender, called restitution, which may help
+cover expenses and losses caused by your victimization.
+IF YOUR PROPERTY WAS STOLEN OR
+HELD AS EVIDENCE
+If your property was stolen, we hope
+to recover it as part of our
+investigation and return it as soon
+as possible. If your property is held
+as evidence, we will notify you,
+maintain it in good condition,
+and make every effort to see
+that it is returned to you as quickly
+as possible when it is no longer
+needed as evidence.
+Please understand that some property we receive as
+evidence has been damaged during the course of the crime.
+IF AN ARREST IS MADE
+Every effort will be made to notify you if a suspect is
+apprehended. If criminal charges are filed, you will be
+contacted by the United States Attorney's Office (USAO)
+assigned to handie your case.
+Each USAO has a Victim Witness Coordinator
+to help answer your questions and deal with
+your concerns during the prosecution of the
+case.
+03956-1098
+
+e on:
+I about
+phone
+ws you
+s. You:
+1d VNS
+he
+hrough
+sty If
+liately
+t
+is, you
+one of
+ernet*
+Call
+your
+serson
+4) the
+U.S.
+9, Must I receive notification?
+Liyou do not wish to receive notification you may
+contact: (1) the VNS Call Center (1-866-365-4968,
+provide your VNS VIN & PIN, Select Opt Out
+option); (2) access the VNS Web site and select the
+Stop Receiving Notifications link; (3) the person
+indicated on your initial notification letter; or (4) the
+•Vietim-Wilness Coordinator at your local •
+U.S.
+Altorney's Office.
+. i
+INFORMATION CARD
+Victim Identification Number (VIN)
+Personal Identification Number (PIN)
+Not all relevant information regarding a case will be
+contained within VNS. Victims may contact the
+respective agency staff for additional information.
+U.S. Department of Justice:
+Overview - VNS Information
+Information -
+Activity
+Internet Call
+Center
+Investigative Status
+(Under Investigation or
+Prosecution Declined)
+Filing of Criminal Charges,
+Outcome of the Charges and
+Sentencing data
+Future & Past Court
+Hearings
+BOP Custody Status &
+location, projected release
+date
+Other available information
+Links to other Internet Web
+resources
+Update address, email,
+telephone number
+Opt out from access 1o VNS,
+including the Internet & Call
+Center
+The Department of
+Justice Victim
+Notification
+System
+• DOJ - USA-260
+USPIS - PSN7610-07-000-1290
+A Service Provided byr
+* The Federal Bureau of Invesigation,
+* The Ünited States Attorneys Offices
+• The Fedevat Bureau of prisons, and
+* The Office for Victims of Odime
+In Cooperation With,
+• The United States Postal Inspection Service
+03956-1099
+
+Introduction
+The Department of Justice and the United States
+Postal Inspection Service are committed to ensuring
+that victims of federal crime are treated fairly as their
+case moves through the criminal justice system.
+In order to provide victims with information on case
+events, the Department of Justice has developed the
+Victim Notification System (VNS). This brochure
+provides information about VNS.
+Victim Notification System (VNS)
+VNS is a cooperative effort between the Federal
+Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the United States
+Postal Inspection Service (USPIS), the United States
+Altorneys' Offices, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons
+(BOP).
+This free, computer-based system provides important
+information to victims. In many cases you will
+receive letters generated through VNS containing
+information about the events pertaining to your case
+and/or any defendants in the case.
+This information is also available in English and
+Spanish on the Internet and through a toil-free
+telephone number (Call Center). In cases with many
+victims, you may receive only one letter and then be
+directed to the Internet or Call Center for further
+information.
+VNS Information
+Registration:
+You will receive a Victim Identification Number
+(VIN) and a Personal Identification Number (PIN)
+that will allow you to access VNS on the Internet and
+using your telephone. You may write those numbers
+on the attached tear-off card to keep with you.
+If you have chosen to participate in VNS, but have
+not received these numbers, please contact either the
+FBI, the USPIS, or U.S. Attorney's Office handling
+your case.
+Your VIN and PIN numbers are
+both required any time you
+contact the Call Center or when
+accessing VNS on the Internet.
+VNS Internet Access:
+You may access information about the case via
+the Internet at: http://www.Notify.USDOJ.Gov
+You will be required to enter your VIN and
+your PIN.
+The Web site, in some instances, may provide
+additional information that is not available
+through the Call Center.
+(Refer to Common Questions, numbers 4, 5 & 6
+below, for more information regarding the Internet.)
+The VNS Call Center:
+You may call 1-866-DOI 4YOU (1-866-365-
+4968) For current information. You will be
+required to enter your VIN and your PIN.
+By following the prompts, VNS will provide
+custody information and notice of upcoming
+court events.
+The Call Center will include options to hear:
+Upcoming Events - information on future
+court hearings
+Historical Court Events - information on past
+court hearings
+Detailed Information on Dach Defendant -
+information regarding criminal charges filed,
+the outcome of the charges, and the sentence
+imposed by the Court; if the defendant is in the
+custody of BOP, the custody location,
+projected date of release from custody and
+other release information.
+You'
+Com
+inab
+infor
+'notifl
+2.
+Each)
+the
+invol
+VNS Notification:
+You may also receive information about case events
+by telephone, email, numeric pager, or fax. Please
+note that in some rare instances, VNS may contact
+you by phone which will require use of your PIN.
+Common Questions
+Below are some common questions about VNS. If at
+any time you have a question about VNS that is not
+answered here, please feel free to contact your local
+FBI, USPIS, or U.S. Attorney's Office.
+1. When can I call the VNS Call
+Center or access VNS on the
+Internet?
+(Eastern Time)
+Monday - Friday 6:00 a.m. - 3:00 a.m.
+Saturday
+6:00 a.m. - 12:00 a.m.
+Sunday
+8:00 a.m1. - 12:00 a.m.
+1-866-DOJ-4YOU - (1-866-365-4968)
+International Callers:
+(1)502-213-2767
+http://www.Notify.USDOJ.Gov
+03956-1100
+
+5. What information is available on
+the VNS Internet Web site?
+The information available will include:
+A. Case Activities Detail - information about
+events in your case.
+B.
+Downloads/Links - supplemental
+information about your case.
+C. My Information - allows you to view
+and/or update your mailing address, phone
+number, and email address.
+D. Stop Receiving Notifications - allows you
+to stop receiving further notifications. You
+can later re-enroil using your VIN and VNS
+6. How often is information on the
+Internet updated?
+The VNS Web site is updated daily, Monday through
+Friday.
+7. Does the Victim Notification
+System ensure my safety?
+No. Do not depead on VNS to ensure your safety. It
+you feel that you are being threatened, immediately
+notify law enforcement.
+8. What should I do if my contact
+information changes?
+If your address, email or phone number changes, you
+should update your contact information using one of
+the following methods: (1) VNS on the Internet*
+(http://www.Notify.USDOJ.gov) (2)
+VNS Call
+Center# (1-866-365-4968) (* You will need your
+VNS VIN & PIN/Web Login ID); (3) the person
+indicated on your initial notification letter, or; (4) the
+Victim-Witness Coordinator at your local U.S.
+Attorney's Office.
+den i10il
+
+..
+You must keep your contact information current (see
+Common Questions number 8). If an agency is
+unable to contact you due to outdated contact
+information, you will be removed from the
+notification program.
+2. What if I forget my PIN?
+Each VNS notification will re-state your VIN & PIN.
+it you do not have this correspondence, please contact
+the agency (FBI/USPIS/U.S. Attorney's Office)
+involved with your case.
+3. What if I am not at home or my
+phone is busy when VNS calls?
+In this instance, the Call Center will continue calling
+you every 30 minutes. If the call is answered, but is
+not confirmed with your PIN number, VNS will
+continue to call every two (2) hours.
+Victim Notification System
+4. How do I access the VNS
+Internet site?
+A. Enter http://www.Notify.USDOI.Govin
+your Web browser.
+B. If you are a new user, click "First time users
+• click here".
+(1) Enter your VIN.
+(2) Enter your PIN.
+(3) Complete the remaining information as
+• requested on the Web site to include
+creating a new VNS Login ID.
+C. Your VNS Login ID must be used in
+conjunction with your VIN during any
+subsequent access of the VNS Web site.
+
+From:
+Miami
+squad PB-2,
+PECRA
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+Date: 10/07/2008
+Attn: ALAT
+Attn:
+ALAT
+b3 -1
+56 -1, -2, -3
+b70 -1, -2, -3
+Jank
+(Pending)
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+ynopsis: Io request hand delivery of Victim Notificatio
+etters from the United States Attorney's Office to victim
+Enclosure (s) : 1)
+Enclosed for L
+no d st Legal Attac Letter addressed to
+Enclosed forl
+Ja letter addressed tol
+| C/O Asst. Legal Attache
+Details: Per the request of the United States Attorney's Office,
+the above referenced letters need to be hand delivered tol
+] dob
+] The letters reference the outcome of a Non-Prosecution
+Agreement entered into by the US Government and Mr. Epstein.
+letters provide the victims with the terms of the Agreement ano
+contact information should the victims have any questions.
+]is currently incarcerated at the Palm Beach
+County Stockade serving an 18 month prison sentence, followed by
+63-1
+66 - 3
+63 - 1
+b6 - 2, -3
+b70 - 2, -3
+b3-1
+b6 - 3
+b6 -1
+b7C -1
+281enkol. ec
+B/E-MM-108062-93956-1103
+
+From:
+Miami
+31E-MM-108062,
+10/07/2008
+b3 - 1
+b6 - 3
+b70 - 3
+a year of house arrest.
+registered sex offender.
+will also be a life time
+66 - 1
+b7C -1
+2
+03956-1104
+
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+H
+2,
+- 2,
+2,
+2,
+2,
+2,
+2
+2
+2
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+29
+30
+31
+32
+33
+34
+35
+36
+37
+38
+39
+40
+41
+42
+43
+44
+45
+46
+47
+48
+49
+50
+51
+52
+53
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b7E
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+6;
+;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1
+;
+;
+1;
+;
+;
+1;
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+b6
+66
+66
+b6
+2
+2
+2
+2
+2
+2
+2
+2
+2
+2
+2
+2
+2
+2
+2,
+2
+2
+2
+2,
+2
+2
+2,
+2
+b
+2.
+2.
+- 3;
+b
+2,
+2
+2
+3;
+;
+2,
+2
+2,
+- 3;
+
+ru
+… . —
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+5;
+1;
+1
+;
+1
+1;
+- 1;
+1
+;
+1
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+1,
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+66
+b6
+b6
+1,
+2
+2,
+2
+2,
+1
+1
+2
+2
+Z,
+2
+2
+2
+2
+2
+2
+-3;
+- 3;
+3
+3;
+3;
+N
+-5
+7D
+7D
+W
+5;
+6;
+7C
+- 2
+-3
+-5
+H
+N
+- 3
+-5; b7D - 3;
+H
+-2,
+b7
+7D
+b7
+=.
+-2, -3; b7C - 1, -2, -3; b7D - 1;
+-3/b7C - 1', -$; b7D - 1;
+5;
+7C
+H
+-3
+-5; b7D - 1;
+-3; b7C - 1, -3; b7D - 1;
+1,
+-5
+
+Page 129 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5;
+Page 130 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5;
+Page 131 ~ b6 - 1, -2; b7C - 1, -2; b7D - 1; b7E - 3;
+Page 132 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1; b7E - 3;
+Page 133 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1; b7E - 3;
+Page 134 ~ b6 - 2; bC - 2; b7D - 1; b7E - 3;
+Page 135 ~ b6 - 1, -2; b7C - 1, -2; b7D - 1; b7E - 3;
+Page 136 ~ b7D - 1; b7E - 3, -7;
+Page 137 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1; b7E - 3;
+Page 138 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 139 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 140 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 141 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+1; b7D - 1;
+Page 142 ~ b6 - 1; bC - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 143 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 144 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 145 ~ b7E - 1;
+Page 146 ~ b7E - 1;
+Page 147 ~ b7E - 1;
+Page 148 ~ b7E - 7;
+Page 149 ~ b7E - 7;
+Page 151 ~ b3 - 1; b5 -
+1; b6 - 1, -3, -5, -6; b7C - 1, -3, -5, -6;
+Page 152 ~ b3
+-1;
+b5
+1; b6 - 3,
+-6; b7C - 3, -6;
+Page 153 - b3
+- 1;
+b5
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 154 - b3
+1;
+b5
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 155 ~ b3
+1; b5
+- 1; b6 - 3, -5, -6; b7C - 3, -5, -6;
+Page 156 - b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+-2, -3; b7C - 1, -2, -3;
+Page
+157 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+1,
+- 3,
+Page 158 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+2,
+-3; b7C - 2, -3;
+Page 159 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 167 ~ b6
+- -2; b7C - -2; b7E - -9;
+Page 171 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -2, -3, -5, -6; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -5, -6; b7D -
+1;
+Page 172 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 174 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+1,
+- 2, -3,
+-6; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -6; b7D - 1;
+Page 176 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,
+-2, -3; b7C - 1, -2, -3; b7D - 1;
+Page 177 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -2, -3, -5, -6; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -5, -6; b7D -
+: 3 B5:1333
+53:3:28 13.3
+Page 178 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 179 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3,
+Page 183 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -2, -3, -5, -6; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -5, -6; b7D -
+9203 33 , -6; 070 -
+1;
+Page 184 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 204 ~ b6 - 2,
+Page 205 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3, -4, -5; b7C - 3,
+Page 207 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7E - 7, -8;
+Page 208 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 7, -8;
+X Deleted Page (s)
+X No Duplication Fee X
+X For this Page
+
+FD-515 (Rev, 12-19-06)
+Squad supervisor approvai
+(please inilial)
+Accomplishment Report
+04/29/08
+(Accomplishment must be reported and loaded into
+Date Prepare 913
+Date Loaded
+ISRAA within 30 days from date of accomplishment)
+Date Loader's Initlats.
+investigative Assistance or Technique Used
+Accomplishment involves:
+(check all that apply)
+Drugs
+A Fugitive
+Bankruptcy Fraud.
+Computer Fraud/Abuse
+Corruption of Public Official
+Money Laundering
+Sub Invest Asst by FO(s)
+(Asst. FO(s)
+File Number
+3IE-MM-108062
+Stat Agent Soc, Sec, No.
+1. Used, but did not help
+3. Helped, substantially
+2. Helped, minimally
+4. Absolutely essential
+For Sub, Invest Assist. by olher FO(s) indicate A, B, C, D for corresponding FO
+Rate FO
+1AT
+Rate FO
+IAT
+Rate Fo
+IAT
+Rate Fo
+IAT
+Fin. Analyst
+Lab. Field Sup
+LUCO-Nal. Back
+vict-Win Coor
+Stat Absent Name.
+Aircraft Ass!.
+Pon Registers
+NCAVC/ VI-CAP
+1o Wanted Flyer
+Computer
+Photo Cover
+CrimitS Intel Assy
+SARG
+Солел Мол.
+Polygraph
+| CART
+A.
+B.
+Task Force
+C. D.
+RA
+Squad
+PECRA
+PB-Z
+Assisling Agents Soc. Sec. No. *1
+Crisis Nag.- Fad
+ELSUR / FISC
+Saarch Warrant
+Crisis Neg-LoGa!
+Asset Fort Prog
+ELSUR/T. 11I
+Show Money
+ERTAsst
+Fort Support Prol
+Eng. Field Spt.
+SOG ASSI
+Butte - ITC
+TFOS/CTD
+Eng. Tapa Ex.
+Swat Team
+CASICIO
+Legals Assi.
+Tech, Ag/Equip,
+Foc - ITC
+| Infra@ard/CyD
+Evid. Purchase
+Phone Toll Rec
+Fl. Mon. - ITO
+OFCICID
+N
+Name:
+A. Complaint / Information/ Indictment
+• Federal [Local internationat
+Complaint Date: _
+Check if Civil Rico Complaint
+information Date:.
+Indictment Date:
+Inf/CW Info
+UCO - Group I
+For. Lang Assl,
+PPP
+Lab. Div. Exam
+VOO - Group HI
+Non Fa! Lab Ex
+E Conviction
+d. CIvil Rico Matters Date:
+Dideral
+BLocal
+J Intemationa
+Also complete "Section G"
+Convictic Date!
+6/30/08
+Other Civil Matters Date:
+Judgment _
+For 6F, G, H-include A
+cy Code
+Judicial Ouicome...
+I Selony
+or
+Misdemeanor
+Amounts.
+Suspension: Years _
+- Months.
+or
+• Tria
+B. Locate (Arrest)
+State: EL
+Judicial District: .
+Eth
+K. Administrative Sanction Date:-
+• Federal
+XLocal
+• International
+Subject Description Code -
+G. U.S. Code Violation
+Subject Priority: DA
+Type:
+Length:
+Required for sections A, B, F and J
+• Suspension • Permanent
+Locate Date:
+(Federal Oniy)
+_ Debarment
+Arrest Date:
+06/30/08
+Titie
+Section
+#Counts
+] Injunctior
+Year. Months_
+• Subject Resisted Arrest
+• Subject Arrested was Armed
+C, Summons Date:
+• Federal • Local
+D. Recovery / Restitution / PELP X
+CATS # Mandatory -
+Circle below one of the three asset forfeiture:
+Admins, Civll Judicial, or Criminal
+Do not indicate $ value in Section D
+• Federal
+• Local
+• international
+Recovery Date:.
+Code
+_ Amount $..
+Code•
+_ Amount $.
+Restitution Date:-
+• Court Ordered • Pretrial Diversion
+Code _
+_ Amount $.
+PELP Date:..
+Code*_
+- Amount $ -
+H. Sentence Date:-
+Senlence Type:_
+in Jail:
+Years.
+Suspended: Years.
+Probation:
+Years.
+Fines:
+1. Disruption/Dismantlement: /
+Mi. Acquittal/ Dismissai/ Pretrlal Diversion
+(Circle one) Date:
+Months_..
+- Months-
+Months.
+N. Drug Seizures / Date:
+Drug Code"
+Weight
+- Code
+FDIN
+Do not indicate $ in Section D
+E. Hostages(s) Released Date:
+Released by: Terrorist Other
+Number of Hostages:
+Disruption Date:
+Dismantlement Date: __
+Completion of FD-515a Side 2 Mandatory
+O. Child Victim Information
+Child tocaled / identified Date:__
+OLiving
+•Deceased
+P. Subject Information - Required for all blocks exciuding block D (Recovery/PELP), blocks E, I, L and N
+- Compoo F0-515 68 1 808 A manding, FA as aproprianize no (0), Rustinfoin Europen, Coriosan, or Aigion Organized Crimo Group
+* Additional information may be added by altaching another form or a plain sheet of paper for additionat entries.
+Serial No. of FD-515
+• Requires that an explanation be altached and loaded into ISRAA for recovery over $1 m and PELP over $5 m, disruplion, dismanllement, and drug seizures.
+3/E-MM- 1080585-11586
+66-2
+670 - 2
+b7E -6
+56 - 1
+b7C -1
+
+For Further Instructions See: MAOT, Part IT, Sections 3-5 thru 3-5.3.
+Revised 12-19-2006
+PROPERTY CODES
+01 Cash
+02
+03
+come and orego, harnes
+Vehicles
+Heavy Machinery & Equipment
+Aircraft
+Jewelry
+Vesscis
+ATT, Aniques or Rare Colletions
+Rcal Propeny
+All Othcr
+SENTENCE TYRES
+cr
+Copital Tunishment
+Joil Sentence
+Life Porole
+LS
+NS
+Life Sentencc
+No Senience (Subjcet is a Fugitive
+Insane, has died, is a Corporarion o
+must pay fine only)
+PB Probation
+SJ
+Suspension of Jail Scrishe
+C Youth Correction ne
+TELL CODES
+22
+Coumerfeit
+Stocks/Bonds/Currency/
+Negotiable Instruments
+23
+Counterfeit/Pirated Sound
+Recordings or Motion Pictures
+Bank That Scheme Aborted
+Ronsom, Exionion or Bribe
+Demand Aborted
+20
+Theti From of Fraud Against
+AGENCY CODES
+AFOSI
+Air Force Officc of Special Investigations
+ACIS
+Army Criminal Investigative Service
+BATF
+BIA
+Bureou of Alcohol, Tobacco d Firearms
+Bureau of Indian Affairs
+CBP
+DCAA
+Custams and Border Proleclion
+Delense Contract Audit Agency
+DCIS • Defense Criminal Invesligaive Strvice
+DEA
+Drug Enforcoment Administration
+DOC
+Deparment of Corrections
+DOI
+Dept. of Inicrior
+DHS
+Dept, of Homeland Security
+EPA
+Environmental Protection Agency
+FAA
+FDA
+Federal Aviation Administration
+Food and Drug Administration
+HHS
+HUD
+cpr. of Health & Hution Service
+ept. of Housing & Urbon Developmen
+ICE
+IRS
+Immigralion and Customs Enforcement
+Intomal Revenuc Service
+NASA
+Nnel Acronautics & Space Admin
+NEIS
+Nal NARC Border Interdiction
+NCIS
+Naval Criminal Inycstigative Service
+ROMP
+Royal Canadian Mounted Police
+SBA
+USCe
+Small Business Administration
+U.S. Coast Guard
+USDS
+USMS
+U.S. Department of State
+U.S. Marshals Service
+USP'S
+U.S. Postal Service
+USSS
+U.S. Secret Service
+USTR
+U.S, Trensury
+LOC
+Local
+CITY
+Cily
+COUN
+County
+sr
+Sinto
+OTHR
+Olher
+JUDGMENT CODES
+Govemment Scheme Aboned
+27 Commercialor Industriat
+Thait Scheme Abored
+30
+All Other
+co
+Court Ordered Scitlement
+DF
+Default Judgment
+Dismesal
+JN
+Judgment Notwithstanding
+MY
+Mixed Verdict
+SJ
+Summary Judgment
+VD
+Verdict for Defendant
+Verdict for PlaintifE
+SUBTECT DESCRIPTION CODES
+UNTON MEMBERS
+5D
+President
+SE
+Vice-President
+5F
+5G
+5J
+5K
+50
+55
+ST
+Clerk
+Trustec
+Other
+SUBJECTS
+JF
+1G
+18
+IK
+1L
+2A
+2B
+20
+3А
+3B
+3D
+ЗЕ
+3F
+TERRORISTS
+4A
+Known Member of a
+Tenorist Organization
+4B
+Possible Terrorist Member
+or Sympashizer
+GoNemoT
+6L
+6M
+JUDICIAL OUTCOME
+G Agreeiner
+R Baned/Removes
+cc
+Civil Contempt
+DC Disciplinary Charges
+•PI
+Fine
+Preliminary Injungrion
+IR
+Temporary Restraining Order
+PS
+Pre-filing Setlement
+RN Reslitution
+SP
+Suspension
+VR Voluntary Resignation
+OT
+Other
+SUBJECT PRIORITY
+A
+Subject wanted for erimes of violence
+(ic, murder, manslaughtcr, forcible rape)
+against another individual or convicied of
+such n crime in die nast five years.
+ubjett wanted fot crimes involving los
+destruction of propony valued in oxces
+orS25,00D or convicled of such a crime
+in the past five years.
+DRUG CODES
+COC Cocaine
+HER
+HSH
+Heroin
+KAT
+Hashish
+LSD
+Khat
+LSD
+heramina
+OPM Opium
+OTD
+GM
+Grams)
+KG
+Liter(s)
+ML
+Plan(s)
+DU
+Continuntian of GOVERNMENT SUBJECTS
+ON State Proscentor
+State Low Enforcement Officer
+State - All Others
+Mayor
+Local Legislator
+Local Judge Magisranc
+Local Prosccutor
+Local Law Enforcement OfficEr
+Local-All Others
+County Commissioner
+BANK EMPLOYEES
+28 Be onl
+OTHERS
+All Other Subje
+Company or Corporat
+CHILD PREDATORS
+9A Child Care provides
+Clergy
+* Altitio Coache
+Teacher/Aide
+Counsclor
+Relative
+Stranger
+Orher
+03956-1109
+
+Page
+1
+09/30/2008
+***************** ARREST ****************
+SENSITIVE / UNCLASSIFIED
+Case Number: 31E-MM-108062
+Serial No.:
+stat Agent Name:
+Stat Agent SOC.:
+Does Accomplishment Invoive
+Assisting Agents soc
+Drugs . ... ........: N
+A Fugitive. .........:N
+Bankruptcy Fraud. ......:N
+Computer Fraud/Abuse. ....: N
+Corruption of Public Officials: N
+Money Laundering. ......:N
+Sub. Invest. Asst by Other FOs:
+Investigative Assistance or Technique Used
+FINAN ANALYST
+AIRCRAFT ASST
+COMPUTER ASST
+CONSEN MONITR
+ELSUR/FISC
+ELSUR/III •
+ENG FIELD SUP
+ENG TAPE EXAM
+LEGATS ASST.
+EVINCE PURCH
+INFORMANT/CW
+LAB DIV EXAMS
+LAB FIELD SUP
+PEN REGISTERS
+PHOTO COVERGE
+POLYGRAPH
+SRCH WAR EXEC
+SHOW MONEY
+SOG ASST
+SWAT TEAM
+TECH AG/EQUIP
+TEL TOLL RECS
+UCO-GROUP I
+LUCO-GROUP II
+UCO - NAT BACK
+NCAVC/VI -CAP
+CRIM/NS INTEL
+CRIS NEG- FED
+CRIS NEG-LOC
+ERT ASST
+BUTTE -ITC
+SAVANNAH-ITC
+POC-URCSC
+FT. MON-NRCSC
+FOR LANG ASST
+NON FBI LAB EX
+VICT-WITN COOR
+IO WANTED FLYR
+ASSET FORF PRO
+FORF SUPPORT P
+CXS/CTD
+INFRAGARD/CYD
+DFC/CID
+Arrest subject Priority (A/B/C).
+Arrest is for Federal, Local, or International (AL. C
+Did Subject Resist (Y/N)
+Was Subject Armed (Y/N)
+= N
+..: N
+09/30/08 18:16:31
+Report Date: 09/30/2008
+Accom Date.: 06/30/2008
+Subject Name
+66 -1, -2
+b7C -1, -2
+b7E -6
+RA
+squad
+PBC
+PBZ
+1 = Used, but did not help
+2 = Helped, Minimaily
+3 = Helped, substantially
+4 = Absoluteiy Essential
+Task Force
+SSPBC
+Title
+-----
+United States Code Violation
+Section
+Count
+Accomplishment Narrative
+ENTERED UPON RECEIPT
+03956-1110
+
+FD-350 (Rev. S-8-81)
+(Mount Clipping in Space Below)
+ate: 12/11/2008
+Billionaire sex offender leaves
+dition: Palm Beach Post
+jail six days a week for work
+itle: Billionaire sex offender leaves jail six
+tys a week for work
+Character:
+lassification: 31B-MM-10806
+ubmitting Offic
+Indexing:
+Lawyer: Six women
+suing him for abuse are
+shocked, disappointed.
+Epstein:
+Palm Beacher
+serving 18
+months in
+stockade
+for soliciting
+underage girl for
+prostitution.
+By MICHELE DARGAN
+Palm Beach Daily News
+-Palm Beach billionaire Jeffrey Epstein, who's serving 18
+months in jail for soliciting an
+underage girl for prostitution,
+is allowed to leave the Palm
+Beach County Stockade six
+days a week on a work-release
+program.
+Teri
+Barbera,
+spokesoffice, monitored on an active
+GPS
+system (he wears an
+ankle bracelet). Mr. Epstein
+hires a permit deputy, at his
+expense, for his own security
+at his workplace during the
+time he is out."
+Miami attorney Jeffrey
+woman for the Palm Beach
+County
+Sheriff's
+Office,
+confirmed that Epstein, 55,
+has been in the work-release
+program since Oct. 10.
+when they were minors.
+"He works six days a week:
+Friday through Wednesday
+» Barbera
+lease program from the US.
+at his local West Palm Beach ' past few days. But Herman
+says Epstein had been out
+Goldberger said.
+and register as a lifelong sex
+offender.
+03956 1191
+3IE-MM-/08042-213
+
+(Mount Clipping in Space Below)
+10/17/2007
+Bation: PALM BEACH POST
+Woman sues billionaire investor,
+says they had sex when she was woman e billonze instr
+says they had sex when she was 16
+/ Chancer:
+assification: 31E-MM-1080€
+Ibmitting Offic
+Indexing:
+NEW YORK - A billionaire
+investor, already facing jail
+in Palm Beach County on
+charges of soliciting underage prostitutes, is being sued
+by a young woman who says
+he had sex with her when
+she was 16 and had sought
+his help becoming a model.
+filed late
+Tuesday in Mannattan's state
+Supreme Court, says financier Jeffrey Epstein had the
+teen perform a sex act when
+she brought
+photographs
+review in his
+Side mansion
+sometime in
+2000.
+Epstein,
+Epstein
+54, a money
+manager,
+told the teen he managed
+finances for Victoria's Secret
+and "could get you into the
+catalog" if she were "nice"
+to him, court papers
+The papers say being "nice"
+included massages and other
+favors.
+When the girl told Epstein,
+"I am 16 years
+old and just
+want to model," he replied,
+"Don't worry, I won't tell anybody," court papers say.
+Epstein, said by London's
+Mail on Sunday to be a close
+friend of England's Prince
+Andrew, has been indicted in
+Palm Beach on charges of soliciting underage prostitutes.
+That case is pending
+the girl visited Epstein
+"several times over the several months and engaged in
+and unnatural sex
+acts" while she was a minor,
+the lawsuit says.
+Epstein
+"repeatedly requested that (the girl) return
+with her 14,
+15, and 16-
+year-old girifriends, stating,
+Come by with your friends
+Doing seenext time Dont
+mutual
+Friend Sher 408). love girls
+your age'"
+The young woman, now
+23, kept returning to Epstein
+because
+she has "mental
+issues," said her lawyer, William J. Unroch. He refused to
+elaborate, but court papers
+say she was "disabled as a result of severe mental disease
+and defect."
+Epstein's lawyer in New
+York, Gerald Lefcourt, said,
+"The girl has admitted she
+is insane, but she can read a
+newspaper and recognize the
+word 'rich.""
+Lefcourt also
+said the
+statute of limitations has
+expired
+for the wornans
+case criminally and civilly
+and will almost certainiy be
+dismissed.
+He refused to comment on
+Epstein's Florida charges.
+Meanwhile,
+. Unroch,
+57,
+also acknowledged that his
+client was living with him
+and was at the center of a $10
+million lawsuit he filed last
+year against a neighbor who
+said he was having sex with
+underage girls. That case is
+pending.
+"What she was doing at
+22 is irrelevant to what happened to her when she was
+16." Unroch said Wednesday.
+He went on the say he hoped
+Epstein would agree to
+right" by his client and resolve the case out of court.
+3/E-MM-108062
+08656-1192
+3/E-MM- 108062-214
+
+Palm Beach Post.com
+Palm Beach, FL
+4/10/2009
+Edition:
+Title:
+Suit accuses jailed
+tycoon of sex crime
+Suit accuses jailed:
+tycoon of sex crime
+Jeffrey Epstein is in the county stockade.
+By SUSAN SPENCER-WENDEL
+•Paim Beach Post Staff Writer
+the cases are still in the
+"discovery"
+suits against billionaire
+financier Jeffrey Epstein
+has grown again, with
+Horowitz said Epstein is
+refusing to turn over the
+the filing of at least the
+12th claim by a young
+she was lured to his Palm
+Beach mansion as a teen
+and sexually abused.
+Prominent Miami attorney Robert Josefsberg
+federal lawsuit last week,
+on behalf of the Jane Doe
+• 101 who allegedly visited
+Epstein a few times while
+17 years old and was paid
+$200 at least once for her
+time there, according to
+Epstein
+in July 2008 ol0 jailed
+the complaint.
+The lawsuit mirrors
+facts alleged in other
+suits: that Epstein had a
+identified
+vulnerable
+lured them to his home
+via other young women.
+The teens describe ascending a staircase lined
+Stockade,
+with nude photographs
+of young girls and to the
+out in September.
+spa room where Epstein
+@ susan_spencer_wendel
+would appear in a small
+@pbpost.com
+Miami attorney Adam Jailed Palm Beacher.
+Horowitz,
+who
+sents
+repre-
+SIX
+other Jane
+See past coverage
+Does, said Monday that
+PalmBeachPost.com/epsteln
+Character
+or
+Classification: 31D-MM-108062
+Submitting Office:
+MM
+Indexing:
+03956-1197
+311- MM-108062-217
+
+$FD-355 (ReV. 5-8-81)
+1A, 4A Palm Beach Post
+Palm Beach, FL
+6/10/2009
+Edition:
+Title:
+Women want sex plea
+deal unsealed
+Women
+want sex
+plea deal
+unsealed
+Their attorneys will ask a judge
+to open Jeffrey Epstein's records.
+зу SUSAN SPENCER-WENDEL
+WEST PALM BEACH — When wealthy
+money manager Jeffrey Epstein of Palm
+Beach pleaded guilty last year to procuring teens for prostitution, his case
+detoured around local anc
+state rules regarding the
+sealing of court documents.
+At a plea conference on
+the state charges, a judge,
+a defense lawyer and a pros--
+ecutor huddled at the bench
+and decided that a deal Epstein
+Epstein had struck with federal prosecutors to avoid charges should be sealed,
+according to a transcript of the hearing.
+And so it was.
+But Florida rules of judicial admin-
+Character
+or
+Classification: 31E-MM-108062
+Submitting Office:
+MM
+Indexing:
+'has been or will be sealed, meaning kept
+from public view. The rules also require a
+judge to find a significant reason to seal,
+See EPSTEIN, 4A *
+See past coverage of Jeffrey Epstein's sex
+scandals. PalmBeachPost.com/epsteln
+0399 1198
+3IE-44-108062-218
+
++
+4A
+THE PALM BACH POST
+• WEDNESDAY, JUNE 10, 2009
+Public has right to know details
+of deal, Post attorney will claim
+• EPSTEIN from 1A
+practice and representing torney Lanna Belohlavek
+one of the women.
+approached Pucillo
+such as protecting a trade
+The Palm Beach Postalso a
+conterence.
+secret or a compelling govwill ask Colbath to unseal Pucillo, who had left the
+ernment interest.
+the agreement. Post attor- bench nine years earlier, .
+notification
+ney Deanna Shullman will was filling in temporarily
+or reason occurred in
+argue that the public has a
+as a senior judge.
+Epstein's case, according
+right to know the specitics
+Accordingto atranscript,
+to court records.
+of Epstein's deal.
+Goldberger told Pucillo that
+Epstein's own attorneys,
+According to
+Epstein had entered a conmedia accounts,
+Epstein
+fidential agreement with
+referred to his confidential deferred prosecution
+moved in circles Clinton, the US. attorney's office
+cluded President
+in which federal prosecu
+agreement with the U.S
+Donald Trump and Prince
+tors brokered not pursuing
+attorney's office, struck in
+Andrew.
+"International
+charges against him if he
+September 2007, as. "UT-
+Moneyman of Mystery," depleaded guilty in
+precedented" and "highly
+clared a 2002 New Yormagi
+court. Pucillo then said she
+unusual." And it was "a
+azine profile of Epstein.
+wanted a sealed copy of the
+significant
+inducement"
+Epstein, 56, is in the
+agreement filed in his case,
+for Epstein to accept the Palin Beach County Stockand Goldberger concurred
+state's deal, observed the
+ade, serving an 18-month
+that he wanted it sealed.
+state judge who accepted
+sentence after pleading
+Belohlavek later signed off
+County. Judge
+guilty nearly a year ago
+Deborah Dale Pucillo.
+to felony solicitation, of
+The Florida Supreme
+Epstein now faces at prostitution and procuring
+Court has expressed "serileast a dozen civil lawsuits teenagers for prostitution.
+ous concern" and launched
+in federal and state courts
+He is allowed out from 7
+an all-out inquiry into sealfiled by young women who
+am. to 11 p.m., escorted by
+ing procedures across the
+said they had sex with a deputy, said Palm Beach
+him and now are seeking
+damages.
+Attorneys for some of
+want his Police Department inagreement with
+vestigation,
+five victims tionalright of access to court
+prosecutors unsealed and and 17 witnesses
+gave records must remain invio
+will ask Circuit Judge Jef statements. They told of late, and this court is. fully
+rey Colbath to do so today.
+young women brought by committed to safeguarding
+'It is against public his assistants to Epstein's this right, justices wrote it
+policy for these documents
+to be have been sealed and for massages and sexual
+Epstein's
+office on
+hidden from public scrutiny.
+activity, and then being Tuesday referred
+As a member of the public,
+paid afterward.
+questions to Goldberger,
+EW. has a right to nave
+At Epstein's plea confer-
+• who declined to comment.
+these documents unsealed," ence last year, his attorney, Pucillo also has declined
+wrote former Circuit Judge Jack
+Goldberger,
+to comment.
+Bill Berger, now in private then-Assistant:
+State. At-@susar_spercer_wendei@pbpost.com
+03956-1199
+
+To: Miami
+From: Miami
+PB-1, Palm Beach County RA
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062V
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN:
+Date: 01/08/2010
+Attn:
+SSA
+b6 1, -2
+57c 1, 22
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: To request transfer of above captioned case due to
+agent's transfer to another squad.
+Details: Due to SA
+transfer to Squad PB-1,
+please reassign the above
+captioned case.
+b6-2|
+b70-2
+66-2
+1/172010
+BIE-MM-ID 86361215221
+oodenkol, ee.
+
+=D-350 (Rev. 5-8-81)
+(Mount Clipping in Space Below)
+Judge rules Epstein attorneys
+can subpoena abortion records
+1/22/10
+EP AiM Bench PosT
+Titie: Judge rules Epstein
+AttorNeys cAn subpoenA Abortion
+Characted s
+or
+31E-MM-108062
+Classification:
+Submitting Office:
+Indexing:
+By JANE MUSGRAVE
+Palm Beach Post Staff Writer
+WEST PALM BEACH - In
+=
+a decision that could spark
+a constitutional showdown
+Epstein
+The judge says
+the records
+would not be
+made public.
+torneys seek the records.
+another
+ruling
+Wednesday, Hafele also
+said that videos from
+depositions in the state
+over privacy rights, a judge
+cases cant be released
+Tuesday gave lawyers rep
+without a court order. The
+resenting multimillionaire
+made public and might not ruling came after Epstein
+sex offender Jeffrey Ep-
+be admissible during trial. attorney Robert Critton
+stein the right to subpoena
+But, he said, since the complained that a video
+Epstein,
+, of Epstein being asked
+women who are seeking
+now 57, is responsible for whether he had an "eggmillions in damages from.
+their emotional distress, shaped" penis became :
+the part-time Palm Beach
+nis attorneys can explore voutube.com sensation. I
+the impact of other events.
+first appeared on The Palm
+Beach County
+Medical records,' Hafele Beach Post Web site.
+said, are a better source
+Critton blamed attorney
+Hafele said the records
+could help Epstein rebut person's memory.
+ronts memory than a Spent. Kiin saod it eas.
+the women's claims that
+Attorney Louis Silver,
+public record.
+they suffered psychologi- who represents the Presi
+The civil suits began
+cal ills after being paid to
+dential Women's Health mounting after Epstein
+give him sexually-charged
+• Center, a West Palm Beach agreed to plead guilty to
+massages at his Palm
+clinic where abortions are two state charges: procu
+Beach mansion when they
+performed, warned Hafele ing a minor for prostitutio
+were as young as 14.
+that he was stepping and soliciting prostitution.
+Hafele told Epstein's at on shaky constitutional He served 13 months of
+• torneys they couldn't go on grounds.
+an 18-month sentence. As
+a fishing expedition. The
+• records are part of the deal brokered
+can't be sought until the
+they have ever had an
+abortion, how many and Florida Constitution.
+lawsuits. He can argue the
+After the. hearing, Sil women don't deserve the
+where. Further, he said,
+, ver said an appeal won't be millions they are seeking.
+the records would not be necessary until Epstein at-@jane_musgrave@pbpost.com
+03956-1214
+3IE-MM-1080620823
+
+=D-350 (Rev. 5-8-81)
+adicate page, name of
+Ex-Epstein worker faces
+ewspaper, city and state.)
+ate:
+1/26/2010
+Edition: MORNING
+obstruction charges
+PALt BEH POST
+Till: Ex-Epstein faces
+Character:
+or
+obstruetion charges
+Classification:
+Subalting ico: 31E-M1M-108067
+=
+Epstein
+Papers
+listed Palm
+Beach sex
+offender's
+victims
+agent's affidavit, Alfredo Rod- sent ir to make the buy from cover agent and produced a
+The FBI says he tried to sell information to an agent.
+riguez offered to later sell
+Rodriguez. Rodriguez, born small bound book and several
+the information for $50,000 in 195:, had told police that
+sheets of legal paper, which
+— Rodriguez calling it the he worked for Epstein as a he told the agent he had tak-
+By SUSAN SPENCER-WENDEL
+critical information from fed-
+"Holy Grail" or "Golden Nugbutler, chauffeur, chef and
+en from Epstein's home while
+Palm Beach Post Staff Writer
+eral agents — an expansive
+get" — to a government wit-
+• house:an, sometimes pickemployed there in 2004 and
+WEST PALM BEACH
+- list of Epstein victims and
+ness, who is not named in the
+ing up and cleaning sex toys
+2005. Rodriguez then began
+A former employee of sex-. witnesses — as investigators affidavit.
+left behind after Epstein fin- counting his $50,000 payofi
+scandal-plagued Jeffrey Ep- probed the Palm Beach finan-
+The affidavit does not refer ished his encounters with the
+He was stopped, detained
+stein has been charged with
+underage giris
+on the spot and questioned
+obstruction of justice after the minors.
+In early November,
+According to the affidavit,
+by agents, according to the
+employee alleredly withhold
+According 10 at. FBl undercover FBI agent wa: Rodriguez met the under-
+See EPSTEIN, 5B •
+Information could have altered case
+• EPSTEIN from 1B
+jury," Pryor wrote.
+The information allegedly withheld by Rodriguez may have been
+Rodriguez told agents of witness-
+a tipping point in the controversial
+ing nude girls whom he believed to
+probe of Epstein. Federal prosecube underage at Epstein's pool area,
+tors ended up striking an extraor
+of knowing that his former employ
+dinary deal with Epstein and his
+er was having sex with underage
+top-flight lawyers; agreeing to recall
+girls, and of viewing underage porgrand jury subpoenas if Epstein
+nography on computers in Epstein's
+home.
+pleaded
+guilty to
+prostitutionrelated felonies in state court, which
+Special Agent Christina Pryor
+he ultimately did.
+wrote that later review of the papers
+Epstein received an 18-month jail
+and book Rodriguez handed over
+sentence. He served 13 months and
+revealed information "that would
+was allowed to leave the jail most
+have been extremely useful
+in
+waking hours of the day.
+investigating and prosecuting the
+An attorney for Rodriguez, Assiscase, including names and contact
+tant Federal Public Defender Dave
+information of material witnesses
+Brannon, declined to comment on
+and additional victims."
+his behalf.
+"Had those items been produced
+An unnamed government witness
+in response to inquiries of state law
+mentioned in the affidavit is likely
+enforcement officers or the Special
+one ot the attorneys representing
+Agents, their contents would have
+women in a gaggle of current civil
+been presented to the federal grand
+inwouits against Epolein.
+• The affidavit outlines how the
+unnamed
+witness
+had
+deposed
+Rodriguez, who denied having documents, then received a call from
+Rodriguez later offering to sell for
+$50,000 the "Holy Grail."
+"Rodriguez explained that the
+information contained hundreds of
+additional victims and their phone
+numbers from diverse geographic
+locations including New York, New
+Mexico and Paris,
+according to the
+affidavit.
+Rodriguez is scheduled to be arraigned in federal court Monday.
+Aiso
+in the affidavit are
+the
+reasons Rodriguez cited to the unnamed witness for why he withheld
+the lists from investigators: He considered it his property and should
+be compensated for it, and he feared
+the target of the federal investigation, Epstein, would make him disappear or otherwise harm him.
+Ocusan _spencer conde provict come
+3IE-MM-10800@224
+
+Jeffrey Epstein Pedophile Billionaire and His Sex Den - The Daily Beast
+
+THE DAILY
+BLOGS & STORIES
+BEAST
+The Billionaire Pedophile's Sex Den
+by Conchita Sarnoff
+BEAD THIS SKIP THAT
+July 22, 2010 | 11:46pm
+The Daily Beast reveals new details about the twisted sex life of
+Jeffrey Epstein and his penchant for underage girls. Conchita
+Sarnoff on his massages, sex toys, and questionable deals. Also:
+• Nude images of young girls were scattered around the house and the
+bathroom soap was shaped like sex organs
+• Staff trolled for fresh recruits to make sure Epstein had two or three
+massage appointments each day
+• The house manager has been sentenced to a longer prison term than
+Newscom
+Epstein-for trying to sell notes regarding massage appointments
+• Epstein gave $1 million to his friend Jean Luc Brunel when he was starting the modeling agency MCZ
+• According to a former bookkeeper, young girls were brought to the U.S. by MC2—often from Eastern
+Europe-then traveled on Epstein's private jets
+Jeffrey Epstein's loyal friends say that his prosecution was unduly harsh, rather than outrageously lenient. They insist
+that his sexual habits, although obsessive and unusual, were mostly legal and essentially harmless. As the police
+records attest, the girls brought to El Brillo Way were routinely told they could "say no" at any time during a massage
+as Epstein escalated contact in a step-by-step assault that was remarkably similar in every victim's statement: First
+she would be asked to remove her shirt, then her pants. He would attempt to fondle her buttocks and breasts as he
+masturbated, then bring out a large vibrator. There was sometimes digital penetration, and the more willing girls were
+lured into full-blown sexual relations with both Epstein and Nadia Marcinkova, who was referred to in press accounts
+and police reports as Epstein's live-in "sex slave."
+A former bookkeeper in the Miami office, who also arranged visas for girls
+traveling to the U.S., confirmed that MC2 girls became frequent guests on
+Epstein's private jets.
+It's true that some underage girls may have lied about their age, and some came to the house voluntarily several
+times-although, according to Florida statutes, none of that has any bearing on the criminality of the contact,
+particularly if the giri was 16 or younger. But what is particulariy disturbing about this case-judging by arrangements
+at the Palm Beach house...is that Epstein, a bilionaire hedge-fund manager, organized his life around this sexual
+compulsion in an open and methodical way that suggests he felt he was beyond the law.
+According to police who executed a search warrant, the house was
+• Conchita Sarnoff:
+Billionaire Pedophile Goes
+Free
+decorated with large, framed photos of nude young girls, and similar
+images were found stashed in an armoire and on the computers seized
+at the house (although palice found only bare cables where other
+computers had been). Some bathrooms were stocked with soap in the
+31EMM- 183888722025
+http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-07-22/jeffrey-epstein-pedophile-billi.. 7/23/2010
+
+Jeffrey Epstein Pedophile Billionaire and His Sex Den - The Daily Beast
+
+shape of sex organs, and various sex toys, such as a "twin torpedo" vibrator and creams and lubricants available at
+erotic specialty shops, were stowed near the massage tables set up in several rooms upstairs.
+Epstein also enlisted his staff in the predatory activity, and four—Sarah Kellen, Adriana Ross, Lesley Groff, and
+Marcinkova-figured in the FBI investigation. The Non Prosecution Agreement stipulated that they would not be
+charged. According to police reports and sworn statements in the civil suits, all four women, among their other duties,
+worked to ensure that an appointment book for twice- or thrice-daily "massages" was stocked with fresh recruits.
+Ghislaine Maxwell, daughter of the late Czechosiovakian-born press baron Robert Maxweli, who was for many years
+Epstein's live-in partner, also recruited young girls.
+Since his 13-month sentence for soliciting prostitution with a minor, Epstein has settled more than a dozen lawsuits
+brought by underage girls. Seven victims reached a last-minute deal last week, days before a scheduled trial; each
+received well over $t million—an amount that will hardly dent Epstein's $2 billion net worth.
+The victims told police they waited in the kitchen to be called upstairs for a massage, and the house chef often gave
+them a bite to eat. House manager Alfredo Rodriguez said in his sworn statement that a maid named Lupita, who was
+a devout Catholic, wept when she complained to him about cleaning up after the massage sessions, picking up soiled
+towels and putting away the sex toys. And she was upset that a photo of Epstein with the pope hung next to one of
+him with a young girl.
+Ironically, Rodriguez, who ran the house on El Brillo Way in 2004 and 2005, ended up being sentenced to more jail
+time than his boss as a result of the complex investigation into Epstein's activities. He was fired, he says, for
+inadvertently drawing police attention to one of the giris when she arrived at the house unannounced to collect money.
+He saw an unfamiliar "beater" in the driveway one evening and called 911. When he left Epstein's employ, Rodriguez
+took away some notes and emails about massage appointments as "protection" against his own prosecution, and
+failed to produce them during the Paim Beach Police Department's initial investigation.
+Unable to get work as a house manager elsewhere in South Florida, he says, Rodriguez later tried to sell this "golden
+nugget"-his term—for $50,000, to be used in the victims' civil suits. Unfortunately, he made the offer to an
+undercover cop, and was subsequently charged with "obstruction of official proceedings" for withholding information
+that could have advanced the criminal investigation of Epstein—which by that point had been settled in a plea deal.
+Rodriguez was sentenced to 18 months in federal prison (Epstein was allowed to serve 13 months in the Palm Beach
+county jait), and now awaits an additional sentence on Aug. 24 in federal court in Miami for transporting firearms,
+another deal he says he made to pay the bills after he lost his job.
+In a deposition given for the civil suits, Rodriguez testified that he was instructed to always have $2,000 in cash on
+hand, so that he could pay both the girls who gave massages and recruiters such as Haley Robson who brought them
+to the house. He also testified that Epstein made large contributions to the Palm Beach Police Department, and in
+return was given PBPD baseball hats to put on the dashboard of his various cars to avoid being stopped or ticketed by
+local police. Retired Police Chief Michael Reiter, in his own deposition, acknowledged that, in addition to earlier
+donations to the police department (which are fairly common in well-heeled Palm Beach), Epstein had recently given
+the department $100,000 for some sophisticated equipment. The police were still researching the purchase when
+Epstein came under suspicion, and Reiter ordered the money returned. (Guy Frostin, one of Epstein's local attorneys,
+toid police that Epstein also gave $100,000 to the Florida Ballet for massages, because he was "very passionate"
+about massages being "therapeutically and spiritually" beneficial. Yet victims told police they had no massage
+training.)
+Perhaps most disturbing, in terms of possible sex trafficking, was Epstein's relationship with Jean Luc Brunel, owner
+of the MCZ modeling agency. According to a complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
+Florida, an alleged victim said that Epstein, Maxwell, Brunel, Rodriguez, and Marcinkova "deliberately engaged in a
+pattern of racketeering that involved luring minor children through MCZ, mostly giris under the age of 17, to engage in
+sexual play for money." (Which would amount to trafficking.)
+Brunel is a 50-plus French playboy who was formerly part owner of Karin, a Paris-based modeling agency. He lives in
+New York and South Beach, Florida, and owns 85 percent of MCZ, which has offices in New York, Miami, and Tel
+03956-1221
+http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-07-22/jeffrey-epstein-pedophile-billi. 7/23/2010
+
+attica
+Jeffrey Epstein Pedophile Billionaire and His Sex Den - The Daily Beast
+
+Aviv. (The remaining 15 percent is owned by his partner, Jeff Fuller.) Brunel has been observed as a house guest at
+Epstein's Palm Beach home and may well have had contact with him also in New York, where Epstein owns a lavish
+home-the city's largest private residence-and in Paris, where Epstein keeps an apartment on elegant Ave. Foch.
+CBS reporter Craig Pyes, who investigated MC2 for a 60 Minutes broadcast several years ago, is quoted in Michael
+Gross' book about the modeling industry, Bad and Beautiful. Pyes told the author that Brunel "ranks among the
+sleaziest people in the fashion industry. We're talking about a conveyor belt, not a casting couch. Hundreds of girls
+were not only harassed but molested." Now The Daily Beast has leamed that Epstein had made a $1 million wire
+transfer to Brunel's offshore bank account in September 2004, just as he was setting up MC2. Whether this was a gift
+or a loan or a backdoor investment in the new venture is unknown. A French citizen who managed to avoid giving
+evidence in the Epstein investigation, Brunel declined to comment on any of this, as does Fuller. Asked in April of
+Brunel's activities, Epstein said "I'm 100 percent convinced that he doesn't traffic chitdren." (Brunel has never been
+charged.)
+An American fashion designer who booked her girls through MC2 says they were very young and very beautiful; many
+were from Eastern Europe and spoke little English. A former bookkeeper in the agency's Miami office, who also
+arranged visas for girls traveling to the U.S., confirmed that MC2 girls became frequent guests on Epstein's private
+jets.
+Pilot logs obtained in the civil suits show that some of the named plaintiffs were on the flight manifests. Other times,
+the pilot would just list the other passengers plus "female."
+Read Conchita Sarnoff's original report on Epstein.
+Conchita Samoff has developed multimedia communication programs for Fortune 500 companies and has produced
+three current events debate television programs, The Americas Forum, From Beirut to Kabul, and a segment for The
+Oppenheimer Report. She is a contributor to The Huffington Post and is writing a book about child trafficking in
+America.
+Get a head start with the Morning Scoop email. It's your Cheat Sheet with must reads from across the Web. Get it.
+For inquiries, please contact The Daily Beast at editorial@thedailybeast.com.
+URL: http://www.theclailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-07-22/jeffrey-epstein-pedophile-billionaire-and-his-sex-den/p/
+http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-07-22/jeffrey-epstein-pedophile-bill.... 12313056-1222
+
+Jeffrey Epstein, Billionaire Padophile, Goes Free - The Daily Beast
+
+THE DANLY.
+BLOGS & STORIES
+BEAST
+Billionaire Pedophile Goes Free
+by Conchita Sarnoff
+READ THIS SKIP THAT
+July 20, 2010 | 11:05pm
+Hedge fund mogul Jeffrey Epstein became a free man Wednesday, five years after he was first
+ccused of sexually abusing underage girls. After months of reporting, The Daily Beast'
+onchita Sarnoff reveals exclusive details of the investigation and the legal wrangling that save
+him from a long prison term. She reports:
+• Palm Beach's police chief objected to Epstein's "special treatment" and gave The Daily Beast an
+exclusive look at his nine-hour deposition about the investigation.
+• Earlier versions of the U.S attorney's charges, including a sealed 53-page indictment, could have
+landed Epstein in prison for 20 years.
+• Victims alleged that Epstein molested underage girls from South America, Europe, and the former
+Soviet republics, including three 12-year-old girls brought over from France as a birthday gift.
+• The victims also alleged trips out of state and abroad on Epstein's private jets, which would be
+evidence of sex trafficking—a much more serious federal crime than the state charges Epstein was
+convicted of.
+• Epstein's attorneys investigated members of the Palm Beach Police Department, while others ordered
+private investigators to follow and intimidate the victims' families; one even posed as a police officer.
+• Then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales told The Daily Beast that he "would have instructed the
+Justice Department to pursue justice without making a political mess."
+Film director Roman Polanski is not the only convicted pedophile to walk free this month and return to a life of
+privilege. On Wednesday, hedge fund manager Jeffrey Epstein completes his one-year house arrest in Palm Beach,
+which has been even less arduous than Polanski's time at a Swiss ski chalet.
+During Epstein's term of "house arrest," he made several trips each month to his New York home and his private
+Caribbean island. In the earlier stage of his sentence for soliciting prostitution with a minor—13 months in the Palm
+Beach Stockade—-he was allowed out to his office each day. Meanwhile, Epstein has settled more than a dozen
+lawsuits brought by the underage giris who were recruited to perform "massages" at his Paim Beach mansion. Seven
+victims reached a last-minute deal last week, days before a scheduled trial; each received well over $1 million—an
+amount that will hardiy dent Epstein's $2 billion net worth.
+With that, the known victims of Epstein's sexual compulsion have been officially silenced, and the case against him is
+closed unless new ones come forward. According to banking sources, he has been moving assets out of the U.S. and
+may well follow Polanski into a luxurious exile.
+Watch Jeffrey Epstein Storm Out of a Deposition When Asked About His Penis
+3IE-mn- 108083856-122376
+http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-07-20/jeffrey-epstein-billionaire-ped.. 7/23/2010
+
+---
+" Jeffrey Epstein, Billionaire Pedophile, Goes Free - The Daily Beast
+
+But the question remains: Did Epstein's wealth and social connections—former President Bill Clinton; Prince Andrew;
+former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak; New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson; and former Treasury Secretary Larry
+Summers were just a few of the prominent passengers on his private jets—-aliow him to receive only a slap on the
+wrist for crimes that carry a mandatory 20-year sentence? Was he able, with his limitless assets and heavy-hitting
+lawyers—Alan Dershowitz, Gerald Lefcourt, Roy Black, Kenneth Starr, Guy Lewis, and Martin Weinberger among
+them—to escape equal justice?
+Michael Reiter, the former Palm Beach police chief, certainly thinks so. He gave The Daily Beast exclusive access to
+the transcript of his nine-hour deposition for the victims' civil suits, in which he explained how the case against Epstein
+was minimized by the State Attorney's Office, then bargained down by the U.S. Department of Justice, all in an
+atmosphere of hardball legal tactics and social pressures so intense that Reiter became estranged from several
+colleagues. At the time, Reiter, who retired in 2009 and now runs his own security firm, objected both to Epstein's plea
+agreement and to the flexible terms of his incarceration in the county jail rather than state prison. Asked during the
+deposition whether he thought Epstein received special treatment, he answered "yes."
+In March 2005, Reiter's department, acting on a complaint from the Florida parents of a 14-year-old girl, launched an
+investigation that would eventually uncover a pattern of predatory behavior stretching back years and spanning
+several continents, knowingly enabled by Epstein's associates and employees. Two or three times a day, whenever
+Epstein was in Palm Beach, a teenage girl would be brought to the mansion on El Brillo Way. ("The younger the
+better," he instructed Haley Robson, a local teenager who was paid to bring other girls to the house, and who
+declared, on a police tape, that she was "like a Heidi Fleiss," the infamous California madam.) Advised that she would
+be giving a "massage," the girl was then pressured to remove her clothes, submit to fondling and a large vibrator, and
+sometimes lured into more invasive sexual contact. Each girl was paid $200 or more, depending on how far things
+went, by house manager Alfredo Rodriguez, who was instructed always to have $2,000 cash on hand.
+The Palm Beach Police Department identified 17 local girls who had contact with Epstein before the age of consent;
+the youngest was 14, and many were younger than 16. And that was just at one of Epstein's many homes around the
+world—he also owns property in New York, Santa Fe, Paris, London, and the Caribbean. Subsequent investigation by
+the FBI, reaching as far back as 2001, indentified roughly 40 victims, not counting Nadia Marcinkova, whom Epstein
+referred to as his "Yugoslavian sex slave* because he had imported her from the Balkans at age 14. Now 24,
+http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-07-20/jeffrey-epstein-billionaire-ped.. 712312056-1224
+
+• Jeffrey Epstein, Billionaire Pedophile, Goes Free - The Daily Beast
+
+Marcinkova became a member of the household and is alleged to have participated in the sexual contact with
+underage girls.
+Epstein quickly got wind of the investigation, and progress on the case got messy very quickly. He hired a squad of
+lawyers and private investigators and dispatched influential friends to pressure the police into backing off. Instead,
+local detectives pressed on and brought the matter to the attention of the FBI. The detectives asked their federal
+colleagues whether the fact that some victims appeared to have traveled out of state on Epstein's planes--plus the
+use of interstate phone service to arrange assignations—might be violations of the federal 2000 Trafficking Victims
+Protection Act, which carries a minimum sentence of 20 years. (Florida enacted the federal TVPA in 2002.)
+So when State Attorney Barry Krischer, who also ran Florida's Crimes Against Children Unit, proved reluctant to
+mount a vigorous prosecution of Epstein, saying the local victims were not credible witnesses, Chief Reiter wrote the
+attorney a letter complaining of the state's "highly unusual" conduct and asking him to remove himself from the case.
+He did not, and the evidence his office presented to a state grand jury produced only a single count of soliciting
+prostitution. (Krischer has since retired and would not comment for this articie.) The day after that indictment was
+returned, Reiter was relieved to have the FBI step in and take over the investigation.
+The details that eventually emerged were often shocking and occasionaliy bizarre. For Epstein's birthday one year,
+according to allegations in a civil suit, he was presented with three 12-year-old girls from France, who were molested
+then flown back to Europe the next day. These same civil complaints allege that young girls from South America,
+Europe, and the former Soviet republics, few of whom spoke English, were recruited for Esptein's sexual pleasure.
+According to a former bookkeeper, a number of the girls worked for MC2, the modeling agency owned by Jean Luc
+Brunel, a longtime acquaintance and frequent guest of Epstein's. Brunel received $1 million from the billionaire around
+the time he started the agency.
+The non-prosecution agreement executed between Epstein and the Department of Justice states that Epstein and four
+members of his staff were investigated for "knowingly, in affecting interstate and foreign commerce, recruiting enticing
+and obtaining by any means a person, knowing that person has not yet obtained the age of 18 years and would be
+caused to engage in commercial sex act"—that is, child sex trafficking. Yet the agreement allowed Epstein to plead
+guilty to only two lower-level state crimes, soliciting prostitution and soliciting a minor child for prostitution.
+Although the police investigation was officially closed, Chief Reiter tried to stay abreast of the federal case against
+Epstein. He was particularly concerned that Epstein be registered as a sex offender, which was part of the final deal,
+and that a fund be set up to compensate his victims—which was not, although Epstein agreed to bankroll their civil
+lawsuits. Attorney Dershowitz says Epstein's agreement to pay attorney fees for the victims and agree to civil damage
+claims—without admitting guilt—amounted to "extortion under threat of criminal prosecution."
+But exactly which crimes did the Department of Justice threaten to prosecute? The Daily Beast has learned that there
+were several earlier versions of the U.S Attorney's charges, including a 53-page indictment that, had he been
+convicted, could have landed Epstein in prison for 20 years. Brad Edwards, aftorney for seven of the victims, confirms
+the existence of an earlier draft of the non-prosecution agreement, officially under seal, in which it appears that
+Epstein "committed, at some point, to a 10-year federal sentence." But in the end Epstein's legal team refused that
+deal and threatened to proceed to trial. And that's where the question of whether the case was "winnable" before a
+jury again came into play, according to a source in the U.S Attorney's Office, which shared the state attorney's view
+that the prosecution was far from a slam dunk.
+For one, it was clear from the start that Epstein would spare no legal expense and that his team of veteran lawyers,
+whose cases ranged from O.J. Simpson to the investigation of Clinton's relationship with an intern, would play rough.
+When the Palm Beach police started to identify victims, according to Detective Joe Recarey's report, Dershowitz
+began sending the detective Facebook and MySpace posts to demonstrate that some of these girls were no angels.
+Reiter's deposition also states that he heard from local private investigators that Dershowitz had launched background
+checks on both the police chief and Det. Recarey. Dershowitz denies all of that. According to Reiter, both he and
+Recarey also became aware that they were under surveillance for several months, without knowing who ordered it.
+And the Florida victims began to complain that they and family members were being followed and intimidated by
+03956-1225
+http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-07-20/jeffrey-epstein-billionaire-ped. 7/23/2010
+
+• • Jeffrey Epstein, Billionaire Pedophile, Goes Free - The Daily Beast
+
+private investigators who were then linked to local attorneys in Epstein's employ. in one reported instance, the private
+investigator claimed to be a police officer, and Reiter considered filing witness-tampering charges.
+The credibility of the victims was also an issue; they had never complained of their treatment by Epstein until they
+were contacted by police, and they may have voluntarily returned to the Palm Beach mansion several times. Many of
+the girls came from disadvantaged backgrounds or broken homes, and they were susceptible to Epstein's cash,
+intimidation, and charm. Those who were 16 when they went to El Brillo Way would have been in their 20s by the time
+they took the stand, and Epstein's investigators had dredged up every instance of bad behavior in their pasts.
+According to an exchange in the Reiter deposition, a few of the victims had worked in West Palm Beach at massage
+parlors known as "jack shacks." Each new compromising detail was immediately forwarded to the State Attorney's
+Office, where staff met frequently with Epstein's lawyers.
+The Florida statutes are clear: Any person older than 24 who engages in sexual contact with someone under the age
+of 18 commits a felony of the second degree. The victim's prior sexual conduct is not relevant; ignorance of her age is
+no defense. She needn't resist physically to cast doubt on the issue of "consent." For a child under 16, even lewd
+behavior short of touching is a felony of the second degree. But convincing a jury that a sexual encounter is a heinous
+crime is difficult if the victim can be made to appear willing and unharmed, not to mention vulgar and mercenary. It
+wasn't hard to imagine some of the victims quickly being discredited in court by Epstein's crack legal team, who
+repeatedly noted that the age of consent is lower in many other states.
+But that doesn't quite explain why the Department of Justice would forgo the child-trafficking charges, which pertain
+regardless of a girl's attitude or character. Epstein's final sentence is so out of line with the statutory guidelines for that
+crime that it appears the department may have been influenced by the existence of his many powerful friends and
+attorneys. A highly intelligent man who once taught math at the Dalton School in New York without a bachelor's
+degree, Epstein has been a serious and respected player in the highest reaches of politics and philanthropy. He has
+made substantial contributions to political candidates, served on the Council on Foreign Relations, and donated $30
+million to Harvard University.
+Moreover, many of his high-powered acquaintances availed themselves of Epstein's private jets, for which the pilot
+logs, obtained by discovery in the civil suits, sometimes showed that bold-face names were on the same flights as
+underage girls. A high-profile trial threatened to splash mud over all sorts of big players, just as both Gov. Richardson
+and Bill Clinton's wife were running for president. Also, a hedge fund prosecution in which Epstein offered to give
+evidence was heating up. Alberto Gonzales, who was U.S. attorney general throughout most of the Epstein
+investigation and resigned just before the non-prosecution agreement was signed, told The Daily Beast that he "would
+have instructed the Justice Department to pursue justice without making a political mess." But that may have been an
+impossible mandate, given the players involved.
+Instead, said attorney Brad Edwards, "Epstein committed crimes that should have jailed him for most of his life... he
+was jailed for only a few months." And this week he walks through his door a free man.
+Conchita Samoff has developed multimedia communication programs for Fortune 500 companies and has produced
+three current events debate television programs, The Americas Forum, From Beirut to Kabul, and a segment for The
+Oppenheimer Report. She is a contributor to The Huffington Post and is writing a book about child trafficking in
+America.
+Get a head start with the Morning Scoop email. It's your Cheat Sheet with must reads from across the Web. Get it.
+For inquiries, please contact The Daily Beast at editorial@thedailybeast.com.
+URL: http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-07-20/jeffrey-epstein-billionaire-pedophile-goes-free/p/
+03956-1226
+http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-07-20/jeffrey-epstein-billionaire-ped.. 7/23/2010
+
+LAPR-16-2010
+13:13
+FBI ICRC WINCHESTER VA
+Fax
+To
+Fax: 5661-650-6951
+Phone:
+Ro: FOlA: Request
+• Urgent:
+IX For Raviow
+From:
+Pages:
+Irate:
+CC:
+• Pleaso Comment
+• Comments:
+---..
+...."
+P. 001
+Federal Bureau of
+Investigation
+170 Marcel Drive
+Winchester, VA 22602
+FAX-(540)868 49941
+:
+56 - 2
+670 - 2
+7/16/2010
+• Please Roply
+• Pleasa Rocyclo
+BIE-MM-10 803958-122227
+
+3IE-mm-108067233
+SAC SIG
+03956-1250
+
+To: Miami
+From: Miami
+PB-2/PBCRA
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+Date: 04/07/2011
+Attn: Third Party Draft
+66-1,-2
+b7C -1,
+(Pending)
+WSTA-CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: EC requesting reimbursement from case funds for
+purchase of supplies
+Enclosure(s): Original receipt, copy of receipt, and FD-759
+Details: After the close of regular business hours on Friday,
+March 11, 2011, it was discovered that the color UNET printer was
+out of black ink and was not functional. SA
+• inquired with
+SSA L
+Jas to replacement cartridges. While there were
+several
+color replacement cartridges, no black cartridges were
+found in the squad supply area.
+SAS I
+b6 -2
+b3 - 1
+56-2, -3
+b7C -2,
+-3
+Printed documents and photographs from the
+Unet machines were needed ior use
+• in the interview. Due to the
+exigent travel requirements and with the situation occurring over
+the
+weekend, a replacement cartridge was purchased from Staples.
+SAC
+purchased one (1)
+Hewlett Packard Model Q6000A black
+toner cartridge for use in
+the UNET unclassified printer on March
+13, 2011. Reimbursement in the
+amount of
+is requested.
+b7E -9
+S: \DRAFTS\PB2
+097cjp.01.ec
+b6 - 2
+670 - 2
+3le-mm-108062-2
+93956,1260
+
+FD-794
+Revised
+10-11-2005
+i. "
+PAYMENT REQUEST
+Request Type:
+r Advance
+& Expense
+Payment Type:
+6 Commercial
+r Confidential
+DRAFT TYPE
+Forfeiture or Drug Related?:
+Catalog:
+Г res
+cW
+IF NO
+INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE
+Official Bureau Name: (Last, First, Middle)
+Social Security Number!
+Division:
+MM
+Section:
+PBCRA
+Unit:
+Telephone Number:
+_ PB-2
+INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE
+Date of Request:
+04/07/2011
+File Number:
+/31E-MM-108062
+b3 -1
+_b6 -2,
+-3
+b7c -2, -3
+Payee Name:
+Social Security or Taxpayer ID Number:
+Justification:
+Printer toper cartridge needed for use in case preparation immediately preceding travel tol
+V2RI
+DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT
+To be completed by Finance Only
+Catalog:
+Item Number:
+
+Description:
+See attached EC
+Amounti
+Total:
+APPROVAL
+Signature
+b7E
+-9
+04/37/201156-3
+7/14/21
+b7C
+719-11
+Supervisor:
+SAC / ASAC / AO / SAS:
+Supply Technician:
+Draft Approval Officer:
+Procurement Authority:
+AMIrn 108062
+34000
+Signature of Cashier:
+OBLIGATION PROCESSING
+
+•Group Number:
+A2
+0L761:50
+Document Number:
+EXPENSE PROCESSING
+Mmm! 110/493 umber.
+[Signature of Cashier:
+Follow Up Dat
+20171
+
+Date 4-20-14
+FD-794 (Revised 10-11-2005)-
+
+THIRD PARTY
+¿ Received
+*APR 15 2011
+DRAFT
+3le-mm 10806830361262
+
+• Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail On... Page 1 of 17
+Click here to print
+Mail Online
+Prince Andrew and the 17-year-old girl his sex
+offender friend flew to Britain to meet him
+By Sharon Churcher
+Last updated at 1:02 PM on 2nd March 2011
+• Virginia Roberts reveals she is 'Jane Doe 102' in Jeffrey Epstein case
+• Mother-of-three spent four years as millionaire's personal masseuse
+• She describes being flown across world to meet Prince Andrew
+• Epstein trained her 'as a prostitute for him and his friends'
+As the UK's special representative for international trade, the Duke of York holds an important position,
+requiring sound judgement and widespread respect.
+But those qualities have been thrown into question since photographs of Prince Andrew with his
+billionaire financier friend Jeffrey Epstein, a convicted child-sex offender who was jailed for 18 months for
+soliciting underage prostitutes, appeared last weekend.
+Today, however, even more serious doubts are cast on his suitability after a woman at the centre of the
+Epstein case revealed to The Mail on Sunday that she had, as a 17-year-old employed by Epstein, been
+flown across the world to be introduced to the Prince.
+31E-MM-108062-246
+03956-1272
+http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361039/Prince-Andrew-girl-17-sex-offender-frie. 3/16/2011
+
+• Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail On... Page 2 of 17
+in t.,
+viti . i
+First meeting: Prince Andrew puts his arms around 17-year-old Virginia, centre
+On one of those occasions Virginia Roberts was subsequently paid $15,000 (£9,400). Her shocking
+account of her four years as Epstein's personal masseuse is supported by court documents, an
+03956-1273
+http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361039/Prince-Andrew-girl-17-sex-offender-frie.. 3/16/2011
+
+* Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail On... Page 3 of 17
+eyewitness, photographs and flight details of Epstein's private jets.
+One picture, said to have been taken by Epstein during Andrew's first encounter with the girl in March
+2001 and published today by The Mail on Sunday, shows the Prince with his arm around her waist.
+This is not the first time the Duke of York's judgment and choice of associates have been questioned. He
+appears to relish the company of super-rich oil billionaires from the Middle East, North Africa and the
+former Soviet Union.
+The peculiar sale of his former marital home to a Kazakh businessman for £15 million after it had
+languished unsold for five years at £12 million has never been satisfactorily explained.
+In the recent leak of American diplomatic cables it was revealed that he had criticised an official
+corruption investigation into the huge Al-Yamamah arms deal between Britain and Saudi Arabia, while he
+is also said to be close to Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, son of the beleaguered Libyan president, and may have
+had a role in the early release of Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset Al Megrahi.
+While on the streets, I slept with men for money. I
+was a paedophile's dream
+But it is Andrew's friendship with Epstein, whom he has known since at least 2000, and with Epstein's
+confidante Ghislaine Maxwell, daughter of the late disgraced newspaper baron Robert Maxwell, that
+gives most concern.
+He was first seen with the pair on holiday in Thailand, and was pictured cavorting with Ghislaine at a
+Halloween fetishthemed party in Manhattan.
+The photograph that appeared last weekend shows the prince strolling through Central Park with 58-
+year-old Epstein. Andrew was said to have spent four days at his New York mansion in December, when
+he was joined by other distinguished guests, including Woody Allen, at a dinner.
+It is by no means the first New York soiree Andrew has attended as Epstein's guest.
+A lengthy profile of the financier in Vanity Fair magazine some years ago reported that Andrew was a
+guest at a cocktail party thrown by Epstein and Maxwell packed with young Russian models. 'Some
+guests were horrified,' said the article's author, Vicky Ward.
+It should not be forgotten that Epstein is a registered sex offender after recently completing his sentence
+for offences relating to child prostitution.
+However, he avoided trial on more serious charges that carried a potential life sentence. And no one
+reading The Mail on Sunday's interview with the woman who was prepared to testify against him can be
+in any doubt of the seriousness of the charges.
+Epstein, a Wall Street money manager who once counted Bill Clinton and Donald Trump among his
+friends, became the subject of an undercover investigation in 2005 after the stepmother of a 14-year old
+girl claimed she was paid $200 (£125) to give him an 'erotic massage'.
+The subsequent FBI probe uncovered at least 20 girls levelling sexual allegations against him.
+Eventually, Epstein struck a 'plea bargain' with prosecutors - a practice not permitted under British law -
+under which he was allowed to plead guilty to two relatively minor charges.
+03956-1274
+http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361039/Prince-Andrew-girl-17-sex-offender-frie.. 3/16/2011
+
+• Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail On... Page 4 of 17
+Police claim that his donations to politicians and his 'dream team' of influential lawyers deterred
+prosecutors from bringing more serious charges of sex-trafficking. The deal certainly kept the names of a
+lot of Epstein's famous friends out of an embarrassing court case.
+However, an unusual part of the agreement was that Epstein's alleged victims were allowed to bring civil
+proceedings against him.
+He has so far made 17 out-of-court settlements, and some cases are ongoing. One of these girls was to
+have been a key witness for the prosecution had the case gone to trial. She was just 15 years old when
+she was drawn into Epstein's exploitative world in 1998.
+In her civil writ against him, under the pseudonym Jane Doe 102' she alleged that her duties included
+being 'sexually exploited by Epstein's adult male peers including royalty'.
+03956-1275
+http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361039/Prince-Andrew-girl-17-sex-offender-frie.. 3/16/2011
+
+. Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail On... Page 5 of 17
+i'
+A new life: Virgina, now a mother-of-three, in Australia
+Now, horrified by the evidence of Epstein and Andrew enjoying each other's company in New York, Jane
+http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361039/Prince-Andrew-girl-17-sex-offender-fri.. 318200-1276
+
+„ Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail On... Page 6 of 17
+Doe 102 has agreed to waive her anonymity and tell for the first time her deeply disturbing story.
+Her real name is Virginia Roberts and she now lives in Australia, where she is a happily married mother
+of three.
+Over the course of a week during which she spoke at length to The Mail on Sunday, she appeared
+sometimes vulnerable, and sometimes steely, but always quietly resolute and consistent.
+Revisiting events from a past that she had hoped she had left behind, Virginia occasionally buried her
+face in her hands.
+Some recollections - and, for reasons of taste, not all the details can be included here - caused her to
+flush with shame. 'I'm telling you things that even my husband didn't know, she said.
+Virginia, who has undergone counselling to try to come to terms with her past, is honest about her
+initiation into Epstein's depraved world.
+She was a troubled teenager, whose slender figure, delicate complexion, hesitant voice and soulful blue
+eyes made her look young for her years.
+Born in Sacramento, California, in August 1983, Virginia spent her early years on a small ranch on the
+West Coast of America.
+This seemingly idyllic childhood ended when she was sexually molested by a man close to her family.
+The fallout from that led to her parents temporarily splitting up. Blaming herself, Virginia began to get into
+trouble Aged 11, she was sent to live with an aunt but repeatedly ran away.
+Living on the streets, she was beaten up and slept with at least two older men in return for food. I was a
+paedophile's dream,' she says.
+Three years later, she was reunited with her family and started a new life with her father who had moved
+to Palm Beach,
+Florida, where he was maintenance manager at Donald Trump's country club, Mar-a-Lago.
+Virginia got a part-time job as a changing room assistant -which is where, soon after her 15th birthday,
+she met Ghislaine Maxwell, who invited her to work as Epstein's personal masseuse.
+*I was wearing my uniform - a white miniskirt and a skin-tight white polo top - when I was approached by
+Ghislaine, Virginia says.
+"I told her 1 wanted to become a masseuse and she said she worked for a very wealthy gentleman who
+was looking for a travelling masseuse.
+I'd get training and be paid well. 'Virginia's father gave his blessing, believing his daughter was being
+handed the opportunity to learn a skill and to work for a wealthy and respectable employer.
+He drove her to Epstein's pink mansion on the Palm Beach waterfront - he also owns a nine-storey home
+in New York, the city's biggest private residence; a 7,500-acre ranch called 'Zorra' in New Mexico and
+Little Saint James, a private 70- acre atoll in the US Virgin Islands.
+http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361039/Prince-Andrew-girl-17-sex-offender-frie... 3010200-1277
+
+_ Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail On... Page 7 of 17
+Virginia says: 'Ghislaine said I was to start immediately and that someone would drive me home.
+My father left and I was told to go upstairs.' She was led by another woman through Epstein's bedroom
+into a massage room where he lay face down naked on a table.
+He started to interviewed Virginia. This was unconventional, but Virginia had no suspicions. Presumably,
+she thought, this was how the wealthy conducted their business.
+Epstein elicited the information that Virginia had been a runaway, and was no longer a virgin.
+Virginia was then told to start massaging Epstein, under the instructions of the woman who had shown
+her in. The massage quickly developed into a sexual encounter.
+Virginia was uncomfortable, but reluctant to deny such important people. 'My face was red with
+embarrassment,' she says. 'But I felt under immense pressure to please them.
+The whole time it was going on, they were promising me the world, that I'd travel with Jeffrey on his
+private jet and have a weil-paid profession.' Afterwards, she was given two $100 bills and told to return
+the next day.
+That was the beginning of the four years she spent with Epstein.
+For three of those years, she was under Florida's age of consent, which is 18.
+:%
+$
+Troubled teenager: Virginia on the billionaire's Zorro ranch in New Mexico in 2001
+...
+Virginia was fascinated by his life story: the son of a humble New York City parks worker, he was a
+teacher before becoming a Wall Street broker and friends with the upper echelons of the political,
+financial and academic establishment.
+As a confused teenager, Virginia easily fell into the practice of sexually gratifying him for money.
+03956-1278
+http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361039/Prince-Andrew-giri-17-sex-offender-frie...
+
+• Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail On... Page 8 of 17
+He guaranteed her a minimum of $200 each time she gave him what he called an 'erotic massage.'
+Virginia said: "I would always receive the money immediately. He would give me the cash from a wad he
+carried in a black duffel bag or an assistant paid me.
+'And, because of the way Epstein had warped her sensibilities, every time she took the cash, Virginia felt
+even more indebted to him. Secretly, he was also preparing her for an even more disturbing role.
+Epstein had trained me to do whatever men wanted. I
+told myself I was special
+'Basically, 1 was training to be a prostitute for him and his friends who shared his interest in young girls,'
+she says: 'After about two years, he started to ask me to "entertain" his friends.'
+it started when Epstein called Virginia at the Palm Beach apartment he had rented for her.
+She recalls: 'He said, "I've got a good friend and I need you to fly to the island to
+entertain him, massage him and make him feel how you make me feel."
+He didn't spell out what I had to do. He didn't have to. 'He'd trained me to do whatever a man wanted. I
+was shocked but I told myself he was sharing me around because he trusted me and I was special.
+I was worried, but 1 would do anything to keep Jeffrey happy and to keep my place as his number one
+girl.
+He would keep telling me how lucky I was with the life I was leading and the money I was making. It was
+easy to fall into his grasp.
+'The way it usually worked was I'd be sent to meet a man on the private island Jeffrey owned in the
+Caribbean, or at his ranch in New Mexico, which was really isolated.' She was 'given' to men ranging in
+age from their 40s to their 60s.
+They included a well-known businessman (whose pregnant wife was asleep in the next room), a worldrenowned scientist, a respected liberal politician and a foreign head of state.
+None appeared to think the arrangement was unusual. Virginia says there were many other girls in
+Epstein's circle and that she was paid extra money to help recruit them.
+03956-1279
+http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361039/Prince-Andrew-girl-17-sex-offender-frie. 3/16/2011
+
+Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail On... Page 9 of 17
+Counselling: Virginia at her mother's home at Palm Beach in 1998
+They would lounge around the Palm Beach house, the ranch or the island, nude or topless,' she says.
+'But I was one of the very few he trusted as "special" and chosen to "entertain" his friends.'
+Virginia took the sedative Xanax to detach herself from sordid reality. 'It was an escape drug,' she says.
+'It made me calm and helped me forget about what I had to do. I was up to eight pills a day.'
+Epstein had no objection to Virginia's use of prescription drugs, no doubt recognising that they made her
+even more malleable. 'I didn't want to go back to the life l'd had before' she says.
+'That made me totally obedient.' Despite the fact that Epstein was, essentially, her pimp, this life now
+seemed normal to Virginia. 'I felt that he and Ghislaine really cared for me,' she said.
+'We'd do family things, like watch Sex And The City and eat popcorn. 'A lot of it was very glamorous. I
+met famous friends of his such as Al Gore and Heidi Klum and Naomi Campbell. He introduced me as his
+"travelling masseuse."
+Some people mistook me for his daughter. 'When we were in New York or Palm Beach, Ghislaine and I
+would shop all day.
+Jeffrey bought me jewellery - diamonds were his favourite - and wonderful furniture. He was paying me
+very well because I'd give him sex whenever he wanted it.'
+She was, she says, delighted when Epstein invited her to accompany him on a six-week trip in 2001.
+'He said we'd be going to Europe and North Africa to meet architects and interior decorators because he
+http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361039/Prince-Andrew-girl-17-sex-offender-frie.. 3/16/201 7280
+
+- Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail... Page 10 of 17
+wanted to redo his New Mexico house.
+I threw my arms around him and gave him a peck on the cheek.' They flew to Paris, then Spain, then
+Tangier.
+Finally, they went to London. 'After we landed, we drove straight to Ghislaine's house,' says Virginia. "I
+was given a small upstairs bedroom. The following morning, Ghislaine came in.
+She was chirpy and jumped on the bed saying, "Get up, sleepyhead. You've got a big day. We've got to
+go shopping. You need a dress as you're going to dance with a Prince tonight."
+'She said I needed to be "smiley" and bubbly because he was the Queen's son.
+Ghislaine and I went to Burberry, where she bought me a £5,000 bag, and to a few other designer stores
+where we bought a couple of dresses, a pair of embroidered jeans and a pink singlet, perfume and makeup.
+We got back to Ghislaine's house at around 4pm and 1 ran straight upstairs to shower and dress.
+When I went downstairs, Ghislaine and Jeffrey were in the lounge. There was a knock at the door.
+Ghislaine led Andrew in and we kissed each other on the cheek. 'Ghislaine served tea from a porcelain
+pot and biscuits. She knew Sarah Ferguson and they talked fondly about Andrew's daughters.
+Then Ghislaine asked Andrew how old he thought 1 was and he guessed 17 and they all laughed.
+Ghislaine made a joke that I was getting too old for Jeffrey.
+She said,
+"He'll soon have to trade her in." It was widely known that he liked young girls' The four of
+them went out to dinner and on to Tramp nightclub where, she says, Andrew danced with her.
+'After about an hour-and-a-half, we drove back to Ghislaine's.
+All of us went upstairs and I asked Jeffrey to snap a picture of me with the Prince. I wanted something to
+show my Mom. Ghislaine and Jeffrey left us after that, and later Andrew left.
+'In the morning, Ghislaine said, "You did well. He had fun". We flew straight back to the States.' The Mail
+on Sunday has confirmed that the tycoon's jet flew to Paris on March 6, 2001, continuing to Granada,
+Tangier and London, before returning to New York.
+On the last leg of the trip, Virginia was paid about $15,000 (£9,400) by Epstein. 'It was amazing money,
+more than l'd ever made on a trip with him before.
+He didn't say there was any special reason, but | felt like l'd done everything he wanted. He was very
+pleased.'
+I took eight pills a day to help me forget what I had
+to do. It made me calm.
+There is no suggestion that there was any sexual contact between Virginia and Andrew, or that Andrew
+knew that Epstein paid her to have sex with his friends.
+However, the Prince must have been aware of Epstein's conviction when he stayed with him in New York
+in December.
+http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361039/Prince-Andrew-girl-17-sex-offender-frie... 303206-1281
+
+Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail... Page 11 of 17
+Virginia says she met Andrew for a second time around Easter 2001 at Epstein's Manhattan mansion.
+'When I got to the mansion, I was told, "Get ready. You are meeting someone in the office" - which is
+what they called the library. Andrew was sitting there in a big leather armchair.
+Ghislaine had just given him a present, a big toy that was his Spitting Image puppet. 'He was smiling earto-ear. He looked like a kid whose parents were taking him to Disney World.
+A beautiful girl called Johanna Sjoberg who worked for Jeffrey was sitting on Andrew's knee. Ghislaine
+guided me over to Andrew and I think he recognised me, though I don't know if he remembered my
+name.
+Organiser: Ghislaine Maxwell looks on as Andrew put his arm around Virginia. Robert
+Maxwell's daughter invited her to work as Epstein's personal masseuse soon after her
+15th birthday
+We kissed on the cheek and Ghislaine placed me on his other knee! Johanna spoke to The Mail on
+Sunday three years ago about this incident, which took place when she was 21.
+http://ww.dailymail.co.uk/news/aticle-1361039/Prince-Andrew-girl-17-sex-offender-fi. 3002061282
+
+- Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail... Page 12 of 17
+She said: 'Ghislaine put the puppet's hand on Virginia's breast, then Andrew put his hand on my breast. It
+was a great joke. Everybody laughed.' After this, Virginia was paid, by Epstein, around $400 (£250):
+She met Andrew for the third and final time on Epstein's Caribbean island, Little Saint James. Virginia
+was never under the British legal age of consent when she met Andrew. She was 17 during the first two
+encounters and 18 at the third.
+Conviction: Jeffrey Epstein
+By now, however, Epstein, had started to hint that she was getting 'too old' for him.
+But during one trip to the island, Epstein and Ghislaine made their most astonishing proposition, and one
+which repulsed her. They said Jeffrey wanted me to have his child,' she says.
+They said I was part of their family and I was beautiful, young, loyal and nurturing and would be a great
+mother.
+They said I would have to sign a contract relinquishing rights to the child and consenting to Jeffrey having
+as many relationships as he liked. In return I would have my own mansion in Palm Beach and a large
+http://wwww.dailymail.co.uk/news/aticle-1361039/Prince-Andrew-girtl-17-sex-offender-fie... 316206-1283
+
+• *
+_ Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail... Page 13 of 17
+monthly payment, a percentage of his income.'
+This, finally, was a wake-up call to Virginia and she began to see the way in which she had been
+groomed.
+'It was a smack in the face,' she says. 'I finally realised this wasn't ever going to be a real relationship but
+I knew if I refused, I'd be thrown back on the streets. So I said, "I'm too young. I want to get my massage
+credentials, then maybe we'll do it":
+The tycoon took her at her word and, for her 19th birthday in August 2002, flew her to Thailand where he
+enrolled her in a massage course.
+Shortly after arriving there, she met an Australian martial arts expert called Robert. They fell in love and,
+just ten days later, married in a Buddhist ceremony.
+I called Jeffrey and told him I'd fallen madly in love,' Virginia says. 'I was hoping he'd be delighted. But
+he said, "Have a nice life," and hung up on me.' The couple now have two sons, aged five and four, and a
+daughter who recently turned one.
+'The first few months after I married Robert were the worst,' she says. 'I couldn't bring myself to tell him
+much. No man wants to know his wife has been traded out.
+'I felt very alone. I was having panic attacks and seeing a psychiatrist and was on anti-depressants.
+'Virginia was beginning to put her Epstein days behind her when, three years ago, she was phoned by
+the FBI.
+'They said they had found photos of me at Jeffrey's Palm Beach house,' she says. 'Epstein had] hidden
+cameras watching me the entire time even when I was in the bathroom, I was so embarrassed.
+'I told the FBI that my true purpose was sexual. They told me everything he did was illegal because I was
+under age! (The age of consent in Florida is 18).
+'They said that if it had to go to trial, they'd need me because I'd lived with him and that made me a key
+witness. I was very afraid, because he had so much power, but eventually 1 agreed to testify.
+I was glad he'd finally been found out. He shouldn't be hurting other girls. Following Epstein's arrest,
+investigators are believed to have found a list of men's names on his computer and asked him whether
+they had been 'treated' to sexual encounters with his menage of minors.
+'He took the Fifth Amendment, refusing to answer, indicating that if he were to answer the question, it
+could be incriminating,' a source told The Mail on Sunday.
+Epstein struck a deal resulting in what commentators characterised as a 'slap on the wrist' for him, and
+ended up serving 13 months of his sentence, much of it in a liberal work-release programme Lawyer Brad
+Edwards, who represented several of Epstein's victims, said: 'Rather than punish him the way they would
+an average Joe, they sent a clear message that with enough money and power and influence, the system
+can be bought.
+Virginia was spared her the humiliation of having to go before a jury, and has kept her feelings bottled up
+until last weekend's photograph of Andrew with Epstein triggered distressing memories.
+03956-1284
+http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361039/Prince-Andrew-girl-17-sex-offender-frie...
+
+• Prince Andrew and giri, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail... Page 14 of 17
+Virginia says: 'I am appalled. To me, it's saying, "We are above the law." But Jeffrey is a monster.'
+Last night, neither Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell nor Prince Andrew would comment on Virginia's story.
+People:
+Woody Allen,
+Bill Clinton,
+Naomi Campbell,
+Al Gore,
+Sarah Ferguson,
+Robert Maxwell,
+Donald Trump,
+Heidi Klum
+Places:
+York,
+London,
+Paris,
+New York,
+Australia,
+Thailand,
+Spain,
+United Kingdom,
+America, (
+Europe,
+Middle East,
+Caribbean
+Organisations:
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+Comments (101)
+Newest
+Oldest
+Best rated
+Worst rated
+View all
+How many people in the middle east must consider themselves lucky when they look at the immorality of our highly paid royal
+family which has been ripping the British public off for years. W.S.
+- Will Stirum, Manchester, 27/2/2011 17:06
+Click to rate __ Rating 323
+Report abuse
+complete waste of space,
+- dusters, up in the north, 27/2/2011 16:58
+Click to rate _ Rating 292
+Report abuse
+...Makes yer proud to be English... I think not....." Rupert, Scotland, 27/2/2011 07:31-..
+-what on earth has being
+English got to do with it? Epstein is American so was the giri. And we all know how morally corrupt the rest of the Maxwell
+family were/are. Prince Andrew is not the epitome of being English. What you are talking about is related to a small minoirty of
+individuals who just happen to be English. If they behave badiy, then it says something about them, their chosen lifestyle, or
+the circies they move around in. What it does NOT, is have any bearing on the rest of the nation! So please, let's not get into
+provocative Scottish vs English battle - history is what it is - the PAST. And I certainly won't be accountable for what someone
+else did long before I was born or simply beacause I am also English. 1 am proud to be English, that is what I am. Now British -
+http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361039/Prince-Andrew-girl-17-sex-offender-frie..
+03956-1285
+
+= 4
+.. Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail... Page 15 of 17
+is another matter. NO thanks.
+- RJ, NW, 2712/2011 16:12
+Click to rate._ Rating 79
+Report abuse
+Andrew needs to be investigated and if found guilty of impropriety banished as Persona non Grata. He will lose his right as
+fourth in line to the throne and all the benefits that come with that, including his extravagant and worthless lifestyle being
+funded by public money.
+- Julia Larsen, London UK, 27/2/2011 16:09
+Click to rate ._ Rating 450
+Report abuse
+Why do we find the lives of these people? REPUBLIC NOW!
+- Newell Fisher, Lancing West Sussex, 27/2/2011 15:42
+Click to rate .... Rating 260
+Report abuse
+I was truly disgusted having read this article. Although sadly not surprised, I wonder why people idolize any kind of celebrity or
+other such "influential" people, most of whom seem to surround themselves with depraved "friends" & whom can turn a blind
+eye to anything where status, fame & wealth are concerned (seemingly typical of our "anything goes" society where everything
+is justifiable). That aside, I am more disgusted that out of the 24 comments on this article so far, people are either talking about
+what a pretty piece of tot she is, how she should have basically kept her mouth shut, how we can't be judged by the actions of
+our friends, whether the royal family has any validity (as if it ever had a clean past), & most astonishingly arguments about
+whether Fergie has more right to a royal wedding invite than Andrew! Absolutely disgusting, looking forward to further
+comments on her weight, whether she looks good for her age, & scrutiny over whether she's had any work done soon.
+- Fiona, Stop the world I wanna get off, 27/2/2011 14:55
+Click to rate._ Rating 356
+Report abuse
+The views expressed in the contents above are those of our users and do not necessarily reflect the views of MailOnline.
+Today's headlines
+Most Read
+http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361039/Prince-Andrew-girl-17-sex-offender-fice... 316256 1286
+
+• Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail... Page 16 of 17
+• 'We're not afraid to die': Extraordinary courage of the Fukushima Fifty as they return to stricken power plant to fight
+nuclear disaster
+• Thug rapes 30-year-old virgin on town centre pavement in full view of passing motorists
+• A very selfiess British hero: This young teacher whose first thought when tsunami warning sounded was how he couk
+save terrified pupils
+• VERY compact and bijou: At just 7ft wide, one of Britain's finiest homes goes on sale
+• Don't give up! Japanese Emperor makes a rare TV appearance to urge his people on. But now they must face a new
+• MOST READ IN DETAIL
+http://www.dailymail.co.uk/rews/artic.le-1361039/Prince-Andrev-girl-17sex-offonder-fric.._ 316/2011287
+
+4
+Prince Andrew and girl, 17, who sex offender friend flew to Britain to meet him | Mail.. Page 17 of 17
+How to build muscle fast
+Shocking discovery for joint
+relief
+Sleep research leads to a
+simple snoring solution
+Find this story at www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361039/Prince-Andrew-giri-17-sex-offender-friend-flew-Britain-meethim.html
+Published by Associated Newspapers Ltd
+Part of the Daily Mail, The Mail on Sunday & Metro Media Group
+Glaminicriaiaracni
+@ Associated Newspapers Ltd
+03956-1288
+http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361039/Prince-Andrew-girl-17-sex-offender-frie. 3/16/2011
+
+Prostitution Ring Leader Sentenced To 21 Months - Sun Sentinel
+
+Adverlisement
+SunSentinal com
+You are here: SunSenlinel.com > Colleclions > Czech Republic
+Ads by Google
+Fly.to Czech Republic
+Up to 70% off Business
+Class to Czech Republic!
+Call: 877-239-1199
+www.Wholesale-Flighis.com
+dentity Fraud Protection
+Protect Your Identity from
+Fraud wilh AllClear ID. Sign
+up for Free!
+www.AllClearlD.com
+Going to Praque?
+Get the Scoop from
+Travelers Who Know
+Praguel
+www.TripAdvisor.com
+Washington DC Coupons
+1 ridiculously huge coupon
+a day. It's like doing DC at
+90% ofil
+www.Groupon.com/Washington-
+ĐC
+Car Rental Czech
+Republic
+Unlimited Miles, No Hidden
+Fees. Full Insurance. Book
+Your Car Nowl
+CzechRepublic. EconomyCorRe
+ntals.com
+Find more stories about
+• Czech Republic
+• Prague
+FEATURED ARTICLES
+Man Admits Smuggling
+Women For Proslitution
+August 23, 2001
+Police Announce Arrest In
+Prostitution Ring
+May 16, 2001
+World Of Prostiulion
+Brought To The Screen
+March 26, 1987
+Prostitution Ring Leader Sentenced To 21 Months
+November 11, 2001 | Stalf report
+i man extradited from Germany has been sentenced to 21 months in priso
+nd fined $6,000 for recruiting Czech women to a prostitution ring will
+promises of modeling work.
+money laundering.
+Eppinger worked with two Czech women to get tourist visas for the future
+prostitutes and kept nearly half of their earnings from operations in Miami, New
+York, Texas and the Bahamas, prosecutors said. Women were brought to the United States illegally from 1997 1o 1999.
+As part of his plea, Eppinger forfeited a boat and limousine used to promote the call-girl service.
+Eppinger learned he was under investigation in June 1999 and moved from the United States to the Czech capital of Prague.
+He was arrested in Germany last December while traveling from the Czech Republic to Spain and was sent to the United
+States in May.
+Ads by Google
+NEW YORK FILM ACADEMY
+LEARN FILMMAKING
+& ACTING FOR FILM
+Advertisement
+If you like saving money
+JOL
+L3/E
+GROUPON
+K TM
+1-800-611-FILM | WWW.NYFA.EDU
+1907/1553
+Two accomplices, Lucie Faubert and Tereza Benesova, pleaded guilty earlier to alien smuggling conspiracy. They also
+received part of the prostitution fees.
+Ads by Google
+Czech republic
+Czech Republic travel information user experiences, hints & tips
+www.visiteurope.com/czech-republic
+Simsennel
+Index by Keyword | Index by Dale | Privacy Policy | Terms of Service
+31E-MM-108062-248
+http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2001-11-11/news/0111100327_1_prostitution-ring-czech-... _prostitution-ring-czech-... 31231289:1291
+
+* Sides argue whether Jeffrey Epstein's nonprosecution deal violated alleged victims' rights Page 1 of 4
+Par Beach Daily News
+Friday, August 19, 2011
+Subscribe Renew
+CLASSIFIEI
+HOME | NEWS | SOCIETY | BUSINESS | ARTS | FASHION | OBITUARIES | OPINION | LIFESTYLES | HOME.
+CONTACT US
+Electronic Edition Now Avail
+It's the new way to read the new
+Home > Palm Beach News
+Sides argue whether Jeffrey Epstein's nonprosecution deal violated alleged
+victims' rights
+LATEST NEWS
+Boys' 3-on-3 basketball
+tournament set at Rosarian
+Academy
+Proposal to abolish airport
+noise committee withdrawn
+Landmarks suggests
+changes to Flagler Memorial
+Bridge aesthetics
+Fire-Rescue puts out fire in
+Breakers' roof
+North End Georgian-style
+house sells for $12.475 million
+By DAVID ROGERS
+DAILY NEWS STAFF WRITER
+Updated: 7:57 p.m. Friday, Aug. 12, 2011
+Posted: 7:14 p.m. Friday, Aug. 12, 2011
+E-mail |
+Print
+Share |
+Larger Type
+U.S. District Judge Kenneth Marra is set to decide in the coming
+days whether the rights of two alleged victims of Palm Beach sex
+offender Jeffrey Epstein were violated when the U.S. Attorney's
+Office failed to confer with them before signing a non-prosecution
+Attorneys Brad Edwards and Paul Cassell, representing Jane Doe
+No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2, argued Friday in federal court in West
+Palm Beach that the government's action violated the girls' rights
+under the federal Crime Victims' Rights Act.
+Edwards and Cassell want the agreement nullified and want Marra to
+After Palm Beach police received a complaint about Epstein in spring
+2005, more than 30 young women participated in civil lawsuits that
+alleged he lured them to his home for sexually charged rubdowns
+and/or sex in exchange for cash when they were minors. Some
+cases were dismissed, and others were settled.
+-ast
+SIE-MM-108082-129
+http://www.palmbeachdailynews.com/news/sides-argue-whether-jeffrey-epsteins-nonprose. 8/19/2011
+
+Sides argue whether Jeffrey Epstein's nonprosecution deal violated alleged victims' rights Page 2 of 4
+Epstein, now 58, pleaded not guilty in August 2006 in state court.
+argued for the federal non-prosecution pact.
+The U.S. attorneys sent letters to Jane Doe No. 1 and No. 2 twice in
+2008 describing their case as being under federal investigation —
+even though a non-prosecution agreement had been created the
+previous year and had been kept secret from the young women,
+according to Edwards. Edwards said the latter action "eviscerated the
+rights" of the two women to bring Epstein to justice.
+Assistant U.S. Attorney Dexter Lee told Marra that the Crime Victims'
+Rights Act dictates that victim notification is triggered only after an
+indictment.
+Cassell disagreed. "It wasn't designed to be so narrowly
+circumscribed," the Fort Lauderdale lawyer said.
+Lee said requiring federal attorneys to confer with alleged victims
+before they can determine whether an indictment is warranted would
+impinge on prosecutorial discretion. "The government believes these
+rights would attach only after a formal indictment," Lee said.
+Marra questioned that assertion. "I think we wouldn't be here if your
+office had conferred with the victims, heard them out," and explained
+why prosecution wasn't pursued, the judge said.
+Lee countered that alleged victims have no right to confer with the
+government when the government is not "in the case."
+The judge reserved ruling on the plaintiffs' motion to unseal the
+federal attorneys' plea deal correspondence with Epstein's legal
+team.
+He gave famed criminal defense attorney Roy Black two weeks to
+submit materials explaining why the letters should not be turned ove
+o the two vound women's lawyers. The U.S. Attornev's Office wi
+then have two weeks to respond, then the plaintiffs' team will have a
+week to respond. Black will then have a week to deliver his final reply
+to the judge.
+Black had argued that the correspondence was protected by attorney
+-client privilege. "Any statements made in regard to plea bargaining
+are immunized" whether related to statements of culpability or not,
+Black said. "This is classic work product we sent to the government."
+Share this article:
+COMMENTS
+http://www.palmbeachdailynews.com/news/sides-argue-whether-jeffrey-epsteins-nonprose... 813201295
+
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+H
+De
+N
+~ b3 -
+6
+= b3
+00
+~ b3
+b
+N
+13
+= b3
+m
+63
+16
+- b3
+17
+= b3
+18
+~ b3
+= b3
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+29
+30
+31
+32
+33
+34
+35
+36
+37
+38
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+- 63
+~ b3
+- b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+~ b3 -
+b3
+63
+63
+= b3
+m
+41
+42
+44
+63
+~ b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+LO
+48
+b3
+b3
+63
+m
+3;
+1;
+1;
+;
+;
+b6
+3
+b6
+b6
+b6
+3
+3
+66
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3
+3;
+3;
+3:
+3;
+
+Page 50 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C -
+Page 51 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C -
+Page 52 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3; b7C -
+Page 53 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3; b7C -
+Page 54 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3; b7C -
+Page 55
+~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3; b7C -
+Page 56
+- b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3
+: 67C -
+Page 57
+- b3
+1;
+66 -
+3; b7C
+Page 58 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3; b7C -
+Page 59
+~ b3 -
+1;
+b6 -
+3; b7C -
+Page 60 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3; b7C -
+Page 61
+~ b3
+- 1: b6-
+3; b7C -
+Page 62 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3; b7C -
+Page 63 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3; b7C -
+Page 64 ~ b3 -
+1; b6 -
+3; b7C -
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+Page
+73
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3
+b7C
+Page
+74
+b3
+1;
+06
+3
+b7C
+Page
+75
+63
+1;
+3
+: b7C
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+7D
+b7D
+7D
+TD
+7D
+D
+7D
+7D
+7D
+7D
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+Z;
+Page 65 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C -
+Page 66 ~ b3 -
+1;
+66 - 3; b7C
+Page
+67
+b3
+1
+;
+b6
+3
+b7C
+Page
+68
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3
+; b7C
+Page
+69
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b70 -
+Page
+70
+~ b3
+1
+;
+06
+3
+: b7C
+Page
+71
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+Page
+72
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3;
+b7C
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3
+Page
+76
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3;
+b70
+3;
+3;
+Page
+77
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3;
+b7C
+7D
+Page
+78
+- 63
+1;
+66
+3;
+b7C
+7D
+Page
+79
+63
+1;
+06
+3;
+b7c
+Page
+80
+b3
+1;
+66
+; b7C
+Page
+81
+63
+1
+;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+82
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C -
+3;
+3;
+3;
+3;
+7D
+7D
+D
+7D
+Page
+83
+63
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+7D
+Page
+84
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+7D
+Page
+85
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+7D
+Page
+86
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+7D
+Page
+87
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+3;
+b7C
+3; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 88 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+Page
+89 - b3 - 1;
+b6 -
+3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+Page
+90 ~ 63 - 1;
+b6 -
+3;
+b7C - 3; b7D
+2;
+Page 91 ~ b3 - 1;
+b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+Deleted Page (s)
+X No Duplication Fee X
+X For this Page
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/1deeaeacea9a800a479fdd1207bbca38dd83edfd8f15050d1704c9fc190960fd.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/1deeaeacea9a800a479fdd1207bbca38dd83edfd8f15050d1704c9fc190960fd.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3627815f66f526e24f56b45d1fa65d32e25cd220
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/1deeaeacea9a800a479fdd1207bbca38dd83edfd8f15050d1704c9fc190960fd.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -4210,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "1deeaeacea9a800a479fdd1207bbca38dd83edfd8f15050d1704c9fc190960fd",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 126,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.page-footer\", \"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "6b19dedbecbc242d8c40c1a4e5559f0191396595f38e85e23194cd6ded7e5ea9",
+  "output_sha256": "0e9049ba8dfca8bb98c4c6d1a41b728249ad56b88001aa94048f9b50df666e93",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/4616e5a507f8eff4ae279fb180d67cc21d33d18bcf29b56990577b6f9d6d50da.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/4616e5a507f8eff4ae279fb180d67cc21d33d18bcf29b56990577b6f9d6d50da.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9854473bc145d6864b0e5ac4e91b2068574c71c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/4616e5a507f8eff4ae279fb180d67cc21d33d18bcf29b56990577b6f9d6d50da.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1380 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI /PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+H
+De
+N
+- 5;
+-
+6
+00
+~b3-
+1;
+m. b3-
+1;
+= b3
+1;
+- b3-1:
+~ b3
+1;
+-
+-
+b3
+-
+-
+3,
+3,
+-
+3,
+3,
+3,
+11
+N
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+29
+30
+31
+32
+33
+34
+35
+36
+37
+38
+39
+40
+41
+42
+43
+44
+45
+46
+47
+48
+49
+b3
+b3
+b3
+~ b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+~ b3
+Fu i
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+b3
+b3
+;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+- 1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+b6
+-
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+- 3,
+-
+m
+-5:
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-5:
+- 5;
+- 5;
+
+50
+51
+52
+53
+54
+55
+56
+57
+58
+59
+60
+61
+62
+63
+64
+65
+67
+68
+69
+70
+71
+72
+73
+74
+75
+76
+77
+78
+79
+80
+81
+82
+83
+84
+85
+86
+87
+88
+89
+90
+91
+92
+93
+94
+95
+96
+97
+98
+99
+100
+101 ~
+102
+103
+-
+-
+-
+;
+;
+;
+;
+;
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+;
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+3
+-
+-
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+6
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+
+= b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3r
+3
+g
+ge
+g
+g
+3
+63
+b3
+3
+63
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1;
+1;
+1i
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+-
+-
+-
+-
+co co
+"wwWW
+wwwWWWww@
+www.
+ww.
+- 5;
+-
+-
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+-5
+- 5;
+-5
+-5
+in u.
+-5
+-5
+5 ;
+- 5;
+- 5
+-5
+- 5 ;
+-5
+- 5;
+-5
+-5
+-5
+-5
+-5
+-5
+
+ge
+g
+5
+ru
+63
+b 3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+3
+b3
+3
+3
+3
+bb
+3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+3
+3
+3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+I;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+6
+6
+6
+b6
+b6
+-
+-
+co co
+wcccow.
+wwwwww
+wwww@
+ww
+mmmmmmmmm
+www.
+ww.
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+-
+-
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+-5
+- 5;
+-5
+-5
+in u.
+-5
+-5
+5 ;
+- 5;
+- 5
+-5
+- 5 ;
+-5
+- 5;
+-5
+-5
+- 5
+-5
+-5
+-5
+
+P
+P
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+g
+ge
+g
+3
+3
+65
+-
+-
+1 II
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1i
+1;
+1;
+6
+b6
+b6
+6
+b6
+6
+i'm
+mm
+• TI
+maman
+nim
+mim
+"III
+-
+- 5;
+-
+-
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+-5
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-5
+-5
+- 5;
+inu.
+-5
+- 5
+- 5;
+- 5
+-5
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-5
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5
+-5
+- 5;
+- 5
+- 5;
+-5
+-5
+- 5
+- 5;
+- 5;
+
+g
+~ b3
+b 3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+bb
+b3
+b3
+3
+3
+63
+b3
+b3
+63
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b 3
+63
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+3
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+I;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+6
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+-
+co co
+wo cowo.
+wwww@
+co wo.
+vvvv
+• | I
+w cowo.
+c c cg
+3;
+-5
+b7c
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+- 5;
+-
+-
+-
+3;
+3;
+3
+3
+3;
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+b7D
+7
+D
+D
+b7D
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+• =
+3
+;
+;
+b7D
+- 2;
+b7D
+-
+2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2:
+b7D - 2:
+b7D - 2;
+-5
+;
+5
+;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D
+- 2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2i
+b7D - 2;
+
+<l ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3, -5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 321 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,
+- 5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Fage 3.: - b3 - 1; b6 - 3, -5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+Deleted Page(s)
+X
+× No Duplication Fee X
+For this Page
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+H
+De
+N
+- 5;
+-
+6
+00
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+-
+-
+-
+-
+3,
+3,
+-
+3,
+3,
+3,
+- 3,
+-
+m
+11
+N
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+29
+30
+31
+32
+33
+34
+35
+36
+37
+38
+39
+40
+41
+42
+43
+44
+45
+46
+47
+48
+49
+Fu i
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+- 1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+-
+-
+-
+_-
+-
+b6
+-
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+-5:
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-5:
+- 5;
+- 5;
+
+50
+51
+52
+53
+54
+55
+56
+57
+58
+59
+60
+61
+62
+63
+64
+65
+67
+68
+69
+70
+71
+72
+73
+74
+75
+76
+77
+78
+79
+80
+81
+82
+83
+84
+85
+86
+87
+88
+89
+90
+91
+92
+93
+94
+95
+96
+97
+98
+99
+100
+101 ~
+102
+103
+-
+-
+-
+;
+;
+;
+;
+;
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+;
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+3
+-
+-
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+6
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+
+= b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3r
+3
+g
+ge
+g
+g
+3
+63
+b3
+3
+63
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1;
+1;
+1i
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+-
+-
+-
+-
+co co
+"wwWW
+wwwWWWww@
+www.
+ww.
+- 5;
+-
+-
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+-5
+- 5;
+-5
+-5
+in u.
+-5
+-5
+5 ;
+- 5;
+- 5
+-5
+- 5 ;
+-5
+- 5;
+-5
+-5
+-5
+-5
+-5
+-5
+
+ge
+g
+63
+1b 3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+3
+-
+-
+1;
+1;
+1i
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1
+1;
+1;
+1;
+coco
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+6
+6
+-
+b3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+b3
+b3
+3
+3
+ru
+~ b3
+I;
+wwww
+6
+-
+-
+3,
+- 1; b6 -
+3,
+- 1; b6 - 3,
+-
+-
+3,
+- 5;
+- 5;
+• 5;
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+× Deleted Page(s)
+X No Duplication Fee X
+X For this Page
+X
+X
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxXX
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/4616e5a507f8eff4ae279fb180d67cc21d33d18bcf29b56990577b6f9d6d50da.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/4616e5a507f8eff4ae279fb180d67cc21d33d18bcf29b56990577b6f9d6d50da.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..099bf38f950ae2b809fea1fdff477c18873cab64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/4616e5a507f8eff4ae279fb180d67cc21d33d18bcf29b56990577b6f9d6d50da.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -839,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "4616e5a507f8eff4ae279fb180d67cc21d33d18bcf29b56990577b6f9d6d50da",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "dd9db53bb3ff5a19d05285ffd78d0e8b1d37c988441aa2d3df7f058134fb913e",
+  "output_sha256": "96c6f8c3b08eee1527f7ccb8ffa2249bebffa1fb240b236cdbeb669c38d9e52e",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/49b210694fe9f26f07251344f1c522077330eaef4adde29c64b515fe689bb1d2.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/49b210694fe9f26f07251344f1c522077330eaef4adde29c64b515fe689bb1d2.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a915d6272c5b523d9f27faa199193e3f18d06a81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/49b210694fe9f26f07251344f1c522077330eaef4adde29c64b515fe689bb1d2.md
@@ -0,0 +1,3706 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-CV-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 341
+Page 2 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 3 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 4 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 1;
+Page 5 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D
+- 1;
+Page 6
+~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D
+- 1;
+Page 7 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 8 ~ b6 - 5;
+b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 22 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 23 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 24 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 32 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 33 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 34 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 35 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5 ;
+Page 36 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 37 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page
+38 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 48 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 1;
+Page 49
+~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 50 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 51 ~ b6
+1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page
+52 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 1;
+Page 53 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page
+54 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 55 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 56
+~ b6- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 57 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 58 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page
+59 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 1;
+Page 60 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 61 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 1;
+Page 62 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 63 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 64 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 1;
+Page 65 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 66 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 67 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 68 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 69 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 70 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 71 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 72 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 73 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 74 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 75 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 76 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 77 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 78 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+
+Page 79 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 80 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 1;
+Page 81 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 1;
+Page 82 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 83 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 84 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 85 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 86 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D
+- 1;
+Page 87 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 88 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 89 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 1;
+Page 90 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 91 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 92 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 93 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D
+- 1;
+Page 94 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 95 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 96 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 97 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 98
+~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 99 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 100 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 101 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 102 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 103 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 104 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+105 ~ b6 - 1.-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+106 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 107 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 108 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 109 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 110 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 111 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 112 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 113 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 114 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 115 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 116 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 117 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 118 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 119 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1:
+Page 120 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 121 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 122 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 123 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 124 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 125 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 126 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 127 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 128 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+129 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 130 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 131 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 132 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+
+Page 133 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 134 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 135 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 136 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 1;
+Page 137 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 138 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 139 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 140 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 141 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 142 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 143 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 144 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 145 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 146 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 147 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 148 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 149- 66 -1,-5; b70 - 1,-5; b7D - 1:
+Page 158 ~ b6
+b7C - 5;
+Page 167 ~ b3
+b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+168 ~ b3
+b6
+-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+169 ~ b3
+Page
+170 ~ b3
+Page
+171 ~ b3
+Page
+172
+~
+b3
+Page
+173
+b3
+Page 174 ~ b3
+Page
+175
+~ b3
+3,
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+3, - 5; b7D
+- 1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3, - 5;
+- 1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3, - 5;
+- 1;
+b6
+1i
+b6
+b6
+b6
+Page
+176 ~ b3
+1i
+b6
+Page
+177
+~ b3
+Page 178 ~ b3
+Page 179 ~ b3
+b6
+b6
+1i
+b6
+Page
+180
+~b3
+b6
+Page 190 ~ b3
+Page
+191 ~ b3
+b6
+1i
+b6
+Page
+192~
+b3
+b6
+Page 193 ~ b3
+b6
+Page 194 ~ b3
+b6
+Page 195 ~ b
+3
+b
+6
+Page
+196~
+b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+3,
+-5;
+b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+3,-5; b7C -
+3, - 5;
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+3, - 5;
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+3, - 5;
+3,-5; b7C -
+, -5;
+- 1;
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D
+- 1;
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+3,
+-5
+;
+3,-5; b7D
+Page
+197 ~ b3
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+3,-5;
+Page
+198
+b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+3
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page
+199
+~ b3
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+3
+,-5;
+Page
+200
+~b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+3
+,-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+201
+~b3
+b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+3,
+-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+202~ b3
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+203
+~ b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+204~b3
+b6 -
+3,- 5;
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+205
+~ b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+3
+, -5;
+- 1;
+Page
+206
+b3
+Page
+207 ~ b3
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+3,
+-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+208
+~ b3
+Page
+209~
+b3
+Page 210
+~
+b3
+Page
+211
+b3
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+- 5;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+3,
+- 5;
+b6
+3,
+-5; b7C
+3, -5;
+
+W
+b6 -
+b3
+b6
+1; b6
+~b3
+~ b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+1; b6
+1; b6
+1; b6
+W
+W
+b6
+1; b6
+b6
+1; b6
+b6
+b6
+1; b6
+b3
+b6 -
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+~
+b3
+b3
+1 I I
+1; b6 -
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+1i
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b
+3
+b6
+b6
+b6
+1i
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b
+6
+b3
+b3
+b3
+W
+~ b3
+~ b3
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+-.
+..
+5
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+- 5
+;
+-5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+-5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+1.
+-.
+..
+
+W
+W
+~ b3
+W
+W
+W
+b3
+~b3
+b3
+b3
+~ b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+~ b3
+~ b3
+b3
+_~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+~
+b3
+b
+3
+W
+b3
+b3
+~b3
+W
+W
+W
+~ b3
+1; b6 -
+b6
+1; b6
+1; b6
+1; b6
+1; b6
+1; b6
+1; b6
+b6
+- 1; b6
+1; b6
+b6
+1; b6
+1; b6 -
+- 1; b6 -
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+6
+b
+6
+b6
+I /I
+1i
+1i
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b
+b
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6 -
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6 -
+b6 -
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+-.
+..
+-5
+3,
+3,
+- 5;
+3,
+-5;
+3,
+3
+- 5;
+3,
+3,
+-5;
+3,
+-5;
+3,
+3,
+- 5;
+-5;
+5;
+3,
+-5;
+3,
+- 5;
+-.
+..
+
+Page 320 ~ b3
+Page 321 ~ b3
+Page 322 ~ b3
+b6 -
+Page
+323~
+b3
+b6
+Page 324 ~ b3
+1; b6
+Page 325 ~ b3
+1; b6
+Page 326 ~ b3
+1; b6
+Page 327 ~ b3
+1; b6
+Page 328 ~ b3
+b6
+Page 329 ~ b3
+1; b6
+Page
+330 ~ b3
+b6
+Page 331 ~ b3
+1; b6
+Page 332 ~ b3
+b6
+Page 333 ~ b3
+b6
+Page 334 ~ b3
+b6
+Page 335 ~ b3
+b6 -
+Page 336 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+Page
+337
+b3
+b6
+Page
+338
+~ b3
+b6
+Page
+339
+~ b3
+b6
+Page
+340 ~ b3
+b6
+Page
+341
+b3
+b6
+Page
+342~
+b3
+b6
+Page
+343
+~
+b3
+b6
+Page
+344
+b3
+1i
+b6
+Page
+345 ~ b3
+b6
+Page
+346 ~ b3
+6
+Page
+347
+b3
+b
+6
+Page
+348
+b3
+b6
+Page
+349
+~
+b3
+b6
+Page
+350
+~ b3
+1i
+Page
+351
+b3
+b
+6
+b6
+Page
+352 ~ b3
+b6
+Page
+353
+b3
+1i
+b6
+Page
+354
+b3
+b6
+Page
+355
+b3
+b6
+Page
+356
+b3
+b
+Page
+357
+b
+6
+Page
+358
+Page
+359 ~
+b3
+b6
+Page
+360
+~b3
+b6
+Page
+361
+b3
+b6
+Page
+362 ~ b3
+b6
+Page
+363
+~ b3
+b6
+Page
+364~b3
+b6
+Page
+365
+~ b3
+b6
+Page
+366 ~ b3
+b6 -
+Page
+367 ~ 63
+b6
+Page
+368
+b3
+Page
+369
+~ b3
+b6
+b6
+Page
+370
+~ b3
+Page
+371
+b3
+b6
+b6
+Page
+372
+b3
+b6
+Page
+373 ~ b3
+b6
+3
+- 5
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+5
+;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+..
+..
+1.
+..
+
+Page 374 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 375 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 376 ~ b3
+….—
+b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 377 ~ b3
+b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3, - 5;
+Page 378 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 379 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 380 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 381 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 382 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+, -5;
+- 1;
+Page 383 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3, - 5;
+- 1;
+Page 384 ~ b3
+b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 385 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 386 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 387 ~ b3
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 388 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 389 ~ b3
+….-
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5; b7D
+- 1;
+Page 390 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 391 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 392 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 393 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 394 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 395 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 396 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxXxXXXXXXX
+X Deleted Page (s)
+X
+× No Duplication Fee X
+X For this Page
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxX
+
+31 E-MM- 108062-1416
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+Mm/ PRORA
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+1/10/2007
+From
+b6 - 5
+-b7C - 5
+(Address)
+simalau
+b70 - 2
+By
+To Be Returned L Yes
+DINo
+Receipt Given • Yes
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+EIÑO
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FIL)
+• Yes
+ENo
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+* ripinal notes re interview of
+66 - 5
+b7C -5
+-1
+• wa
+:
+03956-10584
+
+31E-MM- 108062-/A17
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence Mm/ PRCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received 01/16/2007
+From
+(Name or Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By
+St
+To Be Returned
+U.
+Yes
+• No
+Receipt Given
+• Yes
+• No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+• No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+• No
+66-2
+b7C -2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+Subpoena Results for
+-5
+-5
+-1
+4.
+::
+03956-10592
+
+01/16/3007 13:11 FAX
+01001/006
+41001
+***************************
+#77
+ERROR TX REPORT
+7*7
+17**********7************7*
+TX FUNCTION WAS NOT COMPLETED
+67D - 1
+#8O18 BUSY/NO SIGNAL
+To:1
+From:
+Date: January 15, 2007
+Pages:
+(including cover)
+Fax Number: (561) 833-7970
+Voice Number
+Subject:
+Subpoena Response
+56-2,-5
+b70 - 2,-5
+NO CHOCOA
+Message:
+The information contained in this facsimile transmission is privlleged and confidential. It is Intended only for the use of the individual or entiry
+lamed above. If the reader of this message ls nat the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for dellvering the message t
+ha Intended recipiens, you are hereby notified that any disseminalion, distribution or copying of this communication is sirctty prahibited
+If you have repeived thls communication in error, please notify us Immediately by telephone and relum the original to us at the address listed
+below via regular U.S. Mail, Thank you.
+b7D - 1
+03956-10593
+
+0002/006
+To:
+SA
+From:
+866-LER-0911
+Date:
+January 15, 2007
+Pages:
+(including cover)
+Fax Number:
+(561) 833-7970
+Voice Number:
+Subject:
+Subpoena Response
+b6 2,-5
+b7C 2,-5
+Message:
+fyou have gear u.s. Mail. Thank youn In eror, plase notify us immediatoly by telephone and rotum the original to us at the adros liste
+Use your subpoena tracking number as subject ine.
+03956-10594
+
+• DEC-22-20DS 16:02
+0003/006
+P.52
+FEI WEST FALM BEACH RA
+U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+In the inatter of case number(s):
+31F-MM-108062
+TO:
+ADDRESS:
+TELEPHONES
+
+- 1
+GREETING:
+By the service of this subpoena upon you by SA
+, who is authorized to serve b6 - 2
+you are heruby commanded and required to discloseto SA
+_, a representarive bC -2
+the FBI, the name, address, local and long distance telephone tall billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or
+identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following
+Please provide any and all records to include subscriber and billing
+information on the following phone numbers and associated time periods:
+66 - 5
+b70 - 5
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION, YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE TIE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
+Compliance must be made by personal appearance or production of records no later chan the
+January
+• at 10: 00 o'clock A M, at 505
+S. Flagler Drive,
+#50o day of
+west Palm Beach, FL 33401
+in licu of a nersonal anDearance. the information can be provided, via facsimile, marked to the attention of
+SA E
+, at telephone number
+(561) 833-7970
+In lieu of'a personal appenrance, the information can ba provided, via mail, marked to the atrention of
+SA
+, at the following address: 505 S. Elagler Drive, #500
+Wes: Palm Beach, Eloirda 33401
+If you refuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may invoke the aid of the United States
+District Court to compel compliance. Your failure to obey the resulting court order may be punished as contempt.
+Ised under authori SC 54% 065, 65(6).
+ATTESTED CORY
+Signatures
+Name, TiL
+Isuad this 22
+day of December
+-b6 - 2
+b70-2
+-03956-10595
+
+• DEC-22-2015 1E:011
+1-448 (ReV, 6-2-97)
+0004/006
+P.01
+FBI FACSIMILE
+COVER SHEET
+PRECEDENCE
+U Immediate
+• Priority
+I* Routine
+• CLASSIFICATION
+• Top Seçret
+• secret
+• Confidential
+LI Sensitive
+M Incarcified
+Time Transmitted•
+Sender's Initials:
+Number of Pages:
+(including cover sheet)
+$:50 er
+12/22/2011
+Date:
+09/05/7005
+To:
+Name of Office
+Facsimile Number: -
+AIn: ÷
+Custodian n Recordls
+From:
+EBI-PBCRA
+Name of Office
+subject'
+Sabpawa Request
+Special Handling Instructions:
+Plese delic Aop
+Originaror's Name:
+SA
+Originator's Facsimile Number:
+ephonc:
+(541) 833-7970
+Approved:
+Bricf Description of Communication Faxed:
+Htppsotedas 5
+WARVING
+Information alteched to the cover sheet is U S Guvernment Property
+Il you are not the intonded recipient of this
+intormation, disclosurs, deproduction, diztrbution, or use ofthis infuriatios is prohibired (16 USC, $ 641) Plea:83956-10596
+aminulap ar dha Iorol Elfl Alftoe inmadiatelu le aeranor ine aronor disaastinn
+b6 -2
+b70 -2
+b6
+-2
+
+0005/006
+January 15, 2007
+SAL
+FBI
+505 S, Flagler Dr. #500
+b70 - 2
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+Dear SAL
+This is in response to the Subpoena Duces Tecum, dated December 22, 2006, and served upon
+December 2) 2006 This subpoena requests customer identification/account information for the
+A search of our subscriber database discloses the following information:
+b6-5
+b70 - 5
+-1
+My did you have ay question reparding this information please fel fre to contact me at your coavenienc
+Very truly yours,
+Subpoena Response
+Legal Compliance Agent
+03956-10597
+
+01/16/2007.13:16 FAX
+0006/006
+January 15, 2007
+SAL
+FBI
+505 S. Flagler Dr. #500
+66-2
+b7C -2
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+Dear SAL
+Thís is in response to the Subpoena Duces Tecum, dated December 22, 2006, and served upon_
+December 22. 2006. This subpoena requests customer identification/account information for the
+A search of our subscriber database discloses the following information:
+b6-5
+b70 - 5
+Should you have any questions regarding this information please feel free to contact me at your convenience.
+My direct telephone number is!
+Very truly yours,
+Subpoena Response
+Legal Compliance Agent
+03956-10598
+
+FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03):
+File Number -
+3IE-MM-108062-1418
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received _
+01/16/200
+From
+Metro
+PCS
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+b6 -2|
+b7C -2
+By SA
+To Be Returned •
+Yes
+• No
+Receipt Given L
+_ Yes
+• No:
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+L Yes
+• No
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+→ Original notes te interviemof-
+Subpowa Kesults for
+b6 -3
+- 3
+b3
+- 1
+- 100
+:
+03956-10599
+
+L. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+P.02
+In the matter of case number (s):
+31E-MM-108062
+TO:
+ADDRESS:
+TELEPHONE:
+Metro PCS
+Custodian of Records
+8144 Walnut Hili sane,
+#800
+Dallas,
+Texas 75231
+(972) 860-2635
+GREETING:
+By the service of this subpoena upon you by
+SA
+who is authorized to serve it,
+you are hereby conamanded and required to disclose to SAL
+_ a representative of
+the FBI, the name, address, local and long distance telephone foll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or
+identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following:
+Please provide any and all records to include subscriber and billing
+information for the following phone numbers and associated time period:
+b6 -2
+b70 - 2
+b6 -3
+:
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURVISH THIS
+INFORMATION. YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
+January
+Compliance muz be de by Oral peak a de in rear age lan t
+snager brive, #500 day of
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+SA
+le information can be provided, via facsimile, marked to the attention of
+_, at telephone number
+(561) 833-7970
+In lieu of a personal arearance, the infornation can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+SA
+_, at the following address: 505 5. Flagler Drive, #500
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+If you refuse 1o obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may invoke the aid of the United States
+District Court to compel compliance. Your fallure to obcy the resulting court order may be punished as contempt.
+Tasued under authority of Public Law No. 106-544, 8 5(a).
+(18 U.S.C. §3486)
+ATTESTED COP
+Signature:
+Name, Title
+Issued this 22
+mi day of December
+, 2006
+b6 - 2
+. b70 -2
+03956-10600
+
+P.03
+Public Law 544 - 106th Congress
+2nd Session
+H.R. 3048
+AY ACT
+To amend Title 18, United States Code, to provide clearer coverage over threats against former Presidents and members of their families, and for
+other purposcs. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.
+SEC. 5
+(8) IN GENERAL- Section 3486(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended -
+(1) so that paragraph (1) reads as follows;
+(1)(A) In any investigation of - (i)(1) & Federal health care offense; or (I) a Fedcral offense involving the sexual exploitation or abusc of children, the
+Altorney General; or (ii) an offense under section 871 or 879, or a threat against a person protected by the United States Secset Service under
+paragraph (5) or (6) of section 3056, if the Director of the Secret Service derormincs that the threat constituting the offense or the threat against the
+person probected is imminent, the Socretary of the Theasury, may issue in writing and cause to be served a subpoena requiring the production and
+testimony described in subparagraph (B).
+(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), a subpoena issued under subparagraph (A) may require - (i) the production of any records or other
+things rclevant to the instigation; and (il) testimony by the custodian of the things required to be produced concerning the production and
+authenticity of those things.
+(C) A subpoena issued under subparagraph (A) with respect to a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service, in an
+investigation of a Fcderal offense involving the sexual explojation or abuse of children shall not extend beyond -. (i) requiring that provider to
+discloss the name, address, local and long distance telephone tall billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or identry, and length
+of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of scrvices the subscriber or customer utilized, which may be relesant to an
+authorized law enforcement inquiry; or. (ii) Icquiring a custodian of the records of that provider to give testimony concoming the production and
+authentication of such records or information.
+(D) As used in this paragraph, the term 'Federal offense involving the sexual exploitation or abuse of children mcans an offense under section 1201,
+2,241 (E) 22A2, 2243, 2251. 2251 A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423, in which the victim is an individual who has not attained the age of 18 '
+(2) in paragraph (3)-r
+(A) by inserting 'relating to a Federal health care offense after 'production of iccords'; and
+(B) by adding at the end the following: "The production of things in any other case may be required from any place within the United
+States or subject to the laws or jurisdiction of the United States.'; and
+(3) by adding at the and the following:
+(5) At any time before the return date specified in the summons, the person or entity summoned may, in the Unitcd States district court for the district in
+.:
+which that person or entity does business or resides, petition for an order modifying or setting aside the summons, or a prohibition of disclosure ordered
+by a court under paragraph (6).
+(6)(A) A United State district court for the district in which the summons is or will be served, upon application of the United States, may issus an ex
+parte order hat no person or entity disclose to any other person or entity (other chan to an atorney, in order to obrain legal advice) the existense of such
+summons for a period of up to 90 days.
+(B) Such order may be issued on a showing that the things being sought may be relevant to the investigation and there is reason to believe thet such
+disclosure may result in--
+(i) cndangerment ro the life or physical safety of any person;
+(ii) Night to avoid prosecution;
+(iii) destruclion of or tampering with evidencc; or
+(iv) intimidation of potential witnesses.
+(C) An order under this paragraph may be rencwed for additional periods of up to 90 days upon a showing that the circumstances described in
+subparagraph (B) continue to exist.
+(7) A summons issued under this scction shall not roquire the production of anything that would be protected from production under the standards
+applicable to a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United Statcs.
+(8) If no case or proceeding arises from the production of records or othcr things pursuant to this scotion within a rcasonable timo after those records or
+things are produced, the agency to which those records or things were deljvered shall, upon written demand made by the person producing those records
+or things, relum them to that person, except where the production required was only of copies rather than originals.
+(9) A subpoena issucd under paragraph (1)(A)(®)(II) or (I)(A)(i) may require productioni as soon as possiblc, but in no cvent less than 24 hours afer
+service of the subpoena
+(1o) As soon as practicable following the isuance of a subpoena under paragraph (1)(4)(i), the Secretary of the Treasury shall notify the Attorney
+General of its issuance!.
+(6) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS-
+(1) SECTION HEADING- The heading for section 3486 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking:
+03956-10601
+
+DEC-22-2006 15:54
+P.04
+in federal health care investigations'.
+• (2) TABLE OF SECTIONS- The item relating to section 3486 in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 223 of titlc 18, United States Code, is
+amended by striking: in Federal health care investigations'.
+(3) CONFORMING REPEAL-Section 3486A, and she item relating to that section in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 223, oftizle 18,
+Linised States Code, are repcaled,
+(c) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT- Section 3486 of tirle 18, United States Codo, is amended -
+(1) in subsection (a)(4), by striking "summoned' and inscring'subpocnaed'; and
+(2) in subsection (d), by striking 'summons' each place it appears and insering subpoena.
+:
+• ...
+TOTAL P.Ø4
+03956-10602
+
+metro:
+Permission to speak freety®
+metroPCS
+Law Enforcement Agencies:
+Welcome to metroPoS.!
+Please read for new information!!!
+MetroPCS gives its customers Pomission to spoak frooly® with unlimited calls for one flat fee paid in
+advance of service. MetroPCS currently operates in the greater metropolitan areas of Allanta,
+Dallas/Ft. Worth, Detroit, Sacramento and San Francisco as well as central and southern Florida.
+The Subpoena Compliance Group consists of a Manager, one Supervisor and four Excellent Compliance Analysts. We receive, review, and process all law enforcement requests centrally in the Corporate Office in Dallas, TX. We handle 911 calls, exigent/emergency situations, routine subpoena and
+court order requests, pen registers, Title Ill wiretaps and fraud cases. We represent MetroPCS in all
+state and federal trials as evidentiary witnesses/custodians of records.
+MetroPCS relains call detail records for up to 6 months; after which they are no longer available.
+Because MetroPCS allows its customers unlimited use of its service, call detail reports are typically
+much more voluminous than reports by other carriers. Therefore, beginning April 15, 2006 MetroPCS
+will charge $50 for call detail records for more than 15 days. Call detail records without cell site
+location can be obtained with a subpoena. Call detail fecords with cell site location will require a court
+order.
+MetroPCS is highly motivated to atlain its goal of responding as quickly as possible to legal requests,
+however, lechnical issues do arise that sometimes lead to delays. To further assist us in expediting
+your request, please provide contact information, fax number and an email address with your
+subpoena. Email is the fastest method of receiving results.
+Voicemail: Voicemails are kept for approximately seven (7) days unless deleted by the customer.
+Text Messages: MetroPCS does not store text messages.
+Cell site location requires a court order. Cell site address lists are updated trequently as siles are
+added and are available upon request.
+MetroPCS charges a fee for some services:
+$50 for call detail records for more than 15 day
+S50 for each voicemail password rese
+* Pen Registers: $200 set up fee, plus $20 per day maintenance with
+a minimum fee of $500
+• Wire Taps: $400 set up fee, plus $40 per day maintenance
+• Court Ordered Requests for On-going Weekly Call Detail Records:
+$200 per target number (e.g., fugitive situations)
+• $200 for CFID changes for pen registers and'or wire taps
+All requests received by fax or email generate an automatic receipt of request. The automatic
+response will provide a link to a website that has been created for checking status. Email is the
+fastest method of receiving results. Because MetroPCS allows unlimited calls, a call detail report
+can easily be too large to fax, so it is advised that you narrow your timeframe as much as possible
+metroF
+Permisslon to speak freely ®
+The corporate offices of MetroPCS are located al
+8144 Walnut Hill Lane, Suite 800, Dallas, TX 75231
+MetroPCS - Security Compliance Departmen1
+800-571-1265
+Fax: 972-860-2635
+Email: subpoenas@metr083998°10603
+
+Suits 800
+PRonE: 214.305.2000
+Fax hi Frovesis 10 972-33฿-2535
+Email: stasess somers com.
+Business Man'& #ft operator #: 214-376-3070
+Afe-pur Emergency Number: 409-571-1205
+Trase nesters are for lift-foreaderie
+emergency situations only
+TO
+66-2
+b7C -2
+THIS IS AN AUTOMATED RESPONSE CONFIRMING THE RECEIPT OF YOUR REQUEST DATED12/29/2006
+3:18:16 PM, CASE NUMBER 31E-MIM 108062 Replies to this email address/fax number will be rejected.
+To check the status of your request, logon to http://www.metropcslerms.com/default.asp?W=TrackingPage and enter your
+tracking number.
+TrackingNumber
+b6-3
+MetroPCS makes every effort to provide results in a timely manner. To make this process more efficient, please provide yu3 -1
+email address in the subpoena or court order.
+All court order and subpoena requests for call detail for more than 15 days is subject to a $50 fee without prior notice.
+03956-10604
+
+metroPCS
+DECLARATION FOR METROPCS RECORDS
+Security Compliance
+8144 Walnut Hill Lane
+Suite 800
+Dallas, Texas 75231
+Re:
+LERMS
+b70 - 3,-5
+hereby declare:
+I am employed by MetroPCS Inc. and. have been designated as Custodian of Records with responsibility for
+'MetroPCS' compliance with the subpoena duces tecum, search warrant or court order.
+The attached records are true copies of all the records described in the legal process (subpoena, search warrant, or
+court order). I personally have conducted or supervised compliance by MetroPCS with the subpoena duces tecum,
+search warrant or court order.
+The records are either call detail or subscriber records, employee records, or other wireless records, depending upon
+the legal process (subpoena duces tecum, search warrant, or court order) request.
+The subscriber records were prepared by MetroPCS personnel in the ordinary course of business at or near the time
+of the act, condition, or event. Account information is entered into the MetroPCS Billing System where the data is
+stored. The Custodian of Records retrieves the stored data from the MetroPCS Billing System via billing software
+for compliance purposes.
+MetroPCS allows its customers' unlimited use of their services and therefore does not need call detail records for
+billing purposes. Call detail records are maintained solely for the purpose of complying with legal processes as
+mandated by CALEA. MetroPCS sclected Verisign to store call detail records for the purpose of complying with
+legal processes as mandated by CALEA. Verisign is a secure third-party provider and is an active consultant to
+federal agencies and the Office of Homeland Security.
+Call detail is recorded at the MetroPCS switch at the time of the event. MetroPCS makes it a regular business
+practice to have the records stored for the purpose of meeting requirements for assisting government agencies wit!
+awful subpoena requests for subscriber records. The call detail is electronically transmitted to Verisign where th
+data is stored. Verisign provides a static IP address through a dedicated secure circuit for retrieval of these records.
+The call detail files are maintained for approximately 6 months deperfding on size and quantity, after which
+they are automatically purged.
+Ceria cale No Reco do That therough search four line periled no duestants, records or other)
+or the time period requested.*
+Requested call detail records existed at one time but all or some of the records have since been purged.
+I declare, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.
+Executed at Dallas, Texas on
+_01/15/2007_
+b6 - 5
+b70 - 5
+• Compliance Analyst
+03956-10608
+
+Suits 809
+Pione: 214.285.2650
+Faxil Fequesis 1o 372-500-2835
+Email: seweswsexdovensoss.com.
+Businens Sauri 9ft operator # 214-278-3070
+Áts-tnur Emergpacy Muster: 909.571-1205
+tosse notere are for frontense
+emergency sitestions only
+TO
+This is an automated delivery of the results of your request #
+rejected.
+b6 - 2
+b7C - 2
+Replies to this email address/fax number will be
+03956-10609
+
+3-448 (Rev, 6-2-97)
+FBI FACSIMILE
+COVER SHEET
+PRECEDENCE
+• Immediate
+L Priority
+* Routine
+• Tap Secret
+• Secret
+• Confidential
+• Sensitive
+X Unclassified
+To:
+Metro PCS
+Name of Office
+Facsimile Number:: (972) 860-2635
+Custodian 1 Records
+Telophone
+From:
+Subject:
+FBI-PBCRA
+Name of Office
+Sabpana Request
+Time Transmitted:
+Sender's Initials:
+Number of Pages;
+(including cover sheet)
+10pm
+b6 -2
+b7C -2
+Date: 09/05/2006
+Special Handling Instructions:
+Please deliery ASAP
+Originator's Name:
+Originator's Facsimile Number;
+elephone:
+(561) 833-7970
+Approved:
+Brief Description of Communication Faxed:
+Holidapt
+Thank-you t Happy
+WARNING
+Information allacbed to the cover sheet is U.S. Goveroment Properry. If you are not the intended recipient of this
+information, disclosure, reproduction, distribution, or use of this informacion is prohibited (18.USC, § 641). Please notify ine
+miminaine no tha Innal HAl Affina immorisaab in senanna far monrom dionritina
+b70-2
+03956-10610
+
+31E-MA1-108062-91358-10611
+
+File Number —
+3|E-MM-105062-119
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence _
+MM
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received —
+01/24/2007
+From
+Sprwo
+Water
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+By
+85
+To Be Returned
+Yes
+& No
+Receipt Given
+Yes
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+ET No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+b6 - 2
+b7C -2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+•Originalnotes re interview of.
+03956-10612
+
+Sprint /
+SPRINT CORPORATE SECURITY, 6480 SPRINT PARKWAY, OVERLAND PARK, KS 66251
+Facsimile
+To:
+Fax:
+Company:
+From:
+56-2,-5
+b70 - 2,-5
+
+United States Secret Service
+Department:
+Date:
+January 18, 2007
+Voice:
+Legal Compliance
+1-800-877-7330
+Fax:
+913-315-0736
+Comments:
+Total Pages:
+13
+03956-10613
+
+Security Coordinator
+b6 - 5
+b70 -5
+Mailstop KSOPHM0206
+6480 Sprint Parkway
+verland Park. KS 6625
+Ottice:
+1/18/2007
+b6 - 2
+b70 - 2
+United States Secret Service
+505 S. Flagler Drive
+Suite 500
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+Your Case Number: 31EMM108062
+Sprint Nextel Case Number: 2006-240817
+Dear
+Pursuant to the above referenced case, I have enclosed the requested informatior
+associated with the following number(s)
+03956-10614
+
+7-448 (ReV, 6-2-97)
+P.Ø1
+FBI FACSIMILE
+COVER SHEET
+PRECEDENCE
+• Immediate
+• Priority
+X Routine
+To:
+Pacsimile Number:
+From:
+Subject:
+•J Secret
+
+Sensitive
+Unclassified
+SpruntoN extel
+Name of Office
+(913) 315-0736
+Custodian Recorde
+Telephone
+FBI-PRCRA
+Name of Office
+Subpawa Requet
+. Time Transmitted:
+Sender's Initials:
+Number of Pages:
+(including cover sheet)
+Date:
+12/22/x6 3:45pm.
+b6-2
+b7C -2
+/2/22/200C.
+02/05/2005
+Special Handling Instructions:
+Please delives ASAP
+b6 -2
+b7C -2
+Originalor's Namc:
+Originator's Facsimile Number:
+(561) 833-7976
+Approved:
+Brief Description of Communication Faxed:
+That you,
+Happy Holid
+WARNING
+Information artached to the cover sheer'is U.S. Government Property, If you are not the intended recipient of this
+03956-10622
+information, disclosure, reproduction, distribuzion, or use of this information is prohibitod (18.USC, 42/22/20060Ž: 48PM
+mritinome ne the Incal FRI Offire immediately In arrange for neoney diennsition
+
+P.02
+:
+In the matter of case numbers):
+31E-MM-108062
+TO:
+ADDRESS:
+TELEPHONE:
+Sprint/Nextel
+Custodian of Records
+6480 Sprint Parkway
+Overland Park, KS 66251
+(913) 315-0736
+GREETING:
+By the service of this subpoena upon you by
+SA
+, who is authorized to serve it,
+you are hereby commanded and required to disclose to
+SA
+_ a representative of
+the FBI, the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or
+identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following:
+Please provide any and all account records to include subscriber and
+billing information for the following phone numbers and associated time
+period (toll records not necessary at this time):
+b70 - 2
+b6 -1,-5
+b70-1,-5
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INYESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION, YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
+Compliance must be made by personal appearance or production of records no later than the
+8
+yanuary
+2007
+at 10:00 o'clock A M,at 505 S. Flagler Drive,
+_day of
+$500
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+SA
+do information can be provided, via facsimile, marked to the attention of
+., at telephone number
+(561) 833-7970
+66-2
+b70 - 2
+SA
+In lieu of a personal appearance, the information can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+_, at the following address: 505 S: Flagler Drive, #500
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+If you refuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may Inyoke the ald of the United States
+Distriet Court to compel compliance. Your failure to obey the resulting court order may be punished as contemps.
+Issued under suthority of Public Lav No. 106-544, 8 5(a).
+(18 U.S.C. 83486)
+ATTESTED COI
+..
+Signature:
+Name, Tid
+Issued this 22
+day o_DeST2722/2006~02:956-10623
+
+-BI WEST PALM BEACH RE
+P.03
+uble Law 344 - 100th Longres
+2nd Session
+H.R. 3048
+AN ACT
+To amend Title 18, United States Code, to provida clearer covcrage over treats against former Presidents and members of their familics, and for
+other purposes. Bs it cnacted by the Senare and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.
+:
+..
+SEC. 5
+(4) IN GENERAL- Section 3480(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended -
+(1) so that paragraph (1) reads as follows:
+(1)(A) In any investigation of. (i)(1) a Ederal health care offense: or (II) a Federal offense involving the soxual exploitation or abuse of children, the
+Attorey General; or (i) an offenst under section 871 or 879, or a threat against a person proccted by the United States Secret Service under
+paragraph (5) or (6) of section 3056, if the Direcior of the Secret Service detormines that the threat constituting she offense or the threat against the
+person protected is incinent, the Secretary of the Treasury, may is in witing and cause to be served a subpoena requiring the production and
+lestimony described in subparagraph (B).
+(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), a subpoena issued under subparagraph (A) may require -- (i) the production of any records or other
+things relevant to the investigation; and (i) testimony by the custodian of the things requird to be produced concerning the production and
+authenticity of those things.
+(C) A subpoena issued under subparagraph (A) with respect to a provider of electronic communication scrvice or remore computing service, in an
+investigation, of a Federal offense involving the sexual exploitation or abuse of children shall not extend beyond -- (1) requiring that provider to
+disclose the name, address, local and long distance telephone 1oll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or identity, and length
+of service of a subscriber-to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer urilized, which may be relevant to an
+authorized law enforcement inquiry; or (ii) requiring a custodian of. the records of that provider to give restimony concerning the production and
+authentication of such records or information.
+(D) As used in this paragraph, the lem "Federal offense involving the sexual exploitation or abuse of children' means an offense under section 1201,
+2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2200, 2421, 2422, or 2423, in which the victim is an individual who has not attained the age of 18
+(2) in paragraph (3)-
+(A) by inserting relaring to a Federal health care offensc' after production of records; and
+(B) by adding at the end the following: "The production of things in any other dase may be required from any place within the United
+States or subject to the laws or jurisdiction of the United States!; and
+(3) by adding at the end the following:
+• (5) At any time before the return date specified in the summons, the person or entity summoned may, in the United States district court for the district in
+which that person or entity does business or resides, petition for an order modifying or acting aside the summons, or a prohibition of disclosure ordered
+by & court under paragraph (6).
+(6)(A) A United State district court for the district in which the summons is or will be served, upon application of the United States, may issue an ex
+parte order that no person or entity disclose to any other person or entity (other than to an arcorney in order to obtain logal advice) the existence of such
+summons for a poriod of up to 90 days.
+(B) Such order may be issuod on a showing that the things being sought may be relevent to the investigation and there is reason to believe that such
+disclosure may result in-
+(i) endangerment to the life or physical safety of any person:
+(il) flight to avoid prosecution;
+(ill) destruction of or tampering with cvidence; or
+(iy) intimidarion of potential witesscs.
+(C) An order under this paragraph may be renewed for additional periods of up to 90 days upon a showing that the circumstances described in
+subparagraph (B) continuc to exist.
+(7) A surmons issued under this scction shall not require the production of anything that would be protecred from production under the standards
+applicable to a subpoena duces recum issued by & court of the United Statcs.
+(8) If no case or proceeding arises from the production of records or other things pursuant to this section within a reasonable time after those records or
+things ure produced, the agency to which those records or things wore delivered shall, upon written derand made by the person producing those records
+or things, retur them to that person, except where the production roquired was only of copies rather than originals.
+(9) A subpoena issucd under paragraph (1)(A)(i)(II) or (I)(A)(ii) may require production as soon as possible, but in no cront less than 24 hours after
+service of the subpoena.
+(10) As soon as practicable following the issuance of a subpocna under piragraph (1)(A)(ii), the Sceretary of the Treasury shall notify the Attorney
+General of its issuanct.'.
+(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS-
+(1) SECTION HEADING. The heading for section 3486 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking:
+12/22/2006
+03956-10624
+0Z: 48PM
+
+DEC-22-2006 16:00
+in Federal health care Investigations'.
+. (2) TABLE OF SECTIONS- The item relating to section 3486 in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 223 of tirle 18, United States Code, is
+amended by striking: in Federal health. care investigations'.
+(3) CONFORMING REPEAL- Section 3486A, and the item relating to that saction in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 223, of title 18,
+United States Code, are repealed.
+(c) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT- Secrion 3486 of title 18, United Statcs Codc, is amended -
+(1) in subscetion (a)(4), by striking "summoned' and inserting "subpoenaed"; and
+(2) in subsection (d), by striking 'summons' each place it appars and inserting ' subpocna.
+12/22/2006
+03956-10625
+02:48PM
+
+0395b-10626
+31E-MM-108062-1415
+
+FD-340 (Rev. 7-29-92)
+Universal Case File Number .
+31E-MM-108062-1A21
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence _
+PBCRA/MM
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+02/08/2001
+- b7D -1
+From
+frame of Contributor).
+(Address of Contributor)
+By.
+SA
+To Be Returned • Yes • No
+Receipt Given • Yes • No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes • No
+Title:
+b6 - 2
+b7C -2
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description: • Original notes re interview of
+Subpowa Results
+for
+b6 -1
+b7C -1
+*'
+03956-10627
+
+JAN-16-2007 13:33
+U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+P.01
+In the matter of case number(s): 31E-MM-108062
+-b7D -1
+TO:
+ADDRESS:
+TELEPHONE:
+GREETING:
+By the service of this subpoena upon you by SA
+b6 -2
+who is authorized to serve itb7e
+-2
+you are hereby commanded and required to disclose to SA
+_, a representative of
+the FBI, the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or
+identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following:
+Please provide all
+account records to include subscriber and billing
+information as well as toll records (incoming and outgoing calls) for the
+following number:
+b6 - 1
+b7C -1
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION, YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
+Compliance must be made by personal appearance or production of records no later than the 30
+January
+2007 At 10
+A M, at 505 s. Flagler Drive,
+West Palm Beach; FL 33401
+_ day of
+In Liar
+SA
+ane information can be provided, via facsimile, marked to the attention of
+_ at telephone number
+(561) 833-7970
+In lieu of a personal appearance, the information can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+SA
+., at the following address: 505 S. Flagler Drive, 500
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+If you refuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may invoke the aid of the United States
+District Court to compel compliance. Your failure to obey the resulting court order may be punished as contempt.
+Issued under authority of Public Law No. 106-544, § 5(a).
+(18 U.S.C. §3486)
+ATTESTED CO
+Signature
+Name, Ti
+Issued this 15
+- b70 - 2
+day of January
+2007
+- 03956-10628
+
+To:
+SA
+. From:
+Date: February 4, 2007
+Pages:
+(including cover)
+Facsimile Cover Sheet
+Fax Number:
+Voice Number:
+Subject:
+Subpoena Response
+b6-1,-2
+b70 - 1, -2
+Message:
+The information contained in this facsimile transmission is privileged and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the individual or entity
+named above. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message t
+the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited
+If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by telephone and return the original to us at the address listed
+below via regular U.S. Mail. Thank you.
+03956-10629
+
+February 4, 2007
+SAL
+FBI
+505 S. Flagler Drive, 500
+West Palm Beach, FL
+66-2
+b7C -2
+Dear SAL
+This is in response to the Subpoena Duces Tecum, dated January 16, 2007, and served upon
+February 4. 2007. This subpoena requests customer identification/account information and
+A search of our subscriber database discloses the following information:
+on
+b6-1
+b70 - 1
+b7D - 1
+Should you have any questions regarding this information please feel free to contact me at your convenience.
+My direct telephone number is_
+Very truly yours,
+66 - 5
+670 - 5
+File
+]Legal Compliance Agent I
+03956-10630
+
+éed
+Alue
+3O™™n
+SEQ. NO. 7
+FBI
+WEIGHT(LBS)
+2
+a
+456034B
+N
+79
+0
+505 S. FLAGLER DRIVE.
+PIECES
+1
+WEST PALM BEACH
+USA
+SA
+FL
+ZIPCODE
+33401
+SERVICES
+03956-10733
+GDS THU
+GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG
+PBIY 9S
+DHL 1-800-225-5345 www.dhl-usa.com #1297 (05/04) S
+FSC
+b6-5g
+b7C -5
+b7D -16
+HLE
+HL
+b6 -2
+b7C -2
+4b7D
+
+31E-Mm-108062-1422
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+MM/PRCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+02/22/2007
+From
+print Nexte
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+66-2
+b7C -2
+By
+To Be Retured • Yes
+D No
+Receipt Given • Yes
+• NO
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+[No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+• No
+Title:
+:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+Original notes re Interview of
+cellular telesbone-Strat/Nentel
+03956-10734
+
+052
+ol. ec
+b6 - 2
+b70 - 2
+FBI FACSIMILE
+COVER SHEET
+PRECEDENCE
+• Immediate
+Priority
+Routine
+L Secret
+
+• Sensitive
+X Unclassified
+Time Transmitted:
+Sender's Initials:
+Number of Pages:
+(including cover sheet)
+3:25 pa
+To: Sprint/Nextel
+Name of Office
+Facsimile Number: 913-315-0736
+Attn: Records Custodian
+Name
+Date: 02/21/2007
+Room
+Telephone
+From: FBI
+Subject: Subpoena
+Name of Office
+Special Handling Instructions:
+Originator's Name: SA
+Originator's Facsimile Number: 561-833-7970
+Approved:
+Brief Description of Communication Faxed:
+Telephone:
+WARNING
+Information attached to the cover sheet is U.S. Government Property. If you are not the intended recipient of this
+originator or the local FBI Office immediately to arrange for proper disposition.
+information, disclosure, reproduction, distribution, or use of this information is prohibited (18.USC, § 641). Please 19896-90735
+
+FD-909 (Rev. 8-02-02)
+In the matter of case number(s): 31E-MM-108062
+TO:
+Sprint/Nextel
+Custodian of Records
+ADDRESS:
+6480 Sprint Parkway
+Overland Park, KS 66251
+TELEPHONE: 913-315-0736
+GREETING:
+b6 -2
+By the service of this subpoena upon you by SA
+, who is authorized to serve b70 - 2
+you are hereby commanded and required to disclose to SA
+_ a representative of
+the FBI, the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or
+identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following:
+Please provide all account records to include subscriber, user and billing
+information as well as toll records (incoming and outgoing calis) for the
+following number:
+66 - 5
+b70 - 5
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION. YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
+Compliance must be made by personal appearance or production of records no later than the 10
+2007. at 10: 00 oclock A M, at 505 S. Flagler Drive, #500 day of
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+SA
+In lie of mersonal 2o
+In lien of a nersonal annearance the information can be provided, via facsimile, marked to the attention of
+_ at telephone number
+561-833-7970
+In lieu of a personal appearance, the information can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+SAT
+-, at the following address: 505 S. Flagler Drive, #500
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+If you refuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may invoke the aid of a United States
+District Court to compel compliance. Your failure to obey the resulting court order may be punished as contempt.
+Issued under authority of Public I
+(18 U.S.C. §3
+ORIGINA
+Signature
+Name, Ti
+Issued this _ 21
+SRA
+. day of February
+b6 -2
+-b70 -2
+- 03956-10736
+
+b6 -2,-5
+b7C -2, -5
+Sprint 4
+SPRINT CORPORATE SECURITY, 6480 SPRINT PARKWAY, OVERLAND PARK, KS 66251
+Facsimile
+To:
+Fax:
+Company:
+From:
+
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+Department:
+Legal Compliance
+Date:
+Voice:
+1-800-877-7330
+February 22, 2007
+Fax:
+913-315-0736
+Comments:
+Total Pages:
+5
+03956-10737
+
+56-2,-5
+670 - 2,-5
+Sprint Nextel
+Corporate Security
+Mailstop KSOPHMO206
+Security Coordinator
+]Fax: 913-315-0736
+J@sprint.com
+02/22/2007
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+500 S. Flagler Drive
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+Your Case Number: 31EMM108062
+Sprint Nextel Case Number: 2007-036084
+Dear
+Pursuant to the above referenced case, I have enclosed the requested information
+associated with the following number(s):
+**************************************************
+03956-10738
+
+b6-5
+67C - 5
+***************************************************
+Should you have any questions or further inquiries, please contact the Sprint
+Nextel Subpoena Compliance Group at 866-259-7534.
+Sincerely,
+2
+03956-10739
+
+b6 -5
+- 5
+Subpoena Compliance
+Sprint Nextel Corporate Security
+@sprint.comp
+Enclosures
+*Notice: If the records contained in the attached package are utilized in trial proceedings, and if you
+require a records custodian for authentication, be advised Sprint does not have local representatives.
+Sprint's Trial Team is located at our Corporate Headquarters in Overland Park, Kansas.
+will require at least two-weeks notice in addition to pre-paid travel arrangements by your office.
+03956-10740
+
+..:
+File Number -
+3IE-MM-108062-1123
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+MM-PERA
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+2/210/260
+From
+-66 - 3
+b3 -3
+(Address)
+766-2
+b70 -2
+By
+SA
+To Be Returned
+• Yes
+1 No
+Receipt Given
+• Yes
+DiÑO
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+EÑo
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description: . Original notes re interview of
+Photocraph shour to
+56-3
+-b3 -1
+03956-10742
+
+b70 - 3, -5
+03956-10743
+
+
+b6
+- 3
+-3
+b3
+- 1
+03956-10744
+
+file Number _
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence :
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received -
+From
+03/21/2007
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By
+To Be Returned
+Yes
+Receipt Given L Yes
+ENo
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+El No
+b6 -2
+-b7C -2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+b6-3
+...
+03956-10745
+
+0001/018
+To:
+From:
+Date:
+Pages:
+SA
+March 20, 2007
+(including cover)
+Fax Number: (561) 833-7970
+Voice Number:
+Subject:
+Subpoena Response
+b6-2,-5
+b70 - 2,-5
+Message:
+-1
+Note: Records could not be converted
+to electronic format.
+The information contained in this facsimile transmission is privlleged and confidentialolt is Intendad only for the use of the individual or entit
+If the reader of lhis message is not the intended recipient or the employce or agent responsible for delivering the message i
+the interded recipient. you are hereby notified that any disseminalion, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited.
+you hive received this communication In error, please notify us immediately by telephone and return the original to us at the address liste
+elow v a regular U.S. Mail. Thank yo
+03956-10746
+
+FEB-26-260?
+14:38
+0002/018
+P.B2
+U. 5. DERARTMENT OF JUSTICE/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+In the matter of case number(s): 31E-MM-108062
+—b7D -1
+TO:
+ADDRESS:
+TELEPHONE
+
+GREETING:
+By the se-vice of this subpoena upon you by SA
+b6-2
+who is authorized to serve b70 - 2
+you are hereby commanded and required to disclose to SA
+_ a representative of
+the FBI, the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or
+identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+tilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following:
+Please proved all
+account records to include subscriber, user and billing
+information as well as toll records (incoming and outgoing calls) for the
+Following number:
+**Please provide records on digital media.
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION, YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
+_ day of
+March
+7007_ at 10:00 o'clock_
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+SA
+The information can be provided, via facsimile escalead es tha santia.
+_, at telephone number
+he information can be provided, via mail, marked to the atention of
+_, at the following address: 505 S. Flagler Drive, #500
+West Part Beach, PorIda 33401
+I you refuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may invoke the aid of the United State
+District Court to compel compliance. Your failure to obey the resulting court order may be punished as contempl
+Issued under authority of Public l
+(18 U.S.C. $3
+ATTESTED C
+Signature
+Name, T
+SSRA
+Issued th
+_b7C -2
+03959-10747
+
+FER-26-25D?
+runsed (Men. 0-2.97)
+14:37
+Ø003/018
+P.01
+FBI FACSIMILE
+COVER SHEET
+PRECEDENCE
+] Immediate
+L Priority
+El Routine
+• Secrer
+• Confidential
+• Sensitive
+* Unclassified
+Name of Office
+Time Transmitied:
+Sender's Initials:
+Vumber of Pages:
+including cover sheet
+Date: 02/26/2007
+To:
+Ficsimile Number:
+Atta: Records Custodian
+Name
+F•Om:
+FBI
+Name of Office
+S'ubject:
+Room
+Telephone
+Special Handling Instructions:
+1 Telephone:
+Originator's Name:
+SA
+Originator's Facsimile Number: 561-833-7970
+Approved:
+B'ief Description of Communication faxed:
+b6 -2
+-b7C
+-2
+WARNING
+In formation attached to the cover sheet is U.S. Governmenz Property. If you are not the intended recipient of this
+in ormation, disclosuro, reproduction, distribution, or use of this information is prohibited (18. USC, § 641). Please notify the
+or ginator or the local FBI Office immediately to arrange for proper dispositon.
+03956-10748
+
+12/200? 11:56 FAX
+#004/018
+March 20, 2007
+SAL
+FBI
+505 S. Flagler Dr. #500
+W. Pain Beach, FL 33401
+Dear SA
+b6-2
+b70 - 2
+This is in response lo the Subpoona Duces Tecum, daled February 20, 2007, and served upor
+Peoruary 26, 2007, This subpoena requests
+A search of our subscriber database discloscs the following information:
+-3,-5
+Should you have any questions regarding this information please feel free lo contact ne at your convenience.
+My direct iclephone number is:
+Very truly yours,
+Subpoena Response
+]egal Compliance Agcat
+Liw Enforcement Rclations
+03956-10749
+
+057
+01b6-2
+b70 -2
+FBI FACSIMILE
+COVER SHEET
+PRECEDENCE
+• Immediate
+• Priority
+X Routine
+- Secret
+
+• Sensitive
+[X Unclassified
+Name of Office
+Time Transmitted:
+Sender's Initials:
+Number of Pages:
+(including cover sheet)
+2:30
+7370 pm
+To:
+Facsimile Number:
+Attn: Records Custodian
+Name
+Date: 02/26/2007
+Room
+Telephone
+From: FBI
+Subject:
+Name of Office
+Special Handling Instructions:
+Originator's Name: SA
+Originator's Facsimile Number: 561-833-7970
+Approved:
+Brief Description of Communication Faxed:
+Telephone:
+b6 -2
+b7C -2
+WARNING
+Information attached to the cover sheet is U.S. Government Property. If you are not the intended recipient of this
+information, disclosure, reproduction, distribution, or use of this information is prohibited (18.USC, $ 641). Please 1855 6-10764
+originator or the local FBI Office immediately to arrange for proper disposition.
+
+BE- 1282352-1725
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+1, 0002.
+Serial of Originating Document le
+Date Received
+3/332202
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+*66 - 2
+b7C -2
+By
+To Be Returned
+Yes
+Receipt Given
+• Yes
+A-No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTY)
+• Yes
+•'Ño
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+E Originatroses renterview of
+Totta subtie CA
+03956-10765
+
+Mar. 23. 2007 11:17AM
+No. 1398 P. 1
+b6-2,-5
+b70 -2, -5
+jetBlue
+AIRWAYS®
+Fax
+To:
+SA
+Fax: (561) 833-7970
+Pages: 2 (including cover)
+Phone:
+Re:
+Subpoena Response
+O Urgent
+From:
+Date: 3/23/2007
+• For Review • Please Comment • Please Reply
+• Please Recycle
+Enclosed please find JetBlue Airways Response to the above referenced subpoena.
+-03956-10766
+
+Mar. 23. 2007 11:18AM
+No.1398
+P. 2
+jetBlue
+AIRWAYS.
+VIA FACSIMILE: (561) 833-7970
+March 22, 2007
+SAL
+505 S. Flagler Drive, #500
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+Re:
+66-2
+b70 - 2
+63-1
+3IE-MM-108062
+Sebrona Rene 200 3902
+SA
+Please he advised that we searched our database and do not have information
+responsive to the following request:
+All cravel information from
+Internarional Airport and J
+Jo or from
+— Internarional Airport forl
+b6 - 2
+b70 - 2
+In complying with the subpoena, Jetblue Airways does not waive any privileges,
+lefenses of any protections of persons subject to subpoenas. JetBlue Airway
+eserves the right to assert any and all applicable privileges with respect is
+confidential information and produces the demanded documents only as required by
+law.
+66 - 51
+670 - 5
+Staff Counsel
+Phone:|
+116-29 Queens Boulevard
+Furest Itills, New York 11375
+Icl: (718) 286-7900 → Fax: (718) 709-3631
+03956-10767
+
+FD-909 (Rev. 8-02-02)
+In the matter of case number(s): 31E-MM-108062
+JetBlue Subpoena Compliance
+Attn:
+TO:
+b6 -5
+b7C -5
+ADDRESS:
+TELEPHONE:
+718-709-3631
+GREETING:
+By the service of this subpoena upon you by SA
+., who is authorized to serve jb6 - 2
+you are hereby commanded and required to disclose to SAL
+_ a representative ob7C - 2
+the FBI, the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or
+identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following:
+Please provide all fliaht.
+reservation and billina information reaarding the
+cellular telephone
+or the following dates/airports:
+-b7C -3
+63-1
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION. YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
+March
+West
+Compliance must be made by personal appearance or production of records no later than the 23
+10:00 o'clock A M, at 505 s. Flagler Drive,
+Palm
+Beach, FL 33401
+- day of
+SA
+In lieu of a nersonal annearance the information can be provided, via facsimile marked to the attention of
+_, at telephone number
+b6-2
+b7C -2
+In lieu of a personal appearance, the information can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+SA
+., at the following address: 505 S. Flagler Drive, #500
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+If you refuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may invoke the aid of a United States
+District Court to compel compliance. Your failure to obey the resulting court order may be punished as contempt.
+Issued under authority of Public Law No. 106-544, § 5(a)
+(18 U.S.G $3186)
+ORIG
+Sign
+Nam
+Issued this.
+1
+day of March
+Fesenfor
+., 03955-10768
+
+060
+01. ecb6-2
+b7C -2
+FBI FACSIMILE
+COVER SHEET
+PRECEDENCE
+Immediate
+Priority
+Routine
+• Secret
+
+] Sensitive
+XI Unclassifiec
+To: JetBlue Subpoena Compliance
+Name of Office
+Facsimile Number:
+718-709-3631
+Attn:
+Name
+Room
+Time Transmitted:
+Sender's Initials:
+Number of Pages:
+(including cover sheet)
+11:08 am
+Date: 03/01/2007
+:
+Telephone
+66 - 5
+b70 -5
+From:
+Subject:
+FBI
+Name of Office
+Special Handling Instructions:
+Originator's Name:_SA
+1 Telephone:
+Originator's Facsimile Number: 561-833-7970
+Approved:
+Brief Description of Communication Faxed:_Subpoena Reguest
+56 - 2
+b7C -2
+WARNING
+Information attached to the cover sheet is U.S. Government Property. If you are not the intended recipient of this
+information, disclosure, reproduction, distribution, or use of this information is prohibited (18.USC, $ 641). Please 395 6-10769
+originator or the local FBI Office immediately to arrange for proper disposition.
+
+31E-MM- 108082-1826.
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+3/26/2087
+From
+(Address)
+By
+To Be Returned
+Yes
+El NO
+Receipt Given
+Yes
+•No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+ANo
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+0, No
+b6 -2
+b7C -2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description: • E
+7 Original notes re interview of =
+Adminitritie Subpreva love
+b6 -3
+& Resets
+03956-10770
+
+To: SA L
+FBI 33401
+STE 500
+505 S FLAGLER DRIVE
+WEST PALM BEACH FL 33401
+File Code:
+b7C -2
+Phone Number:
+Fax Number: (561) 853-7970
+Request Dated: 2/21/2007
+Received On: 2/21/2007
+From:
+Number of Pages:
+Date: 3/19/2007
+b7C -2
+If you are not already doing so, please begin addressing all legal requests to
+immediately, please fax all legal requests to
+Additionally, effective
+- Our customer(s) upgraded to a new network, but kept the same wireless number. There are three
+subscriber reports from the different networks. Therefore, we have provided information from two
+different databases to include the subseriber's complete history during the date range requested.
+CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE
+Official Use Only
+U
+R
+03956-10771
+
+FEB721-2007 15:29
+P.02
+In the matter of case numbers): 31E-MM-108062
+TO:
+ADDRESS:
+TELEPHONE
+GREETING:
+b6 -2
+By the service of this subpoena upon you by SA
+who is authorized to serve ib7c
+-2
+you are hereby commanded and required to disclose to SA
+_ a representative of
+the FBI, the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or
+identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following:
+Please provide all account records to include subscriber, user and billing
+information as well as toll records (incoming and outgoing calls) for the
+following number:
+- 3, -5
+..
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION. YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
+March
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+SA
+La lieu of a percanel annearance she information can be provided, via facsimile, marked to the attention of
+_, at telephone number
+561-833-7970
+In lieu of a personal appearance, the information can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+,, at the following address: 505 S. Flagler Drive, #500
+west Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+I you refuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may invoke the aid of the United States
+District Court to compel compliance. Your failure to obey the resulting court order nay be punished as contempt.
+Issued under authority of Public Li
+I scener
+(18 U.S.C. $34
+ATTESTED CO
+Signature:
+Name, Tit
+Issued this
+21
+SSRA
+-b7C -2.
+day of February
+
+
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-CV-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 79
+Page 38 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 39 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 40 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 41 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 42 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 43 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 44 ~ b3 - 1; b6
+- -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 45 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 46 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 47 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 48 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 49 ~ b3 -
+b6
+- -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 50 ~ b3 - 1;
+b6
+- -3, -5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+51
+~ b3
+b6
+-3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+52 ~ b3 - 1;
+Page
+53
+~ b3
+b6- -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+54 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+55 ~ b3 -
+1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+56
+~b3
+1; b6
+Page
+59
+~ b3
+2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+1; b6
+1,-2,-3; b7C - 1,-2,-3; b7D - 1;
+Page
+60
+b3
+b6
+1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+61 ~
+b3
+b6 -
+1,-3; b7C - 1,-3; b7D - 1;
+Page
+62
+~ b3
+b6 -
+1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page
+63
+~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page
+64
+~b3 - 1;
+b6
+,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page
+65
+~ b3
+b6
+3
+; b7C - 3;
+Page 66 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+1,-2,-3,-6; b7C- 1,-2,-3,-6; b7D - 1;
+Page
+67
+b3
+b6 -
+1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page
+68
+_~ b3
+b6 -
+3
+,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page
+69~b3-
+b6 -
+2
+,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page
+70 ~ b3
+1; b6
+2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 71 ~ b3 -
+b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 74 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page
+75 ~ b6 - 3,- 5; b7C - 3,- 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 76 ~ b6 - 3,- 5; b7C - 3,- 5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 77 ~ b6 - 3,- 5; b7C - 3,- 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 78 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 79 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 80 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 81 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 82 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 83 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1:
+Page 84 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 85 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 86 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 87 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 88 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 89 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+
+Page 90 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E
+Page 91 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E
+Page 92 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E
+Page 93 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E
+Page 94 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E
+Page 95 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+b7E
+Page 96 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E
+Page 97 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E
+Page 98 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5 ;
+b7E
+Page 99 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E
+Page 100 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5
+b7E
+Page 101 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5
+b7E
+Page 102 ~ b6
+- 3-5; b7C - 3,-5
+b7E
+Page 103 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5
+..
+b7E
+Page 104 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5
+b
+7E
+Page 105 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5
+b7E
+Page 106 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 107 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 108 ~ b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 109 ~ b6
+- 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 110 ~ b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 121 ~ b3
+- I; b6 - 1,-2,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-2,-3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 122 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 123 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 124 ~ b3
+1; b6
+1,-2,-3; b7C - 1,-2,-3; b7D - -1;
+Page 125 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3; b7D - 1;
+Page 127 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 128 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 129 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 130 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 131 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxXXXXXXX
+X Deleted Page (s)
+* No Duplication Fee X
+X For this Page
+X
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+
+V
+3IE-MM-108062-1A95
+Tield Office Acquiring Evidence Mm / PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _*
+Date Received Various
+From
+(Name of Contributor/interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+b6 -2
+-2
+By
+To Be Returned • Yes.
+• NO
+Receipt Given • Yes
+ENo
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+• No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+•NO
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+• Original notes re interview of
+Bipsraphical: file for
+and Myspace information
+66 -3
+b7C - 3
+03956-16453
+
+PALM BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT
+www.palmbeachpolice.com
+b6-3
+b7C - 3
+In any Emergency
+In-Emergency (561) 838-5454
+Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+TIPS Line (561) 835-4738
+03956-10454
+
+
+b3 -1!
+MySpace.com | Home
+The Web ®
+MySpace O
+SPIRIT
+AIRLINES
+RED LIGHT
+SPECIALS
+Search
+fares
+from
+$29%
+click here
+PURGLARE.
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Help | SignUp
+is in your extended netu
+lappiness makes ti
+orld go round
+Female
+United States
+Last Login: 10/1/2006
+Entry (Subscribe 1
+[View All Blog Entries]
+About me:
+View My: Pics | Videos
+Contacting
+M? Send Message
+B Add to Friends
+* Instant Message
+Gy All to Group
+Bp Forward to Friend
+Acid to Favorites
+83) Block User
+If Rank User
+Who I'd like to meet:
+Friend Space
+Jhas 275 friends.
+ySpace URL:
+tp://www.myspace.co
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=userviewprofile&friendID_
+03956-10455
+
+Chasing Cars
+Snow Patrol
+Interests
+tadd+
+*view+
+General
+INSIDE CLUB NV
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+b7C -3, -5 • Page 2 of 28
+03956-10456
+
+Page 3 of 2806 - 3, -5
+å Online Now!
+Friends Comments
+Displaying 48 of 308 comments (View All| Add C
+Music
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-10457
+
+www.myspace.com/
+
+Groups:
+_Details
+Status:
+Here for:
+Orientation:
+Hometown:
+Body type:
+Ethnicity:
+Religion:
+Zodiac
+Sign:
+Smoke /
+Drink:
+Children:
+b6 -3, - 5|
+b7c
+-3,- 5
+b3
+-1
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-10458
+
+Page 5 of 28b6 - 3, -5
+Education:
+Occupation:
+Income:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm/?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendDD-
+03956-10459
+
+
+66-3
+07C - 3
+03 -:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfmm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-10460
+
+Page 7 of 28 b6 - 3, - 5
+b70-3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-10461
+
+
+66-3
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&.friendID
+03956-10462
+
+Page 9 of 2866 - 3, - 5
+b70 -3,- 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-10463
+
+Page 10 of 2866 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-10464
+
+Page 11 of 28b6 - 3, -5
+- 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfim?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-10465
+
+Page 12 of 2866 - 3, -3
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-
+03956-10466
+
+Page 13 of 2866 - 3, - 5
+b70 - 3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-10467
+
+Page 14of28b6c--ś,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-10468
+
+b6 -3,-5
+Page 15 of 28b7C -3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-10469
+. 10/3/2006
+
+Page 16of2&b7c-З,-55
+- 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-10470
+
+Page 17 of 2806 - 3, -5
+b7C - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-10471
+
+Page 18 of 2867c 33-5
+63-3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-10472
+
+
+66 - 3|
+63-1 l
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-10473
+
+Page 20 of.28
+b7C - 3
+63 -1
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-10474
+
+www.myspace.com_
+Page 21 of 2866 - 3, -5
+b7C - 3,- 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-10475
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-10476
+
+
+66-3'
+b3 -1|
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-10477
+
+Page 24 of 28b6 - 3, -5
+b7C -3, - 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-10478
+
+Page 25 of 28b6c=33→=5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-10479
+
+Page 26 of 2866 - 3, -5_
+b7C -3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-10480
+
+Page 27 of 28b6 -3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-10481
+
+Page 28 of 28b6c=33-55
+About| EAQ| Ierms | Privacy I Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Inappropriate Content | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-10482
+
+_View More Pictures
+
+MySpace.com | Help | SignOut
+Web | MySpace | People | Music | Blogs | Video •
+Search Web
+: Here are the best Smileys
+on the Net.
+For IMs,
+e-mails and blogs
+' you bet! (
+The vanety is truly amazing.
+PYou can even add your own
+phrasing. Plus talking smileys ' makes them better yet! Theycorre
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Pictures of
+Click Picture for Full View & Comments
+b6-3,- 5|
+b70 - 3,-5
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID
+&My Token-fa46cee0-9056-46...
+03956-10483
+
+
+03956-10484
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID
+&MyToken=fa46cee0-905b-4b. 10/3/2006
+
+
+166-3,-5
+b70-3,-5
+03956-10485
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm/fuseaction-user.viewPicture&friendID MyToken=fa46cee0-905b-4... 10/3/2006
+
+
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID=
+03956-10486
+7& My Token-fa46cee0-9056-4b...
+
+b6 -3
+MYSPACE
+CURRENT: PRiVATE
+03956-10487
+
+
+b7C - 3
+Sponsored Links
+Are You Romantic?
+-ind out with this Free Personality Tes
+to see how Romantic you are!
+www.Chatterbean.com/Romantic
+What Type of Mom Are You?
+A fun test to find out what type of
+Heaven or Hell?
+Free Personality Test
+Where are You Going? Take the Quiz. Discover your personality type. Get a
+ee online personality tes
+TheHeavenOrHellQuiz.com
+ww.ActualMe.co
+MySpace
+(Search rare; Google
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+This profile is set to private. This user must
+add you as a friend to see his/her profile.
+Last Login:
+5/24/2007
+Contacting
+* Send Message
++8 Add to Friends
+8* Instant Message
+*88 Add to Group
+MySpace URL:
+http://www.myspace.com
+@ Forward to Friend
+Add to Favorites
+@ Block User
+18 Rank User
+•:
+:
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Abuse | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-10488
+5/31/2007
+
+30.2
+242
+209 ks o1
+b3 -1l
+b6-2
+b7C -2
+03956-10489
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+..
+
+000
+63-1
+=MAPQUEST.-
+Start: 505 S Flagler Dr
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-
+5923, US
+* THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE"
+ROADITOUR
+SWEERSTAKEE
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR A
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+of?
+L Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+'.:
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp
+
+
+Dimi
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+... Page 2 of 2
+b6-3
+b70 -3
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+
+
+3IE-MM-108062-1A96
+Fied ottie Acquiring Evidence_ Mm/ PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document —
+Date Received Various
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+=
+(City and State)
+By
+SA
+To Be Returned O. Yes.
+• No
+Receipt Given • Yes
+• No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+• Nor
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+LI No
+b6 -2
+b7C -2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+Biosiashical file for
+b6 -3
+03956-10524
+
+03956-10525
+
+d.
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Di, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+=MAPQUESTE
+Start:
+505 S Flagler Dr
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-
+5923, US
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE*
+ROADITOUR
+OWEEPSTAKES
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+012
+lip Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+3956-1056
+8/200
+
+d.
+‚Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL t
+... Page 2 of 2
+b6 -3
+b7C - 3
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, road
+conditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest and its suppliers assume no
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+813926-10564
+
+• .
+U.S. Department of Justice
+File Number 315-MM- 108062-1497
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence —
+MM/ PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document ..
+Date Received
+VARIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+b6 -2
+b7C -2
+By
+To Be Returned
+Yes
+Receipt Given ' • Yes
+ENo
+5-NO
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+• No-
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+ENo
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+Fite on
+b6 -3
+03956-10565
+
+Serve
+ToDo: Att records
+Verizon records
+Storage
+Mays
+Phons spege amig Teled,
+03956-10566
+-.."
+
+I want to become a...
+Social
+Worker
+User Shortcuts:
+Home Browse
+Psychologist
+Criminal
+Investigator
+Bounty
+Hunter
+Counselor
+Teacher
+Graphic
+Accountant
+Designer
+ICPA
+HR
+Officer
+Page 1 01b6 - 3
+click here to find out how.
+Project
+Manager
+Chef
+More
+degrees.in
+People
+Search
+Events | MySpace TV | Music | Comedy
+Search | Invite
+Film Mail Blogs
+| Favorites | Forum | Groups
+Classifieds
+Last Login: 1/6/2008
+Mood: restless @
+View My: Pics | Videos
+Contacting
+• send Message
+*° Add to Friends
+8° IM / Call
+*28 Add to Group
+Forward to Friend
+Add to Favorites
+Block User
+*8 Rank User
+My Space URI:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+03956-10567
+
+MySpace.com -
+http://ww,.yspace,com
+Pageb6 - 3, -5
+b70 -3,- 5
+Loading...
+DD:00
+Interests
+General
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-10568
+
+- www.myspace.com/
+Page 26 - 3,-5
+b70-3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-10569
+
+MySpace.coml
+- www.myspace.com
+Page 4b6 3,-5
+b7C 3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-10570
+
+- www.myspace.com
+Page b7c - 3, - 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+03956-10571
+
+b6 - 3, -9
+Page 67c -3, - i
+-b3 -1
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+03956-10572
+
+FD-909 (Rev. 8/02-02)
+U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+In the matter of case number(s): 31E-MM-108062
+TO:
+ADDRESS:
+TELEPHONE:
+GREETING:
+By the service of this subpoena upon you by SA
+., who is authorized to serve it, b6 - 2
+you are hereby commanded and required to disclose to SA
+., a representative of b70 - 2
+the FBI, the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or
+identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may he relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following:
+-3
+-1
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION. YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
+April
+West Palm
+•Beach, Florida 33401
+In lieu of a nersonal annearance, the information can be provided, via facsimile, marked to the attention of
+SA
+_, at telephone number
+In lieu of a personal appearance, the information can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+SA
+1, at the following address: 505 S. Flagler Drive, #500
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+If you refuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may invoke the aid of a United States
+District Court to compel compliance. Your failure to obey the resulting court order may be punished as contempt.
+Issued under authority of Public Law No. 106-544, $ 5(a)
+(18 U.S.C. 83486)
+ORIGINAL
+Signature: _
+Name, Title
+SSRA
+Issued this _
+1
+_ day of April
+b70 - 2
+66-2
+b7C -2
+. 50.0
+_, 2008
+03956-10578
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/49b210694fe9f26f07251344f1c522077330eaef4adde29c64b515fe689bb1d2.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/49b210694fe9f26f07251344f1c522077330eaef4adde29c64b515fe689bb1d2.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b31cf82d43ddc9f4aef53573dc2829a1679ce4e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/49b210694fe9f26f07251344f1c522077330eaef4adde29c64b515fe689bb1d2.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -5686,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "49b210694fe9f26f07251344f1c522077330eaef4adde29c64b515fe689bb1d2",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 29,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.confidential\", \"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.page-footer\", \"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "2d42fdd95903cb1e62aaf4619d2c5a2982f891f6040c479950d83e850a55dd03",
+  "output_sha256": "4381b24a7312880e0aa534c534b4aa5418d2ebe9f0dd17574c8a442c180617c6",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/538546ccc924f4f9bed9092adaac82b0e153d00f29795bd598f13d37a6fea9b1.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/538546ccc924f4f9bed9092adaac82b0e153d00f29795bd598f13d37a6fea9b1.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..04041578e90bc89afa152ec7c0bc0178620031ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/538546ccc924f4f9bed9092adaac82b0e153d00f29795bd598f13d37a6fea9b1.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2177 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+H
+De
+N
+ry
+m.b3-
+-b3
+~ b3
+00
+b
+12
+= b3
+13 ~ b3
+14
+63
+15
+- b3
+16
+~ b3
+17
+= b3
+18
+~ b3
+19
+b3
+20
+- 63
+21
+b3
+22
+b3
+23
+= b3
+24
+~ b3
+25
+- b3
+26
+63
+27
+b3
+28
+b3
+29
+30
+~ b3 -
+31
+b3
+32
+63
+33
+163
+34
+35
+~ b3
+36
+m
+38
+~ 63
+40 ~ b3
+41
+N
+43
+48
+= b3
+b3
+~ b3 -
+b3
+- b3
+~ b3
+m
+;
+1;
+1;
+1
+;
+;
+;
+3
+3
+b6
+b6
+66
+b6
+b6
+
+8
+ru
+;
+;
+;
+;
+;
+;
+;
+b6
+b6
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+…-
+
+Page 103 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 104 ~ 63 - 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 105 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+106 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 107 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 108 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 109 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 110 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 111 - b3 - 1; b6 -
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 112 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 113 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 114 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 115 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 116 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 117 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 118 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 119 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page
+120
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page 121 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7c
+Page
+122
+- b3
+1;
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+123
+~ b3
+1;
+Page
+124
+~ b3
+1;
+Page
+125
+= b3
+1;
+Page
+126
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3, -5;
+b7c
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page
+127
+63
+1;
+3,
+- 5;
+b 7C
+Page
+128
+~ b3
+1;
+Page
+129
+~ b3
+1;
+Page
+130
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+3,-5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+131 - b3
+1;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page
+132
+1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+133
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page
+134
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+135
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+136 ~
+b3
+1;
+66
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+137
+63
+1;
+66
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+Page 138
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7c
+Page
+139
+b3
+1;
+Page
+140
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+b
+6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+141 ~
+1b 3
+1;
+b6 -
+3,
+- 5; b7C
+Page
+142 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+143 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+144
+= b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3,- 5;
+b7C
+Page 145 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 - 3,-5;
+b 7C
+Page
+146 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3, -5;
+b7c
+Page
+147 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page
+148
+= b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+149 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3, -5;
+b7c
+Page
+150 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page
+151 - 63
+1; b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+152 - b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+153 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+154 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b 7C
+Page 155 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 156 - b3
+- 1;
+b6 - 3, -5; b7C
+3,
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+5;
+5;
+
+Page 157 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 158 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 159 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 160 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 161 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 162 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 163 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 164 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,
+-5; b7C
+Page 165 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 166 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 167 ~ 63
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 168 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 169
+~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 170
+~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 171 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 172 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 173 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page
+174
+b3
+1i
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+Page 175 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page
+176 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+177 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+-5:
+b7C
+Page
+178
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+179 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 180 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+181 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b7c
+Page 182 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+183
+1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+184 ~
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+185
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 186
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+187
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+188
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+189 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+190
+- b3
+1;
+66
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+191 ~
+b3
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page 192 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+193
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+194
+- b3
+1;
+3,
+-5; b7C
+b6
+3,
+-5; b7C
+Page
+195
+163
+1;
+b6 -
+3,
+-5; b7C
+Page
+196 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+197 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+198 ~b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+199 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 200 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 201 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 202 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+203 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+204 -b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 205 - b3
+1; b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page 206 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 207
+~ b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+208
+b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page 209
+~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 210 - b3
+- 1;
+b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+5;
+5;
+
+Page 211 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 212 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 213
+- b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+214-
+b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 215
+~b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 216
+= b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 217 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 218
+~ b3
+1; b6
+3,
+- 5; b7C
+Page 219 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 220 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page
+221-b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 222 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+223
+~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 224 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 225 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 226 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 227 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page
+228
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+229
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, - 5;
+b7c
+Page
+230
+~ 63
+1;
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+231
+1;
+Page
+232
+b3
+1;
+Page
+233
+b3
+1;
+Page
+234
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+3,
+-5:
+b7C
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3, -5;
+b7c
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page
+235
+63
+1;
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+236-63
+1;
+Page
+237
+b3
+1;
+Page
+238
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+3,-5;
+b7C
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page
+239
+- 63
+1;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page
+240
+- 63
+1;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page
+241
+= b3
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page 242
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+243
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+244
+b3
+1;
+66
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+245
+63
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page
+246 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, - 5;
+b7c
+Page
+247
+ru
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+248
+b3
+1;
+b
+Page
+249
+1b 3
+1;
+6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+b6 -
+3,
+- 5; b7C
+Page
+250 ~ 63
+1;
+b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+251 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+252 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3,- 5;
+b7C
+Page 253 ~ b3
+- 1;
+66 - 3,-5;
+b 7C
+Page 254 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 255 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page
+256 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+257 = b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3, -5;
+b7c
+Page
+258 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C
+Page 259
+- b3
+1; b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page 260 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 261 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 262 ~ b3
+1;
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page 263 - b3
+1;
+66 -
+3,- 5;
+b7c
+Page 264 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3,
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+5;
+5;
+
+b3
+= b3
+m
+m
+= b3
+ru
+m
+m
+L0
+L0
+10
+10
+L0
+-b6
+L0
+L0
++ %
++ aa
+4%
+1;
+3,
+3,
+b7c
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7c
+b7c
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+3,
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+- 5;
+3
+
+Page 319 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 320 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+321 - b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+322 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 323 - b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 324 ~ b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 325 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 326 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 327 - b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 328
+~ b6
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 329 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 330 - b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 331 - b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 332 ~ b6 -
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 333 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 334 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 335 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 336
+= b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 337 - b6
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+338
+~ 66
+1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+339~b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+340
+- b6
+1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+341 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+342 - b6
+- 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+343~b6
+- 1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 344 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+345 = b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+346 ~
+b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+347 ~ 66
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+348 ~ 66
+- 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+349 ~ 66
+- 1,
+- 5;
+b70 - 1,
+Page
+350
+= b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+351 - b6
+Page
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+352 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+353 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+354 " b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+355
+= b6
+Page
+356 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 357 - b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+358 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 359 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 360 - b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 361 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 362 ~ b6 -
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 363 ~ b6 -
+1,
+- 5; 67C - 1,
+Page 364 ~ b6 -
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+365 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 366 - b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 367 ~ b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 368 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 369 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 370 ~ b6 -
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 371 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 372 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+5;
+- 5;
+D
+D
+D
+D
+7
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+
+Page 373 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 374 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+375 - b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+376 - b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 377 - b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 378 ~ b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 379 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 380 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 381 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 382 ~ b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 383 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 384 - b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 385 ~ b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 386 - b6
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 387 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 388 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 389 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 390 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 391 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+392 ~ 66-
+1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+393~66-
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+394 - b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+395 - b6 -
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+396 - b6
+- 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+397
+~66 - 1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+398 - b6-
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+399
+a b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+400 ~ b6 -
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+401 - b6 - 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+402 ~ b6
+- 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+403~66
+- 1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+404 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 405 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+406 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+407
+~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 408 ~ b6 -
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+409
+= b6
+Page
+410 ~ 66
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+411 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+412 - b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+413 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+414 - b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 415 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+416 " 66
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 417 - b6
+1,
+- 5; 67C - 1,
+Page 418 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+419 - b6
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 420 - b6 - 1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+421 ~ b6
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 422 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 423 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 424 ~ b6 -
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 425 - b6 -
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 426 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+5;
+- 5;
+D
+D
+D
+D
+7
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+
+Page 427 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 428 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 429 - b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 430 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 431 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 432 ~ b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 433 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 434 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 435 - b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 436 ~ b6
+- 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 437
+-b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 438 ~ b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 439
+-b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 440 - b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 441 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 442 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 443 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+444 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C
+- 1,
+Page 445 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+446 ~ b6
+1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+447 ~ b6 -
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+448
+- b6
+- 1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+449
+= bo
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+450
+= b6
+- 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+451 ~ 66
+- 1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 452 ~ b6 -
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+453 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+454 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+455 ~ 66
+- 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+456 ~ b6
+- 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+457 ~ 66
+- 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+458
+~ bб
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 459 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+460
+~ 66
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+461
+66
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 462
+= b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+463
++ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+464 ~ 66
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+465
+- 66 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+466 - b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 467
+~b6 - 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 468 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 469 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 470 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 471 - b6
+1,
+- 5; 67C - 1,
+Page 472 ~ b6 -
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 473 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 474 - b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 475 ~ b6
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 476 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 477 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 478 ~ b6 -
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 479 - b6 -
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 480 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+5;
+- 5;
+D
+D
+D
+D
+7
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+
+Page 481 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 482 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 483 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 484 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 485 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 486
+= b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 487 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 488
+~b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 489 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 490
+~b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 491
+-66 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 492 ~ b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 493
+= b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 494 - b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 495 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 496 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 497 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+498
+= b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 499 - b6 -
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+500
+-b6 -
+1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+501 - b6 -
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+502 ~ b6 -
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+503 ~ 66 -
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+504 ~ b6
+- 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+505 - b6
+- 1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+506 - 66
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+507
+~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+508
+- b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+509
+- b6
+- 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+510
+~ b6
+- 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+511 ~ 66
+- 1,
+-5;
+b70 - 1,
+Page
+512 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+513 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+514 ~ 66
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+515 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+516 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+517 - b6
+Page
+518 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 519 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 520 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 521 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 522 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 523 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 524 ~ b6 -
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 525 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5; 67C - 1,
+Page 526 ~ b6 -
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 527 - b6
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 528 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+529 - 66
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 530 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 531 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 532 ~ b6 -
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 533 - b6 -
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 534 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+5;
+- 5;
+D
+D
+D
+D
+7
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+
+Page 535 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 536 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 537 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+538 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 539 - b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+5;
+Page 540 ~ b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+b7
+D
+b7
+D
+b7
+D
+7
+D
+b7D
+b7D
+Page 541 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 542 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 543 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 544 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 545 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 546 ~ b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 547 - b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 548 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 549 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 550 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+7
+b7
+D
+D
+D
+D
+b7
+D
+b7
+D
+b7
+D
+b7
+D
+Page 551 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 552
+= b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page 553 - b6
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+554 ~ b6
+1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+Page
+555 ~ 66
+1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+556 ~ 66
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+Page
+557 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+558 ~ b6
+- 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+559
+- b6
+1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+b7
+D
+b7
+D
+b7
+D
+b7
+b7
+D
+b7
+D
+D
+b7
+D
+Page
+560 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 561 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+562 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+563
+- 66
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+D
+Page
+564
+~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+b7
+D
+Page
+565 ~ 66
+- 1,
+-5;
+67C - 1,
+D
+Page
+566 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+567 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+Page
+568
+- b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+b7
+D
+b7
+D
+b7
+D
+Page
+569 ~ 66
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+b7
+Page 570 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+b7
+D
+Page
+571 - b6
+Page
+572 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+b7
+D
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 573 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 574 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXxxXXXXX
+× Deleted Page (s)
+× No Duplication Fee X
+X
+For this Page
+X
+X
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxX
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/538546ccc924f4f9bed9092adaac82b0e153d00f29795bd598f13d37a6fea9b1.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/538546ccc924f4f9bed9092adaac82b0e153d00f29795bd598f13d37a6fea9b1.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6eb0db0ca74ad460af0dfbf6877ef2084e42798e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/538546ccc924f4f9bed9092adaac82b0e153d00f29795bd598f13d37a6fea9b1.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -536,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "538546ccc924f4f9bed9092adaac82b0e153d00f29795bd598f13d37a6fea9b1",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "7e2be2e9addb637b1ea37a040fb2ca108c26f244543022e983e54439edddd9dd",
+  "output_sha256": "04e146512fdfd1f8e9ca77ecec0e30d9d50bb32c0aaa6a46c652a5a4205c2472",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/5f29e2cc5736843553002b9fa9ea29fe9e832d3d390d6f3c111b901df4549431.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/5f29e2cc5736843553002b9fa9ea29fe9e832d3d390d6f3c111b901df4549431.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7d277c34c9043847f3e093317ee508a20d9254e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/5f29e2cc5736843553002b9fa9ea29fe9e832d3d390d6f3c111b901df4549431.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1982 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action No.: 17-cv-03956
+Release Date: January 31, 2020
+Total Withheld Page(s) = 4
+Bates Page
+Reference
+03956 - 11026-11027
+03956 - 11028-11029
+Reason for Withholding
+(i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed
+by order of court, etc.)
+Duplicate copies of 10983-10984
+Duplicate copies of 10983-10984
+Deleted Page
+No Duplication Fee
+For this Page
+
+•Case 9:08-Cv-80119-KAM Document 113-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/22/2009
+
+1
+1
+2
+IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
+FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
+IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
+CRIMINAL DIVISION
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+STATE OF FLORIDA
+VS
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN
+Defendant.
+CASE NO.
+06• CF9454AMB
+08 9381CFAMB
+PLEA CONFERENCE
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+PRESIDING: HONORABLE DEBORAH DALE PUCILLO
+APPEARANCES :
+ON BEHALF OF THE STATE:
+BARRY E. KRISCHER, ESQUIRE
+State Attorney
+401 North Dixie Highway
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+By :
+LANNA BELOHLAVEK, ESQUIRE
+Assistant State Attorney
+ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT:
+ATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & WEISS, P.A.
+250 Australian Avenue South
+Suite 1400
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+By: JACK GOLDBERGER, ESQUIRE
+CERTIFIED COPY
+June 30, 2008
+Palm Beach County Courthouse
+West Palm Beach,
+Florida 33401
+Beginning at 8:40 o'clock, a.m.
+03956-10980
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 113-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/22/2009
+
+20
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+regularly congregate?
+MS. BELOHLAVEK: I personally do not
+know.
+THE COURT: Neither do I, which is
+why I'm asking. Has that been
+investigated?
+MR. GOLDBERGER: We have done our due
+diligence, for what it's worth, there is a
+residential street.' There are not children
+congregating on that street. We think the
+address applies, if it doesn't, we fully
+recognize that he can't live there.
+THE COURT: Okay. D is, you shall
+not have any contact with the victim, are
+there more than one victim?
+MS. BELOHLAVER: There's
+several.
+THE COURT: Several, all of the
+victims. So this should be plural. I'm
+making that plural. You are not to have
+any contact direct or indirect, and in this
+day and age I find it necessary to go over
+exactly what we mean by indirect. By
+indirect, we
+mean no text messages, no
+e-mail, no Face Book, no My Späce, no
+telephone calls, no voice mails, no
+03956-10981
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 113-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/22/2009
+
+21
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19-
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+messages through carrier pigeon, no
+messages through third parties, no hey
+would you tell so and so for me, no having
+a friend, acquaintance or stranger approach
+any of these victims with a message of any
+sort from you, is that clear?
+THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am
+THE COURT: And then it states,
+unless approved by the victim, the
+therapist and the sentencing court. Okay.
+THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
+THE COURT: And the sentencing court.
+So, if there is a desire which, I would
+think would be a bit strange to have
+contact with any of the victims the court
+must approve it.
+MS. BELOHLAVEK: Correct.
+THE COURT: If the victim was under
+the age of 18, which was the case, you
+shall not until you have successfully
+attended and completed the sex offender
+program. So, is this sex offender program
+becoming a condition of probation?
+MS. BELOHLAVEK: That is not. I
+don't believe
+I circled that one.
+03956-10982
+
+CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON
+JANE DOE NO. 2,
+Plaintiff,
+VS.
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
+Defendant.
+Related Cases:
+08-80232, 08-80380, 08-80381, 08-80994,
+08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80893, 09-80469,
+09-80591, 09-80656, 09-80802, 09-81092,
+DECLARATION OF ADAM D. HOROWITZ
+1. My name is Adam D. Horowitz. I am an attorney for Jane Doe No. 4.
+2. The deposition of Jane Doe No. 4 was scheduled for September 16, 2009 at 1:00
+p.m. at 350 Australian Ave. South, Suite 115, West Palm Beach, Florida. On the day before the
+deposition, the undersigned and counsel for Jeffrey Epstein entered into a written stipulation in
+which it was agreed that "Jeffrey Epstein will not attend tomorrow's deposition of Jane Doe No.
+4 (in the absence of a court order permitting him to attend)." It was further agreed that Jeffrey
+Epstein may listen in to the deposition by telephone or view a videofeed of the deposition, but
+under no circumstances would he "be seen by our client."
+While Jane Doe No. 4 and I were in the lobby of 350 Australian Ave South at
+approximately 1:00 p.m. for her deposition on September 16, 2009, we crossed paths with
+Jeffrey Epstein and someone who appeared to be his bodyguard. Jeffrey Epstein stopped
+
+A
+03956-10983
+
+walking and began to stare at and intimidate Jane Doe No. 4. Jane Doe No. 4 was terrified,
+began crying and ran outside the building. Jeffrey Epstein smirked at her and walked away.
+4.
+As a result of this incident, Jane Doe began crying uncontrollably and was unable
+to proceed with her deposition.
+Under penalties of perjury I declare that I have read the foregoing Declaration and the
+facts stated in it are true.
+Dated: September 17, 2009
+2-anel
+Adam D. Horowitz
+03956-10984
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 305 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 1 of 8
+CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON
+JANE DOE NO. 2,
+Plaintiff,
+v.
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
+Defendant.
+Related Cases:
+08-80232, 08-80380, 08-80381, 08-80994,
+08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80893, 09-80469,
+09-80581, 09-80656, 09-80802, 09-81092.
+DEFENDANT'S, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND
+TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF JANE DOE NO. 4 AND MEMORANDUM IN
+SUPPORT THEREOF
+Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, by and through his undersigned attorneys, moves this
+court for an order granting sanctions pursuant to Rule 30(d)(2) and (3)(A) and (C) (referencing
+Rule 37(a)(5)), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and compelling the deposition of Jane Doe No.
+4 within fifteen (15) days and as grounds therefore would state:
+1. On August 16, 2009, the deposition of Jane Doe No. 4 was noticed for September
+16, 2009 to begin at 1:00 p.m. Plaintiff's counsel had advised that Jane Doe No. 4 could not
+appear for a deposition prior to that time of day, i.e. 1:00 p.m.
+The deposition was originally set at the offices of the undersigned, but Plaintiff's
+counsel requested that it be moved to the court reporter's office. The court reporter is Prose
+Court Reporting located at 250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 115, West Palm Beach, FL
+33401.
+03956-10985
+
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 2 of 8
+3.
+The undersigned's office began attempting to set the deposition of Jane Doe No. 4
+on July 21, 2009. Because of the number of attorneys who would be attending (based on the
+court's consolidation order) coordinating the video deposition creates logistical problems.
+4. On August 27, 2009, the undersigned wrote a letter to counsel for the Plaintiff
+indicating that Mr. Epstein would be present at the deposition. A copy of that letter is attached
+as Exhibit 1.
+5.
+Some 13 days later, counsel for Jane Doe No. 4 filed a motion for protective order
+on September 9, 2009 attempting to prohibit Mr.Epstein's presence at the deposition. The
+Defendant immediately filed a response (an Emergency Motion) on September 11, 2009
+requesting that the court enter an order allowing Epstein, the Defendant in this matter, to attend
+the deposition. This is common procedure. See Exhibit 2, without exhibits. As of the date of
+the deposition, the court had not ruled on these motions.
+6.
+On Monday, counsel for Jane Doe No. 4 and the undersigned spoke, an agreement
+was reached that the deposition would proceed as scheduled, and that Mr. Epstein would not be
+in attendance other than by telephone or other means. See Exhibit 3.
+7. The deposition was originally scheduled on the 15" Floor and moved by Prose to
+a larger ground floor to accommodate the number of people who were to attend
+8.
+The undersigned and his partner, Mark I. Luttier, had scheduled a meeting with
+Mr. Epstein for approximately an hour prior to the deposition. It is well known through multiple
+newspaper articles that Mr. Epstein's office at the Florida Science Foundation is located on the
+14" Floor in the same building as the court reporter and Mr. Epstein's criminal attorney, Mr.
+Goldberger. As well, had the court issued an order prior to the deposition that would have
+allowed Mr. Epstein to attend, he was readily available.
+2
+03956-10986
+
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 3 of 8
+9. As of 1:00 p.m., no order had been received from the court, so Epstein's
+attorneys, in good faith, decided that Epstein would not attend the deposition (as per the
+agreement), if we chose to proceed, which we were doing. The undersigned and Mr. Luttier
+specifically waited until just after 1:00 o'clock, the time that the deposition was to start, prior to
+leaving with Mr. Epstein. Counsel instructed Mr. Epstein to leave the building. Clearly,
+Defendant and his counsel simply wish to have meaningful discovery.
+10. The undersigned and Mr. Luttier exited the elevator heading toward the
+deposition room and Mr. Epstein and his driver, Igor Zinoviev exited in separate elevator at the
+same time and turned to depart from through the front entrance such that he could go to his home
+to watch the deposition and assist counsel, from a video feed.
+11. Completely unbeknownst and unexpected by anyone, apparently the Plaintiff and
+her attorney(s) were at the front door where Mr. Epstein was intending to exit. Upon seeing two
+women, one who might be the Plaintiff, Mr. Epstein immediately made a left turn and exited
+through a separate set of doors to the garage area. See affidavit of Jeffrey Epstein and Igor
+Zinoviev, Exhibit 4 and 5, respectively.
+12. The entire incident was completely unknown to the undersigned and Mr. Luttier
+until Adam Horowitz, Esq. came in and announced that the deposition was not going to take
+place in that Mr. Epstein and his client saw one another, she was upset and therefore the
+deposition was cancelled from his perspective.
+13. The undersigned and his partner, Mr. Luttier, had a court reporter and a
+videographer present. Additionally, Mr. Hill on behalf of C.M..A., Adam Langino on behalf of
+B.B., William Berger on behalf of three Plaintiffs were present for the deposition.
+3
+03956-10987
+
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 4 of 8
+14. Any suggestion that the chance "visual" between Mr. Epstein and Jane Doe No. 4
+was "pre-planned" would be absurd, disingenuous and false. The undersigned counsel went out
+of his way to make certain Mr. Epstein would not be in the building after the time the deposition
+was set to begin. Had the Plaintiff and her counsel been in the deposition room at the appointed
+time, no visual contact would have occurred.
+15. It is possible that Plaintiff's counsel, by filing their motion for protective order on
+September 9, 2009 and then advising the undersigned on September 14, 2009 that the deposition
+would not go forward unless the undersigned agreed to exclude Mr. Epstein from the deposition,
+were not prepared and/or did not want to proceed with the deposition.
+16. The unilateral termination of the deposition was unnecessary, inappropriate and a
+substantial waste of attorney time and the costs related to the deposition (court reporter and
+videographer). (See Affidavit of Robert D. Critton, Jr., Mark T. Luttier and Deposition
+Transcript, Exhibits 6, 7, and 8 respectively).
+17. Had the "visual" been premeditated, the cancellation of the deposition may have
+been justified, however, under these circumstances, it was grandstanding and improper. In that
+the Plaintiff has stated that she voluntary went to JE's home 50 plus times without trauma until
+she filed a lawsuit, this brief visual encounter from a distance should not have resulted in the
+unilateral cancellation of her deposition.
+18.
+The costs associated with the court reporter and videographer total $428.80.. See
+
+Memorandum of Law In support of Motion
+A substantial amount of administrative time went into the setting up the deposition of
+Jane Doe No. 4. Almost two months passed from the time that the Defendant's counsel first
+4
+03956-10988
+
+Case 9:08-CV-80119-KAM Document 305
+
+requested a date for the deposition of Jane Doe No. 4. The deposition of Jane Doe No. 4 was to
+begin at 1:00 p.m, based on her schedule, and was moved from the undersigned's office to the
+office of the court reporter at her counsel's request.
+Pursuant to Rule 30(d)(2) and (3)(A) and (C) and its reference to 37(a)(5)), Federal Rules
+of Civil Procedure, the court may impose an appropriate sanction, including reasonable expenses
+in attorneys fees incurred by any party on a person who impedes or delays the fair examination
+of the deponent. In this instance, the brief visual encounter, which was completely unintended
+and inadvertent, should not have been grounds for Plaintiff's counsel and Plaintiff refusing to
+move forward with the deposition. Furthermore, pursuant to (3)(A) and (C), Plaintiff and
+Plaintiff's counsel had no right to unilaterally terminate/cancel the deposition and fail to move
+forward. Plaintiff should have continued with the deposition and filed any motion deemed
+appropriate post deposition. Therefore, Defendant is asking for the costs associated with the
+attendance of the court reporter, her transcript and the presence of the videographer. Defendant
+would also request reasonable fees for 2.5 hours at $500 per hour for being required to prepare
+this motion and affidavits associated with same.
+The records obtained thus far on Jane Doe No. 4, do not reflect any "emotional trauma"
+by her own account of some 50 plus visits to the Defendant's home prior to the time that she
+hired an attorney. Even in her interview with attorney's handpicked expert, Dr. Kliman, by her
+own comments, her significant emotional trauma relates to physical and verbal abuse by a prior
+boyfriend, Preston Vineyard, and deaths associated with two close friends, Chris and Jen.
+Therefore, the supposed "emotional trauma" caused by a chance encounter resulting in a
+"glance" at best, should not be the basis for Plaintiff unilaterally cancelling her deposition.
+5
+03956-10989
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM
+Document 305 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 6 of 8
+Rule 7.1 A. 3. Certification of Pre-Filing Conference
+Counsel for Defendant conferred with Counsel for Plaintiff by telephone and by e-mail;
+however, an agreement has not been reached.
+WHEREFORE, Defendant moves this court for an order granting sanctions to include
+attorneys fees and costs as set forth above and costs associated with the attendance of the court
+reporter, the transcript and the presence of the videographer and direction that Jane Doe No. 4
+appear for deposition within fifteen (15) days from the date of the court's order at the court
+reporter's office. If the court has not issued an order regarding Mr. Epstein's attendance at
+Plaintiff's deposition when Jane Doe No. 4 is to appear, the Defendant will agree that Mr.
+Epstein will not be present in the building on the date of her scheduled deposition such that no
+"inadvertent" contact will occur.
+Robert D. Critton, Jr.
+Michael J. Pike
+Attorneys for Defendant Epstein
+Certificate of Service
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered to the Clerk
+of the Court as required by the Local Rules of the Southern District of Florida and electronically
+mailed to all counsel of record identified on the following Service List on this _
+day of
+September, 2009.
+Certificate of Service
+Jane Doe No. 2 v. Jeffrey Epstein
+Case No. 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON
+6
+03956-10990
+
+Case 9:08-cV-80119-KAM Document 305
+
+Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq.
+Adam D. Horowitz, Esq.
+Mermelstein & Horowitz, P.A.
+18205 Biscayne Boulevard
+Suite 2,218
+Miami, FL 33160
+305-931-2200
+Fax: 305-931-0877
+ssm@sexabuseattorney.com
+ahorowitz@sexabuseattorney.com
+Counsel for Plaintiffs
+In related Cases Nos. 08-80069, 08-80119, 08-
+80232, 08-80380, 08-80381, 08-80993, 08-
+80994
+Richard Horace Willits, Esq.
+Richard H. Willits, P.A.
+2290 10* Avenue North
+Suite 404
+Lake Worth, FL 33461
+561-582-7600
+Fax: 561-588-8819
+Counsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. 08-
+80811
+reelrhw@hotmail.com
+Jack Scarola, Esq.
+Jack P. Hill, Esq.
+Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley,
+P.A.
+2139 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard
+West Palm Beach, FL 33409
+561-686-6300
+Fax: 561-383-9424
+jsx@searcylaw.com
+jph@searcylaw.com
+Counsel for Plaintiff, C.M.A.
+Bruce Reinhart, Esq.
+Bruce E. Reinhart, P.A.
+250 S. Australian Avenue
+Suite 1400
+Brad Edwards, Esq.
+Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler
+401 East Las Olas Boulevard
+Suite 1650
+Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
+Phone: 954-522-3456
+Fax: 954-527-8663
+bedwards@rra-law.com
+Counsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. 08-
+80893
+Paul G. Cassell, Esq.
+Pro Hac Vice
+332 South 1400 E, Room 101
+Salt Lake City, UT 84112
+801-585-5202
+801-585-6833 Fax
+cassellp@law.utah.edu
+Co-counsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe
+Isidro M. Garcia, Esq.
+Garcia Law Firm, P.A.
+224 Datura Street, Suite 900
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+561-832-7732
+561-832-7137 F
+isidrogarcia@bellsouth.net
+Counsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. 08-
+80469
+Robert C. Josefsberg, Esq.
+Katherine W. Ezell, Esq.
+Podhurst Orseck, P.A.
+25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800
+Miami, FL 33130
+305 358-2800
+Fax: 305 358-2382
+rjosefsberg@podhurst.com
+kezell@podhurst.com
+Counsel for Plaintiffs in Related Cases Nos.
+09-80591 and 09-80656
+Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq.
+7
+03956-10991
+
+Case 9:08-CV-80119-KAM Document 305
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 8 of 8
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+561-202-6360
+Fax: 561-828-0983
+ecf@brucereinhartlaw.com
+Counsel for Defendant Sarah Kellen
+Theodore J. Leopold, Esq.
+Spencer T. Kuvin, Esq.
+Leopold-Kuvin, P.A.
+2925 PGA Blvd., Suite 200
+Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410
+561-684-6500
+Fax: 561-515-2610
+Counsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. 08-
+08804
+skuvin@riccilaw.com
+tleopold@riccilaw.com
+Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A.
+250 Australian Avenue South
+Suite 1400
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012
+561-659-8300
+Fax: 561-835-8691
+jagesg@bellsouth.net
+Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein
+Respectfully submitt
+By:
+ROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQ
+Florida Bar Ixo. 224162
+rcrit@bclclaw.com
+MICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ.
+Florida Bar #617296
+mpike@bclclaw.com
+BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN
+303 Banyan Boulevard, Suite 400
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+561/842-2820 Phone
+561/213-0164 Fax
+(Co-Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein)
+8
+03956-10992
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 305-2
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 1 of 1
+: BURMAN, CRITTON
+LUTTIER &&COLEMAN, LLP
+A LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHEP
+). MICHAEL BURMAN, P.A.12 .
+GREGORY W. COLEMAN, PA.
+ROBERT D. CRITTON, JR. PA. I'
+BERNARD LEBEDEKER
+MARK T. LUTTIER, P.A.
+JEFFREY C. PEPIN
+MICHASL J. PIKE
+HEATHER MONAMARA RUDA
+DAVID YAREMA
+'FLORIDA BOARD CERTIFIED CIVIL TRIAL LAWYER
+ZADMITTED TO PRACTICE IN FLORIDA AND COLORADO
+ADELQUI J. BENAVENTE
+PARALEGAL/INVESTIGAFOR
+JESSICA CADWELL
+BOBBIE M. MCKENNA
+ASHLIE STOKEN-BARING
+BETTY STOKES
+PARALEGALS
+RITA H. BUDNYK
+OF COUNSEL
+ED RICCI
+SPECIAL CONSUMER
+SUSTICE COUNSEL
+August 27, 2009
+Sent by E.Mail and U.S. Mail
+Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq.
+Herman & Mermeistein, P.A.
+18205 Biscayne Bivd.
+Suite 2218
+Miami, FL 33160
+Re: Jane Doe No. 4 v. Epstein
+Dear Stuart:
+Please be advised that Mr. Epstein plans to be in attendance at the deposition of
+your client. He does not intend to engage in any conversation with your client. However, it
+is certainly his right as a party-defendant in the lawsuit to be present and to assist counsel
+in the defense of any case.
+Cordialy ours,
+Robert
+Critton, Jr.
+RDC/clz
+cc;
+Jack A. Goldberger, Esq.
+EXHIBIT /
+303 BANYAN BOULEVARD • SUITE 400 • WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33401 • PHONE: 561-842-2820 • FAX: 561-844-6929 • MAIL@BCICIAW.COM
+WWW.BCLCLAW.COM
+03956-10993
+
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 1 of 11
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/11/2009 Page 1 of 33
+CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON
+JANE DOE NO. 2,
+Plaintiff,
+V.
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
+FILED by
+SEP 1 1 2009
+STEVEN M. LARIMORE
+CLERK U.S.
+S.D. OF FLA. • W.P.B
+CT.
+D.C.
+Defendant.
+Related Cases:
+08-80232, 08-80380, 08-80381, 08-80994,
+08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80893, 09-80469,
+09-80581, 09-80656, 09-80802, 09-81092.
+!
+Defendant Epstein's Emergency Motion To Strike Plaintiff's Motion For
+Protective Order (DE 292) And Emergency Motion To Allow The
+Attendance Of Jeffrey Epstein At The Deposition Of Plaintiffs And Response
+In Opposition To Plaintiffs', Jane Doe Nos. 2-8, Motion For Protective Order
+As To Jeffrey Epstein's Attendance At The Deposition Of Plaintiffs, With
+Incorporated Memorandum of Law
+Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, by and through his undersigned counsel, and pursuant to all
+applicable rules, including Local Rule 7.1(e) and Local Rule 12, hereby files and serves his
+Emergency Motion To Strike Plaintiff's Motion For Protective Order (DE 292) And Emergency
+Motion To Allow The Attendance Of Jeffrey Epstein At The Deposition Of Plaintiffs And
+Response In Opposition To Plaintiffs', Jane Doe Nos. 2-8, Motion For Protective Order As To
+Jeffrey Epstein's Attendance At The Deposition Of Plaintiffs. In support, Epstein states:
+Introduction and Background
+1.
+On August 19, 2009, Defendant sent a Notice for Taking the Deposition of Jane
+Doe No. 4 for September 16, 2009. See Exhibit "1"
+
+03956-10994
+
+Page 2
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 2 of 11
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/11/2009 Page 2 of 33
+2. Additionally, notices were sent out in other cases in connection with deposing
+additional Plaintiffs.
+3. No objection(s) was/were received for Jane Doe No. 4, which was the only
+deposition set relative to the Jane Doe 2-8 Plaintiffs.
+4.
+On August 27, 2009, the undersigned counsel sent a letter to counsel for Jane Doe
+No. 4 concerning her deposition and the scheduling of same on the above date. See Exhibit "2".
+5. No response was received until counsel for Jane Doe No. 4 called on September
+8, 2009, approximately eight days prior to the scheduled deposition, to indicate that they now
+had an objection and would be filing a motion for protective order seeking to prevent Epstein
+from attending the deposition.. Once again, Plaintiffs are attempting to stifle this litigation
+through their own delay tactics during discovery. Plaintiffs wish not only to attempt to force
+Epstein to trial without any meaningful discovery, but now wish to ban Epstein from any
+depositions, thereby preventing him from assisting his attorneys in his very own defense. What's
+next - will Plaintiffs seek to prevent Epstein from attending any of the trials that result from the
+lawsuits Jane Does 2-8 have initiated? Plaintiffs see millions of dollars in damages, both
+compensatory and punitive, against Defendant.
+6.
+Defendant is filing this emergency motion and his immediate response to the
+motion for protective order to guarantee his right to be present and assist counsel in deposing not
+only Jane Doe No. 4, but other plaintiffs and witnesses in these cases. To hold otherwise would
+violate Epstein's due process rights to defend the very allegations Plaintiffs have alleged against
+him. Does a Defendant not have a right to be present at depositions or other court proceedings to
+assist counsel with the defense of his case? Does a Defendant, no matter what the charges or the
+allegations, have full and unbridled access to the court system and the proceedings it governs,
+03956-10995
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM
+Document 305-3
+Page 3
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 3 of 11
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/11/2009 Page 3 of 33
+including discovery? The short answer is unequivocally, yes. To hold otherwise would be a
+direct violation of Epstein's constitutional due process rights. Plaintiffs' attempts to play fast
+and loose with the law should not be tolerated.
+7.
+As the court is aware, plaintiffs and defendants routinely attend depositions of
+parties and other witnesses in both State and Federal court proceedings. In fact, parties have a
+right under the law to attend such depositions.
+8. As the court will note from Exhibit 2, counsel for the Defendant specifically
+stated that "Please be advised that Mr. Epstein plans to be in attendance at the deposition of your
+client. He does not intend to engage in any conversation with your client. However, it is
+certainly his right as a party-defendant in the lawsuit to be present and to assist counsel in the
+defense of any case." Despite this right, Plaintiffs continue to attempt to control how discovery
+is conducted in this case and how this court has historically governed discovery.
+Interestingly, in Jane Doe II, the state court case, attorney Sid Garcia took the
+deposition of the Defendant and his client, Jane Doe II, was present throughout the deposition.
+This is despite her claims of "emotional trauma" set forth in her complaint. Jane Doe No. II is
+also a Plaintiff in the federal court proceeding Jane Doe II v. Jeffrey Epstein (Case No. 09-CIV-
+80469). Is this court going to start a precedent where it allows Plaintiffs to attend the depositions
+of Jeffrey Epstein, but not allow Epstein to attend their depositions (i.e., the very Plaintiffs that
+have asserted claims against him for millions of dollars)? This court should not condone such a
+practice.
+10. The undersigned is well aware of the court's No-Contact Order entered on July
+31, 2009 (DE 238). A copy of the order is attached as Exhibit "3". In fact, the order provides
+that the defendant have no direct or indirect contact with the plaintiffs, nor communications with
+03956-10996
+
+Case 9:08-CV-80119-KAM Document 296
+Page 4
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 4 of 11
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/11/2009 Page 4 of 33
+the plaintiffs either directly or indirectly. However, there is no prohibition against Mr. Epstein's
+attendance at a deposition where, as is reflected in the order, the communication will be made to
+the plaintiff solely through defense counsel with one or more of plaintiffs' counsel of record
+present in the room in a videotaped deposition. Obviously, any inappropriate contact or
+communication will certainly be flagged by the attorneys in attendance.
+• As such, Plaintiffs
+really have the cart before the horse in this instance (i.e., nothing prevents Epstein from attending
+these depositions and, to the extent Plaintiffs believe that something improper occurs at any
+deposition, only then can that circumstance be addressed by a motion such as the instant one.)
+11. Next, Plaintiffs, Jane Does 2-8, attempt to use the Affidavit of Dr. Kliman for
+every motion for protective order/objection filed to date. This also includes the two most recent
+motions, which attempt to prevent Defendant's investigators from doing their job, such that the
+Defendant and his attorneys can defend the claims asserted in these cases. Plaintiffs lose sight of
+the fact that the court, in discussing the Non-Prosecution Agreement, inquired as to whether
+Epstein and his counsel could fully defend the case, which included discovery and investigation.
+All plaintiffs' counsel and the USAO responded in the affirmative. In fact, Plaintiffs universally
+agreed at the June 12, 2009 hearing on Defendant's Motion to Stay that regular discovery could
+proceed. See Composite Exhibit "4" at pages 26-30 & 33-34. For instance, the court asked
+Plaintiffs' attorneys the following questions:
+The Court: I] So again, I just want to make sure that if the cases go forward and
+if Mr. Epstein defends the case as someone ordinarily would defend a case being
+prosecuted against him or her, that that in and of itself is not going to cause him to
+be subject to criminal prosecution? (Ex. "A," p.26).
+The Court: You agree he should be able to take the ordinary steps that a
+defendant in a civil action can take and not be concerned about having to be
+prosecuted? (Ex. "A," p.27).
+03956-10997
+
+Page 5
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 5 of 11
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/11/2009 Page 5 of 33
+***
+The Court: Okay. But again, you're in agreement with everyone else so far
+that's spoken on behalf of a plaintiff that defending the case in the normal course
+of conducting discovery and filing motions would not be a breach? (Ex. "A,"
+Mr. Horowitz - counsel for Jane Does 2-7: Subject to your rulings, of course,
+yes. (Ex. "A," p.30).
+***
+The Court: But you're not taking the position that other than possibly doing
+something in litigation which
+is any other discovery,
+motion practice,
+investigations that someone would ordinarily do in the course of defending a civil
+case would constitute a violation of the agreement? (Ex. "A," p.34).
+Ms. Villafana: No, your honor. I mean, civil litigation is civil litigation, and
+being able to take discovery is part of what civil litigation is all about.... But...,
+Mr. Epstein is entitled to take the deposition of a Plaintiff and to subpoena
+records, etc. (Ex. "A," p.34)
+12. It is clear from the transcript attached as Exhibit "4" that each of the Plaintiffs'
+attorneys, including Mr. Horowitz for Jane Does 2-8, expected and conceded that
+regular/traditional discovery would take place (i.e., discovery, motion practice, depositions,
+requests for records, and investigations.
+13. Importantly, Plaintiffs' counsel advised the undersigned that they coordinate their
+efforts in joint conference calls at least two times per month. At recent depositions of two
+witnesses, Alfredo Rodriguez and Juan Alessi, five different plaintiffs' attorneys questioned the
+witnesses for approximately six to eight hours, often repeating the same or similar questions that
+had previously been asked.
+14. Clearly, the Plaintiffs' counsel wish to control discovery and how the Defendant
+is allowed to obtain information to defend these cases. However, the court has ruled on a
+number of these issues as follows:
+A.
+Plaintiffs' counsels sought to preclude the Defendant from serving third
+party subpoenas and allowing only Plaintiffs' counsel to obtain
+03956-10998
+
+Case 9:08-CV-80119-KAM Document 305-3 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 6 of 11
+Case 9:08-CV-80119-KAM Document 296 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/11/2009 Page 6 of 33
+Page 6
+depositions and those materials and "filter them" to defense counsel.
+That motion was denied, and the court tailored a method such that the
+Defendant could obtain the records directly.
+B.
+C.
+D.
+Plaintiffs' counsels sought to limit the psychological psychiatric
+examination in C.M.A. v. Jeffrey Epstein and Sarah Kellen (Case No. 08-
+CIV-80811), as to time, subject matter and scope. However, Magistrate
+Johnson entered an order denying the requested restrictions.
+Other Plaintiffs' attorneys have said that they object to requested
+psychological exam of their clients), thus motions for such exams will
+now need to be filed; yet all seek millions of dollars in damages for
+alleged psychological and emotional trauma.
+Many Plaintiffs' object to discovery regarding current and past
+employment (although they are seeking loss of income, both in past and
+future).
+E.
+All Plaintiffs object to prior sexual history, consensual and forced as
+being irrelevant, although in many of the medical records that are now
+being obtained, as well as the psychiatric exams done by Dr. Kliman,
+there is reference to rape, molestation, abusive relationships (both
+physical and verbal), prior abortions, illegal drugs and alcohol abuse.
+15.
+Clearly, Plaintiffs wish to make allegations; however, they forget that they must
+meet their burden by proving same. Meeting that burden and disproving those allegations is not
+possible if this court allows Plaintiffs to stifle and/or control the discovery process.
+16.
+Specifically, with regard to Jane Doe No. 4, which is the deposition set for next
+week, September 16, 2009, the plaintiff has in her past (see affidavit of Richard C.W. Hall,
+M.D., an expert psychiatrist retained by Defendant to conduct exams on various claimants.) See
+
+A. Sought counseling due to a dysfunctional home situation, specifically with
+regard to her father.
+She described herself as being angry, bitter,
+depressed and having body image problems;
+B.
+Had an ex-boyfriend, Preston Vinyard, who was, on information and
+belief, a drug dealer who she lived with;
+C. Had drug and alcohol problems herself; and
+03956-10999
+
+Case 9:08-CV-80119-KAM Document 296
+Page 7
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 7 of 11
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/11/2009 Page 7 of 33
+D.
+Spoke with two psychiatrists when she was sixteen or seventeen (before
+this lawsuit!) and did not reference Epstein, but did reference her
+boyfriend and family issues.
+17. There are police reports that reflect that:
+A.
+In September 2004, a battery report was filed regarding Jane Doe No. 4
+and Vinyard based on an argument where he grabbed her by the neck and
+began spitting on her and calling her a cheater.
+B.
+Also in September 2004, there was a domestic violence file opened where
+Vinyard was physically and verbally abusive to Jane Doe No. 4, his
+girlfriend at the time. There is reference that the two started a serious
+relationship in January 2002, when she was only fourteen (14) years old.
+C. Vinyard was arrested in December 2003, and charged with reckless
+driving and leaving the scene of the accident with Jane Doe No. 4, when
+their vehicle hit a tree and they fled.
+18.
+Moreover, an ex-boyfriend of Jane Doe No. 4 died in a DUI accident and it took
+her two years to get over his death, and another good friend of hers, "Jen," died in an automobile
+accident involving drinking. Within her Amended Complaint and Answers to Interrogatories,
+she indicates that she went to Epstein's house on several occasions. However, at no time did she
+call the police, at no time did she report any traumatic or severe emotional trauma, not alleged
+coercion, force or improper behavior by Epstein until she got a "lawyer" and is now pursuing
+claims for millions of dollars. Epstein's assistance to his attorneys at these depositions regarding
+the above issues is not only a constitutional due process right afforded to him but essential given
+the fact that this court has ruled that Plaintiffs' depositions can only occur one time, no "second
+bite" absent a court order.
+19.
+Given the breadth of the allegations made against Epstein and the substantial
+damages sought, Epstein has an unequivocal and constitutional right to be present at any
+deposition such that he can assist his counsel with the defense of these cases. See infra. Dr. Hall
+03956-11000
+
+Page 8
+247.
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 8 of 11
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/11/2009 Page 8 of 33
+also prepared affidavits regarding Jane Does 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7, which are attached to DE
+Memorandum Of Law
+20. Plaintiffs' motion is required to be denied as they have failed to meet their burden
+showing the "extraordinary circumstances" necessary to establish good cause to support a
+protective order which would grant the extraordinarily rare relief of preventing a named party
+from attending in person the deposition of another named party. Also requiring denial of
+Plaintiffs' motion is the fact that it seeks to exclude Epstein from all the depositions of all the
+Plaintiffs in actions before this Court. Such relief is unprecedented and attempts to have this
+Court look at the Plaintiffs' collectively as opposed to analyzing each case based on facts versus
+broad speculation whether "extraordinary circumstances" exist on a case by case basis. In other
+words, the standard is such that the Court would be required to determine whether each Plaintiff
+has met her burden, should the Court consider adopting such extraordinary relief. On its face,
+the motion does not meet the necessary burden as to Jane Doe 4, or Jane Does 2, 3, 5, 6, or 7.
+Discussion of Law Requiring the Denial of the Requested Protective Order
+Rule 26(c)(1)(E), Fed.R.Civ.P. (2009), governing protective orders, provides in relevant
+part that:
+(1) In General. A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for
+a protective order in the court where the action is pending--or as an alternative on
+matters relating to a deposition, in the court for the district where the deposition will
+be taken. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith
+conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the
+dispute without court action. The court may, for good cause, issue an order to
+protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
+undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
+(E) designating the persons who may be present while the discovery is conducted;
+03956-11001
+
+Case 9:08-CV-80119-KAM Document 305-3 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 9 of 11
+Case 9:08-CV-80119-KAM Document 296 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/11/2009 Page 9 of 33
+Page 9
+In seeking to prevent the Defendant from being present in the room where the Plaintiffs
+are being deposed, Plaintiffs generally rely on treatise material from Wright & Miller, 8 Federal
+Practice & Procedure Civ.2d, §2041, and cases cited therein. The case of Gaella v. Onassis, 487
+F.2d 986, at 997 (2d Cir. 1973), cited by Plaintiffs, makes clear that the exclusion of a party from
+a deposition "should be ordered rarely indeed." Unlike the Gaella case, there is no showing by
+each of the Plaintiffs that there has been any conduct by Epstein, in rightfully defending the
+actions filed against him, reflecting "an irrepressible intent to continue ... harassment" of any
+Plaintiff or a complete disregard of the judicial process, i.e. prior alleged conduct versus any
+action/conduct displayed in this or other cases that would justify extraordinary relief. There is
+absolutely no basis in the record to indicate that Epstein will act other than properly and with the
+proper decorum at the depositions of the Plaintiffs and abide in all respects with the No-Contact
+Order.
+Wherefore, Epstein respectfully requests that this Court enter an order denying Plaintiffs'
+Motion for Protective Order, provide that Epstein is permitted to attend the depositions of the
+Plaintiffs that have asserted claims against him in the related matters, and for such other and
+further relief as this court deems just and proper.
+Robert D. Critton, Jr.
+Michael J. Fike
+Attorney for Defendant Epstein
+03956-11002
+
+Page 10
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 10 of 11
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/11/2009 Page 10 of 33
+Certificate of Service
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered to the Clerk
+of the Court as required by the Local Rules of the Southern District of Florida and electronically
+mailed to all counsel of record identified on the following Service List on this 11th day of
+September, 2009.
+Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq.
+Adam D. Horowitz, Esq.
+Mermelstein & Horowitz, P.A.
+18205 Biscayne Boulevard
+Suite 2218
+Miami, FL 33160
+305-931-2200
+Fax: 305-931-0877
+ssm@sexabuseattorney.com
+ahorowitz@sexabuseattorney.com
+Counsel for Plaintiffs
+In related Cases Nos. 08-80069, 08-80119, 08-
+80232, 08-80380, 08-80381, 08-80993, 08-
+80994
+Richard Horace Willits, Esq.
+Richard H. Willits, P.A.
+2290 10* Avenue North
+Suite 404
+Lake Worth, FL 33461
+561-582-7600
+Fax: 561-588-8819
+Counsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. 08-
+80811
+reelrhw@hotmail.com
+Jack Scarola, Esq.
+Jack P. Hill, Esq.
+Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley,
+P.A.
+Certificate of Service
+Jane Doe No. 2 v. Jeffrey Epstein
+Case No. 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON
+Brad Edwards, Esq.
+Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler
+401 East Las Olas Boulevard
+Suite 1650
+Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
+Phone: 954-522-3456
+Fax: 954-527-8663
+bedwards@rra-law.com
+Counsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. 08-
+80893
+Paul G. Cassell, Esq.
+Pro Hac Vice
+332 South 1400 E, Room 101
+Salt Lake City, UT 84112
+801-585-5202
+801-585-6833 Fax
+cassellp@law.utah.edu
+Co-counsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe
+Isidro M. Garcia, Esq.
+Garcia Law Firm, P.A.
+224 Datura Street, Suite 900
+West Palm Beach; FL 33401
+561-832-7732
+561-832-7137 F
+isidrogarcia@bellsouth.net
+Counsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. 08-
+80469
+03956-11003
+
+Page 11
+2139 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard
+West Palm Beach, FL 33409
+561-686-6300
+Fax: 561-383-9424
+isx@searcylaw.com
+jph@searcylaw.com
+Counsel for Plaintiff, C.M.A.
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 11 of 11
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/11/2009 Page 11 of 33
+Bruce Reinhart, Esq.
+Bruce E. Reinhart, P.A.
+250 S. Australian Avenue
+Suite 1400
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+561-202-6360
+Fax: 561-828-0983
+ecf@brucereinhartlaw.com
+Counsel for Defendant Sarah Kellen
+Theodore J. Leopold, Esq.
+Spencer I. Kuvin, Esq.
+Leopold-Kuvin, P.A.
+2925 PGA Blvd., Suite 200
+Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410
+561-684-6500
+Fax: 561-515-2610
+Counsel for Plaintiff in Related Case No. 08-
+08804
+skuvin@riccilaw.com
+tleopold@riccilaw.com
+Robert C. Josefsberg, Esq.
+Katherine W. Ezell, Esq.
+Podhurst Orseck, P.A.
+25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800
+Miami, FL 33130
+305 358-2800
+Fax: 305 358-2382
+rjosefsberg@podhurst.com
+kezell@podhurst.com
+Counsel for Plaintiffs in Related Cases Nos.
+09-80591 and 09-80656
+Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq.
+Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A.
+250 Australian Avenue South
+Suite 1400
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012
+561-659-8300
+Fax: 561-835-8691
+jagesq@bellsouth.net
+Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein
+Respectfully submitted,
+By:
+ROBERT D/ CRITTON, JR., ESQ.
+Florida Bar No. 224162
+rcrit@bclclaw.com
+MICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ
+Florida Bar #617296
+mpike@bclclaw.com
+BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN
+303 Banyan Blvd., Suite 400
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+561/842-2820 Phone
+561/515-3148 Fax
+(Co-Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein)
+03956-11004
+
+• Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 305-4
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Pragbof Bf 2
+Robert D. Critton Jr.
+From: Adam Horowitz [ahorowitz@sexabuseattorney.com]
+Sent:
+To:
+Cc:
+Tuesday, September 15, 2009 11:43 AM
+Michael J. Pike; Robert D. Critton Jr.
+Stuart Mermelstein
+Subject: Jane Does v. Epstein
+Please allow this to confirm that Jeffrey Epstein will not attend tomorrow's deposition of Jane Doe No. 4 (in the
+absence of a Court order permitting him to attend). We understand you may wish to have your client listen in by
+telephone or view a videofeed of the deposition, but will not be seen by our client.
+Regards,
+Adam D. Horowitz, Esq.
+www.sexabuseattorney.com
+Mermelstein & Horowitz, P.A.
+18205 Biscayne Boulevard
+Suite 2218
+Miami, FL 33160
+ahorowitz@sexabuseattorney.com
+Tel: (305) 931-2200
+Fax: (305) 931-0877
+From: Michael J. Pike [mailto:MPike@bclclaw.com]
+Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2009 10:54 AM
+To: Stuart Mermelstein; Adam Horowitz
+Cc: Robert D. Critton Jr.; Jessica Cadwell
+Subject: FW: Jane Does v. Epstein
+Gentlemen:
+I sent the e-mail below weeks ago. I have not heard back from you. I'm entitled to the
+questionnaires Kliman had your clients fill out and which he utilized to formulate his opinions. I
+need them by tomorrow since they are well over due. If not, I will have no other choice to file a
+motion, which I do not want to do given how we have worked together on these issues in the
+past. Let me know, pike.
+From: Michael J. Pike
+Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2009 11:37 AM
+To: Robert D. Critton Jr.; Stuart Mermelstein; Ashlie Stoken-Baring; Connie Zaguirre
+Subject: Jane Does v. Epstein
+From reviewing the transcripts, it seems Dr. Kliman utilized Questionnaire's with all of your
+clients. I need them. Please advise of your position. I'm sure you will produce since they are
+
+3
+9/15/2009
+03956-11005
+
+Case 9:08 cv-80119-KAM Document 305-4
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 8ge 2 of 2
+discoverable. Thanks.
+Michael J. Pike, Esq
+Burman, Critton, Luttier & Coleman
+515 N. Flagler Dr., Ste. 400
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+Telephone: (561) 842-2820
+Facsimile (561) 844-6929
+
+The information contained in this transmission is attorney/client privileged and/of attorney work product.
+If you are not the addressee or authorized by the addressee to receive this message, you shall not review,
+disclose, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message (including any attachments). If you have received
+this e-mail in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and destroy the message (including
+attachments) and all copies. Thank you.
+9/15/2009
+03956-11006
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 305-5 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 1 of 3
+CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON
+JANE DOE NO. 2,
+Plaintiff,
+JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN,
+Defendant.
+Related Cases:
+08-80232, 08-80380, 08-80381, 08-80994,
+08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80893, 09-80469,
+09-80581, 09-80656, 09-80802, 09-81092.
+AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN
+STATE OF FLORIDA
+COUNTY OF PALM BEACH
+) SS
+)
+BEFORE MB, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Jeffey E. Epstein
+having personal knowledge and being duly sworn, deposes and says:
+1. My office is located at 250 Australian Avenue South, 14th Floor, West Palm
+Beach, Florida. Its location has been well publicized in the news.
+20.
+I met with my attorneys, Robert D. Critton, Jr. and Mark I. Luttier, at 12:30 p.m.
+in preparation for the deposition of Jane Doe No. 4 which was to take place beginning at 1:00
+p.m. on September 16, 2009.
+3.
+I was aware of the motion for protective order which had been served in this case
+by counsel for Jane Doe No. 4 and the Emergency Motion To Strike Plaintiff's Motion For
+
+03956-11007
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 305-5
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 2 of 3
+Jane Doe No. 4 V. Epstein
+Page 2
+Protective Order And Emergency Motion To Allow The Attendance Of Jeffrey Epstein At The
+Deposition Of Plaintiffs And Response In Opposition To Plaintiffs', Jane Doe Nos. 2-8, Motion
+For Protective Order As To Jeffrey Epstein's Attendance At The Deposition Of Plaintiffs, With
+Incorporated Memorandum of Law, which had been filed on my behalf such that I could attend"
+the deposition and assist my attorneys in my defense.
+4. I also understood that as of 1:00 p.m. on September 16, after I had finished
+speaking with my attorneys that the cout had not ruled regarding the above-referenced motions.
+5.
+I was instructed by my attorneys that I could not attend the deposition and
+therefore a video feed was set up such that I could view the deposition from my home.
+6.. I also understood that my attorneys did not want me in the building after the
+deposition began.
+7. At 1:04 p.m. after we assumed that everyone would be in the deposition room, my
+lawyers went down on one elevator and I went down on another elevator with my driver, Igor
+Zinoviev, both exiting at approximately the same time.
+8. I asked Igor where he had parked, and he said "out front". We exited the
+elevator, I walked toward the front door. Near the front door, I saw a taller woman and a
+shorter woman who I thought might be Jane Doe No. 4 and immediately turned to my left and
+went out a separate exit to the garage.
+At no time did I speak with or attempt to interact with either women.
+FURTHER THE AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
+-Jeffrey E. Epstei
+03956-11008
+
+Case 9:08-cV-80119-KAM Document 305-5
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 3 of 3
+Jane Doe No. 4 V. Epstein
+Page 3
+STATE OF FLORIDA
+COUNTY OF PALM BEACH
+Thereby Certify that on this day, before me, an officer dily authorized to administer
+oaths and take acknowledgments, personally appeared Jeffrey E. Epstein known to me to be the
+person described in and who executed the foregoing Affidavit, who acknowledged before me
+that he/she executed the same, that I relied upon the following form of identification of the above
+named person: Jello Epstein
+- and that an oath was/was not taken.
+WITNESS my hand and official seal in the County and State last aforesaid this
+day of Sept. 17
+- 2009.
+PRINT NAME:
+Shen/ Mahum (SEAL)
+NOTARY PUBLIC/STATE OF FLORIDA
+COMMISSION NO.:
+MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:
+MAHO
+NOTARY
+My Comm. Expires
+May 28, 2010
+No. DD519867
+PUBLIG
+She or FOR T
+03956-11009
+
+Case 9:08-Cv-80119-KAM Document 305-6 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 1 of 2
+CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOENSON
+JANE DOE NO. 2,
+Plaintiff,
+Y.
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
+Defendant.
+Related Cases:
+08-80232, 08-80380, 08-80381, 08-80994,
+08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80893, 09-80469,
+09-80581, 09-80656, 09-80802, 09-81092.
+AFFIDAVIT OF IGOR ZINOVIEV
+) SS
+)
+STATE OF FLORIDA
+COUNTY OF PALM BEACH
+BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Igor Zinoviev
+having personal knowledge and being duly sworn, deposes and says;
+1.
+I work for Jeffrey Epstein. I as well drive him from place to place.
+2. At approximately 1:04 p.m., Mr. Epstein and I went down it the elevator from the
+14" floor to the ground level. I was to drive Mr. Epstein to his home. His lawyers went down at
+approximately the same time in a separate elevator.
+I parked the car at the front entrance. As I walked toward the front door and
+notioed that Mr. Epstein quickly turned to the left so as to exit through the door to the garage of
+the building rather than the front entrance.
+
+03956-11010
+
+Case 9:08-Cv-80119-KAM Document 305-6
+Page 2
+4. At no time did Mr. Epstein speak or gesture to anyone, including the individuals
+whom I saw near the front door.
+5.
+At no time did I speak with the individuals at the main entrance.
+FURTHER THE AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT."
+Ega Jou
+STATE OF FLORIDA
+COUNTY OF PALM BEACH
+I hereby Certify that on this day, before me, an officer duly authorized to administer
+oaths and take acknowledgments, personally appeared Igor Zinovier known to me to be the
+person described in and who executed the foregoing Affidavit, who acknowledged before me
+that he/she executed the same, that I relied upon the following form of identification of the above
+named person: defly Epstein and that an oath was/was not taken.
+WITNESS my hand and official seal in the County and State last aforesaid this
+day of _
+Sest. 07
+- 2009.
+NOTARY
+My Comm. Expires
+May 28, 2010
+No. DD519867
+PUBLIC
+TE
+"OF FLORIDA
+7. Make
+NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA
+PRINT NAME: She 11. Mahony (SBAL)
+COMMISSION NO.:
+MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:
+03956-11011
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 305-7 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 1 of 2
+CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON
+JANE DOE NO. 2,
+Plaintiff,
+V.
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
+Defendant.
+Related Cases:
+08-80232, 08-80380, 08-80381, 08-80994,
+08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80893, 09-80469,
+09-80581, 09-80656, 09-80802, 09-81092.
+AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. CRITTON, JR.
+STATE OF FLORIDA
+COUNTY OF PALM BEACH
+) SS
+)
+BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Robert D. Critton, Jr.,
+having personal knowledge and being duly sworn, deposes and says:
+1.:
+I am counsel for Jeffrey Epstein in the above-styled matter and other civil
+lawsuits.
+2.
+The information contained in motion, paragraphs 1 through 9, 11, 13, 14 and 16
+is true and accurate based on my personal knowledge.
+3.
+The costs and fees set forth in the motion are true, correct and reasonable.
+FURTHER THE AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
+Robert p.
+Critton, JT.
+XHIBIT 6
+03956-11012
+
+Case 9:08-Cv-80119-KAM Document 305-7
+Page 2
+STATE OF FLORIDA
+COUNTY OF PALM BEACH
+I hereby Certify that on this day, before me, an officer duly authorized to administer
+oaths and take acknowledgments, personally appeared Robert D. Critton, JI.. known to me to be
+the person described in and who executed the foregoing Affidavit, who acknowledged before me
+that he/she executed the same, that I relied upon the following form of identification of the above
+named person: Delonally Kain
+- and that an oath was/was not taken.
+WITNESS my hand and official seal in the County and State last aforesaid this
+day of 11, Septenber, 2009.
+JESSICA CADWELL
+MY COMMISSION € DD 853529
+EXPIRES: April 19, 2013
+Bonded Thru Notary Public Underertle
+vaca
+PRINT NAME: JESSICA (ADWASEET)
+NOTARY PUBLIC/STATE OF FLORIDA
+COMMISSION NO: DD 853529
+MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:
+04/9/13
+03956-11013
+
+Case 9:08-CV-80119-KAM Document 305-8 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 1 of 2
+CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON
+JANB DOE NO. 2,
+Plaintiff,
+V.
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
+Defendant.
+Related Cases:
+08-80232, 08-80380, 08-80381, 08-80994,
+08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80893, 09-80469,
+09-80581, 09-80656, 09-80802, 09-81092.
+AFFIDAVIT OF MARK T. LUTTIER
+STATE OF FLORIDA
+COUNTY OF PALM BEACH
+) SS
+)
+BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Mark T. Luttier., having
+personal knowledge and being duly sworn, deposes and says:
+I am counsel for Jeffrey Epstein in the above-styled matter and other civil
+1.
+lawsuits.
+2.
+The information contained in motion, paragraphs 1 through 10, 11, 13, 14 and 16
+is true and accurate based on my personal knowledge.
+FURTHER THE AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
+Mach i
+Luther
+Mark T. Luttier
+
+7
+03956-11014
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 305-8 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 . Page 2 of 2
+Page 2
+STATE OF FLORIDA
+COUNTY OF PALM BEACH
+I hereby Certify that on this day, before me, an officer duly authorized to administer
+oaths and take acknowledgments, personally appeared Mark T. Luttier, known to me to be the
+person described in and who executed the foregoing Affidavit, who acknowledged before me
+that he/she executed the same, that I relied upon the following form of identification of the above
+versonally Krown, and that an oath was/ was not taken.
+day of 3
+WITNESS
+my hand and official seal in the County and State last aforesaid this /774
+_ 2009.
+Dessien Cadwell
+/ PRINT NAME: JESSICA C40(SHER)C
+NOTARY PUBLIC/STATE OF FLORIDA
+COMMISSIONNO: 3D853529
+MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:
+04/19/13
+JESSICA CADWELL
+MY COMMISSION # DD 853529
+EXPIRES: April 19, 2013
+Bonded Thru Notary Public Underwriters
+03956-11015
+
+Case 9:08-CV-80119-KAM Document 305-9
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 1 of 3
+CASE NO. 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON
+JANE DOE NO.2,
+Plaintiff,
+- VS-
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
+Defendant.
+Related cases:
+08-80232, 08-08380, 08-80381, 08-80994,
+08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80893, 09-80469,
+09-80591, 09-80656, 09-80802, 09-81092
+DEPOSITION OF JANE DOE #4
+Wednesday, September 16, 2009
+1:03 - 1:08 p.m.
+250 Australian Avenue South
+Suite 115
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+Reported By:
+Cynthia Hopkins, RPR, FPR
+Notary Public, State of Florida
+Prose Court Reporting
+
+(561) 832-7500
+PROSE COURT REPORTING AGENCY, INC.
+Electronically signed by cynthia hopkins (601-051-976-2934)
+03956-11016
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM • Document 305-9
+
+U H
+4
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+4
+5
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+APPEARANCES:
+On behalf of the Plaintiffi
+ADAM D. HOROWITZ, ESQUIRE
+MERMELSTEIN & HOROWITZ, P.A.
+18205 Biscayne Boulevard
+Suite 2218
+Miami, Florida 33160
+Phone: 305.931.2200
+On behalf of the Defendant:
+ROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQUIRE
+MARK T. LUTTIER, ESQUIRE
+BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN, LLP
+303 Banyan Boulevard
+Suite 400
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+Phone: 561.842.2820
+On behalf of Jeffrey Epstein:
+JACK ALAN GOLDBERGER, ESQUIRE
+ATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & WEISS, P.A.
+250 Australian Avenue South
+Suite 1400
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-5012
+Phone: 561.659.8300
+On behalf of LM and EW:
+WILLIAM J. BERGER, ESQUIRE
+ROTHSTEIN, ROSENFELDT, ADLER
+401 East Las Olas Boulevard
+Suite 1650
+Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
+Phone: 954.522.3456
+On behalf of CMA:
+JACK P. HILL, ESQUIRE
+SEARCY, DENNEY, SCAROLA,
+BARNHART & SHIPLEY, P.A.
+2139 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33409
+APPEARNCES CONTINUED...
+On behalf of BB:
+ADAM J. LANGINO, ESQUIRE
+LEOPOLD KUVIN
+2925 PGA Boulevard
+Suite 200
+Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33410
+Phone: 561.515.1400
+Page 2
+1
+2
+3
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+Page
+3
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+Page 4
+PROCEEDINGS
+MR. HOROWITZ: Adam Horowitz, counsel for
+Plaintiff, Jane Doe 4.
+MR. CRITTON: Cindy, what time is it?
+THE COURT REPORTER: It is 1:03.
+MR. BERGER: William J. Berger for LM and
+EW.
+MR. HILL: Jack Hill for CMA.
+MR. LANGINO: Adam Langino from
+Leopold Kuvin on behalf of BB.
+MR. LUTTIER: Mark Luttier on behalf of
+Burman, Critton, Luttier & Coleman for the
+Defendant.
+MR. CRITTON: Robert Critton on behalf of
+Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein.
+MR. HOROWITZ: This is Adam Horowitz.
+We're canceling today's deposition. Before
+appearing here today, we had a stipulation with
+Defense counsel that Mr. Jeffrey Epstein, the
+Defendant, would not be here. He would not
+cross paths with our client.
+And immediately as we were approaching the
+deposition room, he made face-to-face contact
+with our client. He was just feet away from
+Page 5
+her and intimidated her, and for that reason
+we're not going forward.
+MR. CRITTON: I didn't see any contact
+because I, obviously, was not out there. We
+started at about - when you came in it was
+approximately 1:03. Mr. Epstein has an office
+here at the Florida Science Foundation. Had
+you been here at 1:00, your paths never would
+have crossed because Mr. Epstein was leaving
+the building. I instructed him to leave the
+building so that he would not be here.
+He was going to appear by way of Skype so
+that he could be on a video camera so that he
+could see this.
+(Mr. Goldberger entered the room.)
+MR. CRITTON: Had you been here on time,
+and not faulting, I am just saying had you been
+here on time at 1:00, as everyone else seemed
+to be here at least get here before you did,
+Adam, you and your client, your paths never
+would have crossed.
+I directed Mr. Epstein to leave the
+building so he would not be here so that there
+would be no way that your paths could have
+crossed. It was neither my intent nor was it
+(561) 832-7500
+PROSE COURT REPORTING AGENCY, INC.
+Electronically signed by cynthia hopkins (601-051-976-2934)
+2 (Pages 2 to 5)
+03956-11017
+
+Case 9:08-Cv-80119-KAM Document 305-9
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 3 of 3
+Page 8
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+Page 6
+my client's intent specifically, because I also
+advised him that he was not to cross paths, not
+to have any contact with your client, and
+certainly by our agreement not to be here today
+for the deposition.
+MR. HOROWITZ: And at approximately 1:00
+is exactly when my client crossed paths with
+Jeffrey Epstein. And not only did he cross
+paths but he proceeded to stare her down just
+feet away from her. For that reason she became
+an emotional wreck and cannot proceed with the
+deposition. She's simply not in an emotional
+state to do so.
+And in addition Mr. Epstein violated the
+agreement between counsel that he would not
+cross paths or come into contact with our
+client. And it will be also for the criminal
+court judge to decide whether he has violated a
+no-contact order. I have nothing else to say.
+MR. CRITTON: Again I instructed
+Mr. Epstein to leave the building so absolutely
+no contact could occur between he and
+Mr. Horowitz and his client nor anyone else.
+Until the court, until either Judge Marra or
+Judge Johnson ruled on the issue as to whether
+Page
+7
+or not he could appear at the depositions of
+not only Jane Doe 4 but any other individuals,
+so you do what you need to do.
+MR. HOROWITZ: Off the record.
+(The Deposition was concluded.)
+CERTIFICATE
+STATE OF FLORIDA
+COUNTY OF PALM BEACH
+3
+5
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+I, Cynthia Hopkins, Registered Professional
+Reporter and Florida Professional Reporter, State of
+Florida at large, certify that I was authorized to
+and did stenographically report the foregoing
+proceedings and that the transcript is a true and
+complete record of my stenographic notes.
+Dated this 16th day of September, 2009.
+Synthia Hopkins, КРК
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+(561) 832-7500
+PROSE COURT REPORTING AGENCY, INC.
+Electronically signed by cynthia hopkins (601-051-976-2934)
+3 (Pages 6 to 8)
+03956-11018
+
+Case9:08-008018905AM
+Document 305-10
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09M67/2099 PPage 1 of 2
+Prose Court Reporting Agency, Inc
+One Clearlake Centre
+250 South Australian Avenue, Suite 1500
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+(561) 832-7500 Phone (561) 832-7506 Fax
+Tax ID: 26-3892897
+www.prosecra.com
+September 17, 2009
+Robert Critton, Esquire
+Burman, Critton, Luttier & Coleman - WPB
+303 Banyan Boulevard
+Sulte 400
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+Involce Number
+CH 411
+Re: Jane Doe No. 2 VS. Jeffrey Epstein
+9-16-09 Scheduled Deposition of Jane Doe No. 4
+Statement for Record
+Description of Services
+Depo App NT - 1st Hr
+Depo Trans 0&1-Reg
+E-Transcript Emalled
+Appearance 1st Hr
+Transcript Pages - B
+Complimentary
+110.00
+28.80
+Invoice total:
+$138.80
+Thank you for choosing Prose Court Reporting Agency, Inc. Payment is due upon receipt.
+
+03956-11019
+
+&å8& 9108-20080145452 6553cument 305-10
+VISUAL
+EVIDENCE
+P.D. Box 0967 West Palm beach, FL 33405
+Enfered on FLSD Docket 09/7/20dg 'page 2/972
+Invoice
+Date
+9/17/2009
+Number
+28616
+Terms
+Due on recept
+BURMAN, CRITTON & LUTTIER
+ROBERT CRITTON
+303 BANYAN BLVD
+SUITE 400
+WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33401
+Date
+9/16/2009
+9/17/2009
+Case / Reference:
+Services Rendered
+JANE DOE #2 V EPSTEIN
+VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF: JANE DOE # 4
+Tech Time - 1ST 2 Hours
+Digkal Tapa Stock
+MASTER TAPE CONSISTS OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS PRIOR TO SWEARING IN
+REGARDING CANCELLATION OF DEPO.
+Delivary
+MASTER TAPES FORWARDED PER YOUR REQUEST. NO COPIES HAVE BEEN MADE OR KEPT ON
+FILE AT VISUAL EVIDENCE. SHOULD COPIES BE REQUIRED IN THE FUTURE PLEASE FORWARD
+MASTER TAPES TO OUR OFFICE FOR DUPLICATION. THANK YOU.
+RtY
+1
+Amount
+275,00
+15.00
+0.0D
+:
+MORE THAN JUST VIDEO ! See ALL avallable presentation
+technology services at: www.visualevldence.org
+Phone: (561) 655-2855
+TOTAL:
+$290.00
+Fax: (561) 655-2896
+Remit to:
+P.O. BOX 6967
+West Palm Beach, FL 33405
+Tax ID # 59-2476529
+office@visualavidence.org
+03956-11020
+
+Case 9:08-CV-80119-KAM Document 305-11
+Entered on FLSD Docket 09/17/2009 Page 1 of 2
+CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON
+JANE DOE NO. 2,
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
+Plaintiff,
+Defendant.
+Related Cases:
+08-80232, 08-80380, 08-80381, 08-80994,
+08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80893, 09-80469,
+09-80581, 09-80656, 09-80802, 09-81092.
+ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
+AND TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF JANE DOE NO. 4
+AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF
+This matter came before the Court on Defendant's, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Motion For
+Sanctions and to Compel Deposition of Jane Doe No. 4. Having considered Defendant's motion,
+it is HEREBY ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
+Defendant's motion is hereby GRANTED: Plaintiff shall pay sanctions in the amount of
+$
+in costs and S
+in fees directly to Burman, Critton, Luttier and
+Coleman within 10 days, and further directs that the Plaintiff make herself available for
+deposition no later than October _
+— 2009 beginning at 9:30 a.m. at the same location. Mr.
+Epstein shall not be present in the building on the day of the deposition absent a court order on
+pending motions.
+03956-11021
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 305-11
+Page 2
+DONE and ORDERED this
+_day of
+- 2009.
+Kenneth A. Marra
+United States District Judge
+Courtesy Copies: Counsel of Record
+03956-11022
+
+•Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 113-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/22/2009 Page 2 of 4
+1
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
+FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
+IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
+CRIMINAL DIVISION
+STATE OF FLORIDA
+VS
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN
+Defendant.
+CASE NO. 06 CF9454AMB
+08 9381 CFAMB
+PLEA CONFERENCE
+PRESIDING:
+APPEARANCES:
+ON BEHAI
+BAR
+Sta
+401
+West
+By:
+103
+ON BEHALF
+ATTERI
+250 AL
+Suite
+West P.
+*lorida 33401
+By: Jium GOLDBERGER, ESQUIRE
+CERTIFIED COPY
+June 30, 2008
+Palm
+Beach County Courthouse
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+Beginning at 8:40 o'clock, a.m.
+03956-11023
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 113-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/22/2009 Page 3 of 4
+20
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+regularly congregate?
+MS. BELOHLAVER: I personally do not
+know.
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+THE COURT: Neither do I, which is
+why I'm asking. Has that been
+investigated?
+3-
+MR. GOLDBERGER: We have done our due
+diligence, for what It's worth, there is a
+residential street.' There are not children
+congregating on that street. We think the
+address applies, if it doesn't, we fully
+recognize that he can't live there.
+THE COURT: Okay. D is, you shall
+not have any contact with the victim, are
+there more than one victim?
+MS. BELOHLAVEK: There's several.
+THE COURT:
+several, all of the
+victims. So this should be plural. I'm
+making that plural. You are not to have
+any contact direct or indirect, and in this.
+day and age I find it necessary to go over
+exactly what we mean by indirect. By
+indirect, we mean no text messages, no
+e-mail, no Face Book, no My Space, no
+telephone calls, no voice mails, no
+03956-11024
+
+Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 113-2
+Entered on FLSD Docket 05/22/2009 Page 4 of 4
+21
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+messages through carrier pigeon, no
+messages through third parties, no hey
+would you tell so and so for me, no having
+a friend, acquaintance or stranger approach
+any of these victims with a message of any
+sort from you, is that clear?
+THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am
+THE COURT: And then it states,
+unless
+approved by the victim, the
+therapist and the sentencing court. Okay.
+THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
+THE COURT: And the sentencing court.
+So, if there is a desire which, I would
+think would be a bit strange to have
+contact with any of the victims the court
+must approve it.
+MS. BELOHLAVEK: Correct.
+THE COURT: If the victim was under
+the age of 18, which was the case, you
+shall not until you have successfully
+attended and completed the sex offender
+program.
+So, is this sex offender program
+becoming a condition of probation?
+MS. BELOHLAVEK: That is not. I
+don't believe I circled that one.
+03956-11025
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/5f29e2cc5736843553002b9fa9ea29fe9e832d3d390d6f3c111b901df4549431.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/5f29e2cc5736843553002b9fa9ea29fe9e832d3d390d6f3c111b901df4549431.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1f83af9773f490c9fd61a43126b9085cc0869106
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/5f29e2cc5736843553002b9fa9ea29fe9e832d3d390d6f3c111b901df4549431.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -2128,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "5f29e2cc5736843553002b9fa9ea29fe9e832d3d390d6f3c111b901df4549431",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 18,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.exhibit-labels\", \"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.page-footer\", \"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.privileged-attorney-work-product\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "cad5a9f9fa5cb001095c9e2de95377d3f419ea45ac8f780a015811f5c02a5e11",
+  "output_sha256": "b29e4e40764b132cd2115e127e046b708ea0c5d0e96ee0cd63dc4a71a103474d",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/64a67c411cabfa71ee011c3c08d20e374c52629b2618bdbcff2fde72f0b52fe6.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/64a67c411cabfa71ee011c3c08d20e374c52629b2618bdbcff2fde72f0b52fe6.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e94d37120cf9092924e57126714798eacd07393a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/64a67c411cabfa71ee011c3c08d20e374c52629b2618bdbcff2fde72f0b52fe6.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2353 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+H
+P.
+e
+De
+N
+6
+m.b3-
+~ b3
+-
+00
+~ b3
+b
+-
+11
+12
+4
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+29
+30
+31
+32
+36
+37
+38
+39
+40
+41
+42
+43
+44
+45
+46
+47
+48
+4
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b
+3
+-
+-
+1,
+- 1,
+1,
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+;
+1
+;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1
+;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+;
+;
+;
+;
+;
+;
+;
+1
+1,
+1
+1
+1,
+1,
+1
+1
+1,
+1,
+1
+1
+3,
+- 3
+1
+;
+b6
+3
+3,
+U
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+1
+1
+- 5;
+- 5;
+1,
+-
+-
+7C
+;
+b
+1
+1,
+-
+-
+-
+1
+1
+1
+1,
+- 5;
+- 5
+- 5
+- 5
+b7
+-
+-5; b7E - 1;
+- 5
+- 5;
+- 5
+- 5
+-
+- 5;
+- 5;
+b7E - 1;
+
+81
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1
+1;
+1;
+1
+;
+1
+1;
+1
+1
+;
+1
+;
+1
+;
+1;
+1
+1
+;
+;
+1
+;
+1
+1
+;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+-
+6
+1
+1,
+1,
+1
+1
+1
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1
+1
+1,
+1
+1
+1,
+1
+1,
+1
+1,
+1
+7C
+-
+1
+b7C
+1
+b7c
+b7C
+1,
+b7C
+-
+b7C
+b7C
+_-
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1
+- 3, -5;
+- 3,
+-3, -5; b7E - 1;
+- 3,
+b7E - 1;
+;
+- 3,
+- 5;
+-5; b7E - 1;
+- 3, -5;
+- 3, -5;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+-5; b7E - 1;
+- 3, -5;
+- 5;
+- 3,
+-5; b7E - 1;
+-3, -5; b7E - 1;
+b
+5 ;
+1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7E - 1;
+
+e
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+- b3
+b3
+b3
+1b3
+~ b3
+b 3
+= b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+163
+63
+b3
+b3
+b
+3
+b
+b
+1; bo -
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+b6
+b6
+66
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+-
+1;
+- 1;
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1;
+1;
+b6
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+-
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+b
+6
+b
+16
+b6
+6
+b
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+b6
+b
+6
+b
+b6
+66
+b
+b6
+b6
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b
+6
+b
+b
+-
+-
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3;
+- 3,
+b
+-
+-
+-
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+3,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+3
+3;
+3;
+• =
+b
+C
+;
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1
+1,
+-
+;
+- 3
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3
+- 3,
+- 3,
+in co co co is
+- 3,
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-
+- 3,
+- 3
+- 3,
+- 3, -5;
+- 3, -5;
+- 3, -5;
+- 3,
+- 5;
+- 3,
+- 5;
+- 3, -5;
+- 5;
+
+b3
+- b3
+b3
+fu
+b3
+b3
+- b3
+= b3
+b3
+b3
+~ b3
+~ b3
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+103
+b3
+b3
+63
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+~ 63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+63
+b3
+b3
+b
+3
+b
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+b 6
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b
+6
+b6
+b
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b
+6
+b6
+b6
+66
+6
+b6
+b
+b
+b6
+b6
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b
+16
+b6
+b
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+i co co co
+-
+3,
+-
+3,
+3,
+-
+-
+3,
+- 3,
+- 3
+- 3
+-
+3,
+- 3,
+-
+3,
+- 3
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+-
+;
+;
+b
+b
+b
+b
+1,
+1,
+1
+1,
+- 3, -5; b7E - 1;
+- 3, -5;
+- 3, -5;
+- 3, -5;
+- 3,
+- 5;
+- 3, -5;
+- 3, -5;
+- 3,
+- 5;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+C
+i co co co co co co co co co s
+- in in in in in no, no, no, in,
+b7E - 1;
+- 3
+- 3
+;
+- 5;
+- 5i
+- 5;
+
+P
+1;
+b6 -
+-
+1;
+b6
+-b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+- b3
+~ b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+- b3
+~ b3
+~ b3
+-
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+-
+-
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+-
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+-
+1;
+66
+-
+1;
+b6
+-
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+-
+1;
+b6
+b3
+-
+1;
+b6
+~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+-
+-
+-
+-
+b3
+b3
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b3
+b6
+b3
+63
+63
+b
+3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1,
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b3
+b
+6
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b 3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b
+3
+b
+b
+1 I
+-
+-
+TITI
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+b
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+6
+b
+-
+-
+-
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+- 3;
+•3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3;
+c co có
+-3;
+3;
+3,
+3,
+-
+3,
+-
+-
+3,
+- 3,
+-3
+- 3
+- 3
+ins ce
+-
+3,
+- 3;
+- 3;
+- 3;
+-3
+io io co
+-
+-
+-
+1
+1
+1,
+1
+1
+-
+-
+1,
+1,
+;
+;
+;
+- 3, -5;
+- 3,
+- 3, -5;
+-5 ;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+-5; b7E - 1;
+-5; b7E - 1;
+- 5;
+-5; b7E - 1;
+-5 ;
+- 3,
+- 5;
+- 3,
+-5 ;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3, -5;
+- 3,
+
+P.
+e
+e
+e
+- b3
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+= b3
+W
+-b3
+b3
+~ b3
+- b3
+~ b3
+-b3
+b3
+b
+b
+b
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b
+3
+b
+3
+b
+3
+b
+3
+b3
+b3
+b
+3
+b
+3
+b
+b
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b
+b
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+-
+-
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+-
+-
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+-
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+-
+1;
+66
+-
+1;
+b6
+-
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+-
+-
+1;
+b6
+b6
+-
+b6
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+b
+b
+b
+6
+b
+b
+6
+b
+b
+b
+b
+b
+6
+b
+1 I
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b
+6
+b6
+b
+-
+-
+-
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+нАїї
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+- 3,
+3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3;
+-
+3,
+- 3,
+-3;
+-
+3,
+-3;
+- 3,
+-3:
+- 3,
+3,
+3,
+3;
+- 3,
+-
+b
+-
+-
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1,
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1,
+1
+- 3;
+1
+1
+- 3
+1
+1
+-3
+;
+1
+- 3 ;
+- 3;
+1
+1,
+-
+1
+- 3;
+-3;
+1,
+-3;
+- 3;
+- 3 ;
+-3;
+- 3;
+- 3;
+- 3;
+1,
+-3;
+-3;
+1,
+- 3;
+- 3 ;
+- 3;
+- 3 ;
+-3;
+-3;
+1
+-
+-
+-
+1
+-3
+1,
+1
+- 3 ;
+1
+-3;
+1
+1
+1
+-
+-3 ;
+- 1,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 3, -5;
+- 3,
+- 3, -5;
+- 3, -5;
+
+-
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+6
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+66
+b
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+6
+b
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1,
+1,
+-3; b7C
+-
+-3;
+b7C
+3;
+b7C
+b7C
+- 3;
+-3;
+b7C
+b7C
+3;
+b7C
+b7C
+3;
+b7C
+-
+b7C
+b7C
+b7c
+- 3;
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+• -
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+-
+- 5;
+b7C
+b7C
+-
+b7C
+-
+b7C
+-
+b7C
+7C
+7C
+-
+5;
+7C
+-
+7C
+5;
+-3;
+3;
+-3;
+-3
+• 3;
+-
+7C
+7C
+7C
+7C
+7C
+5;
+7C
+-3;
+7C
+-3
+, -5;
+7C
+5;
+3;
+7C
+5;
+1,
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1,
+• 1
+-3
+P.
+e
+qe
+e
+e
+e
+b3
+b3
+fu
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b
+b
+b
+b
+b
+b
+b
+b
+b
+b
+b
+b
+b
+b
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+3
+b
+b
+b
+-
+1;
+1;
+-
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+-
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+b6
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b
+6
+b
+6
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b
+b
+/ /I
+-
+|  |
+1 II
+- 3,
+-5; b7E - 1;
+b7E - 1;
+-3, -5; b7E - 1;
+-3, -5; b7E - 1;
+-3
+
+0 e
+b3
+~ b3
+b 3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+= b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+1b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b 3
+63
+~ b3
+b3
+b
+3
+b
+b
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1;
+1;
+1i
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+b6
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b
+b6
+b6
+b
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+b
+6
+b
+6
+b
+b6
+b6
+6
+b
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+66
+b
+6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b
+b
+b
+-
+-
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+-3;
+- 3;
+- 3;
+- 3;
+- 3;
+-
+3;
+-
+- 3;
+3;
+• -
+-3;
+- 3;
+3,
+-3;
+-3;
+cử co ió
+3 ;
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3;
+- 3;
+-3;
+- 3;
+- 3;
+- 3;
+- 3;
+3,
+3;
+- 3 г
+-
+-
+-
+-
+b
+1
+1
+1
+1
+• 1
+1
+1
+1
+• F
+-
+1
+1
+1
+1
+-
+- 3, -5;
+- 3,
+- 3, -5;
+-5; b7E - 1;
+- 5;
+-5; b7E - 1;
+-3, -5; b7E - 1;
+- 3,
+b7E - 1;
+- 3, -5;
+-3
+-5
+
+~ b3
+- b3
+b3
+_b3
+b3
+- b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+1b3
+~ b3
+~ b3
+-b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+103
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+163
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+-63
+WJ
+b3
+1b 3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b
+3
+b
+1;
+b6 -
+1;
+b6
+-
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+-
+-
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+-
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+-
+1;
+66
+-
+1;
+b6
+-
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+-
+-
+1;
+b6
+-
+1;
+b6
+-
+- 1;
+1;
+b6
+-
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+66
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1,
+b6
+b
+6
+b
+6
+-
+b6
+1;
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+-
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+-
+b6
+b6
+-
+b6
+b
+16
+b6
+b
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3;
+in co io
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+-
+3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3;
+-3
+- 3;
+-3
+- 3,
+- 3;
+-
+b
+b
+b
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1
+-
+-
+-
+1,
+1,
+1,
+-
+1,
+1
+1,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 5;
+- 3,
+- 5;
+- 3,
+- 5;
+- 3,
+- 5;
+- 3,
+- 3, -5;
+frei ci cin co co ao co coco co co co co cio in a is c co cio cin i io io co cio cin
+-
+•5;
+-n in in n in in in in in in in-n,in, in,,-in,lo-n,in, io-l,-in, n e,
+-
+-
+- 3, -5;
+- 3,
+
+e
+- b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+~ b3
+~ b3
+b3
+- b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+1; b6 -
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+-
+1;
+b6
+b6
+66
+-
+1;
+-
+1;
+1;
+1;
+-
+-
+b6
+b6
+-
+b6
+-
+-
+-
+6
+b6
+1;
+1;
+1,
+1;
+b
+6
+1,
+b6
+1,
+b3
+b6
+1,
+b3
+1;
+b6
+63
+1;
+63
+1;
+b6
+b
+3
+1;
+b6
+b3
+1;
+b6
+1;
+1;
+b3
+1;
+b3
+1;
+b3
+1;
+63
+1;
+b3
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b
+6
+b6
+b6
+66
+6
+b6
+b3
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+63
+b6
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+b3
+1;
+b6 - 1,
+b3
+- 1;
+b6
+-
+1,
+- 1:
+66
+- 1,
+1;
+66
+1,
+1;
+b6
+1,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+-
+3;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+3,
+-
+-
+-
+3,
+3,
+- 3
+- 3,
+3,
+- 3
+- 3;
+- 3;
+3;
+;
+-
+- 3,
+-3, -5; bE - 1;
+- 3, -5;
+- 3,
+- 5;
+- 3,
+- 3,
+-5; b7E - 1;
+- 3,
+-5; b7E - 1;
+- 3, -5;
+- 3,
+- 3, -5;
+b
+b
+b7
+b7
+-
+- 1;
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+Deleted Page (s)
+× No Duplication Fee X
+X For this Page
+X
+X
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/64a67c411cabfa71ee011c3c08d20e374c52629b2618bdbcff2fde72f0b52fe6.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/64a67c411cabfa71ee011c3c08d20e374c52629b2618bdbcff2fde72f0b52fe6.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..933975e455b50675469ed681c17a1af5abf4bce1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/64a67c411cabfa71ee011c3c08d20e374c52629b2618bdbcff2fde72f0b52fe6.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -1102,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "64a67c411cabfa71ee011c3c08d20e374c52629b2618bdbcff2fde72f0b52fe6",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 2,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "7cb1926c43aee7daa97789493d474e3acd4cf935a59b76f8f9b65f9c2cb4054e",
+  "output_sha256": "9412c9a1feddf15390bc0747fb8669cba6ac162362f77520dd2b9a2166ff50b5",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/6b0cdd08940862d16346671387ce2a616cf84ce25561b6e286e7350ece7c2ac1.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/6b0cdd08940862d16346671387ce2a616cf84ce25561b6e286e7350ece7c2ac1.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d34305480b7860d2f649d39b12fa38d172e8c33a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/6b0cdd08940862d16346671387ce2a616cf84ce25561b6e286e7350ece7c2ac1.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2582 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 318
+Page 5 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5;
+Page 8 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 10 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 11 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D
+-1;
+Page 12 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 13 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 14
+~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,
+- 3, -5; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 15 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 16 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 17 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 18 ~ b3 - 1;
+06 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 1:
+3 5 10,-9 60 - 1
+Page
+21
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3; b7C - 3;
+Page
+22
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3; b7C - 3;
+Page
+23
+b3
+1;
+3
+b7C - 3;
+Page
+24
+b3
+1;
+Page
+25
+b3
+1;
+Page
+26
+b3
+1;
+Page
+27
+~ b3
+1;
+06
+66
+b6
+b6
+3;
+b7C
+3;
+..
+b7C
+3;
+3;
+b7C
+3;
+3
+b7C
+3;
+Page
+28
+b3
+1;
+3
+b7C
+3;
+Page
+29
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+3
+: b7C
+3;
+Page
+30
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3;
+b7c
+3;
+Page
+31
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3;
+b7C
+3;
+Page
+32
+- 63
+1;
+66
+3;
+b7C
+3;
+Page
+33
+b3
+1;
+06
+Page
+34
+b3
+1;
+66
+Page
+35
+63
+1
+;
+b6
+Page
+36
+b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+37
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3;
+b7c
+3;
+b7C
+3;
+3
+3
+b7C
+3;
+b7c
+3;
+b7C
+3;
+Page
+38
+63
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3;
+Page
+39
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+3;
+Page
+40
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3;
+Page
+41
+63 - 1; b6
+3; b7C
+- 3;
+Page
+42 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 43 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 46
+-b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1,
+-5; b7D
+1;
+Page 47 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D
+- 1;
+Page 51 - Duplicate;
+Page 52 - Duplicate;
+Page 53 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 54 - Duplicate;
+Page 55 - Duplicate;
+Page 56 Duplicate;
+Page 57 - Duplicate;
+Page 58 - Duplicate;
+Page 59 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 60 Duplicate;
+Page 61 - Duplicate;
+Page 62 - Duplicate;
+
+3;
+5;
+5; b7C
+5; b7C -
+5; b7C
+5; b7C
+5; b7C
+5; b70-
+5; b7C
+5; b7C
+5; b7C
+5; b7C
+5; b7C -
+
+Page 145 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 146 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 147 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 148 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 149 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 150 ~ b6
+.-
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 151 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C-
+5;
+Page 152 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 153 - b6 - 5; b7C
+5;
+Page 154 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 155 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 156 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 157 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page 158 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 159 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 160 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 161 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 162 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 163 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 164 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 165 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 166 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C-
+5;
+Page 167 - b6
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+Page 168 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 169 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 170 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 171 - b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 172 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 173 - b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 174 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page 175 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 176 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 177 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 178 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 179 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 180 ~ b6 - 5; b7C
+5;
+Page 181 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 182 - b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 183 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5;
+Page 184 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5%
+Page 185 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 186 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5;
+Page 187 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 188 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 189 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 190 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 191 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 192 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5;
+Page 193
+" b6
+5; b7C - 5;
+Page 194 ~ b6 - 5; b7C|
+5;
+Page 195 - b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 196 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 197 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 198 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+
+Page 199 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 200 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 201 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 202 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 203 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 204 ~ b6
+.-
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 205 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5;
+Page 206 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 207 - b6 - 5; b7C
+… -
+5;
+Page 208 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 209 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page 210 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 211 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page 212 - b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 213 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 214 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 215 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 216 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 217 - b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 218 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 219 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 220 ~ b6
+5; b7C-
+5;
+Page 221 - b6
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+Page 222 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 223 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 224 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 225 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page
+226 - b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 227 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 228 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 229 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 230 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 231 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 232 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 233 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 234 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 235 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 236 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 237 - b6
+5; b7C - 5;
+Page 238 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5%
+Page 239 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5:
+Page 240 - b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 241 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 242 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 243 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 244 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 245 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 246 - b6
+5: b7C -
+5;
+Page 247 ~ b6
+5; b7C - 5;
+Page 248 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 249 - b6
+5; b7c
+5;
+Page 250 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5%
+Page 251 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 252 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+
+Page 253 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 254 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 255 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 256 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 257 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 258 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page 259 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 260 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 261 - b6 - 5; b7C
+….-
+5;
+Page 262 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 263 ~ 66 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 264 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 265 ~ b6 - 5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page 266 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 267 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 268 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 269 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 270 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 271 - b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 272 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 273 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 274 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 275 - b6
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+Page 276 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 277 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 278 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 279 - b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 280 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 281 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 282 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 283 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 284 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 285 - b6
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+Page 286 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 287 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 288 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 289 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 290 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 291 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5;
+Page 292 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5%
+Page 293 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 294 ~ b6 -
+5;b7C -
+5;
+Page 295 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 296 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 297 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 298 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 299 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 300 - b6 -
+5; b7C - 5;
+Page 301 ~ b6
+5; b7C - 5;
+Page 302 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 303 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 304 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 305 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Paqe 306 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+
+Page 307 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 308 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 309 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 310 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 311 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 312 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 313 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C-
+5;
+Page 314 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 315 - b6 - 5; b7C
+5;
+Page 316 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 317 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page 318 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 319 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page 320 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 321 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 322 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 323 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 324 - b6
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+Page 325 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 326 ~ b6
+5;
+67C
+5;
+Page 327 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 328 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page
+329 - b6
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+Page 330 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 331 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 332 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 333 - b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page
+334 = b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 335 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 336 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 337 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 338 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 339 - b6
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+Page 340 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 341 ~ b6
+5;
+b7c
+5;
+Page 342 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 343 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 344 - b6
+5; b7C
+Page 345 - b6
+5;
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 346 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5%
+Page 347 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5:
+Page 348 - b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 349 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+Page 350 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 351 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 352 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5:
+Page
+353 = b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 354 - b6
+5: b7C -
+5;
+Page 355
+- b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 356 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+Page 357 ~ b6
+5; b7c
+5;
+Page 358 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+Page 359 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 360 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+
+Deleted Page (s)
+No Duplication Fee X
+For this Page
+
+1A Envelope
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062
+MM
+1! PHOTO LINE UP POSITIVE ID OF
+MM
+MM
+MM
+..for tot
+2
+3
+4
+ORIGINAL NOTES RE INTERVIEW OF
+SUBPOENA RETURN MATERIALS RE: FRIEDN ID NUMBERS
+MM
+5
+ORIGINAL NOTES RE INTERVIEW OF
+....
+HARD_ COPY AND CD-ROM SUBPOENA RETURN RESULTS FOR MYSPACE
+b3
+-1
+b6 -1,
+b7C -1,
+- 3,
+-3,
+- 5
+-5
+MM
+MM
+MM
+1)
+ID
+6!
+SUBPOENA RESUTLS RE: MYSPACE. COM USER ID
+7
+SUBPOENA RETURN MATERIALS RE:
+8
+! SUBPOENA RETÜRN RE:
+9 SUbpPENA RetuRN fOR
+31E-MM-108067951587
+
+File Number ...
+3)E-MM-108062-111
+Mm
+Serizl # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+08/18/2006
+From
+grante or coronervewee
+•(Address)
+By
+To Be Returned
+Yes
+ENo
+Receipt Given
+D
+Yes
+•No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+No
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+B-Origtatnotes reintervic ofe
+Shots time up
+- positive
+ID 9f/
+•1-=
+b3 - 1
+b6
+-2,
+b7C
+- 2,
+- 3
+- 3
+b6 - 1
+b7C -1
+03956-1588
+
+3IE-MM-108062-97956-1590
+
+FD-340 (Rev, 4-11-03)
+Pile Number _
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+31E-Mr. 108062-1A23
+жеты
+52
+12/13/2006
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+1b6 - 2
+!
+b7C -2
+By
+SA
+To Be Returned
+Yes
+ENo
+Receipt Given
+Yes
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+Yes
+•'No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+No
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Corumunication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+[* Original notes re interview of
+b6-5
+03956-1591
+
+03956-1593
+3IE-MM-108062-112
+
+Witn
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+03/61/2007
+From
+myspace. com
+(Name of Contributor/interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By
+54
+To Be Returned
+• Yes
+I No
+: Receipt Given
+Yes
+I No
+!
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+• Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+It No
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Encosing Material)
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+Subpoena return materials re:
+Friend IN numbers
+is..
+b6 - 2
+b7C -2
+b3 -1
+106
+-3
+b7C -3
+mile.
+03956-1603
+
+01:21:51
+03-01-2007
+1/24
+
+myspace.com
+a piace For friends
+March 1, 2007
+Via Fax 561.833.7970
+ATTN: SAL
+FBI West Palm Beach Florida
+Re: MvSpace, com subpoena results for User IDs_
+b6 -2
+b70 -2
+b3 -1
+b6 -3
+b7C -3
+b6 -2
+b7C -2
+Dear SAL
+• .
+Enclosed are the results for the subpoena sent to MySpace.com.
+All time stamps are Pacific Standard Time.
+Please let us know if you have any questions.
+Thank you,
+b6 - 5
+MySpace.com
+310-969-7396
+407 North Maple Drive • Beverly Hills, California 90210
+Phone: 310-969-7396 • Fax: 310-969-7394
+03956-1604
+
+:3IE-MM-108062-3986-1628
+
+PD 340 (fler. 3-8-01)
+Universal Case Filo Number
+Field Offico Acquiting Bridozco
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received 02/08/2007
+From
+31E-MM-108062-1A4
+AQ
+ntor)
+ibutor)
+b6 -2,
+- 5
+b70 - 2,
+-5
+By
+To Be Returned
+Yes
+ENO
+Receipt Given
+Yes
+M No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+Yes
+18 No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (PTI)
+Yes
+• No
+Title: JEFFREY EDSTEIN
+b6 - 1
+b7C -1
+Reference:
+30
+PROSTTTTTION
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+• Original notes re interview of
+b6 -5
+03956-1629
+
+File Namber
+31E-Min-105.062-2A5
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+03/02/207
+From
+myspace, coi
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State):
+By
+To Be Returned
+Yes
+• No
+Receipt Given
+L
+Yes
+E No
+Grand, Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes i
+• No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+.b6
+b7c
+-2
+- 2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+1) HARO LUPO E CAREM SIBPIENA REMEN
+b3 -1
+b6 -3
+• 67C -3
+03956-1632
+
+File Number _
+31E-mm= 108062-/Al
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence -
+mm
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+From
+03/05/2007
+myspace
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City arid State)"
+By
+To Be Returned
+Yes
+Receipt Given
+Yes
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+Yes
+No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FT!)
+Yes
+D No
+b7c
+-2
+Title:
+Reference:
+1-a
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+Subpeena results re:
+user: ID
+myspace.com
+b3
+b6
+b7c
+- 1
+- 3
+- 3
+03956-1657
+
+
+02:01:24.
+03-05-2007
+1/4
+myspace.com
+a place for friends
+March 5, 2007
+Via Fax 561.833.7970
+ATTN: SA
+FBI
+Re: MySpace.com subpoena results for User IDL
+Dear SAL
+Enclosed are the results for the subpoena sent to MySpace.com.
+All time stamps are Pacific Standard Time.
+Please let us know if you have any questions.
+Thank you,
+56-2.
+b7C -2
+b3 - 1;
+56 - 3:
+b7C - 3
+b6 - 2:
+b7C -2
+56 - 5:
+MySpace.com
+310-969-7396
+407 North Maple Drive • Beverly Hills, California 90210
+Phone: 310-969-7396 • Fax: 310-969-7394
+03956-1658
+
+PD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)
+File Number _
+31E-mm-108062/A1
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence.
+peaks
+Serial # of Originating Document SuB BBP - 19
+• Date Received m
+02/22/2007
+From .
+Sprint Corporate Security
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By
+To Be Retumed
+Yes
+El No
+Receipt Given
+Yes
+LeNo
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+i No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+No
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+Subpoene ration materials re:
++D..
+..*:
+D6
+b7c
+-2
+- 2
+66-5
+03956-1662
+i..
+
+Sprint
+SPRINT CORPORATE SECURITY, 6480 SPRINT PARKWAY, OVERLAND PARK, KS 66251
+Facsimile
+To:
+Fax:
+Company:
+
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+Date:
+February 22, 2007
+From:
+Department:
+Voice:
+Fax:
+56-2, -5
+b7C -2,
+-5
+Legal Compliance
+1-800-877-7330
+913-315-0736
+Comments:
+Total Pages:
+03956-1663
+
+02/22/2007
+Sprint Nextel
+Corporate Security
+Mailstop KSOPHMO206
+6480 Sprint Parkway
+Iverland Park, KS 6625
+| Fax: 913-315-0736
+E-mail:
+b6 - 5
+b70 - 5
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+500 S. Flagler Drive
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+Your Case Number: 31EMM108062
+Sprint Nextel Case Number: 2007-036084
+b6 - 2
+670-2
+Dear
+Pursuant to the above referenced case, I have enclosed the requested information
+associated with the following numbers):
+****************************************************
+b6 - 5
+03956-1664
+
+66 - 5
+****************************************************
+Should you have any questions or further inquiries, please contact the Sprint
+Nextel Subpoena Compliance Group at 866-259-7534.
+Sincerely,
+66 - 5
+2
+03956-1665
+
+Subpoena Compliance
+Sprint Nextel Corporate Security
+66 - 5
+b7C
+: - 5
+Enclosures
+*Notice: If the records contained in the attached package are utilized in trial proceedings, and if you
+require a records custodian for authentication, be advised Sprint does not have local representatives.
+Sprint's Trial Team is located at our Corporate Headquarters in Overland Park, Kansas, You will need to
+contact the Trial Team at CSTrialTeam@mail.sprint.com or call our office at 913-315-8775. Our office
+will require at least two-weeks notice in addition to pre-paid travel arrangements by your office.
+03956-1666
+
+File tamstr
+MAn
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+07/28/2007
+From
+(Nane of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By
+To Be Returned
+Yes
+No
+Receipt Given
+Yes
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+ENo
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+No
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+• Original notes re interview of
+Subpoena return rel
+.t.t*.
+b6 -2
+b7C
+-2
+b3 -1
+b6
+-3
+b7C
+-3
+03956-1668
+
+Page 1 Of 5 #10997
+GE
+MERSOODR
+Subpoena Compliance
+PO Box 54407
+Atlanta, GA 30308
+2/27/2007
+FBI West Palm Beach
+505 S. Flagler Dr., #500
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+b6 - 2
+b7C - 2
+RE: Subpoena #: 31emm 108062
+BellSouth #: BST07025668
+Received: 2007-02-21
+Enclosed is our return of information requested in the above described subpoena. it you have an
+questions concerning this information, please call our oflice at 404-986-5630
+Sincerely,
+Compliance Assistant
+b6-5 :
+b70 - 5
+03956-1669
+
+Page 2 of 5 #10997
+BELCSODIN
+Results for Subpoena BST07025668
+Standard Results
+Request I
+List Name
+...
+List Address
+Billing Nane
+Billing Address
+Service Address
+Service Type
+End Request--
+b3 -1
+b6
+- 3,
+-5
+b7C -3, -5
+03956-1670
+
+Page 3 of 5 #10997 DI
+Call Detail/Toll Records: BST07025668
+NOTE:
+On an incoming call search, if the calling number is a cellular number, this is
+normally not the actual cellular customer's number; it is the cellular provider's
+trunk number. It is the trunk billing number BellSouth uses to identify calls
+originating from a particular cellular telephone carrier. Please contact the cellular
+carrier to identify the actual originating cellular telephone number. The cellular
+carrier will have to conduct a search for all calls terminating to the target number.
+If you have questions on a carrier code, you can access the following web site for
+information: http://davis-company.com/pic/dbsearch.html
+03956-1671
+
+02/28/07 08:25 AM 404 370 9848 via VSI-FAX
+Page 4 of 5 #10997 ®E
+Call Detail/Toll Records: BST07025668
+CALL DETAILS FOR TARGET NUMBER:_
+Call
+late
+Call
+Calling
+Number
+No records were found for
+Called
+Number
+b3-1
+66-3, -5
+b70 - 3, -5
+Call
+Call
+Duration
+Answd Carrier Type
+Billed
+Number
+Srve
+Feat
+03956-1672
+
+02/28/07 08:25 AN
+404 370 9846 via VSI-FAX
+
+#109970E
+03956-1673
+
+13:20
+0001
+
+© BELLSOUTH
+Subpoena Compliance
+PO BOx 54407
+Atlanta, GA 30308
+2/27/2007
+F9l West Palm Beach
+505 S. Flagler Dr., #500
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+56 -2
+670 - 2
+RE: Subpoena #: 31emm108062
+BellSouth #: BST07025668
+Received: 2007-02-21
+Enclosed is our return of information requested in the above described subpoena. No tolls were
+found. if you have any questions concerning this information, please call our office at 404-986-
+5630.
+Sincerely/
+compliance Assistant
+56-5
+b7C - 5
+03956-1674
+
+N
+FEB-21-2007
+ED-909 (Rev. 8-02-02)
+15:31
+P.02
+0002
+FBI WEST PALM BEACH RA
+U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+SUBPOENA
+In the matter of case number(s): 31E-MM-108062
+ECEI
+TO:
+Bell South
+Custodian of Records
+ADDRESS:
+122 East Lake Drive
+Decatux,
+GA 30030
+TELEPHONE:
+404-378-9269
+FEB 2 | 2007
+GREETING:
+SUBPOENA GOMPLLANCE GROUP
+By the service of this subpoena upon you by SA
+b3 -1.
+, Ino is authorized 66 - 2, - 3,
+-5
+you are hereby commanded and required to disclose to SA
+_, a represeb7C -2, -3,
+the FBI, the name, address, local and long distance telephonc toil billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or
+identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following:
+Please provide all account records to include subscriber, user and billing
+intormation as well s toll records (incoming an outgoing calls) for the
+following number:
+-5
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION. YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
+Compliance must be made by personal appearance or production of records no later than the 20
+March
+2007
+• 9
+- at 10:00 o'clock_ A M, ar 505 S.
+Flagler Drive,
+West Palm Beach, FLorida 33401
+- day of
+SA
+In lies of a personal annearance the information can be provided, via facsimile, marked to the attention of
+, at telephone number
+66 - 2
+b7C -2
+In lieu of a personal appearance, the information can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+SA
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+→ at the following address: 505 S. Flagler Drive, #500
+If you refuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may invoke the aid of a United States
+District Court to compel complisnee. Your failure to obey the resulting court order may be punished as contempt.
+Issued under authority of Public Law Nr
+(18 U.S.C. $3486)
+ATTESTED COPY
+b6 - 2]
+b7C -2
+Signature:
+Name, Titles
+Issued this.
+21
+SSRA,
+day of February
+03956-1675
+., 2007.
+
+Results for Subpoena BST07025668
+Standard Results
+Request 1
+Type
+Number
+List Name
+List Address
+Billing Name
+Billing Address
+(Service Address
+Service Type
+End Request-....
+Result
+NO.854
+0003
+© DELSOUTH
+63 - 1
+66-3, -5
+b70 -3, -5
+03956-1676
+
+0004
+O SELLSOUTH
+Call Detail/Toll Records: BST07025668
+NOTE:
+Ou an incoming call search, if the calling number is a cellular number, this is normally not the
+actual cellular customer's number; it is the cellular provider's trunk number. It is the trunk
+billing number BellSouth uses to identify calls originating from a particular cellular telephone
+carrier. Please contact the cellular carrier to identify the actual originating cellular telephone
+munaber. The cellular carrier will have to conduct a search for all calls terminating to the target
+number. If you have questions on a carrier code, you can access the following web site for
+information: http://davis-company.com/pic/dbsearch.html
+• ..
+-=..
+03956-1677
+
+ND.854
+0005
+© BELLSOUTH
+Call Detail/Toll Records: BST07025668
+CALL DETAILS FOR TARGET NUMBER:
+#Call
+Call
+Date
+Time
+No records were found for
+Calling
+Number
+Called
+Number
+63 - 1
+56 - 3, -5
+b7C - 3, - 5
+Call
+Duration
+Ansva Carrier Falle
+Billed
+Number
+Srvc
+Feat
+03956-1678
+
+NO.854
+F006
+"..
+03956-1679
+
+03956-1680
+3/E-MM-108062-148.
+
+FD-34D (Rev. 7-29-92)
+Universal Case File Number
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+08/08/2606
+From
+Verizon
+(Name of Contributor).
+3IETIM-108062-114
+:MM/PACRA
+(Address of Contributor)
+BySA
+To Be Returned I] Yes • No
+Receipt Given • Yes • No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+D Yes • No
+Title:
+b6
+-2
+b7C -2
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description: (Originat notes e interview of
+Subpoera Resalts for
+166 -5
+112
+FoR part 2 seco lA 10
+03956-1681
+
+..
+SWITCH
+DATE •
+This is the switch This is the
+that the call is
+date of the
+hitting off of.. call.
+TIME
+This is the
+start time of
+the call.
+Explanation Form
+DIR
+MO=Outbound
+call
+MT=Incoming call
+MDN
+CALLED #
+TOPN
+SZR
+This is if the call was This is the calling
+This Is
+your
+an out going
+party #.
+the
+target call=then the
+duration
+#.
+aulgoing#
+of the
+that your
+call in
+target dialed
+seconds
+wlll be in this
+cathe call was if the cal was an
+an Incoming
+outgoing call-then
+#then your
+your target #will
+target # will
+be In this column.
+_appear this
+column
+If the call was an
+Incoming
+call=then the
+Incoming # to your
+target will appear
+in this column
+MF=Incoming call
+to volcamail-in
+rare cases, It
+could be mobile
+forwarding
+MM=Mobile to
+Moblie call
+LL, CN, TR.and
+ME all pertain to
+frouting
+information and
+will not be
+relevant to your
+Investlgation.
+NOTES:
+When the#s in the MDN calumn, CALLED # column and the CPN # column are all diferent,
+then you are looking at a routing #. The Routing # will appear in the CALLED # column.
+(All three aumbers are different)
+you see your target # in the MDN column, the CALLED # columa and the CPN # colura
+en you are looking at your target checking his/her voicemail. (All three numbers are the sam
+Codes! :
+*36 is volcomall retriaval
+#225 is checking account balance
+#646 Is checking minutes
+#777 la data/web services
+#738 is prepald volcemail retrieval
+#729 Is adding minutes for propald
+*67 is used to block the moble #
+*82 Is used to unblock the mobile#
+03956-1682
+
+verizorwireless
+This is the switch
+that the call is
+hitting. off of
+Explanation Form For Historical Records
+This is your
+target #
+DLD DGT NO
+SZR-DT-TM
+SZR DURT CNT
+AUTO
+If the call was an out This is the date
+- This is the duration CP IS
+going call-then the and time of the of the call in
+the
+outgoing # that your call
+(seconds
+number
+target dialed will be
+that
+in this column
+(called
+your
+target
+If the call was at
+incoming #-then
+your target # will
+appear this column.
+Codes:
+*86 is voicemail retrieval
+#225 is checking account balance
+#646 is checking minutes
+#777 is datalweb, services
+#738 is prepaid voicemail retrieval
+f129 is adding minutes for prepai
+67 is used to block the mobile ‡
+*82 is used to unblock the mobile #
+03956-1683
+
+VerizOnwireless
+Legal Dept-Subpoena Processing Group, 180 Washington Valley Road, Bedminster NJ 07921
+Date:
+8/2/06
+SA 08/01/06-288220
+Customer Information:
+Subscriber/ Credit Information
+Calling Records:
+Toll Records
+Incoming and outgoing calls
+CD/Disk Enclosed
+Mobile #
+To Date
+Account#
+_ From Date
+Incoming calis are available for one year. Cell tower location requires a court order.
+b6 - 5
+b7C
+-5
+"Please note that the time reflected on any call defail or bill copy is reflective of the switch that
+processed the call, which may not be the same as the clock time at the cellsite where the
+call was initiated."
+b6 - 5
+670 - 5
+Subpoena Compliance Lead Coordinator
+Phone # (800) 451-5242 Option 2
+Fax # (888) 667-0028
+03956-1684
+
+Verizon
+03956-1685
+
+3IE-MM-1080621179
+03056-1686
+
+FD-909 (Rev. 8-02-02)
+U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+SUBPOENA
+In the matter of case number(s):
+31E-MM-108062
+TO:
+ADDRESS:
+TELEPHONE:
+Verizon Wireless/Cellco Partnership
+Custodian of Records
+51 Chubb way
+Branchburg, NJ
+08879
+(908) 203-5878
+GREETING:
+By the service of this subpoena upon you by
+SA
+, who is authorized to ser b6 - 2,
+-5
+you are hereby commanded and required to disclose to SA
+b7C
+- 2,
+-5
+., a representative ot
+the FBI, the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or
+identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer.
+utilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following:
+Please provide any and all account records to include subscriber and.
+billing informațion as well as toll records Mincoming and outgoing
+calls) for the following numbers:
+**Please include cell tower and location for toll records.
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION. YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
+Compliance must be made by personal appearance or production of records no later than the
+August
+2006
+. at 10:00 o'clock_A M,at 505 S. Flagler Drive,
+1500 day of
+west Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+SA
+In lieu of a norsonal annearance the information can be provided, via facsimile, marked to the attention of
+_, at telephone number
+In lieu of a personal appearance, the information can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+SA
+-, at the following address: 505 S. Flagler Drive, #500
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+If you refuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may invoke the aid of a United States
+District Court to compel compliance. Your failure to obey the resulting court order may be punished as contempt.
+Issued under authority of Public Law
+(18 U.S.C. $3486)
+ORIGINAL
+Signature:
+Name, Title:
+Issued this
+01
+SSA
+b6 -2:
+нт Б7С -2
+b6 -2:
+670 - 2
+day of August
+_03956-1687
+
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 200
+Page 2 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 3 ~ b6 - 1,
+-2, -5; b7C - 1, -2, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 5 - b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+6
+~ b6 -
+5;
+b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 7 ~ b6 -
+5;
+b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 8 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 9 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 10 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 11 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 12 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 13 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+14
+= b6
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page 15 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+16
+606
+- 5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+17
+~ 66 - 5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+18
+- b6
+- 5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+19
+= b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+20
+~ b6 - 5; b7C
+- 5;
+b7D -
+Page
+21
+b6
+- 5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+22
+- 66 - 5; b70
+- 5;
+b7D -
+Page
+23
+b6 -
+5;
+b7c
+5;
+b7D -
+Page
+24
+b6 - 5;
+b7C -
+5;
+b7D -
+Page
+25
+-66 - 5:670 - 5;
+67D -
+Page
+26
+~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5;
+b7D
+Page
+27
+- b6
+- 5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+28
+b6
+b7D
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+29
+- 66 - 5; b70 - 5;
+b7D
+Page
+30
+66 -
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+b7D -
+Page
+31
+= b6
+- 5; b70 -
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+32
+- b6
+- 5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+33
+b6
+- 5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+34
+b6
+- 5; b7C -
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+35
+5; b7C -
+5;
+b7D -
+Page
+36
+- b6
+- 5;
+b7C -
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+37
+~ b6-
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+b7D -
+Page
+38
+~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+39
+~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+b7D -
+Page
+40
+b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+b7D
+Page 41
+~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D -
+Page
+42
+~ b6 - 5; b7C-
+5;
+b7D -
+Page
+43
+~ b6 - 5;
+b7C - 5;
+b7D
+Page 44
+- 66 - 5;
+b7C - 5;
+b7D -
+Page
+45
+» b6
+- 5; b7C - 5;
+b7D
+Page 46
+~ b6 - 5; b7C
+-5;
+b7D
+Page 47
+b6 -
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+b7D -
+Page 48
+~ 66 - 5;
+b7c
+5;
+b7D -
+Page
+49
+- b6
+5;
+67c
+5;
+b7D -
+Page 50
+~ b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7D
+
+Page 51 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7D -
+Page 52 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D -
+Page 53
+»b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7D -
+Page
+54
+~b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7D -
+Page 55 ~ b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7D -
+Page 56
+= b6
+- 5; b7C
+5; b7D -
+Page 57
+~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D -
+Page 58
+~b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7D -
+Page 59
+~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D -
+Page
+60
+~ b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7D -
+Page 61
+~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D -
+Page 62
+~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D -
+Page 63
+b6
+- 5; b7C -
+5; b7D -
+Page 64
+~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D -
+Page 65 ~ b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7D -
+Page 66 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C -
+5; b7D -
+Page 67 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page
+68
+b6
+5;
+b7c
+b7D
+Page
+69
+~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+70
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+71
+-b6-
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+72
+~ b6
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+b7D
+vŇŇŇ
+Page
+73
+= b6
+- 5;
+b7c
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+74
+= b6
+- 5; b7C
+5;
+b7D -
+Page
+75
+b6
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+76
+- b6 1
+- 5; b7C
+- 5;
+b7D -
+Page
+77
+b6 -
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+b7D -
+Page
+78
+b6
+- 5;
+7C -
+5;
+b7D -
+Page
+79
+~66 -
+5; b7C
+- 5;
+b7D -
+Page
+80
+- 5; b7C - 5;
+b7D
+Page
+81
+~ b6
+5; b7C
+- 5;
+b7D
+Page
+82
+b6
+Page
+83
+=b6 -
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+84
+b6
+5;
+b7c
+5;
+b7D
+5;
+Page
+85
+b6
+b7c
+5;
+b7D -
+5;
+b7C -
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+86
+= b6
+- 5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+87
+b6
+- 5;
+b7c
+5;
+b7D
+Page
+88
+b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 89 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+Si b7D =
+Page 90 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C -
+5; b7D -
+Page 91
+~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D -
+Page
+92
+= b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D -
+Page 93 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D -
+Page 94
+- b6 - 5; b70-
+5: b7D -
+Page 95 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5: 67D -
+Page 96 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D -
+2:
+Page 97 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D -
+Page 98
+-b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7D -
+Page 99 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D - 2;
+Page 100 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+- Z;
+Page 101 - b6
+5; b7C -
+5: b7D -
+Page 102 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 103 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+;
+Paqe 104 ~ b6 - 5: b7C - 5: b7D
+
+Page 105 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D -
+Page 106 ~ 66 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 107 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 108 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 109 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 110 ~ b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7D
+2
+Page 111 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+2
+;
+Page 112 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 113 - b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 114 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+2
+;
+Page 115 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 116 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+2
+Page 117 ~ b6 - 5; b7C|
+5; b7D
+2
+Page 118 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+;
+Page 119 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+;
+Page 120 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 121 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 122 - b6
+5; b7C
+Page 123 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+Page 124 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+Page 125 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+1 I.
+;
+5;
+b7D
+5;
+b7D
+5;
+b7D
+;
+5;
+b7D
+Page 126 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+b7D
+|  |
+Page 127 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page 128 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page 129 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+| I
+Page 130 ~ b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7D
+Page 131 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page 132 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page 133 - b6 - 5; b7C
+b7D
+Page 134 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C
+5;
+5; b7D
+;
+Page 135 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C
+Page 136 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+Page 137 - b6
+5; b7C
+Page 138
+" b6
+5; b7C
+I I |
+5;
+b7D
+5;
+b7D
+2
+5;
+b7D
+5;
+b7D
+;
+Page 139 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page 140 ~ b6 - 5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+;
+Page 141 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page 142 - b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page 143 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 144 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5: b7D
+Page 145 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 146
+~b6 -
+5;b7C -
+5 ; b70
+Page 147 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 148 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 149 - b6
+5; b7C
+5; b7D
+Page 150 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 151 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5; b7D
+Page 152 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 153
+" b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 154 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C
+5; b7D
+Page 155 - b6
+5; b7C -
+5: b7D
+Page 156 - 66 - 5; 67C -
+5: b7D
+Page 157 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 158 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+2:
+
+Page 159 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D -
+Page 160 ~ 66 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 161 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 162 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 163 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 164 ~ b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7D
+Page 165 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 166 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 167 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 168 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 169 ~ 66 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 170 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 171 ~ b6 - 5; b7C|
+5; b7D
+2
+2
+;
+2
+;
+2
+2
+Page 172 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 173 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+;
+;
+Page 174 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+Page 175 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+;
+Page 176 - b6
+5; b7C
+5; b7D
+Page 177 - b6 -
+5; b7C
+5; b7D
+Page 178
+- b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+;
+Page 179 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+b7D
+Page 180 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 181 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page 182 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page 183 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page 184 ~ b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7D
+Page 185 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+|  |
+| I
+Page 186 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page 187 - b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7D
+Page 188 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C
+5; b7D
+Page 189 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C
+5;
+;
+Page 190 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+Page 191 - b6
+5; b7C
+Page 192 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+I I I
+b7D
+5;
+b7D
+2
+5;
+b7D
+5;
+b7D
+Page 193 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C
+5;
+b7D
+Page 194 ~ b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7D
+;
+;
+Page 195 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C
+5; b7D
+Page 196 - b6 - 5; b7C
+- 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 197 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+198 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 199 ~ b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7D - 2;
+Page 200
+~b6 - 5: b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 201 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 202 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxXX
+Deleted Page (s)
+No Duplication
+Fee X
+For this Page
+
+09/19/2007 FED 15:17 FAX
+40002
+TEPANTMENT OF JUSTTCE/FEDERAL BI
+SUBPOENA
+AU OF INVESTIGATION
+In the matter of case number(s):
+31E-MM-108062
+IO:
+ADDRESS:
+TELEPHONE:
+GREETING:
+By lie service of this subpoena upon you by SA
+you are hereby commanded and required to disclose to SAL
+b7D -2
+.,who is anthorized tosb6 - 1, - 2,
+-1, -2,
+-5
+identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following.
+Please provide all account records to include subscriber and billing
+information as well as toll records (indoming and outgoing calls) for the
+following numbers:
+Number
+Toll Record Dates
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED IO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION. YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINTIELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW,
+Compliance muz be made by 0nd oak d dat so read no lasa brive, ·500 day or.
+west Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+In lieu of a personal apnearance, ihe information can be provided, via facsimile, marked to this attention of
+SA
+_, at telephone number
+in lieu of a personal appearance, the information can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+west Palm Beach, Florida 3340 a the illowing address: 505 S. Flagler Drive, #500
+If you refuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may invoke the aid of the United States
+District Court to compel complianco. Your failure to obey the resuiting court order may be punished as contempt.
+Issued under authority of Public Law NI
+(18 U.S.C. 83486)
+ATTESTED COPY
+Signature:
+Name, Title:
+SERA
+Issued this 8
+- day of August
+_ 2007
+56-2
+66- =2
+66 - 2
+b70 - 2
+03956-1388
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/6b0cdd08940862d16346671387ce2a616cf84ce25561b6e286e7350ece7c2ac1.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/6b0cdd08940862d16346671387ce2a616cf84ce25561b6e286e7350ece7c2ac1.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d8f0d9522f8c06ebe598847acfc59f647d6dd501
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/6b0cdd08940862d16346671387ce2a616cf84ce25561b6e286e7350ece7c2ac1.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -1428,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "6b0cdd08940862d16346671387ce2a616cf84ce25561b6e286e7350ece7c2ac1",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 7,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.page-footer\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "5e69fc3f1228a5521dfb8392ad33e1a8bbeb5627e5f289b8f85deaebba03dccd",
+  "output_sha256": "f6ed5386be2f2f486e029b728c78a14efb1ccc9f1c29d1a98a156b49280bcbcb",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/6b9c217dda070389bc4d4de85b1b5b143d7df919f9aeaa63ebceff2e9a7a7e1d.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/6b9c217dda070389bc4d4de85b1b5b143d7df919f9aeaa63ebceff2e9a7a7e1d.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..000f3ca198406158a1d71a4becc1cd0a38a8208a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/6b9c217dda070389bc4d4de85b1b5b143d7df919f9aeaa63ebceff2e9a7a7e1d.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2465 @@
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-CV-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 46
+Page 2 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 3 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3;
+Page 4 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 6 ~ b3 - 1;
+b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 8 ~ b6 - 1;
+b7c - 1;
+Page 10 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-2,-3; b7C - 1,-2,-3;
+Page 11
+~ b3 - 1; b6
+- 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page 14 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-2,-3; b7C - 1,-2,-3;
+Page 15 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 20 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-2,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-2,-3,-5;
+Page 21 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+Page 22
+~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page 23 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page
+28
+~ 66 - 1,-2,-5; b7C - 1,-2,-5;
+Page 29 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 30 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+36 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 39
+~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+Page 44
+- b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-2,-3; b7C - 1,-2,-3;
+Page 45 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page 48
+b6 - 1,-2; b7C - 1,-2;
+Page 49 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page 50 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 54 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1;
+Page 61
+- 63
+- 2: 66 - 1,-2,-5; b7C - 1,-2,-5;
+Page 62 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 63 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1;
+Page 67
+- 66 - 1,-2; b7C - 1,-2;
+Page
+68 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1;
+Page 71
+~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-2,-3; b7C - 1,-2,-3;
+Page
+72
+~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page 75
+- 63 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 77 - b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 87 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 88 - Duplicate;
+Page 89 ~ b3 - 2; b6 - 1,-2; b7C - 1,-2;
+Page 91 ~ b3 - 2;
+Page 92 ~ 63 - 2;
+Page 94 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 96 - Duplicate;
+Page 97 - Duplicate;
+Page 98 ~ b3 - 2; b6 - 1,-2; b7C - 1,-2;
+Page 99 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 100 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 101 ~ b6 - 1,-2,-5; b7C - 1,-2,-5;
+Page 102 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1;
+
+Deleted Page (s)
+No Duplication
+For this Page
+Fee X
+
+To: Miami
+From: Miami
+Squad PB-2, PBCRA
+Contact:
+SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062V
+Title:
+CHANGED
+JEFFREY, EPSTEIN:
+Date: 12/05/2006
+Attn:
+SSA
+b6 - 2
+670 - 2
+b3 -1
+b6 -1
+b70 -1
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis:
+To request assignment of co-case agent and submit
+documents to case
+file.
+Previous Title:
+Title marked "Changed" to reflect additional
+subjects and the removal of
+Title nreviously carried as "JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION."
+Details: It is requested that SA
+be assigned
+as co-case agent to the above captioned case.
+The documents attached to this electronic communication
+are for submission to the main case file.
+Included in the
+attachment are the
+Palm Beach Police Department's Incident
+Reports
+and Property Receipts.
+•
+44
+b3 - 1
+b6 -1
+b7C -1
+•
+03956-297
+3IE-MM-108062-38
+339l
+ol. ec
+
+Io: New York
+Newark
+From: Miami
+PB2/PBCRA
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+•
+Attn:
+Date: 11/13/2006
+SSAL
+Squad 20
+sSA|
+RBRA-2
+56 - 2
+b7C - 2
+Trending)
+b3 - 1
+b6 -1
+b7C -1
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: To request travel reference captioned case.
+Administratind Reference tend 55 petween Sun 12/07/2006.
+Jand SsAl
+Details: On 07/24/2006 the Federal Bureau of Investigation
+(#BI), Palm Beach County Resident Agency (PBCRA), opened an
+investigation involvina multi-millionaire Jeffrey Fostein and
+captioned subiects
+b6 - 2
+b7c -2
+b3 -1
+b6 - 3
+b7C -3
+FBI Miami, PBCRA, request travel concurrence with FBI
+New York and Newark Ior the purpose of interviewing pertinen
+witnesses.
+will travel on 12/14/2006 and anticipate interviewing witnesses
+Exom 12/14/2006 - 12/17/2006.
+anticipated that SA's
+and AUSA
+return to West Palm,
+12/17/2006.
+56-2,-6
+b70 - 2,-6
+03956-307
+229b1.sc
+3IE-MM-108062-486622
+
+tie
+New York From:
+Miami
+31E-MM-108062, 11/13/2006
+LEAD (s) :
+Set Lead 1: (Info)
+NEW YORK
+AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK
+EBI Miami request travel concurrence from FBI New York
+to conduct witness interviews.
+Set Lead 2: (Info)
+NEWARK
+AT REDBANK, NEW JERSEY
+FBI Miami request travel concurrence from FBI Newark to
+conduct witness interviews.
+44
+2
+03956-308
+
+FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)
+31E-MM-108062
+Continuation of FD-302 of
+_, On 11/27/2006
+_ Page 4.
+03956-316
+
+Precedence: PRIORITY
+To: Albuquerque
+Jacksonville
+San Juan
+From:
+Miami
+Squad PB-2,
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN:
+Date: 12/06/2006
+Santa Fe RA
+Pensacola RA
+St. Thomas RA
+b70 - 2
+(Pending)
+63-3
+b6 - 1
+b70 -1
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: Io set leads for captioned investigation.
+Details: On 07/24/2006 the Federal Bureau of Investigation
+invest catine jeh rey to esident Agency (PBCRA), began
+JeBCRA obtained information From
+the City of Palm Beach Police Department (PBPD) |
+b3 -1
+b6 - 1,-3
+b70-1,-3
+03956-318
+340
+01. Ec
+31E-NM-108062-49
+b6 - 2
+
+Io:
+Albuquerque
+From:
+Miami
+31E-MM-108062, 12/06/2006
+66 - 1,-3
+b7C -1, -3
+Epstein also
+66 - 11
+b7C - 1
+maintains
+To date, the PBCRA continues to develop witnesses and
+victims from across the United States.
+Due to the media coverage,
+unknown status of the state investigation, I
+Tthe AUSAs and
+Case Agents have a target date of January 2007 for indictment.
+Based on the ongoing criminal investigation, the PRCRA
+is requesting the assistance in establishing Epstein
+Terior to conducting captioned ledas, It Is
+requested that the lead agent (s) contact SA
+FBI Miami, West Palm RA.
+or SAL
+tor investigative direction and
+questions.
+66 - 3
+b70 - 3
+b6 -1,-2
+b70 - 1,-2
+3
+03956-320
+
+..
+Albuquerque
+From:
+Miami
+31E-MM-108062, 12/06/2006
+LEAD (s) :
+Set Lead I: (Action)
+ALBUQUERQUE
+AT SANTA FE, NM
+Interview
+Epstein's,
+_Jeffrey
+66 - 1/
+b7C -1
+Set Lead 2: (Action)
+SAN JUAN
+AT ST. THOMAS, U.S.V.I.
+| cellular telephone number of
+b6 -1
+670 - 1
+Set Lead 3: (Action)
+SAN JUAN
+AT ST. THOMAS, U.S.V.I.
+Locate and Interview
+telephone number |
+Miami currently has on
+Set Lead 4: (Discretionary)
+JACKSONVILLE
+AI PENSACOLA, FL
+Interview
+"This is the only information FBI
+b6 - 11
+670-1
+b6 -1
+b7C - 1
+Set Lead 5: (Action)
+4
+03956-321
+•
+
+".
+Albuquerque
+Frón:
+Miami
+31E-MM-108062, 12/06/2006
+JACKSONVILLE
+AT PENSACOLA, EL
+Interviewl
+b6 - 1
+b7C -1
+44
+5
+03956-322
+
+Io: Miami
+From: Miami
+-5
+Contact: Ia
+Approved By:
+Date: 12/20/2006
+Drafted By:
+SI
+Case ID #:
+V31E-MM-108062 Trendingt
+66-2
+b7E -2
+Quk
+(Pending)
+Title:
+CREATION OF 12 ANALYST NOTEBOOK CHARTS
+Synopsis: Io document assistance provided to Intelligence
+Analyst (IA) L
+in the creation of i2 Analyst
+Notebook Charts.
+b7A -1
+66-2
+670 - 2
+Details: Intelligence Assistant (Ia)
+provided
+assistance in the creation of 12 Analyst Notebook Charts for the
+above-mentioned case. The charts were produced according to the
+specifications of Special Agent
+and did
+not require any research or analysis on the part of la
+The
+charts
+dates of the target and
+included the
+during his stay and the day after his departure. Ia
+created a total of 16 charts. The charts ranged in
+66 - 2)
+b70 - 2
+b7E -5
+date from
+•
+•
+03956-323
+31E-mm-108062-50
+
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062 Serial: 54
+Description of Document:
+Type : FD909
+Date
+01/04/07
+To
+From
+: MIAMI
+Topic:
+Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:
+transfer to subpoena sub
+Transferred to:
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062-SBP
+Employee:
+Serial: 57
+Date: 06/21/07 Time: 13:39
+63-2
+66 - 2
+03956-330
+31E-141-10806254
+
+Automated Serial, Permanent Charge-out
+HD-5a (1-5-94)
+Date: 06/21/07
+Time: 13:41
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062
+Serial: 55
+Description of Document:
+Type : FD909
+Date
+01/15/07
+From
+MIAMI
+Topic:
+Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:
+transfer to subpoena sub
+Transferred to:
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062-SBP
+Employee
+b3 -2
+Serial: 58
+03956-331
+31E-MM-108062-55
+
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062
+Serial: 56
+Description of Document:
+Type : FD909
+Date
+01/15/07
+To
+From
+MIAMI
+Topic:|
+Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:
+transfer to subpoena sub
+Transferred to:
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062-SBP
+Employee:
+Serial: 59
+5555
+Date: 06/21/07
+Time: 13:44
+63 - 2
+b6
+-2
+03956-332
+3IE-1M-108062-56
+
+To: Miami
+From: Miami
+Squad PB-2
+Contact: SA
+Attn:
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID/#: 31E-MM-108062" Tending)
+Titie:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN:
+JAnk
+Date: 01/25/2007
+Third Party Draft
+56 -2
+b3 - 1
+b6 - 1
+b7C -1
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTTTUTION
+Synopsis: To request funds for expenses associated to the
+above captioned case.
+Enclosure(s): Enclosed for Miami Third Party Draft:_
+Details: SAL
+Treouests Third Party Draft provide
+63 - 2
+b6 - 2
+b70 - 2
+obtained from ASAC
+SA
+•Prior authorization was
+reguests Third Party Draft provide
+03956-333
+31E-14-108062-57
+
+* d
+To: Miami From:
+niami
+31E-MM-108062, 01/25/2007
+LEAD (s) :
+Set Lead I: (Info)
+MIAMI
+AI MIAMI
+Third Party Draft shall
+associated with the captioned
+case.
+b3 - 2
+03956-334
+
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062 Serial: 63
+Description of Document:
+Date: 0T72R
+Date
+01/23/07
+To
+From
+US DISR COURT
+Topic: EXECUTIVE FGJ SUBPOENA
+Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:
+transfer to the sub sbp
+Iransferred to:
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062-SBP
+Employee:
+Serial: 3
+Date: 02/06/07
+Time: 14:34
+63-2
+b6 - 3
+b7C -3
+56 - 2
+b7C - 2
+03956-344
+3IE-11M-108062-63
+
+Date: 02/06/07
+Time: 14:35
+Case ID: 31E-MM~108062
+Serial: 64
+Description of Document:
+Type : INLET
+Date
+01/24/07
+To
+From
+US ATTORNEY
+Topic: FGJ SUBPOENA FOR
+Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:
+transfer to sub sbp
+Transferred to:
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062-SBP
+Employee:
+•
+63-2
+b6 -3
+b7C -3
+Serial: 4
+31E-MN 108062-66403956-345
+
+Date: 02/06/07
+Time: 14:36
+• Case ID: 31E-MM-108062 Serial: 65
+Description of Document:
+Date: 07/23
+Date
+To
+01/23/07
+From
+: US DIST COURT
+Topic: EXECUTIVE FGJ SUBPOENA FOR
+Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:
+transfer to sbp sub
+Transferred to:
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062-SBP
+Serial: 5
+Employee:
+b3 -2
+b6 -1
+b7C -1
+03956-346
+31E-MM+108042-65
+
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062 Serial: 66
+Description of Document:
+Date: INTER
+Date
+21/24/07
+From
+US ATTORNEY
+Topic: RE: FGJ SUBPOENA SERVED ON
+Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:
+transfer to sbp sub
+Transferred to:
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062-SBP
+Serial: 6
+Employee:
+Date: 02/06/07
+Time: 14:37
+b3 -2
+b6 - 1
+b7C -1
+b7C - 2
+31E-M 108062-63856-347
+
+EC902157
+4.
+Cant
+:
+To: Miami
+From:
+Albuquerque
+Squad 13/ Santa Fe RA
+Contact:
+SA L
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+case ID #: 315-MM-108062
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN:
+Attn:
+Date: 02/15/2007
+Palm Beach County RA
+SA
+66 - 2
+b70 - 2
+Taes 685 - 61
+(pending)
+63 - 2
+66 - 1
+b7C - 1
+PES
+WSTA-CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: Io report results of covered lead.
+Enclosure (s) :
+Enclosed are the original and one copy of FD-302
+interview of
+and agent's original notes.
+Details: An interview of
+was conducted on
+Results
+of the interview are contained in the enclosed FD-302.
+Pending further direction from Miami, Santa Fe RA
+considers this lead covered.
+b6 - 1
+b7C -1
+03956-348
+31E-41-108062-67
+
+(AC) Criminal case
+(AD)
+Criminal OCDETF Case
+(AF)
+FCI Case
+(BC)
+Informant/CW
+BD) informant/CW Providing Drug info.
+CF
+DC)
+Asset
+Group II UCO
+(DD)
+OCDETF Group II
+(5)
+Group 1
+(F)
+FCI UCO
+(GA) SOG
+(GB)
+OPS
+GC
+(H)
+Air Operation
+SSG
+FCI Lookout
+Draft Request
+3. Request for:
+. ( ) Advance
+(Expense
+2. Date
+4. Social Security No: LILLI
+5. Payee Name:
+16.
+01
+02
+03
+04
+05
+06
+07
+Cat
+Item No
+7.
+Description
+8. Amount
+1
+9. Total$ 1
+10. Justification:
+Asset/Informant File No.
+Payment/Code Name
+One Time Non-symbol Source Payment:
+True Name:
+Date of Waiver: _
+Symbol No.
+_Period Covered
+to
+DOB:
+SSAN:
+11. Payment for reimbursable expense - forfeiture or drug related?
+12. Requested by:
+_Yes No
+13. Telephone No:
+14.
+Approval
+Date
+Supervisor Initials:
+SAC/ASAC / AO / SAS Approval:
+Supply Technician Approval:
+Draft Approval Officer:
+Procurement Authorization:
+15. Vendor No.
+-.
+Group
+1 No. 1
+18. Cost Center:
+21 Document No.
+19. Squad/RA:
+No.
+17 Obligation No.
+20.
+Follow-up Date:
+22.CONF -
+COMM
+23. Draft No:
+1;
+24. Date:
+26. Settlement of Advance: Prior month Advariée Balance: $-1
+This Advance:
+Less: Receipts:
+Funds Returned and/ or Cash on Hand:
+$
+$
+Amount to he Beimbursedit
+25. Gashier:"
+03956-349
+27. Document No.
+28. Draft No:
+Shaded areas for draft office use only
+29. Date:
+30. Gas
+Blue Copy - Administrative/Case File
+Classification:
+Classified By:
+Declassify on:
+31C-MM-108062-68
+b3
+: -2
+b7C
+-1.-5
+-1. -5
+
+DRAFT REQUEST FORM INSTRUCTIONS
+REQUESTING EMPLOYEE - Complete blocks 1 to 13 as follows:
+1 - Enter Budget Category Classification to which expenses will be charged.
+2 - Current date.
+3 - Check the box to indicate if this request is for an advance of funds or for payment of an expense.
+4 - Your Social Security Account Number.
+5- The name of the person or company that should appear on the check.
+6 - The substantive fle number, or the file number of the case benefitied by a payment to an informant, asset or
+cooperative witness. (If more than one case, see No. 10 below)
+7 - Brief description of the type of expense to be paid.
+8 - Amount requested for each type of expense.
+9- Total amount requested.
+10 - Enter a brief justification fox expense or advance requested. Indicate multiple cases benefitted by
+asset/information/CW payment if applicable. For Fild Office Use Only: A justification
+electronic communication must be completed for informant/asset/CW expenses and placed in the applicable
+informant/asset/CW file, maintained in the field office.
+11 - Check the proper answer to indicate if the requested expense is reimbursable as asset forfeiture related or as a
+payment for drug information.
+12 - Your name.
+13 - Your telephone number or extension.
+APPROVAL:
+14 - Each request should be reviewed by the employee's direct supervisor, who should initial the form to
+indicate review. Confidential expenses must be approved by signature of an ASAC or above. Expense/Advance
+requests for the purchaso of supplies or equipment must be approved by the Supply Technician prior to
+payment. Commercial expenses must be approved by signature of an AOSM or above prior to payment. The
+Draft Approval Officer may approve commercial expenses undur $50.00. Indicate the name of the FBIHQ
+procurement officer and telephonic authorization number (I- number), if appropriate. All advances and
+expenses must be approved by the Draft Approval Officer, who will complete the following parts of this form:
+APPROVAL OFFICER:
+15 - Vendor Number and Vendor Group Number.
+16 - Classify the expense using Catalog Number (CAT) and Item Number.
+17 - Obligation number if an advance is issued.
+18 - Your cost center.
+19 - Squad/RA code, if applicable.
+20 - Follow-up date for advance liquidation.
+DRAFT CASHIER:
+21 - Document Number assigned to this transaction.
+22 - Check if this transaction is confidential (CONF) or commercial (COMM).
+23 - Drafl Number.
+24 - Date issued.
+25 - Cashier initials.
+26 - Enter advance settlement information when receipts are presented and the matching expense
+transaction is entered. If a supplemental draft is issued, complete blocks 27 to 30.
+27 - Document Number issued to this transaction.
+28 - Draft Number.
+29 - Date issued.
+30 - Cashier initials.
+03956-350
+
+HD-794 (Rey. 2-7-00)
+(AC) Criminal Case
+(AD)
+Criminal OCDETF Case
+(AF)
+FCI Case
+{BC) informant/CW
+(BD) informant/CW Providing Drug info
+(CF) Asset
+(DC)
+Group il UCO
+(DĐ)
+OCDETE Group It
+Group 1
+(F) FCIÚCO
+(GA)
+(GB)
+SOG
+OPS
+(GC) Air Operation
+(H)
+SSG
+(J)
+FCI Lookout
+Draft Request
+2. Date
+154 1 23, 407
+3. Requestfor: 1 ) Advance (VExpense : 1
+4. Social Security No:
+5. Payee Na
+6. File No: 31 Emm10,8062
+16.
+Cat
+Item No
+7.
+Description
+8.
+Amount
+Repurt seich a copy fre
+01
+02
+03
+04
+05
+06
+07
+9. Total$
+10. Justification:
+Th
+angers
+Asset/Informant File No. _
+Payment/Code Name
+One Time Non-symbol Source Payment:
+True Name:
+Date of Waiver:
+_ Symbol No.
+Period Covered
+to
+DOB:_
+SSAN:_
+11. Payinent for reimbursable expense - forfeiture or drug related? _
+_Yes
+12. Requested by:
+3. Telephone Ne
+No
+14.
+Supervisor Initials:
+SACCASADIAO / SAS Approval:
+Supply technician Approval:
+Draft Approval Officer:
+Procurement Authorization:
+15. Vendor No.
+18. Cost Center
+21 Document Na
+Date
+126/0"
+Boloz!
+430\57
+ND
+Groupl
+17
+Obilgation No.
+No.
+I a Square A a 20 Poo a: 23/01107
+23. Draft No:
+24. Dare: - 31-07
+26. Settlement of Advande: Prior month Advance Balance: $
+This Advance:
+Less: Receipts:
+Funds Returned andfor Gash on Hand:
+$
+Amountto be Heimbursecks
+25. Caşhier
+27. Document No.,
+28. Draft No:
+Shaded areas for draft office use only
+29. Date:
+White Original - Submitted to Corfidential Contines Tinis Lo Mr. Arien
+Classification:
+Classitied By:
+b3
+b6
+b7C
+-2
+-2
+-2
+b3
+-2
+b6 -1
+b7C
+-1
+b3
+-2
+b6
+-5
+b7C -5
+03956-351
+
+U.S. Department of Justice
+Wasbingion, D.C. 20330
+Request for Financial Izormation (Authorization,
+Purchase Order, Receiving Report.
+LIHIS EORYLYIUST BE FILLED OUT AND RETURNED BOR PAYMENT
+This form shall only be used when rquesting fundscial records of individuals and parmersbips of five or fewer individuals.
+T Purchase Order Number:
+12 Date Order Prepared,
+Case Numbe
+FET-
+Section A - Authorization and Purchase Order
+4 Name and Address of FinanciaLinsinution:
+- Please include PVN# on payment:
+S D
+16 Resum Date:
+7 Remarks:
+b3 -2
+Telashore dumber
+-66-2,-6
+1 08/0402,-6
+Section B- Financial Institution Joypice
+No Payment Shall Be Made Uniess Expenses Are liemized Below Or On Your Forn To Be Altached.
+Il Service/Financial Records Prayided:
+Unit Price
+Quantity
+Amount
+Cost
+Per
+I hereby certify that the seryices provided below were not performed relative b any corforation, joint ventudes, etc., and pertain onlyllo accounts
+(checking, savings, share, loan, or credit card) of individual(s) or partnership(s) of five or fewer partners
+MADA A ENAME FANSTITUTION MUST BE INCLUDED HERE BEFORE PAYMENT CAN BE
+MADE. TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER:
+7
+1-2
+b6 -5
+b7C - 5
+SEARCH & PROCESSING
+REPRODUCTION COST
+MAIL COST
+:
+titution Official:
+10829/Cl
+Section C - Receiving Report
+T4 i certify that the articles and services lisied were received:
+15 Date Received:
+Total Amount Claimes
+By Financial Institutio
+| 16 Disallowance
+(See Attached)
+17 Net 1o
+Financial
+Institution
+T19 Signature of Approving Official:
+18 Right to Financial Privacy Act - Public Law 95-630
+(12 U.S.C. 3401-3422) Request Pursuant To: (Check One Only)
+SECTION
+• 3404
+• 3405
+3406
+3407
+• 3408
+• 3413 1
+• 1414
+Customer Authorization
+Administrative Subpoena or Summons
+Search Warrant
+Judicial Subpoena
+Formal Writen Requess
+Grand Jury Subpoena
+Special Procedures
+22 Remarks:
+OBJECT
+CLASS
+2540
+2541
+2542
+2543
+2544
+2545
+2546
+¡20 Accounting Classification Code
+FylFc
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+I PROJ
+21 Schedule and Voucher Number:
+DC#
+03956-355
+FORM OBD-21!
+
+(AC) Criminal Cave
+(AD) Criminal OCDETF Case
+(AF)
+FCI Case
+(BC) Informant/cW
+(BD) Informant/CW Providing Drug info.
+Draft Request
+3. Request for: ( ) Advance (_ Expense
+5. Payee Name
+CF) Asset
+GA) SOG
+(DC) •
+• Group II UCO
+(GB)
+(DD)
+OCDETF Group I|
+OPS
+(E)
+(GC) Air Operation
+Sroup |
+(H)
+(F)
+FCI UCC
+(J)
+SSG
+FCI Lookout
+12. Date 1'1
+4 Social Security No: - 111e
+16.
+01
+02
+03
+04
+05
+06
+07
+Cat
+Item No
+7.
+Description
+8. Amount
+9. Total $
+10. Justification:_
+Asset/Informant File No.
+Payment/Code Name
+One Time Non-symbol Source Payment:
+True Name:
+Date of Waiver:
+Symbol No.
+Period Covered
+to
+DOB:
+/
+/
+SSAN:
+11. Payment for reimbursable expense - forfeiture or drug related? _
+12. Requested by: /
+Yes · No
+iN 13. Telephone No: (= 1) :
+14.
+Approval
+Date
+Supervisor Initials:
+SAC / ASACYAO / SAS Approval:
+Supply Technician Approval:
+Draft Approval Officer:
+Procurement Authorization:
+15. Vendor No:
+1 ...
+# 177
+Group
+No.
+18. Cost Center:
+No.
+17: Obligation No:
+20.
+Follow-up Date:
+21 Document No.
+COMM
+23:
+Draft Nó:
+24, Date:
+26. Settlement of Advance: Prior month Advance Balance: $-
+This Advance:
+Less: Receipts:
+Funds Returned and/ or Cash on Hand:
+Amount to be Reimbursed:$
+25. Cashier:
+03956-358
+27. Document No
+28. Draft No:
+29. Date,
+Shaded areas for draft office use only
+Blue Copy - Administrative/Case File
+Classification:
+Classified By:
+Declassify on:
+37C-14-108062-69
+b3 -2
+b6
+b7C
+- 2
+- 6
+-6
+
+- 1. Classification
+(AGI Criminal Case
+(AD)
+(AF)
+Crminal OCDETF Case
+FCI Case
+(BC) InformanucW
+(BD) InformantcW Providing Drug info.
+Drait Request
+3. Request for:
+5. Payee Name:
+16.
+Cat
+0.1
+02
+) Advance (→ Expense
+(CF) Asset
+(DC) Group II UCO
+(DD)
+OCDETF Group II
+ge
+Group |
+FC. UCO
+2. Date
+4. Social Security No:
+(GA) SOG
+(GB) OPS
+(GC) Air Operation
+(H)
+SSG
+FCI Lookout
+101123, '07
+Item No
+7.
+Description
+8. Amount
+04
+05
+06
+07
+9. Total sl
+10. Justification;
+assist
+case investigation
+T
+Asset/Informant File No. _
+Pagmon/Code Name
+One Time Non-symbol Source Payment:
+True Name:
+Date of Waiver:
+_ Symbol No.
+_Period Covered
+DOB: _
+/
+/
+SSAN:
+11. Payment for reimbursable expense - forfeiture or drug related? _
+12. Requested by:
+Yes
+13. Telephone No:
+14.
+Supervisor Initials:
+SAC (ASAC) AO / SAS Approval:
+Supply Technician Approval:
+Dratt Approval Officer:
+Procurement Authorization:
+15. Vendor No.
+18. Cost Center!
+Groug
+No.
+] 19. SquadiA: P2-21
+: 20.
+21 Document No!
+27. Draft No
+24. Date:j-31-07
+26, Settlement of Advance: Prior month Advance Balance: $
+This Advance:
+$
+Less: Receipts:
+$
+Funds Returned and/ or Cash on Hand:
+Amount to be Reimburged:$
+Date
+126/0"
+180o
+130/5
+17 Obligation Nor
+Follow-up DabB/0 1 0=
+2, CONFE COMF
+25. Cashie
+27. Document No.
+28, Draft No:
+Shaded areas for draft office use only
+29, Date:
+2|aile7
+Classification:
+Classified By:
+White Drivinal - Suhmilted to Confidential Services Unil by Dran Office
+Dec'assify on:
+7
+b3 -2
+-2
+b3 - 3
+66 - 1
+b7C -1
+b3 -2
+b6
+-5
+b7C -5
+03956-360
+
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 456
+Page 1-BE 1: BIC 1: 578-21
+Page 2 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 3 ~ b6 - 1;
+b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 4 ~ b6 -
+1;
+b7C - 1;
+67D - 2;
+Page 5 ~ b6 - 1;
+b7C - 1; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 6 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 7
+= b6
+- 1;
+b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 8 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 9 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 10 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 11 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page
+12
+b6
+1; b7C
+1; b7D
+-
+Page
+13
+~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page
+14
+606
+1;
+b7c
+- 1;
+b7D
+-
+Page
+15
+» b6
+1;
+b7C
+1; b7D
+-
+Page
+16
+- b6
+-
+1;
+b7C
+1; b7D
+-
+Page
+17
+~ b6
+1;
+b7c
+-1;
+b7D
+-
+Page 18
+~ b6
+- 1:
+b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page
+19
+66
+1;
+b7C
+- 1; b7D
+-
+Page
+20
+* b6
+-
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page
+21
+b6
+1;
+b7c
+1;
+b7D -
+Page
+22
+b6
+1;
+7C -
+1;
+b7D -
+Page
+23
+- 66
+-
+1;
+b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+NN
+Page
+24
+~ b6
+1;
+b7C - 1; b7D
+Page
+25
+- b6
+1;
+b7C - 1; b7D
+Page
+26
+b6
+1;
+b7C
+- 1; b7D
+-
+-
+Page
+27
+= b6
+1;
+b7C - 1; b7D
+Page
+28
+b6
+-
+1;
+b7c
+- 1:
+b7D
+-
+Page
+29
+= b6
+-
+Page
+30
+• b6
+-
+1;
+b7C -
+1;
+b7D
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page
+31
+b6
+1;
+b7c
+1;
+b7D
+Page
+32
+- b6
+1;
+b70 -
+1; b7D
+Page
+33
+-
+1;
+b70 -
+1; b7D -
+Page
+34
+1;
+b7C -
+1;
+b7D
+Page
+35
+~ b6
+-
+1;
+b7C - 1;
+b7D
+-
+Page
+36
+~ b6
+-
+1;
+b7C - 1;
+b7D
+-
+Page
+37
+1: b7C - 1: b7D
+-
+Page
+38
+~ 66
+1;
+b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 39
+= be
+1;
+b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page
+40
+-b6 -
+1;
+b7c -
+1; b7D -
+Page
+41
+~ b6
+1;
+b7c -
+1; b7D
+-
+Page
+42
+= b6
+1;
+b7C - 1: b7D -
+Page
+43
+- b6
+1;
+b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 44
+= b6
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 45
+b6
+-
+1;
+b7C - 1;
+67D -
+Page 46
+1;
+b7C -
+1; b7D -
+Page 47
+~ b6
+1;
+b7c
+1; b7D -
+Page 48 ~ b6
+- 1: b7C - 1: b7D
+-
+
+Page 49 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 50 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 51
+»b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 52 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 53 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 54
+= b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 55
+~b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 56
+"b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 57 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 58 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 59 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 60 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 61
+= b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 62 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 63 ~ b6 - 1; b7C
+1; b7D -
+Page 64 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 65 ~ b6 - 1;
+b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page
+66
+b6
+-
+1; b7C
+1;
+b7D
+-
+Page
+67
+b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+-
+Page
+68
+b6
+-
+1;
+b7C
+- 1;
+b7D
+-
+Page
+69
+~ b6
+-
+1;
+b7C
+1;
+b7D
+Page
+70
+~ b6
+-
+1;
+b7c
+1; b7D
+-
+Page
+71
+< b6
+-
+1;
+b7c
+- 1;
+b7D
+-
+Page
+72
+b6
+-
+1;
+b7c
+- 1; b7D
+-
+Page
+73
+b6
+-
+1;
+b7c
+1; b7D
+-
+Page
+74
+b6
+-
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page
+75
+b6
+-
+1;
+b7C
+1;
+b7D -
+Page
+76
+b6
+-
+1;
+b7C -
+1;
+b7D
+Page
+77
+- 66
+-
+1;
+b7C -
+1; b7D
+-
+Page
+78
+-
+1;
+b7c
+- 1;
+b7D
+Page
+79
+~ b6
+-
+1;
+b7C
+- 1; b7D
+-
+Page
+80
+b6
+1
+;
+b7c
+-
+1; b7D
+Page
+81
+= b6
+-
+1;
+b7c
+- 1;
+b7D
+Page
+82
+66
+1;
+b7c
+1;
+b7D
+-
+Page
+83
+b6
+1;
+Page 84
+= b6
+-
+b7C
+1;
+b7D
+1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+-
+Page
+85
+b6
+-
+1;
+b7c
+1;
+b7D
+Page
+86
+66
+b70 -
+1; b7D
+Page 87
+b6
+-
+Page 88 ~ b6
+Page 89
+m b6 -
+1;
+Page 90 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 91 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 92 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 93 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 94 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 95 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 96
+-66 - 1: b7C - 1: b7D -
+Page
+97
+- b6
+-
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 98
+~ b6 - 1: b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 99 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 100 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 101 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1;
+b7D
+Paqe 102 ~ b6 - 1: b7C - 1: b7D
+NN N
+2
+2
+2:
+2
+
+Page 103 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 104 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 105 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 106 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 107 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 108 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+2
+Page 109 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+2
+;
+Page 110 ~ b6 - 1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 111 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 112 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+2
+;
+Page 113 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 114 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+2
+Page 115 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+2
+Page 116 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7d
+;
+Page 117 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+;
+Page 118 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 119 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+;
+Page 120 ~ b6 - 1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 121 ~ b6 - 1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 122 ~ b6
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+;
+Page 123 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 124 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+|  |
+Page 125 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+-
+Page 126 - b6
+- 1: b7C - 1: b7D
+Page 127 ~ b6
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+| I
+Page 128 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 129 - b6
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+-
+Page
+130 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 131 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 132 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+;
+Page 133 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 134 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+1; b7D
+2
+Page 135 - b6
+-
+1; b7C -
+1: b7D
+Page 136 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+;
+Page
+137 ~ 66 -
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+-
+Page 138 ~ b6 - 1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+-
+;
+Page 139 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+1; b7D
+Page 140 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 141 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 142 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 143 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 144 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 145 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 146 ~ b6
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 147 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 148 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 149 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 150 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 151 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 152 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 153 - b6
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 154 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 155 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Paqe 156 ~ b6 - 1: b7C - 1: b7D
+2:
+
+Page 157 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 158 ~ 66 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 159 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 160 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 161 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 162 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+2
+Page 163 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+2
+;
+Page 164 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 165 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 166 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+2
+;
+Page 167 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 168 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+2
+Page 169 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+2
+Page 170 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+;
+Page 171 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+;
+Page 172 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 173 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+;
+Page 174 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 175 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 176 ~ b6
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+;
+Page 177 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 178 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+|  |
+Page 179 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+-
+Page 180 - b6
+- 1: b7C - 1: b7D
+Page 181 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+| I
+Page 182 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 183 - b6
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+-
+Page 184 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 185 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 186 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+;
+Page 187 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 188 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+1; b7D
+2
+Page 189 - b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 190 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+;
+Page 191 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 192 ~ b6 - 1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+-
+;
+Page 193 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+1; b7D
+Page 194 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 195 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 196 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 197 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 198 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 199 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 200 ~ b6
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 201 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 202 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 203 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 204 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 205 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 206 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 207 ~ b6
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 208 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 209 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Paqe 210 ~ b6 - 1: b7C - 1: b7D
+2:
+
+Page 211 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 212 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 213 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 214 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 215 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 216 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+Page 217 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 218 ~ b6 - 1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 219 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 220 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 221 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 222 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 223 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+Page 224 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7d
+Page 225 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 226 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 227 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 228 - b6
+- 1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 229 ~ b6 - 1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 230 ~ b6
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 231 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 232 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 233 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+Page 234 - b6
+- 1: b7C - 1: b7D
+Page 235 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 236 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 237 - b6
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+|  |
+-
+| I
+-
+-
+Page 238 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 239 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 240 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 241 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+-
+-
+Page 242 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+1; b7D
+Page 243 - b6
+-
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 244 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 245 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 246 ~ b6 - 1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+-
+-
+-
+Page 247 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+1; b7D
+Page 248 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 249 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 250 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 251 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 252 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 253 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 254 ~ b6
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 255 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 256 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 257 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 258 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 259 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 260 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 261 - b6
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 262 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 263 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 264 ~ b6 - 1: b7C - 1: b7D
+2
+2
+;
+2
+;
+2
+2
+;
+;
+;
+;
+;
+2
+;
+;
+2:
+
+Page 265 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 266 ~ 66 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 267 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 268 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 269 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 270 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+Page 271 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 272 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 273 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 274 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 275 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 276 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 277 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+Page 278 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7d
+Page 279 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 280 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 281 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 282 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 283 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 284 ~ b6
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 285 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 286 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 287 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 288 ~ b6
+- 1: b7C - 1: b7D
+Page 289 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 290 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 291 - b6
+_-
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+|  |
+-
+| I
+-
+-
+Page 292 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 293 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 294 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 295 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+-
+-
+Page 296 ~ b6
+1: b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 297 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 298 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 299 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 300 ~ b6 - 1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+-
+-
+-
+Page 301 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+1; b7D
+Page 302 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 303 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 304 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 305 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 306 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 307 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 308 ~ b6
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 309 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 310 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page
+311 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 312 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 313 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 314 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 315 - b6
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 316 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 317 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Paqe 318 ~ b6 - 1: b7C - 1: b7D
+2
+2
+;
+2
+;
+2
+2
+;
+;
+;
+;
+;
+2
+;
+;
+2:
+
+Page 319 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 320 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 321 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 322 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 323 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 324 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+Page 325 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 326 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 327 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 328 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 329 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 330 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 331 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+Page 332 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 333 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 334 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 335 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 336 - b6
+- 1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 337 - b6 - 1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 338 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+-
+1; b7D
+Page 339 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 340 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 341 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+Page 342 - b6
+- 1: b7C - 1: b7D
+Page 343 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 344 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 345 - b6
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+|  |
+-
+| I
+-
+-
+Page
+346 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 347 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 348 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 349 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+-
+-
+Page 350 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+1; b7D
+Page 351 - b6
+-
+1; b7C
+-
+1: b7D
+Page 352 ~ b6
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 353 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 354 ~ b6 - 1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+-
+-
+-
+Page 355 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+1; b7D
+Page 356 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 357 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 358 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 359 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 360 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 361 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 362 ~ b6
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 363 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 364 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 365 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 366 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 367 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 368 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 369 - b6
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 370 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 371 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Paqe 372 ~ b6 - 1: b7C - 1: b7D
+2
+2
+;
+2
+;
+2
+2
+;
+;
+;
+;
+;
+2
+;
+;
+2:
+
+Page 373 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 374 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 375 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 376 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 377 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 378 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+2
+Page 379 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+2
+;
+Page 380 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 381 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 382 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+2
+;
+Page 383 ~ 66 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 384 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+2
+Page 385 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+2
+Page 386 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7d
+;
+Page 387 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+;
+Page 388 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 389 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+;
+Page 390 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 391 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 392 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+;
+Page 393 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 394 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+|  |
+Page 395 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 396 - b6
+- 1: b7C - 1: b7D
+Page 397 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+| I
+Page 398 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 399 - b6
+-
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+-
+Page 400 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 401 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 402 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+;
+Page 403 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 404 ~ b6
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+2
+Page 405 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 406 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+;
+Page 407 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 408 ~ b6 - 1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+-
+;
+Page 409 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+1; b7D
+Page 410 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 411 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 412 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 413 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 414 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 415 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 416 ~ b6
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 417 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 418 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 419 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 420 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 421 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 422 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 423 - b6
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 424 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 425 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+Page 426 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1: b7D
+2:
+
+Page 427 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 428 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 429 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 430 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 431 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 432 ~ b6
+…-
+1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+Page 433 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 434 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D
+Page 435 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 436 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 437 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 438 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 439 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+2
+2
+;
+2
+;
+2
+2
+Page 440 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7d
+Page 441 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+-
+;
+;
+Page 442 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+2
+Page 443 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 444 - b6
+- 1; b7C
+1; b7D - 2;
+Page 445 - b6
+- 1; b7C
+1; b7D - 2;
+Page 446 ~ b6
+….—
+1; b7C
+-
+1; b7D - 2;
+Page 447 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+-
+1; b7D - 2;
+Page 448 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C -
+1; b7D - 2;
+Page 449 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+1; b7D - 2;
+Page 450 - b6
+- 1: b7C
+-
+1: b7D - 2:
+Page 451 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+1;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 452 ~ b6 - 1; b7C
+-
+1; b7D - 2;
+Page 453 - b6
+1; b7C
+1; b7D - 2;
+Page 454 ~ b6 -
+1; b7C -
+1; b7D - 2;
+Page 455 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 456 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxX
+Deleted Page (s)
+X No Duplication Fee X
+For this Page
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/6b9c217dda070389bc4d4de85b1b5b143d7df919f9aeaa63ebceff2e9a7a7e1d.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/6b9c217dda070389bc4d4de85b1b5b143d7df919f9aeaa63ebceff2e9a7a7e1d.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7baa94af5f75b222d298558cb5b7729d7751ba3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/6b9c217dda070389bc4d4de85b1b5b143d7df919f9aeaa63ebceff2e9a7a7e1d.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -1586,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "6b9c217dda070389bc4d4de85b1b5b143d7df919f9aeaa63ebceff2e9a7a7e1d",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 2,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "804ab014e0bbcdbb05a0a9bd5fb4b3c4a28c9e6d71079b78f8856c39a6c5c6f9",
+  "output_sha256": "b5cd790e30d4df89a8b6dfe43b23d12e76b4f0bc7fe199fc65a5c3dd6d734ca5",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/78bd367ebd6b8d8397d3a31a217731cfc0d238e29c0e7cba01f511877498cf49.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/78bd367ebd6b8d8397d3a31a217731cfc0d238e29c0e7cba01f511877498cf49.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9ebff4e3d3e02415f597d8e595ebe1776ccca590
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/78bd367ebd6b8d8397d3a31a217731cfc0d238e29c0e7cba01f511877498cf49.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1629 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 547
+Page 1 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 2 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 3 - b3 - 1;
+b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 4 ~ b3 -
+b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 5
+-b3
+- 1;
+06 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 6 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 7
+~ b3
+b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 8 ~ b3 -
+1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; 67D - 1;
+Page 9 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 10 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 11 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 12 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 13 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 14
+-63
+-
+1; b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 15 ~ b3
+1; b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+67D - 1;
+Page 16 ~ b3
+-
+1; b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 17
+mb3- 1;b6
+1, -5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 18
+~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 19 ~ b3 - 1; 66 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 20 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 21 ~ b3 - 1;
+b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 22 ~ b3 - 1;
+b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 23 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 24
+= b3
+-
+-
+1,-5; b7C
+- 1,-5;
+67D - 1;
+Page 25
+~ b3
+-
+b6
+Page 26
+~ b3
+-
+b6
+-
+-
+1
+,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D
+- 1;
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D -
+Page 27
+= b3 - 1;
+b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 1:
+Page 28
+- b3
+b6
+-
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+67D - 1;
+Page 29
+-b3
+66
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+67D - 1;
+Page 30
+~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; 67D - 1;
+Page 31
+~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 32 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 33 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+34
+~63- 1:66 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+67D - 1;
+Page 35 ~ b3 - 1;
+b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D -
+Page 36 ~ b3 - 1;
+b6
+-
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 37
+- 63 - 1; 66
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+67D - 1;
+Page 38
+- 63
+-
+66
+1,-5; b7C
+1,-5;
+-
+Page 39 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+-
+Page 40 ~ b3 -
+1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D -
+Page 41 - b3
+- 1;
+66 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 42
+~ b7D - 1;
+Page 43
+- b3
+- 1; b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+67D - 1:
+Page 44 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 45
+~ b3
+-
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 46 ~ b3
+b6 -
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 47 ~ b3 - 1;
+Page 48 ~ b3 - 1;
+
+Page 49 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 50 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 51 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 52 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 53 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 54
+~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 55 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 56 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 57 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 58 ~ b3 - 1;
+b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D -
+Page 59 ~ b3 - 1;
+66 - 1,-5; b7C
+- 1,-5;
+67D - 1;
+Page 60 ~ b3 - 1; b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 61 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+1,-5; b7C
+- 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 62 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D
+-
+Page 63 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 64 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 65 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 66 ~ b3 - 1; b6
+-
+1, -5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 67 ~ b3 - 1; b6
+-
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 68
+-63
+-
+1; b6
+-
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D -
+Page 69 ~ b3
+1; b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 70 ~ b3
+-
+1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 71 ~ b3 - 1;
+66 - 1,-5; b70 - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 72
+~ b7D - 1;
+Page 73
+~ b3 - 1; b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 74 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 75
+b3
+b6
+-
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; 67D -
+Page
+76 ~ b3 - 1;
+b6 -
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+67D - 1;
+Page
+77 - b3 - 1; 66 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+78
+~b7D - 1;
+Page 79
+~63- 1:66 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 80 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 81 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 82 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 83 ~ 63 - 1;
+b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 84 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 85 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 86 - b3 - 1; b6 -
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 87 ~ b3
+-
+Page 88 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 89 ~ b3 - 1;
+1, B6 = 3:3, 07C - 139 B30 - 13
+20 262 126
+Page 90 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 91 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 92 ~ b3
+-
+1; b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+67D -
+Page 93 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+1,-5; b7C -
+1,-5;
+67D
+- 1;
+Page 94 ~ b3
+b6 -
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 1:
+Page 95 - b3
+-1;
+b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 96
+~ b3
+-
+66
+1,-5; b7C
+- 1,-5;
+67D - 1:
+Page 97
+- b3
+-
+b6
+-
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 98
+~ b3 - 1;
+b6
+,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D -
+Page 99 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 100 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 101 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 102 ~ b7D - 1;
+
+Page 103 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 104 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 105 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 106 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 107 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 108 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 109 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 110 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 111 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 112 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 113 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 114 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 115 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 116 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 117 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 118 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 119 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 120 - b3
+-
+1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 121 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 122 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page
+123 ~ 03 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 124 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 125 - b3
+- 1; b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+670 - 1
+Page 126 - b3
+1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+127
+~63- 1:66- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 128 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page
+129 " b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C -
+1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+130 ~ b3
+b6 - 1,-5; b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page 131 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 132 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+- 1,-5; b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page 133 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+134 ~ b3
+-
+1; b6
+1,-5; b7c -
+1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 135 - b3
+1; b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+136 ~ b3
+-
+1; b6 -
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+137
+~ b3 - 1: b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 138 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 139 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 140 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+141 - b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+142- 66- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+-
+Page
+143 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+144 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 145 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+-
+Page
+146 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+-
+Page 147 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+-
+Page 148 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+-
+Page 149 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1:
+Page 150
+-b7D - 1;
+Page 151 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 152 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+153 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+154 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 155 ~ 66 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 156 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+1:
+- 1;
+
+Page 157 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 158 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D
+- 1;
+Page 159 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+67D - 1;
+Page 160 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 161 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 162 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 163 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 164 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 165 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 166 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 167
+~06- 1,-5; b7C- 1,-5;
+Page 168 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+169
+=b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 170
+~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 171 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 172 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 173 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 174 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D
+- 1;
+Page 175 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+176 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1;
+b7D - 1:
+Page
+177 ~ 06 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page
+178 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 179 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 180 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 181 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page 182 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D
+- 1;
+Page 183 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page
+184 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 185 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 186
+~ b6
+-1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5;
+Page 187
+~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C -
+1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+188 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C -
+1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 189 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D -
+Page
+190
+~b6- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+191 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 192 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page
+193 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 194 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+195
+~66- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+196 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 197 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+67D - 1;
+Page 198 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 199 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 200 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 201 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 202 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 203 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 204 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1;
+Page 205 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 206 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 207 ~ b6 - 1-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 208 ~ b6 - 1-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 209 - b6 - 1-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 210 ~ b6 - 1-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+
+Page 211 ~ b6 - 1-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D
+Page 212 ~ b6 - 1-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 213 ~ b6 - 1-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 214 ~ b6 - 1-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 215 ~ b6 - 1-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 216 ~ b6 - 1-5; b7C
+- 1,-5;
+- 1;
+- 1;
+Page 217 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 218 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 219 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 220 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 221 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 222 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 223 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 224 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 225 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 226 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 227 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 228 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C
+- 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 229 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+230 - b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 231 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 232 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 233 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 234 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 235 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 236 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D
+- 1;
+Page 237 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page
+238 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page
+239- b6-1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+67D - 1;
+Page
+240 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 241 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 242 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 243 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page
+244 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page
+245 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 246 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+247 " b6
+- 1,-5; b7C
+-
+1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 248 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D
+- 1;
+Page
+249 - b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+250 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 251 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 252 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 253 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 254 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 255 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D -
+Page 256 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 257 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 258 - b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 259 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+-
+Page 260 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+-
+Page 261 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+-
+Page 262 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+1:
+Page 263 ~ 66 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+67D
+Page 264 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+
+Page 265 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 266 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 267 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 268 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 269 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 270
+~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 271 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 272 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 273 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 274 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 275 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 276 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 1;
+Page 277 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 278 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 279 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 280 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 281 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 282 - b3
+…-
+b6
+-
+3, - 5; b7C
+3
+-5;
+- 1;
+Page 283 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 284 ~ b3
+-
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page 285 ~ b3
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page 286 - b3
+-
+1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 287 ~ b3
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 288 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+Page 289 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 290 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 291 ~ b3
+-
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 292 ~ b3
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 293 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 294 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 295 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 296 ~ b3
+-
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 297 - b3
+-
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 298 ~ b3
+-
+b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+299 - b3
+-
+66
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 300 ~ b3
+-
+b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 301 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+3,-5;
+3,-5;
+- 5;
+- 1:
+- 5;
+- 1;
+3,
+-5;
+- 1;
+3,
+-5;
+-1:
+3,
+- 5;
+- 1;
+3
+- 5;
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 302 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 303 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+304 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 305 ~ b3
+-
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 306 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 307 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 308 ~ b3
+-
+1; b6
+-
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 309 - b3
+-
+b6
+-
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 310 - b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+311 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7c -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+312 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page
+313
+= b3 - 1;66 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 314 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 315 - b3
+-
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 316 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 317 - b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 318 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+
+Page 319 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 320 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 321 - b3
+-
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- I;
+Page
+322 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 323 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 324 ~ b3
+-
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+Page 325 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 326 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 327 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 328 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 329 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 330 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 331 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+-
+3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+- 1;
+Page 332 - b3
+-
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 333 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 334 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 335 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 336 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 337 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+338 - 63
+-
+b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 339 - b3
+b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 340 - b3
+-
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page
+341 ~ b3
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page
+342 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page
+343 ~ b3
+-
+b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 344 ~ b3
+b6
+3,-5; b7c -
+Page 345 - b3
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+346 ~ b3
+b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page
+347 63
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+3,-5;
+3,-5;
+3,-5;
+3,-5;
+-5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3,
+-5;
+3,-5;
+3,-5;
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+348 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page
+349 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+350
+~ b3
+-
+„b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+351 - b3
+b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+352 ~ b3
+-
+66
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+353 ~ 63
+66
+3,-5;
+b7c
+3,
+3
+Page 354 ~ b3
+-
+b6
+-
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 355 - b3
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 356 ~ b3
+1 ; b6
+-
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 357
+b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+-
+Page
+358
+b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+-
+Page
+359
+_ = b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3
+3
+Page 360
+b3
+- 1;
+b6
+- 3,-5; b7C
+Page 361 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+b7D - 1:
+- 1;
+- 1;
+-1;
+b7D - 1:
+1:
+- 1;
+- 1;
+: 1:
+- 1;
+Page 362 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 363 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7c -
+Page 364 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+365 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 366 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 367
+b3
+- 1; b6
+-
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 368 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+-
+3,
+Page 369
+~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 370 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 371 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+- 1;
+- 1;
+- 1;
+- 1;
+- 1;
+-
+- 1;
+Paqe 372 ~ b7D - 1;
+
+Page 373 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 374 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 375 - b3
+-
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 376 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+-] =
+Page 377 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 378 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 379 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+, -5;
+-1;
+Page 380 ~ b3
+-
+1; b6
+-
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 381 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 382 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 383 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 384 - b7D - 1;
+Page 385 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 386 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 387 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 388 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 389 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 390
+~ b3
+-
+b6
+-
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 391 - b3
+-
+b6
+- 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 392 ~ b3
+-
+b6
+-
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 393 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 394 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page
+395 - b3 - 1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 396 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 397
+-b3
+-
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 398 ~ b3
+-
+b6
+-
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 399 - b3
+-
+b6
+-
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+400 ~ b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 401 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+402 - 63
+- 1;
+b6
+-
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+403 ~63
+-
+b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 404 - b3
+-
+b6
+-
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 405 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+3
+,-5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3,
+-5;
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+3,-5;
+3
+- 5;
+3,
+- 5;
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+b7D - 1:
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+406 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page
+407 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 408 ~ b3
+b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page
+409
+= b3
+b6
+-
+3, -5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 410 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+-
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7D - 1:
+Page
+411 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b70 -
+3,-5;
+Page
+412 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+413 ~b3
+-
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3
+-5;
+-1;
+Page
+414 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+-
+3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 415 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+,-5;
+Page 416 ~ b3
+-
+1; b6
+-
+3,-5; b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page 417 -~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+-
+3,-5;
+b7D - 1:
+Page 418 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 419 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+Page 420
+-63 - 1:66-
+3,-5; b7C -
+, -5;
+- 1;
+Page
+421 ~ 03 - 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 422 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 423 - b3
+-
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+-1;
+Page 424 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 425 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+-
+3,-5;
+- I;
+Page 426 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5; b7D - 1;
+
+Page 427 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 428 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 429 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 430 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 431 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 432 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 433 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 434 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 435 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 436 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 437
+~b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 438 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 439 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 440 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 441 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 442 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 443 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+444 - b3
+-
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+-5;
+-
+Page 445 ~ b3
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+3,
+-5;
+-
+Page 446 ~ b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+-
+Page 447 - b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7c
+3,
+- 5;
+-
+Page 448
+- b3
+-
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page
+449
+_= b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page
+450
+~ b3
+b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+451~
+63
+Page 452 ~ b3
+-
+-
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+- 5;
+-
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+3,
+-5;
+-
+Page 453 - b3
+b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+Page
+454-
+Page 455 ~ b3
+- 1;
+66 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+456 - b3
+-
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+457
+~ b3
+66
+3, -5; b7C
+Page
+458
+= b3
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 459 - b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+460
+- b3
+66
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+461 -b3
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page 462 ~ b3
+-
+b6
+-
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+463
+- b3
+Page 464 ~ b3
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+- 1; b6
+- 3,-5; b7C
+-
+Page 465
+-63- 1;66-3,-5; b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+b7D -
+- 5;
+- 1;
+- 5;
+- 1;
+-5;
+-
+3,
+-5;
+-
+3,
+- 5;
+-
+3
+- 5;
+-
+- 5;
+- 1;
+m
+-5;
+-
+3,
+- 5;
+- 1;
+3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 466 ~ b7D - 1;
+Page 467 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 468 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 469 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 470 ~ b3
+-
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 471 - b3
+-
+b6
+-
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 472 - b3
+-
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 473 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 474 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 475 - b3
+- 1; b6
+-
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 476 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+-
+Page 477
+~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+-
+Page 478 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 479 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+3
+-5;
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+3,
+- 5;
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+-1;
+3,-5;
+-1;
+3
+,-5;
+-1;
+, -5;
+- 1;
+, -5;
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+-1;
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Paqe 480 ~ b7D - 1;
+
+ru
+b
+-
+-
+-1;
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+1i
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+b6
+b
+-
+-
+-
+3,
+- 5;
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+-5;
+3,
+-
+-
+-
+-
+-
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+-5;
+-
+| I I
+-
+=.
+- 1;
+..
+- 1;
+-.
+
+Page 535 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 536 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 537
+- b3
+…. —
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 538 ~
+b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 539 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 540 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 541 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 542 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 543 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 544 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 545 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 546 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 547 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1;
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+Deleted Page(s)
+X
+X No Duplication Fee X
+X
+For this Page
+X
+XXXXXXXXXXXXxXxxxxxxxxX
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/78bd367ebd6b8d8397d3a31a217731cfc0d238e29c0e7cba01f511877498cf49.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/78bd367ebd6b8d8397d3a31a217731cfc0d238e29c0e7cba01f511877498cf49.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e0e66ecc2c88dc9c7bd6ce45b3d0bc210d6a9061
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/78bd367ebd6b8d8397d3a31a217731cfc0d238e29c0e7cba01f511877498cf49.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -1874,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "78bd367ebd6b8d8397d3a31a217731cfc0d238e29c0e7cba01f511877498cf49",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "743b2888acb7aee5c935e88a989454d6a39a8314367e8612df3265d7e74f452e",
+  "output_sha256": "b2a6867dead5085b52945f592555856ef668f9e45266047e4c0566a6fd7ba163",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/7c292dfa6ecb24c2755b73382189aa9841d2819ec6d67e3fe437ef2b0459758e.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/7c292dfa6ecb24c2755b73382189aa9841d2819ec6d67e3fe437ef2b0459758e.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..452f0c2b076abaa026537bd1f91d63e7881ce5a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/7c292dfa6ecb24c2755b73382189aa9841d2819ec6d67e3fe437ef2b0459758e.md
@@ -0,0 +1,3693 @@
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+H
+De
+• .
+12
+13
+N
+1,
+2;
+N
+N
+N
+16
+17
+18
+22
+23
+1,
+2;
+g
+24
+b3
+25
+= b3
+26
+-63
+27
+~ b3
+28
+~ b3
+29
+63
+30
+b3
+31
+b3
+32
+~ b3
+33
+= b3
+34
+b3
+35
+- 63
+b3
+37
+38
+39
+40
+43
+44
+45
+46
+47
+48
+49
+50
+51
+5
+2
+53
+b3
+b3
+b3
+- b3
+63
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+b3
+b6
+b6
+b6
+06
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+1
+;
+1
+;
+1
+66
+b6
+b6
+66
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+1
+1
+;
+1
+66
+b6
+b6
+66
+66
+b6
+-2, -3, -4; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -4;
+- 5; b7C - 1, -2, -4, -5;
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1
+1,
+1
+1,
+1,
+1
+1
+1
+2,
+- 3
+- 5
+-3, -4, -5; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -4, -5;
+- 2, -3, -4, -5: b70 - 1, -2, -3, -4, -5;
+4,
+7C
+1,
+- 2
+-3
+-4
+- 5
+-2,
+-3, -4; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -4; b7E - 1;
+" 3
+1,
+N
+N
+- 3, -4,
+-5; b7C - 1, -3, -4, -5; b7D - 1;
+- 3, -4,
+- 5, -7; b70 - 1,
+- 3, -4, -5, -7; b7D-
+- 3
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+-3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+1,
+- 3,
+1,
+- 3,
+1,
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7D - 1;
+- 3
+- 4;
+1,
+-3
+1,
+- 3
+1,
+- 3,
+1,
+- 3,
+1,
+- 3
+-5;
+b7D
+- 1;
+- 5;
+b7D - 1;
+- 3
+- 4;
+1,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 4;
+- 1,
+- 3,
+b7D - 1;
+- 3,
+- 3
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3,
+- 3
+- 3
+- 3,
+- 3
+- 3,
+- 3
+3,
+1
+1
+1,
+1,
+1,
+- 3,
+-4:
+- 3,
+- 4;
+1
+-3,
+- 4;
+- 3,
+- 4;
+- 3,
+- 4;
+1,
+- 3
+1
+- 3,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+- 3,
+1
+1,
+- 3
+- 3
+-3
+- 5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+-5;
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+- 4;
+- 3,
+-3
+1,
+- 3,
+- 5;
+- 5
+-5
+- 5;
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+1
+
+Page
+54
+b3
+Page
+55
+~ b3
+Page
+56
+b3
+Page
+57
+b3
+-1;
+Page
+58
+~ b3 - 1;
+Page
+59
+b3
+Page
+60
+b3
+Page
+61
+b3
+Page
+62
+~ b3
+Page
+63
+b3
+Page
+64
+63
+Page
+73
+~ b3
+Page
+74
+b3
+1:
+Page
+75
+b3
+Page
+76
+b3
+b6
+b6
+1
+b6
+1,
+b6
+1,
+b6
+1,
+b6
+1
+66
+1
+66
+1,
+b6
+1,
+b6
+66
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+- 3,
+- 4,
+-5; b7C - 1, -3,
+-4, -5; b7D - 1;
+-3,
+-4; b7C - 1, -3,
+-4; b7D
+- 1;
+-3,
+-4,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-4,
+-5; b7D - 1;
+- 3,
+-4,
+- 5; b7C -
+1,
+- 3,
+-4,
+-5; b7D
+- 1;
+- 3,
+-4,
+-5; b7C - 1, -3,
+-4,
+-5; b7D - 1, -2;
+- 3,
+-4; b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-4;
+b7D
+- 1;
+- 3,
+-4; b7C - 1,
+- 3,
+-4;
+b7D
+- 1;
+-3,
+-4; b7C - 1,
+- 3,
+-4; b7D
+- 1;
+- 3,
+- 4,
+-5; b7C - 1, -3,
+-4,
+-5; b7D - 1;
+- 3
+-4;
+b7c - 1,
+-3, -4; b7D - 1, -2;
+1,
+2
+-3,
+- 4;
+b7C - 1,
+- 3,
+-4; b7D - 2;
+-3:
+b7C - 2, -3; b7E - 3;
+-5;
+b7C -
+3, -5;
+5;
+2
+b7C - 5;
+-3; b7C -
+Page
+77
+b3
+-5;
+b7C -
+2,
+- 3;
+3, -5;
+Page 88
+- b3
+b6 -
+3;
+b7C - 3;
+Page 89
+~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 90 ~ b6
+- 2; b7C - 2;
+Page
+91
+b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page
+92 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page
+93
+= b3
+-3, 0 - 3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page
+94
+~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2;
+Page
+95 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - Z;
+Page 100 ~ b6 - 1,
+-2; b7C - 1, -2; b7D - 2: b7E - 1, -2;
+Page 107 ~ b3 - 1;
+b6
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - 3, -5;
+Page 109 - b3
+b6
+3;
+b7C - 3;
+Page
+112 ~ b3
+b6
+b7C - 3;
+Page 114 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+Page 118 ~ b3
+- 2; b6
+3;
+2,
+b7C - 3;
+-6; b7C - 2, -6;
+Page
+119 ~ b3
+- 2;
+Page
+120
+= b3
+- 2;
+Page 124 - b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+Page
+125 ~ b3
+66
+1,
+1
+Page
+126 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+Page 129 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+Page
+130 - b3
+b6
+1,
+Page
+133 ~ 63
+- 1; b6
+-1,
+-2, -3; b7C - 1, -2, -3; b7D - 1;
+-3; B7C - 1, -3;
+b7D - 1;
+-3; b7C - 1,
+-3;
+b7D - 1:
+-2, -3; b7C - 1, -2, -3; b7D - 1;
+-3; b7C - 1, -3; b7D - 1;
+-2, -3, -4, -5; b7C - 1, -2,-3, -4, -5; b7D -
+Page
+134 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+1,
+Page
+136 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 1;
+-5; b7C - 3,
+- 5;
+Page
+138
+•= b3
+b6
+3,
+-5; b7C - 3,
+-5;
+Page 140 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 - 1,
+-2, -3;
+b70 - 1,
+-2, -3; b7D - 1;
+Page
+141 ~ b3
+1; b6
+1,
+-2,
+-3;
+b7C - 1,
+-2,
+-3;
+Page
+142 ~ b3
+b6
+1,
+-2,
+- 3;
+b70 - 1,
+- 2, - 3;
+Page
+147 - b3
+1; b6 -
+1,
+-2, -3;
+b7C - 1,
+-2, -3; b7D - 1;
+Page
+148 - b3
+b6 -
+1,
+- 3,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-5;
+b7D - 1;
+Page
+149 -b3
+- 1; b6 -
+1,
+- 3;
+b7C - 1, -3;
+b7D - 1;
+Page
+151 - b3
+1; b6
+3;
+b7C - 3;
+Page
+153 - b3
+1; b6 -
+1,
+-2, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -2, -3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+154 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 1,
+-3, -4, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -4, -5;
+Page
+155 ~ b6
+1; b7C - 1;
+Page 156 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 157 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+
+- b3
+W
+WJ
+5;
+=.
+W0
+W
+Page
+Page
+178 ~ b3
+Page
+180 - b3
+Page
+1,
+- 1,
+Page
+Page
+Page
+Page
+Page
+Page
+Page
+Page
+Page
+Page
+Page
+Page
+Page
+Page
+Page
+Page
+1,
+- b3
+-b3
+-1;
+= b3
+- b3
+b3
+b3
+= b6
+1,
+- 1;
+~ b6
+1,
+= b3
+-b3
+63
+~ b3
+~ b3
+66
+1,
+b3
+b3
+7C
+7C
+7C
+7C
+3
+;
+3;
+3;
+b6
+1,
+1,
+-5,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+-5;
+1,
+-5;
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+-5;
+1,
+1,
+1,
+- 1,
+- 3,
+1,
+- 1,
+-3,
+- 3,
+-5;
+- 1,
+- 3,
+- 1,
+- 3,
+b7C - 1,
+1
+1
+- 7;
+-4;
+-3,
+- 3,
+-3,
+-3,
+-3
+-3
+-4;
+- 3,
+-4;
+-3,
+- 3,
+-3,
+- 3,
+-4
+-4,
+-5; b7D - 1;
+2;
+b7D
+2;
+-7; b7D - 2;
+-7; b7D - 1, -2;
+-7;
+- 1;
+-5;
+b7D - 1;
+-5;
+b7D - 1;
+-4, -5, -7; b7D -
+4,
+5,
+b7D - 1;
+
+Page 209 ~ b6 - 1,
+-3, -4,
+-5, -7; b7C - 1, -3, -4, -5,
+-7;
+b7D - 1;
+Page 210 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 1,
+-3, -5,
+- 7; b7C
+- 1,
+- 3,
+-5,
+-7;
+b7D
+- 1;
+Page 211 - b3
+b6 -
+1
+-3, -4,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-4,
+-5;
+b7D - 1;
+Page 212 ~ b3
+b6
+1
+-3, -4,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+- 3,
+- 4,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 213 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+1,
+-3, -4,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+- 3,
+-4, -5;
+b7D - 1;
+Page 214
+= b3
+1; b6
+1,
+- 3,
+-4;
+b7c - 1,
+-3, -4; b7D - 1;
+Page 215 ~ b6 - 1, -4,
+-5; b7C - 1, -4, -5;
+Page 216 ~ b6 - 1,
+-4; b7C - 1, -4;
+Page 217 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -4, -5, -7; b7C - 1, -3, -4, -5, -7; b7D -
+1, -2;
+Page 218 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -4, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -4, -5; b7D - 2:
+Page 219 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -4, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -4,
+-5; b7D - 2; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 220 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,
+- 3, -5,
+-7; b7C - 1,
+- 3,
+-5, -7; b7D - 2;
+Page 221 ~ b6 - 1, -4, -5,
+-7; b7C - 1, -4,
+-5,
+- 7;
+Page 222 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -4, -5; b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-4,
+-5;
+Page 223 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -4, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -4, -5; b7D - 1, -2;
+Page 224 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+1,
+-3,
+-5;
+b7C
+- 1,
+-3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 225 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+1,
+- 3,
+-4;
+b7C
+1,
+-3,
+-4; b7D - 1, -2;
+Page 226 ~ b3
+1; b6
+1,
+- 3,
+-4,
+- 5;
+b7C
+- 1,
+-3,
+-4, -5; b7D - 1, -2;
+Page 227 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+- 3,
+-4,
+-5;
+b7C
+- 1,
+- 3,
+-4,
+-5; b7D - 1, -2;
+Page 228 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+1,
+-3,
+-4,
+-5,
+-7;
+b7C - 1, -3, -4, -5, -7; b7D -
+1, -2;
+Page 229 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+1,
+Page 230 - b3
+- 1; b6
+1,
+Page 231 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+1,
+Page 232 - b6
+1,
+- 3,
+-4,
+Page
+233 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 - 1,
+Page 234 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+1
+Page 235 - b3
+- 1;
+66
+1,
+Page 236 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+1,
+-3, -5;
+b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-5; b7D - 1;
+-3,
+-4,
+-5;
+b 7C
+- 1, -3, -4,
+-5; b7D - 1;
+-3,
+-4,
+-5; b7C - 1, -3,
+-4,
+-5; b7D - 1;
+-5:
+b7C - 1,
+- 3,
+-4,
+-5; b7D
+- 1;
+-3,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-5;
+b7D - 1;
+- 3,
+-4,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+-3, -4, -5; b7D - 1, -2;
+- 3,
+-4,
+-5;
+b7C
+- 1,
+-3,
+-4,
+-5; b7D - 1;
+-3,
+-4,
+-5, -7;
+b7C - 1, -3,
+-4, -5, -7; b7D -
+Page 237 - b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -4, -5,
+-7;
+b7C - 1, -3, -4, -5, -7; b7D -
+Page 238 ~ b6 - 1, -4, -5,
+-7; b7C - 1,
+Page 239 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -4,
+-5, -7; b7D - 1;
+b7C - 1, -3, -4, -5, -7; b7D -
+Page 240 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -4, -5, -7; b7C - 1, -3, -4, -5, -7; b7D -
+Page 241 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 1,
+Page 242 ~ b3
+- 1: b6 - 3: 670 - 31
+-4; b7C - 1, -3, -4;
+Page 243
+- b3
+- 1; b6 - 1, -3, -4; b7C - 1,
+-3, -4; b7D - 1;
+Page 244 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5; b7D - 1;
+Page 245 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 1,
+-3, -4; b7C - 1,
+-3, -4; b7D - 1;
+Page 246 - b3
+1; b6 - 1, -3,
+-4; b7C - 1,
+-3, -4; b7D - 1;
+Page 247
+= b3
+- 1; b6 - 1, -3; b7C - 1,
+- 3;
+b7D - 1;
+Page
+248 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1, -3; b7C - 1, -3; b7D - 1;
+Page 249 - b3 - 1;
+Page 250 - OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 251 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 252 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 253 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 254 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 255 - OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+
+Page 257 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 258 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 259 - OTHER - Court Sealing
+order;
+Page 260 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing
+Order;
+Page 261 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 262 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 263 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 264 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 265 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing
+Order;
+Page 266 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 267 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 268 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 269 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 270 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 271 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 272 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing
+Order;
+Page 273 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 274 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 275 - OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 276 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 277 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 278 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 279 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 280 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 281 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 282 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 283 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 284 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing
+Order;
+Page 285 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 286 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 287 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 288 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 289 - OTHER - Court Sealing
+Order;
+Page 290 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 291 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 292 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 293 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 294 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 295 - OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 296 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing
+order;
+Page 297 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing
+Order;
+Page 298 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 299 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 300 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 301 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing
+Order:
+Page 302 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing
+Order;
+Page 303 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing
+Order;
+Page 304 - OTHER - Court
+Sealing
+Order;
+Page 305 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 306 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 307 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing
+Order;
+Page 308 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing
+Order;
+Page 309 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 310 - OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+
+Page 311 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 312 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 313 - OTHER - Court Sealing
+Page 314 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing
+Page 315 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 316 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+Page 317 ~ OTHER - Court Sealing Order;
+XXXXXXXXXXXxxxxxxxX
+X
+Deleted Page(s)
+× No Duplication Fee X
+X For this Page
+X
+X
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+
+#
+To: Miami
+From: Miami
+squad PB-2,
+PRORA
+Contact:
+SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN:
+Date: 07/24/2006
+Attn:
+SSA
+Form
+ank
+(OPEN REOPEN)
+ORIGIN DIE DATE 2/24/06
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: To request case be opened and assigned.
+Details: From March 2005 through February 2006, the Palm
+poach county olde Per rent ordered overed ation
+involving the subiects, Jeffrey. Postein,
+b3 -1
+b6 -1, -2
+b7A
+-1
+b7C -1, -2
+TEpstein|
+Epstein's.
+63-1
+b6 -1,
+- 3
+b7C -1, -3
+63 - 1
+b6 - 1, -3
+b7C -1, -3
+203eNKOl.EC
+31E-14-108062+1
+03956-17
+
+*.
+To: Miami From:
+31E-MM,
+07/24/2006
+•
+b3 -1
+56 -1, -3
+b7C -1, -3
+It is requested by SAD
+captioned case be opened and assigned.
+that the above
+66 - 2
+b70 - 2
+2
+03956-18
+
+•obable Cause Affidavit
+Agency ORI# FLO 500600
+Police Case##: 05-368 (1)
+Defendant: Jeffrey Epstein
+Race/Sex:
+White Male
+DOB:
+Charges:
+!
+b6-1
+b7C - 1
+From March 15, 2005, through February 2006, the Palm Beach Police Department conducted a sexual
+battery investigation involving Jeffrey Epstein,
+Palm Beach.
+63 - 1
+b6 -1, -3
+b70 - 1, -3
+The facts, as reported, are as follows:
+b3 - 1
+b6 - 1, -3
+b7C -1, -3
+b7D -1
+The foregoing instrument was sworn to or affirmed
+before me this 15 day of May, 2006 by
+Det
+Twho is personally known to me.
+State of Florida
+County of Palm Beach
+63 - 1
+66-1, -3
+b7C -1, -3
+67D - 1
+66-4
+Signature of Police Officer (F.S.S. 117.10)
+Signature/Arresting Officer
+Date: 05/01/2006
+3E-44-108062-4
+03956-19
+
+iF "
+obable Cause Affidavit
+Agency ORI# FLO 500600
+b3-1
+b6 -31
+b7C -1, -3
+On November 21, 2005 I interviewed]
+he was|
+stated
+b3 -1
+b6 -1, -3, -5
+b7C -1, -3, -5
+B7D -1
+On January 4, 2006 I interviewed another former houseman, Mr Alfredo Rodriguez. During a sworn
+taped statement, Mr. Rodriguez stated he was employed by Jeffrey Epstein for approximately six months, from
+November 2004 through May of 2005. His responsibilities as house manager included being the butler,
+chauffeur, chef, houseman, run errands for Epstein and provide for Epstein's guests. I asked Rodriguez about
+b3 -1
+66 -1, -3
+b7C -1,
+-3
+B7D
+-1
+The foregoing instrument was sworn to or affirmed
+before me this 1" day of May, 2006 by
+Det
+Jwho is personally kaown to me.
+66-4
+bTC -4
+Signature of Police Officer (F.S.S. 117.10)
+State of Florida
+County of Palm Beach
+Signature/Arresting Officer
+Date: 05/01/2006
+03956-39
+
+Cobable Cause Affidavit
+Agency ORI# FLO 500600
+b3 - 1
+66 -1, -3
+b7C -1, -3
+b7D -1
+63 - 1
+66-1, -3
+b70-1, -3
+b7D -1
+63 - 1
+66 -1, -3
+b7C -1, -3
+b7D -2
+b7E -1
+66 - 1
+b70 - 1
+b7D -2
+b7E -1
+Therefore, as Jeffrey Epstein, who at the time of these incidents was
+63-1
+b6 -1,-3
+b7C -1, -3
+The foregoing instrument was sworn to or affirmed
+before me this 1s' day of May, 2006 by
+Det
+who is personally known to me.
+State of Florida
+County of Palm Beach
+66-4
+b7C -4
+Signature of Police Officer (E.S.S. 117.10)
+Signature/Arresting Officer
+Date: 05/01/2006
+03956-40
+
+ЗIE-MH-108062-
+Mystery money man faces soliciting charge
+By NICOLE JANOK
+Palm Beach Post Staff Writer
+A part-time Palm Beacher who has
+socialized with Donald Trump,
+Bill
+Clinton and Kevin Spacey was jailed
+early Sunday with accused drug dealers,
+drunken drivers and wife beaters after
+he was charged with soliciting a prostitute.
+Manhattan money manager Jeffrey
+Epstein, 53, was picked up at his home
+on El Brillo Way at 1:45 a.m. He was
+released hours later on $3,000 bond.
+Epstein was indicted last week by a
+convictions.
+state grand jury, according to state at-
+However, checks of court records
+torney's spokesman Mike Edmondson.
+here and in New York Sunday turned up
+Despite Epstein's arrest, the indictment
+no such convictions.
+=
+containing
+the allegations remained
+Epstein could not be reached. F 1
+sealed Sunday and Edmondson providmondson said he was being representt i
+ed no details.
+by West Palm Beach attorney Jack
+Unlike most accused johns, Epstein
+Goldberg, who declined comment.
+was charged with a third-degree felony
+Epstein is the president of J Epstein
+instead of a misdemeanor. Under state
+= Co., a money management company
+Jeffrey Epstein
+law, a solicitation charge usually is ele
+›ased in Manhattan that caters to ultra
+Indietment
+vated to a more serious felony when the
+wealthy clientele, according to pubrelated to
+defendant has at least two solicitation
+See SOLICING, 6B • prostitution.
+'Mysterious billionaire'
+has been on probation
+• SOLICITING from 1B
+dropped.
+lished
+Since then, Epstein's
+reports. National
+name has turned up in New
+magazines have described
+York City's tabloids. The New
+him as a "mysterious billion-
+York Post noted he flew Presaire" who lives in a 45,000-
+ident Clinton and Kevin
+square-foot New York City
+Spacey to Africa on his primansion.
+vate Boeing 727. In 2003, the
+He has been in trouble
+paper dubbed him one of the
+before. In 1993, he and two
+Big Apple's "top studs."
+other
+defendants
+were
+charged in federal court with
+In 2004, Epstein
+bid
+three counts of postal larceny
+against Trump for a 43.000
+and theft and one count of
+square foot Palm Beach esproperty theft. Epstein plead
+tate once owned by healthguilty to a single charge of
+care magnate Abe Gosman.
+conspiring to
+steal U.S.
+'Trump topped Epstein with a
+Treasury checks from resi-
+$41.35 million bid.
+dential. mailboxes and re-
+Staff Researcher Angelica
+ceived 5 years'
+probation.
+Cortez contributed to this story.
+The remaining charges were
+© nicole_janok@pbpost.com
+Indexing:
+Classification 31E-MM-108082
+Submitting Office:
+MM
+Character
+Title:
+Mystery money man
+faces soliciting charge
+FD-350 (Rev. 5-8-81)
+(Indicate page, name of
+newspaper, city and state.)
+1B, 6B / The Palm Beach Post
+West Palm Beach, FL
+Date:
+0724/2006
+03956-63
+
+31E-M4-108062-5
+..
+4B
+THE PALM BEACH POST
+•
+TUESDAY, JULY 25, 2006
+Indictment: Billionaire solicited 3 times
+the commission of a
+Waterway since 1990, according to
+Palm Beach police will report
+today about their prostitution
+probe of the money manager.
+crime.
+property records. A man answering the
+his attorney, Jack
+door there Monday said that Epstein
+Goldberger, declined to
+wasn't home. A Cadillac Escalade regdiscuss the charge.
+istered to him was parked in the drive
+State attorney's of
+way, which is flanked by two massive
+fice spokesman
+Mike
+gargoyles.
+Edmondson
+also had
+Epstein sued Property Appraiser
+By LARRY KELLER
+Palm Beach Post Staff Writer
+little to say.
+Gary Nikolits in 2001, contending that
+"Generally
+speak-
+Epstein
+the assessment of his home exceeded
+Billionaire money manager
+and
+ing, there is a case that
+its fair market value. He dismissed his
+Palm Beach part-time resident Jeffrey
+has a number of different aspects to it,"
+lawsuit in December 2002.
+Epstein solicited or procured prostitutes
+Edmondson
+said of a
+prostitution-
+A profile of Epstein in Vanity Fair
+three or more times between Aug. 1 and
+related charge being submitted to a
+magazine said he owns what are be-
+Oct 31 of last year, according to an ingrand jury. "We first became aware of
+lieved to be the largest private homes in
+dictment charging him with felony sothe case months ago by Palm Beach
+Manhattan — 51,000 square feet — and
+licitation of prostitution.
+police."
+in New Mexico — a 7,500-acre ranch.
+Epstein, 53, was booked at the Palm
+Prosecutors and police worked to-
+Those are in addition to his 70-acre is-
+Beach County jail at 1:45 a.m. Sunday.
+gether to bring the case to the grand
+land in the U.S. Virgin Islands and fleet
+He was released on $3,000 bond
+jury, he said.
+oi aircraft.
+Epstein's case is unusual in that
+Palm Beach police confirmed that
+Epstein's friends and admirers, acsuspected prostitution johns are usually
+and said the department will release
+cording to the magazine, include promcharged with a misdemeanor, and even
+report today regarding its investigation.
+inent businessmen, academics and sei-
+a felony charge is typically made in a
+Epstein has owned a five-bedroom,
+entists and famed Harvard law professor
+criminal information — an alternative to
+7½-bath, 7,234-square foot home with a
+Alan Dershowitz.
+an indictment charging a person with
+pool and a boat dock on the Intracoastal
+@larry_keller@pbpost.com
+Indexing:
+Classification: 31E.MM-108062
+Submitting Office:
+MM
+Character
+Title:
+Indictment: Billionaire
+solicited 3 times
+FD-350 (Rev. 5-8-81)
+(Indicate page, name of
+newspaper, city and state.)
+4B / The Palm Beach Post
+West Palm Beach, FL
+Date:
+0725/2006
+03956-64
+
+FD-350 (Rev. 5-8-81)
+Atter long probe,
+billionaire faces
+solicitation charge
+ByLARRY KELLER
+Palm Beach Post Staff Writer
+ceived massages and sometimes sex, ac
+cording to an investigation
+by the Palm Beach Police
+Department.
+Palm Beach police spent
+months sitting through Ep
+stein's trash and watching
+his waterfront home and
+Palm Beach International
+Airport to keep tabs on his
+private jet. An indictment
+Epsteln
+charging Epstein, 53, was
+unsealed Monday, charging him with one
+count of felony solicitation of prostitution.
+Pam Beach police thought there was
+propable cause to charge Epstein with un
+awiul sex acts with a minor and lewd an‹
+lascivious molestation.
+with site hittie any Krodhe shan.
+ding of the case that he wrote a memo
+See EPSTEIN, 5B •
+(Indicate page, name of
+newspaper, city and state.)
+11B, 5B/ The Palm Beach Post
+West Palm Beach, FL
+Date:
+0726/2006
+Title:
+After long probe,
+billionaire faces
+solicitation charges
+Character
+Classification 31E-MM-108062
+Submitting Office:
+MM
+indexing:
+:
+03956-65
+31EMM-108062-4
+
+W S C THE PALM BEACH POST •
+WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 2006
+5B
+Police kept watch on home, airport, sifted through trash
+• EPSTEIN from 1B
+suggesting the county's top
+prosecutor disqualify himself.
+"I must urge you to examine the unusual course that
+your office's handling of this
+ratter has taken and consider
+good and sufficient reason
+exists to require your
+disqualification from the preser
+cution of these cases.
+wrote in a May 1 memo to
+Krischer.
+While not commenting
+specifically on the Epstein
+Edmondson,
+spokesman for the state attorney, said his office pre
+sents cases 'other than murders to a grand jury when
+there are questions about
+witnesses' credibility
+their ability to testify.
+By the nature of their jobs,
+police officers look at
+evimance from a "one-sided per-
+"wective,"
+" Edmondson said.
+"A prosecutor has to look at it
+in a much broader fashion.
+weighing the veracity of wit-
+, nesses and how they may fare
+under
+defense
+attorneys'
+questioning, he said.
+Epstein's attorney, Jack
+Goldberger, said
+his client
+committed no crimes.
+The reports and statements in question refer to
+false accusations that were
+not charged because the Palm
+Beach County state attorney
+questioned the credibility of
+the witnesses," Goldberger
+said.
+A
+county grand jury
+The chief's letter
+20, of Royal Palm Beach:
+Give a massage - maybe na-
+"found the allegations wholly
+Robson has worked at an OI
+unsubstantiated and not
+See the letter Palm Beach Police
+ive Garden restaurant in
+Chlef Michael Reiter wrote to
+credible,
+" and that's why his
+client was not charged with
+State Attomney Barry Krischer
+Wellington and said she was a
+journalism major at
+sexual activity with minors,
+on the Epstein case.
+Beach Community
+he said.
+PalmBeachPost.com
+when she was questioned by
+Goldberger said Epstein
+police last October. She has
+passed a lie detector test adan unlisted phone number
+A money manager for the
+ministered by a reputable
+ultra-rich, Epstein was named
+and could not be reached for
+polygraph examiner in which
+one of New York's most eligi
+e said he did not know the
+ble bachelors in 2003 by The
+girls were minors. Also, a
+New York Post. He reportedly
+search
+warrant served
+hobnobs with the likes of
+Epstein's home found no evi
+former President Clinton,
+dence
+to corroborate the
+former Harvard University
+girls allegations, Goldberger
+President Lawrence Sumsaid.
+mers and Donald Trump, and
+According to police docuhas lavish homes in Manhatments:
+tan, New Mexico and the Vir-
+• A Palm Beach Community College student said she
+He has contributed tens of
+gave Epstein a massage in the
+thousands of dollars to Demnude. then brought him six
+ocratic Party candidates and
+girls, ages 14 to 16, for masorganizations, including Sen.
+sage and sex-tinged sessions
+John Kerry's presidential bid,
+Robson said she met Ep
+stein when, at age 17, a friend
+asked her if she would like to
+money giving him a
+massage. She said
+driven to his five-bedroom,
+74-bath home on the Intracoastal Waterway,
+corted upstairs to a bedroom
+with a massage table and oils.
+Epstein and Robson were
+both naked during the mas
+sage, she said, but when he
+grabbed her buttocks, she
+said she didn't want to be
+at his home.
+and the Senate campaigns of
+• A 27-year-old woman
+Joe Lieberman, Hillary Clinwho worked as Epstein's
+ton, Christopher Dodd and
+personal assistant also facili-
+Charles Schumer.
+One 14-year-old girl Robson took to meet Epstein led
+police to start the investigation of him in March 2005. A
+relative of the girl called to say
+she thought the child had recently engaged in sex with a
+Palm Beach man.
+then got into a fight with a
+classmate who accused her of
+being a prostitute, and she
+couldn't explain why she had
+$300 in her purse.
+The girl gave police this.
+account of her meeting with
+Epstein:
+She accompanied Robson
+and a second girl to Epstein's
+house on a Sunday in February 2005. Once there, a woman she thought was Epstein's
+assistant told the girl to follow
+her upstairs to a room featuring a mural of a naked woman,
+several photographs of naked
+wornen on a shelf, a hot pink
+and green sofa and a massage
+stein's bedroom.
+Kellen, whose
+cent known address is in
+North Carolina, has not been
+charged in the case.
+Palm Beach police often
+surveillance
+Epstein's home, and at Palm
+International Airport
+to see if his private jet was
+so they would know
+when he was in town. Police
+also arranged repeatedly to
+receive his trash from Palm
+tated the liaisons, phoning
+Goldberger is one of five
+the PBCC student to arrange
+for girls when Epstein was
+coming to town. And she escorted the girls upstairs when
+they arrived, putting fresh
+sheets on a massage table and
+placing massage oils nearby.
+statements from five alleged
+subject of an investigation,
+Edmondson said. Among the
+others: Alan Dershowitz, the
+well-known Harvard law professor and author, who is a
+friend of Epstein. Dershowitz
+could not be reached for
+victims and
+They contend that on three
+occasions, Epstein had sex
+with the girls.
+Epstein said he'd pay her
+to bring him more girls— the
+younger the better, Robson
+told police. When she tried
+once to bring a 23-year-old
+woman to him. Estein said
+she was too old, Robson said.
+Robson, who has not been
+charged in the case, said she
+eventually brought six girls to
+Epstein who were paid $200
+each time, Robson said. "I'm
+like a Heidi Fleiss," police
+quoted her as saying. The
+Police said the woman
+girls knew what to expect
+who enlisted young girls for
+, when they were taken to Ep
+Epstein was Haley Robson,'
+stein's home, Robson said.
+She stripped to her bra
+and panties and gave him a
+Epstein gave the 14 yearold $300 and she and the other girls left, she said. She said
+Robson told her that Epstein
+paid her $200 that day.
+Other girls told similar
+Epstein's personal assistant at
+the time, Sarah Kellen, now
+27, escorted the girls to Ep-
+collecting papers with names
+and phone numbers, sex toys
+and female hygiene products.
+One note stated that a female could not come over at 7
+p.m. because of soccer. An-
+other said a girl had to work
+"Monday after
+school?™ And still another
+note contained the work
+hours of a girl, saying she
+leaves school at 11:30 a.m.
+and would come over the next
+day at 10:30 a.m.
+Only three months before
+the police department probe
+$90,000 to the department for
+the purchase of a firearms
+simulator, said Jane Struder,
+town finance director. The
+purchase was never made.
+The moner was returned to
+Epstein on Monday, she said.
+Staff writers Andrew Marra
+and Tim O'Meilia and staff researcher Angelica Cortez contributed to this story.
+@larry_keller@pbpost.com
+03956-66 ..
+
+10-350 ReV. 5881)
+Police say
+lawyer tried
+to discredit
+teenage girls
+By LARRY KELLER
+Palm Beach Post Staff Writer
+Famed Harvard law professor Alan
+Dershowitz met with the Palm Beach
+County State Attorney's Office and pro
+vided damaging information about teenage girls who say they gave his client,
+Palm Beach billionaire Jeffrey Epstein
+sexually charged massages, according to
+police reports.
+The reports also state that another
+Epstein attorney agreed to a plea bargain
+that would have allowed Epstein to have no
+criminal record. His current attorney denies this happened.
+And the documents also reveal that the
+father of at least one girl complained that
+investigators aggressively fol-
+Lowed his car, photographed his home and
+chased off visitors.
+Police also talked
+somebody who said she
+was offered money if she
+refused to cooperate with
+the Palm Beach
+Department probe of Ep-
+The
+state attorney's
+office said it presented the
+Epstein case to a county
+grand jury this month
+rather
+than
+directly
+charging Epstein because
+of concerns about the
+girls'
+credibility.
+The
+Epstein: His
+former attomey
+agreed to a
+plea bargain,
+police say.
+grand jury indicted Ep-
+stein, 53, on a single count of felony solicitation of prostitution, which carries a
+maximum penalty of five years in prison.
+Police believed there was probable
+cause to charge Epstein with the more
+serious crimes of unlawful sex acts with a
+minor and lewd and lascivious molestation. Police Chief Michael Reiter was so
+angry that he wrote State Attorney Barry
+Krischer a memo in May sugpesting he
+disqualify himself from the case.
+(Indicate page, name of
+18, 8 ho yand each Post
+West Palm Bech, FL
+Date:
+7/29/2006
+Title:
+Police say lawyer tried to
+discredit teenage girls.
+Character
+or
+Classification: 31E-MMM-108062
+Submitting Office:
+MM
+indexing:
+The case originally was going to be
+presented to the grand jury in February,
+but was postponed aiter Dershowitz pro
+duced information gleaned from the Wel
+site myspace com showing some of the
+alleged victims commenting on alcohol
+and marijuana use, according to the police
+report prepared by Detective Joseph Re
+Haley Robson, a 20 year-old Royal
+Palm Beach woman who told police she
+recruited girls for Epstein, also is profiled
+on myspace.com. Her page includes photos of her and her friends, including one
+5.
+03958-67
+3IE-MM-108062-7
+
+Polygraph shows he didn't know girls' ages, lawyer says
+• EPSTEIN from IB
+plained of being harassed by
+test, "he passed on knowlsaid. "It's a way for the prosprivate investigators providedge of age," the attorney
+ecutor's office to not take the
+the name
+ed license tag numbers oftwo
+full responsibility for not fil-
+Made EZ." Robson, who was
+of the men. Police found the
+After the indictment
+ing the (charge), and not donot charged in the case, is a
+vehicles were registered to a
+against Epstein was unsealed
+ing what the Palm Beach Po-
+prosecution
+private eye in West Palm
+this week, Police Chief Reiter
+lice Department wanted. I
+Beach and another in Jupiter,
+referred the matter to the
+think something fell apart
+According to
+Recarey,
+according to Recarey's re
+FBI. "We've received the re
+with those underage witprosecutor Lanna Belohlavek
+ferral, and we're reviewing
+offered Epstein attorneys
+"I have no knowledge of
+nesses."
+it" said FBI spokeswoman
+Defense attorney Robert
+Dershowitz and Guy Fronstin
+it" defense attorney Gold-
+Judy Orihuela in Miami.
+Gershman was a prosecutor
+a plea deal in April. Fronstin,
+berger said.
+The chief himself has
+for six years.
+"Those girls
+after speaking with Epstein,
+The report also says a
+come under attack from Ep-
+must have been incredible or
+accepted the deal, in which
+woman connected to the Ep-
+stein's lawyers and friends in
+untrustworthy, I don't know,"
+Epstein would plead guilty to
+stein case was contacted by
+New York, where he has a
+he said.
+one count of aggravated as
+somebody who was still in
+home. The New York Post
+Other attorneys said Ep
+sault with intent to commit a touch
+with Epstein. That
+quoted Epstein's prominent
+stein's case raises the issue of
+felony, be placed
+on five
+person told her she would be
+York lawyer,
+Gerald
+whether wealthy, connected
+years' probation and have no
+compensated if she didn't
+etcourt, as saying his client
+defendants like Epstein -
+criminal record. The deal alcooperate with police, Re-
+vas indicted only "because o
+whose friends include former
+so called for Epstein to subreport says. Those
+the craziness of the police
+President Clinton and
+mit to a psychiatric and sexwho did talk "will be dealt
+Donald Trump - are treated
+ual evaluation and have no
+with," the woman said she
+Reiter has declined to
+differently from others. Once
+unsupervised visits with mitold. Phone
+comment on the case.,
+he knew he was the subject of
+nors, according to Recarey's
+show the woman talked with
+Prosecutors have
+a criminal probe,
+report. The plea bargain was
+Epstein
+the person who allegedly inpresented a sex-related case
+hired a phalanx of powerful
+made in connection with only timidated her around
+like Epstein's to a grand jury
+attorneys such as Dershowitz
+one of the five alleged vic- time she said, Recarey rebefore, said Mike Edmondand Lefcourt, who is a past
+tims, the report states.
+son, spokesman for the state
+president of the National As.
+Fronstin — who declined
+Phone records also show
+attorney soffice.
+"That'swhat
+sociation of Criminal Defense
+to comment on the case —
+that the person said to have
+you do with a case that talls
+Lawyers.
+• was subsequently fired and
+veteran
+made the threat then placed a
+into a gray area," he said.
+Miami lawyer Roy Black
+• detense attorney
+call to Epstein's personal as-
+The state attorney's office
+- who became nationally
+Jack Goldberger was hired.
+sistant, who in turn called a
+did not recommend a particknown when he successfully
+He denies there was any
+New York corporation affliular criminal charge on
+defended William Kennedy
+agreement by any of Ep- ated with Epstein, the report
+which to indict Epstein, Ed-
+Smith on a rape charge in
+stein's attorneys to a plea
+mondson said. The grand ju-
+Palm Beach — also was in-
+The issue in the Epstein
+ry was presented with a list of
+volved at one point.
+"We absolutely did not case is not whether females
+charges from highest to low-
+Said defense attorney
+agree to a plea in this case,"
+came to his waterfront home,
+est, then deliberated with the
+Michelle Suskauer: "I think
+he said. Neither Belohlavek but whether he knew their
+prosecutor out of the room,
+it's unfortunate the public
+attorney's
+may get the perception that
+spokesman could be reached
+"He's never denied girls
+for comment.
+"People are surprised at
+with power, you may be
+came to the house." Goldthe grand jury proceeding,"
+treated differently than the
+The parent or parents of berger said. But when Ep-
+West Palm Beach defense
+average Joe."
+alleged victims who comstein was given a polygraph
+attorney Richard Tendler
+@lany_keller@pbpost.com
+03956-68
+
+To: Miami
+From: Miami
+PB2/PBCRA
+Contact:
+SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+Date: 08/01/2006
+Attn: IMA/PB2
+Hendingt
+63 - 1
+66-1, -2
+b7C - 1, -2
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: Io request the opening
+of sub-files in captioned case.
+Details: It is requested that the following sub-files be opened
+to assist in document management in captioned
+case.
+SUB - SBP to capture subpoena, request.
+SUB - FF to capture forfeiture related materials.
+44
+213tr50l.EC
+24E-MN-10306203956-69
+
+FD-350 (Rev. 5-8-81)
+(Indicate page, name of
+newspaper, city and state.)
+20B/ The Palm Beach Post
+West Palm Beach, FL
+Date:
+814/2006
+Title:
+He was over 50
+And they were girls
+Character
+or
+Classification: 31E-MM-108062
+Submitting Office:
+MM
+He was over 50. And they were girls
+If the women whom Palm Beach
+Jury should have decided
+vehicles were registered to two pripolice say a part-time town resident
+invited to his home and paid for
+if Epstein is a pedophile.
+vate investigators. Mr. Goldberger
+denied knowing anything about it.
+sex acts were, in fact, women, the
+Police also note in their reports
+solicitation charge against Jeffrey
+that the state attorney's office of
+Epstein might feel more sufficient.
+But police interviews with five
+fered Mr. Epstein a plea deal that
+But, according to police records,
+alleged victims and 17 witnesses
+would have placed him on probathey weren't. He was over bu. And
+under oath, as well as phone mestion for five years, allowing him
+they were girls.
+sages, a high school transcript and
+ultimately to walk away with no
+Elisa
+Cramer
+14.
+15.
+16.
+17-year-old girls.
+That
+count
+thing - the dif
+ference
+prostitution
+pedophilia.
+So, it is baffling
+that Mr. Epstein, who was indicted
+last month by a grand jury on one
+felony count of solicitation of prostitution, has not been charged, as
+Beach police strenuously
+urged, with unlawful sex acts with
+a minor and lewd and lascivious
+Conviction of crimes against minors would mean steeper penalties
+than the maximum five-year prison
+term Mr. Epstein faces if convicted
+of the single count of felony solicitation. It also would help carry a message of intolerance to perverts who
+prey on girls.
+Prosecutors did not pursue charges against Mr. Epstein reflecting
+the age of the victims because they
+assumed a jury would view the girls
+not as victims but as promiscuous,
+untrustworthy, willing participants.
+The presumption is offensive.
+Mr: Epstein, a 53-year-old Manhattan money manager who has
+hired Harvard law professor Alan
+Dershowitz
+defense attorney Jack Goldberger, has denied
+knowing how old the girls were.
+other items that police found from
+criminal record at all.
+searching Mr. Epstein's trash and
+I asked Mr. Krischer's spokes-
+7,234-square foot waterfront home,
+man, Mike Edmondson, why the
+provide evidence that he knew the
+case was referred to a grand jury ingirls were teenagers.
+• stead of Mr. Epstein being charged
+One girl couldn't show up when
+and facing a trial before a jury. And
+Mr. Epstein wanted because she
+shouldn't the victims' credibility
+had soccer. Another time, Mr. Ep-
+be a factor to determine whether a
+stein had to wait for his "massage"
+crimes been committed, not whethsession because the girl he wanted
+er a jury wil convict. (Alter all, as
+was still in class.
+Mr. Goldberger told Ine Palm Beach
+Why didn't State Attorney Barry
+Post of Mr. Epstein, "He's never de-
+Krischer let a jury decide whether
+nied girls came to the house.")
+to believe the teenagers — in-
+Especially, I asked Mr. Edmondcluding a 16-yearold who went to
+son to explain: Why shouldn't the
+Mr. Epstein's house to "work" in
+public look at this case and think
+December 2004 after being asked
+there are two kinds of justice — one
+whether she needed to make money
+for the wealthy and one for the rest
+for Christmas gifts?
+Mr. Edmondson said he could
+Prosecutors gave greater weight
+to the details Mr Dershowitz pronot comment on the case because it
+is active, but on the latter point, he
+vided about the girls in an apparent
+effort to assail their character. Mr.
+offered, for the sake of "philosophi
+cal debate": "Whether wealth buys a
+Dershowitz pointed out to prosecutors that some of the teenagers had
+different standard of justice across
+the country ... the answer to that
+8/4/05
+talked on myspace.com about marijuana and alcohol use.
+would, of course, be yes."
+The 20-year-old
+But in this case, he said, "regard-
+Beach woman who told police she
+less of the battery of attorneys, the
+recruited girls for Mr. Epstein has
+outcome would be the same. Every
+a Web page on myspace.com that
+issue that was debated in public was
+features one girl using the name
+debated in our office before this :
+"Pimpin' Made EZ."
+case went to the grand jury."
+Although no charges of witness
+In this case, it is not the victims'
+tampering have been filed, the parcredibility but the state attorney's
+ents of at least one of the teenage
+that deserves questioning.
+victims complained to police of be-
+Elisa Cramer is an editorial writer for
+316-1M- 108062
+ing followed and intimidated by two
+The Palm Beach Post. Her e-mail 03956-70
+men. Police determined that their
+address is elisa_cramer@pbpost.com
+-9
+
+F0-350 (Rev. 5-8-81)
+(Indicate page, name of
+newspaper, city and state.)
+1B / 58 / The Palm Beach Post
+West Palm Beach, FL
+Date:
+8/5/2006
+Title:
+ExpertL ignorance of age
+isn't defense in sex cases
+Character
+Ciassification: 31E-MM-108062
+Submitting Office:
+MM
+indexing:
+Expert: Ignorance of age
+isn't defense in sex cases
+By LARRY KELLET
+Palm Beach Post Staff Write
+Even if Palm Beach money manager Jeffrey Epstein
+didn't know that girls who
+police say gave him sexual
+massages at his Intracoastal
+home were under the legal
+age, that alone wouldn't have
+exempted him from criminal
+charges of sexual activity with
+minors.
+"Ignorance is not a valid
+defense," said Bob Dekle, a
+legal skills professor who was
+a Lake City prosecutor for
+nearly 30 years, halt of that
+time
+specializing. in
+crimes against children.
+"There is no knowledge
+element as far as the age is
+concerned," Dekle said.
+After an 11-month investigation, Palm Beach police
+said there was probable cause
+to charge Epstein, 53, with
+unlawful sex acts with a minor
+Epstein: Two
+tions since he
+was charged
+with soliciting
+minors.
+Epstein — friend of the rich
+and famous and financial patron of Democratic Party organizations and candidates —
+committed those acts with
+five underage girls.
+In the past week, New
+York Attorney General and
+gubernatorial candidate Eliot
+Spitzer has retumed about
+$50,000 in campaign contributions he received from Ep
+stein,
+and Mark Green,
+candidate to replace Spitzer in
+See EPSTEIN, 5B *
+03956-76
+31E-MM - 108062-11
+
+Lawyer: Jurous often believe a lults over kids
+* EPSTEIN from 1B
+his current job, has returned
+$10,000 to him because of the
+Palm Beach scandal, the New
+York Daily News has reported.
+Rather that file charges,
+the state
+attorney's office
+presented
+the
+case
+to
+county grand jury. The panel
+indicted Epstein last week on
+a single, less serious charge
+of felony solicitation of prostitution.
+The case raised eyebrows
+because the state attorney's
+office rarely,
+if ever,
+kicks
+such charges to a grand jury.
+And it increases the difficulty
+of
+prosecuting
+child
+sex
+abuse cases, especially when
+the defendant is enormously
+wealthy and
+can hire highpriced, top-tier lawyers.
+At least one of Epstein's
+alleged victims told police he
+knew
+she was
+underage
+when the two of them got
+naked for massages and sexual activity. She was 16 years
+old at the time and said Ep-
+stein
+asked her questions
+about her high school. according to police reports.
+A girl who said she met
+Epstein when she was 15 said
+he told her if she told any.
+body what happened at his
+house, bad things could happen, the police reports state.
+Epstein's
+youngest
+alleged victim was 14 when she
+says she gave him a massage
+that included
+some
+sexual
+activity. She is now 16. The
+girl's father says he doesn't
+know whether she told Ep-
+stein her age.
+"My daughter has kept a
+lot of what happened from me
+because of sheer embarrassment," he said. "But she very
+much looked 14. Any prudent
+man would have had second
+thoughts about that"
+Defense
+attorney
+Goldberger maintains
+Jack
+that
+not only did Epstein pass a
+may sutter trom psychologi
+Child sex abuse cases
+often are difficult
+to prosecute, an
+attorney says.
+cal problems, Dekle said
+"Lots
+of
+child
+sexual
+abuse victims have been victimized by
+multiple people
+over a period of time. Then
+the act of abuse produces
+behavior in the victims that
+Iftwo teens are in a sexual
+further damages their credirelationship
+and
+the boy
+bility
+Examples
+include
+turns 18 before the giri, he
+promiscuous
+behavior
+could be charged with a sex
+and
+drug abuse.
+crime if the sex continues.
+Some of the alleged vic-
+There would be no public intims in the Epstein case re
+terest in pursuing that, Dekle
+turned to his home multiple
+said.
+times for the
+But where there is a large
+massage
+sessions and the $200 to $300 he
+gap in ages — and especially
+typically paid them per visit.
+in cases of teachers with stu-
+That would
+be a definite
+dents — there is a public inproblem for the prosecutor,
+terest in prosecuting, he said.
+said Betty Resch, who prose
+Likewise if the accused has a
+cuted crimes against children
+track record of sex with miin Palm Beach County for five
+nors.
+years and now is in private
+Still there is a "universal
+practice in Lake Worth.
+constant"
+in
+prosecuting
+"The victim becomes less
+these cases, Dekle said. Men
+sympathetic" to ajury, Resch
+who
+exploit underage chilsaid. "But she's a victim nev-
+•ertheless. She's a kid."
+Most men charged with
+sex crimes against mino
+them, he said.
+ok normal, Dekle said.
+tims' ages work against them
+and in favor of the defendant
+in a trial, Dekle said.
+If a child and an adult tell
+different stories and
+both
+swear
+they re
+telling the
+truth, adult jurors are more
+likely to believe the adult,
+Dekle said.
+"You have all these things
+working against you in a child
+sex abuse case. Prosecutors
+normally try to be very care
+ful in filing those cases be
+cause they know what they're
+getting into. There is no such
+thing as an iron-clad
+child
+sexual abuse case."
+@lany_keller@pbpost.com
+ower social status, and they
+minors,
+but
+their
+stories
+weren't credible.
+The state
+attorney's office also implied
+that their credibility was an
+issue when it decided not to
+charge Epstein directly, but
+instead give the case to the
+grand jury.
+"A prosecutor has to look
+at it in a much broader fashion,"
+state
+attorney's
+spokesman said last week.
+Epstein hired
+Harvard
+law
+Professor
+Alar
+showitz when. he
+Derbecame
+aware he was under investi-
+. gation, and Dershowitz gave
+prosecutors information that
+some of the alleged victims
+had spoke of using alcohol
+and marijuana on a popular
+Web site, according to a Palm
+Beach police report.
+Prosecutors
+typically
+consider two things in decid
+ing whether to charge somebody with sex-related offenses against minors — whether
+there is
+sufficient evidence
+and whether there is a public
+interest in doing so, Dekle
+said.
+03956-77
+
+(Rev. 5-8-81)
+Palm Beach chief focus of fire in Epstein case
+Defendant's lawyers take him on; be slams state attorney
+camp tell it, Reiter, 48, is a
+18, and a daughter, 14. The.
+loose cannon better suited couple is scheduled to go to
+to be the sheriff of Maybermediation
+Wednesday
+By LARRY KELLER
+Michael Reiter.
+Palm Beach Post Staff Wnter
+Epstein, 53, was indict
+In the case of Palm
+ed lastmonth on a charge of
+Beach financier Jeffrey Ep-
+felony solicitation of prostistein, it seems, at times, as if
+tution solely because of Re
+two men are accused of
+iter's "craziness,"
+one of
+wrongdoing: Epstein and
+Epstein's lawyers said. His
+Palm Beach Police Chief
+department disseminated
+"a distorted view of the
+case" and behaved in a
+"childish" manner when the
+grand jury didn't indict Ep-
+stein on the charges it
+sought, another_ Epstein
+lawyer complained.
+To hear the Epsteit
+ry. They whisper that he's
+Nothing in the court file
+embroiled in a messy disuggests their split is particularly ugly.
+Reiter did in fact file for
+Reiter
+incurred the
+divorce from his wife, Jill,
+wrath of the Epstein camp
+last year, after 24 years of
+as well as the state attormarriage. They have a son,
+See REITER, 7B *
+31E-MM-108062-12
+indexing:
+Classification 31E-MM-108062
+Submitting Office:
+MM
+Character
+Title:
+Palm Beach chief focus
+of fire in Epstein case
+(indicate page, name of
+newspaper, city and state.)
+1B / 7B / The Palm Beach Post
+West Palm Beach, FL.
+Date:
+8/14/2006
+- 78
+
+Colleagues cite chief's professionalism, integrity
+& REITER from IB
+ney's office for two reasons.
+First, he pressed for Epstein
+to be charged with the more
+serious crimes of sexual activity with minors. Second, he
+slammed State Attorney Barry Krischer in blunt language
+seldom used by one lawenforcement official concerning another because of
+what he perceived as that of
+fice's mishandling of the
+professionalism," Miami-
+Reiter: Town
+Dade
+State
+Attorney
+dent confined to his home
+development from Palm
+Manager Peter
+with a sick child thanked Re
+Beach Atlantic University, ai-.
+Katherine Fernandez Rundle
+Elwell says the
+iter for delivering a few Cokes
+so has attended the FBI Na-
+said of Reiter's letter.
+Palm Beach
+to the house. Reiter refused
+tional Academy in Quantico,
+Following Epstein's inpolice chief's
+payment for the beverages.
+Va., and management cours
+dictment, Reiter referred the
+well worth his
+resident thanked
+es at Harvard. He's been accase to the FBI to determine
+$144,000 sal-
+Reiter for shutting off his
+tive in countywide interagenwhether the super-rich,
+ary.
+car's headlights in his drive
+enforcement
+super-connected
+defendant
+way, saying a valet must have
+organizations and has a "top
+had violated any federal laws.
+Juno Beach Police Chief
+been at fault.
+national
+security
+Reiter won't discuss the
+H.C. Clark II agreed. Al-
+Reiter worked everything
+clearance.
+case or the broadsides aimed
+though he doesn't know Re-
+from road patrol to organized
+"He has a perspective
+at him. But others almost
+iter well, he has met with him
+crime,
+vice and narcotics.
+that's broader than just aduniformly use one word to
+on countywide law enforce
+And he's no novice at investidressing the needs of the
+"In a letter to Krischer
+describe the chief profesment issues. "I've never seen
+gations involving the island's
+town," said Town Manager
+him lose his cool. I've never
+rich and famous. He was the
+Peter Elwell, who promoted
+Written May 1, Reiter called
+"I have always been imseen anything but a profeslead detective probing the
+Reiter from assistant chief to
+chief in March 2001. Reiter
+his actions in the Epstein
+case "highly unusual." He
+pressed by Mike's profes
+sional demeanor from him."
+drug overdose death of David
+makes more than $144,000 as
+Kennedy in 1984. He also was
+added, "I musturgeyouto...
+sionalism and his leader-
+Reiter joined the Palm
+the town's top cop. Elwell
+consider if good and suffiship," said Rick Lincoln, chief
+Beach Police Department in
+one of the officers who
+thinks he's worth it.
+cient reason exists to require
+of the Lantana Police Departworked the investigation of
+1981, leaving a $20,000-a-year
+"He's very businesslike,
+William Kennedy Smith, who
+your disqualification from the
+ment and a Palm Beach
+patrol job at the University of
+very straightforward. He's
+was charged in 1991 — and
+prosecution of these cases."
+County cop for 32 years.
+not easily agitated or flam-
+Pittsburgh. His personnel
+later acquitted — with raping
+boyant. He's about the work,"
+In short, Reiter told the
+"The town of Palm Beach
+jacket shows consistently ex-
+a woman at the Kennedy
+Elwell said. "I think that his
+county's top prosecutor for
+has a very professional police
+cellent job evaluations.
+the past 13 years that he
+department. We all consider
+Posh Palm Beach is no
+Beach. compound in Palm
+service as
+chief has been
+outstanding in five-plus
+oüght to get off the case. "It
+•looks like a departure from
+Man fintegrity, peer and a
+hotbed of crime, and in his
+Reiter, who has a master's
+years."
+first year on the job, a residegree in human resource
+© larry_keller@pbpast.com
+03956-79
+
+,FD-350 (Rev. 5-8-81)
+The man who had
+everything
+358
+(Indicate page, name of
+newspaper, city and state.)
+1A / 6A / The Palm Beach Post
+West Palm Beach, FL
+Date:
+8/14/2006
+Title:
+The man who had
+everything
+Character
+Classification: 31E-MM-108062
+Submitting Office:
+MM
+indexing:
+03956-80
+31E-HM-108062-13
+Epstein's Palm Beach mansion at 358 El Brillo Way.
+Jeffrey Epstein craved big homes, elite friends
+and, investigators say, underage girls
+By ANDREW MARRA, Palm Beach Post Staff Writer
+
+Jeffrey Epstein has donated more than $100,000
+to Democratic candidates' campaigns, including John Kerry's presidential bid,
+the reelection campaign of New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson and the Senate bids
+.....
+of Joe Lieberman, Hillary Clinton, Christopher Dodd and Charles Schumer.
+WINGED GARGOYLES guarded the gate at Jeffrey
+Epstein's Palm Beach mansion. Inside, hidden cameras
+trolled two rooms, while the girls came and went.
+olice detective
+who sited throte tee ye.
+else: the regular arrival of
+teenage girls he hired to give
+bage
+outside
+nim massages and, police
+records of visitors, it was thi
+say, pertorm sexual lavors.
+lair of a troubling target
+Epstein was
+different
+Epstein, one of the most
+from most sexual abuse sus
+mysterious of the country
+pects; he was far more pownega-rich,
+mush for his secrecy as to
+erful. He counted among his
+friends former President Bill
+Clinton, Donald Trump and
+Prince Andrew, along with
+some of the most prominent
+legal, scientific and business
+minds in the country.
+headquarters,
+he was
+be
+coming known for something
+When detectives started
+See EPSTEIN, 6A *
+Epstein's mysterious lifestyle
+began to unravel after claims
+of sexual activity with minors.
+03956-81
+
+A life of luxury and secrecy
+Powerful legal team
+stymies detectives
+Women in his life
+TINA FINEBERG/The Associated Press
+Jeffrey Epstein's Manhattan townhouse dominates a block on the Upper East
+Side. Thought to be the fargest private residence in Manhattan, it is reported
+to have closed-circuit television and a heated sidewalk to melt fallen snow.
+Ghislaine Maxwell, a
+fixture at elite parties
+and the intensely
+prívate daughter of a
+media tycoon, dated
+Epstein in the 1990s.
+I'm like a Heidi
+Fleiss.' Haley Robson
+told police she took at
+least six girls to visit
+Epstein, all between the
+ages of 14 and 16.
+PalmBeachPost.com
+Read previous stories on the Epstein investigation.
+03956-82
+
+• EPSTEIN from IA
+asking questions and teenage girls
+a wave of legal
+resistance followed
+If Palm Beach police didn't know
+quite who Jettrey Epstein was, tney
+Epstein, now 53, was a quintessential man of mystery. He amassed
+his fortune and friends
+quiety,
+always in the background as he
+navigated New York high society.
+When he first attracted notice in
+the early 1990s, it was on account of
+the woman he was dating: Ghislaine
+Maxwell, daughter of the late British
+media tycoon Robert Maxwell
+In a lengthy article, headlined
+*The Mystery of Ghislaine Maxwell's Secret Love," the British Mail
+on Sunday tabloid laid out speculative stories that the socialite's beau
+was a CIA spook, a math teacher, a
+concert pianist or a corporate head-
+"But what is the truth
+him?" the newspaper wondered
+"Like Maxwel, Epstein is both
+flamboyant and intensely private."
+The media frenzy did not begin
+in full until a decade later. In September 2002, Epstein was flung into
+the limelight when he flew Clinton
+and actors Kevin Spacey and Chris
+Tucker to Africa on his private jet.
+Suddeniy everyone wanted to
+know who Epstein was. New York
+magazine and Vanity Fair published
+lengthy profiles. Ine New York Post
+listed him as one of the city's most
+eligible bachelors and began
+describing him in its gossip columns
+with adjectives such as "mysterious"
+and "reclusive."
+Although Epstein gave no interviews, the broad strokes of his past
+started to come into focus.
+Building a life of extravagance
+He was born blue-collar in 1953,
+the son of a New York City parks
+department employee, and raised in
+Brooklyn's Coney Island neighborhood. He left college without a
+bachelor's degree but became a
+math teacher at the prestigious
+Dalton School in Manhattan.
+The story goes that the father of
+one of Epstein's students was so
+impressed with the man that he put
+him in touch with a senior partner at
+Bear Stearns, the global investment
+bank and securities firm.
+in 19(6, Epstein leit Dalton for a
+job at Bear Stearns. By the early
+1980s, he had started J. Epstein and
+Co. That is when he began making
+his millions in earnest
+Little is known or said about
+Epstein's business except this: He
+weathes me is said to handle
+wealthy. He
+said to handle
+accounts only of $1 billion or greater.
+It has been estimated he has
+roughly 15 clients, but their identities are the subject of only speculation. All except for one: Leslie Wexner, founder of The Limited retail
+chain and a former ram beacher
+who is said to have been a mentor to
+Epstein.
+Wexner sold Epstein one of his
+most lavish residences: a massive
+townhouse that dominates a block
+on Manhattan's Upper East Side. It
+is reported to have, among its finer
+features,
+closed circuit television
+and a heated sidewalk to melt away
+fallen snow.
+That townhouse, thought to be
+the largest
+private residence in
+Manhattan, is only a piece of the
+extravagant world Epstein built over
+In New Mexico, he constructed a
+27,000 square-foot hilltop mansion
+on a 10,000 acre ranch outside Santa
+Fe. Many believed it to be the largest
+home in the state.
+In Palm Beach, he bought a
+waterfront home on El Brillo Way.
+And he owns a 100-acre private
+island in the Virgin Islands.
+Perhaps as remarkable as his
+lavish homes is his extensive network of friends and associates at the
+highest echelons of power. This
+includes not only socialites but also
+business tycoons, media moguls,
+politicians, royalty and Nobel Prize
+winning scientists whose research
+he often funds.
+"Just like other people collect
+art, he collects scientists," said
+Martin Nowak, who directs the
+Program for Evolutionary Dynamics
+at Harvard University and was
+reportedly the recipient of a $30 :
+million research donation from;
+Epstein.
+Epstein is said to have
+befriended former Harvard President Larry Summers, prominent law
+Professor Alan Dershowitz, Donald
+Trump and New York Daily News
+Publisher Mort Zuckerman,
+And yet he managed for decades
+to maintain a low profile. He avoids
+eating out and was rarely photogrophed.
+"The odd thing is I never met
+him," said Dominick Dunne, the
+famous chronicler of the trials and
+tribulations of the very rich. "I wasn't
+even aware of him,'
+except for, a
+Vanity Fair article.
+Epstein's friendship with Clinton
+has attracted the most attention.
+Epstein met Clinton as early as
+1995, when he paid tens ot thousands of dollars to join him at an
+intimate fund-raising dinner in Paim
+Beach. But from all appearances,
+they did not become close friends
+until after Clinton left the Oval Office
+and moved to New York.
+Epstein has donated more than
+$100,000 to Democratic candidates'
+campaigns, including John Kerrys
+presidential
+the reelection
+campaign of New Mexico Gov. Bill
+Richardson and the Senate bids of
+Joe Lieberman, Hillary Rodham
+Christopher Dodd and
+Charles Schumer.
+Powerful friends and enemies
+A Vanity Fair profile found
+cracks in the veneer of Epstein's life
+story. The 2003 article said he left
+Bear Stearns in the wake of a federal
+probe and a possible Securities and
+Exchange Commission violation. It
+also pointed out that Citibank once
+sued him for defaulting on a $20
+million loan.
+The article suggested that one of
+his business mentors and previous
+employers was Steven Hoffenberg,
+now serving a prison term after
+"bilking investors out of more than
+$450 million in one of the largest
+Ponzi schemes in American histo-
+As he amassed his wealth,
+03956-83
+
+if umer friend claimed Epstein
+→a-ta out oi a promise to reitburse him hundreds of thousands of
+dollars after their failed investment
+in Texas oil wells. A judge decided
+Epstein owed him nothing.
+"It's a bad memory. I would
+rather not have ever met Jeffrey
+'" said Michael Stroll, the
+retired former president of Williams
+Electronics and, Sega Corp. "Suffice
+it to say I have nothing good to say
+about him."
+Among the characteristics most
+atinbuted to Epstein is a penchant
+for women.
+He has been linked to Maxwell,
+a fixture on the high-society party
+circuits in both New York and London. Previous girlfriends are said to
+include a former Ms. Sweden and a
+Romanian model.
+"He's a lot of fun to be with,"
+Donald Trump told New York magazine in 2002. "It is even said that he
+likes beautiful women as much as I
+do, and many of them are on the
+younger side. No doubt about it,
+Jeffrey enjoys his social life."
+Investigation leads to Epstein
+Although he was not a fre
+quenter of the Palm Beach social
+scene, he made his presence felt.
+Among his charitable donations, he
+gave $90,000 to the Palm Beach
+Police Department and $100,000 to
+Ballet Florida.
+In Palm Beach, he lived in luxury. Three black Mercedes sat in his
+garage, alongside a green Harley-
+Davidson. His jet waited at a hangar
+at Palm Beach International Airport.
+At home, a private chef and a small
+staff stood at the ready. from a
+window in his mansion, he could
+look out on the Intracoastal Waterway and the West Palm Beach skyline. He seemed to be a man who
+had everything.
+But extraordinary wealth can
+fuel extraordinary desires.
+In March 2005, a worried mother
+contacted Palm Beach police. She
+said another parent had overheard a
+conversation between
+their chil-
+Now the mother was afraid her
+14 year-old daughter
+had been
+molested by a man on the island.
+The phone call triggered an
+extensive investigation, one that
+' would lead detectives to Epstein but
+• I leave them frustrated.
+Palm Beach police and the state
+attorney's office have declined to
+discuss the case. But a Palm Beach
+probe repers a tando the to what
+probe offers a window into
+detectives faced as they sought to
+close in on Epstein.
+Detectives interviewed the girl,
+who told them a friend had invited
+her to a rich man's house to perform
+a massage. She said the friend told
+herto say she was 18 if asked. At the
+house, she said she was paid $300
+after stripping to her panties and
+massaging the man while he masturbated.
+Police interview 5 alleged victims
+The investigation began in full
+after the girl identified Epstein in a
+photo as the man who had paid her.
+Police arranged for garbage trucks
+to set aside Epstein's trash so police
+could sift through it. They set up a
+video camera to record the comings
+and goings at his home. They monitored an airport hangar for signs of
+his private jets arrivals and depar
+tures.
+They quickly learned that the
+woman who took the 14-year-old girl
+to Epstein's house was Haley Robson, a Palm Beach Community College student from Loxahatchee, In a
+sworn statement at police headquarters, Robson, then 18, admitted
+she had taken at least six girls to visit
+Epstein, all between the ages of 14
+and 16. Epstein paid her for each
+visit, she said.
+During the drive back to her
+house, Robson told detectives, "Imn
+like a Heidi Fleiss."
+Police interviewed five alleged
+victims and 17 witnesses. Their
+report shows some of the girls said
+they had been instructed to have sex
+with another woman in front of
+Epstein, and one said she had direct
+intercourse with him.
+In October, police searched the
+Palm Beach mansion. They discovered photos of naked, young looking
+temales, just as several of the girls
+had described in interviews. Hidden
+cameras were found in the garage
+area and inside a clock on Epstein's
+desk, alongside a girl's high school
+Two of Epstein's former
+employees told investigators that
+young-looking girls showed up to
+perform massages two or three
+times a day when Epstein was in
+town.
+They said the girls were permitted many
+indulgences.
+A chef
+cooked for them. Workers gave
+them rides and handed out hun
+dreds of dollars at a time.
+One employee told detectives he
+was told to send a dozen roses to one
+teenage girl after a high school
+drama performance. Others were
+given rental cars. One, according to
+bolice, received a $200 Christmas
+The cops moved to cement their
+case. But as they tried to tighten the
+noose, they
+encountered other
+forces at work.
+In Orlando they interviewed a
+possible victim who told them noth
+ing inappropriate had happened
+between her and Epstein. They
+asked her whether she had spoken
+to anyone else. She said yes, a private investigator had asked her the
+same questions.
+When they subpoenaed one of
+Epstein's former employees, he told
+them the same thing. He and a private eye had met at a restaurant days
+earlier to go over what the man
+would tell investigators.
+Detectives received complaints
+that private eyes were posing as
+police officers. When they told
+Epstein's local attorney, Guy Frons
+tin, he said the investigators worked
+tor koy Black, the nigh-powered
+Miami lawyer who has defended the
+likes of Rush Limbaugh and William
+Kennedy Smith.
+While the private eyes were
+From their own profiles on the popular Web site MySpace.com, he
+obtained copies of their discussions
+about their use of alcohol and mari-
+He took his research to a meeting with prosecutors in early 2006,
+where he soughtto cast doubt on the
+teens' reliability.
+- The private eyes had dug u
+03956-84
+
+enough dirt on the girls to make
+prosecutors skeptical. Not only did
+some of the girls have issues with
+drugs or alcohol but also some had
+criminal records and other troubles,
+Epstein 's legal team claimed. And at
+least one of them, they said, led
+when she told
+police
+she
+was
+younger than 18 when she started
+performing massages for Epstein.
+After the meeting, prosecutors
+postponed their decision to take the
+case to a grand jury.
+In the following weeks, police
+received complaints that two of the
+victims or their families had been
+harassed or threatened: Epstein's
+legal team maintains that its private
+investigators did nothing illegal or
+unethical during their research.
+By then, relations' between
+police and prosecutors were fraying.
+At a key meeting with prosecutors
+and the detense, Detective Joseph
+Recarey, the lead investigator, was a
+no-show, according to Epstein's
+attorney.
+"The embarrassment.on
+the
+prosecutor's face was evident when,
+the police officer never showed up
+for the meeting,"
+attorney Jack
+Goldberger said.
+Later in April, Recarey walked
+into a prosecutor's office at the state
+attorney's office and learned the
+case was taking an unexpected turn.
+The
+prosecutor,
+Lanna
+Belohlavek, told Recarey the state
+attorney's office had offered Epstein
+a plea deal that would not require
+him to serve jail time or receive a
+felony conviction.
+Recarey told her he disapproved
+of the plea offer.
+The deal never came to pass,
+however.
+Future unclear after charge
+On May 1, the department asked
+prosecutors to approve warrants to
+arrest Epstein on four counts of
+unlawful sexual activity with a minor
+and to charge his personal assistant,
+Sarah Kellen, now 27, for her alleged
+role in arranging the visits. Police
+officials also wanted to charge Rob
+son, the self described Hidi Fleiss,
+with lewd and lascivious acts.
+By then, the department was
+frustrated with the way the state
+attorney's office had handled the
+case. On the same day the warrants
+were requested, Palm Beach Police
+Chief Michael Reiter wrote a letter
+to state Attorney Barry Krischer
+suggesting he
+disqualify himself
+from the case if he would not act.
+Two weeks later, Kecarey was
+told that prosecutors had decided
+once again to take the case to the i
+grand jury.
+It is not known how many of the
+girls testited before the grand jury.
+But Epstein's defense team said one
+girl who was subpoenaed — the one
+who said she had sexual intercourse
+with Epstein - never showed up.
+The grand jury's indictment was
+handed down in July. It was not the
+one the police department had
+wanted
+Instead of being slapped with a
+charge of unlawtul sexual actvity
+with a minor, Epstein was charged
+with one count of felony solicitation
+prostitution, which
+carries a
+maximum penalty of five years in
+prison. He was booked into the Palm
+Beach County Jail early July 23 and
+released hours later.
+Epstein's legal team "doesn't
+dispute that he had girls over for
+massages, Goldberger said. But he
+said their claims that they had sex
+ual encounters with him lack credibility.
+"They are incapable of being
+believed," he said.
+"They had criminal records. They had accusations of
+theft made against them by their
+employers. There was evidence of!
+drug use by some of thern."
+What remains for Epstein is yet
+to be seen.
+The Palm Beach Police Department has asked the FBI to investigate the case. It also has returned
+the $90,000 Epstein donated in 2004
+In New York, candidates for
+governor and state attorney general
+have vowed to return a total of at
+least $60,000 in campaign contributions from Epstein.
+Meanwhile,
+Epstein's powerful friends have
+remained silent as tabloids and
+Internet blogs feast on the public
+details of the police investigation.
+Goldberger maintains Epstein's
+innocence but says the legal team
+has not ruled out a future plea deal.
+He insists Epstein will emerge in the
+end with his reputation untarnished.
+"He will recover from this," he
+said.
+Staff writer Larry Keller and staff
+researchers Braget Bulger, Angelico
+Cortez, Amy Hanaway and Melanie
+Mena contributed to this story.
+:@ andrew_marra@pbpost.com
+03956-85
+
+FD;350 "Rev. 5-8-81)
+Epstein camp calls female accusers liars
+By LARRY KELLER
+Palm Beach Past Staff Writer
+Attorneys and publicists for
+Palm Beach financier Jeffrey
+Epstein went on the offensive
+Monday, contending
+that
+teenage girls who have ac
+cused Epstein of sexual shenanigans
+at his
+waterfront
+home are liars and saying that
+the Palm Beach Police De
+partment is "childish."
+"There never was any sex
+between Jeffrey Epstein and
+any underage
+ly insisted anybody who came
+tioned," Goldberger said.
+women," his
+to his house be over the age of
+lead
+Epstein, 53, was indicted
+attorney,
+Jack Goldknow. Thee question is, did
+by a county grand jury last
+know. The question
+month on a charge of felony
+berger,
+from
+said
+anything illegal occur. The law
+solicitation of prostitution. Af
+Idaho
+was not violated here."
+ter an 11-month investigation
+where he was
+He had no explanation as to
+that included sifting through
+vacationing
+why Epstein would pay girls or
+with his fami-
+Epstein's trash and surveilling
+Epstein
+women with no massage trainhis home, Palm Beach police
+ly.
+ing — as the alleged victims
+concluded there was enough
+Epstein did have young
+said was the case — $200 to
+evidence to charge him with
+women come to his house to
+sexual activity with minors.
+give him massages, Goldbergcredibility of these witnesses
+When the grand jury indicter
+er said. "Mr. Epstein absoluteseriously ques
+Epstein on the less serious
+charge, Police Chief Michael
+Reiter referred the case to the
+FBI to determine whether
+there were federal law violations.
+After a spate of stories
+about the case last week, New
+York publicist Dan Klores —
+whose client list has included
+Paris Hilton and Jennifer Lopez
+- said on Saturday that Ep-
+stein's camp was ready "to get
+their story out"
+See EPSTEIN, 9B *
+3IE-MM-108062-16
+8/8/86
+*Mr. Epstein
+absolutely
+insisted
+anybody
+who came to
+his house be
+over the age
+of 18.'
+JACK GOLDBERGER,
+Epstein's lead attorney
+.. ...
+Indexing:
+Classification: 31E-MM-108062
+Submitting Office:
+MM
+Character
+Title:
+Epstein camp cails
+female accusers liars
+(Indicate page, name of
+newspaper, city and state.)
+/1B / 9B The Palm Beach Post
+West Palm Beach, FL
+Date:
+8/8/2006
+03956-94
+
+Attorney: Police gave media 'distorted view?
+• EPSTEIN from 1B
+directly against him is wrong, Goldpease" the chief, Goldberger said.
+Epstein investigation
+berger said.
+state attorney's spokesman
+Read a letter from Palm Beach Police
+They did that Monday via Gold-
+The Palm Beach Police Departwould say only that the office refers
+Chief Michael Reiter to State Attorney
+berger and a Los Angeles publicist
+ment was "happy and ecstatic" that
+cases to the grand jury when there
+Barry Krischer on the Epstein probe.
+for Miami criminal defense attorney
+the panel was going to review the
+are issues with the viability of the
+PalmBeachPost.com
+Roy Black, who also has represented
+evidence. "I think what happened is
+evidence or witnesses' credibility.
+Epstein in the case.
+they weren't happy with the result.
+Both the state attorney and the
+"We just think there has been a
+They decided to use the press to
+grand jury concluded there was not
+distorted view of this case in the meembarrass Mr. Epstein."
+sufficient evidence that Epstein had
+dia presented by the Palm Beach po-
+But records show
+that Reiter
+sex with minors, according to Goldlice," Goldberger said.
+wrote Krischer on May 1 — well beberger. "It was just a childish perfor-
+Reiter has consistently declined fore the case wentto the grand jury —
+mance by the Palm Beach Police
+to comment on the case and did not
+suggesting that krischer "consider i
+Department," Goldberger said.
+respond to a request for comment
+good and sufficient reason exists t
+The defense attorney said one o
+require your disqualitication from the
+he alleged victims who claimed she
+The implication that State Attor- prosecution of these cases."
+accusers, he added, have histories of
+drug abuse and thefts. "These wom
+en are liars. We've established that.'
+But why would they all invent
+their stories about meeting Epstein
+for sexual massages?
+"I don't have an answer as to what
+was the motivation for these women
+03956-95
+
+Io: Miami
+Miami-FIG
+Date: 09/13/2006
+Attn:
+SSA
+SIA
+From: Miami
+Squad PB-2,
+PBCRA
+Contact:
+SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+case ID #: 31E-MM-10806251
+Hending)
+Title:
+V
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+63-1
+06-1, -2
+670 - 1, -2
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis:
+Io request analytical assistance regarding b7s -1
+Enclosure (s) :
+b6 - 1
+b7C -1
+b7D - 2
+b7E -1
+Details: An ongoing federal investigation has revealed that
+b3 -1
+66 - 1, -3
+b70 -1, -3
+Enclosed for analytical review arel
+b3 -1
+b6 -1, -3
+b70 -1, -3
+b7D -2
+b7E -1
+26lenkol. e&03956-96
+.31E-MM-108062-17
+
+re: 31E-MM-108062,
+Miami
+09/13/200€
+b6 - 1
+b7C -1
+b7D - 2
+b7E -1
+Please contact SA L
+Jat
+should any further information be needed.
+b6 -2
+b7C -2
+4+
+2
+03956-97
+
+(Rey. 01-31-2003)
+To: Miami
+From: Miami
+PB-2/West Palm Beach RA
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #:
+Date: 09/14/2006
+b6 - 2
+b7C -2
+Tast
+(Pending Inactive)
+(ending)
+(Pending)
+(ending)
+(Pending)
+b7A -1
+b7E -3
+(ending)
+(Pending)
+(Pending)
+(ending)
+(Pending)
+(ending)
+Pending)
+Title: Case update.
+Synopsis: Delayed Investigation.
+Details:
+For information of the file,
+investigation in
+this matter has been delaved due to writer's
+assignment to a
+kidnaping investigation
+since 1/17/2006.
+7E - 3
+420-1M-1097959292
+
+FD-350 (Rov. 5-8-81)
+(Mount Clipping in Space Below)
+Billionaire faces charge
+of solicitation of minors
+MONDAY: Palm Beach billionaire Jeffrey
+Epstein paid to have underage girls and
+young women brought to his home,
+vestigation by the Palm
+Beach Police Department. An indictment
+was unsealed that
+charged Epstein, 53,
+with one count of felony
+solicitation of prostitution, which carries a
+maximum penalty of five years in pris
+on. He was released on $3,000 bond.
+Epstein's attorney, Jack Goldberger,
+said his client, a money manager for the
+wealthy, committed no crimes and
+passed a lie detector test in which he
+said he did not know the girls were mi-
+•:..
+:
+(Indicate page, name of
+newspaper, city and state.)
+Date: 07/30/2006
+Edition: PALM BEACH POST
+i Title: BILLIONAIRE FACES CHARGE OF
+SOLICITATION OF MINORS
+Chancer: 31E-MM-103062
+Classification:
+Submitting Office:
+Indexing:
+316-M4-108060388-10
+
+•
+To: New York
+Date: 09/18/2006
+Attn:
+ssimes Against Children
+Squad C-20
+From: Miami
+PB2/ PBCRA
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+b3-1
+bc 11, 2
+(Bending)
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: To set lead for captioned investigation.
+Enclosure (s) : One Grand Jury Subpoena for [
+Details:
+On
+the Federal Bureau of Investigation
+Palm Beach County Resident Agency (PBCRA), opened an
+investigation involving multi-millionaire ferrery pened and
+captioned subjects. The investigation involves|
+TRS
+b3 -2
+63 - 1
+56 - 1, -3
+b7C -1, -3
+b7E - 4
+b6 - 1
+b70 - 1
+26/7501.EC
+31E-MM-108063056191
+
+Io:
+New York From
+Miami
+31E-MM-108062, 09/18/2006
+FBI Miami, PBCRA, request_
+63-2
+Any questions or concerns contact SA
+Division, PBCRA,
+Miami
+b6-2
+b7C-2
+Name
+DOB
+SSAN
+Hair
+Eyes
+Height
+Weight
+biographical information is the following:
+b6 -1
+b7C -1
+2
+03956-102
+
+..--..
+To: New York From:
+Miami
+31E-MM-108062, 09/18/2006
+LEAD (s) :
+Set Lead 1: (Action)
+NEW YORK
+AT NEW YORK
+It is requested that FBI New York |
+addition, if needed, serve the enclosed subpoena.
+44
+3
+In
+63-2
+b6 -1
+b7C - 1
+03956-103
+
+Automated Serial Permanent Charge-Out
+FD-5a (1-5-94)
+Date: 06/21/07 Time: 14:03
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062 Serial: 20
+Description of Document:
+Type:
+Date :
+From
+: US DIST COURI
+Topic: EXECUTED FGJ SUBPOENA
+b3 - 2
+Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:
+transfer to subpoena sub
+Transferred to:
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062-SBP
+Employee:
+Serial:
+62
+56 - 2
+b70 - 2
+03956-104
+318-11M-108062-20
+
+(Rev: 61-31-2003)
+To: Miami
+Date: 10/17/2006
+Attn:
+SA L
+PB2/PBCRA
+From: New York
+Squad C-20
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062
+Jarm pror
+(ending) - 25
+63-1
+36-1, -2
+b7C - 1, -2
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+WSTA- CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: Lead covered for captioned investigation; Grand Jury
+subpoena served|
+Reference: 31E-MM-108062 Serial 19
+Enclosure(s): Enclosed for Miami is the server copy of the
+on 10/16/2006.
+Details: On 10/16/2006,
+SAL
+received from SAL
+via
+Federal Express delivery service
+the referenced Grand Jury
+subpoena.
+on that date, SAL
+and SA
+63-2
+b3-2
+b6-2, -5
+67C - 2, -5
+63 - 2
+b6 -2, -5
+b7C -2, -5
+03956-1092
+3IE-MM-108062-25
+
+* st
+To: Miami From:
+New York
+Re: 31E-MM-108062, 10/17/2006
+Lat the United
+States District Courthouse located at 701 Clematis Street, West
+Palm Beach, Florida.
+At this time, no further action will be taken by the
+New York Office in this matter. Lead is covered.
+2
+03956-110
+
+TO:
+Ulted States District Court
+SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
+SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY
+BEFORE GRAND JURY
+FGJ 05-02(WPB)-Fri./No. ÒLY-19
+SUBPOENA FOR:
+63 - 2
+YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear and testify before the Grand Jury of the United States District
+Court at the place, date and time specified below.
+PLACE:
+United States District Courthouse
+701 Clematis Street
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+ROOM:
+Room 4-A
+DATE AND TIME:
+YOU ARE ALSO COMMANDED to bring with you the following document(s) or objects):
+63-2
+56-2
+_670 - 2
+Please coordinate your compliance of this subpoena and confirm the date and time of your
+appearance with Special Agent_
+_Federal Bureau of Investigation,
+Telephone: [
+This subpoena shall remain in effect until you are granted leave to depart by the court or by an officer acting on behalf
+of the court.
+CLERK
+(BY) DEPUTY CLERK
+DATE:
+October 6, 2006
+This subpoena is issued upon application
+*If not applicable, enter "none."
+Name, Address and Phone Number of Assistant U.S. ANOMY D6 - 6
+] Assistant U.S. Attorney
+500 So. Australian Avenue, Suite 400
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-6235
+Tel:
+Fax: (561) 802-1787
+To be used in lies of AOLIO
+FORM ORD-227
+JAN.86
+03956-111
+
+Io: Miami
+Date: 11/09/2006
+From: Miani
+PB2/West Palm Beach RA
+Contact: SA
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID|#: 31E-MM-108062 - 33
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN;
+b3-1
+66-1, -2
+67C -1, -2
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis:
+Request that SAL
+with SOC#
+b6 - 2
+receive holiday pay on November 10, 2006,
+Veteran's Day,
+b7C -2
+a
+Federal Holiday.
+Details: SA
+will be working on gathering data for
+the Intelligent Analyst that will be coming to the Palm Beach RA
+on Monday.
+•
+313l003. ec
+3IE-MM-/0806039569123
+
+IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH
+JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, CRIMINAL DIVISION
+IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
+IN RE:
+Search Warrant, Affidavit and Application for Search
+Warrant, and inventory and Return
+DATED AND SIGNED: 10-19-05
+AFFIANTS: Det.
+Palm Beach Police
+b6 - 4
+670-4
+ORDER SEALING AFFIDAVIT AND APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT AND
+RELATED SEARCH WARRANT AND INVENTORY AND RETURN
+THIS CAUSE having come before the Court and the Court having been appraised,
+IT ISHEREBY ORDERED pursuantto Florida Statues Chapter 119.07(3)(b) that the
+Affidavit and Application for Search Warrant signed by Investigator_
+as affiant
+dated and related Search Warrant dated October 18, 2005 hereby sealed until further order
+•
+of the Court.
+The Clerk of Court, Criminal Division is hereby ordered to seal said Search Warrant
+and Affidavit and Application for Search Warrant until further order of the Court.
+It is further
+ORDERED that the Inventory and Return for Said Search Warrant shall be sealed
+• when filed with the Clerk of Court until further order of the Court.
+DONE AND ORDERED this 19th day of October at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach
+County, Florida.
+•
+b6 - 4
+670 - 4
+Laura Johnson
+Circuit Court Judge
+xC:
+Assistant State Attorney
+56 - 7
+b7C - 7
+(COPY)
+03956-235
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/7c292dfa6ecb24c2755b73382189aa9841d2819ec6d67e3fe437ef2b0459758e.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/7c292dfa6ecb24c2755b73382189aa9841d2819ec6d67e3fe437ef2b0459758e.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5221421dbb803919ab27bfa8caa87cc6d1a33b49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/7c292dfa6ecb24c2755b73382189aa9841d2819ec6d67e3fe437ef2b0459758e.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -1887,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "7c292dfa6ecb24c2755b73382189aa9841d2819ec6d67e3fe437ef2b0459758e",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 172,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "882d84e8b46ed40ced6f3407006a4978b967738a60997040c826b5b2625dc8e3",
+  "output_sha256": "c1b9e8ce6bfa74c331fa94e5fc0c644e5fe3a1072bba852f6c16f50e981852f0",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/92087c28be1b3a5254aaaae75cb75516bc983e45dcdb8c6105b0460877aa053a.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/92087c28be1b3a5254aaaae75cb75516bc983e45dcdb8c6105b0460877aa053a.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1d29e79a61def47e58260702b178145a7af4aaae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/92087c28be1b3a5254aaaae75cb75516bc983e45dcdb8c6105b0460877aa053a.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2690 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+H
+De
+00
+N
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+29
+30
+31
+32
+33
+34
+35
+36
+37
+38
+39
+40
+41
+42
+m
+46
+47
+48
+49
+51
+52
+b3
+= b3
+63
+~ b3
+- 63
+~ b3
+~ b3
+b3
+- 63
+b3
+b3
+- 63
+~ b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+63
+;
+1;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+~ b3 -
+1;
+b6
+b3
+1;
+b6
+63
+06
+b3
+b6
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b3
+1;
+b6
+~ 63-1;
+63
+b3
+1;
+66
+1
+~ b3
+;
+b6
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b 3
+1;
+b6
+1;
+66
+b3
+1;
+b6
+~ 63 - 1;
+b6
+b3 - -1;
+„b 6
+- 63- -1: b6
+= 63
+~b3
+3
+3
+
+;
+;
+;
+;
+3
+3
+1;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3
+3
+-5;
+- 5;
+
+Page 109 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 110 ~ 63 - 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 111 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 112 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 113 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 114 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 115 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 -
+3, -5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 116 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+Page 117 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+Page 118 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page 119 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+1-5;
+Page 120 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 121 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 122 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 123 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 124 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 125 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page
+126
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page 127 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7c
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+128
+~ 63
+1;
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+129
+~ b3
+1;
+Page
+130
+b3
+1;
+Page
+131
+b3
+1;
+Page
+132
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3, -5;
+3, -5;
+b7c
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+133
+63
+1;
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+134 - b3
+1;
+Page
+135
+1;
+Page
+136 ~
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b7C
+- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+137
+- 63
+1;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+138
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+139 ~ 63
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+140
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+-5;
+Page
+141 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+142
+1;
+66
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+143
+b3
+1;
+66
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+144 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+145
+ru
+b3
+1;
+Page
+146
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+147
+1b 3
+1;
+b6 -
+3,
+- 5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+148 ~ b3 -
+1; b6 -
+3,- 5;
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+149 - b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+150 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7c
+3,
+-5;
+Page 151 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+152 ~ 63
+1; b6
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+153 " b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3, -5;
+Page
+154 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+155 - b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+3, -5;
+b7c
+Page
+156 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C
+1 - 5;
+Page
+157
+- b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+158 ~ 63
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+159 = b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+160 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 161 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 162 - b3
+- 1;
+
+Page 163 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 164 ~ 63 - 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 165 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 166 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 167 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 168 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 169 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 -
+3, -5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 170
+~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 171 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+Page 172 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page 173
+b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+1-5;
+Page 174 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 175
+- b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 176 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 177 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 178 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 179 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 180
+b3
+1i
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page 181 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+182
+= b3
+1;
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+183
+- 63
+1;
+3,- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+184
+~ 63
+1;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3, -5;
+Page
+185
+b3
+1;
+Page 186
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7c
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+187
+63
+1;
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+188
+- b3
+1;
+Page
+189
+~ b3
+1;
+Page
+190 ~
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b7c
+- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+191 - 63
+1;
+3, -5;
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+192
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+193 ~ 63
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+194
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7c
+3,
+-5;
+Page
+195 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+196 ~ b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+197
+b3
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+198
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+199
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5; b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+200
+b3
+1;
+b
+6
+3,
+- 5; b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+201~
+1b 3
+1;
+b6-
+3,
+- 5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+202 - 63 -
+1;
+b6 -
+3,- 5;
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 203 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5;
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page 204 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3,- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+-5;
+Page 205 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 206 ~ b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 207 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3, -5;
+Page 208 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+209 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+210 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+1 - 5;
+Page
+211 - b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+212 ~ 63
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+213 ~ b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+214 - b3
+1;
+b7c
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 215 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 216 - b3
+- 1;
+b6 - 3, -5; b7C - 3,-5;
+
+Page 217 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 218 ~ 63 - 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+219-b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+220 ~b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 221 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 222 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 223 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 224 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3
+-5; b7C -
+Page 225 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+Page
+226 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, - 5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page
+227 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+1-5;
+Page 228 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 229
+~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 230 - b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 231 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 232 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 233 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page
+234
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+235
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, - 5;
+b7c
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+236
+= b3
+1;
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+237
+1;
+3,- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+238
+b3
+1;
+Page
+239
+b3
+1;
+Page
+240
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3, -5;
+3, - 5;
+b7c
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+241~
+63
+1;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+242-b3
+1;
+Page
+243
+= b3
+1;
+Page
+244
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b7c
+- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+245
+- 63
+1;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+246
+163
+1;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+247
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+248
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+-5;
+Page
+249
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+250
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+251
+b3
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+252
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, - 5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+253
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+254
+b3
+1;
+b
+6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+255
+b
+3
+1;
+b6-
+3,
+- 5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+256 - 63
+1;
+b6 -
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+257 ~ 63
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+258 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3,
+-5;
+Page 259 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 - 3,-5;
+b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 260 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3, -5;
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 261 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3, -5;
+Page 262 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+263 = b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+Page 264 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C
+1 - 5;
+Page 265 - b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 266 - b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 267 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+268-
+b3
+1;
+b7c
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 269
+63
+1;
+66 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 270 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+- 3, -5; b7C - 3,-5;
+
+Page 271 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 272 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 273 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+274-
+b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 275 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 276 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 277 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 278
+~ b3
+1; b6
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+Page 279 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+Page 280 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3
+,-5;
+Page 281 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page 282 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 283 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+Page 284 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 285 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 286 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 287 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page
+288
+b3
+1i
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+289 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3,
+-5;
+Page
+290
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+291 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+292
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+293
+_= b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page
+294 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+-5;
+Page
+295
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b 7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+296 - 63
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page 297
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3,
+-5;
+Page
+298 ~b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+-5;
+Page
+299
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+300
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+301 ~ b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+302
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+-5;
+Page
+303
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3,
+-5;
+Page
+304 ~ b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+305
+-b3
+1;
+66
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+306 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page
+307
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+Page
+308
+b3
+1;
+-5;
+b7c
+3
+-5;
+b
+6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 309 ~
+b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+310 ~63
+1;
+b6 -
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+311 ~ 63
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+3
+-5;
+Page
+312 -b3
+- 1;
+b6
+b7C
+3,
+-5;
+Page 313 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 314 ~ b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+315 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+316 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+317 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+318 b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+, -5;
+Page
+319
+- b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+320 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 321 ~ b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+b7c
+Page 322 ~ b3
+1;
+66
+b7c
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 323 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 324 - b3
+- 1;
+
+Page 325 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 326 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 327
+- b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+328~
+b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 329 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 330 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 331 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 332 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+Page 333 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+Page 334 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+,-5;
+Page 335 ~ 63
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page 336 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 337 - b3
+1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+Page 338 - b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 339 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 340 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 341 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+342
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+343 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, - 5;
+b7c
+3,
+-5;
+Page
+344
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+345
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+346 -
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+347
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page
+348
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+349
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+350 ~63
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+351-
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3,
+-5;
+Page
+352 ~
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+-5;
+Page
+353
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+354
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+355
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+356
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3,
+-5;
+Page
+357 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3,
+-5;
+Page
+358
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+359
+b3
+1;
+66
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+360
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+361
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+Page
+362 ~
+b3
+1;
+-5;
+b7C
+3
+-5;
+b
+Page 363
+1;
+6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+b6 -
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+364 ~ 63 -
+1;
+b6 -
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page
+365 = b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+3
+-5;
+Page
+366 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+b7C
+3,
+-5;
+Page
+367 - 63
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 368 ~ b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 369 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+370 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+371 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+372 -b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+, -5;
+Page
+373
+- b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 374 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 375 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+Page 376 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 377 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 378 ~ b3 - 1;
+
+Page 379 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 380 ~ 63 - 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 381 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 382 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 383 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b70
+Page 384 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 385 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 386 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+Page 387 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 388 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 389 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 390 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 391 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 392 - b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 393 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 394 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 395 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page
+396
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+397 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page
+398
+~ b3
+1i
+b7c
+Page
+399~63
+1;
+3,- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+400
+- b3
+1;
+Page
+401 ~ b3
+1;
+Page
+402
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3, -5;
+b7c
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page
+403
+- b3
+1;
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+3
+Page 404 ~ b3
+1;
+Page
+405 ~ b3
+1;
+Page
+406 ~
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b7c
+b7C
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page
+407~63
+1;
+3, -5;
+b7c
+Page
+408
+~ b3
+- 1;
+Page
+409 ~ 63
+- 1;
+Page
+410
+~ b3
+1;
+Page 411 - b3
+1;
+Page
+412 ~ b3
+1;
+Page
+413 ~ b3
+1;
+Page 414 - b3
+1;
+Page
+415
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+66
+b6
+b6
+66
+66
+b6
+b6
+b7C
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+b7c
+b7c
+b7C
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3,
+- 5; b7C
+Page
+416 ~ 63
+1;
+3,
+- 5; b7C
+Page
+417
+1b 3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b70 -
+Page
+418 ~ b3 - 1; b6-
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+419 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+420
+= b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7c
+Page 421 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+422 ~ 63
+1; b6
+b7C -
+Page 423 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 424 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+425 - b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+b7c
+Page 426 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+427
+- b3
+- 1; b6
+b7C -
+Page 428 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 429 - b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+Page 430 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+b 7C
+Page 431 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+3, -5;
+1-5;
+3,
+-5;
+3
+, -5;
+3
+1-5;
+3,
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3,
+-5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+3,
+-5;
+3, -5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+1 - 5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 432 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+
+Page 433 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 434 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 435 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 436 ~
+b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 437 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 438 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 439 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 440 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+Page 441 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 442 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 443 ~
+b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 444 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 445
+~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 446 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 447 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 448 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 449 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page
+450
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+3,- 5;
+b7C
+Page 451 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page
+452
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+Page
+453
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+454
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+455
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+Page
+456
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+457
+63
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+Page 458
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+Page
+459
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+460 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+461 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+Page
+462
+~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+463 ~63
+- 1;
+66
+b7C
+Page
+464
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7c
+Page 465 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+Page
+466 -63
+1;
+66
+b7C
+Page
+467
+63
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page 468 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+469
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page
+470
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page
+471 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+472 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+473 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+474 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page 475 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 476 ~ b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+Page 477 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 478 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 479 - b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+b7c
+Page 480
+-b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+481 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+b7C -
+Page 482 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 483 - b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+Page 484 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+b7C
+Page 485 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+1-5;
+3,
+-5;
+3
+,-5;
+3
+, -5;
+3,
+-5;
+-5;
+3,
+-5;
+3
+- 5;
+3,
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+3,
+-5;
+3,
+-5;
+3
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3,
+-5;
+3,
+-5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3
+-5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3
+-5;
+3,
+-5;
+3,
+- 5;
+, -5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3,
+- 5;
+3,
+- 5;
+Page 486 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+
+Page 487 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 488 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 489 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 490 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 491 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 492 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 493 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 494 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 495 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+Page 496 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3
+,-5;
+Page 497 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page 498 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 499
+~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+Page 500 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 501 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 502 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 503 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 504 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 505 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 506 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 507 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 508 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 509 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 510 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 511 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 512 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 513 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 514 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 516 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 517 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 518 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+Deleted Page (s)
+X No Duplication Fee X
+X For this Page
+X
+X
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+
+1A Envelope
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062
+MM
+MM
+50 ! ADMINSTRATIVE SUBPOENA RESULTS FROM
+51
+RESULTS FROM ADIN SUBPOENA
+FOR
+b6-3,-5
+--b7C -3,-5
+b3
+-1
+03956-7268
+31E-444-1080621A
+
+FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)
+File Number
+3LE-MM-10806221A50
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+mm/PBERA
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+06/27/2007
+From
+Cingular
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+b6 -2
+b70 - 2
+By
+1o. Be Returned
+/ Yes
+IT No
+Receipt Given
+• Yes
+• No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+ET No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+1-No.
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+Admastate Subpona Result
+Ginaules
+b6 -3,-5
+b7C -3,-5
+b3 -1
+03956-7270
+L.:
+
+*cingular 1s now
+Therest
+jatat
+National Compliance Center
+RESPONSE COVER SHEET
+PO BOX 24679
+WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33416-4679
+Phone 1-800-635-6840 Facsimile 1-888-938-4715
+To:
+File Code:
+66 - 2
+b70 - 2
+FBI 33401
+STE 500
+505 S FLAGLER DRIVE
+WEST PALM BEACH FL 33401
+From: MAC
+Number of Pages:
+Date: 6/26/2007
+Phone Number:|
+Fax Number:
+Request Dated: 6/22/2007
+Received On: 6/22/2007
+If you are not already doing so, please begin addressing all legal requests to AT&T. Additionally, effective
+immediately, please fax all legal requests to AT&T at 1-888-938-4715.
+- The requested information is enclosed, Records were only available in hard copy. No call records
+were found from 3/04/04 - 4/21/04 and 2/28/05 - 6/01/05.
+- The number ported from AT&T to SPRINT PCS. To obtain information regarding the new carrier,
+please visit www.npac.com.
+CONEIDENTIALITY NOTICE
+This by the let, and to dom in lich med, ac giry mania himation that 1 pinge confidence andro it i see or see
+NCC Official Use Only
+U
+0
+
+03956-7271
+
+JUN-22~2007 16:38
+P.02
+FBI WEST PALM BEACH RA
+TI, S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICEFEDERAL, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+SUBPOENA
+In the matter of case number(s): 31E-MM-108062
+TO:
+Cingular wireless
+Custodian of Records
+ADDRESS;
+801 Northpoint Parkway
+West Palm Beach, FL 33407
+TELEPHONE: 888-938-4715
+GREETING:
+By the service of this subpoena upon you by SA
+b6 -2
+., who is authorized to serveb7e
+-2
+you are bereby commanded and required to disclose to SA
+_, a representative of
+the FBI, the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or
+identiry, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following;
+Please provide all account records to include subscriber and billing
+information as well as toll records (incoming and outgoing calls) for the
+following number:
+Number
+Toll Record Dates
+01/01/2004 to 06/01/2005
+b6 - 3,-5
+b7C - 3,-5
+63 - 1
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION, YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW,
+Coropliance must be made by personal appearance or production of records no later than the 24
+2007 at 10:00 o'clock A M, at 505 S. Flagler Drive, #500
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+SA
+In lieu of 1 nessonal amnearance, the information can he provided, vis facsimile, marked to the attention pr
+_ at telephone number
+In lieu of a personal appearance, the information can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+sest Palm Beach, Plorida 3340 to floring does 505 S. fLagler Drive, t500_
+If you refuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may invoke the aid of the United States
+District Court to compel compliance. Your fallure to obey the resulting court order may be punished as contempt.
+Issued inder authority of Public Law No. 106-544, 8 5(a).
+(18 U.S.C. 83486)
+ATTESTED
+Signat
+Name,
+Elp
+ISA
+Teened
+03956-7272
+b6 -2
++b7C -2
+
+FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)
+File Number
+31E-MM- 108062-VASI
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Mm/ PBCRA
+Date Received
+7/10/2007
+From
+Cingube / ATT
+Nashe of Contributor/Interviewee
+(Address)
+By
+st
+To Be Returned
+LJ Yes
+• No
+Receipt Given
+Yes
+1 No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+Yes
+IT No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+# No
+b6
+- 2
+b7C -2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enchsing Material)
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+Resulto Man
+Admin Salameno
+10 l
+b6-3,-5
+b7C
+-3,-5
+b3 -1
+03956-7780
+
+Fax Server
+7/10/2007 1:43:24 PM PAGE
+1/005
+rax server
+% cingular is now
+atst
+National Compliance Center
+RESPONSE COVER SHEET
+PO BOX 24679
+WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33416-4679
+Phonc 1-800-635-6840 Facsimile 1-888-938-4715
+To:
+SAL
+FBI 33401
+STE 500
+505 S FLAGLER DRIVE
+WEST PALM BEACA FL 33401
+File Code:
+b6 -2
+b7C -2
+Frem: MAC
+Number of Pages: 5
+Date: 7/10/2007
+Phone Number:
+Fax Number:_
+Request Dated: 4/10/2007
+Received On: 4/10/2007
+fyou are not already doing so, please begin addressing all legal requests to AT&T. Additionally, effectiv
+mmediately, please fax all legal requests for WIRELESS numbers to AT&T at 1-888-938-4715
+For more efficient and faster response, please provide an email address on future requests.
+- The requested subscriber information is enclosed.
+- Target number
+1/2003 until 12/2004.
+- The numbe
+also associated with accour
+which was active from
+vas not assigned to a customer during the time frame requested.
+b6 - 5
+670 - 5
+CONFIDENTIALITI NOTICE
+This cover shed, and any document which may accompany it contains information from the National Compliance Conter which is intended for use
+only by the individhal to whom it is addressed and which may contain information that is privileged, confidential andior otherwise exempt from
+disclosure under applicable law: If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the person responsible for delivering this message to the
+intended recipient, any revies, disclosure, dissemination, distribution, copying or olher use of this message or its substance is strictly probibited 1I
+you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately hy telephone to arrange for the return of this communication to us at our
+expense Thank you.
+Net Official lise Only
+
+03956-7784
+
+Fax Server
+APR-10-2007
+7/10/2007 1:43:24 PM PAGE
+.. 2/005. 'Fax server
+15:52
+FBI WEST PALM BEACH RA
+U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+SUBPOENA
+In the matter of case number(s): 31E-MM-108062
+Cingular
+Custodian of Records
+11760 U.S. Highway 1 Golden Bear Plaza
+4th Floor, West Iower, North Palm Beach FL 33408
+888-938-4715
+P.Ø2
+TO:
+ADDRESS:
+TELEPHONE:
+GREETING:
+By the service of this subpoena upon you by SA
+, who is authorized to serve it,
+you are hereby commanded and required to disclose to SA
+-, a representative of
+the FBI, the name, address, loral and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or otber subscriber number or
+identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following:
+Please provide all account records to include subscriber, user and billing
+information for the following numbers from 01/01/2004 to 12/31/2005:
+66 -2
+b7C -2
+66 - 5
+b7C - 5
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION. YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SURPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
+Compliance must be made by personal appearance or production of records no later than the 27
+April
+2007
+- day of
+- st 10:00 o'clock A M, at 505 S. Flagler Drive, #500
+West Paim Beach, Florida 33401
+SA
+In lieu ofa nersanal anoressace, the information can be provided, vis facsimile, marker en ste
+attantion
+., at telephone number
+In lieu of a personal appearance, the information can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+SA
+_ at the following address: 505 S. Flagler Drive,
+#500
+West Palm Beach; Florida 33401
+Il you refure to obey this subpoena, the United States Atforney General may invoke the aid of the United States
+District Court to compel compliance. Your failure to obey the resulting court order may be punished as contempt.
+Issued under authority of Public Law No.
+(18 U.S.C. $3486)
+ATTESTED COPY
+Signature:
+Name, Titles
+SSRA
+Issued this_
+10
+_ day of April
+56 - 2
+b7C -2
+2007-03956-7785
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/92087c28be1b3a5254aaaae75cb75516bc983e45dcdb8c6105b0460877aa053a.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/92087c28be1b3a5254aaaae75cb75516bc983e45dcdb8c6105b0460877aa053a.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..177eacd3e35cdfaa609a000fa0c9b301ba3b60c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/92087c28be1b3a5254aaaae75cb75516bc983e45dcdb8c6105b0460877aa053a.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -1773,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "92087c28be1b3a5254aaaae75cb75516bc983e45dcdb8c6105b0460877aa053a",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 3,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "0c12cf1839b01a8574e8ab25f0d29d7e3cfb10dc5f812bfe31f672d76c737db8",
+  "output_sha256": "5205fb2e80b3bc5b9641c09f56b70114363dde778d2846d623129d6993b1efc1",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/9846272ae8efcd78fe52161862fa9f468cbc4479acf404b7a868461f8cd71c08.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/9846272ae8efcd78fe52161862fa9f468cbc4479acf404b7a868461f8cd71c08.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0045ebb452e9eb058135c2d937b8d535e2244708
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/9846272ae8efcd78fe52161862fa9f468cbc4479acf404b7a868461f8cd71c08.md
@@ -0,0 +1,3860 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 367
+Page 10 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 11 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 12 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 13 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 14 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+- 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 15 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+- 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 16
+~ b3 - 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+- 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 17
+=b3 - 1: b6 -
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 18 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+- 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 19 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 20 ~ b3 - 1;
+66 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 21 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 22 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 23 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 29 Duplicate;
+Page 30 Duplicate;
+Page 31 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 32
+~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 36
+~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 37 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 39 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 40 - Duplicate;
+Page 41 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 49 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 50
+~ b3
+- 1;
+66 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 52 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 53 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 54
+-b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+- 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 55 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+- 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 56 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 57 ~ b3 - 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+- 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 58 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 59 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 60 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 61 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 64 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 65 Duplicate;
+Page 68 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 70 - Duplicate;
+Page 71 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 72 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 73 - Duplicate;
+Page 118 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 119 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 120
+~ b3
+1; b6 - Z,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 121 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 122 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 123 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+
+Page 124 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 125 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 126 - b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 127 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 128 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 129
+~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 132 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 133
+~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 134 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 135 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5; b7E - 1;
+Page 136 ~ 63
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 137 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 138 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+- 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 139 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 140 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 141 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 144 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 145 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 146 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 147 - Duplicate;
+Page 148 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 151 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 152 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 153 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 154 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 155 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 159 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 160 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 162 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page 163
+~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 164 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 165
+~ b3
+1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 166 - b3
+1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 167
+- b3
+1; b6 -
+3; b7C -
+3;
+- 1;
+Page 168 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 169 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 170 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-4,-5; b7C - 3,-4,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 171 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+172 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E
+• 1;
+Page
+173 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+1;
+Page 174 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+175
+- b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+-1;
+Page 176 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 177 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page 178 - b3
+- 1;
+3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 179 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 180 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 181 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+- 1;
+Page 185
+- b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+- 1;
+Page 186 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+- 1;
+Page 187
+~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+1;
+Page 188
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 189 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 190 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+
+Page 191 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 192 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 195 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 196 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 197 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C -
+2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 198 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+- 1;
+Page 199 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 200 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 201 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 202 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+- 1;
+Page 203 ~ 63 - 1; 66 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 204 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+-1;
+Page 206 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+- 1,-3,-4, -5; b7C
+- 1,-3,-4, -5; b7D - 2; b7E - 1;
+Page 207 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-4,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-4,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 211 ~ b3
+- 1,-2; b5 - 2; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page 212 ~ 63 - 1,-2; b5 - 2: b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page 216 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 217
+= b6
+- 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 220 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 221 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 222 ~ b6
+- 3.-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 223 ~ b6 - 3.-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 224 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 225 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 226 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 227 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 228 - b6
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 229 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 230
+- b6- 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 231
+"b6
+- 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 234 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 235 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 236 ~ b3 - -1; b6 - -1; b7C - -3;
+Page 237 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 238 ~ b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 251 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 296 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 297 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 298 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 299 ~ b7E - 1;
+Page 300
+~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 301
+= b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 302 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 303 ~ b3
+1; b6
+- 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 304 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+-1;
+Page 305 - b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+-1;
+Page 306 - b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+-1;
+Page 307 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 308 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 309 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 310 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 313 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 314 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 327 - Duplicate;
+
+Page 328 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 332 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 333 - b3
+1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 334 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 335 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 336 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 337 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 338 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 339 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 340 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 341 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 342 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 346 - Duplicate;
+Page 347 - Duplicate;
+Page 349 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 350 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 351 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 352 - b3
+1;
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 355 - b3
+1;
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 356 ~ b3
+1;
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 357 - b3
+1;
+3,
+-5: b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 358 - b3
+1;
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+359 ~ b3
+1;
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 360 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3; b7C - 3;
+- 1:
+Page 361 ~ b3
+1;
+3; b7C - 3;
+- 1;
+Page 362 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+- 1;
+Page 366 - b3
+1;
+3; b7C -
+3;
+1;
+Page
+367 ~ b3
+1;
+2, -3; b7C -
+2,-3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+368 - 63
+- 1; b6
+3;
+b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+369
+~ b3
+- 1;
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+370
+~ b3
+- 1;
+1-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 371 ~ b3
+1;
+- 5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 372 - b3
+1;
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+b7E - 1:
+Page
+373~b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+374 ~ 63
+1;
+66
+3,
+Page 375 - b3
+1;
+-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+3, -5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 376 - b3
+1;
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 377 ~ b3
+1; b6
+- 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 384 - b6 - 2; b7C - 2; b7E - 1;
+Page
+385 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 386 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 387 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 388 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-4,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-4,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page 389 ~ b3
+1; b6
+- 1,-3,-4,-5,-7; b7C - 1,-3,-4,-5,-7; b7D - 1;
+Page 396 - b3
+- 1;
+b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 397 - b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 398 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 399 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1:
+Page 400 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 401 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 402 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 403 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1:
+Page 404 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 405 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+
+Page 409 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-4,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-4,-5; b7D - 1,-3,-4,-5;
+Page 412 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 413 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 414 ~ b7E - 1;
+Page 415 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 416 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 417 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 418 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 419 - b3 - 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 420 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 421 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 422 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 423 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+- 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 424 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 425 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 426 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 431 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page
+432
+1;
+3;
+b7C -
+3;
+1;
+Page 434 ~ b3
+1;
+- 3; b7C -
+3;
+1;
+Page
+436 ~ 63
+1;
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page 437 - b3
+1;
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+1;
+Page 438
+- b3
+1;
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+, -5;
+- 1;
+Page
+439
+_= b3
+1;
+3,-5;
+3,-5;
+1;
+Page
+440
+- b3
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+b7c
+-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+441~ b3
+1;
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+m
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page 442 ~ b3
+1;
+3,-5;
+b70 -
+3
+-5;
+- 1;
+Page 443 - b3
+1;
+3,-5;
+3,
+-5;
+1;
+Page
+444 ~ b3
+1;
+3,-5;
+3,-5;
+1;
+Page 445 ~ b3
+1;
+3,-5;
+b7c
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+446 - b3
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+- 1:
+Page 447
+- b3
+- 1;
+66
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page 448
+~ b3
+1;
+3, -5;
+b7c
+3,
+-5;
+- 1;
+Page 449 - b3
+1;
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+-1;
+Page
+450
+- b3
+1;
+66
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page
+451
+-b3
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+3
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page 452
+~ b3
+1;
+3,-5;
+,-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+453
+3,-5;
+b7c
+3
+-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+454 ~63
+1;
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+- 5;
+1;
+Page
+455
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page
+456 - b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page
+457 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3
+-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+458 ~b3
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+3
+-5;
+- 1;
+Page 459 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C
+3
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page 460 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5;
+b7c
+3,
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page 461 - b3
+1;
+3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+-1;
+Page 462 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+463 - b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+3, -5;
+b7c
+3,-5;
+-1;
+Page 464 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+, -5;
+- 1;
+Page
+465 ~b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page 466 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page 467
+~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 468
+- b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 469
+~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 470 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+1;
+3,
+- 5;
+- 1;
+3
+- 5;
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+-1;
+
+ru
+ru
+H
+- 1; b6 -
+- 1; b6 -
+1; b6 -
+- 1; b6 -
+1; b6 -
+1;
+- 1;
+1;
+1;
+- 1; b6 -
+1;
+b6 -
+- 1; b6 -
+1; b6
+1;
+b6 -
+1;
+b6 -
+1;
+b6 -
+- 1;
+- 1; b6
+1;
+1;
+b6 -
+1; b6 -
+1;
+66 -
+2; b7C -
+N
+N
+N
+N
+N
+b7C -
+5;
+;
+b7C -
+b7C -
+3;
+1;
+-1;
+1,
+b7
+b7
+b7
+7E
+=.
+H
+1;
+1;
+
+Page 525 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 526 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 527 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2; b7E - 1;
+Page 528 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 529 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 530 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2; b7E - 1;
+Page 531 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 532 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7E - 1;
+Page 533 ~ b6 - Z; b7C - 2; b7E - 1;
+Page 534 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 535 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7E - 1;
+Page 536 ~ b6 - 2; bC - 2; b7E - 1;
+Page 537 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 538 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7E - 1;
+- 5, B72
+Page 541 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 542 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 544 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page
+545
+1i
+3,
+-5; b7C
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+546 ~ b3
+1;
+3,
+-5; b7C
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+547
+~ b3
+1;
+3;
+b7C -
+3;
+- 1;
+Page
+548
+~ b3
+1;
+Page
+549
+~ b3
+1;
+Page
+550 ~b3
+1;
+Page
+551 ~ b3
+1;
+b7C -
+3;
+- 1;
+3;
+b7C -
+3
+1;
+3;
+b7C -
+3;
+1;
+3, - 5; b7C
+3,-5;
+-1;
+Page
+552 -b3
+1;
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+m
+- 5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+553 -63
+1;
+Page
+554 ~ b3
+1;
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+3
+-5;
+- 1;
+3,
+-5;
+b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+-1;
+Page
+555 ~ b3
+1;
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C -
+3,-5;
+1;
+Page
+556 -63
+1;
+3,-5;
+b7c
+3,-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+557
+~ b3
+1;
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page
+558
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+, -5;
+b7C -
+- 5;
+- 1;
+Page
+559
+~ b3
+1;
+- 5;
+b7C -
+3
+-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+560 ~ b3
+1;
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C -
+m
+-5;
+-1;
+Page
+561 ~ b3
+Page
+562 - b3
+1;
+66
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+3,
+- 5;
+- 1;
+1;
+Page 563 ~ b3
+66
+3,
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+- 1;
+1;
+3,-5; b7C
+,-5;
+- 1;
+Page
+564
+= b3
+1;
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+1;
+Page
+565
+- b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+- 1;
+Page 566 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 567 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 568 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 569 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 570 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 571 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 572 - b3
+- 1;
+b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 573 - b3
+1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E -
+1;
+Page 574 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C -
+2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 575 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C -
+2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 576 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+X
+X
+Deleted Page (s)
+X No Duplication Fee X
+For this Page
+X
+
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+
+2006-01-01
+2007-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2007-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2007-01-01
+2007-01-01
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+• (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+b6 -2
+b7C -2
+03956-8305
+
+31E-MM-:108062-1A118
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence.
+MM PRCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _
+Date Received _ VArious
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address
+7
+(City and State)
+By
+To Be Returned • Yes •
+Receipt Given D
+It No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+Yes
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+b6-2
+-2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+Original notes re intervier of
+Biographical File en
+DOB
+and Myspace intor Mattoni
+56-31
+03956-8306
+
+NO MYSPACE
+ACCOUNT
+FOUND
+03956-8307
+
+Myspace.comp
+
+MySpace.com | Help | Signout
+Auto Insurance For Less™
+WE*****
+The Ganaral
+Says Yes!"
+GENERAL
+www.thegeneral.com
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Videos | Events b
+_-____
+---
+Search
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Find a Friend
+7ks
+We weren't able to find a
+MySpace.com
+Invite Your Friend
+Sorry we weren't able to find
+email:
+>> Check a different name or email address
+on
+56 - 31
+' on MySpace.com
+Invite
+About | EAQ | Ierms 1 Privacy I Safety Tips | ContactMySpace | Promotel I Advertise I MySpace International
+http://searchresults.myspace.com/index.cfm?Mytoken=
+03956-8308
+
+03956-8309
+
+N=л-4.
+OfficeMax
+03956-8310
+New cell as 8/07
+cell
+
+b6 - 3|
+- 3
+b3 - 1]
+03956-8311
+
+Oct 30200s
+b6-1,-3
+-1,- 3
+cull
+called
+b6 - 3,-5•
+darke sten troked fries a
+- = why world she brig
+You Here
+03956-8326
+
+, -5
+-3,-5
+. havent tik to ten
+Since
+-.b7C
+- 3
+03956-8327
+
+- 3
+7/50:46
+91404:36
+1107)
+12%23
+_b6
+b70
+ile?
+'...
+03956-8328
+
+* Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+=MAPQUEST.-
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE'-
+ROADITOUR
+SWEEPSTAKEO
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+67C -3
+Lp Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+03956-8329
+
+*
+*Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to_
+Page 2 ot 2
+st 2
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, road
+conditions or route usability or expeditlousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest and its suppliers assume no
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp?do
+03956-8330
+
+31E-MM- 108062-1A119
+Pield Office Acquiring Evidene_. MM. PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _*
+Date Received -
+VARIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By
+-SA
+To Be Returned DJ Yes.
+ENo
+Réceipt Given l Yes
+ENo
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (€)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+ENor
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+b6 -2
+-2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Compunication Enclosing Material)
+•Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+wiccanhical File on
+DOB-
+03956-8335
+
+- 3
+63 - 1-
+03956-8336
+
+friend
+1/30/03
+1/02/03
+{
+b6 - 5
+b70-5
+03956-8337
+
+u75
+8/1/2007
+111104/2006
+b6 - 31
+- 1
+4/12/2006
+03956-8340
+
+!
+FD-340 (Rey. 4-11-03)
+31E-MM-108062-1A120
+Field office Acquiring Evidence MM DBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document*
+Date Received
+VArIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+-2
+b7c
+-2
+By..
+To Be Returned
+Yes.
+Receipt Given D7. Yes
+•No
+•NO
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Ruic 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+ENo
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+Title:
+Réference:
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+Bisicastical Ele on
+DOB -
+and My Space in Formation.
+166 - 3
+1670 -3
+163 - 1
+03956-8344
+
+66
+- 3
+MYSPACE
+OLD ACCOUNT
+03956-8345
+
+
+RAMPSON®
+BRESENT S6601
+She's a hot,
+topless hlond
+«is this a neen show
+or afreak show?
+You Gotta
+See What
+Happens!
+MySpace
+Search
+powered Google"
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Fllm | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy i Classifieds
+b6 - 3, -5,
+b70 - 3,- 5
+is in your extended network
+atest Blog Entry [Subscribe to this Blog}
+[View All Blog Entries]
+Blurbs
+View My: Pics | Videos
+Contacting
+2 Send Message
++8
+Add to Friends
+8° Instant Message
+*8S Add to Group
+Interests
+Es Forward to Friend
+Ei Add to Favarites
+Block User
+$8
+Rank User
+General
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user. viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-8346
+
+
+View All of
+Friends
+Friends Comments
+b70 - 3
+Add Comment
+Music
+Movies
+Television
+Books
+Heroes
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-8347
+
+
+Details
+Status:
+Here for:
+Orientation:
+Hometown:
+Body type:
+Zodiac Sign:
+Smoke / Drink:
+Children:
+Education:
+Occupation:
+b6-3|
+b3-11
+About | EAQ I Terms | Privacy. | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Abuse | Promote! | Advertise | MYSpace International
+..i.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-
+03956-8348
+
+03956-8349
+... al
+
+03956-8350
+
+ĘS£8-9S68Ò
+.-.
+.--__.
+- •
+-. --.-u -
+E-
+I- 89
+ą
+§- 94
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL
+Page l of 2
+66 -3
+=MAPQUESTE
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE**
+ROADITOUR
+SWEEPSTAKKE
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+Lip Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.ad/
+03956-8364
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL t
+
+505 5 Flagler Dr
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+EndA
+..
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These disor ste intry or expel uses users me alone Mailes to here sume no
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+03956-8365
+
+11/1/2006
+sell
+hone
+D7C -3
+Dec. ot
+commits
+03956-8368
+
+- 3
+NUS'YIS
+pru tabeli
+- Yau dift tell me
+- 3
+03956-8369
+
+63 - 11
+.....
+0F19p-500801-MM - MM-318
+03956-8371
+
+3LE-MM: 108062-1A121
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence ...
+_MM PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _
+Date Received
+VACIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+-2
+To Be Returned
+Yes.
+• ENo
+Receipt Given
+Yes
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+El No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+Title:
+Reference:
+Description: • Original notes re interview of
+Bicarannical Eleon
+- DOB-
+and MySpace inforMaltonis
+63
+03956-8376
+
+1670 - 3
+MYSPACE
+OLD ACCOUNT
+RECENT ACCOUNT WAS DELETED
+03956-8377
+
+
+"Sponsored Links
+s Click Here
+To Change your
+Online Now Icon
+Prison Break Trivia
+What Type of Mom Are You?
+Free Personality Test
+Think You Know Prison Break? Take Our Quiz A fun test to find out what type of parenting style Discover your personality type. Get a free
+And See What You Know
+online personality test.
+www.popularq.net/PrisonBreak
+www.AreYouASlackerMom.com
+www.ActualMe.com
+• MySpace
+Search
+powery Google
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+b6 -3 -
+is in your extended network
+: Blogl
+]Latest Blog Entry (subscribe to this
+Pics |
+Videos
+Contacting
+Send Message
+*8
+Add to Friends
+8° Instant Message
++88 Add to Group
+j
+$8
+Forward to Friend
+Add to Favorites
+Block User
+Rank User
+¿ [View All Blog Entries]
+MySpace URL:
+http://www.myspace.com
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-8378
+
+
+Song has been
+deleted by the artist
+-add*
++view+
+Interests
+General
+.. .
+2541*
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-8379
+
+, brought to you by Quizilia
+Who I'd like to meet:
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendiD
+03956-83801
+
+Page 4 of 19 b6 - 3, -5
+- 3, -5.
+Friend Space
+: Music
+Movies
+: Television
+: Books
+Heroes
+*7+4***• •
+Details
+View All of
+Is Friends:
+••" ... .
+...
+.4........
+Is Friends Comments
+: Displaying 37 of 68 comments (View All | Add Comment)
+Status:
+Here for:
+: Orientation:
+: Hometown:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-8381
+
+: Body type:
+: Ethnicity:
+• Zodiac Sign:
+• Smoke /
+: Drink:
+: Children:
+• Education:
+: Occupation:
+Schools
+0....
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+Page 5 of 19 b6
+-3,-5 :
+b7C - 3,-5
+03956-8382
+
+Page 6 of 19 66 -3,- 5 •
+-3,-5
+********+**********1****************
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-|
+03956-8383
+
+Page 7 of 19 b6 -3, -5
+b7c -3, -5
+# 7+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-
+03956-8384|
+
+Page 8 of 19 b6 - 3, -5
+_63 - 1
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendiD=
+03956-8385
+
+Page 9 of 19 b6 - 3, - 5
+b7C - 3,- 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-8386
+
+Page 10 of 19 b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-8387
+
+Page 11 of 19 b6 - 3, - 5
+- 3,- 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-8388
+
+Page 12 of 19 b6 - 3, - 5
+- 3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-8389:
+
+Page 13 of 19 b6 - 3,-5
+b7C -3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-8390
+
+Page 14 of 19 b6 - 3, -5
+b7C -3,- 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-8391|
+
+Page 15 of 19 b6 - 3, -5 '
+b7c
+- 3,- 5
+.....
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-8392
+
+Page 16 of 19 b6 -3, -5
+b7C - 3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfn?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-
+03956-8393
+
+Page 17 of 19 b6 - 3, -5 !
+b7C -3,- 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-8394
+
+www.myspace.com/_
+Page 18 of 19 b6 - 3, -5 l
+i
+htttp://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-8395
+
+Page 19 of 19 66 - 3, -5
+b7C-3,-5
+=
+About | FAQ| Ierms | Privacy | Safety Tips. | Contact MySpace | Report Abuse | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-8396
+
+1..
+.....
+PALM BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT
+www.palmbeachpolice.com
+b70-3
+In any Emergency
+•Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+Non-Emergency (561) 838-5454
+TIPS Line (561) 835-4738
+03956-8397
+
+
+66-3;
+Click Here
+To change you
+Drine Now con
+ce.com Home
+The Web ® MySpace O
+Search
+MORE PEOPLE CHOOSE CINGULAR
+THAN ANY OTHER PROVIDER.
+Help | SignUp
+Xongular
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+* is in your extended network
+Latest Blog Entry [Subscribe to this
+View My:
+Pics |
+Videos
+Contacting *
+M: Send Message
+Add to Friends
+instant Message
+Add to Group
+..;
+Et Forvard to Friend
+Add to Favorites
+Block User
+Rank User
+: [View All Blog Entries]
+.. . . . . .
+...
+......
+MySpace URL:
+http://www.myspace.com
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-
+03956-8398
+
+
+b7c -3
+Song has been
+deleted by the artist
++add+
+*viewt
+*'s Interests
+...oner:
+General
+....
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-8399
+
+Page 3 of 1863 - 1
+- 3,- 5
+b7C - 3,-5
+, brought to you by Quizilla
+: Who I'd like to meet:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&.friendID-
+03956-8400
+
+
+-3,-5
+b7C -3, -5
+: Music
+: Movies
+: Televisi
+: Books
+: Heroes
+**=.
+.....
+*s Details
+Status:
+• Here for:
+¡ Orientation:
+Hometown:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-84010
+
+
+Body type:
+Ethnicity:
+Zodiac Sign:
+Smoke /
+Drink:
+Children:
+: Education:
+: Occupation:
+...
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&.friendID
+03956-8402
+
+Page 6 of 1865 - 3
+, - 5
+b7C -3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfim?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-8403
+
+Page 7 of 1893 -1
+b6 - 3,-5
+b70 - 3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-8404|
+
+Page 8 of 1863 - 1
+56-3,-5
+67C - 3,-5
+........
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-
+03956-8405
+
+Page 9 of 1863 -1
+- 3,-5
+b7C - 3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-8406
+
+Page 10 of 18b3 -1
+-3,-5
+b7C -3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-8407
+
+Page 11 of 1863 -1
+b7C -3, -5
+1
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-8408
+
+Page 12 of 1863 -1
+-3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-8409
+
+Page 13 of 18b3 - 1
+b6-3.-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfn?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+03956-8410
+
+• www.myspace.com
+Page 14 of 18b3 -1
+b7C -3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID:
+03956-84111
+
+Page 15 of 18b3 -1
+b6 - 3,-5
+b7C -3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendiD
+03956-8412
+
+Page 16 of 1863 - 1
+56-3,-5
+b7C - 3,- 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=usex.viewprofile&friendlr/
+03956-8413
+
+www.myspace.con
+Page 17 of 1863 -1
+- 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendiD
+03956-8414
+
+Page 18 of 18b3 - 1
+56-3.-5
+....
+About | FAQ| Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Inappropriate Content | Promotel | Advertise | MySpace
+International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-8415
+
+439
+-3, -5
+03956-8416
+
+M/24/01
+ты:
+45kin
+OfficeMax
+==:
+03956-8417
+
+53 -
+03956-8418
+
+FD-125 (Rey. 4-1-93)
+• Birth • Credit * Criminal
+• Death
+• INS
+so 06/08/2007.
+• Marriage* • Motor Vehicle I Other
+To
+ISS
+Return to
+SA
+Buded
+Name and aliases of subject, applicant, or employee, and spouse
+31E-MM-108062
+Address
+Residence
+Business
+Former
+* Date and place of mariage
+(ifapplicable)
+Race
+W
+Birth date
+Sex
+ja Female
+• Male
+Age
+Height
+Weight
+Hair
+Eyes
+Birthplace
+Arrest Number
+Fingerprint classification
+Criminal specialty
+Social Security Number
+b6 -2,-3
+b7C -2,-3
+*
+| Divers License Number
+• D/L Photo • Other
+Specific information desired
+Resuits of check
+NCIC / Mapquest/.
+b7E -1
+E11210788
+03956-8419•
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL t
+- MAPQUEST=
+
+End:
+coffee a
+Notes:
+Only text visible within note field will print.
+Directions
+Distance
+03956-8432
+
+Drifting Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+Ende
+
+b70 -3
+03956-8433
+
+Driving Directions from S0S S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+"MAPQUESTE
+
+« THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE*•
+ROADITOUR
+SWEEPETAKES
+bo
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+LipPrinter-friendly page sponsored by HP
+03956-8444
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to_
+
+..i.
+• 56-3
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, road
+onditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest and its suppliers assume n
+esponsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use
+03956-8445
+http://www.imapquest.com/directions/main.adp?do
+
+FD-340 (Rev, 4-11-03)
+312. MM: 108062-1A122
+MM, PBCRA
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+Serial # of Originating Document ...
+Date Received
+VACIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+Timand States
+By .
+To Be Returned
+• Yes.
+• No
+Receipt Given • Yes
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+L Yes
+ENo
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+ENo
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description: -
+Original notes re interview of
+Bearashical file on
+DoB
+03956-8451
+-2
+- 2
+
+b3 -1:
+- Decal Crene Co
+IN A m
+03956-8452
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+67C - 3
+=MAPQUESTE
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE**
+ROADITOUR
+SWEEPETAKES
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+Lip
+Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+03956-8458
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+Page 2 ofi2
+0P2
+50st palm leah, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+=
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, road
+conditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use, MapQuest and its suppliers assume no
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+03956-8459
+:.http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp
+
+- Age -Dis
+-- Ays! fib
+03956-8460
+3IE.MM-10804211122
+
+dub
+08/10/2006
+b6c =3
+-63 - 1
+- 3
+63 -1'
+I went upstalks
+stayed donnstairs _T
+_introduced hersel
+Self came donna robe introduad hasel
+paid 200.0
+- paid 300.00
+_b7C -3
+and the tad her
+103956-8463
+
+318-MM: 108062-1A123
+Had olice sequiring Evidence_ MM| PBCRA.
+Serial # of Originating Document _
+Date Received
+VACIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By
+SA
+To Be Returned L
+Yes.
+Receipt Given
+• Yes
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+DINO
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+[INO
+66 - 2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+• Original notes re interview of
+Ele en
+DOB.
+b7c -3
+03956-8484
+
+03956-8485
+
+Interviend, on
+04/24/07
+4:00pm
+Video
+03956-8486
+
+• Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, EL to
+
+=MAPQUEST=
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE"*
+ROADITOUR
+SWEEFETAKES
+0106
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR A
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+of2
+000
+Directions
+Distance
+LIp printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+.:
+03956-8495
+
+‹ Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to_
+_ Page 2 of 2
+63-1:
+of2
+505 $ Flagler Dr
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+012
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, road
+conditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest and its suppliers assume no
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp|
+03956-8496
+
+03956-8507
+
+Birth Certificate & Death Certificates Location, Palm Beach County Health Department
+
+MENU
+[Home]
+[About Us]
+[Health Centers]
+[Directory]
+[Health Services]
+[WIC Services]
+[Environmentall
+[Birth & Death
+Records]
+[Immunizations]
+[Education]
+[Forms]
+[Publications]
+[Medical Residency]
+[Be a Volunteer]
+[Press Release]
+[Contact Us]
+[What's New]
+PBCHD Organizational
+Chart (.pdf)
+OTHER LINKS
+Links
+....
+Search
+Contact us
+Hot Topics
+Terrorism &
+Health
+Smallpox.
+Community
+Health
+A.G. Hoiley.
+State Hospital
+Licensing
+Renewal
+Online
+Sunshine
+Disasters &
+Emergency Info
+Statewide
+Palm Roach County
+HEALTH
+DEPARTMENT
+ALES ALTA ANNUAL REPORYTOUR DRECTOR SEE INDENT CONTACTUSI
+Office of Vital
+Statistics
+(Birth & Death Certificate
+Requests)
+Palm Beach County Health
+Department
+Office of Vital Statistics
+1150 45th Street
+West Palm Beach, FL. 33407
+(561) 514-5320
+0f3
+= MAPON
+1300m:
+/4Bth St
+Foster Ro
+rospita
+Greenwood Ave
+52nd St
+50th St
+gth St
+Broadwi
+47th St
+46th St
+(44th St
+A3rd St
+42nd St
+41st Si
+40t6 St
+39th St
+138th St
+137th st
+§2002 ManQuestcam, In; Ø2002 Navication Technobales
+Driving Directions:
+Take I-95 to 45th
+Take the CR-702/45TH STREET
+Take the ramp toward US-1 E
+Merge onto 45TH ST/FL-702 E
+http://www.doh.state.fl.us/chdpalmbeach/vitals/birthdeathloc.html
+03956-8510
+
+Birth Certificate & Death Certificates Location, Palm Beach County Health Department
+
+Official •
+Records.
+People First
+Jobs
+IRST!
+Florida's health
+MyFlorida.com
+141 Get Acrobat
+Adobe
+Reader
+| Home 1 About Us | Heaith Centers | Office Locations | Health Services | WIC Services | Environmental I
+I Birth & Death | Immuntzations | Education | Statistics I Be a Volunteer
+| Search Telephone Directory | Publications I Forms | Press Releases | What's New | Contact Us 1
+Click for Health Department Publications Available Online!!
+wwww.lFlorda.com
+FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
+HEALTH
+HEALTH DENITIENT
+http://www.pbchd.com/
+http://www.doh.stale.fl.us/
+MEDİCALLYNEEDY
+CHARTS
+PEOPLE
+(FloridaHealthStat
+"Where Fionis dealt Data Rexides"
+Fitrida Kidfare
+Child hoalth insurance you can afford!
+VITA
+HEALTH
+The Adobe Acrobat Reader software is available for nearly any operating
+system, and is a free download from Adobe's website
+http://www.doh.state.fl.us/chdpalmbeach/vitals/birthdeathloc.html
+03956-8511
+
+Birth Certificate & Death Certificates Location, Palm Beach County Health Department
+TATGet Acrobard
+"Adobe
+Reader
+discalpyrity 198-206 Pain Beach County Hear Department, aling reme ebmaster
+P.O. Box 29 . West Palm Beach, FL 33402 . (561) 840-4500
+Last Updated: Tuesday, April 04, 2006 12:16:31 PM
+
+00G
+!!..
+03956-8512
+http://www.doh.state.fl.us/chdpalmbeach/vitals/birthdeathloc.html
+
+31E-MM: 108062-1A124
+Field Otice Acquiring Bridence MM, PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _
+Date Receiyed
+VArIOUS
+From
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+-2
+2
+By
+To Be Returned LJ Yes •
+DINO
+Receipt Given
+• Yes
+ENO
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+D-NO
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+Title:
+Reference:
+Description: . L Original notes re interview of
+Bicartonical File on
+DoB-
+and. My Space in Formitions
+03956-8515
+
+Cantall
+b6 - 31
+4b7C
+-1.
+03956-8516
+
+At the
+03956-8517
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+Sorry! When printing directly from the browser your map may be incorrectly cropped. To print the
+entire map, try clicking the "Printer-Friendly" link at the top of your results page.
+- MAPQUEST.
+START.
+.. Page 1 of2 •
+b6 - 3|
+...
+Maneuvers
+Distance
+Pas
+40°
+:..'
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp?go)
+03956-8520
+3/16/2007
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+Sorry! When printing directly from the browser your map may be incorrectly cropped. To print the
+ntire map, try clicking the "Printer-Friendly" link at the top of your results page
+
+070 -3
+1b3 -1
+All rights reseryed. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, road conditions or
+route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest and its suppliers assume no responsibility for any
+loss or delay resulting from such use.
+i
+=
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp?
+Hion
+у іст
+03956-8521
+3/16/2007
+
+_Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+=MAPQUEST.=
+
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE"•
+ROADITOUR
+EWEEPETAKEE
+66 -3
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIF FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+Lip Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.ad/
+03956-8534
+
+_ Driving Directions from SOS S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+.. Page 2 of 2
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+Endi
+All rights reserved. Use Subiect to License/Copyright
+03956-8535
+
+
+MySpace.com | Home
+The Web
+MySpace (
+Search
+Help | SignUp
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+This profile is set to private. This user must
+add you as a friend to see his/her profile.
+PALM BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT
+www.palmbeachpolice.com
+Contacting
+M Send Message
+8B Asid to Friends
+d instant Message
+In any Emergency Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+• Non-Emergency (561) 838-5454 TIPS Line (561) 835-4738
+Et Forwardito Friend
+E Add to Favorites
+3) Black User
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=l
+03956-8541
+
+
+Cy Alid to Groups
+If Rank User
+About | FAQ | Terms! Privacy | Safety. Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Inappropriate Content | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+:.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8542
+
+FD-340 (Rev, 4-1I-03)
+File Number -
+31E_MM: 108062 1A125
+Fide olice Aquiting Evidence MM | PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document __
+Date Received -
+VArIoUS
+From
+-Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and Steic)
+By
+SA
+To Be Returned
+• Yes.
+ENo
+Receipt Given
+• Yes
+ENo
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+E-No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+•ÑO
+-2
+-2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+description
+original note to interview ot
+tile on
+_DOB-.
+and Myspace Informatron..
+1
+03956-8543
+
+CURRENT
+MYSPACE ACCOUNT
+03956-8544
+
+MySpat
+Myspace Lay
+
+60820500L20438902(D€
+MySpace
+(Search
+povered Google'
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Filin | Mail | Biog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy 1
+Classifieds
+63 - 1'
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8545
+
+Page 2 ot 34
+§ online Now!
+Last Login: 5/31/2007
+View My: Pies | Videos
+(IL. Prand Ur Hand
+....
+tadd+
++view+
+Interests
+General
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-8546
+
+
+66 - 31
+- 1 i
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+03956-8547
+
+
+Music
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-8548
+
+i
+
+63 -1
+Movies
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8549
+
+
+63 -1
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8550
+
+
+Television
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?.fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+03956-8551
+
+
+Books
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8552
+
+
+Heroes
+b6 - 3,-5.
+b7C -3, -5
+Details
+Status:
+Orientation:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8554
+
+
+Hometown:
+Zodiac Sign:
+Children:
+Education:
+b7c -3
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8555
+
+www.myspace.com_
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-8556
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8557
+
+
+b6 -3.
+b70 - 3
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8558
+
+
+http:#/profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8559
+
+
+b6 - 3.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-8560
+
+
+b7c -3
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-|
+03956-8561
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8562
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8563
+
+
+b6 -3!
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=/
+03956-8564
+
+
+66 - 3|
+03 - 1
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8565
+
+
+b3 - 1!
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-8566
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8567
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&.friendid-
+03956-8568
+
+
+b6-3!
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+03956-8569
+
+
+66 - 3:
+67C -3
+b3 - 1.
+1
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=/
+03956-8570
+
+
+63 - 11
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-8571
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8572
+
+
+66 - 31
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8573
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8574
+
+
+66-3.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8575
+
+
+66-3}
+63-1,
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&.friendid=
+03956-8576
+
+
+66 - 3:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+03956-8577
+
+www.myspace.com_
+
+b6 -3 :
+About| FAQI Terms| Privacy| Safety Tips| Contact MySpace | Report Abuse | Promote! | Adverlise | MySpace International
+...."
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-8578
+
+
+Creation tondilars
+Is per Minute?
+MySpace | Peopie | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video I Events *
+TRY MONTH FREEL
+Vonage
+Search |
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to Albums
+#photos
+AlL photos
+b6 - 3,-5
+b7C - 3,-5
+Listing 1-20 of 82
+12345
+of
+5
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+Next >
+» Post A comment
+» E-Mail to a Frienc
+› Report This Imag
+» Post A Comment
+E-Mail to a Frien
+Report This Ima
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID=
+&albumId-0
+03956-8579
+
+
+4 Comments)
+2 Comments)
+• Post A Commen
+• E-Mail to a Frient
+4 Comments)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+2 Comments)
+b6 - 3,-5
+b70 - 3,-5
+* Pail to a Friend
+2 Comments)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+0 Comments)
+* E-Mail to a Friend
+1 Comments)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+I Comments)
+› Post A Comment
+› E-Mail to a Frien
+» POST A CommEnT
+E-Mail to a Frien
+Report This Imac
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID-
+]salbumId-0
+03956-8580
+
+2 Comments)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+• Comments)
+2 Comment(s)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+2 Comments)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+0 Comments)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+1 Comments)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID=
+
+!
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+1 Comments)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+03956-8581
+
+
+0 Comment (s)
+2 Comments)
+2 Comment(s)
+0 Comments)
+Listing 1-20 of 82
+12345
+of 5
+Next ›
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy. | Safety. Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved, (
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID=
+Salbumld=0
+03956-8587
+D7C -3
+b3 -1/
+
+
+MySpace.com | Help | Signout
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events P
+Search
+Home! Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+#photos
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to Albums
+All
+Photos
+b6 5
+b70 - 3,-5
+Listing 21-40 of 82
+12345 of 5
+TMATSFONTERE
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+‹ Previous | Next ›
+0 Comments)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+2 Comments)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+1 Comments)
+» Post A'Comment
+› E-Mail to a Friend
+03956-8583
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/Modules/ViewMorePics/Pages/ViewMorePics.aspx?%3ffuseaction=user.viewPicture&friend... 5/31/2007
+
+
+b6 -3,-5)
+b70 -3,-5
+» Post A Comment
+› E-Mail to a Friend
+0 Comment (s)
+• Posti coa Fiend
+• Posti coa mien
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+0 Comment (s)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+!
+03956-8584
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/Modules/ViewMorePics/Pages/ViewMorePics.aspx?%3ffuseaction=user.viewPicture&friend.. 5/31/2007
+
+
+bTC - 3,-5
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+2 Comment (s)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+→ Pesai co a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+Listing 21-40 of 82
+1 2 3 4 5
+of 5
+‹ Previous | Next >
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privack | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+03956-8585
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/Modules/ViewMorePics/Pages/ViewMorePics.aspx?%3ffuseaction=user.viewPicture&.friend... 5/31/2007
+
+
+03956-8586
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/Modules/ViewMorePics/Pages/ViewMorePics.aspx?%3ffuseaction=user.viewPicture&friend..
+
+
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events *
+Search |
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to Albums
+# photos
+All
+Photos
+b6 - 3,-5
+b70 -3,-5
+Listing 41-60 of 82
+12 3 45 of 5
+TNASHORTAETE
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+‹ Previous | Next ›
+• Post A Comment
+• E-Mail to a Frien
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+0 Comments)
+Post A Commen
+E-Mail to a Frien
+2 Comment (s)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+0 Comments)
+03956-85871
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/Modules/ViewMorePics/Pages/View/MorePics.aspx?%3ffuseaction=user.viewPicture&friend... 5131/2007
+
+
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+2 Comment(s)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+› Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+→ Repor toi image
+03956-8588
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/Modules/ViewMorePics/Pages/ViewMorePics.aspx?%3ffuseaction=user.viewPicture&friend.. 5/31/2007
+
+
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+0 Comment (s)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+0 Comment (s)
+» Post A Comment
+* Report tris mange
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+• Comment(s)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+03956-8589
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/Modules/ViewMorePics/Pages/ViewMorePics.aspx?%3ffuseaction=user.viewPicture&friend... 5/31/2007
+
+
+Listing 41-60 of 82
+1 2 3
+4 5
+of 5
+‹ Previous | Next ›
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promotel | Advertise | MySpace International
+03956-8590
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/Modules/ViewMorePics/Pages/ViewMorePics.aspx?%3ffuseaction=ziser.viewPicture&friend.. 5/31/2007
+
+
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events P
+Search (
+Googke
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Back to Profile
+Back to Albums
+# photos
+All
+Photos
+b70 -3,-5
+Listing 61-80 of 82
+1 2 3 4 5 Of 5
+TILNDKFONDENE
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+‹ Previous | Next ›
+› Post A Comment
+› E-Mail to a Frienc
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+• Post A Commen
+• E-Mail to a Frien
+2 Comment(s)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+03956-8591
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/Modules/ViewMorePics/Pages/ViewMorePics.aspx?%3ffuseaction=user.viewPicture&friend.. 5/31/2007
+
+
+› Post A Comment
+• E-Mail to a Friend
+0 Comment (s)
+› Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+3 Comment(s)
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+»E-Mail to a Friend
+03956-8592
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/Modules/ViewMorePics/Pages/ViewMorePics.aspx?%3ffuseaction=user.viewPicture&friend... 5/31/2007
+
+
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+E-Mail to a Frien
+Report This Imag
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+0 Comment (s)
+> Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+> Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+Listing 61-80 of 82
+1 2 3 4 5 of 5
+‹ Previous | Next >
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy I Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+03956-8593
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/Modules/ViewMorePics/Pages/ViewMorePics.aspx?%3ffuseaction=user.viewPicture&friend... 5/31/2007
+
+
+03956-8594
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/Modules/ViewMorePics/Pages/ViewMorePics.aspx?%3ffuseaction=user.viewPicture&friend.. 5/31/2007
+
+
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events *
+Search
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to Albums
+# photos
+All
+Photos
+b7C -3, -5
+Listing 81-82 of 82
+1 2 34
+5
+of
+5
+TEAEFONMERE
+CUŞTOMIZE YEUR PHOTOS
+‹ Previous
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+» Post A Comment
+» E-Mail to a Friend
+03956-8595
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/Modules/ViewMorePics/Pages/ViewMorePics.aspx?%3ffuseaction=user.viewPicture&friend.. 5/31/2007
+
+
+Listing 81-82 of 82
+1 Z 3 4 5 of 5
+‹ Previous
+About | FAQ| Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+03956-8596
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/Modules/ViewMorePics/Pages/ViewMorePics.aspx?%3ffuseaction=user.viewPicture&friend... 5/31/2007
+
+66
+- 3
+03956-8597
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+=MAPQUEST E
+
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE*
+ROADITOUR
+006
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR A
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+!
+Directions
+Distance
+106
+KipPrinter-friendly page sponsored by HP
+03956-8613
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+_.. Page 2 of2
+b6 -3,
+b3 -1!
+(AK)
+o12
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+Endi
+01.2
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These direct on are sorry or eyes resus is is made or arsen aven a to the contes assume no
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+03956-8614
+
+1/31/2005
+56 - 3,-5
+-3,-5
+-b3
+-1~
+A friend
+do you went to nole 20000
+03956-8617
+
+Gare him
+766 -3
+-b3
+- 3
+--- 2.
+03956-8618
+
+-- -.
+= Saturday
+.....
+......-
+→• •
+=--
+- ..
+03956-8619
+._.. .
+
+- 3
+-b3
+FEsset he knew models
+Fat was the reason
+-→.....
+-. - sa.a
+..--
+_-__--
+%,T-
+...
+03956-8620
+----
+
+b6-1,-31
+-1, -3
+2 separt
+-63 - 1
+each. frip.
+tines
+It the
+-- - --
+03956-8621
+
+want: to so bik
+Wart de it again
+- 3
+03956-8622
+- tott a weet artis
+called.
+#Daame # to JE
+
+la Phone#t
+b70 - 3,-5
+Had fanous
+shmed back.
+to
+jE PriddAduce alont
+-What to eat-sald
+druh ots Inater
+-.
+03956-8623
+
+.-..
+Alug 200.r0
+56 pasa 20b00
+03956-8624
+
+Never affreete tinds
+b6 - 3.
+He asteed her to
+03956-8625
+
+He wild unt ne to
+56 - 3,-5
+- 3, -5
+--
+didit like
+03956-8626
+
+10/24/06
+b70 -3,-5
+cell
+(H)
+Twint tJE
+03956-8627
+givento
+Thate
+colt
+anynore.
+
+eave your
+Asked fir t
+couch
+pinet.grencouch.
+an de
+orange booke
+ped paper nest foit
+-b6 -1, - 3.
+b7C -1,- 3
+b3 - 1....
+---
+03956-8628
+
+31E. MM- 108062-14121
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence —
+MAi, PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _*
+Date Received
+VArIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+-2
+-2
+By
+SA
+To Be Returned O
+Yes •
+ENo
+Receipt Given
+• No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+DINO
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+CANO
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+•- Original notes re interview of
+Binacashiral File on
+DOR
+03956-8631
+
+-..
+b6 - 31
+03956-8632
+
+b7E -1
+ull:
+03956-8633
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, EL to
+
+b70 - 3
+=MAPQUEST=
+" THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE*•
+ROADITOUR
+#WEERSTAKES
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+http://www.mapquest.com/ditections/main.ad
+03956-8645
+
+* . Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL 4L
+Page 2 ot 2
+b7E -1
+of2
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+0!.
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, roa
+responsibility for any as or or lay resulting from such usumes all risk of use, MapQuest and it supplers assume no
+'i:
+03956-8646
+
+b70-3
+03956-8647
+
+FD-125 (Rev. 4-1-93)
+• Birth O Credit
+* Criminal
+• Death
+To
+ISS
+Retur to
+SA
+Name and alases otsubject, applicant, or emproyee, an spouse
+Date
+06/08/2007
+• INS • Mariage* • Motor Vehicle 'D Other
+Buded
+BIE-MM-10806Z
+16 - 2,-3
+b70 -2,-3
+Address
+Residence
+Business
+Former
+* Date and place of mariage
+(if applicable)
+Race
+W
+Birth date
+Female
+• Male
+Age
+Height
+Birthplace
+Fingerprint classification
+Weight
+Hair
+Eyes
+Criminal specialty
+Social Security Number
+Divers License Number
+• D/L Photo • Other
+Specific information desired
+Results of check
+NCIC / Mapquest/
+.6112O2
+03956-8650
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+56 -3
+670-3
+- MAPQUEST.=
+Rethinkin
+Humana rethought
+an industry and
+found a better way.
+Shouldn't you
+rethink Húmana?
+End:
+Notes:
+Only text visible within note field will print.
+HUMANA.
+Find out more
+Humana.com/rethinkit.….
+GIC-22642
+-indicsal hewith
+•Dental and Lte
+Directions
+Distance
+03956-8655
+.. 6/13/2007
+
+Driving Directions from SOS S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to_
+
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+hese directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their
+ontent, road conditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQues
+and its suppliers assume no responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+03956-8656
+
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+Serial # of Originating Document.*
+Date Received
+From
+3IS. MM: 10806214127
+- MM PBERA
+(Name of Contributor/Interviesvee)
+(Address)
+mand Sinte
+b6 - 2
+b7C -2
+By
+To Be Returned D Yes.
+ENO
+Receipt Given • Yes
+ENo
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+I-NO
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+•I-No
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+• Original notes re interview of
+Bearashiaul File an
+_DOR
+and Myspace inforMattons
+03956-86654
+
+03956-8666
+
+03956-8667
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL tol
+
+=MAPQUESTE
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE*
+ROADITOUR
+SWERPETARES
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR A
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+o12
+Directions
+Distance
+Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+':
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp1
+03956-8680
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+Page 2 of2
+63 -1
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+AlL rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+constions of route usabity or expertiousness: user asuises al risk of use. Map quest to the supies assume no
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.a
+03956-8681
+
+. * from:
+- Google Maps
+
+Web images Video News Maps Gmail more Y
+Map data ©2007 NAVTEQ™
+http://maps.google.com/maps?f=d&hl-endsaddr-
+03956-8682
+5/17/2007
+
+from:
+- Google Maps
+Page 2 of2
+These directions are for planning purposes only. You may find that
+construction projects, traffic, or other events may cause road conditions to
+differ from the map results.
+Map data ©2007 NAVTEQ ™
+http://maps.google.com/maps?f=d&hl=en&saddr=
+03956-8683
+.... 5/17/2007
+
+• ' from/
+- Google Maps
+
+Web Images
+Video News Maps Gmail more y
+--m__-
+b6-3
+b70 - 3
+http://maps.google.com/maps?um=1&tab=w1&hl=en&q
+S93956-8684
+
+from:
+-Google Maps
+
+66 -3
+Web Images Video News Maps Gmail more y
+http://maps.google.com/maps?um=1&tab=Wl&hl=en&q
+)3956-868
+/17/200
+
+
+MySpace.com | Home
+The Web
+MySpace O
+Search
+Help | SignUp
+b70 - 3
+Shoot The Pop Star and
+TO BONUS RINGTONES!
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+This profile is set to private. This user must
+add you as a friend to see his/her profile.
+PALM BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT
+www.palmbeachpolice.com
+Contacting|
+A Send Message
+E2 Add to Friends
+i Instant Message
+Ee Forvard to Friend
+* Add to Favorites
+83 Block User
+In any Emergency Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+Non-Emergency (561) 838-5454 TIPS Line (561) 835-4738
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-8692
+
+
+Ep Addito Group
+i Rank User
+About | FAQ| Ierms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Inappropriate Content | Promote! | Advertise | MYSpace International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+....
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-8693
+
+MYSPACE
+CURRENT : PRiVATE
+03956-8694
+
+
+MySpace
+(search me Google!
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+This profile is set to private. This user must
+add you as a friend to see his/her profile.
+=
+•.
+Contacting
+& Send Message
++8 Add to Friends
+g° Instant Message
++98 Add to Group
+Est Forsard to Friend
+EX Add to Favorites
+Block User
+*8 Rank User
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Abuse | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&.friendID#
+03956-8695
+
+FD-340 (Rcv, 4-11-03)
+iieNumber_31E-MM-108062-14128
+Pied Office Acquiring Evidenee_ MM., PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document —
+Date Received
+VARIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(iry and Stata)
+b6 -2
+-2
+By
+SA
+To Be Returied I Yes.
+ENO
+Receipt Given • Yes
+[7N5
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+•No-
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+[-No
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description: Original notes re interview of
+incashical tile en
+DOR
+56
+- 3
+- 3
+_63 - 1
+03956-8696
+
+36 - 3
+1670-3
+03956-8697
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL toL
+
+06)6
+=MAPQUESTE
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE"
+ROADITOUR
+SWEERSTAKEG
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+of 2
+Directions
+Distance
+01 2
+Lip
+Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+03956-8708
+
+Driving Directions from
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main2
+End:
+
+b6 - 3!
+.. •
+03956-8709
+
+570-3
+03956-8710
+
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+21E-MM- 1080621A129
+MM PBERA
+Serial # of Originating Document.
+Date Received
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+56 - 2
+b7C - 2
+By
+A
+To Be Retured
+Yes
+ENo
+Receipt Given • Yes
+D-NO
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+•No-
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+Title:
+7
+Reference:
+(Communication Enciosing Matcrial)
+Description:
+•_ Original notes re interview of
+Biocrashical file on
+DOB
+03956-8712
+
+56 - 3|
+163-1
+03956-8713
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+Page 1 of2
+=MAPQUEST.:
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE*
+ROADITOUR
+SWEEPSTANES
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+6201)
+of?
+Directions
+Distance
+vi?
+Lap Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+...
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adj
+03956-8729
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL te
+
+•*
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+...
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+htp://www.mapquest.com/dirtections/main.ad
+03956-8730
+
+File Number _
+31E-MM: 108062-114130
+Field Office Acquiring Bvidence _ MM PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _.-.
+Date Received _
+VArIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By
+SA
+To Be Returmed • Yes •
+Receipt Given • Yes
+17-No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+•No
+bE
+-2
+-2
+Title:
++ -
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+• Original notes re interview of
+Broacennical
+File on
+DOB-
+03956-87319
+
+63 - 1|
+03956-8732|
+
+10/2-
+telephiad
+06 - 3
+b7c -3
+b3 -1:
+lift a cand
+03956-8735
+
+- Google Search
+
+Web Images Video News Maps Gmail more +
+Google
+Web
+Sign in
+b70 - 3
+(Search)
+Advanced Search
+Preferences
+Map
+No standard web pages containing all your search terms were found.
+Your search -
+- did not match any documents.
+Suggestions:
+• Make sure all words are spelled correctly.
+• Try different keywords.
+• Try more general keywords.
+©2007 Google - Google Home - Advertising Programs - Business Solutions - About Google
+http://www.google.com/search?hi=en&q=
+03956-8737
+7/11/2007
+
+31E. MM. 108062-14131
+field Office Acquiring Evidence MM., PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _
+Date Received -
+VArIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+66 -2
+b7C -2
+By
+To Be Retured • *
+Yes.
+• NO
+Receipt Given
+• Yes
+•No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+•No-
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+• No
+Title:
+Reference:
+completion Ending any
+Description:
+DOR:
+666 - 3
+·b7C -3
+463 - 1
+03956-8841
+
+- 3
+03956-8842
+
+FD-125 (Rev. 4-1-93)
+so 1/10/2007
+A Motor Vehicle
+I Birth
+D Credit a Criminal
+p Death
+To
+• NS & Marriage*
+Buded
+31E-MM-108062
+Name and aliases of subiect, applicant, or emplovee, and spouse
+56 - 2, - 3
+b70 - 2,-3
+Address
+Residence
+Business
+Former
+* Date and place of marriage
+(ifapplicable)
+Race
+W
+Birth date
+Sex
+• Female
+• Male
+Arrest Number
+Social Security Number
+Age
+Height
+Birthplace
+Fingerprint classification
+Weight
+Hair
+Eyes
+b6-2,-3
+b7C - 2,-3
+Criminal specialty
+Divers License Number
+• D/L Photo • Other
+Specific information desired
+Results of check
+Complete chicks -CH/Death/marriage/ MatorVehicle
+Tals
+so much
+03956-8845
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/9846272ae8efcd78fe52161862fa9f468cbc4479acf404b7a868461f8cd71c08.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/9846272ae8efcd78fe52161862fa9f468cbc4479acf404b7a868461f8cd71c08.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a115e4e66256ab935c62b053fff78bd19a9703f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/9846272ae8efcd78fe52161862fa9f468cbc4479acf404b7a868461f8cd71c08.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -12086,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "9846272ae8efcd78fe52161862fa9f468cbc4479acf404b7a868461f8cd71c08",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 93,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.page-footer\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "381c5ae0345369e7829321c6895be84a3fc9e2871d25d8feecd2b7d7f1142a50",
+  "output_sha256": "7b4a4d4f0cb83b3814df69202125c0064612d0fd619fb7dfca316f78b70bb8b1",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ac17b569e488e60b3a83fa96851591447c4232796bb961e291fb7ddd0db3f5d8.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ac17b569e488e60b3a83fa96851591447c4232796bb961e291fb7ddd0db3f5d8.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f1ec28434f35ddbdc6b65c2f249f21a3db16935a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ac17b569e488e60b3a83fa96851591447c4232796bb961e291fb7ddd0db3f5d8.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1811 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+(D
+H
+LQ
+H
+- 1; b6
+b3
+63
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+163
+b3
+b 3
+b3
+b3
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+b6
+b6
+66
+66
+b6
+b6
+b
+6
+66 -
+b6 -
+1; b6 -
+- 1;
+b6
+1; b6
+b6
+1; b6 -
+b6 -
+1; b6
+_b6 -
+- 1;
+66 -
+- 1;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+- 5;
+-.
+
+Page 596 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 597 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 598 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 599 ~
+b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 600 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 601
+= b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 602 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 603 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,
+-5; b7C
+Page 604 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 605 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 606 ~
+b3
+- 1; 66
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 607 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 608 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 609 - b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 610 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 611 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 612 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+613
+b3
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+614
+~ b3
+b6
+Page
+615
+~ b3
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7c
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+Page
+616-
+b3
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+Page
+617
+b3
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+Page
+618 -b3
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7c
+Page
+619
+- b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+620
+b3
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+Page
+621-63
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+622 -
+b3
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+623 ~
+b3
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+624 - 63
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page
+625
+b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+626
+b3
+66
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+627
+b3
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+628
+b3
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+629
+b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+Page
+630
+b3
+Page
+631 -b3
+b7C
+66
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+Page
+632
+b3
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+Page
+633
+b3
+b
+6
+3,
+-5
+b7C
+Page
+634
+b3
+b6 -
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+Page
+635 -63
+b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+Page 636 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5;
+b7c
+Page
+637
+= b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+638 -63
+- 1;
+66- 3,-5;
+b7C -
+Page 639 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 640 - b3
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 641 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+642 = b3
+b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 643 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C
+Page 644 - b3
+1; b6
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+Page 645 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 646 - b3
+b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 647 ~ b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page 648 - b3
+66
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 649 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+............
+3,
+3,
+3,
+-5;
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+-.
+
+Page 650 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 651 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 652 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 653 ~
+b3
+b6 -
+3,
+-5; b7C
+Page 654 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 655 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 656 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 657
+• = b3
+1; b6
+3,
+-5; b7C
+Page 658 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,
+-5; b7C
+Page 659 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 660 ~ 63
+- 1; b6
+3,
+-5; b7C
+Page 661 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 662 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 663 - b3
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 664 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 665 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 666 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+667
+b3
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+668
+= b3
+b6
+Page
+669
+~ b3
+b6
+3,
+-5; b7C
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+Page
+670~63
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+Page 671 - b3
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+Page 672 - b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+673 -b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+674
+- b3
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+Page 675 ~ b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+676 - b3
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+677 ~
+b3
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+678
+- b3
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page
+679
+- b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+680
+~ b3
+66
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+681
+b3
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+682 ~ b3
+b6
+3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+683
+b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+Page
+684
+b3
+Page
+685
+b 3
+b7C
+66
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+Page
+686
+ru
+b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+b6
+3,
+-5;
+b7c
+Page
+687
+b3
+b
+6
+3,
+-5;
+b7C
+Page
+688
+b3
+b6 -
+3,
+-5; b7C
+Page
+689 - 63
+b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+Page 690 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+691
+~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+692 - b3
+- 1; 66 - 3,-5;
+b7C -
+Page 693 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+694 ~ b3
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+695 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+696 - b3
+b6 -
+3, -5;
+b7c
+Page
+697 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C
+Page 698
+- b3
+1; b6
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+Page
+699 - b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+700 ~ b3
+_b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+701 - b3
+b6
+3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+702 ~ 63
+66 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 703 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+- 3,-5; b7c
+3
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+............
+3,
+3,
+3,
+-5;
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+-.
+
+b3
+- b3
+b3
+ru
+~ b3
+~ b3
+b3
+~ b3
+b6 -
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6 -
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6 -
+b6
+b6
+b6 -
+b6
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3,
+3
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+Q
+Q
+Q
+Q
+Q
+Q
+Q
+Q
+Q
+Q
+Q
+Q
+Q
+Q
+Q
+Q
+Q
+Q
+I III
+H
+"" "
+
+Deleted Page (s)
+No Duplication Fee X
+For this Page
+
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+H
+H
+LQ
+b3
+63
+63
+b3
+b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+1b 3
+(D
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+-5;
+- 5;
+3,
+3,
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+b6
+b6
+66
+66
+b6
+b6
+b
+6
+b6-
+b6 -
+b6 -
+b6
+b6 -
+66
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+-5, -7; b7D - 2:
+b7D - 2;
+- 5;
+b7D - 2;
+- 5;
+b7D -
+- 5;
+b7D - 2;
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+- 5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+-5; b7D - 2;
+3;
+3,
+3,
+b7D
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+3,
+3
+3,
+3,
+3,
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+
+b3
+W
+W0
+b3
+b3
+~ b3
+b3
+163
+63
+b3
+b3
+63
+- b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+163
+63
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+ru
+b3
+b
+b3
+b6 -
+3,
++ %
+b6
+3,
+3,
+3
+3
+=.
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+b6
+b
+6
+b6
+b6 -
+b6 -
+b6
+b6 -
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3,
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+b7B
+3
+3
+b7B
+b7c
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+3
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+-5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+-5;
+-5;
+-5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+5;
+5;
+-5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+•
+•
+b7D
+- 2;
+
+Page 677 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 678 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 679 - b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page 680 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5
+Page 681 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page 682 ~ b6
+- 1, -5; b7C
+- 1,-5
+Page 683 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page 684 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b70 - 1,-5
+Page 685 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page 686 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5
+Page 687
+~66-1,-5;
+b70 - 1,-5
+Page 688 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page 689
+" b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5
+Page 690 - b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page 691 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page 692 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page 693 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+694
+b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+695 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7c
+- 1,-5
+Page
+696
+- b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+697 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+698
+~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+699
+- 1,-5;
+b7c
+1,-5
+Page
+700
+= b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+701
+- b6
+- 1,-5;
+b 7C
+- 5
+Page
+702~66 - 1,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+703
+a b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+704 ~ b6
+- 1, -5;
+b7C
+..
+H
+H
+H
+1,
+5
+5
+- 5
+Page
+705
+- b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7c
+1,- 5
+Page
+706
+~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,
+- 5
+Page
+707
+- b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,
+- 5
+Page
+708
+= b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7c
+1,-5
+Page
+709 - b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5
+Page
+710
+~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5
+Page
+711 ~ 66
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+712 - b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+713
+~ b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+714 ~ 66
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+715 - 66
+- 1,-5;
+b7C-
+1,-5;
+Page
+716~66 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+717 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page
+718 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page
+719 ~ 66 - 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5;
+Page
+720~66-1,-5;
+b70 -
+1,
+- 5
+Page 721 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7c
+1,
+- 5
+Page 722 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page
+723 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+724~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+725
+" b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1, -5;
+Page
+726 - b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7c
+1,-5;
+Page
+727 = b6
+1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page 728 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page
+729 ~ 66
+- 1,-5;
+b7c
+1,-5;
+Page 730 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+| II
+Z;
+
+Page 731 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 732 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 733 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5
+Page 734 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5
+Page 735 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page
+736 ~ b6
+- 1, -5; b7C
+- 1,-5
+Page 737 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5
+Page 738
+~66 - 1,-5;
+b70 -
+1,-5
+Page 739 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page
+740 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5
+Page
+741 ~ 66 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5
+Page 742 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b70 - 1,-5
+Page
+743 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5
+Page 744 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page 745 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page 746 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page 747 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+748
+b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+749
+~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7c
+1,-5
+Page
+750
+~ 66
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+751 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+752
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+..
+Page
+753
+= b6
+1,-5;
+b7c
+1,-5
+Page
+754
+- b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+755
+= b6
+- 1,-5;
+b 7C
+1,
+- 5
+Page
+756 - 66
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+757
+~ b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+758
+b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+H
+H
+H
+5
+5
+Page
+759
+b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,- 5
+Page
+760
+106
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,
+- 5
+Page
+761
+~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b 7C
+5
+Page
+762
+b6
+1,-5;
+b7c
+1,
+- 5
+Page
+763
+=b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+764
+~ 66
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+765
+66
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+766 - b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+767
+b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+768
+- b6
+1,-5;
+b7c
+1,-5;
+Page 769 - b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page
+770 ~ 66-1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+771 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page
+772 ~ b6 - 1, -5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page 773 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 774 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5
+Page 775 ~ b6 - 1, -5;
+b7C -
+1,
+-5
+Page 776 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page 777 ~ b6 - 1, -5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+778 - b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+779 - b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page 780 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7c
+1,-5;
+Page 781 ~ b6
+1, -5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page 782 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page 783 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+670 -
+1,-5;
+Page 784 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+| II
+Z;
+
+Page 785 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 786 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D
+Page 787 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 788 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D -
+Page 789 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 790 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 791 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 792 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 793 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 794 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 795 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 796 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 797 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+- 1; b7D
+Page 798 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 799 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 800 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+Page 801 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D -
+Page 802 - b6
+1; b7C
+b7D
+2
+Page 803 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C
+b7D
+Page 804 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+b7D
+N
+;
+Page 805 ~ b6
+1; b7C
+b7D
+Page 806 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C -
+b7D
+Page 807 ~ b6 - 1; b7C
+-1;
+b7D
+N
+;
+Page 808 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C
+- 1,-5;
+b7D
+Page 809 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C|
+1,-5;
+b7D
+Page 810 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C
+- 1,-5;
+b7D
+Page 811 - b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+b7D
+Page 812 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page 813 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7c
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page 814 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C
+- 1,-5
+b7D
+Page 815 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+b7D
+Page 816 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C -
+1, -5;
+b7D
+Z;
+Page 817 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1;
+b7D
+Page 818 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+b7D -
+Page 819 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7c
+1,-5
+67D
+Page 820 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page 821 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C
+1,-5;
+b7D
+Page 822 ~ b6
+1,-5; b7C
+1,-5;
+b7D
+Page 823 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+• 1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 824 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 825 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 826 - b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 827 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 828 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+67D - 2;
+Page 829 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7c -
+1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 830 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 831 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5;
+b7D -
+Page 832 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2:
+Page 833 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page 834 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page 835 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+b7D -
+Page 836 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+b7D
+Page 837 ~ 66 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+67D -
+Page 838 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2:
+
+Page 839 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D
+Page 840 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D
+Page 841 - b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+b7D
+Page 842 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5
+b7D
+Page 843 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+b7D
+I II
+Z;
+Page 844 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5
+b7D
+Page 845 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+b7D
+Page 846 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page 847 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+b7D
+Page 848 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page 849 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5
+b7D
+Page 850 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+b7D
+Page 851 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5
+b7D
+Page 852 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+b7D
+Page 853 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+b7D
+Page 854 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+b7D
+Page 855 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D
+Page 856
+= b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page 857 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page
+858
+~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page
+859 ~b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page
+860
+~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+861 - b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+862
+= b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+Page
+863
+- b6
+- 1,-5;
+b 7C
+Page
+864 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+..
+H
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+1,
+- 5
+b7D
+5
+b7D
+Page 865 - b6
+1, -5;
+b7C
+1,
+5
+b7D
+Page
+866 ~
+b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page
+867
+b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7c
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page
+868
+06
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page
+869
+~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page 870
+~ bб
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page 871 - b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5
+b7D
+Page
+872 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page
+873 ~66
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page 874 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page
+875
+= b6
+1,
+-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+b7D
+Page 876 ~ b6
+1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page 877 - b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 878 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b70 - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 879 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 880 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 881 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 882 ~ 66 - 1,-5;
+b7c -
+1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 883 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 884 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 885 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 886 - b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 887
+- b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 888 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 889 - b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 890 - b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+
+Deleted Page (s)
+No Duplication
+For this Page
+Fee X
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ac17b569e488e60b3a83fa96851591447c4232796bb961e291fb7ddd0db3f5d8.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ac17b569e488e60b3a83fa96851591447c4232796bb961e291fb7ddd0db3f5d8.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1a8f9471db648390780ba8b6402a2263ddac726a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ac17b569e488e60b3a83fa96851591447c4232796bb961e291fb7ddd0db3f5d8.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -1583,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "ac17b569e488e60b3a83fa96851591447c4232796bb961e291fb7ddd0db3f5d8",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "ef1171f7817355daea900159c81ba09e0a2edc2a72d760541544cd8d2e85947e",
+  "output_sha256": "9e713e2b2749cd2b958cd40ed9d4d1379c75a9aff6231fbb7490ec4b58355d51",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ade2a320b2d098cc99580807e219910ec4935f1d93408c17194dde12e5df30c1.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ade2a320b2d098cc99580807e219910ec4935f1d93408c17194dde12e5df30c1.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b24d4b37cc9456f3aebce806abc3293910c083d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ade2a320b2d098cc99580807e219910ec4935f1d93408c17194dde12e5df30c1.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2354 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 515
+Page 5 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 6 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 7 - b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 8 ~ b3 -
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 9 ~ b3 - 1;
+06 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 10 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 11
+~ b3 - 1; b6
+- 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 12 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 13 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 14 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 15 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page
+16
+= b3
+1
+;
+b6
+m
+-5; b7C
+- 3, -5;
+Page 17
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5; b7C
+- 3, -5;
+Page
+18
+- 63
+1;
+b6
+-5; b7C
+Page
+19
+~ b3
+1;
+06
+m
+-5; b7c
+Page
+20
+~ b3
+1;
+m
+, -5; b7C
+Page
+21
+~ b3
+1;
+Page
+22
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+, -5; b7C
+3, -5;
+, -5; b7C
+Page
+23
+b3
+1;
+-5; b7C
+Page
+24
+- 63
+1;
+Page
+25
+b3
+1;
+-5; b7C
+Page
+26
+b3
+1;
+Page
+27
+-63
+1;
+Page
+28
+~ b3
+1;
+Page
+29
+~ b3
+1;
+Page
+30
+1;
+Page
+31
+b3
+1;
+Page
+32
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+66
+66
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+, -5; b7C
+, -5; b7C
+m
+, -5; b7C
+m
+-5: b7C
+1-5; b7C
+- 5; b7c
+3, -5;
+, -5; b7C
+, -5; b7C
+Page
+33
+63
+1;
+m
+- 5; b7C
+Page
+34
+~ b3 -
+1;
+Page
+35
+b3
+1;
+Page
+36
+63
+b6
+b6
+06
+Page
+37
+63
+, -5; b7C
+- 5; b7C
+3, -5;
+- 5; b7C
+, -5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page
+38~
+b3
+Page 39
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+m
+1-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+1;
+b6
+, -5; b7C
+Page
+40 ~ b3 - 1;
+b6
+3
+, -5; b7C
+- 3, -5;
+Page 41
+-63 - 1:06-
+3
+Page
+42
+63
+, -5; b7C
+- 3,-5;
+Page 43
+b3
+1;
+66
+m
+-5; b7C
+1;
+b6
+m
+Page
+44
+~ b3
+, -5; b7C
+3, -5;
+1;
+b6
+, -5; b7c
+Page
+45
+b3
+- 1;
+b6
+, -5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 46
+= b3
+1;
+66
+, -5; b7C
+- 3,-5;
+Page 47
+b3
+1;
+, -5; b7C
+- 3,-5;
+Page 48
+~ b3 - 1;
+b6
+- 5; b7C
+- 3, -5;
+Page 49
+~ b3 -
+Page 50
+- 63
+1;
+b6
+m
+, -5; b7C
+3, -5;
+1;
+b6 -
+, -5; b7C
+3, -5;
+Page 51 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+- 3,-5;
+Page 52 ~ b3
+- 1;
+
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+- 1;
+1;
+1:
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1
+;
+1
+1;
+1;
+1
+;
+1
+;
+1
+;
+1
+;
+1;
+1;
+1
+1;
+1;
+..
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1:
+3
+3
+3
+3
+- 5;
+
+H
+1; b6 -
+1;
+b6 -
+- 1; b6
+- 1; b6 -
+1; b6
+W
+- 1; b6 -
+1; b6 -
+- 1; b6
+W0
+- 1; b6 -
+~ b3
+- 1; b6
+~ b3
+1; b6 -
+- 1; b6 -
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b3
+~ b3
+- b3
+= b3
+b3
+ru
+b3
+~ b3
+~ b3
+~ b3
+~ b3
+~ b3
+~ b3
+b3
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+b6
+= b3
+- b3
+b3
+b6
+b
+6
+b6 -
+1;
+b6 -
+1; b6 -
+~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+1; b6
+WJ
+1;
+b6
+1; b6 -
+1;
+b6 -
+- 1; b6 -
+- b3
+1; b6
+1; b6 -
+1;
+b6
+- 1; b6 -
+- 1;
+- 5;
+-5;
+-5;
+3
+3
+3
+3
+............
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+
+Page 161 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 162 ~ 63 - 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 163 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 164 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 165 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 166
+~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 167 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 -
+3, -5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 168
+~ b3
+1; b6
+-5; b7C -
+Page 169 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 170 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page 171 ~ 63
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+1-5;
+Page 172 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 173
+- b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 174 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 175 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 176 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 177 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page
+178
+b3
+1i
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page 179 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+180
+= b3
+1;
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+181 ~ b3
+1;
+Page
+182
+~ b3
+1;
+Page
+183
+= b3
+1;
+Page 184 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+-5:
+b7C
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3, -5;
+3, -5;
+b7c
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+185
+- b3
+1;
+- 5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page 186 ~ b3
+1;
+Page
+187
+~ b3
+1;
+Page
+188 ~
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b7c
+- 5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+189 - 63
+1;
+3, -5;
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+190
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+191 ~ 63
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+192
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7c
+-5;
+Page
+193
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+194
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+195
+b3
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page 196 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+197
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5; b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+198
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+199
+- b3
+1;
+b6 -
+- 5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+200 ~ 63-
+1;
+66 - 3,-5;
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 201 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5;
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+202
+= b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page 203 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 204 ~ b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 206 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3, -5;
+Page 207 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+208 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+209 ~b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C
+1 - 5;
+Page
+210 - b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page
+211 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+212 ~ b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+213 - b3
+1;
+66-
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page
+214~63
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 215 - b3
+- 1;
+b6 - 3, -5; b7C - 3,-5;
+
+Page 216 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 217 ~ 63 - 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+218
+- b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+219 - b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 220 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 221 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 222 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 -
+3, -5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 223
+• = b3
+1; b6
+-5; b7C -
+Page 224 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 225 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page
+226-63
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+1-5;
+Page 227 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+228 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 229 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 230 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 231 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 232 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page
+233
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+234
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+3, - 5;
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page
+235
+~ 63
+1;
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+236~
+1;
+Page
+237
+b3
+1;
+Page
+238
+= b3
+1;
+Page
+239
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+3,- 5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+b7c
+3, -5;
+3, -5;
+b7c
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+240
+b3
+1;
+b 7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+241 ~ b3
+1;
+Page 242 ~ b3
+1;
+Page
+243
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b7C
+- 5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+244
+- 63
+1;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+245
+- b3
+1;
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+246 ~ 63
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+247
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+248
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+249
+- b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+250
+b3
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+251 ~b3
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+252
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+253
+- 63
+1;
+b
+Page
+254
+b
+3
+1;
+6
+- 5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+b6 -
+- 5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+255~b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3,- 5;
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page
+256 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5;
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+257
+= b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page 258 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 - 3,-5;
+b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 259 ~ b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 260 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3, -5;
+Page 261 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+262 = b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3, -5;
+b7c
+Page 263 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C
+1 - 5;
+Page 264 - b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 265 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page 266 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+Page 267 ~ b3
+1;
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page 268 ~ b3
+- 1;
+66 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 269 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+- 3, -5; b7C - 3,-5;
+
+Page 270 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 271 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 272 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 273 - b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 274 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 275
+= b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 276 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 277
+• = b3
+- 1; b6
+-5; b7C -
+Page 278 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 279 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3
+,-5;
+Page 280 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page 281 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 282 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 283 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 284 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 285 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 286 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page
+287
+b3
+1i
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+288
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+-5;
+Page
+289
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+290 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+291~63
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+292 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page
+293 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+294
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page 295 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+-5;
+Page 296 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+297 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+298
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+299
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+300
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+301
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+302 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+303 ~b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+304 ~ 63
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+305 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+306
+ru
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5; b7C
+3
+-5;
+Page
+307
+b3
+1;
+b
+Page 308
+b3
+1;
+6
+-5; b7C
+- 5;
+b6 -
+-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+309 - 63
+1;
+b6 -
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page
+310 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+3
+-5;
+Page
+311 -b3
+- 1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+312 - b3
+- 1; 66 - 3,-5;
+b7C -
+Page
+313 ~ 63
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page
+314 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+315 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+316 -b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+317 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C
+, -5;
+Page
+318
+- b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page
+319 - b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page 320
+~ b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+b7c
+Page 321 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page 322 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 323 - b3
+- 1;
+
+Page 324 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 325 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+326-b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+327~
+b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 328 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 329 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 330 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 331 ~ b3
+1; b6
+-5; b7C -
+Page 332 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 333 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+,-5;
+Page 334 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page 335 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 336 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 337 - b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 338 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 339 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 340 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+341
+b3
+1i
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+342
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, - 5;
+b7c
+-5;
+Page
+343
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+344
+b3
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+345
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+346
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page
+347
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+348
+63
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+349 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+-5;
+Page
+350
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+351
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+352
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+353
+163
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+354
+= b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+355
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+356 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+357
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+358
+63
+1;
+66
+-5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+359
+~ b3
+b6
+3,- 5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+360
+b3
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+3
+-5;
+Page
+361
+b3
+1;
+b
+Page 362
+1;
+6
+-5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+b6 -
+-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+363 ~63
+1;
+b6 -
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page
+365 = b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+3
+-5;
+Page
+366 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+367 - 63
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 368 ~ b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page
+369 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+370 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+371 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+372 -b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C
+, -5;
+Page
+373
+-b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 374 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page 375 - b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+b7c
+Page 376 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page 377 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 378 - b3
+- 1;
+
+Page 379 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 380 ~ 63 - 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 381 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 382 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 383 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b70
+Page 384 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 385 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 386 ~ b3
+1; b6
+-5; b7C -
+Page 387 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 388 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 389 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 390 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 391 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 392 - b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 393 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 394 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 395 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page
+396
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+397 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page
+398
+~ b3
+1i
+b7c
+Page
+399~63
+1;
+3,- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+400
+- b3
+1;
+Page
+401 ~ b3
+1;
+Page
+402
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3, -5;
+b7c
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page
+403
+- b3
+1;
+- 5;
+b7C
+3
+Page 404 ~ b3
+1;
+Page
+405 ~ b3
+1;
+Page
+406 ~
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b7c
+b7C
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page
+407~63
+1;
+3, -5;
+b7c
+Page
+408
+~ b3
+- 1;
+Page
+409 ~ 63
+- 1;
+Page
+410
+~ b3
+1;
+Page 411 - b3
+1;
+Page
+412 ~ b3
+1;
+Page
+413 ~ b3
+1;
+Page 414 - b3
+1;
+Page
+415
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+66
+b6
+b6
+66
+66
+b6
+b6
+b7C
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+b7c
+b7c
+b7C
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5; b7C
+Page
+416 ~ 63
+1;
+- 5; b7C
+Page
+417
+1b 3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b70 -
+Page
+418 ~ b3 - 1; b6-
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+419 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+420
+= b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7c
+Page 421 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+422 ~ 63
+1; b6
+b7C -
+Page 423 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 424 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+425 - b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+b7c
+Page 426 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+427
+- b3
+- 1; b6
+b7C -
+Page 428 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 429 - b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+Page 430 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+b 7C
+Page 431 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+3, -5;
+1-5;
+-5;
+3
+, -5;
+3
+1-5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+-5;
+3, -5;
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+1 - 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+Page 432 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+
+Page 433 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 434 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 435 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 436 ~
+b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 437 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 438 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 439 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 440 ~ b3
+1; b6
+-5; b7C -
+Page 441 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 442 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 443 ~
+b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 444 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 445
+~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 446 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 447 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 448 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 449 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page
+450
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+3,- 5;
+b7C
+Page 451 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page
+452
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+Page
+453
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+454
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+455
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+Page
+456
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+457
+63
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+Page 458
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+Page
+459
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+460 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+461 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+Page
+462
+~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+463 ~63
+- 1;
+66
+b7C
+Page
+464
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7c
+Page 465 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+Page
+466 -63
+1;
+66
+b7C
+Page
+467
+63
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+Page 468 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+469
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page
+470
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page
+471 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+472 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+473 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+474 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page 475 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 476 ~ b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+Page 477 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 478 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 479 - b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+b7c
+Page 480
+-b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+481 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+b7C -
+Page 482 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 483 - b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+Page 484 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+b7C
+Page 485 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+1-5;
+-5;
+3
+,-5;
+3
+, -5;
+-5;
+-5;
+-5;
+3
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+-5;
+-5;
+3
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+3
+- 5;
+- 5;
+3
+-5;
+- 5;
+3, -5;
+- 5;
+3
+-5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+, -5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+- 5;
+Page 486 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+
+Page 487 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 488 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 489 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 490 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 491 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 492 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 493 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 -
+3, -5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 494 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 495 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 496 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page 497 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+1-5;
+Page 498 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 499
+~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 500 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 501 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 502 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 503 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 504 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 505 - b3
+- 1; b6
+- 3, -5; b7C -
+Page 506 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 507 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 508 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+509 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 510 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page
+511 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 512 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 513 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+514 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 515 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b70 -
+Page
+516
+~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5;
+b7C - 3,-5;
+Page
+517 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,- 5;
+Page
+518 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 519 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 520 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 521 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxX
+* Deleted Page (s)
+X
+No Duplication Fee X
+X
+For this Page
+X
+X
+xxXXXXXXxxxxxxxXXXxXxXXX
+
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062
+(20f6>
+1A Envelope
+SUBPOENA RESULTS FOR TELEPHONE #
+b6 -3
+b7C
+b3 -1
+31E-MM-108062-0659-7786
+
+296
+FD-340 (Rev, 4-11-03)
+File Number
+3IE.MM-108062-1A78
+Fied Office Acquiring Evidense MM /PIRCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+04/9/08
+From
+b6 - 3!
+b7c
+-3
+b3
+-13
+(sane or Cosmonotterviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+b6 - 2|
+670 - 2
+By
+To Be Returned • Yes
+Receipt Given Yes
+DANo
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
+D Yes
+* No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+# No
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+• Onginat notes re interview-of
+suspawa Result
+Di telephone #
+- 3
+b7C
+- 3
+b3
+-1
+03950-7787
+
+36f6
+FD-340 (Rev, 4-11-03)
+File Number
+3IE.MM-108062-1A18
+Field Ortice Acquiring Bvidence MM (PIBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+04/7/08
+From
+b6
+- 3
+b7C
+-3
+b3
+-1 !
+(Address)
+b6 - 2:
+b7C -2
+By
+To Be Retumned
+• Yes
+Receipt Given
+• Yes
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+No
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Connunication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+• Original notes te interview-of
+or telephone#
+b6
+b7C
+b3
+-3
+-3
+-1
+03958-7988
+
+!
+4д6..
+FD-340 (Rev. 411-03)
+File Number
+31E-MM-108062-1A18
+Field Office Acquiring Bridence MIM / PISCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Rereived
+04/1/08
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+b6 - 3
+b7C
+-3
+b3 -1
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+b6 - 2
+b7C -2
+By
+To Be Returned • Yes
+ENo
+Receipt Given
+L Yes
+ENNo
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminai Procedure
+• Yes
+ANo
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FT
+• Yes
+A No
+;
+...
+:
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+• Uniginal notes re interview-of
+Results
+of telephone#
+66 - 3
+b7C -3
+63 - 1
+03956-8147
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ade2a320b2d098cc99580807e219910ec4935f1d93408c17194dde12e5df30c1.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ade2a320b2d098cc99580807e219910ec4935f1d93408c17194dde12e5df30c1.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d870274711528c16857f918726f4c083cb2962b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ade2a320b2d098cc99580807e219910ec4935f1d93408c17194dde12e5df30c1.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -2364,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "ade2a320b2d098cc99580807e219910ec4935f1d93408c17194dde12e5df30c1",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "4b39b29d4658a15e0aa425898857dbd6ebb79e17a68a9850fca5b44820d2a99c",
+  "output_sha256": "cc51a7be1a4185a1e2d720a4a24cff101dc2a8d322cb551fbd341f93f1009fcf",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/b00b5e94214e3f9278a839cd8cbaf42860d732f2d1f580dda13de78845268d39.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/b00b5e94214e3f9278a839cd8cbaf42860d732f2d1f580dda13de78845268d39.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4e7644a8a51900f72a6863f0c44b7e01b28e0574
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/b00b5e94214e3f9278a839cd8cbaf42860d732f2d1f580dda13de78845268d39.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4073 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 283
+Page 6 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 10 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page 11 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page 14 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 15 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 16 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 17
+~ b3 - 1; b6
+- 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 18 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 19 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+- 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 20 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 21 ~ b3 - 1;
+66 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 22
+~ b3 - 1: b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 48 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 49 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 50 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 51 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E -
+1;
+Page 52 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E -
+1;
+Page 53
+~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E -
+1;
+Page 54
+- b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 55
+-b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 56
+b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+57
+~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 58
+- 63 - 1: b6- 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 59
+- b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 60
+~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 61
+~ b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 66
+~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 67
+1;
+06 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 68 ~ b3
+1;
+16 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 69 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 70
+= b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+- 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 71
+~ 63 - 1: 66 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 72
+-b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+73
+- 63
+1;
+b6 -
+m
+1-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page
+74
+~ 63-
+1;
+3
+, -5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+75
+~ 63 - 1;
+,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 76
+-63 - 1:06-
+,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 77
+~ 63 -
+1; b6
+; b7C - 3;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 81
+~ 63 - 1;
+_b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 82 ~ b3 -
+1;
+b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 83
+~ b3 - 1;
+3, -5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 84
+- 63-1:
+66
+, -5; b7C
+- 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 85
+- b3
+- 1; b6
+3
+1-5; b7C
+- 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 86 ~ b3 - 1; b6
+- 5; b7C
+- 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 87
+~ 63 -
+1: b6
+, -5; b7C
+3, -5; b7E -
+1;
+Page 88 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3, -5; b7E
+- 1:
+Page 89 ~ b3 -
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Paqe 90 ~ b3 - 1: b6 - 3: b7C - 3: b7E - 1;
+
+Page 91 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 95 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 96 b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 97 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 98 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 99 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 100 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 101 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 139 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 140 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 141 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 142 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 143 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 146 - b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 147 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 148 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 149 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 150 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 151 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 152 - Duplicate;
+Page 153 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 154 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 155 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 159 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3; b7C -
+3: b7E - 1;
+Page 160 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 161 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 162
+~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3; b7E
+-1;
+Page
+163
+b3
+1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 164 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+-3,-4,-5; b7C - -3,-4,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 174
+~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+Page 175 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+Page 176 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3; b7C - 3;
+Page 177 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+Page 178
+- b3
+1; b6 -
+3; b7C -
+3;
+Page 179 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+Page 180 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C -
+3;
+Page 181 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3; b7C -
+3;
+Page 182 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+Page
+183 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+Page
+191 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page
+192 = b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page
+193
+= b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 194 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page
+195 ~ 63
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page
+196 " b3
+1;
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page
+197 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page
+198 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7c -
+3,-5;
+Page
+199 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 200 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 201 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 202 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page
+218 - b3
+1; b6 -
+2,-3; b7C -
+2,-3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 219 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+2,-3; b7C -
+2,-3;
+67F -1.
+Page 273 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 3;
+
+Page 274 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 275 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+-3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+276-63
+1;
+b6-
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+277-
+b3
+1;
+b7C - 3;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 278 ~ b3
+1;
+3;
+b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 279
+~ b3
+1;
+-3,-5;
+b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 280 ~ b3
+1;
+3;
+b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 281 ~ b3
+1;
+3,
+-5; b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 282 - b3
+1;
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 283 ~ b3
+1; b6
+-3, -5; b7C - -3, -5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 284 ~ b3
+1;
+66
+-3,-5;
+b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 285 - b3
+- 1;
+-3, -5; b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 286 ~ b3
+1;
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 287 - b3
+1;
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 288 ~ b3
+1;
+-3,
+-5;
+b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 289 ~ b3
+- 1;
+-3,
+-5;
+b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 290 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+,-5;
+670 - -3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 293
+= b3
+1; b6
+3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 294 - Duplicate;
+Page
+295 ~ Duplicate;
+Page
+296 - Duplicate;
+Page 359 ~ b3 - 1; b6
+3;
+b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page
+360 ~ b3
+- 1;
+3;
+b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+361 ~ b3
+1;
+-3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 362
+-b3
+1;
+3;
+b7C - 3; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 363 ~ b3
+1;
+3;
+b7C - 3; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 364 - b3
+1;
+-3, -5;
+b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E -
+1;
+Page
+365 ~ b3
+1;
+- 3, -5;
+b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page
+366 ~ 63
+1;
+-3,-5; b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page
+367
+~ b3
+1;
+-3,-5; b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page
+368
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+-3,
+-5; b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 369
+~ b3
+1;
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page
+370 - b3
+1;
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page
+371-63
+1;
+66
+-3,
+-5;
+b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page
+372 - b3
+1;
+66
+-3,
+-5;
+b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 373 - b3
+1;
+- 3
+,-5;
+b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+374 ~ b3
+1;
+- 3
+-5:
+b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page
+375 - b3
+1; b6
+-3,-5;
+b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 376 - b3
+- 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E -1;
+Page
+377 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+-3,-5; b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 378 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 380
+= b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+2,-3; b7C-
+2,-3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 382 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 384 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 385 - Duplicate;
+Page 388 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 389 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 390 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+-3,-5;
+b70 - -3,-5;
+Page 391 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+-3,-5; b7C - -3,-5;
+Page 392 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3, -5;
+Page 393 - b3
+1; b6 -
+-3,-5;
+b7C - -3,-5;
+Page 394 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+-3,
+- 5;
+b7C - -3,-5;
+Page 395 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - -3,
+- 5;
+b7C - -3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+b7E - 1;
+b7E - 1;
+b7E - 1;
+b7E - 1;
+b7E - 11
+Page 396 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+
+Page 397 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 398 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 399 - b3
+1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 400 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C -
+2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 401 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C -
+2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 405
+= b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 406 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 407 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E -
+1;
+Page 408 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, - 5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 409 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 410 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 411 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 412 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 413 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 414 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 415 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 416 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+417 ~ b3
+1;
+3, -5; b7C
+m
+-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 418 ~ b3
+1;
+3,-5; b7C
+m
+-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page
+419 - b3
+3,-5;
+b7c
+- 5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 420 - b3
+1;
+3,-5;
+3,
+- 5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 421 ~ b3
+1;
+3, -5; b7C
+- 5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 422 - b3
+1;
+3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 423 - b3
+- 1;
+3, -5; b7C
+m
+m
+- 5;
+b7E
+1;
+-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page
+424 ~ b3
+1;
+3,-5; b7C
+- 5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 425 ~ b3
+1;
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 426 - b3
+1;
+3;
+b7C -
+3;
+b7E
+1;
+Page
+427 ~ b3
+1;
+3, -5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+428 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page
+429
+~ b3
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+- 5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page
+430 ~ 63
+- 1;
+3, -5; b7C
+- 5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 431 ~ b3
+1;
+3, -5; b7C
+m
+-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 432 - b3
+1;
+3,-5;
+-5;
+b7E
+1:
+Page
+433 b3
+1;
+66
+3,-5;
+3,
+- 5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page
+434~b3
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+- 5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 435 - b3
+1;
+3,-5; b7C
+- 5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 436 - b3
+1;
+3, -5; b7C
+3,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 437 ~ b3
+1;
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E
+1;
+Page
+438
+-b3
+1; b6 -
+3,
+-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page
+439 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3
+5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page
+440
+~b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3
+-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page
+441
+- b3
+- 1;
+3,-5;
+3
+-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 442 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+m
+- 5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page
+443 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+- 5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 444 - b3
+1;
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+b7E
+-1;
+Page 445 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+446 - b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+3
+-5;
+b7E
+-1;
+Page 447 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+, -5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page
+448 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5;
+- 5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 449 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 450 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7c
+3,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 451 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5;
+3,
+- 5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 452 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 453 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+3;
+3,
+3;
+3;
+3,
+3
+3
+b7c
+3,
+3,
+3,
+3;
+3
+3,
+1,
+U
+U
+III
+- 1;
+- 1;
+- 1;
+1;
+- 1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+- 1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+
+Page 521 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 524 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 525 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C -
+3;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 526 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C -
+Page 527 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C -
+Page 528 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C -
+Page 529 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+BE BE M
+Page 530 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2; b7E - 1;
+Page 531 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 532 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7E - 1;
+Page 533 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E
+- 3:07C - 37 573-17
+Page 534 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 535 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 537 ~ b6
+- Z; b7C - 2; b7E - 1;
+Page 538 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 539 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 540 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 541 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 542 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7E - 1;
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+Deleted Page(s)
+X No Duplication Fee X
+X For this Page
+X
+X
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+
+55
+b6 -2
+109
+110
+111
+112
+113
+114
+115
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2007-01-01
+2007-01-01
+2008-01-01
+2006-01-01
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+25.3
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+{U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+31E-MM-108062-177
+b7C -2
+03954-8879
+
+BIE-MM 108062-14109
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence _
+MM PECRA
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+Various
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewce)
+(Address)
+(City and Statel
+66 - 2
+b7C -2
+By
+To Be Returned
+L Yes
+•No
+Receipt Given
+• Yes
+ENO
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+•No
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+• Original notes re interview of
+Biograshical File on
+b6 - 3
+67C -3
+T°
+03956-8880
+
+- 3
+03956-8881
+
+tara 666u0ioo8o
+3327502.302
+l(is/2006
+56 - 3
+- -
+HELP FAC
+- Holiday Break - Xmas
+- Tickets to
+JE
+Purchased
+ticket
+PICKED HER UP
+casual? Asking a
+a schools.
+News
+aBout iT
+- Takoss@treveling to help O. school.
+(JE' IDEA).
+office
+BATHROOM lA RESIDENCE LATER
+→ Lito
+03956-8883
+
+- MAn HAVE
+POR. DiLANER
+LeMo
+wat home to
+JE
+D CE
+Famma
+- Unconfrontiste.
+b6 - 31
+Prant worry about school
+The get that macint he would pay.
+talked to
+# from
+03956-8884
+
+Gut to know you bette
+Finalive plans for summer
+- Borget ticket → the maid fait
+Sameone priked her up she did hat tow
+- Friday → Suntans le
+little trivie -
+• Some discission about where she
+was going to be staying
+- It said she will be staying with Us.
+= DE/
+- Thight 5z
+03956-8885
+
+b6 3
+b3
+1
+3
+- Baget Popcora (Cate....
+- seeing then again.??
+doring the trip ete
+- did not want to mess up things for
+Herself and
+6R
+-1,-31
+- 1, -3
+...Miths
+Prior
+to fle. ig
++ NM
+55 called. once
++ few hundred collars
+03956-8888
+
+GAVE
+03956-8889
+
+_ b6 - 3|
+b3 -1j
+03956-8899
+
+Cart.
+1:00 - 4:45
+03956-8900
+
+b6-1,-3,-51
+DJ
+-1-
+133-5
+
+1492
+=altration
+privelges.
+bup tible
+Intraduced
+of called adid for intervie
+I asked to his office
+across the. streeffrom Limitt
+b6-1,-3,-5"
+b7C -1,-3,-5
+TE sid
+is areat
+I cald offa 3956r3901
+
+billegas
+- b3 -1"
+not going do than muchd
+Ane.
+trying to
++ TE
+ten it was ..
++ hot
+not gell its on tin
+JE wait
+was gong
+unconfide.
+had with hastie
+03956-8902
+
+became
+JE comnated
+Door women - nshaate
+Residence "Door Worer.
+the thall If bore but
+Alice in residne
+83 maray.
+b6 -1.-3
+would b bc -1,33
+girls in sorbs -15
+asted chef
+03956-8903
+
+4
+one day
+. come over to hous
+dode
+to tell the sir!
+Lift for
+the wat me to!
+66-1,-3,-5
+b7C -1,-3,- 5
+b3 -1-
+aside +telle
+Hey weregoodt.
+03956-8904
+
+Coming
+b6 -1,-3
+bTC
+-1,-3
+b3
+-1
+Year.
+yoa
+- brim her usE confici
+It net.
+alled Me
+get very dund
+пр
+bo E had a supusee
+gut
+t. alt thy were to come
+to ther hanse
+- Waw you're reall bentfit
+03956-8905
+
+We will will Wate
+help land that.
+sle babi
+- -
+If sea type
+You reall shout fell.
+ergien
+expected fib6-3,-s.
+,-5
+03956-8906
+
+reat day
+surprised
+JE
+VE set neat to
+-b6-1,-3,-5
+b7C -1,-3
+Casin to just insit
+rejan tell
+reeded tugat Manzzes
+ste ailed of she colbsie
+03956-8907
+
+Pressing toget a nonage
+JE My Fund said she ald
+S've you a message it
+Massion
+22-23
+b3
+, -3
+- 1
+- 3
+-1
+very.
+a vunable monets
+If nude
+famed
+03956-8908
+
+Studing
+dit I will pay
+66
+-1, -3, -5
+-1:-3
+! -5
+fur
+My Purclaxed a tidat to
+Isle
+-.-
+: /
+03956-8909
+
+Dont-
+b6 - 3!
+D7C -3
+b3 - 1!
+b6-1,-3,-51
+-1, -3, - 5
+b7E
+- 1
+I had t
+every hit is There
+56-1.-3.-5
+I neally wish von world he
+-1,-3, -5
+-1
+Aude al
+on
+probal for
+03956-8910
+Kur.
+
+Calla
+..t put the
+..... -
+only ones
+b6-1,-3
+, -5
+b7C -1,-3,-5
+63-1.
+Locky through shoe bre
+-sput 2 day list furthe
+ling in
+1ff hore
+Called JE Epstas isst
+03956-8911
+
+accused IE!
+I have then inventory
+asted a vaur sirl
+To
+ramer. is tit JErgy
+be careful wat
+listen
+FE
+Ah fret.
+It where in he tallere tune
+JE put
+lund it ta
+56 - 1,-3
+-1, -3
+03956-8912
+
+A couple weeks later
+He
+, -5
+-3,- 5
+back t his tot
+zimerths talez)
+upset
+sent
+out to
+to help
+03956-8913
+
+durr
+14
+asted f
+suld cin tey
+samper
+-3,-5
+-3,-5
+b3
+-1
+-dostie if santing hoppe toe
+tem..
+tere fur hinth
+is cang
+on weeles
+helpo
+not alland
+to. cone ontside
+pardod
+4 s 90. a51080
+check
+03956-8914
+
+15
+I care to visit
+he dond nee aydig by....
+zid visit jablf inaggpite
+lescai
+-Lakleddor e
+at at
+bathrok on
+. inhere
+TE Cons in wearo 395-gg15
+
+worr
+JE
+roome
+TE
+IS JE
+_Im feel,
+.. Amed
+Datie, silly
+rady had sensed
+66 - 1, -31
+-1,- 3
+Ingry to gue afort tab
+I about an hour it lash!.
+har am I grytolen
+watchy
+well Engun to bed.
+got
+03956-8916
+
+stand in the room
+It called I hige
+Your Not upset
+Are you find ladene
+b6-1,-3.-5
+thinks youre upons
+about bic you coul
+tell the
+can go to hell
+collid
+a Ryde Kuch
+carto sat
+the did someth
+03956-8917
+
+loadid up trach
+Went gary. to Get
+4s.
+• leave
+but said he lean
+Left
+Wart
+If he was my patron
+After left
+Tilled
+b3
+- 3:
+- 3, -5
+-1:
+angered tock my fly 23956-3918
+clas
+
+Tha pissy not all to come bat it
+Stated ho
+He called!
+will.
+60 prent don
+- Ijust intel co
+b6 -1,-3
+b70 - 1,-3
+Thrys
+03956-8919
+
+See v
+Jet
+i comito
+cat borsy
+here. bacare
+trouldbe tE
+colo
+120)
+b6-1.-3,-5
+b7C-1,-3,-5
+D3 -1
+pin-ti.
+→....
+ppd. came t sut youg wom
+03956-8920
+
+2
+b6-1,-3,-5
+-1,-3,-5
+cleog ta h
+'tepist
+1 tin scened tobe congt
+diogpst
+call bitter pot saj a norel
+03956-8921
+
+- tere very careful
+puppet.
+-1
+- 1
+git
+1 step spre
+b3
+- 3,
+- 3
+-1
+Cure
+If yaute. gos to keep
+Nave Too Yoreras
+03956-8922
+
+wating wol
+23
+03956-8923
+
+H-*=
+-2.-5]
+-2,-5
+FIC
+US
+ITS
+1:08
+205
+249
+2:30
+4:ZZ
+1255 4:48 H..
+15 CorT
+•MARO
+16 солт 1252 : 5:45
+1/07
+ytt. pre"
+TUP
+11i5
+leaveno earten thu lioe
+in boy
+03956-8938/
+3IE-M4-108062-17107
+
+By
+To Be Returned
+• Yes :
+ENO
+Receipt Given • Yes
+17 No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+ENO
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+I No
+Title:
+Reference:
+7
+FĐ-340 (Rev, 4-11-03)
+31E-MM- 108062
+Field ottee Acquiring Evidence Min/ PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _
+Date Received
+Vaxious
+Irom
+(Name of Contribufor/interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+-2
+-2
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+...
+Description:
+• Original notes re interview of
+Biographical File for
+66 - 31
+63 - 1|
+-03956-8939
+
+B7C -3
+03956-8940
+
+Record Request
+FD-|25 (Rey. 4-1-93)
+• Birth • Credit
+* Criminal
+• Death
+• INS
+To
+ISS
+Return to
+SAL
+Name and aliases of subject, applicant, or employee, and spouse
+Date
+06/08/2007
+• Marriage* • Motor Vehicle • Other
+Buded
+31E-MM-108062
+66 - 2
+b7C -2
+Address
+Residence
+Business
+Former
+* Date and place of marriage
+(ifapplicable)
+Race
+W
+Birth date
+Sex
+Female
+• Male
+Arrest Number
+Social Security Number
+Age
+Height
+Birthplace
+Fingerprint classification
+Weight
+Hair
+Eyes
+66 -3
+Criminal specialty
+Divers License Number
+• D/L Photo • Other
+Specific information desire
+NCIC
+Results ofcheck
+T
+T
+03956-8941
+
+Driving Directions from S05 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL ta
+- MAPQUEST:
+Start: 505 S Flagler Dr
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-
+5923, US
+Page 1,b6
+- 3
+b3
+-1
+End:
+coffee a
+Notes:
+Only text visible within note field will print.
+KaBONUTS
+DUNKEN
+Directions
+•Distance
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions
+03956-8954
+1 6/13/2007
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to_
+... Page 2 b7c -3
+http://www.mapquest.com/
+03956-8955
+6/13/2007
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+.. Page 3 ‹67c -3
+http://www.mapquest.com/
+03956-8956
+6/13/2007
+
+Priving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL toL
+We... Page 1 of 3
+= '
+=MAPQUEST.:
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-
+5923, US
+* THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE•
+ROADITOUR
+SWEEFSTAKEE
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.
+83956-8968
+
+Driving Directions from s0s S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+We... Page 2 of 3
+006
+Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+i..
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.
+83956-8969
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to_
+_. Page 3'of3
+03 -1
+006
+0f3
+505S Flagler Dr
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, roac
+responsibility for any os or delay resuiting from such usemes all risk of use. MapQuest and its suppliers assume no
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/
+83956-8970
+
+Elle Number 31E-MM- 108062-1A111
+Ried Oric Acquiring Evidence MiM / PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _
+Date Received
+ArIoUs
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By
+SA
+To Be Returned • Yes.
+ENo
+Receipt Given Yes
+ENO
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+ENO
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+b6 -2
+b7C -2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:.
+* Original notes re interview of
+Biocinihical fle on
+and Myspace information is
+03956-8978
+
+www.palmbeachpolice.com
+67C -3
+In any Emergency Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+03956-8979
+
+Page 1 of 1866 - 3, -5
+-3,- 5
+Layouts y
+MySpace.com / Home
+The Web
+9
+MySpace O
+Search
+Help | SignUp
+AND GET A FREE LAPTOP!
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy i
+Classifieds
+is in your extended network
+awesome...
+Female
+United States
+[Blog.
+View My: Pics | Videos
+Contacting
+12 Send Miessage
+188 Astel to Fiends
+Instant Message
+Ez Asiato Group
+Last Login:
+10/2/2006
+[View All Blog Entries]
+Latest Blog Entry [Subscribe to this
+(view more)
+Blurbs
+About me:
+* Forward to Friend
+• Asid to Favorites
+83} Block User
+T& Rank User
+MySpace URL:
+Who I'd like to meet:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-8980
+
+Page 2 of 1856 - 3, -5
+Friend Space
+Interests
+General
+Details
+Status:
+Here for:
+Orientation:
+Body type:
+Ethnicity:
+• Religion:
+Zodiac Sign:
+Smoke / Drink:
+Children:
+Education:
+Income:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-L
+03956-8981
+
+Page 3 of 18b6 - 3, -5
+View Al of riends
+friends Comments
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-8982
+
+Page 4 of 18b6 - 3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&.friend.ID-
+03956-8983
+
+Page 5 of 1§b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&.friendID
+03956-8984
+
+Page 6 of 1866 - 3, -5 '
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-
+03956-8985
+
+Page 7 of 18°6 —S,~s
+89
+-1
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-
+03956-8986
+
+www.myspace.com.
+
+- 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&.friendID
+03956-8987
+
+Page 9 of 1866 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&.friendID-L
+03956-8988
+
+Page 10 of 1866 -3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-8989
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-8990|
+
+Page 12 of 1806 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfn?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-8991
+
+Page 13 of 18b6 - 3, -5
+!
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendIDL
+03956-8992
+
+Page 14 of 1856 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendiD
+03956-8993
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-8994
+
+Page 16 of 1866 - 3, -5
+htt://profilc.myspace.com/incex.c/m/fuseaction-user.viewprofile&.friendID-
+03956-8995
+
+Page 17 of 18b6 - 3, -5
+htttp://profile.myspace.com/index.cfim?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-8996
+
+Page 18 of 1856 - 3, -5
+-3, -5
+Add Comment
+About | FAQ| Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Inappropriate Content | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-89971
+
+* View More Pictures
+
+i
+Web ! MySpace | People / Music | Blogs | Video #
+Search Web
+Online Degrees - Business, IT, Education
+AIGU - a leading online university for affordability in business, IT, and
+education degree programs. Accredited. Western Governors
+University offers flexible programs for busy adults.
+www.wqu.ecu
+Pictures ofl
+Free Degree and Scholarship Information
+Find schools that match your career and academic goals at
+DegreeSelect.com. Complete just one form online to receive tree info
+from multiple schools that meet your needs.
+www.rrilitary.com
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Click Picture for Full View & Comments
+b6 - 3,-5 j
+b7C-3,-5
+b3-1
+4 Commens)
+03956-8998
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.comfuseaction=sex.viewPicture&friendID MyToken=ab710919-0644-48.. 10/3/2006
+
+
+156-3,-5
+63 -1
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promotel | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID=|
+03956-8999
+]&MyToken=ab71c919-0b44.48. 10/3/2006
+
+www.palmbeachpolice.com
+56 - 31
+63-11
+(MARCH 2006)
+In any Emergency
+Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+03956-9000
+
+Page 1 of 1166 - 3,- 5
+63-1
+MySpace.com | Home
+The Web
+© MySpace
+Alamd
+Dinos
+Search
+Hano wants you to be a part of
+The Year of a Million Dreams.
+Help | SignUp
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+is in your extended network
+Latest Blog Entry [Subscribe to this Blog]
+[View All Blog Entries]
+_Blurbs
+About me:
+Contacting|
+1 Send hessage
+88 Add to Friends
+L Instant Message
+Cry Adito Group
+A Forward to Friend
+E And to Favorites
+83 Block User
+gg Rank User
+Who I'd like to meet:
+Friend Space
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-
+03956-9001
+
+MySpace URL:
+Song has been
+defeted by the artist
+Interests
++add+
+*view+
+General
+Music
+Movies
+]Friends Comments
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+View All of
+Page 2 of 1166 -3, -5
+Friends
+03956-9002
+
+Page 3 of 11b6 - 3, -5
+670-3,- 5
+This or That
+Pepsi or Coked
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9003
+
+Page 40f 11b6 - 3, -5 j
+Ever Kissed
+Opposite sex:
+Short or Long:
+Height:
+Style:
+Personality:
+Hot or Cute
+Drugs and Alcohol:
+Muscular or Really
+Number of the Passe
+Ben to the ray.
+Do you lik
+hunderstorms
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-9004
+
+Page 5 of 11b6 - 3, -5
+Shower Daily:
+Been in Love:
+Do you Sing:
+Vant to ge
+Marrier
+Do youident
+Age you wanna
+lose your Virginity:
+Hate anyone:
+Take This Survey
+CREATE YOUR OWN! - or - GET
+PAID TO TAKE SURVEYS!
+Details
+Status:
+Orientation:
+Hometown:
+Religion:
+Zodiac Sign:
+Smoke / Drink:
+Children:
+Education:
+Income:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-
+03956-9005
+
+Page 6 of 1166 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-L
+03956-9006
+10/3/2.006
+
+Page 7 of 11b6 - 3, -5
+b70 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9007
+
+Page 8 of11b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=|
+03956-9008
+
+Page 9 of 1166 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9009
+
+Page 10 of 1166 - 3, -5
+-3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9010
+
+Page 11 of 1156 -3,-5
+Add Comment
+About! FAQ| Terms| Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Inappropriate Content | Promote! | Advertise / MySpace International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9011
+
+
+Web ! MySpace | People | Music | Blogs | Video *
+Free Animated Cursors!
+Click
+Here
+Search Web
+Pictures of
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Click Picture for Full View & Comments
+56-3,-5,
+b70-3,-5
+03956-9012
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID-[
+7&MyToken=2c7edd84-5389-49. 10/3/2006
+
+...
+
+b6 -3,-5:
+67C -3,-5
+163-1
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+03956-9013
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cim.?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID MyToken=207ed84-5389.49... 10/3/2006
+
+Estray Minor
+Conspiinay to Enticement
+let
+let
+let
+tempted travel
+Hempted Enticemast 2' visit et
+let
+b3
+-1
+03956-9014
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+=MAPQUEST.-
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-
+5923, US
+
+56 - 3
+* THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE**
+ROADITOUR
+SWEEPSTAKES
+i00
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+TOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR «
+TO ONE OF • DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+A Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main._
+83956-9020
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL tol
+.. Page 2 of 2
+63-1
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+hese directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, roa
+onditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest and its suppliers assume r
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+..:
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/mair
+93956-9021
+
+2/26/2007
+b6-3,-4,-51
+b7C -3,-4,-5
+and
+Phorecall wh
+2 call' maybe
+net..w.one.guy
+he was.
+test on at same to
+No review d Stetent
+did net hear prior tapent
+03956-9032
+
+• di
+= That lady makin me nervors
+*b6
+-3,-51
+-3,-5
+b3 -1..
+T
+- just say
+Dont even talk about
+lised to thats me for it
+No ridiness
+betweanus
+- cell phere
+short bea
+03956-9033
+
+-31
+63 - 11
+Gotmadat
+S55-
+1 H
+They wat to bathroo
+Argued
+Wear casual clit.,
+Set going tormed
+baked lo and nay.
+Anyuite booke nice.
+03956-9034
+
+He tad her
+for. Cas driver que
+03956-9041
+
+....
+reely
+spally
+--
+- Thet lat jalt lil lee
+ichtifid lift.
+b3
+-1
+I dalt kwor but
+thet tosh a lat Tuch
+..I dee
+Ital
+loachtdhee
+dost prut, toe
+clatne
+Wet I(tet
+03956-9042
+
+wats a motta
+no
+you can say
+JE
+Will yes do The yet con
+say no.
+= Trash pull
+Saturday at. 1050
+, - 51
+-3,- 5
+03956-9043
+
+05/05/2005 08:41 FAX
+0001/016
+Facsimile Cover Sheet
+Fax Number:
+Voice Number:
+Subject:
+b6-3,-4,-5
+b7 - 3,-4, - 5
+Subpoena Responsib3 - 1
+To:
+From:
+Date:
+May 5, 2005
+Paçies:
+(including cover)
+104788I к30M0
+Message:
+10:58
+P.01
+03956-9044
+
+05/05/2005 08:41 FAX 19732928680
+84/12/2885 83:12
+
+01002/016
+PAGE 81
+OFFICE OF THE
+STATE ATTORNEY
+TITERNTH JUDICIAL CIRCUTI OF PLORIDA
+IN AND FOR PALM ZEACH COUNTI
+BARRY E KRISCHIER
+STATEX: TORNEY
+FAX COVER SHEET
+TOL
+LOCATION: SubpOENA CoMpliAnce
+PHONE:
+FAX NO
+NUMBER OF PAGES TO FOLLOW:_
+FROM:_
+LOCATION: S.A.O., WPB, FL.
+PHONE:
+FAX NO:
+b6-3,-4,-5
+b7C - 3,-4,- 5
+SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
+FAX OPERATOR:
+MAY-Ø5-2005
+JB1.N. Disle Highway, West Palm Dench, Florida 33003-1209
+(561) 355-7100
+
+99%
+
+
+05/05/2005 08:41 FAX
+84/12/2885 E9:12
+
+
+2003/016
+PAGE D2
+TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
+Pursuant to an official investigation of a suspected felony
+being conducted by DETECTIVE
+it is requested that your b6 - 3, -4,-5
+67C -3,-4, -5
+company furnish
+PLEASE SEE ATTACHED
+YOU AFE NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF IHIS REQUEST. Any such
+disclosure could obstruct and impede the investigation being conducted and
+thereby with the enforcement of the law.
+Thank you for your cooperation.
+ASSIGNANT STATE ATTORNEY
+10:53
+
+P.03
+03956-9046
+
+05/05/2005 08:41 FAX 19732928680
+84/12/3005 23323619557 JI senor rubict
+1 561 BIS 5491
+0004/018
+93
+P. 02/82
+I DETECTIVE
+of the TOWN OF PALM BEACH POLICE
+DEPARTIENT, agree that any infornation obtained by virtue of the
+state littorney subpoena attached, in confidential and will not be
+releasia co anyone outaide law enforcament. DisseminacÍor of
+chia frifarmacion to anyone ather than Law enfoIceMent paIsonnel
+antitied to such information will he DIORacuLad as ObEIZUCEITE
+b6-3,-4, -5
+b7C -3,-4,-5
+63-1
+I sweat chat thia information is requested in good faith for
+che purpose of investigaring erime.
+DETECTIVE
+478-05-2885 11:15
+
+P.02
+MAY-05-2005 10:59
+- .. —
+
+TOTAL F.02
+95%
+P.84
+_03956-9047
+
+05/05/2005 08:42 FAX
+
+04/12/2005 81:12
+5513557)
+61005/016
+PAGE D4
+IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIETZENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
+IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
+STATE'S ATTORNEY SUBPOENA, DUCES. TECUM 05-368
+IO:
+GREETINGS:
+DUCES TECIM: PIEASE PROVIDE SUBSCRIBER, BILLING INFORMATION AS
+WELL AS DITAILED
+IO DETECTIVE |
+YOU MAY COMPIX BY FORMARDING THE REQUESKED INZORMNYTON
+TOWN OF PAIM BEACH POLICE
+DEPARIMENT, 345 SOUTH COUNTY ROAD. PALM BEACH, FI 33490- PB:
+FAX:
+YOU ARE HIREBY COMMANDED IO BE AND APPEAR BEFORE THE SIATE'S
+ATTORNEX ix his assistant, in and fox Palm Beach County,
+Flarida, it 401 North Dixle Highway, Nest PalM Beach, Elorida
+for interrogation and the truth to speak, in a certain mattar
+ponding and under investigation. Failuro to appear will gubject
+66-3,-4,-5
+b7C -3,-4, -5
+66-4
+b7C -4
+Gagina
+fit state Attorney
+SAL Witness my Bar
+COURT ON 1
+•al of
+15********1
+***
+catted these to the day de
+day of
+a 2005and
+exacuted the same on the
+the County a Copy tharat to the within named 2005 in
+the County of Palm Beach, State of Florída.
+SHERIFF, Pain Beach County
+BY.
+DEPUTY BERTIT
+
+94%
+
+
+. 05196/2005 08:12 FAX
+
+0006/016
+May 5, 2005
+Det
+fown of Paini Beach Police Department
+Palm Beach, L
+Dear Det
+This is in response to the Subpoena Duces Tecum,
+hihis subpoena requests customer
+A search of our subscriber database discloses the following information:
+Account Number:
+Subscriber Account Name:
+Dale of Birth:
+Social Security Number:
+Address:
+Home Telephone:
+Work Telephone:
+IMSI:
+Date Account Established:
+Service Plan
+Current Status
+Disconnect Date
+Last Refill Date
+56-3,-4,-5
+67C -3,-4,-5
+un
+Tor the
+Should you havo any questions regarding this information please feel Icc to contact me at your convenience.
+My direct telephone number is
+Very truly yours.
+File:
+Law Enforcement Relations
+
+F.05
+03956-9049
+
+To: Det
+From:
+Date: August 2, 2005
+Pages:
+(including cover)
+Facsimile Cover Sheet
+Fax Number:
+Voice Number:-
+Subiect:
+Subpoena, Response
+b6-3,-4.-5
+-3,-4, -5
+Message:
+03956-9060
+
+
+01
+OFFICE OF THE
+STATE ATTORNEY
+FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA
+IN AND FOR PAUM BEACH COUNTY
+BARRY E. KRISCHER
+STATE ATTORNEX
+FAX COVER SHEET
+FROM:
+66 - 3,-4,-5
+670-3,-4, -5
+LOCATION:
+PHONE NO.:
+LOCATION: S.A.O., W.P.B., FL
+PHONE NO.
+...:
+FAXNO.:
+FAXNOL
+NUMBER OF PAGES TO FOLLOW: +4
+SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
+FAX OPERATOR: _
+802 87. Dixo slanay, VELo, PS3-1800ch, BorIda 33102-4209
+03956-9061
+ITX/RX Nº 8158] [00i
+
+
+02
+TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
+Pursuant to an official investigation of a suspected felony
+being conducted by Detective
+it is requested that b6 - 4, -5
+b70 -4, -5
+. your company furnish
+PLEASE SEE ATTACHED
+XOU ARE NOT IO DISCIOSE IHE EXISTENCE OF THIS HEQUEST. Any such
+disclosure could obstruct and impede the investigation being conducted
+and thereby with the enforcement of the law.
+Thank you for your cooperation.
+CASSETANI GIANE ANTONINAN
+03956-9062
+ITX/RX NO 8158]
+49002
+
+
+Jul 15 2005 10:43AM PALM BEACH POLICE
+87/15/2085 11:08 56135572B3
+
+103
+p.2
+PAGE 02
+I Detective
+of the Palm Bench Police Department,
+agrea that any information obtained by virtue of the state Attornay
+subpoena attached, 1s confidantial and will not be released to snyone
+outaddo lav enforcement. Dissemination of tila Inforation to anyone
+other than lan enforcerent parsonnel antitled to quen Information WIlI
+be protecuted as Obatricting Justice.
+I awest that this information is requestad in good faith for the
+Durpose of investigating crime
+b6 -4,-5
+b7C - 4, -5
+Detective
+03956-9063
+ITX/RX NO 81581 ฿003
+
+
+PAGE 04
+IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
+IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
+CRIMINAL DIVISION 05/368
+STATE'S ATTORNEY SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
+TO:
+GREETINGS: ** DUCES TECUM: PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILED
+b6-3,-4,-5
+b7C-3,-4,-5
+b3-1
+YOU MAY COMPLY BY FORWARDING THE REQUESTED INFORMATION TO DETECTIVE
+PALM BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT, 3A5 SOUTH COUNTY ROAD,
+PALM. BEACH, FL 33480, TELEPHONE NO.[
+TFAXNO.[
+YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED TO BE AND APPEAR BEFORE THE STATE'S ATTORNEY or
+is assistant, in and for Palm Beach County, Florkta, at 401 North Didle Highway, West Paim Beach,
+Floria for interrogation and the truth to spask, in a certain matter penting and under investigation.
+Faitura to appear wil subject you to conterpt of Court.
+Ansistant State Atto
+(SEAL)
+Witness m
+Countoa
+By.
+Received this subpoens on the ...
+_ 2005 and executed the same on the
+* on by deleing a True Copy fred exe wied the med on ess in the
+County of Paim Beach, State of Florida.
+SHERIFF, Palm Beach County
+By
+Deputy Sherlf
+03956-9064
+ITX/RX NO 8158] 21004
+
+
+PAGE 05
+Business Record Certification
+(Name and address of business entity)
+I,
+_ hereby certify that I am the
+qualified person for: (name of business or institution)
+or other
+_ hereby further certify that the following memorandum,
+report(s), record(s), or data compilation, it any forma, of acts, events, conditions, or diagnosis, to wit:
+56-3,-5
+1.
+2.
+3.
+4.
+were made at or near the time at which the information contained thereon was received by, or from
+information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of the information contained thereon, and further,
+that the information is kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity of name of business
+or institution
+- I further certify that it was the regular practice of that business activity to make
+such memorandum, report, record, or data corpilation.
+(signature ot Declarant)
+8/2/2015
+Date
+b6 - 5
+b7C -5
+STATE OF FLORIDA
+COUNTY OF PALM BEACH
+Before me this day personally appeared
+who, being duty
+swort, deposes and says that the information contained in this affidavit is true and correct."
+Swor to ated subscribed before me this 2No day of
+Ausust
+2005
+My commission expires:
+03956-9065
+ITX/RX NO 8158] 40005
+
+August 2, 2005
+DeL
+Palm Beach Police Department
+West Palm Beach, FL
+Dear Det
+This is in response to the Subpoena Duces Tecum [
+_on b6 - 3,-4, -5
+67 3-4,55
+A search of our subscriber database discloses the following information:
+Account Number:
+Subscriber Account Name:
+Date of Birth:
+Social Security Number:
+Address:
+Home Telephone:
+Work Telephone:
+"IMSI:
+Date Account Established:
+Service Plan
+Current Status
+Disconnect Date
+Last Refill Date
+Should you have any questions regarding this information please feel free to contact me at your convenience.
+My direct telephone number is:[
+Very truly yours.
+Filet
+Law Errorcement Kelatons
+03956-9066
+
+09/27/2006 NED 16:45 FAX ..
+41001/002
+b6 - 5
+67C - 5
+FAX
+TO: SPECIAL AGENT
+FAX NUMBER:
+FROM
+FAX NUMBER
+CONTACT NUMBER
+DATE: 09/21/2006
+RE: MY HUSBAND HAS MISSED PLACED THE INFORMATION PACKET
+THAT WE HAD TO FILL OUT REGARDING OUR MAILBOX. I HAVE GONE
+AHEAD AND FAXED YOU A COPY OF THE RECEIPT FOR THE KNEW
+MAILBOX. PLEASE IF YOU CAN MAIL ME ANOTHER FORM OR FAX IT
+OVER TO ME AT THE ABOVE NUMBER, WHICH EVER WOULD BE EASLER..
+THANK YOU AGAIN,
+P.S.
+DID SPECIAL AGENTI
+TELL YOU THATI CALLED AND SPOKE TO
+HIM DURING THE TIME THAT YOU WERE OUT OF THE OFFICE
+REGARDING A CAR THAT WAS SITTING AT THE PARK, WATCHING MY
+HOUSE IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE FEEL FREE TO CONTACT
+MEAT
+56 - 2,-5
+b7C -2,-5
+b6-2,-5
+b7C 5
+03956-9079
+
+.08/27/2006 NED 16:45
+FAX
+1#002/002
+LOWE'S
+-LOHE'S-HONE-CENTERST IHC.
+103 SOUTH STATE ROAD 7
+ROYAL PALH BEACH, FL
+33411
+(561)795-3808
+-SALE-
+SALES #: S0654L#1 33009 '
+SUBTOTAL:
+TAX .32299 :
+INVOICE 37564 TOTAL:
+09-24-05
+129.00
+129:00
+8.39
+137.39
+b6 -51
+b7C -5
+BALANCE DUE:
+·i
+LCC:
+137.39
+137.39.
+
+LCC XXXXXXXXXXXX2073
+RHGUNT:
+137.39
+0654 TERMINAL: 37 09/24/05 12:53:15
+# OF ITEMS PURCHASÉD:
+• EXCLUDÉS FEES, SERUICES, ARD SPECTAL ÖRDER ITENS.
+.i.H:: ::Mt:::
+03956-9080
+
+- 3
+MYSPACE
+OLD ACCOUNT
+03956-9083
+
+Page 1 of 15 b6 - 3, -5
+670 - 3,-5
+63 -1
+Sponsored Links
+Lavalife Local Singles
+Meet 1000s of local singles men and women. Free to join.
+www.lavalife.com
+MySpace
+• Search
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+is in your extended network
+_Latest Blog Entry [Subscribe to this Blogl
+[View All Blog Entries]
+Sturbs
+About me:
+Contacting |
+If send Message
+to Add to Friends
+g° Instant Message
+*88 Add to firoup
+Forward to Friend
+Add to Favorites
+Block User
+48 Rank User
+who ra like to meet!
+Friend Space
+MySpace URL:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user. viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9084
+
+Song has been
+detsted by the artist
+tacidt
++view+
+Interests
+General
+Music
+Movies
+Name:
+Birihdate:
+Birthplace:
+Current Location:
+Eye Colord
+Hair Color
+Height:
+Weights
+Piercings:
+Tatoos:
+Boyfriend/Girifriend:
+Overused Phraze:
+Friends Comments
+Letter:
+Spaste sex
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+View All of
+Page 2 of 15 b6 - 3, -5.
+Friends
+03956-9085
+
+Page 3 of 15 b6 - 3, -5
+b70 -3,-5
+This or That
+Pepsi or Coke:
+Bedtime:
+Most Missed
+Memory:
+Best phyiscal
+First Thought
+Waking Ups
+Goal for this year
+Best Friends:
+Weakness
+Fears!
+Heritage
+Longest
+Ever been beaten
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9086
+
+Page 4 of 15 b6 -3, -5 .
+b7C -3,- 5
+Ever beaten
+someone up:
+Ever Shoplifted:
+Ever Skinny
+Dipped:
+Ever Kissed
+pposite sex
+Been Dumped
+Lately:
+Favorite Eye Color:
+Favorite Hair Color:
+Short or Long:
+Muscular or Really
+Skinny:
+Number of Regrets
+in the Past:
+That country d
+au want to Visi
+How do you want
+to Die:
+Been to thateay.!
+Do you like
+Thunderstorms:
+Get along with
+your Parents
+Health Freak:
+Do you think your
+Attractive:
+Believe in Yourself:
+Want to go to
+Coflege:
+Do you Smoke:
+Do you Drink:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9087
+
+
+66-3,-51
+Take This Survey...
+CREATE YOUR OWN! - or - GET
+PAID TO TAKE SURVEYS!
+[Details
+Status:
+Orientation:
+Hometown:
+Religion:
+Zodiac Sign:
+Smoke / Drink:
+Children:
+Education:
+Income:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9088
+
+Page 6 of 15 b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9089
+
+Page 7 of 15 b6 -3, -5
+b70 -3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9090
+
+Page 8 of 15 b6 - 3, -5 |
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-9091
+
+www.myspace.com|
+Page 9 of 15 b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9092
+i
+
+Page 10 of 15 b6 - 3, -5 |
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID|
+03956-9093
+
+Page 11 of 15 b6 - 3,-5 |
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9094
+
+Page 12 of 15 b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-9095
+
+Page 13 of 15 b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-9096
+
+Page 14 of 15 b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID|
+03956-9097
+
+
+56 - 3
+63 -1
+About, FAQ| Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Abuse | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-L
+03956-9098
+
+Congratulations!
+Get a FREE 4GB iPod nanos
+(PRODUCTIRED™ SPECIAL EDITION
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events *
+
+Click Here Now!
+*details apply
+Search /
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Graups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+i photos
+Photos - View Image
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to View All Photos
+Previous | Next
+TIANEFORTTERS
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+b6 - 3
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewlmage&friendID=
+talbumID=0&imagelD_
+03956-9099
+
+
+| Post a Corment
+E-mail to a Friend
+Report This Image
+Listing 1 - 1 of 1
+From
+Comment
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID
+calbumID=0&imageID=
+03956-9100
+
+
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promotel | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+03956-9101
+htp:/vieworepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuscaction-viewImagc&friendLDalbumID-0&imageID_
+56 - 3|
+63 - 11
+
+MySpace.com -View Image
+
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events *
+Search |
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+# photos
+Photos - View Image
+Google™
+Back to Profile
+Back to View All Photos
+Previous | Next
+TAD FORTERE
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+b6 - 3
+b7c
+- 3
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID=
+caibumID=0&imageID
+03956-9102
+
+
+Past a Comment
+E-mail to a Friend
+Report This Image
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewlmage&friendID
+aibumID=0&imagelD-
+03956-9103
+
+Listing 1 - 3 of 3
+From
+
+comment
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace. International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID_
+kalbumID=0&imageID-_
+03956-9104
+
+
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events b
+_Search
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Graups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+i photos
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to View All Photos
+Photos - View Image
+Previous | Next
+ARE TAMERs
+CUSTONIZE YOUR PHOTLE
+b3
+-1
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction-viewImage&friendID
+albumID=0&imageID=
+03956-9105
+
+
+66 - 31
+63 -1!
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewJmage&friendID
+kalbumID=0&imageID-
+03956-9106
+
+
+36 - 3,-5!
+63-1
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy. | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendit
+ulbumID=0&imageID=
+03956-9107
+
+
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events *
+Search
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mall | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy 1 Classifieds
+#photos
+Photos - View Image
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to View All Photos
+Previous| Next
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+67C - 3
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID
+kalbumID=0&imageID_
+03956-9108
+
+
+66 - 3,-5.
+Post a Comment
+E-mail to a Friend
+Report This Image
+Listing 1 - 1 of 1
+From
+Comment
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction-viewlmage&friendID
+albumID=0&imagelD C
+03956-9109
+
+Sponsored Links
+Lavalife Local Singles
+Meet 1000s of local singles men and
+women. Free to join.
+www.lavalife.com
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy. | Safety. Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID-
+calbumID=0&timageID-[
+
+03956-9110
+66 - 3|
+63 - 1 l
+
+
+Geta
+STRÄWBERRY
+CHOCOLATE PHONE
+CLICK
+HERE
+Cute CandyPhone.com | Advertisement 1 Participation Required. See Details
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Biogs | Video 1 Events
+* Sleck form
+• VCAST Music & Video
+* Bluetooth capable
+• Navigation System
+• Digital Video Camera
+Search
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+#photos
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to View All Photos
+Photos - View Image
+Previous | Next
+b6 - 3
+b3
+-1
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID
+talbumID=0&imagelD-
+03956-9111|
+
+
+b6 -3,-5
+Post a Comment
+E-mail to a Friend
+Report This Image
+Listing 1 - 1 of 1
+From
+Comment
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm/fuseaction=viewlmage&friendiD
+kalbumID=0&imageID m
+03956-9112
+
+
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy. | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+@2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+03956-9113
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID
+albumID=0&imageID-L
+63-1
+
+
+free curson - free cursors - free cursors - fret cursors - frea
+cursors « free cursors - fres cursors - free cursts - fres cursors • free c
+Click Here!
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events p
+Search
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+#i photos
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to View All Photos
+Photos - View Image
+Previous | Next
+56 - 3
+b3
+-1
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTO
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewlmage&friendID
+kalbumID=0&imageID=
+03956-9114|
+
+
+Post a Comment
+E-mail to a Friend
+Report This Trage
+Listing 1 - 3 of 3
+From
+comment
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendin
+]ibumID=0&imageID-
+03956-9115
+
+
+56 - 3,-5
+About | FAQ | Terms i Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promotel | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID
+calbumID=0&imagelD
+03956-91161
+
+
+tree cursots «
+i. Da seri
+Cursors - free curSors - freE cursors - free
+CURSORMANIA 79
+* Free Cursors! E
+cursors - free cursors - fren cuisors -free cursors- free cursors - fae ¢
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events *
+Search
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+#photos
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to View All Photos
+Photos - View Image
+Previous I Next
+TenFONTENS
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+b6 - 3
+b3
+-1
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID|
+TalbumID=0&imageID=_
+03956-9117
+
+
+66 - 3,-5|
+Post a Comment
+E-mall to a Friend
+Report This Image
+Listing 1 - 3 of 3
+From
+comment
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewlmage&friendin
+JalbumID=0&zimagelD T
+03956-9118
+
+
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+@2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID
+albumID-O&imagelD f
+03956-9119|
+
+
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events *
+Search |
+Home! Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+i photos
+Photos - View Image
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to View All Photos
+Previous | Next
+TRANEFDRMENS
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+56 - 3
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID
+calbumID=0&imagelD-_
+03956-9120
+
+
+66-3,-5
+b70 -3,- 5
+Post a Comment
+E-mail to a Friend
+Report This Image
+Listing 1 - 3 of 3
+| From
+comment
+T
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.c/m/fuseaction-view/mage&friendID bumID-0&imagelD-
+03956-9121
+
+
+b6 -3,-5
+About | EAO | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID_
+JalbumID=0&imageID-L
+03956-9122
+
+
+free cursots - free cursors - frea cursors - free cUrsors - free
+cursors « free cursars - free cursors - free cursors- fren cursors - fra ‹
+280
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video I Events A
+Search l
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy i Classifieds
+#photos
+Google™
+Back to Profile
+Back to View All Photos
+_Photos - View Image
+Previous | Next
+PIANG ORMERS
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOYUS
+b3
+-1
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewlmage&friendID-
+albumiD=0&imagelD
+03956-9123
+
+
+56-3,-51
+b70-3,-5
+L Fost a Conment
+E-mail to a Friend
+(Repart This Image
+Listing 1 - 5 oF5
+From
+Comment
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewlmage&-friendTD
+IbumID-0&imageID=l
+03956-9124
+
+
+66 -3,-5 ;
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendID
+ralbumID=0&imagelD-F
+03956-9125
+
+
+56 - 3,-5;
+Sponsored Links
+Pimp
+Your Page!
+Pagefetti.com
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+...
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewImage&friendIE
+calbumID=0&imageID-L
+03956-9126
+
+- 3
+- 3
+MYSPACE
+OLD UNFiNISHES
+ACCOUNTS
+03956-9127
+
+=<
+wwwww.myspace.com
+Page 1 of 2 b6 - 3, -5|
+Sponsored Links
+Michael Buble - New Album
+Michael Buble brings Big Bands back! Sample his new album here.
+michaelbuble.hyfntrak.com/newcd
+MySpace
+Search
+povered Google"
+Home | Browse | Search 1 Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events / Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+is in your extended network
+View My: Pics T
+Videos
+Contacting
+I send Message
++8 Add to Friends
+go Instant Message
+*g8 Add to Srup
+Details
+Status:
+Zodiac Sign:
+Children:
+Go Forward to Friend
+Ey Add to Favorites
+@ Block User
+10 Rank User
+Latest Blog Entry [Subscribe to this Blog]
+[View All Blog Entries]
+Blurbs
+About me:
+Who I'd like to meet:
+Friend Space
+has 1 friends.
+View All of
+Friends
+Friends Comments
+Add Comment
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-|
+03956-91281
+
+wwww.myspace.com
+
+x.-
+66 - 3]
+63-11
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Abuse / Promote! | Advertise / MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-
+03956-9129
+
+
+66-3,
+Sponsored Links
+Michael Buble - New CD
+Michaet Buble's CD "Irresponsible" is in stores 5/1. Sample it here
+nichaelbuble.hyfntrak.com/newc
+MySpace
+(Search]
+powered Google'
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+This profile is set to private. This user must
+add you as a friend to see his/her profile.
+Last Login: 4/25/2006
+Contacting|
+Ei send Message
++8 Add to Friends
+8° Instant Message
++88 Addto Group
+Forward to Friend
+P Add to Favorites
+8 Block User
+48 Rank User
+About i EQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Abuse 1 Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9130
+
+ww. wwww.myspace.com
+Page 1 of 2 b6 - 3, -5
+Click The N
+MySpace
+Search
+powered Google
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+is in your extended network
+Last Login: 3/5/2006
+atest Blog Entry [Subscribe to this Blog]
+[View All Blog Entries]
+Blurbs
+View My: Pics |
+Videos
+Contacting 11
+55 Send Message
+*8 Add to Friends
+8° Instant Message
++88 Add to Group
+Forward to Friend
+Add to Favorites
+Block User
+Rank User
+Ahout mei
+Who I'd like to meet:
+]s Friend Space
+Details
+Status:
+Orientation:
+Body type:
+Ethnicity:
+Zodiac Sign:
+Smoke / Drink:
+Children:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=|
+03956-9131
+
+t wwww.myspace.com
+Education:
+Income:
+Page 2 of2 b6 - 3, -51
+View All of
+Friends
+Friends Comments
+Add Comment
+About | FAQ. | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Abuse | Promote! | Advertise / MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+.°
+:.....
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9132
+
+File Number -
+318-MM- 108062-1A112
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence MiM. PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received VACIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By
+A
+To Be Returned
+Yes.
+Receipt Given • Yes
+• No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+ENo
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+• No
+Title:
+-2
+b7c
+-2
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+• Original notes ze interview of
+Bioorannical File on
+and My Space inforMation it
+฿66 - 3
+·D7C -3
+:63 - 1
+03956-9133
+
+66-31
+- 3
+53 - 1-
+03956-9134
+
+b6 - 3!
+03956-9135
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+=MAPQUEST.=
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-
+5923, US
+
+* THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE*
+ROAD TOUR
+ENEEPETANTE
+000
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR A
+TO ONE OF S DESTINATIONS
+012
+Directions
+Distance
+Up Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+03956-9154
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to_
+.. Page 2 0f2
+3061
+670 - 3
+63 -1
+of2
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp[
+83956-9155
+
+56
+-X to see
+thaw old ae you
+18
+I KnaVaure wtik
+ace shin t to tene tolele
+304 oz
+Ist visit aded tar alleen
+mist loke fist ine
+JE48Lt
+Note
+seff ottin
+ou ther
+) Prome #t sle lft
+Ot celled lite
+Fridag ca you
+b3 -1 |
+03956-9160
+
+When than wess in
+towns.
+respect
+alwaysetup radiane
+PBI - FIt 20.00
+- 3,-5
+spad money for trip
+blue don tE brthly
+sex
+cout
+sorless
+When then
+would leave sometines tre
+Leave would
+when they were
+comtas
+back!!
+ARRIVED AND SHE RESPINAEO
+
+• . --.. -
+... .
+56-3,-5
+- betty si
+03956-9162
+
+/
+www.nalmbeachnolice.com
+In any Emergency Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+03956-9163
+
+
+b6 - 31
+63-11
+GETQNUNE Space.com| Home
+The Web O Myspace O
+NOW ICONS
+Miami Job Fair - Sep Zth
+Meet wit over 10- Sofia 2ployers Thur, Sep Why Ray SeCking Dating? When You Car
+_Use Us For Free!
+EXTNEWORKBANINDLng.com
+www.plentyoffish.com
+Search /
+Register on Ebay
+Register today and start saving on all of the
+_millions of Items.
+www.ebay.com/register
+Help | SignUp
+Ads by Google
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Biog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+[Latest Blog Entry (subscribe to this Blogi
+Contacting
+Ma: Send Message
+Bild to Friends
+CL Instant Message
+Ey And to Group
+a Forward to Friend
+3? Add to Favorites
+& Block User
+It Rank User
+Blurbs
+About me:
+http://www.myspace.com|
+03956-9164
+
+
+56 -3
+b3 -11
+03956-9165
+
+
+b3-1
+03956-9166
+
+
+7
+670 - 3
+b3 -11
+03956-9167
+
+
+56-31
+b7c - 3
+http://www.myspace.com/|
+03956-9168
+
+Page 6 of 21b6 - 3, -5|
+- 3, -5
+Who I'd like to meet:
+Friend Space
+Friends Comments
+03956-9169
+
+Details
+/ Status:
+Here for:
+Orientation
+Hometown:
+Body type:
+Ethnicity:
+Zodiac
+Sign:
+Smoke /
+Drink:
+Children:
+Education:
+Occupation.
+Schools
+Page 7 of 2166 - 3, -51
+03956-9170
+
+Page 8 of 2166 -3, -5
+03956-9171
+
+Page 9 of 2106 - 3,-5
+03956-9172
+
+Page 10 of 21b6 -3,-5,
+03956-9173
+
+Page 11 of 21b6 -3,-5 |
+03956-9174|
+
+Page 12 of 2156 - 3, -5,
+03956-9175
+
+Page 13 of 2156 - 3, -5
+03956-9176
+
+Page 14 of 21b6 - 3, - 5
+63 -1
+03956-9177
+
+
+56 -3,-5
+03956-9178
+
+Page 16 of 2106 -3,-5
+03956-9179
+
+06 - 3.-5
+age 17 of 21,70 -3, -5
+03956-9180
+
+Page 18 of 2166 - 3, -5 1
+03956-9181
+
+Page 19 of 21b6 - 3,- 5
+http://www.myspace.com_
+03956-9182
+
+Page 20 of 2166 - 3, -5
+03956-9183
+
+Page 21 of 21 b6 -3, -5
+Add Comment
+About| FAQ| Terms| Privacy, | Safety Tips| Contact MySpace | Report Inappropriate Content | Promote!| Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+03956-9184
+
+
+MySpace.com | Help | Signout
+Web | MySpace | People | Music | Blogs | Video *
+Search Web
+Distance Learning Career Programs
+Distance Learning Online
+Earn your degree in your spare time at the University of Phoenix
+Find out whet you need to complete your degree. Then earn your
+online. Undergraduate, teaching and graduate programs, Request inf
+day to start vour career game plar
+degree online in as short a tine as possible. Business, IT, education.
+Non-profit and regionally accredited.
+wwww.uphoenixonline.com
+ww.w.squ.edu
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Pictures of
+Click Picture for Full View & Comments
+56 - 3,-5.
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/indexcim?fuseaction=user. viwPicture&friend/DeMyToken
+03956-9185
+
+
+b6 -3, -5
+b70 - 3, -5
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.view/Picture&friendID- MyToken
+03956-9186
+
+-View More Pictures
+
+About | EAQ | Terms | Privacy. | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID-_
+].MyToken
+03956-9187
+
+66
+63 -1
+MY SPACE
+(CURRENT) (PRIVATE)
+03956-9188
+
+
+Free Animated Cursors!!
+Click
+Here
+MySpace
+Search
+powered Google"
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+This profile is set to private. This user must
+add you as a friend to see his/her profile.
+Contacting
+X send Message
+*8 Add to Friends
+go Instant Message
++08 Add to Group
+MySpace URL:
+Forward to Friend
+E Add to Favorites
+Block User
+Rark User
+About | FAQ| Ierms | Privacy 1 Safety Tips 1 Contact MySpace | Report Abuse I Promotel 1 Advertise I MySpace International
+03956-9189
+
+
+67C - 3
+63 - 11
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+......
+03956-9190
+
+r
+File Number ..
+31S.MM» 108062-1A113
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence_ MM BBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document __
+Date Received _
+VACIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By
+SA
+To Be Returned L
+Yes .
+EÑo
+Receipt Given • Yes
+ENo
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+ENo
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+66 - 2
+b7C -2
+Title:
+Reference:
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+BicarAshical File on
+and My Space inforMation:.
+03956-9191
+
+www.paimbeachpolice.com
+b6 - 3
+67C - 3
+In any Emergency
+Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+03956-9192
+
+:www.myspace.com/
+
+b6 -3:
+53 -1|
+THE WEB C MYSPACE r
+[Scarch
+nore packages
+логе ways to savi
+Packages start at
+$1900*
+mo. for 10 months
+*Resbictions Apply:
+GET DISH...
+dish
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Filin | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Help! SignUp
+VIEW MY: Pics! Videos
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9193
+
+
+56-3
+MYSPACE URL:
+HTTP://WWW.MYSPACE.COM
+INTERESTS
+GENERAL
+TELL ME ABOUT YOURSELF - TH
+MUSIC
+HEIGHT
+RIGHT HANDED OR LEFT HANDED
+YOUR HERITAGI
+THE SHOES YOU WORE TODAY
+YOUR WEAKNESS
+YOUR FEARS
+YOUR PERFECT PIZZA
+GOAL YOU WOULD LIKE TO ACHIEVE
+MOVIES
+TELEVISIO
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-9194
+
+
+BOOKS
+HEROES
+DO YOU LIKE THUNDERSTORMS
+DO YOU PLAY AN INSTRUMENT
+IN THE PAST MONTH HAVE YOU DRANK
+ALCOHOL
+IN THE PAST MONTH HAVE YOU
+SMOKED
+IN THE PAST MONTH HAVE YOU BEEN
+ON DRUGS
+IN THE PAST MONTH HAVE YOU GONE
+ON A DATE
+IN THE PAST MONTH HAVE YOU GONE
+IN THE PAST MONTH HAVE YOU EATEN
+A BOX OF OREOS
+IN THE PAST MONTH HAVE YOU EATEN
+IN THE PAST MONTH HAVE YOU BEEN
+ON STAGE
+IN THE PAST MONTH HAVE YOU BEEN
+DUMPED
+IN THE PAST MONTH HAVE YOU GONE
+SKINNY DIPPING
+EVER BEEN BEATEN UP
+EVER SHOPLIFTED
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9195
+
+Page 4 of 25b6 - 3, -5
+GROUPS:
+HOW DO YOU WANT'TO DIE
+WHAT DO YOU WANT TO BE WHEN WUP
+WHAT COUNTRY WOULD YOU MOST
+LIKE TO VISIT
+IN A BOYA
+FAVOURITE EYE COLOR
+FAVOURITE HAIR COLOR
+SHORT OR LONG HAIR
+WEIGHT
+BEST CLOTHING STYLE
+NUMBER OF DRUGS I HAVE TAKEN
+NUMBER OF CDS I OWN
+DETAILS
+STATUS:
+HERE FOR:
+ORIENTATION:
+HOMETOWN:
+BODY TYPE:
+ETHNICITY:
+RELIGION:
+ZODIAC SIGN:
+CHILDREN:
+EDUCATION:
+OCCUPATION:
+NETWORKING
+Take This Survey
+CREATE YOUR OWNI OR GET PAIN TO
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9196
+
+Page 5 of 2566 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9197
+
+Page 6 of 2566 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-9198
+
+• www.myspace.com
+Page 7 of 2556 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-9199
+
+Page 8 of 2566 - 3, - 5
+63 -1
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendiD=
+03956-9200
+
+Page 9 of 2:b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfim?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9201
+
+Page 10 of 2566 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9202
+
+• www.myspace.com/
+Page 11 of 25b6 - 3,-5 '
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID_
+03956-9203
+
+Page 12 of 2566 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9204
+
+Page 13 of 2:66 -3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&.friendID=
+03956-9205
+
+Page 14 of 25b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9206
+
+
+[
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-9207
+
+Page 16 of 2566 - 3, -5
+- 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9208
+
+Page 17 of 25b6 -3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendD=
+03956-9209
+
+Page 18 of 25b6 - 3, -5
+- 3, - 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-9210
+
+• www.myspace.com
+
+b6 -3.
+670 - 3
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-9211
+
+•www.myspace.com
+Page 20 of 2566 - 3, -5;
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID|
+03956-9212
+
+• www.myspace.com/_
+Page 21 of 2566 - 3, -5
+b7c -3,- 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-9213
+
+• www.myspace.com_
+Page 22 of 2566 - 3, -51
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-9214
+
+•www.myspace.com
+Page 23 of 25b6 - 3, - 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-
+03956-9215
+
+• www.myspace.com_
+Page 24 of 2566 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID1
+03956-9216
+
+
+About! FAQ: Terms; Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Inappropriate Content | Promotc! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2006 MYSPACE.COM. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=_
+03956-9217
+
+
+MySpace.com | Help | Signout
+Web | MySpace | People | Music | Blogs | Video A
+Search Web
+TE
+Pictures of
+35.
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy 1 Classifieds
+Click Picture for Full View & Comments
+b6 -3,-5
+b70-3,-5
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/indexefm?fuseaction-user.viewPicture&etendID MyToken
+03956-9218
+
+
+b7c -3,-5
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfim?fuseaction-user.view/PicturedfiendlDeMytoken
+03956-9219
+
+«View More Pictures
+
+About | FAQ! Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+•.
+03956-9220
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID-
+TeMyToken_
+b6-3,
+463-1
+
+b6 - 31
+b70 -3
+b3 -1.
+oratietotamtin s ': ritsintoesiniaoasfta-u ustinestrinătimts c
+03956-9221
+
+* Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+=MAPQUESTE
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-
+5923, US
+* THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE*
+ROAD TOUR
+SWEEPETANEO
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR A
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+Lip Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+03956-9242
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL t
+.. Page 2 of 2
+106
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/miain.adp?
+93956-9244
+
+12/25/04
+c/a/o4
+03956-9246
+
+FD-340 (Rev, 4-11-03)
+31EMM-1080621A114
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence .
+MM PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Pocument _..
+Date Received
+VACIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By
+SA
+To Be Retuned
+Yes .
+ET No
+Receipt Given • Yes
+DINo
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+ENO
+106-2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+1b6 - 3
+:b7C -3
+..
+03956-9249
+
+404
+56-3
+03956-9250
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+=MAPQUESTE
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-
+5923, US
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE
+ROAD TOUR
+SWEEPSTANEE
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Dileactione
+Distanco
+63 - 1|
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/
+03956-9265
+
+Driving Directions from. 50SS Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+END
+'16
+Total Est.
+
+006
+Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+1
+88256-9266
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, EL to L
+...
+
+006
+013
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+063
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, roac
+conditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest and its suppliers assume no
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp/
+83956-9267
+
+Epsten
+10/25
+Rich gurt- Jun
+a lot o roelt
+hans
+- Duriyschoel yea
+b6 -1,-3
+-b7C -1,-3
+7 taai to Epstein
+Gint colled
+aswend
+showd ten
+Nand houd
+- toh them
+upsturs
+Silte
+ta leri
+Slig en couch / Epstein
+toch a showen lijnst.
+# fora rus
+03956-9369
+
+r
+FD-340 (Rey. 4-11-03)
+3IE-MM: 108062-119115
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence MM. " POCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _*
+Date Received
+VArIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Inerviewee)
+(Address)
+b6 -2
+-2
+By
+SA
+To Be Returned
+ENo
+4 No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+Yes
+ENO
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTY)
+Yes
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+escription:
+/ Original notes re interview of
+566 -3
+$b7c
+03956-9373
+
+56 - 3-
+03956-93741
+
+: 7/28/04
+10,87
+10,06
+03956-9387
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/b00b5e94214e3f9278a839cd8cbaf42860d732f2d1f580dda13de78845268d39.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/b00b5e94214e3f9278a839cd8cbaf42860d732f2d1f580dda13de78845268d39.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7c57003ee44cabcf2e6da77020d87001f65a6cbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/b00b5e94214e3f9278a839cd8cbaf42860d732f2d1f580dda13de78845268d39.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -10005,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "b00b5e94214e3f9278a839cd8cbaf42860d732f2d1f580dda13de78845268d39",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 88,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.page-footer\", \"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "1e9e27b05af4dcf7c009d1ecd7e619499dda7934b8f7e775dfd68dacaac63994",
+  "output_sha256": "cc438e206bbc08a204a9f20b1cb678831dc2228c09cb3674cecc10917a7e7a18",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/b8d3ed37b0a1baab90759ba2e3692106b503e3a14763e52ce8638a8455992e93.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/b8d3ed37b0a1baab90759ba2e3692106b503e3a14763e52ce8638a8455992e93.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e09b8a2b0f354b5505673470c3ed0a219f25ff5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/b8d3ed37b0a1baab90759ba2e3692106b503e3a14763e52ce8638a8455992e93.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2628 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 326
+Page 6 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7E - 1;
+Page 7 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7E - 1;
+Page 8 ~ b6 - 2,-8; b7C - 2,-8; b7E - 1;
+Page 9 ~ b6 - 2,-8; b7C - 2,-8; b7E - 1;
+Page 10 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7E - 1;
+Page 11 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7E - 1;
+Page 12 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 13 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C -
+5, -8; b7E - 1;
+Page 14 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7E - 1;
+Page 15 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7E - 1;
+Page 16 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8;
+67E - 1;
+Page 17
+= b6
+5, -8; b7C -
+5,- 8;
+b7E
+Page 18 ~ b6
+- 5, -8; b7C
+5,-8;
+b7E
+Page 19 ~ b6
+- 5,-8; b7C
+5,-8;
+b7E
+Page 20 ~ b6 -
+5,-8;
+5,-8;
+b7E
+Page
+21 " b6
+- 5,-8; b7C
+5,-8;
+b7E
+Page
+22 ~ b6 - 5,-8;
+5,- 8;
+b7E
+Page 23
+~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C
+5,-8;
+b7E
+Page 24
+- b6
+- 5,-8; b7C
+5,-8;
+b7E
+Page 25
+» b6
+5,-8; b7C -
+5,-8;
+b7E
+Page 26
+b6 - 5,-8; b7C -
+5,- 8;
+b7E
+Page
+27
+~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C -
+5,-8;
+b7E
+Page
+28
+- 06-5,-8; b7C- 5,-8;
+b7E
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1
+1;
+Page
+29
+= bE
+8; b7C - 8; b7E -
+Page
+30
+~ 66 - 8; b7C - 8; b7E -
+H
+Page 31
+~ b6
+- 5,-8; b7C -
+5,-8;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 32 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C -
+5, -8;
+b7E
+1;
+Page
+33 ~ 066 -
+5,-8;
+b7C -
+5, -8;
+b7E
+1;
+Page
+34 ~ 66 - 5,-8;
+b7C -
+5,-8;
+67E
+1;
+Page 35 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C -
+5, -8;
+b7E
+1;
+Page
+36
+~ b6
+- 5, -8; b7C
+5, -8;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 37 - b6
+- 5,-8; b7C-
+5,-8;
+67E
+1;
+Page 38
+~ 66 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7E - 1;
+Page
+39
+" bE
+- 5,-8;
+b70 - 5,-8; bE - 1;
+Page
+40
+~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C-
+5, -8; b7E - 1;
+Page 41
+~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7E - 1;
+Page 42 ~ 66 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7E - 1;
+Page
+43
+~ 66 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7E - 1;
+Page 44
+~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7E - 1;
+Page 53 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page
+54 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 55 - b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 56
+- 06-3,-5; b7C -3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 57 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 58
+~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5; b7E - 1;
+Page 59 - b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 60 ~ b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 61 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+
+Page 62 ~ b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 66 - Duplicate;
+Page 67 - Duplicate;
+Page 70 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7E - 1;
+Page 71 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 72 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 73 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 74 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 75 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 76 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 77 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 78 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 79 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C -
+1,-5; b7E
+- Li
+Page 80 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C -
+1,-5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 81 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 82 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 83 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 84 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 85 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 86
+~ bf
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 87
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E
+- 1:
+Page 88
+~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E
+- 1 :
+Page 89 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page
+90
+= b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page
+91
+- b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 92
+» b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 93
+~ b6 - 1,-2; b7C - 1,-2;
+b7E
+1;
+Page
+94
+~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7E - 1;
+Page
+95 - b6 - -1,-5; b7C - -1,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+96
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7E - 1;
+Page
+97
+- b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+98
+~ b6
+- -1; b7C - -1; b7E - -1;
+Page 99 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 100 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 101 ~ 66 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 102 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7E - 1;
+Page
+103 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7E - 1;
+Page 104 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+105 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+106- 66-1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+107 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 108 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 109 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 110 ~ 66 - 1,-5; b7C -
+1,-5;
+67E
+- 1;
+Page 111 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7e
+-1;
+Page 112 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 113 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 114 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 115 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 116 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 117 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page
+118 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 119 ~ 66 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 123 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+
+Page 124 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 125 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 126 ~ b3; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E
+- 1;
+Page
+127 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 128 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 129 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 130 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+- 5;
+b7E
+-1;
+Page 131 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+3,
+- 5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 132 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, - 5; b7C
+3,
+-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 133 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3
+-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 134 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 135 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 136 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 137 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 138 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 139 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 140 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 141 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 142 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 143 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 146 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 147 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C-
+3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 148 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C -
+3;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 149 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C -
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 150 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C -
+3
+;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 151 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 152 - b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page
+153 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1
+;
+Page 154 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1;
+Page 155 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 156 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3.-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 157
+= b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 158 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 159 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 160 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 161 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 162 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 163 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 164 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 165 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 166 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 167 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 168 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 169 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 170 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 171 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 172 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 177 - Duplicate;
+Page 178 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 179 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 180
+~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 181 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 182 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 183 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+
+Page 184 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 185 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 186 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 187 ~ b7E - 1;
+Page 188 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 189
+~ b3 - 1: b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 193 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 194 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 195 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+b7E - 1:
+Page 196 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 197 ~ 63
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 198 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 199 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+- 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 200 - b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 201 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 202 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 203 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 204 - b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 205 ~ b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 206 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 207 - b6 - 5; b7C -
+5: b7E
+- 1;
+Page 208 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 209 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 210 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 211 ~ b7E - 1;
+Page 214 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+1; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 2,-3;
+Page 215 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 216 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 217 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 218 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 219 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 220 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 221 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 222 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E -
+1;
+Page 223 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 224 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 225 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 234 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 235 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-2,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-2,-3,-5; b7D - 1;
+Page
+236 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3; b7D - 1;
+Page 237 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+Page 238 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 239 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 240 ~ b3
+1; b6
+- 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 241 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 242 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 243 ~ b3
+-1;
+b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 244 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 245 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7 - 1;
+Page 246 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 247
+~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 248
+~b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 249 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 250 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+
+Page 251 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 252 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 253 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 257 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 258 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 259 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 260 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 261 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b70 - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 262 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 263 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 264 ~ 66 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 265 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 266 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 267 - b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 268 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 269 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 270 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 271 - b6
+- 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 272 - b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 273 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7E
+- 1;
+Page 274 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5: b7E
+1;
+Page 275 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 276 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 277 - b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 278 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1
+;
+Page 279 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1;
+Page 280 - b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 281 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3.-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 282 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3.-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1,
+Page 283 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 284 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 285 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 286 - b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 287 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 288 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 289 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+-1;
+Page 290 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 291 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1;
+Page 292 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1;
+Page 293 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1;
+Page 294 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1;
+Page 295 - Duplicate;
+Page 296 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 297 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 298 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 299 ~ Duplicate;
+Page
+300 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 301 - Duplicate;
+Page 302 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 303 - Duplicate;
+Page 304 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 305 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 306 - Duplicate;
+Page 307 - Duplicate;
+
+Page 308 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 309 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 310 - Duplicate;
+Page 311 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 312 - Duplicate;
+Page 313 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 314 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 315 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 316 - Duplicate;
+Page 317 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 318 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 319 - Duplicate;
+Page 320 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 321 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 322 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 323 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 324 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 325 - b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 326 - b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7E
+1
+;
+Page 327 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 328 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 329 - b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 330 ~ b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 331 ~ b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 332 ~ b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 333 ~ b6 - 5; b7C|
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 334 - b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 335 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 336 - b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 337 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1;
+Page 338 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1;
+Page 339 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 340 - b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 341 ~ b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 404 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1:
+Page 405 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - Z,-3; b7C -
+2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 406 - b3
+1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C -
+2,-3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 408 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 409 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b70 -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 410 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 411 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+412 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 413 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page
+414 ~ 63
+1; b6
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1:
+Page 415 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 416 - b3
+1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 420 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-2,-3; b7C - 1,-2,-3; b7D - 1; b7E - 1;
+Page 421 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 1; b7E - 1;
+Page 422 ~ b3 - 1; b6
+- 2,-3, 5; b7C - 2,-3,-5;
+Page 451 ~ b3 - -1; b6 - -3; b7C - -3; b7E - -1;
+Page 452 - b3
+- -1; b6 - -3; b7C - -3; b7E - -1;
+Page 453 ~ b3
+- 1; 66- -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 454 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 455 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+
+Page 456 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 457 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 458 ~ b3 - 1; 66 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 459 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 460 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - -3,-5; b7C - -3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 461 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 463 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 464 ~ Duplicate;
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXxxxxxxXX
+Deleted Page(s)
+* No Duplication Fee X
+For this Page
+X
+X
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2007-01-01
+2007-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2007-01-01
+2007-01-01
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253. (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253 (U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+b6-21
+b7C -2
+03956-6768
+3/E-MM-108062-1A
+
+File Number -
+-3IE.MM:108062-1A98
+Field office Acquiring Evidence_ MM/PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document ..*
+Date Received -
+Various
+From
+(Name of Contribulor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(city and sire)
+66-2
+-2
+By
+To Be Returned O
+Yes.
+ENNo
+Receipt Given
+• Yes
+D-NO
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI).
+- Yes
+DINO
+Title:
+Reference:
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+Biographical i file for
+b6 -5,
+- 8
+-5, -8
+*5*
+03956-6769
+
+03956-6770
+Epstein Mith Teadar
+= No:
+- No
+- No
+b6-1,-5,-8
+b7C -1,-5,-8
+
+Map of
+Citysearch
+
+66 - 8
+b7C -8
+SWEET
+HOLIDAY DEALS
+To find more deals and gift ide
+Toys & Games
+Jewelry
+done Decorations
+sho
+!
+•Citysearch
+Home
+Restaurants & Bars (Hotels Shopping Spa& Beauty Movies Events Legories»
+Search
+Business name, category, and/or keyword
+Address, city & state, or zip
+Search by name only
+Rely Locations Y|
+Home • Yellow Pages • Automotive • Service Stations • Profile • Map
+iF Save to My Citysearch
+-A Auto Service Cente
+bacializine in Land Ravar Ganice for over 17 years
+www.a-aaauto.com
+Service Station Supplies from Concept
+Concept's Catalog offers quality and innovative products for service stations, c-stores, truck stops and car washes.
+cv1.coliatech.com
+66 - 8
+b70 - 8
+E send to a Friend
+own this business?
+» Enhance er edit your listing
+ee something wrong
+_ Suggest a correctio
+* Things to do nearby:
+• Restaurants
+• Hotels
+• Bars
+• Movie Theaters
+• Department Stores
+• Shopping. Centers & Malls
+• Grocery Stores
+• Pharmacies
+• Florists
+• Banks
+http:|
+tysearch.com/map?mode=g008id-9142661&map latermap o.. 123005810
+
+Map of
+- Citysearch
+
+* Related Searches
+CLUBAOLE
+Regional
+& Driving Directions
+1. Enter starting address:
+Address:
+2. Enter destination address:
+Address:
+City:
+City:
+State:
+Postal Code:
+State:
+Postal Code:
+• Options
+Display type:
+• Text
+• Turn by turn maps with text
+Avoid the following:
+•Limited access highways
+• Ferry lanes
+Calculate Directions
+• Find A Different Location
+Enter Location Address:
+Address:
+i
+City:
+State:
+SC
+Postal Code:
+When cllcking on the map
+© Zoom in • Zoom out
+66 - 8
+b70 -8
+Calculate Directions
+MapQuest.com, Inc. Term of Use and Copyright Information
+sponsored links
+Service Station Supplies from Concept
+Concept's Catalog offers quality and innovative products for service stations,
+c-stores, truck stops and car washes.
+cv1.collatech.com
+www.shopping.com
+http://
+citysearch.com/map?mode=geo&id=9142667&map_lat-C
+03956-6811
+]map_1o... 12/9/2005
+
+- Citysearch
+
+- -
+Cities I Get a Business Website | Submit an Event 1 Privacy Policy I Jerms of Use |
+Citysearch is a registered trademark of 720619 Ontario Inc. and is used under license
+(C) 2005 Citysearch.com All rights reserved.
+partner sites:
+Evite - Entertainment.com - Gifts.com - TripAgvisor - ServiceMagic - Ticketmaster - Expedia - Hotelș. com - Hotwire - HSN - Lendin.
+RealEstate.com - ReserveAmerica - Zerodegrees - CondoSaver - ÇlassicVacations - Ballard Designs - Frontgațe - Garnet Hill - Smiti
+Ahead - Trąvel Smith
+56 -81
+-8
+http:/
+citysearch.com/map?mode=geo&id=9142667&map_lat
+03956-6812
+&map_lo. 12/9/2005
+
+- Citysearch
+
+Citysearch
+Home • Yellow Pages • Automotive • Service Stations • Profile • Map • Printer Friendly Version
+A-A Auto Service Center
+Specializing in Land Rover Service for over 17 years!
+www.a-adauto.com
+Service Station Supplies from Concept
+Concept's Catalog offers quality and innovative products for service stations, c-stores, truck stops and car washes.
+LEW HAF]
+66-8.
+b70 - 8
+- MapQuest.com, Inc. Term of Use and Copyright Information
+Service Station Supplies from Concept
+Concept's Catalog offers quality and innovative products for service stations, c-stores, truck stops and car washes.
+v1.collatech.com
+Service Station at Shopping.com
+Find, compare and buy Service Station products. Read product reviews and compare prices with tax and shipping fro
+www.shopping.com
+About Us | Advertise with Us | Contact Us | Press Center | Site Guide | List Your Business on Citysearch | Become an Affiliate | Job
+http:/
+_citysearch.com/map?=&level=9&c_zip=&map_lat-
+03956-6813
+Bemode=geo&... 12/9/2005
+
+- Citysearch
+
+Cities | Get a Business Website | Submit an Event | Privacy Policy | Terms of Use
+Citysearch is a registered trademark of 720619 Ontario Inc. and is used under license
+(C) 2005 Citysearch.com All rights reserved.
+kellow Pages
+vite - Entertainment.com - Gifts.com - TripAdvişor - ServiceMągic - Ticketmaster - Expedia - Hotels.com - Hotwire - HSN - Lendi
+ealestate com - ReserveAmerica - Zerodegrees - CondoSaver - Classicvacations - Ballard Designs - Frontgate - Garnet Hill - Smi
+66-8
+b70 - 8
+hitp:/
+03956-6814
+citysearch com/map?=&level-9&c_zip=&map_lat emode-geo&... 12/9/2005
+66 -8.
+670 - 8
+
+03956-6815
+31E-MM-108042-1498
+
+03956-6816
+
+3IE-MM-108062-1A99
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+Serial # of Originating Document _
+Date Received _ Various
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address).
+(City and State)
+b6
+-2
+- 2
+By
+To Be Returned
+Yes.
+Receipt Giyen
+E Yes
+Grazid Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuazt to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Proçedure
+• Yes
+No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTİ)
+- Yes
+4I No
+Title:
+References.
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+• Original notes ie interview of
+Bioeranticals file for
+- 3
+03956-6817
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+We...
+Page 1 of2b6 -1,-3
+b7C -1,-3
+- MAPQUEST=
+Start:
+505S Flagler Dr
+West Palm Beach; FL 33401-
+5923, US
+* THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE*
+ROADITOUR
+SWEEFSTAKES
+106
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+Lop Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to _
+We... Page 2 of 2b6 -1,-3
+b7c -1, -3
+b3
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp
+873920-8829
+
+03956-6830
+
+66 - 1
+03956-6833
+
+31E-MM-:1080621A100.
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence -
+_MM PRERA
+Serial # of Originating Document —
+Date Received VACIOUS
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Intervielvee)
+(Address)
+command sister
+56 -2
+b70-2
+By
+To Be Returned LI Yes.
+Receipt Given •] Yes
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• D Yes
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+Title:
+ENo
+E-No
+ENo
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Malerial)
+• Original notes re interview of
+mascoenical Eite on
+b6
+03956-6834
+
+03956-6885
+3/E-MM 108062-11100
+
+.b6 - 31
+63 - 11
+03956-6886
+
+FD-340 (Rey. 4-11-03)
+tite Number 3LE-MM-108062-1AID1
+Bield Office Acquiring Evidence_ Mm/PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _
+Date Received Various:
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewce)
+(Address)"
+(City and State)
+b6
+-2
+-2
+By
+To BeRetuned O
+Yes .
+E No
+Receipt Given
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Ride 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+Yes
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+INo
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Comunication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+Original notes te interview of
+Biogradhial file for
+b6
+- 3
+03956-5887-
+
+".
+03956-6909
+3IE-MM-108062-11101
+
+b6-5
+b7C -5
+Possible
+03956-6910
+
+03956-6938
+3IE-11M-108042-1A101
+
+56 - 3
+53-1
+03956-6939
+
+сси"
+66 -3
+b3
+03956-6940
+
+Fic Number_ 3\E-MM-108.062-1A102
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+Mm/PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document - i
+Date Received Various.
+Front
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewec)
+(Address)
+(City and State).
+56
+-2
+-2
+By
+To Be Retuned D Yes:
+Receipt Given
+Yes
+D No
+Grand Jury Material: - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+Yes
+DN0.
+Federal Taxpäyer Information (FT1)
+Yes
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Comptunication Enclosing Matérial)
+Description: .
+Original notes ré interview of
+Biosiashical file on
+- 3
+b3
+, -1
+03956-6941
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+= MAPQUESTE
+Start:
+505 S Flagler Dr
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-
+5923, US
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE"
+ROADITOUR
+EWEERSTAKES
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR A
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+Lip Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+
+
+Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, EL to L
+
+Start:
+505 S Flagler Dr
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+Ench
+All rights reserved. Use Subiect to License/Copyright
+hese directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, roa
+anditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest and its suppliers assume I
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+http://ww.mapquest.com/directipps/mim.adp_
+
+
+03956-6957
+386-14-108062-17102
+
+03956-6977
+3IE:4M-108042-1A102
+
+Record Request
+FD-125 (Rev. 4-1-93)
+• Birth O Credit
+* Criminal
+• Death
+To
+ISS
+Return to
+SA
+Name and aliases ofsubject, applicant, or employee, and spouse
+Dao_ 06/08/2007
+• Marriage* l Motor Vehicle I Other
+Buded
+31E-MM-.10806Z
+66 - 2
+670-2
+b7c -3
+b6 - 2
+57C - 2
+Address
+Residence
+Business
+Former
+*Date and place of marriage
+(ifapplicable)
+Birth date
+Arrest Number
+T
+Social Security Number
+Age
+Height
+- Birthplace
+Fingerprint classification
+Weight
+Hair
+Eyes
+Criminal specialty
+b70 - 3
+Divers License Number
+• D/L Photo O Other
+Specific information desir
+NCIC
+Results of check
+b7E
+03956-6978
+
+3IE-NM+108062-17102
+03956-6991
+
+Elle Number 31E-MM-108062-11103
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence .
+Mm, PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document_
+Date Received : Various
+From
+(Name of Contributor/interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+b6 -2
+b7C -2
+By
+To Be Returned • Yes.
+ENo
+Receipt Given
+• Yes
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+ENo
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+ENO
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+A Original notes re interview of
+Biographicad file on
+arad Myspace infernation is
+b6
+03956-6992
+
+56 - 31
+(MYSPACE)
+(CURRENT) (PRiVATE)
+03956-6993
+
+
+b70 - 3
+MySpace.com / Home
+Message Alert
+The Web O
+MySpace O
+You have 1 message waiting for you.
+Search
+Help | SignUp
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+This profile is set to private. This user must
+add you as a friend to see his/her profile.
+www.palmbeachpolice.com
+Contacting
+Mr Send Message
+88 Asid to Friends
+Fl Instant Message
+Cy Add to Groups
+23 Fornard to Friend
+CEl Ard to Favorites
+23 Block User
+In any Emergency Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+Non-Emergency (561) 838-5454
+MySpace URL:
+http://www.myspace.com
+About | EAQ! Ierms | Privacy I Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Inappropriate Content | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+:
+:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-
+03956-6994
+
+• www.myspace.com
+
+deensaverscom
+Flick Banner to swing net
+Win
+Spongebab
+aVel
+MySpace
+¡ Search
+powered Google
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite I Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+This profile is set to private. This user must
+add you as a friend to see his/her profile,
+Contacting
+E send Message
+*8 Add to Friends
+8° Instant Message
+*88 Add to Group
+MySpace URL:
+http://www.myspace.com/
+Forward to Friend
+Ed Add to Favorites
+• Block User
+*8 Rank User
+-'..
+. "
+About | FAQ| Terms! Privacy I Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Abuse I Promotel I Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-6995
+
+03956-6996
+
+OfficeMass
+2847501-302
+234150111s
+03956-6997
+
+b3-1-
+7. ...
+03956-6998
+
+• Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+=MAPQUEST.=
+Start:
+505 S Flagler Dr
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-
+5923, US
+" THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE*
+ROADITOUR
+EWEEPSTAKES
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR A
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp/
+
+
+• Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+Printer-friendly page sponsored by HP
+Page 2 0f3
+b70 - 3
+;
+013
+üi i
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp_
+
+
+• * Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to_
+
+06 -3
+7C - =
+b3 -1:
+Start:
+505 S Flagler Dr
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+
+
+03956-7107
+3IE+M14-108062-/7103
+
+- 31
+- 3
+MY SPACE
+CURRENT ACCOUNT
+03956-7108
+
+File Number _
+31E MM-108062-1A104
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence Mir/ PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received _ Various
+From
+*Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+b6
+-2
+b7C -2
+By
+To Be Returned • Yes.
+Receipt Given • Yes
+[No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+- Yes
+iANo
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTT)
+• Yes
+ENo
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+* Original notes re interview of
+Biossanhicalifile for
+and Myspace information
+b3
+- 3
+- 1
+03956-7109
+
+_ graphics
+Page 1 of 27b6 -3,-5
+b70 - 3, -5
+Lyrics
+Pimp-My Frotie, con
+Profile Tools
+Ip My Space!
+MySpace
+.. Search
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy I
+Classifieds
+Last Login:
+5/29/2007
+View My: Pics | Videos
+Contacting.....
+•....'s Latest Blog Entry [Subscribe to this Blog]
+(view more)
+(view more)
+[View All Blog Entries]
+.....'s Blurbs
+About me:
+MySpace URL:
+http://www.myspace.com
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-7110
+
+Page 2 of 27 b6 - 3, -5 ;
+i Dont Worry Baby
+lusic
+tadd+
+.....'s Interests
+General
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-7111
+
+
+63-1i
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-7112
+
+Page 4 of 27 b6 - 3, -5 {
+- 3,- 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-7113
+
+Page 5 of 27 b6 - 3, -5 {
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-7114
+
+
+D3 - 1
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-7115
+
+Page 7 of 2706 -3, -5_ i
+-3,-5
+1
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-
+03956-7116
+
+T
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+Page 8 of 27 b6 - 3, -5
+-b3 -1
+03956-7117
+
+Page 9 of 27 b6 - 3, -5 (
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-
+03956-7118
+
+Page 10 of 21b6 - 3, -5 |
+b7c -3, -5
+b3
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID:|
+03956-7119
+
+Page 11 of 27 b6 - 3,- 5
+.....'s Details
+Status:
+Orientation:
+Hometown:
+Body type:
+Ethnicity:
+Religion:
+Zodiac Sign:
+Smoke / Drinks
+Children:
+Education:
+*....'s Schools
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendiD=
+03956-7120
+
+
+56-31
+63 - 1 |
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-7121
+
+
+b6-3
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-7122
+
+Page 14 of 27 b6 - 3, -5 /
+b70 - 3,- 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-7123
+
+
+56-31
+63-1!
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-7124
+
+Page 16 of 27 b6 -3, -5
+b7C -3, - 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&.friendiD
+03956-7125
+
+Page 17 of 27 b6 - 3, - 5 (
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendiD=
+03956-7126
+
+Page 18 of 27 b6 -3, -5 ;
+- 3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendDL
+03956-7127
+
+Page 19 of 27 b6 - 3, -5 |
+http://profile.ryspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-7128
+
+
+b6 - 31
+1
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendiD=
+03956-7129
+
+Page 21 of 27b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfmn?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendiD=
+03956-7130
+
+Page 22 of 27 b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-7131
+
+Page 23 of 27 b6 - 3, -5 |
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-7132
+
+Page 24 of 27 b6 - 3, - 5 |
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&.friendID=
+03956-7133
+
+Page 25 of 27 b6 - 3, - 5 |
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-
+03956-7134
+
+Page 26 of 27 b6 - 3, -5
+b7C -3,- 5
+:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-7135
+
+Page 27 of 27 b6 - 3, - 5|
+b7C - 3,- 5
+• Online Navel
+About FAQ! Terms I Privacy | Safety Tips 1 Contact MySpace | Report Abuse I Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-7136
+
+
+MySpace.com | Help | Signout
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video I Events *
+Search
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to Albums
+#photos
+All.....'s Photos
+RATEFORMERE
+CUSTOMIZE YOUR PHOTOS
+56-3,-5
+htt://iewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID dalbumtd-
+03956-7137
+
+
+0 Commentíel
+56-3,-5
+b70 - 3, -5
+http://iewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cm/fuseaction=user.view/Picture&friendTD album/d-0
+03956-7138
+
+
+Sponsored Links
+Lavalife Local Singles
+Meet 1000s of local singles men and women. Free to join.
+www.lavalife.com
+About | FAQ | Jerms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index,cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID
+&albumid=0
+03956-7139
+66 - 31
+
+:
+- ..
+www.palmbeachpolice.com
+570 - 3
+b3
+n any Emergenc
+Police • Fire « Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+von-Emergency (561) 838-545
+trees 177-3-590691
+03956-7140
+
+Page 1 of 23b6 - 3, -5
+b70 - 3,- 5
+The Enteroom! Home
+The Web
+Universal's
+HALLOWEEN
+HORROR,
+NIGHTS
+MySpace O
+Search 1
+FLORIDA RESIDENTS
+SAVE"*,
+io$27
+Help | SignUp
+BUY IN ADVANCE
+*RESTRICTIONS APPLY
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+is in your extended netwe
+J's Latest Blog Entry (Subscribe to this Blogl
+ast Login
+0/2/200
+View My: Pics | Videos
+Contacting
+D7 Send Message
+83 Alid to Friends
+Cr instart Message
+Cy Adito Group
+Es Forward to Friend
+F alto Favorites
+83 Block User
+if Rank User
+[View All Blog Entries]
+'s Blurbs
+About me:
+MySpace URL:
+http://www.myspace.com
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-
+03956-7141
+
+Page 2 of 2366 - 3, -5'
+Beating Heart Baby
+Head Autonatica
+'s Interests
+tadd+
+tview+
+General
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID.
+03956-7142
+
+Page 3 of 23b6
+- 3,-5
+How You Are In Love
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-7143
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&.friendID-
+03956-7144
+
+Page 5 of 23b6 - 3, -5,
+b7C - 3, - 5
+Music
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-
+03956-7145
+
+Page 6 of 23b6 - 3, -5
+Television
+Heroes
+Groups:
+is Details
+7
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=usex.viewProfile&friendID=/
+03956-7146
+
+Page 7 of 23b6 - 3, -5
+| Status:
+Here for:
+Orientation:
+Hometown:
+Body type:
+Ethnicity:
+Religion:
+Zodiac Sign:
+Smoke / Drink:
+Children:
+Education:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfn?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&.friendID=
+03956-7147
+
+
+66 - 3:
+b3 - 1.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-
+03956-7148
+
+Page 9 of 23b6 - 3, - 5
+b7C -3,- 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-7149
+
+Page 10 of 23b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-7150
+
+• www.myspace.com/_
+Page 11 of 23b6 - 3, -5;
+b7C-3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-7151
+
+Page 12 of 2356 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-7152
+
+Page 13 of 2366 - 3, - 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-
+03956-7153
+
+
+66 - 3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfin?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-
+03956-7154
+
+Page 15 of 2366 -3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-
+03956-7155
+
+Page 16 of 23b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-7156
+
+. www.myspace.com/
+Page 17 of 23b6 - 3, - 5 1
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-C
+03956-7157
+
+Page 18 of 23b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfim?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID=
+03956-7158
+
+Page 19 of 23b6 -3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-7159
+
+Page 20 of 23b6 - 3, -5
+b70 -3,- 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-7160
+
+• Page 21 of 23b6 - 3, -5
+--.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID
+03956-7161
+
+Page 22 of 2356 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-|
+03956-7162
+
+.www.myspace.com/
+Page 23 of 2356 - 3, -5.
+About | FAQ| Terms| Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Inappropriate Content | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID-L
+03956-7163
+
+
+Web | MySpace | People | Music | Blogs | Video b
+mate 1
+INTIMATE DATING'
+Search Web
+lama:
+Woman seeking a:
+Man 2
+Fun & Games El Age: 15E 10 35 0l
+SEARCH
+Pictures d
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Click Picture for Full View & Comments
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm? fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID=
+&MyToken=f0c2341a-f453-448..
+03956-7164
+
+
+b7C -3,- 5
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID-
+&MyToken=f0c2341a-f453-448..
+03956-7165
+
+
+1 Comment(s)
+b6 -3,-5
+0 Comment(s)
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy I Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+.:
+:
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID
+&MyToken=fOc2341a-f453-448..
+03956-7166
+
+03956-7167
+3IE-AM-108062/49104
+
+..
+b6
+- 3
+03956-7168
+
+3IE-MM-108062•1A1D4
+03956-7172
+
+"Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to
+
+= MAPQUESTE
+Start: 505 S Flagler Dr
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-
+5923, US
+• THE AMOCO
+ULTIMATE:
+ROADITOUR
+SWEERETAKES
+End:
+Notes:
+ENTER NOW
+YOU COULD WIN A TRIP FOR 4
+TO ONE OF 5 DESTINATIONS
+Directions
+Distance
+Lip
+Printer-friendiy page sponsored by HP
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.ad/|
+883926-7182
+
+• "Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to _
+. Page 2 of 2
+670-3
+of2
+Start:
+505 S Flagler Dr
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+contions or route escorty or expectious res user assume i or of use apest an he supers, assume no
+responsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use.
+11:
+http://www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp?d
+
+
+7 Hoose
+→ Up stans
+lewes fon
+56 -3|
+63 -1|
+03956-7184
+
+31E-MM-108062-11104
+03956-7188
+
+03956-7189
+
+File Number -
+31E-MM-108062-1A/05
+Sied Office Acquiring Evidence _Mm./PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document...
+Date Received Various
+From
+Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and state.
+66 - 2
+670-2
+By
+To Be Returned • Yes •
+ENO
+Receipt Given • Yes
+[NO
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+[] Yes
+IT NO
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+DINO
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Connieation Enclosing Macia)
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+Biosianbical file on
+and Myspace information*s
+:
+03956-719
+
+www.palmbeachpolice.com
+b6-3
+In any Emergency Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+Non-Emergency (561) 838-5454
+- -•
+03956-7191
+
+Page 1 of21 b6 - 3, -5
+670 - 1
+b3-1
+SignUp | Help
+Search
+matel
+STRATE DATIVE
+The Web
+MySpace
+Rosa92
+Woman, 27
+Body: Slim
+Eyes: Brown
+Your Area
+Sandy2568
+Woman, 22
+Body: Slim
+Eyes: Brown
+Your Area
+dipsitin
+maggeee72
+Woman, 22
+Body: Curvy
+Eyes: Blue
+Your Area
+MySpace.com/Home
+Find Singles in
+Your Area
+SEARCH FREE»
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Biog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+is in your extended network
+[View All Blog Entries]
+Blurbs
+About me:
+view my. Mics, viueas
+Contacting
+L: Send Message
+OB Add to Friends
+dU Instant Message
+Cp Asid to Group
+Et Forward to Friend
+L Acid to Favorites
+53 Block User
+An& Rank User
+ySpace UR
+tp://www.myspace.co
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfi?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-[
+03956-7192
+
+
+Interests
+General
+Music
+Movies
+Television
+Books
+Heroes
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfin?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+0ux0 7193
+
+Groups:
+Status:
+Here for:
+Orientation:
+Hometown:
+Body type:
+Ethnicity:
+Religion:
+Zodiac Sign:
+Children:
+Occupation:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-
+Page 3 of 206 -3, -5
+_b3 -1
+Details
+03956-7194
+
+View All of
+Friends
+Friends Comments
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendTD
+Page 4 of 21b6 - 3, -5
+- 3, -5
+03956-7195
+
+Page 5 of 21b6 - 3, -5 |
+i
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendiD=
+03956-7196
+
+
+b7c - 3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-7197
+
+
+66 -3,-5
+- 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=L
+03956-7198
+
+
+b6-3.-5
+b7C - 3,- 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-7199
+
+
+-3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-7200
+1
+
+Page 10 of 2166 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-7201
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendiD=
+03956-7202
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-7203
+
+
+66-3,-5
+& Online Now!
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-7204
+
+
+b6 -3:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfn?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-7205
+
+
+b6 - 3,- 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-7206
+
+Page 16 of 2156 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID=
+03956-7207
+
++
+
+56-3, -5
+b70-3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendiD
+03956-7208
+
+
+67C -3
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction-user.viewprofile&friendID=_
+03956-7209
+
+
+b6-3.-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfin?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-7210
+
+Page 20 of 21b6 -3, -5
+http://proffle.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID
+03956-7211
+
+Page 21 of 2166 -3,-5|
+b70 -3,- 5
+& Online llaw!
+Add Comment
+About | FAQI Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Report Inappropriate Content | Promote!| Advertise | MySpace International
+.MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved 2006-20038
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendID-[
+03956-7212
+
+
+Web | MySpace | People | Music | Biogs | Video *
+Search Web
+Click to play
+WARP
+Pictures off
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Click Picture for Full View & Comments
+b70-3,-5
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID-
+03956-7213
+_kMyToken=7e7bd171-f489-4b... 10/3/2006
+
+
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+03956-7214
+http://yiewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction-user:viewPicture&friendIDMyToken=7e7bd171-1489.4.. 1013/2006
+
+03956-7215
+3/E-MM+108062-11105
+
+•. Driving Directions from 505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL to L
+_La... Page 2 of2
+of 2
+Start:
+505 S Flagler Dr
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5923, US
+End:
+All rights reserved. Use Subject to License/Copyright
+These directions are informational only. No representation is made or warranty given as to their content, road
+onditions or route usability or expeditiousness. User assumes all risk of use. MapQuest and its suppliers assume r
+esponsibility for any loss or delay resulting from such use
+
+
+3JE-MM-108062-14105
+03956-7230
+
+56 - 31
+MYSPACE
+CURRENT
+03956-7231
+
+FD-340 (Rev, 4-)1-03)
+31E-MM-108062 1A106
+Field Office Acquiring 18vidence_ mm/PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document —
+Date Received _
+Various
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(Chty and Staie)
+b6 -2
+By
+To Be Returned • Yes.
+• No
+Receipt Given
+• Yes
+DINo
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+ENo
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTL)
+Yes
+I No
+-2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Compianication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+[ Original notes re interview of
+Biographical File, tor
+and Myspace informalton s
+56
+03956-7232
+
+www.paimbeachpolice.com
+In any Emergency
+Police • Fire • Medical
+Call 9-1-1
+Non-Emergency (561) 838-5454
+03956-7233
+
+Page 1 of 3956 - 3, -5
+b70-3,-5
+Help | SignUp
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail
+1 Blog I Favorites | Forum I Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-|
+03956-7234
+
+
+MySpace URL:
+http://www.myspace.com/
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-7235
+
+www.myspace.comL
+
+66-3,-5
+67D - 3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-7236
+
+Page 4 of 35b6 - 3, -5
+--
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-7237
+
+Page 5 of 3(b6 - 3, - 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+03956-7238
+
+
+b3 -1!
+:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction-user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-7239
+
+Page 7 of 39b6 - 3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-7240
+
+
+66 - 3;
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid[
+03956-7241
+
+
+63 - 11
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-[
+03956-7242
+
+www.myspace.com/L
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction-user.viewprofile&friendid-[
+03956-7243
+
+Page 11 of 3966 - 3,-31
+1
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+03956-7244
+
+Page 12 of 3956 - 3, - 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-/
+03956-7245
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=|
+03956-7246
+
+Page 14 of 35b6 - 3, -5
+]Details
+Status:
+Here for:
+Orientation:
+Hometown:
+Body type:
+Ethnicity:
+Zodiac Sign:
+Smoke / Drink:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction-user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-7247
+
+
+Children:
+Education:
+Occupation:
+Companies
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-j
+03956-7248
+
+
+Web | MySpace | People | Music | Blogs | Video b
+Free Animated Cursors!!
+Click
+Here
+Search Web
+Pictures off
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Click Picture for Full View & Comments
+56-3,-5
+b70 -3,-5
+03956-7249
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID
+7&МyToken=56d7cd1d-Occf-43._10/3/2006
+
+
+9 Comment(s)
+b7C-3,-5
+About | EAQ | Terms | Privacy. | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace. International
+©2003-2006 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+03956-7250
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cim?fuseaction=user.view/Picture&friendID7&MyIoken=S6d7cd1d-0ccf-43..10/3/2006
+
+03956-7251
+3IE-MM-108062-14106
+
+Page 1 of 11 b6 - 3,-5,
+HEADRUSH_LYIS
+RAMP
+SARISENES
+She's a hot,
+topless hiond
+mis this a been show
+or a freak show?
+myspace
+groups | events | videos music i gomedy | dassifiedş
+You Gotta
+See What
+Happens!
+23. 0R
+Click Here
+NoW!
+send Message
+*% Add to Friends
+g° Instant Message
++88 Add to Group
+ıyszace t
+tp://www.myspace.a
+Forward to Friend
+Add to Favorites
+& Blocke liser
+* Rank User
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+03956-7252
+
+
+status:
+here for:
+orientation:
+hometown:
+bodytype:
+ethnicty:
+zodac sign:
+chedren:
+occupation:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-7253
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-7254
+
+Page 4 of 11 b6 - 3,-5 ,
+:
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-7255
+
+b6 -3,-5:
+
+b7C - 3, - 5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-7256
+
+Page 6 of 11 b6 -3,-5 !
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-7257
+
+www.myspące.com
+Page 7 of 11 be -3, -5.
+b70 -3, -5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+03956-7258
+
+Page 8 of 11 b6 - 3, -5 !
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-7259
+
+Page 9 of 11 b6 - 3,-5
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid
+03956-7260
+
+
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=
+03956-7261
+
+Page 11 of 1l
+b3-1'
+about tag me apa satyps contact
+myspace i reportabuse I promotel I advertise l myspace
+international
+©2003-2007 myspace com al rights reserved.
+http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid-
+03956-7262
+
+
+LAMPOON
+RRESENUS*
+She's a hot,
+topless blond
+…is this a peen show
+or a freak showp
+MySpace | People | Web | Music | Music Videos | Blogs | Video | Events
+You Gotta
+see What
+HappenS!
+Search
+Home | Browse | Search | Invite | Film | Mail | Blog | Favorites | Forum | Groups | Events | Videos | Music | Comedy | Classifieds
+Google
+Back to Profile
+Back to Albums
+# photos
+My Photos
+66 - 3,-5
+b7c - 3,-5
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID=
+03956-7263
+
+
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID
+Realbumia
+03956-7264
+
+
+b6 -3,-5:
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuscaction=user.viewPicture&friendIDkaibumta
+03956-7265
+
+
+56-3,-5 |
+b7C -3, - 5
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendID
+BalbumId-
+03956-7266
+
+
+b6 - 3!
+b3 -1.
+Listing 1-20 of 69
+1 2 3
+4
+of 4
+Next ›
+About | FAQ | Terms | Privacy | Safety Tips | Contact MySpace | Promote! | Advertise | MySpace International
+©2003-2007 MySpace.com. All Rights Reserved.
+i. .::
+http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=user.viewPicture&friendiD#
+TralbumId=
+03956-7267
+bIC
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/b8d3ed37b0a1baab90759ba2e3692106b503e3a14763e52ce8638a8455992e93.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/b8d3ed37b0a1baab90759ba2e3692106b503e3a14763e52ce8638a8455992e93.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4d29125d8b3c341da21b2fb71775c3db8f0870f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/b8d3ed37b0a1baab90759ba2e3692106b503e3a14763e52ce8638a8455992e93.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -6629,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "b8d3ed37b0a1baab90759ba2e3692106b503e3a14763e52ce8638a8455992e93",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 72,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.duplicate-list-marker\", \"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"epstein_legal.stamp-stripping.page-footer\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "c153ce3a59d94d8279053df21c58332ee29bcc0ee3bcf3b57ba2b753eab37958",
+  "output_sha256": "22152a020d545634fc39831213ba58297284d1dc2125946ebaad1e2195b4fab1",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/c02eb0dc41c4397791de96af7656664561a6318b3f5d27c7ae4c74bc88a01f58.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/c02eb0dc41c4397791de96af7656664561a6318b3f5d27c7ae4c74bc88a01f58.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d3a7566c5535ac92361a6c3c5ce4c1e64191edb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/c02eb0dc41c4397791de96af7656664561a6318b3f5d27c7ae4c74bc88a01f58.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1602 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 199
+Page 435 ~ b6 - 1, -5, -8; b7C - 1,
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 436 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 437 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 438 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 439 ~ b3
+- 1: 66 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; 7D - 2;
+Page 440 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 441 ~ b6
+- 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 442 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 443 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D -
+2;
+Page 444 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D -
+2;
+Page 445 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 446 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 447 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 448 ~ b3 - 1; b6
+- 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 449 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 450 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 451 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+452 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+453 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 454 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 455 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+456 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 458 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5,-8; b7C - 3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+459 b6
+- 5,-8;
+b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 460 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5,-8; b7C - 3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 461 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 462 - b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 463 ~ b6 - 1, -5, -8; b7C - 1,
+-5,
+-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+464 - b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 465 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+466 ~ b6
+- 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 467 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2:
+Page 468
+- 06- 1,-5,-8; 670- 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 469 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 470 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 471 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - Z;
+Page 472 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 473 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 474 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - Z;
+Page 475 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 476 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5,-8; b7C - 3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 477 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; 67D - 2;
+Page 478 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 479 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 480
+_~ b6
+- 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 481 ~ b6 - 8: b7C - 8: b7D - 2;
+Page 482 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 483 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+
+Page 484 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 485 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 486 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 487 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 488 ~ b6 - 3,-5,-8; b7C - 3,-5,-8; b7D - 2:
+Page 489
+= b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 490
+~66- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 491 ~ b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 492 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 493 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 494 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 495 ~ b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 496 ~ b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 497 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 498 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 499 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 500 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 501 ~ b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C
+1
+, -3,
+-5,
+-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 502 ~ b6 - 1,-3,-5, -8; b7C
+- 3
+-5
+-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 503 ~ b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C
+-3
+-5
+8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 504 ~ b6 - 3,-5,-8; b7C - 3
+8
+=.
+2;
+Page 505 ~ b6 - 3,-5,-8; b7C - 3
+-8 ;
+2;
+Page 506 ~ b6 - 3,-5,-8; b7C - 3
+- 5
+, -8;
+Page 507 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8
+b7D
+Page 508 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,
+-8;
+Page 509 ~ b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C
+-3
+Page 510 ~ b6
+- 1,-3,-5, -8; b7C
+Page
+511 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1
+-8 ;
+Page 512 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1
+-8 ;
+Page
+513 ~ b6
+- 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,
+-5
+-8;
+Page
+514 ~ 66
+- 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8
+7D
+Page
+515 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1
+-8;
+b7
+D
+2:
+b7D
+-5
+8;
+5,
+8;
+7D
+7D
+b7D
+2;
+b7D
+2;
+2;
+b7D
+b7D
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+Page 516 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C -
+1
+8;
+2:
+Page
+517 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C -
+-8;
+2;
+Page
+518 - b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,
+-8;
+67D
+2;
+Page 519 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C -
+-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 520 ~ b6
+- 1,-5,-8; b7C -
+-5
+-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 521 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page 522 - b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; 67D - 2;
+Page 523 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 524 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+525 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 526 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 527 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 528 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-8; b7D - Z;
+Page 529 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5,-8; b7C - 3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 530 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7C -
+1,-3,-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 531 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7C
+H
+1-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 532 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 533 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5, -8;
+b7c
+1,-3, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 534 - b3
+1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-3, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 535 ~ b6
+- 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 536 ~ 66 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 537 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; 67C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+
+Page 538 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 539 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 540 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 541 ~ b6 - -5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 542 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 543 ~ b6
+- -5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 544 ~ 66 - -5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 545 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5,-8; b7C - 3,-5,-8; 67D - 2;
+Page 546 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - Z;
+Page 547 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5,-8; b7C - 3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 548 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 550 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5,-8; b7C - 3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 551 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5,-8; b7C - 3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 552 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 553 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 554 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 555 ~ 66 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 556 - b3
+- 1: b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 557 - b6
+- 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 558 ~ b6
+- 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 559 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 560 ~ b6
+- 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 561 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 562 - b6
+- 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 563 ~ b6
+- 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 564 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 565 - b6
+- 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 566 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 567 - b6
+- 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 568
+~ b6
+- 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 569 ~ b6
+- 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 570
+= b3
+1;
+b6 - 3,-8; b7C - 3,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 571 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3; b7C -
+3;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page 572 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3;
+b7C -
+b7D
+2;
+Page 573 ~ b3
+- 1;
+66 -
+3;
+b7C -
+b7D
+2;
+Page 574 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C -
+;
+b7D
+2
+Page 575 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3; b7C -
+b7D
+2
+;
+Page 576 ~ b3
+- 1; b6-
+3; b7C -
+3;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 577 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2i
+Page 578 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 579 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 580 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 581 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+Page 582 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 583 - b3
+1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+Page 584 ~ b6
+1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 585 ~ b6
+5: b7C -
+5; b7D - 2;
+Page 586 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 587
+-b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 588 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C
+5; b7D - 2;
+Page 589 - b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7D - 2;
+Page 590 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 591 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 592 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+
+Page 593 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+Page 594 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 595 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 596 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 597 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 598 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 599 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 600 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 601 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - Z;
+173- 1-85,070
+Page 602 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 603 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 604 ~ 66 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 605 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 606 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 607 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 608 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 609 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 610 - b3
+- 1; b6
+- 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 611 - b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1.-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+612 - b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1.-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 613 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+- 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+614 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 615 - b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+616
+= b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+617
+b3
+- 1: b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 618 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+619
+~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+620 ~
+b3
+- 1; b6
+- 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+621 ~
+b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7c
+- 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+622
+b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+623
+~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 624 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 625 - b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+626
+b3
+1;
+66
+- 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+627
+66
+1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 628 - b3
+1;
+b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 629
+= b3
+1; b6
+- 1,-3, -5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 630 ~ b6
+1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 631 - b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+632 - 66- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 633 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 634 - b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 635 - 63 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+X Deleted Page (s)
+X No Duplication Fee X
+For this Page
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 333
+N
+ry
+- 1;
+Page 7
+- b3
+1;
+00
+10
+Page
+12
+Page
+13
+Page
+14
+Page
+15
+Page
+16
+Page
+17
+Page
+18
+Page
+19
+age
+20
+Page
+21
+Page
+22
+Page
+23
+Page
+24
+Page
+25
+Page
+26
+Page
+27
+Page
+28
+Page
+29
+Page
+30
+Page
+31
+32
+LO
+38
+N
+48
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+;
+;
+1
+1
+;
+1
+;
+1
+;
+7C
+7C
+1,
+- 3
+-3
+- 3
+iii
+1
+H
+3
+3
+m m m
+3
+1
+1
+3
+3
+3
+-3
+- 3
+- 8;
+-5;
+- ?
+- .
+Q
+Q
+Q
+U
+U
+U
+U
+U
+U
+U
+00
+00
+N
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+5,
+- 8;
+b7C
+5,
+- 8:
+b7D
+3,-5;
+3,
+-5
+1,
+-8;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+67D
+b7D
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D
+- 2;
+- 2;
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+2;
+2
+;
+- 2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+- Z;
+N
+N
+N
+N
+- 3
+N
+5,
+00
+Q
+D
+2;
+
+Page 49 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 1,-3,-5, -8; b7C - 1,-3,-5, -8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 50 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page
+51 " b3
+1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page
+52 = b3
+1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 53
+=b3-1;
+b6
+,-3,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page
+54
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+, -3,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page
+55
+b3
+1;
+66
+-3,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1
+1 -3,-5,-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 56
+b3
+1;
+66
+1
+,-3,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1,
+-3,-5,
+-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page
+57
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+, -3,-5, - 8;
+b7C
+1,
+-3, -5, -8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page
+58
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+, - 3,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1,
+-3,-5, - 8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page
+59
+~b3
+1;
+06
+1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7C
+,-3,-5,-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page
+60
+- b3
+1;
+66
+1
+,-3,-5,- 8;
+b7C
+1
+,-3,-5,-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page
+61
+b3
+1;
+b6
+, -3,-5,- 8;
+b7C
+1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 62 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+,-3,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 63 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+1,-3,-5, -8;
+b7C
+1,-3,-5, -8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 64 ~ b3
+1;
+66 - 1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1,-3,-5,-8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 65 ~ b6 -
+1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+b7D
+ag
+b3
+N
+=.
+b6
+1
+3
+-5
+8
+b7C
+age
+b3
+1
+;
+b6
+3
+-5,-8;
+b7c
+age
+| I I
+- 2;
+1
+, -3,-5, - 8;
+1
+-3,-5, - 8;
+age
+aqe
+ag
+Page
+Page
+age
+age
+ag
+ag
+e
+Page
+Page
+age
+68
+69
+70
+71
+72
+73
+74
+75
+76
+77
+78
+79
+0
+b3
+1
+b6
+b3
+1
+06
+b3
+1
+06
+1
+HHH
+mmm
+-5,-8;
+b7C
+-3,-5,- 8;
+5,-8;
+b7C
+1
+-3,-5,
+-8:
+5,-8;
+-3,-5,
+-8;
+b7D
+2;
+b7D
+2;
+b7D
+2;
+b7D
+2;
+2;
+b3
+b6
+b3
+b3
+H
+=.
+;
+b6
+b6
+63
+b6
+b3
+b3
+H
+=.
+=.
+b6
+b6
+b3
+66
+b3
+b3
+b3
+H
+1
+H
+06
+66
+b6
+HH
+(D
+b3
+=.
+b6
+P.
+age
+b3
+Pag
+b3
+1
+1
+b6
+b6
+co cis co co co co cis co co co co cé co
+b3
+b3
+=.
+b7C
+b7D
+5,-8;
+b7C
+-3,-5, - 8;
+b7D
+2;
+- 5
+,-8;
+b7C
+-3,-5, -8;
+b7D
+2;
+-5,-8;
+b7C
+-3,-5,
+-8;
+b7D
+2;
+-5,-8;
+b7C
+-3,-5,
+-8;
+b7D
+2;
+5, -8;
+b7C
+-3,-5,
+-8;
+b7D
+2;
+5,-8;
+b7C
+-3,-5,
+-8;
+b7D
+2;
+-5,-8;
+b7C
+,-3,-5,-8;
+b7D
+2;
+-5,-8;
+b7C
+-3,-5,-8;
+b7D
+2;
+-5,-8;
+b7C
+-3,-5,-8 ;
+b7D
+2;
+-5
+-8;
+b7c
+-3,-5,
+- 8;
+b7D
+2;
+5,-8;
+b7C
+- 3,
+-5,
+-8;
+b7D
+2;
+5,-8;
+b7C
+3,-5,
+-8 ;
+b7D
+2;
+Page
+b6
+Page
+b6
+HWH
+5,-8;
+b7C
+-3,-5,- 8 ;
+b7D
+2;
+-5
+, -8;
+b7C
+-3,-5, -8;
+b7D
+2;
+-5,-8;
+b7C
+H
+-3,-5,-8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page
+86
+1
+=.
+66
+1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7c
+- 1,-3,-5,-8 ; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 87 ~
+63
+1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 88 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5,-8; b7C- 1,-3,-5,-8: b7D - 2:
+Page 89 ~ b3 -
+1;
+b6
+,-3,-5, -8; b7C - 1,-3,-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 90 ~ b3 - 1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 91
+- b3
+- 1; b6- 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2:
+Page 92 ~
+b6
+1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 93
+~ b6 -
+1,-5, -8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 94 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+95 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 96
+-b3 -
+1;
+b6 -
+1
+,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 97
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+1
+1-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 98 ~ b3 -
+1;
+b6
+1
+-3,-5, -8; b7C - 1,-3,-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 99 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 100 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 101 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 102 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+
+Page 103 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 104 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 105 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 106 ~ b7D - 2;
+Page 107 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5,-8; b7C - 3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 108 ~ b6 - -5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 109 ~ b6 - -5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 110 ~ b6 - -5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 111 ~ b6 - -5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - Z;
+Page 112 ~ b6 - -5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 113 ~ b6 - -5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 114 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 115 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 116 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 117 - b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; 67D - 2;
+Page 118 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 119 - D6 - 1-5,-8, b70 = 1,-5, 8 B7D - 31
+Page 120 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+Page 121 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 122 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 123 ~ 66 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 124 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 125 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8;
+b7D - Z;
+Page 126 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+127
+-06- 1,-8: b7C- 1,-8:b7D - 2:
+Page 128 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 129 ~ b6
+- -5,-8; b7C - 5,-8;
+b7D - Z;
+Page
+130 ~ b6 - -5,-8;
+b7C - 5,-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 131 ~ b6 - -5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 132 ~ b6
+- -5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 133 ~ b6
+- 8; b7C - 8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 134 ~ b6
+8; b7C
+8; b7D - 2;
+Page 135 - b6
+- 8; b7C
+8: b7D -
+2;
+Page 136 ~ b6
+8; b7C
+8;
+b7D -
+2;
+Page
+137 ~ 66
+8; b7C - 8;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 138 ~ b6
+- 8; b7C - 8; b7D -
+2;
+Page 139 ~ b6
+- 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 140 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+141 - b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+142 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+143 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8;
+67D - 2;
+Page 144 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+Page 145 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+Page 146 ~ 66 - 1,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-5,-8;
+Page 147 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-5,-8;
+Page 148 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-5,-8;
+Page 149 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-5,-8;
+Page 150
+-06-1,-5,-8;670-
+1,-5,-8;
+Page 151 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-5,-8;
+Page 152 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,
+-5,-8;
+Page 153 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-5,-8;
+Page 154 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-5,-8;
+Page 155 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+b7D
+67D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+VNNN
+Page 156 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+
+Page 157 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 158 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 159 - b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 160 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+b7D -
+2;
+Page 161 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 162 ~ b6
+- 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 163 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 164 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 165 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 166 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 167
+-06 - 1,-8:b70- 1,-8:67D - 2:
+Page 168 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 169 ~ b6
+- 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 170 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 171 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 172 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 173 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D -
+Page 174 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D -
+2;
+2;
+Page 175 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 176 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-5,-8; b7D
+2;
+Page 177 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 178 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 179 ~ b3 - 2; b6 - 5,-8; b7C - -5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 180 - b3
+- 2: b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 181 ~ b3
+- 2; b6
+- 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 182 ~ b6 - 5,-8;
+b7C - 5,-8; 67D - 2;
+Page 183 - b3
+2;
+b6
+- 1,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-5,-8; b7D
+- Z;
+Page 184 ~ b3
+- 2;
+b6 -
+1,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-5, -8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 185 - b3
+- 2; b6-
+1,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-5,-8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 186 ~ b3
+- 2; b6
+- 1,-5,-8;
+b7C
+- 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 187 ~ b6
+- 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 188 ~ b3
+2;
+66 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 189 - b3
+2;
+b6 -
+1,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+190 ~ b3
+2;
+b6-
+1,-5,-8;
+b70 -
+1,-5,-8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 191 ~ b3
+- 2;
+66
+1,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1,-5,-8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 192 ~ b3
+- 2: b6 - 1,-5,-8;
+b7C -
+1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 193 ~ b3
+2: b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 194 ~ b6
+- 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+195 - 66 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+196 - 66 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+197 - b3
+- 2: b6 - 5,-8; b7C - -5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 198 - b3
+- 2; b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 199 ~ b3
+- 2: b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 200 ~ b3
+1,-2; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; 67D - 2;
+Page 201 - b6
+- 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 202 ~ b3
+- 2; b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 203 ~ b3 - 2; b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 204 - b6 - 5,-8; b7C - -5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 205 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - -5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 206 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 207 - b6
+- 1,-5, -8; b7C - 1,-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 208 ~ 66 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 209 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8: b7D - 2:
+Page 210 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+
+Page 211 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 212 ~ b3 - 2; b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 213 ~ b3 - 2; b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 214 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; 67D - 2;
+Page 215 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 216 ~ b6
+- 5, -8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 217 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 218 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 219 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 220 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 221 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 22Z - 66 - 1,-5,-8; 6/C - 1,-5,-8; 6/D - 2;
+Page 223 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2:
+Page 224 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 225 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 226 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 227 - b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 228 - b6
+- 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 229 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+230 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 231 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 232 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 233 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 234 - b6
+- 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 235 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 236 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 237 - b6
+- 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D -
+2;
+Page
+238 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C -
+5, - 8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+239 ~ b6
+- 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+240 ~ b6
+- 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 241 ~ b6
+- 5,-8; b7C
+- 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 242 ~ b6
+- 5, -8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 243 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+244 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7C - 1,-3,-5, -8; 67D - 2;
+Page
+245 ~ 66-5,-8;
+b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 246 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 247 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 1,-3,-5, -8; b7C -
+1,-3, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 248 ~ b3
+1: 66 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+249
+1; b6 -
+1,-3,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-3,-5,-8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+250 ~ 63 - 1; 06 - 1,-3,-5,
+- 8
+b7C
+- 3,-5, -8; b7D
+2;
+Page 251 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 1,-3,-5, -8;
+b7C
+- 3, -5, -8; b7D
+2;
+Page 252 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 - 1,-3,-5,
+- 8
+b7C
+-3, -5, -8; b7D
+Page 253 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,
+- 8
+;
+b7C
+2;
+- 3,-5, -8; 67D
+- 2:
+Page 254 ~ b3
+1; b6
+1,-3,-8;
+b7C -
+1,
+- 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 255 - b3
+1;
+b6
+- 1,-3,-5, -8;
+b7c
+-3,-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 256 - b3
+2: b6 - 1,-5,-8;
+b7c - 1,
+- 5, -8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 257 - b3
+1, -2;
+b6 - 1,-3,
+- 5, -8;
+b7C - 1,-3, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 258 - b3
+1 ;
+66 - 1,-3,-5,
+-8;
+b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 259 ~ b3
+1; b6
+- 1,-3,-5,
+- 8
+b7C -
+- 3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 260 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5,-8;
+b7C - 3,
+-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 261 - b3
+1; b6 -
+1,-3,-5,
+- 8;
+-3, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 262 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+1,-3,-5,
+-8:
+Page 263 - b3
+- 1; 66 - 1,-3,-5,-8;
+Page 264 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8;
+b7C
+b7C
+b7c
+- 3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+1-3,-5, - 8; b7D
+2;
+1,-3, -5, -8; 67D - 2;
+
+Page 265 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 266 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; 7D - 2;
+Page 267 - b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 268 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 269 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 270 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 271 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 272 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 273 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 274 ~ b6 - 1,5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 275 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 276 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 277 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 278 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 279 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 280 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 281 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 282 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 283 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 284 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 285 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C -
+• 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 286 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C -
+1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 287 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C
+1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 288 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+b7D - 2:
+Page 289 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 290 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 291 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 292 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 293 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 294 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 295 ~ b6
+- 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 296 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 297 - b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 298 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 299 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 300 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - Z;
+Page 301 ~ b6
+- 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 302 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 303 - b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+304 ~ 66- 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 305 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 306 - b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 307 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 308 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 309 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - Z;
+Page 310 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+311 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8;
+b7D - Z;
+Page
+312 - b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+313 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 314 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 315 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - Z;
+Page 316 ~ 66 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 317 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 318 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+
+Page 319 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 320 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 321 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+3 30 1 30 00- 2
+Page 322 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 323 ~ b6 - 1,-8; b7C - 1,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 324 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5,-8; b7C - 3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 325 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5,-8; b7C - 3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 326 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 327 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 328 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 329 ~ b6 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 330 ~ 66 - 5,-8; b7C - 5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 331 ~ b6
+Page 332 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8: b7D - 2:
+Page 333 ~ b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+B C : 52: 98 - 3
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+Deleted Page (s)
+No Duplication Fee X
+For this Page
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/c02eb0dc41c4397791de96af7656664561a6318b3f5d27c7ae4c74bc88a01f58.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/c02eb0dc41c4397791de96af7656664561a6318b3f5d27c7ae4c74bc88a01f58.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e0c473f44eeba14a954781f4905c1696183ba70c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/c02eb0dc41c4397791de96af7656664561a6318b3f5d27c7ae4c74bc88a01f58.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -234,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "c02eb0dc41c4397791de96af7656664561a6318b3f5d27c7ae4c74bc88a01f58",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "dd0d87e485e21dd6f464f558730170b3c97c01e7325a34ea63f223e8d8f9a367",
+  "output_sha256": "a765493ca0902d50fd6ead7ab4382970d22ba011e096f58958adb53d8a266fb1",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/f76650f09892be3ec39f8e1ea63e13305f3e6f1ffc07c07a69fc34cf2a55364f.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/f76650f09892be3ec39f8e1ea63e13305f3e6f1ffc07c07a69fc34cf2a55364f.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..447d321aa5f3706b923da34b077177fb8414e38d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/f76650f09892be3ec39f8e1ea63e13305f3e6f1ffc07c07a69fc34cf2a55364f.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2507 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-CV-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 475
+Page 5 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 10;
+Page 6 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 10;
+Page 7 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 10;
+Page 8 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7E - 10;
+Page 9 ~ b6 - 5;
+b7C - 5; b7E - 10;
+Page 11 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page 12
+~ b3 - 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 13 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page 14 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page 15 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page 16 ~ b3 - 1;
+66 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page
+17
+;
+b6
+3
+, -5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+Page
+18
+~ b3
+1
+;
+b6
+• 3
+, -5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+Page
+19
+63
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+Page
+20
+~ b3
+Page
+21
+- 63
+Page
+22
+~b3
+1;
+06
+3,
+-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+1;
+66
+3
+- 5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+1;
+b6
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+Page
+23
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+3
+, -5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+Page
+24
+1;
+06
+Page
+25
+- b3
+Page
+26
+1;
+b6
+1;
+b6
+1
+1
+1
+- 3
+-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+3;
+b7C - 1,-3;
+-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+Page
+27
+1;
+b6
+- 3, -5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+Page
+28
+- 63
+1;
+66
+, -3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page
+29
+~ b3
+Page
+30
+Page
+31
+63
+Page
+32
+Page
+33
+Page
+34
+1;
+106
+1;
+66
+1
+;
+b6
+1
+1
+1
+-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+- 3, -5; b7C - 1,-3, -5;
+1;
+b6
+-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+1;
+b6
+,-3, -5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+1;
+b6
+-2,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-2,-3,-5;
+Page
+35
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+• 3
+, -5; b7C - 1,-3,-5;
+Page
+36
+1
+b6
+• 3
+- 5; b7C - 1,-3, -5;
+Page
+37
+63
+1;
+66
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 40
+1; 66 -
+Page 41 ~ b3
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 82 ~ b3 -
+1;
+b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+Page 85 - b6 - 1,-5, -8; b7C - 1, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 86 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 87
+= 66
+- 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 88
+~ b3
+2;
+b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page 89 ~ b3
+2; b6 - 8; b7C - 8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+90 ~ b3
+2;
+b6 -
+1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+91
+= b3
+2;
+66
+1-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+92
+-b3
+2;
+66
+1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 93 ~ b3 -
+2;
+b6
+1
+-5, -8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 94
+~ b3
+2;
+b6
+, -5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 95 ~ b3 - 2; b6 -
+1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 96 ~ b3
+2;
+06 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 97 ~ b3 - 2; b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+
+N
+N
+N
+N
+N
+N
+N
+N
+N
+N
+N
+H
+N
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+- 2;
+2:
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+N
+N
+N
+N
+N
+N
+-1;
+N
+2;
+N
+N
+N
+N
+N
+N
+N
+1
+1
+1
+b70
+1,
+b7D
+1
+1
+1
+3;
+- 2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+- 2;
+..
+- Z;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+- 5
+5
+V
+- 2;
+- Z;
+5
+5
+..
+2
+5
+,-8; b7D - 2;
+2
+5
+-8; 67D - 2;
+5
+-8 ; b7D
+- 2;
+5
+-8 ; b7D
+- Z;
+5
+-8 ; b7D
+- 2;
+5
+-8 ; b7D
+-2:
+• 5
+, -8 ; b7D
+- 2;
+1,-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+b7D
+7D
+2;
+1;
+1;
+2;
+1,
+-5
+-8;
+8
+- 5
+- 5
+- 2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+- 2:
+- Z;
+
+Page 152 ~ b3 - 2; b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page 153 ~ 63 - 2; b6 - 1,-5,-8; b7C
+1,-5,-8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 154 - b3
+- 2; b6 - 1,-5,-8;
+b7c
+1,-5,-8; b7D
+2;
+Page 155 - b3
+- 2; b6 - 1,-5,-8;
+b7c
+1,-5,-8; b7D
+2;
+Page 156 - b3
+- 2: b6 - 1,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1,-5,-8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 157 ~ b3
+2:b6 - 1,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1,-5,-8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 158 ~ b3
+- 2:06- 1,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1,-5,-8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 159 ~ b3
+2:b6- 1,-5,-8;
+b7C
+1,-5,-8; b7D
+- 2:
+Page 160 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 161 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+2;
+Page 162 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+2;
+Page 163 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+2;
+Page 164 ~ b6
+- 1; b7C - 1; b7D
+2;
+Page 165 ~ b6 - 1; bC - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 166 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-6; b7C - 1,-5,-6; b7D - 2;
+Page 167 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-6; b7C - 1,-5,-6; 67D -
+2;
+Page 168 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-6; b7C - 1,-5,-6; b7D - 2;
+Page 169 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 170 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-6; b7C - 1,-5,-6; b7D - 2;
+Page 171 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-6; b7C - 1,-5,-6; b7D - 2;
+Page 172 ~ b6 - 1,-5,-6; b7C - 1,-5,-6; b7D - 2;
+Page 173 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 216 ~ b6 - 1,-4; b7C - 1,-4; b7D -
+2;
+Page 217 ~ b6 - 1,-4; b7C
+1,-4; b7D
+2;
+Page
+218 ~ b6 - 1,-4; b7C
+1,-4; b7D-
+2;
+Page 219 ~ b6 - 1,-4; b7C - 1,-4; b7D - 2;
+Page 220 ~ b6 - 1,-4,-8; b7C - 1,-4,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+221 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7C - 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+222 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+223 ~b3
+- 1; b6
+1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+224 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+1,-3,-5; b7C-
+1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+225 ~ b3
+1; b6
+- 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 226 - b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1.-5; b7D - -2;
+Page
+227 - b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1.-5; b7D - -2;
+Page
+228 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1.-5; b7D - -2;
+Page 229 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3; b7D - 2;
+Page 230 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3; b7D - 2;
+Page 231 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+232 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+233 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 234 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 235 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 236 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 237 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 238 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - Z;
+Page 239 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 240 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 241 - b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 242 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 243 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 244 - b3
+1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D
+- Z;
+Page 245 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 246 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 247 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+
+Page 248 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 249 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 250 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+251 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 252 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 253 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 254 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 255 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 256 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 257 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7c - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 258 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 259 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 260 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 261 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 262 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 263 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 264 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 265 - b3
+1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+1,
+-3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 266 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+- 1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+1,
+-3, -5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 267 ~ b3
+b6
+1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+1,
+-3,-5; b7D
+2;
+Page 268 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+-3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 269 - b3
+1;
+66
+1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+1,-3,-5; b7D
+-2:
+Page 270 - b3
+1;
+b6
+- 1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 271 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+272 - 66 - 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 273 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 274 - b3
+1; b6
+- 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+275 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+276 - b3
+- 1;
+06- 1,-3,-5;
+b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+277 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+278 ~ b3
+-1;
+66
+- 1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 279 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+-3,-5;
+b7C
+1
+- 3
+-5; b7D
+- Z;
+Page 280 - b3
+1;
+b6
+- 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+1
+3,-5; b7D
+- Z;
+Page
+281~ b3
+1;
+b6- 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+1
+-3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 282 ~ b3
+1;
+66
+1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+-3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 283 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+-3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 284 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+1,
+-3, -5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 285 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 286 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 287 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 288 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 289 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 290 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 291 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 292 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 293 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 294 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 295 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 296 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C -
+1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 297 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 298 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 299 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 300 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 301 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7c - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+
+Page 302 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 303 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 304 ~ b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3; b7D - 2;
+Page
+305 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 306 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 307 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 308 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 309 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7d
+- 2;
+Page 310 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 311 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 312 ~ 63 - 1; b6
+- 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 313 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+314 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C -
+1,-3, -5; b7D
+- Z;
+Page 315 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C
+- 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 316 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; 67C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 317 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 318 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+319
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+1,
+3
+-5;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 320 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+1
+3
+-5;
+b7D
+Page
+321 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+3
+-5;
+b7D
+Page 322 - b3
+1;
+b6
+-1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+3
+-5; b7D
+2;
+Page
+323 b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page
+324 - b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page
+325 ~ b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page
+326 -b6
+1,-5;
+b 7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page 327 ~ b6
+1,
+-5;
+b7C
+1,-5
+b7D
+Page
+328
+a b3
+1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+1
+Page
+329 ~b3
+1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+330
+- 63
+1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+Page
+331
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+332 ~ b3
+1;
+66
+1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+333
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+334 - b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7c
+1
+1
+1
+1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+335 ~ b3
+1;
+66
+1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+336 ~ 63
+1;
+66
+1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+Page 337 - b3
+1;
+b6
+- 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+Page
+338 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+1
+1
+Page 339 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+-3,-5;
+Page 340 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+1,-3,-5;
+Page
+341 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+Page
+342 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+-3,-5; b7D
+3
+-5;
+b7D
+3
+-5;
+b7D
+3
+- 5;
+-5;
+3
+- 5;
+3
+-5;
+3
+, -5;
+3
+-5;
+3
+- 5;
+3
+-5;
+3
+Page
+343
+~b3
+- 1;
+b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+7c
+7C
+Page 344 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+Page 345 ~ b3
+1; b6
+1,-3,-5;
+Page 346 - b3
+1;
+b6
+Page 347 - b3
+1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+Page
+348 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+Page
+349 ~b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+Page
+350 ~ b3
+1; b6
+1,-3,-5;
+io ci co
+H
+1
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+Page 351 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+Page 352 - b3
+1;
+b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+Page 353 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+1,-3,-5;
+Page 354 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+71
+7C
+b7c
+7C
+7C
+7C
+1
+1
+Page 355 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+
+Page 356 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C -
+1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 357 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+1,-3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 358 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+1
+-3,-5; b7D
+2;
+Page
+359 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+-3, -5; b7D
+2;
+Page 360 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+- 3
+,-5; b7D
+2;
+Page 361 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+- 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+1
+-3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 362 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 - 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+-3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 363 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D
+Page 364 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D
+2;
+2;
+Page 365 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+1, -3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 366 - b3
+- 1: 66 - 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+-3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 367 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+1
+, -5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 368 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+-1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+1
+-3,-5; b7D
+Page 369 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+1
+3,-5; b7D
+Page 370 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+1
+-3,-5; b7D
+2;
+Page 371 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+1,-3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 372 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+373
+~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+- 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 374 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+- 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+375 ~ 63
+1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5; b70 -
+1,-3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 376 - b3
+1;
+b6
+1,-3,-5; b7C -
+1,-3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 377
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+378 ~ b6
+1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 379 - b3
+-1;
+b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 380 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+- 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 381 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - '2;
+Page 382 - b3
+1; b6
+- 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3, o: b7D - 2;
+Page
+383 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 384 - b3
+- 1; b6
+- 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 385
+~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 386 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 387
+~ b3
+- 1; b6
+- 1,-3, -5; b7C - 1
+3, b7D - 1;
+Page 388 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5; b7D - '•
+Page
+389 ~ 66 - 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+390 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 391 ~ b3
+-1;
+b6
+- 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 392 ~ b6
+- 1,
+-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 393 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 394 - b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C
+- 1,-3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+395 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+3, -5; b7D
+2;
+Page 396 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+1,-3
+, -5; b7D
+2;
+Page 397 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+Page 398 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5;
+b7C
+Page 399 ~ 63 - 1; b6
+- 1,-3,-5;
+b7c
+1,
+-3,-5; b7D
+2;
+1,-3,-5; b7D
+- 2;
+1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 400 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - Z;
+Page 401 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 402 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D -
+2;
+Page 403 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 404 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 405 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D
+2;
+Page 406 - b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7D -
+2;
+Page 407 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2:
+Page 408 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D
+2;
+Paqe 409 ~ b6 - 1: b7C - 1: b7D
+2;
+
+Page 410 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3; b7D - 2;
+Page 411 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,-3,-5; b7C - 1,-3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 417 ~ b3; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+Page 418 ~ b7D - 2;
+Page 419 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+Page 422 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 426 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 427 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 428 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3,-5; b7C - 2,-3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 429 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 430 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 431 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 435 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+- 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 436 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 437 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 438 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 439 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 440 - b3
+- 1; b6
+2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 441 - b3
+- 1; b6
+- 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 442 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 443 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+2,-3,-5; b70 - 2,-31-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 444 - b3
+- 1; b6
+2,-3,-5; b7C - 2,-3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+445
+_ = b3
+- 1; b6
+2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page
+446 - b3
+- 1; b6
+- 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page
+447
+-b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 448 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 449 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+450 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 451 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page
+452 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 453 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 454 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3, -5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 455 - Duplicate;
+Page
+456 - b3 -
+1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C -
+1,-3;
+Page
+457 ~ 63
+1;
+66
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 460 - b3
+1;
+b6 - 3,-5; b7C-
+3,-5;
+Page
+461 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 462 ~ b3
+Page
+463
+-. b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 464 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 465 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 466 - b3
+- 1;
+_b6 -
+3, -5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 467 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 468 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 469 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 470 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 471 ~ b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+3,-5;
+b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page 472 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5;
+Page
+473- b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5;
+b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 474 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 475 - b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 476 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,-3; b7C - 1,-3;
+Page 477 ~ b6 - 2,-4; b7C - 2,-4; b7D - 1;
+Page 478 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4; b7D - 1;
+
+Page 479 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-4; b7C - 3,-4; b7D - 1;
+Page 482 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 483 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 484 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 485 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 486
+= b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 487 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 488 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 489 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 490 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,-5; b7E - 1;
+Page 491 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 - 3; b7C - 3;
+b7E - 1;
+Page 492 ~ b7E - 1;
+Page 493 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 494 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 495 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 496 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 497 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 2,-3; b7C - 2,-3; b7E - 1;
+Page 498 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;
+Page 499 - Duplicate;
+Page 500 - Duplicate;
+Page 501 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 502 - Duplicate;
+Page 503 ~ Duplicate;
+Page 504 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 505 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1;
+Page 506 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 507 - b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 508 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 509 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 510 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 511 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 512 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 513 - b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 514 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 515 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+- 1;
+Page 516 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+-1;
+Page 517 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 518 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1;
+Page 519 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1;
+Page 520 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5: b7E
+1;
+Page 521 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 522 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 523 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 524 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 525 - b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 526 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5: b7E
+1;
+Page 527 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 528 - b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 529
+-b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 530 ~ b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 531 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 532 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1;
+Page 533 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1;
+Page 534 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1;
+
+Page 535 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E -
+Page 536 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+Page 537 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+Page 538 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+Page 539 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 540 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5; b7E
+Page 541 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+Page 542 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+Page 543 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+Page 544 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+Page 545 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+Page 546 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+Page 547 ~ b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7E
+Page 548 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+Page 549 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1
+;
+Page 550 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+Page 551 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+;
+Page 552 - b6
+5; b7C
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 553 - b6 - 5; b7C
+5; b7E
+1
+;
+Page 554 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7E
+1
+;
+Page 557 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1
+Page 558 ~ b6
+5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1
+;
+Page 559 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 560 - b6
+5; b7C
+5; b7E
+;
+Page 561 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5; b7E
+1
+;
+Page 562 ~ b6 - 5; b7C|
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 563 - b6
+5; b7C -
+5;
+b7E
+1
+Page 564 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C -
+5;
+b7E
+1
+Page 565 - b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 566 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+1;
+Page 567 ~ b6
+- 5; b7C -
+5; b7E
+1
+Page 568 ~ b6
+5; b7C
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 569 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C
+5;
+b7E
+1;
+Page 570 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E -
+1;
+Page 571 ~ b7E - 1;
+Page 572 - b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 573 ~ b6 - 5; b7C|
+5; b7E
+1;
+Page 574 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 575 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 576 - 66 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 577 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 578 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 579 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 580 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 581 ~ b6 - 5; b7C -
+5; b7E - 1;
+Page 582 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 583 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E - 1;
+Page 584 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+- 1:
+Page 585 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7E
+- 1;
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxX
+X
+X
+X
+Deleted Page(s)
+X
+No Duplication Fee X
+For this Page
+
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+
+88
+89
+90
+22
+92
+93
+94
+95
+96
+97
+2011-03-17
+2011-03-17
+2011-03-18
+2011-03-18
+2011-03-09
+2008-01-01
+2007-01-01
+2007-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2006-01-01
+2008-01-01
+251
+(U
+251
+(U
+251
+{U
+251
+14
+252
+(U) Items received fron
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+253
+(U) EC for submission of victim/witness work files to case file.
+b6
+b7c
+-2,-3,- 8:
+-2, -3, -8
+З/Е-ММ-108062-114
+b7D
+- 2
+03956-9394
+
+FD-340 (Rev, 4-1 I-03)
+31E-mM- 108062
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence -
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received
+03/17/2011
+25|
+From
+(Name of Contributor/interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+- 1A87
+By
+SA
+To Be Returned • Yes
+• No
+Receipt Given • Yes
+E NO
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+E No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+Title:
+66 -2
+b70 - 2
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+• Original notes re interview of
+Phate array shipien to
+b6 -3:
+570 - 3
+03956-9395
+
+FD-340 (Rev. 411-03)
+31E-MM- 108042 - A88
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+Serial # of Originating Document ....
+251
+Date Received _
+03/12/2011
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewec)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By
+To Be Returned • Yes
+El No
+Receipt Given • Yes
+• No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Ruie 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+E NO
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTY)
+• Yes
+E NO
+Title:
+b6 -2
+b7C - 2
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material
+Description:
+5 Dietro Benionor
+b6 - 31
+03956-9401
+
+FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)
+31E-mm- 108062 - 1A89
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence —
+Serial # of Originating Document
+251
+Date Received
+03/18/2011
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewcc)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By
+To Be Returned • Yes
+• No
+Receipt Given El Yes
+• No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+E No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+ENo
+56 -2
+b7C - 2
+•
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclasing Material
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+20 photograghs received from
+and
+FA 597
+66 - 3
+=
+03956-9429
+
+•US. GPO: 2004-307-714 63015
+FD-597 (Rey 8-11-94)
+Page
+/
+of
+/
+File #
+On (date)
+UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+Receipt for Property Received/Returned/Released/Seized
+31 E-mM- 108062
+03/17/2011
+items) listed below were:
+& Received From
+| Returned To
+Released To
+•
+Seized
+(Name)
+(Street Address)_
+(City)
+66 - 30
+b7c
+Description of Items): _
+20 PROTOGRASHS
+NOTHING
+56-2,
+b7C
+-2
+Received By:
+Received Fron
+03956-9430
+
+1414
+03956-9433
+
+3rd person frivil (4) in centre.
+Jean's & Grey Swelter
++
+in France,
+00 NNHNN-26AU 0072
+Paris
+Dec
+o0'
+03956-9434
+
+03956-9435
+b6 -1,-5
+b7C -1,-5.
+
+(Fram "L'" to "R"') ITi
+Dec 00°
+CNo- 90009
+33+0ğ NHNNN+019U 0072
+b6-1,-5
+b70-1,-5
+03956-9436
+
+03956-9437
+
+b6 - 11
+in
+N. Lore -1
+03956-9438
+
+03956-9439
+b7c -3
+63 -1
+
+Albequique ili-suem
+03956-9440
+
+b7C - 3
+03956-9441
+
+Alb. Mueseum
+03956-9442
+
+12175
+11-03 -1
+03956-9443
+
+"Ai Moeseum"
+03956-9444
+
+Stt6-99680
+0g
+atis sih. sir..
+tanian-pons
++* *k
+...:
+all
+
+'Alb: Muscuie"
+03956-9446*
+
+66 - 31
+03956-9447
+
+Ranch Zorro
+03956-9448
+
+-b6 -3
+*.
+03956-9449
+
+Horse i Ru. and
+"Zomo
+66-1
+03956-9450
+
+aa. anit
+.......
+03956-9451
+
+Ranch Zome s
+03956-9452
+
+: $3956-9453
+..t.
+
+Zorro" Ranch Entrance
+03956-9454
+
+b6-3
+03956-94554
+ш AN
+
+Ny- Ferries
+P, it Photo"
+03956-9456
+
+1 b7C - 3
+03956-9457
+
+Indian Artard::
+Ranch 2mp
+b6 -1 :
+03956-9458
+
+- u-
+-...
+•.-
+66 - 1
+03956-9459
+
+b6 -11
+Hones
+- In Zoro"
+03956-9460
+
+03956-9461
+
+Horse
+66 - 11
+03956-9462
+
+03956-9463
+
+03956-9464
+
+b6
+- 3
+b7C
+03956-9465
+
+...
+03956-9466
+
+b6 - 3
+03956-9467
+
+Ranch Zoro
+03956-9468
+
+b6
+b7c
+-5
+- 5
+03956-9469
+
+Ranch Hand " Zomo
+56 - 5
+b7C -5
+03956-9470
+
+FD-340c (4-1I-03)
+31E-Mm- 108062
+-A90
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence —
+25/
+Serial # of Originating Document _
+Date Received
+03/18/2011
+From
+butor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+b7C
+- 3
+By
+54
+To Be Returned • Yes
+Receipt Given 57-Yes
+• No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+* No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+Title:
+b6 -2
+b7C
+-2
+•
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+• Original notes re interview of
+Land FD-597
+..
+_..
+anut
+03956-9471
+
+•US GPO 2..;
+FD-597 (Rev 8-11-94)
+Page
+•.-
+of
+UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+Receipt for Property Received/Returned/Released/Seized
+File #
+31E-Mr- 108062
+On (date)
+03/17/2011
+item(s) listed below were:
+* Received From
+Returned To
+• Released To
+seized
+(Name)_
+(Street Addre
+(City)_
+b6-2
+b7C
+-2
+-b3 -1
+Description of Items):
+Received By:
+Received From:
+03956-9472
+
+FD-340c (4-11-03)
+318-mm- 108062 - 149)
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence -
+Serial # of Originating Document _
+252
+Date Recelved
+03/09/2011
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewce)
+(Address)
+(City and State)
+By
+To Be Returned DO Yes
+EI No
+Receipt Given • Yes
+• No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+@ No.
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+E No
+Title:
+b6
+-2
+b7C -2
+Reference:
+(Communication Enciosing Material)
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+Items receined form
+56
+b7c
+b7D
+- 8
+- 8
+-2
+03956-9474
+
+DOCUMENTS RECEIVED
+FROM
+ON
+66 -81
+b7C -8
+67D -2
+03956-9475
+
+(Rev. 05-01-2008)
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+Precedence: IMMEDIATE
+Io: Miami
+Date: 03/11/2011
+AtEn: SAL-
+56 - 2
+670 - 2
+From: Miami
+PB-3/PBCRA
+Contact:
+Approved By:
+Drafted By:
+Case ID #: 31E-MM-108062 (pending)
+Title:
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN:
+66-2
+b7C -2
+b6 - 1
+67C - 1
+WSTA - CHILD PROSTITUTION
+Synopsis: Update case file as to interview conducted by writer
+on March 9, 2011.
+Details: On March 7, 2011, PB-3 SAL
+and CE-1
+Branch ASAC
+_concurred with two requests from
+Tie have walter join bes in a telerhone
+and accompany AUSA
+I protect ence an
+2011 with
+(protect
+identity).
+66-2,-6,-8
+b7C-2,-6,-8
+b7D -2
+On the evening of March 7, 2011, AUSA
+Tand
+writer placed a telephone call tol
+] indicated she
+is willing to cooperate fully with any FBI investigation
+involving JEFFREY EPSTEIN
+and others.
+She has requested to meet
+with FBI Agents in
+along with
+police for the debries ing.
+On March 9, 2011
+_AUSAL
+(protect identity) and writer met for the interview at the United
+States
+Attorney's Office in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
+b6-3,-6
+b7C -6
+67D -1
+b3 - 1
+b6 -8
+b7C-6,-8
+b7D -2
+03956-9761
+133) 07OUEBOZ.EC
+66 - 2
+670 - 2
+
+Io: Miami
+From: Miami
+Re: ??31E-MM-108062, 03/11/2011
+provided information about
+Tof
+EPSTEIN byL
+b6-1,-6
+b7C - 1,-6
+b7D - 1,-2
+Thas also made contact withl
+b6 - 3,-8
+b7C - 3,-8
+b7D -1,-2
+Torovided
+Below is the list of items produced to
+writer:
+b6 - 8,
+670 - 8
+b7D -2
+b6-1,-8
+b7C -1,-8
+b7D - 2
+2
+03956-9762
+
+"1.
+To: Miami
+Re:
+From:
+Miami
+??31E-MM-108062, 03/11/2011
+b6 - 1.
+67C -1
+67D - 2
+Evidence obtained during interview will be turned over
+to case agent SA
+66 - 2;
+670-2
+03956-9763
+
+To: Miami From: Miami
+Re: ??31E-MM-108062, 03/11/2011
+LEAD (s) :
+Set Lead 1: (Info)
+MIAMI
+AT MIAMI, FLORIDA
+Read and clear.
+Set Lead 2: (Action)
+MIAMI
+AT WEST PALM BEACH, FLORIDA (PB-2)
+Determine if follow-up interview of
+is warranted
+Contact Legat
+Jor Interview if appropriate.
+44
+4
+in
+in
+b6-3
+67D -1
+03956-9764
+
+88 73
+U.S. Department of Justice
+• FD-340 (Rcv. 4-11-03)
+31E-MM-108062-1A92
+rield Office Acquiring Evidence. Mm/PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document —
+Date Received
+Various
+From
+(Name of Contribulor/Interviewide)
+(Acidress)
+(Cily and State)
+106 -2
+1b70 - 2
+By
+To Be Returned L Yes •
+ENo
+Receipt Given
+• Yes
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+•No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Conmunication Enclosing Matcriai)
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+Biographical: file for
+666 - 3
+ib7c -3
+163-1
+03956-9768
+
+56-3
+03956-9769
+
+505 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL 33401 to _
+Google
+Mans
+Page 1 of 206 - 3
+b7C - 3
+These directions are for planning purposes only. You may find that construction projects, traffic, or
+http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&q=
+Hfi&um=18ie-U... 325200771
+
+S05 S Flagler Dr, West Palm Beach, FL 33401 to_
+other events may cause road conditions to differ from the map results.
+Map data ©2008 NAVTEQ ™M
+Page 2 of 256 - 3
+http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&q
+03956-9772
+westtpalm+beachtfl&um=1&ie=U.
+6/26/2008
+
+west palm beach fi - Google Maps
+Google Adress
+Maps
+Page 1 of 106 -3
+b3 - 1
+http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&q
+03956-9773
+west+palm+beach+fl&um=1&ie=U.
+6726/2008
+
+..-.
+r
+FD-340 (Rev, 4-11-03)
+31E-MM-108062-1A93
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence_ Mm/ PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _..*
+Date Received Various
+From
+(Name of Contributor/interviewee)
+(Address)
+(City and Statc)
+b6 - 2
+b70-2
+By
+Io Be Returned • Yes:
+E No-
+Receipt Given L. Yes
+El No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+•Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+•
+Yes
+ENo
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+Biosrashical file for
+66 - 3
+56 -3
+63-1
+03956-97804
+
+all
+56-3
+b7C
+03956-9781
+
+66-3
+03956-9782
+
+FEB-25-2008
+11:27
+561 650 6951
+U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+SUBPOENA
+P.Ø2/03
+In the matter of case number(s): 31E-MM-108062
+TO:
+custodial of lords
+ADDRESS:
+11760 U.S. Highway 1 Golden Bear Plaza
+TELEPHONE:
+4th Floor, west Tower, North Palm Beach, Florida 33408
+888-938-4715
+GREETING:
+By the service of this subpoena upon you by SA
+,56 - 2
+, whn is authorized to serve 670 - 2
+you are hereby commanded and required to disclose to SA
+_: a representative ot
+the FBI, the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or
+identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following:
+b70 - 3
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI, YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION. YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
+Compliance must be made by personal appearance or production of records no later than the 7
+March
+2008
+20: 00 islack A M, at 505 S. Flagler Drive. #500 day of
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+SAI
+In lieu of a personal appearance, the information can be provided, via facsimile, parked to the attention of
+_, at telephone number
+In lieu of a personal appearance, the information can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+SA |
+_, at the following address: 505 S. Flagler Drive, #500
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+If you refuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may invoke the aid of the United States
+District Court to compel compliance, Your failure to obey the resulting court order may be punished as contempt
+issued under authority of Public Law No. 106-544, § 5(a).
+(I8 U.S.C. $3486)
+ATTESTED COI
+Signature: _
+Name, Title
+Issued this J
+day of
+b6 - 2
+b7C -2
+66-2
+_b70-2
+03956-9806
+
+FEB-25-2008 11:27
+FBI
+561 650 6951
+P.03/D3
+2nd Session
+H.R, 3048
+AN ACT
+To amend Titie 18, United States Code, to provide clearer coverage over threats against former Presidents and rombers of their familics, and for
+otber purposes. Be it enucted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled
+SEC. 5
+(a) IN GENERAL- Section 3486(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended --
+(1) so that paragraph (1) reads as follows:
+(1)(A) In any invostigation of -- (i)(1) a Federal health care offense; or (II) a Federal offense involving the scxual exploitation or abusc of children,
+the Attorney Cieneral; or (ii) an offense under section 871 or 879, or a threat against a person protected by the United States Sccret Service under
+paragraph (D) or (6) of section 3056, if the Director of the Secret Service determines that the threat constituting the offense or the threal against the
+person protectca is imminent, the Secretary of the Treasury, may issue in writing and cause to be served a subpoena requiring the production and
+testimony described in subparagraph (B).
+(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), a subpoena issued under subparagraph (4) may require - (i) the production of any records or other
+things relevant to the investigation; and (il) testimony by the custodian of the things required to be produced concerning the production and
+authenticity of those things.
+(C) A subpoena issued under subparagraph (A) with respect to a provider of clectronic communication service or remote computing service, in an
+nvestigation of a Fcderal offense involving the sexual exploitation or abuse of children shall not exlend beyond -- (i) requiring thet provider t
+isclose the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or identity, an
+length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of scrvices the subscriber or customer utilized, which may be relevant tr
+an autborized law entorcement inquiry; or (ii) requiring a custodian of the records of that provider to give testimony concerning the production and
+authentication of such records or infortation.
+(D) As used in this paragraph, the term "Federal offense involving the sexual exploitation or abuse of children' means an offense under section 1201,
+2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 3422, or 2423, in which the victim is an individual who has not attained the age of 18
+yèars.;
+(2) in paragraph (3)-
+(A) by inserting relating to a Federal health care offense' after production of records'; and
+B) by adding at the end the following: "The production of things in any other case may be required from any place within the Unite
+states or subject to the laws or jurisdiction of the United States.': an‹
+(3) by adding at the and the following:
+(5) At any time before the return date specified in the summons, the person or catity summoned may, in the United States district court for the district in
+which that person or entity dues business or resides, potition for an order modifying or setting aside the summons, or a prohibition of disclosure ordered
+by a court under paragraph (6).
+(6)(A) A United State district court for the district in which the summons is or will be scrved, upon application of the United States, may issue an ex parte
+order that no person or entity disclose to any other person or entity (other than to an attorney in order to obtain logal advice) the existence of such
+summons for a period of up to 90 days.
+(13) Such order may be issued on a showing that the things being sought may be relevant to the invesligation and there is reason to believe that such
+disclosure may result in--
+(1) endangerment to the life or physical safety of any person;
+(ii) flight to avoid prosecution;
+(ill) destruction of' or tumpering with evidence; or
+(iv) intimidation of potential witnesses.
+(C) An order under this paragraph may be renewed for additional periods of up to 90 days upon a showing that the circumstances described in
+subparagraph (B) continue to exist.
+(1) A summons issued under this section shall not require the production of anything that would be protected from production under the standard!
+applicable to a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States
+(8) If no case ur prucceding arises from the production of records or other things pursuant to this scction within a reasonable time after those records or
+things are-producec, the agency to which those records or things were dolivered shall, upon written demand made by the porson producing those records
+or things, return them to that person, except where the production required was only of copies rather than originals.
+(9) A subpoena issued under paragraph (1)(A)(i)(II) or (1)(A)(il) may require production as soon as possible, bul in no event less than 24 hours sitter
+service of the subpocna
+(10) As soon as practicable following the issuance of a subpoena under paragraph (1)(A)(ii), the Secrelary of the Treasury shail notify the Altorney
+General of its issuence.'.
+(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS-
+(1) SEÇTION HEADING- The heading for section 3486 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking:
+in Federal hewith cure inycatigations'.
+. (2) TABLE OF SECTIONS- The item relating to section 3486 in the table of sections at the beginning of chupter 223 of title 18, United Stales Code, is
+amended by striking: in Federal health care investigations'.
+(3) CONFORMING REPEAL- Section 3486A. and the item relating to that section in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 273, of title 18,
+United States Code, are repealed.
+(c) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT- Section 3486 of title 18, United States Code, is amended -
+(1) in subsection (a)(4), by striking 'summoned' and inserting 'subpoenaed and
+(2) in subsection (d), by striking 'summons' each place it appears and inserting 'subpoena'.
+03956-9807
+TATAI P.AR
+
+FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)
+3IE-MM-108062-1A94
+Field Office Aguiring Evidence _ MM/ PBCRA
+Serial # of Originating Document _
+Date Received
+Various
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Intervievee)
+(Address)
+By -
+SA
+To Be Returned • Yes.
+• No
+Receipt Given L Yes
+ENo
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+•No
+• Yes
+ENo
+Title:
+b6 -2
+b7C
+-2
+Reference:
+(Communication Enciosing Matcrial)
+Description:
+Original notes re interview of
+A CL
+b6 - 3
+66c -3
+*.5..
+03956-9828
+
+66 -3
+37C - 3
+03956-9829
+
+04/08/2008 14:18_FAX 5618021787
+USAO WPB FL
+R001
+U.S. Department of Justice
+United States Attorney
+Souzhern District of Florida
+56-6
+SOO S. Australian Ave, 4th Floor
+West Palm Beuch, Florida 33401
+(561) 820-8711
+Facsimile (561) 820-8777
+FACSIMILE COVER SHEET
+TO:
+DATE:
+FAX NO.
+PHONE NO.
+FROM:
+PHONE NO
+56-3,-5,- 6
+b7C-3,-5,-6
+63-1
+April 9, 2008
+# OFPAGES:2
+RE:
+COMMENTS:
+66 - 2
+670 - 2
+03956-9903
+
+04/08/2008 14:18 FAX 5618021781.
+USAO WPB FL
+0002
+U.S. Department of Justice
+United States Attorney
+Southern District of Florida
+500 South Australian Ave., Suite 400
+West Palm Beach, FL 33401
+(561) 820-8711
+Facsimile: (561) 820-8777
+April 9, 2008
+VIA FACSIMILE
+b6 -3,-5
+b7C -3, -5
+Re:
+Dear
+Thank you for your letter of March 28, 2008, regarding
+Pursuant
+to the strict rules of grand jury secrecy, I am not able to provide you with the intormation that
+you have requested. Ibelieve that some of the information you are seeking is available from
+public sources on the internet. We also do not have any
+I regret that I cannot be of more assistance. I would appreciate it if you would keep
+me updated on the course of the civil litigation.
+Sincerely,
+R. Alexander Acosta
+United States Attorney
+b7C - 3
+b6 - 2,- 6
+670 - 2, -6
+By:
+Assistant United States Attorney
+cc:
+FBI
+03956-9904
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/f76650f09892be3ec39f8e1ea63e13305f3e6f1ffc07c07a69fc34cf2a55364f.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/f76650f09892be3ec39f8e1ea63e13305f3e6f1ffc07c07a69fc34cf2a55364f.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..20a49d95e8e81f16d82f14d5cf7490b5d6bb750e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/f76650f09892be3ec39f8e1ea63e13305f3e6f1ffc07c07a69fc34cf2a55364f.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -1025,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "f76650f09892be3ec39f8e1ea63e13305f3e6f1ffc07c07a69fc34cf2a55364f",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "0ac3bbbd9f898a6e206984b1c1b8986112ffcc0016bdc9aca49c88454f6a67e5",
+  "output_sha256": "07ad7875c14ebb385d8e299f5890fabb506abfe4cd5d987cd639385e21b3ec7f",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/fd781f6758059d741959fa8a0fb72e94f4e1ed41716f22a3a95ea6f3b9ef21e2.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/fd781f6758059d741959fa8a0fb72e94f4e1ed41716f22a3a95ea6f3b9ef21e2.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7f80f92bd26ab3ea2845c1c0f27f4a16a44f4aaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/fd781f6758059d741959fa8a0fb72e94f4e1ed41716f22a3a95ea6f3b9ef21e2.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2008 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+H
+H
+LQ
+H
+H
+H
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+29
+30
+31
+32
+34
+35
+38
+42
+43
+b6
+b6
+606
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b6
+b6
+b6
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+- 5,
+b7D
+b7D
+- 5,
+b7D -
+b7D
+;
+;
+;
+1
+1
+-5;
+5;
+7D
+- 3,
+-5: b7D - 2:
+- 3,
+-5; b7D
+- 2;
+- 3,
+-5; b7D
+- 2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+7D
+3,
+5;
+-5; b7D - 2;
+- 3
+7D
+7D
+7D
+7D
+7D
+*.
+b7
+=.
+
+b
+H
+H
+H
+H
+1,
+1,
+=.
+1,
+H
+1,
+5
+1
+1
+5
+1
+5
+;
+1
+5;
+5
+5
+;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1,
+- 1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+- 1,
+H
+H
+5;
+5;
+5;
+- 2;
+- 2;
+1,
+1,
+- 1,
+1 -5;
+-5;
+-5;
+, -5;
+1,
+b7D - 2;
+- 2;
+b7C -
+b7C -
+3
+3
+- 5: b7C
+1,
+1
+1, -5;
+1,
+-5;
+-5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+-5;
+1,
+-8;
+-8 ;
+b7D
+2:
+7D
+- 2;
+
+Page 103 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,
+-3, - 5; b7C - 1, -3, - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 104 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 105 - b6
+- 1,
+-5,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 106 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 107 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 108 ~ b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 109 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2:
+Page 110 ~ b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 111 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 112 ~ b6
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 113 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 114 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 115 ~ b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 116 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 117 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 118 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 119 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+120
+b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+121 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+, -5; b7C - 1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+122
+~ b6
+5,
+1,
+-3
+, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+-8; b7C
+5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+123
+b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C
+1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+124
+b6
+5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+125
+~ b6
+Page
+126
+b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7c
+- 1,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+127
+06
+1,
+-5;
+b7C
+1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+128
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+-5; b7C - 3,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+129
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+130
+b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+131
+63
+1;
+b6
+3,
+-5; b7C -
+3,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+-5; b7C - 3,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+132
+06
+Page
+133
+1,
+-5,
+-8;
+b7C - 1,
+- 5,
+-8; b7D - 2;
+~ b6
+Page
+134
+b6
+1,
+-5
+-8;
+b7C - 1,
+-5,
+-8; b7D - 2;
+5,
+- 8;
+b7c
+5, -8; b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+135
+b6
+Page
+136
+66
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C -
+1,
+-5; b7D
+- 2;
+1,
+-5;
+b7C
+1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+137
+b3
+1;
+66
+3,
+Page
+138
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+- 5,
+-8; b7C - 3,
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+-5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+139
+b6
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+140
+- b6
+5,
+-8;
+b7C
+- 5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+141 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 1,
+-3,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+142 ~ 66 - 5,
+-8; b7C - 5,
+-8:
+b7D
+Page
+143 ~ b6 -
+5,
+- 8;
+b7C - 5,
+-8;
+b7D
+Page
+144 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5,
+-8; b7C - 1
+-5
+- 8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+145 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+Page
+146 ~ 66
+1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+2
+;
+Page
+147 = b6
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+b7D
+Page
+148
+- b6
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+Page
+149 " b6
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+b7D
+Page
+150
+-b6 - 1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+Page
+151 ~ b6
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+Page
+152 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+2
+;
+Page
+153 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+Page
+154 ~ b6 -
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5:
+7D
+Page 155 ~ b6
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5 ;
+b7D
+Page 156 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+2
+2
+;
+
+Page 157 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+Page 158 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7
+Page 159 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7
+2
+Page 160 ~
+b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+Page 161 - b6
+- 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7
+D
+Page 162
+= b6
+1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+Page 163 ~ b6
+-1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+2
+;
+Page 164 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 1, -3,
+-5;
+b7C
+1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 165 - b3
+…-
+1;
+b6 - 3, -5;
+b7C
+3,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 166 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+1,
+- 3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+1,
+- 3,
+- 5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+167
+~b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7C
+- 1
+• 1
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 168 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+1,
+-3,
+-5,
+-8;
+b7C
+- 1,
+-3
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 169
+-b3
+1; b6
+1,
+-3,
+- 5;
+b7C
+1,
+-3,
+- 5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page 170
+~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+1,
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7C
+1
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page 171 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+1,
+-3,
+-5;
+b7C
+1
+-3,
+- 5;
+b7D
+-2;
+Page 172 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+1,
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7C
+1,
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7D
+- Z;
+Page 173 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+174
+b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+175 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+-.
+3, -5; b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+176 ~ 66
+1,
+-5; b7C
+1,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+177 ~ b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+1, -5; b7D - 2:
+Page
+178
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+179 ~ b6
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+180 - b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+181 ~ 63
+1;
+b6
+Page
+182 - b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+183
+b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+-3, -5; b7C -
+1,
+-3,
+-5;
+b7D
+Page
+184
+b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+185
+b6
+1,
+-5;
+b7C
+- 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+186
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+187
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1, -3,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+188
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+- 3
+, -5; b7C - 1, -3,
+- 5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+189
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+190
+b6
+5;
+1,
+b7C -
+5;
+B7D S 2:
+-5, -8; b7C - 1, -3, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+191
+63
+1;
+b6 - 1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+192
+= b6
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+b7D - 2:
+Page
+193
++ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C
+Page
+194
+- b6
+5; b7C - 5;
+1,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+195
+-66- 1,-5; b70 - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+196 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 197 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 198 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 199 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2:
+Page 200 ~ b6
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 201 ~ b6 -
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 202 ~ b6 -
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 203 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 204 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+b7D - 2:
+Page 205 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 206 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 207 ~ b6 -
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 208 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 209 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,
+-5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 210 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+
+m
+-b6
+10
+L0
+= b6
+= b3
+L0
+-b6
+b6
+= b6
+~ b6
+L0
+= b6
+ru
+10
+- b3
+- b6
+L0
+m
+-b6
+~ 63
+= b3
+= b6
+- b3
+63
+b3
+b3
+~ b6
+~ b6
+b3
+b3
+b3
+63
+~ b3
+b3
+63
+63
+4%
++ %
+1,
++ %
+1;
++ %
+1;
+b
+I l I
+5;
+-5;
+- 5;
+- 3
+b7
+-3, -5; b7D - 2;
+-3, -5; b7D - 2;
+-3, -5; b7D - 2;
+-3
+-3
+* herg
+-3, -5; b7D - 2;
+-3,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+-3,
+- 5; b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+-3
+-5
+
+Page 265 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 266 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 267 - b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 268 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 269 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 270
+eb6
+- 1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+-2;
+Page 271 ~ b6
+-1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2:
+Page 272 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 3,
+-5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 273 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3,
+-5; b7C - 3,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 274 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 275 ~ 63
+1;
+1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7C
+-1,
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 276 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7C -
+1
+- 3,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 277 ~ b3
+1; b6
+1,
+-3,
+-5; b7C
+1
+-3,
+- 5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page 278 - b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+- 3,
+-5; b7C
+1,
+-3,
+-5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page 279 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+1,
+-3, -5; b7C -
+1,
+-3,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 280 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,
+page 281 - 66 - 5; b7C- 5: B7D - 2:
+-5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+282
+= b6
+1,
+-5; b7C
+- 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+283 ~ b6
+1,
+-5; b7C -
+1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+284
+- b6
+5;
+b7C -
+5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+285
+~ b3
+1;
+66 -
+3,
+-5, -8; b7C - 3, -5, -8; 67D - 2;
+Page
+286
+b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+287
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+Page
+288
+- b6
+5;
+b7C
+5;
+- b7D = 2;
+-5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+289
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+290 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+-31
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+291 = b6
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+292 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 - 1, -3,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+293 ~ b6
+1,
+-5; b7C -
+1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+294
+~ b6
+1,
+-5; b7C -
+Page
+295
+~ b6
+5;
+b7C - 5;
+1,
+-5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+296 ~ b6
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+297 - b6
+5;
+b7C - 5;
+b7D - Z;
+Page
+298
+"b6
+1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+299 ~ b6
+1,
+-5;
+67C -
+1,
+-5 ;
+67D
+-L:
+Page
+300 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1, -5;
+b7D
+Page
+301 - b6
+Page 302 - b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C -
+-5;
+b7D
+1,
+-5;
+1,
+b7C -
+1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 303 - b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+Page
+304 ~ 66 - 5;
+b7C - 5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page 305 ~ b6 -
+5;
+b7C - 5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+306 - b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b70
+Page 307 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7
+2
+;
+Page
+308 ~ 66
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+2
+Page 309 ~ b6 -
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+b7D
+Page 310 ~ b6 -
+5; b7C - 5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+311 ~ b6 -
+5;
+b7C - 5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+312 - b6 - 5; b7C - 5;
+b7D
+-2:
+Page
+313
+- b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page 314 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+Page
+315 - b6
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+2
+Page 316 ~ b6 -
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5:
+b7D
+2
+Page 317 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5 ;
+b7D
+Page 318 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+
+Page 319 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 320 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; 67D - 2;
+Page 321 - b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+322 - b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 323 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 324 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 325 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 326 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 327 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5, -8; b7C - 1,
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 328 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 329 ~ b6 - 5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 330 - b6
+- 5, -8; b7C - 5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 331 ~ b6
+5; b7C - 5; b7D - 2;
+Page 332 - b6
+5,
+-8; b7C - 5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 333 ~ b6 -
+5,
+-8; b7C - 5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 334 ~ b6 - 5,
+-8; b7C - 5, -8; b7D - 2:
+Page 335 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3, -8; b7C - 3, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+336
+b3
+1;
+b
+Page
+337
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+-8
+; b7C - 3,
+- 8;
+b7D - 2;
+age
+338
+b3
+1;
+b6
+3,
+-8
+; b7C -
+3,
+-8; b7D - 2;
+3,
+-8
+; b70 -
+3
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+P
+age
+339
+103
+1;
+b6
+: b7C -
+3,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+P
+açe
+340
+b6
+1,
+-5
+P
+age
+341
+b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+342
+b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+343
+06
+-5,
+age
+344
+1,
+63
+1;
+b6
+age
+345
+b6
+1,
+- 5;
+Page
+346
+b3
+b6
+-8;
+1,
+1,
+-8;
+1
+b7C
+1,
+b7
+C - 1,
+-5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+-3, -5,
+-8;
+b7C - 1,
+- 3,
+-3
+-5,
+-8; b7C - 1,
+-3,
+- 5,
+-8; b7D - 2;
+-5, -8;
+b7D - 2;
+b7C - 1,
+-5, -8; b7D - 2;
+-3,
+- 5,
+-8; b7C - 1, -3, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+1, -5; b7D - 2;
+b7C - 1, -5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+347
+b3
+b6
+; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+348
+06
+Page
+349
+b6
+1,
+-5;
+b7C
+1, -5; b7D
+- 2;
+-5
+-8;
+b7C - 1,
+-5,
+-8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page
+350
+b3
+P
+age
+351
+b3
+age
+352
+b3
+b6
+b6
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+b6
+1,
+: b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D - 2;
+age
+353
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+1, -5; b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+354
+b6
+Page
+355
+b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C
+1, -5;
+b7D
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5; b7D
+Page
+356
+b
+6
+1,
+1,
+-3,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+357
+5,
+8;
+b7C - 1, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page
+358
+b3
+1;
+b6
+1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+359
+b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+360
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 1,
+-3,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+361 - 63
+- 1;
+b6
+- 1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+362 ~ 63
+1; b6
+3,
+-5; b7C - 3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+363 ~ b6
+5;
+b7C -
+5;
+b7D - 2:
+Page
+364 ~ b6
+1,
+-5;
+b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+365 - b3
+1;
+b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+366 ~ 66
+1,
+-5;
+170 - 1, -5: b7D - 21
+-3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+367
+1;
+b6
+- 1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5; b7D - 2; b7E - 1;
+Page
+368 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1,
+-3,
+-5; b7D - 2; b7E - 1;
+Page
+369
+~ b6
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2; b7E - 1;
+Page
+370
+-b3
+1;
+66 - 1,-3,-5, -8: b7C- 1,-3,-5,-8; b7D - 2: b7E
+- 1;
+
+W0
+WJ
+W
+W
+H
+1,
+3,
+co
+00
+00
+e
+b3
+b3
+b3
+66
+163
+b3
+b3
+b6
+06
+b6
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b3
+b
+1;
+1,
+1;
+1;
+1,
+1,
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+b3
+b3
+WJ
+1;
+1;
+1;
+- 1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+1;
+66
+…-
+1,
+1;
+1,
+1,
+b
+b
+b
+b
+P.
+;
+7
+b7
+D
+;
+- 3
+- 5
+E
+H
+7E
+-5
+- 5
+b7D
+- 2;
+b7D - 2;
+00
+=.
+00
+b7D - 2;
+7E
+7E
+1;
+1;
+b7D
+b7D
+b7D
+2
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D - 2;
+b7D
+b7D
+2:
+;
+- 2;
+b7D - 2;
+
+Page 422 ~ b6 - 1, -5, -8; b7C - 1, -5, -8; b7D - 2;
+Page 423 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 424 - b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 425 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1,
+-3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 426 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 427 ~ b3
+-3, -5; b7C - 1,
+Page 428 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+-3, -5; b7C - 1, -3,
+-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 429 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1,
+-3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 430 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 431 ~ b6
+- 1,
+- 5,
+-8; b7C - 1, -5, -8;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 432 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 1, -3, -5; b7C - 1, -3, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 433 ~ b6
+- 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+Page 434 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+Deleted Page(s)
+X No Duplication Fee X
+For this Page
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+
+03956-3948
+
+03956-3949
+
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+H
+De
+• .
+ry
+1;
+1,
+00
+10
+12
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+19
+20
+21
+22
+23
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+29
+30
+31
+32
+34
+35
+36
+37
+38
+39
+40
+41
+42
+43
+44
+45
+46
+47
+48
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1
+1,
+1,
+1
+1
+1,
+1
+1
+1,
+1
+1,
+1
+1
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+;
+;
+1
+1,
+1,
+1
+1
+1,
+1,
+1
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+
+50
+51
+52
+53
+54
+55
+56
+57
+58
+60
+61
+62
+63
+64
+65
+6
+67
+68
+69
+70
+71
+72
+73
+74
+75
+76
+77
+78
+79
+80
+81
+82
+83
+84
+8
+86
+87
+88
+89
+90
+91
+92
+93
+96
+97
+98
+b
+1,
+1,
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1,
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1,
+1
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+1,
+- 1,
+H
+;
+5;
+5;
+5;
+b
+2
+b
+ÑŃŃÑŇ
+NÄNÄNNN
+NNN
+b
+D
+D
+
+Page 103 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 104 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+105 - b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page
+106 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+Page 107 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+5;
+Page 108 ~ b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+D
+D
+D
+7
+D
+b7D
+b7D
+Page 109 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+Page 110 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+7
+Page 111 - b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+D
+Page 112 - b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+D
+Page 113 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+D
+Page 114 ~ b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+D
+Page 115 - b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+D
+Page 116 ~ b6 -
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+D
+Page 117 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+D
+Page 118 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+D
+Page 119 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1, -5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 120
+~ bb
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+b7D
+Page 121 ~ b6 - 1,
+- 5; bC - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+122 ~ b6
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+123 - b6
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+b7D
+Page
+124 ~ b6
+- 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+b7D
+Page
+125 ~ b6
+1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+b7D
+Page
+126 = b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+2:
+Page
+127
+- b6
+1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+Page
+128 - b6 - 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+- 2;
+Page
+129
+= b6
+1,
+- 5;
+b70 - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+Page
+130 ~ b6 -
+1,
+- 5;
+b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+b7D
+Page 131 ~ b6 - 1,
+-5; b7C - 1,
+-5;
+b7D
+Page 132 ~ b6
+- 1,
+- 5; b7C - 1,
+- 5;
+b7D
+Page 133 ~ b6 - 1, -5; b7C - 1, -5; b7D - 2;
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+Deleted Page (s)
+× No Duplication Fee X
+× For this Page
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/fd781f6758059d741959fa8a0fb72e94f4e1ed41716f22a3a95ea6f3b9ef21e2.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/fd781f6758059d741959fa8a0fb72e94f4e1ed41716f22a3a95ea6f3b9ef21e2.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fd12c052a019b9a8e6b732c240a948c7bd4d9cd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/fd781f6758059d741959fa8a0fb72e94f4e1ed41716f22a3a95ea6f3b9ef21e2.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -993,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fd781f6758059d741959fa8a0fb72e94f4e1ed41716f22a3a95ea6f3b9ef21e2",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "857e47f4e6fe9756c95077854e3749bea16d5ee9534d107ffc0f244f614f3251",
+  "output_sha256": "e2479c417397739387ad651474b508a64c85a7bae9f0a527739b88d852f6c9b6",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ffde35942f1bf0e827e415dce195a810ad9a83a2e5ad4317fbc6e9035eac547b.md b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ffde35942f1bf0e827e415dce195a810ad9a83a2e5ad4317fbc6e9035eac547b.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f34e8c83e53b586fbd7e6fb09e737ebfabb7fa98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ffde35942f1bf0e827e415dce195a810ad9a83a2e5ad4317fbc6e9035eac547b.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2675 @@
+FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+FOI/PA
+DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
+Civil Action# 17-cv-03956
+Total Deleted Page (s) = 507
+Page 8 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 9 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 10 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7D - 2;
+Page 11 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+Page 12 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 13 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 14
+~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 2;
+Page 15 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 16 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 17 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 18 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page
+19
+b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+20
+< b6
+1,-5;
+b7c
+- 1,-5;
+Page
+21
+1,-5;
+b7c
+- 1,-5;
+Page
+22
+2;
+2;
+Page
+23
+Page
+24
+Page
+25
+Page
+26
+Page
+27
+Page
+28
+Page
+29
+~ b6
+~ b6
+< b6
+b6
+b6
+= b6
+b6
+b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+b7
+1
+, - 5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+b7
+7
+D
+2:
+2:
+2;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+2;
+Page
+30
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+31
+b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+32
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+33
+Page
+34
+b6
+= b6
+1, -5;
+b7c
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+35
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+36
+66
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+D
+b7
+D
+b7
+D
+7
+D
+7
+D
+7D
+2;
+2;
+2;
+Page
+37
+= b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+38
+b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+39
+66
+1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5;
+7D
+Page
+40
+= b6
+1,-5;
+b70 - 1,-5;
+Page
+41 " b6
+- 1,-5;
+b70 - 1,-5;
+Page
+42
+~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+43
+b6
+- 1,- 5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 44
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+45
+1,-5;
+b70 -
+1,-5;
+Page 46
+~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+47
+= b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+48
+a b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 49
+~ 66-1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+50
+- b6
+1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+51
+• b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+52
+~ b6 -
+1, -5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+53
+- b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 54 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 55 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+7D
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+;
+2;
+
+Page 56 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 57 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 58 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 59 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+Page 60 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 61 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 62 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 63 ~ b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 64 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 65 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 66 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 67 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 68 ~ b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page 69 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C -
+1, -5;
+Page 70 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 71 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+73
+Page
+74
+b6
+b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7c
+1,-5;
+Page
+75
+Page
+76
+Page
+77
+Page
+78
+Page
+79
+Page
+80
+~ b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+1,-5;
+b7c
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1
+, - 5;
+b7C
+1
+, -5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+81
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+82
+Page
+83
+Page
+84
+Page
+85
+Page
+86
+Page
+87
+Page
+88
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+66
+b6
+= b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1, -5;
+b7c
+1,-5;
+Page
+89
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+90
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+91
+Page
+92
+b6
+b6
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+1,-5;
+b7C
+1,-5;
+Page
+93
+1,-5;
+b7c
+- 1,-5;
+Page 94 ~ b6
+1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 95 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 96
+~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 97 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 98 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 99 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 100 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 101 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 102 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 103 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 104 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 105 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+106 - b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page
+107 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 108 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 109 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+2;
+D
+D
+D
+D
+;
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+D
+7D
+
+b6
+= b6
+ru
+ru
+" b6
+- b6
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7c
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7c
+b7C
+b7c
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+b7C
+- b3
+- b
+1;
+1;
+1;
+- 1;
+1;
+1;
+-b3
+- 1;
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6
+b6 -
+1,-5
+1,-5
+1,-5
+1,-5
+1,-5
+1,-5
+1,-5
+1,-5
+1,
+- 5
+1,
+-5
+1,-5
+1,-5
+1,-5
+1,-5
+1,-5
+1,-5
+b7C -
+b7c
+b7C
+b7C -
+b7c
+b7c
+b7C -
+b7c
+b7c
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+Z;
+2:
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2:
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2:
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2;
+2:
+2;
+2;
+2;
+3
+
+Page 170
+~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 171 ~ 63 - 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 172 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+173
+b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 174 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 175
+= b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 176 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 177
+- b3
+1; b6
+-5; b7C -
+Page 178 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 179 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3
+,-5;
+Page 180 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page 181 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 182 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 183 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 184 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 185 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 186 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 187
+= b3
+1i
+b6
+-5; b7C
+-5;
+Page 188 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+-5;
+Page
+189
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+190 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page
+191 ~ 63
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+192 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page 193 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+-5;
+Page
+194 - b3
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page 195 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+-5;
+Page
+196 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+197 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+-5;
+Page
+198
+- b3
+- 1;
+b6
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+199
+~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+200 ~ b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page 201 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5; b7C
+-5;
+Page 202 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+-5;
+Page
+203 b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+204 ~ 63
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page 205 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page 206
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+3
+-5;
+Page 207 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+-5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+208
+b3
+1;
+b6 -
+-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+209 ~ 63 - 1;
+b6 -
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page
+210
+~ b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+3
+-5;
+Page
+211
+~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page 212 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C -
+Page
+213 ~ b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page
+214 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+215 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+216 -b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+217 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C
+, -5;
+Page
+218 ~ b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page
+219 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page 220 - b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+Page 221 ~ b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page 222 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+b7c
+Page 223 - b3
+- 1;
+
+Page 224 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 225 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+226-b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+227 -b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 228 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 229 ~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 230 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 231 ~ b3
+1; b6
+-5; b7C -
+Page 232 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 233 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+,-5;
+Page 234 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page 235 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 236 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 237 - b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 238 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 239 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 240 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+241
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page 242 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, - 5;
+b7c
+-5;
+Page
+243
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+244 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+245
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+246
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page
+247
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+248
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b 7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+249 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+-5;
+Page
+250
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+251
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+252
+- 63
+1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+253
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+254
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+255
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+256 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+257
+b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+258
+-b3
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+259
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+260
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+-5;
+Page
+261
+b3
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page 262 ~
+1;
+b6 -
+-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+263 -63
+1;
+b6 -
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 264 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+3
+-5;
+Page
+265 -b3
+- 1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page 266 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 267 ~ b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 268 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 269 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+270 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+271 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C
+, -5;
+Page 272 - b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 273 ~ b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page 274 - b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+275 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page 276 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 277 - b3
+- 1;
+
+Page 278 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 279 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 280 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 281 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 282 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 283 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 284 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 285 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+-5; b7C -
+Page 286 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 287 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3
+,-5;
+Page 288 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page 289 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 290 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 291 - b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 292 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 293 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 294 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page
+295
+b3
+1i
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page 296 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+-5;
+Page
+297
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+298
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+299
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+300
+_= b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page
+301
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+-5;
+Page
+302
+b3
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b 7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+303 - 63
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+304 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+305 ~
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+306 ~ 63
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+307
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+308
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+309
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+310
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+311
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+312 ~
+b3
+1;
+66
+- 5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+313 b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page
+314~
+b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+315
+- b3
+1;
+- 5;
+b7c
+3
+-5;
+b
+6
+-5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+316-
+b3
+1;
+b6 -
+-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+317 - b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page
+318
+~ b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+3
+-5;
+Page
+319
+= b3
+- 1;
+b6
+b7c
+-5;
+Page 320 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 321 ~ b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 322 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 323 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+324 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+325 - 63
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7c
+, -5;
+Page
+326 - b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 327 - b3
+1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page 328 ~ b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+b7c
+Page 329 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page 330 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 331 - b3
+-1;
+
+Page 332 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 333 ~ 63 - 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 334 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+335~
+b3
+1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 336 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 337
+~ b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 338 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 339 ~ b3
+1; b6
+-5; b7C -
+Page 340 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 341 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3
+,-5;
+Page 342 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page 343 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 344 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 345 - b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 346 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 347 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 348 ~ b3 - 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+349
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+350
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+Page
+351
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7c
+-5;
+-5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+352 - b3
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+353
+b3
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+Page
+354
+_ = b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page
+355
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+356
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+357 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+-5;
+Page
+358
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+359 ~
+b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+360
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+361
+163
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+362
+~ b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+363
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+364 - b3
+1;
+b6
+- 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+365 ~
+b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+366 ~
+63
+66
+-5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+367
+= b3
+Page
+368
+b3
+1;
+1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+3
+-5;
+Page
+369
+b3
+b
+6
+-5;
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page 370
+b3
+b6 -
+-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+371 ~ 63 - 1;
+66 - 3,-5;
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page
+372 - b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+3
+-5;
+Page
+373 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3, - 5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page 374 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 375 ~ b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 376 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+377 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+378 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+Page
+379 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C
+, -5;
+Page
+380 ~ 63
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 381 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page 382 - b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+b7c
+Page 383 ~ b3
+1;
+66 -
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page 384 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 385 - b3
+- 1;
+
+Page 386 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 387 ~ 63 - 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 388 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page
+389 ~ b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 390 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 391 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 392 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+1-5;
+Page 393 ~ b3
+1; b6
+-5; b7C -
+Page 394 - b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 395 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+3
+,-5;
+Page 396 - b3
+- 1; 66
+3, -5; b7C
+3
+, -5;
+Page 397 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 398 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+-5;
+Page 399 - b3
+1; b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 400 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 401 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 402 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page
+403
+b3
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7C
+-5;
+Page 404
+= b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5; b7C
+-5;
+Page
+405
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+406 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page 407
+~ 63
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+Page
+408
+_= b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page
+409
+- b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+410 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page 411 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+-5;
+Page
+412 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+413 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page
+414 " b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+3
+- 5;
+Page
+415
+~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page 416 - b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+417 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+3, -5;
+b7c
+-5;
+Page 418 - b3
+1;
+b6
+b7c
+-5;
+Page
+419 ~ b3
+1;
+66
+b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+420 ~ b3
+1;
+66
+3, -5;
+b7C
+3
+- 5;
+Page 421 ~ b3
+Page
+422 ~ b3
+1;
+b6
+b7C
+- 5;
+1;
+b6
+-5;
+b7c
+3
+-5;
+Page
+423 ~b3
+1;
+b6
+-5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page
+424 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page
+425 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page
+426 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+3
+-5;
+Page
+427 -b3
+- 1;
+b6
+b7C
+-5;
+Page 428 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C -
+Page
+429 - b3
+1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 430 - b3
+1;
+b6
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 431 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page
+432 - b3
+1;
+_b6 -
+b7c
+Page 433 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5;
+b7C
+, -5;
+Page
+434 - b3
+- 1; b6
+b7C -
+- 5;
+Page 435 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+- 5;
+Page 436 - b3
+1; b6 -
+b7c
+Page 437 ~ b3
+1;
+b6 -
+b7c
+- 5;
+Page 438 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 439 - b3
+-1;
+
+Page 440 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 441 ~ 63 - 1; 66 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 442 - b3
+1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 443 - b3
+- 1;
+b6 -
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 444 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C
+Page 445
+= b3
+- 1; b6
+3, -5; b7C -
+Page 446 ~ b3
+- 1; 66 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+3,- 5;
+Page 447
+~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 448 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 449 ~ b3
+1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+3, -5;
+Page 450 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 451 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 452 ~ b3
+- 1; b6
+3, - 5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 453 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 454 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C
+Page 455 ~ b3 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3,- 5;
+Page 456 ~ 63 - 1; b6 -
+3; b7C - 3;
+Page 457 - b3
+- 1: b6 - 3,-5; b7C - 3,-5;
+Page 458 - b6
+- 5; b7C - 5;
+Page 459 ~ b6
+5; b70 -
+5;
+Page 460 - b3
+- 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+Page 461 ~ b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3,-5; b7C -
+Page 462 - b3
+- 1;
+b6
+3, - 5; b7C
+Page 463 - b3
+- 1; b6 -
+3, -5; b7C
+Page 464 ~ 63 - 1; b6 - 3,-5; b7C -
+3, -5;
+Page 466 ~ b7E - 1;
+Page 472 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 473 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 474 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+67D - 2;
+Page
+475 - b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 476 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+- 2;
+Page 477 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+- 2;
+Page 478 - b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2:
+Page 479 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 480 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 481 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+b7D - 2;
+Page 482 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C
+- 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 483 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C -
+1,-5; b7D
+2;
+Page 484 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D
+2;
+Page
+485~ 66-1,-5;
+b70 - 1,-5;
+2;
+Page
+486 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+2;
+Page
+487
+~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+2;
+Page 488 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+2;
+Page 489 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C -
+1,-5
+2;
+Page 490 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5
+2;
+Page 491 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+2;
+Page 492 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+2;
+Page 493 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+2;
+Page
+494
+" b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+2;
+Page 495 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+2;
+Page 496 - b6
+- 1,-5;
+b7C -
+1,-5;
+2;
+Page 497 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+2:
+Page 498
+~ 66-1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5;
+2;
+Page 499 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+2:
+
+Page 500 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+2;
+Page 501 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5;
+Page 502 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page
+503 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page 504 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+I II
+2;
+2;
+2;
+Z;
+Page 505 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C
+- 1,-5
+2:
+Page 506 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+2;
+Page 507 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+2;
+Page 508 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+2;
+Page 509 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5
+2;
+Page 510 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5
+2;
+Page 511 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page 512 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+2;
+2;
+Page 513 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+2;
+Page 514 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+2;
+Page 515 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5
+Page 516 ~ 16 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 517
+~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 518 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 519 ~ b6
+- 1,-5; b7c -
+1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 520 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 521 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C
+- 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 522 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7c
+- 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 523 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 524 ~ b6 - 1,-5;
+b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 525 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+Page 526 ~ b6 - 1,-5; b7C - 1,-5; b7D - 2;
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+X
+Deleted Page(s)
+X No Duplication Fee X
+For this Page
+X
+X
+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+
+JA Envelope
+Case ID: 31E-MM-108062
+MM
+11
+MM
+12
+RUSULTS FROM
+BE #S
+ADMIN SUBPOENA RESULTS FROM
+ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA
+b6 - 1,-3, -5
+b7C
+-1,-3, - 5
+_b7D
+-2-
+63 - 1
+MM
+MM
+MM
+MM
+MM
+MM
+MM
+MM
+MM
+MM
+13
+I CD CONTAINING TOLL RECORDS FROM
+DOCUMENTATION
+14 ! SUBPOENA RESULTS FOR
+! ADMIN SUBPOENA FOR L
+16 ! ORIGINAL NOTES RE INTERVIEW OE
+17 ! SUBPOENA RESULTS FOR
+18
+! SUBPOENA RESULTS FOR
+19
+RESULT OF SUBPOENA DATED 12-22-2006
+20
+!
+ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA REGARDING
+21
+SUBPOENA RESULTS FOR
+22
+SUBPOENA
+• RESULTS FOR INFORMATION ON
+ULAR TELEPHONE-SPRINT/NEXTEL
+PHOTOGRAPH SHOWN TOl
+AND
+LAND RESULTS
+AND
+SUBSCRIBER INFO ONLY)
+ICELL
+MM
+MM
+MM
+MM
+23
+24
+25
+26
+!
+!
+JETBLUE SUBPOENA RESULTS
+INISTRA
+TIVE SUBPOENA FOR
+AND RESULTS
+---03956-9934--
+31E1M-108062-17
+
+. FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)
+File Number .
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+31E-Mm- 108062-1A|1
+mm/PBIRA.
+Serial # of Originating Document
+D'ate Received
+08/30/2006
+From
+e of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+-2
+By
+To Be Returned • Yes
+Receipt Given
+Yes
+I No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+• No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+Yes
+No
+b6
+D7C
+-2
+-2
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description:
+E-Originat sotes re interview of
+Resulto brom
+_ne#s
+b6
+b7C
+b3
+-3
+-3
+-2
+- 1
+Admintratine Subpous
+03956-9935
+
+----
+...
+To: SAL
+FBI 33401
+STE 500
+505 S FLAGLER DRIVE
+WEST PALM BEACH FL 33401
+File Codes
+b6-2
+b7C - 2
+From:
+Number of Pages:
+Date: 8/23/2006
+Fax lumber: (561) 833-7970
+equest Dated: 8/1/201
+eceived On: 8/22/201
+I you analy already doing so, plea agi a dising el teal regus le
+- The requested information is enclosed.
+- We have no call details for
+- We have no call details for_
+- Target number L
+Jafter 4/5/05.
+Jafter 10/06/05.
+is associated with account
+which was active from
+66-3
+b70 - 3
+07D-2
+03 - 1
+- All records were put on disk whenever possible.
+U
+R
+03956-993670
+-2
+
+08/22/2006 18:21 FAX
+NEST PALA BEACH
+2001/009
+• To: SAL
+FBI 33401
+STE 500
+505 S FLAGLER DRIVE
+WEST PALM BEACH FI, 33401
+File Code
+66 - 2
+b7C -2
+Fas Number: (561) 833-79701
+From:
+Number of Pages: 9
+Date: 8/22/2006
+If you are not already doing so, please begin addressingiall legal requests fol
+Additionally, effective immedialely, please fax all legalrequests to
+67D -2
+:
+- The requested information is enclosed.
+:
+:
+:
+:
+expense, Thank you.
+U
+R
+Piluis Use Only
+wil
+03956-9937
+
+08672272086 1121
+FAX
+17:28320
+WEST PALM BEACH
+=
+U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+SUBPOENA
+01002/009
+R4002
+56 -2,-3
+b7C - 2,-3
+b3 - 1
+In the matter af case mumber(8):
+31E-MM-108062
+TO:
+ADDRESS:
+TELEPHONE:
+GREETING:
+By the service of this subpoena upon you by SA
+who is authorized to serve it,
+you are hereby commanded and roquired to disclose to
+SA
+_, * representative of
+the FBI the name, address, local ad long distanse telephone toll filling records, relephoze number or other subacriber number or
+¡denăly, and lengti of service of a suascriber to or custorner of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement laquiry, involving the following:
+Please provide
+account records to include subscriber and billing
+infontation as
+well as toll records (incoming and outgoing calls) [oI the
+Following numbers:
+Number
+Toll Recard Dates
+**Please provide cell tower and Iscattion for toll tecords.
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI, YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION. YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT IO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF TIES SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW.
+August
+Compliance must be made by personal appearance or production of itoords no later than the
+2006
+_ day of
+- at 10:00 o'clock A M, at 505 S.
+Elagler Drive,|#500
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+SAL
+i lieu of a personal bonerante the information can be provided, via facs/mile, marked to the attention af
+i, at telephone number
+561-833~7970
+In lieu of a personal soperaice, the information can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+SAL
+-, at the following address: 505 S. Flagler Drive, #500
+west Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+if you refuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may invoke the aid of the United State
+District Court to compol complianse. Your failure to obey the desulting court order may be punished as conterot
+Issued under suthority of Pubic Law No.
+(18 U.S. 0, 37056)
+ATTESTEN COPY
+Signature:
+Narnä, Tirle
+ISSA
+b6 - 2
+b7C -2
+day of August
+- 2006
+03956-9938
+
+FD-340 (Rev. 7-29-92)
+Universal Case File Number _
+Field Office Acquiring Evidence
+Serial # of Originating Document
+Date Received 11/19/2006
+From
+Metro
+PCS
+(Name of Contributor)
+31E-MAN 1080621414
+PBCRA/MM
+(Address of Contributor)
+By-
+St
+To Be Returned L Yes LI No
+Receipt Given • Yes • No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes • No
+Title:
+b6 - 2
+_b7C -2
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material)
+Description: E Original notes re interview of
+subpreva results for
+b6 - 3
+b7C -3
+63 - 1
+='
+03956-10077
+
+08/01/2006 TUE 16:25 FAX
+41002
+U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTICATION
+SUBPOENA
+In tite matter of case number(s):
+3IE-MM-108062
+TO:
+ADDRESS:
+TELEPHONE:
+Metro PCS
+Custodian of Records
+8144 Walnut Hill Jane, #800
+Dallas,
+• IX 75231
+(972) 860-2635
+GREETING:
+By the service of this subpot upon you by SA
+who is authorized to serve it,
+., a represcatative of
+the FBI, the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number of
+identity, and length of service of a sudscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may be relevant to an uuthorized law calorement inquiry, involving the folluwing:
+Please provide any and all account records to include subscriber ano
+billing information as well as toll records (incoming and outgoing
+calls) for the following numbers:
+-2
+b7C -2
+56 - 3
+b7C -3
+63 - 1
+Please provide cell tower and location for the toll records.
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI, YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION. YOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW,
+August
+West Palm
+SA
+56 - 2
+67C -2
+In lieu of a personal appearance, the information can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+SA
+_, at the following address: 505 5. Flagler Drive, #500
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+If you retuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney Gencral may invoke tire aid of the United States
+District Court to compet compliance. Your failure to obey the resulting court order may be punished as content.
+sited under autiority of Public La
+18 U.S.C. $34
+ATTESTED CO
+Signature:
+Name, Tit
+SSA
+Issued this.
+01
+• day of _August
+_, 2006
+03956-10078
+
+metroPCS
+DECLARATION FOR METROPCS RECORDS
+56-8
+b7C -8
+Security Compliance
+8144 Walnut Hill Lane
+Suite 800
+Dallas, Texas 75231
+Re:
+CASE NO: 31E-MM-108062
+TARGET NUMBER:_
+56-3
+b7C -3
+b3 - 1
+1) hereby declare:
+I am employed by MetroPCS Inc. and have been designated as Custodian of Records with responsibility for
+MetroPCS' compliance with the subpoena duces tecum, search warrant or court order.
+The attached records are true copies of all the records described in the legal process (subpoena, search warrant, or
+court order). I personally have conducted or supervised compliance by MetroPCS with the subpoena duces tecuz,
+search warrant or court order.
+The records are either call detail or subscriber records, employee records, or other wireless records, depending upon
+the legal process (subpoena duces tecurn, search warrant, or court order) request.
+The subscriber records were prepared by MetroPCS personnel in the ordinary course of business at or near the time
+of the act, condition, or event. Account information is entered into the MetroPCS Billing System where the data is
+stored. The Custodian of Records retrieves the stored data from the MetroPCS Billing System via billing software
+for compliance purposes.
+MetroPCS allows its customers' unlimited use of their services and therefore does not need call detail records for
+billing purposes. Call detail records are maintained solely for the purpose of complying with legal processes as
+mandated by CALEA. MetroPCS selected Verisign to store call detail records for the purpose of complying with
+legal processes as mandated by CALEA. Verisign is a secure third-party provider and is an active consultant to
+federal agencies and the Office of Homeland Security.
+Call detail is recorded at the MetroPCS switch at the time of the event. MetroPCS makes it a regular business
+practice to have the records stored for the purpose of meeting requirements for assisting government agencies with
+lawful subpoena requests for subscriber records. The call detail is electronically transmitted to Verisign where the
+data is stored. Verisiga provides a static IP address through a dedicated secure circuit for retrieval of these records.
+The call detail files are maintained for approximately 6 months depending on size and quantity, after which
+they are automatically purged.
+Certification of No Records: That a thorough search of our files revealed no documents, records or other
+material called for in the subpoena.
+Requested call detail records existed at one time but all or some of the records have since been purged.
+I declare, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.
+Executed at Dallas, Texas on9/24/06
+b6 - 8
+b7C -8
+b6 - 8
+b7C -8
+Compliance Analyst
+03956-10392
+
+FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)
+File Number
+3IE-MM-108062-1A15
+Serial # of Originating Document
+D'ate Received
+01/03/2007
+From
+(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
+(Address)
+b6
+b7C
+D7D
+-2
+- 2
+- 2
+By
+To Be Refumed L Yes
+Receipt Given
+• Yes
+IT No
+Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
+Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
+• Yes
+I No
+Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
+• Yes
+I to
+Title:
+Reference:
+(Communication Enclosing Material) •
+Description:
+It Original hotes te interviom of
+Admin Subpowa
+fir
+* Result
+b6 -1
+b7C
+-1
+03956-10394
+
+To:
+SAL
+FBI
+STE 500
+505 S FLAGLER DRIVE
+WEST PALM BEACH FL 33401
+File Code:
+66 - 2
+7C -:
+97D -1
+hone Number:
+ax Number: (561) 833-797
+Reces Dr: 2720066
+From
+Number of Pages:
+Date: 12/27/2006
+If you are not already doing so, please begin addressing all legal requests tol
+Additionally, effective immediately, please fax all legal requests to
+b7D - 2
+- The requested information is enclosed.
+-2
+only by the individual to whom it is addressed, and whichr may contain information that is privileged, condentar andror otherwise exempt from
+expense, Thank you,
+ficial Use Only
+R
+C
+03956-10395
+
+DEC-22-2006
+15:51
+FBI WEST PALM BEACH RA
+•
+U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
+SUBPOENA
+P.D2
+In the matter of case number(s):
+31E-MM-108062
+-2
+TO:
+ADDRESS:
+TELEPHONE:
+GREETING:
+By the service of this subpoena upon you by SA
+b6 -2:
+who is authorized to serve it, b70 - 2
+you are hereby commanded and required to disclose to SA
+_ a representative of
+the FBT, the name, address, local and long distance telephone roll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or
+identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of services the subscriber or customer
+utilized which may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry, involving the following:
+Please provide any and all records to include subscriber and billing
+information for the following number:
+66 - 1:
+b7C -1
+670 - 2
+:
+•
+THE INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH THIS SUBPOENA RELATES TO A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
+INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI. YOUR COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH THIS
+INFORMATION. XOU ARE REQUESTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA
+INDEFINITELY AS ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE COULD INTERFERE WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION
+AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW,
+Compliance must be made by personal appearance or production of records no later than the
+January
+2007.
+at 10:00 o'clock...
+West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
+_Mar 505S. Flagler Drive, #500 day of
+SA E.
+In liauota narcarnl ansarmace the information can be provided, via facsimile, marked to the attention of
+_ at telephone number
+(561) 833-7970
+In lieu of a personal appearance, the information can be provided, via mail, marked to the attention of
+SA E.
+-, at the following address: 505 S. Elagler Drive, #500
+West Palm Beach, EL 33401
+If you refuse to obey this subpoena, the United States Attorney General may Invoke the aid of the Unlted States
+District Court to compei compliance. Your failure to obey the resulting court order may be punished as contempt.
+Tssued under aurhorty of Public Law No. 106-544, 8 5(a).
+(18 U.S.C. $3486)
+ATTESTED CO!
+Signature:
+Name, Title
+Issued this 22
+day of December
+66-2
+• b7C -2
+03956-10396
+_ 2006
+
+-2...
+"z."
+FBI
+STE 500
+505 S FLAGLER DRIVE
+WEST PALM BEACH FL 33401
+b6 - 2
+b7C -2
+STATESFPOSASAN
+PITNEY BOWES
+02 1A
+
+$ 02.550
+DEC 28 2006
+MAILED FROM ZIPCODE 33407
+[OPENEDAND INSPECTED
+03956-10452
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ffde35942f1bf0e827e415dce195a810ad9a83a2e5ad4317fbc6e9035eac547b.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ffde35942f1bf0e827e415dce195a810ad9a83a2e5ad4317fbc6e9035eac547b.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..46297ff0e5134d8f155912390053bc9dbe57074d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/fbi-vault-01/ffde35942f1bf0e827e415dce195a810ad9a83a2e5ad4317fbc6e9035eac547b.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -2374,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "ffde35942f1bf0e827e415dce195a810ad9a83a2e5ad4317fbc6e9035eac547b",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 2,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "040fed85d03a260da2ac33f6e03c5e6e562793cf339b554d695099f659292a33",
+  "output_sha256": "cb3898603dc9bc729386743e6b27155822577a89518dd6c12644683e0dd39202",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/017c2a8bd62d1a5bcf6b3f76caf48352a5078964387e49f5a297782684c1662f.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/017c2a8bd62d1a5bcf6b3f76caf48352a5078964387e49f5a297782684c1662f.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..74bb48d6ed89b75968a6fe7d57090548ab325955
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/017c2a8bd62d1a5bcf6b3f76caf48352a5078964387e49f5a297782684c1662f.md
@@ -0,0 +1,11157 @@
+a ration it is mir
+"i me man decipe per sort
+THE FIRST APPEARANCE OF THE DEVIL TO
+CHRISTOPH HAIZMANN
+
+THE STANDARD EDITION
+OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF
+SIGMUND FREUD
+Translated from the German under the General Editorship of
+JAMES STRACHEY
+In Collaboration with
+ANNA FREUD
+Assisted by
+ALIX STRACHEY and ALAN TYSON
+•..:
+VOLUME XIX
+(1923-1925)
+The Ego and the Id
+and
+Other Works
+LONDON
+THE HOGARTH PRESS
+AND THE INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
+
+FESS
+PUBLISHED BY
+THE HOGARTH PRESS LIMITED
+CLARKE, IRWIN AND CO. LTD.
+TORONTO
+This Edilion first Published in 1961
+Reprinled 1962, 1964, 1968, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1978, 1981 and 1986
+ISBN 07012 00677
+!..
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
+system, or transmitted, in any form, or by
+prior permission of The Hogarth Press Ltd.
+TRANSLATION AND EDITORIAL MATTER
+C THE INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
+AND ANGELA RICHARDS 196I
+PRINTED AND BOUND IN GREAT BRITAIN
+BY BUTLER AND TANNER LTD, FROME
+
+VOLUME NINETEEN
+•
+Editor's Introduction
+Preface
+I
+Consciousness and What is Unconscious
+The Ego and the Id
+III
+The Ego and the Super-Ego (Ego Ideal)
+IV
+The Two Classes of Instincts
+V
+The Dependent Relationships of the Ego
+Appendix A. The Descriptive and the Dynamic Unconscious
+Appendix B. The Great Reservoir of Libido
+A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY DEMONOLOGICAL
+NEUROSIS (1923 [1922])
+Editor's Note
+Introduction
+I
+The Story of Christoph Haizmann the Painter
+The Motive for the Pact with the Devil
+III The Devil as a Father-Substitute
+IV The Two Bonds
+V The Further Course of the Neurosis
+REMARKS ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
+DREAM-INTERPRETATION (1923 [1922])
+SOME ADDITIONAL NOTES ON DREAM-INTER-
+PRETATION AS A WHOLE (1925)
+Editor's Note
+(A) The Limits to the Possibility of Interpretation
+(B) Moral Responsibility for the Content of Dreams
+(C) The Occult Significance of Dreams
+V
+page 3
+12
+13
+19
+<28
+70
+48
+60
+63
+79
+83
+93
+100
+109
+125
+127
+131
+135
+
+vi
+THE INFANTILE GENITAL ORGANIZATION: AN
+INTERPOLATION INTO THE THEORY OF
+SEXUALITY (1923)
+NEUROSIS AND PSYCHOSE (192 [192)
+page 141
+149
+THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF MASOCHISM (1924)
+Editor's Note
+The Economic Problem of Masochism
+157
+159
+THE DIESOLUTION OF THE ORDIPUS COMPLEX
+173
+THE LOSS OF REALITY IN NEUROSIS AND PSY-
+CHOSIS (1924)
+183
+A SHORT ACCOUNT OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (1924
+[19231)
+191
+THE RESISTANCES TO PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (1925
+[1924])
+213
+Appendix: Extract from Schopenhauer's The World as Will
+and Idea
+223
+A NOTE UPON THE 'MYSTIC WRITING-PAD' (1925
+[1924])
+NEGATION (1925)
+227
+235
+SOME PSYCHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
+ANATOMICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE
+SEXES (1925)
+Editor's Note
+Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction
+between the Sexes
+OSEF POPPER-LYNKEUS AND THE THEORY OI
+REAMS (1923
+DR. SÁNDOR FERENCZI (ON HIS 50th BIRTHDAY)
+PREFACE TO AICHHORNS WAYWARD YOUTH
+273
+
+JOSEF BREUER (1925)
+SHORTER WRITINGS (1922-25)
+Preface to Raymond de Saussure's The Psycho-Analytic
+Method
+Preface to Max Eitingon's Report on the Berlin Psycho.
+Analytical Policlinic (March 1920 to June 1922)
+Letter to Fritz Wittels
+Letter to Señor Luis Lopez-Ballesteros y de Torres
+Letter to Le Disque Vert
+Letter to the Editor of the jewish Press Centre in Zurich
+On the Occasion of the Opening of the Hebrew University
+Editorial Changes in the Zeitschrift
+BIBLIOGRAPHY AND AUTHOR INDEX
+LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
+vii
+page 279
+283
+285
+286
+289
+290
+291
+292
+293
+295
+308
+309
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+The First Appearance of the Devil to Christoph
+Haizmann
+Frontispiece
+'he Second Appearance oi the Devil to Ghristop.
+Jaizman
+Facing page 69
+From the Trophaeum Mariano-Cellense, MS. 14,086 in the Austrian
+National Library. Reproduced by kind permission of the Keeper of the
+Department of Manuscripts.
+
+......
+
+DAS ICH UND DAS ES
+1923 Leipzig, Vienna and Zurich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. Pp. 77.
+1925
+G.S., 6, 351-405.
+1931
+Theoretische Schriften, 338-91.
+1940
+G.W., 13, 237-289.
+(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+The Ego and the Id
+1927 London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-
+Analysis. Pp. 88. (Tr. Joan Riviere.)
+The present is a very considerably modified version of the
+one published in 1927.
+This book appeared in the third week of April, 1923, though
+it had been in Freud's mind since at least the previous July
+(normationa, Psycho-Analypical Congres, Which thas See th
+Berlin and was the last he ever attended, he read a short paper
+with the title 'Etwas vom Unbewussten [Some Remarks on the
+Unconscious]', in which he foreshadowed the contents of the
+book. Anabstractofthis paper (which was neveritself published)
+appeared that autumn in the Int. Zeitschrift Psychoanal., 5(4),
+486,1 and, although there is no certainty that it was written
+by Freud himself, it is worth while recording it:
+'Some Remarks on the Unconscious
+"The speaker repeated the familiar history of the development
+of the concept "unconscious" in psycho-analysis. "Unconscious"
+was in the first instance a purely descriptive term which accordingly included what is temporarily latent. The dynamic view
+1 A translation was published in the Int. J. Psycho-Anal. the next year,
+4 (3), 361. (The date of the reading of the paper is there misprinted
+"Sept, 25) It is reprinted here in a slightly modified form.
+
+4
+of the process of repression made it necessary, however, to give
+the unconscious a systematic sense, so that the unconscious had
+to be equated with the repressed. What is latent and only
+temporarily unconscious received the name of "preconscious"
+and, from the systematic point of view, was brought into close
+proximity to the conscious. The double meaning of the term
+"unconscious" undoubtedly involved disadvantages, though
+they were of little significance and were difficult to avoid. It
+has turned out, however, that it is not practicable to regard
+the repressed as coinciding with the unconscious and the ego
+with the preconscious and conscious. The speaker discussed the
+two facts which show that in the ego too there is an unconscious,
+which behaves dynamically like the repressed unconscious: the..
+two facts of a resistance proceeding fro mthe ego during analysis
+and of an unconscious sense of guilt. He announced that in a
+book which was shortly to appear-The Ego and the Id—he had
+made an attempt to estimate the influence which these new
+discoveries must have upon our view of the unconscious.?
+The Ego and the Id is the last of Freud's major theoretical
+works It offers a description of the mind and its workings
+which is at first sight new and even revolutionary and indeed
+-al psycho-analytic writings that date from after its publica-
+..ton bear the unmistakable imprint of its effects at least in
+• regard to their terminology. But, in spite of all its fresh insights
+"and fresh syntheses, we can trace, as so often with Freud's
+-apparent innovations, the seeds of his new ideas in earlier, and
+-sometimes in far earlier, writings.
+The forerunners of the present general picture of the mind
+had been successively the 'Project' of 1895 (Freud, 1950a), the
+seventh chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) and the
+metapsychological papers of 1915. In all of these, the interrelated problems of mental functioning and mental structure
+were inevitably considered, though with varying stress upon
+the two aspects of the question. The historical accident that
+psycho-analysis had its origin in connection with the study of
+hysteria led at once to the hypothesis of repression (or, more
+generally, of defence) as a mental function, and this in turn to
+a topographical hypothesis—to a picture of the mind as including two portions, one repressed and the other repressing.
+The quality of 'consciousness' was evidently closely involved in
+
+5
+these hypotheses; and it was easy to equate the repressed part
+of the mind with what was 'unconscious'
+and the repressing part
+with what was 'conscious'. Freud's earlier pictorial diagrams
+of the mind, in The Interpretation of Dreams (Standard Edo, 5,
+537-41) and in his letter to Fliess of December 6, 1896 (Freud,
+1950a, Letter 52), were representations of this view of the
+position. And this apparently simple scheme underlay all of
+Freud's earlier theoretical ideas: functionally, a repressed force
+endeavouring to make its way into activity but held in check
+by a repressing force, and
+structurally,
+an unconscious'
+opposed by an 'ego'.
+Nevertheless, complications soon became manifest. It was
+quickly seen that the word 'unconscious' was being used in two
+senses: the "descriptive'
+sense (which merely attributed a
+particular quality to a mental state) and the 'dynamic' sense
+(which attributed a particular function to a mental state). This
+distinction was already stated, though not in these terms, in
+The Interpretation of Dreams (Standard Ed., 5, 614-15). It was
+stated much more clearly in the English paper written for the
+Society for Psychical Research (1912g, ibid., 12, 262). But
+from the first another, more obscure notion was already involved (as was plainly shown by the pictorial diagrams)-the
+notion of 'systems' in the mind. This implied a topographical or
+structural division oi the mind based on something more than
+function, a division into portions to which it was possible to
+attribute a number of differentiating characteristics and
+methods of operating. Some such idea was no doubt already
+implied in the phrase 'the unconscious', which appeared very
+early (e.g. in a footnote to the Studies on Hysteria, 1895d, Standard
+Ed., 2, 76). The concept of a 'system' became explicit in The
+Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), ibid., 5, 536-7. From the terms
+in which it was there introduced, topographical imagery was
+at once suggested, though Freud gave a warning against taking
+this literally. There were a number of these 'systems' (mnemic,
+perceptual, and so on) and among them 'the unconscious'
+(ibid., 541), which "for simplicity's sake' was to be designated
+as 'the system Ucs?. In these earlier passages all that was
+overtly meant by this unconscious system was the repressed,
+until we reach the final section of The Interpretation of Dreams
+(ibid., 5, 611 ff.), where something with a much wider scope
+was indicated. Thereafter the question remained in abeyance
+
+6
+until the S.P.R. paper (1912g) already referred to, where
+(besides the clear differentiation between the descriptive and
+dynamic uses of the term 'unconscious'), in the last sentences
+of the paper, a third, 'systematic', use was defined. It may be
+noted that in this passage (ibid., 12, 266), it was only for this
+'systematic' unconscious that Freud proposed to use the symbol
+'Ucs.'. All this seems very straightforward, but, oddly enough,
+the picture was blurred once more in the metapsychological
+paper on "The Unconscious' (1915e). In Section II of that
+paper (ibid., 14, 172 ff.) there were no longer three uses of the
+term 'unconscious' but only two. The 'dynamic' use disappeared, and was presumably subsumed into the 'systematic'
+one,! which was still to be called the 'Ucs., though it now
+included the repressed. Finally, in Chapter I of the present
+work (as well as in Lecture XXXI of the New Introductory
+Lectures, 1933a) Freud reverted to the threefold distinction and
+classification, though at the end of the chapter he applied the
+abbreviation 'Ucs.', inadvertently perhaps, to all three kinds of
+"unconscious' (p. 18).
+But the question now arose whether, as applied to a system,
+the term 'unconscious' was at all appropriate. In the structural
+picture of the mind what had from the first been most clearly
+differentiated from 'the unconscious' had been 'the ego'. And
+it now began to appear that the ego itself ought partly to be
+described as 'unconscious. This was pointed out in Beyond the
+Pleasure Principle, in a sentence which read in the first edition
+(1920g): 'It may be that much of the ego is itself unconscious;
+only a part of it, probably, is covered by the term "preconscious"' In the second edition, a year later, this sentence
+was altered to: 'It is certain that much of the ego is itself unconscious ...; only a small part of it is covered by the term
+"preconscious"! 3 And this discovery and the grounds for it
+were stated with still greater insistence in the first chapter of
+the present work.
+It had thus become apparent that, alike as regards the
+1 The two terms seem to be definitely equated in Beyond the Pleasure
+Principle (1920g), ibid., 18, 20.
+" [I.e. not merely in the descriptive but also in the dynamic sense.]
+& Freud had actually already spoken in the opening sentence of his
+second paper on "The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence' (1896b) of the psychical mechanism of defence as being 'unconscious'.
+
+7
+unconscious' and as regards 'the ego', the criterion of consciousness was no longer helpful in building up a structural
+picture of the mind. Freud accordingly abandoned the use of
+consciousness in this capacity: 'being conscious' was henceforward to be regarded simply as a quality which might or
+might not be attached to a mental state. The old 'descriptive'
+sense of the term was in fact all that remained. The new
+terminology which he now introduced had a highly clarifying
+effect and so made further clinical advances possible. But it did
+not in itself involve any fundamental changes in Freud's views
+on mental structure and functioning. Indeed, the three newly
+presented entities, the 1d, the ego and the super-ego, all had
+lengthy past histories (two of them under other names and
+these will be worth examining.
+The term 'das Es',1 as Freud himself explains below (p. 23),
+was derived in the first instance from Georg Groddeck, a
+physician practising at Baden-Baden, who had recently become
+attached to psycho-analysis and with whose wide-ranging ideas
+Freud felt much sympathy. Groddeck seems in turn to have
+derived 'das Es' from his own teacher, Ernst Schweninger, a
+well-known German physician of an earlier generation. But,
+tod also points out, the use of the word certainly goes
+to a different and more precise meaning than Groddeck's. It
+cleared up and in part replaced the ill-defined uses of the
+earlier terms 'the unconscious, 'the Us? and 'the systematic
+unconscious'.?
+The position in regard to "das Ich' is a good deal less clear.
+The term had of course been in familiar use before the days
+of Freud; but the precise sense which he himself attached to it
+in his earlier writings is not unambiguous. It seems possible to
+detect two main uses: one in which the term distinguishes a
+person's self as a whole (including, perhaps, his body) from
+1 There was to begin with a good deal of discussion over the choice of
+an English equivalent. "The id' was eventually decided upon in preference to 'the it', so as to be parallel with the long-established 'ego'.
+& The symbol 'Ucs.' disappears after the present work, except for a
+single belated occurrence in Moses and Monotheism (1939a), Chapter II!,
+Part 1 (E), where oddly enough it is used in the 'descriptive' sense.
+Freud continued to use the term 'the unconscious', though with diminishing frequency, as a synonym for 'the id'.
+
+8
+other people, and the other in which it denotes a particular
+part of the mind characterized by special attributes and
+functions. It is in this second sense that the term was used in
+the elaborate account of the 'ego' in Freud's early 'Project' of
+1895 (Freud, 1950a, Part I, Section 14); and it is in this same
+sense that it is used in the anatomy of the mind in The Ego and
+the Id. But in some of his intervening works, particularly in
+connection with narcissism, the 'ego' seems to correspond rather
+to the 'self'. It is not always easy, however, to draw a line
+between these two senses of the word.1
+What is quite certain, however, is that, after the isolated
+attempt in the 'Project' of 1895 at a detailed analysis of the
+structure and functioning of the ego, Freud left the subject
+almost untouched for some fifteen years. His interest was concentrated on his investigations of the unconscious and its
+instincts, particularly the sexual ones, and in the part they
+played in normal and abnormal mental behaviour. The fact
+that repressive forces played an equally important part was,
+of course, never overlooked and was always insisted on; but
+the closer examination of them was left to the future. It was
+enough for the moment to give them the inclusive name of
+'the ego'.
+There were two indications of a change, both round about
+the year 1910. In a paper on psychogenic disturbances of
+vision (1910i), there comes what seems to be a first mention
+of 'ego-instincts' (Standard Ed., 11, 214), which combine the
+functions of repression with those of self-preservation. The other
+and more important development was the hypothesis of narcissism which was first proposed in 1909 and which led the way
+to a detailed examination of the ego and its functions in a
+variety of connections-in the study on Leonardo (1910c), in
+the Schreber case history (1911c), in the paper on the two
+principles of mental functioning (19116), in the paper on
+'Narcissism' itself (1914c) and in the metapsychological paper
+on "The Unconscious' (1915e). In this last work, however, a
+1 In a few places in the Standard Edition where the sense seemed to
+demand it, 'das Ich' has been translated by 'the self'. There is a passage
+in Givilization and its Discontents (1930a), towards the beginning of the
+fourth paragraph of Chapter 1, in which Freud himself explicitly
+equates 'das Selbst' and 'das Ich'. And, in the course of a discussion of the
+moral responsibility for dreams (1925i), p. 133, below, he makes a clear
+distinction between the two uses of the German word 'Ich'.
+
+9
+further development occurred: what had been described as the
+ego now became the 'system' Gs. (Pcs.).1 It is this system which
+is the progenitor of the 'ego' as we have it in the new and
+corrected terminology, from which, as we have seen, the confusing connection with the quality of 'consciousness' has been
+removed.
+The functions of the system Gs. (Pcs.), as enumerated in "The
+Unconscious'
+', Standard Ed., 14, 188, include such activities as
+censorship, reality-testing,
+and so on, all of which are now
+assigned to the 'ego'.
+• There is one particular function, however,
+whose examination was to lead to momentous results—the selfcritical faculty. This and the correlated 'sense of guilt' attracted
+Freud's interest from early days, chiefly in connection with the
+obsessional neurosis. His theory that obsessions are transformed
+self-reproaches' for sexual pleasure enjoyed in childhood was
+fully explained in Section II of his second paper on "The Neuro-
+Psychoses of Defence' (18966) after being outlined somewhat
+earlier in his letters to Fliess. That the self-reproaches may be
+unconscious was already implied at this stage, and was stated
+specifically in the paper on 'Obsessive Actions and Religious
+Practices' (19076), Standard Ed., 9, 123. It was only with the
+concept of narcissism, however, that light could be thrown on
+the actual mechanism of these self-reproaches. In Section III
+of his paper on narcissism (1914c) Freud began by suggesting
+that the narcissism of infancy is replaced in the adult by devotion to an ideal ego set up within himself. He then put forward
+the notion that there may be 'a special psychical agency' whose
+task it is to watch the actual ego and measure it by the ideal
+ego or ego ideal—he seemed to use the terms indiscriminately
+(Standard Ed., 14, 95). He attributed a number of functions
+to this agency, including the normal conscience, the dreamcensorship and certain paranoic delusions. In the paper on
+'Mourning and Melancholia' (1917e [1915]) he further made
+this agency responsible for pathological states of mourning
+(ibid., 14, 247) and insisted more definitely that it is something
+apart from the rest of the ego, and this was made still more
+clear in Group Psychology (1921c). It must be noticed, however,
+that here the distinction between the 'ego ideal' itself and the
+'agency' concerned with its enforcement had been dropped: the
+Ucs. go back to The Interbretation oj
+S.F. X'X-B
+
+10
+'agency' was specifically called the 'ego ideal' (Standard Ed.,
+18, 109-10). It is as an equivalent to the 'ego ideal' that "das
+Über-Ich' 1 makes its first appearance (p. 28 below), though
+its aspect as an enforcing or prohibiting agency predominates
+later. Indeed, after The Ego and the Id and the two or three
+shorter works immediately following it, the 'ego ideal' disappears almost completely as a technical term. It makes a brief
+re-emergence in a couple of sentences in the Nero Introductory
+Lectures (1933a), Lecture XXXI; but here we find a return to
+the original distinction, for 'an important function' attributed
+to the super-ego is to act as 'the vehicle of the ego ideal by
+which the ego measures itself'—almost the exact terms in
+which the ego ideal was first introduced in the paper on narcissism (Standard Ed., 14, 93).
+But this distinction may seem to be an artificial one when we
+turn to Freud's account of the genesis of the super-ego. This
+account (in Chapter III) is no doubt the part of the book
+second in importance only to the main thesis of the threefold
+division of the mind. The super-ego is there shown to be derived
+from a transformation of the child's earliest object-cathexes
+into identifications: it takes the place of the Oedipus complex.
+This mechanism (the replacement of an object-cathexis by an
+identification and the introjection of the former object) had
+been first applied by Freud (in his study of Leonardo, 1910c)
+to the explanation of one type of homosexuality, in which a
+boy replaces his love for his mother by identifying himself
+with her (Standard Ed., 11, 100). He next applied the same
+notion to states of depression in 'Mourning and Melancholia'
+(1917e), ibid., 14, 249. Further and more elaborate discussions
+of these various kinds of identifications and introjections were
+pursued in Chapters VII, VIII and XI of Group Psychology
+(19216), but it was only in the present work that Freud arrived
+at his final views on the derivation of the super-ego from the
+child's earliest object-relations.
+Having once established his new account of the anatomy of
+the mind, Freud was in a position to examine its implications,
+and this he already does in the later pages of the book-the
+1 Jones (1957, 305 n.) remarks that the term had been used earlier by
+Münsterberg (1908), though, he adds, it was in a different sense and it is
+unlikely that Freud had come across the passage.
+
+11
+relation between the divisions of the mind and the two classes
+of instincts, and the interrelations between the divisions of the
+mind themselves, with special reference to the sense of guilt.
+But many of these questions, and in particular the last one,
+were to form the subject of other writings which followed in
+rapid succession. See, for instance, "The Economic Problem of
+Masochism' (1924c), "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex'
+(1924d), the two papers on neurosis and psychosis (1924b and
+1924e), and the one on the anatomical distinction between the
+sexes (1925)), all in the present volume, as well as the still
+more important Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d), published only a little later. Finally, a further long discussion of
+the super-ego, together with an interesting examination of the
+proper use of the terms 'super-ego', 'conscience', 'sense of guilt,
+'need for punishment' and 'remorse' will be found in Chapters
+VII and VIII of Civilization and its Discontents (1930a).
+Extracts from the earlier (1927) translation of this work were
+included in Rickman's General Selection from the Works of Sigmund
+Freud (1937, 245-74).
+
+[PREFACE]
+THe present discussions are a further development of some
+trains of thought which I opened up in Beyond the Pleasure
+Principle (1920g), and to which, as I remarked there, my
+attitude was one of a kind of benevolent curiosity. In the
+following pages these thoughts are linked to various facts of
+analytic observation and an attempt is made to arrive at new
+conclusions from this conjunction; in the present work, however, there are no fresh borrowings from biology, and on that
+account it stands closer to psycho-analysis than does Beyond the
+Pleasure Principle. It is more in the nature of a synthesis than of
+a speculation and seems to have had an ambitious aim in view.
+I am conscious, however, that it does not go beyond the roughest
+outline and with that limitation I am perfectly content.
+In these pages things are touched on which have not yet
+been the subject of psycho-analytic consideration, and it has
+not been possible to avoid trenching upon some theories which
+have been put forward by non-analysts or by former analysts
+on their retreat from analysis. I have elsewhere always been
+ready to acknowledge what I owe to other workers; but in this
+instance I feel burdened by no such debt of gratitude. If psychoanalysis has not hitherto shown its appreciation of certain
+things, this has never been because it overlooked their achievement or sought to deny their importance, but because it followed a particular path, which had not yet led so far. And
+finally, when it has reached them, things have a different look
+to it from what they have to others.
+' [Standard Ed., 18, 59.]
+12
+
+I
+CONSCIOUSNESS AND WHAT IS
+UNCONSCIOUS
+In this introductory chapter there is nothing new to be said
+and it will not be possible to avoid repeating what has often
+been said before.
+The division of the psychical into what is conscious and what
+an unconneus i ch podam or al yean of psychoana and.
+the pathological processes in mental life, which are as common
+as they are important, and to find a place for them in the framework of science. To put it once more, in a different way: psychoanalysis cannot situate the essence of the psychical in consciousness, but is obliged to regard consciousness as a quality of the
+psychical, which may be present in addition to other qualities
+or may be absent.
+If I could suppose that everyone interested in psychology
+would read this book, I should also be prepared to find that at
+this point some of my readers would already stop short and
+would go no further; for here we have the first shibboleth of
+psycho-analysis. To most people who have been educated in
+philosophy the idea of anything psychical which is not also
+conscious is so inconceivable that it seems to them absurd and
+refutable simply by logic. I believe this is only because they
+have never studied the relevant phenomena of hypnosis and
+dreams, which-quite apart from pathological manifestations
+—necessitate this view. Their psychology of consciousness is
+incapable of solving the problems of dreams and hypnosis.
+'Being conscious' 1 is in the first place a purely descriptive
+term, resting on perception of the most immediate and certain
+'Bewusstsein' is the regular
+German word for 'consciousness'
+, and printing it in two words emphasizes the fact that 'bewusst' is in its form a passive participle—-'being
+conscioused'. The English 'conscious' is capable of an active or a passive
+use; but in these discussions it is always to be taken as passive. Cf.. a footnote at the end of the Editor's Note to Freud's metapsychological paper
+on The Unconscious", Standard Ed., 14, 165.]
+
+14
+character. Experience goes on to show that a psychical element
+(for instance, an idea) is not as a rule conscious for a protracted
+length of time. On the contrary, a state of consciousness is
+characteristically very transitory; an idea that is conscious now
+is no longer so a moment later, although it can become so again
+under certain conditions that are easily brought about. In the
+interval the idea was—we do not know what. We can say that
+it was latent, and by this we mean that it was capable of becoming
+conscious at any time. Or, it we say that is was unconscious, we
+shall also be giving a correct description of it. Here 'unconscious' coincides with 'latent and capable of becoming
+conscious'. The philosophers would no doubt object: 'No, the
+term "unconscious" is not applicable here; so long as the idea
+was in a state of latency it was not anything psychical at all'
+To contradict them at this point would lead to nothing more
+profitable than a verbal dispute.
+But we have arrived at the term or concept of the unconscious
+along another path, by considering certain experiences in which
+mental dynamics play a part. We have found —that is, we have
+been obliged to assume-that very powerfill mental processes
+or ideas exist (and here a quantitative or economic factor comes
+into question for the first time) which can produce all the
+effects in mental life that ordinary ideas do (including effects
+that can in their turn become conscious as ideas), though they
+themselves do not become conscious. It is unnecessary to repeat
+in detail here what has been explained so often before.' It is
+enough to say that at this point psycho-analytic theory steps in
+and asserts that the reason why such ideas cannot become
+conscious is that a certain force opposes them, that otherwise
+they could become conscious, and that it would then be
+apparent how little they differ from other elements which are
+admittedly psychical. The fact that in the technique of psychoanalysis a means has been found by which the opposing force
+can be removed and the ideas in question made conscious
+renders this theory irrefutable. The state in which the ideas
+existed before being made conscious is called by us repression,
+and we assert that the force which instituted the repression
+and maintains it is perceived as resistance during the work of
+analysis.
+" [See, for instance, 'A Note on the Unconscious' (1912g), Standard
+Ed., 12, 262 and 264]
+
+(I) CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS
+15
+Thus we obtain our concept of the unconscious from the
+theory of repression. The repressed is the prototype of the
+unconscious for us. We see, however, that we have two kinds.
+ofunconsciou.-. the one which is latent but capable of becoming
+conscious, and the one which is repressed and which is not, in
+This phed it it more ado, capable or arion can co five.
+affect terminology and description. The latent, which is unconscious only descriptively, not in the dynamic sense, we call
+preconscious, we restrict the term unconscious to the dynamically
+unconscióus repressed; so that now we have three terms, conscious (Cs.), preconscious (Pcs.), and unconscious (Ucs.), whose
+sense is no longer purely descriptive. The Pcs. is presumably a
+great deal closer to the Gs. than is the Ucs., and since we have
+called the Us. psychical we shall with even less hesitation call
+the latent Pos. psychical. But why do we not rather, instead of
+this, remain in agreement with the philosophers and, in a
+consistent way, distinguish the Pos. as well as the Ucs. from the
+conscious psychical? The philosophers would then propose that
+the Pcs. and the Ucs. should be described as two species or stages
+of the 'psychoid', and harmony would be established. But endless difficulties in exposition would follow; and the one important
+fact, that these two kinds of 'psychoid' coincide in almost every
+other respect with what is admittedly psychical, would be forced
+into the background in the interests of a prejudice dating from
+a period in which these psychoids, or the most important part
+of them, were still unknown.
+We can now play about comfortably with our three terms,
+Gso, Poso, and Ucs., so long as we do not forget that in the
+descriptive sense there are two kinds of unconscious, but in
+the dynamic sense only one. For purposes of exposition this
+distinction can in some cases be ignored, but in others it is of
+course indispensable. At the same time, we have become more
+or less accustomed to this ambiguity of the unconscious and
+have managed pretty well with it. As far as I can see, it is
+impossible to avoid this ambiguity; the distinction between
+conscious and unconscious is in the last resort a question of
+perception, which must be answered 'yes' or 'no', and the act
+of perception itself tells us nothing of the reason why a thing is or
+1 [Some comments on this sentence will be found in Appendix A
+(p. 60).]
+
+16
+is not perceived. No one has a right to complain because the
+actual phenomenon expresses the dynamic factor ambiguously.1
+In the further course of psycho-analytic work, however, even
+1 This may be compared so tar with my 'Note on the Unconscious ir
+Psycho-Analysis' (1912g). [Ci. also Sections 1 and Il of the metapsychological paper on 'The Unconscious' (1915e).] A new turn taken
+by criticisms of the unconscious deserves consideration at this point. Some
+investigators, who do not refuse to recognize the facts of psycho-analysis
+but who are unwilling to accept the unconscious, find a way out of the
+difficulty in the fact, which no one contests, that in consciousness (regarded as a phenomenon) it is possible to distinguish a great variety of
+gradations in intensity or clarity. Just as there are processes which are
+very vividly, glaring'y, and tangibly conscious, so we also experience
+others which are only faintly, hardly even noticeably conscious; those
+that are most faintly conscious are, it is argued, the ones to which
+psycho-analysis wishes to apply the unsuitable name 'unconscious.
+These too, however (the argument proceeds), are conscious or 'in consciousness'
+', and can be made fully and intensely conscious if sufficient
+attention is paid to them.
+In so far as it is possible to influence by arguments the decision of a
+question of this kind which depends eitheron convention or on emotional
+factors, we may make the following comments. The reference to gradations of clarity in consciousness is in no way conclusive and has no more
+evidential value than such analogous statements as: "There are so very
+many gradations in illumination-from the most glaring and dazzling
+light to the dimmest glimmer-therefore there is no such thing as darkness at all'; or, "There are varying degrees of vitality, therefore there is
+no such thing as death. Such statements may in a certain way have a
+meaning, but for practical purposesthey are worthless. This will be seen if
+one tries to draw particular conclusionsfrom them, such as, 'there is therefore no need to strike a light', or, 'therefore all organisms are immortal'.
+Further, to include 'what is unnoticeable' under the concept of 'what is
+conscious' is simply to play havoc with the one and only piece of direct
+and certain knowledge that we have about the mind. And after all, a
+consciousness of which one knows nothing seems to me a good deal more
+absurd than something mental that is unconscious. Finally, this attempt
+to equate what is unnoticed with what is unconscious is obviously made
+without taking into account the dynamic conditions involved, which
+were the decisive factors in forming the dsycho-analytic view. For it
+ignores two facts: first, that it is exceedingly difficult and requires very
+great effort to concentrate enough attention on something unnoticed of
+this kind; and secohdly, that when this has been achieved the thought
+which was previously unnoticed is not recognized by consciousness, but
+often seems entirely alien and opposed to it and is promptly disavowed
+by it. Thus, seeking refuge from the unconscious in whatris scarcely
+noticed or unnoticed is after all only a derivative of the preconceived
+belief which regards the identity of the psychical and the conscious as
+settled once and for all.
+
+(I) CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS
+17
+these distinctions have proved to be inadequate and, for
+practical purposes, insufficient. This has become clear in more
+ways than one; but the decisive instance is as follows. We have
+formed the idea that in each individual there is a coherent
+organization of mental processes, and we call this his ego. Iris
+to this ego that consciousness is attached, the ego controls the
+approaches to motility-that is, to the discharge of excitations
+into the external world; it is the mental agency which supervises
+all its own constituent processes, and which goes to sleep at
+night, though even then it exercises the censorship on dreams.
+From this ego proceed the repressions, too, by means of which
+it is sought to exclude certain trends in the mind not merely
+from consciousness but also from other forms of effectiveness
+and activity. In analysis these trends which have been shut
+out stand in opposition to the ego, and the analysis is faced
+find during analysis that, when we put certain tasks before the
+patient, he gets into difficulties; his associations fail when they
+should be coming near the repressed. We then tell him that he
+is dominated by a resistance; but he is quite unaware of the
+fact, and, even if he guesses from his unpleasurable feelings
+that a resistance is now at work in him, he does not know what
+it is or how to describe it. Since, however, there can be no
+question but that this resistance emanates fromhis. ego
+and
+belongs to it, we find ourselves in an unforeseen situation. We
+have come upon something in the ego itself which is also unconscious, which behaves exactly like the repressed—that is,
+which produces powerful effects without itself being conscious
+and which requires special work before it can be made conscious. From the point of view of analytic practice, the consequence of this discovery is that we land in endless obscurities
+and difficulties if we keep to our habitual forms of expression
+..and try, for instance, to derive neuroses from a conflict between
+the conscious and the unconscious. We shall have to substitute
+for this antithesis another, taken from our insight into the
+structural conditions of the mind—the antithesis between the
+coherent ego and the repressed which is split off from it. 1
+for our conception of the unconscious, however, the consequences of our discovery are even more important. Dynamic
+' Cf. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g) [Standard Ed., 18, 19].
+
+18
+considerations caused us to make our first correction; our
+insight into the structure of the mind leads to the second. We
+recognize that the Ucs. does not coincide with the repressed;
+it is still true that all that is repressed is Ucs., but not all that
+is Ucs. is repressed. A part of the ego, too-and Heaven knows
+how important a part-may be Ucs., undoubtedly is Ucs.1
+And this Ucs. belonging to the ego is not latent like the Pcs.;
+for if it were, it could not be activated without becoming Gs.,
+and the process of making it conscious would not encounter
+such great difficulties. When we find ourselves thus confronted
+by the necessity of postulating a third Ucs., which is not repressed, we must admit that the characteristic of being unconscious begins to lose significance for us. It becomes a quality
+which can have many meanings, a quality which we are unable
+to make, as we should have hoped to do, the basis of farreaching and inevitable conclusions. Nevertheless we must
+beware of ignoring this characteristic, for the property of being
+conscious or not is in the last resort our one beacon-light in the
+darkness of depth-psychology.
+1 [This had already been stated not only in Beyond the Pleasure Principle
+(loc. cit.) but earlier, in "The Unconscious' (1915e), Standard Ed., 14,
+192-3. Indeed, it was implied in a remark at the beginning of the
+second paper on The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence' (1896b).]
+
+PATHOLOGICAL research has directed our interest too exclusively
+to the repressed. We should like to learn more about the ego,
+now that we know that it, too, can be unconscious in the proper
+sense of the word. Hitherto the only guide we have had during
+our investigations has been the distinguishing mark of being
+conscious or unconscious; we have finally come to see how
+ambiguous this can be.
+Now all our knowledge is invariably bound up with consciousness. We can come to know even the Ucs. only by making
+it conscious. But stop, how is that possible? What does it mean
+when we say 'making something conscious? How can that
+come about?
+We already know the point from which we have to start in
+this connection. We have said that consciousness is the surface of
+the mental apparatus; that is, we have ascribed it as a function
+to a system which is spatially the first one reached from the
+external world-and spatially not only in the functional sense
+but, on this occasion, also in the sense of anatomical dissection.1
+Our investigations too must take this perceiving surface as a
+starting-point.
+All perceptions which are received from without (senseperceptions) and from within—what we call sensations and
+feelings—are Cs. from the start. But what about those internal
+processes which we may—roughly and inexactly— sum up under
+the name of thought-processes? They represent displacements
+of mental energy which are effected somewhere in the interior
+of the apparatus as this energy proceeds on its way towards
+action. Do they advance to the surface, which causes consciousness to be generated? Or does consciousness make its way
+to them? This is clearly one of the difficulties that arise when one
+bęgins to take the spatial or "topographical' idea of mental life
+seriously. Both these possibilities are
+equally unimaginable;
+there must be a third alternative.?
+- Beyond the Pleasure Principle [Standard Ed., 18, 26].
+& [This had been discussed at greater length in the second section of
+"The Unconscious' (1915e), Standard Ed., 18, 173-6.]
+
+20
+I have already, in another place, 1 suggested that the real
+difference between a Us. and a Pcs. idea (thought) consists in
+this: that the former is carried out on some material which
+remains unknown, whereas the latter (the Pes.) is in addition
+brought into connection with word presentations. This is the
+first attempt to indicate distinguishing marks for the twosystems,
+the Pcs. and the Ucs., other than their relation to consciousness.
+The question, 'How does a thing become conscious? would
+thus be more advantageously stated: 'How does a thing become
+preconscious." And the answer would be: "Through becoming
+connected with the word-presentations corresponding to it?
+These word-presentations are residues of memories; they
+were at one time perceptions, and like all mnemic residues they
+can become conscious again. Before we concern ourselves
+further with their nature, it dawns upon us like a new discovery
+that only something which has once been a Cs. perception can
+become conscious, and that anything arising from within
+(apart from feelings) that seeks to become conscious must try to
+transform itself into external perceptions: this becomes possible
+by means of memory-traces.
+We think of the mnemic residues as being contained in
+systems which are directly adjacent to the system Popt.-Cs., so
+that the cathexes of those residues can readily extend from
+within on to the elements of the latter system.? We immediately
+think here of hallucinations, and of the fact that the most vivid
+memory is always distinguishable both from a hallucination and
+from an external perception; but it will also occur to us at once
+that when a memory is revived the cathexis remains in the
+mnemic system, whereas a hallucination, which is not distinguishable from a perception, can arise when the cathexis does
+not merely spread over from the memory-trace on to the Popt.
+element, but passes over to it entirely.
+Verbal residues are derived primarily from auditory perceptions," so that the system Pos. has, as it were, a special
+1 'The Unconscious' [ibid., 201 ff.].
+"[Cf. Chapter VII (B) of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a),
+Standard Ed., 5, 538.]
+" [This view had been expressed by Breuer in his theoretical contribution to Studies on Hysteria (1895d), Standard Ed., 2, 188.]
+* [Freud had arrived at this conclusion in his monograph on aphasia
+(18916) on the basis of pathological findings (ibid., 92-4). The point
+
+21
+sensory source. The visual components of word-presentations
+are secondary, acquired through reading, and may to begin
+with be left on one side; so may the motor images of words,
+which, except with deaf-mutes, play the part of auxiliary indications. In essence a word is after all the mnemic residue of a
+word that has been heard.
+We must not be led, in the interests of simplification perhaps,
+to forget the importance of optical mnemic residues, when they
+are of things, or to deny that it is possible for thought-processes
+to become conscious through a reversion to visual residues,
+and that in many people this seems to be the favoured method.
+The study of dreams and of preconscious phantasies as shown
+in Varendonck's observations! can give us an idea of the
+special character of this visual thinking. We learn that what
+becomes conscious in it is as a rule only the concrete subjectmatter of the thought, and that the relations between the
+various elements of this subject-matter, which is what specially
+characterizes thoughts, cannot be given visual expression.
+Thinking in pictures is, therefore, only a very incomplete form
+of becoming conscious. In some way, too, it stands nearer to
+unconscious processes than does thinking in words, and it is
+unquestionably older than the latter both ontogenetically and
+phylogenetically.
+To return to our argument: if, therefore, this is the way in
+which something that is in itself unconscious becomes preconscious, the question how we make something that is repressed
+(pre) conscious would be answered as follows. It is done by
+supplying Pcs. intermediate links through the work of analysis.
+Consciousness remains where it is, therefore; but, on the other
+hand, the Ucs. does not rise into the Gs.
+Whereas the relation of external perceptions to the ego is quite
+perspicuous, that of internal perceptions to the ego requires
+special investigation. It gives rise once more to a doubt whether
+we are really right in referring the whole of consciousness to the
+single superficial system Pcpt.-Gs.
+Internal perceptions yield sensations of processes arising in
+the most diverse and certainly also in the deepest strata of the
+is represented in the diagram reproduced from that work in Appendix C
+to the paper on The Unconscious',
+', Standard Ed., 14, 214.]
+1 [Cf. Varendonck (1921), a book to which Freud contributed an
+introduction (19216).]
+
+22
+menta. apparatus. Very little is known about these sensations
+and feelings; those belonging to the pleasure-unpleasure series
+may still be regarded as the best examples of them. They are
+more primordial, more elementary, than perceptions arising
+externally and they can come about even when consciousness is
+clouded. I have elsewhere expressed my views about their
+greater economic significance and the metapsychological
+reasons for this. These sensations are multilocular, like external
+perceptions; they may come from different places simultaneously
+and may thus have different or even opposite qualities.
+Sensations of a pleasurable nature have not anything inherently impelling about them, whereas unpleasurable ones have
+it in the highest degree. The latter impel towards change,
+towards discharge, and that is why we interpret unpleasure as
+implying a heightening and pleasure a lowering of energic
+cathexis.? Let us call what becomes conscious as pleasure and
+unpleasure a quantitative and qualitative 'something' in the
+course of mental events; the question then is whether this
+'something' can become conscious in the place where it is, or
+whether it must first be transmitted to the system Popt.
+Clinical experience decides for the latter. It shows us that
+this 'something' behaves like a repressed impulse. It can exert
+driving force without the ego noticing the compulsion. Not
+until there is resistance to the compulsion, a hold-up in the
+discharge-reaction, does the 'something' at once become conscious as unpleasure. In the same way that tensions arising from
+physical needs can remain unconscious, so also can pain—a
+thing intermediate between external and internal perception,
+which behaves like an internal perception even when its source
+is in the external world. It remains true, therefore, that sensations and feelings, too, only become conscious through reaching the system Pcpt.; if the way forward is barred, they do not
+come into being as sensations, although the "something' that
+corresponds to them in the course of excitation is the same as if
+they did. We then come to speak, in a condensed and not
+entirely correct manner, of 'unconscious feelings, keeping up
+an analogy with unconscious ideas which is not altogether
+justifiable. Actually the difference is that, whereas with Ucs.
+¿deas connecting links must be created before they can be
+" [Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), Standard Ed., 18, 29.]
+" [Ibid., 8]
+
+23
+brought into the Gs., with feelings, which are themselves transmitted directly, this does not occur. In other words: the
+distinction between Cs. and Pos. has no meaning where feelings.
+are concerned, the Pos. here drops out-and feelings are either
+conscious or unconscious. Even when they are attached to
+word-presentations, their becoming conscious is not due to that
+circumstance, but they become so directly. 1
+The part played by word-presentations now becomes perfectly clear. By their interposition internal thought-processes
+are made into perceptions. It is like a demonstration of the
+theorem that all knowledge has its origin in external perception.
+When a hypercathexis of the process of thinking takes place,
+thoughts are actually perceived —as if they came from withoutand are consequently held to be true.
+After this clarifying of the relations between external and
+internal perception and the superficial system Pcpt.-Gs., we can
+go on to work out our idea of the ego. It starts out, as we see,
+trom the system Pcpt., which is
+its nucleus, and begins by
+embracing the Pos., which is adjacent to the mnemic residuest
+But, as we have learnt, the ego is álso unconscious.
+Now I think we shall gain a great deal by following the
+suggestion of a writer who, from personal motives, vainly asserts
+that he has nothing to do with the rigours of pure science. I am
+speaking of Georg Groddeck, who is never tired of insisting that
+what we call our ego behaves essentially passively in life, and
+that, as he expresses it, we are 'lived' by unknown and uncontrollable forces.? We have all had impressions of the same kind,
+even though they may not have overwhelmed us to the exclusion of all others, and we need feel no hesitation in finding a
+place for. Groddeck's discovery in the structure of science. I
+propose to take it into account by calling the entity which starts
+out from the system Popt. and begins by being Pos. the 'ego', and
+by following Groddeck in calling the other part of the mind,
+into which this entity extends and which behaves as though it
+were Us, the ..
+1 [Cf. Section III of "The Unconscious' (1915e), Standard Ed., 14,
+177-8.]
+& Groddeck (1923).
+" [See Editor's Introduction, p. 7.]—Groddeck himself no doubt
+tollowed the example of Nietzsche, who habitually used this grammatical
+term for whatever in our nature is impersonal and, so to speak, subject to
+natural law.
+14)
+
+24
+We shall soon see whether we can derive any advantage from
+this view for purposes either of description or of understanding.
+We shall now look upon an individual as a psychical id,
+unknown and unconscious, upon whose surface rests the ego,
+developed from its nucleus the Popt. system. If we make an
+effort to represent this pictorially, we may add that the ego does
+not completely envelop the id, but only does so to the extent to
+which the system Popt. forms its [the ego's] surface, more or less
+as the germinal disc rests upon the ovum. The ego is not sharply
+separated from the id; its lower portion merges into it.
+But the repressed merges into the id as well, and is merely a
+part of it. The repressed is only cut off sharply from the ego by
+the resistances of repression; it can communicate with the ego
+through the id. We at once realize that almost all the lines of
+demarcation we have drawn at the instigation of pathology
+relate only to the superficial strata of the mental apparatus —
+the only ones known to us. The state of things which we have
+been describing can be represented diagrammatically (Fig. 1);
+though it must be remarked that the form chosen has no pretensions to any special applicability, but is merely intended to
+serve for purposes of exposition.
+Pcpt.-Cs.
+acoust.
+Pcs.
+LEGỘ
+ID
+Repressed
+FIG. 1.
+" [Compare the slightly different diagram near the end of Lecture
+XXXI of the New Introductory Lectures (1933a). The entirely different one
+in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Standard Ed., 5, 541, and its predecessor in a letter to Fliess of December 6, 1896 (Freud, 1950a, Letter
+52), are concerned with function as well as structure.]
+
+25
+Wemightadd, perhaps, that the ego wears a 'cap of hearing' 1
+—on one side only, as we learn from cerebral anatomy. It
+might be said to wear it awry.
+It is easy to see that the ego is that part of the id which has
+been modified by the direct influence of the external world
+through the medium of the Pcpt.-Cs.; in a sense it is an extension
+of the surface-differentiation. Moreover, the ego seeks to bring
+the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its
+tendencies, and endeavours to substitute the reality principle
+for the pleasure principle which reigns unrestrictedly in the id.
+For the ego, perception plays the part which in the id falls to
+instinct. The ego represents what may be called reason and
+common sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the passions.
+All this falls into line with popular distinctions which we are all
+familiar with; at the same time, however, it is only to be regarded as holding good on the average or ideally.
+The functional importance of the ego is manifested in the fact
+that normally control over the approaches to motility devolves
+upon it. Thus in its relation to the id it is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of
+the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do so
+with his own strength while the ego uses borrowed forces.
+The analogy may be carried a little further. Often a rider, if
+he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide it
+where it wants to go; so in the same way the ego is in the
+habit of transforming the id's will into action as if it were its
+own.
+"Another factor, besides the influence of the system Pcpt.,
+seems to have played a part in bringing about the formation of
+the ego and its differentiation from the id. A person's own body,
+and above all its surface, is a place from which both external
+and internal perceptions may spring. It is seen like any other
+object, but to the touch it yields two kinds of sensations, one of
+which may be equivalent to an internal perception. I'sychophysiology has fully discussed the manner in which a person's
+own body attains its special position among other objects in the
+world of perception. Pain, too, seems to play a part in the process, and the way in which we gain new knowledge of our organs
+1 ['Hörkappe? I.e. the auditory lobe. Cf. footnote 4, p. 20 above.]
+" [This analgy appears as an association to one of Freud's dreams in
+The Interpretation of Dreams, Standard Ed., 4, 231.]
+S.F. XIX-a
+
+26
+during painful illnesses is perhaps a model of the way by which
+in general we arrive at the idea of our body.
+The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a
+surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface.' If we
+wish to find an anatomical analogy for it we can best identify it
+with the 'cortical homunculus' of the anatomists, which stands
+on its head in the cortex, sticks up its heels, faces backwards and,
+as we know, has its speech-area on the left-hand side.
+The relation of the ego to consciousness has been entered
+into repeatedly; yet there are some important facts in this
+connection which remain to be described here. Accustomed as
+we are to taking our social or ethical scale of values along with
+us wherever we go, we feel no surprise at hearing that the scene
+of the activities of the lower passions is in the unconscious; we
+expect, moreover, that the higher any mental function ranks in
+our scale of values the more easily it will find access to conthat even subtle and difficult intellectual operations which
+ordinarily require strenuous reflection can equally be carried
+out preconsciously and without coming into consciousness.
+Instances of this are quite incontestable; they may occur, for
+example, during the state of sleep, as is shown when someone
+finds, immediately after waking, that he knows the solution to a
+difficult mathematical or other problem with which he had
+been wrestling in vain the day before.?
+There is another phenomenon, however, which is far stranger.
+In our analyses we discover that there are people in whom the
+faculties of self-criticism and conscience—mental activities, that
+is, that rank as extremely high ones-are unconscious and
+unconsciously produce effects of the greatest importance; the
+example of resistance remaining unconscious during analysis is
+" [I.e. the ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly
+from those springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body, besides, as we
+have seen above, representing the superficies of the mental apparatus.—
+This footnote first appeared in the English translation of 1927, in which
+it was described as having been authorized by Freud. It does not appear
+in the German editions.]
+" I was quite recently told an instance of this which was, in fact,
+brought up as an objection against my description of the 'dream-work'.
+[Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams, Standard Ed., 4, 64, and 5, 564]
+
+27
+therefore by no means unique. But this new discovery, which
+compels us, in spite of our better critical judgement, to speak of
+an 'unconscious sense of guilt', 1 bewilders us far more than the
+other and sets us fresh problems, especially when we gradually
+come to see that in a great number of neuroses an unconscious
+sense of guilt of this kind plays a decisive economic part and
+puts the most powerful obstacles in the way of recovery.? If we
+come back once more to our scale of values, we shall have to
+say that not only what is lowest but also what is highest in the
+ego can be unconscious. It is as if we were thus supplied with a
+proof of what we have just asserted of the conscious ego: that it
+is first and foremost a body-ego.
+1 [This phrase had already appeared in Freud's paper on 'Obsessive
+Actions and Religious Practices' (1907b), Standard Ed., 9, 123. The
+notion was, however, foreshadowed much earlier, in Section Il of the
+first paper on "The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence' (1894a).]
+• [This is further discussed below, p. 49 ff.]
+
+III
+THE EGO AND THE SUPER-EGO (EGO IDEAL)
+If the ego were merely the part of the id modified by the
+influence of the perceptual system, the representative in the
+mind of the real external world, we should have a simple state
+of things to deal with. But there is a further complication.
+The considerations that led us to assume the existence of a
+grade in the ego, a differentiation within the ego, which may
+be called the 'ego ideal' er 'super-ega', have been stated elsewhere.' 'They still hold good. ' The fact that this part of the ego
+is less firmly connected with consciousness is the novelty which
+calls for explanation.
+At this point we must widen our range a little. We succeeded
+in explaining the painful disorder of melancholia by supposing
+that [in those suffering from it] an object which was lost has
+been set up again inside the ego-that is, that an objectcathexis has been replaced by an identification. & At that time,
+however, we did not appreciate the full significance of this
+process and did not know how common and how typical it is.
+Since then we have come to understand that this kind of substitution has a great share in determining the form taken by
+the ego and that it makes an essential contribution towards
+building up what is called its 'character' 4
+1 [See Editor's Introduction, pp. 9-10.] Cf. 'On Narcissism: an Introduction' (1914c), and Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (19416).
+& Except that I seem to have been mistaken in ascribing the function
+of 'reality-testing to this super-ego—a point which needs correction.
+[See Group Psychology (19216), Standard Ed., 18, 114 and n. 2, and the
+Editor's Note to the metapsychological paper on dreams (1917d), 14,
+220.] It would fit in perfectly with the relations of the ego to the world
+of perception if reality-testing remained a task of the ego itself. Some
+earlier suggestions about a 'nucleus of the ego', never very definitely
+formulated, also require to be put right, since the system Pcpt.-Cs. alone
+can be regarded as the nucleus of the ego. [In Beyond the Pleasure Principle
+(1920g) Freud had spoken of the unconscious part of the ego as its
+nucleus (Standard Ed., 18, 19); and in his later paper on 'Humour'
+(1927d) he referred to the super-ego as the nucleus of the ego.]
+'Mourning and Melancholia' (1917e) [Standard Ed., 14, 249].
+• [Some references to other passages in which Freud has discussed
+28
+
+29
+At the very beginning, in the individual's primitive oral
+phase, object-cathexis and identification are no doubt indistinguishable from each other.1 We can only suppose that
+later on object-cathexes proceed from the id, which feels erotic
+trends as needs. The ego, which to begin with is still feeble,
+becomes aware of the object-cathexes, and either acquiesces in
+them or tries to fend them off by the process of repression.?
+When it happens that a person has to give up a sexual object,
+there quite often ensues an alteration of his ego which can only
+be described as a setting up of the object inside the ego, as it
+occurs in melancholia; the exact nature of this substitution is
+as yet unknown to us. It may be that by this introjection, which
+is a kind of regression to the mechanism of the oral phase, the
+ego makes it easier for the object to be given up or renders that
+process possible. It may be that this identification is the sole
+condition under which the id can give up its objects. At any
+rate the process, especially in the early phases of development,
+is a very frequent one, and it makes it possible to suppose that
+the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned objectcathexes and that it contains the history of those object-choices.
+It must, of course, be admitted from the outset that there are
+varying degrees of capacity for resistance, which decide the
+extent to which a person's character fends off or accepts the
+influences of the history of his erotic object-choices. In women
+who have had many experiences in love there seems to be no
+difficulty in finding vestiges of their object-cathexes in the traits
+of their character. We must also take into consideration cases
+of simultaneous object-cathexis and identification-cases, that
+character-formation will be found in an Editor's footnote at the end of
+the paper on 'Character and Anal Erotism' (1908b), Standard Ed, 9,
+" [Cf. Chapter VII of Group Psychology (19216), Standard Ed., 18, 105.]
+" An interesting parallel to the replacement of object-choice by
+identification is to be found in the belief of primitive peoples, and in the
+prohibitions based upon it, that the attributes of animals which are
+incorporated as nourishment persist as part of the character of those
+who eat them. As is well known, this belief is one of the roots of cannibalism and its effects have continued through the series of usages of the
+totem meal down to Holy Communion. [Cf. Totem and Taboo (1912-13),
+Standard Ed., 13, 82, 142, 154-5, etc.] The consequences ascribed by this
+belief to oral mastery of the object do in fact follow in the case of the
+later sexual object-choice.
+
+30
+is, in which the alteration in character occurs before the object
+has been given up. In such cases the alteration in character has
+been able to survive the object-relation and in a certain sense
+to conserve it.
+From another point of view it may be said that this transformation of an erotic oblect-choice into an alteration of the
+ego is also a method by which the ego can obtain control over
+the id and deepen its relations with it—at the cost, it is true,
+of acquiescing to a large extent in the id's experiences. When
+the ego assumes the features of the object, it is forcing itself,
+so to speak, upon the id as a love-object and is trying to make
+good the id's loss by saying: "Look, you can love me too-I am
+so like the object?
+The transformation of object-libido into narcissistic libido
+which thus takes place obviously implies an abandonment of
+sexual aims, a desexualization—a kind of sublimation, therefore. Indeed, the question arises, and deserves careful consideration, whether this is not the universal road to sublimation, whether all sublimation does not take place through the
+mediation of the ego, which begins by changing sexual objectlibido into narcissistic libido and then, perhaps, goes on to give
+it another aim.1 We shall later on have to consider whether
+other instinctual vicissitudes may not also result from this
+transformation, whether, for instance, it may not bring about
+a defusion of the various instincts that are fused together, ?
+Although it is a digression from our aim, we cannot avoid
+giving our attention for a moment longer to the ego's objectidentifications. If they obtain the upper hand and become too
+numerous, unduly powerful and incompatible with one another,
+a pathological outcome will not be far off. It may come to a
+disruption of the ego in consequence of the different identifications becoming cut off from one another by resistances; perhaps
+1 Now that we have distinguished between the ego and the id, we
+must recognize the id as the great reservoir of libido indicated in my
+paper on narcissism (19140) standard ta., 14, 1]. The libido which
+rows into the ego owing to the identitications described above brings
+about its 'secondary narcissism'. [The point is elaborated below on
+p. 46.]
+* Freud returns to the subject of this paragraph below, on pp. 45
+and 54. The concept of the fusion and defusion of instincts is explained
+on pp. 41-2. The terms had been introduced already in an encyclopaedia article (1923a), Standard Ed., 18, 258.]
+
+31
+the secret of the cases of what is described as 'multiple personality' is that the different identifications seize hold of consciousness in turn. Even when things do not go so far as this, there
+remains the question of conflicts between the various identifications into which the ego comes apart, conflicts which cannot
+after all be described as entirely pathological.
+But, whatever the character's later capacity for resisting the
+influences of abandoned object-cathexes may turn out to be,
+the effects of the first identifications made in earliest childhood
+will be general and lasting. This leads us back to the origin of
+the ego ideal; for behind it there lies hidden an individual's
+first and most important identification, his identification with
+the father in his own personal prehistory. This is apparently
+not in the first instance the consequence or outcome of an objectcathexis; it is a direct and immediate identification and takes
+place earlier than any object-cathexis.? But the object-choices
+belonging to the first sexual period and relating to the father
+and mother seem normally to find their outcome in an identification of this kind, and would thus reinforce the primary one.
+The whole subject, however, is so complicated that it will be
+necessary to go into it in greater detail. The intricacy of the
+problem is due to two factors: the triangular character of the
+Oedipus situation and the constitutional bisexuality of each
+individual.
+In its simplified form the case of a male child may be
+described as follows. At a very early age the little boy develops
+an object-cathexis for his mother, which originally related to the
+mother's breast and is the prototype of an object-choice on the
+anaclitic model; & the boy deals with his father by identifying
+himself with him. For a time these two relationships proceed
+1 Perhaps it would be safer to say 'with the parents'; for before a child
+has arrived at definite knowledge of the difference between the sexes,
+the lack of a penis, it does not distinguish in value between its father and
+its mother. I recently came across the instance of a young married
+woman whose story showed that, after noticing the lack of a penis in
+herself, she had supposed it to be absent not in all women, but only in
+those whom she regarded as inferior, and had still supposed that her
+mother possessed one. [Cf. a footnote to "The Infantile Genital Organization' (1923e), p. 145 below.]—In order to simplify my presentation I
+shall discuss only identification with the father.
+" [See the beginning of Chapter VII of Group Psychology (1921c),
+Standard Ed., 18, 105.]
+" [See the paper on narcissism (1914c), Standard Ed., 14, 87 ff.]
+
+32
+side by side, until the boy's sexual wishes in regard to his
+mother become more intense and his father is perceived as an
+obstacle to them; from this the Oedipus complex originates. 1
+His identification with his father then takes on a hostile colouring and changes into a wish to get rid of his father in order to
+take his place with his mother. Henceforward his relation to his
+father is ambivalent; it seems as if the ambivalence inherent
+in the identification from the beginning had become manifest.
+An ambivalent attitude to his father and an object-relation of
+a solely affectionate kind to his mother make up the content
+of the simple positive Oedipus complex in a boy.
+Along with the demolition of the Oedipus complex, the
+boy's object-cathexis of his mother must be given up. Its place
+may be filled by one of two things: either an identification
+with his mother or an intensification of his identification with
+his father. We are accustomed to regard the latter outcome as
+the more normal; it permits the affectionate relation to the
+mother to be in a measure retained. In this way the dissolution
+of the Oedipus complex? would consolidate the masculinity in
+a boy's character. In a precisely analogous way, the outcome
+of the Oedipus attitude in a little girl may be an intensification
+of her identification with her mother (or the setting up of such
+an identification for the first time)—a result which will fix the
+child's feminine character.
+These identifications are not what we should have expected
+[from the previous account (p. 29)], since they do not introduce the abandoned object into the ego; but this alternative
+outcome may also occur, and is easier to observe in girls than
+in boys. Analysis very often shows that a little girl, after she
+has had to relinquish her father as a love-object, will bring her
+masculinity into prominence and identify herself with her
+father (that is, with the object which has been lost), instead of
+with her mother. This will clearly depend on whether the
+masculinity in her disposition-whatever that may consist inis strong enough.
+1 Cf. Group Psychology (1921c), loc. cit.
+& [Cf. the paper bearing this title (1924d) in which Freud discussed
+the question more fully. (P. 173 below.)]
+& ['The idea that the outcome of the Oedipus complex was 'precisely
+analogous' in girls and boys was abandoned by Freud not. long after
+this. See 'Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction
+between the Sexes' (1925j), p. 248 below.]
+
+33
+It would appear, therefore, that in both sexes the relative
+strength of the masculine and feminine sexual dispositions is
+what determines whether the outcome of the Oedipus situation
+shall be an identification with the father or with the mother.
+This is one of the ways in which bisexuality takes a hand in the
+subsequent vicissitudes of the Oedipus complex. The other way
+is even more important. For one gets an impression that the
+simple Oedipus complex is by no means its commonest form,
+but rather represents a simplification or schematization which,
+to be sure, is often enough justified for practical purposes.
+Closer study usually discloses the more complete Oedipus
+complex, which is twofold, positive and negative, and is due
+to the bisexuality originally present in children: that is to say,
+a boy has not merely an ambivalent attitude towards his father
+and an affectionate object-choice towards his mother, but at
+the same time he also behaves like a girl and displays an
+affectionate feminine attitude to his father and a corresponding
+jealousy and hostility towards his mother. It is this complicating
+element introduced by bisexuality that makes it so difficult to
+obtain a clear view of the facts in connection with the earliest
+object-choices and identifications, and still more difficult to
+describe them intelligibly. It may even be that the ambivalence
+displayed in the relations to the parents should be attributed
+entirely to bisexuality and that it is not, as I have represented
+above,
+developed out of identification in consequence of
+rivalry.t
+In my opinion it is advisable in general, and quite especially
+where neurotics are concerned, to assume the existence of the
+complete Oedipus complex. Analytic experience then shows
+that in a number of cases one or the other constituent disappears, except for barely distinguishable traces; so that the
+" [Freud's belief in the importance of bisexuality went back a very
+long way. In the first edition of the Three Essays (1905d), for instance, he
+wrote: 'Without taking bisexuality into account I think it would scarcely
+be possible to arrive at an understanding of the sexual manifestations
+that are actually to be observed in men and women.? (Standard Ed., 7,
+220.) But still earlier we find a passage in a letter to Fliess (who influenced him greatly on this subject) which seems almost to foreshadow
+the present paragraph (Freud, 1950a, Letter 113, of August 1, 1899):
+'Bisexuality! I am sure you are right about it. And I am accustoming
+myself to regarding every sexual act as an event between four individuals:]
+
+34
+result is a series with the normal positive Oedipus complex
+at one end and the inverted negative one at the other, while
+its intermediate members exhibit the complete form with one
+or other of its two components preponderating. At the dissolution of the Oedipus complex the four trends of which
+it consists will group themselves in such a way as to produce a father-identification and a mother-identification. The
+father-identification will preserve the object-relation to the
+mother which belonged to the positive complex and will at
+the same time replace the object-relation to the father which
+belonged to the inverted complex: and the same will be true,
+mutatis mutandis, of the mother-identification. The relative intensity of the two identifications in any individual will reflect the
+preponderance in him of one or other of the two sexual dispositions.
+The broad general outcome of the sexual phase dominated by the
+Oedipus complex may, therefore, be taken to be the forming of a precipitate in the ego, consisting of these troo identifications in some way
+united with each other. This modification of the ego retains its special
+position; it confronts the other contents of the ego as an ego ideal or
+super-ego.
+The super-egois, however, not simply a residue of the earliest
+object-choices of the id; it also represents an energetic reactionformation against those choices. Its relation to the ego is not
+exhausted by the precept: "You ought to be like this (like your
+father)? It also comprises the prohibition: You may not be like
+this (like your father)-that is, you may not do all that he does;
+some things are his prerogative? This double aspect of the ego
+ideal derives from the fact that the ego ideal had the task of
+repressing the Oedipus complex; indeed, it is to that revolutionary event that it owes its existence. Clearly the repression
+of the Oedipus complex was no easy task. The child's parents,
+and especially his father, were perceived as the obstacle to à
+realization of his Oedipus wishes; so his infantile ego fortified
+itself for the carrying out of the repression by erecting this same
+obstacle within itself. It borrowed strength to do this, so to
+speak, from the father, and this loan was an extraordinarily
+momentous act. The super-ego retains the character of the
+father, while the more powerful the Oedipus complex was and
+the more rapidly it succumbed to repression (under the influence of authority, religious teaching, schooling and reading),
+
+(TII) THE EGO AND THE SUPER-EGO
+35
+the stricter will be the domination of the super-ego over the ego
+later on—in the form of conscience or perhaps of an unconscious sense of guilt. I shall presently [p. 48] bring forward a
+suggestion about the source ofits power to dominate in this way
+—the source, that is, of its compulsive character which manifests itself in the form of a categorical imperative.
+If we consider once more the origin of the super-ego as we
+have described it, we shall recognize that it is the outcome of
+two highly important factors, one of a biological and the other
+of a historical nature: namely, the lengthy duration in man of
+his childhood helplessness and dependence, and the fact of his
+Oedipus complex, the repression of which we have shown to be
+connected with the interruption of libidinal development by
+the latency period and so with the diphasic onset of man's
+sexual life.! According to one psycho-analytic hypothesis,? the
+last-mentioned phenomenon, which seems to be peculiar to
+man, is a heritage of the cultural development necessitated by
+the glacial epoch. We see, then, that the differentiation of the
+super-ego from the ego is no matter of chance, it represents the
+most important characteristics of the development both of the
+individual and of the species, indeed, by giving permätient
+expression to the influence of the parents it perpetuates the
+existence of the factors to which it owes its origin.
+Psycho-analysis has been reproached time after time with
+ignoring the higher, moral, supra-personal side of human
+nature. The reproach is doubly unjust, both historically and
+methodologically. For, in the first place, we have from the very
+beginning attributed the function of instigating repression to
+the moral and aesthetic trends in the ego, and secondly, there
+has been a general refusal to recognize that psycho-analytic
+1 [In the German editions this sentence reads as follows: If we consider once more the origin of the super-ego as we have described it, we
+shall recognize that it is the outcome of two highly important biological
+factors: namely, the lengthy duration in man of his childhood helplessness and dependence, and the fact of his Oedipus complex, which we
+have traced back to the interruption of libidinal development by the
+latency period and so to the diphasic origin of man's sexual life.' The
+slightly different version given in the text above was inserted by Freud's
+express orders in the English translation in 1927. For some reason the
+emendations were not included in the later German editions.]
+" [The idea was put forward by Ferenczi (1913). Freud seems to
+accept it rather more definitely near the end of Chapter X of Inhibitions,
+Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d), Standard Ed., 20, 155.]
+
+36
+research could not, like a philosophical system, produce a
+complete and ready-made theoretical structure, but had to
+find its way step by step along the path towards understanding
+the intricacies of the mind by making an analytic dissection of
+both normal and abnormal phenomena. So long as we had to
+concern ourselves with the study of what is repressed in mental
+life, there was no need for us to share in any agitated apprehensions as to the whereabouts of the higher side of man. But now
+that we have embarked upon the analysis of the ego we can
+give an answer to all those whose moral sense has been shocked
+and who have complained that there must surely be a higher
+nature in man: 'Very true,' we can say, 'and here we have that
+higher nature, in this ego ideal or super-ego, the representative
+of our relation to our parents. When we were little children we
+knew these higher natures, we admired them and feared them;
+and later we took them into ourselves.'
+The ego ideal is therefore the heir of the Oedipus complex,
+and thus it is also the expression of the most powerful impulses
+and most important libidinal vicissitudes of the id. By setting
+up this ego ideal, the ego has mastered the Oedipus complex
+and at the same time placed itself in subjection to the id.
+Whereas the ego is essentially the representative of the external
+worla; of reality, the super-ego stands in contrast to it as the
+representative of the internal world, of the id. Conflicts between
+the ego and the ideal will, as we are now prepared to find,
+ultimately reflect the contrast between what is real and what is
+psychical, between the external world and the internal world.
+Through the forming of the ideal, what biology and the
+vicissitudes of the human species have created in the id and left
+behind in it is taken over by the ego and re-experienced in
+relation to itself as an individual. Owing to the way in which
+the ego ideal is formed, it has the most abundant links with the
+phylogenetic acquisition of each individual—his archaic heritage. What has belonged to the lowest part of the mental life of
+each of us is changed, through the formation of the ideal, into
+what is highest in the human mind by our scale of values. It
+would be vain, however, to attempt to localize the ego ideal,
+even in the sense in which we have localized the ego, or to
+" [The super-ego is accordingly not included in the diagram on
+p. 24. Nevertheless it is given a place in the later diagram in Lecture
+XXXI of the New Introductory Lectures (1933a).]
+
+37
+work it into any of the analogies with the help of which we have
+tried to picture the relation between the ego and the id.
+It is easy to show that the ego ideal answers to everything
+that is expected of the higher nature of man. As a substitute for
+a longing for the father, it contains the germ from which all
+religions have evolved. The self judgement which declares that
+the ego falls short of its ideal produces the religious sense of
+humility to which the believer appeals in his longing. As a
+child grows up, the role of father is carried on by teachers and
+others in authority; their injunctions and prohibitions remain
+powerful in the ego ideal and continue, in the form of conscience, to exercise the moral censorship. The tension between
+the demands of conscience and the actual performances of the
+ego is experienced as a sense of guilt. Social feelings rest on
+identifications with other people, on the basis of having the
+same ego ideal.
+Religion, morality, and a social sense—the chief elements in
+the higher side of man'—were originally one and the same
+thing. According to the hypothesis which I put forward in
+Totem and Taboo? they were acquired phylogenetically out of
+the father-complex: religion and moral restraint through the
+process of mastering the Oedipus complex itself, and social
+feeling through the necessity for overcoming the rivalry that
+then remained between the members of the younger generation.
+The male sex seems to have taken the lead in all these moral
+acquisitions; and they seem to have then been transmitted to
+women by cross-inheritance. Even to-day the social feelings
+arise in the individual as a superstructure built upon impulses
+of jealous rivalry against his brothers and sisters. Since the
+hostility cannot be satisfied, an identification with the former
+rival develops. The study of mild cases of homosexuality confirms the suspicion that in this instance, too, the identification
+is a substitute for an affectionate obiect-choice which has taken
+the place of the aggressive, hostile attitude. 3
+With the mention of phylogenesis, however, fresh problems
+arise, from which one is tempted to draw cautiously back. But
+* [Freud (1912-13), Standard Ed., 13, 146 ff.]
+Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality'
+(19226) [ibid., 231].
+
+38
+there is no help for it, the attempt must be made—in spite of
+a fear that it will lay bare the inadequacy of our whole eifort.
+The question is: which was it, the ego of primitive man or his
+id, that acquired religion and morality in those early days out
+of the father-complex? If it was his ego, why do we not speak
+simply of these things being inherited by the ego? If it was the
+id, how does that agree with the character of the id? Or are
+we wrong in carrying the differentiation between ego, superego, and id back into such early times? Or should we not
+honestly confess that our whole conception of the processes in
+the ego is of no help in understanding phylogenesis and cannot
+be applied to it?
+Let us answer first what is easiest to answer. The differentiation between ego and id must be attributed not only to primi.
+tive man but even to much simpler organisms, for it is the
+inevitable expression of the influence of the external world.
+The super-ego, according to our hypothesis, actually originated
+from the experiences that led to totemism. The question
+whether it was the ego or the id that experienced and acquired
+these things soon comes to nothing. Reflection at once shows
+us that no external vicissitudes can be experienced or undergone by the id, except by way of the ego, which is the
+representative of the external world to the id. Nevertheless it
+is not possible to speak of direct inheritance in the ego. It is
+here that the gulf between an actual individual and the concept
+of a species becomes evident. Moreover, one must not take the
+difference between ego and id in too hard-and-fast a sense, nor
+forget that the ego is a specially differentiated part of the id
+[p. 25]. The experiences of the ego seem at first to be lost for
+inheritance; but, when they have been repeated often enough
+and with sufficient strength in many individuals in successive
+generations, they transform themselves, so to say, into experiences of the id, the impressions of which are preserved by
+heredity. Thus in the id, which is capable of being inherited,
+are harboured residues of the existences of countless egos; and,
+when the ego forms its super-ego out of the id, it may perhaps
+only be reviving shapes of former egos and be bringing them to
+resurrection.
+The way in which the super-ego came into being explains
+how it is that the early conflicts of the ego with the objectcathexes of the id can be continued in conflicts with their heir,
+
+39
+the super-ego. If the ego has not succeeded in properly mastering the Oedipus complex, the energic cathexis of the latter,
+springing from the id, will come into operation once more in
+the reaction-formation of the ego ideal. The abundant communication between the ideal and these Ucs. instinctual
+impulses solves the puzzle of how it is that the ideal itself can
+to a great extent remain unconscious and inaccessible to the
+ego. The struggle which once raged in the deepest strata of the
+mind, and was not brought to an end by rapid sublimation
+and identification, is now continued in a higher region, like
+the Battle of the Huns in Kaulbach's painting. 1
+1 [This was the battle, usually known as the Battle of Châlons, in
+which, in 451, Attila was defeated by the Romans and Visigoths.
+Wilhelm von Kaulbach (1805-1874) made it the subject of one of his
+mural decorations, originally painted for the Neues Museum in Berlin.
+
+IV
+THE TWO CLASSES OF INSTINCTS
+We have already said that, if the differentiation we have made
+of the mind into an id, an ego, and a super-ego represents any
+advance in our knowledge, it ought to enable us to understand
+more thoroughly the dynamic relations within the mind and to
+describe them more clearly. We have also already concluded
+Lp. 25] that the ego is especially under the influence of perception, and that, speaking broadly, perceptions may be said
+to have the same significance for the ego as instincts have for
+the id. At the same time the ego is subject to the influence of
+the instincts, too, like the id, of which it is, as we know, only a
+specially modified part.
+I have lately developed a view of the instincts which I shall
+here hold to and take as the basis of my further discussions.
+According to this view we have to distinguish two classes of
+instincts, one of which, the sexual instincts or Eros, is by far the
+more conspicuous and accessible to study. It comprises not
+merely the uninhibited sexual instinct proper and the instinctual impulses of an aim-inhibited or sublimated nature
+derived from it, but also the self-preservative instinct, which
+must be assigned to the ego and which at the beginning of our
+analytic work we had good reason for contrasting with the
+sexual object-instincts. The second class of instincts was not so
+easy to point to; in the end we came to recognize sadism as its
+representative. On the basis of theoretical considerations, supported by biology, we put forward the hypothesis of a death
+instinct, the task of which is to lead organic life back into the
+inanimate state; on the other hand, we supposed that Eros, by
+bringing about a more and more far-reaching combination of
+the particles into which living substance is dispersed, aims at
+complicating life and at the same time, of course, at preserving
+it. Acting in this way, both the instincts would be conservative
+in the strictest sense of the word, since both would be endeavouring to re-establish a state of things that was disturbed
+by the emergence of life. The emergence of life would thus be
+Beyond the Pleasure Principle [1920g].
+
+41
+the cause of the continuance of life and also at the same time
+of the striving towards death; and life itself would be a conflict
+and compromise between these two trends. The problem of the
+origin of life would remain a cosmological one; and the problem
+of the goal and purpose of life would be answered dualistically.
+On this view, a special physiological process (of anabolism or
+catabolism) would be associated with each of the two classes of
+instincts; both kinds of instinct would be active in every particle
+of living substance, though in unequal proportions, so that some
+one substance might be the principal representative of Eros.
+This hypothesis throws no light whatever upon the manner in
+which the two classes of instincts are fused, blended, and alloyed
+with each other; but that this takes place regularly and very
+extensively is an assumption indispensable to our conception.
+It appears that, as a result of the combination of unicellular
+organisms into multicellular forms of life, the death instinct of
+the single cell can successfully be neutralized and the destructive impulses be diverted on to the external world through the
+instrumentality of a special organ. This special organ would
+seem to be the muscular apparatus; and the death instinct
+would thus seem to express itself-though probably only in
+part—as an instinct of destruction directed against the external
+world and other organisms.?
+Once we have admitted the idea of a fusion of the two classes
+of instincts with each other, the possibility of a—more or less
+complete-'defusion' of them forces itself upon us. " The sadistic
+component of the sexual instinct would be a classical example
+of a serviceable instinctual fusion; and the sadism which has
+made itself independent as a perversion would be typical of a
+defusion, though not of one carried to extremes. From this point
+we obtain a view of a great domain of facts which has not before
+been considered in this light. We perceive that for purposes of
+discharge the instinct of destruction is habitually brought into
+the service of Eros; we suspect that the epileptic fit is a product
+and indication of an instinctual defusion;* and we come to
+1 [Cf. footnote 2, p. 46 pelow.]
+• [Freud returns to this in "The Economic Problem of Masochism',
+p. 163 below].
+3 [Cf. above, p. 30. What follows in regard to sadism is hinted at in
+Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Standard Ed., 18, 54.]
+* [Cf. Freud's later paper on Dostoevsky's fits (19286).]
+S.F. XIX-D
+
+42
+understand that instinctual defusion and the marked emergence
+of the death instinct call for particular consideration among
+the effects of some severe neuroses—for instance, the obsessional
+neuroses. Making a swift generalization, we might conjecture
+that the essence of a regression of libido (e.g. from the genital
+to the sadistic-anal phase) lies in a defusion of instincts, just as,
+conversely, the advance from the earlier phase to the definitive
+genital one would be conditioned by an accession of erotic
+components.1 The question also arises whether ordinary ambivalence, which is so often unusually strong in the constitutional
+disposition to neurosis, should not be regarded as the product
+of a defusion; ambivalence, however, is such a fundamental
+phenomenon that it more probably represents an instinctual
+fusion that has not been completed.
+It is natural that we should turn with interest to enquire
+whether there may not be instructive connections to be traced
+between the structures we have assumed to exist—the ego, the
+super-ego and the id—on the one hand and the two classes of
+instincts on the other; and, further, whether the pleasure
+principle which dominates mental processes can be shown to
+have any constant relation both to the two classes of instincts
+and to these differentiations which we have drawn in the mind.
+But before we discuss this, we must clear away a doubt which
+arises concerning the terms in which the problem itself is stated.
+There is, it is true, no doubt about the pleasure principle, and
+the differentiation within the ego has good clinical justification;
+but the distinction between the two classes of instincts does not
+seem sufficiently assured and it is possible that facts of clinical
+analysis may be found which will do away with its pretension.
+One such fact there appears to be. For the opposition between the two classes of instincts we may put the polarity of
+love and hate.? There is no difficulty in finding a representative
+of Eros; but we must be grateful that we can find a representative of the elusive death instinct in the instinct of destruction,
+to which hate points the way. Now, clinical observation shows
+1 [Freud recurs to this point in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d),
+Standard Ed., 20, 114.]
+2 [For what follows, see the earlier discussion of the relation between
+love and hate in 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1915c), Standard Ed.,
+14, 136-40, as well as the later one in Chapters V and VI of Croilization
+and its Discontents (1930a).]
+
+43
+not only that love is with unexpected regularity accompanied
+by hate (ambivalence), and not only that in human relationships hate is frequently a forerunner of love, but also that in a
+number of circumstances hate changes into love and love into
+hate. If this change is more than a mere succession in timeif, that is, one of them actually turns into the other-then
+clearly the ground is cut away from under a distinction so
+fundamental as that between erotic instincts and
+.. death instincts, one which presupposes physiological processes running
+in opposite directions.
+Now the case in which someone first loves and then hates the
+same person (or the reverse) because that person has given him
+cause for doing so, has obviously nothing to do with our
+problem. Nor has the other case, in which feelings of love that
+have not yet become manifest express themselves to begin with
+by hostility and aggressive tendencies; for it may be that here
+the destructive component in the object-cathexis has hurried
+on ahead and is only later on joined by the erotic one. But we
+know of several instances in the psychology of the neuroses in
+which it is more plausible to suppose that a transformation does
+take place. In persecutory paranoia the patient fends off an excessively strong homosexual attachment to some particular
+person in a special way; and as a result this person whom he
+loved most becomes a persecutor, against whom the patient
+directs an often dangerous aggressiveness. Here we have a right
+to interpolate a previous phase which has transformed the love
+into hate. In the case of the origin of homosexuality, and of
+desexualized social feelings as well, analytic investigation has
+only recently taught us to recognize that violent feelings of
+rivalry are present which lead to aggressive inclinations, and
+that it is only after these have been surmounted that the formerly hated object becomes the loved one or gives rise to an
+identification.! The question arises whether in these instances
+we are to assume a direct transformation of hate into love. It is
+clear that here the changes are purely internal and an alteration
+in the behaviour of the object plays no part in them.
+There is anotherpossible mechanism, however, which we have
+come to know of by analytic investigation of the processes concerned in the change in paranoia. An ambivalent attitude is
+present from the outset and the transformation is effected by
+" [See footnote 3, p. 37.]
+
+4f
+means of a reactive displacement of cathexis, energy being withdrawn from the erotic impulse and added to the hostile one.
+Not quite the same thing but something like it happens when
+the hostile rivalry leading to homosexuality is overcome. The
+hostile attitude has no prospect of satisfaction; consequently—
+for economic reasons, that is—it is replaced by a loving
+attitude for which there is more prospect of satisfaction-that
+is, possibility of discharge. So we see that we are not obliged in
+any of these cases to assume a direct transformation of hate into
+love, which would be incompatible with the qualitative distinction between the two classes of instincts.
+It will be noticed, however, that by introducing this other
+mechanism of changing love into hate, we have tacitly made
+another assumption which deserves to be stated explicitly. We
+have reckoned as though there existed in the mind-whether
+in the ego or in the id—a displaceable energy, which, neutral in
+itself, can be added to a qualitatively differentiated erotic or
+destructive impulse, and augment its total cathexis. Without
+assuming the existence of a displaceable energy of this kind we
+can make no headway. The only question is where it comes
+from, what it belongs to, and what it signifies.
+The problem of the quality of instinctual impulses and of its
+persistence throughout their various vicissitudes is still very
+obscure and has hardly been attacked up to the present. In the
+sexual component instincts, which are especially accessible to
+observation, it is possible to perceive a few processes which are
+in the same category as what we are discussing. We see, for
+instance, that some degree of communication exists between the
+component instincts, that an instinct deriving from one particular erotogenic source can make over its intensity to reinforce another component instinct originating from another
+source, that the satisfaction of one instinct can take the place
+of the satisfaction of another, and more facts of the same
+nature-which must encourage us to venture upon certain
+hypotheses.
+In the present discussion, moreover, I am only putting
+forward a hypothesis; I have no proof to offer. It seems a
+plausible view that this displaceable and neutral energy, which
+is no doubt active both in the ego and in the id, proceeds from
+the narcissistic store of libido—that it is desexualized Eros. (The
+erotic instincts appear to be altogether more plastic, more
+
+45
+readily diverted and displaced than the destructive instincts.)
+From this we can easily go on to assume that this displaceable
+libido is employed in the service of the pleasure principle to
+obviate blockages and to facilitate discharge. In this connection
+it is easy to observe a certain indifference as to the path along
+which the discharge takes place, so long as it takes place somehow. We know this trait; it is characteristic of the cathectic
+processes in the id. It is found in erotic cathexes, where a
+peculiar indifference in regard to the object displays itself; and
+it is especially evident in the transferences arising in analysis,
+which develop inevitably, irrespective of the persons who are
+their object. Not long ago Rank [1913] published some good
+examples of the way in which neurotic acts of revenge can be
+directed against the wrong people. Such behaviour on the part
+of the unconscious reminds one of the comic story of the three
+village tailors, one of whom had to be hanged because the only
+village blacksmith had committed a capital offence.! Punishment must be exacted even if it does not fall upon the guilty. It
+was in studying the dream-work that we first came upon this kind
+of looseness in the displacements brought about by the primary
+process. In that case it was the objects that were thus relegated
+to a position of no more than secondary importance, just as
+in the case we are now discussing it is the paths of discharge.
+It would be characteristic of the ego to be more particular about
+the choice both of an object and of a path of discharge.
+If this displaceable energy is desexualized libido, it may also
+be described as sublimated energy; for it would still retain the
+main purpose of Eros—that of uniting and binding—in so tar
+as it helps towards establishing the unity, or tendency to unity,
+which is particularly characteristic of the ego. If thoughtprocesses in the wider sense are to be included among these displacements, then the activity of thinking is also supplied from
+the sublimation of erotic motive forces.
+Here we arrive again at the possibility which has already
+been discussed [p. 30] that sublimation may take place regularly
+through the mediation of the ego. The other case will be
+recollected, in which the ego deals with the first object-cathexes
+of the id (and certainly with later ones too) by taking over the
+libido from them into itself and binding it to the alteration of
+" [The story was told by Freud in the last chapter of his book on jokes
+(1905c), Standard Ed., 8, 206.]
+
+46
+the ego produced by means of identification. The transformation [of erotic libido] into ego-libido of course involves an
+abandonment of sexual aims, a desexualization. In any case
+this throws light upon an important function of the ego in its
+relation to Eros. By thus getting hold of the libido from the
+object-cathexes, setting itself up as sole love-object, and desexualizing or sublimating the libido of the id, the ego is
+working in opposition to the purposes of Eros and placing itsell
+at the service of the opposing instinctual impulses. It has to
+acquiesce in some of the other object-cathexes of the id; it has,
+so to speak, to participate in them. We shall come back later to
+another possible consequence of this activity of the ego [p. 54].
+This would seem to imply an important amplification of the
+theory of narcissism. At the very beginning, all the libido is
+accumulated in the id, while the ego is still in process of formation or is still feeble. The id sends part of this libido out into
+erotic object-cathexes, whereupon the ego, now grown stronger,
+tries to get hold of this object-libido and to force itself on the id
+as a love-object. The narcissism of the ego is thus a secondary
+one, which has been withdrawn from objects.1
+Over and over again we find, when we are able to trace
+instinctual impulses back, that they reveal themselves as
+derivatives of Eros. If it were not for the considerations put
+forward in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, and ultimately for the
+sadistic constituents which have attached themselves to Eros,
+we should have difficulty in holding to our fundamental dualistic point of view.? But since we cannot escape that view, we
+are driven to conclude that the death instincts are by their
+nature mute and that the clamour of life proceeds for the most
+part from Eros. s
+And from the struggle against Eros! It can hardly be doubted
+that the pleasure principle serves the id as a compass in its
+struggle against the libido—the force that introduces disturb-
+" [See Appendix B (p. 63) for a discussion of this.]
+& [The consistency with which Freud held to a dualistic classification
+of the instincts will be seen from his long footnote at the end of Chapter
+VI of Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), Standard Ed., 18, 60-1, and
+from the historical sketch in the Editor's Note to 'Instincts and their
+Vicissitudes' (1915c), Standard Ed., 14, 113-16.]
+• In fact, on our view it is through the agency of Eros that the destructive instincts that are directed towards the external world have been
+diverted from the self.
+
+47
+ances into the process of life. If it is true that Fechner's principle of constancy! governs life, which thus consists of a continuous descent towards death, it is the claims of Eros, of the
+sexual instincts, which, in the form of instinctual needs, hold
+up the falling level and introduce fresh tensions. The id,
+guided by the pleasure principle-that is, by the perception of
+unpleasure fends off these tensions in various ways. It does so
+in the first place by complying as swiftly as possible with
+the demands of the non-desexualized libido-by striving
+for the satisfaction of the directly sexual trends. But it does so
+in a far more comprehensive fashion in relation to one particular form of satisfaction in which all component demands
+converge-by discharge of the sexual substances, which are
+saturated vehicles, so to speak, of the erotic tensions. The
+ejection of the sexual substances in the sexual act corresponds in
+a sense to the separation of soma and germ-plasm. This accounts
+for the likeness of the condition that follows complete sexual
+satistaction to dying, and for the tact that death coincides with
+the act of copulation in some of the lower animals. These
+creatures die in the act of reproduction because, after Eros has
+been eliminated through the process of satisfaction, the death
+instinct has a free hand for accomplishing its purposes. Finally,
+as we have seen, the ego, by sublimating some of the libido for
+itself and its purposes, assists the id in its work of mastering
+the tensions.
+1 [Cf. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Standard Ea., 10, o-.0.]
+" [Freud's views on the part played by the 'sexual substances' will
+be found in Section 2 of the third of his Three Essays (1905d), Standard
+Ed., 7, 212-16.]
+
+V
+THE DEPENDENT RELATIONSHIPS
+OF THE EGO
+THE complexity of our subject-matter must be an excuse for
+the fact that none of the chapter-headings of this book quite
+correspond to their contents, and that in turning to new aspects
+of the topic we are constantly harking back to matters that have
+Thus we have said repeatedly that the ego is formed to a
+great extent out of identifications which take the place of
+abandoned cathexes by the id; that the first of these identifications always behave as a special agency in the ego and stand
+apart from the ego in the form of a super-ego, while later on,
+as it grows stronger, the ego may become more resistant to the
+influences of such identifications. •The super-ego owes its
+special position in the ego, or in relation to the ego, to a factor
+which must be considered from two sides: on the one hand it
+• was the first identification and one which took place while the
+ego was still feeble, and on the other hand it is the heir to the
+Oedipus complex and has thus introduced the most momentous
+objects into the ego. The super-ego's relation to the later alterations of the ego is roughly similar to that of the primary
+sexual phase of childhood to later sexual life after puberty..
+Although it is accessible to all later influences, it nevertheless
+preserves throughout life the character given to it by its derivation from the father-complex-namely, the capacity to stand
+apart from the ego and to master it. It is a memorial of the
+former weakness and dependence of the ego, and the mature
+ego remains subject to its domination. As the child was once
+under a compulsion to obey its parents, so the ego submits to )
+the categorical imperative of its super-ego.
+But the derivation of the super-ego from the first objectcathexes of the id, from the Oedipus complex, signifies even
+more for it. This derivation, aswe have already shown [p. 36 ff.],
+brings it into relation with the phylogenetic acquisitions of the
+id and makes it a reincarnation of former ego-structures which
+have left their precipitates behind in the id. Thus the super-ego
+
+49
+is always close to the id and can act as its representative vis-d-vis
+the ego. It reaches deep down into the id and for that reason is
+farther from consciousness than the ego is. 1
+We shall best appreciate these relations by turning to certain
+clinical facts, which have long since lost their novelty but which
+still await theoretical discussion.
+There are certain people who behave in a quite peculiar
+fashion during the work of analysis. When one speaks hopefully
+to them or expresses satisfaction with the progress of the treatment, they show signs of discontent and their condition invariably becomes worse. Une begins by regarding this as
+detiance and as an attempt to prove their superiority to the
+physician, but later one comes to take a deeper and juster
+view. One becomes convinced, not only that such people
+cannot endure any praise or appreciation, but that they react
+inversely to the progress of the treatment. Every partial solution
+that ought to result, and in other people does result, in an improvement or a temporary suspension of symptoms produces in
+them for the time being an exacerbation of their illness; they
+get worse during the treatment instead of getting better. They
+exhibit what is known as a 'negative therapeutic reaction'
+There is no doubt that there is something in these people
+that sets itselfagainst their recovery, and its approach is dreaded
+as though it were a danger. We are accustomed to say that the
+need for illness has got the upper hand in them over the desire
+for recovery. If we analyse this resistance in the usual way—
+then, even after allowance has been made for an attitude of
+defiance towards the physician and for fixation to the various
+forms of gain from illness, the greater part of it is still left over;
+and this reveals itself as the most powerful of all obstacles to
+recovery, more powerful than the familiar ones of narcissistic
+inaccessibility, a negative attitude towards the physician and
+clinging to the gain from illness.
+In the end we come to see that we are dealing with what may
+be called a 'moral' factor, a sense of guilt, which is finding its
+satisfaction in the illness and refuses to give up the punishment
+of suffering. We shall be right in regarding this disheartening
+explanation as final. But as far as the patient is concerned this
+1 It may be said that the psycho-analytic or metapsychological ego
+stands on its head no less than the anatomical ego-the 'cortical
+homunculus' [p. 26].
+
+50
+sense of guilt is dumb; it does not tell him he is guilty; he does
+not feel guilty, he feels ill. This sense of guilt expresses itself only
+as a resistance to recovery which it is extremely difficult to
+overcome. It is also particularly difficult to convince the patient
+that this motive lies behind his continuing to be ill; he holds
+fast to the more obvious explanation that treatment by analysis
+is not the right remedy for his case.
+The description we have given applies to the most extreme
+instances of this state of affairs, but in a lesser measure this
+factor has to be reckoned with in very many cases, perhaps in
+all comparatively severe cases of neurosis. In fact it may be
+precisely this element in the situation, the attitude of the ego
+ideal, that determines the severity of a neurotic illness. We shall
+not hesitate, therefore, to discuss rather more fully the way
+in which the sense of guilt expresses itself under different
+conditions.
+An interpretation of the normal, conscious sense of guilt
+1 The battle with the obstacle of an unconscious sense of guilt is not
+made easy for the analyst. Nothing can be done against it directly, and
+nothing indirectly but the slow procedure of unmasking its unconscious
+repressed roots, and of thus gradually changing it into a conscious sense
+sense if guine as a revied oner-unien for inhe product andeni ca
+tion with some other person who was once the object of an erotic
+cathexis. A sense of guilt that has been adopted in this way is often the
+sole remaining trace of the abandoned love-relation and not at all easy
+to recognize as such. (The likeness between this process and what happens in melancholia is unmistakable.) If one can unmask this former
+object-cathexis behind the Us. sense of guilt, the therapeutic success is
+often brilliant, but otherwise the outcome of one's efforts is by-no means
+certain. It depends principally on the intensity of the sense of guilt;
+there is often no counteracting force of a similar order of strength which
+the treatment can oppose to it. Perhaps it may depend, too, on whether
+the personality of the analyst allows of the patient's putting him in the
+place of his ego ideal, and this involves a temptation for the analyst to
+play the part of prophet, saviour and redeemer to the patient. Since the j
+rules of analysis are diametrically opposed to the physician's making
+use of his personality in any such manner, it must be honestly confessed
+that here we have another limitation to the effectiveness of analysis;
+after all, analysis does not set out to make pathological reactions impossible, but to give the patient's ego freedom to decide one way or the
+other.—[Freud returned to this topic in his paper on "The Economic
+Problem of Masochism' (1924c), p. 166 below, where he discussed the
+distinction between the unconscious sense of guilt and moral masochism.
+See also Chapters VII and VIII of Civilization and its Discontents (1930a).]
+
+51
+(conscience) presents no difficulties; it is based on the tension
+between the ego and the ego ideal and is the expression of a
+condemnation of the ego by its critical agency. The feelings of
+inferiority so well known in neurotics are presumably not far
+removed from it. In two very familiar maladies the sense of
+guilt is over-strongly conscious; in them the ego ideal displays
+particular severity and often rages against the ego in a cruel
+fashion. The attitude of the ego ideal in these two conditions,
+obsessional neurosis and melancholia, presents, alongside of this
+similarity, differences that are no less significant.
+In certain forms of obsessional neurosis the sense of guilt is
+over-noisy but cannot justify itself to the ego. Consequently the
+patient's ego rebels against the imputation of guilt and seeks
+the physician's support in repudiating it. It would be folly to
+acquiesce in this, for to do so would have no effect. Analysis
+eventually shows that the super-ego is being influenced by processes that have remained unknown to the ego. It is possible to
+discover the repressed impulses which are really at the bottom
+of the sense of guilt. Thus in this case the super-ego knew more
+than the ego about the unconscious id.
+In melancholia the impression that the super-ego has obtained a hold upon consciousness is even stronger. But here the
+ego ventures no objection; it admits its guilt and submits to the
+punishment. We understand the difference. In obsessional
+neurosis what were in question were objectionable impulses.
+which remained outside the ego, while in melancholia the
+object to which the super-ego's wrath applies has been taken
+into the ego through identification.
+It is certainly not clear why the sense of guilt reaches such
+an extraordinary strength in these two neurotic disorders; but
+the main problem presented in this state of affairs lies in another
+direction. We shall postpone discussion of it until we have dealt
+with the other cases in which the sense of guilt remains unconscious. [See p. 53.]
+It is essentially in hysteria and in states of a hysterical type
+that this is found. Here the mechanism by which the sense of
+guilt remains unconscious is easy to discover. The hysterical
+ego fends off a distressing perception with which the criticisms
+of its super-ego threaten it, in the same way in which it is in the
+habit of fending off an unendurable object-cathexis—by an act
+of repression. It is the ego, therefore, that is responsible for the
+
+52
+sense of guilt remaining unconscious. We know that as a rule
+the ego carries out repressions in the service and at the behest
+ofits super-ego; but this is a case in which it has turned the same
+weapon against its harsh taskmaster. In obsessional neurosis, as
+we know, the phenomena of reaction-formation predominate;
+but here [in hysteria] the ego succeeds only in keeping at a
+distance the material to which the sense of guilt refers.
+One may go further and venture the hypothesis that a great
+part of the sense of guilt must normally remain unconscious,
+because the origin of conscience is intimately connected with
+the Oedipus complex, which belongs to the unconscious. If
+anyone were inclined to put forward the paradoxical proposition
+that the normal man is not only far more immoral than he
+believes but also far more moral than he knows, psycho-analysis,
+on whose findings the first half of the assertion rests, would have
+no objection to raise against the second half.'
+It was a surprise to find that an increase in this Ucs. sense of
+guilt can turn people into criminals. But it is undoubtedly a
+fact. In many criminals, especially youthful ones, it is possible
+to detect a very powerful sense of guilt which existed before the
+crime, and is therefore not its result but its motive. It is as if it
+was a relief to be able to fasten this unconscious sense of guilt
+on to something real and immediate.?
+In all these situations the super-ego displays its independence
+of the conscious ego and its intimate relations with the unconscious id. Having regard, now, to the importance we have
+ascribed to preconscious verbal residues in the ego [p. 20 f.],
+the question arises whetherit can be the case that the super-ego,
+in so far as it is Ucs., consists in such word-presentations and,
+if it does not, what else it consists in. Our tentative answer
+will be that it is as impossible for the super-ego as for the ego
+to disclaim its origin from things heard; for it is a part of the
+ego and remains accessible to consciousness by way of these
+word-presentations (concepts, abstractions). But the cathectic
+energy does not reach these contents of the super-ego from
+1 This proposition is only apparently a paradox; itsimply states that
+human nature has a far greater extent, both for good and for evil, than it
+thinks it has—1.e. than its ego is aware of through conscious perception.
+• [A full discussion of this (together with some other reterences) will
+be found in Part III of Freud's paper on 'Some Character Types'
+(1916d), Standard Ed., 14, 332-3.]
+
+53
+auditory perception (instruction or reading) but from sources
+in the id.
+The question which we put off answering [see p. 51] runs
+as follows: How is it that the super-ego manifests itself essentially
+as a sense of guilt (or rather, as criticism-for the sense of
+guilt is the perception in the ego answering to this criticism
+and moreover develops such extraordinary harshness and
+severity towards the ego? If we turn to melancholia first, we
+find that the excessively strong super-ego which has obtained
+a hold upon consciousness rages against the ego with merciless
+violence, as if it had taken possession of the whole of the sadism
+available in the person concerned. Following our view of sadism,
+we should say that the destructive component had entrenched
+itself in the super-ego and turned against the ego. What is now
+holding sway in the super-ego is, as it were, a pure culture of the
+death instinct, and in fact it often enough succeeds in driving
+the ego into death, if the latter does not fend off its tyrant in
+time by the change round into mania.
+The reproaches of conscience in certain forms of obsessional
+neurosis are as distressing and tormenting, but here the situation
+is less perspicuous. It is noteworthy that the obsessional neurotic,
+in contrast to the melancholic, never in fact takes the step of
+self-destruction; it is as though he were immune against the
+danger of suicide, and he is far better protected from it than the
+hysteric. We can see that what guarantees the safety of the ego
+is the fact that the object has been retained. In obsessional
+neurosis it has become possible, through a regression to the pregenital organization, for the love-impulses to transform themselves into impulses of aggression against the object. Here again
+the instinct of destruction has been set free and it seeks to destroy
+the object, or at least it appears to have that intention. These
+purposes have not been adopted by the ego and it struggles
+against them with reaction-formations and precautionary
+measures; they remain in the id. The super-ego, however, behaves as if the ego were responsible for them and shows at the
+same time by the seriousness with which it chastises these destructive intentions that they are no mere semblance evoked by
+regression but an actual substitution of hate for love. Helpless in
+both directions, the ego defends itself vainly, alike against the
+instigations of the murderous id and against the reproaches of
+the punishing conscience. It succeeds in holding in check at
+
+54
+least the most brutal actions of both sides; the first outcome is
+interminable self-torment, and eventually there follows a systematic torturing of the object, in so far as it is within reach.
+The dangerous death instincts are dealt with in the individual
+in various ways: in part they are rendered harmless by being
+fused with erotic components, in part they are diverted towards
+the external world in the form of aggression, while to a large
+extent they undoubtedly continue their internal work unhindered. How is it then that in melancholia the super-ego can
+become a kind of gathering-place for the death instincts?
+From the point of view of instinctual control, of morality, it
+may be said of the id that it is totally non-moral, of the ego that
+it strives to be moral, and of the super-ego that it can be supermoral and then become as cruel as only the id can be. It is
+remarkable that the more a man checks his aggressiveness towards the exterior the more severe—that is aggressive—he
+becomes in his ego ideal. The ordinary view sees the situation
+the other way round: the standard set up by the ego ideal seems
+to be the motive for the suppression of aggressiveness. The fact
+remains, however, as we have stated it: the more a man controls
+his aggressiveness, the more intense becomes his ideal's inclination to aggressiveness against his ego.1 It is like a displacement,
+a turning round upon his own ego. But even ordinary normal
+morality has a harshly restraining, cruelly prohibiting quality.
+It is from this, indeed, that the conception arises of a higher
+being who deals out punishment inexorably.
+I cannot go further in my consideration of these questions
+without introducing a fresh hypothesis. The super-ego arises, as
+we know, from an identification with the father taken as a
+model. Every such identification is in the nature of a desexualization or even of a sublimation. It now seems as though
+when a transformation of this kind takes place, an instinctual
+defusion occurs at the same time [p. 30]. After sublimation the
+erotic component no longer has the power to bind the whole
+of the destructiveness that was combined with it, and this is
+released in the form of an inclination to aggression and
+• [Freud returned to this paradox in Section B oi Some Additiona
+Notes on Dream-Interpretation as a Whole' (1925), p. 134 below, anc
+also in 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' (1924c), p. 170 below,
+and discussed it more fully in Chapter VII of Cvilization and its Discontents (1930a).]
+
+55
+destruction. This defusion would be the source of the general
+character of harshness and cruelty exhibited by the ideal—its
+dictatorial Thou shalt'.
+Let us again consider obsessional neurosis for a moment. The
+state of affairs is different here. The defusion of love into
+aggressiveness has not been effected by the work of the ego, but
+is the result of a regression which has come about in the id. But
+this process has extended beyond the id to the super-ego, which
+now increases its severity towards the innocent ego. It would
+seem, however, that in this case, no less than in that of melancholia, the ego, having gained control over the libido by means
+of identification, is punished for doing so by the super-ego
+through the instrumentality of the aggressiveness which was
+mixed with the libido.
+Our ideas about the ego are beginning to clear, and its
+various relationships are gaining distinctness. We now see the
+ego in its strength and in its weaknesses. It is entrusted with
+important functions. By virtue of its relation to the perceptual
+system it gives menta. processes an order in time and submits
+them to 'reality-testing. ' By interposing the processes of thinking, it secures a postponement of motor discharges and controls
+the access to motility.a This last power is, to be sure, a question
+more of form than of fact; in the matter of action the ego's
+position is like that of a constitutional monarch, without whose
+sanction no law can be passed but who hesitates long before
+imposing his veto on any measure put forward by Parliament.
+All the experiences of life that originate from without enrich the
+ego; the id, however, is its second external world, which it
+strives to bring into subjection to itself. It withdraws libido from
+the id and transforms the object-cathexes of the id into egostructures. With the aid of the super-ego, in a manner that is
+still obscure to us, it draws upon the experiences of past ages
+stored in the id [p. 38].
+There are two paths by which the contents of the id can
+penetrate into the ego. The one is direct, the other leads by way
+of the ego ideal; which of these two paths they take may, for
+some mental activities, be of decisive importance. The ego
+develops from perceiving instincts to controlling them, from
+• Cf. 'The Unconscious
+• Tortions on the 1), Standards or Mental Functioning"
+(19116), Standard Ed., 12, 221.]
+
+56
+obeying instincts to inhibiting them. In this achievement a
+large share is taken by the ego ideal, which indeed is partly a
+reaction-formation against the instinctual processes of the id.
+Psycho-analysis is an instrument to enable the ego to achieve
+a progressive conquest of the id.
+From the other point of view, however, we see this same ego
+as a poor creature owing service to three masters and consequently menaced by three dangers: from the external world,
+from the libido of the id, and from the severity of the super-ego.
+Three kinds of anxiety correspond to these three dangers, since
+anxiety is the expression of a retreat from danger. As a frontiercreature, the ego tries to mediate between the world and the id,
+to make the id pliable to the world and, by means ot its muscular
+activity, to make the world fall in with the wishes of the id. In
+point of fact it behaves like the physician during an analytic
+treatment: it offers itself, with the attention it pays to the real
+world, as a libidinal object to the id, and aims at attaching the
+id's libido to itself. It is not only a helper to the id; it is also a
+submissive slave who courts his master's love. Whenever possible, it tries to remain on good terms with the id; it clothes the
+id's Ucs. commands with its Pos. rationalizations; it pretends
+that the id is showing obedience to the admonitions of reality,
+even when in fact it is remaining obstinate and unyielding; it
+disguises the id's conflicts with reality and, if possible, its conflicts with the super-ego too. In its position midway between the
+id and reality, it only too often yields to the temptation to become sycophantic, opportunist and lying, like a politician who
+sees the truth but wants to keep his place in popular favour.
+Towards the two classes of instincts the ego's attitude is not
+impartial. Through its work of identification and sublimation it
+gives the death instincts in the id assistance in gaining control
+over the libido, but in so doing it runs the risk of becoming the
+object of the death instincts and of itself perishing. In order to
+be able to help in this way it has had itself to become filled with
+libido; it thus itself becomes the representative of Eros and
+thenceforward desires to live and to be loved.
+But since the ego's work of sublimation results in a defusion
+of the instincts and a liberation of the aggressive instincts in the
+super-ego, its struggle against the libido exposes it to the danger
+of maltreatment and death. In suffering under the attacks of
+the super-ego or perhaps even succumbing to them, the ego is
+
+57
+meeting with a fate like that of the protista which are destroyed
+by the products of decomposition that they themselves have
+created. ' From the economic point of view the morality that
+functions in the super-ego seems to be a similar product of
+decomposition.
+Among the dependent relationships in which the ego stands,
+that to the super-ego is perhaps the most interesting.
+The ego is the actual seat of anxiety. ‹ Threatened by dangers
+from three directions, it develops the flight-reflex by withdrawing its own cathexis from the menacing perception or
+from the similarly regarded process in the id, and emitting it as
+anxiety. This primitive reaction is later replaced by the
+carrying-out of protective cathexes (the mechanism of the
+phobias). What it is that the ego fears from the external and
+from the libidinal danger cannot be specified; we know that the
+fear is of being overwhelmed or annihilated, but it cannot
+be grasped analytically. & The ego is simply obeying the warning
+of the pleasure principle. On the other hand, we can tell what is
+hidden behind the ego's dread of the super-ego, the fear of
+conscience.* The superior being, which turned into the ego
+ideal, once threatened castration, and this dread of castration
+is probably the nucleus round which the subsequent fear of
+conscience has gathered; it is this dread that persists as the
+ear of conscience.
+The high-sounding phrase, 'every fear is ultimately the fear
+of death'
+', has hardly any meaning, and at any rate cannot be
+justified.& It seems to me, on the contrary, perfectly correct to
+1 [Freud had discussed these animalculae in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Standard Ed., 18, 48. They would probably now be discribed as
+'protozoa' rather than "protista'.]
+• [What follows on the subject of anxiety must be read in connection
+with Freud's revised views as stated in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety
+(1926d), where most of the points raised here are further discussed.]
+" [The notion of the ego being 'overwhelmed' (of an 'Überwältigung')
+occurs very early in Freud's writings. See, for instance, a mention of it
+in fart Il of his first paper on "The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence' (1894a).
+But it plays a prominent part in his discussion of the mechanism of the
+neuroses in Draft K of January 1, 1896, in the Fliess correspondence
+(Freud, 1950a). There is an evident connection here with the 'traumatic
+situation' of Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d) .]
+* ['Gewissensangst.' An Editor's footnote on the use of this word will be
+found in Chapter VII of Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, Standard Ed.,
+20, 128.]
+• [Cf. Stekel (1908, 5).]
+S.F. XIX-E
+
+58
+distinguish the fear of death from dread of an object (realistic
+anxiety) and from neurotic libidinal anxiety. It presents a
+difficult problem to psycho-analysis, for death is an abstract
+concept with a negative content for which no unconscious
+correlative can be found. It would seem that the mechanism of
+the fear of death can only be that the ego relinquishes its
+narcissistic libidinal cathexis in a very large measure-that is,
+that it gives up itself, just as it gives up some external object
+in other cases in which it feels anxiety. I believe that the fear of
+death is something that occurs between the ego and the superego.
+We know that the fear of death makes its appearance under
+two conditions (which, moreover, are entirely analogous to
+situations in which other kinds of anxiety develop), namely, as
+a reaction to an external danger and as an internal process, as
+for instance in melancholia. Once again a neurotic manifestation
+may help us to understand a normal one.
+The fear of death in melancholia only admits of one explanation: that the ego gives itself up because it feels itself hated
+and persecuted by the super-ego, instead of loved. To the ego,
+therefore, living means the same as being loved-being loved
+by the super-ego, which here again appears as the representative
+of the id. The super-ego fulfils the same function of protecting
+and saving that was fulfilled in earlier days by the father and
+later by Providence or Destiny. But, when the ego finds itself
+in an excessive real danger which it believes itself unable to
+overcome by its own strength, it is bound to draw the same
+conclusion. It sees itself deserted by all protecting forces and
+lets itself die. Here, moreover, is once again the same situation
+as that which underlay the first great anxiety-state of birtht and
+the infantile anxiety of longing—the anxiety due to separation
+from the protecting mother.?
+These considerations make it possible to regard the fear of
+death, like the fear of conscience, as a development of the feat
+of castration. The great significance which the sense of guilt
+has in the neuroses makes it conceivable that common neurotic
+" [Some discussion of the appearance of this notion here will be found
+in the Editor's Introduction to Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, Standard
+Ed., 20, 85-6.1
+= [This foreshadows the 'separation anxiety discussed in Inhibitions,
+Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d), Standard Ed., 20, 151.]
+
+59
+anxiety is reinforced in severe cases by the generating of anxiety
+between the ego and the super-ego (fear of castration, of conscience, of death).
+The id, to which we finally come back, has no means of
+showing the ego either love or hate. It cannot say what it wants;
+it has achieved no unified will. Eros and the death instinct
+struggle within it; we have seen with what weapons the one
+group of instincts defends itself against the other. It would be
+possible to picture the id as under the domination of the mute
+but powerful death instincts, which desire to be at peace and
+(prompted by the pleasure principle) to put Eros, the mischiefmaker, to rest; but perhaps that might be to undervalue the
+part played by Eros.
+.....
+
+APPENDIX A
+THE DESCRIPTIVE AND THE DYNAMIC
+UNCONSCIOUS
+A curIous point arises out of two sentences both of which
+appear on p. 15 above. The Editor's attention was drawn to it in
+a private communication from Dr. Ernest Jones, who had come
+across it in the course of examining Freud's correspondence.
+On October 28, 1923, a few months after this work appeared,
+Ferenczi wrote to Freud in these terms: . . . Nevertheless I
+venture to put a question to you .... since there is a passage
+in The Ego and the Id which, without your solution, I do not
+understand.... On p. 131 I find the following: "... that in the
+descriptive sense there are two kinds of unconscious, but in the
+dynamic sense only one." Since, however, you write on p. 121
+that the latent unconscious is unconscious only descriptively,
+not in the dynamic sense, I had thought that it was precisely
+the dynamic line of approach that called for the hypothesis of
+there being two sorts of Ucs., while description knows only Gs.
+and Ucs.
+To this Freud replied on October 30, 1923: '... Your question
+about the passage on p. 13 of The Ego and the ld has positively
+horritied me. What appears there gives a directly opposite
+sense to p. 12; and in the sentence on p. 13 "descriptive" and
+"dynamic" have simply been transposed.'
+A little consideration of this startling attair suggests, however,
+that Ferenczi's criticism was based on a misunderstanding and
+that Freud was over-hasty in accepting it. The confusions which
+underlie Ferenczi's remarks are not very easily sorted out, and
+a rather lengthy argument is inevitable. Since, however, others
+besides Ferenczi may fall into the same error, it seems worth
+while to try to clear the matter up.
+We will start off with the first half of Freud's later sentence:
+'in the descriptive sense there are two kinds of unconscious.'
+The meaning of this seems perfectly clear: the term 'unconscious' in its descriptive sense covers two things—the latent
+unconscious and the repressed unconscious. Freud might, however, have expressed the idea even more clearly. Instead of
+1 Of the German edition. Both sentences are on p. 15 here.
+
+APPENDIX A
+61
+two kinds of unconscious [zweierlei Unberusstes]' he might have
+said explicitly that in the descriptive sense there are 'two kinds
+of things that are unconscious. And in fact Ferenczi evidently
+misunderstood the words: he took them to be saying that the
+term 'descriptively unconscious' had two different meanings.
+This, as he rightly saw, could not be so: the term unconscious,
+used descriptively, could only have one meaning-that the
+thing it was applied to was not conscious. In logical terminology, he thought Freud was speaking of the connotation of the
+term whereas he was actually speaking of its denotation.
+We now proceed to the second half of Freud's later sentence:
+'but in the dynamic sense [there is] only one [kind of unconscious. Here again the meaning seems pertectly clear:
+the term 'unconscious' in its dynamic sense covers only one
+thing-the repressed unconscious. This is once more a statement about the denotation of the term; though even if it had been
+about its connotation it would still be true-the term 'dynamic
+unconscious' can only have one meaning. Ferenczi, however,
+objects to it, on the ground that 'it was precisely the dynamic
+line of approach that called for the hypothesis of there being
+two sorts of Ucs.. Ferenczi was once more misunderstanding
+Freud. He took him to be saying that if we consider the term
+'unconscious, bearing dynamic factors in mind, we see that it
+has only one meaning-which would, of course, have been the
+opposite of everything that Freud was arguing. Whereas what
+Freud really meant was that all the things that are unconscious
+dynamically (ie. that are repressed) fall into one class.—The
+position is made a little more confused by Ferenczi's using the
+symbol 'Us' to mean 'unconscious' in the descriptive sense—a
+slip which Freud himself makes by implication on p. 18.
+Thus this later sentence of Freud's seems altogether immune
+from criticism in itself. But is it, as Ferenczi suggests and as
+Freud himself seems to agree, incompatible with the earlier
+sentence? This earlier sentence speaks of the latent unconscious
+as being 'unconscious only descriptively, not in the dynamic
+sense. Ferenczi appears to have thought that this contradicts
+the later statement that 'in the descriptive sense there are two
+kinds of unconscious. But the two statements do not contradict
+each other: the fact that the latent unconscious is only descriptively unconscious does not in the least imply that it is the only
+thing that is descriptively unconscious.
+
+62
+There is, indeed, a passage in Lecture XXXI of Freud's New
+Introductory Lectures, written some ten years later than the present
+work, in which the whole of this argument is repeated in very
+similar terms. In that passage it is explained more than once that
+in the descriptive sense both the preconscious and the repressed
+are unconscious, but that in the dynamic sense the term is
+restricted to the repressed.
+It must be pointed out that this interchange of letters took
+place only a very few days after Freud had undergone an
+extremely severe operation. He was not yet able to write (his
+reply was dictated), and he was probably in no condition to
+weigh the argument thoroughly. It seems likely that on reflection he realized that Ferenczi's discovery was a mare's nest, for
+the passage was never altered in the later editions of the book.
+
+APPENDIX B
+THE GREAT RESERVOIR OF LIBIDO
+THErE is considerable difficulty over this matter, which is
+mentioned in the first footnote on p. 30 and discussed at greater
+length on p. 46.
+The analogy seems to have made its first appearance in a new
+section added to the third edition of the Three Essays (1905d),
+which was published in 1915 but had been prepared by Freud
+in the autumn of 1914. The passage runs as follows (Standard Ed.,
+7, 218): Narcissistic or ego libido seems to be the great reservoir from which the object-cathexes are sent out and into
+which they are withdrawn once more; the narcissistic libidinal
+cathexis of the ego is the original state of things, realized in
+earliest childhood, and is merely covered by the later extrusions
+of libido, but in essentials persists behind them.'
+The same notion had, however, been expressed earlier in
+another favourite analogy of Freud's, which appears sometimes
+as an alternative and sometimes alongside the 'great reservoir. 1
+This earlier passage is in the paper on narcissism itself (1914c),
+which was written by Freud in the early part of the same year,
+1914 (Standard Ed., 14, 75): "Thus we form the idea of there
+being an original libidinal cathexis of the ego, from which some
+is later given off to objects, but which fundamentally persists
+and is related to the object-cathexis much as the body of an
+amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out.'
+The two analogies appear together in a semi-popular paper
+written at the end of 1916 for a Hungarian periodical ('A
+Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis, 1917a, Standard Edo,
+17, 139): "The ego is a great reservoir from which the libido
+that is destined for objects flows out and into which it flows
+back from those objects ... As an illustration of this state of
+things we may think of an amoeba, whose viscous substance
+puts out pseudopodia...
+The amoeba appears once more in Lecture XXVI of the
+1 This analogy had appeared already in a rudimentary form in the
+third as y in Tate and Taboo, which was first published early in 1913.
+
+64 m
+Introductory Lectures (1916-17), dating from 1917, and the reservoir in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), Standard Ed., 18,
+51: 'Psycho-analysis ... came to the conclusion that the ego
+is the true and original reservoir of libido, and that it is only
+from that reservoir that libido is extended on to objects.'
+Freud included a very similar passage in an encyclopaedia
+article which he wrote in the summer of 1922 (1923a, Standard
+Ed., 18, 257), and then almost immediately afterwards came the
+announcement of the id, and what appears like a drastic
+correction of the earlier statements: 'Now that we have distinguished between the ego and the id, we must recognize the
+id as the great reservoir of libido ... And again: 'At the very
+beginning, all the libido is accumulated in the id, while the ego
+is still in process of formation or is still feeble. The id sends part
+ot this libido out into erotic object-cathexes, whereupon the ego,
+now grown stronger, tries to get hold of this object-libido and
+to force itself on the id as a love-object. The narcissism of the
+ego is thus a secondary one, which has been withdrawn from
+objects.' (Pp. 30n. and 46 above.)
+This new position seems quite clearly intelligible, and it is
+therefore a little disturbing to come upon the following sentence,
+written only a year or so after The Ego and the Id, in the Autobiographical Study (1925d [1924]), Standard Ed., 20, 56: "All through
+the subject's life his ego remains the great reservoir of his libido,
+from which object-cathexes are sent out and into which the
+libido can stream back again from the objects.' 1
+The sentence, it is true, occurs in the course of a historical
+sketch of the development of psycho-analytic theory; but there
+is no indication of the change of view announced in The Ego and
+the Id. And, finally, we find this passage in one of Freud's very
+last writings, in Chapter II of the Outline of Psycho-Analysis
+(1940a), written in 1938: 'It is hard to say anything of the
+behaviour of the libido in the id and in the super-ego. All that
+we know about it relates to the ego, in which at first the whole
+available quota of libido is stored up. We call this state the
+absolutely primary narcissism. It lasts till the ego begins to
+cathect the ideas of objects with libido, to transform narcissistic
+libido into object-libido. Throughout the whole of life the ego
+remains the great reservoir, from which libidinal cathexes are
+1 An almost identical statement is made in Lecture XXXII of the
+New Introductory Lectures (1933a).
+
+APPENDIX B
+65
+sent out to objects and into which they are also once more
+withdrawn, just as an amoeba behaves with its pseudopodia?
+Do these later passages imply that Freud had retracted the
+opinions he expressed in the present work? It seems difficult to
+believe it, and there are two points that may help towards a
+reconciliation of the apparently conflicting views. The first is a
+very small one. The analogy of the 'reservoir' is from its very
+nature an ambiguous one: a reservoir can be regarded either as
+a water storage tank or as a source of water supply. There is no
+great difficulty in applying the image in both senses both to the
+ego and to the id, and it would certainly have clarified the
+various passages that have been quoted-and in particular the
+footnote on p. 30—if Freud had shown more precisely which
+picture was in his mina.
+The second point is of greater importance. In the Ner
+Introductory Lectures, only a few pages after the passage referred
+to in the footnote above, in the course of a discussion of masochism, Freud writes: If it is true of the destructive instinct as
+well that the ego—but what we have in mind here is rather the
+id, the whole person—originally includes all the instinctual
+impulses ..? The parenthesis points, of course, to a primitive
+state of things in which the id and the ego are still undifferentiated." And there is a similar, but more definite, remark in the
+Outline, this time two paragraphs before the passage already
+quoted: We picture some such initial state as one in which the
+total available energy of Eros, which henceforward we shall
+speak of as "libido"
+, is present in the still unditterentiated egoid...' If we take this as being the true essence of Freud's theory,
+the apparent contradiction in his expression of it is diminished.
+This 'ego-id' was originally the 'great reservoir of libido' in the
+sense of being a storage tank. After differentiation had occurred,
+the id would continue as a storage tank but, when it began sending out cathexes (whether to objects or to the now differentiated
+ego) it would in addition be a source of supply. But the same
+would be true of the ego as well, for it would be a storage tank of
+narcissistic libido as well as, on one view, a source of supply for
+object-cathexes.
+This last point leads us, however, to a further question, on
+which it seems inevitable to suppose that Freud held different
+views at different times. In The Ego and the Id (p. 46) 'at the
+1 This is, of course, a familiar view of Freud's.
+
+66
+very beginning, all the libido is accumulated in the id; then
+'the id sends part of this libido out into erotic object-cathexes'
+which the ego tries to get control of by forcing itself on the id
+as a love-object: 'the narcissism of the ego is thus a secondary
+one' But in the Outline, 'at first the whole available quota of
+libido is stored up in the ego, 'we call this state the absolutely
+primary narcissism' and it lasts until the ego begins to cathect
+the ideas of objects with libido. Two different processes seem to
+be envisaged in these two accounts. In the first the original
+object-cathexes are thought of as going out direct from the id,
+and only reaching the ego indirectly; in the second the whole
+of the libido is thought of as going from the id to the ego and
+only reaching the objects indirectly. The two processes do not
+seem incompatible, and it is possible that both may occur; but
+on this question Freud is silent.
+
+• A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
+DEMONOLOGICAL NEUROSIS
+(1923 [1922])
+
+ift is in lets
+red eatingra: def is ease
+: 1C
+signest
+itis
+fire in sues forehe
+Tori
+THE SECOND APPEARANCE OF THE DEVIL TO
+CHRISTOPH HAIZMANN
+
+EINE TEUFELSNEUROSE IM SIEBZEHNTEN
+JAHRHUNDERT
+1923 Imago, 9 (1), 1-34.
+1924 G.S., 10, 409-45.
+1924
+Leipzig, Vienna and Zurich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. Pp. 43.
+1928
+'Bibliophiles' limited edition, with 7 plates. Same
+publishers. Pp. 81.
+1940 G.W., 13, 317-53.
+(6) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+'A Neurosis of Demoniacal Possession in the Seventeenth
+Century
+1925 C.P., 4, 436-72. (Tr. E. Glover.)
+The present translation, under a new title, is a considerably
+modified version of the one published in 1925. The 'Bibliophiles' edition was produced for the 1928 Congress of German
+Bibliophiles in Vienna. It contained black and white reproductions of three of the paintings (representing the first, second
+and fifth appearances of the Devil) and of four folios of the
+manuscript.
+This was written in the last months of 1922 (Jones, 1957,
+105). The origin of the paper is sufficiently explained by Freud
+himself at the beginning of Section I (p. 73). Freud's interest
+in witchcraft, possession and allied phenomena was of long
+standing. It seems possible that it was stimulated by his studies
+at the Salpêtrière in 1885-6. Charcot himself had paid much
+attention to the historical aspects of neurosis, a tact reterred to
+at more than one point in Freud's 'Report' on his visit to Paris
+(1956a [1886]). There is an account of a sixteenth-century case
+of possession at the beginning of Lecture XVI in the first set of
+Charcot's lectures translated by Freud (1886f) and a discussion
+
+70
+of the hysterical nature of mediaeval 'demonio-manias' in the
+seventh of the Leçons du mard in the second set of Freud's translations (1892-93a). Moreover, in his obituary of Charcot
+(1893f), he laid especial emphasis on this side of his teacher's
+work.
+Two letters to Fliess, of January 17 and 24, 1897 (Freud,
+1950a, Letters 56 and 57), which discuss witches and their
+relation to the Devil, show that this interest had not diminished;
+in the first of them, indeed, he speaks as though the topic was
+one which had often been discussed between him and Fliess.
+There is already a suggestion that the Devil may be a fatherfigure, and the part played by anal material in mediaeval
+beliefs about witches is particularly insisted upon. Both of these
+points recur in a short allusion to the subject in the paper on
+"Character and Anal Erotism' (1908b), Standard Ed., 9, 174.
+We learn from Jones (1951, 378) that on January 21, 1909,
+Hugo Heller, the Vienna bookseller and publisher, read a paper
+to the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society, of which he was a
+member, on "The History of the Devil'. The minutes of the
+Society have unfortunately not been made accessible to us, but,
+according to Jones, Freud spoke at length on the psychological
+composition of the belief in the Devil, evidently on much the
+same lines as in Section III of the present paper. In this section
+of the paper, too, Freud passes beyond the discussion of an
+individual case and of the limited demonological problem to a
+consideration of some of the wider questions involved in the
+adoption by males of a feminine attitude towards the father.
+And here he brings up the history of Dr. Schreber as a parallel,
+though he nowhere classifies the present case as one of paranoia.
+A sumptuous volume has recently been brought out under
+the title Schizophrenia 1677 (London, 1956: Dawson) by Dr. Ida
+Macalpine and Dr. R. A. Hunter. This includes a facsimile of
+the manuscript of the "Trophy of Mariazell' and coloured
+reproductions of the nine paintings attached to it.' An examination of these has made it possible to make one or two additions
+and corrections to Freud's account of the manuscript, which
+was no doubt based entirely on the transcription and report of
+Dr. Payer-Thurn (see p. 73). It must be added that the lengthy
+commentaries of Dr. Macalpine and Dr. Hunter are largely
+1 Reproductions of the pictures in black and white are included in
+an earlier article (1954) by the same authors.
+
+71
+directed to criticism of Freud's views on the case; and it has
+unfortunately been impossible to adopt their translation of the
+many passages from the manuscript quoted by Freud, since at
+two or three important points their rendering of the original is
+inconsistent with Freud's.
+No attempt has been made in the present translation to
+imitate the style of the seventeenth-century German of the
+manuscript.
+
+A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY DEMONO-
+LOGICAL NEUROSISI
+[INTRODUCTION]
+THe neuroses of childhood have taught us that a number of
+things can easily be seen in them with the naked eye which at a
+later age are only to be discovered after a thorough investiration. We may expect that the same will turn out to be true o
+neurotic illnesses in earlier centuries, provided that we are pre
+pared to recognize them under names other than those of our
+present-day neuroses. We need not be surprised to find that,
+whereas the neuroses of our unpsychological modern days take
+on a hypochondriacal aspect and appear disguised as organic
+illnesses, the neuroses of those early times emerge in demonological trappings. Several authors, foremost among them
+Charcot, 2 have, as we know, identified the manifestations of
+hysteria in the portrayals of possession and ecstasy that have
+been preserved for us in the productions ofart. If more attention
+had been paid to the histories of such cases at the time, it would
+not have been difficult to retrace in them the subject-matter of
+a neurosis.
+The demonological theory of those dark times has won in the
+end against all the somatic views of the period of 'exact' science.
+The states of possession correspond to our neuroses, for the
+explanation of which we once more have recourse to psychical
+powers. In our eyes, the demons are bad and reprehensible
+wishes, derivatives of instinctual impulses that have been
+repudiated and repressed. We merely eliminate the projection
+of these mental entities into the external world which the
+middle ages carried out; instead, we regard them as having
+arisen in the patient's internal life, where they have their abode.
+1 [In the English translation of 1925 the following footnote appeared
+at this point: "The author wishes to add to the English translation two
+footnotes (which appear within square brackets), and to express his
+regret that they were omitted from the German version' Actually what
+was in question were additions to two existing footnotes, on pp. 86 and
+87. They were not included in later German editions.]
+• [Cf. Editor's Note, pp. 69-70.]
+72
+
+THE STORY OF CHRISTOPH HAIZMANN
+THE PAINTER
+I AM indebted to the friendly interest of Hofrat Dr. Payer-
+Thurn, director of the former Imperial Fideikommissbibliothek'
+of Vienna, for the opportunity of studying a seventeenthcentury demonological neurosis of this kind. Payer-Thurn had
+iscovered a manuscript in this library which originated fron
+he shrine of Mariazell and in which there was a detaile
+account of a miraculous redemption from a pact with the Devil
+through the grace of the Blessed Virgin Mary. His interest was
+aroused by the resemblance of this story to the legend of Faust,
+and has led him to undertake the exhaustive publication and
+editing of the material. Finding, however, that the person
+whose redemption was described had been subject to convulsive
+seizures and visions he approached me for a medical opinion
+on the case. We came to an agreement to publish our investigations independently and separately. & I should like to take this
+opportunity of thanking him for his original suggestion and
+for the many ways in which he has assisted me in the study
+of the manuscript.
+This demonological case history leads to really valuable findings which can be brought to light without much interpretation
+—much as a vein of pure metal may sometimes be struck which
+must elsewhere be laboriously smelted from the ore.
+The manuscript, an exact copy of which lies before me, falls
+into two quite distinct sections. One is a report, written in
+Latin, by a monastic scribe or compiler; the other is a fragment
+from the patient's diary, written in German. The first section
+contains a preface and a description of the actual miraculous
+' [A law library for the registration of entails (somewhat akin to the
+library of the Record Office in London), now included in the National
+Library of Austria.]
+* [A well-known place of pilgrimage, some eighty miles south-west of
+Vienna.]
+" [Payer-Thurn's paper was published the year after Freud's.]
+S.F. XIX-F
+
+74
+cure. The second can scarcely have been of any significance for
+the reverend Fathers but so much the more is it of value for us.
+It serves in large part to confirm our judgement of the case,
+which might otherwise have been hesitant, and we have good
+cause to be grateful to the clergy for having preserved the document although it added nothing to support the tenor of their
+views and, indeed, may rather have weakened it.
+But before going further into the composition of this little
+manuscript brochure, which bears the title Trophaeum Mariano-
+Cellense, I must relate a part of its contents, which I take from
+the preface.
+On September 5, 1677, the painter Christoph Haizmann, 1
+a Bavarian, was brought to Mariazell, with a letter of introduction from the village priest of Pottenbrunn (in lower Austria)
+not far away.? The letter states that the man had been staying
+in Pottenbrunn for some months, pursuing his occupation of
+painting. On August 29, while in the church there, he had been
+seized with frightful convulsions. As these convulsions recurred
+during the following days, he had been examined by the
+Praefectus Dominii Pottenbrunnensis® with a view to discovering
+what it was that was oppressing him and whether perhaps he
+had entered into illicit traffic with the Evil Spirit.* Upon this,
+the man had admitted that nine years before, when he was in
+a state of despondency about his art and doubtful whether he
+could support himself, he had yielded to the Devil, who had
+tempted him nine times, and that he had given him his bond
+in writing to belong to him in body and soul atter a period of
+nine years. This period would expire on the twenty-fourth day
+of the current month. The letter went on to say that the
+1 [This is the spelling of the name used throughout in the original
+manuscript, with one possible exception. The German editions of
+Freud's paper adopt the form 'Haitzmann'.]
+& No mention is anywhere made of the painter's age. The context
+suggests that he was a man of between thirty and forty, probably nearer
+the lower figure. He died, as we shall see [p. 78], in 1700.
+8 [Prefect of the Domain of Pottenbrunn.]
+& We will merely note in passing the possibility that this interrogation
+inspired in the sufferer—'suggested' to him—the phantasy of his pact
+with the Devil.
+" Quorum el finis 24 mensis hujus futurus appropinquat. [This refers to
+September, at the beginning of which the letter of introduction was
+written.]
+
+(I) CHRISTOPH HAIZMANN'S STORY
+75
+unfortunate man had repented and was convinced that only
+the grace of the Mother of God at Mariazell could save him,
+by compelling the Evil One to deliver up the bond, which had
+been written in blood. For this reason thevillage priest ventured
+to recommend miserum hunc hominem omni auxilio destitutum' to
+the benevolence of the Fathers of Mariazell.
+So far the narrative of Leopoldus Braun, the village priest
+of Pottenbrunn, dated September 1, 1677.
+We can now proceed with the analysis of the manuscript
+It consists of three parts:
+(1) A coloured title-page representing the scene of the signing of the pact and the scene of the redemption in the chapel
+of Mariazell. On the next sheet? are eight pictures, also coloured, representing the subsequent appearances of the Devil,
+with a short legend in German attached to each. These pictures
+are not the originals; they are copies—faithful copies, we are
+solemnly assured-of the original paintings by Christoph
+Haizmann.
+(2) The actual Trophaeum Mariano-Cellense (in Latin), the
+work ofa clerical compiler who signs himself at the foot 'P.A.E.'
+and appends to these initials four lines of verse containing his
+biography. The Trophaeum ends with a deposition by the Abbot
+Kilian of St. Lambert, 3 dated September 12, 1729, which is
+in a different handwriting from that of the compiler. It testifies
+to the exact correspondence of the manuscript and the pictures
+with the originals preserved in the archives. There is no
+mention of the year in which the Trophaeum was compiled.
+We are free to assume that it was done in the same year in
+which the Abbot Kilian made his deposition-that is, in 1729;
+' ['This wretched man, who was bereft of all help?]
+& [This does not seem to fit in with the account given by Macalpine
+and Hunter (1956, 55, see p. 70 above): "The manuscript is made up
+of twenty foolscap folios measuring 307 x 196 mm. Five folios are
+devoted to paintings of the Devil in the various shapes and guises in
+which the painter saw him during his illness; and a triptych showing his
+first meeting with the Devil, the centre piece of which depicts the return
+of one of the pacts in the Shrine at Mariazell.' The distribution of the
+pictures is not explicitly described in this account, but presumably one
+of the five folios was occupied by the triptych (Freud's 'title-page') and
+each of the remaining four contained two of the smaller pictures.]
+& ['The monks of the Convent of St. Lambert were in charge of the
+shrine.]
+
+76
+or, since the last date mentioned in the text is 1714, we may
+put the compiler's work somewhere between the years 1714
+and 1729. The miracle which was to be preserved from oblivion
+by this manuscript occurred in 1677—that is to say, between
+thirty-seven and fifty-two years earlier.
+(3) The painter's diary, written in German and covering
+the period from his redemption in the chapel till January 13
+of the following year, 1678. It is inserted in the text of the
+Trophaeum near the end.
+The core of the actual Trophaeum consists of two pieces of
+writing: the letter of introduction, mentioned above [p. 74],
+from the village priest, Leopold Braun of Pottenbrunn, dated
+September 1, 1677, and the report by the Abbot Franciscus
+of Mariazell and St. Lambert, describing the miraculous cure.
+This is dated September 12, 1677, that is to say, only a few
+days later. I'he activity of the editor or compiler, P.A.E., has
+provided a pretace which as it were fuses the contents of these
+two documents; he has also added some connecting passages of
+little importance, and, at the end, an account of the subsequent
+vicissitudes of the painter, based on enquiries made in the year
+1714.1
+The painter's previous history is thus told three times over in
+the Trophaeum: (1) in the village priest of Pottenbrunn's letter
+of introduction, (2) in the formal report by the Abbot Franciscus and (3) in the editor's preface. A comparison of these three
+sources discloses certain discrepancies which it will be not
+unimportant for us to follow up.
+I can now continue with the painter's story. After he had
+undergone a prolonged period of penance and prayer at
+Mariazell, the Devil appeared to him in the sacred Chapel at
+midnight, on September 8, the Nativity of the Virgin, in the
+form of a winged dragon, and gave him back the pact, which
+was written in blood. We shall learn later, to our surprise, that
+two bonds with the Devil appear in Christoph Haizmann's
+story—an earlier one, written in black ink, and a later one,
+written in blood. The one referred to in the description of the
+scene of exorcism, as can also be seen from the picture on the
+title-page, is the one written in blood-that is, the later
+one.
+* This would seem to suggest that the Trophaeum, too, dates from 1714.
+
+(I) CHRISTOPH HAIZMANN'S STORY
+77
+At this point a doubt as to the credibility of the clerical
+reporters may well arise in our minds and warn us not to waste
+our labours on a product of monastic superstition. We are told
+that several clerics, mentioned by name, assisted at the exorcism
+and were present in the Chapel when the Devil appeared. If
+it had been asserted that they, too, saw the Devil appear in the
+form of a dragon and offer the painter the paper written in red
+(Schedam sibi porrigentem conspexisset), ' we should be faced by
+several unpleasant possibilities, among which that of a collective
+hallucination would be the mildest. But the Abbot Franciscus's
+testimony dispels this doubt. Far from asserting that the assisting clerics saw the Devil too, he only states in straightforward
+and sober words that the painter suddenly tore himself away
+from the Fathers who were holding him, rushed into the corner
+of the Chapel where he saw the apparition, and then returned
+with the paper in his hand.a
+The miracle was great, and the victory of the Holy Mother
+over Satan without question; but unfortunately the cure was
+not a lasting one. It is once more to the credit of the clergy
+that they have not concealed this. After a short time the painter
+left Mariazell in the best of health and went to Vienna, where
+he lived with a married sister. On October 11 fresh attacks
+began, some of them very severe, and these are reported in the
+diary until January 13 [1678]. They consisted in visions and
+"absences, in which he saw and experienced every kind of thing,
+in convulsive seizures accompanied by the most painful sensations, on one occasion in paralysis of the legs, and so on. This
+time, however, it was not the Devil who tormented him; it was
+by sacred figures that he was vexed-by Christ and by the
+Blessed Virgin herself. It is remarkable that he suffered no less
+through these heavenly manifestations and the punishments
+they inflicted on him than he had formerly through his traffic
+with the Devil. In his diary, indeed, he included these fresh
+experiences too as manifestations of the Devil; and when, in
+1 [See next footnote.]
+a '... [poenitens] ipsumque Daemonem ad Aram Sac. Cellae per fenestrellam
+in cornu Epistolae, Schedam sibi porrigentem conspexisset, eo advolans e Religiosorum manibus, qui eum tenebant, ipsam Schedam ad manum obtinuit...
+['... (the penitent) saw the Demon himself by the sacred altar of Zell
+through the little window on the Epistle side, offering him the paper; he
+rushed to the place from the hands of the Fathers who were holding
+him, and seized the same paper...']
+
+78
+May, 1678, he returned to Mariazell, he complained of maligni
+Spiritis manifestationes ['manifestations of the Evil Spirit'].1
+He told the reverend Fathers that his reason for returning
+was that he had to require the Devil to give him back another,
+earlier bond, which had been written in ink.? This time once
+more the Blessed Virgin and the pious Fathers helped him to
+obtain the fülfilment of his request. As to how this came about,
+however, the report is silent. It merely states shortly: quâ iuxta
+votum reddita ['when this had been returned in accordance with
+his prayer']he prayed once again and received the pact back.
+After this he felt quite free and entered the Order of the
+Brothers Hospitallers.
+We have occasion yet again to acknowledge that in spite of
+the obvious purpose of his efforts, the compiler has not been
+tempted into departing from the veracity required of a case
+history. For he does not conceal the outcome of the enquiry
+that was made in 1714 from the Superior of the Monastery of
+the Brothers Hospitallers [in Vienna] concerning the painter's
+later history. The Reverend Pater Provincialis reported that
+Brother Chrysostomus had again been repeatedly tempted by
+the Evil Spirit, who tried to seduce him into making a fresh
+pact though this only happened 'when he had drunk somewhat too much wine').3 But by the grace of God, it had always
+been possible to repel these attempts. Brother Chrysostomus
+had died of a hectic fever 'peacefully and of good comfort 4
+in the year 1700 in the Monastery of the Order, at Neustatt
+on the Moldau.
+" [The manuscript reads: "de ... maligni Spiritas infestatione (of...
+molestation by the Evil Spirit) •J
+» This bond had been signed in September, 1668, and by May, 1678,
+nine and a half years later, it would long since have fallen due.
+& ['Wenn er etwas mehrers von Wein getrunken.']
+• ['Sanft und trostreich.']
+
+THE MOTIVE FOR THE PACT WITH
+THE DEVIL
+IF we look at this bond with the Devil as if it were the case
+history of a neurotic, our interest will turn in the first instance
+to the question of its motivation, which is, of course, intimately
+connected with its exciting cause. Why does anyone sign a bond
+with the Devil? Faust, it is true, asked contemptuously: Was
+willst du armer Teufel geben?' ['What hast thou to give, poor
+Devil?'11 But he was wrong. In return for an immortal soul,
+the Devil has many things to offer which are highly prized by
+men: wealth, security from danger, power over mankind and
+the forces of nature, even magical arts, and, above all else,
+enjoyment—the enjoyment of beautiful women. These services
+performed or undertakings made by the Devil are usually
+mentioned specifically in the agreement made with him. " What,
+then, was the motive which induced Christoph Haizmann to
+make his pact?
+Curiously enough, it was none of these very natural wishes.
+To put the matter beyond doubt, one has only to read the short
+remarks attached by the painter to his illustrations of the
+apparitions of the Devil. For example, the caption to the third
+vision runs: 'On the third occasion within a year and a hall,
+he appeared to me in this loathsome shape, with a book in his
+hand which was full of magic and black arts.. ' But from
+1 [Faust, Part I, Scene 4.]
+a Cf. Faust, Part I, Scene 4:
+Ich will mich hier zu deinem Dienst verbinden,
+Auf deinem Wink nicht rasten und nicht ruhn;
+Wenn wir uns drüben wieder finden,
+So sollst du mir das Gleiche thun.
+[Here, an unwearied slave, I'll wear thy tether,
+And to thine every nod obedient be:
+When There again we come together,
+Then thou shalt do the same for me
+(Bayard Taylor's translation.)]
+• ['Zum driten ist er mir in anderthalb Jahren in diser abscheüh-
+lichen Gestalt erschinen, mit einen Buuch in der Handt, darin lauter
+Zauberey und schwarze Kunst war begrüffen . . ?]
+79
+
+80
+the legend attached to a later apparition we learn that the
+Devil reproached him violently for having 'burnt his beforementioned book, and threatened to tear him to pieces if he
+did not give it back.
+At his fourth appearance the Devil showed him a large
+yellow money-bag and a great ducat and promised him to give
+him as many of these as he wanted at any time. But the painter
+is able to boast that he 'had taken nothing whatever of the kind'. ‹
+Another time the Devil asked him to turn to enjoyment and
+entertainment, & and the painter remarks that 'this indeed came
+to pass at his desire; but I did not continue for more than three
+days and it was then brought to an end'.*
+Since he rejected magical arts, money and pleasures when
+they were offered him by the Devil, and still less made them
+conditions of the pact, it becomes really imperative to know
+what the painter in fact wanted from the Devil when he signed
+a bond with him. Some motive he must have had for his dealings
+with the Devil.
+On this point, too, the Trophaeum provides us with reliable
+information. He had become low-spirited, was unable or unwilling to work properly and was worried about making a
+livelihood; that is to say, he was suffering from melancholic
+depression, with an inhibition in his work and (justified) fears
+about his future. We can see that what we are dealing with
+really is a case history. We learn, too, the exciting cause of the
+illness, which the painter himself, in the caption to one of his
+pictures of the Devil, actually calls a melancholia ('that I
+should seek diversion and banish melancholy' 5). The first of
+our three sources of information, the village priest's letter of
+introduction, speaks, it is true, only of the state of depression
+('dum artis suae progressum emolumentumque secuturum pusillanimis
+perpenderet ®), but the second source, the Abbot Franciscus's
+report, tells us the cause of this despondency or depression as
+" [' . . sein vorgemeldtes Buuch verbrennt.]
+& ['... aber ich solliches gar nit angenomben.']
+• [There is some indication in the illustration to the original manuscript that this has a sexual meaning.]
+• ['... welliches zwar auch auf sein begehren geschehen aber ich
+yber drey Tag nit continuirt, vnd gleich widerumb aufgelöst worden.']
+" ['... solte mich darmit belustigen und meläncoley vertreiben.']
+® ['... when he was feeling despondent about the progress of his art
+and his future earnings ...]
+
+(II) THE MOTIVE FOR THE PACT
+81
+well. Hesays: " accept aliqua pusillanimitate ex morte parentis; and
+in the compiler's preface the same words are used, though in
+a reversed order: ('ex morte parentis accepta aliqua pusillanimitate').
+His father, then, had died and he had in consequence fallen
+into a state of melancholia; whereupon the .
+Devil had
+approached him and asked him why he was so downcast and
+sad, and had promised to help him in every way and to give
+him support.?
+Here was a person, therefore, who signed a bond with the
+Devil in order to be freed from a state of depression. Undoubtedly an excellent motive, as anyone will agree who can have
+an understanding sense of the torments of such a state and who
+knows as well how little medicine can do to alleviate this
+ailment. Yet no one who has followed the story so far as this
+would be able to guess what the wording of this bond (or
+rather, of these two bonds) & with the Devil actually was.
+These bonds bring us two great surprises. In the first place,
+they mention no undertaking given by the Devil in return for
+whose fulfilment the painter pledges his eternal bliss, but only
+a demand made by the Devil which the painter must satisfy.
+It strikes us as quite illogical and absurd that this man should
+give up his soul, not for something he is to get from the Devil
+but for something he is to do for him. But the undertaking given
+by the painter seems even stranger.
+The first 'syngrapha' [bond], written in ink, runs as follows:
+'Ich Christoph Haizmann vndterschreibe mich disen Herrn
+sein leibeigener Sohn auff 9. Jahr. 1669 Jahr'4 The second,
+written in blood, runs:-
+*Anno 1669.
+'Christoph Haizmann. Ich verschreibe mich disen Satan ich
+" ['... having become somewhat despondent owing to the death of
+his parent. . ?]
+" ['... auf alle Weiss zu helfen und an die Handt zu gehen.']—The
+first picture on the title-page and its caption represent the Devil in the
+orm ot an honest citizen' L'ersamer Bürger. He is also so represented i
+he first of the eight separate pictures (cf. p. 85 and the frontispiece).
+& Since there were two of them-the first written in ink, and the
+second written about a year later in blood—both said still to be in the
+treasury of Mariazell and to be transcribed in the 1 rophaeum.
+* ['I, Christoph Haizmann, subscribe myself to this Lord as his
+bounden son till the ninth year. Year 1669]
+
+82
+sein leibeigner Sohn zu sein, und in 9.Jahr ihm mein Leib und
+Seel zuzugeheren.'1
+All our astonishment vanishes, however, if we read the text
+of the bonds in the sense that what is represented in them as
+a demand made by the Devil is, on the contrary, a service
+performed by him—that is to say, it is a demand made by the
+painter. The incomprehensible pact would in that case have a
+straightforward meaning and could be paraphrased thus. The
+Devil undertakes to replace the painter's lost father for nine
+years. At the end of that time the painter becomes the property,
+body and soul, of the Devil, as was the usual custom in such
+bargains. The train of thought which motivated the painter
+in making the pact seems to have been this: his father's death
+had made him lose his spirits and his capacity to work; if he
+could only obtain a father-substitute he might hope to regain
+what he had lost.
+A man who has fallen into a melancholia on account of his
+father's death must really have been fond of him. But, if so,
+it is very strange that such a man should have hit upon the
+idea of taking the Devil as a substitute for the father whom he
+loved.
+• ['Christoph Haizmann. I sign a bond with this Satan, to be hi
+ounden son and in the ninth year to belong to him body and soul'
+
+III
+THE DEVIL AS A FATHER-SUBSTITUTE
+I FEAR that sober critics will not be prepared to admit that this
+fresh interpretation has made the meaning of this pact with the
+Devil clear. They will have two objections to make to it.
+In the first place they will say that it is not necessary to regard
+the bond as a contract in which the undertakings of both parties
+have been set out. On the contrary, they will argue, it contains
+only the painter's undertaking; the Devil's is omitted from the
+text, and is, as it were, sousentendu: the painter gives two undertakings—firstly to be the Devil's son for nine years, and secondly
+to belong to him entirely after death. In this way one of the
+premisses on which our conclusion is built would be disposed of.
+The second objection will be that we are not justified in
+attaching any special importance to the expression 'the Devil's
+bounden son'; that this is no more than a common figure of
+speech, which anyone could interpret in the same way as the
+reverend Fathers may have done. For in their Latin translation
+they did not mention the relationship of son promised in the
+bonds, but merely say that the painter 'mancipavit' himself
+made himself a bondslave—to the Evil One and had undertaken
+to lead a sinful life and to deny God and the Holy Trinity. Why
+depart from this obvious and natural view of the matter! The
+position would simply be that a man, in the torment and perplexity of a melancholic depression, signs a bond with the Devil,
+to whom he ascribes the greatest therapeutic power. That the
+depression was occasioned by his father's death would then be
+irrelevant; the occasion might quite as well have been something
+else.
+All this sounds convincing and reasonable. Psycho-analysis
+has once more to meet the reproach that it makes hair-splitting
+complications in the simplest things and sees mysteries and
+1 In point of fact, when we come to consider later [p. 96 fl.] at what
+time and for whom these bonds were drawn up, we shall realize that
+their text had to be expressed in unobtrusive and generally comprehensible terms. It is enough for us, however, that it contains an
+ambiguity which we can take as the starting-point of our discussion.
+83
+
+84
+problems where none exist, and that it does this by laying undue
+stress on insignificant and irrelevant details, such as occur everywhere, and making them the basis of the most far-reaching and
+strangest conclusions. It would be useless for us to point out
+that this rejection of our interpretation would do away with
+many striking analogies and break a number of subtle connections which we are able to demonstrate in this case. Our
+opponents will say that those analogies and connections do not
+in fact exist, but have been imported into the case by us with
+quite uncalled-for ingenuity.
+I will not preface my reply with the words, 'to be honest' or
+'to be candid', for one must always be able to be these things
+without any special preliminaries. I will instead say quite
+simply that I know very well that no reader who does not
+already believe in the justifiability of the psycho-analytic mode
+of thought will acquire that belief from the case of the seventeenth-century painter, Christoph Haizmann. Nor is it my
+intention to make use of this case as evidence of the validity of
+psycho-analysis. On the contrary, I presuppose its validity and
+am employing it to throw light on the painter's demonological
+illness. My justification for doing so lies in the success of our
+investigations into the nature of the neuroses in general. We
+may say in all modesty that to-day even the more obtuse among
+our colleagues and contemporaries are beginning to realize that
+no understanding of neurotic states can be reached without the
+help of psycho-analysis.
+"These shafts can conquer Troy, these shafts alone'
+as Odysseus confesses in the Philoctetes of Sophocles.
+If we are right in regarding our painter's bond with the
+Devil as a neurotic phantasy, there is no need for any further
+apology for considering it psycho-analytically. Even small in
+dications have a meaning and importance, and quite specially
+when they are related to the conditions under which a neurosis
+originates. To be sure, it is as possible to overvalue as to undervalue them, and it is a matter of judgement how far one should
+go in exploiting them. But anyone who does not believe in
+psycho-analysis-or, for the matter of that, even in the Devilmust be left to make what he can of the painter's case, whether
+he is able to furnish an explanation of his own or whether
+he sees nothing in it that needs explaining.
+
+(III) THE DEVIL AS A FATHER-SUBSTITUTE
+85
+We therefore come back to our hypothesis that the Devil with
+whom the painter signed the bond was a direct substitute for
+his father. And this is borne out by the shape in which the Devil
+first appeared to him—as an honest elderly citizen with a brown
+beard, dressed in a red cloak and leaning with his right hand
+on a stick, with a black dog beside him! (cf. the first picture).
+Later on his appearance grows more and more terrifyingmore mythological, one might say. He is equipped with horns,
+eagle's claws and bat's wings. Finally he appears in the chapel
+as a flying dragon. We shall have to come back later to a
+particular detail of his bodily shape.
+It does indeed sound strange that the Devil should be chosen
+as a substitute for a loved father. But this is only so at first
+sight, for we know a good many things which lessen our surprise. To begin with, we know that God is a father-substitute;
+or, more correctly, that he is an exalted father; or, yet again,
+that he is a copy of a father as he is seen and experienced in
+childhood-by individuals in their own childhood and by
+mankind in its prehistory as the father of the primitive and
+primal horde. Later on in life the individual sees his father as
+something different and lesser. But the ideational image belonging to his childhood is preserved and becomes merged with the
+inherited memory-traces of the primal father to form the
+individual's idea of God. We also know, from the secret life of
+the individual which analysis uncovers, that his relation to his
+father was perhaps ambivalent from the outset, or, at any rate,
+soon becameso. That is to say, it contained two sets of emotional
+impulses that were opposed to each other: it contained not only
+impulses of an affectionate and submissive nature, but also
+hostile and defiant ones. It is our view that the same ambivalence governs the relations of mankind to its Deity. The
+unresolved conflict between, on the one hand, a longing for
+the father and, on the other, a fear of him and a son's defiance
+of him, has furnished us with an explanation of important
+characteristics of religion and decisive vicissitudes in it.?
+Concerning the Evil Demon, we know that he is regarded as
+the antithesis of God and yet is very close to him in his nature.
+His history has not been so well studied as that of God; not all
+Scenes 2 and 3l
+& Cf. Totem and Taboo (1912-13) and Reik (1919).
+
+86
+religions have adopted the Evil Spirit, the opponent of God, and
+his prototype in the life of the individual has so far remained
+obscure. One thing, however, is certain: gods can turn into evil
+demons when new gods oust them. When one people has been
+conquered by another, their fallen gods not seldom turn into
+demons in the eyes of the conquerors. The evil demon of the
+Christian faith—the Devil of the Middle Ages—was, according
+to Christian mythology, himself a fallen angel and of a godlike
+nature. It does not need much analytic perspicacity to guess that
+God and the Devil were originally identical—were a single
+figure which was later split into two figures with opposite
+attributes.1 In the earliest ages of religion God himself still
+possessed all the terrifying features which were afterwards
+combined to form a counterpart of him.
+We have here an example of the process, with which we are
+familiar, by which an idea that has a contradictory-an
+ambivalent-content becomes divided into two sharply contrasted opposites. The contradictions in the original nature of
+God are, however, a reflection of the ambivalence which
+governs the relation of the individual to his personal father. If
+the benevolent and righteous God is a substitute for his father,
+it is not to be wondered at that his hostile attitude to his father,
+too, which is one of hating and fearing him and of making complaints against him, should have come to expression in the
+creation of Satan. Thus the father, it seems, is the individual
+prototype of both God and the Devil. But we should expect
+religions to bear ineffaceable marks of the fact that the primitive prima. father was a being of unlimited evil—a being less
+like God than the Devil.
+It is true that it is by no means easy to demonstrate the traces
+of this satanic view of the father in the mental life of the individual. When a boy draws grotesque faces and caricatures,
+we may no doubt be able to show that he is jeering at his father
+in them; and when a person of either sex is afraid of robbers
+and burglars at night, it is not hard to recognize these as splitoff portions of the father." The animals, too, which appear in
+1 Cf. Reik, 1923, Chapter VII [quoting Ernest Jones, 1912. (See footnote -, p. TL.)]
+& In the familiar fairy tale of "The Seven Little Goats, the Father
+Wolf appears as a burglar. [This fairy tale figures prominently in the
+Wolf Man' case history (1918b).]
+
+(III) THE DEVIL AS A FATHER-SUBSTITUTE 87
+children's animal phobias are most often father-substitutes, as
+were the totem animals of primaeval times. But that the Devil
+is a duplicate of the father and can act as a substitute for him
+has not been shown so clearly elsewhere as in the demonological neurosis of this seventeenth-century painter. That iswhy,
+at the beginning of this paper [p. 73], I foretold that a
+demonological case history of this kind would yield in the form
+of pure metal material which, in the neuroses of a later epoch
+(no longer superstitious but hypochrondriacal instead) has to
+be laboriously extracted by analytic work from the ore of free
+associations and symptoms. A deeper penetration into the
+analysis of our painter's illness will probably bring stronger
+conviction. It is no unusual thing for a man to acquire a
+melancholic depression and an inhibition in his work as a result
+of his father's death. When this happens, we conclude that the
+man had been attached to his father with an especially strong
+love, and we remember how often a severe melancholia appears
+as a neurotic form of mourning.
+In this we are undoubtedly right. But we are not right if we
+conclude further that this relation has been merely one of love.
+On the contrary, his mourning over the loss of his father is the
+more likely to turn into melancholia, the more his attitude to
+him bore the stamp of ambivalence. This emphasis on ambivalence, however, prepares us for the possibility of the father being
+subjected to a debasement, as we see happening in the painter's
+demonological neurosis. If we were able to learn as much about
+Christoph Haizmann as about a patient undergoing an analysis
+with us, it would be an easy matter to elicit this ambivalence,
+1 The fact that in our analyses we so seldom succeed in finding the
+Devil as a father-substitute may be an indication that for those who
+come to us for analysis this figure from mediaeval mythology has long
+since played out its part. For the pious Christian of earlier centuries
+belief in the Devil was no less a duty than belief in God. In point of fact,
+he needed the Devil in order to be able to keep hold of God. The later
+decrease in faith has, for various reasons, first and foremost affected the
+figure of the Devil.
+If we are bold enough to apply this idea of the Devil as a fathersubstitute to cultural history, we may also be able to see the witch-trials
+of the Middle Ages in a new light [as has already been shown by
+Ernest Jones in his chapter on witches in his book on the nightmare
+(1912). (See footnote 1, p. 74.) —Ci. also Editor's Note, pp. 69-70 above.]
+a For this and the following paragraph see 'Mourning and Melancholia' (1917e).]
+
+88
+to get him to remember when and under what provocations he
+was given cause to fear and hate his father; and, above all, to
+discover what were the accidental factors that were added to
+the typical motives for a hatred of the father which are necessarily inherent in the natural relationship of son to father.
+Perhaps we might then find a special explanation for the
+painter's inhibition in work. It is possible that his father
+had opposed his wish to become a painter. If that was so, his
+inability to practise his art after his father's death would on the
+one hand be an expression of the familiar phenomenon of
+'deferred obedience'1; and. on the other hand, by making him
+incapable of earning a livelihood, it would be bound to increase
+his longing for his father as a protector from the cares of life.
+In its aspect as deferred obedience it would also be an expression of remorse and a successful self-punishment.
+Since, however, we cannot carry out an analysis of this sort
+with Christoph Haizmann, who died in the year 1700, we must
+content ourselves with bringing out those features of his case
+history which may point to the typical exciting causes of a
+negative attitude to the father. There are only a few such
+features, nor are they very striking, but they are of great
+interest.
+Let us first consider the part played by the number nine. The
+pact with the Evil One was for nine years. On this point the
+unquestionably trustworthy report by the village priest of
+Pottenbrunn is quite clear: pro novem annis Singraphen scriptam
+tradidit. 2 This letter of introduction, dated September 1, 1677,
+is also able to inform us that the appointed time was about to
+expire in a few days: quorum et finis 24 mensis hujus futurus
+appropinquat. The pact would therefore have been signed on
+September 24, 1668.4 In the same report, indeed, yet another
+use is made of the number nine. The painter claims to have
+withstood the temptations of the Evil One nine times—'nonies'
+—before he yielded to him. This detail is no longer mentioned
+" [An example of this will be fourd in the analysis of 'little Hans'
+(1909b), Standard Ed., 10, 35.]
+" ['He handed over a pact signed for nine years.']
+& ['... the end of which is about to approach on the twenty-fourth of
+this month.]
+* The contradictory fact that both the pacts as transcribed bear the
+date 1669 will be considered later [p. 93 ff.].
+
+(III) THE DEVIL AS A FATHER-SUBSTITUTE 89
+in the later reports. In the Abbot's deposition the phrase post
+annos novem [after nine years]' is used, and the compiler repeats
+"ad novem annos [for nine years] in his summary—a proof that
+this number was not regarded as indifferent.
+The number nine is well known to us from neurotic phantasies. It is the number of the months of pregnancy, and
+wherever it appears it directs our attention to a phantasy of
+pregnancy. In our painter's case, to be sure, the number refers
+to years, not months; and it will be objected that nine is a
+significant number in other ways as well. But who knows
+whether it may not in general owe a good deal of its sanctity
+to the part it plays in pregnancy? Nor need we be disconcerted
+by the change from nine months to nine years. We know from
+dreams' what liberties 'unconscious mental activity' takes with
+numbers. If, for instance, the number five occurs in a dream,
+this can invariably be traced back to a five that is important
+in waking life; but whereas in waking life the five was a five
+years' difference in age or a company of five people, it appeared
+in the dream as five bank-notes or five fruits. That is to say, the
+number is kept, but its denominator is changed according to
+the requirements of condensation and displacement. Nine yéars
+in a dream could thus easily correspond to nine months in real
+life. The dream-work plays about with the numbers of waking
+life in another way, too, for it shows a sovereign disregard for
+noughts and does not treat them as numbers at all. Five dollars
+in a dream can stand for fifty or five hundred or five thousand
+dollars in reality.?
+Another detail in the painter's relations to the Devil has once
+more a sexual refèrence. On the first occasion, as I have mentioned, he saw the Evil One in the shape of an honest citizen.
+But already on the second occasion the Devil was naked and
+misshapen, and had two pairs of female breasts. In none of his
+subsequent apparitions are the breasts absent, either as a single
+or a double pair. Only in one of them does the Devil exhibit,
+in addition to the breasts, a large penis ending in a snake.
+This stressing of the female sexual character by introducing
+large pendulous breasts (there is never any indication of the
+1[Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Chapter VI, Section F,
+Standard Ed., 5, 414-18.]
+"[Cf. an example of this in 'Dreams and Folklore' (1957a [1911]),
+Standard Ed., 12, 186.]
+& [Cf. plate facing p. 69.]
+S.F. XIX-G
+
+90
+female genitals) is bound to appear to us as a striking contradiction of our hypothesis that the Devil had the meaning of a
+father-substitute for the painter. And, indeed, such a way of
+representing the Devil is in itself unusual. Where "devil' is
+thought of in a generic sense, and devils appear in numbers,
+there is nothing strange about depicting female devils; but that
+the Devil, who is a great individuality, the Lord of Hell and the
+Adversary of God, should be represented otherwise than as a
+male, and, indeed, as a super-male, with horns, tail and a big
+penis-snake-this, I believe, is never found.
+These two slight indications give us an idea of what the
+typical factor is which determines the negative side of the
+painter's relation to his father. What he is rebelling against is
+his feminine attitude to him which culminates in a phantasy
+of bearing him a child (the nine years). We have an accurate
+knowledge of this resistance from our analyses, where it takes
+on very strange forms in the transference and gives us a great
+deal of trouble. With the painter's mourning for his lost father,
+and the heightening of his longing for him, there also comes
+about in him a re-activation of his long-since repressed phantasy
+of pregnancy, and he is obliged to defend himself against it by
+a neurosis and by debasing his father.
+But why should his father, after being reduced to the status
+of a Devil, bear this physical mark of a woman? The feature
+seems at first hard to interpret; but soon we find two explanations which compete with each other without being mutually
+exclusive. A boy's feminine attitude to his father undergoes
+repression as soon as he understands that his rivalry with a
+woman for his father's love has as a precondition the loss of his
+own male genitals—in other words, castration. Repudiation of
+the feminine attitude is thus the result of a revolt against
+castration. It regularly finds its strongest expression in the converse phantasy of castrating the father, of turning him into a
+woman. Thus the Devil's breasts would correspond to a projection of the subject's own femininity on to the father-substitute.
+The second explanation of these female additions to the Devil's
+body no longer has a hostile meaning but an affectionate one.
+It sees in the adoption of this shape an indication that the child's
+tender feelings towards his mother have been displaced on to
+his father; and this suggests that there has previously been a
+strong fixation on the mother, which, in its turn, is responsible
+
+(III) THE DEVIL AS A FATHER-SUBSTITUTE 91
+for part of the child's hostility towards his father. Large breasts
+are the positive sexual characteristics of the mother even at a
+time when the negative characteristic of the female—her lack
+of a penis—is as yet unknown to the child.t
+If our painter's repugnance to accepting castration made it
+impossible for him to appease his longing for his father, it is
+perfectly understandable that he should have turned for help
+and salvation to the image of his mother. This is why he
+declared that only the Holy Mother of God of Mariazell could
+release him from his pact with the Devil and why he obtained
+his freedom once more on the day of the Mother's Nativity
+(September 8). Whether the day on which the pact was made—
+September 24—was not also determined in some similar way,
+we shall of course never know.
+Among the observations made by psycho-analysis of the
+mental life of children there is scarcely one which sounds so
+repugnant and unbelievable to a normal adult as that of a boy's
+feminine attitude to his father and the phantasy of pregnancy
+that arises from it. It is only since Senatspräsident Daniel Paul
+Schreber, a judge presiding over a division of the Appeal Court
+of Saxony, published the history of his psychotic illness and his
+extensive recovery from it,? that we can discuss the subject
+without trepidation or apology. We learn from this invaluable
+book that, somewhere about the age of fifty, the Senatspräsident
+became firmly convinced that God-who, incidentally, exhibited distinct traits of his father, the worthy physician, Dr.
+Schreber-had decided to emasculate him, to use him as a
+woman, and to beget from him 'a new race of men born from
+the spirit of Schreber 3 (His own marriage was childless.) In
+his revolt against this intention of God's, which seemed to him
+highly unjust and 'contrary to the Order of Things'
+, he fell ill
+with symptoms of paranoia, which, however, underwent a
+process of involution in the course of years, leaving only a small
+residue behind. The gifted author of his own case history could
+not have guessed that in it he had uncovered a typical
+pathogenic factor.
+This revolt against castration or a feminine attitude has been
+torn out of its organic context by Alfred Adler. He has linked
+1 Cf. Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood (1910c).
+& Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken, 1903. See my analysis of his case
+(1911c).
+Standard Edo, I2, 48 and 58]
+
+92
+it superficially or falsely with the longing for power, and has
+postulated it as an independent 'masculine protest'. Since a
+neurosis can only arise from a conflict between two trends, it
+is as justifiable to see the cause of 'every' neurosis in the masculine protest as it is to see it in the feminine attitude against
+which the protest is being made. It is quite true that this
+masculine protest plays a regular part in the formation of
+character—in some types of people a very large part-and that
+we meet it in the analysis of neurotic men as a vigorous resistance. Psycho-analysis has attached due importance to the
+masculine protest in connection with the castration complex,
+without being able to accept its omnipotence or its omnipresence in neuroses. The most marked case of a masculine
+protest with all its manifest reactions and character-traits that
+I have met with in analysis was that of a patient who came to
+me for treatment on account of an obsessional neurosis in whose
+symptoms the unresolved conflict between a masculine and a
+feminine attitude (fear of castration and desire for castration)
+found clear expression. In addition, the patient had developed
+masochistic phantasies which were wholly derived from a wish
+to accept castration; and he had even gone beyond these
+phantasies to real satisfaction in perverse situations. The whole
+of his state rested —like Adler's theory itself—on the repression
+and denial of early infantile fixations of love.!
+Senatspräsident Schreber found the way to recovery when
+he decided to give up his resistance to castration and to accommodate himself to the feminine role cast for him by God. After
+this, he became lucid and calm, was able to put through his
+own discharge from the asylum and led a normal life—with
+the one exception that he devoted some hours every day to
+the cultivation of his femaleness, of whose gradual advance
+towards the goal determined by God he remained convinced.
+1 [Freud had discussed Adler's 'masculine protest' at greater length
+a few years earlier in ' "A Child is Being Beaten"' (1919e), Standard Ed.,
+17, 200 ff.]
+
+IV
+THE TWO BONDS
+A REMARKABLE detail in our painter's story is the statement that
+he signed two different bonds with the Devil.
+The first, written in black ink, ran as follows: 1
+'I, Chr. H., subscribe myself to this Lord as his bounden son
+till the ninth year.?
+The second, written in blood, ran:
+'Chr. H. I sign a bond with this Satan, to be his bounden son,
+and in the ninth year to belong to him body and soul.'
+The originals of both are said to have been in the archives at
+Mariazell when the Trophaeum was compiled, and both bear the
+same date—1669.
+I have already made a number of references to the two bonds;
+and I now propose to deal with them in greater detail, although
+it is precisely here that the danger of overvaluing trifles seems
+especially great.
+It is unusual for anyone to sign a bond with the Devil twice,
+in such a way that the first document is replaced by the
+second, but without losing its own validity. Perhaps this occurrence is less surprising to other people, who are more at home
+with demonological material. For my part, I could only look on
+it as a special peculiarity of our case, and my suspicions were
+aroused when I found that the reports were at variance precisely on this point. Examination of these discrepancies will
+afford us, unexpectedly, a deeper understanding of the case
+history.
+The village priest of Pottenbrunn's letter of introduction
+describes a very simple and clear situation. In it mention is only
+made of one bond, which was written in blood by the painter
+nine years before and which was due to expire in a few days'
+time—on September 24 [1677]. It must therefore have been
+drawn up on September 24, 1668; unfortunately this date,
+although it can be inferred with certainty, is not explicitly
+stated.
+The Abbot Franciscus's deposition, which was dated, as we
+1 [The German versions will be found above on pp. 81~2.]
+
+94
+know, a few days later (September 12, 1677), already describes
+a more complicated state of affairs. It is plausible to assume that
+the painter had given more precise information in the interval.
+The deposition relates that the painter had signed two bonds:
+one in the year 1668 (a date which should also be the correct
+one according to the letter of introduction), written in black
+ink, and the other 'sequenti anno [in the following year] 1669',
+written in blood. The bond that he received back on the day of
+the Nativity of the Virgin [September 8] was the one written
+in blood—viz. the later bond, which had been signed in 1669.
+This does not emerge from the Abbot's deposition, for there it
+merely says later 'schedam redderet [should give back the paper]'
+and 'schedam sibi porrigentem conspexisset [saw him offering him the
+paper]' as if there could only be a single document in question.
+But it does follow from the subsequent course of the story, and
+also from the coloured title-page of the Trophaeum, where what
+is clearly a red script can be seen on the paper which the demon
+dragon is holding. The further course of the story is, as I have
+already related, that the painter returned to Mariazell in May,
+1678, after he had experienced further temptations from the
+Evil One in Vienna; and that he begged that, through a further
+act of Grace on the part of the Holy Mother, the first document,
+written in ink, might also be given back to him. In what way
+this came about is not so fully described as on the first occasion.
+We are merely told: 'qua juxta votum red ditd [when this had been
+returned in accordance with his prayer]'; and in another
+passage the compiler says that this particular bond was thrown
+to the painter by the Devil 'crumpled up and torn into four
+pieces 1 on May 9, 1678, at about nine o'clock in the evening.
+Both bonds, however, bear the date of the same year—1669.
+This incompatibility is either of no significance or may put us
+on the following track.
+If we take as a starting-point the Abbot's account, as being
+the more detailed one, we are confronted with a number of
+difficulties. When Christoph Haizmann confessed to the village
+priest of Pottenbrunn that he was hard pressed by the Devil and
+that the time-limit would soon run out, he could only (in 1677)
+have been thinking of the bond which he had signed in 1668—
+namely, the first one, written in black (which is referred to in
+the letter of introduction as the only one, but is described there
+'[... 'in globum convolutam et in quatuor partes dilaceratam . . ?]
+
+95
+as being written in blood). But a few days later, at Mariazell, he
+was only concerned to get back the later bond, in blood, which
+was not nearly due to expire then (1669-77), and allowed the
+first one to become overdue. This latter was not reclaimed till
+1678—that is, when it had run into its tenth year. Furthermore,
+why are both the bonds dated in the same year (1669), when
+one of them is explicitly attributed to the following year (anno
+subsequenti' 1)?
+The compiler must have noticed these difficulties, for he
+made an attempt to remove them. In his preface he adopted the
+Abbot's version, but he modified it in one particular. The
+painter, he says, signed a bond with the Devil in 1669 in ink, but
+afterwards ('deinde vero') in blood. He thus overrode the express
+statement of both reports that one bond was signed in 1668, and
+he ignored the Abbot's remark in his deposition to the effect
+that there was a difference in the year-number between the two
+bonds. This he did in order to keep in harmony with the dating
+of the two documents that were given back by the Devil.
+In the Abbot's deposition a passage appears in brackets after
+the words 'sequenti vero anno [but in the following year] 1669'. It
+runs: "sumitur hic alter annus pro nondum completo, uti saepe in loquendo
+fieri solet, nam eundem annum indicant syngraphae, quarum atramento
+scripta ante praesentem attestationem nondum habita fuit?" This passage is clearly an interpolation by the compiler; for the Abbot,
+who had only seen one bond, could not have stated that both
+bore the same date. The placing of the passage in brackets,
+moreover, must have been intended to show that it was an
+addition to the text of the deposition. It represents another
+attempt on the compiler's part to reconcile the incompatible
+evidence. He agrees that the first bond was signed in 1668; but
+he thinks that, since the year was already far advanced (it was
+September), the painter had post-dated it by a year so that both
+bonds were able to show the same year. His invoking the fact
+that people often do the same sort of thing in conversation
+" [This is derived from the compiler's preface. The 'sequenti anno'
+quoted above (p. 94) and again below is from the Abbot's deposition.]
+" ['Here the second (later) year is taken instead of the one that was
+not yet completed, as is often done in conversation; for the same year is
+indicated by (both) syngraphae (bonds), of which the one written in ink
+had not yet been received back before the present deposition.']
+" [It is also written in very much smaller script than the rest of the
+Abbot's deposition.]
+
+96
+seems to me to stamp his whole attempt at an explanation as no
+more than a feeble evasion.
+I cannot tell whether my presentation of the case has made
+any impression on the reader and whether it has put him in a
+position to take an interest in these minute details. I myself have
+found it impossible to arrive with any certainty at the true state
+of affairs; but, in studying this confused business, I hit upon a
+notion which has the advantage of giving the most natural
+picture of the course of events, even though once more the
+written evidence does not entirely fit in with it.
+My view is that when the painter first came to Mariazell he
+spoke only of one bond, written in the regular way in blood,
+which was about to fall due and which had therefore been
+signed in September, 1668-all exactly as described in the
+village priest's letter of introduction. In Mariazell, too, he presented this bond in blood as the one which the Demon had
+given back to him under compulsion from the Holy Mother.
+We know what happened subsequently. The painter left the
+shrine soon afterwards and went to Vienna, where he felt free
+till the middle of October. Then, however, he began once more
+to be subjected to sufferings and apparitions, in which he saw
+the work of the Evil Spirit. He again felt in need of redemption,
+but was faced with the difficulty of explaining why the exorcism
+in the holy Chapel had not brought him a lasting deliverance.
+He would certainly not have been welcome at Mariazell if he
+had returned there uncured and relapsed. In this quandary, he
+invented an earlier, first bond, which, however, was to be
+written in ink, so that its supersession in favour of a later bond,
+written in blood, should seem more plausible. Having returned
+to Mariazell, he had this alleged first bond given back to him
+too. After this he was left in peace by the Evil One; but at the
+same time he did something else, which will show us what lay
+in the background of his neurosis.
+The drawings he made were undoubtedly executed during
+his second stay at Mariazell: the title-page, which is a single
+composition, contains a representation of both the bond
+scenes. The attempt to make his new story tally with his earlier
+one may well have caused him embarrassment. It was unfortunate for him that his additional invention could only be of an
+earlier bond and not of a later one. Thus he could not avoid the
+awkward result that he had redeemed one—the blood bond—
+
+97
+too soon (in the eighth year), and the other—the black bondtoo late (in the tenth year). And he betrayed the double editing
+of the story by making a mistake in the dating of the bonds and
+attributing the earlier one as well as the later to the year 1669.
+This mistake has the significance of a piece of unintentional
+honesty: it enables us to guess that the supposedly earlier bond
+was fabricated at the later date. The compiler, who certainly
+did not begin revising the material before 1714, and perhaps not
+till 1729, had to do his best to resolve its not inconsiderable
+contradictions. Finding that both the bonds before him were
+dated 1669, he had recourse to the evasion which he interpolated in the Abbot's deposition.
+It is easy to see where the weak spot lies in this otherwise
+attractive reconstruction. Reference is already made to the
+existence of two bonds, one in black and one in blood, in the
+Abbot's deposition. I therefore have the choice between accusing the compiler of having also made an alteration in the
+deposition, an alteration closely related to his interpolation, or
+confessing that I am unable to unravel the tangle.!
+1 The compiler, it seems to me, was between two fires. On the one
+hand, he found, in the village priest's letter of introduction as well as in
+the Abbot's deposition, the statement that the bond (or at any rate the
+first bond) had been signed in 1668; on the other hand, both bonds,
+which had been preserved in the archives, bore the date 1669. As he had
+two bonds before him, it seemed certain to him that two bonds had been
+signed. If, as I believe, the Abbot's deposition mentioned only one bond,
+he was obliged to insert in the deposition a reference to the other and
+then remove the contradiction by the hypothesis of the post-dating. The
+textual alteration which he made occurs immediately before the interpolation, which can only have been written by him. He was obliged to
+(but in the polain year 169)n with the paide had expressly
+written in his (very much damaged) caption to the title-page:
+'A year after He
+•.. terrible threatenings in
+• • . shape No. 4, was torced
+•.. to sign a bond in blood.'
+['Nach einem Fahr würdt Er
+• .. schrökhliche betrohungen in ab-
+• .. gestalt Nr. 2 bezwungen sich
+• . . n Bluot zu verschreiben?]
+The painter's blunder [Verschreiben] in writing his Syngraphae-a
+lunder which I have been obliged to assume in my attempted explana•
+ion-appears to me to be no less interesting than are the actua
+
+98
+The reader will long ago have judged this whole discussion
+superfluous and the details concerned in it too unimportant.
+But the matter gains a new interest if it is pursued in a certain
+direction.
+I have just expressed the view that, when the painter was
+disagreeably surprised by the course taken by his illness, he
+invented an earlier bond (the one in ink) in order to be able to
+maintain his position with the reverend Fathers at Mariazell.
+Now I am writing for readers who, although they believe in
+psycho-analysis, do not believe in the Devil; and they might
+object that it was absurd for me to bring such an accusation
+against the poor wretch—hun miserum, as he is called in the
+letter of introduction. For, they will say, the bond in blood was
+just as much a product of his phantasy as the allegedly earlier
+one in ink. In reality, no Devil appeared to him at all, and the
+whole business of pacts with the Devil only existed in his
+imagination. I quite realize this: the poor man cannot be
+denied the right to supplement his original phantasy with a
+new one, if altered circumstances seem to require it.
+But here, too, the matter goes further. After all, the two bonds
+were not phantasies like the visions of the Devil. They were
+documents, preserved,
+according to the assurances of the
+copyist and the deposition of the later Abbot Kilian, in the
+archives of Mariazell, for all to see and touch. We are therefore
+in a dilemma. Either we must assume that both the papers
+which were supposed to have been given back to the painter
+through divine Grace were written by him at the time when he
+needed them; or else, despite all the solemn assurances, the
+confirmatory evidence of witnesses, signed and sealed, and so
+on, we shall be obliged to deny the credibility of the reverend
+Fathers of Mariazell and St. Lambert. I must admit that I am
+unwilling to cast doubts on the Fathers. I am inclined to think,
+it is true, that the compiler, in the interests of consistency,
+has falsified some things in the deposition made by the first
+Abbot; but a 'secondary revision' such as this does not go much
+beyond what is carried out even by modern lay historians, and
+bonds. [There is a pun here on the word 'Verschreiben', which means
+'making a mistake in writing' as well as 'signing a bond'.—At the
+beginning of Chapter X of The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (19016),
+Standard Edo, 6, 220, Freud points out that an accidental slip often
+reveals a deliberate falsification.]
+
+99
+at all events it was done in good faith. In another respect, the
+reverend Fathers have established a good claim to our confidence. As I have said already [pp. 77 and 78] there was
+nothing to prevent them from suppressing the accounts of the
+incompleteness of the cure and the continuance of the temptations. And even the description of the scene of exorcism in the
+Chapel, which one might have viewed with some apprehension,
+is soberly written and inspires belief. So there is nothing for it
+but to lay the blame on the painter. No doubt he had the red
+bond with him when he went to penitential prayer in the
+Chapel, and he produced it afterwards as he came back to his
+spiritual assistants from his meeting with the Demon. Nor need
+it have been the same paper which was later preserved in the
+archives, and, according to our construction, it may have borne
+the date 1668 (nine years before the exorcism).
+.....
+
+THE FURTHER COURSE OF THE NEUROSIS
+But if this is so, we should be dealing not with a neurosis but
+with a deception, and the painter would be a malingerer and
+forger instead of a sick man suffering from possession. But the
+transitional stages between neurosis and malingering are, as
+we know, very fluid. Nor do I see any difficulty in supposing
+that the painter wrote this paper and the later one, and took
+them with him, in a peculiar state, similar to the one in which
+he had his visions. Indeed there was no other course open to him
+ifhe wished to carry into effect his phantasy of his pact with the
+Devil and of his redemption.
+On the other hand, the diary written in Vienna, which he
+gave to the clerics on his second visit to Mariazell, bears the
+stamp of veracity. It undoubtedly affords us a deep insight into
+the motivation—or let us rather say, the exploitation-of the
+neurosis.
+The entries extend from the time of the successful exorcism
+till January 131 of the following year, 1678.
+Until October 11 he felt very well in Vienna, where he lived
+with a married sister; but after that he had fresh attacks, with
+visions, convulsions, loss of consciousness and painful sensations,
+and these finally led to his return to Mariazell in May, 1678.
+The story of his fresh illness falls into three phases. First,
+temptation appeared in the form of a finely dressed cavalier,
+who tried to persuade him to throw away the document attesting his admission to the Brotherhood of the Holy Rosary. " He
+resisted this temptation, whereupon the same thing happened
+next day; only this time the scene was laid in a magnificently
+decorated hall in which grand gentlemen were dancing with
+beautiful ladies. The same cavalier who had tempted him
+before made a proposal to him connected with paintings and
+promised to give him a handsome sum of money in return. After
+he had made this vision disappear by prayer, it was repeated
+once more a few days later, in a still more pressing form. This
+1 [In all the German editions except the first this is misprinted '15'.]
+* [A religious order to which he had been admitted on his arrival in
+Vienna.]
+3 This passage is unintelligible to me.
+
+(V) FURTHER COURSE OF THE NEUROSIS 101
+time the cavalier sent one of the most beautiful of the ladies who
+ir company, and he had difficulty in defending himself from
+the temptress.
+Most terrifying of all, moreover, was the vision
+which occurred soon after this. He saw a still more magnificent
+hall, in which there was a 'throne built up of gold pieces.
+Cavaliers were standing about awaiting the arrival of their
+King. The same person who had so often made proposals to him
+now approached him and summoned him to ascend the throne,
+for they 'wanted to have him for their King and to honour him
+for ever'. This extravagant phantasy concluded the first, perfectly transparent, phase of the story of his temptation.
+There. was bound to be a revulsion against this. An ascetic
+reaction reared its head. On October 20 a great light appeared,
+and a voice came from it, making itself known as Christ, and
+commanded him to forswear this wicked world and serve God
+in the wilderness for six years. The painter clearly suffered
+more from these holy apparitions than from the earlier demoniacal ones; it was only after two and a half hours that he awoke
+from this attack. In the next attack the holy figure surrounded
+by light was much more unfriendly. He issued threats against
+him for not having obeyed the divine behest and led him down
+into Hell so that he might be terrified by the fate of the damned.
+Evidently, however, this failed in its effect, for the apparitions
+of the figure surrounded by light, which purported to be Christ,
+were repeated several more times. Each time the painter underwent an absence and an ecstasy lasting for hours. In the grandest
+of these ecstasies the figure surrounded by light took him first
+into a town in whose streets people were perpetrating all the
+acts of darkness; and then, in contrast, took him to a lovely
+meadow in which anchorites were leading a godly life and were
+receiving tangible evidence of God's grace and care. There then
+appeared, instead of Christ, the Holy Mother herself, who,
+reminding him of what she had already done on his behalf, called
+on him to obey the command of her dear Son. 'Since he could
+not truly resolve so to do', Christ appeared to him again the
+next day and upbraided him soundly with threats and promises.
+At last he gave way and made up his mind to leave the world
+and to do what was required of him. With this decision, the
+second phase ended. The painter states that from this time
+onwards he had no more visions and no more temptations.
+
+102
+Nevertheless, his resolution cannot have been firm enough
+or he must have delayed its execution too long; for while he was
+in the midst of his devotions, on December 26, in St. Stephen's
+[Cathedral], catching sight of a strapping young woman
+accompanied by a smartly dressed gentleman, he could not fend
+off the thought that he might himself be in this gentleman's
+place. This called for punishment, and that very evening it overtook him like a thunderbolt. He saw himself in bright flames
+and sank down in a swoon. Attempts were made to rouse him
+but he rolled about in the room till blood flowed from his mouth
+and nose. He felt that he was surrounded by heat and noisome
+smells, and he heard a voice say that he had been condemned to
+this state as a punishment for his vain and idle thoughts. Later
+he was scourged with ropes by Evil Spirits, and was told that he
+would be tormented like this every day until he had decided to
+enter the Order of Anchorites. These experiences continued up
+to the last entry in his diary (January 13).
+We see how our unfortunate painter's phantasies of temptation were succeeded by ascetic ones and finally by phantasies of
+punishment. The end of his tale of suffering we know already.
+In May he went to Mariazell, told his story of an earlier bond
+written in black ink, to which he explicitly attributed his continued torment by the Devil, received this bond back, too, and was
+cured.
+During his second stay there he painted the pictures which
+are copied in the Trophaeum. Then he took a step which was in
+keeping with the demands of the ascetic phase of his diary. He
+did not, it is true, go into the wilderness to become an anchorite,
+but he ioined the Order of the Brothers Hospitallers: religrosus
+factus est.
+Reading the diary, we gain insight into another part of the
+story. It will be remembered that the painter signed a bond
+with the Devil because after his father's death, feeling depressed
+and unable to work, he was worried about making a livelihood.
+These factors of depression, inhibition in his work and mourning
+for his father are somehow connected with one another, whether
+in a simple or a complicated way. Perhaps the reason why the
+apparitions of the Devil were so over-generously furnished with
+breasts was that the Evil One was meant to become his fosterfather. This hope was not fulfilled, and the painter continued to
+be in a bad state. He could not work properly, or he was out of
+
+(V) FURTHER COURSE OF THE NEUROSIS 103
+luck and could not find enough employment. The village priest's
+letter of introduction speaks of him as 'hunc miserum omni auxilio
+destitutum' [p. 75]. He was thus not only in moral straits but was
+suffering material want. In the account [in his diary] of his
+later visions, we find remarks here and there indicating-as do
+the contents of the scenes described—that even after the successful first exorcism, nothing had been changed in his situation.
+We come to know him as a man who fails in everything and who
+is therefore trusted by no one. In his first vision the cavalier
+asked him 'what he is going to do, since he has no one to stand
+by him'. The first series of visions in Vienna tallied completely
+with the wishful phantasies of a poor man, who had come down
+in the world and who hungered for enjoyment: magnificent
+halls, high living, a silver dinner-service and beautiful women.
+Here we find what was missing in his relations with the Devil
+made good. At that time he had been in a melancholia which
+made him unable to enjoy anything and obliged him to reject
+the most attractive offers. After the exorcism the melancholia
+seems to have been overcome and all his worldly-minded desires
+had once more become active.
+In one of the ascetic visions he complained to his guide
+(Christ) that nobody had any faith in him, so that he was unable to carry out the commands laid upon him. The reply he
+was given is, unfortunately, obscure to us: 'Although they will
+not believe me, yet I know well what has happened, but I am
+not able to declare it.' Especially illuminating, however, are the
+experiences which his heavenly Guide made him have among
+the anchorites. He came to a cave in which an old man had been
+sitting for the last sixty years, and in answer to a question he
+learnt that this old man had been fed every day by God's
+angels. And then he saw for himself how an angel brought the
+old man food: "Three dishes with food, a loaf, a dumpling and
+some drink? After the anchorite had eaten, the angel collected
+everything and carried it away. We can see what the temptation
+was which the pious visions offered the painter: they were meant
+to induce him to adopt a mode of existence in which he need no
+longer worry about sustenance. The utterances of Christ in the
+last vision are also worthy of note. After threatening that, if he did
+not prove amenable, something would happen which would
+oblige him and the people to believe [in it"], Christ gave him a
+' ['Daran', in square brackets in the German.]
+
+104
+direct warning that 'I should not heed the people; even if they
+were to persecute me or give me no help, God would not
+abandon me'
+Christoph Haizmann was enough of an artist and a child of
+the world to find it difficult to renounce this sinful world. Nevertheless, in view of his helpless position, he did so in the end. He
+entered a Holy Order. With this, both his internal struggle and
+his material need came to an end. In his neurosis, this outcome
+was reflected in the fact of his seizures and visions being brought
+to an end by the return of an alleged first bond. Actually, both
+portions of his demonological illness had the same meaning. He
+wanted all along simply to make his life secure. He tried first
+to achieve this with the help of the Devil at the cost of his salvation; and when this failed and had to be given up, he tried to
+achieve it with the help of the clergy at the cost of his freedom
+and most of the possibilities of enjoyment in life. Perhaps he
+himself was only a poor devil who simply had no luck; perhaps
+he was too ineffective or too untalented to make a living, and
+was one of those types of people who are known as 'eternal
+sucklings'—who cannot tear themselves away from the blissful
+situation at the mother's breast, and who, all through their
+lives, persist in a demand to be nourished by someone else.—
+And so it was that, in this history of his illness, he followed the
+path which led from his father, by way of the Devil as a fathersubstitute, to the pious Fathers of the Church.
+To superficial observation Haizmann's neurosis appears to be
+a masquerade which overlays a part of the serious, if commonplace, struggle for existence. This is not always the case, but it is
+not infrequently so. Analysts often discover how unprofitable it
+is to treat a business man who though otherwise in good health,
+has for some time shown signs of a neurosis. The business catastrophe with which he feels himself threatened throws up the
+neurosis as a by-product; and this gives him the advantage of
+being able to conceal his worries about his real life behind his
+symptoms. But apart from this the neurosis serves no useful
+purpose whatever, since it uses up forces which would have
+been more profitably employed in dealing rationally with the
+dangerous situation.
+In a far greater number of cases the neurosis is more autonomous and more independent of the interests of self-preservation and self-maintenance. In the conflict which creates the
+
+(V) FURTHER COURSE OF THE NEUROSIS 105
+neurosis, what are at stake are either solely libidinal interests
+or libidinal interests in intimate connections with self-preservative ones. In all three instances the dynamics of the neurosis
+are the same. A dammed-up libido which cannot be satisfied
+in reality succeeds, with the help of a regression to old fixations,
+in finding discharge through the repressed unconscious. The
+sick man's ego, in so far as it can extract a 'gain from illness' out
+of this process, countenances the neurosis, although there can
+be no doubt of its injuriousness in its economic aspect.
+Nor would our painter's wretched situation in life have provoked a demonological neurosis in him if his material need had
+not intensified his longing for his father. After his melancholia
+and the Devil had been disposed of, however, he still had to face
+a struggle between his libidinal enjoyment of life and his
+realization that the interests of self-preservation called imperatively for renunciation and asceticism. It is interesting to see
+that the painter was very well aware of the unity of the two
+portions of his illness, for he attributed both to the bonds which
+he had signed with the Devil. On the other hand, he made no
+sharp distinction between the operations of the Evil Spirit and
+those of the Divine Powers. He had only one description for
+both: they were manifestations of the Devil.
+S.P.
+-H
+
+REMARKS ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
+OF DREAM-INTERPRETATION
+(1923 [1922])
+
+BEMERKUNGEN ZUR THEORIE UND PRAXIS
+DER TRAUMDEUTUNG
+1923
+1925
+1925
+1931
+1940
+Int. Z. Psychoanal., 9(1), 1-11.
+G.S., 3, 305-18.
+Traumlehre, 49-62.
+Sexualtheore und Traumlehre, 354-68.
+G. W., 13, 301-14.
+(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+'Remarks upon the Theory and Practice of
+Dream-Interpretation'
+1943
+Int. J. Psycho-Analo, 24
+(1-2), 66-71. (Tr. James
+Strachey.)
+1945
+1b. Psychoan., 1, 13-30. (Reprint of above.)
+1950
+G.P., 5, 136-49. (Revised reprint of above.)
+The present translation is a corrected version, with additional
+notes, of the one published in 1950.
+The contents of this paper were communicated by Freud to
+his companions during a walking-tour in the Harz mountains
+in September, 1921 (Jones, 1957, 86), the same tour in which he
+read them two other papers, 1941d and 19226 (Standard Ed., 18,
+175 and 223). The present paper, however, was not actually
+written until a year later, in July, 1922, at Gastein (Jones, 1bid.,
+93). (The date of the year of writing is wrongly given as '1923'
+in Jones, 1955, 269.) It will be seen that Sections VIII and X
+reflect Freud's interest in the 'compulsion to repeat' and in the
+demonstration of an 'ego ideal', as discussed in his contemporary works, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g) and Group
+Psychology (1921c) respectively.
+108
+
+REMARKS ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
+OF DREAM-INTERPRETATION
+THE accidental circumstance that the last editions of my
+Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) 1 have been printed from stereoype plates has led me to issue the following remarks in an
+independent form, instead of introducing them into the text as
+modifications or additions.
+I
+In interpreting a dream during an analysis a choice lies open
+to one between several technical procedures.?
+One can (a) proceed chronologically and get the dreamer to
+bring up his associations to the elements of the dream in the
+order in which those elements occurred in his account of the
+dream. This is the original, classical method, which I still
+regard as the best if one is analysing one's own dreams.
+Or one can (b) start the work of interpretation from some one
+particular element of the dream which one picks out from the
+middle of it. For instance, one can choose the most striking
+piece of it, or the piece which shows the greatest clarity or sensory intensity; or, again, one can start off from some spoken
+words in the dream, in the expectation that they will lead to the
+recollection of some spoken words in waking life.
+Or one can (c) begin by entirely disregarding the manitest
+content and instead ask the dreamer what events of the previous
+day are associated in his mind with the dream he has just
+described.
+Finally, one can (d), if the dreamer is already familiar with
+the technique of interpretation, avoid giving him any instructions and leave it to him to decide with which associations to the
+dream he shall begin.
+I cannot lay it down that one or the other of these techniques
+is preferable or in general yields better results.
+" [The sixth and seventh editions, published in 1921 and 1922.]
+" [Cf. the similar discussion near the beginning of Lecture XXIX of
+the New Introductory Lectures (1933a).]
+109
+
+110
+What is of far greater importance is the question of whether
+the work of interpretation proceeds under a pressure of resistance
+which is high or low—a point on which the analyst never remains long in doubt. If the pressure is high, one may perhaps
+succeed in discovering what the things are with which the
+dream is concerned, but one cannot make out what it says
+about these things. It is as though one were trying to listen to a
+conversation taking place at a distance or in a very low voice.
+In that case, one can feel confident that there is not much
+prospect of collaborating with the dreamer, one decides not to
+bother too much about it and not to give him much help, and
+one is content to put before him a few translations of symbols
+that seem probable.
+The majority of dreams in a difficult analysis are of this kind;
+so that one cannot learn much from them about the nature and
+mechanism of dream-formation. Least of all can one learn anything from them upon the recurring question of where the
+dream's wish-fulfilment may lie hidden. When the pressure of
+resistance is quite extremely high, one meets with the phenomenon of the dreamer's associations broadening instead of
+deepening. In place of the desired associations to the dream
+that has already been narrated, there appear a constant succession of new fragments of dream, which in their turn remain
+without associations.
+It is only when the resistance is kept within moderate limits
+that the familiar picture of the work of interpretation comes into
+view: the dreamer's associations begin by diverging widely from
+the manifest elements, so that a great number of subjects and
+ranges of ideas are touched on, after which, a second series of
+associations quickly converge from these on to the dream-thoughts
+that are being looked for. When this is so, collaboration between the analyst and the dreamer becomes possible; whereas
+under a high pressure of resistance it would not even be of any
+advantage.
+A number of dreams which occur during analyses are untranslatable even though they do not actually make much show
+of the resistance that is there. They represent free renderings of
+the latent dream-thoughts behind them and are comparable to
+successful creative writings which have been artistically worked
+
+111
+over and in which the basic themes are still recognizable though
+they have been subjected to any amount of re-arrangement and
+transformation. Dreams of this kind serve in the treatment as an
+introduction to thoughts and memories of the dreamer without
+their own actual content coming into account.
+III
+It is possible to distinguish between dreams from above and
+dreams from below, provided the distinction is not made too
+sharply. Dreams from below are those which are provoked by
+the strength of an unconscious (repressed) wish which has found
+a means of being represented in some of the day's residues. They
+may be regarded as inroads of the repressed into waking life.
+Dreams from above correspond to thoughts or intentions of the
+day before which have contrived during the night to obtain
+reinforcement from repressed material that is debarred from the
+ego.' When this is so, analysis as a rule disregards this unconscious ally and succeeds in inserting the latent dream-thoughts
+into the texture of waking thought. This distinction calls for no
+modification in the theory of dreams.
+IV
+In some analyses, or in some periods of an analysis, a divorce
+may become apparent between dieam-life and waking life, like
+the divorce between the activity of phantasy and waking life
+which is found in the 'continued story' (a novel in day-dreams).
+In that case one dream leads off from another, taking as its
+central point some element which was lightly touched upon in
+its predecessor, and so on. But we find far more frequently that
+reams are not attached to one another but are interpolated int
+successive series of portions of waking though
+The interpretation of a dream falls into two phases: the phase
+1 [Freud makes some further remarks on 'dreams from above' in his
+letter to Maxime Leroy on some dreams of Descartes (1929b). He had
+already noticed the existence of such dreams in The Interpretation of
+Dreams (1900a), Standard Ed., 5, 560.]
+
+112 REMARKS ON DREAM-INTERPRETATION
+in which it is translated and the phase in which it is judged or
+has its value assessed. During the first phase one must not allow
+oneself to be influenced by any consideration whatever for the
+second phase. It is as though one had before one a chapter from
+some work in a foreign language-by Livy, for instance. The
+first thing one wants to know is what Livy says in the chapter;
+and it is only after this that the discussion arises of whether
+what one has read is a historical narrative or a legend or a
+digression on the part of the author.
+What conclusions can one draw from a correctly translated
+dream? I have an impression that analytic practice has not
+always avoided errors and over-estimations on this point, partly
+owing to an exaggerated respect for the 'mysterious unconscious. It is only too easy to forget that a dream is as a rule
+merely a thought like any other, made possible by a relaxation
+of the censorship and by unconscious reinforcement, and distorted by the operation of the censorship and by unconscious
+revision. 1
+Let us take as an example the so-called dreams of recovery. If
+a patient has had a dream of this kind, in which he seems to
+abandon the restrictions of his neurosis—if, for instance, he
+overcomes some phobia or gives up some emotional attachment
+—we are inclined to think that he has made a great step forward, that he is ready to take his place in a new state of life, that
+he has begun to reckon on his recovery, etc. This may often be
+true, but quite as often such dreams of recovery only have the
+value of dreams of convenience:? they signify a wish to be well
+at last, in order to avoid another portion of the work of analysis
+which is felt to lie ahead. In this sense, dreams of recovery very
+frequently occur, for instance, when the patient is about to
+enter upon a new and disagreeable phase of the transference.
+He is behaving in this just like some neurotics who after a few
+" [The fact that dreams are merely 'a form of thinking' is often
+insisted on by Freud. See, for instance, his 'History of the Psycho-
+Analytic Movement' (1914d), Standard Ed., 14, 65, 'Some Neurotic
+Mechanisms' (1922b), ibid., 18, 229 and a long footnote added to The
+Interpretation of Dreams in 1925, ibid., 5, 506-7.]
+" [See The Interpretation of Dreams, ibid., 4, 123 I. For examples and
+a discussion of these dreams and of the 'corroborative' dreams in Section VII below, see Section III of the case of female homosexuality
+(1920a), ibid., 18, 164-6.]
+
+113
+hours of analysis declare they have been cured —because they
+want to escape all the unpleasantness that is bound to come up
+for discussion in the analysis. Sufferers from war neuroses, too,
+who gave up their symptoms because the therapy adopted by
+the army doctors succeeded in making being ill even more
+uncomfortable than serving at the front—these sufferers, too,
+were following the same economic laws and in both cases alike
+the cures have proved to be only temporary.1
+VI
+It is by no means easy to arrive at general conclusions upon
+the value of correctly translated dreams. If a conflict due to
+ambivalence is taking place in a patient, then the emergence in
+him of a hostile thought certainly does not imply a permanent
+overcoming of his affectionate impulse—that is to say, a resolution of the conflict: neither does any such implication follow
+from a dream with a similarly hostile content. During a conflict
+such as this arising from ambivalence, there are often two
+dreams every night, each of them representing an opposite
+attitude. In that case the progress lies in the fact that a complete
+isolation of the two contrasted impulses has been achieved and
+that each of them, with the help of its unconscious reinforce-
+And if it sometimes happens that one of the tex ambivalent.
+dreams has been forgotten, one must not be deceived into
+assuming that a decision has been made in favour of the one
+side. The fact that one of the dreams has been forgotten shows,
+it is true, that for the moment one tendency is in the ascendant,
+but that is true only of the one day, and may be changed. The
+next night may perhaps bring the opposite expression into the
+foreground. The true state of the conflict can only be determined by taking into account all the other indications, including those of waking life.
+VII
+The question of the value to be assigned to dreams is intimately related to the other question of their susceptibility to
+" [Cf. Freud's memorandum on the treatment of war neuroses
+(1955c [1920]), Standard Ed., 17, 213-14.]
+
+114
+influence from 'suggestion' by the physician. Analysts may at
+first be alarmed at the mention of this possibility. But on
+further reflection this alarm will give place to the realization
+that the influencing of the patient's dreams is no more a blunder
+on the part of the analyst or disgrace to him than the guiding
+of the patient's conscious thoughts.
+The fact that the manifest content of dreams is influenced by
+the analytic treatment stands in no need of proof. It follows
+from our knowledge that dreams take their start from waking
+life and work over material derived from it. Occurrences
+during analytic treatment are of course among the impressions
+of waking life and soon become some of the most powerful of
+these. So it is not to be wondered at that patients should dream
+of things which the analyst has discussed with them and of
+which he has aroused expectations in them. At least it is no
+more to be wondered at than what is implied in the familiar fact
+of 'experimental' dreams.?
+But from here our interest proceeds to the question whether
+the latent dream-thoughts that have to be arrived at by interpretation can also be influenced or suggested by the analyst. And
+to this the answer must once more be that they obviously can be.
+For a portion of these latent dream-thoughts correspond to preconscious thought-formations, perfectly capable of being conscious, with which the dreamer might quite well have reacted
+to the physician's remarks in his waking state too—whether the
+patient's reactions were in harmony with those remarks or in
+opposition to them. In fact, if we replace the dream by the
+dream-thoughts which it contains, the question of how far one
+can suggest dreams coincides with the more general question of
+how far a patient in analysis is accessible to suggestion.
+On the mechanism of dream-formation itself, on the dreamwork in the strict sense of the word, one never exercises any
+influence: of that one may be quite sure.
+Besides that portion of the dream which we have already
+discussed —the preconscious dream-thoughts—every true dream
+contains indications of the repressed wishful impulses to which
+it owes the possibility of its formation. The doubter will reply
+that they appear in the dream because the dreamer knows that
+" [Cf. paragraph '4', near the end of Lecture XV of the Introductory
+Lectures (1916-17).]
+" [See The Interpretation of Dreams, ibid., 4, 181 n. and 5, 384]
+
+115
+he ought to produce them-that they are expected by the
+analyst. The analyst himself will rightly think otherwise.
+If a dream brings up situations that can be interpreted as
+referring to scenes from the dreamer's past, it seems especially
+important to ask whether the physician's influence can also play
+a part in such contents of the dream as these. And this question
+is most urgent of all in the case of what are called 'corroborative'
+dreams, dreams which, as it were, 'tag along behind' the analysis.1 With some patients these are the only dreams that one
+obtains. Such patients reproduce the forgotten experiences of
+their childhood only after one has constructed them from their
+symptoms, associations and other signs and has propounded
+these constructions to them.? Then follow the corroborative
+dreams, concerning which, however, the doubt arises whether
+they may not be entirely without evidential value, since they
+may have been imagined in compliance with the physician's
+words instead of having been brought to light from the dreamer's
+unconscious. This ambiguous position cannot be escaped in the
+analysis, since with these patients unless one interprets, constructs and propounds, one never obtains access to what is
+repressed in them.
+The situation takes a favourable turn if the analysis of a
+corroborative dream of this sort, which 'tags along behind', is
+immediately followed by feelings of remembering what has
+hitherto been forgotten. But even then the sceptic can fall back
+upon an assertion that the recollections are illusory. Moreover,
+such feelings are for the most part absent. The repressed material
+is only allowed through bit by bit; and every lack of completeness inhibits or delays the forming of a sense of conviction.
+Furthermore, what we are dealing with may not be the reproduction of a real and forgotten event but the bringing forward
+of an unconscious phantasy, about which no feeling of memory
+is ever to be expected, though the possibility may sometimes
+remain of a sense of subjective conviction.
+Is it possible, then, that corroborative dreams are really the
+result of suggestion, that they are obliging' dreams? The
+patients who produce only corroborative dreams are the same
+patients in whom doubt plays the principal part in resistance.
+" [See the technical paper on dream-interpretation (191le), Standard
+Ed, (Se freud's late paper 'Constructions in Analysis" (1937a).]
+
+116
+One makes no attempt at shouting down this doubt by means of
+one's authority or at reducing it by arguments. It must persist
+until it is brought to an end in the further course of the analysis.
+The analyst, too, may himself retain a doubt of the same kind
+in some particular instances. What makes him certain in the end
+is precisely the complication of the problem before him, which
+is like the solution of a jig-saw puzzle. A coloured picture, pasted
+upon a thin sheet of wood and fitting exactly into a wooden
+frame, is cut into a large number of pieces of the most irregular
+and crooked shapes. If one succeeds in arranging the confused
+heap of fragments, each of which bears upon it an unintelligible
+piece of drawing, so that the picture acquires a meaning, so that
+there is no gap anywhere in the design and so that the whole fits
+into the frame if all these conditions are fulfilled, then one
+knows that one has solved the puzzle and that there is no
+alternative solution.
+An analogy of this kind can of course have no meaning for a
+patient while the work of analysis is still uncompleted. At this
+point I recall a discussion which I was led into with a patient
+whose exceptionally ambivalent attitude was expressed in the
+most intense compulsive doubt. He did not dispute my interpretations of his dreams and was very much struck by their agreement with the hypotheses which I put forward. But he asked
+whether these corroborative dreams might not be an expression
+of his compliance towards me. I pointed out that the dreams
+had also brought up a quantity of details of which I could have
+had no suspicion and that his behaviour in the treatment apart
+from this had not been precisely characterized by compliance.
+Whereupon he switched over to another theory and asked
+whether his narcissistic wish to be cured might not have
+caused him to produce these dréams, since, after all, I had
+held out to him a prospect of recovery ifhe were able to accept
+my constructions. I could only reply that I had not yet come
+across any such mechanism of dream-formation. But a decision
+was reached by another road. He recollected some dreams
+which he had had before starting analysis and indeed before he
+had known anything about it; and the analysis of these dreams,
+which were free from all suspicion of suggestion, led to the same
+interpretations as the later ones. It is true that his obsession for
+contradiction once more found a way out in the idea that the
+earlier dreams had been less clear than those that occurred
+
+117
+during the treatment; but I was satisfied with their similarity.
+I think that in general it is a good plan occasionally to bear in
+mind the fact that people were in the habit of dreaming before
+there was such a thing as psycho-analysis.
+VIII
+It may well be that dreams during psycho-analysis succeed
+in bringing to light what is repressed to a greater extent than
+dreams outside that situation. But it cannot be proved, since
+the two situations are not comparable; the employment of
+dreams in analysis is something very remote from their original
+purpose. On the other hand, it cannot be doubted that within
+an analysis far more of the repressed is brought to light in
+connection with dreams than by any other method. In order to
+account for this, there must be some motive power, some unconscious force, which is better able to lend support to the
+purposes of analysis during the state of sleep than at other
+times. What is here in question cannot well be any factor other
+than the patient's compliance towards the analyst which is
+derived from his parental complex—in other words, the positive
+portion of what we call the transference; and in fact, in many
+dreams which recall what has been forgotten and repressed, it
+is impossible to discover any other unconscious wish to which
+the motive force for the formation of the dream can be attributed. So that if anyone wishes to maintain that most of the
+dreams that can be made use of in analysis areobliging dreams
+and owe their origin to suggestion, nothing can be said against
+that opinion from the point of view of analytic theory. In that
+case I need only add a reference to what I have said in my
+Introductory Lectures [(1916-17) Lecture XX VIII], where I have
+dealt with the relation between transference and suggestion
+and shown how little the trustworthiness of our results is
+affected by a recognition of the operation of suggestion in our
+sense.
+In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g) [Standard Edo, 18,
+18 ff.] I have dealt with the economic problem of how what are
+in every respect distressing experiences of the early infantile
+sexual period can succeed in forcing their way through to some
+kind of reproduction. I was obliged to ascribe to them an extraordinarily strong upward drive in the shape of the 'compulsion
+
+118
+to repeat'—a force able to overcome the repression which, in
+obedience to the pleasure principle, weighs down upon them—
+though not until 'the work of treatment has gone half-way
+to meet it and has loosened the repression'. Here we may add
+that it is the positive transference that gives this assistance to the
+compulsion to repeat. Thus an alliance has been made between
+the treatment and the compulsion to repeat, an alliance which
+is directed in the first instance against the pleasure principle
+but of which the ultimate purpose is the establishment of the
+dominion of the reality principle. As I have shown in the
+passage to which I am referring, it happens only too often that
+the compulsion to repeat throws over its obligations under this
+alliance and is not content with the return of the repressed
+merely in the form of dream-pictures.
+IX
+So far as I can at present see, dreams that occur in a traumatic neurosis are the only genuine exceptions [ibid., 18, 32 f.],
+and punishment dreams are the only apparent exceptions [ibid.,
+5, 557 f.J, to the rule that dreams are directed towards wishfulfilment. In the latter class of dreams we are met by the
+remarkable fact that actually nothing belonging to the latent
+dream-thoughts is taken up into the manifest content of the
+dream. Something quite different appears instead, which must
+be described as a reaction-formation against the dream-thoughts,
+a rejection and complete contradiction of them. Such offensive
+action as this against the dream can only be ascribed to the
+critical agency of the ego and it must therefore be assumed that
+the latter, provoked by the unconscious wish-fulfilment, has
+been temporarily re-established even during the sleeping state.
+It might have reacted to the undesirable content of the dream
+by waking up; but it has found a means, by the construction of
+the punishment dream, of avoiding an interruption of sleep.
+For instance, in the case of the well-known dreams of the poet
+Rosegger which I discussed in The Interpretation of Dreams [ibid.,
+5,473-7], we must suspect the existence of a suppressed version
+with an arrogant and boastful text, whereas the actual dream
+said to him: 'You are an incompetent journeyman tailor.' It
+would, of course, be useless to look for a repressed wishful
+impulse as the motive power for a manifest dream such as this;
+
+119
+one must be content with the fulfilment of the wish for self
+criticism.
+A dream-structure of this kind will excite less astonishment if
+one considers how frequently dream-distortion, acting in the
+service of the censorship, replaces a particular element by something that is in some sense or other its opposite or contrary. It is
+only a short step from there to the replacement of a characteristic portion of the content of the dream by a defensive contradiction, and one further step will lead to the whole objectionable dream-content being replaced by the punishment dream.
+I should like to give a couple of characteristic examples of
+the intermediate phase in the falsification of the manifest
+content.
+Here is an extract from the dream of a girl with a strong
+fixation to her father, who had difficulty in talking during the
+analysis. She was sitting in a room with a girl friend, and
+dressed only in a kimono. A gentleman came in and she felt
+embarrassed. But the gentleman said: 'Why, this is the girl we
+saw once before dressed so nicely!'—The gentleman stood for
+me, and, further back, for her father. But we can make nothing
+of the dream unless we make up our mind to replace the most
+important element in the gentleman's speech by its contrary:
+"This is the girl I saw once before undressed and who looked so
+nice then!' When she was a child of three or four she had for
+some time slept in the same room as her father and everything
+goes to suggest that she used then to throw back her clothes in
+her sleep to please her father. The subsequent repression of her
+pleasure in exhibiting herself was the motive for her secretiveness in the treatment, her dislike of showing herself openly.
+And here is another scene from the same dream. She was
+reading her own case history, which she had before her in print.
+In it was a statement that 'a young man murdered his fiancée-
+cocoa—that comes under anal erotism.' This last phrase was a
+thought that she had in the dream at the mention of cocoa.
+The interpretation of this piece of the dream was even
+more difficult than the former one. It emerged at last that
+before going to sleep she had been reading my 'History of an
+Infantile Neurosis' (1918b), the central point of which is the
+1 [The German word 'Kakao' suggests 'Kaka', the nursery expression
+for 'faeces. Cf. an example of the same connection in a footnote to
+"Character and Anal Erotism' (19086), Standard Ed., 9, 172.]
+
+120 REMARKS ON DREAM-INTERPRETATION
+real or imagined observation by a patient of his parents copulating. She had already once before related this case history to
+her own, and this was not the only indication that in her case
+as well there was a question of an observation of the same kind.
+The young man murdering his fiancée was a clear reference to
+a sadistic view of the scene of copulation. But the next element,
+the cocoa, was very remote from it. Her only association to
+cocoa was that her mother used to say that cocoa gave one a
+headache, and she maintained that she had heard the same
+thing from other women. Moreover, she had at one time identified herself with her mother by means of headaches like hers.
+Now I could find no link between the two elements of the dream
+except by supposing that she wanted to make a diversion from
+the consequences of the observation of coitus. No, she was saying, coitus had nothing to do with the procreation of children;
+children came from something one ate (as they do in fairy tales);
+and the mention of anal erotism, which looks like an attempt in
+the dream at interpretation, supplemented the infantile theory
+which she had called to her help, by adding anal birth to it.
+Astonishment is sometimes expressed at the fact that the
+dreamer's ego can appear two or more times in the manifest
+dream, once as himself and again disguised behind the figures
+of other people.' During the course of the construction of the
+dream, the secondary revision has evidently sought to obliterate
+this multiplicity of the ego, which cannot fit in with any possible
+scenic situation; but it is re-established by the work of interpretation. In itself this multiplicity is no more remarkable than
+the multiple appearance of the ego in a waking thought,
+especially when the ego divides itself into subject and object,
+puts one part of itself as an observing and critical agency in
+contrast to the other, or compares its present nature with its
+recollected past, which was also ego once; for instance, in such
+sentences as When I think what I've done to this man' or 'When
+I think that I too was a child once. But I should reject as a
+meaningless and unjustifiable piece ofspeculation the notion that
+all figures that appear in a dream are to be regarded as frag-
+1 [See The Interpretation of Dreams, ibid., 4, 323. In 1925 Freud added a
+sentence to the original passage, giving the gist of what follows here.]
+
+121
+mentations and representatives of the dreamer's own ego. It is
+enough that we should keep firmly to the fact that the separation of the ego from an observing, critical, punishing agency
+(an ego ideal must be taken into account in the interpretation
+of dreams as well.
+S.F. XIX—I
+
+SOME ADDITIONAL NOTES ON
+DREAM-INTERPRETATION AS A
+WHOLE
+•
+
+EINIGE NACHTRÄGE ZUM GANZEN DER
+TRAUMDEUTUNG
+1925 G.S., 3, 172-84.
+1925
+Traumlehre, 63-76.
+1931
+Sexualtheorie und Traumlehre, 369-81 (Omitting Part III).
+1952 G.W.., 1, 559-73.
+(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+'Some Additional Notes upon Dream-Interpretation
+as a Whole'
+1943 Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 24 (1-2), 71-5. (Tr. James Strachey.)
+1950 G.P., 5, 150-62. (Revised reprint of above.)
+Volume III of the Gesammelte Schriften, in which this first
+appeared, was published in the autumn of 1925. At about the
+same time (September, 1925) the third only of these essays was
+included in Almanach 1926 (pp. 27-31) and was also printed in
+Imago, 11 (3) (1925) 234-8. A reprint of the English translation of the third essay only was included in Psychoanalysis and
+the Occult, New York, 1953, International Universities Press,
+87-90, edited by George Devereux. The present translation
+is a slightly modified version, with additional notes, of the
+one published in 1950.
+These three short essays have had a somewhat chequered
+bibliographical history. As was explained in the Editor's Introduction to The Interpretation of Dreams (Standard Ed., 4, xii), when
+the first collected edition of Freud's works (the Gesammelte
+Schriften) was brought out, it was decided to devote the second
+volume to an exact reprint of the first edition of Die Traumdeutung and to collect in the third volume all the alterations and
+additions to that work which had been made in its later
+editions. Among this additional material were three whole
+'Zusatzkapiteln (Supplementary Chapters)'. The first two of
+these (dealing with symbols and secondary revision respectively)
+
+126
+consisted almost entirely of old material which had been added
+to the book from the second edition onwards. But Zusatzkapitel
+C (the present group of papers) was entirely new and had never
+appeared in any previous edition. There can be little doubt,
+however, that Freud intended to include it in all later editions
+of Die Traumdeutung, for the place at which it was to appear—
+at the very end of the book—was indicated clearly in the
+reprint of the first edition in the Gesammelte Schriften (2, 538).1
+This was in 1925. The next normal, one-volume, edition of
+Die Traumdeutung (the 8th) appeared in 1930. It included all
+the new material from the 1925 edition, with the single exception of Supplementary Chapter C. One immediate consequence of this was its absence also from the revised English
+(Brill) translation of 1932. Nor is it included in the edition of
+Die Traumdeutung which occupies the double volume 2-3 of the
+Gesammelte Werke (1942). Indeed,? it seemed dogged by misfortunes, for it was accidentally overlooked when its turn came
+for inclusion at the correct chronological point in G.W., 14
+(published in 1948) and room had finally to be found for it at
+the end of G.W., 1, the last volume of the series to appear, in
+1952. The German text had thus been lost sight of for over
+twenty years.
+There is a possible explanation of the earliest of these events
+—the omission of the chapter from the 8th edition of Die
+Traumdeutung. Freud's more than half-acceptance of the
+genuineness of telepathy in the last of these essays had, on its
+first appearance, provoked some strong protests from Ernest
+Jones on the ground that it would damage the cause of psychoanalysis in scientific circles, particularly in England. The
+account given of the episode by Jones (1957, 422 ff.) shows that
+Freud seemed unmoved by the protests; but it is conceivable
+that he nevertheless yielded to them to the extent of not including the essay in the canon of the most famous of all his
+works.
+1 In the course of these essays, moreover, Freud speaks of 'this book'
+and 'these pages' with obvious reference to The Interpretation of Dreams
+(Pp, 13l and 132 below).
+The first two essays only were reprinted in 1931 in the collective
+volume of Freud's shorter writings on dreams. The absence of the third
+essay goes to confirm the hypothesis in the last paragraph of this note.
+
+SOME ADDITIONAL NOTES ON DREAM-
+INTERPRETATION AS A WHOLE
+(A) THE LIMITS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF
+INTERPRETATIONI
+It may be asked whether it is possible to give a complete
+and assured translation into the language of waking life (that
+is, an interpretation) of every product of dream-life. This
+question will not be treated here in the abstract but with
+reference to the conditions under which one works at interpreting dreams.
+Our mental activities pursue either a useful aim or an immediate yield of pleasure. In the former case what we are dealing
+with are intellectual judgements, preparations for action or the
+conveyance of information to other people. In the latter case
+we describe these activities as play or phantasy. What is useful
+is itself (as is well known) only a circuitous path to pleasurable
+satisfaction. Now, dreaming is an activity of the second kind,
+which is indeed, from the point of view of evolution, the earlier
+one. It is misleading to say that dreams are concerned with the
+tasks of life before us or seek to find a solution for the problems
+of our daily work. That is the business of preconscious thought.
+Useful work of this kind is as remote from dreams as is any intention of conveying information to another person. When a
+dream deals with a problem of actual life, it solves it in the
+manner of an irrational wish and not in the manner of a
+reasonable reflection. There is only one useful task, only one
+function, that can be ascribed to a dream, and that is the
+guarding of sleep from interruption. A dream may be described
+as a piece of phantasy working on behalf of the maintenance of
+set follows from this that it is on the whole a matter of indifference to the sleeping ego what may be dreamt during the
+1 [Freud had touched on this question more briefly in several earlier
+passages: in The Interpretation of Dreams itself (1900a), Standard Ed., 5,
+524-5, in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (19016), Chapter XII (E),
+ibid., 6, 269, and in the technical paper on dream-analysis (191le),
+ibid., 12, 93-4]
+127
+
+128 DREAM-INTERPRETATION AS A WHOLE
+night so long as the dream performs its task, and that those
+dreams best fulfil their function about which one knows nothing
+after waking. If it so often happens otherwise, if we remember
+dreams—even after years and decades—it always means that
+there has been an irruption of the repressed unconscious into
+the normal ego. Without this concession to it the repressed
+would not have consented to lend its help to the removal of the
+threat of disturbance to sleep. We know that it is the fact of this
+irruption that gives dreams their importance for psychopathology. If we can uncover a dream's motivating force, we
+shall obtain unsuspected information about the repressed impulses in the unconscious; and on the other hand, if we can
+undo its distortions, we shall overhear preconscious thought
+taking place in states of internal reflection which would not
+have attracted consciousness to themselves during the day-time.
+No one can practise the interpretation of dreams as an
+isolated activity: it remains a part of the work of analysis. In
+analysis we direct our interest according to necessity, now to
+the preconscious content of the dream and now to the unconscious contribution to its formation; and we often neglect
+the one element in favour of the other. Nor would it be of any
+avail for anyone to endeavour to interpret dreams outside
+analysis. He would not succeed in escaping the conditions of
+the analytic situation; and if he worked at his own dreams, he
+would be undertaking a self-analysis. This comment would not
+apply to someone who did without the dreamer's collaboration
+and sought to interpret dreams by intuitive insight. But dreaminterpretation of such a kind, without reference to the dreamer's
+associations, would in the most favourable case remain a piece
+of unscientific virtuosity of very doubtful value.
+If one practises dream-interpretation according to the sole
+justifiable technical procedure, one soon notices that success
+depends entirely upon the tension of resistance between the
+awakened ego and the repressed unconscious. Work under a
+"high pressure of resistance' demands (as I have explained elsewhere [p. 110 above]) a different attitude on the part of the
+analyst from work under a low pressure. In analysis one has for
+-ong periods at a time to deal with strong resistances which are
+still unknown to one and which it will in any case be impossible
+to overcome so long as they remain unknown. It is therefore
+not to be wondered at that only a certain portion of a patient's
+
+(A) THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION
+129
+dream-products can be translated and made use of, and, even
+at that, most often incompletely. Even if, owing to one's own
+experience, one is in a position to understand many dreams to
+the interpretation of which the dreamer has contributed little,
+one must always remember that the certainty of such interpretations remains in doubt and one hesitates to press one's
+conjectures upon the patient.
+Critical voices will now be raised. It will be objected that,
+since it is not possible to interpret every dream that is dealt with,
+one should cease asserting more than one can establish and
+should be content to say that some dreams can be shown by
+interpretation to have a meaning but that as to the rest we
+are in ignorance. But the very fact that success in interpretation
+depends upon the resistance absolves the analyst from the
+necessity for such modesty. He may have the experience of a
+dream that was at first unintelligible becoming clear during the
+very same hour after some fortunate remark has got rid of one
+of the dreamer's resistances. A portion of the dream which the
+patient had hitherto forgotten may suddenly occur to him and
+may bring the key to the interpretation; or a new association
+may emerge which may throw light upon the darkness. It
+sometimes happens, too, that, after months or years of analytic
+labour, one returns to a dream which at the beginning of the
+treatment seemed meaningless and incomprehensible but which
+is now, in the light of knowledge obtained in the meantime,
+completely elucidated.' And if one further takes into consideration the argument from the theory of dreams that the model
+dream-products of children invariably have a clear meaning
+and are easy to interpret, then it will be justifiable to assert that
+dreams are quite generally mental structures that are capable
+of interpretation, though the situation may not always allow
+of an interpretation being reached.
+When the interpretation of a dream has been discovered, it
+is not always easy to decide whether it is a 'complete onethat is, whether further preconscious thoughts may not also
+have found expression in the same dream. In that case we
+1 [Cf. a remark by Freud on the length of time required for the interpretation of the 'Wolf Man's' dream (1918b), Standard Ed., 17, 33.]
+" [See, however, the qualifying remark added in 1925 to The Interpretation of Dreams, ibid., 4, 127, footnote 1.]
+& [Cf. ibid., 4, 279 and 5, 523.]
+
+130 DREAM-INTERPRETATION AS A WHOLE
+must consider the meaning proved which is based on the
+dreamer's associations and our estimate of the situation, without on that account feeling bound to reject the other meaning.
+It remains possible, though unproven; one must become accustomed to a dream being thus capable of having many meanings.
+Moreover, the blame for this is not always to be laid upon incompleteness of the work of interpretation; it may just as well
+be inherent in the latent dream-thoughts themselves. Indeed
+it may happen in waking life, quite apart from the situation of
+dream-interpretation, that one is uncertain whether some remark that one has heard or some piece of information that one
+has received is open to construction this way or that, or whether
+it is hinting at something else beyond its obvious meaning.
+One interesting occurrence which has been insufficiently investigated is to be seen where the same manifest dream-content
+gives simultaneous expression to a set of concrete ideas and to
+an abstract line of thought based upon them. It is of course
+difficult for the dream-work to find a means for representing
+abstract thoughts.
+1 [See a footnote to the metapsychological paper on dreams (1917d),
+ibid., 14, 228, and a passage added to The Interpretation of Dreams in 1919,
+ibid.. 5, 523-4.]
+
+(B) MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONTENT
+OF DREAMS
+In the introductory chapter of this book [The Interpretation of
+Dreams] (which discusses
+"The Scientific Literature Dealing
+with the Problem of Dreams') 1 I have shown the way in which
+writers have reacted to what is felt as the distressing fact that the
+unbridled content of dreams is so often at odds with the moral
+sense of the dreamer. (I deliberately avoid speaking of'criminal'
+dreams, as such a description, which would overstep the limits
+of psychological interest, seems to me quite uncalled-for.) The
+immoral character of dreams has naturally provided a fresh
+motive for denying them any psychical value: if dreams are the
+meaningless product of disordered mental activity, then there
+can be no ground for assuming responsibility for their apparent
+content.
+The problem of responsibility for the manifest content of
+ireams has been fundamentally shifted and indeed disposed o.
+by the explanations given in my Interpretation of Dreams.
+We know now that the manifest content is a deception, a
+façade. It is not worth while to submit it to an ethical examination or to take its breaches of morality any more seriously than
+its breaches of logic or mathematics. When the 'content' of the
+dream is spoken of, what must be referred to can only be the
+content of the preconscious thoughts and of the repressed wishful impulse which are revealed behind the façade of the dream
+by the work of interpretation. Nevertheless, this immoral façade
+has a question to put to us. We have heard that the latent dreamthoughts have to submit to a severe censorship before they are
+allowed access to the manifest content. How can it happen, then,
+that this censorship, which makes difficulties over more trivial
+things, breaksdown so completely over these manifestly immoral
+dreams?
+The answer is not easy to come by and may perhaps not
+seem completely satisfying. If, in the first place, one submits
+these dreams to interpretation, one finds that some of them
+have given no offence to the censorship because au fond they
+sane , , %, can big, 019-2 gal Sene in Dreams,
+
+132
+have no bad meaning. They are innocent boastings or identifications that put up a mask of pretence; they have not been
+censored because they do not tell the truth. But others of
+them-and, it must be admitted, the majority—really mean
+what they say and have undergone no distortion from the
+censorship. They are an expression of immoral, incestuous and
+perverse impulses or of murderous and sadistic lusts. The
+dreamer reacts to many of these dreams by waking up in a
+fright, in which case the situation is no longer obscure to us.
+The censorship has neglected its task, this has been noticed too
+late, and the generation of anxiety is a substitute for the distortion that has been omitted. In still other instances of such
+dreams, even that expression of affect is absent. The objectionable matter is carried along by the height of the sexual excitement that has been reached during sleep, or it is viewed with
+the same tolerance with which even a waking person can regard
+a fit of rage, an angry mood or the indulgence in cruel
+phantasies.
+But our interest in the genesis of these manifestly immoral
+dreams is greatly reduced when we find from analysis that the
+majority of dreams—innocent dreams, dreams without affect
+and anxiety-dreams—are revealed, when the distortions of the
+censorship have been undone, as the fulfilments of immoral
+—egoistic, sadistic, perverse or incestuous—wishful impulses.
+As in the world of waking life, these masked criminals are far
+commoner than those with their vizors raised. The straightforward dream of sexual relations with one's mother, which
+Jocasta alludes to in the Oedipus Rex,? is a rarity in comparison
+with all the multiplicity of dreams which psycho-analysis must
+interpret in the same sense.
+I have dealt so exhaustively in these pages [i.e., of The
+Interpretation of Dreams] with this characteristic of dreams, which
+indeed provides the motive for their distortion, that I can pass
+at once from this topic to the problem that lies before us: Must
+one assume responsibility for the content of one's dreams? For
+the sake of completeness, it should, however, be added that
+dreams do not always offer immoral wish-fulfilments, but often
+energetic reactions against them in the form of 'punishment
+dreams'
+• In other words, the dream-censorship can not only
+express itself in distortions and the generation of anxiety, but
+• [Cf. ibid., 5, 437]
+= [Cf. ibid., 4, 264.]
+
+(B) MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DREAMS 133
+can go so far as to blot out the immoral subject-matter completely and replace it by something else that serves as an
+atonement, though it allows one to see what lies behind. 1 But
+the problem of responsibility for the immoral content of dreams
+no longer exists for us as it formerly did for writers who knew
+nothing of latent dream-thoughts and the repressed part of our
+mental life. Obviously one must hold oneself responsible for
+the evil impulses of one's dreams. What else is one to do with
+them? Unless the content of the dream (rightly understood) is
+inspired by alien spirits, it is a part of my own being. If I seek
+to classify the impulses that are present in me according to
+social standards into good and bad, I must assume responsibility for both sorts; and if, in defence, I say that what is unknown, unconscious and repressed in me is not my 'ego', & then
+I shall not be basing my position upon psycho-analysis, I shall
+not have accepted its conclusions-and I shall perhaps be
+taught better by the criticisms of my fellow-men, by the disturbances in my actions and the confusion of my feelings. I
+shall perhaps learn that what I am disavowing not only is' in
+me but sometimes 'acts' from out of me as well.
+It is true that in the metapsychological sense this bad repressed content does not belong to my 'ego'—that is, assuming
+that 1 am a morally blameless individual—but to an id' upon
+which my ego is seated. But this ego developed out of the id, it
+forms with it a single biological unit, it is only a specially modified peripheral portion of it, and it is subject to the influences
+and obeys the suggestions that arise from the id. For any vital
+purpose, a separation of the ego from the id would be a hopeless
+undertaking.
+Moreover, if I were to give way to my moral pride and tried
+to decree that for purposes of moral valuation I might disregard the evil in the id and need not make my ego responsible
+for it, what use would that be to me? Experience shows me that
+I nevertheless do take that responsibility, that I am somehow
+compelled to do so. Psycho-analysis has made us familiar with
+a pathological condition, obsessional neurosis, in which the
+• [As Freud himself points out in the next paragraph, the Germai
+Ich here stands for something more like the English 'self'. This am
+biguity in the German usage is discussed in the Editor's Introduction to
+I he Ego and the Id (1923b), pp. 7-8 above.]
+
+134
+poor ego feels itself responsible for all sorts of evil impulses of
+which it knows nothing, impulses which are brought up against
+it in consciousness but which it is unable to acknowledge.
+Something of this is present in every normal person. It is a
+remarkable fact that the more moral he is the more sensitive
+is his 'conscience'.1 It is just as though we could say that the
+healthier a man is, the more liable he is to contagions and to the
+effects of injuries. This is no doubt because conscience is itself
+a reaction-formation against the evil that is perceived in the id.
+The more strongly the latter is suppressed, the more active is
+the conscience.
+The ethical narcissism of humanity should rest content with
+the knowledge that the fact of distortion in dreams, as well
+as the existence of anxiety-dreams and punishment-dreams,
+afford just as clear evidence of his moral nature as dreaminterpretation gives of the existence and strength of his evil
+nature. If anyone is dissatisfied with this and would like to be
+'better' than he was created, let him see whether he can attain
+anything more in life than hypocrisy or inhibition.
+The physician will leave it to the jurist to construct for social
+purposes a responsibility that is artificially limited to the metapsychological ego. It is notorious that the greatest difficulties
+are encountered by the attempts to derive from such a construction practical consequences which are not in contradiction
+to human feelings.
+1 [This paradox had been mentioned in The Ego and the Id (1923b),
+p. 54 above, and is further discussed in "The Economic Problem of
+Masochism' (1924c), p. 170 below. It is considered at greater length
+in Chapter VII of Civilization and its Discontents (1930a).]
+
+(C) THE OCCULT SIGNIFICANCE OF DREAMS:
+There seems to be no end to the problems of dream-life.
+But this can only be surprising if we forget that all the problems
+of mental life recur in dreams with the addition of a few new
+ones arising from the special nature of dreams. Many of the
+things that we study in dreams, because we meet with them
+there, have nevertheless little or nothing to do with the psychological peculiarity of dreams. Thus, for instance, symbolism is
+not a dream-problem, but a topic connected with our archaic
+thinking-our 'basic language'
+, as it was aptly called by the
+paranoic schreber. * It dominates myths and religious ritual no
+less than dreams, and dream-symbolism can scarcely even claim
+that it is peculiar in that it conceals more particularly things
+that are important sexually. Again, it is not to be expected that
+the explanation of anxiety-dreams will be found in the theory
+of dreams. Anxiety is a problem rather of neurosis, and all that
+remains to be discussed is how it comes about that anxiety
+can arise under dream conditions. S
+The position is just the same, I think, in the matter of the
+relation of dreams to the alleged facts of the occult world. But,
+since dreams themselves have always been mysterious things,
+they have been brought into intimate connection with the other
+unknown mysteries. No doubt, too, they have a historic claim
+to that position, since in primaeval ages, when our mythology
+was being tormea, dream-images may have played a part in the
+origin of ideas about spirits.
+There would seem to be two categories of dreams with a
+claim to being reckoned as occult phenomena: prophetic
+dreams and telepathic ones. A countless multitude of witnesses
+speak in favour of both of them, while against both of them
+there is the obstinate aversion, or maybe prejudice, of science
+There can, indeed, be no doubt that there are such things
+1 [This subject and much of this actual material were dealt with by
+Freud at greater length in a posthumously published paper Psycho
+Analysis and Telepathy' (1941d [1921]), as well as in Dreams and
+Telepathy' (1922a) and in Lecture XXX ('Dreams and Occultism') ot
+his New Introductory Lectures (1933a).]
+te Shreber analysis 19116), Standard Ed., 12, 43.
+[Ci.. The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) Standard Ed., 5, 582 and
+footnote 2.]
+135
+
+136
+as prophetic dreams, in the sense that their content gives some
+sort of picture of the future; the only question is whether these
+predictions coincide to any noticeable extent with what really
+happens subsequently. I must confess that upon this point my
+resolution in favour of impartiality deserts me. The notion that
+there is any mental power, apart from acute calculation, which
+can foresee future events in detail is on the one hand too much
+in contradiction to all the expectations and presumptions of
+science and on the other hand corresponds too closely to certain
+ancient and familiar human desires which criticism must reject
+as unjustitiable pretensions. I am theretore ot opinion that atter
+one has taken into account the untrustworthiness, credulity
+and unconvincingness of most of these reports, together with the
+possibility of falsifications of memory facilitated by emotional
+causes and the inevitability of a few lucky shots, it may be
+anticipated that the spectre of veridical prophetiç dreams will
+disappear into nothing. Personally, I have never experienced
+anything or learnt of anything that could encourage a more
+favourable presumption.f
+It is otherwise with telepathic dreams. But at this point it
+must be made quite clear that no one has yet maintained that
+telepathic phenomena-the reception of a mental process by
+one person from another by means other than sensory perception—are exclusively related to dreams. Thus once again telepathy is not a dream-problem: our judgement upon whether it
+exists or not need not be based on a study of telepathic dreams.
+If reports of telepathic occurrences (or, to speak less exactly,
+of thought-transference) are submitted to the same criticism as
+stories of other occult events, there remains a considerable
+amount of material which cannot be so easily neglected.
+Further, it is much more possible to collect observations and
+experiences of one's own in this field which justify a favourable
+attitude to the problem of telepathy, even though they may not
+be enough to carry an assured conviction. One arrives at a
+provisional opinion that it may well be that telepathy really
+exists and that it provides the kernel of truth in many other
+hypotheses that would otherwise be incredible.
+1 [Cf. the posthumously published analysis of an allegedly prophetic
+dream (1941c [1899]). This is printed as Appendix A to The Interpretation of Dreams, Standard Ed., 5, 623 and also summarized in The
+Psychopathology of Everyday Life (19016), ibid., 6, 262-3.]
+
+(C) THE OCCULT SIGNIFICANCE OF DREAMS 137
+It is certainly right in what concerns telepathy to adhere
+obstinately to the same sceptical position and only to yield
+grudgingly to the force of evidence. I believe I have found a
+class of material which is exempt from the doubts which are
+otherwise justified—namely, unfulfilled prophecies made by
+professional fortune-tellers. Unluckily, I have but few such
+observations at my disposal; but two among these have made
+a powerful impression on me. I am not in a position to describe
+them in such detail as would produce a similar effect upon
+other people, and I must restrict myself to bringing out a few
+essential points.
+A prediction had been made, then, to the enquirers (at a
+strange place and by a strange fortune-teller, who was at the
+same time carrying out some, presumably irrelevant, ritual
+that something would happen to them at a particular time,
+which in fact did not come true. The date at which the prophecy
+should have been fulfilled was long past. It was striking that
+those concerned reported their experience not with derision or
+disappointment but with obvious satisfaction. Included among
+what had been told them there were certain quite definite details which seemed capricious and unintelligible and would
+only have been justified if they had hit the mark. Thus, for
+instance, the palmist told a woman who was twenty-seven
+(though she looked much younger) and who had taken off her
+wedding-ring, that she would be married and have two children
+before she was thirty-two.* The woman was forty-three when,
+now seriously ill, she told me the story in her analysis: she had
+remained childless. If one knew her private history (of which
+the 'Professor' in the lounge of the Paris hotel was certainly
+ignorant) one could understand the two numbers included in
+the prophecy. The girl had married after an unusually intense
+attachment to her father and had then had a passionate longing
+for children, so as to be able to put her husband in the place of
+her father. After years of disappointment, when she was on the
+brink of a neurosis, she obtained the prophecy, which promised
+her—the lot of her mother. For it was a fact that the latter had
+had two children by the time she was thirty-two. Thus it was
+only by the help of psycho-analysis that it was possible to give
+a significant interpretation of the peculiarities of this pretended
+1 [This story is told more fully in Lecture XXX of Freud, 1933a and
+more fully still in Freud, 1941d [1921], Standard Ed., 18, 185 ff.]
+S.F. XIX—K
+
+138
+message from without. But there was then no better explanation
+of the whole, unequivocally determined chain of events than to
+suppose that a strong wish on the part of the questioner-the
+strongest unconscious wish, in fact, of her whole emotional life
+and the motive force of her impending neurosis—had made
+itself manifest to the fortune-teller by being directly transferred
+to him while his attention was being distracted by the performances he was going through.1
+I have often had an impression, in the course of experiments
+in my private circle, that strongly emotionally coloured recollections can be successfully transferred without much difficulty.
+If one has the courage to subject to an analytic examination the
+associations of the person to whom the thoughts are supposed
+to be transferred, correspondences often come to light which
+would otherwise have remained undiscovered. On the basis of
+a number of experiences I am inclined to draw the conclusion
+that thought-transference of this kind comes about particularly
+easily at the moment at which an idea emerges from the unconscious, or, in theoretical terms, as it passes over from the
+'primary process' to the "secondary process'.
+In spite of the caution which is prescribed by the importance,
+novelty and obscurity of the subject, I feel that I should not be
+justified in holding back any longer these considerations upon
+the problem of telepathy. All of this has only this much to do
+with dreams: if there are such things as telepathic messages,
+the possibility cannot be dismissed of their reaching someone
+during sleep and coming to his knowledge in a dream. Indeed,
+on the her posity ar per at alepathic mesage received
+in the course of the day may only be dealt with during a
+dream of the following night.? There would then be nothing
+contradictory in the material that had been telepathically communicated being modified and transformed in the dream like
+any other material. It would be satisfactory if with the help of
+psycho-analysis we could obtain further and better authenticated knowledge of telepathy.
+" [The significance of this distraction of the fortune-teller's attention
+is considered in 'Psycho-Analysis and Telepathy' (1941d), ibid., 18,
+184.]
+" [Similarly in 'Dreams and Telepathy' (1922a), Standard Ed., 18,
+220.]
+
+THE INFANTILE GENITAL
+ORGANIZATION
+THEORY OF SEXUALITY)
+
+DIE INFANTILE GENITALORGANISATION
+(EINE EINSCHALTUNG IN DIE SEXUALTHEORIE)
+1923
+1924
+Int. 2. Psychoanal., 9 (2), 168-71.
+G.S., 5, 232-7.
+1926
+Psychoanalyse der Neurosen, 140-6.
+1931
+Sexualtheorie und Traumlehre, 188-93.
+1940
+G.W., 13, 291-8.
+(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+"The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido:
+1924
+1924
+A Supplement to the Theory of Sexuality.?
+Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 5, 125-9. (Tr. Joan Riviere.)
+G.P., 2, 244-9. (Reprint of above.)
+The present translation, with a modified title, is based on the
+one published in 1924.
+This paper was written in February, 1923 (Jones 1957, 106).
+It is essentially, as its sub-title implies, an addition to Freud's
+Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d); and in fact a new
+footnote giving the gist of what is put forward here was added
+to the edition of that work which appeared in the following
+year (1924), Standard Ed., 7, 199-200. The starting-point of this
+paper is mainly from Sections 5 and 6 of the Three Essays, ibid.,
+194-9, both of which date only from 1915. But it also takes
+up ideas that will be found in the last pages of the paper on
+*The Das posias a Obesionack surl earlier, to), he Sexual
+Theories of Children' (1908c), ibid., 9, 215-20.
+140
+
+THE INFANTILE GENITAL ORGANIZATION
+THEORY OF SEXUALITY)
+The difficulty of the work of research in psycho-analysis is
+clearly shown by the fact of its being possible, in spite of whole
+decades of unremitting observation, to overlook features that
+are of general occurrence and situations that are characteristic,
+until at last they confront one in an unmistakable form. The
+remarks that tollow are intended to make good a neglect of this
+sort in the field of infantile sexual development.
+Readers of my Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d)
+will be aware that I have never undertaken any thorough remodelling of that work in its later editions, but have retained
+the original arrangement and have kept abreast of the advances
+made in our knowledge by means of interpolations and alterations in the text.* In doing this, it may often have happened
+that what was old and what was more recent did not admit of
+being merged into an entirely uncontradictory whole. Originally, as we know, the accent was on a portrayal of the fundamental difference between the sexual life of children and of
+adults; later, the pregenital organizations of the libido made their
+way into the foreground, and also the remarkable and momentous fact of the diphasic onset of sexual development. Finally, our
+interest was engaged by the sexual researches of children; and from
+this we were able to recognize the far-reaching approximation of
+the final outcome of sexuality in childhood (in about the fith year)
+to the definitive form taken by it in the adult. This is the point
+atwhich I left things in the last (1922) edition of my Three Essays.
+On p. 63 of that volume? I wrote that 'the choice of an
+object, such as we have shown to be characteristic of the
+pubertal phase of development, has already frequently or
+habitually been effected during the years of childhood: that is
+to say, the whole of the sexual currents have become directed
+1 [Cf. Standard Ed., 7, 126.]
+* [This corresponds to Standard Ed., 7, 199, where there will also be
+found a footnote, added in 1924, which briefly summarizes the findings
+1 the present paper. The whole section of the book trom which th
+pa the regented had tel only ben added to the work in 1915.1
+
+142
+towards a single person in relation to whom they seek to achieve
+their aims. This then is the closest approximation possible in
+childhood to the final form taken by sexual life after puberty.
+The only difference lies in the fact that in childhood the combination of the component instincts and their subordination
+under the primacy of the genitals have been effected only very
+incompletely or not at all. Thus the establishment of that
+primacy in the service of reproduction is the last phase through
+which the organization of sexuality passes.'
+To-day I should no longer be satisfied with the statement
+that in the early period of childhood the primacy of the genitals
+has been effected only very incompletely or not at all. The
+approximation of the child's sexual life to that of the adult goes
+much further and is not limited solely to the coming into being
+of the choice of an object. Even if a proper combination of the
+component instincts under the primacy of the genitals is not
+eflected, nevertheless, at the height of the course of development of infantile sexuality, interest in the genitals and in their
+activity acquires a dominating significance which falls little
+short of that reached in maturity. At the same time, the main
+characteristic of this 'infantile genital organization' is its
+difference from the final genital organization of the adult. This
+consists in the fact that, for both sexes, only one genital, namely
+the male one, comes into account. What is present, therefore,
+is not a primacy of the genitals, but a primacy of the phallus.
+Unfortunately we can describe this state of things only as it
+affects the male child; the corresponding processes in the little
+girl are not known to us. The small boy undoubtedly perceives
+the distinction between men and women, but to begin with he
+has no occasion to connect it with a difference in their genitals.
+It is natural for him to assume that all other living beings,
+humans and animals, possess a genital like his own; indeed, we
+know that he looks for an organ analogous to his own in
+inanimate things as well.! This part of the body, which is easily
+excitable, prone to changes and so rich in sensations, occupies
+the boy's interest to a high degree and is constantly setting new
+1 [Cf. the analysis of 'Little Hans' (1909b), Standard Ed., 10, 9.J-It is,
+incidentally, remarkable what a small degree of attention the other part
+of the male genitals, the little sac with its contents, attracts in children.
+From all one hears in analyses, one would not guess that the male
+genitals consisted of anything more than the penis.
+
+143
+tasks to his instinct for research. He wants to see it in other
+people as well, so as to compare it with his own; and he behaves
+as though he had a vague idea that this organ could and should
+be bigger. The driving force which this male portion of the body
+will develop later at puberty expresses itself at this period of
+life mainly as an urge to investigate, as sexual curiosity. Many
+of the acts of exhibitionism and aggression which children
+commit, and which in later years would be judged without
+hesitation to be expressions of lust, prove in analysis to be
+experiments undertaken in the service of sexual research.
+In the course of these researches the child arrives at the
+discovery that the penis is not a possession which is common
+to all creatures that are like himself. An accidental sight of
+the genitals of a little sister or playmate provides the occasion
+for this discovery. In unusually intelligent children, the observation of girls urinating will even earlier have aroused a suspicion
+that there is something different here. For they will have seen
+a different posture and heard a different sound, and will have
+made attempts to repeat their observations so as to obtain
+enlightenment. We know how children react to their first impressions of the absence of a penis. They disavow the fact!
+" [From now on, the concept of 'disavowal' comes to occupy a more
+and more important place in Freud's writings. In the present passage
+the German word used is 'leugnen', but its place is later almost invariably
+taken by the allied form 'verleugnen'. It appears in a somewhat different
+connection in the paper on 'The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and
+Psychosis' (1924e), p. 184 below; but usually, as here, the topic concerned is the castration complex. see, tor
+masochism (1924c), p. 165 below and on the distinction between the
+sexes (1925j), p. 252 below. In his later paper on fetishism (1927e),
+Freud differentiates between the correct use of the words 'Verdrängung
+(repression)' and 'Verleugnung (disavowal). There, and in the unfinished
+posthumous paper on 'Splitting of the Ego' (1940e [1938]) and in
+Chapter VIII of the (also unfinished) Outline (1940a [1938]), the term
+serves as a basis for an addition to metapsychological theory. Actually,
+the notion had been hinted at very much earlier-at the end of a
+long footnote to the paper on "The Two Principles of Mental Functioning' (19116), Standard Ed., 12, 220n.-The word Verleugnung has in the
+past often been translated 'denial' and the associated verb by "to deny.
+These are, however, ambiguous words and it has been thought better
+to choose 'to disavow' in order to avoid confusion with the German
+p. 235 belowed, is latter erman woe 19 perce more in order to rol.
+ambiguity, there translated by 'to negate'.]
+
+144
+and believe that they do see a penis, all the same. They gloss
+over the contradiction between observation and preconception
+by telling themselves that the penis is still small and will grow
+bigger presently; and they then slowly come to the emotionally
+significant conclusion that after all the penis had at least been
+there before and been taken away afterwards. The lack of a
+penis is regarded as a result of castration, and so now the child
+is faced with the task of coming to terms with castration in
+relation to himself. The further developments are too well
+known generally to make it necessary to recapitulate them here.
+But it seems to me that the significance of the castration complex can
+only be rightly appreciated if its origin in the phase of phallic primacy
+is also taken into account.z
+We know, too, to what a degree depreciation of women,
+horror of women, and a disposition to homosexuality are
+derived from the final conviction that women have no penis.
+Ferenczi (1923) has recently, with complete justice, traced back
+the mythological symbol of horror—Medusa's head—to the
+impression of the female genitals devoid of a penis.
+It should not be supposed, however, that the child quickly
+and readily makes a generalization from his observation that
+some women have no penis. He is in any case debarred from
+doing so by his assumption that the lack of a penis is the result
+of having been castrated as a punishment. On the contrary,
+the child believes that it is only unworthy female persons that
+have lost their genitals—females who, in all probability, were
+guilty of inadmissible impulses similar to his own. Women
+' [Cf. the Little Hans' analysis, Standard Ed., 10, 11.]
+" It has been quite correctly pointed out that a child gets the idea of
+a narcissistic injury through a bodily loss from the experience of losing
+his mother's breast after sucking, from the daily surrender of his faeces
+and, indeed, even from his separation from the womb at birth. Nevertheless, one ought not to speak of a castration complex until this idea
+of a loss has become connected with the male genitals. [This point is
+treated at greater length in a footnote added in 1923 to the 'Little Hans'
+analysis, Standard Ed., 10, 8. It is also mentioned in "The Dissolution
+of the Oedipus Complex' (1924d), p. 175 below.]
+• I should like to add that what is indicated in the myth is the
+mother's genitals. Athene, who carries Medusa's head on her armour,
+becomes in consequence the unapproachable woman, the sight of whom
+extinguishes all thought of a sexual approach.— [Freud had himself
+drafted a short paper on this subject a year earlier, which was published
+posthumously (19406 [1922]) ]
+
+145
+whom he respects, like his mother, retain a penis for a long
+time. For him, being a woman is not yet synonymous with
+being without a penis.! It is not till later, when the child takes
+up the problems of the origin and birth of babies, and when
+he guesses that only women can give birth to them—it is only
+then that the mother, too, loses her penis. And, along with this,
+quite complicated theories are built up to explain the exchange
+of the penis for a baby. In all this, the female genitals never
+seem to be discovered. The baby, we know, is supposed to live
+inside the mother's body (in her bowel) and to be born through
+the intestinal outlet. These last theories carry us beyond the
+stretch of time covered by the infantile sexual period.
+It is not unimportant to bear in mind what transformations
+are undergone, during the sexual development of childhood,
+by the polarity of sex with which we are familiar. A first antithesis is introduced with the choice of object, which, of course,
+presupposes a subject and an object. At the stage of the pregenital sadistic-anal organization, there is as yet no question
+of male and female; the antithesis between active and passive is
+the dominant one.? At the following stage of infantile genital
+organization, which we now know about, maleness exists, but
+not femaleness. The antithesis here is between having a male
+genital and being castrated. It is not until development has
+reached its completion at puberty that the sexual polarity
+coincides with male and female. Maleness combines [the factors
+of] subject, activity and possession of the penis; femaleness takes
+over [those of] object and passivity. The vagina is now valued
+as a place of shelter for the penis; it enters into the heritage of
+the womb.
+1 I learnt from the aralysis of a young married woman who had no
+father but several aunts that she clung, until quite far on in the latency
+period, to the belief that her mother and her aunts had a penis. One of
+her aunts, however, was feeble-minded; and she regarded this aunt as
+castrated, as she felt herself to be. [Cf.. a footnote to The Ego and the Id,
+p. 31, n. 1 above.]
+to the same work in 1915, ibid., 219-20.]
+
+
+NEUROSE UND PSYCHOSE
+1924
+Int. 2. Psychoanal., 10(1), 1-5.
+1924
+GoN., 5, 418-22.
+1926
+Psychoanalyse der Neurosen, 163-o.
+1931
+Neurosenlehre und Technik, 186-91.
+1940
+G.W., 13, 387-91.
+(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+'Neurosis and Psychosis
+1924 C.P., 2, 250-4. (Tr. Joan Riviere.)
+The present translation is based on that of 1924.
+This was written during the late autumn of 1923. It is an
+application of the new hypotheses put forward in The Ego and
+the Id to the particular question of the genetic difference between
+neuroses and psychoses. This same discussion was carried further
+in another paper, written a few months after the present one,
+'The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis' (1924e), p. 183
+below. The roots of the matter were already under discussion
+by Freud in Section III of his first paper on The Neuro-
+Psychoses of Defence' (1894a).
+In the second paragraph of this paper, Freud speaks of its
+having been stimulated by 'a train of thought raised in other
+quarters. It seems likely that what he was referring to was a
+work on the psycho-analysis of general paralysis by Hollós and
+Ferenczi (1922), which had just appeared and to which a
+theoretical section was contributed by Ferenczi.
+148
+
+In my recently published work, The Ego and the Id (1923b), I
+have proposed a differentiation of the mental apparatus, on the
+basis of which a number of relationships can be represented in a
+simple and perspicuous manner. As regards other points-for
+instance, in what concerns the origin and role of the super-ego
+—enough remains obscure and unelucidated. Now one may
+reasonably expect that a hypothesis of this kind should prove
+useful and helpful in other directions as well, if only to enable
+us to see what we already know from another angle, to group it
+differently and to describe it more convincingly. Such an
+pli cation fibe hypothesis might also bring with it a profitexperience.
+In the work I have mentioned I described the numerous
+dependent relationships of the ego, its intermediate position
+between the external world and the id and its efforts to humour
+all its masters at once. In connection with a train of thought
+raised in other quarters, which was concerned with the origin
+and prevention of the psychoses, a simple formula has now
+occurred to me which deals with what is perhaps the most
+important genetic difference between a neurosis and a psychosis:
+neurosis is the result of a conflict between the ego and its id, whereas
+psychosis is the analogous outcome of a similar disturbance in the
+relations between the ego and the external world.
+There are certainly good grounds for being suspicious of such
+simple solutions of a problem. Moreover, the most that we may
+expect is that this formula will turn out to be correct in the
+roughest outline. But even that would be something. One recalls
+at once, too, a whole number of discoveries and findings which
+seem to support our thesis. All our analyses go to show that the
+transference neuroses originate from the ego's refusing to accept
+' [Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,
+Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum.
+My worthy friend, gray is all theory,
+And green alone Life's golden tree
+(Trans. Bayard Taylor, emended.)
+Mephistopheles in Faust, Part I, Scene 4.]
+
+150
+a powerful instinctual impulse in the id or to help it to find a
+motor outlet, or from the ego's forbidding that impulse the
+object at which it is aiming. In such a case the ego detends
+itself against the instinctual impulse by the mechanism of repression. The repressed material struggles against this fate. It
+creates for itself, along paths over which the ego has no power,
+a substitutive representation (which forces itself upon the ego
+by way of a compromise) —the symptom. The ego finds its
+unity threatened and impaired by this intruder, and it continues to struggle against the symptom, just as it fended off the
+original instinctual impulse. All this produces the picture of a
+neurosis. It is no contradiction to this that, in undertaking the
+repression, the ego is at bottom following the commands of its
+super-ego-commands which, in their turn, originate from
+influences in the external world that have found representation
+in the super-ego. The fact remains that the ego has taken sides
+with those powers, that in it their demands have more strength
+than the instinctual demands of the id, and that the ego is the
+power which sets the repression in motion against the portion of the id concerned and which fortifies the repression by
+means of the anticathexis of resistance. The ego has come
+into conflict with the id in the service of the super-ego and of
+reality; and this is the state of affairs in every transference
+neurosis.
+On the other side, it is equally easy, from the knowledge we
+have so far gained of the mechanism of the psychoses, to adduce
+examples which point to a disturbance in the relationship
+between the ego and the external world. In Meynert's amentia
+—an acute hallucinatory confusion which is perhaps the most
+extreme and striking form of psychosis-either the external
+world is not perceived at all, or the perception of it has no
+effect whatever.' Normally, the external world governs the ego
+in two ways: firstly, by current, present perceptions which are
+always renewable, and secondly, by the store of memories o
+earlier perceptions which, in the shape of an 'internal world',
+form a possession of the ego and a constituent part of it. In
+amentia, not only is the acceptance of new perceptions refused,
+but the internal world, too, which, as a copy of the external
+posthumous vutine o
+p. 153 below.]
+
+151
+world, has up till now represented it, loses its significance (its
+cathexis). The ego creates, autocratically, a new external and
+internal world; and there can be no doubt of two facts-that
+this new world is constructed in accordance with the id's wishful
+impulses, and that the motive of this dissociation from the
+external world is some very serious frustration by reality of a
+wish—a frustration which seems intolerable. The close affinity
+of this psychosis to normal dreams is unmistakable. A precondition of dreaming, moreover, is a state of sleep, and one
+of the features of sleep is a complete turning away from perception and the external world. 1
+We know that other forms of psychosis, the schizophrenias,
+are inclined to end in affective hebetude-that is, in a loss of
+all participation in the external world. In regard to the genesis
+of delusions, a fair number of analyses have taught us that the
+delusion is found applied like a patch over the place where
+originally a rent had appeared in the ego's relation to the
+external world. If this precondition of a conflict with the
+external world is not much more noticeable to us than it now is,
+that is because, in the clinical picture of the psychosis, the
+manifestations of the pathogenic process are often overlaid by
+manifestations of an attempt at a cure or a reconstruction. ?
+The aetiology common to the onset of a psychoneurosis and
+of a psychosis always remains the same. It consists in a frustration, a non-fulfilment, of one of those childhood wishes which
+are for ever undefeated and which are so deeply rooted in our
+phylogenetically determined organization. This frustration is
+in the last resort always an external one; but in the individual
+case it may proceed from the internal agency (in the super-ego)
+which has taken over the representation of the demands of
+reality. The pathogenic effect depends on whether, in a conflictual tension of this kind, the ego remains true to its dependence on the external world and attempts to silence the id, or
+whether it lets itself be overcome by the id and thus torn away
+from reality. A complication is introduced into this apparently
+shich, titution a hinterat is not yester to us unes al
+' [Cl. the metapsychological paper on dreams (1917d).]
+• [Ci. the schreber analysis (1911c), Standara Ea., 12, /1.
+& [See some remarks in the discussion of frustration in "Types of
+Onset of Neurosis' (1912c), Standard Ed., 12, 234.]
+
+152
+influences coming from the id as well as from the external
+world, and is to some extent an ideal model of what the whole
+endeavour of the ego is aiming at—a reconciliation between its
+various dependent relationships. 1 The attitude of the super-ego
+should be taken into account—which has not hitherto been done
+—in every form of psychical illness. We may provisionally
+assume that there must also be illnesses which are based on a
+conflict between the ego and the super-ego. Analysis gives us a
+right to suppose that melancholia is a typical example of this
+group; and we would set aside the name of 'narcissistic psychoneuroses' for disorders of that kind. Nor will it clash with our
+impressions if we find reasons for separating states like melancholia from the other psychoses. We now see that we have been
+able to make our simple genetic formula more complete,
+without dropping it. Transference neuroses correspond to a
+conflict between the ego and the id; narcissistic neuroses, to a
+conflict between the ego and the super-ego; and psychoses, to
+one between the ego and the external world. It is true that we
+cannot tell at once whether we have really gained any new
+knowledge by this, or have only enriched our store of formulas;
+but I think that this possible application of the proposed
+differentiation of the mental apparatus into an ego, a super-ego
+and an id cannot fail to give us courage to keep that hypothesis
+steadily in view.
+The thesis that neuroses and psychoses originate in the ego's
+conflicts with its various ruling agencies-that is, therefore, that
+they reflect a failure in the functioning of the ego, which is at
+pains to reconcile all the various demands made on it—this
+thesis needs to be supplemented in one further point. One
+would like to know in what circumstances and by what means
+the ego can succeed in emerging from such conflicts, which are
+certainly always present, without falling ill. This is a new field
+of research, in which no doubt the most varied factors will come
+up for examination. Two of them, however, can be stressed at
+once. In the first place, the outcome of all such situations will
+undoubtedly depend on economic considerations—on the relative magnitudes of the trends which are struggling with one
+another. In the second place, it will be possible for the ego to
+avoid a rupture in any direction by deforming itself, by submitting to encroachments on its own unity and even perhaps
+" [Cf. "The Economic Problem of Masochism' (1924c), p. 167 below.]
+
+153
+by effecting a cleavage or division of itself. In this way the
+inconsistencies, eccentricities and follies of men would appear
+in a similar light to their sexual perversions, through the acceptance of which they spare themselves repressions.
+In conclusion, there remains to be considered the question
+of what the mechanism, analogous to repression, can be by
+means of which the ego detaches itself from the external world.
+This cannot, I think, be answered without fresh investigations;
+but such a mechanism, it would seem, must, like repression,
+comprise a withdrawal of the cathexis sent out by the ego.?
+1 [This is an early hint at a problem that was to occupy Freud in his
+later years. It was first discussed at length in the paper on 'Fetishism'
+(1927e) and afterwards in two unfinished works, in 'Splitting of the Ego
+in the Process of Defence' (1940e [19381) and in Chapter VIII of the
+'[This problem, too—the nature of what Freud later called 'Ver
+disavowal'-was discussed in the later papers mentioned ir
+Organization', this volume, p. 143 above, for a fuller discussion of the
+question.]
+S.F. XIX—L
+
+THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF
+MASOCHISM
+
+DAS ÖKONOMISCHE PROBLEM DES MASOCHISMUS
+1924
+Int. Z. Psychoanal., 10 (2), 121-33.
+1924 G.S., 5, 374-86.
+1926 Psychoanalyse der Neurosen, 147-62.
+1931 Neurosenlehre und Technik, 193-207.
+1940 G.W., 13, 371-83.
+(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+"The Economic Problem in Masochism'
+1924 G.P., 2, 255-68. (Tr. Joan Riviere.)
+The present translation, with a slightly changed title, is
+based on that of 1924.
+This paper was finished before the end of January, 1924
+(Jones, 1957, 114).
+In this important work Freud gives his fullest account of the
+puzzling phenomenon of masochism. He had previously dealt
+with it, but always somewhat tentatively, in his Three Essays on
+the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), Standard Ed., 7, 157-60,1 in the
+metapsychological paper 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes'
+(1915c), ibid., 14, 127-30, and, at much greater length in
+' "A Child is Being Beaten" ' (1919e), which he himself described in a letter to Ferenczi as 'a paper on masochism'. In all
+these writings masochism is derived from a previous sadism;
+no such thing as primary masochism is recognized. (See, for
+instance, Standard Ed., 14, 128 and 17, 193-4.) In Beyond the
+Pleasure Principle (1920g), however, after the introduction of the
+'death instinct', we find a statement that 'there might be such
+a thing as primary masochism' (ibid., 18, 55), and in the present
+paper the existence of a primary masochism is taken as certain.?
+1 Much of this was in fact only added to the book in 1915; a footnote
+added in 1924 gives the gist of the present paper.
+& It should perhaps be mentioned that it was only in later writings,
+beginning with Chapter VI of Civilization and its Discontents (1930a), that
+
+158
+The existence of this primary masochism is here accounted
+for chiefly on the basis of the 'fusion' and 'defusion' of the two
+classes of instinct—a concept which had been examined at
+length in The Ego and the Id (1923 b), published less than a year
+previously —while the apparently self-contradictory nature of
+an instinct which aims at unpleasure is dealt with in the
+interesting introductory discussion, which for the first time
+clearly distinguishes between the 'principle of constancy' and
+the 'pleasure principle.
+• Freud's analysis shows that this primary or 'erotogenic'
+masochism leads to two derivative forms. One of these, which
+he terms 'feminine', is the form that Freud had already discussed in his paper on 'beating phantasies' (1919e). But the
+third form, 'moral masochism', gives him an opportunity of
+enlarging upon many points that had only been lightly touched
+on in The Ego and the Id, and of opening up fresh problems in
+connection with feelings of guilt and the operation of the
+conscience.
+Freud turned his attention more particularly to the outward operation of
+the death instinct-to aggressiveness and destructiveness, though it is
+discussed to some extent in the later part of the present paper.
+
+THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF MASOCHISM
+THe existence of a masochistic trend in the instinctual life of
+human beings may justly be described as mysterious from the
+economic point of view. For if mental processes are governed
+by the pleasure principle in such a way that their first aim is
+the avoidance of unpleasure and the obtaining of pleasure,
+masochism is incomprehensible. If pain and unpleasure can
+be not simply warnings but actually aims, the pleasure principle
+is paralysed —it is as though the watchman over our mental life
+were put out of action by a drug.
+Thus masochism appears to us in the light of a great danger,
+which is in no way true of its counterpart, sadism. We are
+tempted to call the pleasure principle the watchman over our
+life rather than merely over our mental life. But in that case
+we are faced with the task of investigating the relationship of
+the pleasure principle to the two classes of instincts which we
+have distinguished—the death instincts and the erotic (libidinal) life instincts; and we cannot proceed further in our
+consideration of the problem of masochism till we have
+accomplished that task.
+It will be remembered that we have taken the view that the
+principle which governs all mental processes is a special case of
+Fechner's 'tendency towards stability', 1 and have accordingly
+attributed to the mental apparatus the purpose of reducing to
+nothing, or at least of keeping as low as possible, the sums of
+excitation which flow in upon it. Barbara Low [1920, 73] has
+suggested the name of 'Nirvana principle' for this supposed
+tendency, and we have accepted the term.? But we have unhesitatingly identified the pleasure-unpleasure principle with this
+Nirvana principle. Every unpleasure ought thus to coincide with
+a heightening, and every pleasure with a lowering, of mental
+1 Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g) [Standard Ed., 18, JJ.
+• [Beyond the Pleasure Principle, ibid., 56. Freud had previously given
+this same principle the name of 'the principle of constancy. A tull discussion of the history of Freud's use of these concepts and of their
+relation to the pleasure principle will be found in an Editor's footnote to
+'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1915c), Standard Ed., 14, 121.]
+
+160
+tension due to stimulus; the Nirvana principle (and the pleasure
+principle which is supposedly identical with it) would be
+entirely in the service of the death instincts, whose aim is to
+conduct the restlessness of life into the stability of the inorganic
+state, and it would have the function of giving warnings against
+the demands of the life instincts—the libido-which try to
+disturb the intended course of life. But such a view cannot be
+correct. It seems that in the series of feelings of tension we have a
+direct sense of the increase and decrease of amounts of stimulus,
+and it cannot be doubted that there are pleasurable tensions
+and unpleasurable relaxations of tension. The state of sexual
+excitation is the most striking example of a pleasurable increase
+of stimulus of this sort, but it is certainly not the only one.
+Pleasure and unpleasure, therefore, cannot be referred to an
+increase or decrease of a quantity (which we describe as
+'tension due to stimulus'), although they obviously have a
+great deal to do with that factor. It appears that they depend,
+not on this quantitative factor, but on some characteristic of it
+which we can only describe as a qualitative one. If we were
+able to say what this qualitative characteristic is, we should be
+much further advanced in psychology. Perhaps it is the rhythm,
+the temporal sequence of changes, rises and falls in the quantity
+of stimulus.' We do not know.
+However this may be, we must perceive that the Nirvana
+principle, belonging as it does to the death instinct, has undergone a modification in living organisms through which it has
+become the pleasure principle; and we shall henceforward
+avoid regarding the two principles as one. It is not difficult, if
+we care to follow up this line of thought, to guess what power
+was the source of the modification. It can only be the life
+instinct, the libido, which has thus, alongside of the death
+instinct, seized upon a share in the regulation of the processes
+of life. In this way we obtain a small but interesting set of
+connections. The Nirvana principle expresses the trend of' the
+death instinct; the pleasure principle represents the demands oi
+the libido; and the modification of the latter principle, the
+reality principle,? represents the influence of the external world.
+1 [This possibility had already been raised in Beyond the Pleasure
+Principle, Standard Ed., 18, 8 and 63.]
+" [Cf. 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning'
+(19116), Standard Edo, 12, 219.]
+
+161
+None of these three principles is actually put out of action by
+another. As a rule they are able to tolerate one another,
+although conflicts are bound to arise occasionally from the
+fact of the differing aims that are set for each—in one case a
+quantitative reduction of the load of the stimulus, in another
+a qualitative characteristic of the stimulus, and, lastly [in the
+third case], a postponement of the discharge of the stimulus
+and a temporary acquiescence in the unpleasure due to tension.
+The conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that
+the description of the pleasure principle as the watchman over
+our life cannot be rejected.
+To return to masochism. Masochism comes under our
+observation in three forms: as a condition imposed on sexual
+excitation, as an expression of the feminine nature, and as a
+norm of behaviour.? We may, accordingly, distinguish an
+erotogenic, a feminine and a moral masochism. The first, the
+erotogenic, masochism—pleasure in pain—lies at the bottom
+of the other two forms as well. Its basis must be sought along
+biological and constitutional lines and it remains incomprehensible unless one decides to make certain assumptions
+about matters that are extremely obscure. The third, and in
+some respects the most important, form assumed by masochism
+has only recently been recognized by psycho-analysis as a sense
+of guilt which is mostly unconscious; but it can already be
+completely explained and fitted into the rest of our knowledge.
+Feminine masochism, on the other hand, is the one that is
+most accessible to our observation and least problematical, and
+it can be surveyed in all its relations. We will begin our
+discussion with it.
+We have sufficient acquaintance with this kind of masochism
+in men (to whom, owing to the material at my command, I
+shall restrict my remarks), derived from masochistic-and
+therefore often impotent-subjects whose phantasies either
+terminate in an act of masturbation or represent a sexual
+satisfaction in themselves. s The real-life performances of masochistic perverts tally completely with these phantasies, whether
+' [Freud took up this discussion again in Chapter VIII of his Outline
+(1940a [1938]).]
+& [This last word is added in English in the original.]
+" [See Section VI of '"A Child is Being Beaten' ' (1919e), Standard
+Edo, 17, 196 ff.]
+
+162
+EGONOMIG PROBLEM OF MASOCHISM
+the performances are carried out as an end in themselves or
+serve to induce potency and to lead to the sexual act. In both
+cases—for the performances are, after all, only a carrying-out
+of the phantasies in play—the manifest content is of being
+gagged, bound, painfully beaten, whipped, in some way maltreated, forced
+into unconditional obedience, dirtied
+and
+debased. It is far more rare for mutilations to be included in
+the content, and then only subject to strict limitations. The
+obvious interpretation, and one easily arrived at, is that the
+masochist wants to be treated like a small and helpless child,
+but, particularly, like a naughty child. It is unnecessary to
+quote cases to illustrate this; for the material is very uniform
+and is accessible to any observer, even to non-analysts. But if
+one has an opportunity of studying cases in which the masochistic phantasies have been especially richly elaborated, one
+quickly discovers that they place the subject in a characteristically female situation; they signify, that is, being castrated, or
+copulated with, or giving birth to a baby. For this reason I have
+called this form of masochism, a potiori
+as it were [ie. on the
+basis of its extreme examples], the feminine form, although so
+many of its features point to infantile life. This superimposed
+stratification of the infantile and the feminine will find a simple
+explanation later on. Being castrated—or being blinded, which
+stands for it—often leaves a negative trace of itself in phantasies,
+in the condition that no injury is to occur precisely to the
+genitals or the eyes. (Masochistic tortures, incidentally, rarely
+make such a serious impression as the cruelties of sadism,
+whether imagined or performed.) A sense of guilt, too, finds
+expression in the manifest content of masochistic phantasies;
+the subject assumes that he has committed some crime (the
+nature of which is left indefinite) which is to be expiated by all
+these painful and tormenting procedures. This looks like a
+superficial rationalization of the masochistic subject-matter, but
+behind it there lies a connection with infantile masturbation.
+On the other hand, this factor of guilt provides a transition to
+the third, moral, form of masochism.
+This feminine masochism which we have been describing
+is entirely based on the primary, erotogenic masochism, on
+pleasure in pain. Ihis cannot be explained without taking our
+discussion very far back.
+
+EGONOMIG PROBLEM OF MASOCHISM
+163
+In my Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, in the section on
+the sources of infantile sexuality, I put forward the proposition
+that in the case of a great number of internal processes sexual
+excitation arises as a concomitant effect, as soon as the intensity
+of those processes passes beyond certain quantitative limits'.
+Indeed, it may well be that nothing of considerable importance
+can occur in the organism without contributing some component to the excitation of the sexual instinct 1 In accordance
+with this, the excitation of pain and unpleasure would be bound
+to have the same result, too.? The occurrence of such a libidinal
+sympathetic excitation when there is tension due to pain and
+unpleasure would be an infantile physiological mechanism
+which ceases to operate later on. It would attain a varying
+degree of development in different sexual constitutions; but
+in any case it would provide the physiological foundation on
+which the psychical structure of erotogenic masochism would
+afterwards be erected.
+The inadequacy of this explanation is seen, however, in the
+fact that it throws no light on the regular and close connections
+of masochism with its counterpart in instinctual life, sadism. If
+we go back a little further, to our hypothesis of the two classes
+of instincts which we regard as operative in the living organism,
+we arrive at another derivation of masochism, which, however,
+is not in contradiction with the former one. In (multicellular)
+organisms the libido meets the instinct of death, or destruction,
+which is dominant in them and which seeks to disintegrate the
+cellular organism and to conduct each separate unicellular
+organism [composing it] into a state of inorganic stability
+(relative though this may be). The libido has the task of making
+the destroying instinct innocuous, and it fulfils the task by
+diverting that instinct to a great extent outwards—-soon with
+the help of a special organic system, the muscular apparatus—
+towards objects in the external world. The instinct is then called
+the destructive instinct, the instinct for mastery, or the will to
+power. A portion of the instinct is placed directly in the service
+play. This is sadism propa. Another portion does tot stato
+in this transposition outwards; it remains inside the organism
+and, with the help of the accompanying sexual excitation
+1 [Three Essays (1905d), Standard Ed., 7, 204-5.]
+* [Ibid., 204]
+
+164
+described above, becomes libidinally bound there. It is in
+this portion that we have to recognize the original, erotogenic
+masochism. 1
+We are without any physiological understanding of the ways
+and means by which this taming? of the death-instinct by the
+libido may be effected. So far as the psycho-analytic field of
+ideas is concerned, we can only assume that a very extensive
+fusion and amalgamation, in varying proportions, of the two
+classes of instincts takes place, so that we never have to deal
+with pure life instincts or pure death instincts but only with
+mixtures of them in different amounts. Corresponding to a
+fusion of instincts of this kind, there may, as a result of certain
+influences, be a defusion of them. How large the portions of the
+death instincts are which refuse to be tamed in this way by
+being bound to admixtures of libido we cannot at present
+guess.
+If one is prepared to overlook a little inexactitude, it may
+be said that the death instinctwhich is operativein the organism
+—primal sadism—is identical with masochism. After the main
+portion of it has been transposed outwards on to objects, there
+remains inside, as a residuum of it, the erotogenic masochism
+proper, which on the one hand has become a component of
+the libido and, on the other, still has the self as its object. This
+masochism would thus be evidence of, and a remainder from,
+the phase of development in which the coalescence, which is
+so important for life, between the death instinct and Eros took
+place. We shall not be surprised to hear that in certain circumstances the sadism, or instinct of destruction, which has been
+directed outwards, projected, can be once more introjected,
+turned inwards, and in this way regress to its earlier situation.
+If this happens, a secondary masochism is produced, which is
+added to the original masochism.
+Erotogenic masochism accompanies the libido through all
+its developmental phases and derives from them its changing
+" [For all of this see Chapter IV of The Ego and the Id (p. 41 above).
+Cf. also another account in Chapter VI of Beyond the Pleasure Principle,
+Standard Ed., 18, 5U.J
+• ['Bändigung' Freud takes up the word again in the third section of
+his late paper on 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' (1937c). He
+had much earlier applied the idea to the 'taming' of memories in
+Section 3 of Part III of his Project' of 1895 (Freud, 1950a).]
+
+165
+psychical coatings.1 The fear of being eaten up by the totem
+animal (the father) originates from the primitive oral organization; the wish to be beaten by the father comes from the
+sadistic-anal phase which follows it; castration, although it is
+later disavowed, enters into the content of masochistic phantasies
+as a precipitate of the phallic stage or organization;? and from
+the final genital organization there arise, of course, the situations of being copulated with and of giving birth, which are
+characteristic of femaleness. The part played in masochism by
+the nates, too, is easily understandable, apart from its obvious
+basis in reality. The nates are the part of the body which is
+given erotogenic preference in the sadistic-anal phase, like the
+breast in the oral phase and the penis in the genital phase.
+The third form of masochism, moral masochism," is chiefly
+remarkable for having loosened its connection with what we
+recognize as sexuality. All other masochistic sufferings carry
+with them the condition that they shall emanate from the loved
+person and shall be endured at his command. This restriction
+has been dropped in moral masochism. The suffering itself is
+what matters; whether it is decreed by someone who is loved
+or by someone who is indifferent is of no importance. It may
+even be caused by impersonal powers or by circumstances; the
+true masochist always turns his cheek whenever he has a chance
+of receiving a blow. It is very tempting, in explaining this
+attitude, to leave the libido out of account and to confine oneself to assuming that in this case the destructive instinct has
+been turned inwards again and is now raging against the self.;
+yet there must be some meaning in the fact that linguistic usage
+has not given up the connection between this norm of behaviour
+and erotism and calls these self-injurers masochists too.
+' ['Psychische Umkleidungen.?' The image is an old one of Freud's. It
+occurs several times, for instance, in the 'Dora' case history (1905e),
+Standard Ed., 7, 83, 84, and 99 n. 2.]
+a See 'The Infantile Genital Organization' (1923e) [p. 143 above, where
+a footnote discussing the use of the word 'disavowal' will also be found].
+& [Cf. a reference to this at the end of Section 4 of the second of the
+Ihree Essays (1905d), Standard Ed., 7, 193.]
+[in a paragraph added in 1909 to 1he Interpretation of Dream
+(1900a), Freud had proposed the term 'mental masochism' for people
+"who find their pleasure, not in having physical pain inflicted on them,
+but in humiliation and mental torture'. (Standard Ed., 4, 159.)]
+
+166
+Let us keep to a habit of our technique and consider first the
+extreme and unmistakably pathological form of this masochism.
+I have described elsewhere! how in analytic treatment we come
+across patients to whom, owing to their behaviour towards its
+therapeutic influence, we are obliged to ascribe an 'unconscious'
+sense of guilt. I pointed out the sign by which such people can
+be recognized (a 'negative therapeutic reaction') and I did not
+conceal the fact that the strength of such an impulse constitutes
+one of the most serious resistances and the greatest danger to
+the success of our medical or educative aims. The satisfaction
+of this unconscious sense of guilt is perhaps the most powerful
+bastion in the subject's (usually composite) gain from illness—
+in the sum of forces which struggle against his recovery and
+refuse to surrender his state of illness. The suffering entailed
+by neuroses is precisely the factor that makes them valuable
+to the masochistic trend. It is instructive, too, to find, contrary
+to all theory and expectation, that a neurosis which has defied
+every therapeutic effort may vanish if the subject becomes involved in the misery of an unhappy marriage, or loses all his
+money, or develops a dangerous organic disease. In such
+instances one form of suffering has been replaced by another;
+and we see that all that mattered was that it should be possible
+to maintain a certain amount of suffering.
+Patients do not easily believe us when we tell them about the
+unconscious sense of guilt. They know only too well by what
+torments-the pangs of conscience—a conscious sense of guilt,
+a consciousness of guilt, expresses itself, and they therefore cannot admit that they could harbour exactly analogous impulses
+in themselves without being in the least aware of them. We
+mayhe thim to concies sent mof the becion in any give
+, which is in any case
+psychologically incorrect, & and speak instead of a 'need for
+punishment, which covers the observed state of affairs just as
+aptly. We cannot, however, restrain ourselves from judging and
+localizing this unconscious sense of guilt in the same way as we
+do the conscious kind.
+We have attributed the function of conscience to the superego and we have recognized the
+consciousness of guilt as an
+1 The Ego and the Id (1923b) [Chapter V, p. 49 f. above]
+" [Feelings cannot properly be described as 'unconscious. See Chapter II of The Ego and the Id, pp. 22-3 above.]
+
+167
+expression of a tension between the ego and the super-ego.1
+The ego reacts with feelings of anxiety (conscience anxiety)?
+to the perception that it has not come up to the demands made
+by its ideal, the super-ego. What we want to know is how the
+super-ego has come to play this demanding role and why the ego,
+in the case of a difference with its ideal, should have to be afraid.
+We have said that the function of the ego is to unite and to
+reconcile the claims of the three agencies which it serves; and
+we may add that in doing so it also possesses in the super-ego
+a model which it can strive to follow. For this super-ego is as
+much a representative of the id as of the external world.® It
+came into being through the introjection into the ego of the
+first objects of the id's libidinal impulses—namely, the two
+parents. In this process the relation to those objects was desexualized; it was diverted from its direct sexual aims. Only
+in this way was it possible for the Oedipus complex to be surmounted. The super-ego retained essential features of the introjected persons—their strength, their severity, their inclination
+to supervise and to punish. As I have said elsewhere,* it is
+easily conceivable that, thanks to the defusion of instinct which
+occurs along with this introduction into the ego, the severity
+was increased. The super-ego-the conscience at work in the
+ego—may then become harsh, cruel and inexorable against the
+ego which is in its charge. Kant's Categorical Imperative is thus
+the direct heir of the Oedipus complex.
+But the same figures who continue to operate in the super-ego
+as the agency we know as conscience after they have ceased to
+be objects of the libidinal impulses of the id — these same figures
+also belong to the real external world. It is from there that they
+were drawn; their power, behind which lie hidden all the
+influences of the past and of tradition, was one of the most
+strongly-felt manifestations of reality. In virtue of this concurrence, the super-ego, the substitute for the Oedipus complex,
+becomes a representative of the real external world as well and
+thus also becomes a model for the endeavours of the ego.
+In this way the Oedipus complex proves to be-as has
+1 [Ibid., Chapter III, p. 37 above.]
+" ['Gewissensangst.' An Editor's footnote discussing this term will be
+found in Chapter VIl of Inhibitzons, Symptoms and Anxiety (1946d), Standard
+a [Ci. Neurosis and Psychosis (19440), p. 154 above._
+Ead, The 120 and the la (p. 50e and of 192, pp. 15 and veil
+
+168
+already been conjectured in a historical sense!-the source of
+our individual ethical sense, our morality. The course of childhood development leads to an ever-increasing detachment from
+parents, and their personal significance for the super-ego recedes
+into the background. 1o the imagos" they leave behind there
+are then linked the influences of teachers and authorities, selfchosen models and publicly recognized heroes, whose figures
+need no longer be introjected by an ego which has become more
+resistant. The last figure in the series that began with the parents
+is the dark power of Destiny which only the fewest ofus are able
+to look upon as impersonal. There is little to be said against the
+Dutch writer Multatuli when he replaces the Moiga [Destiny]
+of the Greeks by the divine pair 'Aóyos zai Aváyun, [Reason and
+Necessity]'; but all who transfer the guidance of the world to
+Providence, to God, or to God and Nature, arouse a suspicion
+that they still look upon these ultimate and remotest powers as
+a parental couple, in a mythological sense, and believe themselves linked to them by libidinal ties. In The Ego and the Id
+[p. 58] I made an attempt to derive mankind's realistic fear
+of death, too, from the same parental view of fate. It seems
+very hard to free oneself from it.
+After these preliminaries we can return to our consideration
+of moral masochism. We have said° that, by their behaviour
+during treatment and in life, the individuals in question give
+an impression of being morally inhibited to an excessive degree,
+of being under the domination of an especially sensitive con-
+1 In Essay IV of Totem and Taboo (1912-13).
+" [The term 'imago' was not often used by Freud, especially in his
+later writings. Its first appearance seems to be in his technical paper on
+"The Dynamics of Transference' (19126), Standard Ed., 12, 100, where
+he attributes it to Jung (1911, 164). In this latter passage Jung tells us
+that he partly chose the word trom the title of a novel of the same name
+by the Swiss writer, Carl Spitteler; and we learn from Hanns Sachs
+(1945, 63) that the psycho-analytic periodical Imago, started by him
+and Rank in 1912, also owed its title to the same source.]
+& E. D. Dekker (1820-87). ['Multatuli' had long been a favourite of
+Freud's. He heads the list of 'ten good books' which he drew up in 1907,
+Standard Ed., 9, 246.]
+['Aváyan had been named by Freud at least as early as in the
+Leonardo paper (1910c), Standard Ed., 11, 125. Aóyos, on the other hand,
+seems to appear for the first time here. Both are discussed, and more
+
+ECONOMI PROBLEM OF MASOCHISM
+169
+science, although they are not conscious of any of this ultramorality. Un closer inspection, we can see the ditterence there
+is between an unconscious extension of morality oi this kind
+and moral masochism. In the former, the accent falls on the
+heightened sadism of the super-ego to which the ego submits;
+in the latter, it falls on the ego's own masochism which seeks
+punishment, whether from the super-ego or from the parental
+powers outside. We may be forgiven for having confused the
+two to begin with; for in both cases it is a question of a relationship between the ego and the super-ego (or powers that are
+equivalent to it), and in both cases what is involved is a need
+which is satisfied by punishment and suffering. It can hardly
+be an insignificant detail, then, that the sadism of the superego becomes for the most part glaringly conscious, whereas the
+masochistic trend of the ego remains as a rule concealed from
+the subject and has to be inferred from his behaviour.
+The fact that moral masochism is unconscious leads us to an
+obvious clue. We were able to translate the expression 'unconscious sense of guilt' as meaning a need for punishment at
+the hands of a parental power. We now know that the wish,
+which so frequently appears in phantasies, to be beaten by the
+father stands very close to the other wish, to have a passive
+(feminine) sexual relation to him and is only a regressive distortion of it. If we insert this explanation into the content of
+moral masochism, its hidden meaning becomes clear to us.
+Conscience and morality have arisen through the overcoming,
+the desexualization, of the Oedipus complex; but through moral
+masochism morality becomes sexualized once more, the Oedipus complex is revived and the way is opened for a regression
+from morality to the Oedipus complex. This is to the advantage
+neither of morality nor of the person concerned. An individual
+may, it is true, have preserved the whole or some measure of
+ethical sense alongside of his masochism; but, alternatively, a
+large part of his conscience may have vanished into his masochism. Again, masochism creates a temptation to perform 'sinful'
+actions, which must then be expiated by the reproaches of the
+sadistic conscience (as is exemplified in so many Russian
+character-types) or by chastisement from the great parental
+power of Destiny. In order to provoke punishment from this
+last representative of the parents, the masochist must do what
+is inexpedient, must act against his own interests, must ruin
+S.F. XIX—M
+
+170
+the prospects which open out to him in the real world and
+must, perhaps, destroy his own real existence.
+The turning back of sadism against the self regularly occurs
+where a cultural suppression of the instincts holds back a large
+part of the subject's destructive instinctual components from
+being exercised in lite. We may suppose that this portion of the
+destructive instinct which has retreated appears in the ego as
+an intensification of masochism. The phenomena of conscience,
+however, lead us to infer that the destructiveness which returns
+from the external world is also taken up by the super-ego,
+without any such transformation, and increases its sadism
+against the ego. The sadism of the super-ego and the masochism
+of the ego supplement each other and unite to produce the same
+effects. It is only in this way, I think, that we can understand
+how the suppression of an instinct can-frequently or quite
+generally—result in a sense of guilt and how a person's conscience becomes more severe and more sensitive the more he
+refrains from aggression against others. ' One might expect that
+if a man knows that he is in the habit of avoiding the commission of acts of aggression that are undesirable from a cultural
+standpoint he will for that reason have a good conscience and
+will watch over his ego less suspiciously. The situation is usually
+presented as though ethical requirements were the primary
+thing and the renunciation of instinct followed from them.
+This leaves the origin of the ethical sense unexplained. Actually,
+it seems to be the other way about. The first instinctual renunciation is enforced by external powers, and it is only this
+which creates the ethical sense, which expresses itself in conscience and demands a further renunciation of instinct.?
+Thus moral masochism becomes a classical piece of evidence
+for the existence of fusion of instinct. Its danger lies in the fact
+that it originates from the death instinct and corresponds to the
+part of that instinct which has escaped being turned outwards as
+an instinct of destruction. But since, on the other hand, it has the
+significance of an erotic component, even the subject's destruction of himself cannot take place without libidinal satisfaction.®
+" Ci. I he Ego and the la, p. 54 above.
+• The subjects discussed
+in this paragraph were enlarged upon by
+Freud in Chapter VII of Civilization and its Discontents (1930a).]
+° [Freud discussed masochism in relation to psycho-analytic treatment once more in Section VI of his paper on 'Analysis Terminable and
+Interminable' (1937c).]
+
+THE DISSOLUTION OF THE
+OEDIPUS COMPLEX
+
+DER UNTERGANG DES ÖDIPUSKOMPLEXES
+1924
+Int. 2. Psychoanal., 10 (3), 245-52.
+1924
+G.S., 5, 423-30.
+1926
+Psychoanalyse der Neurosen, 169-77.
+1931
+Neurosenlehre und Technik, 191-9.
+1940
+G.W., 13, 395-402.
+(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+"The Passing of the Oedipus Complex'
+1924 Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 5 (4), 419-24. (Tr. Joan Riviere.) •
+1924 C.P., 2, 269-76. (Reprint ot above.)
+The present translation, with a changed title, is based on that
+of 1924.
+This paper, written in the early months of 1924, was in its
+essence an elaboration of a passage in The Ego and the Id
+(p. 31 ff. above). It further claims our special interest as
+laying emphasis for the first time on the different course taken
+by the development of sexuality in boys and in girls. This
+fresh line of thought was carried further some eighteen months
+later in Freud's paper on Some Psychical Consequences of the
+Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes' (1925j). The history
+of Freud's changing views on this subject is discussed in an
+Editor's Note to the latter paper (p. 243 ff. below).
+172
+
+THE DISSOLUTION OF THE
+OEDIPUS COMPLEX
+To an ever-increasing extent the Oedipus complex reveals its
+importance as the central phenomenon of the sexual period of
+early childhood. After that, its dissolution takes place; it succumbs to repression, as we say, and is followed by the latency
+period. It has not yet become clear, however, what it is that
+brings about its destruction. Analyses seem to show that it is
+the experience of painful disappointments. The little girl likes
+to regard herself as what her father loves above all else; but the
+time comes when she has to endure a harsh punishment from
+him and she is cast out of her fool's paradise. The boy regards
+his mother as his own property; but he finds one day that she
+has transferred her love and solicitude to a new arrival. Reflection must deepen our sense of the importance of those influences,
+for it will emphasize the fact that distressing experiences of this
+sort, which act in opposition to the content of the complex, are
+inevitable. Even when no special events occur, like those we
+have mentioned as examples, the absence of the satisfaction
+hoped for, the continued denial of the desired baby, must in
+the end lead the small lover to turn away from his hopeless
+longing. In this way the Oedipus complex would go to its
+destruction from its lack of success, from the effects ofits internal
+impossibility.
+Another view is that the Oedipus complex must collapse
+because the time has come for its disintegration, just as the
+milk-teeth fall out when the permanent ones begin to grow.
+1 ['Untergang.' We learn from Ernest Jones (1957, 114) that Ferenczi
+in a letter of March 24, 1924, objected to the strength of this word and
+suggested that it was chosen as a reaction to Rank's ideas on the importance of the 'birth trauma'. Freud, replying two days later, 'admitted
+that the word in the title might have been emotionally influenced by his
+feelings about Rank's new ideas, but said that the paper itself was quite
+independent of the latter' (Jones, loc. cit.). It must be pointed out, in"
+deed, that the phrase 'Untergang des Ödipuskomplexes' had in fact been
+used twice by Freud in The Ego and the Id, which was written before the
+publication of Kank's hypothesis. (See above, pp. 34 and 34.) In the
+same passage he had in fact also used the still stronger word 'Zertrüm-
+merung (demolition)'.]
+173
+
+174 DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX
+Although the majority of human beings go through the Oedipus
+complex as an individual experience, it is nevertheless a phenomenon which is determined and laid down by heredity and
+which is bound to pass away according to programme when the
+next pre-ordained phase of development sets in. This being so,
+it is ofno great importance what the occasions are which allow
+this to happen, or, indeed, whether any such occasions can be
+discovered at all.t
+The justice of both these views cannot be disputed. Moreover, they are compatible. There is room for the ontogenetic
+view side by side with the more far-reaching phylogenetic one.
+It is also true that even at birth the whole individual is destined
+to die, and perhaps his organic disposition may already contain
+the indication of what he is to die from. Nevertheless, it remains
+of interest to follow out how this innate programme is carried
+out and in what way accidental noxae exploit his disposition.
+We have lately? been made more clearly aware than before
+that a child's sexual development advances to a certain phase
+at which the genital organ has already taken over the leading
+role. But this genital is the male one only, or, more correctly,
+the penis; the female genital has remained undiscovered. 'This
+phallic phase, which is contemporaneous with the Oedipus
+complex, does not develop further to the definitive genital
+organization, but is submerged, and is succeeded by the latency
+period. Its termination, however, takes place in a typical
+manner and in conjunction with events that are of regular
+recurrence.
+When the (male) child's interest turns to his genitals he
+betrays the fact by manipulating them frequently; and he then
+finds that the adults do not approve of this behaviour. More or
+less plainly, more or less brutally, a threat is pronounced that
+this part of him which he values so highly will be taken away
+from him. Usually it is from women that the threat emanates;
+very often they seek to strengthen their authority by a reference
+to the father or the doctor, who, so they say, will carry out the
+punishment. In a number of cases the women will themselves
+" [The ideas contained in this and the preceding paragraph had
+been expressed by Freud in very similar terms in Section IV of • A
+Child is Being Beaten"' (1919e), Standard Ed., 17, 188.]
+• [See 'The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido' (1923e),
+p. 141 above.]
+
+DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX 175
+mitigate the threat in a symbolic manner by telling the child
+that what is to be removed is not his genital, which actually
+plays a passive part, but his hand, which is the active culprit.
+It happens particularly often that the little boy is threatened
+with castration, not because he plays with his penis with his
+hand, but because he wets his bed every night and cannot be
+got to be clean. Those in charge of him behave as if this
+nocturnal incontinence was the result and the proof of his being
+unduly concerned with his penis, and they are probably right.
+In any case, long-continued bed-wetting is to be equated with
+the emissions of adults. It is an expression of the same excitation
+of the genitals which has impelled the child to masturbate at this
+period.
+Now it is my view that what brings about the destruction of
+the child's phallic genital organization is this threat of castration. Not immediately, it is true, and not without other
+influences being brought to bear as well. For to begin with the
+boy does not believe in the threat or obey it in the least.
+Psycho-analysis has recently attached importance to two experiences which all children go through and which, it is suggested,
+prepare them for the loss of highly valued parts of the body.
+These experiences are the withdrawal of the mother's breast—
+at first intermittently and later for good-and the daily demand
+on them to give up the contents of the bowel. But there is no
+evidence to show that, when the threat of castration takes place,
+those experiences have any effect. ? It is not until a fresh experience comes his way that the child begins to reckon with the
+possibility of being castrated, and then only hesitatingly and
+unwilling-y, and not without making efforts to depreciate the
+significance of something he has himself observed.
+The observation which finally breaks down his unbelief is the
+sight of the female genitals. Sooner or later the child, who is so
+" [Cf. the case history of 'Dora' (1905e), Standard Ed., 7, 74 and the
+second of the Three Essays (1905d), ibid., 190.]
+" [Cf. a footnote added, at about the time this paper was written, to
+the case history of 'Little Hans' (19096), Standard Ed., 10, 8, in which
+reterence is made to papers by Andreas-Salomé (1916), A. Stärcke (1910)
+and Alexander (1922). A third experience of separation-that of birth
+-is also mentioned there, but, as in the present passage, Freud objects
+EThe inlantie Genital Orgatraton onthe Libido (19230), po 144
+above.J
+
+176 DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX
+proud of his possession of a penis, has a view of the genital
+region of a little girl, and cannot help being convinced of the
+absence of a penis in a creature who is so like himself. With this,
+the loss of his own penis becomes imaginable, and the threat of
+castration takes its deferred effect.
+We should not be as short-sighted as the person in charge of
+the child who threatens him with castration, and we must not
+overlook the fact that at this time masturbation by no means
+represents the whole of his sexual life. As can be clearly shown,
+he stands in the Oedipus attitude to his parents; his masturbation is only a genital discharge of the sexual excitation belonging
+to the complex, and throughout his later years will owe its
+importance to that relationship. The Oedipus complex offered
+the child two possibilities of satisfaction, an active and a passive
+one. He could put himself in his father's place in a masculine
+fashion and have intercourse with his mother as his father did,
+in which case he would soon have felt the latter as a hindrance;
+or he might want to take the place of his mother and be loved
+by his father, in which case his mother would become superfluous. The child may have had only very vague notions as to
+what constitutes a satisiying erotic intercourse; but certainly
+the penis must play a part in it, for the sensations in his own
+organ were evidence of that. So far he had had no occasion to
+doubt that women possessed a penis. But now his acceptance of
+the possibility of castration, his recognition that women were
+castrated, made an end of both possible ways of obtaining
+satisfaction from the Oedipus complex. For both of them
+entailed the loss of his penis-the masculine one as a resulting
+punishment and the feminine one as a precondition. If the
+satisfaction of love in the field of the Oedipus complex is to cost
+the child his penis, a conflict is bound to arise between his
+narcissistic interest in that part of his body and the libidinal
+cathexis of his parental objects. In this conflict the first of these
+forces normally triumphs: the child's ego turns away from the
+Oedipus complex.
+I have described elsewhere how this turning away takes
+place. The object-cathexes are given up and replaced by
+identifications. The authority of the father or the parents is
+introjected into the ego, and there it forms the nucleus of the
+super-ego, which takes over the severity of the father and per-
+1 [In Chapter III of The Ego and the Id, p. 29 ff.. above.]
+
+DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX 177
+petuates his prohibition against incest, and so secures the ego
+from the return of the libidinal object-cathexis. The libidinal
+trends belonging to the Oedipus complex are in part desexualized and sublimated (a thing which probably happens with
+every transformation into an identification) and in part inhibited in their aim and changed into impulses of affection.
+The whole process has, on the one hand, preserved the genital
+organ-has averted the danger of its loss-and, on the other,
+has paralysed it—has removed its function. This process ushers
+in the latency period, which now interrupts the child's sexual
+development.
+I see no reason for denying the name of a 'repression' to the
+ego's turning away from the Oedipus complex, although later
+repressions come about for the most part with the participation
+of the super-ego, which in this case is only just being formed.
+But the process we have described is more than a repression.
+It is equivalent, if it is ideally carried out, to a destruction and
+an abolition of the complex. We may plausibly assume that we
+have here come upon the borderline-never a very sharply
+drawn one-between the normal and the pathological. If the
+ego has in fact not achieved much more than a repression of the
+complex, the latter persists in an unconscious state in the id and
+will later manifest its pathogenic effect.
+Analytic observation enables us to recognize or guess these
+connections between the phallic organization, the Oedipus complex, the threat of castration, the formation of the super-ego and
+the latency period. These connections justify the statement that
+the destruction of the Oedipus complex is brought about by
+the threat of castration. But this does not dispose of the problem;
+there is room for a theoretical speculation which may upset the
+results we have come to or put them in a new light. Before we
+start along this new path, however, we must turn to a question
+which has arisen in the course of this discussion and has so far
+been left on one side. The process which has been described
+refers, as has been expressly said, to male children only. How
+does the corresponding development take place in little girls?
+At this point our material-for some incomprehensible
+reason —becomes far more obscure and full of gaps. The female
+sex, too, develops an Oedipus complex, a super-ego and a
+1 [Freud suggested some explanation for this in Section I of his paper
+on 'Female Sexuality' (19316).]
+
+178 DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX
+latency period. May we also attribute a phallic organization
+and a castration complex to it? The answer is in the affirmative;
+but these things cannot be the same as they are in boys. Here
+the feminist demand for equal rights for the sexes does not take
+us far, for the morphological distinction is bound to find
+expression in differences of psychical development. 1 'Anatomy
+is Destiny', to vary a saying of Napoleon's. (The little girl's
+clitoris behaves just like a penis to begin with; but, when she
+makes a comparison with a playfellow of the other sex, she
+perceives that she has 'come off badly'& and she feels this as a
+wrong done to her, and as a ground for inferiority. For a while
+still she consoles herself with the expectation that later on, when
+she grows older, she will acquire just as big an appendage as the
+boy's. Here the masculinity complex of women branches off.
+A female child, however, does not understand her lack of a
+penis as being a sex character; she explains it by assuming that
+at some earlier date she had possessed an equally large organ
+and had then lost it by castration. She seems not to extend this
+inference from herself to other, adult females, but, entirely on
+the lines of the phallic phase, to regard them as possessing large
+and complete-that is to say, male-genitals. The essential
+difference thus comes about that the girl accepts castration as
+an accomplished fact, whereas the boy fears the possibility of
+its occurrence.
+The fear of castration being thus excluded in the little girl,
+a powerful motive also drops out for the setting-up of a superego and for the breaking-off of the infantile genital organization. In her, far more than in the boy, these changes seem to be
+the result of upbringing and of intimidation from outside which
+threatens her with a loss of love. The girl's Oedipus complex
+is much simpler than that of the small bearer of the penis; in my
+experience, it seldom goes beyond the taking of her mother's
+place and the adopting of a feminine attitude towards her
+father. Renunciation of the penis is not tolerated by the girl
+without some attempt at compensation. She slips-along the
+1 [See Freud's paper, written about eighteen months after this one,
+on Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes' (1925j), p. 248 below. Much of what follows is elaborated there. The paraphrase of Napoleon's epigram had appeared
+already in the second paper on the psychology of love (1912d), Standard
+Ed., 11, 189.]
+" [Literally, "come off too short'.]
+
+DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX 179
+line of a symbolic equation, one might say—from the penis to
+a baby. Her Oedipus complex culminates in a desire, which is
+long retained, to receive a baby from her father as a gift-to
+bear him a child.1 One has an impression that the Oedipus
+complex is then gradually given up because this wish is never
+fulfilled. The two wishes—to possess a penis and a childremain strongly cathected in the unconscious and help to prepare the female creature for her later sexual role. The comparatively lesser strength of the sadistic contribution to her
+sexual instinct, which we may no doubt connect with the
+stunted growth of her penis, makes it easier in her case for the
+direct sexual trends to be transformed into aim-inhibited trends
+of an affectionate kind. It must be admitted, however, that in
+general our insight into these developmental processes in girls
+is unsatisfactory, incomplete and vague.?
+I have no doubt that the chronological and causal relations
+described here between the Oedipus complex, sexual intimidation (the threat of castration), the formation of the super-ego
+and the beginning of the latency period are of a typical kind;
+but I do not wish to assert that this type is the only possible one.
+Variations in the chronological order and in the linking-up of
+these events are bound to have a very important bearing on the
+development of the individual.
+Since the publication of Otto Rank's interesting study, The
+Trauma of Birth [1924], even the conclusion arrived at by this
+modest investigation, to the effect that the boy's Oedipus
+complex is destroyed by the fear of castration, cannot be
+accepted without further discussion. Nevertheless, it seems to
+me premature to enter into such a discussion at the present time,
+and perhaps inadvisable to begin a criticism or an appreciation
+of Rank's view at this juncture. 3
+" [C. Freud's paper on "Transformations of Instinct' (19176),
+Standard La., I7, 140 II.; see also below, p. 456.]
+[reud discussed this topic much more fully in his papers on the
+anatomical distinction between the sexes (1925j) and on female sexuality (19316), in both of which he gave a very different account of the
+girl's Vedipus complex from the present one.]
+of which he gaved overy
+& [The question was taken up by Freud soon afterwards in Inhibitions,
+Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d). Cf. Section (e) of the Editor's Introduction
+to that work, Standard Ed., 20, 03 il.]
+
+THE LOSS OF REALITY IN NEUROSIS
+AND PSYCHOSIS
+
+DER REALITATSVERLUST BEI NEUROSE
+UND PSYCHOSE
+1924
+Int. Z. Psychoanal., 10 (4), 374-9.
+1925
+G.S., 6,409-14.
+1926
+Psychoanalyse der Neurosen, 178-84.
+1931
+Neurosenlehre und Technik, 199-204.
+1940
+G.W., 13, 363-8.
+(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+"The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis
+1924
+G.P., 2, 277-82. (Tr. Joan Riviere.)
+According to a statement in a footnote to the English translation (C.P., 2, 277), it was actually published before the
+German original. The present translation is based on that of
+1924.
+This paper was written by the end of May, 1924, for it was
+read by Abraham during that month. It continues the discussion begun in the earlier paper 'Neurosis and Psychosis'
+(1924b), p. 149 above, which it amplifies and corrects. Some
+doubts about the validity of the distinction drawn in these
+two papers were discussed by Freud later, in his paper on
+'Fetishism' (1927e).
+182
+
+THE LOSS OF REALITY IN NEUROSIS
+AND PSYCHOSIS
+I HAVE recently! indicated as one of the features which
+differentiate a neurosis from a psychosis the fact that in a
+neurosis the ego, in its dependence on reality, suppresses a piece
+of the id (of instinctual life), whereas in a psychosis, this same
+ego, in the service of the id, withdraws from a piece of reality.
+Thus for a neurosis the decisive factor would be the predominance of the influence of reality, whereas for a psychosis
+it would be the predominance of the id. In a psychosis, a loss
+of reality would necessarily be present, whereas in a neurosis,
+it would seem, this loss would be avoided.
+But this does not at all agree with the observation which all
+of us can make that every neurosis disturbs the patient's
+relation to reality in some way, that it serves him as a means of
+withdrawing from reality, and that, in its severe forms, it
+actually signifies a flight from real life. This contradiction seems
+a serious one; but it is easily resolved, and the explanation of it
+will in fact help us to understand neuroses.
+For the contradiction exists only as long as we keep our eyes
+fixed on the situation at the beginning of the neurosis, in which
+the ego, in the service of reality, sets about the repression of an
+instinctual impulse. This, however, is not yet the neurosis itself.
+The neurosis consists rather in the processes which provide a
+compensation for the portion of the id that has been damaged
+—that is to say, in the reaction against the repression and in the
+failure of the repression. The loosening of the relation to reality
+is a consequence of this second step in the formation of a
+neurosis, and it ought not to surprise us if a detailed examination shows that the loss of reality affects precisely that piece of
+reality as a result of whose demands the instinctual repression
+ensued.
+There is nothing new in our characterization of neurosis as
+the result of a repression that has failed. We have said this all
+along,? and it is only because of the new context in which we
+are viewing the subject that it has been necessary to repeat it.
+1 'Neurosis and Psychosis' (1924b) [this volume, p. 149].
+" [The notion that the 'return of the repressed' constitutes 'the illness
+
+184 REALITY IN NEUROSIS AND PSYCHOSIS
+Incidentally, the same objection arises in a specially marked
+manner when we are dealing with a neurosis in which the exciting cause (the "traumatic scene') is known, and in which one
+can see how the person concerned turns away from the experience and consigns it to amnesia. Let me go back by way of
+example to a case analysed a great many years ago, 1 in which
+the patient, a young woman, was in love with her brother-inlaw. Standing beside her sister's death-bed, she was horrified
+at having the thought: 'Now he is free and can marry me.'
+This scene was instantly forgotten, and thus the process of
+regression, & which led to her hysterical pains, was set in motion.
+It is instructive precisely in this case, moreover, to learn along
+what path the neurosis attempted to solve the conflict. It took
+away from the value of the change that had occurred in reality,
+by repressing the instinctual demand which had emerged
+that is, her love for her brother-in-law. The psychotic reaction
+would have been a disavowal of the fact of her sister's death.
+We might expect that when a psychosis comes into being,
+something analogous to the process in a neurosis occurs, though,
+of course, between different agencies of the mind; thus we
+might expect that in a psychosis, too, two steps could be
+discerned, of which the first would drag the ego away, this
+time from reality, while the second would try to make good the
+damage done and re-establish the subject's relations to reality
+at the expense of the id. And, in fact, some analogy of the sort
+can be observed in a psychosis. Here, too, there are two steps,
+the second of which has the character of a reparation.
+But beyond that the analogy gives way to a far more extensive
+similarity between the two processes. The second step of the
+psychosis is indeed intended to make good the loss of reality,
+proper is already stated in Draft K of the Fliess correspondence, of
+January 1, 1896 (Freud 1950a). A little later Freud restated this,
+using the actual words 'failure of defence' as equivalent to 'return of the
+repressed', in Section II of the second paper on "The Neuro-Psychoses
+of Defence' (1896b).]
+1 In Studies on Hysteria (1895d). [Standard Ed., 2, 156 and 167. The
+words of the patient, Frau Elisabeth von R., are not here quoted
+verbatim.]
+" [The German word is 'Regression', not "Verdrängung' (repression),
+in all editions.
+• [See Editor's footnote to The Infantile Genital Organization'
+(1923e), p. 143 above.]
+
+REALITY IN NEUROSIS AND PSYCHOSIS 185
+not, however, at the expense of a restriction of the id—as
+happens in neurosis at the expense of the relation to reality—
+but in another, more autocratic manner, by the creation of a
+new reality which no longer raises the same objections as the
+old one that has been given up. The second step, therefore, both
+in neurosis and psychosis, is supported by the same trends. In
+both cases it serves the desire for power of the id, which will
+not allow itself to be dictated to by reality. Both neurosis and
+psychosis are thus the expression of a rebellion on the part of
+the id against the external world, of its unwillingness-or, if
+one prefers, its incapacity—to adapt itself to the exigencies of
+reality, to 'Aváyun [Necessity]. 1 Neurosis and psychosis differ
+from each other far more in their first, introductory, reaction
+than in the attempt at reparation which follows it.
+Accordingly, the initial difference is expressed thus in the
+final outcome: in neurosis a piece of reality is avoided by a sort
+of flight, whereas in psychosis it is remodelled. Or we might
+phase of remodeling; in neurosis sucinetial obedience ve
+succeeded by a deferred attempt at flight. Or again, expressed
+in yet another way: neurosis does not disavow the reality, it
+only ignores it; psychosis disavows it and tries to replace it.
+We call behaviour 'normal' or 'healthy', if it combines certain
+features of both reactions—if it disavows the reality as little as
+does a neurosis, but if it then exerts itself, as does a psychosis, to
+effect an alteration of that reality. Of course, this expedient,
+normal, behaviour leads to work being carried out on the external world; it does not stop, as in psychosis, at effecting internal
+changes. It is no longer autoplastic but alloplastic.?
+In a psychosis, the transtorming of reality is carried out upon
+the psychical precipitates of former relations to it—that is, upon
+the memory-traces, ideas and judgements which have been
+previously derived from reality and by which reality was represented in the mind. But this relation was never a closed one; it
+was continually being enriched and altered by fresh perceptions.
+1 [See "The Economic Problem of Masochism' (1924c), p. 168 above.]
+& [These terms are possibly due to Ferenczi, who used them in a
+paper on "The Phenomena of Hysterical Materialization' (1919a, 24;
+English trans., 1926, 97). But he there appears to attribute them to
+Freud, who, however, does not seem to have used them elsewhere than
+in this passage.]
+S.F. XIX-N
+
+186
+REALITY IN NEUROSIS AND PSYCHOSIS
+Thus the psychosis is also faced with the task of procuring for
+itself perceptions of a kind which shall correspond to the new
+reality; and this is most radically effected by means of hallucination. The fact that, in so many forms and cases of psychosis, the
+paramnesias, the delusions and the hallucinations that occur
+are of a most distressing character and are bound up with a
+generation of anxiety—this fact is without doubt a sign that
+the whole process of remodelling is carried through against
+forces which oppose it violently. We may construct the process
+on the model of a neurosis, with which we are more familiar.
+There we see that a reaction of anxiety sets in whenever the
+repressed instinct makes a thrust forward, and that the outcome
+of the conflict is only a compromise and does not provide complete satisfaction. Probably in a psychosis the rejected piece of
+reality constantly forces itself upon the mind, just as the
+repressed instinct does in a neurosis, and that is why in both
+cases the consequences too are the same. The elucidation of the
+various mechanisms which are designed, in the psychoses, to
+turn the subject away from reality and to reconstruct reality
+-this is a task for specialized psychiatric study which has not
+yet been taken in hand.1
+There is, therefore, a further analogy between a neurosis
+and a psychosis, in that in both of them the task which is
+undertaken in the second step is partly unsuccessful. For the
+repressed instinct is unable to procure a full substitute (in
+neurosis); and the representation of reality cannot be remoulded into satisfying forms (not, at least, in every species of
+mental illness). But the emphasis is different in the two cases.
+In a psychosis it falls entirely on the first step, which is pathological in itself and cannot but lead to illness. In a neurosis, on
+the other hand, it falls on the second step, on the failure of the
+repression, whereas the first step may succeed, and does succeed
+in innumerable instances without overstepping the bounds of
+health—even though it does so at a certain price and not without leaving behind traces of the psychical expenditure it has
+called for. These distinctions, and perhaps many others as well,
+are a result of the topographical difference in the initial situation of the pathogenic conflict—namely whether in it the ego
+to however some beginning made by freed himsell in the case
+of paranoia (Standard Ed., 12, 69-71) and of 'paraphrenia' (ibid., 14,
+86-7, 203-4 and 230).]
+
+REALITY IN NEUROSIS AND PSYCHOSIS
+187
+yielded to its allegiance to the real world or to its dependence
+on the id.
+A neurosis usually contents itself with avoiding the piece of
+reality in question and protecting itself against coming into
+contact with it. The sharp distinction between neurosis and
+psychosis, however, is weakened by the circumstance that in
+neurosis, too, there is no lack of attempts to replace a disagreeable reality by one which is more in keeping with the subject's
+wishes. This is made possible by the existence of a world of
+phantasy, of a domain which became separated from the real
+external world at the time of the introduction of the reality
+principle. This domain has since been kept free from the
+demands of the exigencies of life, like a kind of 'reservation';
+it is not inaccessible to the ego, but is only loosely attached to it.
+It is from this world of phantasy that the neurosis draws the
+material for its new wishful constructions, and it usually finds
+that material along the path of regression to a more satisfying
+real past.
+It can hardly be doubted that the world of phantasy plays
+the same part in psychosis and that there, too, it is the storehouse from which the materials or the pattern for building the
+new reality are derived. But whereas the new, imaginary
+external world of a psychosis attempts to put itself in the place
+of external reality, that of a neurosis, on the contrary, is apt,
+like the play of children, to attach itself to a piece of reality—
+a different piece from the one against which it has to defend
+itself-and to lend that piece a special importance and a secret
+meaning which we (not always quite appropriately) call a
+symbolic one. Thus we see that both in neurosis and psychosis
+there comes into consideration the question not only of a loss
+of reality but also of a substitute for reality.
+1 [Cf. the paper on the 'Two Principles of Mental Functioning'
+(19116), Standard Ed., 12, 222 and footnote.]
+
+i
+A SHORT ACCOUNT OF
+PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
+
+KURZER ABRISS DER PSYCHOANALYSE
+(1923
+Date of Composition)
+1928
+G.S., 11, 183-200.
+1940
+G.W., 13, 403-27.
+(6) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+Psychoanalysis: Exploring the Hidden Recesses of the Mind'
+1924 In These Eventful Years: The Twentieth Century in the
+Making, as Told by Many of its Makers, Vol. II, Chap.
+LXXIII, 511-23, London and New York: Encyclopaedia Britannica Publishing Co. (Tr. A. A. Brill.)
+The present translation, with a changed title, is a new one by
+James Strachey.
+We learn from Ernest Jones (1957, 114) that this was written
+by Freud, at the request of the American publishers, in October
+and November, 1923. This work is to be distinguished from the
+article written
+some two years later for the Encyclopaedia
+Britannica itself (1926f). The original German text, with a less
+exciting title than the American one, was published for the first
+time in 1928.
+190
+
+A SHORT ACCOUNT OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
+I
+PSYCHO-ANALYSIs may be said to have been born with the
+twentieth century; for the publication in which it emerged
+before the world as something new—my Interpretation of Dreams
+—bears the date '1900'.1 But, as may well be supposed, it did
+not drop from the skies ready-made. It had its starting-point in
+older ideas, which it developed further; it sprang from earlier
+suggestions, which it elaborated. Any history of it must therefore begin with an account of the influences which determined
+its origin and should not overlook the times and circumstances
+that preceded its creation.
+Psycho-analysis grew up in a narrowly-restricted field. At
+the outset, it had only a single aim—that of understanding
+something of the nature of what were known as the 'functional'
+nervous diseases, with a view to overcoming the impotence
+which had so far characterized their medical treatment. The
+neurologists of that period had been brought up to have a high
+respect for chemico-physical and pathologico-anatomical facts;
+and they were latterly under the influence of the findings of
+Hitzig and Fritsch, of Ferrier, Goltz and others, who seemed to
+have established an intimate and possibly exclusive connection
+between certain functions and particular parts of the brain.
+They did not know what to make of the psychical factor and
+could not understand it. They left it to the philosophers, the
+mystics and—the quacks; and they considered it unscientific to
+have anything to do with it. Accordingly they could find no
+approach to the secrets of the neuroses, and in particular of
+the enigmatic 'hysteria', which was, indeed, the prototype of the
+whole species. As late as in 1885, when I was studying at the
+Salpêtrière, I found that people were content to account for
+hysterical paralyses by a formula which asserted that they were
+founded on slight functional disturbances of the same parts of
+the brain which, when they were severely damaged, led to the
+corresponding organic paralyses.
+Of course this lack of understanding affected the treatment of
+" [It was actually published at the beginning of November, 1899. Cf.
+Standard Ed., 4, xii. ]
+191
+
+192
+these pathological conditions badly as well. In general this consisted in measures designed to 'harden' the patient—in the prescription of medicines and in attempts, mostly very ill-contrived
+and executed in an unfriendly manner, at bringing mental
+influences to bear on him by threats, jeers and warnings and by
+exhorting him to make up his mind to "pull himself together.
+Electrical treatment was given out as being a specific cure for
+nervous conditions; but anyone who has endeavoured to carry
+out Erb's [1882] detailed instructions must marvel at the space
+that phantasy can occupy even in what professes to be an exact
+science. The decisive turn was taken in the eighties, when the
+phenomena of hypnotism made one more attempt to find
+admission to medical science—this time with more success than
+so often before, thanks to the work of Liébeault, Bernheim,
+Heidenhain and Forel. The essential thing was that the
+genuineness of these phenomena was recognized. Once this had
+been admitted, two fundamental and unforgettable lessons
+could not fail to be drawn from hypnotism. First, one was given
+convincing proof that striking somatic changes could after all
+be brought about solely by mental influences, which in this case
+one had oneself set in motion. Secondly, one received the clearest impression-especially from the behaviour of subjects after
+hypnosis-of the existence of mental processes that one could
+only describe as 'unconscious'. The 'unconscious' had, it is true,
+long been under discussion among philosophers as a theoretical concept; but now for the first time, in the phenomena of
+hypnotism, it became something actual, tangible and subject to
+experiment. Apart trom all this, hypnotic phenomena showed an
+unmistakable similarity to the manifestations of some neuroses.
+It is not easy to over-estimate the importance of the part
+played by hypnotism in the history of the origin of psychoanalysis. From a theoretical as well as from a therapeutic point
+of view, psycho-analysis has at its command a legacy which it
+has inherited from hypnotism.
+Hypnosis also proved a valuable aid in the study of the
+neuroses—once again, first and foremost, of hysteria. Charcot's
+experiments created a great impression. He suspected that certain paralyses which appeared after a trauma (an accident)
+were of a hysterical nature, and he showed that, by suggesting
+a trauma under hypnosis, he was able to provoke paralyses
+of the same sort artificially. The expectation was thus raised
+
+193
+that traumatic influences might in all cases play a part in the
+production of hysterical symptoms. Charcot himself made
+no further efforts towards a psychological understanding of
+hysteria; but his pupil, Pierre Janet, took up the question and
+was able to show, with the help of hypnosis, that the symptoms
+of hysteria were firmly dependent on certain unconscious
+thoughts (idées fixes). Janet attributed to hysteria a supposed
+constitutional incapacity for holding mental processes together
+—an incapacity which led to a disintegration (dissociation) of
+mental life.
+Psycho-analysis, however, was not in any way based on these
+researches of Janet's. The decisive factor in its case was the
+experience of a Viennese physician, Dr. Josef Breuer. In 1881,
+independently of any outside influence, he was able with the
+help of hypnosis to study and restore to health a highly-gifted
+girl who suffered from hysteria.! Breuer's findings were not
+given to the public until fifteen years later, after he had taken
+the present writer (Freud) into collaboration. This case of
+Breuer's retains its unique significance for our understanding of
+the neuroses to this day; so that we cannot avoid dwelling on it
+a little longer. It is essential to realize clearly in what its peculiarity consisted. The girl had fallen ill while she was nursing her
+father, to whom she was tenderly attached. Breuer was able to
+establish that all her symptoms were related to this period of
+nursing and could be explained by it. Thus it had for the first
+time become possible to obtain a complete view of a case of this
+puzzling neurosis, and all its symptoms had turned out to have
+a meaning. Further, it was a universal leature of the symptoms
+that they had arisen in situations involving an impulse to an
+action which, however, had not been carried out but had for
+other reasons been suppressed. The symptoms had, in fact,
+appeared in place of the actions that were not performed. Thus,
+to explain the aetiology of hysterical symptoms, we were led to
+the subject's emotional life (to affectivity) and to the interplay.
+of mental forces (to dynamics); and since then these two lines of
+approach have never been dropped.
+The precipitating causes of the symptoms were compared by
+Breuer to Charcot's traumas. Now it was a remarkable fact that
+all these traumatic precipitating causes, and all the mental
+impulses starting from them, were lost to the patient's memory,
+" [Cf. Standard Ed., 2, 21 ff]
+
+194
+as though they had never happened; while their products—the
+symptoms—persisted unaltered, as though, so far as they were
+concerned, there was no such thing as the effacing effect of
+time. Here, therefore, we had a fresh proof of the existence of
+mental processes which were unconscious but for that very
+reason especially powerful-processes which we had first come
+to know in post-hypnotic suggestion. The therapeutic procedure adopted by Breuer was to induce the patient, under
+hypnosis, to remember the forgotten traumas and to react to
+them with powerful expressions of affect. When this had been
+done, the symptom, which had till then taken the place of these
+expressions of emotion, disappeared. Thus one and the same
+procedure served simultaneously the purposes of investigating
+and of getting rid of the ailment; and this unusual conjunction
+was later retained in psycho-analysis.
+After the present writer had, during the early nineties, confirmed Breuer's results in a considerable number of patients,
+the two, Breuer and Freud, together decided on a publication,
+Studies on Hysteria (1895d), which contained their findings and
+an attempt at a theory based on them. This asserted that
+hysterical symptoms arose when the affect of a mental process
+cathected with a strong affect was forcibly prevented from
+being worked over consciously in the normal way and was thus
+diverted into a wrong path. In cases of hysteria, according to
+this theory, the affect passed over into an unusual somatic
+innervation ('conversion'), but could be given another direction
+and got rid of ('abreacted), if the experience were revived
+water he Cour The author feet a pranduath name of
+The cathartic method was the immediate precursor of psychoanalysis; and, in spite of every extension of experience and of
+every modification of theory, is still' contained within it as its
+nucleus. But it was no more than a new medical procedure for
+• influencing certain nervous diseases, and nothing suggested that
+it might become a subject for the most general interest and for
+the most violent contradiction.
+Soon after the publication of Studies on Hysteria the partnership between Breuer and Freud came to an end. Breuer, who
+
+195
+was in reality a consultant in internal medicine, gave up treating nervous patients, and Freud devoted himself to the further
+perfection of the instrument left over to him by his elder collaborator. The technical novelties which he introduced and the
+discoveries which he made changed the cathartic method into
+psycho-analysis. The most momentous step, no doubt, was his
+determination to do without the assistance of hypnosis in his
+technical procedure. He did so for two reasons: first, because,
+in spite of a course of instruction with Bernheim at Nancy, he
+did not succeed in inducing hypnosis in a sufficient number of
+cases, and secondly, because he was dissatisfied with the therapeutic results of catharsis based on hypnosis. It is true that
+these results were striking and appeared after a treatment of
+short duration, but they turned out not to be permanent and to
+depend too much on the patient's personal relations with the
+physician. The abandonment of hypnosis made a breach in the
+course of development of the procedure up to then, and it
+meant a fresh start.
+Hypnosis had, however, performed the service of restoring to
+the patient's memory what he had forgotten. It was necessary to
+find some other technique to replace it; and the idea occurred
+to Freud of substituting for it the method of 'free association'.
+That is to say, he pledged his patients to refrain from any conscious reflection and to abandon themselves, in a state of quiet
+concentration, to following the ideas which occurred to them
+spontaneously (involuntarily) — "to skim off the surface of their
+consciousness'.! They were to communicate these ideas to the
+physician even if they felt objections to doing so, if, for instance,
+the thoughts seemed too disagreeable, too senseless, too unimportant or irrelevant. The choice of free association as a
+means of investigating the forgotten unconscious material
+seems so strange that a word in justification of it will not be out
+of place. Freud was led to it by an expectation that the so-called
+'free' association would prove in fact to be unfree, since, when
+all conscious intellectual purposes had been suppressed, the
+ideas that emerged would be seen to be determined by the
+unconscious material. This expectation was justified by experience. When the 'fundamental rule of psycho-analysis' which has
+1 [The reason for the inverted commas is not clear. See, however, the
+similar phrase in Freud's contribution on 'Psycho-Analysis' to Marcuse's
+encyclopaedia (1923a), Standard Ed., 18, 238.]
+
+196
+just been stated was obeyed, the course of free association produced a plentiful store of ideas which could put one on the
+track of what the patient had forgotten. To besure, this material
+did not bring up what had actually been forgotten, but it
+brought up such plain and numerous hints at it that, with the
+help of a certain amount of supplementing and interpreting,
+the doctor was able to guess (to reconstruct) the forgotten
+material from it. Thus free association together with the art of
+interpretation performed the same function as had previously
+been performed by hypnotism.
+It looked as though our work had been made much more
+difficult and complicated; but the inestimable gain was that an
+insight was now obtained into an interplay of forces which had
+been concealed from the observer by the hypnotic state. It
+became evident that the work of uncovering what had been
+pathogenically forgotten had to struggle against a constant and
+very intense resistance. The critical objections which the patient
+raised in order to avoid communicating the ideas which
+occurred to him, and against which the fundamental rule of
+psycho-analysis was directed, had themselves already been
+manifestations of this resistance. A consideration of the phenomena of resistance led to one of the corner-stones of the psychoanalytic theory of the neuroses —the theory of repression. It was
+plausible to suppose that the same forces which were now
+struggling against the pathogenic material being made conscious had at an earlier time made the same efforts with
+success. A gap in the aetiology of neurotic symptoms was thus
+filled. The impressions and mental impulses, for which the
+symptoms were now serving as substitutes, had not been forgotten without reason or on account of a constitutional incapacity for synthesis (as Janet supposed); they had, through
+the influence of other mental forces, met with a repression the
+success and evidence of which was precisely their being debarred from consciousness and excluded from memory. It was
+only in consequence of this repression that they had become
+pathogenic-that, is, had succeeded in manifesting themselves
+along unusual paths as symptoms.
+A conflict between two groups of mental trends had to be
+looked on as the ground for repression and accordingly as the
+cause of every neurotic illness. And here experience taught us
+a new and surprising fact about the nature of the forces that
+
+197
+were struggling against each other. Repression invariably proceeded from the sick person's conscious personality (his ego) and
+took its stand on aesthetic and ethical motives; the impulses that
+were subjected to repression were those of selfishness and
+cruelty, which can be summed up in general as evil, but above
+all sexual wishful impulses, often of the crudest and most forbidden kind. Thus the symptoms were a substitute for forbidden
+satisfactions and the illness seemed to correspond to an incomplete subjugation of the immoral side of human beings.
+Advance in knowledge made ever clearer the enormous part
+played in menta. lite by sexual wishtul impulses, and led to a
+detailed study of the nature and development of the sexual
+instinct. ' But we also came upon another purely empirical finding, in the discovery that the experiences and conflicts of the
+first years of childhood play an unsuspectedly important part
+in the individual's development and leave behind them ineffaceable dispositions bearing upon the period of maturity.
+This led to the revelation of something that had hitherto
+been fundamentally overlooked by science-intantile sexuality,
+which, from the tenderest age onwards, is manifested both in
+physical reactions and in mental attitudes. In order to bring
+together this sexuality of children with what is described as
+the normal sexuality of adults and the abnormal sexual life of
+perverts, the concept of what was sexual had itself to be corrected and widened in a manner which could be justified by
+the evolution of the sexual instinct.
+After hypnosis was replaced by the technique of free association, Breuer's cathartic procedure turned into psycho-analysis,
+which for more than a decade was developed by the author
+(Freud) alone. During that time psycho-analysis gradually
+acquired a theory which appeared to give a satisfactory account
+of the origin, meaning and purpose of neurotic symptoms and
+provided a rational basis for medical attempts at curing the
+complaint. I will once again enumerate the factors that go to
+make up this theory. They are: emphasis on instinctual life
+(affectivity), on mental dynamics, on the fact that even the
+apparently most obscure and arbitrary mental phenomena
+invariably have a meaning and a causation, the theory of psychical conflict and of the pathogenic nature of repression, the view
+that symptoms are substitutive satisfactions, the recognition of
+1 Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d).
+
+198
+the aetiological importance of sexual life, and in particular of
+the beginnings of infantile sexuality. From a philosophical
+standpoint this theory was bound to adopt the view that the
+mental does not coincide with the conscious, that mental processes are in themselves unconscious and are only made conscious by the functioning of special organs (agencies or systems).
+By way of completing this list, I will add that among the
+affective attitudes of childhood the complicated emotional
+relation of children to their parents—what is known as the
+Oedipus complex—came into prominence. It became ever
+clearer that this was the nucleus of every case of neurosis, and
+in the patient's behaviour towards his analyst certain phenomena of his emotional transference emerged which came to be
+of great importance for theory and technique alike.
+In the form which it thus assumed, the psycho-analytic
+theory of the neuroses already contained a number of things
+which ran counter to accepted opinions and inclinations and
+which were calculated to provoke astonishment, repugnance
+and scepticism in outsiders: for instance, the attitude of psychoanalysis to the problem of the unconscious, its recognition of an
+infantile sexuality and the stress it laid on the sexual factor in
+mental life generally. But more was to follow.
+III
+In order to reach even half way to an understanding of how,
+in a hysterical girl, a forbidden sexual wish can change into a
+painful symptom, it had been necessary to make far-reaching
+and complicated hypotheses about the structure and functioning of the mental apparatus. There was an evident contradiction here between expenditure of effort and result. If the
+conditions postulated by psycho-analysis really existed, they
+were of a fundamental nature and must be able to find expression in other phenomena besides hysterical ones. But if this
+inference were correct, psycho-analysis would have ceased to
+be of interest only to neurologists; it could claim the attention of everyone to whom psychological research was of any
+importance. Its findings would not only have to be taken into
+account in the field of pathological mental life but could not be
+overlooked either in coming to an understanding of normal
+functioning.
+
+199
+Evidence of its being of use for throwing light on other than
+pathological mental activity was early forthcoming in connection with two kinds of phenomena: with the very trequent parapraxes that occur in everyday life—such as forgetting things,
+slips of the tongue, and mislaying objects—and with the dreams
+dreamt by healthy and psychically normal people. Small failures
+of functioning, like the temporary forgetting of normally
+familiar proper names, slips of the tongue and of the pen, and
+so on, had hitherto not been considered worthy of any explanation at all or were supposed to be accounted for by conditions
+of fatigue, by distraction of the attention, etc. The present
+writer then showed from many examples, in his book The
+Psychopathology of Everyday Life (19016), that events of this kind
+have a meaning, and arise owing to a conscious intention being
+interfered with by another, suppressed or actually unconscious
+one. As a rule, quick reflection or a short analysis is enough to
+reveal the interfering influence. Owing to the frequency of such
+parapraxes as slips of the tongue, it became easy for anyone to
+convince himself from his own experience of the existence of
+mental processes which are not conscious, but which are nevertheless operative and which at least find expression as inhibitions and modifications of other, intended acts.
+The analysis of dreams led further: it was brought to public
+notice by the present writer as early as in 1900 in The Interpretation of Dreams. This showed that dreams are constructed in
+just the same way as neurotic symptoms. Like them, they may
+appear strange and senseless; but, if we examine them by a
+technique which differs little from the free association used in
+psycho-analysis, we are led from their manifest content to a
+secret meaning, to the latent dream-thoughts. This latent meaning is always a wishful impulse which is represented as fulfilled
+at the moment of the dream. But, except in young children and
+under the pressure of imperative physical needs, this secret
+wish can never be expressed recognizably. It has first to submit
+to a distortion, which is the work of restrictive, censoring forces
+in the dreamer's ego. In this way the manifest dream, as it is
+remembered in waking life, comes about. It is distorted, to the
+pitch of being unrecognizable, by concessions made to the dreamcensorship; but it can be revealed once more by analysis as an
+expression of a situation of satisfaction or as the fulfilment of a
+wish. It is a compromise between two conflicting groups of
+
+200
+mental trends, just as we have found to be the case with
+hysterical symptoms. The formula which, at bottom, best
+meets the essence of the dream is this: a dream is a (disguised)
+fulfilment of a (repressed) wish. The study of the process which
+transforms the latent dream-wish into the manifest content of
+the dream—a process known as the 'dream-work'—has taught
+us the best part of what we know of unconscious mental
+life.
+Now a dream is not a morbid symptom but a product of the
+normal mind. The wishes which it represents as fulfilled are the
+same as those which are repressed in neuroses. Dreams owe the
+possibility of their genesis merely to the favourable circumstance
+that during the state of sleep, which paralyses man's power of
+movement, repression is mitigated into the dream-censorship.
+If, however, the process of dream-formation oversteps certain
+limits, the dreamer brings it to a stop and wakes up in a fright.
+Thus it is proved that the same forces and the same processes
+taking place between them operate in normal as in pathological
+mental life. From the date of The Interpretation of Dreams psychoanalysis had a twofold significance. It was not only a new
+method of treating the neuroses but it was also a new psychology; it claimed the attention not only of nerve-specialists but
+also of all those who were students of a menta Iscience.
+The reception given it in the scientific world was, however, no
+friendly one. For some ten years no one took any notice of
+Freud's works. About the year 1907 attention was drawn to
+psycho-analysis by a group of Swiss psychiatrists (Bleuler and
+Jung, in Zurich), and a storm of indignation, which was not
+precisely fastidious in its methods and arguments, thereupon
+broke out, particularly in Germany. In this, psycho-analysis
+was sharing the fate of many novelties which, after a certain
+lapse of time, have found general recognition. Nevertheless it
+lay in its nature that it should inevitably arouse particularly
+violent opposition. It wounded the prejudices of civilized
+humanity at some specially sensitive spots. It subjected every
+individual, as it were, to the analytic reaction, by uncovering
+what had by universal agreement been repressed into the unconscious, and in this way it forced its contemporaries to behave
+like patients who, under analytic treatment, above all else bring
+their resistances to the fore. It must also be admitted that it was
+no easy thing to become convinced of the correctness of the
+
+201
+psycho-analytic theories, nor to obtain instruction in the practice
+of analysis.
+The general hostility, however, did not succeed in preventing
+psycho-analysis from continuous expansion during the next
+decade in two directions: on the map, for interest in it was constantly cropping up in new countries, and in the field of the
+mental sciences, for it was constantly finding applications in
+new branches of knowledge. In 1909 President G. Stanley Hall
+invited Freud and Jung to give a series of lectures at Clark
+University in Worcester, Mass., of which he was the head and
+where they were given a friendly reception. Since then psychoanalysis has remained popular in America, although precisely
+in that country its name has been coupled with much superficiality and some abuses. As early as in 1911, Havelock Ellis
+was able to report that analysis was studied and practised, not
+only in Austria and Switzerland, but also in the United States,
+in England, India, Canada, and, no doubt, in Australia too.
+It was in this period of struggle and of first blossoming, moreover, that the periodicals devoted exclusively to psycho-analysis
+were inaugurated. These were the Fahrbuch für psychoanalytische
+und psychopathologische Forschungen [Yearbook for Psycho-Analytic
+and Psychopathological Researches] (1909-1914), directed by
+Bleuler and Freud and edited by Jung, which ceased publication at the outbreak of the World War, the Zentralblatt für
+nationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse [International Journal for
+Psycho-Analysis] (1913, to-day in its tenth volume); further,
+since 1912, Imago, founded by Rank and Sachs, a periodical for
+the application of psycho-analysis to the mental sciences. The
+great interest taken in the subject by Anglo-American doctors
+was shown in 1913 by the founding of the still active Psycho-
+Analytic Review by White and Jelliffe. Later, in 1920, The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, intended specially for readers
+in England, made its appearance under the editorship of
+Ernest Jones. The Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag
+and the corresponding English undertaking, The International
+Psycho-Analytical Press, brought out a continuous series of
+analytic publications under the name of the Internationale
+Psychoanalytische Bibliothek (International Psycho-Analytical
+Library). The literature of psycho-analysis is, of course, not to
+S.P. XIX-O
+
+202
+be found only in these periodicals, which are for the most part
+supported by psycho-analytic societies; it appears far and wide
+in a great number of places, in scientific and in literary publications. Among the periodicals of the Latin world which pay
+special attention to psycho-analysis the Rivista de Psiquiatria,
+edited by H. Delgado in Lima (Peru), may be specially mentioned.
+An essential difference between this second decade of psychoanalysis and the first lay in the fact that the present writer was
+no longer its sole representative. A constantly growing circle of
+pupils and followers had collected around him, who devoted
+themselves first to the diffusion of the theories of psycho-analysis
+and then extended them, supplemented them and carried them
+deeper. In the course of years, several of these supporters, as was
+inevitable, seceded, took their own paths, or turned themselves
+into an opposition which seemed to threaten the continuity of
+the development of psycho-analysis. Between 1911 and 1913
+C. G. Jung in Zurich and Alfred Adler in Vienna produced
+some stir by their attempts at giving new interpretations to the
+facts of analysis and their efforts at a diversion from the analytic
+standpoint. But it soon appeared that these secessions had
+effected no lasting damage. What temporary success they
+achieved was easily accounted for by the readiness of the mass
+of people to have themselves set free from the pressure of the
+demands of psycho-analysis by whatever path might be opened
+to them. The great majority of co-workers remained firm and
+continued their work along the lines indicated to them. We
+shall come on their names repeatedly in the short account below
+of the findings of psycho-analysis in the many and various fields
+of its application.
+IV
+The noisy rejection of psycho-analysis by the medical world
+could not deter its supporters from developing it, to begin with,
+along its original lines into a specialized pathology and treatment of the neuroses—a task which has not been completely
+accomplished even to-day. Its undeniable therapeutic success,
+which far exceeded any that had previously been achieved,
+constantly spurred them on to fresh efforts; while the difficulties
+which came to light as the material was examined more deeply
+led to profound alterations in the technique of analysis and to
+
+203
+important corrections in its theoretical hypotheses and postulates.
+In the course of this development, the technique of psychoanalysis has become as definite and as delicate as that of any
+other specialized branch of medicine. A failure to understand
+this fact has led to many abuses (particularly in England and
+America) because people who have acquired only a literary
+knowledge of psycho-analysis from reading consider themselves
+capable of undertaking analytic treatments without having
+received any special training. The consequences of such behaviour are damaging both to the science and to the patients
+and have brought much discredit upon psycho-analysis. The
+foundation of a first psycho-analytic out-patient clinic (by Max
+Eitingon in Berlin in 1920) has therefore become a step of high
+practical importance. This institute seeks on the one hand to
+make analytic treatment accessible to wide circles of the population and on the other hand undertakes the education of
+doctors to be practical analysts by a course of training which
+includes as a condition that the learner shall agree to be
+analysed himself.
+Among the hypothetical concepts which enable the doctor to
+deal with the analytic material, the first to be mentioned is that
+of 'libido'. Libido means in psycho-analysis in the first instance
+the force (thought ofas quantitatively variable and measurable)
+of the sexual instincts directed towards an object—'sexual' in
+the extended sense required by analytic theory. Further study
+showed that it was necessary to set alongside this object-libido'
+a 'narcissistic' or 'ego-libido', directed to the subject's own ego;
+and the interaction of these two forces has enabled us to
+account for a great number of normal and abnormal processes
+in mental life. A rough distinction was soon made between what
+are known as the 'transference neuroses' and the narcissistic
+disorders. The former (hysteria and obsessional neurosis) are the
+objects proper of psycho-analytic treatment, while the others,
+the narcissistic neuroses, though they can, it is true, be examined
+by the help of analysis, offer fundamental difficulties to therapeutic influence. It is true that the libido theory of psychoanalysis is by no means complete and that its relation to a
+general theory of the instincts is not yet clear, for psychoanalysis is a young science, quite unfinished and in a stage of
+rapid development. Here, however, it should be emphatically
+
+204
+pointed out how erroneous the charge of pan-sexualism is which
+is so often levelled at psycho-analysis. It seeks to show that
+psycho-analytic theory knows of no mental motive forces other
+than purely sexual ones and in doing so exploits popular
+prejudices by using the word 'sexual' not in its analytic but in
+its vulgar sense.
+The psycho-analytic view would also have to include in
+narcissistic disorders all the ailments described in psychiatry as
+'functional psychoses'
+. It could not be doubted that neuroses
+and psychoses are not separated by a hard and fast line, any
+more than health and neurosis; and it was plausible to explain
+the mysterious psychotic phenomena by the discoveries achieved
+on the neuroses, which had hitherto been equally incomprehensible. The present writer had himself, during the period of
+his isolation, made a case of paranoid illness partly intelligible
+by an analytic investigation and had pointed out in this
+unquestionable psychosis the same contents (complexes) and a
+similar interplay of forces as in the simple neuroses.! Bleuler
+[1906] followed out the indications of what he called Freudian
+mechanisms' in a whole number of psychoses, and Jung won
+high opinions as an analyst at a single blow when, in 1907, 2 he
+explained the most eccentric symptoms in the end-stages of
+dementia praecox from the individual life-histories of the
+patients. The comprehensive study of schizophrenia by Bleuler
+(1911) probably demonstrated once and for all the justification
+of a psycho-analytic angle of approach for the understanding of
+these psychoses.
+In this way psychiatry became the first field to which psychoanalysis was applied and it has remained so ever since. The
+same research workers who have done most to deepen analytic
+knowledge of the neuroses, such as Karl Abraham in Berlin and
+Sándor Ferenczi in Budapest (to name only the most prominent), have also played a leading part in throwing analytic
+light on the psychoses. The conviction of the unity and intimate
+connection of all the disorders that present themselves as
+neurotic and psychotic phenomena is becoming more and more
+firmly established despite all the efforts of the psychiatrists.
+People are beginning to understand—best of all, perhaps, in
+' [See Section III of Freud's second paper on the neuro-psychoses of
+defence (1896b).]
+" [This is misprinted '1901' in both the German editions.]
+
+205
+America-that the psycho-analytic study of the neuroses is the
+thay preparation yis is destined o lina of possible a scie, and
+psychiatry of the future which will not need to content itself
+with describing curious clinical pictures and unintelligible
+sequences of events and with tracing the influence of gross
+anatomical and toxic traumas upon a mental apparatus which
+is inaccessible to our knowledge.
+V
+But the importance of psycho-analysis for psychiatry would
+never have drawn the attention of the intellectual world to it or
+won it a place in The History of our Times, 1 This result was
+brought about by the relation of psycho-analysis to normal, not
+to pathological, mental life. Originally, analytic research had
+indeed no other aim than to establish the determinants of the
+onset (the genesis) of a few morbid mental states. In the course
+of its efforts, however, it succeeded in bringing to light facts of
+fundamental importance, in actually creating a new psychology, so that it became obvious that the validity of such findings
+could not possibly be restricted to the sphere of pathology. We
+have seen already when it was that the decisive proof was produced of the correctness of this conclusion. It was when dreams
+were successfully interpreted by analytic technique-dreams,
+which are a part of the mental life of normal people and which
+yet may in fact be regarded as pathological products that can
+regularly appear under healthy conditions.
+If the psychological discoveries gained from the study of
+dreams were firmly kept in view, only one further step was
+needed before psycho-analysis could be proclaimed as the
+theory of the deeper mental processes not directly accessible to
+consciousness—as a 'depth-psychology' —and before it could be
+applied to almost all the mental sciences. This step lay in the
+transition from the mental activity of individual men to the
+psychical tunctions of human communities and peoples-that
+is, from individual to group psychology; and many surprising
+analogies forced this transition upon us. It had been found, for
+instance, that in the deep strata of unconscious mental activity
+contraries are not distinguished from each other but are
+" [In English in the original—a probable allusion to the title of the
+publication for which this paper was written.]
+
+206
+expressed by the same element. But already in 1884 Karl Abel
+the philologist had put forward the view (in his 'Uber den Gegensinn der Urworte'1) that the oldest languages known to us
+treat contraries in the same way. Thus Ancient Egyptian, for
+example, had in the first instance only one word for 'strong' and
+'weak'
+, and not till later were the two sides of the antithesis
+distinguished by slight modifications. Even in the most modern
+languages clear relics of such antithetical meanings are to be
+found. So in German 'Boden' ['garret' or 'ground'] means the
+highest as well as the lowest thing in the house; similarly in Latin
+"altus' means 'high' and 'deep'. Thus the equivalence of contraries in dreams is a universal archaic trait in human thinking.
+To take an instance from another field. It is impossible to
+escape the impression of the perfect correspondence which can
+be discovered between the obsessive actions of certain obsessional patients and the religious observances of believers all over
+the world. 2 Some cases of obsessional neurosis actually behave
+like a caricature of a private religion, so that it is tempting to
+liken the official religions to an obsessional neurosis that has
+been mitigated by becoming universalized. This comparison,
+which is no doubt highly objectionable to all believers, has
+nevertheless proved most fruitful psychologically. For psychoanalysis soon discovered in the case of obsessional neurosis what
+the forces are that struggle with one another in it till their conflicts find a remarkable expression in the ceremonial of obsessive
+actions. Nothing similar was suspected in the case of religious
+ceremonial until, by tracing back religious feeling to the relation
+with the father as its deepest root, it became possible to point to
+an analogous dynamic situation in that case too. & This instance,
+moreover, may warn the reader that even in its application to
+non-medical fields psycho-analysis cannot avoid wounding
+cherished prejudices, touching upon deeply-rooted sensibilities
+and thus provoking enmities which have an essentially emotional
+basis.
+If we may assume that the most general features of unconscious mental life (conflicts between instinctual impulses, repressions and substitutive satisfactions) are present everywhere, and
+if there is a depth-psychology which leads to a knowledge of
+" ['The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words' Cf. Freud, 1910e.]
+• [Cf. Freud, 'Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices' (19076).]
+3 [Cf. Totem and Taboo, 1912-13.]
+
+207
+those features, then we may reasonably expect that the application of psycho-analysis to the most varied spheres of human
+mental activity will everywhere bring to light important and
+hitherto unattainable results. In an exceedingly valuable study,
+Otto Rank and Hanns Sachs (1913) have tried to bring together what the work of psycho-analysts had been able to
+achieve up to that time towards fulfilling these expectations.
+Lack of space prevents me from attempting to complete their
+enumeration here. I can only select for mention the most
+important findings with the addition of a few details.
+İf we leave little-known internal urges out of account, we may
+say that the main motive force towards the cultural development of man has been real external exigency, which has withheld from him the easy satisfaction of his natural needs and
+exposed him to immense dangers. This external frustration
+drove him into a struggle with reality, which ended partly in
+adaptation to it and partly in control over it; but it also drove
+him into working and living in common with those of his kind,
+and this already involved a renunciation of a number of
+instinctual impulses which could not be satisfied socially. With
+the further advances of civilization the demands of repression
+also grew. Civilization is after all built entirely on renunciation
+of instinct, and every individual on his journey from childhood
+to maturity has in his own person to recapitulate this development of humanity to a state of judicious resignation. Psychoanalysis has shown that it is predominantly, though not
+exclusively, sexual instinctual impulses that have succumbed to
+this cultura. suppression. Une portion of them, however,
+exhibit the valuable characteristic of allowing themselves to be
+diverted from their immediate aims and of thus placing their
+energy at the disposal of cultural development in the form of
+"sublimated' trends. But another portion persist in the unconscious as unsatisfied wishes and press for some, even if it is
+distorted, satisfaction.
+We have seen that one part of human mental activity is
+directed towards obtaining control over the real external world.
+Psycho-analysis now tells us further that another, particularly
+highly-prized, part of creative mental work serves for the fulfilment of wishes—for the substitutive satisfaction of the
+repressed wishes which, from the days of childhood, live in the
+spirit of each of us, unsatistied. Among these creations, whose
+
+208
+connection with an incomprehensible unconscious was always
+suspected, are myths and works of imaginative writing and of
+art, and the researches of psycho-analysts have in fact thrown a
+flood of light on the fields of mythology, the science of literature,
+and the psychology of artists. It is enough to mention Otto
+Rank's work as an example. We have shown that myths and
+fairy tales can be interpreted like dreams, we have traced the
+convoluted paths that lead from the urge of the unconscious
+wish to its realization in a work of art, we have learnt to understand the emotional effect of a work of art on the observer, and
+in the case of the artist himself we have made clear his internal
+kinship with the neurotic as well as his distinction from him, and
+we have pointed out the connection between his innate disposition, his chance experiences and his achievements. The
+aesthetic appreciation of works of art and the elucidation of the
+artistic gift are, it is true, not among the tasks set to psychoanalysis. But it seems that psycho-analysis is in a position to
+speak the decisive word in all questions that touch upon the
+imaginative life of man.
+And now, as a third point, psycho-analysis has shown us, to
+our growing astonishment, the enormously important part
+played by what is known as the 'Oedipus complex'-that is, the
+emotional relation of a child to its two parents—in the mental
+life of human beings. Our astonishment diminishes when we
+realize that the Oedipus complex is the psychical correlate of
+two fundamental biological facts: the long period of the human
+child's dependence, and the remarkable way in which its sexual
+life reaches a first climax in the third to fifth years of life, and
+then, after a period of inhibition, sets in again at puberty. And
+here, the discovery was made that a third and extremely serious
+part of human intellectual activity, the part which has created
+the great institutions of religion, law, ethics, and all forms of
+civic life, has as its fundamental aim the enabling of the
+individual to master his Oedipus complex and to divert his
+libido from its infantile attachments into the social ones that are
+ultimately desired. The applications of psycho-analysis to the
+science of religion and sociology (e.g. by the present writer,
+Theodor Reik and Oskar Pfister), which have led to these findings, are still young and insufficiently appreciated; but it cannot be doubted that further studies will only confirm the
+certainty of these important conclusions.
+
+... i
+209
+By way, as it were, of postscript, I must also mention that
+educationists, too, cannot avoid making use of the hints which
+they have received from the analytic exploration of the mental
+life of children; and further that voices have been raised among
+therapists (e.g. Groddeck and Jelliffe, maintaining that the
+psycho-analytic treatment of serious organic complaints shows
+promising results, since in many of these affections some part is
+played by a psychical tactor on which it is possible to bring
+influence to bear.
+Thus we may express our expectation that psycho-analysis,
+whose development and achievements hitherto have been
+briefly and inadequately related in these pages, will enter into
+the cultural development of the next decades as a significant
+ferment, and will help to deepen our understanding of the
+world and to fight against some things in life which are
+recognized as injurious. It must not be forgotten, however, that
+psycho-analysis alone cannot offer a complete picture of the
+world. If we accept the distinction which I have recently proposed of dividing the mental apparatus into an ego, turned
+towards the external world and equipped with consciousness,
+and an unconscious id, dominated by its instinctual needs, then
+psycho-analysis is to be described as a psychology of the id (and
+of its effects upon the ego). In each field of knowledge, therefore,
+it can make only contributions, which require to be completed
+from the psychology of the ego.! If these contributions often
+contain the essence of the facts, this only corresponds to the
+important part which, it may be claimed, is played in our lives
+by the mental unconscious that has so long remained unknown.
+on the super payn thanasa, to be imposing unusual restrictions
+
+THE RESISTANCES TO
+PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
+(1925 [1924])
+
+DIE WIDERSTÄNDE GEGEN DIE PSYCHOANALYSE
+(a) GERMAN EDITIONS
+1975 La Revue Fuive (Geneva), March. In a French trans
+lation.)
+1925
+1925
+1926
+1928
+1948
+Imago, 11 (3), 222-33.
+Almanach 1926, 9-21.
+Psychoanalyse der Neurosen, 185-98.
+G.S., 11, 224-35.
+G.W., 14, 99-110.
+(6) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+"The Resistances to Psycho-Analysis'
+1950 G.P., 5, 163-74. (Tr. James Strachey.)
+The present translation is a slightly corrected version of the
+one published in 1950.
+Freud's name was on the 'Editorial Committee' of the
+periodical in which this essay first appeared in French. It was
+written at the request of the actual editor, Albert Cohen,
+probably in September, 1924. The German original appeared
+almost simultaneously in Imago and in the Almanach 1926,
+which was published in September, 1925—some six months
+after the French issue.
+212
+
+THE RESISTANCES TO PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
+A cHILD in his nurse's arms will turn away screaming at the
+sight of a strange face; a pious man will begin the new season
+with a prayer and he will also greet the first fruits of the year
+with a blessing; a peasant will refuse to buy a scythe unless it
+bears the trade-mark that was familiar to his parents. The
+distinction between these situations is obvious and would seem
+to justify one in looking for a different motive in each of them.
+Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to overlook what they
+have in common. In each case we are dealing with unpleasure
+of the same kind. The child expresses it in an elementary
+fashion, the pious man lulls it by an artifice, while the peasant
+uses it as the motive for a decision. The source of this unpleasure is the demand made upon the mind by anything that
+is new, the psychical expenditure that it requires, the uncertainty, mounting up to anxious expectancy, which it brings
+along with it. It would be interesting to devote a whole study
+to mental reactions to novelty; for under certain, no longer
+primary, conditions we can observe behaviour of the contrary
+kind—a thirst for stimulation which flings itself upon anything
+that is new merely because it is new.
+In scientific affairs there should be no place for recoiling
+from novelty. Science, in her perpetual incompleteness and insufficiency, is driven to hope for her salvation in new discoveries
+and new ways of regarding things. She does well, in order not
+to be deceived, to arm herselt with scepticism and to accept
+nothing new unless it has withstood the strictest examination.
+Sometimes, however, this scepticism shows two unexpected
+features; it may be sharply directed against what is new while
+it spares what is tamiliar and accepted, and it may be content
+to reject things before it has examined them. But in behaving
+thus it reveals itself as a prolongation of the primitive reaction
+against what is new and as a cloak for the retention of that
+reaction. It is a matter of common knowledge how often in the
+history of scientific research it has happened that innovations
+have met with intense and stubborn resistance, while subsequent events have shown that the resistance was unjustified
+and that the novelty was valuable and important. What
+213
+
+214
+provoked the resistance was, as a rule, certain factors in the
+subject-matter of the novelty, while, on the other side, several
+factors must have combined to make the irruption of the
+primitive reaction possible.
+A particularly bad reception was accorded to psychoanalysis, which the present writer began to develop nearly
+thirty years ago trom the discoveries of Joset Breuer (of Vienna)
+on the origin of neurotic symptoms. It cannot be disputed that
+it possessed the quality of novelty, even though it made use of
+plenty of material which was well known from other sources
+(quite apart from Breuer's discoveries), such as the lessons
+from the teachings of Charcot, the great neuropathologist, and
+impressions derived from the sphere of hypnotic phenomena.
+Its original significance was purely therapeutic: it aimed at
+creating a new and efficient method for treating neurotic illnesses. But connections which could not be foreseen in the
+beginning caused psycho-analysis to reach out far beyond its
+original aim. It ended by claiming to have set our whole view
+of mental life upon a new basis and therefore to be ofimportance
+for every field of knowledge that is founded on psychology.
+After a decade of complete neglect it suddenly became a
+subject of general interest-and set loose a storm of indignant
+opposition.
+The forms in which the resistance to psycho-analysis found
+expression need not now be considered. It is enough to say that
+the struggle over this innovation is by no means at an end,
+though it is already possible to see what direction it will take.
+Its opponents have not succeeded in suppressing the movement.
+Psycho-analysis, of which twenty years ago I was the only
+spokesman, has since attracted the support of numerous
+valuable and active workers, medical and non-medical, who
+make use of it as a procedure for the treatment of nervous
+diseases, as a method of psychological research and as an
+auxiliary instrument for scientific work in the most various
+departments of intellectual life. In the following pages our
+interest will be directed only to the motives of the resistance
+to psycho-analysis, with particular stress upon the composite
+character of that resistance and upon the differing amount of
+weight carried by its components.
+From a clinical standpoint the neuroses must necessarily be
+put alongside the intoxications and such disorders as Graves'
+
+215
+disease. These are conditions arising from an excess or a relative
+lack of certain highly active substances, whether produced
+inside the body or introduced into it from outside-in short,
+they are disturbances of the chemistry of the body, toxic conditions. If someone succeeded in isolating and demonstrating
+the hypothetical substance or substances concerned in neuroses,
+he would have no need to worry about opposition from the
+medical profession. For the present, however, no such avenue
+of approach to the problem is open. At the moment we can
+only start from the symptoms presented by a neurosis—
+symptoms which in the case of hysteria, for instance, consist
+of a combination of somatic and mental disturbances. Now
+Charcot's experiments as well as Breuer's clinical observations
+taught us that the somatic symptoms of hysteria are psychogenic toothat is, that they are precipitates of mental processes that have run their course. By putting a subject into a
+state of hypnosis it was possible at will to produce the somatic
+symptoms of hysteria artificially.
+Psycho-analysis took hold of this new realization and began
+to consider the problem of the nature of the psychical processes
+which led to these unusual consequences. But the direction
+taken by this enquiry was not to the liking of the contemporary
+generation of physicians. They had been brought up to respect
+only anatomical, physical and chemical factors. They were not
+prepared for taking psychical ones into account and therefore
+met them with indifference or antipathy. They obviously had
+doubts whether psychical events allowed of any exact scientific
+treatment whatever. As an excessive reaction against an earlier
+phase during which medicine had been dominated by what
+was known as the 'philosophy of Nature', they
+regarded
+such abstractions as those with which psychology is obliged
+to work as nebulous, fantastic and mystical; while they simply
+refused to believe in remarkable phenomena which might have
+been the starting-point of research. The symptoms of hysterical
+neuroses were looked upon as shamming and the phenomena
+of hypnotism as a hoax. Even the psychiatrists, upon whose
+attention the most unusual and astonishing mental phenomena
+were constantly being forced, showed no inclination to examine
+" [A pantheistic attitude, chiefly associated with the name of Schelling, which was very prevalent in Germany during the first part of the
+nineteenth century.]
+
+216
+their details or enquire into their connections. They were content to classify the variegated array of symptoms and trace
+them back, so far as they could manage, to somatic, anatomical
+or chemical aetiological disturbances. During this materialistic
+or, rather, mechanistic period, medicine made tremendous
+advances, but it also showed a short-sighted misunderstanding
+of the most important and most difficult among the problems
+of life.
+It is easy to understand why doctors, with an attitude of this
+kind towards the mind, should have had no liking for psychoanalysis and should have demurred to its demand for learning
+many things afresh and for seeing many things in a different
+light. But as a compensation it might be supposed that the new
+theory would be all the more likely to meet with applause from
+philosophers. For philosophers were accustomed to putting
+abstract concepts (or, as unkind tongues would say, hazy words)
+in the forefront of their explanations of the universe, and it
+would be impossible that they should object to the extension
+of the sphere of psychology for which psycho-analysis had paved
+the way. But here another obstacle arose. The philosophers'
+idea of what is mental was not that of psycho-analysis. The
+overwhelming majority of philosophers regard as mental only
+the phenomena of consciousness. For them the world of consciousness coincides with the sphere of what is mental. Everything else that may take place in the 'mind'-an entity so hard
+to grasp—is relegated by them to the organic determinants of
+mental processes or to processes parallel to mental ones. Or,
+more strictly speaking, the mind has no contents other than
+the phenomena of consciousness, and consequently psychology,
+the science of the mind, has no other subject-matter. And on
+this point the layman's view is the same.
+What, then, can a philosopher say to a theory which, like
+psycho-analysis, asserts that on the contrary what is mental is
+in itself unconscious and that being conscious is only a quality,
+which may or may not accrue to a particular mental act and
+the withholding of which may perhaps alter that act in no
+other respect? He will naturally say that anything both unconscious and mental would be an impossibility, a contradictio
+in adjecto, and he will fail to observe that in making this judgement he is merely repeating his own detinition of what is menta_,
+" ['A contradiction in terms.']
+
+217
+a definition which may perhaps be too narrow. It is easy for
+philosophers to feel this certainty, since they have no acquaintance with the material whose investigation has compelled
+analysts to believe in unconscious mental acts. Philosophers
+have never taken account of hypnosis, they have not concerned
+themselves with the interpreting of dreams—on the contrary,
+like doctors, they regard dreams as the meaningless products of
+reduced mental activity during sleep—they are scarcely aware
+that there are such things as obsessions and delusions and they
+would find themselves in a most embarrassing situation if they
+were asked to explain them on the basis of their own psychological premisses. Analysts, too, refuse to say what the unconscious is, but they can indicate the domain of phenomena
+whose observation has obliged them to assume its existence.
+Philosophers, who know no kind of observation other than
+self-observation, cannot follow them into that domain.
+So it comes about that psycho-analysis derives nothing but
+disadvantages from its middle position between medicine and
+philosophy. Doctors regard it as a speculative system and refuse
+to believe that, like every other natural science, it is based on a
+patient and tireless elaboration of facts from the world of perception; philosophers, measuring it by the standard of their
+own artificially constructed systems, find that it starts from
+impossible premisses and reproach it because its most general
+concepts (which are only now in process of evolution) lack
+clarity and precision.
+This state of affairs is enough to account for the reluctant and
+hesitant reception of analysis in scientific quarters. But it does
+not explain the outbursts of indignation, derision and scorn
+which, in disregard of every standard of logic and good taste,
+have characterized the controversial methods of its opponents.
+A reaction of such a kind suggests that resistances other than
+purely intellectual ones were stirred up and that powerful
+emotional forces were aroused. And there are indeed plenty of
+things to be found in the theory of psycho-analysis calculated
+to produce such an effect as this upon the passions of men of
+every kind and not of scientists alone. Above all there is the
+very important place in the mental life of human beings which
+psycho-analysis assigns to what are known as the sexual instincts.
+Psycho-analytic theory maintained that the symptoms of
+neuroses are distorted substitutive satisfactions of sexual
+S.F. XIX—P
+
+218
+instinctual forces, the direct satisfaction of which has been
+frustrated by internal resistances. Later on, when analysis had
+extended beyond its original field of work and began to be
+applied to normal mental life, it sought to show that these
+same sexual components, which could be diverted from their
+immediate aims and directed to other things, made the most
+important contributions to the cultural achievements of the
+individual and of society. These views were not entirely new.
+The incomparable significance of sexual life had been proclaimed by the philosopher Schopenhauer in an intensely
+impressive passage. Moreover, what psycho-analysis called
+sexuality was by no means identical with the impulsion towards
+a union of the two sexes or towards producing a pleasurable
+sensation in the genitals; it had far more resemblance to the
+all-inclusive and all-preserving Eros of Plato's Symposium.
+But the opponents of psycho-analysis forgot its illustrious
+forerunners; they fell upon it as though it had made an assault
+upon the dignity of the human race. They accused it of 'pansexualism', though the psycho-analytic theory of the instincts
+had always been strictly dualistic? and had at no time failed to
+recognize, alongside the sexual instincts, others to which it
+actually ascribed force enough to suppress the sexual instincts.
+(These mutually opposing forces were described to begin with
+as the sexual instincts and the ego instincts. A later theoretical
+development changed them into Eros and the instinct of death
+or destruction.) The suggestion that art, religion and social
+order originated in part in a contribution from the sexual
+instincts was represented by the opponents of analysis as a
+degradation of the highest cultural values. They emphatically
+declared that men have other interests besides this eternal one
+of sex, overlooking in their zeal the fact that animals too have
+other interests-indeed they are subject to sexuality, not permanently like men, but only in bouts occurring at specific
+periods—overlooking, too, the fact that the existence of these
+other interests in men had never been disputed and that nothing
+can be altered in the value of a cultural achievement by its
+being shown to have been derived from elementary animal
+instinctual sources.
+1 [See the Appendix, p. 223 below.]
+* [Cf. an Editor's footnote near the end of Chapter IV of The Ego
+and the Id (1923b), p. 46, n. 2 above.]
+
+219
+Such a display of unfairness and lack of logic cries out for an
+explanation. Its origin is not hard to find. Human civilization
+rests upon two pillars, of which one is the control of natural
+forces and the other the restriction of our instincts. The ruler's
+throne rests upon fettered slaves. Among the instinctual components which are thus brought into service, the sexual instincts, in the narrower sense of the word, are conspicuous for
+their strength and savagery. Woe, if they should be set loose.
+The throne would be overturned and the ruler trampled under
+foot. Society is aware of this-and will not allow the topic to
+be mentioned.
+But why not? What harm could the discussion do? Psychoanalysis has never said a word in favour of unfettering instincts
+that would injure our community; on the contrary it has issued
+a warning and an exhortation to us to mend our ways. But
+society refuses to consent to the ventilation of the question,
+because it has a bad conscience in more than one respect. In
+the first place it has set up a high ideal of morality—morality
+being restriction of the instincts-—and insists that all its members
+shall fulfil that ideal without troubling itself with the possibility
+that obedience may bear heavily upon the individual. Nor is it
+sufficiently wealthy or well-organized to be able to compensate
+the individual for the amount of his instinctual renunciation.
+It is consequently left to the individual to decide how he can
+obtain, for the sacrifice he has made, enough compensation to
+enable him to preserve his mental balance. On the whole,
+however, he is obliged to live psychologically beyond his means,
+while the unsatisfied claims of his instincts make him feel the
+demands of civilization as a constant pressure upon him. Thus
+society maintains a condition of cultural hypocrisy which is bound
+to be accompanied by a sense of insecurity and a necessity for
+guarding what is an undeniably precarious situation by torbidding criticism and discussion. Ihis line of thought holds
+good for all the instinctual impulses, including, therefore, the
+egoistic ones. The question whether it applies to all possible
+forms of civilization, and not merely to those which have
+evolved hitherto, cannot be discussed here. As regards the
+sexual instincts in the narrower sense, there is the further point
+that in most people they are tamed insufficiently and in a
+manner which is psychologically wrong and are therefore
+readier than the rest to break loose.
+
+220
+Psycho-analysis has revealed the weaknesses of this system
+and has recommended that it should be altered. It proposes
+that there should be a reduction in the strictness with which
+instincts are repressed and that correspondingly more play
+should be given to truthfulness. Certain instinctual impulses,
+with whose suppression society has gone too far, should be
+permitted a greater amount of satisfaction; in the case of
+certain others the inefficient method of suppressing them by
+means of repression should be replaced by a better and securer
+procedure. As a result of these criticisms psycho-analysis is
+regarded as 'inimical to culture' and has been put under a
+ban as a 'social danger'
+. This resistance cannot last for ever.
+No human institution can in the long run escape the influence
+of fair criticism; but men's attitude to psycho-analysis is still
+dominated by this fear, which gives rein to their passions and
+diminishes their power of logical argument.
+By its theory of the instincts psycho-analysis offended the
+feelings of individuals in so far as they regarded themselves as
+members of the social community; another branch of its theory
+was calculated to hurt every single person at the tenderest point
+of his own psychical development. Psycho-analysis disposed
+once and for all of the fairy tale of an asexual childhood. It
+demonstrated the fact that sexual interests and activities occur
+in small children from the beginning of their lives. It showed
+what transformations those activities pass through, how at
+about the age of five they succumb to inhibition and how from
+puberty onwards they enter the service of the reproductive
+function. It recognized that early infantile sexual life reaches its
+peak in what is known as the Oedipus complex (an emotional
+attachment of the child to the parent of the opposite sex
+accompanied by an attitude of rivalry to the parent of the same
+sex) and that at that period of life this impulsion extends uninhibited into a straightforward sexual desire. This can be confirmed so easily that only the greatest efforts could make it
+possible to overlook it. Every individual has in fact gone through
+this phase but has afterwards energetically repressed its purport
+and succeeded in forgetting it. A horror of incest and an
+enormous sense of guilt are left over from this prehistoric
+epoch of the individual's existence. It may be that something
+quite similar occurred in the prehistoric epoch of the human
+species as a whole and that the beginnings of morality, religion
+
+221
+and social order were intimately connected with the surmounting of that primaeval era. To adults their prehistory seems so
+inglorious that they refuse to allow themselves to be reminded
+of it: they were infuriated when psycho-analysis tried to lift the
+veil of amnesia from their years of childhood. There was only
+one way out: what psycho-analysis asserted must be false and
+what posed as a new science must be a tissue of tancies and
+distortions.
+Thus the strongest resistances to psycho-analysis were not of
+an intellectual kind but arose from emotional sources. This
+explained their passionate character as well as their poverty
+in logic. The situation obeyed a simple formula: men in the
+mass behaved to psycho-analysis in precisely the same way as
+individual neurotics under treatment for their disorders. It is
+possible, however, by patient work to convince these latter
+individuals that everything happened as we maintained it did:
+we had not invented it ourselves but had arrived at it from a
+study of other neurotics covering a period of twenty or thirty
+years. The position was at once alarming and consoling: alarming because it was no small thing to have the whole human race
+as one's patient, and consoling because after all everything was
+taking place as the hypotheses of psycho-analysis declared that
+it was bound to.
+If we cast our eyes once again over the various resistances to
+psycho-analysis that have been enumerated, it is evident that
+only a minority of them are of the kind which habitually arise
+against most scientific innovations of any considerable importance. The majority of them are due to the fact that powerful
+human feelings are hurt by the subject-matter of the theory.
+Darwin's theory of descent met with the same fate, since it tore
+down the barrier that had been arrogantly set up between men
+and beasts. I drew attention to this analogy in an earlier paper,
+in which I showed how the psycho-analytic view of the relation
+of the conscious ego to an overpowering unconscious was a
+severe blow to human self-love. I described this as the psychological blow to men's narcissism, and compared it with the
+biological blow delivered by the theory of descent and the earlier
+cosmological blow aimed at it by the discovery of Copernicus.
+Purely external difficulties have also contributed to strengthen
+the resistance to psycho-analysis. It is not easy to arrive at an
+1 'A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis' (1917a).
+
+222
+independent judgement upon matters to do with analysis without having experienced it oneself or practised it on someone
+else. Nor can one do the latter without having acquired a
+specific and decidedly delicate technique, while until recently
+there was no easily accessible means of learning psycho-analysis
+and its technique. This position has now been improved by the
+foundation (in 1920) of the Berlin Psycho-Analytic Clinic and
+Training Institute, and soon afterwards (in 1922) of an exactly
+similar institute in Vienna.
+Finally, with all reserve, the question may be raised whether
+the personality of the present writer as a Jew who has never
+sought to disguise the fact that he is a Jew may not have had
+a share in provoking the antipathy of his environment to psychoanalysis. An argument of this kind is not often uttered aloud.
+But we have unfortunately grown so suspicious that we cannot
+avoid thinking that this factor may not have been quite without
+its effect. Nor is it perhaps entirely a matter of chance that the
+first advocate of psycho-analysis was a Jew. To profess belief
+in this new theory called for a certain degree of readiness to
+accept a situation of solitary opposition—a situation with which
+no one is more familiar than a Jew.
+
+APPENDIX
+EXTRACT FROM SCHOPENHAUER'S THE WORLD AS
+WILL AND IDEA
+In his later works, Freud made several references to the
+emphasis which Schopenhauer laid on the importance of
+sexuality. As well as mentioning the subject on p. 218 above,
+he also referred to it in the closing paragraph of 'A Difficulty in
+the Path of Psycho-Analysis' (1917a), Standard Ed., 17, 143-4,
+and in the Preface (written in 1920) to the fourth edition of the
+Three Essays (1905d), ibid., 7, 134. It appears again in Chapter
+VI of Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), ibid., 18, 50—a work
+which Freud was revising at about the same time as he wrote
+the Preface just mentioned-and yet again near the end of
+Chapter V of the Autobiographical Study (1925d), ibid., 20, 59.
+Freud sometimes alluded specifically to 'an intensely impressive passage' or 'words of unforgettable impressiveness',
+though he nowhere quoted the passage or indicated its source
+in Schopenhauer's writings. It seems highly likely, however, that
+the extract printed here is from the passage Freud had in mind,
+and it is, therefore, perhaps of interest to reproduce it. This
+paragraph occurs in the Supplements to the Fourth Book of
+The World as Will and Idea, Chapter XLII, "The Life of the
+Species' ['Leben der Gattung']. Immediately before this point,
+Schopenhauer has been discussing the character of sexual
+desire, which he declares is different from every other desire:
+•.. it is not only the strongest but even specifically of a more
+powerful kind than any other' He gives examples of the
+recognition accorded in antiquity to this power and continues
+as follows:
+"To all this corresponds the important role which the relation
+of the sexes plays in the world of men, where it is really the
+invisible central point of all action and conduct, and peeps out
+everywhere in spite of all veils thrown over it. It is the cause of
+war and the end of peace, the basis of what is serious, and the
+aim of the jest, the inexhaustible source of wit, the key to all
+1 Translated by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, 1886, 3, 313-14. The
+extract is printed by arrangement with Messrs. George Allen & Unwin.
+
+224
+APPENDIX
+allusions, and the meaning of all mysterious hints, of all unspoken offers and all stolen glances, the daily meditation of the
+young, and often also of the old, the hourly thought of the unchaste, and even against their will the constantly recurring
+imagination of the chaste, the ever ready material of a joke,
+just because the profoundest seriousness lies at its foundation.
+It is, however, the piquant element and the joke of life that the
+chief concern of all men is secretly pursued and ostensibly
+ignored as much as possible. But, in fact, we see it every moment
+seat itself, as the true hereditary lord of the world, out of the fulness of its own strength, upon the ancestral throne, and looking
+down from thence with scornful glances, laugh at the preparations which have been made to bind it, imprison it, or at least
+to limit it and wherever it is possible to keep it concealed, or
+even so to master it that it shall only appear as a subordinate,
+secondary concern of life. But all this agrees with the fact that
+the sexual passion- is the kernel of the will to live, and consequently the concentration oi all desire; therefore in the text
+have called the genital organs the focus of the will. Indeed, one
+may say man is concrete sexual desire; for his origin is an act
+of copulation and his wish of wishes is an act of copulation, and
+this tendency alone perpetuates and holds together his whole
+phenomenal existence. The will to live manifests itself indeed
+primarily as an effort to sustain the individual, yet this is only
+a step to the effort to sustain the species, and the latter endeavour
+must be more powerful in proportion as the life of the species
+surpasses that of the individual in duration, extension and
+value. heretore sexua. passion- is the most pertect manitestation of the will to live, its most distinctly expressed type; and
+the origin of the individual in it, and its primacy over all other
+desires of the natural man, are both in complete agreement with
+this.'
+" ['Geschlechtstrieb' in the original—a word which, when used by
+Freud, is translated 'sexual instinct' in the Standard Edition.]
+
+A NOTE UPON THE 'MYSTIC
+WRITING-PAD'
+(1925 [1924])
+
+NOTIZ ÜBER DEN 'WUNDERBLOCK'
+1925
+Int. 2. Psychoanal., 11 (1), 1-5.
+1925
+1931
+G.s., 6, 415-20.
+Theoretische Schriften, 392-8.
+1948
+G.W., 14, 3-8.
+(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+'A Note upon the "Mystic Writing-Pad" ›
+1940
+Int. J.Psycho-Anal., 41 (4), 409-14. (II. James Strachey.)
+1950 C.P., 5, 175-80.
+The present translation is a slightly corrected reprint of the
+one published in 1950, with some additional notes.
+This paper was probably written in the autumn of 1924, for
+Freud reported in a letter to Abraham that he was revising it
+in November of that year (Jones, 1957, 124-5). The curious
+little apparatus, which is the basis of this ingenious and illuminating discussion of the conscious, preconscious and perceptualconscious systems, is still (1961) quite easily obtainable, at least
+in Great Britain, under the trade name of 'Printator. The
+subject-matter of the paper will become much clearer if an
+actual specimen can be examined and dissected.
+226
+
+A NOTE UPON THE 'MYSTIC WRITING-PAD'
+IF I distrust my memory—neurotics, as we know, do so to a
+remarkable extent, but normal people have every reason for
+doing so as well—I am able to supplement and guarantee its
+working by making a note in writing. In that case the surface
+upon which this note is preserved, the pocket-book or sheet of
+paper, is as it were a materialized portion of my mnemic
+apparatus, which I otherwise carry about with me invisible.
+I have only to bear in mind the place where this 'memory'
+has been deposited and I can then 'reproduce' it at any time
+I like, with the certainty that it will have remained unaltered
+and so have escaped the possible distortions to which it might
+have been subjected in my actual memory.
+If I want to make full use of this technique for improving my
+mnemic function, I find that there are two different procedures
+open to me. On the one hand, I can choose a writing-surface
+which will preserve intact any note made upon it for an indefinite length of time—for instance, a sheet of paper which I
+can write upon in ink. I am then in possession of a 'permanent
+memory-trace'. The disadvantage of this procedure is that the
+receptive capacity of the writing-surface is soon exhausted. The
+sheet is filled with writing, there is no room on it for any more
+notes, and I find myself obliged to bring another sheet into use,
+that has not been written on. Moreover, the advantage of this
+procedure, the fact that it provides a 'permanent trace', may
+lose its value for me if after a time the note ceases to interest me
+and I no longer want to 'retain it in my memory. The alternative procedure avoids both of these disadvantages. If, for
+instance, I write with a piece of chalk on a slate, I have a
+receptive surface which retains its receptive capacity for an
+unlimited time and the notes upon which can be destroyed as
+soon as they cease to interest me, without any need for throwing
+away the writing-surface itself. Here the disadvantage is that
+I cannot preserve a permanent trace. If I want to put some
+fresh notes on the slate, I must first wipe out the ones which
+cover it. Thus an unlimited receptive capacity and a retention
+of permanent traces seem to be mutually exclusive properties
+in the apparatus which we use as substitutes for our memory:
+227
+
+228
+either the receptive surface must be renewed or the note must
+be destroyed.
+All the forms of auxiliary apparatus which we have invented
+for the improvement or intensification of our sensory functions
+are built on the same model as the sense organs themselves or
+portions of them: for instance, spectacles, photographic cameras,
+ear-trumpets.! Measured by this standard, devices to aid our
+memory
+seem particularly imperfect,
+since our
+mental
+apparatus accomplishes precisely what they cannot: it has an
+unlimited receptive capacity for new perceptions and nevertheless lays down permanent-even though not unalterablememory-traces of them. As long ago as in 1900 I gave expression
+in The Interpretation of Dreams? to a suspicion that this unusual
+capacity was to be divided between two different systems (or
+organs of the mental apparatus). According to this view, we
+possess a system Pcpt.-Cs., which receives perceptions but retains
+no permanent trace of them, so that it can react like a clean
+sheet to every new perception; while the permanent traces of
+the excitations which have been received are preserved in
+'mnemic systems' lying behind the perceptual system. Later, in
+Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), $ I added a remark to the
+effect that the inexplicable phenomenon of consciousness arises
+in the perceptual system instead of the permanent traces.
+Now some time ago there came upon the market, under the
+name of the 'Mystic Writing-Pad', a small contrivance that
+promises to perform more than the sheet of paper or the slate.
+It claims to be nothing more than a writing-tablet from which
+notes can be erased by an easy movement of the hand. But if it
+is examined more closely it will be found that its construction
+shows a remarkable agreement with my hypothetical structure
+of our perceptual apparatus and that it can in fact provide
+both an ever-ready receptive surface and permanent traces of
+the notes that have been made upon it.
+The Mystic Pad is a slab of dark brown resin or wax with a
+paper edging; over the slab is laid a thin transparent sheet, the
+1 [This notion is expanded in Chapter III of Civilization and its Discontents (1930a).]
+*[Standard Ed., 5, 540. As Freud mentions in Beyond the Pleasure
+Principle (1920g), ibid., 18, 25, this distinction had already been drawn
+by Breuer in his theoretical section of Studies on Hysteria (1895d), ibid.,
+2, 188-9 n.]
+" [Ibid., 18, 25.]
+
+229
+top end of which is firmly secured to the slab while its bottom
+end rests on it without being fixed to it. This transparent sheet
+is the more interesting part of the little device. It itself consists
+of two layers, which can be detached from each other except
+at their two ends. The upper layer is a transparent piece of
+celluloid; the lower layer is made of thin translucent waxed
+paper. When the apparatus is not in use, the lower surface of
+the waxed paper adheres lightly to the upper surface of the
+wax slab.
+To make use of the Mystic Pad, one writes upon the celluloid
+portion of the covering-sheet which rests on the wax slab. For
+this purpose no pencil or chalk is necessary, since the writing
+does not depend on material being deposited on the receptive
+surface. It is a return to the ancient method of writing on tablets
+of clay or wax: a pointed stilus scratches the surface, the
+depressions upon which constitute the writing'. In the case of
+the Mystic Pad this scratching is not effected directly, but
+through the medium of the covering-sheet. At the points which
+the stilus touches, it presses the lower surface of the waxed paper
+on to the wax slab, and the grooves are visible as dark writing
+upon the otherwise smooth whitish-grey surface of the celluloid.
+If one wishes to destroy what has been written, all that is
+necessary is to raise the double covering-sheet from the wax
+slab by a light pull, starting from the free lower end. The close
+contact between the waxed paper and the wax slab at the
+places which have been scratched (upon which the visibility
+of the writing depended) is thus brought to an end and it does
+not recur when the two surfaces come together once more. The
+Mystic Pad is now clear of writing and ready to receive fresh
+notes.
+The small imperfections of the contrivance have, of course,
+no importance for us, since we are only concerned with its
+ahe rindation to the structure of the perceptual apparatus of
+If, while the Mystic Pad has writing on it, we cautiously
+raise the celluloid from the waxed paper, we can see the writing
+just as clearly on the surface of the latter, and the question may
+arise why there should be any necessity for the celluloid portion
+" [The method by which the covering-sheet is detached from the
+wax slab is slightly different in the current form of the device; but this
+does not affect the principle.]
+
+230
+of the cover. Experiment will then show that the thin paper
+would be very easily crumpled or torn if one were to write
+directly upon it with the stilus. The layer of celluloid thus acts
+as a protective sheath for the waxed paper, to keep off injurious
+effects from without. The celluloid is a 'protective shield against
+stimuli; the layer which actually receives the stimuli is the
+paper. I may at this point recall that in Beyond the Pleasure
+Principle [ibid., 18, 27 ff.] I showed that the perceptual
+apparatus of our mind consists of two layers, of an external
+protective shield against stimuli whose task it is to diminish the
+strength of excitations coming in, and of a surface behind it
+which receives the stimuli, namely the system Pcpt.-Gs.
+The analogy would not be of much value if it could not be
+pursued further than this. If we lift the entire covering-sheet—
+both the celluloid and the waxed paper—off the wax slab, the
+writing vanishes and, as I have already remarked, does not
+re-appear again. The surface of the Mystic Pad is clear of
+writing and once more capable of receiving impressions. But it
+is easy to discover that the permanent trace of what was written
+is retained upon the wax slab itself and is legible in suitable
+lights. Thus the Pad provides not only a receptive surface that
+can be used over and over again, like a slate, but also permanent traces of what has been written, like an ordinary paper
+pad: it solves the problem of combining the two functions by
+dividing them between tro separate but interrelated component parts or
+yone, sis which meiered way in which accordippo this
+performs its perceptual function. The layer which receives the
+stimuli-the system Pcpt.-Cs.—forms no permanent traces; the
+foundations of memory come about in other, adjoining,
+systems.
+We need not be disturbed by the fact that in the Mystic Pad
+no use is made of the permanent traces of the notes that have
+been received; it is enough that they are present. There must
+come a point at which the analogy between an auxiliary
+apparatus of this kind and the organ which is its prototype will
+cease to apply. It is true, too, that once the writing has been
+erased, the Mystic Pad cannot 'reproduce' it from within; it
+would be a mystic pad indeed if, like our memory, it could
+accomplish that. None the less, I do not think it is too farfetched to compare the celluloid and waxed paper cover with
+
+THE 'MYSTIO WRITING-PAD'
+231
+the system Pcpt.-Gs. and its protective shield, the wax slab with
+the unconscious behind them, and the appearance and disappearance of the writing with the flickering-up and passingaway of consciousness in the process of perception.
+But I must admit that I am inclined to press the comparison
+still further. On the Mystic Pad the writing vanishes every time
+the close contact is broken between the paper which receives
+the stimulus and the wax slab which preserves the impression.
+This agrees with a notion which I have long had about the
+method by which the perceptual apparatus of our mind functions, but which I have hitherto kept to myself." My theory
+was that cathectic innervations are sent out and withdrawn in
+rapid periodic impulses from within into the completely pervious system Pcpt.-Gs. So long as that system is cathected in this
+manner, it receives perceptions (which are accompanied by
+consciousness) and passes the excitation on to the unconscious
+mnemic systems; but as soon as the cathexis is withdrawn, consciousness is extinguished and the functioning of the system
+comes to a standstill.2 It is as though the unconscious stretches
+out feelers, through the medium of the system Pcpt.-Cs., towards
+the external world and hastily withdraws them as soon as they
+have sampled the excitations coming from it. Thus the interruptions, which in the case of the Mystic Pad have an external
+origin, were attributed by my hypothesis to the discontinuity
+in the current of innervation; and the actual breaking of contact
+which occurs in the Mystic Pad was replaced in my theory by
+the periodic non-excitability of the perceptual system. I further
+had a suspicion that this discontinuous method of functioning
+of the system Pcpt.-Gs. lies at the bottom of the origin of the
+concept of time. s
+• It had in fact been mentioned in Beyond the Pleasure Princible, ibid.
+18, 28. The notion re-appears at the end of the paper on Negation
+(1925h), below, p. 238. It is already present in embryo at the end of
+Section 19 of Part I of the 'Project' of 1895 (Freud 1950a).]
+" ['This is in accordance with the 'principle of the insusceptibility to
+excitation of uncathected systems, which is discussed in an Editor's
+footnote to the metapsychological paper on dreams (1917d), Standard
+Ed., 14, 227.]
+3 [This also had been suggested in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, ibid.,
+28, and hinted at earlier, in "The Unconscious (1915e), ibid., 14,
+187-8. It is restated in 'Negation' (1925h), p. 238 below, where, however, Freud attributes the sending out of teelers to the ego.]
+
+232
+If we imagine one hand writing upon the surface of the
+Mystic Writing-Pad while another periodically raises its covering-sheet from the wax slab, we shall have a concrete representation of the way in which I tried to picture the functioning of the
+perceptual apparatus of our mind.
+
+S.F. XIX-R
+
+DIE VERNEINUNG
+1923
+1926
+1928
+1931
+1948
+Imago, 11 (3), 217-21.
+Psychoanalyse der Neurosen, 199-204.
+G.S., 11, 3-7.
+Theoretische Schriften, 399-404.
+G.W., 14, 11-15.
+(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+'Negation'
+1925 Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 6 (4), 367-71. (Tr. Joan Riviere.)
+1950
+G.P., 5, 181-5, (Revision of above.)
+The present translation is a modified version of the one
+published in 1950. The translation of 1950 is reprinted in
+D. Rapaport, Organization and Pathology of Thought, New York,
+1951.
+We are told by Ernest Jones (1957, 125) that this was written
+in July, 1925. The subject had, however, evidently been in
+Freud's thoughts for some time, as is shown by the footnote
+added by him to the 'Dora' case history in 1923. (See p. 239
+below.) The paper is oneofhis most succinct. Though primarily
+it deals with a special point of metapsychology, yet in its opening and closing passages it touches upon technique. It will be
+seen from the references in the footnotes that both of these
+aspects of the paper had a long previous history.
+Extracts from the earlier (1925) translation of this paper were
+included in Rickman's General Selection from the Works of Sigmund
+Freud (1937, 63-7).
+234
+
+The manner in which our patients bring forward their associations during the work of analysis gives us an opportunity for
+making some interesting observations. 'Now you'll think I mean
+to say something insulting, but really I've no such intention?
+We realize that this is a rejection, by projection, of an idea
+that has just come up. Or: 'You ask who this person in the
+dream can be. It's not my mother' We emend this to: "So it is
+his mother' In our interpretation, we take the liberty of
+disregarding the negation and of picking out the subject-matter
+alone of the association. It is as though the patient had said:
+'It's true that my mother came into my mind as I thought of
+this person, but I don't feel inclined to let the association
+count.'1
+There is a very convenient method by which we can sometimes obtain a piece of information we want about unconscious
+repressed material. 'What'
+, we ask, 'would you consider the
+most unlikely imaginable thing in that situation? What do you
+think was furthest from your mind at that time?" If the patient
+falls into the trap and says what he thinks is most incredible,
+he almost always makes the right admission. A neat counterpart to this experiment is often met with in an obsessional
+neurotic who has already been initiated into the meaning of his
+symptoms. 'I've got a new obsessive idea, he says, 'and it
+occurred to me at once that it might mean so and so. But no;
+that can't be true, or it couldn't have occurred to me.' What he
+is repudiating, on grounds picked up from his treatment, is,
+of course, the correct meaning of the obsessive idea.
+Thus the content of a repressed image or idea can make its
+way into consciousness, on condition that it is negated. ' Negation
+is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed; indeed it is
+1 [Freud had drawn attention to this in (among other places) the
+'Rat Man' analysis (1909d), Standard Ed., 10, 183 n.]
+a [The German 'verneinen' is here translated by 'to negate' instead of
+by the more usual 'to deny', in order to avoid confusion with the German "verleugnen', which has also in the past been rendered by "to deny.
+In this edition 'to disavow' has in general been used for the latter German word. See the footnote on this point in "The Infantile Genital
+Organization' (1923e), p. 143 above.]
+
+236
+already a lifting of the repression, though not, of course, an
+acceptance of what is repressed. We can see how in this the
+intellectual function is separated from the affective process.
+With the help of negation only one consequence of the process
+of repression is undone the fact, namely, of the ideational
+content of what is repressed not reaching consciousness. The
+outcome of this is a kind of intellectual acceptance of the
+repressed, while at the same time what is essential to the repression persists. In the course of analytic work we often
+produce a further, very important and somewhat strange
+variant of this situation. We succeed in conquering the negation
+as well, and in bringing about a full intellectual acceptance of
+the repressed; but the repressive process itself is not yet removed
+by this.
+Since to affirm or negate the content of thoughts is the task
+of the function of intellectual judgement, what we have just
+been saying has led us to the psychological origin of that
+function. To negate something in a judgement is, at bottom,
+to say: "This is something which I should prefer to repress.' A
+negative judgement is the intellectual substitute for repression;?
+its 'no' is the hall-mark of repression, a certificate of origin—
+like, let us say, 'Made in Germany' 3 With the help of the
+symbol of negation, thinking frees itself from the restrictions of
+repression and enriches itself with material that is indispensable
+for its proper functioning.
+The function of judgement is concerned in the main with two
+sorts of decisions. It affirms or disaffirms the possession by a
+thing of a particular attribute; and it asserts or disputes that a
+presentation has an existence in reality.A The attribute to be
+1 The same process is at the root of the familiar superstition that
+boasting is dangerous. 'How nice not to have had one of my headaches
+for so long.' But this is in fact the first announcement of an attack, of
+whose approach the subject is already sensible, although he is as yet
+unwilling to believe it. [Freud's attention had first been drawn to this
+explanation by one of his earliest patients, Frau Cäcilie M. C.. the long
+footnote on the subject in the first of Freud's case histories in Studies on
+Hysteria (1895d), Standard Ed., 2, 76.]
+" [Freud's earliest statement of this idea seems to have been in his
+book on jokes (1905c), Standard Ed., 8, 175. It re-appears in the paper on
+'The Two Principles of Mental Functioning' (19116), ibid., 12, 221,
+and in the metapsychological paper on "The Unconscious' (1915e),
+ibid., 14, 186.]
+8 [In English in the original.] * [This is explained below, p. 237.]
+
+237
+decided about may originally have been good or bad, useful
+or harmful. Expressed in the language of the oldest—the oral—
+instinctual impulses, the judgement is: 'I should like to eat this'
+or I should like to spit it out; and, put more generally: i
+should like to take this into myself and to keep that out.' That
+is to say: 'It shall be inside me' or 'it shall be outside me. As
+I have shown elsewhere, the original pleasure-ego wants to
+intrjoect into itself everything that is good and to eject from
+itself everything that is bad. What is bad, what is alien to the
+ego and what is external are, to begin with, identical.1
+The other sort of decision made by the function of judgement
+—as to the real existence of something of which there is a
+presentation (reality-testing) —is a concern of the definitive
+reality-ego, which develops out of the initial pleasure-ego. It
+is now no longer a question of whether what has been perceived
+(a thing) shall be taken into the ego or not, but of whether
+something which is in the ego as a presentation can be rediscovered in perception (reality) as well. It is, we see, once
+more a question of external and internal. What is unreal, merely
+a presentation and subjective, is only internal; what is real is
+also there outside. In this stage of development regard for the
+pleasure principle has been set aside. Experience has shown the
+subject that it is not only important whether a thing (an object
+of satisfaction for him) possesses the 'good' attribute and so
+deserves to be taken into his ego, but also whether it is there
+in the external world, so that he can get hold of it whenever he
+needs it. In order to understand this step forward we must
+recollect that all presentations originate from perceptions and
+are repetitions of them. Thus originally the mere existence of a
+presentation was a guarantee of the reality of what was presented. The antithesis between subjective and objective does not
+exist from the first. It only comes into being from the fact that
+thinking possesses the capacity to bring before the mind once
+more something that has once been perceived, by reproducing
+it as a presentation without the external object having still to
+be there. The first and immediate aim, therefore, of realitytesting is, not to find an object in real perception which corresponds to the one presented, but to refind such an object, to
+1 See the discussion in Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1915c)
+Standard Ed., 14, 136.—Freud took up this question again in the first
+chapter of Givilization and its Discontents (1930a).]
+
+238
+convince oneself that it is still there. 1 Another capacity of the
+power of thinking offers a further contribution to the differentiation between what is subjective and what is objective. The
+reproduction of a perception as a presentation is not always a
+faithful one; it may be modified by omissions, or changed by
+the merging of various elements. In that case, reality-testing
+has to ascertain how far such distortions go. But it is evident
+that a precondition for the setting up of reality-testing is that
+objects shall have been lost which once brought real satisfaction.
+Judging is the intellectual action which decides the choice of
+motor action, which puts an end to the postponement due to
+thought and which leads over from thinking to acting. This postponement due to thought has also been discussed by me elsewhere.? It is to be regarded as an experimental action, a motor
+palpating, with small expenditure of discharge. Let us consider
+where the ego has used a similar kind of palpating before, at
+what place it learnt the technique which it now applies in its processes of thought. It happened at the sensory end of the mental
+apparatus, in connection with sense perceptions. For, on our
+hypothesis, perception is not a purely passive process. The ego
+periodically sends out small amounts of cathexis into the perceptual system, by means of which it samples the external
+stimuli, and then after every such tentative advance it draws
+back again.
+The study of judgement affords us, perhaps for the first time,
+1 [Much of this is foreshadowed in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900)a,
+Standard Ed., 5, 565-1, and, more particularly, in the 1095 Project
+(Freud, 1950a; Section 16 of Part I). Here the 'object' to be refound i
+the mother's breast. Cif., too, a sentence which occurs in a similar connection in Section 5 of the Three Essays (1905d), Standard Ed., 7, 222:
+"The finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it.']
+* [See The Ego and the Id (1923b), p. 55 above. But Freud made the
+point repeatedly, beginning with the Project' of 1895 (at the end of
+Section 17 of Part I). A list of references will be found in Lecture
+XXXII of the New Introductory Lectures (1933a). Incidentally, the whole
+topic of judgement is discussed at great length and on much the same
+lines as the present ones, in Sections 16, 17 and 18 of Part I of the
+"Project'.]
+" [See Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), Standard Ed., 18, 28, and
+'A Note upon the "Mystic Writing-Pad" '
+(1925a), p. 231 above. It
+may be remarked that in this last passage Freud suggests not that the ego
+but that the unconscious 'stretches out feelers, through the medium of the
+system Pcpt.-Cs., towards the external world'.]
+
+239
+an insight into the origin of an intellectual function from the
+interplay of the primary instinctual impulses. Judging is a
+continuation, along lines of expediency, of the original process
+by which the ego took things into itself or expelled them from
+itself, according to the pleasure principle. The polarity of judgement appears to correspond to the opposition of the two groups
+of instincts which we have supposed to exist. Affirmation-as
+a substitute for uniting-belongs to Eros; negation—the successor to expulsion—belongs to the instinct of destruction. The
+general wish to negate, the negativism which is displayed by
+some psychotics, is probably to be regarded as a sign of a
+defusion of instincts that has taken place through a withdrawal
+of the libidinal components. But the performance of the function
+of judgement is not made possible until the creation of the
+symbol of negation has endowed thinking with a first measure
+of freedom from the consequences of repression and, with it,
+from the compulsion of the pleasure principle.
+This view of negation fits in very well with the fact that in
+analysis we never discover a 'no' in the unconscious and that
+recognition of the unconscious on the part of the ego is expressed
+in a negative formula. There is no stronger evidence that we
+have been successful in our effort to uncover the unconscious
+than when the patient reacts to it with the words I didn't
+think that', or 'I didn't (ever) think of that'.?
+1 [Cf. a remark in Chapter VI of the book on Jokes (1905c), Standard
+Ed., 8, 175, footnote 2.]
+* [Freud had made this point in almost the same words in a footnote
+added in 1923 to the 'Dora' analysis (1905e), Standard Ed., 7, 57. He
+once more returned to it in his very late paper on 'Constructions in
+Analysis' (1937d).]
+
+SOME PSYCHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
+THE ANATOMICAL DISTINCTION
+BETWEEN THE SEXES
+
+:
+EINIGE PSYCHISCHE FOLGEN DES ANATOMISCHEN
+GESCHLECHTSUNTERSCHIEDS
+1925
+Int. Z. Psychoanal., 11 (4), 401-10.
+1926
+Psychoanalyse der Neurosen, 205-19.
+1928
+Gos., 11, 8-19.
+1931
+Sexualtheorie und Traumlehre, 207-20.
+1948
+G.W., 14, 19-30.
+(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+'Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical
+Distinction between the Sexes'
+1927
+Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 8 (2), 133-42. (Tr. James Strachey.)
+1950
+G.P., 5, 186-97. (Revised reprint of above.)
+The present translation is a corrected and freshly annotated
+version, with a slightly modified title, of the one published in
+1950.
+Thispaper was finished by August, 1925, when Freud showed
+it to Ferenczi. It was read on his behalf by Anna Freud at the
+Homburg International Psycho-Analytical Congress on September 3, and was published in the Zeitschrift later in the
+autumn (Jones, 1957, 119).
+What is in effect a first complete re-assessment of Freud's
+views on the psychological development of women will be found
+condensed in this short paper. It contains the germs of all his
+later work on the subject.
+From early days Freud made complaints of the obscurity
+enveloping the sexual life of women. Thus, near the beginning
+of his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), he wrote
+that the sexual life of men 'alone has become accessible to
+research. That of women . . . is still veiled in an impenetrable
+obscurity.' (Standard Edo, 7
+151.) Similarly, in his discussion
+of the sexual theories of children (1908c), he wrote: 'In consequence of unfavourable circumstances,
+both of an external
+243
+
+244
+and an internal nature, the following observations apply chietly
+to the sexua. development of one sex only—that is, of males.'
+(Ibid., 9, 211.) Again, very much later, in his pamphlet on lay
+analysis (1926e): 'We know less about the sexual life of little
+girls than of boys. But we need not feel ashamed of this distinction; after all, the sexual life of adult women is a "dark continent" for psychology.' (Ibid., 20, 212.) 1
+One result of this obscurity was to lead Freud to assume very
+otten that the psychology of women could be taken simply as
+analogous to that of men. There are many examples of this. In
+his first full account of the Oedipus situation, for instance, in
+The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), he assumes that there is a
+complete parallel between the two sexes, that a girl's first
+affection is for her father and a boy's first childish desires are for
+his mother' (Standard Ed., 4, 257). Similarly, in his long description of the sexual development of children in Lecture XXI of
+the Introductory Lectures (1916-17) he writes: 'As you see, I have
+only described the relation of a boy to his father and mother.
+Things happen in just the same way with little girls, with the
+necessary changes: an affectionate attachment to her father, a
+need to get rid of her mother as superfluous ... Or, speaking
+of the early history of identification in Group Psychology (1921c):
+"The same holds good, with the necessary substitutions, of the
+baby daughter as well' (Standard Ed., 18, 106). Even in The
+Ego and the Id (1923b) the complicated processes accompanying
+and following the dissolution of the Oedipus complex are supposed to be 'precisely analogous' in girls and boys (p. 32
+above)." Or the account of the female Oedipus complex may
+1 Ernest Jones writes (1955, 468): "There is little doubt that Freud
+found the psychology of women more enigmatic than that of men. He
+said once to Marie Bonaparte: "The great question that has never been
+answered and which I have not.yet been able to answer, despite my
+thirty years of research into the feminine soul, is 'What does a woman
+want?' " › Unfortunately Jones gives no date for this remark. Freud
+himself suggests a part explanation of his difficulty in the last paragraph
+of Section I of his later paper on 'Female Sexuality' (19316), where he
+attributes it to a peculiarity in his transference-relation with women.
+* A similar position was adopted in the Autobiographical Study (1925d):
+'boys concentrate their sexual wishes upon their mother and develop
+hostile impulses against their father as being a rival, while girls adopt an
+analogous attitude (Standard Ed., 20, 36). But here Freud added a
+footnote in 1935 with a drastic correction of his earlier views and an
+explanation of how they arose: "The information about infantile sexu-
+
+245
+simply be omitted, as in the article for Marcuse's encyclopaedia
+(1923a), Standard Ed., 18, 245. On the other hand, in describing
+the "phallic phase' in the paper on the infantile genital organization (1923e) Freud writes frankly: 'Unfortunately we can
+describe this state of things only as it affects the male child; the
+corresponding processes in the little girl are not known to us
+(p. 142 above).
+But in fact over a long period from the time of the 'Dora'
+analysis in 1900, Freud's interest had not been directed to
+feminine psychology. It was not for fifteen years that he published any important case material dealing with a woman. Then
+came the case of female paranoia 'running counter to psychoanalytic theory' (1915f), the essence of which lay in the
+patient's relation to her mother. Not long after came the case
+of female homosexuality (1920a) of which the same might well
+be said. Between them came the study of beating phantasies
+(1919e), which was almost wholly concerned with the infantile
+sexual development of girls. And here already there is clear
+evidence of dissatisfaction with the 'precise analogy' between
+the two sexes: 'the expectation of there being a complete
+parallel was mistaken' (Standard Ed., 17, 196). Thereafter the
+problem of the sexual history of women was no doubt constantly
+in Freud's mind. And although there is little about it in The Ego
+and the Id (1923b), it was the theories developed there concerning the end of the Oedipus complex which, linked with fresh
+clinical observations, gave the key to the new thesis. Freud was
+already feeling his way towards it in "The Dissolution of the
+Oedipus Complex' (1924d) but it is fully stated for the first
+time in the present paper. It was to be further enlarged on in
+the later paper on 'Female Sexuality' (19316), in Lecture
+XXXIII of the New Introductory Lectures (1933a) and finally in
+Chapter VII of the posthumous Outline of Psycho-Analysis (1940a
+[1938]).
+ality was obtained from the study of men and the theory deduced from
+it was concerned with male children. It was natural enough to expect
+to find a complete parallel between the two sexes; but this turned out
+not to hold.' And he went on to give the gist of the findings first announced in the present paper.
+1 The most important addition made in this was the discovery, based
+on fresh case-material, of the strength and duration of the little girl's
+pre-Oedipus attachment to her mother.
+
+246
+Almost every detail is already present in a condensed form
+in this work. But it is remarkable that many of these details
+had been ready to hand long before and only required linking
+up. Thus certain peculiarities in the sexual development of
+girls had been noted and insisted upon. Already in the first
+edition of the Three Essays (1905d) Freud had maintained that
+in little girls the leading sexual organ was the clitoris, that, in
+conformity with this fact, 'the sexuality of little girls is of a
+wholly masculine character, and that 'a wave of repression
+at puberty' is required before the clitoris gives place to the
+vagina and masculinity to temininity (Standard Ea., 7, 219-21).
+Most of this had, indeed, been indicated many years before in
+a letter to Fliess of November 14, 1897 (Freud, 1950a, Letter
+75). The matter was carried further in the paper on "The
+Sexual Theories of Children' (1908c), where it was brought into
+relation with the girl's envy for the penis and the castration
+complex (Standard Ed., 9, 217-18).1 The fact that the injury to
+her narcissism caused by this leads to resentment against her
+mother was pointed out in the paper on 'Some Character-
+Types' (1916d), ibid, 14, 315; and other grounds for this resentment had been enumerated in the paranoia case history a little
+earlier (1915f), ibid., 267-8.
+Nor had the fundamental basis of the new thesis been unstated—though for long periods it seemed forgotten. In the
+Three Essays we find the plain statement that a child's first
+sexual object is the mother's breast and that this is the prototype
+of every later love-relation (Standard Ed., 7, 222). This was
+clearly meant to be true of girls as well as boys, but it seems
+to be repeated explicitly for the first time here (p. 251)." The
+twofold change required of the little girl before she could arrive
+at the 'normal' Oedipus complex thus became evident: a change
+in her leading sexual organ and a change in her sexual object.
+And the path lay open for an investigation of her 'pre-Oedipus'
+phase, together with the dilerences between girls and boys
+ımplea by the hypotheses in 1 he Ego and the la—the ditterence
+1 This was further discussed in "The Taboo of Virginity' (1918a).
+" In the paper on narcissism (1914c), this primary fact is again stated
+(Standard Ed., 14, 87-8), but somehow passed over; and the distinction
+between the early libidinal objects of boys and girls becomes concentrated on the distinction between the anaclitic and narcissistic types of
+object-choice.
+
+247
+in the relation of their castration and Oedipus complexes and
+the further difference in the construction of their super-egos. It
+is the synthesis of these various pieces of knowledge, derived
+from such widely separated historical strata of Freud's work,
+which gives its importance to the present paper.
+
+SOME PSYCHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
+ANATOMICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN
+THE SEXES
+In my own writings and in those of my followers more and
+more stress is laid on the necessity that the analyses of neurotics
+shall deal thoroughly with the remotest period of their childhood, the time of the early efflorescence of sexual life. It is only
+by examining the first manifestations of the patient's innate
+instinctual constitution and the effects of his earliest experiences
+that we can accurately gauge the motive forces that have led to
+his neurosis and can be secure against the errors into which we
+might be tempted by the degree to which things have become
+remodelled and overlaid in adult life. This requirement is not
+only of theoretical but also of practical importance, for it distinguishes our efforts from the work of those physicians whose
+interests are focused exclusively on therapeutic results and who
+employ analytic methods, but only up to a certain point. An
+analysis of early childhood such as we are considering is tedious
+and laborious and makes demands both upon the physician
+and upon the patient which cannot always be met. Moreover,
+it leads us into dark regions where there are as yet no signposts. Indeed, analysts may feel reassured, I think, that there
+is no risk of their work becoming mechanical, and so of losing
+its interest, during the next few decades.
+In the following pages I bring forward some findings of
+analytic research which would be of great importance if they
+could be proved to apply universally. Why do I not postpone
+publication of them until further experience has given me the
+necessary proof, if such proof is obtainable? Because the conditions under which I work have undergone a change, with
+implications which I cannot disguise. Formerly, I was not one
+of those who are unable to hold back what seems to be a new
+discovery until it has been either confirmed or corrected. My
+Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) and my Fragment ofan Analysis
+ofa Case of Hysteria' (1905e) (the case of Dora) were suppressed
+by me-if not for the nine years enjoined by Horace-at all
+events for four or five years before I allowed them to be pub-
+248
+
+1
+249
+lished. But in those days I had unlimited time before me-
+'oceans of time'1 as an amiable author puts it-and material
+poured in upon me in such quantities that fresh experiences
+were hardly to be escaped. Moreover, I was the only worker in
+a new field, so that my reticence involved no danger to myself
+and no loss to others.
+But now everything has changed. The time before me is
+limited. The whole of it is no longer spent in working, so that
+my opportunities for making fresh observations are not so
+numerous. If I think I see something new, I am uncertain
+whether I can wait for it to be confirmed. And further, everything that is to be seen upon the surface has already been
+exhausted; what remains has to be slowly and laboriously
+dragged up from the depths. Finally, I am no longer alone.
+An eager crowd of fellow-workers is ready to make use of what
+is unfinished or doubtful, and I can leave to them that part of
+the work which I should otherwise have done myself. On this
+occasion, therefore, I feel justified in publishing something
+which stands in urgent need of confirmation before its value or
+lack of value can be decided.
+In examining the earliest mental shapes assumed by the
+sexual life of children we have been in the habit of taking as.
+the subject of our investigations the male child, the little boy.
+With little girls, so we have supposed, things must be similar,
+though in some way or other they must nevertheless be different.
+The point in development at which this difference lay could
+not be clearly determined.
+In boys the situation of the Oedipus complex is the first stage
+that can be recognized with certainty. It is easy to understand,
+because at that stage a child retains the same object which he
+previously cathected with his libido—not as yet a genital one—
+during the preceding period while he was being suckled and
+nursed. The fact, too, that in this situation he regards his father
+as a disturbing rival and would like to get rid of him and take
+his place is a straightforward consequence of the actual state of
+affairs. I have shown elsewhere? how the Oedipus attitude in
+mind. The ilerthe to orace is totil at hatchor Freud had it
+" 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex' (1924d) [this volume,
+p. 173. Much of what follows is an elaboration of that paper.]
+S.F. XIX-R
+
+250
+little boys belongs to the phallic phase, and how its destruction
+is brought about by the fear of castration—that is, by narcissistic
+interest in their genitals. The matter is made more difficult to
+grasp by the complicating circumstance that even in boys the
+Oedipus complex has a double orientation, active and passive,
+in accordance with their bisexual constitution; a boy also wants
+to take his mother's place as the love-object of his father—a fact
+which we describe as the feminine attitude.1
+As regards the prehistory of the Oedipus complex in boys
+we are far from complete clarity. We know that that period
+includes an identification of an affectionate sort with the boy's
+father, an identification which is still free from any sense of
+rivalry in regard to his mother. Another element of that stage
+is invariably, I believe, a masturbatory activity in connection
+with the genitals, the masturbation of early childhood, the more
+or less violent suppression of which by those in charge of the
+child sets the castration complex in action. It is to be assumed
+that this masturbation is attached to the Oedipus complex and
+serves as a discharge for the sexual excitation belonging to it. It
+is, however, uncertain whether the masturbation has this character from the first, or whether on the contrary it makes its
+first appearance spontaneously as an activity of a bodily organ
+and is only brought into relation with the Oedipus complex at
+some later date; this second possibility is by far the more
+probable. Another doubtful question is the part played by bedwetting and by the breaking of that habit through the intervention of training measures. We are inclined to make the
+simple connection that continued bed-wetting is a result of
+masturbation and that its suppression is regarded by boys as
+an inhibition of their genital activity—that is, as having the
+meaning of a threat of castration;? but whether we are always
+right in supposing this remains to be seen. Finally, analysis
+shows us in a shadowy way how the fact of a child at a very
+early age listening to his parents copulating may set up his
+first sexual excitation, and how that event may, owing to its
+after-effects, act as a starting-point for the child's whole sexual
+development. Masturbation, as well as the two attitudes in the
+Oedipus complex, later on become attached to this early experience, the child having subsequently interpreted its meaning.
+It is impossible, however, to suppose that these observations
+" [Cf. ibid., p. 176.]
+" [Cf. ibid., p. 175.]
+
+251
+of coitus are of universal occurrence, so that at this point we
+are faced with the problem of 'primal phantasies'.! Thus the
+prehistory of the Oedipus complex, even in boys, raises all of
+these questions for sifting and explanation; and there is the
+further problem of whether we are to suppose that the process
+invariably follows the same course, or whether a great variety
+of different preliminary stages may not converge upon the same
+terminal situation.
+In little girls the Oedipus complex raises one problem more
+than in boys. In both cases the mother is the original object;
+and there is no cause for surprise that boys retain that object
+in the Oedipus complex. But how does it happen that girls
+abandon it and instead take their father as an object? In pursuing this question I have been able to reach some conclusions
+which may throw light precisely on the prehistory of the
+Oedipus relation in girls.
+Every analyst has come across certain women who cling with
+especial intensity and tenacity to the bond with their father
+and to the wish in which it culminates of having a child by him.
+We have good reason to suppose that the same wish ful phantasy
+was also the motive force of their infantile masturbation, and
+it is easy to form an impression that at this point we have been
+brought up against an elementary and unanalysable fact of
+infantile sexual life. But a thorough analysis of these very cases
+brings something different to light-namely, that here the
+Oedipus complex has a long prehistory and is in some respects
+a secondary formation.
+The old paediatrician Lindner [1879] once remarked that
+a child discovers the genital zones (the penis or the clitoris) as
+a source of pleasure while indulging in sensual sucking (thumbsucking). " I shall leave it an open question whether it is really
+true that the child takes the newly found source of pleasure in
+exchange for the recent loss of the mother's nipple—a possibility to which later phantasies (fellatio) seem to point. Be
+that as it may, the genital zone is discovered at some time or
+• Ed, C cheal son and 7, and natal x lo, e aard
+ductory Lectures (1916-17)•]
+« Of. Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d) [Standard Ed., 7,
+179].
+
+252
+other, and there seems no justification for attributing any
+psychical content to the first activities in connection with it. But
+the first step in the phallic phase which begins in this way is not
+the linking-up of the masturbation with the object-cathexes of
+the Oedipus complex, but a momentous discovery which little
+girls are destined to make. They notice the penis of a brother
+or playmate, strikingly visible and of large proportions, at once
+recognize it as the superior counterpart of their own small and
+inconspicuous organ, and from that time forward fall a victim
+to envy for the penis.
+There is an interesting contrast between the behaviour of the
+two sexes. In the analogous situation, when a little boy first
+catches sight of a girl's genital region, he begins by showing
+irresolution and lack of interest; he sees nothing or disavows!
+what he has seen, he softens it down or looks about for expedients for bringing it into line with his expectations. It is not until
+later, when some threat of castration has obtained a hold upon
+him, that the observation becomes important to him: if he then
+recollects or repeats it, it arouses a terrible storm of emotion
+in him and forces him to believe in the reality of the threat
+which he has hitherto laughed at. This combination of circumstances leads to two reactions, which may become fixed and
+will in that case, whether separately or together or in conjunction with other factors, permanently determine the boy's relations to women: horror of the mutilated creature or triumphant contempt for her. These developments, however, belong to
+the future, though not to a very remote one.
+A little girl behaves differently. She makes her judgement and
+her decision in a flash. She has seen it and knows that she is
+without it and wants to have it.?
+"[See Editor's footnote to "The Infantile Genital Organization',
+p. 143 above.]
+" This is an opportunity for correcting a statement which I made
+many years ago. I believed that the sexual interest of children, unlike
+that of pubescents, was aroused, not by the difference between the
+sexes, but by the problem of where babies come from. We now see that,
+at all events with girls, this is certainly not the case. With boys it may
+no doubt happen sometimes one way and sometimes the other; or with
+both sexes chance experiences may determine the event.—[The statement mentioned at the beginning of this footnote appears in more than
+one place: e.g. in the paper on "The Sexual Theories of Children'
+1908c), Standard Ed., 9, 212, in the case history of'Little Hans' (1909b),
+
+253
+Here what has been named the masculinity complex of
+women branches off. ' It may put great difficulties in the way of
+their regular development towards femininity, ifit cannot be got
+over soon enough. The hope of some day obtaining a penis in
+spite of everything and so of becoming like a man may persist
+to an incredibly late age and may become a motive for strange
+and otherwise unaccountable actions. Or again, a process may
+set in which I should like to call a 'disavowal',& a process
+which in the mental life of children seems neither uncommon
+nor very dangerous but which in an adult would mean the
+beginning of a psychosis. Thus a girl may refuse to accept the
+fact of being castrated, may harden herself in the conviction
+that she does possess a penis, and may subsequently be compelled
+to behave as though she were a man.
+The psychical consequences of envy for the penis, in so far
+as it does not become absorbed in the reaction-formation of
+the masculinity complex, are various and far-reaching. After
+a woman has become aware of the wound to her narcissism,
+she develops, like a scar, a sense of inferiority. 3 When she has
+passed beyond her first attempt at explaining her lack of a
+penis as being a punishment personal to herself and has realized
+that that sexual character is a universal one, she begins to share
+the contempt felt by men for a sex which is the lesser in so
+important a respect, and, at least in holding that opinion,
+insists on being like a man."
+ibid., 10, 133, and in a passage added in 1915 to the Three Essays (1905d),
+ibid., 7, 195. In a passage earlier than any of these, however, in a paper
+on "The Sexual Enlightenment of Children' (1907c), ibid., 9, 135, Freud
+in fact takes the opposite view-the one advocated here.]
+' [This term seems to have been introduced by Van Ophuljsen
+(1917). Freud adopted it in '"A Child is Being Beaten"' (1919e),
+Standard Ed., 17, 191. Cl. also p. 170 above.
+* [For the parallel process in boys, see "The Infantile Genital Organization' (1923e), pp. 143-4 above.]
+8 [Cf. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), Standard Ed., 18, 20-1.]
+4 In my first critical account of the 'History of the Psycho-Analytic
+Movement' (1914d) [Standard Ed., 14, 54-5], I recognized that this fact
+represents the core of truth contained in Adler's theory. That theory has
+no hesitation in explaining the whole world by this single point (organinferiority, the 'masculine protest', 'breaking away from the feminine
+line) and prides itself upon having in this way robbed sexuality of its
+importance and put the desire for power in its place! Thus the only
+organ which could claim to be called 'inferior' without any ambiguity
+
+254
+Even after penis-envy has abandoned its true object, it continues to exist: by an easy displacement it persists in the
+character-trait of jealousy. Of course, jealousy is not limited to
+one sex and has a wider foundation than this, but 1 am of
+opinion that it plays a far larger part in the mental life of
+women than of men and that that is because it is enormously
+reinforced from the direction of displaced penis-envy. While I
+was still unaware ofthis source of jealousy and was considering
+the phantasy 'a child is being beaten', which occurs so commonly in girls, I constructed a first phase for it in which its
+meaning was that another child, a rival of whom the subject
+was jealous, was to be beaten.' This phantasy seems to be a
+relic of the phallic period in girls. The peculiar rigidity which
+struck me so much in the monotonous formula 'a child is being
+beaten' can probably be interpreted in a special way. The child
+which is being beaten (or caressed) may ultimately be nothing
+more nor less than the clitoris itself, so that at its very lowest
+level the statement will contain a confession of masturbation,
+which has remained attached to the content of the formula
+from its beginning in the phallic phase till later life.
+A third consequence of penis-envy seems to be a loosening of
+the girl's relation with her mother as a love-object. The situation as a whole is not very clear, but it can be seen that in the
+end the girl's mother, who sent her into the world so insufficiently equipped, is almost always held responsible for her lack
+of a penis. The way in which this comes about historically is
+often that soon after the girl has discovered that her genitals
+are unsatistactory she begins to show jealousy of another child
+on the ground that her mother is fonder of it than of her, which
+serves as a reason for her giving up her affectionate relation to
+her mother. It will fit in with this if the child which has been
+preferred by her mother is made into the first object of the
+beating-phantasy which ends in masturbation.
+would be the clitoris. On the other hand, one hears of analysts who
+boast that, though they have worked for dozens of years, they have
+never found a sign of the existence of a castration complex. We must
+bow our heads in recognition of the greatness of this achievement, even
+though it is only a negative one, a piece of virtuosity in the art of overlooking and mistaking. The two theories form an interesting pair of
+opposites: in the latter not a trace of a castration complex, in the former
+nothing else than its consequences.
+1 ' "A Child is Being Beaten"' (1919e) [Standard Ed., 17, 184-5].
+
+255
+There is yet another surprising effect of penis-envy, or of the
+discovery of the inferiority of the clitoris, which is undoubtedly
+the most important of all. In the past I had often formed an
+impression that in general women tolerate masturbation worse
+than men, that they more frequently fight against it and that
+they are unable to make use of it in circumstances in which a
+man would seize upon it as a way of escape without any
+hesitation. Experience would no doubt elicit innumerable
+exceptions to this statement, if we attempted to turn it into a
+rule. The reactions of human individuals of both sexes are of
+course made up of masculine and feminine traits. But it
+appeared to me nevertheless as though masturbation were
+further removed from the nature of women than of men, and
+the solution of the problem could be assisted by the reflection
+that masturbation, at all events of the clitoris, is a masculine
+activity and that the elimination of clitoridal sexuality is a
+necessary precondition for the development of femininity.!
+Analyses of the remote phallic period have now taught me that
+in girls, soon after the first signs of penis-envy, an intense current
+of feeling against masturbation makes its appearance, which
+cannot be attributed exclusively to the educational influence of
+those in charge of the child. This impulse is clearly a forerunner
+of the wave of repression which at puberty will do away with
+a large amount of the girl's masculine sexuality in order to
+make room for the development of her femininity. It may
+happen that this first opposition to auto-erotic activity fails to
+attain its end. And this was in fact the case in the instances
+which I analysed. The conflict continued, and both then and
+later the girl did everything she could to free herself from the
+compulsion to masturbate. Many of the later manifestations of'
+sexual life in women remain unintelligible unless this powerful
+motive is recognized.
+I cannot explain the opposition which is raised in this way
+by little girls to phallic masturbation except by supposing that
+there is some concurrent factor which turns her violently against
+that pleasurable activity. Such a factor lies close at hand. It
+1 [A reference to clitoridal masturbation in girls appeared in the first
+edition of the Three Essays (1905d), Standard Ed., 7, 220. In the course
+of his 'Contributions to a Discussion on Masturbation' (1912 f), Freud
+expressed regret at the lack of knowledge about female masturbation
+(Standard Ed., 12, 247)]
+
+256
+cannot be anything else than her narcissistic sense of humiliation which is bound up with penis-envy, the reminder that after
+all this is a point on which she cannot compete with boys and
+that it would therefore be best for her to give up the idea of
+doing so. Thus the little girl's recognition of the anatomical
+distinction between the sexes forces her away from masculinity
+and masculine masturbation on to new lines which lead to the
+development of femininity.
+So far there has been no question of the Oedipus complex,
+nor has it up to this point played any part. But now the girl's
+libido slips into a new position along the line—there is no other
+way of putting it—of the equation 'penis-child'. She gives up
+her wish for a penis and puts in place of it a wish for a child:
+and with that purpose in view she takes her father as a loveobject. 1 Her mother becomes the object of her jealousy. The
+girl has turned into a little woman. If I am to credit a single
+analytic instance, this new situation can give rise to physical
+sensations which would have to be regarded as a premature
+awakening of the female genital apparatus. When the girl's
+attachment to her father comes to grief later on and has to be
+abandoned, it may give place to an identification with him
+and the girl may thus return to her masculinity complex and
+perhaps remain fixated in it.
+I have now said the essence of what I had to say: I will stop,
+therefore, and cast an eye over our findings. We have gained
+some insight into the prehistory of the Oedipus complex in girls.
+The corresponding period in boys is more or less unknown.
+In girls the Oedipus complex is a secondary formation. The
+operations of the castration complex precede it and prepare for
+it. As regards the relation between the Oedipus and castration
+complexes there is a fundamental contrast between the two
+sexes. Whereas in boys the Oedipus complex is destroyed by the castration
+complex,? in girls it is made possible and led up to by the castration
+complex. This contradiction is cleared up if we reflect that the
+castration complex always operates in the sense implied in its
+subject-matter: it inhibits and limits masculinity and encourages femininity. The difference between the sexual development of males and females at the stage we have been considering
+" [Cf. "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex', p. 179 above.]
+" [Ibid., p. 177 above.]
+
+257
+is an intelligible consequence of the anatomical distinction
+between their genitals and of the psychical situation involved
+in it; it corresponds to the difference between a castration that
+has been carried out and one that has merely been threatened.
+In their essentials, therefore, our findings are self-evident and it
+should have been possible to foresee them.
+The Oedipus complex, however, is such an important thing
+that the manner in which one enters and leaves it cannot be
+without its effects. In boys (as I have shown at length in the
+paper to which I have just referred [1924d] and to which all
+of my present remarks are closely related) the complex is not
+simply repressed, it is literally smashed to pieces by the shock
+of threatened castration. Its libidinal cathexes are abandoned,
+desexualized and in part sublimated; its objects are incorporated into the ego, where they form the nucleus of the
+super-ego and give that new structure its characteristic qualities. In normal, or, it is better to say, in ideal cases, the Oedipus
+complex exists no longer, even in the unconscious; the super-ego
+has become its heir. Since the penis (to follow Ferenczi [1924])
+owes its extraordinarily high narcissistic cathexis to its organic
+significance for the propagation of the species, the catastrophe
+to the Oedipus complex (the abandonment of incest and the
+institution of conscience and morality) may be regarded as a
+victory of the race over the individual. This is an interesting
+point of view when one considers that neurosis is based upon a
+struggle of the ego against the demands of the sexual function.
+But to leave the standpoint of individual psychology is not of
+any immediate help in clarifying this complicated situation.
+In girls the motive for the demolition of the Oedipus complex
+is lacking. Castration has already had its effect, which was to
+force the child into the situation of the Oedipus complex. Thus
+the Oedipus complex escapes the fate which it meets with in
+boys: it may be slowly abandoned or dealt with by repression,
+or its effects may persist far into women's normal mental life.
+I cannot evade the notion (though I hesitate to give it expression) that for women the level of what is ethically normal is
+different from what it is in men. Their super-ego is never so
+inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its emotional
+origins as we require it to be in men. Character-traits which
+critics of every epoch have brought up against women-that
+they show less sense of justice than men, that they are less
+
+258
+ready to submit to the great exigencies of life, that they are
+more often influenced in their judgements by feelings of affection
+or hostility—all these would be amply accounted for by the
+modification in the formation of their super-ego which we have
+inferred above. We must not allow ourselves to be deflected
+from such conclusions by the denials of the feminists, who are
+anxious to force us to regard the two sexes as completely equal
+in position and worth; but we shall, of course, willingly agree
+that the majority of men are also far behind the masculine
+ideal and that all human individuals, as a result of their bisexual
+disposition and of cross-inheritance, combine in themselves both
+masculine and feminine characteristics, so that pure masculinity
+and femininity remain theoretical constructions of uncertain
+content.
+I am inclined to set some value on the considerations I have
+brought forward upon the psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes. I am aware, however,
+that this opinion can only be maintained if my findings, which
+are based on a handful of cases, turn out to have general
+validity and to be typical. If not, they would remain no more
+than a contribution to our knowledge of the different paths
+along which sexual life develops.
+In the valuable and comprehensive studies on the masculinity
+and castration complexes in women by Abraham (1921),
+Horney (1923) and Helene Deutsch (1925) there is much that
+touches closely on what I have written but nothing that
+coincides with it completely, so that here again I feel justified
+in publishing this paper.
+
+
+JOSEF POPPER-LYNKEUS UND DIE THEORIE DES
+TRAUMES
+1923
+Allgemeine Nähreflicht (Vienna), 6.
+1928
+G.S., 11, 295-7.
+1940
+G.W., 13, 357-9.
+(6) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+"Josef Popper-Lynkeus and the Theory of Dreams'
+The present translation, by James Strachey, is the first to
+appear in English.
+Josef Popper (1838-1921) was an engineer by profession,
+but was well known in Austria for his writings (under the
+pseudonym of 'Lynkeus'), mainly on philosophical and sociological topics. An account of his schemes of social reform will
+be found in a book by Fritz Wittels, published in English under
+the title An End to Poverty (London, 1925). This also contains
+a short biography of Popper himself by the translators, Eden
+and Cedar Paul. The volume of short imaginative sketches,
+Phantasien eines Realisten, which is the subject of Freud's remarks,
+was highly popular and passed through many editions, the
+twenty-first having appeared in 1921. Freud's paper was no
+doubt written on the occasion of its author's death, for publication in a periodical which, as its title shows, called for the
+universal provision of subsistence and owed its inspiration to
+Popper. Freud wrote another and longer paper on the same
+subject some ten years later (19326).
+260
+
+THErE is much of interest to be said on the subject of apparent
+scientific originality. When some new idea comes up in science,
+which is hailed at first as a discovery and is also as a rule disputed as such, objective research soon afterwards reveals that
+after all it was in fact no novelty. Usually the discovery has
+already been made repeatedly and has afterwards been forgotten, often at very long intervals of time. Or at least it has
+had forerunners, had been obscurely surmised or incompletely
+enunciated. This is too well known to call for further discussion.
+But the subjective side of originality also deserves consideration. A scientific worker may sometimes ask himself what was
+the source of the ideas peculiar to himself which he has applied
+to his material. As regards some of them he will discover without much reflection the hints from which they were derived,
+the statements made by other people which he has picked out
+and modified and whose implications he has elaborated. But
+as regards others of his ideas he can make no such acknowledgements; he can only suppose that these thoughts and lines of
+approach were generated—he cannot tell how—in his own
+mental activity, and it is on them that he bases his claim to
+originality.
+Careful psychological investigation, however, diminishes this
+claim still further. It reveals hidden and long-forgotten sources
+which gave the stimulus to the apparently original ideas, and
+it replaces the ostensible new creation by a revival of something
+forgotten applied to fresh material. There is nothing to regret
+in this; we had no right to expect that what was 'original' could
+be untraceable and undetermined.
+In my case, too, the originality of many of the new ideas
+employed by me in the interpretation of dreams and in psychoanalysis has evaporated in this way. I am ignorant of the source
+of only one of these ideas. It was no less than the key to my
+view of dreams and helped me to solve their riddles, so far as
+it has been possible to solve them hitherto. I started out from
+the strange, confused and senseless character ofso many dreams,
+and hit upon the notion that dreams were bound to become like
+261
+
+262
+JOSEF POPPER-LYNKEUS
+that because something was struggling for expression in them
+which was opposed by a resistance from other mental forces.
+In dreams hidden impulses were stirring which stood in contradiction to what might be called the dreamer's official ethical
+and aesthetic creed; the dreamer was thus ashamed of these
+impulses, turned away from them and refused to acknowledge
+them in day-time, and if during the night he could not withhold expression of some kind from them, he submitted them to
+a 'dream-distortion' which made the content of the dream
+appear confused and senseless. To the mental force in human
+beings which keeps watch on this internal contradiction and
+distorts the dream's primitive instinctual impulses in favour of
+conventional or of higher moral standards, 1 gave the name
+of dream-censorship'.
+Precisely this essential part of my theory of dreams was, however, discovered by Popper-Lynkeus independently. I will ask
+the reader to compare the following quotation from a story
+called "Träumen wie Wachen' ['Dreaming like Waking'] in his
+Phantasien eines Realisten [Phantasies of a Realist] which was
+certainly written in ignorance of the theory of dreams which I
+published in 1900, just as I myself was then in ignorance of
+Lynkeus's Phantasien:
+"About a man who has the remarkable attribute of never
+dreaming nonsense . . ..
+6 "This splendid gift of yours, for dreaming as though you
+were waking, is a consequence of your virtues, of your kindness,
+your sense of justice, and your love of truth; it is the moral
+serenity of your nature which makes me understand all about
+' "But when I think the matter over properly", replied the
+other, "I almost believe that everyone is made like me, and
+that no one at all ever dreams nonsense. Any dream which one
+can remember clearly enough to describe it afterwards-any
+dream, that is to say, which is not a fever-dream—must always
+make sense, and it cannot possibly be otherwise. For things that
+were mutually contradictory could not group themselves into a
+single whole. The fact that time and space are often thrown
+into confusion does not affect the true content of the dream,
+since no doubt neither of them are of significance for its real
+essence. We often do the same thing in waking life. Only think
+" [First edition, Vienna, 1899.]
+
+JOSEF POPPER-LYNKEUS
+263
+of fairy tales and of the many daring products of the imagination, which are full of meaning and of which only a man without
+intelligence could say: "This is nonsense, for it is impossible? "
+‹ "If only one always knew how to interpret dreams in the
+right way, as you have just done with mine!" said his friend.
+‹ "That is certainly no easy task; but with a little attention
+on the part of the dreamer himself it should no doubt always
+succeed.—You ask why it is that for the most part it does not
+succeed? In you other people there seems always to be something that lies concealed in your dreams, something unchaste
+in a special and higher sense, a certain secret quality in your
+being which it is hard to follow. And that is why your dreams
+so often seem to be without meaning or even to be nonsense.
+But in the deepest sense this is not in the least so; indeed, it
+cannot be so at all-for it is always the same man, whether
+he is awake or dreaming.",
+I believe that what enabled me to discover the cause of
+dream-distortion was my moral courage. In the case of Popper
+it was the purity, love of truth and moral serenity of his nature.
+" [These were the epithets applied by Popper himself to the man in
+his story. Freud returned to the subject in a later paper 'My Contact
+with Josef Popper-Lynkeus' (1932c), where a further short quotation
+trom the story will be found. Freud first commented on the coincidence
+between his views and those of Popper in his 'Postscript' added in 1909
+to Chapter I of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Standard Ed., 4, 94-5,
+and in a footnote added in 1909 to Chapter VI (B) of the same work
+(Ibid., 300-9), where he quoted the same passage as in the present
+paper.—The question of the 'originality' of his discoveries was raised by
+Freud in a passage also added in 1909 to Chapter II of The Interpretation
+of Dreams (1900a), ibid., 102-3, in some passages in the first section of
+his 'History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement' (1914d), ibid., 14,
+13-20, and in 'A Note on the Prehistory of the Technique of Analysis'
+(19206), ibid., 18, 263-5.]
+
+:
+S.F. XIX-S
+
+DR. FERENCZI SÁNDOR
+(ZuM 50. GEBURTSTAG)
+1923
+Int. Z. Psychoanal., 9 (3), 257-9.
+1928
+G.S., 11, 273-5.
+1940
+G.W., 13, 443-5.
+(5) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+'Dr. Sándor Ferenczi (on his 50th Birthday)'
+The present translation by James Strachey seems to be the
+first into English.
+This appeared first, over the signature 'Herausgeber und
+Redaktion (Director and Editor)', as an introduction to a special
+issue of the Zeitschrift commemorating Ferenczi's fiftieth birth-
+266
+
+Not many years after its publication (in 1900), The Interpretation of Dreams fell into the hands of a young Budapest
+physician, who, although he was a neurologist, psychiatrist
+and expert in forensic medicine, was eagerly in search of new
+scientific knowledge. He did not get far in reading the book;
+very soon he had thrown it aside—whether out of boredom or
+disgust is not known. Soon afterwards, however, the call for
+fresh possibilities of work and discovery took him to Zurich,
+and thence he was led to Vienna to meet the author of the book
+that he had once contemptuously cast aside. This first visit was
+succeeded by a long, intimate and hitherto untroubled friendship, in the course of which he too made the journey to America
+in 1909 to lecture at Clark University at Worcester, Mass. 1
+Such were the beginnings of Ferenczi, who has since himself
+become a master and teacher of psycho-analysis and who in the
+present year, 1923, completes alike the fiftieth anniversary of
+his birth and the first decade of his leadership of the Budapest
+Psycho-Analytical Society.
+Ferenczi has repeatedly played a part, too, in the external
+affairs of psycho-analysis. His appearance at the Second Analytical Congress, at Nuremberg in 1910, will be remembered, where
+he proposed and helped to bring about the foundation of an
+International Psycho-Analytical Association as a means of
+defence against the contempt with which analysis was treated
+by official Medicine. At the Fifth Analytical Congress, at
+Budapest, in September, 1918, he was elected President of the
+Association. He appointed Anton von Freund as Secretary; and
+there is no doubt that the combined energy of the two men,
+together with Freund's generous schemes of endowment, would
+have made Budapest the analytic capital of Europe, had not
+political catastrophes and personal tragedy put a merciless end
+to these fair hopes. Freund fell ill and died in January, 1920.2
+In view of Hungary's isolation from contact with the rest of the
+" [Cf. Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Freud, 1910a).]
+" [See Freud's obituary of him (1920c).]
+
+268
+world, Ferenczi had resigned his position in October, 1919, and
+had transferred the Presidency of the International Association
+to Ernest Jones in London. For the duration of the Soviet
+Republic in Hungary! Ferenczi had been allotted the functions
+of a University teacher, and his lectures had attracted crowded
+audiences. The Branch Society, which he had founded in 1913,2
+survived every storm and, under his guidance, became a centre
+of intense and productive work and was distinguished by an
+accumulation of abilities such as were exhibited in combination
+by no other Branch Society. Ferenczi, who, as a middle child
+in a large family, had to struggle with a powerful brother
+complex, had, under the influence of analysis, become an
+irreproachable elder brother, a kindly teacher and promoter
+of young talent.
+Ferenczi's analytic writings have become universally known
+and appreciated. It was not until 1922 that his Popular Lectures
+on Psycho-Analysis were published by our Verlag [publishing
+house] as Volume XIII of the 'Internationale Psychoanalytische
+Bibliothek'.
+• These lectures, clear and formally perfect, sometimes most fascinatingly written, offer what is in fact the best
+Introduction to Psycho-Analysis'& for those who are unfamiliar
+with it. There is still no [German] collection of his purely
+technical [psycho-analytic] medical writings, a number of
+which have been translated into English by Ernest Jones. The
+Verlag will fulfil this task as soon as more favourable times make
+it possible.* Those of his books and papers which have appeared
+in Hungarian have passed through many editions and have
+made analysis familiar to educated circles in Hungary.
+Ferenczi's scientific achievement is impressive above all from
+its many-sidedness. Besides well-chosen case histories and
+acutely observed clinical communications ('A Little Chanti-
+1 [Under Béla Kun, March to August, 1919.]
+2 Its Inaugural General Meeting was held on May 19, 1913, with
+Ferenczi as President, Dr. Radó as Secretary, and Drs. Hollós, Ignotus
+and Lévy as members.
+" [This is an allusion to the German title of Freud's own Introductory
+Lectures, published a few years earlier (1916-17)•]
+" [A complete German edition of Ferenczi's shorter works, Bausteine
+zur Psychoanalyse, was published in four volumes from 1927 to 1939. An
+equally comprehensive English edition has appeared in three volumes,
+of which the first, the one mentioned in the text above, was originally
+published in 1916]
+
+269
+cleer' [1913a], "Transitory Symptom-Constructions during the
+Analysis' [1912a], and shorter clinical works) we find exemplary
+critical writings such as those upon Jung's Wandlungen und
+Symbole der Libido [19136], upon Régis and Hesnard's views on
+psycho-analysis [1915], as well as effective polemical writings
+such as those against Bleuler on alcohol [1911] and against
+Putnam on the relation between psycho-analysis and philosophy
+[19126], moderate and dignified in spite of their decisiveness.
+But besides all these there are the papers upon which Ferenczi's
+fame principally rests, in which his originality, his wealth of
+ideas and his command over a well directed scientific imagination find such happy expression, and with which he has enlarged
+important sections of psycho-analytic theory and has promoted
+the discovery of fundamental situations in mental life: Introjection and Transference', including a discussion of the theory
+of hypnosis [1909], 'Stages in the Development of the Sense of
+Reality' [1913c] and his discussion of symbolism [1912c].
+Finally there are the works of these last few years— "The Psycho-
+Analysis of the War Neuroses' [19196], Hysterie und Pathoneurosen [1919c] and, in collaboration with Hollós, Psycho-
+Analysis and the Psychic Disorder of General Paresis [1922] (in
+which the medical interest advances from the psychological
+conditions to the somatic determinants), and his approaches
+to an 'active' therapy.
+However incomplete this enumeration may seem to be, his
+friends know that Ferenczi has held back even more than he has
+been able to make up his mind to communicate.' On his fiftieth
+birthday they are united in wishing that he may be granted
+strength, leisure and a frame of mind to bring his scientific plans
+to realization in fresh achievements.
+1 [Freud returned to this point in his obituary of Ferenczi, written
+just ten years later (1933c).]
+
+PREFACE TO AICHHORN'S
+WAYWARD YOUTH
+
+PREFACE TO AICHHORN'S VERWAHRLOSTE JUGEND
+1925 In August Aichhorn, Verwahrloste Jugend, 5-6, Leipzig
+Vienna and Zurich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. (1931, 2nd ed.)
+1928 G.S., 11, 267-9.
+1948
+G.W., 14, 565-7.
+(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS:
+1935
+135 In Ais (printed 198, London: Param (
+unspecifiéd.)
+1950
+C.P., 5, 98-100. (Under the title Psycho-Analysis and
+1951
+Delinquency.) (Tr. James Strachey.)
+In Aichhorn, Wayward Youth, vii-ix, London: Imago
+Publishing Co. (Revised reprint of 1935 edition, but
+with Freud's Preface tr. James Strachey.)
+of the ore fint panied in ry lighly coreced vermion
+A biographical study of August Aichhorn (1878-1949), by
+Dr. K. R. Eissler, appears in the 1951 edition of the English
+translation of Wayward Youth. Aichhorn's book was first
+published in July, 1925. Freud made a further short reference
+to it in a footnote to Chapter VII of Civilization and its Discontents (1930a).
+A fuller discussion of the relations between psycho-analysis
+and education was given by Freud in a long passage in the
+middle of Lecture XXXIV of his New Introductory Lectures
+(1933a).
+272
+
+PREFACE TO AICHHORN'S WAYWARD YOUTH
+NoNe of the applications of psycho-analysis has excited so much
+interest and aroused so many hopes, and none, consequently,
+has attracted so many capable workers, as its use in the theory
+and practice of education. It is easy to understand why; for
+children have become the main subject of psycho-analytic
+research and have thus replaced in importance the neurotics
+on whom its studies began. Analysis has shown how the child
+lives on, almost unchanged, in the sick man as well as in the
+dreamer and the artist; it has thrown light on the motive forces
+and trends which set its characteristic stamp upon the childish
+nature; and it has traced the stages through which a child
+grows to maturity. No wonder, therefore, if an expectation has
+arisen that psycho-analytic concern with children will benefit the
+work of education, whose aim it is to guide and assist children
+on their forward path and to shield them from going astray.
+My personal share in this application of psycho-analysis has
+been very slight. At an early stage I had accepted the bon mot
+which lays it down that there are three impossible professions—
+educating, healing and governing-and I was already fully
+occupied with the second of them. But this does not mean that
+I overlook the high social value of the work done by those of
+my friends who are engaged in education.
+The present volume by August Aichhorn is concerned with
+one department of the great problem-with the educational
+influencing of juvenile delinquents. The author had worked
+for many years in an official capacity as a director of municipal
+institutions for delinquents before he became acquainted with
+psycho-analysis. His attitude to his charges sprang from a warm
+sympathy with the fate of those unfortunates and was correctly
+guided by an intuitive perception of their mental needs. Psychoanalysis could teach him little that was new of a practical kind,
+but it brought him a clear theoretical insight into the justification of his way of acting and put him in a position to explain
+its basis to other people.
+It must not be assumed that this gift of intuitive understanding will be found in everyone concerned with the bringingup of children. Two lessons may be derived, it seems to me,
+273
+
+274
+AICHHORN'S WAYWARD YOUTH
+from the experience and the success of August Aichhorn. One
+must remain an inaccessible problem to him. A training of this
+kind is best carried out if such a person himself undergoes an
+analysis and experiences it on himself: theoretical instruction
+in analysis fails to penetrate deep enough and carries no
+conviction.
+The second lesson has a somewhat conservative ring. It is to
+the effect that the work of education is something sui generis:
+it is not to be confused with psycho-analytic influence and cannot be replaced by it. Psycho-analysis can be called in by
+education as an auxiliary means of dealing with a child; but
+it is not a suitable substitute for education. Not only is such a
+substitution impossible on practical grounds but it is also to be
+disrecommended for theoretical reasons. The relation between
+education and psycho-analytic treatment will probably before
+long be the subject of a detailed investigation. Here I will only
+give a few hints. One should not be misled by the statement—
+incidentally a perfectly true one—that the psycho-analysis of
+an adult neurotic is equivalent to an after-education.' A child,
+even a wayward and delinquent child, is still not a neurotic;
+and after-education is something quite different from the education of the immature. The possibility of analytic influence rests
+on quite definite preconditions which can be summed up under
+the term 'analytic situation'; it requires the development of
+certain psychical structures and a particular attitude to the
+analyst. Where these are lacking—as in the case of children,
+of juvenile delinquents, and, as a rule, of impulsive criminals
+something other than analysis must be employed, though something which will be at one with analysis in its purpose. The
+theoretical chapters of the present volume will give the reader
+a preliminary grasp of the multiplicity of the decisions involved.
+I will end with a further inference, and this time one which
+is important not for the theory of education but for the status
+of those who are engaged in education. If one of these has learnt
+[Freud had used this comparison as early as in his lecture 'On
+achertherng i accurately tra Stated education inhead be word
+education'. See also a passage towards the beginning of Lecture XX VIII
+of the Introductory Lectures (1916-17).]
+
+AICHHORN'S WAYWARD YOUTH
+275
+analysis by experiencing it on his own person and is in a position
+of being able to employ it in borderline and mixed cases to
+assist him in his work, he should obviously be given the right to
+practise analysis, and narrow-minded motives should not be
+allowed to try to put obstacles in his way.
+
+
+1925
+Int. Z. Psychoanal., 11 (2), 255-6.
+1928
+G.S., 11, 281-3.
+1948
+G.W., 14, 562-3.
+(6) ENGLISH TRANSLATION:
+1925 Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 6 (4), 459-60. (Tr. unnamed.)
+The present translation is a new one by James Strachey.
+The last dozen lines of this obituary were quoted at the end
+of the Editor's Introduction to Studies on Hysteria (1895d),
+Standard Ed., 2, xxviii, where a discussion will also be found of
+the scientific relations between the two collaborators.
+278
+
+ON June 20, 1925, there died in Vienna, in his eighty-fourth
+year, Josef Breuer, the creator of the cathartic method, whose
+name is for that reason indissolubly linked with the beginnings
+of psycho-analysis.
+Breuer was a physician, a pupil of the clinician Oppolzer. In
+his youth he had worked at the physiology of respiration under
+Ewald Hering, and later, in the scanty hours of leisure allowed
+by an extensive medical practice, he occupied himself successfully with 'experiments on the function of the vestibular
+apparatus in animals. Nothing in his education could lead
+one to expect that he would gain the first decisive insight into
+the age-old riddle of the hysterical neurosis and would make a
+contribution of imperishable value to our knowledge of the
+human mind. But he was a man of rich and universal gifts, and
+his interests extended in many directions far beyond his
+professional activities.
+It was in 18801 that chance brought into his hands an
+unusual patient, a girl of more than ordinary intelligence who
+had fallen ill of severe hysteria while she was nursing her sick
+father. It was only some fourteen years later, in our joint
+publication, Studies on Hysteria (1895d)—and even then unluckily only in a much abbreviated form, censored, too, from
+considerations of medical discretion—that the world learnt the
+nature of his treatment of this celebrated 'first case', with what
+immense care and patience he carried out the technique when
+once he had discovered it, till the patient was freed from all
+the incomprehensible symptoms of her illness, and what insight he obtained in the course of the work into the mental
+mechanisms of the neurosis.
+We psycho-analysts, who have long been familiar with the
+idea of devoting hundreds of sessions to a single patient, can
+form no conception of how novel such a procedure must have
+seemed forty-five years ago. It must have called for a large
+amount of personal interest and, if the phrase can be allowed,
+of medical libido, but also for a considerable degree of freedom
+of thought and certainty of judgement. At the date of the
+* [Breuer was born in 1842]
+
+280
+publication of our Studies we were able to appeal to Charcot's
+writings and to Pierre Janet's investigations, which had by
+that time deprived Breuer's discoveries of some of their priority.
+But when Breuer was treating his first case (in 1881-2) none of
+this was as yet available. Janet's Automatisme psychologique
+appeared in 1889 and his second work, L'état mental des
+hystériques, not until 1892. It seems that Breuer's researches
+were wholly original, and were directed only by the hints
+offered to him by the material of his case.
+I have repeatedly attempted —most recently in my Autobiographical Study (1925d), in Grote's series, Die Medizin der Gegenwhich nemorashed jointly. My mini may chiefly ith revivies
+in Breuer an interest which seemed to have become extinct, and
+in then urging him on to publication. A kind of reserve which
+was characteristic of him, an inner modesty, surprising in a
+man of such a brilliant personality, had led him to keep his
+astonishing discovery secret for so long that not all of it was
+any longer new. I found reason later to suppose that a purely
+emotional factor, too, had given him an aversion to further
+work on the elucidation of the neuroses. He had come up
+against something that is never absent—his patient's transference on to her physician, and he had not grasped the
+impersonal nature of the process. At the time when he submitted to my influence and was preparing the Studies for
+publication, his judgement of their significance seemed to be
+confirmed. 'I believe'
+, he told me, 'that this is the most
+important thing we two have to give the world.'
+Besides the case history of his first patient Breuer contributed
+a theoretical paper to the Studies. It is very far from being out
+of date; on the contrary, it conceals thoughts and suggestions
+which have even now not been turned to sufficient account. Anyone immersing himself in this speculative essay will form a true
+impression of the mental build of this man, whose scientific
+interests were, alas, turned in the direction of our psychopathology during only one short episode of his long life.
+
+(1922-25)
+S.F. XIX-T
+
+PREFACE TO RAYMOND DE SAUSSURE'S
+THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC METHOD:
+(1922)
+IT is with great pleasure that I am able to assure the public
+that the present work by Dr. de Saussure is a book of value and
+merit. It is especially well calculated to give French readers a
+correct idea of what psycho-analysis is and what it contains.
+Ding, Sain are tom he has consciental of cod my
+to me to undergo an analysis lasting several months. This has
+put him in a position to form his own judgement on the majority
+of those questions in psycho-analysis which are still undecided,
+and to avoid the many distortions and errors which one is
+accustomed to finding in French as well as in German expositions of psycho-analysis. Nor has he failed to contradict certain
+false or negligent statements which commentators pass on from
+one to another: such as, for instance, that all dreams have a
+sexual meaning or that, according to me, the only motive
+force in our mental life is that of sexual libido.
+Since Dr. de Saussure has said in his preface that I have
+corrected his work, I must add a qualification; my influence
+has only made itself felt in a few corrections and comments
+and I have in no way sought to encroach upon the author's
+independence. In the first, theoretical part of this work, I should
+have expounded a number of things differently from him: for
+instance, the difficult topic of the preconscious and the unconscious. And above all, I should have treated the Oedipus
+complex far more exhaustively.
+' [Published (in French) in R. de Saussure's La méthode psychanalytique
+Lausanne and Geneva, 1922, vii-vili. The German text has not been
+published and the French version seems never to have been reprinted.
+The work does not appear in either G.S. or G. W.; it should have been
+included in Volume XVIII of the Standard Edition, but did not come to
+light until that volume was in print. Through the kindness of Dr. de
+Saussure, we have seen the original German autograph, and it is upon
+this that our translation is based. Thus it differs slightly at two or three
+points from the French version.
+The present translation, the first into
+English, is by Angela Richards.]
+283
+
+284
+The excellent dream which Dr. Odier has put at the author's
+disposal may give even the uninitiated an idea of the wealth of
+dream-associations and of the relation between the manifest
+dream-image and the latent thoughts concealed behind it. It
+demonstrates too the significance that the analysis of a dream
+can have in the treatment of a patient.
+Finally, the remarks which the author makes in conclusion
+on the technique of psycho-analysis are quite excellent. They
+are entirely correct and, in spite of their conciseness, leave aside
+nothing essential. They are convincing evidence of the author's
+subtle understanding. The reader should not, of course, conclude that knowledge of these rules of technique alone will
+make him capable of undertaking an analysis.
+To-day psycho-analysis is beginning to arouse in a larger
+measure the interest of professional men and of the lay public
+in France as well; it will certainly not find any fewer resistances
+there than it has encountered previously in other countries.
+Let us hope that Dr. de Saussure's book will make an important
+contribution to the clarification of the discussions that lie
+ahead
+FREUD
+VIENNA, February 1922
+
+PREFACE TO MAX EITINGON'S REPORT ON
+THE BERLIN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL POLICLINIC
+(MARCH 1920 to JUNE 1922)"
+1923)
+My friend Max Eitingon, who created the Berlin Psycho-
+Analytical Policlinic and has hitherto supported it out of his
+own resources, has in the following pages made public his
+reasons for founding it and has also given an account of the
+Institute's organization- and functions. I can only add to what
+he has written my wish that individuals or societies may be
+found elsewhere to follow Eitingon's example and bring similar
+institutions into existence. If psycho-analysis, alongside of its
+scientific significance, has a value as a therapeutic procedure,
+if it is capable of giving help to sufferers in their struggle to
+fulfil the demands of civilization, this help should be accessible
+as well to the great multitude who are too poor themselves to
+repay an analyst for his laborious work. This seems to be a
+social necessity particularly in our times, when the intellectual
+strata of the population, which are especially prone to neurosis,
+are sinking irresistibly into poverty.? Institutes such as the
+Berlin Policlinic are also alone in a position to overcome the
+difficulties which otherwise stand in the way of thorough
+instruction in psycho-analysis. They make possible the education of a considerable number of trained analysts, whose
+activity must be regarded as the sole possible protection
+against injury to patients by ignorant and unqualified persons,
+whether they are laymen or doctors.
+1 [First published in Max Eitingon's Bericht über die Berliner psychoanalytische Poliklinik (März 1920 bis juni 1922), Leipzig, Vienna and
+Lurich, 1923, 3; reprinted G.S., 11 (1928), 265 and G. W., 13 (1940),
+441. Ihe present translation, the first into English, is by James Strachey.
+Some years later Freud wrote a preface to another pamphlet on the
+same subject (1930b).]
+* [Freud had discussed this question at greater length in his paper at
+the Budapest Psycho-Analytical Congress (1919a), Standard Edo, 17,
+166-8.]
+285
+
+LETTER TO FRITZ WITTELS:
+You have given me a Christmas present which is very largely
+occupied with my own personality. The failure to send a word
+of thanks for such a gift would be an act of rudeness only to be
+accounted for by very peculiar motives. Fortunately no such
+motivesexily in thireet, adit mani les by no mrious heret it
+the topic which was to be anticipated in so able a writer as
+yourself.
+I need hardly say that I neither expected nor desired the
+publication of such a book. It seems to me that the public has
+no concern with my personality, and can learn nothing from
+an account of it, so long as my case (for manifold reasons) cannot be expounded without any reserves whatever. But you have
+thought otherwise. Your own detachment from me, which you
+consider an advantage, entails serious drawbacks none the less.
+You know too little of the object of study, and you have not
+been able to avoid the danger of straining the facts a little in
+your analytic endeavours. Moreover, I am inclined to think
+that your adoption of Stekel's standpoint, and the fact that you
+1 [Fritz Wittels (1880-1950) was one of the earliest members of the
+Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society, but left it on some unspecified personal grounds in 1910. In 1924 he published a biography of Freud and
+sent him an advance copy of the work at the end of 1923. Freud acknowledged it in a letter dated December 18, 1923. Later on, in 1924, an
+English translation of the book, by Eden and Cedar Paul, was published:
+Sigmund Freud, his Personality, his Teaching and his School (London: Allen
+and Unwin; New York: Dodd, Mead). This was prefaced with Freud's
+express authorization' by a translation of extracts from his letter to
+Wittels. We have had access to the original German text of the letter,
+which never seems to have been published, and the version given here,
+a reprint (with two or three very small changes) of the one printed in
+1944, is substantially correct. No doubt it was made by the translators of
+Wittels's book itself. The short omitted passage contains a further reterence to Stekel and a remark about Freud's own illness. It may be added
+that Wittels was re-elected to the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society in
+1927. The letter appears here by arrangement with Messrs. George
+Allen and Unwin.]
+286
+
+287
+contemplate the object of study from his outlook, cannot but
+have impaired the accuracy of your discernment.
+In some respects, I think there are positive distortions, and
+I believe these to be the outcome of a preconceived notion of
+yours. You think that a great man must have such and such
+merits and defects, and must display certain extreme characteristics; and you hold that I belong to the category of great men.
+That is why you ascribe to me all sorts of qualities many ot
+which are mutually contlicting. Much of general interest might
+be said on this matter, but unfortunately your relationship to
+Stekel precludes further attempts on my part to clear up the
+misunderstanding.
+On the other hand, I am glad to acknowledge that your
+shrewdness has enabled you to detect some things which are
+well known to myself. For instance, you are right in inferring
+that I have often been compelled to make détours when following my own path. You are right, too, in thinking that I have
+no use for other people's ideas when they are presented to me
+at an inopportune moment. (Still, as regards the latter point,
+I think you might have defended me from the accusation that
+I am repudiating ideas when I am merely unable for the time
+being to pass judgement on them or to elaborate them.) But I
+am delighted to find that you do me full justice in the matter
+of my relations with Adler....
+I realize that you may have occasion to revise your text in view
+of a second edition. With an eye to this possibility, I enclose a
+list of suggested emendations.1 These are based on trustworthy
+" [A number of these are stated to have been adopted in the English
+translation. One such correction of Freud's is quoted in full (on pp.
+251-2 of the translation). Wittels had suggested that freud's hypothesis
+of the 'death instinct' in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g) occurred to
+him as the result of the death of his daughter. But Freud wrote: "That
+seems to me most interesting, and I regard it as a warning. Beyond question, if I had myself been analysing another person in such circumstances, I should have presumed the existence of a connection between
+my daughter's death and the train of thought presented in Beyond the
+Pleasure Principle. But the inference that such a sequence exists would
+have been false. The book was written in 1919, when my daughter was
+still in excellent health. She died in January, 1920. In September, 1919,
+I had sent the manuscript of the little book to be read by some friends
+in Berlin [Eitingon and Abraham]. It was finished, except for the discussion concerning the mortality or inmortality of the protozoa. What
+seems true is not always the truth.]
+
+288
+data, and are quite independent of my own prepossessions.
+Some of them relate to matters of trifling importance, but some
+of them will perhaps lead you to reverse or modify certain
+inferences. The fact that I send you these corrections is a token
+that I value your work though I cannot wholly approve it.
+
+LETTER TO SEÑOR LUIS LOPEZ-
+BALLESTEROS Y DE TORRES:
+WHEN I was a young student, the desire to read the immortal
+Don Quixote in the original of Cervantes led me to learn, untaught, the lovely Castilian tongue. Thanks to this youthful
+enthusiasm, I am able to-day—at an advanced age—to test
+the accuracy of your Spanish version of my works, the reading
+of which invariably provokes in me a lively appreciation of
+your very correct interpretation of my thoughts and of the
+elegance of your style. I am above all astonished that one who,
+like you, is neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist by profession
+should have been able to obtain so absolute and precise a
+mastery over material which is intricate and at times obscure.
+^ This letter, dated May 7, 1923, was addressed by Freud to the
+Spanish translator of his works. It was printed in Spanish in Volume IV
+of Obras Completas del Professor S. Freud, Madrid, 1923, 7. Reprinted G.S.,
+11 (1928), 266 and G.W., 13 (1940), 442. No German text is extant,
+and it is not impossible that Freud wrote it himself in Spanish, of which
+he had a good knowledge (ci. Jones, 1953, 180). The present translation,
+the first into English, is by James Strachey.]
+289
+
+LETTER TO LE DISQUE VERTI
+Or the many lessons lavished upon me in the past (1885-6) by
+the great Charcot at the Salpêtrière," two left me with a deep
+impression: that one should never tire of considering the same
+phenomena again and again (or of submitting to their effects),
+and that one should not mind meeting with contradiction on
+every side provided one has worked sincerely.
+FREUD
+1 In Le Disque Vert, 2 (3rd Series) (June), 3. This periodical, issued in
+Paris and Brussels by Franz Hellens (a pseudonym for Frédéric van
+Ermengem), published in 1924 a special number with the title "Freud
+et la Psychanalyse. It contained more than 200 pages and contributions
+of varying length by 36 authors. It was introduced by a short letter from
+Freud in French dated 'Vienna, February 26, 1924'. A detailed account
+of the contents of the special number will be found in Int. Z. Psychoanal.,
+10 (1924), 206-8, where the text of Freud's letter is also printed. It was
+reprinted G.S., 11 (1928), 266 and G.W., 13 (1940), 446. No German
+text is extant, and the original was perhaps written in French. The
+present translation, the first into English, is by James Strachey.]
+" [Cf. Freud's obituary of him (1893 f).]
+290
+
+LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF THE
+JEWISH PRESS CENTRE IN ZURICH"
+•..- CAN say that - stand as tar apart from the Jewish
+religion as from all other religions: that is to say, they are of
+great significance to me as a subject of scientific interest. but
+I have no part in them emotionally. On the other hand I have
+always had a strong feeling of solidarity with my fellow-people,
+and have always encouraged it in my children as well. We have
+all remained in the Jewish denomination.
+In the time of my youth our free-thinking religious instructors
+set no store by their pupils' acquiring a knowledge of the
+Hebrew language and literature. My education in this field
+was therefore extremely behindhand, as I have since often
+regretted.
+- This was first published in the Füdische Presszentrale Zürich on
+291
+
+ON THE OCCASION OF THE OPENING
+OF THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY I
+HIstorIans have told us that our small nation withstood the
+destruction of its independence as a State only because it began
+to transfer in its estimation of values the highest rank to its
+spiritual possessions, to its religion and its literature.
+We are now living in a time when this people has a prospect
+of again winning the land of its fathers with the help of a Power
+that dominates the world, and it celebrates the occasion by the
+foundation of a University in its ancient capital city.
+A University is a place in which knowledge is taught above
+all differences of religions and of nations, where investigation
+is carried on, which is to show mankind how far they understand
+the world around them and how far they can control it.
+Such an undertaking is a noble witness to the development
+to which our people has forced its way in two thousand years
+of unhappy fortune.
+I find it painful that my ill-health prevents me from being
+present at the opening festivities of the Jewish University in
+Jerusalem.
+1 [This was originally published, along with similar messages trom
+other well-known people, in the fortnightly periodical The New Judaea
+the Hebrew University'—The University was inaugurated by Lord
+Balfour in April, 1925.1
+292
+
+EDITORIAL CHANGES IN THE
+ZEITSCHRIFTI
+DR. OTTo RaNk has acted as editor of this journal ever since
+its foundation in 1913, even though it is only since 1920 that he
+has been named on its title-page as sole editor. During his
+period of military service in the War, his place was taken by
+Dr. Hanns Sachs, who was at that time in Vienna. Since the
+beginning of the current volume Dr. S. Ferenczi has also had
+a share in the editing.
+At Easter, 1924, Dr. Rank accepted an invitation which took
+hira to New York. On his return home he announced that he
+had decided to transfer his activity as a teaching and practising
+. analyst to America-at least for a part of the year. Thus it
+became necessary to place the editorship of the Zeitschrift in
+other hands. It is not within the rights of the Director to give
+public expression to his opinion of the level and achievements
+of this journal. No one who is inclined to appreciate them
+should overlook or forget how much of its success is due to the
+tireless devotion and exemplary work of the retiring editor.
+Dr. Rank's place will now be taken by Dr. S. Radó of Berlin.
+He will be supported as advisers and collaborators by Dr. M.
+Eitingon (Berlin) and Dr. S. Ferenczi (Budapest). All communications and contributions for the editor should be
+addressed to Dr. Sándor Radó, Berlin-Schöneberg, Am Park,
+20. The business side of the Zeitschrift will be conducted as
+before at the offices of the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer
+Verlag in Vienna (Manager: A. J. Storfer).
+1 ['Mitteilung des Herausgebers' ("Announcement by the Director'),
+Int. Z. Psychoanal., 10 (1924), 373. This has never been reprinted. I'he
+present translation, the first into English, is by James Strachey.]
+293
+
+AND AUTHOR INDEX
+graphy of Freud's writings to be included in the last volume of the
+Standard Edition.
+For non-technical authors, and for technical authors where no specific
+work is mentioned, see the General Index.]
+'ABel, K. (1884) Uber den Gegensinn der Urworte, Leipzig. (206)
+ABRAHaM, K. (1921) 'Aüsserungsformen des weiblichen Kastrationskomplezes, Int. 2. Psychoan., 7, 422. (258)
+[Trans.: 'Manifestations of the Female Castration Complex',
+Selected Papers on Psycho-Analysis, London, 1927, Chap. XXII.)
+AICHHOrN, A. (1925) Verwahrloste Jugend, Vienna. (272-5)
+[Trans.: Wayward Youth, New York, 1935; London, 1936; revised
+reprint, London, 1951.]
+ALEXANDER, F. (1922) "Kastrationskomplex und Charakter, Int. Z.
+Psychoan., 8, 121. (175)
+[Trans.' "The Castration Complex in the Formation of Character, Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 4 (1923), 11.]
+ANDREAS-SALOMÉ, L. (1916) '"Anal" und "Sexual"', Imago, 4, 249.
+BLUE, E. (1906) "Freudsche Mechanismen in der Symptomatologie
+von Psychosen', Psychiat.-neurol. Wschr., 8, 323, 338. (204)
+(1911) Dementia Praecox, oder Gruppe der Schizophrenien, Leipzig and
+Vienna. (204)
+[Trans.: Dementia Praecox, or the Group of Schizophrenias, New York,
+1950.]
+DEUTSCH, H. (1925) Psychoanalyse der weiblichen Sexualfunktionen, Vienna.
+(258)
+ErrINGoN, M. (1923) Bericht über die Berliner psychoanalytische Poliklinik
+(März 1920 bis Juni 1922), Leipzig, Vienna, Zurich. (285)
+ELLIs, HAVELOcK (1911) 'Die Lehren der Freud-Schule', Zbl. Psychoan.,
+2, 61. (201)
+ERB, W. (1882) Handbuch der Elektrotherapie, Leipzig. (192)
+(Trans.: Handbook of Electro-Therapeutics, London, 1883.]
+295
+
+296
+FERENCi, S. (1909) 'Introjektion und Übertragung', Jb. psychoan.
+psychopath. Forsch., 1, 444. (469)
+[Trans.: 'Introjection and Transference', First Contributions to
+Psycho-Analysis, London, 1952, Chap. II.]
+(1911) 'Alkohol und Neurosen. Antwort auf die Kritik von Prof.
+Eugen Bleuler'
+›Fb. psychoan. psychopath. Forsch., 3, 853. (269)
+(1912a) 'Über passagère Symptombildung während der Analyse',
+Zbl. Psychoan., 2, 588. (269)
+[Trans.:
+"Transitory
+Symptom-Constructions during the
+Analysis', First Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, London, 1952,
+Chap. VII.]
+(1912b) 'Philosophie und Psychoanalyse. Bemerkungen zu einem
+Autsatz des Herr Prot. James J. Putnam', Imago, 1, 519. (469)
+[Trans.: 'Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis (Comments on a paper
+by Professor J. J. Putnam of Harvard University), Final Contributions to the Problems and Methods of Psycho-Analysis, London and
+New York, 1955, Chap. XXXV.]
+(1912c) Symbolische Darstellung des Lust- und Realitätsprinzips
+im Ödipus-Mythos', Imago, 1, 276. (269)
+[Trans.: "The Symbolic Representation of the Pleasure and
+Reality Principles in the Oedipus Myth', First Contributions to
+Psycho-Analysis, London, 1952, Chap. X.]
+(1913a) 'Ein kleiner Hahnemann', Int. 2. (ärzil.) Psxchoanal., 1, 240.
+(268-9)
+[Trans. 'A Little Chanticleer',
+First Contributions to Psycho-
+Analysis, London, 1952, Chap, IX.]
+(1913b) Review of C. G. Jung's Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido
+(Leipzig and Vienna, 1912), Int. 2. (ärztl.) Psychoanal., 1, 391.
+(269)
+(1913c) "Entwicklungsstufen des Wirklichkeitssinnes', Int. 2. (ärztl.)
+Psychoanal., 1, 124. (35, 269)
+[Trans.. 'Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality,
+First Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, London, 1952, Chap. VIII.]
+(1915) 'Die psychiatrische Schule von Bordeaux über die Psychoanalyse', Int. Z. (ärztl.) Psychoanal., 3, 352. (269)
+(1919a) Contribution to a Symposium published
+Zur Psychoanalyse der Kriegsneurosen, Leipzig and Vienna. (269)
+[Trans.: In Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses, London, Vienna
+and New York, 1921.]
+(19196) Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, Leipzig and Vienna. (Includes
+'Hysterische Materializationsphänomene'.) (185, 269)
+[Trans.: In Further Contributions to the Theory and Technigue of
+Psycho-Analysis, London, 1926, Chaps. V, VI, IX, X, XI, XV.]
+(1922) Populäre Vorträge über Psychoanalyse, Vienna. (268)
+(1923) "Zur Symbolik des Medusenhauptes', Int. Z. Psychoan., 9,
+69. (144)
+[Trans.' 'On the Symbolism of the Head of Medusa', Further
+Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psycho-Analysis, London,
+1926, Chap. LXVI.]
+
+297
+(1924) Versuch einer Genitaltheorie, Vienna. (257)
+[Trans.: Thalassa, a Theory of Genitality, New York, 1938.]
+(1927-39) Bausteine zur Psxhoanalyse (4 vols.), Vienna. (460)
+FERENCZI, So, and HoLLós, S. (1942) Zur Psychoanalyse der paralytischen
+[Trans.• Psycho-Analysis and the Psychio Disorder of General Paresis,
+New York and Washington, 1925.]
+FREUD, S. (1886f) Translation with Preface and Footnotes of J.-M.
+Charcot's Leçons sur les maladies du systéme nerveux, 3, Paris, 1887,
+under the title Neue Vorlesungen über die Krankheiten des Nerven
+systems insbesondere über Hysterie, Vienna. (69)
+[Trans.' Preface and Footnotes to Charcot's Neue Vorlesunger
+über die Krankheiten des Nervensystems insbesondere über Hysterie,
+Standard Ed., 1.]
+(18916) Zur Auffassung der Aphasien, Vienna. (20-1)
+[Trans." On Aphasia, London and New York, 1953.]
+(1892-93a) Translation with Preface and Footnotes of J.-M.
+Charcot's Leçons du mardi (188y-8), Paris, 1888, under the title
+Poliklinische Vorträge, 1, Vienna. (70)
+[Trans: Preface and Footnotes to Charcot's Poliklinische Vorträge,
+1, Standard Ed., 1.]
+(1893f) 'Charcot, G.S., 1, 243; G.W., 1, 21. (70, 290)
+[Trans.: 'Charcot', C.P., 1, 9; Standard Ed., 3.]
+(1894a) 'Die Abwehr-Neuropsychosen', G.S., 1, 290; G.W., 1, 59.
+(27,57, 148)
+[Trans.: "The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence', C.P., 1, 59; Standard
+Edo, 3.]
+( 1 reine Suis ober futions 5,20, 164, 19 3,
+228, 236, 278, 279-80)
+[Trans.: Studies on Hysteria, Standard Ed., 2. Including Breuer's
+contributions.]
+(1896b) Weitere Bemerkungen über die Abwehr-Neuropsychosen',
+G.S., 1, 363; G.W., 1, 379. (6, 18, 184, 204)
+[Trans.: 'Further Remarks on, the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence",
+C.P., 1, 155; Standard Ed., 3.]
+(1900a) Die Traumdeutung, Vienna. G.S., 2-3; G.W., 2-3. (4-5, 24,
+25, 26, 89, 109, 111, 112, 114, 118-19, 120, 125-6, 127, 129, 130,
+131-2, 135, 136, 165, 191, 199-200, 228, 238, 244, 248-9, 262-3,
+267)
+ITrans.: The Interpretation of Dreams, London and New York,
+1955; Standard Edo, 4-5.]
+(19016) Zur Psycho pathologie des Alltagslebens, Berlin, 1904. G.v., %, 3;
+G.W., 4. (98, 127, 136, 199)
+¡Irans.: Ihe Psychopathology of Everyday
+(1905a) 'Uber Psychotherapie, G.s., 6, 11; G.W., 5, 13. (274)
+[Trans.: 'On Psychotherapy', C.P., 1, 249; Standard Ed., 7, 257.]
+(1905c) Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten, Vienna. G.S.,
+9, 5; G. W.., 6. (45, 236, 239)
+S.F. XIX-U
+
+298
+[Trans.: Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, Standard
+Ed., 8.]
+(1905d) Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, Vienna. G.S., 5, 3; G.W.,
+5, 29. (33, 47, 63, 140, 141-2, 145, 157, 163, 165, 175, 197, 223,
+238, 243, 246, 251, 253, 255)
+Standara La., 7, 145.]
+(1905e [1901]) 'Bruchstück einer Hysterie-Analyse, G.s., 8, 3;
+The 12 tuck 23 tarie Analy, GS, 8, 31
+G. W., 5, 163. (165, 175, 234, 239, 248-9)
+[Trans.: 'Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria', G.P.,
+3, 13; Standard Ed., 7, 3.]
+(1907b) 'Zwangshandlungen und Religionsübung', G.S., 10, 210;
+r. W., 7, 149. 19,41,400,
+Trans.: "Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices, G.f., 4, 40
+Standard Ed., 9, 116.]
+(1907c) "Zur sexuellen Aufklärung der Kinder', G.S., 5, 134; G.W.,
+7, 19. (253)
+[Trans.. "The Sexual Enlightenment of Children', G.P., 2, 36;
+Standard Ed., 9, 131.]
+(1907d) Antwort auf eine Rundfrage Vom Lesen und von guten
+Büchern, Vienna. (168)
+[Trans.: Contribution to a Questionnaire on Reading, Int. J.
+Psycho-Anal., 32, 319; Standard Ed., 9, 245.]
+(1908b) 'Charakter und Analerotik', G.S., 5, 261; G.W., 7, 203.
+29, 70, 119)
+[Trans.: "Character and Anal Erotism', G.P., 2, 45; Standard Ed.,
+(1903) Ober infantile Sexualtheorien", G.S., 5, 168; G.W., 7, 171.
+(140, 243-4, 246, 252)
+[Trans. 'On the Sexual Theories of Children', G.P., 2, 59;
+Standard Ed., 9, 207.]
+(1909b) 'Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben', G.S., 8,
+149; G.W., 7, 243. (00, 144, 144, 175, 452-3)
+179, Standard lydi, 0, Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy', C.P., 3,
+(1909d) 'Bemerkungen über einen Fall von Zwangsneurose', G.S.,
+8, 269; G. W., 7, 381. (235)
+[Trans.: 'Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis', C.P., 3,
+293; Standard Ed., 10, 155.]
+(1910a [1909]) Über Psychoanalyse, Vienna. G.S., 4, 349; G.W., 8, 3.
+(267)
+[Trans.: 'Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis', Amer. J. Psychol., 21
+(1910), 181; Standard Ed., 11, 3.]
+(1910c) Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci, Vienna. G.S., 9,
+371; G.W., 8, 128. (8, 10, 91, 168)
+[Trans.: Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood, Standard
+Ed., 11, 59.]
+(191V), 214. den Gegensinn der Urworte"", G.s., 10, 221;
+
+299
+[Trans.: 6 "'The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words"', G.P.,
+4, 184; Standard Ed., 11, 155.]
+(1910г) 'Die psychogene Sehstörung in psychoanalytischer Auffassung', G.S., 5, 310; G.W., 8, 94. (8)
+[Trans.: "The Psycho-Analytic View of Psychogenic Disturbance
+of Vision', C.P., 2, 105; Standard Ed., 11, 211.]
+[Trans.: 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning', C.P., 4, 13; Standard Ed., 12.]
+(1911c) 'Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschrieben Fall von Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides), G.S., 8, 355; G.W., 8, 240. (8, 70, 91, 135, 151, 186)
+[Trans.. 'Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account
+of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides); C.P., 3, 387;
+Standard Ed., 12, 3.]
+(191le) 'Die Handhabung der Traumdeutung in der Psychoanalyse', G.S., 6, 45; G.W., 8, 350. (115, 127)
+[Trans.: 'The Handling of Dream-Interpretation in Psycho-
+Analysis', G.P., 2, 305; Standard Ed., 12, 91.]
+(1912b) "Zur Dynamik der Übertragung', G.S., 6, 53; G.W., 8, 364.
+(168)
+[Trans.. "The Dynamics of Transference', G.P., 2, 312; Standard
+Ea., 14, 99.)
+(1912c) 'Uber neurotische Erkrankungstypen', G.S., 5, 400; G.W.,
+8, 322. (151)
+[Trans.. "Types of Onset of Neurosis', C.P., 2, 113; Standard Ed.,
+(19122) Über die allgemeinste Erniedrigung des Liebeslebens,
+G.S., 5, 198; G. W., 8, 78. (178)
+[Trans.: 'On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the
+Sphere of Love', C.P., 4, 203; Standard Ed., 11, 179.]
+(1912f) 'Zur Onanie-Diskussion', G.S., 3, 324; G.W., 8, 332. (255)
+[Trans.: 'Contributions to a Discussion on Masturbation',
+(1912g) 'A Note on the Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis' [in
+English), G.f., 4, 44; Standard Ea., 14, 45%. (3, 6, 14, 16)
+[German Trans. (by Hanns Sachs): 'Einige Bemerkungen über
+den Begriff des Unbewussten in der Psychoanalyse', G.S., 5, 433;
+G.W., 8, 430.]
+(1912-13) Totem und Tabu, Vienna, 1913. G.S., 10, 3; G.W., 9.
+(29, 37, 63, 85, 168, 206)
+[Trans.: Totem and Taboo, London, 1950; New York, 1952;
+Standard Ed., 13, 1.J
+(1913i) 'Die Disposition zue Zwangsneurose', G.S., 5, 277; G.W., 8,
+442. (140)
+[Trans.. "The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis, C.P., 2, 122;
+Standard Ed., 12, 313.]
+
+300
+(1914c) 'Zur Einführung des Narzissmus, G.S., 6, 155; G.W.., 10,
+130. 18,9, 20,30, 31, 63, 186, 246,
+Trans.: 'On Narcissism: an Introduction', C.P., 4, 30; Standara
+Ed., 14, 69.1
+[Trans.: 'On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement',
+C.P., 1, 287; Standard Ed., 14, 3.]
+(1915c) "Triebe und Triebschicksale', G.S., 5, 443; G.W., 10, 210.
+(42, 46, 157, 159, 237)
+[Trans.: 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes, C.P., 4, 60; Standard
+Ed., 14, 111.]
+(1915e) 'Das Unbewusste'
+, G.s., 5, 480; G.W., 10, 264. (6,8-9, 13,
+16, 18-20, 21, 23, 55, 186, 231, 236)
+[Trans.: "The Unconscious', C.P., 4, 98; Standard Ed., 14, 161.]
+(1915f) 'Mitteilung eines der psychoanalytischen Theorie widersprechenden Falles von Paranoia', G.S., 5, 288; G.W., 10, 234.
+(245, 246)
+[Trans.: 'A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psycho-
+Analytic Theory of the Disease', C.P., 2, 150; Standard Ed., 14,
+263.]
+(1916d) 'Einige Charaktertypen aus der psychoanalytischen
+Arbeit, G.s., 10, 487; G. W., 10, 304. (54, 246)
+[Trans.: 'Some Character-Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic
+Work, C.P., 4, 318; Standard Ed., 14, 311.]
+(1916-17) Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, Vienna.
+G.S., 7; G.W., 11. (63-4, 114, 117, 244, 251, 268, 274)
+[Trans.: Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, revised ed., London, 1929 (A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, New York,
+1935); Standard Ed., 15-16.]
+(1917a) 'Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyse', G.S., 10, 347;
+G.W., 12, 3. (63, 221, 223)
+[Trans.: "A Drificulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis, C.P., 4,
+347; Standard Ed., 17, 137.]
+(1917c) 'Über Triebumsetzungen insbesondere der Analerotik',
+G.S., 5, 268; G.W., 10, 402. (179)
+[Txans.: 'On Transformations of Instinct as Exemplified in Anal
+Erotism', C.P., 2, 164:; Standard Ed., 17, 127.]
+(1917d) 'Metapsychologische Ergänzung zur Traumlehre', G.S., 5,
+520; G.W., 10, 412. (28, 130, 151, 186, 231)
+[Trans.: 'A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of
+(197e [1915) rally und Melancholie, G.5, 5, 535; G.W., 10,
+428. (9,10, 28, 87)
+[Trans.: 'Mourning and Melancholia', C.P., 4, 152; Standard
+Ed., 14, 239.]
+(1918a) 'Das Tabu der Virginität', G.S., 5, 212; G. W., 12, 161. (246)
+[Trans.: "The Taboo of Virginity', C.P., 4, 217; Standard Ed.,
+11, 193.]
+
+301
+(19186 [1914]) 'Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose',
+G.S., 8, 439; G.W., 12, 29. (86, 119-20, 129, 251)
+[Trans.: 'From the History of an Infantile Neurosis, C.P., 3,
+473; Standard Ea., 17, 3.]
+(1919a [1918]) 'Wege der psychoanalytischen Therapie', G.S., 6,
+136; G.W., 12, 183. (285)
+[Trans.: 'Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy', C.P., 2,
+392; Standard Ed., 17, 159.]
+(1919e) ' "Ein Kind wird geschlagen"', G.S., 5, 344; G.W., 12,
+(1920a) Über die Psychogenese eines Falles von weiblicher Homosexualität, Gos., 5, 312; G.W., 12, 271. (112, 245)
+[Trans.: "The Psychogenesis of a Case of Female Homosexuality',
+C.P., 2, 202; Standard Ed., 18, 147.]
+(1920b) 'Zur Vorgeschichte der analytischen Technik', G.S., 6, 148;
+G.W., 12, 309. (263)
+[Trans.. "A Note on the Prehistory of the Technique of Analysis',
+C.P., 5, 101; Standard Ed., 18, 263.]
+(1920c) 'Dr. Anton von Freund', G.S., 11, 280; G.W., 13, 435. (267)
+(1070) Dois des on von de Vie, Sandas 6,19; C.., 13, 3.
+(6, 12, 17-18, 19,22, 28, 40, 41, 46, 47, 57, 64, 108, 117-18, 157,
+159, 160, 164, 223, 228, 230, 231, 238, 253, 287)
+[Trans: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Lond on, 1950; Standard Ed.
+18, 3.]
+(1921b) Introduction [in English] to J. Varendonck's The Psychology
+of Day-Dreams, London; Standard Ed., 18, 271. (21,
+[German Text (part only): G.S., 11, 264; G.W., 13, 439..
+(1921c) Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse, Vienna. GS., 6, 261;
+G.W., 13, 73. (9-10, 28, 29, 31, 32, 37, 108, 244)
+[Trans.: Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, London, 1959;
+Standard Ed., 18, 67]
+(1922a) "Traum und Telepathie', G.S., 3, 278; G.W., 13, 165. (135,
+[Trans.. "Dreams and Telepathy', C.P., 4, 408; Standard Edo, 18,
+(19226) Elber einige neurotische Mechanismen bei Eifersucht,
+Paranoia und Homosexualität', G.S., 5, 387; G.W.., 13, 195. (37,
+108, 112)
+[Trans.: 'Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and
+Homosexuality', C.P., 2, 232; Standard Ed., 18, 223.]
+(1922e) Preface [in French] to Raymond de Saussure's La méthode
+psychanalytique, Geneva.
+[Trans.: Standard Ed., 19, 283.]
+(1922f) 'Etwas vom Unbewussten' (Author's Abstract of Congress
+Address), Int. Z. Psychoan., 8, 486.
+[Trans.: Included in 1923b, Standard Edo, 19, 3.]
+
+302
+(1923a) ' "Psychoanalyse" und "Libido Theorie" ', G.S., 11, 201;
+G. W., 13, 211. (30, 64, 195, 244-5)
+[Trans.: "Two Encyclopaedia Articles', C.P., 5, 107; Standard Ed.,
+18,235.J
+(1923b) Das Ich und das Es, Vienna. G.S., &, 353; G.W., 13, 237,
+(133, 134, 145, 140, 149, 158, 164, 166-9, 170, 172, 173, 176, 218.
+430, 444, 445, 446-7)
+[Trans.: The Ego and the Id, London, 1927; Standard Ed., 19, 3.]
+(1923c [1922]) Bemerkungen zur Theorie und Praxis der Traumdeutung', G.S., 3, 305; G.W., 13, 301.
+G.S., 10, 409; G.W., 13, 317. (174)
+[Trans.: 'A Seventeenth Century
+Demonological Neurosis'
+G.f., $, 430; Standard Lao, 19, 69.J
+(1923e) 'Die infantile Genitalorganisation', G.s., 5, 232; G.W ., 13,
+293. (31, 153, 165, 174, 175, 184, 235, 245, 252, 253)
+[Trans.:
+"The Infantile Genital Organization, C.P., 2, 244;
+Standard Ed., 19, 141.]
+(1923f) 'Josef Popper-Lynkeus und die Theorie des Traumes',
+G.S., 11, 295; G.W., 13, 357.
+[Trans.: 'Joseph Popper-Lynkeus and the Theory of Dreams',
+Standard Ed., 19, 261.]
+(1923g) Preface to Max Eitingon's Bericht über die Berliner psychoanalytisch Poliklinik, Vienna. G.S., 11, 265; G.W., 13, 441.
+[Trans.: Preface to Max Eitingon's Report on the Berlin Psycho-
+Analytical Policlinic, Standard Ed., 19, 285.]
+(1923/1) Letter [in Spanish] to Señor Luis Lopez-Ballesteros y de
+Torres, G.S., 11, 266; G.W., 13, 442.
+[Trans.: Standard Ed., 19, 289.]
+(1923i) 'Dr. Ferenczi Sándor', G.S., 11, 273; G.W., 13, 443.
+[Trans.: 'Dr. Sándor Ferenczi (on his 50th Birthday)', Standard
+Ed. 19, 267.]
+(1924a) Letter [in French] to Le Disque Vert, G.S., 11, 266; G.W.,
+13, 446.
+[Trans.: Standard Ed., 19, 290.]
+(1924b [1923] 'Neurose und Psychose', G.S., 5, 418; G. W., 13, 387.
+(11, 167, 182, 183)
+ispans: "Neurosis and Psychosis, C.P., 2, 250; Standord Dide, 1%,
+(1924c) 'Das ökonomische Problem des Masochismus', G.S., 5, 374;
+G.W., 13, 371. (11,41, 50, 54, 134, 143, 152, 185)
+[Trans.: "The Economic Problem of Masochism', G.. ., 4, 430;
+Standard Ed., 19, 157.]
+(1924d) 'Der Untergang des Ödipuskomplexes', G.S., 5, 423; G.W.,
+13, 395. (11, 32, 144, 245, 249-50, 490-1)
+[Trans.: "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex', C.l., 2, 269;
+Standard Ed., 19, 173.]
+
+303
+(1924e) 'Die Realitätsverlust bei Neurose und Psychose', G.S., 6,
+409; G.W., 13, 363. (11, 143, 148)
+[Trans.: "The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis', C.P., 2,
+277; Standard Ed., 19, 183.]
+(1924f [1923]) "A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis' [published as
+'Psychoanalysis: Exploring the Hidden Recesses of the Mind'],
+Chap. 73, Vol. 2 of These Eventful Years, London and New York;
+Standard Ed., 19, 191.
+[German Text: 'Kurzer Abriss der Psychoanalyse', G.S., 11, 183;
+G.W., 13, 405. German original first appeared in 1928.]
+(1944g [1923]) Extracts from a Letter to Wittels, in Wittels's
+Sigmund Freud, London. Standard Ed., 19, 286. German original
+unpublished
+(1924h) 'Mitteilung des Herausgebers', Int. Z. Isychoan., 10, 373.
+[Trans.: 'Editorial Changes in the Zeitschrift', Standard Ed., 19,
+(1925a [1924]) 'Notiz über den "Wunderblock"', G.S., 6, 415;
+G.W., 14, 3. (238)
+[Trans.: 'A Note upon the "Mystic Writing-Pad"', G.P., 5, 175;
+Standard Ed., 19, 227.]
+(1925b) Letter to the Editor of the Jüdische Presszentrale, Zürich, G.S.,
+11, 298; G. W., 14, 556.
+[Trans.: Standard Ed., 19, 291.]
+(1925c) Message on the Opening of the Hebrew University [in
+English], G.S., 11, 298; G. W., 14, 556; Standard Ed., 19, 292.
+(1945a [1944J) Selbstdarstellung, Vienna, 1934. G.s., 11, 119; G. W.,
+14, 33. (64, 223, 244-5, 280)
+[Trans.: An Autobiographical Study, London, 1935 (Autobiography,
+New York, 1935); Standard Ed., 20, 3.]
+(1925e [1924]) 'Die Widerstände gegen die Psychoanalyse', G.S., 11,
+224; G.W., 14, 99.
+[Trans.: "The Resistances to Psycho-Analysis, C.P., 5, 163;
+Standard Ea., 19, 413.]
+(1925f) Preface to August Aichhorn's Verwahrloste Jugend, Vienna.
+G.S., 11, 267; G.W., 14, 565.
+[Trans.: Preface to Aichhorn's Wayward Youth, C.P., 5, 98;
+Standard Ed., 19, 273.]
+(1925g) Josef Breuer, G.S., 11, 281; G.W., 14, 562.
+[Trans.: 'Josef Breuer', Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 6, 459; Standard Edo,
+19, 279.]
+(1925h) 'Die Verneinung', G.S., 11, 3; G.W., 14, 11. (143, 231)
+[Trans. 'Negation', C.P., 5, 181; Standard Ed., 19, 235.]
+(1925i) 'Einige Nachträge zum Ganzen der Traumdeutung', G.S.,
+3, 172; G.W., 1, 561. (8, 54)
+[Trans.: 'Some Additional Notes upon Dream-Interpretation as
+a Whole', C.P., 5, 150; Standard Ed., 19, 125.]
+(1925)) Einige psychische Folgen des anatomischen Geschlechtsunterschieds, G.S., 11, 8; G.W., 14, 19. (11, 32, 143, 172, 178,
+179)
+
+304
+[Trans.: Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical
+Distinction between the Sexes, C.P., 5, 186; Standard Edo, 19,
+243.]
+(1926d) Hennung, Symptom und Angst, Vienna. G.S., 11, 23; G.W.,
+14, 113. (11, 35, 42, 57, 58, 167, 179)
+[Trans.. Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, London, 1960; Standard
+Ed., 20, 77.]
+(1926e) Die Frage der Laienanalyse, Vienna. G.S., 11, 307; G.W., 14,
+209. (13, 244)
+[Trans.: The Question of Lay Analysis, London, 1947; Standard Ed.,
+20, 179]
+(1926f) An Article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica [published as
+Psycho-Analysis: Freudian School'], Encyclopaedia Britannica,
+13th ed., New Vol. 3, 253; Standard Ed., 20, 261. (190)
+[German Text: Psycho-Analysis, G.S., 12, 372; G. W., 14, 299.
+(1 9r) Dho riginal end alicared Vie 103 dis, 1, 411; G.W., 14,
+325. (168)
+[Trans.' The Future of an Illusion, London and New York, 1928;
+Standard Ed., 21, 3.]
+(1927d) 'Der Humor, G.s., 11, 402; G.W., 14, 383. (28)
+[Trans.• 'Humour, C.P., 5, 215; Standard Ed., 21, 161.]
+(1927e) 'Fetischismus, G.S., 11, 395; G.W., 14, 311. (143, 153, 182)
+[Trans.: "Fetishism', C.P., 5, 198; Standard Ed., 21, 149.]
+(1928b) 'Dostojewski und die Vatertötung', G.S., 12, 7; G.W., 14,
+399. (41)
+[Trans.. Dostoevsky and Parricide, G.P., 5, 222;, Standard Ed.,
+21, 175.]
+(1929b) Letter [in French] to Maxime Leroy on Some Dreams of
+Descartes', G.S., 12, 403; G.W., 14, 558. (111)
+[Trans.: Standard Edo, 21, 199.]
+(1930a) Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, Vienna. G.N., 12, 49; G. W., 14,
+421. (8, 11, 42, 50, 54, 134, 157-8, 170, 228, 237, 272)
+[Trans.: Civilization and its Discontents, London and New York,
+1930; Standard Ed., 21, 59.]
+(1930b) Preface to Zehn Fahre Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut,
+Vienna. G.S., 12, 388; G.W., 14, 572. (285,
+[Trans.: In 'Personal Memories, in Max Eitingon In Memoriam
+Jerusalem, 1951; Standard Ed., 21, 257.]
+(19316) 'Über die weibliche Sexualität', G.S., 12, 120; G. W., 14,
+517. (177, 179, 244, 245)
+[Trans.: 'Female Sexuality', C.P., 5, 252; Standard Ed., 21, 223.]
+(1932c) Meine Berührung mit Josef Popper-Lynkeus', G.S., 12,
+415; G.W., 16, 261. (260, 263)
+[Trans.: 'My Contact with Josef Popper-Lynkeus, G.P., 5, 295;
+Standard Ed., 22.]
+(1933a) Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse,
+Vienna. G.S., 12, 151; G.W., 15, 207. (6, 10, 24, 36, 62, 64, 65,
+109, 135, 137, 238, 245, 272)
+
+305
+Trans.i New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, London and
+New York, 1933; Standard Ed., 22.]
+(1933c) 'Sándor Ferenczi', G.S., 12, 397; G.W., 16, 267. (269)
+[Trans.: 'Sándor Ferenczi', Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 14, 297; Standard
+Ed., 22.]
+(1937c) 'Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse', G.W., 16, 59.
+(164, 170)
+[Trans.. "Analysis Terminable and Interminable, C.P., 5, 316;
+Standard Ed., 23.]
+(1937d) "Konstruktionen in der Analyse', G.W., 16, 43. (115,
+[Trans.: 'Constructions in Analysis', G.P., 5, 358; Standard Ed.,
+(1939a [1937-39]) Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion,
+G. W., 16, 103. (7)
+[Trans. Moses and Monotheism, London and New York, 1939;
+Standard Ed., 23.]
+(1940a [1938]) Abriss der Psychoanalyse, G.W., 17, 67. (64, 143, 150,
+153, 161, 245)
+Trans.' An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, London and New York
+1949; Standard Ed., 43.
+(1940c [1922]) 'Das Medusenhaupt, G. W., 17, 47. (144)
+[Trans.: 'Medusa's Head', C.P., 5, 105; Standard Ed., 18, 273.]
+(1940e [1938]) 'Die Ichspaltung im Abwehrvorgang, G. W., 17, 59.
+(143, 153)
+[Trans.: Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Detence, C.f., 5,
+372; Standard Ed., 23.
+, С.р., 5, 70; Standara
+Ed., 5, 623.]
+(1941 d [1921]) Psychoanalyse und Telepathie, G. W., 17, 21. (108,
+135, 137-8)
+[Trans.: 'Psycho-Analysis and Telepathy, Standard Ed., 18, 177.]
+(195Va [1887-1902]) Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse, London
+Includes 'Entwurf einer Psychologie' (1895). (4-5, 8, 24, 33, 57,
+70, 164, 184, 231, 238, 246)
+[Trans.: The Origins of Psycho-Analysis, London and New York,
+1954. (Partly, including 'A Project for a Scientific Psychology',
+in Standard Ed., 1.)]
+(1955c [1920]) 'Memorandum on the Electrical Treatment of War
+Neuroses', Standard Edo, 17, 211. (113)
+[German Text (unpublished): 'Gutachten über die elektrische
+Behandlung der K<riegsneurotiker.']
+(1956a [1886]) 'Report on my Studies in Paris and Berlin, on a
+Travelling Bursary Granted from the University Jubilee Fund,
+1885-6, Int. J. Psycho-Analo, 37, 2; Standard Ed., 1. (69)
+[German Text (unpublished): 'Bericht über meine mit Universitäts-Jubiläums _ Reisestipendium unternommene Studienreise
+nach Paris und Berlin.']
+B.F. XIX - U*
+
+306
+(1957a [1911]) With OPPENHEIM, D. E., "Träume im Folklore',
+Dreams in Folklore, New York, 1958, Part II. (89)
+[Trans.: Dreams in Folklore, New York, 1958, Part I; Standard Edo,
+12, 177.]
+GRODDECK, G. (1923) Das Buch vom Es, Vienna. (23)
+HoLLós, S., and FERENCZI, S. See FerenczI, S., and HoLLós, S.
+HorNey, K. (1923) 'Zur Genese des weiblichen Kastrationskomplexes',
+Int. Z. Psychoan., 9, 12. (450)
+[Trans.: 'On the Genesis of the Castration Complex in Women',
+int. J. Isycho-Analog 5 (1944), 50.1
+HUNTER, R. A., and MACALPINE, I. See MAcALPINe, I., and HuNTER,
+R. A.
+JANET, PIERRE (1809) L'automatisme psychologique, Paris. (280)
+(1892) Etat mental des hysteriques, Paris. (280)
+JoNes, E. (1912) Der Alptraum in seiner Beziehung zu gewissen Formen des
+mittelalterlichen Aberglaubens, Leipsig and Vienna. (86, 87)
+[English Text: In On the Nightmare, London, 1931.]
+(1953) Sigmund Freud: Life and Work, Vol. 1, London and New York.
+(Page reference is to the English edition.) (289)
+(1955) Sigmund Freud: Life and Work, Vol. 2, London and New
+York. (Page references are to the English edition.) (108, 244)
+(1957) Sigmund Freud: Life and Work, Vol. 3, London and New
+York, (Page references are to the English edition.) (3, 10, 69, 70,
+108, 126, 140, 157, 173, 190, 226, 234, 243)
+JuNg, C. G. (1907) Uber die Psychologie der Dementia praecox, Halle. (204)
+[Trans.. The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, New York, 1909.]
+(1911) 'Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido', Part I, Fb. psychoan.
+psychopath. Forsch., 3, 120. (168)
+[Trans.: Psychology of the Unconscious, New York, 1916; London,
+1919.]
+LINDNER, S. (1879) 'Das Saugen an den Fingern, Lippen, etc. bei den
+Kindern (Ludeln), Jb. Kinderheilk., N. F., 14, 68. (251)
+Low, B. (1920) Psycho-Analysis, London. (159)
+MAdALPINe, I., and HUNTER, R. A. (1954) 'Observations on the Psychoanalytic Theory of Psychosis', Brit. J. Med. Psychol., 27, 175. (70)
+(1956) Schizophrenia 1677, London. (70-1, 75)
+MüNsterBerg, H. (1908) Philosophie der Werte; Grundzüge einer Weltanschauung, Leipzig. (10)
+OPHUSeN, J. H. W. VAN (1917) 'Beiträge zum Männlichkeitskomplex
+der Frau', Int. Z. Psychoan., 4, 241. (253)
+[Trans.: "Contributions to the Masculinity Complex in Women',
+Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 5 (1924), 39.]
+OPPENHEIM, D. E., and FREUD, S. See FREUD, S. (1957a)
+PAYER-THURN, R. (1924) 'Faust in Mariazell', Chronik des Wiener
+Goethe-Vereins, 34, 1. (70, 73)
+POPPER, J. ('LYNKEUs') (1899) Phantasien eines Realisten, Vienna. (260,
+RANIK, O. (1913) Der "Tamilienroman" in der Paychologie des
+Attentäters'
+,Int. 2. (ärztl.) Psychoanal., 1, 565. (45)
+
+307
+(1924) Das Trauma der Geburt, Vienna. (173, 179)
+[Trans.. The Trauma of Birth, London, 1929.]
+RANK,
+O., and SacHs, H. (1913) Die Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse für die
+Geisteswissenschaften, Wiesbaden. (207)
+New York, 1 nificance of Psychanalyois for the Mental Sciences,
+RAPPORT, D. (1951)
+Organization and Pathology of Thinking, New
+York. (234)
+REIK, T. (1919) Probleme der Religionspsychologie, Vienna. (85)
+(1923) Der eigene und der fremde Gott, Vienna. (86)
+RICKMAN, J. (ed.) (1937) General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud,
+London. (234)
+SacHs, H., and RANK, O. See RANK, O., and SacHs, H.
+SAUSSURE, R. DE (1922) La méthode psychanalytique, Lausanne and Geneva.
+(283-4)
+SCHOPENHAUER, A. (1949) Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Sämtliche
+Werke (ed. Hübscher) (4nd ed.), 3, Wiesbaden. (418, 243-4)
+[Trans.: The World as Will and Idea, London, 1886.]
+ScHReBer, D. P. (1903) Denkwärdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken, Leipzig.
+(91)
+STÄrcke, A. (1910) 'Der Kastrationskomplex', Int. Z. (ärztl.) Psychoanal., 1, 9. (175)
+STeKeL, W. (1908) Nervöse Angstzustände und ihre Behandlung, Vienna. (57)
+VARENDONCK, J. (1921) The Psychology of Day-Dreams, London. (21)
+WITTELS, F. (1924) Sigmund Freud, his Personality, his Teaching and his
+School, London and New York. (286-8)
+(1925) An End to Poverty, London. (260)
+
+LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
+G.S. = Freud, Gesammelte Schriften (12 vols.), Vienna, 1924-34
+G.W. = Freud, Gesammelte Werke (18 vols.), London, from 1940
+C.P. = Freud, Collected Papers (5 vols.), London, 1924-50
+Standard Ed. = Freud, Standard Edition (24 vols.), London, from 1953
+Veurosenlehre und Technik = Freud, Schriften zur Neurosenlehre und zu
+bsychoanalytischen Technik (1913-1926), Vienna, 193.
+Psychoanalyse der Neurosen = Freud, Studien zur Psychoanalyse der Neurosen
+aus den Jahren 1913-1925, Vienna, 1926
+Sexualtheorie und Traumlehre = Freud, Kleine Schriften zur Sexualtheorie und
+zur Traumlehre, Vienna, 1931
+Theoretische Schriften = Freud, Theoretische Schriften (1911-1925), Vienna,
+1931
+Traumlehre = Freud, Kleine Beiträge zur Traumlehre, Vienna, 1925
+308
+
+This index includes the names of non-technical authors. It also includes
+the names of technical authors where no reference is made in the text to
+specific works. For references to specific technical works, the Bibliography
+should be consulted.—The compilation of the index was undertaken by
+Mrs. R. S. Partridge.
+Abraham, K., 182, 204, 226, 287 n.
+and feminine), 145, 176, 250
+Adler, 4., 91-2, 201-2, 253 n. 4, 287
+Affect, 193-4, 197-8, 236
+Aggressiveness (see also Death instinct; Destructive impulses),
+37, 43, 53-6, 143, 157 n. 2, 170
+Archhorn, A., 272-5
+Ambivalence, 32-3, 42-4, 53, 85-7,
+113, 116
+Amentia (Meynert's), 150
+America,_psycho-analysis in, 201,
+204-5,261, 493
+Amnesia (see also f'orgetting), 104,
+Anaclitic object-choice, 246 n. 2
+Anal erotism, 119-20
+and witchcraft, 70
+Analogies
+amoeba and pseudopodia, 63-5
+chapter of Livy, 112
+child screaming at a strange face,
+213
+constitutional monarch, 55
+cortical homunculus, 26, 49 n.
+drugged watchman, 159
+jigsaw puzzle, 116
+'Made in Germany', 236
+man on horseback, 25
+masked criminals, 132
+milk-teeth replaced by permanent
+ones, 173
+peasant buying a scythe, 213
+pious man beginning the season
+with a prayer, 213
+'eservoir (of libido), 30 n. 1, 63-!
+ruler's throne and fettered slaves,
+309
+Antithetical ideas, 206-1
+Anxiety (see also Fear; Phobias),
+56-8, 135, 186
+ego as seat of, 57-8, 167
+Anxiety-dreams, 132, 134-5
+Archaic heritage, 36-8, 48-9, 55,
+135; 151, 174, 206, 220-1
+Ars Poetica (Horace), 249 n. 1
+Art, 72, 207-8, 218
+Athene, 144 n. 3
+Attention, 16 n., 138
+Attila, 39 n.
+Auditory
+lobe of brain, 25
+perception, 20-1, 25, 52-3
+Auto-erotism (see Masturbation)
+Autoplastic and alloplastic, 184
+Baby equated with penis, 178-9, 256
+Balfor, First Earl, 292 n.
+Ballesteros y de Torres, L. L., 289
+Beating phantasies,
+165,
+169, 245,
+Bed-wetting, 175, 250
+Berlin
+International
+Psycho-Analytical
+Congress of 1922 in, 3
+Psycho-Analytical Policlinic in,
+39 п., 203-4, 222, 285
+Bernheim, H., 192, 195
+Birth
+anal theories of, 120, 145
+infantile theories of,
+, 120, 145,
+252 n. 2
+phantasies, 162, 165
+
+310
+Bra (on 38, 144 . 2, 173 m., 175
+Castration
+trauma,
+соТ, 175-9, 246-, 3 0, 253.
+246-7, 250, 253
+Bisexuality, 31-3, 33 n., 34, 250, 255,
+256-8
+phantasies, 90, 162, 165
+Bleuler, E. (see also Bibliography),
+174-7, 179, 250,
+252,
+Blinding as symbolfor castration, 162
+257
+Body, the human, and perception,
+Categorical imperative, as heir to
+25-7
+the Oedipus complex, 35, 48,
+Bonaparte, Marie, 244 n. 1
+Boys' (see also Men)
+167
+Cathartic therapy, 194-5, 197, 279
+fear of father, 85-8
+Censorship of dreams, 9, 17, 112
+feminine attitude to tather, 70,
+119, 131-4, 199-200, 262
+90-2, 169, 176, 250
+Chalons, Battle of, 39 n.
+Character-formation, 28-31, 92
+in men and women compared
+257-8
+identification with father, 31-4,
+176, 250
+identification with mother, 250
+Oт9, 240-51, 25, 31-2, 176-7,
+, 256-7
+sexual development, 10, 31-4, 90-
+91, 172-7, 243-6, 249-57
+Brain, anatomy of, 19, 25, 191
+Leopoldus, 74-6, 80, 88, 934,
+97 no, 103
+Breuer, J., 193-5, 197, 214-15, 278-
+Budapest
+International Psycho-Analytical
+Congress of 1918 at, 261, 285
+n. 2
+Psycho-Analytical Society of, 267
+Burglars, fear of, 86
+Buttocks, 165
+Cäcilie M., case of, 236 n. 1
+Cannibalism, 29 n. 2
+Cases
+of 'Dora'
+от Апа, 173 %. 1, 234, 239 г. 2,
+245, 248
+236 n. I
+of Christoph Hairman,
+73-105
+of Elisabeth von R., 184
+or 44 . an, 2, 175 h. 2, 252
+of 'Rat Man',
+, 235 n. 1
+of Schreber, 70, 91-2,
+, 135, 151 n. 2
+of 'Wolf Man', 86 n. 2,
+, 129 n. 1,
+251 n. 1
+Charcot, У.-М., 69-70, 72, 192-3,
+214-15,400, 490
+Childhood impressions, 05, 115, II/,
+197
+Children (see also Intantile)
+and
+anatomical sex-distinction,
+31 n. 1, 142-5, 176, 252-8
+bisexuality of, 33
+dreams of, 129
+exhibitionism ol, 119, 143
+narcissism ot, 9, 63, 116, 400
+neuroses of, 72
+play of, 187
+psycho-analysis of, 91, 274
+sexual researches of, 141-5, 252
+Civilization, 170, 207, 210-20, 205
+Clark University, Worcester, Niass.,
+201, 267
+Clit214 178, 246, 251, 253 n. 4,
+Cohen, Albert, 212
+Component instincts, 41-2, 44, 54,
+Compromise-formations, symptoms
+as, 199-200
+Compulsion to repeat, 108, 117-18
+Condensation in dreams, 89
+Conscience, 9, 11, 26, 35-38, 50,
+54-4, 57-0, 134, 166-70,457
+Conscience anxiety, 167 and n. 2
+Consciousness
+exclusion from, in repression, 17,
+nature of, 4-5, 9, 13-15, 19-23,
+216,228
+
+311
+psycho-analysis brings repressed
+pacts with, 73-84, 88, 91, 93-100,
+material into, 14, 17, 21, 50 n.,
+102, 104-5
+Diphasic onset of sexuality, 35, 141,
+relation of ego to, 17-19, 26-7,
+Disavowal, 143, 153 n. 2, 165 n. 2,
+relation of Pcs. to, 15, 21-3
+184-5, 235 n. 2, 252-3
+topographically considered, 6-7,
+Displacement in dreams, 8!
+Disque Vert, Le, 29(
+Constancy, principle of, 47, 158-61
+Convenience dreams, 112
+in dreams, 112, 119, 128, 132, 134,
+Conversion, hysterical, 194
+199, 262-3
+Convulsions, hysterical, 73-4, 77,
+in perception, 238
+in symptoms, 217-18
+Copernicus, 221
+Corroborative dreams, 112 n. 2, 115-
+Door Quixote, 289
+, case of, 175 n. 1, 434, 43.
+n. 2, 245, 248
+Crime, 52, 273-4
+Dostoeusky, F., 41 n. 4
+Damascrus, 39 n.
+Danger, 57-8, 207
+Darwin, 221
+Day's residues, 109, 111
+Deaf-mutes, 21
+• Death, fear of, 57-9, 168
+Death instinct (see also Aggressiveness; Destructive impulses), 40-
+46, 53-6, 59, 65, 157, 159-60,
+163-5, 170, 218
+• 439, 40/
+Defaecation, 144 n. 2, 175
+Defence, 4, 6 n. 3
+failure of, 183 n. 2
+Deferred obedience,
+, 88
+Delzao, t1, 202
+168 n. 3
+Delinquency, juvenile, 413-4
+Delusions, 9, 151, 186, 41
+Dementia praecox, 204
+Demonological neurosis, 69-105
+Depression (see also Melancholia), 10,
+80-1, 102
+Descartes, 111 n.
+Descriptive, dynamic, and systematic
+senses of 'unconscious, 5-7, 13-
+10, 40, 60-2
+Destiny, 58, 168-9
+Destructive impulses (see also Aggressiveness; Death instinct), 41-6,
+53-6, 157 n. 2, 170
+Devil, the, 69-70, 04-6, 81 n. 1, 90
+as adversary of God, 05-6, 90
+as father-figure, 70, 81-2, 85-7,
+89-90, 104
+equated with God, 86
+female sexual
+characteristics
+attributed to, 89-90
+Dream-content,
+manifest,
+109-10,
+114, 118-20, 130-1, 133, 199-
+Dream-interpretation, 109-41, 121-
+132, 134, 205, 200, 217, 261-3,
+284
+Dreams
+abstract thought represented in,
+absurdity and confusion of, 261-
+and the unconscious, 1!-I4, 11-
+118, 127
+and waking lite, 109, 111, 113-14,
+127, 130
+anxiety-, 134, 134-5
+as guardians of sleep, 118, 121-8
+censorship of, 9, 17, 114, 119, 131-
+132, 199-200, 262
+children's, 129
+compared to psychoses, 151
+condensad on in, ptoms, 199
+convenience, 112
+corroborative, 112 n. 2, 115-16
+1 , то, 62,019, 23, 12,
+experimental, 114
+"from above and below, 111
+innocent, 132
+numbers in, 89
+of recovery, 112
+prophetic, 135-6
+punishment, 118-19, 132-4
+repression and, 111, 114, 111-19,
+128, 130, 133, 153, 200
+
+312
+Dreams (contd.)
+secondary revision of, 112, 120;
+125-6
+speeches in, 109, 119
+symbolism of, 110, 125-6, 135
+telepathic, 135-6, 138
+, 13, 21, 111, 129, 135,
+wish-fulfilment in, 110-12, 114,
+116, 118-19, 130, 134, 199-400
+Dream-thoughts,
+latent,
+110-11,
+114, 118, 130-1, 133,
+199, 284
+Dream-work, 26 n. 2, 45, 89, 114,
+130, 200
+Dynamic, descriptive and systematic
+senses of 'unconscious, 5-7, 13-
+18, 40, 60-2
+Economic factors, 14, 22, 27, 44, 57,
+105, 113, 154, 159
+Education, 34-5, 53, 168, 255
+and psycho-analysis, 209, 272-5
+Ego
+and instincts, 40, 42, 44-5, 55-6,
+and neurosis, 149-52, 183
+and phantasy, 10/
+and sublimation, 30, 45-7
+as reservoir of libido, 63-6
+as seat of anxiety, 57-8, 167
+development of concept of, 7-9
+in primitive man, 38
+introjection of object into, 29-30,
+34, 40, 51, 167-0, 237-9,257
+masochism of, 169-70
+overwhelming of, 57
+on oco, 12-1, 2 50,40 20,
+53-6, 59,
+65,
+133-4, 149-54,
+183-4, 186-7
+relation to perception of external
+Ego ideal (see also Super-ego), 9-10
+28, 108
+Ego-instincts
+(see
+also
+Death instinct), 8, 218
+Ego-libido, 30, 44 1, 63-5, 203
+Eissler, K. R., 272
+Eitingon, M., 203, 285, 287 n., 293
+Electrical treatment, 192
+Elisabeth von R., case of, 184
+Ellis, Havelock, 201
+Emission, nocturnal, 175
+End of Poverty, An (by F. Wittels), 260
+Energy, displaceable and neutral,
+44-5, 52-3
+Epilepsy, 41
+Ermengem, I. von, 490 n..
+Eros (see also Libido;
+Sexual instinct), 40-7, 56, 59, 65, 159-60,
+163-4.
+:, 218, 239
+Eros (in Plato's Symposium), 218
+Erotogenic masochism, 157-8, 161-4
+Exhibitionism, 119, 143
+Experimental dreams, 114
+External world (see also Reality;
+Reality-testing)
+death instinct and, 46 n. 3, 54,
+ego and,
+a -7, 143-35, 202, 36,
+237-8
+the id in rebellion against, 185
+super-ego ana, 150-4, 167
+the unconscious 'stretches out
+feelers towards, 231, 238 n. 3
+Fairy tales, 86 n. 2, 208
+Father
+* 0,00-2, 119, 165, 376, 20,
+249-50
+death as 8-once, g, 90, 165,
+phantasies concerning,
+relation to upo, e32, 16-7, 169%
+70, 176-7
+relation to the unconscious, 4,
+17-19, 23, 26-1, 28 n. 2, 239
+repressive forces of, 8, 17
+, 24, 29,
+35,51-2, 150, 183, 197,
+resistance of, 4, 17, 30, 128, 150
+splitting of, 152-3
+unilying tendency of, 45, 150, 167
+use of term, 4, 6-9, 17, 23, 133
+Father-figur
+animal in animal phobias as, 86-
+the Devil as, 70, 81-2, 85-7, 89-
+90, 104
+God as, 85-6, 91-2, 207
+totem animal as, 87, 165
+Fear (see also Anxiety; Phobias)
+of burglars, 86
+of
+castration
+(see
+Castration
+complex)
+of conscience, 57-9
+of death, 57-9, 168
+
+313
+Fechner, G. T., 47, 159
+Group psychology, 205-7
+Feminine (see also Girls; Masculine
+Guilt, sense of, 4, 9, 11, 37, 49-51,
+and feminine; Women)
+58, 158, 162, 166, 170, 220
+masochism, 158, 161-2, 165, 169
+unconscious, 4, 9, 26-7, 35, 49-54,
+Ferenczi, S. (see also Bibliography),
+161, 166, 169
+60-2, 157, 173 n., 204, 243,
+266-9, 293
+Ferrier, Sir Do, 191
+Fliess, W., 5, 9, 24л., 33 п., 57 п. 3,
+fallen 20, ase of, 73-05
+70, 183 n. 2, 246
+Flight-reflex, 57
+Hallucinatory confusion, 150
+Forel, A., 192
+"Hans, Little', case of, 88 n. 1,142 n.
+Forgetting (see also Amnesia), 199
+144 n. 1 and 2, 175 n. 2, 252
+Fortune-tellers and telepathy, 137-8
+Franciscus, Abbot, 76-1, 80-1, 89, 93-
+Harz mountains, 108
+Hate and love, ambivalence of., 42-4
+Free 2o30, 185-7, 09, 23-10, 115,
+Heidenhain, R., 192
+Heller, H., 70
+Freud, Anna,
+, 243
+Hereditary tactors, 30, 114
+Freud, Sophie, 287 n. 1
+Hering, E., 279
+Freund, Anton von, 267
+Hitzig, E., 191
+Fritsch, G., 191
+Hollós, S. (see also Bibliography),
+Frustration, 151, 207, 218
+268 n. 2
+Holy Communion, 29 n. 2
+Gain from illness, 49, 104-5, 166
+Homburg,
+International
+Psycho-
+Gastein, 108
+Analytical Congress of 1925 at
+General paralysis of the insane, 148,
+243
+269
+Homosexuality, 10, 37, 43-4, 144
+Genital
+female, 245
+organization,
+_ infantile, 141-2,
+145, 165, 174-5, 177-8, 245
+Horace, 248
+Hungary, psycho-analysis in, 267-8
+Hypnosis, 13, 192-6, 214-15, 217
+castration complex in, 178, 246-1, Hysteria, 4, 51-3, 184, 191-3, 198-
+253, 256-8
+masturbation in, 255-6
+Hy 200, 203,23
+Breuer's work on, 193, 279-80
+Vedipus complex in, 31-4, I/3,
+177-9, 244-7, 251-2, 256-7
+2, 133 173,
+demonomania as, 70, 72
+penis-envy in, 178-9, 246, 252-6
+conversion, 194
+phallic phase in, 178, 254-i
+convulsions, 73-4, 77, 100
+ore-Oedipus
+attachment
+to
+paralyses, 191-2
+mother in, 245 n. 1, 251, 254
+sexual development in
+172-3,
+Id, the
+177-9, 243-6, 249, 251-7
+and neurosis, 183-5
+Codial post, 3. 1, 168
+as reservoir oflibido, 30 n. 1, 46-7,
+as adversary of the Devil, 84-6,
+cathectic energy has its source in,
+87 n. 1, 168
+as father-figure, 85-6, 91-2, 207
+equated with the Devil, 86
+Goethe, 79, 85 n. 1, 149 n.
+• the unconscious,
+n. 2 231
+Goltz, Fo, 191
+Graves disease, 214-15
+Groddeck, G. (see also Bibliography),
+7, 23, 209
+
+314
+Id, the (contd.)
+International
+Psycho-Analytical
+non-moral, 54
+Association
+object-choices of, 29, 34, 45-6, 48,
+foundation of, 267
+55, 64-6, 167
+presidency of, 267-8
+ples-re principle reigns in, 25,
+International
+Psycho-Analytical
+Congress
+rebellion of, against the external
+at Berlin in 1922, 3
+world, 185
+at Budapest in 1918, 267, 285 n. 2
+relation to ego, 24-5, 28-30, 36-
+at Hamburg in 1925, 243
+40, 53-6, 59, 65, 133-4, 149-52,
+at Nuremberg in 1910, 267
+183-4, 186-7
+International
+Psycho-Analytical
+relationto the repressed, 24, 29, 133
+Press, 201
+relation to super-ego,
+_36, 48-9,
+Internationale Zeitschrift für Psycho-
+51-2,58, 151-2,
+analyse, 201, 293
+Tees fixes (Janet), 193
+Identification,
+Internationaler Psychoanalytischer
+, 20-34, 37-9,43
+Verlag, 201, 293
+48, 50 п., 51, 54-6, 176-7, 244,
+Interpretation of dreams (see Dream-
+250, 256
+interpretation)
+Ignotus, H., 268 n. 2
+Introjection, 10, 29-30, 32, 48, 51,
+Imago, 168 and n. 2
+167-8, 237-9, 257
+mago, 100 n. 2
+, 201
+Impotence, 161-2
+Fahrbuch fir psychoanalytische und
+Incest, horror of, 220, 257
+Infantile
+psychopathologische
+Forschungen,
+(see
+Childhood;
+201
+Children
+Janet P. (see also Bibliography), 193,
+genital organization, 142, 145,
+196, 280
+174-5, 178, 245
+masturbation, 162
+sexual theories, 31 n. 1, 120, 142-
+sexuality, 9, 48, 17,
+141-5, 163,
+Fesus Christ, 77, 101, 103
+Jews, 222, 291-2
+Inferiority, feelings oi, 51, 178, 253-5
+Jocasta (in Sophocles' Oedipus Rex), 132
+Inhibition in work, 80, 82, 87-8, 102
+Jones, Ernest (see also Bibliography),
+Innocent dreams, 132
+60, 126, 201, 268
+Instincts (see also Component in-
+Judgement, 236-9
+stincts; Death instinct; Ego-
+Jung, G. G. (see also Bibliography),
+instincts;
+Self-preservation;
+200-2,269
+Sexual instinct)
+fusion and delusion of, 30, 40-4
+Kant, 167
+54-6, 158, 164, 167, 170, 239
+Kaulbach, W. von, 39
+pressure of civilization upon, 170,
+Kilian, Abbot, 75, 98
+207, 219-20
+Kun, Béla, 268 n. 1
+two groups of, 11, 40-7, 56, 59,
+158-9,
+, 163-4, 218, 239
+Latency period, 35, 173-4, 177-9.
+Instinctual impulses
+208, 220
+and dreams, 267
+of the id, 25, 29, 36, 39-40, 42, 56,
+Lary, Ma., il 274-5,285
+Leroy, M.,
+59, 65, 12, 149-51, 209
+Lévy, L., 268 n. 2
+repression of, 51, 72, 183-4, 186, Libido
+Intellectual processes (see l houghtprocesses)
+International Fournal of Psycho-Analysis,
+ego-, 30, 44-7, 63-5, 203
+go as reservoir of, 63-
+d as reservoir of 30 n. 1, 46-
+64-6
+
+315
+narcissistic, 30, 44-7, 57-8, 63-5, Morality, 26-7,
+34-8, 52,
+54, 57.
+168-70, 197, 208, 219-21, 257
+object-, 30, 44-7, 63-5, 203
+and dreams, 1314, 262
+pregenital organizations of, 141
+regression of, 42, 53, 55, 109
+as child's first sexual object, 10,
+31-4, 90-1, 244, 245 n. 1, 251,
+Life instinct (see Eros)
+Lima, 202
+boy's identification with, 250
+Linguistic usage, 165
+girl's identification with, 31 n. 1,
+Livy, 112
+32,34
+Love and hate, ambivalence of, 42-4
+Medusa's head symbolizes genitals
+Malingering and neurosis, 100
+Mania, 53
+Mariazell, 73-8, 93-6, 102
+the Trophy of, 70, 73, 75-6, 80,
+81 n. 3, 93-5, 98, 100, 102
+Mary, the Virgin, 73, 75, 77-8, 94, 16,
+as mother-figure, 91
+Masculine
+and feminine (see also
+Active and passive), 145, 255-
+"Masculine protest' (Adler), 92, 253
+Masculinity complex, in females,
+253, 255-6, 258
+Masochism, 49, 50 n., 65, 157-70
+Masochistic phantasies,
+92, 161-2,
+165, 169, 245, 254
+Masturbation, 161, 174-6, 250-2,
+254-5
+phantasies, 161, 251
+Medicine and psycho-analysis, 214-
+Medusa's head, 144 n. 3
+Melancholia (see also Depression),
+28-9, 50 л., 51, 53-5, 58, 80-3,
+81, 103, 105, 152
+Memory, 5, 20, 115, 150, 226-31
+Memory-traces, 20-1, 23, 185, 228
+Men (see also Boys)
+character-formation in, 257-8
+feminine masochism in, 161-2
+masturbation in, 255
+sexual development of, 243-4,
+255, 257
+Mental masochism, 165 n. 4
+Mephistopheles (in Goethe's Faust),
+149n.
+Neynert's amentia, 150
+Mislaying, 199
+Mnemic system, 5, 228, 231
+Moral masochism, 49, 158, 161-2,
+165-6, 168-70
+penis attributed to, !!
+Mother-figure, the Virgin Mary as, 91
+Motility, 17, 25, 55-6, 150, 238
+Multiple personality, 30-1
+Myths, 87 n. 1, 135, 144, 168, 208
+Nancy, 195
+Napoleon, 178
+Narcissism, 8-10, 46, 49, 116, 134,
+144 n
+• 2, 176, 221, 246, 250,
+253, 256-7
+infantile, 9, 63, 176, 250
+primary, 64, 66
+secondary, 30 n. 1, 46, 64-6
+Narcissistic
+libido, 30, 44-7, 57-8, 63-5, 203
+neuroses, 152, 203-4
+Negation as substitute for repression,
+235-6, 239
+Negative therapeutic reaction
+Negativiho in psychotics 2, 166
+Neuroses (see also Hysteria; Obsessional neurosis; Transference
+neuroses; Traumatic neurosis;
+War neuroses)
+and gain from illness, 104-5, 166
+and organic disease, 72, 166, 191,
+and sense of guilt, 27, 50-4, 50, 166
+and toxic factors, 214-16
+as result of contlict between ego
+and id, 17, 149-50, 183-4
+as result of repression, 17, 92; 105,
+183, 186, 196, 200.
+compared to psychoses, 148-53,
+183-7,204
+disposition to, 42
+historical aspect of, 69, 72
+
+316
+Neuroses (contd.)
+in business men, 104
+narcissistic, 152, 203-4
+Dedipus complex as nucleus of
+33, 198
+and artists compared, 208
+und normal persons compared
+58. 185. 204. 22"
+psych, 27a-ys of, 112-13, 221,
+Neustatt, 78
+retzsche, Fo, 1, 43
+ine, number, as symbol, 88-g
+Virvana principle, 159-61
+Normal menta
+and neurotic compared, 58, 185,
+204, 227
+application of psycho-analysis to,
+199, 200, 205, 218
+Novelty, reaction against, 213-14
+Numbers
+as symbols, 89-90
+in dreams, 89
+Nuremberg, Psycho-Analytical Congress of 1910 at, 267
+Object-choice
+anaclitic and narcissistic, 246 n. 2
+in carly childhood, 10, 31-4, 40
+of the id, 29, 34, 45-6, 48, 55, 64-
+66, 167
+replaced by identification, 10, 28-
+Object-libido, 30, 44-7, 63-5, 203
+Obsessional neurosis,
+55, 92, 133-4, 203, 206, 235
+as self-reproach, 9
+compared to religion, 206
+Obsessive
+actions, 200
+ideas, 217, 23!
+Odier, G., 284
+Odysseus (in Sophocles Philoctetes), 84
+Dedipus complex, 208, 220, 283
+as nucleus of neurosis, 33, 198
+dissolution of, 31-9, 173-4, 176-7,
+179, 244-5, 256-7
+in boys, 31-2, 176-7, 179, 249-51,
+256-7
+51g- 2,256. 173, 177-9, 244-7,
+repression of, 34-5, 37, 173, 177,
+220-1, 257
+super-ego replaces, 10, 34-6, 38-9,
+40-9,167-9, 179, 457
+Oedibus Rex (Sophocles), 130
+Oppolzer, F. von, 279
+Opposite, representation by, 119
+Oral-erotic phase, 29 and n. 1, 165,
+237
+Organic diseas
+nd neurosis, 72, 166, 191, 215-1
+and psycho-analysis, 209
+Organ-inferiority (Adler), 253 n. 4
+Paralysis, hysterical, 77, 191-2
+Parama, 9, 13, 70, 91, 186 n., 204
+in women, 245-6
+Paraphrenia, 186 n.
+Parapraxes, 97 no, 199
+Parents
+and children see also
+Father; Mother; Oedipus complex), 48, 167-8, 198, 208, 220
+Paris, 69
+Passive sexual attitude, boy's to
+father (see also Active and passive; Masculine and feminine),
+Paul, Eden and Cedar, 260, 286 n.
+Payer-Thur, R., 70, 73
+Penis (see also Phallic phase)
+and reproductive function, 257
+boy's attitude to girl's lack ol,
+143-5, 175-6
+boy's interest in own, 142-3, 174-
+distortion in, 238
+periodical innervation of, 231-2,
+Pfister, O., 208
+Phallic 5, 197-8, 245, 250-2
+, 141-2, 144-5, 165,
+
+317
+Phallic phase, in girls, 178, 254-5
+and education, 209, 272-5
+Phantasien eines Realisten
+Popper-Lous, 260, 262-3
+7.
+and medicine, 214-17
+and philosophy, 14, 216-18
+Phantasies, 21, 84, 98, 100-3, 111,
+and sociology, 208
+115, 127, 187
+masochistic, 92, 161-2, 165, 169,
+245, 254
+masturbation, 161, 251
+ofbeing beaten, 165, 169, 245, 254
+of birth, 162, 165
+material
+by laymen, 274-5, 285
+criticisms of., 200-2, 204, 206, 214
+222
+into
+of castrating father, 90
+of pregnancy, 89-91
+16-17, 26, 33-
+i primal scene, 40.
+sadistic, 13
+Philoctetes (Sophocles), 84
+Philosophy and psycho-analysis, 14,
+Phobias (see also Anxiety; Fear), 57,
+animal, 86-7
+Phylogenesis (see Archaic heritage)
+Plato, 218
+Play of children, 187
+• Pleasure principle, 22, 25, 42, 45-6,
+57, 59, 118, 237, 239
+and masochism, 158-61
+Popper-Lynkeus, J., 260, 262-3
+Possession, 69, 72, 100
+Pottenbrunn, 74-6, 88, 93-4
+Power, will to, 163, 253 n. 4
+Preconscious system (Pcs.)
+and thought processes, 26, 56,
+114, 127-9
+and word-presentations, 20-1, 23,
+defined, 4, 15, 18
+relation to Gs., 15, 21-3
+relation to ego, 4, 6, 8-9, 18, 23-4
+relation to Popt., 19-22
+relation to the unconscious, 4, 15,
+20-2,62
+Pregnancy
+number nine as symbo of, 89-90
+phantasy, 89-91
+, 112-13, 221, 248,
+273-4
+resistance to, 4, 14, 17, 26-7, 49-
+50,
+90, 92,
+110, 115, 128-9,
+166, 196, 200
+technique of, 194-8, 200, 202-3,
+235, 284
+therapeutic aspect of, 49-50, 84,
+Psycho-Analytic Review, 201
+Psychoses (see also Amentia Mey.
+nert's);
+Dementia
+praecox;
+General paralysis of the insane;
+Mania; Melancholia; Paranoia;
+Schizophrenia), 91-4, 183, 106,
+204-5, 215-16, 239, 253
+compared to dreams, 151
+compared to neuroses,
+148-53,
+183-7, 204
+result of disturbance between ego
+and external world, 149-52,
+183-7
+Pube240, 25, 141, 2,145, 208
+3. 220
+Punishment
+-dreams, 118-19, 132-4
+need for, 11, 49, 166, 169
+Putnam, J.J., 269
+Primal horde, 85-6
+Primal scene, 119-20, 250-1
+phantasies of, 251
+Quantity and quality, 22, 44, 160-1
+Primary process, 45, 138
+Primit, Speoples, 291. 2, 36-8, 48-
+Problems solved in sleep, 26
+Prophetic dreams, 135-6
+Psycho-analysis
+and dreams, 109-10, 112-14, 116-
+117,128
+'Rat Man',
+*Reaction cana 00, 52-3, 118, 253
+Reaper 20, 3834, 39, 56, 184
+
+318
+Reality (see also External world)
+Sadism, 40-1, 46, 53, 132, 157, 159,
+flight from, in neurosis, 183, 185-7
+162-3, 169-70
+remodelling of, in psychosis, 184-1
+primal, 164
+substitution of, in phantasy, 187
+Sadistic-anal phase (see also Ana
+Reality principle, 25, 11, 160, 18/
+erotism), 42, 145, 165, 179
+Keality-testing, 9, 28 n. 2, 55, 237-8
+Salpêtrière, 69, 191, 290
+Regression, 42, 53, 55, 105, 169, 184,
+Saussure, R. de, 283-4
+Schelling, F., 215 n.
+Reik, T. (see also Bibliography), 208
+Schizophrenia, 151, 204
+Religion, 34-5, 31-0, 54, 85-6, 135,
+Schopenhauer,
+A. see also Biblio-
+208, 218, 220-1
+graphy), 418, 223-4
+compared to obsessional neurosis,
+Schreber, Senatspräsident, case of, 70
+91-2, 135, 151n. 2
+freud's attitude to, 291
+Jewish, 291-2
+Secondary process, 138
+Remorse, 11, 88
+Repeat, compulsion to, 108, 117-18
+Boor dreams, 112, 120, 125-6
+Repressed, the, return of, 183 n. 2
+Self-preservation, instinct of, 8, 40,
+Repressed material made conscious
+by psycho-analysis, 14, 17, 21, • Sensory
+50 п., 235
+perceptions (see Perceptions)
+Repression
+stimuli, 230, 238
+and dreams, 111, 114, 117-19,
+Seven Little Goats, The, 86 n. 2
+120, 130, 133, 153, 400
+Sex-distinction, anatomical, children
+and neurosis, 17, 92, 105, 183,
+and, 31 n. 1, 142-5, 176, 252-8
+180, 190, 400
+Sexual
+and the unconscious, 4-6, 14-15,
+act (see also Primal scene), 33 n. 1,
+18, 60-2
+47, 162, 218, 224
+as exclusion from Cs., 17, 196
+aims, 30, 46
+by the ego, 8, 17, 24, 29, 35, 51-4,
+development, 10, 31-4, 90-1, 172-
+150, 183, 197, 199
+179, 243-6, 249-57
+in girls at puberty, 246, 455
+excitation, 132, 160-1, 163, 175-6,
+negation as substitute tor, 433-0,
+instinct (see also Eros; Libido), 8,
+of instinctual impulses, 51, 72,
+103-4,100, 191, 400-1,419-20
+2234, 297, 203, 207, 217-19,
+of the Oedipus complex, 34:-5, 31,
+substances, 47
+173, 177, 220-1, 257
+wishful impulses, 197-8
+theory of, 3-5, 14-15, 17, 19, 196-
+Sexuality, diphasic onset of, 35, 141,
+Reproductive function, 47, 142, 220,
+208
+Sleep, 17, 26, 151, 200, 217
+dreams a s guardians of, 118, 127-
+128
+Slips
+of the pen, 97n.
+to psycho-analysis, 4, 14, 17, 26-7,
+49-50, 90, 92, 110, 115, 128-9,
+166, 196, 200
+Revenge, 40
+Rivista di Psiquiatria, 202
+Rosegger; P., 118
+Sachs, Hanns (see also Bibliography),
+Snake as phallic symbol, 89-90
+Social sense, 26, 37, 218, 220-1
+Sociology and psycho-analysis, 208
+Speeches in dreams, 109, 119
+specs V. (see also
+Stekel,
+(see also Bibliography),
+201, 286-7
+Stimuli, sensory, 230, 238
+
+Storfer, A. F., 293
+Sublimation, 30, 39-40, 45-7, 54,
+56, 207, 257
+Substitute-formations, symptoms as,
+as substitute formations, 150, 193,
+196-7
+compared to dreams, 199
+curability of, 194, 197
+319
+150, 193, 196-7
+Suckling and breast, 104, 144 n. 2,
+165, 175, 238 n. 1, 246, 249,
+251
+Suggestion
+by phylician, in psycho-analysis,
+express a repressed wish, 198
+interpretation of, 87, 215
+Systematic, descriptive and dynamic
+18,40, 60-2
+Sued impolice, 88
+Thought-processes
+19-23, 26, 45,
+55, 112, 130, 236-
+analyst identified with, 50n.
+and neurosis, 50, 151
+development of concept of, 7,9-11,
+149
+equated with conscience, 36-8,
+pathy)
+Tele-
+54, 118, 121, 166-8
+Thumb-sucking, 251
+equated with introjected parents,
+Time, concept of, 231
+34, 36-7, 54, 57-8, 167-9, 176-
+Topographical division of the mind,
+177,257
+4-7, 10-11, 17-20, 24, 36-7
+hest to 3e dips, 157-9, 110,
+Totem animal
+as father-figure, 87,
+165
+Totemism, 29 n. 2, 38, 87, 165
+in girls and boys compared, 247,
+Toxic factors, 214-16
+257-8
+Transference, 45, 56, 90, 114, 1/-
+in primitive man, 38
+118, 198, 244 n. 1, 274, 280
+partly unconscious, 39, 52
+Transference neuroses (see also
+relation to us., 40, 49
+Hysteria; Obsessional neurosis),
+relation to ego, 9-10, 34-9, 48,
+149-50, 152, 203
+51-8, 150, 152, 166-7, 169-70,
+Irauma of birth, 50, 144 n. 2, 173 no,
+176-7
+175 n. 2
+relation to external world, 150-2,
+Traumatic
+neurosis, 118
+representative of the id, 36, 48-9,
+situation, 57 n. 3, 184, 192-4
+51-4, 56, 50, 151-4, 167
+severity of, 51-6, 58, 121, 167,
+Unconscious, the
+169-70, 176-7
+access to, in psycho-analysis, 50 n.,
+Superstition, 87, 236 n. 1
+235
+Symbol
+blinding as, 162
+development of concept, 3-7, 13-
+Medusa's head as, 144 n. 3
+dreams and, 111-12, 117-18, 127
+number nine as, 88-9
+equated with id, 7 n. 2, 23-4
+snake as, 89-90
+descriptive,
+dynamic,
+and
+systematic senses,
+, 5-7, 13-18,
+of dreams, 110, 125-6, 135
+of neurotic symptoms, 187
+instincts and, 26, 39
+Symposium, the (Plato), 218
+"no' does not exist in, 239
+Symptoms, neurotic
+relation to ego, 4-7, 17-19, 23,
+etiology oi, 150, 193-4, 196-7
+26-7, 28 л. 2, 239
+14-1
+relation to Pcs., 4, 15, 20-2, 62
+as compromise formations, 199-
+200
+repression and.
+, 4-6, 14-15, 18,
+
+320
+Unconscious, the (contd.)
+'stretches
+feelers
+extermal world, 291, 238 n. 3
+the
+Unconscious
+nenta, processes, existence of, 7
+, 16 n., 192, 194-5, 198-
+200, 206, 209, 216-17
+sense of guilt, 4, 9, 26-1, 35, 49-
+54, 161, 166, 169
+wish, 138, 207-8
+Unpleasure, 22, 25-6, 161, 163, 213
+and masochism, 158-9
+Vagina, 145, 246
+Verbal residues, 20-1, 23, 52
+Vienna, 69, 73, 77, 94, 96, 100-3,
+Vie na nycho-,alytical Society,
+Visual residues, 21
+Wakins-i4, a27, dreams, 109, Il!,
+War neuroses, 113
+War of 1914-18, 201
+Wayward Youth (by Aichhor), 272-5
+White, W. A., 201
+Wish-fulfilment
+in creative art, 207-8
+in dreams, 110-12, 114, 116, 118-
+119, 130, 132, 199-200
+Withs, F. (se diss Bibliography),
+260, 286-8
+'Wolf Man', case of the, 86 n. 2, 149
+n. 1, 251 n. 1
+Womb, 144n. n.4, 145
+Women (see also Girls)
+character-formation in, 29, 257-
+horror of, 144, 252
+masturbation in, 255
+›aranoia in, 245-6
+benis attributed to, 144-5, 176
+sexual development of, 243, 245,
+255, 257
+Word-presentations
+(see
+Verbal
+residues)
+Work, inhibitions in, 80, 82, 87-8,
+Zentralblatt für Psochoanalyse, 201
+Zurich school, 200, 202
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/017c2a8bd62d1a5bcf6b3f76caf48352a5078964387e49f5a297782684c1662f.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/017c2a8bd62d1a5bcf6b3f76caf48352a5078964387e49f5a297782684c1662f.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fa9312bb8003b64fcaeeab563b974d43b9e83317
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/017c2a8bd62d1a5bcf6b3f76caf48352a5078964387e49f5a297782684c1662f.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -7172,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "017c2a8bd62d1a5bcf6b3f76caf48352a5078964387e49f5a297782684c1662f",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 812,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "ce7001fce8bfa6fdec1c47b865450bf6126db5541b5dedaa211252189fad9ad7",
+  "output_sha256": "7716f7ea5727bc7221d66830c818d3f6ab1d96fbc7a7e8db49e65f1cb1250dcc",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/3a6d01543ca85d1371807b97339660d5c5207a0a26c3699bf8d4b83baba8ef24.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/3a6d01543ca85d1371807b97339660d5c5207a0a26c3699bf8d4b83baba8ef24.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4ab3bcfd8a8bf98114c525eab79e35676bbf0c9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/3a6d01543ca85d1371807b97339660d5c5207a0a26c3699bf8d4b83baba8ef24.md
@@ -0,0 +1,12872 @@
+INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY
+Logical
+Investigations
+Volume 2
+
+Logical Investigations
+Volume Il
+
+International Library of Philosophy
+Edited by José Bermúdez, Tim Crane and Peter Sullivan
+Advisory Board: Jonathan Barnes, Fred Dretske, Frances Kamm,
+Brian Leiter, Huw Price and Sydney Shoemaker
+Recent titles in the ILP:
+The Facts of Causation
+D. H. Mellor
+The Conceptual Roots of Mathematics
+J. R. Lucas
+Stream of Consciousness
+Barry Dainton
+Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science
+Jody Azzouni
+Reason without Freedom
+David Owens
+The Price of Doubt
+N. M. L. Nathan
+Matters of Mind
+Scott Sturgeon
+Logic, Form and Grammar
+Peter Long
+The Metaphysicians of Meaning
+Gideon Makin
+Logical Investigations, Vols 1 & I|
+
+Logical Investigations
+Translated by J. N. Findlay
+from the Second German edition of Logische Untersuchungen
+Edited by Dermot Moran
+Volume II
+On the theory of wholes and parts
+(Investigation III, Volume Il of the German editions)
+The distinction between independent and
+non-independent meanings
+(Investigation IV, Volume II of the German editions)
+On intentional experience and their 'contents'
+(Investigation V, Volume Il of the German editions)
+Elements of a phenomenological elucidation
+of knowledge
+(Investigation VI, Volume II, Part 2 of the German editions)
+ROUTLEDGE
+Francis
+Group
+London and New York
+
+First published in German as Logische Untersuchungen
+By M. Niemeyer, Halle 1900/1901
+Second German edition, Vol. I, Part I, first published 1913
+Second German edition, Vol. II, Part I, first published 192l
+First published in English 1970
+By Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd
+Reprinted 1976, 1977, 1982
+This paperback edition first published 2001
+by Routledge
+2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
+Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
+by Routledge
+270 Madison Ave, New York NY 10016
+Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group
+Transferred to Digital Printing 2006
+Translation @ 1970 J. N. Findlay
+Editorial matter © 2001 Dermot Moran
+Typeset in Times by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong
+Il rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduce
+r utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other mean
+now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording
+or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission ir
+writing from the publishers.
+British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
+A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
+Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
+A catalog record for this book has been requested
+ISBN 0-415-24189-8 (Vol. I)
+ISBN 0-415-24190-1 (Vol. II)
+Publisher's Note
+The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint
+but points out that some imperfections in the original may be apparent
+
+VOLUME II, PART | OF THE GERMAN EDITIONS
+(CONTINUED)
+INVESTIGATION III
+ON THE THEORY OF WHOLES AND PARTS
+CHAPTER ONE
+The difference between independent and non-independent objects
+81 Complex and simple, articulated and unarticulated objects
+82 Introduction of the distinction between independent and
+non-independent objects (contents)
+§3 The inseparability of non-independent contents
+84 Analyses of examples following Stumpf
+85 The objective determination of the concept of inseparability
+§6 Continuation. Tie-up with a criticism of a much-favoured
+notional determination
+§7 Further pointing up of our notional determination by
+introducing the concepts of pure law and pure genus
+§la Independent and non-independent Ideas
+§8 Demarcation of the distinction of independent and
+non-independent contents and the distinction between
+intuitively emphatic and intuitively blended contents
+§9 Continuation. Reference to the wider sphere of the
+phenomena of fusion
+§10 The multiplicity of laws governing the various sorts of
+non-independent contents
+§11 The difference between these 'material' laws and "formal' or
+'analytic' laws
+§12 Basic determinations in regard to analytic and synthetic
+propositions
+§13 Relative independence and non-independence
+3
+4
+4
+5
+6
+10
+11
+13
+15
+17
+19
+20
+22
+
+vi
+CHAPTER TWO
+Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts
+$14 The concept of foundation and some relevant theorems
+§15 Transition to the treatment of the more important
+part-relations
+§16 Reciprocal and one-sided, mediate and immediate foundation
+§17 Exact determination of the concepts of piece (portion),
+moment, physical part, abstractum, concretum
+§18 The difference between the mediate and immediate
+S19 A novel sense of this distinction: nearer and more remote paris
+of the whole
+820 Nearer and remoter parts relatively to one another
+§21 Exact pinning down of the pregnant notions of whole and
+part, and of their essential species, by means of the notion of
+foundation
+$22 Forms of sensuous unity and wholes
+§23 Forms of categorial unity and wholes
+§24 The pure formal types of wholes and parts. The postulate
+of an a priori theory
+§25 Additions regarding the 'piecing' (fragmentation) of wholes
+through the 'piecing' of their 'moments'
+INVESTIGATION IV
+THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT
+AND NON-INDEPENDENT MEANINGS AND THE
+IDEA OF PURE GRAMMAR
+81 Simple and complex meanings
+§2 Whether complexity of meanings merely reflects complexity of
+objects
+83 Complexity of meanings and complexity of the concrete act of
+leaning. Implied meaning
+1 The question of the meaninefulness of 'syncategoremati
+$5 Independent and non-independent meanings. The nonindependence of the sensory and expressive parts of words
+§6 Other opposed distinctions. Unclosed, abnormally abbreviated
+contents
+25
+27
+27
+28
+30
+30
+32
+34
+38
+39
+47
+49
+50
+50
+51
+53
+55
+56
+58
+
+Contents vii
+§8 Difficulties of this conception. (a) Whether the
+non-independence of the meaning does not really only
+lie in the non-independence of the object meant
+§9 (b) The understanding of isolated syncategorematica
+$10 A priori laws governing combinations of meanings
+§11 Objections. Modifications of meaning which are rooted in
+the essence of expressions or meanings
+$12 Nonsense and absurdity
+§13 The laws of the compounding of meanings and the pure
+logico-grammatical theory of forms
+14 Laws which discourage nonsense and laws which discourag
+bsurdity. The Idea of a purely logical gramma
+INVESTIGATION V
+ON INTENTIONAL EXPERIENCES AND
+THEIR 'CONTENTS'
+CHAPTER ONE
+Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego
+and consciousness as inner perception
+§1 Varied ambiguity of the term 'consciousness'
+§2 First sense: Consciousness as the real phenomenological
+unity of the ego's experiences. The concept of an experience
+83 The phenomenological and the popular concept of
+experience
+§4 The relation between experiencing consciousness and
+experienced content is no phenomenologically peculiar
+§5 Second sense. 'Inner' consciousness as inner perception
+§6 Origin of the first concept of consciousness out of the second
+§7 Reciprocal demarcation of psychology and natural science
+88 The pure ego and awareness ("Bewusstheit)
+Additional Note to the Second Edition
+CHAPTER TWO
+Consciousness as intentional experience
+$ Themeing of Brentano's demarcation of psychic
+60
+61
+64
+67
+68
+77
+79
+82
+84
+85
+86
+87
+89
+91
+93
+94
+94
+
+viii
+§10 Descriptive characterization of acts as 'intentional'
+experiences
+§11 Avoidance of verbally tempting misunderstandings.
+(a) The "mental' or "immanent' object
+§12 (b) The act and the relation of consciousness or the ego to
+the object
+$13 The fixing of our terminology
+14 Difficulties which surround the assumption of acts as
+descriptively founded class of experiences
+§15 Whether experiences of one and the same phenomenological
+kind (of the genus feeling in particular) can consist partly of
+a) Are there any intentional feelings
+b) Are there non-intentional feelings? Distinction betwee
+feeling-sensations and feeling-acts
+§16 Distinction between descriptive and intentional content
+§17 The intentional content in the sense of the intentional
+object
+§18 Simple and complex, founding and founded acts
+§19 The function of attention in complex acts. Instance of the
+phenomenological relation of verbal sound to sense
+$20 The difference between the quality and the matter of
+The intentional and the semantic essence
+Appendix to $11 and $20. Critique of the "image-theory'
+and of the doctrine of the immanent' objects of acts
+CHAPTER THREE
+The matter of the act and its underlying presentation
+§22 The question of the relation between the matter and
+quality of an act
+§23 The view of 'matter' as a founding act of "mere presentation'
+§24 Difficulties. The problem of the differentiation of
+qualitative kinds
+§25 Closer analysis of our two possible solutions
+$26 Consideration and rejection of the proposed conception
+§27 The testimony of direct intuition. Perceptual presentation
+and perception
+§28 Special investigation of the matter in the case of
+judgement
+$29 Continuation: 'acceptance' or 'assent' given to the mere
+presentation of the state of affairs
+Additional note
+95
+97
+100
+101
+102
+106
+107
+109
+112
+113
+115
+116
+119
+122
+125
+128
+128
+129
+131
+132
+134
+135
+139
+140
+143
+
+Contents ix
+§30 The conception of the identical understanding of a word
+or a sentence as a case of "mere presentation'
+§31 A last objection to our view. Mere presentations and
+isolated 'matters'
+CHAPTER FOUR
+Study of founding presentations with special regard to the
+theory of judgement
+$32 An ambiguity in the word "presentation', and the supposed
+self-evidence of the principle that every act is founded on
+an act of presentation
+§33 Re-establishment of our proposition by means of a new
+notion of presentation. Naming and asserting
+§34 Difficulties. The concept of the name. Positing and
+non-positing names
+§35 Nominal positing and judgement. Where judgements as such
+can be parts of nominal acts
+§36 Continuation. Whether assertions can function as complete
+names
+CHAPTER FIVE
+143
+144
+146
+146
+147
+149
+152
+155
+§37 The aim of the following investigation. The concept of an
+objectifying act
+§38 Qualitative and material differentiation of objectifying acts
+§39 Presentation in the sense of an objectifying act, and its
+qualitative modification
+§40 Continuation. Qualitative and imaginative modification
+§41 New interpretation of the principle that makes
+presentations the basis of all acts. The objectifying act as
+S42 the phenay leareror Basic principles of complex acts
+$43 Backward glance to our previous interpretation of the
+principle under discussion
+CHAPTER SIX
+Summing-up of the most important ambiguities in the terms
+"Dresentation' and 'content'
+§44 'Presentation'
+$45 The 'presentational content'
+Note
+158
+158
+159
+162
+165
+167
+168
+169
+171
+171
+175
+175
+
+x Contents
+VOLUME II, PART 2 OF THE SECOND
+GERMAN EDITION
+INVESTIGATION VI
+ELEMENTS OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL
+ELUCIDATION OF KNOWLEDGE
+First section
+Objectifying intentions and their fulfilments:
+knowledge as a synthesis of fulfilment and its
+gradations
+CHAPTER ONE
+Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment
+§1 Whether every type of mental act, or only certain types,
+can function as carriers of meaning
+§2 That all acts may be expressed does not decide the issue.
+There are two senses to talk about expressing an act
+83 A third sense of talk about the 'expression' of acts.
+Formulation of our theme
+§4 The expression of a percept ("judgement of perception'). Its
+meaning cannot lie in perception, but must lie in peculiar
+expressive acts
+§5 Continuation. Perception as an act which determines
+meaning, without embodying it
+Addendum
+§6 The static unity of expressive thought and expressed
+intuition. Recognition (das Erkennen)
+1 Recognition as a character of acts, and the 'generality of words'
+8 The dynamic unity of expression and expressed intuitior
+The consciousness of fulfilment and that of identity
+§9 The differing character of an intention inside and outside
+he unity of fulfilment
+10 The wider class of experiences of fulfilment. Intuitions a
+intentions which require fulfilment
+§11 Frustration and conflict. The synthesis of distinction
+177
+177
+181
+183
+189
+191
+191
+192
+193
+195
+196
+199
+201
+202
+206
+208
+209
+
+Contents xi
+§12 Total and partial identification and distinction as the
+common phenomenological foundations of predicative
+and determining forms of expression
+CHAPTER TWO
+Indirect characterization of objectifying intentions and their essential
+varieties through differences in the syntheses of fulfilment
+§13 The synthesis of knowing (recognition) as the characteristic
+form of fulfilment for objectifying acts. Subsumption of
+acts of meaning under the class of objectifying acts
+§14 Phenomenological characterization of the distinction between
+signitive and intuitive intentions through peculiarities of
+fulfilment. (a) Sign, image and self-presentation
+(b) The perceptual and imaginative 'adumbration' of the
+object
+§15 Signitive intentions beyond the limits of the
+meaning-function
+CHAPTER THREE
+The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge
+816 Simple identification and fulfilment
+§17 The question of the relation between fulfilment and intuitive
+illustration
+§18 The gradations of mediate fulfilments. Mediate presentations
+§19 Distinction between mediate presentations and presentations
+of presentations
+§20 Genuine intuitive illustration in every fulfilment. Authentic
+and inauthentic intuitive illustration
+§21 The "fulness' of a presentation
+$22 Fulness and 'intuitive substance' (Gehalt)
+§23 Relations of weight between the intuitive and signitive
+'substance' (Gehalt) of one and the same act. Pure intuition
+and pure signification. Perceptual and imaginal content, pure
+perception and pure imagination. Gradations of fulness
+$24 Graded series of fulfilments
+§25 Fulness and intentional matter
+§26 Continuation. Representation or interpretation (Auffassung).
+Matter as the interpretative sense, the interpretative form and
+the interpreted content. Differentiating characterization of
+intuitive and signitive interpretation
+§27 Representations as the necessary bases of presentation in all
+acts. Final clarification of talk about the different modes of
+the relation of consciousness to its object
+213
+216
+216
+218
+220
+222
+226
+226
+228
+229
+230
+231
+233
+234
+235
+238
+240
+242
+244
+
+xii
+§28 Intentional essence and fulfilling sense. Epistemic essence.
+$29 Complete and defective intuitions. Adequate and objectively
+complete intuitive illustrations. Essentia (Essenz)
+CHAPTER FOUR
+Consistency and inconsistency
+§30 The ideal distinction of meanings into the possible or real
+§31 Compatibility or consistency as an ideal relationship in the
+CHAPTER FIVE
+The ideal of adequation. Selfevidence and truth
+§36 Introduction
+§37 The fulfilling function of perception. The ideal of ultimate
+fulfilment
+§38 Positing acts in the function of fulfilment. Self-evidence in
+the loose and strict sense
+§39 Self-evidence and truth
+Second section
+Sense and understanding
+CHAPTER SIX
+Sensuous and categorial intuitions
+840 The problem of the fulfilment of categorial meaning-forms,
+with a thought leading towards its solution
+§41 Continuation. Extension of our sphere of examples
+842 The distinction between sensuous stuff and categorial form
+throughout the whole realm of objectifying acts
+§43 The objective correlates of categorial forms are not 'real'
+(realen) moments
+§44 The origin of the concept of Being and of the remaining
+categories does not lie in the realm of inner-perception
+245
+246
+250
+250
+252
+253
+254
+256
+257
+259
+259
+259
+262
+263
+269
+271
+271
+274
+275
+277
+278
+
+Contents xili
+§45 Widening of the concept of intuition, and in particular of
+the concepts perception and imagination. Sensible and
+categorial intuition
+§46 Phenomenological analysis of the distinction between
+sensuous and categorial perceptior
+§47 Continuation. Characterization of sense-perception as
+'straightforward' perception
+§48 Characterization of categorial acts as founded acts
+$49 Added note on nominal formations
+§50 Sensuous forms categorially grasped but not functioning
+nominally
+§51 Collectiva and disjunctiva
+§52 Universal objects constituting themselves in universal
+intuitions
+CHAPTER SEVEN
+A study in categorial representation
+$53 Backward reference to the researches of our first section
+§54 The question of the representing contents of categorial forms
+§55 Arguments for the assumption of peculiar categorial
+representing contents
+§56 Continuation. The mental linkage of combined acts and
+the categorial unity of corresponding objects
+857 The representing contents of the founding intuitions are
+not immediately connected by the representing content of
+the synthetic form
+§58 The relation of our two distinctions: outer and inner sense,
+also sense for categories
+CHAPTER EIGHT
+The a priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking
+859 The complication into ever new forms. The pure theory
+§61 Categorial forming involves no real reshaping of the object
+$62 Our freedom in the categorial forming of given material and
+signitive acts (laws of inauthentic thinking)
+§64 The pure logico-grammatical laws are laws for any
+understanding whatever, and not merely for any human
+280
+281
+283
+286
+289
+290
+291
+292
+295
+295
+296
+298
+299
+300
+302
+305
+305
+306
+307
+308
+311
+
+XIV
+understanding. Their psychological meaning and normative
+§65 The senseless problem of the real meaning of the logical
+§66 Distinction between the most important differences mixed
+up in the current opposition of 'intuiting' and 'thinking'
+Additional note to the second edition
+314
+316
+Third section
+Clarification of our introductory problem
+CHAPTER NINE
+Non-objectifying acts as apparent fulfilments of meaning
+$67 That not every act of meaning includes an act of knowing
+§68 The controversy regarding the interpretation of the peculiar
+grammatical forms which express non-objectifying acts
+§69 Arguments for and against the Aristotelian conception
+§70 Decision
+APPENDIX
+External and internal perception: physical and psychical phenomena
+§1 The popular and the traditional philosophical concepts of
+external and internal perception
+§82 and 3 Epistemological and psychological motives for
+deepening the traditional division: Brentano's conception
+§4 Criticism. External and internal perception are,
+on a normal interpretation of the concepts, of the same
+epistemological character: Perception and apperception
+§5 The equivocations of the term 'appearance'
+§5a Excised passage from the First Edition
+86 There is for this reason confusion between the
+epistemologically meaningless opposition of inner and outer
+perception, and the epistemologically fundamental opposition
+of adequate and inadequate perception
+87 That the dispute is not verbal
+§8 Confusion of two fundamentally different divisions of
+"phenomena'. That "physical' contents do not exist
+"in merely phenomenal fashion', but exist 'actually
+Index
+321
+323
+323
+325
+327
+332
+335
+335
+336, 339
+340
+341
+344
+344
+346
+347
+349
+359
+
+Investigation III
+On the theory of wholes
+and parts
+
+Introduction'
+The difference between 'abstract' and 'concrete' contents, which is plainly
+the same as Stumpf's distinction between dependent (non-independent) and
+independent contents, is most important for all phenomenological investigations; we must, it seems, therefore, first of all submit it to a thorough analysis.
+As said in my previous Investigation, this distinction, which first showed up
+in the field of the descriptive psychology of sense-data, could be looked on
+as a special case of a universal distinction. It extends beyond the sphere of
+conscious contents and plays an extremely important role in the field
+of objects as such. The systematic place for its discussion should therefore be
+in the pure (a priori) theory of objects as such, in which we deal with ideas
+pertinent to the category of object, ideas such as Whole and Part, Subject
+and Quality, Individual and Species, Genus and Species, Relation and Collection, Unity, Number, Series, Ordinal Number, Magnitude etc., as well as
+the a priori truths which relate to these. Here again we cannot allow our
+analytic investigation to wait on the systematic development of our subjectmatter. Difficult notions employed by us in our clarificatory study of
+knowledge, and made to work rather in the manner of a lever, cannot be left
+unexamined, till they spontaneously emerge in the systematic fabric of the
+logical realm. For we are not here engaged on a systematic exposition of
+logic, but on an epistemological clarification, as well as on the prolegomena
+To plumb the difference between dependent and non-independent contents, therefore, points so directly to the fundamental questions of the Pure
+Theory of Wholes and Parts (which is a part of formal ontology) that w
+cannot avoid going into these questions in some detail.
+
+The difference between
+independent and non-independent
+objects
+§1 Complex and simple, articulated and
+unarticulated objects
+Since the Investigation which follows mainly concerns relations of Parts, we
+start off with a wholly general discussion of such relations.
+Objects can be related to one another as Wholes to Parts, they can also
+be related to one another as coordinated parts of a whole. These sorts of
+relations have an a priori foundation in the Idea of an object. Every object is
+ither actually or possibly a part, i.e. there are actual or possible wholes tha
+include it. Not every object, on the other hand, need perhaps have parts
+and we have therefore the ideal division of objects into the simple and the
+complex.
+The terms 'complex' and 'simple' are therefore defined by the qualification of having parts or not having parts. They may, however, be understood
+tymology suggests, points to a plurality of disjoined parts in the whole, s
+hat we have to call simple whatever cannot be 'cut up' into a plurality o
+moments, since they have no community of content. They have, we may
+say, a mutual association in the widest sense of the word; we have here a
+general relation of parts which is that of disjoined parts in a whole, an
+association of such parts. It now seems appropriate to call the associated
+parts members of the association: but to give so wide a sense to talk about
+members of a whole, means to count colour and shape as the associated
+parts of a coloured expanse. That goes against linguistic usage. For in such
+wholes the parts have relative dependence as regards one another: we find
+them so closely united as to be called 'interpenetrating'. It is quite different
+in the case of wholes which are broken up, or could be broken up, into
+
+The difference between independent and non-independent objects 5
+pieces: in their case talk of members or of articulated structure alone comes
+natural. The parts are here not merely disjoined from each other, but relatively independent, they have the character of mutually-put-together pieces.
+Even at the start of our discussion, we see that the relations of parts fall
+under characteristically different forms: these forms, we suspect, depend on
+the cardinal difference between independent and non-independent objects,
+which is our theme in the present section.
+Introduction on the dispendien bere (contents)
+Wari that a the dirin guated the aidese sen or we may all ased that
+part' that can be distinguished 'in'
+is 'present' in it. Everything is a part that is an object's real possession, not
+only in the sense of being a real thing, but also in the sense of being something really in something, that truly helps to make it up! an object in itself,
+considered in abstraction from all contexts to which it is tied, is likewise a
+part. Every non-relative "real' (reale) predicate therefore points to a part of
+the object which is the predicate's subject: 'red' and 'round', e.g., do so, but
+not 'existent' or "something'. Every 'real' (reale) mode of association, e.g.
+the moment of spatial configuration, likewise counts as a proper part of the
+The term 'part' is not used so widely in ordinary discourse. If we now try
+to pin down the limitations which mark off this ordinary, from our notion
+of part, we come up against the fundamental distinction called by us that of
+independent and non-independent parts. Where one talks of 'parts' without
+qualification, one generally has the independent parts (those referred to as
+pieces') in mind. Since each part can be made the specific object (or, as we
+also have frequently said, 'content') of a presentation directed upon it, and
+can therefore be called an object or 'content, the distinction of parts just
+mentioned points to a distinction in objects (or contents) as such. The term
+'object' is in this context always taken in its widest sense.
+In ordinary talk of objects or of parts, one of course involuntarily thinks of
+independent objects. The term 'content' is less restricted in this respect since
+'abstract contents' are also commonly talked of. But talk of 'contents' tends to
+nove in a purely psychological sphere, a limitation with which we may star
+nvestigating our distinction, but which must be dropped as we proceed.
+As a matter of history the distinction between independent and nonindependent contents arose in the psychological realm, more specifically in
+the field of the phenomenology of inner experience. In a polemic against
+Locke, Berkeley said: We have the ability to recall individual things pre
+viously seen, or to put them together or break them down in imagination.
+We can imagine a man with two heads, the trunk of a man tied to the body
+of a horse, or isolated pieces such as a separated head, nose, ear etc. As
+
+6 On the theory of wholes and parts
+opposed to this, it is impossible to form 'abstract ideas, to separate the idea,
+e.g., of a movement from that of a moving body. We can only abstract
+in the Lockean separative sense, such parts of a presented whole as are in
+fact unified with other parts, but as could also exist without them. Since esse
+for Berkeley here always means the same as percipi, this inability to exist
+means no more than an inability to be perceived. We must note, further, that
+for Berkeley ideas are the things perceived, i.e. contents of consciousness in
+the sense of things we really (reell) live through.
+We may now make a statement that brings out the essential point of
+cherkeley's distinctions, making use of a readily understandable verbal
+Seen in their mutual interrelations, contents presented together on any
+§3 The inseparability of non-independent contents
+To be more precise in regard to this ability or inability-to-be-separatelypresented, we make use of some of Stumpf's observations - quite insufficiently
+noticed - and assert the following.
+It is self-evident, in regard to certain contents, that the modification or
+elimination of at least one of the contents given with them (but not contained in them), must modify or eliminate those contents themselves. In the
+case of other contents, this is not at all self-evident; it is not absurd to
+even if nothing whatever exists beside them, nothing therefore bound up
+with them to form a whole.
+In the sense just laid down every phenomenal thing and piece of a thing is
+separably presentable. The head of a horse can be presented 'on its own' or
+'cut off', i.e. we can hold it in our fancy, while we allow the other parts of
+the horse, and its whole intuited setting, to alter and vanish at will. Strictly
+speaking, the phenomenal thing or its piece, i.e. the sensuous phenomenon
+as such, the spatial shape filled with sensuous qualities, never stays just the
+same in descriptive content: but the content of such a 'phenomenon' does
+not at least involve anything entailing a self-evident, necessary, functional
+dependence of its changes on those of coexistent phenomena. This holds, we
+may say, of phenomenal objects as such, as well as of the 'appearances', in
+the sense of the experiences, in which these things appear, as also in respect
+of the sensational complexes which are given an objective 'interpretation' in
+such experiences. Good examples in this field are the phenomena of tones
+
+The difference between independent and non-independent objects 7
+apa hom al feation tod other perioes that we can readiy think of
+§4 Analyses of examples following Stumpf
+definitely, colour stay the same while extent and figure vary indefinitel
+ut, strictly speaking, such independent variability affects only the kinds o
+nuance of quality, may be stretched or spread out over every extension,
+and, conversely, the same extension may be covered by every quality. Scope,
+however, remains for relations of functional dependence among the changes
+of such moments, which, be it noted, are not exhausted by the ideal content
+of their Species. The moment of colour, as immediate part-content of the
+intuited concrete thing, is not the same in the two concrete intuitions, even
+when the quality, the lowest differentiation of the genus colour, remains the
+same. Stumpf has made the powerful observation:
+Quality shares after a fashion in changes of extension. We express this
+verbally when we say that colour diminishes, becomes smaller, even to
+the vanishing point. Increase and diminution are names for quantitative
+Quality is indeed affected in sympathy with changes in extent,
+although its own peculiar manner of change is independent of extent. It
+does not thereby become less green or less red: it has itself no degrees,
+only kinds, and can in itself neither increase nor diminish, only alter.
+But none the less, when we leave quality quite unchanged as regards its
+peculiar manner of change, e.g. let it stay green, it still is affected by
+quantitative change. And that this is perhaps not an improper or mis
+leading verbal transfer, is shown by the fact that a quality can decreas
+to nothing, that in the end mere change of quantity can bring it to nought.?
+Ve accept Stumpf's observation, only adding that it is not really th
+uality that is affected, but the immediate intuitive 'moment falling unde
+it. Quality must be looked on as a second-order abstraction, just like the
+figure and magnitude of an extension. But just on account of the law here
+under discussion, the moment in question can only be named by way
+of concepts determined by the genera of Quality and Extension. Quality
+is differentiated to the qualitative 'moment' now under consideration, by
+
+8 On the theory of wholes and parts
+something not contained in the Genus Colour, since we rightly treat the
+quality, e.g. the determinate shade of red, as the Infima Species within this
+genus. Just so, a determinate figure is the last difference of the Genus Figure,
+though the corresponding immediate, intuitive 'moment' is further differentiated. But the combinations among the various last differences of the
+Genera Figure and Colour fully determine the "moments' in question, determine
+whatever else may be like or unlike them. The dependence of the immediate
+'moments' therefore means a certain necessary relationship among them,
+which is determined purely by their abstracta at the level just above them.
+Stumpf adds the following valuable remarks:
+From this (i.e. the above described functional dependence of the 'moments' of Quality and Extension), it follows that both are in their nature
+inseparable, that they in some manner compose a total content, of which
+they are merely part-contents. Were they merely items in a sum, one
+might possibly think that, absolutely treated, disappearance of Extension might mean the concomitant disappearance of Quality, that they
+did not exist apart; but that Quality should gradually diminish and
+vanish through the mere diminution and vanishing of Quantity, without
+changing in its own fashion as Quality, would be unintelligible... they
+can in any case not be independent contents. Their nature forbids them
+to have an isolated and mutually independent existence in our ideas.®
+The same sort of thing could be said of the relation of Intensity to Quality.
+The intensity of a tone is not something indifferent or so-to-speak alien to
+its quality. We cannot keep the intensity just as it is, while the quality varies
+at will, or is allowed to vanish. Eliminate quality and you unavoidably
+eliminate intensity, and vice versa. Evidently this is no mere empirical fact,
+but an a priori necessity, grounded in pure essence. In the response to change
+we have a further analogy to the previously mentioned case: if intensity
+steadily approaches the zero-limit, we feel our qualitative impression likewise reduced, even though the quality as such remains specifically unaltered.
+Further examples fully illustrate the 'moments' of unity in the intuitive
+contents, 'moments' built on the elements that we primarily distinguish, by
+which such elements are similarly or dissimilarly associated into sensuous
+intuitive wholes. The use of such examples gives us our first narrower concepts
+of a whole, of an association etc., and, further, our distinctive concepts of
+various kinds and sorts of wholes, whether present to outer or inner sense.
+These 'moments of unity' are of course the same as the contents called
+'form-qualities' by von Ehrenfels, 'figural' moments by myself, and 'founded
+contents' by Meinong. But one needs here a supplementary distinction
+between the phenomenological moments of unity, which give unity to the
+experiences or parts of experiences (the real phenomenological data), and
+
+The difference between independent and non-independent objects 9
+the objective moments of unity, which belong to the intentional objects and
+parts of objects, which in general transcend the experiential sphere. The
+expression 'moment of unity', incidentally recommended to me by Riehl,
+has such obvious advantages in virtue of its immediate intelligibility, that it
+might well be universally adopted.
+§5 The objective determination of the concept of
+inseparability
+Stumpf uses considerations of this sort to prove the mutual inseparability of
+Extension and Quality, and hence their non-independence: we shall rather
+make use of them to define inseparability or non-independence, or contrariwise separability or independence. Stumpf himself gives us the means to
+do this at the end of the last quoted passage.!° What does it mean to say we
+can form an idea of a content 'by itself' or 'in isolation'? Does this mean, as
+regards the actually experienced contents of the phenomenological sphere,
+that such a content can be freed from all blending with coexistent contents,
+can therefore ultimately be torn out of the unity of consciousness? Obviously not. In this sense no contents are isolable, and the same holds of the
+phenomenal thing-contents in their relation to the total unity of the phenomenon as such. If we form an independent idea of the content head of a horse,
+we inescapably present it in a context, the content stands relieved from an
+objective background that appears with it, it is inescapably given with many
+other contents, and is also in a way united to them. How then can this
+content be isolable in idea? The only answer we can give is the following:
+Isolabilitý means only that we can keep some content constant in idea
+despite boundless variation - variation that is free, though not excluded by a
+law rooted in the content's essence - of the contents associated with it, and,
+in general, given with it. This means that it is unaffected by the elimination
+of any given arrangement of compresent contents whatsoever.
+This self-evidently entails: that the existence of this content, to the extent
+that this depends on itself and its essence, is not at all conditioned by the
+existence of other contents, that it could exist as it is, through an a priori
+necessity of essence, even if nothing were there outside of it, even if all
+around were altered at will, i.e. without principle.
+Or what plainly amounts to the same: In the 'nature' of the content itself,
+in its ideal essence, no dependence on other contents is rooted; the essence
+that makes it what it is, also leaves it unconcerned with all other contents.
+It may as a matter of fact be that, with the existence of this content, other
+contents are given, and in accordance with empirical rules. In its ideally graspable essence, however, the content is independent; this essence by itself, i.e.
+considered in a priori fashion, requires no other essence to be interwoven
+
+10 On the theory of wholes and parts
+The sense of non-independence (Unselbständigkeit) lies likewise in the
+positive thought of dependence (Abhängigkeit). The content is by its nature
+bound to other contents, it cannot be, if other contents are not there together with it. We need not emphasize the fact that they form a unity with
+it, for can there be essential coexistence without connection or 'blending',
+however loose? Contents which lack self-sufficiency can accordingly only
+exist as partial contents.
+We need only say 'object' and 'partial object', instead of 'content' and
+'partial content' - the term 'content' we regard as the narrower term, the
+one restricted to the sphere of phenomenology - to achieve an objective
+distinction freed from all relation to interpretative acts and to any
+phenomenological content that might be interpreted. No reference back to
+consciousness is therefore needed, no reference to differences in the 'mode of
+presentation, to determine the difference between 'abstract' and 'concrete
+which is here in question. All determinations which make use of such a
+relation, either represent an incorrect, misguided confusion with other notions of 'abstract', or are merely subjectively slanted expressions of a purely
+and useful in other cases.
+§6 Continuation. Tie-up with a criticism of a
+much-favoured notional determination
+Occasionally one hears the difference between independent and nonndependent contents expressed in the attractive formula: Independent con
+ents (part-contents) could be presented by themselves. non-independen
+contents only noticed by themselves, not presented by themselves. To this
+formula one may object that "by themselves' functions vary differently in the
+two expressions to be distinguished: 'presented by themselves' and 'noticed
+by themselves'. A thing is 'noticed by itself' if it is an object of an act of
+notice specially directed upon it (a direct act of attending), a thing is 'presented by itself' if it is an object of a specially directed presentation - this
+at least if 'by itself' functions analogously in the two cases. On such a
+basis, however, we cannot sustain the opposition between what can only be
+noticed and what can only be presented by itself. Could emphatic notice
+perhaps conflict with presentation in a class of cases, and exclude it? But
+non-independent moments such as attributes and terms of relations are as
+nuch the objects of presentations (as stated above) as are independent con
+tents like window, head etc. Otherwise we should not be able to talk of them
+To attend to something by itself, and to represent it by itself (in the sense just
+presupposed) are so little mutually exclusive, that we find them together. In
+perceptual 'interpretation' the thing we attend to by itself is at the same time
+eo ipso presented; and the complete content presented by itself, e.g. head, is
+also attended to by itself.
+
+The difference between independent and non-independent objects I|
+'By itself' in fact means something quite different in the case of a presentation from what we thought it did. The equivalent expression 'present in
+isolation' points plainly to this fact. What it plainly means is that it is possible
+to present the object as something existing by itself, as independently there in
+he face of all other objects. A thing or piece of a thing can be presented b
+itself - this means it would be what it is even if everything outside it wer
+annihilated. If we form a presentation of it, we are not necessarily referred
+to something else, included in which, or attached to which, or associated
+with which, it has being, or on whose mercy it depends, as it were, for its
+existence. We can imagine it as existing by itself alone, and beyond it nothing else. If it is intuitively presented, a context, a whole including it, may
+nonetheless be presented with it, must inevitably be so presented. The visual
+content head cannot be presented without a visual background from which
+it stands relieved. This impossibility is, however, quite different from the
+impossibility used to define non-independent contents. If we let the visual
+content head count as independent, we think that, despite its inescapable
+accompanying background, it could be presented as existing by itself, and
+could therefore be intuitively envisaged in isolation. We, however, cannot
+effect this, whether because of powerful original or acquired associations, or
+other purely factual connections. The logical' possibility remains unshaken,
+our visual field, e.g., 'could' shrink down to this single content etc.
+What we here express by the word 'present', could be better expressed by
+the word 'think'. An attribute, a form of association and the like, cannot be
+thought of as self-existent, as isolated from all else, as being all that exists:
+this only can happen with 'thinglike' contents. Wherever the word 'think
+occurs in this peculiar sense, we detect one of those subjective slantings of
+an objective, nay of an a priori state of affairs, which we referred to above.
+Differences such as this, that one object - we again choose the wider term
+which includes the contents of intuitive experience - can be in and for
+itself, while another can only have being in, or attached to some other
+object - are no mere contingencies of our subjective thinking. They are real
+differences, grounded in the pure essence of things, which, since they obtain,
+and since we know of them, prompt us to say that a thought which oversteps
+hem is impossible, ie. a judgement deviating from them is wrong. Wha
+annot be thought, cannot be, what cannot be, cannot be thought - this
+equivalence fixes the differences between the pregnant notion of thinking
+and the ordinary subjective sense of presentation and thought.
+§7 Further pointing up of our notional determination
+by introducing the concepts of pure law and
+pure genus
+Wherever therefore the word 'can' occurs in conjunction with the pregnant
+use of "think', there is a reference, not to a subjective necessity, i.e. to the
+
+12 On the theory of wholes and parts
+subjective incapacity-to-represent-things-otherwise, but to the objectivelyideal necessity of an inability-to-be-otherwise." This is by its essence such
+as to be given in our consciousness of apodictic self-evidence. If we remain
+within the expressions of this consciousness, we must assert it to be of the
+essence of such an objective necessity that it is correlated with a definite
+pure law in each case. It is in the first place obvious in general that objective
+necessity is as such tantamount to a being that rests on an objective law. An
+individual matter of fact, considered as such, is contingent in its being: that
+it is necessary means that it stands in a context of law. What prevents
+its being otherwise is the law which says that it is not merely so here and
+now, but universally so, and with a lawful universality. Here we must note
+that, just as the 'necessity' relevant to our discussion of non-independent
+'moments' stands for an ideal or a priori necessity rooted in the essences
+of things, so, correspondingly, our 'lawfulness' stands for a lawfulness of
+essence, a non-empirical, universal and unconditionally valid lawfulness. No
+relation to empirical existence may restrict the extension of our legal concepts, no empirical assertion of existence be inwoven into our consciousness
+of law, as occurs in the case of empirically general rules and laws. 'Natural
+laws, laws in the sense of the empirical sciences, are not laws of essence
+(ideal or a priori laws): empirical necessity is no necessity of essence.
+The inability-to-exist-by-itself of a non-independent part points therefore
+to a law of essence, according to which the existence of a content belonging
+to the part's pure Species (e.g. the Species of Colour, Form etc.) presupposes
+the existence of contents of certain pertinent pure Species, i.e. contents to
+which - if such an addition is still needed - the content in question can pertain
+as a part or an adjunct, an associate. Put more simply we can say: Nonindependent objects are objects belonging to such pure Species as are governed
+by a law of essence to the effect that they only exist (if at all) as parts of more
+inclusive wholes of a certain appropriate Species. This is what we mean by
+the terser expression that they are parts which only exist as parts, that
+cannot be thought of as existing by themselves. The colour of this paper is a
+non-independent 'moment' of the paper. It is not merely an actual part, but
+its essence, its pure Species, predestines it to partial being: a colour in general and purely as such can exist only as a 'moment' in a coloured thing. In
+the case of independent objects such a law is lacking: they may, but need
+not, enter into more comprehensive wholes.
+In clarifying what must be meant by the phrase "presented by itself' in the
+formulation just criticized, we have therefore brought the essence of the
+difference to be pinned down into the sharpest focus. It has shown itself to
+be an objective difference, one rooted in the pure essence of the objects (or
+the partial contents) in question. We may now ask how it stands with the
+rest of the formula; how far does the statement that non-independent objects
+or 'moments' could 'only' be noticed by themselves, or singled out from
+their associates for exclusive attention, not presented by themselves, help us
+
+The difference between independent and non-independent objects 13
+to pin down such objects? We can only answer: Not at all. For if the word
+'only is tied exclusively to the phrase presented by itself', such an exclusive
+opposition achieves everything for it that can be achieved. Strictly speaking
+our approach is positive in the case of what is non-independent, negative
+in the case of what is independent: when we say that the former cannot be
+presented by itself, we merely return in double negation to our real startingpoint. However this may be, we need not fall back on the high-lighting role
+of attention, and it is not clear how it can help us. A head can certainly be
+presented apart from the person that has it. A colour, form etc., is not
+presentable in this fashion, it needs a substrate, in which it can be exclusively noticed, but from which it cannot be taken out. But the head also,
+considered, e.g. visually, can only be noticed by itself, since it is unavoidably
+given as an element in a total visual field. If we do not treat it as such an
+element, if we abstract from the background as something really foreign and
+indifferent, this does not depend on the peculiarity of our content, but on
+the circumstances of our thing-directed thought.
+§la Independent and non-independent Ideas
+Our distinctions have first of all related to the being of particular individuals
+thought of in 'ideal universality', i.e. of such individuals treated purely as
+instances of Ideas. But they obviously carry over to Ideas themselves, which
+can, in a corresponding, if somewhat modified sense, be spoken of as independent' and 'non-independent'. A lowest difference of some highest pure
+Genus may be called relatively independent in relation to the hierarchy of
+pure Species which lead up to the highest Genus, just as every lower Species
+counts as relatively independent as against higher Species. Genera, the existnce of whose corresponding individualizations represents an a priori im
+ossibility, unless they simultaneously belong to the individual, but purel
+conceived extensions of other Genera, are non-independent in regard to
+these latter, and so mutatis mutandis in the case of other fields of instances.
+§8 Demarcation of the distinction of independent and
+non-independent contents and the distinction between
+intuitively emphatic and intuitively blended contents
+We must be prepared for a further objection. Some may perhaps point to
+the manner in which an independent content puts itself forward as a unity
+valid in its own right, and cut off from all around, while a non-independent
+content is contrariwise characterized as something only grounded on other,
+independent contents, and insist that we here have a phenomenological contrast that our discussion has not taken full account of.
+We might deal, in the first place, with the following descriptive situation.
+The non-independent moments of an intuition, are not mere parts, but in a
+
+14 On the theory of wholes and parts
+certain (notionally immediate) manner they must also be regarded as parts:
+separately noticed unless the whole object, which has the figure or the colour,
+stands out in relief. A 'striking' colour or form may seem at times to impress
+peula biet it series and lie plane i begin is in series or he
+ensuouslv-unified whole itself.'' In this manner the setting in relief of one cor
+ent is at times the basis for noticing another that intimately belongs to it_
+If we explore the deeper grounds of the matter, we note that a second
+distinction is mixed up with and crosses the previously discussed difference
+of independent and non-independent contents in the phenomenological field
+(or the field of intuitive data as such). This is the distinction between intuitively 'separated' contents, contents relieved from or cut apart from associated
+contents, on the one hand, and contents which blend with their associates, or
+which flow undividedly over into them, on the other. Our terms are of course
+ambiguous, but to put them together makes plain that we really do have a
+new distinction before us.
+A content, accordingly, is intuitively separated in relation to other contents if it does not flow over into them without a point of difference: it can
+thus make itself count on its own, and stand forth independently. The intuitively unseparated content forms a whole with other coexistent contents, but
+is not cut off in this manner within the whole; it is not merely bound up with
+its associates, but blends with them. Independent contents in our previous
+sense, which are what they are no matter what goes on around them, need
+not have the quite different independence of separateness. The parts of an
+intuitive surface of a uniform or continuously shaded white are independent, but not separated.
+If we ask what is involved in intuitive separation, the image of a mutual
+overflow points to cases where contents are continuously graded. This holds
+mainly in the case of sensuous concreta (i.e. of independent contents in the
+sphere of outer sense). Here separation often rests on discontinuity. One may
+affirm that:
+Two contemporaneous sensuous concreta necessarily form an 'undifferentiated
+whole' if all the immediately constitutive 'moments' of the one pass unbrokenly
+over into corresponding constitutive 'moments' of the other. The case of exact
+likeness of any such corresponding moments shall here count as a legitimate
+limiting case of continuity, i.e. as a continuous 'passing over into self'.
+
+The difference between independent and non-independent objects
+115
+We can apply this in readily understandable fashion to a multiplicity of
+concreta. Here each single concretum lacks separation, if the aggregated
+concreta form a series, at each step of which the items are continuously
+conjoined, i.e. if what we have described holds of each neighbouring pair of
+items. An individual item already lacks separation from all other items if there
+is a single item from which it does not stand forth in relief.
+§° Continuation. Reference to the wider sphere of
+the phenomena of fusion
+These propositions are in a certain sense idealized expressions of facts. Continuity and discontinuity must of course not be taken in a mathematically exact
+sense. Points of discontinuity are not mathematical limits, and distances
+must not be 'too small'.
+One might draw a somewhat finer distinction between sharper and more
+confused separation or limitation, in the empirically vague sense in which,
+in ordinary life, one speaks of sharp points and corners as opposed to blunt
+or even rounded ones. Plainly the essential forms of all intuitive data are not
+in principle to be brought under 'exact' or "ideal' notions, such as we have in
+mathematics. The spatial shape of the perceived tree as such, taken precisely
+as a 'moment' found in the relevant percept's intentional object, is no geometric shape, no ideal or exact shape in the sense of exact geometry. Just so
+a seen colour as such is no ideal colour, whose Species occupies an ideal
+point in the colour-pyramid. The essences which direct ideation elicits from
+intuitive data are 'inexact essences, they may not be confused with the
+'exact' essences which are Ideas in the Kantian sense, and which (like an
+'ideal point', an ideal surface or solid, or ideal Species of colour in the ideal
+colour-pyramid) arise through a peculiar "idealization'. The descriptive concepts of all pure description, i.e. of description adapted to intuition immediately and with truth and so of all phenomenological description, differ in
+principle from those which dominate objective science. To clear up these
+matters is a phenomenological task never yet seriously undertaken and not
+carried out in relation to our present distinction.
+It is also clear that this separation through discontinuity (or this fusion
+through continuity) only covers a very restricted field.
+I recall Stumpf's instructive investigations into the remarkable facts of
+fusion," in whose sphere we are here plainly moving. The cases stressed by
+us would play a peculiar role in the field of the phenomena of fusion. Considering these cases more closely, we are led back from the concreta, the
+independent total sensa, to their immediate, non-independent moments, or
+to the Species under which these immediately fall. Discontinuity relates as
+such to the lowest specific differences within one and the same immediately
+superordinate pure Genus: to qualities of colour, e.g., as compared with
+qualities of colour. But we do not define discontinuity as the mere distance
+
+16 On the theory of wholes and parts
+of coexistent contents in respect of such lowest differences. Simultaneous
+tones have distance, but they lack discontinuity in the pregnant sense of the
+word. This only relates to specifically differing moments in so far as they are
+'spread out' with common boundaries over a continuously varying spatial
+or temporal 'moment'. It is 'at' a spatial or temporal boundary that one
+visual quality, e.g., leaps over into another. In our continuous progress from
+spatial part to part there is at the same time no continuous progress in the
+overing quality: in one place at least the neighbouring qualities are finitely
+and not too minutely) distant. The same holds of a discontinuity in phenom
+enal order. Here not merely qualities, e.g., colours, achieve separation
+but whole concreta set bounds to one another, the visual field is split up
+into parts. The colour-distance in such a context of 'covering' - without
+which there can be no talk of discontinuity - also wins separation for the
+'moments' bound up with it, the covered spatial parts of our example. These
+could otherwise not be free from the fusion. Spatiality necessarily varies continuously. A piece of such variation can only become separately noticeable
+and primarily emphatic in consciousness,' when a discontinuity is provided
+by the covering 'moment', and the whole concretum which corresponds to it
+has thus been separated.
+The first meaning we give to 'spatiality', is here the sensational moment'
+which, when objectively referred, first yields phenomenal spatiality properly
+so called. But we can also mean by it the spatiality which a given intuition
+helps us to apprehend in the phenomenal thing as such, spatiality therefore
+as the intentional moment in which the objective, and objectively measurable, spatial shape of the physical 'thing itself' is intuitively revealed to us,
+and is differently revealed in different intuitions.
+The concrete thing of sensuous intuition therefore owes its isolation to the
+qualitative gap between neighbouring 'moments', but the relief achieved by
+the whole concretum has priority over the relief of the mutually separated
+moments of its content. This depends on the peculiarly intimate fusion of
+reveals itself in a mutual dependence as regard change and destruction. This
+fusion is not a fading into one another in the manner of the continuous, nor
+does it remove all separateness, but it is nonetheless a sort of peculiarly
+intimate mutual interconnection which must at a stroke set the whole complex of interpenetrating moments in relief, if only once a single discontinuous
+A profounder and more penetrating analysis could here lay bare a wealth
+of interesting descriptive differences; for our purposes these fairly rough
+treatments are enough. We have gone far enough to see that, in thus distinguishing stressed from unstressed contents, as was done above, or to employ
+a few readily suggested expressions, in distinguishing between contents that
+can, and contents that cannot be presented 'by themselves, or that are
+independent and non-independent respectively, we are dealing with differences
+
+The difference between independent and non-independent objects 17
+of 'subjective', intuitive materials, which have their own remarkable peculihe act which presents a concrete object is immediate, and is independen
+n not needing to be based on other presentations. whereas the act whic
+apprehends an abstract content is mediate and non-independent, in that it
+must be based on the presentation of a suitable concretum. Our analyses
+show, however, that anything that holds water in this descriptive situation
+is mixed up with other quite alien matters, and is in any case unfitted to
+illuminate our ontological distinction.
+§10 The multiplicity of laws governing the various
+sorts of non-independent contents
+Our discussions so far have shown that there is always an a priori law
+governing what is non-independent, having its conceptual roots in what is
+universal in the whole and part in question. But this law can be interpreted
+and expressed with more or less definiteness. To pin down the concept of
+non-independence, it is enough to say that a non-independent object can
+only be what it is (i.e. what it is in virtue of its essential properties) in a more
+comprehensive whole. At times, however, a non-independent object can
+vary in Species: this entails varying the kind of supplementation it requires
+for existence. If we say, for example, that the 'moment' of sensory quality,
+e.g. of sensory colour, is non-independent, and requires a whole in which it
+may be embodied, we have only laid down one side of our governing law,
+the side of a part which belongs to the Genus Sensory Quality. We have not,
+however, laid down the character of the whole, the manner in which such a
+'quality' is its part, nor the sort of supplement it needs to achieve existence. It
+is different when we say that a sensory quality can only exist in a sense-field
+and a sensory colour in a visual sense-field, or that it can only exist as qualifying an extension. Here the law lays down the other sides as well; the notion
+of a visual sense-field is given; and it means a particular, definite sort of whole
+among various possible sorts of whole. Just so, the notion of 'qualifying an
+extension' points to quite specific possibilities of law-governed inherence
+
+18 On the theory of wholes and parts
+that a non-independent 'moment' may have to a whole. The specific character of this inherence is fixed in general fashion both by the essence of Sensory
+Quality and the essence of Extension, but each is contained in its own manner in the essential unity of visual sensation, or of the visual field in which
+all such unities find their place. This manner cannot be further described.
+If we ask what differentiates the generic feature of being a sensory 'moment',
+so as to yield the specific feature of being a sensory quality, we can give
+no answer that helps us; we can point to no additional feature in which the
+concept of quality is not included. Just so, if we are asked what must be
+added to Colour to produce its Species Redness we can only answer 'Redness'.
+The notion of what is non-independent, with its indirectly, generally characterized definitory lawfulness, points to many factually determined, variable laws of essence. It is not a peculiarity of certain sorts of parts that they
+should only be parts in general, while it remains quite indifferent what they
+are conglomerated with, and into what sorts of connection they are fitted.
+There are fixed, necessary connections, pure laws definite in content, which
+vary with the pure Species of non-independent contents, and accordingly
+prescribe one sort of completion to one of them, another sort of completion
+to another. The Species associated in these laws, which mark off the spheres
+of contingent individuality presupposed by these laws - are occasionally,
+but not always, lowest specific differences. A law, for instance, may prescribe to contents of the Species Colour a connection with contents of the
+Species Extension, but it does not prescribe a definite extension to a definite
+colour, or vice versa. The values of the lowest differences are accordingly not
+functionally interrelated. The law only refers to lowest Species, i.e. Species
+having the multiplicity of ultimate specific differences immediately beneath
+them. On the other hand, if we consider the dependence of qualitative remoteness on the qualities on which it rests, we find it unambiguously determined
+by the lowest specific differences of these qualities, and so again determined
+as a lowest difference.
+The concept of non-independence accordingly amounts to that of ideal
+Lawfulness in unified combinations. If a part stands in an ideally law-bound
+and not merely factual combination, it must lack independence; since such a
+law-bound combination merely means that a part whose pure essence is
+of one sort, can exist lawfully only in association with certain other parts of
+these or those suitable sorts. And even where a law tells us of the impossibility, rather than the necessity of an association, where it says, e.g., that the
+existence of a part A excludes the existence of a part B as incompatible with
+A, our case still reduces to one of non-independence. For an A can only
+exclude a B, if both exclusively require the same thing. A colour excludes
+another colour, but only if both aim to cover an identical piece of surface,
+and both cannot do so completely. To each essential, law-bound exclusion
+of a determinate characterization, there corresponds a positive law-bound
+requirement of a corresponding characterization and vice versa.
+
+The difference between independent and non-independent objects 19
+§11 The difference between these 'material' laws and
+'formal' or 'analytic' laws
+The necessities or laws which serve to define given types of non-independent
+contents, on their peculiar nature. More precisely, they rest on the pure
+Genera, Species, differentiae under which, as contingent singulars, nonindependent contents as well as their supplementing contents, fall. If we
+conceive of the totality of such ideal objects, we have with them the totality
+of pure essences, the essences of all ideally possible individual objects (existences). To these essences correspond the concepts or propositions which
+have content, which we sharply distinguish from purely formal concepts and
+propositions, which lack all 'matter' or 'content'. To the latter belong the
+categories of formal logic and the formal ontological categories mentioned
+in the last chapter of the Prolegomena, which are essentially related to these,
+as well as to all syntactical formations they engender. Concepts like Something, One, Object, Quality, Relation, Association, Plurality, Number, Order,
+Ordinal Number, Whole, Part, Magnitude etc., have a basically different
+character from concepts like House, Tree, Colour, Tone, Space, Sensation,
+Feeling etc., which for their part express genuine content. Whereas the former
+group themselves round the empty notion of Something or Object as such,
+and are associated with this through formal ontological axioms, the latter
+are disposed about various highest material Genera or Categories, in which
+material ontologies have their root. This cardinal division between the
+'formal' and the 'material' spheres of Essence gives us the true distinction
+between the analytically a priori and the synthetically a priori disciplines
+(or laws and necessities). The next section will make systematic pronouncements on these matters.
+It is now immediately plain, that all the laws or necessities governing
+different sorts of non-independent items fall into the spheres of the synthetic
+a priori: one grasps completely what divides them from merely formal,
+contentless items. Laws of the type of the law of causation, which lay down
+the non-independence of changes in what is thinglike and real, or the laws -
+generally imperfectly formulated - which assert the non-independence of
+mere qualities, intensities, extensions, boundaries, relational forms etc. -
+would not be put on a level with a purely 'analytic' generalization such as A
+whole cannot exist without parts' or with analytic necessities such as There
+cannot be a king (master, father) without subjects (servants, children) etc.?.
+We may say in general: correlatives mutually entail one another, they cannot be thought of, or cannot be, without each other. If we set beside these
+any definite propositions of the opposite sort, e.g., 'A colour cannot exist
+without something coloured' or 'A colour cannot exist without some space
+that it covers' etc. - the difference leaps into view. 'Colour' is not a relative
+expression, whose meaning includes the idea of a relation to something else.
+
+20 On the theory of wholes and parts
+Though colour is 'unthinkable' without something coloured, the existence
+of the latter, and more definitely that of a space, is not 'analytically' founded
+on the notion of colour.
+The following discussion clears up the essence of the difference.
+A part as such cannot exist at all without a whole whose part it is. On the
+other hand we say, with an eye to independent parts: A part often can exist
+without a whole whose part it is. Obviously this involves no contradiction.
+What we mean is that, if the part is treated in respect of its internal content,
+its own essence, then a thing having this same content can exist without a
+whole in which it exists; it can exist by itself, not associated with anything
+else, and will not then be a part. Change in, or complete elimination of
+associations, does not here affect the part's own, peculiarly qualified content, and does not eliminate its existence: only its relations fall away, the
+fact that it is a part. The contrary holds of other sorts of parts: without any
+association, as non-parts, they are unthinkable, in virtue of their very content. These impossibilities or possibilities are rooted in the essential specificity
+of the contents. The case is quite different in regard to the analytic triviality
+that a part as such cannot exist without a whole whose part it is. It would be
+a 'contradiction', i.e. a 'formal', 'analytical' absurdity, to call X a part where
+there was no whole belonging to X. Here the inner content of the part is
+irrelevant, the underlying 'formal' lawfulness of our case has nothing in common with the material lawfulness of our above cases, and can accordingly
+not disturb them.
+That correlatives as such mutually condition one another certainly points
+to certain mutually requiring 'moments', it points to the mutually 'belongrelationships and relative properties which we find in the case of every
+relation. But it does so only with formal indefiniteness. The legality which
+here obtains is one and the same for all relations as such: it is in fact a
+merely formal legality, rooted in mere analytic essences, here in fact in the
+essence of relation as a formal category. It takes over none of the material
+specificity of relations and of their members, and discourses merely of 'certain' relations and members. It will perhaps say in the simple case of dyadic
+relations: If a certain A stands in a certain relation to a certain B, this same
+B stands in a certain corresponding (converse) relation to that A; A and B
+are here quite freely variable.
+§12 Basic determinations in regard to analytic and
+synthetic propositions
+We may give the following general definitions:
+Analytic Laws are unconditionally universal propositions, which are
+accordingly free from all explicit or implicit assertions of individual existence; they include none but formal concepts, and if we go back to such as
+are primitive, they contain only formal categories. Analytic Laws stand
+
+The difference between independent and non-independent objects 2l
+opposed to their specifications, which arise when we introduce concepts
+with content, and thoughts perhaps positing individual existence, e.g. this, the
+Kaiser. The specification of laws always yields necessary connections: specifications of analytic laws therefore yield analytically necessary connections.
+What are called 'analytic propositions' are in general analytically necessary
+connections. When they imply existential assertions (e.g. If this house is red
+then redness pertains to this house) such analytic necessity relates to that
+content of the proposition in virtue of which it empirically specifies the
+We may define analytically necessary propositions as propositions whose
+truth is completely independent of the peculiar content of their objects
+(whether thought of with definite or indefinite universality) and of any possible existential assertions. They are propositions which permit of a complete
+'formalization' and can be regarded as special cases or empirical applications
+of the formal, analytic laws whose validity appears in such formalization. In
+an analytic proposition it must be possible, without altering the proposition's logical form, to replace all material which has content, with an empty
+formal Something, and to eliminate every assertion of existence by giving all
+one's judgements the form of universal, unconditional laws.
+It is, e.g., an analytic proposition that the existence of this house includes
+that of its roof, its walls and its other parts. For the analytic formula holds
+that the existence of a whole W (A, B, C...) generally includes that of its
+parts A, B, C... This law contains no meaning which gives expression to a
+material Genus or Species. The assertion of individual existence, implied by
+the this of our illustration, is seen to fall away by our passage into the pure
+law. This is an analytic law: it is built up exclusively out of formal-logical
+categories and categorial forms.
+Having formed the concept of an analytic law and of an analytic necessity, we also have eo ipso formed the concept of a synthetic a priori law, and
+of a synthetic a priori necessity. Each pure law, which includes material
+concepts, so as not to permit of a formalization of these concepts salva
+veritate - each such law, i.e., that is not analytically necessary - is a synthetic
+a priori law. Specifications of such laws are synthetic necessities: empirical
+specifications of course are so also, e.g. This red is different from this green.
+What we have said should be enough to make plain the essential distinction between laws grounded in the specific nature of the contents to which
+non-independent factors belong, and analytic and formal laws, which, being
+founded purely on formal 'categories', are unaffected by all 'material of
+knowledge'.
+Note 1 The points here made may be compared with those of Kant, which
+in our view do not deserve to be called 'classical'. It seems to us that these
+points satisfactorily dispose of one of the most important problems in the
+theory of knowledge, and make a first, decisive step in the division of a
+priori ontologies. Future publications will carry the enquiry further.
+
+22 On the theory of wholes and parts
+Note 2 It is readily seen that the main concepts dealt with by us in this
+section: Whole and Part, Independence and Non-independence, Necessity and
+aw, are essentially changed in sense when they are not understood in th
+ense of purely conceptual matters of essence, but are given an empirica
+interpretation. For the purpose of the investigations which follow, it is not,
+however, necessary fully to discuss these empirical concepts and their relation to the pure ones.
+§13 Relative independence and non-independence
+Independence we have so far conceived absolutely, as a lack of dependence
+on all associated contents: non-independence was its contradictory opposite, a corresponding dependence on at least one such content. It is, however,
+important to treat both concepts relatively also, in such a way, that is, that
+the absolute distinction then becomes a limiting case of the relative. In the
+sphere of mere sense-data (not that of the things represented or apparent in
+such sense-data) the 'moment' of visual extent, with all its parts, counts as
+non-independent, but within this extent conceived in abstracto each of its
+pieces counts as relatively independent while each of its 'moments', e.g. the
+'moment' of 'form' as opposed to that of position and magnitude, counts as
+relatively non-independent. Here we therefore have a relative sort of 'independence, which taken absolutely, or in some other relation, could have
+been a case of non-independence, it is an independence, relatively to a whole,
+whose total range of parts, together with the whole itself, constitutes a
+sphere within which the distinctions previously drawn unrestrictedly now
+must move.! We can therefore define as follows:
+Non-independence in and relative to the whole W or to the total range
+of contents determined by W, characterizes each of W's partial contents
+which can only exist as parts, and as parts of a sort of whole represented in
+this range. Every partial content regarding which this is not true, is called
+independent in, and relative to, the whole W. We also speak briefly of nonindependent or dependent parts of the Whole, and in a corresponding sense
+of non-independent and independent parts of parts (i.e. of part-wholes) of the
+whole.
+Our determinations can plainly be further generalized. One can interpret
+our definition so that it does not merely relate a partial content to a more
+comprehensive whole, but, quite generally, a content to another content, even
+if both are separated off. We define accordingly:
+A content A is relatively non-independent in regard to a content B (or in
+regard to the total range of contents determined by B and all its parts), if a
+oure law, rooted in the peculiar character of the kinds of content in ques.
+ion, ensures that a content of the pure Genus A has an a priori incapacit
+to exist except in, or as associated with, other contents from the total ranges
+of the pure Genera of contents determined by B.
+
+The difference between independent and non-independent objects 23
+If such a law is absent, we say that A is relatively independent in regard to B.
+More simply we can say: A content A is non-independent relatively to
+a content B, if there is a law rooted in the Generic Essences A, B, which
+lays down a priori that a content of the pure Genus A can only exist in
+or associated with a content of the Genus B. We naturally leave open th
+ossibility that the Genera A and B should be Genera of combinations, s
+that in the elements of such combinations several corresponding Genera
+should be woven together. Our definition entails that an A as such, taker
+n unconditional universality, requires to be accompanied by, and unifie
+with some B or other: otherwise put, the pure Genus requires, in respect of
+shed sil exinenice of said from ali and ri, the may sly onto be
+being of an A is relatively independent or non-independent in regard to
+The necessary coexistence mentioned in our definition is either a coexistence relating to any point in time, or a coexistence for a certain stretch of
+time. In the latter case B is a temporal whole, and temporal determinations
+then play their part (as temporal relations or stretches) in the range of
+contents determined by B. A content K, e.g., which includes the timedetermination to, may thus require the existence of another content with the
+time-determination 4, = to + A, and accordingly be non-independent. In
+the sphere of the phenomenological events of the 'stream of consciousness,
+a law of essence paradigmatically illustrates the non-independence just
+mentioned, the law, namely, that each actual, fulfilled now-consciousness
+necessarily and continuously passes over into one that has just existed, so
+that our present conscious state makes continuous demands on our conscious
+future. The law further requires that our retentive awareness of what has
+just been, which itself has the immanent character of being actually present,
+demands that the phenomenon we are aware of as having just existed should
+in fact just have existed. The time we are talking of in this context is of
+course the immanent temporality which belongs to the phenomenological
+stream of consciousness itself.
+In the sense of our definition, to take somewhat differently slanted examples, each bit of our visual field, each concretely filled section of it, is
+independent within, and relatively to, the concrete totality of a visual intuition
+of a moment, whereas each colour of such a portion, the colour-pattern of the
+whole etc., is non-independent. And again in, and relatively to, the whole of
+the momentary sensuous total intuition, the visual field with its contents, the
+tactual field with its contents etc., are independent, whereas the qualities,
+forms etc., whether attaching to whole fields, or their individual member
+are non-independent. We observe at the same time that all that counted a
+non-independent or independent in relation to the whole of our previous
+example will count as such in relation to our present standard of reference.
+It is in fact generally true that:
+
+24 On the theory of wholes and parts
+Whatever is independent or non-independent in relation to a B, also maintains this property in relation to every whole B' in relation to which B is
+independent or non-independent - a proposition, whose converse is of course
+invalid. Although therefore, relations (and with them relative conceptions)
+vary as boundaries are differently drawn, nonetheless our law entails a
+certain relation for the groups of contents in the context referred to. Such
+a relation obtains, e.g., when we compare a coexistent group belonging to
+each point of time with successive groups which include such coexistent
+groups, or perhaps even with the inclusive group of unending, fully occupied
+phenomenological time. What counts as an independent element in the latter
+group is what is the more comprehensive element, and so not everything
+that counts as independent in the order of coexistence must for that reason
+count as independent in the order of succession. The converse holds, however.
+An independent thing in the order of coexistence, e.g. a bounded portion of
+the visual sense-field in its concrete fulness, is non-independent relatively
+to the whole of occupied time, to the extent that its time-determination is
+treated as a mere instant. Following on what we have said, an instant of
+time is as such non-independent: it can be concretely occupied only as part
+of the concrete occupation of a time-stretch or duration. If we replace the
+instant by a duration, in which our concrete content is thought of as remaining quite constant, then such an enduring coexistence could count as
+independent even in this wider sphere.
+
+Thoughts towards a theory of the
+pure forms of wholes and parts
+§14 The concept of foundation and some relevant
+theorems
+Definitions. If a law of essence means that an A cannot as such exist
+except in a more comprehensive unity which connects it with an M, we say
+that an A as such requires foundation by an M or also that an A as such needs
+to be supplemented by an M. If accordingly Ao, Mo are determinate instances
+of the pure kinds A or M, actualized in a single whole, and standing in the
+relations mentioned, we say that Ao is founded upon Mo, and that it is
+exclusively founded on Mo, if Ao's need for supplementation is satisfied by
+Mo alone. This terminology can of course be carried over to the Species, by
+a quite harmless equivocation. We say further, more indefinitely, that the
+two contents or two pure Species, stand in a foundational relationship or in a
+relationship of necessary connection. This indeed leaves it open which of the
+two possible but not mutually exclusive relationships is meant. The indefinite expression: Ao requires supplementation by, is founded upon a certain
+moment, plainly means the same as the expression: "Ao is non-independent'.
+Proposition 1 If an A as such requires to be founded on an M, every whole
+having an A, but not an M, as a part, requires a similar foundation.
+This proposition is axiomatically self-evident. If an A cannot be except when
+completed by M, a whole including an A but no M cannot satisfy A's need
+for supplementation and must itself share it.
+
+26 On the theory of wholes and parts
+As a corollary we can assert the following, making use of the definition of
+our previous section.
+Proposition 2 A whole which includes a non-independent 'moment, without
+including, as its part, the supplement which that 'moment' demands, is likewise
+non-independent, and is so relatively to every superordinate independent whole
+in which that non-independent 'moment' is contained.
+Proposition 3 If W is an independent part of (and so' also relatively to) F
+then every independent part w of W also is an independent part of F.
+If w needed a supplement M relatively to F, and so had a foundation Mo
+in the range of F, this foundation would necessarily be included in W. For,
+if this were not so, W would require supplementation in respect of Min
+conformity with Prop. 1, and since Mo is a part of F, it would, on Prop. 2,
+be non-independent relatively to F, which contradicts the assumption. But
+in accordance with this assumption, w is an independent part of W, and so
+also independent relatively to W: there can therefore be nothing in the range
+of W which could serve as a foundation for w, and so also nothing in the
+whole range of F.
+The proposition before us can also, with suitable changes in symbolization, be expressed as follows:
+If A is an independent part of B, and B an independent part of C, A is also
+an independent part of C or more briefly: An independent part of an independent part is an independent part of a whole.
+Proposition 4 If C is a non-independent part of a whole W, it is also a nonindependent part of every other whole of which W is a part.
+C is non-independent relatively to W, i.e. it possesses a foundation in an
+Mo belonging to the range of W. This M, must naturally also appear in the
+range of every whole superordinate to W, i.e. every whole which includes W
+as a part. C must therefore also be non-independent relatively to each such
+whole. (On the other hand, we add, C may very well be independent relatively to a subordinate whole: we need only so draw its boundaries that
+the required supplement M is excluded therefrom. A 'piece' of an extended
+phenomenon in abstracto, but taken as a 'moment, is independent relatively
+to such extension; this, however, itself lacks independence relatively to the
+concrete wholes of the occupied extension.)
+Our proposition permits an expression analogous to the previous one, i.e.
+if A is a non-independent part of B, and B a non-independent part of C,
+then A too is a non-independent part of C.
+A non-independent part of a non-independent part is a non-independent
+part of a whole.
+
+Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts 27
+Proposition 5 A relatively non-independent object also is absolutely nonindependent, whereas a relatively independent object may be non-independent
+in an absolute sense.
+For a proof see the previous section.
+Proposition 6 If A and B are independent parts of some whole W, they are also
+independent relatively to one another. For i A required supplementation by
+B, or any part of B, there would be, in the range of parts determined by W,
+certain parts (those of B) in which A would be founded. A would therefore not
+be independent relatively to its whole W.
+§15 Transition to the treatment of the more
+important part-relations
+We shall now deal with some of the most remarkable differences among the
+in its whole in the same fashion, and not every part is woven together with
+every other, in the unity of a whole, in the same way. In comparing the
+relations among the parts of different wholes, or even among the parts of
+one and the same whole, we come upon striking differences, on which our
+common talk of different sorts of wholes and parts is founded. A hand, e.g.,
+forms part of a person in quite a different way from the colour of his hand,
+from his body's total extent, from his mental acts, and from the internal
+'moments' of such phenomena. The parts of the extension are otherwise
+united with each other than they each are united with their colours etc. We
+shall see at once that all these differences belong to the sphere of our present
+investigations.
+§16 Reciprocal and one-sided, mediate and
+immediate foundation
+If we consider any pair of parts of a whole, the following possibilities obtain:
+1. There is a relation of foundedness between both parts.
+2. There is no such relation. In case 1 the foundedness can be:
+(a) reciprocal
+(b) one-sided, according as the law in question is convertible or not. Colou
+and extension accordingly are mutually founded in a unified intuition, sinc
+no colour is thinkable without a certain extension, and no extension without
+a certain colour. The character of being a judgement is, on the other hand,
+one-sidedly founded on underlying presentations, since these latter need not
+
+28 On the theory of wholes and parts
+function as foundations of judgements. Brentano's distinctions of parts mutually isolable, and parts having one-sided isolability, agrees in extension,
+though not in definition, with the notion before us. Brentano's additional
+talk of 'mutual isolability' rules out every sort of foundational relation.
+There is some interest in asking how matters here stand in regard to the
+relative independence or non-independence of the parts, relatively, of course,
+to the whole in which they are considered. If there is a reciprocal relation
+of foundedness among two parts, their relative lack of independence is unquestionable, as is the case, e.g., in the unity of Quality and Place. The case
+differs when the relation is one-sided: in that case the foundational (though
+naturally not the founded) content can be independent. Thus in every extension the shape of a portion is founded on the portion in question: something
+non-independent relatively to the whole extension is accordingly founded on
+something which is independent in relation to this whole.
+The foundation of one part in another can further be:
+(a) an immediate foundation or
+(b) a mediate foundation, according as the two parts are immediately or
+mediately associated. This relationship, like the previous one, is naturally
+not bound to the individually present "moments', but concerns the essential
+being of the foundational relationship. If Ao is immediately founded on Bo,
+but mediately on Co (in so far as Bo is immediately founded on Co), it holds
+universally and purely in virtue of essence that an A is in general immediately founded on a B, and mediately upon a C. This results from the fact
+that if an A and a B are associated at all, they are so immediately, and again
+that, if an A and a Care associated, they are only mediately associated. The
+order of mediacy and immediacy is based by law on the pure Genera involved
+The generic 'moment' of Colour, for instance, and in quite different fashion
+the 'moment' of Brightness, can only be realized in and with a 'moment' of
+lowest difference such as Red, Blue etc., and the latter again only in combination with a certain definite extension. These associations and foundations,
+which are always immediate, condition the mediate associations and founda-
+Ions between the moment of Colour or Brightness and that of Determinat
+Extension. Plainly the laws of combination which concern such mediat
+foundations, are analytic, indeed syllogistic consequences of those which
+pertain to the immediate foundations.
+§17 Exact determination of the concepts of piece
+(portion), moment, physical part, abstractum,
+concretum
+We may now also reduce a further series of familiar, fundamental concepts
+to the above defined concepts, and so give them an exact definition. Some
+of these terms may, we note in advance, be open to objection; the concepts
+correlated with them in what follows are nonetheless very valuable.
+
+Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts 29
+We first perform a fundamental division of the concept Part into Pieces,
+or Parts in the narrowest sense, and into Moments or Abstract Parts of the
+Whole. Each part that is independent relatively to a whole W we call a Piece
+(Portion), each part that is non-independent relatively to W we call a Moment
+(an abstract part) of this same whole W. It makes no difference here whether
+the whole itself, considered absolutely, or in relation to a higher whole, is
+independent or not. Abstract parts can in their turn accordingly have pieces,
+and pieces in their turn abstract parts. We speak of the portions of a duration, although this is something abstract, just as we speak of the portions of
+an extension. The forms of these portions are their immanent, abstract parts.
+Pieces that have no piece identically in common are called exclusive
+(disjoined) pieces. The division of a whole into a plurality of mutually exclusive pieces we call a piecing or fragmentation (Zerstückung) of the same. Two
+such pieces may still have a common identical 'moment': their common
+boundary, e.g., is an identical 'moment' of the adjoining pieces of a divided
+continuum. Pieces are said to be isolated when they are disjoined in the strict
+sense, when they therefore also have no identical 'moments'.
+Since an abstract part also is abstract in relation to each more compre
+nensive whole and, in general, to any range of objects embracing this whole,
+what is abstract, relatively considered, is eo ipso abstract when considered
+absolutely. The latter can be defined as the limiting case of relative treatment, where the relation is determined by the total range of objects in
+general. We therefore needed no preliminary definition of the abstract or
+non-independent in the absolute sense. An abstractum simpliciter is therefore an object, in relation to which there is some whole of which it is a nonindependent part.
+When a whole permits the sort of 'piecing' in which the pieces essentially
+belong to the same lowest Genus as is determined by the undivided whole,
+we speak of it as an extended whole, and of its pieces as extended parts. Here
+belongs, e.g., the division of an extent into extents, in particular of a spatial
+stretch into spatial stretches, of a temporal stretch into temporal stretches etc.
+We may here further add the following definition:
+An object in relation to its abstract 'moments' is called a 'relative concretum',
+and in relation to its proximate 'moments', their 'proximate concretum'.
+(The difference here presupposed between remoter and nearer 'moments'
+will be more precisely pinned down in the following sections.) A concretum
+that itself is abstract in no direction can be called an 'absolute concretum'.
+Since the proposition holds that each absolutely independent content possesses abstract parts, each such content can also be looked on and spoken
+of as an absolute concretum. The two notions are thus of equal extent. For
+a similar reason one can also speak of a piece as a concrete part, whose
+concreteness is either to be understood as absolute or relative, according as
+the whole itself only has abstract parts, or is itself abstract. Where the word
+'concretum' is used simply, an absolute concretum is usually intended.
+
+30 On the theory of wholes and parts
+§18 The difference between the mediate and
+immediate parts of a whole
+The distinction between pieces and abstract parts is intimately connected
+with the distinction between mediate and immediate parts, or, more clearly,
+the distinction between proximate and remote parts. For talk of immediacy
+and mediacy can be understood in two ways. We shall first discuss the most
+natural sense of such talk.
+If P(W) is a part of the whole W, then a part of this part, e.g. P (P(W)),
+s again a part of the whole, but a mediate part. P(W) may then be called
+relatively immediate part of the whole. The distinction is a relative one, sinc
+P(W) may itself again be a mediate part, in relation to another part of the
+whole in which it is contained as a part. The relative distinction is transformed into an absolute one, if we understand by absolutely mediate parts
+such parts as themselves enter into other parts in the whole, whereas absolutely immediate parts will be such as may enter as parts into any part of the
+same whole. Every geometrical part of an extension is in this absolute sense
+mediate, for there are always other geometric parts that include it. It is
+harder to adduce suitable examples of absolutely immediate parts. Perhaps
+the following might do: if we emphasize in a visual intuition the unified
+combination formed by all such internal 'moments' as remain identical
+despite all change of place, we have a part of the whole that can have no
+superordinate part above it. The same would hold of the totality of their
+mere extension in regard to the geometric bodies congruent with them in all
+except position. If we limit our distinction to parts of one and the same sort.
+then the 'moment' of total coloration is an absolutely immediate part, since
+there is no like moment of the whole, of which such coloration could be
+reckoned a part. As opposed to this, the coloration of a piece of the whole
+can be treated as mediate, in so far as it contributes to the total coloration
+of the whole. The same holds, in relation to the Species Extension, of the
+total extension of an extended thing: this is an absolutely immediate part of
+that thing, whereas a portion of that extension is an absolutely mediate part
+of that thing.
+§19 A novel sense of this distinction: nearer and
+more remote parts of the whole
+Our talk of immediate and mediate parts acquires quite a different content
+if we attend to certain remarkable differences that force themselves on u
+vhen we compare the relations between wholes and mediate parts. If w
+think of an extensive whole as "pieced together, its pieces in their turn
+permit of further "piecings', the pieces of the pieces in their turn etc. Here
+the parts of the parts are parts of the whole in exactly the same sense as the
+original parts were. We do not merely observe this likeness in respect of
+
+Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts 3l
+the sort of partial relation which condition talk of 'the same sort of parts' in
+regard to the whole - the pieces of the pieces are in their turn pieces of the
+- but we also observe a likeness of such relations between the whole
+and its mediate parts, on the one hand, and its relatively immediate parts
+on the other. There are diverse possible divisions in which the same part
+genuinely have the parts distinguished in them, which are therefore mediate
+parts in relation to the whole, and the same is true of each stage of the serial
+division. But in themselves the remotest of these parts are no further from
+the whole than the nearest. The parts in any case also owe their serial order
+to the serial order of our divisions, and these latter have no objective foundation. In an extended whole there is no division which is intrinsically primary,
+and no definitely delimited group of divisions forming the first grade in
+division; from a given division there is also no progress determined by the
+thing's nature to a new division or grade in division. We could begin with
+each division without violating an intrinsic prerogative. Each mediate part
+can, according to one's chosen mode of division, likewise count as an immediate part, each immediate part as a mediate one.
+inified tone-sequence, e.g. a melody,
+Thed case is quite dierent if vod bring in olin wain te. And individaly
+tones as parts. Each of these tones has further parts, a 'moment' of quality,
+of intensity etc., which as parts of parts are also parts of the melody. But it
+is clear in this case that the mediacy with which the qualitative 'moment' of
+the individual tone enters the whole, cannot be attributed to our subjective
+series of divisions or to any other subjective ground. It is no doubt certain
+that if the individual tone's moment of quality is to be singly noticed, the
+tone itself must be 'stressed'. To single out the mediate part presupposes the
+singling out of the immediate one. But this phenomenological relationship
+must not be confused with the objective situation we are here concerned
+with. It is evident that the quality in itself only forms part of the melody in
+so far as it forms part of the single tone: it belongs immediately to the latter,
+and only mediately to the total tone-pattern. This mediacy is not therefore
+bound up with some arbitrary, or some psychologically compulsive preference for a certain order of division which first makes us hit on the tone, and
+then on its 'moment' of quality: the tone in itself is a prior part in the whole
+melody, and its quality a later, mediate part. The same holds of the tone's
+intensity: it would here seem even to take us a step further from the melodic
+whole, being as it were no immediate 'moment' of the tone, but one more
+
+32 On the theory of wholes and parts
+directly of its quality, and so a secondary part in relation to this melody (no
+doubt a somewhat objectionable conception, which requires closer scrutiny). If we are right in holding that there is a part of the quality, e.g. the
+pitch C, of the tone in question, which represents its generic moment, what
+do the moment of elit or sap that shes in
+extended part of what is visually intuited as such, is primarily attached to
+this part, only secondarily to the intuited whole. It is even more mediately
+latea to the whole voluminousness ot the patterned extension, the ma!
+itude that it primarily possesses. (We can of course not talk of a genuir
+quantitative pinning down in the sphere of mere data of intuition as such.)
+After these discussions, the novel and important sense of the distinction
+between mediate and immediate parts should be clear. The difference is,
+however, not merely relative: in every whole there are parts which belong
+directly to the whole, and not first to one of its parts. It is definite for the
+single part whether it is mediate or not in our sense, and, if it is mediate,
+whether it is so primarily, secondarily or more remotely. To make a terminological distinction one could here speak of nearer and remoter parts, or to fix
+of primary scar,. pans or era, the teas
+mediate and immediate part we retain in the more general sense applicable to
+any parts. Secondary parts are primary parts of primary parts, tertiary parts,
+primary parts of secondary parts etc. The notions comprised in this series
+are obviously mutually exclusive.
+Primary parts may be, and in general also will be, absolutely mediate. But
+there are also primary parts that are absolutely immediate, i.e. that are not
+included as parts in any part of their whole. Each portion of an extension is
+primarily contained in it, although it can always be regarded as a mediate
+part of the same extension. Objectively there are always parts whose part it
+is. As against this, the form of an extension is not included as a part in any
+of that extension's parts.
+§20 Nearer and remoter parts relatively to
+one another
+the terms and, in the latter case, draw further distinctions. Some parts, we
+ay, are closer to one another, other parts further. Here the following rela
+ions are relevant. It often happens that a mode of association peculiarl
+which, further, B and not A is associated in just this manner with C. In this
+
+Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts 33
+situation A is also associated with C, in virtue, that is, of a complex form of
+chieved in the form ABC, is mediate. If there are further peculiar assoc
+tions CD, DE etc., we shall say that A is associated with their final tern
+still more remote than D etc. We have obviously only characterized a simple
+special case. Each symbol A, B, C.
+special aty, a syre gro 1p of Cited memers in tid was cosplee
+the members of the different groups appear in relations of nearer or remoter
+connection.
+As to whether other associations, and in particular other direct associations, subsist among the mediately associated members - and association
+erhaps of the same kind as those among the immediately associate
+members - we have so far said nothing. We are considering the members
+exclusively in respect of the forms of the complex relationships determined
+by their elementary associations. Naturally the treatment of these forms will
+be of particular significance in that special class of cases, so frequently dealt
+the relations of points in a straight line. If we select any series of points from
+associated members belong, with the associations of immediately neighbouring points, to one and the same lowest Genus of associations: they are
+further only different in respect of their lowest specific difference, whereas
+this difference itself is unambiguously determined by the differences of the
+varied mediating associations. This holds of time-sequences, of spatial configurations, in short of every case where associations can be characterized by
+directed stretches of one and the same Genus. In every case, to put it briefly,
+stretches are addible. But in our quite formal treatment we can pass all such
+matters by.
+The essence of the matter can be conceptually laid out in the following
+fashion. Two associations form a concatenation, when they have some but
+not all members in common (i.e. do not coincide as when, e.g., the same
+members are united by several associations). Each concatenation is on this
+showing a complex association. Associations now divide into those which
+include concatenations and those which do not: associations of the former
+are combinations of associations of the latter sort. The members of an
+association that is free from concatenations are said to be immediately associated or proximate. In every concatenation, and therefore in every whole
+containing concatenations, there must be immediately associated members,
+which belong to associations of parts which include no further concatenations.
+All other members of such a whole are said to be mediately associated with
+one another. The member common to a simple concatenation ABC (simple
+
+34 On the theory of wholes and parts
+because it contains no concatenation as a part) is, in the sense of our rulings, immediately associated with its neighbours, while these are mediately
+associated with one another etc. Talk of nearer and remoter parts alway
+relates to concatenations. The concepts next neighbour (=immediately asso
+ciated member), next-neighbour of a next-neighbour etc., yield, by an easily
+determined formal completion, the requisite gradations of 'distance', and
+are then no different from ordinal numbers: first, second etc. The completion
+naturally tries to make these concepts unambiguous by fixing a 'direction of
+progress', e.g. by bringing in the asymmetry of a class of relations, in consequence of which we form conceptual structures like 'right next-neighbour
+of A' (first man right of A), 'right next-neighbour of right next-neighbour
+of A' ('second man right of A') etc. The essential purposes of the present
+investigation do not require us to go more deeply into this not intrinsically
+trivial point.
+§21 Exact pinning down of the pregnant notions
+of whole and part, and of their essential species,
+by means of the notion of foundation
+Our interest in the foregoing treatments was directed to the most general
+relations of essence between wholes and parts, or between parts among one
+another (i.e. of contents that combine into a whole). In our definitions and
+descriptions on these matters the notion of Whole was presupposed. It is
+however possible to dispense with this notion in all cases: for it can be substituted the simple coexistence of the contents that were denominated parts.
+One could, e.g., define as follows:
+A content of the species A is founded upon a content of the species B, if an
+A can by its essence (i.e. legally, in virtue of its specific nature) not exist,
+unless a B also exists: this leaves open whether the coexistence of a C, a D
+etc. is needed or not.
+One can proceed similarly with the other definitions. If all is taken thus
+generally, one could then give the following noteworthy definition of the
+pregnant concept of Whole by way of the notion of Foundation:
+By a Whole we understand a range of contents which are all covered by a
+single foundation without the help of further contents. The contents of such
+a range we call its parts. Talk of the singleness of the foundation implies that
+every content is foundationally connected, whether directly or indirectly, with
+every content. This can happen in that all these contents are immediately or
+mediately founded on each other without external assistance, or in that all
+together serve to found a new content, again without external assistance. In
+the latter case the possibility remains open that this unitary content is built
+up out of partial contents, which in their turn are founded on partial groups
+from the presupposed range of contents, just as the Whole content is founded
+on its total range. Intermediate cases are finally also possible, where the
+
+Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts 35
+unity of foundation is so formed, e.g., that A founds a new content together
+with B, B one together with C, C one together with D etc. In such cases the
+formation of new unities is in short concatenated.
+The same whole can be interpenetrative in relation to certain parts, and
+combinatory in relation to others: the sensuous, phenomenal thing, the
+intuitively given spatial shape clothed with sensuous quality, is (just as it
+appears) interpenetrative in respect of reciprocally founded 'moments' such
+as colour and extension, and combinatory in respect of its 'pieces.
+822 Forms of sensuous unity and wholes
+Before we go further, it is well to indicate expressly that, in harmony with our
+definition, there need not be a peculiar form for every whole, in the sense of a
+specific 'moment' of unity which binds all the parts. If unity arises, e.g., by
+concatenation, so that each pair of next members founds a new content, the
+demands of our definition are satisfied, without the presence of a peculiar
+moment (i.e. one of unity) founded on all parts together. That such a moent must always be presumed can scarcely be maintained a priori. On or
+oncept of a whole, it is not even requisite that the parts should be assoc
+ated in groups or pairs by peculiar 'moments' of unity. Only if the whole is
+an extended whole, and in general one that can be broken down into "pieces',
+are such moments obvious and indispensable a priori.
+It might, however, seem odd that we make do with this definition, and
+can even dare to think that all wholes, with the sole exception of these which
+break up into 'pieces', lack binding forms of unity. It is odd to hold that the
+unity, e.g., of extension and colour, of tone-quality and tone-intensity, or
+between the sensational stuff of our percept of a thing and the peculiar
+phenomenological 'moments' brought to it by our perceptual consciousness,
+and all other similar unities, rest merely on one-sided or two-sided relations
+of foundation, without the added foundation, by way of such coexistence,
+of a peculiar form-content or 'moment' of unity. It is nonetheless obvious
+that wherever associative forms can really be demonstrated as peculiar moments in intuition, the things associated are relatively independent parts,
+parts such as tones in the unity of a melody, colours picked out piecemeal in
+
+36 On the theory of wholes and parts
+the unity of a colour-pattern, or partial shapes taken from the unity of a
+phenomenon for special form-contents in addition to those which unify its
+such as colour and extension, or which will bring together colour-tone and
+brightness in the former, and the 'moments'
+of form and size in the latter.
+We are of course far from wishing to turn the undiscovered into the nonexistent without more ado. But it is in any case most important to discuss
+the possibility of there being sensuous unities without abstractible sensuous
+form, and if this proves feasible, to clarify the notion.
+It may at first seem extraordinary in this respect that mere necessities of
+coexistence, demands for supplementation, consisting in no more than the
+fact that the existence of certain sorts of contents conditions the mere coexistence of contents of certain coordinated sorts, that requirements of this
+kind, I say, should serve to produce unity. One at once objects: could contents in such a situation be side by side in complete isolation, dependent on
+each other for their existence and yet entirely uncombined, without their
+'foundation' amounting to a connected unity in the manner here supposed?
+Our answer is plain. Talk of separation implies a thought of the relative
+independence of the separated, which is just what we have excluded. The
+picture of side-by-side existence is revealing: it plainly presupposes relatively
+independent contents, which, since they are such, can serve to found this
+sensuous form of side-by-side existence. What recommends such an unsuitable picture - unsuitable since it tries to illustrate sensuous formlessness by
+a case of sensuous form - is the mutual indifference of the contents merely
+given together in space. The thought insinuates itself: where there is not
+even the loosest, but simply no unifying form, contents could really not have
+anything to do with each other: they could never therefore come together but
+would remain eternally isolated. Is it not absurd to want to bind contents
+together without any bond? This is no doubt quite right for the contents the
+image presupposes, but the contents of which we speak have plenty to do
+with each other, they are in fact "founded' on one another, and for this
+reason they require no chains and bonds to chain or knit them together, or
+to bring them to one another. In their case all these expressions have in fact
+no sense at all. Where it makes nonsense to speak of isolation, the problem
+of overcoming such isolation is likewise nonsensical.
+This conception is naturally not limited in its application to the sphere of
+the intuitive objects (phenomenological contents in particular) which served
+as our illustrations, but applies to the sphere of objects in general. The only
+true unifying factors, we may roundly say, are relations of 'foundation'. The
+unity even of independent objects is in consequence brought about by
+"foundation'. Since they are not, as independent objects, 'founded' on one
+another, it remains their lot to "found' new contents themselves, and to
+'found' them together; it is only in virtue of this situation that these latter
+
+Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts 37
+are thought of as unifying contents in respect of their 'founding' members.
+But the contents 'founded' on one another (whether one-sidedly or reciprocally) likewise have unity, and a much more intimate unity since less
+mediated unity. Such 'intimacy' consists simply in the fact that unity is here
+not engendered by a novel content, which again only engenders unity since it
+is 'founded' on many members separate in themselves. If one calls such a
+content 'unity', then unity is indeed a 'real predicate, a "positive' 'real
+content, and other wholes have, in this sense, no unity, and we shall not
+even be able to say that their own moment of unity is unified with each of
+the united members. If we refuse however to adopt such a wrong-headed
+terminology, which necessitates double-talk in practice, we shall speak of
+unities and wholes wherever we have a unitary foundation. We shall be
+entitled to say of each range of contents united in this manner that it has
+unity, though the predicate thus attributed to it is no 'real' one, though
+there is no constituent called 'unity anywhere in our whole which can be
+prised out. Unity is in fact a categorial predicate.
+One should also take into account the by no means small theoretical
+advantage which our notion promises as removing a long-known and
+troublesome difficulty in the theory of wholes. This concerns the endlessly
+complicated part-relations which seem required by the endlessly complicated
+"moments' of unity in every whole. The view against which our objections
+are directed is based on the apparently plain truth that, wherever two contents form a real unity, there must be a peculiar part, a 'moment of unity,
+that binds them together. If then U is the moment of unity of A and B, there
+must be a new 'moment' of unity U,, for A and U (since these two are
+unified) and again a new Uz, for B and U; and just so new 'moments' Ul and
+Uz, for U and U,, and for U and U, respectively, and so on in infinitum. If
+no distinction is drawn between associations and relations, between differences of 'sense-material' and 'categorial form', and if one then takes the
+boundlessly varied conceptual differences that are possible a priori, and
+which ideal principles allow one to complicate indefinitely, and puts all such
+differences into objects as their real moments, one gets the analyses which
+Twardowski has offered us in his 'psychological' researches, and which are
+as subtle as they are queer.
+Our conception avoids these endless regresses of parts which are always
+splitting into further series. Nothing really exists - in the sense of being a
+possible object of sense-perception - beyond the aggregate of a whole's
+'pieces', together with the sensuous forms of unity, which rest on these
+pieces conjointly. Unity is conferred on the 'moments' in the 'pieces', as also
+on the 'moments' of unity and the 'pieces', by the foundational relations in
+the sense of our definition.
+The notion of the moments of unity, which we still distinguish from that of
+the 'form' which gives unity to a whole, has, lastly, been defined above in
+passing. Expressly put, we mean by it a content founded on a plurality of
+
+38 On the theory of wholes and parts
+contents, and on all of them together, and not on some of them simply. (All
+this naturally presupposes our notion of foundation.) If we keep within the
+phenomenal sphere, this content may as readily belong to outer as to inner
+sense, according to the nature of its foundational contents.
+Note. 'Moments' of unity, like all other abstract contents, fall into pure
+Genera and Species? The Genus Spatial Figure differentiates itself into
+Figure, in the sense in which we speak of the 'same' triangle however mucl
+ve may shift or turn it. Such examples make clear that the Genus of 'Mo
+nents of unity is determined by the Genus of the contents which found them
+ind that the lowest difference of the former is unambiguously determine
+by the lowest difference of the latter. One notes, further, that 'moments of
+third... level, according as the form is immediately 'founded' upon absolute contents, or on forms of the first level, or on forms founded on forms of
+the first level, and so on. One sees further that the form-contents of higher
+level necessarily form a whole with the whole descending series of forms
+of lower level, and in such combination always represent complex forms
+relatively to the ultimately foundational elements. In the sphere of complex
+sensuous shapes, particularly visual and auditory ones, this can be readily
+illustrated, whereas the general fact can be seen a priori from concepts.
+§23 Forms of categorial unity and wholes
+In the sense in which we are here trying to pin down the notion of a whole,
+a mere aggregate or mere coexistence of any contents is not to be called a
+whole, as little as a likeness (the being of the same sort) or a difference (the
+being of another sort, or, in another sense, the not being identical are wholes.
+'Aggregate' is an expression for a categorial unity corresponding to the mere
+form of thought, it stands for the correlate of a certain unity of reference
+relating to all relevant objects. The objects themselves, being only held together in thought, do not succeed in founding a new content, whether taken
+as a group or together; no material form of association develops among
+them through this unity of intuition, they are possibly 'quite disconnected
+and intrinsically unrelated. This is shown in the fact that the form of the
+aggregate is quite indifferent to its matter, i.e. it can persist in spite of
+wholly arbitrary variation in its comprised contents. A 'founded' content,
+lowever, depends on the specific 'nature' of its 'founding' contents: there i
+I pure law which renders the Genus of the 'founded' content dependent o1
+the definitely indicated Genera of the 'founding' contents. A whole in the
+full and proper sense is, in general, a combination determined by the lowest
+Genera of the parts. A law corresponds to each material unity. There are
+different sorts of whole corresponding to these different laws, or, otherwise
+put, to the different sorts of contents that are to serve as parts. We cannot at
+
+Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts 39
+will make the same content at one time part of one sort of whole, at another
+governed by laws which in our sense are a priori laws or 'laws of essence'
+This is a fundamental insight whose meaning must be respected in all our
+tion for a systematic theory of the relations of wholes and parts as regards
+their pure forms, the categorially definable types which abstract from the
+'sensuous' material of such wholes.
+Before we pursue these thoughts, we must remove a further difficulty. The
+form of an aggregate is a purely categorial form, in opposition to which
+the form of a whole, of a unity due to foundation, appeared to be a material
+form. But did we not say in the previous section that unity (and we were
+talking specifically of a unity based on foundation) was a categorial predicate? Here we must note that, on our doctrine, the Idea of unity or the Idea
+of a whole is based on the idea of 'Founding', and the latter Idea upon the
+Idea of a Pure Law; the Form of a Law is further as such categorial - a law
+is not thinglike, not therefore perceptible - and that to this extent the notion
+of a Founded Whole is a categorial notion. But the content of the law
+governing each such whole is determined by the material specificity of the
+'founding' contents and consequently of the 'founded' types of content, and
+it is this law, definite in its content, which gives the whole its unity. For this
+reason we rightly call each ideally possible specification of the Idea of such
+unity a material or also a real (reale) unity.
+According to our previous assertions,' the laws constitutive of the various
+sorts of whole are synthetically a priori, as opposed to laws which are anaytically a priori, such as those governing pure categorial forms, e.g. th
+'orm-Idea of a whole as such, and all merely formal specifications of thi
+Idea. We prefer to dwell in what follows, on such formal specifications.
+24 The pure formal types of wholes and parts
+The postulate of an a briori theor
+The pure forms of wholes and parts are determined by the pure forms of law.
+Only what is formally universal in the foundational relation, as expressed in
+our definition, is then relevant, together with the a priori combinations that
+it permits. We rise, in the case of any type of whole, to its pure form, its
+categorial type, by abstracting from the specificity of the sorts of content in
+question. More clearly expressed, this formalizing abstraction is something
+quite different from what is usually aimed at under the title of 'abstraction:
+it is a quite different performance from the one which sets in relief the
+universal Redness in a concrete visual datum, or the generic 'moment' of
+Colour in the Redness previously abstracted. In formalization we replace
+
+40 On the theory of wholes and parts
+the names standing for the sort of content in question by indefinite expressions such as a certain sort of content, a certain other sort of content etc. At
+the same time, on the semantic side, corresponding substitutions of purely
+categorial for material thoughts take place."°
+The distinctions between abstract parts and 'pieces' are purely formal,
+being in this sense drawn in purely categorial fashion, as can be seen at once
+from our pronouncements above. These pronouncements had however to be
+suitably interpreted in accordance with our present leaning towards final
+formalization: the pure concept of the whole, in the sense of our last definition, had to be made their basis. The distinction likewise between nearer and
+remoter parts that we merely explained, in descriptive fashion, by means of
+illustrations, can now be reduced to the mere form of certain foundational
+relations, and so formalized.
+In our examples we saw above that, in the case of many intuitive wholes,
+a graded series of fragmentations of such wholes always results in fragments
+of these wholes themselves, fragments all equally close to the whole, and
+which could with equal justice count as results of a first fragmentation. The
+sequence of the 'piecings' was in these instances not prescribed by the essence of the wholes. What is here relevant is first the proposition that pieces
+of pieces of a whole are themselves pieces of the whole - a proposition that we
+formally proved above!? (in different words). But we were there dealing with
+"pieces, for which the sequence of fragmentations was meaningless, since it
+corresponded to no graded series of 'foundations'. All pieces always stood to
+the whole in the same relation of 'foundation'. There were no differences in
+the form of the relation to the whole, all parts were 'contained in the whole'
+in the same fashion. The matter would be quite different were we to fragment aesthetic unities, e.g. a star-shape built out of star-shapes, which in
+their turn are composed of stretches and ultimately of points. The points
+serve to "found' stretches, the stretches serve to found", as new aesthetic
+unities, the individual stars, and these in their turn serve to 'found' the starpattern, as the highest unity in the given case. The points, stretches, stars
+and the final star-pattern are not now coordinated as are partial stretches in
+a stretch. There is, in their case, a fixed order of 'foundations', in which
+what is founded at one level serves to 'found' the level next above, and in
+such a manner that at each level new forms, only reachable at that level, are
+involved. We may here add the universal proposition:
+'Pieces' are essentially mediate or remote parts of a whole whose 'pieces'
+they are, if combinatory forms unite them with other 'pieces' into wholes which
+in their turn constitute wholes of higher order by way of novel forms.
+The difference between the parts nearer or further in regard to the whole
+has accordingly its essential ground in the formally expressible diversity of
+foundational relations.
+The case is similar in regard to non-independent 'moments', if we take
+account of the essential formal distinction between such 'moments' as can
+
+Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts 4l
+only satisfy their need for supplementation in the complete whole, and such
+as can satisfy this need in pieces of this whole. This makes a difference to
+the mode of belonging, to the form of foundation: by it certain parts, e.g.
+the total extent of the intuited thing, belong exclusively to the thing as a
+whole, while other parts, e.g. the extent of a piece', belong specifically to
+this 'piece', and only more remotely to the whole. This mediacy is no longer
+inessential, as is that of second-level 'pieces' in the division of a stretch, but
+is an essential mediacy, to be characterized in terms of the formal nature of
+the relationship. Obviously similar reasons place 'pieces' of non-independent
+'moments' which pertain directly to the whole, further from the whole than the
+'moments' are: this at least is the case if the rule holds that we found valid in
+the field of intuition, that such 'pieces' can have their immediate foundation
+only in a 'piece' of the whole. The wider proposition also can be formally
+expressed: Abstract parts are further from the whole, are in essence mediate
+parts, if their need for supplement is satisfied in the sphere of a mere part. This
+part can then well either be a 'piece' of the whole, or be in need of further
+completion. The mediacy in the latter case consists in the fact that the law of
+supplementation in which the form of foundation resides, points, in the case
+of the originally mentioned abstract part, to a whole which, in virtue of
+a new law of supplementation is, and must be, a part of a more comprehensive whole, i.e. of the complete whole, which accordingly only includes
+the first part mediately. This permits us also to say that abstract parts of the
+whole that are not abstract parts of its 'pieces', are nearer to the whole than
+the abstract parts of the 'pieces'.
+These thoughts can only be meant, and are only meant, to count as mere
+indications of a future treatment of the theory of Wholes and Parts. A
+proper working out of the pure theory we here have in mind, would have to
+define all concepts with mathematical exactness and to deduce all theorems
+by argumenta in forma, ie. mathematically. Thus would arise a complete
+law-determined survey of the a priori possibilities of complexity in the form
+of wholes and parts, and an exact knowledge of the relations possible in this
+sphere. That this end can be achieved, has been shown by the small beginnings of purely formal treatment in our present chapter. In any case the
+progress from vaguely formed, to mathematically exact, concepts and
+theories is, here as everywhere, the precondition for full insight into a priori
+connections and an inescapable demand of science.
+25 Additions regarding the 'piecing' (fragmentation
+f wholes through the 'piecing' of their 'moments
+We may end with an additional observation that is perhaps not without
+interest.
+It is an analytic proposition that pieces considered in relation to the whole
+whose 'pieces' they are, cannot be founded on each other, either one-sidedly
+
+42 On the theory of wholes and parts
+or reciprocally, and whether as wholes or in respect of their parts. But, on
+he other hand, we cannot at all conclude from the content of our basi
+lefinition that it is impossible that 'pieces' should enter into foundationa
+relationships in regard to a more comprehensive whole in which they all
+count as non-independent 'moments'. In fact, however, we find no such
+example in the field of pure intuition and self-evidence that is open to us
+and remarkable relationships among parts depend on this circumstance in
+precisely this field. We can in fact enunciate a proposition which is in a
+each of the latter. In other words: the fragmentation of a non-independent
+'moment' conditions a fragmentation of the concrete whole, in so far as the
+mutually exclusive 'pieces', without themselves entering into a foundational
+relation with one another, attract new 'moments' to themselves in virtue of
+which they are singly distributed to 'pieces' of the whole.
+A few examples will make this clear. The fragmentation of the quasispatial extensity of a visual content, which endures unchanged, but which is
+considered in abstraction from its temporality, also effects a 'piecing' of this
+visual content itself. The same holds of spatial data of intuition in respect
+of spatial 'piecing'. The separated spatial pieces serve to 'found' mutually
+independent complementary 'moments'. The colouring of one piece is not,
+e.g., 'founded' upon the colouring of any other. To this extent one may say,
+further, that the complementary moments are themselves fragmented by the
+fragmentation of the spatiality which serves to 'found' them, or that they
+divide themselves piecemeal over the spatial 'pieces'. The colourings of the
+'pieces' stand in the same whole-part relations (exclusion, inclusion, intersection) as the 'pieces' themselves. This peculiar fact, that here the 'piecing'
+of a 'moment' simultaneously entails a 'piecing' of the whole, obviously
+rests on the fact that the 'pieces' of the 'moment' do not serve to 'found' one
+another even within the more inclusive whole, but that they need new moments' to 'found' them in each case: it also depends on the further fact that
+these new 'moments' themselves only find their needed foundation in the
+'pieces', not mutually in one another.
+The same is the case with intuitive time-wholes. If we fragment the duration
+of a concrete course of events, we have fragmented this course of events itself:
+to the segments of time, segments of movement correspond ('movement'
+being understood in the widest Aristotelian sense). The same holds in the case
+of rest: rest too has its segments that count as 'pieces' in the sense of our
+pronouncements, since rest during one lapse of time, and rest during any
+other lapse, do not stand in any evident foundational relation to each other.
+The case is quite different if, instead of limiting ourselves to the sphere
+of essential data to be studied by way of intuition, we rather bring our consideration to bear on empirically-real natural connections.
+
+Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts 43
+'orresponding to the parts and 'moments'. But nature with all its thing-lik
+contents certainly also has its a priori, whose systematic elaboration an
+all the thing-histories which fall under them is infected with 'contingency.
+Nature with all its physical laws is a fact that could well have been otherwise. If we now treat natural laws, without regard to their infection with
+contingency, as true laws, and apply to them all the pure concepts we have
+formed, we arrive at modified Ideas of empirical 'foundation', of empirical
+wholes, empirical independence and non-independence. If, however, we conceive the Idea of a factual nature as such, of which our own nature is an
+individual specification, we arrive at universal Ideas, not bound down to our
+nature, of an empirical whole, empirical independence etc. These Ideas are
+plainly constitutive of the Idea of a nature in general, and must fit, together
+with the essential relations pertaining to them, into a universal ontology of
+All this being presumed, we return to our specific question. While we
+found no example in the material sphere of essence where a fragmentation
+of a non-independent 'moment", e.g. of the spatial and temporal "moment,
+did not entail a fragmentation of the concrete whole, the matter is different
+in the field of all empirically real connections of coexistence and succession.
+This is clear if we consider the sense of empirical relations of necessity,
+which associate things spatially and temporally separate. If a particular causal law involves that a concrete process of change in a time-segment ty-to, is
+necessarily succeeded by a certain new process in the neighbouring timesegment, t2-ty, the former thereby loses independence in regard to the latter.
+Let us assume now that particular laws of this sort, whose essence it is only
+to be knowable empirically, belong ontologically, i.e. in virtue of the Idea of
+Nature as such, to each concrete process of change, to which they assign
+certain necessary, temporally contiguous consequences, and let us make the
+still stronger assumption that each such process must itself be a necessary
+consequence of previous antecedents. To assume all this is to hold that each
+concrete natural process of change lacks independence in respect of the
+more embracing temporal whole in which it is realized, and that no fragmentation of a time-stretch therefore conditions a fragmentation of the correlated concrete temporal whole. But the limitation to processes of change is
+unnecessary and, strictly speaking, not even allowable. As mechanics treats
+
+44 On the theory of wholes and parts
+of rest and movement from a single viewpoint, and includes rest as a special
+limiting case of motion in its laws, so one should proceed analogously with
+concepts extended in the Aristotelian manner. Even the imaginary case of
+fixed rest isolated from the whole world is not immune from the properly
+formulated principle of causality. If we conceive of any time-lapse, however
+small, as filled with a rigidly unchanging concrete content (if indeed the Idea
+of Nature permits such a conceptual possibility) and if we conceive of the
+whole of reality as reduced, during this period to such a changeless being,
+then the causal principle certainly demands that such being should persist
+unchanged a parte post for all eternity (though, a parte ante, it may have
+arisen out of eternal rest or law-governed change). In regard to these causal
+connections, from which nothing temporal is immune, we may therefore say
+that a fragmentation of its time aspects never entails a fragmentation of
+a concrete temporal whole. The 'moments' needed to complete its timesections are indeed separated as these sections are, but such separation
+effects no fragmentation in the temporal concretum: this is prevented by the
+reciprocal causal 'foundation' of its temporally sundered contents.
+The case is of course similar at least in regard to the spatial fragmentation
+of those wholes in which spatial and temporal extension are coincident, so
+that each fragmentation of the one 'moment' is attended by a fragmentation
+of the other, and vice versa. The fragmentation of the spatial aspect of a
+movement is as little able, as is the fragmentation of its temporal aspect, to
+effect a fragmentation of the movement itself.
+These considerations also mean that in objective time, the time of nature,
+time-stretches that in abstracto had the character of 'pieces' in respect of
+each duration that embraced them, lose their mutual independence, if we
+treat them in relation to a concretely occupied temporal unity of which they
+are non-independent 'moments'.
+. The proposition that each objective temporal duration is a mere part of time, which cannot only be extended in both
+directions in infinitum, but also has to be so, is, as one readily sees, a mere
+consequence of causality, and therefore related to the content of time. This
+consequence makes a temporal part non-independent, not merely in relation
+to its own filling, but also in relation to neighbouring parts of time and their
+contents. This non-independence of temporal parts, and their reciprocal
+"foundation', is governed by laws which not merely associate time-stretches
+with time-stretches, but associate concretely occupied temporal wholes with
+other similar temporal wholes. Since in these laws, among the variables
+representing 'moments' of time-occupying contents, times or time-stretches
+also figure as mutually dependent variables, such time-stretches likewise
+acquire a mediate relation of 'foundedness' in regard to a more inclusive
+concrete unity. The same of course holds of bits of space in relation to more
+embracing spatial unities, and ultimately to the whole infinite space of
+nature. The proposition that each bit of space requires to be extended in all
+directions, or, as we should put it more precisely, requires the real possibility
+
+Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts 45
+f certain causal laws, more precisely of certain natural laws. The fact tha
+ve freely extend spatial and temporal stretches in imagination, that we ca
+really be so. This can only be proved by a law of causation which presup
+poses, and so requires, the possibility of being extended beyond any giver
+
+Investigation IV
+The distinction between
+independent and nonindependent meanings and
+the idea of pure grammar
+
+In the following discussions we wish to turn our gaze to a fundamental
+difference in the field of meanings, a difference which lies hidden behind
+insignificant grammatical distinctions, such as those between categorematic
+and syncategorematic expressions, or between closed and unclosed expressions. To clear up such distinctions will enable us to apply our general
+distinction between independent and non-independent obiects in the special
+field of meanings, so that the distinction treated in our present Investigation may be called that of independent and non-independent meanings. It
+yields the necessary foundation for the essential categories of meaning on
+which, as we shall briefly show, a large number of a priori laws of meaning
+rest, laws which abstract from the objective validity, from the real (real)
+or formal truth, or objectivity of such meanings. These laws, which govern
+the sphere of complex meanings, and whose role it is to divide sense from
+nonsense, are not yet the so-called laws of logic in the pregnant sense of this
+term: they provide pure logic with the possible meaning-forms. i.e. the a
+priori forms of complex meanings significant as wholes, whose formal truth
+or 'objectivity' then depends on these pregnantly described 'logical laws'.
+The former laws guard against senselessness (Unsinn), the latter against formal or analytic nonsense (Widersinn) or formal absurdity. If the laws of pure
+logic establish what an object's possible unity requires in virtue of its pure
+form, the laws of complex meanings set forth the requirements of merely
+significant unity, i.e. the a priori patterns in which meanings belonging to
+different semantic categories can be united to form one meaning, instead of
+producing chaotic nonsense.
+Modern grammar thinks it should build exclusively on psychology and
+other empirical sciences. As against this, we see that the old idea of a universal, or even of an a priori grammar, has unquestionably acquired a foundation and a definite sphere of validity, from our pointing out that there are
+a priori laws which determine the possible forms of meaning. The extent
+to which there may be other discoverable fields of the grammatical a priori
+goes beyond our present field of interest. Within pure logic, there is a field of
+laws indifferent to all objectivity to which, in distinction from 'logical laws'
+
+50 The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings
+in the usual pregnant sense, the name of 'logico-grammatical laws' can be
+justifiably given. Even more aptly we can oppose the pure theory of semanti
+forms to the pure theory of validity which presupposes i
+§I Simple and complex meanings
+part-meanings as those of man, iron, king, love etc.
+If we now find further part-meanings in such part-meanings, meanings
+may again come forward as parts of these, but this can obviously not go on
+sign of complexity.
+§2 Whether complexity of meanings merely reflects
+complexity of objects
+We may ask first whether the complexity or simplicity of meanings' merely
+reflects the complexity or simplicity of the objects which such meaning
+cases, and that its presumed parallelism holds from neither side. In the first
+It is true, conversely, that simple meanings can "present' complex objects,
+can refer to them in significant fashion. One might doubt (though I do not think
+correctly) whether the simple names in our above examples ('man', 'iron,
+'king' etc.), really give expression to simple meanings, but we shall have to
+count names like 'one' and 'something' as doing so. It is clear that they, in
+their indefinite reference to all that is possible, will refer to every complex
+object, even if they refer to it quite indeterminately, or as a mere 'something.
+It is clear, further, that even where a complex meaning refers to a complex
+object, no part of the object need correspond to each part of the meaning,
+
+The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings 5l
+let alone the other way round. Bolzano's noteworthy example, a land with-
+§3 Complexity of meanings and complexity of the
+concrete act of meaning. Implied meanings
+There are, on the other hand, wide ranges of cases where doubt arises whether
+a given meaning should count as complex or simple. If we wish, e.g., to treat
+the meanings of proper names as simple, we face the objection that in a
+certain obviously good sense, we can say that a name like 'Schultze', when
+used of a person known to us, helps to present a certain human being, a
+being possessed of all the parts and attributes that we think proper to
+human beings, as well as many individual peculiarities which distinguish
+him from others. On the other hand, we hesitate to assign partial meanings
+within such 'proper meaning' to the successively stressed attributes of the
+thing the name uniquely stands for, the more or less clearly presented
+object, or even to identify such a 'proper meaning' with a complex meaning
+of the form 'an A, which is a, b, c...' which we build up step by step as we
+analyse the content of the idea Schultze objectively.
+Closer consideration shows that we must here distinguish two senses of
+simplicity and complexity; simplicity in one sense does not exclude complexity in another. Undoubtedly we must refuse to look on a 'proper meaning'
+as an articulate, and so complex structure of meanings: we must nonetheless
+grant that our consciousness of meaning here shows a certain complexity,
+that surely stands in need of clarification. Everything that later explication
+and conceptualization coax out of the Schultze on whom we confer a name
+and a certain content, no doubt represents new meanings that were not
+really (reell) implicit as under-emphasized parts in our original meaning.
+Without doubt, the 'proper meaning' of Schultze was simple. It is plain,
+further, that the presentative content with which Schultze is presented when
+we name him, can change in many ways, while his proper name goes on
+performing the same significant role, always naming the same Schultze
+'directly. On the other hand, we are not here dealing with some chance
+presentational addition to our consciousness of meaning, but with facts of
+presentation that are necessary, even though variable in content; without
+them our actual meaning could not point to the object it means, and so not
+really be a meaning at all. Using the proper name significantly, we must
+present to ourselves the subject named, in this case the definite person
+Schultze, and as endowed with some definite content or other. However
+
+52 The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings
+impalpably, defectively, vaguely, indefinitely we may think of him, presentaional content cannot be wholly lacking. The indefiniteness which is her
+und no other. Or what is the same: our consciousness of meaning, taken i
+ts full concreteness, has an essence which involves possibilities of fulfilmen
+determinable whether as a physical thing, an animal, a human being etc.
+- even if not meant in such capacities.
+The consciousness of meaning which attaches to proper names therefore
+has a certain double-sidedness: there are two directions in which one can
+here talk of complexity or simplicity. One side fixes the simplicity or complexity of the meaning itself, and here we have the pure essence of meaning
+as such; to it alone belongs the intentional essence of our concrete, complete
+meaning-consciousness which, regarded in specie, is the meaning. In our
+case of 'proper meanings' this side is simple. But it necessarily presupposes a
+wider intentional background of content, for the very reason that the same
+thing, referred to in the same sense (or univocally named by the same proper
+name) can be very differently presented, with a variable set of determining
+marks, and that it must be presented with some such set - while the variation and complexity of this set do not touch the meaning itself.
+Here we have openings for expositions and for predicative interpretations
+of meaning, such as we give when we try to answer the question as to how,
+and as what, the object called 'Schultze' is presented in a given case. Such
+complicating developments stand in contrast with our original consciousless of meaning, and we must therefore first clarify the essence of our presen
+distinction: the distinction between concrete, meaning-conferring experiences
+of the same intentional object. Explicative meanings such as E which is a, Ea
+which is b, Eb which is a etc., are many-rayed meanings, or are at least put
+
+The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings
+53
+together in several steps and in varying forms, so that they can 'head for' the
+ame object with varying content. Their plurality of levels does not distur
+heir unity: they are unified, complex meanings. The corresponding con
+sciousness of meaning is, on its purely meaning-side, a single act, but also an
+act that is complex.
+We assumed above that the proper name was that of a known person. This
+means that it is functioning normally, and not in the indirect sense of a certain
+tion, in which bounds are set to the difficulties of articulate analysis, and
+above all to shifts in verbal meanings, is of course merely a practical logical
+artifice, through which meaning cannot properly be said to be demarcated
+or inwardly articulated. Here, rather, a new meaning, articulate in content,
+is set over against the existent meaning, as a standard to govern judgements
+which rely on the meaning in question. To avoid logical dangers, we forbid
+all judgements in which meanings cannot be replaced by such standard
+equivalents, and recommend also, as far as possible, the regular use of such
+standard word-meanings in the work of knowing, or the regulation of the
+effect on knowledge of our actual meanings, by frequently measuring these
+latter against such standards and by appropriate habits of use.
+Note. The duality of our meaning-intentions as treated in the first edition
+of this section has received a clearer, phenomenologically more profound
+treatment in the present edition. The writer had not plumbed the full sense
+and range of application of the distinction when he first conceived of this
+book. The careful reader will note that the Sixth Investigation does not give
+a proper account of it.
+syncat equesematic che menenits complex
+syncategorematic'
+expressions
+The treatment of complex meanings leads at once to a new and fundamental
+division. Such meanings are, in general, only given to us as meanings of
+articulate word-complexes. Regarding these one may, however, ask whether
+each word in such a complex has its own correlated meaning, and whether
+all verbal articulation and form counts as expressing a corresponding semantic articulation and form. According to Bolzano, 'each word in speech
+stands for its own presentation, while some stand for entire propositions!
+He therefore, without further ado, attributes a peculiar meaning to every
+conjunction or preposition. On the other hand, one frequently hears of
+words and expressions that are merely 'synsemantic, i.e. that have no meaning by themselves, but acquire this only in conjunction with other meanings
+
+54 The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings
+or expressions. One distinguishes between complete and incomplete expressions of presentations, and likewise between complete and incomplete
+expressions of judgements and of the phenomena of feeling and will,
+and one bases on such a distinction the notion of the categorematic or syncategorematic sign. Marty applies the expression 'categorematic sign' (or
+'name') to 'all verbal means of designation, that are not merely synsemantic
+(as, e.g., "the father's", "around", "nonetheless" etc.) but which yet do not
+themselves completely express a judgement (an assertion), or a feeling or
+voluntary decision etc. (requests, commands, questions etc.), but merely
+express a presentation
+"The founder of ethics", "a son who has insulter
+his father" are names'" Since Marty and other writers employ the terms
+'syncategorematic' and 'synsemantic' in the same sense of signs which only
+have complete significance together with other parts of speech, whether they
+help to arouse concepts as mere parts of a name, or contribute to the expression of a judgement (i.e. to a statement) or to that of an emotion or act of
+will (i.e. to a request or command-sentence) etc."* it would have been more
+consistent to interpret the notion of categorematic expression equally widely.
+This notion should have been made to cover all independently significant
+or complete expressions of any intentional experience (any 'psychic
+phenomenon' in Brentano's sense), and a division should have been made
+then between the categorematic expressions of presentations (i.e. names), the
+categorematic expressions of judgements (i.e. statements) etc. Whether such
+a coordination is justified, whether names, e.g., express presentations in the
+same sense that request-sentences express requests, wish-sentences express
+wishes etc., and likewise whether the things that names and sentences are
+said to 'express' are themselves experiences of meaning, or how they stand
+to meaning-intentions and meanings - all these are questions to which we
+shall have to devote earnest thought. However this may be, the distinction
+between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions, and the pleas for
+its introduction, certainly have justification, and so we are led to conceive
+syncategorematic words in a manner at variance with the above-mentioned
+doctrine of Bolzano. Since the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic words is grammatical, it might seem that the situation underlying it is likewise 'merely grammatical'. We often use several words to
+express a 'presentation' - this, one might think, depends on chance peculiarities of one's language. The articulation of one's expression may bear no
+only the whole expression really has a meaning.
+The grammatical distinction, however, permits another interpretation,
+provided one decides to view the completeness or incompleteness of expressions as reflecting a certain completeness or incompleteness of meanings, the
+grammatical distinction as reflecting a certain essential semantic distinction.?
+Language has not been led by chance or caprice to express presentations by
+
+The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings 55
+names involving many words, but by the need to express suitably a pluralty of mutually cohering part-presentations, and dependent presentationa
+forms, within the enclosed self-sufficiency of a presentational unity & Even
+•g., two presentations unite in a third, can find semantic expression, it ca
+letermine the peculiar meaning-intention of a word or complex of word
+hatever, are to have their faithful reflections in the sphere of meanin
+ntentions, then there must be a semantic form which corresponds to eac
+resources of language are to be a faithful mirror of all meanings possibl
+a priori, then language must have grammatical forms at its disposal which
+§5 Independent and non-independent meanings.
+The non-independence of the sensory and expressive
+parts of words
+This conception is plainly the only right one. We must not merely distinguish between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions but also
+between categorematic and syncategorematic meanings! It is more significant to speak of independent and non-independent meanings. It is of course
+possible that meaning may so shift that an unarticulated meaning replaces
+one that was originally articulated, so that nothing in the meaning of the
+the expression has ceased to be genuinely complex, and tends, in developed
+speech, to be telescoped into one word. We no longer count its members as
+syncategorematic expressions, since we do not count them as expressions
+at all. We only call significant signs expressions, and we only call expressions
+complex when they are compounded out of expressions. No one would call
+the word 'king' a complex expression since it consists of several sounds and
+syllables. As opposed to this, many-worded expressions are admittedly
+complex, since it is part of the notion of a word to express something
+the meaning of the word need not, however, be independent. Just as non
+independent meanings may occur only as 'moments' of certain independent
+ones, so the linguistic expression of non-independent meanings may function
+only as formal constituents in expressions of independent meanings: they
+therefore become linguistically non-independent, i.e. 'incomplete' expressions.
+Our first purely external impression of the difference between categorematic
+and syncategorematic expressions ranks the syncategorematic parts of
+expressions on a level with quite different parts of expressions, with the letters, sounds and syllables which are in general meaningless. I say 'in general',
+since there are many genuine syncategorematic expressions even among these,
+
+56 The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings
+such as the prefixes and suffixes used in inflexion. But, in the vast majority
+nificant parts; they are only parts of the expression as a sensuous phenomenon. Syncategorematic expressions are therefore understood, even when they
+content, 'moments' that look forward to a certain completion which, though
+it may be indeterminate materially, is formally determined together with
+the content in question, and is circumscribed and governed by it. But where
+text of an independently complete expression, it has always, as illustration
+will testify, a determinate meaning-relation to our total thought; it has as its
+meaning a certain non-independent part of this thought, and so makes a
+definite contribution to the expression as such. That we are right becomes
+clear when we consider that the same syncategorematic expression can
+occur in countless compounds in which it always plays the same semantic
+role. For this reason, in cases of syncategorematic ambiguity, we can reasonably consider, doubt and dispute whether the same conjunction, predicate
+or relational expression has the same meaning in two contexts or not. To a
+conjunction like 'but', or to a genitive like 'father's', we can significantly
+attribute a meaning, but not to a verbal fragment like 'fu'. Both come
+before us as needing completion, but their needs of completion differ essentially: in the one case the need principally affects the thought rather than the
+mere expression, in the other case it affects the expression alone or rather
+the fragmentary expression. The hope is it may become an expression, a
+possible spur to thought. In the successive formation of a complex verbal
+structure its total meaning gradually gets built up,"° in the successive formation of a word, the word alone gets built up; only when the word is
+completed does it house the fleeting thought. In its own way, of course, the
+verbal fragment evokes thoughts: that it is, e.g., a verbal fragment, and how
+it may be completed; these are not, however, its meaning. And according as
+we complete it in differing ways (fu-futile, fuming, fugitive, furry, refuge
+etc.) the meaning alters, without thereby revealing an element common to
+this multitude of meanings, that could be taken to be the meaning of this
+§6 Other opposed distinctions. Unclosed, abnormally
+abbreviated and defective expressions
+We must go on to a much-needed clarification of the difference between independent and non-independent meanings, fixing its character more precisely
+in relation to more general concepts, and connecting with it the dominant fact, the presiding rule in the whole field of meaning. Before we do this,
+
+The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings 57
+however, it will be useful to separate off the grammatical distinction that
+formed our starting point from other distinctions confused with it.
+Syncategorematic expressions, qua non-independent, require some sort
+of completion, and we therefore also call them 'incomplete expressions'.
+Talk of 'incompleteness' has, however, another sense, which is not to be
+confused with the need for completion which is here in question. To show
+this, we first observe that a division of meanings into independent and nonindependent crosses the division into simple and complex. Meanings such as,
+e.g., larger than a house; beneath God's own sky; in life's troubles; but, Lord,
+o give thy messengers due honour, are non-independent meanings, unitary
+despite their plurality of discernible parts. Several non-independent mean.
+ings, or meanings partly non-independent and partly independent, can be
+accordingly associated in relatively closed units, which yet manifest, as wholes,
+a character of non-independence. This fact of complex non-independent
+meanings is grammatically registered in the relatively closed unity of complex syncategorematic expressions. Each of these is a single expression, because expressive of a single meaning, and it is a complex expression, because
+expressive part by part of a complex meaning. It is in relation to this meaning that it is a complete expression. If nonetheless we call it incomplete, this
+depends on the fact that its meaning, despite its unity, is in need of completion. Since it can only exist in a wider semantic context, its linguistic
+expression likewise points to a wider linguistic context, to a completion in
+speech that shall be independent and closed.
+It is quite different in the case of an abnormally abbreviated expression,
+which gives to thought, whether independent or non-independent, an incomplete, though possibly in the circumstances quite intelligible, expression.
+We can here point to defective expressions, where syntactical members are
+omitted from a continuous sentential context, although a certain mutual
+belongingness of the disjecta membra remains recognizable. The need for
+completion of such defective utterances differs in kind from the need for the
+completion of the syncategorematica. Not because the pertinent meaning is
+non-independent, but because all unitary meaning is absent, such defective
+talk cannot serve as finished talk, not even as talk at all. If on deciphering
+a fragmentary inscription we read Caesar... qui... duabus, external indications may point to a certain sentential and semantic unity: this indirect
+thought is not, however, the meaning of the fragment before us. As it stands,
+it is without unitary meaning, and constitutes no expression: a loose assemblage of partially independent, partially non-independent meanings, together
+with a side-thought relative but also strange to them, that they may be part
+of a certain significant unity: that is all that is given.
+Talk about expressions that are unclosed, incomplete and requiring
+completion, therefore plainly covers quite different things. On the one hand
+t covers syncategorematic expressions: on the other hand. abnormall
+abbreviated and, in the limit, defective expressions, which are not so much
+
+The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings
+expressions as expressional fragments. These distinct notions cross one
+another. An abbreviated expression can be categorematic, a syncategorematic
+expression gapless etc., etc.
+§7 The conception of non-independent meanings as
+founded contents
+We have recognized that the seemingly indifferent distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions corresponds to a fundamental
+division in the realm of meanings. We took the former as our starting-point,
+but the latter revealed itself as basic, as the prime foundation of the grammatical distinction.
+The concept of the expression, or of the difference between the merely
+audible, or sensuous parts of an expression and its partial expressions in the
+true sense of the word, or, as we may say more pointedly, its syntactical
+parts (roots, prefixes, suffixes," words, conjoined complexes of words), can
+only be fixed by recurring to a distinction among meanings. If these divide
+into simple and complex meanings, the expressions which fit them must
+also be simple or complex, and this complexity necessarily leads back to
+final significant parts, to syntactical parts and so once more to expressions.
+On the other hand, the analysis of expressions as mere sensuous phenomena
+also always yields mere sensuous parts, ones that no longer signify. The
+same is true of the superimposed distinction of expressions into categorematic
+and syncategorematic. It can at least be described by holding the former to
+be capable of serving as complete expressions, finished locutions by themselves, whereas the latter cannot. But if one wishes to limit the vagueness of
+this characterization, and to pin down the sense that is here relevant, as well
+as the inner ground that enables some expressions, and not others, to stand
+as finished locutions, one must, as we saw, go back to the semantic realm,
+and point out there the need of completion that attaches to certain nonindependent meanings.
+Having called syncategorematic meanings 'non-independent', we have already said where we think the essence of such meanings lies. In our enquiries
+tion onie dependen of onis epenerace it is this same noneral dependence
+that we have to recognize in the field of meaning. Non-independent contents, we stated above (Inv. III, §85-7), are contents not able to exist alone,
+but only as parts of more comprehensive wholes. This inability has its a
+priori governing ground in the specific essences of the contents in question
+Each non-independence points to a law to the effect that a content of the
+sort in question, e.g. sort A, can exist only in the context of a whole W
+(AB... M), where B... M stand for determinate sorts of content. 'Determinate', we said, since no law merely asserts connection between the sort A, and
+any other sorts whatever, that an A only needs some completion, no matter
+
+The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings 59
+what. Law involves specific determinateness of context: dependent and
+independent variables have spheres limited by fixed generic or specific characters. We have mainly employed as examples the concrete things of sensuous
+intuition. We could, however, have brought in other fields, those of actexperiences and their abstract contents.
+Here we are only interested in meanings. We conceived these as ideal
+unities, but our distinction naturally passed over from the real (real) to the
+A meaning, accordingly, may be called 'independent' when it can constitute
+the full, entire meaning of a concrete act of meaning, 'non-independent', when
+this is not the case. It can then only be realized in a non-independent partact in a concrete act of meaning, it can only achieve concreteness in relation
+to certain other complementary meanings, it can only exist in a meaningful
+whole. The non-independence of meaning qua meaning thus defined determines, in our view, the essence of the syncategorematica.
+§8 Difficulties of this conception. (a) Whether the
+non-independence of the meaning does not really only
+lie in the non-independence of the object meant
+We must now consider the difficulties of our conception. We shall first
+for the moment think the former distinction reducible to the latter.!' Acts
+objects. If some constituent of an object is non-independent, it cannot be
+'presented' in isolation; the corresponding meaning therefore demands a
+completion, it is itself non-independent. The seemingly obvious principle
+syncategorematic expressions to non-independent ones.
+Such a conception is readily seen to be erroneous. The very expression
+non-independent moment provides a decisive counter-example. It is a
+categorematic expression and yet presents a non-independent object. Every
+non-independent object whatever can be made the object of an independent
+meaning, and that directly, e.g. Redness, Figure, Likeness, Size, Unity, Being.
+These examples show that independent meanings correspond, not merely to
+
+60 The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings
+material moments of objects, but also to their categorial forms, meanings
+peculiarly directed to these forms and making them their objects: the latter
+are not for that reason self-existent in the sense of being independent. The
+an obeca, ben does no hereore hav on he character of picturing it, that
+meant, i.e. can become an intentional object.
+§9 (b) The understanding of isolated
+syncategorematica
+A serious difficulty is occasioned by our understanding of syncategorematic
+expressions torn from all context. If our notion is right, there can be no such
+thing: for us the non-independent elements of categorematically closed speech
+(lóyos) cannot be isolated. How can we possibly treat such elements, as
+Aristotle treated them, apart from all connection? Under the headings of
+TỜ ÖVEU OVUTJOKÂS, Tà KaTà unSuÍON OVuTAOKiY dEyóuEva he covers all
+classes of words, including the syncategorematica.
+This objection can first be met by pointing to the distinction between
+'authentic' and 'so-to-speak' presentations, or what is here the same, the difference between merely intending and fulfilling meanings. We may in fact say:
+Isolated syncategorematica such as equals, together with, and, or can achieve
+no fulfilment of meaning, no intuitive understanding, except in the context
+of a wider meaning-whole. If we wish to 'be clear' what the word 'equals'
+means, we must turn to an intuitive equation, we must actually (genuinely)
+perform a comparison, and following upon this, bring to understanding and
+fulfilment a sentence of the form a = b. If we wish to be clear as to the
+meaning of the word 'and', we must actually carry out an act of collection,
+and bring to fulfilment in the aggregate thus genuinely presented a meaning
+of the form a and b. And so in every case. The non-independent status of the
+fulfilling meaning, which thus necessarily forms part of a fulfilling meaning
+of wider content, serves to base derived talk about the non-independent
+status of the intending meaning. 13
+Undoubtedly we have here a correct and valuable thought. We can also
+express it by saying that no syncategorematic meaning, no act of nonindependent meaning-intention, can function in knowledge outside of the context
+of a categorematic meaning. Instead of 'meaning', we could of course say
+'expression', in the normal sense of a unity of verbal sound and meaning or
+sense. But we have to ask whether, since there is a unity-of-coincidence
+between intending and fulfilling meaning in the state of fulfilment, we can
+look on a fulfilling meaning as non-independent, while an intending meaning
+
+The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings 6l
+is independent. Can we, in other words, hold that talk of non-independence
+in the case of intuitively unfulfilled meanings is merely loose, conditional on
+non-independence in possible fulfilment? This seems scarcely thinkable, and
+so we are pushed back to holding that even empty meaning-intentions - the
+"non-authentic, 'symbolic' presentations which give sense to an expression
+apart from any knowledge-function - reveal a difference between independence and non-independence. How can we explain the indubitable fact that
+olated syncategorematica, e.g. the isolated word 'and', are understood
+hey are non-independent as regards their meaning-intention, and this sure!
+means that such intentions can exist only in categorematic contexts: the
+isolated 'and', the particle torn from its context, ought therefore to be a
+hollow noise.
+We can only resolve our difficulty in the following manner:
+A syncategorematic expression torn from context either has not got the
+meaning it has in categorematic contexts, or it has got it, but has also
+undergone a completion of meaning quite indefinite in content, so that it is
+an incomplete expression of this momentarily activated, completed meaning. We understand an isolated 'and' either because the indirect, verbally
+unexpressed thought of a certain familiar conjunction gives it an unusual
+meaning, or because vague, unverbalized presentations of things help us to
+form a thought of the type A and B. In the latter case, the word 'and' is functioning normally to the extent that it is really only an aspect in a complete,
+inwardly performed meaning-intention, the same aspect as in a combination of categorematic expressions standing for a collection. It is functioning
+abnormally only in not being connected with other expressions, which give
+normal utterance to the complementary parts of the meaning here in question.
+Our difficulties are thus removed. We may assume that the difference
+between independent and non-independent meanings affects the realm of
+meaning-intentions as it affects the realm of fulfilment. We have the situation which the possibility of an adequate fit between intention and fulfilment
+necessarily requires.
+§I0 A priori laws governing combinations of meanings
+If we relate the distinction between independent and non-independent
+meanings to the more general distinction between independent and nonindependent objects, we are really covering one of the most fundamental facts
+in the realm of meaning: that meanings are subject to a priori laws regulating
+their combination into new meanings. To each case of non-independent meaning, a law of essence applies - following the principle discussed by us in
+relation to all non-independent objects whatever - a law regulating the meaning's need of completion by further meanings, and so pointing to the forms
+and kinds of context into which it must be fitted. Since meanings cannot be
+combined to form new meanings without the aid of connective forms, which
+
+62 The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings
+are themselves meanings of a non-independent sort, there are obviously a
+priori laws of essence governing all meaning-combinations. The important
+fact here before us is not peculiar to the realm of meaning: it plays its part
+wherever combination occurs. All combinations whatever are subject to
+pure laws; this holds particularly of all material combinations limited to a
+single sphere of fact, where the results of combination must occupy the
+same sphere as the combining members. (This case is opposed to that of
+formal, 'analytic' combinations, e.g. collections, which are not bound up
+with the peculiarities of a sphere of fact, nor with the factual essence of their
+combining members.) In no sphere is it possible to combine items of any anc
+every kind by way of any and every form: the sphere of items sets a priori
+limits to the number of combinatorial forms, and prescribes the general
+laws for filling them in. That this fact is general should not lessen our
+obligation to point out such general laws in each given field, and to pursue
+their unfolding into special laws.
+As regards the field of meaning, the briefest consideration will show up
+our unfreedom in binding meanings to meanings, so that we cannot juggle
+at will with the elements of a significantly given, connected unity. Meanings
+only fit together in antecedently definite ways, composing other significantly
+unified meanings, while other possibilities of combination are excluded by
+laws, and yield only a heap of meanings, never a single meaning. The impossibility of their combination rests on a law of essence, and is by no
+means merely subjective. It is not our mere factual incapacity, the compulsion
+of our 'mental make-up', which puts it beyond us to realize such a unity. In
+the cases we here have in mind, the impossibility is rather objective, ideal,
+rooted in the pure essence of the meaning-realm, to be grasped, therefore,
+with apodictic self-evidence. The impossibility attaches, to be more precise,
+not to what is singular in the meanings to be combined, but to the essential
+kinds, the semantic categories, that they fall under. This or that meaning is,
+of course, itself a species, but, relative to a meaning-category, it only counts
+as an individual specification. In arithmetic, likewise, relatively to numerical
+forms and laws a numerically definite number is an individual specification.
+Wherever, therefore, we see the impossibility of combining given meanings,
+this impossibility points to an unconditionally general law to the effect that
+meanings belonging to corresponding meaning-categories, and conforming
+to the same pure forms, should lack a unified result. We have, in short, an
+a priori impossibility.
+What we have just said holds of course of the possibility of significant
+combinations as it holds of their impossibility.
+To consider an example. The expression "This tree is green' has unified
+meaning. If we formalize this meaning (the independent logical proposition)
+and proceed to the corresponding pure form of meaning, we obtain 'This
+S is P', an ideal form whose range of values consists solely of independent (propositional) meanings. It is now plain that what we may call the
+
+The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings 63
+'materialization' of this form, its specification in definite propositions, is
+possible in infinitely many ways, but that we are not completely free in such
+specification, but work confined within definite limits. We cannot substitute
+any meanings we like for the variables 'S' and 'P'. Within the framework of
+our form we can change our example "This tree is green' into "This gold..?,
+"This algebraic number ..?, "This blue raven etc., is green': any nominal
+material - in a wide sense of 'nominal material' - can here be inserted, and
+so plainly can any adjectival material replace the 'P'. In each case we have
+once more a meaning unified in sense, i.e. an independent proposition of
+the prescribed form, but if we depart from the categories of our meaningmaterial, the unitary sense vanishes. Where nominal material stands, any
+nominal material can stand, but not adjectival, nor relational, nor completed propositional material. But where we have materials from such other
+categories, other material of the same kind can be put, i.e. always material
+from the same category and not from another. This holds of all meanings
+whatsoever, whatever the complexity of their form.
+In such free exchange of materials within each category, false, foolish,
+ridiculous meanings - complete propositions or elements of propositions -
+may result, but such results will necessarily be unified meanings, or grammatical expressions whose sense can be unitarily realized. When we transgress
+the bounds of categories, this is no longer true. We can string together
+words like 'This careless is green', 'More intense is round', 'This house is
+just like'; we may substitute 'horse' for 'resembles' in a relational statement
+of the form 'a resembles b', but we achieve only a word-series, in which each
+word is as such significant, or points to a complete, significant context, but
+we do not, in principle, achieve a closed unity of sense. This is above all the
+case when we seek arbitrarily to exchange parts which are themselves formed
+units within an articulated unit of meaning, or when we replace such parts
+by others taken at random from other meanings, as, e.g., when we try to
+replace the antecedent in a hypothetical proposition (a mere element in the
+total unity that we call 'the hypothetical proposition') by a nominal element,
+or one of the members of a disjunction by a hypothetical consequent.
+Instead of doing this in the concrete, we may also attempt it in the corresponding pure forms of meaning, i.e. propositional forms. We are at once
+made aware, through a priori insight into law, that such intended combinations are ruled out by the very nature of the constituents of the pure patterns
+in question, that such constituents can only enter into definitely constituted
+meaning-patterns.
+It is plain, finally, that the pure elements of form in a concrete unity of
+meaning can never change places with the elements to which they give form,
+and which also give our meaning its relation to things. The specification of
+unified meaning-forms such as 'An Sis p', 'If S' is p, Q is r'etc., cannot, in
+principle, so proceed that abstracted elements of form take the place of the
+'terms', i.e. the materials in the meaning-pattern which relate to things. We
+
+64 The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings
+can construct verbal strings such as 'if the or is green', 'A tree is and' etc.,
+but such strings have no graspable single meanings. It is an analytic truth
+that the forms in a whole cannot function as its materials, nor vice-versa,
+and this obviously carries over into the sphere of meanings.
+In general we recognize, as we construct and think over such examples,
+that every concrete meaning represents a fitting together of materials and
+forms, that each such meaning falls under an ideal pattern that can be set
+forth in formal purity, and that to each such pattern an a priori law of
+meaning corresponds. This law governs the formation of unitary meanings
+out of syntactical materials falling under definite categories having an a
+priori place in the realm of meanings, a formation according to syntactical
+forms which are likewise fixed a priori, and which can be readily seen to
+constitute a fixed system of forms. Hence arises the great task equally
+fundamental for logic and for grammar, of setting forth the a priori constitution of the realm of meanings, of investigating the a priori system of
+the formal structures which leave open all material specificity of meaning, in
+a 'theory of the forms of meanings'.
+§I| Objections. Modifications of meaning which are
+rooted in the essence of expressions or meanings
+We must now take account of possible objections. One must not be led
+astray by the fact that meanings of any category, even syncategorematic
+forms like and, can be put into the subject-position otherwise occupied by
+substantival meanings. If one looks closely, one sees that this happens by a
+modification of meaning, so that what replaces a name is itself really nominal:
+a meaning differing in syntactical type (an adjectival or merely formal
+meaning) has not been simply transplanted. We have such a case, e.g., in
+statements like 'If is a conjunction',
+", 'And is a non-independent meaning'
+The words certainly occupy the subject-position, but their meaning is plainly
+not the same as they have in an ordinary context. That each word and
+expression can, by a change of meaning, come to occupy every place in a
+categorematic whole, is not remarkable. What we have in mind here is not
+a verbal but a semantic compounding, or a compounding of words ir
+which meanings remain constant. Logically considered, all shifts of meaning
+are to be adjudged abnormal. Our logical interest, oriented towards unitary
+selfsameness of meaning, demands constancy in the meaning-function. It
+naturally happens, however, that certain meaning-transformations belong to
+the grammatically normal stock-in-trade of every language. Verbal context
+will at least make a modified meaning readily intelligible, and, if the motives
+for modification are pervasively general, rooted, e.g., in the general charac
+er of expressions, or in the pure essence of the realm of meanings, then sucl
+abnormalities will recur regularly, and their logical abnormality will win a
+grammatical sanction.
+
+The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings 65
+Here belongs the suppositio materialis of scholastic parlance. Every expression, whether its normal meaning is categorematic or syncategorematic,
+can also function as its own name, i.e. it will name itself as a grammatical
+phenomenon. If we say '"The earth is round" is a statement', our subjectpresentation is not the meaning of the statement, but a presentation of
+the statement as such. We do not judge about the state of affairs that the
+earth is round, but about the indicative sentence: this sentence itself functions abnormally as its own name. If we say ' "And" is a conjunction', the
+nuance of meaning normally corresponding to the word 'and' is not put
+into the position of subject: this is occupied by an independent meaning
+directed to the word 'and'. In this abnormal reading, 'and' is not really a
+syncategorematic, but a categorematic expression: it names itself as a word.
+We have an exact analogue of suppositio materialis when an expression
+has, instead of its normal meaning, a presentation of this meaning (i.e. a
+meaning directed to this meaning as object). This is the case, e.g., if we say
+'And, but, greater than are non-independent meanings'. Here we should generally say that the meanings of the words 'and', 'but', 'greater than' are nonindependent. Just so in the utterance 'Man, table, house, are thing-concepts',
+presentations of these concepts function as subjects, and not the concepts
+themselves. In these, as in the previous cases, the change of meaning regularly shows itself in our written expression: quotation marks, or what may
+be suitably called other hetero-grammatical modes of expression, are employed.
+All expressions to which 'modifying' rather than 'determining' predicates
+attach, function abnormally in the above described or some similar sense:
+the normal sense of our utterance is to be replaced by another, in a more or
+less complex fashion, so that, however it may otherwise be built up, its
+apparent subject (on a normal interpretation) is replaced by some sort of
+presentation of itself, an ideal presentation, perhaps, in the sense of pure
+logic, or an empirical-psychological one, or a purely phenomenological one.
+We say, e.g., "The centaur is a poetic fiction'. With a little circumlocution
+we can instead say: 'Our ideas of centaurs, i.e. subjective presentations with
+the meaning-content centaur, are poetic fictions'. The predicates 'is', "is not,
+"is true, "is false' modify meaning. They do not express properties of the
+apparent subject, but of the corresponding subject-meaning. 'That 2 + 2 = 5
+is false' means that the thought is a false thought, the proposition a false
+proposition.
+Leaving aside the examples in the last paragraph, where the modifying
+presentation is subjective in a psychological or a phenomenological sense
+and understanding our analogue of suppositio materialis with its previously
+stated limitations, we note that we are here dealing with alterations in the
+content, or rather act of meaning, that have their roots in the ideal nature of
+the meaning-realm itself. They have their roots in changes of meaning, in a
+certain other sense of 'meaning' that abstracts from expressions, but which is
+not unlike that of arithmetical talk of 'transforming' arithmetical patterns.
+
+66 The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings
+In the realm of meaning there are a priori laws allowing meanings to be
+position that requires nominal members. We may point to cases where adjectival predicates or attributes are 'nominalized', so as to dispel any doubt
+aroused by things said in our previous section. An adjective has, as it were,
+a predicative and, in consequence, an attributive role; it functions normally,
+in its 'original', unmodified meaning in, e.g., our above example "This tree is
+green'. It remains intrinsically unchanged - apart from its syntactical role -
+if we say 'This green tree'. Such a change in form as opposed to the stuff of
+syntax, which occurs also when, e.g., a nominal presentation functioning as
+subject takes on the object-role, or a proposition functioning as antecedent takes on the role of a consequent, must first be pinned down: it is a
+central theme in describing pervasive structures in the meaning-realm. But an
+adjectival meaning, in the sense of syntactical material not affected by changing from a predicative to an attributive role, can yet undergo a modification
+when, from functioning merely as an attributive aspect of some nominal
+meaning, it is itself nominalized, ie. made into a name, as, e.g., in 'Green is
+a colour' and 'Being green (Greenness) is a differentiation of Being coloured
+(of Colour)'. These two modes of speech do not mean quite the same, despite shifting ambiguities, since in one case a non-independent side of a
+concrete object's content may be meant, while in the other case we mean
+a nominalization of the being which is the correlate of the predicativity
+attaching to the predicate member of a categorical predication and applied
+kernels, together with their forms qua kernels, as their syntactical materials
+If the form qua kernel of an adjectival kernel or kernel-content yields syntac
+tical material of nominal type, then such determinately constructed nominal
+
+The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings 67
+meanings can perform every syntactical function which requires nominal meanngs for its syntactical materials in accordance with formal meaning-law:
+This will suffice as an indication. Closer treatment belongs in a systemati
+setting forth of our theory of forms.
+§12 Nonsense and absurdity
+One must, of course, distinguish the law-governed incompatibilities to
+which the study of syncategorematica has introduced us, from the other
+incompatibilities illustrated by the example of 'a round square'. As said in
+our First Investigation 4 one must not confound the senseless (or nonsensical) with the absurd (or 'counter-sensical'), though we tend to exaggerate
+and call the latter 'senseless', when it is rather a sub-species of the significant. The combination 'a round square really yields a unified meaning,
+having its mode of 'existence' or being in the realm of ideal meanings, but it
+is apodictically evident that no existent object can correspond to such an
+existent meaning. But if we say 'a round or, 'a man and is' etc., there exist
+10 meanings which correspond to such verbal combinations as their ex
+bressed sense. The coordinated words give us the indirect idea of som
+unitary meaning they express, but it is apodictically clear that no such meaning can exist, that significant parts of these sorts, thus combined, cannot
+consist with each other in a unified meaning. This indirect notion would not
+itself be accepted as the meaning of such verbal complexes. When an expression functions normally, it evokes its meaning: when understanding
+fails, its sensuous similarity to understood, meaningful speech will evoke the
+inauthentic notion of a 'certain' pertinent meaning, since the meaning itself
+is what is precisely missing.
+The difference between the two incompatibilities is plain. In the one case
+certain partial meanings fail to assort together in a unity of meaning as fal
+as the objectivity or truth of the total meaning is concerned. An object (e.g
+a thing, state of affairs) which unites all that the unified meaning conceives
+as pertaining to it by way of its 'incompatible' meanings, neither exists nor
+can exist, though the meaning itself exists. Names such as 'wooden iron' and
+'round square' or sentences such as 'All squares have five angles' are names
+or sentences as genuine as any. In the other case the possibility of a unitary
+meaning itself excludes the possible coexistence of certain partial meanings
+in itself. We have then only an indirect idea, directed upon the synthesis of
+such partial meanings in a single meaning, and at the same time see that no
+object can ever correspond to such an idea, i.e. that a meaning of the intended
+sort cannot exist. The judgement of incompatibility is in one case connected
+with presentations, in another with objects; presentations of presentations enter
+the former unity of judgement, whereas plain presentations enter the latter.
+The grammatical expression of the a priori incompatibilities and
+compatibilities here in question, as of the pertinent laws governing
+
+68
+The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings
+hich develop in one way in one speech-community and another way i
+nother. In part, however, we encounter the essential difference of ind
+§13 The laws of the compounding of meanings and
+the pure logico-grammatical theory of forms
+The task of an accomplished science of meanings would be to investigate
+the law-governed, essence-bound structure of meanings and the laws of combination and modification of meaning which depend upon these, also to
+reduce such laws to the least number of independent elementary laws. We
+should obviously also need to track down the primitive meaning-patterns
+and their inner structures, and, in connection with these, to fix the pure
+categories of meaning which circumscribe the sense and range of the
+indeterminates - the 'variables' in a sense quite close to that of mathematics
+- that occur in such laws. What formal laws of combination may achieve,
+can be made fairly plain by arithmetic. There are definite forms of synthesis,
+through which, quite in general or in certain definite conditions, two numbers give rise to new numbers. The 'direct operations' a + b, ab, a' yield
+resultant numbers unrestrictedly, the 'inverse operations, a - b, alb,
+ba,'loga, only in certain conditions. That this is the case must be laid down
+by an assertion or rather a law of existence, and perhaps proved from certain
+primitive axioms. The little we have so far been able to indicate has made
+plain that there are similar laws governing the existence or non-existence
+of meanings in the semantic sphere, and that in these laws meanings are not
+free variables, but are bound down to the range of varying categories, all
+arising out of the nature of the sphere in question.
+In the pure logic of meanings, whose higher aim is the laws of objective
+validity for meanings (to the extent that such validity depends purely on
+semantic form), the theory of the essential meaning-structures, and the laws
+of their formal constitution, provide the needed foundation. Traditional
+logic, with its theories of concepts and judgements, offers us a few isolated
+starting-points, without being clear as to the end to be aimed at, either in
+general or in respect of the pure Idea of meaning. Plainly the theory of the
+elementary structures and the concrete patterns of 'judgement' - here understood as 'propositions' - will comprise the whole form-theory of meanings,
+each concrete meaning-pattern being either a proposition or a possible element
+
+The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings 69
+in propositions. We must note that the exclusion of the 'material of knowledge, to which pure logic is by its very sense committed, obliges us to keep
+ut everything which could give semantic forms (types, patterns) a definit
+elation to factual spheres of being. Everywhere indefinitely general pres
+entations of factual material, definitely determined only in respect of semantic
+category, e.g. nominal, adjectival, propositional etc., must do duty for con
+tentful concepts and even for the highest of such concepts, e.g. physical thing,
+Our first task, therefore, in a purely logical form-theory of meanings, is to
+lay down the primitive forms of meaning with the requisite purity just described. We must fix the primitive forms of independent meanings, of complete
+propositions with their internal articulations, and the structures contained in
+such articulations. We must fix, too, the primitive forms of compounding and
+modification permitted by the essence of different categories of possible
+elements. (We must note that complete propositions can become members
+of other propositions.) After this, we must systematically survey a boundless
+multitude of further forms, all derivable by way of repeated compounding
+or modification.
+The forms to be established are naturally 'valid', which here means that,
+however specified, they will yield real meanings, meanings real as meanings.
+To each such primitive form there belongs, therefore, an a priori law of
+existence, to the effect that each meaning-combination conforming to such
+a form genuinely yields a unified meaning, provided only that its terms, the
+Form's indeterminates or variables, belong to certain semantic categories.
+The deduction of derived forms must also pro tanto be a deduction of their
+validity, and laws of existence will, therefore, also relate to these, but they
+will be deduced from those relating to the primitive forms. Any two propositions yield, when combined in the form M and N, another proposition, any
+two adjectives another adjective (again one meaning that can stand as a
+complex but unitary attribute or predicate). To any two propositions, MI,
+N, there belong, likewise, the primitive connective forms If MI then N, M or
+N, so that the result again is a proposition. To any nominal meaning S,
+and any adjectival meaning p, there belongs the primitive form Sp (e.g. red
+house), the result being a new meaning fixed by law in the category of
+nominal meaning. We could in this manner give many other examples of
+primitive connective forms. We must remember, in stating all the laws that
+hold here, and in conceiving categorial Ideas of proposition, nominal presentation, adjectival presentation, which determine the variables of the laws,
+to abstract from the changing syntactical forms that such meanings have
+in given cases, and that they have to have in some determinate form. We
+speak of the same name, whether it occupies the subject-position or serves
+as a correlated object, of the same adjective, whether used predicatively or
+attributively, of the same proposition, whether used as a free unit or as a
+con junctive, disjunctive, or hypothetical antecedent or consequent, or whether
+
+70 The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings
+occupying this or that place as a member in a complex propositional unity.
+We thus fix plainly the much used, but never scientifically clarified, tall
+about terms in traditional logic. In the formal laws which enter the purview
+of this logic,'' as in our own laws of structures, such 'terms' function as
+variables; the categories circumscribing the range of their variability are
+categories of terms. The scientific pinning down of these categories is plainly
+one of the first tasks of our doctrine of forms.
+If we now make gradual substitutions in the primitive forms set forth, and
+for a simple term repeatedly substitute a combination exemplifying the same
+orms, and if we always reapply our primitive existential law, we arrive a
+'ver new forms, of deductively proven validity, encapsulated in one anothe
+with any degree of complexity. Thus for the con junctive combination of propositions one can substitute:
+(M and N) and P
+(M and N) and (P and 2)
+{ (M and N) and P) and 2
+etc., etc., and so for the disjunctive and hypothetical combination of propositions, and for other modes of combinations in any other semantic
+categories. We see at once that the compoundings go on in infinitum, in a
+manner permitting comprehensive oversight, that each new form remains
+tied to the same semantic category, the same field of variability as its terms,
+and that, as long as we stay in this field, all framable combinations of
+meanings necessarily exist, i.e. must represent a unified sense. We see also
+that the relevant existential propositions are obvious deductive consequences
+of an existential proposition with the primitive form. Instead of constantly reapplying the same mode of combination, we can plainly vary our procedure
+at will, and combine different forms of combination in our construction,
+always within legally allowed limits, and so conceive an infinity of complex
+forms legally engendered. As we formulate these facts in consciousness, we
+gain insight into the a priori constitution of the meaning-realm in respect of
+all those forms which have their a priori origin in its basic forms.
+This insight, and the final comprehensive insight into the formal constitution of the ule semand to op for ourse, the rules for of suminetia.
+of meanings (or rules for the grammatical compounding of expressions)
+from the formulation of semantic types, and the existential laws relating to
+them. There is no temptation here to depart from the line of correctness,
+hence no practical interest in determining it scientifically. Nonsense stands
+so immediately revealed, with each deviation from normal forms, that we
+hardly fall into such deviations in the practice of thought and speech. The
+theoretical interest of the systematic investigation of all possible meaningforms and primitive structures, is all the greater. We, in fact, rise to the
+insight that all possible meanings are subject to a fixed typic of categorial
+
+The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings 71
+314 Laws which discourage nonsense and laws whicl
+liscourage absurdity. The Idea of a purely logica
+grammar
+The formal laws of meaning just discussed, which serve merely to separate
+the realms of sense and nonsense, must in an extended sense certainly count
+as laws of formal logic. They will, however, be the last things one will think
+different vs, al laid me ren iguesting this termy practice haire
+concerned only with significant (i.e. not-nonsensical) meanings, and with
+their objective possibility and truth. Let us look into the relation of these
+two types of law.
+The a priori laws pertinent to the constitution of the essential forms
+of meaning, leave quite open whether meanings built on such forms have
+objects or not, or whether (when they are propositional forms) they yield
+possible truth or not. As said above, these laws have the mere function of
+separating sense from nonsense. The word 'nonsense' - let us stress it again
+- must be understood in its literal, strict sense. A heap of words like 'King but
+or like and' cannot be understood as a unit: each word has sense in isolation,
+but the compound is senseless. These laws of sense, or, normatively put, laws
+of the avoidance of nonsense, direct logic to the abstractly possible forms of
+meaning, whose objective value it then becomes its first task to determine. This
+logic does by setting up the wholly different laws which distinguish a formally
+consistent from a formally inconsistent, i.e. absurd, sense.
+
+72 The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings
+The consistency or absurdity of meanings expresses objective, ie. a priori,
+possibility (consistency, compatibility) as opposed to objective impossibility
+(incompatibility); it expresses, in other words, the possibility or impossibility of the being of the objects meant (compatibility or incompatibility of
+the objective determinations meant) to the extent that this depends on the
+intrinsic essence of meanings, and is seen from this essence with apodictic
+evidence. This contrast between objectively, semantically consistent sense
+and absurdity, has been notionally opposed and set apart from the contrast
+between sense and nonsense, but we must observe that, in loose, common
+speech, the two contrasts are confused, and every absurdity, even every
+affront to empirical truth, is readily called 'nonsense'. We have also to draw
+a line between material (synthetic) absurdity and formal, analytic absurdity.
+In the former case, concepts with content (first-order material kernels of
+meaning) must be given, as is the case, e.g., in the proposition 'A square is
+round' and in all false propositions of pure geometry, while the latter covers
+every purely formal, objective incompatibility, grounded in the pure essence
+of the semantic categories, without regard to any material content of knowledge. (There is an analogous division within the contrasted concept of a
+consistent sense.) Laws such as that of Contradiction, Double Negation or
+the Modus Ponens are, normatively restated, laws of the avoidance of formal
+absurdity. They show us what holds for objects in general in virtue of their
+pure 'thought-form', i.e. what can be said regarding the objective validity of
+meanings on a basis purely of the meaningful form in which we think them,
+and in advance of all objective matters signified. These laws may not be
+violated if falsehood is not to result, even before objects in their factual
+particularity have been taken into account. They are, in the sense of our
+Third Investigation (111, $§11 f.) 'analytic' laws, as opposed to the synthetic
+a priori laws which contain non-formal concepts, and depend on these for
+their validity. In the sphere of analytic laws as such, these formal laws, with
+their objective validity reposing on pure categories of meaning, are distinct
+from ontological-analytic laws, which rest on formal-ontological categories
+(such as object, property, plurality etc.) and they define sharply a second,
+narrower notion of the analytic. We may call it the apophantic analytic, the
+What has been hinted at in this regard in our Introduction, scarcely needs
+
+The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings 73
+fuller exposition. The older grammarians instinctively concentrated attention on this sphere of laws, even if they were unable to bring it to full clarity.
+Even in the sphere of grammar there are fixed standards, a priori norms that
+may not be transgressed. As in the proper sphere of logic, the a priori
+element separates itself off from the empirically and practically logical, so in
+the grammatical sphere the so-called purely grammatical, i.e. the a priori
+element or 'idealized form of speech', as it is well called, separates itself off
+from the empirical element. In both cases the empirical element is in fac
+determined by universal, yet merely factual traits of human nature, partl
+by chance peculiarities of race, nationality and national history, or by peculiarities of the individual and his life-experience. The a priori in either case
+is, at least in its primitive forms, obvious, even trivial, but its systematic
+demonstration, theoretical pursuit and phenomenological clarification
+remains of supreme scientific and philosophical interest, and is by no
+The notion of universal grammar can of course be carried beyond the
+a priori sphere, if the somewhat vague sphere of the universally human (in
+the empirical sense) is brought in. There can, and must, be a universal grammar in this widest of senses, and that this extended sphere is 'rich in important and well-established findings' (as A. Marty observes on page 61 of
+his Untersuchungen z. Grundlegung etc., under the strange impression that he
+is contradicting me) is something I do not, and never did, doubt. But here,
+as elsewhere where philosophical interests are concerned, it is important
+to separate the a priori sharply from the empirical, and to recognize that,
+within this widely conceived discipline, the findings of formal semantics
+relevant for grammarians have a peculiar character: they belong to an a
+priori discipline that should be kept apart in its purity. Here as elsewhere,
+one must subscribe to a great Kantian insight, and steep oneself in its sense:
+that one does not enrich, but rather subverts, the sciences if one blurs their
+boundaries. One must realize that a universal grammar in this widest sense
+is a concrete science which, like all concrete sciences, frequently brings
+together for explanatory purposes findings whose theoretical place lies in
+essentially different theoretical sciences, in empirical sciences, on the one
+hand, and in a priori sciences, on the other. Our age, oriented towards
+natural science, sees to it that generalizing, empirical investigations are not
+neglected in the grammatical field, nor in any other. What is a priori is not
+so favoured; even though all basic insights lead back to the a priori, our
+age's sense for it almost threatens to wither away. I therefore fairly take
+up the cudgels for the old doctrine of a grammaire générale et raisonnée, a
+philosophical grammar, for its obscure, undeveloped intention aiming at
+the 'rational' in speech, in the true sense of the word, and in particular at the
+"logic' of speech or its semantic a priori,
+If I am right, it is of basic importance for linguistic investigations that
+they should become clear as to the distinctions provisionally shadowed forth
+
+74 The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings
+here. They should possess themselves of the insight that the foundations
+ered in itself, forms a first, basic sphere, the pure theory of meaning-forms
+Considered from the standpoint of grammar, it must lay bare an ideal
+at random. To whatever extent the actual content and grammatical forms of
+historical languages are thus empirically determined, each is bound to this
+ideal framework: theoretical research into this framework must accordingly
+be one of the foundations of the final scientific clarification of all language
+as such. The main point to be kept in mind is this: all semantic types set
+forth in pure, formal semantics, and systematically explored in their articulations and structures - the basic forms of propositions, the categorical
+proposition with its many particular patterns and forms of members, the
+primitive types of propositionally complex propositions, e.g. the conjunctive, disjunctive and hypothetical propositional unities, the differences of
+universality and particularity, on the one hand, and of singularity, on the
+other, the syntactical forms of plurality, negation, the modalities etc. - all
+these matters are entirely a priori, rooted in the ideal essence of meanings
+as such. The same applies to the semantic formations to be conjured up by
+operational laws of compounding and modification out of these primitive
+They hold prime place over against their empirical-grammatical expressions, and resemble an absolutely fixed ideal framework, more or less
+perfectly revealed in empirical disguises. One must have this in mind in
+order to be able to ask significantly: How does German, Latin, Chinese etc.,
+express 'the' existential proposition, 'the' categorical proposition, 'the' antecedent of a hypothetical, the plural, 'the modalities of possibility and
+probability, 'the' negative etc? It is no matter of indifference whether the
+grammarian is content with a prescientific personal opinion on meaning
+forms, or with notions empirically contaminated by historical, e.g. by Latir
+grammar, or whether he keeps his eyes on a scientifically fixed, theoretically
+coherent system of pure meaning-forms, i.e. on our own form-theory of
+meanings.
+Considering the fact that in this lowest field of logic questions of truth,
+bjectivity, objective possibility are not yet relevant, and considering too i
+ist described role of rendering intelligible the ideal essence of all speech
+such, one might give this basic field of pure logic the name of pure logical
+
+The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings 75
+Note 2 After what has been said, no one will imagine that there could be a
+universal grammar in the sense of a universal science comprehending all
+particular grammars as contingent specifications, just as a universal mathematical theory contains all possible cases a priori in itself, and settles them
+all 'in one go'. Naturally we speak of a general or purely logical grammar in
+a sense analogous to that in which we speak of general linguistic science.
+Just as the latter deals with the universal principles that can be placed before
+the sciences of particular languages, and mainly, therefore, with the presuppositions and foundations equally relevant to all such languages, so pure
+logical grammar in its narrower sense explores only one of these foundations, which has pure logic for its theoretical home-territory. Its inclusion
+in linguistic science naturally only serves interests of application just as, in
+another direction, linguistic science itself satisfied similar interests in many
+chapters of psychology.
+Marty of course disagrees with me on these points, as also generally in
+regard to a theoretical classification into a priori and empirical researches
+(cf. loc. cit. §21, pp. 63 ff.). In the note to page 67, he holds that the logicogrammatical findings I credit to pure logic 'have, theoretically, their natural
+home in the psychology of language. Logic, and the nomothetic part of
+linguistic psychology, borrow from this what serves and suits their purpose'
+To me Marty's conception is basically mistaken. On it, we should ultimately
+have to class arithmetic, as well as all other formal disciplines in mathematics in - psychology, if not in linguistic psychology. For pure logic in the
+narrower sense, i.e. the doctrine of the validity of meanings, and the connected pure theory of meaning-forms, is, I hold, essentially one with these
+disciplines (cf. the final chapter of the Prolegomena). In the essential unity of
+a mathesis universalis all these sciences must be treated, and certainly be kept
+quite apart from all empirical sciences, whether styled 'physics' or 'psychology'.
+Mathematicians in fact do this, even if in naïvely dogmatic fashion, turning
+their back on specifically philosophical problems, and not worrying about
+philosophical objections - to the great profit, in my view, of their science.
+Note 3 Nothing has so much confused discussions of the question of the
+right relation of logic to grammar, as the constant confusion of two logical
+
+76 The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings
+spheres, sharply distinguished by us as lower and upper, and characterized
+by way of their negative counterparts - the spheres of nonsense and of
+formal absurdity respectively. The logical sphere, in the sense of the upper
+sphere oriented towards formal truth and objectivity, is certainly irrelevant
+to grammar. This is not true of all logic whatever. If, however, one tried to
+discredit the lower logical sphere on account of its supposed narrow obviousness and practical uselessness, one would have to say that it ill befits the
+philosopher, the dedicated representative of purely theoretical interests, to
+let himself be guided by considerations of practical use. He must surely also
+now that it is precisely behind the obvious that the hardest problems li
+aidden, that this is so much so, in fact, that philosophy may be paradoxi
+cally, but not unprofoundly, called the science of the trivial. In the present
+case at least what seems at first quite trivial, reveals itself, on closer examination, as the source of deep-lying, widely ramif ying problems. These problems, though intrinsically prior in the sense of Aristotle, are not the first to
+make themselves felt by logicians, concerned as these are with objective
+validity: it is not, therefore, remarkable that, till this day, no logicians, not
+even Bolzano, have even formulated these problems scientifically, have
+formed the idea of a purely logical theory of forms. Logic accordingly lacks
+its prime foundation; it lacks a scientifically strict, phenomenologically
+clarified distinction of primitive meaning-elements and structures, and a
+knowledge of relevant laws of essence. We may thus explain how, in particular, the many theories of 'the concept or 'the judgement, which in certain
+of their aspects belong in this field, have produced so few tenable results.
+This is to a large extent due to a lack of correct aims and viewpoints, to
+confusions of radically distinct layers of problems, and to a psychologism
+operative openly or in manifold disguises. Since the eye of the logician is
+ever on form, these defects also point to difficulties inherent in these matters
+Note 4 For related but opposed conceptions one may refer to H. Steinthal's
+Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft (Introduction IV,
+'Sprechen und Denken, Grammatik und Logik', pp. 44 ff.). I refer especially
+to his beautifully precise statement of the notion of W. v. Humboldt (loc. cit.
+pp. 63 ff.), from which it would seem that the views stated here are in some
+points close to those of the great thinker, whom Steinthal also respects.
+Steinthal himself sides against us, and raises many objections to our views,
+but our distinctions would seem to have disposed of these all so clearly, that
+no thoroughgoing criticism is required here
+
+Investigation V
+On intentional experiences
+and their 'contents'
+
+In our Second Investigation we clarified the general sense of the ideality of
+the Species and, together with it, the sense of the ideality of meanings with
+which pure logic is concerned. As with all ideal unities, there are here real
+possibilities, and perhaps actualities, which correspond to meanings: to meanings in specie correspond acts of meaning, the former being nothing but
+ideally apprehended aspects of the latter. New questions now arise regardng the kind of experiences in which the supreme genus Meaning has it
+riginative source, and likewise regarding the various sorts of experiences i
+which essentially different sorts of meaning unfold. We wish to enquire into
+the originative source of the concept of Meaning and its essential specifications, so as to achieve a deeper-going, more widely ranging answer to our
+question than our investigations have so far given us. In very close connec
+tion with this question, certain other questions arise: meanings have to be
+present in meaning-intentions that can come into a certain relation to intuition. We have often spoken of the fulfilment of a meaning-intention through
+a corresponding intuition, and have said that the highest form of such fulflment was that of self-evidence. It is therefore our task to describe this
+remarkable phenomenological relationship, and to lay down its role, and so
+to clarify the notions of knowledge which presuppose it. For an analytical
+investigation these tasks are not really separable from our earlier work on
+the essence of meaning (particularly as this last relates to the logical presentation and the logical judgement).
+The present investigation will not yet embark on these tasks, since we
+phenomenological investigation. Experiences of meaning are classifiable
+as 'acts', and the meaningful element in each such single act must be sough
+n the act-experience, and not in its obiect: it must lie in that element whic
+makes the act an 'intentional' experience, one 'directed' to objects. The
+essence of the fulfilling intuition likewise consists in acts, for thinking anc
+in descriptive psychology is, however, more controversial than the term
+
+80 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+ages in our previous Investigations where we made use of the notion o
+act' to characterize or express our conception. It is therefore importan
+ense of an intentional experience, circumscribes an important generic unit
+n the sphere of experiences (apprehended in its phenomenological purity
+It is of course part of phenomenological research into the essence of acts
+as such, that we should clear up the difference between the character and
+the content of acts, and that, as regards the latter, we should point out the
+fundamentally different senses in which the 'content' of an act has been
+The nature of acts as such cannot be satisfactorily discussed unless one
+goes fairly fully into the phenomenology of 'presentations'. The intimate
+relevance of this topic is recalled by the well-known statement, that every
+act is either a presentation or is founded upon presentations. We must,
+however, ask which of the very many concepts of 'presentation' is here the
+required one: to separate the closely confused phenomena underlying the
+ambiguities of this word thus becomes an essential part of our task.
+The treatment of the problems thus roughly outlined (to which certain
+others will be intimately linked) is suitably connected by us with the many
+concepts of consciousness which are always being distinguished, and are
+always shading into one another in descriptive psychology. Mental acts are
+often called 'activities of consciousness', 'relations of consciousness to a
+content (object)', and 'consciousness' is, in fact, at times defined as a comprehensive expression covering mental acts of all sorts.
+
+Consciousness as the
+phenomenological subsistence of
+the ego and consciousness as inner
+perception
+§I Varied ambiguity of the term 'consciousness'
+In psychology there is much talk of'consciousness', and likewise of'conscious
+contents' and 'conscious experiences': the latter are generally abbreviated to
+'contents' and 'experiences'. This talk is mainly connected with the division
+between psychical and physical phenomena; the former being those phenom-
+1. Consciousness as the entire, real (reelle) phenomenological being of the
+empirical ego, as the interweaving of psychic experiences in the unified
+stream of consciousness.
+2. Consciousness as the inner awareness of one's own psychic experiences.
+3. Consciousness as a comprehensive designation for 'mental acts, or 'intentional experiences, of all sorts.
+It need hardly be said that we have not exhausted all ambiguities of
+the term in question. I particularly recall, e.g., modes of speech current in
+non-scientific parlance such as 'entering consciousness', 'coming to consciousness', 'heightened' or 'reduced' self-consciousness, the 'awakening of
+self-consciousness' (the last expression quite differently used in psychology
+from the sense given it in ordinary life), and so forth.
+Since all terms at all relevant for terminological differentiation are
+ambiguous, an unambiguous fixing of the concepts which here distinguish
+themselves can only be done indirectly: we must put together equivalent
+
+82 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+expressions, and oppose them to expressions to be kept apart from them, and
+we must employ suitable paraphrases and explanations. We shall therefore
+have to make use of these aids.
+§2 First sense: Consciousness as the real
+phenomenological unity of the ego's experiences.
+The concept of an experience
+We begin with the following summary statement. The modern psychologist
+defines (or could define) his science as the science of 'psychic individuals'
+considered as concrete conscious unities, or as the science of the conscious
+experiences of experiencing individuals; the juxtaposition of these terms in
+this context determines a certain concept of consciousness and, at the same
+time, certain concepts of experience and content. These latter terms, 'experience' and 'content', mean for the modern psychologist the real occurrences
+(Wundt rightly calls them 'events') which, in flux from one moment to the
+next, and interconnected and interpenetrating in manifold ways, compose
+the real unity-of-consciousness of the individual mind. In this sense, percepts, imaginative and pictorial presentations, acts of conceptual thinking,
+surmises and doubts, joys and griefs, hopes and fears, wishes and acts of will
+etc., are, just as they flourish in our consciousness, 'experiences' or 'contents
+of consciousness'. And, with these experiences in their total and concrete
+fulness, their component parts and abstract aspects are also experienced:
+they are real contents of consciousness. Naturally, it is irrelevant whether
+these parts are in some manner inwardly articulated, whether they are marked
+off by special acts directed upon themselves, and whether, in particular, they
+are themselves objects of an 'inner' perception, which seizes them as they are
+in consciousness, and even whether they can be such objects or not.
+We may now point out that this concept of consciousness can be seen in a
+purely phenomenological manner, ie. a manner which cuts out all relation to
+empirically real existence (to persons or animals in nature): experience in
+the descriptive-psychological or empirically-phenomenological sense then
+becomes experience in the sense of pure phenomenology. The clarifying
+illustrations that we now append may and must lead to the conviction that
+the required exclusion lies always in our power, and that the descriptivepsychological treatments that we have first applied or might first apply to
+such illustrations, are to be interpreted 'purely' in the manner sketched
+above, and to be understood in what follows as pure, a priori insights into
+essence. The same, of course, holds in all parallel cases.
+The sensational moment of colour, e.g., which in outer perception forms
+a real constituent of my concrete seeing (in the phenomenological sense of a
+visual perceiving or appearing) is as much an 'experienced' or 'conscious'
+content, as is the character of perceiving, or as the full perceptual appearing
+of the coloured object. As opposed to this, however, this object, though
+
+Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego 83
+perceived, is not itself experienced nor conscious, and the same applies to
+the colouring perceived in it. If the object is non-existent, if the percept is
+open to criticism as delusive, hallucinatory, illusory etc., then the visually
+perceived colour, that of the object, does not exist either. Such differences of
+normal and abnormal, of veridical and delusive perception, do not affect the
+internal, purely descriptive (or phenomenological) character of perception.
+While the seen colour, ie. the colour appearing upon and with the appearing object of visual perception, and seen as its property, and one with it in
+its present being - while this colour certainly does not exist as an experience,
+there is a real part (reelles Bestand stück) of our experience, of this appearing
+to perception, which corresponds to it. Our colour-sensation corresponds to
+it, that qualitatively determinate phenomenological colour-aspect, which receives an 'objectifying interpretation' in perception, or in an intrinsic aspect
+of such perception (the 'appearance of the object's colouring'). These two,
+the colour-sensation and the object's objective colouring, are often confounded. In our time people have favoured a form of words according to
+which both are the same thing, only seen from a different standpoint, or with
+a different interest: psychologically or subjectively speaking, one has a sensation, physically or objectively speaking, one has a property of an external
+thing. Here it is enough to point to the readily grasped difference between
+the red of this ball, objectively seen as uniform, and the indubitable, unavoidable projective differences among the subjective colour-sensations in our
+percept, a difference repeated in all sorts of objective properties and the
+sensational complexes which correspond to them.
+What we have said about single properties carries over to concrete wholes.
+It is phenomenologically false to say that the difference between a conscious
+content in perception, and the external object perceived (or perceptually
+intended) in it, is a mere difference in mode of treatment, the same appearance being at one time dealt with in a subjective connection (in connection
+with appearances which relate to an ego), and at another time in an objective connection (in connection with the things themselves). We cannot too
+sharply stress the equivocation which allows us to use the word 'appearance'
+both of the experience in which the object's appearing consists (the concrete
+erceptual experience, in which the object itself seems present to us) and o
+he object which appears as such. The deceptive spell of this equivocatio
+vanishes as soon as one takes phenomenological account as to how little
+of the object which appears is as such to be found in the experience of its
+appearing. The appearing of the thing (the experience) is not the thing
+which appears (that seems to stand before us in propria persona). As belong.
+ing in a conscious connection, the appearing of things is experienced by us,
+as belonging in the phenomenal world, things appear before us. The appearing of the things does not itself appear to us, we live through it.
+If we ourselves appear to ourselves as members of the phenomenal world,?
+physical and mental things (bodies and persons) appear in physical and
+
+84 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+mental relation to our phenomenal ego. This relation of the phenomenal
+object (that we also like to call a 'conscious content') to the phenomenal subject (myself as an empirical person, a thing) must naturally be kept apart from
+the relation of a conscious content, in the sense of an experience, to consciousness in the sense of a unity of such conscious contents (the phenomenological
+subsistence of an empirical ego). There we were concerned with the relation
+of two appearing things, here with the relation of a single experience to a
+complex of experiences. Just so, conversely, we must of course distinguish
+the relation of the appearing person I to the externally appearing thing,
+from the relation of the thing's appearing ('qua' experience) to the thing which
+appears. If we speak of the latter relation, we only make clear to ourselves
+that the experience is not itself what is intentionally present 'in' it: we can,
+e.g., make plain that what is predicated of a thing's appearing is not also
+predicated of the thing that appears in it. And yet another relation is the
+objectifying relation ascribed by us to the sense-complex experienced by us
+when something appears to us, a relation in which the complex stands to the
+object which appears to us. We concede that such a complex is experienced in
+he act eived eari holtay hit it is in enemain manner intereste
+an animating interpretation of sensation that what we call the appearing of
+the obiect consists.
+Similar distinctions of essence to those needed by us in the case of perception, when we sought to separate off what is really 'experience' in it and
+really composes it, from what is only 'in' it in an 'improper or intentional
+sense, will have soon to be drawn in the case of other 'acts' as well. We shall
+soon have to deal with such distinctions more generally. Here it is only important to guard from the start against certain misleading thought-tendencies,
+which might obscure the plain sense of the notions to be elucidated.
+§3 The phenomenological and the popular concept
+of experience
+A similar aim leads us to point out that our concept of experience does not
+tally with the popular notion; here the distinction just sketched, between
+real (reellem) and intentional content, has its part to play.
+If someone says he 'experienced' the wars of 1866 and 1870, then what he
+has been said to have 'experienced' in this sense, is a complex of outer
+events, and 'experiencing' consists here in perceptions, judgements and other
+acts, in which these events appear as objects, and often as objects of certain
+assertions which relate them to the empirical ego. The experiencing ego, in
+the phenomenologically paradigmatic sense, has naturally not got these events
+in itself as things mentally lived through, as its real constituents or contents,
+in the way in which these events are in the things concerned in them. What
+it finds in itself, what are present in it as realities, are the relevant acts of
+
+Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego 85
+perceiving, judging etc., with their variable sense-material, their interpretative content, their assertive characters etc. Experiencing in the latter sense
+what the ego or consciousness experiences, are its experience: there is no
+difference between the experience or conscious content and the experience
+itself. What is sensed is, e.g., no different from the sensation. If, however, an
+experience 'directs itself' to an object distinguishable from itself, as, e.g.,
+external perception directs itself to a perceived object, a nominal presentation to an object named etc., such an object is not experienced or conscious
+in the sense to be established here, but perceived, named etc.
+The situation justifies talk of 'contents', which is here entirely proper. The
+normal sense of the word 'content' is relative: it refers quite generally to a
+comprehensive unity which has its content in the sum total of its component
+parts. Whatever can be regarded as a part of a whole, and as truly constituting it in real fashion (reell), belongs to the content of that whole. In our
+current descriptive-psychological talk of contents, the tactitly assumed relational focus, i.e. the corresponding whole, is the real unity of consciousness
+Its content is the sum total of present experiences, and 'contents' in the
+plural means these experiences themselves, i.e. all that as real parts constitute any phenomenological stream of consciousness.
+§4 The relation between experiencing consciousness
+and experienced content is no phenomenologically
+peculiar type of relation
+The foregoing exposition has made clear that the relation in which experione's own ego as much as someone else's, and each ego as much as any
+physical thing, a house or a tree etc. Scientific elaboration may alter our
+ego-concept as much as it will, but, if it avoids fiction, the ego remains an
+individual, thinglike object, which, like all such objects, has phenomenally
+no other unity than that given it through its unified phenomenal properties,
+and which in them has its own internal make-up. If we cut out the ego-body
+from the empirical ego, and limit the purely mental ego to its phenomenological content, the latter reduces to a unity of consciousness, to a real
+
+86 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+experiential complex, which we (i.e. each man for his own ego) find in
+selves in more comprehensive unities and, in so far as they thus become
+and are one, the phenomenological ego or unity of consciousness is already
+constituted, without need of an additional, peculiar ego-principle which
+supports all contents and unites them all once again. Here as elsewhere it is
+not clear what such a principle would effect.
+§5 Second sense. 'Inner' consciousness as
+inner perception
+Our sense of the terms 'consciousness'.
+", 'experience", 'content", has been fixed
+in the treatments of the last three sections, a descriptive-psychological sens
+which, with phenomenological 'purification', becomes purely phenomenological
+We wish to adhere to this sense in future, but only when other concepts
+have been expressly indicated.
+¡ciousness'. This is that 'inner perception
+relate to them as its objects. The 'self-evidence' usually attributed to inner
+perception, shows it to be taken to be an adequate perception, one ascribing
+ively presents and posits its objects just as they are in fact experienced in
+of grasping its object as present, and in propria persona. To this intention
+perception corresponds with complete perfection, achieves adequacy, if the
+object in it is itself actually present, and in the strictest sense present in
+propria persona, is exhaustively apprehended as that which it is, and is there.
+fore itself a real (reell) factor in our perceiving of it. It is accordingly clear,
+and evident from the mere essence of perception, that adequate perception
+can only be 'inner' perception, that it can only be trained upon experiences
+simultaneously given, and belonging to a single experience with itself. This
+holds, precisely stated, only for experiences in the purely phenomenological
+sense. One cannot, however, at all concur with the converse opinion and
+say, in psychological language, that each percept directed upon one's own
+
+Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego 87
+inner experience (which would be called an "inner percept in the natural
+sense of the word) need be adequate. In view of the just exposed ambiguity
+logically misused distinction of inner and outer perception would then vanish;
+it has been put in the place of the genuine contrast between adequate and
+nadequate perception which has its roots in the pure phenomenologica
+essences of such experiences. [On this point, see the Appendix on interna
+and external perception,]
+Many thinkers, as, e.g., Brentano, are led to posit a close connection between
+the two concepts of consciousness so far discussed, because they think that
+they may regard the consciousness, or the being-experienced, of contents, in
+the first sense, as at the same time a consciousness in the second sense. The
+equivocation which pushes us to treat consciousness as a sort of knowing,
+and in fact of intuitive knowing, may here have recommended a conception
+fraught with too many grave difficulties. I recall the infinite regress which
+ence, which requires a new percept, to which the same again applies etc., a
+and a secondary direction of perception. Since our concern is here with
+purely phenomenological asseverations, we must leave theories of this sort
+on one side, so long, that is, as the need to assume the unbroken activity of
+inner perception cannot be phenomenologically demonstrated.
+§6 Origin of the first concept of consciousness
+out of the second
+one. If we consider the self-evidence of the Cogito, ergo sum, or rather of its
+simple sum, as one that can be sustained against all doubts, then it is plain
+that what here passes as ego cannot be the empirical ego. But since, on the
+other hand, we cannot allow the self-evidence of the proposition I am' to
+depend on the knowledge and acceptance of philosophical ideas about
+the ego which have always remained questionable, we can at best say: In
+the judgement 'I am' self-evidence attaches to a certain central kernel of
+our empirical ego-notion which is not bounded by a perfectly clear concept.
+If we now ask what could belong to this conceptually undemarcated and
+therefore unutterable kernel, what may constitute the self-evidently certain,
+given element in the empirical ego at each moment, it comes easy to refer to
+judgements of inner (i.e. adequate) perception. Not only is it self-evident
+that I am: self-evidence also attaches to countless judgements of the form
+
+88
+I perceive this or that, where I not merely think, but am also self-evidently
+assured, that what I perceive is given as I think of it, that I apprehend the
+thing itself, and for what it is - this pleasure, e.g., that fills me, this phantasm of the mind that float before me etc. All these judgements share the lot
+of the judgement 'I am', they elude complete conceptualization and expression, they are evident only in their living intention, which cannot be adequately imparted in words. What is adequately perceived, whether expressed
+thus vaguely or left unexpressed, constitutes the epistemologically primary,
+absolutely certain focus yielded by the reduction, at any given moment, of
+the phenomenal empirical ego to such of its content as can be grasped by
+the pure phenomenologist. It is also true, conversely, that in the judgement
+I am', it is the kernel of what is adequately perceived which, ranged under
+the ego, first makes possible and provides a ground for this I am's' evidence. To this primary focus more territory is added when we reduce to its
+past phenomenological content all that retention, essentially attached to
+perception, reports as having been recently present, and also all that recollection reports as having belonged to our earlier actual experience, and
+when we then go back through reflection to what 'in' retention and remembrance is reproductively phenomenological. We proceed similarly with what
+can be assumed on empirical grounds to coexist with what at each instant
+we adequately perceive, or with what can be assumed to have coexisted with
+what now forms the reflective substance of retention and recollection, and
+can be assumed to have cohered continuously with it in unity. When I say
+'cohered continuously with it in unity, I refer to the unity of the concrete
+phenomenological whole, whose parts are either abstract aspects, mutually
+founded upon, and requiring each other in their coexistence, or pieces from
+whose nature spring forms of coexistent unity, forms which actually contribute to the content of the whole as real indwelling aspects. These 'unities
+of coexistence' pass continuously into one another from one moment to the
+next, composing a unity of change, of the stream of consciousness, which in
+its turn demands the continuous persistence, or no continuous change, of at
+least one aspect essential for its total unity, and so inseparable from it as
+a whole. This part is played by the presentative form of time which is immanent in the stream of consciousness, which latter appears as a unity in
+time (not in the time of the world of things, but in the time which appears
+together with the stream of consciousness itself, and in which the stream
+flows). Each instant of this time is given in a continuous projective series of
+(so-to-speak) 'time-sensations'; in each actual phase of the stream of consciousness the whole time-horizon of the stream is presented, and it thereby
+possesses a form overreaching all its contents, which remains the same form
+continuously, though its content steadily alters
+This accordingly forms the phenomenological content of the ego, of the
+empirical ego in the sense of the psychic subject. Phenomenological reduction
+yields the really self-enclosed, temporally growing unity of the stream of
+
+Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego 89
+experience. The notion of experience has widened out from what is inwardly
+perceived, and that is in this sense conscious, to the notion of the 'phenomenological ego', by which the empirical ego is intentionally constituted.
+§7 Reciprocal demarcation of psychology and
+natural science (first edition)
+(Paragraph from the First Edition, excised by Husserl from the Second
+Edition as being unclear and irrelevant.)
+Psychology's task - descriptively - is to study the ego-experiences (or conscious contents) in their essential species and forms of combination, in order
+to explore - genetically - their origin and perishing, and the causal patterns
+and laws of their formation and transformation. For psychology, conscious
+contents are contents of an ego, and so its task is to explore the real essence
+of the ego (no mystical thing-in-itself but one only to be demonstrated
+empirically), to explore the interweaving of psychic elements in the ego, and
+their subsequent development and degeneration.
+To empirical egos stand opposed empirical, physical things, non-egos,
+unities of coexistence and succession, having a claim to exist as things. To
+us, who are egos, they are only given as intentional unities, as things referred to in psychical experiences, as unities presented or judged about.
+They are not for this reason themselves mere presentations, any more than
+the same is true of the egos alien to ourselves. Physical things are given to
+us, they stand before us, they are objects - this means that we have certain
+percepts and judgements fitted to them which are 'directed to these objects'
+To the system of all such percepts and judgements corresponds its intentional correlate, the physical world. As we deal with the system of such
+judgements in individuals, or as the common judgement-system of a community of individuals, or in the unity of science, we should draw more
+empirical, social community, and perhaps the world of an ideal community
+of knowers, the world of (ideally perfected) science, the world in itself
+Psychical experiences and the ego likewise document their being and thei
+law-governed connections only in science as a system of obiectively vali
+lappens in the case of physical things. The doctrine of Berkeley and Hum
+vhich reduces phenomenal bodies to bundles of ideas, fails to do justice t
+realizable, the bundle itself, the intended complexes of elements, are never
+present in real fashion (reell gegenwärtig) in any human consciousness and
+never will be. No body can be inwardly perceived - not because it is "physical,
+
+90 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+but because, e.g., its three-dimensional spatiality cannot be adequately intuited in any consciousness. But adequate intuition is the same as internal
+perception. It is the fundamental defect of phenomenalistic theories that
+they draw no distinction between appearance (Erscheinung) as intentional
+experience, and the apparent object (the subject of the objective predicates),
+and therefore identify the experienced complex of sensation with the complex of objective features. In any case the objective unities of psychology
+and those of natural science are not identical, at least not, as in the position
+of first data, they await scientific elaboration. Whether the two sciences in
+their full development will still be separated, depends on whether they really
+concern separate, or at least relatively self-sufficient realities in their mutual
+relation. (Such self-sufficiency does not of course entail necessary separation
+of the two realities by any mystical abysses.) We can turn the matter round
+and say: If there is such a separation, we can only learn of it as both sciences
+develop. It is sure, at least, that their points of origin, the original spheres of
+facts that they attempt to elaborate, are to a large extent mutually independent, and that this is true, further, as regards their advancing growth.
+We can indeed not exclude the possibility which is presented by phenomenalism as a proven theory - to me phenomenalism has not advanced
+beyond vague, if by no means worthless lines of thought - that the objective
+bases of all talk of physical things and happenings lie merely in lawgoverned correlations established among the psychical experiences of many
+consciousnesses. The acceptance of such a theory would not, however, remove the separation of the sciences. The distinction between lived experiences, conscious contents, and the non-experiences presented in such
+experiences (and perceived in them or judged to exist) would remain as
+before the foundation for the division of the sciences as departments of reason. It would therefore be the foundation for the sort of division that alone
+is in question at the present stage of development of the sciences. With the
+demand of a 'psychology without a soul', i.e. a psychology that abandons
+all metaphysical presumptions in regard to the soul - and does so because
+they could only become insights when science was perfected - corresponds
+the demand of a 'natural science without bodies', i.e. a natural science that
+begins by rejecting all theories as to the metaphysical nature of the physical.
+Such a theory which puts metaphysics in bondage from the outset, is what
+we have in phenomenalism. But it ought not to anticipate the answer to
+the question as to the division of the two sciences. The division must rest
+on purely phenomenological ground, and I think that, in this respect, our
+discussions above were well suited to resolve the much-debated question
+in a satisfactory manner. They only make use of the most fundamental
+phenomenological distinctions, those between the descriptive content and
+the intended object of our percepts and of our "acts' in general
+This distinction has naturally not escaped the psychologists. We find it
+in Hobbes, Descartes and Locke. One can say that all the greater modern
+thinkers have at times touched on it or treated of it. It is only a pity that
+
+Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego 9l
+they merely do so at times, instead of starting with the distinction, and
+taking the closest account of it at every step, instead, that is, of making it
+the foundation of scientific epistemology and psychology. Only in this manner
+can there be scientific correctness in our way of speech and thought, al-
+What we are conscious of, in the narrower sense, is something apparent
+and, if one wishes to speak of such a thing, in the usual way, as a 'phenomenon',
+a psychic phenomenon. As against this, far the greater part of what we are conscious of, in the wider sense of the word, is not, properly speaking, apparent.
+For one would certainly not wish to assert that all psychic being is perceived
+or is even perceptible (i.e. in the sense of a real possibility). The definition of
+psychology as the science of psychic phenomena must therefore be understood
+just as we understand the definition of natural science as the science of physical
+phenomena. The phenomena in question do not mean an objective scientific
+field which they are to exhaust, but only the nearest points of attack for our
+scientific researches. So understood, these definitions raise no objections.
+§8 The pure ego and awareness ('Bewusstheit')
+We have not so far referred to the pure ego (the ego of 'pure apperception')
+which for many Kantians, and likewise for many empirical investigators,
+provides the unitary centre of relation, to which all conscious content is as
+such referred in a wholly peculiar fashion. To the fact of 'subjective experience' or consciousness, this pure ego is accordingly held to pertain essentially. 'Consciousness is relation to the ego', and whatever stands in this
+relation is a content of consciousness. We call anything content if it is
+related to an ego in consciousness: its other properties are irrelevant.' "This
+relation is plainly one and the same despite manifold variation of content: it
+constitutes, in fact, what is common and specific to consciousness. We mark
+it off, says Natorp (whom we are continuously quoting),? 'by the special
+expression "awareness" (Bewusstheit) to distinguish it from the total fact of
+consciousness.'
+The ego as subjective centre of relation for all contents in my consciousness, cannot be compared to what are contrasted with it, it is not relative to them as they are to it, it is not consciously given to its contents as
+they are given to it. It reveals itself as sui generis in its incapacity to be
+in anything else's consciousness, while other things are in its consciousness. It cannot itself be a content, and resembles nothing that could
+be a content of consciousness. For this reason, it can be no further
+described, since all descriptive terms we might seek to employ, could be
+drawn only from the content of consciousness, and could not therefore
+hit off the ego, or a relation to the ego. Otherwise put: each idea we
+could make of the ego would turn it into an object, but we have ceased
+
+92 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+to think of it as an ego, if we think of it as an object. To be an ego is not
+The fact of awareness, while it is the basic fact of psychology, can be
+acknowledged and specially emphasized, but it can neither be defined
+nor deduced from anything else.
+These statements are impressive, but closer consideration fails to substantiate them. How can we assert such a 'basic fact of psychology', if we
+are unable to think it, and how can we think it, if not by making the ego and
+consciousness, both subject-matters of our assertion, into 'objects? This
+might be done if we thought of this fact only in indirect, symbolic fashion.
+Natorp, however, wants it to be a 'basic fact', which must as such surely be
+given in direct intuition. He in fact tells us that it 'can be acknowledged and
+specially emphasized'. Surely what is acknowledged or emphasized will be
+content? Surely it will be made into an object? Perhaps, indeed, some narrower
+concept of object is excluded, but the wider concept is here relevant. A taking
+note of a thought, a sensation, a stirring of displeasure etc., makes these
+experiences objects of inner perception, without making them objects in the
+sense of things, just so, the ego as relational centre, and any particular relation of the ego to some content, will, if taken note of, be objectively given.
+I must frankly confess, however, that I am quite unable to find this ego,
+this primitive, necessary centre of relations. The only thing I can take note
+of, and therefore perceive, are the empirical ego and its empirical relations
+to its own experiences, or to such external objects as are receiving special
+attention at the moment, while much remains, whether 'without' or 'within',
+which has no such relation to the ego.
+I can only clarify this situation by subjecting the empirical ego, with its
+empirical relation to objects, to phenomenological analysis, from which
+the above conception necessarily results. We excluded the body-ego, whose
+appearances resemble those of any other physical thing, and dealt with the
+mind-ego, which is empirically bound up with the former, and appears as
+belonging to it. Reduced to data that are phenomenologically actual, this
+yields us the complex of reflectively graspable experiences described above,
+a complex which stands in the same sort of relation to the mental ego as the
+side of a perceived external thing open to perception stands to the whole
+thing. The conscious intentional relation of the ego to its objects means for
+me simply that intentional experiences whose intentional objects are the egoody, the personal ego-mind and therefore the entire empirical ego-subje
+r human person, are included in the total phenomenological being of
+unity of consciousness, and that such intentional experiences also constitute
+an essential phenomenological kernel in the phenomenal ego.
+
+Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego 93
+notice, acts in which the ego directs itself to the appropriate object.
+I am unable, further, to grasp the view that the relation of the ego to
+conscious content is bare of all difference. For if by 'content' we mean the
+experience which forms the real side of the phenomenological ego, surely
+the way in which contents enter the unity of experience will depend throughout on their specific nature, which is true of all parts that enter into wholes?
+But, if by 'content' we mean some object upon which consciousness 'directs
+itself', whether perceivingly, imaginingly, retrospectively, expectantly, conceptually or predicatively etc., then it plainly involves many differences,
+obvious even in running through the expressions just used.
+Objection may be raised to our previous assertion that the ego appears to
+itself, enjoys a consciousness and, in particular, a perception of itself. Selfperception of the empirical ego is, however, a daily business, which involves
+no difficulty for understanding. We perceive the ego, just as we perceive an
+external thing. That the object does not offer all its parts and sides to perception is as irrelevant in this case as in that. For perception is essentially the
+presumptive apprehension of some object, not its adequate intuition. Perception itself, though part of the ego's phenomenological being, naturally falls,
+like so much else in consciousness that evades notice, beyond the glance of
+perception, much as ungrasped, yet apparent, aspects of a perceived external thing are not themselves perceived. Ego and thing are in either case said
+to be perceived, and perceived they indeed are, and in full, 'bodily' presence.
+Additional Note to the Second Edition. I must expressly emphasize that the
+attitude here taken up to the question of the pure ego - an attitude I no longer
+endorse, as remarked before - is irrelevant to the investigations of this volume.
+Important as this question may be, phenomenologically or in other respects,
+there remain wide fields of phenomenological problems, relating more or less
+generally to the real content of intentional experiences, and to their relation
+of essence to intentional objects, which can be systematically explored without taking up any stance on the ego-issue. The present investigations are
+entirely confined to such problems. But since such an important work as
+volume I of P. Natorp's Second Edition of his Einleitung in die Psychologie
+concerns itself with what I have said above, I have not simply struck it out.
+
+Consciousness as intentional
+experience
+We must now embark upon a fuller analytic discussion of our third concept
+of consciousness, which ranges over the same phenomenological field as the
+concept of 'mental act'. In connection with this, talk of conscious contents,
+talk in particular concerning contents of presentations, judgements etc., gains
+a variety of meanings, which it is all-important to sort out and to subject to
+the sharpest scrutiny.
+69 The meaning of Brentano's demarcation of
+'psychic phenomena'
+Among the demarcations of classes in descriptive psychology, there is none
+nore remarkable nor more important philosophically than the one offere
+y Brentano under his title of 'psychical phenomena', and used by him i
+his well-known division of phenomena into psychical and physical. Not
+that I can approve of the great thinker's guiding conviction, plain from the
+22222
+science as the science of physical phenomena, but there are good reasons
+for disputing the view that the concepts which occur in Brentano's division
+are those found under like names in the definitions in question. It can be
+shown that not all 'psychical phenomena' in the sense of a possible definition of psychology, are psychical phenomena (i.e. mental acts) in Brentano's
+sense, and that, on the other hand, many genuine 'psychical phenomena' fall
+under Brentano's ambiguous rubric of 'physical phenomena'.' The value of
+Brentano's conception of a 'psychical phenomenon' is, however, quite independent of the aims that inspired it. A sharply defined class of experiences is
+here brought before us, comprising all that enjoys mental, conscious existence in a certain pregnant sense of these words. A real being deprived of
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience 95
+such experiences, merely having? contents inside it such as the experiences
+of sensation, but unable to interpret these objectively, or otherwise use them
+to make objects present to itself, quite incapable, therefore, of referring to
+objects in further acts of judgement, joy, grief, love, hatred, desire and
+loathing - such a being would not be called 'psychical' by anyone. If one
+doubts whether it is at all possible to conceive of such a being, a mere
+complex of sensations, one has but to point to external phenomenal things,
+aside from psychology, and entering the field of the philosophical disciplines
+proper, we perceive the fundamental importance of our class of experiences,
+since only its members are relevant in the highest ranks of the normative
+sciences. They alone, seized in their phenomenological purity, furnish concrete bases for abstracting the fundamental notions that function system
+atically in logic, ethics and aesthetics, and that enter into the ideal laws of
+these sciences. Our mention of logic recalls the particular interest which has
+inspired our whole probing into such experiences.
+§10 Descriptive characterization of acts as
+'intentional' experiences
+sychical phenomena or acts. This strikes us unmistakably in any illustratio
+ve choose. In perception something is perceived. in imagination, somethin
+of an object, and by what we, not without ambiguity, call the relation to
+content, the direction to an object (by which a reality is not to be under
+stood) or an immanent objectivity. Each mental phenomenon contains some
+thing as object in itself, though not all in the same manner'.! This 'manne
+in which consciousness refers to an object' (an expression used by Brentano
+
+96 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+in other passages) is presentative in a presentation, judicial in a judgement
+etc. etc. Brentano's attempted classification of mental phenomena into presentations, judgements and emotions ('phenomena of love and hate') is plainly
+based upon this 'manner of reference', of which three basically different
+kinds are distinguished (each admitting of many further specifications).
+Whether we think Brentano's classification of 'psychical' phenomena
+successful, and whether we think it basically significant for the whole treatment of psychology, as Brentano claims it is, does not matter here. Only one
+point has importance for us: that there are essential, specific differences of
+intentional relation or intention (the generic descriptive character of 'acts').
+The manner in which a 'mere presentation' refers to its object, differs from
+the manner of a judgement, which treats the same state of affairs as true or
+false. Quite different again is the manner of a surmise or doubt, the manner
+of a hope or a fear, of approval or disapproval, of desire or aversion; of the
+resolution of a theoretical doubt (judgemental decision) or of a practical
+doubt (voluntary decision in the case of deliberate choice); of the confirmation of a theoretical opinion (fulfilment of a judgemental intention), or of a
+voluntary intention (fulfilment of what we mean to do). Most, if not all, acts
+are complex experiences, very often involving intentions which are themselves multiple. Emotional intentions are built upon presentative or judging
+intentions etc. We cannot, however, doubt that to resolve such complexes is
+always to come down on primitive intentional characters whose descriptive
+essence precludes reduction into other types of experience, and that the
+unity of the descriptive genus 'intention' ('act-character') displays specific
+differences, flowing from its pure essence, which take a priori precedence
+over empirical, psychological matters-of-fact. There are essentially different
+species and subspecies of intention. We cannot, in particular, reduce all differences in acts into differences in the presentations or judgements they
+involve, with help only from elements not of an intentional kind. Aesthetic
+approval or disapproval, e.g., is evidently and essentially a peculiar mode
+of intentional relation as opposed to the mere presentation or theoretical
+assessment of the aesthetic object. Aesthetic approval and aesthetic predicates may be asserted, and their assertion is a judgement, and as such includes
+presentations. But the aesthetic intention and its objects are then objects
+of presentations and judgements: it remains essentially distinct from these
+theoretical acts. To evaluate a judgement as valid, an emotional experience
+as elevated etc., presupposes analogous, closely related, not specifically
+identical intentions. Just so in comparisons of judgemental with voluntary
+decisions etc.
+We take intentional relation, understood in purely descriptive fashion as
+an inward peculiarity of certain experiences, to be the essential feature of
+"psychical phenomena' or 'acts', seeing in Brentano's definition of them as
+'phenomena intentionally containing objects in themselves' a circumscription of essence, whose 'reality' (in the traditional sense) is of course ensured
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience 97
+by examples. Differently put in terms of pure phenomenology: Ideation
+erformed in exemplary cases of such experiences - and so performed a
+o leave empirical-psychological conception and existential affirmation of
+tent of these experiences - yields us the pure, phenomenological generic Ide
+of intentional experience or act, and of its various pure species. That not
+intentionally objective, in the whole.
+The discussions which follow will give precision and clarity to the fundamentally different uses of the word 'content'. Everywhere it will appear that
+what one grasped in the analysis and comparison of instances of the two
+sorts of contents, can be ideationally seen as a pure distinction of essence. The
+phenomenological assertions we aim at, are all meant by us (even without
+special pointing) as assertions of essence.
+A second characterization of mental phenomena by Brentano that has
+value for us is the formula 'that they are either presentations or founded
+upon presentations.? Nothing can be judged about, nothing can likewise be
+desired, nothing can be hoped or feared, if it is not presented!® In this characterization the term "presentation' does not of course mean the presented
+content or object, but the act of presenting this.
+This characterization does not seem a suitable starting-point for our researches, since it presupposes a concept of 'presentation' that has yet to be
+worked out: it is hard to draw distinctions among the word's highly ambiguous uses. The discussion of the concept of 'act' will lead us naturally on to
+this. But the characterization is an important utterance, whose content
+prompts further investigations: we shall have to come back to it later.
+§I| Avoidance of verbally tempting misunderstandings.
+(a) The 'mental' or 'immanent' object
+While we adhere to Brentano's essential characterization, our departures
+from his opinions force us to abandon his terminology. It will be as well to
+drop talk of 'psychical phenomena', or of 'phenomena' at all, where we are
+dealing with experiences of the class in question. 'Psychical phenomena' is a
+justifiable phrase only on Brentano's view that it fairly circumscribes the
+psychological field of research: on our view all experiences are in this respect
+on a level. The term 'phenomenon' is likewise fraught with most dangerous
+ambiguities, and insinuates a quite doubtful theoretical persuasion, expressly
+professed by Brentano, that each intentional experience is a phenomenon
+As 'phenomenon' in its dominant use (which is also Brentano's) means an
+appearing object as such, this implies that each intentional experience is not
+only directed upon objects, but is itself the object of certain intentional
+
+98 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+experiences. One thinks here, mainly, of the experiences in which things
+'appear' in the most special sense, i.e. perceptions: 'every psychical phenomenon is an object of inner consciousness'. We have already mentioned the
+grave misgivings that keep us from assenting to this.
+Further objections surround the expressions used by Brentano as parallel
+with, or roughly circumscribing, his term 'psychical phenomenon, and
+which are also in general use. It is always quite questionable, and frequently
+misleading, to say that perceived, imagined, asserted or desired objects etc.,
+'enter consciousness' (or do so in perceptual, presentative fashion etc.), or
+to say conversely that 'consciousness', 'the ego' enters into this or that sort
+of relation to them, or to say that such objects 'are taken up into conscious
+ness' in this or that way, or to say, similarly, that intentional experience
+'contain something as their object in themselves' etc. etc? Such expressions
+promote two misunderstandings: first, that we are dealing with a real (realen)
+event or a real (reales) relationship, taking place between 'consciousness'
+or 'the ego', on the one hand, and the thing of which there is consciousness,
+on the other; secondly, that we are dealing with a relation between two
+things, both present in equally real fashion (reell) in consciousness, an act
+and an intentional object, or with a sort of box-within-box structure of
+mental contents. If talk of a relation is here inescapable, we must avoid
+expressions which tempt us to regard such a relation as having psychological reality (Realitat), as belonging to the real (reellen) content of an
+Let us first discuss our second misunderstanding more closely. It is particularly suggested by the expression 'immanent objectivity' used to name
+the essential peculiarity of intentional experiences, and likewise by the
+equivalent scholastic expressions "intentional' or 'mental inexistence' of an
+object. Intentional experiences have the peculiarity of directing themselves
+in varying fashion to presented objects, but they do so in an intentional sense.
+An object is 'referred to'l° or 'aimed at' in them, and in presentative or judging or other fashion. This means no more than that certain experiences
+are present, intentional in character and, more specifically, presentatively.
+judgingly, desiringly or otherwise intentional. There are (to ignore certair
+xceptions) not two things present in experience, we do not experience th
+bject and beside it the intentional experience directed upon it, there are n
+even two things present in the sense of a part and a whole which contains
+it: only one thing is present, the intentional experience, whose essential
+descriptive character is the intention in question. According to its particular
+specification, it constitutes the full and sole presentation, judgement etc
+etc., of this object. If this experience is present, then, eo ipso and through it
+own essence (we must insist), the intentional 'relation' to an object is achieved
+and an object is 'intentionally present'; these two phrases mean precisely the
+same. And of course such an experience may be present in consciousness
+together with its intention, although its object does not exist at all, and is
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience 99
+perhaps incapable of existence. The object is 'meant', i.e. to 'mean' it is an
+experience, but it is then merely entertained in thought, and is nothing in
+If I have an idea of the god Jupiter, this god is my presented object, he is
+'immanently present' in my act, he has 'mental inexistence' in the latter, or
+whatever expression we may use to disguise our true meaning. I have an
+idea of the god Jupiter: this means that I have a certain presentative experience, the presentation-of-the-god-Jupiter is realized in my consciousness
+This intentional experience may be dismembered as one chooses in de
+scriptive analysis, but the god Jupiter naturally will not be found in it. The
+'immanent, 'mental object' is not therefore part of the descriptive or real
+make-up (deskriptiven reellen Bestand) of the experience, it is in truth not
+really immanent or mental. But it also does not exist extramentally, it does
+not exist at all. This does not prevent our-idea-of-the-god-Jupiter from being
+actual, a particular sort of experience or particular mode of mindedness
+(Zumutesein), such that he who experiences it may rightly say that the mythical king of the gods is present to him, concerning whom there are such
+and such stories. If, however, the intended object exists, nothing becomes
+phenomenologically different. It makes no essential difference to an object
+presented and given to consciousness whether it exists, or is fictitious, or is
+perhaps completely absurd. I think of Jupiter as I think of Bismarck, of the
+tower of Babel as I think of Cologne Cathedral, of a regular thousand-sided
+polygon as of a regular thousand-faced solid.!!
+These so-called immanent contents are therefore merely intended or intentional, while truly immanent contents, which belong to the real make-up
+(reellen Bestande) of the intentional experiences, are not intentional: they
+constitute the act, provide necessary points d'appui which render possible an
+intention, but are not themselves intended, not the objects presented in the
+act. I do not see colour-sensations but coloured things, I do not hear tonesensations but the singer's song, etc. etc.!
+What is true of presentations is true also of other intentional experiences
+that are built upon them. To represent an object, e.g. the Schloss at Berlin,
+to oneself, is, we said, to be minded in this or that descriptively determinate
+fashion. To judge about this Schloss, to delight in its architectural beauty, to
+cherish the wish that one could do so etc. etc., are new experiences, characterized in novel phenomenological terms. All have this in common, that
+they are modes of objective intention, which cannot be otherwise expressed
+than by saying that the Schloss is perceived, imagined, pictorially represented, judged about, delighted in, wished for etc. etc.
+We shall need more elaborate investigation to determine the justification
+of talking figuratively about the object presented in a presentation, judged
+in a judgement etc., as well as the full sense of talk about the relation of acts
+to objects. It is clear, at least, as far as we now have penetrated, that it will
+be well to avoid all talk of immanent objectivity. It is readily dispensed with,
+
+100 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+since we have the expression 'intentional object' which is not exposed to
+similar objections.
+s read mate in talk prehe enio tongine to obsce in.
+necessary care in talking of consciousness as inner perception, or in talking
+of it as intentional relation, even if we do not altogether avoid such 'uses,
+which would scarcely be practicable.
+§12 (b) The act and the relation of consciousness or
+the ego to the object
+The situation is similar as regards the first misunderstanding we mentioned,
+consciousness' on the other, become related to one another in a real sense.
+('The ego' is here often put in the place of 'consciousness'.) In natural refleche relation in question, while the other pole is the object. If one then studie
+in act-experience, which last tempts one to make of the ego an essentia
+selfsame point of unity in every act. This would, however, bring us back to
+the view of the ego as a relational centre which we repudiated before.
+But if we simply 'live' in the act in question, become absorbed, e.g., in the
+of the ego may be specially ready to come to the fore, or rather to be
+recreated anew, but only when it is really so recreated, and built into our
+act, do we refer to the object in a manner to which something descriptively
+ostensible corresponds. We have here, in the actual experience described, a
+correspondingly complex act which presents the ego, on the one hand, and
+the presentation, judgement, wish etc., of the moment, with its relevant
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience 10l
+subject-matter, on the other. From an objective standpoint (and so, too,
+mares these expen if sesh and such an intentional experience or one de.
+ego eo ipso has the corresponding intention.
+The sentences 'The ego represents an object to itself', 'The ego refers
+presentatively to an object', 'The ego has something as an intentional objec
+of its presentation' therefore mean the same as In the phenomenological
+ego, a concrete complex of experiences, a certain experience said, in virtue
+of its specific nature, to be a presentation of object X, is really (reell) present.?
+Just so the sentence "The ego judges about the object' means the same as
+'such and such an experience of judging is present in the ego' etc. etc. In our
+escription relation to an experiencing ego is inescapable, but the experienc
+lescribed is not itself an experiential complex having the ego-presentatio
+as its part. We perform the description after an objectifying act of reflection,
+in which reflection on the ego is combined with reflection on the experienced
+act to yield a relational act, in which the ego appears as itself related to
+its act's object through its act. Plainly an essential descriptive change has
+occurred. The original act is no longer simply there, we no longer live in it,
+but we attend to it and pass judgement on it.
+We must therefore avoid the misunderstanding which our present discussion has just ruled out, that of treating relation to an ego as of the essence of
+an intentional experience itself, 13
+§13 The fixing of our terminology
+After these critical prolegomena, we shall now fix our own terminology,
+excluding as far as we can, and in their light, all conflicting assumptions and
+confusing ambiguities. We shall avoid the term 'psychical phenomenon'
+entirely, and shall talk of 'intentional experiences' wherever accuracy requires it. 'Experience' must be understood in the phenomenological sense
+fixed above. The qualifying adjective 'intentional' names the essence common to the class of experiences we wish to mark off, the peculiarity of
+intending, of referring to what is objective, in a presentative or other analogous fashion. As a briefer expression, in harmony with our own and foreign
+verbal usage, we shall use the term 'act'.
+These expressions certainly have their defects. We speak of 'intending
+[not, of course, in English: Trans.] in the sense of specially noticing, ol
+attending to something. An intentional object need not, however, always be
+
+102 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+noticed or attended to. Several acts may be present and interwoven with one
+another, but attention is emphatically active in one of them. We experience
+them all together, but we 'go all out' (as it were) in this particular one. But
+it is not unfitting, in view of the traditional use of the term 'intentional
+object', to which Brentano has given renewed currency, to speak in a correlative sense of 'intention', especially when we have the term 'attending' to
+imagining them to aim at something, and so fits the numerous cases that are
+naturally and understandably ranked as cases of theoretical aiming. But the
+metaphor does not fit all acts equally, and if we study the examples enumerated in §10, we cannot avoid distinguishing a narrower and a wider concept
+of intention. In our metaphor an act of hitting the mark corresponds to that
+of aiming, and just so certain acts correspond as 'achievements' or 'fulfilments'
+to other acts as 'intentions' (whether of the judging or the desiring sort).
+The image therefore fits these latter acts quite perfectly; fulfilments are,
+however, themselves acts, i.e. 'intentions', though they are not intentions -
+at least not in general - in that narrower sense which points to corresponding
+fulfilments. This ambiguity, once recognized, becomes harmless. But of course,
+where the narrower concept is wanted, this must be expressly stated. The
+equivalent term 'act-character' will also help to avoid misunderstandings.
+In talking of 'acts', on the other hand, we must steer clear of the word's
+original meaning: all thought of activity must be rigidly excluded! The term
+'act' is so firmly fixed in the usage of many psychologists, and so wellworn
+and loosed from its original sense that, after these express reservations, we
+can go on using it without concern. If we do not wish to introduce artificial
+novelties, strange alike to our living speech-sense and to historical tradition,
+we can hardly avoid inconvenience of the just-mentioned sort.
+§14 Difficulties which surround the assumption of
+acts as a descriptively founded class of experiences
+In all these terminological discussions, we have gone deep into descriptive
+analyses of a sort required by our interests in logic and epistemology. Before
+we go deeper, however, we shall have to consider some objections which
+affect the bases of our descriptions.
+There are a group of thinkers who absolutely reject any marking-off of a
+class of experiences which have been described by us as 'acts' or 'intentional
+experiences'. In this connection Brentano's original introduction of the
+distinction, and his aims in introducing it, have, with some surreptitious
+misunderstandings, produced confusion: they have kept the distinction's
+extraordinarily valuable descriptive content from being rightly assessed.
+Natorp, e.g., rejects it decisively. But when this distinguished thinker objects
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience 103
+by saying that! I can deal with a tone by itself or in relation to other concertainly cannot be torn out of the hearing of a tone, as if it were something
+apart from the tone it hears. But this does not mean that two things ar
+him, I am unable to follow him.? It seems to me, however, that the 'existence
+of something for me, is a thing both permitting and requiring further
+phenomenological analysis. Consider, first, differences in the mode of attention. A content is differently present to me, according as I note it implicitly,
+not relieved in some whole, or see it in relief, according as I see it marginally, or have specially turned my focussing gaze upon it. More important
+still are differences between the existence of a content in consciousness in
+the sense in which a sensation so exists, without being itself made a perceptual object, and of a content which is made such an object. The choice of
+a tone as an instance slightly obscures the distinction without altogether
+removing it. 'I hear' can mean in psychology 'I am having sensations': in
+ordinary speech it means 'I am perceiving'; I hear the adagio of the violin,
+the twittering of the birds etc. Different acts can perceive the same object
+and yet involve quite different sensations. The same tone is at one moment
+heard close at hand, at another far away. The same sensational contents are
+likewise 'taken' now in this, and now in that manner. What is most emphasized in the doctrine of apperception is generally the fact that consistency of
+stimulus does not involve constancy of sensational content: what the stimulus really provokes is overlaid by features springing from actualized dispositions left behind them by previous experiences. Such notions are, however,
+inadequate and, above all, phenomenologically irrelevant. Whatever the
+origin of the experienced contents now present in consciousness, we can
+think that the same sensational contents should be present with a differing
+interpretation, i.e. that the same contents should serve to ground perceptions of different objects. Interpretation itself can never be reduced to an
+influx of new sensations; it is an act-character, a mode of consciousness, of
+'mindedness' (Zumuteseins). We call the experiencing of sensations in this
+conscious manner the perception of the object in question. What has here
+been made plain, in a context of natural existence, and by methods appro
+priate to psychology and natural science, will yield up its phenomenological
+substance if we abstract from the empirically real (Realen). If we consider
+pure experiences and their own essential content, we form Ideas of pure
+species and specific situations, in this case the pure species of Sensation,
+Interpretation, Perception in relation to its perceptum, and the relations of
+
+104 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+essence among these. We then see it to be a fact of essence that the being of
+a sensational content differs from that of the perceived object presented by
+it, which is not a reality in consciousness (reell bewusst).!
+All this becomes clear if we change our field of illustration for that of
+vision. Let us lay the following considerations before a sceptic. I see a thing,
+e.g. this box, but I do not see my sensations. I always see one and the same
+box, however it may be turned and tilted. I have always the same 'content of
+consciousness' - if I care to call the perceived object a content of consciousness. But each turn yields a new 'content of consciousness', if I call experienced contents 'contents of consciousness', in a much more appropriate use
+of words. Very different contents are therefore experienced, though the same
+object is perceived. The experienced content, generally speaking, is not the
+perceived object. We must note, further, that the object's real being or nonbeing is irrelevant to the true essence of the perceptual experience, and to
+its essence as a perceiving of an object as thus and thus appearing, and as
+thus and thus thought of. In the flux of experienced content, we imagine
+ourselves to be in perceptual touch with one and the same object; this itself
+belongs to the sphere of what we experience. For we experience a 'consciousness of identity', i.e. a claim to apprehend identity. On what does this
+consciousness depend? Must we not reply that different sensational contents
+are given, but that we apperceive or 'take' them 'in the same sense'
+to take them in this sense is an experienced character through which the 'being
+of the object for me' is first constituted. Must we not say, further, that the
+consciousness of identity is framed on a basis of these two sorts of experienced characters, as the immediate consciousness that they mean the same?
+And is this consciousness not again an act in our defined sense,
+objective correlate lies in the identity it refers to? These questions, I think,
+call for an affirmative and evident answer. I find nothing more plain than
+the distinction here apparent between contents and acts, between perceptual
+contents in the sense of presentative sensations, and perceptual acts in the
+sense of interpretative intentions overlaid with various additional characters. Such intentions, united with the sensations they interpret, make up the
+full concrete act of perception. Intentional characters and complete intentional acts are, of course, contents of consciousness in the widest descriptive
+sense of experiences: all differences predicable at all, are in this sense eo ipso
+differences of content. But within this widest sphere of what can be experienced, we believe we have found an evident difference between intentional
+experiences, in whose case objective intentions arise through immanent characters of the experiences in question, and experiences in whose case this does
+not occur, contents that may serve as the building-stones of acts without
+being acts themselves.
+Examples that will serve to elucidate this distinction, and also to show up
+various characters of acts, are provided by comparing perception with
+memory, or comparing either with presentations by means of physical images
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience 105
+(paintings, statues etc.), or of signs. Verbal expressions yield the best extreating it as representative of 'any A whatsoever? In this and countless
+similar cases it is act-characters that differ. All logical differences, and differences in categorial form, are constituted in logical acts in the sense of
+In analysing such cases the inadequacies of the modern theory of apperception become plain: it overlooks points decisive from a logical or epistemological standpoint. It does not do justice to phenomenological fact; it
+does not even attempt to analyse or describe it. Differences of interpretation
+are above all descriptive differences, and these alone, rather than obscure,
+hypothetical events in the soul's unconscious depths, or in the sphere of
+physiological happenings, concern the epistemologist. These alone permit of
+a purely phenomenological treatment, excluding all transcendent affirmations,
+such as the critique of knowledge presupposes. Apperception is our surplus,
+which is found in experience itself, in its descriptive content as opposed to the
+raw existence of sense: it is the act-character which as it were ensouls sense,
+and is in essence such as to make us perceive this or that object, see this tree,
+e.g., hear this ringing, smell this scent of flowers etc. etc. Sensations, and the
+acts 'interpreting' them or apperceiving them, are alike experienced, but they
+do not appear as objects: they are not seen, heard or perceived by any sense.
+Objects on the other hand, appear and are perceived, but they are not
+experienced. Naturally we exclude the case of adequate perception.
+The same holds in other cases: it holds, e.g., in the case of the 'sensations'
+(or however we choose to call contents serving as bases to interpretation)
+which are found in acts of simple or representative imagining. It is an imaging
+interpretation that sets an imagined rather than a perceptual appearance
+before us, where experienced sensations mediate the appearance of a pictorially presented object (e.g. a centaur in a painting). One sees at once that
+the very same thing which, in relation to the intentional object, is called its
+presentation, i.e. the perceiving, remembering, picturing, symbolizing intention directed towards it, is also called an interpretation, conception, apperception in relation to the sensations really present in this act.
+I also regard it as relevantly evident, in regard to the examples just cited, that
+there are different "manners of consciousness', different intentional relations
+
+106 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+to objects: the character of our intention is specifically different in the case
+of perceiving, of direct 'reproductive' recall, of pictorial representation (in
+the ordinary sense of the interpretation of statues, pictures etc.), and again
+in the case of a presentation through signs. Each logically distinct way of
+entertaining an object in thought corresponds to a difference in intention.
+To me it seems irrefragable that we only know of such differences because
+we envisage them in particular cases apprehend them adequately and immediately), can then compare them and range them under concepts, and
+can thus make them into objects of varying acts of intuition and thought.
+From such 'seeing' we can, through abstract Ideation, progress toward an
+adequate grasp of the pure species they exemplify, and of the connections
+of essence among these latter. When Natorp remarks that 'all richness, all
+multiplicity of consciousness pertains rather to contents alone. Consciousness of a simple sensation does not differ, qua consciousness, from consciousness of a world: the "being in consciousness" is entirely the same in
+both; their difference lies solely in their content', he seems to me not to be
+explained the sense in which we too teach that all multiplicity of consciousness depends on content. Content must mean experience, a real part of consciousness: consciousness itself must be the complex formed by experiences.
+The world, however, never is a thinker's experience. To refer to the world
+may be an experience, but the world itself is the object intended. It is immaterial, from the point of view of our distinction, what attitude one takes up
+to the question of the make-up of objective being, of the true, real inner
+being of the world or of any other object, or of the relation of objective
+being, as a 'unity', to our 'manifold' thought-approaches, or of the sense in
+which one may metaphysically oppose immanent to transcendent being. The
+distinction in question is prior to all metaphysics, and lies at the very gates
+of the theory of knowledge: it presupposes no answers to the questions that
+this theory must be the first to provide.
+§15 Whether experiences of one and the same
+phenomenological kind (of the genus feeling in
+particular) can consist partly of acts and partly
+of non-acts
+• new ditticulty arises in regard to the generic unity of intentional experiences
+* might be thought that the standpoint from which we divide experi
+ences into intentional and non-intentional, is a merely external one, that the
+same experiences, or experiences of the same phenomenological class, may
+at times have an intentional relation to some object, and at times have none.
+The examples used to attest either concept, and also, in part, the attempted
+solutions of the problem, have already been discussed in literary fashion in
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience 107
+regard to the debated issue as to whether the 'intentional relation' suffices to
+We must first see whether any sorts of feeling-experience are essentially intentional, and then whether other sorts of feeling-experience lack this property.
+(a) Are there any intentional feelings?
+Many experiences commonly classed as 'feelings' have an undeniable, real
+relation to something objective. This is the case, e.g., when we are pleased
+y a melody, '
+that every yo, dir oased a tat silly or stret. t se som obvious e think al
+is a directed act. Instead of joy we can speak of pleased delight in something, instead of sorrow we can speak of displeased or painful dislike of it,
+aversion from it etc. etc.
+Those who question the intentionality of feeling say: Feelings are mere
+states, not acts, intentions. Where they relate to objects, they owe their
+stand the neiy ein
+hat he lin is i Pallas that are other dies resenter line presen
+ations as their foundations
+jects that are presented to us by inwoven presentations. No difference emerges
+tion gives it a certain relation to an object, a relation only intentional by
+way of this connection and not intrinsically so. This is just what the other
+party disputes.
+Brentano thinks we have here two intentions built on one another: the
+underlying, founding intention gives us the presented object, the founded
+intention the felt object. The former is separable from the latter, the latter
+inseparable from the former. His opponents think there is only one intention
+ere, the presenting one
+If we subiect the situation to a careful phenomenological review, Brentano
+conception seems definitely to be preferred. Whether we turn with pleasure
+to something, or whether its unpleasantness repels us, an object is presented.
+
+108
+But we do not merely have a presentation, with an added feeling associatively tacked on to it, and not intrinsically related to it, but pleasure or
+distaste direct themselves to the presented object, and could not exist without such a direction. If two psychical experiences, e.g. two presentations, are
+associated in an objective-psychological sense, there is a phenomenologically
+discernible type of associative unity among the reproduced experiences
+which corresponds to the objective dispositions which govern them. Side by
+side with the intentional elation which each has to its object, there is also a
+phenomenological mode of connection: one idea, e.g. that of Naples, carries
+with it the idea of Vesuvius, the one is peculiarly bound up with the other,
+so that we say in regard to the objects presented - the mode of their presentation here essentially requires further description - that the one reminds us
+of the other. (This sentence is being used to express a phenomenological
+situation.) It is easily seen, however, that though all this in a sense constitutes a new intentional relationship, it does not turn each associated
+member into an object of the other's intention. The intentional relationships
+remain unconfused in their association. How indeed could they furnish an
+object, borrowed from an associated intention, to something not itself
+intentional? It is clear, further, that such a phenomenologically associative
+relation is extrinsic, not at all to be put on a level with the relation of
+pleasure to the pleasant. The presentation which reproduces is quite possible
+without such a reproductive function. But pleasure without anything pleasant is unthinkable. And it is unthinkable, not because we are here dealing
+with correlative expressions, as when we say, e.g., that a cause without an
+effect, or a father without a child, is unthinkable, but because the specific
+essence of pleasure demands a relation to something pleasing. Just so the
+feature known as conviction is unthinkable apart from something of which
+we are convinced. There is, similarly, no desire whose specific character can
+do without something desired, no agreement or approval without something
+agreed on or approved etc. etc. These are all intentions, genuine acts in our
+sense. They all 'owe' their intentional relation to certain underlying presentations. But it is part of what we mean by such 'owing' that they themselves
+really now have what they owe to something else.
+It is plain, too, that the relation between founding (underlying) presentation and founded act cannot be correctly described by saying that the former
+produces the latter. We say that the object arouses our pleasure, just as we
+say in other cases that some circumstance inspires doubt, compels agreement, provokes desire etc. But the result of such apparent causation, the
+pleasure, doubt or agreement provoked, is itself through and through intentional. We are not dealing with an external causal relation where the effect
+conceivably could be what it intrinsically is without the cause, or where the
+cause brings something forth that could have existed independently.
+Closer consideration shows it to be absurd in principle, here or in like
+cases, to treat an intentional as a causal relation, to give it the sense of an
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience 109
+empirical, substantial-causal case of necessary connection. For the intencausation we have when we see the visible landscape - in virtue of such
+and such a mode of appearing and such and such pictured colours and
+(b) Are there non-intentional feelings? Distinction between
+feeling-sensations and feeling-acts
+We may now ask more generally whether, in addition to the intentional
+varieties of feeling, there are not other non-intentional species. It may seem
+at first that an obvious 'Yes' is the right answer. In the wide field of socalled sensory feelings, no intentional characters can be found. The sensible
+pain of a burn can certainly not be classed beside a conviction, a surmise, a
+volition etc. etc., but beside sensory contents like rough or smooth, red or
+blue etc. If we recall such pains, or any sensory pleasures (the fragrance of a
+rose, the relish of certain foods etc. etc.), we find that our sensory feelings
+are blended with the sensations from the various sense-fields, just as these
+latter are blended with one another.
+Every sensory feeling, e.g. the pain of burning oneself or of being burnt,
+is no doubt after a fashion referred to an object: it is referred, on the one
+hand, to the ego and its burnt bodily member, on the other hand, to the
+object which inflicts the burn. In all these respects there is conformity with
+other sensations: tactual sensations, e.g., are referred in just this manner to
+the bodily member which touches, and to the external body which is touched.
+And though this reference is realized in intentional experiences, no one
+would think of calling the referred sensations intentional. It is rather the
+case that our sensations are here functioning as presentative contents in
+perceptual acts, or (to use a possibly misleading phrase) that our sensations
+here receive an objective 'interpretation' or 'taking-up'. They themselves are
+not acts, but acts are constituted through them, wherever, that is, intentional characters like a perceptual interpretation lay hold of them, and as it
+were animate thei. In just this manner it seems that a burning, piercing,
+boring pain, fused as it is from the start with certain tactual sensations, must
+
+110 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+itself count as a sensation. It functions at least as other sensations do, in
+providing a foothold for empirical, objective interpretations.
+All this seems unobjectionable, and the whole question disposed of. We
+seem to have shown that some feelings are to he reckoned among intentional
+experiences, while others are non-intentional.
+But we are led to doubt, then, whether two such sorts of feelings' really
+form a single class. We spoke previously of 'feelings' of liking and dislike, of
+voluntary decision etc. Here we have a kind, a plain unity of essence, which
+included nothing but acts, where such sensations of pain and pleasure have
+no place: descriptively the latter belong, in virtue of their specific essence,
+among tactual, gustatory, olfactory and other sensations. Being at best presentative contents of objects of intention, but not themselves intentions,
+they manifest descriptive differences so essential, that we cannot seriously
+believe in the unity of a genuine class. In both cases of course, we speak of
+'feelings', i.e. in the case of the above-mentioned acts of liking as in the case
+of the above-mentioned sensations. This fact need not perplex, any more
+than our ordinary talk of 'feeling', in the sense of touching, need lead us
+astray in the case of tactile sensations.
+Brentano has already pointed to the ambiguity here dealt with, in discussing the intentionality of feelings. He draws a distinction, in sense if not in
+words, between sensations of pain and pleasure (feeling-sensations) and pain
+and pleasure in the sense of feelings. The contents of the former - or, as
+I should simply say, the former? - are in this terminology 'physical', while
+the latter are 'psychical phenomena', and they belong therefore to essentially different genera. This notion I regard as quite correct, but only doubt,
+whether the meaning of the word 'feeling' does not lean predominantly
+towards 'feeling-sensation', and whether the many acts we call 'feelings' do
+not owe their name to the feeling-sensations with which they are essentially
+interwoven. One must of course not mix up questions of suitable terminology
+with distins on adid consanul ber kept in mind and fruitily applied
+in analysing all complexes of feeling-sensations and feeling-acts. Joy, e.g.,
+concerning some happy event, is certainly an act. But this act, which is not
+merely an intentional character, but a concrete and therefore complex experience, does not merely hold in its unity an idea of the happy event and an
+act-character of liking which relates to it: a sensation of pleasure attaches to
+the idea, a sensation at once seen and located as an emotional excitement in
+the psycho-physical feeling-subject, and also as an objective property - the
+event seems as if bathed in a rosy gleam. The event thus pleasingly painted
+now serves as the first foundation for the joyful approach, the liking for,
+the being charmed, or however one's state may be described. A sad event,
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience |||
+likewise, is not merely seen in its thinglike content and context, in the respects which make it an event: it seems clothed and coloured with sadness.
+The same unpleasing sensations which the empirical ego refers to and locates
+in itself - the pang in the heart - are referred in one's emotional conception
+to the thing itself. These relations are purely presentational: we first have an
+essentially new type of intention in hostile repugnance, in active dislike etc.
+Sensations of pleasure and pain may continue, though the act-characters
+built upon them may lapse. When the facts which provoke pleasure sink
+into the background, are no longer apperceived as emotionally coloured,
+and perhaps cease to be intentional objects at all, the pleasurable excitemen
+nay linger on for a while: it may itself be felt as agreeable. Instead of
+representing a pleasant property of the object, it is referred merely to the
+feeling-subject, or is itself presented and pleases.
+Much the same holds in the sphere of desire and volition?3 If difficulty
+is felt in the fact that desire does not always seem to require conscious
+reference to what is desired, that we are often moved by obscure drives or
+pressures towards unrepresented goals, and if one points especially to the
+wide sphere of natural instinct, where goal-consciousness is at least absent
+at the start, one may say: This is a case of mere sensations - we may speak
+analogically of 'desire-sensations' - without needing to affirm the existence
+of an essentially new class of sensations - i.e. of experiences really lacking
+intentional reference, and so also remote in kind from the essential character of intentional desire. Alternatively one may say: Here we are dealing
+with intentional experiences, but with such as are characterized by indeterminateness of objective direction, an 'indeterminateness' which does
+not amount to a privation, but which stands for a descriptive character of
+one's presentation. The idea we have when 'something' stirs, when there is
+a rustling, a ring at the door, etc., an idea had before we give it verbal
+expression, has indeterminateness of direction, and this indeterminateness is
+of the intention's essence, it is determined as presenting an indeterminate
+'something'.
+Our one concept of desire might fit many cases, and our other concept
+others, and we might have to allow, not a relation of generic community
+between intentional and non-intentional urges or desires, but one of mere
+equivocation.
+We must observe, also, that our classification is oriented to the concretely
+complex, and that the total character of such unities may at one time seem
+to depend on sensational features (e.g. pleasure on urge-sensations), at
+another on act-intentions which rest on these. The formation and use of
+our expressions will at times therefore point to sensory contents, at times to
+act-intentions, so giving rise to the equivocations in question.
+Additional Note. The obvious tendency of our conception is to attribute
+primary, genuine differences in intensity to underlying sensations, and to
+concrete acts only in a secondary manner, in so far as their concrete total
+
+112
+character involves differences of intensity in their sensational basis. Actintentions, the inseparable aspects which give acts their essential distinctive
+peculiarities, or which characterize them severally as judgements, feelings
+etc., must be without intrinsic intensity. Deeper analyses are, however, required here.
+§16 Distinction between descriptive and
+intentional content
+We have buttressed our notion of the essence of acts against objection, and
+given them a generic unity of essence in their character as intentions, as consciousnesses in the unique descriptive sense. We now introduce an important
+phenomenological distinction, obvious after our previous discussions, between
+the real (reellen) 4 and the intentional content of an act.
+By the real phenomenological content of an act we mean the sum total of
+its concrete or abstract parts, in other words, the sum total of the partial
+experiences that really constitute it. To point out and describe such parts
+is the task of pure descriptive psychological analysis operating from an
+empirical, natural-scientific point of view. Such analysis is in all cases concerned to dismember what we inwardly experience as it in itself is, and as it
+is really (reell) given in experience, without regard either to genetic connections, or to extrinsic meaning and valid application. Purely descriptive
+psychological analysis of an articulated sound-pattern finds only sounds
+and abstract parts or unifying forms of sounds, it finds no sound-vibrations
+or organs of hearing etc.; it also never finds anything that resembles the ideal
+sense that makes the sound-pattern to be a name, nor the person to whom
+the name may apply. Our example suffices to make our intention clear. The
+real (reell) contents of acts are of course only known through descriptive analyses of this kind. That obscurities of intuition or inadequacies of
+descriptive conception - faults, in short, of method - may lead to much
+'manufacture' of sensations (to use Volkelt's phrase) cannot be denied.
+This, however, only concerns the legitimacy of particular cases of descriptive
+analysis. It is clear, if anything is clear, that intentional experiences contain
+distinguishable parts and aspects, and this alone is of importance here.
+Let us now shift from our natural-scientific, psychological standpoint to
+an ideal-scientific, phenomenological one. We must exclude all empirical
+interpretations and existential affirmations, we must take what is inwardly
+experienced or otherwise inwardly intuited (e.g. in pure fancy) as pure
+experiences, as our exemplary basis for acts of Ideation. We must ideate universal essences and essential connections in such experiences - ideal Species
+of experiencing of differing levels of generality, and ideally valid truths of
+essence which apply a priori, and with unlimited generality, to possible experiences of these species. We thus achieve insights in a pure phenomenology
+which is here oriented to real (reellen) constituents, whose descriptions are
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience 113
+in every way "ideal' and free from 'experience, i.e. from presupposition of
+real existence. When we speak simply of the real (reellen), and in general
+of the phenomenological analysis and description of experiences, the tie-up
+of our discussions to psychological material is (we must keep on stressing)
+merely transitional, since none of its empirically real (reellen) conceptions
+and assertions of existence (e.g. of experiences as states of animal beings
+having experiences in a real (realen), space-time world) are at all operative,
+hat pure phenomenological validity of essence is aimed at and claimed.
+Content in the real (reellen) sense is the mere application of the mos
+general notion of content, valid in all fields to intentional experiences. If
+we now oppose intentional 6 to real (reell) content, the word shows that the
+however, there are several concepts, all grounded in the specific nature of
+acts, which may be equally covered by the rubric intentional content, an
+distinctions will become familiar in the course of the following very general
+analyses, which are also essential to the more restricted aim of clarif ying the
+essence of knowledge.
+§17 The intentional content in the sense of the
+intentional object
+Our first concept of intentional content needs no elaborate preliminaries.
+It concerns the intentional object, e.g. a house when a house is presented.
+discussed. This is not only true of acts pointing intentionally to 'outer' things;
+when I speak of, e.g., my actually present, but "background' conscious experiences. Partial coincidence is only found where an intuition actually points
+to something 'lived through' in the intentional act itself, as, e.g., in acts of
+adequate perception.
+We must distinguish, in relation to the intentional content taken as object
+of the act, between the object as it is intended, and the object (period) which
+is intended. In each act an object is presented as determined in this or that
+manner, and as such it may be the target of varying intentions, judgemental,
+emotional, desiderative etc. Known connections, actual or possible, entirely
+external to the reality of the act, may be so cemented with it in intentional
+unity as to be held to attribute objective properties to the same presented
+object, properties not in the scope of the intention in question. Many new
+presentations may arise, all claiming, in virtue of an objective unity of knowledge, to be presenting the same object. In all of them the object which we
+
+114 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+intend is the same, but in each our intention differs, each means the object
+in a different way. The idea, e.g., of the German Emperor, presents its
+object as an Emperor, and as the Emperor of Germany. The man himself is
+the son of the Emperor Frederick III, the grandson of Queen Victoria, and
+has many other properties neither named nor presented. One can therefore
+quite consistently speak of the intentional and extra-intentional content of
+the object of some presentation, and one can use many other suitable, nontechnical expressions, e.g. what we intend in the object, that would not lead
+to misunderstandings.
+Another, yet more important, distinction goes with the distinction just
+drawn, that between the objective reference of the act, taken in its entirety,
+and the objects to which its various partial, constituent acts refer. Each act
+has its own appropriate, intentional, objective reference: this is as true of
+complex as of simple acts. Whatever the composition of an act out of partial
+acts way be, if it is an act at all, it must have a single objective correlate, to
+which we say it is 'directed', in the full, primary sense of the world. Its
+partial acts (if they really are acts entering the complex act as parts, and not
+mere parts of this act) likewise point to objects, which will, in general, not be
+the same as the object of the whole act, though they may occasionally be the
+same. In a secondary sense, no doubt, the whole act may be said to refer to
+these objects also, but its intention only terminates on them inasmuch as its
+constituent acts primarily intend them. Or, seen from the other side, they
+are only the act's objects in so far as they help to make up its true object, in
+the manner in which this is intended. They function as terms of relations in
+which the primary object is seen as the correlated term. The act, e.g., corresponding to the name 'the knife on the table' is plainly complex: the object of
+the whole act is a knife, of one of its part-acts, a table. But, as the whole
+nominal act refers to the knife as on the table, presents it in this relative
+position to the latter, one can say that the table is in a secondary sense an
+intentional object of the whole act. Again, to illustrate another important
+class of cases, the knife is the object about which we judge or make a
+statement, when we say that the knife is on the table; the knife is not,
+however, the primary or full object of the judgement, but only the object of
+its subject. The full and entire object corresponding to the whole judgement
+is the state of affairs judged: the same state of affairs is presented in a mere
+presentation, wished in a wish, asked after in a question, doubted in a doubt
+etc. The wish that the knife were on the table, which coincides (in object)
+with the judgement, is concerned with the knife, but we don't in it wish the
+knife, but that the knife should be on the table, that this should be so. The
+state of affairs must obviously not be confused with the judging of it, nor
+with the presentation of this judgement: I plainly do not wish for a judgement, nor for any presentation. Just so there is a corresponding question
+regarding the knife, but the knife is not (nonsensically) what we ask; we ask
+regarding the knife's position on the table, whether this actually is the case.
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience 115
+So much for the first sense in which we speak of intentional contents. Since
+such talk is so highly ambiguous, we shall do well never to speak of an intentional content where an intentional object is meant, but to call the latter the
+intentional object of the act in question.
+§18 Simple and complex, founding and founded acts
+We have so far only learnt to attach one meaning to the term 'intentional
+contents'. Further meanings will develop in our ensuing investigations, where
+we shall attempt to seize on certain important peculiarities of the phenomenological essence of acts, and to throw light on the ideal unities rooted in these.
+We start with the difference, previously noted, between simple and compound acts. Not every unitary experience compounded out of acts is for
+that reason a compound act, just as every concatenation of machines is not a
+compound machine. Our comparison illuminates our further requirements.
+A compound machine is a machine compounded out of machines, but so
+compounded, that it has a total performance into which the performances
+of the partial machines flow, and the like is the case in regard to compounded acts. Each partial act has its particular intentional reference, each
+its unitary object, and its way of referring to it. These manifold part-acts
+are, however, summed up in one total act, whose total achievement lies in
+the unity of its intentional reference. To this the individual acts contribute
+their individual performances: the unity of what is objectively presented,
+and the whole manner of the intentional reference to it, are not set up
+alongside of the partial acts, but in them, in the way in which they are
+combined, a way which realizes a unity of act, and not merely a unity of
+experience. The object of this total act could not appear as it does, unless
+the partial acts presented their objects in their fashion: their general function is to present parts, or to present externally related terms, or to present
+relational forms of the object etc. The same is true of the non-presentative
+aspects of the act that make out of the unified qualities in the partial acts
+the quality of whole acts, and so determine the specifically different ways
+in which the objects concerned in either sort of act are 'taken up into
+consciousness'.
+We may take as an example the unity of categorical or hypothetical predicaion, where the total acts are plainly put together out of partial acts. Th
+subject-member of a categorical assertion is an underlying act, a positing ol
+a subject, on which the positing of a predicate, its attribution or denial,
+reposes. Just so the antecedent of a hypothetical assertion is constituent in
+a clearly demarcated part-act, upon which the conditional assertion is built.
+The total experience is in each case plainly one act, one judgement, whose
+single, total object is a single state of affairs. As the judgement does not
+exist alongside of, or between, the subject-positing and the predicating acts,
+but exists in them as their dominant unity, so, on the correlative side, the
+
+116 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+objective unity is the state of affairs judged, an appearance emergent out of
+subject and predicate, or out of antecedent and consequent.
+The situation may be yet more complex. On such a structured act (whose
+members may themselves be further structured) a new act may be built, e.g.
+a joy may be built on the assertion of a state of affairs, a joy in that state of
+affairs. The joy is not a concrete act in its own right, and the judgement an
+act set up beside it: the judgement rather underlies the joy, fixes its content,
+realizes its abstract possibility for, without some such foundation, there
+could be no joy at all.?? Judgements may similarly serve as foundations for
+surmises, doubts, questions, wishes, acts of will etc., and the latter acts may
+likewise serve to found other acts in their turn. There are therefore manifold
+ways in which acts may be combined into total acts. The briefest consideration makes plain that there are deep differences in the ways in which acts are
+concretely woven into other acts, or based upon underlying acts, and made
+ossible by such concretion: the systematic investigation of such ways, eve
+n descriptive. psychological fashion, is as vet hardly in its beginning.
+§19 The function of attention in complex acts.
+Instance of the phenomenological relation of verbal
+sound to sense
+How far differences go in this direction will be plain from an example
+previously considered: the whole which is formed by expression and sense?
+This will be quite as interesting as the examples just analysed. Further considerations will also illustrate the obvious to anyone, the fact that there are
+great differences in the energy, so to speak, with which acts assert themselves in an act-complex. Generally the greatest energy will be displayed by
+he act-character which comprehends and subsumes all partial acts in its
+unity - whether it be a particular act-intention like joy, or a form of unity
+that pervades all parts of the whole act. In this act, we live, as it were,
+principally; in the subordinate acts only in proportion to the importance of
+their achievements for the whole act and its intention. But plainly to talk
+of such differences of importance, is just to use other words to cover the
+'preferential living in question, which some acts enjoy and others not.
+Let us now consider our example. It concerns a union of the acts in which
+an expression, treated as a sensuous verbal sound, is constituted, with the
+quite different act constitutive of its meaning, an essentially different connection, we may note, to that of the last-mentioned acts with the acts in
+which they have an immediate or a more remote intuitive fulfilment. Not
+only is the mode of union here essentially different, but also the energy with
+which certain acts are performed. The expression is indeed perceived, but
+our interest does not live in this perception; we attend, when not distracted.
+to the signified rather than the signs. Dominant energy resides in the sensegiving acts. The intuitive acts which perhaps accompany, and are inwoven
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience 117
+into the total act's unity, lending it evidence, or illustrating it, or otherwise
+functioning in it, absorb our dominant interest in varying degree. They may
+be prominent, as in the perceptual judgement, or the analogously constituted picture-judgement, where our one wish is to express the perception or
+imagination in which we live, and likewise in the completely evident judge.
+ment of necessary law. They may recede and come to seem quite subsidiary,
+as in cases of imperfect or wholly unsuitable illustration of some dominant
+thought. They may then be a vanishing phantasm, to which practically no
+interest attaches. (In extreme cases one may even doubt whether accompanying picture-ideas really enter the unity of the expressive act at all, whether
+they are not mere accompaniments; coexisting with the acts in question but
+not forming a single act with them.)
+For us it is especially important to get as much clarity as we can on this
+situation of expressions: we shall therefore dwell on some points in more
+detail.
+Expression and sense are two objective unities, laid before us by certain
+acts. An expression itself, e.g. a written word, is, as our First Investigation
+showed 29 as much a physical obiect as any penscratch or ink-blot on paper.
+It is 'given' to us in the same sense as a physical object, ie. it appears, and
+that it appears merely means, as it means elsewhere, that a certain act is
+experienced, in which certain sensory experiences are 'apperceived' in a certain manner. The acts in question are naturally perceptual or imaginative
+presentations: in these the expression (as physically meant) is constituted.
+What make the expression an expression are, we know, the acts attaching to it. These are not outside of it or beside it, or merely simultaneous in
+consciousness; they are one with it, and so one, that we can scarce avoid
+regarding them all as making up a unitary total act. (By the word 'expression' we mean, with natural and convenient looseness, the act-unity
+which presents it.) A statement, an assertion, e.g., we should at once say, is
+a strictly unitary experience, which belongs to the genus Judgement. We do
+not find in ourselves a mere sum of acts, but a single act in which, as it were,
+a bodily and spiritual side are distinct. Just so an expressed wish is no mere
+ensemble of expression and wish - with perhaps an additional, debatable
+judgement regarding the wish - but a whole, an act, which we unhesitatingly
+call a wish. The physical expression, the verbal sound, may seem unessential
+to this unity, and it is unessential inasmuch as any other verbal sound might
+have replaced it and done duty for it: it could even have been wholly dispensed with. But if it is there, and serves as a verbal sound, it will be fused
+with the accompanying acts in a single act. Plainly the connection is in a
+certain sense extrinsic, since the expression as such, i.e. the manifest verbal
+sound or written sign etc., is not seen as part of the object meant in the
+whole act, nor even as really determining it, nor as having really to do with
+it. The contribution made by the acts constituting the verbal sound of a
+statement, differs characteristically from the contribution of the underlying
+
+118 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+acts illustrated and discussed above, or of the partial acts which pertain
+to the predicative members of complete predications. We must not, however, despite all this, question the presence of a certain intentional linkage
+between word and thing. Inasmuch, e.g., as the word names the thing, it
+once more appears as in some sense one with it, as belonging to it, even il
+not as materially part of it, or one of its material properties. Its material
+unrelatedness does not exclude a certain intentional unity, correlated with
+the interconnection of the corresponding acts to form a single act. This is
+confirmed if we recall the deep-set tendency to exaggerate the bond between
+word and thing, to invest it with objectivity, perhaps even to insinuate something of mystic unity into it. [Cf. Inv. vI, 86 ff]
+In the compound act which includes both appearing-expression and sensegiving acts, it is plainly the latter, or the act-unity which dominates both,
+which essentially fixes the character of the whole act. It is for this reason that
+we call experiences, whether expressed or unexpressed, by the same names:
+i.e., "judgement', 'wish', etc. Certain acts in the compound are therefore
+peculiarly prominent, a fact incidentally noted when we said that, when we
+normally express something, we do not, qua expressing it, live in the acts
+constituting the expression as a physical object - we are not interested in this
+object - but we live in the acts which give it sense: we are exclusively turned
+to the object that appears in such acts, we aim at it, we mean it in the special,
+pregnant sense. We pointed out, also, that, while a special orientation to the
+physical expression is possible, it essentially changes the character of our
+experience: this no longer is 'expressive' in the ordinary sense of the word.
+Plainly we are here concerned with a case of the general fact of attention,
+to which long effort has not yet brought sufficient clearness. Nothing has
+so hindered right views in this field as the by-passing of the fact that attention is an emphatic function which belongs among acts in the above defined
+sense of intentional experiences, and which is not descriptively graspable as
+long as 'being experienced', in the sense of the mere existence of a content in
+consciousness, is confused with intentional objectivity. Acts must be present,
+before we can live in them or be absorbed in performing them, and when we
+are so absorbed (in various manners requiring further description) we mind
+the objects of these acts, we are primarily or secondarily oriented toward
+them, perhaps thematically concerned with them. Absorption in acts anc
+minding objects are the same thing expressed from different angles.
+As opposed to this, men speak of attention as if it were a name for modes
+of special relief imparted to experienced contents. At the same time there is
+still talk of these contents (the contemporary experiences themselves) as if
+they were the things to which we ordinarily say we are attending. We do not
+of course dispute the possibility of attending to experienced contents, but
+when this happens, such contents become objects of internal perception
+such perception is not the mere being of the content in a conscious setting,
+but an act in which the content is rendered objective. Intentional objects of
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience 119
+acts may be carried out? This would seem to be undoubtedly right.
+But we do not wish to work out a 'theory' of attention here, but to discuss
+the important role played by it in complex acts, in putting certain actcharacters into relief, and so essentially influencing the phenomenological
+pattern of these acts.
+§20 The difference between the quality and the
+matter of an act
+We now turn from the distinction between the acts in which we 'live' and
+the acts which proceed 'on the side, to another extremely important,
+seemingly plain distinction lying in a quite different direction. This is the
+distinction between the general act-character, which stamps an act as merely
+presentative, judgemental, emotional, desiderative etc., and its 'content' which
+stamps it as presenting this, as judging that etc. etc. The two assertions
+2 × 2 = 4' and 'Ibsen is the principal founder of modern dramatic realism'
+are both, qua assertions, of one kind; each is qualified as an assertion, anc
+their common feature is their judgement-quality. The one, however, judges
+one content and the other another content. To distinguish such 'contents'
+from other notions of 'content' we shall speak here of the matter (material) of
+judgements. We shall draw similar distinctions between quality and matter
+in the case of all acts.
+
+120 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+Under the rubric of 'matter' we shall not divide, and then reassemble in
+unity, constituents of an act such as the subject-act, the predicate-act etc.:
+this would make the unified total content the act itself. What we here have
+in mind is something totally different. Content in the sense of 'matter' is a
+component of the concrete act-experience, which it may share with acts of
+quite different quality. It comes out most clearly if we set up a series of
+identical utterances, where the act-qualities change, while the matter remains identical. All this is not hard to provide. We recall familiar talk to the
+effect that the same content may now be the content of a mere presentation,
+now of a judgement, now of a question, now of a doubt, a wish etc. etc. A
+man who frames the presentation 'There are intelligent beings on Mars'
+frames the same presentation as the man who asserts "There are intelligent
+beings on Mars'
+, and the same as the man who asks 'Are there intelligent
+beings on Mars?', or the man who wishes 'If only there are intelligent beings
+on Mars!' etc. etc. We have deliberately written out the closely correspondent expressions in full. To be alike in 'content', while differing in act-quality
+has its visible grammatical expression; the harmony of grammatical forms
+points the way to our analysis.
+What do we mean by the 'same content'? Plainly the intentional objectivity of the various acts is the same. One and the same state of affairs is
+presented in the presentation, put as valid in the judgement, wished for in
+the wish, asked about in the question. This observation does not, however, go far enough, as we shall now show. In real (reell) phenomenological
+treatment, objectivity counts as nothing: in general, it transcends the act. It
+makes no difference what sort of being we give our object, or with what sense
+or justification we do so, whether this being is real (real) or ideal, genuine,
+possible or impossible, the act remains 'directed upon' its object. If one now
+asks how something non-existent or transcendent can be the intentional
+object in an act in which it has no being, one can only give the answer we
+gave above, which is also a wholly sufficient one. The object is an intentional object: this means there is an act having a determinate intention,
+and determinate in a way which makes it an intention towards this object.
+This 'reference to an object' belongs peculiarly and intrinsically to an actexperience, and the experiences manifesting it are by definition intentional
+experiences or acts 3! All differences in mode of objective reference are descriptive differences in intentional experiences.
+We must note, however, that this peculiarity revealed in the phenomenological essence of acts, of directing themselves to a certain object and not
+another, will not exhaust the phenomenological essence in question. We
+spoke of differences in mode of objective reference, but this lumps together
+totally distinct, independently variable differences. Some are differences in
+act-quality, as when we speak of such different ways of being intentional as
+being presented, being judged, being asked etc. Such variation intersects
+with the other, wholly independent variation in objective reference: one act
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience 12l
+may point to this, another to that object, regardless as to whether the acts
+are alike or different in quality. Every quality can be combined with every
+objective reference. This second variation therefore points to a second side in
+the phenomenological content of acts, differing from their quality.
+In the case of this latter variation, which concerns the changing direction
+to objects, one does not speak of different 'manners of objective reference',
+though the differentia of this direction lies in the act itself.
+Looking more closely, we see another possibility of variation independent
+of quality which certainly prompts talk of different ways of referring to
+objects. We see, too, that the twofold variation just distinguished is not
+quite in a position to effect a neat separation of what must be defined as
+'matter' from quality. Our distinction posited two sides in every act: its
+quality, which stamped it as, e.g., presentation or judgement, and its matter,
+that lent it direction to an object, which made a presentation, e.g., present
+this object and no other. This is quite right, and yet is to some extent
+misleading. For one is at first tempted to interpret the situation simply:
+matter is that part of an act which gives it direction to this object and no
+other. Acts are therefore unambiguously determined by their quality, on
+the one hand, and by the object they will intend, on the other. This seeming
+obviousness is, however, delusive. One can readily see, in fact, that even if
+quality and objective direction are both fixed at the same time, certain variations remain possible. Two identically qualified acts, e.g. two presentations,
+may appear directed, and evidently directed, to the same object, without
+full agreement in intentional essence. The ideas equilateral triangle and equiangular triangle differ in content, though both are directed, and evidently
+directed, to the same object: they present the same object, although 'in a
+different fashion'. The same is true of such presentations as a length of a + b
+units and a length of b + a units; it is also true of statements, in other respects
+synonymous, which differ only in 'equivalent' concepts. The same holds if
+we compare other types of equivalent assertions, e.g. We shall have rain and
+The weather is becoming rainy. If we consider a series of acts like the judgement It will rain today, the surmise It may well rain today, the question Will
+it rain today? and the wish Oh that it would rain today!, we see that it
+exemplified identity not only as regards objective reference in general, but
+also as regards a new sense of objective reference, a sense not fixed by the
+Quality only determines whether what is already presented in definite
+fashion is intentionally present as wished, asked, posited in judgement etc.
+The matter, therefore, must be that element in an act which first gives it reference to an object, and reference so wholly definite that it not merely fixes the
+object meant in a general way, but also the precise way in which it is meant??
+The matter - to carry clearness a little further - is that peculiar side of an
+act's phenomenological content that not only determines that it grasps the
+object but also as what it grasps it, the properties, relations, categorial forms,
+
+122 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+that it itself attributes to it. It is the act's matter that makes its object count
+as this object and no other, it is the objective, the interpretative sense (Sinn
+der gegenständlichen Auffassung, Auffassungssinn) which serves as basis for
+the act's quality (while indifferent to such qualitative differences). Identical
+matters can never yield distinct objective references, as the above examples
+prove. Differences of equivalent, but not tautologically equivalent expressions, certainly affect matter. Such differences must not be thought to corespond to any fragmentation of matter: there is not one piece of matte
+corresponding to an identical object, another to the differing mode of pre
+senting it. Reference to objects is possible a priori only as being a definite
+manner of reference: it arises only if the matter is fully determined.
+act age as, un tikable apar from al mater Coula we had al
+experience possible which was a judging without definite subject-matter?
+which is evidently part of its essence.
+The same holds of matter. A matter that was not matter for presentation,
+terms 'quality' and 'matter'. That such talk has yet other important meanings will appear in due course. [Cf. the enumeration in Inv. VI, §27 below]
+§21 The intentional and the semantic essence
+We shall postpone investigation of the difficult problems here involved, to
+treat of a new distinction, in which a new concept of intentional content
+arises, which has to be separated off from the full descriptive content of
+the act.
+In each act's descriptive content we have distinguished quality and matter
+as two mutually dependent aspects. If both are taken together, it would at
+first seem, the act in question will merely have been reconstituted. Looked at
+more closely, however, another conception distinguishes itself from whose
+point of view the two aspects, brought to unity, do not make up the concrete,
+complete act. Two acts may in fact agree in respect of their quality and their
+matter, and yet differ descriptively. In so far as quality and matter now
+count for us (as will be shown later) as the wholly essential, and so never to
+be dispensed with, constituents of an act, it would be suitable to call the
+inion of both, forming one part of the complete act, the act's intentiona
+essence. To pin down this term, and the conception of the matter it goe
+with, we simultaneously introduce a second term. To the extent that we deal
+with acts, functioning in expressions in sense-giving fashion, or capable of
+so functioning - whether all acts are so capable must be considered later -
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience 123
+we shall speak more specifically of the semantic essence of the act. The
+ideational abstraction of this essence yields a 'meaning in our ideal sense.
+In justification of our conceptual ruling, we may point to the following
+new series of identifications. We may say generally, and with good sense,
+that a man may, at different times, and that several men may, at the same or
+lifferent times, have the same presentation, memory, expectation, percep
+ion, utter the same assertion or wish, cherish the same hope etc. eto.
+To have the same presentation means, but does not mean as much as,
+having a presentation of the same object. The presentation I have of Greenland's icy wastes certainly differs from the presentation Nansen has of it,
+yet the object is the same. Just so the ideal objects straight line and shortest
+line are identical, but the presentations - 'straight' being suitably defined -
+alk about the same presentation, judgement etc. points to no individua
+ameness ot acts. as it mv consciousness were in some wav conloined wit.
+someone else's. It also means no relation of perfect likeness, of indiscernibility
+as regards inner constituents, as if the one act merely duplicated the other.
+We have the same presentation of a thing, when we have presentations in
+which the thing is not merely presented, but presented as exactly the same:
+following our previous treatment we may add 'presented with the same
+interpretative sense' or 'based on the same matter'. In our 'essence' we really
+have the same presentation despite other phenomenological differences. Such
+essential identity comes out most clearly when we reflect how presentations
+function in forming higher acts. For essential identity can be equivalently
+defined if we say: Two presentations are in essence the same, if exactly the
+same statements, and no others, can be made on the basis of either regarding the presented thing (either presentation being taken alone, i.e. analytically). The same holds in regard to other species of acts. Two judgements
+are essentially the same judgement when (in virtue of their content alone)
+everything that the one judgement tells us of the state of affairs judged,
+would also be told us by the other, and nothing more is told us by either.
+Their truth-value is identical, and this is clear to us when 'the judgement,
+the intentional essence uniting judgement-quality and judgement-matter, is
+the same.
+Let us now be quite clear that the intentional essence does not exhaust the
+act phenomenologically. An imaginative presentation, qualified as merely
+imaginative, is unessentially altered in manner, if the fulness and vividness
+of the sensuous contents helping to build it up is increased or decreased, or,
+objectively put, if the object now appears with greater clearness and definiteness, now becomes lost in a mist, now becomes paler in colour etc. Whether
+or not one here assumes intensive differences, whether one concedes or
+denies a basic likeness between the sensory phantasms here present and
+the sensational elements in perception, all this makes little difference to the
+absolute qualities, forms etc. of the act, in so far as the act's intention, its
+
+124 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+meaning, stays unchanged, identically determined (identity of matter). We
+attribute these changes, not to the object, but to its 'appearance'; we mean'
+the object as constant and persistent, and we 'mean' this in merely 'feigning'
+fashion (identity of quality). As opposed to this, the matter of a unitary presentation changes if its object is given as changing (despite any overreaching
+form of unity to which the intentional object's identity-in-variety corresponds).
+The same is true when new features enrich our conception of an object,
+which is constantly before consciousness, features not previously part of the
+object's intentional content, of the object of our presentation as such.
+The case of perception is similar. If many persons share the 'same' percept, or repeat a previous one, we have merely an identity of matter, of
+intentional essence, which does not at all exclude change in the descriptive
+content of the experience. The same holds of the variable part played, or that
+can be played, by imagination in perception, in the putting of a perceived
+object before us. Whether or not images of the back of the cigarette-box
+float in front of me, with this or that degree of fulness, steadiness and
+vividness, is quite irrelevant to the essential content, the interpretative sense
+of my percept, to that side of it, in short which, suitably understood, explains and justifies talk of the 'same percept' in opposition to a multiplicity
+of phenomenologically distinct perceptual acts. In each of such cases the
+object is presupposed as identical, is seen clothed with the same array of
+properties: it is 'meant' or 'apprehended' and posited in perceptual fashion.
+A percept may, further, have the same matter as a flight of fancy: the
+latter may present an object or state of affairs in imagination as being 'just
+the same' as it is perceptually apprehended in the percept. Nothing may be
+objectively ascribed in the one case which is not likewise ascribed in the
+other. Since the quality of the presentation may be identical (e.g. in the case
+of memory), we see that the specific differences of intuitive acts do not
+depend on their intentional essence.
+Much the same may be said of any sort of act. Many persons cherish the
+same wish, when their optative intention is the same. This wish may in one
+person be fully expressed, in another unexpressed, in one person it may
+bring to full intuitive clarity its basic presentative content, in another it may
+e more or less 'notional' etc. In each case the identity of essence plainly le
+n the two aspects distinguished above. in an identity of act-quality and o
+matter. The same may be claimed for expressive acts, for the acts in particular which lend meaning to expressions: as said above by anticipation, their
+semantic essence, i.e. the really present (reell) phenomenological correlate of
+their meaning, coincides with their intentional essence.
+We may confirm our notion of semantic essence (the act of meaning in
+concreto) by recalling the series of identities used above in Investigation I
+(§12) in order to draw a distinction between a unity of meaning and a unity
+of object, and the numerous examples of expressive experience which there
+illustrated our general notion of intentional essence. The identity of 'the'
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience 125
+judgement or of 'the' statement consists in an identity of meaning repeated
+Appendix to §11 and §20
+ritique of the 'image-theory' and of the doctrine of th
+immanent' objects of act
+There are two fundamental, well-nigh ineradicable errors that have to be
+guarded against in the phenomenological interpretation of the relationship
+between act and subject:
+1. The erroneous image-theory, which thinks it has sufficiently explained
+the fact of presentation - fully present in each act - by saying that: 'Outside
+the thing itself is there (or is at times there); in consciousness there is an
+image which does duty for it.'
+To this notion we must object that it entirely ignores a most weighty
+point: that in a representation by images the represented object (the original)
+is meant, and meant by way of its image as an apparent object. This representative character is, however, no 'real predicate', no intrinsic character of
+the object which functions as image: an object is not representative as, e.g.,
+it is red and spherical. What therefore enables us to go beyond the image
+which alone is present in consciousness, and to refer to the latter as an
+image to a certain extraconscious object? To point to the resemblance between image and thing will not help. It is doubtless present, as an objective
+matter-of-fact, when the thing actually exists. But for consciousness, which
+is assumed only to possess the image, this fact means nothing: it can throw
+no light on the essence of the representative relation to the object, to the
+original, which is external to itself. Resemblance between two objects, however precise, does not make the one be an image of the other. Only a presenting ego's power to use a similar as an image-representative of a similar
+- the first similar had intuitively, while the second similar is nonetheless
+meant in its place - makes the image be an image. This can only mean that
+the constitution of the image as image takes place in a peculiar intentional
+consciousness, whose inner character, whose specifically peculiar mode of
+apperception, not only constitutes what we call image-representation as
+such, but also, through its particular inner determinateness, constitutes the
+image-representation of this or that definite object. The reflective, relational
+opposition of image to original does not, however, point to two genuinely
+apparent objects in the imaginative act itself, but rather to possible cognitiv
+consummations, which new acts must realize, both fulfilling the imagina
+intention and achieving a synthesis between the image and the thing it represents. Inaccurate oppositions of inner likenesses to outer objects cannot
+
+126 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+be allowed in a descriptive psychology, and much less in a pure phenomenology. A painting only is a likeness for a likeness-constituting consciousness,
+whose imaginative apperception, basing itself on a percept, first gives to its
+primary, perceptually apparent object the status and meaning of an image.
+Since the interpretation of anything as an image presupposes an object
+intentionally given to consciousness, we should plainly have a regressus in
+infinitum were we again to let this latter object be itself constituted through
+an image, or to speak seriously of a 'perceptual image' immanent in a simple
+percept, by way of which it refers to the 'thing itself'. We must come to see,
+moreover, the general need for a constitution of presented objects for and in
+consciousness, in consciousness's own circle of essential being. We must
+realize that a transcendent object is not present to consciousness merely
+because a content rather similar to it simply somehow is in consciousness -
+a supposition which, fully thought out, reduces to utter nonsense - but that
+all relation to an object is part and parcel of the phenomenological essence
+of consciousness, and can in principle be found in nothing else, even when
+such a relation points to some 'transcendent' matter. This pointing is 'direct'
+in the case of a straightforward presentation: it is mediate in the case of a
+'founded' presentation, e.g. one by way of images.
+One should not talk and think as if an image stood in the same relation to
+consciousness as a statue does to a room in which it is set up, or as if the
+least light could be shed on the matter by inventing a hotch-potch of two
+objects. One must rise to the fundamental insight that one can only achieve
+the understanding one wants through a phenomenological analysis of
+the essences of the acts concerned, which are acts of the 'imagination' in the
+wide, traditional sense of Kant and Hume. The essential and a priori peculiarity of such acts consists in the fact that in them 'an object appears',
+sometimes straightforwardly and directly, and sometimes as 'counting' as a
+'representation by images' of an object that resembles it. Here we must not
+forget that the representative image, like any apparent object, is itself constituted in an act in which the prime source of its representative character is
+to be sought.
+Our exposition extends, mutatis mutandis, to the theory of representation
+in the wider sense of a theory of signs. To be a sign, likewise, is no real (real)
+predicate; it requires a founded conscious act, a reference to certain novel
+characters of acts, which are all that is phenomenologically relevant and, in
+consequence of this last predicate, all that is really (reell) phenomenological.
+2. It is a serious error to draw a real (reell) distinction between 'merely
+immanent' or 'intentional' objects, on the one hand, and 'transcendent',
+'actual' objects, which may correspond to them on the other. It is an error
+whether one makes the distinction one between a sign or image really (reell)
+present in consciousness and the thing it stands for or images, or whether
+one substitutes for the 'immanent object' some other real (reelles) datum of
+consciousness, a content, e.g., as a sense-giving factor. Such errors have
+
+Consciousness as intentional experience |27
+dragged on through the centuries - one has only to think of Anselm's ontological argument - they have their source in factual difficulties, but their
+support lies in equivocal talk concerning 'immanence' and the like. It need
+only be said to be acknowledged that the intentional object of a presentation
+is the same as its actual object, and on occasion as its external object, and that
+it is absurd to distinguish between them. The transcendent object would not
+be the object of this presentation, if it was not its intentional object. This
+to obfuscate so completely.
+What we have said above does not, of course, stop us from distinguishing,
+as we said previously, between the object tout court which is intended on a
+given occasion, and the object as it is then intended - what interpretative
+slant is put upon it and with what possible fulness of intuition - and in the
+latter case peculiar analyses and descriptions will be appropriate.
+
+Chapter 3
+The matter of the act and
+its underlying presentation
+$22 The question of the relation between the matter
+and quality of an act
+We wind up our general probe into the phenomenological structure of intentional experience with a discussion which throws important light on the
+main problems in our special field of meaning. It deals with the relation of
+quality to matter, and so with the sense in which each act both needs and
+also includes in itself a presentation which serves as its basis. We here at
+once come up against fundamental difficulties, scarce noticed before! anc
+certainly not put into words. The gap in our phenomenological knowledge
+is all the more grievous since, while it remains unfilled, we can have no real
+insight into the essential make-up of intentional experiences, and none therefore into meanings.
+Quality and matter were distinguished by us as two 'moments', two inner
+constituents of all acts. We did so quite properly. If, e.g., we call an experi
+ence one of 'judgement', there must be some inner determination, not some
+mere outwardly attached mark, that distinguishes it as a judgement from
+this identical element is and how it stands to the moment of quality. Are we
+dealing with two separate albeit abstract constituents of acts, such as colour
+nd shape in sensuous intuition, or are they otherwise related, as, e.g., gen
+nd differentia etc.? This question is all the more weighty since the matter (
+acts is that aspect of them which gives them their determinate objective
+
+The matter of the act and its underlying presentation 129
+reference. To be as clear as one can in regard to the nature of such reference is
+of fundamental interest for epistemology, since all thinking takes place in acts.
+823 The view of 'matter' as a founding act of
+'mere presentation'
+tional experience - is either a presentation or based upon underlying presentations. More precisely, this remarkable proposition means that in each act
+the intentional object is presented in an act of presentation, and that, whenever we have no case of 'mere' presentation, we have a case of presentation
+so peculiarly and intimately inwoven with one or more further acts or rather
+act-characters, that the presented objects become the object judged about,
+wished for, hoped for etc. Such plurality of intentional reference is not
+achieved in a linked concomitance or sequence of acts, in each of which the
+object has a novel, i.e. a recurrent, intentional presence, but in a single
+strictly unitary act, in which a single object is only once apparent, but is in
+this single appearance the target of a complex intention. We can, in other
+words, interpret our proposition as saying that an intentional experience
+only gains objective reference by incorporating an experienced act of pres
+entation in itself, through which the object is presented to it. The object
+would be nothing to consciousness if consciousness did not set it before
+itself as an object, and if it did not further permit the object to become an
+object of feeling, of desire etc.
+These added intentional characters are plainly not to be regarded as
+complete and independent acts: they cannot be conceived apart from the act
+of objectifying presentation, on which they are accordingly based. That an
+object or state of affairs should be desired, without being presented in and
+with such desire, is not merely not the case in fact, but is entirely inconceivable, and the same holds in every similar case. The matter before us therefore claims to be a priori, and the proposition asserting it is a self-evident
+law of essence. The addition of, e.g., desire to some underlying presentation,
+is not the addition of something that exists independently, with its own
+independent direction to some object: we must see it as the addition of a
+non-independent factor, intentional no doubt as having real reference to an
+object, and unthinkable a priori without it, but only able to develop or gain
+such reference through intimate liaison with a presentation. But this last is
+more than a mere act-quality: unlike the quality of desire based upon it, it is
+quite capable of independent existence as a concrete intentional experience,
+as an act of 'mere' presentation.
+We round off these explanations with an observation which must be kept
+in mind in future discussions: that among cases of 'mere presentation' we
+
+130 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+must include, following Brentano, all cases of mere imagination, where the
+apparent object has neither being nor non-being asserted of it, and where no
+further acts concern it, as well as all cases where an expression, e.g. a statement, is well understood without prompting us either to belief or disbelief.
+It is mainly by contrast with such a 'belief-character', whose addition perfects judgement, that the notion of mere presentation can be elucidated. It is
+well-known how important a part this contrast plays in the modern theory
+of judgement.
+Returning to our proposition, we are tempted (as said at the beginning)
+to apply the principle there expressed and here set forth, to explain the relation between matter and quality. Identity of matter accompanying change
+of quality rests, we may say, on the 'essential' identity of the underlying
+presentation. Or otherwise put: acts having the same 'content', and differing
+only in intentional essence, inasmuch as one judges, one wishes, one doubts
+etc., this same content, have "in essence' the same presentation as their basis.
+If this presentation underlies a judgement, it yields (in its present sense as
+'matter') the content of a judgement. If it underlies a desire, it yields the
+content of a desire etc. etc.
+We spoke of 'essentially the same presentation'. We are not to be taken
+cussion, presentations with one and the same matter, which may, of course,
+be phenomenologically differentiated by further 'moments' which have nothing to do with matter. Since quality is also the same, all these presentations
+have the same 'intentional essence'.
+The following is the outcome: that, while every other intentional essence
+is a complex of quality and matter, the intentional essence of a presentation
+is pure matter - or is pure quality, however one may choose to call it.
+Otherwise put, it is only because all other acts have a complex intentional
+essence, and necessarily include a presentative factor among their essential
+constituents, that talk of the difference between quality and matter arises.
+The word 'matter' refers to the necessary, basic presentative constituent. In
+the case of simple acts, which are also eo ipso presentative, the whole distinction necessarily falls away. One should then say: the difference between
+quality and matter represents no basic difference among the kinds of abstract moments found in acts. Matters, treated in and for themselves, do not
+differ from qualities: they are qualities of presentation. What we call the
+intentional essence of an act is its total qualitative being: this is what is
+essential to it, as opposed to what varies accidentally.
+The matter could also be put in the following manner:
+If an act is simple, ie. is a pure presentation, its quality coincides with
+what we have called its intentional essence. If it is complex - and all acts
+that are not mere presentations, as well as all complex presentations, belong
+
+The matter of the act and its underlying presentation 131
+here - its complex intentional essence is merely a complex of qualities brought
+together in unity, from which a unitary total quality emerges, in such a way,
+§24 Difficulties. The problem of the differentiation
+of qualitative kinds
+Evident as this whole interpretation seems, and based on an irrefragable
+support, it is yet not such as to exclude other possibilities. Brentano's principle is undoubtedly self-evident, but things have perhaps been read into it
+which are not truly part of it. We note at least the peculiar stress laid on
+presentations' as the one class of intentional experiences whose intentional
+essence (or, what now is the same, whose intentional quality) could be truly
+simple. In connection with this a problem arises as to the interpretation of the
+last specific differences of the various types of intentional essence (or briefly of
+'intentions'). When we judge, e.g., is our full judgement-intention, the aspect
+in the act of assertion which corresponds to our asserted sentence's meaning, a complex whole made up, on the one hand, of a presentative intention,
+which merely gives 'presence' to some state of affairs, and a corresponding,
+strictly judgemental intention, which sees it in the further aspect of what
+really is? What is the position, we may ask, in regard to last specific differences of such added intentions? The summum genus of Intention specifies
+itself, mediately or immediately, in the species of Judgement-intention (the
+latter of course conceived 'for itself', and in abstraction from its supposedly
+underlying presentative intention). Is this species, we may ask, an ultimate
+specific difference?
+To preserve clarity let us compare our case with a plain case where
+generic essence is differentiated. The genus Quality is essentially specified in
+the species Colour, and this in its turn has the species Red ranged under it,
+as well as this determinate shade of Red. This last is a last specific difference, permitting of no differentiation which remains within its generic
+limits. All that is still possible are alliances with determinations which
+belong to other genera, which are themselves last differences in their own
+class. Such alliances add definiteness to content, but they do not, properly
+speaking, differentiate. The same Red, e.g., can be extended in this or that
+shape. We modify the moment of Red, not qua quality, but in respect of the
+new genus Extension, a moment essentially belonging to it, since it is of the
+essence of colour that it cannot be without extension.
+Returning to our present case, how shall we hold that the superadded
+character of judging stands to its presentational basis in a concrete judgement?
+Is it quite the same in all judgements, and is the Species Judgement-intention
+
+132 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+(understood in ideal isolation, uncomplicated by presentations) truly a lowest specific difference? We should not hesitate to say so. But if we do say so,
+and if we then try to argue similarly in the case of all kinds of intention, we
+encounter serious difficulties in the case of presentations. For, if no further
+differentiation of the species Presentation is possible, the difference between
+this or that presentation in specie, e.g. the difference between the presentation Emperor and the presentation Pope, will not affect the presentative
+intention as such. What then will differentiate these presentations, or rather
+these intentional essences or presentational meanings? They must plainly be
+complexes of the character or quality Presentation together with another,
+generically different character and, since all difference of objective reference
+is absent from the former, this second character must introduce such difference into the complete meaning. In other words, the intentional essence of
+the presentation (its meaning, in our example) cannot be the last specific
+difference in the presentative intention; a wholly new determination of some
+other sort must be added to the fully differentiated intention. The meaning
+of each presentation will then consist of Presentative Intention compounded
+with Content, two generically different ideal unities woven together in unity.
+Returning to our old terms we must say: If we hold it obvious, as we did
+above, that intentions of all sorts must be differentiated in like manner, we
+must again opt for an essential distinction between act-quality and actmatter. We cannot maintain the view that what we called 'matter' is identical
+with the intentional essence of an underlying presentation, and that this in
+its turn is identical with a mere quality of presentation.
+§25 Closer analysis of our two possible solutions
+Many will here ask in amazement why we are so prolix in removing the
+difficulties that we ourselves have put in our path. The whole matter is quite
+simple. Each act of presentation has of course the general act-character
+of the Species Presentation, which permits no further genuine differentiation. What differentiates presentation from presentation? Their content, of
+course. The presentation Pope presents the Pope, the presentation Emperor
+the Emperor.
+Such 'obviousnesses will satisty nobody who has grasped the phenomeno
+logical distinctions of kind which obtain here, and which derive from ideal
+unities, and especially the fundamental cleft between 'content' as object and
+'content' as matter (interpretative sense or meaning). It will only satisfy those
+who, at this point where it is so all-important, fail to feel the force of the
+truth that the object is, properly speaking, nothing at all 'in' a presentation.
+Our prolixity was therefore quite necessary. Objects, that are nothing in
+a presentation are also unable to create differences among presentations, and
+especially not the differences so familiar to us from the proper content of
+each presentation in respect of what it presents. If we think of this last as a
+
+The matter of the act and its underlying presentation 133
+'content', both distinct from the intended object and immanent in the presentation, it is not clear what we could mean by it. Only two possibilities seem
+open to us, which were indicated above and which we now wish to set forth
+as sharply as possible.
+semantic essence permits. In the compared case the universal is Colour, the
+particular this or that definite colour, this shade of Red, that shade of Blue.
+That a presentation refers to a certain object in a certain manner, is not due
+to its acting on some external, independent object, 'directing' itself to it in
+some literal sense, or doing something to it or with it, as a hand writes with
+a pen. It is due to nothing that stays outside of the presentation, but to its
+own inner peculiarity alone. This last holds on any view but, on the present
+view, a given presentation presents this object in this manner in view of its
+peculiarly differentiated presentational quality.
+Or we may hold, as the second possibility open to us, that the full intentional essence (in our cases the full semantic essence) that achieves Abstract
+Ideation in talk of 'The (ideally-single) Presentation Pope' or of 'The Meaning of the word "Pope"'
+', is essentially complex, and divides into two abstract moments: Presentational Quality, on the one hand, the Act-Quality of
+presentation conceived in universal selfsameness and purity, and 'Content'
+or Matter, on the other hand, which does not pertain to the inner essence of
+Presentation as a differentiating feature, but accedes to it and perfects it into
+a total meaning. The relation of Presentational Quality to Matter is therefore like that of Determinate Shade of Colour to Extension, in our parallel
+example. Each colour is the colour of a certain extension: each presentation
+likewise is the presentation of a certain content. In neither case is the connection contingent, but has a priori necessity.
+Our comparison shows how we wish to conceive this kind of combination, and how we must conceive it from our present point of view. It is
+form of combination that still lacks a suitable name. Brentano and certair
+kindred thinkers call it a combination of 'metaphysical parts': Stumpf prenote that the completing character which adds determining content to the
+content) must be seen as truly belonging to a new genus. If we again regarded
+
+134 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+it as a qualitative character, the difficulties we are now seeking to remove
+vould surge up once more, and only names would have been altered
+If we therefore decide to exclude 'Content' or 'Matter' from the genu
+Act-Quality, we shall have to say: The qualitative character which is such
+as to make a presentation a presentation, and the qualitative characters,
+consequently, which are such as to make judgements judgements, desires
+desires etc., have in their inner essence no relation to an object. But an
+ideally necessary relation is grounded in this essence: this character cannot b
+vithout complementary 'matter', through which the relation to the objec
+first enters the complete intentional essence and the concrete intentional
+resence isles i carries over so to these at see of
+pressive experiences, what makes us speak, e.g.,
+asserted by different persons. This semantic essence, this meaning in the
+ideal sense, is, in the concrete judgement-experience, the Act-character of
+Judgemental Position (the abstract Judgement-quality), attributively bound
+up with the 'content' (the Matter of Judgement) through which the relation
+to the 'object', i.e. the state of affairs, is consummated. This Judgemental
+Assertion may be seen a priori to be unthinkable without a Content, as a
+colour is unthinkable without extension.
+§26 Consideration and rejection of the proposed
+conception
+How shall we decide among these opposed possibilities, both pondered over
+with equal care?
+If we accept the first possibility Presentation stands as an unacceptable
+(or matter), while qualities of Judgement, Wishing, Willing etc., are last
+differences: differences of content are in their case mere differences in the
+presentational qualities which are combined with, or underlie, their own
+quality. The matter can be seen in another way. One cannot restore uniformity by treating the distinguishing contents of different judgements, wishes,
+willings etc., as differences of the qualitative species Judgement, Wish, Will
+etc., since different pure species cannot share the same lowest difference. Is
+this anomaly not exchanged for another if we accept different species at the
+same level, of which some have lowest differences under them, while others
+themselves are such lowest differences?
+But if we adopt the second possibility it seems to force us to change our
+conception yet further. Have we good ground left for adhering to the principle that every intentional experience is either a 'mere' presentation, or
+implies presentations as its necessary basis? Such priority for presentations -
+
+The matter of the act and its underlying presentation 135
+as acts - and such complication in all acts not themselves presentations,
+The peculiar character of many sorts of acts may of necessity require
+mediation: many act-qualities may only make their appearance in combination with other act-qualities, e.g. that of presentation, which underlie them
+in the total act, and which relate to the same matter, so that they are mediately linked with this matter. But that this must always be so, and that the
+Act-species of Mere Presentation plays this all-important role, so that every
+act not itself a mere presentation gets its matter only through a mediating
+presentation: all this appears neither obvious nor initially likely.
+§27 The testimony of direct intuition. Perceptual
+presentation and perception
+We close our argument with the 'testimony of inner perception', which
+should come first in exploring controversial questions of description, though
+we see reason to prefer speaking of immediate intuitive analysis of the
+essences of intentional experiences. Such a reversal of expository order is
+permitted and in certain circumstances necessary. We wish in epistemology
+to render all due honour to the evidence of a rightly understood, immanent
+inspection of essence which is falsely credited to 'internal perception'. But
+this testimony, when appealed to, must be conceptually apprehended and
+asserted, and will thereby lose much authority and permit of well-founde
+doubts. Different people all appeal to such 'internal perception', and come
+to quite opposite results: they read different things into it or out of it. This
+is true in the case before us. The analyses just done enable us to recognize
+this fact, and to distinguish and appraise various illusions which arise in
+interpretations of the data of phenomenological inspections of essence. The
+same holds in regard to the evidence of general principles based on our
+inner intuition of individual cases, based on this evidence, i.e., and not on
+interpretative interpolations.
+We said above that it was wrong to talk of "internal perception' instead
+of 'immanent inspection of essences' in making the usual appeals to the
+
+136 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+'evidence of internal perception'. For, if one examines the matter, all such
+appeals either serve to establish facts of essence belonging to the pure
+phenomenological sphere, or mere transfers of such facts to the sphere of
+psychological reality. Assertions of phenomenological fact can never be
+epistemologically grounded in psychological experience (Erfahrung), nor in
+internal perception in the ordinary sense of the word, but only in ideational,
+phenomenological inspection of essence. The latter has its illustrative start
+in inner intuition, but such inner intuition need not be actual internal perception or other inner experience (Erfahrung), e.g. recollection: its purposes
+are as well or even better served by any free fictions of inner imagination
+provided they have enough intuitive clarity. Phenomenological intuition,
+however, as often stressed, fundamentally excludes all psychological apperception and real (reale) assertion of existence, all positings of psycho-physical
+nature with its actual things, bodies and persons, including one's own empirical ego, as well as all that transcends pure consciousness. This exclusion is
+achieved eo ipso, since the phenomenological inspection of essence, in its
+turning of immanent ideation upon our inner intuitions, only turns its ideating gaze on what is proper to the real (reellen) or intentional being of the
+experiences inspected, and only brings to an adequate focus the specific
+modes of experience which such individual experiences exemplify, and the
+a priori ideal laws which relate to them. It is of the greatest importance to
+be quite clear on this matter. Men are misled by a mere illusion when they
+think, in conducting epistemological discussions, or in psychological discussions which base general principles of conscious data on apodictic evidence,
+that the source of such evidence lies in inner experience (Erfahrung), and in
+particular in internal perception, i.e. in acts which assert existence. This
+cardinal error infects that style of psychologism which thinks it has satisfied
+the requirements of pure logic, ethics and epistemology and that it has gone
+beyond extreme empiricism, merely because it speaks of 'apodictic evidence'
+and even of 'a priori insights', without ever leaving the ground of internal
+experience (Erfahrung) and psychology. It is in principle impossible to go
+beyond Hume in this manner, since he too acknowledges the a priori in
+the form of 'relations of ideas', and yet is so far from distinguishing in principle between inner experience (Erfahrung) and Ideation, that he interprets
+the latter nominalistically as a set of contingent facts. [Second Edition comment. Trans.]
+Going into more detail, it is, of course, evident that each intentional
+experience has its basis in a presentation. It is evident that we cannot judge
+if the state of affairs about which we judge is not present to our minds, and
+'Each act-experience is either a mere presentation, or has its basis in presentations'. We are put on our guard by the fact that, if we confront our
+
+The matter of the act and its underlying presentation 137
+experiences in sternly descriptive fashion, we do not by any means always
+find it possible to analyse the acts which are not 'mere presentations' into
+the partial acts which supposedly make them up. Let us contrast a case
+where intentional reference is plainly compound, and in relation to the same
+matter, with one or other of our dubious cases. I cannot rejoice in anything
+unless what I rejoice in stands before me in the hues of existence, in the
+perceptual, the reminiscent, possibly also the judgemental and assertive
+manner. Here the compounding is indubitable. If, e.g., I see and rejoice, the
+act-character of my joy has its basis in a percept with its own act-character,
+which makes its matter into matter for my joy. The character of my joy may
+fall away while my percept remains unaltered. Without doubt, therefore, it
+forms part of the concretely complete experience of joy.
+Perception offers an example of the dubious compounding of acts. Here
+as in all acts we distinguish between quality and matter. Comparison with a
+corresponding mere presentation, one, e.g., of mere imagination, shows how
+the same object can be present as the same (with the same 'interpretative
+sense'), and yet present in an entirely different 'manner'. In perception the
+object seemed to achieve full-bodied presence, to be there in propria persona.
+In the imaginative presentation it merely 'floats before us', it is represented'
+without achieving full-bodied presence. This is not, however, the difference
+that concerns us: ours is a difference of mere 'moments', involving neither
+matter nor quality, just like, e.g., the difference between perceiving and
+recollecting one selfsame object which is present to mind with the same
+interpretative sense etc. Let us therefore compare a percept with a mere
+presentation that corresponds to it, while abstracting from all such differences. On our conception, a 'matter' is abstractly common to both cases,
+given in each case in different fashion, and with a differing act-quality. On
+the other conception which we were questioning, the matter which underlies
+perception is itself a second act-quality, that of an underlying act of mere
+presentation. Does analysis reveal anything of the sort? Can we look on a
+percept as a compound act in which an independent act of mere presentation can be really isolated?
+Perhaps someone will here point to the possibility of an exactly correspondent illusion, and will hold that, once exposed as illusion, it can be seen
+as the isolated mere presentation, inwrought without change into our percept
+and providing it with its matter. Illusion, while not recognized as illusion,
+was simple perception. But, later, its perceptual character, the act-quality of
+belief, fell away, and the mere perceptual presentation remained. The same
+compounding must be assumed to obtain in all percepts: everywhere the
+underlying perceptual presentation - whose quality forms the matter of
+perception - will be completed by a belief-character.
+Let us discuss the matter more closely in the light of a concrete example.
+Wandering about in the Panopticum Waxworks we meet on the stairs a
+charming lady whom we do not know and who seems to know us, and who
+
+138 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+is in fact the well-known joke of the place: we have for a moment been
+tricked by a waxwork figure. As long as we are tricked, we experience a
+perfectly good percept: we see a lady and not a waxwork figure. When the
+illusion vanishes, we see exactly the opposite, a waxwork figure that only
+represents a lady. Such talk of 'representing' does not of course mean that
+the waxwork figure is modelled on a lady as in the same waxworks there are
+figure-models of Napoleon, of Bismarck etc. The percept of the wax-figure
+as a thing does not therefore underlie our awareness of the same figure a
+representing the lady. The lady, rather, makes her appearance together witt
+the wax-figure and in union with it. Two perceptual interpretations, or two
+appearances of a thing, interpenetrate, coinciding as it were in part in their
+perceptual content. And they interpenetrate in conflicting fashion, so that
+our observation wanders from one to another of the apparent objects each
+barring the other from existence.
+It can now be argued that while the original perceptual presentation does
+not achieve an entirely detached existence, but appears in conjunction with
+the new percept of the wax-figure, it does not serve to found a genuine
+percept: only the wax-figure is perceived, it alone is believed to be really
+there. The isolation is achieved after a fashion, which suffices for the present
+purpose. But it would only really suffice if we could truly speak of isolation
+in this case, if we could, in other words, assume the presentation of the lady
+in the second case to be really contained in the original percept of the same
+lady. But, when the fraud is exposed, presentation amounts to perceptual
+consciousness resolved in conflict. But a consciousness qualified in this
+fashion is naturally not part of the original percept. Certainly both have
+something in common: they are as like one another in our illustration,
+which cannot in this respect be improved upon, as percept and corresponding presentation can possibly be. Certainly both share the same matter, for
+which such far-reaching likeness is by no means needed. It is the same lady
+who appears on both occasions, and who appears endowed with the same
+set of phenomenal properties. But in the one case she stands before us as
+real, in the other case as a fiction, with a full-bodied appearance which yet
+amounts to nothing. The difference lies in the qualities of our acts. It i
+almost exactly as if she herself were present, a genuine, actual person: the
+
+The matter of the act and its underlying presentation 139
+for a mere perceptual fiction, but both can evidently not be combined. A
+percept cannot also fictitiously construct what it perceives, and a fiction
+Descriptive analysis does not, therefore, favour the view, so obvious to
+many, that each percept is a compound, in which a moment of belief, the
+characteristic quality of perception, is imposed on a complete act of percep
+tual presentation, endowed with its own independent quality.
+§28 Special investigation of the matter in the
+case of judgement
+The situation is similar in the case of judgements, a class of acts of particular interest to the logician. We here employ this word in its principal sense,
+which connects it with assertions (predications), and so excludes percepts,
+remembrances and similar acts (despite their not unessential descriptive
+affinity). In the judgement a state of affairs 'appears' before us, or, put
+more plainly, becomes intentionally objective to us. A state of affairs, even
+one concerning what is sensibly perceived, is not, however, an object that
+could be sensibly perceived and apparent (whether to our 'outward' or to
+our 'inward' sensibility). In perception an object is given to us as having
+full-bodied existence. We call it something which now is, in so far as our
+percept serves as our basis for judging that it is. In this judgement, which can
+continue essentially unaltered even when the percept falls away, what appears or intentionally is 'in consciousness', is not the existent sensible object,
+but the fact that this is. In the judgement it further seems to us that something has such and such properties, and this 'seeming', which we must not of
+course conceive as a case of doubtful surmise, but as one of firm opinion,
+of certainty, of conviction as in the ordinary sense of "judgement', may be
+realized in many forms which vary in content. It may be an opinion that S
+is or is not, that Sis p or is not p, that either Sis por Qis r etc.
+What plays the part of object to judgement and opinion we call the state
+of affairs judged: we distinguish this in reflex knowledge from the judging
+itself, the act in which this or that appears thus or thus, just as in the case of
+perception we distinguish the perceived object from the perception as act.
+Following this analogy, we must ask ourselves whether what constitutes the
+matter of our judgement, what makes it the judgement of a given state of
+af fairs, lies in an underlying act of presentation. The state of affairs will then
+be first presented through this presentation, and, thus presented, will become the target or a new act, or rather act-quality, of judgemental positing
+which is built upon this presentation.
+No one would question that, for every judgement, conceived a priori in
+essential generality, there is a presentation endowed with the same matter,
+and therefore presenting the same thing in exactly the same manner, as the
+judgement judges about it. To the judgement, e.g., The earth's mass is about
+
+140 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+11325,000 of the sun's mass, corresponds, as 'mere' presentation, the act
+performed by someone who hears and understands this statement, but sees
+no reason to pronounce any judgement upon it. We now ask ourselves: Is
+this very act of mere presentation a constituent of the judgement, and does
+the latter merely differ in respect of a superadded, deciding note of judgement which supervenes upon the mere presentation? I for my part, try as
+I may, can find no confirmation of this view in descriptive analysis. I can
+find no trace of the required duplicity in act-quality. One cannot of course
+base a pretended analysis on the fact that one talks of 'mere presentation'.
+The word 'mere' points to a deficiency, as it does everywhere, but not every
+deficiency is remedied by an addition. We oppose, e.g., 'mere' imagination
+to perception, thereby according a preference to the former, without crediting it with a plus. Just so, in the verbal opposition of mere presentation to
+judgement, a preference for the former corresponds to a deficiency in the
+latter, the preferential status of having come to a decision, a judgement, in
+regard to what formerly was a merely presented state of affairs.
+§29 Continuation: 'acceptance' or 'assent' given
+to the mere presentation of the state of affairs
+Others may think that the complications that escape our notice are in certain cases extremely clear. For they recall the familiar experiences where a
+mere idea first floats before our mind, without leading to an immediate
+decision in judgement, and to which an obviously novel act of assent or
+acceptance (or denial or rejection) only afterwards accrues.
+We shall not, of course, dispute these plain facts, but we shall try to
+see them, and the whole matter before us, in a somewhat different light.
+Undoubtedly a new act terminates our 'mere presentation', follows upon the
+latter and maintains itself in consciousness. What is questionable, however,
+is that the new act really contains the old act whole and entire in itself. and
+that, to be more precise, it simply grows out of the old one through the
+association of the note of belief, the specific quality of judgement, with the
+mere presentation, thereby completing the concrete experience of judging
+- much as the act-quality of joy associates itself with a perceptual act and
+so completes the concrete act of rejoicing. Undoubtedly when the new act
+thus emerges from the old, an identical element persists which includes what
+we called their 'matter. This identical element need not, however, be a
+complete act of presentation, the only change being the emergence of a new
+quality based upon it. We can also interpret what happens as involving the
+supersession of the specific note of presentation in the original merely presentative act by the note of judgement, while the 'identical element' was only
+an abstract 'moment' not amounting to a full act.
+We must, however, be more precise. Only part of the situation is to some
+degree described by the above line of thought: what justifies talk of 'assent'
+
+The matter of the act and its underlying presentation
+141
+is precisely absent. We shall base a more careful description on a case where
+acts are involved in the mere presentation, to which assent is added. We
+dwell ponderingly on the speaker's opinion, for what is merely entertained
+ing, are certainly not contained in this judgement. Assent is rather achieved
+when a judgement is pronounced that accords with the speaker's judgement
+and with the pondered question, which has the same 'matter'. I assent to a
+judgement means that I judge likewise, my judgement bases itself on the
+same matter. I answer 'yes' to the question means that I precisely hold what
+the question questions: my act again has an identical matter.
+Regarded more narrowly, however, this analysis still betrays incompleteness: what is specific to assent is really omitted. The sequence of question
+and concordant judgement, or of judgement and concordant judgement,
+does not complete the whole, i.e. that of a judgement which assents to a
+question or a judgement. Plainly a certain transitional experience mediates
+or rather connects the two distinct members. The pondering and question
+'intention' is fulfilled in the assenting decision, and in this fulfilling unit of
+response (which has the phenomenological character of a moment of union)
+the two acts are not merely successive but mutually related in the most
+intimate unity. The answer fits the question: the decision says It is so', just
+so, in fact, as it was previously pondered over as being.
+Where our pondering thoughts swing to and fro like a balance, where
+question wakes counter-question and the latter the former (Is this so or
+not?), our intention is duplex, and the whole pondering experience is ful
+filled by either of two possible decisions: that it is so or that it is not so. The
+fulfilling answer, of course, specially concerns the corresponding half of
+the pondered question. In simpler cases decisions with opposing fulfilments
+exemplify negative fulfilment or (as it were) disappointment. This automatically carries over to manifold disjunctions which are not limited to a 'Yes'
+and a 'No'. Negative fulfilment then lies in the decision: 'Neither A nor B,
+Plainly such talk of an assenting judgement - assenting in relation to
+another judgement uttered by a speaker - has its source in this experience
+of fulfilment, the resolution of a kind of tension, which is related to a
+pondered question. The speaker conceives of his auditor, whose concordant
+
+142 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+judgement he cannot simply count upon, as pondering the matter, and requests his agreement: even when a like judgement has occurred without
+pondering, agreement is felt as assent, especially since prior pondering will
+enhance its worth. The auditor in his turn is pleased to pose to his inter
+locutor as pondering and assenting, even when he has had no occasion
+to ponder: he hopes to give his interlocutor the joy of assent obtained
+Straightforward agreement often is thought of as assent, while true assent
+onsists in the complex experience where a perceived or presented judg
+lent leads to a phase of questioning, which in its turn finds fulfilment in th
+corresponding actual judgement (or, in the contrary case, in its frustration
+or rejection).
+These considerations lead us to look on assent as the same sort of transitional experience as the fulfilment of a surmise, an expectation, a wish and
+similar 'directed' intentions. We have, e.g., in the fulfilment of wishes, no
+mere sequence of wishful intention and wished-for consummation but a
+characteristically unitary consciousness of fulfilment. Here too there is agreement in 'material', but such agreement alone is insufficient: otherwise any
+two acts with the same material would yield a fulfilment'. It is the consciousness of fulfilment which first coordinates the wish that S should be P
+with the judgemental experience that S' is P, giving to the latter the relative
+character of the fulfilling act, and to the wish the character of a pregnantly
+intending, directed act.
+Our analysis shows plainly - as we observe for later Investigations - that
+any 'theory of judgement', or, more properly, any purely phenomenological
+characterization of the judgement, which identifies its peculiar quality with
+an assent or acceptance, or a denial or rejection, of some presented state of
+affairs (or of some presented object in general), is not on the right path.
+Supervenient assent is not an act-quality supervening upon a prior act of mere
+presentation: what analysis really discovers is first mere presentation (which
+here includes the interrelated acts of mere entertainment, putting the question and consideration) passing over by way of fulfilment into a judgement
+of like material. The judgement is not intrinsically the acceptance of a previously given mere presentation: it is accepting, assertive only in a context
+of fulfilment. Only in this context has it this relational character, just as in
+it alone the 'presentation' (or pondering) has the relational character of an
+intention directing itself to such assent. The analogy with other sorts of
+fulfilment, e.g. of wish-fulfilment, is here most illuminating. The 'turning up'
+of the wished-for consummation, or rather our belief in its turning up - we
+are concerned not with an objective turning up but with our knowledge or
+conviction about it - has in itself no character of wish-fulfilment. No one
+would here wish to describe the experience of fulfilment as the mere addition
+of a new act-quality to the original wish, or would dream of treating the
+fulfilling conviction, the goal of the process, as a compound which includes
+the wish as an underlying partial act.
+
+The matter of the act and its underlying presentation 143
+After all this, we can no longer argue from an experience of assent subequently added to a mere presentation, to that constitution of intentiona
+xperiences that we have found so dubious, at least not in the field of th
+The doubt just mentioned is, likewise, no emotional act. It is not in fact an
+act distinct from a theoretical question nor on occasion woven into it, but is
+simply the special case of a disjunctive question, in our present theoretical
+§30 The conception of the identical understanding of
+a word or a sentence as a case of 'mere presentation'
+understands his words without himself judging. The same words function ir
+the same sense: they are used and grasped with a similar understanding. Th
+what in the other man appears coloured with conviction, desire, hope etc.
+
+144 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+Mere understanding is here mere presentation which furnishes a uniform
+basıs for a series of acts having the same 'matter. The same notion can of
+course be transferred from verbally expressed acts to acts without such
+expression.
+This is certainly a specious argument. Talk of a sameness of sense, of
+sameness of understanding of words and sentences, certainly points to something which does not vary in the varied acts thus brought to expression.
+This something is not merely what leads us to attribute a 'stance', an active
+response of conviction, desire, hope, etc., to ourselves, but something that
+we think also consists purely in an activity, an active achievement of understanding. Much of this may point back to peculiarities of character having
+genuine phenomenological interest, but we must remind ourselves that the
+concept of act was not defined by us in terms of activity, but that we meant
+to use the word merely to abbreviate the locution 'intentional experience'.
+By this last we understood any concrete experience that 'refers' intentionally
+to an object, in one of the familiar modes of consciousness that can be elucidated only by examples. Such sameness of understanding therefore offers
+two possibilities of interpretation. Either we are dealing with a common
+element which is not a complete act, but is something in an act which gives
+it definiteness of objective direction. This common element will occur with
+differing act-qualities, through which the total intentional essence of each
+act is completed. Or our common element consists in a complete intentional
+essence, and there is a peculiar act of understanding underlying all the acts
+of a close-knit group, serving as a basis for this or that sort of act or rather
+act-quality. In this way, e.g., a judgement arises when mere presentation is
+enriched by the quality of judging, a wish when it is enriched by the quality
+We cannot, however, be sure that the proposed isolation of a basic act
+of the mere understanding of a statement represents a true isolation, in the
+sense that is here relevant. Closer consideration rather proves that such
+understanding stands to actual judgement much as a mere idea of imagination
+stands to a precisely similar memory. There are different modes of intentional reference to one and the same object of which we are in an identical
+sense 'conscious', and this means that we have two acts similar in matter but
+differing in quality. One of them is not, as a real part, enclosed in the other, in
+the sense merely that, in the latter, a new qualification has been added to it.
+§31 A last objection to our view. Mere presentations
+and isolated 'matters'
+If one immerses oneself without bias in descriptive relations, and frees
+oneself from delusive prejudices and equivocations, one will be led to the
+conviction that "presentations', conceived as 'mere presentations' in isolation
+from and in opposition to judgements as a peculiar species of acts, play no
+
+The matter of the act and its underlying presentation 145
+such dominant role in knowledge as has been supposed. What is ascribed to
+them - the 'making present' in each act of its intentional object - is in fact
+performed by non-independent experiences, which are necessarily found in all
+acts, since they are abstract aspects of their intentional essence.
+The opponents of this view remain silently beguiled by the following
+argument: If an intentional character is to have reference to something
+objective, this last must be 'present' to us. How can I believe, wish, doubt
+etc., a state of affairs, if it is not at all present to me? But what gives
+'presence' to objects is precisely an underlying presentation.
+There is nothing factually wrong in all this. What is here said is quite true,
+only it is no objection to our view. Every intentional experience certainly
+houses a component, a side, that looks after the presentation of a thing.
+That this component is a complete act is, however, just what is in question.
+And it is in question above all in the case of the judgement and its immanent
+component, the presentation of the state of affairs judged, which are our
+special concern. We felt forced to the conclusion that this component, in
+respect of the essential feature through which the 'presenting' of the state of
+affairs was managed, must differ essentially in kind from the characters
+elsewhere called 'act-qualities', the familiar characters in virtue of which
+the presented thing is judged, wished etc. Among these characters we count
+also that of 'mere presentation' mentioned above, but not the abiding, selfidentical moment of 'content' or 'matter, however much the latter, or the
+whole underlying act-component, may likewise be called a presentation or a
+The following route of evasion still seems open. Having admitted that
+'contents' are not act-qualities, one might still think it possible that the very
+same contents which at one time make their appearance in acts, ie. in
+conjunction with complementary act-qualities, may at other times also appear
+by themselves, i.e. in concrete experiences quite free from act-qualities. Genuine cases of mere presentation would arise in the latter manner, as concrete
+experiences which are yet not 'acts', if we hold, that is, to the notion of acts
+as involving, among other things, the presence of an act-quality.
+Careful inspection of the essences of the experiences concerned forces us,
+however, to treat mere presentation as a genuine act. Exemplary intuition
+will convince us that the involvement of matters with act-qualities is an
+involvement of abstract 'moments'. But matters cannot occur in isolation:
+they can only achieve concretion if supplemented by certain moments which
+fall under the supreme genus 'act-quality' and are subject to its limiting laws.
+Mere understanding, mere entertainment as such, certainly differs totally
+from the 'assertion' of belief, or from our other attitudes of surmise, wish
+etc. We must accordingly acknowledge differences in the comprehensive
+Genus Act-quality, and pin these down phenomenologically.
+
+Chapter 4
+Study of founding presentations
+with special regard to the theory
+of judgement
+§32 An ambiguity in the word 'presentation', and the
+supposed self-evidence of the principle that every act
+is founded on an act of presentation
+If we may take the results of our last chapter as assured, we must distinguish
+two concepts of Presentation. Presentation in Sense One is an act (or a
+peculiar act-quality) on a level with Judgement, Wish, Question etc. We
+have examples of this concept in all cases where isolated words, or where
+complete sentences not functioning normally, are merely understood: we
+understand indicative, interrogative and optative sentences without ourselves
+judging, asking or wishing. The same applies to any unexpressed, merely
+floating thoughts where no 'attitude' is taken up, or any mere imaginations etc.
+In Sense Two, 'Presentation' is no act, but the matter for an act, constituting one side of the intentional essence of each complete act, or, more
+underlies every act, and so also underlies the act of presentation (in Sense
+One). If this happens, the matter which can function as self-identical in acts
+of different sorts, is given with the peculiar act-quality of 'presentation', in a
+If we model the meaning of talk about acts of mere presentation on the
+above examples, we can in the case of such acts undoubtedly carry out a
+phenomenological analysis in terms of quality and matter just as we could
+in the case of other acts. In the case of judgement we distinguish between
+the specific character of conviction, and the contents of the conviction: here
+we distinguish between the peculiar mental state of mere understanding,
+pure entertainment, and the determination which lays down what we understand. The same plainly holds whatever set of examples one selects to elucidate Mere Presentation or to bring out its notion. It must always be kept in
+mind that our present analysis attempts no resolution of acts into parts,
+only a distinction of abstract moments or 'sides' in them. These appear as
+
+Study of founding presentations to the theory of judgement 147
+acts are compared, they are moments contained in the essence of the acts
+themselves, they condition the possibility of arranging acts serially according
+to their likeness and difference. The likeness and difference intuitively shown
+in such a series plainly are the 'sides' in question, eg. quality and matter. In
+the same way no one can break up a motion into direction, acceleration etc.:
+he can only distinguish these properties in it.
+That each intentional experience is either itself a (mere) presentation, or is
+based on such a presentation, is a proposition that our previous investigation:
+lave shown to have a merely pretended self-evidence. The mistake rested o1
+the just discussed ambiguity of 'presentation'. In its first half, the proposition, correctly interpreted, speaks of 'presentation' in the sense of a certain
+sort of act, in its second half in the sense of the mere matter of acts (completed in the manner indicated above). This second half by itself, i.e. every
+intentional experience is based on a presentation, has genuine self-evidence, if
+'presentation' is interpreted as completed matter. The false proposition we
+reject arises if "presentation' is here given the sense of an act as well.
+An objection here warns us to take care. Is there only one way in which
+'presentation' can be interpreted as an act? The questionable proposition
+perhaps admits of other interpretations which are not open to our objection.
+In that case our treatment would be right as regards the concept of presentation taken over from ordinary explanations of the word, but not right in
+regard to other concepts of presentation, nor to the consequently arising
+new interpretations of our proposition, with its ever shifting senses.
+§33 Re-establishment of our proposition by means of
+a new notion of presentation. Naming and asserting
+We must now ask whether our proposition cannot be completely sustained
+on the basis of another notion of presentation.
+The unity of an act corresponds in each case to the correlated objective
+unity of the 'object' (understood in the widest sense) to which it refers
+'intentionally'. We had doubts regarding the proposition under discussion
+in so far as it meant by 'presentation' a certain act underlying another act,
+and directing itself upon the total objective unity of the latter act. The state
+of affairs opined in the judgement, wished in the wish, surmised in the
+surmise etc., is necessarily 'presented', and presented in a peculiar act of
+'presentation'. By the term 'presentation' we understood 'mere' presentation, a kind of act illustrated by the case of the mere understanding of
+isolated words, or of statements heard, but to which a 'wholly neutral
+attitude is adopted. But our proposition at once achieves a new and unobjectionable sense, if a new concept is made to underlie the term 'presentation, one not strange and remote, since talk of names as expressing
+presentations leads up to it. We must indeed then cease to demand that our
+'presentation' should intentionally cover the whole objective unity of the act
+
+148 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+in question. But we can employ the term to cover acts in which something
+becomes objective to us in a certain narrower sense of the word, one borrowed
+from the manner in which percepts and similar intuitions grasp their objects
+in a single 'snatch', or in a single 'ray of meaning', or borrowed, likewise,
+from the one-term subject-acts in categorical statements, or from acts of
+straightforward hypothesis, serving as antecedents in acts of hypothetical
+assertion etc.
+We here have in view the following most important descriptive difference:
+When we make a judgement, an act of complete predication, something
+seems to us either to be or not to be, e.g. that S is P. But the same being
+which thus becomes 'present' to us, can plainly become present in quite
+different fashion when we speak of 'the P-ness of S'. The state of affairs S
+is P likewise comes before consciousness in quite different fashion when
+we simply judge and assert 'S is P', and when it occurs in the subject-act
+of another judgement, as when we say 'the fact that S' is ', or simply 'That
+Sis P - has as a consequence ... is delightful, is doubtful' etc. The same is
+true when we say, in the antecedent of some hypothetical or causal proposition, 'If (Since) S is P', or, in the second or later member of a dis junction,
+'or S is P', In all these cases the state of affairs - not the judgement - is our
+object in a different sense, and is seen in the light of different meanings,
+from what it is for the judgement whose full objective correlate it is. Plainly
+the state of affairs is 'objective' in much the same sense as a thing caught in
+single 'mental ray' of perception or imagination or representation, although
+a state of affairs is of course no thing, and cannot be perceived, imagined or
+represented in the stricter, narrower sense of these words.
+I said above in passing that propositions functioning as subjects were not
+presentations of judgements, but of the corresponding states of affairs. This
+point must be noted. Judgements as concrete experiences can, like things,
+be objects of possible perception, imagination and perhaps of some nonphysical representation. They can then function as subject-objects in judgements, as happens when we judge about judgements. When such subordinate
+judgements are expressed, and not merely indirectly referred to (e.g. as 'this
+judgement', 'your judgement' etc.) a sentence will occupy the subject-position.
+But where a sentence occupies this position, it will not always serve to name
+a judgement. Judging about judgements differs from judging about states of
+affairs: having a presentation of or naming a judgement is likewise different
+from having a presentation of, or naming some state of affairs as a logical
+subject. If I say, e.g., 'That S is P is delightful' I do not think that my
+judgement is delightful. It makes no difference in this connection whether
+we mean by 'judgement' the individual act, or the proposition or judgement
+qua Species. What is delightful, is rather that such and such is the case,
+the objective state of affairs, the fact. This is shown by the objectively equivalent transformation (which however differs in meaning), 'The P-ness of
+S (the victory of the righteous cause) is delightful'.
+
+Study of founding presentations to the theory of judgement 149
+If one builds upon this changed notion of presentation, and also lets drop,
+as suggested above, the claim that the presentation underlying an act must
+also cover all the matter of the act that it underlies, it would seem that our
+least one presentation, just as each expressed statement contains at least one
+name. On the prevailing view which cites S is Pas the normal form of
+simple judgements, we should have to accept a basis of at least two presentations (or two names). There is, however, no maximal upper limit to such
+presentations. Indefinitely many presentations can nest in a single judgement. It makes no difference if one here brings in compound judgements
+since each compound judgement undoubtedly also is a judgement.
+The same seems to hold for all other acts, to the extent that they are full
+and complete. The wish 'May S be P', 'May truth triumph' etc., has as its
+presentations 'S' and 'P', 'truth' is straightforwardly posited as subject, and
+our wish arises out of its predicatively presented triumph. The same holds of
+all similarly constituted acts, and of the simpler acts immediately based on
+intuitions, eg. my rejoicing in something perceived.
+We may finally add the proposition that the ultimately underlying acts in
+each act-complex are necessarily presentations.
+§34 Difficulties. The concept of the name. Positing
+and non-positing names
+Our new concept of presentation is by no means free from difficulties. That
+our ultimate, underlying acts genuinely have it in common to make objects
+'present', in a peculiar, pregnant sense, cannot be doubted. But whether
+'presentations' in this sense stand for an essential genus of intentional experiences, whose generic unity is purely determined by act-quality, so that the
+acts excluded from their sphere necessarily belong to qualitatively different
+genera: all this is not established. It is not at all easy to decide in what the
+community consists.
+In this connection the following elaborations are necessary. Where names
+are said, as they usually are, to be expressions of presentations, our present
+concept of presentation really is in question. All presentations expressed by
+names certainly form a unity, which must now be examined. Different senses
+in which one can speak of 'expression' involve that by 'presentations' one
+
+150 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+can mean both nominal meaning-intentions and also the corresponding
+fulfilments of meaning. Both non-intuitive and intuitive acts alike fall under
+the notion here demarcated. By 'names' we should not understand mere
+nouns, which by themselves do not express complete acts. If we wish to see
+clearly what names are and mean we should look at contexts, particularly
+statements, in which names function in their normal meaning. Here we note
+that words and word-groupings that are to count as names only express
+complete acts when they either stand for some complete simple subject of a
+statement (thereby expressing a complete subject-act), or at least could perform such a simple subject-function in a statement without change in their
+intentional essence. (Syntactical formations are here disregarded.) It is not
+therefore a mere noun, perhaps even coupled with an attributive or relative
+clause, that makes a full name: we must also add the definite or indefinite
+article, which has a most important semantic function. "The horse', 'a bunch
+of flowers', 'a house built of sandstone', 'the opening of the Reichstag', also
+expressions like 'that the Reichstag has been opened', are names.
+We now note a remarkable difference. In many, but plainly not all cases,
+names and nominal presentations are such as to intend and mean objects as
+actually existent, without thereby being more than mere names, without in
+other words counting as full assertions. This last is excluded by the fact that
+assertions can never take the subject-position without a change in meaning.
+Judgements may function as subjects of judgements in the sense of objects
+judged about, but never, without a certain change of meaning, as subjectacts of other judgements, as "presentations'. This important proposition
+must not, however, be conceded without further argument, which we shall
+provide in what follows. Let us for the time being ignore cases where full
+statements apparently serve as subjects, and deal with names such as Prince
+Henry, 'the statue of Roland in the market-place', 'the postman hurrying
+by' etc. Someone who uses these names in their normal sense in genuine
+discourse 'knows' that Prince Henry is a real, and not a mythic, person, that
+a statue of Roland does stand in the market-place, that the postman is
+hurrying by etc. The objects named certainly confront him differently from
+imaginary objects: not only do they appear to him as existent, but their
+expression also treats them as such. Nothing of all this is, however, said in
+the act of naming: exceptionally existence may be expressed attributively in
+some such form as 'the really existent S', as, in the opposed case, one may
+say 'the supposed S', 'the imaginary S' etc. But existential positing is achieved.
+even in the case of such a grammatically enriched name - we shall not
+enquire whether its sense has been essentially modified or merely extended -
+in that aspect of the act expressed by the definite article, and only the matter
+is altered. Even now we have not said that S exists, only that S, possibly in
+an altered sense, is presented as really existent, that it is also posited and
+therefore called 'the really existent S', and even here naming differs in sense
+from saying.
+
+Study of founding presentations to the theory of judgement 15l
+If this is conceded, we have two different sorts of names and nominal
+out an existential commitment.
+Plainly there are similar differences in other underlying acts, as a com.
+parison of an if-protasis with a since-protasis shows: this was only to be
+not themselves nominal, have the logical vocation of fulfilling nominal acts
+of meaning, there are certain positing acts, sense-perception, recollection
+and anticipation, which all catch their object in a single ray of positing reterence. The corresponding abnormal perceptions lack existential commitment,
+e.g. illusions freed from attitudes towards the reality of the apparent, and all
+cases of mere fancy. To each positing act there corresponds a possible nonpositing act having the same matter, and vice versa.
+This characteristic difference is plainly a difference in act-quality, which
+imports a certain duality into the notion of presentation. Can we still speak
+of a genus of presentations in the strict sense, and dare we think that positing and non-positing presentations are species or differentiations of this
+unitary genus?
+Our difficulty would be at once removed, could we treat positing acts as
+acts founded on other acts, not as mere presentations, but as acts founded
+on presentations, a new positing character being then presumably added on
+to the mere presentation. (One would then have to consider whether this
+new character was not obviously of the same kind as judgement-quality.)
+The analyses performed above make such a notion most questionable.
+As little as one can separate off an act of mere presentation from a percept,
+or an act of mere, unjudging understanding from an actual assertion, so
+litle can one, e.g., separate off a non-positing act of nominal meanin
+from a positing one. A perfect analogy must obtain between nominal anc
+propositional acts, since it is clear a priori that to each complete, positing
+nominal act a possible complete assertion corresponds, and that to each
+non-positing nominal act a correlated act of modified assertion (mere
+understanding of an assertion) corresponds. Analysis would therefore
+reveal, even in this wider sphere, that what is common to positing and
+non-positing acts of like content is no full act, but the mere matter for
+an act, that occurs in the two cases with a different act-quality. A name
+may be merely understood, but such mere understanding is not part of
+the positing use of the name. There seems no way, therefore to span the
+deep cleft now yawning among presentations in our present sense of
+nominal acts.
+
+152
+§35 Nominal positing and judgement. Where
+judgements as such can be parts of nominal acts
+Let us now go back to the question raised above as to the affinity and true
+relationship between positing presentations and predicative judgements. Une
+might try to look on the difference of the two sorts of act as unessential, and
+to say: a positing may be no assertion, i.e. no independent predication, no
+expression of self-sufficient judgement. But it still yields a judgement, one,
+however, that will serve as a presupposition or basis of another act that will
+be built upon it. This role, though making no difference to the judgement s
+intentional content, makes a difference to the judgement's verbal form. If
+someone says 'the postman hurrying by..? he implies the judgement 'The
+postman is hurrying by'. The nominal form merely indicates the thetic subjectfunction, which points towards the predicative positing which follows.
+We can scarcely approve such a total externalization of the difference
+under discussion - as if new acts simply attached themselves to some selfidentical judgement, and the grammatical name-form merely gave an indirect indication of this sort of attachment. Most logicians, among them the
+profound Bolzano, saw the distinction between names and assertions as one
+of essence, and a maturer science will support them. Something may very
+well be common to both cases, but views of the difference as merely external
+must be disputed. One must, more precisely, be clear that nominal acts and
+complete judgements never can have the same intentional essence, and that
+every switch from one function to the other, though preserving communities, necessarily works changes in this essence.
+What most leads us astray at this point is the circumstance that true
+predications, complete assertions, can in a certain sense really function as
+ogical subjects. Though not themselves subject-acts, they are built into thes
+ast in a certain fashion as judgements determining subjects otherwis
+already given in them, e.g. 'the Minister - he is now driving up - will make
+the decision'. We can replace our parenthetic assertion without change of
+sense by speaking of 'the Minister who is now driving up' or 'the Minister now
+driving up'. It can be seen, however, that such a conception is not always
+suitable. Attribution often represents a determining predication, but, even if
+it invariably did so, which it certainly does not, it would only concern part
+of the subject-name. After the removal of such determining additions, a
+complete name would be left over, corresponding to which it would be vain
+to look for some judgement functioning as logical subject. In our example
+the determining predication attaches to the name 'the Minister', from which
+no second predication can be separated. What could the underlying judgement be in this case, and how would we formulate it independently? Is 'the
+Minister' equivalent to 'he - he is a Minister"? In that case 'he' would be a
+complete name and would require its own judgement. But how can this be
+uttered? Is it perhaps the judgement which, expressed independently, would
+
+Study of founding presentations to the theory of judgement 153
+run 'He exists'? Here again we encounter the same subject 'he', and so are
+involved in an infinite regress.
+udgements. But such talk of 'arising' and 'referring back' implies that name
+and judgements are different. The difference is so sharp, that it shoul
+implifications in the theory of presentation and judgement. The prior judge
+nent is not as yet the nominal meaning that grows out of it. What in th
+Halle is on the Saale, or that i is a transcendent number, we may go on to
+talk of Halle-on-the-Saale or of the transcendent number , but we shall
+not be judging any longer, or at least we need not be doing so, and such a
+judgement, should it arise on the side, makes no contribution to our act of
+nominal reference. And so in every case.
+We said above that judgements could function in determining fashion,
+but this is not strictly or properly so. Better regarded, their function consists
+solely in setting before our eyes an attribution which enriches the name.
+Judging itself is not an attributive function, and cannot take over such a function: it will only provide the soil out of which an attributive meaning will
+phenomenologically grow. This function once performed, the judgement
+can fall away, and the attribute with its significant content remain over.
+Our exceptional cases are therefore cases of compounding: the attributive
+function is combined with the predicative. The latter gives rise to the former,
+but still wants to count independently and 'on the side' - hence the normal
+parenthetic expression. Ordinary cases of attribution are free from such
+complication. A man who speaks of 'the German Emperor' or 'the transcendent number m', does not mean to say 'the Emperor - he is the Emperor
+of Germany' nor 'n - it is a transcendent number'.
+What has been said is only fully intelligible with an important addition.
+The performance of the modified act, we said, no longer contains the 'original'
+one: this is at best present as an unnecessary, subsidiary complication. This
+does not remove the fact that the 'original' judgement is in some sense logically implicit in the modified act. We must here stress that talk of 'origin'
+and 'modification' are not to be understood in an empirical-psychological,
+biological sense, but as expressing a peculiar relation of essence grounded in
+the phenomenological content of the experiences. It is part and parcel of the
+essential content of the nominal, attributive presentation that its intentior
+'refers back' to the corresponding judgement, and that it intrinsically presents
+itself as a 'modification' of this judgement. If we wish to 'realize' the sense of
+presentations of the form 'the S which is P' (the transcendent number t), and
+to do this with complete clarity and authenticity, if we wish to enter the path
+
+154 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+of demonstrative fulfilment of what the expression 'means', we must appeal as
+it were to the corresponding predicative judgement, we must carry this out,
+and take our nominal presentations from it as from a source, let them proceed
+from it, derive them from it. The same plainly holds, mutatis mutandis, of
+non-positing attributive presentations, their 'proper' carrying out requires
+phenomenologically predicative acts of qualitatively modified type (the
+counterparts of the actual judgements) out of which they may then 'originate'.
+A certain mediacy therefore enters phenomenologically into the essence of
+the attributive presentation, which our talk of origination, derivation and
+also of 'referring back' expresses. It is therefore true a priori that the grounded
+validation of each nominal attribution leads back to that of the corresponding judgement. Correlatively, we may likewise say that the nominal object,
+whatever its categorial interpretation, derives from the corresponding state
+of affairs, which has an intrinsic priority as regards authenticity.
+After saying all this, we may maintain generally that there are differences
+between names and assertions which affect their 'semantic essence',
+rest on the essential difference of presentations and judgements. It is not the
+same, in terms of intentional essence, whether one perceives an existent or
+judges that it exists, so it is not the same if one names an existent as existent,
+or says or predicates of it that it exists.
+We may now note that to every positing name a possible judgement selfevidently corresponds, or that to every attribution a possible predication corresponds and vice versa. After we have rejected the essential sameness of
+these acts, we can assume only that we have here a case of law-governed
+connection, and of connection governed by ideal law. Ideal connections do
+not point to the causal genesis or the empirical concomitance of the acts
+they coordinate, but to a certain ideally governed, operative belongingness
+of the ideatively graspable act-essences? in question, which have their 'being'
+and law-governed ontological order, in the realm of phenomenological
+ideality, just as pure numbers and pure specifications of geometric patterns
+have theirs respectively in the realms of arithmetical and geometrical ideality.
+If we enter the a priori reaches of pure Ideas, we can likewise say that 'one'
+(in pure, ie. unconditional universality) could not perform the one set of
+acts without being able to perform those coordinated with them, and this on
+account of the specific semantic essence of the acts concerned. We may say.
+further, that there are coordinations, interesting from the point of view of
+logical validity, law-governed equivalences, rendering it impossible or rather
+irrational to start with the words 'this S" without 'potentially conceding
+that there are S's. In other words, that propositions containing positing
+names should be true, and that the existential judgements which correspond
+to such names should be false, involves an a priori inconsistency. This is one
+of the ideal, analytic truths which are rooted in the "mere form' of our
+thought, or in the categories or specific Ideas which belong to the possible
+forms of thinking proper.
+
+Study of founding presentations to the theory of judgement 155
+§36 Continuation. Whether assertions can function
+as complete names
+We have yet another important class of instances to consider and shall use
+them to confirm our notion of the relation of nominal acts and judgements.
+We are concerned with cases where declarative sentences are not merely
+used with determining intent, and so seem, as actual assertions, to be parts
+f names, but where they seem to function as full and complete names, e.
+That rain has set in at last will delight the farmers'. It seems impossible t
+avoid the admission that the subject-sentence is here a complete assertion.
+or it means that rain has really set in. The modified expression of th
+idgements by way of a subordinate clause-form here only serves to sho
+that our assertion is functioning as a subject, that it provides the basic act
+on which a predicative assertion may be imposed.
+All this sounds very nice. If the disputed conception had real support in
+our class of instances, and were really allowable there, a doubt would arise
+whether, despite all previous objections, it might not apply even over a
+wider field.
+Let us consider our example more closely. If asked what the farmers are
+glad about, one replies with a 'that so-and-so' or 'about the fact that rain
+has at length fallen'. The fact, therefore, the state of affairs posited as existent, is the object of the gladness, is the subject about which we are making
+an assertion. This fact can be variously named. We can simply say 'this, as
+in the case of all other objects, we can also say 'this fact, or, more definitely,
+'the fact of the set-in rain, of the setting in of the rain' etc. We can also say,
+'that the rain has set in'. Our coordination shows that this clause
+is a name in exactly the same sense as all other nominal expressions of acts,
+that it does not differ essentially in sense-giving backing from other acts. It
+names exactly as they do, and in naming presents; as other names name
+other things, properties etc., so it names or presents a state of affairs, which
+in particular is an empirical fact.
+What is the difference between such naming and the independent assertion
+of the state of affairs, when, e.g., we make the assertion: Rain has at last
+set in'?
+It sometimes happens that we first assert something absolutely, and then
+proceed to name the state of affairs: 'Rain has at last set in. That will delight
+the farmers. Here we can study an undeniable contrast. The state of affairs
+is in both cases the same, but it is our object in quite a different manner. In
+the straightforward assertion we judge about the rain, and about its having
+set in: both are in a pregnant sense objective to us, presented. But we do not
+enact a mere sequence of presentations, but a judgement, a peculiar 'unity of
+consciousness', that binds these together. In this binding together the consciousness of the state of affairs is constituted: to execute judgement, and to
+be conscious of a state of affairs, in this synthetic positing of something as
+
+156 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+referred to something, are one and the same. A thesis is enacted, and on it a
+second dependent thesis is based, so that, in this basing of thesis on thesis,
+the synthetic unity of the state of affairs is intentionally constituted. Such
+a synthetic consciousness is plainly quite different from setting something
+before one in a single-rayed thesis, in a possible, direct subject-act, in a presentation. One may compare the ways in which the rain comes to consciousness',
+the assertedness of the state of affairs, and the presentational, naming way
+which in our example succeeds it, and which applies to the same state of
+affairs: "That will delight the farmers'. "That', as it were, points a finger to
+the state of affairs: it therefore means this same state of affairs. But this
+reference is not the judgement itself, which has preceded it as a thus and
+thus qualified mental happening now passed away: it is a new act of a new
+kind, which in pointing to the state of affairs previously constituted in synthetic, many-rayed fashion, now simply confronts this state of affairs with a
+single-rayed thesis, and so makes it an object in a sense quite different from
+the way the judgement does so. The state of affairs comes more 'primitively
+to consciousness in the judgement: the single-rayed intention towards the
+state of affairs presupposes the many-rayed judgemental intention, and a
+reference to the latter is part of its intrinsic sense. But in each many-rayed
+conscious approach there is rooted, in a priori fashion, an essential, ideal
+possibility of transformation into the single-rayed approach, in which a
+state of affairs will be pregnantly 'objective' or "presented'. (Just as there is
+an a priori possibility, resting on the ideal essence of geometrical figures, that
+'one' can turn them about in space, distort them into certain other figures
+etc.) It is now at all events quite clear that the manner in which we are
+conscious of something, or in which it is our intentional object, is different
+in each case. Otherwise put, we are dealing with 'essentially different acts,
+or with acts differing in intentional essence.
+If we ignore pointing proper, what is essential in the "That' of our previous example is also present in the thought of the mere sentence occupying
+a subject-position (and any other position in a context which demands
+resentation), and is necessarily absent from the thought of a genuit
+nd independent assertion. As soon as the semantic moment which underli
+the definite article comes alive, a presentation in our present sense is enacted.
+Whether a language or dialect actually employs the article or not, whether
+one speaks of der Mensch or homo, of Karl or der Karl is irrelevant. That this
+moment of meaning attaches to the sentence "That S is P', functioning as
+subject, is easily seen. For 'That S is P' means what we mean by 'This, that
+S' is P', or, a little more elaborately, 'The fact, the circumstance that S' is P'.
+The situation is not of a kind, after all this, to encourage us to speak of
+judgements, actual predications, that could be logical subjects or nominal
+acts. We rather see that there is a difference of intentional essence between
+sentences serving to name states of affairs, and the corresponding assertions
+of states of affairs, a gulf bridged by ideal relations of law. An assertion can
+
+Study of founding presentations to the theory of judgement 157
+never function as a name, nor a name as an assertion, without changing its
+essential nature, i.e., its semantic essence, and therewith its very meaning.
+This does not of course mean that the corresponding acts are descriptively alien. The matter of the assertion is in part the same as that of the
+nominal act, in both the same state of affairs is intended in the same terms,
+though in a different form. The great affinity of expressive form is no matter
+of chance, but has semantic roots. If occasionally the expression stays
+unchanged, despite a change in semantic function, we are dealing with a
+particular case of equivocation, which belongs to the broad class of cases
+here expressions have anomalous meanings. These anomalies, arising fror
+he pure essence of the semantic field, resemble the anomalies of pure gram
+mar? Our conception accordingly admits of a consistent working-out: we
+differentiate in all cases between presentations and judgements and, among
+presentations, between such as are positing and existentially committed, and
+such as are not. We shall accordingly not hesitate to deny judgement-status
+to antecedents of the form 'Because S is P' which state causes: we shall put
+them in the same relation to hypothetical antecedents that we have recognized
+as obtaining between positing and non-positing names. The 'because' may
+point back to a judgement that asserted S to be P, but this judgement is not
+again enacted with the causal sentence itself. We no longer assert that S is P,
+but we impose on a purely presentative substructure, that of an antecedent
+characterized in its very sense as a modified judging synthesis, a second
+consequential thesis which is grounded upon, and which 'looks to', the
+former. The whole is a new form of judgemental synthesis, whose sense, a
+little elaborated, can be said to be: the conditioning of the being of one state
+of affairs by that of another which grounds it. Only as so combined, moreover, antecedent and consequent function as a judgement, as when we assert
+'S is P', and because this is so, 'Q is R'. Here it is not enough to establish
+such a sequence synthetically, but to have and to hold the two states of
+affairs "S'is P' and 'Q is R' judgementally together, in our relating, synthetic
+consciousness itself.
+Note. The extensions just made show that nominal presentations in the
+strict, narrow sense merely represent a wider, but still limited class of 'thetic'
+or 'single-rayed positing' acts. This must be remembered in what follows,
+even when we connect our treatments with genuinely nominal presentations.
+The term 'nominal presentation', understood as a class-term, must accord-
+
+Chapter 5
+Further contributions to
+the theory of judgement.
+'Presentation'
+as a qualitatively
+unitary genus of nominal and
+propositional acts
+§37 The aim of the following investigation.
+The concept of an objectifying act
+The investigations just completed have not done with the question raised
+at the beginning of §34. Our result was that presentations and judgements
+are essentially different acts. Since the ambiguity of words again needs the
+hich means that the acts which confer or fulfil meaning for each, differ i
+intentional essence, and therefore in act-species. Have we thereby shown that
+presentation and judgement, the acts which lend meaning and semantic
+fulfilment to naming and assertion, belong to different basic classes of intentional experience?
+Obviously our answer must be negative: nothing points to such a thing.
+We must recall that intentional essence is made up of the two aspects of
+matter and quality, and that a distinction of "basic class' obviously relate
+only to act-qualities. We must further recall that our exposition does not at
+all entail that nominal and propositional acts differ in quality, much less that
+they differ generically as regards quality.
+This latter point should not arouse objection. The matter of acts is in our
+sense no alien, external attachment, but an internal moment, an inseparable
+side of the act-intention, of the intentional essence itself. Talk about the
+differing 'ways of consciousness', in which we can be aware of the same
+state of affairs, should not mislead us. It points to a distinction of acts, but
+not one of act-qualities. Quality may remain identical - so much has guided
+us since we formed the Idea of matter - while the same object remains
+differently present to consciousness. One may think, e.g., of equivalent positing presentations, which point by way of differing matters to the same
+object. The essential change of meaning which an assertion undergoes when
+it passes over into the nominal (or other parallel) function, a point whose
+proof we found so important above, may involve no more than a change of
+
+Further contributions to the theory of judgement 159
+matter; quality or at least qualitative genus (according to the kind of nominal
+modification) may remain unchanged.
+oes with a transfer of unchanged, essential, material content, and wher
+herefore, interpretative functions are present which the original assertio
+the two cases, also undergo, as we can see in each case, a different 'categorial
+structuring'. One may compare, e.g., the form 'S is P' with its nominal
+modification 'S which is P'.
+The following treatments will show, on the other hand, that there is a
+qualitative community between nominal and propositional acts; we shall
+na more signicant than the tormer. I
+interpretation of the principle that each act has its basis in presentations.
+To keep our present two concepts of 'presentation' apart, we shall -
+without making final recommendations as to terminology - speak of 'nominal acts' in the case of the narrower concept, and of 'objectifying acts' in
+the case of the wider. We need hardly stress, after our whole introduction of
+the concept of 'nominal presentation' in the last chapter, that the expression
+does not merely cover acts attached to nominal expressions, and conferring
+or fulfilling their meaning, but also all acts that function analogously, even
+if not performing the same grammatical role.
+§38 Qualitative and material differentiation of
+objectifying acts
+Among nominal acts we distinguish positing from non-positing acts. The
+of like matter, corresponds, and vice versa, this correspondence being understood in the sense of the ideally possible.
+A certain modification, as we may also express the matter, makes each
+positing nominal act pass over into a mere presentation with like matter.
+We find exactly the same modification in the case of judgements. Each
+
+160 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+judgement has its modified form, an act which merely presents what the
+judgement takes to be true, which has an object without a decision as to
+truth and falsity? Phenomenologically regarded, this modification of judgements is quite of the same sort as that of positing nominal acts. Judgements
+as positing propositional acts have therefore their merely presentative correlates in non-positing propositional acts. The corresponding acts have in both
+cases the same matter and a differing quality. But just as we count positing
+and non-positing nominal acts as one genus of quality, we do the same for
+propositional acts in regard to judgements and their modified counterparts.
+The qualitative differences are in both cases the same, and not to be
+regarded as differentiations of any higher genera of quality. To pass from
+the positing to the modified act is not to pass to a heterogeneous class, as in
+the case of passing from any nominal act to a desire or act of will. But in the
+passage from a positing nominal act to an act of affirmative assertion, we
+are not tempted to see a qualitative difference; the same holds if we compare
+the corresponding 'mere presentations'. Matter alone, in the sense fixed for
+the present investigation, constitutes both differences: it alone determines the
+unity of the nominal, and the unity of the propositional acts.
+This suffices to mark off a comprehensive class of intentional experiences
+which includes all the acts hitherto dealt with in their qualitative essence, and
+determines the widest concept that the term 'presentation' can stand for within
+the total class of intentional experiences. We ourselves would like to call this
+qualitatively unitary class, taken in its natural width, the class of objectifying
+acts. It yields (to put the matter clearly in front of us):
+1. through qualitative differentiation, the division into positing acts - acts
+of belief or judgement in the sense of Mill and Brentano respectively - and
+non-positing acts, acts 'modified' as regards positing, the corresponding
+'mere presentations'. How far the concept of positing belief extends, and
+how it is specified, remains undetermined;
+2. through differentiation of matter, it yields the difference of nominal
+and propositional acts, though we still must consider whether this difference
+is not merely one of many equally valid material differences.
+A glance over the analyses of the last chapter, makes us aware of the truly
+pervasive opposition between synthetic, many-rayed act-unifies and singlerayed acts, acts which posit or entertain something in a single thesis. We must
+note, however, that predicative synthesis is only an especially favoured form
+(or complete system of forms) of synthesis, to which other frequently inwoven
+forms stand opposed, e.g. the form of conjunctive or disjunctive synthesis.
+We have, for example, in the plural predication 'A and B and C are P' a
+unitary predication terminating in three predicative layers on the same predicate P. 'Upon' the basic positing of A, the secondary positing of B, and the
+tertiary positing of C, the predicate P, kept identical throughout, is posited
+in a single, three-layered act. Our act of judgement is as it were articulated
+by a 'caesura' into a subject- and a predicate-positing, but so that the one
+
+Further contributions to the theory of judgement 16l
+subject-member is in its turn a unitary conjunction of three nominal members. These are united in the conjunction, but they do not come together
+in one nominal presentation. But it is true of the 'conjunctive (or better
+'collective') synthesis, as it is true of the predicative synthesis, that it permits
+of nominalization, in which case the collective object constituted by the
+synthesis, becomes the simply presented object of a new 'single-rayed' act,
+and so is made 'objective' in the pregnant sense of the word. The nominal
+resentation of the collection now again refers back in its own sense (ir
+he matter from the original act that it takes over and modifies) to th
+matter (or the consciousness) which originally constituted it. Closer examination reveals in all synthesis what we noted in the case of the predicative
+synthesis - when we kept, moreover, to the basic predicative form of categorical synthesis - that we can always perform the fundamental operation of
+nominalization, the transformation of many-rayed synthesis into single-rayed
+naming with an appropriate backward reference in our material.
+Our general treatment of ideally possible objectifying acts therefore
+brings us back to the basic distinction of 'thetic' and 'synthetic' acts, of
+'single-rayed' and 'many-rayed' acts. The single-rayed acts are not articulate,
+the many-rayed acts are articulate. Each member has its objectifying quality
+(its peculiar stance towards being, or the corresponding qualitative modification of this stance) and its matter. The whole synthesis as a single objectifying
+act has likewise a quality and a matter, the latter articulate. To analyse such
+a whole is, on the one hand, to come upon members and, on the other, upon
+syntactical forms of synthesis. The members in their turn may be simple or
+complete. They may themselves be articulate and synthetically unified, as in
+our above example of the conjunctive subjects of plural predications, or as
+in the case of conjoined antecedents in hypothetical predications, or as in
+the corresponding disjunctions in either case etc.
+We at length come down to simple members, single-rayed in their
+objectification, but not necessarily primitive in some ultimate sense. For such
+single-rayed members may still be nominalized syntheses, nominal presentations of states of affairs or collectiva or disjunctiva, whose members may
+again be states of affairs etc. Our matter will therefore contain backward
+references of a more or less complex sort, and therefore, in a peculiarly
+modified, indirect sense, implicit articulations and synthetic forms. If the
+members no longer refer back, they are also simple in this respect. This is,
+e.g., plainly true of all proper name-presentations, and of single-membered
+percepts, imaginations, etc., which are not split up by explanatory syntheses.
+Such wholly straightforward objectifications are free from all 'categorial
+forms'. Plainly the analysis of each act that is not straightforward in its
+objectifications, must pursue the series of backward references contained
+in its nominalizations, until it comes down upon such straightforward actmembers, simple both in form and in matter. We may finally note that the
+general treatment of possible articulations and synthetic formations leads to
+
+162 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+the pure logico-grammatical laws discussed in our Fourth Investigation. In
+this respect only matters (objectifying act-senses) are relevant, and in these
+all forms of structured objectifying synthesis express themselves. Here the
+principle obtains that our self-contained objectifying matter (and therefore
+any possible non-dependent meaning) can function as a member in every
+synthesis of every possible form. This entails the particular principle that
+each such matter is either a complete propositional (predicative) matter or
+a possible member of such a matter. If we now bring in qualities, we can
+affirm the principle that, ideally regarded, any objectifying matter can be
+combined with any quality.
+If we now look at the special difference between nominal and propositional
+acts, which is of such particular interest in our present Investigation, the
+just-mentioned possibility of combining any quality with any matter can
+be readily confirmed. In the analyses of previous sections, it has not been
+made universally plain, since we confined ourselves to modifications of the
+judgement, i.e. a positing propositional act, into a nominal act. Undeniably,
+however, each judgement modified into a 'mere' presentation can be transformed into a corresponding nominal act. Thus '2 × 2 = 5', uttered to
+express understanding and not to take up an assertive stance, can be changed
+into the name 'that 2 × 2 = 5'. Since 'modifications' are spoken of in the
+case of such transformations of propositions into names as leave qualities
+unaffected, i.e. in the case of mere transformations of propositional or
+other synthetic matters, it will be well to reserve the name 'qualitative modification' for the quite different type of modification which affects qualities
+(transforming of positing names and statements into non-positing ones).
+Where the matter, which alone gives form or underlies formal distinctions,
+either remains, or is meant to remain constant, where a name stays a name,
+a proposition a proposition, in all their internal articulations and forms, we
+shall also have to speak of conformative modifications of positing acts. But if
+the notion of conformative modification is widened, by a natural extension,
+so as to cover every modification not affecting act-material, then (as we shall
+presently see) it will be a wider notion than our present concept of qualitative modification.
+§39 Presentation in the sense of an objectifying act,
+and its qualitative modification
+moved by the fact that this whole class is characterized by one qualitative
+inal belief, so there is one in the case of each propositional belief, each
+omplete judgement. We may now doubt, however, whether this qualitativ
+nodification really characterizes a class, whether it does not rather gover
+
+Further contributions to the theory of judgement 163
+An obvious argument favours this last: there is a mere presentation corresponding to every intentional experience, to a wish the mere idea of a
+wish, to a hate the mere idea of a hate, to a volition the mere idea of willing
+etc. - just as there are mere presentations corresponding to actual cases of
+naming and assertion.
+One should not, however, mix up quite different things. To each possible
+act, to each possible experience, to each possible object in general, there is
+resentation which relates to it, and which can as readily be qualified a
+positing as non-positing (as 'mere' presentation). Fundamentally, however,
+we have not here one, but a whole multitude of presentations of different
+sorts: this is true even if we restrict ourselves (as we would seem tacitly to
+have done) to presentations of nominal type. Such a presentation can present
+its object intuitively or notionally, directly or by way of attributes, and can
+do so very differently. But it suffices for our purposes to speak of one presentation, or to high-light any one variety of presentation, e.g. the imaginative, since all varieties of presentation are in each case and in the same
+way possible.
+To each object, therefore, corresponds the presentation of that object, to
+a house the presentation of a house, to a presentation the presentation of
+the presentation, to a judgement the presentation of a judgement etc. Here
+we must note, however, as indicated above, that the presentation of the
+judgement is not the presentation of the state of affairs judged. Just so,
+more generally, the presentation of a positing is not the presentation of the
+positingly presented object. Different objects are presented in each case.
+The will, e.g., to realize a state of affairs, differs from the will to realize a
+judgement or the nominal positing of this state of affairs. A positing act's
+qualitative counterpart corresponds to it in quite different fashion from the
+fashion in which its presentation, or any act's presentation, corresponds to
+that act. Modifying an act qualitatively is quite a different 'operation', as it
+were, from producing a presentation 'of' this act. The true difference between
+these operations comes out in the fact that the operation of presentative objectification, shown symbolically in the sequence O, P(O), P(P(O)) ... where O
+is any object and P(O) its presentation, admits of iteration, whereas qualitative
+modification does not, and in the further fact that presentative objectification
+applies to all objects whatever, whereas qualitative modification only makes
+sense in the case of acts. It also comes out in the fact that, in the one order
+of modifications, 'presentations' are exclusively nominal, whereas the other
+order is not so restricted, and in the further fact that, in the first order,
+qualities remain irrelevant, and modification only affects matters, whereas, in
+the other order of modification, it is precisely quality that is modified. Each
+act of belief has a 'mere presentation' as its counterpart, which presents the
+same object in precisely the same manner, i.e. on the ground of the same
+matter, and only differs from the former act in that it leaves the presented
+object in suspense, and does not refer to it positingly as existent. Such a
+
+164 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+modification can of course not be repeated, as little as it makes sense in the
+case of acts not ranged under the notion of belief. It therefore creates a quite
+peculiar connection between acts of this quality and their counterparts. A
+positing percept or recollection, e.g., has its counterpart in a corresponding
+act of 'mere' imagination having the same matter, as in, e.g., the intuitive
+percept of an image, the consideration of a painting that we allow to influence us purely artistically, without in any way responding to the existence or
+non-existence of what is represented, or the intuition of some mental picture
+where we drop all stances towards existence and lose ourselves in fantasy.
+'Mere' presentation has here no further counterpart: it is unintelligible what
+such a presentation could mean or achieve. If belief has been transformed
+into mere presentation, we can at best return to belief: There is no modification that can be repeated in the same sense, and carried on further.
+The case is different if we pass from the operation of qualitative modification to that of nominalizing, presentative objectification. Here there is an
+evident possibility of iteration. This is most simply shown in the relation
+of acts to the ego, and their division among different persons and points
+of time. At one time I perceive something, at another I present to myself
+that I am perceiving it, at yet another I present to myself that I am presenting
+to myself that I am perceiving it eto.* Or another example: A is painted, a
+second painting represents the first painting, a third the second etc. The
+differences are obvious in these cases, and they are of course not merely
+differences in sense-contents, but in the interpretative act-characters (and
+their intentional 'matters') without which it would be quite senseless to talk
+of mental images, paintings etc. These differences are immanently apprehended, are phenomenologically certain, as soon as the corresponding experiences have been had, and their intentional differences reflected upon. This
+happens, e.g., when a man draws distinctions and says: I am now perceiving
+A, picturing B, while C is represented in this painting etc. A man who has
+become clear regarding these relations, will not fall into the error of those
+who think presentations of presentations phenomenologically undiscoverable,
+in fact mere fictions. Such judgements confuse the two operations distinutterly impossible qualitative modification of this presentation.
+We may now, it seems, assume a community of kind among qualitie
+or other of these qualities pertains to all acts, entering essentially into th
+unitary structure of each qualitatively unmodified or modified judgement
+meaning. It is obvious, further, that the mere presentations of any act whatever, which we distinguished above from the qualitative counterparts poss-
+
+Further contributions to the theory of judgement 165
+a wish, but of any positing act, e.g. a percept, directed upon this wish. This
+air, percept and mere presentation of a wish, are of one kind, whereas the
+wish and its percept or imagination or any other presentation which relates
+to it, differ in kind
+§40 Continuation. Qualitative and imaginative
+modification
+One is readily led to call positing acts affirmative (fürwahrhaltende), their
+counterparts imaginative. Both expressions have at first blush their objections, which especially impede the terminological fixation of the latter. The
+discussion of these objections will prompt us to make certain not unimportant additions.
+The whole tradition of logic only speaks of affirmation in the case of
+judgements, i.e. the meanings of statements, but now we wish to call all
+percepts, recollections, anticipations, and all acts of normally expressed
+positing, 'affirmations'. The word 'imagination', likewise, normally means a
+non-positing act, but we should have to extend its original meaning beyond
+the sphere of sensuous imagination, so as to cover all possible counterparts
+of affirmations. Its meaning will also require restriction, since we must
+exclude all thought of imaginations as conscious fictions, as objectless
+presentations or false opinions. Often enough we understand narrations
+without decision as to their truth or falsity. Even when we read novels, this
+is normally the case: we know we are dealing with aesthetic fictions, but this
+knowledge remains inoperative in the purely aesthetic effect. In such cases
+all expressions express non-positing acts, 'imaginings' in the sense of our
+proposed terminology, both in respect of significant intentions and of fancied
+fulfilments. This also affects complete assertions. Judgements are passed in
+a certain manner, but they lack the character of genuine judgements: we
+neither believe, deny or doubt what is told us - mere "imaginings' replace
+genuine judgements. Such talk must not be taken to mean that imagined
+judgements here take the place of actual ones. We rather enact, instead of a
+judgement affirming a state of affairs, the qualitative modification, the neutral
+putting in suspense of the same state of affairs, which cannot be identified
+with any picturing of it.
+The name imagination' has an inconvenience which seriously blocks its use
+as a term: it suggests an imaginative or fanciful conception, pictorial in the
+tricter sense, while we can by no means say that all non-positing acts involve
+imagining, and that all positing acts are non-imagining. This last is immediately clear. A pictured sensuous object can as readily come before us posited
+as existent, as merely imagined in modified fashion. This can be so, while
+the representative content of its intuition remains identical, the content which
+not merely gives the intuition its determinate relation to this object, but also
+the character of imaginative, i.e. of fanciful or pictorial representation, of it
+
+166 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+The phenomenal content of a painting, with its painted figures etc., remains,
+e.g., the same, whether we regard these as representing real objects, or allow
+them to influence us aesthetically without positing anything. It is most doubtful whether anything similar occurs in its purity in normal perception: whether
+perception can preserve the rest of its phenomenological features, but be
+qualitatively modified, so as to lose its normal positing character. It may be
+doubted whether the characteristic perceptual view of the object as itself
+present in full-bodied reality, would not at once pass over into a pictureview, where the object, much as in the case of normal perceptual pictureconsciousness (paintings and the like) appears portrayed rather than as
+itself given. Yet one might here point to many sensible appearances, e.g.
+stereoscopic phenomena, which one can treat, like aesthetic objects, as
+mere phenomena', without adopting an existential stance, and yet treat as
+'themselves', and not as portraits of something else. It suffices that perception can pass over into a corresponding picturing (an act with like 'matter'
+differently interpreted) yet without change in its positing character.
+We see that two conformative modifications may here be distinguished:
+one qualitative and one imaginative. In both the 'matter' remains unchanged.
+But with matter unchanged, more than quality can alter in an act. Quality
+and matter we took to be absolutely essential to acts, since inseparable from
+them, and relevant to their meaning, but we originally pointed out that other
+aspects could be distinguished in them. Our next investigation will show more
+precisely the relevance of these last two distinctions between non-intuitive
+objectification and intuition, and between perception and imagination.
+When the descriptive relations are clarified, it is plainly a purely terminological issue whether one limits the word 'judgement', in the sense of tradition, to the unmodified meaning of statements, or applies it throughout the
+sphere of acts of belief. In the former case no 'ground-class' of acts, not
+even a lowest qualitative difference, is completely covered, since the 'matter'
+- which for us covers the 'is not' as well as the "is' - assists in the demarcation. All this is, however, irrelevant. Since "judgement' is a logical term, it is
+for logical interests and logical tradition alone to decide what concept will
+be its meaning. It has to be said, in this connection, that a notion so fundamental as that of an (ideal propositional meaning, being the ultimate point
+of unity to which all things logical must relate, must retain its natural,
+traditional expression. The term 'act of judging' must therefore be confined
+to corresponding types of act, to the significant intentions behind complete
+statements, and to the fulfilments which fit in with these and share their
+semantic essence. To call all positing acts "judgements' tends to obscure the
+essential distinction, despite all qualitative community, between nominal
+and propositional acts, and so to confuse an array of important relationships. The case of the term 'presentation' resembles that of the term judgement'. Logical requirements must decide what logic is to mean by it. Heed
+must be paid to the (mutually) exclusive separation of presentation and
+
+Further contributions to the theory of judgement 167
+judgement, and to the fact that a 'presentation' claims to be something from
+which a complete judgement may possibly be built up. Shall one then accept the
+notion of presentation, as comprehending all possible part-meanings of logical
+judgement, which Bolzano made basic for his treatment of Wissenschaftslehre?
+Or shall one limit one's notion to what are, phenomenologically speaking,
+relatively independent meanings of this type, complete members of judgements and, in particular, nominal acts? Or shall one not follow another
+route of division, and treat as presentations the mere representations, i.e. the
+total content of all acts that survives the abstraction of quality, and only
+preserves the 'matter' out of their intentional essence? These are difficult
+questions which can certainly not be decided here.
+§41 New interpretation of the principle that makes
+presentations the bases of all acts. The objectifying
+act as the primary bearer of 'matter'
+Several thinkers in olden and more modern times have interpreted the term
+'presentation' so widely as to include 'affirmative' acts, particularly judgements, as well as 'merely presentative' acts, in its purview, and so to include
+in this the whole sphere of objectifying acts. If we now base ourselves on
+this important concept which sums up a closed class of quality, our proposition regarding basic presentations gains a highly significant, novel sense - as
+pointed out above - of which the former sense based on the nominal concept of presentation, is merely a secondary offshoot. For we may say: Each
+intentional experience is either an objectifying act or has its basis in such an
+act, i.e. it must, in the latter case, contain an objectifying act among its
+constituents, whose total matter is individually the same as its total matter.
+What we previously said,' in expounding the sense of this as yet unclarified
+proposition, can now be practically used word for word in justification of
+the term 'objectifying act'. If no act, or act-quality, not objectifying by
+nature, can acquire 'matter' except through an objectifying act that is inwoven
+ing other acts with presented objects, to which they may then refer in their
+act's 'matter'. But all matter, according to our principle, is the matter of an
+objectifying act, and only through the latter can it become matter for a new
+act-quality founded upon this. We must after a fashion distinguish between
+secondary and primary intentions, the latter owing their intentionality to
+their foundation on the former. Whether primary objectifying acts are of a
+positing, affirming, believing character, or of a non-positing, merely presenting, neutral character, does not affect this function. Many secondary
+acts invariably require affirmations, as, e.g. joy and sorrow: for others mere
+modifications suffice, e.g. for wishes or aesthetic feelings. Quite often there
+is a complex underlying objectifying act, including acts of both sorts.
+
+168
+§42 Further developments. Basic principles of
+complex acts
+To cast more light on this remarkable situation, we add the following remarks.
+Each complex act is eo ipso qualitatively complex: it has as many qualities, whether of differing or identical sort, as it has distinguishable individual acts in itself. Each complex act is further a founded act: its total
+quality is no mere sum of the qualities of part-acts, but a single quality, with
+a unity resting on those constitutive qualities, just as the unity of the total
+'matter' is no mere sum of the matters of the part-acts, but is founded, to
+the extent that this 'matter' is really divided among these part-acts, in the
+partial 'matters'. The manner, however, in which an act can be qualitatively
+complex and founded upon other acts, differs profoundly, and this as regards
+the varied ways in which differing qualities stand to one another, and stand
+to the unitary total matter and to possible part-matters, ways in which they
+achieve unity through varied sorts of elementary foundedness.
+An act can be complex in such fashion that its complex total quality divides
+into several qualities, each having individually the same common matter, e.g.
+in joy over some fact, the specific quality of the joy is compounded with that
+of the affirmation in which the fact becomes 'present' to us. This might lead
+one to think that each of these qualities, bar one chosen at random, could
+fall away, while a concrete complete act was left standing. One might also
+think that qualities of any kind could be bound up with a single matter in
+the manner in question. Our law asserts that all this is not possible, that in
+each act there must necessarily be an act-quality of the objectifying kind,
+since there can be no matter that is not the matter of an objectifying act.
+Qualities of other kinds are accordingly always founded on objectifying
+qualities; they can never be immediately associated with matter in their own
+right. Where the former are present, the total act must be qualitatively
+multiform, i.e. must involve qualities differing in kind, in such a way that a
+complete objectifying act can be (one-sidedly) separated from it, an act
+having the whole matter of the total act as its total matter. Acts uniform in
+a corresponding sense need not be simple. All uniform acts are objectifying
+acts and, conversely, all objectifying acts may be held to be uniform, but
+objectifying acts may nonetheless be complex. The matters of the part-acts
+are then mere parts of the matter of the total act: in this total act the total
+matter is constituted inasmuch as its parts belong to the part-acts, while the
+unif ying element of the total matter belongs to the unifying element of the
+total quality. The division into parts can, further, be an explicit articulation,
+but matters nominalized in the previously described fashion, may also reveal
+as implicit articulations all the forms otherwise possible in free syntheses.
+To their members correspond underlying part-acts with their part-matters,
+while founded act-characters (and together with them founded moments of
+the total matter) correspond to the connective forms, to the is or the is not,
+
+Further contributions to the theory of judgement 169
+the if and the then, the and, the or etc. In all this compounding the act remains
+uniform: there can be no more than a single objectifying quality related to a
+single 'matter' considered as a whole.
+From such uniformity multiformity arises if the objectifying total act
+becomes associated with new kinds of quality referred to its total matter,
+or if such qualities merely accompany single part-acts, as when, on the basis
+of one unified, articulate intuition, liking becomes directed to one member
+and dislike to another. It is plain, conversely, that in each complex act
+involving non-objectifying act-qualities, which rest either on the total matter
+or its parts, these latter act-qualities can all as it were be eliminated. A
+complete objectifying act is then left, containing the total matter of the
+original act.
+of course, des hop hold, not al nominal acts are simple. al ten ariviate,
+thing
+we shall call 'representation' in our next investigation. Everything
+essential will then be unaffected.
+§43 Backward glance to our previous interpretation
+of the principle under discussion
+It can now be understood why we said above that Brentano's principle
+interpreted in terms of the nominal concept of presentation is merely a secondary consequence of the same proposition in our new interpretation. If every
+non-objectifying, or not purely objectifying act, is founded on objectifying
+acts, it is plain that it must ultimately also be founded on nominal acts. For
+every objectifying act is, as we said, either simple, and so eo ipso nominal, or
+complex, and so founded upon simple, i.e. again on nominal acts. The new
+interpretation is plainly much more significant, since in it alone essential
+relations of grounding receive pure expression. On the other interpretation,
+though it states nothing false, two utterly different modes of foundation are at
+confused cross-purposes:
+1. The founding of non-objectifying acts such as joys, wishes, volitions on
+objectifying acts (presentations, affirmations): here one act-quality has its
+
+170 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+primary foundation in another act-quality, and is only mediately founded
+2. The founding of objectifying acts on other objectifying acts, where
+n act-material is primarily founded on other act-materials, e.g. the ac
+laterial of a predicative statement on those of the underlving nomina
+acts. For we can see the matter in this way also. The fact that no 'matter' is
+possible without objectifying quality, has as an automatic consequence that
+where one matter is founded on others, an objectifying act having the former
+matter is founded on just such acts as have the latter 'matters'. The fact,
+therefore, that each act is always founded on nominal acts, has a variety of
+sources. The original source is always that each simple 'matter', involving no
+further material foundations, is nominal, and that therefore each ultimately
+underlying objectifying act is nominal. But since all other act-qualities are
+founded on objectifying acts, this last foundation upon nominal acts carries
+over from objectifying acts to all acts whatever.
+
+Chapter 6
+Summing-up of the most
+important ambiguities in the
+terms 'presentation' and 'content'
+$44 'Presentation'
+In the last chapter we have encountered a fourfold or fivefold ambiguity
+attaching to the word 'presentation'
+1. Presentation as act-material or matter, which can be readily completed
+it is there meant. 'Representation' brings in the additional moments lying
+outside of the intentional essence which determine whether the object is
+referred to in, e.g., a perceptually intuitive or imaginatively intuitive fashion, or in a merely non-intuitive mode of reference. Comprehensive analyses
+will be devoted to all this in the first section of the next Investigation.
+2. Presentation as 'mere presentation', as qualitative modification of any
+form of belief, e.g. as mere understanding of propositions, without an inner
+decision leading to assent or dissent, surmise or doubt etc.
+3. Presentation as nominal act, e.g. as the subject-presentation of an act of
+assertion.
+4. Presentation as objectifying act, ie. in the sense of an act-class necessarily represented in every complete act since every 'matter' (or 'representa
+ion) must be given primarily as the matter of such an act. This qualitative
+ground-class includes acts of belief, whether nominal or propositional, as
+well as their counterparts, so that all presentations in the second and third
+of our above senses are included here.
+The more precise analysis of these concepts of presentation or the experiences they comprise, and the final determination of their mutual relations,
+will be a task for further phenomenological investigations. Here we shall
+only try to add some further equivocations to those affecting the term under
+discussion. To keep them sharply apart is of fundamental importance in
+our logical and epistemological endeavours. The phenomenological analyses
+
+172 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+indispensably needed to resolve these equivocations, have only been partially encountered in our previous expositions. What is missing has, however,
+often been touched upon, and indicated to an extent that makes a brief list
+of headings possible. We therefore continue our enumeration as follows:
+5. Presentation is often opposed to mere thinking. The same difference is
+then operative that we also call the difference between intuition and concept.
+Of an ellipsoid I have a presentation, though not of a surface of Kummer:
+through suitable drawings, models or theoretically guided flights of fancy
+I can also achieve a presentation of the latter. A round square, a regular
+icosahedron' and similar a priori impossibilia are in this sense 'unpresentable'.
+The same holds of a completely demarcated piece of a Euclidean manifold
+of more than three dimensions, of the number i, and of other constructs
+quite free from contradiction. In all these cases of non-presentability 'mere
+concepts' are given to us: more precisely, we have nominal expressions
+inspired by significant intentions in which the objects of our reference are
+'thought' more or less indefinitely, and particularly in the indefinite attributive form of an A as the mere bearer of definitely named attributes. To mere
+thinking 'presentation' is opposed: plainly this means the intuition which
+gives fulfilment, and adequate fulfilment, to the mere meaning-intention.
+The new class of cases is favoured because in it 'corresponding intuitions'
+are added member by member and from all sides to thought-presentations
+- whether these are purely symbolic meaning-intentions or fragmentarily
+and inadequately mixed with intuitions - presentations which leave our deepest cognitive cravings unsatisfied. What we intuit stands before our eyes in
+perception or imagination just as we intended it in our thought. To present
+something to oneself means therefore to achieve a corresponding intuition of
+what one merely thought of or what one meant but only at best very inadequately intuited.
+6. A very common concept of presentation concerns the opposition of
+imagination to perception. This notion of presentation dominates ordinary
+discourse. If I see St Peter's Church, I do not have an "idea', a presentation
+of it. But I do have the latter, when I picture it in my memory, or when it
+stands before me in a painting or drawing etc.
+7. A presentation has just been identified with the concrete act of imagination. But, looked at more narrowly, a physical thing-image is also called a
+presentation or representation of what it depicts, as, e.g., in the words This
+photograph represents St Peter's Church'. The word 'presentation' is also
+applied to the apparent image-object, in distinction from the image-subject
+or thing represented. This is here the thing appearing in photographic
+colours, not the photographed church (image-subject), and it only presents
+(represents) the latter. These ambiguities carry over into the straightforward
+pictured presence of memory or mere imagination. The appearance of the
+fancied object as such in experience is naïvely interpreted as the real containment of an image in consciousness. What appears, in its mode of
+
+Summing-up of the most important ambiguities 173
+appearing, counts as an inner picture, like a painted picture presenting the
+imagined object. In all this it is not realized that the inner 'picture' is inten
+tionally constituted, and that so is the way in which it and other possible
+pictures present one and the same thing, and that it cannot be counted as a
+real moment in the imaginative experience.?
+8. In all cases of this ambiguous talk of presentation, where a picturing
+relation is supposed, the following thought also seems active. A very inad.
+equate picture 'represents' a thing and also recalls it, is a sign of it, and this
+last in the sense that it is able to introduce a direct presentation of it that
+is richer in content. A photograph recalls an original, and also is its representative, in a manner its surrogate. Its pictorial presentation makes many
+judgements possible, that would otherwise need a basis in a percept of the
+original. A sign remote in content from a thing often fulfils similar functions, e.g. an algebraic symbol. It arouses the presentation of what it stands
+for, even if this is something non-intuitive, an integral etc.; it turns our
+thought towards this, as when we represent to ourselves the complete
+definitory sense of the integral. At the same time, the sign functions 'representatively
+, surrogatively, in a context of mathematical operations: one
+operates with it in additions, multiplications etc., as if the symbolized were
+directly given in it. Previous discussions have shown this mode of expression
+to be rather crude but it expresses the governing notion in our use of
+'presentation', which here means representation in the double sense of
+provoking presentations and doing duty for them. Thus the mathematician
+drawing on the blackboard says: 'Let OX represent (present) the asymptote
+of the hyperbola, or, calculating,
+'Let x represent (present) the root of
+the equation f(x) = O'. A sign, whether it depicts or names, is called the
+'representation' ('presentation') of what it stands for.
+Our present talk of representation (which we do not wish to erect into a
+fixed terminology) relates to objects. These 'representative objects' are
+constituted in certain acts, and acquire a representative character for new
+objects in certain new acts of transcendent (hinausdeutenden) presentation.
+Another, more primitive sense of 'representation' was mentioned under
+(1): this made 'representatives' experienced contents receiving an objectifying
+interpretation in such representation, and in this manner helping to present
+objects, without becoming objective themselves.
+This leads to a new ambiguity.
+9. The distinction between perception and imagination (which latter itself
+shows important descriptive differences) is always confused with the distinction between sensations and images. The former is a distinction of acts,
+the latter of non-acts, which receive interpretation in acts of perception
+or imagination. (If one wishes to call all contents which are in this sense
+'representative',
+"sensations, we shall have to have the distinct terms
+"impressional' and 'reproductive sensations'.) If there are essential descriptive differences between sensations and images, if the usually mentioned
+
+174 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+differences of liveliness, constancy, elusiveness etc., are sufficient, or if a
+varying mode of consciousness must be brought in, cannot be discussed
+here. Anyhow we are sure that possible distinctions of content do not make
+up the difference between perception and imagination, which analysis shows,
+with indubitable clarity, to be a difference of acts qua acts. We cannot
+regard what is descriptively given in perception or imagination as a mere
+complex of experienced sensations or images. The all too common confusion between them is, however, grounded in the fact that at one time a
+sonatin or inad on The
+"presentation' is understood as an imaginative idea (in the sense of (6) and
+(7)), at another time as a corresponding image (the complex of representative contents or imagery), so that a new ambiguity arises.
+10. The confusion between an appearance (e.g., a concrete imaginative
+experience or a 'mental picture'), and what appears in it, leads us to call the
+presented object a presentation (idea. This applies to perceptions, and generally to presentations in the sense of mere intuitions or logically interpreted
+intuitions, e.g. "The world is my idea'
+11. The notion that all conscious experiences (contents in the real
+(reellen)" phenomenological sense) are "in consciousness', in the sense of inner
+perception or some other inner orientation (consciousness, original apperception), and that with this orientation a presentation is eo ipso given (consciousness or the ego represents the content to itself, led to all contents of
+consciousness being called 'presentations'. These are the ideas' of the English
+empiricist philosophy since Locke. (Hume calls them '"perceptions'.) To have
+an experience and to experience a content: these expressions are often used as
+In logic it is very important to separate the specifically logical concepts
+of presentation (idea from other concepts of it. That there are several
+such concepts has already been indicated in passing. We may again mention
+one not included in our list so far, Bolzano's notion of the 'presentation in
+itself', which we interpreted as equal to every independent or dependent
+part-meaning within a complete assertion.
+In connection with all purely logical concepts of presentation, we must,
+on the one hand, distinguish the ideal presentation from the real (realen)*
+one, e.g. the nominal presentation in the purely logical sense and the acts in
+which it is realized. And, on the other hand, we must distinguish between
+the mere meaning-intentions and the experiences which fulfil them more or
+less adequately, i.e. presentations in the sense of intuitions.
+13. Beside the aforementioned ambiguities, whose danger is obvious to
+all who seriously absorb themselves in the phenomenology of the thoughtexperiences, there are others which are in part less important. We may for
+instance mention talk of presentation (idea) in the sense of Opinion (Sófa).
+This is an ambiguity which arose through gradual transformations as occurs
+in all similar terms. I recall the verbally manifold, but always equivalent
+phrases: It is a widely held opinion, idea, view, conception etc.
+
+Summing-up of the most important ambiguities 175
+§45 The 'presentational content'
+logical sphere - to which these authors limit themselves without being aware
+of their limitation - there is not one thing which can be distinguished as
+be so distinguished. Above all, we can mean by 'content', in the case, e.g.,
+of a nominal presentation, its meaning as an ideal unity: the presentation in
+the sense of pure logic. To this corresponds, as a real (reelles) moment in
+the real (reellen) content of the presentative act, the intentional essence with
+its presentative quality and matter. We can further distinguish, in this real
+ness (in the intentional essence), i.e. the sensations and images. To these are
+again added, in the case of many presentations, variously meant differences
+of form and content: particularly important is here the difference of matter
+(in a totally new sense) and categorial form, with which we shall have to
+concern ourselves a great deal. With this is connected the by no means
+univocal talk concerning the content of concepts: content = sum total of
+'properties', in distinction from their mode of combination. How dubious
+'blanket' talk about 'content' can be, when we merely oppose act, content
+and object, is shown by the difficulties and confusions into which Twardowski
+fell, and which have in part been exposed above. We may point particularly
+to his talk of 'presentative activity moving in two directions', his complete
+ignoring of meaning in the ideal sense, his psychologistic elimination of
+plain differences of meaning by recourse to etymological distinctions and,
+lastly, his treatment of the doctrine of 'intentional inexistence' and the doctrine of universal objects.
+Note. In recent times a view has often been expressed which denies the
+
+176 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'
+by way of an interpretative sense: it is, in particular, not an introspective
+percept. For this reason we identified a sensation with a sensational content.
+But can anyone doubt, once he has distinguished the various concepts of
+presentation, that a concept so delimited is impossible to sustain, and has
+arisen merely through a misinterpretation of original, intentional notions of
+presentation? However the notion of presentation is defined, it is universally
+seen as a pivotal concept, not only for psychology, but also for epistemlogy and logic, and particularly for pure logic. A man who admits thi
+nd yet bases himself on the above rejection, has eo ipso involved himself i
+confusion. For this concept has no part to play in epistemology and pure
+Only through this confusion can I explain how a thinker as pentrating as
+v. Ehrenfels, on occasion maintained (Zeitschr. f. Psychologie u. Physiologie
+der Sinnesorgane, XVI, 1898) that we cannot dispense with a distinction
+between act and content of presentation since without it we should be unable to state the psychological difference between the presentation of an
+object A, and the presentation of a presentation of this object. For the rest,
+he informs us, he has no direct assurance of the existence of such a phenomenon. I myself should say that an act of presentation is as such directly
+intuited, precisely where this distinction between a presentation and a presentation of this presentation is phenomenologically drawn. Were there no
+such cases, no earthly argument could possibly provide an indirect justification of the distinction in question. Just so, I believe, we have directly
+established the existence of an act of presentation in becoming clear as to
+the difference between a mere sound-pattern and the same pattern understood
+as a name etc.
+
+Volume II, Part 2 of the Second German Edition
+The present new edition of the final part of my Logical Investigations does
+not correspond, unfortunately, with the notice in the Preface added in 1913
+to the first volume of the Second Edition. I was forced to a decision to
+publish the old text, only essentially improved in a few sections, instead of
+the radical revision of which a considerable portion was already in print at
+the time. Once again the old proverb came true: that books have their
+destinies. The exhaustion naturally consequent on a period of overwork first
+forced me to interrupt the printing. Theoretical difficulties that had made
+themselves felt as the printing progressed, called for revolutionary transformations of the newly planned text, for which fresher mental powers were
+necessary. In the war years which followed, I was unable to muster, on
+behalt of the phenomenology of logic, that passionate engagement without
+which fruitful work is impossible for me. I could only bear the war and the
+ensuing 'peace' by absorption in the most general philosophical reflections,
+and by again taking up my works devoted to the methodological and material elaboration of the Idea of a phenomenological philosophy, to the systematic sketch of its foundations, to the arrangement of its work-problems
+and the continuation of such concrete investigations as were in these connections indispensable. My new teaching activity at Freiburg favoured a
+present work, and have decided to make its last part once more accessible,
+at least in its old form.
+
+178
+The First Section, that I could not revise in detail without endangering
+larification of logical self-evidence (and eo ipso of its parallels in th
+xiological and practical sphere). Many misunderstandings of my Ideas t
+categorial intuition, an opposition to the mediacy of a non-intuitive, e.g. an
+emptily symbolic thought. But people have substituted for this immediacy,
+the immediacy of intuition in the ordinary sense of the word, just because
+they were unacquainted with the distinction, fundamental to any theory of
+reason, of sensible and categorial intuition. I think it shows something about
+the contemporary state of philosophical science that straightforward statements of such incisive meaning, presented in a work that for nearly two
+decades has been much attacked, but also much used, should have remained
+without noticeable literary effect.
+The position is similar in the case of the textually improved chapter on
+'The A Priori Laws of Authentic and Inauthentic Thinking'. It at least offers
+a blueprint for the first radical worsting of psychologism in the theory of
+Reason. This blueprint makes its 'breakthrough' within the framework
+of an Investigation exclusively concerned with formal logic, and is therefore
+restricted to the Reason of formal logic. With how little deep attention this
+chapter is read, is shown by the often heard, but to my mind grotesque
+reproach, that I may have rejected psychologism sharply in the first volume
+of my work, but that I fell back into psychologism in the second. It does not
+affect what I have said to add that, after twenty years of further work, I
+should not write at many points as I then wrote, and that I do not approve
+of much that I then wrote, e.g. the doctrine of categorial representation.
+Nonetheless, I think I can say that even the immature and misguided elements in my work deserve a close pondering. For everything and all that is
+there said, derives from a research which actually reaches up to the things
+themselves, which orients itself towards their intuitive self-givenness, and
+which also has that eidetic-phenomenological attitude to pure consciousness
+through which alone a fruitful theory of reason becomes possible. Anyone
+who here, as also in the Ideas, wishes to grasp the sense of my arguments,
+must not be afraid of considerable efforts, including the efforts of 'bracketing' his own notions and convictions upon the same, or the putatively same,
+themes. These efforts are demanded by the nature of the things themselves.
+
+Foreword to the second edition 179
+One who is not afraid, will find sufficient opportunity for improving or
+my positions and, if he cares to, for censuring their imperfections. Only if
+lot to be disavowed by all who truly understand the matter. How readil
+nany authors employ critical rejections, with what conscientiousness the
+if Someone fal o find such an esperence a real des hid all thi hat
+domain of psychology, this indicates that he has not understood the doctrine,
+that he has not yet penetrated to the correct attitude of experience and
+thought, for this requires "peculiar, strenuous studies". The total impossibility that I should have been able to utter so insane an assertion as that
+attributed to me by Schlick in the above italicized sentences, and the falsity
+of the rest of his exposition of the meaning of phenomenology, must be
+olain to anyone familiar with this meaning. Of course I have always repeated my demand for 'strenuous studies'. But not otherwise than, e.g., the
+mathematician demands them of anyone who wishes to share in talk of
+mathematical matters, or who even presumes to criticize the value of mathematical science. In any case, to devote less study to a doctrine than is
+necessary to master its meaning, and yet to criticize it, surely violates the
+eternal laws of the literary conscience. No amount of learning in natural
+science or psychology or historical philosophies, will make it unnecessary to
+make these efforts in penetrating into phenomenology, or can do more than
+lighten them. Everyone, however, who has made these efforts, and who has
+risen to a very seldom exercised lack of prejudice, has achieved an indubitable certainty regarding the givenness of its scientific foundation and the
+inherent justification of the method demanded by it, a method which here, as
+in other sciences, renders possible a common set of conceptually definite
+work-problems, as well as definite decisions as to truth or falsehood. I must
+expressly observe that, in the case of M. Schlick, one is not dealing with
+irrelevant slips, but with sense-distorting substitutions on which all his criticism is built up.
+After these words of defence, I must also observe, in regard to Section 111,
+that I changed my position on the problem of the phenomenological interpretation of interrogative and optative sentences shortly after the first edition of the work, and that there would be no place for small revisions, which
+were all that could be undertaken at the time. The text therefore remained
+unaltered. I could be less conservative as regards the much used Appendix
+on 'External and Internal Perception'. Though the text's essential content
+has been preserved, it now appears in a considerably improved form.
+
+180
+The desideratum of an Index for the whole work could unfortunately not
+be realized, since my promising pupil, Dr Rudolf Clemens, who had undertaken to prepare it, had died for his country.
+E. HUSSERL
+Freiburg-im-Breisgau,
+October 1920
+
+Investigation VI
+Elements of a
+phenomenological
+elucidation of knowledge
+
+Our last Investigation may have seemed at first to lose itself in remote
+questions of descriptive psychology: it has, however, been of considerable
+help in our attempted elucidation of knowledge. All thought, and in particular all theoretical thought and knowledge, is carried on by way of certain
+'acts', which occur in a context of expressive discourse. In these acts lies the
+source of all those unities-of-validity which confront the thinker as objects
+of thought and knowledge, or as the explanatory grounds and principles,
+the theories or sciences of the latter. In these acts, therefore, lies the source,
+also, of the pure, universal Ideas connected with such objects, whose ideally
+governed combinations pure logic attempts to set forth, and whose elucidation is the supreme aim of epistemological criticism. Plainly we shall have
+gone far in our elucidation of knowledge, once we have established the
+phenomenological peculiarities of acts as such, that much debated, little
+understood class of experiences. By putting our logical experiences into this
+class, we shall have taken an important step towards the demarcation of
+an analysis which will 'make sense' of the logical sphere and of the fundamental concepts which concern knowledge. In the course of our Investigation we were led to distinguish various concepts of content which tend to
+become confusedly mixed up whenever acts, and the ideal unities pertaining
+to acts, are in question. Differences which had already struck us in our First
+Investigation, in the narrower context of meanings and of acts conferring
+meaning, appeared once more in a wider context and in the most general
+forms. Even the highly noteworthy notion of content, that of 'intentional
+essence', which emerged as a novel gain from our last Investigation, was
+not without this relation to the logical sphere: for the same series of identities, previously employed to illustrate the unity of meaning, now yielded.
+suitably generalized, a certain identity, that of 'intentional essence'
+applied to all acts whatsoever. By thus linking up, or subordinating, the
+ideal unities and phenomenological characters of the logical realm, to the
+quite general characters and unities of the sphere of acts, we importantly
+deepened our phenomenological and critical understanding of the former.
+
+184 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+The investigations carried out in the last chapter, basing themselves on
+the distinction of act-quality and act-material within the unity of intentional
+essence, again led us far into the zone of logical interest. We were forced to
+tion in meaning, and whether all types of acts may not be in this respect
+on a level. But when we seek to tackle this question, we at once encounter -
+as the next paragraphs will demonstrate - the relation between meaningintention and meaning-fulfilment, or to speak traditionally, and in fact
+ambiguously, the relation between 'concept' or 'thought' on the one hand,
+understood as mere meaning without intuitive fulfilment, and 'corresponding intuition', on the other.
+It is most important that this distinction, touched on even in our First
+Investigation, should be most minutely explored. In carrying out the appropriate analyses and, in the first instance, attaching them to the simplest
+naming-intentions, we at once perceive that our whole treatment calls for a
+natural extension and general circumscription. The widest class of acts, in
+which we meet with distinctions between intention and intention-fulfilment
+(or intention-frustration), extends far beyond the logical sphere. This is
+itself demarcated by a peculiarity in the relation of fulfilment. A class of acts
+- those known as 'objectifying' - are in fact marked off from all others, in
+that the fulfilment-syntheses appropriate to their sphere have the character
+of knowings, of identifications, of a 'putting-together' of things congruent,
+while their syntheses of frustration, similarly, have the correlative character
+of a setting apart of things conflicting. Within this widest sphere of
+objectifying acts, we shall have to study all the relations relevant to the unity
+of knowledge. We shall not have to limit ourselves to the fulfilment of
+such peculiar meaning-intentions as attach to our verbal expressions, since
+similar intentions also turn up without grammatical support. Our intuitions, further, themselves mostly have the character of intentions, which
+both require, and very often sustain a further fulfilment.
+We shall provide a phenomenological characterization of the quite general notions of signification and intuition in relation to the phenomena of
+fulfilment, and we shall pursue the analysis of various sorts of intuition,
+starting with sensuous intuition, an enquiry basic to the elucidation of
+knowledge. We shall then embark upon the phenomenology of the varying
+degrees of knowledge, giving clearness and definite form to a related series
+
+Introduction 185
+of fundamental epistemological concepts. Here certain novel notions of content, barely glanced at in our previous analyses, will take the centre of the
+stage: the concept of intuitive content and the concept of representing (interpreted) content. We shall range the notion of epistemic essence alongside of
+our previous notion of intentional essence, and within the former we shall
+draw a distinction between intentional quality and intentional matter, the
+latter being divided into interpretative sense, interpretative form and interpreted (apperceived, or representing) content. We shall thereby pin down
+the concept of Interpretation (Auffassung) or Representation, as the unity of
+material and representing content by way of interpretative form.
+In connection with the graded transition from intention to fulfilment,
+we shall recognize distinctions of greater or less mediacy in an intention
+itself, which exclude straightforward fulfilment, and which require rather a
+graded sequence of fulfilments: this will lead to an understanding of the allimportant, hitherto unclarified sense of talk about 'indirect presentations'.
+We then follow up the differences of greater or lesser adequacy of intention
+to the intuitive experiences which fuse with it, and which fulfil it in knowledge, and point to the case of an objectively complete adequacy of the one
+to the others. In this connection we strive towards an ultimate phenomenological clarification of the concepts of Possibility and Impossibility (harmony,
+compatibility - conflict, incompatibility, and of the ideal axioms relating to
+these. Bringing back into consideration the act-qualities that we have for a
+while neglected, we then deal with the distinction, applicable to thetic acts,
+of a provisional and a final fulfilment. This final fulfilment represents an ideal
+of perfection. It always consists in a corresponding percept (we of course
+take for granted a necessary widening of the notion of perception beyond
+the bounds of sense). The synthesis of fulfilment achieved in this limiting
+case is self-evidence or knowledge in the pregnant sense of the word. Here we
+have being in the sense of truth, 'correspondence' rightly understood, the
+adaequatio rei ac intellectus: here this adaequatio is itself given, to be directly
+seized and gazed upon. The varying notions of truth, which all must be built
+up on one single, selfsame phenomenological situation, here reach complete
+clearness. The same holds of the correlative ideal of imperfection and therefore of the case of absurdity, and as regards the 'conflict' and the non-being,
+experienced therewith, of falsehood.
+The natural course of our Investigation, which at first only concerns itself
+ith such intentions as are meanings, has as a consequence that our trea
+lents all begin with the simplest meanings, and in so doing abstract frol
+formal differences among such meanings. The complementary Investigations
+of our Second Section will then make these differences their main theme.
+contrast between sensuous stuff and categorial form or - abandoning an
+
+186 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+distinction between sensuous (real) and categorial objects, determinations,
+combinations etc., regarding which last it becomes clear that they can only
+be 'perceptually' given in acts which are founded upon other acts, and in the
+last resort, on acts of sensibility. In general we may say that the intuitive,
+old epistemological contrast between sensibility and understanding achieves
+a much-needed clarity through a distinction between straightforward or
+sensuous, and founded or categorial intuition. The same is true of the contrast between thinking and seeing (intuiting), which confuses philosophical
+parlance by confounding the relations of signification to fulfilling intuition,
+on the one hand, with the relations of sensuous and categorial acts, on
+the other. All talk of logical form concerns what is purely categorial in the
+meanings and meaning-fulfilments in question. But the 'matter' of logic, the
+"intention' of terms, itself admits, through a graded superimposition of
+categorial intentions, of distinctions of matter and form, so that the logical
+antithesis of matter and form points the way to a readily understandable
+'relativization' of our absolute distinction.
+We shall end the main body of this Investigation by discussing the factors
+which limit freedom in the actual categorial shaping of given matter. We
+shall become aware of the analytic rules of authentic thinking which, grounded
+in pure categories, do not depend on the specificity of their materials. Similar factors limit thought in the inauthentic sense, i.e. pure acts of meaning to
+the extent that they might lend themselves to authentic cases of expression,
+resting on a priori principles and not dependent on subject-matters to be
+expressed. From this demand springs the function of the laws of authentic
+thinking to provide norms for our acts of mere meaning.
+We raised a question at the beginning of this Investigation as to the
+natural circumscription of sense-giving and sense-fulfilling acts: this is
+answered by ranging such acts under objectifying acts, and by subdividing
+the latter into acts of signification and acts of intuition. Having successfully
+clarified the phenomenological relations which concern fulfilment, we are at
+last in a position to evaluate the arguments for, and the arguments against,
+Aristotle's view of optative and imperative sentences as special cases of predication. The last section of the present Investigation is devoted to clearing
+up this controversial issue
+The aims just sketched are not the final, highest aims of a phenomenological
+elucidation of knowledge in general. Our analyses, comprehensive as they
+
+Introduction 187
+are, leave untilled the extremely fruitful field of mediate thought and
+rst, underlying foundations of a critique of knowledge. Even such a cr
+que demands of us an exercise of the modesty essential to all strict, scie
+nerely criticizing traditional philosophemes or by probable argumentatior
+f it has at last seen that matters can be advanced and transformed only b
+fore their most interesting developments, but in their comparatively simplest
+forms, in the lowest grades of development accessible to us. That even such
+a modest epistemological enquiry has vastly many difficulties to surmount,
+that it has in fact still got all its achievements ahead of it, will become clear
+in the course of the ensuing analyses.
+
+First Section
+Objectifying intentions and
+their fulfilments: knowledge as
+a synthesis of fulfilment and its
+gradations
+
+Meaning-intention and
+meaning-fulfilment
+§I Whether every type of mental act, or only certain
+types, can function as carriers of meaning
+We shall now go on with the question raised in our Introduction: whether
+meaning-something is exclusively the prerogative of certain restricted sorts
+of mental acts. It might seem at first plain that no such restrictions can exist,
+and that any and every act might operate in sense-giving fashion. For it
+seems plain that we can verbally express acts of every kind - whether presentations, judgements, surmises, questions, wishes etc. - and that, when we
+do this, they yield us the meanings of the forms of speech in question, the
+meanings of names, of statements, of interrogative or optative sentences etc.
+The opposite view can, however, lay claim to the same obviousness, particularly in a form that restricts meanings to a single, narrow class of acts.
+All acts are certainly expressible, if language is sufficiently rich, each has its
+own appropriate speech-form: sentence-forms, e.g., differentiate themselves
+into indicative, interrogative, imperative etc., and among the first of these
+we have categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive and other sentence-forms. In
+each case the act, in so far as it achieves expression in this or that speechform, must be known for the sort of act it is, the question as a question, the
+wish as a wish, the judgement as a judgement etc. This will apply also to
+the partial acts constitutive of such acts, in so far as these too are expressed.
+Acts cannot, it seems, find their own appropriate expressive forms till their
+form and content have been apperceived and known. The expressive role
+in speech lies, accordingly, not in mere words, but in expressive acts: these
+create for the correlated acts to be expressed by them a new expressive
+material in which they can be given thinking expression, the general essence
+of which constitutes the meaning of the speech-form in question.
+A striking confirmation of this view seems to lie in the possibility of a
+purely symbolic functioning of expressions. The mental (geistige) expression, the thinking counterpart of the act to be expressed, attaches to the
+verbal expression, and can be brought to life by the latter even when the act
+itself is not performed by the person who understands the expression. We
+
+192 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+understand the expression of an act of perception without ourselves perceiving anything, of a question without ourselves asking anything etc. We
+experience more than the mere words, we enjoy the thought-forms or the
+expressions. In the opposed case, where the intended acts are themselves
+actually present, the expression comes to coincidence with what it has to
+express, the meaning which clings to the words fits itself into what it means,
+its thought-intention finds in the latter its fulfilling intuition.
+It is plainly in close connection with these opposed viewpoints that we
+have the old dispute as to whether or not the peculiar forms of interrogative, optative, imperative and similar sentences are to count as statements,
+and their meanings as judgements. Aristotle's doctrine places the meaning of
+all complete sentences in the varied array of psychic experiences, experiences
+of judging, wishing, commanding and so forth. As against this, another more
+modern and increasingly influential doctrine locates meaning exclusively in
+our judgements (or in their purely presentative modifications). An interrogative sentence in a sense expresses a question, but only in so far as this
+question is realized to be a question, in so far as it is referred in thought to
+a speaker, and so judged to be his experience. And so similarly in other
+cases. Each meaning is, on this view, either a name-meaning or a propositional
+meaning, i.e. either the meaning of a complete indicative sentence or a possible
+part of such a meaning. Indicative sentences are here to be understood as
+predicative sentences, since judgements are, on this view, generally thought
+of as predicative acts: we shall see, however, that the controversy still has a
+sense even when judgements are looked on as positing acts in general.
+To find the right stance towards the questions here raised would call for
+more exact discussion than the above, superficial argumentations have attempted. It will become plain, when we look at the matter more closely, that
+the appeals to sheer obviousness on one side or the other conceal obscurity
+and even error.
+§2 That all acts may be expressed does not decide
+the issue. There are two senses to talk about
+expressing an act
+All acts it has been agreed are expressible. This cannot, of course, be
+questioned, but it does not therefore follow, as might be surreptitiously
+suggested. that all acts for that reason also function as carriers of meaning.
+Talk of 'expressing' is, as we argued earlier,' ambiguous, and it remains so
+even when we connect it with the acts to be expressed. What are expressed
+may be, on the one hand, said to be the sense-giving acts, to which, in the
+narrower sense, 'voice' is given. But there are other acts which can also be
+said to be expressed, though this is the case, naturally, in a different sense. I
+refer here to the very frequent cases in which we name acts we are now experiencing, and through such naming manage to say that we are experiencing
+
+Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment 193
+them. In this sense I 'express' a wish through the words 'I wish that..., a
+und, when we do the former, the meanings of the relevant sentences wil
+eside in our judgements upon such experiences, and not in the experience
+themselves, our wishes, questions etc. Just so, the meanings of statements
+about external things do not reside in these things (the horses, houses etc.)
+but in the judgements we inwardly pass upon them (or in the presentations
+that help to build up such judgements). That the objects judged about in
+one case transcend consciousness (or purport to do so), in another case are
+taken to be immanent in consciousness, makes no real difference. Naturally
+when I express the wish that now fills me, it is concretely one with my act of
+judgement, but it does not really contribute to the latter. The wish is apprehended in an act of reflex perception, subsumed under the concept of wishing, and named by way of this concept and of the further determining
+presentation of the wish-content. Thus the conceptual presentation makes
+the same sort of direct contribution to the judgement about the wish (and
+the corresponding wish-name to the wish-statement), that the presentation
+of Man makes to a judgement about Man (or the name 'Man' to a statement about Man). Substitute for the subject word T' in the sentence 'I wish
+that..? the relevant proper name, and the sense of the sentence remains
+unaffected in its remaining parts. It is, however, undeniable that the wishstatement can now be understood without change of sense by someone who
+hears it, and can be imitatively re-judged by him, even though he does not
+share the wish at all. We see, therefore, that, even when a wish chances to
+form a unity with an act of judgement directed upon it, it does not really
+form part of the meaning of the latter. A truly sense-giving experience can
+never be absent if the living sense of the expression is to survive change.
+It becomes clear, therefore, that the expressibility of all acts is without
+relevance to the question whether all acts can function in sense-giving fashion,
+so far, that is, as such 'expressibility' means no more than the possibility of
+making certain statements about such acts. For in this connection acts are
+just not functioning as carriers of meaning at all.
+3 A third sense of talk about the 'expression' o
+cts. Formulation of our them‹
+appropriately widened. Plainly the situation that it covers would not differ
+in any essential respect, were an expressed act not to be attributed to the
+
+194 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+experiencing ego, but to other objects, and it would not differ for any conceivable form of expression that really (reell) named this act as something
+experienced, even if it did not do it so as to mark the act off as the subjector object-member of a predication. The main point is that the act, whether
+directly named or otherwise 'expressed', should appear as the actually present
+object of discourse (or of the objectifying, positing activity behind discourse),
+whereas this is not the case in regard to our sense-giving acts.
+There is a third sense of the same talk of 'expression' in which we deal, as
+in our second sense, with a judgement or other objectification related to the
+acts in question, but not with a judgement about the latter - not, therefore,
+with an objectification of these acts by way of presentations and namingacts which refer to them; we have rather a judgement grounded upon such
+acts, which does not demand their objectification. That I express my percept
+of something may, e.g., mean that I attribute this or that content to it: it
+may also mean that I derive my judgement from my percept, that I do not
+merely assert but also perceive the matter of fact in question, and that I
+assert it as I perceive it. My judgement is not here concerned with the
+perceiving but with the thing perceived. By 'judgements of perception' tout
+court we generally mean judgements belonging to this last class.
+In a similar manner we can give expression to other intuitive acts, whether
+imaginings, remembering or expectations.
+In the case of utterances grounded on imagination we may indeed doubt
+whether a genuine judgement is present: it is in fact plain that this is not then
+present. We are here thinking of cases where we allow our imagination
+to 'run away' with us, and where we employ ordinary statements, appropriate to things perceived, in giving a name to what then appears to us, or of
+the narrative form in which story-tellers, novelists etc., 'express', not real
+circumstances, but the creations of their artistic fancy. As we saw in our last
+Investigation, we are here dealing with conformably modified acts which
+serve as counterparts which correspond to the actual judgements that might
+be expressed in the same words, just as intuitive imaginations correspond to
+perceptions, and perhaps also to rememberings and expectations. We shall
+leave aside all such distinctions for the present.
+In connection with the above class of cases, and in connection with the
+thereby defined new sense of 'expressed act', we wish to make clear the whole
+relation between meaning and expressed intuition. We wish to consider
+whether such an intuition may not itself be the act constitutive of meaning,
+or if this is not the case, how the relation between them may be best under.
+stood and systematically classified. We are now heading towards a more
+general question: Do the acts which give expression in general, and the acts
+which in general are capable of receiving expression, belong to essentially
+fferent spheres, and thereby to firmly delimited act-species? And do th
+netheless take their tone from an overarching, unifying genus of acts,
+which all acts capable of functioning 'meaningfully", in the widest sense of the
+
+Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment 195
+word - whether as meanings proper, or as 'fulfilments' of meanings - can be
+brought together and set apart, so that all other genera of acts can eo ipso, in
+law-governed fashion, be excluded from such functions? This, we may say, is
+the immediate aim of our Investigation. And as our considerations advance,
+here will be an obvious widening of our sphere of treatment so as to rende
+elf-evident the relation of the questions here raised to a general 'sense
+making' of knowledge. New and higher aims will then enter our field of view.
+§4 The expression of a percept ('judgement of
+perception'). Its meaning cannot lie in perception,
+ut must lie in peculiar expressive acts
+Let us consider an example. I have just looked out into the garden and now
+give expression to my percept in the words: 'There flies a blackbird!' What is
+here the act in which my meaning resides? I think we may say, in harmony
+with points established in our First Investigation, that it does not reside in
+perception, at least not in perception alone. It seems plain that we cannot
+escribe the situation before us as if there were nothing else in it - apar
+rom the sound of the words - which decides the meaningfulness of th
+expression, but the percept to which it attaches. For we could base different
+statements on the same percept, and thereby unfold quite different senses. I
+could, e.g., have remarked: "That is black!', 'That is a black bird!', 'There
+flies that black bird!', "There it soars!', and so forth. And conversely, the
+sound of my words and their sense might have remained the same, though
+my percept varied in a number of ways. Every chance alteration of the
+perceiver's relative position alters his percept, and different persons, who
+perceive the same object simultaneously, never have exactly the same perepts. No such differences are relevant to the meaning of a perceptual state
+nent. One may at times pay special attention to them. but one's statemen
+will then be correspondingly different.
+One might, however, maintain that this objection only showed meaning
+eld to reside in something common to the whole multitude of perceptua
+icts which centre in a single objec
+may understand my words, and my sentence as a whole, without looking
+into the garden: confident in my veracity, he may bring forth the same
+judgement without the percept. Possibly he is helped by an imaginative
+re-enactment, but perhaps this too is absent, or occurs in so mutilated, sc
+is the same sense as before, we cannot suppose that perception is the act in
+
+196 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+which the sense of a perceptual statement, its expressive intention, is achieved.
+The acts which are united with the sound of our words are phenomenologically quite different according as these words have a purely symbolic,
+or an intuitively fulfilled significance, or according as they have a merely
+fancied or a perceptually realizing basis: we cannot believe that signification
+is now achieved in this sort of act, and now in that. We shall rather have to
+conceive that the function of meaning pertains in all cases to one and the
+same sort of act, a type of act free from the limitations of the perception or
+the imagination which so often fail us, and which, in all cases where an expression authentically 'expresses, merely becomes one with the act expressed.
+It remains, of course, incontestable that, in "judgements of perception',
+perception is internally related to our statements' sense. We have good reason
+to say: the statement expresses the percept, i.e. brings out what is perceptually
+'given'. The same percept may serve as a foundation for several statements,
+but, however the sense of such statements may vary, it addresses itself to the
+phenomenal content of perception. It is now one, now another, part of our
+unified, total percept - a part, no doubt, in a non-independent, attributive
+sense - which gives our judgement its specific basis, without thereby becoming the true carrier of its meaning, as the possibility of eliminating percepts
+has just shown us.
+We must accordingly say: This 'expression' of a percept - more objectively
+phrased, of a perceived thing as such - is no affair of the sound of words, but
+of certain expressive acts. 'Expression' in this context means verbal expression informed with its full sense, which is here put in a certain relation to
+perception, through which relation the latter is in its turn said to be 'expressed'. This means, at the same time, that between percept and sound of
+words another act (or pattern of acts) is intercalated. I call it an act, since
+the expressive experience, whether or not accompanied by a percept, always
+has an intentional direction to something objective. This mediating act must
+be the true giver of meaning, must pertain to the significantly functioning
+expression as its essential constituent, and must determine its possession of
+an identical sense, whether or not this is associated with a confirming percept.
+The rest of our investigation will show ever more clearly that our conception is workable.
+§5 Continuation. Perception as an act which
+determines meaning, without embodying it
+stitutes the full meaning of a statement grounded on perception, it seems
+nonetheless to make a contribution to this meaning, and to do so in cases of
+the sort just dealt with. This will become clearer if we slightly modify our
+
+Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment 197
+example, and instead of speaking quite indefinitely of a blackbird, proceed
+to speak of this blackbird. 'This' is an essentially occasional expression which
+only becomes fully significant when we have regard to the circumstances
+• utterance, in this case to an actually pertormed percept. The perceive
+ject, as it is given in perception, is what the word 'this' signifies. TI
+present tense in the grammatic form of a verb likewise expresses a relation
+to what is actually present, and so again to perception. Plainly the same
+holds of our original example: to say 'There flies a blackbird' is not to say
+that some blackbird in general is flying by, but that a blackbird is flying by
+here and now.
+It is clear, of course, that the meaning in question is not attached to the
+word-sound of "this"; it does not belong among the meanings firmly and
+generally bound up with this word. We must, however, allow that the sense
+of a unified statement is to be found in the total act of meaning which in a
+given case underlies it - whether or not this may be completely expressed
+through the universal meanings of its words. It seems, therefore, that we
+must allow that perception contributes to the significant content of a judgement, in all cases where such perception gives intuitive presence to the fact
+to which our statement gives judgemental expression. It is of course a contribution that can perhaps also be made by other acts, in an essentially
+similar manner. The listener does not perceive the garden, but he is perhaps
+acquainted with it, has an intuitive idea of it, places the imagined blackbird
+and reported event in it, and so, through the mere picture-work of fantasy,
+achieves an understanding which follows the intention and which agrees in
+sense with the speaker's.
+The situation permits, however, of another reading. Intuition may indeed
+be allowed to contribute to the meaning of a perceptual statement, but only
+in the sense that the meaning could not acquire a determinate relation to the
+object it means without some intuitive aid. But this does not imply that
+the intuitive act is itself a carrier of meaning, or that it really makes contributions to this meaning, contributions discoverable among the constituents
+of the completed meaning. Genuinely occasional expressions have no doubt
+a meaning which varies from case to case, but in all such changes a common
+element is left over, which distinguishes their ambiguity from that of a casual
+equivocation.? The addition of intuition has as effect that this common
+element of meaning, indeterminate in its abstraction, can determine itself.
+Intuition in fact gives it complete determinateness of objective reference,
+and thereby its last difference. This achievement does not entail that a part
+of the meaning must itself lie in the intuitive sphere.
+I say 'this', and now mean the paper lying before me. Perception is responsible for the relation of my word to this object, but my meaning does
+not lie in perception. When I say 'this', I do not merely perceive, but a new
+act of pointing (of this-meaning) builds itself on my perception, an act directed
+upon the latter and dependent on it, despite its difference. In this pointing
+
+198 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+reference, and in it alone, our meaning resides. Without a percept - or some
+correspondingly functioning act - the pointing would be empty, without
+definite differentiation, impossible in the concrete. For of course the indeterminate thought of the thing pointed to has been merely associated. One
+should not confuse the general character of actual pointing as such with the
+even part of it.
+In so far as the act-character of a pointing act is oriented to intuition, it
+achieves a definiteness of intention which fulfils itself in intuition, in accordance with a general feature of acts which may be called their intentional
+essence. For a pointing reference remains the same, whichever out of a
+multitude of mutually belonging percepts may underlie it, in all of which
+the same, and recognizably the same, object appears. The meaning of "this'
+is again the same when, instead of a percept, some act from our range of
+imaginative presentation is substituted for it, an act presenting the same
+object through a picture in a recognizably identical manner. It changes,
+however, when intuitions from other perceptual or imaginative spheres are
+substituted. We are once more referring to a this, but the general character
+of the reference which obtains here, that of direct, attributively unmediated
+aiming at an object, is otherwise differentiated: the intention to another
+object attaches to it, just as physical pointing becomes spatially different
+with each change in spatial direction.
+We hold, therefore, that perception is an act which determines, but does
+not embody meaning. This view is confirmed by the fact that essentially
+occasional expressions like 'this' can often be used and understood without
+an appropriate intuitive foundation. Once the intention to an object has
+been formed on a suitable intuitive basis, it can be revived and exactly
+reproduced without the help of a suitable act of perception or imagination.
+Genuinely occasional expressions are accordingly much like proper names,
+in so far as the latter function with their authentic meaning. For a proper
+name also names an object 'directly. It refers to it, not attributively, as the
+bearer of these or those properties, but without such 'conceptual' mediation,
+as what it itself is, just as perception might set it before our eyes. The
+meaning of a proper name lies accordingly in a direct reference-to-thisobject, a reference that perception only fulfils, as imagination does provisionally and illustratively, but which is not identical with these intuitive acts.
+It is just in this manner that perception gives an object to the word 'this'
+(where it is directed to objects of possible perception): our reference to "this'
+
+Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment 199
+is fulfilled in perception, but is not perception itself. And naturally the
+been formed in direct application (and so on a basis of intuitions which give
+things to us), we can, by employing the concept of 'being called', itself
+formed by reflection on the use of proper names, give proper names to
+objects, or take cognizance of their proper names, even though such objects
+are not directly given or known to us, but are only described indirectly as
+the bearers of certain properties. The capital of Spain, e.g., is called (i.e. has
+the proper name) 'Madrid'. A person unacquainted with the town Madrid
+itself, thereby achieves both knowledge of its name and the power to name
+it correctly, and yet not thereby the individual meaning of the word 'Madrid'.
+Instead of the direct reference, which only an actual seeing of the city could
+arouse, he must make do with an indirect pointing to this reference, operating through characteristic ideas of properties and the conception of "being
+called' such and such.
+If we may trust our arguments, we must not only draw a general distinction between the perceptual and the significant element in the statement of
+perception; we must also locate no part of the meaning in the percept itself.
+The percept, which presents the object, and the statement which, by way of the
+judgement (or by the thought-act inwoven into the unity of the judgement)
+thinks and expresses it, must be rigorously kept apart, even though, in the case
+of the perceptual judgement now being considered, they stand to each other in
+the most intimate relation of mutual coincidence, or in the unity of fulfilment.
+We need not dwell on the fact that a like result applies also to other
+intuitive judgements, and thus also to statements which, in a sense analogous to that which applies to perceptual judgements, 'express' the intuitive
+content of an imagination, a remembering, an expectation etc.
+Addendum. In the exposition of §26 of Investigation I we began with the
+understanding of the hearer, and drew a distinction between the 'indicating'
+(anzeigende) and the 'indicated' (angezeigte) meaning of an essentially occasional expression and, in particular, of the word 'this'. For the hearer, in
+whose momentary field of vision the thing that we wish to point out is
+perhaps not present, only this indefinitely general thought is at first aroused:
+
+200 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+Something is being pointed out. Only when a presentation is added (an
+ntuitive presentation if the thing dealt with demands an intuitive pointing
+ut), Is a definite reference constituted for him, and so a full, authenti
+meaning for the demonstrative pronoun. For the speaker there is no such
+sequence: he has no need of the indefinitely referential idea which functions
+as 'index' for the hearer. Not the idea of an indication, but an indication
+itself, is given in his case, and it is eo ipso determinately directed thingward:
+rom the first the speaker enjoys the 'indicated' meaning, and enjoys it in
+resentative intention immediately oriented towards intuition. If the thin
+meant cannot be intuitively picked out, as in a reference to a theorem in a
+mathematical proof, the conceptual thought in question plays the part of
+an intuition: the indicative intuition could derive fulfilment from an actual
+re-living of this past thought. In each case we observe a duplicity in the
+indicative intention: the character of the indication seems in the first case to
+espouse the directly objective intention, as a result of which we have an intention directed upon a definite object that we are intuiting here and now. Our
+other case does not differ. If the previous conceptual thought is not now
+being performed, an intention which corresponds to it survives in memory;
+this attaches itself to the act-character of the indication, thereby lending it
+definiteness of direction.
+What we have just said about indicating and indicated meaning can have
+two meanings. It can mean (1) the two mutually resolving thoughts which
+characterize the hearer's successive understanding: first the indeterminate
+idea of something or other referred to by 'this", then the act of definitely
+directed indication into which a completing presentation transforms it. In
+the latter act we have the indicated, in the former the indicating meaning.
+(2) If we confine ourselves to the complete, definitely directed indication
+which the speaker has from the beginning, we can again see something
+double about it: the general character of indication as such, and the teature
+which determines this, which narrows it down to an indication of 'this thing
+there'. The former can again be called an indicating meaning, or rather the
+indicating element in the indissoluble unity of meaning, in so far as it is
+what the hearer can immediately grasp by virtue of its expressive generality,
+and can use to indicate what is referred to. If I say 'this', the hearer at least
+knows that something is being pointed at. (Just so in the case of other
+essentially occasional expressions. If I say 'here', I have to do with somehing in my nearer or further spatial environment, etc.) On the other han
+le true aim of my talk lies not in this general element, but in the dire
+ntending of the object in question. Towards it and its fulness of content
+am directed, and these empty generalities do little or nothing towards deter
+mining the latter. In this sense a direct intention is the primary, indicated
+This second distinction is the one laid down by our definition in our
+previous exposition. (Inv. 1, §26). The distinctions achieved in this section,
+
+Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment 201
+and our much clearer treatment, will probably have helped towards a further clarification of this difficult matter.
+86 The static unity of expressive thought and
+expressed intuition. Recognition (das Erkennen)
+We shall now absorb ourselves in a closer investigation of the relations holdng among intuitive acts, on the one hand, and expressive acts, on the other
+Ne shall confine ourselves, in the present section entirely, to the range of th
+simplest possible cases, and so naturally to expressions and significant intenions which belong to the sphere of naming. We shall make, for the rest, n
+claim to treat this field exhaustively. We are concerned with nominal expressions, which refer themselves in the most perspicuous of possible fashions to
+'corresponding' percepts and other forms of intuition.
+Let us first glance in this field at a relationship of static union, where a
+sense-giving thought has based itself on intuition, and is thereby related to its
+object. I speak, e.g., of my inkpot, and my inkpot also stands before me: I
+see it. The name names the object of my percept, and is enabled to name it
+by the significant act which expresses its character and its form in the form
+of the name. The relation between name and thing named, has, in this state
+of union, a certain descriptive character, that we previously noticed: the
+name 'my inkpot' seems to overlay the perceived object, to belong sensibly
+to it. This belonging is of a peculiar kind. The words do not belong to the
+objective context of physical thinghood that they express: in this context
+they have no place, they are not referred to as something in or attaching to
+the things that they name. If we turn to the experiences involved, we have,
+on the one hand, as said before,' the acts in which the words appear, on the
+other hand, the similar acts in which the things appear. As regards
+the latter, the inkpot confronts us in perception. Following our repeated
+demonstration of the descriptive essence of perception, this means no more
+phenomenologically then that we undergo a certain sequence of experiences
+of the class of sensations, sensuously unified in a peculiar serial pattern, and
+informed by a certain act-character of interpretation' (Auffassung), which
+endows it with an objective sense. This act-character is responsible for the
+fact that an object, i.e. this inkpot, is perceptually apparent to us. In similar
+fashion, the appearing word is constituted for us in an act of perception or
+Not word and inkpot, therefore, but the act-experiences just described, in
+which they make their appearance, are here brought into relation: in these
+by acts of meaning, but by acts of recognition (Erkennen), which are here
+also acts of classification. The perceived object is recognized for an inkpot,
+
+202 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+known as one, and in so far as the act of meaning is most intimately one with
+an act of classification, and this latter, as recognition of the perceived object,
+is again intimately one with the act of perception, the expression seems to be
+applied to the thing and to clothe it like a garment.
+Ordinarily we speak of recognizing and classifying the object of perception, as if our act busied itself with this object. But we have seen that there
+is no object in the experience, only a perception, a thus and thus determinate mindedness (Zumutesein): the recognitive act in the experience must
+accordingly base itself on the act of perception. One must not of course
+misunderstand the matter, and raise the objection that we are putting the
+matter as if perception was classified rather than its object. We are not
+doing this at all. Such a performance would involve acts of a quite different,
+much more complex constitution, expressible through expressions of corresponding complexity, e.g. 'the perception of the inkpot'. It follows that the
+recognitive experience of this thing as 'my inkpot, is nothing but a recognition which, in a definite and direct fashion, fuses an expressive experience,
+on the one hand, with the relevant percept, on the other.
+The same holds of cases in which picture-presentations serve in place of
+percepts. The imaginatively apparent object, e.g. the identical inkpot in
+memory or in fancy, is felt to bear the expression which names it. This
+means, phenomenologically speaking, that a recognitive act in union with
+an expressive experience is so related to an imaginative act as to be, in
+objective parlance, spoken of as the recognition of an imaginatively presented object as, e.g., our inkpot. The imagined object, too, is absolutely nothing in our presentation of it, our experience is rather a certain blend of images,
+fancied sensations, informed by a certain interpretative act-character. To
+live through this act, and to have an imaginative presentation of the object,
+are one and the same. If we therefore express the situation in the words I
+have before me an image, the image of an inkpot, we have plainly coupled
+new acts with our expressions and, in particular, a recognitive act which is
+intimately one with our act of imagining.
+§7 Recognition as a character of acts, and the
+'generality of words'
+The following more exact argument would seem to show conclusively that,
+in all cases where a name is applied to a thing intuitively given, we may
+presume the presence of a recognitive act-character mediating between the
+appearance of the word-sounds, on the one hand (or the complete senseinformed word), and the intuition of the thing on the other. One often hears
+of the generality of words, and usually understands by this highly ambiguous phrase that a word is not bound to an individual intuition, but belongs
+rather to an endless array of possible intuitions.
+In what, however, does this belonging consist?
+
+Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment 203
+Let us deal with an extremely simple example, that of the name 'red'. In
+concomitance, a mere external going with or following on one another would
+not forge any internal bond among them, and certainly not an intentional
+bond. Yet plainly we have here such an intentional bond, and one of quite
+peculiar phenomenological character. The word calls the red thing red. The
+red appearing bet ore us is what is referred to by the name, and is referred to
+as 'red'. In this mode of naming reference, the name appears as belonging to
+the named and as one with it.
+On the other hand, however, the word has its sense quite apart from an
+attachment to this intuition, and without attachment to any 'corresponding'
+intuition. Since this sense is everywhere the same, it is plain that it is not the
+mere phoneme, rather the true, complete word, endowed on all occasions
+with the constant character of its sense, that must be held to underlie the
+naming relation. Even then it will not be enough to describe the union of
+meaningful word and corresponding intuition in terms of mere concomitance. Take the word, present in consciousness and understood as a mere
+symbol without being actually used to name anything, and set the corresponding intuition beside it: these two phenomena may at once, for genetic
+reasons, be brought together in the phenomenological unity of naming.
+Their mere togetherness is, however, not as yet this unity, which grows out
+of it with plain novelty. It is conceivable, a priori, that no such unity should
+emerge, that the coexistent phenomena should be phenomenologically
+disjoined, that the object before us should not be the thing meant or named
+by the meaningful word, and that the word should not belong to the object
+as its name, and so name it.
+Phenomenologically we find before us no mere aggregate, but an intimate,
+in fact intentional, unity: we can rightly say that the two acts, the one setting
+up the complete word, and the other the thing, are intentionally combined
+in a single unity of act. What here lies before us can be naturally described,
+with equal correctness, by saying that the name 'red' calls the object red, or
+that the red object is recognized (known) as red, and called 'red' as a result of
+this recognition. To 'call something red' - in the fully actual sense of 'calling'
+which presupposes an underlying intuition of the thing so called - and to
+'recognize something as red, are in reality synonymous expressions: they
+
+204 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+only differ in so far as the latter brings out more clearly that we have here
+no mere duality, but a unity engineered by a single act-character. In the
+intimacy of this fusion, we must nonetheless admit, the various factors
+implicit in our unity - the physical word-phenomenon with its ensouling
+meaning, the aspect of recognition and the intuiting of what one names - do
+not separate themselves off clearly, but our discussion compels us to presume them all to be there. We shall have more to say on this point later on
+It is plain that the recognitive character of certain acts, which gives them
+their significant relation to objects of intuition, does not pertain to words as
+noises, but to words in their meaningful, their semantic (bedeutungsmässigen)
+essence. Very different verbal sounds, e.g. the 'same' word in different languages, may involve an identical recognitive relation: the object is essentially
+the complete recognition of something red, being equivalent to the actually
+used name, must include the noise 'red' as a part. The members of different
+speech-communities feel different verbal sounds to be fitting, and include
+these in the unity of 'knowing something'. But the meaning attaching to such
+words, and the recognitive act actually attaching this meaning to its object,
+remains everywhere the same, so that these verbal differences are rightly
+regarded as irrelevant.
+The 'generality of the word' means, therefore, that the unified sense of
+one and the same word covers (or, in the case of a nonsense-word, purports
+to cover) an ideally delimited manifold of possible intuitions, each of which
+could serve as the basis for an act of recognitive naming endowed with the
+same sense. To the word 'red', e.g., corresponds the possibility of both
+knowing as, and calling 'red', all red objects that might be given in possible
+intuitions. This possibility leads on, with an a priori guarantee, to the further possibility of becoming aware, through an identifying synthesis of all
+such naming recognitions, of a sameness of meaning of one with the other:
+this A is red, and that A is the same, i.e. also red: the two intuited singulars
+belong under the same 'concept'.
+A dubious point emerges here. We said above that a word could be understood even if not actually used to name anything. Must we not, however, grant
+that a word must at least have the possibility of functioning as the actual name
+of something and so of achieving an actual recognitive relation to corresponding intuition? Must we not say that without such a possibility it could
+not be a word at all? The answer, of course, is that this possibility depends or
+the possibility of the recognitions, the 'knowings', in question. Not all intender
+knowing is possible, not all nominal meaning can be realized. 'Imaginary'
+names may be names, but they cannot actually be used to name anything, they
+have, properly speaking, no extension, they are without generality in the sense
+of the possible and the true. Their generality is empty pretension. But how these
+last forms of speech are themselves to be made clear, what phenomenological
+facts lie behind them, will be a matter for further investigation.
+
+Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment 205
+What we have said applies to all expressions, and not merely to such as
+have generality of meaning in the manner of a class-concept. It applies also
+to expressions having individual reference, such as proper names. The fact
+spoken of as the 'generality of verbal meaning does not point to the generality accorded to generic, as opposed to individual concepts, but, on the
+contrary, embraces either indifferently. The 'recognition', the 'knowing', of
+which we speak when a significantly functioning expression encounters
+corresponding intuition, must not, therefore, be conceived as an actual classification, the ranging of an intuitively or cogitatively presented object in a
+class, a ranging necessarily based on general concepts and verbally mediated
+by general names. Proper names, too, have their generality, though, when
+actually used to name anything, they can eo ipso not be said to classify it
+Proper names, like other names, cannot name anything, without thereby
+also 'knowing' it. That their relation to corresponding intuition is, in fact,
+as indirect as that of any other expression, can be shown by a treatment
+exactly analogous to the one conducted above. Each and every name obviously belongs to no definite percept, nor to a definite imagination nor to any
+other pictorial illustration. The same person can make his appearance in
+countless possible intuitions, and all these appearances have no merely intuitive but also a recognitive unity. Each appearance from such an intuitive
+manifold will justify a precisely synonymous use of the proper name. Whichever appearance is given, the man using the name means one and the same
+person or thing. And he means this not merely in being intuitively oriented
+to it, as when he deals with an object personally strange to him; he knows it
+as this definite person or thing. He knows Hans as Hans, Berlin as Berlin.
+To recognize a person as this person, or a city as this city, is again an act not
+tied to the particular sensuous content of this or that word-appearance. It is
+identically the same act in the case of a variety (in possibility of an infinite
+variety) of verbal noises, as, e.g., when several different proper names apply
+to the same thing.
+This generality of the proper name, and of the peculiar meaning which
+corresponds to it, is plainly quite different in kind from that of the general
+name.
+The former consists in the fact that a synthesis of possible intuitions belongs
+to a single individual object, intuitions made one by the common intentional
+character imparted by every relation to the same object, despite all phenomenal differences among individual intuitions. On this unified basis, the
+particular unity of recognitive knowing reposes, which belongs to the 'gen
+erality of verbal meaning', to its range of ideally possible realizations. In this
+way the naming word has a recognitive relation to a boundless multitude of
+The case of the class-name is quite different. Its generality covers a range
+of objects, to each of which, considered apart, a possible synthesis of percepts, a possible individual meaning and proper name belongs. The general
+
+206 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+name 'covers' this range through being able to name each item in the whole
+range in general fashion, ie. not by individually recognizing it in the manner
+named accordingly.
+38 The dynamic unity of expression and expresser
+intuition. The consciousness of fulfilment and that
+of identity
+From the tranquil, as it were static coincidence of meaning and intuition, we
+now turn to that dynamic coincidence where an expression first functions in
+merely symbolic fashion, and then is accompanied by a 'more or less' corresponding intuition. Where this happens, we experience a descriptively peculiar
+consciousness of fulfilment: the act of pure meaning, like a goal-seeking
+intention, finds its fulfilment in the act which renders the matter intuitive.
+In this transitional experience, the mutual belongingness of the two acts, the
+act of meaning, on the one hand, and the intuition which more or less corresponds to it, on the other, reveals its phenomenological roots. We experience how the same objective item which was 'merely thought of in symbol
+is now presented in intuition, and that it is intuited as being precisely the
+determinate so-and-so that it was at first merely thought or meant to be. We
+are merely expressing the same fact if we say that the intentional essence of
+the act of intuition gets more or less perfectly fitted into the semantic essence
+of the act of expression.
+In the previously considered static relation among acts of meaning and
+intuition, we spoke of a recognition, a knowing. This represents the senseinformed relation of the name to the intuitive datum that it names. But the
+element of meaning is not here itself the act of recognition. In the purely
+symbolic understanding of a word, an act of meaning is performed (the
+word means something to us) but nothing is thereby known, recognized.
+The difference lies, as the foregoing paragraphs have established, not in the
+mere accompanying presence of the intuition of the thing named, but in
+the phenomenologically peculiar form of unity. What is characteristic about
+this unity of knowing, of recognition, is now shown up by the dynamic
+relationship before us. In it there is at first the meaning-intention, quite on
+its own: then the corresponding intuition comes to join it. At the same time
+we have the phenomenological unity which is now stamped as a consciousness of fulfilment. Talk about recognizing objects, and talk about fulfilling a
+meaning-intention, therefore express the same fact, merely from differing
+standpoints. The former adopts the standpoint of the object meant, while
+the latter has the two acts as its foci of interest. Phenomenologically the acts
+are always present, while the objects are sometimes non-existent. Talk of
+
+Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment 207
+fulfilment therefore characterizes the phenomenological essence of the recognitive relation more satisfactorily. It is a primitive phenomenological fact,
+that acts of signification" and acts of intuition can enter into this peculiar
+elation. Where they do so, where some act of meaning-intention fulfils itsel
+in an intuition, we also say: "The object of intuition is known through it
+concept' or 'The correct name has been applied to the object appearing
+We can readily do justice to the obvious phenomenological difference
+between the static and the dynamic fulfilment or recognition. In the dynamic
+relationship the members of the relation, and the act of recognition which
+relates them, are disjoined in time: they unfold themselves in a temporal
+pattern. In the static relationship, which represents the lasting outcome of
+this temporal transaction, they occur in temporal and material (sachlicher)
+coincidence. There we have a first stage of mere thought (of pure conception
+or mere signification), a meaning-intention wholly unsatisfied, to which a
+second stage of more or less adequate fulfilment is added, where thoughts
+repose as if satisfied in the sight of their object, which presents itself, in
+virtue of this consciousness of unity, as what is thought of in this thought,
+what it refers to, as the more or less perfectly attained goal of thinking
+In the static relationship, on the other hand, we have this consciousness
+of unity alone, perhaps with no noticeably marked-off, precedent stage of
+unfulfilled intention. The fulfilment of the intention is not here an event
+of self-fulfilment, but a tranquil state of being-fulfilled, not a coming into
+coincidence, but a being coincident.
+From an objective point of view we may here also speak of a unity of
+identity. If we compare both components of a unity of fulfilment - whether
+treating them in dynamic transition into one another, or holding them
+apart analytically in their static unity, only to see them at once flowing back
+into one another - we assert their objective identity. For we said, and said
+with self-evidence, that the object of intuition is the same as the object of
+the thought which fulfils itself in it and, where the fit is exact, that the object
+is seen as being exactly the same as it is thought of or (what always says
+the same in this context) meant. Identity, it is plain, is not first dragged in
+through comparative, cogitatively mediated reflection: it is there from the
+start as experience, as unexpressed, unconceptualized experience. In other
+words, the thing which, from the point of view of our acts is phenomenologically described as fulfilment, will also, from the point of view of the
+two objects involved in it, the intuited object, on the one hand, and the
+thought object, on the other, be expressively styled 'experience of identity,
+'consciousness of identity', or 'act of identification'. A more or less complete identity is the objective datum which corresponds to the act of fulfilment, which 'appears in it'. This means that, not only signification and
+intuition, but also their mutual adequation, their union of fulfilment, can be
+called an act, since it has its own peculiar intentional correlate, an objective
+
+208 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+something to which it is 'directed'. Another side of the same situation is
+again, we saw above, expressed in talk about recognizing or knowing. The
+fact that our meaning-intention is united with intuition in a fulfilling manner, gives to the object which appears in such intuition, when it primarily
+concerns us, the character of a thing known. If we try to say more exactly
+'as what' we recognize something, our objective reflection points, not to
+our act of meaning (Bedeutens), but to the meaning (Bedeutung), the selfidentical 'concept' itself; talk of recognition therefore expresses our view of
+the same unified state from the standpoint of the object of intuition (or of
+the fulfilling act), in its relations to the meaning-concept of the signitive act.
+Conversely we say, though perhaps in more special contexts, that our thought
+'grasps' (begreife) the matter, that it is the latter's concept (Begriff) or
+'grasp'. After our exposition it is obvious that recognition, like fulfilment -
+the former is in fact only another name for the latter - can be called an act
+of identification.
+Addendum. I cannot here suppress a difficulty connected with the otherwise
+illuminating notion of the unity of identity or recognition, as an act of
+identification or recognition. This is particularly the case, since this difficulty will reveal itself as a serious one as our clarifications proceed and
+progress, and will inspire fruitful discussions. Closer analysis makes it plain
+that, in the cases detailed above, where a name is actually applied to an
+object of intuition, we refer to the intuited and named object, but not to the
+identity of this object, as something at once intuited and named. Shall we
+say that an emphasis of attention decides the matter? Or ought we not
+rather to grant that there is not here a fully constituted act of identification:
+the nucleus of this act, the connective union of significant intention and
+corresponding intuition is really present, but it 'represents' no objectifying
+interpretation (Auffassung). On the experienced unity of coincidence no
+act of relational identification is founded, no intentional consciousness of
+identity, in which identity, as a unity referred to, first gains objective status.
+In our retlection on the unity of fulfilment, in analysing and opposing its
+mutually connected acts, we naturally, and indeed necessarily, also framed
+that relational interpretation which the form of its union, with a priori
+necessity, permits. Our second section will deal with this question in its
+widest form which concerns the categorial characters of acts (see Chapter VI,
+§48, and the whole of Chapter VI). Meanwhile we shall continue to treat the
+sort of unity in question as a full act, or we shall at least not differentiate it
+expressly from a full act. This will not affect the essential point in our
+treatment, in so far as the passage from a consciousness of unity to a relational identification always remains open, has a possibility guaranteed a
+priori, so that we are entitled to say that an identifying coincidence has been
+experienced, even if there is no conscious intention directed to identity, and
+no relational identification.
+
+Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment 209
+§9 The differing character of an intention inside and
+outside the unity of fulfilment
+Our introduction of dynamic fulfilment, or of fulfilment strung out in an
+difficulty which threatens to blur our clear grasp of the relation between
+only lays bare verbal expressions, particularly names, on the one hand, and
+intuition, on the other, both unified through the character of recognitive
+naming. One might reject the idea of an act of meaning bound up with the
+verbal expression, an element distinct from recognitive character and fulfilling intuition, and identifiable with the 'understanding' as opposed to the
+'knowing' character of the expression: this would seem, at least, to be an
+unnecessary assumption.
+This doubt affects, therefore, the central conception which in 84 we took
+to be most intelligible, before we embarked on our analysis of the unity of
+recognition. We must accordingly re-emphasize the following points in our
+1. If we compare expressions used in recognizing objects with those
+used outside of such recognition, it is plain that both have the very same
+meaning. Whether I understand the word 'tree' as a mere symbol, or use it
+in connection with my intuition of a tree, it is plain that I mean something
+by the word, and mean the same thing on both occasions.
+2. It is plain that it is the significant intention of the expression that
+"fulfils' itself in the process of fulfilment, and so achieves 'coincidence'
+with an intuition, and that the recognition which stems from this process
+of coincidence is itself this unity of coincidence. The notion of this unity
+of coincidence plainly involves that we are not here concerned with a divided duality but with a seamless unity, which only acquires articulation
+when drawn out in time. We must, therefore, maintain that the same act of
+meaning-intention which occurs in an empty symbolic presentation is also
+part of the complex act of recognition, but that a meaning-intention that
+was 'free', is now 'bound' and 'neutralized' in the stage of coincidence. It
+is so peculiarly inwrought and infused in this combination that, while its
+semantic essence remains intact, it nonetheless undergoes a certain change
+of character.
+The same holds wherever contents are first studied apart, and then seen
+in their connection with other contents, as parts knit into wholes. Connections would not connect if they made no difference to what they connected
+Certain changes necessarily occur, and these are naturally such specific
+connectednesses as constitute the phenomenological correlatives of what
+
+210 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+are objectively relational properties. Consider, for example, a line set apart,
+erhaps on a bare white background, and the same line as part of a figur
+n the latter case, it impinges on other lines, is touched, cut by them etc. |
+we turn from mathematical ideals to empirically intuited linear stretches,
+these are phenomenological characters that help determine the appearance
+of linearity. The same stretch - 'same' in internal content - appears ever
+different according as it enters into this or that phenomenal context and, if
+incorporated in a line or surface qualitatively identical with it, melts indis
+tinguishably into this background, losing its phenomenal separateness anc
+independence.
+§10 The wider class of experiences of fulfilment.
+Intuitions as intentions which require fulfilment
+We may now further characterize the consciousness of fulfilment by seeing
+in it an experiential form which plays a part in many other fields of mental
+life. We have only to think of the opposition between wishful intention
+and wish-fulfilment, between voluntary intention and execution, of the fulfilment of hopes and fears, the resolution of doubts, the confirmation of
+surmises etc., to be clear that essentially the same opposition is to be found
+in very different classes of intentional experiences: the opposition between
+significant intention and fulfilment of meaning is merely a special case of it.
+We have dealt with this point previously, and delimited a class of intentional
+experience under the more pregnant name of 'intentions': their peculiarity
+lies in being able to provide the basis for relations of fulfilment. In this class
+are ranged all the acts which are in a narrower or wider sense 'logical',
+including the intuitive, whose role it is to fulfil other intuitions in knowledge.
+When, e.g., a familiar melody begins, it stirs up definite intentions which
+find their fulfilment in the melody's gradual unfolding. The same is the case
+even when the melody is unfamiliar. The regularities governing melody
+as such, determine intentions, which may be lacking in complete objective
+definiteness, but which nonetheless find or can find their fulfilments. As
+concrete experiences, these intentions are of course fully definite: the 'indefinteness' of what they intend is plainly a descriptive peculiarity pertaining t
+heir character. We may say, in fact, with correct paradox (as we did befor
+in a similar case) that "indefiniteness' (i.e. the peculiarity of demanding an
+incompletely determined completion, which lies in a 'sphere' circumscribed
+by a law) is a definite feature of such an intention. Such an intention has not
+merely a range of possible fulfilment, but imports a common fulfilmentcharacter into each actual fulfilment from this range. The fulfilment of acts
+which have definite or indefinite intentions is phenomenologically different,
+and the same holds of fulfilments of intentions whose indefiniteness points
+in this or that direction of possible fulfilment.
+
+Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment 211
+In our previous example there is also a relation between expectation
+ind fulfilment of expectation. It would, however, be quite wrong to think
+conversely, that every relation of an intention to its fulfilment was a rela
+tionship involving expectation. Intention is not expectancy, it is not of its
+essence to be directed to future appearances. If I see an incomplete pattern,
+e.g. in this carpet partially covered over by furniture, the piece I see seems
+clothed with intentions pointing to further completions - we feel as if the
+lines and coloured shapes go on 'in the sense' of what we see - but we expect
+nothing. It would be possible for us to expect something, if movement
+promised us further views. But possible expectations, or occasions for possible expectations, are not themselves expectations.
+The external perceptions of the senses offer us an indefinite number of
+relevant examples. The features which enter into perception always point to
+completing features, which themselves might appear in other possible percepts, and that definitely or more or less indefinitely, according to the degree
+of our 'empirical acquaintance' with the object. Every percept, and every
+perceptual context, reveals itself, on closer analysis, as made up of components which are to be understood as ranged under two standpoints of intention
+and (actual or possible) fulfilment. The same applies to the parallel acts of
+imagining and picture-thought in general. In the normal case intentions lack
+the character of expectancy, they lack it in all cases of tranquil perceiving or
+picturing, and they acquire it only when perception is in flux, when it is
+spread out into a continuous series of percepts, all belonging to the perceptual manifold of one and the same object. Objectively put: the object then
+shows itself from a variety of sides. What was pictorially suggested from one
+side, becomes confirmed in full perception from another; what was merely
+adumbrated or given indirectly and subsidiarily as background, from one
+side, at least receives a portrait-sketch from another, it appears perspectivally
+foreshortened and projected, only to appear "just as it is from another side.
+All perceiving and imagining is, on our view, a web of partial intentions,
+fused together in the unity of a single total intention. The correlate of this
+last intention is the thing, while the correlate of its partial intentions are the
+thing's parts and moments. Only in this way can we understand how consciousness reaches out beyond what it actually experiences. It can so to say
+mean beyond itself, and its meaning can be fulfilled.
+§11 Frustration and conflict. The synthesis
+of distinction
+In the wider sphere of the acts to which distinctions of intention and fulfilment apply, frustration may be set beside fulfilment, as its incompatible
+contrary. The negative expression that we normally use in this case, e.g.
+even the term 'non-fulfilment', has no merely privative meaning: it points to
+
+212 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+a new descriptive fact, a form of synthesis as peculiar as fulfilment. This is
+so even in the narrower case of significant intentions as they stand to intuitive
+intentions. The synthesis of recognition, of 'knowing', is the consciousness
+of a certain agreement. The possibility correlated with agreement is, however, 'disagreement' or 'conflict': intuition may not accord with a significant
+intention, but may 'quarrel' with it. Conflict 'separates', but the experience
+of conflict puts things into relation and unity: it is a form of synthesis. If the
+previously studied synthesis was one of identification, this new synthesis is
+one of distinction (unfortunately we possess no other positive name). This
+'distinction' must not be confused with the other 'distinction' which stands
+opposed to a positive likening. The oppositions between identification and
+distinction' and between likening and distinction' are not the same, though
+it is clear that a close phenomenological affinity explains our use of the same
+word. In the 'distinction' which is here in question, the object of the frustrating act appears not the same as, 'distinct from the object of the intending
+act. These distinctions point to wider classes of cases than we have hitherto
+preferred to deal with. Not only significative, but even intuitive intentions
+are fulfilled in identifications and frustrated in conflicts. We shall have to
+explore the whole question of the natural circumscription of the acts to
+which the terms 'same' and 'other' (we can as well say "is' and 'is not) have
+application.
+The two syntheses are not, however, completely parallel. Each conflict
+presupposes something which directs its intention to the object of the conflicting act; only a synthesis of fulfilment can give it this direction. Conflict,
+we may say, presupposes a certain basis of agreement. If I think A to be red,
+when it shows itself to be 'in fact' green, an intention to red quarrels with an
+intention to green in this showing forth, ie. in this application to intuition.
+Undeniably, however, this can only be the case because A has been identified in the two acts of signification and intuition. Were this not so, the
+intention would not relate to the intuition. The total intention points to an
+A which is red, and intuition reveals an A which is green. It is in the coincidence of meaning and intuition in their direction to an identical A, that
+the moments intended in union with A in the two cases, come into conflict.
+The presumed red (i.e. red of A) fails to agree with the intuited green. It is
+through identity that such non-coincident aspects correspond with each other:
+instead of being 'combined' by fulfilment, they are 'sundered' by conflict.
+An intention is referred to an appropriate aspect in intuition from which it
+is also turned away.
+What we have here said with special regard to significant intentions and
+the frustrations they encounter, applies also to our whole previously sketched
+class of objectifying intentions. We may generally say: An intention can only
+be frustrated in conflict in so far as it forms part of a wider intention whose
+completing part is fulfilled. We can therefore not talk of conflict in the case
+of simple, i.e. isolated, acts.
+
+Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment 213
+§12 Total and partial identification and distinction
+as the common phenomenological foundations of
+predicative and determining forms of expression
+The relation between intention (in particular, meaning-intention) and ful
+ilment that we have so far considered, was that of total agreement. This
+like a garment. But by bringing in conflict as the possibility opposed to the
+case of total agreement - conflict that could therefore, somewhat misleadan intention and the act which fulfils or frustrates it.
+We shall, from the start, keep the closer treatment of these possibilities
+so general, that the validity of all essential results will be clear for intentions of the above indicated wider class, and not merely, therefore, for
+meaning-intentions.
+tion was part of a more comprehensive intention, which partially fulfilled
+itself (i.e. in the supplementary parts) while the original part was estranged.
+In every conflict there is, accordingly, in a certain fashion, both partial
+agreement and partial conflict. Our attention to objective relations shoul
+have revealed these possibilities, since wherever we can talk of coincidence
+we can talk about the correlated possibilities of exclusion, inclusion and
+intersection.
+If we keep to the case of conflict, the following additional points suggest
+themselves:
+If a e is frustrated in a 0 in that e is associated with other intentions n
+1... which are fulfilled, these latter need not be so united with 0, that the
+whole © (0; n; 1...) deserves to be called an act constituted on its own, one
+"in which we live', and to whose unified object we 'pay heed'. In the texture
+of conscious, intentional experience, there are many possibilities of pointing
+selection of acts and act-complexes, which remain for the most part
+unrealized. And only such pointed unities are relevant when we are speaking
+of individual acts and their syntheses. The case of pure and complete frustration therefore consists in the fact that O alone, not O, is emphasized or at
+least mainly emphasized, and that a pointed consciousness of conflict establishes unity only between 0 and 6. Our interest in other words, is specially
+directed to the objects corresponding to 0 and 6. This happens when a
+green-intention is frustrated by an intuited red, and the green and red are
+alone attended to. If the clashing intuition of the red is expressed at all, i.e.
+by a verbal intention fulfilled in it, we should perhaps say: "This (red) is not
+
+214 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+green'. (Of course this sentence does not have the same meaning as the
+sentence "The verbal intention "green" is frustrated by the intuition of red'.
+For the new expression renders objective the relation of acts which concerns
+us, and turns new meaning-intentions upon the latter in total fulfilment.)
+It can also be the case that a 0 (0; 7; 1...) enters synthesis as a whole,
+and is herewith either associated with a corresponding whole 0(6; n; 1...)
+or specially associated with its isolated part 0. In the former case there is in
+art coincidence among the combined elements, i.e. among n, 1... and ir
+part total conflict, (0, ē). The whole synthesis has the character of a total
+conflict, but of conflict not pure, but mixed. In the other case 0 alone stands
+out as the corresponding act, for the reason, perhaps, that in mixed conflict
+the unity of © (6; n; 1....) is resolved. The special synthesis of conflict unites
+© (6; n; 1...) and (6), which is appropriately expressed by "This (whole
+object, the red-tiled roof) is not green. This important relation may be
+called one of exclusion (Ausscheidung). Its central character is plainly unaffected, when 0 and 6 are themselves complex, so that we can distinguish
+between pure and mixed exclusion. Roughly speaking, the latter may be
+illustrated by the example "This (red-tiled roof) is no green-tiled roof.
+Let us now consider the case of inclusion. An intention can be fulfilled
+in an act which contains more than its fulfilment needs, in so far as the
+latter presents an object which contains the intention's object, either as a
+as belonging to it. We are of course ignoring the acts in which a more
+comprehensive objective field is set up as an objective background, acts not
+delimited as unities nor as preferential carriers of attention: otherwise we
+should be brought back to the synthesis of total coincidence. Let us suppose
+that a red-tiled roof is presented to us, and that the meaning-intention
+behind the word 'red' is fulfilled in it. The verbal meaning is here fulfilled
+with complete coincidence in the intuited red, but the total intuition of the
+red-tiled roof, relieved sharply as a single item from the background, through
+the work of attention, still enters into a peculiar sort of synthetic unity with
+the meaning-intention Red: '(This) is red'. We speak here of a relation of
+'subsumption' (Einordnung), the opposite of the exclusion mentioned above.
+Subsumption can obviously only be pure.
+The act of subsumptive synthesis, as the act which puts together the
+intending and fulfilling acts in its total unity, has its objective correlate
+in the relation of partial identity of the corresponding objects. Talk of subsumption points in this direction: it pictures our grasp of the relation as
+an activity which subsumes the part in the whole. The same objective relationship is, with a change of conceptual standpoint - pointing to unnoticed
+phenomenological differences casually revealed in our form of expression -
+expressed in the words: 'O, has Og' or 'Og pertains to Og'. The index , make
+us aware that it is the intentional objects of the acts in question which enter
+into these relations; we stress the intentional objects, the objects as they are
+
+Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment 215
+referred to in these acts. The application of these remarks to the case of
+exclusion, and to the expressions 'has not' or 'does not pertain', is obvious
+To the mere 'is' objective identity belongs in all cases, to the 'is not' nonidentity (conflict). That we are specially dealing with a relation of subsumption
+or exclusion requires other means of expression, e.g. the adjectival form,
+which marks off what is had or what pertains as such, just as the substantival
+form expresses its correlative, the thing which has as such, ie. in its function
+as 'subject' of an identification. In the attributive, or more generally determining form of expression (even complete identity determines), being is
+hidden in the inflexion of the adjective, to the extent that it is not explicitly
+and separately expressed in a relative clause, or, per contra, not wholly
+suppressed (this philosopher Socrates'). Whether the always mediate expression of non-identity, whether in cases of predication or attribution, or
+in substantival forms such as 'non-identity', "non-agreement', expresses a
+necessary relation of actual 'negation' to an affirmation which, if not actual,
+is at least present in modified form, would lead to discussions into which
+we do not now care to enter.
+All normal statements are accordingly statements of identity or nonidentity, and expressions of the same wherever there is a relation to 'corresponding intuition', i.e. where the intention towards identity or non-identity
+fulfils itself in a completely achieved identification or distinction. 'The tiled
+roof', as we would say in our previous case provided a mere intention went
+before, 'is really red'. The predicate-intention fits the subject which is presented and intuited as, e.g., 'this tiled roof'. In the opposite case we say: It
+is not really red; the predicate does not pertain to the subject.
+But if the meaning of 'is' finds a fulfilment based on an actual identification (which often has the character of a fulfilment), it is clear that we are
+here passing beyond the sphere on which we had hitherto always kept our
+eye, without being quite clear as to its limits, the sphere namely of expressions that can really be fulfilled through corresponding intuition. Or rather
+we are made aware that intuition, in the common-or-garden sense of external or internal 'sensibility', which we took as an obvious basis in our treatnent, is not the only function that can rightly be styled 'intuitive', and ca
+be regarded as capable of carrying out the work of fulfilment. We leave th
+closer exploration of this emerging difference to the Second Section of the
+present Investigation.
+We must stress, in conclusion, that the above exposition has not provided
+complete analysis of the judgement, but a mere fragment of the same. W
+lave ignored the quality of the synthetic act, the differences between attr
+bution and predication etc.
+
+Indirect characterization of
+objectifying intentions and
+their essential varieties through
+differences in the syntheses of
+fulfilment
+§13 The synthesis of knowing (recognition) as the
+characteristic form of fulfilment for objectifying acts.
+Subsumption of acts of meaning under the class of
+objectifying acts
+We have, in the above treatment, classed meaning-intentions in the wider
+class of 'intentions' in the pregnant sense of the word. All intentions have
+corresponding possibilities of fulfilment (or of opposed frustration): these
+themselves are peculiar transitional experiences, characterizable as acts, which
+permit each act to 'reach its goal' in an act specially correlated with it. These
+latter acts, inasmuch as they fulfil intentions, may be called 'fulfilling acts',
+but they are called so only on account of the synthetic act of fulfilment, or
+rather of self-fulfilment. Such transitional experience is not always the same in
+character. In the case of meaning-intentions, and not less clearly in the case
+of intuitive intentions, such experiences are unities of knowing, or unities of
+identification in respect of their objects. This need not be so in the wider
+class of intentions in general. Everywhere we may speak of coincidences, and
+everywhere we shall meet with identifications. But the latter often depend on
+an inwrought act of a sort which permits of a unity of identification and
+also serves as the foundation of one in the contexts in question.
+An example will clarify the matter. The self-fulfilment of a wish is achieved
+in an act which includes an identification, and includes it as a necessary
+component. For there is a law which ties the quality of wishing to an underlying presentation, i.e. to an objectifying act, and more precisely to a 'mere
+presentation', and this leads to a complementary law tying a wish-fulfilment
+to an underlying act, which incorporates this presentation in its identifying
+grasp. A wishful intention can only find its fulfilling satisfaction in so far as
+the underlying mere presentation of the thing wished for becomes transformed into the corresponding percept. What we have, however, is not this
+nere transformation, the mere fact of imagination dissolved in perception
+oth enter in unity into the character of an act of identifying coincidence. I
+this synthetic character, we have it constituted that a thing is really and truly
+
+Indirect characterization of objectifying intentions and essential varieties 217
+so (i.e. as we had previously merely pictured and wished): this of course does
+copeciald i the posability hat such dely beiy presenter. if a usa is based
+especially, in most cases,
+of a wish is founded on an identification, and perhaps on an act of intuitiv
+recognition, this latter act never exhausts the fulfilment of the wish, but
+a peculiar, act-character, different in kind. It is by a mere analogy that we
+extend talk of satisfaction, and even of fulfilment, beyond the sphere of
+emotional intentionality.
+The peculiar character of an intention accordingly goes with the peculiat
+character of its fulfilling coincidence. Not only does every nuance of ar
+intention corres pond to some nuance of the correlated fulfilment, and likewise of
+the self-fulfilling activity in the sense of a synthetic act, but to the essentially
+different classes of intention there also correspond pervasive class-differences
+in fulfilment (in the twofold sense mentioned above). And obviously the
+members which belong to these parallel series belong also to a single class of
+acts. The syntheses of fulfilment in the case of wish- and will-intentions
+certainly show close affinities, and differ deeply from those occurring, e.g.,
+in the case of meaning-intentions. On the other hand, the fulfilments of
+meaning-intentions and of intuitive acts are definitely of the same character,
+and so in the case of all acts that we classed as 'objectifying'. We may say of
+this class of acts which alone concerns us here, that in them unity of fulfil
+ment has the character of unity of identification, possibly the narrower character of a unity of knowing, i.e. of an act to which objective identity is the
+corresponding correlate.
+We must here emphasize the following point: As pointed out above, every
+fulfilment of a 'signitive' by an intuitive act has the character of a synthesis
+of identification. But it is not the case, conversely, that, in each synthesis of
+identification, a meaning-intention is fulfilled, and fulfilled by a corresponding intuition. In the widest sense, certainly, we do ordinarily speak of every
+actual identification as a recognition. But, in a narrower sense, what is
+clearly felt to be at issue is an approach to a goal of knowledge and, in the
+narrowest sense of a critique of knowledge, the arrival at that goal. To turn
+this mere feeling into clear insight, and to define the precise sense of this
+approach or arrival, will yet be our task. Meanwhile we shall maintain that
+the unity of identification, and thereby all unity of knowing in the narrower
+and the narrowest sense, has its place of origin in the sphere of objectifying acts.
+
+218 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+Their peculiar manner of fulfilment will therefore suffice to characterize
+the unified class of acts to which it essentially belongs. We can accordingly
+define objectifying acts as those whose syntheses of fulfilment have a character of identification, while their synthesis of frustration has a character of
+distinction. We can also define them as acts which can function phenomenologically as members of possible syntheses of identification and distinction.
+Lastly, presuming a law as yet unformulated, we can define them as the
+ntending, fulfilling or frustrating acts which have a possible knowledg
+unction. To this class belong also the synthetic acts of identification an
+listinction themselves: they are themselves either a merely putative grasp of
+identity or non-identity, or a corresponding real grasp of the one or the
+other. This putative grasp can be either 'confirmed' or 'refuted' in an act of
+knowing (in the pregnant sense of the word): identity is really grasped, i.e.
+"adequately perceived', in the former case, as non-identity in the latter.
+Our analyses have been lightly sketched rather than thoroughly executed,
+but they lead to the result that both meaning-intentions and acts of meaningfulfilment, acts of 'thought' and acts of intuition, belong to a single class of
+objectifying acts. We establish thereby that acts of another sort can never
+exercise any sense-giving function, and that they can be 'expressed' only in so
+far as the meaning-intentions which attach to words are fulfilled in percepts
+or imaginations which have as objects the acts requiring expression. While,
+therefore, where acts function meaningfully, and achieve expression in this
+sense, a 'signitive' or intuitive relation to objects is constituted in them, in
+the other cases the acts are mere objects, and objects, of course, for other
+acts which here function as the authentic carriers of meaning
+Before we discuss this matter more closely, and seek to refute many plausible counter-arguments - see the final Section of this Investigation - we
+must explore the remarkable facts of fulfilment somewhat more carefully,
+and in the sphere of objectifying acts.
+§14 Phenomenological characterization of the
+distinction between signitive and intuitive intentions
+through peculiarities of fulfilment
+(a) Sign, image and self-presentation
+In the course of the last discussion we have been led to note how the generic
+character of an intention closely coheres with that of its synthesis of fulfilment, so that the whole class of objectifying acts can be defined through
+the identification generically characteristic of their syntheses of fulfilment,
+whose nature we take to be familiar. This thought leads us on to ask
+whether the specific differences within this class of objectifications, may not
+likewise rest upon corresponding differences in the mode of fulfilment
+Objectifying intentions are basically divided into significative and intuitive
+
+Indirect characterization of objectifying intentions and essential varieties 219
+intentions: let us try to give an account of the difference between these types
+of act.
+Since the starting point of our treatment lay in expressed acts, we took
+signitive intentions to be the significations, the meanings of expressions. If
+we leave aside the question whether the same acts which give sense to expressions can also function outside of the sphere of meaning, these signitive
+intentions always have intuitive support in the sensuous side of the expression, but not on that account intuitive content. Though in a manner one
+with intuitive acts, they yet differ from them in kind.
+We can readily grasp the distinction between expressed and purely intuitive intentions if we contrast signs with likenesses or images.
+The sign has in general no community of content with the thing it signifies; it can stand as readily for what is heterogeneous, as for what is homogeneous with itself. The likeness on the other hand is related to the thing
+by similarity: where there is no similarity, there can be no talk of a likeness,
+an image. The sign as object is constituted for us in an act of appearing.
+This act is not significant: it needs, as we held in former analyses, to be tied
+up with a new intention, a new way of taking things, through which a novel,
+signified object takes the place of the old, intuitively apparent one. The
+likeness similarly, e.g. the marble bust, is as much a thing as anything else:
+the new way of regarding it first makes it a likeness. Not merely a thing of
+marble appears before us, but we have, based on this appearance, a reference to a person through a likeness.
+The intentions attaching to the phenomenal content are, in either case,
+not externally tied up with it, but essentially based upon it, and in such
+a way that the character of the intention is determined thereby. It would be a
+descriptively wrong notion of the matter, to think of the whole difference as
+lying in the fact that the same intention which, in the one case is tied to the
+signifies, even entirely like it: the sign-presentation is not thereby made into
+a presentation by way of a likeness. A photograph of the sign A is immediately taken to be a picture of the sign. But when we use the sign A as a sign
+of the sign A, as when we write " A is a letter of the Latin written alphabet', we
+treat A, despite its representational similarity, as a sign, and not as a likeness.
+The objective fact of similarity between what appears and what is meant,
+is accordingly irrelevant: it is not, however, irrelevant where something is
+presented by way of a likeness. This shows itself in the possibility of fulfilment: it was only the recollection of this possibility which allowed us to
+bring in 'objective' similarity in this context. The likeness-presentation plainly
+has the peculiarity that, when it achieves fulfilment, the object which appears before it as likeness gets identified through similarity with the object
+given in the fulfilling act. Having held this to be the peculiarity of a presentation by way of likeness, we have admitted that fulfilment of like by like
+
+220 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+internally fixes the character of a synthesis of fulfilment as imaginative. But,
+when, on the other hand, casual likeness between sign and thing signified
+leads to a knowledge of their mutual resemblance, this knowledge is not at
+all a case of the peculiar consciousness of identity, when similar is referred to
+similar and made to coincide with it in the manner of likeness and original
+thing. It is rather of the very essence of a significative intention, that in it
+the apparent objects of intending and fulfilling acts (e.g. name and thing
+named in their fully achieved unity) 'have nothing to do with one another'.
+It is clear, therefore, that descriptively distinct modes of fulfilment, being
+rooted in the descriptively distinct character of our intention, can help us to
+detect these latter differences, and to find definitions for them.
+We have so far only considered the difference between signitive and imaginative intentions. If we ignore less weighty distinctions within the wider
+sphere of imaginative acts - we have preferred to consider representation by
+way of physical images, instead of stressing those of fantasy - we must still
+not merely appear "in a likeness'. In this we at once recognize characteristic
+differences in syntheses of fulfilment. Imagination fulfils itself through the
+eculiar synthesis of image-resemblance, perception through the synthesis of
+dentical thinghood (sachlichen Identität). The thing establishes itself througl
+its very self, in so far as it shows itself from varying sides while remaining
+(b) The perceptual and imaginative adumbration of
+the object
+We must, however, pay heed to the following distinction. Perception, so far
+as it claims to give us the object itself, really claims thereby to be no mere
+intention, but an act, which may indeed be capable of offering fulfilment to
+other acts, but which itself requires no further fulfilment. But generally, and
+in all cases of 'external' perception, this remains a mere pretension. The
+object is not actually given, it is not given wholly and entirely as that which
+it itself is. It is only given "from the front, only 'perspectivally foreshortened
+and projected' etc. While many of its properties are illustrated in the nuclear
+content of the percept, at least in the (perspectival) manner which the last
+expressions indicate, many others are not present in the percept in such
+illustrated form: the elements of the invisible rear side, the interior etc., are
+no doubt subsidiarily intended in more or less definite fashion, symbolically
+suggested by what is primarily apparent, but are not themselves part of
+the intuitive, i.e. of the perceptual or imaginative content, of the percept.
+On this hinges the possibility of indefinitely many percepts of the same
+object, all differing in content. If percepts were always the actual, genuine
+
+Indirect characterization of objectifying intentions and essential varieties 22l
+self-presentations of objects that they pretend to be, there could be only a
+single percept for each object, since its peculiar essence would be exhausted
+in such self-presentation.
+We must, however, note that the object, as it is in itself - in the only sense
+fulfilment to the adequate percept that would offer us the object itself, in the
+ideally strict and most authentic sense, then we may say that a percept so
+intends its object that this ideal synthesis would have the character of a
+partial coincidence of the purely perceptual contents of intending and fulfilling acts, and also the character of a complete coincidence of both complete
+perceptual intentions. The 'purely perceptual' content in 'external' perception is what remains over when we abstract from all purely imaginative and
+symbolic components: it is the 'sensed' content to which its own, immediate,
+purely perceptual interpretation is given, which evaluates all its parts and
+moments as self-projections of corresponding parts and moments of the
+perceptual object, and so imparts to its total content the character of a 'perceptual picture', a perceptual adumbration of the object. In the ideal, limiting case of adequate perception, this self-presenting sensed content coincides
+with the perceived object. This common relation to the object 'in itself", i.e.
+to the ideal of adequation, enters into the sense of all perception, and is also
+manifest in the phenomenological mutual belongingness of the manifold
+percepts pertaining to a single object. In one percept the object appears
+from this side, in another from that side; now it appears close, now at a
+distance etc. In each percept, despite these differences, one and the same
+It is at once clear that similar distinctions apply in the case of imaginative
+presentation. Here too the same object is pictured, now from this and now
+
+222 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+from the passage from likeness to original thing.
+The above analysis will be of use for the further investigations to be carried
+on in the next chapter; they also show the mutual affinity of percepts and
+imaginations, and their common opposition to 'signitive' intentions. In all
+cases we distinguish between an actually given, appearing content, which is
+not what we mean, and an object which is what we mean - whether we signify,
+represent or perceive it - or between a sign-content on the one hand, and the
+imaginative or perceptual projection of the object on the other. But while sign
+and thing signified 'have nothing to do with one another, there are inner
+affinities between a thing's imaginative and perceptual projections and the
+thing itself, affinities which are part of the very sense of our use of such words.
+These relationships are phenomenologically documented in differences in
+their constitutive intentions, and not less in their syntheses of fulfilment.
+This account does not, of course, affect our interpretation of every fulfilment as being an identification. In all cases an intention comes into coincidence with the act which offers it fulness, i.e. the object which is meant in it
+is the same as the object meant in the fulfilling act. We were not, however,
+comparing these objects of meaning-reference, but signs and adumbrations
+in their relations to such objects, or to what corresponds phenomenologically
+to these relationships.
+Our interest in the preceding paragraphs was primarily directed to peculiarities in syntheses of fulfilment: these enable us to differentiate intuitive
+and signitive acts in a merely indirect manner. Only in the further course of
+our investigation - in $26 - shall we be able to give a direct characterization,
+based on an analysis of the intentions, and without regard to their possible
+fulfilments.
+§15 Signitive intentions beyond the limits of the
+meaning-function
+In our last discussion we have pinned down certain components of intuitive acts as signitive intentions. But in the whole of our investigations up to
+this point, signitive acts were for us acts of meaning, sense-giving factors
+attached to expressions. The terms 'signification' and 'signitive intention' were
+for us synonymous. It is now time to ask ourselves whether the same acts, or
+
+Indirect characterization of objectifying intentions and essential varieties 223
+acts essentially similar to those found to function in meaning, may not
+occur quite divorced from this function and from all expressions
+That this question must be answered affirmatively, is shown by certain
+recognition, although words, in their sensuous-signitive content, are not
+actually present at all. We recognize an object, e.g. as an ancient Roman
+e aroused at once, or indeed at all. We recognize a tool as a drill, bi
+s name will not come back to us etc. Genetically expressed, present intu
+ions stir up an associative disposition directed to the significant expression
+But the meaning-component of this last alone is actualized, and this nov
+the latter with the character of a fulfilled intention. These cases of wordless
+recognition are none other than fulfilments of meaning-intentions, but
+phenomenologically divorced from the signitive contents which otherwise
+pertain to them. Comparable examples are furnished by reflection on the
+normal interweavings of scientific pondering. We observe here how trains
+of thought sweep on to a large extent without bondage to appropriate
+words, set off by a flood of intuitive imagery or by their own associative
+interconnections.
+With this is connected the further fact that expressive speech goes so far
+beyond the intuitive data necessary for the actual appropriateness of the
+expression of acquaintance. This has, no doubt, an opposed ground in
+the extraordinary ease with which verbal images are revived by intuitions,
+and can themselves then revive symbolic thoughts without corresponding
+intuitions. But we must also observe, contrariwise, how the reproduction of
+imaged words often lags quite far behind the trains of thought revived by
+each present intuition. In both these ways a large number of inadequate
+expressions arise, which do not apply in a straightforward manner to the
+primary intuitions actually present, nor to the synthetic formations actually
+built upon them, but range far beyond what is thus given. Curious mixtures
+of acts result. Objects are, strictly speaking, only 'known', as they are given
+in their actual intuitive foundation, but, since the unity of our intention
+ranges further, objects appear to be known as what they are for this total
+intention. The character of knowing is accordingly somewhat broadened. Thus
+we recognize (know) a person as an adjutant of the Kaiser, a handwriting as
+Goethe's, a mathematical expression as the Cardanian formula, and so on.
+Here our recognition can of course not apply itself to what is given in perception, at best it permits possible application to intuitive sequences, which
+need not themselves be actualized at all. In this manner recognitions, and
+sequences of recognitions, are possible on a basis of partial intuitions,
+which would on a priori grounds, not at all be possible on a basis of complete actual intuitions, since they combine incompatibles in themselves. There
+are, and are only too many, false and even absurd recognitions. But 'really'
+
+224 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+they are not recognitions, i.e. not logically worthwhile, complete 'knowings',
+not recognitions in the strong sense. To say this is to anticipate later discussions. For we have not yet clarified the ordering of the levels of knowledge
+(a matter here touched upon), nor the ideals which limit these.
+So far we had to do with signitive intentions, which exist identically, and
+just as they are, both within and without the function of meaning. But
+countless signitive intentions lack either a fixed or a passing tie with expressions, though their essential character puts them in a class with meaningintentions. I here recur to the perceptual or imaginative course of a melody,
+or of some other familiar type of event, and to the definite or indefinite
+intentions and fulfilments which arise in such a course. I refer likewise to
+the empirical arrangement and connection of things in their phenomenal
+coexistence, in regard to whatever gives the things appearing in this order,
+and especially the parts in each unified individual thing, the character of
+a unity involving precisely this order and this form. Representation and recognition through analogy may unite likeness and original (analogon and
+analogizatum), and may make them seem to belong together, but they cannot unite what is not merely contiguously given together, but what appears
+as belonging together. And even if, in the realization of representations
+through contiguity, images anticipating what is signitively represented are
+confirmed by their fulfilling originals, the unity among such contiguous
+representatives and what is represented through them can be given by no
+relation of picturing (since such a relation is not operative among them) but
+only through the entirely peculiar relation of signitive representation by way
+of contiguity.
+We may therefore rightly see,
+in inadequate percepts and imaginations,
+interwoven masses of primitive intentions, among which, in addition to
+perceptual and imaginative elements, there are also intentions of a signitive
+kind. We may therefore maintain, in general, that all phenomenological
+differences in objectifying acts reduce to their constituent elementary intentions and fulfilments, the former bound to the latter through syntheses
+of fulfilment. On the side of intentions, the only last differences are those
+between signitive intentions, as intentions by way of contiguity, and imaginative intentions, as intentions by way of analogy, each plain and pure in
+their own kind. On the side of fulfilment, intentions of either sort again
+function as components, but on occasion (as in the case of perception) we
+have components which cannot be called intentions, since they only fulfil
+but require no fulfilment, self-presentations of the object meant by them in
+the strictest sense of the word. The character of the elementary acts then
+determines the characters of the syntheses of fulfilment, which in their turn
+determine the homogeneous unity of the complex act. The emphatic power
+of attention helps to transfer the character of this or that elementary act
+to the unity of the act as a whole: this whole act becomes imagination or
+signification or pure perception. And where two such unified acts enter into
+
+Indirect characterization of objectifying intentions and essential varieties 225
+relation, relationships of agreement and conflict arise, whose character is
+determined by the total acts underlying such relations, and ultimately by
+their elements.
+In the next chapter these relationships will be further tracked down, within
+the limits in which they can be phenomenologically ascertained and epistemologically evaluated. We shall keep strictly to phenomenologically given
+
+Chapter 3
+The phenomenology of the levels
+of knowledge
+§16 Simple identification and fulfilment
+In describing the relation of significant intention to fulfilling intuition we
+began with the verbal expression of a percept, and said that the intentional
+essence of the intuitive act fitted in with, or belonged to, the semantic essence
+of the significative act. This is plainly so in every case of total identification,
+where acts of like quality, i.e. both assertive or both unassertive, are synthetically unified; where the acts are of unlike quality, the identification is solely
+based on their materials. This carries over, mutatis mutandis, to cases of partial identification, so that we may hold that the material or matter is the aspect
+of the character of each act which comes up for synthesis, that is essential
+for identification (and naturally also for distinction).
+In the case of identification, the 'matters' are the special carriers of the
+synthesis, without themselves being identified. For talk of identification Is,
+in virtue of its sense, concerned with the objects presented by such 'matters'.
+On the other hand, in the act of identification, the matters themselves achieve
+coincidence. Every example shows, however, that even where qualities are
+alike, the acts need not become quite alike: this is due to the fact that an act
+importance in a careful phenomenological investigation of the levels of
+knowledge, which will be our task. It is clear from the start that, if knowledge
+dmits of degrees of perfection, even when matter is constant, matter cann
+e responsible for such differences of perfection, and cannot therefore dete
+We equated fulfilment with knowledge (in the narrower sense of the word)
+indicating that we were only talking of certain forms of identification which
+brought us nearer to the goal of knowledge. What this means may be elucidated by saying: In each fulfilment there is more or less complete intuitive
+illustration (Veranschaulichung). What the intention means, but presents only
+in more or less inauthentic and inadequate manner, the fulfilment - the act
+
+The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge 227
+attaching itself to an intention, and offering it 'fulness' in the synthesis of
+ulfilment - sets directly before us, or at least more directly than the inten
+ion does. In fulfilment our experience is represented by the words: 'This i
+nust be some percept bringing the object itself to actual phenomenal pres
+ence. It is possible that, in the progress of knowledge, in the gradual ascen
+each individual identification that we call a fulfilment, need contain a percept
+as its fulfilling act. The relative manner in which we speak of 'more or less
+has a superiority which the mere intention lacks: it imparts to the synthesis
+the fulness of 'self', at least leads it more directly to the thing itself. The
+relativity of this 'directness', this 'self", points further to the fact that the
+relation of fulfilment is of a sort that admits of degrees. A concatenation of
+such relations seems accordingly possible where the epistemic superiority
+steadily increases. Each such ascending series points, however, to an ideal
+limit, or includes it as a final member, a limit setting an unsurpassable
+goal to all advances: the goal of absolute knowledge, of the adequate selfpresentation of the object of knowledge.
+We have thereby achieved, at least in preliminary fashion, the characteristic differentiating mark of fulfilments within the wider class of identifications. For not every identification represents such an approach to a goal of
+knowledge: there can well be a purposeless infinity of ever further identifications. There are, e.g., indefinitely many arithmetical expressions having the
+same numerical value 2, which permit us to add identification to identification
+in infinitum. Just so there may be infinitely many images of one and the same
+thing, determining again the possibility of endless chains of identifications
+tending to no goal of knowledge. The same holds for the endlessly many
+percepts of one and the same thing.
+If we pay heed to the constitutive elementary intentions in these intuitive
+examples, we shall of course find moments of true fulfilment entering into
+the total act of identification. This happens when we set image-presentations
+side by side which are not of completely equal intuitive content, so that the
+new image brings out many things much more clearly, and perhaps sets
+something before us "just as it is', while a former image merely 'projects' it
+or denotes it symbolically. If we imaginatively envisage an object turning
+itself to every side, our sequence of images is constantly linked by syntheses
+of fulfilment in respect of its partial intentions, but each new imagepresentation does not, as a whole, fulfil its predecessor, nor does the whole
+series progressively approach any goal. Just so in the case of the manifold
+percepts belonging to the same external thing. Gain and loss are balanced
+at every step: a new act has richer fulness in regard to certain properties,
+
+228 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+for whose sake it has lost fulness in regard to others. But against this we
+may hold that the whole synthesis of the series of imaginations or percepts
+represents an increase in fulness in comparison with an act singled out from
+Such examples from the sphere of mere imagination show that the character of fulfilment does not require that assertive quality in the intending
+and fulfilling acts which is part of the logical concept of knowledge. We
+prefer to speak of 'knowledge' where an opinion, in the normal sense of a
+belief, has been confirmed or attested.
+§17 The question of the relation between fulfilment
+and intuitive illustration
+inds of objectif ying acts - signitive and intuitive acts - and, under the latte
+ubric, acts of perception and imagination. Here intuitive acts plainly seer
+o be preferred, so much so, in fact, as to incline one to call all fulfilmen
+ntuitive illustration (Veranschaulichung) - as we did above in passing - or t
+describe the work of fulfilment, wherever one deals with intuitive intentions
+as a mere increase in intuitive fulness. The relation between intention and
+into the sense of all fulfilment, it closely depends on the latter and even presupposes it. To make a thought clear to oneself means, primarily, to give
+epistemic fulness to the content of one's thought. This can, however, be
+achieved, in a certain fashion, even by a signitive presentation. Of course, it
+we ask for a clearness which will make matters self-evident, which will make
+'the thing itself' clear, render its possibility and its truth knowable, we are
+referred to intuition in the sense of our intuitive acts. For this reason talk of
+'clearness' in epistemological contexts plainly has this narrower sense, it
+indicates recourse to fulfilling intuition, to the 'originative source' of concepts and propositions in their subject-matters themselves.
+
+The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge 229
+dearly analysed ramule ael the need if we are to coheren and
+nd inauthentic illustration (or fulfilment) will distinguish themselves clearly
+nd the difference between mere identification and fulflment will als
+lovel element, to which the name 'fulness' may be given. We are thereb!
+made aware ot a hitherto unstressed side of the phenomenological conten
+moment specially belonging to the matter which it in some manner completes.
+§18 The gradations of mediate fulfilments.
+Mediate presentations
+The formation of every mathematical concept which unfolds itself in a chain
+of definitions reveals the possibility of fulfilment-chains built member upon
+member out of signitive intentions. We clarify the concept (53)4 by having
+recourse to the definitory presentation: Number which arises when one forms
+the product 53 • 53 • 53. 53.
+3. If we wish to clarify this latter concept, we must
+go back to the sense of 5', i.e. to the formation 5 • 5 • 5. Going back further,
+we should have to clarify 5 through the definitory chain 5 = 4 + 1, 4 = 3 + 1,
+3 = 2 + 1,2 = 1 + 1. After each step we should have to make a substitution
+in the preceding complex expression or thought and, were this proceeding
+indefinitely repeatable - it is certainly so in itself, just as it is certainly not so
+for us - we should at last come to the completely explicated sum of ones of
+which we should say: 'This is the number (5) "itself"'. It is plain that an
+act of fulfilment not only corresponded to this final result, but to each
+individual step leading from one expression of this number, to the expression next in order, which clarified it and enriched its content. In this manner
+each ordinary decimal number points to a possible chain of fulflments,
+whose links are one less in number than the number of their component
+units, so that chains of indefinitely many numbers are possible a priori.
+We usually talk as if, in the sphere of mathematics, the straightforward
+meaning of a word were identical with the content of its complex defining
+expression. In this case there could be no talk of fulfilment-chains: we should
+be moving among pure identities wholly tautological in character. But if one
+considers the complexity of the thought-formations which arise through
+substitution, and compares them, in those very simple cases where such
+substitution can be fully carried out, with the significative intentions that
+one at first experienced, one can hardly seriously think that in these last
+intentions all this complication was present from the start. It is plain that
+
+230 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+there are real differences in intention which, whatever their more precise
+description, are knit together through relationships of fulfilment which
+identify them as wholes.
+A remarkable property of the cases just discussed, and of the class of
+significative presentations which they illustrate, lies in the fact that in them
+the content of the presentations - or, more clearly their 'matter' - dictates
+the presentation here also prescribes a prime fulfilment, which puts the
+primary image 'itself' before our eyes, but to this intention a new intention
+pertains, whose fulfilment leads on to the thing itself. What is common to all
+mediate presentations, whether intuitive or signitive, may be put by saying
+that they are presentations which do not present their objects straightforwardly, but by way of presentations built upon other presentations to
+a higher or lower degree. To put it more pointedly, they are presentations
+which present their objects as objects of other presentations, or as related to
+objects so presented. As objects can be presented in relation to any other
+objects, so they can be presented in relation to presentations. These presentations are presented presentations in the relational presentation: they belong
+In connection with the class of cases just mentioned, we speak of mediate (or superordinate) intentions or fulfilments. The rule holds that every
+mediate intention requires a mediate fulfilment, which naturally, after a finite
+number of steps, ends up in an immediate intuition.
+§19 Distinction between mediate presentations and
+presentations of presentations
+From these mediate presentations we must, however, distinguish presentations
+of presentations, i.e. presentations simply directed upon other presentations
+as their objects. Although such presented presentations are, generally speaking, themselves intentions, and so capable of fulfilment, the nature of the
+presenting presentations which are in question requires no mediate fulfilment
+through fulfilment of the presented presentation. The intention of P1 (P2), a
+presentation of a presentation, is directed to P2: it is fulfilled, and completely fulfilled, when P2 'itself' is present. It is not enriched when the intention of P2 is fulfilled in its turn, when its object appears in an image or in a
+richer image, or even in a percept. For P1 refers, not to this object, but only
+to its presentation P2. Nothing obviously alters if the emboîtement becomes
+more complex, e.g. in the case expressed by the symbol P1(P2(P3)) etc.
+
+The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge 23l
+The thought 'signitive presentation', for instance, is fulfilled in the intuition of a signitive presentation, e.g. of the presentation 'integral', or of the
+presentation 'signitive presentation' itself. These examples must not be misunderstood as meaning that the signitive presentation integral' itself claimed
+an intuitive status, as if the concepts of intuition and signitive act (meaningintention) were here confounded.
+gral' but the inner percept of this presentation that serves as the fulfilling
+intuition to the thought 'signitive presentation'. This presentation is not the
+fulfilling intuition, but the object of the fulfilling intuition. As the thought of
+a colour has its fulfilment in the act of intuiting this colour, so the thought
+of a thought has its fulfilment in an act of intuiting this thought, and its final
+intuitive fulfilment in an adequate percept of the same. Here as elsewhere,
+the mere being of an experience involves neither its intuition, nor, more
+particularly, its perception. It must be noted that, in our general opposition
+between thought or intention, and fulfilling intuition, intuition is not to be
+understood as mere outward intuition, the perceiving or imagining of external physical objects. As our just discussed example shows, and as the nature
+of presentation makes obvious, 'inner' perception or 'inner' imagination can
+function as a fulfilling intuition.
+§20 Genuine intuitive illustration in every fulfilment.
+Authentic and inauthentic intuitive illustration
+Now that we have sufficiently stressed and clarified the distinction between
+mediate presentations and presentations of presentations, it will be proper
+to turn to what they have in common. Each mediate presentation includes,
+on the above analysis, presentations of presentations, inasmuch as it refers
+to is if vet is tor bio as 10e, wain pink of tians, which it i shit presented.
+Thus if we think of 1000 as 10°
+as the object of the presentation which would arise were we to carry out the
+exponentiation in question. From this it is clear that genuinely intuitive illustrations play the essential part in all fulfilment of mediate intentions, and at
+each step in such fulfilment. The characterization of an object as object of a
+presented presentation (or as one related in a certain manner to objects so
+defined) presupposes in its fulfilment the fulfilment of these presentations of
+presentations, and these 'inwoven' intuitive fulfilments are the first to give
+the whole identification its character of a fulfilment. Its gradual increase in
+'fulness' consists solely in the fact that, one by one, all its presentations of
+presentations have been fulfilled, whether such presentations were 'inwoven'
+in it from the beginning, or have emerged in the process of fulfilment through
+realizing 'construction' of these presented presentations, and through intuition of them when realized, so that in the end the dominant, total intention,
+with its structure of conjoined and subordinate intentions, appears as
+identified with an immediate intention. This last identification thereby has
+
+232 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+as a whole the character of a fulfilment. This kind of fulfilment is, however,
+a case of inauthentic intuitive illustration, since we are only entitled to predicate authentic intuitive illustration if fulness is not added anywhere, but
+only imparts an increase to the object presented by the presentation as a
+whole, which accordingly becomes more fully presented. This means no
+more, ultimately, than that a purely signitive presentation is without any
+fulness, and that all fulness rather resides in the actual 'making present'
+(Vergegenwärtigung) of properties that pertain to the object itself.
+We shall presently pursue this last thought. Here we shall add that the
+difference we called one of 'authentic' and 'inauthentic intuitive illustration'
+could also be called one of authentic and inauthentic fulfilment, since an intention aims at its object, is as it were desirous of it, and since fulfilment, in
+the pregnant sense of the word only registers the fact that some part of the
+fulness of the object is imparted to the intention. We must, however, still
+hold that inauthentic and authentic fulfilments are alike marked out among
+syntheses of identification by a common phenomenological character (that
+of fulfilment in the wider sense), and that there is a peculiar principle to the
+effect that all inauthentic fulfilment implies authentic fulfilments, and indeed
+borrows its character of fulfilment from these authentic cases.
+To demarcate the difference between authentic and inauthentic intuitive
+illustrations somewhat more precisely, and at the same time deal with a class
+of cases where inauthentic intuitive illustrations have every appearance of
+authenticity, we add the following remarks:
+It is not always the case that, when the fulfilment of a signitive intention
+is consummated on an intuitive basis, the 'matters' of the acts concerned, as
+presupposed above, are in a relationship of coincidence, so that the object
+which appears intuitively also comes before us as itself meant in our act
+of meaning. Only when this happens, however, may one talk of intuitive
+illustration in the true sense: only then is a thought realized perceptually, or
+illustrated imaginatively. The case is different when the fulfilling intuition
+presents an indirectly represented object, as when the use of a geographical
+name calls up the imaginative presentation of a map, which blends with the
+meaning-intention of this name, or as when a statement about certain streetconnections, courses of rivers, features of mountains, is confirmed by what
+stands inscribed on a map before us. Here intuition should not be said to
+fulfil in the true sense of the word: its own matter does not enter into action.
+The real basis of fulfilment does not lie in it at all, but in a plainly signitive
+intention intertwined with it. That the apparent object here functions as
+indirectly representing the object meant and named, means, phenomenologically speaking, that its constitutive intuition is now the bearer of a novel
+intention, an intention pointing beyond the apparent object, and thereby
+characterizing it as a sign. The analogy of what appears and what is meant,
+which may be present here, does not lead to a straightforward presentation
+by way of an image, but to a sign-presentation resting upon the latter. The
+
+The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge 233
+he land itself, but the pictorial image of the map which comes up wher
+England is mentioned, does not mean England itself in pictorial fashion, not
+ven mediately, as the country pictured on the map. It means England aft
+le manner of a mere sign, through external relations of association, whic
+§21 The 'fulness' of a presentation
+It will, however, now be necessary to view the achievement of intuitive
+intentions more closely. Since the fulfilment of mediate intentions refers
+back to the fulfilment, the intuitive fulfilment of immediate intentions, and
+since it has transpired that the final outcome of the whole mediate process
+is an immediate intention, we now concern ourselves with the question of
+the intuitive fulfilment of immediate intentions and of the relationships
+and laws governing their sphere. This question we therefore attack. But we
+may observe from the start that, in the following investigations, only the
+'matter'-side of an act's intentional essence will have relevance for the relationships to be established. The qualities of our intention (whether assertive
+or merely presentative) can be varied indifferently.
+We begin with the following proposition:
+To every intuitive intention there pertains, in the sense of an ideal possibility, a signitive intention precisely accommodated to its material. This
+unity of identification necessarily has the character of a unity of fulfilment,
+in which the intuitive, not the signitive member, has the character of being
+the fulfiller, and so also, in the most authentic sense, the giver of fulness.
+We only express the sense of this last statement in a different way if we say
+that signitive intentions are in themselves 'empty', and that they 'are in need
+of fulness'. In the transition from a signitive intention to the corresponding
+intuition, we experience no mere increase, as in the change from a pale image
+or a mere sketch to a fully alive painting. The signitive intention is rather
+lacking in every sort of fulness: the intuitive presentation first brings fulness
+to it, and, through identification, into it. A signitive intention merely points
+to its object, an intuitive intention gives it 'presence', in the pregnant sense
+of the word, it imports something of the fulness of the object itself. However
+far an imaginative presentation may lag behind its object, it has many features in common with it, more than that, it is like this object, depicts it,
+makes it really present to us. A signitive presentation, however, does not
+present analogically, it is 'in reality' no 'presentation', in it nothing of the
+object comes to life. The ideal of complete fulness is, accordingly, the fulness
+of the object itself, as the sum total of its constitutive properties. The fulness
+
+234 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+of the presentation is, however, the sum total of properties pertaining to the
+resentation itselt
+or sentends it as itself given. fulness is, accordives escharacteristic mot
+ment of presentations alongside of quality and matter, a positive constituent
+only in the case of intuitive presentations, a privation of the case of signitive.
+The 'clearer' a presentation is, the higher its pictorial level, the richer it is in
+fulness. The ideal of fulness would, accordingly, be reached in a presentation
+vhich would embrace its object, entire and whole, in its phenomenologica
+ontent. If we include individualizing features in the fulness of the objec
+such features can be embraced by no imagination, only by a percept. But, if
+re ignore these features, a definite ideal exists for imagination as wel
+Ve must accordingly return to the features of the presented object: Th
+more of these features enter into the analogical representation and, as regards
+each separate feature, the greater the similarity with which the presentation
+represents it in its content, the greater is the fulness of the presentation.
+Somehow, no doubt, every feature of an object is included in the scope
+of every presentation, and so in that of the pictorial presentation, but not
+every property is analogically represented, the phenomenological content of
+the presentation does not contain a peculiar, so-to-say analogizing or depicting
+moment for each. The sum total of the intimately fused moments which are
+thought to underlie purely intuitive (in this case imaginative) ways of regarding things, which first gives them the character of being representative of
+corresponding objective moments, constitutes the fulness of the imaginative
+presentation. Hence in addition to imaginative representations, there are also
+erceptual ones, graspings of the thing itsell
+nomena one assable sher the total of she imageshibity or propitivy
+functioning moments of the perceptual presentation, we have marked off
+the fulness of the latter.
+§22 Fulness and 'intuitive substance' (Gehalt)
+Closely regarded, the concept of fulness is still fraught with an ambiguity.
+The above mentioned moments can be looked at in respect of their own
+existential content, without regard to the functions of pure imagination o
+perception, which first confer on them the value of being a picture or
+perspectivally slanted self-revelation, and so a value for the function of
+fulfilment. On the other hand, one can consider these moments in their
+interpretation, i.e. not these moments alone, but the full pictures or slanted
+self-revelations in question. Ignoring only intentional qualities, one can deal
+with purely intuitive acts as wholes, which include these moments in themselves, since they give them an objective significance. These "purely intuitive'
+acts we conceive as mere constituents of the intuitions just mentioned, being
+the element in them which gives to the moments previously mentioned, a
+relation to corresponding objective properties which are represented through
+
+The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge 235
+them. We ignore therewith (in addition to the qualities) the yet further
+attached signitive relations to further parts or sides of the object which are
+not, properly speaking (intuitively), represented.
+It is plainly these purely intuitive constituents which impart to total acts
+e character of percepts or imaginings, i.e. their intuitive character, al
+hich function in the system of serially ordered fulfilments as the eleme
+which confers 'fulness', or which enriches or increases the same when already present. To deal with this ambiguity in our talk of 'fulness' we shall
+introduce the following distinguishing terms:
+By intuitively presentative or intuitively representative contents (Inhalten)
+we understand those contents of intuitive acts which, owing to the purely
+imaginative or perceptual interpretations that they sustain, point unambiguously to definitely corresponding contents in the object, represent these in
+imagined or perceived perspectival slantings. The act-aspects which characterize them in this manner, we ignore. Since the character of imagination
+lies in analogical picturing, in 'representation' in a narrower sense, while
+the character of perception can be called strictly presentative, the following
+distinctive names suggest themselves: For the intuitively presentative contents in either case - analogizing or picturing contents, on the one hand, and
+strictly presentative or self-presentative contents, on the other. The expressions imaginatively slanted contents' and 'perceptively slanted contents'
+are also very apt. The intuitively presentative contents of outer perception
+define the concept of sensation in the ordinary, narrow sense. The intuitively
+presentative contents of external fantasy are sensory phantasms or images.
+The intuitively presentative or intuitively representative contents in and
+with the interpretation put upon them, we call the intuitive substance (Gehalt)
+of the act: in this we still ignore the quality of the act (whether assertive or
+not), as being indifferent to the distinctions in question. On the above, all
+signitive components of an act are excluded from its intuitive 'substance'."
+§23 Relationships of weight between the intuitive and
+signitive 'substance' (Gehalt) of one and the same act.
+Pure intuition and pure signification. Perceptual and
+imaginal content, pure perception and pure
+imagination. Gradations of fulness
+To increase the clearness of the concepts just marked off, and to aid in the
+marking off of a new set of concepts, rooted in the same soil, we embark on
+the following discussion:
+
+236 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+there for our presentation (Vorstellung). We now find in general that it is
+possible to draw the following phenomenological distinction between
+(1) The purely intuitive 'substance' (Gehalt) of the act, i.e. all that corresponds
+in the act to the sum total of the object's properties that 'become apparent',
+(2) The signitive 'substance of the act, which corresponds to the sum total
+of the remaining, subsidiarily given properties of the object, which do not
+themselves become apparent.
+We all draw such a distinction, in purely phenomenological fashion, in
+the intuition involved in the percept or image of a thing, between whatever
+in the object is truly made apparent, the mere 'side' from which the object
+is shown to us, and whatever lacks intuitive presentation (Darstellung), is
+hidden by other phenomenal objects etc. Such talk plainly implies, what
+phenomenological analysis within certain limits definitely proves, that even
+what is not presented (Nicht-Dargestelltes) in an intuitive presentation
+(Vorstellung) is subsidiarily meant, and that an array of signitive components
+must accordingly be ascribed to the latter, from which we have to abstract,
+if we wish to keep our intuitive content pure. This last gives the intuitively
+presenting (darstellende) content its direct relation to corresponding objective moments: other novel and, to that extent, mediate, signitive intentions,
+are attached to these by contiguity.
+If we now define the weight of the intuitive (or signitive) content as the
+sum total of the intuitively (or signitively) presented (vorgestellte) moments
+of the object, both 'weights' in each presentation (Vorstellung) will add up
+to a single total weight, i.e. the sum total of the object's properties. Always
+therefore the symbolic equation holds: i + s = 1. The weights i and s can
+plainly vary in many regards: the same, intentionally same, object can be
+intuitively given with more or less numerous, ever varying properties. The
+signitive content also alters correspondingly, it is increased or diminished
+Ideally we now have the possibility of two limiting cases:
+i =0 s = 1
+i= 1 s = 0.
+In the former, the presentation (Vorstellung) would have only signitive
+content: no property of its intentional object would remain over which
+was brought to intuitive presentation (Darstellung) in its content. The special
+case of purely signitive presentations, well-known to us as pure meaningintentions, therefore appears here as a limiting case of intuition.
+In the second case the presentation (Vorstellung) has no signitive content
+whatever. In it all is fulness: no part, no side, no property of its object fails to
+be intuitively presented (dargestellt), none is merely indirectly and subsidiarily
+meant. Not only is everything that is intuitively presented also meant - so
+much is analytically true - but whatever is meant is also intuitively presented. This new class of presentations may be defined as pure intuitions, the
+
+The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge 237
+term here used with innocuous ambiguity, at times to cover complete acts,
+at times such acts in abstraction from their quality. We may speak distinis pure intuition in it, just as we may also speak of the object's purely intuit
+ive content, of all that is rendered intuitive in this presentation. The lik
+applies to the signitive substance of the presentation: this can be said to be
+all that is pure signification in it.
+Each total act of intuition has either the character of a percept or an
+magination: its intuitive substance is then either perceptual or imaginativ
+substance or content. This must not be confused with the perceptually o
+imaginatively presenting content in the sense defined in $22.
+interpretation (as in the case of physical images), in which they function
+strictly presentatively.
+On account of the mixture of perceptual and imaginative components
+which the intuitive substance of a percept permits and usually exhibits, we can
+purely perceptual and purely imaginative components, we can write down
+the symbolic equation
+Pp+1p= 1
+where 1 symbolizes the weight of the total intuitive content of the pure
+intuition, and thus the total content of its object. If Ip = 0, ie. if the pure
+intuition is free from all imaginal content, it should be called a pure perception: we shall here ignore the qualitatively assertive character usually
+embraced in the sense of the term "perception'. But if Pp = 0, the intuition is
+called pure imagination. The 'purity' of pure perception relates, therefore,
+not merely to signitive, but also to imaginative supplements. The narrowing
+of an impure percept which throws out symbolic components yields the pure
+intuition which is immanent in it: a further reductive step then throws out
+everything imagined, and yields the substance of pure perception.
+Can the intuitively presentative content in the case of pure perception be
+identified with the object itself? The essence of pure presentation (in the
+strict sense) surely consists in being a pure self-presentation of the object,
+
+238 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+one which means the intuitively presentative content directly (in the manner
+of self") as its object. This would, however, be a paralogism. The percept,
+as presentation in the strict sense, so interprets the intuitively presentative
+content, that the object appears as itself given with and in this content. Presentation (in the strict sense) is pure, when each part of the object is actually
+and intuitively presented in the content, and none is merely imagined or
+symbolized. As there is nothing in the object not strictly presented, so there
+is nothing in the content not strictly presentative. Despite such exact corres
+ondence, self-presentation may still have the character of the mere, even i
+all-sided perspectivity (of a completed perceptual picture): it need not attain
+image, whereas perception looks on it as a self-revelation of the object. Pure
+perception no less than pure imagination admits, accordingly, of differing
+legrees of fulness, without thereby altering its intentional object. Regardin
+moments of content in the object.
+3. The reality-level (Realitätsgehalt) of the fulness, the greater or less
+number of its strictly presentative contents.
+In all these regards, adequate perception represents an ideal: it has a
+maximum of extent, liveliness and reality: it is the self-apprehension of the
+whole, full object.
+§24 Graded series of fulfilments
+We framed our talk of 'fulness' with an eye to relationships of fulfilment,
+that peculiar form of the synthesis of identification. But in our last results
+we not only threw light on the concept of fulness, but also on its differences
+of greater or lesser completeness, liveliness and reality, as well as on the
+gradations in pictorialization and perspectival projection, and all by way of
+relationships among the inner 'moments' of our presentations, or among
+these and the objective moments that they intend. But it is plain that to these
+relationships there correspond possible gradients of increase, founded on syntheses of fulfilment.
+
+The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge 239
+Fulfilment arises out of the first application of fulness as such, in the
+while to the corresponding empty parts of both intentions, which alike enter
+this identifying coincidence, no part of this sense of increase can be ascribed.
+A continuous increase in fulfilment is further achieved in the continuity of
+intuitive acts or serial fulfilments which present the object with ever more
+extended and intense illustrativeness. That Bz is a 'more perfect' image than
+B1, means that fulfilment obtains in the synthetic context of the pictorial
+presentation in question, and increased fulfilment in the direction of By. Here
+as elsewhere distances pertain to increases, and transitivity to concatenated
+relationships. If B, is at once > By, and B3 > Bz, then B3 > B, and this last
+distance exceeds those which mediate it. This is so at least if we take separate
+account of the three moments of fulness, i.e. extent, liveliness and reality,
+which were distinguished above.
+These increases and gradients of increase correspond, as analysis shows,
+to resemblances and gradients of resemblance among the intuitively presentative contents of the fulnesses. Likeness of presentative contents, or
+concatenations of such likenesses, are not, however, to be taken to be the
+same as simple or concatenated increases: they are not so when these
+'fulnesses' are considered in their own being as contents, in abstraction from
+their representative function in the relevant acts. Only through this latter
+function, i.e. through the fact that, in the order of graded fulfilments, and of
+the increases obtaining among its acts, each later act of fulness appears
+richer, do the representative contents of the acts achieve their ascending
+order. They appear one after the other as not only themselves furnishing
+fulness, but as furnishing it ever more abundantly. To call such components
+'fulnesses' is to talk relatively and functionally: it is to express a characteristic accruing to the contents through the acts, and through the part played
+by these acts in possible syntheses of fulfilment. Our term here resembles
+species of content: it refers to the content only as intentionally correlated
+plainly have their foundation in the phenomenological 'substance' (Gehalt)
+of our acts, considered purely in their specificity. We are concerned throughout only with ideal relationships determined by the ideal Species in question.
+In the synthesis of intuitive acts there is, however, not always an increase
+in fulness: partial fulfilment can go hand in hand with partial emptying, as
+we mentioned above. The distinction between mere identification and fulfilment points back to the fact, we may say, that in the case of the former there
+may be either no genuine fulfilment, since we have to do only with asserted
+identities among acts alike lacking in fulness, or because the fulfilment or
+
+240 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+enriched fulfilment which obtains goes together with a simultaneous empty-
+§25 Fulness and intentional matter
+We now wish to discuss the relation between the new concept of pre
+sentational content covered by the name 'fulness', with content in the sense
+of 'matter', which last has played such a large part in our investigation up
+to this point. 'Matter' was classed as that moment in an objectifying act
+which makes the act present just this object in just this manner, ie. in just
+these articulations and forms, and with special relation to just these properties or relationships. Presentations which agree in their matter do not merely
+present the same object in some general fashion: they mean it in the most
+complete fashion as the same, as having exactly the same properties. The
+one presentation confers nothing on the object in its intention which the
+other presentation does not likewise confer. To each objectifying articulation and form on one side there is a corresponding articulation and form on
+the other, in such a manner that the agreeing elements of the presentations
+have an identical objective reference. In this sense we said in our Fifth
+Investigation, in elucidating the concepts of 'matter' and 'semantic essence':
+'Two judgements are in essence the same judgement (i.e. judgements with
+the same 'matter'), if everything that would hold of the state of affairs
+judged according to one, would likewise hold of it according to the other,
+and nothing different would hold of it in either case. The truth-value of the
+judgements is the same. They mean the same in regard to the object, even if
+they are otherwise quite different, if the one, e.g., is achieved signitively,
+while the other is more or less illustrated by intuition.
+I was led to form this notion through a consideration of what is identical
+in the assertive and understanding use of the same expression, where one
+may 'believe' the content of some statement, while another leaves it undecided, without disturbing this content's identity, in which case it also makes
+no difference whether expression occurs in connection with correspondent
+intuition, and whether it can so occur or not. One might therefore be tempted
+- I myself hesitated long on this point - to define meaning as this very
+, which would, however, have the inconvenience that the moment of
+assertion in, e.g., a predicative statement, would fall outside of that statement's meaning. (One could no doubt limit the concept of meaning in this
+fashion, and then distinguish between qualified and unqualified meanings.)
+Our comparison of meaning-intentions with their correlative intuitions, in
+the static and dynamic unity of identifying coincidence, showed us, however,
+
+The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge 24l
+that the very thing that we marked off as the 'matter' of meaning, reappeared once more in the corresponding intuition, and furnished the means
+for an identification. Our freedom, therefore, to add to or take away intuitive elements, and even all correspondent intuitions, wherever we limited our
+concern to the abiding meaningfulness of a given expression, was based on
+the fact that the whole act attaching to the sound of our words had the same
+'matters' on the intuitive as on the meaning side, in respect, that is, of such
+elements of meaning as receive intuitive illustration at all.
+It is clear, therefore, that the concept of 'matter' must be defined by way
+of the unity of total identification as the element in our acts which serves as a
+basis for identification, and that all differences of fulness which go beyond
+mere identification, and which variously determine peculiarities of fulfilment
+and increase of fulfilment, have no relevance in the formation of this conception. However the fulness of a presentation may vary within its possible
+gradients of fulfilment, its intentional object, intended as it is intended, remains
+the same: its 'matter, in other words, stays the same. Matter and fulness are,
+however, by no means unrelated and, when we range an intuitive act alongside a signitive act to which it brings fulness, the former act does not differ
+from the latter merely by the joining on of a third distinct moment of fulness
+to the quality and matter common to the two acts. This at least is not the
+case where we mean by 'fulness' the intuitive content of intuition. For intuitive content itself already includes a complete 'matter', the matter of an act
+reduced to a pure intuition. If the intuitive act in question was already purely
+intuitive, its matter also would be a constituent of its intuitive content.
+The relations which obtain here will be best set forth by establishing the
+following parallelism between signitive and intuitive acts.
+A purely signitive act would be a mere complex of quality and matter, if
+indeed it could exist by itself at all, i.e. be a concrete experiential unity 'on
+its own'. This it cannot be: we always find it clinging to some intuitive basis.
+This intuition of a sign may have 'nothing at all to do' with the object of the
+significative act, it may stand to it in no relation of fulfilment, but it realizes
+its possibility in concreto of being an altogether unfulfilled act. The following proposition therefore seems to hold: An act of signification is only possible in so far as an intuition becomes endued with a new intentional essence,
+whereby its intuitive object points beyond itself in the manner of a sign
+(whether as a sign regularly or fleetingly used). More closely considered, this
+proposition does not, however, seem to express the necessities of connection
+which obtain here with the needed analytic clearness, and perhaps says more
+than is justified. For we can, it seems, say that it is not our founding intuition
+as a whole, but only its representational content, which really assists the
+ink etc., or seem to be such objectively, makes no difference. Only their
+
+242 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+repeatedly recognizable shape is relevant, not as the objective shape of the
+thing of wood etc., but as the shape actually present in the intuitively presentative sensuous content of intuition. If there is only a connection between
+the signitive act and the intuitively presentative content of our intuition, and
+if the quality and matter of this intuition mean nothing to this signitive
+function, then we ought not to say that each signitive act requires a founding
+intuition, but only that it requires a founding content. It would seem that
+If we now turn our regard to the parallel case of the purely intuitive act,
+its quality and matter (its intentional essence) are not capable of separate
+existence on their own: here too a supplement is required. This is furnished
+by the representative content, i.e. the content - sensuous in the case of a
+sensuous intuition - which in its present fusion with an intentional essence
+has acquired the character of being an intuitive representative. If we bear in
+mind the fact that the same (e.g. sensuous) content can at one time carry a
+meaning, and at another time an intuition - denoting in one case and picturing in the other - we are led to widen the notion of a representative content.
+and to distinguish between contents which represent signitively (signitive representatives) and contents which represent intuitively (intuitive representatives).
+Our division is, however, incomplete. We have so far considered only the
+purely intuitive or purely signitive acts. If we bring in the mixed acts as well,
+those we ordinarily class as intuitive, we find them peculiar in the fact that
+their representative content is pictorial or self-presentative in respect of one
+part of what it objectively presents, while being merely denotative as to the
+remaining part. We must accordingly range mixed representatives beside
+purely signitive and purely intuitive representatives: these represent signitively
+and intuitively at the same time, and in regard to the same intentional essence.
+We may now say:
+Each concretely complete objectifying act has three components: its quality,
+its matter and its representative content. To the extent that this content
+functions as a purely signitive or purely intuitive representative, or as both
+together, the act is a purely signitive, a purely intuitive or a mixed act.
+§26 Continuation. Representation or interpretation
+(Auffassung). Matter as the interpretative sense, the
+interpretative form and the interpreted content.
+Differentiating characterization of intuitive and
+signitive interpretation
+We may now ask what this 'functioning' really stands for, since we have it as
+an a priori possibility that the same content, bound up with the same quality
+and matter, should function in this threefold manner. It is plain that it can
+only be the phenomenological peculiarity of the relevant form of unity that
+
+The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge 243
+can give a phenomenologically discoverable content to our distinction. This
+form specially unites the matter to the representative content, since the
+representative function is unaffected by change in the quality. Whether, e.g.
+an imaginative picturing claims to be the calling up of a real object or to be
+merely imaginative, makes no difference to its pictorially presentative character, that its content bears the function of an image-content. We therefore
+call the phonomenological union of matter with representative content, in so far
+as it lends the latter its representative character, the form of representation,
+and the whole engendered by these two moments the representation pure and
+simple. This designation expresses the relation between representing and
+represented content (latter = the object or part of the object represented) by
+going back to its phenomenological foundation. Leaving aside the object as
+something not phenomenologically given, and endeavouring merely to express the fact that, when a content functions representatively, we are always
+differently 'minded, we may speak of a change in interpretation (Auffassung).
+We may also call the form of representation the interpretative form. Since
+the matter after a manner fixes the sense in which the representative content
+is interpreted, we may also speak of the interpretative sense. If we wish to
+recall the older term, and at the same time indicate an opposition to form, we
+may also speak of the interpretative matter. In each interpretation we must
+therefore distinguish phenomenologically between: interpretative matter or
+sense, interpretative form and interpreted content; this last is to be distinguished
+from the object of the interpretation. The term 'apperception' is unsuitable
+despite its historical provenance, on account of its misleading terminological opposition to 'perception'; 'apprehension' would be more usable.
+Our next question concerns the distinguishing marks of the various modes
+of representation or interpretation which, as we saw, can be different even
+when the interpretative matter - the 'as what' of interpretation - is constant.
+In the previous chapter we characterized differences of representations
+through differences in forms of fulfilment, in the present context we have
+regard to an internal characterization limited to the proper descriptive stutt
+of intentions. If we may make use of the beginnings of an analytical clarification which our previous treatment suggested, as well as of our subsequent
+advances in the general grasp of 'representation', the following train of ideas
+suggests itself:
+We begin with the observation that signitive representation institutes a
+contingent, external relation between matter and representative content,
+whereas intuitive representation institutes one that is essential, internal. The
+contingency of the former consists in the fact that an identical signification
+can be thought of as attached to every content whatsoever. Significative matter has a general need for supporting content, but between the specific nature
+of the former and the specific being of the latter no bond of necessity can be
+found. Meaning cannot, as it were, hang in the air, but for what it means,
+the sign, whose meaning we call it, is entirely indifferent.
+
+244 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+The case of purely intuitive representation is quite different. Here there is
+an internal, necessary connection between matter and representing content,
+fixed by the specific stuff of both. Only those contents can be intuitively
+representative of an object that resemble it or are like it. Phenomenologically put: we are not wholly free to interpret a content as this or as that (or
+in this or that interpretative sense) and this has more than an empirical
+foundation - every interpretation including a significative one is empirically
+necessary - since the content to be interpreted sets limits to us through a
+certain sphere of similarity and exact likeness, i.e. through its specific substance. The internality of the relation does not merely forge a link between
+the interpretative matter as a whole and the whole content: it links their parts
+on each side piece by piece. This occurs in the presupposed case of pure
+intuition. In the case of impure intuition the specific union is partial: a part
+of the matter - the matter of the reduced, and therefore, of course, pure,
+intuition - provides the intuitive sense in which the content is interpreted,
+while the remainder of the matter undergoes no representation through
+similarity or exact likeness, but merely through contiguity, i.e. in mixed
+intuition the representative content functions as intuitive representative for
+one part of the matter, but as signitive representative for the remaining part.
+If one finally asks how one and the same content (in the sense of 'same matter') can at times be 'taken up' in the manner of an intuitive, and at times
+in the manner of a signitive representative, in what the differing nature of
+these interpretative forms consists, I can give them no further answer. We
+are facing a difference that cannot be phenomenologically reduced.
+In these discussions we have treated representation independently as a
+union of matter and representative content. If we go back again to the
+complete acts, these reveal themselves as combinations of act-quality with
+either intuitive or signitive representation. The whole acts are called intuitive or signitive, a difference determined by these inwrought representations.
+The study of relations of fulfilment led us above to the concept of intuitive
+substance or fulness. If we compare that case of concept-formation with the
+present one, it sets bounds to the purely intuitive representation (1.e. pure
+intuition) that belongs to an act of impure intuition. 'Fulness' was a notion
+specially framed for the comparative treatment of acts in their fulflling
+function. The limiting case opposed to pure intuition, pure signification, is
+of course the same as purely signitive representation.
+$27 Representations as the necessary bases of
+resentation in all acts. Final clarification of tal
+bout the different modes of the relation o
+consciousness to its object
+Each objectifying act includes a representation in itself. Every act whatever,
+following the conclusions of the Fifth Investigation (see particularly the
+
+The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge 245
+penultimate chapter, 841) is either itself an objectifying act, or has such an
+act as its basis. The ultimate bases of all acts are therefore 'presentations' in
+the sense of representations.
+Talk of the differing mode of relation of an act to its objects has been shown,
+the above discussions, to cover the following essential ambiguitie
+The quality of acts, the modes of believing, entertaining, wishing, dout
+ing etc.
+2. The underlying representation, and
+(a) the interpretative form, i.e. whether the object is presented in purely
+signitive, or intuitive, or mixed fashion. Here also belong the differences
+between a perceptual and an imaginative presentation etc.;
+(b) the interpretative matter: whether the object is presented in this or that
+'sense', e.g. significatively through differing meanings, presenting the same
+object but qualifying it differently;
+(c) the interpreted contents: whether the object is presented by way of this
+or that sign, or by way of this or that representative content. In the latter
+case, if we consider the matter more closely, the laws connecting intuitive
+representatives with matter and form, entail that we are also concerned with
+differences that affect form even where matter remains constant
+§28 Intentional essence and fulfilling sense.
+Epistemic essence. Intuitions in specie
+In our First Investigation (§14) we opposed 'fulfilling sense' to meaning
+(or fulfilling meaning to intending meaning) by pointing to the fact that, in
+fulfilment, the object is 'given' intuitively in the same way in which the mere
+meaning means it. We then took the ideally conceived element which thus
+coincides with the meaning, to be the fulfilling sense, and said that, through
+this coincidence, the merely significant intention (or expression) achieved
+relation to the intuitive object (expressed this and just this object).
+This entails, to employ conceptual formations later introduced, that the
+fulfilling sense is interpreted as the intentional essence of the completely and
+adequately fulfilling act.
+This conceptual formation is entirely correct and suffices for the purpose of pinning down the entirely general aspects of the situation where a
+signitive intention achieves relation to its intuitively presented object: it
+expresses the important insight that the semantic essence of the signitive (or
+expressive) act reappears identically in corresponding intuitive acts, despite
+phenomenological differences on either side, and that the living unity of
+identification realizes this coincidence itself, and so realizes the relation of
+the expression to what it expresses. On the other hand it is clear, in virtue
+precisely of this identity, that the fulfilling sense' carries no implication of
+fulness, that it does not accordingly include the total content of the intuitive
+act, to the extent that this is relevant for the theory of knowledge. It might be
+
+246 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+thought objectionable that we have conceived the intentional essence so
+Or rather it is fulness, but not fulness of the signitive act, but of the act on
+which it is founded, the act in which the sign is set up as an intuitive object.
+This fulness may, we saw, vary without limit, without affecting the signitive
+intention, and what concerns its object. Taking into account this circumstance, as well as the fact that, even in intuitive acts, fulness may vary, albeit
+within bounds, while the same object is constantly meant, with the same
+properties and with the same act-quality, we plainly need a term to stand for
+the mere unity of quality with matter.
+But it is now also useful, on the other hand, to frame a more embracing
+concept. We accordingly define as the epistemic essence of an objectifying act
+(in opposition to its merely semantic essence) all the content which has relevance for its knowledge-function. The three components of quality, matter
+and fulness (or intuitive content) all belong to it. If we wish to avoid the
+overlap of the last two components, and have wholly exclusive components,
+we may make it consist of quality, matter and intuitively representative content,
+the last of which falls away in empty intentions, together with all 'fulness'.
+All objectifying acts having the same epistemic essence are the 'same' act
+for the ideal purposes of the theory of knowledge. When we speak of
+objectifying acts in specie, we have a corresponding idea in mind. The same
+holds of (deliberately) restrictive talk of intuitions in specie etc.
+§29 Complete and defective intuitions. Adequate and
+objectively complete intuitive illustrations. Essentia
+(Essenz)
+In an intuitive presentation a varying amount of intuitive fulness is possible.
+This talk of a varying amount points, as we argued, to possible gradients
+that intuition can occur where whole sides and parts of the object meant are
+not apparent at all, i.e. the presentation has an intuitive content not con-
+
+The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge 247
+taining pictorial representatives of these sides and parts, so that they are
+only presented 'inauthentically', through inwrought signitive intentions
+in connection with these differences, which result in very different modes of
+bresentation for one and the same object, with meaning governed by th
+ame matter, we spoke above of differences in the extent of fulness. Her
+two important possibilities must be distinguished.
+1. The intuitive presentation presents its object adequately, i.e. with an
+intuitive substance (Gehalt) of such fulness, that to each constituent of the
+object, as it is meant in this presentation, a representative constituent of
+the intuitive content corresponds.
+2. Or this is not the case. The presentation contains no more than an
+incomplete projection of the object: it presents it inadequately.
+Here we are talking of the adequacy or inadequacy of a presentation to its
+object. Since, however, we speak more widely of adequacy in contexts of
+fulfilment, we introduce yet another set of terms. We shall speak of complete
+and defective intuitions (more particularly of complete and mutilated percepts
+or imaginations). All pure intuitions are complete. The following considerations will at once show that the converse does not hold, and that our proposed
+division does not simply coincide with that of pure and impure intuitions.
+Whether presentations are simple or complex is a matter regarding which
+nothing is presupposed in the distinction just drawn. Intuitive presentations
+may, however, be complex in two ways:
+(a) The relation to the object may be simple in so far as the act (more
+specifically, its matter) has no constituent acts (or no separate matters) that
+independently present the same total object. This does not preclude the possibility that an act should be made up of partial intentions homogeneously
+fused, which relate to the individual parts or sides of its object. One can
+scarcely avoid assuming such complexity in the case of 'external' percepts
+and imaginations, and we have proceeded on this assumption. But, on the
+other hand we have
+(b) the kind of complexity in which the total act is built out of constituent acts, each of which independently is a full intuitive presentation of
+the same object. This we have in those extremely remarkable continuous
+syntheses which bind together a multitude of percepts which pertain to the
+same object, into a single 'many-sided' or 'all-sided' percept, which deals with
+he object continuously in 'varying positions'. There are the correspondin
+yntheses of imagination. In the continuity of a prolonged fusion-into
+sameness not broken up into isolated acts, the same single object appears
+singly, not as often as individual acts can be distinguished. It appears, however, with altering fulness of content, though the matters, and likewise the
+qualities remain steadfastly the same, at least when the object is known from
+all angles, and repeatedly comes to light in its unenriched familiarity.
+The distinction between adequacy and inadequacy relates also to these
+continuous syntheses. An adequate presentation of, e.g., an external thing is
+
+248 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+possible in synthetic form in respect of its all-sided surface-contours: in the
+form of an objectively simple presentation, it is impossible.
+Of complete intuitions it is plain that objectively simple ones, but by
+no means always objectively complex ones, are pure intuitions. The pure
+intuition which corresponds to an empirical thing is denied to us, it lies
+hidden after a fashion in the complete synthetic intuition itself, but as it
+were dispersedly, with a perpetual admixture of signitive representation. If
+we reduce this synthetic intuition to its pure form, we do not have the pure
+intuition possible in an objectively simple presentation, but a continuum of
+intuitive contents, in which each aspect of the object quite often achieves
+intuitive representation, achieves ever varied perspectival projection, and in
+which only the continuous fusion of identity constitutes the phenomenon of
+objective unity.
+When an intuitive fact serves to give fulness in connection with a signitive
+intention, perhaps in connection with a meaning-intention expressed in words,
+similar possibilities arise. The object as it is meant can receive an adequate
+or an inadequate intuitive illustration. The former possibility covers tw
+separable possibilities in the case of complex meanings:
+First, that to all parts (members, moments, forms) of the meaning, which
+themselves have a meaning-character, fulfilment should accrue through corresponding parts of the fulfilling intuition.
+Secondly, that the fulfilling intuition, to the extent that its object is meant
+in any articulations and forms which have been drawn into the function of
+fulfilment, is intrinsically adequate to its object.
+The expression a green house'
+house is pression sen green list can auren intuis is l ise of ted first
+illustration.
+Similar relationships obtain in the case of an intuitive illustration which
+red, the objective completeness of the intuitive realization of conflict requires
+
+The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge 249
+naturally in another intuition which cannot be united to the intuition of
+the red A. It is not then merely the signitive green-intention, but the same
+intention in its objectively complete fulfilment, which is at odds with the
+red-intuition: these two intuitive moments are in total 'rivalry', while the correlative intuitive wholes are in partial rivalry. This rivalry especially touches,
+as one might say, the intuitive or intuitively presentative contents of these
+fulfilling acts.
+If nothing special is prefaced we shall in future speak of 'intuitive illustrations' only in the case of fulfilments (not frustrations).
+Distinctions of fulness in cases where quality and matter are identical,
+prompt us to frame one further important concept:
+We shall say that two intuitive acts have the same essentia (Essenz), if
+their pure intuitions have the same matter. A percept, and the whole possibly
+existent infinity of imaginative presentations, which all present the same
+object with the same breadth of fulness, have one and the same essentia. All
+objectively complete intuitions with one and the same matter have the same
+A signitive presentation has no essentia in its own right. But a certain
+essentia may, in an inauthentic sense, be ascribed to it, if it permits of complete fulfilment through one of the possible manifold of intuitions pertaining
+to this essentia, or, what is the same, if it has a 'fulfilling sense'.
+This probably clarifies the true meaning of the scholastic term essentia,
+which certainly hinges on the possibility of a 'concept'.
+
+Chapter 4
+Consistency and inconsistency
+§30 The ideal distinction of meanings into the
+possible or real (reale) and the impossible or
+imaginary
+It is not possible to fit intuitive acts to every signitive intention in the
+manner of an 'objectively complete intuitive illustration'!' Meaning-intentions
+may accordingly be divided into the possible (internally consistent) and
+the impossible (internally inconsistent, imaginary). This division, and the
+law underlying it, does not concern acts in isolation - this applies also to all
+other propositions propounded here - but their epistemic essence in general,
+and therein their 'matters' taken generally. For it is not possible that a
+signitive intention with matter M should find a possibility of fulfilment
+in some intuition, while another signitive intention with the same matte
+M, should lack this possibility. These possibilities and impossibilities de
+not refer to intuitions actually found in certain empirical interweavings
+of consciousness: they are not real (reale), but ideal possibilities, with their
+sole ground in specific character. In the sphere of the verbally expressed, to
+which we may without essential loss limit ourselves, the axiom runs: Meanings (i.e. concepts and propositions in specie) divide into the possible and the
+Drawing on our just made notional constructions, we may define the possibility (reality) of a meaning by saying that there is an adequate essentia which
+corresponds to it in specie in the sphere of objectifying acts, an essentia whose
+matter is identical with its own, or what is the same, that it has a fulfilling
+sense, or that there exists in specie a complete intuition whose matter is identical with its own. This 'exists' has here the same ideal sense as in mathematics;
+to reduce it to the possibility of corresponding particulars is not to reduce it
+to the possibility of anything different, but merely to employ an equivalent
+turn of phrase. (This is true, at least, when "possibility' is given its 'pure',
+and therefore non-empirical, sense, and is 'real' only in this 'pure' fashion.)
+The idea of the possibility of a meaning really expresses, to look at the
+matter more exactly, a generalization of the relation of fulfilment in the case
+
+Consistency and inconsistency 25l
+of objectively complete intuitive illustration, and the above definitions are to
+of an essentia, possibility also obtains, and conversely also that in every case
+of possibility such a relationship obtains.
+Further: that such an ideal relationship obtains at all, i.e. that this generact of meaning). Not every empirical relationship permits such a generalization. If we find this intuited paper rough, we cannot pronounce generally
+'Paper is rough', as we can pronounce generally, on the basis of a certain
+actual act of meaning: "This meaning is possible (real)'. Just for this reason
+the proposition 'Every meaning is either possible or impossible', is no mere
+case of the law of excluded middle, in the familiar sense which excludes
+contradictory predicates from individual subjects, and can only pronounce
+such an exclusion for such subjects. The exclusion of contradictory predicates in an ideal sphere (e.g. the sphere of numbers, of meanings etc.) is
+by no means obvious, but must be demonstrated afresh in each such
+sphere, or set up as an axiom. We may recall that we cannot, for instance,
+say that every kind of paper is either rough or not rough, for this would
+entail that every individual paper of a particular sort was rough, or that
+every individual paper of that particular sort was not rough: such assertions are obviously not valid for every possible species. There accordingly
+really lies, behind the division of meanings into possible and impossible, a
+peculiar general law rich in content, a law that governs phenomenological
+moments in ideal fashion by binding their species in the manner of general
+propositions.
+To be able to utter such an axiom, one must see its truth, and that we
+possess self-evidence in our case is certain. If we realize, e.g., the meaning of
+the expression 'white surface' on an intuitive basis, we experience the reality
+of the concept; the intuitive appearance really presents something white and
+a surface, and precisely as a white surface. This implies that the fulfilling
+intuition does not merely present a white surface, but brings it to intuitive givenness through its content as completely as its meaning-intention
+demands.
+Impossibility is ranged beside possibility as an Idea of equal title, which
+should not merely be defined as a negation of possibility, but should be
+realized by way of a peculiar phenomenological fact. This is, moreover,
+presupposed by the fact that the concept of impossibility can find application, and that it can appear in an axiom: There are impossible meanings. The
+equivalence of talk about impossibility and inconsistency shows us that this
+phenomenological fact is to be sought in the realm of conflict.
+
+252 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+§31 Compatibility or consistency as an ideal
+'elationship in the widest sphere of contents ir
+general. Compatibility of 'concepts' as meaning
+widest sphere of contents in general (objects in the widest sense of the word).
+Two contents, which are parts of any whole, are united in it, and are
+chance not to come together. There is good sense in speaking of a compatibility of contents, whose actual union always has been, and always will be,
+own compatibility, but that of an ideal infinity of other cases, namely of all
+pairs of contents exactly like them and belonging to similar kinds. It is clear
+what this points to, and that the following axiom is by no means an empty
+assertion: Compatibility does not pertain to dispersed individual specimens,
+but to the Species of contents. If, e.g., the moments of redness and roundness
+have once been found unified, a complex Species is at once reached by
+ideative abstraction, and can forthwith be given, which embraces both the
+Species of redness and roundness in its specifically grasped form of combination. It is the ideal 'existence' of this complex Species in which the
+compatibility of redness and roundness, in each thinkable instance, has its
+a priori foundation, a compatibility which is an ideally valid relationship
+whether empirical union occurs anywhere in the world or not. If the valuable sense of talk of compatibility is pinned down as the ideal being of the
+corresponding complex Species, a yet weightier point must be made: that
+talk of compatibility always relates to some sort of whole, which is the decisive
+point for our logical interest. Such talk is applied when we are considering
+whether or not certain given contents can be fitted together on a pattern set
+by certain forms, a question decided in the affirmative if we can exhibit a
+whole of the sort in question. The correlate of this compatibility of contents
+is the 'possibility' of the complex meanings: this follows from our above
+criteria of possibility. The appropriate essentia, the complete intuitive illustration of the corresponding complex content, proves the compatibility of
+its parts, and conversely furnishes an essentia and a corresponding meaning
+to such incompatibility. The reality of a meaning is therefore equivalent to:
+the meaning is an objectively complete 'expression' of an intuitive compatibility of content. In the limiting case of a simple content one can define the
+validity of the simple species as a 'compatibility with self'. Obviously the
+combination of expression and expressed (meaning and corresponding, ie.
+objectively quite adequate, intuition) is itself again a combination of compatibles, whose specific content we determined above. In talk of compatibility
+as regards meanings ('concepts'), we are not merely concerned with their
+compatibility in a whole - this would rather be a purely logico-grammatical
+
+Consistency and inconsistency 253
+compatibility in the sense of our Fourth Investigation - but are rather
+concerned with a compatibility of meanings in a "possible' meaning, i.e. a
+meaning compatible with corresponding intuition in the unity of objectively
+adequate knowledge. We have here accordingly a derived, secondary form
+of speech. The same is true of the term "possibility'. The original possibility
+(or reality) is the validity, the ideal existence of a Species: it is at least fully
+guaranteed by this. Next the intuition of an individual case which corresponds to this possibility, and the intuitable individual itself, are possible.
+Finally the meaning realized with objective completeness in such an intuition is said to be possible. The difference between talk about compatibility
+and talk about possibility consists solely in the fact that, while the latter
+denotes the simple validity of a Species, the former (prior to the widening of
+the notion to cover the limiting case) connotes the relationship of the component Species in a Species which counts as one, and in connection therewith
+also the relationship of the partial intuitions in a total intuition, of the partial
+contents to be intuited within a total content to be intuited as one, of partial
+meanings to be fulfilled within a total meaning to be fulfilled as one.
+Finally we remark that the concept of essentia, like the concepts of possibility and compatibility, imparts its original sense derivatively to the realm
+of meaning. The original concept of essentia is expressed in the proposition:
+Every valid species is an essentia.
+§32 Incompatibility (conflict) of contents in general
+Contents are incompatible, to pursue the opposed case down to its general
+grounds, if they cannot suffer each other in the unity of a whole. Put
+phenomenologically: no unified intuition must be possible which presents
+such a whole with complete adequacy. But how shall we know this? In
+empirical instances we attempt to unite contents, sometimes successfully,
+sometimes without success - we experience an absolute resistance. But the
+factual failure does not establish a necessary failure. Possibly greater power
+could ultimately overcome the resistance. Nonetheless, in our empirical
+concern with the contents in question, and our attempted removal of their
+'rivalry', we experience a peculiar relationship of the contents, again grounded
+in their specific being, and with an ideality quite independent of the empirical
+effort, and all the other features of the individual case. It is the relationship
+This relationship puts quite definite sorts of content into relation, within
+quite definite associations of contents. Colours conflict with one another, not
+in general, but only in specific contexts: several moments of colour, of varying specific difference, are incompatible as simultaneous overlays of one and
+the same bodily extension, while they are quite compatible if set side by side
+within a single extension. This is universally the case. A content of the sort
+q is never simply incompatible with a content of the sort p: talk of their
+
+254 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+incompatibility always relates to a definite sort of combination of contents
+W(a, b...p) Which includes p, and should now include q as well. The word
+'should' certainly indicates an intention, a presentative and generally also a
+voluntary intention, which thinks of the q, given in any intuition I(g), as
+brought into the present intuition of W, which presents q signitively in W.
+This intention we shall, however, ignore, just as, in the case of compatibility,
+we ignored the intention towards unification, as well as the process of transference and union. We only maintain the presence of a descriptively peculiar
+relationship between q - the remainder of A is variable at will and plays
+no further part - and p, within the whole of contents W, and that this whole
+is independent of the individual element in the case. In other words, it is
+grounded purely in the Species W, p and q. What is specific in the consciousness of conflict pertains to these Species, i.e. the generalization of
+the situation is actual, is realizable in an intuitively unified consciousness of
+universality, it yields a unified, valid ('possible') Species which unites p and
+Q, through conflict, on the basis of W.
+§33 How conflict can also be a foundation for unity.
+Relativity of the talk of compatibility and conflict
+To this last expression and sentence there attach a series of disquieting
+doubts and questions. Does conflict unify? Is the unity of conflict a unity of
+possibility? Unity in general certainly underlies possibility, but does not the
+latter absolutely exclude conflict, inconsistency?
+These difficulties are resolved when we remember that not only talk of an
+incompatibility, but also talk of a compatibility, necessarily relates to a
+certain whole W which, subjectively speaking, governs our intention. Looking out from the specific make-up of this whole, we call its parts compatible.
+We should call the same contents p, q... (which here function as parts)
+incompatible, if in our symbolic intention towards their unity within such a
+whole, we experienced intuitive conflict instead of intuitive unity. The correlation of the two possible cases in relation to the two definite sorts of wholes,
+or combinations of compatible or incompatible contents, is clear. This relation also determines the sense of these terms. We do not call p, q.
+... simply
+compatible, merely considering that they are unified and not at all how they
+are so, but in the light of their union after the manner of W, and that this
+union of p, q... excludes the conflict of the same p, q... in relation to the
+same W. Contents p, q... are similarly not said to be simply incompatible,
+but in the light of the fact that they will not 'suffer' one another within the
+framework of a unity of the sort W which just happens to interest us.
+The intention to such a unity brings out a conflict instead of such a unity:
+the exclusion of unity by correlated conflict once more also plays its part.
+The consciousness of conflict entails 'disunity', since it excludes the
+W-type unity which is in question here. With this direction of interest, conflict
+
+Consistency and inconsistency 255
+does not itself count as unity, but as separation, not as a combination but
+a sundering. But if we change the relations, an incompatibility can also
+function as a unity, e.g. between the character 'conflict' and the contents
+separated by it. This character is compatible with these contents, and perhaps
+incompatible with others. If our dominant intention is upon the wholeshaped-by-conflict which is the whole for the parts just mentioned, then,
+when we find such a whole, when conflict accordingly obtains, there is
+compatibility among these parts, p, q... in this context, and in the conflict
+which separates them. This conflict is not a conflict among the members
+of the intended conflict, whose absence it in fact indicates, but a conflict
+attaching to the contents p, q.... united without conflict in one intuition,
+and the moment of conflict which is made intuitive in another intuition.
+The paradox of talking of a unification-through-conflict is cleared up by
+noting the relativity of these concepts. One can no longer object: 'Conflict
+absolutely excludes unity. In the manner of conflict anything and everything
+could ultimately be unified. Where unity fails, there conflict obtains, and to
+allow this conflict once more to count as a unity, is to obliterate the absolute, stark distinction between unity and conflict, and corrupt its true sense'.
+No, we may now presume to reply, conflict and unity do not 'absolutely
+exclude one another, but only in a variously determined correlation which
+changes from case to case. In this correlation, they exclude each other as
+stark opposites, and only if we limit our 'absolutely' to some such tacitly
+presupposed correlation can we be satisfied with our polemical assertion.
+Not everything, moreover, can be unified in the form of a conflict, but only
+such things as serve to base a conflict, and none of the things that are or
+could be unified. For in the meaning of this talk of union-in-the-form-ofconflict it is implied that the form of conflict of a p, q... thought of as in a
+certain combination Wo, shall count as a unity, which as a unity re-establishes
+union and compatibility, and so corresponds to the W we mentioned above.
+But if unity obtains among p, q... in respect of the combination Wo, then
+these p, q... will not permit themselves to be brought into a relationship of
+conflict in respect of this combination, since combination as such means
+unity.
+So not everything can really be united in the form of conflict, at least not
+for the stated reason that failure of unity would be manifest in a conflict,
+which would therefore restore unity through conflict. We understand the
+not, however, yield the unity Wo, but another unity. As regards the former it
+has the character of a separation, as regards the new unity that of a combination. All this is in order, as an example will make clear. In relation to a
+peculiar phenomenal context, red and green are called incompatible, red and
+round compatible. The character of conflict determines incompatibility in
+
+256 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+the first case, it produces separation between red and green. Despite this,
+in regard to another kind of combination, it helps to establish a unity, i.e
+in regard to the type of combination conflict among the sensuous qualities of
+§34 Some axioms
+After this elucidation, very important for our basic analysis, of the sense
+of relations of compatibility, we can lay down primitive axioms and complete their phenomenological clarification. The first would be the axiom of
+the convertibility of relations of compatibility (or incompatibility, which our
+analysis of the underlying phenomenological relationships makes immediately clear.
+The next axiom to be set up requires more consideration: that unity and
+conflict (or compatibility and incompatibility) - each pair related to the same
+basis of correlation - exclude each other reciprocally (or are incompatible
+with one another). We need no longer emphasize that incompatibility is not
+the mere privation of compatibility, not the mere fact that a certain unity
+does not objectively obtain. Union and conflict are notions with different
+phenomenological foundations, and we are therefore really uttering a statement with content if we say that if a p conflicts with a q as regards the
+form of unity W(p, q...) - such conflict is a phenomenologically positive
+character - the union of a p with a q in the sense of the same W is "impossible'. The phenomenological ground of this fact has been laid bare in the
+previous discussion: when we try to unite actual conflict between p, q... with
+the corresponding unity of p, q... - actually to impose the form of unity W
+which has been somewhere really intuited in the case of items m, n... in the
+pertinent case of conflict on the same items p, q... - a new conflict emerges,
+which has its roots in the first conflict and the elsewhere intuited form of
+unity. Analogous things are plain in the converse case, which may for the
+rest be regarded as an application of the first axiom.
+The propositions that there is a conflict, and the proposition that there is
+no unity among any given p, q... (the same in both cases), say exactly the
+same thing. Every 'not expresses a conflict.
+When a conflict attaches to the circumstance that p, q shall be in conflict, that
+p, q.... shall be one in the form of conflict, p, q... are one. In other words:
+If P, q are not in conflict, are not not unified, they are unified (axiom of
+double negation) which entails that:
+Either unity or conflict obtains - one or other is the case - there is no third
+possibility.
+
+Consistency and inconsistency 257
+Four possibilities must here be distinguished, expressed in the following
+terms:
+Unity obtains
+Conflict/
+does not obtain.
+Non-unity is, however, another name for conflict, and non-conflict accordng to the previous axiom) an equivalent of unity
+The final elucidation of these axioms, and their relation to purely logica
+axioms, goes beyond the boundaries of the present Investigation. What we
+have here adduced is only intended to point to the internal relations that
+we desire to track down later: they make us aware, very vividly, that we
+are here already working to lay down the phenomenological foundations of
+pure logic.
+§35 Incompatibility of concepts as meanings
+Incompatibility, like compatibility, appears in thought in connection with
+signitive intentions directed to certain combinations, in connection, accordingly, with signitive and intuitive identifications. The concept of incompatibility does not relate to intentions, but the identically styled concept which
+relates to intentions is derivative, is a special case of the original notion, very
+definite in scope, and with limited openings for relations of frustration.
+Here we have an analogue of the matters set forth above (§31) in regard to
+compatibility or consistency. Talk of incompatibility in regard to meanings
+('concepts') may again be said to express, not any and every ideal incompatibility of the same, not, e.g., a purely grammatical incompatibility. It has
+to do only with the relationship of the partial meanings within a comple
+meaning, which does not fulfil itself in an objectively complete illustration
+but is, or may be frustrated. Plainly conflict of the intuitively illustrated
+cepts above (which have, however, to be carried further). Here we have such
+Incompatibility and compatibility among the same meanings, in relation
+to identical context, are mutually exclusive.
+
+258
+Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+Of a pair of contradictory meanings - of meanings such that what the one
+means as incompatible the other means as compatible - one is possible and
+the other impossible.
+The negative of a negative - i.e. a meaning which presents incompatisame presentative matter (the matter left over after the negations have been
+Quite obviously a real theory of meanings according to their logical relations would demand that all such propositions should be enunciated and
+proved in a systematically ordered fashion.
+We break off our fragmentary discussions, leaving their completion to
+later investigations. We need, in the interests of logic, a much more extensive, completely executed phenomenology and theory of identifications and
+differentiations, particularly of such as are partial, as well as of their obviously
+close relations to the doctrine of unity and conflict.
+
+Chapter 5
+The ideal of adequation.
+Self-evidence and truth
+836 Introduction
+In our discussions up to this point we have said nothing of the qualities of
+acts, nor presumed anything in regard to them. Possibility and impossibility
+have indeed no special relation to these qualities. It makes no difference,
+e.g., to the possibility of a proposition, whether we realize the propositional
+matter as matter for an act of assertion (not of an act that assents to something in the accepting or recognizing manner of approval, but in the manner
+of a simple act of belief or taking for true), or whether we use it, in qualitatively modified fashion, as the matter of a pure presentation. A proposition
+is always 'possible', when the concrete act of propositional meaning permits
+of a fulfilling identification with an objectively complete intuition of matching material. It is likewise irrelevant if this fulfilling intuition is a percept, or
+a pure construction of fantasy, etc. Since the summoning up of imaginative
+pictures is more subject, in varying degrees, to our will, than that of percepts
+and assertions, we incline to relate possibility specially to the picture-life of
+fantasy. A thing counts as possible, if it allows itself, objectively speaking,
+to be realized in the form of an adequate imaginative picture, whether we
+ourselves, as particular empirical individuals, succeed in thus realizing it or
+not. But through the ideal linkage between perception and imagination,
+which assures us a priori that to each percept a possible image corresponds,
+this proposition is equivalent to our own, and the limitation of the concept
+to imagination not essential.
+What we have now to do, quite briefly, is to discuss the effect of these just
+indicated differences upon relationships of fulfilment, so that our treatments
+may at least reach a provisional term, as well as a view over further researches.
+§37 The fulfilling function of perception. The ideal
+of ultimate fulfilment
+We have seen that differences in the completeness of 'fulness' have an
+important bearing on the manner in which objects are made present in
+
+260 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+presentations. Signitive acts constitute the lowest step: they possess no fulness
+whatever. Intuitive acts have fulness, in graded differences of more and less,
+and this is already the case within the sphere of imagination. The perfection
+of an imagination, however great, still leaves it different from a perception:
+it does not present the object itself, not even in part, it offers only its image,
+which, as long as it is an image at all, never is the thing itself. The latter we
+owe to perception. Even this, however, 'gives' us the object in varied gradations of perfection, in differing degrees of 'projection'. The intentional character of perception, as opposed to the mere representation of imagination,
+is that of direct presentation. This is, as we know, an internal difference of
+acts, more precisely of their interpretative form. But 'direct' presentation
+does not in general amount to a true being-present, but only to an appearance of presence, in which objective presence, and with it the perfection of
+veridicity (Wahr-nehmung, perception) exhibits degrees. This is shown by a
+glance at the corresponding scale of fulfilment, to which all exemplification
+of perfection in presentation is here, as elsewhere, referred. We thereby
+become clear that a difference extends over the fulness of perception that we
+sought to cover by our talk of perceptual projection, a difference that does
+not concern fulness in respect of its sensuous stuff, its internal character, but
+means a graded extension of its character as fulness, i.e. of the interpretative
+character of the act. From this point of view many elements of fulness count
+for us - quite apart from anything genetic, for we know full well that these,
+like all similar differences, have an associative origin - as final presentations
+of the corresponding objective elements. They offer themselves as identical
+with these last, not as their mere representatives: they are the thing itself in
+an absolute sense. Other cases again count as mere adumbrations of colour,
+perspectival foreshortenings etc., in which case it is clear that to such locutions
+something corresponds in the phenomenological content of the act prior to
+all reflection. We have already dealt with these 'projective' differences, and
+found them, pictorially transferred, in the case of imagination. Every projection is representative in character, and represents by way of similarity,
+but the manner of this representation by similarity differs according as the
+representation takes the projected content as picture or sell-presentation
+(self-projection) of the object! The ideal limit, which an increase of fulness
+of projection permits, is, in the case of perception, the absolute self of the
+thing (as in imagination it is its absolutely resembling image), and that for
+every side and for every presented element of the object.
+The discussion of possible relationships of fulfilment therefore points to
+a goal in which increase of fulfilment terminates, in which the complete and
+entire intention has reached its fulfilment, and that not intermediately and
+partially, but ultimately and finally. The intuitive substance of this last fulfilment is the absolute sum of possible fulness; the intuitive representative is
+the object itself, as it is in itself. Where a presentative intention has achieved
+its last fulfilment, the genuine adequatio rei et intellectus has been brought
+
+The ideal of adequation. Self-evidence and truth 261
+aboar medied is a pally inten or remains and present sita cing
+fulfilment.
+And so also, eo ipso, the ideal of every fulfilment, and therefore of a
+gnicative fulfilment, is sketched for us; the intellectus is in this case th
+lought-intention, the intention of meaning. And the adequatio is realize
+One sees that the perfection of the adequation of thought to thing is
+twofold: on the one hand there is a perfect adaptation to intuition, since the
+thought means nothing that the fulfilling intuition does not completely present
+as belonging to the thought. In this the two previously (§29) distinguished
+'perfections'
+are plainly comprehended: they yield what we called the
+'objective completeness' of the fulfilment. On the other hand the complete
+intuition itself involves a perfection. The intuition fulfils the intention
+which terminates in it as not itself again being an intention which has need
+of further fulfilment, but as offering us the last fulfilment of our intention.
+We must therefore draw a distinction between the perfection of the adaptation
+to intuition, which is 'adequation' in the natural, wider sense, and the perfection of final fulfilment which presupposes this fulfilment, and which is an
+adequation with the 'thing itself'. Each faithful, unalloyed description of an
+intuitive object or event provides an example of the former perfection. If the
+object is something in interior experience, and is grasped as it is in reflex
+perception, then the second perfection may be added, as when, for instance,
+looking back on a categorical judgement just made, we speak of the subjectpresentation in this judgement. The first perfection is, however, lacking,
+when we call the tree standing before us a 'cultivated' variety of apple-tree,
+or when we speak of the 'vibratory frequency' of the note just dying away,
+or, in general, when we speak of such properties of perceptual objects as,
+however much they may be marginally meant in our perceiving intention,
+are not even more or less projectively present in what actually appears.
+The following observation is also in place. Since an ultimate fulfilment
+may contain absolutely no unfulfilled intentions, it must issue out of a pure
+percept. An objectively complete percept, but one achieved by the continuous synthesis of impure percepts, will not fill the bill.
+intentions in perce of, i may be big places the re lue conscious.
+ness of the universal, the consciousness which gives fulness to conceptually
+general presentations, and which sets the 'universal object itself" before
+our eyes, rests on a ground of mere imagination, or is at least indifferent to
+the difference between perception and imagination. The same is obviously
+true, as a consequence of what has just been said, of all self-evident general
+
+262 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+assertions, which make themselves plain to us, in axiomatic fashion, 'from
+our very notions alone.
+This objection points to a gap in our investigation that has already been
+touched on from time to time. We first took perception, with immediate
+obviousness, as being the same as sense-perception, intuition as being the
+same as sensuous intuition. Tacitly, without any clear consciousness, we
+have frequently gone beyond the bounds of these notions, e.g. in connection
+with our discussions of compatibility. We regularly did this, when, e.g., w
+poke of intuiting a conflict or a union, or some other synthesis as such. Il
+our next chapter, which deals generally with categorial forms we shall show
+the need to widen the concepts of perception and other sorts of intuition.
+To remove our objection, we shall now only say that the imagination, which
+serves as basis for generalizing abstraction, does not therefore exercise an
+actual, authentic function of fulfilment, and so does not play the part of a
+'corresponding' intuition. What is individually singular in phenomena, is not
+itself, as we have several times stressed, the universal, nor does it contain the
+universal as a real (reell) 'piece' of itself.
+§38 Positing acts in the function of fulfilment.
+Self-evidence in the loose and strict sense
+Under the rubric of 'intentions', positing and non-positing acts have so far
+been indiscriminately ranged. Nonetheless, though the general character of
+fulfilment essentially depends on the 'matter' of acts, which alone is relevant
+to an array of most important relationships, the quality of acts shares in
+the determination of others, and to such a degree that talk of intention, of
+directed aiming, really only seems to suit assertive acts. Our thought (Meinung)
+aims at a thing, and it hits its mark, or does not hit it, according as it agrees
+reveals itself, with more clearness than before, as a chapter in the theory of
+judgement. For according as positing or non-positing acts function in ou
+
+The ideal of adequation. Self-evidence and truth 263
+confirmation and its opposite refutation, on the other. The concept of verification relates exclusively to positing acts in relation to their positing fulfilment,
+and ultimately to their fulfilment through percepts.
+To this last pre-eminent case we now give closer consideration. It is a case
+in which the ideal of adequation yields us self-evidence (Evidenz). We speak
+somewhat loosely of self-evidence wherever a positing intention (a statement
+in particular) finds verification in a corresponding, fully accommodated
+percept, even if this be no more than a well-fitting synthesis of coherent
+single percepts. To speak of degrees and levels of self-evidence then has a
+good sense. Here are relevant all approximations of percepts to the objective
+the final ideal of perfection, the ideal of adequate perception, of the complete
+self-manifestation of the object, however it was referred to in the intention
+to be fulfilled. But the epistemologically pregnant sense of self-evidence is
+exclusively concerned with this last unsurpassable goal, the act of this mos
+The object is not merely meant, but in the strictest sense given, and given as
+it is meant, and made one with our meaning-reference. It does not matter
+of an identifying or distinguishing synthesis.
+Self-evidence itself, we said, is the act of this most perfect synthesis of
+coincidence. Like every identification, it is an objectifying act, its objective
+orrelate being called being in the sense of truth, or simply truth - if one doe
+not prefer to award this term to another concept of the many that ar
+rooted in the said phenomenological situation. Here, however, a closer discussion is needed.
+§39 Self-evidence and truth
+1. If we at first keep to the notion of truth just suggested, truth as the
+correlate of an identifying act is a state of affairs (Sachverhalt), as the correlate of a coincident identity it is an identity: the full agreement of what
+is meant with what is given as such. This agreement we experience in selfevidence, in so far as self-evidence means the actual carrying out of an
+adequate identification. The proposition that self-evidence is the 'experience' of truth cannot, however, be simply interpreted as telling us that the
+self-evidence is the perception (in a sufficiently wide sense) of truth and, in
+the case of strict self-evidence, the adequate perception of truth. For, to recur
+to a previously voiced doubt (see the addendum to §8 and chapter 7), we
+must allow that the carrying out of an identifying coincidence is not as yet
+an actual perception of objective agreement, but becomes so only through
+its own act of objectifying interpretation, its own looking towards present
+
+264 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+truth. Truth is indeed 'present'. Here we have always the a priori possibility
+of looking towards this agreement, and of laying it before our intentional
+consciousness in an adequate percept.
+2. A second concept of truth concerns the ideal relationship which obtains
+in the unity of coincidence which we defined as self-evidence, among the
+epistemic essences of the coinciding acts. While truth in sense 1 was the
+objective item corresponding to the act of self-evidence, truth in this sense is
+the Idea which belongs to the act-form: the epistemic essence interpreted as
+the ideal essence of the empirically contingent act of self-evidence, the Idea of
+absolute adequation as such.
+3. We also experience in self-evidence, from the side of the act which
+furnishes 'fulness', the object given in the manner of the object meant: so
+given, the object is fulness itself. This object can also be called being, truth,
+the "truth' in so far as it is here not experienced as in the merely adequate
+percept, but as the ideal fulness for an intention, as that which makes an
+intention true (or as the ideal fulness for the intention's specific epistemic
+essence).
+4. Lastly, considered from the standpoint of the intention, the notion of
+the relationship of self-evidence yields us truth as the rightness of our intention (and especially that of our judgement), its adequacy to its true object,
+or the rightness of the intention's epistemic essence in specie. We have, in the
+latter regard, the rightness, e.g., of the judgement in the logical sense of
+the proposition: the proposition 'directs' itself to the thing itself, it says that
+it is so, and it really is so. In this we have the expression of the ideal, and
+therefore general, possibility that a proposition of such and such a 'matter'
+admits of fulfilment in the sense of the most rigorous adequation.
+We must further particularly note that the 'being' here in question in our
+first objective sense of truth, is not to be confused with the 'being' covered by
+the copula in the affirmative categorical judgement. Self-evidence is a matter
+of total coincidence, whereas the 'being' of the copula corresponds generally,
+if not invariably to partial identifications (i.e. judgements of quality).
+But even where total identification is predicated, the two 'beings' will not
+coincide. For we must observe that in the case of a self-evident judgement,
+i.e. of a self-evident predicative assertion, being in the sense of truth is experienced but not expressed, and so never coincides with the being meant and
+experienced in the 'is' of the assertion. This second 'being' is the synthetic
+moment in what is in the sense of is true - how could it express the fact that
+the latter is true? There are in fact several agreements which are here brought
+to synthesis: one of these, the partial, predicative one, is meant assertively
+and perceived adequately, and so self-presented. (What this means will
+become clearer in the next chapter by way of the more general doctrine of
+categorial objectification.) This is the agreement of subject with predicate, the
+suiting of predicate to subject. We have, in the second place, the agreement
+which constitutes the synthetic form of the act of self-evidence, and therefore
+
+The ideal of adequation. Self-evidence and truth 265
+asserted, it is not objective like the first agreement, which belongs to the
+state of affairs judged. No doubt it can always be asserted and asserted with
+the not-objectified state of affairs.
+The distinctions just drawn lead to the following general discussion.
+In our exposition of the relationships of the concepts of self-evidence and
+truth, we have not drawn a distinction which touches the objective side of
+the acts which, whether functioning as intentions or fulfilments, find their
+absolute adequation in self-evidence: we have not, that is, distinguished
+between states of affairs, on the one hand, and other objects, on the other.
+We have paid no heed, correspondingly, to the phenomenological difference
+between acts which relate, on the one hand - acts of agreement and disagreement, predicative acts - and acts which do not relate, on the other. We
+have paid no need, therefore, to the difference between relational and nonrelational meanings, or to the relational-non-relational distinction among
+ideally apprehended essences in general. Strict adequation can bring nonrelating as much as relating intentions into union with their complete
+fulfilments. If we now particularly consider the field of expressions, we need
+not concern ourselves with judgements as assertive intentions or assertive
+fulfilments; acts of naming can also achieve their adequation. The concepts
+of truth, rightness, the true, are generally interpreted more narrowly than
+we have done: they are connected with judgements and propositions, or
+with the states of affairs which are their objective correlates. 'Being' is meanwhile mainly spoken of in relation to absolute objects (not states of affairs),
+though no definite lines are drawn. Our right to our more general interpretation of these concepts is unassailable. The very nature of the case demands
+that the concepts of truth and falsehood, should, in the first instance at
+least, be fixed so widely as to span the whole sphere of objectifying acts. It
+seems therefore most suitable that the concepts of truth and being should be
+so distinguished, that our concepts of truth - a certain range of equivocation remaining inevitable but hardly dangerous once our concepts are
+clarified - are applied from the side of the acts themselves and their ideally
+graspable moments, whereas the concepts of being (genuine being) are
+applied to the corresponding objective correlates. Truth would then have to
+be defined in the manner of (2) and (4) as the Idea of adequation, or as the
+rightness of objectifying assertion and meaning. Being would then have to
+be pinned down according to (1) and (3) as the identity of the object at once
+meant and given in adequation, or (in conformity with the natural sense of
+
+266 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+words) as the adequately perceivable thing as such, in an indefinite relation
+to an intention that it is to make true or fulfil adequately.
+After our concepts have been thus widely fixed and assured phenomenologically, we may pass on, having regard to the distinction between
+relational and non-relational acts (predications versus absolute assertions)
+to define narrower concepts of truth and being. The narrower concept of
+truth would be limited to the ideal adequation of a relational act to the
+corresponding adequate percept of a state of affairs: just so the narrower
+concept of being would concern the being of absolute objects, and would
+separate this off from the 'subsistence' of the state of affairs.
+The following is accordingly clear: if one defines a judgement as an assertive act in general, then the sphere of judgement, subjectively speaking,
+coincides with the joint spheres of the concepts true and false in the widest
+sense of these words. But if one defines it by way of the statement and its
+possible fulfilment, and ranges under judgements only the sphere of relational assertions, then the same coincidence obtains again, provided that the
+narrower concepts of truth and falsehood are again used as a basis.
+In one-sided fashion we have hitherto favoured the case of self-evidence,
+the act described as one of total coincidence. But, turning to the correlated
+case of conflict, we encounter absurdity, the experience of the total conflict
+between intention and quasi-fulfilment. To the concepts of truth and being
+the correlated concepts of falsehood and non-being then correspond. The
+phenomenological clarification of these concepts can be carried out without
+particular difficulty, once all foundations have been prepared. The negative
+ideal of an ultimate frustration would first have to be exactly circumscribed.
+When self-evidence is conceived strictly, in the manner made basic
+here, it is plain that such doubts as have from time to time been expressed
+in modern times are absurd, doubts as to whether the experience of selfevidence might not be associated with the matter A for one man, while
+absurdity is associated with it for another. Such doubts are only possible as
+long as self-evidence and absurdity are interpreted as peculiar (positive or
+negative feelings which, contingently attaching to the act of judgement,
+impart to the latter the specific features which we assess logically as truth
+and falsehood. If someone experiences the self-evidence of A, it is selfevident that no second person can experience the absurdity of this same A,
+for, that A is self-evident, means that A is not merely meant, but also genuinely given, and given as precisely what it is thought to be. In the strict sense
+it is itself present. But how could a second person refer in thought to this
+same thing A, while the thought that it is A is genuinely excluded by a
+genuinely given non-A? One is, it is plain, dealing with a matter of essence,
+the same matter, in fact, that the law of contradiction (into whose ambiguities
+the correlations discussed in §39, p. 264 naturally enter) successfully expresses.
+It is reliably clear, as a result of our analyses, that being and non-being
+are not concepts which in their origin express opposition among the qualities
+
+The ideal of adequation. Self-evidence and truth 267
+of our judgements. Following our interpretation of the phenomenological
+relationships involved, every judgement is assertive: this assertion does not
+characterize the "is' of which the 'is not' is the qualitative contrary. The
+qualitative contrary of a judgement is a mere presentation having the same
+'matter'. Differences between 'is' and is not' are differences in intentional
+'matter'. Just as an "is' expresses predicative agreement after the manner of
+a meaning-intention, so an "is not' expresses a predicative conflict.
+
+Second Section
+Sense and understanding
+
+Chapter 6
+Sensuous and categorial intuitions
+§40 The problem of the fulfilment of categorial
+meaning-forms, with a thought leading towards
+its solution
+lopical la rica ion the sedation or a mening asian the thing obey
+ments, and shall use them to shed light on the theme of our next treatments,
+in the following manner:
+In the case of a perceptual statement, not only the inwrought nominal
+presentations are fulfilled: the whole sense of the statement finds fulfilment
+through our underlying percept. We say likewise that the whole statement
+gives utterance to our percept: we do not merely say 'I see this paper, an
+inkpot, several books', and so on, but also I see that the paper has been
+written on, that there is a bronze inkpot standing here, that several books
+are lying open', and so on. If a man thinks the fulfilment of nominal meanings clear enough, we shall ask him how we are to understand the fulfilment
+of total statements, especially as regards that side of them that stretches
+beyond their 'matter, in this case beyond their nominal terms. What may
+and can furnish fulfilment for those aspects of meaning which make up
+propositional form as such, the aspects of 'categorial form' to which, e.g.,
+Looked at more narrowly, this question also applies to nominal meanings,
+in so far as these are not totally formless like the meanings for individuals.
+The name, like the statement, even in its grammatical appearance, possesses
+
+272 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+both 'matter' and 'form'. If it comprises words, the form lies partly in the
+way these words are strung together, partly in its own form-words, partly in
+the mode of construction of the individual words, which allows us to draw a
+distinction between its moments of 'matter' and its moments of 'form'. Such
+grammatical distinctions refer us back to distinctions of meaning. There is
+at least a rough expression of the articulations and forms which are rooted
+in our meaning's essence and the articulations and forms of grammar. In
+our meanings, therefore, parts of very different kinds are to be found, and
+among these we may here pay special attention to those expressed by formal
+words such as the, 'a', 'some", "many", "few, two, "is, 'not, which", 'and,
+'or' etc., and further expressed by the substantival and adjectival, singular
+and plural inflection of our words etc.
+How does all this stand as regards fulfilment? Can the ideal of completely
+adequate fulfilment formulated by us in our third chapter still be maintained? Are there parts and forms of perception corresponding to all parts and
+forms of meaning? In that case we should have the parallelism between meaningful reference and fulfilling intuition that talk of 'expression' suggests.
+The expression would be an image-like counterpart of the percept (i.e. in all
+its parts and forms to be expressed) but reconstituted in a new stuff - an
+ex-pression in the stuff of meaning.
+The prototype for interpreting the relation between meaning and intuiting would then be the relation of the 'proper' individual meaning to corresponding percepts. The man who knows Cologne itself, and therefore
+possesses the genuine 'proper meaning' of the word 'Cologne', has in his
+contemporary actual experience something exactly corresponding to the
+future confirming percept. It is not, properly speaking, a representation of
+the percept, as, e.g., the corresponding imagination would be. But just as
+the city is thought to be itself present to us in the percept, so the proper
+name 'Cologne', in its 'proper meaning', refers, as previously argued, to the
+same city 'directly: it means that city itself, and as it is. The straightforward
+percept here renders the object apparent without the help of further, superordinate acts, the object which the meaning-intention means, and just as the
+latter means it. The meaning-intention therefore finds in the mere percept
+the act which fulfils it with complete adequacy.
+If instead of considering directly naming, unstructured expressions, we
+I see that this paper is white, and express just this by saying: "This paper is
+white'.
+We are not to let ourselves be led astray by such ways of speaking; they
+re in a certain manner correct, yet are readily misunderstood. One migh
+ry to use them to show that meaning here has its seat in perception, which
+as we have shown, is not so. The word 'white' certainly means something
+
+Sensuous and categorial intuitions 273
+attaching to the white paper itself; this 'meaning' therefore coincides, in
+the state of fulfilment, with the partial percept which relates to the 'whiteaspect' of the object. But the assumption of a mere coincidence with this
+art-percept is not enough: we are wont to say here that the white thu
+apparent is known as white and is called so. In our normal talk of 'knowl
+he paper is known as white, or rather as a white thing, whenever we expres
+our percept in the words 'white paper'. The intention of the word 'white
+ance itself to confirm it. White paper is paper which is white. Is this form
+not also repeated, even if it remains hidden, in the case of the noun 'paper?
+Only the quality-meanings contained in its 'concept' terminate in perception. Here also the whole object is known as paper, and here also a supplementary form is known which includes being, though not as its sole form, in
+itself. The fulfilment effected by a straight percept obviously does not extend
+We have but to ask, further, what corresponds in perception to the difference between the two expressions 'this white paper' and 'this paper is white',
+which are both realized on the same perceptual basis, we have but to ask
+what side of perception is really brought out by this difference - the difference, that is, of the attributive and the predicative mode of statement - and
+what, in the case of adequate adaptation, this difference brings out with
+peculiar exactness, and we experience the same difficulty. Briefly we see that
+the case of structured meanings is not so simple as the case of a 'proper'
+individual meaning, with its straightforward relation of coincidence with
+perception. Certainly one can tell one's auditors, intelligibly and unambiguously that 'I see that this paper is white', but the thought behind such talk
+need not be that the meaning of this spoken sentence expresses a mere act of
+seeing. It may also be the case that the epistemic essence of our seeing, in
+which the apparent object announces itself as self-given, serves to base certain connective or relational or otherwise formative acts, and that it is to
+these that our expression in its changing forms is adjusted, and that it is in
+such acts, performed on a basis of actual perception, that our expression, in
+respect of such changing forms, finds fulfilment. If we now combine these
+founded acts or rather act-forms with the acts which serve as their foundation, and give the comprehensive name 'founded act' to the whole actcomplexes that result from such formal 'founding', we may say: Granted the
+possibility just sketched, our parallelism may be re-established, but it is
+no longer a parallelism between the meaning-intentions of expressions and
+the mere percepts which correspond to them: it is a parallelism between
+meaning-intentions and the above mentioned perceptually founded acts.
+
+274 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+§4l Continuation. Extension of our sphere
+of examples
+If we suppose our range of examples widened so as to cover the whole field
+predicative thinking, we shall encounter similar difficulties and simil
+ossibilities of resolving them. Judgements in particular will come up whi
+through any intuition: they will give general expression to relations among
+ideal unities. The general meanings embodied in such judgements can also
+be realized on a basis of corresponding intuition, since they have their
+origin, mediately or immediately, in intuition. The intuited individual is not,
+an example, or only as the rough analogue of an example, for the universal
+which alone interests us. So, for instance, when we speak generically of
+'colour' or specifically of 'red', the appearance of a single red thing may
+furnish us with a documenting intuition.
+It also at times happens, that one calls such a general statement an expression of intuition. We say, e.g., that an arithmetical axiom expresses what
+we find in intuition, or we raise objection to a geometrician that he merely
+expresses what he sees in his figure without deducing it formally, that he
+borrows from his drawing and omits steps in his proof. Such talk has its good
+sense (as when the objection scores no mean hit against the formal validity
+of Euclidean geometry) but 'expression' here means something different from
+the previous cases. Even in their case expression was not a mere counterpart
+of intuition: this is even less the case here, where our thought's intention is
+not aimed at intuitively given phenomena nor at their intuitive properties or
+relationships, and can in our case not be aimed at them. For a figure understood geometrically is known to be an ideal limit incapable in principle of
+intuitive exhibition in the concrete. Even in our case, nonetheless, and in the
+generic field as such, intuition has an essential relation to expression and to
+its meaning: these, therefore, constitute an experience of general knowledge
+iented towards intuition, through which alone, after corresponding a
+istment, self-evidence, the crown of knowledge, emerges. It requires lit
+guestion is not houthen hindi, to at tha that such intuition it ges thei
+i filling of clarity and in the favourable case of self-evidence. We in fac
+now only too well that the overwhelming majority of general statement.
+
+Sensuous and categorial intuitions 275
+wholly away, our judgement would cease to know anything. It means, in all
+cases, in cogitative style, just what could be known by the aid of intuition, if
+such judgement is indeed true at all. Knowledge always has the character of
+a fulfilment and an identification: this may be observed in every case where
+we confirm a general judgement through subsequent intuition, as in every
+other case of knowledge.
+Our difficulty then is how identification can arise where the form of the
+general proposition, and in particular its form of universality, would vainly
+seek sympathetic elements in individual intuition. To remove this difficulty,
+as in the previous case, the possibility of 'founded acts' suggests itself. This
+possibility, carried out more fully, would run more or less as follows:
+Where general thoughts find fulfilment in intuition, certain new acts are
+built on our percepts and other appearances of like order, acts related quite
+differently to our appearing object from the intuitions which constitute it.
+This difference in mode of relation is expressed by the perspicuous turn of
+phrase employed above: that the intuited object is not here itself the thing
+meant, but serves only as an elucidatory example of our true general meaning. But if expressive acts conform to these differences, their significative
+intention will not move towards what is to be intuitively presented, but
+towards what is universal, what is merely documented in intuition. Where this
+new intention is adequately fulfilled by an underlying intuition, it reveals its
+own objective possibility (or the possibility or 'reality' of the universal).
+842 The distinction between
+sensuous stuff and
+categorial form throughout the whole realm of
+objectifying acts
+Iter these provisional treatments have shown us our ditticulty. and hav
+rovided us with a thought leading to its possible removal, we shall embar
+upon our actual discussion.
+We started by assuming that, in the case of structured expressions, the notion of a more or less mirror-like mode of expression was quite unavailing
+in describing the relation which obtains between meanings to be expressed,
+on the one hand, and expressed intuitions, on the other. This is doubtless
+correct and need now only be made more precise. We need only earnestly
+ponder what things can be possible matter for perception, and what things
+possible matter for meaning, to become aware that, in the mere form of a
+judgement, only certain antecedently specifiable parts of our statement can
+have something which corresponds to them in intuition, while to other parts of
+the statement nothing intuitive possibly can correspond.
+Let us consider this situation a little more closely.
+Perceptual statements are, completely and normally expressed, articulate
+utterances of varying pattern. We have no difficulty in distinguishing such
+types as 'A is P' (where 'A' serves as index for a proper name), 'An S' is P',
+
+276 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+"This S' is P, 'All S are P' etc. Many complications arise through the modifying influence of negation, through the introduction of distinctions between
+absolute and relative predicates (attributes), through conjunctive, disjunctive and determinative connectives etc. In the diversity of these types certain
+sharp distinctions of meaning make themselves clear. To the various letters
+(variables) and words in these types correspond sometimes members, sometimes connective forms, in the meanings of the actual statements which
+belong to these types. Now it is easy to see that only at the places indicated
+by letters (variables) in such forms of judgement', can meanings be put
+that are themselves fulfilled in perception, whereas it is hopeless, even quite
+misguided, to look directly in perception for what could give fulfilment to
+our supplementary formal meanings. The letters (variables) on account of
+their merely functional meaning, can doubtless take complex thoughts as
+their values: statements of high complexity can be seen from the standpoint
+of very simple judgement-types. The same difference between 'matter' and
+'form' therefore repeats itself in what is looked upon, in unified fashion, as
+a 'term'. But eventually, in the case of each perceptual statement, and likewise, of course, in the case of every other statement that in a certain primary
+sense, gives expression to intuition, we shall come down to certain final
+elements of our terms - we may call them elements of stuff - which find
+direct fulfilment in intuition (perception, imagination etc.), while the supplementary forms, which as forms of meaning likewise crave fulfilment,
+can find nothing that ever could fit them in perception or acts of like order.
+This fundamental difference we call, in a natural extension of its application
+over the whole sphere of objectifying presentation, the categorial and absolute distinction between the form and matter of presentation, and at the same
+time separate it off from the relative or functional difference which is closely
+bound up with it, and which has just been subsidiarily touched on above.
+We have just spoken of a natural extension of our distinction over the
+whole sphere of objectifying presentation. We take the constituents of
+the fulfilment which correspond to the material or formal constituents of our
+meaning-intentions as being material or formal constituents respectively, so
+making clear what is to count as 'material' or 'formal' in the general sphere
+Of matter (stuff) and form we often talk in many other senses. We must
+expressly point out that our present talk of 'matter', which has its contrast
+in categorial form, has nothing whatever to do with the 'matter' which
+contrasts with the quality of acts, as when, e.g., we distinguish the 'matter'
+in our meanings from their assertive or merely presentative quality, this
+'matter' being what tells us as what, or as now determined and interpreted,
+an object is meant in our meanings. To make the distinction easier, we
+shall not speak of 'matter' in our categorial contrast, but of 'stuff', while
+wherever "matter' is meant in our previous sense, we shall talk pointedly
+of 'intentional matter' or of 'interpretative sense'.
+
+Sensuous and categorial intuitions 277
+43 The obiective correlates of categorial forms ar
+ot real' (realen) moment
+It is now time to illuminate the distinction to which we have just given a
+name. We shall link on, for this purpose, to our previous examples.
+The form-giving flexion Being, whether in its attributive or predicative
+function, is not fulfilled, as we said, in any percept. We here remember
+ant's dictum: Being is no real predicate. This dictum refers to being gr
+‹istence, or to what Herbart called the being of 'absolute position', but
+can be taken to be no less applicable to predicative and attributive being.
+In any case it precisely refers to what we are here trying to make clear. I can
+see colour, but not being-coloured. I can feel smoothness, but not beingsmooth. I can hear a sound, but not that something is sounding. Being is
+nothing in the object, no part of it, no moment tenanting it, no quality or
+intensity of it, no figure of it or no internal form whatsoever, no constitutive
+feature of it however conceived. But being is also nothing attaching to an
+object: as it is no real (reales) internal feature, so also it is no real external
+feature, and therefore not, in the real sense, a 'feature' at all. For it has
+nothing to do with the real forms of unity which bind objects into more comprehensive objects, tones into harmonies, things into more comprehensive
+things or arrangements of things (gardens, streets, the phenomenal external
+world). On these real forms of unity the external features of objects, the right
+and the left, the high and the low, the loud and the soft etc., are founded.
+A mong these anything like an 'is' is naturally not to be found.
+We have just been speaking of objects, their constitutive features, their
+factual connection with other objects, through which more comprehensive
+objects are created, and also, at the same time, external features in the
+partial objects. We said that something corresponding to being was not to
+be sought among them. For all these are perceptible, and they exhaust the
+range of possible percepts, so that we are at once saying and maintaining
+that being is absolutely imperceptible.
+Here, however a clarifying supplement is necessary. Perception and object
+are concepts that cohere most intimately together, which mutually assign
+sense to one another, and which widen or narrow this sense conjointly.
+But we must emphasize that we have here made use of a certain naturally
+delimited, natural, but also very narrow concept of perception (or of object).
+It is well-known that one also speaks of 'perceiving, and in particular of
+'seeing', in a greatly widened sense, which covers the grasping of whole
+states of affairs, and even ultimately the a priori self-evidence of laws (in the
+case of 'insight'). In the narrower sense of perception (to talk roughly and
+popularly) we perceive everything objective that we see with our eyes, hear
+with our ears or can grasp with any 'outer' or even 'inner sense'. In ordinary
+speech, no doubt, only external things and connective forms of things (together with their immediate qualities) can count as "perceived by the senses'.
+
+278 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+But once talk of an 'inner sense' had been introduced, one should in consistency have widened the notion of sense-perception suitably, so as to include
+"inner perception', and so as to include under the name 'sense-object' the
+correlated sphere of 'inner objects", the ego and its internal experiences.
+n the sphere of sense-perception thus understood, and in the spher‹
+kewise. of sensuous intuition in general - we adhere to our much widene
+talk of the 'sensuous' - a meaning like that of the word 'being' can find no
+possible objective correlate, and so no possible fulfilment in the acts of such
+perception. What holds of 'being' is plainly true of the remaining categorial
+forms in our statements, whether these bind the constituents of terms together, or bind terms themselves together in the unity of the proposition.
+The 'a' and the 'the', the 'and' and the 'or', the 'if' and the 'then', the 'all'
+and the 'none', the 'something' and the 'nothing', the forms of quantity and
+the determinations of number etc. - all these are meaningful propositional
+elements, but we should look in vain for their objective correlates (if such
+may be ascribed to them at all) in the sphere of real objects, which is in fact
+no other than the sphere of objects of possible sense-perception.
+844 The origin of the concept of Being and of the
+remaining categories does not lie in the realm of
+inner perception
+This holds - we stress it expressly - both of the sphere of outer sense, and of
+that of 'inner sense'. It is a natural but quite misguided doctrine, universally
+put about since the time of Locke, that the meanings in question (or the
+corresponding substantivally hypostatized meanings) - the logical categories such as being and non-being, unity, plurality, totality, number, ground,
+consequence etc. - arise through reflection upon certain mental acts, and so
+fall in the sphere of 'inner sense', of 'inner perception'. In this manner, indeed,
+concepts like Perception, Judgement, Affirmation, Denial, Collecting, Counting, Presupposing and Inferring arise, which are all, therefore, 'sensuous
+concepts, belonging, that is, to the sphere of "inner sense'. The previous
+series of concepts do not arise in this manner, since they cannot at all be
+regarded as concepts of mental acts, or of their real constituents. The thought
+of a Judgement fulfils itself in the inner intuition of an actual judgement,
+but the thought of an 'is' does not fulfil itself in this manner. Being is not
+a judgement nor a constituent of a judgement. Being is as little a real constituent of some inner object as it is of some outer object, and so not of a
+judgement. In a judgement, a predicative statement, 'is' functions as a side
+of our meaning, just as perhaps, although otherwise placed and functioning,
+'gold' and, 'yellow' do. The is itself does not enter into the judgement, it is
+merely meant, signitively referred to, by the little word 'is'. It is, however,
+self-given, or at least putatively given, in the fulfilment which at times invests
+the judgement, the becoming aware of the state of affairs supposed. Not only
+
+Sensuous and categorial intuitions 279
+what is meant in the partial meaning gold, nor only what is meant in the
+partial meaning yellow, itself appears before us, but also gold-being-yellow
+thus appears. Judgement and judgemental intuition are therefore at one in
+the self-evident judgement, and pre-eminently so if the judgement is selfevident in the ideally limiting sense.
+nected wino actual asands by ud inhe fut menly that in finend on com.
+completely, it is indeed correct that being can only be apprehended through
+judging, but this does not at all mean that the concept of being must be
+arrived at 'through reflection' on certain judgements, or that it can ever be
+arrived at in this fashion. 'Reflection' is in other respects a fairly vague
+word. In epistemology it has at least the relatively fixed sense that Locke
+gave it, that of internal perception: we can only adhere to this sense in
+interpreting a doctrine which imagines it can find the origin of the concept
+of Being through reflecting on judgements. The relational being expressed
+in predication, e.g. through 'is, 'are' etc., lacks independence: if we round
+it out to something fully concrete, we get the state of affairs in question,
+the objective correlate of the complete judgement. We can then say: As the
+sensible object stands to sense-perception so the state of affairs stands to the
+'becoming aware' in which it is (more or less adequately) given - we should
+like to say simply: so the state of affairs stands to the perception of it. As the
+concept Sensuous Object (Real Object) cannot arise through reflection upon
+perception, since this could only yield us the concept Perception (or a concept of certain real constituents of Perception), so the concept of State of
+Affairs cannot arise out of reflection on judgements, since this could only
+yield us concepts of judgements or of real constituents of judgements.
+That percepts in the one case, and judgements (judgemental intuitions,
+percepts of states of affairs) in the other, must be experienced, in order that
+each such act of abstraction should get started, goes without saying, but
+to be experienced is not to he made objective. 'Reflection', however, implies
+that what we reflect upon, the phenomenological experience, is rendered
+objective to us (is inwardly perceived by us), and that the properties to be
+generalized are really given in this objective content.
+Not in reflection upon judgements, nor even upon fulfilments of judgements,
+but in the fulfilments of judgements themselves lies the true source of the
+concepts State of Affairs and Being (in the copulative sense). Not in these
+acts as objects, but in the objects of these acts, do we have the abstractive
+basis which enables us to realize the concepts in question. And naturally the
+appropriate modifications of these acts yield just as good a basis.
+It is in fact obvious from the start that, just as any other concept (or Idea,
+Specific Unity) can only 'arise', i.e. become self-given to us, if based on an
+act which at least sets some individual instance of it imaginatively before
+our eyes, so the concept of Being can arise only when some being, actual or
+imaginary, is set before our yes. If 'being' is taken to mean predicative being,
+
+280 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+some state of affairs must be given to us, and this by way of an act which
+gives it, an analogue of common sensuous intuition.
+The like holds of all categorial forms (or of all categories). An aggregate,
+e.g., is given, and can only be given, in an actual act of assembly, in an act,
+that is, expressed in the conjunctive form of connection A and B and C... But
+the concept of Aggregate does not arise through reflection on this act: in
+stead of paying heed to the act which presents an aggregate, we have rather
+to pay heed to what it presents, to the aggregate it renders apparent in
+concreto, and then to lift the universal form of our aggregate to conceptually
+universal consciousness.
+§45 Widening of the concept of intuition, and
+in particular of the concepts perception and
+imagination. Sensible and categorial intuition
+If we now ask: 'Where do the categorial forms of our meanings find their
+fulfilment, if not in the "perception" or "intuition which we tried provisionally to delimit in talking of "sensibility"', our answer is plainly prefigured in
+the discussions just completed.
+We have taken it for granted that forms, too, can be genuinely fulfilled, or
+that the same applies to variously structured total meanings, and not merely
+to the 'material' elements of such meanings, and our assumption is put
+beyond doubt by looking at each case of faithful perceptual assertion. This
+vill explain also why we call the whole perceptual assertion an expressiot
+of perception and. in a derivative sense of whatever is intuited or itseli
+presented in perception. But if the 'categorial forms' of the expression, present
+he latter we understand merely sense-perception, then talk of expressing
+ercept must here rest on a different meaning: there must at least be a
+that merely sensuous perception renders to the material elements. The essen.
+tial homogeneity of the function of fulfilment, as of all the ideal relation.
+ships necessarily bound up with it, obliges us to give the name 'perception
+to each fulfilling act of confirmatory self-presentation, to each fulfilling
+name of 'object'. If we are asked what it means to say that categoriall
+structured meanings find fulfilment, confirm themselves in perception, we
+can but reply: it means only that they relate to the object itself in its categorial
+structure. The object with these categorial forms is not merely referred to, as
+in the case where meanings function purely symbolically, but it is set before
+our very eyes in just these forms. In other words: it is not merely thought
+of, but intuited or perceived. When we wish, accordingly, to set forth what
+this talk of 'fulfilment' is getting at, what structured meanings and their
+structural elements express, what unitary or unifying factor corresponds to
+
+Sensuous and categorial intuitions 28l
+them objectively, we unavoidably come on 'intuition' (or on 'perception'
+and 'object'). We cannot manage without these words, whose widened sense
+is of course evident. What shall we call the correlate of a non-sensuous
+subject-presentation, one involving non-sensuous structure, if the word
+'object' is not available to us? How shall we speak of its actual givenness.
+or apparent givenness, when the word 'perception' is denied us? In com
+mon parlance, therefore, aggregates, indefinite pluralities, totalities, numbers,
+disjunctions, predicates (right-ness), states of affairs, all count as 'objects',
+while the acts through which they seem to be given count as 'percepts.
+Plainly the connection between the wider and narrower, the supersensuous
+(i.e. raised above sense, or categorial) and sensuous concept of perception, is
+no external or contingent matter, but one rooted in the whole business on
+hand. It falls within the great class of acts whose peculiarity it is that in
+them something appears as 'actual', as 'self-given'. Plainly this appearance
+of actuality and self-givenness (which may very well be delusive) is throughout characterized by its difference from essentially related acts through which
+alone it achieves full clarity - its difference from an imaginative 'making
+present, or from a merely significative 'thinking of'.
+, which both exclude
+'presence' (so to say appearance 'in person'), though not excluding the belief
+in being. As regards the latter, imaginal or symbolic representation is
+possible in two manners: in an assertive manner, asserting something's being
+in imaginal or symbolic fashion, and in a non-assertive manner, as 'mere'
+imagination or thinking without taking something to be. We need not enter
+more closely into the discussion of these differences after the analyses of the
+previous section, which permit of a sufficiently general interpretation. It is
+clear, in any case, that the concept of imagination must be widened in correspondence with the concept of perception. We could not speak of something
+super-sensuously or categorially perceived, if we could not imagine this thing
+'in the same manner' (i.e. not merely sensuously). We must therefore draw a
+quite general distinction between sensuous and categorial intuition (or show
+the possibility of such a distinction).
+Our extended concept of Perception permits, further, of a narrower and
+a wider interpretation. In the widest sense even universal states of affairs
+can be said to be perceived ('seen', 'beheld with evidence'). In the narrower
+sense, perception terminates upon individual, and so upon temporal being.
+§46 Phenomenological analysis of the distinction
+between sensuous and categorial perception
+In our next treatments we shall first only discuss individual percepts, then
+widen our treatment to take in individual intuitions of the same order.
+The division between 'sensuous' and 'supersensuous' percepts was only
+very superficially indicated and quite roughly characterized above. Antiquated talk of external and internal senses, plainly stemming from the naïve
+
+282 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+metaphysic and anthropology of daily life, may be useful in pointing out the
+sphere to be excluded, but a true determination and circumscription of the
+sensory sphere is not thereby reached, so depriving the concept of categorial
+perception of its descriptive underpinning. To ascertain and clarify the said
+distinction is all the more important, since such fundamental distinctions
+as that between categorial form and sensuously founded matter, and the
+similar distinction between categories and all other concepts, depends wholly
+on it. Our concern is therefore to seek more profound descriptive characterizations, which will give us some insight into the essentially different contitution of sensuous and categorial percepts (or intuitions in general)
+For our immediate purposes it is, however, unnecessary to carry out al
+exhaustive analysis of the phenomena involved. That would be a task that
+to concentrate on some weightier points, which may help to mark off both
+sorts of acts in their mutual relation.
+It is said of every percept that it grasps its object directly, or grasps this
+object itself. But this direct grasping has a different sense and character
+according as we are concerned with a percept in the narrower or the wider
+sense, or according as the directly grasped object is sensuous or categorial.
+Or otherwise put, according as it is a real or an ideal object. Sensuous
+or real objects can in fact be characterized as objects of the lowest level of
+possible intuition, categorial or ideal objects as objects of higher levels.
+In the sense of the narrower, 'sensuous'
+perception, an object is directly
+apprehended or is itself present, if it is set up in an act of perception in a
+straightforward (schlichter) manner. What this means is this: that the object
+is also an immediately given object in the sense that, as this object perceived
+with this definite objective content, it is not constituted in relational, connective, or otherwise articulated acts, acts founded on other acts which bring
+other objects to perception. Sensuous objects are present in perception at a
+single act-level: they do not need to be constituted in many-rayed fashion
+in acts of higher level, whose objects are set up for them by way of other
+objects, already constituted in other acts.
+Each straightforward act of perception, by itself or together with other
+acts, can serve as basic act for new acts which at times include it, at time
+merely presuppose it, acts which in their new mode of consciousness like
+wise bring to maturity a new awareness of objects which essentially presupposes the old. When the new acts of conjunction, of disjunction, of definite
+and indefinite individual apprehension (that - something), of generalization,
+of straightforward, relational and connective knowledge, arise, we do not
+then have any sort of subjective experiences, nor just acts connected with the
+original ones. What we have are acts which, as we said, set up new objects.
+acts in which something appears as actual and self-given, which was not
+given, and could not have been given, as what it now appears to be, in these
+foundational acts alone. On the other hand, the new objects are based on the
+
+Sensuous and categorial intuitions 283
+older ones, they are related to what appears in the basic acts. Their manner of
+appearance is essentially determined by this relation. We are here dealing
+completely.
+§47 Continuation. Characterization of
+sense-perception as 'straightforward' perception
+We shall now scrutinize the acts in which sensuous concreta and their sensuous constituents are presented as given; as opposed to these we shall later
+consider the quite different acts in which concretely determinate States of
+Affairs, Collections and Disjunctions are given as complex thought-objects,
+or as objects of higher order, which include their foundational objects as real
+parts reel!) in themselves. We shall then deal with acts of the type of generalızıng or indefinitely individual apprehension, whose objects certainly are of
+higher level, but which do not include their foundational objects in themselves.
+In sense-perception, the 'external' thing appears 'in one blow', as soon as
+our glance falls upon it. The manner in which it makes the thing appear
+present is straightforward: it requires no apparatus of founding or founded
+acts. To what complex mental processes it may trace back its origin, and in
+We are not ignoring the obvious complexity that can be shown to exist in
+the phenomenological content of the straightforward perceptual act, and
+particularly in its unitary intention.
+Many constitutive properties certainly pertain to the thing when it appears
+with a given content, some of them themselves falling under perception',
+others merely intended. But we certainly do not live through all the articulated acts of perception which would arise were we to attend to all the details
+
+284 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+of the thing, or, more precisely, to the properties of the "side turned to us',
+were we to make them objects in their own right. No doubt ideas of such
+supplementary properties, not given in perception, are 'dispositionally excited', no doubt intentions which relate to them contribute to perception,
+and determine its total character. But, just as the thing does not appear
+before us as the mere sum of its countless individual features, which a later
+preoccupation with detail may distinguish, and as even the latter does not
+dirempt the thing into such details, but takes note of them only in the ever
+complete, unified thing, so the act of perception also is always a homogeneous unity, which gives the object 'presence' in a simple, immediate way.
+The unity of perception does not therefore arise through our own synthetic
+activity, as if only a form of synthesis, operating by way of founded acts.
+could give unity of objective reference to part-intentions. It requires no
+articulation and hence no actual linkage. The unity of perception comes into
+without the addition of new art-intentions.
+We may also be unsatisfied with a single glance, we may handle the thing
+from all sides in a continuous perceptual series, feeling it over as it were with
+our senses. But each single percept in this series is already a percept of the
+thing. Whether I look at this book from above or below, from inside or
+outside, I always see this book. It is always one and the same thing, and that
+ot merely in some purely physical sense, but in the view of our percept
+hemselves. If individual properties dominate variably at each step, the thins
+itself, as a perceived unity, is not in essence set up by some overreaching act,
+founded upon these separate percepts.
+Considering things more closely, we should not present the matter as if
+the one sensible object could be presented in a founded act (in a continuously developing act of perceiving, while it merely does not need to be
+presented in such an act. Closer analysis shows that even a continuous perceptual flux involves a fusion of part-acts in one act, rather than a peculiar
+act founded upon such part-acts.
+To prove this we embark on the following discussion.
+The individual percepts of our series have a continuous unity. Such continuity does not amount to the mere fact of temporal adjunction: the series
+of individual acts rather has the character of a phenomenological unity, in
+which the individual acts are fused. In this unity, our manifold acts are not
+merely fused into a phenomenological whole, but into one act, more precisely, into one concept. In the continuous running on of individual percepts
+we continuously perceive the single, selfsame object. Can we now call this
+continuous percept, since it is built out of individual percepts, a percept
+founded upon them? It is of course founded upon them in the sense in which
+a whole is founded on its parts, not however in the sense here relevant,
+according to which a founded act manifests a new act-character, grounded
+in the act-characters that underlie it and unthinkable apart from these. In
+
+Sensuous and categorial intuitions 285
+to be broken off from itself which can function as complete, independen
+percepts. But the unification of these percepts into a continuous percept i
+not the performance of some peculiar act, through which a new consciousness
+I something objective is set up.
+new is ething objectiva is int up. ended ant, bl, that abe sutle bittin
+were already meaning.
+One might lay stress on this sameness, and say that our unity is plainly
+unity of identification, that the intention of the serially arranged acts coin
+cides continuously, and that so the unity arises. This is certainly right. But
+unity of identification is unavoidably distinct, does not say the same as the
+unity of an act of identification. An act means something, an act of identification means identity, presents it. In our case an identification is performed,
+but no identity is meant. The object meant in the differing acts of the continuous perceptual series is indeed always the same, and the acts are one
+through coincidence, but what is perceived in the series, what is rendered
+objective in it, is solely the sensible object, never its identity with self. Only
+when we use the perceptual series to found a novel act, only when we
+articulate our individual percepts, and relate their objects to each other,
+does the unity of continuity holding among these individual percepts - the
+unity of fusion through their coinciding intentions - provide a point d'appui
+for a consciousness of identity. Identity itself is now made objective, the
+moment of coincidence linking our act-characters with one another, serves
+as representative content for a new percept, founded upon our articulated
+individual percepts. This brings to intentional awareness that what we now
+see and what we saw before are one and the same. Naturally we have then
+to do with a regular act of our second group. Our act of identification is in
+sober fact a new awareness of objectivity, which causes a new 'object' to
+appear to us, an object that can only be apprehended or given in its very
+selfhood in a founded act of this sort.
+Before we penetrate further into our new class of acts and objects, we
+must, however, first round off our treatment of straightforward percepts.
+If we may presume to have cleared up the sense of the concept of a straightforward percept, or, what we take for the same, of sense-perception, then
+we have also cleared up the concept of a sensible or real object (in the most
+basic sense of 'real'). We define a real object as the possible object of a
+straightforward percept. There is a necessary parallelism between perception
+and imagination, which guarantees that a possible imagination (or more
+precisely a whole series of imaginations) having the same essence, corresponds to each possible percept, a straightforward imagination is correlated
+with each straightforward percept, thereby giving certainty to the wider
+concept of sensible intuition. We can then define sensible objects as the possible objects of sensible imagination and sensible intuition in general: this of
+
+286 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+course involves no essential generalization of our previous definition. The
+parallelism just stressed makes both definitions equivalent.
+Through the concept of a real object, the concept of a real part, or more
+particularly, the concepts of a real piece, and a real moment (real feature),
+and a real form, are determined. Each part of a real object is a real part.
+In straightforward perception we say that the whole object is explicitly
+given, while each of its parts (in the widest sense of 'parts') is implicitly
+given. The sum total of objects that can be explicitly or implicitly given in
+straightforward percepts constitutes the most widely conceived sphere of
+sensible objects.
+§48 Characterization of categorial acts as
+founded acts
+A sensible object can be apprehended by us in a variety of ways. It can, first
+of all, of course, be apprehended in 'straightforward' fashion. It is this
+possibility, which like all the other possibilities here in question must be
+throughout interpreted as 'ideal', which characterizes the sensible object as
+a sensible object. Understood in this manner, it stands as it were simply
+before us: the parts which constitute it are indeed in it, but are not made our
+explicit objects in the straightforward act. The same object can, however, be
+grasped by us in explicating fashion: acts of articulation can put its parts
+'into relief", relational acts bring the relieved parts into relation, whether to
+one another or to the whole. Only through such new modes of interpretation will the connected and related members assume the character of 'parts'
+(or of 'wholes'). The articulating acts and, taken in retrospect, the act
+we call 'straightforward', are not merely experienced one after the other:
+
+Sensuous and categorial intuitions 287
+overreaching unities of act are rather always present, in which, as new objects,
+An act of perception grasps A as a whole, at one 'blow' and in straightforward fashion. A second act of perception is trained upon a, the part or
+dependent moment, that belongs constitutively to A. These two acts are not
+merely performed together, or after one another, in the manner of disjoined
+experiences; rather are they bound together in a single act in whose synthesis
+A is first given as containing a in itself. Just so, a can, with a reversal of the
+direction of relational perception, achieve self-givenness as pertaining to A.
+Let us now try to penetrate a little deeper.
+The total intuitive reference to our object implicitly contains an intention
+to a. For perception purports to grasp the object itself: its 'grasping' must
+therefore reach to all its constituents in and with the whole object. (Naturally we are here only concerned with what constitutes the object as it appears
+in perception, and as what it appears in perception, and not with such
+constituents as may pertain to it in 'objective reality', and which only later
+experience, knowledge and science will bring out.)
+In the narrowing down of our total percept to one specific percept, the
+part-intention to a will not be torn out of the total appearance of A, so as to
+break up the latter's unity, but an independent act will have a as its own
+perceptual object. At the same time one's continuously operative total percept will coincide with this specific percept in respect of one implicit partintention. The 'content' which represents a, will be functioning as the same
+content in a twofold fashion and, in so far as it does this, it will effect a
+coincidence, a peculiar unity of the two representative functions; we shall, in
+other words, have two coincident interpretations, both sustained by the
+representative content in question. But this unity of these two representative
+functions will now itself take on a representative role. It will not itself count
+in its own right as an experienced bond among acts: it will not set itself up
+as our object, but will help to set up another object. It will act representatively, and to such effect, that A will now appear to contain a in itself (or,
+with a reversed direction, a will appear as contained in A).
+According, therefore, to our 'interpretative standpoint', or to the 'sense
+of our passage' from part to whole or contrariwise - which are both novel
+phenomenological characters making their contribution to the total intentional
+
+288 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+matter of the relating act - there will be two possibilities, marked off in a
+priori fashion, in which the 'same relation' can achieve actual givenness. To
+these correspond two a priori possibilities of relation, objectively different,
+yet tied together by an ideal law, possibilities which can only be directly
+constituted in founded acts of the sort in question, which can achieve 'selfgivenness to perception' only in acts built up in this manner.
+Our exposition obviously applies to all specific forms of the relation between a whole and its parts. All such relationships are of categorial, ideal
+nature. It would be a mistake to try to locate them in the straightforwardly
+lies hidden in the whole, is at first merely the ideal possibility of bringing the
+part, and the fact that it is a part, to perception in correspondingly articulated and founded acts.
+predications such as A is to the right of B',
+edications such as 4 is to the right of of, * is larger, brighter, louder
+than B etc?, take their rise. Wherever sensible objects - directly and independently perceptible - are brought together, despite their mutual exclusion,
+into more or less intimate unities, into what fundamentally are more comprehensive objects, then a possibility of such external relations arises. They
+all fall under the general type of the relation of part to parts within a whole.
+Founded acts are once more the media in which the primary appearance of the
+states of affairs in question, of such external relationships, is achieved. It is
+clear, in fact, that neither the straightforward percept of the complex whole,
+nor the specific percepts pertaining to its members, are in themselves the
+relational percepts which alone are possible in such a complex. Only when
+one member is picked out as principal member, and is dwelt on while the
+other members are still kept in mind, does a determination of members by
+members make its appearance, a determination which varies with the kind
+of unity that is present and plainly also with the particular members set in
+relief. In such cases also the choice of a principal member, or of a direction
+of relational apprehension, leads to phenomenologically distinct forms of
+relationship, correlatively characterized, which forms are not genuinels
+present in the unarticulated percept of the connection as a straightforwar
+phenomenon, but which are in it only as ideal possibilities, the possibilities,
+that is, of fulfilling relevant founded acts.
+A real (reelle) location of these relations of parts in the whole would be a
+confusion of distinct things: of sensuous or real (realen) forms of combination, with categorial or ideal ones. Sensible combinations are aspects of the
+real (realen) object, its actual moments, present in it, if only implicitly, and
+capable of being 'lifted out of it' by an abstractive percept. As against this,
+forms of categorial combination go with the manner in which acts are synthesized: they are constituted as objects in the synthetic acts built upon our
+
+Sensuous and categorial intuitions 289
+sensibility. In the formation of external relations sensuous forms may serve
+a novel act which, taking charge of such presentations, shapes and combines
+them suitably.
+§49 Added note on nominal formations
+ant point in a special class of cases: we observed, in our Fifth Investigation
+synthetic act built upon it, the subject- or object-member of a new assertion.
+state of affairs becomes objective in a new, nominal fashion (Inv. v, $$35, 36).
+In this fact the intuitive distinction we have in view is brought out, a distinction which does not merely hold of the relata of the hitherto discussed
+syntheses of lowest grade, immediately based on sensibility, but of all presentations presided over by 'many-rayed' syntheses of whatever kind or level.
+We may at first then hazard the general statement: Objectifying acts which
+exist purely 'on their own', and 'the same' objectifying acts serving to constitute the terms of some relation or other, are not really the same acts: they
+differ phenomenologically, and differ in respect of what we have called their
+intentional matter. Their interpretative sense has changed, and hence the
+changed meaning of their adequate expression. It is not as if something had
+merely been shoved in between unchanged presentations, a bond which
+combined them in merely external fashion. The working of synthetic thought,
+of intellection, has done something to them, has shaped them anew, although, being a categorial function, it has done this in categorial fashion, so
+that the sensuous content of the apparent object has not been altered. The
+object does not appear before us with new real (realen) properties; it stands
+before us as this same object, but in a new manner. Its fitting into its categorial
+context gives it a definite place and role in this context, the role of a relatum,
+and in particular of a subject- or object-member. These are differences that
+are phenomenologically evident.
+
+290 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+It is no doubt easier to pay heed to changes of meaning in our expressive
+symbols than to modifications of our direct presentations themselves: the
+situation, e.g., in the field of straightforward intuitions, when we compare
+such intuitions within and without some relational function, is far from
+clear, and I have not therefore touched on it in my last Investigation. There
+isolated sense-percepts were put on a level with nominally functioning acts
+(see Inv. V, §33). Just as the object in a straightforward percept directly
+confronts us, so too does the state of affairs in the act which names it, and
+so too does any categorially formed object. The gradual constitution of
+the object has been completed, as a finished object it becomes a term in a
+relation: it keeps, it seems, its constitutive sense quite unaltered. One can
+certainly say that the phenomenological change in sense made by entry into
+a relational act is at first masked by the very fact that the new form includes
+the whole previous interpretative sense in itself, to which it only imparts the
+it was before given, 'only' it is 'put into relation'. Such shapings due to
+our synthetic function do not alter the object itself, we count them only
+is pertaining to our subjective activity, and we therefore overlook them ir
+phenomenological reflections aiming at a clarification of knowledge. W
+should in consistency therefore say: A state of affairs also is the same state
+of affairs when it functions as logical subject (or generally when it functions
+nominally), and it has its ultimate constitution in the same act of originative
+intuition as when it functioned in isolation. When, however, it functions as a
+relatum in an act of higher level, it is constituted with a new form (and with,
+so to say, the characterizing costume of its role) of which the nominal form
+is the adequate expression. Further researches will however be necessary for
+a last clearing-up of the phenomenological situation just tackled.
+§50 Sensuous forms categorially grasped but not
+functioning nominally
+We have so far only spoken of the re-shapings of terms put into such relations as that of whole and part. External relations, however, show us how
+sensuous forms enter into the unity of a relation (in its predicate) without
+undergoing nominal reification, e.g. 'A brighter than B', 'A to the right of B'
+etc. There are undeniable phenomenological differences - differences in
+interpretative sense - between cases where we, so to say, pay direct attention
+to the form of brightness, and make this our nominal object, as when we say
+"This relation of brightness (between A and B) is more readily noticeable
+than that one (between M and N), and the quite different cases, where this
+form of brightness is meant as in the above expression 'A is brighter than
+B'. In the latter class of cases we once more have a categorial form pointing
+to a peculiar function in the total relational situation. Concepts such as
+Terms of Relations, Form of Relation, Subject, Object etc., concepts not
+
+Sensuous and categorial intuitions 291
+always clearly expressed and certainly insufficiently clarified, plainly lead
+back to differences in such categorial forms with which in this and previous
+paragraphs we have become familiar.
+§51 Collectiva and disjunctiva
+We have so far discussed, as instances of categorial and synthetic objectforms, only certain very simple forms of states of affairs, those of total and
+partial relations of identity, and of simple external relations. We now turn
+our regard to two further examples, to synthetic forms, i.e. which, though
+not themselves states of affairs, nevertheless play a large part in connection
+with states of affairs: Collectiva and Disjunctiva. The acts in which these are
+constituted as data are those which furnish a fulfilling intuition for the
+meanings of the conjunctions 'and' and 'or'.
+What intuitively corresponds to the words 'and' and 'or', to 'both' or
+'either', is not anything, as we rather roughly put it above, that can be
+grasped with one's hands, or apprehended with some sense, as it can also
+not really be represented in an image, e.g. in a painting. I can paint A and
+I can paint B, and I can paint them both on the same canvas: I cannot,
+however, paint the both, nor paint the A and the B. Here we have only the
+one possibility which is always open to us: to perform a new act of conjunction or collection on the basis of our two single acts of intuition, and so
+mean the aggregate of the objects A and B. In the situation just viewed as an
+example this act is constituted as an imaginative presentation of A and B,
+while this aggregate is only given as 'itself',
+" in the manner of perception,
+and can only be so given, in just such an act, an act merely modified in a
+conformable manner, and which is founded on the percepts of A and B.
+That we speak of an act which unites these percepts, and not of any
+connection or mere coexistence of these percepts in consciousness, depends
+on the fact that a unitary intentional relation is here given, and a unitary
+object which corresponds to it; this object can only be constituted in such
+a connection of acts, just as a State of Affairs can only be constituted in
+a relational act-connection. We at once see the essential mistake made by
+those eminent modern logicians who have tried to explain the conjunctive
+association of names or statements through a mere conscious coexistence of
+nominal or propositional acts, and have so surrendered and as an objective
+'orm in Logic.'
+ense must ailed muard ids series fusing to, straightovard percepts o
+with the coniunctive percept
+in which alone the consciousness of plurality is itself properly constituted.
+I have tried to show in my Philosophy of Arithmetic how the sensuously
+unifying characters - I there called them 'figural' or 'quasi-qualitative
+moments of sensuous intuitions - serve as signs of plurality. This means that
+they serve as sensuous points d'appui for the signitively mediated cognition
+
+292 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+of plurality as such, and of plurality of the kind in question - which cognition now has no need of an articulated grasp and knowledge of individual
+tems, but does not therefore as yet possess the character of a genuine intui
+ion of the collection as such.
+§52 Universal objects constituting themselves in
+universal intuitions
+The simple synthetic acts with which we have so far concerned ourselves
+were so founded upon straightforward percepts that the synthetic intention
+was subsidiarily directed to the objects of these founding percepts, inasmuch
+as it held them together in ideal 'contents' or brought them to a relational
+unity. This is a universal character of synthetic acts as such. We now turn to
+examples from another set of categorial acts, in which the objects of the
+founding acts do not enter into the intention of the founded one, and would
+only reveal their close relation to it in relational acts. Here we have the field
+of the universal intuition - an expression which no doubt will not seem better
+to many than 'wooden iron'.
+Abstraction gets to work on a basis of primary intuitions, and with it a
+new categorial act-character emerges, in which a new style of objectivity
+becomes apparent, an objectivity which can only become apparent - whether
+given as 'real' or as 'merely imagined' - in just such a founded act. Naturally
+I do not here mean 'abstraction' merely in the sense of a setting-in-relief of
+some non-independent moment in a sensible object, but Ideational Abstraction, where no such non-independent moment, but its Idea, its Universal, is
+brought to consciousness, and achieves actual givenness. We must presuppose such an act in order that the Very Sort, to which the manifold single
+moments 'of one and the same sort' stand opposed, may itself come before
+us, and may come before us as one and the same. For we become aware of
+the identity of the universal through the repeated performance of such acts
+upon a basis of several individual intuitions, and we plainly do so in an
+overreaching act of identification which brings all such single acts of abstraction into one synthesis. Through such acts of abstraction, woven into new
+act-forms, there arise, further, acts of universal determination, acts, that is,
+which determine objects generally as subsumed under certain species A, or
+acts in which unspecified objects of a sort A become present to us.
+In an act of abstraction, which need not necessarily involve the use of an
+abstract name, the universal itself is given to us; we do not think of it merely
+in significative fashion as when we merely understand general names, but we
+apprehend it, behold it. Talk of an intuition and, more precisely, of a perception of the universal is in this case, therefore, well-justified.
+Difficulties arise, however, from another quarter. Talk of "perception'
+presupposes the possibility of correspondent imagination: a distinction between them, we held, is part of the natural sense of our ordinary talk about
+
+Sensuous and categorial intuitions 293
+'intuition'. But it is just this distinction that we cannot here draw. This
+seems to stem from the fact that abstractive acts do not differ in consonance
+with the character of the straightforward intuitions which underlie them;
+they are quite unaffected by the assertive or non-assertive character of such
+underlying acts, or by their perceptual or imaginative character. The Red
+the Triangle exemplified in mere phantasy is specifically the same as the Red,
+las as satisfactory a basis in perception as it has in parallel imagination, and
+vherever it arises, the Idea Red, the Idea Triangle, is itself apprehended, i
+and original.
+We must, however, note that the examples adduced were all cases of the
+adequate perception of the universal. The universal was here truly grasped
+and given on the basis of truly correspondent instances. Where this is the
+case, there seems in fact to be no parallel imagination having the same
+intuitive content, and this is so in every case of adequate perception. For
+how, we may ask, even in the realm of individuals, could a content pattern
+itself on itself, since, taken as itself, it cannot also be meant as its own
+analogon? And how can the note of assertion be wanting, where the meant
+content is the one experienced and given? It is quite different in, e.g., the
+case where mathematical analysis has given us an indirectly conceived Idea
+of a certain class of curves of the third order, though we have never seen any
+curve of this sort. In such a case an intuitive figure, e.g. of a familiar thirdorder curve, perhaps actually drawn, perhaps merely pictured, may very
+well serve as an intuitive image, an analogon, of the universal we are intending: our consciousness of the universal is here intuitive, but analogically
+intuitive, in its use of an individual intuition. And does not an ordinary
+rough drawing function analogically in comparison with an ideal figure,
+thereby helping to condition the imaginative character of the universal presentation? This is how we contemplate the Idea of a steam-engine, basing
+ourselves on a model of a steam-engine, in which case there can naturally
+be no talk of an adequate abstraction or conception. In such cases we are
+not concerned with significations, but with universal representations by way
+of analogy, with universal imaginations, in short. If, however, the consciousness of mere analogy lapses, as may happen, e.g., in the intuition of
+a model, we have a case of the perception of the universal, even if it is one
+of inadequate perception.
+In the same way we may now discover the previously missing differences
+between an assertive, and a merely contemplative, consciousness of the universal. Where we contemplate a universal object in a merely analogizing, imaginative fashion, we may also mean it assertively, and this act, like any assertive
+reference, may be confirmed or refuted by adequate future perception. The
+former happens wherever the universal meaning is fulfilled by an adequate
+percept, i.e. by a new consciousness of the universal which constitutes itself
+
+294 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+on the basis of a 'true' abstraction from the corresponding individual percept. The universal object is then not merely presented and posited, but is
+itself given to us. Again we can have an analogizing presentation of the
+universal, without actually positing it. We conceive it, but leave it in suspense. The intention to the universal which here rests on an intuitive basis
+makes no decision regarding 'being' or 'non-being', only one regarding the
+possibility or impossibility of the universal, and of its presentation through
+adequate abstraction.
+
+Chapter 7
+A study in categorial
+representation
+§53 Backward reference to the researches of our
+first section
+The founded acts analysed by us in select examples were considered by us
+to be intuitions, and intuitions of the new types of object that they brought
+to light, objects which can only be given in founded acts of a sort and form
+which corresponds to each of them. The explanatory value of this extended
+use of the concept Intuition can only lie in the fact that we are not here
+dealing with some inessential, merely disjunctive widening of a concept,
+which permits us to extend the sphere of that concept over the spheres of
+any heterogeneous concepts whatsoever,' but with an authentic generalization, which rests on a community of essential features. We call the new acts
+intuitions' in that, with a mere surrender of a 'straightforward' relation to
+their object - the peculiar sort of immediacy defined by us as 'straightfor
+wardness' - they yet have all the essential peculiarities of intuitions: we find
+in their case the same essential divisions, and they show themselves capable
+of achieving the same fully performed fulfilments. This last mentioned capacity is particularly important for our purposes, for it was with a view to such
+performances that this whole investigation has been conducted. Knowledge
+as the unity of fulfilment is not achieved on a mere basis of straightforward
+acts, but in general, on a basis of categorial acts: when, accordingly, we
+oppose intuition to thought (as meaning), we cannot mean by 'intuition' merely
+sensuous intuition.
+The conception of categorial acts as intuitions, first brings true perspicuity into the relation of thought to intuition - a relation that no previous
+critique of knowledge has made tolerably clear: it is the first to render
+knowledge itself intelligible, in its essence and its achievement. Through
+such a conceptual extension the theses of our first section first gain adequate
+confirmation. To all intuitions, in our present widest sense, however near
+or far they may stand from sensibility, expressive meanings correspond - as
+their possible ideal counterparts. The divisions drawn by us within 'epistemic
+essence', and the concepts framed in close connection therewith, retain their
+
+296 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+validity in this wider sphere, though marked off by us in relation to a narrower one.
+Each categorial act of intuition has therefore:
+1. its quality;
+2. its (intentional) material, or interpretative sense;
+3. its representing contents.
+These distinctions do not reduce to distinctions among founding acts. The
+quality of a total act may differ from that of a basic act, just as basic acts,
+when many, may be differently qualified, as, e.g., in an idea of a relation
+between a fictitious object and one taken to be real.
+Not only has each of the founding acts its own material, but the founded
+act imports its own material: it is true to say that this novel material, or,
+where this includes the materials of basic acts, the newly added part of it, is
+founded on the materials of the basic act.
+Finally, also, the new act has representing contents in regard to which
+there are serious difficulties. Must new representing contents be assumed for
+this new material, and what can these be?
+§54 The question of the representing contents of
+categorial forms
+
+A study in categorial representation 297
+imaginations built upon them. Just so, in the other case, we shall not be collecting the objects of our fancyings, but those fancyings themselves, i.e. the
+ct of collection Will not be directly founded on fancyings, but upon 'inne
+ercepts' directed upon these latter. This establishes no difference betwee
+'real' collections on a basis of perceived objects, and imaginary' collections
+on a basis of imagined objects: such a difference does not exist, except as a
+difference in underlying acts.
+The same seems to hold for all other modifications that the collective
+consciousness can show us. The universality or specificity, definiteness or
+indefiniteness, or whatever other categorial forms may come into play for
+our underlying objects, will also determine the character of our collective
+presentation, but not so that we shall be able to find phenomenological
+differences in the connective character itself: it is always the same and.
+According as our underlying presentations differ in type, we have a collection of universal objects before us (e.g. Species of colour, Red and Blue and
+Yellow), or a collection of individual objects (Aristotle and Plato), a collection of definite objects (as in the previous example) or of indefinite ones (a
+person and another person, a colour and a tone). One cannot conceive how
+differences in acts of collection should be possible except in respect of differences in the acts which underlie them.
+The same also seems immediately clear in regard to relational intuitions.
+Relating always displays an identity of form, all variation depending on the
+underlying acts.
+In this situation can we still hope for ascertainable differences between
+representing contents and interpretative sense in respect to the newly added
+part of a founded act, the form of connection in the case of synthetic acts?
+In the case of straightforward intuitions, interpretative sense (material) and
+representing content were intimately united: they were mutually related,
+and far from independent in their variations. Nonetheless they underwent
+abundant shifts as against one another. The representing sensum could stay
+he same while the interpretative sense altered, and could vary while the latter
+remained constant. An imaginative presentation, e.g., can remain identical
+in respect, not only of material, but also of extent of fulness, and can nonetheless notably change in respect of vivacity. In the sphere of sense, the
+distinction between material and representing content can be readily pointed
+out and unhesitatingly acknowledged. How is it, however, in the case of
+categorial acts, where, if we ignore their act-foundation, variability seems
+entirely absent? Are we to say that they lack the distinction in question as
+regards their form, that they have no representing contents which extend
+beyond the representing contents of their underlying acts? When these underlying acts are themselves categorial, e.g. acts of ideation, these too will
+lack representation, which will be found only in their ultimate foundation of
+straightforward intuitions.
+
+298 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+55 Arguments for the assumption of peculia
+ategorial representing content
+In default of an attitude to this question we must emphatically observe that,
+in the previous exposition, the complete absence of differentiation amon
+orms, as against the multifarious changes in the total act and its founda
+ton, crail, liters in character from at of am imagerie pal prescion.
+If the form is what is really new and essential in the categorial presentation,
+it must share in the import of each essential character that penetrates the
+ences of interpretative sense in the form, or at least in the form of the
+synthetic act - the matter has already been treated sufficiently as regards the
+abstractive act in the discussions of §52 - this can be explained by the fact
+that we involuntarily abstract from these interpretative characters, since
+they do not distinguish and mark off the moment of synthesis, but rather
+pervade the complete, founded act equally. Instead we attend exclusively to
+the common element that confronts us in, e.g., all forms of collective synthesis.
+But just this common element could be the representing content that we
+are looking for. As, in straightforward sense-perception, the homogeneous
+unity of the perceptual sense pervades the total representation, having definite relations to each separate part of the representing content, without
+seeming to inner reflection to be made up of separate partial conceptions,
+so, in the case of categorial intuitions, the interpretative sense pervades the
+total act and its representing content, without being clearly divided to match
+the representing contents that can be distinguished by reflection. The above
+exposition contains, if we allow the interpretation, the important truth that
+in all change of founding acts and interpretative forms, there is a unique
+representing content for each sort of founded act. The abundant multiplicity
+of sense-qualities, of sensible forms etc., is at the disposal of straightforward
+sensuous intuition for purposes of representation. In the sphere of collective
+intuitions or intuitions of identity etc., we were always limited to one sort
+the form of and is everywhere the same, and so is the is-form etc. These
+forms were here to be understood as analogues of the sense-kernel, of what
+is sensuous in sensuous intuition: there was to be abstraction from quality
+and from interpretative sense.
+One might here suspect that the wish was being father to the thought, an
+night direct attention to a fact issuing from our former treatment: tha
+representing contents are by no means essential constituents of acts. For it is
+the peculiarity of all signitive acts that they lack representing contents, i.e.
+authentic representing contents which themselves relate to the internal being
+of the object. For signitive acts, too, have their non-authentic representing
+contents, which do not stand for the object meant in the act, but for some
+
+A study in categorial representation 299
+other object, the object of an underlying act. If non-authentic representing
+are present in our case,
+authentic representing contents of these underlying acts can be seen as non
+authentically representative in relation to the acts founded on them.
+ulfilment, of the 'fulness' which intuitive acts confer on signitive one
+of the ascending scales formed among intuitive acts by variable fulnes
+of final adequation as an ideal limit. Representing contents constitute the
+difference between 'empty' signification and 'full' intuition; they are responsible for 'fulness', as is shown by the fact that they determine one sense of
+'fulness' (see §22). Only intuitive acts render their object apparent, seeable,
+for the reason, namely, that a representing content is there, which the interpretative form sees as a likeness, or as the very self, of the object. This is a
+fact rooted in the universal essence of the relation of fulfilment, and must
+therefore be demonstrable in our present sphere too. In this present sphere,
+too, we find 'signitively' opposed to 'intuitively: the opposition between
+objectif ying acts which mean a categorial object signitively, and the parallel
+acts which present the same object through the same interpretative sense
+intuitively, whether 'in likeness' or 'in very self'. Since the intentional material is the same in both cases, we can again only treat the new element in our
+categorial intuition as being representative, as setting the object before us in
+its content, as treating experienced contents as representing an object meant.
+Such representation cannot, however, be exclusively carried out in underlying acts, for it is not solely their objects that are presented, but the whole
+state of affairs, the whole aggregate etc.
+56 Continuation. The mental linkage of combine
+cts and the categorial unity of corresponding obiect
+One might for a moment suppose that, in the case, e.g., of a relation, only
+the relata were presented, and that the new element consisted in a mere
+mental character connecting the two appearances. A connection of acts is
+not, however, pro tanto, a connection of objects. At best it can help to make
+such a connection apparent: it is not itself the connection that appears in it.
+A mental bond can be established among acts, and can cause an objective
+relation to appear before us, while this relation, though it unites truly existent objects, has no being at all. If we judge significatively, without intuitive
+representation of the state of affairs judged - as is the case in ordinary
+arithmetical judgements - the relational unity of the act is articulated, and
+has a mental form of connection entirely analogous to that of the corresponding intuition. But the state of affairs is not, in the strong sense of the
+
+300 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+word, 'apparent': it is merely meant. If we contrast with this a case of intuitive
+representation, as when we identify the colour of two perceived surfaces, or of
+two surfaces recalled in memory, or a person represented in two imaginative
+nanner, in a manner that gives us the object, or, in the case of imagination
+hat gives us a likeness of it. What makes such differences possible? Ough
+nust object that, e.g., in the signitive identification, the identity of the mean
+bjects is not experientially lived through but is merely thought of, wherea
+the case of intuited objects, the identity is indeed perceived or imagin
+it is only given and lived through where adequation is full and strict. I
+mental bond, which establishes the synthesis, is therefore a bond of thought or
+meaning (Meinung) and is as such more or less fulfilled. It is merely a nonindependent constituent of the total meaning, a significative constituent of
+significative meaning, and an intuitive constituent of an intuitive meaning
+but at all events a constituent which itself shares the character of this meaning, and with this its differences of fulness. We are therefore not unjustified
+in interpreting the situation as involving that this constituent also exercises a
+representative function. As we compare different cases in the light of the
+possibility just raised, we believe that we may reduce the mental bond experienced in actual identification, collection etc. ('actual' = authentic, intuitive)
+to a universal common feature, to be thought of separately from quality and
+interpretative sense, and yielding in such reduction the representative content that pertains specially to the moment of categorial form.
+§57 The representing contents of the founding
+intuitions are not immediately connected by the
+representing content of the synthetic form
+Certain not unimportant observations must here suggest themselves as natural
+Objectively considered, a synthesis, e.g. one of identity, of attribution etc.,
+belongs to the founding objects: identity is, e.g., identity of the person, attribution the relation between the subject tree and the predicate fruit-bearing.
+The connected objects appear before us by way of their representing contents, and it might be thought that the synthetic bond, in which (or by way
+of which, perhaps in the manner of a representing content) the connection
+comes before us as a form, is also the simple and direct phenomenological
+bond between the representing contents of the underlying objects.
+As against this we affirm that the moment of synthesis establishes no direct
+connection between the representing contents of the basic acts, but that, e.g.,
+the phenomenological form of identification has its essential basis in the
+underlying acts as such, i.e. it has its basis in what these acts are and contain,
+in addition to their representing contents.
+
+A study in categorial representation 301
+If the lived-through moment of identity, its mental character, were an
+in the various kinds of sense-content. The concrete contents are many-sided.
+they sustain various abstract moments in themselves, they underlie manifol
+possibilities of alteration and connection. We accordingly refer many kind
+of connection to this or that moment in such contents. If particular union.
+in their complete specific content, they are nonetheless founded in the
+primitive generic characters which correspond to the moments of the whole
+in question. The real lack of relation between categorial act-forms and the
+sense-contents of their bases, shows itself in the limitless variability of the
+generic characters of these contents; in other words, no genus of content
+lacks an a priori possibility of functioning in the foundation of categorial
+acts of every sort. What is categorial is not bound up with representing
+sensuous contents, but only and necessarily with their objects, and yet not
+with them in their sensuous (real) content. This means that the mental character in which the categorial form is constituted is bound up phenomenologically
+with the acts in which the objects are constituted. In these acts, sense-contents
+are representatively present, and so certainly contribute to such acts. They
+do not, however, make up the characteristic essence of these acts, and they
+can also exist without the interpretation which first renders them representative: in the latter case, they are there, but nothing thereby appears, and
+nothing is consequently there to be connected, or to be treated as subject or
+predicate etc., in categorial fashion. The categorial moment of the synthetically founded act does not bind these unessential elements of the founding
+acts together, but binds what is essential to them both: it connects, in all
+upon these last. This is what was said above quite generally: in all categoria
+acts, we maintained, the material of the founded acts was founded in th
+categorial formations, but this only means that categorial formation rests
+henomenologically on what is universal in an objectifying act, or is
+unction essentially bound up with the generic element in objectifying act
+Only experiences of this class permit categorial syntheses, and such synthesis
+directly connects their intentional essences.
+
+302 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+Particularly in the case of adequate synthetic intuitions, immediately based
+on individual intuitions, must we guard against the tempting delusion of an
+immediate phenomenological connection, present at least on this lowest level
+of categorial synthesis, between the representing sense-contents of the one
+aderlying act and those of the other. In virtue of the functional dependen
+the adequation (evidence) of the total act on the adequation of its foun
+ing intuitions, the situation would seem to have the following pattern: since
+the founding acts are adequate, the representing contents coincide with the
+object represented. If on such a basis the intuition of a relation arises, a relation, e.g., between part and whole, the relational act too is evident in character:
+the relation itself is truly given with the truly given contents. The mental bond
+of relating, conceived as a relation among sensuous contents and objects,
+here binds these experienced sense-contents as with a direct bond.
+Binds them with nothing, one might object. Not the sense-contents, but
+the adequate intuitions of such contents, serve to base the unity of the act of
+relating. Here as elsewhere we must look to the objects, to the sensuous
+contents at once representing and represented, in order to perform the act of
+relating, to relate this content as whole to that content as part. Relations
+can only be given on a basis of given objects: objects are, however, not given
+in mere lived experience, in itself blind, but only and solely in percepts, and
+in our case in the perception of lived through contents which no longer
+represent something beyond themselves.
+All this confirms our original introduction of categorial acts as founded
+acts. It is essential to these acts, in which all that is intellectual is constituted,
+that they should be achieved in stages. Objectivations arise on a basis
+of objectivations, and constitute objects which, as objects of higher order,
+objects in a wider, intellectual sense, can only come to light in such founded
+acts. This excludes from synthetic acts that immediate unity of representation which unites all representative contents of straightforward intuitions.
+The complete synthetic intuition therefore arises (if we are right in our
+above attempted interpretation which requires a most careful pondering) in
+so far as the mental content which binds the underlying acts itself sustains
+interpretation as the objective unity of the founded objects, as their relation
+of identity, of part to whole etc.
+§58 The relation of our two distinctions: outer and
+inner sense, also sense for categories
+It is now extremely important to bring to complete clearness the relation
+between the two distinctions introduced by us at the very beginning of this
+Investigation, the distinction between outer and inner sensibility, on the one
+hand, and between straightforward and categorial acts, on the other.
+A presentation as a mental experience, whether it be straightforward o
+founded, sensuous or categorial, belongs to the sphere of 'inner sense'. I
+
+A study in categorial representation 303
+there no contradiction in this? Is an inner percept, which reflects on an
+ct, and a founded act to boot, e.g. on an actual insight into the equatio
++ 1 = 1 + 2, not eo ipso a founded percept, and therefore a non-sensuou
+one? In this act of perception the founded act is given together with the acts
+that underlie it, and is given in the strongest sense of the word. It belongs to
+and is part of the real make-up of the (inner percept. In so far as the latter
+directs itselt to the former act, it is itself related to it, and is therefore itself
+a founded percept.
+We shall here obviously have to reply: to perceive an act, or an actmoment, or an act-complex of any sort, is to perceive sensuously, since it is
+to perceive straightforwardly. This cannot be doubted, since the relation of
+an act which perceives to an act which is perceived is no relation of foundation, even if we take a founded act to be the act perceived. The foundedness
+of an act does not mean that it is built on other acts in any manner whatsoever, but that a founded act, by its very nature or kind, is only possible
+as built upon acts of the sort which underlie it, and that, as a result, the
+objective correlate of the founded act has a universal element of form which
+can only be intuitively displayed by an object in a founded act of this kind.
+The intuitive consciousness of the universal cannot, e.g., exist without
+underlying individual intuition, nor an identification without underlying
+acts which relate to the identified objects etc.
+The perception, however, which we direct to a founded act could as readily be directed to a non-founded act and to any objects of outer sense, e.g.
+horses, colours etc. In each case perception consists in a straightforward
+looking at our object. The material of perception (its interpretative sense)
+stands in no necessary relation to the material of the perceived act. The
+whole phenomenological content of this act has rather the sheer character of
+a representative content, it is objectively interpreted in accordance with the
+interpretative form of perception, as being this very act of perception itself.
+For this reason also, every abstraction based on inner sense, e.g. the
+abstraction which looks to a founded act, is a sensuous abstraction. As
+opposed to this, an abstraction which is itself built upon a founded act, is, to
+the extent that this founded act has the character of an intuition, even that
+of a categorial intuition, a categorial abstraction. If we look at an intuitive
+act of identification, i.e. an intuition of identity, and if we abstract from it
+the moment of identification, we have performed a sensuous abstraction.
+But if, while living through an identification, we turn our regard to objective
+identity, and make this the basis of our abstraction, we have performed a
+categorial abstraction (cf. the closer discussion in $60). The objective moment of identity is no act, and no form of an act: it is an objective categorial
+form. As against this, on the other hand, the moment of identification, that
+unites the founded acts phenomenologically, is a sensuous and categorial
+act-form. The same difference essentially divides those concepts framed on a
+ground of reflection on any intuitive acts, from the quite different concepts
+
+304 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+framed on the ground of these intuitive acts themselves. I perceive a house and,
+reflecting on my percept, frame the concept of perception. But if I look simply
+at the house, I use my percept itself, rather than the percept of this percept,
+as the founding act for an abstraction, and the concept of house arises.
+There is accordingly nothing remarkable in saying: The same mental moments which are sensuously given in inner perception (and which therefore
+function in it as sensuous representing contents) may, in a founded act of the
+character of a categorial perception or imagination set up a categorial form,
+and so sustain a totally different categorial representation.
+The non-independence of categorial forms as forms, is mirrored in the
+department of inner sense in the fact that the moments in which a categorial
+form can be constituted - moments' narrowly restricted for each form, so
+that each type of form corresponds to a single type of moment - themselves
+phenomenological gulf in the field of sense.
+We have principally to distinguish between:
+1. the contents of reflection, those contents which are themselves characters of acts or founded upon such characters;
+2. the primary contents, those contents in which all contents of reflection
+are either immediately or mediately founded
+plainly not defined in terms of some metaphysical distinction of outward
+and inward, but through the nature of its representing contents, as being
+ultimately foundational, phenomenologically lived-through contents. The
+contents are never bound to a narrower class than the whole class of these
+primary contents.
+Corresponding to the difference between purely sensuous and purely
+categorial objects of intuition, there is a distinction of representing contents:
+only reflective contents can serve as purely categorial representing contents.
+One might now try to pin down the concept of a category by saying that
+it comprises all objective forms arising out of the forms, and not out of the
+matters, of conceptual interpretation. The following misgiving no doubt might
+arise. Ought we not also to attribute to sensuous intuition the character of a
+categorial act, in so far as through it the form of objectivity is constituted?
+For what we perceive does not merely exist in perception, but is given in it
+as an object. The concept of an object is, however, framed as the correlate
+of the concept of perception, and so presupposes, not merely an act of
+abstraction, but also acts of relation. It therefore also qualifies as a categorial
+concept in our present sense.
+
+Chapter 8
+The a priori laws of authentic and
+inauthentic thinking
+§59 The complication into ever new forms.
+The pure theory of the forms of possible
+intuitions
+The varied forms of founded acts where,
+instead of straightforward,
+sensuously-intuitive objects, categorially formed and synthetically connected
+objects are constituted, permit manifold complications into new forms: in
+consequence of certain a priori categorial laws, categorial unities may again
+and again become the objects of new connecting, relating or ideating acts.
+Universal objects, e.g., can be collectively connected, the collections thus
+formed can in their turn be collectively connected with other collections of
+similar or different type, and so on in infinitum. The possibility of unlimited
+complication is here self-evident and a priori. Just so, within certain lawbound limits, one can unify states of affairs in new states of affairs, pursue
+an indefinitely extended search for internal and external relations among all
+such possible unities, use the results of such discovery as terms for nove
+elations etc. Obviously such complication is achieved in founded acts ol
+ever higher level. The governing legality in this field is the intuitive counterpart of the grammatical legality of pure logic. In this case, also, we are no
+concerned with laws which seek to assess the real being of the objects pre
+sented at different levels. These laws at all events say nothing directly about
+the laws of their successive complication into ever new and more complex
+intuitions must be laid down. To the extent that adequate intuition itself
+presents a type of intuition, the pure theory of intuitive forms embraces al
+the laws which concern the forms of adequate intuition: these have a peculiar
+of intentions already intuitive.
+
+306 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+§60 The relative or functional difference between
+mose mind with Sense Sensfous costepis annd
+categories
+($42). In an absolute sense, a founding sensibility provides the matter for,
+all acts of categorial form which are built upon it. In a relative sense, the
+emergent forms of the founded acts. If we relate two objects already categorial, e.g. two states of affairs, these states of affairs are our matter relatively
+to the relation which brings them together. To this definite use of the concepts of matter and form the traditional distinction between the matter and
+form of statements corresponds exactly. The terms of a statement express the
+founding acts of the whole 'relational presentation', or, what is the same,
+they are names for its founding objects, and therefore represent the place in
+which alone contributions of sense may be sought. But founding objects may
+themselves be categorial in type. Plainly fulfilment is carried out in a chain of
+acts which take us down a whole ladder of 'foundations'. Indirect presentations here play an essential part, whose exact investigation is an important
+task in a clarification of the complex forms of cognitive thought.
+Acts of straightforward intuitions we called 'sensuous; founded acts,
+whether leading back immediately or mediately to sense, we called 'categorial".
+But it is worth our while to draw a distinction, within the sphere of categorial
+acts, between those acts that are purely categorial, acts of 'pure understanding', and mixed acts of understanding that are blended with sense. It lies in the
+nature of the case that everything categorial ultimately rests upon sensuous
+intuition, that a 'categorial intuition', an intellectual insight, a case of thought
+in the highest sense, without any foundation of sense, is a piece of nonsense.
+The idea of a pure intellect, interpreted as a faculty of pure thinking
+= categorial action), quite cut off from a faculty of sensibility', could onl
+e conceived before there had been an elementary analysis of knowledg
+in the irrefragable evidence of its being. Nonetheless, the distinctions just
+indicated, and with them the concept of a purely categorial act and, if one
+likes, the further concept of a pure understanding, all have a good sense. If
+we ponder on the peculiarity of eidetic abstraction, that it necessarily rests
+on individual intuition, but does not for that reason mean what is individual
+individuality, but also all sensibility from their intentional purview. In other
+
+The a priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking
+307
+words, we distinguish between sensuous abstraction, which yields sensuous
+oncepts - purely sensuous or mixed with categorial forms - and purel
+ategorial abstraction, which yields purely categorial concepts. Colour, house
+judgement, wish are purely sensuous concepts; colouredness, virtue, the axion
+of parallels etc., have a categorial admixture, while unity, plurality, relation
+concept are purely categorial. Where we speak absolutely of categorial concepts, purely categorial ones are always meant. Sensuous concepts find their
+underlies an abstraction, the abstractive consciousness may direct itself to
+the relational form in specie, so that everything sensuous in what underlies
+the relation is discounted. So arise categories, which rubric, understood
+pointedly, merely covers the primitive concepts in our present context.
+We have just identified concept and Species: this was implicit in the whole
+sense of our completed discussion. But, if one understands by 'concepts'
+universal presentations instead of universal objects, whether these be universal
+intuitions or the universal meanings which correspond to them, our distinction carries over simply to these. It carries over similarly to presentations of
+the form an A, having regard to the fact that the Species A may include or
+exclude what is sensible. All logical forms and formulae such as All S are P,
+No S is P etc., are purely categorial. Here the letters 'S', 'P' etc., merely
+point indirectly to 'certain', indefinite concepts, variable at will; in the total
+formula a complex thought, made up of purely categorial elements, corresponds to them. Like all pure logic, so all pure arithmetic, the pure theory of
+manifolds, pure mathematics, in short, in the widest sense, are pure in the
+sense that they contain no sensuous concept in their whole theoretical fabric.
+6 Categorial forming involves no real
+reshaping of the object
+Our talk of categorial form, as has been clear from our last set of discussions, is naturally and harmlessly ambiguous, since we have drawn a thoron the one chand in beer a and obed is mich give form to aces of
+straightforward or of already founded intuition, and transform them into
+lew presentations of objects. These latter presentations, as opposed to th
+cts on which they are founded, set up for us a peculiarly modified objectiv
+ity: the original objects are now seen in certain interpretative and connective
+forms which are our categorial forms in the second, objective sense. The
+
+308 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+significative forms, forms which find possible fulfilment in founded types of
+act, are called categorial forms, or, more cautiously, categorial forms in a
+loose sense of the word.
+This being premised, we now wish to bring to explicit clearness, for the
+sake of its importance, a proposition that we have already enunciated
+and which is really obvious in the light of our whole exposition. This is the
+proposition that categorial functions, in 'forming' sensible objects, leave
+their real essence untouched. The object is intellectually grasped by the
+ntelligence, and especially by 'knowledge' (itself a categorial function), bu
+t is not thereby falsified. To clarify this, let us remember the differenc
+mentioned in passing between categorial unities in the objective sense, and
+real unities such as the unity of the parts of a thing, or of trees in an avenue
+etc. The unity of the real elements in a mental experience, or the unity of
+all experiences which coexist in a single individual consciousness, likewise
+count among such real unities. All such unities, treated as wholes, resemble
+their parts in being objects in the straightforward, primary sense: they can
+be intuited in possible straightforward intuitions. They are not merely
+categorially unified, constituted through a being-considered-together, through
+collection, disjunction, relation etc. They are intrinsically unified: they have
+a form of union, perceivable in the whole as a real property, a real moment
+of unity, and perceivable in the same sense in which any of their connected
+members and their intrinsic properties are perceivable.
+It is quite different in the case of categorial forms. The new objects they
+create are not objects in the primary, original sense. Categorial forms do not
+glue, tie or put parts together, so that a real, sensuously perceivable whole
+emerges. They do not form in the sense in which the potter forms. Otherwise
+the original datum of sense-perception would be modified in its own objectivity: relational and connective thought and knowledge would not be of what
+is, but would be a falsifying transformation into something else. Categorial
+forms leave primary objects untouched: they can do nothing to them, cannot
+change them in their own being, since the result would otherwise be a new
+object in the primary, real sense. Evidently the outcome of a categorial act,
+piece of nonsense.
+§62 Our freedom in the categorial forming of given
+material and its limits. Purely categorial laws
+(laws of 'authentic' thinking)
+Real, sensuous forms of unity, whether external or internal, are determined
+by a law governing the essential nature of the parts to be connected; if the
+
+The a priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking 309
+eal governing legality. What is really one. :
+'orms, the position is quite different in regard to categorial forms. With rea
+contents none of the categorial forms which fit them is necessarily given
+tc. There are many arbitrary ways to divide up a sensuously unified grou
+nto part-groups: we may at will arrange these diversely divisible part-groups
+and effect same-level connections among them, we can also build collections
+of the second, third ... order upon one another. Many possibilities of categorial shaping therefore arise on the foundation of the same sensuous stuff.
+Just so, we can compare any item from one and the same sense-complex with
+any other of its members, or distinguish it from them. We can make either
+of them the subject-term, or, by arbitrary conversion, the object-term of
+some relation in question. We can put these relations into relation with one
+another, connect them collectively, classify them etc.
+Great, however, as this freedom of categorial union and formation may
+be, it still has its law-governed limits. The very fact that categorial forms
+constitute themselves in founded characters of acts, and in these alone,
+involves a certain necessity of connection. For how else could we speak of
+categorial perception and intuition, if any conceivable matter could be put
+into any conceivable form, and the underlying straightforward intuitions
+therefore permitted themselves to be arbitrarily combined with categorial
+characters? Where, e.g., we carry out a whole-part relationship intuitively,
+we can normally convert it, but not in such a manner that the part, with
+unchanged real content, can be looked on as the whole, and the whole as the
+part. It is also not open to us to treat this relation as one of total identity
+or of total exclusion etc. We can no doubt 'think' any relation between any
+set of terms, and any form whatever on the basis of any matter - think them,
+that is, in the sense of merely meaning them. But we cannot really carry out
+'foundings' on every foundation: we cannot see sensuous stuff in any
+categorial form we like, let alone perceive it thus, and above all not perceive
+it adequately.
+In framing our widened concept of perception, we found, eo ipso, a
+certain tied character in it. This does not mean that the character of percep-
+This means that the actual performance of actual acts on the ground of just
+these straightforward intuitions is in the ideal sense possible. And these
+
+310 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+possibilities, like ideal possibilities in general, are limited by law to the
+extent that certain impossibilities, ideal incompatibilities, are by law ranged
+alongside of them.
+The ideal laws governing the connection of such possibilities and impossibilities, belong among categorial forms in specie, i.e. among categories ir
+the objective sense of the word. They determine what variations in any giver
+categorial forms there can be in relation to the same definite, but arbitraril
+hosen, matter. They circumscribe the ideally closed manifold of the rearrange
+ments and transformations of categorial forms on the basis of constant,
+selfsame matter. This matter is here only relevant in so far as it must be kept
+intentionally identical. But, to the extent that the species of this matter are
+quite freely variable, and are only subject to the obvious ideal condition of
+capacity to sustain the forementioned forms, the laws in question are of an
+entirely pure and analytic character, and quite independent of the particularity
+of their matter. Their general expression, therefore, contains no reference to
+material species, but makes exclusive use of algebraical symbols as bearers
+of indeterminately general presentations of certain matters, variable in all
+but the identity they must keep with themselves.
+To gain insight into these laws, does not therefore require an actual carrying out of a categorial intuition, which makes its matters truly intuitive:
+any categorial intuition suffices, which puts the possibility of the categorial
+formation in question before one's eyes. In the generalizing abstraction of
+this comprehensive possibility the unitary, intuitive 'insight' into the law is
+achieved: this insight has, in the sense used in our doctrine, the character of
+an adequate general percept. The general object, which is itself present in it,
+is the categorial law. We may assert: The ideal conditions of categorial intuition in general are, correlatively regarded, the conditions of the possibility of
+the objects of categorial intuition, and of the possibility of categorial objects
+simpliciter. That an object thus and thus categorially formed is possible, is
+essentially related to the fact that a categorial intuition - a mere imagination
+- can set such an object completely before one's eyes, to the fact, in other
+words, that the requisite categorial syntheses and other categorial acts can be
+really performed on the basis of the founding intuitions concerned (even if the
+latter are imaginary).
+What categorial formations are in fact permitted by given materials of
+perception or imagination, what categorial acts can be really carried out on
+the basis of their constitutive sensuous intuitions: on this point our analytic
+laws, which are here our ideal conditions, say nothing. That boundless
+arbitrariness does not here obtain, that 'actual' performability has not here
+the character of empirical actuality, but of ideal possibility, is shown by
+our above examples. These also make plain that it is the particularity of
+the matter which, from case to case, circumscribes possibility, so that
+we can, e.g., say that W is really a whole as regards w, or that g is really a
+property of G etc. In such cases, of course, the categorial form (unlike its
+
+The a priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking 311
+real counterpart) is not limited to the kinds of content covered by W, w, G,
+8, so as to have no bearing on contents of other kinds. Contrariwise it is
+evident that contents of all kinds can be formed by all categories. For categorial
+forms are not founded on material contents, as we have already explained
+above (cf. §57). These pure laws can therefore not prescribe what forms a
+given matter can assume, but can only tell us that, when it, and any matter
+in general, assumes a certain form, or is capable of assuming it, a definitely
+limited circle of further forms remains open to the same matter. There is,
+i.e., an ideally closed circle of possible transformation of a functioning form,
+into ever new forms. The ideal possibility of these new forms in relation to
+the same matter, has its a priori guarantee in the before mentioned analytic
+laws which embody the presuppositions in question.
+These are the pure laws of authentic thinking, the laws, that is, of categorial
+intuitions in virtue of their purely categorial forms. For categorial intuitions
+function in the thought of theory as actual or possible fulfilments (or frustrations) of meanings, and impart to statements (according to their mode
+of functioning) the logical values of truth and falsehood. On the laws here
+considered the normative regulation of purely signitive, or admixedly signitive,
+thought depends.
+To expound this matter more precisely, and to clear up the special sense
+implied in talk of the laws of authentic thinking, we must take a closer look
+into the sphere of meanings and of meaning-fulfilments.
+§63 The new laws of the validity of signitive
+and admixedly signitive acts (laws of inauthentic
+thinking)
+In our discussions up to this point we have thought of categorial acts as free
+from all significative side-structures, as carried out, but not as founding
+acts of knowing or naming. Every unprejudiced analyst will concede that
+we can, e.g., intuit aggregates, or many primitive states of affairs, without
+expressing them nominally or propositionally. We now oppose the case
+of mere signification to the case of mere intuition: we note that to all acts of
+categorial intuition, with their categorially formed objects, purely significative
+acts may correspond. This is an obvious a priori possibility. There is no
+act-form relevant here, to which there is not a corresponding possible form
+of meaning, and each meaning can be thought of as carried out without a
+correlated intuition. The ideal of a logically adequate language is that of a
+language which can give unambiguous expression to all possible matters
+and all possible categorial forms. To its words certain significative intentions unambiguously pertain, which can come alive even in the absence of
+'corresponding', i.e. of fulfilling, intuition. There is therefore, running parallel to all possible primary and founded intuitions, a system of primary and
+founded meanings which could possibly express them.
+
+312 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+The realm of meaning is, however, much wider than that of intuition, i.e.
+than the total realm of possible fulfilment. For, on the meaning-side, an
+endless host of complex meanings arises, which lack 'reality' or 'possibility'.
+They are patterns of meanings assembled together into unitary meanings, to
+which, however, no possible unitary correlate of fulfilment can correspond.
+For this reason there is no complete parallelism between categorial types,
+i.e. types of categorial intuition, and types of meaning. To each categorial
+type of lower or higher level a meaning-type corresponds, but to every type
+formed by free significative welding to complex types, there is not a corresponding type of categorial objectivity. We recall types of analytic contradiction such as 'an A which is not an A', 'All A's are B's and some A's are
+not B's' etc. Only in connection with primitive types can and must such
+parallelism obtain, since all primitive meanings 'originate' in the fulness of
+correlated intuition, or, to put the matter more plainly, since talk of compatibility and incompatibility applies only in the sphere of what is put
+together, or is to be put together, simple meanings, as expressions of what
+is simple, can never be 'imaginary'. This applies also to every simple form
+of meaning. While 'Something that is at once A and not-A' is impossible, 'an
+A and a B' is possible, since the and-form, being simple, has a 'real' sense.
+If we transfer the term 'categorial' to the realm of meaning, a peculiar
+significative form (and a peculiar meaning-form in specie) will correspond to
+each authentic categorial form, whether to one authentic in the objective
+sense, or to the corresponding categorial form of intuition (in which what
+is categorially objective is perceptually or imaginatively constituted). In this
+form of signification we achieve significative reference to a collection or a
+disjunction, an identity or a non-identity etc. Whenever one opposes presentation in the authentic, to presentation in an inauthentic sense, one normally
+has the intuitive-significative antithesis in mind (though occasionally, no
+doubt, one is thinking of the other antithesis of adequate-inadequate). Our
+present cases would accordingly be cases of collection, disjunction, identification, abstraction etc., in an inauthentic sense.
+If one includes under the rubric of 'acts of thinking, all the categorial acts
+through which judgements, as predicative significations, gain fulness and
+their whole value for knowledge, we must distinguish between authentic act.
+of thinking and inauthentic ones. The inauthentic acts of thinking would b
+the significant intentions behind statements and, by a natural extension, all
+significative acts which could possibly function as parts of such predicative
+intentions: all significative acts can plainly function in this fashion. The
+authentic acts of thinking would lie in the corresponding fulfilments, i.e. the
+intuitions of states of affairs, and all intuitions which function as possible
+(the meanings of statements) includes that of the forms of meaning in general
+
+The a priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking 313
+(the pure logico-grammatical forms). Just so the general doctrine of the pure
+forms of the intuitions of states of affairs (and of the pure forms of states of
+attairs) includes that of the categorial forms of intuitions and of objective
+categorial forms) in general.
+If, as often happens, thinking is identified with judging, we should have
+to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic judging. The concept of
+judging would then be pinned down by the element common to statementintention and statement-fulfilment, i.e. by the intentional essence compounded
+of quality and intentional material. As acts of thinking in the widest sense,
+not only acts of judging, but also all possible part-acts in judgements, would
+have to count: we should be brought back to a definition equivalent to our
+previous definition of the concept Act of Thinking.
+In the sphere of inauthentic thinking, of pure signification, we are beyond
+all bounds of categorial laws. Here anything and everything can be brought
+together in unity. We spoke of this in our Fourth Investigation: we pointed
+to the purely logico-grammatical laws which, as laws of complication and
+modification, distinguish the spheres of sense and nonsense. In inauthentic
+categorial formation and transformation, we are free as long as our meanings
+are not nonsensically conglomerated. But if we wish to avoid formal and
+real nonsense, the widest sphere of inauthentic thought, of the significatively
+combinable, is very much narrowed. We are now concerned with the objective possibility of complex meanings, with the possibility of their application
+to an intuition which fulfils them totally and singly. The pure laws of the validity of meanings, of the ideal possibility of their adequate intuitive illustration,
+obviously runs parallel to the pure laws governing the combination and
+transformation of authentic categorial forms.
+In the pure laws of the validity of meanings, we are again not dealing with
+laws from which the validity of any given meaning can be read off, but with
+the possibilities, determined in purely categorial fashion, of the combination and transformation of meanings, that can be undertaken, salva veritate,
+in each possible given case, i.e. without prejudicing the possibility of a fulgeneral, which, in their turn, depend on the pure conditions of the possibility
+
+314 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+of categorial intuition in general. These laws of the validity of meanings
+are not, of course, themselves identical with the authentic categorial laws,
+but they follow the latter faithfully, in virtue of the law which regulates the
+connection of significant intentions with fulfilments of meaning.
+The whole treatment that we have just completed requires a natural, obvious extension. We have simplified the matter to the extent of confining our
+discussion to two extremes only: we opposed completely intuitive, i.e. actually executed categorial act-forms, on the one hand, to purely signitive,
+i.e. not authentically executed act-forms, on the other, forms only to be realized in processes of possible fulfilment. The ordinary cases are, however,
+mixtures: thought proceeds intuitively in many stretches, in many stretches
+ignitively, here a categorial synthesis, a predication, a generalization i
+really carried out, there a merely signitive intention directed to such
+enterine stors in caches to aruinely brothere all
+enter members. i
+whole, the character of inauthentic categorial intuitions: their total objective
+correlate is not actually, only inauthentically, presented. Its "possibility', i.e.
+objecive possibility of correlate not uaranted The sphere i
+these mixed act-forms also. Everything we have said then holds, mutatis
+of mere meanings, merely symbolic judgements etc., we shall also have to
+speak of the laws of the validity of signitively admixed presentations or
+judgements. Where there is talk of merely symbolic thinking, it is generally
+these mixed cases that one has in mind.
+$64 The pure logico-grammatical laws are laws for
+any understanding whatever, and not merely for any
+human understanding. Their psychological meaning
+and normative function in relation to inadequate
+Both sorts of laws are, of course, of an ideal nature. That a piece of sensory
+stuff can only be apprehended in certain forms, and bound together according to certain forms, that the possible transformation of these forms is
+subject to pure laws, in which the material element varies freely, that the
+meanings to be expressed are likewise limited to certain forms, which they
+can change only in prescribed manners, if they are not to lose their true
+expressibility - all this does not depend on the empirical contingencies of
+the course of consciousness, not even on the contingencies of our intellectual
+or common-human organization. It depends on the specific nature of the acts
+in question, on their intentional and epistemic essence; it belongs not to the
+nature of just our (individual or common-human) sensibility, nor just our
+understanding, but rather to the Ideas of Sensibility and Understanding in
+
+The a priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking 315
+haps, as a capacity for expression and meaning directed upon such acts, and
+made 'right' by them, then the general laws rooted in the specific nature
+other than ours, but, if they are minded creatures at all, possessing some sort
+of intentional experiences, with the relevant differences between perception
+and imagination, straightforward and categorial intuition, meaning an
+intuition, adequate and inadequate knowledge - then such creatures have
+both sensibility and understanding, and are 'subject' to the pertinent laws.
+The laws of authentic thinking naturally, therefore, belong also to the
+nature of human consciousness, to our common human 'psychic organization'.
+But they are not characteristic of this organization in respect of its peculiar
+character. The laws are rooted, we said, in the purely specific character of
+certain acts: this means that they concern these acts not just in so far as they
+occur together in a human organization. They pertain rather to all possible
+organizations which can be made up of acts of this sort. The differentiating
+peculiarities of each type of mental organization, all that distinguishes, e.g.,
+the human consciousness as such, in the manner of a natural historical species, is not at all affected by such pure laws as are the laws of thought.
+A relation to 'our' mental organization, or to 'consciousness in general'
+(understood as the aspects of consciousness common to men in general), does
+not define the pure and genuine, but a grossly distorted a priori. The notion
+of a common mental organization, like that of a physical organization,
+clearly has a merely 'empirical' meaning, the meaning of a mere 'matter of
+fact. But pure laws are precisely pure of matter of fact, they tell us not what
+is generally wont to be in this or that province of the real, but what absolutely goes beyond all wont and all divisions into spheres of reality, and that
+for the reason that what is in question belongs to the essential make-up of
+vhat is. The true logical a priori, therefore concerns all that pertains to th
+deal essence of understanding as such, to the essence of its act-species an
+ct-forms, to that, accordingly, which cannot be eliminated, as long as tr
+nderstanding, and the acts definitory of it, are what they are, i.e. thus ar
+thus natured, maintaining their selfsame conceptual essence.
+The extent, accordingly, to which the logical laws and, in the first in
+tance, the ideal laws of authentic thinking, also claim a psychologica
+meaning, and the extent to which they govern the course of actual mental
+possibilities of psychological (phenomenological) coexistence and succession.
+What is seen to be incompatible in specie, cannot be brought together, be
+
+316 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+rendered compatible, in empirical instances. In so far as the logical thought
+of experience is, to an incomparably major extent, conducted inadequately
+and signitively, we can think, believe, many things which in truth, in the
+manner of authentic thought, the actual carrying out of merely intended
+syntheses, cannot be brought together at all. Just for this reason the a priori
+laws of authentic thinking and authentic expression become norms for merely
+opinion-forming, inauthentic thought and expression. Put somewhat differently: on the laws of authentic thinking other laws are founded, formulable
+too as practical norms, which express in a manner suited to the sphere of
+signitive or admixedly signitive presentation, the ideal conditions of a possible truth (or rightness in general), the ideal conditions, that is, of 'logical'
+compatibility (logical, since related to possible adequation) within this sphere
+of admixedly signitive thinking. The laws of inauthentic thinking do not
+1old psychologically like empirical laws governing the origin and change of
+such thought, but as the possibilities or impossibilities of adequation founder
+in their ideal purity in the variously formed acts of inauthentic thinking in
+relation to corresponding acts of authentic thinking.
+§65 The senseless problem of the real meaning of
+the logical
+We now also completely understand why the notion of a course of the world
+violating the laws of logic - the analytic laws of authentic thinking and the
+essence about categorial forms, as forms of possible correctness and truth as
+such - represents a most obvious Heráßaois eis ällo yévos. Laws which
+refer to no fact cannot be confirmed or refuted by a fact. The problem,
+earnestly and profoundly treated by great philosophers, as to the 'real or
+formal meaning of the logical', is therefore a nonsensical problem. One
+requires no metaphysical or other theories to explain the agreement of the
+course of nature and the 'native' regularities of the understanding. Instead of
+an explanation, one needs only a phenomenological clarification of meaning,
+thinking and knowing, and of the ideas and laws which spring from these.
+The world constitutes itself as a sensuous unity: its very meaning is to be
+the unity of actual and possible straightforward percepts. Its true being,
+
+The a priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking 317
+however, precludes its being adequately given, or given without qualification, in any closed process of perception. It is for us always a quite inadequately meant unity for theoretical research, in part intended through
+straightforward and categorial intuition, in part through signification. The
+further our knowledge progresses, the better and more richly will the idea of
+the world be determined, the more, too, will inconsistencies be excluded
+from it. To doubt whether the world really is as it appears to us to be, or as
+it is thought of in contemporary theoretical science, and as it counts for the
+well-grounded belief of the latter, has a good sense, since inductive science
+can never construct an adequate world-picture, however far it may carry us.
+But it is also nonsensical to doubt whether the true course of the world, the
+true structure of the world in itself, could conflict with the forms of thinking. For this would mean that a definite, hypothetically assumed sensibility,
+which would bring the world to adequate representation in an ideally complete set of unending perceptual processes, would be capable of assuming
+categorial forms, while forcing syntheses upon them that are generically
+ruled out by the universal nature of such forms. That they are thus ruled
+out, and that the laws of the categories hold as pure laws in abstraction
+from all sensuous stuff, and are accordingly unaffected by limitless variation
+of such stuff, this we do not merely think, but we see it to be true. It is given
+to us in fullest adequacy. This insight is of course achieved subjectively on
+the basis of any casual empirical intuition, but it is a generic insight relating purely to form. The basis of abstraction contains in this case, as in
+others, nothing presupposed by the ideal possibility and validity of the Idea
+abstracted from it.
+It would further be possible to demonstrate ad nauseam the absurdity
+involved in considering the possibility of an illogical course of the world
+in signitive thought, thereby making this possibility hold, and destroying
+in one breath, so to say, the laws which make this or any other possibility
+hold at all. We could also point out that a correlation with perceivability,
+intuitability, meanability and knowability, is inseparable from the sense of
+being in general, and that the ideal laws, therefore, which pertain to these
+possibilities in specie, can never be set aside by the contingent content of
+what itself happens to be at the moment. But enough of such argumentations,
+which merely ring the changes on one and the same position, and have
+§66 Distinction between the most important
+differences mixed up in the current opposition of
+'intuiting' and 'thinking'
+The above investigations should have imported a satisfactory, general clearness into the much used, but little clarified, relation between thinking and
+intuiting. We here list the following oppositions, whose confusion has vexed
+
+318 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+epistemological research so inordinately, and whose distinctness has become
+quite clear to ourselves.
+1. The opposition between
+intuition and signification. Intuition as perception or imagination - it is irrelevant whether categorial or sensuous,
+adequate or inadequate - is opposed to mere thinking, as merely significative
+reference. Our parenthetically noted differences are, of course, generally
+ignored. We consider them very important, and now specially stress them.
+2. The opposition between sensuous and categorial intuition. We therefore
+oppose sensuous intuition in the ordinary, straightforward sense, to categorial
+intuition, or intuition in the extended sense. The founded acts, characteristic
+of the latter, now count as the thought which 'intellectualizes' sensuous
+3. The opposition between inadequate and adequate intuition, or, more
+generally, between adequate and inadequate presentation (since we are classing intuitive and significative presentation together). In an inadequate representation we merely think that something is so (appears so), in adequate
+presentation we look at the matter itself, and are for the first time made
+acquainted with its full selfhood.
+4. The opposition between individual intuition (usually conceived, with
+what is plainly baseless narrowness, as sensuous intuition) and universal
+intuition. A new concept of intuition is fixed by means of this opposition. It
+is opposed to generalization, and so, further, to the categorial acts implying
+generalization, and also, in unclear admixture, to the significative counter.
+parts of such ps intuition we saw say, merdu presenay the nical.
+One generally speaks in this context of the opposition between "intuition and
+How strongly we tend to let these oppositions shade into one another
+would be shown by a criticism of Kant's theory of knowledge, which throughout bears the impress of the failure to draw any clear distinction among
+these oppositions. In Kant's thought categorial (logical) functions play a
+great role, but he fails to achieve our fundamental extension of the concepts
+of perception and intuition over the categorial realm, and this because he
+fails to appreciate the deep difference between intuition and signification,
+complete his analysis of the difference between the inadequate and adequate
+adaptation of meaning to intuition. He therefore also fails to distinguish
+between concepts, as the universal meanings of words, and concepts as spe
+cies of authentic universal presentation, and between both, and concepts as
+universal objects, as the intentional correlates of universal presentations.
+Kant drops from the outset into the channel of a metaphysical epistemology
+in that he attempts a critical 'saving' of mathematics, natural science and
+metaphysics, before he has subjected knowledge as such, the whole sphere
+of acts in which pre-logical objectivation and logical thought are performed,
+
+The a priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking 319
+Additional note to the second edition
+\ll the main obscurities of the Kantian critique of reason depend ultimatel!
+on the fact that Kant never made clear to himself the peculiar character of
+pure Ideation, the adequate survey of conceptual essences, and of the laws
+of universal validity rooted in those essences. He accordingly lacked the
+phenomenologically correct concept of the a priori. For this reason he could
+never rise to adopting the only possible aim of a strictly scientific critique of
+reason: the investigation of the pure, essential laws which govern acts a
+intentional experiences, in all their modes of sense-giving objectivation, and
+their fulfilling constitution of 'true being'. Only a perspicuous knowledge of
+these laws of essence could provide us with an absolutely adequate answer
+to all the questions regarding our understanding, questions which can be
+meaningfully raised in regard to the "possibility of knowledge'.
+
+Third Section
+Clarification of our
+introductory problem
+
+Chapter 9
+Non-objectifying acts as apparent
+fulfilments of meaning
+§67 That not every act of meaning includes an act
+of knowing
+Having gone far enough in our investigation of the relation between
+which troubled us at the beginning of this Investigation, and which first
+prompted us to undertake it.
+We have, above all, rid ourselves of the temptation to conceive of the
+meaning-function of expressions as in some sense a case of knowing, and in
+fact a case of classification, a temptation which springs from a line of thought
+touched on above (81), and which always crops up in important epistemological contexts. One says: An expression must surely give expression to
+some act of the speaker, but in order that this act should find its appropriate
+speech-form, it must be suitably apperceived and known, a presentation as
+resentation, an attribution as an attribution, a negation as a negation et
+Dur reply is that talk of knowledge refers to a relationship between act
+of thought and fulfilling intuitions. Acts of thought are not, however, brough
+to expression in statements and parts of statements, e.g. names, in such a
+manner that they in their turn are thought of and known. Otherwise these
+last acts would be the carriers of meaning, it would be they primarily that
+were expressed, they would accordingly be in need of other new acts of
+thought, and so on in infinitum. If I call this intuited object a 'watch', I complete, in naming it, an act of thought and knowledge, but I know the watch,
+and not my knowledge. This is naturally so in the case of all acts that confer
+meaning. Should I utter the word 'or' in a context of expressive speech, I
+carry out a disjunction, but my thought (of which the disjoining is a part)
+is not trained upon the disjoining but upon the (objective) disjunctivum, in
+so far as this last enters into the unitary state of affairs. This disjunctivum is
+known and objectively denominated. The word 'or' is accordingly no name,
+and likewise no non-independent appellation of disjoining; it merely gives
+
+324 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+voice to this act. Naturally this applies also to complete judgements. If I
+assert something, - think of things, that things stand in this or that manner
+his is what I express, and perhaps also know. But I do not think and knov
+a certain manner or in certain cases it does, in all those cases, that is, where
+he sense of 'expression' dealt with by us at the beginning of the present
+pression as a mere 'voice-giving,
+means the same as 'meaning', and what is expressed is one and the same
+meaning. In the two latter senses, every statement, whether merely significative
+or intuitively fulfilled, expresses something: it expresses the judgement (our
+conviction), or that 'judgement's content' (the selfsame propositional meaning). But in the former sense only the intuitively fulfilled statement (or the
+statement which is to be intuitively fulfilled) expresses something, in which
+case not the verbal noise, but the already sense-enlivened locution represents
+the 'expression' of the corresponding intuition. It is the function that lends
+meaning to our words which is primarily and universally responsible for the
+unitary interweaving of the signitive intentions attaching to those words.
+The latter merely make up a signitive judgement, in which they lack all
+fulfilling intuition: the synthesis of agreement or disagreement, which our
+total signitive intention expresses (or claims to express) is here not authentically carried out, only signitively meant. But if, contrariwise, the indicated
+synthesis is authentically carried out, the authentic synthesis will coincide
+with the non-authentic one (the synthesis in signification). Both are one
+and the same intentional essence, representing one and the same meaning,
+the simple, selfsame judgement, whether carried out intuitively or merely
+signitively. Similar things plainly hold for cases where only some of our
+verbalized intentions enjoy intuitive 'fulness'. The signitive acts involve the
+same meaning as the intuitive, though without the latter's fulness; they merely
+'express' this meaning. The suggestions of this word are the more fitting,
+since signitive acts likewise preserve the sense of an intuition after the latter
+has disappeared, like an empty shell without the intuitive kernel. The unity
+of coincidence is, in the case of the intuitive judgement, a true unity of
+knowledge (if not a unity of relational cognition): we know, however, that,
+in the unity of knowledge, it is not the fulfilling act (here the authentic
+synthesis of judgement) that we know, but the fact which is its objective
+correlate. In intuiting things we carry out a judging synthesis, an intuitive
+thus it is or thus it is not. Because our expressive intention, with its associated word-sounds (the grammatical expression) applies itself to this act of
+fact-envisagement, we achieve knowledge of the intuited fact in question.
+
+Non-objectifying acts as apparent fulfilments of meaning 325
+of the pecontr yers maria orts her express
+lon-obiectifying acts
+We now turn to a final discussion of the seemingly trivial, but, correctly regarded, most important and difficult point at issue (see above, 81 ff.) whether
+the familiar grammatical forms used in our speech for wishes, questions
+voluntary intentions - acts, generally speaking, we do not class as 'objectifying' - are to be regarded as judgements concerning our acts, or whether
+these acts themselves, and not merely such as are 'objectifying, can function
+as 'expressed', whether in a sense-giving or sense-fulfilling fashion. We are
+dealing with sentences like 'Is it a transcendental number?' 'May heaven
+help us!' etc.
+The teasing character of the question is shown by the fact that pre-eminent
+logicians since Aristotle have been unable to agree on its answer. Statements
+express the fact that something is, or that something is not, they assert, they
+judge about something. In their case alone can one talk of true and false. A
+wish or a question asserts nothing. We cannot object to one who utters them:
+'What you say is untrue. He would not even understand our objection.
+Bolzano thought this argument invalid. He said: "A question like "What
+is the relation of the diameter of a circle to its circumference?" asserts
+nothing about what it enquires into, but it asserts something nonetheless:
+our desire, in fact, to be informed concerning the object asked about. It is
+indeed capable of truth and falsehood, and is false when our desire is
+mis-stated by it' (Bolzano, Wissenschaftslehre 1, 822, p. 88).
+We may doubt, however, whether Bolzano has not here confused two
+things: the adequacy or inadequacy of an expression - here a word-sound -
+to our thought, and the truth or falsehood which relates it to the content
+of that thought, and its adequacy to the thing. Regarding the adequacy of
+an expression (as word-sound) to our thought, we can speak in two senses,
+one which relates to unsuitability - as when a speaker chooses to express the
+actually filling his mind, but others at variance with these, and merely imagined by him: he wishes to express these thoughts as if they were filling his
+mind. A suitable, sincerely employed expression can still state both what is
+true and what is false, according as through its sense it expresses what is or
+is not, or, what is the same, according as its sense can be adequately fulfilled
+Instated by a posite adequat as elow. One can talk of sincerity and
+insincerity, of suitability and unsuitability, in the case of every expression
+but one can only talk of truth and falsehood in the case of statements. A
+speaker can, accordingly, be objected to in different ways. What you say is
+
+326 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+false': this is the factual objection. And 'You are not speaking sincerely' or
+'You are expressing yourself unsuitably: this is the objection of insincerity
+or inadequacy of speech. Objections of the latter sort are the only ones that
+an be made to a questioner. He is perhaps pretending, or is using his word
+correctly, and saying something different from what he intends to say. Bu
+one can raise no factual objection to him, since he is making no factual
+claim. If one treats the objection concerned with unsuitability of expression
+as showing that a question expresses a judgement, one, i.e., that would be
+completely expressed in the form 'I am asking whether .. ., one would have in
+consistency to treat each expression in the same manner, and so to treat the
+true sense of each statement whatever as being what we adequately express
+in the word-form 'I am asserting that..?. But the same would have to hold
+of these restatements, which would accordingly land us in an infinite regress.
+In all this it is easily seen that this abundance of ever new statements is no
+mere abundance of words, but yields new statements by no means equival-
+202a
+ent to the original ones, let alone identical in meaning. Does such nonsensical
+consistency not compel us to acknowledge an essential difference between
+one order of sentence-forms and another? (How this difference really must
+be interpreted is explained in our next section: cf. the final paragraph.)
+Here two positions can be taken up. Either one can say: The question of
+sincerity affects every utterance: a judgement accordingly pertains to each
+utterance as such, a judgement relating to the experience of the speaker
+which is to be intimated. A man who speaks, intimates something, and to
+this the intimating judgement corresponds. But what is intimated or expressed
+differs from case to case: the interrogative sentence intimates a question,
+the imperative sentence a command, the indicative sentence a judgement.
+Each indicative sentence therefore implies a double judgement, a judgement,
+namely, about this or that fact, and a second judgement, passed by the
+speaker as such, upon this first judgement as his own experience.
+This appears to be Sigwart's position. We read (Logik, 1, 2nd Edn., 17 f.
+Note):
+The imperative undoubtedly includes an assertion, to the effect, namely,
+that the speaker wills the action he is demanding, the optative that he
+wishes what he utters. This assertion is involved in the fact of speech
+not in the content of what he utters; every statement of the form A is B
+accordingly involves the assertion, based on the mere fact of speech,
+that the thinker thinks and believes what he says. These assertions regarding the subjective state of the speaker, involved in the fact that he
+speaks, and valid on the assumption of his sincerity, accompany all
+speech in the same fashion, and can accordingly not serve as a basis for
+differentiating our various sentence-forms.
+Another way of conceiving the matter would be to reject the intimating
+judgement', and to regard the consequent duplication of judgement in the
+
+Non-objectifying acts as apparent fulfilments of meaning 327
+Against this one might hold that, in each case of adequate, not contextually
+elliptical speech what was expressed was essentially one, in the interrogaive sentence a question, in the optative sentence a wish, in the indicative
+entence a judgement. Before I had completed these Investigations, I mysell
+ments, that I now accompany with suitable criticism.
+§69 Arguments for and against the Aristotelian
+conception
+According to the doctrine which is opposed to that of Aristotle, a man
+who, e.g., utters a question will be communicating to another his wish to be
+informed regarding the state of affairs in question. This communication
+regarding the speaker's actual experience is, it is held, a statement like any
+communication. In the form of the question itself there is no express saying
+that one is asking whether...; this form only marks off the question as a
+question. Our speech, therefore, is a case of contextual ellipticity. The circumstances of utterance make it obvious that it is the speaker himself who
+asks the question. The complete meaning of the sentence does not, accordingly lie in what its mere word-sounds suggest, but is determined by the
+occasion, the context, the relation to the person speaking at the moment.
+In favour of the Aristotelian conception, many replies could now be given.
+(a) The argument ought to apply equally to indicative sentences, so that
+we have to interpret the sentence 'S is P' as a contextual ellipsis for the new
+expression 'I judge that S is P',
+', and so on in infinitum.
+(b) The argument is based on the view that the expressed sense of the
+interrogative sentence differs from its real sense. For, undeniably, in the
+interrogative or wish-sentence, the relation of the wish to the wisher does
+not need to be brought out, as little as, in the case of the indicative sentence,
+the relation of the judgement to the judging person. If this relation is not
+part of the explicit sense of the sentence, but only of its contextually variable
+part, this concession gives one all that one could want. The explicit meaning
+can be altered in certain circumstances, but there will surely also be circumstances where it will be just what we mean. In such cases the mere question
+(and similarly the mere request or command etc.) will receive wholly adequate expression.
+(c) More careful comparison with the indicative sentences of ordinary
+speech favours the Aristotelian conception. In verbal communication such a
+sentence intimates that one is judging, and it is the grammatical form of the
+indicative sentence which brings out the judgement as such. On the utterance of such grammatically framed speech, the effect forthwith attends, that
+
+328 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+the person addressed takes the speaker to be judging. This effect cannot,
+however, constitute the meaning of the expression, which surely means the
+same in soliloquy as in communicative speech. The meaning lies rather in
+the act of judging as the identical judgement-content.
+The same could be the case in regard to interrogative sentences. The
+meaning of an interrogative sentence is unchanged whether we deal with an
+internal question or an overt one. The relation of speaker to person addressed belongs here, as in the case compared, to the merely communicative
+function. And just as in that case the 'content of judgement, i.e. a certain
+specific character of judgement, determined in this or that manner as reards content, constituted the meaning of the indicative sentence, so her
+he content of the question constitutes the meaning of the interrogative
+sentence. In both cases the ordinary meaning can undergo circumstantial
+modifications. We may utter an indicative sentence with the primary intention, not of communicating the relevant state of affairs, but the fact that
+we have the conviction in question, and mean to put it forward. This intention, buttressed, perhaps, by non-grammatical aids (stress, gesture), may be
+understood. Here what underlies our words is a judgement relating to our
+explicit judgement. Just so, in the case of an interrogative or wish-sentence,
+our primary intention may lie, not in our mere wish, but in the fact that we
+wish to express the wish to a hearer. Naturally this interpretation could
+not hold in all cases. It could not hold, e.g., where a burning wish bursts
+spontaneously from the heart. The expression then is intimately one with
+the wish, it clings to it immediately and directly.
+Criticism. Regarded more closely, this argument only proves that a thought
+relating to the communicative function cannot be part of the sense of every
+sentence. The opposing argument is refuted: it rests on the false assumption
+that all expression is communicative, and that communication is always
+a judgement regarding the internal (intimated) experiences of the speaker.
+But its thesis is unrefuted, at least when suitably modified. For we cannot
+exclude the possibility that the controversial wish-, request-, and commandsentences etc., are still judgements about the relevant experienced acts of
+wishing, asking and willing, and that it is only as being so, that they can give
+hese experiences adequate expression. If there is no place for judgement
+ere in the narrower sense of predications - Aristotle certainly had thi
+conception of the controversial sentences - perhaps there is place for them
+in a wider sense of assertive objectivations in general.
+1. As regards (a) we note, further, that the case of statements is not the
+same as, e.g., that of questions. If we transform the sentence 'S' is P' into the
+sentence I judge that S is P', or into any related sentence, which expresses
+a relation to the judging person, however indefinitely, we obtain not merely
+altered meanings, but such as are not equivalent to the original ones: for the
+straightforward sentence may be true, the subjectivized sentence false, and
+conversely. The situation is wholly different in the case compared. Even if
+
+Non-objectifying acts as apparent fulfilments of meaning 329
+one refuses to speak of true and false in this case, one can surely always find
+a statement that 'in essence says the same as the original question or wishform, e.g. 'Is S P?' = 'I should like to know... or 'One would like to know
+whether S is P' etc. May such sentence-forms not imply a relation to the
+speaker, even if only indefinitely and subsidiarily? Does the preservation of
+'essential meaning' in the transformed indicative forms not point to the fact
+conception is, however, affected by the following argument:
+2. There is another way in which one might try to interpret the expressed
+forms in question as judgements. If we utter a wish, even in soliloquy, we
+put it, and the wished-for content, into words, we accordingly have a presentation of it, and of what constitutes it. The wish is, however, not any
+merely presented wish, but the living wish that we have just taken note of.
+And it is this wish, and this wish as such, that we want to intimate. It is not,
+accordingly, our mere presentation, but our inner percept, i.e. really a judgement, that achieves expression. It is not, indeed, a judgement of the same
+sort as our ordinary assertions, that predicate something of something. In
+the expression of a wish, it is only our concern to grasp the internally noted
+experience conceptually (significatively) in straightforward affirmation, and
+to express its simple existence. It is not our concern to make a relational
+predication about such an experience, connecting it with the experiencing
+Against this conception it may be objected that the situation is exactly the
+same for expressed judgements as for all other expressed experiences. If we
+state something, we judge, and our words cover not only the presentation
+underlying our judgement, but also our judgement itself (i.e. in the form of
+an assertion). We should, therefore, also conclude here that the judgement is
+internally perceived, and that the meaning of our statement lies in the straightforwardly affirmative judgement about what we perceive, i.e. about our
+judgement. If no one finds such a conception acceptable in the case of a
+statement, it cannot be seriously entertained in the case of other independent sentences. We recall what was said in our last section. The expressions
+which fit themselves to the expressed experiences, are not related to them
+in the way that names are, nor in any analogous manner. Our experiences
+are not first objectively presented, and then brought under concepts, as if
+together with each new word, a subsumption or predication had taken place
+ment, but the being which is found in a state of affairs. 'Gold', likewise,
+
+330 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+does not name a presentative experience: it names a metal. Expressions
+lame experiences only when such experiences have been made objects o
+resentation or judgement in reflection. The same holds for all words, eve
+syncategorematic ones, in their relation to what is objective: they mean this
+Expressions are not therefore associated as names with the acts which fill
+our minds at each moment, acts in which we live without judging about
+them reflectively: such expressions belong rather to the concrete being of the
+acts themselves. To judge expressly is to judge, to wish expressly is to wish
+To name a judgement or wish is not to judge or wish, but merely to name.
+A judgement named need never be judged by the man who names it, a wish
+named never wished by him. And, even when this is not so, the naming
+expresses no judgement or no wish, but a presentation related to one or the
+other.
+Criticism. This objection also exposes the weakness of our at first attractive
+preliminary argument. It is clear from it, as from our previous discussions,
+that not every expression (qua the expression it is) presupposes a judgement
+or other act, which makes the intimated experience its object. This again
+does not dispose of the thesis: we have not shown, just in the case of the
+sentence-forms under discussion, that they are not judgements about momentary wishing, questioning or requesting experiences, or that they do not
+express their straightforward existence in the speaker. True, to name a wish
+is not therefore to wish, but is experiencing a wish and naming it in the same
+breath, not also a case of wishing? So that, even if expressed wishing is necessarily a wishing which involves naming and stating, the proposition still
+holds, that expressed wishing is wishing and not mere naming
+3. The controversial expressions have the form of sentences, and at times
+the form of categorical sentences with subjects and predicates. From this
+it follows that they can also be treated as having predication in their content, and not merely as predications in relation to one, same, unmentioned
+subject 'I'. E.g. 'May God protect the Kaiser', 'The coachman should harness the horses'. A 'may' or a 'should' is uttered: the subject in question is
+One could here rejoin: Where a 'should' counts as an objective predicate
+and is actually attributed as such, the should-sentence has not merely the
+force of a wish or a command, or not this alone. An objective obligation can
+be said to hold, though the man stating it need experience no act of the kind
+which constitutes an actual consciousness of obligation. If I know that someone's will is bound by a relationship of service or by custom or morality, I
+can judge that he should and must do something. But this expresses no
+living wish, desire or obligation. Statements of obligation may indeed serve
+in appropriate contexts to express acts of this sort, e.g. 'John must harness
+the horses!' But it is clear that here no mere objective obligation is expressed, but my own will, and this not in my words, but rather in my tone
+
+Non-objectifying acts as apparent fulfilments of meaning 33l
+and in the circumstances. In such circumstances the predicative form doubtless
+does duty for an imperative or optative form, i.e. the thought-predication
+implied by the words is either not carried out at all, or is merely subsidiary.
+It is undeniable, lastly, that the predicative interpretation only is plausible in
+certain cases, and not in the case in question. B. Erdmann, who otherwise
+leans towards it, does not favour it in this case. (See B. Erdmann, Logic, 1',
+845, pp. 271 ff.)
+Criticism. It may be questioned whether this refutation suffices. That a
+should-predicate has an objective sense and value cannot be doubted. But
+that, where this is not true, nothing is predicated or at least judged, is by no
+means proved. One might maintain: When we issue a command to someone,
+e.g. a command to the coachman John to harness the horses, he counts for
+us as someone subordinate to our will: he is apprehended as such by us and
+accordingly addressed in this form of expression. We say: 'John, harness
+the horses!' That he is one who should harness horses is here predicated of
+him, naturally in the expectation of corresponding practical results, and not
+merely to attest that he counts as such for me. The expression of the command is relative. We can think of no one commanded, without at the same
+time thinking, definitely or indefinitely, of someone who commands him.
+This being wholly obvious requires no explicit expression. Instead of the
+cumbrous form I command etc., we employ the brief imperative, whose
+form points to a communicative relation. The speech-forms 'should' and
+'must' were not originally used by a commander in face of the commanded
+to express his actual voluntary intent, but only when a more objective expression of his own or someone else's voluntary intent was needed, e.g.
+when there was a third person relaying someone else's command or when a
+legislating will found expression in a law. When communication between
+commander and commanded lapses, the imperative, which fits the conscious
+situation of the former, loses application. This conception can be applied
+generally. One can say: In the optative, what we wish is presented as wished,
+and stated to be such. Just so, in a requesting form, what we request is
+presented as requested, in a question what we ask presented as asked etc
+These acts are related in our presentation to their intentional objects, anc
+are so themselves made objective as reflexive predicates attaching to the
+latter.
+In the communicative situation, many others of the expressions in question have, like commands, the role of telling the hearer (like essentially
+occasional expressions) that the speaker is performing certain intimated acts
+(of request, congratulation, condolence etc.) with an intentional regard to
+his auditor. To the extent that expressions of all sorts may in full consciousness be informed by the wish to communicate with others, and to acquaint
+others with one's own convictions, doubts, hopes etc., they are perhaps all
+accompanied by reflex acts directed upon such inner experiences and, more
+precisely, by acts which intuitively relate the latter to the speaker and to the
+
+332 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+person addressed. This accordingly holds of communicative statements as
+well. These acts of reflection and reference do not on that account form part
+of the meaning of a statement and of all other expressions, but this may very
+well be said of expressions of our controversial class, in virtue of which they
+are in all cases directed to inner experiences of the speaker.
+In solitary mental life - if we disregard exceptional cases of talking to
+oneself, asking oneself questions, desiring or commanding oneself - relation
+to an auditor falls away, and the subjective expressions in question, which
+are still applicable, express the simple being of inner experiences in more
+or less definite relation to the subject. In a monologue a question is either
+of the form 'I ask myself whether..., or relation to the subject vanishes
+entirely: the interrogative expression becomes a mere name, or not really
+even that. For the normal use of a name is in a context of predicative or
+attributive relation, of which there is here no question. Since the expression
+becomes one with the intuited inner experience as a knowing of the latter,
+an interweaving of factors arises having the character of a self-enclosed
+edge is not here a theoretical function - this is the case only in predication,
+while here nothing is predicated. The question is known and expressed
+without being 'subjectivized', in the sense of being made either the subject or
+the object of predicative acts. Plainly this directly expressive sense of the
+interrogative sentence helps to constitute the predicative interrogation - I
+ask myself whether etc. - or the meaning which corresponds to such altered
+circumstances.
+§70 Decision
+If by a "judgement' one means a predicative act, then our discussions have
+shown that our disputed sentences do not invariably express judgements.
+Even in these cases, however, an unbridgeable gulf separates us from the
+logicians who side with Aristotle. On their view, names, statements, optative
+sentences, interrogations, commands etc., are coordinated expressive forms,
+and coordinated in the following manner: names express presentations,
+statements express judgements, optative sentences express wishes etc. Presentations, judgements, questions etc., in short, acts of all sorts, can serve to
+confer meaning in exactly the same fashion, for to 'express acts' means the
+same in all cases, i.e. to have one's meaning in such acts. We, on the other
+hand, see a fundamental difference between names and statements, on the
+one hand, and the expressions of our controversial group, on the other. The
+acts of presentation or judging expressed by names or statements may
+confer or fulfil meaning, but are not therefore meant; they do not become
+objects of naming and predication, but are constitutive of such objects. On
+
+Non-objectifying acts as apparent fulfilments of meaning 333
+the other hand we find, in flat contrast, that the acts 'expressed' by our conof asking, wishing, commanding etc
+alked of, and perhaps into components of preten state of air
+class of intuitions. It is not the wishes, commands etc., themselves that are
+expressed by these grammatical patterns and their significations; it is rather
+the intuitions of these acts that serve as fulfilments. When we compare
+indicative with optative sentences, we must not coordinate judgements with
+wishes, but states of affairs with wishes.
+What results accordingly is the fact that:
+The ostensible expressions of non-objectifying acts are really contingent
+specifications of statements and other expressions of objectifying acts which
+have an immense practical and communicative importance.
+The contentious issue here dealt with is of fundamental importance, since
+on its solution depends, on the one hand, whether we accept a doctrine
+Which makes all meaning, whether in intention or fulfilment, of a single kind
+- the genus of objectifying acts, with their fundamental division into the
+significative and the intuitive - or whether, on the other hand, we decide to
+permit acts of all sorts to confer or fulfil meaning. The issue is, of course,
+not less important because it is the first to call our attention to the fundamental triplicity of the ambiguity of talk about 'expressed acts, on whose
+analysis our present Investigation first embarked (cf. §2 above). There it was
+said that we may mean by 'expressed acts':
+1. The significative acts which give expressions meaning, and which have,
+in their significative fashion, a certain objectivity of reference.
+2. The intuitive acts, which frequently fulfil the significant intent of an
+expression, and so represent the significantly meant objects intuitively, and
+in a parallel intuitive 'sense'.
+3. The acts which are the objects of signification, and likewise of intuition,
+in all cases where an expression (in sense 2) expresses the speaker's own
+experiences of the moment. If these are not objectifying acts, their nature will
+not permit them to function under the rubrics 1 and 2.
+The root of all our difficulties lies in the fact that, in the direct application of
+expressions (or acts to be expressed) to intuitively grasped inner experiences,
+
+334 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
+our significative acts are completely fulfilled by the inner intuition which
+attaches to them, so that both are most intimately blended, while these same
+intuitions, being internal, exhaust themselves in the straightforward presentation of the acts that they mean.
+Finally we must observe that the distinction made above as against Bolzano
+- between cases where only the subjective objection can be raised - the
+objection to the expression's sincerity or adequacy - and cases where the
+factual objection can be raised - the objection related to objective truth and
+falsity - that this distinction has, on a closer survey, no true connection with
+our controversial question. For it has a quite general concern with the difference between expressions relating to intuitively envisaged act-experiences,
+and experiences not so relating. In the first class there are many quite uncontroversial predications, e.g. all statements of the form 'I ask whether..?,
+'I command, wish that..? etc. And, be it noted, there can be no factual
+objections to subjective judgements thus formulated: they are true or false,
+but truth here coincides with sincerity. In the case of other statements which
+aim at what is 'objective' (i.e. not at the self-expressing subject and his
+experiences) the factual question concerns our meaning. The question of
+sincerity depends on the possibility of seeming assertions, from which the
+genuine, normal act of meaning is absent. Really there is no judgement; the
+meaning of a statement is presented in the context of an intent to deceive.
+
+Appendix
+External and internal perception:
+physical and psychical phenomena
+The concepts of external perception and perception of self, of sensuous and
+internal perception, have for the naive man the following content. External
+perception is the perception of external things, their qualities and relationships, their changes and interactions. Perception of self is the perception that
+each can have of his own ego and its properties, its states and activities.
+Asked who this perceived ego may be, the naive man would reply by point
+ing to his bodily appearance, or would recount his past and present experi
+ences. To the further question whether all this is included in his percept
+of self, he would naturally reply that, just as the perceived external thing
+has many properties, and has had many in the course of its changes, which
+are not for the moment 'open to perception', so a corresponding fact holds
+for his perceived ego. In the changing acts of self-perception appear, on
+occasion, such and such presentations, feelings, wishes and bodily activities
+of the ego, just as the exterior or the interior of a house, or such and such
+sides and parts of it, enter from time to time into outer perception. Naturally,
+however, the ego remains the perceived object in the one case, as the house
+is in the other.
+For the naive man our second pair of notions, that of sensuous and internal perception, does not altogether coincide with the pair just discussed, that
+of outward perception and perception of self. We perceive sensuously wha
+we perceive by the eye and the ear, by smell and taste, in brief, through the
+organs of sense. In this field everyone locates, not only external things, but
+nis own body and bodily activities, such as walking, eating, seeing, hearin
+etc. What we call 'inner perception', on the other hand, concerns mainl
+such 'spiritual' experiences as thinking, feeling and willing, but also everyhing that we locate, like these, in the interior of our bodies, do not conne
+vith our outward organs
+In philosophical diction, both pairs of terms - we usually prefer the pair
+of 'internal and external perception' - express only one pair of concepts.
+After Descartes had sharply separated mens and corpus, Locke, using the
+
+336 Elements of a phenomenological eludication of knowledge
+terms 'sensation' and 'reflection', introduced the two corresponding classes
+of perception into modern philosophy. This division has remained in force till
+today. External perception was regarded, following Locke, as our perception
+of bodies, while inner perception was the perception that our 'spirits' or 'souls
+have of their own activities (their cogitationes in the Cartesian sense). A
+division of perceptions is accordingly mediated by a division among the objects
+of perception, though a difference in origin is likewise set beside it. In one
+case perception arises from the effects of physical things operating through
+the senses on our spirits, in the other case out of a reflection on the activities
+carried out by the mind on the basis of "ideas' won through sensation.
+2
+In quite recent times men have been much concerned to achieve an adequate
+overhaul and a deepening of Locke's obviously vague and rough positions.
+General epistemological interests were, on the one hand, responsible for this
+move. We recall the traditional estimate of the relative value for knowledge
+of the two forms of perception: external perception is deceptive, inner perception evident. In this evidence lies one of the basic pillars of knowledge, which
+scepticism cannot shake. Inner perception is also the only case of perception where the object truly corresponds to the act of perception, is, in fact,
+immanent in it. It is also, to speak pointedly, the one type of perception that
+deserves the name. In the interest of perceptual theory, we must therefore
+enter more exactly into the essence of inner, as opposed to outer perception.
+Psychological interests were, on the other hand, involved. Men were concerned with the much-debated fixing of the domain of empirical psychology
+and, particularly, with establishing for it its own justification as against the
+natural sciences, by marking out for it a peculiar territory of phenomena.
+Even the prime place in epistemology readily accorded to psychology as
+basic philosophical discipline, required that its objects be defined with as
+few epistemological commitments as possible; it should not, therefore, concern itself with transcendent realities of so controversial a type as soul and
+body as if they were obvious data. Locke's classification of perceptions had
+just such a presupposition: it was therefore at once unsuited, and not in fact
+designed, to serve as a basis for a definition of psychology, and to do justice
+to the interests mentioned. It is clear, further, that if a distinction of perceptions is set up on the basis of an anticipated distinction between bodily
+and spiritual matters, then the former distinction cannot be used as a basis
+of distinction between the science of bodily and the science of spiritual
+phenomena. The matter would be different if one could succeed in finding
+urely descriptive marks for a division of percepts, marks which left ou
+lasses unaltered in extent, and which, while lacking all epistemological pre
+suppositions, would serve to demarcate the corresponding bodily phenomena
+from psychic phenomena.
+
+Appendix 337
+A possible path seemed here to be opened by the Cartesian approach
+through doubt, with its emphasis on the epistemological position of inner
+perception. We have already touched on this above. The line of thought,
+which develops here, runs as follows:
+However widely I may extend my critical doubts regarding knowledge,
+I cannot doubt that I exist and am doubting, or again, while I experience
+them, that I am having presentations, am judging, feeling or however else
+may designate such inwardly perceived appearances: to doubt in such
+ase would evidently be irrational. We accordingly have absolute 'evidence
+regarding the existence of the objects of inner perception, we have that
+clearest cognition, that unassailable certainty which distinguishes knowledge
+in the strictest sense. It is quite different in the case of outer perception.
+It lacks 'evidence, and the frequent conflicts in statements relying upon it
+point, in fact, to its capacity to deceive. We have therefore no right to
+assume from the outset that the objects of outer perception really and truly
+exist as they seem to us to be. We have, in fact, many reasons to think that
+they do not really exist at all, but can at best lay claim to a phenomenal or
+"intentional' existence. If one makes the reality of a perceived object part of
+the notion of perception, then outer perception is not, in this strict sense,
+perception at all. This evident character will in any case give us a descriptive
+mark, free from presuppositions regarding metaphysical realities, which will
+enable us to sort out our various classes of perceptions. It is a character
+given with, or absent from, the perceptual experience itself, and this alone
+determines our division.
+perceptions, they unmistakably constitute essentially distinct classes. This is
+not to assert that the objects in themselves, i.e. the souls and bodies, that we
+ightly or wrongly range under them, differ essentially: a purely descriptive
+reatment that avoids all transcendence establishes an unbridgeable gulf
+between these phenomena. On the one side we have the sensory qualities,
+which in themselves form a descriptively closed class, whether there are
+ments, surmises, wishes, hopes etc. We here enter, as it were, another world.
+
+338 Elements of a phenomenological eludication of knowledge
+These phenomena have relation to what is sensible, but are not themselves
+to be compared with the latter: they do not belong to one and the same
+(genuine) kind. When we have first clearly seen the descriptive unity of thi
+class through examples, one finds, with a little attention, a positive mark
+which characterizes them all: the mark of 'intentional inexistence'
+One can of course use the above descriptive distinction of inner and outer
+perception to arrive at just such a distinction of the two classes of phenomena.
+t becomes now a good definition to say: Psychic phenomena are the phenom
+na of inner perception, physical phenomena those of outer perception!
+In this manner a closer treatment of the two sorts of perceptions leads
+not merely to a descriptive, epistemologically important characterization of
+these perceptions themselves, but also to a fundamental, descriptive division
+to have achieved, for psychological and scientific purposes, a metaphysically
+uncommitted definition, not oriented towards supposed data in some transcendent world, but to what is truly given phenomenally.
+out of the operation of bodies on our minds through our sense-organs,
+psychic phenomena as the phenomena discovered by us in perceiving the
+activities of our minds. In both cases the descriptive character of the phenow be defined as the science of psychic phenomena, as natural science is of
+physical phenomena.
+These definitions require certain limitations in order to correspond truly
+to our actual sciences, limitations which point to explanatory metaphysical
+hypotheses, whereas the phenomena, as descriptively differentiated, remain
+the true starting-points of our treatments, and the objects to be explained.
+The definition of natural science is particularly in need of limiting conditions, for it is not concerned with all physical phenomena, not with the
+phenomena of imagination, but only with those which come before senseperception. And, even in their case, it only sets up laws to the extent that
+these depend on the physical stimulation of the sense-organs. One might
+express the scientific task of natural science, by saying that natural science
+is the science which seeks to explain the sequence of the physical phenomena of normal, pure sensations - sensations uninfluenced by peculiar
+psychical conditions and events - by assuming the action on our senseorgans of a world extended in three space-like dimensions, and taking
+place in one time-like dimension. Without settling the absolute character
+of this world, it is satisfied to attribute to it powers provocative of our
+sensations and influencing each other in their operation, and to set up
+laws of coexistence and succession for such powers. In stating these, it
+indirectly states the laws of sequence of the physical phenomena of our
+sensations, laws conceived in their purity, in scientific abstraction from
+
+Appendix 339
+concomitant mental conditions, as things taking place for an invariant
+ensibility. The expression 'science of physical phenomena' must be inter
+reted in this rather complicated way, if it is to be equated with th
+meaning of 'natural science'
+(Brentano, Psychologie, 1, pp. 127-128)
+hat the concept of the psychic phenomenon should be widened rathe
+is plain that such physical phenomena only enter into descriptions o
+he peculiarities of psychic phenomena as the content of the latter. The
+(Ibid. pp. 129 f.)
+3
+The interesting line of thought that I have just expounded represents, as
+my longer quotations have made plain, the standpoint of Brentano, and
+also that of a whole succession of thinkers who are theoretically close to
+him. There are further respects, as is well known, in which 'inner perception'
+plays an important role in Brentano's psychology. I am here only concerned
+with his doctrine of inner consciousness. Every psychic phenomenon is
+not merely a consciousness, but itself the content of a consciousness; we are
+conscious of it in the narrower sense of perceiving it. The flux of inne
+experience is therefore also a continuous flux of inner percepts, which are
+most intimately united with the psychic experiences in question. For inner
+perception is no second, independent act supervening upon a relevant
+psychic phenomenon; the latter rather involves, in addition to its relation to
+a primary object, e.g. an externally perceived content, 'itself in all its completeness as presented and known' (ibid. p. 182). In so far as the act directly
+intends its primary object, it is also subsidiarily directed upon itself. In this
+way one avoids the endless complication seemingly threatened by the consciousness which accompanies all psychic phenomena (since their multiple
+division into three 'ground-classes' itself involves an inner perception). The
+'evidence' and infallibility of inner perception will also be rendered possible
+in this manner (ibid. II, ch. 3, pp. 182 ff.). Brentano is here, in one of his
+main views, i.e. in his interpretation of consciousness as a continuous stream
+
+340 Elements of a phenomenological eludication of knowledge
+of internal perception, in harmony with the great thinkers of the past. Even
+Locke, a true student of experience, defines consciousness as the perception
+of what goes on in a man's own mind.4
+Brentano's theories have aroused much opposition. This has not only
+been directed to the doctrines of inner perception just mentioned, whose
+subtly constructed complexity still certainly requires a phenomenological
+foundation, but also against his distinction between perceptions and phenomena and, in particular, against the laying down of the tasks of psychology
+and natural science which is based upon this. The relevant questions have
+repeatedly been made the theme of serious discussion in the past decade,
+and it is sad that, despite its fundamental importance for psychology and
+epistemology, agreement has not been reached.
+the fact that the fundamental psychological and epistemological questions
+which cause controversy in these dimensions of enquiry, have not been
+sufficiently clarified, a natural consequence of defective phenomenological
+analysis. On both sides the conception with which men operated remained
+ambiguous, on both sides there was a consequent falling into delusive confusions. This will be clear from the following criticism of the illuminating
+views of Brentano.
+4
+According to
+Brentano inner perception distinguishes itself from outer
+perception:
+1. by its evidence and its incorrigibility, and
+2. by essential differences in phenomena. In inner perception we experience
+exclusively psychic phenomena, in outer perception physical phenomena.
+his exact parallelism makes it possible for the first-named distinction
+erve as a characteristic distinguishing mark of the perceivable phenomer
+as well.
+As opposed to this, inner and outer perception seem to me, if the terms are
+naturally interpreted, to be of an entirely similar epistemological character.
+More explicitly: there is a well-justified distinction between evident and nonevident, or between infallible and fallible perception. But, if one understands
+by outer perception (as one naturally does, and as Brentano also does) the
+perception of physical things, properties, events etc., and classes all other
+perceptions as inner perceptions, then such a division will not coincide at all
+with the division previously given. For not every perception of the ego, nor
+every perception of a psychic state referred to the ego, is certainly evident,
+if by the 'ego' we mean what we all mean by it, and what we all think we
+perceive in perceiving ourselves, i.e. our own empirical personality. It is
+
+Appendix 34l
+clear, too, that most perceptions of psychic states cannot be evident, since
+these are perceived with a bodily location. That anxiety tightens my throat,
+that pain bores into my tooth, that grief gnaws at my heart: I perceive these
+things as I perceive that the wind shakes the trees, or that this box is square
+and brown in colour, etc. Here, indeed, outer perceptions go with inner
+perceptions, but this does not affect the fact that the psychic phenomena
+perceived are, as they are perceived, non-existent. Surely it is clear that
+psychic phenomena, also, can be perceived transcendently? Exactly regarded,
+all psychic phenomena seen in natural or empirical-scientific attitudes are
+perceived transcendently. The pure presentedness of experience presupposes a purely phenomenological attitude which will inhibit all transcendent
+assertions.
+I know what will here be objected: that we have forgotten the difference
+between perception and apperception. Inner perception means the directlyconscious living-through of mental acts, they are here taken as what they
+are, and not as what they are apprehended or apperceived as. One must,
+however, reflect that what is true for the case of inner perception must be
+true also for the case of outer perception. If the essence of perception does
+not lie in apperception, then all talk of perception in regard to external
+things, mountains, woods, houses etc., is misguided, and this, the normal
+sense of the word 'perception', surely illustrated in these cases above all
+others, must be abandoned. Outer perception is apperception, and the unity
+of the concept demands that inner perception should be so too. It is of
+the essence of perception that something should appear in it: apperception,
+however, constitutes what we call appearance, whether veridical or not, and
+whether it remains faithfully and adequately in the frame of the immediately
+given, or anticipates future perception in going beyond it. The house appears
+to me - in no other manner than that I apperceive actually experienced
+sense-contents in a certain fashion. I hear a barrel organ - the tones sensed
+are interpreted as those of a barrel organ. In the same way I apperceivingly
+perceive my own psychic phenomena, the blessedness quivering through
+'me', the grief in my heart etc. They are called 'appearances, or rather
+apparent contents, being contents of apperception.
+5
+The term 'appearance' is, of course, beset with ambiguities, whose extreme
+dangers are seen precisely in this case. It will not be useless at this point to
+list these equivocations explicitly: we have already touched on them in passing in the text of these Investigations. Talk of 'appearance' has a preferred
+ipplication to acts of intuitive presentation, to acts of perception, on the on
+land, and to acts of representation, on the other, e.g. acts of rememberin
+magining, or pictorially representing (in the ordinary sense), on a basi
+nixed with perception. 'Appearance' accordingly means
+
+342 Elements of a phenomenological eludication of knowledge
+1. The concrete intuitive experience (the intuitive presentedness or representedness of a given object for us); the concrete experience, e.g., when
+we perceive the lamp standing before us. Since the qualitative character of
+the act, whether the object is regarded as real or not, is irrelevant, it can also
+be ignored entirely, and 'appearance' then coincides with what we defined as
+'representation' in the last Investigation (cf. VI, $26, p. 740).
+2. The intuited (appearing) object, taken as it appears here and now, e.g.
+this lamp as it counts for some percept we have just performed.
+3. In misleading fashion we also call the real (reellen) constituents of appearances in sense 1, i.e. those of the concrete acts of appearing or intuiting,
+'appearances'. Such appearances are, above all, the presentative sensations,
+the experienced moments of colour, form etc., which we fail to distinguish
+from apparent properties of the (coloured, formed) objects corresponding
+to them, and apparent in the act which 'interprets' them. That it is important to distinguish between them, that it does not do to confuse a coloursensation with an apparent bodily colouring, the sensation of form with
+bodily form etc., we have often stressed. Uncritical theories certainly ignore
+the distinction. But even those who would refuse to say with Schopenhauer
+that 'the world is my idea, are accustomed to speak as if apparent things
+were compounded out of sense-contents. One could certainly say that
+apparent things as such, the mere things of sense, are composed of a stuff
+analogous to that which as sensation is counted a content of consciousness. This does not affect the fact that the thing's apparent properties are
+not themselves sensations, but only appear as analogues of sensations. For
+they are not present, as sensations are, in consciousness, but are merely
+represented in it, as properties which appear in it, which are transcendently referred to. For this reason perceived external things, likewise, are
+not complexes of sensations: they are rather objects of appearances, objects
+appearing as complexes of properties, whose types stand in a peculiar analogy to types found among sensations. We could put what we have just
+said somewhat differently. Under the rubric of 'sensations', we range certain sorts of experiences of this or that actual kind belonging to a unity
+of consciousness. If it now happens that, in a unity of consciousness, real
+properties of analogous kinds appear as external to, and transcending such
+sensations, we may then call them after these sensational classes, but they
+are no longer sensations. We emphasize the word 'external', which must
+of course not be understood spatially. However we may decide the question of the existence or nonexistence of phenomenal external things, we
+cannot doubt that the reality of each such perceived thing cannot be understood as the reality of a perceived complex of sensations in a perceiving
+consciousness. For it is plain, and confirmable by phenomenologica
+inalysis in each instance, that the thing of perception, this so-called sensational complex, differs in every circumstance, both as a whole and in every
+
+Appendix 343
+distinct moment of property, from the sensational complex actually lived
+through in the percept in question, whose objective apperception first constitutes the perceptual sense, and thereby the apparent thing, in intentional
+fashion.
+It may indeed be said that the original concept of appearance was the one
+given in our second place above: the concept of what appears, or of what
+inner intuition, we call all experiences in an ego's experiential unity phenomena. Phenomenology is accordingly the theory of experiences in general, inclusive of all matters, whether real (reellen) or intentional, given in
+experiences, and evidently discoverable in them. Pure phenomenology is
+accordingly the theory of the essences of 'pure phenomena', the phenomena
+of a "pure consciousness' or of a 'pure ego': it does not build on the ground,
+given by transcendent apperception, of physical and animal, and so of
+psycho-physical nature, it makes no empirical assertions, it propounds no
+judgements which relate to objects transcending consciousness: it establishes
+no truths concerning natural realities, whether physical or psychic - no
+psychological truths, therefore, in the historical sense - and borrows no such
+truths as assumed premisses. It rather takes all apperceptions and judgemental assertions which point beyond what is given in adequate, purely
+immanent intuition, which point beyond the pure stream of consciousness,
+and treats them purely as the experiences they are in themselves: it subjects
+them to a purely immanent, purely descriptive examination into essence.
+This examination of essence is also pure in a second sense, in the sense of
+Ideation; it is an a priori examination in the true sense. So understood, all
+the Investigations of the present work have been purely phenomenological,
+in so far, that is, as they did not have ontological themes, and did not, as in
+the Third and Sixth Investigation, seek to make a priori assertions regarding
+the objects of possible consciousness. They did not speak of psychological
+facts and laws in an 'objective' nature, only of pure possibilities and necessities, which belong to any form of the pure 'cogito': they spoke of these as
+regards their real (reellen) and their intentional contents, or as regards their
+a priori possibilities of connection with other such patterns in an ideally
+possible conscious context.
+As the term 'appearance' is ambiguous, so also, and consequently, is the
+term 'perception', and so are all further terms used in connection with perception. These ambiguities fill theories of perception with confused errors.
+The 'perceived' is, e.g., what appears in perception, i.e. its object (the house)
+ind, further, the sense-content experienced in it, i.e. the sum of the present
+ng contents, which in their interconnection are 'interpreted' as the hous
+and singly 'interpreted' as its properties.
+
+344 Elements of a phenomenological eludication of knowledge
+5a
+Excerpt from the First Edition which was replaced by the first two paragraphs of the third note in the preceding §5 in Edition II.
+3. If we are only clear that we have to draw a distinction in our
+intuition between sensations as lived experiences, which are accordingly
+components of the subject, and phenomenal determinations, as componnts of the intentional object, and that both only coincide in the ideal
+case of adequate intuition (which does not come into question for us):
+then we readily see that our inwoven sensations cannot themselves count
+as appearances, whether in the sense of acts or of apparent objects. Not
+in the former, since under the rubric of sensations we sum up certain
+lon-acts, which perhaps receive an objectifying interpretation in acts
+not in the latter, since acts would have to be part of the phenomena
+tion to them. Such acts are indeed possible, but that they are part of
+the stock-in-trade of every percept, and this in relation to the percept's
+presentative sensations, cannot be shown to be necessary either by
+descriptive analysis or on genetic grounds. All this goes without saying
+for imaginative intuitions as well, in relation to their imaginatively representative contents.
+If one has once got to the point of regarding all components of
+appearances in sense 1 as themselves appearances, then it is a further,
+almost unconscious step to regard everything psychic, all lived experi
+ences in the experiential unity of the ego, as phenomena.
+6
+How misleading such ambiguities show themselves to be appears in
+Brentano's theory, with its division into inner and outer perception accordng to evidential character and separate phenomenal class. We are told tha
+uter perception is not evident, and is even delusive. This is undoubtedl
+the case if we mean by the 'physical phenomena' what such perception
+perceives, physical things, their properties and changes etc. But when
+Brentano exchanges this authentic, and alone permissible sense of the word
+"perceive', for an improper sense which relates, not to external objects, but
+to presenting contents, contents, i.e., present as real parts (reell angehörigen)
+in perception, and when he consequently gives the name of 'physical phenomena', not merely to outer objects, but also to these contents, these latter
+seem infected with the fallibility of outer perception. I believe that stricter
+divisions are necessary here. If an external object (a house) is perceived,
+presenting sensations are experienced in this perception, but they are not
+perceived. When we are deluded regarding the existence of the house, we
+are not deluded regarding the existence of our experienced sense-contents,
+
+Appendix 345
+since we do not pass judgement on them at all, do not perceive them in this
+it as being what it is. There are, therefore, evident percepts of 'physical'
+contents, as well as of 'psychical'.
+If it were now objected that sensuous contents are invariably and necessarily interpreted objectively, that they are always bearers of outer intuitions,
+and can only be attended to as contents of such intuitions, the point need
+not be disputed: it would make no difference to the situation. The evidence
+of the existence of these contents would be as indisputable as before, and
+would also not be our evidence for 'psychic phenomena' in the sense of acts.
+The evidence for the being of the whole psychic phenomenon implies that
+for each of its parts, but the perception of the part is a new perception with
+a new evidence, which is by no means that of the whole phenomenon.
+An analogous ambiguity to that which affects the notion of a physical
+phenomenon, will also be found, if our conception is consistent, in the case
+of the notion of the psychic phenomenon. This is not the case for Brentano.
+He understands by a psychic phenomenon only an actually present actexperience, and by an inner perception a perception which simply apprehends such an experience, just as it is there. Brentano ignores the fact that
+he has only done justice to one class of percepts of psychic phenomena
+under the name of 'inner perception', and that it is not possible to divide all
+percepts into the two groups of outer and inner. He also ignores the fact
+that the whole evidential prerogative accorded to his 'inner perception' hangs
+upon the fact that he has employed an essentially distorted concept of perception in the case of inner perception, and that it does not depend on the
+peculiarity of inwardly perceived 'phenomena'. Had he treated as genuine
+percepts of physical phenomena only such objective interpretations and
+apprehensions as survey their objects adequately, he could have attributed
+evidence to that perception of sense-experiences which was by him assigned
+to outer perception, and he could not have said of inner perception (in his
+sense) that it is 'really the only sort of perception in the true sense of the
+word' (ibid. p. 119).
+It is absolutely clear that the conceptual pairs of inner and outer, and of
+evident and non-evident perception, need not coincide at all. The first pair
+is determined by the concepts of physical and psychical, however these may
+
+346 Elements of a phenomenological eludication of knowledge
+be demarcated; the second expresses the epistemologically fundamental antithesis studied in our Sixth Investigation, the opposition between adequate
+perception (or intuition in the narrowest sense, whose perceptual intention
+is exclusively directed to a content truly present to it) and the merely supposing, inadequate perception, whose intention does not find fulfilment in
+present content, but rather goes through this to constitute the lively, but
+always one-sided and presumptive, presentedness of what is transcendent.
+In the first case the experienced content is also the object of perception, in
+the second, content and object fall asunder. The content represents what it
+does not itself have, what is, however, made manifest in it, and what is, in a
+certain sense, its analogue (if we confine ourselves to what is immediately
+intuited), as body-colour is an analogue of sense-colour.
+In this separation we have the essence of the epistemological difference
+that men look for between inner and outer perception. It is the operative
+factor in the Cartesian treatment of doubt. I can doubt the truth of an
+tentional, object is not immanent in the act of appearing. The intention
+is there, but the object itself, that is destined finally to fulfil it, is not one
+with it. How could its existence be evident to me? But I cannot doubt an
+adequate, purely immanent perception, since there are no residual intentions
+in it that must yet achieve fulfilment. The whole intention, or the intention
+in all its aspects, is fulfilled. Or, as we also expressed it: the object is not in
+our percept merely believed to exist, but is also itself truly given, and as
+what it is believed to be. It is of the essence of adequate perception that the
+intuited object itself really and truly dwells in it, which is merely another
+way of saying that only the perception of one's own actual experiences is
+indubitable and evident. Not every such percept is evident. In the percept of
+toothache, e.g., a real experience is perceived, and yet our perception often
+deceives: the pain appears to bore a sound tooth. The possibility of our
+error is plain. The perceived object is not the pain as experienced, but the
+pain in a transcendent reference as connected with the tooth. Adequate
+perception involves, however, that in it the perceived is experienced as it is
+perceived (as the perception thinks or conceives it). In this sense we obviously only have an adequate percept of our own experiences, and of these only
+to the extent that we apprehend them purely, without going apperceptively
+7
+It might now be objected: An experience is surely the same as a psychic
+phenomenon. What, then, is the dispute all about? I answer: If one means
+by "psychic phenomena' the real (realen) constituents of our consciousness, the experiences themselves that are there, and if one further means by
+inner percepts, or percepts of psychic phenomena, adequate percepts, whose
+
+Appendix 347
+intention finds immanent fulfilment in the experiences in question, then
+the scope of inner perception will of course coincide with that of adequate
+perception. It is important, however, to note:
+1. That psychic phenomena in this sense are not the same as psychic
+Rochemena or operatino sensed in is Desphere exparione as reh
+all sense-contents, all sensations, also belong.
+2. That the non-inner perceptions (the remainder class) will not then coincide with outer perceptions in the ordinary sense of the word, but with the
+much wider class of transcendent, inadequate perceptions. If a sense-content,
+or sense-complex or sequence of sense-contents is apprehended as a thing
+out there, as a multitude, an articulated connection of several things, or as a
+change in things, an external happening etc., we have an outer percept in the
+ordinary sense. But a non-sensuous content can also belong to the representative stuff of a transcendent percept, particularly in association with
+sense-contents. Our perceived object can then as readily be an external object with perceived mental properties (this happens in differing fashion in the
+apprehension of one's own and other men's bodily being as "persons') or, as
+in psycho-physical apperception, an inner object, a subjective experience,
+perceived with physical properties attaching to it.
+3. When in psychology, as the objective science of animal mentality,
+we mean by perceptions of psychic phenomena the perceptions that a man
+has of his own experiences, which the perceiver apprehends as belonging
+to himself, this particular person, all inner perceptions are no less cases of
+transcendent apperception than are outer perceptions. Among these there
+are some which (with some abstraction) count as adequate, in so far as they
+seize the man's own (relevant) experiences in their very selves. But in so far
+as even such 'adequate' inner perceptions apperceive the experiences they
+apprehend as those of a percipient, psycho-physical, personal ego, and so as
+belonging to the presented objective world, they are in this respect infected
+with an essential inadequacy. There are, further, cases of inner perception,
+as there are cases of outer perception, where the perceived object, in the
+sense given to it in our percept, has no existence. The distinction, funda
+nental even for psychology, between adequate and inadequate perception -
+psychological adequateness being understood as the abstraction we mentione
+- intersects the distinction between inner and outer perception, and therefore
+pervades the sphere of the former.
+8
+The ambiguities of the word 'phenomenon' allow us first to call apparent
+objects and their properties 'phenomena', then to apply the term to the
+experiences which constitute their act of appearing (particularly to the experienced contents in the sense of sensations) and, lastly, to all experiences
+
+348 Elements of a phenomenological eludication of knowledge
+whatever. These ambiguities explain why we tend to confuse two essentially
+different types of psychological division of phenomena'.
+1. Divisions of experiences, e.g. the division of experiences into acts and
+non-acts. Such divisions naturally fall into the sphere of psychology, which
+accordingly has to deal with all experiences, which it of course apperceives
+in transcendent fashion as experiences of animal beings in nature.
+2. The division of phenomenal objects into, e.g., such as seem to belong to
+the consciousness of an ego and such as do not seem to do so, i.e. the division
+into psychical and physical objects (contents, properties, relations etc.).
+In Brentano these two divisions are confused. He simply opposes physical to psychical phenomena, and defines them unmistakably as a division
+of experiences into acts and non-acts. But he at once mixes up, under the
+rubric of physical phenomena the contents of sensę,® and apparent external
+objects (or their phenomenal properties), so that the division now becomes a
+division of phenomenal objects into physical and psychical (in an ordinary
+or near-ordinary sense), in which the latter division furnishes the names.
+Closely connected with this confusion is the erroneous criterion, also used
+by Brentano, to divide the two classes of phenomena: that physical phenomena only exist 'phenomenally and intentionally, while psychical phenomena
+also 'have an actual existence as well as an intentional one'.? If we understand by 'physical phenomena' phenomenal things, it is at least sure that
+they do not need to exist. The forms of productive fancy, most of the objects
+of artistic representation in paintings, statues, poems etc., hallucinatory and
+illusory objects, exist only in a phenomenal and intentional manner, i.e. they
+do not exist in the authentic sense at all; only the relevant acts of appearing
+exist with their real (reellen) and intentional contents. The matter is quite
+different in the case of physical phenomena interpreted as sensed contents.
+The sensed (experienced) colour-contents, shape-contents etc., which we
+enjoy when we look at Böcklin's picture of the Elysian Fields, and which,
+informed by an imaginative act-character, are made into the consciousness
+of the pictured objects, are real (reelle) constituents of this experience. And
+they do not exist in merely phenomenal, intentional fashion (as apparent,
+merely intended contents) but in actuality. One must not forget, of course,
+that 'actual' does not here mean the same as 'external to consciousness', but
+the same as 'not merely putative'.
+
+Investigation III: On the theory of wholes and parts
+1 As regards these 'formal objective categories' and the formal ontological truths
+of essence pertaining to them, see the statements of the last chapter of the Pro
+legomena, (1 §867 f).
+I The difference between independent and non-independent
+objects
+L The two Husserlian terms, real and reell, here occur in the same sentence, the
+former connoting what is actually there in the space-time world, and not abstract
+or ideal, the latter what is actually immanent in an experience, and not merely
+'meant' by it. [Translator's note]
+tion signifies.
+3 Principles, Introduction, 810.
+[4 Almost exactly as formulated by C. Stumpf in Über den psychologischen Ursprung
+der Raumvorstellung (1873), p. 109
+L5 Stumpf previously used the expression 'partial content', but now prefers to speak
+of an attributive moment'.
+6 In the following expositions I employed my essay, On Abstract and Concret
+Contents', (Number I of the 'Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic'
+Philos. Monatshefte, 1894, Vol. xxx).
+] Loc. cit. p. 112.
+8 Loc. cit. p. 113.
+9 Cf. Ehrenfels,
+'Über Gestaltqualitäten', Vierteljahrsschrift für wiss. Philosophie
+(1890); my Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891), particularly the whole of ch. XI
+Meinong, 'Beiträge Zur Theorie der psychischen Analyse', Zeitschrift f. Psychologie
+u. Physiologie d Sinnesorgane, VI (1893).
+10 Cf. the words italicized by us.
+11 The ontological transformation of the notion of self-evidence into one of pure
+essential lawfulness - a transformation which starts at this point and which
+decisively influences the content of the rest of the Investigation - has already
+
+350 Notes
+been clearly carried out in my 'Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik', (1894)
+Archiv für Syst. Philos. III, p. 225, n. 1.
+112 See my Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891), ch. XI, p. 228 (an 'avenue' of trees, a
+'flock' of birds, a 'flight' of duck, etc.).
+13 From my Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik, Philos. Monatshefte,
+17 'Position' anc
+sphere, pree nine noden on the ily sana (apparen) position an ina.
+tude in the straightforward sense.
+2 Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes
+and parts
+• In the sense namely of the abbreviated mode of speech defined in the last section,
+which must everywhere be remembered here.
+2 More precisely: in the unity of a visual intuitum as such.
+3 From Prop. 4 in §14, above.
+4 See Bolzano's, Wissenschafislehre, 1, 858, p. 251, and Twardowski, loc. cit. 89,
+Husser here has 'volumness' which i take to be an unsuccesstul venture in
+English, Trans.]
+1 See my Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891), p. 232.
+8 One must certainly distinguish the sensuous moment of likeness from likeness as ‹
+categorial unity: the former is related to the latter as the sensuous characters ol
+lurality, which serve us as direct indications of multiplicity and diversity, stan
+o multiplicity and diversity themselves. See my Phil. der Arithmetik, p. 233. Th
+first work of mine (an elaboration of my Habilitationsschrift, never published
+and only partially printed, at the University of Halle, 1887) should be compared
+binations, wholes and bjects of higher order, am sorry that in many recent.
+on, is already to be found, differently expressed, in my Philos. der Arithm.
+ink it would still be of use today to consult this work on the phenomenologic
+attached importance to acts and objects of higher order and investigated them
+thoroughly.
+9 See §11, above.
+L10 See Prolegomena, Vol. 1 (S§§67-72) on the role of formalization for constituting
+the idea of a pure logic as mathesis universalis. We must emphasize again that
+where we speak simply of 'abstraction', as we have done so far, we mean the
+
+Notes 35l
+emphasis on a non-independent 'moment' of content, or the corresponding ideation under the title of 'ideating abstraction', but not formalization
+I See §19, above.
+112 Prop. 3, in §19, above.
+Investigation IV: The distinction between independent and
+non-independent meanings and the idea of pure grammar
+Ul We could equally say: 'of presentations'. For plainly an answer to the more
+specialized question also answers the more general question relating to presentaare no simple objects. Cf. Twardowski's own question where he speaks expressly
+of presented objects. We are here dealing with objects of reference as such.
+3 Twardowski, op. cit. p. 98.
+4 B. Bolzano,
+5 A. Marty, 'Über subjektlose Sätze', Vierteljahrschrift fur wis. Philos., virth year,
+16 Marty, Ober das Verhältnis von Grammatik und Logik', Symbolae Pragenses
+(1893), p. 121, n. 2.
+7 In his last-mentioned article Marty defines a categorematic sign as one which
+independently arouses a complete presentation, through which an object is named.
+ut the definition of the syncategorematic sign which follows (see above) do
+ot clearly bring out that the grammatical division rests on an essential divisio
+8 The word 'presentation
+The bud presly air is presented is sled, loggot here me artic of pros alad
+orms with which it is present in consciousness. The 'presentational form'
+herefore the form of what is presented as such: we must keep this in mind i
+what follows.
+A. Marty recently wrote, in his 'Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemein
+rammatik und Sprachphilosophie' (Halle, 1908) of 'autosemantic' and 'ss
+110 The mode of speech need not be taken as literally as Marty has done in his Untersuchungen, pp. 211 f., as meaning that we build total meanings out of "bricks' of
+partial meaning that could also exist separately. That this is a wrong conception
+is precisely the theme of my further argued doctrine of non-independent meanings. I cannot see how the exposition above can bear such an interpretation, and
+that it is in any way touched by Marty's objections. See the further discussions
+below regarding the understanding of isolated syncategorematica.
+11 In so far as these and the rest have not lost their articulate meanings in the
+evolution of speech.
+12 We dealt with an analogous, closely related question in $2.
+13 In our whole exposition 'fulfilment' must of course be taken to cover the oppose
+tate of 'frustration', the phenomenologically peculiar situation in which al
+surdly combined meanings in a meaningful whole make their incompatibility
+
+352 Notes
+plain in intuitive clarification and in 'bringing to insight': the intended unity is
+'frustrated' in intuitive disunity.
+Investigation V: On intentional experiences and
+their 'contents'
+I Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the
+ego and consciousness as inner perception
+1 See my Ideas towards a Pure Phenomenology, etc., in the Jahrbuch für Philos. u
+nanom. forschung, I (1913), Section 2. [The present paragraph is an insertion i
+13 Or enal yed in callis the sense in in the ense gone albert hich will do
+experience is itself styled an 'appearance'.
+4 In' the First Edition the name 'phenomenological ego' was given to the stream of
+consciousness as such.
+5 The opposition to the doctrine of a 'pure' ego, already expressed in this paragraph,
+is one that the author no longer approves of, as is plain from his Ideas cited
+6 The text as here set forth is taken over without essential change from the First
+ure ego, there can be no real (adequate) self-evidence attaching to the 'I am
+ut if there is really such an adequate self-evidence - who indeed could deny it
+experience of the type cogito.
+7 Cf. the whole of 84 in Natorp's Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer
+Methode, pp. 11 f.
+
+Notes 353
+8 I have since managed to find it, i.e. have learnt not to be led astray from a pure
+grasp of the given through corrupt forms of ego-metaphysic cf. note to §6.
+2 Consciousness as intentional experience
+LI My deviations from Brentano are not on the same lines as the qualifications that
+le found necessary to add to the inadequate simplifications of which he wa:
+learly conscious (See Psychologie, I, pp. 127 ff.). This will be plain from th
+discussions in App. 2 at the end of this volume.
+tached to acts, in a unity of consciousness so essential that, were it to fall away,
+talk of 'experiencing' would lose its point.
+Psychologie, 1, 115.
+See further the Appendix referred to above.
+Psychologie, p. 111 (end of §3).
+8
+, Psychologie, p. 104.
+9 Cf. Brentano, Psychologie, pp. 266-7, 295 and passim.
+L10 No reference to selective attention or notice is included in the sense of the reference' involved in our 'intention'. See also §13.
+11 We may here ignore the various possible assertive traits involved in the believed
+being of what is presented. One should again recall that it is possible to leave out
+which cut out whatever is matter of transcendent apperception and assertion, so
+has then become the pure experience of phenomenology, from which psychological
+apperception has likewise dropped away.
+12 As regards the seemingly obvious distinction between immanent and transcendent objects, modelled on the traditional schema of inner conscious image v.
+extraconscious being-in-itself, cf. the Appendix at the end of this chapter.
+113 Cf. the additional note to ch. I, above, pp. 93-4, and my Ideen zu einer reinen
+Phänomenologie, 1.c.
+14 Cf. §19.
+15 We are in complete agreement with Natorp (Einleitung in die Psychologie, 1st edn,
+p. 21) when he objects to fully serious talk about "mental activities', or 'activities
+of consciousness', or 'activities of the ego', by saying that 'consciousness only
+
+354 Notes
+appears as a doing, and its subject as a doer, because it is often or always
+accompanied by conation'. We too reject the 'mythology of activities': we define
+'acts' as intentional experiences, not as mental activities.
+116 P. Natorp, Einleiltung in die Psychologie, 1st edn, p. 18.
+17 Last three sentences added in Edition II.
+18 Cf. my Psychological Studies..?', Philos. Monatshefte, XXX, (1894), p. 182.
+19 The much discussed dispute as to the relation between perceptual and imaginative presentation can have no satisfactory outcome in default of a properly
+prepared phenomenological foundation and consequent clarity in concepts and
+questions. The like holds of enquiries as to the relation of simple perception to
+representational or sign-consciousness. It can be readily shown, I think, that actcharacters differ in such cases in pictorial representation, e.g. an essentially new
+mode of intention, is experienced.
+20 Psychologie, 1, pp. 116 ff.
+21 [Paragraph added in Edition II.]
+22 Here as elsewhere I identify the pain-sensation with its 'content', since I do not
+recognize peculiar sensing acts. Naturally I reject Brentano's doctrine that presentative acts, in the term of acts of feeling-sensation, underlie acts of feeling.
+23 I point here, for purposes of comparison, and perhaps completion, to H. Schwarz's
+Psychologie des Willens (Leipzig, 1900) which in §12 deals with similar questions.
+24 In the First Edition I wrote 'real or phenomenological' for 'real'. The word
+phenomenological' like the word 'descriptive' was used in the First Edition only
+in connection with real (reelle) elements of experience, and in the present edition
+it has so far been used predominately in this sense. This corresponds to one's
+natural starting with the psychological point of view. It became plainer and plainer,
+however, as I reviewed the completed Investigations and pondered on their
+themes more deeply - particularly from this point onwards - that the description
+of intentional objectivity as such, as we are conscious of it in the concrete actexperience, represents a distinct descriptive dimension where purely intuitive description may be adequately practised, a dimension opposed to that of real (reellen)
+act-constituents, but which also deserves to be called 'phenomenological'. These
+methodological extensions lead to important extensions of the field of problems
+now opening before us and considerable improvements due to a fully conscious
+separation of descriptive levels. Cf. my Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie,
+Book I, and particularly what is said of Noesis and Noema in Section III.
+25 Paragraph added in the Second Edition.
+26 Real would sound much better alongside 'intentional' but it definitely keeps the
+notion of thinglike transcendence which the reduction to real (reell) immanence
+in experience is meant to exclude. It is well to maintain a conscious association of
+the real with the thinglike.
+27 We have here a case of 'foundation' in the strict sense of our Third Investigation.
+We only use the term in this strict sense.
+28 Investigation I, 8$9, 10.
+29 Cf. 810.
+30 We encountered this fact in criticizing the prevailing theory of abstraction. See
+31 Cf. the Appendix to this chapter.
+L32 Confusion results from unavoidable ambiguities in talk of the definite and the
+indefinite. One speaks, e.g., of the indefiniteness of perceptual judgements, which
+consists in the fact that the rear side of a perceived object is subsidiarily meant,
+but indefinitely, whereas the clearly seen front side seems definite. Or one speaks
+of the indefiniteness of 'particular' assertions, e.g. An A is B, Some A's are B's, as
+opposed to the definiteness of the singular assertion 'This A is B'. Such definite-
+
+Notes 355
+examples fall out and become irrelevant with the ideational grasp of the
+phenomenological difference of essence.
+34 Cf. 8§17, 30.
+35 For the moment we permit ourselves this improper mode of expression, which in
+talk about 'referring'.
+3 The matter of the act and its underlying presentation
+be thoroughly investigated in the next two chapters.
+4 I have here ignored the disputed
+sub-species of Affirmative and Negativ
+udgement. If anyone accepts them he can everywhere substitute 'Affirmativ
+ludgement' for 'Judgement' in the present discussion, while those who rejec
+hem, may take our words as they stand. It makes no essential difference to ou
+4 Study of founding presentations with special regard to the
+theory of judgement
+• Conjunctive or dis junctive plurality on the subject side, as illustrated by ' A and B
+3 See Inv. IV, §11, and the additional note to §13.
+5 Further contributions to the theory of judgement.
+'Presentation' as a qualitatively unitary genus of nominal and
+propositional acts
+1 Cf. the examples in §34
+2 It must be noted that this mode of expression is a circumlocution
+3 [§38, from this point onwards, is mainly a Second Edition supplement.]
+4 All this must of course not be understood in an empirical-psychological manner
+We are concerned here (as everywhere in this investigation) with a priori possibilities rooted in pure essence, which are as such grasped by us with apodictic
+5 Cf. however the interpretation of a 'community of kind' as a peculiar relation o
+'essence and counter-essence' in my Ideas, p. 233. The further pursuit of th
+
+356
+results of this investigation has generally led to many essential deepenings and improvements. Cf. in particular, Ideas, $§109-14, 117 on the neutrality modification.
+L The same is of course true of other act-products, e.g. the aesthetic consideration
+6 Summing-up of the most important ambiguities in the terms
+'presentation' and 'content'
+Ta heal a Real to a being of real pings as op word rant it merely intends or
+Investigation VI: Elements of a phenomenological
+elucidation of knowledge
+First section: Objectifying intentions and their fulfilments:
+knowledge as a synthesis of fulfilment and its gradations
+I Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment
+1 Log. Inv. I, §12.
+2 See Log. Inv. I, 826.
+3 Log. Inv. I, $89, 10.
+4 Cf. my Psych. Studies of elementary Logic, II, 'Concerning Intuitions and Representations, Philos. Monatshefte, 1894, p. 176. I have given up the concept of
+sense.
+6 Cf. §13 of the previous Investigation.
+3 The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge
+1 See above §14.
+translates 'Vorstellung'. [Translator]
+
+Notes 357
+4 Consistency and inconsistency
+• Understanding of the analytical clarifications attempted in this chapter and the
+deas of popular speech take their plac
+5 The ideal of adequation. Self-evidence and truth
+I CF. $23.
+Second section: Sense and understanding
+6 Sensuous and categorial intuitions
+• Thus we read in Sigwart (Logic, I (ed. 2), p. 206): 'The verbal conjoining of
+sentences through
+... expresses only the subjective fact of their coexistence in one conciousness, and it therefore has no objective meaning.' Cf. also
+tuition, while true collection and counting presuppose articulated acts of high
+rder - it was this question that independently led me to take note of tho
+7 A Study in categorial representation
+• If a represents the constitutive features in a concept and B those of any other
+oncept whatever. (
+contents as such.
+Appendix: External and internal perception: physical and
+psychical phenomena
+
+358
+2 Brentano (Psychologie, 1, Pp. 118 f.) says it is a distinguishing mark of all psychic
+phenomena 'that they are only perceived in an inner consciousness, whereas
+uter perception alone is possible in the case of physical phenomena'. It
+mphatically said on p. 119 that this determination characterizes psychic phenon
+ena adequately. 'Inner consciousness' is here merely another expression for inner
+4 Locke's Essay, II. i. 19. Locke is not perfectly consistent in so far as he expressly
+makes 'perception' an apprehension of ideas, and yet makes the apprehension o
+e ¡deas o menta aces enc c
+mes supervene on acese aes dies dois is ecialously due to the wretched du
+tains. We call 'sensations' the mere fact that a sense-content and, further, that a
+1on-act in general, is present in the experiential complex. In relation to appearin
+talk of 'sensing' only serves to point to the apperceptive function of such con
+tents (that they function as bearers of an interpretation, in which the appearance
+in question is carried out perceptually or imaginatively).
+see... warmth, cold, smell that I sense?
+
+Index
+a priori 9, II, 39-41, 70-1, 122, 126,
+129, 154, 172, 186, 203, 229, 277,
+288, 311, 343; analytic/synthetic laws
+[19, 21; existence 22-3; laws 17, 49,
+61-4, 66, 69, 71-4; proof 25; truth
+55; whole/part relationship 27
+abbreviated expressions 56-8
+abstract 10, 17, 29, 40, 41, 88, 137,
+298
+abstraction 39, 292, 306-7
+absurdity 67-8, 71-4, 76, 223, 266
+acceptance 140-3
+act-character 80, 96, 102, 103, 105,
+119-22, 134-5, 137, 164, 201, 202,
+284, 285
+act-quality 122, 129, 144, 145, 146, 149,
+151, 169-70, 184
+acts| 59, 80, 20, 93, 96-7, 100-12,
+114-19, 137, 140, 146-9, 151, 167,
+183, 222-3, 285-9, 306, 309, 323,
+332, 344, 348
+adequate, adequation 246-2, 261,
+263-0, 272, 29213, 294, 302, 310,
+firmation 161
+gregatel 35
+greement 213, 225, 32
+ambiguity 158, 171-4, 197, 343, 344,
+analyic: laws 19-21, 72, propositions
+apodictic 12, 62, 67, 136
+apophantic logic 72
+appearance 83-4, 341-3
+apperception 103, 105, 243
+Aristotle 76, 325, 327, 328
+arithmetic 65, 154, 307
+articulated objects 5
+assent 140-3
+assertion 68, 139, 147-9, 155-7,1158,
+160, 226, 26213, 293, 334
+association 18, 32-4
+attention 103,116-19
+attribution 153, 273
+authentic 186, 312-14, 316, 324;
+contents 298-2; illustration 231-3;
+presentation 60 ]; thinking 308-11
+being/ 265-6, 278-80, 294
+being-in-consciousness 91+
+belief 130, 164, 166
+Berkeley, G.5-6
+Böcklin, A. 348
+Bolzano, B. 54, 325
+boundaries 16, 45, 73
+Brentano, F. 28, 54, 87, 94 -8, 102, 107,
+1110.12930.160.169, 339-40, 344,
+bundle theory 101
+categorematic expressions 54, 58
+categorial, acts 185-6, 286-9, 295-6,
+299-300, 306; content 298 L9; form
+[37, 60, 121-2, 185, 271-6, 280-0,
+291.296-7. 307-8, 310, 311,317;
+3081, main 32, obel am
+orrelates 27718; objects 304
+
+360
+Index
+perception 281-3; predicate 37,
+115-16; structures 7d-J; unity 389
+categories 19, 70, 278-80, 304, 306-7;
+formal-logical 21; semantic 62-3
+coincidence 199, 208, 221, 232
+collectival 291-2
+communication 327-32
+compatibility 67-8, 252-6, 312, 315
+completeness 246-2, 261
+complexity 115-19, 130-, 168-9, 229;
+defined 4; of expressions 53-5; of
+meaning 50-5
+concatenation of association 33-4
+concept 69, 76, 172, 173, 175, 184, 279,
+290+2, 306-7
+concrete 10, 16-17, 24, 83, 88; acts 59,
+1172; complex 51-3; experience 145;
+temporal 43; whole 286
+concretum, proximate/absolute 29
+conflict 211-12, 213, 225, 253-7
+connection 296, 301
+consciousness 80, 87-9, 98, 100-Ll,
+103-4, 105-6, 126, 129, 138, 146.
+158, 174, 206-8, 244-5, 301, 303,
+309, 315, 339-40, 343; experience
+82-4, 85-6; inner 86-7; stream of
+22-3; varied ambiguity of term 81-2
+content 5-7, 22, 80, 81, 85-6, 93,
+1103-4, 106, 132-3, 135, 145, 175-6.
+209, 235, 246, 297, 304, 311, 344-5;
+by itself 10-11, 16; of consciousness
+119; incompatible 253-4; inseparable
+25, nature of ofs9.0, plaided
+137-8
+defective expressions 56-8
+Descartes, R. 90, 335, 337
+lescription 15, 17, 11241
+letermination 10-13, 19
+iscontinuity 14, 15f1
+isiunctiva 2912132
+egol 82-6, 88-9, 91-3, 98, 100-1, 125,
+164, 340, 343
+Ehrenfels, C. von 8, 176
+emotion 96
+129, 130-1, 154, 158, 183-4, 246,
+1250; exact/inexact 15
+Chi 1253
+events 82
+exclusion 214
+existence 21, 22-4, 36, 37, 68, 113, 164
+expectation 211
+experience 6, 52, 82-4, 93, 101-6,
+1136-7, 145, 147, 201, 279, 329-30,
+33, 342, 346; consciousness/conte
+lation 85-6; phenomenologica
+opular concept 84-
+xpression 50, 55+8, 117, 191-5, 22
+272, 274, 312, 316, 323-4, 325-6,
+330, 333-4; acts 192-5; complex
+53-5; modification of meanings 64-
+bercept 195-6; unity 206-8
+extension 7-8, 18, 30
+external: perception 95, 335-9, 340-1,
+342, 345; relations 288-9, 290
+facts 155, 343
+falsehood 266, 329, 334
+feeling 107-9; sensations/acts
+distinction|109{12
+form 5, 8, 22, 36, 68-71, 272, 2967,
+305-8
+306, 312, 324; graded/238-40
+mediate 229-30: unity 209-11
+
+fulness 233-5, 240-2, 259, 299, 324;
+gradations 234-8
+fusion (15-417
+generality of words 202-6
+genus 12
+hetero-grammatical modes of
+expression 65
+Hobbes, T.90
+Humboldt, W. von 76
+Hume, D. 126, 174
+hypothetical predication 115-16
+Idea (ideation)[15, 97, 103, 106, 112,
+136, 154, 279, 317; categorial 69;
+independent/non-independent 13;
+universal 43
+ideal 79, 112, 264
+identity 104, 123, 206-8, 215, 218,
+226-8, 285, 301, 303
+illusion 137-8
+image 125-7, 218-20
+imagination 165-7, 172-4, 202, 220+2,
+224, 234-8, 259, 280-1, 297
+immanence 125-7, 164, 343; characters
+104; objectivity 98-100
+immediate 28, 30, 32
+impossibility 251
+inclusion 214
+incompatibility 67-8, 253-4, 257-8
+independent: contents 13-15; ideas 13;
+meaning 55L7; relative 224
+nner: experience 136; perception 86.67
+39.95. 135 6.231.335-7.339-41
+[345. 347; sense 278, 302-3
+inseparability 617; examples 19;
+objective determination 9l1d
+insight 70, 82
+intention 116, 122-5, 158, 167, 184,
+210-11, 213-14, 224, 226, 233, 257
+intentional: characters 104, 129; content
+11215; essence 122-5, 130-5, 158,
+183-4; experience 93, 101-3, 147;
+feelings 107-12; inexistence 175;
+Index 36l
+objects 95-100, 101+2, 113-15,
+118-19
+intentionality 107
+interpretation 6, 52, 103,105, 201,
+242-4, 272, 287, 298, 302, 343
+intuition 90, 106, 116-17, 136, 172,
+184-5, 199-200, 201-2, 210-11,
+218-19. 226. 2289, 233, 234-8,
+242-4, 245 12, 251, 261, 272, 274-5,
+279, 280-1, 295, 297, 303-4, 308,
+[309, 313, 317-19, 323, 324, 333, 344;
+omplete/mutilated 246-9; genuin
+231 €3; universall 292 L
+intuitive separation 13-15
+isolability 9; mutual 28
+judgements 54, 76, 89, 96, 114, 117,
+123, 125, 130, 131+2, 135, 139 40,
+141-3, 146-57, 158, 160, 166-7, 192,
+193, 194, 256-7, 267, 274, 278-80,
+312-13, 324, 326-7, 328-9, 332-4
+Kant, 1. 21, 126, 318-19
+knowing 204, 205, 216-18, 323
+knowledge 226-8, 246, 273, 275, 308.
+[319,1332
+language 54-5, 64
+laws 12, 43, 59, 72, 313-16, 343;
+categorial 308-11; compounding of
+meanings 68-7l; governing
+combinations of meanings 61-4
+material/formal distinction 19-20;
+Locke, J.I90, 174, 278, 335 -6, 340
+gico-grammatical, compatibilit
+252 3: forms 68É71: laws 162.31
+1314-16
+manifolds 106, 291, 307
+mathematics 307
+
+362 Index
+matter 119-22, 128-9, 133-4, 137-9,
+140-5,158-9, 164, 166, 171,175,
+184, 226, 250, 272, 276; fulness/
+intentional 240-2; interpretative
+242-4; isolated 144-5; as
+presentation 129-31
+meaning-fulfilment 184, 191+2
+meaning-intention 61, 79, 174, 184,
+191+2, 207, 214, 217, 250, 273,
+276
+meaning(s) 49, 132, 184, 196-201, 208,
+222-5, 272+3, 312, 313-14, 315, 323,
+334; combinations 61-4, 67-8;
+complex 50-5; compounding 68-71;
+implied 51-3; incompatible 257-8;
+independent/non-independent 55-7;
+modifications 64-Z; simple 50
+mediate 28, 30, 32, 229-31
+Meinong, A. 8
+memory 104, 172
+mental: acts 80, 81, 94; character 301;
+phenomena 95-7, 315
+metaphysics 90, 106
+Mill, J. S. 160
+modification 71, 159-60, 162;
+imaginative 165-7; qualitative
+1162-7
+moments) 4, 12, 20, 28-9, 30, 31-2,
+55, 137, 145, 277-8, 286, 333; nonindependent 36, 40-1; piecing of
+wholes 41-S; qualitative 7-8; of
+unity 8-9, 14, 35-8; variable 7
+mutilated intuitions 246-9
+names 67, 147-9, 152-3, 155-7, 192,
+332; positing/non-positing 149-52,
+Natorp, P. 91-2, 93, 1106
+natural science 8991,103.338
+necessity 12
+nominal: acts 152-4, 159, 161, 169-70
+171; formations 289-91; meanings
+10-acts 106 nation 16
+on-independence 36; contents 13-15
+governing 17-18, 19-20; meanings
+5-б, 57, 58-60; moments 40-1, 4
+55, 59; objects 12-13: relative 22l
+06463.74, 170.215 15, 245. 250,
+275-6
+objectivity 49
+objects|125-7, 132, 201-2, 208, 277,
+299-300, 332-3; complexity 50-l
+ontological-analytic laws 72
+parts) 4-5, 22, 286-9, 308-9; formal
+39-41; independent/non-independent
+distinction 5-6; nearer/remoter 32-4;
+pairs 27-8; pieces/moments 29;
+primary 32; proximate/remote 30;
+relationship with whole 27
+perception 82-3, 95, 103-4, 124, 1359,
+173-4, 194, 195-201, 220-2, 224,
+234. 8, 259| -62, 272, 273, 275 -6, 277,
+280-6, 292-3, 296-7, 302, 303-4,
+[309, 335-41, 344. -6
+phenomena 97, 337-8, 347-8
+phenomenalism 90
+phenomenology 112-13, 203, 206,
+picturing 173, 202
+pieces 5, 29, 30-1, 37, 40-1;
+phenomenological proposition
+41-5
+positing, non-positing 16, 162, 167
+possibility 20, 204, 250-1|259, 294,
+[309-10,317, 343
+predication 139, 273; acts 192;
+exposition 52; form 331
+resentations 1d,|54, [60, 69. 96.97
+99, 104-5, 113-14, 119, 123, 129-31.
+1133, 13413, 154, 158-60, 166, 230,
+[260, 330; ambiguity |146-7, 171-4
+content 175-6; fulness 233-4;
+
+230-l; state of affairs 140-3; word/
+sentence 143-4
+projection 260
+proper names 52-3, 161, 198-9, 205-6
+properties 83
+propositions 19, 68-9, 1148, 154, 1160,
+192, 259, 278; analytic/synthetic 21
+roximate 30-
+sychic phenomena 346-
+sychical phenomena 54, 91, 94-8
+3389.341.345.34
+psychologism 76, 136
+psychology 89-91, 103, 176, 336, 347
+pure logic 68-74, 307
+quality 7-8, 16, 17-18, 119-22, 124,
+128-9, 137, 140, 145, 149, 158,
+165-7, 168-70, 184, 259, 266L7,
+337; of acts 159-67; differentiated
+131+4
+real (reelle, realen) 112-13, 127, 175,
+[250-5, 277-8, 286, 288-9, 342, 344
+recognition 201-6, 216-18, 223-4
+reflection 279, 303, 304
+relations 20, 98, 265, 290-2, 297
+relatum 289
+remote 30-4
+representation 146, 169, 171, 224, 234,
+243-4, 298-9, 300-2; necessity of
+244-5
+rest 44
+Riehl, A. 9
+Schlick, M. 179
+Schopenhauer, A. 342
+self-evidence 6, 12, 62, 79, 86, 87-8,
+147, 228, 251, 261-1, 274, 277
+self-fulfilment 79
+self-perception 93
+self-presentation 218-20
+semantics 62-3, 72, 74, 122-5, 156
+sensations 84, 90, 103-4, 105, 109-12,
+sense 105, 1117, 144, 275-6, 297, 1302-44,
+306-7
+sense-contents 344
+sense-material 37
+Index 363
+sense-perception 262, 278-80, 281-6,
+senseless 316-17
+sensible forms 280-
+ensory quality 55-
+sign 126, 218-20, 222-5, 231, 234-8,
+242-4, 246, 260, 299
+signification 184, 308, 311-14, 318, 324,
+333
+Sigwart, C. 326
+simplicity 4, 115-16; of meaning 50
+single-rayed acts 161
+so-to-speak presentation 60
+spatiality |16, 29, '33, 42, 44-5
+species 12, 15, 18, 96, 103, 112, 131-2,
+134, 307, 315
+states of affairs 148, 155-7, 263, 265,
+280-7, 313, 329, 333
+Steinthal, H. 76
+straightforward acts 283-6, 295
+302-3
+Stumpf, C. 6, 7-8, 9, 15
+substance 234-8
+substitution 70
+subsumption 214
+yncategorematic expression 53-6, 57
+58, 59; isolated 60 F
+synthesis 288-9, 300-2, 324; acts 298:
+propositions 19, 21
+temporality 29l 33, 207
+thinking 11, 154, 308-1I, 312, 316-19
+*9,14, 084, 201-2,275,295,
+time 42, 43-5, 88
+transcendence 126-7
+truth(s) 49, 55, 74, 149, 251, 263 -7,
+[329, 334
+Twardowski, K. 37
+underlying acts 115-16
+unformany 314115
+unity 89, 53, 106, 117-18, 147,
+[217. 242 3. 2547. 278. 279.1287.
+
+364 Index
+299-300, 308-9; categorial 38-9;
+ot consciousness 30l; ot expressior
+206-8; of fulfilment 209-10; of
+objects 307; sensuous 35+8
+niversal, grammar 72-4, 75; object
+175, 261, 292E
+unconsciousness 293-4
+validity 317; of meaning 313-14
+verification 262-3, 265
+whole 4, 8, 22, 34-3, 118, 287-9, 309;
+oncrete 83, 88; formal 39-41
+ounded 38-9; piecing throug
+oments 41-5; proximate/remo
+istinction 3d-2; unity of 351
+Wundt, W. 82
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/3a6d01543ca85d1371807b97339660d5c5207a0a26c3699bf8d4b83baba8ef24.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/3a6d01543ca85d1371807b97339660d5c5207a0a26c3699bf8d4b83baba8ef24.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e310e4c7595f13fdf0855827b2df2b3a518ba375
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/3a6d01543ca85d1371807b97339660d5c5207a0a26c3699bf8d4b83baba8ef24.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -3241,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "3a6d01543ca85d1371807b97339660d5c5207a0a26c3699bf8d4b83baba8ef24",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1288,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "4345d99607c2630651dc70834528a7fe7abd3d74a7dc400d7716517327cf0a86",
+  "output_sha256": "6565e356f77f14e6907474f40733507cd204957efc31771355b649585654a7fd",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/5e7ab2596378ecf03260dce976efe06f291d1b18ff4a91b966d4ced89d0d00b0.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/5e7ab2596378ecf03260dce976efe06f291d1b18ff4a91b966d4ced89d0d00b0.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1c9ec4a3a5b2e1991327fbcdee0be687de1433b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/5e7ab2596378ecf03260dce976efe06f291d1b18ff4a91b966d4ced89d0d00b0.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31223 @@
+Jean-Paul Sartre
+Critique of Dialectical Reason
+Volume One
+TRANSLATED BY Alan Sheridan-Smith
+FOREWORD BY Fredric Jameson
+NEW EDITION
+
+Critique of Dialectical Reason
+VOLUME 1
+Theory of Practical Ensembles
+JEAN-PAUL SARTRE
+Translated by Alan Sheridan-Smith
+Edited by Jonathan Rée
+Foreword by Fredric Jameson
+V
+VERSO
+London • New York
+
+First published as Critique de la Raison Dialectique
+by Editions Gallimard, Paris 1960
+This translation first published by New left Books 1976
+© Editions Gallimard 1960
+Translation © New Left Books 1976
+Corrected edition first published by Verso in 1991 based on the revised
+French edition of 1985 © Editions Gallimard 1960, 1985
+This edition first published by Verso 2004
+© Verso 2004
+l'oreword © Fredric Jameson 2004
+All rights reserved
+The moral rights of the authors, editor and translator have been asserted
+
+Verso
+UK: 6 Meard Street, London W1F OEG
+US: 180 Varick Street, New York, NY 10014-4606
+www.versobooks.com
+Verso is the imprint of New Left Books
+ISBN 1-85984-485-5
+British Library Cataloging in Publication Data
+A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
+Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publishing Data
+A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress
+Typeset in Fournier
+Printed in the UK by Biddles, King's Lynn
+
+EDITOR'S NOTE
+xi
+FOREWORD by Fredric Jameson
+xili
+INTRODUCTION
+13
+I THE DOGMATIC DIALECTIC
+AND THE CRITICAL DIALECTIC
+15
+Dialectical Monism 15
+2 Scientific and Dialectical Reason 18
+3 Hegelian Dogmatism 21
+4 The Dialectic in Marx 23
+5 Thought, Being and Truth in Marxism 24
+6 The External Dialectic in Modern Marxism 26
+7 The Dialectic of Nature 27
+8 Critique of the External Dialectic 29
+• The Domain of Dialectical Reason 32
+II CRITIQUE OF CRITICAL INVESTIGATION
+The Basis of Critical Investigation
+2 Dialectical Reason as Intelligibility
+42
+43
+3 Totality and Totalisation 45
+4 Critical Investigation and Totalisation 47
+42
+
+vi
+5 Critical Investigation and Action
+49
+6 The Problem of Stalinism
+51
+7 The Problem of the Individual
+53
+8 Totalisation and History 57
+• Primary and Secondary Intelligibility 57
+10 The Plan of this Work 64
+11 The Individual and History 70
+12 Intellection and Comprehension
+74
+BOOK I
+FROM INDIVIDUAL PRAXIS
+TO THE PRACTICO-INERT
+I INDIVIDUAL PRAXIS AS TOTALISATION
+79
+1 Need 79
+2 The Negation of the Negation 83
+3 Labour 89
+77
+II HUMAN RELATIONS AS A MEDIATION
+BETWEEN DIFFERENT SECTORS OF MATERIALITY 25
+| Isolated Individuals 25
+2 Duality and the Third Party 100
+3 Reciprocity, Exploitation and Repression
+109
+III MATTER AS TOTALISED TOTALITY:
+A FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH NECESSITY
+122
+Scarcity and Mode of Production
+122
+(i) Scarcity and History 125
+(ii) Scarcity and Marxism
+140
+Worked Matter as the Alienated Objectification of
+Individual and Collective Praxis 153
+
+vii
+(i) Matter as Inverted Praxis 161
+(ii) Interest 197
+3
+Necessity as a New Structure of Dialectical
+Investigation 220
+4 Social Being as Materiality: Class Being 228
+IV COLLECTIVES 256
+1 Series: the Queue 256
+2 Indirect Gatherings: the Radio Broadcast 270
+3 Impotence as a Bond: the Free Market 277
+4 Series and Opinion: the Great Fear 293
+5 Series and Class: the French Proletariat 306
+6 Collective Praxis 318
+BOOK II FROM GROUPS TO HISTORY
+I THE FUSED GROUP
+345
+1 The Genesis of Groups
+345
+2 The Storming of the Bastille 351
+3
+The Third Party and the Group 363
+4
+The Mediation of Reciprocity: the
+Transcendence-Immanence Tension
+374
+5 The Intelligibility of the Fused Group
+382
+343
+I1 THE STATUTORY GROUP
+405
+1 The Surviving Group: Differentiation
+2 The Pledge 417
+3 Fraternity and Fear
+428
+405
+
+vili
+III THE ORGANISATION 445
+1 Organised Praxis and Function 445
+2 Reciprocity and Active Passivity 463
+3 Structures: the Work of Levi-Strauss 478
+(i) Structure and Function
+484
+(11) Structure and System 491
+(iii) Structure and the Group's Idea of Itself 499
+IV THE CONSTITUTED DIALECTIC
+505
+1 Individual and Common Praxis:
+the Manhunt
+505
+2 Spontaneity and Command 519
+3
+Disagreements in Organisational Sub-groups 524
+4
+Praxis as Process
+539
+5 Taylorism
+559
+V THE UNITY OF THE GROUP AS OTHER:
+THE MILITANT 564
+VI THE INSTITUTION 576
+Mediated Reciprocity in the Group 576
+2 Purges and Terror
+583
+3 Institutionalisation and Inertia 599
+4 Institutionalisation and Sovereignty 607
+5 States and Societies
+635
+6 Other-direction: the Top Ten,
+Racism and Antisemitism 642
+7 Bureaucracy and the Cult of Personality 655
+
+ix
+VII THE PLACE OF HISTORY 664
+1 The Reciprocity of Groups and Collectives 664
+2 The Circularity of Dialectical Investigation
+671
+The Working Class as Institution, Fused
+Group and Series
+678
+4 Economism, Materialism and Dialectics 710
+5 Racism and Colonialism as Praxis and Process
+716
+VIII CLASS STRUGGLE AND DIALECTICAL REASON
+735
+• Scarcity, Violence and Bourgeois Humanism 735
+Malthusianism as the Praxis-Process of the Bourgeoisie 754
+(i) June 1848 754
+(ii) Bourgeois 'Respectability' in the Late
+Nineteenth Century 770
+(iii) Class Struggle in the Twentieth Century 781
+3 Class Struggle as a Conflict of Rationalities 794
+4 The Intelligibility of History: Totalisation without
+a Totaliser
+805
+ANNEXE 821
+GLOSSARY 827
+INDEX 831
+COMPARATIVE PAGINATION CHART
+836
+
+Editor's Note
+The text translated here was originally published in 1960 in a volume
+entitled Critique de la Raison Dialectique, precédé de Questions de
+Méthode, Tome 1, Théorie des Ensembles Pratiques. Questions de
+Méthode was originally published as a separate essay, and is available in
+English (entitled either The Problem of Method or Search for a Method).
+It is therefore not translated here. None of the material translated here
+has appeared in English before except in small fragments.
+Sartre's text was written hastily, and is not easy to translate. The
+glossary explains how various neologisms and technical terms have
+normally been translated; but it must be admitted that in many cases,
+including such crucial terms as 'expérience' and'dépassement' (which we
+have translated by 'investigation' and 'transcendence' respectively), no
+completely satisfactory English equivalent has been found.
+Many of Sartre's longer sentences and paragraphs have been divided,
+as have his chapters. Most of the divisions into chapters, sections and
+subsections, along with their titles, are our own. So too are most of the
+footnotes. In these and other matters, the German translation by
+Traugott König (Rowohlt 1967) has been very useful to us.
+Jonathan Rée
+1976
+
+Fredric Jameson
+There are many reasons why Sartre's Critique has not had the attention
+it deserved, and its unfinished character is the least of those (especially
+since, except for the plays, he never really finished anything). For
+one thing, it came at a moment in the early Igoos when the intellectual
+hegemony of existentialism - virtually universal in the immediate postwar years - was giving way to that new intellectual passion called
+structuralism. Claude Lévi-Strauss's rather summary attack on Sartre's
+'myth' of the French Revolution (and no doubt provoked by Sartre's
+reassimilation of nascent structuralism in the lectures in which the
+Critique was first presented) anticipated François Furet's version of the
+topic by twenty years without the anti-communism. (Sartre's view of
+'structure' as the objectification of praxis, its exoskeletal trace, will be
+revived and powerfully augmented by Pierre Bourdieu's Esquisse d'une
+theorie de la pratique of 1972, which itself in turn in many ways marked
+the end of the structuralist period.) But Lévi-Strauss's authority in the
+early 1g6os was powerful enough to legitimate a wholesale reaction
+against, and withdrawal from, phenomenological positions in general:
+yet those still very much motivated the insistence of the Critique on the
+necessity for a continuity between individual and group experience.
+Meanwhile, now that structuralism has followed existentialism into
+intellectual history, it is the notorious stylistic difficulty of the Critique
+that offers the more fundamental reason why all those who ought
+to be most immediately concerned by it - they include political
+philosophers, sociologists, militants interested in the Laclau-Mouffe
+dynamics of action, as well as whatever Sartreans may have survived
+the deluge (Bernard-Henri Lévi's enthusiastic new book suggests that
+there may be a whole generation of new converts waiting in the wings)
+- have given it a wide berth.
+
+xiv Foreword
+This very linguistic difficulty reinforces the idea that philosophers
+have no business reflecting on sociological issues that ought to be left
+to experts. The professionalization of the social sciences thus reinforces empiricist and anti-theoretical prejudices already alerted by
+Sartre's radical political positions and in particular his rather strident
+adherence to Marxism (and to the 'orthodox Marxism' of the early
+Ig6os at that!). How can he write on the French Revolution? He's no
+historian, he only uses secondary sources! How can he write on the
+history of French unions and anarcho-syndicalism? He's no labor
+historian! How can he write on French Malthusianism and France's
+peculiar economic development? He's not an economic historian!
+And as for Chinese deforestation and the gold and silver of the Spanish
+New World - it's obvious that a philosopher has no expertise on
+any of these subjects. Perhaps, as he is a 'culture worker'
+, he might at
+best be granted some authority in speaking, as he does, about French
+'distinction' and bourgeois manners (another theme in which he is
+followed, far more famously, by Bourdieu later on). So the idea,
+from Kant to Deleuze, that the philosopher's job is to look over the
+shoulder of the various scientists and experts and check their thinking
+and their use of abstract categories - this notion of the philosopher's,
+vocation is no longer very current among us.
+Do we need, in other words, to philosophize history? In a nominalistic age, indeed, 'philosophies of history' (famously rebaptized by
+Jean-François Lyotard as 'grand narratives') are greeted with universal
+suspicion, even though the most tenacious of them - the story of
+modernization - continues to have a powerful grip on political thinking
+in East and West alike. Capitalism itself lives in a perpetual present;
+the human past seems to be a senseless accumulation of unsuccessful
+human efforts and intentions; yet the future of technology inspires
+blind and unshakeable faith. Sartre here offers to reorganize this doxa
+into what may at least be considered as negative meanings, in the
+categories of counter-finality and the practico-inert: a proposal which
+would, as we shall see, restore a certain philosophical meaning to historical events, at the same time as it risks projecting some new cyclical
+'vision of history'
+As for the undoubted difficulty and occasional unreadability of this
+text, so thoroughly devoid of the fireworks that make up Sartre's other
+discursive writing, the complaint betrays something of a misapprehension as to the internal dynamics of this philosophical prose. It is
+meant to be a study in the status of two kinds of thinking, analytic
+
+Foreword xv
+reason and dialectical reason. But unlike so much of Sartre's philosophy, it does not have as its primary function the invention of new
+philosophical concepts (although new terms and concepts do emerge
+from it). Rather, it is an operation in matching an already existing
+dialectical language or code against a series of individual and collective
+experiences. The Critique is thus from this standpoint to be seen as an
+austere and formalistic exercise, without any instrumental coloration,
+like late Bach; and it invites us to judge whether the rewriting of this
+or that type of historical content in the terminology, for example, of the
+negation of the negation (or of subject and object, passive and active,
+multiplicity and unification, transcendent and immanent, exteriority
+and interiority) is successful: that is, whether the new formulations
+have a new and heightened kind of intelligibility in their own right.
+This can be an exasperating process, particularly when Sartre tries out
+various different versions of this matching in succession. But the
+reader's interest will be fully stimulated only if this unique and peculiar
+linguistic operation is the center of the focus. The problem can be
+rephrased as a testing of the validity of Engels' dialectical categories
+(for it is he, rather than Marx himself, who originally formulated them,
+in the Anti-Dühring) for the illumination - which is to say, the rewriting
+- of history, and not least of contemporary twentieth-century history
+(up to 1960). This means that Sartre here takes on himself a preexisting
+alien language: that of Engels' three laws of the dialectic - the transformation of quantity into quality (and vice versa); the interpenetration
+of opposites; and the negation of the negation. He will now attempt
+to rewrite the problems of a philosophy of history at a level of
+philosophical intensity and abstraction quite different from that of the
+orthodox Marxist version of this philosophy to be found in Stalin's
+dialectical materialism - a 'philosophy' still very much alive at the
+moment in which Sartre is writing and is attempting to work out his
+own practical and theoretical relationship to the existing Communist
+Parties as well as to the other revolutionary traditions. Much is thus at
+stake in this seemingly formalistic exercize; I therefore recommend a
+preliminary approach through the form and its problems, before we
+hazard a judgment on the resultant content, not to speak of the success
+of the enterprise as a whole. Yet for the reader, in order to read and
+understand the work in the first place, as with most original philosophies, we are here required to learn what amounts to a new language,
+as Sartre constructs one out of his matching and rewriting enterprise,
+a new artificial language he not only devised but taught himself to
+
+xvi Foreword
+speak with occasionally maddening fluency. The Critique is thus a
+'language experiment'
+, and the reader is to be reassured that with a
+little practice its rhythms fall into place.
+This approach can be further strengthened by an awareness of the
+continuities between Sartre's earlier existential system (embodied in
+Being and Nothingness) and this new project which so many people
+have wrongly assumed to mark a break with existentialism and a philosophical as well as a political turn towards Marxism - the implication
+being that Sartre will now stage a wholesale replacement of his older
+concepts and terms. The argument for this rather different kind of
+matching operation, however, depends on establishing a fundamental
+continuity between the two moments, something Perry Anderson has
+succinctly evoked as a 'conduit from many of the concepts of Being
+and Nothingness to those of the Critique of Dialectical Reason: among
+Ley to 900 of "facicity" leading to that of "scarcy", "inauthen -
+, the instability of the "for-itself-in-itself" to that
+of the "fused group"' Yet the rewriting process is far from being a
+static translation of the older system, in which the bleak pessimism of
+the existential period is replaced by the ferocious world of competition
+and violence in the dialectical one. I want to go further and to claim
+that the revisions of the Critique make possible a genuine philosophical
+solution to the dilemma that remained open in Being and Nothingness,
+namely that of 'concrete relations with the other': we will return to
+this below.
+At any rate, it seems best to skip over the methodological reflexions
+with which the text begins (and even the questions of structure and the
+frustrating perspective according to which the first volume merely lays
+in place the philosophical instruments - seriality, group-in-fusion, etc.
+- which are to be concretely deployed in the second one) and to note
+a few basic initial presuppositions. Thus, if we are to continue the translational operation sketched out above, we will have to say that what is
+here called praxis is more or less the same as what Being and Nothingness
+called the project: The new language betokens an extension of the
+original concept rather than its replacement, for now what will be
+argued is that the freely chosen project describes not only individual
+action but collective acts as well; or better still, that understanding
+collective action is not different in nature than the understanding of the
+individual (existential) act. Here, in other words, we find the same
+fundamental existential and phenomenological bias mentioned above,
+but which now confronts us with the fundamental dilemma of the
+
+Critique, namely whether collective or historical events can be thought
+to have the same transparency for understanding as do individual ones.
+This is not at all evident, and Sartre's task is clearly a difficult one,
+which a mere change in terminology is unlikely to make any easier.
+As if all this were not enough, the very status of Volume I of the
+Critique makes for some additional complications. For it is in effect a
+preparatory volume, and never arrives at what will presumably be the
+central concern of this philosophical enterprise, namely the meaning
+of history. What are being laid in place in this volume (the only
+completed one) are merely the basic sociological and even metaphysical concepts, the static instruments, required before we set 'history'
+in motion. The division of the projected work into two general types
+of discourse - that of methodology and basic concepts, and the more
+properly philosophical argument about history's putative unity,
+direction and meaning - would seem however to be a rather undialectical one: in both Hegel and Marx the Darstellung of the basic
+concepts turned into a whole dialectical exposition in its own right (in
+Hegel, the Logic, or perhaps even the Encyclopedia as a whole), in Marx,
+the first and simplest approach to capital (Volume I), which was to
+have been redeveloped dialectically in the far more complex spirals of
+Volumes II and III (along with the projected unwritten ones), which
+retrace the earlier simple or "basic' steps in more concrete trajectories
+(many capitals, capital as a whole). Nothing of thesortis here in Sartre,
+whose defense might take the following form: Marxism and the
+tradition now already exists, so that it is not a question of expounding
+utterly new conceptualities but rather critically and dialectically
+reexamining those in place to restore to them a dialectical spirit which
+has long since evaporated in the hands of the various orthodoxies. And
+this is a task that probably has to proceed, à la Hobbes, in a more or
+less analytical fashion.
+The other explanation is a reflex of Sartre's unique strengths rather
+than of any formal or conceptual weakness: it is simply his irrepressibly narrative spirit, which tends to convert an y simple expository task
+into a storytelling form, something evidently related to the historical
+subject-matter, for which 'concrete' always means 'event' Thus even
+economics - the question of inflation in imperial Spain - or sociology
+- the exposition of what class interest might mean - let alone the long
+illustrative sections drawn either from the French Revolution or from
+the Soviet Revolution down to Stalinism - all of these illustrations tend
+to overpower the surface text and to acquire a dynamism of their own.
+
+xviii Foreword
+But this means that the reader is tempted to mistake these narrative
+illustrations for so many positive philosophical propositions about
+concrete history: something which results in the fundamental error so
+many readers (including myself, in an earlier effort) have made about
+Volume I, namely the notion that it sets in place a cyclical view of
+history in which groups incessantly form and then dissolve back into
+seriality, leaving an essentially dictatorial structure in place behind
+them. We will come back to this issue.
+Let me now enumerate the key moments, which is to say the key
+operative concepts, of Volume I. I have already suggested that the first
+of these concepts, the very starting point, that of scarcity, allows Sartre
+to preserve the much disputed dialectical category of the negation of
+the negation: scarcity is seen as an initial structure of the world, or of
+being, which is negated and transcended by human need - the experience
+of lack and desire, of hunger and thirst, is then the initial way in which
+we organize the en-soi (being-in-itself) into a situation, turning a
+combination of chemical elements into a desert or a lush landscape. The
+human organism, as a meaningless fact, thereby makes itself over into
+a project, into a praxis that can henceforth have a meaning (to call it a
+human meaning is simply to multiply these terms unnecessarily), and
+thus an outcome, whether of failure or success. But to begin with scarcity
+is also to short-circuit and disqualify the whole false problem of human
+nature (something the fundamental existential tenet - existence precedes
+essence - sought to do on a more abstract level). Now it becomes
+possible to share the realist pessimism of Hobbes or Machiavelli - that
+human beings are necessarily evil - without any metaphysical premises
+about nature itself. Indeed the simple fact of inhabiting a world of
+scarcity (a world we still inhabit even if or when our own society
+happens to become rich and prosperous) explains the fact of violence
+and aggressivity in a situational rather than a naturalistic way: 'When,
+in the course of a migration, members of a tribal group come across a
+strange tribe, they suddenly discover man as an alien species, that is, as
+a fierce carnivorous beast who can lay ambushes and make tools' (107).*
+This is not some belated form of social darwinism nor even a proposition
+out of socio-biology, it is the expression of human freedom, as well as
+of that of reciprocity: "In pure reciprocity, that which is Other than me
+is also the same. But in reciprocity as modified by scarcity, the same
+appears to us as anti-human in so far as this same man appears as
+*All translations from the Critique here are my own.
+
+Foreword xix
+radically Other - that is to say, as threatening us with death' (131-2).
+Scarcity is thus a contingent feature of our world (we can imagine SF
+alien creatures from a world without scarcity, but then they would not
+be human in the ways we experience that condition). Meanwhile,
+generosity, cooperation and the like are not false or fictional, but they
+are not features of human nature either (there is no such thing as human
+nature). They are, rather, other forms in which our freedom negates that
+initial fact of being.
+Once this initial ontological (or even metaphysical) premise is given,
+we are in a position to name and to appreciate its transformations. Once
+again, these are given in the order of their emergence: that is to say, a
+Hegelian or evolutionary presentation is adopted which can very easily
+lend itself to the narrative misconceptions I have already warned about.
+In other words, this sequence of concepts, categories or forms can very
+easily be mistaken for something like a 'philosophy of history' (a
+misconception, to be sure, only strengthened by the decision to publish
+this enormous definitional section as a whole book or separate volume
+in its own right). Let's go even further than this, on the grounds that
+authors are always complicitous in the misunderstandings of their own
+works: this sequence then may well in reality betray something like an
+alternate 'philosophy of history' within the larger (and never completed) text; it betrays a cyclical pattern virtual in Sartre's thinking and no
+doubt in contradiction with the official analysis of historical direction
+he meant to offer us.
+At any rate, the first move in this 'emergence' will follow the logical
+order of Being and Nothingness, where pure being (being-in-itself) is
+then initially shaped and organized by the negativity of human beings
+(or by being-for-itself). Here the being of scarcity is transformed into
+a situation of need by way of the negativity of human lack (or:
+inorganic being is transformed by organic being or life, and there
+results a first simple and fundamental form of the project, the negation
+of the negation: the form in other words of human action itself. In the
+translational scheme with which Sartreans must become familiar in
+order to read the Critique, the key term 'project' is here rendered as
+praxis.
+It would be tempting indeed to pause for a lexical digression on
+this momentous word, recoined and placed back in philosophical
+circulation by Count Cieslowski in 1839, and then almost at once
+appropriated by Marx in the Theses on Feuerbach (1845-1846), where
+it is defined as sinnlich-menschliche Tätigkeit or 'sensuous human
+
+xx Foreword
+activity', that is to say a material, or materialist, action involving
+change. What does the new borrowing add to the plainer language of
+acts themselves? Well, to be sure, even the choice of the word act adds
+something to our narrative understanding of events, since it implies a
+unified process which leaves real traces (as opposed, in one of Sartre's
+favorite dualisms, to the mere gesture, on the one hand, or the
+immaterial thought or wish on the other - that 'mere interpretation'
+of which Marx accused the philosophers). Praxis then suggests that we
+need to open up even the conventional conception (or better still
+category) of the act, to include two more dimensions: one of ontology
+and one of history.
+Praxis thus implies and designates the deep structure of the act, as
+that combines being and negativity; and it also asks us to consider the
+humblest act in what Hegel would have called a world-historical light,
+or what Sartre himself terms the incarnation of the meaning of History
+itself: in this sense, then, the opening of a can of peas stages my whole
+relationship to being itself at the same time that it inflects the historical
+modalities of the world of capitalist industrial production (in this case,
+as we shall see, what Sartre calls 'exigency'). 'Praxis' does not impose
+those two dimensions of meaning on an act in advance, but rather
+opens the act up to an interrogation in terms of both or either one.
+But as if that were not enough (now closing our parenthesis), the
+word praxis itself in the Critique is quickly doubled and outpaced by
+another one, a true neologism this, whose technical meaning has latterly
+been utterly transformed and travestied by its increasingly central role
+in ideological debate. This is of course the word 'totalization'
+, which
+Sartre coined specifically in order to differentiate himself from Lukács
+and the latter's key word 'totality' Unfortunately, the ideological
+connotation with which the Sartrean term has been more recently
+endowed pointedly conflates these two terms, and makes Sartre over
+into yet another philosopher of 'totality', that is to say, not merely of
+universals and of Marxism, but, above all in the context of identity
+politics, a philosopher representative of identity itself and the hegemony
+of the white male Western intellectual (and no doubt characterizing the
+left intellectual, as opposed to the various right-wing ideologies).
+"Totalizing' has thus become a slogan which identifies a claim to speak
+from above and for all of society, as opposed to the minoritarian and
+differential positions of this or that Foucauldian 'specific intellectual'
+There is thus, in the deployment of this epithet in discursive struggle,
+a movement out from the condemnation of the various Communist
+
+xxi
+Parties and their claims to truth and to hegemonic leadership towards
+the indictment of political intellectuals generally as those espouse this
+or that 'total' systemic change of capitalism as a whole, as opposed to
+this or that specific minority group agenda within capitalism.
+Nor did Lukács himself really mean anything so offensive, even
+though the 'standpoint of totality' will be evoked as a criterion of
+truth, where it means grasping the system as a whole, and characterizes
+a dialectic for which thinking starts not with Descartes' smallest parts
+or units and working upwards but with the most complex final form
+and working downwards. But Lukács identified this standpoint and
+this perspective with a class position; and he evoked the proletariat's
+"aspiration to totality rather than their empirical possession of such a
+universal view, which the party itself was supposed to mediate, by way
+no doubt of all kinds of bad 'totalizations'
+However one evaluates Lukács's so -called standpoint theory, which
+has been very suggestively revived and adopted by theoreticians of
+gender and of race, it has nothing whatsoever to do with Sartre's usage.
+Sartrean totalization was meant, indeed, to exclude any implication that
+multiples like the 'group in fusion' have the ontological status of a
+totality or an organism (of a 'hyperorganism' as Sartre's text will constantly warn us). For Sartre, then, a totality is precisely a static concept,
+a concept of being rather than of process, and one governed by analytic
+rather than by dialectical reason.
+But these lofty philosophical issues are scarcely raised by Sartre's
+use of the word totalization, which simply means praxis itself, organized activity with a view towards an end; and, whatever its possible
+extension to collective and historical movements and events, its relevancy begins with the behavior of individuals, and indeed with acts as
+insignificant as that opening of a can, I have already singled out.
+It is curious that Sartre should have chosen a relatively spatial word,
+redolent of exteriority, to characterize even the initial forms of human
+activity; indeed we will find it associated with unification as well,
+which compounds our sense of the incongruity of the choice of such
+terms to characterize interiority and human action. Yet they evoke the
+multiple and the dispersed, separation and heterogeneity, in order to
+dramatize what the human project most immediately confronts and
+what it must most immediately overcome. Indeed, I feel that the
+importance of the notion and the experience of multiplicity for Sartre
+has scarcely yet been evaluated, for it arguably governs everything
+from the inert things and beings of the outside world all the way to
+
+xxii Foreword
+demography itself, in its twin form of philosophical otherness and of
+colonial subjugation.
+At any rate, in this first context of the simplest acts of individuals,
+totalization and unification underscore what negativity, the project,
+human praxis, first does to the world of being that confronts us, which
+is to organize its scattered bits and pieces, its 'blooming buzzing
+confusion', into a unified situation: for it is only with the situation -
+this great leitmotif of the dynamism of Sartre's earlier work - that
+praxis can begin, as the intervention into and the transformation -
+Sartre says, the dépassement, the transcendence - of that situation it
+has itself initially brought into being (a dimension of the nascent act
+reminiscent of Heidegger's Vorgriff). And with this 'first' human act,
+then, we are thrown into history itself.
+For what totalization or praxis produces is one form or another of
+'worked matter'
+, what Hegel would have called my objectification in
+the outside world, and as it were an inert and alienated trace of my
+completed act. And with this, the dialectic itself begins, and the funda;
+mental dualism of all of Sartre's philosophy rears its head, namely
+the radical differentiation between people and things, between my
+consciousness, my alienation in matter, and my alienation by other
+people. This, which was the tripartite organizing principle of Being
+and Nothingness, must not be confused with that dualism of subject and
+object, of the pour-soi and the en-soi, to which Merleau-Ponty objected,
+in his own effort to restore a phenomenological monism by way of the
+corps propre. (Yet Merleau-Ponty was himself guilty of this particular
+dualism common to all phenomenology, and the central target, not
+only of Heidegger's Kehre, but of so-called poststructuralism in
+general.) No, this particular dualism is scandalous precisely because it
+is itself the recognition of the scandal of the existence of other people,
+surely Sartre's central philosophical motif and the most original and
+durable element of his various systems. Nor is it subject to the usual
+critiques of dualism as such, since it is a dualism which functions as a
+moment in the reestablisment of monism proper. In this respect, the
+remarks about Marxism, which Sartre considers to be 'in fact both
+monist and dualist', are significant:
+It is dualist because it is monist. Marx's ontological monism consisted
+in affirming the irreducibility of Being to thought, and, at the same
+time, in reintegrating thoughts with the real as a particular form of
+human activity .... (25) The dialectic is precisely a form of monism,
+
+Foreword xxiii
+in that oppositions appear to it as moments which are posited for
+themselves for an instant before bursting. (180)
+But these methodological considerations do not yet specify the
+concrete and fundamental dualism at work in the Critique, which can
+be understood as constituting a commentary on Marx's famous remark:
+'Men make their own history, but not under conditions of their own
+choosing.' On Sartre's reading, however, what will be underscored is
+the peculiarity of just those 'situations not of their own choosing',
+which, however, as historical situations, were in fact the result of
+human action in the past, even though they may now be considered as
+materiality. The point here is that, although such 'conditions' are
+material ones, they are certainly not natural, in the sense of absolute
+contingency unmodified by human action. (Or, to be even more
+precise about it, even 'contingency' is the result of human reality,
+insof ar as it has already been produced as contingency by human need
+and human desire.)
+At any rate, Sartre will now reformulate the maxim in a new and
+circular way: 'the crucial discovery of dialectical investigation is that
+man is "mediated" by things to the same extent as things are "mediated" by man' (79). 'Matter', he observes elsewhere, is 'a mediation
+between individuals' (113). At this point, we approach one of the great
+original ideas of the Critique, which goes well beyond the alienation
+theory of the early Marx. Just as theology needs to account for evil and
+suffering in a world otherwise attributed to God, so any conceptually
+satisfying 'philosophy of history' needs to account for violence and
+failure in some meaningful way, rather than as a series of accidents
+that fall outside of meaning. The Communist Manifesto does so by
+underscoring the dialectical nature of capitalism, its immensely destructive power, which is at one with its immensely productive power.
+Sartre's dialectic will go further than this by theorizing an antidialectic intertwined with the dialectic of human praxis, a counter finality
+inextricably conjoined with the finalities of human action and
+production. Indeed, this new force has a bonus for us in the invention
+of a new concept and a new and durable philosophical term, the socalled practico-inert, as a more precise way of designating objects which
+are not mere things and agencies which are not exactly people either.
+But this will not be a Manichaean vision of history: that type of evil
+is, as we have seen, already profoundly human: it is the immeasurable
+brutality people visit on other people within the world of scarcity. This
+
+XXIV
+new kind of negative force is to be understood in a different way, and
+to theorize it properly would, as Sartre observes, explain how praxis
+can logically 'be an experience both of necessity and of freedom' (79).
+Indeed, 'what has never been attempted is a study of the type of passive
+action which materiality as such exerts on man and his History in
+returning a stolen praxis to man in the form of a counterfinality' (124).
+We have here to do, therefore, with a type of 'unintended consequence'
+quite different also from the reversals of human action in history, as
+Marx writes their comic epic in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
+Bonaparte. (Indeed this new anti-dialectic offers one more dramatization
+of the banality and inadequacy of current fashionable attempts to
+rewrite the dialectic precisely in such everyday or 'common-language'
+terms as that precisely of an 'unintended consequence'.)
+Counterfinality is thus a negative version of Hegel's 'ruse of history'
+(or 'ruse of reason'), which he himself derived from Adam Smith's
+hidden hand and Mandeville's Fable of the Bees, with the qualification
+that what was unexpectedly positive in them becomes, characteristically
+enough, implacably negative in Sartre. The premise, however, remains
+that of the efficacy of praxis: what is negative in counterfinality is not
+the result of a matter as such, but rather of the human productivity or
+praxis invested in it, and returning in unrecognizable form upon the
+human beings who invested their labor in it in the first place. Sartre will
+also call the bearer of this new, and active, malign power worked
+matter' (matière ouvrée), and it can be distinguished from human 'totalization in course' as being very precisely an already 'totalized totality'
+This is thus the place of the various historical forms Marx calls modes
+of production, and it is the concomitant of a specific form of human
+sociality Sartre will call 'the collective' (among which is included the
+Marxian phenomenon of social class). We can better understand this
+important notion by observing that it can be said to have two distinct
+sources.
+On the one hand, we may find it anticipated in the relatively phenomenological rehearsal of the oppositions between activity and passivity,
+and interiority and exteriority, in which (as in the other oppositions we
+have already enumerated) a human realm is opposed to a non-human
+one. For, as Sartre never ceases to remind us, in this following Heidegger
+as well as many of the descriptions of Being and Nothingness, the human
+agency works on exteriority by making itself exterior, and works on
+passivity by making itself passive. Not only is this the meaning of the
+tool as such, but it is also the disposition of the hand that wields the tool.
+
+But this work on the self and on my own body, which lends my body
+efficacity in the passive and external realm of bodies as such, also in
+some reciprocal yet seemingly magic fashion endows the matter on
+which I work with some of my human characteristics.
+At which point we may take up what strikes me as Sartre's other
+source, namely Marx's own notion of 'stored labor', and in particular
+the consequences of the labor process for machinery and machineproduced goods. The non-human world must for Marx be distinguished from a material invested by labor: such material objects
+become 'masses of crystallized labor-time',
+', their raw material 'soaked
+in labor' Machinery now dialectically transforms this process of
+involved. This is because the machine stores up the labor which has
+gone into its own production and then reinvests it in its new product:
+'Only in large-scale industry has man succeeded in making the product
+of his past labor, labor which has already been objectified, perform
+gratuitous service on a large scale, like a force of nature'
+It is this peculiar temporal def eral - the possibility of storing up an
+initial quantity of expended labor in order to reinvest it in smaller
+amounts later on in a secondary product - which seems to me the most
+suggestive antecedent for grasping what Sartre will now describe as a
+more 'metaphysical' process. Nor should the fundamental opposition
+of multiplicity and unity be left out: for counterf inality reflects a
+'material unity of human actions
+And passive unity, as the
+synthetic appearance of pure dispersal and as the exteriorization of the
+bond of interiority, is for praxis its unity as Other and in the domain
+of the other' (163). (This first passive activity of worked matter will
+find its echo in that much later objectification which is the social
+institution, characterized as an 'active passivity' .)
+Two famous examples or set-pieces will be called upon to illustrate
+the baleful effects of this "praxis without an author' (166): the deforestation of China and the monetary crisis which strikes the Spanish
+empire at the height of its power in the New World. But it is important
+to remember that it is this global unity of counterfinality which also
+defines social class, as that shared situation which makes an agglomeration of individuals over into a class (and a collective in the larger
+sense): so that Sartre's excursus on class interest here (197-219) can be
+seen as a doctrinal obligation and a more specific contribution to
+Marxian class theory, and one which is in addition meant to distinguish
+
+xxvi Foreword
+this particular social structure from other features generally lumped
+together under an omnibus concept of ideology.
+In Marx, the structure of labor and the structure of the commodity
+are two faces of the same phenomenon, two distinct languages, as it
+were, which characterize the same fundamental originality of capitalism
+like the alternating figuration of waves and that of particles in quantum
+theory. So it is that at this point in the Critique the dialectic, or antidialectic, of worked matter turns over into an examination of the type
+of social relations inseparable from it. We must here remember the
+paradox of the we-subject as it was described in Being and Nothingness:
+it is a form of subjectivity in which my ( purely psychological) identification with other people is mediated by the "directions' on the world
+of things, the instructions on the box, the proper method for opening
+a can. But it is through such requirements (exigences, here translated
+exigencies) that worked matter directs our activity in general. The
+subjectivity which accompanies this purely ideal or imaginary community with other people, other users and consumers, but other
+workers as well, will now be called seriality.
+With this, we are at the very heart of this first, definitional volume
+of the Critique and are in a position to evaluate its central conceptual
+antithesis between two fundamental forms of collective existence,
+between the side-by-side indifference and anonymity of the serial
+agglomeration and the tightly-knit interrelationship of the group-infusion. This is an antithesis that is not merely a classificatory one, for
+as a principle of social dynamics and an empirical fact of social history,
+the group-in-fusion emerges from seriality as a reaction against it,
+its subsequent development and fate governed by the danger of its
+dissolution back into seriality again.
+Nor is this a particularly original distinction, although Sartre's account
+of the internal structure of each form is remarkable and probably without
+precedent. Yet formally the antithesis has something of the same spirit
+as that traditionally attributed to the distinction between anthropology
+and sociology, given its now classical (modern) form by Tönnies in his
+famous opposition between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, the former
+designating small clan-based or tribal, pre-modern or 'traditional'
+societies, the latter the great urban agglomerations of modern industrial
+ones. In the Critique, however, no particular social or political form is
+attributed to the two terms; indeed, they are scarcely symmetrical at all
+in that sense, since seriality is a social condition that must extend through
+all kinds of societies and populations, while the group-in-fusion is hardly
+
+a social form at all, but rather an emergence and an event, the formation
+of a guerilla unit, the sudden crystallization of an 'in-group' of any kind.
+(As we shall see, the formation of the group has a motivation and real
+historical content; but that content is quite irrelevant for the present
+structural description, and might range from stamp collecting to assassination conspiracies or political parties.)
+The more fundamental question about the antithesis is an ethical one,
+for it is clear from the language of these descriptions that a judgment is
+implicit in them, and that the serial state, however comfortable or content
+its members might consider themselves to be, is one of mediocrity if not
+of alienation, while the group-in-fusion incarnates active human praxis
+in a uniquely heightened fashion - a kind of praxis all the more
+distinctive in that it constitutes the production, not of things, but of
+other people and the self, of a new kind of sociality.
+Our question must then turn on the affinity between this judgment
+on social relations (which might in a pinch be foreshortened into a
+distinction between the private and the political) and the existential
+legacy of the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity, which clearly
+spring to the tip of the tongue with any evocation of seriality and group
+existence. For thisis an ambiguous legacy indeed, and in its first modern
+form, in Heidegger's work of the ig2os, is overwhelmingly conservative
+in tenor: authentic is the individual's being-unto-death, and the call of
+a duty or mission, which if it is not overtly couched in group terms
+certainly evokes the soldier and the military unit. What is unmistakably
+inauthentic on the other hand is the anonymous state of what the 1920s
+characterized as 'mass man'
+:, the faceless crowds of the big city, the "man'
+or 'on' (German and French versions of the anybody or the impersonal
+'you'). Sartrean seriality is not far behind these early accounts, even
+though already in Being and Nothingness the class character of these
+collective actors is reversed, and it is the bourgeois we-subject which is
+inauthentic, while the we-object, the alienated and reified small group,
+is described in terms of underclass marginality and already anticipates
+the account of the group-in-fusion.
+At a time when the very notions of authenticity and inauthenticity
+have come to seem suspiciously humanist and psychologizing, if not
+individualist, Sartre's celebration of the group may well incur the
+diagnosis of anarchism, or even left infantilism: the Right may well
+indict it for the excesses of the 196os and their aftermath; the Left sense
+in it some surviving trace of left adventurism and romanticism; while
+Americans are likely to conjecture uncomfortable affinities with conspir-
+
+xxvili Foreword
+atorial terrorist organizations. It would be more difficult, however, to
+take the other alternative offered by Sartre's antithesis and to come out
+with a full-throated defense and endorsement of seriality.
+It is easiest to deal with the two states together, as they are in fact
+defined in deliberately antithetical terms. Thus in seriality, as in the
+now famous example of the waiting line for a city bus, 'everyone is the
+same as the Others in so far as he is Other than himself' (260). And
+this otherness is as spatial as it is psychological: I am not in the center
+of my world, which is elsewhere, in other people (all of whom feel the
+same way as I do). In the group, on the contrary, each member is the
+center, the center is everywhere; otherness has been converted into
+identity. Nor, inasmuch as group-formation is first and foremost an
+attempt to overcome the serial situation, is it surprising to find that in
+the group, everyone is the same as the other, and otherness has
+momentarily become a kind of collective identity. But it will also be
+clear that this second structure is necessarily far more complex than
+the first one, of seriality, in which people stand in a simple exteriority
+to one another.
+Certainly seriality also knows its paradoxes: it is indeed no accident
+that Sartre's principal extended illustrations are those of radio broadcasts and of the free market. In fact, I believe, the notion of seriality
+developed here is the only philosophically satisfactory theory of public
+opinion, the only genuine philosophy of the media, that anyone has
+proposed to date: something that can be judged by its evasion of the
+conceptual traps of collective consciousness on the one hand, and of
+behaviorism or manipulation on the other. If this were all Sartre had
+managed to do in the Critique, it would already mark a considerable
+achievement (neglect of which may reflect the turn of current media
+theory towards a problematic of the image as much as anything else).
+When it comes to the group-in-fusion, however, things are by no
+means so simple: we must reckon with what is no longer a dualism, a
+simple reciprocity or indifference of one person to another, but rather
+with a triadic form, in which (as in the group-object theory of Being
+and Nothingness) formerly serial individuals are united by the threat
+(or the Look) of an external third, which the emergent group must
+then interiorize in order to retain its coherence and its dynamic. Thus
+each member becomes a third to all the others, thereby grounding that
+omnipresent centrality of each member that was far too simply evoked
+in the preceding paragraphs:
+
+XXIX
+The individual, as a third party, is connected, in the unity of a single
+praxis (and therefore of a single perceptual vista) with the unity of
+individuals as inseparable moments of a nontotalised totalisation, and
+with each of them as a third party, that is to say, through the mediation
+of the group. In terms of perception, I perceive the group as my
+common unity, and, simultaneously, as a mediation between me and
+every other third party
+the members of the group are third parties,
+which means that each of them totalises the reciprocity of others. (374)
+Just as this seemingly Ptolemaic system of turning thirds (tiers)
+proves to be something familiar that we know already from our daily
+experience, so the reader will find that, with a little practice, this rather
+startling prose quickly becomes readable enough.
+We leave the reader to navigate it, but with an important proviso:
+we have here only designated the emergence of the group - famously
+illustrated by Sartre in the taking of the Bastille. What is not yet clear,
+indeed what is supremely problematic, is how it can possibly remain
+in being, as a group, when the threat of the external third party (the
+King's troops) has been withdrawn. One simple and obvious answer
+overshoots the mark: and that is that the group cannot remain in being;
+indeed it never was in being to begin with, in the ontological sense. It
+never had, nor can it ever acquire, any durable ontological status; it
+cannot therefore accede to any new form of collective being which
+might be expected to supercede that of the individual 'being-for-itself'
+and thereby to cancel the famous peroration of Being and Nothingness.
+Here as there, then, 'man' remains a 'useless passion': yet at the same
+time Sartre's in veterate pessimism can here be grasped far more clearly
+as a critical instrument, and not merely an inheritance of the out-ofdate Cartesian and phenomenological traditions of a 'philosophy of
+the subject' centered on a purely individual consciousness. Rather, as
+always in Sartre, ontological failure and anxiety are energizing and the
+stimulus to further praxis and subsequent group formation:
+The group has not, and cannot have, the ontological nature which it
+claims in its praxis; conversely, each and all are produced and defined in
+terms of this non-existent totality. There is a sort of internal vacuum, an
+unbridgeable and indeterminate distance, a sort of malaise in every
+community, large or small; and this uneasiness occasions a strengthening
+of the practices of integration, and increases with the integration of the
+group. (583)
+
+XXX
+It remains to indicate briefly how, in this situation and seemingly
+doomed to failure, the group does finally manage to become something
+structurally other than a mere punctual interruption of seriality.
+We have already hinted at the crucial mechanism by which a few
+straggling 'others' momentarily brought together by an external threat
+(from the external Other or third) solidify this momentary solidarity:
+it is by interiorizing the tiers itself (the 'third party') in such a way that
+each member of the initial group becomes a third to all the others. Each
+is now both part and whole of this strange new structure, both
+individual member and also that now internalized exteriority which
+grasps all of the members ('as though from the outside') as a group.
+We must not say that at this stage there is no leader: on the contrary,
+at this stage everyone is the leader, whose task, like the tribal chieftain
+of Pierre Clastres's anthropology, is not to impose a line of action but
+merely to speak its possibility aloud, to be the mouthpiece of the
+situation itself before the group.
+It is a Utopian state (Malraux's 'lyric apocalypse') which cannot
+last. Everything now turns on the problem of the future, and of the
+future of the group: it will be clear in a moment how this problem sets
+vibrating the deepest existential concerns of Being and Nothingness at
+the same time that it generates its most dramatic language, its most
+eloquent pathos: my project is 'a temporal form where I await myself
+in the future, where I make an appointment with myself on the other
+side of that hour, of that day, of that month. Anxiety is the fear of not
+finding myself at that appointment, of no longer even wishing to be
+there in the first place' But where the group is concerned, this
+appointment is the pledge, and the paradigm of the French Revolution
+reveals that its fundamental structure is the Terror and the threat of
+death. The Tennis-Court Oath is the moment in which this paradigm
+becomes fixed: the very beginning of the Revolution itself - the
+'revolutionary' Revolution, as opposed to the counterrevolution of
+the nobles against the King that preceded and triggered it. For in the
+Tennis-Court Oath, the bourgeoisie and its hegemonic bloc,
+reassembled in an unused space in the palace, collectively swear, under
+pain of death, not to separate until the Constitution shall have been
+established 'sur des fondements solides' (June 20, 1789). The crucial
+clause, 'under pain of death'
+', is not merely Sartre's interpretation or
+extrapolation: it is the implied reading deduced after the fact by
+Robespierre's Terror, as the latter's justification. It is also the
+(desperate and impossible) attempt to solve the problem of future
+
+Foreword xxxi
+commitment already raised in Being and Nothingness: for this consent
+to my own death and execution (by all the members of the group) is
+not only my effort to compel the fidelity of all the others, itis also and
+first and foremost my attempt to protect myself against myself, to
+compel the fidelity of my future self against the present one (422). It
+is, finally, also the production of treason as such, since seriality cannot
+know the latter, which can only exist as the violation of this very oath
+of allegiance. This is the moment to remember the profound resonance
+of this theme of treason and the traitor throughout all of Sartre: as the
+'objective treason' of the intellectual, never fully or ontologically
+committed to any cause; as the jouissance of treason in the rebel
+(particularly in Genet), or of the homme de ressentiment (particularly
+in the collaborators); the great test of my authenticity as well (will I
+stand up under torture?), and the eternal self-doubt of the bourgeois
+renegade against his own class, variously elaborated in Lucifer and the
+Lord and in Words, if not in the interminable Family Idiot itself.
+The pledge is now the positive side of all that, the great moment of
+affirmation in all of Sartre; indeed it is the very 'origin of humanity'
+(436):
+we are the same because we emerged from the clay at the same date and
+through all the others; and so we are, as it were, an individual species,
+which has emerged at a particular moment through a sudden mutation;
+but our specific nature unites us in so far as it is freedom
+this
+fraternity is not based, as is sometimes stupidly supposed, on physical
+resemblance expressing some deep identity of nature. If it were, why
+should not a pea in a can be described as the brother of another pea in
+the same can? We are brothers in so far as, following the creative act
+of the pledge, we are our own sons, our common creation. (437)
+The pledge is thus the climactic moment of constituent power: its
+articulation as a date and an event is what gives the French Revolution
+its paradigmatic quality over all those other revolutions in which it is
+necessarily present but only implicit as an act and as the very
+expression of the multitude. Its theorization places Sartre squarely in
+the great tradition that runs from Rousseau to Antonio Negri and
+passes through the Paris Commune itself.
+The more sombre concluding pages of the Critique will then observe
+and bear witness to the inevitable decline from this apotheosis. They
+chronicle the slow ossification of the group under the pressure of some
+
+xxxi Foreword
+surrounding universal seriality. Indeed, they permit us to reaffirm the
+transformation (or sublation) of the older question of authenticity into
+this newer political and collective dilemma. For (as in Heidegger),
+authenticity is never, for Sartre, a state which one can somehow achieve
+and in which one can then dwell and persevere: it is a precarious space
+conquered from the swamp of inauthenticity itself, into which it then
+fatally lapses. If one can speak, indeed, of anything like a human nature,
+then one must say that that nature is first and foremost inauthentic, in
+which moments of authenticity are but fitful and evanescent episodes (it
+is a doctrine already anticipated in a distorted form by Christian images
+of sin and grace). But this raises serious questions about the implications
+for a philosophy of history of such a view of group authenticity.
+At any rate, it would seem that Sartre foresees at least three ways in
+which the group can dissolve: it can of course simply disperse back into
+seriality, like a crowd which dissolves and goes back to its ordinary
+business. But this is to grasp the group-in-fusion before the defining
+moment of the pledge. After that, what lies in store for it is institutionalization, with its dual forms of bureaucracy and dictatorship, forms
+which Sartre's account - with its accounts of schism and factionality, of
+the passive activity of the institutional practico-inert, of hierarchy, of
+the externalization of authority and the emergence of the sovereign and
+of a henceforth serial obedience - seems to conflate and to identify
+together. But this is because the underlying paradigm has changed; and
+from now on, and throughout Volume II of the Critique, it will be the
+fate of the Soviet Revolution after Lenin's death which is the reference.
+(Thus the entire Critique may also be read as an elaborate historical
+commentary, in the spirit of Machiavelli or Gramsci, on these two
+supreme events which are the French and the Soviet Revolutions.)
+But it should not thereby be concluded that the Critique replicates
+the standard bourgeois dogma according to which revolution (here,
+group formation) inevitably leads to totalitarianism (or in other words,
+Stalinism). Nor, on the other hand, do we here discover in advance the
+Deleuze-Guattari vision of innumerable nomadic and guerrilla warmachines forever flinging themselves against the inevitable State. In
+Sartre, the State itself is a reified group-in-fusion which has established
+itself within a milieu of seriality (perhaps on the distant analogy of
+those former nomads who become the imperial ruling class).
+The point is, however, as has already been warned, that this first
+volume of the Critique is not intended to offer a vision of History; but
+only to lay in place the concepts and the categories with which such a
+
+Foreword xxxii
+vision might be constructed. If history is already present here, this is
+merely in the formal sense in which all history offers an endless
+spectacle of the interaction of seriality and group formation, like a
+great current, on which white water, ripples and swells, appear and disappear ceaselessly. Yet the river's source and its drainage, its ultimate
+return into the sea, are issues distinct from this steady stream into
+which one always steps.
+Those issues, intimated at the end of this volume and then sporadically developed in what was to have been the second one, turn on the
+rather different matter of historical unification, and of Sartre's
+fundamental maxim that the many histories of the past have gradually
+become unified into one history. Any 'philosophy of history' today
+must begin with this qualification that History, in that unified and
+universal sense, has not yet existed, but is only now coming into being.
+There were once many distinct and unrelated histories, many distinct
+modes of production, as innumerable, if not as grains of sand, then at
+least as the languages of the New World and of Australasia, so many
+separate and unrelated tribes and groups of hunters and gatherers, who
+only gradually over many millennia come to be unified, that is to say,
+to share the common destiny which a world capitalism gradually
+imposes on them. In the brief decades between Sartre's composition of
+the Critique and the visible emergence of what we now call globalization, this principle has become inescapable, and with it the very
+possibility of a universal history reemerges in a new way.
+2004
+
+Introduction
+
+The Dogmatic Dialectic
+and the Critical Dialectic
+• Dialectical Monism
+Everything we established in The Problem of Method' follows from
+our fundamental agreement with historical materialism. Butas long as
+we present this agreement merely as one option among others we shall
+have achieved nothing, and our conclusions will remain conjectural. I
+have proposed certain methodological rules; but they cannot be valid,
+in fact they cannot even be discussed, unless the materialist dialectic
+can be assumed to be true. It must be proved that a negation of a
+negation can be an affirmation, that conflicts - within a person or a
+group - are the motive force of History, that each moment of a series
+is comprehensible on the basis of the initial moment, though irreducible
+to it, that History continually effects totalisations of totalisations, and
+so on, before the details of an analytico-synthetic and regressiveprogressive method can be grasped.
+But these principles cannot be taken for granted; indeed most
+anthropologists (anthropologistes) would reject them. Of course, the
+determinism of the positivists is necessarily a form of materialism:
+whatever its subject matter, it endows it with the characteristics of
+mechanical materiality, namely inertia and exterior causation. But it
+normally rejects the reinteriorisation of the different moments in a
+synthetic progression. Where we see the developmental unity of a
+single process, the positivists will attempt to show several independent, exterior factors of which the event under consideration is the resultant. What the positivists reject is a monism of interpretation. Take,
+I. Though a separate essay, this is printed at the beginning of the French
+edition of Critique. It is available in English as The Problem of Method, trans.
+Hazel E. Barnes (London, Methuen, 1964). The American edition is published
+under the title Search for a Method. [Ea.]
+
+1G Introduction
+for example, the excellent historian Georges Lefebvre. He criticises
+Jaurès? for claiming to see the unity of a process in the events of 1789.
+"As presented by Jaurès, 178) was one simple event. The cause of the
+Revolution was the ripening of the power of the bourgeoisie, and its
+result was the legalisation of that power. But it is now well known that
+the Revolution of 1789 as a specific event required a truly abnormal
+and unpredictable set of immediate causes: a financial crisis aggravated
+by the war in America; unemployment, caused by the commercial
+treaty of 1786 and by the war in the Far East; and, finally, high prices
+and shortages brought about by the poor harvest of 1788 and by the
+edict of 1787 which had emptied the granaries.
+As for underlying causes, Lefebvre stresses the fact that without the
+abortive aristocratic revolution, which began in 1787, the bourgeois
+revolution would have been impossible. He concludes: "The rise of a
+revolutionary class is not necessarily the only cause of its victory; nor
+is its victory inevitable; nor need it lead to violence. In this instance,
+the Revolution was begun by those whom it was to annihilate rather
+than by those who profited from it, and ... there is no reason to suppose that great kings could not have checked the progress of the
+aristocracy in the eighteenth century. '4
+I do not wish to analyse this text, at least at present. Certainly,
+Lefebvre may be right to say that Jaurès' interpretation is simplistic,
+that the unity of a historical process is more ambiguous, more 'polyvalent' than he says - at least in its origins. One might try to find the
+unity of the disparate causes in a broader synthesis, to show that the
+incompetence of the eighteenth century kings was effect as much as
+cause, etc., to rediscover circularities, and to show how chance is
+integrated into those 'feed-back' devices which are the events of
+History; and that it is instantly incorporated by the whole so that it
+appears to everyone as a manifestation of providence, etc. But this
+misses the point. It is not a matter even of showing that such syntheses
+are possible, but of proving that they are necessary: not any particular
+one, but in general that the scientist must adopt, in every case and at
+every level, a totalising attitude towards his subject matter.
+Let us not forget that anthropologists never reject the dialectical
+method absolutely. Even Lefebvre does not formulate a general criti-
+2. Jean Jaurès, Histoire socialiste de la révolution française, Paris 1901-4 and
+1922-4. [Ed.]
+3. Etudes sur la Révolution française, Paris 1954, P. 247.
+4. Ibid.
+
+The Dogmatic Dialectic and the Critical Dialectic 1]
+cism of every attempt at totalisation. On the contrary, in his celebrated
+lectures on the French Revolution he approached the relations between
+the Assembly, the Commune and various groups of citizens, from 1o
+August to the September Massacres, as a dialectician; he gave the
+'First Terror' the unity of a developing totalisation. But Lefebvre
+refused to adopt the totalising attitude consistently. In response to our
+questions, he would no doubt say that History is not a unity, that it
+obeys diverse laws, that an event may be produced by the pure accidental coincidence of independent factors, and that it may, in turn,
+develop according to totalising schemata which are peculiar to it. In
+short, Lefebvre would simply say that he rejects monism, not because
+it is monism, but because it seems to him a priori.
+The same attitude has been formulated in other branches of knowledge. The sociologist Georges Gurvitch has described it very accurately as dialectical hyper-empiricism. This is a neo-positivism which
+rejects every a priori; neither the exclusive appeal to analytical Reason,
+nor the unconditional choice of dialectical Reason can be justified
+rationally. We must accept the object as it is and let it develop freely
+before our eyes, without prejudging what types of rationality we will
+encounter in our investigations. The object itself dictates the method,
+the manner of approach. Gurvitch calls his hyper-empiricism dialectical, but this hardly matters since all he means is that his object
+(social facts) presents itself to investigation as dialectical. His dialecticism is thus itself an empirical conclusion. This means that the attempt
+to establish totalising movements, reciprocities of conditioning - or, as
+Gurvitch quite correctly puts it, reciprocities of "perspectives' - etc., is
+based on past investigations and is confirmed by present ones. Generalising this attitude, one might, I think, speak of a neo-positivism which
+discovers in a given region of anthropology now a dialectical field, now
+a field of analytical determinism, and now, if occasion demands, other
+types of rationality. ®
+5. Georges Gurvitch, 'Hyper-Empirisme dialectique', Cahiers Internationaux
+de Sociologie XV, 1953. [Ed.]
+example, cannot now be regarded as a contradiction or exactly as a Kierkegaardian ambiguity. Given the way the concept is used, one is tempted to think of a real
+contradiction with interpenetrating terms, or in other words, of a contradiction
+without opposition. In my opinion, what psychoanalysts lack is opposition, at
+least in certain respects (for there is dialectical conflict between the id, the super-
+
+28 Introduction
+Within the limits of an empirical anthropology this distrust of the
+a priori is perfectly justified. I have shown in The Problem of Method
+that this is necessary if a living Marxism is to incorporate into itself the
+disciplines which have hitherto remained external to it. However,
+whatever else one may say about it, this incorporation must consist in
+revealing beneath the classical determinism of particular 'fields', their
+dialectical connection with the whole or, where we are dealing with
+processes whose dialectical character is already recognised, in revealing
+this regional dialectic as the expression of a deeper totalising movement. In the end, this means that we are confronted once again with
+the need to establish the dialectic as the universal method and universal
+law of anthropology. And this amounts to requiring Marxists to
+establish their method a priori: whatever relations are investigated,
+there will never be enough of them to establish a dialectical materialism. Such an extrapolation - that is, an infinitely infinite extrapolation
+- is radically different from scientific induction.
+2 Scientific and Dialectical Reason
+The attempt to ground the Marxist dialectic on anything other than its
+content, that is to say, the knowledge which it provides, might be deego and the ego). They have nonetheless constructed a rationality and what might
+be called a logic of ambiguity - which would scandalise poor Kierkegaard. This
+logic is non-Aristotelian (because it expresses the connection between facts and
+attitudes which transcend one another, meet again, and struggle against each
+other and because, in the last analysis, it is applicable to neuroses, that is to say, to
+circular beings); but this logic is not entirely Hegelian either, since it is concerned
+with reciprocity of conditioning rather than with totalisation. However, to the
+extent that, for such a logic, a particular action is an expression of the circularity of
+the conditions and of the individual history, the analysed subject appears as a true
+whole. The truth is, however, that his being is passivity, at least in "classical'
+psychoanalysis. The fact that Freudian analysts have been led to attribute greater
+and greater importance to the functions of the ego scarcely affects this. The simple
+fact that Anna Freud (following so many others) can refer to these functions as
+'defence mechanisms' imprints upon the work of the ego an a priori inertia. In the
+same way physics speaks of 'forces' and of 'work' without ever abandoning the
+terrain of exteriority.
+
+The Dogmatic Dialectic and the Critical Dialectic 19
+nounced as idealism. In the first place, it might be said that Diogenes
+demonstrated motion by walking; but what if he had been momentarily
+paralysed? There is a crisis in Marxist culture; there are many signs
+today that this crisis is temporary, but its very existence prohibits us
+from justifying the principles by their results.
+The supreme paradox of historical materialism is that it is, at one
+and the same time, the only truth of History and a total indetermination
+of the Truth. The totalising thought of historical materialism has
+established everything except its own existence. Or, to put it another
+way, contaminated by the historical relativism which it has always
+opposed, it has not exhibited the truth of History as it defines itself,
+or shown how this determines its nature and validity in the historical
+process, in the dialectical development of praxis and of human experience. In other words, we do not know what it means for a Marxist
+historian to speak the truth. Not that his statements are false - far from
+it; but he does not have the concept of Truth at his disposal. In this
+way, Marxism presents itself to us, as ideologists,? as an unveiling of
+being, and at the same time as an unanswered question as to the validity
+of this unveiling.
+In response to this, it may be claimed that physicists are not concerned with the ground of their inductions. This is true. But there is a
+general, formal principle; that there are strict relations between facts.
+This means: the real is rational. But is this really a principle, in the
+ordinary sense of the term. Let us say, rather, that it is the condition
+and fundamental structure of scientific praxis. Through experimentation, as through any other form of activity, human action posits and
+imposes its own possibility. Praxis does not, even dogmatically,
+affirm the absolute rationality of the real, if this means that reality obeys
+a definite system of a priori principles and laws, or, in other words,
+that it complies with a kind of constituted reason. Whatever the object
+of his research, whatever its orientation, the scientist, in his activity,
+assumes that reality will always manifest itself in such a way that a
+provisional and fluid rationality can be constituted in and through it.
+This amounts to saying that the human mind will accept everything
+presented to it by investigation and will subordinate its conception of
+7. 'Idéologues. Sartre defines this word in The Problem of Method: "Those
+intellectuals who come after the great flowering and who undertake to set the
+systems in order... should not be called philosophers. ... These relative men I
+propose to call "ideologists"'. The Problem of Method, trans. Hazel E. Barnes,
+p. 8. [Ed.]
+
+20 Introduction
+logic and of intelligibility to the actual data revealed by its investigations. Bachelard has shown clearly how modern physics is in itself a
+new rationalism: the only presupposition of the praxis of the natural
+sciences is an assertion of unity conceived as the perpetual unification
+of an increasingly real diversity. But this unity depends on human
+activity rather than on the diversity of phenomena. Moreover, it is
+neither a knowledge, nor a postulate, nor a Kantian a priori. It is action
+asserting itself within the undertaking, in the explanation of the field
+and the unification of the means by the end (or of the sum of experimental results by the aim of the experiment).
+This is why any comparison between the scientific principle of
+rationality and the dialectic is absolutely unacceptable.
+Scientific research can in fact be unaware of its own principal
+features. Dialectical knowledge, in contrast, is knowledge of the dialectic. For science, there is not any formal structure, nor any implicit
+assertion about the rationality of the universe: Reason is developing, and
+the mind prejudges nothing. In complete contrast, the dialectic is both
+a method and a movement in the object. For the dialectician, it is
+grounded on a fundamental claim both about the structure of the real
+and about that of our praxis. We assert simultaneously that the process
+of knowledge is dialectical, that the movement of the object (whatever
+it may be) is itself dialectical, and that these two dialectics are one and
+the same. Taken together, these propositions have a material content;
+they themselves are a form of organised knowledge, or, to put it
+differently, they define a rationality of the world.
+The modern scientist sees Reason as independent of any particular
+rational system. For him, Reason is the mind as an empty unifier. The
+dialectician, on the other hand, locates himself within a system: he
+defines a Reason, and he rejects a priori the purely analytical Reason of
+the seventeenth century, or rather, he treats it as the first moment of a
+synthetic, progressive Reason. It is impossible to see this as a kind of
+practical assertion of our detachment; and equally impossible to make
+of it a postulate, or a working hypothesis. Dialectical Reason transcends
+the level of methodology; it states what a sector of the universe, or,
+perhaps, the whole universe is. It does not merely direct research, or
+even pre-judge the mode of appearance of objects. Dialectical Reason
+legislates, it defines what the world (human or total) must be like
+for dialectical knowledge to be possible; it simultaneously elucidates
+the movement of the real and that of our thoughts, and it elucidates
+the one by the other. This particular rational system, however, is
+
+The Dogmatic Dialectic and the Critical Dialectic 21
+supposed to transcend and to integrate all models of rationality.
+Dialectical Reason is neither constituent nor constituted reason; it is
+Reason constituting itself in and through the world, dissolving in itself all constituted Reasons in order to constitute new ones which it
+transcends and dissolves in turn. It is, therefore, both a type of rationality and the transcendence of all types of rationality. The certainty of
+always being able to transcend replaces the empty detachment of
+formal rationality: the ever present possibility of unifying becomes the
+permanent necessity for man of totalising and being totalised, and for
+the world of being an ever broader, developing totalisation. But knowledge of such scope would be a mere philosophical dream if it did not
+have all the marks of apodictic certainty. This means that practical
+successes are not enough; even if the assertions of the dialectician were
+infinitely confirmed by research, this permanent confirmation would
+not get us beyond empirical contingency.
+So we must take up the whole problem once again, and explore the
+limits, the validity and the extent of dialectical Reason. We cannot
+deny that a Critique (in the Kantian sense of the term) of dialectical
+Reason can be made only by dialectical Reason itself; and indeed it
+must be allowed to ground itself and to develop itself as a free critique
+of itself, at the same time as being the movement of History and of
+knowledge. This is precisely what has not been done until now:
+dialectical Reason has been walled up in dogmatism.
+3 Hegelian Dogmatism
+The source of this dogmatism lies in the basic problem of 'dialectical
+materialism'. In setting the dialectic back on its feet Marx revealed the
+true contradictions of realism. These contradictions were to be the
+very substance of knowledge, but they have been concealed. We must
+therefore take them as our starting-point.
+The superiority of Hegelian dogmatism, for those who believe in
+it, lies precisely in that part of it which we now reject - its idealism.
+For Hegel, the dialectic had no need to prove itself. In the first place
+Hegel took himself to be at the beginning of the end of History, that
+is to say, at that moment of Truth which is death. The time had come
+
+22 Introduction
+to judge, because in future the philosopher and his judgement would
+never be required again. Historical evolution required this Last
+Judgement; it culminated in its philosopher. Thus the totalisation was
+complete: all that remained was to bring down the curtain. Besides,
+and most important, the movement of Being and the process of Knowledge are inseparable. This implies, as Hyppolite rightly says, that
+Knowledge of the Other (object, world, nature) is self-Knowledge, and
+conversely. Thus Hegel could write: Scientific knowledge, however,
+demands precisely that we surrender to the life of the object, or, which
+means the same thing, that one hold present and express the internal
+necessity of this object's Absolute empiricism becomes identical with
+absolute necessity: the object is taken as given, at its moment in the
+history of the World and of Spirit. But this means that consciousness
+returns to the beginning of its Knowledge and allows this Knowledge
+freely to reconstitute itself within consciousness
+it reconstitutes
+knowledge for itself; it means, in other words, that consciousness can
+see the strict necessity of the sequence and of the moments which
+gradually constitute the world as a concrete totality, because it is consciousness itself which constitutes itself for itself as absolute Knowledge, in the absolute freedom of its strict necessity. The reason why
+Kant could preserve the dualism of noumena and phenomena is that,
+for him, the unification of sense experience was effected by formal and
+non-temporal principles: the content of Knowledge could not change
+the mode of knowing. But if form and knowledge were modified
+together, and by each other, if necessity no longer belonged to a pure
+conceptual activity, but to a perpetual, and perpetually total, transformation, then it would have to be suffered in the realm of Being in order to be recognised in the development of Knowledge; and it would
+have to be lived in the movement of knowledge in order to be attributed to the development of the object. In Hegel's time, this seemed to
+imply the identity of Knowledge and its object. Consciousness was
+consciousness of the Other, and the Other was the being-other of
+consciousness.
+8. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, (Preface) trans. Kaufman in
+Walter Kaufman, Hegel, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1066, p. 434.
+[Ed.]
+
+23
+4
+The Dialectic in Marx
+Marx's originality lies in the fact that, in opposition to Hegel, he
+demonstrated that History is in development, that Being is irreducible to
+Knowledge, and, also, that he preserved the dialectical movement both
+in Being and in Knowledge. He was correct, practically. But having
+failed to re-think the dialectic, Marxists have played the Positivist game.
+Positivists often ask Marxists how they can claim, given that Marx had
+the good sense to realise that "pre-history' had not yet come to an end,
+to detect the 'ruses' of History, the 'secret' of the proletariat, and the
+direction of historical development. For Positivists, prediction is
+possible only to the extent that the current order of succession reenacts a previous order of succession; and so the future repeats the
+past. Hegel could have answered them by saying that he had only
+predicted the past, in that his history was finished and complete and
+that, as a matter of fact, the moment which posits itself for itself in the
+process of living History can only guess the future, as the truth of its
+own incompleteness, unknowable for it. The Marxist future, however,
+is a genuine future: it is completely new, and irreducible to the present.
+Nevertheless, Marx does make predictions, and long term rather than
+short term ones. But in fact, according to Positivist Rationalism, Marx
+had disqualified himself from doing this, and given that he himself was
+pre-historical and within pre-history, his judgements can have only a
+relative and historical significance - even when they concern the past.
+Thus Marxism as dialectic must reject the relativism of the positivists.
+And it must be understood that relativism rejects not only vast
+historical syntheses, but also the most modest assertions of dialectical
+Reason: whatever we may say or know, however close we may be to
+the present or past event which we attempt to reconstitute in its totalising movement, Positivism will always deny us the right. It does not
+regard the synthesis of all knowledge as completely impossible
+(though it envisages it as an inventory rather than as an organisation
+of Knowledge): but it considers such a synthesis impossible now. It is
+therefore necessary to demonstrate, in opposition to Positivism, 110w,
+at this very moment, dialectical Reason can assert certain totalising
+truths - if not the whole Truth.
+
+24 Introduction
+5
+Thought, Being and Truth in Marxism
+But that is not all. For Hegel, as we have seen, the apodicticity of
+dialectical knowledge implied the identity of being, action and knowled ge. Marx, however, began by positing that material existence was
+irreducible to knowledge, that praxis outstrips Knowledge in its real
+efficacy. Needless to say, this is my own position. However, this
+position gives rise to new difficulties: how can we establish that one
+and the same movement animates these different processes? In particular, thought is both Being and knowledge of Being. It is the praxis
+of an individual or a group, in particular conditions, at a definite
+moment of History. As such, thought is subject to the dialectic as its
+law, just like the historical process, considered either as a whole or in
+its particular details. But it is also knowledge of the dialectic as Reason,
+that is, as the law of Being. But this presupposes an explanatory
+separation from dialectical objects, allowing us to unveil their movement. Is there not an inevitable contradiction between the knowledge
+of Being and the being of knowledge? The demonstration that
+thought, as Being, is carried along in the same movement as the whole
+of History, does not dissolve all contradictions. In fact it is precisely
+to this extent that thought is incapable of grasping itself in the necessity
+of its own dialectical development.
+In the Phenomenology of Spirit, consciousness apprehends its own
+necessity in the Other and, at the same time, it apprehends in itself the
+necessity of the Other. But, once again, the totalising operation is carried
+out in the past - according to Hegel, Christianity and scepticism provide
+the means for understanding the previous moment, Stoicism - and, in
+general, Being is Knowledge, and thought itself is simultaneously both
+constituent and constituted. In one and the same movement it is subject to
+its law in so far as it is constituted, and it knows this law in so far as it is
+constituent. But if thought were no longer the whole, it would see its own
+development as if it were an empirical succession of moments, and this
+lived experience (le vécu) would appear as contingency and not as necessity. If thought were to understand itself as a dialectical process, it could not
+formulate its discovery except as a simple fact. Still less could thought
+pretend to settle the question whether the movement of its object is
+
+The Dogmatic Dialectic and the Critical Dialectic 25
+modelled on the movement of thought, or whether the movement of
+thought is modelled on that of its object. If material being, praxis and
+knowledge are indeed irreducible realities, do we not have to appeal to a
+pre-established harmony in order to relate their developments? In other
+words, if the search for Truth is to be dialectical in its methods, how can it
+beshown without idealism that it corresponds to the movement of Being!
+And on the other hand, if Knowledge is to allow Being to develop itself
+according to its own laws, how can we prevent whatever processes are
+involved from appearing as empirical! Moreover, in the latter case, the
+question arises how passive, and therefore non-dialectical, thought can
+evaluate the dialectic; or in ontological terms, how it can be that the only
+reality which lies beyond the laws of synthetic Reason is that which
+decrees them. Let no one think that he can get out of these dilemmas by
+means of some pseudo-dialectical answer such as: Thought is dialectical
+by virtue of its object, it is simply the dialectic as the movement of the real.
+For, even if it is true that History becomes intelligible when considered
+dialectically, the example of the Positivists shows that this can be regarded
+as mere determinism. For this reason, one must already be situated within
+constituent dialectical Reason in order to see History as constituted
+dialectical Reason. But if dialectical Reason creates itself (rather than
+suffering itself, how can one prove that it corresponds to the dialectic of
+Being, without relapsing into idealism. This old problem recurs whenever traditional dogmatic dualism is revived. No doubt it will seem surprising that I refer to Marxist monism as a dualism; it is, in fact, both
+monist and dualist.
+It is dualist because it is monist. Marx's ontological monism consisted in affirming the irreducibility of Being to thought, and, at the
+same time, in reintegrating thoughts with the real as a particular form of
+human activity. This monistic claim, however, appears as a dogmatic
+Truth. But we must distinguish it from conservative ideologies which
+are mere products of the universal dialectic: in this way thought as the
+vehicle of truth can recover what it has lost ontologically since the
+collapse of idealism, and become a Norm of Knowledge.
+Of course dialectical materialism has a practical advantage over contemporary ideologies in that it is the ideology of the rising class. But
+if it were merely the inert expression of this rise, or even of revolutionary praxis, if it did not direct its attention back upon this rise so as
+to explain it, to reveal it to itself, how could we speak of a progress of
+consciousness? How could the dialectic be regarded as the real movement of History unfolding itself? Like philosophical liberalism today,
+
+26 Introduction
+it would be no more than a mythical reflection. Besides, for the dialectician, even ideologies, however mystifying, contain an element of
+truth, as Marx often emphasised. But how is this partial truth to be
+established? Materialist monism, in short, has successfully eliminated
+the dualism of thought and Being in favour of total Being, which is
+thereby grasped in its materiality. But the effect of this has only been
+to re-establish, as an antinomy - at least an apparent one - the dualism
+of Being and Truth.
+G
+The External Dialectic in Modern Marxism
+This difficulty has appeared insurmountable to modern Marxists. They
+have seen only one solution: to refuse to acknowledge thought itself
+as a dialectical activity, to dissolve it into the universal dialectic, and to
+eliminate man by dispersing him into the universe. This enables them
+to substitute Being for Truth. There is no longer knowledge in the strict
+sense of the term; Being no longer manifests itself in any way whatsoever: it merely evolves according to its own laws. The dialectic of
+Nature is Nature without men. There is therefore no more need for
+certainty, for criteria; even the attempt to criticise and establish
+knowledge becomes useless. Knowledge of whatever form is a relation between man and the world around him, and if man no longer
+exists this relation disappears.
+The source of this unfortunate approach is well known: as Whitehead said, a law begins by being a hypothesis and ends by becoming a
+fact. When we say that the earth revolves, we no longer feel that we
+are stating a theory, or that we are relying on a system of knowledge;
+we feel that we are in the presence of the fact itself, which immediately
+eliminates us as knowing subjects in order to restore to us our 'nature'
+as objects of gravitation. For anyone with a realist view of the world,
+knowledge therefore destroys itself in order to become the world, and
+this is true not only of philosophy but also of all scientific Knowledge.
+When dialectical materialism claims to establish a dialectic of Nature it
+does not present itself as an attempt at an extremely general synthesis
+of human knowledge, but rather as a mere ordering of the facts. And
+its claim to be concerned with facts is not unjustified: when Engels
+speaks of the expansion of bodies or of electric current, he is indeed
+
+27
+referring to the facts themselves - although these facts may undergo
+essential changes with the progress of science. This gigantic - and, as
+we shall see, abortive - attempt to allow the world to unfold itself by
+itself and to no one, we shall call external, or transcendental, dialectical
+materialism (le matérialisme dialectique du dehors ou transcendental).
+The Dialectic of Nature
+It is clear that this kind of materialism is not Marxist, but still it is
+defined by Marx: "The materialist outlook on nature means nothing
+more than the conception of nature just as it is, without alien addition.'9
+On this conception, man returns to the very heart of Nature as one of
+its objects and develops before our eyes in accordance with the laws of
+Nature, that is, as pure materiality governed by the universal laws of
+the dialectic. The object of thought is Nature as it is, and the study of
+History is only a particular form of it: we must trace the movement
+that produces life out of matter, man out of primitive forms of life, and
+social history out of the first human communities. The advantage of
+this conception is that it avoids the problem: it presents the dialectic,
+a priori and without justification, as the fundamental law of Nature.
+This external materialism lays down the dialectic as exteriority: the
+Nature of man lies outside him in an a priori law, in an extra-human
+nature, in a history that begins with the nebulae. For this universal
+dialectic, partial totalisations do not have even provisional value; they
+do not exist. Everything must always be referred to the totality of
+natural history of which human history is only a particular form. Thus
+all real thought, as it actually forms itself in the concrete movement of
+History, is held to be a complete distortion of its object. It becomes a
+truth again only if it is reduced to a dead object, to a result; and thus a
+position outside man, and on the side of things, is adopted so that the
+idea can be seen as a thing signified by things rather than as a signifying
+2. This sentence appears to be by Engels and not by Marx. It is part of an
+unused section of a draft of Engels, Ludwig Feuer bach and the Outcome of Classical
+German Philosophy. The text of this unused section appears as a section of Dialectics of Nature, trans. C. P. Dutt, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1934, Pp.
+195-2. Sartre refers to the sameremark in The Problem of Method, p. 32, n. 2, and
+also below, p. 18I [Ed.]
+
+28 Introduction
+act. In this way, that 'alien addition' which is man - concrete, living
+man with his human relations, his true or false thoughts, his actions, his
+real purposes - is removed from the world. An absolute object is put in
+his place: 'What we call a subject is only an object considered as the
+centre of particular reactions. '10 The notion of truth is replaced by
+those of success or normality as applied to performances in tests: 'As
+the centre of more or less delayed reactions, the body performs movements which organise themselves as behaviour. This produces actions.
+(Thinking is an action. Suffering is an action.) These actions can be
+regarded as "tests"
+• as trials.'" Thus we get back to the disguised
+scepticism of 'reflection'. But when everything has apparently culminated in sceptical objectivism, we suddenly realise that it has been
+imposed on us dogmatically, that it is the Truth of Being as it appears
+to universal consciousness. Spirit sees dialectic as the law of the world.
+Consequently we fall back into complete dogmatic idealism.
+Scientific laws are experimental hypotheses verified by facts; but at
+present, the absolute principle that 'Nature is dialectical' is not open to
+verification at all. You may claim that some set of laws established by
+scientists represents a certain dialectical movement in the objects of these
+laws, but you cannot prove it. 12 Neither the laws nor the 'great theories' will change, however you view them. Your problem is not
+whether light transmits energy particles to the bodies it illuminates,
+but whether quantum theory can be integrated into a dialectical
+totalisation of the universe. You need not question the kinetic theory
+of gases; you need only see whether it weakens the totalisation. You
+are reflecting on Knowledge. And since the law discovered by the
+scientist, taken in isolation, is neither dialectical nor anti-dialectical (it
+is only a quantitative determination of a functional relation), the consideration of scientific facts (that is to say, of established laws) cannot
+furnish, or even suggest, a proof of the dialectic. Dialectical Reason
+can only be captured elsewhere, so that it can be forcibly imposed on
+1o. Pierre Naville, Introduction générale à 'La Dialectique de la Nature' de
+Frédéric Engels, Paris, Librairie Marcel Rivière, 1950, p. 59.
+Ibid.
+12. These remarlis apply, of course, only to the dialectic conceived as an
+abstract and universal law of Nature. However, when the dialectic is applied to
+human history, it loses none of its heuristic value. Concealed, it directs the collection of facts; then it reveals itself by making them comprehensible, by totalising
+them. This comprehension reveals a new dimension of History, and finally, its
+truth, its intelligibility.
+
+The Dogmatic Dialectic and the Critical Dialectic 29
+the data of physics and chemistry. It is well known, in fact, that the
+notion of dialectic emerged in History along quite different paths, and
+that both Hegel and Marx explained and defined it in terms of the relations of man to matter, and of men to each other. The attempt to find
+the movement of human history within natural history was made only
+later, out of a wish for unification. Thus the claim that there is a dialectic of Nature refers to the totality of material facts - past, present, future
+- or, to put it another way, it involves a totalisation of temporality. 13
+It has a curious similarity to those Ideas of Reason which, according to
+Kant, were regulative and incapable of being corroborated by any
+particular experience.
+8 Critique of the External Dialectic
+Thus a system of ideas is contemplated by a pure consciousness
+which has pre-constituted their law for them, 14 though utterly incapable of
+justifying this ukase. But in order to grasp materiality as such, it is not
+sufficient to discuss the word 'matter'. Language is ambiguous in that
+words sometimes designate objects and sometimes concepts; and this
+is why materialism as such is not opposed to idealism. In fact, there is a
+materialist idealism which, in the last analysis, is merely a discourse on
+the idea of matter; the real opposite of this is realist materialism - the
+thought of an individual who is situated in the world, penetrated by
+every cosmic force, and treating the material universe as something
+which gradually reveals itself through a 'situated' praxis. In the present
+case, we are evidently confronted with an idealism which has appropriated the vocabulary of science in order to express ideas of such poverty
+that one can see straight through them. But the important point is this:
+if you are hunting for the Truth (as a human undertaking) of the Universe, you will find it, in the very words you use, as the object of an
+absolute and constituting consciousness. This means that it is impossible to get away from the problem of Truth. Naville deprives his
+13. There is such a thing as a totalisation from within of temporalisati
+meaning of History. But this is something completely different.
+14. In The Dialectics of Nature, Engels goes so far as to defend the theory of
+the Eternal Return.
+
+30 Introduction
+'centres of delayed reactions' of the ability to distinguish between True
+and False; he imposes the dialectic on them without allowing them
+knowledge of it; but what he says thereby becomes an absolute truth
+without foundation.
+How can we accept this doubling of personality? How can a man
+who is lost in the world, permeated by an absolute movement coming
+from everything, also be this consciousness sure both of itself and of
+the Truth? It is true that Naville observes that 'these centres of reaction
+elaborate their behaviour according to possibilities which, at the level
+both of the individual and of the species, are subject to an unalterable
+and strictly determined development
+, and that 'experimentally
+established reflex determinations and integrations enable one to
+appreciate the narrowing margin within which organic behaviour can
+be said to be autonomous'. We obviously agree with this; but the
+important thing is Naville's application of these observations, which
+inevitably leads to the theory of reflection, to endowing man with
+constituted reason; that is, to making thought into a form of behaviour
+strictly conditioned by the world (which of course it is), while neglecting
+to say that it is also knowledge of the world. How could 'empirical'
+man think? Confronted with his own history, he is as uncertain as when
+he is confronted by Nature, for the law does not automatically produce knowledge of itself - indeed, if it is passively suffered, it transforms its object into passivity, and thus deprives it of any possibility of
+collecting its atomised experiences into a synthetic unity. Meanwhile,
+at the level of generality where he is situated, transcendental man, contemplating laws, cannot grasp individuals. Thus, in spite of ourselves,
+we are offered two thoughts, neither of which is able to think us, or,
+for that matter, itself: the thought which is passive, given, and discontinuous, claims to be knowledge but is really only the delayed effect of
+external causes, while the thought which is active, synthetic and desituated, knows nothing of itself and, completely immobile, contemplates a world without thought. Our doctrinaires have mistaken for a
+real recognition of Necessity what is actually only a particular form of
+alienation, which makes their own lived thinking appear as an object for
+a universal Consciousness, and which reflects on it as though it were the
+Thought of the Other.
+We must stress this crucial fact: Reason is neither a bonel nor an
+Is. Cf. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, 'Phrenology', trans. J. B. Baillie,
+London, Unwin, 1910, PP. 351-72. [Ed.]
+
+_31
+accident. In other words, if dialectical Reason is to be rationality, it
+must provide Reason with its own reasons. From this point of view,
+analytical rationalism demonstrates itself, because, as we have seen, it
+is the pure affirmation - at a quite superficial level - of the bond of
+exteriority as permanent possibility. But let us see what Engels says
+about 'the most general laws' of 'the history of nature and human
+society'. It is this:
+they can be reduced in the main to three:
+The law of the transformation of quantity into quality, and vice
+versa;
+The law of the interpenetration of opposites;
+The law of the negation of the negation.
+All three are developed by Hegel in his idealist fashion as mere laws
+of thought.... The mistake lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on
+nature and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them. 15a
+Engels uncertainty is revealed by his words, for abstraction is not
+the same as deduction. And how can universal laws be deduced from a
+set of particular laws? If you want a name, it can only be called induction. And as we have seen, the only dialectic one will find in Nature
+is a dialectic that one has put there oneself. But let us suppose for a
+moment that universal laws can actually be induced, that is to say, that
+they provide both a means of ordering scientific Knowledge and a
+heuristic procedure. For all that, they will remain only probabilities.
+Let us suppose, also, that their probability is very high and that, consequently, we are obliged to accept them as true. Where will this get
+us? To a discovery of the laws of Reason in the universe, like Newton's
+discovery of the principle of gravitation. When Newton said 'Hypotheses non fingo, he meant that while calculation and investigation
+permitted him to prove the de facto existence of gravitation, he would
+not try to establish it de jure, to explain it, to reduce it to some more
+general principle. Thus, to his contemporaries, rationality seemed to
+come to a halt with demonstrations and proofs; the fact in tself remained inexplicable and contingent. Science does not have to account
+for the facts that it discovers; it firmly establishes their existence and
+their relations with other facts. Later, the movement of scientific
+thought itself was to lift this mortgage, for in contemporary
+physics gravitation is treated quite differently; without ceasing to be a
+ISa. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, trans. Dutt, Moscow, 1934, p. 62. [Ed.]
+
+32 Introduction
+fact, it is no longer the untranscendable final fact; it is part of a new conception of the universe and we know now that every contingent fact,
+however untranscendable it may appear, will be transcended in its
+turn, by other facts.
+But what are we to make of a doctrine which presents the laws of
+Reason in the same way as Newton presented those of gravitation? If
+someone had asked Engels: Why are there three laws rather than ten,
+or just one?; Why are the laws of thought these and not others?;
+Where do they come from?; Is there some more general principle from
+which they might be deduced, instead of appearing as having the contingency of a fact?; Is there some way of uniting them in an organised
+synthesis, and putting them in some order?; etc., he would probably
+have shrugged his shoulders and replied, like Newton, 'Hypotheses non
+fingo. The upshot of this is paradoxical: Engels criticises Hegel for
+imposing the laws of thought on matter, but he does precisely the
+same himself, in that he expects the sciences to verify a dialectical
+reason which he discovered in the social world. But, in the historical
+and social world, as we shall see, there really is a dialectical reason; by
+transferring it into the 'natural' world, and forcibly inscribing it there,
+Engels stripped it of its rationality: there was no longer a dialectic
+which man produced by producing himself, and which, in turn, produced man; there was only a contingent law, of which nothing could be
+said except it is so and not otherwise. In short, Reason once more
+becomes a bone, since it is merely a fact and has no knowable necessity.
+It so happens that opposites interpenetrate. Rationality is merely a
+final and universal law; and therefore it is irrationality pure and simple.
+However one looks at it, transcendental materialism leads to the irrational, either by ignoring the thought of empirical man, or by creating
+a noumenal consciousness which imposes its law as a whim, or again,
+by discovering in Nature "without alien addition' the laws of dialectical
+Reason in the form of contingent facts.
+The Domain of Dialectical Reason
+Must we then deny the existence of dialectical connections in inanimate
+Nature? By no means. Indeed, in the present state of our knowledge,
+
+33
+I do not see that we are in a position to affirm or deny it. Every one is
+free either to believe that physico-chemical laws express a dialectical
+reason, or not to believe it. In any case, in the domain of the facts of
+inorganic Nature, the claim must be extra-scientific. We merely ask
+for the restoration of the order of certainties and discoveries: for if
+there is such a thing as a dialectical reason, it is revealed and established in and through human praxis, to men in a given society at a
+particular moment of its development. On the basis of this discovery,
+the limits and scope of dialectical certainty have to be established. The
+dialectic will be an effective method as long as it remains necessary as
+the law of intelligibility and as the rational structure of Being. A
+materialist dialectic will be meaningless if it cannot establish, within
+human history, the primacy of material conditions as they are discovered by the praxis of particular men and as they impose themselves
+on it. In short, if there is to be any such thing as dialectical materialism,
+it must be a historical materialism, that is to say, a materialism from
+within; it must be one and the same thing to produce it and to have it
+imposed on one, to live it and to know it. Consequently, this materialism, if it exists, can be true only within the limits of our social universe.
+It is at the heart of a society which is organised and stratified - and
+which is also rent by strife - that the appearance of a new machine will
+bring profound changes which will reverberate from the infrastructures to the superstructures; it is within a society which possesses tools
+and institutions that the material facts - the poverty or richness of the
+subsoil, the climate, etc. - which condition it and in relation to which
+it is itself defined, will be discovered.
+As for the dialectic of Nature, it cannot be anything more than the
+object of a metaphysical hypothesis. The procedure of discovering
+dialectical rationality in praxis, and then projecting it, as an unconditional law, on to the inorganic world, and then returning to the study
+of societies and claiming that this opaquely irrational law of nature
+conditions them, seems to us to be a complete aberration. A human
+relation, which can be recognised only because we are ourselves human,
+is encountered, hypostasised, stripped of every human characteristic
+and, finally, this irrational fabrication is substituted for the genuine
+relation which was encountered in the first place. Thus in the name of
+monism the practical rationality of man making History is replaced by
+the ancient notion of a blind Necessity, the clear by the obscure, the
+evident by the conjectural, Truth by Science Fiction. If there is a
+dialectic now, and if we are to establish it, we shall have to seek it
+B
+
+34 Introduction
+where it is. We shall accept the idea that man is a material being among
+other material beings and, as such, does not have a privileged statute;
+we shall even refuse to reject a priori the possibility that a concrete
+dialectic of Nature will one day be discovered, which would mean that
+the dialectical method would become a heuristic in the natural sciences
+and would be used by scientists themselves and under experimental
+control. All I say is that dialectical Reason must be turned over once
+again, that it must be recognised where it is there to be seen, instead of
+being dreamed of in areas where we cannot yet grasp it. There is such
+a thing as historical materialism, and the law of this materialism is the
+dialectic. But if, as some writers imply, dialectical materialism is to be
+understood as a monism which is supposed to control human history
+from outside, then we are compelled to say that there is no such thing as
+dialectical materialism, at least for the time being. 16
+This long discussion has not been useless: it has enabled us to
+formulate our problem; it has revealed the conditions under which a
+dialectic can be established. No doubt these conditions are contradictory, but it is their moving contradictions which will throw us into
+the dialectical movement. Engels' mistake, in the text we quoted above,
+was to think that he could extract his dialectical laws from Nature by
+non-dialectical procedures
+comparison, analogy, abstraction and
+induction. In fact, dialectical Reason is a whole and must ground itself
+by itself, or dialectically.
+(I) The failure of dialectical dogmatism has shown us that the
+IG. It may be said that the metaphysical hypothesis of a dialectic of Nature
+becomes more interesting when it is used to explain the passage from inorganic
+matter to organic bodies, and the evolution of life on earth. This is true. But it
+should be noted that this formal interpretation of life and evolution will never be
+more than a pious dream as long as scientists have no way of using the notions of
+'totality' and 'totalisation' as a guiding hypothesis. Nothing is gained by proclaiming that the evolution of the species or the appearance of life are moments of
+the 'dialectic of Nature' as long as we are ignorant of how life appeared and how
+species are transformed. For the present, biology, in its actual research, remains positivistic and analytical. It is possible that a deeper knowledge of its
+object, through its contradictions, will force biology to consider the organism in
+its totality, that is to say, dialectically, and to consider all biological facts in their
+relation of interiority. This is possible, but it is not certain. In any event, it is
+curious that Marxists, as dialecticians of nature, denounce as idealists those who,
+like Goldstein, attempt (rightly or wrongly) to consider organic beings as
+totalities although this only involves showing (or trying to show) the dialectical
+irreducibility of the 'state of matter' which is life, to another state - inorganic
+matter - which nevertheless generated it.
+
+35
+dialectic as rationality must be open to direct, everyday investigation,
+both as the objective connection between facts and as the method for
+knowing and fixing this connection. But at the same time, the provisional character of dialectical hyper-empiricism forces us to the conclusion that dialectical universality must be imposed a priori as a necessity.
+The 'a priori, here, has nothing to do with any sort of constitutive
+principles which are prior to experience. It relates to a universality and
+necessity which are contained in every experience but which transcend any particular experience. But since, as Kant showed, experience
+provides facts but not necessity, and since we reject all idealist soiltions, there is obviously a contradiction here. Husserl could speak of
+apodictic certainty without much difficulty, but this was because he
+remained on the level of pure, formal consciousness apprehending itself in its formality; but, for us, it is necessary to find our apodictic
+experience in the concrete world of History.
+(2) We have noticed the aporias of being and knowledge in Marx.
+It is clear that the former is irreducible to the latter. On the other hand,
+the 'dialectic of Nature' has shown us that knowledge vanishes when
+reduced to one modality of being among others. Nevertheless, this
+dualism, which threatens to lead us into some form of disguised
+spiritualism, must be rejected. The possibility that a dialectic exists is
+itself dialectical; or, to put it another way, the only possible unity of
+the dialectic as law of historical development and the dialectic as
+knowledge-in-movement of this development is the unity of a dialectical movement. Being is the negation of knowledge, and knowledge
+draws its being from the negation of being
+(3) 'Men make their own History... but under circumstances ...
+given and transmitted from the past.'1? If this statement is true, then
+both determinism and analytical reason must be categorically rejected
+as the method and law of human history. Dialectical rationality, the
+whole of which is contained in this sentence, must be seen as the permanent and dialectical unity of freedom and necessity. In other words,
+as we have seen, the universe becomes a dream if the dialectic controls
+man from outside, as his unconditioned law. But if we imagine that
+every one simply follows his inclinations and that these molecular
+collisions produce large scale effects, we will discover average or
+statistical results, but not a historical development. So, in a sense, man
+17. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Marx and
+Engels, Selected Works, (1962) Vol. I, p. 247. [Ed.]
+
+36 Introduction
+submits to the dialectic as to an enemy power; in another sense, he
+creates it, and if dialectical Reason is the Reason of History, this contradiction must itself be lived dialectically, which means that man must
+be controlled by the dialectic in so far as he creates it, and create it in
+so far as he is controlled by it. Furthermore, it must be understood
+that there is no such thing as man; there are people, wholly defined by
+their society and by the historical movement which carries them along;
+if we do not wish the dialectic to become a divine law again, a metaphysical fate, it must proceed from individuals and not from some kind
+of supra-individual ensemble. Thus we encounter a new contradiction:
+the dialectic is the law of totalisation which creates several collectivities, several societies, and one history - realities, that is, which impose
+themselves on individuals; but at the same time it must be woven out
+of millions of individual actions. We must show how it is possible for
+it to be both a resultant, though not a passive average, and a totalising
+force, though not a transcendent fate, and how it can continually bring
+about the unity of dispersive profusion and integration.
+(4) We are dealing with a materialist dialectic; and by this I mean -
+from a strictly epistemological point of view - that thought must discover its own necessity in its material object, at the same time as discovering in itself, in so far as it is itself a material being, the necessity of
+its object. This could be done within Hegelian idealism, and either the
+dialectic is a dream or it can be done in the real material world of
+Marxism. This inevitably refers us from thought to action. Indeed, the
+former is only a moment of the latter. We must therefore inquire
+whether, in the unity of an apodictic experience, every praxis is constituted, in and through the material universe, as the transcendence of
+its object-being (être-objet) by the Uther, while revealing the praxis of
+the Other as an object. But, at the same time, a relation must be
+established, by and through the Other, between each praxis and the universe of things, in such a way that, in the course of a perpetual totalisation, the thing becomes human and man realises himself as a thing. It
+must be shown, in concrete reality, that the dialectical method is
+indistinguishable from the dialectical movement; indistinguishable,
+that is to say, both from the relations which each person has with
+everyone through inorganic materiality, and from those which he has
+with his materiality and with his own organic material existence,
+through his relations with others. We must show, therefore, that the
+dialectic is based on this, everyone's permanent experience: in the
+universe of exteriority, one's relation of exteriority to the material
+
+37
+universe and to the Other is always accidental, though always present;
+but one's relation of interiority with men and with things is fundamental, though often concealed.
+(5) The dialectic, however, if it is to be a reason rather than a blind
+law, must appear as untranscendable intelligibility. The content, the
+development, the order of appearance of negations, of negations of
+negations, of conflicts, etc., the phases of the struggle between opposed
+terms, and its outcome - in short, the reality of the dialectical movement, is governed in its entirety by the basic conditions, the structures
+of materiality, the initial situation, the continuous action of external
+and internal factors, and the balance of the forces involved. Thus
+there is no one dialectic which imposes itself upon the facts, as the
+Kantian categories impose themselves on phenomena; but the dialectic, if it exists, is the individual career of its object. There can be no
+pre-established schema imposed on individual developments, neither
+in someone's head, nor in an intelligible heaven; if the dialectic exists,
+it is because certain regions of materiality are structured in such a way
+that it cannot not exist. In other words, the dialectical movement is not
+some powerful unitary force revealing itself behind History like the
+will of God. It is first and foremost a resultant; it is not the dialectic
+which forces historical men to live their history in terrible contradictions; it is men, as they are, dominated by scarcity and necessity,
+and confronting one another in circumstances which History or
+economics can inventory, but which only dialectical reason can explain.
+Before it can be a motive force, contradiction is a result; and, on the
+level of ontology, the dialectic appears as the only type of relation
+which individuals, situated and constituted in a certain way, and on
+account of their very constitution, can establish amongst themselves.
+The dialectic, if it exists, can only be the totalisation of concrete
+totalisations effected by a multiplicity of totalising individualities. I
+shall refer to this as dialectical nominalism. Nevertheless, the dialectic
+cannot be valid for all the particular cases which recreate it, unless it
+always appears as necessity in the investigation which reveals it, nor
+is it valid unless it provides us with the key to the process which expresses it, that is, unless we apprehend it as the intelligibility of the
+process in question. 1s
+The combination of the necessity and intelligibility of dialectical
+Reason, with the need to discover it empirically in each instance,
+18. And, from this point of view, nominalism is also a dialectical realism.
+
+38 Introduction
+leads to several reflections. In the first place, no one can discover the
+dialectic while keeping the point of view of analytical Reason; which
+means, among other things, that no one can discover the dialectic
+while remaining external to the object under consideration. Indeed, for
+anyone considering a given system in exteriority, no specific investigation can show whether the movement of the system is a continuous
+unfolding or a succession of discrete instants. The stance of the desituated experimenter, however, tends to perpetuate analytical Reason
+as the model of intelligibility; the scientist's passivity in relation to the
+system will tend to reveal to him a passivity of the system in relation
+to himself. The dialectic reveals itself only to an observer situated in
+interiority, that is to say, to an investigator who lives his investigation
+both as a possible contribution to the ideology of the entire epoch and
+as the particular praxis of an individual defined by his historical and
+personal career within the wider history which conditions it. In short,
+in order to preserve the Hegelian idea (that Consciousness knows
+itself in the Other and knows the Other in itself, while completely
+discarding its idealism, I must be able to say that the praxis of everyone,
+as a dialectical movement, must reveal itself to the individual as the
+necessity of his own praxis and, conversely, that the freedom, for
+everyone, of his individual praxis must re-emerge in everyone so as
+to reveal to the individual a dialectic which produces itself and produces him in so far as it is produced. The dialectic as the living logic of
+action is invisible to a contemplative reason: it appears in the course of
+praxis as a necessary moment of it; in other words, it is created anew in
+each action (though actions arise only on the basis of a world entirely
+constituted by the dialectical praxis of the past) and becomes a theoretical and practical method when action in the course of development
+begins to give an explanation of itself. In the course of this action, the
+dialectic appears to the individual as rational transparency in so far as
+he produces it, and as absolute necessity in so far as it escapes him,
+that is to say, quite simply, in so far as it is produced by others. Finally,
+to the extent that the individual becomes acquainted with himself in
+the transcendence (dépassement) of his needs, he becomes acquainted
+with the law which others impose on him in transcending their own (he
+becomes acquainted with it: this does not mean that he submits to it),
+and becomes acquainted with his own autonomy (in so far as it can be,
+and constantly is, exploited by the other - shamming, manoeuvring,
+etc.) as an alien power and the autonomy of the others as the inexorable law which enables him to coerce them. But, through the very
+
+The Dogmatic Dialectic and the Critical Dialectic 30
+reciprocity of coercions and autonomies, the law ends up by escaping
+everyone, and in the revolving movement of totalisation it appears as
+dialectical Reason, that is to say, external to all because internal to
+each; and a developing totalisation, though without a totaliser, of all
+the totalised totalisations and of all the de-totalised totalities.
+If dialectical Reason is to be possible as the career of all and the
+freedom of each, as experience and as necessity, if we are to display
+both its total translucidity (it is no more than ourself) and its untranscendable severity (it is the unity of everything that conditions us), if
+we are to ground it as the rationality of praxis, of totalisation, and of
+society's future, if we are then to criticise it as analytical Reason has
+been criticised, that is to say, if we are to determine its significance,
+then we must realise the situated experience of its apodicticity through
+ourselves. But let it not be imagined that this experience is comparable
+to the "intuitions' of the empiricists, or even to the kind of scientific
+experiments whose planning is long and laborious, but whose result
+can be observed instantaneously. The experience of the dialectic is itself dialectical: this means that it develops and organises itself on all
+levels. At the same time, it is the very experience of living, since to live
+is to act and be acted on, and since the dialectic is the rationality of
+praxis. It must be regressive because it will set out from lived experience
+(le vécu) in order gradually to discover all the structures of praxis.
+However, we must give notice that the investigation we are undertaking, though in itself historical, like any other undertaking, does not
+attempt to discover the movement of History, the evolution of labour
+or of the relations of production, or class conflicts. Its goal is simply to
+reveal and establish dialectical rationality, that is to say, the complex
+play of praxis and totalisation.
+When we have arrived at the most general conditionings, that is to
+say, at materiality, it will then be time to reconstruct, on the basis of
+the investigation, the schema of intelligibility proper to the totalisation. This second part, which will be published later, 1° will be what one
+might call a synthetic and progressive definition of 'the rationality of
+action'. In this connection, we shall see how dialectical Reason extends beyond analytical Reason and includes within itself its own
+critique and its own transcendence. However, the limited character of
+the project cannot be emphasised sufficiently. I have said - and I
+repeat - that the only valid interpretation of human History is historical
+19. The second volume of the Critique has in fact never appeared. (Ea.]
+
+40 Introduction
+materialism. So I shall not be restating here what others have
+already done a thousand times; besides, it is not my subject.
+If a summary of this introduction is required, however, one could
+say that in the field of dialectical rationality historical materialism is its
+own proof, but that it does not provide a foundation for this rationality
+even, and above all, if it provides the History of its development as
+constituted Reason. Marxism is History itself becoming conscious of
+itself, and if it is valid it is by its material content, which is not, and
+cannot be, at issue here. But precisely because its reality resides in its
+content, the internal connections which it brings to light, in so far as
+they are part of its real content, are indeterminate in form. In particular, when a Marxist makes use of the notion of 'necessity' in order to
+characterise the relation of two events within one and the same process,
+we remain hesitant, even if the attempted synthesis convinces us completely. This does not mean that we reject necessity in human affairs -
+quite the opposite; but simply that dialectical necessity is by definition
+different from the necessity of analytical Reason and that Marxism is
+not concerned - why should it be? - with determining and establishing
+this new structure of being and of experience. Thus our task cannot in
+any way be to reconstruct real History in its development, any more
+than it can consist in a concrete study of forms of production or of the
+groups studied by the sociologist and the ethnographer. Our problem
+is critical. Doubtless this problem is itself raised by History. But it is
+precisely a matter of testing, criticising and establishing, within
+History and at this particular moment in the development of human
+societies, the instruments of thought by means of which History thinks
+itself in so far as they are also the practical instruments by means of
+which it is made. Of course, we shall be driven from doing to knowing
+and from knowing to doing in the unity of a process which will itself be
+dialectical. But our real aim is theoretical. It can be formulated in the
+following terms: on what conditions is the knowledge of a History
+possible? To what extent can the connections brought to light be
+necessary? What is dialectical rationality, and what are its limits and
+foundation? Our extremely slight dissociation of ourselves from the
+letter of Marxist doctrine (which I indicated in The Problem of Method)
+enables us to see the meaning of this question as the disquiet of the
+genuine experience which refuses to collapse into non-truth. It is to
+this disquiet that we are attempting to respond. But I am far from
+believing that the isolated effort of an individual can provide a satisfactory answer - even a partial one - to so vast a question, a question
+
+which engages with the totality of History. If these initial investigations have done no more than enable me to define the problem, by
+means of provisional remarks which are there to be challenged and
+modified, and if they give rise to a discussion and it, as would be best,
+this discussion is carried on collectively in working groups, then I
+shall be satisfied.
+
+2
+Critique of
+Critical Investigation
+• The Basis of Critical Investigation
+We know the abstract conditions which this investigation must
+satisfy if it is to be possible. But these conditions leave its individual
+reality undetermined. In the same way, in the sciences of Nature we
+can have a general idea of the aim of an experiment (expérience) and
+the conditions for it to be valid, without knowing what physical fact is
+to be investigated, what instruments it will employ, or what experimental system it will identify and construct. In other words, a scientific
+hypothesis includes its own experimental requirements; it indicates, in
+broad outline, the conditions that the proof must satisfy; but this
+initial schema can be distinguished only formally from the conjecture
+which is to be tested. This is why the hypothesis has sometimes been
+called an experimental idea. It is historical circumstances (the history of
+the instruments, the contemporary state of knowledge) which give the
+projected experiment its peculiar physiognomy: thus Faraday, Foucault and Maxwell, for example, constructed such and such a system
+in order to get such and such a result. But our concern is with the
+problem of a totalising investigation, and this clearly means that it
+bears only an extremely distant resemblance to the experiments of the
+exact sciences. Nevertheless, it too must present itself in its technical
+particularity, detail the instruments of thought it employs, outline the
+concrete system it will constitute (that is to say, the structural reality
+which will be exteriorised in its experimental practice). This is what we
+shall now specify. " By what particular experimentation can we expect
+20. These moments are in fact for the most part inseparable. But it is appropriate that methodological reflection should at least register an example of the
+stubbornness of reason.
+
+43
+to expose and demonstrate the reality of the dialectical process? What
+instruments do we need? What is their point of application? What
+experimental system must te construct? On the basis of what facts?
+What type of extrapolation will it justify? What will be the validity of
+its proofs!
+Dialectical Reason as Intelligibility
+In order to answer these questions we must have some guide-line; and
+this is provided purely by what the object demands. We must turn,
+therefore, to this basic demand. But if this demand is reduced to the
+simple question, 'Are there ontological regions where the law of being
+and, correlatively, that of knowledge can be said to be dialectical?'
+there is a serious risk of making it unintelligible and of relapsing either
+into some form of hyper-empiricism or into the opacity and contingency of the laws formulated by Engels. If we were to discover these
+regions in the same way as natural regions (for example, an area of the
+earth, together with its climate, hydrography, orography, flora and
+fauna, etc.) are discovered, then the discovery would share the opacity
+of something merely found. If, on the other hand, we were to ground
+our dialectical categories on the impossibility of experience without
+them, as Kant did for positivist Reason, then we would indeed attain
+necessity, but we would have contaminated it with the opacity of
+facts. Indeed, to say, 'If there is to be any such thing as experience, the
+human mind must be able to unify sensuuus diversity through synthetic judgements', is, ultimately, to base the whole critical edifice on
+the unintelligible judgement (a judgement of fact), 'But experience
+does occur.' And we shall see later that dialectical Reason is itself the
+intelligibility of positivist Reason; and this is precisely why positivist
+Reason presents itself at first as the unintelligible law of empirical
+intelligibility."
+21. I am thinking here of the Critique of Pure Reason rather than of Kant's
+later works. It has been clearly demonstrated that, in the very last part of Kant's
+life, the requirement of intelligibility led him right up to the threshold of dialectical Reason,
+
+44 Introduction
+If, however, dialectical Reason has to be grasped initially through
+human relations, then its fundamental characteristics imply that it
+appears as apodictic experience in its very intelligibility. It is not a
+matter of simply asserting its existence, but rather of directly experiencing its existence through its intelligibility, independent of any
+empirical discovery. In other words, if the dialectic is the reason of
+being and of knowledge, at least in certain regions, it must manifest
+itself as double intelligibility. Firstly, the dialectic as the law of the
+world and of knowledge must itself be intelligible; so that, unlike
+positivist Reason, it must include its own intelligibility within itself.
+Secondly, if some real fact - a historical process, for example - develops dialectically, the law of its appearing and its becoming must be
+- from the stand-point of knowledge - the pure ground of its intelligibility. For the present, we are concerned only with original intelligibility. This intelligibility - the translucidity of the dialectic - cannot
+arise if one merely proclaims dialectical laws, like Engels and Naville,
+unless each of these laws is presented as a mere sketch, revealing the
+dialectic as a totality. The rules of positivist Reason appear as separate
+instructions (unless this Reason is envisaged as a limiting case of
+dialectical Reason and from its point of view). Each of the so-called
+'laws' of dialectical Reason is the whole of the dialectic: otherwise the
+dialectic would cease to be a dialectical process, and thought, as the
+praxis of the theoretician, would necessarily be discontinuous. Thus
+the basic intelligibility of dialectical Reason, if it exists, is that of a
+totalisation. In other words, in terms of our distinction between being
+and knowledge, a dialectic exists if, in at least one ontological region,
+a totalisation is in progress which is immediately accessible to a thought
+which unceasingly totalises itself in its very comprehension of the
+totalisation from which it emanates and which makes itself its object.
+It has often been observed that the laws stated by Hegel and his
+disciples do not at first seem intelligible; taken in isolation, they may
+even seem false or gratuitous. Hyppolite has shown convincingly that
+the negation of the negation - if this schema is envisaged in itself - is
+not necessarily an affirmation. Similarly, at first glance, the opposition
+between contradictories does not seem to be necessarily the motive
+force of the dialectical process. Hamelin, for example, based his whole
+system on the opposition between contraries. Or, to give another
+example, it is difficult to see how a new reality, transcending contradictions while preserving them within itself, can be both irreducible
+to them and intelligible in terms of them. But, these difficulties arise
+
+45
+only because the dialectical 'principles' are conceived either as mere
+data or as induced laws; in short, because they are seen from the point
+of view of positivist Reason in the same way as positivist Reason conceives its own 'categories'. Each of these so called dialectical laws becomes perfectly intelligible when seen from the point of view of
+totalisation. It is therefore necessary for the critical investigation to ask
+the fundamental question: is there a region of being where totalisation
+is the very form of existence?
+3 Totality and Totalisation
+From this point of view, and before taking the discussion any further,
+we must make a clear distinction between the notions of totality and
+totalisation. A totality is defined as a being which, while radically
+distinct from the sum of its parts, is present in its entirety, in one form
+or another, in each of these parts, and which relates to itself either
+through its relation to one or more of its parts or through its relation
+to the relations between all or some of them. If this reality is created (a
+painting or a symphony are examples, if one takes integration to an
+extreme), it can exist only in the imaginary (l'imaginaire), that is to
+say, as the correlative of an act of imagination. The ontological status
+to which it lays claim by its very definition is that of the in-itself, the
+inert. The synthetic unity which produced its appearance of totality is
+not an activity, but only the vestige of a past action (just as the unity
+of a medallion is the passive remnant of its being struck). Through its
+being-in-exteriority, the inertia of the in-itself gnaws away
+at this
+appearance of unity; the passive totality is, in fact, eroded by infinite
+divisibility. Thus, as the active power of holding together its parts, the
+totality is only the correlative of an act of imagination: the symphony
+or the painting, as 1 have shown elsewhere, are imaginaries projected
+through the set of dried paints or the linking of sounds which function
+as their analogon. In the case of practical objects - machines, tools,
+consumer goods, etc. - our present action makes them seem like
+totalities by resuscitating, in some way, the praxis which attempted to
+totalise their inertia. We shall see below that these inert totalities are
+of crucial importance and that they create the kind of relation between
+
+46 Introduction
+men which we will refer to, later, as the practico-inert. These human
+objects are worthy of attention in the human world, for it is there that
+they attain their practico-inert statute; that is to say, they lie heavy on
+our destiny because of the contradiction which opposes praxis (the
+labour which made them and the labour which utilises them) and
+inertia, within them. But, as these remarks show, they are products;
+and the totality, despite what one might think, is only a regulative
+principle of the totalisation (and all at once disintegrates into the inert
+ensemble of its provisional creations).
+If, indeed, anything is to appear as the synthetic unity of the diverse, it must be a developing unification, that is to say, an activity.
+The synthetic unification of a habitat is not merely the labour which
+has produced it, but also the activity of inhabiting it; reduced to itself,
+it reverts to the multiplicity of inertia. Thus totalisation has the same
+statute as the totality, for, through the multiplicities, it continues that
+synthetic labour which makes each part an expression of the whole
+and which relates the whole to itself through the mediation of its parts.
+But it is a developing activity, which cannot cease without the multiplicity reverting to its original statute. This act delineates a practical
+field which, as the undifferentiated correlative of praxis, is the formal
+unity of the ensembles which are to be integrated; within this practical
+field, the activity attempts the most rigorous synthesis of the most
+differentiated multiplicity. Thus, by a double movement, multiplicity
+is multiplied to infinity, each part is set against all the others and
+against the whole which is in the process of being formed, while the
+totalising activity tightens all the bonds, making each differentiated
+element both its immediate expression and its mediation in relation to
+the other elements. On this basis, it is easy to establish the intelligibility
+of dialectical Reason; it is the very movement of totalisation. Thus, to
+take only one example, it is within the framework of totalisation that
+the negation of the negation becomes an affirmation. Within the practical field, the correlative of praxis, every determination is a negation,
+for praxis, in differentiating certain ensembles, excludes them from the
+group formed by all the others; and the developing unification appears
+simultaneously in the most differentiated products (indicating the
+direction of the movement), in those which are less differentiated
+(indicating continuities, resistances, traditions, a tighter, but more
+superficial, unity, and in the conflict between the two (which expresses the present state of the developing totalisation). The new
+negation, which, in determining the less differentiated ensembles, will
+
+Critique of Critical Investigation 4J
+raise them to the level of the others, is bound to eliminate the negation
+which set the ensembles in antagonism to each other. Thus it is only
+within a developing unification (which has already defined the limits
+of its field) that a determination can be said to be a negation and that
+the negation of a negation is necessarily an affirmation. If dialectical
+Reason exists, then, from the ontological point of view, it can only be
+a developing totalisation, occurring where the totalisation occurs, and,
+from the epistemological point of view, it can only be the accessibility
+of that totalisation to a knowledge which is itself, in principle, totalising
+in its procedures. But since totalising knowledge cannot be thought of
+as attaining ontological totalisation as a new totalisation of it, dialectical
+knowledge must itself be a moment of the totalisation, or, in other
+words, totalisation must include within itself its own reflexive retotalisation as an essential structure and as a totalising process within
+the process as a whole.
+4
+Critical Investigation and Totalisation
+Thus the dialectic is a totalising activity. Its only laws are the rules
+produced by the developing totalisation, and these are obviously concerned with the relation between unification and the unified, 22 that is
+22. A few examples: the whole is entirely present in the part as its present
+meaning and as its destiny. In this case, it is opposed to itself as the part is opposed
+to the whole in its determination (negation of the whole) and, since the parts are
+opposed to one another (each part is both the negation of the others and the
+whole, determining itself in its totalising activity and conferring upon the partial
+structures the determinations required by the total movement), each part is, as
+such, mediated by the whole in its relations with the other parts: within a totalisation, the multiplicities (as bonds of absolute exteriority - i.e., quantities) do not
+eliminate,
+, but rather interiorise, one another. For example, the fact of being a
+hundred (as we shall see when we discuss groups) becomes for each of the hundred a synthetic relation of interiority with the other ninety-nine; his individual
+reality is affected by the numerical characteristics of being-the-hundredth. Thus
+quantity can become quality (as Engels said, following Hegel) only within a
+whole which reinteriorises even relations of exteriority. In this way, the whole
+(as a totalising act) becomes the relation among the parts. In other words,
+totalisation is a mediation between the parts (considered in their determinations)
+
+48 Introduction
+to say, the modes of effective presence of the totalising process in the
+totalised parts. And knowledge, itself totalising, is the totalisation
+itself in so far as it is present in particular partial structures of a definite
+kind. In other words, totalisation cannot be consciously present to
+itself if it remains a formal, faceless activity of synthetic unification,
+but can be so only through the mediation of differentiated realities
+which it unifies and which effectively embody it to the extent that they
+totalise themselves by the very movement of the activity of totalising.
+These remarks enable us to define the first feature of the critical
+investigation: it takes place inside the totalisation and can be neither a
+contemplative recognition of the totalising movement, nor a particular,
+autonomous totalisation of the known totalisation. Rather, it is a real
+moment of the developing totalisation in so far as this is embodied in
+all its parts and is realised as synthetic knowledge of itself through the
+mediation of certain of these parts. In practice, this means that the
+critical investigation can and must be anyone's reflexive experience.
+as a relation of interiority: within and through a totalisation, each part is mediated
+by all in its relation to each, and each is a mediation between all; negation (as
+determination) becomes a synthetic bond linking each part to every other, to all,
+and to the whole. But, at the same time, the linked system of mutually conditioning parts is opposed to the whole as an act of absolute unification, to precisely
+the extent that this system in movement does not and cannot exist except as the
+actual embodiment and present reality (here and now) of the whole as a developing synthesis. Similarly, the synthetic relations that two (or n + I) parts maintain between themselves, precisely because they are the effective embodiment of
+the whole, oppose them to every other part, to all the other parts as a linked
+system ana, consequently, to the whole in its triple reality as a developing synthesis, as an effective presence in every part, and as a surface organisation. Here
+we are only giving a few abstract examples; but they are sufficient to illustrate the
+meaning of the bonds of interiority within a developing totalisation. Obviously
+these oppositions are not static (as they might be if, as might happen, the totalisation were to result in totality); rather they perpetually transtorm the interior
+field to the extent that they translate the developing act into its practical ethcacity.
+It is no less clear that what I call a 'whole' is not a totality, but the unity of the
+totalising act in so far as it diversifies itself and embodies itself in totalised
+diversities.
+
+49
+5
+Critical Investigation and Action
+But we must both deepen and delimit our terms. For when I say that
+the investigation must be reflexive, I mean that, in the particularity of
+its moments, it cannot be separated from the developing totalisation
+any more than reflection can be distinguished from human praxis. I
+have shown elsewhere that reflection must not be conceived as a parasitical, distinct consciousness, but as the distinctive structure of certain
+'consciousnesses'. If a totalisation is developing in a given region of
+reality, it must be a unique process occurring in unique conditions and,
+from the epistemological point of view, it will produce the universals
+which explain it and individualise them by interiorising them. (In-
+deed, all the concepts forged by history, including that of man, are
+similarly individualised universals and have no meaning apart from
+this individual process.) The critical investigation can only be a moment of this process, or, in other words, the totalising process produces itself as the critical investigation of itself at a particular moment
+of its development. And this critical investigation apprehends the
+individual movement through reflection, which means that it is the
+particular moment in which the act gives itself a reflexive structure.
+Thus the universals of the dialectic - principles and laws of intelligibility - are individualised universals; attempts at abstraction and universalisation can only result in schemata which are continually valid for
+that process. Later, we shall see how far formal extrapolations are conceivable (on the abstract hypothesis that other, as yet unknown, ontological regions are also totalisations); but, at any rate, such extrapolations cannot claim to be knowledge and their only utility, if they are
+possible, is to throw more light on the particularity of the totalising
+process where the investigation takes place.
+G
+The Problem of Stalinism
+This makes clear how we are to understand the word 'anyone'. If the
+totalisation produces a moment of critical consciousness as the necessary
+
+50 Introduction
+incarnation of its totalising praxis, then obviously this moment
+can only appear at particular times and places. In its deep reality as well
+as in its modes of appearance, it is conditioned by the synthetic rule
+characteristic of this particular totalisation as well as by prior circum-
+Stances which it must transcend and retain within itself according to
+this rule. To make myself clearer, let me say that - if, as we assume,
+the region of totalisation is, for us, human history - the critique of
+dialectical Reason could not appear before historical totalisation had
+produced that individualised universal which we call the dialectic, that
+is to say, before it was posited for itself in the philosophies of Hegel and
+Marx. Nor could it occur before the abuses which have obscured the
+very notion of dialectical rationality and produced a new divorce
+between praxis and the knowledge which elucidates it. Indeed,
+Critique derives its etymological meaning and its origin from the real
+need to separate the true from the false, to define the limits of totalising activities so as to restore to them their validity. In other words,
+critical investigation could not occur in our history, before Stalinist
+idealism had sclerosed both epistemological methods and practices. It
+could take place only as the intellectual expression of that re-ordering
+which characterises, in this 'one World' of ours, the post-Stalinist
+period. Thus, when we claim that anyone can carry out the critical
+investigation, this does not mean it could happen at any period. It
+means anyone today. What, then, does 'anyone' mean? We use this
+term to indicate that, if the historical totalisation is to be able to exist,
+then any human life is the direct and indirect expression of the whole
+(the totalising movement) and of all lives to precisely the extent that
+it is opposed to everything and to everyone. Consequently, in any life
+(though more or less explicitly, depending on the circumstances)
+totalisation effects the divorce of blind unprincipled praxis and
+sclerosed thought, or, in other words, the obscuring of the dialectic
+which is a moment of the totalising activity of the world. Through
+this contradiction, lived in discontent and, at times, in agony, the
+totalisation compels everyone, as part of his individual destiny, to reexamine his intellectual tools; and this represents in fact a new, more
+detailed, more integrated and richer moment of human development.
+In fact, we are witnessing today the emergence of numerous attempts -
+all of them interesting and all of them debatable (including, of course,
+this one) - to interrogate the dialectic about itself. This means not only
+that the origin of critical investigation is itself dialectical, but also that
+the appearance of a reflexive and critical consciousness in everyone
+
+5г
+takes the form of individual attempts to grasp the moment of historical
+totalisation through one's own life, conceived as an expression of the
+whole. Thus, in its most immediate and most superficial character, the
+critical investigation of totalisation is the very life of the investigator
+in so far as it reflexively criticises itself. In abstract terms, this means
+that only a man who lives within a region of totalisation can apprehend
+the bonds of interiority which unite him to the totalising movement.
+• The Problem of the Individual
+These remarks coincide with those I made in The Problem of Method
+about the need to approach social problems by situating oneself in
+relation to the ensembles under consideration. They also remind us
+that the epistemological starting point must always be consciousness as
+apodictic certainty (of) itself and as consciousness of such and such an
+object. But we are not concerned, at this point, with interrogating
+consciousness about itself: the object it must give itself is precisely the
+life, the objective being, of the investigator, in the world of Others, in
+so far as this being totalises itself from birth and will continue to
+totalise itself until death. On this basis, the individual disappears from
+historical categories: alienation, the practico-inert, series, groups,
+classes, the components of History, labour, individual and communal
+praxis - the individual has lived, and he still lives, all of these in interiority. But if there is a movement of dialectical Reason, it is this movement which produces this life, this membership of a particular class,
+of certain milieux and of certain groups; it is the totalisation itself
+which brought about his successes and his failures, through the vicissitudes of his community, and his personal joys and sorrows. Through
+his love or family relations, through his friendships and through the
+'relations of production' that have marked his life, the dialectical bonds
+reveal themselves. For this reason, his understanding of his own life
+must go so far as to deny its distinctiveness so as to seek its dialectical
+intelligibility within human development as a whole. What I have in
+mind is not an act of consciousness which would make him grasp the
+content of his life in terms of concrete history, of the class to which he
+belongs, its characteristic contradictions and its struggles against other
+
+52 Introduction
+classes: we are not trying to reconstruct the real history of the human
+race; we are trying to establish the Truth of History.
+The point is, therefore, that the critical investigation should bear on
+the nature of bonds of interiority (if they exist), on the basis of the
+human relations which define the investigator. If he is to be totalised by
+history, the important thing is that he should re-live his membership
+of human ensembles with different structures and determine the reality
+of these ensembles through the bonds which constitute them and the
+practices which define them. And to preciseiy the extent that the investigator is in himself (like any other individual) a living mediation
+between these different kinds of ensembles, his critical investigation
+must reveal whether this mediating bond is itself an expression of
+totalisation. In short, if there is such a thing as the unity of History,
+the experimenter must see his own life as the Whole and the Part, as
+the bond between the Parts and the Whole, and as the relation between
+the Parts, in the dialectical movement of Unification; he must be able
+to leap from his individual life to History simply by the practical
+negation of the negation which defines his life. From this point of view,
+the order of the investigation becomes clear: it must be regressive.
+The critical investigation will move in the opposite direction to the
+synthetic movement of the dialectic as a method (that is to say, in the
+opposite direction to Marxist thought, which proceeds from production and the relations of production to the structures of groups, and
+then to their internal contradictions, to various milieux and, where
+appropriate, to the individual); it will set out from the immediate, that
+is to say from the individual fulfilling himself in his abstract23 praxis,
+so as to rediscover, through deeper and deeper conditionings, the
+totality of his practical bonds with others and, thereby, the structures
+of the various practical multiplicities and, through their contradictions
+and struggles, the absolute concrete: historical man. This is tantamount to saying that the individual, the investigator under investigation, is both myself and no one. The bond between collectives and
+groups remains: through the lived interconnection between affiliations,
+we shall, through this disappearing self, grasp the dynamic relations
+between the different social structures in so far as they transform
+23. I am using the term 'abstract' here in the sense of incomplete. The individual is not abstract from the point of view of his individual reality (one could
+say that he is the concrete itself; but only on condition that the ever deeper
+determinations which constitute him in his very existence as a historical agent and,
+at the same time, as a product of History, have been revealed.
+
+53
+themselves in History. For instance, we must grasp the group in the
+moment it constitutes itself from the dissolution of the collective, or,
+similarly, the return of certain groups to sociality through the very
+movement of common praxis and its decomposition.
+8
+Totalisation and History
+But we have neglected a crucial dimension of the critical investigation:
+the past. It is clear how I dissolve myself practically in the process of
+human development, but this still leaves us on the synchronic plane.
+It remains the case that the totalisation differs from the totality in that
+the latter is totalised while the former totalises itself. In this sense, it is
+obvious that to totalise itself means to temporalise itself. Indeed, as I
+have shown elsewhere, the only conceivable temporality is that of a
+totalisation as an individual process. If the totalisation is to be revealed
+as a developing totalisation, this means not only that it becomes and
+that it will become, but also that it has become. In this instance, my life,
+in its individual movement, is too short for us to hope to grasp the
+diachronic process of totalisation within it, except in so far as the
+totalising bond with the past which constitutes the individual may
+serve as a symbol of a totalisation of individuals.
+All this is true; or rather it would be true if we were to ignore the
+cultural structure of every diachronic experience. Now, if culture is
+more than an accumulation of heteroclite knowledge and dates (in
+short - and this is the question - if a totalisation is developing), then
+what I know exists both within me and outside me as a field of particular
+tensions; bodies of knowledge, however disparate their content or the
+dates of their appearance (both in the world and in my cultural apprenticeship), are linked by relations of interiority. Besides, within
+modern culture as a whole, my knowledge must be dialectically conditioned by my ignorance. Once again, at the present time, this does
+not appear self-evident: there seems to be no reason why culture
+should not be a collection, or, at the very most, a superimposition of
+strata whose only bond (the superimposition itself) is external. One
+might even, like our eclectics, imagine some cultural regions which
+condition one another in interiority, others which remain mere
+
+54 Introduction
+aggregates, and still others which (depending on the state of knowledge)
+possess both characteristics. Equally, cultural regions might be defined
+on the basis of their internal, dialectical conditioning while their interrelations were supposed to be ones of pure contiguity (or certain
+exterior bonds).
+But if History is a totalisation which temporalises itself, culture is
+itself a temporalising and temporalised totalisation, despite the "disparateness' of my knowledge and perhaps of knowledge in general
+within the objective Culture of this century. This problem must be
+resolved according to whether dialectical investigation is, or is not,
+possible. Supposing, for a moment, that it is possible, it is immediately
+clear that my culture cannot be treated as a subjective accumulation of
+knowledge and methods 'in my mind'; instead, this culture which I
+call mine must be conceived as a specific participation in interiority in
+the objective culture. And instead of me being a particular social atom
+which itself defines the cultural possibilities, this participation defines
+me (in a specific way). As soon as I reflexively grasp this bond of interiority which links me to the cultural totalisation, I disappear as a
+cultivated individual and emerge as the synthetic bond between everyone and what might be called the cultural field. And this connection
+will itself appear in all its complexity (relation of the Whole to the
+Whole for my mediation, opposition of the Whole to the part and to
+the Whole, opposition between some parts and the part and the Whole,
+etc.). Moreover - still on the assumption that dialectical investigation
+is possible - this very bond gives us access to the Culture itself as
+totalisation and temporalisation. In this way, I find myself dialectically
+conditioned by the totalised and totalising past of the process of human
+development: as a 'cultured' man (an expression which applies to
+every man, whatever his culture, and even if he is an illiterate) |
+totalise myself on the basis of centuries of history and, in accordance
+with my culture, I totalise this experience. This means that my life
+itself is centuries old, since the schemata which permit me to understand, to modify and to totalise my practical undertakings (and the set
+of determinations which go with them) have entered the present
+(present in their effects and past in their completed history. In this
+sense, diachronic evolution is present (as past - and, as we shall see
+later, as future) in synchronic totalisation; their relations are bonds of
+interiority and, to the extent that critical investigation is possible, the
+temporal depth of the totalising process becomes evident aș soon as 1
+reflexively interpret the operations of my individual life.
+
+5.5
+Of course, the individual is here only the methodological point of
+departure, and his short life soon becomes diluted in the pluridimensional human ensemble which temporalises its totalisation and totalises
+its temporality. To the extent that its individual universals are perpetually aroused, in my immediate as well as my reflective life, and,
+from the depths of the past in which they were born, provide the keys
+and the rules of my actions, we must be able, in our regressive investigation, to make use of the whole of contemporary knowledge (at least in
+principle) to elucidate a given undertaking or social ensemble, a
+particular avatar of praxis. In other words, the first use of culture must
+be in the unreflected content of critical reflexion, to the extent that its
+first grasp of synchronisms is through the present individual. Far from
+assuming, as certain philosophers have done, that we know nothing,
+we ought as far as possible (though it is impossible) to assume that we
+know everything. At any rate, we use the whole of knowledge in order
+to decipher the human ensembles which constitute the individual and
+which the individual totalises by the very style in which he lives them.
+We use this knowledge because the dream of an absolute ignorance
+which reveals pre-conceptual reality is a philosophical folly, as dangerous as the dream of the 'noble savage' in the eighteenth century. It
+is possible to be nostalgic about illiteracy, but this nostalgia is itself a
+cultural phenomenon, since absolute illiteracy is not aware of itself -
+and, if it is, it sets about eliminating itself. Thus the starting point of
+'supposing we know nothing', as a negation of culture, is only culture,
+at a certain moment of totalising temporalisation, choosing to ignore
+itself for its ownsake. It is, one might say, a sort of pre-critical attempt to
+criticise knowledge, at a time when the dialectic has not reached the
+stage of criticising itself.
+Our critical investigation, on the other hand, will make use of everything that comes to hand because, in an individual life, each praxis uses
+the whole of culture and becomes both synchronic (in the ensemble of
+the present) and diachronic (in its human depth); and because our
+investigation is itself a cultural fact. In the methodical reconstruction
+of History it is practically forbidden to follow analogies of content,
+and to interpret, for example, a revolution such as Cromwell's in terms
+of the French Revolution. On the other hand, if we are trying to grasp
+formal bonds, (for example, any kind of bonds of interiority) between
+individuals or groups, to study the different forms of practical multiplicities and the kinds of interrelations which exist within them, the
+best example is the clearest provided by culture regardless of date. In
+
+56 Introduction
+other words, the dialectic is not the culmination of history; it can only
+exist as the original movement of totalisation. Of course, the dialectic
+must in the first instance be the immediate, simple lived praxis, and, in
+so far as it acts upon itself in the course of time so as to totalise itself, it
+discloses itself and progressively mediates itself through critical
+reflection. But for this reflection, by definition, the immediate no longer
+exists in relation to either present or past praxis. The former, contemporary with the critical investigation, acquires a reflexive structure at
+the moment of its constitution; the latter, precisely because it has been
+preserved (at least vestigially) or reconstituted, is already mediated
+when it is brought to light: in this case reflexive scissiparity becomes a
+kind of distantiation. But a reflexive critique forms part of what we
+shall call reconstituting praxis (that of the historian or the ethnographer); and reconstituting praxis - in so far as it effects reconstitution -
+is indissolubly linked to reconstituted praxis. (It constructs past, that
+is to say transcended, reality, by rediscovering it in the present transcendence which preserved it; and it is itself constructed by this resuscitated past which transforms it in so far as it restores it.) Furthermore,
+as a transcended past, the reconstituted praxis necessarily forms part of
+our present praxis as its diachronic depth. Thus, the reflexive critique
+becomes critical and quasi-reflexive knowledge when it seeks its
+examples and its explanations in the objective Culture. And let us not
+forget that the choice of social memories defines both the present
+praxis (in so far as it motivates this choice) and social memory in
+so far as it has produced our praxis along with its characteristic
+choice.
+This being so, reflexive investigation and quasi-reflexive knowledge
+are completely homogeneous in bringing to light the synthetic bonds
+of History. The content of these bonds, in its materiality, can be used
+only to distinguish and to differentiate: it must be recognised that a
+friendship in Socrates' time has neither the same meaning nor the same
+functions as a friendship today. But this differentiation, which completely rules out any belief in 'human nature', only throws more light
+on the synthetic bond of reciprocity (which will in any case be described
+below) - an individualised universal, and the very foundation of all
+human relations. Bearing in mind these difficulties, we may select the
+best examples of this fundamental reciprocity from the past which we
+did not live, but which is nevertheless, through the medium of culture,
+completely ours. We are proposing not the rewriting of human history,
+but the critical investigation of bonds of interiority, or, in other words,
+
+the discovery, in connection with real, though quite ordinary, undertakings, structures and events, of the answer to this all-important
+question: in the process of human history, what is the respective role of
+relations of interiority and exteriority! And if this total investigation -
+which can be summed up as that of my whole life in so far as it is dissolved in the whole of history, and of the whole of history in so far
+as it is concentrated in an entire life - establishes that the bond of exteriority (analytical and positivist reason) is itself interiorised by practical
+multiplicities, and that it acts within them (as a historical force) only to
+the extent that it becomes an interior negation of interiority, 24 we will
+find ourselves situated, through the investigation itself, at the heart of a
+developing totalisation.
+9 Primary and Secondary Intelligibility
+But our task involves more than establishing the existence of an ontological region of totalisation within which we are situated. For if dialectical reason exists, the totalising movement must, at least in principle, be intelligible to us everywhere and at all times. (Sometimes our
+information may not be sufficient to make an event accessible to us; but
+even if this were usually so, intelligibility in principle would still have
+to be guaranteed by our investigation.) This is a matter of secondary
+intelligibility. Primary intelligibility, if it is to be possible, that is to
+say, if there is such a thing as a totalising temporalisation - must, as we
+have seen, consist in reducing the laws of the dialectic to moments of
+the totalisation. Instead of grasping certain principles within ourselves,
+a priori (that is to say, certain opaque limits of thought), we must grasp
+the dialectic in the object and understand it - to the extent that each of
+us, simultaneously individual and the whole of human history, produces
+it from this double point of view and is subject to it in producing it -
+as the totalising movement. Secondary intelligibility, however, is not
+the translucidity of dialectical Reason: it is the intelligibility of partial
+moments of the totalisation, resulting from the totalisation itself in its
+24. We shall see later, for example, how a numerical multiplicity, in order to
+become a group, must interiorise its number (its quality as exteriority).
+
+58 Introduction
+temporalisation, that is to say, through the critical application of
+dialectical schemata. We have seen that dialectical Reason, when
+applied to the sciences of Nature, cannot be "constitutive': in other
+words, it is no more than the empty idea of totalisation projected beyond the strict and quantitative laws established by positivist Reason.
+Within the totalisation where we are and which we are, however, dialectical Reason must prove its constant superiority for the understanding of historical facts: it must dissolve the positivist, analytical
+interpretation from within its own totalising activity; it must reveal
+certain structures, relations and meanings which necessarily elude all
+positivism. Moreover, in the limiting case of perfect information, the
+event itself must become transparent, that is to say, it must reveal
+itself as accessible only to dialectical Reason. This means that the
+movement by which totalising agents, in transcending their contradictions, produce new and irreducible moments of the totalisation
+must present itself to us both as reality and as elucidation. In other
+words, if there is any such thing as dialectical Reason, it must be defined as the absolute intelligibility of the irreducibly new, in so far as
+it is irreducibly new. It is the opposite of the positivist analytical
+enterprise of explaining new facts by reducing them to old ones. And,
+in a sense, the positivist tradition is so firmly anchored in us, even today,
+that the requirement of intelligibility may seem paradoxical. The new,
+in so far as it is new, seems to elude the intellect: the new quality is
+regarded as a brute fact or, at best, its irreducibility is taken to be
+temporary, and analysis is expected to reveal old elements in it. But in
+fact it is man who brings novelty into the world: it is his praxis (at the
+level of perception: colours, odours) which, through the partial or
+total reorganisation of the practical field, produces a new instrument in
+the new unity of its appearance and function; it is the praxis of users
+which, coordinated with that of producers, will maintain the tool in
+the human world and, through use, link together its so-called 'elements'
+in such a way as to preserve its irreducibility, in relation to men.
+'Human reality' is a synthesis at the level of techniques, and at the
+level of that universal technique which is thought. This much is clear.
+It is also clear - and it will become clearer - that analytical Reason is a
+synthetic transformation to which thought intentionally subjects itself: this thought must become a thing and control itself in exteriority
+in order to become the natural milieu in which the object under
+investigation defines itself in itself, as conditioned in exteriority. In
+this respect, as we shall see in detail later, thought, when it makes itself
+
+Critique of Critical Investigation 59
+into directed inertia in order to act on inertia, conforms to the rule of
+the practical organism at every level. But, while making itself the
+object of this transformation, thought also controls it and realises it in
+connection with the inert system it is trying to study. It becomes the
+law of bodies in motion (at first as an indeterminate schema and in
+order to become this specific law), or the rule of chemical combination
+(as the simple, a priori certainty that such combinations cannot be
+totalisations). Thus analytical Reason, as the pure, universal schema of
+natural laws, is really only the result of a synthetic transformation or,
+so to speak, a particular practical moment of dialectical Reason: this
+latter, like animal-tools, uses its organic powers to make certain
+regions of itself into a quasi-inorganic residue deciphering the inert by
+means of its own inertia; scientific thought is synthetic in its internal
+movement (creation of experiments and hypotheses), and (in the case
+of the sciences of Nature in their present state) analytical in its noemic
+projection of itself. Its hypotheses are synthetic in virtue of their
+unifying function (y=f(x)) and analytical in virtue of the dispersive
+inertia of their material content. If our experiment is a success, we shall
+see later that dialectical Reason sustains, controls and constantly recreates positivist Reason as its relation of exteriority with natural exteriority. But this positivist Reason, produced like the chitinous carapaces
+of certain insects, has its foundation and intelligibility only in dialectical
+Reason. If it is sometimes true and intelligible that an object gets its
+unity from exterior forces, and if these forces are themselves systematically conditioned by the indefinite exteriority of the universe, this
+is because man is part of this universe and is strictly conditioned by it;
+because all praxis, and consequently all knowledge, must unify molecular dispersal (either by constructing a tool, or by unifying social multiplicity within a group by interiorising it). Thus the sciences of Nature
+are analytical with respect to their content, whereas scientific thought
+is both analytical in its particular procedures and synthetic by virtue
+of its ultimate aims.
+But if there is such a thing as totalisation, it would be wrong to
+suppose that the existence of organising and creative thought is the unintelligible fact about the human race, or some kind of unconscious
+activity revealed only through the use of the methods and the knowledge of the natural sciences. To understand a mathematical or experimental proof is to understand the method and orientation of thought.
+In other words, it is to grasp both the analytical necessity of the calculations (as a system of equivalences, and so as the reduction of change
+
+Go Introduction
+to zero) and the synthetic orientation of these equivalences towards the
+creation of new knowledge. Indeed, even if a reduction of the new to
+the old were to be rigorously proved, the emergence of proved knowledge where before there was only a vague hypothesis which at any
+rate lacked Truth, must be seen as an irreducible novelty in the order
+of knowledge and its practical applications. And if there could be no
+complete intelligibility of this irreducibility, there could be neither
+any consciousness of its aim nor any understanding of the gradual
+progress of the proof (on the part either of the scientist who invented
+the experiment or of the student listening to an account of it). Thus
+natural science has the same structure as a machine: it is controlled by
+a totalising thought which enriches it and finds applications for it and,
+at the same time, the unity of its movement (accumulation) totalises
+ensembles and systems of a mechanical order for man. Interiority
+exteriorises itself in order to interiorise exteriority.
+The transparence of praxis (let us say, for the moment, of individual
+praxis) has its source in the indissoluble connection between negation
+(which totalises in situation what it negates) and a project which defines
+itself in terms of an abstract and still formal whole which the practical
+agent projects into the future and which appears as the reorganised
+unity of the negated situation. In this sense, the very temporalisation of
+an undertaking is accessible since it can be understood on the basis of
+the future which conditions it (that is to say of the Whole which
+praxis conceives as having to be realised). Thus in the very act of
+negating, negation creates a temporary totality; it totalises before becoming partial. Furthermore, when it resolves to negate a particular
+structure of the rejected situation, it does so on the basis of a provisional
+totalisation; the particularisation of the negation is not pure analysis,
+but, on the contrary, a dialectical moment: the secondary structure
+appears within the provisional whole as expressing the totality and as
+incapable of changing without the totality itself being modified (or
+even, as incapable of changing except as a result of the prior modification of the totality. This unification, in fact (and the discovery which
+is effected in the totalised field) is intelligibility in the first instance, in
+so far as human praxis, transparent to itself as the unity in act either
+of a rejection or of a project, defines its own practical understanding
+as the totalising grasp of a unified diversity (to understand, for a
+technician, is to see the whole - the entire functioning of a machine to
+be repaired, for example - and to search for the particular structures
+which obstruct its functioning on the basis of this overall function). It
+
+Critique of Critical Investigation 6z
+is a case, in fact, of what we were talking about a moment ago: totalisation diversifies itself and integration grows proportionately stronger.
+But it is also a movement from the future (for example, the machine
+in working order) towards the past: repairing something means
+grasping its integrity both as a temporal abstract and as the future
+state which is to be reconstituted. On this basis, all the activities of a
+practical agent are to be understood through the future as a perpetual
+re-totalisation of the provisional totality. And the ensemble of these
+moments, themselves re-totalised by the temporalisation, is in fact
+original intelligibility, for the practical agent is transparent to himself
+as the unifying unity of himself and his environment. In this sense, the
+new is immediately intelligible to him in his activity itself (in so far as
+this activity produces it, not in so far as it comes from outside, since,
+for the practical agent, it is nothing but his own practical unity in so
+far as he constantly produces it outside himself as the mark of an ever
+deeper diversity. Thus dialectical intelligibility rests on the intelligibility of every new determination of a practical totality, in so far as this
+determination is nothing other than the preservation and the totalising
+transcendence of all previous determinations and in so far as this
+transcendence and preservation are explicable by a totality which has
+to be realised. "
+These remarks do not prejudge the outcome of the critical investigation which we are about to undertake. They merely indicate its
+intention. It is possible that, on some plane, individual praxis is transparent to itself and that, in this transparence, it provides the model and
+the rules of full intelligibility; but this still has to be proved. It is also
+conceivable, at least hypothetically, that human thought (in so far as
+it is itself praxis and a moment of praxis) is fundamentally the understanding of novelty (as a perpetual re-organisation of the given in
+accordance with acts explicable by their end).2 But it is clear that this
+25. This totality is only a moment of practical totalisation. If the agent regards it as definitive, this can only be for reasons external to the pure diversifying
+unification, such as its utility. Besides, we shall see that the created totality will
+elude him to the extent that its very realisation causes it to relapse into original
+inertia and into pure exteriority.
+26. From the point of view of the future totality, each new state of the organised system is in reality a pre-novelty, and it shows its intelligibility only in so
+far as it is already transcended by the future unity, in so far as it is not new enough.
+Take the simple example of intuitive (and dialectical) certainty as compared with
+a geometrical proof. It is quite certain - first and foremost for a child - that a
+
+62 Introduction
+straight line which intersects a circle at any given point must also intersect it at
+another point. The child or the untutored person will grasp this truth on the
+basis of the circle itself; he will say of the line drawn on the blackboard: since it
+enters the circle it must come out. A mathematician will not be satisfied with this
+naive certainty: he requires a proof. This is partly for all the well known reasons
+which make geometry rigorously systematic, and which imply that a proposition
+can be integrated into the system only if it is demonstrated, that is, proved according to the proper rules of geometry. But it is also, and above all, because proof is
+analytic whereas the intuitive certainty which I have described is dialectical. The
+circle-as-sensible-object is eliminated, relegated to the background, and replaced
+by one of its properties: there is a point inside the circle equidistant from every
+point on the circle; all points on the circle are equidistant from a point called 'the
+centre'. Let us take a point and baptise it "centre'; it is connected to a given line
+by a line segment baptised 'radius'. Then one can prove that there is another
+point on the line which can be connected to the centre by a segment equal to the
+first. The actual proof does not concern us here, though we shall come back to it
+when we discuss necessity. What is important for us now is that the proof
+destroys the sensible and qualitative unity of the circle-gestalt in favour of the
+inert divisibility of 'geometrical loci'. The gestalt now exists only to the extent
+that it is compressed into implicit knowledge. All that remains is exteriority, that
+is to say, the residue of the generative movement. The circle-gestalt, in contrast,
+is much more than a sensible form: it is an organising movement which has been
+going on since the very conception of the figure, and which the eye constantly
+recreates. This enables us to see that this human determination of spatial indifference is practical, or rather that it is abstract praxis including within itself all the
+practices of enclosure. Similarly, the line in question is no longer a set of particular
+points; it is a movement: the shortest path between two points, and thus both a
+charting of the route and a strict law of a given movement. These considerations
+enable us to understand the dialectical intelligibility of the theorem under consideration. The circle, as the abstract idealisation of enclosure, confines. The
+straight line, as the idealisation of a disciplined journey, shatters obstacles in its
+path. Or, if it could not shatter them, it would 'mark time' before a rampart or a
+hill, and it would have to demolish the wall or bore a tunnel. But since we are
+concerned with an infinite journey, and so one without any real obstacles, we
+immediately see, in the geometrical diagram, that the line has arrived outside the
+circular enclosure and, in short, we grasp its movement only on the basis of
+points not represented on the blackboard or the sketch, and which are implicit
+in what we see as the destiny, the direction, the future of the line. But, to the
+extent that this infinitely distant future is already present in the perception of the
+straight line, what we see of it is already left behind what we cannot see of it. In a
+sense the present is already past since the movement has already reached infinity:
+the line becomes a vestige, a trail on the point of disappearing. Thus we see it, in
+the upper right-hand corner of the blackboard, for example, taking off into the
+sky. And thus the two points where it crossed the circle which was drawn in the
+middle of the blackboard appear within the diagram itself as a transcended past.
+However limited and abstract it may be, a schematic temporalisation (which the
+transformation of the straight line into a vector only serves to explicate) totalises the career (aventure) of the line. The line, like the circle, is individualised,
+
+Critique of Critical Investigation 63
+however vaguely, by the process of human development (aventure). And when
+we encounter this movement crossing a closed curve, we are really re-encountering
+it: the straight line has already reached infinity when we see it cut the circle. And
+indeed the encounter with this double organisation is a new piece of knowledge.
+But here intelligibility originates in the intuitive apprehension of two contradictory practices (for example, an enclosure and a rail) one of which dominates
+the other by submitting to its law. The absolute hardness of the movement and
+the inflexible rigidity of its path come to terms with the circular resistance of the
+enclosure. The meaning of the latter is to form an interior (and there, too, the
+completed movement will make us grasp the circle, whether drawn by the mathematician or constructed by men in danger, as a totalised temporalisation). All we
+need to understand here is the generating act, the synthesis which collects the
+palissades or which holds together the abstract elements of space. The new is the
+trace left by a totalising temporalisation on the absolute, inert dispersal which
+represents space. It is intelligible in so far as the dispersive inertia which it collects
+itself adds nothing to it and is only the congealed reproduction of the generating
+act. At every point on the curve, the circle is both in the process of being formed
+and already finished. At every point on the curve, the movement to be made (the
+rule of construction) is understood on the basis of the movement already accomplished (the temporalised totality of the synthesis), and conversely (the new
+opacity of sensible determination is dissolved in the rule which produces it; it
+becomes, at each point, the sketch of the movement's past and future.
+As for the relationship between the straight line and the closed curve, it appears
+here as a temporal and quasi-particularised process: it is the synthesis of two contradictory and already executed sets of instructions. The closed curve resists
+exteriority, and doubly so: it presents a barrier to every exterior force; and within
+this barrier it encloses an interiority. But the straight line which crosses it, when
+it breaks down the barrier, finds itself subjected to the law of interiority: it must
+return to the exterior out of which it came, following the rule which defines its
+movement. Thus the 'entry' of the movement demands its 'exit' because the
+entry has transformed it into a determination of the interiority of the circle. But
+conversely, the straight line realises the exteriority of the interior content by
+crossing the curve. Thus it is this new organisation which provides the practical
+intelligibility of the geometrical process by realising, through us and through the
+movement which we recreate, the exteriorisation of the interior (the action of the
+line on the circle) and the interiorisation of the exterior (the line makes itself
+interior in order to traverse the obstacle, it conforms to the structures of the
+circle). But this synthesis of contradictories in its transcended novelty, is decoded
+on the basis of future totalisations, that is to say, on the basis of operations which
+are performed through the mere indication that they must be.
+If we examine this extremely simple case closely, it is clear that sensible intuition is simply the generative act which produces the two spatial determinations,
+in so far as the agent understands his partial operation in terms of a double total
+praxis (draw theline, close the circle). In short, dialectical certainty elucidates the
+developing act by means of the totalised act, and the nature of the material intervenes only in order to qualify the informing praxis (of course, this is no longer so
+if the material in question becomes concrete, and we shall have occasion to discuss
+this point at length; but at any rate the principle of dialectical certainty must be
+
+GA Introduction
+is not the important point; it is not just a matter of studying an individual at work. A critique of dialectical Reason must concern itself
+with the field of application and the limits of this reason. If there is to
+be any such thing as the Truth of History (rather than several truths,
+even if they are organised into a system), our investigation must show
+that the kind of dialectical intelligibility which we have described above
+applies to the process of human history as a whole, or, in other words,
+that there is a totalising temporalisation of our practical multiplicity
+and that it is intelligible, even though this totalisation does not involve
+a grand totaliser. It is one thing to claim that individuals (possibly
+"social atoms') totalise dispersals through their very existence (but
+individually and each within the private region of his work), and it is
+quite another to show that they totalise themselves, intelligibly, without
+for the most part showing any concern about it.
+20
+The Plan of this Work
+If History is totalisation and if individual practices are the sole ground
+of totalising temporalisation, it is not enough to reveal the totalisation
+developing in everyone, and consequently in our critical investigations, through the contradictions which both express and mask it. Our
+critical investigation must also show us how the practical multiplicity
+(which may be called 'men' or 'Humanity" according to taste) realises,
+in its very dispersal, its interiorisation. In addition, we must exhibit
+the perception of a developing praxis in the light of its final term). If this immediate understanding of practical novelty seems, in the example we have just considered, useless and almost childish this is because geometry is concerned not
+with acts but with their vestiges. It matters little for geometry whether its geometrical figures are abstractions, limiting schemata of real work; geometry is
+concerned only to reveal relations of radical exteriority beneath the seal of interiority which is stamped on these figures when they are generated. But this
+means that intelligibility disappears. In effect, practical syntheses are studied in so
+far as the synthesising action becomes a pure passive designation making way for
+the establishment of relations of exteriority between the elements which it has
+brought together. We shall see later how the practico-inert rediscovers this
+passive exteriorisation of practical interiorisation and how, in tracing this process,
+it is possible to define alienation in its original form.
+
+Critique of Critical Investigation 65
+the dialectical necessity of this totalising process. Indeed, the multiplicity of dialectical agents (that is, of individuals producing a praxis)
+seems at first sight to involve a second-order atomism, through the
+multiplicity of totalisations. If this were so, we should return on a new
+level, to the atomism of analytical Reason. But since our starting point
+is individual praxis, we must carefully follow up every one of those
+threads of Ariadne which lead from this praxis, to the various forms of
+human ensembles; and in each case we shall have to determine the
+structures of these ensembles, their real mode of formation out of their
+elements, and finally their totalising action upon the elements which
+formed them. But it will never be sufficient to show the production of
+ensembles by individuals or by one another, nor, conversely, to show
+how individuals are produced by the ensembles which they compose.
+It will be necessary to show the dialectical intelligibility of these transformations in every case.
+Of course, this is a matter of formal intelligibility. By this I mean
+that we must understand the bonds between praxis, as self-conscious,
+and all the complex multiplicities which are organised through it and
+in which it loses itself as praxis in order to become praxis-process.
+However - and I shall have occasion to repeat this still more emphatically - it is no part of my intention to determine the concrete history
+of these incarnations of praxis. In particular, as we shall see later, the
+practical individual enters into ensembles of very different kinds, for
+example, into what are called groups and what I shall call series. It is no
+part of our project to determine whether series precede groups or vice
+versa, either originally or in a particular moment of History. On the
+contrary: as we shall see, groups are born of series and often end up by
+serialising themselves in their turn. So the only thing which matters to
+us is to display the transition from series to groups anu trom groups to
+series as constant incarnations of our practical multiplicity, and to test
+the dialectical intelligibility of these reversible processes. In the same
+way, when we study class and class-being (l'être de classe) we shall
+find ourselves drawing examples from the history of the working class.
+But the purpose will not be to define the particular class which is
+known as the proletariat: our sole aim will be to seek the constitution
+of a class in these examples, its totalising (and detotalising) function
+and its dialectical intelligibility (bonds of interiority and of exteriority, interior structures, relations to other classes, etc.). In short, we
+are dealing with neither human history, nor sociology, nor ethnography. To parody a title of Kant's, we would claim, rather, to be
+
+GG Introduction
+laying the foundations for 'Prolegomena to any future anthropology'
+If our critical investigation actually yields positive results, we shall
+have established a priori - and not, as the Marxists think they have
+done, a posteriori - the heuristic value of the dialectical method when
+applied to the human sciences, and the necessity, with any fact, provided it is human, of reinserting it within the developing totalisation
+and understanding it on this basis. Thus the critical investigation will
+always present itself as a double investigation: if totalisation exists, the
+investigation will supply us with, on the one hand (and in the regressive
+order), all the means brought into play by the totalisation, that is to
+say the partial totalisations, detotalisations and retotalisations in their
+functions and abstract structures and, on the other hand, it must enable
+us to see how these forms dialectically generate one another in the full
+intelligibility of praxis. Moreover, in so far as our investigation proceeds from the simple to the complex, from the abstract to the concrete, from the constituting to the constituted, we must be able to
+settle, without reference to concrete history, the incarnations of individual praxis, the formal structural conditions of its alienation?? and
+the abstract circumstances which encourage the constitution of a
+common praxis. This leads to the principal divisions of this first
+volume: the constituent dialectic (as it grasps itself in its abstract translucidity in individual praxis) finds its limit within its own work and is
+transformed into an anti-dialectic. This anti-dialectic, or dialectic
+against the dialectic (dialectic of passivity), 28 must reveal series to us as
+27. This means: the dialectical investigation of alienation as an a priori possibility
+of human praxis on the basis of the real alienations to be found in concrete History.
+It would indeed be inconceivable that human activity should be alienated or that
+human relations should be capable of being reified if there were no such thing as
+alienation and reification in the practical relation of the agent to the object of his
+act and to other agents. Neither the un-situated freedom of certain idealists, nor
+the Hegelian relation of consciousness to itself, nor the mechanistic determinism
+of certain pseudo-Marxists can account for it. It is in the concrete and synthetic
+relation of the agent to the other through the mediation of the thing, and to the
+thing through the mediation of the other, that tve shall be able to discover the
+foundations of all possible alienation.
+28. The dialectic of passivity is in no way reducible to analytical reason,
+which is the a priori construction of the inert (spatio-temporal) framework of
+exteriority as such, or which, as it were, is the dialectic giving itself exteriority in
+order to grasp the exterior and manifesting itself implicitly only in the unitary
+direction of the passive behaviour of exteriorised exteriority. What we call the
+dialectic of passivity, or anti-dialectic, is the moment of intelligibility corresponding to a praxis turned against itself in so far as it is reinstated as the per-
+
+a type of human gathering and alienation as a mediated relation to the
+other and to the objects of labour in the element of seriality and as a
+serial mode of co-existence. " At this level we will discover an equivalence between alienated praxis and worked inertia, and we shall call
+the domain of this equivalence the practico-inert. And we shall see the
+group emerge as a second type of dialectical gathering, in opposition
+both to the practico-inert and to impotence. But I shall distinguish, as
+will be seen, between the constituted dialectic and the constituent
+dialectic to the extent that the group has to constitute its common
+praxis through the individual praxis of the agents of whom it is composed. Therefore, if there is to be any such thing as totalisation, the
+intelligibility of constituted dialectical Reason (the intelligibility of
+common actions and of praxis-process) must be based on constituent
+dialectical reason (the abstract and individual praxis of man at work).
+Within the context of our critical investigation, we shall be able at this
+point to define the limits of dialectical intelligibility and, by the same
+token, the specific meaning of totalisation. It may then appear that
+realities such as class, for example, do not have a unique and homogeneous kind of being, but rather that they exist and they create themselves on all levels at once, through a more complex totalisation than
+we expected (since the anti-dialectic must be integrated and totalised,
+but not destroyed, by the constituted dialectic which, in turn, can
+totalise only on the basis of a constituent dialectic).
+At this level, it will become evident that the regressive investigation has reached bedrock. In other words, we shall have grasped our
+individual depth in so far as, through the movement of groups and
+series, our roots reach down to fundamental materiality. Every moment of the regress will seem more complex and general than the
+manent seal of the inert. At this level we shall have to turn our attention to the
+way inertia itself becomes dialectical through having this seal placed upon it: not
+in so far as it is pure inertia, but in so far as we must station ourselves at the point
+of view of inert exteriority in order to discover passivised praxis (for example,
+the circulation of currency). On the surface, this pseudo-dialectic or inverted
+dialectic has the appearance of magic, but in fact it has its own type of rationality
+which we shall have to reveal.
+29. Obviously alienation is a much more complex phenomenon and its conditions, as we shall see, are present at all levels of experience. Nevertheless we
+must here indicate its ground. For example, alienation exists as a constant danger
+within the practical group. But this is intelligible only in so far as the most
+lively and united group is always in danger of relapsing into the series from which
+it came.
+
+68 Introduction
+isolated, superficial moment of our individual praxis, yet from another
+point of view, it remains completely abstract, that is, it is still no more
+than a possibility. Indeed, whether we consider the relations between
+group and series formally, in so far as each of these ensembles may
+produce the other, or whether we grasp the individual, within our
+investigation, as the practical ground of an ensemble and the ensemble
+as producing the individual in his reality as historical agent, this formal
+procedure will lead us to a dialectical circularity. This circularity
+exists; it is even (for Engels as much as for Hegel) characteristic of the
+dialectical order and of its intelligibility. But the fact remains that
+reversible circularity is in contradiction with the irreversibility of
+History, as it appears to investigation. Though it is true in the abstract
+that groups and series can indifferently produce each other, it is also
+true that historically a particular group, through its serialisation,
+produces a given serial ensemble (or conversely) and that, if a new
+group originated in the serial ensemble, then, whatever it might be, it
+would be irreducible to the serial ensemble. Moreover, such a regressive
+investigation, though it brings certain conflicts into play, only reveals
+our underlying structures and their intelligibility, without revealing
+the dialectical relations between groups and series, between different
+series or between different groups.
+Thus, dialectical investigation in its regressive moment will reveal
+to us no more than the static conditions of the possibility of a totalisation, that is to say, of a history. We must therefore proceed to the
+opposite and complementary investigation: by progressively recomposing the historical process on the basis of the shifting and contradictory relations of the formations in question, we shall experience
+History; and this dialectical investigation should be able to show us
+whether the contradictions and social struggles, the communal and
+individual praxis, labour as producing tools, and tools as producing
+men and as regulator of human labour and human relations, etc., make
+up the unity of an intelligible (and thus directed) totalising movement.
+But above all, though these discoveries have to be made and consolidated in relation to these particular examples, our critical investigation
+aims to recompose the intelligibility of the historical movement within
+which the different ensembles are defined by their conflicts. On the
+basis of synchronic structures and their contradictions, it seeks the
+diachronic intelligibility of historical transformations, the order of
+their conditionings and the intelligible reason for the irreversibility of
+History, that is to say, for its direction. This synthetic progression,
+
+Critique of Critical Investigation G9
+though merely formal, must fulfil several functions: by recomposing
+instances in terms of process, it must lead us, if not to the absolute
+concrete, which can only be individual (this event at this date of this
+history, at least to the absolute system of conditions for applying the
+determination "concrete fact' to the fact of one history.
+In this sense it could be said that the aim of the critical investigation
+is to establish a structural and historical anthropology, that the regressive moment of the investigation is the basis of the intelligibility of
+sociological Knowledge (without prejudging any of the individual
+components of this Knowledge), and that the progressive moment must
+be the basis of the intelligibility of historical Knowledge (without prejudging the real individual unfolding of the totalised facts). Naturally,
+the progression will deal with the same structures as those brought to
+light by regressive investigation. Its sole concern will be to rediscover the moments of their inter-relations, the ever vaster and more
+complex movement which totalises them and, finally, the very direction
+of the totalisation, that is to say, the "meaning of History' and its
+Truth. The multiple, fundamental bonds between the constituent
+dialectic and the constituted dialectic and vice versa through the constant mediation of the anti-dialectic, will become clear to us in the
+course of these new investigations. If the results of the investigation are
+positive, we shall finally be in a position to define dialectical Reason as
+the constituent and constituted reason of practical multiplicities. We
+shall then understand the meaning of totalisation without a totaliser,
+or a de-totalised totalisation, and we shall finally be able to prove the
+strict equivalence between praxis with its particular articulations and
+the dialectic as the logic of creative action, that is to say, in the final
+analysis, as the logic of freedom.
+Volume I of the Critique of Dialectical Reason stops as soon as we
+reach the 'locus of history'; it is solely concerned with finding the
+intelligible foundations for a structural anthropology - to the extent,
+of course, that these synthetic structures are the condition of a directed,
+developing totalisation. Volume II, which will follow shortly, 30 will
+retrace the stages of the critical progression: it will attempt to establish that there is one human history, with one truth and one intelligibility - not by considering the material content of this history, but by
+demonstrating that a practical multiplicity, whatever it may be, must
+unceasingly totalise itself through interiorising its multiplicity at all levels.
+30. See above, P. 39, n. (Ea.]
+
+yo Introduction
+11
+The Individual and History
+The link of our critical investigation is none other than the fundamental identity between an individual life and human history (or,
+from the methodological point of view, the reciprocity of their perspectives'). Strictly speaking, the identity of these two totalising
+processes must itself be proved. But in fact critical investigation proceeds from exactly this hypothesis and each moment of the regression
+(and, later, of the progression) directly calls it into question. The
+continuity of the regression would be interrupted at every level if
+ontological identity and methodological reciprocity did not in fact
+always appear both as fact and as necessary and intelligible Truth. In
+reality, the hypothesis which makes the critical investigation feasible is
+precisely the one which the investigation aims to prove. If there is a
+dialectic we must submit to it as the unavoidable discipline of the
+totalisation which totalises us and grasp it, in its free practical spontaneity, as the totalising praxis which we are; at each stage in our investigation we must rediscover, within the intelligible unity of the
+synthetic movement, the contradiction and indissoluble connection
+between necessity and freedom, though, at each moment, this connection appears in different forms. In any case, if my life, as it deepens,
+becomes History, it must reveal itself, at a deep level of its free development, as the strict necessity of the historical process so as to
+rediscover itself at an even deeper level, as the freedom of this necessity
+and, finally, as the necessity of freedom. 31
+The critical investigation will reveal this interplay of aspects in so
+far as the totaliser is always also the totalised, even if, as we shall see,
+he is the Prince in person. And, if the investigation is successful, and
+we reveal the rocky sub-soil of necessity beneath the translucidity of
+31. Though I present the final relation between these realities in this form, I am
+not halting the enumeration of these contradictory unities on account of the two
+terms of the comparison: nothing would prevent us from circularly conceiving
+other dialectical moments in which the succession of the unities mentioned would
+turn out to take place in the opposite order. If I halt the enumeration here, this
+is because the very movement of structural and historical totalisation requires, as
+we shall see, that these unities, and these alone, should mark the moments of our
+investigation.
+
+free individual praxis, we will be able to hope that we have taken the
+right track. Then we shall be able to glimpse what these two volumes
+together will try to prove: that necessity, as the apodictic structure of
+dialectical investigation, resides neither in the free development of
+interiority nor in the inert dispersal of exteriority; it asserts itself, as an
+inevitable and irreducible moment, in the interiorisation of the exterior
+and in the exteriorisation of the interior. This double movement will
+be that of our entire regressive investigation: a thorough examination
+of individual praxis will show us that it interiorises the exterior (in
+delimiting, through action itself, a practical field); but conversely, we
+shall grasp in the tool and in objectification through labour an intentional exteriorisation of interiority (of which a seal is both the symbol
+and the example); similarly, the movement by which the practical life
+of the individual must, in the course of the investigation, dissolve itself
+into sociological or historical totalisations, does not preserve the
+translucid interiority of the totalising agent in the new form, which
+appears as the objective reality of life (series, group, system, process).
+To put it more vividly if less precisely, it is initially within itself that
+free subjectivity discovers its objectivity as the intelligible necessity of
+being a perspective within totalisations which totalise it (which integrate it in synthetic developing forms). Subjectivity then appears, in
+all its abstraction, as the verdict which compels us to carry out, freely
+and through ourselves, the sentence that a 'developing' society has
+pronounced upon us and which defines us a priori in our being. This
+is the level at which we shall encounter the practico-inert.
+However, it must be understood that praxis presupposes a material
+agent (the organic individual) and the material organisation of an
+operation on and by matter. Thus we shall never find men who are
+not mediated by matter at the same time as they mediate different
+material regions. A practical multiplicity is a certain relation of matter
+to itself through the mediation of the praxis which transforms the
+inert into worked matter, just as the collection of objects which
+surrounds us imposes its mediation on the practical multiplicity which
+totalises us. Thus, the history of man is an adventure of nature, not
+only because man is a material organism with material needs, but also
+because worked matter, as an exteriorisation of interiority, produces
+man, who produces or uses this worked matter in so far as he is forced
+to re-interiorise the exteriority of his product, in the totalising movement of the multiplicity which totalises it. The external unification of
+the inert, whether by the seal or by law, and the introduction of inertia
+
+72 Introduction
+at the heart of praxis both result, as we have seen, in producing necessity as a strict determination at the heart of human relations. And the
+totalisation which controls me, in so far as I discover it within my free
+lived totalisation, only takes the form of necessity for two fundamental reasons: first, the totalisation which totalises me has to make
+use of the mediation of inert products of labour; second, a practical
+multiplicity must always confront its own external inertia, that is to
+say, its character as a discrete quantity. We shall see that the interiorisation of number is not always possible and that, when it does take
+place, quantity produces in each member of a group a thick layer of
+inertia (exteriority within interiority), though it is lived dialectically
+in interiority. Consequently, the problem of necessity, which is immediately given as a structure of our critical investigation, necessarily
+leads us to the fundamental problem of anthropology, that is, to the
+relations of practical organisms to inorganic matter. We must never
+lose sight of the fact that exteriority, (that is to say, quantity, or, in
+other words, Nature), is, for every multiplicity of agents, a threat both
+from without and from within (we shall see its role in the anti-dialectic), and that it is both the permanent means and the profound
+occasion for totalisation. We shall also see that it is the essence of man
+in the sense that essence, as transcended past, is inert and becomes the
+transcended objectification of the practical agent (thus producing
+within everyone and within every multiplicity the continually resolved
+and constantly renewed contradiction between man-as-producer and
+man-as-product). 32 In the second volume we will also learn that
+exteriority is the inert motive force of History in that it is the only
+possible basis for the novelty which places its seal on it and which it
+preserves both as an irreducible moment and as a memory of Hu-
+manity. Whether as inert motive force or as creative memory, inorganic matter (always organised by us) is never absent from the history
+of our organic materialities; it is the condition of exteriority, interiorised
+so as to make history possible, and this fundamental condition is the
+absolute requirement that there must be a necessity in History at the very
+heart of intelligibility - and perpetually dissolved in the movement of
+32. The objectification of man places a seal on the inert. Thus, a transcended
+objectification, in so far as it is the space of the practical man, is, in the last analysis,
+a robot. In the strange world which we are describing the robot is the essence of
+man: he freely transcends himself towards the future, but he thinks of himself as
+a robot as soon as he looks back on his past. He comes to know himself in the inert
+and is therefore a victim of his reified image, even prior to all alienation.
+
+J3
+practical understanding. 33 Thus, our critical investigation must present
+us with apodicticity as the indissoluble unity - at every totalising and
+totalised level - of the organic and the inorganic through all the forms
+that this connection can assume (from the presence of the inorganic
+within the organism itself and all around it, up to and including the
+33. There is, in fact, a contradiction between intelligibility and necessity.
+Intelligibility makes the new perfectly clear on the basis of the old; it enables us to
+witness the transparent practical production of the new on the basis of previously
+defined factors and in the light of totalisation. However, precisely because this
+light is shed everywhere, it dissolves that external control which, as we shall see,
+necessity is and remains, even within processes of thought. For necessity
+merely eliminates all possibility by simply positing from the exterior the impossibility, given y and 1, that a should not occur (and of course this impossibility also
+applies to processes of thought). Dialectical understanding, in so far as it offers a
+full, temporalised intuition of the organising movement whereby y and z are
+unified in x simply through their connection of interiority (within the developing
+totalisation), tends to get absorbed into the very temporalisation of this certainty.
+Transparency is its own guarantee, and the basic problem is not that of ruling out
+possibilities, but that of grasping, the full realisation of one possibility, in every one
+of its moments, and on the basis of a future totality. Certainty tends to avoid
+apodicticity to the extent that necessity tends to repel certainty. But in so far as
+historical certainty must always display the bonds of interiority, to the extent that
+these unite and partially transform an exterior diversity (every element of which is
+external to the others, external to itself and controlled from the exterior), to the
+extent, also, that these interior bonds are affected through their very activity
+with a quasi-exteriority, necessity appears within certainty as the formal inertia of
+intelligibility; every adjustment tends to dissolve it in the very movement which
+circumscribes the inert diversity and seems, for a moment, to endow it with an
+internal and autonomous strength. But necessity reappears at the very end of the
+partial totalisation as the bony structure, the skeleton of certainty: thus the intelligibility of praxis comes to depend on the result of the praxis, both as it was projected and yet always different, and this result, in so far as it differs (that is to say,
+in so far as it too is connected to the whole by exteriority) will appear as incapable
+of being different than it is (and by the same token all totalising processes of
+thought will appear as having been incapable of being other than they are). It is
+worth recalling - as an illustration rather than an example - that the reading of
+novels and plays is a totalisation (as is the life of the reader). On the basis of the
+double totalisation effected by History, and as his own individual life, the reader
+approaches the work as a totality to be re-totalised in its own individuality. The
+understanding of actions or of dialogues must, if the work is to satisfy the mind,
+be both the translucidity of the unf orseen, (one witnesses the intelligible birth of
+a response, for example, as the partial re-totalisation of the situation and of the
+conflicts) and, in so far as each moment falls within a past of inertia, the impossibility, to which immediate memory is subjected, that this moment should have
+been different.
+
+74 Introduction
+organisation of the inorganic and the presence of number as pure
+exteriority within number interiorised by organised practical multiplicity). It is in this way that we rediscover the schema of the critical
+investigation. In the regressive moment, we shall find the constituent
+dialectic, the anti-dialectic and the constituted dialectic. And in the
+moment of synthetic progression, we shall trace the totalising movement which integrates these three partial movements within a total
+totalisation. On this basis we shall be able to put the question of
+possibility in history (and, in general, in praxis), and of historical
+necessity in its true light. It is thus in this progressive moment that we
+shall finally understand our original problem: what is Truth as the
+praxis of synthetic unification, and what is History? Why is there such
+a thing as human history (ethnography having acquainted us with
+societies with no history)? And what is the practical meaning of historical totalisation in so far as it can reveal itself today to a (totalising
+and totalised) agent situated within History in development?
+12
+Intellection and Comprehension
+The close connection between comprehension (la compréhension), as I
+defined it in The Problem of Method, 34 and intellection (l'intellection), as
+we must be able to define it if there is such a thing as dialectic, will no
+doubt have been noticed. Comprehension is simply the translucidity of
+praxis to itself, whether it produces its own elucidation in constituting
+itself, or recognises itself in the praxis of the other. In either case, the
+comprehension of the act is effected by the (produced or reproduced)
+act; and the teleological structure of the activity can only be grasped
+within a project which defines itself by its goal, that is to say, by its
+future, and which returns from this future in order to elucidate the
+present as the negation of the transcended past. From this point of
+view, every praxis is a partial re-totalisation of the practical field (in so
+far as this is defined by its negation - the first internal totalisation
+34. 'Comprehension is nothing other than my real life; it is the totalizing movement which gathers together my neighbour, myself, and the environment in the
+synthetic unity of an objectification in process. The Problem of Method, trans.
+H. E. Barnes, p. 155. [Ed.]
+
+Critique of Critical Investigation J5
+effected by the agent or the practical multiplicity), and it is because my
+life is a perpetual (horizontal and vertical) re-totalisation that I have
+access to the other's present on the basis of his future. Now, dialectical
+intelligibility is, as we have seen, defined by the degree of transparency
+of the developing totalisation and the practical agent can temporalise
+an intelligible certainty only in so far as, situated within this totalisation, he is himself both totalising and totalised. It might seem, therefore, that "intellection' is only another word for comprehension - in
+which case it would seem to be useless. However, it is usual to oppose
+intellection (restricted to the processes of analytical Reason) to comprehension (which occurs only in the human sciences).
+This distinction, however commonplace, is quite meaningless.
+There is no such thing as intelligibility in the sciences of Nature: when
+praxis puts its seal on a region of the exteriority of inertia, it produces
+and reveals necessity in the form of the impossibility that the facts in
+question should be other than they are; and as we have seen, Reason
+then makes itself into a system of inertia in order to rediscover sequences in exteriority and in order both to produce and to discover
+necessity as their sole exterior unity. Necessity as succession in exteriority (the moments are exterior to each other and they cannot occur
+in a different order) is only the mind producing and discovering its
+own limit, that is to say, producing and discovering the impossibility
+of thinking in exteriority 35 The discovery of thought as impossibility
+is the complete opposite of understanding, for understanding can only
+be the recognition of the accessibility of the real to a rational praxis.
+Comprehension, on the other hand, which recognises this accessibility
+within the human sciences, is insufficiently grounded and, unless it is
+reduced to praxis producing itself along with its elucidation, it is in
+danger of becoming irrational or mystical intuition (sympathy, etc.).
+If we are to see comprehension as a moment of praxis, then it goes
+without saying that it is totalising and that it grasps the temporalising
+and temporalised certainty of practices, wherever they occur, in so far
+as they are totalisations.
+The opposition between the intelligible and the comprehensible
+ought really to be rejected. It is not as though there are two fundamentally different kinds of certainty. If we retain the two terms in
+35. When I say 'producing', it is obvious that I am not thinking of Kantian
+'categories'. The seal impressed upon exteriority is only a practical operation
+(such as the construction of a mechanical model or an experimental system).
+
+JG Introduction
+spite of this, it is because comprehension is a kind of species of which
+intellection is the genus. We shall in fact retain the term 'comprehensible' to designate any intentional praxis (whether of an individual
+or of a group). And of course affectivity itself is practical. Thus we do
+not mean to confine comprehension to pure straightforward action
+and labour. Whenever a praxis can be traced to the intention of a
+practical organism or of a group, even if this intention is implicit or
+obscure to the agent himself, there is comprehension. However,
+critical investigation will reveal actions without an agent, productions
+without a producer, totalisations without a totaliser, counter-finalities
+and infernal circularities. We shall also discover multiplicities producing totalised thoughts and acts without reference to the individuals
+composing them, indeed without their even being aware of it. In
+such cases, and in many others which will turn up in due course,
+either the Truth of History is not unified, or totalising intellection must
+be possible. Vagabond and authorless, these free actions, which can
+overturn a society or its dead institutions, and which have always lost
+their meaning (and, perhaps, taken on a new meaning), must be totalisable, cannot remain foreign bodies within developing History; consequently, they must be intelligible. Intellection, being more complex,
+must be able to grasp, on the basis of the developing totalisation, the
+source of such things, the reasons (within History) for their inhumanity
+and for their accessibility, as such, to a totalising anthropology: it
+must see them arise and dissolve themselves in the unity of a dialectical
+process, that is, in direct connection with praxis itself and as the transitory exteriority of an interiority. For this reason, I shall call any
+temporalising dialectical certainty, in so far as it is capable of totalising
+all practical realities intellection, and reserve the term comprehension for
+the totalising group or any praxis in so far as it is intentionally produced by its author or authors.
+
+From Individual Praxis
+to the Practico-Inert
+
+Individual Praxis
+as Totalisation
+Need
+If the dialectic is possible, we must be able to find answers to the
+following four questions:
+(1) How can praxis in itself be an experience both of necessity and
+of freedom since neither of these, according to classical logic, can be
+grasped in an empirical process?
+(2) If dialectical rationality really is a logic of totalisation, how can
+History - that swarm of individual destinies - appear as a totalising
+movement, and how can one avoid the paradox that in order to totalise
+there must already be a unified principle, that is, that only actual
+totalities can totalise themselves
+(3) If the dialectic is comprehension of the present through the past
+and through the future, how can there be a historical future?
+(4) If the dialectic is to be materialist, how are we to comprehend
+the materiality of praxis and its relation to other forms of materiality?
+It should be recalled that the crucial discovery of dialectical investigation is that man is 'mediated' by things to the same extent as things
+are 'mediated' by man. This truth must be born in mind in its entirety
+if we are to develop all its consequences. This is what is called dialectical circularity and, as we shall see, it must be established by dialectical
+investigation. But if we were not already dialectical beings we would
+not even be able to comprehend this circularity. I present it at the
+outset not as a truth, nor even a conjecture, but as the type of thought
+which is necessary, prospectively, in order to elucidate a self-developing
+investigation.
+On the most superficial and familiar level, the investigation first
+reveals, in the unity of dialectical connections, unification as the movement of individual praxis, plurality, the organisation of plurality, and
+
+80 Book /
+the plurality of organisations. One need only open one's eyes to see
+this. Our problem concerns these connections. If there are individuals,
+who, or what, totalises?
+A simple but inadequate answer is that there would not even be the
+beginnings of partial totalisation if the individual were not totalising
+through himself. The entire historical dialectic rests on individual praxis
+in so far as it is already dialectical, that is to say, to the extent that
+action is itself the negating transcendence of contradiction, the determination of a present totalisation in the name of a future totality, and
+the real effective working of matter. This much is clear, and is an old
+lesson of both subjective and objective investigation. Our problem is
+this: what becomes of the dialectic if there are only particular men each
+of whom is dialectical? As I have said, the investigation provides its
+own intelligibility. We must therefore see what is the real rationality of
+action, at the level of individual praxis (ignoring for the moment the
+collective constraints which give rise to it, limit it or make it ineffective).
+Everything is to be explained through need (le besoin); need is the
+first totalising relation between the material being, man, and the
+material ensemble of which he is part. This relation is univocal, and of
+interiority. Indeed, it is through need that the first negation of the
+negation and the first totalisation appear in matter. Need is a negation
+of the negation in so far as it expresses itself as a lack within the organism; and need is a positivity in so far as the organic totality tends to
+preserve itself as such through it. The original negation, in fact, is an
+initial contradiction between the organic and the inorganic, in the
+double
+sense that lack is defined in relation to a totality, but that a
+Lacuna, a negativity, has as such a mechanical kind of existence, and
+that, in the last analysis, what is lacking can be reduced to inorganic or
+less organised elements or, quite simply, to dead flesh, etc. From this
+point of view, the negation of this negation is achieved through the
+transcendence of the organic towards the inorganic: need is a link of
+univocal immanence with surrounding materiality in so far as the organism tries to sustain itself with it; it is already totalising, and doubly
+so, for it is nothing other than the living totality, manifesting itself as
+a totality and revealing the material environment, to infinity, as the
+total field of possibilities of satisfaction.
+On the level which concerns us here, there is nothing mysterious
+in this transcendence through need since the basic behaviour associated
+with need for food reproduces the elementary processes of nutrition:
+chewing, salivation, stomach contractions, etc. Transcendence here
+
+Individual Praxis as Totalisation
+82
+takes the form of a simple unity of a totalising function working in a
+vacuum. Without a unity of basic behaviour within the whole, there
+would be no such thing as hunger; there would only be a scattering of
+disconnected, frantic actions. Need is a function which posits itself for
+itself and totalises itself as a function because it is reduced to an empty
+gesture, functioning for itself and not within the integration of organic
+life. And this isolation threatens the organism as a whole with disintegration - the danger of death. This initial totalisation is transcendent to
+the extent that the being of the organism lies outside it, immediately or
+mediately, in inanimate being; need sets up the initial contradiction
+because the organism, in its being, depends directly (oxygen) or indirectly (food), on unorganised being and because, conversely, the
+control of its reactions imposes a biological statute on the inorganic. In
+fact, this is really a matter of two statutes of the same materiality, since
+everything points to the fact that living bodies and inanimate objects
+are made of the the same molecules. 1 Yet these statutes contradict one
+another, since one of them presupposes a bond of interiority between
+the whole as a unity and molecular relations, whereas the other is
+purely external. Nevertheless, negativity and contradiction come to the
+inert through organic totalisation. As soon as need appears, surrounding matter is endowed with a passive unity, in that a developing totalisation is reflected in it as a totality: matter revealed as passive totality by
+an organic being seeking its being in it - this is Nature in its initial
+form. Already, it is in terms of the total field that need seeks possibilities of satisfaction in nature, and it is thus totalisation which will
+reveal in the passive totality its own material being as abundance or
+scarcity.
+But while Nature appears, through the mediation of need, as a false
+organism, the organism exteriorises itself in Nature as pure materiality.
+In effect, a biological statute is superimposed, in the organism, on a
+physico-chemical statute. And while it is true that, in the interiority of
+nutritive assimilation, molecules are controlled and filtered in close
+coordination with the permanent totalisation, yet when it is seen from
+the point of view of exteriority the living body obeys all the exterior
+laws. In this sense, one could say that the matter outside it subjects the
+living body to an inorganic statute precisely to the extent that it is
+itself transformed into a totality. The living body is therefore in
+danger in the universe, and the universe harbours the possibility of the
+I. Though this has not been proved by any definite investigation.
+
+82 Book I
+non-being of the organism. Conversely, if it is to find its being within
+Nature or to protect itself against destruction, the organic totality
+must transform itself into inert matter, for it is only as a mechanical
+system that it can modify the material environment. The man of need
+is an organic totality perpetually making itself into its own tool in the
+milieu of exteriority. The organic totality acts on inert bodies through
+the medium of the inert body which it is and which it makes itself. It is
+inert in as much as it is already subjected to all the physical forces which
+reveal it to itself as pure passivity; it makes itself inert in its being in
+so far as it is only externally and through inertia itself that a body can
+act on another body in the milieu of exteriority.
+The action of a living body on the inert can be exercised either
+directly or through the mediation of another inert body, in which case
+we call the intermediary a tool. But once the organised body takes its
+own inertia as mediation between inert matter and its own need, instrumentality, purpose and labour are given together: the totality to be
+preserved is, in effect, projected as the totalisation of the movement by
+which the living body uses its inertia to overcome the inertia of things.
+At this level, the transcendence of exteriority towards interiorisation
+is characterised both as existence and as praxis. Organic functioning,
+need and praxis are strictly linked in a dialectical manner; dialectical
+time came into being, in fact, with the organism; for the living being
+can survive only by renewing itself. This temporal relation between the
+future and the past, through the present, is none other than the functional relation of the totality to itself; the totality is its own future
+lying beyond a present of reintegrated disintegration. In short, a
+living unity is characterised by the decompression of the temporality of
+the instant; but the new temporality is an elementary synthesis of
+change and identity, since the future governs the present in so far as
+this future strictly identifies itself with the past. The cyclical process -
+which characterises both biological time and that of primitive societies?
+- is interrupted externally, by the environment, simply because the
+contingent and inescapable fact of scarcity disrupts exchanges. This
+disruption is lived as negation in the simple sense that the cyclical move-
+2. This is not because these societies are organic, for, as we shall see, organicism has to be absolutely rejected, but because their individual members remain
+very close to the organic temporality of cyclical repetition, and because the mode
+of production helps to maintain the process of repetition - at first through itself,
+and then through the type of mediation and integration which it introduces into
+the institutional relations between men.
+
+Individual Praxis as Totalisation
+83
+ment or function continues in a vacuum, thus denying the identity of
+the future and the past and relapsing to the level of a present circular
+organisation conditioned by the past. This dislocation is necessary if
+the organism is to become, not the milieu and destiny of the function,
+but its end.
+The only real difference between primitive synthetic temporality and
+the time of elementary praxis lies in the material environment which,
+by not containing what the organism seeks, transforms the totality as
+future reality into possibility. Need, as a negation of the negation, is the
+organism itself, living itself in the future, through present disorders,
+as its own possibility and, consequently, as the possibility of its own
+impossibility; and praxis, in the first instance, is nothing but the relation of the organism, as exterior and future end, to the present organism as a totality under threat; it is function exteriorised. The real
+difference is not between function as internal assimilation and the
+construction of tools with an end in view. Many species of animals, in
+fact, make tools of themselves: that is to say, organised matter produces the inorganic or the pseudo-inert out of itself. I have said that
+organisms cannot act on the environment without temporarily returning to the level of inertia; but animal-tools make themselves
+permanently inert in order to protect their lives or, to put it another
+way, instead of using their own inertia they hide it behind a created
+inertia. It is at this ambiguous level that the dialectical transition from
+function to action can be seen. The project, as transcendence, is merely
+the exteriorisation of immanence; transcendence itself is already
+present in the functional fact of nutrition and excretion, since what we
+find here is a relation of univocal interiority between two states of
+materiality. And, conversely, transcendence contains immanence
+within itself in that its link with its purpose and with the environment
+remains one of exteriorised interiority.
+2
+The Negation of the Negation
+Thus although in the first instance the material universe may make
+man's existence impossible, it is through man that negation comes to
+man and to matter. It is on this basis that we can understand in its
+
+84 Book I
+original intelligibility the celebrated law of 'the negation of the negation' which Engels erroneously presents as, basically, an irrational
+'abstraction' from natural laws. In reality, the dialectic of Nature -
+whether one seeks it in 'changes of state' in general or makes it the
+external dialectic in human history - is incapable of providing an answer to two essential questions: why should there be any such thing as
+negation either in the natural world or in human history? And why
+and in what specific circumstances does the negation of a negation
+yield to affirmation? Indeed, it is not clear why transformations of
+energy - even if they are 'vectoral' as M. Naville would have it, even
+if certain among them are reversible and others irreversible, even if, as
+in chemical experiments, certain partial reactions occur within an
+overall reaction and alter it3 — should be regarded as negations, except
+by men and as a convention for indicating the direction of the process.
+There is no denying that matter passes from one state to another, and
+this means that change takes place. But a material change is neither an
+affirmation nor a negation; it cannot destroy anything, since nothing
+was constructed; it cannot overcome resistances, since the forces involved
+simply produced the result they had to. To declare that two opposed
+forces applied to a membrane negate each other is as absurd as saying
+that they collaborate to determine a certain tension. The only possible
+use for the order of negation is to distinguish one direction from an other.
+3. I am thinking, for example, of what has been known, since Sainte-Claire
+Deville, as chemical equilibrium: when the chemist attempts, by putting two substances, a and b, together in certain experimental conditions to produce two other
+substances, c and d, the direct reaction, a + 6 = c + d, is normally accompanied
+by the inverse reaction, c and d reacting with one another to form a and b. Thus a
+chemical equilibrium is reached; the transformation stops half-way. Here, te
+have indeed two forms of reaction and there is nothing to stop the scientist calling
+one of them positive and the other negative, provided that this is in relation to his
+human undertaking, whether experimental or industrial. If 'inverse' reactions are
+regarded as negative, this means that their existence prevents the achievement of a
+certain result; they are impediments in relation to the directed ensemble. If one is
+dealing with strictly natural reactions, reactions occurring outside the laboratory
+and having no connection with any preconceived hypothesis, it is still possible to
+regard one of them as a positive and the other as a negative quantity, but only as an
+indication of the order in which they occur. In any case this is a molecular redistribution which, though directed, is not in itself either positive or negative.
+Moreover, even if the inverse reaction is regarded as the negation of the direct
+reaction, the definitive result is not a synthetic form but an inert equilibrium, a
+mere coexistence of results - all of them 'positive' too, whether their origins are
+'positive' or 'negative'.
+
+Individual Praxis as Totalisation 85
+Resistance and, consequently, negative forces can exist only within
+a movement which is determined in accordance with the future, that is to
+say, in accordance with a certain form of integration. If the end to be
+attained were not fixed from the beginning, how could one even conceive of a restraint? In other words, there is no negation unless the
+future totalisation is continually present as the de-totalised totality of
+the ensemble in question. When Spinoza says 'All determination is
+negation,' he is right, from his point of view, because substance, for him,
+is an infinite totality. This formula is thus an intellectual tool for
+describing and comprehending the internal relations of the whole. But
+if Nature is an immense dispersive decompression, if the relations
+between natural facts can only be conceived in the mode of exteriority,
+then the individual couplings of certain particles and the little solar
+system which temporarily results from them are not particularisations,
+except in a purely formal, logical and idealist sense. To say that
+through entering into a given combination, a molecule thereby does not
+enter another, is merely to reiterate the proposition one wishes 1o
+affirm in a negative form - like a logician replacing 'All men are mortal' by "All non-mortals are non-men'.
+Determination will be real negation only if it identifies the determined within a totalisation or a totality. Now, praxis, born of need, is a
+totalisation whose movement towards its own end practically makes the
+environment into a totality. It is to this double point of view that the
+movement of the negative owes its intelligibility. On the one hand, the
+organism engenders the negative as that which destroys its unity:
+discharge and excretion, as a directed movement of rejection, are just
+opaque and biological forms of negation. Similarly, lack appears
+through function, not only as a mere inert lacuna, but also as an
+opposition of function to itself. Finally, need posits negation by its
+very existence in that it is itself an initial negation of lack. In short, the
+intelligibility of the negative as a structure of Being can be made manifest only in connection with a developing process of totalisation;
+negation is defined on the basis of a primary force, as an opposing
+force of integration, and in relation to a future totality as the destiny
+or end of the totalising movement. At a still deeper level, and more
+obscurely, the organism itself as a transcendence of the multiplicity of
+exteriority is a univocal primary negation in that it preserves multiplicity within itself and unites itself against this multiplicity, without
+being able to eliminate it. Multiplicity is its danger, the constant
+threat to it; and, at the same time, it is its mediation with the material
+
+86 Book I
+universe which surrounds it and which can negate it. Thus negation is
+determined by unity; indeed it is through unity and in unity that it can
+manifest itself. In the first instance, negation manifests itself not as a
+contrary force, but, what amounts to the same thing, as partial determination of the whole in so far as this partial determination is posited
+for itself.
+On this basis, a dialectical logic of negation conceived as the relation of internal structures both to each other and to the whole within a
+complete totality or within a developing totalisation, could be constructed. It would then become clear that, within the field of existence
+and tension determined by the whole, every particular exists in the
+unity of a fundamental contradiction: it is a determination of the whole
+and, consequently, it is the whole which gives rise to it; in a certain
+sense, in so far as the being of the whole demands that it be present in
+all its parts, every particular is the whole itself. But at the same time, as
+arrest, as turning-back upon themselves, as delimitation, particulars are
+not the whole, and in fact it is in opposition to the totality (rather than
+to beings which transcend it) that they particularise themselves. But in
+the context of this fundamental contradiction, particularisation is precisely the negation of interiority - as particularisation of the whole it is
+the whole opposing itself through a particular which it governs and
+which depends on it; and as determination - that is, as limitation - it
+becomes the nothing which stands in the way of the retotalisation of
+the whole and which would destroy itself in such a retotalisation. It is
+the existence of this non-being as a developing relation between the
+constituted whole and the constituent totalisation, that is to say,
+between the whole as the future, abstract, but already present result and
+the dialectic as a process tending to constitute in its concreteness the
+totality which defines it as its future and its end; it is the existence of
+this nothingness, which is both active (totalisation positing its moments)
+and passive (the whole as the presence of the future), which constitutes
+the first intelligible dialectical negation. And it is within the totality, as
+the abstract unity of a field of forces and tension, that the negation of
+a negation becomes an affirmation.
+Thus, however, it manifests itself - whether as the liquidation of a
+partial moment or as the appearance of other moments in conflict with
+the first (in short, the differentiation or even fragmentation of the
+partial totality into smaller parts) - the new structure is the negation of
+the first (either directly or by attracting, through its very presence, the
+relation of the first to the whole). In this way, the whole manifests
+
+Individual Praxis as Totalisation 8J
+itself in the second structure, which it also produces and preserves, as a
+totality resuming within itself the particular determinations, and
+erasing them, either by simply destroying their particularity or by
+differentiating itself around and in relation to them, in such a way as to
+insert them into a new order which in its turn becomes the whole
+itself as a differentiated structure.
+Such a logic of totalisations would be an abstract system of propositions concerning the multiplicity of possible relations of a whole to
+its parts and of different parts amongst themselves, either direct or
+mediated by their relation to the whole. It would be completely useless
+to devise this system here; it is something which everyone can work
+out for himself. Let me just remark that the content of these propositions, though abstract, would not be empty, like the analytical judgements of Aristotelean logic, and that, though these propositions are
+synthetic, they possess in themselves a genuine intelligibility. In other
+words, they need only be established on the basis of a totality (any
+totality) in order to be comprehended as certain. We shall return to this
+later.
+Let us return to need. When the project passes through the surrounding world towards its end - in this case, the restoration of a negated
+organism - it unifies the field of instrumentality around itself, so as to
+make it into a totality which will provide a foundation for the individual objects which must come to its aid in its task. The surrounding
+world is thus constituted practically as the unity of materials and means.
+However, since the unity of the means is precisely the end, and since
+the end itself represents the organic totality in danger, a new, inverted
+relation between the two 'states of matter' emerges here for the first
+time: inert plurality becomes totality through unification by the end
+into an instrumental field; it is in itself the end fallen into the domain of
+passivity. Its character as a completed totality, however, far from being
+damaged by its inertia, is actually preserved by it. In the organism,
+bonds of interiority overlay those of exteriority; in the instrumental
+field, it is the other way round: a bond of internal unification underlies
+the multiplicity of exteriority, and it is praxis which, in the light of the
+end, constantly reshapes the order of exteriority on the basis of a deeper
+unity. On this basis, a new type of negation arises, for this is a new
+type of totality which is both passive and unified, but which is constantly reshaping itself, either through the direct action of man or in
+accordance with its own laws of exteriority. In either case the changes
+occur on the basis of a pre-existing unity and become the destiny of this
+
+88 Book I
+totality even if their sources lie elsewhere, at the furthest corner of the
+world. Everything which takes place within a totality, even disintegration, is a total event of the totality as such and is intelligible only in
+terms of the totality. But as soon as the ferment of the totalised plurality produces a few passive syntheses, it shatters the relation of immediate integration between the elements and the whole, within the
+constituted whole.
+The relative autonomy of the part thus formed necessarily acts as a
+brake on the overall movement; the whirlpool of partial totalisation
+thus constitutes itself as a negation of the total movement. By the same
+token, even in the case of a transformation necessary for praxis, its
+determination becomes its negation: the relation of the integrated
+elements to the partial whole is more precise, less 'indeterminate' than
+its relation to the overall totalisation, but poorer and less comprehensive. As a result of its new bond of exteriorised interiority, the
+element loses the set of objective possibilities which each element
+possessed within the general movement; it becomes impoverished.
+Thus the relation of this partial totality to the total totality takes the
+form of conflict; absolute integration requires that every particular
+determination should be eliminated to the extent that it threatens to
+constitute a new plurality. Conversely, inertia and the necessities of
+partial integration require each part of the relative totality to resist the
+pressures of the whole. Finally, the determination of a partial totality,
+within the detotalised totality, must also determine the ensemble which
+remains outside this integration, as a partial totality, albeit negatively.
+The unity in exteriority of those regions which lie outside the zone of
+partial integration (in the first instance, those which have not been
+integrated) is transformed into a unity of interiority, that is, into an
+integrating determination, simply because, within a totality, even
+exteriority is expressed by relations of interiority. At the same time,
+the relation of the new totalisation to the whole varies: it may start to
+posit itself for itself, in which case the developing totalisation is completely shattered; it may identify itself with the whole itself and strive
+to reabsorb the new enclave; finally, it may be torn apart by contradiction, positing itself both as the whole, or at any rate, as the very
+process of totalisation, and as a partial moment which derives its
+determinations from its opposition to the Other.
+
+Individual Praxis as Totalisation 89
+3 Labour
+Man, who produces his life in the unity of the material field, is led by
+praxis itself to define zones, systems and privileged objects within this
+inert totality. He cannot construct his tools - and this applies to the
+agricultural tools of primitive peoples as much as to the practical use
+of atomic energy - without introducing partial determinations into the
+unified environment, whether this environment is the whole world or
+a narrow strip of land between the sea and the virgin forest. Thus he
+sets himself in opposition to himself through the mediation of the
+inert; and, conversely, the constructive power of the labourer opposes
+the part to the whole in the inert within the 'natural' unity. We shall
+come across many examples of this later. It follows, in the first place,
+that negation becomes internal in the very milieu of exteriority, and
+secondly, that it is a real opposition of forces. But this opposition
+comes to Nature through man in two ways, since his action constitutes
+both the whole and its disruption. Labour of any kind always exists
+only as a totalisation and a transcended contradiction. Once it has
+constituted the environment as the milieu in which the labourer
+produces himself, every subsequent development will be a negation
+precisely to the extent that it is positive. And such negations can
+be grasped only as moments which posit themselves for themselves, since the force of inertia increases their separation within
+the whole. Hence the subsequent task of labour must be to put the
+created object back in contact with the other sectors within the
+whole and to unite them from a new point of view; it negates
+separation.
+But this new process, the negation of the negation, derives its
+intelligibility, once again, from the original totality. In a realist and
+materialist system there can be no justification for asserting, a priori,
+that the negation of a negation must give rise to a new affirmation, as
+long as the type of reality in which these negations occur remains undefined. Even in the human universe, the universe of totalities, there
+are quite definitive and classifiable situations in which the negation of
+the negation is a new negation, because in these special cases there is
+interference between totality and recurrence. But this is not our present
+
+90 Book I
+concern. At all events, it is clear that the negation of a negation produces an indeterminate ensemble unless it is regarded as arising within
+a totality. But even within a totality the negation of the negation
+would be a return to the starting point if it did not involve a totality
+being transcended towards a totalising end. The elimination of the
+partial organisations of the instrumental field would simply bring us
+back to the original non-differentiation of the unified environment (as
+when one destroys the traces of an event, an experience or a construction), unless the movement to eliminate them is accompanied by an
+effort to preserve them - that is, unless they are regarded as a step
+towards a unity of differentiation in which a new type of subordination
+of the parts to the whole and a new co-ordination of the parts with one
+another is to be achieved. And this is what has to happen given that the
+aim is not to preserve the unity of the field of action in and for itself,
+but to find in it material elements capable of preserving or restoring
+the organic totality it contains. Thus, in so far as body is function,
+function need and need praxis, one can say that human labour, the
+original praxis by which man produces and reproduces his life, is
+entirely dialectical: its possibility and its permanent necessity rest upon
+the relation of interiority which unites the organism with the environment and upon the deep contradiction between the inorganic and
+organic orders, both of which are present in everyone. Its primary
+movement and its essential character are defined by a twofold contradictory transformation: the unity of the project endows the practical
+field with a quasi-synthetic unity, and the crucial moment of labour is
+that in which the organism makes itself inert (the man applies his
+weight to the lever, etc.) in order to transform the surrounding
+inertia.
+The oscillation which opposes the human thing to the thing-man
+will be found at every level of dialectical investigation. But the meaning
+of labour is provided by an end, and need, far from being a vis a tergo
+pushing the labourer, is in fact the lived revelation of a goal to aim at,
+and this goal is, in the first instance, simply the restoration of the
+organism. Eventually, action really converts the material surroundings
+into a real whole on the basis of which an organisation of means to an
+end is possible. In the simplest forms of activity, this organisation is
+given by the end itself: that is to say, it is merely an exteriorisation of
+function. The totality defines its means through its lacks: the hunter
+or fisherman lies in wait; the food-gatherer searches: the field has been
+unified so as to provide a basis on which the object sought may be
+
+Individual Praxis as Totalisation 91
+more readily apprehended. Thus labour organises itself by synthetic
+determinations of the ensemble, by discovering or constructing tighter
+and tighterrelations within the practical field so as to convert what was
+originally only a vague relation of the parts to the whole and to one
+another into a complete circle of conditioning.
+Determination of the present by the future, oscillation between the
+inert and the organic, negation, transcended contradictions, negation
+of the negation - in short, developing totalisation: these are the
+moments of any form of labour, until - at a dialectical level that we
+have yet to consider - society develops the division of labour to the
+point of the specialisation of machines. The process is then inverted:
+the semi-automatic machine defines its environment and constructs its
+man, so that the inorganic comes to be characterised by a false but
+effective interiority, and the organic by exteriority. Man becomes the
+machine's machine; and to himself he is his own exteriority. But in all
+other cases, the dialectic appears as the logic of labour. To consider an
+individual at work is a complete abstraction, since in reality labour is as
+much a relation between men as a relation between man and the
+material world. I do not claim to have revealed the historically primary
+moment of the dialectic: I have merely tried to show that our most
+everyday experience, which is surely labour, considered at the most
+abstract level, that is as the action of an isolated individual, immediately
+reveals the dialectical character of action. Or, to put it another way,
+even if we accept the molecular theories of analytical rationalism, the
+dialectic is already present, even at the highest level of abstraction, in
+the elementary but complete form of a law of development and a
+schema of intelligibility. It goes without saying that, although the real
+existence of organic totalities and totalising processes reveals a dialectical movement, the existence of organic bodies can in no way be
+derived from the dialectic. However biology may develop in future,
+organic bodies can never be regarded as any more than de facto
+realities; we have no means of establishing their existence by reason
+alone. The theory that they originate from unorganised matter is a
+reasonable and economical hypothesis, on which even Christians can
+agree. But this hypothesis is no more than a belief. Thus neither
+analytical Reason, which applies to relations in exteriority, nor dialectical Reason, which derives its intelligibility from totalities, and
+which governs the relations of wholes to their parts and of totalities to
+one another in a process of increasing integration, can establish a
+statute of intelligibility for organised bodies. If they emerged from
+
+92 Book I
+inorganic matter, there was a passage not only from the inanimate to
+life, but also from one rationality to the other.
+It might be thought that this merely brings us back to the irrationalities of Engels. But it is not so. For Engels, it is the laws which are
+irrational - opaque formal principles of thought and nature. For us,
+however, what is contingent is the existence of certain objects. But
+just as analytical Reason is not qualified to ask why matter exists
+instead of nothing, so dialectical Reason is not bound to inquire why
+there are organised wholes rather than merely inorganic matter. These
+questions may become scientific (for one cannot set a priori limits to
+science), but at present they are not. The essential point is, however,
+that if there are organised wholes, then their type of intelligibility is
+the dialectic. Since the individual worker is just such a totalisation, he
+can only understand himself in his acts, and in his relation to Nature
+(and indeed, as we shall see, in his relations with others) if he interprets
+every partial totality in terms of the overall totalisation, and all their
+internal relations in terms of their relations to the developing unification, the means in terms of the end and the present in terms of the
+relation which links the future to the past. On the other hand, his
+praxis is dialectical and contains its own intelligibility. To take but one
+example, the law of the interpenetration of opposites, baldly proclaimed
+by Engels, becomes perfectly intelligible when related to a praxis seen
+in the light of its future totalisation and of the completed totalities
+which surround it. Within a totality (whether completed or developing), each partial totality, as a determination of the whole, contains the
+whole as its fundamental meaning and, consequently, also contains the
+other partial totalities; the secret of each part therefore lies in the others.
+In practical terms, this means that each part determines all the others in
+their relations to the whole, that is to say, in their individual existence.
+At this level, the truly dialectical type of intelligibility appears, combining the direct conflict between the parts (to the extent that dialectical
+Reason includes and transcends analytical Reason) with the constantly
+shifting hidden conflict which modifies each part from within in response to internal changes in any of the others, and establishing
+alterity in each part both as what it is and as what it is not, as that which
+it possesses and as that by which it is possessed.
+With these remarks I have merely described the form of connection
+proper to these objects, namely the bond of interiority. At this level,
+dialectical investigation may be difficult to describe, but it is universal
+and constant. It is true that most people speak according to the rules of
+
+Individual Praxis as Totalisation 93
+analytical rationality, but this does not mean that their praxis is not
+conscious of itself. In the first place,* dialectical Reason includes
+analytical Reason, just as totality includes plurality. In the process of
+labour, the practical field must already be unified before the worker can
+undertake an analysis of its problems. An 'analysis of the situation' is
+carried out in accordance with the methods and mode of intelligibility
+of analytical Reason; and though indispensable it presupposes totalisation. Ultimately it leads to the underlying plurality, that is, to the
+elements as united by the bonds of exteriority. But the practical movement, which transcends this molecular dispersal of conditions, will recover a unity through itself, in creating both the problem and the
+solution. Moreover, this unity was never lost, since it was within it
+that the dispersal was sought. But the analysis is initially carried out by
+discourse and thought, even if it requires a material expression later;
+the production of the object, on the other hand, is entirely practical.
+And although praxis is self-explanatory and transparent to itself, it is
+not necessarily expressible in words. In fact, knowledge appears as the
+explanation of the practical field of perception by the end, that is to say,
+by future non-being. It would be a simple task, though too lengthy to
+undertake here, to show that only the dialectic can establish the intelligibility of knowledge and truth because neither knowledge nor truth
+can be a positive relation of being to being; they are, on the contrary,
+negative relations mediated by a nothingness. The transcended and its
+transcendence can be explained only in terms of a future which does
+not yet exist, and within the practical unity of a developing totalisation. But such a discovery can only be practical; in a society which, as
+a whole, confuses knowledge and contemplation, it cannot be frozen
+in discourse. Thus we all try to express our dialectical investigation of
+everything in the terms of analytical, mechanical rationality. Nevertheless, as long as we are aware of this situation, all of us can characterise
+our fundamental experience at any given moment. Man as a totalising project is himself the active intelligibility of the totalisations; and
+since alienation has not yet come into the picture (simply because we
+cannot deal with everything at once, doing and understanding are
+indissolubly linked.
+4. We shall see later that the dialectical investigation is not only permanent, in
+that men always have worked and always will, but also the result of becoming, in
+that it is the discovery at a particular point in time of the dialectic as the intelligibility of History.
+
+97 Book I
+The investigation, however, in its elucidation of the logic of wholes
+and of the intelligibility of the relations of man to the universe, still
+cannot be regarded as apodictic. The full comprehension of act and
+object remains the temporal development of a practical intuition,
+rather than apprehension of a necessity. For necessity can never be
+given in intuition, except as a horizon, an intelligible limit of intelligibility.
+
+2
+Human Relations
+as a Mediation Between
+Different Sectors of Materiality
+• Isolated Individuals
+Immediate experience reveals being at its most concrete, but it takes it at
+its most superficial level and remains in the realm of abstractions. We
+have described the man of need and seen his labour as dialectical
+development. But we must not assume that there are no such things as
+isolated labourers. Isolated labourers, in fact, exist wherever the social
+and technical conditions of their work require that they work alone.
+But their very isolation is a historical and social characteristic: in a
+given society, and given a certain level of technical development, etc.,
+peasants work in complete isolation at certain times of year and this is
+a social mode of the division of labour. And the labourer's work, his
+manner of producing himself, conditions not only the satisfaction of his
+need, but also the need itself.
+In southern Italy, the agricultural day labourers, the semi-employed
+bracciante, eat only once a day or even, sometimes, once every two
+days. In this situation, hunger ceases to exist as need (or rather, it
+appears only if it suddenly becomes impossible for the labourers to
+get their single meal every one or two days). It is not that hunger has
+ceased to exist, but that it has become interiorised, or structured, as a
+chronic disease. Need is no longer the violent negation which leads to
+praxis: it has passed into physical generality as exis, as an inert, generalised lacuna to which the whole organism tries to adapt by degrading
+itself, by idling so as to curtail its exigencies (exigences). In spite of this,
+given that the labourer is alone, and given that he chooses this or that
+piece of west any ecide en his partic lambie, at she presenois at
+
+96 Book I
+his disposal), he can be made the object of a regressive investigation,
+and his praxis can be grasped and located as temporalising itself
+through all the conditionings. But it must be noticed that this moment
+of the regression, though true as a first approximation within a dialectical investigation, would be false and idealist if it were taken no
+further. Conversely, when our whole investigation is complete, we
+shall see that individual praxis, always inseparable from the milieu
+which it constitutes, and which conditions and alienates it, is at the
+same time constituent Reason (la Raison constituante) itself, operating
+within History seen as constituted Reason.
+For precisely this reason, the second moment of the regression cannot be directly the relation of the individual to social bodies (inert or
+active) and to institutions. Marx clearly indicated that he distinguished
+human relations from their reification or, in general, from their alienation within a particular social system. He says, in effect, that in feudal
+society, based on different institutions and tools, a society which
+presented different questions, its own questions, to its members, the
+exploitation of man by man did exist, together with the fiercest
+oppression, but that everything happened differently and, in particular,
+human relations were neither reified nor destroyed. It is obvious,
+however, that he was not trying to evaluate or compare two systems,
+both built on exploitation and institutionalised violence. He merely
+stated that the connection between the serf or the black slave and the
+proprietor is often personal (which, in a sense, makes it even more
+intolerable and humiliating) and that the relations between labourers
+and employer (or of labourers among themselves in so far as they are
+subject to forces of massification) is a simple relation of exteriority.
+But this relation of exteriority is itself inconceivable except as a reifcation of an objective relation of interiority. History determines the
+content of human relations in its totality, and all these relations, even
+the briefest and most private, refer to the whole. But History itself does
+not cause there to be human relations in general. The relations which
+have established themselves between those initially separate objects,
+men, were not products of problems of the organisation and division
+of labour. On the contrary, the very possibility of a group or society
+being constituted - around a set of technical problems and a given
+collection of instruments - depends on the permanent actuality of the
+human relation (whatever its content) at every moment of History,
+even between two separate individuals belonging to societies with
+different systems and entirely ignorant of one another.
+
+Human Relations as a Mediation of Materiality 97
+This is why the habit of skipping the abstract discussion of the human relation and immediately locating ourselves in the world of productive forces, of the mode and relations of production, so dear to
+Marxism, is in danger of giving unwitting support to the atomism of
+liberalism and of analytical rationality. This error has been made by
+several Marxists: individuals, according to them, are a priori neither
+isolated particles nor directly related activities; it is always up to
+society to determine which they are through the totality of the movement and the particularity of the conjuncture. But this reply, which is
+supposed to avoid our 'formalism'
+', involves compiete formal acceptance of the liberal position; the individualistic bourgeoisie requires just
+one concession: that individuals passively submit to their relations and
+that these are conditioned in exteriority by all kinds of other forces;
+and this leaves them free to apply the principle of inertia and positivistic laws of exteriority to human relations. From this point of view it
+hardly matters whether the individual really lives in isolation, like a
+cultivator at certain periods, or whether he lives in highly integrated
+groups: absolute separation consists in the fact that individuals are
+subject to the historical statute of their relations to others in radical
+exteriority. In other words - and this amounts to the same thing,
+though it misleads certain undemanding Marxists - absolute separation
+is when individuals as products of their own product (and therefore as
+passive and alienated) institute relations among themselves (on the
+basis of relations established by earlier generations, of their own constitution and of the forces and requirements of the time).
+This brings us back to our problem in the first part of this book:"
+what does it mean to make History on the basis of earlier conditions?
+I then said: if we do not distinguish the project, as transcendence, from
+circumstances, as conditions, we are left with nothing but inert objects, and History vanishes. Similarly, if human relations are a mere
+product, they are in essence reified and it becomes impossible to understand what their reification really consists in. My formalism, which is inspired by that of Marx, consists simply in recognising that men make
+History to precisely the extent that it makes them. This means that
+relations between men are always the dialectical consequence of their
+activity to precisely the extent that they arise as a transcendence of
+dominating and institutionalised human relations. Man exists for man
+only in given circumstances and social conditions, so every human
+5. i.e. The Problem of Method. [Ed.]
+
+98 Book I
+relation is historical. But historical relations are human in so far as they
+are always given as the immediate dialectical consequence of praxis,
+that is to say, of the plurality of activities within a single practical field.
+A good example is language.
+Words are matter. In appearance (an appearance which has its
+truth as such), words make a material impression on me, as disturbances of the air producing certain reactions in my organism, in particular certain conditioned reflexes which materially reproduce the
+words in me (I understand them in forming them at the back of my
+throat). Accordingly, one can say, more briefly, and with a measure of
+both truth and falsity, that words enter the interlocutors as vehicles of
+their meaning. They carry the projects of the Other into me and they
+carry my own projects into the Other. Language might well be studied
+on the same lines as money: as a circulating, inert materiality, which
+unifies dispersal; in fact this is partly what philology does. Words
+live off the death of men, they come together through men; whenever
+I form a sentence its meaning escapes from me, is stolen from me;
+meanings are changed for everyone by each speaker and each day;
+the meanings of the very words in my mouth are changed by
+others.
+There can be no doubt that language is in one sense an inert totality.
+But this materiality is also a constantly developing organic totalisation.
+Nor can there be any doubt that speech separates as much as it unifies;
+or that it reflects the cleavages, the stratifications and the inertias of
+the group; or that dialogues are partly dialogues of the deaf. Bourgeois
+pessimism decided long ago to rest content with this observation; the
+original relation of men to one another would be reduced to the pure
+and simple exterior coincidence of immutable substances. This being
+so, it is obvious that a person's every word must depend, in its present
+meaning, on its references to the total system of interiority and that it
+must be the object of an incommunicable comprehension. But this
+incommunicability - in so far as it exists - can have meaning only in
+terms of a more fundamental communication, that is to say, when
+based on mutual recognition and on a permanent project to communicate; or rather, on the permanent, collective, institutiona! communication of, for example, all French people, through the constant mediation
+of verbal materiality, even in silence; and on people's actual projects of
+particularising this general communication.
+Every word is in fact unique, external to everyone; it lives outside,
+as a public institution; and speaking does not consist in inserting a
+
+Human Relations as a Mediation of Materiality 99
+vocable into a brain through an ear, but in using sounds to direct the
+interlocutor's attention to this vocable as public exterior property.
+From this point of view, the totality of language as a set of internal
+relations between objective senses is given, for and to everyone;
+words are simply specifications expressed against the background of
+language; 6 the sentence is an actual totalisation where every word
+defines itself in relation to the others, to the context and to the entire
+language, as an integral part of a whole. To speak is to modify each
+vocable by all the others against the common background of the
+word (verbe); language contains every word and every word is to be
+understood in terms of language as a whole; it contains the whole of
+language and reaffirms it. But this fundamental totality can only be
+praxis itself in so far as it is directly expressed to others; language as the
+practical relation of one man to another is praxis, and praxis is always
+language (whether truthful or deceptive) because it cannot take place
+without signifying itself. Languages are the product of History; as
+such, they all have the exteriority and unity of separation. But language
+cannot have come to man, since it presupposes itself: for an individual to
+discover his isolation, his alienation, for him to suffer from silence or,
+for that matter, to become integrated into some collective undertaking,
+his relation to others, as manifested in and by the materiality of language, must constitute him in his own reality.
+This implies that, if the praxis of the individual is dialectical, his
+relation to the other must be dialectical too and that it is contemporary
+with his original relation to materiality both inside and outside him.
+And this relation should not be seen as a potentiality present in everyone as a kind of 'opening to the other' which is actualised in a few
+particular cases. This would be to shut up these relations in 'natures'
+like boxes and to reduce them to mere subjective dispositions: and
+then we would relapse into analytical reason and molecular solipsism.
+'Human relations' are in fact inter-individual structures whose common bond is language and which actually exist at every moment of
+History. Isolation is merely a particular aspect of these relations.
+The reversal of our investigation shows us the same men: but
+whereas we started by considering them in so far as each of them was
+ignorant of most (in fact, almostall) the others, we are now considering
+them in so far as each is bound by work, interest, family ties, etc., to
+6. It is in this sense that every vocable is the whole of actualised Language.
+Specification is totalisation.
+
+100 Book I
+several others, each of these to others, etc. This is not really a totalisation, or even a totality; it is rather a changing indefinite dispersal of
+reciprocities. And our investigation is not yet in a position to comprehend the structures of this group; it still seeks the elementary bond
+which conditions all structurations. It is necessary to know at the
+simplest level, the level of duality and trinity, whether the relation
+between men is unique and, if so, in what respect it is so. This, like
+everything else, will have to be revealed in simple everyday praxis.
+Since we began with the dispersal of human organisms, we shall
+consider individuals who are completely isolated by institutions, by
+their social condition, or by accidents of fortune. We shall try to reveal
+in this very separation, and therefore in a relation which tends towards
+absolute exteriority, their concrete historical bond of interiority.
+2
+Duality and the Third Party
+From my window, I can see a road-mender on the road and a gardener
+working in a garden. Between them there is a wall with bits of broken
+glass on top protecting the bourgeois property where the gardener is
+working. Thus they have no knowledge at all of each other's presence;
+absorbed as they are in their work, neither of them even bothers to
+wonder whether there is anybody on the other side. Meanwhile, I can
+see them without being seen, and my position and this passive view of
+them at work situates me in relation to them: I am taking a holiday,
+in a hotel; and in my inertia as witness I realise myself as a petty bourgeois intellectual; my perception is only a moment of an undertaking
+(such as trying to get some rest after a bout of 'over-working', or
+some "solitude' in order to write a book, etc.), and this undertaking
+refers to possibilities and needs appropriate to my profession and
+milieu. From this point of view, my presence at the window is a
+passive activity (I want 'a breath of fresh air' or I find the landscape
+"restful, etc.) and my present perception functions as a means in a complex process which expresses the whole of my life. Hence my initial
+relation to the two workers is negative: I do not belong to their class,
+I do not know their trades, I would not know how to do what they
+are doing, and I do not share their worries.
+
+_zOl
+But these negations have a double character. In the first place, they
+can be perceived only against an undifferentiated background consisting of the synthetic relations which support me together with them
+in an actual immanence: I could not contrast their ends with mine
+without recognising them as ends. The basis of comprehension is
+complicity in principle with any undertaking, even if one then goes on
+to combat or condemn it. Anynew end, once determined, is set against
+the organic unity of all human ends. In certain pathological states (e.g.
+'de-personalisation') man appears as the representative of an alien
+species because he is no longer seen in his teleological reality, that is,
+because the link between the patient and his own ends is temporarily
+broken. To anyone who believes himself to be an angel, the activities
+of other people will seem absurd, because he tries to transcend the
+human undertaking by having nothing to do with it.
+But it would be a mistake to suppose that my perception reveals me
+to myself as a man confronted by two other men: the concept of man is
+an abstraction which never occurs in concrete intuition. It is in fact
+as a 'holiday-maker', confronting a gardener and road-mender, that I
+come to conceive myself; and in making myself what I am I discover
+them as they make themselves, that is, as their work produces them;
+but to the extent that I cannot see them as ants (as the aesthete does) or
+as robots (as the neurotic does), and to the extent that I have to project
+myself through them before their ends, in order to differentiate their
+ends from mine, I realise myself as a member of a particular society
+which determines everyone's opportunities and aims; and beyond
+their present activity, I rediscover their life itself, the relation between
+needs and wages, and, further still, social divisions and class struggles.
+In this way, the affective quality of my perception depends both on my
+social and political attitude and on contemporary events (strikes,
+threats of civil or foreign war, occupation of the country by enemy
+troops or a more or less illusory 'social truce').
+Secondly, every negation is a relation of interiority. By this I mean
+that the reality of the Other affects me in the depths of my being to the
+extent that it is not my reality. My perception provides me first with a
+multiplicity of tools and apparatuses, produced by the labour of Others
+(the wall, the road, the garden, the fields, etc.) and it unifies them
+according both to their objective meaning and to my own project.
+Every thing maintains with all its inertia the particular unity which a
+long forgotten action imposed upon it; things in general are indifferent
+to the living, but ideal act of unification which I perform in perception.
+
+202 Book I
+But I see the two people both as objects situated among other objects in
+the visual field and as prospects of escape, as outflow-points of reality.
+In so far as I understand them on the basis of their work, I perceive
+their gestures in terms of the aims they set themselves, and so on the
+basis of the future which they project. The movement of intra-perceptual comprehension, then, is achieved by reversing the simple
+perception of the inanimate: the present is explained by the future,
+particular movements by the overall operation, in short, the detail in
+terms of the totality.
+In the same way, their material environment eludes me in so far as
+it is made the object or the means of their activity. Their practical relation to the things I see implies a concrete exposure of these things
+within praxis itself; and this exposure is implied in my perception of
+their activity. But to the extent that this activity defines them as other
+than me, to the extent that it constitutes me as an intellectual confronting manual workers, the exposure which is a necessary moment of it
+appears to me to reveal, within objectivity, an objectivity-for-the-other
+which escapes me.? Each of the two men is re-conceived and located in
+the perceptual field by my act of comprehension; but with each of
+them, through the weeding, pruning or digging hands, or through the
+measuring, calculating eyes, through the entire body as a lived instrument, I am robbed of an aspect of the real. Their work reveals this to
+them8 and in observing their work, I feel it as a lack of being. Thus
+their negative relation to my own existence constitutes me, at the
+deepest levels of myself, as definite ignorance, as inadequacy. I sense
+myself as an intellectual through the limits which they prescribe to my
+perception.
+Each of these men therefore represents a point of haemorrhage of
+the object and qualifies me objectively in my very subjectivity; and
+that is how they are linked at first in my perception, that is to say, as
+two centrifugal and divergent 'slips' (glissements) within the same
+world. But, since it is the same world, they are united, by my personal
+perception, within the universe as a whole, and in so far as each
+deprives the Other of it. The mere fact, for each of them, of seeing what
+7. But, as we shall see in the next chapter, it eludes me as objectivity, which, in
+specific circumstances, I may define or even divine, and is part of the obiectivit
+of the totalised practical field.
+8. The act in effect defines the areas of competence and ignorance both in real
+extension and in relation to the past.
+
+203
+the Other does not see, of exposing the object through a special kind
+of work, establishes a relation of reciprocity in my perceptual field
+which transcends my perception: each of them constitutes the ignorance of the Other. Of course these mutual ignorances would not come
+into objective existence without me: the very notion of ignorance presupposes a questioning or knowing third party; otherwise it could be
+neither experienced nor described; the only real relation would be
+contiguity, or co-existence in exteriority. But my perception makes me
+a real and objective mediation between these two molecules: if I can,
+in effect, constitute them in a reciprocity of ignorance, it is because their
+activities jointly affect me and because my perception defines my
+limits by revealing the duality of my internal negations. Even my
+subjectivity is objectively designated by them as Other (another class,
+another profession, etc.), and in interiorising this designation, I become
+the objective milieu in which these two people realise their mutual
+dependence outside me.
+It is important notto reduce this mediation to a subjective impression:
+we should not say that for me the two labourers are ignorant of one
+another. They are ignorant of one another through me to the extent
+that I become what I am through them. In the same way, each enters
+into the environment of the Other as an implicit reality; each sees and
+touches what the other would see and touch in his place, but each
+reveals the world through a particular practice which regulates this
+process. Thus, by limiting me, each constitutes the limit of the Other,
+and deprives him, as he deprives me, of an objective aspect of the world.
+But this mutual theft is nothing like the haemorrhage they make in my
+own perception: they are both manual workers, and they are both from
+the country; they differ from each other less than they differ from me
+and, in the last analysis, their reciprocal negation is, for me, a kind of
+deep complicity. A complicity against me.
+In fact, in the moment of discovering either of them, the project of
+each displays the world, as the objective envelope of his work and his
+ends: and this spherical unveiling returns to him so as to situate him in
+relation to what lies behind him as much as to what lies in front of him,
+in relation both to what he sees and to what he does not see. The objective and the subjective are indistinguishable; the worker produces
+himself through his work as a certain exposure of the world which
+objectively makes him the product of his own product. Thus each of
+them, as the objectification of self in the world, reaffirms the unity of the
+world by inscribing himself in it through his work and through the
+
+104 Book I
+particular unifications which this work brings about; thus each of them
+can discover the Other, as an object actually present in the universe,
+within his own situation. And - as these possibilities can be objectively
+seen from my window, as my mediation suffices to uncover the real
+routes which might bring them closer - separation, ignorance, and
+simple juxtaposition in exteriority appear as mere accidents concealing
+the fundamental, immediate and permanent possibility of mutual discovery, and, therefore, the existence of a human relation.
+At this fundamental level, I myself am picked out and put in question. Three objective possibilities are given in my perception: the first
+is to establish a human relation with one or the other; the second is to
+become a practical mediation enabling them to communicate with one
+another, or, in other words, to be revealed by them as the objective
+milieu which I already am; the third is to play a passive part in their
+meeting and to observe them constituting a closed totality from which
+I am excluded. In the third case, I am directly involved in the exclusion
+and it forces a practical choice on me: either I submit to it or I adopt it
+and co-operate with it (for example, I close the window and go back to
+my work) or I myself enter into collaboration with them. But in this
+way I change them in changing myself.º However, whichever choice I
+make each of the two men, in his ignorance of the Other - an ignorance which becomes real through me10 - will interiorise in his behaviour
+what was an exteriority of indifference, even if they never meet. The
+hidden existence of a human relation relegates physical and social
+objects, or the world of inertia, to the level of inessential reality. This
+permanent inessentiality exists as a passive possibility: either simple
+recognition abolishes distance, or work projects onto matter the inanimate movement of convergence.
+In short, the organisation of the practical field in the world determines a real relation for everyone, but one which can only be defined
+by the experience of all the individuals who figure in this field. This
+comes down to unification through praxis; and everyone, unifying to
+the extent that his acts determine a dialectical field, is unified within this
+feld by the unification of the Other, that is to say, in accordance with
+the plurality of unifications. The reciprocity of relations - which we will
+2. See below, section 3.
+Io. When I count on it, it becomes a reality. If a military leader uses the
+enemy's ignorance to destroy two units which do not know their relative positions, this ignorance becomes lack of co-ordination, incompetence, etc.
+
+Human Relations as a Mediation of Materiality 105
+examine in detail later - is a new moment of the contradiction between
+the unifying unity of praxis and the exteriorising plurality of human
+organisms. This relation becomes inverted in that the exteriority of
+multiplicity is a condition of the synthetic unification of the field. But
+multiplicity also remains a factor of exteriority since, within this multiplicity of totalising centralisations, each eluding the Other, the only
+true bond is negation (at least as the moment we have now reached).
+Each centre stands in relation to the Other as a point of flight, as an
+other unification. This is a negation of interiority, but not a totalising
+negation. Everyone is not the Other in an active, synthetic manner,
+since not to be someone is in this case to make him serve, in a more or
+less differentiated way, as an object - an instrument or a conflicting
+purpose - in the very activity which grasps the unity of the practical
+field, since it is both to constitute this unity against him (in so far as he
+is himself constituent) and to deprive him of an aspect of things. The
+plurality of doubly negated centres at the level of practical unification
+becomes a plurality of dialectical movements, but this plurality of
+exteriority is interiorised in that it characterises every dialectical process in interiority, simply because a dialectical development can be
+recognised from the inside only by characteristics which are dialectical
+(that is, synthetically organised within the whole).
+Thus, this new stage of the investigation reveals the human relation
+within pure exteriority in so far as objective exteriority turns out to be
+lived and transcended in the interiority of my praxis, and to indicate an
+elsewhere which escapes me and escapes all totalisation because it is
+itself a developing totalisation. Conversely, one might say that I find
+that this negative rudiment of the human relation is an objective and
+constituent interiority for everyone in so far as I find myself in the
+subjective moment of praxis to be objectively characterised by this
+interiority. In this elementary sense, the individual's movement from
+the subjective to the objective no longer involves knowing his being
+from the point of view of matter as it used to do; it now involves
+realising his human objectivity as the unity of all the negations which
+connect it internally to the interior of others, and of his project as the
+positive unification of these negations. It is impossible to exist amongst
+men without their becoming objects both for me and for them through
+me, without my being an object for them, and without my subjectivity
+getting its objective reality through them as the interiorisation of my
+human objectivity.
+The foundation of the human relation as the immediate and
+
+z0G Book I
+perpetual determination of everyone by the Other and by all is neither
+an a priori communication engineered by a kind of Great Telephone
+Operator, nor the indefinite reiteration of essentially separate patterns of
+behaviour. This synthetic connection, arising always for particular
+individuals at a definite moment of History and on the basis of determinate relations of production, but which also turns out to be a priori,
+is simply praxis, that is, the dialectic as the development of living
+action in everyone in so far as it is pluralised by the multiplicity of men
+within a single material zone. Every existent integrates the other into
+the developing totalisation and thereby, even if he never sees him,
+and in spite of barriers, obstacles and distances, defines himself
+in relation to the actual totalisation which the Other is performing.
+But it should be noted that the relation revealed itself through the
+mediation of a third party. It is through me that ignorance became
+reciprocal. And yet this reciprocity no sooner came into being than it
+repulsed me; as we saw, it closed in upon itself. If the triad is necessary
+in the extreme case of a relation stranded in the universe, and actually
+linking two individuals who are ignorant of each other, it is broken up
+by the exclusion of the third party as soon as people or groups either
+help one another or fight one another deliberately and self-consciously.
+The human mediator cannot help transforming the elementary relation
+whose essence is to be lived with no other mediation than matter into
+something else. (The meaning of this metamorphosis will become clear
+later.) But this is not all. Even when men are face to face, the reciprocity of their relation is actualised through the mediation of this
+third party and at once closes itself off from it.
+Following Mauss, Lévi-Strauss has shown that potlatch is 'supraeconomic' in character: "The best proof... is that... greater prestige
+results from the destruction of wealth than from its distribution,
+because however liberal it may be, distribution always requires a
+similar return.'"! And it cannot be denied that in this case the gift has
+II. The Elementary Structures of Kinship, (1949), London and Boston, 1962,
+p. 55. Lévi-Strauss emphasises, of course, the fact that its economic aspect persists, 'although it is always limited and qualified by the other aspects of the
+institution of exchange'. By way of objection, one might refer to some interesting
+observations made by Georges Bataille (La Part maudite) to the effect that,
+in certain societies and in certain conditions, extravagance (which is tightly
+bound up with other institutions of a political-religious character) is an economic
+function. Economics as the science of the production, distribution and consump-
+
+Human Relations as a Mediation of Materiality 10J
+a basic quality of reciprocity. But it should be noted that in its destructive form the gift is not so much an elementary form of exchange
+as a mortgage of the one for the other: the period of time which separates
+the two ceremonies, even if reduced to a minimum, masks their
+reversibility; in effect, the first donor issues a challenge to the second.
+Mauss has emphasised the ambiguous character of potlatch being an
+act both of friendship and of aggression. In effect, in its simplest form,
+the act of giving is a material sacrifice whose object is to put the absolute Other under an obligation. When, in the course of a migration,
+members of a tribal group come across a strange tribe, they suddenly
+discover man as an alien species, that is, as a fierce carnivorous beast
+who can lay ambushes and make tools.12 This terrified discovery of
+alterity necessarily implies recognition: human praxis confronts them
+as a hostile force. But this recognition is crushed by the quality of
+strangeness which it itself produces and supports. And the gift, as a
+propitiatory sacrifice, is offered both to a god whose anger is being
+appeased, and to a beast which is tamed by being fed. It is the material
+object which, by its mediation, sets reciprocity free. But it is not experienced as such: whoever receives a gift, provided he agrees to receive
+it, conceives the gift both as proof of non-hostility and as an obligation on himself to treat the newcomers as guests; the threshold is crossed,
+that is all.
+The importance of temporality cannot be overemphasised: the gift is
+and is not an exchange; or, to put it another way, it is exchange experienced as irreversibility. So that its temporal character can be dissolved
+in absolute reciprocity, it must be institutionalised, that is to say,
+apprehended and located through an objective totalisation oflived time.
+Duration then appears as a material object, as a mediation between two
+acts which determine one another in their interiority; it may be defined
+tion of goods in a context of scarcity ought to pay attention to gratuitous expenditure in consumption societies.
+12. Cf. Lévi-Strauss's excellent descriptions of the relation between strangers
+who are forced to share the same restaurant table or the same railway compartment in our society (p. 59). 'A conflict exists ... between the norm of privacy and
+the fact of community! See also his description of the former markets of the
+Chukchee. 'Everyone came armed, and the products were offered on spear
+points. Sometimes a bundle of skins was held in one hand and a bared knife in the
+other so that one was ready for battle at the slightest provocation. The market
+was also formerly designated by the one word, ElpurIrkIn "to exchange",
+which was also applied to the vendetta' (p. 60).
+
+208 Book I
+by reference to tradition or law, so that the homogeneity of instants
+conceals the heterogeneity of succession. But institutions, such as
+marriage between cross-cousins, are themselves manifested against the
+background of the 'dualistic organisation' of which Lévi-Strauss has
+given such a striking description, and whose origin lies in a reaction
+against the pluralisation of primitive groups. Migratory movements
+"have introduced allogenic elements', the absence of central power has
+encouraged 'fissions'
+', etc. Thus a dualistic ordering is 'superimposed'
+on a plurality of clans and 'sections' and functions as a 'regulating
+principle'. The Mekeo of New Guinea themselves say that the 'apparent confusion of their groups' actually conceals a dualistic order based
+on reciprocal tributes. This is because reciprocity as a relation within
+the totality can be conceived only from the point of view of totality,
+that is, by each group in so far as it can claim to be integrated with all
+the others. The whole precedes the parts, in this case, not as a static
+substance but as a turning totalisation. We shall come back to this
+point later. But what has emerged clearly here is that duality, both as a
+general rule and in each particular case, is released by a sort of commutative trinity which presupposes plurality: it is only the third party in
+fact who can, through his mediation, show the equivalence of the goods
+exchanged and consequently of the successive acts. For this exterior
+third party, the use-value of the goods exchanged is clearly transformed into exchange-value. Thus to precisely the extent that he is not
+an agent in the operation, he negatively determines the potlatch, and,
+for those who do it, he illuminates their reciprocal recognition. And
+here, whatever the society, the third party is everyone and everybody;
+thus reciprocity is lived by everyone as diffuse objective possibility. But
+as soon as it is actualised, or rather unmasked, it closes in upon itself.
+The dualistic ordering is based on the ever turning totalisation and
+negates this totalisation as soon as it is established.13
+Similarly, reciprocity becomes isolated as a human relation between
+individuals; it presents itself as the fundamental, concrete lived bond.
+If I try to locate myself in the social world, I discover around me
+various ternary or binary formations, the first of which are constantly
+disintegrating and the second of which arise from a turning totalisation and may at any moment integrate themselves into a trinity. Thus
+it is inconceivable that a temporal process should begin with a dyad
+13. As we shall see, it will lay claim to it again at a later moment of its development.
+
+Human Relations as a Mediation of Materiality 209
+and culminate in a triad. A binary formation, as the immediate relation
+of man to man, is the necessary ground of any ternary relation; but
+conversely, a ternary relation, as the mediation of man amongst men,
+is the basis on which reciprocity becomes aware of itself as a reciprocal connection. If the idealist dialectic misused the triad, this is
+primarily because the real relation between men is necessarily ternary.
+But this trinity is not a designation or ideal mark of the human relation: it is inscribed in being, that is to say, in the materiality of individuals. In this sense, reciprocity is not the thesis, nor trinity the
+synthesis (or conversely): it is lived relations whose content is
+determined in a given society, and which are conditioned by materiality and capable of being modified only by action.
+3 Reciprocity, Exploitation and Repression
+But let us go back to the binary formation. We take it first because it
+is the simplest, but we must not lose sight of the synthetic ensemble in
+relation to which it defines itself. As we have seen, it is not something
+which can come to men from outside, or which they can establish
+between themselves by common consent. Regardless of the action of
+the third party, and however spontaneous the mutual recognition of
+the two strangers who have just met may seem, it is really only the
+actualisation of a relation which is given as having always existed, as
+the concrete and historical reality of the couple which has just been
+formed. It is important to see in this how each of them exists, or produces his being, in the presence of the Other and in the human world. In
+this sense, reciprocity is a permanent structure of every object: defined
+as things in advance, by collective praxis, we transcend our being by
+producing ourselves as men among men and we allow ourselves to be
+integrated by everyone else to the extent that they are to be integrated
+into our own project. And since the historical content of my project is
+conditioned by the fact of my already being amongst men, and being
+recognised by them in advance as a man of a certain kind and milieu,
+with my place in society already fixed by meanings engraved in matter,
+reciprocity is always concrete. It cannot be based on a universal
+abstract bond, like Christian 'charity'; nor on an a priori willingness to
+
+1 2 0
+treat the human person, in myself and in the Other, as an absolute end;
+nor on a purely contemplative intuition revealing 'Humanity' to
+everyone as the essence of his fellows. It is the individual's praxis, as
+the realisation of his project, which determines his bonds of reciprocity with everyone.
+And the quality of being a man does not exist as such: this particular
+gardener recognises in this particular road-mender a concrete project,
+which is expressed in his behaviour and which others have already
+recognised by the very task which they have set him. Thus everyone
+recognises the Other on the basis of a social recognition to which his
+clothes, his tools, etc., passively bear witness. From this point of view,
+the mere act of speaking, the simplest gesture, and the elementary
+structure of perception (which, moving from future to present, from
+totality to particular moments, discloses the behaviour of the Other)
+imply mutual recognition. And capitalist exploitation and oppression
+are no counterexample to this. The swindle of capitalist exploitation is
+based on a contract. And though this contract necessarily transforms
+labour, or praxis, into an inert commodity, it is, formally, a reciprocal
+relation; it is a free exchange between two men who recognise each
+other in their freedom; it is just that one of them pretends not to notice
+that the Other is forced by the constraint of needs to sell himself as a
+material object. The clear conscience of the employer is based entirely
+on that moment of exchange in which the wage-labourer appears to
+offer his labour-power in complete freedom. And if he is not free in
+relation to his poverty, he is juridically free in relation to his employer,
+since, at least in theory, the employer does not put any pressure on the
+workers when he hires them, and merely fixes a top rate and turns away
+those who ask for more. Here, once again, competition and antagonism
+between workers moderate their demands; the employer himself has
+nothing to do with it. This example shows clearly enough that man
+becomes a thing for the Other and for himself only to the extent that
+he is initially posited as human freedom by praxis itself. Absolute
+respect for the freedom of the propertyless is the best way of leaving
+him at the mercy of material constraints, at the moment of the contract.
+As for oppression, it consists, rather, in treating the Other as an
+animal. The Southerners, in the name of their respect for animality,
+condemned the northern industrialists who treated the workers as
+material; but in tact it is animals, not 'material', which are forced to
+work by breaking-in, blows and threats. However, the slave acquires
+his animality, through the master, only after his humanity has been
+
+recognised. Thus American plantation owners in the seventeenth
+century refused to raise black children in the Christian faith, so as to
+keep the right to treat them as sub-human, which was an implicit
+recognition that they were already men: they evidently differed from
+their masters only in lacking a religious faith, and the care their
+masters took to keep it from them was a recognition of their capacity
+to acquire it. In fact, the most insulting command must be addressed
+by one man to another; the master must have faith in man in the person
+of his slaves. This is the contradiction of racism, colonialism and all
+forms of tyranny: in order to treat a man like a dog, one must first
+recognise him as a man. The concealed discomfort of the master is that
+he always has to consider the human reality of his slaves (whether
+through his reliance on their skill and their synthetic understanding of
+situations, or through his precautions against the permanent possibility
+of revolt or escape), while at the same time refusing them the economic
+and political status which, in this period, defines human beings.
+Thus reciprocity, though completely opposed to alienation and
+reification, does not save men from them. As we shall see later, a
+dialectical process produces these inhuman relations out of their
+opposite. Reciprocal ternary relations are the basis of all relations
+between men, whatever form they may subsequently take. Though
+reciprocity is often concealed by the relations which are established
+and supported by it (and which may, for example, be oppressive,
+reified, etc.), it becomes evident whenever it manifests itself that each
+of the two terms is modified in its very existence by the existence of
+the Other. In other words, men are bound together by relations of
+interiority. It might be objected that this reciprocal relation is unintelligible: for we have tried to show that the intelligibility of the synthetic bond either manifests itself in the process of a totalising praxis,
+or remains congealed in an inert totality. But in this case there is
+neither totality nor totalisation, and these relations manifest themselves
+as plurality within exteriority. The primary answer to this objection is
+that, while we are at this stage of the investigation, we are not dealing
+with one dialectic, but with the external relation between several, a
+relation which must be both dialectical and external. In other words,
+the relation of reciprocity and the ternary relation are neither of them
+totalising: they are multiple adhesions between men which keep a
+'society' in a colloid state. Besides, in order to gain comprehension,
+te must - in this as in every other case - make use of the totality of the
+moments of the investigation which have already been established. It
+
+212 Book I
+is true that the dialectical materiality of everyone is not sufficient to
+account for a reciprocity; the least that is necessary is a quasi-totality.
+And this quasi-totality, as we know, exists in the form of worked
+matter in so far as it mediates between men; it is on the basis of this
+negative inert unity that reciprocity arises. This means that it always
+arises on an inert foundation of institutions and instruments by which
+everyone is already defined and alienated.
+We must not suppose that we have entered the kingdom of ends and
+that, in reciprocity, everyone recognises and treats the Other as an
+absolute end. This would be formally possible only in so far as everyone treated himself, or treated the human person in himself, as an unconditioned end. Indeed this hypothesis would throw us back into
+absolute idealism: only an idea amongst other ideas can posit itself as
+its own end. But man is a material being set in a material world; he
+wants to change the world which crushes him, that is, to act on the
+world of materiality through the mediation of matter and hence to
+change himself. His constant search is for a different arrangement of the
+universe, and a different statute for man; and in terms of this new order
+he is able to define himself as the Other whom he will become. Thus he
+constantly makes himself the instrument, the means, of this future
+statute which will realise him as other; and it is impossible for him to
+treat his own present as an end. In other words, man as the future of
+man is the regulative schema of every undertaking, but the end is
+always a remoulding of the material order which by itself will make man
+possible.
+Or, to approach the question from a different angle, Hegel's mistake
+was his belief that within everyone there is something to objectify and
+that work reflects the individuality of its author. In fact, however,
+objectification as such is not the goal, but the consequence attached to
+the goal. The aim is the production of a commodity, an object of consumption, or a tool, or the creation of a work of art. And it is through
+this production, this creation, that man creates himself, or in other
+words detaches himself gradually from things as he inscribes his work
+in them. Consequently, in so far as my project is a transcendence of the
+present towards the future, and of myself towards the world, I always
+treat myself as a means and cannot treat the Other as an end. Reciprocity implies, first, that the Other is a means to the extent that I
+myself am a means, that is to say, that the Other is the means of a
+transcendent end and not my means; second, that I recognise the Other
+as praxis, that is to say, as a developing totalisation, at the same time as
+
+113
+integrating him as an object into my totalising project; third, that I
+recognise his movement towards his own ends in the same movement
+by which I project myself towards mine; and fourth, that I discover
+myself as an object and instrument of his ends through the same act
+which constitutes him an objective instrument of my ends.
+In this way, reciprocity can be either positive or negative. In the
+first case, everyone may make himself a means within the project of
+the other so that he becomes a means within his own project; and in
+this case the two transcendent aims remain separate. This is what
+happens with exchange or the provision of services. Alternatively, the
+end may be shared (a collective undertaking or work), everyone
+making himself the Other's means in order that their collective effort
+shall realise their single transcendent aim. In the case of negative reciprocity, the four necessary conditions are fulfilled but on the basis of a
+reciprocal refusal: each refuses to serve the Other's end and, while
+recognising his own objective being as a means within the adversary's
+project, he uses his own instrumentality in others to make them an
+instrument of his own ends in spite of themselves. This is struggle; in
+it, everyone reduces himself to his materiality so as to act on that of the
+Other; through pretences, stratagems, frauds and manoeuvres everyone allows himself to be constituted by the Other as a false object, a
+deceptive means. But here again it would be quite wrong to think that
+the aim is the annihilation of the adversary or, to use Hegel's idealist
+language, that each consciousness seeks the death of the Other. The
+origin of struggle always lies, in fact, in some concrete antagonism
+whose material condition is scarcity (la rareté), 1ª in a particular form,
+and the real aim is objective conquest or even creation, in relation to
+which the destruction of the adversary is only the means. Hatred - a
+form of recognition - even if it is posited for itself, is really only a
+mobilisation of all one's strength and passions in the service of an aim
+which requires such total commitment. Hegel, in other words, ignored
+matter as a mediation between individuals. Even if one uses his terminology, one has to say that while each consciousness is the counterpart of the Other, this reciprocity can take an infinity of different forms,
+positive or negative, and that it is the mediation of matter which determines these forms in every concrete case.
+But this relation, which comes to all from each in so far as he makes
+himself a man amongstthem, contains a contradiction: it is a totalisation
+14. This theme will be developed in the next chapter.
+
+114 Book
+which has to be totalised by what it totalises. It presupposes the
+complete equivalence of two systems of reference and of two actions;
+in short, it does not posit its own unity. The limit of unification lies
+in the mutual recognition which occurs in the process of two synthetic
+totalisations: however far the two integrations are carried, they respect
+one another, there will always be two of them, each integrating the entire
+universe.
+Two men are performing a certain task together. Each adapts his
+behaviour to that of the Other, each approaches or withdraws according to the requirements of the moment, each makes his body into the
+Other's instrument to the extent that he makes the Other into his, each
+anticipates the Other's movement in his body, and integrates it into his
+own movement as a transcended means; and in this way each of them
+acts in such a way as to become integrated as a means into the Other's
+movement. But this intimate relation in its reality is the negation of
+unity. Of course, there is always the objective possibility of unification;
+it is foreseen, even required, by the material environment, that is, by
+the nature of the tools, the structure of the workshop, the job to be
+done, the materials to be used, etc.
+But it is always a third party which picks them out, through the
+mediation of objects; or, in other words, the unity of the work team
+is inscribed in matter as an inanimate imperative. Each of them is
+defined in reality as a class individual by the objects which he uses or
+modifies, to the extent that he uses them, that is, to the extent that he
+arouses and sustains materialised meanings by his oraxis;15 he makes
+himself into the manual worker, the proletarian, which this particular
+machine requires. But their unity lies in matter, or rather, it goes from
+tool to material: their double praxis is objectified as a common praxis
+in the finished product; but in this way it loses its quality as the unity
+of a duality and becomes merely the unity of the object, that is to say,
+the crystallisation of anonymous labour, with no characteristics which
+enable one to judge a priori how many workers produced it.
+Of course, while doing the work, each of them will see this objective
+unity coming into existence, and will see his own movement reflected
+in the object both as his own and as other. Of course, when each of them
+approaches the Other, each will see this approach as coming to him
+from outside. And of course, every moment of this continuum must be
+ambivalent since the praxis of each resides in that of the Other, as its
+I5. See below, 'class being'.
+
+Human Relations as a Mediation of Materiality 115
+secret exteriority and its deep interiority. Nevertheless, this reciprocity
+is lived in separation; and since mutual integration implies the beingan-object of each for the Other, it could not be otherwise. Each reflects
+his own project to the Other as coming to him within the objective;
+but these experiences, ordered and connected in interiority, are not
+integrated into a synthetic unity.
+The fact is that in their mutual recognition each of them discloses and
+respects the project of the Other, as also existing outside his own
+project; that is, they define it as a transcendence which cannot be
+reduced to its simple objectivity as transcended transcendence, but
+which produces itself in the direction of its own ends, through its own
+motivations. But precisely because it is experienced over there, or
+outside, every transcendence, in its subjective reality, recedes from the
+Other and can be referred to, in the objectivity of behaviour, only as a
+signification with no graspable content. It is therefore impossible to
+unite a work team in a totalising movement since such a developing
+totalisation actually contains an element of disintegration: the Other
+appears as a totalised object referring beyond its project to a different,
+transcendent, lived totalisation, and one in which the first, in its turn,
+features as a similarly destructive object. Another reason why unification is impossible is that each totalisation here and now posits itself as
+essential to the extent that it affirms the co-essentiality of the Other.
+Thus each lives within the absolute interiority of a relation which
+lacks unity; his concrete certainty is mutual adaptation within separateness; it is the existence of a two-centred relation which he can never
+grasp in its totality. This disunity within solidarity (whether positive
+or negative) is caused by an excess rather than a deficiency: it is the
+product, in effect, of two synthetic and strictly equivalent unifications.
+Here we encounter ambiguity in a real material object, for the terms of
+the relation are incapable both of being reckoned as distinct quantities
+and of effectively realising their unity. In effect, the only possible unity
+of these epicentres is a transcendent hyper-centre. In other words, the
+unity of a dyad can be realised only within a totalisation performed
+from outside by a third party. Each member of the team comes upon
+this unity as a negation, as a lack, in a kind of disquiet; it is at once an
+obscure deficiency arising from the very requirements of each totalisation, and an imprecise reference to an absent witness, and the lived but
+unarticulated certainty that the total reality of the collective undertaking can only exist elsewhere, through the mediation of an Other and
+as a non-reciprocal object.
+
+22G Book I
+Thus the mutual relation is haunted by its unity as if it were an
+inadequacy of being transforming its original structure. This disquiet
+of reciprocity, in its turn, is intelligible as the moment in which the
+dialectic of each experiences the dialectic of the Other as a limitation on
+the project of totalisation, imposed in and by the very attempt at
+synthesis. For this reason, it is always possible for reciprocity to
+collapse into its terms as a false, crushing totality. And this can be
+positive as well as negative. A collective undertaking can become a
+kind of infernal impuision when each insists on continuing it out of
+consideration for the Other. Apprentice boxers are often dominated
+by their fight, as if they were drowning in this ever disintegrating unity;
+hitting at the air, suddenly leaning against each other in a common
+fatigue which hints at the shadow of a positive reciprocity, or pursuing
+each other to the four corners of the ring, they are possessed: they
+become inessential while the match becomes essential.
+Of course, in actual fact, each of them has at his disposal an array of
+abstract designations with which to express this fleeting unity to the
+Other and with which to refer to it in the void. But it must be observed,
+in the first place, that these designations, and the possibility of employing them, that is of conceiving the double totalisation as an objective
+totality, depend on the presence of a third party. For, as we have seen,
+the third party makes reciprocity visible to itself, while reciprocity
+closes in upon itself by denying the third party, and yet referring to
+him through its own inadequacy. In this sense, the relation between
+third parties, in so far as each is preoccupied with mediating a reciprocal relation, is one of separation postulating reciprocity as the
+fundamental bond between men. However, lived reciprocity always
+refers back to the third party and in its turn shows that a ternary
+relation is both its foundation and its culmination. It is this new relation which we must now investigate: what is the significance for a
+binary relation of being integrated into a ternary one?
+Let us return to our example of two labourers performing a joint
+task. Let us suppose that a norm is being established. The presence of a
+timekeeper and his specific task reanimate inert meanings. His aim is
+to regulate a particular event: he sees each movement in its objectivity
+in terms of a certain objective purpose, namely, increasing productivity.
+The irreducible heterogeneity of the dyad is concealed because from
+the point of view of the task to be done, the workers and tools appear
+as a homogeneous ensemble; the two reciprocal actions together constitute the object of his inquiry. And, since his task is to determine this
+
+rhythm as precisely as possible, the common rhythm, in the light of the
+objective end, appears as the living unity which animates the two
+workers. Thus the movement of objectivity is inverted: what the timekeeper initially sees as the meaning and unity of his own project, is the
+aim which he pursues. He has to measure speeds; and through this
+relation which is definitive of his praxis, he grasps the end which is
+imposed upon the workers in its full objectivity; for it is not the same
+as his own end though it is intimately linked with it. As the end of
+Others it is the essential means for him to do his job. The objective
+and subjective connection between his own end and that of others
+makes him see the rhythm as his object and the workers as the means of
+maintaining or increasing its speed. Reciprocity as the real bond of a
+double heterogeneity is relegated to another level; this interiority
+without a centre, this intimacy lived in separation, is abruptly dislocated and torn apart so as to become a single praxis whose end lies
+outside itself. This end which belongs to Others, reveals itself as their
+end and as his means and is presented to the witness in its objective
+totality. And as it discloses its content, which refers back to the activity
+of the whole factory and to the entire social system, it reveals itself as a
+structure of control set up from outside by technicians in accordance
+with the requirements of production. It is this disclosure which defines
+the relation of the timekeeper to the two workers and to his superiors,
+or in other words, which designates his objective being in his very
+subjectivity: he is the one through whom the end is posited as a structure
+of transcendence in relation to the workers. Thus he reveals it as an
+autonomous object. But this structure of control refers, in its very
+objectivity, to the subjectivity of those whom it controls: this goal has
+to be achieved, it imposes itself on them as a common imperative. This
+imperious goal, though entirely present in the objective field, cannot be
+grasped by the witness; it closes in on the two subjectivities which it
+equalises and shows them its inner surface - which the timekeeper has
+to see as pure meaning, as a dimension of flight at the heart of plenitude.
+Objectively, the totality includes the two simultaneous actions; it
+defines and limits them at the same time as enveloping them, and so
+masking them from direct perception. It is a structure of the world,
+which exists through itself; it is expressed and sustained by a double
+praxis, but only in so far as this is subjected to the pre-established imperative which conditions it. Objectively, and through the third party,
+the independence of the end turns reciprocity into a binding together of
+movement, and mutual adaptation into the internal self-determination
+
+228 Book 1
+of praxis; it transforms a double action into a single event which
+controls the two workers as secondary structures whose particular
+relations depend on overall relations and who communicate through
+the mediation of the whole. This living totality, comprising men, their
+objects and the material on which they work, is both an event as a
+temporalisation of the objective imperative and - though this amounts
+to the same thing - the regressive disclosure of the end (from the future
+to the present) as the concrete unity of the event.
+Subjectivities are enveloped within this moving totality as necessary
+but elusive significations; but they define themselves as a common relation to a transcendent end rather than as each apprehending its own
+ends in a reciprocity of separations. Thus these significations, in their
+objective meaning, become homogeneous, and come together and
+merge into one another in their recognition of the transcendent imperative. Thus this imperative is expressed, through the mediation of the
+Other, as essential, and subjectivity becomes its inessential means of
+making itself felt as imperative. In this way, subjectivity is merely the
+internal milieu which mediates the imperative as the interiorisation of
+control; in this milieu the individual appears as an a posteriori and arbitrary determination of the subjective substance. As in wave mechanics,
+the principle of individuality is not really applicable. Whatever their
+external differences, individuals are defined on the basis of the end as a
+complete interiorisation of the entire imperative, and therefore by the
+presence in them of the whole of subjectivity.
+Here the social group appears reduced to its simplest expression. It
+is the objective totality in so far as it defines its subjectivity simply by
+interiorisation of values and objective ends and, within a given undertaking, controls real individuals as simple interchangeable modes of
+subjective praxis. Through the intervention of third parties, the subjectivity of the group is shown to be indivisible, and circulates freely
+within the object as milieu, substance and pneuma; it expresses itself in
+self-temporalising objectivity as intersubjective reality. And intersubjectivity expresses itself in the most fortuitous and temporary groupings; for a taxi-driver looking at some people staring into a river, they
+are united by one and the same curiosity. And their active curiosity
+(they push one another, lean over, and stand on tiptoe) shows the
+existence of a transcendent, but invisible end: there is something that
+has to be looked at. The mediation of the third party reanimates the objective significations, already inscribed in things, which constitute the
+group as a totality. These crystallised significations already represent
+
+the anonymous praxis of the Other and produce, in matter, a solidified
+revelation. In awakening them the third party makes himself a mediator
+between objective thought as Other and concrete individuals; through
+him a rigid universality constitutes them by its own activity.
+Thus duality is unified from outside through the praxis of the third
+party; and we shall see in a moment how the members of a group interiorise it. At present it is still a transformation which transcends him.
+True, the relation of the third party to the dyad is one of interiority
+in that he modifies himself in modifying it. But this relation is not
+reciprocal: in transcending the dyad towards his own ends, the third
+party shows it to be an object-unity, that is a material unity. Of course,
+the relation of the integrated terms is neither external nor molecular,
+but, in so far as each of them excludes the Other through their actual
+recognition, or in so far as this relation can only link but not unify, unity
+is imprinted from outside and, in the first moment, passively received.
+The dyad becomes a team not by producing its totality, but, initially,
+by being subjected to it as a determination of being.
+It will no doubt have been noticed that this Trinity seems like an
+embryonic hierarchy: the third party as mediator is a synthetic power
+and the bond between him and the dyad is unreciprocal. It will therefore be asked what this spontaneous hierarchy is based on, given that
+we are considering it in the abstract, as a synthetic bond, without
+examining the historical circumstances in which it arises. The answer
+to this question is provided by two points, and these will enable us to
+make further progress in our regressive investigation. First, if there is
+no reciprocity between the dyad and the third party, this is because of
+the very structure of the third party relation; but this does not generate
+any a priori hierarchy since any member of the Trinity might become
+the third party in relation to the Other two. Only the conjuncture (and
+therefore History in its entirety) can determine whether this changing
+relation shall be commutative (each member becoming the third party
+in turn, like in children's games where everyone takes turns at being
+the general or the bandit chief) or whether it is to be fixed in the form
+of a primitive hierarchy. It is already fairly obvious, in fact, that the
+problem will become infinitely complex since social reality comprises
+an indefinite multiplicity of third parties (because the relation changes
+even if the number of individuals is finite) and an indefinite multiplicity of reciprocities; and also because individuals can constitute
+themselves as group third parties, and there can be reciprocities of
+reciprocities, and reciprocities of groups; finally, individuals or groups
+
+120 Book I
+can be engaged in reciprocal actions even while defining themselves as
+third parties.
+At present we are not equipped to think these moving, indefinite
+relations in their intelligibility, for we have not yet mastered all our
+instruments. But it is worth recalling, to conclude, that the human
+relation really exists between all men and that it is no more than the
+relation of praxis to itself. The only origin of the complication which
+gives birth to these new relations is plurality, that is, the multiplicity
+of active organisms. So, quite apart from any question of antagonism,
+every praxis both affirms and negates the other, in so far as it transcends it as its object, and also causes itself to be transcended by it. And
+every praxis, as a radical unification of the practical field, adumbrates,
+in its relation to all others, the project of unifying them all by eliminating the negation of plurality. This plurality is none other than the
+inorganic dispersal of organisms; and given that this plurality always
+arises within an existing society, it is in fact never wholly natural and,
+as we have seen, is always expressed in techniques and social institutions - which transform it to the extent that it occurs within them. But,
+although natural dispersal cannot be any more than the abstract sense
+of real, social dispersal, it is always the case that, within a given society,
+the negative element of mechanical exteriority always conditions that
+peculiar relation of reciprocity which negates not only plurality,
+through the adhesion of activities, but also unity, by a plurality of
+recognitions, and also the relation of a third party to a dyad, which
+defines itself as exteriority within pure interiority. Moreover, the
+designation of a third party as the actualisation in a given individual of
+this universal relation always occurs, as we have seen, in a given
+practical situation and under the pressure of material circumstances.
+Thus our investigation is reversed: starting from the isolated worker,
+we showed individual praxis to be the complete intelligibility of dialectical movement; but, moving on from this abstract moment, we
+have found that the first relation between men is the indefinite adherence of each to each; and these formal conditions for all History are
+immediately seen to be conditioned by inorganic materiality, both as
+the fundamental condition determining the content of human relations,
+and as an external plurality within the commutative reciprocity and
+within the Trinity. It can also be seen that this commutativity, though
+by degrees it unites each to all, is in itself incapable of realising totalisation as the movement of History, since the jelly-like substance which
+constitutes human relations involves the infinite interiorisation of
+
+122
+bonds of dispersive exteriority, rather than their elimination or totalising transcendence. No doubt it does transcend them, but only because
+the discrete multiplicity of organisms happens to be engaged in a kind
+of dance with an unlimited, circulating multiplicity of epicentres.
+This ambiguity accounts well enough for our private relations with
+friends, companions, casual customers or chance acquaintances, and
+even with colleagues (in an office, or a factory) in so far as they are
+both the living milieu which unites us to everyone and the mechanical
+indifference which separates them from us when work is over. But this
+ambiguity cannot explain the structured relations which at all levels
+produce active groups, classes, and nations, any more than it can
+explain institutions or the complex ensembles known as societies. The
+reversal of the investigation takes place through historical materialism:
+it totalisation is a historical process, it comes to men through matter.
+In other words, praxis as the free development of the organism has
+now totalised the material environment in the form of a practical field;
+and in a moment we shall see the material milieu as the first totalisation
+of human relations.
+
+3
+- A First Encounter
+with Necessity
+1 Scarcity and Mode of Production
+Pure, non-human inorganic matter - that is, not matter in itself but
+matter from the point of view of the praxis in which it is the object of
+scientific experiment - is governed by laws of exteriority. If it is true
+that matter effects an initial union between men, this can only be so to
+the extent that man has already made a practical attempt to unify it, and
+that it has passively received the seal of that unity. In other words, a
+passive synthesis whose unity conceals a molecular dispersal conditions
+the totalisation of organisms whose deep bonds of interiority cannot be
+masked by their dispersal. This synthesis, therefore, represents the
+material condition of historicity. At the same time, it is what might be
+called the passive motor of History. Human history - an orientation
+towards the future and a totalising preservation of the past - is in fact
+also defined in the present by the fact that something is happening to
+men.
+As we shall see later, the inert totality of worked matter, which,
+functioning as an inert universal memory, records and conserves the
+forms impressed on it by earlier labour, is the only factor in any given
+social field which allows every particular historical situation to be
+transcended by the total process of History. In addition, as a kind of
+material synthetic judgement, it makes possible the continuous enrichment
+of historical events. But since inorganic materiality which has received
+the imprint of praxis appears as a passive unity (unité subie), and since
+the unity of interiority which belongs to the dialectical moments of
+action returns into itself and can only be preserved through exteriority
+(that is to say, to the extent that there is no external force to destroy
+
+123
+it), it is necessary, as we shall soon see, that human history should be
+lived, at this level of the investigation, as non-human history. This does
+not mean that historical events are going to appear to us as an arbitrary succession of irrational facts; on the contrary, it means that they
+are going to assume the totalising unity of a negation of man. History,
+at this level, has a fearful and depressing meaning: it appears as though
+what unites men is an inert demonic negation, taking away their substance, that is to say, their labour, and turning it against all men in the
+form of active inertia and totalisation by extermination. We shall see
+that this peculiar relation, together with the initial alienation which
+results from it, will produce its own dialectical intelligibility, as soon as
+the relation of a multiplicity of individuals to the practical field which
+surrounds them is investigated, in so far as this relation is for everyone
+a univocal relation of interiority, and as soon as it is linked dialectically
+to the reciprocal relations which unite them.
+At the same time, it is worth pointing out that this univocal relation
+of surrounding materiality to individuals is expressed in our History in
+a particular and contingent form since the whole of human development, at least up to now, has been a bitter struggle against scarcity. Thus
+at every level the basis of the passive actions of worked and socialised
+materiality will turn out to be the original structure of scarcity as a
+primary unity transmitted to matter through men and returning to men
+through matter. But we should not be disturbed by the fact that the
+relation of scarcity is contingent. It is indeed logically possible to conceive of other organisms on other planets having a relation to their
+environment other than scarcity. (However we are completely incapable of simply imagining such a relation, and supposing that there is
+life on other planets, it is most likely that it too would suffer from
+scarcity.) Above all, although scarcity is universal, at a given historical
+moment it may vary from one region to another. (And while some of
+the causes of these variations, such as over-population or underdevelopment, are historical, and are therefore fully intelligible within
+History itself, others, such as climate, or the richness of the sub-soil,
+given a certain level of technical development, condition History
+through social structures without being conditioned by it.)
+The fact is that after thousands of years of History, three quarters
+of the world's population are undernourished. Thus, in spite of its
+contingency, scarcity is a very basic human relation, both to Nature
+and to men. In this sense, scarcity must be seen as that which makes us
+into these particular individuals producing this particular History and
+
+124 Book I
+defining ourselves as men. It is perfectly possible to conceive of a dialectical praxis, or even of labour, without scarcity. In fact, there is no
+reason why the products required by the organism should not be
+practically inexhaustible, while a practical operation was still necessary
+in order to extract them from the earth. In that case, the inversion of
+the unity of human multiplicities through the counter-finalities of
+matter would still necessarily subsist. For this unity is linked to labour
+as to the original dialectic. But what would disappear is our quality as
+men, and since this quality is historical, the actual specificity of our
+History would disappear too. So today everyone must recognise this
+basic contingency as the necessity which, working both through
+thousands of years and also, quite directly, through the present,
+forces him to be exactly what he is.
+In the progressive moment of our investigation, we shall study the
+problem of the contingency of History; and we shall see that the problem is particularly important from the point of view of a future for
+man. In the case which we are considering, scarcity appears to grow less
+and less contingent in that we ourselves produce new forms of it as the
+milieu of our life, on the basis of an original contingency - which shows,
+one might say, both the necessity of our contingency and the contingency of our necessity. Nevertheless, an attempted critique must distinguish between this determinate relation and the general relation,
+independent of historical determination, between dialectical, multiple
+praxis and materiality. However, since scarcity is a determination of
+this general relation and the latter is manifested to us only through the
+former, it will be safest to discuss scarcity first and then to let the universal relations between the dialectic and the inert emerge later.
+Our description of the relation of scarcity will be brief, because
+there is nothing new to say about it. In particular, historical materialism,
+as the interpretation of our History, has provided the necessary explanations here. But what has never been attempted is a study of the
+type of passive action which materiality as such exerts on man and his
+History in returning a stolen praxis to man in the form of a counterfinality. The point must be emphasised: History is more complex
+than some kinds of simplistic Marxism suppose; man has to struggle
+not only against nature, and against the social environment which has
+produced him, and against other men, but also against his own action
+as it becomes other. This primitive type of alienation occurs within
+other forms of alienation, but it is independent of them, and, in fact,
+is their foundation. In other words, we shall reveal, through it, that a
+
+125
+permanent anti-praxis is a new and necessary moment of praxis. If we
+do not try to define this moment,
+historical intelligibility - that is,
+certainty within the complexity of temporal development - loses one
+of its essential moments and is transformed into unintelligibility.
+(i) Scarcity and History
+Scarcity is a fundamental relation of our History and a contingent
+determination of our univocal relation to materiality.
+Scarcity, as the lived relation of a practical multiplicity to surrounding materiality within that multiplicity itself, is the basis of the possibility of human history. But this calls for two explicit qualifications.
+First, for a historian situated in 1957, scarcity is not the basis of the
+possibility of all History. We have no way of telling whether, for
+different organisms on other planets - or for our descendants, if
+technical and social changes shatter the framework of scarcity - a
+different History, constituted on another basis, and with different
+motive forces and different internal projects, might be logically conceivable. (By this I do not simply mean that we cannot tell whether the
+relation of organic beings to inorganic (inorganisés) ones might somewhere be something other than scarcity; first and foremost, I mean that
+it is impossible to know a priori whether the temporalisation of such
+beings would take the form of a history.) But to say that our History is
+a history of men is equivalent to saying that it is born and developed
+within the permanent framework of a field of tension produced by
+scarcity.
+The second qualification is this. Scarcity is the basis of the possibility of human history, but not of its reality. In other words, it makes
+History possible, but other factors (yet to be determined) are necessary
+if History is to be produced. The reason for this restriction is that there
+are some backward societies which, in a sense, are more prone than
+others to famine or to seasonal depressions of food resources, but
+which are, nevertheless, correctly classified by ethnographers as
+societies with no history, societies based on repetition. 16 This means
+IG. In fact, as we shall see, they have begun to interiorise our History, because
+they have been subjected to colonialism as a historical event. What historialises
+them, however, is not a reaction to their own scarcity.
+
+126 Book I
+that scarcity can exist on a very large scale. If a state of equilibrium is
+established within a given mode of production, and preserved from
+one generation to the next, it is preserved as exis - that is to say, both
+as a physiological and social determination of human organisms and
+as a practical project of keeping institutions and physical corporate
+development at the same level. This corresponds ideologically to a
+decision about human 'nature'. Man is a stunted misshapen being,
+hardened to suffering, and he lives in order to work from dawn till
+dusk with these (primitive) technical means, on a thankless threatening
+earth. We shall see later that certain scarcities can condition a moment
+of History, if, in the context of changes of technique (which will
+themselves have to be explained), they take the form of abrupt changes
+in the standard of living. History is born from a sudden imbalance
+which disrupts all levels of society. Scarcity is the basis of the possibility of human history - and of no more than its possibility - because,
+through the internal adaptation of organisms, it can, within certain
+limits, be lived as an equilibrium. From this point of view, there is no
+logical (dialectical) absurdity in the idea of a country with no History,
+where human groups would vegetate and never break out of a cycle
+of repetition, producing their lives with primitive techniques and
+instruments and knowing absolutely nothing of one another.
+Some people, of course, have said that these societies with no
+History are in fact societies whose History has come to a halt. That is
+quite plausible, since they do indeed have their techniques, and,
+however primitive their tools may be, there must have been a temporal
+process to bring them to this degree of efficiency, by means of social
+forms which themselves, in connection with this process, are in spite of
+everything differentiated, so that they, too, refer back to this temporalisation. But this way of presenting matters disguises the a priori desire
+of some ideologists, 1 idealists as well as Marxists, of basing History
+on some essential necessity. From this point of view, non-historical
+societies would in fact be very special moments in which historical
+development had slowed itself down and stopped, by turning its power
+against itself.
+For the critical position, however, this conception, though pleasing
+in that it reinstates necessity and unity everywhere, is unacceptable
+simply because it offers itself as a conception of the world which the
+facts could neither confirm nor refute. (It is true that many groups
+17. See above, p. 19, n. 7 [Ed.]
+
+12J
+hich here settled into repetition have a legendary history; but this is
+relevant, for legend is a negation of History, its function being to re
+ntroduce the archetype into sacred moments of repetition.) The only
+onclusion we can draw from the examination of the validity of a dia
+lectic is that scarcity could never be sufficient by itself either to
+initiate a historical development or, in the course of a development, to
+burst some log jam which has transformed History into repetition. On
+the contrary, it is always scarcity, as a real and constant tension both
+between man and his environment and between man and man, which
+explains fundamental structures (techniques and institutions) - not
+in the sense that it is a real force and that it has produced them, but
+because they were produced in the milieu of scarcity18 by men whose
+praxis interiorises this scarcity even when they try to transcend it.
+Scarcity can be seen, in the abstract, as a relation of the individual
+to the environment. Practically and historically, that is, in so far as we
+exist in particular situations, the environment is a ready-constituted
+practical field, which relates everyone to collective structures (we shall
+explain what this means later). The most fundamental of these structures is scarcity as the negative unity of the multiplicity of men (of
+this concrete multiplicity). This unity is negative in relation to men
+because it is transmitted to man by matter in so far as matter is nonhuman (that is to say, in so far as its being human is possible only
+through struggle on this earth). This means, therefore, that the first
+totalisation effected by materiality manifests itself (in a given society
+and between independent social groups) both as the possibility of
+universal destruction and as the permanent possibility that this destruction through matter might come to any individual through the
+praxis of other men. This first aspect of scarcity can condition the
+unity of the group, in that the group, taken collectively, may organise
+itself to react collectively. But this dialectical and properly human aspect
+of praxis cannot possibly be contained within the relation of scarcity
+itself, precisely because the positive dialectical unity of a common
+action is the negation of negative unity as surrounding materiality
+turning on the individuals who have totalised it. In fact, scarcity as
+tension and as force-field is the expression of a quantitative fact (more
+or less strictly defined). There will be an insufficient quantity of a
+18. As we shall see, scarcity is a milieu in that it is a unitary relation of a plurality of individuals. In other words, it is
+an individual relation and a social
+milieu.
+
+128 Book I
+particular natural substance or manufactured product in a particular
+social field, given the number of members of the groups or inhabitants
+of the region. There is not enough for everybody.
+Thus the world (the ensemble) exists for anyone in so far as the
+consumption of such and such a product elsewhere, by others, deprives
+him here of the opportunity of getting and consuming something of
+the same kind. In examining the indefinite and universal relation of
+indeterminate reciprocity we have noticed that men can be united with
+each other indirectly through a series of adhesions, without having the
+slightest idea of the existence of this or that other person. In the
+milieu of scarcity, however, even if individuals are unaware of each
+other, even if social stratifications and class structures completely
+sever reciprocity, everyone within the particular social field still exists
+and acts in the presence of everyone else. Perhaps this member of this
+society does not even know how many individuals it contains. He may
+not know the exact relation of man to natural substances, to instruments and to human products - the relation which strictly defines
+scarcity. And he may account for present poverty in ways which are
+completely untrue and absurd. All the same, the other members of the
+group do exist for him collectively, in that each one of them is a threat
+to his life - in other words, in that the existence of every one of them is
+the interiorisation and absorption by a human life of the environment
+as a negation of mankind. But this individual member, if he realises
+himself, through his need and praxis, as being amongst men, will see
+everyone in terms of the object of consumption or the manufactured
+product, and, on this basic level, he will recognise them as the mere
+possibility of the consumption of something he himself needs. In short,
+he will find each of them to be the material possibility of his being
+annihilated through the material annihilation of an object of primary
+necessity.
+Of course, these remarks describe a still very abstract moment of our
+regressive investigation: in reality, all the social antagonisms in a given
+society are qualified and structured, and the society itself defines the
+bounds of scarcity, at least within certain limits, both for each of its
+constituent groups, and in the fundamental matter of collective scarcity
+- that is, in terms of an original relation between forces and relations
+of production. But the important thing for us now is simply to record,
+in order, the structures of dialectical intelligibility. Now, trom this
+point of view, it is easy to see that the totalisation effected by scarcity
+is circular. Scarcity is not the absolute impossibility of the human
+
+229
+organism surviving (although, as I have shown, one might wonder
+whether this statement would remain true in this form: the radical
+impossibility of the human organism surviving without labour). But
+in a given situation, whether it be the raft of the Medusa, 1º an Italian
+city under siege, or a moder society (which, of course, discreetly
+selects its dead simply by distributing items of expenditure in a particular
+way, and which, at its deepest foundations, is already in itself a choice
+of who is well provided for and who is to go hungry, scarcity makes
+the passive totality of individuals within a collectivity into an impossibility of co-existence. The group ur the nation is defined by its surplus
+population (ses excedentaires); it has to reduce its number in order to
+survive.
+This numerical reduction, of course, though always present as a
+practical necessity, need not take the form of murder. People can
+simply be allowed to die, as was the case with surplus children under
+the Ancien Régime. Or birth control can be used, in which case the
+potential child, as a future consumer, is designated as undesirable.
+This may be conceived either, as in bourgeois democracies, in terms of
+the impossibility of continuing to feed its brothers in an individual
+family, or, in a socialist nation such as China, in terms of the impossibility of maintaining a certain rate of population growth until a certain
+rate of production growth can be reached. But when there is no
+question of controlling the birth rate, the negative requirements of
+materiality take a purely quantitative form: the size of the surplus
+population can be determined, but not their individual characters. 20
+Here we see the full force of commutativity, whose importance will
+become clearer later, and which marks each member of the group both
+as a possible survivor and as a dispensable surplus member. And each
+member is constituted in this way in his objectivity both by himself and
+by everyone. The direct movement of need affirms him unconditionally
+as having to survive; this is the practical message of hunger and labour;
+and a direct challenge to it is inconceivable since it itself expresses
+man's transcendence of a radical threat by matter. But at the same time
+the individual's being is put in doubt by everyone, and by the very
+cas has to vehmi to is there is still indeenay bath wire he dass ade
+the level of individuals.
+
+130 BookI
+movement which transcends all threats. Thus his own activity is turned
+against him and returns to him as Other through the social milieu.
+Through socialised matter and through material negation as an inert
+unity, man is constituted as Other than man. Man exists for everyone
+as non-human man, as an alien species. And this does not necessarily
+mean that conflict is already interiorised and lived as a fight for survival. It simply means that the mere existence of everyone is defined by
+scarcity as the constant danger of non-existence both for another and for
+everyone. Better still: this constant danger of the annihilation of myself
+and of everyone is not something I see only in Others. I am myself that
+danger in so far as I am Other, and designated by the material reality
+of the environment as potentially surplus with Others. This concerns
+an objective structure of my being because I really am a danger to
+Others and, through the negative totality, to myself, in so far as I am
+a part of that totality. We shall see below why both sellers and buyers
+in a free market can fix prices only to the extent that they are Others in
+and for themselves. But at present we must confine ourselves to drawing
+certain consequences from these observations.
+When I say that man exists as Other in the guise of non-human man,
+this must obviously be understood as applying to all the human occupants of the social field under consideration, for others and for themselves. In other words, everyone is a non-human man for all Others,
+and considers all Others as non-human men, and actually treats the
+Other without humanity (the meaning of this will become clear later).
+These remarks of course must be understood in a proper sense, that is
+to say, in the light of there being no such thing as human nature.
+However, at least up to this moment of our pre-history, scarcity, in
+some form or other, has dominated all praxis. It must therefore be
+understood both that man's non-humanity does not come from his
+nature, and that far from excluding his humanity, it can only be understood through it. But it must also be understood that, as long as the
+reign of scarcity continues, each and every man will contain an inert
+structure of non-humanity which is in fact no more than material
+negation which has been interiorised. So let us understand that nonhumanity is a relation between men and could not be anything else.
+No doubt it is possible to be wantonly cruel to some animal. But
+any punishment or blame for this cruelty can only be in the name of
+human relations. For who could believe that this carnivorous species -
+which rears animals in their hundreds of thousands in order to kill
+them or to make them labour, and which systematically destroys
+
+131
+others, for the sake of hygiene, or for self-protection, or gratuitously,
+for fun - who could believe that this predatory species has put its
+values and its real definition of itself into its relations with animals,
+except for ones which are castrated and domesticated, and then only by
+means of a simplistic symbolic mechanism?
+Now, human relations (positive or negative) are reciprocal. This
+means that each individual's praxis, in its practical structure and for
+the sake of the completion of its project, recognises the praxis of the
+other, which means, basically, that it sees the duality of activities as
+inessential and the unity of praxes as such as essential to them. In
+reciprocity, my partner's praxis is, as it were, at root my praxis, which
+has broken in two by accident, and whose two pieces, each of which is
+now a complete praxis on its own, both retain from their original unity
+a profound affinity and an immediate understanding. I do not claim
+that the relation of reciprocity ever existed in man before the relation of
+scarcity, man being, after all, the historical product of scarcity. But
+without this human relation of reciprocity the non-human relation of
+scarcity would not exist. Indeed, scarcity as a univocal relation of each
+and of all to matter, finally becomes an objective social structure of the
+material environment, and in that way its inert finger points to every
+individual as both a cause and a victim of scarcity. And everyone
+interiorises this structure in that by his behaviour he makes himself a
+man of scarcity. His relation to the Other in so far as it comes from
+matter is a relation of exteriority: in the first place, because the Other is
+the pure (living but abstract) possibility of the destruction of the necessary product, so that he defines himself in exteriority as a threatening
+but contingent possibility inherent in the product itself, as an external
+object; in the second place, because scarcity, as a rigid schema of negation, organises, through everyone's praxis, every group of potentially
+surplus people as a totality which has to be negated, as a totality which
+negates everything except itself. Thus the negative unity which comes
+from matter totalises men falsely, or inertly, as molecules of wax are
+inertly united externally by a seal. But since relations of reciprocity
+survive, exteriority penetrates into them. This means that everyone's
+understanding of the praxis of the Other continues to exist, but that
+this other praxis is understood from within only to the extent that the
+interiorised materiality of the agent constitutes the Other as an inert
+molecule separated from every other molecule by an external negation.
+In pure reciprocity, that which is Other than me is also the same. But
+in reciprocity as modified by scarcity, the same appears to us as anti-
+
+132 Book I
+human in so far as this same man appears as radically Other - that is to
+say, as threatening us with death. Or, to put it another way, we have a
+rough understanding of his ends (for they are the same as ours), and
+his means (we have the same ones) as well as of the dialectical structures of his acts; but we understand them as if they belonged to another species, our demonic double. Nothing - not even wild beasts or
+microbes - could be more terrifying for man than a species which is
+intelligent, carnivorous and cruel, and which can understand and outwit human intelligence, and whose aim is precisely the destruction of
+man. This, however, is obviously our own species as perceived in
+others by each of its members in the context of scarcity.
+This, at any rate, is the basic abstract matrix of every reification of
+human relations in any society. At the same time, it is the first stage of
+ethics, in so far as this is praxis explaining itself in terms of given circumstances. The first movement of ethics, in this case, is the constitution of radical evil and of Manichaeism; it values and evaluates the
+breaking of the reciprocity of immanence by interiorised scarcity
+(though we cannot go into the production of values here), but only by
+conceiving it as a product of the praxis of the Other. The anti-human
+(Le contre-homme) in fact tries to destroy men by sharing their ends and
+adopting their means. The break occurs the moment this deceptive
+reciprocity reveals the deadly danger which it contains, or, in other
+words, when it reveals that it is impossible for all those bound by reciprocal links to stay on the soil which supports and feeds them. And let
+us not make the mistake of thinking that this interiorised impossibility
+characterises individuals subjectively; on the contrary, it makes everyone objectively dangerous for the Other and makes the concrete existence
+of each individual endanger that of the Other. Thus man is objectively
+constituted as non-human, and this non-humanity is expressed in
+rave hat che used plane of evil as the structure of the Oiher. The
+s. whose origin is highly ambiguous, whic
+take place between nomadic tribes when they happen to encounter one
+another, have for this reason been interpreted by historians and ethnographers as a challenge to some of the elementary truths of historical
+materialism. It is certainly true that the economic motive is not always
+essential, and is even sometimes not to be found at all. These wandering
+groups have the whole savannah to themselves; they do not trouble
+one another. But this is not the point. It is not always necessary for
+scarcity to be explicitly involved; but, in each of these tribes, the man
+of scarcity encounters, in the other tribe, the man of scarcity in the
+
+133
+form of the anti-human. All of them are so constituted by their
+struggle against the physical world and against people (often within
+their own group) that the appearance of strangers, which presents them
+both with the bond of interiority and with the bond of absolute
+exteriority, makes them see man as an alien species. The strength of
+their aggressiveness and hatred resides in need, and it makes very little
+difference if this need has just been satisfied: its constant renewal and
+everyone's anxiety mean that whenever a tribe appears, its members
+are constituted as famine being brought to the other group in the form
+of a human praxis. And, when there is a clash, what the adversaries try
+to destroy in each other is not the simple threat of scarcity, but
+praxis itself in so far as it is a betrayal of man in favour of the antihuman.
+For this reason, I believe that, at the level of need and through it,
+scarcity is experienced in practice through Manichaean action, and that
+the ethical takes the form of the destructive imperative: evil must be
+destroyed. And at this level, too, violence must be defined as a structure
+of human action under the sway of Manichaeism and in a context of
+scarcity. Violence always presents itself as counter-violence, that is to
+say, as a retaliation against the violence of the Other. But this violence
+of the Other is not an objective reality except in the sense that it exists
+in all men as the universal motivation of counter-violence; it is nothing
+but the unbearable fact of broken reciprocity and of the systematic
+exploitation of man's humanity for the destruction of the human.
+Counter-violence is exactly the same thing, but as a process of restoration, as a response to a provocation: if I destroy the non-humanity of
+the anti-human in my adversary, I cannot help destroying the humanity
+of man in him, and realising his non-humanity in myself. I may try to
+kill, to torture, to enslave, or simply to mystify, but in any case my
+aim will be to eliminate alien freedom as a hostile force, a force which
+can expel me from the practical field and make me into 'a surplus nian'
+condemned to death. In other words, it is undeniable that what I attack
+is man as man, that is, as the free praxis of an organic being. It is
+man, and nothing else, that I hate in the enemy, that is, in myself as
+Other; and it is myself that I try to destroy in him, so as to prevent him
+destroying me in my own body.
+These relations of exteriority in reciprocity, however, are complicated by the development of praxis itself, which re-establishes reciprocity in the negative form of antagonism, as soon as a real struggle
+develops. In terms of the concrete necessities of strategy and tactics,
+
+134 Book I
+one is bound to lose if one does not recognise the enemy as another
+human group, capable of inventing traps, and of getting out of them,
+and of allowing itself to be caught by some of them. Conflicts of
+scarcity, from nomad wars to strikes, are always oscillating between
+two poles, one of which turns the conflict into the Manichaean struggle
+of men against their terrifying counterparts, while the other reduces it
+to human proportions as a dispute which is being resolved by violence
+because the possibilities of reconciliation have been exhausted or
+because mediation has broken down. The important point here is that,
+as soon as it is constituted as the action of an army, a class, or even of a
+lesser group, praxis in principle transcends the reifying inertia of the
+relations of scarcity.
+This shows, I think, that the inert morality of Manichaeism and
+radical evil presupposes a suffered distance, a lived impotence, and, in
+a way, the discovery of scarcity as destiny - in short, a veritable
+domination of man by the interiorised material environment. So it is
+not a permanent structure, in the sense that it must always remain
+rigid and inert at a given level of human density, but rather a certain
+moment of human relations, which is constantly being transcended and
+partially destroyed, but which is always being reborn. In fact, this
+moment is located midway between the destruction of positive reciprocities by scarcity (to whatever degree of social praxis this destruction goes) and the reappearance, under the sway of scarcity, of negative and antagonistic reciprocities. And this intermediate moment
+is identical with the first moment and the productive schema of the
+complex process of reification. In this moment, the individuals belonging to a given social field live in a false relation of reciprocity with the
+environment (that is to say, they allow themselves and others to be
+defined by matter as pure quantity, and they carry this relation into
+the social milieu by living their reciprocity as human beings as a
+negated interiority or, in other words, by living it falsely in exteriority.
+It may be said that we have not explained how matter as scarcity
+can unite men in a common practical field when free human relations,
+abstracted from economic constraint, reduce themselves to constellations of reciprocity. In other words, given that the possibility of
+totalising comes from praxis, how can matter control totalising actions
+through scarcity so as to make them totalise every individual totalisation? The question contains its own answer. It must be recognised that
+neighbouring groups, though differing in structure - like, for example,
+
+" 35
+Chinese peasants and nomads on the frontiers of China during the
+Tang dynasty - can in fact be materially united in one and the same
+place, defined by a particular material configuration, and by a particular
+state of techniques, especially communications. The nomads have a
+limited freedom of movement and always remain on the edge of the
+desert; while the pioneering army of Chinese peasants advances step
+by step seizing a little more arable land from the unproductive desert
+every day. The two groups are aware of each other: they are both
+divided and united by an extreme tension. For the Chinese, the nomads
+are robbers capable only of stealing the fruit of the labour of others;
+and for the nomads, the Chinese are pure colonialists, gradually
+driving them into an uninhabitable desert. For each group, as praxis,
+the Other is an object in the unity of its practical field (we shall return
+to groups later); and everyone is aware of being an object for the
+Other's group. This utilitarian knowledge will be expressed in such
+things as the peasants' precautions against surprise attack, and the
+nomads' care in preparing their next raid. And it is precisely this that
+prevents the two movements of practical unification from constituting
+two different fields of action in the same environment. For each of them,
+the existence of the Other as the object for which it is itself the object,
+simply constitutes the material field as undermined, or as having a
+double foundation. In this co-existence, the only duality is a duality of
+meanings for every material object. The field is practically constituted
+as a means which can be used by the Other; it is a mediation between
+the two groups in that each makes it a means against the means of the
+Other. Everything is both a trap and a display; the secret reality of the
+object is what the Other makes of it. And while the pure surrounding
+materiality becomes the contradictory unity of two opposed totalisations, each group, as an object among objects, that is to say, as a means
+chosen by the Other to achieve his own ends, is objectively totalised
+as material fragility along with all the other material structures of the
+field. As a praxis which has been transcended and outwitted, as a freedom which has been misled and used against its will (I sketched these
+relations in The Problem of Method), every individual and every village
+will realise itself as objectively characterised by the inertia of the surroundings; and these objective characteristics will become more and
+more clear as the peasants who dread the raids take stricter measures to
+avoid them by transcending their environment. In a solitary praxis, as
+we have seen, the farmer makes himself into an inert object in order to
+act on the soil; but at this point, his inertia reappears, transmitted to
+
+236 Book 1
+him through other people. But, if the balance of forces in some clash
+is favourable to him, he will find a new form of labour (for war is a
+labour of man upon man) in the shape of power. And this means something entirely new, namely the power of one human praxis, through
+matter, against the praxis of the other, and the possibility of transforming an objectifying object into an absolute one. But what is
+particularly interesting from our point of view is that every square
+metre of the practical field totalises the two groups and their two
+activities for all their members, in so far as the terrain presents itself as
+a permanent possibility of alienation for everyone. The negative unity
+of scarcity, which is interiorised in the reification of reciprocity, is reexteriorised for us all in the unity of the world as the common locus of
+our antagonisms; and we will re-interiorise this unity in turn, in a new
+negative unity. We are united by the fact that we all live in a world
+which is determined by scarcity.
+It goes without saying that scarcity, as indeed we have already
+seen, can be the occasion for the formation of new groups whose project is to combat it. Man, in fact, produces his life in the midst of other
+men who are also producing theirs, or at least causing others to produce
+it; he produces his life in the social field of scarcity. I do not intend to
+study the types of groups, collectives and institutions which arise
+within this social field; I am not trying to reconstitute the moments of
+History or the descriptions of sociology. Besides, this is not the place
+for a description of those human fields which are unified under the
+pressure of an active organisation of multiplicity, with differentiated
+functions. We must pursue our investigation in the regressive order
+and return to materiality as the inert synthesis of human plurality.
+However, we must not move on from this stage of our inquiry without making some observations about those groups which are united
+and differentiated in a unique way by struggling against scarcity and
+by being conditioned in their structures by scarcity. They constitute
+and institutionalise themselves not because scarcity appears to everyone in need through the need of Others, but because it is negated, in
+the unified field, by praxis, by labour. This obviously means that labour,
+as we have seen, is primarily the organism which reduces itself to a
+controlled inertia so as to act upon inertia and satisfy itself as need.
+Clearly this does not in itself mean either that labour exists in the field of
+scarcity, or that it must be defined as a struggle against scarcity. But
+given a social field which is defined by scarcity, that is, given the
+historical human field, labour for man has to be defined as praxis
+
+137
+aimed at satisfying need in the context of scarcity by a particular negation of it. In hunting, for example, which is a matter not of systematically producing some tool, but of finding animals already in the field, it
+must not be forgotten that the speed of the 'game', its average distance
+(a flock of migrant birds in the sky, etc.), and all kinds of dangers,
+constitute causes of scarcity. And so a hunting weapon appears as
+creative, both negatively, in that it partially destroys distance, and sets
+its own speed against that of the hunted animal, and positively, in that
+for the hunter it multiplies the amount of possible prey or, in other
+words, his chances of catching one of them. And from our point of
+view, it is important that in the present context there is no difference
+between saying, on the one hand, that the chances of an individual or
+family being fed are multiplied by the tool in a given practical field
+(since the practical field, at this level, is not really changed by the tool),
+and saying, on the other hand, that the tool transforms the practical
+field for people who live by fishing and hunting, if not in its extent,
+then at least in its differentiation and fertility.
+Thus the human labour of the individual, and, consequently, of the
+group, is conditioned in its aim, and therefore in its movement, by
+man's fundamental project, for himself or for the group, of transcending scarcity, not only as the threat of death, but also as immediate
+suffering, and as the primitive relation which both constitutes Nature
+through man and constitutes man through Nature. But for precisely
+this reason scarcity will, without ceasing to be the fundamental relation, come to qualify the group or the individual who struggle against
+it by making themselves scarce so as to destroy it. In certain historical
+conditions, provided that techniques enable a certain level of scarcity
+to be transcended - provided, in other words, that the milieu worked
+by previous generations and the quantity and quality of the tools
+available enable a definite number of workers to expand production
+by a certain amount - it is men who become scarce or risk becoming
+so - men as units of labour which destroy scarcity by means of organised production. Again we must be clear what we mean: it is the
+scarcity of products which defines men as scarce in certain social
+fields (though not in all) even if it still defines them commutatively as
+surplus in so far as they are men of need. And, of course, the scarcity
+of men can refer to various structures of organisation (shortage of
+manual labour, of skilled workers, of technicians, or of managers). In
+any case, what matters is that within a given group the individual is
+constituted in his humanity by other individuals both as expendable
+
+138 Book I
+and as scarce. His expendability is immediate; and his scarcity appears
+in the most primitive forms of practical association and creates a
+constant tension in any given society. But in particular societies, with
+particular modes of production, the scarcity of men in relation to tools
+can be transformed, as a result of its own effects, into a scarcity of tools
+in relation to men. But the basic issue is the same. For a given society
+the quantity of tools in itself defines the producers, and thus the combination of producers and means of production defines the limits of
+production and the margin of non-producers (that is to say, of rejected producers) which the society can permit itself. The remaining
+non-producers represent a surplus which can either vegetate in
+malnutrition or disappear.
+It goes without saying that this new form of scarcity presupposes a
+society based on particular kinds of work performed in common by an
+organised group. But this is not sufficient to define any particular
+historical society. Chinese society in imperial times (in so far as it was
+conditioned primarily by its rivers), and Roman society (in so far as it
+secured domination of the Mediterranean world by constructing an
+enormous system of communications), both satisfy the necessary
+conditions just as well as capitalism, although this type of scarcity has
+essentially developed as part of the process of modern industrialisation.
+But, in the same way, in certain structured historical situations, the
+institutionalised inequality of classes and conditions can cause a complete reversal of the situation - a scarcity of consumers in relation to
+products. Of course such relative scarcity is caused both by some
+material rigidity of production (which must not fall below certain
+levels) and by the institutionalised social choice of consumers (or
+rather of the hierarchy of consumers, which itself reflects the social
+structures which crystallise around the mode of production - what
+Marxists call 'relations of production'). It is all too clear that this
+reversal is particularly marked in our capitalist society and that it is an
+expression of its fundamental contradiction - over-production. And it
+is the absence of home markets capable of absorbing the entire product which has forced maritime societies since antiquity to trade by
+sea in order to search for new products or raw materials; it is this
+which has forced the continental powers into military imperialism.
+But this scarcity of man in relation to the product, the final twist of
+the dialectic of scarcity, presupposes as its essential condition the
+scarcity of the product in relation to man. And this scarcity is a fundamental determination of man: as is well known, the socialisation of
+
+139
+production does not put an end to it except possibly through a long
+dialectical process of which we cannot yet know the outcome. The
+scarcity of consumers in relation to a particular product is conditioned
+by the scarcity of all products in relation to all consumers. Indeed, it is
+because of this fundamental scarcity that certain relations of production have arisen, defined on the basis of the mode of production,
+which institutionally exclude certain social groups from full consumption, reserving it for other groups, insufficient in number to
+consume everything.
+There would be no point in expounding the dialectic of 'overproduction' and its crises here. But it is important to notice that,
+taking the process as a whole, the capitalist is ruined, because of lack
+of outlets under competition, precisely to the extent that the proletariat is impoverished, that is to say, to the extent that the process
+produces a scarcity of objects of primary necessity. It is perfectly
+logical, at this level of the contradiction, for a given society to destroy
+some of its members as surplus to requirements at the same time as
+destroying part of its product because production exceeds consumption.
+And of course even if these products were distributed free to those
+whom society would otherwise allow to die, this would scarcely
+improve their lot. There would have to be a change at the level of the
+mode of production and of the basic relations to which it gives rise if
+the scarcity of consumers were to be made absolutely impossible and
+the reality of basic scarcity eliminated in the long term. The important
+thing, from the point ofview of the logical structures of History, is that the
+historical process is constituted in the field of scarcity; and if it actualises all its dialectical possibilities, this is because of its actual contingent materiality, the outcome of an original contingency. But although,
+it we consider each case in isolation, it would have been possible for
+some of these dialectical moments not to have developed (we have only
+to consider peoples with no history, or those Asiatic nations which
+were forced to interiorise the fundamental relation of man to machine
+in the form in which the capitalist West initially imposed it on them in
+colonialism, once these moments appear as structures of intelligibility
+in a developing history, they alone enable it to be seen as a total
+rationality.
+
+140 Book I
+(iż) Scarcity and Marxism
+It should be noted that Marx21 - so clear and intelligible in his dialectical reconstruction of the capitalist process and in demonstrating its
+necessity - always refused, and rightly so, to present Marxism as 'a
+general historico-philosophical theory the supreme virtue of which
+consists in being supra-historical' " But at the same time, he believed -
+correctly, though without historical proof - that historical materialism
+was applicable to every moment of the historical process. In a remarkable passage, he criticised our contemporary Marxists and their dogmatism.
+'(The plebeians) of ancient Rome were originally free peasants, each
+cultivating his own piece of land on his own account. In the course of
+Roman history they were expropriated. The same movement which
+divorced them from their means of production and subsistence involved the formation not only of big landed property but also of big
+money capital. Thus one fine morning there were to be found, on the
+one hand, free men stripped of everything except their labour power
+and on the other, the owners of all the acquired wealth ready to exploit
+this labour. What happened? The Roman proletarians became not
+wage labourers but a mob of do-nothings... and alongside them there
+developed a mode of production which was not capitalist but based on
+slavery. Thus events strikingly analogous but taking place in different
+historical surroundings led to totally different results. By studying
+each of these forms of evolution separately, and then comparing them
+one can easily find the clue to this phenomenon....
+This passage clearly shows that, for Marx, the history of the non-
+21. Since Marx constituted the materialist dialectic out of and in opposition to
+the bourgeois economists of scarcity, the discussion which follows is necessary,
+though it may appear to be a digression. Its aim is to re-integrate scarcity into
+human history as a human fact, rather than as the malignity of a cruel Nature.
+22. Karl Marx, Letter to the editorial board of the Otechestvenniye Zapiski,
+Nov. 1877, in Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, Moscow, 1975, p. 294.
+[Ed.]
+23. Ibid. The object is to show that the proletarianisation of the Roman
+plebs, despite its similarity to the proletarianisation of a section of the contemporary peasant class, does not produce the same results and that, consequently,
+the march of Russia towards socialism will be different from that of the advanced
+capitalist countries.
+
+142
+capitalist and pre-capitalist societies of the past is not over and done with.
+It is important to study the development of these societies, and to
+compare them amongst themselves and with modern societies, at least
+when there are compelling analogies; and intelligibility will be produced by these separate studies and by their comparison. Of course, the
+comparison will make them intelligible in so far as they differ through
+occurring in entirely different surroundings. But it is not based purely
+on the external similarity of the processes: the similarity is founded,
+although it in turn provides a foundation for difference. It is based
+essentially on the dialectical development of certain relations of man to
+his praxis, that is, to his labour (free peasants, that is, peasants freely
+working their fields; concentration of landed property and monetary
+capital reducing the expropriated to the condition of possible labourers
+for whom, nevertheless, labour, as the condition of the production of
+life, has become the primary scarcity). But all this is only roughly
+sketched, and consequently the evolution of the transformations of
+Roman society has the form of a story which lacks genuine intelligibility.
+Thope it will not be suggested that the reason for the differentiation
+between the two processes resides in the radical difference between the
+two modes of production. It is true, in a sense, that the constitution of
+the Roman plebs presupposed that there was no industry in the modern
+sense at the time. But this is merely to say that the proletarianisation of
+the peasants driven from the countryside directly depended, in our own
+case, on industrialisation and industrial concentration. In other words,
+the movement towards industrialisation is a source of positive intelligibility for the contemporary phenomenon; but its absence, for Rome
+and the Romans, has meaning only forus, and only as a strict negation
+of total exteriority. It is a negative source of intelligibility, for instance,
+to show that a nation lost a war through the inadequacy of its armaments compared to the enemy's. It would be completely senseless to
+say that Napoleon was beaten at Waterloo because he did not have an
+air force. In short, the Roman process must provide its positive sources
+of intelligibility from within itself.
+It is worth observing that the schemata of pre-history, antiquity, the
+Middle Ages and the pre-capitalist period are very seldom presented by
+Marx in an intelligible form. Firstly, he did not hesitate to reshape them
+in response to the work of non-Marxist historians - and this is to his
+credit. For instance, he presented his theory of class struggle as a very
+general truth, based on experience: "The history of all hitherto existing
+
+142
+society is the history of class struggles'24 Later Engels added the
+following note: "That is, all written history. In 1847, the pre-history of
+society, the social organization existing previous to recorded history,
+was all but unknown. Since then ... (it has been discovered that)
+common ownership of land ... and ... village communities... have
+been the primitive form of society. ... With the dissolution of these
+primeval communities society begins to be differentiated into separate
+and finally antagonistic classes.'
+It has been discovered'.... By whom! Haxthausen, Maurer and
+Morgan. They studied the data of pre-history, made conjectures and
+judged that they were confirmed by events. On the basis of this
+probability, Engels (and Marx before him) did not hesitate to change
+his conception of History, and thus to substitute an empirical conditioning for an intelligible development. On the basis of recent work in
+pre-history and ethnography, he would no doubt change again and
+recognise that the truth, though not proving him entirely wrong, is
+more complex than the simplistic historians of the nineteenth century
+ever imagined.
+Buy why did this dissolution occur? First, Engels himself believed
+that it did not take place everywhere; he liked the Iroquois and wished
+to believe that original purity had lasted longer in them. Secondly, he
+cited many societies in which it occurred at very different periods, and
+often from outside, through contact with more 'evolved' societies. For
+instance, he wrote in the Anti-Dühring: 'For thousands of years,
+Oriental despotism and the changing rule of conquering nomad
+peoples were unable to injure these old communities; the gradual
+destruction of their primitive home industry by the competition of
+products of large-scale industry brought these communities nearer and
+nearer to dissolution'. 25 And Marx, referring to the Russian commune,
+described Russia as 'the only European country where the "village
+community" has been maintained on a national scale down to our own
+day.'26 These considerations inevitably bring us back to the difficult
+problem of peoples with no history. But they amplify and exaggerate
+the problem, since they make the temporal order of different histories
+seem completely contingent. I certainly would not claim that Marx and
+24. Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, (1848). See Marx and Engels,
+Selected Works, (1962), Vol. 1, p. 34. LEd.
+25. Engels, Anti-Dühring, Moscow, 1947, p. 194. [Ed.]
+26. Letter to Vera Zassulitsch, first draft, Marx and Engels Werke, Vol. I9,
+p. 389. [Ed.]
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 143
+Engels regarded this particular contingency as irreducible - irreducible,
+for example, to the more general contingency of there being a history,
+which we will discuss more fully later. What is certain is that in the
+cases under consideration we are confronting vast hypotheses about
+the succession of events which have no dialectical intelligibility. But
+let us see how Engels himself described the dissolution of village
+communities. Here are two passages from the same work. In the first
+we read:
+Private property ... already existed, though limited to certain
+objects, in the ancient primitive communes of all civilized peoples. It
+developed into the form of commodities within these communes, at
+first through barter with foreigners. The more the products of the
+commune assumed the commodity form, that is, the less they were produced for their producers' own use and the more for the purpose of
+exchange, and the more the original natural division of labour was
+extruded by exchange also within the commune, the more did inequality develop in the property owned by the individual members of
+the commune, the more deeply was the ancient common ownership of
+the land undermined, and the more rapidly did the commune develop
+towards its dissolution and transformation into a village of smallholding peasants' 27
+Exactly. This is an example of a law in the positivist sense, that is to
+say, of a function and the determination of its variable. Y = f(X). The
+rate at which a commune changes into a village of property-owning
+peasants is directly proportional to the rate at which increasing numbers of 'natural' products are transformed into commodities. But then,
+because this law, like every law of Nature, merely describes a universal
+relation between possibilities, its content is non-historical; on the
+contrary, it is for History to explain how and why in a given society the
+rate suddenly accelerates while in another there is practically no change.
+And this History must provide its own intelligibility as a temporal
+process; no analytical law can explain it. And it is striking that Engels
+tried in the sentence that follows to provide just such an example of
+this dissolution as historical intelligibility, and that he took the example
+from the Asiatic communes. The sentence, in fact, has already been
+quoted. It says that these communes managed to resist everything
+except the entirely modern competition of large-scale industry. Of
+course this sentence must be taken in context; Engels was rightly
+27. Anti-Dühring, p. 194. [Ed.]
+
+141 Book I
+trying to prove to Dühring that private property is not based on
+violence. Nevertheless he gave the effect of an industrialised society on
+a peasant commune as an example. The other example he chose is even
+more conclusive. It explains the contemporary dissolution of arable
+lands into agricultural properties on the banks of the Moselle or in the
+Hochwald as follows: "The peasants simply find it to their advantage
+that the private ownership of land should take the place of common
+ownership.'28 In their interests, of course - today, in an industrialised
+Germany. But earlier generations certainly did not see their interests in
+this way. So it is curious that the explanation of History relies on
+examples showing societies with no history being engulfed and dissolved by the history of Others. But this is precisely what needs to be
+explained. And it is pointless to conclude that Wherever private
+property evolved it was the result of altered relations of production
+and exchange, in the interest of increased production and in furtherance of intercourse - hence as a result of economic causes.'29 This
+tries to say everything but means nothing, and is still no more than a
+universal function.
+It will have been noticed that, in this passage, Engels makes commodity production the source of inequalities of wealth. But it could
+not possibly be maintained that these inequalities in themselves produce classes; and Engels himself did not believe it: in part three he
+gave a completely different interpretation of the division into classes:
+"The separation of society into an exploiting and an exploited class,
+a ruling and an oppressed class, was the necessary. consequence of the
+deficient and restricted development of production in former times. So
+long as the total social labour only yields a produce which but slightly
+exceeds that barely necessary for the existence of all; so long, therefore,
+as labour engages all or almost all the time of the majority of the members of society - so long, of necessity, this society is divided into
+classes. Side by side with the great majority, exclusively bond slaves to
+labour, arises a class freed from directly productive labour, which looks
+after the general affairs of society: the direction of labour, state business,
+law, science, art, etc. It is, therefore, the law of division of labour that
+lies at the basis of the division into classes.'30
+28. Ibid. [Ea.]
+29. Ibid. [Ed.]
+30. Anti-Dühring, PP. 333-4. Apart from the contradictions which will be
+noted below, it is curious that Engels can treat government and justice as factors
+engendering classes when he maintains elsewhere, and with more justification,
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 145
+Here the explanation is historical, and this is what makes it possible
+to see what is wrong with it. To begin with, it is clear that past societies
+- those which belong to 'written' History and are therefore characterised by classes - are divided into a plurality of classes, whose number
+tends to be gradually reduced by their struggles, rather than into the
+schematic duality which does not apply even today in industrialised
+countries. Besides, how can we accept the idea that the upper class is
+initially constituted as a ruling class and frees itself from directly productive labour by means of its new function when Engels himself says
+that the institution of slavery frees the majority of 'free men' from a
+part of the constraints of labour? Or when the moment of the expropriation and concentration of landed property, according to Marx,
+follows that of the individual ownership of land by peasants; and when
+this moment in fact creates a defenceless proletariat confronting a class
+of big proprietors (together with other intermediary classes)? Similarly, in the Middle Ages, as Marc Bloch has said, a noble was originally
+a person who owned a horse; and if the peasants gathered around the
+castle, accepted the constraints of serfdom, forced labour and the
+communal kitchen, this was indeed due to a certain division of labour,
+but not the one Engels mentions. The peasant asks the noble to undertake the labour of war, that is to say, to defend him with violence
+against violence in the milieu of scarcity.
+What is striking in Engels' interpretations, and often in Marx's too,
+is that the references to scarcity are almost incomprehensible and, what
+is more, ambiguous. We find traces of it in this explanation of class
+duality; but the imagined society is assumed to produce a little more
+than necessary. And the scarcity is not a scarcity of goods, or of tools
+or of men, but of time. Of course, this scarcity reflects the others: if
+time is scarce for the worker (because he does not have enough of it to
+exercise his own sovereignty), we must obviously conclude that
+scarcity of goods and producers has been transposed and converted
+into scarcity of time. But this quintessentialised form does not take
+account of the reality of malnutrition which is universal today even
+under socialist régimes. The historical interpretations of Marx and
+that the dominant class produces the State as one of its organs. No doubt this is
+not a contradiction, but the 'circularity' is very suspicious. A class which developed on the basis of its political and judicial sovereignty would not have the
+characteristics of the owners of landed property or of the bourgeoisie of the
+Ancien Régime.
+
+146 Book I
+Engels, taken literally, would have us believe that societies always have
+enough of what is necessary, given the instruments at their disposal and
+the needs which have become stratified in their organisms; and that it
+is the mode of production which, through the institutions that it conditions, produces the social scarcity of its product, that is to say, class
+inequality.
+In Wage Labour and Capital Marx wrote: 'In production, men not
+only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by cooperating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In
+order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations
+with one another and only within these social connections and relations
+does their action on nature, does production, take place.'31 And a little
+further on: "The relations of production in their totality constitute what
+are called the social relations, society 32 I entirely agree with Marxism
+on this point. Given the existence of classes, that is to say, once "cooperation' has revealed the deep antagonism which underlies it, it
+provides us with the bases for a true intelligibility. The entire problem
+- and we can now see that there is only one problem here, the problem
+of the historical disintegration of agricultural communes being merely
+an aspect of it - is how, within Marxism, to conceive the transition
+from positive to negative. In Engels, we see workers creating their
+administrators; and in Marx, we see the direct co-operation of individuals around a mode of production which determines its conditions.
+But why must these direct transformations, which even look something like a Rousseauan contract, inevitably become antagonisms?
+Why should the social division of labour, which is a positive differentiation, be transformed into class struggle, that is, into a negative differentiation? After all, today, militant trade unionists are the organisers
+and administrators of the working class; and in certain countries they
+have taken on too much importance, or the leadership is becoming
+bureaucratic; the workers, however, have not claimed that they form a
+class or are going to become one. Is this because the differentiation
+occurs within the exploited class and against other classes? Undoubtedly. But when a group which is absorbed in labour which takes up all
+its time, produces apparatuses for supervision, management and control, these apparatuses, according to Engels, are maintained within
+this rudimentary society and their purpose is to counter internal
+3I. Marx, 'Wage Labour and Capital', Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 89. [Ed.]
+32. Ibido, p. 20. [Ea.]
+
+147
+divisions, natural dangers and enemies. Why should they break the
+unity of the society and produce classes? The only possible answer -
+not as the historical Reason for any particular process, but as the foundation of the intelligibility of History - is that negation must be given
+in the first instance in the original indifferentiation, whether this is an
+agricultural commune or a nomadic horde. And this negation, of
+course, is the interiorised negation of a number of men by scarcity, that
+is to say, the necessity for society to choose its dead and its underfed.
+In other words, it is the existence of a practical dimension of nonhumanity in the man of scarcity.
+Marx says very little about scarcity. The reason for this, I believe, is
+that it was a commonplace of classical economics, made fashionable by
+Adam Smith and developed by Malthus and his successors. Marx took
+it for granted and, rightly, since this is what Marxism consists in, preferred to treat labour as producing tools and consumption goods, and,
+at the same time, as producing definite relations between men. But in
+addition, when Marx did mention scarcity, in connection with the
+surplus part of the population, and resulting emigration, the only
+negative Reason for this seemed to him to be ignorance. In Antiquity,
+in fact, forced emigration ... was a constant element of the social
+structure.... Because the Ancients were ignorant of the application of
+the sciences of Nature to material production, they had to stay few in
+number in order to remain civilised.'33 But, as we saw above, this negative Reason is really a nothingness of Reason. It is as though Marx tried
+to transform an internal negation of the Greek or Roman groups into
+an external negation which had fallen out of the sky - that is to say, out
+of the year 1853. Besides, he only gave this example in order to contrast
+it with that of emigration in the capitalist period which is explained by
+sur plus. 'It is not the poverty of the productive forces which creates the
+surplus population; it is the increase in productive forces which demands
+a decrease in population and gets rid of the surplus by famine or emigration. '34 Of course, this is only a passing allusion to technological
+unemployment and the growing impoverishment of the working class
+through industrialisation. But the juxtaposition is typical. In the first
+case Marx evokes a negative Reason (the inadequacy of knowledge and,
+therefore, of the productive forces) only to make it vanish; and, in the
+second, he gives an entirely positive cause (the increase of the productive
+33. New York Tribune, 2 February 1853; Marx and Engels Werke, Vol. VIII,
+p. 493. [Ed.]
+34. Ibid.
+
+148 Book I
+forces) for an entirely negative event (the liquidation of surplus population by famine or emigration). This is just the conclusion he wanted to
+reach: in the capitalist period the mode of production itself produces
+scarcity (surplus population in a given society, decrease of purchasing
+power for each of them), because it comes into contradiction with the
+relations of production.
+This means that, according to Marx, the Revolution - which he
+believed to be imminent - would not simply be the heir of bankruptcy,
+and that, by transforming the relations of production, the proletariat
+would soon be in a position to reabsorb this social scarcity into a new
+society. The truth will appear later on when new contradictions will
+arise in a socialist society owing to the gigantic struggle against
+scarcity. It is this positive certainty which prevented Marx and Engels
+from emphasising scarcity as a negative unity through matter in labour
+and man's struggles. And it was this same certainty which gave such
+uncertainty to Engels's reflections on violence. For, in a sense, he saw
+violence everywhere and, like Marx, made it the midwife of change;
+and if words have any meaning, struggle involves violence. But in
+another sense, Engels refused, quite rightly, to follow Dühring when
+he tried to base property and exploitation on violence. Now Dühring
+was a fool, and his robinsonades are absurd; but Engels did not see that
+his idealist and romantic ideas and all their follies required the presence
+of the negative in History. And this is what Dühring meant by 'violence': the historical process cannot be understood without a permanent
+element of negativity, both exterior and interior to man. This is the
+perpetual possibility in man's very existence of being the one who sends
+Others to their deaths or whom Others send to his - in other words, of
+scarcity.
+The errors of the classical economists and of Dühring are exact
+opposites. The former, like everyone else at the time, believed in
+human nature. They placed man in situations of scarcity - this is what
+defined the economy - and tried to study his behaviour and the resulting relations between the objects of the economy. But it is assumed
+that man is what he is at the outset and that scarcity conditions him
+externally. Dühring, on the other hand, immediately attributed to man
+a capacity for violence and a will to use it which could only come from
+his enslaved will. This wicked creature's behaviour when there is no
+bread is not difficult to imagine. But violence is not necessarily an
+action; and Engels succeeded in showing that as an action it is absent
+from a great many processes. Nor is it a feature of Nature or a hidden
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 149
+potentiality. It is the constant non-humanity of human conduct as
+interiorised scarcity; it is, in short, what makes people see each other as
+the Other and as the principle of Evil. Thus the idea that the economy
+of scarcity is violence does not mean that there must be massacres,
+imprisonment or any visible use of torce, or even any present project
+of using it. It merely means that the relations of production are established and pursued in a climate of fear and mutual mistrust by individuals who are always ready to believe that the Other is an antihuman member of an alien species; in other words, that the Other,
+whoever he may be, can always be seen by Others as 'the one who
+started it'.
+This means that scarcity, as the negation of man in man by matter,
+is a principle of dialectical intelligibility. But I am not trying either to
+give an interpretation of pre-history or to fall back on the notion of
+classes and show, as so many others have done, how they originated.
+Such a project exceeds the powers of one individual; and in any case
+it is not what I intend. I simply wish to show that the dissolution of
+agricultural communes (where they existed), like the appearance of
+classes (even if we admit, with Engels, that they originate in a differentiation of functions), is intelligible only in terms of an original negation,
+whatever the real conditions of such events may be. From a material
+point of view, if workers produce a little more than society really
+needs, and if they are administered by a group which is freed from
+productive labour and whose members, necessarily few in number,
+can share out the surplus, there seems no reason at all why the situation
+should ever change. However, if we assume that differentiation occurs
+in a society whose members always produce a little less than everyone
+needs (which is always so, whatever the level of technique and so of
+demand), so that the constitution of an unproductive group depends on
+general malnutrition, and so that one of its essential functions is the
+selection of surplus population to be eliminated - if we assume all this,
+then, it seems to me, we will have grasped the very framework of the
+transformations, and their intelligibility.
+No one has the right to regard the fear of famine which is so striking
+in underdeveloped societies, or the Great Fears of peasants under
+feudalism confronting the spectre of starvation, as mere subjective
+feelings. On the contrary, they represent the interiorisation of objective
+conditions and are in themselves an origin of praxis. History has
+developed, through the differentiation of functions and sub-groups,
+within a humanity in which even today millions of men literally die of
+
+250 Book 1
+hunger. So it is immediately obvious that administrative, managing
+and ruling groups are both the same as those they administer (in so far
+as the latter accept them) and other than them. For not only are they
+responsible for determining the Others in the group, that is, for choosing the victims of the new system of distribution; but also, they are
+themselves the Others in the sense that they are completely dispensable,
+consuming without producing and constituting a pure threat for
+everybody. In the context of scarcity, the differentiation of functions
+(however this takes place, for Engels saw it in a very simplistic way)
+necessarily implies the constitution of a dispensable (but accepted)
+group and the formation, by this group, with the complicity of many
+Others, of a group of under-nourished producers. Conversely, the
+unproductive groups, which are perpetually in danger of liquidation
+because they are the absolute Other (living off the labour of Others),
+interiorise this ambivalent alterity and behave towards individuals
+either as if they were Other than man (positively, as gods) or as if they
+alone were men in the midst of a different, sub-human species. As for
+the sacrificial group, its relation with Others can truly be described as
+struggle. For even if violence is not used, such a group will be negated
+by everyone, that is, by scarcity in everyone and it will reply by
+negating this negation - not, however, at the level of praxis, but
+simply through that negation of negation which is need.
+We shall see later how in reality these acts and attitudes become
+beings, or collectives. We shall also see the true structure of groups.
+But it has been important to explore the primary conditioning of men
+by interiorised matter, this first, constant reassertion of control by the
+inertia of exteriority which contradicts praxis within praxis itself.
+This provides a foundation for the intelligibility of that cursed aspect of
+human history, both in its origins and today, in which man constantly
+sees his action being stolen from him and totally distorted by the
+milieu in which he inscribes it. It is primarily this tension which, by
+inflicting profound dangers on everyone in society, by creating
+diffused violence in everyone, and by producing the possibility for
+everyone of seeing his best friend approaching him as an alien wild
+beast, imposes a perpetual statute of extreme urgency on every praxis,
+at the simplest level, and, whatever its real aim, makes the praxis into
+an act of aggression against other individuals or groups. If one grants
+Marx and Engels the idea of class struggles, that is, of the negation of
+classes by one another; in other words, if one grants them negation,
+then they are able to comprehend History. But then we still have to
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 25г
+explain negation in the first place. And we have just seen that, under the
+rule of scarcity, the negation of man by man, adopted and interiorised
+by praxis, was the negation of man by matter in so far as the
+organism has his being outside him in Nature. But we cannot stop
+here, for two reasons. In the first place, scarcity is a fundamental but
+contingent expression of the reaction of matter to the organism, which
+means that we must attempt a general theory of the relations of matter
+and praxis in the inevitable framework of scarcity which ceaselessly
+produces us, but without dealing with scarcity in isolation. Secondly,
+goods, products, etc., have a double character in relation to man. On
+the one hand, they are scarce; on the other hand, this particular
+product, for example, is a real and present being, which I produce,
+possess, consume, etc. And no doubt scarcity dwells in it as a negative
+being through the very precautions I take in using it. But to the extent
+that I produce it and make use of it I also have relations with it by
+which I transcend it towards my own ends, by which my praxis is its
+negation; relations by which the result inscribed in it is, within man's
+univocal bond of interiority with Nature, a positive acquisition. The
+creation of a tool or an object of consumption diminishes scarcity - by
+a negation of the negation. It ought therefore, as such, to relax the
+tensions of alterity in the group, especially in so far as individual productive labour is also social labour, that is, in so far as, whether individual or collective, it increases the wealth of the community.
+Now, at this level of positivity, that is to say, precisely at the level of
+objectification, worked matter can be seen in all its docility both as a
+new totalisation of society and as its radical negation. At this level the
+real foundations of alienation appear: matter alienates in itself the action
+which works it, not because it is itself a force nor even because it is
+inertia, but because its inertia allows it to absorb the labour power of
+Others and turn it back against everyone. In the moment of passive
+negation, its interiorised scarcity makes everyone appear to Others as
+Other. In the moment of labour - the human moment in which man
+objectifies himself in producing his life - the inertia and material
+exteriority of objectification mean that, whatever else human relations
+may be, it is the product which defines men as Others and constitutes
+them as another species, as anti-human; and that it is in the product that
+people produce their own objectivity, which returns to them as an
+enemy and constitutes them as Other. Historical society could not
+produce itself through class struggles if the praxis which has been
+detached from it did not return to men as an independent and hostile
+
+252 Book I
+reality - not only in the context of the capitalist process, but also at
+every other moment of the historical process. Marx explained the
+material conditions for the appearance of capital, a social force which
+ultimately imposes itself on individuals as anti-social. But our concern
+is to carry out a concrete investigation of the general, dialectical conditions which produce a determinate inversion in the relations of man
+and matter as a moment of the overall process; and which produce,
+within that determinate moment, through the praxis of Others, and
+through his own praxis as Other, the domination of man by matter
+(by this particular already-worked matter) and the domination of
+matter by man. It is within this complex of dialectical relations that the
+possibility of the capitalist process constitutes itself as one of the possible historical moments of alienation.
+In other words: we have seen how production establishes itself and
+how it makes alterity a characteristic of the relations of production in
+the context of scarcity, or the negation of man by materiality as an
+inert absence of matter, and we shall now investigate how alienation
+becomes the rule of objectification in a historical society to the extent
+that materiality, as the positive presence of worked matter (of the
+tool), conditions human relations. We shall then understand, through
+the connection of these two dialectical moments, how classes are
+possible. But in the moment in which our praxis experiences its alienation, an internal and external structure of objectification appears, and
+this is precisely Necessity. So the rest of the regressive investigation
+need not be confined to displaying the intelligibility of class formation
+(on the basis of the mode of production and in the context of scarcity,
+as complex structures of stratified alterities, of interiorised and subsequently, re-exteriorised contradictions and of antagonisms); it also
+introduces us to its first structure of apodicticity. 35
+35. It must be clearly understood here that the rediscovery of scarcity in this
+investigation makes absolutely no claim either to oppose Marxist theory, or to
+complete it. It is of a different order. The essential discovery of Marxism is that
+labour, as a historical reality and as the utilisation of particular tools in an already
+determined social and material situation, is the real foundation of the organisation of social relations. This discovery can no longer be questioned. What we are
+arguing, however, is this: the possibility of these social relations becoming contradictory is itself due to an inert and material negation re-interiorised by man.
+We are also arguing that violence as a negative relation between one praxis and
+another characterises the immediate relation of all men, not as a real action but
+as an inorganic structure re-interiorised by organisms and that the possibility of
+reification is present in all human relations, even in the pre-capitalist period, and
+
+153
+Worked Matter as the Alienated Objectification of
+Individual and Collective Praxis
+It is important to be clear about what is meant by saying that a society
+designates its undernourished producers and selects its dead. It sometimes happens than an organised power consciously and deliberately
+decides to overpower and exploit certain groups for the advantage of
+others. This is the case, for instance, when one nation conquers another, and plunders and enslaves the defeated. But this is certainly not
+the most usual kind of case; on the contrary. Engels was right to say
+that very often, when two groups engage in a series of contractual
+exchanges, one of them will end up expropriated, proletarianised and,
+often, exploited, while the other concentrates the wealth in its own
+hands. This takes place in violence, but not by violence: and experiencingexchange as a duel in this way is characteristic of the man of scarcity.
+even in family relations or relations between friends. As for scarcity itself, it has
+a formal dialectic which we have already sketched: scarcity of products, scarcity
+of tools, scarcity of workers, and scarcity of consumers; it also has a historical,
+concrete dialectic about which we will be silent since it is for historians to retrace its moments. Indeed, it would be necessary to show the double transition,
+under the influence of production itself, from scarcity as the dispensability of each
+individual in relation to all, to scarcity as the designation by society of groups of
+under-consuming producers. At this point the relation between groups becomes
+violence - not necessarily because it was established by violence - Engels is right
+about this - but because it is in itself a relation of violence between violent men.
+The second aspect of the transition is from absolute scarcity, as a determinate
+impossibility of all the members of the group existing together in certain definite
+material conditions, to relative scarcity, as the impossibility that the group, in
+certain circumstances, should grow beyond a certain limit without any change in
+the mode or the relations of production (that is to say, scarcity in the form of the
+discreet liquidation of non-producers in a given society according to certain
+rules, and also as the selection of undernourished producers). This relative
+scarcity, which itself has a historical dialectic (an intelligible history), acquires, in
+class societies, the status of an institution. The analytical study of institutions of
+scarcity is political economy. This implies that in giving due weight to scarcity
+we are not reverting to a pre-Marxist theory of the pre-eminence of 'consumption', but merely throwing into relief negativity as the implicit motive force of
+the historical dialectic and making it intelligible. In the context of scarcity all the
+structures of any given society depend on the mode of production.
+
+154 Book I
+Though the result is appropriated in violence by the dominant class,
+it is not foreseen by the individuals who compose it.
+The striking thing about Marxist descriptions, however, is not so
+much exchange as the constraints of tools. Late eighteenth and nineteenth century society was completely dependent on the iron and coal
+complex. In other words, coal as a source of energy itself conditioned
+the means of harnessing that energy (for instance, the steam engine)
+and, through these new tools, it conditioned new methods of working
+iron. (The meaning and intelligibility of this observation will become
+clear later.) In this way, mankind came into possession of a source of
+accumulated energy derived from vanished vegetable matter; one
+might describe it as capital bequeathed to mankind by other living
+beings. But at the same time every proprietor was eating away his own
+capital; for mines are not inexhaustible. This peculiar feature of mining,
+as well as favouring industrialisation in its initial stages, made this
+first moment of industrial capitalism violent and feverish in character.
+All exploitative activities come to be based on the mode of exploitation
+of the mines; they are constituted in the perspective of rapid, brutal
+gains before the raw material is exhausted. And this gave rise to steam
+transport, railways (which are very directly linked to mining since
+their original function was to serve it, gas-lighting, etc. And within
+this complex of materials and instruments, there had to be a division
+of labour: mines and factories created their capitalists, their technicians
+and their workers.
+Marx and many later thinkers have shown the meaning of these constraints of matter - how the iron and coal complex presents itself at the
+basis of a society as the condition for class mobility, for new functions
+and institutions, for more extreme differentiations and for changes in
+the system of property, etc. But the undeniable result of what has sometimes been called the 'palaeotechnical' period was the partial destruction of the structures of the old society, the proletarianisation of
+certain groups and their subjugation to the two inhuman forces of
+physical fatigue and scarcity. And as a result of all this, a new kind of
+men came into being, 'iron and coal men', produced by mining and by
+new smelting techniques, the industrial proletarians (and, of course,
+industrialists and technicians, etc.). All this is well known. But still, it
+seems paradoxical that the ruthless proletarianisation of the peasants,
+which continued throughout the century, arose and developed from
+an incredible growth in the wealth of mankind and from absolute progress in its techniques. The historical reasons for this are well known.
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 155
+To take just two well understood examples, it has been shown hundreds of times how industry under the Second Empire itself produced
+a concentration of landed wealth, once industrialists had decided to
+construct the agricultural implements which enabled rich peasants to
+get richer while forcing poor, ruined peasants to sell their land and
+migrate to the towns. It has also been shown how steam ships caused
+the demographic transformation of England at the end of the last
+century by causing an unprecedented agricultural crisis simply by
+bringing Argentinian corn within a few days of England.
+From the point of view of intelligibility, the important thing is to
+comprehend how a positive fact, such as the large scale use of coal,
+could become the source of deeper and more violent divisions between
+people within a working society, a society which was also seeking to
+increase its social wealth by all available means; and to understand, too,
+how the constraints of the material complex which men inherit can
+negatively define the new expropriated, exploited and undernourished
+groups. Of course, this new mode of production could not haveabolished
+scarcity, so it was not even conceivable that the means of production
+should be socialised. But this negative explanation is no more valuable
+than the attempt to explain the emigration of ancient Greeks by reference
+to their ignorance of the sciences of Nature. It would be both more
+reasonable and more intelligible to exhibit industrialisation as a process
+which developed out of previous scarcity, which is a real factor in
+History (in so far as it is crystallised in institutions and practices), and
+therefore on the basis of the negation of men by matter through other
+men. It is obvious, for instance, that the first people to work in factories and mines in England were paupers, that is to say, peasants who
+had been designated, sometimes from father to son, as dispensable,
+surplus population as a result of the complex movement of agricultural
+economies and the hard policies of bourgeois land-owners. It was left
+to machines to shatter the last positive bond: the parish had formerly
+fed its poor; this was an ethico-religious practice, and the only vestige
+of feudal relationships built around the Church. (And as is well known,
+Marx said that in these relationships, oppression and exploitation did
+not altogether hide a non-reified human relation.) Industry, and the
+political representatives of industrialists, in so far as they made themselves political servants of industrialisation, however, condemned the
+poor. They were torn from their villages, and immense movements of
+population took place, and individuals were reduced to interchangeable
+units of an abstract labour power, the same in everyone. This labour
+
+256 Book I
+power itself became a commodity, and finally massification constituted
+workers in this first aspect: mere inert things who relate to other
+workers through competitive antagonism, and to themselves through
+the "free' possibility of selling that other thing, their labour power,
+which also means the possibility of working as a man rather than an
+animal, of organising one's praxis so as to contribute more to production, and of being a man in general, since praxis is the real humanity of
+man. In all these specific negations, scarcity and pre-capitalist social
+structures are no longer to be found, although of course the new negations were based on the old ones; they actually owe their negative
+character to the mode of production in so far as it rests on this incredible wealth. In an altogether different context, and with a very
+different intention, Engels noted this paradoxical character very
+clearly: negation as the result of positivity.
+"The natural division of labour within the family cultivating the
+soil made possible, at a certain level of well-being, the introduction of
+one or more strangers as additional labour forces. This was especially
+the case in countries where the old common ownership of the land had
+already disintegrated. ... Production had developed so far that the
+labour-power of a man could now produce more than was necessary
+for its mere maintenance; the means of maintaining additional labour
+forces existed; likewise the means of employing them; labour power
+acquired a value. But the community ... yielded no available, superfluous labour forces. On the other hand, such forces were provided by
+war, and war was as old as the simultaneous existence alongside each
+other of several groups of communities. Up to that time, ... prisoners of
+war... had
+... simply been killed.... But... now... the prisoners
+acquired a value; one therefore let them live and made use of their
+labour.... Thus force, instead of controlling the economic situation
+was on the contrary pressed into the service of the economic situation.
+Slavery had been invented. '36
+Considered in the context of economic evolution, slavery represents
+progress, and therefore in itself it expresses a positive response to the
+positive conditions hich gave rise to it: after all, it is, true that it was
+the basis of Ancient Greece and of the Roman Empire. Again, considered in itself, it can also be seen as a humanisation of war and a
+positive element in that prisoners of war acquired value on account of
+their potential labour (on the highly dubious assumption that slavery
+36. Anti-Dühring, PP. 215-IG.
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 15J
+can be explained in such simplistic terms). But from the first point of
+view, we could also say that, as far as the technical and even ethical
+progress of humanity are concerned, the industrial proletariat is a
+positive gain, because industrialisation involves proletarianisation and
+because the worker thus produced is destined to carry out the sentence
+which capitalism passes on itself.
+Marxism in no way conflicts with this; however, today, from the
+point of view of making History, it presents the positive character of
+the proletariat as the negation (human negation = praxis) of a negation. Similarly, from the point of view of the entire ancient world, the
+emancipation of the few through the enslavement of the many presents
+itself as the negation of the enslavement of all, and as an enslavement
+imposed only on some. Slavery prevents a possible enslavement. But
+when Engels shows us the origins of slavery, (or what he takes to be its
+origins), slavery appears as the negative result of a positive development
+of production. Freemen, working for themselves and their community,
+are reduced to their labour power, are forced to use it entirely for the
+advantage of some foreigner. That this negative side was perfectly
+evident to groups in which slavery existed is sufficiently proved by the
+frequent wartime oaths to die rather than become a slave. So it would
+be absolutely wrong to say that the massacre of prisoners, when it
+occurred, expressed the victor's indifference about the defeated. What
+it expressed was, rather, a certain statute of violence, in which death
+was a bond of antagonistic reciprocity; slavery was seen as positive in
+that positive extra labour power was actually present in exploitation,
+and it was seen as a negation of war, under the threat of war, perpetually,
+as the danger of a new statute being imposed on everyone. Besides,
+even if the transformation in the fate of prisoners of war due to economic development is, in this simplistic form, romanticised history, it is
+nevertheless clear that, when the practice became institutionalised, a
+complex system was constituted in response to the scarcity of slavery,
+involving a multiplication of wars and raids for the sake of conquering
+slaves, and also for the organisation of the slave-trade.
+It would be pointless for us to take up a moral position - which
+would be entirely meaningless - and to condemn the ancient system of
+slavery. Our concern has simply been to show that Engels wrote his
+paragraph on slavery using exclusively positive words and expressions,
+as against Dühring, who saw enslavement as simple violence and
+therefore as nothing but a fundamental negation of man by man. But
+Engels's collection of positive propositions does not conceal the fact
+
+258 Book I
+that slavery originally appeared as a choice of a category of undernourished sub-humans, by men who were conscious of their own
+humanity and that, as such, in spite of the false, specious argument
+based on war, it appeared as negativity. But should this negativity be
+attributed to a displacement of scarcity? Scarcity of labourers, replacing
+a scarcity of tools and raw materials? Yes indeed; but this only takes us
+back to the heart of the problem, since this displacement of scarcity, as
+a negation which had to be negated, emerged out of a positive process.
+And this production of negativity did not result directly from scarcity
+Jelt as need, since it occurred in groups (in particular, families) which
+were quite 'well off'. They could conceive it only as a lack which had to
+be acquired, that is, in so far as it was expressed - in tools, in cultivation,
+and in the technical organisation of familial exploitation - as a positive
+possibility creating its own negation in its very positivity. In this case,
+the materiality revealed by action is really entirely positive: in the
+practical field, the soil is revealed as soil to be cultivated. This means
+that materiality also indicates the means of cultivation - it reveals
+itself as such through the tools and organisation which have actually
+cultivated some other part of the same soil. But this positive ensemble
+is lived as a negative turning back, and conditions all negativity (the
+raid in which men are captured like animals, and the statute which
+assigns them to a place in the new society as both necessary producers
+and dispensable consumers reduced to underconsumption and which,
+in constituting the Other as sub-human, makes of the slave-owner a
+man other than man). 3?
+37. This is not a return to Hegelianism, which makes the Slave the Truth of
+the Master. Apart from the idealism of the celebrated passage on 'Master and
+Slave', Hegel can be criticised for describing the Master and the Slave, that is to
+say, ultimately, for describing the relations of a master with his slave through
+universals, without reference to their relations to other slaves or other masters. In
+reality, the plurality of masters and the serial character of every society cause the
+Master as such, even in idealist terms, to find a different truth within the ensemble
+of his class. Slaves are the truth of masters, but masters are also the truth of
+masters, and these two truths oppose one another as do these two categories of
+individuals. Besides, except at the time of great concentrations of landed wealth,
+in Rome and later, the Master also worked. So the problem was no longer to
+compare an idle whim with slave labour (which thereby became identified with
+labour in general), but rather, (to take for example a Greek artisan), to compare
+free (manual) labour with the slave labour which is its condition (but which is no
+longer identified with labour in general, since the slave is only given unpleasant
+tasks requiring no skill). If the slave possesses the secret of the master this is
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 15g
+Within praxis, therefore, there is a dialectical movement and a dialectical relation between action as the negation of matter (in its present
+organisation and on the basis of a future re-organisation), and matter,
+as the real, docile support of the developing re-organisation, as the
+negation of action. And this negation of action - which has nothing in
+common with obstruction - can be expressed in action only in terms of
+action itself; that is to say, its positive results, in so far as they are inscribed in the object, are turned against and into it in the form of
+objective, negative exigencies. This should surprise no-one; everyone
+understands the necessity of social transformations in terms of material
+and technical complexes. Today, everyone finds a true intelligibility
+in the objective process (which is much more complex than Engels's
+Marxism portrayed it) which adumbrates the slave as the sub-human
+future of still undetermined individuals on the basis of a technical progress and an increase in wealth which will rescue certain groups
+(including, in many cases, ones which will be reduced to slavery) from
+what Engels called the constraint of animality. Today everyone understands, or can understand, how machines, by their structure and
+functions, determine the nature of their servants as the rigid and imperious future of undetermined individuals and, thereby, create men.
+It is true that the intelligibility and objective necessity contained in
+the whole process sustain and illuminate our knowledge of it; but, on
+the other band, they remain hidden in so far as they are absorbed by a
+material content which then reveals them to knowledge through its own
+temporalisation and as the special rule of its historical development.
+We are unable to give a dialectical account of our social and historical
+language. In his excellent book, Mumford says: 'Since the steam engine
+requires constant care on the part of the stoker and engineer, steam
+power was more efficient in large units than in small ones. ... Thus
+steam power fostered the tendency toward large industrial plants... '38
+I do not wish to question the soundness of these observations, but
+simply to note the strange language - language whichhasbeenourssince
+Marx and which we have no difficulty in understanding - in which a
+single proposition links finality to necessity so indissolubly that it is
+impossible to tell any longer whether it is man or machine which is a
+because his labour is destined to approach a moment where it will cost more than
+it produces, thereby bringing about the ruin of the ancient world.
+38. Levis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, 1934, p. 162. The italics are
+Sartre's. [Ed.]
+
+260 Book I
+practical project. We all feel that this language is correct, but also
+realise that we cannot explain or justify this feeling. Similarly, when we
+learn that gas-lighting, which was a consequence of the use of coal as a
+source of energy, enabled employers to make their workers work
+fifteen or sixteen hours a day, we do not quite know whether it was the
+industrial ensemble dominated by coal which, through the medium of
+the men it produced, required a working day of sixteen hours, or
+whether it was the industrialist, in the coal-based economy, who used
+gas-lighting to increase production or, again, whether the two formulations do not refer to two aspects of a single dialectical circularity. It is
+precisely at this level that a dialectical investigation must supply its
+own intelligibility, as the general condition of the relation of praxis to
+tools and, generally speaking, to materiality. This means that the
+translucidity of the individual praxis as the free, re-organising transcendence of particular conditionings, is really an abstract moment of
+the dialectical investigation - even though this moment can develop as
+a concrete reality in any particular undertaking, even in the wage
+earner's manual labour (for instance, when a skilled worker, though
+conscious of having sold his labour power, remains the organiser of his
+professional praxis). The deepening of the investigation must also be
+a deepening of praxis. It is in praxis itself, in so far as it objectivises
+itself, that we will find the new moment of dialectical intelligibility,
+which constitutes the result of a negation of the undertaking. This new
+structure of rationality can be called dialectical intelligibility because
+in its immediate purity it is simply a new dialectical determination
+produced on the basis of existing structures, and without any new
+factors apart from those it itself produces on the basis of these structures
+as the totalisation of their transcendence and as the strict necessity
+of this transcendence. 39
+39. After the transcendence the totalisation itself becomes particular, both as
+an alienated objectification and in relation to the transcended structures which
+still exist, also in freedom (that is to say, in the strict conditioning of their reciprocal determinations and beyond all transcendence). So the particularised
+totalisation becomes, with others, the object of a new totalising transcendence
+which we shall have to discuss later. By way of an example, I would refer the
+reader to the observations I made in The Problem of Method (p. 72) on some
+studies by Kardiner, in particular the inquiry into the natives of the Marquesas
+islands.
+
+1(iz
+(i) Matter as inverted praxis
+Every praxis is primarily an instrumentalisation of material reality. It
+envelops the inanimate thing in a totalising project which gives it a
+pseudo-organic unity. By this I mean that this unity is indeed that of a
+whole, but that it remains social and human; in itself it does not achieve
+the structures of exteriority which constitute the molecular world.
+However, if the unity persists, it does so through material inertia. But
+this unity is nothing other than the passive reflection of praxis, that is
+to say, of a human enterprise undertaken in particular circumstances,
+with well defined tools and in a historical society at a certain point in
+its development, and therefore the object produced reflects the whole
+collectivity. But it reflects it in the dimension of passivity. Take, for
+example, the act of sealing something. It is performed on certain ceremonial occasions (treaties, contracts, etc.) with a special tool. The wax
+returns (retourne) the act; its inertia reflects the doing as pure beingthere. At this level, practice absorbed by its 'material' becomes a
+material caricature of the human. The manufactured object proposes
+itself to men and imposes itself on them; it defines them and indicates
+to them how it is to be used. In order to incorporate this set of indications into a general theory of signs, one would have to say that the too!
+is a signifier and that man here is a signified. In fact, the tool can have
+meaning only through man's labour, and man can only signify what he
+knows. In a sense, therefore, it appears that tools reflect to individuals
+nothing but their own knowledge. One can see this in the routine of a
+craftsman, in which the worker apprehends, through the tool he has
+himself made, the eternal return of the same movements, defining a
+permanent statute within the corporation or the town, in relation to an
+unchanging clientèle.
+But precisely because signification takes on the character of materiality, it enters into relation with the entire Universe. This means that
+infinitely many unforeseeable relations are established, through the
+mediation of social practice, between the matter which absorbs praxis
+and other materialised significations.
+Inert praxis which imbibes matter transforms natural, meaningless
+forces into quasi-human practices, that is to say, into passivised actions.
+Chinese peasants, as Grousset rightly says, are colonialists. For four
+thousand years, they have been appropriating arable land on the frontiers of their territory, from Nature and from the nomads. One aspect
+
+162 Book I
+of their activity is the deforestation which has been going on for
+centuries. This praxis is living and real, and retains a traditional aspect:
+even recently the peasant was still tearing up scrub to clear a place for
+millet. But, at the same time, it inscribes itself on nature, both positively
+and negatively. Its positive aspect is that of the soil and the division of
+cultivation. Its negative aspect is a signification of which the peasants
+themselves are not aware, precisely because it is an absence - the absence
+of trees. A European flying over China today is immediately struck by
+this feature; China's present leaders have perceived it and are aware of
+the seriousness of the danger. But traditionalist Chinese in previous
+centuries could not perceive it since their goal was conquest of the soil.
+They saw only the plenty represented by their harvests and had no
+eyes for the lack, which was for them, at most, a simple process of
+liberation, the elimination of an obstacle. On this basis, deforestation,
+as a passivised practice which had become characteristic of the mountains, particularly those that dominate Szechwan, transformed that
+physico-chemical sphere which can be called 'wild' in the sense that it
+begins where human practice leaves off. To begin with, this wild
+sector is human in that it expresses the historical limit of society at a
+particular moment. But above all deforestation as the elimination of
+obstacles becomes negatively a lack of protection: since the loess of the
+mountains and peneplains is no longer retained by trees, it congests the
+rivers, raising them higher than the plains and bottling them up in their
+lower reaches, and forcing them to overflow their banks. Thus, the
+whole history of the terrible Chinese floods appears as an intentionally
+constructed mechanism. 40
+If some enemy of mankind had wanted to persecute the peasants of
+the Great Plain, he would have ordered mercenary troops to deforest
+the mountains systematically. The positive system of agriculture was
+transformed into an infernal machine. But the enemy who introduced
+the loess, the river, the gravity, the whole of hydrodynamics, into this
+destructive apparatus was the peasant himself. Yet, taken in the moment
+of its living development, his action does not include this rebound,
+either intentionally or in reality. In this particular place, and for this
+particular man cultivating his land, all that existed was an organic
+connection between the negative (removal of the obstacle) and the
+positive (enlargement of the arable sector). The first thing that is
+necessary for counter-finality to exist is that it should be adumbrated
+40. Cf. my remarks about counter-finality, above.
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 163
+by a kind of disposition of matter (in this case the geological and hydrographic structure of China). It seems that in order to remove the danger
+of flooding completely it would not have been sufficient not to deforest.
+From ancient times, reforestation would have been necessary. Second,
+human praxis has to become a fatality and to be absorbed by inertia,
+taking on both the strictness of physical causation and the obstinate
+precision of human labour. Destruction by Nature is imprecise: it
+leaves little islands, even whole archipelagos. Human destruction is
+systematic: a particular farmer proceeds on the basis of an approach to
+a limit which conditions his praxis - quite simply, the idea that every
+tree growing in his field should be destroyed. Thus the absence of
+trees, which is an inert and thus a material negation, also has the
+systematic character of a praxis at the heart of materiality. Last, and
+most important, the activity must be carried on elsewhere: peasants
+everywhere must burn or uproot the scrub. These actions, which are
+legion and, as actions, both identical and irreducible, are united by the
+matter they unify. Through molecular homogeneity, the multiplicity
+of actions is diffused in the 'community' of being. Imprinted on the
+red soil, which offers itself as an infinite deployment of materiality,
+particular actions lose both their individuality and their relation of
+identity (in space and time): they spread themselves out without
+frontiers, carried along by this material deployment, and lose themselves
+in it; there is just one seal impressed on just one land.
+But the passive movement of this deployment is itself the result of
+an initial praxis; the changing links between groups, by river, canal and
+road created closeness and distance within an initial unity, which was the
+life lived in common under the same geographical conditions by a
+society already structured by its tools and its labour. Thus deforestation
+as the material unity of human actions is inscribed as a universal absence on an initial inert synthesis, which itself is already the materialisation of the human. And passive unity, as the synthetic appearance of
+pure dispersal and as the exteriorisation of the bond of interiority, is
+for praxis its unity as Other and in the domain of the Other. 41 On this
+basis, deforestation as the action of Others becomes everyone's action
+as Other in matter; objectification is alienation, and at first this primitive alienation does not express exploitation, though it is inseparable
+from it, but rather the materialisation of recurrence. There is no joint
+4I. Obviously my example can be understood only in the context of scarcity
+and as a displacement of it.
+
+164 Book 1
+undertaking, but still the infinite flight of particular undertakings inscribes itself in being as a joint result. By the same token, Others are
+fused, as Others, in the passive synthesis of a false unity; and, conversely, the Oneness stamped on matter reveals itself as Other than
+Oneness. The peasant becomes his own material fatality; he produces
+the floods which destroy him. 4z
+Thus human labour, though only just 'crystallised', is enriched with
+new meanings precisely to the extent that it eludes the labourer through
+its materiality. At this elementary stage, by inscribing itself in the
+natural milieu, it extends to the whole of Nature and incorporates the
+whole of Nature within itself: in and through labour Nature becomes
+both a new source of tools and a new threat. In being realised, human
+ends define a field of counter-finality around themselves. Through the
+unity of this counter-finality, deforestation negatively unites the
+enormous masses who people the great plain of China: it creates
+universal solidarity in the face of a single danger. But at the same time
+it aggravates antagonisms, because it represents a social future both for
+the peasants and for the land-owners. This future is both absurd, in that
+it comes to man from the non-human, and rational, in that it merely
+accentuates the essential features of the society. Future floods are lived
+as a traditional feature of Chinese societies. They bring about a perpetual shift of fortunes, and equalisation through catastrophe followed
+by renewed inequality; - hence the immemorial feudalism in which
+repetition replaces transformation, and in which, apart from the great
+landowners, the rich man is almost always a nouveau riche. Later, when
+it is recognised as the foremost danger, deforestation remains a threat
+to be eliminated, in the form of a common task whose success will give
+benefits to all.
+This first relation of man to the non-human - where Nature becomes
+the negation of man precisely to the extent that man is made anti-
+42. The extraordinary separation of rural workers in China, which the comunited.
+
+≥ 65
+physis and that the actions in exteriority of the atomised masses are
+united by the communal character of their results - does not as yet integrate materiality with the social, but makes mere Nature, as a brutal,
+exterior limitation of society, into the unity of men. What has happened
+is that, through the mediation of matter, men have realised and perfected a joint undertaking because of their radical separation. Nature,
+as an exterior constraint on society, at least in this particular form,
+constrains society as an interiority based on the objectification in exteriority of that society. This limit, however, is re-interiorised and institutionalised precisely to the extent that deforestation as a practical
+result appears as the means chosen by the Other for bringing about
+floods and to the extent that, throughout historical society, these floods
+appear as scourges which have to be combated, which necessarily
+implies a 'river civilisation', involving large-scale public works, movements of population, and the absolute authority of the rulers, etc. Thus
+we can begin to see an actual state of labour as a univocal relation of
+interiority between man and surrounding matter, a state in which there
+is a constant transformation of man's exigencies in relation to matter
+into exigencies of matter in relation to man. In this state, man's needs
+for material products, in so far as they express his being in their
+finality and rigidity as interiorised exteriority, are homogeneous in
+relation to the exigencies of matter in so far as these express a crystallised, inverted human praxis.
+These rational connections will become clearer at a more complex
+level of integration. Praxis uses tools which are not only the means by
+which the organism realises its own inertia in order to act on the inert
+milieu, but also the support of this inertia which has been exteriorised
+by an inorganic inertia, and the passive unity of the practical relation
+between an undertaking and its result. Thus Nature, though transcended, reappears within society, as the totalising relation of all
+materiality to itself and of all workers to one another. It is at this level
+that matter can be studied as an inverted praxis. As an example, we
+shall consider the role of precious metals in a given historical situation -
+Spanish hegemony, the decline of the Mediterranean, merchant
+capitalism struggling against feudal forms, and the exploitation of gold
+mines in Peru by new techniques. The precious metals will be considered as simultaneously products, commodities, signs, powers and
+instruments, and as themselves becoming exigencies, constraints,
+undertakings and non-human activities (in the sense that the nonhuman is a different species), while in a different way remaining for
+
+166 Book 1
+everyone the passive indication of a definite if temporary purchasing
+power. Obviously we do not intend to make an economic or historical
+study. But, given the work of historians and economists on the circulation of precious metals in the Mediterranean world during the Renaissance, we will try to grasp the intelligible bond of exteriority and
+of interiority in real life within that circulation, observing how, in the
+case of gold and silver as materiality, and in the case of man as the
+product of his product, it transforms human praxis into antipraxis, that
+is to say, into a praxis without an author, transcending the given towards rigid ends, whose hidden meaning is counter-finality. I shall
+apply myself, therefore, to an example, drawn from Spanish history,
+which has the advantage of showing the process of the inversion of
+praxis in all its clarity. It goes without saying that this process develops
+in class societies with class divisions. But it is not classes which we will
+be trying to understand in it, but rather, other things being equal, the
+dialectic of antipraxis as an objective relation between matter and man.
+On the basis of this inquiry, te shall, perhaps, be able to determine the
+conditions for the dialectical intelligibility of the constitution of classes
+as schism and conflict within a given grouping.
+In the example we have chosen, as in those quoted above, a social
+heritage turns into a disaster; and plenty itself becomes negativity (as
+also happened later, in the age of mining). The discovery of the Peruvian mines seemed at the time to be an increase of wealth and, in the
+middle of the sixteenth century, it caused a new technique of metallic
+amalgamation to be perfected. The continual increase in stocks of
+precious metals in Spain, however, eventually resulted in an increased
+cost of living on the whole of the Mediterranean seaboard, worsening
+poverty for the exploited classes, the paralysis of business and the ruin
+of many merchants and industrialists. The Spanish terror, caused by
+the outflow of gold, must be seen, finally, as containing not only the
+prophetic announcement of the decline of Spain and the Mediterranean,
+but also its result and one of its conditions. How can the affirmation of
+an affirmation produce a negation?
+As soon as the first Spanish gold coins had been struck, a living bond
+between them, other Spanish coins, and the coins of all other countries,
+and also between all these and all the gold mines established itself,
+through the apparatus and structures of mercantile capitalism and the
+historical praxis of Charles V and Philip II. The bond was initially a
+human one: mining, transport, melting down, minting - so many
+modalities of labour - defined techniques and social structures. Circu-
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 16J
+lation and hoarding are forms of praxis. It was the labour in the Peruvian mines, the long and difficult journey along the routes crossing the
+isthmus of Panama, and the comings and goings of the Spanish fleet
+which, under the Ancien Régime, placed Spanish currency as a whole in
+a permanent relation with mining as the source of constant, limited
+expansion. But it ivas the instruments of mining, the means of transport, the techniques of minting, etc. which, at least in part, accounted
+for the reserves of money at any particular moment in the reign of
+Philip I.
+At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Mediterranean suffered
+a 'gold famine': African sources were exhausted. America was replacing them, and up to 1550, Spain was importing both gold and
+silver. But in the second half of the century, silver predominated, and
+this was because Bartolomeo de Medina had introduced a new amalgamation process into the American mines. Between 1580 and I630
+imports of precious metals increased tenfold. This is a case of matter
+acting on matter: the treatment of silver ore with mercury conditioned
+the whole evolution of money up to the middle of the following
+century. But this instrumental materiality was materialised practice.
+Later, as prices rose, the effects of the increase were felt particularly in
+Florence and in Castille. Braudel explains why: 'Continental prices
+reflected the constant tension in economies affected by the hostile
+distances separating them from the sea.'43 But these hostile distances
+also express materialised praxis: distance as materiality is a function of
+the state of the roads, of the means of communication, and of conflicts
+between towns: Florence was now close to the sea. In short, at this
+level, matter as a limit to signification becomes a mediation between
+significations. It is in and through matter that significations (crystallised praxis) combine into new but still inert syntheses.
+American gold and silver took on their true character within these
+passive totalisations. Coins became human quantities under the influence of the inert actions surrounding them. In a sense, indeed, quantity
+was already in them, since it cannot be separated from materiality, nor,
+43. F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of
+Philip II (1949). [English translation of second edition by Sian Reynolds, Collins,
+1972 - Ed.] The whole of the exposition which follows is no more than a commentary on this admirable work. See, in particular, Part Two. "Collective
+Destinies and General Trends', chapter two, 'Economies: Precious Metals, Money
+and Prices'. [The sentence quoted by Sartre is on p. 413 of the first, French
+edition, and does not occur in the second - Ed.]
+
+Book 1
+above all, from being in exteriority. But it was not a differentiated
+quantum; and, above all, it did not concern coins as such. I am not
+referring to the value of coins, which is something we shall come to
+later. If it were only a question of their weight, even that would have
+its concrete reality only in relation to the galleons which transported
+them and the carts which brought them to the capital from the coast.
+And how could their number be determined except in relation to a
+definite vessel in which they accumulated without being able to escape?
+Such a vessel existed: it was Spain itself, 'a country traditionally protectionist, fenced around with customs barriers. ... So, in principle,
+the huge American treasure was being drawn into a sealed vessel. '44 It
+was the unity of the vessel, the customs barriers and the authoritarianism of the absolute monarchy which allowed the amount of coins or
+precious metal to be checked and counted. It was in relation to this
+unit that this quantity would be reckoned as abundance or as scarcity.
+It was at the bottom of this crucible that the heavy burden of ingots
+and coins began to weigh; it was in and through it that real relations
+came to be established between this mineral and other material objects
+- manufactured products, food-stuffs, etc. Should this crucible, this
+unbreakable vessel (unbreakable in theory at least) be called material,
+on the grounds that the very nature of the Spanish frontiers (the sea,
+the Pyrenees) constitutes in itself a natural barrier, and that institutions,
+social structures and the system of government are crystallised practices? Or should it be called praxis, on the grounds that governments
+pursuing a precise policy and supported by the ruling classes appointed
+quite definite people - administrators, policemen, customs officials,
+etc. - to keep watch over the outflow of gold and silver?
+In reality, it is completely impossible to separate the first interpretation from the second: at this point we reach concrete and fundamental reality. Matter as the receptacle of passivised practices is
+indissolubly linked to lived praxis, which simultaneously adapts to
+material conditions and inert significations, and renews their meaning,
+re-constituting them by transcending them, if only to transform them.
+At this level, the process of revelation is constitutive in the sense that
+it realises a unity which, without man, would be instantly destroyed.
+Spain was the living unity of an undertaking, and restored their value
+and meaning to the signs inscribed in a sector of matter: and, at the
+same time, it was a material entity, a set of geographical, geological and
+44. Braudel, trans. Reynolds, p. 476.
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 169
+climatological conditions which sustained and modified the institutional meanings which it created and, in this way, conditioned the
+praxis of the men who were subject to that de facto unity, even in the
+movement which enabled them to transcend it. At this level of the
+double, regressive and progressive, approach we find a new structure
+of the real dialectic: every praxis is a unifying and revelatory transcendence of matter, and crystallises in materiality as a signifying
+transcendence of former, already materialised, actions. And all matter
+conditions human praxis through the passive unity of prefabricated
+meanings. There are no material objects which do not communicate
+among themselves through the mediation of men; and there is no man
+who is not born into a world of humanised materialities and materialised institutions, and who does not see a general future prescribed
+for him at the heart of the movement of History.
+In this way, society in its most concrete movement is shot through
+with passivity, and unceasingly totalises its inert multiplicities and
+inscribes its totalisation in inertia, while the material object, whose
+unity is thereby recreated, re-discovered and imposed, becomes a
+strange and living being with its own customs and its own movement.
+It is this point of view which enabled Braudel to write: "The Mediterranean as a unit, with its creative space, the amazing freedom of its
+sea-routes (its automatic free trade as Ernest Labrousse called it), with
+its many regions, so different yet so alike, its cities born of movement
+'45 This is not a metaphor. To preserve its reality as a dwelling a
+house must be inhabited, that is to say, looked after, heated, swept,
+repainted, etc.; otherwise it deteriorates. This vampire object constantly absorbs human action, lives on blood taken from man and finally
+lives in symbiosis with him. It derives all its physical properties,
+including temperature, from human action. For its inhabitants there is
+no difference between the passive activity which might be called
+'residence' and the pure re-constituting praxis which protects the house
+against the Universe, that is, which mediates between the exterior and
+the interior. At this level one can speak of 'the Mediterranean' as a real
+symbiosis of man and things, and as tending to petrify man in order to
+animate matter. Within a historical society, a definite economy based
+on particular types of exchange and, in the last analysis, on a particular
+kind of production, the Mediterranean, as a conditioned condition,
+emerges as a 'creative space'. For and through ships it expresses the
+45. Ibid., p. 1239.
+
+170 Book I
+freedom of its sea-routes, etc. In transcending his material condition
+man objectifies himself in matter through labour. This means that he
+loses himself for the sake of the human thing, " and that he can rediscover himself in the objective as the meaning for man of his product.
+Two types of human mediation must, however, be distinguished.
+The first is communal, premeditated, synthetic praxis uniting men
+(whether exploited or not) in a single enterprise aimed at a single
+object. Such - to return to our example - was the policy of Philip II's
+government, in particular, in relation to precious metals. This concerted undertaking*? led to the accumulation of ingots and coins in the
+depths of the crucible of Spain. Through this mediation matter
+directly produced its own idea. But this has nothing to do with
+philosophical or religious conceptions, constituted at the level of
+"superstructures' as dead possibilities far removed from reality. The
+idea of the thing is in the thing, that is to say, it is the thing itself revealing its reality through the practice which constitutes it, and through
+the instruments and institutions which define it. In the sixteenth
+century, the use of colonial mines necessarily meant importing unprocessed products from the colonies into the metropolitan country, and
+therefore accumulating precious metals in Spain. But this very practice revealed gold and silver as commodities, and this, moreover,
+corresponded to the mercantilism of the age. Money revealed itself as
+a commodity because it was treated as a commodity: since the necessities of colonisation implied the accumulation of gold in the colonising
+country, it is obvious that the labour expended on transport defined
+gold as real wealth. But it is even more obvious that the density and
+material opacity of the object, its weight and brilliance also turned it
+into an autonomous substance which was apparently sufficient to
+itself; the physical reality of the coin proved its bonitas intrinseca. 48
+Price became an intrinsic relation between the values of two commodities: that of the object you wished to buy and that of the monetary unit.
+46. Hence the profundity of Zola's title for one of his most famous novels, La
+Bête Humaine - the humanised machine, man with his animal needs, man as prey
+to the machine and the machine acquiring a parasitic life from man.
+47. In due course we will come back to these collective undertakings in so far
+as they make history. But we do not yet have the means to think them.
+48. On the other hand it would not have occurred to anyone in 1792 to regard
+assignats (promissory notes) as commodities. However, the metalist theory being
+then at its height, they were regarded as fiduciary signs backed by money-commodities which themselves served to mediate between the note and the national
+wealth.
+
+This idea of matter is naturalistic and materialistic in that it is matter
+itself producing its own idea. It is materialistic because it is simply the
+instrument itself conceived in its visible and tangible materiality; it is
+naturalistic because natural properties of the physical object are given
+as the source of its utility. 49 But, above all, it is praxis reverberating
+through a thing. Each praxis contains its own ideological justification:
+the movement of accumulation necessarily involves the idea that the
+accumulation of goods leads to prosperity; and since gold and silver
+are accumulated, it must be the case that the more ingots or coins you
+have, the richer you are. Thus the value of a unit must be constant,
+since wealth consists in the simple addition of monetary units. But is
+this idea of gold coins true?... or false? In fact, it is neither. In the
+importation process, the idea is gold revealing itself as a precious metal;
+but, at the same time, it is inert; it is not an invention of the mind, but
+a petrification of action. The idea is true of and in the coin, for the
+individual, for the moment, and as a direct connection between man
+and his product. But it becomes false, or incomplete, as soon as the
+play of recurrence totally falsifies the group's unitary, concerted
+undertaking. Here, and for this particular merchant, whatever the
+circumstances and however prices may fluctuate, it is still true that he
+will be richer this evening if he gets an extra thousand ducats. But in the
+process as a whole it is not the case that collectivities are enriched by the
+accumulation of monetary signs. Here, matter as passive activity and
+counter-finality contradicts its own idea through its movement.
+These remarks bring us to the second type of human mediation,
+which is serial. In this case, the same or different men constitute themselves at the margins of the undertaking as Others in relation to the
+common praxis. In other words, the synthetic interiority of the group
+at work is penetrated by the reciprocal exteriority of individuals, in so
+49. Marx wrote in Capital: "To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e.,
+the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea"
+forms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the
+real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea". With me, on the
+contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human
+mind, and translated into forms of thought'. ('Afterword to the Second German
+Edition', in Capital, Vol. I, trans. Moore and Aveling, London, Lawrence and
+Wishart, 1970, p. 19.) This is entirely correct, provided we add: and this material
+world has already transformed and translated human praxis into its own language, that is to say, into terms of inertia. The money-commodity is opaque
+matter in the head of a Spanish minister precisely to the extent that, in the gold
+coin, it is an idea.
+
+172
+far as this constitutes their material separation. In spite of customs
+barriers, prohibitions and police investigations, precious metals
+entered Spain only to leave it again: gold escaped across every frontier. First, there were illegal dealings: in this period, the Mediterranean
+world needed gold; trade was active and Sudanese gold was exhausted;
+and foreign merchants who had settled in Spain sent cash back to their
+own countries. Then there were legal outlets: imports of cereals and of
+certain manufactured products necessitated payment in cash. Finally,
+Spain's imperialist policy cost her dear, for the Netherlands swallowed
+up a large part of the Peruvian gold. So Braudel concludes that 'the
+Peninsula ... acted as a reservoir for precious metals'. 50a Indeed, in so
+far as frauds were perpetrated by Others (by and for foreigners), and
+in so far as Spanish imperialism was constituted as the policy of the
+Other in relation to money, in other words, in so far as the king was
+other than himself when he contradicted his own decisions, it becomes
+impossible to discern any communal action; there were only innumerable separate actions, without any concerted link. Whether they
+cheated individually or in small organised groups, the illegal operators
+did not usually know one another, since they were forced to act in
+secrecy; the king did not know his own contradiction; the purchase of
+corn and of essential products was immediately seen from another point
+of view in connection with the vital needs of Spain.
+But these isolated actions had an exterior bond in the inert unity of
+the stock of gold and in the inert idea which was inscribed on every
+ingot. Precious metal presented itself as the wealth of Spain, that is to
+say, it appeared, through the legal activities of merchants and of the
+government, as a material synthetic power liable both to increase and
+to decrease. Thus the losses of gold were regarded by the Cortes as a
+systematic impoverishment of the country. The unity of the concerted
+process of accumulation gave matter its passive unity as wealth; and
+this material unity in its turn unified the amorphous growth in fraud
+and in imports. In this way, matter itself became the essential thing, and
+individuals disappeared unrecognised into inessentiality. What had to
+be stopped was the outflow of gold. This outflow through the Other
+became a spontaneous movement of matter as Other, in so far as it was,
+in its very humanisation, Other than man. But since it was Other
+through its inertia, through its molecular structure, and through the
+reciprocal exteriority of its parts, that is to say, as matter, it absorbed
+soa. Braudel, op. cit., P. 479
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 173
+recurrence and made of it a sort of spontaneous resistance on the part
+of matter to the wishes and practices of men. In this case, inertia itself
+merged with alterity, and became a synthetic principle producing new
+forces. But these forces were negative: gold took on a 'life of its own'
+mediating between real praxis, whose unifying power and negativity
+it absorbed, and the mere succession of physical phenomena, whose
+dispersal in exteriority it re-affirmed. The characteristics of this
+magical life, which turns praxis back on itself and transforms ends into
+counter-ends, cannot be analysed here; but I will examine one example,
+which I shall call bewitched quantity.
+The Spanish government accumulated gold, yet the gold flowed out.
+On this plane, we have first a positive, logical action of quantity: it
+seems, in short, that gold flowed out faster and more abundantly as
+the monetary potential of the country rose. Hence Braudel's metaphor:
+'Spain was a reservoir'. If this action was negative, it was so only in
+relation to human undertakings. But this only means that the action's
+powers of destroying accumulation have to be seen in the same light
+as, for instance, the limits on the size of a galleon's cargo. If the
+galleon foundered, the shipwreck was due to the positive action of
+overloading; the more ingots it carried, the more it weighed. In reality
+this is not so clear, since any given current contains negativity. But,
+after all, a historian or an economist may use a physical symbol to
+describe the phenomenon as a whole.
+However, it is the other aspect of the complex fact of 'accumulationoutflow' that we shall refer to as a 'bewitchment of quantity'. American
+wealth stayed for a while in Spain, and was then discharged into other
+Mediterranean countries; for nearly a century the Spanish reserves were
+reconstituted and increased by new imports. Here a contradiction
+arises between the material idea of the money-commodity and economic reality. The quantitative notion enters into the idea; if the value
+of the monetary unit is fixed, then the greater the sum, the greater its
+value. And as I have shown, this is always true for the individual. But,
+while for him every new quantity increases his wealth, in the national
+community it devalues the unit; and thus individual wealth constantly
+deteriorates in the hands of the merchant or the industrialist, and his
+own increasing prosperity is partially responsible. Without any doubt,
+there are physical laws stating functional relations between two
+quantities, one of which increases as the other diminishes. This is what
+allowed the metalists of the liberal period to present the phenomenon
+of devaluation in terms of a relation between two variables, the money-
+
+174 Book l
+commodity and non-money commodities: if the quantity of money in
+circulation increases, then prices rise. But when the use-value of commodities - as well as their labour-value - remains fixed, then ex
+hypothesi the price rises solely because the value of the monetary unit
+has slumped. So we come back to this basic fact: the value of coins
+diminishes as they increase in number. Yesterday I had 5,000 ducats;
+today I have 10,000. Consequently this particular ducat, which has
+never left my pocket, has, without changing in nature, undergone a sort
+of deterioration or loss of power (always assuming, of course, that
+increase in wealth is related to the growth of reserves).
+Apparently the rise of prices in Spain 'seemed mad at the time'. A
+ship of 5oo tons was worth 4,000 ducats in the time of Charles V and
+15,000 in I6I2. Earl J. Hamiltonsob has shown that 'the correlation
+between the rate of imports of precious metals from America and
+prices is so obvious that they seem to be connected by a physical,
+mechanical link. Everything was governed by the increase in the stock
+of precious metals.' This stock tripled in the course of the sixteenth
+century and the monetary unit lost two thirds of its value. In short, it
+was partly a matter of a mechanical bond; but there was also the dialectical action of the whole on its parts. For mechanical bonds, strictly
+speaking, are bonds of exteriority: the forces acting on an object are
+independent of each other, and the elements of a system are invariable.
+It is for precisely this reason that they can be treated as quantities: the
+whole does not act on the parts for the simple reason that there is no
+whole. There are ensembles or sums: relations change, but the terms
+they relate are not modified by these changes.
+In the case of the price-rises, however, we find what might be called
+a phantom totality; in other words, the sum acts negatively on its parts
+as if it were a whole. As we have seen, the increase in reserves governed
+the devaluation of each unit. So the elements are constantly conditioned
+by their relations. But still, such a relation appears quantitative; in fact,
+it is a relation between quantities. But this relation of exteriority is
+eroded by a relation of interiority. This will be even clearer if we put
+the phenomenon back into the temporality of praxis instead of confining it to the timeless present of mechanism. A future then appears:
+inside the concerted action, which defines itself, as we have seen, in
+terms of its future totality, and which therefore takes the form of a
+5ob. Cf. Earl J. Hamilton, American Treasure and the Price Revolution in
+Spain, 1502-1650, Harvard, 1934. [Ed.]
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 175
+totalisation, the process of devaluation itself becomes a movement,
+whose future (the prospect of an even larger increase of reserves)
+determines the present itself and the praxis of groups or individuals
+(this is why it later became possible to speculate "bearishly"). Ultimately, devaluation came to the Spaniards from the future, and they
+could foresee it. Admittedly, the metalist theory caused confusion in
+the sixteenth century, and merchants did not realise that the increase
+in reserves governed the economy as a whole. On the other hand, they
+did realise that prices would continue to rise. They realised this because they extrapolated from the rise itself: and as a continuing process
+it projected its own future through them.
+Various acts and decisions followed from this: they would have to
+protect themselves against the present danger, but without losing
+sight of the continually worsening situation; in particular, industrialists would try to keep wages down. Wages in Spain (taking 1571-1580
+= 100 as base) stood at 127.84 in 1510, and after several ups and downs
+reached 21.31 in 16oo. Thus price rises, through the mediation of
+praxis in alterity (for the limitation of wages was not achieved by the
+government, but was the result of innumerable private initiatives51)
+produced far-reaching changes in other sectors of society. There was
+as yet no concerted praxis which could oppose these changes. Lacking
+the means to defend themselves, workers were controlled by an iron
+law, which also reveals to us the action of quantity as totalisation.
+When wages rocketed again in IGII (130.56), this was because poverty
+and epidemics had 'considerably reduced the population of the Peninsula'
+This shows us three things. First, the action of the employers, like
+that of the Chinese peasants, produced the opposite of what they hoped
+for. By lowering the standard of living they placed the population at
+the mercy of famine and epidemics, and thereby brought about a manpower crisis. Secondly, the masses, 'atomised' as they were by their
+lack of political unity, were materialised by the forces of massification.
+Here we can see them in their mechanical reality, for the organic and
+human aspect of each of them did not stop their relation to others being
+purely molecular from the point of view of the defece of wages. The isolation of everyone resulted in the ensemble of wage-earners being
+constituted as a vast, externally conditioned inert system. At this level,
+5I. Of course, it expresses a class attitude; but we are not yet equipped to
+think the action and interests of a class. See below.
+
+176 Book I
+this shows that inanimate matter is not defined by the actual substance
+of the particles composing it (which may be inert or living, inanimate
+or human), but by their relations among themselves and to the universe. We can also observe here, in this elementary form, the Nature of
+reification. It is not a metamorphosis of the individual into a thing, as
+is often supposed, but the necessity imposed by the structures of
+society on members of a social group, that they should live the fact
+that they belong to the group and, thereby, to society as a whole, as
+a molecular statute. What they experience or do as individuals is still,
+immediately, real praxis or human labour. But a sort of mechanical
+rigidity haunts them in the concrete undertaking of living and subjects
+the results of their actions to the alien laws of totalising addition. Their
+objectification is modified externally by the inert power of the objectification of others. Thirdly, it is materiality which opposes materiality:
+depopulation increases the value of the individual. This relation is the
+reverse of that which we found to apply to money: in this case less
+creates more. Here again it would be pointless to try and establish a
+functional relationship between the number of human commodities
+and their wages. For, from this point of view, the reality of the manthing, that is to say, his instrumentality, is already his labour, decomposed, detotalised and divided into the external atoms of hours of
+labour; and the only reality of the hour of labour is social: the price it
+fetches.52 Thus abundance produces devaluation, and consequently
+human material becomes scarce; therefore scarcity revalues social
+molecules. In this example, increasing scarcity plays the same role as a
+growth of monetary reserves: through the mediation of supply and
+demand, numerical decrease acts on its units as a totalisation by increasing the quantity of each of them. The possibility of being added
+becos lisa enamound, chat i to for the for ders. beone te rahes
+formation has taken place: the atomised group has become a mechanical system, but the pure exteriority of the summation has become a
+human or pseudo-human totality, and acts against employers in the
+manner of a general strike. 53
+52. One of the mystifications of surplus value is that the dead time of working
+hours is substituted for the concrete, human time of real labour, that is, of a
+totalising, human undertaking. Marx says this, though without stressing it. We
+shall return to it elsewhere.
+53. This transformation of matter and materialisation of the human in the
+individual himself is also to be found in marginalism. From this point of view,
+
+The process as a whole retained a human meaning in Spain because,
+in a way, everything from the outflow of gold to the outbreak of
+epidemics, including the price rises, can be regarded as the result of the
+deliberate and persistent practice of monetary accumulation. In the
+other Mediterranean countries, however, precious metal appeared,
+through various individual frauds, as an invasion. Governments had
+no legal means of encouraging the influx of money; the most they could
+do was to close their eyes to this automatic accumulation. In this case,
+money appeared in its material dispersal, in small separate sumsit or
+on the occasion of legal transactions, but with no other relation than
+temporal co-existence. Once again, the unity is human: the 'hunger for
+gold'. But this means a diffuse need on the part of Mediterranean industry
+and trade, felt through individuals unknown to one another. The
+unity was not a lived reality for anyone; it was a material reality expressed by a cloud of particular demands. In a sense, every merchant
+personal desires and needs are objectified and alienated in the use-values of the
+thing in which they become quantities. But, at the same time, the 'units' (doses)
+are no longer forced to co-exist like coins in a stocking; or rather, their coexistence becomes an internal relation. The 'marginal un it' - that with the lowest
+use-value - determines the value of all the others. And this is not a real synthesis,
+but a phantom interiorisation. In a real synthesis, the relation would establish
+itself between real, concrete and individuated parts. In marginalism, the final unit
+could be any one of them. Any of my ten gold coins can be regarded as the one
+which I shall use last; each of the employer's ten workers can be regarded as the
+last one, and his labour can always be seen in terms of its mar ginal productivity.
+But what makes this link of interiority commutative is the materialisation of
+need. It is this which, through the decomposition due to Gossen's law, impregnates the sum of marginal units with its unitary project. The truth of marginalism
+does not lie outside, in pure quantity; nor does it lie inside, in the 'psychological':
+it lies in the dialectical uncovering of a constant exchange between interiority and
+exteriority which bases a pseudo-mathematics on a pseudo-psychology and
+crystallises the lived time of satisfied need in a hidden ordinalism of cardinals.
+This pseudo-mathematics is in fact more like a logistic. There is nothing to prevent the construction of a symbolism once some universal relations of pseudointeriority have been defined. It is sufficient that exteriority should be present
+somewhere. It is the true interiority of relations - that is to say, the individuated
+part's concrete membership of the whole - which is always absolutely unamenable to symbolisation. In other words, certain moments of the dialectic can be
+expressed algebraically; but the dialectic itself in its real movement lies beyond
+any mathematics.
+54. 'In 1554... Don Juan de Mendoza searched the passengers travelling on
+his galleys from Catalonia to Italy. The result was the confiscation of 70,000
+ducats, most of it on Genoese merchants,? (Braudel, op. cit., p. 478.)
+
+178 Book l
+who demanded money realised the totalisation of the economy outside himself in institutions and social structures. Thus the influx of
+money was both summoned and suffered: an attraction was surrendered
+to like an invasion. The attraction was concrete and active when it
+affected individuals or particular companies; but in the case of a whole
+city or State it was passively suffered. Thus, if it is true that the State
+can be viewed as the destiny of every citizen, then, conversely, in the
+milieu of recurrence and alterity the atomised ensemble of citizens (at
+of the state.
+réals were at a premium, and they were even worth more than money
+minted in the country in question. A form of Spanish presence and
+hegemony were imposed through them and through the price rises
+they brought about. We need not labour the point, but it should also
+be noted how, through Spanish money, the social reality of the bourgeois class imposed itself as an intolerable constraint on the world of
+the workers. But the bourgeoisie was its own victim: as a class it
+suffered from the dealings of its members. Bankers and manufacturers
+were hit hard by inflation. It is indisputable that through this monetary
+revolution the Mediterranean world, violently impeded in its economic
+development, learned the fatality of its own decadence.
+What can we learn from this rapid survey? First, that significations
+are composed of matter alone. Matter retains them as inscriptions and
+gives them their true efficacity. In losing their human properties,
+human projects are engraved in Being, their translucidity becomes
+opacity, their tenuousness thickness, their volatile lightness permanence. They become Being by losing their quality as lived events; and in
+so far as they are Being they cannot be dissolved into knowledge even
+if they are deciphered and known. Only matter itself, beating on
+matter, can break them up. The meaning of human labour is that man
+is reduced to inorganic materiality in order to act materially on matter
+and to change his material life. Through trans-substantiation, the
+project inscribed by our bodies in a thing takes on the substantial
+characteristics of the thing without altogether losing its original
+qualities. It thus possesses an inert future within which we have to
+determine our own future. The future comes to man through things in
+so far as it previously came to things through man. Significations as
+passive impenetrability come to replace man in the human universe:
+he delegates his powers to them. They affect the entire material universe both by contact and by passive action at a distance. This means
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 279
+not only that they have been inscribed in Being, but also that Being
+has been poured into the mould of significations. It also means, however, that these heavy, inert objects lie at the basis of a community
+whose bonds are, in part, bonas of interiority. It is through this interiority that one material element can act on another from a distance; for
+example, the fall in the output of American mines put an end to inflation in the Mediterranean towards the middle of the seventeenth
+century. Through such modifications, however, an element may help
+to break the bond of interiority which unites men to one another.
+From this point of view, it is possible to accept both Durkheim's
+maxim and 'treat social facts as things', and the response of Weber and
+many contemporaries, that 'social facts are not things'. That is to say,
+social facts are things in so far as all things are, directly or indirectly,
+social facts. T'he foundation of the synthetic growth of wealth must be
+sought not, as it was by Kant, in a synthetic a priori judgement, but
+rather in an inert collection of significations in so far as they are forces.
+To the extent, however, that these forces are forces of inertia, that is to
+say, to the extent that they are communicated by and to matter from
+the outside, they introduce exteriority in the form of passive unity as
+a material bond of interiority. Thus materialised praxis (the minted
+coin, etc.) has the effect of uniting men precisely to the extent that it
+separates them by imposing on every one a meaningful reality infinitely
+richer and more contradictory than they anticipated individually.
+Materialised practices, poured into the exteriority of things, impose a
+common destiny on men who know nothing of one another, and,
+at the same time, by their very being, they reflect and reinforce the
+separation of individuals. In short, alterity comes to things through
+men and comes back to men from things in the form of atomisation: it
+was the Other that produced the outflows of gold. But gold, as an
+inert dispersal of monetary units, imbibed this alterity and became
+Other than man; through it, alterity was reinforced in everyone.
+However, as this alterity became the unity of an object or process
+(Gold, the Outflow of Gold), and as the unity arose within a human
+dispersal both as a community of destiny and as a conflict of interests,
+as a project of union and as lived separation, it became, for everyone,
+a synthetic determination of each in relation to all and, consequently, a
+more or less antagonistic connection between men. Thus worked
+matter reflects our activity back to us as inertia, and our inertia as
+activity, our interiority with the group as exteriority and our exteriority as a determination of interiority. In worked matter, the living is
+
+180
+Book 1
+transformed into the mechanical, and the mechanical is raised to a kind
+of parasitic life; it is our inverted reflection, and in it, to make use of a
+celebrated phrase of Hegel's, 'Nature appears as the Idea in the form
+of Otherness'. There is, simply, no Idea here at all, but only material
+actions performed by individuals. Matter is this changing reflection of
+exteriority and interiority only within a social world which it surrounds completely and penetrates, in so far as it is worked.
+If materiality is everywhere and if it is indissolubly linked to the
+meanings engraved in it by praxis, if a group of men can act as a
+quasi-mechanical system and a thing can produce its own idea, what
+becomes of matter, that is to say, Being totally without meaning? The
+answer is simple: it does not appear anywhere in human experience. At
+any moment of History things are human precisely to the extent that
+men are things. A volcanic eruption destroys Herculaneum; in a way,
+this is man destroying himself by the volcano. It is the social and
+material unity of the town and its inhabitants which, within the human
+world, confers the unity of an event on something which without men
+would perhaps dissolve into an indefinite process without meaning.
+Matter could not be matter except for God and for pure matter,
+which is absurd. But does this lead us back to dualism? Not at all. We
+situate man in the world, and we simply note that for and through man
+this world cannot be anything but human. But the dialectic is precisely
+a form of monism, in that oppositions appear to it as moments which
+are posited for themselves for an instant before bursting. If we were
+not wholly matter, how could we act on matter, and how could it act
+on us? If man were not a specific entity which lives its condition in
+totalising transcendence, how could there be a material world? How
+could we conceive of the general possibility of any activity whatever?
+We always experience material reality as a threat to our lives, as resistance to our labour, as a limit to our knowledge and also as actual or
+possible instrumentality. But we experience it in society, where inertia,
+automatism and impenetrability act as a brake on our action, as well as
+in inert objects which resist our efforts. In both cases we experience
+this passive force within a process of signifying unification. Matter
+eludes us precisely to the extent that it is given to us and in us. The
+universe of science is a strict chain of significations. These are produced
+by practice and return to it in order to illuminate it. But each of them
+appears as temporary; even if it is still in the system tomorrow, the
+permanent possibility of the overthrow of the ensemble will modify it.
+The monism which starts from the human world and situates man in
+
+182
+Nature is the monism of materiality. This is the only monism which is
+realist, and which removes the purely theological temptation to contemplate Nature 'without alien addition'.55 It is the only monism
+which makes man neither a molecular dispersal nor a being apart, the
+only one which starts by defining him by his praxis in the general
+milieu of animal life, and which can transcend the following two true
+but contradictory propositions: all existence in the universe is material;
+everything in the world of man is human.
+But how can we ground praxis, if we treat it as nothing more than
+the inessential moment of a radically non-human process? How can it be
+presented as a real material totalisation if the whole of Being is totalised
+through it? Surely man would become what Walter Biemel, in his
+commentary on Heidegger, calls 'the bearer of the Opening of Being' 56
+This is not a far fetched comparison. The reason why Heidegger payed
+tribute to Marxism is that he saw Marxist philosophy as a way of
+showing, as Waelhens says (speaking of Heideggerian existentialism),
+'that Being is Other in me... (and that) man... is himself only
+through Being, which is not him.'57 But any philosophy which subordinates the human to what is Other than man, whether it be an existentialist or Marxist idealism, has hatred of man as both its basis and its
+consequence: History has proved this in both cases. There is a choice:
+either man is primarily himself, or he is primarily Other than himself.
+Choosing the second doctrine simply makes one a victim and accomplice of real alienation. But alienation presupposes that man is primarily
+action. Servitude is based on freedom; the human relation of exteriority is based on the direct bond of interiority as the basic type of
+human relation. Man lives in a universe where the future is a thing,
+where the idea is an object and where the violence of matter is the
+'midwife of History'. But it is man who invests things with his own
+praxis, his own future and his own knowledge. If he could encounter
+55. Friedrich Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 198. See above, p. 27, n. 2.
+56. Walter Biemel, Le Concept du Monde chez Heidegger, Paris, 1950, pp. 85-6.
+Biemel adds that, in his writings after Sein und Zeit, 'Heidegger begins with
+Being and ends up with an interpretation of man' (Ibid.). This method brings him
+close to what we have called the external materialist dialectic. It, too, begins with
+Being (Nature without alien addition) and ends up with man; it too regards
+knowledge-reflection as 'an opening to Being (l'Etant) maintained in man by the
+Been (l'Eté)?
+57. Alphonse de Waelhens, Phénoménologie et Vérité, essai sur l'évolution de
+l'idée de vérité che, Husserl et Heidegger, Paris, Collection Épiméthée, 1953, p. 16.
+
+182 Book 1
+pure matter in experience, he would have to be either a god or a stone;
+and in either case, it would not affect him: either he would produce it out
+of the incomprehensible fulguration of his intuitions, or else action
+would disappear and be replaced by mere energy equations. The only
+temporal movement would be decay, that is to say, an inverted dialectic moving from the complex to the simple, from the concrete
+wealth of the earth to the indifferentiation of a perfect equilibrium: in
+short there would be involution and dissolution instead of evolution.
+In our example we saw how things can absorb the whole of human
+activity, and then materialise and return it: it could not be otherwise.
+Nothing happens to men or to objects except in their material being
+and through the materiality of Being. But man is precisely the material
+reality from which matter gets its human functions. Every effect of
+Spanish money was a transformation and reflection of human activity:
+wherever we find that an action of gold disrupts human relations without being willed by anyone, we discover an underlying profusion of
+human undertakings, directed towards individual or collective ends and
+metamorphosed through the mediation of things. In the indissoluble
+couple of 'matter' and 'human undertakings', each term modifies the
+other: the passive unity of the object determines material circumstances
+which the individual or group transcend by their projects, that is, by a
+real and active totalisation aimed at changing the world. This totalisation, however, would be pure negation if it were not inscribed in
+Being, if Being did not take hold of it as soon as it occurred, so as to
+transform it again into the pseudo-totality of the tool, and relate it as a
+finite determination to the whole universe. The totalising extraction
+from inert meanings involves a more or less profound and explicit
+decoding and understanding of the signifying ensemble. A project
+awakens significations; it momentarily restores their vigour and true
+unity in the transcendence which finally engraves this totality in some
+completely inert but already signifying material, which might be iron,
+marble or language, and which others animate with their movement
+from beneath, like stage-hands creating waves by crawling around
+under a piece of canvas. Everything changes and becomes confused;
+different meanings come together and merge in a passive recomposition which, by substituting the fixity of Being for the indefinite progress of the actual totalisation, encloses the totality-object within its
+limits and produces the ensemble of contradictions which will set it in
+opposition to the Universe. For it is not comprehension which solidifies meanings; it is Being.
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 183
+In this sense, the materiality of things or institutions is the radical
+negation of invention or creation; but this negation comes to Being
+through the project's negation of previous negations. Within the
+'matter-undertaking' couple, man causes himself to be negated by
+matter. By putting his meanings (that is to say, the pure totalising
+transcendence of previous Being) into matter, man allows himself to
+lend it his negative power, which impregnates materiality and transforms itself into a destructive power. 58 Thus negation, as a pure
+extraction from Being and an unveiling of the real in the light of a
+rearrangement of previous givens, becomes an inert power to crush,
+demolish and degrade. In the most adequate and satisfactory tool,
+there is a hidden violence which is the reverse of its docility. Its
+inertia always allows it to 'serve some other purpose', or rather, it
+already serves some other purpose; and that is how it creates a new
+system. Those who, in their turn, transcend this system must therefore have a project with a double aim: to resolve the existing contradictions by a wider totalisation, and to diminish the hold of materiality
+by substituting tenuousness for opacity, and lightness for weight; in
+other words it must create immaterial matter.
+Through the contraclictions which it carries within it, worked matter
+therefore becomes, by and for men, the fundamental motive force of
+History. In it the actions of all unite and take on a meaning, that is to
+say, they constitute for all the unity of a common future. But at the
+same time it eludes everyone and breaks the cycle of repetition because
+this future, always projected in a framework of scarcity, is non-human;
+its finality in the inert milieu of dispersal either changes into a counterfinality or, while remaining itself, produces a counter-finality for
+some or all. It therefore produces a necessity for change of itself, and as
+a synthetic summary of all actions, that is, of all inventions, creations,
+58. This is what primitive man immediately realises when he dreads and
+reveres his own power, become maleficent and turned against him in the arrow or
+the axe. In this sense, there is nothing surprising about religious ceremonies in
+which a supernatural power is conferred on weapons whose effectiveness is shown
+every düy by technique and experience. For this effectiveness is both a crystallisation of some human labour (the labour of an other) and a solidified indication of
+future behaviour. This fusion of the Other and himseli in a kind of eternity, this
+possession of the hunter by the technical capacities of the blacksmith and, in the
+end, the petrification of both - primitive man sees in these both a beneficent
+power and a threat. He guesses ai the hidden hostility of worked matier beneath
+its instrumentality. As has been known for a long time, this contradiction is
+characteristic of the relation to the sacred.
+
+287
+Book !
+etc. It is not only the social memory of a collectivity, but also its transcendent but interior unity, the totality made up of all its dispersed
+activities, the solidified threat of the future and the synthetic relation of
+alterity by which men are connected. It is both its own Idea and the
+negation of the Idea, and in any case the perpetual enrichment of all.
+Without it, thoughts and actions would disappear, for they are inscribed in it as a hostile power, and it is through it that they act
+materially or mechanically on men and on things, and in it that they are
+subjected to the mechanical action of things and of reified ideas. A coin
+as a human object in circulation is subject to the laws of Nature through
+other human objects, such as caravels, waggons, etc. These laws of
+Nature are unified in it in so far as its circulation is a parasitic inertia
+which vampirises human actions. Through this changing unity of
+natural laws, as through the strange human laws which result from
+circulation, it produces an inverted unity of men. This can be summarised in one word: praxis as the unification of inorganic plurality becomes the practical unity of matter. Material forces gathered together
+in the passive unity of tools or machines perform actions: they unify
+other inorganic dispersals and thereby impose a material unification on
+the plurality of men. The movement of materiality, in fact, derives
+from men. But the praxis inscribed in the instrument by past labour
+defines behaviour a priori by sketching in its passive rigidity the outline
+of a sort of mechanical alterity which culminates in a division of labour.
+Precisely because matter mediates between men, men mediate between
+materialised praxes, and dispersal orders itself into a sort of quasisynthetic hierarchy reproducing the particular ordering imposed on
+materiality by past labour in the form of a human order.
+At the level which we have now come to, our investigation has
+already reached richer meanings, but is still abstract. Obviously the
+human world contains more than this non-humanity; and it will be
+necessary to pass through further layers of intelligibility before completing our dialectical investigation. Nonetheless, whatever its relations with other moments of the investigation, it is correct to present
+this moment as the determination of a specific structure of real History,
+namely the domination of man by worked matter. But, in so far as we
+have been able to follow the movement of this domination in our
+example, we have seen the expression of that terrible aspect of man in
+which he is the product of his product. (We have also seen that, at this
+stage of the inquiry, he is nothing more than this.) We must now study
+this within the unity of this moment of the investigation and in close
+
+Matter as Totalised Iotality
+285
+connection with the non-human humanisation of materiality. In effect
+we have been inquiring into what type of intelligibility can be attributed to those curious synthetic everyday locutions, which we think
+we understand, in which finality and necessity, praxis and inertia, etc.,
+are united in an indissoluble totalisation. We also claimed that these
+locutions apply equally to human action and to the 'behaviour' of
+worked matter, as if man in so far as he is produced by his product and
+matter in so far as it is worked by man approached total equivalence
+through the gradual elimination of all their original differentiations;
+and even as if that equivalence, once realised, allowed us, by using
+these notions, to designate and to think objects which appear different
+but are of the same nature, one of them being a man or a group of men,
+and the other, for instance, a railway system or a group of machines.
+But this is not how it always is. Normally, at the present level of our
+investigation, the human object and the inanimate tool do not become
+identical; rather, an indissoluble symbiosis is set up between the
+humanised matter of the material ensembles and the dehumanised men
+of the corresponding human ensemble. Thus we use phrases like 'the
+factory' or 'the business' to refer either to a particular complex of
+instrumentality, surrounded by walls which materially determine its
+unity, or to the personnel within them, or to both at once in deliberate
+indifferentiation. But this totalisation, in the sense in which we understand it here, can occur only to the extent that the material and the
+personal factors are adapted to one another, without being strictly
+equivalent. Indeed, if individuals, as products of their labour, were
+simply free praxis organising matter - which, amongst other things,
+they really are at a more superficial level - the bond of interiority would
+remain univocal and it would be impossible to speak of the very distinctive unity which expresses itself in the social field as passive activity,
+as active passivity, and as praxis and destiny. In order that the social
+object thus constituted should have a being, it is necessary for man and
+his product to exchange their qualities and statutes in the process of
+production itself. Soon we shall examine the being of primitive social
+objects; but we must now turn to man in so far as he is dominated by
+worked matter.
+In this respect, man is still the man of need, of praxis and scarcity.
+But, in so far as he is dominated by matter, his activity is no longer
+directly derived from need, although this remains its fundamental
+basis: it is occasioned in him, from the outside, by worked matter as
+the practical exigency of the inanimate object. In other words, the
+
+286 Book 1
+object designates its man as one who is expected to behave in a certain
+tray. In the case of a circumscribed social and practical field, the worker's need and the necessity of producing his life (or of selling his
+labour pover so as to purchase his subsistence) are sufficient to create
+the unifying and totalising tension of the field for everyone. But this
+need is not necessarily present 'in person'; it is simply that to which the
+praxisas a whole refers. On the other hand, in so far as this social field
+(the factory or workshop, for example) is unified by all the others by
+means of an already constructed hierarchy, the individual worker is
+subjected to this unification in things themselves, as an alien power
+and, at the same time, as his own power. (This is quite apart from the
+structure of alienation, strictly so called, in so tar as this is linked to
+capitalist exploitation.) And this unification, which relates him both to
+Others and to himself as Other, is quite simply the collective unity of
+labour (of the workshop, the factory, etc.), to the extent that he can
+grasp it concretely only from the point of view of his own labour.
+Indeed, if he were to observe other men working, his knowledge of the
+unification of their movements would be abstract. But he lives in his
+own labour as the labour of Others, of all the Others of whom he is
+one, to the extent that the general movement of the collective praxis
+awakens the practical meanings which were given to the tools by labour
+which was completed in other times and places.
+A tool is in fact a praxis which has been crystallised and inverted by
+the inertia which sustains it, and this praxis addresses itself in the tool
+to anyone: a brace and bit and a monkey-wrench designate me as much
+as my neighbour. But when these designations are addressed to me,
+they generally remain abstract and purely logical, because I am a pettybourgeois intellectual, or rather, because I am designated as a pettybourgeois intellectual by the very fact that these relations remain pure,
+dead possibilities. However, in the practical field of actual common
+labour, the skilled worker is really and directly designated by the too!
+or the machine to which he is assigned. The method of using the
+machine, as established in the past by its producer, does not in fact
+designate him any more than it does me; it is only a particular way of
+being useful, and this constitutes the object itself, whoever uses it.
+But through this dead designation of inertia, the group of workers
+designates him, to the extent that the labour of all depends on the
+labour of each.
+But, as Marx has shown, the passive materiality of the machine
+realises itself as the negation of this human interdependence, and inter-
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 18J
+poses itself between labourers to precisely the extent that it is indispensable for their work; the living solidarity of the group is destroyed
+even before it can take shape. What one man expects of another, if
+their relation is human, is defined in reciprocity, for expectation is a
+human act. There can only be such a thing as passive exigency between
+them if, within a complex group, divisions, separations and the rigidity
+of the organs of transmission replace living bonds by a mechanical
+statute of materiality (we shall come back to this point later). For it is
+possible for praxis as such to unite itself to praxis in reciprocal action,
+and for everyone to propose his own end in so far as he recognises that
+of the Other; but no praxis as such can even formulate an imperative,
+simply because exigency does not enter into the structure of reciprocity.59
+As for sovereignty, which, as we shall see, is possessed by the third
+party, it is, as I shall try to show, nothing but freedom positing itself
+for itself. On the other hand, the expectation of others, affecting the
+individual labourer through the machine, is qualified by the machine
+itself. Simply by virtue of its structure, the machine says what task is
+to be performed. But even while human expectation - at least provided
+it achieves self-consciousness, and the group is not too large - relates
+to the worker in person, with his name and character, etc., the machine
+absorbs and depersonalises it, translating it into anyone's expectation;
+that is, into the expectation of the worker himself, in so far as he is not
+himself, but is defined by a universal pattern of behaviour, and is therefore other. In this way, it also makes his comrades Other than themselves, since they are merely the men who happen to be serving other
+machines, and by means of its demand it refers to the demand made on
+Others by other machines; so that it ends up as a group of machines
+imposing a demand on any men, regardless of who they are. But this
+demand on the part of a tool designed to be used in a particular way,
+with particular rhythms, etc., is also transformed by its very materiality: it becomes exigency through receiving the double quality of
+alterity and passivity.
+Exigency, in fact, whether in the form of an order or a categorical
+imperative, constitutes itself in everyone as other than him. (He cannot modify it, but simply has to conform to it; it is beyond his control,
+and he may change entirely without it changing; in short, it does not
+59. We shall see below how the individual can affect himself with inertia by
+means of a pledge; exigency then becomes possible.
+
+288 Book I
+enter into the dialectical movement of behaviour.) In this way, exigency constitutes him as other than himself. In so far as he is characterised by praxis, his praxis does not originate in need or in desire; it is
+not the process of realising his project, but, in so far as it is constituted
+so as to achieve an alien object, it is, in the agent himself, the praxis of
+another; and it is another who objectifies himself in the result. But in
+order to escape this dialectical movement from the objective to the
+objective which, as it progresses, totalises everything, praxis itself
+must occupy the domain of inertia and exteriority. What characterises
+the imperative is perseverance through inertia; in short, materiality.
+An order is only an order in so far as it can no longer be changed.
+(Whoever issued it has gone away; one can only carry it out.) Precisely for this reason the basic form of exigency lies in the inert expectation on the part of the instrument or material, designating the
+worker as the Other who is expected to do certain things. If we put this
+exigency in a concrete context, that is, if we realise that the broken
+solidarity of the workers is really their common subservience to
+production, and remember that the tension of the practical field
+originates fundamentally and more or less directly in need, then we
+can conclude, without even going into the specifically capitalist
+structure of exigency 6° (labour/commodity), that all forms of imperative come to man through worked matter, to the extent that it signifies
+him in his generality within the social field. In other words, at the level
+under consideration, the univocal relation of interiority changes into
+an interior relation of false reciprocity: man as Other affirms his preeminence over man through matter. Thus the machine demands
+(exige) to be kept in working order and the practical relation of man to
+materiality becomes his response to the exigencies of the machine.
+Of course, it is easy to object that the inert matter of which the
+machine consists cannot demand anything at all. However, to the extent
+that, as I have said, we never make contact with anything but worked
+and socialised matter, this argument ceases to have any value. A given
+machine in a society which already has a capitalist structure, is not only
+the real product of real labour (by unknown workers); it is also, as
+capital, the private property of an individual or group which is structured as a function of property; and it is the possibility for these men
+of producing a certain quantity of goods in a given time, through other
+6o. In socialist societies this description would at least apply to particular
+factories in particular circumstances.
+
+18g
+men animating it with their labour power; and, for the manual labourers, it is the very object of which they are the objects and in which
+their actions are inscribed in advance. But this machine arises in the
+milieu of industrial competition: it is the product of this competition
+and serves to intensify it. Competition as recurrent antagonism determines even the employer as Other than himself in so far as it determines
+his action as a function of the Other and of the Other's action on
+Others. It was imported into France as Other, and was to inaugurate
+new destinieș and antagonisms for all and between all. (Consider, for
+example, the first cautious importation of English machinery around
+1830 by a few producers in the textile industry.) These defined classes
+and milieux within this perspective by necessarily constituting them as
+Others. (We shall see that about 1830 labourers and artisans, disqualified and proletarianised by these machines, lived their destinies
+like a conjuring trick which reduced them to ruins and completely
+transformed them without touching them.) There can be no doubt that
+a particular machine of a particular type, which by its form expresses
+the techniques and social structures of the age, is, in itself, and as a
+means of realising, maintaining and expanding a certain sector of production, exactly what I said, namely, the Other in the milieu of the
+Other. Nor can it be doubted that, in this milieu, it has already absorbed into itself both the tensions of competition, so as to reflect
+them to the employer as exigency, and those of need and social constraint so as to turn them into exigencies in relation to the workers.
+In this way, every object, in so far as it exists within a given economic, technical and social complex, will in its turn become exigency
+through the mode and relations of production, and give rise to other
+exigencies in other objects. The basic intelligibility of this transformation at a distance of one material object by others naturally lies in the
+serial action of men; but this intelligibility requires precisely that the
+action of man should be constituted as inessential, that is, that it
+should take note of its own impotence and make itself a means to the
+accomplishment of some non-human end - that of worked matter in
+so far as it presents itself as passive activity, and sole producer of goods -
+in the name of which it appears as a social force, as a social power and
+as unconditioned exigency.
+Admittedly it is logically and abstractly possible to consider
+material exigencies as hypothetical imperatives, such as 'If you want
+your wages...' or 'If productivity is to be increased and the number
+of workers reduced ... But this abstract view belongs in the milieu
+
+190/
+of analytical Reason. It is true that the possibility of taking one's own
+life is not given vith life itself, the only reality of which is the perpetuation of its being. However, it appears in definite historical and social
+conditions. For example, for the Indian population it was the result of
+the establishment of Europeans in Central and South America, which
+brought about a transformation of the mode of labour and of life of
+the conquered, enslaved peoples and, through their very organism and
+its perpetual maladaptation, led to a threat to their survival. 61
+Thus the hypothetical If you want your wages... cannot appear
+concretely in anyone's praxis unless society itself has already threatened the lives of its members through the changes which it requires of
+them. In the milieu of organic life as the absolute positing of itself the
+sole aim of praxis is the indefinite reproduction of life. In so far as the
+means of subsistence are determined by society itself, together with
+the types of activity which will allow them to be procured either
+directly or indirectly, on the other hand, the vital tension of the
+practical field effectively results in exigency being presented as a
+categorical imperative. And to the extent that the employer, as we shall
+see, subordinates his praxis to his Being-outside-himself in the world
+under the common name of interest (such as a factory, property in the
+soil or what lies beneath it, or a group of machines), the imperative comes
+to him too from need itself, even if this need is not felt at the time or
+even directly brought into question. (Forevenif the employer is ruined,
+he is not necessarily unable to satisfy his needs or those of his family.)
+However, we must also approach the object from the opposite
+direction. In so far as it is a categorical imperative for Others and in the
+milieu of the Other, of which every one is a part, it comes back to
+everyone as an imperative power which condenses in itself the whole
+of social dispersal reunited by the negation of materiality. Thus the
+categorical imperative, lived in the direct milieu of vital urgency, turns
+round and addresses everyone categorically as Other, that is to say, as
+a mediation between the material object and the imperative of Others.
+It might be said here that the imperative has a double - and doubly
+categorical - structure, because for everyone the tension of life sustains serial alterity, which reacts on it and conditions it. In this way,
+individuals in an organisation interiorise the exigency of matter and
+61. It seems, in fact, that they suffered even more as a result of the abrupt
+change, without transition, from nomadic life to the settled labour of the peasant
+than as a result of defeat and servitude.
+
+291
+re-exteriorise it as the exigency of man. Through supervisors and
+inspectors, machines demand a particular rhythm of the worker: and
+it makes no difference whether the producers are supervised by particular men or whether, when the equipment allows it, the supervisors are
+replaced by a more or less automatic system of checks. In either case,
+material exigency, whetier it is expressed through a machine-man or a
+human machine, comes to the machine through man to precisely the
+extent that it comes to man through the machine. Whether in the
+machine, as imperative expectation and as power, or in man, as mimicry
+(imitating the inert in giving orders), as action and coercive power,
+exigency is always both man as a practical agent and matter as a worked
+product in an indivisible symbiosis.
+More precisely, a new being appears as the result of a dialectical process, in which the total materialisation of praxis is the negative humanisation of matter, and whose true reality transcends the individual
+as an isolated agent and inorganic matter as an inert and sealed reality,
+that is to say, the labourer. On this basis, we can comprehend how
+"steam initiated the tendency towards larger factories', how 'the poor
+performance of locomotives on inclines of more than 2 per cent at
+first compelled new lines to follow water-courses and valleys' and how,
+among other factors, some of which were much more important, this
+characteristic of railways 'tended to drain away the populations of the
+hinterland'. Of course, these material factors in no way depend
+either on God the Father or on the Devil: it is by and through men
+that these exigencies arise, and they would disappear if men did. But
+still, the example of the locomotive shows that the exigency of matter
+ends up by being extended to matter itself through men. Thus the very
+praxis of individuals or groups is altered in so far as it ceases to be the
+free organisation of the practical field and becomes the re-organisation
+of one sector of inert materiality in accordance with the exigencies of
+another sector of materiality. Even before it is made, an invention may,
+in certain circumstances, be an exigency of the practico-inert Bein
+which we have defined. In so far as a mine is 'capital' which is progressively destroyed, and in so far as its owner is forced by the exigency of
+the objectto open up new galleries, the net cost of the mineral extracted
+must increase. 62
+6z. These exigencies were already objective in the social world of the sixteenth
+century, since Hero, Porta, Caus and Cardan all grasped them practically, in
+suggesting the use of steam.
+
+192 Book l
+But, in so far as coal had become the main exigency of an industrial
+world in the process of equipping itself, the necessity of 'devouring
+oneself' affected both the mine and its owner, in so far as they were
+Others, fused by demand into a common alterity. Common exigency,
+then, arose out of the mine, as if matter itself could interiorise the
+exigency of other material sectors as a new imperative. To reduce
+costs, water had to be removed from the deep galleries; and the labour
+of men and beasts was not sufficient for this. In the eighteenth century,
+the first steam pump, which was made in England, inscribed itself
+within a tradition of effort and research which was itself crystallised in
+material objects, in experiments to be repeated and meanings deposited
+in books. In other words, the exigency of matter working through its
+men ended by nominating the material object it required. Papin and
+Newcomen had defined that particular exigency, and had thereby
+established the schemata and general principles of the invention be fore
+it was made: in this way, sustained by the growing consumption of
+coal and the gradual exhaustion of certain galleries, it was the object
+itself, as defined but not yet made, which became an exigency of being.
+And, through competition, the exigency which put every engineer
+under an obligation to make one, became, through Others, a matter of
+urgency for all potential inventors: a pump had to be made as quickly as
+possible. So, when Watt constructed his steam-engine, it already
+existed and his invention was no more than an improvement involving
+the separate condensation chamber.
+But this improvement was also a realisation, in that it was a means of
+increasing output - this being the justification for the industrial production of such machines. The same years (roughly the last decade of
+the eighteenth century) saw the appearance of other essential objects,
+in particular steamboats. The fundamental exigency determined similar exigencies in other sectors: it was negatively totalising, as inert
+matter must be. At the same time it produced exigency-man; that is,
+new generations, or certain groups within them, interiorised, as their
+own exigencies, the diffuse exigencies of materiality which previous
+generations had lived as their limits. The inventor is a technician who
+makes himself into an exigency-man, an inessential mediation between
+present materiality and the future it demands (exige). A man who
+invents a steam-engine must himself be a steam-engine, as an inert
+ensemble of known principles relating to it; he must himself be the
+Lack of a sufficiently powerful pump, as the old, but still real, exigency
+of the mine, and the future objectification of past praxis in a realisation
+
+293
+which demands realisation through the future. Thus we rediscover the
+dimensions of praxis, which was only to be expected, since everything
+is sustained by individual praxis. But through it coal produces its own
+means of extraction, by becoming the fuel and energy source for the
+machine which will male it possible to excavate new galleries.
+The moment of exigency as inert, imposed finality makes it possible
+to conceive of the kind of negativity known as objective contradiction.
+We shall see that the deep structure of every contradiction lies in the
+opposition between human groups within a given social field. But at
+the level of technical ensembles of the activity inertia type, contradiction is the counter-finality which develops within an ensemble, in
+so far as it opposes the process which produces it and in so far as it is
+experienced as negated exigency and as the negation of an exigency by
+the totalised ensemble of practico-inert Beings in the field. What must
+in fact be comprehended is that, at the level of practico-inert Being,
+counter-finalities are highly structured and become, through the mediation of certain groups which stand to benefit, finalities against (des
+finalites contre) others. And, at the same time, since each inert finality
+is both the exigency of the Other and Other reality, each of them is
+equally a counter-finality. The over-industrialisation of a country is a
+counter-finality for the rural classes who become proletarianised to
+precisely the extent that is is a finality for the richest landowners because it enables them to increase their own productivity. But within
+the ensemble of a nation it may, once a particular threshold has been
+passed, become a counter-finality in so far as the country is now further
+away from its new rural bases. 63 The transcendence of this contradiction between things will be found only in over-industrialisation
+itself - for example, in the development of a merchant fleet with
+bigger and faster ships and of a navy one of whose functions is to
+defend the trading ships. Here again, the transcendence is adumbrated
+by the contradiction itself; and, to this extent, we can rediscover this
+contradiction in a different form on the basis of the transcendence.
+Alternatively, the finality of a praxis can be presented as changing,
+for a group or class, into counter-finality of its own accord - within the
+context of the class struggle, no doubt, but still as a relatively autonomous development of the material fact itself.
+There can be no doubt that the first industrial revolution (coal, iron,
+63. Colonies, under-developed countries selling their corn in order to buy
+manufactured products, etc.
+
+194 Book I
+steam-engines, concentration of workers around towns, etc.) involved
+air pollution for the constantly growing urban populations. It goes
+without saying that the biological effects were essentially harmful to
+the workers, in the first place because their habitat and mode of work
+brought them closer to the sources of the pollution; and secondly,
+because their starvation wages forced them to work all the time so that
+they had to stay in the smoke of the factories year in year out; and
+lastly, because the poison would have more effect on exhausted and
+undernourished bodies. In this sense, this counter-finality simply reproduces the class struggle (whose existence we are assuming, though
+we have not yet established its intelligibility: it is one aspect of that
+struggle. All the same we must notice that air pollution presupposes
+the iron-coal complex and, although it is obvious that this complex
+conditions one particular aspect of the class struggle and no other, air
+pollution is another consequence of the complex, contemporaneous
+with the structuring of the class but of a different order.
+And, in fact, pollution is also a counter-finality for the employer,
+or so, at least, one might think. Admittedly, he has sufficient means to
+spend his evenings and his Sundays out of town, in his country cottage.
+But still he does not breathe in less coal dust during the days. In a way,
+there was appreciably less inequality from the point of view of air
+pollution during working hours between the employer and the wageearners, and between the office clerks and the labourers. Bourgeois
+children themselves suffered in their development from this pollution,
+which sometimes reached truly cataclysmic proportions. (For example,
+in 1930 in the Upper Meuse region an excessive concentration of noxious gas produced a suffocating cloud which spread throughout the
+whole region killing sixty-five people.)
+Moreover, to stay with our example, coal fumes contain another
+definite counter-finality from the point of view of the employers. They
+are costly, as the following figures prove. In order to maintain the
+normal standard of cleanliness of any industrial city, Pittsburgh is
+committed to extra expenditure (over and above the average cleaning
+expenses for a city of its kind and with its population) amounting to
+1,500,000 dollars for household washing, 7,500,000 dollars for general
+cleaning and 300,000 dollars for curtains. And in order to estimate the
+total cost we should have to add losses due to the corrosion of buildings, additional electricity consumption for those periods when concentrations of gas over the city make it necessary to switch on the
+lights in offices and workshops, etc.
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 195
+So what is the difference between the bourgeoisie and the working
+class in this case? In the first place, from the beginnings of urban concentration the workers have been aware of the danger which threatens
+their lives. (The contrast is obvious for proletarianised peasants.) But
+before union organisations had been formed the demand for a hygiene
+policy was a luxury which the first resistance and combat groups
+could not afford: it was quite hard enough to prevent wages from
+falling. Besides, their impotence at that time made them prefer the
+factory, with all its counter-finalities, which allowed them to sell their
+labour power, to the disappearance of the factory, which would
+necessarily lead to the total destruction of dispensable groups. In the
+end, therefore, as a result of their situation at the time, counterfinality threw them back on the employers as a universal exigency
+which constituted the employers as a special group to precisely the extent
+that they failed to satisfy it. In other words, the nineteenth century
+industrialists, indifferent to the mortal dangers which threatened the
+working population, and to the real danger and even to the real costs
+that public squalor represented for them, were truly characterised as a
+special group by their refusal to constitute this effect of industrialisation as a universal counter-finality, though it could have been constituted as such through a well defined praxis. (Of course, this is not what
+made them a special group; but it was in this, amongst other things,
+that their distinctiveness was expressed.)
+From the outset means were in fact available of lessening the pollution if not of ending it entirely. Franklin had already suggested that
+coal smoke could be reused, since it was really just incompletely consumed carbon. Ultimately, smoke expressed the limitations of the
+machine at this time. Ninety per cent of the heat generated was lost as
+the fuel escaped up the chimney. But the failure to see this human and
+technical exigency, or to see it and take it seriously, is precisely what
+characterises the praxis of the bourgeoisie at this time. (Today the ensemble of safety and health measures is due to union pressures; and in
+the most advanced countries, the initiative sometimes reverts to the
+employers, in so far as they want to increase the productivity of labour;
+but the problems in this case are different.) Mines, as capital subject to
+a gradual process of exhaustion, created the first employing class
+(patronat), a curious mixture of traditionalist prudence and of wastage
+(wastage of human lives, of raw materials and of energy). They were
+constituted as a class (in this particular respect) by a refusal to see the
+effects of air pollution on the other class as a counter-finality. But they
+
+196 Book I
+were constituted as an archaic type of industrialist (for us and in relation to us) by their indifference to the effects which this pollution
+might have on themselves and by their refusal - which, as we have
+seen, was not due to ignorance - to develop industrial techniques to
+alleviate the situation.
+Here we have the complexity of a practico-inert process: finality,
+counter-finality discovered and suffered by particular powerless
+groups, counter-finality denounced in theory but, in a particular period, never recognised in practice by the other groups which had the power
+to alter the situation. Counter-finality can become an end for certain
+ensembles: the first steam-engines were noisy, and engineers, Watt in
+particular, tried to reduce the noise. But in a practico-inert ensemble
+(for instance, the iron and coal 'complex', the first employers' class, or
+the first appearances of mechanisation), noise, like the black smoke
+which rose from the factory chimneys, demanded to be maintained as a
+material affirmation of new-found human power, that.' of the power
+of a new class produced in the context of a changing mode of production, and therefore in opposition both to landowners and to workers.
+The counter-finality which has to be removed (though it is really a
+counter-finality only for the exploited class, since it is the workers who
+live amid the noise, whereas the employers merely pass through it),
+becomes a finality which had to be maintained, and in this way it appears,
+in the ensemble under consideration, as negative exigency, and itself
+develops the ensemble of its 'advantages' and 'disadvantages' within
+practical inertia as a series of contradictions (this reveals their original
+active structure) which are passive (they are structured in exteriority).
+"There are pros and cons' At this negative level transcendence is
+inconceivable. In the inert struggle of pros and cons, which takes
+place outside everyone, in the milieu of alterity, there is either a
+balance, or a victory for the pros (like a superior weight and not as a
+totality which returns to its contradictory and enfolds it in itself, or
+victory for the cons. Here we encounter another, slightly different
+aspect of the indissoluble unity of the inert and of finality. To sum up,
+the intelligibility of material contradictions within a developing process is due to the fact that, through negation as a material unity within
+the social field, every finality is a counter-finality; and to the fact that,
+on the other hand, to the extent that all movements of matter are
+sustained and directed by men, every counter-finality is objectively,
+at its own level, and from the point of view of particular practicoinert ensembles, a finality.
+
+197
+(it) Interest
+A new characteristic of the symbiosis we are uncovering is what
+economists and some psychologists have called interest. In a way, this
+is merely a specific form of exigency, in particular conditions and
+amongst particular individuals or groups. Interest is being-whollyoutside-oneself-in-a-thing in so far as it conditions praxis as a categorical imperative. Considered in himself, in his simplé, free activity, an
+individual has needs and desires, he is a project, he realises ends through
+his work; but in this fictitious abstract state, he has no interest; or
+rather, ends reveal themselves spontaneously in his praxis as objectives
+which have to be reached or tasks which have to be carried out, without
+any return into himself to link these tasks and objectives with subjective aims. And if, at the level of scarcity, he sees a man coming towards him as a threat to his life, it is his life which is at stake and which
+affirms itself by becoming objectified as violence (that is to say, which
+constitutes the Other as a being who is capable of doing harm as well
+as being harmed); but interest has no real existence either as motivation or as stratification of the past. Interest is a certain relation between
+man and thing in a social field. It may be that it reveals itself fully, in
+human history, only with what is called real property. But it exists in a
+more or less developed form wherever men live in the midst of a
+material set of tools which impose their techniques on them. In fact,
+the dialectical possibility of its existence is already given with the
+biological organism, since this already has its being-outside-itself-inthe-world, in so far as its possibilities of survival are given outside
+itself in its milieu.
+The origin of interest, as an abstract foundation, is therefore the
+univocal relation of interiority which connects the human organism to
+its environment. But interest does reveal itself in the practico-inert
+moment of the investigation in so far as man constitutes himself in the
+exterior milieu as this particular practico-inert set of worked materials,
+while establishing its practical inertia within his real person. To take
+the clearest example, real bourgeois property, the first moment of the
+process is the identification of the being of the owner with the ensemble
+of his property. This ensemble - if for example it is a house with a
+garden - confers human interiority on the ensemble, by raising walls to
+
+198 Book I
+hide his wealth from the world; through his very life, as we have seen,
+he communicates a certain unity to the ensemble; he lays out his
+memory in drawers or on tables, until in the end it is everywhere, as
+is the ensemble of his practices and habits; when everything is outside
+him, sheltered behind the walls, in rooms where each piece of furniture
+is the materialisation of a memory, one can say that his interior life
+(La vie intérieure) is literally none other than his home life (la vie
+d'intérieur) and that his thoughts are defined by the inert and changing
+relations between his various pieces of furniture. But at the same time
+the exteriority of the thing becomes his own human exteriority. The
+inert separation which encloses his intimate life as a signifying materiality between four walls constitutes him as a material molecule among
+molecules: the relation he has, on this level, with other human beings,
+taken as a social, institutionalised practice, is in effect the absolute
+negation of any relation of interiority in the positive guise of mutual
+respect for possessions (and consequently for private life). It then
+becomes possible for the proprietor to assert that 'human beings are
+impenetrable', because he has given them in his person the impenetrability of matter (that is to say, the impossibility of distinct bodies
+occupying the same place at the same time). What we have here is an
+everyday phenomenon of reification; but the proprietor will find his
+truth and reality more completely in the thing possessed, which already addresses him as his own visible and tangible essence, the more
+he experiences, in his direct relation with this metamorphosis into an
+inanimate power, his mechanical isolation in the midst of a molecular
+dust.
+However, this dual, complementary aspect of private property is as
+yet no more than an abstraction: this property exists in a particular
+society, at a particular moment of History, and is dependent on the
+institutions of this society, which are themselves based on the development of the mode of production. Beneath the molecular relation between owners, we discover their serial conditioning within a structured
+social field and within a certain general movement of History. For
+example, in the case of rural properties, it may happen that the movement of investments which have been diverted, for other historical
+reasons, from agricultural enterprises results in disposable capital
+being concentrated for a time in rapidly developing industries. At this
+stage, agriculture, deprived of capital, will stick at the same technical
+level, the yield of the land will not increase, nor, consequently, its
+value. But by gradually improving the means of communication the
+
+199
+development of industry may have the effect of raising land values.
+And if a sector of industry starts producing new agricultural tools,
+yields will increase and there will be a concentration of land, accompanied by expropriation. Throughout all these transformations, our
+proprietor's income and the value of his possessions will change (or at
+least they may change) from one year to another and they will change,
+as it were, in his hands, even if, like Gustave Flaubert, he is a bachelor
+and an artist and remains entirely passive. In other words, this interiorbeing as possessed materiality turns out to be conditioned by the
+whole of exteriority. His real person as an isolated molecule is separated from all others by an absolute vacuum and his personality-matter,
+as the object that he is, is subjected to the shifting laws of exteriority,
+as a perverse and demoniac interiority. Lastly, throughout the ups and
+downs, the crises and the good years, everything drives him back into
+need, through the fear of privation (in negative moments), or into
+expansion of his property as a real intensification of his powers. In
+other words, the negative moment sends him back to the immediate
+and absolute exigency of the organism as such; the positive moment
+becomes his own possible expansion as inert materiality, or as exigency.
+As soon as an objective ensemble is posited in a given society as the
+definition of an individual in his personal particularity and when as
+such it requires this individual to act on the entire practical and social
+field, and to preserve it (as an organism preserves itself) and develop it
+at the expense of the rest (as an organism feeds itself by drawing on its
+exterior milieu), the individual possesses an interest.
+But the material ensemble, being practico-inert, is already of itself
+a passive action on the practico-inert world around it; it reflects the
+exigencies of this world in the negative unity of passivity, and as its
+own exigencies, while at the same time it is already a teleological process acting on the whole of the field and reflected as an exigency by all
+sectors of materiality. In this way, to the small extent that the individual
+can escape or act, he becomes, in fact, the mediation between the exigencies of the material totality (mediated by everyone) and those of the
+limited totality which is himself. His being-outside-himself has become
+essential and, in so far as its truth lies in the practico-inert totality, it
+dissolves within him the characteristics of pseudo-interiority which
+appropriation gave him. Thus the individual finds his reality in a
+material object, conceived initially as an interiorising totality which
+functions, in effect, as an integrating part of an exteriorised totality;
+the more he tries to conserve and increase the object which is himself
+
+200 Book I
+the more the object becomes the Other as dependent on all Others and
+the more the individual as a practical reality determines himself as inessential in his molecular isolation, in short as a mechanical element. In
+the extreme case, in the structure of interests, men consider themselves
+as a sum of atoms or as a mechanical system and their praxis is used to
+preserve their material being in an inorganic ensemble seen as a
+totality.
+At the level of individual interest, the relation of interest therefore
+involves the massification of individuals as such and: heir practical
+communication through the antagonisms and affinities of the matter
+which represents them. A French industrialist who, in 1830, in the
+good old days of the family business, was wise enough to introduce
+English machines "because it was in his interest to do so' related to these
+machines only through the medium of his factory. Although the basis
+of his praxis was, as I have suggested, the fear of privation or the desire
+for expansion, it should be remembered that this fear was merely a
+horizon; he certainly never had to face the following dilemma: increase the number of machines or go begging. Similarly, the desire for
+expansion (like all the acts of violence covered by such terms as willto-power, conatus, etc.) is simply the real expansion of his factory in so
+far as he controls it through his praxis, and in so far as his praxis
+transcends it towards a teleological future (that is to say, in so far as
+this praxis, as an activity necessarily orientated towards an objective,
+uncovers in its very movement and as its own end what amounts to
+the objective expansion of the factory in a favourable conjuncture). He
+is already his factory, in the sense, for example, that he inherited it from
+his father and that he finds in it the unity and slow rise of his
+family.
+If he introduces English machines, it is because the factory requires
+it in a particular competitive field, and therefore, already, because it is
+Other and conditioned by Others. It might be a question, for example,
+of benefiting from a few prosperous years in order to make a new
+investment and to reduce costs by increasing productivity and reducing labour. This decision is imposed on him as an exigency by the
+milieu of competition (beating competitors by undercutting them),
+but in a negative manner, because competition (and the possibility that
+other factories may also resort to English machines) imperil him in so
+far as he has constituted himself as a factory. But the machine has only
+to be installed for the interest to shift. His own interest, that is to say,
+his subjection to his being-outside-himself, was the factory; but the
+
+202
+interest of the factory becomes the machine itself; from the moment it
+is put into operation, it is the machine which determines production,
+and which forces him to disrupt the old equilibrium between supply
+and demand and to seek new markets, that is to say, to condition
+demand by supply. The interest of the factory has changed, the prudence and stability which characterised this interest are transformed
+into calculated risk and expansion; the manufacturer has established an
+irreversible mechanism in the workshops of his factory. This irreversibility (the machine cannot stop) characterises him in his being as well
+as his praxis; or rather, it realises in him as a social object the identity
+of Being (as a structure of inertia) and praxis (as developing realisation).
+But in the milieu of antagonisms of alterity (in this case, the competitive milieu) the interest of each manufacturer is the same precisely to
+the extent that he constitutes himself as Other; or, to put it another
+way, the need continually to reduce costs by installing new and improved machines appears to each manufacturer as his interest (as the
+real exigency of the factory) in so far as it is the interest of Others and
+in so far as for Others he himself constitutes this interest as the interest
+of the Other. In a given sector of industry, each manufacturer determines the interest of the Other to the extent that he is an Other for
+this Other, and each determines himself by his own interest to the extent that this interest is experienced by the Other as the interest of
+an Other. This is to a large extent the case today with the forward
+planning by American factories in certain sectors which have still
+remained at least partly competitive: there is an initial calculation,
+on the basis of known data, of the production of the factory in
+future years (as possibilities of this abstract system, other things
+being equal); then there is an attempt to situate this estimate,
+and the alterations that it involves, in the overall national output for
+the sector. The management of a particular factory commits itself to a
+set of wagers, strictly based on an estimate of probabilities, resting on
+factual data concerning competitors' production in the same period,
+suppliers of raw material, etc. These wagers bear above all on the present decisions of these other groups in so far as they make, or will
+make, their decisions on the basis, first, of their own possibilities and,
+second, of a set of wagers bearing on the production which is expected
+and decided by Others and, in particular, by the factory in question.
+This factory makes its decision therefore as a result of a system of
+wagers concerning the unknown decisions that it itself conditions as an
+unknown decision. It thus becomes a condition of itself as Other and
+
+202.
+once the rhythm of production has been established it will always contain within itself its structure of alterity. 64
+Being-outside-oneself as worked materiality therefore unites under
+the name of interest, individuals and groups by the negation, always
+other and always identical, of each by all and of all by each. In other
+words, the interest-object acts (through the mediation of the individual)
+under the negative pressure of similar exigencies developed in other
+interest-objects. At this level, to take an example from the liberal' era
+of the nineteenth century, it is impossible to say whether profit is an
+end or a means for the industrialist. In the movement of interest as
+negative exigency - that is, in the perpetual and necessary transformation of the means of production - most of the profit is reinvested in the
+enterprise itself. In one sense, the end of such transformations is to
+maintain or increase the rate of profit but, in another sense, profit is the
+only possible means for the capitalist to realise these transformations -
+that is to say, in a way, to adapt the enterprise to exterior changes and
+to see that it benefits from them, and at the same time to prevent the
+transformations of others from putting his enterprise out of business -
+so that in the unity of the total process, the factory as the possessionpower of an individual or group of individuals constitutes itself in its
+maintenance and development as its own end, changing either in order
+to remain the same or in order to develop itself by means of the profit
+it produces. From the impossibility of stopping the movement of production without destroying the object, to the need to find new markets
+for increased production and to increase this production in order to
+maintain market positions, there is the movement of growth and
+maturation of a quasi-organism, that is to say, of the inverted simulacrum of an organism - a false totalised totality in which man loses
+himself in order that it can exist, a false totalising totality which groups
+together all men in the practical field in the negative unity of alterity.
+The interest of the manufacturer is simply the factory and its machines
+in so far as their development requires his participation in the form of
+exigency, and in so far as, through his bond of interiority with their
+exteriorised pseudo-interiority, he is in constant danger in the world of
+practical and social materiality. But, in this and in every other case, at
+64. In reality, other factors intervene, and the calculation is much more complicated, since the entire national economy and its orientation have to be taken
+into account through customers. But still, the predictions and wagers in a particular sector have a partial autonomy and, furthermore, at the level of the conjuncture, the factory under consideration reappears as an other.
+
+203
+every other moment of History in which interest appears, the essential
+point is that my (or our) interest first appears to us to the extent that it
+is that of the Other and that I have to negate it in the Other (in the
+Other's being-outside-himself) in order to realise it in my own beingoutside-myself; or in so far as it is revealed as the negation of the
+Other's being-outside-himself by my own. There are just two reasons
+why a Rouen manufacturer should buy English machinery: either
+urgency (his competitors are going to import machines or at least they
+may do so), or counter-attack (machinery has been imported by an
+Other and the manufacturer can no longer struggle against this competition; his costs must be lowered because of the lowering of the
+Other's). Interest is the negative life of the human thing in the world of
+things in so far as man reifies himself in order to serve it. It goes without saying that in the hierarchy of social structures, the human thing
+can use its tangibility without necessarily ceasing to be: it is enough that
+it is the rigid law of man and that in the practico-inert world it opposes
+man to himself as Other in so far as it pursues the destruction of another object, which is really itself in the milieu of antagonism.
+It goes without saying that these attenuated forms of materiality,
+which we will encounter again in the superstructures, have their basis
+and their rationality in solid, elementary forms; and we shall come back
+to this. Nevertheless, one can speak of ideological interests, for example. This does not mean considering an author's work as providing
+him with income (interest does exist at this level but it is not ideological); but rather considering it as a set of inert meanings, supported
+by verbal material, to the extent that the author has constituted his
+being-outside-himself in it. On this basis, indeed, we can state, first,
+that it is not always possible for this work to be reactualised in its
+totality by its author and that, therefore, the detailed set of meanings
+which compose it remains purely material (not because they are black
+marks on a sheet of paper, but because, as significations, they remain
+inert and the ensembles they form are an unbalanced synthesis of
+mechanical summations and totalising integrations). But secondly this
+perpetual reactualisation (as long as we are dealing with a sufficiently
+well known published work, of course) perpetually operates elsewhere
+and everywhere through Others, that is to say, through beings who are
+similar to the author, but who negate him (because of their age - a new
+generation - or their milieu, or the perspectives which constitute their
+practical opening to the same world) and who, above all, through
+reading as a praxis of transcendence, reactualise significations towards
+
+204 Book 1
+themselves and towards the material and social world and transform
+these meanings by elucidating them in terms of a new context (a book
+written ten years ago and read today, in this historical moment, by a
+young man of twenty). Whether or not the author continues to write
+books, however, and whether or not he rereads them from time to
+time, his ideological interest consists in the fact that he has his beingoutside-himself in material meanings (which he might still be said to
+know and understand though without producing them and living
+them), whose pseudo-organic ensemble has constituted itself as the
+inorganic reality of his practical organism and through which he is
+perpetually threatened in the world by the Other, unless he constantly
+comes back to them, explains them, and shows (or tries to show) that
+they are compatible with new findings and practices, and that they
+cannot die through Others as they died through him (in so far as they
+were a movement of living objectification transforming itself into
+objectivity). If he tries to defend himself or to complement himself to
+the extent that he is this work, to show that he was not wrong to write
+this or that, etc., he finds himself thrown back into dependence on the
+whole of History in the making, by the object in which he had taken
+refuge against History. His ideological interest will be to combat new
+theories and new works - anything that threatens to declass him (and
+also to try to absorb and digest everything in order to constitute other
+works, to complement and justify his previous work).
+It will be noted that the relation of reciprocal pseudo-interiority
+between man and his object is not, at this level, that of the owner to the
+possession: in fact, on one plane, whatever the society's institutions
+for controlling the relation between an author and a book in so far as
+the book is the author's livelihood (pension, salaries, royalties, etc.),
+the relation between creator and creation - in so far as the latter is
+merely the former as a consumable product - is not one of possession.
+It is not necessary for us to investigate this dependence in itself: I
+simply wish to point out that, although it is strikingly exemplified in
+the case of private property, it would be quite improper to limit
+interest to the real property of our bourgeois societies. Interest is a
+negative practical relation between man and the practical field, mediated by the thing which he is outside; or, conversely, a relation between
+the thing and other things in thesocial field, mediated by its human object.
+It is this, and not the optimistic harmonies of liberal economics,
+which explains how individual interest can, in particular conditions, be
+transformed into group (or class) interest. To conceive of group or
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 205
+class interest in terms of the subjective characteristic of one individual
+coinciding with the subjective characteristics of all the Others, one
+would in fact have to begin by forgetting the dialectic of alterity which
+renders this agreement as such impossible. But, even if this could be
+done, it would still be necessary to understand the agreement of these
+molecular subjectivities: if one begins by positing them as different, it
+is not clear why a common exterior situation should notaggravate these
+differences; indeed, in the true milieu of alterity, in particular conditions, a common danger may, by its very urgency, accentuate antagonisms and conflicts. On the other hand, it is easy enough to point out
+that special interest as a material object in the world already has a
+structure of generality because it offers itself as the same for everyone
+in that it is this sameness that creates antagonisms in the milieu of
+alterity. But of course this is not altogether true: interest does not begin
+the same, and then divide into an infinity of oppositions; rather, in so
+far as the unity of the same equipment, the same techniques, and the
+same skills, constitutes the fundamental practical basis of all antagonism,
+it is the oppositions in a given social field which, through one another
+and in their confrontation, define the unity of all of them, in so far as
+they negate each of them as the universal characteristic of particular
+interests.
+Thus, classical economics tried to define identical interests as if they
+existed equally in every individual member of a group, and it did not
+take account of the fact that this very identity was the result of a
+serial process. In other words, when they stated some obvious truth,
+for example, that in a capitalist system the interest of the producer is, at
+least within limits, to intensify production and lower costs, they took
+themselves to be stating logically an analytical, Aristotelian truth, of
+the same kind as 'all men are mortal'. But, in fact, it is something quite
+different, partly because this interest involves a structure of serial
+alterity of the individual being-outside-himself, and partly because it
+cannot be acquired by an individual except in certain totalising conditions, and through others. (Hor instance, in a t'rance where a sort of
+tacit understanding and very real, it secret, agreements stifled any
+competition which small enterprises would have been unable to resist,
+in the name of Malthusianism, the interest of the employer, which
+seldom situated itself in a European or world context, was to increase
+productivity without increasing production; and thus this interest
+came to him from Others.) Thus the universality of particular interests
+can appear only to a form of thought (a rationality) which I will define
+
+206 Book I
+below when I deal with serial transfinites. And from this point of view,
+the universality of particular interests ('everyone pursues his own
+interest', etc.) finally becomes the material and transcendent unity of all
+interests as reciprocal conditionings by a single, fundamental, inert
+negation which basically offers itself as the self-destructive result of all
+antagonisms.
+'Everyone follows his own interest' means: the general characteristic
+of particular interests is never to be able to transform themselves into
+general interests or to realise themselves in stability as particular
+interests. But it should also be observed that we have presupposed in
+this investigation that the practical field was occupied by a multiplicity
+of individuals who began with more or less equal opportunities, and
+that this field remained free, that is to say, it was assumed that there was
+no action by any other grouping, dominating or exploiting the individuals under consideration from the outside. This therefore involved
+an abstract moment of the investigation, so that, for example, a free
+practical field amongst the high capitalist bourgeoisie was investigated
+without other classes being taken into account. But, to go back to the
+example of nineteenth century French industrialisation, we must
+realise that the machine is also a determination of the practical field of
+the working population and - this is the third characteristic of practicoinert Being - that it is destiny for the workers to precisely the extent
+that it is interest for the employer.
+The worker who serves the machine has his being in it just as the
+employer does; and just as the employer reinvests his profits in it, so
+the worker finds himself objectively forced to devote his wages to the
+upkeep (at minimum cost) of a servant for the machine who is none
+Other than himself. Indeed, we saw above how tools, in the field of the
+need and labour of Others (and of himself, as Other) expressed their
+exigencies as imperatives; and how his very organism was attacked by
+the counter-finalities of a machinery of which he was the true animator. But we must not be misled by this apparent symmetry: the
+machine is not, and cannot be, the worker's interest. The reason for
+this is simple: far from the worker objectifying himself in it, the
+machine objectifies itself in him. In so far as industrialisation and concentration determine the proletarianisation of a section of the rural
+classes, they constitute not only the opportunity for the new proletarians of selling their labour power, but also, in the field of practicoinert Being, a force of attraction which tears the peasant away from
+agriculture and puts him in a workshop before a loom:
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 20J
+Now, the individual thus signified by material practice is, in a
+different sense, reduced to a nonentity: he need only satisfy a few universal conditions (being an expropriated peasant, or a peasant in danger
+of being expropriated, or the son of a large, penurious peasant family,
+etc.); as a worker he is no more than a particular labour power used for
+various tasks, and renewed each day by his daily wage. Thus not only
+does his being exist before and outside him, in the movement of the
+economy, and ultimately in this particular machine (or these tools)
+which lay claim to him; but also, this Being represents the pure abstraction of himself. His object-being awaits him and patiently produces him from a distance: for example, the industrialisation of certain
+agricultural processes, by gradually preparing the ruin and expropriation of his father, patiently shapes the son until penury turns him into
+a free worker - an exploited man whose exploitation resides entirely in
+freedom of contract. The machine shapes its man to precisely the
+extent that man shapes machines (I shall deal with this process of
+shaping more extensively below). This means that it constitutes its
+servant, by a temporal, teleological process, as a machine for operating
+machines. It inverts the relations within the practical agent; it is a
+categorical imperative, which makes him an absolute but conscious
+means (in that he knows the imperative); a distributor of wages, which
+transforms his praxis (or labour power) into a commodity, that is, an
+inert product, while preserving for him the power of unifying a practical field. Indeed, to the extent that he makes himself a force of inert
+exteriority (or uses his substance in energy transformations which are
+inorganic in nature), it itself becomes a living thing and a pseudoorganism.
+Thus the machine defines and produces the reality of its servant,
+that is to say, it makes of him a practico-inert Being who will be a
+machine in so far as the machine is human and a man in so far as it
+remains, in spite of everything, a tool to be used: in short, it becomes
+his exact complement as an inverted man. At the same time, it determines his future as a living organism, just as it defines that of the
+employer. The difference is that it defines him negatively as an impossibility of living in the more or less long term. The machine does this
+not only through the counter-finalities which we have described (air
+pollution, destruction of the environment, occupational diseases, etc.),
+but also through representing, for him, in so far as it develops his being
+in the practical field of industrialisation, a permanent threat of reduced
+wages, of technological unemployment and of becoming disqualified.
+
+208 Book I
+This has its rationality in the true meaning of industry: that the machine is made to replace man. It is obvious that in certain conditions,
+and for certain societies, this may signify that it will relieve man of
+labour. But apart from its historical appearance in the social context of
+the period, its function is to replace certain men - manual workers in
+fact - because it costs less to maintain. Thus, while the employer sees
+in the factory the being-outside-itself of his own individuality, his own
+possibility of expansion according to certain rules, and an object to
+serve and, of course, develop - but only because it is his own positive
+materiality and his power over the world - the worker finds in it his
+being as indifferent generality, his praxis as already materialised in
+predetermined tasks as inert exigencies to be satisfied, and his future as
+impotence; and in the end he finds his prefabricated destiny in the inert
+design of the machine whose purpose is to eliminate its servants.
+This means that the machine could never be the particular interest of
+the worker; on the contrary, it is the a priori negation both of his
+particularity and of any possibility of his having an interest. In so far
+as his objective being is in the machine and in the wages it gives him,
+he is effectively prevented from engaging it elsewhere: there is no other
+object which can be described as the particular being-outside-himself
+of the worker in the world. Of course, his labour power is treated as an
+inert commodity; but, although it does in fact become a commodity
+in social terms, it represents in the worker the perpetual need to turn
+himself into an inorganic means to an end which has nothing to do
+with him, rather than an exterior materiality in which he might objectify himself. On the other hand, he is objectified in his product, but only
+to the extent that this product does not belong to him. No doubt the
+mere fact of treating labour power as a commodity creates a labour
+market in which workers oppose one another in antagonistic competition; this means that they become sellers in a market structured by
+capitalism itself. But this antagonism has a dual origin, of need directly
+felt or immediately anticipated, and of the relative scarcity of demand
+(a scarcity which machines themselves enable employers to maintain).
+It is not the interest of the worker to work: the situation is quite different,
+since, under the constraint of need, his work exhausts him and its
+ultimate results (the construction of machines) contribute to his elimination. As for the antagonism between tvorkers on the market, it
+necessarily culminates in results which are entirely opposed to the
+"interests' of individuals or of the class (if it can have interests),
+since it enables the employers to get starvation wages freely accepted
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 209
+and to intimidate strikers by threatening to replace them immediately.
+But to precisely the extent that the machine signifies the worker as a
+practico-inert being, deprived of any particular interest (and of all
+possibility of having one), it also designates him as a general individual,
+that is, as a class individual (using the word 'class' at this stage only in
+the very abstract sense of "collectivity"). And in this case to produce
+and to signify are clearly the same thing. Of course, this does not mean
+that machines produce abstract beings which lack individuality; even
+within reification, the human agent is a constituent, dialectical totality:
+in fact, everyone puts the particularity of his praxis into the way he
+constitutes himself, and allows himself to be constituted, as generality;
+and the generality of everyone characterises everyone's relations;
+everyone discovers his generality in the Other, and personal relations
+are constructed on this basis. In the early stages of industrialisation,
+inert generality, as the milieu of the working class, cannot be regarded
+as the real, totalising unity of the workers in a factory, a city or a
+country; and we shall return to this. It presents itself to them on the
+basis of worked matter, like the false negative unities discussed above,
+and it is constitutive of each and every individual as the negative unity
+of a destiny which condemns him. But, by the same token, in the
+negative milieu of generality, everyone sees the general destiny (which,
+at this stage, is the general destiny not of a totality of workers but of an
+indeterminate number of similar instances connected by their identical
+condition) of everyone in the very generality of his own destiny; in
+other words, he sees the destiny of the worker, as the negation of the
+possibility of his own existence, in the generality of machines as
+possessions of the generality of Others.
+It is too early to describe the way in which the class or a section of
+it can unify itself into an organised group, that is, transform generality
+and identity into a unifying totalisation. But, at this stage of the investigation, all I have wanted to show is that there is no difference
+between realising the active totality of the group (whether in trade
+union or political terms), and constituting the totality of industrial
+machinery, in a capitalist society, in relation to this group (in so far as
+it represents the developing unification of the class) and in opposition
+to it, as the total being-outside-itself of the working class and the
+totality of production as the totality of objectified and inverted praxis).
+In this way, in so far as it organises itself so as to reappropriate its
+total class destiny through the socialisation of the means of production,
+and, indeed, in so far as, at the level, for example, of trade union
+
+210 Book I
+struggle, it struggles against particular effects of the private ownership
+of machines in the development of a specific moment of the historical
+process, as a fundamental relation of production, the praxis of the
+group, through the practical negation of its being-outside-itself as
+destiny, constitutes its destiny as future interest (through the material
+object),
+and as exigency contained in the destiny-materiality of
+changing itself into interest-materiality.
+The contradiction of the machine in the capitalist period is that it
+both creates and negates the worker; this contradiction is materialised
+into a general destiny and becomes a fundamental condition of the
+assumption of consciousness, that is to say, of the negation of the
+negation. But the only negation which is possible as the unity of all, is
+not the negation of the machine in itself (which was attempted, about
+1830, by craftsmen thrown out of work and by disqualified workers
+whose wages were steadily falling) and, consequently, of the worker in
+so far as he is its product and in so far as it is his being; it is the negation of the machine in so far as it is destiny in exteriority for the man it
+produces because, within a given social system, it controls him and he
+cannot control it in return. Thus all the worker can wish for is that the
+means of production and products as a whole should represent the
+material expansion of his class (there is no need to show here how this
+praxis moves towards the exigency of a classless society), that is to say,
+that this ensemble, simply through the movement which negates its
+character as destiny (organisation and struggle), should become his
+interest.
+This does not mean that a real socialisation of the means of production must, in a particular historical development, lead to the total
+elimination of interest itself as linking men in alterity through matter.
+On the contrary, interest arises, as always, out of alterity as the primary
+human practical relation, but as det ormed by the matter which mediates it; and it maintains itself in the milieu of alterity. There are several
+workers' interests, but only one working class interest. This is because
+the employers, by introducing new machines within the framework of
+capitalism and appropriating them as their interest, constitute the
+destiny of the workers as the interest of the Other, controlling them in
+the form of counter-interest (destiny), and because in the moment of
+social struggle, that is to say, of the negation of the negation, the real
+material objective can only be the negation of the capitalist's interest in
+so far as it has become the worker's destiny, that is to say, the negation
+of the interest of the other as negation. And so, at a particular historical
+
+222
+moment of unification, the negation of the Other's interest realises
+itself as an affirmation of the true interest of the working class.
+The whole of my description here applies, really, to the first stages
+of capitalism (the existence of activist groups and of workers' institutions, as well as the achievement of socialism in certain countries,
+completely transforms the problem). But there can be no doubt that
+about 1830 the workers who broke up machines and even the Lyon
+silk-weavers (who were protesting against a reduction of wages) had
+only one demand: the stabilisation of their destiny. Nothing contributed more to workers' organisation, under Louis-Philippe, than the
+inexorable lowering of real wages which was linked to a certain phase
+of industrialisation (above a certain threshold, wages were to rise
+during the second phase of industrialisation, between 1870 and 1914).
+This showed workers that the stabilisation of their destiny was impossible in that their destiny was simply the impossibility of any
+stabilisation. This was due not to the physical, technological materiality
+of the machine, but to its social materiality (to its practico-inert being);
+in other words, to the impossibility of controlling this materiality and
+orienting it towards the real reduction of human labour for all rather
+than towards the negation of the workers, or at least of their humanity.
+The interest of the working class, therefore, inscribes itself in the
+practico-inert ensemble which, in the contradiction of struggles, and
+about the middle of the nineteenth century, represents both its future
+interest and its present destiny: its destiny, when a hardening of
+employers' attitudes, or a failure of attempts to form unions, or unsuccessful strikes, or strikes which end in bloody defeat, relegate the
+realisation of socialisation as a total process to an indeterminate future;
+and its interest, on the other hand, when, as a result of industrial
+expansion, the value of labour, and therefore the power of the workers,
+increases, so that activities of unification and the production of
+apparatuses and organs within the class itself, increase too. But, of
+course, in all capitalist countries from the middle of the nineteenth
+century to the present day, these two structures have always occurred
+together: in defeat, socialisation remains to be achieved and defeat itself
+teaches new methods of struggle; the bitterest disappointment of the
+present generation (these machines are my destiny) is necessarily negated by the existence of generations to come; conversely, the greatest
+working-class victories in the capitalist countries have not, by definition, eliminated appropriation by individuals or groups, even if profit
+margins are fixed by the social ensemble, and even if the employers are
+
+212 Book l
+effectively supervised by trade unions in matters of hygiene, security
+and even of management. But the workers' interest never appears to
+the worker as an inert object of contemplation, but rather as the variable, practical meaning of his daily struggle against the necessary
+consequences of the capitalist process, and therefore both as present (to
+the extent that any successful action, however local, presents itself as
+the human negation of a destiny and, concretely, as the practical,
+negative use of machines against the employer in the milieu of liberal
+competition itself, 65 and as future in a perspective whose opening and
+depth are conditioned by praxis itself as it assumes its total historical
+meaning. Thus, though we are not yet able to answer our questions: -
+how can a class be dialectically intelligible, and how can a practical
+group be formed; and what type of dialectical reality can it represent? -
+our investigation already gives us the rational certainty that workers do
+not have particular interests (as individuals subjected to forces of
+massification) and that their unification, if it occurs, is indissolubly
+bound up with the constitution of general interest (as such still undetermined) as class interest.
+It is on this basis that class interest arises amongst employers: the
+moment which is, in effect, passed over in silence in the constitution of
+their material property as their private interest, is that neither land nor
+machines on their own can be productive; or, in other words, they need
+human means in order to be made to work. When I say 'passed over in
+silence', this does not imply any particular reflection on the attitude of
+employers to workers: in false innocence they may believe in the
+absolute value of the free wage contract; or, while having no illusions
+as to the nature of profit, they may believe that the workers are
+massified and too impotent to initiate anything. This abstract position,
+while making it possible to merge the worker and the machine in the
+real symbiosis of their common social activity, legitimates for them the
+constitution of a single social field: that of the employers, whose
+properties, as materials and means of production, oppose one another in
+their practico-inert being and thus oppose them. In a way, the multiplicity of these antagonisms has always been integrated into the ab-
+65. Strikes, as the collective refusal to use machines, turn machines - in so far
+as they require a certain level of production in particular circumstances - into the
+workers' weapon against the employers and, if the strike continues and shows
+signs of succeeding, the employer in turn will discover his destiny as a distant
+future possibility (for succeeding generations if not for him) through the medium
+of his present interest.
+
+213
+stract forms of unity and universality. Although divided to the extent
+that each of them produces the same commodity as the other, two industrialists will, in one way or another, affirm their positive unity as
+producers of wealth for mankind as a whole. This is the true meaning
+of Calvinism since the sixteenth century and of Puritanism up to the
+twentieth: the bourgeois is the man of God because God has put him
+on earth to continue the work of creation; and the pride of the Victorian industrialist watching his factory chimneys poisoning his native
+town involves a collective structure: even if he is the most powerful,
+he is not alone and, indeed, he needs other powerful men in order to be
+more powerful than them.
+What these abstract integrations really express is simply the other
+side of particular interest: based on the diversification of production and
+causing an increasingly extreme division of functions and of labour (at
+least in the nineteenth century), the private ownership of a factory
+implies solidarity in matter between the industrialist, his suppliers and
+his customers. We are in fact still in the domain of the practico-inert:
+it is the machine which requires certain materials (and which is thereby
+affected, for example, by improvements in communication), and again,
+it is the machine which demands certain markets (that is to say, at a
+certain level of production, customers who are themselves producers).
+This is expressed in the practical field, and under the aberrant appearance of "private life', in social relations between employer-suppliers and
+employer-customers. (This is an extreme simplification because these
+social relations in fact concern the entire social field of production in so
+far as it is the private interest of the capitalists, and because such 'private'
+social relations also connect financiers and senior civil servants.) But
+these social relations - simple activities aimed at establishing the human
+relations between employers that their machines demand - are in fact
+eroded by exteriority (in so far as it is reconstituted in competition).
+Nothing really connects a particular supplier to a particular customer,
+other than a material situation which is itself given as variable (it only
+requires a lowering of transportation costs for it to become the particular interest of this particular customer to obtain his supplies elsewhere).
+In this sense, the negative unity of 'everyone follows his own interest'
+erodes and neutralises the positive unity of their supposed solidarity in
+differentiation. In the drawing-rooms of the rich bourgeois, machines
+pay visits on one another and manifest their temporary concord.
+The concrete unity of the bourgeois class can be realised only
+through a common opposition to the common praxis of the workers.
+
+214 Book I
+The exploited classes manifest themselves as exploited simply through
+the unity which, in the class milieu, makes the worker appear a man:
+for the employer, isolated in his private interest, the absolute refusal of
+the exploited to regard the machine as their destiny manifests itself as
+the possibility, that his own interest will be transformed into a destiny
+for him - not only through the still distant socialisation of the means of
+production, but also simply through the workers' resistance (to wage
+cuts, raising of norms, etc.), which in principle implies a reduction of
+profits, and therefore possible ruin (through competitors). But the
+unity of the workers'
+praxis, through the geographical dispersal of
+factories in the social field, gives each employer the possibility of a
+destiny, in so far as this possibility applies to him both as a general
+individual and as a particular moment of the capitalist process in its
+totality. In this sense, it is through the unity of the workers that the capitalists realise capital as the totality of the process instead of as a mere
+dispersal of interests which sometimes support and sometimes contradict one another.
+This change occurred towards the end of the eighteenth century and
+it can be observed in a number of writings of that period. Nasmyth
+wrote at the time that 'strikes do more good than harm because they
+serve to encourage inventions'. And Ure said: If capital takes science
+into its service, the recalcitrant labourer will be forced to be docile.'
+In reality, there is a circle here: the machine causes strikes precisely in
+so far as it aims to eliminate workers. The crucial fact is that capital
+becomes self-conscious in so far as it is unified in the milieu of the Other,
+and therefore in so far as it is an other totality; its general (and total)
+interest comes to it therefore as other, and negatively, as the need to
+destroy any possibility of the other class transforming its destiny into
+interest. This emerges very clearly in a remark by another classical
+economist: 'As far as most of our tools and powerful, automatic
+machines are concerned, industrialists could be led to adopt them only
+when forced to do so by strikes. This, too, is only partially true: it is
+equally true, in fact, that in a period of competition the machine produces the machine, since it is the machine which determines the flow of
+investments. But this admission is historically interesting, in the sense
+that it shows the historical development of capital as producing itself
+for the bourgeois themselves under pressure from the Other class. And,
+in so far as the machine becomes an exigency for the capitalist himself,
+to the extent that it is his private interest, and in so far as the expansion
+of production directly or indirectly defines all the social and political
+
+215
+activities of a human grouping, and in so far as the discovery of new
+sources of energy in certain countries becomes an external destiny for
+less favoured countries, the totality of 'capital, as the common interest
+of the capitalist class, also controls everyone as his destiny. At this level
+the State, as a class organ, represents an apparatus of struggle against
+capital as the destiny of the capitalists; and it is at this level, too, that the
+organs of the workers' struggle will create, in the other class, as an Other
+for itself, agreements and employers' organisations whose structure is
+determined by that of the workers' organisations. However, as long as
+the competitive system is not directly challenged by employers'
+organisations struggling against the counter-finalities of capital itself, 66 the fractured unity of the social field of the capitalists is due to
+the fact that they can unite only to impose the changing multiplicity
+of their contradictions. In short, the capitalists' class interest, up to the
+end of the nineteenth century, was to maintain a system ruled by the
+conflict of private interests. Or, to take them in their being-outsidethemselves, their interest was the material totality of production
+goods - in so far as this totality, in its social materiality, negated the
+66. In this sense; monopolies, cartels, agreements, and even State intervention,
+in so far as they define the semi-competitive system in which we live, derive both
+from the transformation of the means of production (electric power, etc.) and
+from the working class itself in so far as, by the same process, it becomes one of
+the essential markets for mass-production. However, it should be remarked that
+this is an attempt on the part of industry to mitigate a structural contradiction of
+the capitalist process in itself. Producers find that, in themselves and as consumers, they are the destiny of capital, to precisely the extent that the capitalists'
+need to reinvest most of their profits has the contradictory double result of
+expanding production and diminishing the overall buying power of the working
+masses. Thus the destiny of the workers, as the negation of their standard of
+living by machines, becomes the destiny of the machine (in the social field of
+capitalism) as the negation of the possibility of selling its products; and this
+destiny exercises its control through crises. The policy of paying high wages in
+the context of controlled mass-production (which implies at least a partial negation of the competitive system), in the "second industrial revolution', was undoubtedly an attempt at conscious organisation by the employers, in certain
+sectors of industry and in the most advanced countries, to transcend the deep
+contradictoriness of the capitalist process by making the producers themselves
+the consumers of their own products. At this level of the investigation, a new
+theoretical conflict will set Marxists (who think that the contradiction is simply
+veiled) in opposition to technocrats (who claim that it has been overcome). We
+cannot go into this here; but it was worth explaining the reversal which, for the
+capitalists, transforms the destiny of the proletariat (even in grinding poverty)
+into the destiny of capitalism, in the field of consumption itself.
+
+216 Book I
+practical totalisation which the class without property wanted (namely,
+socialisation) and in so far as it affirmed the negative dispersal of the
+owners of capital with the whole of its practico-inert being. Thus
+everything becomes Other: for the possessors the threat of Others
+constitutes their general interest as Other, and this material interest is
+the exigency that relations between capitalists should be relations of
+Other to Other or, in other words, the exigency that in so far as it
+determines the relations of production, the capitalist mode of production cannot unite the members of the dominant class except through
+their radical alterity. Thus we see, in effect, how particular interests
+ultimately express material being-outside-itself in the medium of the
+Other and one's own coming to oneself as Other than self.
+These formal remarks cannot, of course, claim to add anything at all
+to the certainty of the synthetic reconstruction which Marx carried out
+in Capital; they are not even intended to be marginal comments on it.
+By its very certainty, the reconstruction in effect defies commentary.
+But my remarks, though they are possible only on the basis of this
+reconstruction, which simultaneously recreates its method and its
+object, belong, logically, before this historical reconstruction, at a
+higher level of greater indeterminacy and generality: in so far as they
+have fixed certain relations of the practico-inert field in its generality,
+their purpose is simply to define the type of intelligibility which is
+involved in the Marxist reconstruction. I have simply tried to establish
+without prejudice (the inquiry is not yet complete) the basic relations
+between praxis and the material environment (in so far as it organises a
+practical field and defines the relations between men through their
+objects, and the relations between objects through men) in which
+a rational foundation for the certainty of dialectical investigations
+(l'évidence de l'expérience dialectique), which any reader of Marx can
+experience, can be found. And, as for conflicts uf interest, in particular,
+my own investigations, as conducted in this book, have provided a
+means to pay off the hedonistic, utilitarian mortgage which makes of
+interest an irrational mixture of subjective conatus and objective conditions.
+There is a choice: either 'everyone follows his interest', which implies that divisions between men are natural - or it is divisions between
+men, resulting from the mode of production, which make interest
+(particular or general, individual or class) appear as a real moment of
+the relations between men. In the first case, interest as a fact of nature
+is an entirely unintelligible datum; indeed, the induction which posits
+
+21J
+it as an a priori reality of human nature could never be justified. The
+whole of History, in so far as its motive force is provided by conflicts
+of interest, sinks entirely into the absurd; in particular, Marxism becomes no more than an irrational hypothesis: if conflicts of interest are
+a priori then relations of production are determined by them rather
+than by the mode of production; in other words, the mode of production is not praxis objectifying itself and finding the basis of its contradictions in its objectification, that is to say, in its becoming-matter;
+instead, it is a mere mediation through which individual interests
+determine the type and intensity of their conflicts. In effect, the immediate consequence of the law of interest (or the Darwinian 'struggle
+for life') is that human relations are a priori antagonistic.
+This being so, it is hardly surprising that one conservative ideology
+condemns all attempts at socialisation in the name of human nature
+(that is, in the name of the obscure law of interest): human beings are
+not going to change, etc. But it is more surprising that several Marxist
+writers seem to hesitate between the law of interest and the Marxist
+conception of History, that is to say, between a sort of biological
+materialism and historical materialism. They make the concept of need
+completely opaque. Having made it completely unintelligible, they are
+satisfied with calling this unintelligibility 'objective reality" and then
+consider this inert dark force, this exteriority within interiority, as
+interest. As a result, it is no longer possible to comprehend anything;
+about human conflicts, since most of them, especially those which
+oppose an oppressed or exploited group to a group of oppressors or
+exploiters, seem to involve 'interests' of completely different level,
+complexity and structure. And, to take the example of a factory on
+strike, if we were told - as might be perfectly true - that the strikers
+were fighting desperately and had their backs to the wall because, in
+this particular case, they could no longer bear the slightest reduction in
+their income, whereas the employers, who could afford a readjustment
+of wages, have an interest in refusing it in the context of the economic
+situation and in view of their forecasts and production plans (or
+alternatively they might give in because the country was becoming
+industrialised and the value of labour was increasing), then we are
+dealing with heterogeneous realities which are being grouped together
+under the same name in spite of being constituted on different levels.
+In this case, the interest of the worker would simply be fundamental
+needs, while the interest of the employer would be a necessity (or possibility) imposed on him by production itself, that is, through all the
+
+218 Book I
+structures of capitalist society, and which, as we have seen, relates only
+very indirectly to need itself, although need is always present as tension.
+The same would apply to a kind of quasi-socialist idealism which represented the employers as necessarily rapacious, that is to say, if the
+pursuit of profit, power, etc. (which exists only in and through a
+particular society and whose character and even intensity depend on
+the historical situation as a whole and on particular institutions) was
+treated as the natural force which moves individuals. We would then
+find, as we often do, the same unintelligible heterogeneity when confronted with workers grouped into unions and acting in accordance
+with the interests of their class against vampire-employers giving in to
+their rapacious instincts.
+In both these cases, the transition from false individual objectivity
+(conatus conceived as an external force) to the objective, abstract
+generality of the process simply becomes incomprehensible. And if the
+workers were fundamentally these interests posited in divergence and
+antagonism as natural realities, if their class interest were not negatively inscribed for everyone in the destiny prefabricated by machines,
+no propaganda, no political or union education, no emancipation
+would be possible. For every individual or class, interests are constituted in and through matter itself in so far as it defines and produces,
+as instruments, the men and relations suited to serving it (to serving
+production). For the men or groups under consideration their interests
+do not differentiate themselves from their being-outside-themselves in
+matter at work in so far as this being-outside-themselves controls the
+Other as destiny (through other men or groups). The structure of the
+material equipment alone determines what kind of interests are operative. (It is this structure which creates a practical field of individual
+interests for one class and a field of general interest as its only possibility for another.) From this point of view, conflicts of interest are
+defined at the level of relations of production, or rather, they are these
+relations themselves: they appear as directly caused by the movement
+of worked matter, or rather as this matter itself in its exigencies and
+movement, in so far as each group (or person) struggles to regain
+control of it (in order to control production in and through their
+being-outside-themselves-in-it, that is to say, through the inert but
+powerful objectification of themselves in it) and to wrest this control
+from the Other.
+In this sense, it is not diversity of interests which gives rise to conflicts, but conflicts which produce interests, to the extent that worked
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 219
+matter imposes itself on struggling groups as an independent reality
+through the temporary impotence which emerges from their balance
+of forces. And, in this sense, interest is always a negation not only of
+the Other but also of the practico-inert being both of matter and of
+men in so far as this being is constituted by everyone as the destiny
+of the Other. But, in the same moment, it is precisely this interchangeability of man and his product in the medium of the practico-inert.
+The contradiction of interest is that it reveals itself in the individual or
+collective attempt to rediscover the original univocal bond between
+man and matter, that is to say, free constituent praxis, but that it is
+already in itself the perversion and petrification of this attempt by
+matter as the false counterpart of human action. In the practico-inert
+feld, in other words, active man, inert in his product, becomes the
+only way of preventing his interest from becoming destiny, or of
+transforming his destiny into interest. But, as destiny and interest are
+two contradictory statutes of being-outside-oneself, and as these two
+statutes always exist together (although the one may enclose the other
+and veil it), they mark the limits of the practico-inert field, in so far as
+worked matter produces, as means to its ends, its men with their conflicts and their work relations, that is to say at that moment of the
+dialectical investigation in which man, defined by his being-outsidehimself (whether this is the seal he impresses on matter or the prefabrication of his functions by the coming together and passive organisation of material exigencies), is defined as bewitched matter (that is,
+precisely as an inorganic, worked materiality which develops a nonhuman activity because its passivity synthesises the serial infinity of
+human acts which sustain it).
+Thus for this being who reveals himself in the perpetual appropriation of his praxis by the technical and social environment, destiny
+threatens as a mechanical fatality; and his struggle against destiny as
+such cannot itself be conceived as free human affirmation: it must
+appear as a means of safeguarding, or at least serving, his interest.
+Interest therefore appears as the inorganic materiality of the individual
+or group seen as an absolute and irreducible being which subordinates
+itself to praxis as a way of preserving itself in its practico-inert exteriority. In other words, it is the passive, inverted image of freedom, and
+the only way in which freedom can produce itself (and become conscious of itself) in the shifting hell of the field of practical passivity.
+
+220 Book I
+Necessity as a New Structure of Dialectical
+Investigation
+At its most immediate level, dialectical investigation (l'expérience
+dialectique) has emerged as praxis elucidating itself in order to control
+its own development. The certainty of this primary experience, in
+which doing grounded its consciousness of itself, provides us with one
+certainty: it is reality itself which is revealed as presence to itself. The
+only concrete basis for the historical dialectic is the dialectical structure
+of individual action. And, in so far as we have been able provisionally
+to abstract this action from the social milieu in which it is in fact
+embedded, we have discovered a complete development of dialectical
+intelligibility as the logic of practical totalisation and of real temporalisation. But this investigation, just because it is its own object, provides
+us with complete transparency but not necessity. Since man becomes
+dialectical by acting on matter, and since knowledge is action in so far
+as action is knowledge, this constitutes an indubitable fact. Indubitability, however, is not necessity.
+And as soon as we tried to reach the more complex, more concrete
+reality of everyday life, we discovered a multiplicity of discrete quantities, which is capable of being studied by analytical Reason. The fact
+that this multiplicity reveals itself on the level of totalising synthesis
+rather than on that of simple living organisms is irrelevant; and so is
+the fact that the origin of dispersal is itself dialectical: the plurality of
+human actions is still a negation of the dialectical unity of each praxis.
+But since these actions as a whole - of which some are done by groups,
+and others by individuals - act on a single material field (an isolated
+Indian village in the virgin forest of Brazil, or the soil and sub-soil of
+a country or of the whole world), and since this field, which was
+originally united by its bond of univocal practical interiority to everyone is, in its passivity, the basis and support of the multiplicity of
+determinations, we have discovered, by deepening our investigation,
+that men unwittingly realise their own unity in the form of antagonistic
+alterity through the material field in which they are dispersed and
+through the multiplicity of unifying actions which they perform upon
+
+221
+this field. Thus while the plurality of bodies and actions, if it is conceived directly, produces isolation, it is transformed into a unifying
+factor if it is reflected to men through worked matter.
+This is apparent in the most everyday objectivity: from my window
+I can see men who do not know each other walking across a square to
+jobs which, at least at the present level of the investigation, isolate them
+from one another; I can also see a group of people waiting for a bus,
+while none of them pays the slightest attention to the others - all eyes
+are turned towards the rue de Rennes, looking out for the bus which
+is about to arrive. In this state of semi-isolation, it is obvious that they
+are united by the street, the square, the paving-stones and the asphalt,
+the pedestrian crossings, and the bus, that is to say, by the material
+underside of a passivised praxis. But this unity is itself that of a material
+system, and in this sense it is highly ambiguous. It can be called dialectical in so far as the ensemble under consideration has been totalised
+by actions; and also in so far as scarcity, in any form, transforms
+separation into antagonism. But from another point of view, if dialectic is totalisation, materiality cannot be said to totalise: the avatars of
+Spanish gold did not totalise the practices of the nations and cities of
+the Mediterranean; they absorbed them and gave them the passive unity
+of interpenetration. Moreover, the inversion of activity into passivity,
+combined with the transformation of the diverse into a totalised inertia,
+has the effect of inverting both relations of exteriority and relations of
+interiority: quantity controls reified men in so far as these same men
+magically haunt quantity. Everything changes its sign when we enter
+the domain of the negative; from the point of view of this new logic,
+the unity of men through matter can only be their separation. In other
+words, separation ceases to be a pure relation of exteriority and becomes a bond of lived interiority. People are separated by alterity, by
+antagonisms, by their place in the system; but these separations, such
+as hatred, flight, etc., are also modes of connection. However, since
+matter unites men in so far as it binds them together and forces them
+to enter a material system, it unifies them in so far as they are inertia.
+We have already seen how, through its quality as inorganic inertia,
+the organism can come into contact with the non-organised world;
+what we find here is passive materiality, as an elementary structure of
+the human organism, in thrall to an inorganic matter which has taken
+away its power of transcendence towards organised action. To stop at
+this level would lead to a very elementary and very false picture of the
+materialist dialectic - which is, unfortunately, most widespread:
+
+222 Book I
+scarcity, the antagonisms of need, tools, and organisation around
+tools. These are all acceptable in themselves, but they are explained in
+a way which gives priority to the inert, to inverted praxis, in short, to
+inorganic matter over the historical agent. However, we ought not to
+leave this moment of the investigation yet. What has to be established
+is that the introduction of new elements does not destroy dialectical
+intelligibility and that, for the first time, the agent has objective experience of necessity.
+Complex as they may be, the facts which we have taken as examples
+are in fact accessible only to dialectical Reason. There can never be any
+hope of analytical Reason explaining the metamorphoses of Spanish
+gold, just because, as we have seen, the quantitative bonds of exteriority, though they do not disappear, are turned back or diverted by
+bonds of interiority; in other words, each piece of gold is both a unit in
+a sum and, through its relations to all the other pieces, a part in a whole.
+Dialectical intelligibility, however, is entirely preserved, since it
+enables one to grasp, in terms of the proliferation of acts, the type of
+negative unity represented by materiality. The transparency of praxis
+is certainly not to be found at this level. But it must be understood
+that there is a dialectic within the dialectic. That is to say, from the
+point of view of a realist materialism, the dialectic as totalisation produces its own negation as absolute dispersal. It does this both because
+the confrontation of activities is a union in separation, and because it is
+only through it and in it that plurality as dispersal can have a meaning.
+It is not that the dialectic as Idea produces exteriority as the reverse
+side of the Idea; it is the real analytical dispersal of specifically dialectical agents, which they have to live as the interiorisation of exteriority.
+Thus it is not a process which is transparent to itself in so far as it is
+produced in the unity of a project, but an action which escapes from
+itself and diverts itself according to laws which we know and clearly
+understand in so far as they effect an unbalanced synthesis between
+interior and exterior. In so far as, having achieved our own goal, we
+understand that we have actually done something else and why our
+action has been altered outside us, we get our first dialectical experience
+of necessity. 67
+But necessity must not be confused with constraint. We are sub-
+67. As every means is a provisional end, it is obvious that the experience of
+necessity occurs not just when the action is complete, but during the entire
+development of the praxis.
+
+223
+jected to constraint as to an exterior force, with all the contingent
+opacity of a fact; it appears as violence in so far as it opposes itself to
+free praxis. Nor is the discovery of necessity to be found in that
+gradual confinement of action which finally reduces the number of
+possibilities to one, in relation to a given end, and on the basis of certain
+already constructed means. When only one course is possible (for
+moving a material ensemble from one state to another, for going from
+one place to another, or from one person to another, or from one idea
+to another), and when this course exists and opens or offers itself, then
+praxis will conceive of itself as creating it - and rightly so, since,
+without it, neither the possibilities nor the means would exist as such.
+Thus the synthetic, royal road to comprehension, in the domain of
+thought, is a synthetic advance which is given negatively, as incapable
+of being otherwise, through the positive consciousness of becoming
+everything it can become. The unfolding of action and the conformity
+berween the result achieved and the result intended cannot in fact give
+rise to any apodicticity except of the Other and by means of the
+Other, and on another level of the investigation.
+This shows that the first practical experience of necessity occurs in
+the unconstrained activity of the individual to the extent that the final
+result, though conforming to the one anticipated, also appears as
+radically Other, in that it has never been the object of an intention on
+the part of the agent. This elementary type of necessity is already to be
+found in mathematics; at the end of a proof, the last proposition is
+transformed into an other which is just a statement of the theorem to
+be demonstrated. The difference is that the mathematician uses the
+dialectical fact of the transformed result as a method. The moment of
+necessity in practical experience is the simultaneous recognition of the
+same as Other and of the Other as the same. Let there be no misunderstanding: a solitary activity involving a tool undergoes transformations due to the nature of the chosen instrument or of the
+object on which it is used. But these transformations, transcended, corrected and controlled, do not alter praxis, even if they
+force it to modify itself, to make deviations, etc.: the metamorphoses of
+praxis are dialectical and form part of praxis as inevitable, living
+moments linked by relations of interiority; failure itself is integrated
+into the movement, as a final term and destruction of the dialectic in
+the same way as our death may be said to be part of our life. Moreover,
+in the case of solitary activity, failure returns to throw light upon the
+whole of the praxis and reveals within it the real reasons for our defeat:
+
+224
+we were wrong to undertake it, or we chose the wrong means. In
+general, failure, illuminating past movement, shows us that we were
+already certain to fail, or, in other words, that an objectively inappropriate action produces in interiority in one form or another (stubbornness, haste, etc.) the knowledge of its inappropriateness. But when
+this knowledge is absent, failure still exists within praxis itself as a
+dialectical possibility of negation.
+Necessity appears in experience when we are robbed of our action
+by worked matter, not in so far as it is pure materiality but in so far as
+it is materialised praxis. In this moment, the tool made by an Other
+represents an element of exteriority in the dialectical field of interaction;
+but this exteriority does not derive from the external connections
+which are characteristic of inorganic materiality. All these connections
+are effectively taken up in the practical field of action. Exteriority
+exists to the extent that the tool as materiality is part of other fields of
+interiority. Finally, it is primarily a matter not of fields determined by
+the deliberate praxis of individuals or groups, but of the quasidialectical field whose fugitive unity does not come from anyone, but
+proceeds from matter to men who mediate between different sectors of
+materiality. In this way, a magical field of quasi-dialectical counterfinality comes to be constituted: everything acts on everything else
+from a distance, and the slightest novelty produces complete devastation, just as if the material ensemble were a true totality. And the
+instrument used by a given individual or community is transformed
+externally within the very hands which use it.
+During the period of Spanish hegemony, for example, gold could
+be real power for a person or collectivity. And, in so far as a historical
+agent is defined by his objective reality, and therefore by his objectification, this precious metal became, for a given society, this objectification itself; and objectifying praxis came to be defined, in turn, by its
+use of gold, that is to say, by the distribution of wealth (capitalisation,
+the financing of enterprises, items of expenditure, etc.). But in addition to
+being the mode of exteriorising interiority for particular individual or
+collective agents, what gold represented for the agent was existence in
+to tal exteriority, since its value at any particular time, was determined
+by the whole of History; and in this way, to the extent that a prince or
+merchant realised his objective reality, it eluded him. But this exteriority refers back to material totalities in which every element acts at a
+distance as in an organic whole (the discovery of a mine, a massive
+influx of precious metals, the discovery of a new technical process,
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 225
+etc.). In this way, the haemorrhage of objective reality, which is
+emptied of its meaning in the hands of the agent, takes on a definite
+meaning when interpreted in terms of the developing totality. The ruin
+of a particular Genoese merchant can be interpreted from within his
+praxis, but in order for it to be intelligible it must also be seen as coming from outside as a result of the accumulation of stocks of precious
+metals, etc., to the extent that the Mediterranean is, as Braudel says, a
+material unity.
+There is no a priori reason why the transformation of the result
+should be understood by the agent: everything depends upon the
+instruments of thought provided for him by his period, class and
+historical circumstances. On the other hand, at the present level of
+development of our knowledge, it is possible to claim that this transformation is always intelligible, provided one has the necessary instruments at one's disposal; in other words, it defines its own type of
+rationality. The point is to conceive the praxis and its result from two
+inseparable points of view: that of objectification (or of man acting on
+matter) and that of objectivity (or of totalised matter acting on man).
+It is necessary to grasp how the concerted result of a practice, as a new
+fact, can produce a universal modification in the material quasitotality, and how it can receive from this moving, inorganic totality a
+sort of passive modification which makes it Other than it is. The
+example of deforestation is very clear: uprooting a tree in a field of
+sorghum becomes deforestation from the point of view of a large plain
+and of terraces of loess, united by the work of separate men; and deforestation as the real meaning of the individual action of uprooting is
+simply the negative union of all those who are isolated by the material
+totality which they have produced. Thus the transformation of the act
+is completely intelligible from the point of view of a process of comprehension which, having evaluated its end in isolation, strives to
+comprehend it in terms not only of the massification of the peasants
+(identity of work, repetition), but also of the constitution of a material
+totality which abolishes separations in the common unity of a destiny
+(foods) and, lastly, of new material totalities created on this basis and
+separately. Although this doubly referring work can be done by an
+isolated agent only with difficulty, there is no reason in principle why
+he should not do it; in other words, it is possible for anyone to comprehend himself in his action both from the outside and from within:
+this is proved by the fact that the Chinese government's propaganda
+against deforestation explained the totalised meaning of his familial
+
+226 Book I
+praxis to everyone. The experience of necessity is all the more obvious,
+all the more blinding, to the extent that every moment of the praxis
+has been clear and conscious, and that the choice of means has been
+deliberate. And it should be remembered that, as it becomes richer,
+praxis gradually reduces the number of possibilities to one and, in the
+end, eliminates itself, as dialectical unfolding and as work, in favour of
+a result inscribed in things.
+We have seen that the agent's real aim, and (this comes to the same
+thing) the agent himself, can only be assessed in the light of the result.
+It is Madame Bovary who illuminates Flaubert, not the reverse. But
+if an other, broader result, bound up with the present totality, always
+superimposes itself on the result which has been intended and achieved,
+then what is assessed from the point of view of totalised objectivity is
+not only the aim, but also the agent himself in so far as he is nothing
+Other than his objectification through praxis. It is therefore necessary
+to recognise oneself as Other in one's own individual objectification on
+the basis of an other result. And this recognition is an experience of
+necessity because it shows us an unconstrained irreducibility inside the
+framework of intelligibility. This individual experience can occur only
+through the freedom of praxis (as I defined it in The Problem of
+Method); it is the free fullness of successful action providing me with
+the objective result as irreducibility: if I have made mistakes or been
+subject to constraints, it is always possible that they have falsified the
+result. But if I take full responsibility for the operation, I shall discover
+necessity as ineluctable. In other words, the basic experience of necessity is that of a retroactive power eroding my freedom, from the final
+objectivity to the original decision, but nevertheless emerging from it;
+it is the negation of freedom in the domain of complete freedom, sustained by freedom itself, and proportional to the very completeness of
+this freedom (degree of consciousness, instruments of thought, practical success, etc.). In this sense, it is the experience of the Other, not in
+so far as he is my adversary, but in so far as his dispersed praxis, totalised by matter, turns back on me in order to transform me; it is the
+historical experience of matter as praxis without an author, or of praxis
+as the signifying inertia which signifies me. We shall find that this
+experience becomes more complex as our investigation progresses, but
+for the present we may say: the man who looks at his work, who recognises himself in it completely, and who also does not recognise himself
+in it at all; the man who can say both: "This is not what I wanted' and
+I understand that this is what I have done and that I could not do
+
+227
+anything else', and whose free praxis refers him to his prefabricated
+being and who recognises himself equally in both - this man grasps, in
+an immediate dialectical movement, necessity as the destiny in exteriority of freedom.
+Should we describe this as alienation? Obviously we should, in that
+he returns to himself as Other. However, a distinction must be made:
+alienation in the Marxist sense begins with exploitation. Should we go
+back to Hegel who sees alienation as a constant characteristic of all
+kinds of objectification? Yes and no. We must recognise that the
+original relation between praxis as totalisation and materiality as
+passivity obliges man to objectify himself in a milieu which is not his
+own, and to treat an inorganic totality as his own objective reality. It
+is this relation between interiority and exteriority which originally
+constituted praxis as a relation of the organism to its material environment; and there can be no doubt that as soon as man begins to designate himself not as the mere reproduction of his life, but as the
+ensemble of products which reproduce his life, he discovers himself as
+Other in the world of objectivity; totalised matter, as inert objectification perpetuated by inertia, is in effect non-human or even anti-human.
+All of us spend our lives engraving our maleficent image on things,
+and it fascinates and bewilders us if we try to understand ourselves
+through it, although we are ourselves the totalising movement which
+results in this particular objectification. 68
+68. It is the necessity for the practical agent to discover himself in the organised inorganic as a material being, and this necessary objectification as grasping
+himself in the world and outside himself in the world, which makes man into what
+Heidegger calls a 'being of distances'. But it is very important to notice that he
+first discovers himself as the real object of his praxis in a milieu which is not that
+of his practical life, so that his knowledge of himself is knowledge of himself as
+inertia stamped with a seal (whereas, in fact, he is the movement by which he
+transcends material conditioning through the act of placing his seal on the inorganic). Thus the practical agent is an organism transcending himself by
+an action, and his objective perception of himself presents him as an inanimate
+object, the result of an operation, whether it is a statue, a machine or his particular interest. For those who have read Being and Nothingness, I can describe the
+foundation of necessity as practice: it is the For-Itself, as agent, revealing itself
+initially as inert or, at best, as practico-inert, in the milieu of the In-Itselt. I his,
+one might say, is because the very structure of action as the organisation of the
+unorganised primarily relates the For-Itself to its alienated being as Being in
+itself. This inert materiality of man as the foundation of all knowledge of himself
+by himself is, therefore, an alienation of knowledge as well as a knowledge of
+alienation. Necessity, for man, is conceiving oneself originally as Other than one is
+
+228 Book I
+4
+Social Being as Materiality - Class Being
+In the moment where we reach the apodictic structure of dialectical
+experience, still in its most abstract form, the discovery by the agent
+of the alienation of his praxis is accompanied by the discovery of his
+objectification as alienated. This means in fact that through a praxis
+which effaces itself before an inert, alienated objectivity, he discovers
+his being-outside-in-the-thing as his fundamental truth and his reality.
+And this being-outside constitutes itself (or is constituted) for him as
+practico-inert matter; either he himself, as a particularity, is roughly
+conditioned in exteriority by the whole universe, or, alternatively, his
+being awaits him from outside, prefabricated by a conjuncture of
+exigencies. In either case, human praxis and its immediate aims can
+appear at this level only in subordination: human praxis is subordinated
+to the direct and lifeless exigency of a material ensemble, and is the
+means of fulfilling this exigency, the immediate aims appearing as the
+means of initiating praxis. 'It is useful that workers should strike since
+this encourages inventions.' Inventions are required by production
+itself (which sets itself the absolute aim: accumulation of wealth on
+God's earth); production demands from it the means of intensifying
+itself; the employers finance and encourage research through the militancy of the workers.
+According to this optimistic way of thinking, which is perfectly
+adapted (as capitalist thinking) to the practico-inert hell which produced it, strikes, conceived as a means of determining employers to
+break out of absolute inertia, are characterised by two things, which we
+will recognise immediately. First, they lose their quality of collective
+praxis (the motives, objectives, and unity which, in the early stages,
+and in the dimension of alterity. Certainly, praxis is self-explanatory (se donne ses
+Lumières); it is always conscious of itself. But this non-thetic consciousness counts
+for nothing against the practical afhrmation that I am what I have done (which
+eludes me while constituting me as other). It is the necessity of this fundamental
+relation which explains why, as I have said, man projects himself in the milieu of
+the In-Itself-For-Itself. Fundamental alienation does not derive, as Being ano
+Nothingness might mislead one into supposing, from some prenatal choice: it
+derives from the univocal relation of interiority which unites man as a practical
+organism with his environment.
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 229
+had been so difficult to create, the calculation of chances, courage,
+adoption of a plan, the relation between elected representatives and
+their comrades, etc., in short everything which is or can be the moment of constitution of the group as human activity) and become a
+universal exis. They become - as a special quality of the mechanical
+ensemble known as the working population - the turbulence which is
+manifested in its anonymous generality in odd anecdotes which, in
+themselves, are without interest; thus the Birmingham or Sheffield
+strike becomes not a particular human undertaking within the development of human history, but the exemplification of a concept. Having
+said this, we must not treat this abject way of thinking as a mistake; for
+it is true at the level where employers take account of the likelihood of
+strikes (calculated on the basis of previous years) in their production
+forecasts. Secondly, they control an inert milieu from outside: disturbances amongst the workers, as a general reality and negative force
+(like 'physical force', as it was conceived at about the same time)
+impinges on the employers' milieu as an inert ensemble, communicates to it a certain energy which produces internal reactions and, in
+particular, invention.
+Inertia, exteriority: classical economics aspires to be like physics.
+But, at the same time, this inertia and exteriority are, for this way of
+thinking, human characteristics (that is to say, they both refer back to
+praxis as their sole intelligibility). Employers are blamed for this
+inertia: it is said that they do not know their own interest; that militant
+employers would not need external incentives; moreover, the authors
+quoted above also express annoyance at working class disturbances,
+which, when not resolved in definite, historical events, appear to them
+as an evil failing. (The working class can never be cured of it; but, by
+constantly maintaining the fear of being sacked or replaced, and by
+constant maintenance of a threat of replacement by the victims of
+technological unemployment, it is secured, externally, that disturbances are opposed by terror as a physical force.) But just as disturbances, which they see simply as chaotic expressions, are not just a
+force, but an exis, so terror - as one can read in every line of these
+frightful books - is a moral as well as a physical reaction: it is justified
+punishment - or the revenge of terrorised employers (which amounts
+to the same thing). Here we have a mixture of inertia (the stability of
+equal and constant forces in equilibrium) and practice (values imposed on the exis of disturbances, and on their punishment.)
+The fact that such thinking is incomplete or false, and that it
+
+230 Book I
+belongs to the employers, is unimportant; and we can say with assurance that this is how capitalism saw itself at the beginning of the first industrial revolution: an inert milieu in which transmutations of energy
+could take place provided they were produced by an exterior energy
+source. However, this need not correspond to any particular manufacturer's judgement of himself when he tries to know himself as an
+individual: on the contrary, he will regard himself as a bold innovator
+(if he has just bought a new machine, if his factory is expanding) or as
+a wise man (if he is refusing to take an interest in some invention).
+Employers as Other, (the ensemble of his competitors, suppliers and
+clients) however, he will judge in this way; but this Other body of
+employers exists in him as his own (relative or total) powerlessness to
+change anything ("Personally, I would be only too happy to...).
+Thus he will rediscover in himself, as his negative social being and as
+caused impotence, the inertia which he considers to be a constituent
+characteristic of the being of Others.
+He is not entirely mistaken. It must be recognised that his impotence
+is created for him out of the inertia of Others, and is lived by Others
+as an other inertia reducing them to impotence. It should also be understood that, for him and for Others, impotence is simply the level of his
+production in so far as it is conditioned by total production in terms of
+the system and the conjuncture. It is on the basis of this being-outside
+in a field of unifying materiality on the part of everyone that Marx can
+describe the process of capital as an
+• 'anti-social force' developed
+within a definite social field and positing itself for itself. But this inertia
+of impotence, in so far as it can also be conscious of itself as impotence
+through inertia (circumstances, or a competitor's innovation can define
+a manufacturer's pseudo-impotence as inertia for him: 'I should have
+suspected something, I should have accepted so and so's proposal,'
+etc.). And in so far as it constitutes itself as the reality of the individual
+(or group), and as the negative medium in which external transmutations of energy produce praxis in the form of a transformation of
+energy conditioned from the outside but producing itself as human
+value, we can regard it as the social Being of man at the fundamental
+level, that is to say, in so far as there are several people within a practical
+field totalised by the mode of production. At an elementary level of the
+social (and we sha!l see that there are others), everyone must become
+conscious of his being as the inorganic materiality of the outside interiorising itself in the form of a bond linking him to everyone else. We
+shall try to see social Being from the point of view of the practico-
+
+232
+inert in so far as it really determines a structure of inertia from the
+inside, first in individual praxis, then in common praxis; and finally we
+shall see it as the inorganic substance of the first collective beings: we
+shall then be in a position to see the primary structure of class as social
+and collective Being.
+If the reader is surprised to see the external being which is my being
+determining a structure of inertia in my praxis (whereas praxis is
+precisely the transcendence of all the inertia of the 'material conditions'
+towards an objective), I have not entirely succeeded in explaining my
+approach: the beings, objects and people we are talking about, though
+still abstract, are real. In a given practical field, we really are practicoinert beings. I am not providing symbolic headings to indicate the
+results of human activities which have been dispersed and reunited by
+materiality: the flight of gold and the crisis of the Ancien Régime are
+realities. But these realities are produced at a certain level of concrete
+experience; they exist neither by nor for the block of stone in the
+mountain, nor for God, nor for isolated individuals, for illiterates, for
+example, though they may well be subjected to its effects. It is social
+men who produce and reveal these realities, as these realities reveal and
+create them, through other social realities which serve as a mediation
+and which have already constituted themselves.
+Thus we have managed to refine our definition of the contradiction
+between being and doing. This contradiction does not exist in the
+individual considered in isolation, apart from his social relations; but
+on the contrary, it breaks out in the region of the practico-inert, since
+the first basis of the social field is this very contradiction. In this connection we have recognised that human existence is constituted
+through a practical project which transcends and negates given characteristics towards a totalising rearrangement of the field. Do we also
+have to admit that one is a worker or petit-bourgeois passively!
+Existentialism denied the a priori existence of essences; must we not
+now admit that they do exist and that they are the a priori characteristics of our passive being? And if they exist, how is praxis possible? I
+used to say that one never is a coward or a thief. Accordingly, should
+I not now say that one makes oneself a bourgeois or a proletarian? This
+is the question which we must now turn to.
+There can be no doubt that one makes oneself a bourgeois. In this
+case, every moment of activity is embourgeoisement. But in order to
+make oneself bourgeois, one must be bourgeois. There is no comparison between cowardice, courage and other such useful summaries of
+
+232 Book I
+complex activity, and membership of a class. At the origin of this
+membership, there are passive syntheses of materiality. And these
+syntheses represent both the general conditions of social activity and
+our most immediate, crudest objective reality. They already exist; they
+are simply the crystallised practice of previous generations: individuals
+find an existence already sketched out for them at birth; they 'have
+their position in life and their personal development assigned to them
+by their class' 69 What is 'assigned' to them is a type of work, and a
+material condition and a standard of living tied to this activity; it is a
+fundamental attitude, as well as a determinate provision of material and
+intellectual tools; it is a strictly limited field of possibilities. Thus
+Claude Lanzmann is right when he says: 'A working woman who earns
+25,000 francs a month and contracts chronic eczema by handling Dop
+shampoo eight hours a day is wholly reduced to her work, her fatigue,
+her wages and the material impossibilities that these wages assign to
+her: the impossibility of eating properly, of buying shoes, of sending
+her child to the country, and of satisfying her most modest wishes.
+Oppression does not reach the oppressed in a particular sector of their
+life; it constitutes this life in its totality. They are not people plus
+needs: they are completely reducible to their needs. There is no distance between self and self, no essence is hidden within the bounds of
+interiority: the person exists outside, in his relation to the world, and
+visible to all; he coincides exactly with his objective reality.'0
+But this objective reality involves an obvious contradiction: it is
+both the individual and his predetermination through generality: the
+working woman is expected in bourgeois society, her place is marked
+in advance by the capitalist 'process', by national production requirements and by the particular needs of the Dop shampoo factory. Her
+life and destiny can be determined before she gets her job, and this prefabricated reality must be conceived in the mode of being, in the pure
+materiality of the in-itself. The role and attitude imposed on her by
+her work and consumption have never even been the object of an
+intention; they have been created as the negative aspect of an ensemble
+of directed activities; and as these activities are teleological, the unity
+of this prefabrication renains human, as a sort of negative reflection of
+ends pursued outside it, or, in other words, as a result of counter-
+69. The German Ideology, Moscow, 1964, PP. 69-70.
+70. Les Temps Modernes, special issue on the Left, Nos 112-13, (1955), p.
+I 647-
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 233
+finality. At the same time, this material apparatus in which everything
+is meticulously controlled as if by a sadistic will is the working woman
+herself. This is what Marx elucidated in The German Ideology: "The
+conditions under which individuals have intercourse with each other,
+so long as the above-mentioned contradiction is absent, are conditions
+appertaining to their individuality, in no way external to them; conditions under which these definite individuals, living under definite
+relationships, can alone produce their material life and what is connected with it, are thus the conditions of their self-activity and are
+produced by this self-activity??1
+Marx here refers to the contradiction which opposes the productive
+forces to the relations of production. But this is really the same contradiction as that mentioned above, which forces the working woman to
+live a prefabricated destiny as her reality. She would try in vain to take
+refuge in intimate 'privacy'; such a remedy would betray her directly,
+and become simply a mode of subjective realisation of objectivity.
+When semi-automatic machines were first introduced, investigations
+showed that specialised women workers indulged in sexual fantasies
+as they worked: they recalled their bedrooms, their beds, the previous
+night - everything that specially concerns a person in the isolation of
+the self-enclosed couple. But it was the machine in them which was
+dreaming of love: the kind of attention demanded by their work
+allowed them neither distraction (thinking of something else) nor
+total mental application (thinking would slow down their movements).
+The machine demands and creates in the worker an inverted semiautomatism which complements it: an explosive mixture of unconsciousness and vigilance. The mind is absorbed but not used; it is
+concentrated in lateral supervision; and the body functions 'mechanically' while yet remaining under surveillance. Conscious life overflows
+the job; the minutes of false distraction have to be lived one by one;
+they must be lived without concentration, and there can be no attention
+to detail, or to systematic ideas; otherwise the lateral function of supervision would be impeded, and movements would be slowed down. It
+is therefore appropriate to sink into passivity.
+In similar situations, men have less tendency to indulge in erotic
+fantasies; this is because they are the 'first sex', the active sex; if they
+were to think of'taking' a woman, their work would suffer; conversely,
+work, by absorbing their total activity, cuts them off from sexuality.
+71. The German Idedogy, p. 89.
+
+234 Book I
+The woman worker thinks about sexual abandonment, because the
+machine requires her to live her conscious life in passivity in order to
+preserve a flexible, preventive vigilance without ever mobilising herself into active thought. Naturally, rumination can have various aspects, and may attach itself to different objects: the woman may recall
+the pleasure of the night before, or dream of the night to come, or
+constantly relive her troubled feelings while reading a book or magazine; or she may avoid sexuality and ruminate on the bitterness of her
+social condition instead. Nevertheless, it is essential that the object of
+her daydreams should also be the subject, that there should always be
+adherences: if the object posits itself for itself (if the woman emerges
+from her daydream, and thinks about her husband or her lover), the
+work will stop or slow down. That is why mothers are practically
+unable to think about their children - objects of their attention and
+worries - and why, very often, a woman's sexual ruminations do not
+correspond to her sexual attitude in married life. The truth is that when
+the woman worker thinks she is escaping from herself, she is really
+finding an indirect way of making herself what she is; the vague uneasiness which she maintains - and which, indeed, is limited by the
+constant movement of the machine and of her body - is a means of
+preventing thought from reforming, of confining consciousness and
+absorbing it in flesh, even while making use of it. Is she conscious of
+this? Yes and no: no doubt she tries to people the desert of boredom
+produced by the specialised machine. But at the same time, she tries
+to fix her mind within the limits allowed by the operation, by the objective task: she is the unwilling accomplice of employers who
+have determined norms and minimum output in advance. Thus the
+deepest interiority becomes a means of realising oneself as total exteriority.
+In this sense, the conditioning of the person is itself a future contradiction, which will eventually break out, but it is this contradiction in
+its present ambiguity or, as Marx says, in its 'incompleteness'; it will
+not be evident until after it has broken out and 'thus exists (only) for
+the later individuals'.? In fact, wherever one places oneself in history,
+one will find some oppositions which are entrenched and others which
+are uncertain, since we are always both those who come before and
+those who come after. It is true that 'for the proletarians... the condition of their existence, labour, and with it all the conditions of
+72. Ibid., p. 8g.
+
+235
+existence governing modern society have become something accidental 23 This implies that the individual enters into conflict with the
+situation in which he finds himself. But it is also true that all the actions
+he carries out as an individual merely reinforce and emphasise the
+objective being imposed on him: when the woman in the Dop shampoo
+factory has an abortion in order to avoid having a child she would be
+unable to feed, she makes a free decision in order to escape a destiny
+that is made for her; but this decision is itself completely manipulated
+by the objective situation: she realises through herself what she is
+already; she carries out the sentence, which has already been passed on
+her, which deprives her of free motherhood.
+On this first point dialectical intelligibility is unimpaired and existential principles are unaffected. In Being and Nothingness I said,
+following Hegel, that essence is past, transcended being. And, indeed,
+this is precisely what the being of the worker primarily is, in that in a
+capitalist society, it is prefabricated by already performed, already
+crystallised labour. And his personal praxis, as a free productive dialectic, in turn transcends this prefabricated being by the very movement
+which it impresses on the lathe or machine-tool. Inertia comes to him
+from the fact that previous work has constituted in the machine a
+future which cannot be transcended in the form of exigency (that is to
+say, specifically, the way the machine is to be used and its ability, in
+definite conditions, to increase production by a definite proportion),
+and from the fact that this untranscendable future is actualised in all its
+urgency by present circumstances (the capitalist process as a whole and
+the conjuncture in the unity of historical totalisation). Thus the inertia
+of praxis, as a new characteristic of it, removes none of its previous
+characteristics: praxis remains a transcendence of material being towards a future reorganisation of the field. But passivising annulment
+modifies it from the future towards the past within the petrified framework of exigency: this is because the future to be realised is already
+fabricated as mechanical inertia in the way in which past being is transcended. And indeed it can always be said that any material circumstance
+which has to be transcended, even the configuration of the land in the
+course of a walk, imposes a certain content on the future towards which
+it is transcended. It restricts certain possibilities and provides a certain
+instrumentality which will characterise the final result. However, it
+does not produce that future; the future comes to material circumstances
+73. Ibid., p. g6.
+
+236 Book l
+through men, and if material circumstances are preserved in it as
+significations, it is not because it is homogeneous with them (and passive like them), but on the contrary because human praxis has given it
+a human future by projecting it (as transcended and preserved) into
+this future. On the contrary, precisely because they have been worked
+and assembled by men, who have made them anti-human, the machine
+and the combination of exigencies contain the movement of transcendence in themselves and, in connection with this inert movement, the
+future of the ensemble is the mechanico-practical meaning of this totality in so far as it functions (that is to say, in so far as an exterior force
+enables it to realise itself as a pseudo-organic function). Thus the reason
+why past being cannot be transcended is that it is itself the inscription
+in being of a praxis which produces, beyond any particular human
+praxis, its own meaning as transcendent being. So the human praxis
+which lives in symbiosis with this inert practice and which is controlled
+by it as exigency constitutes itself as a mechanical means (in exteriority)
+of introducing mechanics amongst its characteristics as a human undertaking. It remains entirely what it is (if one takes it abstractly as a pure,
+isolated praxis) but its own future as transcendence of its past being is
+transcended by this very past-being in so far as it is already signified by
+the future.
+As I have said already, if the stratagems of the enemy lead a regiment
+to retreat towards an emplacement which seems protected but which
+has in fact been heavily mined, the practical freedom of the commanders who execute this retreat remains unimpaired in each of its dialectical moments, but their ignorance of the trap the enemy has prepared for them means that their free praxis is the necessary means
+selected by the enemy of bringing this military unit to inevitable
+destruction. Thus some other freedom, supported by powerful
+material means, may force a praxis into the role of a blind process
+leading men toward a passive future which cannot be transcended:
+that of their own destruction. And, if we assume that - as is usually the
+case - the commanders could not know that the field was mined, their
+praxis should not even be described as playing this role, but rather as
+objectively being this necessity itself. In any case, it should be noted
+that a praxis can constitute itself in this way only in the milieu of a
+praxis which transcends it and knows it better than it knows itself. Of
+course, it often happens that, in trying to avoid some annoyance, we
+fall into worse trouble; but if nobody has deliberately arranged the
+first danger in order to lead us into the second through the complicity
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 73J
+of our personal activity, this involves nothing more than the inherent
+uncertainty of praxis; for every praxis, to some degree, takes account
+of its areas of ignorance, reckons on probabilities (in the strict sense of
+the term), makes wagers, and takes risks.
+The freedom of an action which ends in failure is simply freedom
+which fails, since the fundamental relation of the organism to its
+environment is univocal. Matter does not make a constitutive return
+to praxis in order to transform it into a controlling fatality. In the case
+of a trap, however, it is clear that the freedom of the enemy, through
+the complex of material means involved, from the initial shot to the
+mine field, has given our own freedom a negative aspect (envers), and has
+made it objectively a practico-inert process of counter-finality: so
+much so that the soldier who falls into the trap will, if he escapes,
+discover an extraordinary (but easily understood) paradox, conveyed
+by the colloquial expression: 'We've really been had! To have: that is,
+to possess an enemy in so far as he is an inalienable praxis (and not, for
+example, because one is stronger or better armed). This petrification of
+freedom as such is obvious in military stratagems because once the
+material machine which forces us to destroy ourselves is set in motion,
+it is sustained and controlled by the living, practical freedom of the
+enemy. In the case of class-being as inertia which infiltrates freedom,
+the thing seems less obvious: for one thing, the workers who created
+the machines through their work are absent, perhaps dead; and in any
+case, it is not they but others - their exploiters - who desired our
+enslavement; indeed they did not desire it directly, but were essentially
+trying to increase their profit; besides, the empty position which each
+worker is expected to fill derives thereby from the diverse variety of
+exigencies which have come together without any particular action
+having presided over the process. Thus there is not really a freedom on
+the part of the employers to constitute the negative aspect in itself of the
+workers' praxes. But the univocal relation of interiority has transformed itself through the medium of the real meanings and real
+exigencies whose material object has been provided by human practices, whether multiple or unified, in false reciprocal interiority. And
+this false interiority, along with the prefabricated ends which cannot
+be transcended but which praxis must freely realise, is sufficient to
+transform this transcendence of Being into transcendence transcended
+by the Being to be transcended. Thus in the complex movement of
+alienated labour we have the inert Being of machinery as a material
+circumstance to be transcended, transcendence by praxis (setting in
+
+238 Book 1
+motion, use, and supervision) and transcendence of praxis (in so far as
+some exterior norm transfuses it as inert exigency) by that same Being,
+but to come as an other meaning realising itself.
+This will apply on every plane and not just that of production. The
+worker is socially constituted as a practico-inert object to the extent
+that he receives a wage: he becomes a machine that has to be maintained and fed. Now, in deciding his budget in accordance with the
+needs created in him by his work (by satisfying above all his hunger,
+to the detriment of clothes and lodging), the nineteenth-century
+worker made himself what he was, that is to say, he practically and
+rationally determined the order of priority of his expenditure; he
+therefore decided in his free praxis, and through this very freedom he
+made himself what he was, what he is, and what he must be: a machine
+whose wages simply represent maintenance costs." At this level we
+will encounter the questions raised in The Problem of Method. We can
+now see why transcending one's class condition effectively means
+realising it. And since praxis, as the transparent movement of action,
+cannot alienate itself, we find different actions in everyone: one worker
+reads, another agitates, another finds time to do both, another has
+just bought a scooter, another plays the violin, and another does
+gardening. All these activities are constituted on the basis of particular
+circumstances, and they constitute the objective individuality of each
+person. But still, in so far as they are located, in spite of themselves,
+inside a framework of exigencies that cannot be transcended, they
+simply realise everyone's class being. Everyone makes himself signify
+by interiorising, by a free choice, the signification with which material
+exigencies have produced him as a signified being. Class-being, as
+practico-inert being mediated by the passive syntheses of worked
+matter, comes to men through men; for each of us it is our being-
+74. I say 'the nineteenth-century worker' because contemporary economists
+increasingly tend to regard wages as the portion of the national income socially
+assigned to each individual. We may well wonder whether this ethical conception
+of wages - based on old 'solidarist' theories - has any advantage other than
+"drowning the fish' - that is to say, passing over class struggle in silence; whether,
+in effect, tamily allowances, social security, etc., do not represent what one might
+call a social portion of wages. It should be observed however that even so it is tar
+from being the case that society as a whole provides this national contribution.
+In any case, the contemporary worker has entirely different characteristics, in
+many fields, than previous generations. But the problem of class-being, as a
+logical and dialectical problem of rationality, remains the same for all that.
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 239
+outside-ourselves in matter, in so far as this produces us and awaits us
+from birth, and in so far as it constitutes itself through us as a futurefatality, that is to say as a future which will necessarily realise itself
+through us, through the otherwise arbitrary actions which we choose.
+It is obvious that this class-being does not prevent us from realising
+an individual destiny (each life is individual), but this realisation of our
+experience until death is only one of several possible ways (determined
+by the structured field of possibilities) of producing our class-being.
+However, it should not be thought that class-being realises itself as
+a simple relation of everyone to instrumentality and thereby to the
+other class; it is produced, in simultaneous connection with everything, as the structure of a class, that is to say, as a prefabricated relation between people of the same class on the basis of instrumentality.
+From this point, in a circular movement, it becomes the inert statute of
+their collective praxis in the context of class struggle. Admittedly, we
+have not yet established the nature of groups as organised activity.
+But even without examining this (we shall come to it in the next
+chapter) it will be appropriate to show that they can be organised only
+on the basis of inert structures representing both a qualification of their
+action and its objective limit, including its secret inertia. A well-known
+example will make this clearer.
+Corresponding to the iron and coal complex there is the so called
+'universal' machine. This means a machine - like the lathe in the second
+half of the nineteenth century - whose function remains indeterminate
+(in contrast to the specialised machines of automation and semiautomation), and which can do very different jobs provided it is
+guided, prepared and supervised by a skilful, expert worker. The
+universality of the machine produces specialisation in its servants: it is
+accessible only to those who know how to use it, and who have
+therefore had to undergo an often very long apprenticeship. (Conversely, the specialisation of the machine, fifty years later, in the period
+of semi-automation, has brought with it the universalisation of its
+servants: they are interchangeable.) Thus the producer of the machines, through his product and the improvements he makes to it,
+identifies a certain type of men, namely the skilled workers who are
+capable of carrying out a complete operation from beginning to end,
+unaided, that is to say, a dialectical praxis.
+This practical effect is built into machines themselves in the form of
+exigency. They reduce specifically physical effort, but require skill.
+They require that men freed of all secondary labours should devote
+
+240 Book I
+themselves entirely to them: and in this way, they fix, first, the mode
+of recruitment; then, through the employers, they create employment
+opportunities and relatively high wages on the labour market; and so
+a structured future opens up for certain sons of workers, who turn out
+to have the abilities and means required to become apprentices. (This
+means sons whose fathers, themselves workers, are in a position to let
+their sons work for a number of years without being able to support
+themselves. Generally, the father himself will have to be a skilled
+worker.) But, in the same process, machines create a lower proletariat which is not only the direct result of the rise of an élite of better
+paid workers, who are selected by apprenticeship, but is also directly
+required by the universal machine, in the form of the ensemble of
+unskilled workers who, in every workshop, have to be attached to the
+skilled workers, obey them, and relieve them of all the lowly chores
+which Others can do for them.
+Thus, the nineteenth-century machine constitutes a priori a passive
+structure of the proletariat. I shall call this a solar-system structure:
+the unskilled workers - indistinguishable and defined only as nonspecialised (and therefore completely indeterminate) individuals -
+circle around an equally interchangeable skilled worker in groups of
+five to ten; but he is defined, in universal terms, by his specialisation.
+This proletariat, structured by its functions - that is to say, by the role
+of its members in production - is required not only by the employers
+(who need to organise and encourage apprenticeship, and fear a
+crisis of skilled labour), but also by the workers themselves (who have
+to carry out the selection themselves, under the pressure of needs and
+in the context of everyone's opportunities). The machine organises
+men. But this human organisation has nothing in common with a
+synthetic union, with a community based on a conscious decision; the
+hierarchy will establish itself in the mechanical dispersal of massified
+pluralities and as if by accident. One child will happen to fulfil the
+physical, mental and social conditions required to become an apprentice; another - with no apparent relation to the first - will become an
+unskilled worker because these conditions are not fulfilled. Everyone's
+relation to machines being, strictly speaking, an individual and relatively autonomous destiny, the statistical relation of the machine to
+everyone appears as a real redistribution of social molecules in a given
+society, at a given moment, by materiality itself. And it is precisely
+material inertia which makes this mysterious and rigid, hierarchical
+unity in dispersal possible, just as it is the solidified praxis of matter, as
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality: 241
+the mechanical future of a group, class or society which establishes
+this hierarchical order a priori as the ensemble of those abstract relations which are to unite arbitrary individuals and which will impose
+themselves on these individuals whoever they are in the temporal
+context of production: the factory, with all its machines, has already
+decided on the ratio of unskilled to skilled workers, and consequently
+it has already established, for everyone, their chances of joining the
+élite or remaining in a state of sub-humanity.
+Thus the universal machine imposes differentiation on workers as a
+law of things; but at the same time, by the process described above in
+connection with Spanish gold, it becomes its own idea. As the property
+of an employer, it relegates its servant to the ranks of the exploited, and
+maintains and aggravates the contradiction which opposes the propertied class to the working class; but through the skill it demands, it
+creates a humanism of labour in the hands and body of the person who
+operates it. To the extent that, through the machine, the skilled worker
+sees his labour power, his skill and his abilities transformed into a
+product, that is to say, into social wealth, he will not regard himself as
+a 'sub-human conscious of his sub-humanity'. Admittedly, his product is taken away from him: but his indignation at being exploited
+has its deepest source in his pride as a producer. The 'damned of the
+earth' are precisely the only people capable of changing life, and who
+do change it every day, who feed, clothe and house humanity as a
+whole. And since the machine is selective, since, through the competence it exacts and creates, it constitutes work, for the skilled worker,
+as the honour of the exploited, it produces, in one process, both for the
+skilled workers and for the working masses, the unskilled worker as an
+inferior who gets lower wages, and possesses less technical value and
+less being. In relation to the employer, of course, the unskilled worker
+is posited as exploited; but what is he in relation to the skilled worker?
+Perhaps someone less fortunate (his father was poor, he started work
+at the age of twelve), or perhaps someone who lacked courage or
+ability; perhaps both. There is a tension here. It is not a true antagonism, at least at first: the unskilled worker harbours ambiguous feelings
+about the skilled worker. He admires him and listens to him: the skilled
+worker, acquiring political and sometimes scientific knowledge, and
+regarding himself as the active wing of the proletariat, merely develops
+the machine's own idea of itself and of its servant; but his positive
+education and his combativeness deceive the unskilled worker: he
+follows. But sometimes he will get the impression that the élite workers,
+
+242
+incorporating him in their struggles, are not always defending his own
+interests.
+Everything I have just described is inscribed in Being. The inert idea
+of labour-dignity, technical operations, differentiation between men,
+the hierarchy and the tension it produces, are all a product of machines;
+in other words, in a given factory, they are the practico-ineri Being of
+the workers themselves in so far as the relations between them are the
+machine itself through its servants. But what has to be demonstrated is
+that these passive structures will induce a quite specific inertia in
+militant workers' groups in that praxis will always be incapable of
+transcending certain untranscendable structures. I have indicated elsewhere how anarcho-syndicalist organisations, a product of the free
+efforts of skilled workers, were destined, even before unification was
+•achieved, to reproduce in the form of a 'voluntary' association the
+structures which had been established through the mediation of the
+universal machine in different enterprises. But it would be a grave
+mistake to believe that the machine created the syndicalism of 1900 in
+the way that a 'cause' produces its 'effect'. If this were the case, both
+the dialectic and mankind would disappear.
+The humanism of labour is in fact the material being of the skilled
+worker; he realises it in his work, in his hands and his eyes; he receives
+it in his wages, which express both exploitation and the hierarchy of
+the exploited; and he creates it by his very influence on the unskilled
+workers, and through an obscure conflict between them which remains
+hard to grasp. He still has to find out what he is. This means that his
+attempt to unite with his equals and to oppose exploitation by a
+practical negation must be made through the projection of what he is
+into his very praxis. How should he transcend exploitation, if not with
+what it has made of him: the fundamental movement by which skilled
+workers unite and transcend their antagonisms is also the affirmation
+of the humanism of labour. The anarcho-syndicalist decries exploitation in the name of the absolute superiority of skilled manual labour
+over all other activities. And practice fully confirms that this was the
+situation: in the period of the universal machine, it mattered very little
+if there was a strike of unskilled workers, whereas the absence of a few
+skilled workers, who would be very hard to replace, was enough to
+disrupt a whole workshop. So the élite of specialists deprived themselves, unwittingly, of the means of protesting against the exploitation
+of the unskilled workers: admittedly, their poverty angered them, but
+they could not support the claims of these 'sub-humans' on the grounds
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 243
+of the skill of their work. As soon as machine labour required that the
+worker should have a sort of suzerainty over his assistants, the fundamental affirmation of the humanism of labour and the related circumstances of the class struggle gave rise to a new device, which might be
+called the paternalism of the labour élite: unskilled workers must be
+educated, trained, inspired by example, etc. Thus the organisation
+against exploitation recreated, rigorously but freely, all the conditions
+which materiality imposes on alienated man.
+The interesting point here is the subtle nothingness at the heart of a
+positive fullness: the impossibility of transcending this humanism. It
+was in fact transcended when the skills of the skilled workers were
+rendered useless by specialised machines: this recreated workers' unity
+(in the advanced capitalist countries) on the basis of the interchangeability of skilled workers. Work took on once again all its negative
+characteristics: an exhausting burden, a hostile force. Admittedly,
+manual workers were still proud of their work: but this was because
+they sustained the whole of society, rather than because of the distinctiveness of the particular quality of their work. A humanism of need,
+as the direct hold of every man on all men, was being born. But it is
+crucial that anarcho-syndicalist humanism was unable to transcend itself. The reason, indeed, is simple enough: this practice and theory
+represented the very life of the group, and the militant group (whether
+a trade union or the employees of a factory) was simply the unification
+and reorganisation of the social struggle on existing structural bases.
+It was really impossible that the skilled workers, with their superior education, and their greater militancy and effectiveness, who could bring
+work to a halt by their mere absence, should merge themselves in
+practice with mass organisations in which the less educated and less
+militant would have been in a majority. If mass unions are possible and
+necessary today, it is because the technique of struggle has changed
+with the class structure, and because the interchangeability of skilled
+workers forces them to adopt a policy of mass action.
+The equality of workers has come both from changes in the means
+of production and from the practical tasks which these changes impose: hence it is real, that is to say, it is constantly being proved by its
+efficacity. But in 1900 this would have been an idealist position, since
+the slightest strike could have demonstrated its ineffectiveness. How
+could one affirm equality as long as a strike could succeed without the
+support of unskilled workers and when the unskilled workers on their own
+could not win a strike at all? And how could one give the same weight
+
+244
+to every opinion given that the unskilled workers of that time, with
+their poor education, their timidity, and their lack of the deeply respectable pride of the skilled workers, really were an inert mass which needed
+to be roused and galvanised into action?
+Positively, the humanism of labour appeared as an absorbing, endless task: innumerable monographs prove how seriously these men took
+it. They had to improve their skills in their trade, to educate themselves, and to educate the unskilled - they regarded themselves as
+responsible for their assistants; and they had to fight, to forge workingclass unity and bring forward the day when they would seize power.
+In short, it was a free, full world and they developed it tirelessly and
+passionately. And this living fullness was, at the same time, doomed:
+confronted by contemptible employers, incapable of exercising a truly
+productive trade, and surrounded by the unskilled workers whom they
+were obliged to emancipate, they identified the real, fulfilled human
+being with the skilled worker. And this false identification (false not
+in relation to the employers but in relation to the masses) represented
+a limit which could not be transcended, since it was themselves, or in
+other words, the theoretical and practical expression of their practicoinert relations with other workers. This should not be misunderstood:
+if, today, someone manages to glimpse absolute equality in his practical
+efficacity as the only valid form of human relation, his theory is false in
+so far as it paralyses, and becomes destiny. But when the problem of
+the structure of unions (whether they should be based on crafts or
+industries) arose, theory and practice became false in that they were an
+inert resistance to effective reorganisation; the humanism of labour
+became false when it led certain syndicalist dreamers to propose a
+workers' order of chivalry; and the link with the vassals became false
+when the docility of the unskilled workers gave way to increasing
+discontent. And above all the ideological and practical ensemble
+which expressed the struggle of a class which was structured by the
+universal machine became false when it prevented the unions from encompassing and organising the new masses, produced since before 1914
+by the first specialised machines.
+But how could this exploited class fight for a proletariat other than
+itself? And was it not precisely a proletariat which was structured in its
+being by universal machines, and passively affected by the material
+idea of 'dignity of labour',
+', which its élite interiorised in praxis. By
+determining what the members of the exploited class were, machines
+determined what they could be: they even deprived them of the ability
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 245
+to imagine different forms of struggle, at the same time as giving their
+self-affirmation (that is to say, their ethico-practical reinteriorisation of
+the machine's exigencies and the temporalising development in action
+of structures prefabricated by it) the form of the only effective struggle
+that was possible in these circumstances and against these employers.
+In this situation, Being became the prefabricated Future as a negative
+determination of temporalisation. In other words, it appeared in action
+(at least to some people, in some circumstances, such as, for example,
+certain antagonistic relations with unskilled workers) as its solidified
+but incomprehensible contradiction, as an impossibility of going
+further, of desiring or comprehending any more, like an iron wall in
+translucidity. In a way, indeed, the limit is given and even interiorised
+by praxis itself (in our example, it appears inside individual relations
+themselves: work relations, politico-social relations, personal relations)
+of both skilled and unskilled workers; it even affects a simple greeting
+between a skilled and an unskilled worker, just as the relation between
+classes in the same period is visible in the greeting between an industrialist and one of his workers.
+For us, who belong to another society (still capitalist, but one whose
+structures are governed by new energy sources, new machines and
+mass production), these interiorised limits appear as the objective
+meaning of structural relations in the period of anarcho-syndicalism.
+Of course, we can neither see nor hear these men, and the meaning of
+their everyday individual praxis eludes us. But it is expressed everywhere in the collective actions of which society retains some memory,
+in the institutions which they produced, in the sectarian conflicts within
+the unions, in the speeches which express them and even in the dreams
+of certain anarchist journalists. Elsewhere I have quoted some statements by syndicalist leaders which affirm quite blandly that the exploitation of man by man is more deplorable the more skilled the work
+(there are thousands of such statements). This can be taken to mean that
+the exploitation of an illiterate labourer - who has no skill, but who
+exhausts himself in carrying enormous loads from one end of the workshop to the other - is not completely unjustified. Above all, this
+proves that such syndicalists (whatever they may have said or written)
+did not really understand that this illiterate, possibly stupid labourer
+had been marked by society, even before he was born, as incapable of
+becoming a skilled worker. So for us the meaning of this is blindingly
+obvious; and this is a measure of our distance from them; and we too
+com prehend it in terms of our invisible walls: we can understand every
+
+246 Book I
+petrified limit of human relations in terms of the invisible limit which
+reifies our own. I am not saying that for them this objective meaning
+was a priori incapable of being achieved: for example, the contacts
+between two societies with different structures, though always degrading for the underdeveloped society, lead certain groups in the
+underdeveloped society to see certain relations which were formerly
+simply produced in their objectivity. Supposing, for example - though
+it is historically absurd - that in the name of another trade union
+movement, established on the basis of mass production in advanced
+capitalist countries, foreign workers were able, in the course of an international dialogue, to point out to the anarcho-syndicalists certain ossified structures of social praxis, there is no a priori reason for denying
+that certain groups or individuals might have become conscious of
+them (at least it is not logically impossible). However, this does not in
+any way imply that they would have wanted to alter these structures;
+it is more likely that they would have engaged in the kind of secondary
+activity which might be called practices of justification. But, in any
+case, contacts - between differently structured proletariats - could not
+have had such a simple meaning at the beginning of the twentieth
+century, when, unknown to itself, the second industrial revolution was
+taking place. Today, such contacts exist, but they have a different
+meaning (France: for a long time backward in its development, with a
+more homogeneous working class in certain key-industries, and still a
+taleran, a destiny which was for long time rejected es France, boday
+Malthusian employers and by the working class).
+The fact remains that it is always abstractly possible for any practico-inert limit to a human relation to reveal itself to the men it unites
+as the objective Being of their relation. But at this very moment, their
+experience of this meaning as real Being shows them that it has always
+existed, interiorised but petrified, in living praxis, even at the moment
+of subjectivity. It is simply that it then appeared both as an incomprehensible nothingness in the full development of some reciprocal
+activity and as a positive qualification of this practical fullness (suzerainty lived in the relation between the skilled and unskilled worker as
+the basis of the responsibilities of the suzerain and even of his love for
+the vassal). And precisely for that reason, the discovery of our Being
+is frightening (since it generally occurs in the midst of failure and conflict) - because it reveals that what one did not know was something
+one knew all along, in other words, because it retrospectively consti-
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 24J
+tutes our ignorances of our Being as determined and prefabricated by
+the Being which we are but of which we were unaware. In this way -
+and this applies to the group as much as to the individual - inert
+Being can also be defined in terms of the type of practical choice which
+prevents one from knowing what one is.
+But above all it must be emphasised that this prefabricated objectivity does not prevent praxis from being free temporalisation and
+effective reorganisation of the practical field in relation to aims discovered and posited in the course of praxis itself. Anarcho-syndicalism
+was in fact a vital and effective struggle, which gradually forged its
+weapons and created trade union unity out of dispersal; today, it even
+seems that its historical role was precisely to create the first organs of
+unification in the working class. In other words, it was simply the
+during in a rudimen aary parim its first electives appeases. But it
+must be understood, quite simply, that its form of hierarchical unity
+was already inscribed in human plurality by universal machines, to the
+extent that their exigencies had structured hierarchical groups of
+workers and that the transcendence of real multiplicity, of individual
+antagonisms, of local peculiarities, of mistrusts, of inertia, etc., in so
+far as it was a totally human praxis (that is to say, one which necessitated theoretical understanding of the situation, organisation of the
+practical field, constant efforts, courage, patience, and the practical
+development of an experience which itself brought new technical
+means of transcending the situation, etc.), simply carried out in a
+human way - that is to say, practically, dialectically - the sentence
+which universal machines had passed on the proletariat. The sentence
+still had to be carried out: without human praxis, the class remained
+the inert collective which will be described in the next paragraph; but
+human praxis, occasioned by the very structures of the collective (our
+discussion of the group will explain the meaning of the word 'occasion'),
+could only temporalise the same structures which had made it possible, in the unity of an action which was both organisational and
+tactical, through relations established by men.?5
+75. Although it lies beyond our subject, it is worth remarking that value (in
+the ethical rather than the economic sense of the term, though the former is
+based on the latter) is precisely the contradictory unity of praxis (as free transcendence positing itself as an indeterminate possibility of transcending everything in the translucence of creative action) and of exigency (as the future which
+cannot be transcended). From pure praxis, value derives the translucidity of self-
+
+248 Book I
+positing freedom; but in so far as the end projected is in fact an inert, untranscendable meaning of the prefabricated future, value acquires an independent
+passive being. Instead of being pure praxis, laying down its own laws (which
+would deprive it of its characteristics of interior exteriority, that is, of transcendence in immanence, and which would reduce it to a mere act of awareness
+(prise de conscience)), it isolates itself. But, since its inertia necessarily makes it
+transcendable, and since its practico-inert characteristic is that it cannot be transcended, it posits itself as the transcendent unity of all possible transcendences,
+(dépassements), that is to say, as the term which is untranscendable (because it is
+situated at infinity) and towards which every action transcends the material conditions which occasion it. In the case of anarcho-syndicalist humanism, for
+example, skilled labour became human value as soon as the conditions which had
+made it necessary began to make it impossible even to conceive of a different mode
+of being, constituted on the basis of unskilled labour. If he became conscious of
+himself, without this a priori limit and as a mere historical agent, the skilled
+worker would certainly have come to see his work as the dialectical, translucent
+development of human praxis within an exploitative system, in short, as the
+historical, dated actualisation of his reality as a man. But labour became impossible
+to transcend in him, because it also appeared as other; that is, when the actual
+praxis of the worker constituted itself as having to realise itselt as other than
+itself, as a particular embodiment of an inert meaning which, even when embodied,
+would remain alien to it, or in other words, would remain the sign of all transcendences. However, value is different from exigency. They are two different
+structures within a single process. The imperative character of exigency is due to
+the fact that materiality is animated by the praxis of the other and to the fact that
+this praxis is revealed to me as both human and alien: it signifies me and awaits
+me, but it is not mine: it is myself as nothing. Value, on the other hand, is in a
+double movement: both the revealing of my praxis in its free development in so
+far as it posits itself as other within immanence, and the revealing of a future
+signification as an inertia which necessarily refers back to my freedom. In either
+case, the original structure is worked materiality as a bond between men, and
+praxis as absorbed and inverted by this matter. But in the first case, the inversion
+directly signifies me in so far as I am the means of realising a material aim; whereas
+in the second case, which arises at a different level of the investigation, I apprehend primarily my praxis, but only in so far as it transcends itself in its very
+freedom towards the Other-Being of all praxis; and, consequently, in so far as a
+controlling and created limit affects it with materiality. This new structure implies
+that the experience of praxis as the creator (or realiser) of value is new (originale):
+there is not any constraint in this case, but rather an (alienated) awareness of an
+identity between praxis itself, at its highest level of conscious translucidity, and a
+particular inert meaning which absorbs it and gives it its practico-inert statute as
+materiality. In short, value is not the alienation either of the aim or of realised
+objectivity; it is the alienation of praxis itself. In other words, it is praxis unwittingly revealing the inertia with which the practico-inert being of the practical
+agent affects it. From the point of view of ethics, this means that values are bound
+negative) and that if a liquidation of these structures is to be possible - a question
+
+Matter as Totalised Totality 249
+which we shall examine in the progressive moment of the investigation-values
+will disappear with them, allowing praxis in its free development to be revealed
+as the sole ethical relation between people in so far as together they dominate
+matter. The source of the am' iguity of all morality, past and present, is that freedom as a human relation reveals itself, in the world of exploitation and oppression, in opposition to this world and as a negation of the inhuman through values,
+and that it reveals itself there as alienated and loses itself in it and that, by means of
+values, it realises nevertheless the untranscendable exigency imposed on it by
+practico-inert being, while still contributing to an organisation which carries
+vithin it the possibilities of reorganising the practico-inert field (at least on the
+basis of new circumstances). Every system of values rests on exploitation and
+oppression; every system of values effectively negates exploitation and oppression
+(even aristocratic systems, if not explicitly at least in their internal logic); every
+system of values confirms exploitation and oppression (even systems constructed
+by oppressed classes, if not in intention, at least in so far as they are systems);
+every system of values, in so far as it is based on a social practice, contributes
+directly or indirectly to establishing devices and apparatuses which, when the
+time comes (for example, on the basis of a revolution in techniques and tools)
+will allow this particular oppression and exploitation to be negated; every system
+of values, at the moment of its revolutionary efficacity, ceases to be a system, and
+values cease to be values: their character was due to the fact that they could
+not be transcended; and circumstances, overthrowing structures, institutions and
+exigencies, transform them into transcended significations: systems are reabsorbed into the organisations which they have created and the organisations,
+transformed by the overthrow of the social field, integrate themselves into new
+collective actions, carried out in the context of the new exigencies; and they disclose new values. But Marxists can be criticised for confusing systems of values
+with their expression in language and with the moralities invented by intellectuals
+on the basis of these systems. This makes it easy to see them as mere dead reflections of practice. By confusing them with the philosophical vocabulary which
+is used to refer to them, Marxism has avoided a difficult problem: that of accounting for their structure. And in this way, it has had no defence against moralism,
+because it cannot give an account of them. Nothing is more striking, for example,
+than the profound moralism of Russian society (which there is no reason for
+confusing with the collective praxis which is constructing, through new contradictions, a socialist society). In the USSR, certain notions, common to all (in
+particular, that of life both as a value to be preserved and as the ethical source of
+all experience) are expressly presented as values, at every level of the society. In
+order to give an account of them, Marxism must understand that value is produced
+at the level of elementary praxis (individual and collective), as this praxis itself
+in so far as it conceives its own limits in the false guise of a positive fullness which
+cannot be transcended. What I am trying to show here is that every supposed
+superstructure is really already contained in the base, as a structure of the fundamental relation of men to worked matter and to other men. If we then see them
+appear and posit themselves for themselves as abstract moments and as superstructures, this is because a complex process refracts them through other fields
+and, particularly, in the field of language. But no idea, no value, and no system
+would be conceivable if they were not already contained, at every level of the
+
+250 Book I
+Thus we have seen class-being as the practico-inert statute of individual or common praxis, as the future sentence, petrified in past
+being, which this praxis itself has to carry out and in which it must
+finally recognise itself in a new experience of necessity. But this
+practico-inert being appeared to us as a real moment of the individual
+or as the passive statute uf an active group or, conversely, as the active
+pseudo-unity of an inert material ensemble. In order to understand it
+better, we must investigate a new structure, conditioned by the preceding ones and conditioning them in turn: for, as we have seen, classbeing is not a niere characteristic of untranscendable materiality existing
+as a separate quality in discrete entities isolatec! from one another (like,
+for example, height or colour of hair). In fact class-being, far from
+manifesting itself as an identity of being between independent realities,
+appears in this investigation (expérience) as the material unity of individuals or, in other words, as the collective basis of their individuality.
+Our examples were designed to show that individuals realise their class
+statute through one another: from elementary praxis, from working in
+a workshop, everyone's class-being, in so far as it is a practico-inert
+exigency of machines, comes to him not only from the class which
+exploits him, but also from all his comrades; or rather, it comes to him
+from the class which exploits him and the machines which require him
+through the medium of his comrades and their universal character as
+exploited.
+At the same time, class-being defines itself for everyone as an inert
+(untranscendable) relation with his class comrades on the basis of
+certain structures. Destiny, general (and even particular) Interest,
+Exigency, Class Structures, Values as common limits, all necessarily
+direct our attention not only to a type of individual being which we
+have already described, but also, through it, to a type of collective being
+as the basis of all individual reality. I am not referring here to those
+active collectivities which organise themselves for a definite purpose
+and which we will study later under the name of groups. Nor am I
+referring to those ensembles which are both hot and cold, like an army,
+because they possess both the practical and historical activity of an
+organisation and the inert materiality of an institution. Rather, at a
+deeper level, as the basis of all individuation as well as all unity, I am
+experience and in various forms, in all the moments of activity and of alienation,
+not only as signs, as exigencies in the tool, but also as a revelation of the world
+through this tool by labour, etc.
+
+251
+referring to inert collective being, as the inor ganic common materiality of
+all the members of a given ensemble. This indeed is basically what it
+means to speak of a class. For the term does not primarily mean either
+the active unification of all the individuals within the organisations
+which they themselves have produced, or an identity of nature between several separate products. In the first meaning, indeed, the term
+is not always, or even very frequently, applicable in our investigation;
+numerous contradictions, born of historical circumstances, often cause
+deep divisions within a class.
+There can be no doubt that the proletariat would be able to approach
+the unity of a collective praxis if the organisations it has produced - in
+France for example - succeeded in bringing about trade union unity.
+But, when it is represented by warring parties and unions, must we
+stop calling it the proletariat? Everyone's experience testifies to the
+contrary; for it is normal to speak of the divisions in the working class,
+which presupposes a deeper unity, on the basis of which, in certain
+conditions, it will produce either its active unity as an increasingly
+developed integration (and totalisation), or its divisions as the destruction of an already existing totality. Ur rather: no one would
+dream of arguing that, because these divisions exist, the working class
+is being replaced by several groups of exploited individuals, more
+opposed in their aims and their tactics than they are united by common
+exploitation. These divisions would be described as threatening to
+reduce the working class to impotence. The divisions appear therefore as
+accidents, which, though undoubtedly very serious for practice, cannot
+affect the fundamental substance, which is one.
+And it cannot be argued that this substance does not really exist,
+that there are only individuals threatened by a single destiny, victims
+of the same exigencies, possessing the same general interest, etc., for it
+is precisely the ensemble of structures of the practico-inert field that
+necessarily conditions the substantial unity of the being-outsideoneself of individuals, and conversely, this being-outside-oneself as a
+substantial and negative unity on the terrain of the Other conditions
+the structures of this field in its turn. But at the same time, we should
+avoid thinking in terms of those gelatinous realities, somewhat vaguely
+haunted by a supra-individual consciousness which, in defiance of all
+appearances, a discredited organicism still tries to find in the rough,
+complex field, furrowed with passive activity, which contains several
+individual organisms and inorganic material realities. And in fact, if
+everyone merges together in a particular common being, this must
+
+252 Book 1
+occur in the practico-inert field and precisely to the extent that they are
+not individual organisms, or in other words, in so far as worked materiality itself makes itself into a synthesis (or false synthesis) of their
+being-outside-themselves-in-it. This is clearly reflected in our language,
+when an individual is said to be born into the working class or to have
+sprung from the proletariat (if he has emerged from it) or to belong to
+it, as if the class as a whole was a matrix, a milieu and a sort of passive
+weight (the idea of class viscosity is used to explain a worker's son's
+chances of emerging from the working class). In a word, class as
+collective being is in everyone to the extent that everyone is in it, and
+before 'getting organised' and "producing apparatuses', it appears in the
+contradictory aspect of a sort of common inertia as a synthesis of
+multiplicity. 'These considerations, which normally satisfy sociologists,
+obviously cannot establish the intelligibility of fundamental socialities.
+We must abandon such vague descriptions and try to extend our
+dialectical investigation to include them. But, although class, as a
+fundamental structure, represents at a certain level the very substance
+of which groups and passive socialities are determinations, and although every collection of human beings, at the present time, expresses
+this substance in one way or another, or manifests the class divisions of
+society - both within themselves and in their inertia or praxis - we will
+not immediately attempt a definition of the practico-inert sociality of
+class. We shall examine the most obvious, immediate and superficial
+gatherings of the practical field, as they appear in everyday experience.
+And, since many of them arise as simple internal determinations of a
+substance with which they are homogeneous, they can be treated
+formally not in their particularity, but in so far as through themselves
+they are social beings in the practico-inert field: through themselves
+they will manifest to us what might be called their ontological intelligibility, and in a later moment we will be able, through them, to
+understand and fix this more fundamental reality, class. In The Problem of Method I called these inorganic social beings collectives.
+
+4
+Social objects (by which I mean any objects which have a collective
+structure and which, as such, must be the subject matter of sociology)
+are, at least in their fundamental structure, beings of the practico-inert
+field. Their being therefore resides in inorganic materiality in so far as,
+in this field, it is itself practico-inert. I am not referring to the material
+beings (produced by human labour) which are sometimes called rallying
+points, or symbols of unity: what I have in mind are practical realities,
+with their exigencies, to the extent that they realise in and through
+themselves the interpenetration of a multiplicity of unorganised individuals within them and that they produce every individual in them in
+the indistinction of a totality. The structure of this 'totality' has yet to
+be determined; but it ought not to be understood in the same sense as
+that in which a group of machines becomes the unity of its servants by
+determining tasks: this unity, as the reverse side of a well-defined
+division of labour, is simply the inorganic inversion of a differentiated
+unity of functions, and in so far as it turns back on men to produce
+them, it produces them through distinct exigencies and to the extent
+that everyone, as a general individual, is the means of a given differentiated function (as Other, as we have seen).
+A collective structure, that is to say, a structure of totalising or
+pseudo-totalising interpenetration, could exist within a mechanical
+ensemble only to the extent that the mechanical ensemble itself
+existed as an undifferentiated practico-inert reality - for example, as a
+factory which, when it closes its gates, throws two thousand workers
+out of work, or as an ensemble which is a threat to everyone because the
+employer refuses to take the necessary security measures (though it is
+hard to draw this distinction in general terms, and the examination of a
+particular case would take too long). On the other hand, we must
+emphasise that groups (both as practical organisations, directly established by human praxis, and as present, concrete undertakings) can
+
+254 Book I
+arise only on the foundation of a collective which, however, they do
+not eliminate (at least not entirely) and, conversely, that in so far as,
+whatever its aim, it necessarily acts through the medium of the practico-inert field, it must itself, as a free organisation of individuals with
+a common aim, produce its collective structure, that is to say, exploit its
+inertia for practice (this, as we have seen, characterises action at every
+level). In the end, for reasons whose very intelligibility will be criticised when we come to discuss them, subject to certain circumstances
+and in certain conditions, groups die and then disintegrate. This means
+that they ossify, become stratified and return into more general socialities, though without dissolving into them, while retaining their own
+sociality, as true collectives. Any social field is constituted, very
+largely, by structured ensembles of groupings which are always both
+praxis and practico-inert, although either of these characteristics may
+constantly tend to cancel itself out; only experience can indicate the
+internal relation of the structures in a definite group and as a definite
+moment of its interior dialectic.
+The collective, therefore, will often appear in my examples through
+living or moribund groups of which it is a fundamental structure. But,
+in so far as the group constitutes itself as a negation of the collective
+which engenders and sustains it, and in so far as the collective reappears
+when a complex of historical circumstances negates the group as an
+undertaking but does not liquidate it as a determination, we can identify,
+at the extremes, groups in which passivity tends to disappear entirely
+(for example, a very small 'combat unit, all of whose members live
+and struggle together, and never leave each other), and collectives
+which have almost entirely reabsorbed their group: thus in Budapest,
+before the insurrection, the Social Democratic Party, which had
+practically no members left, officially retained its emblems and its
+76. The majority had merged with the Communists to form a new party.
+Some elements of the right-wing minority had been put on trial, and others had
+emigrated. The social-democratic tendency, which was very strong among the
+workers, became a tendency, an exis, but outside any party. On the other hand, the
+headquarters as worked materiality became the Party itself, not only for the
+government (which was concerned to show that the grouping had not been
+eliminated in an authoritarian way, but that it had simply lost its members), but
+also for the emigré socialists (who found in it the material, transcendent and
+distant unity of their dispersal, as well as a petrified affirmation of their hope),
+and for the socialists who had merged with the Communists (as their transcended
+and, at least for some of them, untranscendable past being) and, lastly, for the
+non-party sympathisers as the solidified exigency (their own exigency turned
+
+Collectives 255
+name and its headquarters in a certain building. These extreme -
+though frequent and normal - cases enable us to make a clear separation between the two social realities: the group is defined by its undertaking and by the constant movement of integration which tends to
+turn it into pure praxis by trying to eliminate all forms of inertia
+from it; the collective is defined by its being, that is to say, in so far as
+all praxis is constituted by its being as mere exis; it is a material,
+inorganic object in the practico-inert field in so far as a discrete multiplicity of active individuals is produced in it under the sign of the Other,
+as a real unity within Being, that is to say, as a passive synthesis, and to
+the extent that the constituted object is posited as essential and that its
+inertia penetrates every individual praxis as its fundamental determination by passive unity, that is to say, by the pre-established and given
+interpenetration of everyone as Others.
+In this new moment of the spiral, we find the same terms enriched
+by their partial totalisations and reciprocal conditionings: reciprocity
+as a fundamental human relation, the separation of individual organisms, the practical field with its dimensions of alterity in depth, inorganic materiality as man's being-outside-himself in the inert object
+and as the inert's being-outside-itself as exigency in man, in the unity
+of a falsely reciprocal relation of interiority. But specifically, outside
+the human relation of reciprocity and the relation to the third party,
+which in themselves are not social (although in a sense they condition
+all sociality and are conditioned by sociality in their historical content),
+the structural relation of the individual to other individuals remains in
+itself completely indeterminate until the ensemble of material circumstances on the basis of which the relation is established has been defined,
+from the point of view of the historical process of totalisation. In this
+sense, the contrast between 'reciprocity as a relation of interiority' and
+'the isolation of organisms as a relation of exteriority, which, in the
+abstract, conditions an unspecified tension within multiplicities, is in
+fact transcended, and merged in a new type of 'external-internal'
+relation by the action of the practico-inert field which transforms contradiction in the milieu of the Other into seriality. In order to understand the collective one must understand that this material object
+realises the unity of interpenetration of individuals as beings-in-theback on itself) of a temporarily or absolutely impossible integration. And none of
+these people was unaware of what this collective object produced in the others.
+
+256 Book I
+world-outside-themselves to the extent that it structures their relations
+as practical organisms in accordance with the new rule of series.
+Series: the queue
+Let us illustrate these notions by a superficial everyday example. Take
+a grouping of people in the Place Saint-Germain. They are waiting
+for a bus at a bus stop in front of the church. I use the word 'grouping'
+here in a neutral sense: we do not yet know whether this gathering is,
+as such, the inert effect of separate activities, or whether it is a common
+reality, regulating everyone's actions, or whether it is a conventional
+or contractual organisation. These people - who may differ greatly in
+age, sex, class, and social milieu - realise, within the ordinariness of
+everyday life, the relation of isolation, of reciprocity and of unification
+(and massification) from outside which is characteristic of, for example,
+the residents of a big city in so far as they are united though not integrated through work, through struggle or through any other activity
+in an organised group common to them all. To begin with, it should be
+noted that we are concerned here with a plurality of isolations: these
+people do not care about or speak to each other and, in general, they
+do not look at one another; they exist side by side alongside a bus stop.
+At this level, it is worth noting that their isolation is not an inert
+statute (or the simple reciprocal exteriority of organisms); rather, it is
+actually lived in everyone's project as its negative structure. In other
+words, the isolation of the organism, as the impossibility of uniting
+with Others in an organic totality, is revealed through the isolation
+which everyone lives as the provisional negation of their reciprocal
+relations with Others. This man is isolated not only by his body as
+such, but also by the fact that he turns his back on his neighbour - who,
+moreover, has not even noticed him (or has encountered him in his
+practical field as a general individual defined by waiting for the bus).
+The practical conditions of this attitude of semi-unawareness are,
+first, his real membership of other groups (it is morning, he has just
+got up and left his home; he is still thinking of his children, who are
+ill, etc.; furthermore, he is going to his office; he has an oral report to
+make to his superior; he is worrying about its phrasing, rehearsing it
+
+Collectives 25J
+under his breath, etc.); and secondly, his being-in-the-inert (that is to
+say, his interest). This plurality of separations can, therefore, in a way,
+be expressed as the negative side of individual integration into separate
+groups (or into groups that are separate at this time and at this level);
+and, through this, as the negative side of everyone's projects in so far
+as they determine the social field on the basis of given conditions. On
+the other hand, if the question is examined from the point of view of
+groups, interests, etc. - in short, of social structures in so far as they
+express the fundamental social order (mode of production, relations of
+production, etc.) - then one can define each isolation in terms of the
+forces of disintegration which the social group exerts on individuals.
+(These forces, of course, are correlatives of forces of integration,
+which we shall discuss soon.)
+In other words, the intensity of isolation, as a relation of exteriority
+between the members of a temporary and contingent gathering, expresses the degree of massification of the social ensemble, in so far as it
+is produced on the basis of given conditions."
+At this level, reciprocal isolations, as the negation of reciprocity,
+signify the integration of individuals into one society and, in this
+sense, can be defined as a particular way of living (conditioned by the
+developing totalisation), in interiority and as reciprocity within the
+social, the exteriorised negation of all interiority ('No one helps
+anyone, it's everyone for himself') or, on the other hand, in sympathy
+(as in Proust's 'Every person is very much alone'). Finally, in our
+example, isolation becomes, for and through everyone, for him and for
+others, the real, social product of cities. For each member of the group
+waiting for the bus, the city is in fact present (as I have shown in The
+Problem of Method) as the practico-inert ensemble within which there
+is a movement towards the interchangeability of men and of the instrumental ensemble; it has been there since morning, as exigency, as
+instrumentality, as milieu, etc. And, through the medium of the city,
+there are given the millions of people who are the city, and whose
+completely invisible presence makes of everyone both a polyvalent
+isolation (with millions of facets), and an integrated member of the
+city (the 'vieux Parisien", the "Parisien de Paris, etc.). Let me add that
+the mode of life occasions isolated behaviour in everyone - buying the
+paper as you leave the house, reading it on the bus, etc. These are often
+77. When I say that the intensity of isolation expresses the degree of massification, I mean that it does this in a purely indicative way.
+
+258 Book I
+operations for making the transition from one group to another (from
+the intimacy of the family to the public life of the office). Thus isolation is a project. And as such it is relative to particular individuals and
+moments: to isolate oneself by reading the paper is to make use of the
+national collectivity and, ultimately, the totality of living human
+beings, in so far as one is one of them and dependent on all of them,
+in order to separate oneself from the hundred people who are waiting
+for or using the same vehicle. Organic isolation, suffered isolation,
+lived isolation, isolation as a mode of behaviour, isolation as a social
+statute of the individual, isolation as the exteriority of groups conditioning the exteriority of individuals, isolation as the reciprocity of
+isolations in a society which creates masses: all these forms, all these
+oppositions co-exist in the little group we are considering, in so far as
+isolation is a historical and social form of human behaviour in human
+gatherings.
+But, at the same time, the relation of reciprocity remains in the
+gathering itself, and among its members; the negation of isolation by
+praxis preserves it as negated: it is, in fact, quite simply, the practical
+existence of men among men. Not only is there a lived reality - for
+everyone, even if he turns his back on the Others, and is unaware of
+their number and their appearance, knows that they exist as a finite and
+indeterminate plurality of which he is a part - but also, even outside
+everyone's real relation to the Others, the ensemble of isolated behaviour, in so far as it is conditioned by historical totalisation, presupposes
+a structure of reciprocity at every level. This reciprocity must be the
+most constant possibility and the most immediate reality, for otherwise
+the social models in currency (clothes, hair style, bearing, etc.) would
+not be adopted by everyone (although of course this is not sufficient),
+and neither would everyone hasten to repair anything wrong with their
+dress as soon as they notice it, and if possible in secret. This shows that
+isolation does not remove one from the visual and practical field of the
+Other, and that it realises itself objectively in this field.
+At this level, we recognise the same society (which we just saw as an
+agent of massification), in so far as its practico-inert being serves as a
+medium conducive to inter-individual reciprocities: for these separate
+people form a group, in so far as they are all standing on the same pavement, which protects them from the traffic crossing the square, in so far
+as they are grouped around the same bus stop, etc. Above all, these
+individuals form a group to the extent that they have a common
+interest, so that, though separated as organic individuals, they share a
+
+259
+structure of their practico-inert being, and it unites them from outside.
+They are all, or nearly all, workers, and regular users of the bus
+service; they know the time-table and frequency of the buses; and consequently they all wait for the same bus: say, the 7.49. This object, in
+so far as they are dependent upon it (breakdowns, failures, accidents),
+is their present interest. But this present interest - since they all live in
+the district - refers back to fuller and deeper structures of their general
+interest: improvement of public transport, freezing of fares, etc. The
+bus they wait for unites them, being their interest as individuals who
+this morning have business on the rive droite; but, as the 7-49, it is their
+interest as commuters; everything is temporalised: the traveller recognises himself as a resident (that is to say, he is referred to the five or
+ten previous years), and then the bus becomes characterised by its
+daily eternal return (it is actually the very same bus, with the same driver
+and conductor). The object takes on a structure which overflows its
+pure inert existence; as such it is provided with a passive future and
+past, and these make it appear to the passengers as a fragment (an
+insignificant one) of their destiny.
+However, to the extent that the bus designates the present commuters, it constitutes them in their interchangeability: each of them is
+effectively produced by the social ensemble as united with his neighbours, in so far as he is strictly identical with them. In other words,
+their being-outside (that is to say, their interest as regular users of the
+bus service) is unified, in that it is a pure and indivisible abstraction,
+rather than a rich, differentiated synthesis; it is a simple identity,
+designating the commuter as an abstract generality by means of a
+particular praxis (signalling the bus, getting on it, finding a seat,
+paying the fare), in the development of a broad, synthetic praxis (the
+undertaking which unites the driver and conductor every morning, in
+the temporalisation which is one particular route through Paris at a
+particular time). At this moment of the investigation, the unit-being
+(être-unique) of the group lies outside itself, in a future object, and
+everyone, in so far as he is determined by the common interest, differentiates himself from everyone else only by the simple materiality of
+the organism. And already, if they are characterised in their temporalisation as awaiting their being as the being of all, the abstract unity of
+their common future being manifests itself as other-being in relation to
+the organism which it is in person (or, to put it another way, which it
+exists). This moment cannot be one of conflict, but it is no longer one
+of reciprocity; it must simply be seen as the abstract stage of identity.
+
+260 Book I
+In so far as they have the same objective reality in the future (a minute
+later, the same for everyone, and the bus will come round the corner of
+the boulevard), the unjustited separation of these organisms (in so tai
+as it arises from other conditions and another region of being) determines itself as identity. There is identity when the common interest (as
+the determination of generality by the unity of an object in the context
+of particular practices) is made manifest, and when the plurality is
+defined just in relation to this interest. In that moment, in fact, it
+matters little if the commuters are biologically or socially differentiated;
+in so far as they are united by an abstract generality, they are identical
+as separate individuals. Their identity is their future practico-inert
+unity, in so far as it determines itself at the present time as meaningless
+separation. And, since all the lived characteristics which might allow
+some interior differentiation lie outside this determination, everyone's
+identity with every Other is their unity elsewhere, as other-being;
+here and now, it is their common alterity. Everyone is the same as the
+Others in so far as he is Other than himself. And identity as alterity is
+exterior separation; in other words, it is the impossibility of realising,
+through the body, the transcendent unity to come, in so far as this
+unity is experienced as an irrational necessity.?8
+It is at precisely this level that material objects will be found to
+determine the serial order as the social reason for the separation of
+individuals. The practico-inert exigency, here, derives trom scarcity:
+there are not enough places for everyone. But, apart trom scarcity as the
+contingent but fundamental relation of man to Nature, which remains
+the context of the whole investigation, this particular scarcity is an
+aspect of material inertia. Whatever the demands, the object remains
+passively what it is: there is no reason to believe that material exigency
+must be a special, directly experienced scarcity: we shall find different
+practico-inert structures of the object as an individuated being of
+generality conditioning different serial relations. I take this example for
+its simplicity. Thus the specific scarcity - the number of people in
+relation to the number of places - in the absence of any particular
+practice, would designate every individual as dispensable; the Other
+would be the rival of the Other because of their identity; separation
+would turn into contradiction. But, except in cases of panic - where, in
+78. It becomes perfectly rational when the stages of the entire process are reconstructed. All the same, the conflict between interchangeability and existence
+(as unique, lived praxis) must be lived at some level as a scandalous absurdity.
+
+Collectives 26г
+effect, everyone fights himself in the Other, in the whirling madness of
+an abstract unity and a concrete but unthinkable individuality - the
+relation of reciprocity, emerging or re-emerging in the exteriority of
+identity, establishes interchangeability as the impossibility of deciding,
+a priori, which individuals are dispensable; and it occasions some
+practice whose sole purpose is to avoid conflicts and arbitrariness by
+creating an order.
+The travellers waiting for the bus take tickets indicating the order
+of their arrival. This means that they accept the impossibility of deciding
+which individuals are dispensable in terms of the intrinsic qualities of the
+individual; in other words, that they remain on the terrain of common
+interest, and of the identity of separation as meaningless negation;
+positively, this means that they try to differentiate every Other from
+Others without adding anything to his characteristic as Other as the
+sole social determination of his existence. Serial unity, as common
+interest, therefore imposes itself as exigency and destroys all opposition. The ticket no doubt refers to a temporal determination. But this
+is precisely why it is arbitrary: the time in question is not a practical
+temporalisation, but a homogeneous medium of repetition. Taking his
+ticket as he arrives, everyone does the same as the Other. He realises a
+practico-inert exigency of the ensemble; and, since they are going to
+different jobs and have different objectives, the fact of having arrived
+first does not give any distinctive characteristic, but simply the right to
+get on the bus first. The material justifications for the order have
+meaning, in fact, only after the event: being the first to arrive is no
+virtue; having waited longest confers no right. (Indeed, one can
+imagine fairer classifications - waiting means nothing to a young man,
+but it is very tiring for an old woman. Besides, war wounded have
+priority in any case, etc.) The really important transformation is that
+alterity as such, pure alterity, is no longer either the simple relation to
+common unity, or the shifting identity of organisms. As an ordering,
+it becomes a negative principle of unity and of determining everyone's
+fate as Other by every Other as Other. It matters a lot to me, in effect,
+that I have the tenth number rather than the twentieth. But I am tenth
+through Others in so far as they are Other than themselves, that is to
+say, in so far as the Reason for their number does not lie in themselves.
+If I am after my neighbour, this may be because he did not buy his
+newspaper this morning, or because I was late leaving the house. And
+if we have numbers y and io, this depends on both of us and also on
+all the Others, both before and after.
+
+262 Book /
+On this basis, it is possible to grasp our relations to the object in
+their complexity. On the one hand, we have effectively remained
+general individuals (in so far as we form part of this gathering, of
+course). Therefore the unity of the collection of commuters lies in the
+bus they are waiting for; in fact it is the bus, as a simple possibility of
+transport (not for transporting all of us, for we do not act together,
+but for transporting each of us). Thus, as an appearance and a first
+abstraction, a structure of universality really exists in the grouping;
+indeed, everyone is identical with the Other in so far as they are
+waiting for the bus. However, their acts of waiting are not a communal
+fact, but are lived separately as identical instances of the same act. From
+this point of view, the group is not structured; it is a gathering and the
+number of individuals in it is contingent. This means that any other
+number was possible (to the extent that the individuals are considered
+as arbitrary particles and that they have not collected together as a
+result of any common dialectical process). This is the level where
+conceptualisation has its place; that is to say, concepts are based on the
+molecular appearance of organisms and on the transcendent unity of
+the group (common interest).
+But this generality, as the fluid homogeneity of the gathering (in so
+far as its unity lies outside it), is just an abstract appearance, for it is
+actually constituted in its very multiplicity by its transcendent unity as
+a structured multiplicity. With a concept, in effect, everyone is the
+same as the Others in so far as he is himself. In the series, however,
+everyone becomes himself (as Other than self) in so far as he is other
+than the Others, and so, in so far as the Others are other than him.
+There can be no concept of a series, for every member is serial by
+virtue of his place in the order, and therefore by virtue of his alterity
+in so far as it is posited as irreducible. In arithmetic, this can be demonstrated by reference to numbers, both as concepts and as serial entities.
+All whole numbers, or integers, can be the object of the same concept,
+in so far as they all share the same characteristics; in particular, any
+whole number can be represented by the symbol n + I (if we take
+n = o for the number one). But for just this reason, the arithmetical
+series of integers, in so far as all of them are constituted by adding one
+to the preceding number, is a practical and material reality, constituted
+by an infinite series of unique entities; and the uniqueness of each
+number is due to the fact that it stands in the same relation to the one
+that precedes it as this one does to the one preceding it. In the case of
+ordinals, alterity also changes its meaning: it manifests itself in the
+
+Collectives 263
+concept as common to all, and it designates everyone as a molecule
+identical with all the others; but, in the series, it becomes a rule of
+differentiation. And whatever ordering procedure is used, seriality
+derives from practico-inert matter, that is to say, from the future as an
+ensemble of inert, equivalent possibilities (equivalent, in this case,
+because no means of forecasting them is given): there is the possibility that there will be one place, that there will be two, or three, etc.
+These rigid possibilities are inorganic matter itself in so far as it is
+non-adaptability. They retain their rigidity by passing into the serial
+order of separate organisms: for everyone, as a holder of a numbered
+ticket, they become a complex of possibilities peculiar to him (he
+will get a place if there is room for ten or more people on the bus; he
+will not do so if there is only room for nine, but then he will be the
+first for the next bus). And it is these possibilities and these alone which,
+within the group, constitute the real content of his alterity.
+But it should be noticed that this constituent alterity must depend
+both on all the Others, and on the particular possibility which is actualised, and therefore that the Other has his essence in all the Others, in
+so far as he differs from them. " Moreover, this alterity, as a principle of
+ordering, naturally produces itself as a link. Now this link between men
+is of an entirely different kind from those already examined. On the
+one hand, it cannot be explained in terms of reciprocity, since the
+serial movement in our example excludes the relation of reciprocity:
+everyone is the Reason for the Other-Being of the Other in so far as
+an Other is the reason for his being. In a sense, we are back with material exteriority, which should come as no surprise since the series is
+determined by inorganic matter. On the other hand, to the extent that
+the ordering was performed by some practice, and that this practice
+included reciprocity within it, it contains a real interiority: for it is in
+his real being, and as an integral part of a totality which has totalised
+itself outside, that each is dependent on the Other in his reality. To put
+it another way: reciprocity in the milieu of identity becomes a false
+reciprocity of relations: what a is to b (the reason for his being other),
+b is to c, b and the entire series are to a. Through this opposition
+between the Other and the same in the milieu of the Other, alterity
+becomes this paradoxical structure: the identity of everyone as everyone's action of serial interiority on the Other. In the same way,
+identity (as the sheer absurdity of meaningless dispersal) becomes
+79. In so far as he is the same, he is simply and formally an other.
+
+264 Book I
+synthetic: everyone is identical with the Other in so far as the others
+make him an Other acting on the Others; the formal, universal structure of alterity produces the formula of the series (la Raison de la série).
+In the formal, strictly practical, and limited case that we have been
+examining, the adoption of the serial mode remains a mere convenience, with no special influence on the individuals. But this simple
+example has the advantage of showing the emergence of new praticoinert characteristics: it reveals two characteristics of the inactive human
+gathering. The visible unity, in this case, in the time of the gathering
+(the totalised reality which they comprise for someone who sees them
+from a window or from the pavement opposite), is only an appearance;
+its origin for every observer to whom this totality is revealed, is
+integral praxis in so far as it is a perpetual organisation of its own dialectical field and, in practico-inert objectivity, the general, inert link
+between all the people in a field which is limited by its instrumentality,
+in so far as it is social - that is to say, in so far as its inert, instrumental
+materiality ultimately refers back to the order of historical movement -
+combined with their true being-outside-themselves in a particular
+practical object which, far from being a symbol, is a material being
+which produces their unity within itself and imposes it on them
+through the inert practices of the practico-inert field.
+In short, the visible unity of a gathering is produced partly by
+accidental factors (accidental at this level of the investigation - their
+unity will be restored in a broader movement of totalisation), and
+partly by the real but transcendent unity of a practico-inert object, in
+so far as this unity, in the development of a directed process, produces
+itself as the real material unity of the individuals in a given multiplicity, which it itself defines and limits. I have already said that this
+unity is not symbolic; it is now possible to see why. It is because it has
+nothing to symbolise; it is what unites everything. And if, in special
+circumstances, it is possible to see a symbolic relation between the
+gathering, as a visible assembly of discrete particles (where it presents
+itself in a visible form), and its objective unity, this is to be found in the
+small visible crowd which, by its presence as a gathering, becomes a
+symbol of the practical unity of its interest or of some other object
+which is produced as its inert synthesis. This unity itself, in so far as
+it is practico-inert, may present itself to individuals through a larger
+praxis of which they are either the inert means, the ends or the objects,
+or a combination of these, and which constitutes the true synthetic
+field of their gathering and which produces them in the objeer with
+
+Collectives 265
+their new laws of unified multiplicity. This praxis unifies them by
+producing the object in which they are already inscribed, in which
+their forms are negatively determined, and, in so far as it is already
+other (affected by the entire inertia of matter), it is this praxis which
+produces them in common in other unity.
+The second point to be made is that the apparent absence of structure in the gathering (or its apparent structures) does not correspond
+to objective reality: if they were all unaware of each other and if they
+carried their social isolation behaviour to the limit, the passive unity
+of the gathering in the object would both require and produce an
+ordinal structure from the multiplicity of the organisms. In other
+words, what presents itself to perception either as a sort of organised
+totality (men huddled together, waiting) or as a dispersal, possesses,
+as a collecting together of men by the object, a completely different
+basic structure which, by means of serial ordering, transcends the
+conflict between exterior and interior, between unity and identity.
+From the point of view of the activity-institution (the exact meaning
+of these terms will be clarified later), which is represented in Paris by
+the RATP (the public transport authority), the small gathering which
+slowly forms around the bus stop, apparently by a process of mere
+aggregation, already has a serial structure. It was produced in advance
+as the structure of some unknown group by the ticket machine attached to the bus stop. Everyone realises it for himself and confirms
+it for Others through his own individual praxis and his own ends. This
+does not mean that he helps to create an active group by freely determining, with other individuals, the end, the means, and the division of
+tasks; it means that he actualises his being-outside-himself as a reality
+shared by several people and which already exists, and awaits him, by
+means of an inert practice, endowed by instrumentality, whose meaning
+is that it integrates him into an ordered multiplicity by assigning him
+a place in a prefabricated seriality.
+In this sense, the indifferentiation of beings-outside-themselves in
+the passive unity of an object exists between them as a serial order, as
+separation-unity in the practico-inert milieu of the Other. In other
+words, there is an objective, fundamental connection between collective unity as a transcendence which is given to the gathering by the
+future (and the past), and seriality as everyone's practico-inert actualisation of a relation with Others in so far as this relation determines him
+in his being and already awaits him. The thing as common being produces seriality as its own practico-inert being-outside-itself in the
+
+266 Book I
+plurality of practical organisms; everyone realises himself outside himself in the objective unity of interpenetration in so far as he constitutes himself in the gathering as an objective element of a series. Or
+again, as we shall see more clearly later, whatever it may be, and
+whatever the circumstances, the series constitutes itself on the basis of
+the unity-object and, conversely, it is in the serial milieu and through
+serial behaviour that the individual achieves practical and theoretical
+participation in common being.
+There are serial behaviour, serial feelings and serial thoughts; in
+other words a series is a mode of being for individuals both in relation to
+one another and in relation to their common being and this mode of being
+transforms all their structures. In this way, it is useful to distinguish
+serial praxis (as the praxis of the individual in so far as he is a member
+of the series and as the praxis of the whole series, or of the series
+totalised through individuals) both from common praxis (group
+action) and from individual, constituent praxis. Conversely, in every
+non-serial praxis, a serial praxis will be found, as the practico-inert
+structure of the praxis in so far as it is social. And, just as there is a
+logic of the practico-inert layer, there are also structures proper to the
+thought which is produced at this social level of activity; in other
+words, there is a ratzonality of the theoretical and practical behaviour
+of an agent as a member of a series. Lastly, to the extent that the series
+represents the use of alterity as a bond between men under the passive
+action of an object, and as this passive action defines the general type
+of alterity which serves as a bond, alterity is, ultimately, the practicoinert object itself in so far as it produces itself in the milieu of multiplicity with its own particular exigencies. Indeed, every Other is both
+Other than himself and Other than Others, in so far as their relations
+constitute both him and Others in accordance with an objective,
+practical, inert rule of alterity (or a formal particularisation of this
+alterity).
+Thus this rule - the formula of the series - is common to all precisely
+to the extent that they differentiate themselves. I say common, but not
+identical: for identity is separation, whereas the formula of the series is
+a dynamic scheme which determines each through all and all through
+each. The Other, as formula of the series and as a factor in every particular case of alterity, therefore becomes, beyond its structure of
+identity and its structure of alterity, a being common to all (as negated
+and preserved interchangeability). At this level, beyond the concept
+and the rule, the Other is me in every Other and every Other in me
+
+Collectives 26J
+and everyone as Other in all the Others; finally, it is the passive Unity
+of the multiplicity in so far as it exists in itself; it is the reinteriorisation
+of exteriority by the human ensemble, it is the being-one of the organisms in so far as it corresponds to the unity of their being-inthemselves in the object. But, in so far as everyone's unity with the
+Other and with all Others is never given in him and the Other in a true
+relation based on reciprocity, and in so far as this interior unity of all
+is always and for everyone in all the Others, in so far as they are others
+and never in him except for Others, and in so far as he is other than
+them, this unity, which is ever present but always elsewhere, again becomes interiority lived in the milieu of exteriority. It no longer has any
+connection with molecularity: it is genuinely a unity, but the unity of a
+flight.
+This can best be understood in the light of the fact that in an active,
+contractual and differentiated group, everyone can regard himself both
+as subordinate to the whole and as essential, as the practical local
+presence of the whole, in his own particular action. In the case of the
+bond of alterity, however, the whole is a totalisation of flight; Being as
+material reality is the totalised series of not-beings; it is what everyone
+causes the other to become, as his double, out of reach, incapable of
+acting on him directly, and, simply in its transformation, subject to the
+action of an Other. Alterity, as the unity of identities, must always be
+elsewhere. Elsewhere there is only an Other, always other than self and
+which seems, from the point of view of idealist thought concerning
+other real beings, to engender them by logical scissiparity, that is to
+say, to produce the Others as indefinite moments of its alterity (whereas, in reality, exactly the opposite occurs). Ought we to say that this
+hypostasised serial reason simply refers us back to the practico-inert
+object as the unity outside themselves of individuals? On the contrary,
+for it engenders it as a particular practical interiorisation of beingoutside through multiplicity. In this case, must we treat it as an Idea,
+that is to say, an ideal label? Surely not.
+The Jew (as the internal, serial unity of Jewish multiplicities), or the
+colonialist, or the professional soldier, etc., are not ideas, any more than
+the militant or, as we shall see, the petty bourgeois, or the manual
+worker. The theoretical error (it is not a practical one, because praxis
+really does constitute them in alterity) was to conceive of these beings
+as concepts, whereas - as the fundamental basis of extremely complex
+relations - they are primarily serial unities. In fact, the being-Jewish of
+every Jew in a hostile society which persecutes and insults them, and
+
+268 Book I
+opens itself to them only to reject them again, cannot be the only
+relation between the individual Jew and the anti-semitic, racist society
+which surrounds him; it is this relation in so far as it is lived by every
+Jew in his direct or indirect relations with all the other Jews, and in so
+far as it constitutes him, through them all, as Other and threatens him
+in and through the Others. To the extent that, for the conscious, lucid
+Jew, being-Jewish (which is his statute for non-Jews) is interiorised as
+his responsibility in relation to all other Jews and his being-in-danger,
+out there, owing to some possible carelessness caused by Others who
+mean nothing to him, over whom he has no power and every one of
+whom is himself like Others (in so far as he makes them exist as such
+in spite of himself), the Jew, far from being the type common to each
+separate instance, represents on the contrary the perpetual being-outsidethemselves-in-the-other of the members of this practico-inert grouping.
+(I call it this because it exists within societies which have a non-Jewish
+majority and because every child - even if he subsequently adopts it
+with pride and by a deliberate practice - must begin by submitting to
+his statute.)
+Thus, for example, if there is an outbreak of anti-semitism, and
+Jewish members of society are beginning to be accused of 'getting all
+the best jobs', then for every Jewish doctor or teacher or banker, every
+other banker, doctor or teacher will constitute him as dispensable
+(and conversely). Indeed it is easy to see why this should be so:
+alterity as everyone's interiorisation of his common-being-outsidehimself in the unifying object can be conceived as the unity of all only
+in the form of common-being-outside-oneself-in-the-other. This is
+because totalisation as an organised form of social relations actually presupposes (in the abstract and in extreme cases, of course) an original
+synthetic praxis whose aim is the human production of unity as its
+objectification in and through men. This totalisation - which will be
+described below - comes to men through themselves. But the totality
+of the gathering is only the passive action of a practico-inert object on
+a dispersal. The limitation of the gathering to these particular individuals is only an accidental negation (since, in principle, as identities, their
+number is not determined). Transformation into a totality is never the
+aim of a praxis; it reveals itself in so far as men's relations are governed
+by object-relations, that is to say, in so far as it comes to them as a
+practico-inert structure whose sealed exteriority is revealed as the
+interiority of real relations. Un this basis, and in the context of exzgency as an objectivity to be realised, plurality becomes unity, alterity
+
+Collectives 269
+becomes my own spontaneity in the Other and that of everyone in me,
+and the reciprocity of flights (as a pseudo-reciprocity) becomes a
+human relation of reciprocity. I have taken the simple and unimportant
+example of the passengers on the bus only in order to show serial
+structure as the being of the most ordinary, everyday gatherings: as a
+fundamental constitution of sociality, this structure does in fact tend to
+be neglected by sociologists. Marxists are aware of it, but they seldom
+mention it and generally prefer to trace the difficulties in the praxis of
+emancipation and agitation to organised forces rather than to seriality
+as the material resistance of gatherings and masses to the action of
+groups (and even to the action of practico-inert factors).
+If we are to encompass the world of seriality, if only in one glance,
+or to note the importance of its structures and practices - in so far as
+they ultimately constitute the foundation of all seriality, even that
+which aims to bring man back to the Other through the organisation
+of praxis - we must abandon the example we have been using and consider what occurs in a domain where this basic reality discloses to our
+investigation its true nature and efficacity. I call the two-way relation
+between a material, inorganic, worked object and a multiplicity which
+finds its unity of exteriority in it collective. It defines a social object; it
+is a two-way relation (false reciprocity) because it is possible not only
+to conceive the inorganic object as materiality eroded by serial flight,
+but also to conceive the totalised plurality as materialised outside
+itself as common exigency in the object. Conversely, one can start
+either from material unity as exteriority, moving towards serial flight
+as a determinant of the behaviour which marks the social and material
+milieu with the original seal of seriality, or from serial unity, defining
+its reactions (as the practico-inert unity of a multiplicity) to the common object (that is to say, the transformations they bring about in
+the object). Indeed, from this point of view the false reciprocity between the common object and the totalised multiplicity can be seen
+as an interchangeability of two material statutes in the practico-inert
+field; but at the same time it must be regarded as a developing transformation of every one of the practico-inert materialities by the Other.
+In any case, we can now elucidate the meaning of serial structure and
+the possibility of applying this knowledge to the study of the dialectical intelligibility of the social.
+
+270 Book I
+z Indirect gatherings: the radio broadcast
+In order to understand the rationality of alterity as a rule of the social
+practico-inert field, we must, in effect, understand that this alterity is
+more complex and concrete than in the superficial and limited example
+in which we have observed it. Following up our investigation, we may
+find that some new characteristics emerge as seriality comes to be constituted in a larger field, and as the structure of more complex collectives. First, it should be noted that, in accordance with their own structure and passive action, practico-inert objects produce the gathering
+as a direct or indirect relation between the members of the multiplicity.
+The relation based on presence will be referred to as direct. And
+presence will be defined as the maximum distance permitting the immediate establishment of relations of reciprocity between two individuals, given the society's techniques and tools. (This distance obviously varies. In particular, there is the real presence of two people
+speaking on the telephone, each in relation to the other; similarly, an
+aeroplane can remain in a permanent relation of presence, by radio,
+with all the technical services which ensure its security.)
+There are, of course, different kinds of presence, and they depend on
+praxis (some undertakings require that everyone should be present in
+the perceptual field of the Other - without the mediation of instruments) but, in any case, I define gatherings by the co-presence of their
+members, not in the sense that there must be relations of reciprocity
+between them, or a common, organised practice, but in the sense that
+the possibility of this common praxis, and of the relations of reciprocity
+on which it is based, is immediately given. Housewives queueing in
+front of a baker's shop, in a period of shortage, are characterised as a
+gathering with a serial structure; and this gathering is direct: the possibility of a sudden unitary praxis (a riot) is immediately given. On the
+other hand, there can be practico-inert objects whose structure is
+completely determinate but which, within the indeterminate multiplicity of men (of a city, a nation, or the world), themselves constitute
+a given plurality as an indirect gathering. And I define such gatherings
+by absence; by which I mean not so much absolute distance (in a given
+society, at a given moment in its development) which is, in reality,
+only an abstraction, as the impossibility of individuals establishing
+
+Collectives 271
+relations of reciprocity between themselves or a common praxis, in so
+far as they are defined by this object as members of the gathering.
+But the important point is not whether a particular radio listener
+possesses his own transmitter and can make contact, as an individual,
+later, with some other listener, in another city or country: the mere
+fact of listening to the radio, that is to say, of listening to a particular
+broadcast at a particular time, establishes a serial relation of absence
+between the different listeners. In this way, the practico-inert object
+not only produces a unity of individuals outside themselves in inorganic matter, but also determines them in separation and, in so far as
+they are separate, ensures their communication through alterity and the
+same applies to all 'mass media'). When I listen to a broadcast, the
+relation between the broadcaster and myself is not a human one: in
+effect, I am passive in relation to what is being said, to the political
+commentary on the news, etc. This passivity, in an activity which
+develops on every level and over many years, can to some extent be resisted: I can write, protest, approve, congratulate, threaten, etc. But it
+must be noted at once that these activities will carry weight only if a
+majority (or a considerable minority) of listeners who do not know me
+do likewise. So that, in this case, reciprocity is a gathering with one
+voice. Moreover, radio stations represent the point of view of the
+government or the special interests of a group of capitalists; so the
+listeners' activities (about programmes or about the opinions that are
+expressed) are unlikely to have any effect.
+It often happens that political and social events which occur at all
+levels and throughout the country suffice to bring about changes in
+programmes or in controversial comment. From this point of view, the
+listener who disagrees with the policy of the government, even if,
+elsewhere, as a member of organised groups, he plays an effective part
+in opposing this policy, will see his passive activity - his 'receptivity' -
+as impotence. And, in so far as this voice gives it exactly the limits of
+its powers (there was an excessively bad drama or music programme),
+the public can act. Not entirely, however, as many examples have
+shown: the listener's indignation may simply be the lived discovery of
+his impotence as a man confronting a man. (The same applies if he is
+enthusiastic; 1 am taking the negative case because it is simpler, but
+the same impotence exists if 1 am delighted by some speaker or singer
+and demand that he be given a regular programme or that he broadcast
+more frequently.) For, in a sense, the voice, with its particular inflections and intonations, is the individual voice of a particular person, who
+
+272 Bookl
+has prepared his audience by a series of precise, individual actions. At
+the same time, there can be no doubt that the voice is addressed to me.
+To me and to Others, the voice says: 'Dear listeners' But, although
+the speaker at a meeting addresses everyone present, each of them is in
+a position to contradict or even insult him (on condition, of course,
+that he takes certain risks in certain cases, with the more or less clearly
+defined intention, according to the circumstances, of 'changing public
+opinion'). Thus the public speaker really does address us, in that both
+individual reciprocity (1 shout out my approval or my criticism) and
+collective reciprocity (we applaud him or shout our disapproval at
+him) are perfectly conceivable.
+The broadcaster's voice, in contrast, in its reality as a human voice,
+is, in principle, mystifying: it is based on the reciprocity of discourse,
+and therefore on a human relation, but it is really a reif ying relation in
+which the voice is given as praxis and constitutes the listener as the
+object of praxis; in short, it is a univocal relation of interiority, similar
+to that of the organism acting on the material environment, but one in
+which I, as an inert object, am subjected as inorganic matter to the
+human work of the voice. Yet I can, if I wish, turn the knob, and switch
+off the set or change stations. But here the gathering at a distance
+emerges. For this purely individual activity changes absolutely nothing
+in the real work of this voice. It will continue to echo through millions
+of rooms and to be heard by millions of listeners; I will merely have
+rushed into the ineffective, abstract isolation of private life, objectively
+changing nothing. I will not have negated the voice; I will have
+negated myself as an individual member of the gathering. And, especially in the case of ideological broadcasts, it is really as Other that
+I will have wanted this voice to be silent, that is to say, in so far as it
+can, for example, harm Others who are listening to it. I may be perfectly sure of myself, I may even belong to some active political group,
+sharing all its views and adopting all its positions. Nevertheless, the
+voice is unbearable for me in so far as it is listened to by Others -
+Others who, to be precise, are the same in so far as they listen to the
+radio and Others in so far as they belong to different milieux. I tell
+myself that it may convince them. In fact, I feel as though I could challenge the arguments put forward by this voice in front of these Others,
+even if they do not share my views; but what I actually experience is
+absence as my mode of connection with the Others. In this case, my
+impotence does not lie only in the impossibility of silencing the voice:
+it also lies in the impossibility of convincing, one by one, the listeners
+
+Collectives 273
+all of whom it exhorts in the common isolation which it creates for all
+of them as their inert bond. Indeed, as soon as I imagine some practical
+action against what the broadcaster says, I can conceive of it only as
+serial: I would have to take the listeners one by one.... Obviously,
+this seriality is a measure of my impotence and, perhaps, of that of my
+Party. In any case, if the Party planned to do some counter-propaganda, it would be obliged to adapt itself to the serial structure imposed by the mass media. (And if the listener is a journalist, if he
+expresses his indignation in his newspaper the next day, then he is
+opposing one serial action to another: he addresses the four hundred
+thousand separate listeners in the city in so far as he can reach them as
+separate readers.)
+Thus the impotent listener is constituted by the very voice as an
+other-member (membre-autre) of the indirect gathering: with the first
+words, a lateral relation of indefinite seriality is established between him
+and the Others. Of course, this relation originated in knowledge produced by language itself in so far as it is a means for the mass media.
+Everyone gets their information about French radio programmes from
+newspapers and the radio itself. But this knowledge (which is itself of
+a serial order by virtue of its origin, content and practical objective)
+has for a long time been transformed into a fact. Every listener is
+objectively defined by this real fact, that is to say, by the structure of
+exteriority which has been interiorised in knowledge. Now, when, in a
+given historical situation and in the context of the conflicts it gives rise
+to, one listens to the voice in impotent anger, one no longer listens to
+it for oneself (assuming that one can be sure of withstanding the arguments), but from the point of view of Others. Which others! This is
+determined by circumstances and by the individual himself, with his
+experience and his past. Perhaps he will imagine himself in the situation
+of his friends the Xs, who are rather impressionable or who seemed
+more wavering than usual last night. Or perhaps he will try to listen as
+an abstractly defined kind of listener known only in his generality (as
+lukewarm, or passive, or, more specifically, as a listener with a particular interest which is being skilfully played up to, etc.).
+But in any case, the abstract individual whom he evokes in his
+alterity has also long been a ready-made notion (a schema forged both
+in experience and through the schematisations of the mass media) and,
+conversely, the wavering family which he takes as a reference can
+really disturb him only in so far as it represents the first term of a series,
+that is to say, in so far as it is itself schematised as Other. It would be
+
+2J4 Book I
+useless to describe the curious attitude of the indignant listener here
+(everyone can find it in his own experience) and the three moment
+dialectic: the moment of triumph in which he refutes the argument, or
+perhaps just thinks he does (this is already for the Other, but only in so
+far as a relation of reciprocity might be possible). Then there is the
+moment of impotent indignation, in which he realises himself as a
+member of a series whose members are united solely by the bond of
+alterity; and finally, the moment of anguish and temptation, in which,
+placing himself at the point of view of the Othei, he allows himself to be
+convinced as Other, up to a certain point, in order to feel the force of
+the argument. This third moment is that of discomfort and fascination;
+it involves a violent contradiction: I become, in effect, both someone
+who knows how to refute such nonsense, and someone who is liable
+to be convinced by it. And I do not mean that I become both myself
+and the Other: perhaps the triumphant attitude of the individual who
+knows is only another form of alterity (I have confidence in Others
+who are in a position to refute such arguments and I identify myself
+with them because I share their opinion). The main point is that my
+inability to act on the series of Others (who may allow themselves to
+be convinced) reverts to me and makes these Others my destiny. Of
+course, this is not because of the broadcast on its own, but because it
+occurs in a wider context of mystificatory propaganda which lulls them
+into unawareness.
+In this way, the voice becomes vertiginous for everyone: it is no
+longer anyone's voice (even if the broadcaster is named), since reciprocity has been destroyed. But it is doubly a collective: on the one
+hand, as we have just seen, it produces me as an inert member of a
+series and as Other in the midst of Others; and on the other hand, it
+appears in itself as the social result of a political praxis (of the government, in the case of a state radio station) and as sustained in itself by
+a different serial cross-section of listeners - those who are already convinced, and whose opinions and interests it expresses. Thus, in it and
+through it, Others (supporters of the policy) influence Others (the
+waverers, the undecided); but this influence is itself serial (what is not
+serial, of course, is the political action of the government and its propaganda activities), since everyone listens from the position of the
+Other, and as Other and because the voice itself is Other. It is Other
+for those who reject the policy which inspires it, both as expressing
+certain Others and as action on Others; it is Other for the waverers,
+who listen to it already as the opinion of Others (of those all-powerful
+
+Collectives 275
+Others who control the mass media) and who are influenced by the
+mere fact that this policy has the power to propagate itself publicly;
+and finally, it is Other for those who support government policy, in
+that for everyone in isolation it is backed up by the approval of Others
+(those who share his opinion) and by its effect on waverers. For them,
+the voice expresses their own thinking, but as Other, in that it is
+uttered by an Other, expressed in other terms (better than they could
+have done and differently) and in so far as it exists simultaneously for
+all Others as an Other-Thought. The reactive behaviour occasioned in
+the listeners by the Other-Thought as the meaning of the Other-Voice
+is always the behaviour of alterity. By this I mean that it has neither the
+immediate structure of an individual praxis, nor the concerted structures of a common, organised praxis. It is occasioned immediately - as
+the individual's free reaction - but he cannot produce it under the
+influence of the collective except in so far as it is itself a lateral totalisation of seriality (indignation, ironical laughter, impotent anger,
+fascination, enthusiasm, the need to communicate with Others, shock,
+collective fear, 80 etc.). In other words, the individual, as a member of
+a series, exhibits behaviour which is altered (alterées), and every part
+of which is the action of the Other in him, which means that of itself
+it is recurrence taken to its limit (that is to say, to infinity).
+In developing this example our investigation (expérience) of seriality
+has grown richer. From the very fact that some objects can establish
+indirect bonds of alterity between individuals who are unaware of
+each other as such, we can see how the possibility emerges of a series
+being either finite, indefinite or infinite. When a multiplicity, though
+numerically determined in itself, remains practically indeterminate as
+a factor of the gathering, it is indefinite. (This applies, for example, to
+the radio: there is a definite number of individuals listening to a particular programme at a given moment, but it is as an indeterminate
+quantity that the broadcast constitutes the seriality of its listeners as a
+relation of each of them to the Others.) When the multiplicity is
+8o. In so far as collective fear is manifested as serial behaviour in an isolated
+listener, it occurs if the broadcast seems audacious or shocking; then it is the fear
+of anger or of others, it is sacred fear, for it is the fear that these words should
+have been spoken in the indefinite milieu of seriality, and also the fear in the milieu
+of the Other of having heard these words. These others, in me, condemn this
+moment of receptivity in which, by my individuality as a practical organism,
+these words have existed here in this room; alterity condemns in me my personal
+reality, and the Other passes sentence on the Same.
+
+276 BookI
+gathered together by a movement of circular recurrence, we have a
+practically infinite series (at least provided the circular movement continues). Each term, in effect, in so far as it produces the alterity of
+Others, itself becomes Other to the extent that Others produce it as
+Other, and that it helps modify them in their alterity in turn.
+But we have also noticed that pure, formal alterity (as our first
+examples showed) is only an abstract moment of the serial process. It
+is true that it occurs in any group which, for example, is ordered in
+some way or other (a group of shoppers, for example, when there is a
+scarcity of goods or staff). But the formal purity is maintained here by
+a deliberate action - the refusal to discriminate between individuals on
+any basis other than alterity, itself constituted as a rule of succession.
+Otherwise, that is to say when alterity is not itself a means of selection,
+individuals in the serial milieu have a few special characteristics which
+vary among them or from one ensemble to another. Of course, the
+fundamental structure remains the same: the radio listeners at this
+moment constitute a series in that they are listening to the common
+voice which constitutes each of them in his identity as an Other. But it
+is precisely for this reason that an alterity of content arises between
+them. This alterity is still extremely formal, for it constitutes them on
+the basis of the object (the voice) and in accordance with their possible
+reactions to it. It goes without saying that in order to ground these
+reactions, one would have to enter more deeply into the differences,
+find other collectives and interests and groups, and, finally, one would
+have to totalise the historical moment together with its past. But in so
+far as the gathering is created by the radio, it remains at the level of the
+practical alterity of listening behaviour. It is on this basis that alterity
+as the formula of the series becomes a constituent force of each and for
+all; for in everyone, the Other is no longer mere formal difference in
+identity; in everyone, the Other is a different reaction, other behaviour,
+and everyone is conditioned in the fleeting unity of alterity by these
+different kinds of behaviour of the Other in so far as he cannot modify
+them in the Other. Thus everyone is as effective in his action on the
+Other as if he had established human relations with him (either direct
+and reciprocal, or organised), but his passive, indirect action derives
+from his very impotence, in so far as the Other lives it in himself as his
+own impotence as Other.
+
+Collectives 277
+3 Impotence as a bond: the free market
+This material, but still abstract, determination of the variable content
+of alterity (in other words, of a synthetic alterity which by itself
+creates a practico-inert world of alterity) leads us logically to the
+investigation (expérience) of impotence as a real bond between members of a series. A series reveals itself to everyone when they perceive
+in themselves and Others their common inability to eliminate their
+material differences. We shall see how, in certain special conditions, a
+group constitutes itself as the negation of this impotence, that is to say,
+of seriality: I feel my impotence in the Other because it is the Other as
+Other who will decide whether my action will remain an individual,
+mad initiative and throw me back into abstract isolation or whether it
+is to become the common action of the group; in this way, everyone
+awaits the Other's action and makes himself the Other's impotence in
+so far as the Other is his impotence. But this impotence, as a constituent presence in everyone in the series, does not necessarily correspond
+to the pure, passive immobility of the ensemble. On the contrary, it may
+become unorganised violence: precisely to the extent that I am impotent through the Other, it is the Other himself who becomes an active
+power in me. Incapable of changing the Other's indignation (when I
+witness a scene which some people find shocking), this indignation,
+lived in impotence, becomes for me an other-indignation, in which the
+Other in me is angered and guides my action. Provocateurs apart,
+there is no difference between Scandal and the Fear of Scandal. In other
+words, Scandal is the aggressive Fear of the Other's Scandal. In other
+words, Scandal is the Other himself as the transcendent reason of the
+serial propagation of acts of violence caused by the fear of Scandal.
+But in order to simplify the structure of collectives, we have so far
+assumed that series are constituted by isolated terms, whose only, and
+fleeting, unity was alterity as impotence. Series of this kind actually
+exist; generally speaking, readers of Le Figaro or radio listeners
+would be an example. But other cases are more complex: for human
+relations of reciprocity define the co-existence of men as well as the
+statute of massified dispersal. And as these relations constitute complex chains and polyvalent systems, every individual relation, through
+the medium of the surrounding material reality, is conditioned by
+
+278 Book I
+Others, either negatively or positively. Thus the multiplicity has
+merely changed position: and in so far as an object in the practico-inert
+field is the unity-outside-themselves of these inter-individual relations,
+seriality determines the multiplicities of reciprocal relations, as it determines the multiplicities of individuals. Thus the dispersal of human relations (in so far as each of them is linked to an other, or to several others, and
+these to others, etc.), in so far as it becomes alterity as the formula of the
+series, transforms each of them into an other-relation, by means of all the
+other relations. In other words, the Other produces itself as the fleeting
+unity of all in so far as it appears in each as a necessary alteration of direct
+reciprocity; or, again, in so far as everyone, if he wishes to communicate
+with an Other, constitutes his relation in practico-inert being on the basis
+of all the other totalised relations.
+This plurality is of a special type: it is better to call it a quasiplurality. In reality, it is difficult truly to separate links from one
+another (as one separates terms) and to quantify them - in so far as a
+human relation of reciprocity can be established between several
+persons at once. However, serial-being as a rigid alterity within every
+living relation draws its strength from practical distancing, that is to
+say, from the inconceivable proliferation of other relations, in so far as
+every gathering of relations (the discontent in a particular workshop
+about a particular measure taken by the management, in so far as it
+manifests itself, before exploding into action, in the quasi-plurality of
+human relations between the workers) refers to other gatherings (other
+workshops in so far as they have constituted themselves individually
+as Others, in their material difference, through their past conduct in
+earlier conflicts or in the development of this one), and these gatherings to yet others (outside the factory, but in the same industry) and
+to others (through individual responsibilities - connected, for example,
+by the date - they are referred back to the family, and to residential
+groups as to a branch of lateral seriality, of a secondary, but in fact very
+important kind) to this extent, distant relations arise for close relations, not as homogeneous relations far away, but, in their inert
+gathering, as an inert conducting medium, that of alteration (altération).
+Every concrete inter-individual relation therefore arises, in this
+moment, linked with all the others. The link is serial, as the determination of a more or less definite milieu, which is characterised by a real
+cohesion, a compact solidity, and which as a whole exerts a force of
+inertia and exhibits the synthetic structure of the relation. But the
+practical reality of this milieu (a simple practico-inert totality of all
+
+Collectives 279
+these relations as alterity in each relation) resides simply in its serial
+structure. In other words, there are human milieux, and they are men,
+in so far as common objects produce them as the milieu of men. But it
+is wrong for sociologists and historians to study the milieu, as a
+collective - that is to say, as the other-unity of a quasi-plurality of
+human relations - in the form which it displays to its individuals. As it
+is manifested to everyone through relations of reciprocity as their
+synthetic cohesion, individuals do not perceive it directly as other, as a
+serial rule of distancing: what is clear to them when they are themselves
+the terms of the series is beyond their grasp - in immediate practice -
+when they are only an interior structure of the terms and when each
+term is, in fact, the relation which unites them. The milieu appears
+immediately to its members as a homogeneous container and as a permanent (practico-inert) linking force which unites everyone to everyone without distance; from this point of view, every human relation
+which establishes itself concretely between two or more individuals
+arises in the milieu as an inessential actualisation of a practico-inert
+structure already inscribed in Being. At the contingent level of individual histories, such an encounter naturally appears as a more or less
+intentional, more or less accidental realisation of individual and interindividual possibilities. But, as a relation belonging to a milieu, the actualisation of a reciprocal determination in inertia is nothing like the
+realisation of a possibility. It was possible that this particular individual
+should have met that one, but, to take for example a competitive
+market (we shall return to this example later), this need not prevent a
+particular merchant from being already linked, as a practico-inert element of multiple (or quasi-plural) relations, with his competitors and
+customers (that is to say, not only with his real, active customers, but
+also with all the customers in the market minus his own customers, and,
+in the last analysis, with all the customers in the market, including his
+usual customers). Naturally, these multiple links manifest and transform themselves in the course of practico-inert processes which traverse the milieu.
+This apparent structure of the milieu makes sociologists like Lewin
+tend to take it for a Gestalt which performs a synthetic action on its
+structures as a real totality and determines the behaviour and processes
+of every part in so far as it communicates directly with all the others
+through the real presence of the whole in every one of them. But this
+apparent structure is only a superficial moment of a preliminary investigation. The next moment reveals the collective as the relation
+
+280 Book I
+between a totality of worked objects, a unity of inert exteriority (the
+sixteenth arrondissement of Paris, etc.), and the quasi-plurality which
+is signified by it and which produces unity in it as an absence. My relation
+with my customer arises in the bourgeois milieu of retailing (and more
+specifically of a particular retail trade, in a particular town, etc.) and
+contributes to determining it while actualising a predetermined
+structure; but the milieu which unites us is revealed as an active, synthetic force (in the course of business) only in so far as precise relations
+link one term to another, and link the relation itself to other terms and
+relations (deals between big companies which are trying to lower
+prices and ruin small businesses or simply approaches to one of my
+customers by a competitor), on which practical influence is inconceivable.
+Thus the true structures of the mille, those which produce its real
+force in the practico-inert held, are in tact structures of alterity. It is
+true that every relation is linked to every other, but only in particular
+ways: every element is linked to all elements, but from its place in the
+series and through its fleeting link with all the intermediate elements,
+just as any number is linked to every other number through precise
+relations which presuppose that every one of them is related to the
+others through the series of numbers which separate them - that is, on
+the basis that one of them is (nt I) and the other (nt I) + I, etc.
+Similarly, there is the unity of the milieu, which can, in certain cases,
+be a terrifying collective force. (It can be measured objectively, at
+least in some cases, by the chances of an individual in the milieu
+emerging from it, and inversely by the chances of an individual from
+a particular social category entering it, apart from any constraint
+exerted by his own milieu.) But the unity of the milieu exists precisely
+in so far as it does not reside in its terms as the whole in the part, in so
+far as it realises itself for each relation as those relations which elsewhere condition its concrete existence and its content. It is true that in
+the serial behaviour of terms which are present, the totality of the
+others arises as a milieu and as a general conditioning of behaviour.
+But this totality must not be confused with a positive, concrete totality,
+with a real presence: it is not the result of the unification of a practical
+field. On the contrary, it is a real extrapolation of an infinite series of
+relations which are both identical and other in so far as everyone conditions the Other by his absence. The totality here is the practicoinert totalisation of the series of concrete negations of every totality.
+The totality manifests itself in every reciprocity as its other-being, in
+
+Collectives 281
+so far as every reciprocity is characterised by the impossibility of any
+totalisation. The intelligibility of serial action (that is to say, of serial
+unity as a negative totality) derives from the relation of concrete
+reciprocity which unites two practical organisms in so far as it produces
+itself as conditioned by its inability to act on all the others and in so far
+as each of the others has the same inability within a serial field whose
+structure is determined by an identical relation of everyone to the
+common object and to its demands. And the distinctive property of
+the milieu, as the indefinite alterity of human relations, is that it offers
+itself to experience as a unitary synthetic form, totalising but not
+structured (in the sense in which each part would be a relation with
+every other and with the whole) and then reveals itself in praxis as a
+serial structure of determination by the other.
+However, we must make a closer examination of these structures
+before we can understand the real (but practico-inert) action of seriality as a force which is suffered in impotence and which acts both on
+every reciprocal relation and on the series (as totalised in each of them
+by being taken to its limit). I will take a very simple, schematic
+example from everyday economics: the determination of current
+prices in a competitive market. It goes without saying that this determination presupposes a plurality of contractual relations (between
+buyers and sellers) and of competitive antagonisms, and therefore of
+negative reciprocities (between sellers on the one hand and buyers on
+the other). Obviously, we are not going to consider either the origins
+or the structures of this common object (the price of this particular
+commodity) and we will take the Marxist theory of value and prices
+for granted. The reader may wish to dispute this theory, but this has
+no bearing on the rest of our investigation, since we are concerned only
+with the final readjustment, which, other things being equal, is made
+at the market stage. Moreover, we will consider neither the components of the price (production cost, etc.), nor the effects of the conjuncture; we will assume the atomicity and fluidity of the sellers and
+buyers. This pure competitive market is neither a sort of 'state of
+nature' of the market as eighteenth-century economists believed, nor,
+as is too often said nowadays, a mere convenient abstraction: it simply
+represents a constituted reality, dependent on the system as a whole,
+which appears and disappears in accordance with the overall evolution
+of the economy, at a particular level of exchange. Up to 1939, for
+example, the Stock Exchanges (in Paris, London and New York) had
+all the characteristics of a competitive market, as, indeed, did the
+
+282 Book 1
+other nineteenth-century commercial markets in major international
+products (wheat, cotton, etc.). If we examined all the conditions
+affecting markets in general, our conception of 'collectives' as recurrences would be confirmed, but the problem would go beyond the
+limits of this study. The market has an undeniable reality; it is imposed
+on everyone in so far as the price and volume of transactions are
+necessarily determined (in terms of constant elements and within
+determinate limits) by the quantities on offer, the prices asked, the
+quantities needed and the prices people want to pay. Now, it is easy to
+see that the necessity which imposes itself on a merchant in his relation
+with an individual consumer arises from the concrete relations between
+other tradesmen and their customers, and from the relations between
+other buyers and this seller (who, for them, becomes Other than he
+was for the customer in question) and, finally, from the very fact that
+the consumer as such appears on the market as Other than himself
+and acts as Other on the direct human relation which he tries to form
+with the seller. The price corresponds to the intersection of the supply
+and demand curves, as everyone knows: this means that the quantities
+supplied and demanded at this price are equal. If the seller set his price
+at a lower level, demand would exceed supply; if he set it higher,
+supply would exceed demand. But there is no direct agreement between
+two men or two groups, understanding one another directly. A dealer
+never actually fixes his prices himself. And the mathematical rigour of
+the object demonstrates precisely that it is the objective representation
+of a line of flight.
+The table opposite is of quantities supplied and demanded.
+According to what we have just said, 11,000 units will be sold at the
+price of 6 francs.
+First, it goes without saying that the justification for this quantitative
+law lies neither in purely mathematical principles, nor in the essential
+characteristics of quantity. The heart of the proof (that if the price
+were lower, demand would be higher than supply, and inversely) must
+refer us back to the seller and to his real action, to the buyer and his
+real demand. Demands cannot be higher than supply precisely because
+buyers who are in a position to pay more will make new offers and this
+will have the effect of raising prices. Supply cannot be higher than
+demand, because the better placed merchants (with lower production
+costs) will drop their prices immediately. Thus men are considered as
+forces of buying and selling. To simplify matters, let us assume that
+one buyer corresponds to each unit of demand, and that one seller
+
+Collectives 283
+corresponds to each unit of supply. Now, of the 27,500 supposed
+sellers, we can see that only 11,000 are prepared to drop the price to
+6 francs per unit. And, of these, only 8,500 would go to s francs. Of
+27,500 sellers, therefore, there are just 2,500 who can go down to 6
+francs but no lower, and these 2,500 determine the price for everyone
+Price
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+IO
+II
+I2
+13
+14
+15
+16
+17
+18
+Quantity demanded
+18,500
+16,500
+15,000
+13,500
+12,250
+11,000
+10,000
+2,000
+8,250
+7,500
+6,750
+6,000
+5,250
+4,750
+4,250
+3,750
+3,250
+2,750
+Quantity supplied
+O
+3,000
+6,000
+8,500
+11,000
+13,500
+15,500
+17,250
+18,000
+20,500
+22,000
+23,250
+24,250
+25,250
+26,000
+26,750
+27,500
+else. On the one hand, by lowering the price, they effectively exclude
+from the market 16,500 sellers, who, for one reason or another, cannot
+match this price reduction. On the other hand, by setting the price at
+6 francs, they enable 8,500 sellers to avoid going down to 4 francs a
+unit, and 3,000 to avoid going to 3 francs. Ihus, to confine our attention to them, these 3,000 receive a seller's profit, that is to say, they
+realise 3 francs a unit above their minimum expectations. How, then,
+do we explain the fate of the 25,000 people, of whom some have sold
+
+284 Book I
+nothing at all while others have made an unexpected profit? It is due;
+firstly, to the fact that they are active, that is to say, real sellers standing
+in real relations®1 with their possible customers. Secondly, it is due to
+the fact that in the transaction they are affected by the action of Other
+sellers and that they are treated (by the customer himself) as Others:
+the real impossibility of 2,500 sellers going below 6 francs becomes for
+8,500 of their competitors a prohibition against lowering the price. (I
+do not mean to give the word 'prohibition' an ethical or psychological
+sense. But the fact is that they might, hypothetically, lower their price
+and that the action of others creates a new type of impossibility for
+them, which no longer has anything to do with the cost price or with
+transport costs: it is no longer a material condition, a real, direct component of the price, but a law laid down from the outside governing
+their activity as sellers.) And obviously the same might be said about
+the sellers: 11,000 of them deprive 7,500 people of the possibility of
+buying the product in question; of these 11,000, 1,000 customers constitute buyers profits for the 10,000 others. Thus, of the 46,000 people
+who constitute the group of buyers and sellers, 42,500 immediately
+appear as controlled by the law of the others; for them, the law of the
+market is a heteronomy. But if we consider the 3,500 who appear to
+have fixed the market, it is obvious that their supposed activity is only
+an appearance. In effect, if some of them bought as dear as possible (for
+them), and others sold as cheap as possible, it is because they were
+pushed to their utmost limits. The interest of both has been to benefit
+from the buyer's or seller's "profit: but it is precisely the people who
+can go lower or higher than they can who really force them to give up
+additional profit. The sellers, for example, are in a situation of total
+alterity: 8,500 of them live the prohibition against going lower because 2,500 of them are materially incapable of doing so. And these
+2,500 go down to their limit because the 8,500 others might go even
+lower.
+Thus all their operations are determined by the action of the Other.
+But it is also the action of everyone in so far as he is Other (for other
+sellers and for other customers). Let us suppose that only 10,000 sellers
+are materially able to lower their price to 7 francs and 10,000 buyers to
+pay for the unit at this price. The point of intersection of the two curves
+would then be different, the quantities exchanged would be 10,000
+81. We shall see that once the "collective' is established, it has the effect of derealising these relations and of reifying them.
+
+285
+units, and the price 7 francs. Thus the possibility of lowering prices
+acts against them. Why? Because it reaches the upper limit which
+characterises a definite number of buyers and which makes possible the
+equalisation of supply and demand. It should also be noted that there
+is no correspondence between the number of buyers who could go as
+far as 6 francs and the number of sellers who could lower their prices
+to that figure (1,000 and 2,500): it is not a true relation, but, on the
+contrary, an absence of relation (because we have assumed that every
+buyer and seller corresponds to one unit of supply or demand). What
+counts, of course, is that this figure of 11,000, arbitrarily fixed by us,
+determines prices and the equality of the exchanges. There are 11,000
+people willing to sell at 6 francs, and 11,000 willing to buy. But this
+figure is precisely that of alterity since every individual sells or buys as
+an eleven thousandth, rather than as an individual person. On the
+other hand, such a number cannot be regarded simply as a sum: for
+example, if one said that it is the number of products sold at 6 francs,
+or of dealers who sell at this price, one would be forgetting the vital
+fact that all these dealers, with their own opportunities and projects,
+have gone down to this price simply and solely because they number
+I1,000 relating to 11,000 buyers. But it would be impossible to find
+any true unity in this collection: 11,000 here represents 11,000 individuals and not the concrete unity of these 11,000 people. The relations between the sellers are competitive and therefore antagonistic.
+But this antagonism which opposes them to one another finds expres
+sion in the fact that each receives his law from the Other (and not, as in
+direct struggle, that each tries to impose his law on the Other). The
+link between sellers (within a particular number) is neither a simple
+juxtaposition nor a unitary synthesis. They are juxtaposed precisely to
+the extent that, in its real movement, every direct relation to the buyer
+is independent of the relation of the Other. They are united by the fact
+that the juxtaposition of men is not that of sardines in a tin: sellers who
+carry out the same operation determine a social field, simply because
+the operation is human and necessarily concerns Others; in other
+words because every operation, in addressing itself to the indistinct
+mass of buyers, projects a human future.
+I have taken the example of the pure competitive market because it
+illustrates what Hegel called 'the atomised crowd': but in fact the
+quantitative relations between physical molecules are radically different
+from the relations between social atoms. The former act and react in
+the milieu of exteriority; the latter in that of interiority. Everyone
+
+286 Book I
+determines both himself and the Other in so far as he is Other than the
+Other and Other than himself. And everyone observes his direct action
+deprived of its real meaning in so far as the Other governs it, and in
+his turn hastens to influence the Other, over there, without any real
+relation to his intention. There must be a false unity. And it exists: it
+is the market as a gathering (whether it is a physical place or a system of
+telecommunications informing everyone of supplies, demands and
+prices), 82 At the outset, everyone yields to the gathering; he already
+determines it (in alterity) by his expectations, and it already eludes him
+and determines him. Consequently, the market exists through him (in
+itself and for him) as an object of expectation and as the fleeting determination of his action; but he himself sees it as an ensemble of juxtaposed persons. The totality of the market is thus detotalised.
+To take the simplest examples (flower markets, cattle markets, etc.),
+the unity of place shows that all the individuals are united in that they
+devote themselves to the same direct operation, which allows itself to
+be determined in exteriority and alterity by all the other similar operations, so that this determination in alterity finally turns them into the
+object itself and reality: everyone's expectations, in a market that is
+supposed to be competitive, depend on the hypothesis that atomisation
+will remain the typical social link at least for the duration of the exchange. Thus, the unity cannot be conceived as a unifying synthesis,
+but as a form of dispersal as such, when this dispersal is seen as a rule
+and means for action. Two essential facts must be noted. First, the real
+difference between the physical molecule and the social molecule is
+that the first is purely and simply an element of numerical dispersal,
+while the second is a factor of dispersal only in so far as it begins as a
+factor of unity. The human molecule does not remain in multiplicity:
+through its action it organises the multiplicity into a synthetic unity
+(it is the market as the aim and condition of its activity). Dispersal
+intervenes in the second degree: there is a multiplicity, not of simple
+isolated molecules, but of unifications of purely physical multiplicity
+which have already been practically (and sometimes even consciously)
+realised. Everyone unifies, and perceives, and manipulates the market as
+a total reality (he perceives it through local traditions, habit, periodicity, his own material existence, his project as a producer-seller, etc.).
+But these unifications are separated from one another by a real
+82. The market as a gathering (practico-inert place) itself becomes the price in
+so far as it grounds the practico-inert activity of the series.
+
+Collectives 287
+vacuum, that is to say, by the fact that, physically and practically,
+everyone is not the other, that walls really do separate them, as well as
+practical antagonisms or their real ignorance of their reciprocal existence. And the market is not the synthetic unity of a multiplicity, but
+the dispersive, real multiplication of its own unity. The unity of the
+market is not only the foundation of the operation which everyone
+tries to carry out, but also something which eludes him because the
+very action of this atomicity is alienating; and, finally, it is the fact that
+the centre of a market is always elsewhere as well as always present (as
+the place of the gathering or as all the information about prices); and
+it is this very contradiction which creates the social object. It is precisely this contradiction that enables the unity of the gathering to be
+not simply transcended by common action (as happens when there is a
+direct agreement between producers or consumers), or even by indidual action, but on the contrary to present itself both as the common
+object of an action and as the rigid, external law of every particular
+action, that is to say, to exist in the manner of an instrumental object,
+'to hand', 'before one's eyes' and as an objective but alien necessity in
+every one of us. It is this second point which has to be emphasised. If
+prices are agreed between unions (or co-operatives) and monopolies,
+the price tends to lose its reality as a constraint: Obviously production
+costs and real wages indicate objective limits of variation; but these
+conditions are material and visible and can be confronted head-on;
+the profit margin, in contrast, can be reduced or increased by the direct
+relation between the forces present. At this level, selling price becomes
+a 'reciprocal object, that is to say, its opacity for one is based on the
+direct resistance of the other, and it affords us a glimpse, in its depths,
+of the action and needs of trusts or co-operatives.
+Under Roosevelt's presidency, Americans refused to buy meat in
+order to struggle against the claims of the trust of slaughter-house
+owners. In such a situation - as long as the boycott lasts - price remains an ideal sign, since nobody either sells or buys and its meaning
+refers directly to the trust's will to struggle; it is a mere statement of
+the trust's determination, of their will to 'hold out' and of the material
+conditions which occasion or necessitate their attitude. But this is
+because the unification of the two groups makes a direct relation between them possible. (And as I have said, this unification only displaces recurrence.) When unification does not occur, for example in a
+competitive market, the price derives its objective and practical
+reality from the physical and mental separation of the agents; it is real
+
+288 Book I
+because it gathers within it all the real factors of separation - the
+inadequacy of the available means of communication, the stone walls
+which separate the retail stores, or the actual time needed to reach
+one's neighbours and persuade them to transcend antagonism towards
+co-operation; but above all, it is based on a certain type of human
+relations, which might be called indirect, or lateral. Its strength derives from the impotence (whether temporary or absolute) of every
+buyer (or seller) in relation to the series of other buyers (or sellers);
+it corresponds to the necessity that if the seller (or buyer) wanted to
+try to defend himself, he would have to undertake a serial action,
+passing, that is, from one individual to the next. This serial action must
+be both indeterminate (for the number of persons to be directly
+reached is not given), and circular (for the individual with whom I
+make direct contact becomes other for me again, as soon as I move
+away from him in order to reach another; and it will be necessary to
+return to him). So it is a case of infinite recurrence.
+The type of arithmetical reasoning which demonstrates that all the
+elements of a series possess the same property is well known. It can be
+divided into three operations. First, we establish a simple universal
+proposition: if the property exists for any number a, it necessarily
+exists for the number b (which comes immediately after a in the series);
+secondly, we verify that some number of the series does, in fact,
+possess the property in question; and lastly, we proceed to a sort of
+artificial totalisation, in other words, a sort of passage to the limit
+which dispenses with an infinite series of operations. (It is true of a,
+and therefore it is true of b; if it is true of b, then it is true of c, therefore
+a possesses the property; but if it is true of c, it is true of d, etc.) Thus
+collective objects originate in social recurrence: they represent totalisations of impracticable operations. But they do not appear at first as an
+object of knowledge: above all, they are realities which we are subjected to and which we live, and we learn them, in their objectivity,
+through acts which we have to do. The price imposes itself on me, as a
+buyer, because it imposes itself on my neighbour; it imposes itself on
+him because it imposes itself on his neighbour, and so on. But, conversely, I am not unaware that I help to establish it and that it imposes
+itself on my neighbours because it imposes itself on me; in general, it
+imposes itself on everyone as a stable collective reality only in so far
+as it is the totalisation of a series.
+The collective object is an index of separation. This would emerge
+more clearly if we took as our example a more complex market (in
+
+Collectives 289
+connection with the conjuncture, with State intervention, with the
+existence of semi-monopolies, and taking into account advertising, the
+weather - and consequently, fluctuations of production and touling -
+etc.), but this would require a treatment beyond the scope of this
+study. Let us simply take a particular case: that of a market in a period
+of rapid inflation. 83 The depreciation of money accelerates as everyone
+tries to get rid of it in order to acquire real values; but this behaviour
+determines the depreciation above all by reflecting it; in other words,
+it is future depreciation, in so far as it imposes itself on the individual
+to the extent that he foresees it as the unity of a process which conditions him, and it is this future depreciation which determines present
+depreciation. Now, the individual submits to this future depreciation
+as the action of Others on money. He adapts to it by imitating it: that
+is to say, he makes himself Other. In this way, he acts against his own
+wages in so far as he is Other, because it is he who contributes as much
+as anyone else to the destruction of the monetary unit; and his own
+position in relation to money (with its psychological characteristics of
+pessimism, etc.) has no other basis than the attitude of Others. The
+phenomenon occurs as flight: because I cannot prevent some unknown
+person from changing his money as quickly as possible into goods
+which he will stockpile, I hasten to exchange mine for other goods.
+But it is my own action, in so far as it is already inscribed in economic
+behaviour as a whole, and my future action, which determine the action
+of this unknown person. I return to myself as Other and my subjective
+fear of the Other (whom I cannot reach) appears to me as an alien
+force, the accelerated depreciation of money. Thus the collapse of the
+assignat84 in 1792 was a collective process which could not be stopped:
+its objectivity was complete, and everyone suffered it as a destiny.
+Indeed, its objective factors were numerous and powerful: monetary
+circulation had doubled without any increase in production; the
+83. Here again, I am ignoring the material conditions of inflation, namely the
+considerable increase in the quantity of money (which relates to the financial
+deficit of the government and, therefore, to history as totalisation) and some
+poverty of the factors of production (no stocks, etc.). These conditions are
+absolutely necessary for inflation, and their combination makes inflation inevirable. But they cause it through men who live the situation and react to it in their
+behaviour. These men are under-determined by the fact that the Other constantly
+eludes them and that they can struggle against him only by imitating him.
+84. The promissory note issued by the revolutionary government in 1790.
+
+290 Book l
+persistence of coinage alongside paper money introduced a bi-monetary
+system (2,000 million in coin, 2,000 million in paper) and, as is well
+known, in such situations bad money chases good, that is to say supply
+exceeds demand, and it devalues rapidly; lastly, we must take account
+of speculation, forged notes from abroad, etc. 85
+But, apart from the fact that many of them can be effective only in
+so far as they are lived (for example Gresham's law necessarily refers
+to confidence - good money disappears because people hoard it, and they
+do so because they have no confidence in each other), historians recognise the importance of political factors in the decline of the assignat:
+confidence in it was all the weaker because it was issued by a revolutionary power, which might be overthrown. The failure of the assignat
+therefore reflects the flight of Louis XVI, the retractions of the
+Constituent Assembly, the defeat of the revolutionaries at the end of
+179I and, after the first defeats of 1792, the fear of the restoration of
+absolute monarchy. For the men who came together to struggle
+against these different events, in so far as they are historical, were
+directly subjected to them; it was an organised response to the king's
+treason which expelled him from the Tuileries on 1o August. The
+collapse of the assignat, however, gives expression to these events in
+so far as they had lateral effects on everyone, lived as the dispersed
+reaction of Others, in recurrence and impotence. The same person
+might belong to a Jacobin club, approve enthusiastically of' 1o August,
+and keep his gold without noticing that the same facts are appearing
+to him at two distinct levels and that he reacts in contradictory ways
+depending on the level at which he considers them. As far as the assignat is concerned, the Revolution crumbles in his hands, and he helps it
+to do so; but as far as the motion which he helped to get carried at his
+club is concerned, he sees himself as carried along by revolutionary
+fervour. And supposing someone was aware of the contradiction,
+would he receive payment in assignats but pay for things in coin?
+Recurrence intervenes here; such an act could serve neither as propaganda, nor as an example; hardly anyone would notice it, and the only
+result would be that if the patriot was a merchant he would be ruined,
+while if he was a producer, though he would no doubt be saved, he
+85. All these factors relate, of course, to the praxis of the bourgeoisie, to its
+economic liberalism (its refusal to give the assignat a power equal to that of coin,
+a refusal to decree compulsory circulation (this was to come later) and a refusal
+to shoulder the expenses of war).
+
+Collectives 291
+would be helping (though to a negligible degree) to maintain the bimonetarism which was undermining the Revolution.
+So must this revolutionary be worried, and suspicious? Yes, profoundly; defiance of the Other, and a vague awareness of recurrence
+are necessary concomitants of the first steps of a revolution. The suspicion calls for unity against recurrence (and not, as some people think,
+against mere multiplicity), and for totalisation against indefinite flight
+(and not, as Hegel says, universality against specific difference): it is
+suspicion which engenders and sustains Terror as an attempt at subjective unification. but this suspicion, governed by the suspicion of
+Others, is also counter-revolutionary and presents itself in the collapse
+of the assignat as an alien object. At this level, we come back to money
+as materiality. But this time, we can consider it in the context of
+practical relations of reciprocity. Its meaning sums up the totality of
+the historical process up to the present moment, but it does so by
+mechanising it; and the agents do not conceive of it as a positive
+characteristic of the material object (like the Genoese merchants when
+they carried off the Spanish gold), but as an infinite and regressive
+absence. Today, the rapid succession of inflations and devaluations has
+shown everyone the double character of all money, as material presence
+and as indefinite flight. The real value of a given banknote can be
+determined only in a specific, dated historical conjuncture; it must
+refer to the capitalist system, to the relations of production, to the
+relative strengths of classes, to the contradictions of imperialism and
+to the relation between France and other bourgeois democracies. But
+this complex is a flight for me; I see it in the 5-franc piece in so far as it
+is lived by the Other, either the buyer who stockpiles in the expectation
+of war, or the seller who raises his prices, or the producer who reduces
+his own production. But this absence, this movement of perpetual regression, can be manifested only in a material object of which it constitutes the human reality. The diabolical appearance of the coin (or
+note) is that it is apprehended (at successive moments) in its material
+identity and that I can take it, hold it, and hide it; but that in its very
+immobility it is affected by an absent change, which always occurs
+elsewhere and which reflects to me the image of my impotence through
+atomisation.
+I shall develop the example of money in a later work. Here, I
+simply wish to draw attention to the fact that money, in each of its
+concrete units, has the double infinity of the universal and of recurrence. This particular banknote is constituted in my hands as a
+
+292 Book I
+universalised abstraction by the fact that it is valid everywhere: it is the
+hundred-franc note. (Hence the familiar phrases: 'How much does that
+cost?' 'The hundred-franc note'.) And at the same time, its real purchasing power is the result of an infinite recurrence in which I myself
+feature as an other. We shall therefore treat it as a 'collective'. In so far
+as their inertia preserves them, all social objects are collectives in their
+fundamental materiality; as long as they last, all of them derive their
+reality from the perpetual detotalisation of the totality of men; basically,
+they all presuppose a haemorrhage from which material presence
+drains away. Of course, they have very diverse structures. The competitive market can be conceived of as, at most, the radical atomisation
+(or massification) of human groups; the ponderous reality of price,
+fixed by common disagreement, is the collective (valid for everyone)
+expression of the impossibility of a real unity, of an organisation of
+buyers (or of sellers). It does not connect: rather, it is the consequence
+of separation, and a factor of new separation; in short, it is realised
+separation. But for men, separation, like union, is a constructed situation, resulting from certain actions performed by certain forces. Price
+derives its false unity from the fact that separation is a produced
+reality, a type of relation between men.
+It is this separation which Le Chapelier attempted to effect on the
+labour market, 8 after some strikes which had worried the bourgeoisie, and which, for the workers, was expressed in the absolute
+inflexibility of wages. The unity of the collective object therefore
+becomes stricter, and its rigidity more inflexible as the atomisation of
+groups develops. And as price originally represents everyone's
+activity in so far as it is governed laterally, and at a distance, by the
+activity of the Other, its collective character expresses the simplest
+form of alienation. Wage limits, taxes, and modern State intervention
+do not initially come up against ill will: but such attempts at positive
+unification, which presuppose (and also try to constitute) a centralisation and organisation of inter-human relations, are in constant danger
+of dissolving back into the milieu from which they arise, that is to say,
+into the milieu of recurrence: before they can be lived as a direct
+relation between a centralising organ and every individual, they will
+be lived as other and through the other regardless of the express wish of
+the rulers. This is why the Convention eludes the Convention member
+86. The Le Chapelier law of June 1791 deprived the workers of the right of
+combination.
+
+293
+and takes on an impenetrable depth in so far as it also exists for a nonmember, for the sans-culottes, for the provincial towns, for the countryside, and for Europe itself (how often revolutionary orators declared:
+"The eyes of the world are upon us!'). Originally, this relation is a
+direct one: the Convention, with its powers, its authority, its tasks, its
+deputies, exists as a direct object for the elector, for the Jacobin, and
+for the représentant en mission; it is both the organ of government and
+the elected assembly which is accountable to the nation; it is suffered
+and resisted, venerated and detested. But what makes us relapse into
+recurrence is the fact that, in spite of the political clubs, the citizens
+were not organised in any way, and that, in a way, the Assembly was
+in the position of a monopoly facing dispersed buyers. This dispersal
+creates both the power and impotence of the rulers: it reduces the
+possibility of organised resistance (strikes against maximum wages,
+etc.) to a minimum, but, at the same time, it erodes its unifying decrees and dissolves them in itself (the crisis in foodstuffs, the collapse of
+the assignat, etc.). Representations and beliefs, always coming from
+elsewhere, bear in themselves the mark of recurrence, they are 'overflowing' ideas (idées "débordantes'): no doubt they express everyone's
+real situation, but they express it in flight, and mythically; their inconsistency makes them impenetrable and invincible. When the member
+of the Convention tries to understand the Convention, as a changing
+undertaking, for his electors or for the country, it will elude him completely: the object is there, enlarged to the frontiers of France, real,
+constricting, but, strictly speaking, unthinkable.
+4 Series and Opinion: che Great Fear
+These last remarks enable us to see a few characteristics of another
+collective - a most important one from the point of view of rulers.
+This is public opinion. In the context of the process of temporalisation
+and totalisation, there is undoubtedly such a thing as opinion, and it is
+expressed in words and deeds which refer to certain meanings. It is an
+everyday matter for some of these words and deeds to form the subject of police reports to the head of government. It is for the leaders
+themselves to interpret their meanings as objective realities and as an
+
+294 Book 1
+effective ideological materiality. Then there will be talk of the discontent of a particular social category, of the tension developing amongst
+individuals and groups (in so far as it is expressed in speech and action
+- brawls, lynchings, etc.). At this level it will be determined whether
+public opinion does or does not make a direct connection between two
+facts or objective meanings (for example, between the refusal of the
+bourgeoisie to finance the war of 1792 from taxation and the fall of the
+assignat) or whether, in contrast, it creates - rightly or wrongly - a
+single meaning with two different meanings. So public opinion tends
+to be seen as a collective consciousness arising from the synthetic unification of the citizens into a nation, and imposing its representations
+on everyone as an integral part of the whole, just as the totality is
+present in each of its parts.
+The discontent of retailers (as revealed both in common actions and
+in wholly distinct ones), the distrust of the government amongst
+industrialists and bankers (as expressed in the refusal of loans), the
+revival of anti-semitism (after a defeat or a national humiliation): all
+these objective realities should be regarded as totalising schemata. But
+we should realise that every one of them, in itself and for everyone, is
+the Other, that its signifying structure is infinite seriality, and that it
+has the practico-inert unity of an index of separation. For example, in
+so far as retailers have produced their own organs of defence and can
+affect the government, it is inappropriate to speak of discontent: they
+fight ministerial power and try to change it. Everything is praxis: if it
+succeeds, everything will be settled amicably. On the other hand, when
+the isolated small shopkeeper sees taxes and wholesale prices rising
+when he is unable to raise his retail prices, he feels, in his very, person,
+the fear of ruin and hunger. But his reaction would be pure terror,
+rather than discontent, unless, in his very fear, he discovered the same
+discontent among other shopkeepers as a serial totality of impotence,
+that is to say, unless he discovered himself as dispersed in the seriality
+of the Other, as affected by the impotence of Others, and as affecting
+the Others (that is to say, himself as Other to infinity) with his impotence. For this reason, the common material object (for example, tax or
+the index of wholesale prices) in its practico-inert development,
+creates the unity of the discontent. But it creates it outside, in him. In
+the multiplicity of individuals, this discontent realises itself in the
+theoretical and practical protests of isolated, discontented individuals
+(who do not know one another as individuals), as the index of their
+separation. In this sense, it is a social reality; it is a force (as impotence
+
+295
+lived individually, it may lead a person to sell his business, to commit
+suicide, etc.; and in circumstances which will be defined below, it can
+serve as a basis for regroupment) and this force is simply the practicoinert power of hundreds of thousands of people as potential energy.
+But this force does not reside in anyone, and it is not the product of
+everyone; it is alterity itself to precisely the extent that, for everyone, it
+is elsewhere.
+In specific cases where discontent (or some other affective state) has
+spread through the country, then, rather than being felt and expressed
+by everyone in his own right, people take part in serial propagations
+which clearly illuminate its character as alterity. One need only recall
+the Great Fear of 1789, of which Lefebvre has provided such a remarkable study.®? First he shows that the fear did not break out
+everywhere at the same time and that it did not cover the whole of
+France, contrary to what some historians have claimed in the name of
+a spontaneous organicism. He shows that five different waves of fear
+ought to be distinguished, and that certain regions were never affected.
+Finally, he shows that these waves, the origins of each of which can be
+localised and dated, were propagated serially, from town to village and
+from village to town, and that their routes were determined by quite
+precise conditions. But the most striking thing in his book is that one
+constantly feels driven to discovering the intelligibility of a movement
+in the rationality of the Other. I will simply recall a few observations:
+the fear arose in very specific conditions, but what it expressed, in the
+provinces and the countryside, was above all a structure of alterity in
+relation to Paris. News was scarce, slow to arrive, and impatiently
+awaited: it eventually reached the towns, but it spread unevenly and
+confusedly in the countryside (it was already stale and distorted when
+the peasants heard it on market days). Thus the contrast between the
+rapidity of events in the capital and Versailles and the scarcity of information showed everyone his passivity in relation to those Others
+(aristocrats, deputies of the Third Estate, the Parisian people) who
+made History in Paris. Later, Jacobin societies tried to organise the
+provinces and even the countryside. But at this time, these men -
+disturbed, anxious and impatient - all felt themselves as Others (who
+suffered History) in so far as they could have no effect on the subjects
+who were making History in Paris.
+87. Georges Lefebvie, The Great Fear of 1789 (1956), trans. Joan White,
+NLB, 1973. [Ed.]
+
+296 Book I
+The conditions which gave rise to the Great Fear must therefore be
+seen in the context of everyone's discovery of himself as Other (as an
+object of a History made by others). But it is striking that the fear was
+essentially born out of'fear of bandits'. Begging, in fact, was the chronic
+sore of the countryside: there were beggars and tramps everywhere.
+Basically, these were just ruined peasants or the children of over-large
+families. Nevertheless, the farmers did not regard them favourably.
+The smallholders and even the day-labourers saw them as an agricultural 'lumpen-proletariat' at the same time as recognising themselves in the vagabonds, in that a permanent possibility threatened
+them too with ruin, with vagabondage, and with being Others. But,
+for the peasant, the true other, the other class, was, of course, the landed
+aristocracy with its feudal rights. Now it is remarkable that, on the
+news that an aristocratic plot was feared in the towns, the synthetic
+link between aristocrats and vagabonds suddenly became apparent.
+Of course, one might offer a reasonable explanation: the aristocrats had
+had the vagabonds in their pay in order to crush the country people.
+But this interpretation rationalises retrospectively a movement whose
+intelligibility lies in the process of alterity itself and which makes the
+vagabond appear as absolute Other, that is to say, as doubly Other
+(Other as a pauper, and Other as a hireling of the oppressing class,
+combining in himself, in the dimension of alterity, both crime as the
+anti-human activity of the Other than man, and oppressive domination
+as a praxis aiming to reduce the peasant to a sub-human state. The proof
+that it was essentially a synthetic union of all alterities in the absolute
+Other (a cruel man reducing his fellow-men to sub-humanity, a cruel
+beast exactly like men except that his sole aim is to eliminate them) is
+that, in regions where memories of the ravages caused by the Hundred
+Years War still lingered on, bandits were known as 'Englishmen' and
+that, almost everywhere, with no concern for coherence, the vagabondhirelings were known as foreigners. The 'aristocrat's plot', supported
+by a professional army, initially had meaning, in fact, only in Paris and
+Versailles: it was conceivable that the aristocracy would use the troops
+massed around Paris to break the resistance of the Third Estate and of
+the people (and certain aristocrats actually attempted to impose this
+policy). But, in the new form that this policy assumed in the eyes of
+the peasant, it became perfectly absurd. Nevertheless it was the same,
+but seen in the milieu of the Other by individuals whose impotence
+had dragged them into the world of objects, of Others. Bandits were
+the aristocratic plot as Other, seen in the original milieu of the Other
+
+297
+and as a characteristic of absolute alterity; they were History as an
+enemy force, coming to everyone as alien.
+What makes the Great Fear even more complex is that, as Lefebvre
+has shown, it did not cause riots or the looting of châteaux but, on the
+contrary, was preceded by a series of local insurrections (though
+naturally there was far more looting during and atter the Great Fear):
+peasants besieged châteaux, occupied them, and sometimes damaged
+them and they also attacked some of the nobles. Now these local actions
+also helped to produce the fear - and not only the fear of the Other's
+reaction (or of reprisals), for they also appeared, to those who had not
+taken part in them (and perhaps also, after some time, to the participants themselves) as terrifying, evil actions - rather like a violation of
+some sacred prohibition or a fearful unleashing of violence. Now, these
+non-participating peasants were the same as those who took part in the
+riot: by seeing the action (directed against the same oppressor they
+hated) as directed in fact against them, they saw their own violence as
+that of an Other and their fellows as aliens. Thus setting a château on
+fire assumed an ambivalent character in popular memory (in the form
+of alterity as a structure of memory) like the sacred itself: both black
+and white. It was both a legitimate revolt of the people and Other violence, violence as Other: which is why it was attributed to bandits.
+Faced with this alien violence, everyone, in effect, as though confronting History, felt himself to be an other object. Similarly, the storming of
+the Bastille, as a piece of news which spread everywhere, assumed both
+a more or less vague, but true and positive aspect (that the people had
+stormed the Bastille), and a polymorphous, negative aspect, depending
+whether it was rationalised (the storming of the Bastille would unleash
+the vengeance of the aristocracy on the people); and a consequence of
+the storming of the Bastille was that numerous bandits escaped from
+Paris and disappeared into the countryside (in this version, Paris becomes, in spite of everything, the negative cause, the source of evil);
+and lastly, more or less obscurely (elements hostile to the Revolution
+must have helped), the Bastille was stormed by bandits.
+Having said this, neither the economic, political and social causes
+known to us, nor the fear of bandits or the constitution of the milieu
+of the Other as a refracting medium (milieu) of History are enough to
+explain the Great Fear. The factors referred to, including fear of
+bandits, are in fact universal. The Great Fear as a real process was
+broad, but localised. In each case, it had to be triggered off by some
+local incident which was perceived as Other by those who witnessed it,
+
+298 Book I
+and seriality had to propagate itself by becoming actualised. At first,
+indeed, what appears is always taken for something else. This does not
+in any way mean that one object is mistaken for another, as in the case
+of a sensory error: the object correctly conceived actually returns as an
+other meaning in the very movement of propagation. A gang of daylabourers in the Oise valley protest because the farmer refuses to pay
+what they demand. "The news,' said a local newspaper, 'spread and
+grew. Bells were rung in all the parishes.' In the same region another
+newspaper offered a different interpretation: 'from a distance, a group
+of surveyors had apparently been mistaken for bandits. Elsewhere,
+town militias or soldiers were mistaken, from a distance, for bands of
+assassins. From a distance means: when the information was so poor
+that it was impossible to know who was coming. In such a case, that
+is to say, whenever witnesses could choose between a positive and a
+negative interpretation, between reciprocity and alterity, between man
+and anti-man, they chose the Other, the no, the anti-human. Anyone
+seen from a distance was other than man because the observer felt
+himself to be other in this developing History.
+We must now show how alterity creates its own laws: the truth
+becomes obvious for everyone not only in so far as it is negative and
+relates to the Other, but also in so far as it is transmitted by an Other
+in so far as he is Other. These are the rules of belief: what everyone
+believes of the Other is what the Other conveys in so far as he is
+Other (or in so far as the news comes to him already from an Other).
+In other words, it is negative information in that neither the person who
+receives it, nor the one who gives it, could or can verify it. Their
+impotence is simply seriality itself as a negative totality, and it should
+not be supposed that everyone believed his informer in spite of it. On
+the contrary, this impotence in each of them as Other supports and
+sustains the belief in the Other as a means of propagating truth as
+Other. If I believe my informer, it is not because I cannot check what
+he says, or because I trust him (which would re-establish a direct
+relation of reciprocity), or because, while I may check it sometime it
+is more prudent to be prepared for the worst. I believe him because, as
+Other, the truth of a report is its seriality, that is to say, the infinite
+series of impotences which will be, or are being, or have been actualised, and which constitute me through Others as a practico-inert conveyor
+of the truth. I believe it because it is Other (that is to say, in accordance with the principle that History is really the history of the Otherthan-man and that the worst is always certain), because it shows the
+
+299
+man it describes as an alien species, and because the mode of its communication is other, and has no reciprocity. The informer propagates
+a material wave; he does not truly inform; his report is a panic; in a word,
+the truth, as Other, is transmitted as a state by contagion; it is quite
+simply the Other-state of the Other in the face of Others, and it is this
+contagion which grounds it for everyone, in so far as it is ultimately
+the Other-Being of the series which realises itself through it in him;
+if I believe a madman whom I see approaching, running and shouting,
+when I am already aware of my own impotence, I become the same
+for another and run like a madman towards my neighbour. Belief, in a
+process like the Great Fear, is alterity itself in so far as it temporalises
+itself in the actualisation of an already constituted series. Thus the
+contagious fact is unintelligible apart from the collective and recurrence. Whatever the fundamental historical conditions which gave
+rise to it, it would never have produced itself as a chain-disintegration
+unless it had taken place in the structured temporality of the practicoinert field and unless the infinite complex of serialities had already been
+produced as the very grain and web of this field. Indeed, it was in terms
+of seriality and alterity that contemporaries explained it when they
+tried to slow it down. One simply changes level: newspapers and local
+authorities explain that foreigners are spreading rumours to the effect
+that there are bandits (or else are passing themselves off as bandits) in
+order to spread panic. This amounts to saying: if you plunge into the
+milieu of the Other, you are playing the game of the absolute Other.
+I have used this example in order to exhibit a new temporal object:
+a series in the process of actualisation. It is not an historical event in the
+ordinary sense of the term, that is to say, a developing totalisation of
+antagonistic and concerted actions, but rather a process. However, in
+so far as the practico-inert field is the field of material exigencies, of
+counter-finalities and of inert meanings, its unity necessarily remains
+teleological and signifying. Thus, the Great Fear appeared to contemporaries either as the practical result of a revolutionary agitation which
+aimed to set the peasants against the feudal lords (and, in fact, looting
+and rioting, as the first group reaction against the impotence of the
+collective, did increase; and, a little later, the project of federation
+also appeared as a reaction against the impotence of the masses), or as
+the result of an attempt by representatives of the aristocracy and a
+section of the lower clergy) to demoralise the peasant masses and to
+set them against the bourgeoisie of the Third Estate. In actual fact, it
+involved this double counter-finality only because the series lived
+
+300 Book 1
+History as Other and on the basis of human impotence. The opinions
+of public opinion arise like the Great Fear, in that everyone makes
+himself Other by his opinion, that is to say, by taking it from the
+Other because the Other believes it as Other, and makes himself the
+informer of the Others. At this level, the Idea is a process; it derives
+its invincible strength from the fact that nobody thinks it. That is to
+say, it does not define itself as the conscious moment of praxis - that is
+to say, as the unifying unveiling of objects in the dialectical temporalisation of action. Instead, it defines itself as a practico-inert object whose
+self-evidence, for me, is the same as my double inability to verify it and
+to transform it in Others. 88
+88. There are also other forms of ideas in the collective: for example, the Ideaexis. As we have seen, the practico-inert object (the gold coin, for example) produced its own Idea in the general movement of practice, that is to say, the passive
+unity of its materiality was constituted by practice as meaning. In so far as this
+object becomes the common-being-outside-itself of a series, the Idea, as such,
+becomes the unity of the series as its reason or its index of separation. This is how
+colonialism, as a material system in the practico-inert field of colonisation, in
+other words as the common interest of the colonists, produced its own Idea in its
+very development: it became a means of practical choice between those who are
+the exploited by essence, and those who have become exploiters through merit.
+And if it does designate the exploited by their essence (that is to say, as exploitable sub specie aeternitatis), it is because it cannot allow any change in their condition, however minimal, without destroying itself. Colonialism defines the exploited as eternal because it constitutes itself as an eternity of exploitation. In so
+far as the inert sentence passed on the colonised peoples becomes the serial unity
+of the colonialists (in its ideological form), or their link of alterity, it is the Idea
+as Other or the Other as Idea; it thereforeremains an Idea of stone, but its strength
+derives from its ubiquity of absence. In this form of alterity, it becomes racism.
+The essence of racism, in effect, is that it is not a system of thoughts which might
+be false or pernicious - and the same applies to thousands of other "theses'; I
+simply took the first example to come to mind. It is not a thought at all. It cannot
+even be formulated. And the attraction of racism for intelligent, well-meaning
+people (for example, in the form of an innocent pride: 'One has to admit that the
+Mediterranean races ..., etc.) is normally experienced by them (and in an objectively observable way) as the attraction of stupidity, that is to say, as the secret
+hope that thought is a stone. In reality, racism is the colonial interest lived as a
+link of all the colonialists of the colony through the serial flight of alterity. As
+such, like the living Idea, it presents itself as infinite depth. But this depth is both
+petrified and strictly formal, because it is limited to producing itself as a negation
+of everyone by serial infinity: in other words, it gives itself in the abstract as other
+than each of its particular formulations. At the same time it realises itself constantly in every relation between the colonists and the colonised through the
+colonial system and, as the basic activity of the colonists amongst themselves, it
+
+30 г
+is reduced to a few phrases, which have almost no content, but are uniquely
+guaranteed by alterity in that the Other-Idea guarantees them in a negative way
+by negating its reduction, as a totalised seriality, to these particular expressions.
+These determinations of discourse are very familiar: "The native is lazy, dishonest, and dirty; he doesn't work unless he is forced to; he's an eternal child
+quite incapable of controlling himself; in any case, he lives on nothing, he never
+thinks of the next day; the native is properly understood only by the colonialist,
+etc.' These phrases were never the translation of a real, concrete thought; they
+were not even the object of thought. Furthermore, they have not by themselves
+any meaning, at least in so far as they claim to express knowledge about the
+colonised. They arose with the establishment of the colonial system and have
+never been anything more than this system itself producing itself as a determination of the language of the colonists in the milieu of alterity. And, from this point
+of view, they must be seen as material exigencies of language (the verbal milieu of
+all practico-inert apparatuses) addressed to colonialists as members of a series and
+signifying them as colonialists both in their own eyes and in those of others, in the
+unity of a gathering. It is pointless to say that they circulate, that people repeat
+them to one another in some form; the truth is that they cannot circulate because
+they cannot be objects of exchange. They have a priori the structure of a collective
+and when two colonialists, in conversation, appear to be exchanging these ideas,
+they actually merely reactualise them one after the other in so far as they represent
+a particular aspect of serial reason. In other words, the sentence which is uttered,
+as a reference to the common interest, is not presented as the determination of
+language by the individual himself, but as his other opinion, that is to say, he
+claims to get it from and give it to others, in so far as their unity is based purely
+on alterity. (Of course, it is possible to imagine colonialist groups associating for
+the organised defence of their colonial interests; indeed, there have been plenty of
+cases of it. Naturally, these groups multiply as tension between colonists and
+colonised increases. But we are here considering only the colonial milieu. It is
+enough to indicate - and we shall come back to this in the next chapter - that the
+presence of groups constituted from the gathering itself must complicate any real
+description.)
+In fact, the affirmative force of this opinion derives from the fact that, in and
+through everyone, it is the invincible stubbornness of others; and the certainty of
+the person who affirms it rests on his (cheerfully accepted) inability to occasion
+any doubt about this subject in any other members of the series. The Idea as a
+product of the common object has the materiality of a fact because no one thinks
+it. Therefore, it has the opaque indubitability of a thing. But in the moment where
+a particular colonialist is pleased to relate to it as to a thing, that is to say, as an
+unthinkable thought, he presents it as a spontaneous rediscovery, a fresh, new
+re-creation elsewhere (anywhere in the colony): for example, there is this colonial
+administrator, a nice chap, but terribly young and so foolishly idealistic, and he is
+just learning the job...; in him and through him, the idea becomes a hypothesis,
+a key to decipher an experience, etc. Elsewhere, and therefore in the Other, the
+inert formula which everyone repeats recovers its pristine force as a discovery; in
+other words this particular colonialist, as Other, here repeats a stereotyped formula in the certainty that he himself, in an Other and as an Other, is rediscovering it.
+But, in fact, he has neither the means nor the intention of renewing his experience
+
+302 Book 1
+for himself, of testing the Idea, in order to guarantee it anew: the Idea as a living
+praxis emerges in action and as a moment of action as an ever contestable key to
+the world. But there is no need to contest it since the common object is based on
+the practical avoidance of all testing. The strength of this particular colonialist lies
+in the fact that the Idea (as a common bond) comes to him as the thought of the
+Other, of totalised alterity, and that he is entirely the Other as infinite flight,
+frozen at the moment he repeats it, while this absolute certainty becomes work,
+unification and translucidity in Others - in the young, etc. He affirms himself as
+the Other who really thinks it elsewhere by making himself the Other who repeats
+it here without thinking.
+In connection with this opacity conceived as obviousness and the inability to
+change the Other conceived as indubitability, it should be remembered that each
+of these Ideas is imposed on everyone as a practico-inert exigency, that is to say, as
+a categorical imperative. In this sense, it is common interest constituting
+itself as the solidarity of the colonialists against the colonised; but this solidarity,
+at the level of seriality, can only have a negative form: it is determined in alterity.
+On this basis, it arises as the (negative) fact that, amongst the small number of
+colonialists who maintain themselves by force and against the colonised, everyone is
+in danger in the Other; that is to say, everyone is impotently in danger of suffering
+the consequences of some pernicious act occurring somewhere in the series. In
+fact, in this particular example, the serial unity of the colonists comes to them from
+the Absolute Other which is the colonised people; and it reflects them as an active
+grouping (a synthetic, positive unity of plurality). The impotence of the series
+constitutes itself as a magical power of the colonised people. They are oppressed
+and, in a way, still impotent-otherwise the colonialists would no longer be there;
+but, at the same time, 'they know everything, they see everything, they spy on us,
+they communicate among themselves instantly, etc.'. In this magical milieu of the
+colonised Other and of the participation of every native in the whole, seriality is revealed in its impotence as the threat to each by all, and consequently as an obligation for everyone to maintain the Other-Action, which means: not that which has
+been established by universal agreement, but that which he would like any other
+to maintain. This act, of course, is the Other itself as the formula of the series of
+colonialists; in other words, it is the colonialist in so far as he is always the model
+who inspires me in an Other. The colonialist produces himself in the Other
+without weakness; he imposes himself within me as a prohibition: show no weakness
+to the native staff; and this brings us to the exigency of the system: no change for
+the colonised without the destruction of the colonial apparatus. The colonialist
+is a particular being who needs to be realised through me in so far as no one can
+realise him and in so far as he must remain outside as the negative formula of the
+series. In a way, every colonialist spontaneously and constantly realises him by
+his free activities in so far as they express his particular interests as an exploiter in
+the milieu of the exploited; but at this level, he is not a being. He becomes one when
+the threat of insurrection becomes more concrete. But in this case, his practicoinert relation to everyone is imperative precisely because it produces itself as
+everyone's responsibility towards the Other in so far as every Other is responsible
+for everyone. Hence that strange magical bond through the virgin forest of
+seriality: I try to realise the Other - that is to say, to make myself more deaf,
+ruthless, and negative to the claims of the native, than my plantation as my own
+
+303
+I have described serial being as the determination of the bond of alterity
+as a unity of plurality by the exigencies and structures of the common
+object which in itself defines this plurality as such. We have seen that this
+being is practical because it is sustained in reality by the relations which
+are established in the practico-inert field between the individual activities
+of men. But at the same time as it produces itself as collective in and
+through the real behaviour of every practical organism, this serial being
+is constituted as a negative unity and a threatening (or paralysing) interdependence by the impotence of each real action in so far as it derives from
+the actions of the others through the practical field. Its reality, then, is in
+itself practico-inert and its transformations are born of a simple dialectic.
+(Activity is sometimes constituted as collective passivity by failures due
+interest actually requires - so that my attempt becomes, for some other who
+might be tempted to make a concession to the natives, the real presence of the
+Other, as a magical force of constraint. In fact, of course, there is nothing irrational in this: the Other as the presence-constraint of a negative unity is given to
+all the members of the series; it is the same imperative for all. In actualising it in my
+action I actualise it for all those present and, by degrees, (by a real series of propagation, which, however, like all movements, exhausts itself) for the serial totality. In
+fact, the example is in no way the direct unification of the multiplicity of a gathering by the real activity of a single individual (although the existence of the group
+will complicate its structures). Originally, the example was quite simply the
+actualisation in one term of the relation of seriality. In this Other, who behaved
+correctly in public (that is to say, as the Other that he is and that I am) towards the
+native, I discover myself as Other (an identity determined in seriality). Conversely, this particular Other, who has shown himself so perfectly as the Other in all
+his opacity, becomes for me the common interest as my particular imperative:
+the Other that I have to be. This makes it clear that racist ideas, as structures of
+the collective opinion of the colonialists, are petrified actions (petrified from the
+beginning) which are manifested as imperatives in the context of the Other to be
+realised by me. As perpetual exigencies of reaffirmation by individual verbal
+acts, they indicate the impossibility of a real totalisation of these affirmations, that
+is to say, the intensity of the imperative is directly proportional to the index of
+separation. In short, by the very act of repeating them, one shows that it is impossible for everyone to unite simultaneously against the natives, that it is merely
+shifting recurrence, and that in any case such a unification could occur as an active
+grouping only so as to massacre the colonised people, which is the perpetual,
+absurd temptation of the colonialists, and which, if it were possible, would amount
+to the immediate destruction of colonisation. In this way, the racist idea, both as
+an unthinkable idea and as a categorical imperative, can serve us as a typical
+example of the serial idea as an act of alterity which realises in urgency (and for
+lack of anything better) the practico-inert unity of the gathering, and, in contradiction with the original exigency, manifests this unity as a fundamental negation,
+that is to say, as impotence grounded on separation.
+
+304 Book I
+to impotence, that is to say, to a qualification and a transformation which
+come to the agent from others; serial being becomes immobility through
+innumerable impotent activities, or activities of impotence. And
+sometimes, as in the case of the colonialists, impotence presents itself as a
+unitary exigency of action; but, in this case, action is not really praxis; it is
+practico-inert because it realises the Other as a fleeting and prefabricated
+passivity.) In this way, serial being, as a practico-inert reality, can be
+defined as a process, that is to say, as a development which, though orientated, is caused by a force of exteriority which has the result of actualising
+the series as the temporalisation of a multiplicity in the fleeting unity of a
+violence of impotence. These observations have shown us that the collective is not simply the form of being of certain social realities, but that it
+is also the being of sociality itself at the level of the practico-inert field.
+And I have been able to describe this being as social being in its elementary, fundamental structure because it is at the practico-inert level that
+sociality is produced in men by things as a bond of materiality which
+transcends and alters simple human relations. Besides, a collective is in
+itself a sort of scale model of the practico-social field and of any passive
+activity carried out in it. It is constructed, moreover, on the false
+reciprocity of the practical agent and of worked matter; in reality,
+worked materiality, in bearing the seal of an other activity (and entering
+into human action under the impulse of a series of dispersed praxes),
+becomes in the collective the practico-inert unity of the multiplicity of
+which it is the common object. Thus the unity of the gathering, far from
+being organic or practical, manifests itself with all the characteristics of
+sealed materiality; in other words, inorganic materiality comes to the
+gathering as such from its inert (or practico-inert) unification by the
+interiorisation of the seal of its common object. But this materiality, as an
+inorganic materiality which produces itself in and through practical relations, takes on the determination of alterity. Thus, in the dialectical
+movement which characterises this structure of false reciprocity within
+the collective, seriality as the seal of the common object projected onto
+the human multiplicity turns back on the common object and determines
+it by the action of everyone as an other-object (objet autre) (that is to say, a
+common object as the objectification of the Other or as Other objectivity). It
+is in this dialectical moment that the object produces its men (as workers,
+owners, etc.), as the others whose alterity it is and who act on it or suffer
+its action in so far as it becomes for each of them his Other Destiny or his
+Other Interest, that is to say, in so far as the activity of everyone - in so
+89. Though certain of these realities have no being other than collective being.
+
+Collectives 305
+far as it responds to the exigencies of the common object - also reveals the
+impotence of everyone in the objective form of the inflexibility of the
+object. The celebrated inexorable laws of bourgeois economics in the
+nineteenth century have never been anything but the effect of scarcity
+appearing in a practico-inert field of serial impotence. Indeed, from this
+point on, the same practico-inert notions (solidified finality, simultaneous inversion of the dialectical laws of human praxis and of the
+analytical quantitative laws of inorganic materiality) apply within the
+collective, to matter as the sealed unity of men, to the gathering as the
+material negation of molecular dispersal and of the human relation, and
+to the acting individual in so far as his free praxis constitutes itself as
+inessential in relation to the practico-inert activity of the Other and to the
+practico-inert exigencies of the worked thing. In fact, we rediscover here
+a real and universal mode of discourse, in so far as discourse itself is a
+practico-inert designation of the practico-inert field. These verbal structures are genuine tools of thought for thinking the world of passive
+activity and active passivity; all that is necessary is that a direct, organised
+practice (on the part of an individual ora group) should take them in their
+practico-inert being and use them, as is only proper, as replacements for
+things. And in so far as they have been invented by nobody, and in so far
+as they are language organising itself as passive activity in the milieu of
+alterity, these verbal structures are, in a collective, the collective itself,
+that is to say, the common object in so far as it is produced (under
+everyone's real actions) as a material Idea of the being of man or of the
+acting individual in so far as he acts and speaks as Other in the milieu of
+serial impotence. These verbal structurations (practical schemata for
+constructing an indeterminate series of sentences) are characterised by an
+absolute refusal to make a distinction at any level between the agent (or
+agents) as member of a series and the object as producing men as its
+products. In fact, in the collective, exigency really is in the object, because
+some men have put it there and others maintain it there on the basis of the
+entire historical process; and it really is inhuman, because inorganic matter, as the conducting medium, necessarily inverts the structures of praxis. Conversely, it is really human in everyone (in so far as it is grounded
+on need, etc., and in so far as it manifests itself through a project which
+transcends past and present conditions towards the future), but it is dehumanising in so far as it produces itself as the unification of the gathering
+by the thing: its reality therefore produces itself in everyone as inflexible
+in so far as it produces impotence as the negative and totalising link of the
+series as materiality; furthermore, the structure of alterity which is manifested on the basis of this impotence forces man to demand, as Other and
+as conditioned by Others, (and as conditioning them as an Other) so
+
+30G Book 1
+that, ultimately, everyone's need, though directly present in the organism as a real negation of it, is itself felt through impotence as the need of
+the Other or Need as Other. At this level, there is no difference between
+saying that the children of poor districts need sun, that the car needs
+petrol, that the room needs a good clean, or that France needs children,
+etc." It would be completely mistaken to reduce these structures and
+their mode of expression to capitalist societies alone and to regard them
+as a historical product of capital: others can be found, different in content
+but similar in essence, in socialist societies too. A Polish journalist indignantly quoted the following sentence which had appeared all over the
+walls of Warsaw, two years before Poznan: "Tuberculosis impedes
+(freine) production.' He was both right and wrong to be indignant. He
+was right because it makes the tubercular worker, as a manual worker,
+into a mere negative (and inert) relation between a microbe and a
+machine. Indeeed, there can be few slogans which show more vividly the
+absolute equivalence between serial multiplicity and the common
+material object within a collective." But, on the other hand, the slogan is
+neither stupid nor false: it is the expression of bureaucracy as the decomposition (by the exigencies of a practico-inert field) of an active ruling
+group into a serial gathering. Bureaucracy, in effect, is the Other erected
+into a principle and a means of government: it means that the decomposition of the group has totally enclosed men in the internal field of the
+practico-inert. It is not that man has ceased to be the future of man, but
+that the man of the future comes to man as a human thing.
+From this point of view, dialectical investigation provides the answer
+to the question we just posed: it shows us class at the level of the
+practico-inert field as a collective, and class being as a statute of seriality
+90. On the social and political plane, the point is not to negate these structures of
+being and language, but to act together in order to liquidate the practico-inert field.
+9I. Production, indeed, as an unconditional imperative, is the quantity of goods
+produced in so far as they haveabsorbed as their inessential means the strength and
+activity of the producers. In so far as the slogan affirms the practical homogeneity of
+the concepts which it unites, tuberculosis is a disease in so far as it is experienced by
+nobody, in so far as it is a statistic, that is to say, measured, forexample, by the number
+of working hours which it causes to be lost. Finally, the relation between them is
+expressed by a word which qualifies the objecton the basis of human labour; impeding
+can, in fact, today, refer to a natural modification within some mechanical system, but
+this is only because, for millennia, men have been constructing a certain internal
+relation within worked objects known as the brake. This expression theref oreresults
+in inserting a Manichean typeof counter-finality as a practico-inert relation betweena
+material exigency and its negation by material circumstances.
+
+Collectives 307
+imposed on the multiplicity which composes it. But a few points still
+remain to be cleared up. We shall return for a moment to the example
+of the French proletariat as produced by industrialisation in the first
+half of the nineteenth century.
+5 Series and Class: The French Proletariat
+As collectives are both a result of particular undertakings and a radical
+inversion of finality, they have peculiar powers which may have made
+it possible to believe in their subjective existence, but which need to be
+studied in objectivity. Because the economic system of a society is a
+collective, it can be conceived as a system which functions of itself,
+tending to persevere in its being. In particular, what Marx calls the
+process of capital must necessarily be understood through the materialist dialectic and in accordance with his rigorous interpretation of it.
+But if it is true that this process is partially responsible for 'the atomisation of crowds' and also for recurrence,
+92 it is also true that it can
+92. There is no trace of atomisation in medieval communities. They have their
+own structures, grounded on the relation of man to man (personal dependence).
+In this period, writes Marx: "The social relations between individuals in the performance of their labour, appear at all events as their own mutual personal
+relations, and are not disguised under the shape of social relations between the
+products of labour...? (Capital, 1, p. 77). Yet this feudal constitution did nothing
+to prevent alterity or circular recurrence or even in certain cases the perspective
+of flight: this is what creates, for example, the reality of the Church, which is
+certainly something more than the set of the personal relations amongst the clergy
+and between the clergy and the laity. If the enormous, real substratum of religious
+alienation existed, and weighed on the whole of Europe with the weight of its
+properties and its privileges, this is not because it was tending to realise its unity
+as a subjective community of believers, but rather because it remained a detotalised totality and because any attempted action on it, whether from outside or
+inside, lost itself in a perspective of indefinite flight. The real problem - which we
+cannot go into here - relates not so much to the past, where recurrence and
+alienation have always existed, as to the future: to what extent will a socialist
+society do away with atomism in all its forms! To what extent will collective
+objects, the signs of our alienation, be dissolved into a true inter-subjective community in which the only real relations will be those between men, and to what
+extent will the necessity of every human society remaining a detotalised totality
+maintain recurrence, flights and therefore unity-objects as limits to true unifica-
+
+308 Book 1
+exist as 'a relation determined by production' only in and through this
+milieu of recurrence which it helps to maintain. 'Capital is a collective
+product, and only by the united action of many members, nay, in the
+last resort, only by the united action of all members of society, can it
+be set in motion. Capital is, therefore, not a personal, it is a social
+power,' we read in the Communist Manifesto." But this social power
+will impose itself as 'a thing existing outside individuals through what
+Marx called an 'interversion and a prosaically real and in no way
+imaginary mystification'. And a passage in Capital explains the origin
+of this interversion itself: 'In the form of society now under consideration, the behaviour of men in the social process of production is
+purely atomic. Hence their relations to each other in production
+assume a material character independent of their control and conscious
+individual action. These facts manifest themselves at first by products
+as a general rule taking the form of commodities. ... Hence the riddle
+presented by the money-fetish is but the riddle presented by the
+commodity-fetish.'4 Thus it is not so much, as Marx says somewhat
+unfortunately in the Manifesto, 'the united action of many members',
+but above all their separation and atomisation which endows their real
+relations of production with the inhuman character of a thing.
+Yet this 'uniting of action' does occur; the proof is that bourgeois
+economists speak quite readily of the solidarity of the interests of
+workers and employers. Thus, the finished product is presented as if
+it were the result of a concerted undertaking, that is to say, of an action
+and work group comprising management, technicians, office staff and
+workers. But the bourgeois economist does not wish to see that this
+solidarity is expressed in inert matter as an inversion of the real relations; this false unity, as the inert seal which supposedly signifies men,
+can, in fact, refer only to relations of antagonism and seriality. It is the
+object and the object alone which combines human efforts in its inhuman unity: and if it can make people believe in the existence of an
+original agreement where there is, in fact, only an anti-social (practicotion? Must the disappearance of capitalist forms of alienation mean the elimination of all forms of alienation. This brings us to the question posed by Jean
+Hyppolite in his Etudes sur Marx et Hegel (Paris, 1955; translated by John
+O'Neill as Studies on Marx and Hegel, Basic Books, 1969. [Ed.])
+93. Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, p. 47. [Ed.]
+94. Capital, Vol. 1, pp. 92-3. The emphases are Sartre's and the translation is
+slightly amended. [Ed.] The passage is missing from the French translation. See
+Maximilien Rubel, Karl Marx. Essai de biographie intellectuelle, P. 350.
+
+309
+inert) force, this is because its passive unity, in its radical heterogeneity, cannot refer to any kind of human unification. In other words, it
+leaves the social origin of a machine as such totally indeterminate (at a
+particular moment of History there is no way of telling, for example,
+whether a particular machine was produced in a country with a capitalist system or in one where the means of production are socialised).?5
+How can one fail to see that "reification' comes to man through recurrence, that is to say, precisely as that which makes him act as Other
+than himself and which determines his real relations on the basis of
+relations between Others! We have seen how price stabilises as a
+result of recurrence, and how it immediately imposes itself on everyone
+without having been wished as such by anyone; we have also seen how
+the concrete relation of the buyer to the seller is relegated to being an
+inessential appearance: entering the shop, saying hello, asking the
+price, haggling, hesitating, and buying something: all these supposed
+moments of the act are no more than gestures; the exchange is settled
+in advance, the price imposes itself; it is things that determine the
+relations of men. If, as Marx has often said, everything is other in
+capitalist society, this is primarily because atomisation, which is both
+the origin and the result of the process, makes social man an Other
+than himself, conditioned by Others in so far as they are Other than
+themselves.
+In so far as the worker is a product of capitalism, that is to say, in so
+far as he works for wages and produces goods which are taken from
+him and uses industrial machinery which belongs to individuals or to
+private groups, the negative common object of the working class in
+the first half of the nineteenth century was, as we have seen, its total
+national production, that is to say, machines as capital requiring the
+worker to produce, through them, an expansion of capital. We have
+also seen that the common interest of the class can only be the negation
+of this negation, that is to say, the practical negation of a destiny which
+95. On the other hand, the same machine as such may yield information about
+contemporary means of production, about techniques and, in this way, about
+certain ossified structures which worked matter establishes amongst its servants.
+But, in so far as the means of production are the same everywhere, these inert
+structures are everywhere the same. It is at the level of the group that one can tell
+whether a common praxis has returned to these structures and made them more
+flexible, or balanced them in other areas (reduction of working hours, organisation of leisure, cultural activities, etc.) or whether they have been left to fend
+for themselves.
+
+310 Book 1
+is suffered as common inertia. We must therefore recognise that
+practical organisation, as human exigency, is, in itself, and even in the
+practico-inert field, a constitutive structure of relations amongst
+workers (this will become clearer in the next chapter). And this
+organisation is both a means and an end, since it presents itself both as
+a ineans of struggling against destiny (that is to say, against the men
+who in a particular system make this particular destiny out of the
+machine), and as the future reinteriorisation of the practico-inert field
+and its projected dissolution within a perpetually active social organisation which, as a concrete totality, will govern both the means of production and production as a whole.
+The worker will be saved from his destiny only if the human multiplicity as a whole is permanently changed into a group praxis. His only
+future, therefore, is at the second degree of sociality, that is to say, in
+human relations as they arise in the unity of a group (and not in the
+disunity of the gathering-milieu). This is what Marx meant when he
+spoke of the sociality of the worker. Yet it should be noted that this
+sociality appears as the joint negation of two reciprocal aspects of the
+practical field: a negation of the common object as destiny and a
+connected negation of multiplicity as seriality. In other words, sociality as a still individual project of transcendence (in the organised
+group) of the multiplicity of individuals reveals seriality itself as a link
+of impotence; this seriality is the being-to-be-transcended towards an
+action tending to socialise the common object. On the other hand, this
+sociality, in so far as it was determined in everyone by the very
+structure of the collective in which he produced himself, and in so far
+as it initially produced no result (that is, during the first quarter of the
+nineteenth century and, basically, right up to the revolt of the Lyon
+silk-weavers) or was limited to the creation of reciprocal relations,
+appeared in everyone as a structure peculiar to his own project and
+thus decomposed into a multiplicity of identical projects, before producing active organisations through itself. Thus it emerges as a process
+of isolation precisely to the extent that it is fundamentally a transcendence of plurality towards unity. This means, quite simply, that the
+organising project in everyone begins by being negated by that which it
+transcends and negates, that is to say, by seriality as a link of impotence.
+When we look at it more closely, we can see that the necessity of
+some common action can arise only out of an existing link between men
+and can present itself only as the transcendence and inversion of this
+fundamental link. If it were possible to conceive real (but abstract)
+
+321
+individuals in a pure state - and I do not mean the social atoms of
+liberalism - in so far as they are united by bonds of reciprocity, and if
+one could abstract from the object's transformation of reciprocity
+into a link of alterity, it would be impossible to understand how the
+infinite dispersal of human relations could of itself produce the means
+of pulling itself together again. This conception is completely inapplicable to human history, but it retains some sense as a logical
+possibility, provided the idea mentioned above of living organisms,
+which depend on the universe, but are not affected by the contraction
+which is caused by scarcity as a fundamental, contingent characteristic
+of our History, is consistent. In the practico-inert world based on
+scarcity, however, the object brings men together by imposing the
+violent, passive unity of a seal on their multiplicity. And in the very
+moment where this object is a threat (for the colonised, or the exploited), in the very moment where this object, as positive interest, is
+threatened (for the colonists or the exploiters), the unity of impotence
+transforms itself into a violent contradiction: in it, unity opposes itself
+to the impotence which negates it. We shall discover the intelligibility
+of this moment later. For the time being, what needs to be emphasised
+is that impotence, as a force of alterity, is primarily unity in its negative
+form, primarily action in the form of passivity, and primarily finality
+in the form of counter-finality."
+Thus, as we have seen, there is a sort of common mode of behaviour
+amongst the white minority in a city where the majority are black:
+quite simply this behaviour is common in that it is imitated by everyone but never adopted by anyone (not counting the creation of organisations). All the same, the practical unity of men can never arise or
+originate in the domination of worked matter over man, from such
+unity itself. In this sense, the common class-being of the workers in
+1830, in the presence of Machine-Destiny and of the organs of oppression and constraint, was the seriality of their relations of reciprocity, in that this profound impotence was also a unity. In fact, the
+existence of a labour market created a link of antagonistic reciprocity
+between workers, in which separation was lived as opposition and
+alterity: in the negative ensemble of individuals selling their labour
+power, we have seen everyone featuring both as himself and as Other.
+It is also clear that labour itself, according to the mode of production,
+96. I see these three notions as socialities. It has been obvious from the beginning of our dialectical investigation that the original foundation of unity, of
+
+312
+engenders relations either of positive reciprocity or of dispersal.
+Although in the nineteenth century capitalist concentralisation tended
+to bring workers together, dispersal remained a crucial factor (the
+dispersal of industries throughout France, the dispersal of residential
+groups, etc.). Yet the worker tended to become aware of the objective
+characteristics which made a worker of him and which defined him by
+his labour and by the type of exploitation to which he was subjected.
+He gradually became aware of his objective reality and, thus, of that of
+his comrades. But their common characteristic of being the product of
+their product and of the society which was organised around this
+product, however apparent it may have been to some of them, could
+not create anything more than an abstract, conceptual identity amongst
+them, unless it was lived in action.
+By this I mean that this common characteristic was manifested each
+day in the reciprocal and contradictory double link of antagonism on
+the market and of solidarity in labour, and above all on the occasion of
+local retaliatory actions, through their first failures and surrenders. In
+these early days of the workers' movement, when resistance was spontaneous, impotent and rapidly repressed, the defeated realised themselves in this impotence and lived it as the serial dispersal of men in their
+condition; but this objective condition realised itself through their
+everyday relations with their comrades, and it was this that held back
+all their efforts to take common action. This indefinite plurality of
+contradictory relations is both what defined their condition as workers
+(in particular, the fact that they competed with their comrades) and
+what created class as an indefinite series whose serial unity lay everywhere in the impotence of the individuals who composed it, just because this impotence derived from their separation. Exploitation was
+revealed as the passive unity of all (and not simply as an identity of
+condition), in so far as everyone lived the isolation of Others as his own
+isolation and their impotence through his own. Class as a collective
+became a material thing made out of men in so far as it constituted itself as a negation of man and as a serial impossibility of negating this
+negation. This impossibility makes class a factual necessity: it is unaction, and of finality is individual praxis as the unifying and reorganising transcendence of existing circumstances towards the practical field. But we also know
+that this individual praxis can no longer be recognised at the most concrete level of
+the practico-inert and that it exists there only to lose itself, to the advantage of the
+maleficent actions of worked matter.
+
+313
+changeable destiny. It is not a practical solidarity but, on the contrary,
+the absolute unity of destinies brought about by lack of solidarity.
+Every worker feels himself confirmed in his inertia by the inertia of all
+the Others; every small organised group feels its own class as a universal flight, which neutralises all its efforts. For this proletariat in the
+process of formation, the Other is primarily the serial totalisation of
+Others (in which he features as an Other), that is to say, of all those,
+including himself, who represent for everyone the possibility of being
+out of work or of working for lower wages; in short, it is himself as
+Other, in so far as his serialised and totalised antagonisms manifest
+themselves in the fact that on the labour market he is his own counterfinality, who emerges as the Other who forces demands to be lowered.
+This serialised antagonism, or negative seriality (which, for reasons
+of space, we have not examined thoroughly except in relation to the
+market) constitutes an initial structure of alterity, based on the reciprocity of antagonism, and constitutes every worker for every Other
+as himself in so far as he is his own enemy. But in the same moment the
+serial unity of these oppositions posits itself as a contradiction of the
+same and of the Other demanding a unifying praxis. Now, paradoxically, but very logically, it is not these antagonisms as such which make
+unity-praxis so difficult; on the contrary, as we shall see, their truth lies
+in the transcendence which integrates them in the common unity of
+demands. What made the workers impotent, in the first half of the last
+century, was alterity as spatial and temporal stratification. At the level
+of positive reciprocity in labour (which is the structure of alterity
+which contradicts the former and creates the true practico-inert
+tension of class), it is in effect dispersal which creates impotence. At
+this level, in fact, everyone's objective grasp of his class-being as the
+practico-inert reality of his own praxis (which was examined above)
+implies a reciprocal grasp of his comrade in his particular class-being;
+this was achieved practically (and not theoretically, at least at that time)
+by friendship, mutual aid, work relations, etc. And, in so far as this
+reciprocity spread through France in constellations and chains of constellations (including, through their relations with other groups, the
+villages from which some of the proletarians came and the political
+groups of the republican petty bourgeoisie), class posited itself - as the
+indefinite seriality of class-beings - as a milieu.
+But this milieu was not an objective representation of the worker: it
+constantly realised him as practical impotence. If he learnt that a
+workers' newspaper had been founded, as a practical determination of
+
+314 Book I
+class action, he would produce himself as directly affected by this
+group, which, from within the practico-inert, affected him in his being
+as an imperative order? to negate the structure of impotence and
+separation in this being. But, at the same time, because this limited
+undertaking was constituted at the horizon (he did not work in the town
+where it was constituted, a comrade from there told him about it,
+showed him a copy of the paper), it produced itself as a negative
+determination of itself and of everyone: in itself, it was in fact a proof
+that the totalisation of the milieu by class-action was always possible,
+and that it is the profound truth of the passive totality. But, by the
+same token, it defines itself as not being this totalisation, as being nothing
+in relation to class-totalisation and in a way as negating it through the
+simple fact, which is in any case inevitable, of positing itself for itself: it
+therefore refers back by itself to the class-gathering as an inert unity of
+multiplicity. As for the worker in Lyon who, in a moment of defeat,
+learnt of the initiative of his Parisian comrades, he himself was constituted as inertia, as rooted in impotence by sheer distance (connected
+in fact with everything), which prevented him from joining them and
+by circumstances which meant that the moment to imitate their action
+had not yet arrived at Lyon. At the same time, in this period of uncertainty, he remained hesitant about the content of the initiative: he
+has not completely thrown off Christian ideology, and he knows that
+his Parisian comrades are not entirely free of it either, so that his relation to the object produced (the newspaper, the ideas it supports, its
+propaganda, etc.) remains indeterminate. Here again it is common
+class-being which realises itself in this contradictory relation: in this
+collective, in effect, if a group, however small, constitutes itself, and if
+this group becomes known, then the unity of the group is lived negatively by everyone as a sort of intermediary between serial inertia and
+the active organism: everyone is united with the Others, passively but
+directly, in so far as he is determined as a moment of a total totalisation
+by the movement of partial totalisation which, somewhere else, and
+through a few people, negates the class-gathering as everyone's inert
+being-there. Between him and the groupuscule, through the inert
+density of the milieu, a synthetic link of univocal interiority (which
+proceeds from the group to the individual) establishes itself; but at the
+97. Clearly the imperative character which collective action presents to someone who has not joined the group is the only way in which human freedom can
+manifest itself as other in the practico-inert field of materiality.
+
+325
+same time, both his own indeterminacy and the thorough indeterminacy of the group action, mean that this relation remains indeterminate
+(neither negative nor positive), so that the bond of synthetic interiority allows itself to be absorbed by the serial bond of common membership of the milieu.
+On the other hand, through the failures of local attempts which had
+not been supported and followed through, or sustained and continued,
+every group saw active class solidarity as an inert exigency of the classobject on the basis of the rediscovery, in the defeat of negative solidarity, of destiny as serial flight. What was at stake here was not a
+conflict of interests between workers, but rather their separation.
+Faced with this indefinite milieu which needed to be agitated by serial
+methods, the group became aware of its smallness, its impotence and
+its fragility. In other words, it came to be seen as a fragile mode of the
+common substance and, by the same token, it produced itself in its
+vacillating activity as the relation of a 'micro-organism' (I am not using
+this term in an organicist or Gestaltist sense) to the substance which it
+determines, and which gives it its depth and fragility. Naturally, classbeing manifests itself as a temporalised separation, not only because any
+political education and agitation presupposes a hysteresis originating in
+the 'passivity of the masses'; that is to say, in the seriality of the classgathering, but also because the workers are at different levels of politicisation and liberation depending on their individual histories and
+because spatial dispersal is reinforced by temporal dispersal.
+In any case, in so far as the historical reality and specific structure of
+the class had been defined in certain men produced by the mode of
+production through the relations of production, it derived its general
+structure and intelligibility from the fact that its common object constituted it as a serially structured milieu and that other classes, through
+the contradictions which opposed them to it, through the same practicoinert ensemble, made the negative unity of alterity into the leaven of its
+organising praxis. In the example of the archaic proletariat, the worker
+is in the class in so far as he is conditioned by Others, that is to say, to
+the extent that he is himself, for himself, always Other, and that his
+labour power, as a commodity, is Other than him, that is to say,
+alienated. He is in the class in so far as his own inertia is based on the
+inertia of Others and becomes the class itself in everyone as the inertia
+of the Other as Other. And this class-being is normally expressed in
+the serial, negative practices of abstentionism, defeatism, demoralisation or surrender. These practices in everyone are seriality as a whole.
+
+316 Bookl
+In this way, common-class-Being manifests itself in all its rigidity in
+periods when workers are 'on the defensive; on the basis of the contradictions of the individual, and of the material conditions of his life,
+it becomes, in everyone, destiny producing itself as the Other-Being
+of the worker in relation to himself and to all the Others. In this sense,
+common-class-Being as an interiorised common object is neither a
+totality imposing itself on its parts but differing from them, nor a word
+connoting the indefinite repetition of particular class-being as a
+universal reproduction of the identical, nor a way of designating the
+set of conditions common to everyone and which are sometimes called
+the 'condition of the working class'. At the most superficial level of the
+investigation, everyone is in the class, in so far as the indefinite series
+of relations is realised as a milieu by the human terms between which
+these relations hold. But at first this milieu as such is no Other than
+men and their objects making themselves into the milieu of man or, in
+other words, it is reciprocity as a relation amongst workers making
+themselves through things not only humanity but also a homogeneous,
+inert container of all. But in any case, at a later stage of the investigation the milieu will dissolve and reveal serially structured multiplicities
+of multiplicities. At this moment, common class-being is no longer, for
+everyone, being-in-the-milieu-of-class: it is, in fact, everyone's beingelsewhere in so far as he is constituted as the Other by the progressive
+series of Others, and as the Other-Being of everyone in his position
+in the series in so far as he constitutes the Others. Class exists as a
+totalised series of series.
+This is why it is not really very significant to find (or to think one
+can find) continuous transitions from one class to another, intermediaries, and unclassifiable groups: if class were to be treated as a total,
+synthetic form, enclosing its members, it would indeed be highly
+embarrassing to admit those imperceptible passages from one class to
+another which bourgeois economists are so happy to describe, and the
+aporias which this new scepticism claims to have found (and whose
+logical structure resembles that of the old arguments about the bald
+man, etc.). But, if class is a serial totality of series and if the ensemble of
+these series corresponds roughly both to the worker's class-being and
+to his Other-Being, it does not matter if these series finally disappear,
+decompose or become. Other; on the contrary, it is of the essence of
+seriality (as a determination of the practico-inert) to be infinite or indefinite; thus it is of the essence of class-being, as the absolute elsewhere of impotence, to disappear at the horizon and to allow itself to
+
+31J
+be determined in its Other-Being-to-infinity, by the Other-Being of
+other individuals belonging to other classes. These mediations do not
+affect the true weight of class and are practically ineffective: in cases of
+tension (which is to say, permanently), alterity sticks at the level of
+mediation, and nothing gets through any more, or the intermediary
+explodes and the two freed series define themselves by their struggle.
+Conversely, if one could define precisely the historical reality of a class
+and if this definition could be applied to all its members and to them
+alone, the series would still be infinite, because they would be circular.
+But the seriality of class makes the individual (whoever he is and
+whatever his class) into a being who defines himself as a humanised
+thing and who, in the practico-inert universe, is strictly interchangeable, in given conditions, with some material product. And what
+finally characterises the working class (this being our example) is that
+the organised praxis of a militant group originates in the very heart of
+the practico-inert, in the opaque materiality of impotence and inertia as
+a transcendence of this materiality. Thus the other form of class, that
+is to say, the group which totalises in a praxis, originates at the heart of
+the passive form and as its negation. A wholly active class, all of whose
+members are integrated into a single praxis and whose apparatuses
+organise themselves in unity rather than conflicting with one another,
+is realised only in very rare (and revolutionary) moments of workingclass history. Even without going into the question of the development
+of the working-class experience and of its objective organisation
+(which are one and the same thing), it is therefore clear, from the point
+of view of the intelligibility of the practico-inert, that the proletariat,
+in so far as it is both Destiny and the Negation of Destiny, constitutes
+in its very form a changing and contradictory reality, or in other words,
+that it is always, to a degree which is determined by the historical
+situation, a group praxis (or, usually, a multiplicity of group activities)
+which erodes the inert unity of a common-class-being. It is therefore
+a class which produces itself as a contradictory double unity, for the
+inert-being-of-seriality, as the basis and material of every other combination, is really the unity of workers in their being and through
+Being, in so far as their destiny owes its rigidity to their dispersal, " and
+98. The dispersal of which 1 speak here has no historical connection with the
+process of concentration, although the latter can help to decrease it by increasing
+contacts; dispersal is fundamentally only the impotence of alterity in so far as it is
+lived by a necessarily dispersed plurality, although the field of dispersal may be
+more or less extensive.
+
+318 Book 1
+increases it; whereas an active organisation constitutes itself against
+Being, and its unity is purely practical; in other words, praxis, as the
+organising transcendence of inert being towards the reorganisation of
+the social field, is the unity of the multiple as a perpetual labour.
+However, a number of points should be noted. First, that collective
+praxis can occur only on the basis of a fundamental cominon-being;
+secondly, that it will remain structured by the being which it transcends and which determines it up to its limits and efficacity (as we saw,
+trade-union practice about 1900 was structured in its very temporalisation by the practico-inert characteristics of the proletariat as they had
+been produced under the pressure of universal machines); thirdly, that
+it stands in a relation of alterity and, through antagonisms, of seriality
+to other organisations independent of it and that the conducting medium
+of this new seriality is the class as a collective; fourthly and lastly, that
+any organisation, as we shall see, is in constant danger of dissolving
+into seriality (the bureaucratic nature of certain unions in some countries) or of falling straight back into the inertia of common-being,
+while, at the same moment, the class-collective, as worked matter, with
+all its inertia, supports the practical unities, which have become unitiesof-being and inert meanings, as a seal. Thus, whether or not organisation has progressed beyond the series, the working class in its
+contradiction represents the most resolute and visible effort of men to reconquer themselves through one another, that is to say, to rescue themselves from Being to the extent that it gives them the statute of a human
+thing amongst other human things which are their inanimate products;
+and the field of practico-inert being is constantly closing up or threatening to do so; Being petrifies their actions in full freedom. This new
+moment of the investigation shows us that the practico-inert field is no
+more than a still abstract structure of History; indeed, it cannot
+constitute itself unless the world of alterity produces as a serial unity
+the condition and principle of its own transcendence. We must now
+examine this transition from being to organisation. Having grasped the
+dialectical intelligibility of individual praxis and of the passive activity
+of the collective, we must now grasp and fix that of collective praxis.
+o Collective Praxis
+We have traversed the practico-inert field with the intention of dis-
+
+319
+covering whether this place of violence, darkness and witchcraft
+actually has dialectical intelligibility or, in other words, whether some
+strict rationality underlies the strange appearance of this world. It is
+now clear that it does: not only do all the objects and processes which
+occur there obey rules of dialectical development, thus making comprehension always possible, but also the structuration of the experience
+in the practico-inert field realises itself through the appearance of
+necessity within certainty (évidence) and, therefore, necessity at the heart
+of free individual praxis presents itself as the necessity of the existence
+of this field of inert activity. In other words, in the practical experience
+of a successful action, the moment of objectification presents itself as a
+necessary end of the individual practical dialectic - which is submerged
+in it as in its object - and as the appearance of a new moment. And this
+new moment (that of the practico-inert or of fundamental" sociality)
+comes back to the total, translucid dialectic of individual praxis and
+constitutes it as the first moment of a more complex dialectic. This
+means that in every objectified praxis the practico-inert field becomes
+its negation in favour of passive activity as a common structure of
+collectives and worked matter. Thus the moment of objectivity defines
+its dialectical necessity as organic activity which has been transcended
+and preserved by inertia precisely to the extent that, both for the individual agent himself and in the apodicticity of the investigation, it
+presents itself as the transcendence of individuality, in this agent and
+in everyone, by a suffered original statute of reifying sociality. And we
+have carried the study of this sociality far enough to discover in it,
+through a new kind of investigation, the principles of an inversion,
+which refers from necessity to a different freedom (that of unification)
+as a third moment.
+But this dialectical movement, as 1 have described it - and as it
+superficially appears - has no intelligibility; or rather, if we were to
+neglect its real conditions, we would fall back into an external dialectic
+(dialectique du dehors). Only Magic or Fate could explain how individual
+praxis, absorbed in the object, could be the source of a new negation
+by which it transforms itself into the first moment of a dialectic of
+collectivity, if we really had to accept that the intelligibility of the
+practico-inert field and of its negation by the group resides in the action
+of a dialectical force expressed through free praxis and developing
+99. As I have already observed, the word "fundamental' does not refer to any
+historical a priori.
+
+320 Book /
+throughchanges in the field and diff erent kinds of action. The intelligibility
+of individual praxis as translucidity cannot in any way be the same as
+that of the practico-inert field, and, similarly, it would be absurd or
+idealistic to imagine that individual praxis, inert activity and common
+action are the three moments of the development of a single force
+conceived as human praxis, for example. In reality, there are two quite
+distinct dialectics: that of individual practice and that of the group as
+praxis - and the moment of the practico-inert field is in fact that of the
+anti-dialectic. It is, in effect, contained between two radical negations:
+that of the individual action which meets it in itself, in so far as it still
+adheres to its product, as its negation; and that of the unification into
+groups which occurs in collectives as a practical rejection of seriality.
+If one can nevertheless apply the term 'dialectical' to this material field
+of the anti-dialectic, it is precisely because of this double negation. In
+this field, everyone's action disappears, and is replaced by monstrous
+forces which, in the inertia of the inorganic and of exteriority, retain
+some power of action and unification combined with a false interiority.
+And conversely, the simple movement of unification, as it developed
+in the working class in the course of the last century, was sufficient to
+constitute the class, far beyond its precarious, limited initial unifications, as an impotence which was haunted by an invincible human power,
+as the serialisation of a fundamental totality.
+The intelligibility of practico-inert processes therefore rests on a
+few simple, clear principles which are themselves the synthetic contraction of the obvious characteristics of the univocal relation of
+interiority as a basis of individual praxis and of the plurality of agents
+within the practical field. In fact, objectification always directly
+involves alteration. When they say that, in a socialist society, man will
+be his own product instead of 'the product of his product', Marxists
+mean that if man is his own product, he will be his only objectification
+(in himself and in Others); thus objective being will be homogeneous
+with the practice of objectification. But if the individual's reality lies in
+a material object, an anti-dialectic starts: sealed inorganicism appears as
+man's being. Now, this very special situation obviously depends on the
+multiplicity of individuals co-existing in the field of scarcity. In other
+words, only the free praxis of the Other on the basis of material circumstances, through some worked matter, can limit the efficacity and
+freedom of my praxis. In this sense the explanation of classes in Anti-
+Dühring is correct, although it hardly has any historical value. But,
+paradoxically, it is correct as a dialectical schema of intelligibility
+
+327
+rather than as a reconstruction of a particular social process. Engels
+claimed in fact that classes (that is to say, the collective as a practicoinert type of sociality) begin to constitute themselves in an agricultural community when the products of labour become commodities.
+I have shown that his examples are all irrelevant, because they concern
+communities disintegrating under the impact of bourgeois societies
+which surround them or which have commercial relations with them.
+But from the point of view of intelligibility these examples are adequate:
+for the characteristic of being a commodity comes to the product of
+peasant labour from the outside. Engels assumes that the land is common property and that every peasant produces in order to feed himself and his family, and we shall make the same assumption. At this
+moment of rural labour, the product is neither an aim nor an objective
+limit: it is the aim of labour only to the extent that it is a means of
+getting food. It is on the basis of exchange - and in particular of
+exchange as practised between bourgeois societies and under-developed
+societies - that objective demand, as a moment of a free praxis of the
+Other, constitutes the product as Other; that is to say, it removes it
+from the closed circle of the 'production/consumption' cycle and
+posits it in itself as an independent object, which has absorbed labour
+and is capable of being exchanged. Of course, this is not some ideal
+structure conferred on the product by the mere desire of the future
+purchaser; these changes occur in the course of a common action
+(colonisation, semi-colonisation, and an overall movement to enclose
+the community, and turn it into an enclave) performed by bourgeois
+groups, and through a set of serial processes which effect the disintegration of the village through a society which trades with it. The
+product really becomes a commodity. But the important point here is
+that this transformation imposes itself on free individual praxis:
+objectification becomes production of the object in so far as it posits
+itself for itself; in this case, the product becomes the man and as such
+the product. But this transformation is wholly intelligible. If we ignore
+for the moment the serial processes and transformations of the practicoinert field, two things remain. First, a praxis (that of a buyer or a group
+of buyers) has appropriated the freedom of the producer: it is as the
+object of this free enterprise that the producer will find himself to be
+producing commodities rather than objects of immediate consumption.
+Objectification becomes other because it produces its object in the free
+field of another's action. It is freedom limiting freedom. But secondly,
+two practical freedoms can confront one another only in the practical
+
+322 Book 1
+field and through the medium of materiality as a whole. If circumstances
+enable one praxis to appropriate the meaning of the other praxis, this
+only means that the object in which the latter objectifies itself takes on
+a different meaning and a counter-finality (for its producer) in the
+practical field of the former and through a reorganisation of this field.
+The original situation therefore presents itself as follows: the univocal relation of interiority enables the buyer to manipulate the peasant's practical field; in effect, the peasant's relation to his environmentthat is to say his labour - is an interiorisation in so far as praxis is a
+unifying organisation and in so far as the organism has its being-outside
+-itself in Nature. But of itself produced materiality cannot transform
+anything since it stands in a univocal relation with the producer. On
+the other hand, as soon as it is given another meaning for the producer
+by an other whose relation with it is also a relation of interiority
+though in a different way, a false relation of reciprocal interiority
+establishes itself between the product and the producer, because the
+former signifies the latter and because the producer behaves as signified
+by his product. Now, all this is perfectly clear, because, through this
+product and in so far as he is this product, a human praxis directs itself
+at the worker and tends to make him work for others when he is still
+working for himself. On the other hand, it is no less clear that the
+product, in becoming a commodity, allows itself to be constituted
+according to the laws of its passivity: it is its very inertia which sustains
+its new unity, and which transforms the praxis of the buyers into an
+exigency in so far as it becomes its own independent meaning (signification) against the worker. And it is through this independence (as an
+absence of human relations, lived in interiority as a synthetic relation
+of inhumanity) that, as a product which posits itself for itself as a commodity-exigency it becomes that which the worker has made, and
+therefore what he is, in the world of the object and as an object. Destructive power is simply a structure of praxis as individual dialectic; but the
+confrontation of freedoms, by the double constitution of the intermediate
+object, cannot become an objective, material contradiction unless the
+inertia of the object makes the two unities which are conferred on it into
+real, inert negations, that is to say, into passive forces.
+This simple example contains all the conditions of the intelligibility
+of the practico-inert field: the only practical dialectical reality, the
+motive force of everything, is individual action. When a field of scarcity
+determines the confrontation of real agents, a new statute is imposed
+on the worked Thing by the activities which confront one another. In
+
+323
+everyone's practical field (in so far as it is everyone's), it takes on
+secret, multiple meanings which indicate the directions of its flights
+towards Others; and as means and end of a particular undertaking
+(that of transforming the freedom of the Other into a docile means to
+my own freedom, not by force but by manipulating the practical field),
+it converts the praxis of the one who is winning into an inert and fascinating hold over the practical freedom of the loser. In the univocal
+milieu of interiority it re-exteriorises the praxis of the conqueror as the
+interiorising synthesis of the practical field. And as significationexigency it reflects his being to the producer as the inert exteriority of a
+slave in the milieu of interiority. But, by mortgaging the worker's freedom by its imperative inertia, it transforms, through itself, the free
+praxis which confronts the worker into a mere inertia of exigency. And,
+in a way, every freedom, both in the milieu of the Other and in its own
+milieu of interiority, experiences its own inertial limit, that is to say, its
+necessity. As soon as multiplicity becomes indefinite (in the practical
+and serial sense), the multiplication of actions and responses is unified
+in the object which posits itself for itself as a negation of everyone by
+everyone (and, later, as a common object). And when I say that the
+object, as inorganic, sealed inertia, posits itself for itself, I mean this
+literally, although we are grasping the process in its full intelligibility:
+the fleeting unity of the object which affirms itself in opposition to
+everyone is in reality the negation of everyone, and of everyone for
+everyone in everyone's practical field, in so far as it becomes a negative,
+inert unity in the object (for example, everyone's impotence revealed in
+the object and through every attempt to change its structures.
+The ensemble of living structures must, therefore, be recomposed
+in each case, according to the rule of the particular process, if we are to
+reach the schemata of intelligibility we are looking for: first, the univocal relation of interiority within free praxis as the unification of the
+field; second, the equivocal relation of a multiplicity of practical
+activities each of which tries to appropriate the freedom of Others by
+the transformations which it imposes on the object (practices are both
+negative reciprocal relations, and therefore relations of interiority, and,
+through the mediation of the inert object, indirect relations of exteriority); third, the transformation of every free praxis (in so far as it is
+absorbed and returned by the object) into an exis; fourth, the inevitable transformation of every exis of worked Things into a passive
+activity by the free praxis of an Other, whoever he may be, whose
+projects and overall point of view are other; fifth, the transformation of
+
+324 Book l
+everyone into active passivity by the passive activity of the object, not
+through some metamorphosis of his organic and human reality, but
+through his relentless transformation of himself into an Other, effected
+by and under his own hands when he produces the object (in so far as
+the multiple meanings of the object, its exigencies and the meanings
+(significations) it gives its producer are prefabricated by other activities
+or by other objects produced by these activities).
+From this point of view, it must be pointed out both that the
+practico-inert field exists, that it is real, and that free human activities
+are not thereby eliminated, that they are not even altered in their translucidity as projects in the process of being realised. The field exists: in
+short, it is what surrounds and conditions us. I need only glance out
+of the window: I will be able to see cars which are men and drivers who
+are cars, a policeman who is directing the traffic at the corner of the
+street and, a little further on, the same traffic being controlled by red
+and green lights: hundreds of exigencies rise up towards me: pedestrian
+crossings, notices, and prohibitions; collectives (a branch of the
+Crédit Lyonnais, a café, a church, blocks of flats, and also a visible
+seriality: people queueing in front of a shop); and instruments (pavements, a thoroughfare, a taxi rank, a bus stop, etc., proclaiming with
+their frozen voices how they are to be used). These beings - neither
+thing nor man, but practical unities made up of man and inert things -
+these appeals, and these exigencies do not yet concern me directly.
+Later, I will go down into the street and become their thing, 1°° I will
+buy that collective which is a newspaper, and suddenly the practicoinert ensemble which besieges and designates me will reveal itself on
+the basis of the total field, that is to say, of the Earth, as the Elsewhere
+of all Elsewheres (or the series of all series of series). It is true that this
+reality, which tells me, from Elsewhere, my destiny as a petty bourgeois
+Frenchman, is still an abstraction - although, depending upon the case,
+it will either crush me or ensnare me. But we must be absolutely clear:
+it is an abstraction in so far as groups are constituted in it and against
+it, in order finally to try to dissolve it; it is an abstraction in that a total
+experience must involve the conscious striving for a unity which, most
+of the time, is not directly perceptible, or which remains masked by
+seriality. But if, from the point of view of totalisation, and taking the
+practico-inert field in its totality, there is such a thing as a group
+I00. It goes without saying that while I am in my flat I am the thing of other
+things (furniture, etc.).
+
+32.5
+intelligibility as the transcendence of necessity towards a common
+freedom, if, indeed, the dialectical origin of the group lies in the passive
+unity of alterity in so far as it negates itselt as passivity, then, apart
+from assessing their concrete situation and their history within totalising History, there is no way of telling whether given individuals or
+gatherings will emerge from their abstract condition as practico-inert
+beings. In other words, for some men and some multiplicities, in so far
+as both of them are concrete realities, the possibility of remaining,
+within the limits of one life or of a set of lives, under the statute of
+Being and of passive activity, is itself a real, concrete possibility. There
+is no guarantee that a given bureaucrat or clerk will one day, by integration into a group, cease to be an Other both for himself and for
+Others. At this moment, manipulated by things his office, as a collective, his boss as an Other), he is for other men a factor of alterity, of
+passivity and of counter-finality, as if he were a thing (a Spanish ducat)
+circulating through men's hands. There is no guarantee that, in itself
+and for him, this situation contains the seed of a contradiction.
+This contradiction would be inevitable, however, if the freedom of
+practice came into conflict with constraints, with interiorised exterior
+prohibitions, in everyone. Such cases do occur: but they are not relevant
+to our present concerns. Mystification, in fact - as a real process rather
+than a concerted undertaking - is unfortunately so deep that the reified
+individual remains in possession of his free praxis. Or rather: to be
+alienated, or simply altered, a man must be an organism capable of
+dialectical action; and it is through free praxis that he will discover
+necessity as a transformation of his product, and of himself by his
+product, in the Other. The constraints of need, the exigencies of the
+worked Thing, the imperatives of the Other, and his own impotence -
+his praxis will reveal all these to him and interiorise them. His free
+activity, in its freedom, will take upon itself everything which crushes
+him - exhausting work, exploitation, oppression, and rising prices.
+This means that his liberty is the means chosen by the Thing and by
+the Other to crush him and to transform him into a worked Thing.
+Hence the moment of the free contract by which, in the nineteenth
+century, the isolated worker, a prey to hunger and poverty, sold his
+labour power to a powerful employer who imposed his own rates, is
+both the most shameless mystification and a reality. It is true that he
+has no other way out; the choice is an impossible one; he has not the
+ghost of a chance of finding better-paid work and in any case he never
+even asks himself the question: what is the point of it all? He goes and
+
+326 Book 1
+sells himself at the factory every morning (in the good old days, they
+made one day contracts to keep workers), by a sort of sombre resigned
+exis which scarcely resembles a praxis. And yet, in fact, it is a praxis:
+habit is directed and organised, the end is posited, the means chosen (if
+he learns that there will be a lot of workers offering themselves for
+hire, he will get up an hour earlier in order to be there before the
+others); in other words, the ineluctable destiny which is crushing him
+moves through him.
+It would be true to say - and I said it above - that the semi-automatic machine dreams through the women workers, lost in some day
+dream and moving in a rhythm external to them - which is everyone's
+work itself as other. But, at the same time, these dreams are quiet,
+private behaviour, carrying out the machine's sentence by pursuing its
+own ends (the valorisation of the physical per son against devaluation by
+the alien universality of exigency, etc.). And as for this rhythm, which
+is so alien to the personal rhythms of her life that for the first few days
+it seemed absolutely unendurable: the woman worker wanted to adapt
+herself to it, she made an effort, took advice from her friends, and
+invented a personal relation of interiority applying to herself alone
+(given her height, strength, other physical characteristics, etc.); and
+this, one might say, is the best means of individual adaptation. It is
+perfectly clear that this involved giving herself to the machine, and that
+the latter, as the work of Others in the negative unity of a destiny,
+took possession of her work and made it other: ultimately, the total
+adaptation to semi-automatism meant the destruction of her bodily
+rhythms and the interiorisation of a rhythm which was absolutely other.
+But the moment in which the girl emerged as the object of the machine -
+that is to say, when mystification revealed itself in objective alienation
+- was also the moment in which her adaptation was accomplished
+(within the narrow limits assigned her). There is nothing in this that
+she could have avoided (except, perhaps, by failing to adapt and
+getting herself eliminated, first of all from the labour market, and then,
+as surplus population, from society, through sickness): the initial
+constraints (the fact that her family could not survive without at least
+three people working at the factory); the constraints which put her in
+the factory, on the production line, etc., are ineluctable, and they reinforce one another. But these constraints derive from things only in so
+far as things become transmitters of human actions lying behind them.
+There is the multiplicity of workers and their false unity through the
+factory - that is to say, through a destiny which they have to negate
+
+32J
+and suffer together; and in any case these are not so much purely
+material constraints as exigencies in so far as a free praxis defines itself
+according to these stony voices.
+In other words, freedom, in this context, does not mean the possibility of choice, but the necessity of living these constraints in the form
+of exigencies which must be fulfilled by a praxis. The family situation
+(the illness or unemployment of some of its members) may constitute
+itself, in the practico-inert field, as the impossibility of ensuring the
+survival of all its members unless a particular woman or old man resumes work. This family situation, as such, can be described by a
+simple quantitative study, as a functional relation between, on the one
+hand, the family structure, family size and the members' chances of
+survival, and, on the other hand, the number and character of its active
+members (in a given society, at a given moment, and for a given
+branch and sector of production). Nevertheless, for the old man who
+resumes work, this situation is first manifested as a specific and quite
+specifically qualified danger (the dangers are more definite for children
+or invalids and, consequently, appear to him through his human relations and preferences), which only he, the old man, can avert (since the
+others are out of work, or sick or already employed). And, in so far as
+the danger is avoidable, its negation constitutes itself, through the particular relations of the old man with the members of his family (and
+once illnesses are manifested in behaviour or as the exis of some members of the family in the restricted field of the home) as exigency. This
+characteristic of exigency in the actual context of individual praxis, is,
+as a matter of fact, entirely useless: the collective praxis of the family
+group (eroded at the same time by an internal seriality), one might say,
+comprises in its very development the possibility of a moment in which
+it will develop through the work and action of this old man. He knows
+this, everybody knows it and, in a way, his initiative in offering himself for hire did not involve any individual decision (in the classical
+sense of the term: hesitation, weighing of arguments for and against,
+etc.). Indeed, this is precisely what characterises free individual
+praxis: when it develops as an undertaking which temporalises itself
+in the course of a life, motivations are never 'psychical' or "subjective':
+they are things and real structures in so far as these are revealed by the
+project through its concrete ends and on the basis of them. Thus there
+is normally no act of consciousness: the situation is known through the
+act which it motivates and which already negates it. But precisely
+because others are involved through things, and because their freedom
+
+328 Book I
+confronts my freedom as Other - that is to say, as a freedom-thing or
+as the freedom of a given thing - the structure of the situation is nevertheless still exigency.
+The importance of this authoritarian structure of passivity varies. It
+is negligible in the present case, but, in certain cases, it is crucial in
+that the free praxis of the individual reactualises it in constituting itself by surrendering its own sovereignty to this piece of matter -
+which, as we have seen, turns it against itself and converts it into
+inertia because of the impossibility of transcending it. But this inertia
+itself reaches praxis in so far as it is praxis: it confers its statute as a
+thing on a free activity, rather than on another thing. Similarly, if the
+exigency of a thing confronts another thing (tuberculosis slows down
+production = production demands the disappearance of tuberculosis
+this can only be through the medium of free praxis. Between these
+things, as we have seen, the praxis of Others constitutes the individual's
+activity as a mediation, that is to say, as a means (essential as a means,
+but inessential as praxis). But it constitutes it as a praxis, that is to say,
+as an activity which organises a field in the light of certain objectives.
+It is really a means, in so far as the objectives of the practical agent are
+manipulated in exteriority in such a way that they give way to other
+material objectives and that they may never be attained: thus the manual
+worker steals from himself and produces the wealth of Others at the
+expense of his own life in the very work he carries out in order to
+support his life. But all these manipulations, which make freedom into
+a curse, presuppose that the relation of men to matter and to other men
+resides above all in doing, as synthetic creative work. And the being of
+man, as inorganic passivity, comes to him in his action from the fact
+that every individual undertaking is forced by its dialectical freedom
+to interiorise a double inert materiality: number, as the material
+statute of inert exteriority which characterises human multiplicity
+(abstract quantity which is revealed only through the set of relations
+which we have examined); and worked matter, as the inert meaning of
+the worker. Number can be regarded either as the absolute abstraction
+of man or as his absolute materiality in the abstract; and it is in this
+abstraction that worked Things designate him individually (as a
+general individual in a population). But if he can reinteriorise this reciprocity of materiality as the untranscendable being of his activity, this
+is because other activities have already interiorised and re-exteriorised
+it as other. In other words, the materiality of the multiple remains
+indeterminate as long as it is not itself revealed in a practical system.
+
+329
+(Demography, for example, is necessarily the study of both an exis and
+a praxis: number appears as the product of a certain mode of production
+and of the institutions it produces, and also as the movement of production, and its exigencies produce demographic differentiations between different sectors of the population. And these conditions are
+interiorised for everyone through their individual practices - birth
+control, or the Christian prohibition of it.)
+From this point of view, for an isolated individual - that is to say,
+for every one of us, in so far as we receive and interiorise the statute of
+isolation - the consciousness of our praxis as free efficacity remains,
+through every constraint and exigency, our own constant reality in so
+far as we are the perpetual transcendence of our ends. And the individual does not recognise that it is in direct contradiction with his
+Other-Being because this untranscendable Other-Being reveals itself
+in praxis itself, either as a motivation of this praxis (in exigency or in
+value systems), or as an object of a possible transcendence. It is clear,
+in fact, that the Other-Being of the individual as the common structure
+of the collective derives its being for everyone from its untranscendability. But precisely to the extent that it is freedom which reveals untranscendability as a necessary structure of alienated objectification, it
+does so in the milieu of freedom as transcendable untranscendability.
+Indeed, for an exploited man who, in a period betore any important
+developments of proletarian organisation, became aware, through his
+own praxis as his own reality, of his fatigue, of his occupational diseases, of price rises, of the obsolescence of his trade through machinery,
+etc., as the statute which defined him in his sub-humanity, the reality he
+grasps is simply the set of his impossibilities (the impossibility of
+living humanly or, perhaps more radically, of living at all). Clearly
+this reality of his Being is precisely that of his impotence; it defines
+itself, in and through the series of exploited men, as alterity or as an
+index of separation in negative unity. But in so far as everyone perceives his own impossibility (that is to say, his inability to change or
+reorganise anything) through his praxis (which posits itself in its dialectical structure as a permanent possibility of transcending any actual
+circumstances), this impossibility inside freedom appears to him as
+temporary and relative.
+Of itself, no doubt, praxis does not occur as a concrete, material
+transcendence of impossibility towards a particular reorganisation:
+this, indeed, is what proves that the statute cannot be transcended. But
+the mere exposure of the impossibility makes it confront itself as the
+
+330 Book I
+pure, abstract, and ideal negation of every given by a transcendence
+towards an end. Confronted with the real impossibility of living
+humanly, it affirms itself in its generality as human praxis. This
+affirmation is neither more than nor other than the action itself in so far
+as it transcends the milieu in order to reproduce life: and its affirmative
+power is simply the material power of the organism striving to change
+the world. But for lack of any real objective and of real means of
+attaining the end, the praxis reveals itself as a pure negation of negation
+(or of affirmation) universally; and, to be more precise, what it immediately grasps is not its formal structure, but, in the reality which
+crushes it, the impossibility of the impossibility of man. In fact, the
+impossibility of man is given as an individual determination of life;
+but the praxis which reveals it cannot see it as its own impossibility: it
+sees it in action - which is, of itself, an affirmation of man as an impossibility which is in some way impossible. In fact, praxis, as the
+praxis of an organism which reproduces its life by reorganising the
+environment, is man - man making himself in remaking himself.
+To make oneself and to produce oneself on the basis of one's own
+possibility are one and the same thing; but it is at the level of the
+practico-inert, in the real production of man, that the impossibility of
+man reveals itself as his being. This impossibility refers to pure,
+formal transcendence as an affirmation without an object. It is impossible that this should continue; it is impossible that it should be
+unchangeable; it is impossible that there should be no way out, that I
+should continue to live like this.' Such formulas, which insist on the
+objective structure of possibilities, are very common. And there are
+also ones which refer to the subjective moment: 'I'll find a way out,
+I'll find a solution somehow'
+', etc. After all, the contradiction would be
+in danger of exploding if it opposed two homogeneous moments. But
+the individual will change his reality, he will transcend it: he will occasionally have a chance to improve his lot. Thus the untranscendable
+comes to be transcended. But it is only an appearance: he has simply
+realised his being - the very thing he cannot change - in slightly
+different circumstances; and these superficial differences make no
+difference to the Being which has been actualised. A particular worker
+leaves a factory where the working conditions are particularly bad and
+goes to work in another where they are a little better. He is merely
+defining the limits within which his statute allows a few variations
+(themselves due to general circumstances of production: manpower
+requirements, wage rises in a particular sector, etc.), but at the same
+
+331
+time he is confirming his general destiny as exploited. A rise in wages in
+a particular branch of production occurs only in the general context of
+the search for profit and it is to be explained in terms of the historical
+totalisation and of the present conjuncture. He may, therefore, vary
+the implementation of the verdict, but he cannot transcend it. Concretely, however, things are not so simple: provided he breaks his
+bonds of impotence but avoids replacing them by union, he will be
+able to acquire, in a still indefinite society, a society which remains
+indeterminate in spite of serial structurations (and because of them),
+the efficacity of an imponderable, that is to say, of a disintegrated
+individual.
+In certain circumstances, in certain historical moments and in
+certain societies, there may be real possibilities of moving from one
+class to another. And these possibilities vary from sector to sector, and
+from country to country. In the patrician Venice of the sixteenth
+century, the bourgeois had absolutely no possible access to the patrician class; elsewhere - in France, for example - they were able to
+'betray' their class and enter the noblesse de robe, and sometimes even
+slip into the noblesse d'épée.''1 Thus, at this level, an individual may
+avoid being a class individual, and may sometimes transcend his classbeing and thereby produce for all the members of the class he has left
+the possibility of individually escaping their destiny. However, in factthough it took him a great deal of intelligence, work and patience to
+transcend the common destiny - all he has done is to realise, in his
+person, one of the possibilities in the structured field of his class
+possibilities. In other words, if he moves into the petty bourgeoisie or
+gets his son to do so, he practically realises - at the same moment as
+several other individuals - a possibility (statistically determinable and
+conditioned by the whole historical process) of his class of origin: in
+the structured social field of his possibilities and impossibilities (as
+destiny), this class, at a particular moment and in definite conditions
+and sectors, is also determined by the possibility that a definite proportion of its members may move into another class (return to the
+peasant class, move into the bourgeoisie, etc.). This can be called class
+viscosity. Thus the worker who becomes a bourgeois demonstrates the
+viscosity of his class: by thus escaping the untranscendable in his
+IOI. The noblesse de robe owed their patents of nobility to administrative or
+legal posts which they or their ancestors bought. The noblesse d'épée was the old
+nobility. [Ed.]
+
+332 Book I
+quality as an atom, he helps to constitute in its reality the structured
+impossibility which produces itself as the common-class-being of his
+comrades and himself. Thus untranscendability as destiny relates to
+the free isolation of a molecular praxis when the individual lives it as an
+impossibility of remaining at one with his class; we shall see shortly that
+this same practical freedom, positing both impossibility and the impossibility of this impossibility as the common-class-being which is to
+be transcended by the class itself, will posit a new type of transcendence, namely the group. But the important point has been to show that
+this impossibility can only be revealed through practical, directed
+activities, and also that it reveals praxis to itself in the abstract as the
+sovereign affirmation of the possibility of man.
+It would be quite wrong to interpret me as saying that man is free
+in all situations, as the Stoics claimed. I mean the exact opposite: all
+men are slaves in so far as their life unfolds in the practico-inert field
+and in so far as this field is always conditioned by scarcity. In modern
+society, in effect, the alienation of the exploited and that of the exploiters are inseparable; in other societies, the relation between master
+and slave - though very different from what Hegel described - also
+presupposes a reciprocal conditioning in alienation. And the master of
+ancient times was alienated from his slaves not because they were his
+truth (though they were that too), nor because of their labour (as free
+praxis expressing itself by operating on the material environment), but
+above all because the cost of a slave tends constantly to increase whereas
+his productivity constantly tends to decrease. The practico-inert field
+is the field of our servitude, which means not ideal servitude, but real
+subservience to 'natural' forces, to 'mechanical' forces and to 'antisocial' apparatuses. This means that everyone struggles against an
+order which really and materially crushes his body and which he
+sustains and strengthens by his individual struggle against it. Everything is born at this line which simultaneously separates and unites
+huge physical forces in the world of inertia and exteriority (in so far as
+the nature and orientation of the energy transformations which characterise them give a definite statute of improbability to life in general and
+to human life in particular) and practical organisms (in so far as their
+praxis tends to confirm them within their structure of inertia, that is to
+say, in their role as convertors of energy). This is where the change
+from unification as a process to unity as an inert statute occurs; and
+where inertia, as a moment which has been transcended and preserved
+by life and practice, turns back on them so as to transcend them and
+
+333
+preserve them in the name of their dialectical unity, precisely to the
+extent that, in labour and through instrumentality, it identifies itself
+with the practical inertia of the tool.
+These transformations are wholly material; or rather, everything
+really takes place in the physico-chemical universe and the organism's
+power of assimilation and of strictly biological selection exists at the
+level of consumption. But one will never understand anything of
+human history if one fails to recognise that these transformations take
+place in a practical field inhabited by a multiplicity of agents, in so far
+as they are produced by the free actions of individuals. Serial plurality,
+as the inorganic unity of inertia, comes to this multiplicity only
+through the mediation of worked matter in so far as it transforms
+individual labours into the negative unity of counter-finality. Thus
+praxis alone, as it appears between the inert (and abstract) multiplicity
+of number and the (equally abstract) passive exteriority of the physicochemical world, is, in its dialectical freedom, the real and permanent
+foundation (in human history up to the present) of all the 'inhuman
+sentences which men have passed on men through worked matter. In
+praxis, multiplicity, scarcity, exteriority and the improbability of the
+continuation of life are interiorised and humanised as the internal
+inhumanity of the human race; through it, these same characteristics of
+the inorganic take on the practical and directed aspect of Fatum and
+their simple non-humanity becomes counter-finality or anti-humanity.
+Of course, it is possible to reverse the terms completely, and, as we
+did at a more abstract moment of the dialectical investigation, show
+worked matter in its primacy and inorganic materiality as governing
+men through it: this view is as correct, or perhaps more so, in so far
+as it refers directly from the non-organised physico-chemical world
+to the number of individuals as the inorganic materiality of the social;
+but it will remain abstract as long as the development of the investigation fails to show clearly that any relation between things, in
+so far as they mediate between men, is strictly conditioned by the
+multiple relations of human actions in so far as they mediate between
+things.
+From this point of view the problem of negation, as stated at the
+beginning of this chapter from a simple practico-inert point of view,
+is also completely explained. Our problem, in relation to the origins of
+the "iron and coal complex', was to explain how it was that the discovery of techniques, which made the exploitation of fabulous wealth
+possible, took the form of a negation for most members of a nation (the
+
+334 Book I
+gradual elimination of the English peasantry by expropriation and
+proletarianisation). We were acquainted with the historical explanation
+and it appeared obvious, provided it was based on an intelligible
+structure of the practico-inert field; that is to say, provided we could
+see its dialectical skeleton as matter constituting itself as the practicoinert negation of the praxis which works it and uses it in the context of
+multiplicity. We more or less know this much: that free praxis is the
+negation of every particular given, in the course of a particular action,
+and that it negates matter in so far as it reorganises it in its passive
+being in terms of a future objective originating in the satisfaction of
+needs. In fact, it is neither the presence nor the possible instrumentality
+of matter which is negated by the project, but simply its 'co-efficient of
+adversity', in so far as inertia presents it as a factual impossibility. And
+in its first moment, that is to say in its elementary structure, negation
+is a practical, univocal relation of interiority which man derives from
+matter through the need which explains it, and which matter derives
+from men in so far as the present material state (and not materiality) is
+always what has already been transcended. Thus in the practical field
+of man, as an individual worker, there appear tools which he himself
+made, or acquired in exchange for his labour, and these material tools
+are a practical, solidified negation, which is borne by matter and which
+refers to certain states of materiality in their passivity (that is to say,
+adversities, or counter-finalities). Thus, from the tool as a solidified
+product of past labour and a solidified inscription of future labour, to
+the Thing (which might itself be a too! - for example, one which needs
+to be mended), a negative signification establishes itself as solidified passivity. The future comes to objects through the tool, as a necessity that
+some material combinations should be realised and that others should
+disappear. In fact, it comes through freedom to the practical field in so
+far as it is already unified by need. But the negative structure as a relation of the worked object to nature and of tools among themselves
+nonetheless appears, in the field of scarcity, as a definite intra-material
+tension. Destruction, and destructability as a negation of man's
+materiality and of his goods, come to matter through man; they are
+designated and negated (wholly or partly) by the presence of the human
+tool. It is obvious that the tool has some positive, creative function, and
+that it is this function which initially characterises it.
+In the next chapter we shall see the positive aspect of praxis: at
+present what interests us is that, even in productive labour, tools are
+the inert as a negation of the inert (combined with the permanent possi-
+
+335
+bility of the organism acting in exteriority by becoming the tool of its
+too!). It is at this level that the matter to be worked, as passive resistance,
+makes itself a negation of man in so far as man negates the existing
+state of affairs; fatigue is being in so far as it is distinct from knowledge
+and from praxis, in so far as its inert capacity can be reduced only
+through an expenditure of energy. It is the inertia of exteriority interiorised in the organism in so far as organic praxis exteriorises itself as
+the seal applied to the product. Negation is there in these fundamental
+relations of need and labour and in so far as, in the practical feld, they
+constitute materiality as the negation of its own passivity as much as of
+human activity. It comes to matter in praxis and, through the development of this praxis, it turns back against the individual in so far as it
+becomes a double negation solidified by inertia (the ambivalence of
+the tool). It is obvious, however, that the relation between two human
+activities is of itself indeterminate, as long as we have not defined the
+material conditions on the basis of which it arises. It is not true that
+each must aim at the death of the other'102 - or his life, for that matter.
+Material circumstances as a whole (the set of tools and goods in the
+context of scarcity) settle it. In a word, if some free praxis becomes the
+negation of another praxis, this negation, which comes to them as a
+reciprocity of antagonism, produces itself in everyone as primary
+inertia, because it is the interiorisation of an exterior negation. It is in
+this sense that there was competitive antagonism between workers on
+the labour market, at the beginning of the century, even before they
+had made it a moment of practice or rejected it in the name of unity of
+action. Thus, praxis as a fundamental relation of man to the environment structures the practical field as a set of inert, intra-material relations of negation. Negation as a force of inertia is a human inscription
+in the inorganic world. And the multiplicity of activities is constituted
+in its being as a multiplicity of negative relations (antagonisms) because every praxis re-actualises for the Other, with all its signifying
+power, the inert negation of a particular part of the field by the Other
+in so far as this negation refers to the statute which makes one man the
+inert negation of an Other (in definite conditions and in a determinate
+form). Indeed, it might be said that negation comes to inert matter from
+individual labour and that negations come to men through worked
+matter as the matrix and receptacle of all passive negativity, through
+the inert numerical statute of their multiplicity. In counter-finalities,
+I02. Phenomenology of Mind, trans. Baillie, p. 233. [Ed.]
+
+336 Book I
+praxis inscribes itself in inertia and inertia returns as inverted praxis to
+dominate the very group which has objectified itself in this worked
+matter. Thus not only do individuals and groups receive their statute in
+inertia through matter-negation, in this inversion of action and passivisation; in addition, this very matter, in the development of dispersed
+actions, becomes their unity as the pure negation in everyone as Other
+both of himself and of all Others, in the name of an alterity which
+might, purely metaphorically, be called the perspective of the inor ganic
+on man.
+These few observations enable us to elucidate one final point. We
+have claimed, in effect, that everyone has the practico-inert experience
+in his work and in his public life (and, to a lesser degree, in his private
+life) and that it is, in fact, characteristic of our everyday life. We also
+saw that it remained abstract because this inert bond of sociality does
+not explain the group, as an organised plurality, but that the universe
+of passive-activity was still, for particular individuals (depending on
+their function, their class, etc.) a field which they could not leave. Yet,
+at the same time, we saw that everyone's free praxis remained his
+translucid experience of himself, not in so far as it was the Other but
+in so far as it was produced by dialectical praxis - in the regulated
+change which it produces - as the same as itself (or as 'changing so as
+to remain the same'). It seems therefore that, for all of us, there are two
+contradictory experiences. In other words, although the critique of
+dialectical Reason can and must constitute the second as a negation of
+the first, but as deriving its intelligibility from it, in everyday reality
+our remarks might imply that the practico-inert field is not a synthetic
+blossoming and a reunification of the fundamental abstraction and its
+contradiction. Something is negated in misfortune; which means that
+negation itself is diverted and that all activities lose themselves in the
+practico-inert to the advantage of false, anti-human unities. How, it
+will be asked, is one to conceive of this duality of experiences, which is
+always possible for everyone? Can we just pass from the translucid
+consciousness of our activity to the grotesque or monstrous apperception of the practico-inert, according to circumstances? My answer is
+not only that we can but also that we constantly do. There can be no
+doubt that at the moment of labour, and in so far as there remains,
+even in the case of a small section of work, the simple necessity of a
+control or, in the total subservience of the individual to specialised
+machines, a need for an eye or a hand, prior to automation, the action
+still appears - at least - as an adaptation of the body to a demanding
+
+337
+situation. Similarly, if some worker agreed to work extra hard and thus
+to contribute to raising the norms, this result, from which he must
+necessarily suffer, will at first present itself to him as an almost unbearable work rhythm, which nevertheless he bears by a decision which
+anticipates the exigency of machines, that is to say, by a choice which
+may be disapproved of by his comrades. In this sense, the moment of
+freedom as unifying, translucid practice is the moment of the trap. By
+positing itself as free individual praxis, it contributes for its part, in
+itself and for all, to the realisation of the world of the Other. And this
+is precisely the practical moment in which it apprehends itself and sees
+only its reality.
+The terrible constraints which matter forces on both the factory
+worker and the agricultural worker never allow them to remain for
+long at this level of abstraction; but there is nothing to prevent a
+member of the middle class, in certain favourable circumstances, from
+fortifying himself within the consciousness of his individual praxis by
+using an interior monologue on freedom as a kind of solder. However,
+it is through the experience of alienation as necessity (that is to say, as
+the real, social being of one's being), that the practico-inert field is
+revealed. It is for this reason that simplistic Marxists have calmly
+eliminated the moment of individual praxis as an irreducible experience of the dialectic or, in other words, as dialectic realising itself in
+practical experience. They have not seen that unless the fundamental
+reality of this moment is preserved the reality of alienation will have to
+be rejected. Their only excuse - and it is a feeble one - is that the moment of necessity throws experience into the universe of alterity. From
+the moment in which impotence becomes the meaning of practical
+power, and counter-finality the deep meaning of the aim pursued,
+when praxis discovers that its freedom is the means chosen elsewhere
+to reduce it to slavery, the individual suddenly finds himself back in
+a world where free action is the fundamental mystification; he no
+longer knows it except as a reality which is negated at this stage of
+the experience, absent or forever fleeing, and as the propaganda of the
+oppressors against the oppressed. But it is important to see that this
+experience is no longer that of the action, but that of the materialised
+result; it is no longer the positive moment in which one does, but the
+negative moment in which one is produced in passivity by what the
+practico-inert ensemble makes out of what one has just made. It is the
+moment, for example, when the worker who wished to raise his own
+work norm finds that this norm has become a general exigency and,
+
+338 Book I
+thereby sees himself signified as an Other, that is to say, in this case,
+as his own enemy, as the agent of the employers and of exploitation.
+In this sense, the discovery of sociality as passive being containing
+worked matter is not a plenary experience, comparable to the individual's experience of the action of his activity as a dialectical development. It occurs as a fleeting discovery, precisely because, through
+alienation as a passive result inscribed in social (worked) matter, it is
+the discovery of sociality as series, and because this series is flight
+(normally indefinite or infinite). Similarly, when anyone discovers
+his other-Being in so far as it is constituted by the serial absence of
+Others, he can realise it only as a negative, abstract meaning whose
+content he can express in language though he cannot hold it in a
+plenary intuition. The Being of this being is that it should be elsewhere. I do not mean by this that the alienation and the Other-Being
+which are manifested in it are essentially probable beings (as given to
+experience). It may, of course, happen that the otherness of my act remains obscure and probable for me: this depends on the circumstances
+of my experience and on the type of act in question; nevertheless
+alienation is the object of a necessary discovery, in the sense that the
+passivising reflection of objectified praxis is always given as necessary,
+even though the particular meaning (signification) of the alienation may
+remain confused and blurred. This means that the experience of alienation is not an instantaneous intuition - this would be meaningless -
+but a process which temporalises itself and which the ways of the
+world' can always interrupt, either provisionally or definitively, from
+outside and within by the intervening transformation of the conditions
+of the experience. But, in the context of a shorter, uninterrupted experience, Other-Being may also manifest itself in its own content as
+necessary-being. In short, it is possible to have a precise knowledge of
+it as the necessity that a given action will actualise a particular Other-
+Being. This knowledge, however, does not realise anything: the Other-
+Being which I am is in principle incapable of living in the dialectical
+development of praxis; it is the fleeting object of consciousness rather
+than consciousness itself; an abstract and precise limit of knowledge
+rather than a concrete presence to intuition. In this sense, my everyday
+experience of the Other-Being of Others realises itself as concrete
+experience only in moments when the necessity of the discovered
+alienation and the flight of alterity incite me to pursue this Other in his
+flight to the Others, for example, to realise my alterity through the
+serial impoience of the members of the series.
+
+339
+But, this shifting, indefinite experience of the practico-inert field
+reveals the Elsewhere to me as a spatial structure of alterity, and shows
+me my Other-Being in this Elsewhere, fleeing from one to the other,
+as the Other to Others, that is to say, to reified man as Other than man,
+as well as to the worked Thing as Other than the Thing (as the antihuman being of man). This fleeting experience reveals its unity only in
+the form of common impotence as the negative cement of all the beings
+in a series or as the development to the limit (that is to say, the practical,
+abstract affirmation of a totalisation to infinity of the series by a recurrent, infinite transcendence). In this experience, which is constantly
+eluding itself, it is true that worked things come to us as men in the
+most everyday moment of life. (And the theatre has made great use, in
+melodrama, of the frightening effect produced by a door which opens
+by itself in an empty house, or - and this amounts to the same thing -
+of a door which slowly opens and which we know to conceal the
+criminal, and which becomes the door-being of the criminal, etc.) But
+this is true only in so far as man has become, for us, pure flight, in us
+and in objects - in so far as the inanimate relation of a thousand-franc
+note to some absolutely necessary article may be altered at a distance
+by the serial ensemble of serialities (an alteration of my being-outsidemyself) just as my human relation to a comrade or to a member of my
+family may be alienated everywhere, in the ensemble of series which
+constitute my class - so that there is, in the end, a unity and fusion of
+all the meanings of practico-inert objects (men, things, relations of
+things, and relations of men) to the infinity of every Elsewhere.
+In this first form, as the limit which separates praxis from passive,
+alienated activity (that is to say, from the individual of sociality)
+necessity provides its own intelligibility, that is to say, the Reason of its
+being. We have seen that it could not even appear in individual praxis
+or in human relations of reciprocity (with or without a 'third party").
+But, in the same way, nobody, except by conceiving of natural laws
+in terms of a Platonic conceptualism, can imagine that such laws are a
+priori rules which impose themselves on matter and inflexibly govern
+transformations of energy. To the extent that scientific laws rest on
+experience, which constantly returns to them and modifies them, they
+are both statistical and contingent (at least for us and at this stage). In
+fact, we can now see that necessity is a particular meaning (signification)
+which links human action to the material thing in which it objectifies
+itself, on the basis of a univocal link of interiority between the organism
+and the environment. This is the moment where, through the very
+
+340 Book L
+freedom which produces it, the Thing, transformed by other freedoms,
+presents, through its own characteristics, the objectification of the agent
+as a strictly predictable but completely unforseen alteration of the ends
+pursued. In this case, the characteristics of the object become the necessary foundation for any explanation of this alteration, because the
+action of other freedoms puts them in relief and manifests them: 'You
+should have realised that if you did this with that instrument, the result
+would be such and such, etc.' But the fixed characteristics (exigencies,
+instrumentality) of the instrument are precisely those of worked
+matter.
+Thus, as one might say, necessity is freedom as the exis of worked
+matter, or worked materiality as the freedom-exis of Others in so far
+as it is revealed within a free operation. And, from this point of view,
+we can conclude that necessity manifests itself neither in the action of
+the isolated organism, nor in the succession of physico-chemical facts:
+the reign of necessity is the domain - the real, but still abstract domain
+of History - in which inorganic materiality envelops human multiplicity and transforms the producers into its product. Necessity, as a
+limit within freedom, as blinding obviousness and as the moment of
+the inversion of praxis into practico-inert activity, becomes, once man
+has swung back into serial sociality, the very structure of all processes
+of seriality, that is to say, the modality of their absence in presence and
+of their empty obviousness. It is the shifting ensemble of unlucky
+materiality in so far as it is simultaneously affirmed and stolen away,
+for everyone and in any free act, by all free acts as Others; that is to
+say, as forging our chains. This is the only possible relation between
+practical organisms and their milieu and, through the milieu, between
+them, in so far as they have not achieved a new practical unity. It
+would be easy to show how so-called 'scientific' necessity - that is to
+say, the modality of certain chains of exact propositions - comes to
+science through practice and by it as the limit-negation, through exteriority, of the dialectic, and how it appears by means of free dialectical
+research as its real and always Other objectification. But this is not our
+present concern.
+What we must retain from all this is that the practico-inert field is
+not a new moment of some universal dialectic, but the pure and simple
+negation of several dialectics by exteriority and plurality. This negation, however, operates not by destruction or dissolution, but by
+deviation and inversion. Thus this second moment of the investigation
+(l'expérience) (but not of the dialectic) appears in itself as the anti-
+
+341
+dialectic or, in other words, as the inorganic simulacrum, in and outside man, of the dialectic as free human activity. Thus, just as the
+dialectic transcends material conditions in preserving them in its very
+negation, so materiality as the inflexible necessity of the practico-inert
+transcends everyone's free praxis, that is to say, the multiple dialectics
+in their development, so as to preserve them in it as the only means of
+setting its clumsy machinery in motion.
+We have seen that the practico-inert field, considered in general and
+a priori, cannot, by any of its contradictions, occasion the form of
+practical sociality which we are about to study, namely the group.
+Groups always constitute themselves on the basis of certain particular
+contradictions which define a particular sector of the field of passiveactivity, while one cannot have any a priori assurance that the same
+applies everywhere. When such contradictions occur, then, as we shall
+see, the dialectical praxis of the individual puts itself on trial at the heart
+of the anti-dialectic which appropriates its results, and invents itself in
+another social space as the totalisation of multiple actions in, for and by
+a totalising objective result. This new approach is both reflexive and
+constituent: each praxis as a free individual totalising dialectic places
+itself at the service of a common dialectic whose very type is modelled
+on the synthetic action of an isolated worker. Thus the original dialectics are transcended towards an other dialectic, which they constitute
+on the basis of the anti-dialectic as an impossibility which cannot be
+transcended. In this sense, we might be said to be passing here from
+the nature-dialectic, as an original relation of interiority between the
+organism and its milieu, to the culture-dialectic, as an apparatus constructed against the power of the practico-inert. In other words, individual dialectics, after having created anti-physis as the power of man
+over nature and, in the same act, anti-humanity as the power of inorganic matter over man, create their own anti-physis by unification
+so as to construct human power (that is to say, free relations amongst
+men). It is at this level and on the basis of previous conditions that men
+totalise, and totalise themselves, in order to reorganise themselves into
+the unity of a praxis: in other words, we are approaching the third and
+last moment of our investigation (expérience) - that which totalises the
+human world (that is to say, the world of men and their objects) in the
+historical undertaking. This new structure of the investigation presents
+itself as an inversion of the practico-inert field: that is to say, the nerve
+of practical unity is freedom, appearing as the necessity of necessity -
+in other words, as its inexorable inversion. Indeed, in so far as the
+
+342 Book l
+individuals in a given milieu are directly threatened, in practico-inert
+necessity, by the impossibility of life, their radical unity (in reappropriating this very impossibility for themselves as the possibility of
+dying humanly, or of the affirmation of man by his death) is the inflexible negation of this impossibility ('To live working or die fighting); thus the group constitutes itself as the radical impossibility of
+living, which threatens serial multiplicity. But this new dialectic, in
+which freedom and necessity are now one, is not a new incarnation of
+the transcendental dialectic: it is a human construction whose sole
+agents are individual men as free activities. For this reason, in order to
+distinguish it from constituent dialectics, we shall refer to it as the
+constituted dialectic.
+
+From Groups to History
+
+The group - the equivalence of freedom as necessity and of
+necessity as freedom - the scope and limits of any realist dialectic
+• The Genesis of Groups
+As we have seen, the necessity of the group is not present a priori in a
+gathering. But we have also seen that through its serial unity (in so far
+as the negative unity of the series can, as abstract negation, oppose
+seriality) the gathering furnishes the elementary conditions of the
+possibility that its members should constitute a group. But this remains
+abstract. Obviously everything would be simpler in a transcendental,
+idealist dialectic: the movement of integration by which every organism contains and dominates its inorganic pluralities would be presented as transforming itself, at the level of social plurality, into an
+integration of individuals into an organic totality. Thus the group
+would function as a hyper-organism in relation to individual organisms. This organicist idealism is often to be seen re-emerging as a
+social model of conservative thought (under the Restoration, it was
+opposed to liberal atomism; after 1860, it tried to dissolve class formations into a national solidarity). But it would be a mistake to reduce the
+organicist illusion to the role of a reactionary theory. Indeed, it is
+obvious that the organic character of the group - its biological unity -
+reveals itself as a particular moment of the investigation. As we approach the third stage of the dialectical investigation, we can describe
+the organic structure as above all the illusory, immediate appearance of
+the group as it produces itself in and against the practico-inert field.
+In two remarkable works! Marc Bloch has shown how, in and even
+I. Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, two volumes, (1939-40). English translation by
+L. A. Manyon, Routledge and Kegan Paul, I96I. [Ea.]
+
+34G Book I/
+before the twelfth century, the nobility, the bourgeoisie and the serfs -
+to mention only these three classes - existed de facto if not de jure. In
+our terminology we would describe them as collectives. But the repeated efforts of rich bourgeois, as individuals, to integrate themselves
+into the noble class caused this class to close up: it moved from a de
+facto statute to a de jure one. Through a common undertaking, it
+imposed draconian conditions on anyone wishing to enter knighthood,
+with the result that this mediating institution between the generations
+became a selective organ. But this also conditioned the class consciousness of the serfs. Prior to the juridical unification of the nobility, every
+serf had regarded his situation as an individual destiny, and lived it as
+an ensemble of human relations with a family of landowners, in other
+words, as an accident. But by positing itself for itself, the nobility ipso
+facto constituted serfdom as a juridical institution and showed the serfs
+their interchangeability, their common impotence and their common
+interests. This revelation was one of the factors of peasant revolts in
+later centuries.
+The point of this example is simply to show how, in the movement
+of History, an exploiting class, by tightening its bonds against an
+enemy and by becoming aware of itself as a unity of individuals in
+solidarity, shows the exploited classes their material being as a collective and as a point of departure for a constant effort to establish lived
+bonds of solidarity between its members. There is nothing surprising
+about this: in this inert quasi-totality, constantly swept by great movements of counter-finality, the historical collectivity, the dialectical law,
+is at work: the constitution of a group (on the basis, of course, of real,
+material conditions) as an ensemble of solidarities has the dialectical
+consequence of making it the negation of the rest of the social field,
+and, as a result, of occasioning, in this field in so far as it is defined as
+non-grouped, the conditions for an antagonistic grouping (on the basis
+of scarcity and in divided social systems).
+But the most important point here is that the non-grouped, on the
+outside, behave towards the group by positing it through their very
+praxis as an organic totality. Thus every new collective organisation can
+find its archetype in any other older one, because praxis as the unification of the practical field objectively tightens the bonds of the objectgroup. It is striking that our most elementary patterns of behaviour
+relate to external collectives as if they were organisms. The structure of
+scandal, for example, is, for everyone, that of a collective taken as a
+totality: in a theatre, everyone, in confronting each speech of a scene
+
+347
+which he finds outrageous, is in fact conditioned by the serial reaction
+of his neighbours. Scandal is the Other as the formula of a series. But
+as soon as the first manifestations of scandal have occurred (that is to
+say, the first acts of someone acting for the Others in so far as he is
+Other than himself, they create the living unity of the audience against
+the author, simply because the first protester, through his unity as an
+individual, realises this unity for everyone in transcendence (la transcendance). Moreover, it will remain a profound contradiction in everyone, because this unity is that of all the Others (including himself) as
+Others and by an Other: the protester was not revealing or expressing
+popular opinion; rather, he was expressing, in the objective unity of a
+direct action (shouts, insults, etc.), what still existed for everyone only
+as the opinion of the Others, that is to say, as their shifting, serial unity.
+But once the scandal has been reported and discussed, it becomes, in
+the eyes of those who did not witness it, a synthetic event which gave
+the audience which saw the play that night a temporary unity as an
+organism. Everything becomes clear if we situate the non-grouped who
+discover themselves to be a collective through their impotence in
+relation to the group which they reveal. To the extent that, through the
+unity of its praxis, the group determines them in their inorganic
+inertia, they conceive its ends and its unity through the free unifying
+unity of their own individual praxis and on the model of the free
+synthesis which is fundamentally the practical temporalisation of the
+organism. Indeed, in the practical field, all exterior multiplicity becomes,
+for every agent, the object of a unifying synthesis (and, as we have
+already seen, the result of this synthesis is that the serial structure of
+gatherings is concealed). But the group which I unify in the practical
+field produces itself, as a group, as already unified, that is to say, as
+structured by a unity which in principle eludes my unification and
+negates it (in so far as it is praxis relegating me to impotence). This free
+active unity which eludes me appears as the substance of a reality of
+which I myself, in my practical and perceptual field, have unified only
+its multiplicity as the pure materiality of appearance; or, to put it
+another way, I do not attribute inertia - which must constitute the real
+foundation of the group (as inertia which has been transcended and
+preserved) - to the active community; on the contrary, it is my praxis
+which, in its unificatory movement takes responsibility for it. And the
+common action, which eludes me, becomes the reality of this appearance, that is to say, the practical, synthetic substance, the totality
+controlling its parts, entelechy, life; or, at another level of perception
+
+348 Book II
+and for other groups, a Gestalt. We shall encounter this naive organicism both as an immediate relation of the individual to the group and
+as an ideal of absolute integration. But we must reject organicism in
+every form. The relation of the group, as the determination of a collective and as a perpetual threat of relapsing into a collective, to its inertia
+as a multiplicity can never in any way be assimilated to the relation of
+the organism to the inorganic substances which compose it.
+But if there is no dialectical process through which the moment of
+the anti-dialectic can become by itself a mediation between the multiple
+dialectics of the practical field and the constituted dialectic as common
+praxis, does the emergence of the group contain its own intelligibility!
+Following the same method as we have used so far, we shall now
+attempt to find in our investigation the characteristics and moments of
+a particular process of grouping from the point of view of the purely
+critical aim of determining its rationality. In our investigation we shall
+therefore have to study successively the genesis of groups, and the
+structures of their praxis - in other words, the dialectical rationality of
+collective action - and, finally, the group as passion, that is to say, in
+so far as it struggles in itself against the practical inertia by which it is
+affected.
+I will begin with two preliminary observations. First, I have claimed
+that the inert gathering with its structure of seriality is the basic type
+of sociality. But I have not meant this in a historical sense, and the term
+"fundamental' here does not imply temporal priority. Who could claim
+that collectives come before groups. No one is in a position to advance
+any hypothesis on this subject; or rather - despite the data of prehistory and ethnography - no such hypothesis has any meaning.
+Besides, the constant metamorphosis of gatherings into groups and of
+groups into gatherings would make it quite impossible to know a priori
+whether a particular gathering was a primary historical reality or
+whether it was the remains of a group which had been reabsorbed by
+the field of passivity: in either case, only the study of earlier structures
+and conditions can answer the question - if anything can. Our reason
+for positing the logical anteriority of collectives is simply that according
+to what History teaches us, groups constitute themselves as determinations and negations of collectives. In other words, they transcend
+and preserve them. Collectives, on the other hand, even when they
+result from the disintegration of active groups, preserve nothing of
+themselves as collectives, except for dead, ossified structures which
+
+349
+scarcely conceal the flight of seriality. Similarly, the group, whatever
+it may be, contains in itself its reasons for relapsing into the inert being
+of the gathering: thus the disintegration of a group, as we shall see, has
+an a priori intelligibility. But the collective - as such and apart from the
+action of the factors we are about to study - contains at most the mere
+possibility of a synthetic union of its members. Lastly, regardless of
+pre-history, the important thing here, in a history conditioned by class
+struggle, is to explain the transition of oppressed classes from the state
+of being collectives to revolutionary group praxis. This is particularly
+important because such a transition has really occurred in each
+case.
+But having mentioned class relations, I will make a second observation: that it would be premature to regard these classes as also being
+groups. In order to determine the conditions of their intelligibility, I
+shall, as with collectives, take and discuss ephemeral, superficial groups,
+which form and disintegrate rapidly, and approach the basic groups of
+society progressively.
+The upheaval which destroys the collective by the flash of a common
+praxis obviously originates in a synthetic, and therefore material,
+transformation, which occurs in the context of scarcity and of existing
+structures. For organisms whose risks and practical movement, as well
+as their suffering, reside in need, the driving-force is either danger, at
+every level of materiality (whether it be hunger, or the bankruptcy
+whose meaning is hunger, etc.), or transformations of instrumentality
+(the exigencies and scarcity of the tool replacing the scarcity of the
+immediate object of need; or the modifications of the tool, seen in their
+ascending signification, as necessary modifications of the collective). In
+other words, without the original tension of need as a relation of
+interiority with Nature, there would be no change; and, conversely,
+there is no common praxis at any level whose regressive or descending
+signification is not directly or indirectly related to this original tension.
+It must therefore be understood at the outset that the origin of any
+restructuration of a collective into a group is a complex event which
+takes place simultaneously at every level of materiality, but is transcended into organising praxis at the level of serial unity.
+But however universal the event may be, it cannot be lived as its own
+transcendence towards the unity of all, unless its universality is objective for everyone, or unless it creates in everyone a structure of unifying
+objectivity. Up to this point, in fact - in the dimension of the collective
+- the real has defined itself by its impossibility. Indeed, what is called
+
+350 Book II
+the meaning of realities is precisely the meaning of that which, in principle, is forbidden. The transformation therefore occurs when impossibility itself becomes impossible, or when the synthetic event reveals
+that the impossibility of change is an impossibility of life.? The direct
+result of this is to make the impossibility of change the very object which
+has to be transcended if life is to continue. In other words, we have
+come to a vicious circle: the group constitutes itself on the basis of a
+need or common danger and defines itself by the common objective
+which determines its common praxis. Yet neither common need, nor
+common praxis, nor common objectives can define a community unless
+it makes itself into a community by feeling individual need as common
+need, and by projecting itself, in the internal unification of a common
+integration, towards objectives which it produces as common. Without
+famine, this group would not have constituted itself: but why does it
+define itself as common struggle against common need? Why is it that,
+as sometimes happens, individuals in a given case do not quarrel over
+food like dogs? That is the same as asking how a synthesis can take
+place when the power of synthetic unity is both everywhere (in all
+individuals as a free unification of the field) and nowhere (in that it
+would be a free transcendent (transcendante) unification of the plurality
+of individual unifications). Indeed, let us not forget that the common
+object, as the unity of the multiple outside itself, is above all the producer of serial unity and that it is on the basis of this double determination that the anti-dialectical structure of the collectivity, or alterity,
+constitutes itself.
+2. Obviously it is not under a threat of mortal danger that anglers form their
+association or old ladies set up a system of swopping books: but these groups,
+which in any case respond to some very real exigencies and whose objective
+meaning relates to the total situation, are superstructures, or, in other words,
+groups which are constituted in the general, permanent regroupment activity of
+collectives (class structures, class against class, national and international organisations, etc.). From the moment that the stage of the dialectical regroupment of
+dialectics has been reached, totalising activity itself becomes a factor, a milieu and
+a reason for secondary groups. They are its living determination and therefore its
+negation; but, at the same time, they contain it entirely within themselves, and their
+dialectical conflicts take place through it and by it. In this way, as we saw in The
+Problem of Method, it is possible to study them either horizontally (and empirically) in so far as they determine themselves in a milieu in which the group
+structure is already objectively given, or vertically in so far as each of them in its
+concrete richness expresses the whole of human materiality and the whole
+historical process. Thus I need only concern myself here with the fundamental
+fact of grouping as the conquest or reconquest of the collective by praxis.
+
+35г
+But this last observation may help us. If the object really produces
+itself as the bond of alterity between the individuals of a collective,
+then the serial structure of multiplicity depends, basically, on the
+fundamental characteristics of the object itself and on its original relation with each and all. This is how the set of means of production, in so
+far as they are the property of Others, gives the proletariat an original
+structure of seriality because it produces itself as an indefinite ensemble
+of objects whose exigencies themselves reflect the demand of the
+bourgeois class as the seriality of the Other. Conversely, however, it is
+possible for the investigation to consider the common objects which
+constitute by themselves, and in the practico-inert field, an approximation to a totality (as the totalisation of the multiple by the Other
+through matter) and to try to discover whether they too must constitute the multiple in question as seriality.
+2 The Storming of the Bastille
+After 12 July 1789 the people of Paris were in a state of revolt. Their
+anger had deep causes, but as yet these had affected the people only in
+their common impotence. (Cold, hunger, etc., were all suffered either
+in resignation - serial behaviour falsely presenting itself as individual
+virtue - or in unorganised outbursts, riots, etc.). On the basis of what
+exterior circumstances were groups to be constituted! In the first place
+(in temporal order) the existence of an institutional, practical group,
+the electors of Paris, in so far as they had constituted themselves in
+accordance with royal decrees and in so far as they were in permanent
+session, in spite of, or contrary to these decrees, designated the inert
+gathering of Parisians as possessing, in the dimension of collective praxis,
+a practical reality. The electoral assembly was the active unity, as the
+being-outside-itself-in-freedom, of the inert gathering.
+But this totalisation was not enough: indeed representation consists
+in defining, by some procedure, an active group as a projection of the
+İnerrane democracies, alectisins mi pasive, serial processes Each
+elector, of course, decides how to vote as Other and through Others;
+but instead of deciding in common and as a united praxis with the
+
+352 Book II
+Others, he allows it to be defined inertly and in seriality by opinion.
+Thus an elected assembly represents the gathering as long as it has not
+met, as long as its members are the inert product of an inert alterity and
+as long as crude multiplicity, as a numerical relation between the parts,
+expresses the relations of impotence amongst collectives and power
+relations in so far as these forces are forces of inertia. But as soon as an
+assembly gets organised, as soon as it constitutes its hierarchy, and
+defines itself (by party alliances) as a definite group (characterised by
+the permanence of a majority, by a complex play around a shifting
+majority, by the complicity of all the parties against a single individual
+etc.), this real praxis (in which the passing of laws, votes of confidence,
+etc., now have only the formal aspect of the original election as an
+infinite alterity of isolations, but express numerically and symbolically
+the agreements, disagreements, alliances, etc., amongst the groups in
+the majority) presents itself both as the faithful representation of the
+gathering - which being or ganised, it cannot in any way be - and as its
+dialectical efficacity. But the very fact of penetrating the gathering with
+a false totalised unity ('Frenchmen, your government... etc.) relegates the gathering to its statute of impotence. France as a totality
+realises itself outside it through its government: as the free totalisation
+of the collective which is the nation, the government relieves individuals of the task of determining their inert sociality in a grouping. So in
+so far as class conflicts and social conflicts did not, through the struggles
+of new groups, set the gathering against the legislative body and the
+executive power, the existence of these bodies was necessarily a
+mystification which relegated the collective to inertia: powers were
+delegated through serial passivity, and the affirmation of our unity
+there, in the Council, condemned us in all cases to infinite alterity.
+In this sense, those 'electors of Paris' were not necessarily a factor of
+practical unification, indeed, they probably feared the violence of the
+people even more than that of the government. However, provided that
+circumstances indicate a unification elsewhere, they can become a
+representation, but this time as a unity which is to be reintegrated as a
+unifying praxis in the gathering itself and as a negation of impotence.
+The government constituted Paris as a totality from outside. As
+3. I am not considering the problem at the real historical level and there is no
+need at present to know whether the government is an organ of the dominant
+class. I am merely discussing its formal relation as a representing praxis with the
+'represented' gathering.
+
+35 з
+early as 8 July, Mirabeau had reported to the National Assembly (and
+his speech immediately became known to the Parisians) that 35,000
+men were divided between Paris and Versailles, and that 20,000 more
+were expected. And Louis XVI answered the deputies thus: 'I have to
+use my power to restore and maintain order in the capital. ... These
+are my reasons for assembling troops around Paris.' And on the morning of Sunday I2 July, the city was full of posters 'by order of the king'
+announcing that the concentration of troops around Paris was intended
+to protect the city against bandits. Through these notices the city was
+designated for and within itself. Thus the place, as the practico-inert
+tension and exis of the Parisian gathering, was constituted by an
+exterior praxis and organised as a totality. And this totality as an object
+of praxis (the city to be besieged, disturbances to be prevented) was by
+itself a determination of the practico-inert field; the city was both the
+place, in its totalised and totalising configuration (the threat of siege
+determining it as a container) and the population designated in the
+form of materiality sealed by the military action which produced it as a
+confined crowd. The rumours, the posters, the news (especially that of
+Necker's departure) communicated their common designation to
+everyone: each was a particle of sealed materiality. At this level, the
+totality of encirclement can be described as being lived in seriality. It
+was what is known as enthusiasm: people were running in the streets,
+shouting, forming gatherings, and burning down the gates of the toll
+houses. The bond between individuals was, in its various real forms,
+that of alterity as the immediate discovery of oneself in the Other.
+Imitation - which I have described elsewhere - is one manifestation
+of this alterity of quasi-reciprocity. This structure of alterity constitutes
+itself through the action of common fate as a totality? (that is to say, as
+the practical objective of the royal armies! - in this case it is a totality
+of destruction, in so far as individuals were designated by their identical
+4. Destiny as a common danger to the working class (in its structure of
+seriality) is not totalising because the class is not the object of one organised,
+totalising undertaking: exploitation is a process which occurs both as the deliberate practice of a particular group and through the dispersal of group antagonisms.
+5. Furthermore, the government does not seem to have had any very precise
+plans. It did not really know either what it wanted or what lay in its power. But
+this is not the important point: the deployment of troops and the beginning of the
+encirclement bore their objective meaning in themselves, that is to say, they
+designated the Parisian population as the unique object of a systematic and synthetic extermination campaign. It is pointless to say that no one at court wanted
+there to be any killing: it became, of itself and in the relation between the general
+
+354 Book I/
+membership of the same city) on the basis of seriality as inert flight. By
+threatening to destroy seriality through the negative order of a massacre,
+the troops, as practical unities, provided the totality, which was experienced by everyone as a negation, or a possible negation, of seriality.
+This was how, through the coexistence of the two structures, the one
+being the possible and future negation of the other (and at the same
+time the negation of all in everyone), everyone continued to see himself in the Other, but saw himself there as himself, that is to say, in
+this case, as a totalisation in himself of the Parisian population, by the
+sabre blow or the rifle shot which would kill him. And this situation
+established what is sometimes, and improperly, called contagion or
+imitation, etc.: in this behaviour everyone sees his own future in the
+Other and, on that basis, discovers his present action in that of the
+Other; but, in these still inert movements, imitation is also selfdiscovery through doing one's own action over there in the Other, and
+through doing the action of the Other here, in oneself, fleeing one's
+own flight and that of the Other,' launching a single attack both
+through the Other and with one's own fists, without either understanding or agreement (it is exactly the opposite of an understanding),
+but realising and living alterity on the basis of the synthetic unity of an
+organised, future totalisation of the gathering by an outside group.
+This was followed by some incidents in Paris itself, at the barricades
+and in the Tuileries Gardens, between military detachments and
+imitation gatherings (rassemblements d'imitation). These resulted in a
+new wave of serial, defensive violence, and arsenals were looted. This
+revolutionary response to a constantly deteriorating situation has of
+course the historical significance of an organised common action. But
+that is just what it was not. It was a collective action: everyone was
+forced to arm himself by others' attempts to find arms, and everyone
+tried to get there before the Others because, in the context of this new
+scarcity, everyone's attempt to get a rifle became for the Others the
+risk of remaining unarmed. At the same time, this response was constituted by relations of imitation and contagion, everyone finding himfunction of an army and this particular situation, an immediate possibility which
+no longer actually depended on the intentions of the leaders.
+6. A person runs when he sees someone running: this is not because he learns
+what he must do: he discovers what he is actually doing. And, of course, he discovers it only by doing it. We encounter the same law in the group relation but
+with exactly the opposite meaning.
+
+355
+self in the Other in the very way he followed in his footsteps. These
+violent, efficacious gatherings, however, were entirely inorganic. Certain unities were lost or rediscovered, but this had no effect on what one
+might-like Durkheim but in a quite different sense - call the 'mechanical solidarity' of their members. Besides, there was an imminent
+danger that they would fight among themselves (the collective breaking
+down into reciprocities of antagonism) over the possession of a rifle. If
+the meaning of this passive activity is revolutionary, this is mainly
+because, as a result of an exterior praxis, the unity of impotence
+(inertia) had, by sheer weight of numbers, transformed itself into a massive force. For this crowd, which within itself was still structured in
+alterity, found, in its very disorganisation, an irresistible mechanical
+force for destroying sporadic resistance at the arsenals.
+But the other factor - which was soon to create the revolutionary
+praxis of a group - was that the individual act of arming oneself, in so
+far as it was in itself a complex process whose aim, for every individual,
+was the defence of his own life, but whose motive force was seriality,
+was reflected, both of itself and in its result, as a double signification of
+freedom. In so far as everyone wanted to defend himself against the
+dragoons - in other words, to the extent that the government was
+attempting a politics of force and that this attempt at organised practice
+determined the entire field as practice - both as what might help this
+policy and as what might oppose it - the result, in the field of praxis, was
+that the people of Paris armed themselves against the king. In other
+words, the political praxis of the government alienated the passive
+reactions of seriality to its own practical freedom: indeed, from the
+point of view of this praxis, the passive activity of the gathering was
+taken from it in its passivity and inert seriality reappeared on the other
+side of the process of alterity as a united group which had performed a
+concerted action. This applies not only to the army leaders, who were
+well aware of it, but also to the Parisian population, which re-interiorised this knowledge as a structure of unity. Here again, their unity was
+elsewhere, that is, it was both past and future. It was past in that the
+group had performed an action and that the collective had recognised
+this action with surprise as a moment of its own passive activity: it
+had been a group - and this group defined itself by a revolutionary
+action which made the process irreversible. And it was future in that
+the weapons themselves, in so far as they had been taken for the sake
+of opposing concerted action by soldiers, suggested in their very
+materiality the possibility of concerted resistance.
+
+356 Book II
+The uneasiness of the electors was to create institutional groups
+inside gatherings, as negative unities. They actually decided to reestablish a militia of 48,000 citizens to be provided by the various
+districts. The avowed aim was to avoid disturbances. In this new
+moment, the future militia appeared both as raised from the gathering
+and as designed to fight it, whereas most of the population had no fear
+of 'disturbances' and, quite rightly, saw no real danger except in the
+deployment of troops around the capital. In so far as the districts did
+seriously try to form militias, these groups in formation, unlike the
+representative groups, helped to unify the gatherings. 'Representation'
+in fact, presented itself as the gathering itself in the dimension of
+organised praxis and therefore, as we have seen, tended to maintain it
+in its inertia. The militia, on the other hand, was an organised body
+designed to bring about the practical negation of the gathering: it
+would prevent public assemblies and disarm the citizens. In this way,
+it helped the gathering to perceive its reality as an organised being. For
+it had to forcibly prevent the development of the organised being
+which armed itself yesterday and which would defend itself tomorrow. Or,
+to express it differently, these pre-fabricated groups were anti-groups
+which appeared to the gathering as having the task of keeping it in its
+structure of serial impotence. Through them, something was manifested as that which was negated, and had to be prevented and every
+member of the gathering, in so far as he was imperatively designated in
+his inertia,? saw profound unity both as an absence beneath seriality
+and as a fundamental possibility. At the same time, the militia, as prefabricated groups, themselves represented, though negatively, a
+synthetic determination of the gathering. And the fact that they had
+been defined within the gathering externally, by institutional or semiinstitutional organs, manifested itself - in so far as it was a negated
+negation - as what had to be destroyed by means of a unification produced internally by the gathering itself. The violent contradiction
+between the militia and the people, occurring within the people,
+produced the possibility of an internal unity as the negation of the
+external unity. In so far as the militia was still a seal applied to a multiplicity, it could contradict and dissolve itself only in a free organisation.
+district withour delerson found with riles, etc., shall take them to his own
+'... Citizens are warned not to form assemblies' (Decree of the General
+Assembly, 13 July.)
+
+35]
+Freedom - as a simple positive determination of praxis organised on
+the basis of its real objectives (defence against the troops of the Prince
+de Lambesc) - was manifested as the necessity of dissolving necessity.
+On this basis, a dialectic established itself at the Hôtel de Ville between
+the constituted authorities, which did not wish to hand out weapons,
+and which equivocated and found pretexts, and the crowd, which was
+increasingly threatening, and which, through the behaviour of the
+electors, of the provost of merchants, etc., revealed itself as a unity-exis.
+When rags were found in the boxes of arms promised by Flesselles, the
+crowd felt that it had been tricked - in other words, it interiorised
+Flesselles' actions and saw them, not in seriality, but in opposition to
+seriality as a sort of passive synthesis. The process of trickery, in fact,
+belongs in the context of an antagonistic relation of reciprocity. In
+tricking the crowd,® Flesselles gave a sort of personal unity to the flight
+into alterity; and this personal unity was a necessary characteristic of
+the anger which expressed and, for the gathering itself, revealed it.
+Everyone reacted in a new way: not as an individual, nor as an Other,
+but as an individual incarnation of the common person. There was
+nothing magical in this new reaction: it merely expressed the reinteriorisation of a reciprocity.
+From this moment on, there is something which is neither group nor
+series, but what Malraux, in Days of Hope, 8a called the Apocalypse -
+that is to say, the dissolution of the series into a fused group. And this
+group, though still unstructured, that is to say, entirely amorphous, is
+characterised by being the direct opposite of alterity. In a serial relation,
+in fact, unity as the formula (Raison) of the series is always elsewhere,
+whereas in the Apocalypse, though seriality still exists at least as a
+process which is about to disappear, and although it always may reappear, synthetic unity is always here. Or, to put the same point in
+another way, throughout a city, at every moment, in each partial
+process, the part is entirely involved and the movement of the city is
+fulfilled and signified in it. 'By evening,' wrote Montjoye, 'Paris was a
+new city. Regular cannon shots reminded the people to be on their
+guard. And added to the noise of the cannon there were bells sounding
+a continuous alarm. The sixty churches where the residents had
+8. It appears that he had acted in good faith, but this is not very important. It
+is not that the crowd thought it was being duped: but that it was.
+8a. André Malraux, L'Espoir, Paris, 1937, translated as Days of Hope, London,
+1938.
+
+358 Book II
+gathered were overflowing with people. Everyone there was an
+orator'9
+The city was a fused group. We shall soon see how this differs from
+seriality. But first we must make it clear that it would congeal into a
+collective if it were not structured in a temporal development, the
+speed and duration of which obviously depend on the circumstances
+and situation. A fused group is in fact still a series, negating itself in
+re-interiorising exterior negations; in other words, in this moment
+there is no distinction between the positive itself (the group in formation) and this self-negating negation (the series in dissolution). It can
+be shown that the initial structuration (in so far as it comes from the
+group itself) affected one district, as a part of a fluid whole, with its
+practico-inert structure. The Saint-Antoine district had always lived in
+the shadow of the Bastille: that black fortress was a threat, not so much
+because it was a prison as because of its cannons. It was the symbol of
+repressive power, as the boundary of a poverty-stricken and unsettled
+district. Moreover, skirmishes and repressed uprisings - in particular
+the bloody repression in April (the Réveillon affair) - had remained
+inside the gathering itself as an exis (a collective memory was passing
+into the common structure - a point to which we shall have to return).
+For the moment, I am not even taking into account the explosiveness which this exis might derive from the energy released by the
+dissolution of bonds of impotence. The important point as far as the
+genesis of an active group is concerned, is that this exis actually structured a route; it was primarily a hodological determination of the lived
+space of the district. And this route was negative: it was the opportunity for troops to enter the district by coming from the west and the
+north-west in order to massacre people there (as in April). 1° In other
+words, the practico-inert unity of the field was determined at the
+9. In L'ami du Roi, third edition, p. 70.
+Io. The Réveillon affair also proves that the different districts were opposed
+and already limited by a certain social tension, that is to say, by class conflicts. It
+was the practice of Réveillon, one of the precursors of the nineteenth-century
+French industrialists - a tough, rapacious, and arrogant man - that provoked
+disturbances among the workers. Conversely, newspapers owned by "middle"
+bourgeois like Hardy show that the military isolation of the district (always
+liable to be cut off from the others and subjected to looting or massacre) was based
+on social isolation: "The Parisians,' wrote Hardy, 'are frightened of some kind of
+popular insurrection, even to the point of shutting their shops in some areas...
+A considerable portion of the so-called workers of this suburb, stirred up by
+bandits against a very rich manufacturer of furniture paper, named Réveillon ..?
+
+359
+moment in which seriality was in the process of dissolution, as the
+possible act of penetration by the Other, that is to say, by free hostile
+organisation. At the same time, this possibility actualised the threat of
+the Bastille: it was the possibility that the district's inhabitants would
+be caught in the cross-fire. And this possibility refers back to its
+fundamental social separation (which I have mentioned in the last
+footnote), which was also its negative unity. Of course, all this was
+still merely lived in anxiety during the first few days of July. But as
+soon as the news of the intervention of the troops at the Tuileries
+arrived in Saint-Antoine, it actualised the possibility of a special
+massacre in the district. In fact, the news, reported by Others and
+The configuration of the place was a perfect expression of the social condition of
+its inhabitants. However, the district was not constituted solely of the poor, for
+the structures of a great industrial city did not yet exist. But the workers (in so far
+as they were working in the first factories, and had therefore been uprooted from
+the craftsman class by the new conditions) were much more numerous there than
+elsewhere and, generally speaking, most of the residents belonged to the less
+fortunate classes. It should also be noted that the Réveillon riots are cases of
+serial violence. At the beginning, there was not even any violence and workers
+could be seen crossing Paris in companies of five or six hundred men. In these
+regiments of hunger, unity as a negative determination of the whole could already
+be detected. But at the same time they were still gatherings of inertia: there was
+no structuration (no differentiation of functions), and no common action. For the
+individual troop, the procession of workers involved neither some particular
+action, nor a determination of plurality as such: two hundred more or less would
+not make any difference. Their number was pure exteriority and was not defined
+by the group in accordance with its praxis, and it therefore remained in a state of
+absolute materiality: pure quantity. Naturally, the unity of the gathering on the
+march, in so far as it was its real reason, was seriality. Even if, from the depths of
+the initial and contagional march, negative unity as a future totality was already
+occasioning being-together (être-ensemble) (that is to say, everyone's non-serial
+relation to the group as a milieu of freedom) as a possibility which was perceived
+in seriality and which presented itself as the negation of seriality, the objective of
+the march was still indeterminate: it appeared both as seriality itself as a reaction
+to the situation, and as an equally serial attempt at display. Everyone agreed that
+these groups were perfectly peaceful and that they never resorted to violence; yet
+everyöne carried a stick. The Other (the petty bourgeois who was made a comprehensive witness by this passive activity) was presented with the contradictory
+character of the condition of the working-class: when he saw the gathering go
+past, he could see both their poverty and their strength. But this strength, which
+still derived from their number, and this poverty (whose characteristic of repetition in identity, or alterity, will strike the Other), consequently make the
+gathering on the march, in its practico-inert structure, at best a sort of serial
+exploitation of seriality.
+
+360 Book I|
+believed in so far as it was Other, had to be perceived, in the practicoinert, as the truth of the district as Other, that is to say, in so far as it
+presented itself through Others as an other event, affecting Others.
+But this very alterity was a sign: this clash in the middle of Paris was
+simply a determination to take repression to extremes in so far as it was
+a sign - that is to say, as the first action in the district least exposed to
+this kind of action. Thus the real (but future) meaning (signification) of
+the Tuileries affair was the destruction of the Quartier Saint-Antoine,
+defined by the recent schemata of the Réveillon affair. Or, to be more
+accurate from the serial point of view, the Quartier Saint-Antoine was
+exterminated in the future by the Prince de Lambesc.
+Of course, what we encounter here is, once again, the designation of
+the district by things and by its topographical configuration, as these
+would be used in the organised action of an exterior enemy, as the
+particularisation of a general development. However, there is a considerable difference. In so far as things, in this case, presented themselves as destiny (as instruments of the organised action which was
+going to destroy the district) and in so far as the individuals in the
+gathering were obliged to negate them as such, they defined themselves for everyone within this negation - violent, but still purely
+subjective (passionnelle) - as an instrumentality capable of being turned
+against the Others by a free, organised praxis. This means that their
+instrumentality for the enemy, once negated, revealed itself as a
+counter-finality for the enemy. But this counter-finality, as a pure
+abstract possibility, required a free, common organisation in order to
+be actualised and developed. From the point of view of this still
+unactualised aspect of destiny, organised by the Other and negated,
+what is new in relation to the characteristics already discussed is that
+the practico-inert structure of the district, as a negated destiny, realises
+synthetically, and as a material exigency (which only practical freedom
+can bring out) an objective relation of differentiation within the fused
+group. In other words, the practico-inert structure not only makes the
+fused group, through everyone, the unity of all, but also makes it a
+structured unity; materially and in inertia it suggests an initial differentiation of functions, a division of labour; that is to say, it presents
+everyone with the condition necessary for preventing the fused group
+from relapsing into a gathering. In fact, suffered destiny shows us the
+gathering caught in cross-fire, that is to say, subjected to the combined
+action of the two forces of extermination situated at either end of the
+district. Turned back into negativity, it points to the unity of this
+
+362
+interiorised duality as a double movement of struggle within the unity of
+an organisation defined in its practice both by theplace as passive activity
+and by hostile organisation in so far as it is negated. Armed men would
+be needed to defend the district against the royal troops, and others to
+defend it against the Bastille. And the Bastille, in turn, in the context of
+scarcity, revealed the primary exigency of common freedom: if the
+district was to be defended against the soldiers, they would have to get
+some arms; there were not enough in the district, but there were plenty
+in the Bastille. The Bastille became the common interest in so far as it
+both could be and had to be not only disarmed, but also made a source of
+supply of arms, and, perhaps, be turned against the enemies from the
+west - all in a single action. The urgency then was due to scarcity of
+time: the enemy was not there but he might arrive at any minute. The
+task defined itself for everyone as the pressing revelation of a frightening common freedom. Naturally, the action itself had its own weight,
+its schemes and even a model derived from the past: it appeared
+through the ambivalence of the relations between the Parisian population and the constituted bodies. The practice of the crowd in front of
+the Hôtel de Ville during the past few days had been partly solicitous
+and partly threatening, and, to this extent, the objective to be attained
+(getting arms wherever they could be found) defined itself through a
+predetermined operation. Yet the social structure of the group in
+formation (and the character of the repression it had already suffered),
+in addition to that of the hostile group (soldiers, some of them
+foreigners, and commanded by a noble officer) helped to give the
+operation a more uncertain character; that is to say, these two structures, in their synthetic relation, defined a limited field of possibilities
+in which the explosion of the still passivised attitude (demandexigency) and the appearance of organised action as violence appeared
+as the probable future of the ambivalent task.
+This example shows a group being constituted by the liquidation of
+an inert seriality under the pressure of definite material circumstances,
+in so far as particular practico-inert structures of the environment were
+synthetically united to designate it, that is to say, in so far as its practice
+was inscribed in things as an inert idea. But in order that the city or
+section should become totalising totalities - when, in other circumstances, the same realities might be lived as. 'collectives' - they had to
+be constituted as such by the external action of another organised
+group. The population would constitute itself as a defensive organisation in so far as it was threatened through things by an organisation
+
+362 Book II
+which aimed at its negative totalisation (through annihilation). Should
+we therefore say that groups in the process of constitution are determined as the liquidation of a serial structure in so far as this selfdetermination is conditioned by the transcendent (transcendante) action
+of one or more already constituted groups? The answer is both yes
+and no. The proposition is true - it conforms to practical experience -
+in so far as it suggests a sort of serial conditioning of groups in the
+domain of the Other. And as we shall see, the moment of this infinite
+conditioning does exist. Of course, very often - as in the example we
+have been discussing - a collective derives its possibilities of selfdetermination into a group from its antagonistic relations with an
+already constituted group or with a person representing this group.
+Nevertheless, the unity of self-determination through all the relations
+described comes to the collective through the Other in alterity as an
+other structure (structure autre) of the gathering, and as needing to be
+realised by self-determination. In fact, it was not the intention of the
+two reciprocal actions to constitute a group; the objective was always
+other and the antagonism was based on the conflict of needs, interests,
+etc. Thus the developing group is not constituted intentionally by the
+praxis of the Other and it is led to self-determination through this practice
+(which may, for example, be one of extermination) and through reorganisation of the environment by the Other, in so far as the unity of the other
+praxis conditions it as the negation of its own unity (or as totalisation
+through systematic destruction). In this sense, though the unity of the
+group is its own product and is always here, wherever its members act at
+least abstractly and in theory), it is also characterised by a structure of
+flight, since the induction (l'occasion inductive) proceeds from the outside
+inwards without being either necessarily or generally desired by other
+groups.
+But the structure of seriality, as one of the relations between groups,
+should not detain us any longer. It was only necessary to observe that
+synthetic self-determination is frequently the practical reinteriorisation,
+as the negation of the negation, of the unity constituted by the other
+praxis. The reason for using the example of the Fourteenth of July is
+that it shows how a new regroupment dissolves a habitual seriality into
+the homogeneity of a fused city: the constituted reality had ceased to
+exist long ago and for a time the violence of the danger and the pressure
+(what Jaurès called a historical fever) overcame social heterogeneities.
+Nothing had been foreseen which might constitute the unity of the city
+(except as a feudal 'good city'), no organ of unification, no instrument
+
+363
+had been left at the disposal of the future group. On the contrary, it was
+intended to prevent it from existing as such. The Versailles Assembly
+had to be put at the mercy of the aristocracy by being isolated from the
+city. But the very precautions taken against the possible unity became
+a future of projected and shunned unity for the gathering, and therefore
+a negative ferment. Unity proceeded from one to another as an
+alienation of necessity to freedom, that is to say, as Other than the
+enemy's project and as an other result (resultat autre) of his praxis. This
+type of group (a homogeneity of fusion) produces itself as its own idea
+(we shall see what this means later): it is (by totalising extension) the
+sovereign nation.
+In this conception of a fused totality, combined with the old conception
+of electoral assemblies (parasites of the electoral body as a practico-inert
+thing), we will find the crigin of the contradictions which split the
+ideology of the Constituent Assembly and, particularly, of its theoretician Sieyès. But we might have explained the formation of other groups
+by self-determination, no longer as negatively defined by a praxis
+which, from the outside, makes them the antagonists of certain Other
+groups, but as induced to determine themselves by the marginal
+existence of a multiplicity of organised groups, whether institutional or
+not, as determinations of the practico-inert field by a common action.
+In this sense every group to constitute itself is singled out as a group
+through seriality by the synthetic relations amongst other groups, even
+if these relations do not affect it directly. Of course a group will constitute itself only on the basis of specific circumstances, directly or
+indirectly connected with the life or death of organisms. But the
+practical movement of organisation, in so far as it transcends its conditions towards its objectives, actualises an external determination, which
+the gathering has already interiorised as a fantom possibility of producing itself in the field of freedom.
+3
+The Third Party and the Group
+Thus groups usually come to gatherings from groups; they may also
+arise within a larger group, as the recapture of unity in a partial or
+generalised petrification. However, it should be observed that worked
+matter, in so far as it mediates between the most varied activities
+(individual, collective, or common), may spontaneously present itself
+
+364 Book!!
+in the practico-inert field as a counter-finality, with the appearances of
+a negative totalisation of human multiplicity, although no concerted
+praxis presided over the configuration. In this way, it defines the place
+and time of self-determination negatively and in multiplicity. In fact, it
+almost always happens like this, at least in part; for example, the
+characteristics of materiality (as topographical configuration, as
+sociality of inertia, as transcended past or as exis) did, as we have seen,
+amplify and divert the vacillating, dangerous policy of the government
+(that is to say, they gave a character of brutal force to what in reality
+could only be a policy of weakness - even if the objective was violent
+oppression). In other words, it is always possible for materiality, as a
+worked Thing, to posit itself as essential through the inessentiality of
+separated men, and, in the seriality of inert-men, to constitute an imperceptible and omnipresent structure of free practical unity. Basically
+this means that scarcity itself, as a tension of the polyvalent practical
+field, at the same time as constituting man as the other species, determines, in the same field, an undifferentiated (valid for any kind of
+grouping) possibility of unifying synthesis. And, from this point of
+view, we encounter what we found before: there is one level of reality
+at which unity comes to the group through groups as the interiorisation
+of a practical process of revelation and of the serial unity of multiplicities of groupings; and there is another level at which the unity of the
+group is reflected to the gathering on the basis of the inert unity (or
+passive synthesis) of worked matter, that is to say, the level at which
+the unity of the individual praxis, joined with other unities in the object,
+is reinteriorised by the gathering as a possible structure of common
+unity. Of course, this possibility of the designation-exigency of a group
+by worked matter arises in specific conditions (which may, in turn,
+require the marginal co-existence of other groups). In other words, the
+historical problem of the priority of the group over the gathering (or of
+the gathering over the group) is, in this context, a metaphysical problem, devoid of meaning.
+In fact, however, this is not the real problem. And, in order to
+determine whether the transition from a gathering to a group possesses
+a dialectical intelligibility, it is not necessary to know whether the
+group derives its unity of self-determination as its own possibility from
+the practico-inert synthesis as a conducting medium for other common
+actions, or as providing in itself a model of a practico-inert community
+of action on the basis of the dispersal of the individuals who transform
+it. We have established that a group only arises if it is designated
+
+365
+through the field of passive activity. But this designation is received by
+a gathering, which can receive it only in seriality (that is to say, in the
+flight of the Other Elsewhere). The real problem of structural intelligibility, therefore, is this: what are the conditions for a series, on the
+basis of given circumstances, to actualise a structure of practical unity
+which, though really determining it, as a material meaning (signification) (or the unitary praxis of a group), must in principle elude it, in
+so far as milieux of seriality are structured so that they can refract unity
+only in the infinite flight of the facets of recurrence, as the absolute
+Elsewhere, that is to say, as the Other or as a series totalised in the
+abstract, by a passage to the limit? It is not enough that unity is possible: it is also necessary that the instruments for wresting it from
+recurrence should be present in the collective itself. And this is the
+second, and more important, point which we must examine.
+As we have seen in relation to class, it is possible for unity, as an
+empty, formal totality which negates identity, to enter, under certain
+conditions, into contradiction with the seriality of impotence. We are
+not talking about concepts here, and it must not be supposed that the
+concept of unity will, through its opposition to the concept of alterity,
+develop from being abstract and negative into a concrete notion of
+positive unification. This simply means that the exis of serial unity is
+lived through multiple relations of reciprocity (comradeship of labour,
+bonds in the residential collective, the close links of small groups which
+are themselves thrown into seriality, families, societies, etc.), which
+tend through their own free development to produce it as a synthetic
+foundation of all concrete relations (labour, belonging to the same
+class, etc., form the basis of friendships; in this way, the unitary basis
+arises in these relations as the mirage of a free foundation for all choices).
+But, at the same time, confronted by Destiny and the Exigencies of the
+practico-inert field, the same unity as a serial structure of alterity is
+revealed as fundamental impotence (assuming we can ignore synthetic
+organisations) and reciprocity is encountered again, as the fleeting,
+inert dependence of everyone on the series, and of everyone, in his
+place in the series, on everyone else. This contradiction cannot take us
+very far, since unity arises here only to dissolve as an illusion; in
+practice it does not much matter whether, at least as a moment of
+illusion, it has a place marked out for it in serial experience. Unity cannot present itself, at least initially, as the objective possibility of
+groupment (that is to say, as the possibility of negating itself as gathering) because, at the moment where reality is impossible, the inert
+
+366 Book II
+gathering presents itself as a concrete truth whose unity is an abstract
+appearance. Apart from this, the structure of this unity is indeterminate,
+since it does not present itself in terms of a practical objective, but
+rather as fundamental class-being, in so far as individual relations of
+free reciprocity cause it to appear as the foundation of individual
+choices.
+The importance of the contradiction we are describing lies elsewhere: its function, in effect, is to lead us, in our dialectical investigation, back from the moment of the constitution of groups, to the
+ternary relations of free, individual action, of free reciprocity, and of
+the mediating third party. In other words, those relations which appeared to us as self-mystifying freedoms in the field of passive activity,
+are the only possibilities of making intelligible the appearance of a
+constituted praxis, in and against the passive field. Mystified, alienated,
+and cheated, these free, practical developments, the source of individual, serial impotence, are still actual synthetic actions, and are still
+capable of unifying - from the individual point of view, admittedly -
+any multiplicity that appears in the practical field. And though I claim
+that the totalising totality of the environment indicates a possible unity
+as the self-determination of every individual, it is true that it indicates
+it in the milieu of seriality, but it does it for everyone's free, dialectical
+actions in so far as they are for themselves dialectical translucidities.
+But the fact of everyone being affected by the possibility of union with
+all would have very little importance if this designation affected people
+only in their isolation or their relations of reciprocity. Indeed, unity
+could not appear as the omnipresent reality of a seriality in the process
+of total liquidation unless it affected everyone in his third-party relations with Others, which constitute one of the structures of his existence
+in freedom. In fact, as we have seen, everyone is also a third party in
+relation to reciprocal relations between other individuals, and this
+means that he totalises this relation in his praxis on the basis of material
+meanings (significations) and indications, uniting the individual terms
+of the relation as instruments serving a partial end. The third party is
+submerged in seriality, being structured a priori as the Other, and
+therefore as Other than everyone and Other than us, so that his
+internal-external relation of free alterity in relation to reciprocity gets
+lost in serial alterity. Nevertheless, it does exist - it is every one of
+us - as alienated freedom revealing itself in lived alienation as inessential.
+Now, by constituting the worked Thing as a totalising totality, the
+
+367
+common danger does not at first eliminate seriality, either at the level of
+the isolated individual, or at that of reciprocity: it tears everyone away
+from his Other-Being in so far as he is a third party in relation to a
+certain constellation of reciprocities; in short, it frees the ternary
+relation as a free inter-individual reality, as an immediate human
+relation. Through the third party, in effect, practical unity, as the
+negation of a threatening organised praxis, reveals itself through the
+constellation of reciprocities. From a structural point of view, the
+third party is the human mediation through which the multiplicity of
+epicentres and ends (identical and separate) organises itself directly, as
+determined by a synthetic objective. However, according to circumstances, this object will either fall outside the practical ends of the third
+party, or partially overlap with them, or contradict them, or harmonise with them, or subordinate them to itself, or subordinate itself
+to them. But if the practical unity of surrounding materiality constitutes the multiplicity, externally and negatively, as a totality, the
+objective of the third party produces itself for him as a common
+objective, and the plurality of epicentres reveals itself to him as
+unified by a common exigency (or common praxis), because it
+decodes serial multiplicity in terms of a community which is already
+inscribed in things, in the manner of a passive idea or a totalising
+destiny.
+As the possibility of repression in the Quartier Saint-Antoine
+appeared increasingly probable, residents of this district, seen as third
+parties, were directly threatened. However, this threat did not apply
+to them as 'accidental individuals': they were not being sought for
+their individual activities (like a criminal in hiding). On the other hand,
+no one wanted to kill or imprison them as Other, that is to say, as
+general individuals (in the way that price rises threaten every wageearner in a given category as a wage-earner of that category. Rather,
+they are threatened as a moment of a punitive campaign which will
+develop dialectically, as a free organised action, whose successive
+moments are foreseen by the enemy. In other words, it was their
+political and social activity, their condition, the location of their homes
+(in relation to the military exercise), the urgency, from the enemy's
+point of view, of beginning 'flushing out' somewhere, the importance
+of their neighbours, their activities, etc., which had been or would be
+synthetically united by a single totalising process which would be
+realised in its dialectical unity by realising the progressive and synthetic
+unity of the district by annihilating it. At this level, everyone, as a
+
+368 Book I|
+third party, became incapable of distinguishing his own safety from
+that of the Others.
+This was not an issue of altruism and egoism; such behaviour, in so
+far as it exists in this very schematic form, constitutes itself on the
+basis of existing circumstances and it preserves human relations which
+are engraved in the practico-inert field, in transcending them. It is
+easy to see how a neo-positivist might interpret the new statute of the
+third party: in a situation of looting, disturbances, and sporadic
+riots (he would say) the 'accidental', 'serial' (in pseudo-generality) or
+universal individual might still have a chance of defending himself on
+his own; but if he was concretely threatened as a certain moment of a
+repressive campaign which unified the district by the development of
+totalising action, he would no longer have any such opportunity. He
+would have to defend himself as a concrete part of the totalised totality,
+that is to say, no one would have any hope apart from the totalising
+negation (through the union of all) of the destructive operation. But
+this kind of rationalism is not dialectical, and, though Marxists sometimes make use of it, its analytical, utilitarian origins are quite apparent. The truth is not that the campaign of repression linked individual risks to the risks run by everyone; it is that, for every third party,
+it constituted a statute (which we will define below), by producing his
+own possibility of being killed or imprisoned as a specification of the
+common danger, that is to say, as a foreseen and controlled element of
+the programme of extermination.
+We must be quite clear about this: the totalisation which the third
+party receives from outside determines him through a new contradiction. His original structure as a third party expresses, in effect, simply
+the practical power of unifying any multiplicity within his own field
+of action, that is to say, of totalising it through a transcendence towards
+his own ends. As such, it can therefore serve as one moment of the
+mediation we are looking for: in his own activity (as a shopkeeper,
+worker, etc.), every resident of the Quartier Saint-Antoine district
+totalised his district in principle ('the customers', 'the comrades'
+, etc.).
+But, at the same time, his real membership of the district was serial in
+character and manifested its inertia of alterity. In this connection, it is
+easy to make the mistake of believing in the homogeneity of their
+statutes on the ground that they concern the relations between one man
+and one multiplicity. He actually totalises the district in so far as he is
+not part of the totality, and the district serialises him in so far as he
+lives in it. But if the totalising power of the third party produces, as the
+
+369
+revelation of an objective possibility, the perception of the district as
+now being a totality in danger, he will find himself thereby designated
+by this threat as integrated into the totality which he has totalised. But
+this requires mediation: to begin with, in fact, the free organisation of
+the practical field presupposes a transcendence and it is impossible for
+this transcendence itself to feature in the field as transcended; then, as I
+have said, the threat is perceived in Others as totalising, but at first it
+affects his being-resideni, and does so as panic, in his serial impotence.
+The contradiction between contagious processes as a serial realisation
+of the common threat and the perception of the human totality as
+unified negatively (en creux) by this threat, therefore resides in everyone (since everyone is also the third party).
+The contradiction can be transcended only in action. This is the
+reason which caused the Parisians to go out on to the streets in the
+critical hours of the Revolution, and to constitute gatherings, anywhere, anyhow. These gatherings, which were still serial but already
+quasi-intentional"
+' were to become groups through their internal
+tension, and in a passive activity which changed, in accordance with
+strict rules proper to each event, into a common action. In other words,
+the third party, designated by the situation, which he revealed
+through the unification of his practical field, as an integral part of a
+whole, realised this whole without integrating himself into it and
+uneasily discovered his own absence in it as a risk of death. The object
+of the gathering was to overcome this malaise by practically integrating
+everyone by praxis. But no one could determine this objective clearly,
+since everyone joined the gathering both as Other, as the sovereign
+organiser of the practical field, and as a part required by a totality. Now,
+as we shall see later, seriality does in practice tend to effect an initial
+integration. We have already seen how the direct action of the totalising
+totality (the hostile group as a threat) on the practico-inert gathering
+immediately produced contagious reactions, that is to say, passive
+actions realising themselves through the free activity of individuals in
+so far as it was alienated, and in so far as they were subjected, by the
+necessity of freedom, to the laws of the Other. We should remember
+one of the most common episodes in these gatherings: a march,
+II. People did not come out to meet particular individuals, or to obey some
+order, or to carry out some definite task: they went to a particular public place in
+the knowled ge that they would find a lot of other people there who had come under
+the same conditions and whose objective was otherwise indeterminate.
+
+370 Book lI
+followed by panic, flight, and regroupment (followed perhaps by an
+organised struggle). The panic was both the new practical incarnation
+of the Other and a practico-inert process realising itself through the
+alienation of free reciprocities. Everyone freely fled the flight of the
+Other, which means that the Other was embodied in everyone as
+imperative flight.
+But as well as being Other, everyone is also a third party: as a third
+party, he organises the constellation which surrounds him, he attributes
+a free, totalising meaning to flight, as the violence of inertia on the
+basis of the overall situation. In so far as he becomes a third party, he
+can no longer grasp the serial structure of flight: he perceives the panic
+as the adaptation of a totality to a total threat. For him, it is neither
+Others, nor a few individuals, who flee: instead, flight, conceived as a
+common praxis reacting to a common threat, becomes flight as an
+active totality. But this simple unification would only be abstract,
+external and theoretical, if, for example, he observed these events from
+his window. Here, seria'ity helps: at the moment in which the third
+party grasps the flight, from outside, as an organised reaction, he lives
+it through himself, in serial imitation and as alterity. The two contradictory aspects of the Other and of the third party are now directly
+opposed in the indissoluble unity of a praxis. And the materiality of his
+membership of the series and of his passive activity gives the individual
+a statute which prevents him from unifying the multiplicity from outside; the movement of practical integration as freedom returns to him,
+a human thing in flight, and signifies him; the synthetic movement
+which starts from him cannot really enclose him, but at any rate it
+designates his integration as a task to be done. In the context of this new
+task, every third party as such will seek in himself the dissolution into
+free common activity of his serial being. The activity of the group
+turns back on his passive activity; for him, flight, which began as a
+contagious phenomenon, becomes a common, organised action,
+through his individual praxis, and in so far as he has unified the group
+in his practical field, with its own objective and, therefore, having to
+regulate itself, to adjust the means to the end, etc. For example, it may
+become a limited retreat leading to an offensive comeback etc. And this
+transformation would not be a change in knowledge or perception; it
+would be a real change, in himself, of inert activity into collective
+action. At this moment, he is sovereign, that is to say, he becomes,
+through the change of praxis, the organiser of common praxis. It is not
+that he wishes it; he simply becomes it; his own flight, in effect, realises
+
+371
+the practical unity of all in him. This particular structure derives from
+the particular link which unites the third party to the gathering which
+is being destroyed, and it makes him both the transcendent synthetic
+unification (over which everyone is supreme in the practical field) and
+a term which is signified in immanence by the circular movement of its
+own totalisation. Transcendent, because the unification of all by the
+agent does not come to an end with his real integration into the totality;
+and immanent because the serial contagion can dissolve in him only in
+favour of the unity of the whole. On the other hand, his praxis is no
+longer in him as that of an Other, any more than it is his own reality
+for Others: in so far as seriality as contagion is liquidated in the
+resumption into freedom of the passive movement, his praxis is his
+own in himself, as the free development in a single individual of the
+action of the entire group which is in the process of formation (and,
+consequently, of everyone in so far as common unity serves as a
+mediation between everyone and the third party). It is on this basis
+that his own action as sovereign (simultaneously unique and shared)
+lays down its laws in him and in everyone merely by its development.
+Just now, he was fleeing because everyone else was fleeing. Now he
+shouts, 'Stop!', because he is stopping and because stopping and giving
+the order to stop are identical in that the action develops in him and in
+everyone through the imperative organisation of its moments.
+It must be understood that, at this instant, the third party unifies the
+gathered multiplicity and makes it a totality, as when he unifies the
+Others in his practical field, as, for example, to take a readily intelligible case, when, in my perceptual praxis, 1 see the gathering of people
+waiting for the bus as a group, and consequently say to myself, "There
+are too many of them, I'll take the underground!' (Thus this groupobject, seen in relation to my own aim - finding a way of getting to
+work - and defined in these terms, becomes in its turn an objective
+motivation, that is to say, in the unity of my immediate project, it tends
+to counteract the slight preference which I have always had for travelling by bus.) The difference is that the group of passengers appears to
+me as an object, as a totalised totality. In effect, my project totalises
+them through its transcendence: to notice roughly how many there
+are, or to estimate it according to the density of the gathering, is to
+define it in my practical temporalisation by its co-efficient of adversity,
+that is to say, to define it in terms of how long I would have to wait
+before getting a seat on a bus. Besides, as we have seen, 1 pass from
+the illusion of polyvalent unity, as an initial synthetic perception, to
+
+372 Book Il
+the discovery of seriality, because the serial order which will forcę me
+to join a queue and perhaps arrive late outlines itself within my very
+perception of the group.
+On the other hand, I have sometimes had the experience of groupsubjects, which may be either terrifying or helpful, and for which 1 am
+an object to be preserved, or destroyed; and I have a sense of being
+transcended by their untranscendable transcendence (transcendance).
+This is what happens to the soldier who suddenly finds himself alone
+in the midst of the enemy, or to a half-dead mountaineer being carried
+down the mountain on a stretcher by a rescue team. Here, the unification is effected in the same way and in my practical field. But this
+unification does not disappear when confronted with passive seriality:
+on the contrary, on the basis of the common action of the group, it
+has the effect of revealing to me a unifying unity which does not
+depend on my own unification and which, suddenly, by its numerical
+strength, invests, penetrates and metamorphoses my own practical
+field, to the point of putting my own freedom in question (not in its
+inalienable existence, but in its ever changing or alienable objectification). This group is not an object in any way and, in fact, I never see it;
+I totalise it in so far as it sees me, in so far as its praxis takes me as a
+means or an end.
+There are also some intermediate forms: an emperor's pretorian
+guard might, according to circumstances, be either his worked Thing,
+his human tool or, if he is afraid of being assassinated, a communitysubject concealed behind simulated objectivity. Any transition from
+one form to an other is possible. But the gathering transformed by me
+into my group does not have either of these two forms; nor does it
+have any of the intermediate ones. However, it is easy to see how it
+presents itself: as a sort of synthetic transcendence of the group-object
+and the group-subject of the practical field. If, on this basis, I perceive
+flight as a common activity, totalisation will take place: the immediate
+structure of membership of the fused group is the real totalisation of all
+these movements by the same which is in me. In simple terms of perception, I can see the flight of the group, which is my flight, because, in
+the dialectical development of my praxis, I unite and co-ordinate
+similar or reciprocal actions (people helping one another to flee or to
+defend themselves). There is, therefore, something resembling one
+object fleeing on these hundred pairs of legs. And it really would be
+an object if I did not flee from its flight. But in fact, to the extent that I
+discover it through our flight, it is necessary that my synthesis should,
+
+373
+in the end, turn back on me and integrate me entirely as a part of it.
+But this is impossible, because a totalising praxis cannot totalise itself
+as a totalised element. Thus, through the group, I indicate myself as a
+necessary culmination of the totalising action; but this operational indication never actually has its effect. (We shall deal with this fundamental
+structure at greater length later.) Thus I am neither totally integrated
+into the group, which has been revealed and actualised through praxis,
+nor totally transcendent (transcendant). I am not a part of a totalityobject and, for me, there is no transcendent (transcendant) totalityobject: the group is not in fact my object; it is the common structure of
+my action. In material terms, this is often expressed by the fact that I
+cannot really effect a total (for example, perceptual) synthesis of the
+group in so far as it is my environment: I can see my neighbours, or,
+turning my head, the people behind me, but I can never see them all at
+once, whereas 1 synthesise the marching of everyone, both behind and
+ahead of me, through my own marching.
+Thus one thing which the group has in common with the groupsubject of which we spoke earlier is that the synthetic totalisation
+which I effect in my field through my praxis reveals to me an interior
+unity independent of this totalisation itself, that is to say, a unity which
+has constituted (or is constituting) itself spontaneousiy and outside it.
+Flight, as the unity of the group, is a unity independent of an objectifying totalisation: it is simply revealed through it. But, conversely, 1
+could not take the group as a community-subject of which I am the
+object (the means, for example): I have discovered that its flight, in it
+and in me, is the same; in other words, the practical unity which my
+totalisation reveals and which negates the objectivity of the group
+thereby negates my own in relation to the group, since this practical
+unity is the same (not in me and it, but in us). In the same way, if the
+pure, formal totalisation of multiplicity in my perceptual field revealed
+nothing but a practical unity which eluded it, this would be because
+this unity was in fact based on some deeper praxis: I come to the group
+as its group activity, and constitute it as an activity in so far as the
+group comes to me as my group activity, as my own group existence.
+The characteristic of the tension of interiority between the group
+(apart from me) and myself inside it is that in reciprocity we are
+simultaneously both quasi-object and quasi-subject, for and through
+each other.
+
+374 Book II
+4
+The Mediation of Reciprocity: the Transcendence-
+Immanence Tension
+But it is a common error of many sociologists to stop at this point and
+treat the group as a binary relation (individual-community), whereas,
+in reality, it is a ternary relation. Indeed, this is something that no
+picture or sculpture could convey directly, in that the individual, as a
+third party, is connected, in the unity of a single praxis and therefore
+of a single perceptual vista), with the unity of individuals as inseparable
+moments of a non-totalised totalisation, and with each of them as a
+third party, that is to say, through the mediation of the group. In terms
+of perception, I perceive the group as my common reality, and, simultaneously, as a mediation between me and every other third party. I
+say every third party deliberately: whatever relations of simple reciprocity (helping, training a new neighbour or comrade, etc.) there are
+within the common action, these relations, though transfigured by their
+being-in-a-group, are not constitutive. And I also say: the members of
+the group are third parties, which means that each of them totalises the
+reciprocities of others. And the relation of one third party to another
+has nothing to do with alterity: since the group is the practical milieu
+of this relation, it must be a human relation (with crucial importance for
+the differentiations of the group), which we shall call mediated reciprocity. And, as we shall see, this mediation is dual, in that it is both
+the mediation of the group between third parties and the mediation of
+each third party between the group and the other third parties.
+First moment of mediation. - Consider a regroupment behind some
+shelter, after a flight. Some individuals will not take part in it: the
+action of the enemy will have cut them off completely from any
+synthetic community. For them, seriality itself, which began in panic,
+has culminated in molecular exteriority: the individual, alone, cut off
+from Others, continues his flight, loses his way, hides in a cellar, gives
+himself up, etc. But we should not suppose that he has revealed his
+cowardliness. Cowardliness is a serial feeling, and, in isolation, the
+absent Other still determines it. But in any case - and this is the
+important point - every one of the third parties who are regrouping
+knows that the group will be less numerous than the gathering. This
+knowledge might be derived from experience, and in any case with cer-
+
+375
+tainty from his immediately preceding perception: the third party has seen
+the practico-inert field from which he has torn himself away reforming
+itself at the horizon through the flight of certain Others who will never
+return. When he goes back to join those who are planning to resist, his
+fate depends on the number of the resisters and is revealed to him by a
+rough estimate of this number. It is in the same way - though, as we
+shall see, in an entirely different structure of being - that everyone
+calculates the duration of his wait by the density of the serial gathering
+waiting for the bus. At most, the praxis may negate itself: this is what
+happens, for example, if the resisting forces are objectively excessively
+inferior to the enemy forces. And the risk run by the third party in his
+organic, personal reality reveals itself in objectivity as directly connected to the risks of failure which threaten collective praxis, and as
+inversely proportional to its perceived density (as the initial estimate of
+the multiplicity as power).
+But, while I am on my way to join up with the central core of
+resisters, who are sheltering behind some building, I happen to be in
+the practical field of another third party, who is coming out of another
+street and approaching the same group with the same purpose. And the
+arrival of this third party at the group has real, objective links with my
+own approach: for me he increases the multiplicity of resisters, thereby
+increasing the chances of success and diminishing my personal risks.
+This is the joyful surprise which all the assembled demonstrators feel
+when, on the occasion of a demonstration which has been forbidden by
+the police, they see individuals and small groups converging from
+every direction, more numerous than they had expected, and representing
+hope to everyone. On the other hand, I am for them exactly what they
+are for me. This newcomer joins a group of 100 through me in so far as
+the group which I join will have 100 through him. Serially (or, as we
+shall see, from the point of view of the organisers, if there are any), we
+arrive at the group as two units. Through us, there will be 1oo rather
+than 98. But for each of us (both me and the other third party) we are,
+reciprocally, each by the other (and, as we shall see, by all the Others)
+the 99th. To put it another way, each of us is the rooth of the Other.
+Thus it is clearly a matter of reciprocity. I see approaching me the
+number which I form by adding myself to the group and I see it
+through the arrival of the Other; at the same time, because of this, the
+group is increased in me and in the Other, by me and by the Other, in
+me through the Other and through me in the Other. And this reciprocity is mediated, because the action of each of us is the counterpart
+
+376 BookIl
+of that of the Other through his numerical objectification in the
+group. Thus the group is the mediation.
+We have already discussed certain mediations by an object: in work,
+there are reciprocities which are mediated by the tool and the object
+to be produced. My act takes on meaning, in inert materiality, only if
+the act of the Other has already informed this materiality, has given it
+some initial meanings. If, however, we have not emphasised the
+mediating character of the practico-inert field, this is because its
+mediation is passive: it is the pure milieu in which actions meet. But the
+mediation of the third party by the group is of a different kind: first, of
+course, the bond between the worker and the material field is univocal;
+my bond with the group (as the link of the other third party) is one of
+interiority. When I approach it to join it, I am already part of it. We
+have seen in what sense: as a limit of totalisation, as an impracticable
+task which has to be done. And, from this point of view, the present
+multiplicity of the group (to the extent that it has been roughly estimated) constitutes me objectively as a member of a tiny group of
+desperate men12 who will get themselves killed on the spot, either as
+members of a huge invincible demonstration, or as taking part (as is
+more usual) in some intermediate formation. This internal, synthetic
+constitution of me by the group is simply totalisation returning to me
+to give me my first common quality over the collapse of seriality. And
+it gives me this quality as power. Thus the third party comes to the
+group which already possesses him, as a constituent and constituted
+power; that is, he receives the power he gives, and he sees the other
+third party approaching him as his power. For, in the group, the other
+third party, in so far as I totalise him with the Others, is not for me a
+third-party-object, that is to say, a third party transcendent (transcendant) to me. As an individual, he transcends (transcende) me towards
+his projects in so far as I transcend him: this is simple reciprocity.
+Integrated into the group by totalisation, he is quasi-transcendent
+through the mediation of the group, since I am in fact to integrate
+myself with him into the community, and since the task is indicated
+and since I remain in tension, at the
+limit of immanence and trans-
+12. I am not claiming that number alone makes me desperate: whether I am
+desperate depends on the total situation. It is simply that although I may behave
+with desperate tenacity in some circumstances, I will have neither the opportunity
+nor the time, nor even the desire, to behave like this in the event of a popular
+tidal wave effortlessly breaking down all resistance, such as, for example, an unprotected body of police.
+
+3JJ
+cendence. My link to him is therefore new: if we were to collaborate in
+the group in some action which would involve only the two of us, we
+would encounter strict relations of reciprocity-transcendence again;
+but in so far as he himself signifies in and through my totalisation my
+being-in-the-group as a task realised over there and not here by me, he is
+transcendent-immanent to me; or rather his immanence refers back to
+my (totalising) transcendence in so far as, as we shall see later, his transcendence can determine my immanence. Through the mediation of the
+group, he is neither the Other nor identical (identical with me): but he
+comes to the group as I do; he is the same as me. The characteristic of
+this new, crucial structure of mediated reciprocity is this: that I see
+myself come to the group in him, and what I see is merely the objectification
+of what I realise at the same time as him; he is my lived objectivity. We
+know that up to now the objectivity of an act appeared to Others or was
+reflected for me in the object produced. In the fused group, the third party
+is my objectivity interiorised. I do not see it in him as Other, but as mine.
+Now, the reason for this new structure (which lies at the origin of all
+so-called 'projective' actions or actions 'of projection') resides precisely in the fundamental characteristics of mediation. For the mediator
+is not an object, but a praxis. The group which I go to is not the inert
+gathering of these hundred people. Its inertia is merely an appearance -
+and one that does not even exist for me. It is, in fact, an action: we
+are waiting (to become sufficiently numerous, or for some information,
+or for the enemy to be off guard, etc.). And the truth is that I try to
+integrate my praxis into the common praxis (that is to say, the plan to
+counter-attack, for example). This praxis is immediately given as the
+comprehensible meaning of the regroupment, and if this meaning is
+comprehensible it is because it appears to me through my own praxis,
+which is already, in itself, a regroupment (of myself with Others), and
+is conditioned by the common regroupment. On the other hand, the
+group is constituted in its compact nucleus by several men huddled
+close to one another, but who, for me and for the third party who
+comes to the group, are simply third parties. The apparent exis of
+everyone (his being-there, immobile, in-the-midst-of-the-group) is
+revealed to me as my praxis both in me and in him: the dislocation of
+temporality makes no difference; being in the group, in effect, consists
+in having come to it, as I come to it, and in staying in it (that is to say,
+coming to it constantly) just as, for me, to come to the group is to be
+already in it, in that its structures and forces determine me in my very
+reality. Thus both the third party and myself are mediated by the
+
+378 Book Il
+action of every third party, in so far as this action produces multiplicity
+and makes each of us the hundredth for the Other - in other words, in
+so far as this unity of practical self-determination penetrates the
+freedom of our reciprocal actions and makes them the same for each of
+us in being common to all. There is nothing magical or irrational about
+this: on the contrary, the transformation of free action into common
+free action by the free praxis of the group is absolutely intelligible. The
+unity of the praxis is conditioned by circumstances: from the moment
+that I, as one of its members, unify the group which is in the process
+of unifying itself, the unification, in so far as it may be effected by any
+third party, inside the common movement, is not only conditioned, in
+its freedom, by free action, but also conditioning, as my own freedom
+(that is to say, as my own project) within my own praxis. And this
+conditioning of me by every third party, that is to say, by the same
+movement everywhere, whether it is manifested in my praxis positing
+itself as regulatory, or in the reciprocity of my action and of that of a
+particular third party, is precisely my own freedom recognising itself
+as common action in and through my individual action. It is this
+synthetic enrichment (apprehended in me here and in the third party
+over there) which makes my simple action, which comes to me as the
+same (and simultaneously as realised here), produce in reciprocity a
+common result ('There are a hundred of us! Here's the hundredth!',
+etc.), which could not be envisaged in itself (at least not at the rudimentary level of the fused group) and which operates through me in
+objectivity as the inversion of alienation.
+We have already seen how, on the market, my mere presence is
+alienating, how I am already for myself the Other, and how bewitched
+quantity causes the stock-piling of precious metals in Spain, for example, to lead to devaluation - so that to appear is, in itself, at least in
+the abstract, to force up prices. In this example we can see seriality
+and alienation as the other objectivity of my objectification. But in the
+present case, by contrast, what 1 discover is action as human, and
+quantity as instrumentality. Within certain limits, to be more numerous
+is to be more powerful. My appearance in the group eludes me in so far
+as the number depends on everyone: but this objectivity of my objectification suddenly becomes my objectivity for me. Through me, the
+number is increased; I am no longer the Other who comes to Others,
+endangering myself by my mere material presence; I am now my own
+action in the praxis of the group in so far as its objectification belongs
+to me as a common result. A common result: it is new, but it is mine in
+
+379
+so far as it is the multiple result of my action multiplied everywhere, and
+everywhere the same; at the same time, this multiplied action is a single
+praxis which overflows in everyone and into a totalising result. For the
+moment we can set aside the example of the regroupment: it was only
+meant to provide a graphic model. Of course, it is obvious that the
+relation of every third party to every Other in the group and through it
+is a mediated reciprocity. And reciprocity within the group produces
+the group as a container to precisely the extent that the group allows
+this reciprocity by becoming a mediation.
+But I mentioned a second mediation: every third party tends to
+become a mediation, as such, between the group and any other third
+party (or all of them). This is because I am not in fact alone in carrying
+out the totalising operation, that is to say, in integrating the ensemble
+of individuals into the group and in revealing, through my action, the
+unity of a praxis which I produce and which produces itself. This
+operation is the individual and common praxis of every third party in so
+far as (failing to effect his real integration) he designates himself as
+free, common action becoming regulatory through him. From this
+point of view, 1 am, for every third party, a free human agent, but
+engaged (with other third parties and inside the group) in a constellation of mediated reciprocities. I move from the position of totalising
+sovereign in relation to everyone to that of totalised sovereign. At
+other (more abstract) levels of our investigation (expérience), this
+totality may be both the result and the source of violent conflicts. But
+this cannot be the case in this initial moment of the group, because the
+Other, by totalising the practical community through his regulatory
+action, effects for me the integration which I myself should have
+realised but was unable to. Through him, in fact, my being-in-thegroup becomes immanence; I am amongst third parties and I have no
+privileged statute. But this operation does not transform me into an
+object, because totalisation by the third party only reveals a free praxis
+as a common unity which is already there and which already qualifies
+him.
+In practice, this means that I am integrated into the common action
+when the common praxis of the third party posits itself as regulatory.
+I run with all the others; I shout: 'Stop!'; everybody stops. Someone
+else shouts, 'Let's go!' or, "To the left! To the right! To the Bastille!'
+And everyone moves off, following the regulatory third party, surrounding him and sweeping past him; then the group reabsorbs him
+as soon as another third party, by giving some order or by some action
+
+380 Bank Il
+visible to all, constitutes himself as regulatory for a moment. But the
+order is not obered. Who would obey! And whom? It is simply the
+common praxis becoming, in some third party, regulatory of itself in
+me and in all the other third parties, in the movement of a totalisation
+which totalises me and everyone else. I can recognise this totalising
+regulation as such only in so far as my action is the same in the totalising
+third party. On the basis of the common future adumbrated by the
+common movement (flight, charge, etc.), that is to say, on the basis of
+my future as the common meaning of my regulatory and totalising
+praxis, the order gives me my common, future possibility. It reveals
+this possibility as a means within my project. In this way I can, as
+being-in-the-group, myself become a means of the common praxis, that
+is to say, an instrument of my own praxis. (Get back, you lot! Let the
+others move ahead!' - initial differentiations, almost immediately reabsorbed, according to the circumstances and the outcome.) I execute
+the 'command'; I am the 'order', in so far as, through the third party,
+it accomplishes the integration which I cannot accomplish myself. This
+integration is real (and as we shall see, it will become more real as the
+group becomes more differentiated). And it is really the constituent
+whole which achieves practical unification through the order. In the
+extreme case, no regulatory third party even appears: orders circulate.
+Of course, they originated in some individual third party, or sometimes
+in several third parties at once. But distance, and the impossibility of
+grasping the group when one is inside it, and many other reasons all
+mean that it is only the word which reaches my ears and that I hear it
+in so far as it comes from afar (in so far as my neighbour repeats
+it without changing it). The words circulate from mouth to mouth, it
+might be said, like a coin from hand to hand. And, in fact, discourse is
+a sound-object, a materiality. Furthermore, as they 'circulate", the
+words take on an inorganic hardness, and become a worked Thing.
+But this is far from meaning that we are going back to collectives. This
+thing is the vehicle of sovereignty: in short, it does not circulate. Even
+if it 'comes from afar', it is produced here as new, in so far as wherever
+it is, every place in the group is the same here. This object which is
+apprehended, understood, and reproduced in the immediate transcendence of praxis is merely totalisation itself in everyone, in so far as
+it can be achieved only by a sign. I decode the sign by my action, by
+conforming to the maxim produced; and the absence of the first
+signifier (of the third party who was the first to shout the words) makes
+no difference to the structure of my praxis: the authorless words,
+
+.38 г
+repeated by a hundred mouths including my own) do not appear to
+me as the product of the group (in the sense in which this might be a
+hyper-organism or a closed totality) but, in the act which comprehends
+it by actualising its meaning, I apprehend it as the pure totalising and
+regulatory presence of the third party (as the same as me) in so far as it
+accomplishes my integration where I am and through my freedom.
+But it should be noted that this regulatory totalisation realises my
+immanence in the group in the quasi-transcendence (transcendance) of
+the totalising third party; for the latter, as the creator of objectives or
+organiser of means, stands in a tense and contradictory relation of
+transcendence-immanence, so that my integration, though real in the
+here and now which define me, remains somewhere incomplete, in the
+here and now which characterise the regulatory third party. We see here
+the re-emergence of an element of alterity proper to the statute of the
+group, but which here is still formal: the third party is certainly the
+same, the praxis is certainly common everywhere; but a shifting dislocation makes it totalising when 1 am the totalised means of the group,
+and conversely. In other words, everyone has, for each and for all, a
+possible dimension of escape or of tyranny, in so far as integration,
+though a free, practical unity, refers everyone who has been integrated
+back to an "immanence-transcendence' tension which is in danger of
+breaking into transcendence (or into a false immanence which conceals
+a dominating transcendence). In any case, we shall call the individual's
+being-in-the-group, in so far as it is mediated by the common praxis of
+a regulatory third party, his "interiority' or "bond of interiority' in
+relation to the group.
+This alternation of statutes (everyone passing from interiority to
+quasi-exteriority) must appear as the very law of the fused group.
+Everyone is distanced from all, as the transcendent (transcendant) agent
+of the union and as merged with everyone by a totalising third party;
+this alternation is characteristic of temporal actualisation, but it temporalises a basic structure, or in other words, a set of structural determinations. In historical reality the event conditions the actualisation.
+In fact the number of regulatory third parties, even if it is fairly high,
+is always limited, and concrete circumstances select them, or lead each
+of them to select himself from the group as its spokesman. At the
+Palais-Royal in 1782, the first person to have got himself heard, on
+some historic day, was probably one who happened to be close to a
+bench or chair and who could therefore get higher than the Others, in
+the spatial materialisation of all the dialectical characteristics which we
+
+382 Book Il
+have enumerated, within the group, but separating from it in order to
+totalise it and therefore establishing a dialectical relationship with the
+crowd and then being reabsorbed by it and reintegrated by the speeches
+of some other orator emerging a little further on. At this level, there is
+no longer any leader. In other words, the crowd in situation produces
+and dissolves within itself its own temporary leaders, the regulatory
+third parties. But a dialectical inversion can already be detected here.
+For we have seen practical community coming to individual action and
+structuring it in the movement of disintegration of seriality. But we can
+now see in this orator, addressing the upturned faces and shouting, "To
+the Bastille!', a common individual (that is to say, one whose praxis is
+common) who gives the entire crowd the biological and practical unity
+of its organism as the rule of common unification: and in fact we shall
+see below how common unity, as a developing totalisation, attempts to
+realise itself as individuality.
+5
+The Intelligibility of the Fused Group
+We have now observed the formation of a fused group and described
+its structures. Now we must define the mode of intelligibility of this new
+praxis. I must remark to the reader that this appearance of the group
+as an undifferentiated totality does not correspond, at least not necessarily, to a historical anteriority of the Apocalypse. (On the contrary,
+for me, the Apocalypse presupposes the existence of serial gatherings
+and institutionalised groups). We are discussing it first because its
+historical reality is undeniable: in certain circumstances, a group
+emerges 'hot' (à chaud) and acts where previously there were only
+gatherings and, through this ephemeral, superficial formation, everyone
+glimpses new, deeper, but yet to be created statutes (the Third Estate
+as a group from the standpoint of the nation, the class as a group in so
+far as it produces its apparatuses of unification, etc.). Sieyès' question 13
+about the Third Estate, which was nothing (and therefore a pure
+13.. 'What is the third estate? Everything! Up to now, what has it been in the
+political system? Nothing! What does it seek? To become something in it!' See
+Albert Soboul, 2789: 'I' An un de la liberté", Paris, 1950, p. 64. [Ed.]
+
+383
+multiplicity of inertia, since it existed as nothing) but could be everything (that is to say - as certain people then thought, including Sieyès
+himself, by an abstraction from which, as a liberal bourgeois, he soon
+recovered - the nation, as a totality perpetually reshaping itself, the
+nation as permanent revolution) shows clearly how through the troubles
+of 1788-9 and the groups which formed sporadically (which up to that
+time were called riots) the bourgeois even more than the worker in the
+cities (though work was really done by the workers) glimpsed the
+transition from an ossified, cold world to an Apocalypse. This
+Apocalypse terrified them; in order to avoid it, the members of the
+Constituent Assembly would willingly have become accomplices of
+the aristocracy if only it had been possible. But it was France as the
+Apocalypse that they discovered through the storming of the Bastille.
+And through this people's battle, they learnt not only what the inert
+words of this speech suggested to them: its "power', the contradictory
+'necessity' of governing both through it and against it etc.; they sensed
+that History itself was revealing new realities.
+This was not highly significant; but what is important is that this
+form constitutes itself in reality at certain moments of the historical
+experience and that it then forms itself as new - irreducible to the
+gathering, to the mass statute, etc., and also to organised, semiorganised, or institutionalised groups, and that its novelty is of itself
+an allusion to a more radical and deeper novelty: free praxis becoming
+through society as a whole and through the conflicts of antagonistic
+groups the developing statute of all the social structures of inertia. For
+our purposes, this is enough: its real, dialectical existence and its
+emergence from the liquidation of petrified forms are sufficient reasons
+for taking such a historical reality as our starting point. Indeed, from
+the point of view of critical knowledge - that is to say, from our point
+of view - this formation is more absolutely simple than any other
+(since groups develop by differentiating themselves) and, therefore,
+more legible. I shall now go back over my earlier descriptions and
+examine them from the point of view of practical dialectical rationality.
+Is there an intelligibility of the fused group! And what intelligibility?
+And what can intelligibility mean in this conext? These are the
+questions which we have to turn to now.
+The centre of the problem is the question of the shifting unity of
+syntheses, of the multiplicity of the unifications, etc. It is at this level
+that we must ask ourselves: can several syntheses produce one synthesis? Is the synthesis useless? etc.
+
+384 Book I/
+What we have seen emerging, at the expense of the collective, and
+under the pressure of circumstances and through a hostile praxis which
+expressed its project of totalising destruction through the synthetic
+significations of the practico-inert field, is not an actual totality, but a
+shifting and ceaselessly developing totalisation. But this group did not
+constitute itself for itself; whatever enthusiasm and joy may have been
+felt by the petty hourgeois who ran through Paris, addressing complete strangers and exhorting one another, the deep motivation was
+Terror; that is to say, as project and motivation are one, it characterised the project in so far as it was transcended and preserved; and
+union was created on the basis of a number of objectives which gradually
+became more definite and converged into a single one: the defence of
+Paris (and, in the case of the Quartier Saint-Antoine, the defence of the
+district). Furthermore, to precisely the extent that the structure of the
+group anticipates differentiation, it comes to the group, as we have
+seen, precisely from the gradual definition of the objective (for
+example, the need to defend the district by fighting on two fronts). It
+will be said that the same applies to an organism, and this is true - with
+two crucial reservations. The possibility of an action, whether individual or common, arises at a certain stage in the development of
+organisms and through their or ganised structure; the organism which has
+satisfied a need by some practical activity survives the disappearance of
+this activity: it survives as an organism, that is to say, through the
+unified variety of its functions. Although the group, as an evolved and
+differentiated reality, is also characterised by a hierarchised and unified
+plurality of functions, the completed action (local - that is to say,
+entrusted to a group or common organ) refers the group to a certain
+type of practico-inert being which we shall describe later. In short, the
+organism is both totalisation and totality; whereas the group must be
+a developing totalisation whose totality lies outside it in its object, that
+is to say, in the material totality which designates it and which it
+attempts to appropriate and turn back into instrumentality. In this
+sense, the objective and the danger are two stages of a single process
+which designates the developing totalisation from the outside: objectification (or the conquest of the objective) becomes the transcendence
+and domination of the common danger through transforming material
+destiny (topographical configuration, etc.) into an instrument. But to
+precisely the extent that the totalised totalisation achieved by the surrounding matter (occasioned, for example, by an other praxis on the
+part of some other group) is reappropriated by the group and re-
+
+385
+interiorised as its internal and univocal relation to a particular instrumentality, this totalising totality, within the group, and as an instrument
+in use, becomes the very condition of all structural transformations.
+It is chiefly in this sense that we should understand the intelligibility
+of Marxist descriptions wnich show the object at the basis of the group
+as conditioning its internal turbulences and the overthrow of its relations with the others. In one sense, therefore, and provided one
+remembers that work - not only as a free organic dialectic, but also as
+wear and tear, as expenditure of energy, and as real but particularised
+efficacity (which, as such, is stolen or integrated into an active group) -
+is a material, concrete reality as a process, as a transformation of energy,
+only at the level of individual praxis, it can be said that the praxis of
+the group is constantly to reorganise itself, that is to say, to interiorise
+its objective totalisation through the things produced and the results
+attained, to make of it its new differentiations and its new structures,
+and thereby to transcend this rearrangement towards new objectives -
+or rather, to make this internal rearrangement, as structures which have
+to be transcended (because attained) the transcendence of old objectives
+and of interiorised instrumentality. In this sense, a group might
+define itself from the outside on the basis of the common objective
+imposed on men by a totalising structure of the surrounding materiality
+(and perhaps of another praxis examined in its objectivity). If the group
+happens to posit itself for itself in its most differentiated forms (and, for
+example, with antagonistic bonds with some other group); even if the
+group happens to be able in itself to present itself as the real, total
+meaning of each and every individual life, as is the case whenever a
+national community (which, as we shall see, is a complex ensemble of
+antagonistic groups, of provisional alliances and of serialities) goes
+through a crisis of nationalism; and if, finally, being-in-the-group
+becomes, as a regulatory objective, a structure of the human relations
+which are to be constructed out of the liquidation of bourgeois atomism, the fact remains that the concrete group, in its elementary forms,
+is a practical organisation required by certain situations through every
+third party. In other words, it constitutes itself as a means: but this in
+no way implies that it must remain a means. Here, in fact, the dialectical
+investigation (expérience) shows us at once that it is a means of the
+third party to the extent that he is a means of the group. In particular,
+because it is free, practical relations between individuals which produce
+the group, it must be recognised that the group undergoes a dialectical
+evolution of which we must provide an account. The point is to show
+
+38G Book II
+the (dialectical rather than historical) basis of all groups (including
+ones which posit themselves as essential through the inessentiality of
+their members), that is to say, to display their practical instrumental
+reality. Certain situations pose urgent questions to individuals, as
+multiplicities in the practical field - questions which already transform
+them in their reciprocal relations and which can be resolved only by a
+rearrangement of their relations, that is to say, by the interiorisation of
+multiplicity and the liquidation of alterity.
+From this point of view, the danger of the organicist illusion having
+been finally removed, it should be noted that this reshaping of human
+(and non-human) relations takes place in the same mode as the transformations of an organism: individual action is perpetual adaptation to
+the objective, that is to say, to the material configuration; the body
+interiorises the surrounding materiality in its attitudes and postures and,
+less noticeably, in its internal reactions and even in its metabolism. In
+this sense, the basis of intelligibility, for the fused group, is that the
+structure of certain objectives (communised or communising through
+the praxis of the Others, of enemies, of competitors, etc.) is revealed
+through the praxis of the individual as demanding the common unity
+of a praxis which is everyone's. The structure of synthetic unity is,
+therefore, even at the level of the univocal relation of interiority,
+directly derived from the grasp of a unitary (and passive) structure of
+the surrounding materiality through the synthetic unity of a dialectical, individual praxis. Unity is reactualised practically by the individual, both over there as the community of the objective, and in his own
+action, here, in its present moment either as the exigency of being
+common praxis or as the first realisation in him and in every third
+party of this community. On the other hand, if the urgency of common
+action appears (whether rightly or wrongly, that is to say, whether in
+accordance with a real actualisation of objective exigency or in accordance with mistaken calculations) only to one individual, or to several
+members of the gathering, then this intelligibility relates only to a
+possibility which is negated as soon as it is posited. If the 'order' is
+not followed, if the individual who advances towards the enemy
+remains alone (either because there has been no liquidation of seriality,
+or because the group has constituted itself against him and by another
+praxis suggested by Others), then the constitution of the common
+praxis manifests itself in this individual praxis as a negated possibility.
+Of itself it liquidates itself in favour of isolated action or, on the other
+hand, of immediate reintegration into the gathering. The individual
+
+387
+who no one follows may, in case of extreme anger, throw stones at the
+attacker or the police, alone. Alternatively, he may suddenly turn
+round and seek refuge in the infinite milieu of circular seriality.
+The reality of the praxis of a (fused) group depends on the liquidation (either simultaneous or subject to temporal dislocations which
+can be ignored) of the serial, both in everyone and by everyone in
+everyone, and its replacement by community. This reality (which
+sometimes produces itself and sometimes does not) must therefore be
+comprehended in its intelligibility. But this intelligibility is defined
+precisely by the practical relation of the hostile praxis (through the
+material object) to the free action by which the third party unveils this
+praxis by opposing it. It is through the individual discovery of common
+action as the sole means of reaching the common objective, in fact, that
+the historian demonstrates and evaluates the urgency, the imperious
+clarity, and the totalising force of the objective (that is to say, of the
+danger which has to be avoided, of the common means which has to
+be found). Since every action, here, is the same, we must concentrate
+our attention primarily on the praxis of the third party, wherever it
+may be, in so far as it is conditioned in its free development by a
+common future (either to be realised or to be avoided). It is the tension
+of this future in the practical present, and the progressive and regressive
+decoding of this fundamental relation, which furnish the first elements
+of intelligibility. We must investigate not only how the threat - or the
+real action, already begun - of the enemy affects the third party, but
+also how this developing future transforms his statute, and with what
+urgency it appears (an urgency which, as an objective relation between
+the enemy action and that of the third party, may turn out to be very
+different from real urgency, that is to say, from the urgency which the
+historian will be able to demonstrate after the event as a meaning of the
+entire process). And conversely, on the basis of a common action
+adumbrated by the third party, we must investigate what possibilities
+are defined through and for this action, and what chances of success
+reveal themselves in the object itself through the adumbration of the
+praxis, etc. From this point of view, it may be that the problem is not.
+to understand why a given initiative accompanied by a particular order
+was not taken up (in a historical reconstruction, the explanation might
+be, for example, that the group would have run into disaster if it had
+followed the order, and that it must have known this, given the
+material configuration of the place and all the other circumstances) but,
+rather, to interpret intelligibly the fact that in such circumstances a few
+
+388 Book II
+individuals might have believed they could dissolve the gathering by
+inventing a common praxis.
+This problem - though a negative one - concerns certain secondary
+disciplines within anthropology in particular those which deal with the
+individual as such) and it refers us back to the abstract statute which we
+went through in the first moment of our dialectical investigation
+(expérience). The failure of this attempt relegates the individual to
+isolation and is to be explained in terms of his negative relation to the
+third party, that is to say, of a relative non-integration (or maladjustment, the word does not matter) which in turn is to be explained, in the
+context of the totalising movement and of History, in terms of the
+circumstances of his personal life. Precisely because of this, the transformation of the gathering into a group, wherever it occurs, includes,
+for the historian, its own intelligibility: that is to say, it is to be interpreted positively as the most concrete relation of the third party to
+circumstances and to circumstantial objectives, in so far as this relation
+manifests itself without being either obscured or determined by the
+specific behaviour of every individual as such. But it is obvious that
+such individual circumstances (which, as we have seen, may be his
+position; or which may also be his personal qualities - intelligence,
+courage, initiative there are plenty of these rather vague words) will
+produce one individual rather than an Other as the first regulatory
+third party. But these circumstances are 'general particularities': they
+determine the third party in relation to the group and the group in
+relation to the third party without telling us anything about the past or
+the transcended-being of the individual, and indeed, even without our
+really knowing14 whether this rapidity of initiative was produced in
+him by his free praxis as one of his group qualities, that is to say, as an
+14. I say, 'even without our knowing', not because, a priori, there can be no
+means to settle the question, but because, in fact, most of the spontaneous regulations, directly emerging and directly absorbed, elude the observer and moreover
+the historian who, in any case, is seldom obliged to study them. He would,
+however, if, for example, he was dealing with the event known as the 'September
+Massacres', simply because, ever since the first meetings of the Convention, the
+Girondins brought up the problem of responsibility in relation to this very
+subject. But it is clear that later historians will seek for the action of an anonymous
+Third Party only if they are trying to establish the responsibility of particular
+organised bodies (the Commune) or politicians. The Third Party in so far as he
+is the same, a little ahead of the same, is not their concern: only the Third Party as
+a group (simple totalised-totalisation, immanence-transcendence relation) can be
+of interest to them.
+
+389
+exis which can be neither interpreted nor understood outside his
+collective praxis and his being-in-the-group; and without our even
+knowing whether it manifested itself on this occasion and inside this
+particular gathering.
+Nevertheless, the first moment (first from the point of view of the
+investigation (expérience): the Apocalypse may be the liquidation of a
+seriality of old groups in favour of the amorphous homogeneity of a
+new fused group) suggests a number of observations. In so far as the
+group is - simply and primarily - a common praxis, the community of
+praxis is still expressed in the appearance of a group as the interiorisation of multiplicity and the reorganisation of human relations. We
+should therefore examine the immediate characteristics of a fused
+group such as, for example, Paris in 1789, or the population of the
+Quartier Saint-Antoine on 13 and 14 July, in connection, of course,
+with the situation and the objectives which alone give it meaning, but
+in so far as the group presents itself in its praxis as a developing reality.
+From the outset, in fact, we can understand that the group is a directed
+process: we must fight, save Paris, seize weapons wherever they can be
+found, etc. Nothing will prevent this objective, once attained, from
+suddenly revealing broader, more distant objectives (or for that
+matter, imminent dangers) which will necessitate the continuance of
+the group and its reorganisation. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent a
+consciousness of this possibility from existing in some way (we shall
+have to investigate how) in the group itself.
+What is important for us at this moment is that this directed process
+constitutes itself only to be annihilated in its objectification. The
+insurrection of 1789 (unlike, for example, the revolutionary 'days' of
+June 1848 or of 1917) was purely defensive (in an objectively revolutionary context): the purpose was to restore order, that is, to repulse a
+threat. Once this had been done - that is to say, the negation having
+been negated - the group would dissolve into the inertia of seriality.
+But in fact this is never what happens; after the storming of the
+Bastille, Paris could never again be the Paris of June 1789. New
+organisations arose on the ruins of the old; new alarms led to new
+differentiations; and the struggle between group and inertia continued. Nevertheless, it is true that the realisation of its objectives led
+to a dissolution of the group as such. The 'Conquerors of the Bastille'
+as such were now united only by a past action which was engraved
+in Being, and also by a desire to exploit it for their own purposes or in
+support of a particular policy: it was no longer either the same group
+
+390 Book II
+or the same men. The fused group should therefore be characterised
+as an irreversible and limited process: the reshaping of human relations
+by man had temporalised itself in the practical context of a particular
+aim and as such would not survive its objectification. 15
+In this sense, a group defines its own temporality, that is to say, its
+practical speed and the speed with which the future comes to it (on the
+bases of a threat, for example, which itself externally defines an ur gency,
+that is to say, which makes time an objective exigency and a scarcity;
+the practical speed of the group is the reinteriorisation and embracing
+of urgency). Joseph Le Bon, a member of the Convention and representative of the people at Arras, said, from his prison, after Thermidor, that no one - not even himself - could really understand or
+judge events and actions which had occurred at an other speed. But this
+problem of temporalisation refers us back precisely to the real structure
+of the group, that is to say, to its own type of reality. The problem is to
+understand what, in a fused group, is signified by unity (which the
+description immediately confers on it: the group does this or that, etc.)
+as a synthetic unification of the diverse.
+What is really involved, as we have seen, is in fact a synthetic
+relation which unites men for and by an action, and not those vague
+interpenetrations which an idealist sociology sometimes tries to
+resuscitate in some form or other. But - and this is where the question
+of structural intelligibility arises - our comprehension of the individual
+dialectic has made us see synthesis as the unifying unity of a unique
+praxis which integrated diversity through work. The univocal relation
+of interiority linked inertia as diversity to action as the unifying
+negation of this diversity. Within the group, as we have seen, diversity
+arises not at the level of the individual agent, or even at that of relations
+of reciprocity: it appears at the level of the syntheses. In other words,
+every third party, in so far as he is himself and not another, effects the
+unification of all, and by the mere actualisation and practical interiorisation of the totalising designations through which other groups single
+out the inert gathering as a negated totality (or a totality to be negated)
+indicates that his integration is a task to be done. Is this not just
+another example of serial commutativity! It would seem that alterity
+is. I shall deal with institutional groups and groups of repetition later. It is
+obvious that their structure is more complex, since they define themselves both
+by the dissolution of serial inertia and as materiality sustained by the passive
+syntheses of seriality.
+
+391
+is to be found quite simply at the level of totalisations and that every
+totalisation is, for everyone, that of the Other, in him and in the Other.
+These questions at least have the advantage of defining the problem: if
+there is any doubt as to the intelligibility of the group, this is not
+because of any lack (that is to say, the question is not, and never has
+been, as some have believed, how separate particles could constitute a
+totality). On the contrary, it is because of an excess: the difficulty is due
+to the fact that we are acquainted with praxis as a synthetic activity,
+that we have observed every third party in action liquidating seriality
+and unifying the gathering into a group; thus we seem to be faced with
+an excess of unifications. Can we call this reality with a thousand centres
+a unity, when we have already discovered, in the case of reciprocity, a
+relation with several epicentres, which, for this very reason, was
+unable to unify its terms.
+But, in fact, the question has been badly formulated. We are not
+really trying to find out whether the group, as a multiplicity of individuals, possesses an inert statute of unity, whether the men who compose it can be stuck together as organisms by some kind of gelatinous
+glue, or whether some 'collective consciousness', a totality irreducible
+to its parts, imposes itself externally on each and every consciousness,
+as the Kantian categories impose themselves on the multiplicity of
+sensations. We have seen, in fact, that the unity of the group was
+praxis (when it was hot; we shall observe other possibilities later). The
+important thing, therefore, is to find out how far the multiplicity of
+individual syntheses can, as such, be the basis for a community of
+objectives and of actions.
+But these syntheses themselves, as we saw when we discussed them
+above, realise the substantial unity not of men, but of actions. In effect,
+every synthesis is both the practical constitution of common action,
+subject to reciprocal conditioning, and the revelation of this action
+as already existing. And in effect we have taken the third party at the
+moment when he was still in the gathering, and engaged in a passive,
+disordered activity. And we have seen how, by dissolving his seriality,
+he is able to see the original contagion disappear and how he constitutes not only his behaviour as free activity (by giving it a meaning),
+but also serial violence as common action, through his own activity
+(which he constitutes as the rule and meaning (signification) of the
+common praxis). This 'discovery, in fact, is itself an action: at first, as
+we have seen, the third party, by his exhortations, his orders, etc., acts
+on passive activity and helps to transform it in Others into a praxis;
+
+392 Book II
+and thus he makes himself a free rule for the liquidation of passivity in
+all. On the other hand, on the basis of existing circumstances (in
+particular, on the basis of the negative unity signified by a hostile
+praxis through the passive syntheses of the environment), this movement of actualisation of the common praxis occurs at about the same
+time in all the third parties as such. It is the moment in which orders
+circulate. Now, in this moment - for example, in the moment already
+mentioned, where a gathering, broken up by the police, regroups
+against it and becomes a demonstration - the multiplicity of individuals
+is still not transformed into substantial unity. Yet a regroupment does
+occur: something exists as a totality. But this totality is quite simply
+the demonstrators' attack on the police. And this is the first thing for us
+to explain. Now, it is obvious that, in the case of gatherings which, as
+in 1789, are unorganised, the transition from flight to regroupment does
+not originate in any particular order, issued by any particular individual; or at least, such an order was not very important. If the first
+order was 'obeyed', this was actually because everyone gave it. But
+here, it seems, we have that plurality of syntheses which would seem
+to be incapable of constituting a true unity. However, let us look at it
+more closely: in the moment where the demonstrators regroup,
+everyone rediscovers his praxis in the Other emerging from the other
+street and joining the group in formation; but, in so far as each of them
+was the free origin of his new behaviour, he would find it in the Other,
+not as his Other-Being, but as his own freedom. Here we encounter once
+more the mediated reciprocity which will turn out to be the essential
+structure of the organised group. But we can now see that this regroupment in formation, towards which everyone is advancing, and
+seeing himself advance in the person of his neighbour, serves as a
+mediation between third parties: this means that for everyone it is an
+ensemble to be totalised and a group to be expanded by his own
+presence; and through him, in fact, everyone perceives the movement
+of the third party who confronts him as his own movement and as the
+spontaneous expansion of the group of which he is about to become a
+part. Thus my praxis appears to me not only as myself, here, now, but
+also as myself approaching me through my neighbour, and as sustained by its own totalised effect on my neighbour and myself. (By
+acting in the same way and by making myself the same as him, I
+encounter him in the group as a totalising increase of its strength,
+which by totalisation determines me through the group itself: his
+individual action which is mine gives me, through the expansion of the
+
+393
+whole, a greater security). Now, from the beginning of the regroupment, and during the ensuing fight, the plurality of totalisations by
+third parties does not cease to exist; there is nothing but hundreds of
+individual syntheses. However this multiplicity negates itself in every
+one of the acts which constitute it. Indeed, in so far as each of them
+constitutes the whole as common praxis, he presents himself as the
+regulator, that is to say, as the praxis of the whole in himself. And in
+so far as he recognises himself in each individual praxis, he sees each
+of them as the presence in a third party of the total praxis. But, at the
+same time, by liquidating seriality, he has produced his own praxis as a
+free, dialectical determination. Thus when he tries to attack the police,
+he carries out an action which only the existence and practice of the
+group make possible; but, at the same time, he produces it as his free
+practical activity. Thus the action of the group as total praxis is not
+initially other action (action autre), in him, or alienation from the
+totality; it is the action of the whole in so far as it is freely itself, in him
+and in any third party.
+This requires further explanation. We must show in what way every
+praxis is a free individual development and in what way it could only
+be what it is as the praxis of a totalised multiplicity. The second point
+can be easily established by means of an example: alone or with a few
+comrades, a particular demonstrator would never even have tried to
+attack the police - simply because the impossibility of such an attempt
+would have been inscribed in the facts. His behaviour was therefore
+determined in itself as collective, that is to say, as an action which
+could be carried out only by a multiplicity of individuals. But for the
+first time we are encountering this multiplicity in the form of a means,
+that is to say, as a reinteriorised multiplicity. We have seen how the
+mass, by its sheer quantity, is weight, efficacity. But it is also clear that
+the efficacity of masses as such produces the other effect (l'effet autre);
+that is to say, the effect necessarily produced by inorganic materiality in
+the practical field. Here, in contrast, the individual joins the struggle
+as a multiple, that is to say, multiplicity is already in his action as a
+means which has been integrated by a free praxis. He joins in the
+attack neither as isolated nor as a hundredth, but as the free utilisation
+of the power he gets from being, here and everywhere, the material
+strength of the number one hundred. Number, as a structure of the
+action - that is to say, as an element in everyone of the decision of the
+third party - is merely an elementary kind of weapon. Everyone
+possesses it in its entirety, just as everyone can possess a pick or a
+
+394 Book II
+pistol (that is to say, the pick or the pistol). But, at the same time,
+everyone sees it around him, and finds himself in it, just as several
+soldiers may find themselves together in some military machine and
+manoeuvre it together. For instance, as well as being his own guarantee,
+it may be his protection (or, in other circumstances, a negative element
+- people separate and divide; but this will become clear later). In this
+sense, number in this particular third party and in others does not
+appear as an other-being (être-autre), but as the interiorised reality
+which multiplies individual effectiveness a hundredfold (not by giving
+the third party a hundred times his own strength, but by allowing him,
+for example, to disintegrate the hostile group by fighting against one
+of the individuals who compose it, instead of suffering their undivided
+action in separation). Addition, therefore, instead of being a mere inert
+summation of the units, becomes a synthetic act for everyone: everyone
+joins the group in order to be more numerous and hence the increase of
+the group becomes everyone's practice.
+The other question can now be answered directly: free totalising
+praxis allows itself to be conditioned in reality and in practice by the
+totalisation it has just brought about. Its dialectical rationality has
+revealed the threat to it, in totalisation, as the negative unity of the
+group and of itself as totalised by the enemy; again, its dialectical
+rationality, by transforming the passive totality of the future victims
+of the repression into the active totalisation of resistance, has, in and
+through the group, appropriated a practical structure of interiorised
+multiplicity. In and by his praxis, the third party affirms in the group
+the lack of distinction between the individual and the common action.
+Earlier we said that the series was nowhere, that it is always elsewhere;
+the group, in contrast, is always here and in so far as we know it to be
+elsewhere too, it constitutes this elsewhere as the same here. This is how
+its circularity is to be understood. The circularity of the series is a
+circularity of flight; it destructures every here-and-now by disqualifying
+it through the Others here-and-now. The circularity of the group
+comes from everywhere into this here-and-now so as to constitute it
+as the same everywhere, and, at the same time, as free, real activity.
+My praxis is in itself the praxis of the group totalised here by me in so
+far as every other myself totalises it in another here, which is the same,
+in the course of the development of its free ubiquity. Here there
+appears the first 'us', which is practical but not substantial, as the free
+ubiquity of the me as an interiorised multiplicity. It is not that I am
+myself in the Other: it is that in praxis there is no Other, there are only
+
+395
+several myselves. In fact the free development of a praxis can only be
+total or totally alienated. Thus the synthetic unity of the group is, in
+everyone, freedom as the free, synthetic development of the common
+action; for the demonstrators fighting the police, it is the battle (though
+not for Stendhal, the provincial officer or for Fabrice, a mere witness,
+in that it was always elsewhere and that its elsewhere was its unity), but to
+the extent that it is everywhere the same and that everyone becomes in
+it the same as all, namely self-objectifying freedom.
+Later, when the group has cooled off and become permanent, its
+members will be chronically separated, and the struggle will remain
+their unity - their only unity - as a practice: but freedom here, in so
+far as it is that of all in everyone, may regain an imperative character.
+This is because, as te shall see, it is not only the same but also, as such,
+already, affected by alterity. But in the spontaneous praxis of the fused
+group, free activity is realised by everyone as unique (his own),
+multiple (interiorised multiplicity, and force realised in the individual
+result as a multiple result) and total (as the total developing objectification). Obviously this is not a matter either of co-operation, or of
+solidarity, or of any of the forms of rational organisation which are
+based on this first community. The original structure of the group
+derives from the fact that free, individual praxis, can objectify itself in
+everyone, through the totalising situation and in the totalised object,
+as free, common praxis. The battle in progress is, for everyone, an
+absolute reciprocity, in the object and seen in the object, between the
+group, as a multiplicity which has been reinteriorised because of the
+regulatory third party, in so tar as it allows the individual a given
+initrative, and the individual, in so far as his praxis, as a total, regulatory
+praxis here (as being the whole battle), allows the totality in everyone,
+and everyone as a free totality, to objectify itself, or himself, in the
+common objective.
+This objective, of course, is discovered as the process continues (we
+have only been examining the case of the fused group) according to the
+possibilities which present themselves. But it is revealed in its development in so far as anyone, as a regulatory third party, exhibits the
+common possibility in the particular. The street and the little wall will
+appear to everyone or anyone, and thereby to all, as a temporary
+shelter: to signify this is to create a group. Whoever signified was the
+group, since he saw the possibility with common eyes; but he made the
+group (advanced its integration, avoided rout) by designating. But
+everyone already transcends this designation: it is no longer a possibility
+
+306 Book II
+(actualised by some designation but already materially present in
+the structure of the common environment), but by the time the other
+third parties realise that the little wall is a possible shelter, they are
+already regrouping behind it. The sovereign third party who freely
+designates is no different - precisely because he is everyone's own
+freedom - from a mere sign-post bearing a practico-inert message
+(signification) which is to be transcended by praxis. To say: 'Let's shelter
+behind this wall' is to make oneself a free meaning freely transcended everywhere including here, since for the third party who points
+it out, indicating it and running are the same thing.
+We should notice here that, in a case of panic, the mere fact of the
+Other's running reveals my action to me in the milieu of the Other,
+and that running to hide behind the wall emerges as a contagious
+propagation. In any case, in so far as the group is in the process of
+constituting itself by liquidating seriality in all, where seriality does
+remain it may help the common action by caricaturing it, simply by
+local panics. The basic difference between serial activity, which -
+though counter-finalised and passive - does have its teleological reason,
+and group praxis, in this case and wherever it occurs, is not the freedom
+of individual praxis, since contagious panic, as much as a deliberate
+attack, realises itself through everyone's praxis; it is that in the first
+case, freedom posits itself only to reveal its alienation in the passive
+activity of impotence (I discover myself in the Other as hunted, and
+the alienation culminates by transforming itself and passing from the
+discovery of necessity to the submission by the other to the reign of
+necessity, while in the second case, in the group in the process of
+constitution, the leader is always me, there are no others, I am sovereign
+and I discover in my own praxis the orders which come from the other
+third parties. When demonstrators are questioned about the origin of
+this or that common praxis (either when their action was "wild' or,
+quite simply, when it took place on a local scale and without being
+foreseen), they often cannot decide whether someone (that is to say,
+anyone) gave a practical sign to direct the common activity or whether,
+as they all say, in fact: 'We did this because it was the obvious thing
+to do, because there was nothing else to be done', etc. They have -
+especially if they are questioned in a trial, by hostile judges - a clear,
+active awareness of their solidarity with any of the demonstrators: if
+someone actually did shout, attack or fire first, etc., they will not give
+his name or, if someone has been caught in the act and is shown to
+them, they will say (and this is an active praxis of a militant group)
+
+397
+that they do not know, that they are all responsible. Thus, at this first
+stage, there is no leader, or, in other words, the situation may by
+accident be such that a single third party designates, signifies and
+adumbrates the initial action; but after that for one reason or another,
+and in any case because of the circumstances of the struggle, there was
+no longer any common signification, the developments of the skirmish
+forced every individual or small group to adapt to the praxis of the
+enemy without being able to co-ordinate with the other parts of the
+original group - but with each individual still fighting as the free
+totalisation in action of the demonstration.
+But it is remarkable, too, that when he is questioned, the demonstrator does not relate to the group, either as to a transcendent (transcendante) synthesis or as to a single quality in everyone's action. Whether
+he is responding in a hostile way to the representatives of an oppressive
+government or establishing the facts for themselves, he will interpret
+the action as a free development, the objectives and means as free,
+practical certainties (évidences). And this means that he presents the
+situation as revealing itself to praxis as it does in simple, individual
+activity. Quite simply, the accounts (and the emergence of the dangers
+which themselves designated their demonstrations, or of objectives
+which produced their risks and their finality, as each individual
+describes them to us in his evidence) necessarily presuppose that every
+participant was the same praxis as the totalisation here of the free,
+common development by and through the free totalisation of the
+practical field by an individual praxis. Thus, in contrast to the rout as
+seriality, this flight - which already projects itself obscurely as a means
+of regroupment - has everyone as its sovereign agent here in so far as
+it is common; and everyone produces the common meanings (significations) which come to him from everywhere either as certainties, by
+transcending them, or as free choices of means and ends. Of course, in
+the fight itself, the offensive or defensive activity may involve certain
+beginnings of differentiation which constitute a structure of alterity
+(some - others). But since this alterity is a means (some people are to
+attack the soldiers or police from the street behind, while others charge
+them head on), it is produced in the free development of praxis as
+invention. For everyone, of course, this involves reinteriorising a
+given (in fact this 'given' will turn out to be simply the earlier statute
+of seriality). But, for precisely this reason, he is subordinated to the
+common unity of the praxis and every 'same' becomes other, both here
+and over there, in so far as he is the same everywhere (that is to say, in
+
+398 Book !!
+so far as the elementary, spontaneous organisation is half-produced by,
+and half-imposed on, every third party by objective circumstances and
+by the tactics of the enemy). Similarly, the interiorised number remains a
+quantity; but in so far as it conditions (as a means) the development of
+action, this quantity without parts presents itself in everyone as an
+intensity, that is to say, as the same degree of power (in all third parties)
+against the enemy. In this sense, the relation to the neighbour is both
+interchangeability ard unicity (of me and him) as the absolute presence
+of the entire praxis everywhere: everyone is a hundredth in so far as
+everyone freely becomes a hundred.
+In the methodologically simplest case (that of victory; for example,
+the taking of the Bastille), the unity of the result (as in individual
+praxis) becomes the objective reality of the group, that is to say its
+being, in so far as it can produce itself only in inert materiality. It may
+be objected that the result is not always inert: but this objection is
+based on regarding the inorganic as a certain statute which defines a
+particular kind of materiality, rather than, as would be correct, as a
+condition which, in particular circumstances, may characterise any
+kind of material entity. If, for example, the prisoners taken by the
+crowd, on 14 July, are a material and inorganic result of the common
+action, this is because they represent the objectification of the people's
+victory as the destruction of an organised fighting group and as its
+replacement by a multiplicity of impotence (by re-exteriorised quantity
+as the only possible relation amongst the prisoners). It goes without
+saying, of course, that the result - as a group objectified in its practice
+- IS in itself capable of being alienated. This problem must be studied
+quite closely and we shall return to it. But this alienation - even if it is
+a new encounter with necessity - does not necessarily appear in the
+moment of victory; it may continue only much later, through thousands of different circumstances and practices. Indeed, in this respect,
+collective practice resembles individual practice: everyone can, now or
+later, discover his alienation as necessity, dependent on activities and
+circumstances. However, as we have seen, this alienation shows
+through in every moment of daily life, in that, for example, every
+attempt by the exploited to escape their condition individually inflexibly confirms their class-being in objectivity. The action of the
+group is necessarily new in so far as the group is a new reality and its
+result an absolute novelty.
+The people have taken the Bastille. This public fact cannot be interpreted in the same way as the significations which it has just over-
+
+399
+thrown. This is why alienation - if it occurs - generally reveals itself
+much later and through confrontations. Thus the moment of victory
+presents itself to the victorious group - except in exceptional circumstances - as the pure objectification of freedom as praxis; and its
+character of irreducible novelty reflects for the group the novelty of its
+unity. And no doubt everyone sees the objectification as the result of
+his free praxis, in so far as it is the whole developing here through free
+individual action; but it is striking that this perception by everyone of
+total objectivity occurs in the milieu of third parties, as common behaviour. It is the constant procession of Parisians in the passages, halls
+and staircases of the Bastille which is the real actualisation of the
+people's victory. For isolated individuals (such as an armed bourgeois
+on guard at night) the common objectification has now become simply
+an abstract signification and their exultation - if they experience it in
+isolation - is a spiritual exercise rather than a way of living victory.
+(Besides - as we know from contemporary accounts - the dominant
+feeling amongst the bourgeois guards was fear. Absorbed by a worked
+thing which was too large for them, the common action transcended and
+crushed them, and manifested itself - wrongly - with its counterfinalities, and perhaps even, in an illusory way, as alienation. In the
+absence of all, it became the Other Action (l'Acte Autre), which might
+lead to catastrophes, merciless repression, etc.) In short, as long as the
+victory was still alive, the total object appeared to everyone only
+through a total practice, that is to say, in so far as everyone was with
+everyone else and realised here the actual presence of this totality. Thus
+its inorganic materiality, as the first alteration of the objective praxis,
+remained temporarily concealed: in so far as every visitor to the
+captured Bastille interiorised the multiplicity in his 'public visit' the
+synthetic unity of the object as a practical organisation revealed itself
+and the plurality of inertia was itself subjected, in this object, to unity.
+The unity of a group had, to some extent, come to the gathering from
+the hostile object which designated it as the unity of a process of
+annihilation (in so far as a group praxis actualised this threat). At
+present, the common action of everyone in the milieu of all expresses
+the victory by producing the total unity of the enemy object, and reduced
+to impotence. What, from a certain point of view, is already no more than
+a historic château, a ruin, produces itself through the group as hostility
+crushed and bound, but still dangerous.
+In short, the multiplicity of syntheses cannot be defined in the
+practical group (or the fused group) as the inert co-existence of
+
+400
+identical processes, connected by mere relations of exteriority. Nor can
+it be described as a serial link of alterity uniting the syntheses as others.
+Yet it does exist, since everyone acts and develops his actions on the
+basis of circumstances which condition him. It is also true that there is
+no synthetic unity of the multiplicity of totalisations, in the sense of a
+hypersynthesis which would become, in transcendence (la transcendance), a synthesis of syntheses. What actually happens is that the unity
+of the all is, within each actual synthesis, its bond of reciprocal interiority with any other synthesis of the same group, in so far as it is
+also the interiority of this other synthesis. In short, unity is the unification from within of the plurality of totalisations, it is from within that
+it negates this plurality as the co-existence of distinct actions and
+affirms the existence of the collective activity as unified (unique). From
+within: from the inside of each synthesis in so far as it affirms itself
+here, in freedom, as the developing totalisation and constitutes all the
+others, through practice, as itself (either by positing itself as regulatory,
+or by accepting its rule from some third party, that is to say, by producing it freely here as the same and unified).
+On the other hand, the interiorisation of practical unity involves, as
+we have seen, that of the multiplicity which becomes the means of the
+common action, and, therefore, the means of unification from the point
+of view of total objectification. This reinteriorisation of multiplicity,
+as a transition from discontinuous quantity to intensity, results in the
+dissolution of number as a relation of exteriority between discrete
+elements (between individual totalisations). Being a hundred, being a
+thousand, as much for the group as in the eyes of the enemy himself
+('There are too many of them, we'd better leave them alone,' etc.), is a
+possibility of counting or being counted which immediately reverts to
+being a free unity-means. Thus, in so far as it reabsorbs number, the
+group is a non-quantifiable multiplicity. This does not mean that its
+quantity is eliminated as inorganic materiality; it means that its quantity
+must be conceived in it as instrumentality. And, of course, this also
+applies to the characteristics of masses (weight, etc.), in so far as, in the
+elementary fight we are considering, they are all interiorised and
+controlled exteriority. Here, the inorganic characteristics of the group
+are means of acting in the practico-inert field, just as the practical
+organism in its individual action acts as a source for transforming
+energy in the physico-chemical field of exteriority (that is to say, in so
+far as it uses and controls its being-in-exteriority as an inorganic
+structure transcended and preserved by organic structures.
+
+401
+Now it is clear that the intelligibility of this new (and possibly
+unexpected) structure, that is to say, of unity as ubiquity within each
+and every synthesis, depends entirely on the two following characteristics: this ubiquity is practical: it is not that of a being or of a state, but
+that of a developing action; and it can be conceived only as the ubiquity
+of freedom positing itself as such. I have already stressed the first
+characteristic: if the problem were to place the unity of the group in its
+substance, everything we have just said would be pure logomachy or
+sophistry, for the substantial unity of a totality exists in every part only
+in so far as the whole is distinct from each part and produces itself as a
+transcendent (transcendante) totalisation of them all. But we are dealing
+with a praxis, and we must realise that here, in contrast, all the synthetic determinations we have described really create the common
+action in so far as each of them makes it exist both in itself and everywhere (for example, the order which springs from any mouth and
+which is executed by a hundred arms is a real process of totalisation).
+Besides, the substantial being of such a common action lies outside it
+and in the future, in the common objective (which is the first designation of the group by the enemy in so far as the group constitutes itself
+as the negation of this negation); and it objectifies itself as common by
+the common realisation of the objective which itself and by itself (outside it) has already constituted itself as common. For example, the
+flight of the adversary is common in itself (and not only as produced by
+the common effort), in so far as the common practice of the enemy
+appears as turned back but still common. Even the prisoners, as the
+destruction of a threatening unity which has been reduced to passive
+multiplicity, have meaning only by reference to a previous meaning (to
+the negative common praxis which has been destroyed). But the
+essential characteristic of the fused group is the sudden resurrection of
+freedom. Not that freedom ever ceased to be the very condition of
+acts and the mask which conceals alienation, but we have seen how, in
+the practico-inert field, it became the mode in which alienated man has
+to live his servitude in perpetuity and, finally, his only way of discovering the necessity of his alienations and impotences. The explosion of
+revolt, as the liquidation of the collective, does not have its direct
+sources either in alienation revealed by freedom, or in freedom suffered
+as impotence; there has to be a conjunction of historical circumstances,
+a definite change in the situation, the danger of death, violence.
+The silk-weavers of Lyon did not unite against alienation and
+exploitation: they fought in order to prevent the constant lowering of
+
+402 Book II
+wages, that is to say, basically, for the restoration of the status quo.
+(But of course, their very practice prevented this restoration in any
+case. After the revolt, society was no longer the same, the pre-history
+of the French proletariat had given way to its history.) But against the
+common danger, freedom frees itself from alienation and affirms itself
+as common efficacity. Now, it is precisely this characteristic of freedom
+which produces in each third party the perception of the Other (the
+former Other) as the same: freedom is both my individuality and my
+ubiquity. In the Other, who acts with me, my freedom is recognisable
+only as the same, that is to say, as individuality and ubiquity. It is
+freedom, therefore, as the dialectical structure of action, which prevents
+the third party from letting himself be determined by the third parties
+as Others: in fact, in our example of running away and regrouping,
+freedom dissolved alterity by positing itself, simultaneously, as a first
+synthesis, in the third party and in everyone, and as a transformation of
+passive activity into freely directed action for a common objective. And
+the totality as praxis came to my freedom through the totalisation of all
+(that is to say, through the transformation of the gathering into a group
+unified by action). Thus, through the presence of the free actions of
+which it made itself regulatory, my own action took on a dimension of
+interiorised multiplicity. But if this interiorisation of the inorganic did
+not reintroduce alterity into the agent in the form of an inertia of the
+totality, or of an infinitesimal distance between the practical totality and
+the individual praxis, this was just because the interiorisation was only
+an instrument chosen by my free action in so far as it was chosen everywhere by the free praxis of all.
+Thus the common praxis, as the totalisation and struggle against a
+common praxis of the enemy, realises itself in everyone as the new, free
+efficacity of his praxis, as the free intensification of his effort; every
+freedom creates itself laterally as the totalisation of all freedoms, and
+totalisation comes to it through the others as a lateral dimension of its
+individuality, in so far as it is freely individual for them. This has
+nothing to do with the radical transformation of freedom as individual
+praxis, since the statute of this freedom is to live the very totality of
+the group as a practical dimension to be realised in and by its individuality. But it is true that there is a new relation between freedoms
+here, since in every totalisation of the group, the freedoms acknowledge themselves to be the same. This relation, which differs from
+ternary relations of reciprocity and from third-party relations, is a
+reciprocal recognition between third parties in so far as it is mediated
+
+403
+by the developing totalisation of all the reciprocities; and this recognition is neither contemplative nor static: it is simply the means required
+by a common emergency. It is for this reason that common action, at
+the elementary level, is not essentially different from individual action,
+at least in its practical aspects, except in its results, which are obviously
+greater. A single individual freedom, inflated by a totalised multiplicity, and emerging anywhere, identical, always controls, in a
+plurality in action, from here, from the centre, wherever it manifests
+itself, a first use of the multiple and of its strength, a first differentiation
+of functions. And the unity of this freedom beneath the shifting
+multiplicity of the syntheses is itself, and fundamentally, the relation
+between a negative unity of all (totalisation through annihilation by the
+enemy) and the negation of this negation to the extent that it is
+occasioned as totalising and that it produces itself freely on this basis.
+Of course, this theoretical description is never completely applicable: it is not true that freedom, emerging every where and everywhere
+the same, communicates the common project through everyone to all
+and through all to everyone. Conflicts occur precisely to the extent
+that the liquidation of seriality is a temporal process which may be late
+here and early there; the remnants of alterity represent, for the freedoms
+themselves, as totalising, a threat of seriality. The group must act on
+itself in order to hasten these liquidations: we shall come back to such
+common, internal action. Moreover, we have supposed for convenience that the individuals who compose it are homogeneous, or (to
+put it differently) we have considered them only from the point of
+view of the threat which hangs over them. In fact, each comes to the
+group with a passive character (that is to say, with a complex conditioning which individualises him in his materiality); and this passivity - in
+which we should include biological as well as social determinations -
+contributes to the creation, even apart from seriality, of a hysteresis
+which is capable of occasioning a new series. For these and other
+reasons, the theoretical schema which I have sketched does not apply
+in reality: there are procrastinators, oppositionists, orders and counterorders, conflicts, temporary leaders who are quickly re-absorbed and
+replaced by other leaders. But the essential point remains, through this
+life of the fused group (which is in fact only its struggle against death
+through passivisation): namely, if the group is really to constitute itself
+by an effective praxis, it will liquidate alterities within it, and it will
+eliminate procrastinators and oppositionists. This means that the
+common freedom will create itself in everyone against them until in the
+
+404 Book II
+end the orders which circulate really are the orders which everyone
+gives himself in himself and in all, until the homogeneity of anger,
+courage, and the determination to fight to the end, manifesting itself
+everywhere, reassures every demonstrator, and shows him that the
+danger of defeat or indecision will no longer create, over there, as an
+anxiety, the possibility of an Elsewhere and instead constitutes him
+from everywhere as the practical reality of the group here. This is the
+heart of the matter: I depend on everyone, but through freedom as
+practical recognition I am guaranteed against this dependence. They
+will fight my fight, with my determination; over there is no more than
+a here; I am no more in danger 'over there' than they are here; I expect
+nothing from them (alterity), since everyone gives everything both
+here and 'over there'; thus my own action - even when the conditions
+of struggle prevent me from seeing them - is regulatory of theirs; it is
+practical freedom in me which sets its own limits in them; thus in
+driving my tenacity to the limit, - produce this tenacity everywhere. 16
+IG. In fact, aggravating surprises, stampedes, and routs do occur. But for the
+moment we are discussing the group without taking into account the hostile
+praxis (if the hostile group decides to throw in all its strength at a particular
+point, it will break down the homogeneity of the group from the outside). But
+for the moment, this does not concern us: in effect, the group is not a metaphysical
+reality, but a definite practical relation of men to an objective and to each other.
+If certain circumstances of struggle lead to stampede and if this stampede is not
+followed by regroupment, the group is simply dead, and contagious panic restores the domination of the practico-inert.
+
+2
+• The Surviving Group: differentiation
+The intelligibility of the fused group depends, therefore, on the
+complex ensemble of a negative designation of its community, reactualised in the negation of this negation, that is, in the free constitution of individual praxis into common praxis. At this level, there is
+group behaviour and there are group thoughts in that the common
+praxis is self-elucidating; and the essential structure of these practical
+thoughts is the unveiling of the world as a new reality through a
+negation of the old reality of impotence, that is to say, through the
+negation of the impossibility of humanity. The fact that the origin of
+the grouping was Terror is not actually very significant; every praxis
+constitutes itself as an opening made in the future, and sovereignly
+affirms its own possibility - simply through the emergence of the
+undertaking itself - that is to say, it makes success into a structure of
+practical freedom. As the freedom of revolt reconstitutes itself as
+common violence against practico-inert necessity, its future objectification becomes, for it, the free violence of men against misery and
+impossibility of living. But this structure of the common project -
+which derives from its synthetic character - does not settle the real
+issue, at least not alone.!? However, it does make intelligible for us the
+complex dispositions that are to be found amongst the demonstrators,
+during the insurrectional days of the French Revolution - especially,
+the transcendence of Terror towards Hope and the double structure of
+sovereignty and violence which characterises freedom as a common
+17. It scttles it in so far as it occasions inflexibility in the combatants. But then
+everything depends on other factors; and inflexibility may simply lead them to
+extermination.
+
+406 Book Il
+praxis. It is, in effect, not only a practice of defensive violence against
+the violence of the enemy but also, as sovereignty, violence against
+necessity, that is to say, violence against the practico-inert field in so
+far as it is constituted by Thing-destinies and by enslaved men. Just as,
+as the investigation has shown, in this field of alteration, necessity is an
+imperative limit which imposes itself on freedom from within (in so
+far as it is expropriated by the outside), so the reversal of the practical
+movement and its reappearance as a negation of necessity constitute
+themselves as the violent destiny of necessity itself, in so far as it
+produces itself for man through men and things.
+But, at the same time, this violence, always ready to attack any reemergence of inertia within the group, dissolves itself in pure, unanimous sovereignty, in so far as, through the active member of the
+group, sovereign freedom is always here and now. However, as violence
+is always going on, whether against an external enemy or against
+insidious alterity within, the behaviour of a revolutionary, on 14 July
+as on 1o August, appears contradictory: he not only fights for freedom
+(that is to say, for the practical realisation of a concrete objective, but
+also realises sovereign freedom in himself as unity and ubiquity; at the
+same time, however, he commits violence on the enemy (in fact this is
+simply counter-violence) and he uses perpetual violence in order to
+reorganise himself, even going so far as to kill some of his fellow
+members. But there is not really any contradiction here: this common
+freedom gets its violence not only from the violent negation which
+occasioned it, but also from the reign of necessity, which it transcended
+but preserved in itself, and which constantly threatens to be reborn
+as a disguised petrification, that is to say, as a collapse into the inertia
+of the gathering. Freedom as the sovereignty of individual praxis is not
+violence: it is simply the dialectical reorganisation of the environment.
+Freedom as alienation unmasked becomes the structure of its own
+impossibility in the form of necessity; finally, necessity as confined and
+self-confining freedom in passivity becomes the qualification of the
+practical negation which transcends it in so far as this practical negation
+has to destroy a dimension of freedom in it. As ruthless destruction of
+freedoms buried in practico-inert necessity (and which, as slaves,
+exhaust themselves in imparting to it its movement of infinite flight),
+this freedom constitutes itself a priori as violence. The only contradiction between the characteristics which are so often opposed to one
+another by reactionary writers - Hope and Terror, sovereign Freedom
+in everyone and Violence against the Other, both outside and inside
+
+40J
+the group - is a dialectical one. And indeed, these are the essential
+structures of a revolutionary group (not only in its most undifferentiated reality but also, and to an even greater degree, as we shall see, in
+its most complex forms). And it will be easy to show that these supposedly incompatible characteristics are indissolubly and synthetically
+united in every action and declaration of the revolutionary demonstrators. I mention them in passing here in order to show, as I have done in
+previous chapters for other levels of the investigation, that the practical
+and ideological determinations of a fused group are a single structure
+dependent on its morphology and the dialectical laws of its movement.
+But this definition of the fused group in terms of common praxis
+does not determine the structural relations which hold between third
+parties in primary interiority, in so far as the group is a means of
+common action. We have seen that the ontological relations of the
+group's members cannot be characterised in terms of common membership of a totalised totality. But at this level of our investigation we can
+in fact define the group as a perpetual reshaping of itself, in accordance
+with objectives, with exterior exchanges and with internal imbalances.
+We have still not established anything about History, or whether it is
+really a totalisation of totalisations. But - apart from the dialectical
+syntheses which constitute individual action and which totalise the
+whole of the practical field rather than the organism - fused groups
+have presented us with the (methodologically) most simple form of
+totalisation. A group is not (or at least it dries up and ossifies, the more
+being or inert materiality it contains): it constantly totalises itself and
+disappears either by fragmentation (dispersal) or by ossification
+(inertia). This totalisation does not produce itself - in the simple case
+I have discussed - through differentiated organs: it occurs everywhere
+and through everyone; wherever one is, it happens here. So we must
+now define the relation between individuals (as totalising and totalised,
+rather than as the presence here of the total praxis). In short, does
+common activity not condition a being-in-the-group for everyone? And
+how should this term be interpreted!
+We have already observed that totalising syntheses have two
+moments: in the first, I produce myself as the third party by effecting
+the totalisation of the gathering; and indeed, - produce this totalisation
+in so far as I form part of it and in so far as the inertia tends to dissolve
+in me, along with my bonds of alterity. Yet, as I have pointed out, I
+cannot effect a real integration of myself into the group. To the extent
+that I produce the synthetic unity, this unification cannot figure in the
+
+408 Book II
+totality as a unified unity. But this does not in any way mean that the
+unified individuals are passive objects in the synthesis: the unification is
+practical and I can recognise my own action in the common action.
+But the common action, which is free in so far as it is common, this
+flight, for example, is constituted by my unifying praxis as a grouped
+flight, that is to say, as a unification of the diverse in one praxis; and
+the movement which reveals this group to me in its action refers me
+back to the same action, performed by me in the group, and as a
+member of the group; but at this moment the movement stops and
+designates me as needing to be integrated in my organic reality into the
+ensemble which I have just constituted. In short, my integration
+becomes a task to be done; in so far as I am designated abstractly in my
+membership of the group (as one of its members) and in so far as 1 am
+really unified by my praxis as common praxis here, I become a regulatory third party, that is to say, my action presents itself as the same in
+the very slight dislocation which derives from the non-realisation of
+membership; and as it is freedom, this infinitesimal (but impassable)
+distance produces it as the free reflection here of the common action,
+that is to say, as the possibility for all of grasping the common action
+in myself and of consciously regulating it. But, conversely, in so far as
+every third party does the same and issues some order, he becomes the
+rule of my freedom in me and therefore really integrates me into the
+totalisation, which returns to him without closing. Through him, an
+interiority creates itself as a new type of milieu (a milieu of freedom)
+and I am in this interiority: if he stands on a chair, or on the podium of
+a statue, or if he harangues the crowd, then I am inside; and ifI in turn
+climb onto the podium which he chose, I am, again, inside but my
+interiority is stretched to the limit, and the slightest jolt could make it
+into an exteriority (for example, if I make a mistake about the common
+action, if 1 propose to the group an object different from its own).
+Thus, in the simple case of the fused group, my being-in-the-group
+is my integration into it through all the regulatory third parties in so
+far as it is the same free support of a common action within the interiorised multiplicity; and at the same time, or alternatively, it is my
+belonging to the totalisation which I effect, and which is the same, in
+so far as I cannot totalise myself. It is this presence-absence, this
+belonging which is always realised for the Other who is myself but
+unrealisable for me, who am nothing other than him, it is this contradiction, this abstract separation within the concrete which characterises
+me in the individual tension of my being-in-the-group. Of course, this
+
+409
+tension exists in everyone as a third party. But we should be quite clear
+about this: the group is not a reality which exists in itself in spite of the
+'transcendence-immanence' tension which characterises the third party
+in relation to it. On the contrary, the "transcendence-immanence' of
+its members creates the possibility of the group as common action.
+Pure immanence, indeed, would eliminate the practical organism in
+favour of a hyper-organism. Or, quite simply, if it were possible for
+everyone to effect his own integration, every action, in so far as it was
+common, would lose any possibility of or reason for positing itself as
+a regulatory action and the group would no longer conceive itself in
+its praxis through innumerable refractions of the same operation. In
+other words, the action would be blind, or would become inertia. Pure
+transcendence, however, would shatter the practical community into
+molecules related only by bonds of exteriority and no one would
+recognise himself in the action or signal of some atomised individual.
+Altogether, these observations enable us to attempt a critical
+assessment of rationality (as a rule of understanding) at the level of
+the group. Common praxis is dialectical, from the most basic level on
+(that of the fused group): it totalises the object, pursues some total
+aim, unifies the practico-inert field and dissolves it in the synthesis of
+the common practical field. If common praxis is to be a form of rationality, it must be dialectical rationality. And, since it is always intelligible,
+we are compelled to recognise the existence of this form of rationality.
+Moreover, it should be noted that in itself it does not display the
+specific characteristics of the individual dialectic as the free development of a practical organism. Although - as we have seen, and as will
+soon become clearer - a dialectical relation may insert itself between a
+common praxis and an individual's praxis, a common praxis is not in
+itself a mere amplification of the praxis of an individual. As we have
+seen, the interiorisation of multiplicity is one of its essential characteristics. And the organism is undoubtedly comparable in some ways with
+interiorised inertia. But, when applied to the organic individual, these
+words have only a metaphysical and uncertain meaning in relation to
+its biological being, in so far as it eludes apodictic, dialectical investigation and manifests itself, beyond reach, in the milieu of the transcendental (transcendentale) dialectic. In fact, dialectical investigation shows
+us the action of the individual as unifying itself in the unifying synthesis and in the transcendence of the practical field, but it never
+reveals it to us as unified. The practical organism is the unifying unity
+of unification; thus the investigation refers us (as if to its first, most
+
+410 Book II
+abstract intuition, and as if to its limit) to man as the biological unit on
+which every praxis is based (and which every immediate praxis
+realises as a temporalisation towards an end). The interiorisation of
+multiplicity, however, is a moment of collective action and the group
+constitutes itself by it (as by the other factors already mentioned) as
+the means of the common praxis. In this simple form (the fused group),
+we are in fact forced to admit that the group is initially a means, in
+which the organism is agent, end and means all at once.
+In our example, the grouping, still in a primitive state, is the
+invention of everyone in so far as everyone is personally threatened by a
+danger which presents itself as common. And everyone can invent this
+new instrument in so far as the practical organism can already totalise
+multiplicities in a practical field, recognise the praxis of developing
+common totalisations and create a group as a reinteriorisation and
+practical inversion of a totalising signification of negation (the praxis
+of total annihilation). Thus the practical creation of means of defence is
+a resumption in freedom, as a new relation with men, of an exterior
+unity, or a dissolution of the serial relation of impotence by the free
+affirmation (through circumstances) of freedom as a human relation
+in a new praxis (which comes to the same thing). This does not mean,
+however, that either the interiorisation of the multiplicity in me, or
+the affirmation here of my freedom as a recognition of all our freedoms,
+or totalisation as the constitution of a means for praxis, or the synthetic
+and common character of the original urgency and of our objectification
+in the victory, are capable of constituting a new statute of hyperorganic existence, as being-in-the-group - any more than the specific
+characteristics of common action (in particular, the utilisation of
+multiplicity and the differentiation of functions) succeed in making it
+a hyper-dialectic whose intelligibility lies in its synthetic transcendence
+of individual dialectics.
+We have shown in fact that the unity of the group is immanent in
+the multiplicity of syntheses, every one of which is an individual praxis,
+and we have emphasised the fact that this unity has never been that of
+a created totality, but rather that of a totalisation which is carried on
+by everyone everywhere. Thus the intelligibility of the group as praxis
+depends on the intelligibility of individual praxis, in so far as individual
+praxis is lost and then rediscovered in the practico-inert field. A rupture
+occurred, as we saw, at the stage of alienation (and not the creation of a
+new moment of the dialectic) and the groups we have described are a
+new determination of every praxis, beyond impossibility, in so far as
+
+The Statutory Group 412
+it is determined by itself coming to itself as the same and in so far as
+it comes to itself everywhere as the same. This dialectic of the group
+is certainly not reducible to the dialectic of individual labour, but it is
+not autonomous either. Thus its intelligibility, as will become clearer
+later, is that of a constituted reason, of which the dialectic of free
+individual praxis is the constituent reason. Although they present themselves to our investigation as specific realities, and although they are,
+in effect, specificities whose very obviousness implicates a range of
+factors which they unite in an original synthesis; and although they
+presuppose as their foundation, their danger, their means of action and
+the servitude which they are transcending, the practico-inert field
+which as such eludes the synthesis of the individual organism, their
+own certainty (évidence) is based on the translucidity of the praxis of
+an organism and to the extent that, as we shall see, dialectical investigation displays group structures and group behaviour as certainties
+(évidences) which lack translucidity, their specific contribution can be
+described as a new aspect of object-being (and, as we shall see, of
+seriality), in so far as a certain passivity masks the translucid certainties of constituent praxes but nevertheless bases itself on them. The
+difference between constituent Reason and constituted Reason can be
+concentrated into two words: the former is the basis of the intelligibility of a practical organism, while the latter is the basis of the intelligibility of an organisation. Thus our investigation will lead us from the
+fused group to the organisation and thence to the institution.
+This is not a matter of genesis. I am explaining organisations in terms
+of the Apocalypse; but it could be done the other way round. This order
+is not untrue; but the reverse order is possible. I am adopting it because
+it leads from the simple to the complex, and from the abstract to the
+concrete. Now, we have already seen certain as yet fluid differentiations
+occurring within fusion under the pressure of circumstances. It
+would be instructive to examine how such a relatively homogeneous
+group (setting aside the presence of the French guards) creates its
+differentiations in action, on the basis of objective structures, by
+investigating the various stages of the taking of the Bastille, under the
+guidance of Flammermont and Lefebvre; but such an examination
+would take too long. In any case, this differentiation originates in the
+fact that the whole group is always here in the praxis of this third party,
+and that for this third party it is also over there, that is to say, here yet
+in the praxis of another third party. Consequently, the action which I
+perform here against some enemy, though its particular structure
+
+412
+depends on the enemy, the place, etc., is, through and for me, the
+common action; it is so in so far as the activities of Others, by individualising themselves under the pressure of circumstances, help to
+render mine possible and, to this extent, require it. In a way, each
+individual holds down part of the hostile forces by his struggle.
+Mediated reciprocity is the basis for the intelligibility of the differentiation which arises in the context of the struggle and as a response to the
+hostile praxis. The action of the other third party remains the same as
+mine (whether what we are combating is a natural scourge or an
+enemy), beneath a differentiation which produces itself as purely
+circumstantial, in that the common praxis is defined in and through
+the regroupment with its common objective, which remains the same in
+every individual praxis. But in a fused group, a mere means to common
+security, these differentiations, however advanced they may be, do not
+survive action. Even if they are free adaptations to enemy action, they
+are nevertheless originally induced by it. Any spontaneous innovation
+(such as that of the combatants who try to scale a wall in order to lower
+the draw-bridge of the Bastille) is - as in individual praxis - a transformation of a practico-inert structure into practical activity; or, to put
+it differently, it is the practical reading of a possibility inscribed in
+matter, and which reveals itself (or constitutes itself as a means) on the
+basis of the total project. Once the total result is achieved, the group
+can read its unity as a totalitarian synthesis in its objectification. Thus it
+can, in principle, relapse into non-differentiation. 18 The differentiation
+of functions - as a very general structure of which the division of
+labour is a concrete particularisation - appears as the statutory reality
+of the group only in so far as the group itself becomes the object of its
+totalising praxis.
+In particular, whatever the origin of the group may be, the permanence of the dangers may require it to persist between the moments
+of real activity, as a permanent means of resisting the enemy. I take this
+example (the enemy have withdrawn, they may attack tomorrow)
+because it is an extension of those we have just examined: but I must
+repeat that we are not trying to reconstruct a genesis. The new
+exigency comes to the group to the extent that the third party reveals
+it, or in other words, in so far as individual praxis interiorises the
+18. In fact, memory, roles one has played, successes won, etc., create a particular exis for certain individuals as members of the group. And this is already a first
+return of Being in so far as the past is transcended-being.
+
+The Statutory Group 413
+objective permanence of the common danger in the form of a common
+exigency. But this new state of the group (which manifests itself
+historically in every revolutionary situation) is defined by new
+characteristics, conditioned by new circumstances. The unity of the
+fused group lay quite simply in real common action, that is to say, in
+its own undertaking as much as in that of the enemy, and in the violent,
+dangerous, and sometimes fatal attempt to destroy the common
+danger. There was nothing ideal about the totalisation of the group: it
+was done by sweat and blood. It objectified itself in destruction, and
+perhaps in the slaughter of enemies (for example the summary executions after the taking of the Bastille). At the same time, though constituting itself as a means of acting, the group did not posit itself for
+itself: it posited the objective and it became praxis. If, however, the
+grouped multiplicity is to survive the realisation of its immediate
+objectives, the urgency diminishes. Of course, the offensive return of
+the enemy troops is always possible; in some cases, it is probable, even
+highly probable. Faced with this threat, extending from the possible to
+the virtually certain, the common watch (the refusal to sleep, or to
+yield to fatigue), continually being armed, etc., cannot be regarded as
+belonging to what I called exis; these are really actions - especially as
+these actions (whose development we shall examine later) transform
+themselves into organised and organising behaviour. But the imminence
+of the danger should not be allowed to conceal its absence from us. This
+absence of the enemy is not a non-being: it is a relation to the group
+which fears its return. And this relation - at least as far as we are
+concerned - manifests itself as practical deconditioning. The differentiations of the group, during the skirmish, its transformations and its real
+intentions, occurred under the almost unbearable pressure of the
+enemy group and were determined as negations of this pressure. It is
+in this sense that they can be called 'adaptive behaviour': the structure
+of the fighting group is also that of the enemy taken negatively (saisie
+en creux). In absence, the new differentiations are, of course, determined in close relation to the totality of objective circumstances.
+Nevertheless, the group determines itself in accordance with a future
+unification (unification through the return of the enemy) and a past
+unity (its group-being as transcended past, or, in other words, its
+practical reality in so far as it has been, and in so far as it has objectified
+itself in materiality). This means that it has no way of acting on the
+enemy, tomorrow or even tonight, other than by immediately acting
+upon itself.
+
+414 Book II
+This structure of common action was already implicit in the fusion,
+since the initial differentiations were, in effect, internal transformations
+of the group. However, the active and the passive were so closely
+intertwined that it was often impossible to tell whether the group
+differentiated itself through its struggle or whether it was differentiated
+by an enemy manoeuvre. 19 On the other hand, when the enemy does
+not realise itself as a controlling force, differentiation becomes, within
+the group, an action of the group on itself. In other words, by becoming
+its own immediate objective, the group becomes a means of future
+action. We may speak here of reflection, in the strictly practical sense:
+the group, waiting for the attack, looks for positions to occupy,
+divides itself so as to man all of them, distributes weapons, assigns
+patrol duties to some, and scouting or guard duties to others, establishes communications - even of the crudest sort, a mere warning
+shout - and in this way, in the free exploitation of places and resources,
+it constitutes itself for itself as a group. Its objective is indeed a new
+statute, in which individuals and sub-groups take on various functions
+in, by and for it, and so intensify its power, and strengthen its unity.
+It is impossible to deny that it posits itself for itself once it has survived
+its victory. Or, to put it another way, there is a new structure to be
+explained: group consciousness as the transcendence by every third party
+of his being-in-the-group towards a new integration. We must examine
+the dialectical problem of unity and differentiation in this light. Are
+these two practices initially incompatible? Or does one arise as a
+transcendence and strengthening of the other?
+Furthermore, the problem of the surviving group (for it begins by
+surviving its original praxis) suddenly becomes connected for us with
+the problem of being, that is to say, of permanence. So far we have seen
+only two sorts of permanence, the first being the inert synthesis of the
+inorganic, the second, biological integration. Can the group transcend
+both? Or will it be constructed on the model of one or other of them?
+From the moment in which the pressure drops, the chances of dispersive massification increase: every third party can see behind him his
+common action, and can also perceive it ahead of him in a produced
+object (or in the ruins of a destroyed object); and, as we have seen, this
+19. Or by tactical mistakes: in thoughtlessly attacking one part of the group,
+vithout seeing the other elements emerging from other streets, the body of
+soldiers or police will constitute these new arrivals as encirclers or define them by
+the opportunity it offers them of attacking from behind.
+
+The Statutory Group 415
+perception of common objectification is a group structure (the crowd
+visits its conquest, the Bastille). But as the urgency disappears, group
+behaviour may also be broken. For the common perception of objectification is neither necessary (for every third party) nor urgent: besides,
+all it does is relate the group's past-being to its present totalising
+practice as its sole reason. The group comes in order to see itself in its
+past victory; that is to say, it takes itself as its own end, first of all
+implicitly (seeing the Bastille conquered, the fortress finally reduced to
+impotence) and then explicitly (the lowered draw-bridges, the prisoners,
+the free movement in the courtyards and halls, all reflecting, in the
+practico-inert, the action which changed their statute. To this extent,
+then, reflexivity comes to the group from its past praxis, in so far as the
+produced object designates the group to itself as a group - to precisely
+the extent that this object appears only to an unfolding group praxis.
+But this object designates it to every third party in a synthetic opposition of two statutes: outside, past, inert, inscribed in things, the group
+is already made of marble and steel; its object-being (the Bastille) is
+the real preservation of its past-being (practical struggle and victory)
+in so far as this past being is in itself inertia (transcended being). 20
+But in so far as its praxis of disclosure is common, and in so far as
+the common object refers of itself to this community, the practical link
+appears as developing disintegration. Indeed, from one point of view, the
+only reason for the regroupment here is the common object, in so far
+as it has to be perceived in common. Thus the immense pressures
+which caused the liquidation of seriality have temporarily disappeared;
+in this way, the regulatory third party has practically nothing left to
+regulate: the 'order' no longer has any meaning simply because there
+is very little left to do apart from reactulising the common objectification. The people may be united to one another by an immense
+20. It would be impossible to devise a theory of individual and group memory
+here. This problem is central in any study of groups, whatever its purpose. But it
+lies beyond the range of the present investigation. It should however be observed
+that the structure of inertia of the past (as transcended being) is not its only determination: it derives a practical structure from the transcendence itself in so far as
+it preserves it in its movement. It would also be necessary to describe the past as
+exis both in the practical organism and in the group. Organic exis is itself the
+object of a transcendence (there is no habit which is not also an adaptation to the
+present on the basis of the future); the exis of organisation, as we shall see, can be
+transcended, but need not necessarily be so. In any case, it is sufficient here to note
+that I consider the group in its relations to a certain structure of the past rather
+than to the past as a complex reality within the dialectic.
+
+416 Book II
+collective pride (or any other common conduct), but this is not very
+relevant: the behaviour of the third party always manifests itself as the
+same here as anywhere else in the group, but it no longer has practical
+efficacity. Multiplicity remains interiorised (we visit the site of our
+struggle), but it does not have any real effect. (Though it may have an
+effect on the group itself: we come in large numbers to inspect our
+victory, therefore we still hold fast. Or again: we can feel confident, etc.
+This is an example of what I shall call propaganda as immediacy: a
+finality without an agent and without a project.) Certain actions can be
+regarded as true regulations: someone dares to push open a door and
+go into a dark room; then some other daredevils follow on his heels:
+but the real aim - such as free access to the conquered Bastille - is not
+directly connected to these initiatives; even if the door had not been
+pushed open, the crowd would still have enjoyed its great victory. And
+even at the time there is no way of telling for certain whether these
+unnecessary (si peu exigées) actions, which are already dispersing, are
+totalising and common actions, or whether they are contagious or
+quasi-serial. In short, the being-of-the-group is the unity of all outside
+themselves in the produced object and the group praxis is weakened
+by the very movement by which it tries to appropriate the object.
+Total disintegration (which would mean the disappearance of the
+common object as such) does not actually ever occur, because everyone
+is still linked to the object by other practices of appropriation unfolding
+through other third parties as the same: one person climbs on to the
+battlements, and another plants a flag. All these slightly differentiated
+practices run through the common object (like shivers), and so it is
+revealed to me by them too and therefore appears to me - illusorily - as
+a still developing objectification of the common action. No matter: this
+tension within survival expresses for every third party the double
+danger which threatens the group: being incorporated into a passive
+synthesis of the practico-inert field (a 'monument to the dead") or
+dissolving into a new serial gathering. This tension, lived by the third
+party, is in fact a sudden flash of awareness, to the extent that it reveals
+the group in danger and that it transcends itself - by revealing itself
+towards a new end, that is to say, towards the preservation of the
+group, as a free practical unity, against this double danger. In particular,
+this aim will appear in urgency, when struggles threaten to begin
+again, or when a surprise attack is expected. The group becomes the
+common objective in everyone: its permanence must be secured. But
+the tension which we have just explained posits a common exigency:
+
+the permanence of the group cannot be either the loosening of the
+common bond, threatening to tip the group back into seriality (either
+suddenly or gradually), or the practico-inert inertia of objectification,
+which is simply a being-outside-oneself, and which by its very structure
+contradicts freedom itself as a common violation of necessity.?1 In
+other words, the group as survival, between a completed action and an
+imminence in absence, posits itself for itself as an immediate objective,
+both from the point of view of its practical structure (differentiation
+and unity) and from the point of view of its ontological statute. Of
+course, it is still a mere means; but it is a means to be worked on - in the
+same way that a tool must be an immediate aim to the extent that
+essential ends depend on its manufacture.
+2
+The Pledge
+It will be immediately obvious that initially the ontological statute is
+the most important: in a first moment of the dialectic, in fact, the
+relation of unity to differentiation depends on permanence. If the
+existence of the group in itself resists the forces of dissolution, divisions
+into sub-groups according to the needs of the struggle and of work
+will not pose any threat to its unity. But in a second moment, as we
+shall see, unity as praxis will become the very foundation of the
+ontological statute.
+In the first moment, the group, positing itself for itself through the
+third party and by the reflection of transcendent unity as inertia onto
+totalisation in interiority as praxis in the process of dispersal, requires
+a contradictory statute, because the group desires permanence in the
+form in which it derives it from inertia and from free totalising praxis
+or, to put it differently, because it desires that totalisation in its very
+freedom should be subject to the ontological statute of inert synthesis.
+21. This practico-inert being-outside-itself effectively threatens to subject the
+common action in its objective result to a new alienation: the alienation of the
+group itself as a group in the alienated world. We shall see that it cannot avoid it.
+But the spontaneous movement is to avoid it: simply because it perpetuates itself
+in freedom.
+
+428 Book II
+It is the actual conditions of survival which drive it back into this
+contradiction: the common praxis is freedom itself doing violence to
+necessity. But if circumstances demand the persistence of the group (as
+an organ of defence, of vigilance, etc.), while people's hearts are
+untouched by any urgency or hostile violence, which might occasion
+common praxis; if its praxis, turning back upon itself, in the form of
+organisation and differentiation, demands the unity of its members as
+the pre-existing foundation of all its transformations, then this unity
+can exist only as an inert synthesis within freedom itself. This moment
+of the fused group, in which everyone is the same, here, in some
+exhausting and dangerous action, which itself becomes the universal
+measure of everyone's action, must perpetuate itself for everyone in
+separation and in waiting and perhaps in isolation (in the case of a
+guard, for example); any particular sub-group must be able to retain
+in itself, in so far as it becomes regulatory, a free but given link with
+every other third party as regulatory and as totalised. This opaque
+elsewhere, which congeals around it and isolates it (night, silence, the
+special dangers of the situation), retains the fundamental structure of a
+here, despite all the appearances of alterity; in short, the really other
+action of the sub-group (which is on patrol, while the others are behind
+the barricades or at the windows of houses) is designated from its very
+foundation as the same, here and everywhere. But since in fact its
+alterity is real, this determination of unity can come to it only from the
+group as a lived permanence which imposes itself through dispersal.
+This ontological structure of the group therefore involves an inversion. Of course, it is always a means in relation to the final objective
+(which is complete victory). But in relation to the praxis of differentiated waiting, it has to posit itself as a pre-existing agent. Praxis is the
+only real unity of the fused group: it is praxis which creates the group,
+and which maintains it and introduces its first internal changes into it.
+In the moment of the praxis of organisation and anticipation, it is the
+group which guarantees that every separate action is a common action
+or, to put it differently, it is the group as a reality which produces the
+unity of the common praxis. My courage and endurance, during my
+lonely watch, will be proportional to the permanence within me of the
+group as a common reality.
+The dialectical exigency which I have just explained reveals itself to
+everyone, in the moment of survival, as a practical exigency: in fact, to
+the extent that the distribution of tasks determines itself on the basis of
+a near future, it entails mistrust of the future; it is in it, as a possibility
+
+419
+of dispersal, that the dissolving action of separation and of inactive
+activity first come to be feared. Suspicion appears within the group not
+as a characteristic of human nature, but as the behaviour appropriate
+to this contradictory structure of survival: it is simply the interiorisation of the dangers of seriality. (Interiorised multiplicity was really
+present in everyone as an immediately given power in the earlier
+skirmish; and this multiplicity remains; it is always instrumentalised,
+and it is what makes it possible to post guards, patrols and combat
+groups everywhere. But, at the same time, it passes over to a statute
+which is more concrete, in that it is diversified and structured, but less
+immediately understood, since it coins itself in isolation. Separation as
+the rational use of number is an inversion of immediate union, or a
+mechanical use of quantity. One does indeed turn out to be multiple,
+but in a situation which appears to have all the characteristics of the
+isolation of impotence). Besides, the possibility of free secession manifests itself as a structural possibility of every individual praxis; and this
+possibility reveals itself in every other third party as the same in so far
+as this particular third party, here, reveals it in them.
+Thus the ontological statute of the surviving group appears at first
+as the practical contrivance of a free, inert permanence of common
+unity in everyone. When freedom becomes common praxis and
+grounds the permanence of the group by producing its own inertia
+through itself and in mediated reciprocity, this new statute is called the
+pledge (le serment). It goes without saying that pledges can take very
+different forms, from the explicit act of swearing an oath (for example,
+the Tennis Court oath; an oath as the synthetic link between members
+of a medieval commune) to the implicit assumption of a pledge as the
+already existing reality of the group (for example, by those who are
+born into the group and who grow up among its members). In other
+words, the historical act of making a pledge in common, though it is
+universal and always corresponds to a surviving group's resistance to
+the divisive tendency of (spatio-temporal) distance and differentiation,
+is not the only possible form of the common pledge, in so far as the
+pledge is a guarantee against the future, inertia produced in immanence
+and by freedom, and the foundation of all differentiation. If we examine
+it in its explicit reality as a historical act - for example, the communal
+bond in the Middle Ages - this is only because this posits itself as such
+and shows its structures more clearly.
+A pledge is mediated reciprocity. All its derivative forms - for
+example a witness's oath in law, an individual swearing on the Bible,
+
+420 Book II
+etc. - derive their meaning from this basic form of pledge. But we must
+be careful not to confuse this with a social contract. We are not trying
+to describe the basis of particular societies - which, as we shall see,
+would be absurd; we are trying to explain the necessary transition from
+an immediate form of group which is in danger of dissolution to
+another form, which is reflexive but permanent.
+A pledge is a practical device. It cannot be presented as a possibility for the individual, unless it is assumed that the possibility is social
+and that it appears only on the basis of groups which are already bound
+by a pledge. As we have seen, the abstract experience of the practical
+organism, in so far as its praxis is a constituent dialectic, can give us
+only the translucidity of an action which is defined by its objective and
+which exhausts itself in its objectification. But, in so far as it is the
+group itself as praxis, this invention is the negation of some exterior
+circumstance which defines it negatively (en creux). In other words, it
+is the affirmation by the third party of the permanence of the group as
+the negation of its exterior negation. And exterior negation must not
+be confused with the danger of extermination by the enemy (or by a
+cataclysm); it only involves the possibility that certain tasks involve
+the re-emergence of the multiplicity of alterity or of exteriority, and
+this re-emergence does not directly imply the annihilation of the individuals as such. In this sense, the pledge is an inert determination of the
+future: that is to say, this inertia is above all a negation of dialectic
+inside the dialectic. Regardless of subsequent developments of praxis, of
+the event, or of the developing totalisation (up to and including the
+level of historical totalisation), one element will remain non-dialectical:
+every member's common membership of the group. The group will
+enter into new dialectical combinations which will transform it as such,
+but this will not affect its common unity, that is to say, its interior
+statute as a group.2 The act of swearing an oath therefore consists in
+freely presenting the dispersal of the group in the future as an inert
+impossibility (as a permanent negation of certain possibilities within
+the field of possibilities) and, conversely, in bringing the future group
+to the present community as the limit to all possible transcendence.
+Here again we encounter the dialectical law which we met at the
+beginning of this investigation: the re-exteriorisation of inorganic
+inertia is the basis of instrumentality, that is, of the struggle against the
+22. I refer to the intended objective rather than to the real effect of historical
+developments on the group under consideration.
+
+The Statutory Group 422
+inertia of matter within the practical field. The group tries to make
+itself its own tool against the seriality which threatens to dissolve it; it
+creates a factitious inertia to protect it against the threats of the
+practico-inert.
+The device itself, that is to say, behaviour as immediate praxis,
+appears in the schema of intelligibility elucidated earlier. There is
+mediated reciprocity; whether or not it is spoken, the order: "swear'
+certainly represents the invention as the regulatory action of the third
+party in the existing group. But it should be observed that in the milieu
+of the same, the third party fears dispersive dissolution in the other third
+party as much as in himself: the possibility of his being isolated may
+come to him from the third party, but only to the extent that it can
+come to the third party from him, or even, to the extent that it can come
+to him through himself. This negative possibility is therefore in everyone and here the same, and the reverse of the praxis of the fused group
+as ubiquity. And it is the possibility in everyone of becoming other
+through the other third party, and for him, through himself and for
+himself. Thus, in the order: 'Let us swear, he claims an objective
+guarantee from the other third party that he will never become Other:
+whoever gives me this guarantee thereby protects me, as far as he is
+concerned, from the danger that Being-Other may come to me from the
+Other. But equally, if he were to swear alone (or if everyone swore
+except me, then I alone would thereby take responsibility for bringing
+alterity to the group. But in fact the act of making a pledge cannot be
+anything but common: the order is 'Let us swear'. This means that I
+also make myself, both in and for him, a guarantee that alterity cannot
+come to him through me (either directly, as would happen if I were to
+abandon him in the middle of a joint action on behalf of the group, or
+through the mediation of all, as would happen if, within the majority, I
+abandoned the struggle with them and fled or surrendered).
+This reciprocity is mediated: I give my pledge to all the third parties,
+as forming the group of which I am a member, and it is the group
+which enables everyone to guarantee the statute of permanence to
+everyone. A given third party can pledge the permanence of the group
+against alterity only in so far as this permanence depends on him, that
+is to say, in so far as the other third parties have assured him, on their
+account, of future unchangingness. For how could he guarantee that he
+will never be the Other, if he does not begin with the assurance that
+alterity will not come to him from outside and in spite of him (or
+unknown to him)? Indeed, it is characteristic of alterity to come to
+
+422 Book /1
+everyone through the Other. Thus my pledge to the third party receives
+at its source a dimension of community; it comes to touch everyone
+directly and through all. This common action of the third party realises
+itself as an objective structure of interiority and characterises the group
+as such. The pledge is not a subjective or merely verbal determination:
+it is a real modification of the group by my regulatory action. The inert
+negation of certain future possibilities is my bond of interiority with
+the sworn group to which I belong, in the sense that for everyone the
+same negation is conditioned by mine, in so far as it is his behaviour.
+Of course, it must be added that my own behaviour is itself conditioned
+by everyone else's. But this is not the most important point to emphasise: what appears at first, indeed, is that the guarantee of permanence
+provided by the oath of the Others produces itself in me as the objective impossibility (in interiority) that alterity should come to me from
+outside; but, at the same time, it is the possibility that I should make
+myself Other (by betraying, fleeing, etc.) which is underlined as a
+possible future coming from me to the Others. Now, this possibility
+may realise itself in the free development of my action: I may freely
+decide to abandon my post or to go over to the enemy. It goes without
+saying that the word 'freely' - here and elsewhere in this work - refers
+to the dialectical development of an individual praxis, born of need and
+transcending material conditions towards a definite objective. Betrayal
+and desertion, brought about by fear and suffering, are, therefore, from
+this point of view, free praxes in that they are organised behaviour in
+response to exterior threats. It is also clear that the fear of being afraid -
+for example, of letting the side down, of being the one through whom
+the group changes through panic into an inert mass - may be important
+for an inexperienced young combatant. He is afraid of this fear as an
+irresistible impulse and, at the same time, he rejects it as a free preference for his own safety over that of all. In this sense, my pledge
+becomes my surety for myself in that it is me offering myself, in every
+third party, as everyone's guarantee of not relapsing, in my person or
+through my conduct, into serial alterity. Thus, in making a pledge, the
+first movement is to swear so as to make the Others swear, through
+mediated reciprocity, that is to say, so as to guarantee oneself against
+the possibility that they will disperse. The second moment of the
+operation is to swear in order to protect oneself against oneself in the
+Others. It should also be noted that the second moment cannot be that
+of the totalising action of a regulatory third party: when I make a
+pledge, in fact, or when I swear or perform some equivalent act, I
+
+The Statutory Group 423
+remain in a relation of transcendence-immanence to the group as a
+whole, and through my behaviour I effect a totalising synthesis which
+does not actually integrate me into the whole. My making the pledge
+thereby reveals itself as common freedom, but not as the inert negation
+of my possibilities. In other words, I unveil my future behaviour and
+its objective, which is the permanence of the group; but I unveil them
+in freedom, that is to say, the description expresses an untranscendability which freedom, as practical transcendence, cannot produce of
+itself. To put the same point another way, by becoming a freedom
+which swears, it reproduces itself as a freedom to transcend (to change,
+to betray) the pledge if circumstances change. On the other hand, the
+pledge which I have made returns to me from the third party and reintegrates me into the group, in so far as it is a constitutive structure of
+his pledge: it is the third party who, by his pledge, reintegrates me into
+the group as a third party whose immutability is an objective condition
+over there of the pledge of another third party. The act of swearing,
+when performed by the third party, becomes in turn a regulatory and
+totalising praxis and I am synthetically united with Others in the
+community of a quasi-object. Now, this quasi-object is reinteriorised
+by the third party, who makes a pledge as the sworn permanence which
+can alone give meaning to the pledge. My 'sworn faith' is reflected to
+me as a surety against my freedom, through that of the third party: in
+fact it is this which gives him a real possibility of swearing, since it is
+because of it (and, of course, because of everyone else's) that the
+possibility of relapsing into alterity no longer depends on him alone.
+(How could he for his part pledge the permanence of the unity, if this
+permanence were not constituted everywhere else except in his own
+freedom, if it was in danger of being broken at every point and at every
+moment?) Insured against my possible betrayal, he is in a position to
+affirm to all that he will not be the one through whom betrayal comes.
+But this totalisation is also the moment in which a new sort of
+alterity emerges. In so far as, with the others, I am a common condition
+of the pledge for the third party, I already am permanence. My pledge
+is not a mere free act or a mere set of words describing my future
+behaviour and its possible developments: in so far as a third party
+constitutes it as such by basing his own pledge upon it, it is already the
+untranscendable, and therefore inert, negation of any possibility that I
+may change, regardless of the circumstances. And when the third party
+addresses me (and, as we have seen, he does this both indirectly and
+directly) his regulatory pledge is addressed to everyone who has
+
+424 Book II
+already assumed permanence or, to be more precise, he constitutes me
+as such simply by transcending my pledge through his. Thus I turn out
+to be Other than myself within my own free praxis simply because its
+untranscendability comes from the other third party, that is to say, in
+fact, from all the third parties who have sworn, are swearing, or are
+going to swear, although I entirely accept my pledge. For the guarantee
+which I give to a particular third party is guaranteed by everyone and
+it is also the same (in the totalising synthesis of the third party) as that
+of all; it therefore turns out to be, for the regulatory third party, my
+common-being as untranscendability. And in this way it returns to me
+through everyone's pledge; that is to say, the group to which I belong
+becomes, in me, the common-being as Other-Being as a limit of my
+freedom: in fact this limit as untranscendability is different from free
+praxis and can come to it only from the Other. Or, to put it differently,
+it is this common Other-Being, which I am for the same, here (anywhere, which is the basis of his pledge to remain the same in so far as
+his oath is the same as mine.
+It may be objected that my action here, in the fused group (work or
+combat), already allows and conditions that of the Other (of the same
+in that Other over there). And this is true: but the action conditions it in
+and through the object. It is the enemy held down and the task completed (by me, or us) which objectively determines the possibilities of
+action for a given third party. Similarly, everyone features as a unit in
+the interiorised multiplicity: but in everyone's act of interiorisation
+every third party figures (through mediated reciprocity chiefly as a
+transcendence of this inert separation by the interiorisation of the
+multiple. In other words, in the fused group, the third party is never
+other: he produces his action in the object as the objective condition of
+my own action or, through the mediation of the group, his free praxis,
+in its real living development, conditions mine to the extent that it is the
+same (that is to say, a free dialectical development) and that it is
+conditioned by it. Besides, the results of this reciprocity of conditioning
+are to be read in the group as an objective reality (its growth) rather
+than in the free action of every individual. Free reciprocity in the
+regroupment so arranges things that we come to the group as two. But
+"two' characterises neither my act of going to the group nor that of the
+third party, although both reinteriorise the quantity. On the contrary,
+the pledge is an act which refers to free praxis as such and tries freely
+to limit this freedom, from within. It would be absurd to suppose that
+an individual freedom could be limited by itself, except through some
+
+425
+form of unpredictability (that is to say, the opposite form from that of
+the pledge: if circumstances were to change in some way or other I
+would be unable to predict sincerely what I would do), since praxis is
+the transcendence of conditions, it is adaptation to transformations of
+the practical field. This does not mean, of course, that we are uncertain,
+that we lack basic projects, acquired structures of predictables: quite
+the reverse.
+But even if these conditions, transcended and preserved by freedom,
+did enable us to predict everything (as with an agent who is completely
+contained within the practico-inert field), they are exactly the opposite
+of a pledge: through a pledge, freedom gives itself a practical certainty
+for cases in which (because circumstances vary) future behaviour is
+unpredictable. This is possible only in so far as freedom is other for
+itself - that is to say, in so far as it is no longer simply the transparency
+of an urgent adaptation to the exigencies of need and to the dangers of
+the field. And this alterity can come to freedom only from the Other.
+If, however, we do not relapse (at least not yet) into seriality, this is
+because the Other is being regarded here in his practice, that is to say,
+as power and as freedom; and this activity affects me as a hardening
+against the world of impotence and seriality. In short, the third party
+remains the same for me (he freely does what I do, when I do it: his
+pledge, like mine, is regulatory in mediated reciprocity; but through
+the practical activity of the third party, in so far as it is the same, I come
+back to myself as the unshakable common condition of his possibility.
+The deep reason for this completely formal, negative alterity is that the
+group takes itself as its own objective. Thus every action of every third
+party must have every other third party (and all) as its objective, and as
+its means and agent (in so far as he takes it up or transcends it and
+organises it for Others); and, instead of transcending itself towards the
+object, every action turns out to be in an object which manifests itself
+as homogeneous. Thus, by appearing as an aim and revealing itself as
+a common praxis which has to be sustained, the group reveals every
+praxis, in formalism (if not in inaction, since there is such a thing as an
+activity of surviving communities), as the condition and means of
+every Other, in so far as this Other is the same. In practical reflection,
+everyone returns to himself in so far as he positively conditions the free
+action of every third party by negatively limiting his own. But the
+project of limitation returns to him (through a freedom which makes a
+pledge) as an exigency in him for everyone's freedom, that is to say,
+both as his freedom as an Other and as the freedom of the Others. The
+
+42G Book Il
+moment of making the pledge is - in spite of the words that are spoken
+- only a project which announces itself with an urgency and affirmative
+force which are conditioned by the real organism, by need, by danger,
+etc.; or rather it would be, if it could be separated, for one individual,
+from the common pledge. But if this moment is, also, that of all the
+pledges returning upon mine, 1 become in everyone the transcended
+condition of free praxis (sure of myself and of the Others, no one need
+concern himself with anything outside his specialised task) and, in so
+far as this free common praxis returns to me as a condition of my own
+freedom (I, too, must rely on them in performing my task, either on
+my own or in a sub-group), it constitutes the untranscendability of
+being-in-the-group as an exigency.
+Exigency, as we saw in our discussion of the practico-inert, is a
+claim made on some praxis by an inorganic materiality (and, of course,
+through some other praxis). Exigency, in this context, has the same
+characteristics, but it is the agents themselves that are inorganic inertia.
+To the extent that the permanence of my membership of the group is
+my own free project, this permanence is for my action an objective
+situated in the future, and coming to me on the basis of future dangers.
+But this project of itself makes a claim on every member of the group,
+in that it can be carried out for and by everyone only in and through
+the permanence of the group, everywhere. In so far as the same project
+becomes, through my free pledge, a complete response, deliberately
+given by me, to this claim in the third party, it returns to me through
+the third party: as faith sworn to the Other - and in the Other - it is,
+therefore, a limitation on my freedom. Now this limitation conditions
+the possibility of his free pledge, that is to say, of that free limitation
+which I need in order to be free. Thus my project returns to me as its
+own negative, inert condition: for me to be able to rely on the group
+in separation, everyone must be able to rely upon me; I can claim that
+they will sustain the limitation of their own possibilities (of betraying,
+of disbanding, of slackening their activity, their work, etc.) as an
+impossibility of changing only if I yield to their claim on my freedom,
+for example, as the necessary condition of the calm with which they
+will carry out a dangerous task, certain that everyone everywhere is
+doing everything to guarantee their maximum security. Yes, in this
+dangerous mission which may save us, or save me in the totality, I exist
+in everyone as his trust and courage, that is to say, as the immutability
+of all the Others; through every concrete action performed elsewhere,
+the future negative therefore appears in my action as my exigency upon
+
+42J
+myself in so far as it is the claim of all the Others on me (and on all the
+Others). The inorganic, in this context, is the rigid, non-dialectical
+future, and this future is posited both as an impenetrable framework
+and as the basis of any dialectical praxis: a framework because whatever
+my acts may be, they cannot destroy the permanence of the group; and
+a basis, because as long as the group still has an urgent objective, any
+activity must tend to sustain the powers and practical efficacity of the
+group. On the basis of this untranscendability, I will set myself tasks
+(or be given some), which can be achieved only through free, practical
+development. This triple character of untranscendability (the exigency,
+framework, and basis of any praxis) may have given the impression
+that the reflected group becomes the basis of a new dialectic (as praxis),
+whereas it is really constituted by the original dialectic, of which
+permanence is simply a negative determination.
+For clarity, I have distinguished two moments: that of the project
+being announced, and that of the pledge of the Other which returns to
+me. But it goes without saying that this purely formal distinction was
+intended to explicate the structures of the pledge. In other words, the
+project (as the dialectical transcendence of material conditions) is still
+the fundamental movement. But it is obvious that for everyone, even
+before the Others make their pledge, it is already a pledge. My point has
+simply been that it could be so only through the Others. A pledge
+necessarily involves the following: (I) the characteristics of an order,
+of a regulatory action, whose (reflected) aim is to involve third parties:
+Ioffer myself so that they can offer themselves; the offer of my services
+(my life, etc.) is already the same as theirs. At this level, my commitment
+(engagement) is a reciprocal commitment, mediated by the third
+party. (2) The characteristic of a manipulation of myself: to swear is to
+give what one does not possess in order that the Others shall give it to
+you so that one can keep one's word: I define the permanence of the
+group as my untranscendability in a practical movement of all which,
+through the totalisation of pledges, must confer on me this untranscendability as a negative limit and as an absolute exigency. These two
+characteristics are indissolubly linked; in so far as each of them is a
+claim made upon the other third party or myself, through the mediation
+of the third party, these claims are immediately satisfied by the pledges
+of all the Others. In fact, although the actual giving of the pledges may
+be successive (each representative of the Third Estate in turn signing
+the proceedings in the Jeu de Paume) and thus involve a quite formal
+seriality, the entire real moment of the common action is contained in
+
+428 Book II
+the order 'Let us swear' - that is to say, in the common decision to
+swear. At the moment of the decision, the pledge still lies in the future,
+but its signification - as an immediate objective of the group and as a
+means of maintaining the permanence required by certain more distant
+objectives - presents it to everyone as a common operation, or, in
+other words, as the group acting on itself through every member. Thus
+even if the pledge of one third party is given before that of others (for
+example, in the serial order of signing), it can never fail: it temporalises
+itself in an already limited temporality which contains in advance the
+pledges of all. In a sense, to say 'Let us swear' is to swear: the possibility of a disagreement about this is in fact normally purely formal. If
+the pledge is recreated, this is because objective circumstances already
+constitute it as the group's only reflexive means of preserving its unity.
+It should be defined as everyone's freedom guaranteeing the security
+of all so that this security can return to everyone as his other-freedom
+so as to ground his free, practical membership of the group as an
+untranscendable exigency. Indeed, after the pledge, as before, the third
+party makes himself a member of the group through his common praxis,
+and therefore in freedom: this means that his very action develops in
+dialectical freedom, either within a sub-group or as the common praxis
+of an isolated individual. The pledge is simply the coincidence, at the
+source of his practice, of the security of the absent third parties (which
+he guarantees) and of his own security (guaranteed by the third
+parties). Exigency and untranscendable permanence as an inert negation of possibilities reveal themselves under the influence of definite
+conditions (actions of the enemy, for example, such as terror, torture,
+or separate offers to negotiate, etc.).
+3 Fraternity and Fear
+At this level of description, it is at last possible to pose the question of
+intelligibility. In fact, we shall discover the intelligibility proper to the
+pledge if we can solve two problems. First, since the pledge comes to
+the surviving group through third parties and in mediated reciprocity,
+our investigation must grasp the dialectical continuity (that is to say,
+the free development) which always constitutes the re-creation of
+sivorn faith. In other words, the individual project and the common
+
+429
+praxis of the fused group are comprehensible realities; our investigation
+must establish whether the re-creation of the pledge is a dialectical process, capable of being understood on the basis of concrete circumstances. Secondly, the structures of the common pledge, as elucidated
+here, at first appear to have a sort of abstract ideality: the reason for this
+is that the pledge as an action of the group on itself does not at first
+appear as a modification by the effort (by work and combat) of the
+material statute of the group, but as an immobile contraction of its
+bonds. Of course, language is materiality, action is effort. But neither
+the repetition of orders by a hundred mouths, nor the raising of hands,
+can be compared with the exhausting work of construction or of combat. In our descriptions of the fused group, meanings (significations)
+corresponded to the creation of a common praxis both as a real consumption of energy and as a directed modification of the environment.
+Thus the group really constructed itself as a whole produced by work,
+through sweat and toil, to precisely the extent that its common effort
+inscribed it in Being. Compared with this enormous dialectical event,
+which can also be seen simply in terms of energy transformations, the
+moment of the pledge appears as a moment of ideality. Moreover, the
+unity of the fused group derived its materiality from the intolerable
+pressure of the enemy group; it was the interiorisation and inversion of
+this pressure (of this totalising destruction). The unity of the pledged
+group, by way of contrast, in so far as it comes from it alone and from
+a possible but not yet actual attack, seems to be a mere play of signs and
+meanings; nothing material really unites me to the third parties. And if
+the pledge were simply a reciprocal determination of discourse, it
+would not explain the adhesive force which causes me, while isolated
+and under enemy pressure, to have the feeling of being a member of the
+group. In the case of differentiated dispersal, in fact, the action of the
+enemy tends (directly or indirectly, and whether deliberately or not) to
+accentuate isolation (in contrast to what happens in a fused group). In
+the face of death or torture, common interest is in danger of giving
+way to immediate necessity (avoidance of death or pain): it would be
+almost impossible to believe that the operation described above could,
+on its own, constitute the untranscendability of the group in these
+circumstances as an irresistible force of inertia.
+These two problems are really identical; we will solve them together
+and through each other. For, though we have described the internal
+structures of the pledged group, we have not grasped the true, immediate meaning of the pledge as freely re-created by the third party.
+
+430 Book II
+The origin of the pledge, in effect, is fear (both of the third party and
+of myself). The common object exists; indeed it is common interest in
+so far as it negates a community of destiny. But a reduction of enemy
+pressure while the threat persists, entails the unveiling of a new danger
+for everyone: that of the gradual disappearance of the common interest
+and the reappearance of individual antagonisms or of serial impotence.
+This reflexive fear is born of a real contradiction: the danger still exists
+(it may even be objectively more serious - the enemy may have obtained
+reinforcements), but it becomes distant, and moves to the level of
+signification, and does not arouse enough fear. Reflexive fear, for the
+third party, is born when no one - not even him - is sufficiently afraid.
+The change of state which characterises the surviving group is its very
+vulnerability: assuming it does not disintegrate, there is no guarantee
+that attack would give it back its statute as a fused group. Reflexive fear
+is lived entirely in the concrete, through real facts: one man being
+exhausted, another wounded, and a third asleep, myself having an
+argument with a fourth, and so on. And the transcendence of this
+developing dissolution by the third party can occur only through the
+negation of the circumstances which condition it, that is to say, by the
+negation of the absence of fear.
+The fundamental re-creation, within the pledge, is the project of
+substituting a real fear, produced by the group itself, for the retreating
+external fear, whose very distance is deceptive. And we have already
+encountered this fear as a free product of the group, and as a coercive
+action of freedom against serial dissolution; we have seen it appear
+momentarily during the action itself; and it is called Terror. Terror,
+we said, is common freedom violating necessity, in so far as necessity
+exists only through the alienation of some freedom. Through the third
+party who reveals the group as threatened by death in his own person
+and in that of the Others, transcendence reaffirms the group as a threat
+of immediate death for any praxis which tried to become individual
+again and relapse into seriality. The group as action upon itself, at the
+level of survival, can only be coercive. The regulatory third party
+reveals that the diminishing fear of danger is the real threat, and that it
+must be counteracted by an increasing fear of destroying the group
+itself. The aim is the same: to protect the common interest. But, in the
+absence of any material pressure, the group must produce itself as a
+pressure on its members. And this re-creation is in no way idealist, for
+it presents itself concretely as a set of real means (accepted for everyone
+by all) of establishing in the group a reign of absolute violence over its
+
+431
+members. It does not matter much whether statutes are laid down, and
+organs of supervision and policing created (as in some developed
+groups) or whether the pledge simply gives everyone, as a member of
+the group, the right of life and death over everyone, either as an
+individual or as a member of a series. The essential point is that the
+transformation lies in the risk of death which, as a possible agent of
+dispersal, everyone runs within the group. On the other hand, this
+violence is free: for present purposes, it is irrelevant that, historically
+and in particular circumstances, some elements of the community may
+have usurped it for their own advantage: we shall return to this point.
+What matters is that no usurpation of violence (or conquest of power)
+can be intelligible unless violence is initially a particular, real, practical
+bond between freedoms within common action - in other words,
+unless this violence is the kind of action on itself of the pledged group,
+in so far as this action is re-created, carried out and accepted by all.
+But this is precisely what a pledge is: namely the common production, through mediated reciprocity, of a statute of violence; once the
+pledge has been made, in fact, the group has to guarantee everyone's
+freedom against necessity, even at the cost of his life and in the name of
+freely sworn faith. Everyone's freedom demands the violence of all
+against it and against that of any third party as its def ence against itself
+(as a free power of secession and alienation). To swear is to say, as a
+common individual: you must kill me if I secede. And this demand has
+no other aim than to install Terror within myself as a free defence
+against the fear of the enemy (at the same time as reassuring me about
+the third party who will be confirmed by the same Terror). At this
+level, the pledge becomes a material operation. The first moment, 'Let
+us swear', corresponds to the practical transformation of the common
+statute: the common freedom constitutes itself as Terror. The second
+moment - the successive or simultaneous giving of pledges - is a
+materialisation of Terror, its embodiment in a material object (swearing
+on the sword; signing the text of the common pledge or creating organs
+of coercion). Thus the intelligibility of the pledge derives from the fact
+that it is a rediscovery and an affirmation of violence as a diffuse structure of the fused group and that it transforms it reflexively into a
+statutory structure of common relations. In fact, to precisely the extent
+that the relations of the third parties are mediated, that is to say, to the
+extent that they pass through all, the character of violence cannot be
+detected in them: they are the free common relations of members of the
+group as such. But as soon as the danger of disintegration appears,
+
+432 Book II
+every third party produces himself for everyone else as the one who
+passes sentence in the name of the group and who then carries out the
+sentence (or, conversely, as the one on whom the sentence will be
+executed by everyone else). But, at the same time, everyone has constituted himself as demanding to be defended against himself and as
+accepting the sentence, whatever it may be. And Terror comes to
+everyone - even before any particular risk - from his structure of
+immanence-transcendence: at the very moment when the synthetic,
+totalising operation of his praxis becomes a pure designation of the
+totalising third party as a third party to be integrated, the real danger of
+falling out of the group is lived in practice in and through this impossible integration. The material force which unites the sworn parties is
+the force of the group as a totalisation which threatens to totalise itself
+without them (if they lost sight of the common interest) and this force
+as the coercive power of a hostile totality is, for everyone, directly
+and constantly, the possibility of losing his life. In this sense, being-inthe-group as an untranscendable limit produces itself as the certainty
+of death should the limit be transcended.
+From this point of view, it does not matter whether the pledge, as a
+material operation, involves some transcendent (transcendant) being
+(the Cross, the Bible, or God himself) or whether it remains in common
+immanence. In either case, transcendence (la transcendance) is present
+in the pledged group as the absolute right of all over every individual:
+in other words, the statute does not present itself as a mere practical
+formation which is provisionally adopted because it is best suited to the
+circumstances; it is posited by everyone's freedom as demanded by it and
+all the third parties, against it and against any failings of the Others. Its
+transcendence (that is to say, its permanent, absolute right to manifest
+itself in a sentence of death for anyone) is based on freedom's affirmation
+of itself as justified violence against the practico-inert. Thus God, or
+the Cross, do not add anything to this character which is, so to speak,
+for the first time, the positing of man as the absolute power of man over
+man (in reciprocity). But, conversely, when the pledge, in a profoundly
+religious society, is given under the eye of God and calls for divine
+punishment of anyone who violates it (damnation, etc.), this commitment to God is only a substitute for immanent integration. God
+becomes responsible for executing the lofty tasks of the group; he is,
+as it were, a substitute for the executioner. It might even be thought
+that damnation takes the place of capital punishment (since it is taken
+to be real and has the same function as death); but in fact, if the pledge
+
+433
+is betrayed, divine sanctions in no way prevent the group from executing the traitor: the right of life and death - however linked to the
+transcendent - is the very statute of the group.
+A free attempt to substitute the fear of all for the fear of oneself and
+of the Other in and through everyone, in so far as it suddenly reactualises violence as the intelligible transcendence of individual
+alienation by common freedom: that is what pledges are. They are
+completely intelligible because they are the free transcendence of
+already given elements towards an already posited objective in so far as
+this transcendence is conditioned by concrete circumstances which prefigure it negatively (en creux) (a destiny to be negated). But the structures of freedom and reciprocity which we examined at the beginning,
+far from disappearing, take on their full meaning when they manifest
+themselves in the practical material movement of terror. It is still true
+that my pledge is a guarantee for the other third party; but the meaning
+of this guarantee is precisely violence. The third party is guaranteed
+against my free betrayal by the right which I have granted everyone
+(including him) to eliminate me in the event of my failure, and by the
+Terror which the common right establishes within me and which I have
+demanded; and this guarantee - which deprives him of any excuse in
+the event of dispersal or betrayal - means that he can freely guarantee
+his own solidarity (freely demand Terror for himself).
+Thus I encounter Terror within myself as exigency. In other words,
+the fundamental statute of the pledged group is Terror; but, if circumstances are not specially restrictive, I can remain at the level of exigency
+and untranscendability. For the pledge is a free relation of free commitments. At this level, I perceive the exigency only as my committed
+freedom in the other and as the exigency of myself towards the Other.
+If the pressure increases, the same relation reveals itself in its fundamental structure: I have freely consented to the liquidation of my person as free constituent praxis, and this free consent returns to me as the
+free primacy of the Other's freedom over my own, that is to say, as the
+right of the group over my praxis. Here again, it does not matter
+whether this right is conceived as a duty towards the group (that is to
+say, concretely as an imperative negation of a possibility: this obviously
+has nothing to do with morals or even with codes) or whether it is
+conceived as a power of the group, consented to by me, of taking my
+life if I do not act in accordance with a given directive. For us, and in
+this moment of our investigation, this makes no difference: these different
+forms of behaviour are in fact conditioned by circumstances and they
+
+434 Book II
+constitute themselves in their situation. The important point is that
+within itself, and implicitly, the concrete duty contains death as a
+possible destiny for me; or, conversely, that the right of the group
+determines me, in so far as it is agreed.
+This statute of the pledged group is, in any case, crucial: indeed, it
+might be said that our dialectical investigation has led us to elucidate
+the original practical, and created (and constantly re-created) relation
+between active men within an active community. The group as
+permanence is, in effect, an instrument constructed in concrete circumstances, on the basis of a fused group (or at least, this is how it appears
+in our dialectical investigation). And this construction, which is
+common, or effected by every third party as a common individual, can
+never be reduced to 'natural', 'spontaneous' or 'immediate' relations. It
+occurs, in effect, when external conditions have occasioned a reflexive
+praxis within a surviving group: the nature of the danger and of the
+task implies that the group - in so far as it is threatened with dissolution
+- posits itself as a means of its praxis and a means to be consolidated.
+Thus the relations between members of the group establish themselves
+in a community which is acting on itself; they are pierced by this subjective praxis and conditioned by it. However, we have already seen
+that the coercive character of the group derives from the fact that it
+does not have existence (like an organism) or being (like a material
+totality). At this level, the group, as a reality, is initially no more than
+the impossibility for everyone of abandoning the common praxis. To
+put it differently, its being is for everyone a pledge of death as the inert
+negation of any possibility of strictly individual action.
+This being is, as we have seen, an Other-Being for every free praxis.
+But still we do not relapse into seriality, since, for each third party, this
+Other-Being is the same Other-Being as for his neighbour. In this sense,
+violence is everywhere Terror as the first common statute. But this
+Terror, as long as unity has not been destroyed by circumstances, is a
+terror which unites rather than a terror which separates. Indeed, in so
+far as these men have constituted themselves by their pledges as
+common individuals, they find their own Terror, in one another, as the
+same; here and everywhere they live their grounded (that is to say,
+limited) freedom as their being-in-the-group, and their being-in-thegroup as the being of their freedom. In this sense, Terror is their primary
+unity in so far as it is the power of freedom over necessity in everyone.
+In other words, being-in-the-group is, for everyone, an intermediary
+between free common praxis (for simplicity, we assume that the action
+
+The Statutory Group 435
+has not yet begun) and the statute of serial impotence. It is the statutory
+guarantee, freely demanded, that no one will relapse into the practicoinert field and that individual action, in so far as it becomes common, as
+such escapes from alienation (even if the total praxis of the group
+relapses into it). As a reflexive construction, this guarantee is everyone's
+solicitude for everyone, but this solicitude is a bearer of death. But still,
+it is through this mortal solicitude that man as a common individual is
+created, in and by everyone (and by himself), as a new entity; and the
+violent negation of certain future possibilities is, for him, indistinguishable from this statute of created novelty. In the pledged group, the
+fundamental relation between all the third parties is that they created
+themselves together from the clay of necessity. It is on this basis that
+their immediate relations of reciprocity established themselves. Everyone recognises violence in the other third party as the agreed impossibility of turning back, of reverting to the statute of sub-humanity 23 and
+as the perpetuation of the violent movement which created him as a
+common individual. But, of course, this recognition is both practical
+and concrete. It is concrete because every third party recognises the
+members of the group not as abstract men (or abstract instances of the
+genus), but as sworn members of a particular species - a species which
+is connected with concrete circumstances, with objectives, and with the
+pledge. It is practical because it is the pledge itself renewing itself
+through some particular act of reciprocity (he helps me, does me a good
+turn, etc.) and presenting itself as its fundamental structure. This is
+particularly evident in the case of public or clandestine mutual aid
+groups, but this case is more complex than those we are examining here.
+And as every pledge is conditioned by that of all, since ultimately it is
+that of all which provides the basis in everyone, in his inert-being, of the
+freedom of the common individual, recognition is simultaneously
+recognition in everyone of his freedom (in a double form: committed
+freedom and the freedom of free practical development following
+commitment) through the freedom of the other, and an affirmation of
+membership of the group.
+Totalisation, in this context, is simply the reactualisation of the
+statute everywhere (that is to say, in everything here and now). It
+presents itself both as having been performed once and for all and as
+23. I use this term without giving it any definite content and because it seems
+to me to mark, at every stage, the relation between a group which posits itself for
+itself and the passivity of the practico-inert field.
+
+436 Book Il
+having to be constantly reactualised. In the act of constructing the
+pledge, in fact, an object is created (in the 'historic' moment in which
+the decision was taken): this material object retains in its materiality the
+historical pledge as an untranscendable past. The objectification of the
+fused group (a fortress taken and dismantled, etc.) is not abandoned;
+on the contrary, it becomes the material realisation of an archaic unity,
+the moment of common rising. But it is another, earlier mode of
+reality: the signed agreement and the actual place where the pledge
+was made appear, at the level of the pledged group, as the group's
+force of inertia, as the perseverance of the being-in-the-group in its
+being against internal and external threats. It is the indissoluble reciprocity of significations between, on the one hand, the inorganic
+materiality of the fact, revealing here and now, on the basis of every
+future-project (avenir-projet), its present-being as a constitutive structure, and, on the other, past human fact as the immediate link with the
+future (the fact of swearing was, in both its immediate and its profound
+reality, a precaution against the future, but as an untranscendable link,
+and so as the eternity of presence in the future. The pledged group
+produces its objectification as a particular material product in it (the
+written pact, and the very hall in which it was signed, which was
+formerly a container, become, after dispersal, an interiorised product,
+a material mediation between the members). But this interior objectivity (which produces itself for everyone as an impossibility of going
+back beyond a certain past date, as an irreversibility of temporalisation)
+is not the objectification of the group as being; it is the eternal, frozen
+preservation of its rising (of the reflexive, statutory rising through the
+pledge). It is the origin of humanity.24
+In becoming for everyone an imperative nature (by virtue of its
+character as an untranscendable permanence in the future), this beginning therefore directs recognition to the reciprocal affirmation of these
+two common characteristics: we are the same because we emerged from
+24. Let there be no misunderstanding: I am not talking about those few great
+revolutionary moments in which contemporaries actually have the feeling of
+producing, and being subjected to, man as a new reality. Every organisation
+which has the reciprocity of the pledge is a new beginning, since it is always the
+victory of man as common freedom over seriality, whatever it may be. In fact,
+this victory is already won at the level of the fused group, but it is through the
+pledge that the group posits itself for itself, no longer as the implicit means of a
+common praxis, both produced and absorbed by it, but as a means of attaining a
+more or less distant objective, and therefore as its own immediate objective.
+
+437
+the clay at the same date, through each other and through all the others;
+and so we are, as it were, an individual species, which has emerged at a
+particular moment through a sudden mutation; but our specific nature
+unites us in so far as it is freedom. In other words, our common being is
+not an identical nature in everyone. On the contrary, it is a mediated
+reciprocity of conditionings: in approaching a third party, I do not
+recognise my inert essence as manifested in some other instance; instead I recognise my necessary accomplice in the act which removes us
+from the soil: my brother, whose existence is not other than mine approaches me as my existence and yet depends on mine as mine depends
+on his (through everyone) in the irreversibility of free agreement.
+Indeed, everyone lives group-being as a nature: he is 'proud' to belong to
+it, he becomes the material referent (signifie) of the uniforms of the
+group (if there are any) - but as the nature of freedom (it is its frightening
+force of inertia, in so far as it comes to me as exigency). Thus the relations of common individuals within the group are ambivalent links of
+reciprocity (unless they are governed by the resumption of the struggle
+and the total objective): he and I are brothers. And this fraternity is not
+based, as is sometimes stupidly supposed, on physical resemblance
+expressing some deep identity of natures. If it were, why should not a
+pea in a can be described as the brother of another pea in the same can?
+We are brothers in so far as, following the creative act of the pledge,
+we are our own sons, our common creation. And, as in real families,
+fraternity is expressed in the group by a set of reciprocal and individual
+obligations, defined by the whole group on the basis of circumstances
+and objectives (obligations to help one another in general or in the
+particular and fully determinate case of an action or a concrete task).
+But as we have just seen, these obligations in turn express only the
+community of fundamental exigency and, in addition, past self-creation
+as an irrevocable mortgage of practical temporalisation. From this point
+of view, fraternity is the real bond between common individuals, in so
+far as everyone lives his being and that of the Other (whether in simply
+being there, close to the Other, or in the resemblance-solidarity of
+black rebels, or of whites on the def ensive) in the form of untranscendable reciprocal obligations. Indeed: the colour of their skin, taken as a
+pure, reciprocal obligation by the black rebels of San Domingo, and,
+at the same time, as everyone's material, inert guarantee against the
+possibility of being alienated, the colour of their skin being taken, in
+and by everyone, not as a universal physiological characteristic, but as
+a historical characteristic based on the past unity of a free promotion -
+
+438
+this is fraternity, that is to say the fundamental, practical structure of all
+the reciprocal relations between the members of a group. What is later
+called comradeship, friendship, love - and even fraternity, using the
+term in a vaguely affective sense - arises on the basis of particular
+circumstances and within ? particular perspective, for a given reciprocity as a dialectical, practical enrichment, as a free specification of
+this original structure, that is to say, of the practical, living statute of
+the sworn members. The constituted group is produced in and by
+everyone as his own birth as a common individual and, at the same time,
+everyone can grasp, in fraternity, his own birth as a common individual
+as having been produced in and by the group.
+Furthermore, this fraternity is the right of all through everyone and
+over everyone. It is not enough to recall that it is also violence, or that
+it originated in violence: it is violence itself affirming itself as a bond
+of immanence through positive reciprocities. This means that the
+practical power of the bond of fraternity is simply (in immanence25) the
+free transformation of the fused group by everyone, for himself and for
+the other third party, into a group of constraint. This lack of distinction
+is particularly evident when the sworn group proceeds to the summary
+execution or lynching of one of its members (suspected, rightly or
+wrongly, of betraying the group). The traitor is not excluded from the
+group; indeed he himself cannot extricate himself from it. He remains a
+member of the group in so far as the group - threatened by betrayal -
+reconstitutes itself by annihilating the guilty member, that is to say, by
+discharging all its violence onto him. But this exterminating violence is
+still a link of fraternity between the lynchers and the lynched in that the
+liquidation of the traitor is grounded on the positive affirmation that he
+is one of the group; right up to the end, he is abused in the name of his
+own pledge and of the right over him which he acknowledged in the
+Others. On the other hand, lynching is a praxis of common violence
+for the lynchers in so far as its objective is the annihilation of the traitor.
+It is a bond of fraternity aroused and accentuated amongst the lynchers,
+in so far as it is a brutal reactualisation of the pledge itself and in so far
+as every stone that is thrown, every blow delivered, is a new affirmation
+of the pledge: whoever participates in the execution of the traitor
+reaffirms the untranscendability of group-being as a limit of his freedom
+25. Indeed, it goes without saying that, down to its last member, the group is
+characterised by its transcendent relation to the other group, that is to say, to the
+hostile group; we shall return to this.
+
+439
+and as his new birth, and he reaffirms it in a bloody sacrifice which,
+moreover, constitutes an explicit recognition of the coercive right of
+all over every individual and everyone's threat to all. Furthermore, in
+the developing praxis (that is to say, during the execution) everyone
+feels at one with everyone in the practical solidarity of the risks run
+and of the common violence. I am a brother in violence to all my
+neighbours: and it is clear that anyone who shunned this fraternity
+would be suspect. In other words, anger and violence are lived both as
+Terror against the traitor and (if circumstances have produced this
+feeling) as a practical bond of love between the lynchers. 26 Violence is
+the very power of this lateral reciprocity of love.
+This enables us to understand how the intensity of the group's
+actions arises from the intensity of the external threats, that is to say,
+from danger; and if this intensity no longer manifests itself as a real
+pressure but the danger itself still exists, then it is replaced by the
+artificial substitute of Terror. Terror is a real product of men in groups,
+but it still depends, in itself and for its degree of intensity, on hostile
+violence (that is to say, both on suffered violence surviving in people's
+memories, and on expected violence, as in the case, for example, of a
+counter-attack). The creation of Terror as a counter-violence engendered by the group itself and applied by common individuals to
+every particular agent (in so far as he contains a threat of seriality) is,
+therefore, a use of common strength, hitherto used against the enemy,
+in order to reshape the group itself. And all the internal behaviour of
+common individuals (fraternity, love, friendship, as well as anger and
+lynching) derives its terrible power from Terror itself. In this sense,
+everyone is, for everyone, the same in the unity of a common praxis;
+but, precisely because reciprocity is not integration, and because the
+epicentres, though dissimulated, are still in mediated reciprocity, and
+because I cannot be both a totalising and a totalised third party, and
+because the Other me who approaches me also exists in me as myself
+become Other (and limiting my freedom), the possibility of constraint
+or extermination is given simultaneously in every reciprocal relatiori.
+This has nothing to do with mistrust: mistrustful behaviour occurs in
+groups of constraint when they are already eroded by divisions, and
+therefore at a quite different moment of the common temporalisation
+26. I am of course referring to the execution of traitors rather than to the kind
+of racist lynching which, in America, provides recreation for a member of another
+group.
+
+440 Book II
+and in different circumstances. The possibility of loving a traitor is
+given in fraternity itself and as a condition of it: and this means that
+any concrete and practical relation within the group is necessarily
+addressed through the common individual to the organic individual, and
+thereby helps to give him a real existence which common solidarity
+must either negate or pass over in silence. And this possibility that
+fraternity with a given person may suddenly change, through the
+betrayal of the brother, into lynching and extermination, is given in
+fraternity itself as its source and limit: we fraternise because we have
+made the same pledge, because everyone has limited his freedom by the
+other; and the limit of this fraternity (which also determines its
+intensity) is everyone's right of violence over the other, that is to say,
+precisely the common, reciprocal limit of our freedoms. However, as
+can still be observed today in authoritarian parties, fraternity is the
+most immediate and constant form of Terror: traitors, in fact, are by
+definition the minority. It is really the reciprocal translucidity of common individuals (which is capable of leading organic individuals into
+friendship): no 'milieu' is warmer than an authoritarian party which is
+constantly subject to external threats (and which is authoritarian because
+it is threatened). But, whatever the fraternity, in the event of deviation,
+heresy, or betrayal, it cannot survive violence (except in the form
+described above: the link between the executioner and the condemned
+man); and it cannot oppose it either; not, as has too often been said,
+because it would be weak and ineffective against Terror, but quite
+simply because it is violence itself lived as violence-friendship (as a
+violent force within relations of friendship). This violence, born in
+opposition to the dissolution of the group, creates a new reality, the act
+of treason; and this act defines itself precisely as that which transforms
+fraternity (as positive violence) into Terror (negative violence). Thus,
+if 1am a member of a constraining group, the violence of my fraternisation rests on the practical certainty (which is not, or need not be,
+explicit) that this fraternisation will become either a lynching, in its
+own name, or a pitiless condemnation, if my brother behaves as an
+Other and if the group sees in him a threat of dissolution.
+The immediate bond of freedom and constraint has produced a new
+reality, a synthetic product of the group as such. My application of the
+term 'right' to this reality may seem premature, since, ultimately, all
+institutions are grounded on the pledge, which is not in itself institutional. It would be better to say that this reality, in this abstract moment
+of our investigation of the group, is simply the diffuse power of
+
+The Statutory Group 442
+jurisdiction. But we must be quite clear about this: I use the word
+diffuse only to make a contrast with specialised organs; in fact, the
+common individual's pledge gives him juridical power over the organic
+individual (in himself and Others). Freedom which has been freely
+limited forever by his other-being is each person's power over all in so
+far as it is in everyone an accepted mutilation. It is impossible to derive
+juridical power either from individual freedom, which has no power
+over reciprocal freedom, or from a social contract uniting several
+entities, or from the constraint imposed on the group by some differentiated organ, or from the customs of a community in so far as they
+appear to involve an exis. As for the circumstances which explain the
+particular content of this power (that it is exerted as a particular prohibition, as a particular exigency, etc.), they may show us, in fact, that a
+given risk run by a given group in particular circumstances gave birth
+in this group to a given common decision, but by themselves they
+cannot explain repressive power as a practical form of the decision in
+question.
+However, we are not in any way attempting to describe the historical
+genesis of the power of jurisdiction: and we shall see below that such
+an undertaking does not even have any sense. But our dialectical
+investigation involves us in the re-creation of this power in a surviving
+group which is attempting to become a statutory group. Juridical
+power appears here as the creation of a community which realises that
+it neither is nor ever will be a totalised (and totalising) totality; it is
+therefore a new form of totalisation intended to compensate for the
+impossibility of completing the totalisation, that is to say, of its appearing as a form, a Gestalt, a collective consciousness above all the
+members, and, therefore a guarantee of their permanent integration.
+This new statute of totalisation is Terror, and Terror is jurisdiction:
+through the mediation of all, everyone agrees with everyone else that
+the permanent foundation of every freedom should be the violent
+negation of necessity, that is to say, that, in everyone, freedom as a
+common structure is the permanent violence of the individual freedom
+of alienation. And everyone demands that everyone should both
+guarantee him the inert structure of common freedom and make himself, as violence and terror, the inert negation of certain possibilities.
+It would be dangerous to assimilate this diffuse juridical power to the
+simplest form of the sacred: this would take us too far and the examination of these matters is not part of our task. It will be sufficient to note
+that in our investigation and at this level of abstraction, for groups
+
+442 Book II
+which have defined themselves in combat and by the liquidation of the
+old seriality of impotence, the Sacred constitutes the fundamental
+structure of Terror as juridical power. The Sacred is manifested
+through things; it is freedom producing itself in worked matter, both as
+absolute sovereignty and as thing. It is, so to speak, freedom returning
+to man as a superhuman, petrified power. This has nothing to do with
+the exigencies of the practico-inert field, which, although they do
+indeed express the freedom of the Other, absorb it entirely and do not
+show it, so that an inert thing could of itself be an exigency. In the
+case of the Sacred, freedom manifests itself in a thing, upon its very
+destruction (through explosive disintegration)", but by affirming
+itself in opposition to the thing it becomes an inert-power over man.
+And revelation, prayer and other practices in relation to this power
+constitute it as sacred in its very contradiction: freedom, in human
+relations, does not intimidate; it is the same in the agents of a relation
+of reciprocity; it defines itself for everyone by its homogeneity. In the
+present case, however, it manifests itself to individuals over the total
+submission of matter (disintegrated or pierced by rays or directly
+modified, without labour, by mere sovereign will), but it does so as
+heterogeneity, that is to say, as an untranscendable negation of their
+possibilities. In this sense,
+, its power has the possibilities which are
+negated in everyone as its fundamental structure, as the inertia of every
+freedom. To put it differently, it constitutes everyone, within his
+freedom, as received (and accepted) passivity. And worship consists
+precisely in free praxis which recognises the inert limitation in it of its
+possibilities as an absolute gift and a creation which proceeds from
+inert freedom as a sacred power. This simply means that any pledged
+group, as a diffuse power of jurisdiction, manifests itself for every
+third party, and in the totalisation performed by the other third party,
+as a sacred power. It serves no purpose if the sacred assumes a specifically religious or cultural form: it is (at least in general: circumstances
+determine cases) simply a character proper to Terror as inert freedom
+and negative power and its relation to everyone's other-freedom in so
+far as it negates certain possibilities. This relation manifests itself as
+sacred when a coercive and unanimous totalisation reveals itself through
+the common object. This is the origin of ceremonies, to the extent that
+materiality (vestments, stereotyped actions, objects of veneration, the
+27. This disintegration keeps the thing (Moses' tablet, etc.) intact as a material
+entity. At the same time, it does not stop producing itself.
+
+443
+inert commemoration of the past, the inflexible and invariable order of
+actions etc.) expresses inertia in them, and also that their conventional and teleological aspect embodies freedom-power. And the
+Sacred, with its rituals and its ceremonies, derives, like juridical power,
+from a non-being of the group, that is to say, from the fact that any
+real community is a totalisation or, to put it differently, a totality which
+is perpetually detotalised. It is through a fundamental contradiction, in
+fact, that the act of totalising, in so far as it is performed by everyone, is
+also the essential factor of detotalisation.
+However, as we have already noted, the possibilities of dissolution,
+for the group, even when enemy pressure is relaxed, would be less close
+and less threatening if its members could remain united, in one place,
+in the square, etc. For unity in everyone, as a synthetic determination
+of multiplicity, would be the interiorisation of the real, visible and
+tangible promiscuity of the people in the group. We have seen that the
+group posits itself for itself in a reflexive practice and becomes its own
+immediate objective not only when circumstances require it to be
+permanent, but also when the diversity of its tasks requires that
+differentiation take the place of the fluid homogeneity of fusion. In this
+way, in fact, a risk is incurred that distance will make everyone isolated
+and separate, or that new conflicts, arising from the differentiation
+itself, will produce new antagonisms in the community. Through the
+pledge, the group ensures an ontological statute which will mitigate the
+dangers of differentiation. As I have already said, this pledge is not
+necessarily a real operation or an explicit decision: in reality, when the
+group posits itself as its own end in and by every third party, and
+when this practical reflexivity defines, if only implicitly, the common
+reception of Terror, it is enough that violence, both in its negative
+forms (the liquidation of the uncommitted, and the suspect) and in its
+positive forms (fraternisations) manifests itself in such a way that the
+statute of permanence becomes an immediate certainty for every
+totalising third party. So, whether or not a pledge was really made, the
+organisation of the group becomes the immediate objective. It was this
+organisation, as an ulterior objective, which necessitated the creation
+of permanence; and again it is this organisation which the permanent
+group now sets itself as its immediate aim. And the unity of the group
+is nowhere but in everyone, as a pledge.
+This pledge, whether implicit or explicit, defines everyone as a
+common individual, not only because it concerns his being-in-the-group,
+but also because it is only through the mediation of all that it can take
+
+444 Book II
+place in everyone. But this has nothing to do with inorganic products
+or with an inertia of exteriority: in this sense, Terror does not inflexibly
+define the permanent limits of freedom for everyone. In fact, it merely
+raises the threshold at which untranscendability will become transcendable; or, to put it differently, it makes it less probable that one will
+abandon one's post, go over to the enemy, etc. Treason, as a new form
+of human action, is nevertheless always a concrete possibility for everyone; its probability is a function of the synthetic complex of historical
+circumstances (including everyone's individual history). This means
+that the group is also - negatively - the totalisation of its points of
+possible rupture, and that for each point there is a certain threshold
+ahove which the rupture may occur; and these thresholds are extremely
+variable. 28
+28. This does not in any way mean that for certain individuals their being-inthe-group is really untranscendable. But this has nothing to do with either
+courage or fidelity: the best may fall into a trap, the most devoted may become
+the unwitting instrument of the enemy. It is therefore perfectly legitimate to
+consider the group also as a multiplicity of points of rupture; the more so the more
+differentiated it is. However, we shall see that from another point of view differentiation is a unifying link.
+
+3
+Organised Praxis and Function
+In so far as organisation, as the action on itself of the statutory group,
+is directly relevant to a critique of dialectical Reason (whether it is a
+matter of differentiation in combat, or of the division of labour in a
+particular case, there is no need for a formal enumeration of its possible
+forms (or for tracing the historical movement of the division of labour
+or of the transformations of the army on the basis of weapons and of
+combat techniques). Our sole problem is dialectical rationality. We are
+acquainted with two types of intelligible actions: the translucid (but
+abstract) praxis of the individual, and the rudimentary praxis of the
+fused group. To the extent that the second is relatively undifferentiated
+and that action in it is everywhere the same, everywhere common,
+everywhere governed by orders coming from all sides, but which a
+single third party might have uttered one after the other, we can take it
+that non-differentiated praxis retains the characteristics of individual
+action and amplifies them. It is alive in so far as it is, in everyone, both
+total and the same; no doubt it multiplies, but we have seen that an
+individual becomes a member of a group by interiorising multiplicity.
+Through the relation of mediated reciprocity, he spontaneously and
+concretely benefits in his own activity from the activity of the Others.
+Inertia, control, and complex organisations are nowhere to be found:
+this means that praxis is everywhere plenary, that it is everything it can
+be everywhere and that, ultimately, reciprocal conditioning manifests
+itself through the object and through objectification, but that the
+operation, in so far as it is very close to the operations of a practical
+organism - though separated from individual praxis by the whole
+practico-inert field - retains a sort of translucidity. Organised action,
+however, involves a system of relations, and of relations between
+relations, such as to make one wonder what type of praxis manifests
+
+446
+itself in it - comparing these combined structures with the constitutive
+dialectic of individual action - and whether this praxis is still dialectical,
+and what kind of objective it sets itself, what kind of reshaping of the
+practical field it performs, what internal development characterises it,
+and, finally, how far it is really praxis (that is to say, freedom) and how
+far a constituted instrument.
+The word 'organisation' refers both to the internal action by which a
+group defines its structures and to the group itself as a structured
+activity in the practical field, either on worked matter or on other
+groups. People say both: We have failed because the organisation
+(distribution of tasks) left a lot to be desired' and 'Our organisation
+has decided that..., etc. This ambiguity is important. It expresses a
+complex reality which might be described in the following terms: the
+group can act on a transcendent (transcendant) object only through the
+mediation of its individual members: but the individual agent performs
+his action only in the definite context of the organisation, that is to say,
+in so far as his practical relation with the thing is directly conditioned
+by his functional relation to the other members of the group, as already
+established either by the group (as a plenary meeting of its members) or
+by its representatives (however they have been chosen).
+Organisation, then, is a distribution of tasks. And it is the common
+objective (common interest, common danger, common need assigning
+a common aim) which defines praxis negatively and lies at the origin
+of this differentiation. Organisation, then, is both the discovery of
+practical exigencies in the object and a distribution of tasks amongst
+individuals on the basis of this dialectical discovery. In other words,
+the organising movement settles the relation between men on the basis
+of the fundamental relation between group and thing. Depending on
+the nature of the circumstances and on the characteristics of the praxis
+(in fact, according to the whole historical conjuncture), this can lead
+either to a voluntarism which defines the task of the individual on the
+basis of the exigencies of the aim without reference to everyone's
+individual possibilities, or to an unprincipled opportunism which
+reduces the common praxis (common in its aims, intensity, and complex organisation), in accordance with empirically given limits of
+individual praxis (limits which, on closer examination, might show
+themselves capable of being pushed back by some action of the group
+upon itself, without the workers, combatants, etc. suffering it in their
+individual organisms). Depending on the ensemble, one can equally
+well find organisations (generally very close to the simple pledged
+
+447
+group) in which function is always (or sometimes) defined in terms of
+the task to be carried outand of the particular capacities of each person
+(in so far as he is known by Others: for example, in a very small combat
+unit, a particular mission will be assigned to a particular soldier
+because of his exceptional strength).
+I have presented these various possibilities not because they occur
+historically in disorder or in an arbitrary order, but because, as far as
+our problem is concerned, they are strictly equivalent: voluntarism and
+opportunism are characterised, in the organisation, as the action of the
+group on its members. The group acts on the object, indirectly, only
+in so far as it acts upon itself; and its action upon itself - which as we
+shall see is its only action as a group - defines itself on the basis of a
+praxis (which is either already established or gradually revealing itself).
+The group defines, directs, controls and constantly corrects the
+common praxis; it may even, in some cases, produce the common
+individuals who will realise it (through technical education, for
+example, etc.). But this set of operations presupposes differentiation:
+for example, the distribution of tasks (or of weapons or supplies) presupposes an earlier distribution, that is to say, the creation within the
+group of specialised apparatuses (misleadingly called organs: directive
+organs, groups for co-ordinating, mediating or distributing, or regulating exchanges, administration, etc.). This first moment of differentiation - which has nothing in common with the appearance of command, although, as we shall see, it is the basis of it - is, therefore, fundamentally an action of the group upon itself. And, to precisely the
+extent that this differentiation remains very abstract (there is the
+service which prepares the work and the other common individuals), it
+corresponds to a still very abstract conception of praxis: the group,
+united in a common, but still inadequately determined project (a
+combatant community, a vigilance committee, a team of technicians
+or an association for buying and selling property on the moon) produces its first differentiation in order to give itself the means of proceeding to this determination. And there should be nothing to surprise
+us in this differentiation, in itself, since it is simply a pledged statutory
+group acting on itself - a group, that is, whose internal relations have
+been explicitly constituted so as to respond to the demands of the
+situation and to make differentiations possible. In other words, our
+problem is not to explain any particular division: the internal praxis of
+the pledged group or (and this comes to the same thing) the possibilities which reveal themselves to the action of every third party in the
+
+448 Book II
+group, are simply the unveiling of its tasks through its morphology. The
+establishment of any particular differentiation is only a concrete
+modality of a more general structure: through the pledge, the statutory
+group becomes capable of differentiation; to put it differently, it makes
+itself such that not only do differentiations not destroy its unity, but also
+practical problems can reveal themselves to it through differential problems. And since the thought of the group, that is to say, its practical idea
+of the Universe, is simply the transcendence (dépassement) of the
+practical idea which it has of itself towards the transcendent (transcendant) object; and since the practical idea which a group has of itself -
+the schema which it uses to resolve its internal problems - cannot be
+separated from its internal constitution (both as its action on itself and
+as its objective structure), differentiation, which is the abstract thought
+of the statutory group, becomes the concrete thought of the organised
+group: it appears, in fact, as the creation by third parties of an increasingly precise differentiation and thus the thought of the transcendent
+object expresses the increasingly concrete and differentiated structure of
+unified multiplicity. (I shall return to this point shortly.)
+Thus individual differentiation is of little importance, at least for our
+purposes, and its appearance, though new, is immediately intelligible.
+But the intelligibility of organised action is a completely different matter:
+the problem is what type of unity and reality can be attributed to praxis
+in its new form of organised praxis, and what meaning it can have.
+What we are interested in, therefore, is the relation between the action
+of the group on itself and the action of its members on the object.
+We shall study the different moments of this relation step by step and
+by deepening our investigation (expérience). We must first specify
+what the task is when it appears in the group as the objective of a
+process of organisation; this will lead us to a new definition of the
+common individual, since his statute in the organised group is of itself
+a determination (and therefore a limitation) and a concrete enrichment
+of the statute of the pledged member (inertia in freedom, right, etc.).
+Then, having explained function, as the statute of the common individual, and its two aspects (a practical task in relation to the object, and
+a human relation in so far as it characterises the being-in-the-group of
+the third party), we shall have to examine the foundations of a logistics
+of organised systems (as the multiplicity and unity of inverted and
+mediated reciprocities) and describe the structures as such, that is to say,
+as they arise in the group in opposition to the passive activities of the
+practico-inert; and then we shall find in them a new human and social
+
+449
+product: active passivity. Only then can we approach our two essential
+questions: in fact we shall have to rearrange all our conclusions into a
+synthetic movement which will itself produce the intelligibility of
+organised praxis and reveal in it a new apodicticity - that is to say, a
+radically different necessity from the first. This will enable us to
+examine the ontological statute of the organised group as a concrete
+reality given in the dialectical investigation (expérience) or, in other
+words, we shall discover whether the organisation should be regarded
+as practical existence or as being.
+At the level of the fused group, the common individual appeared to
+us as an organic individual in so far as he interiorised the multiplicity
+of the third parties and unified it through his praxis, that is to say, in
+so far as unity determined multiplicity through him as an instrument, a
+force. This characteristic of synthetic unity posits itself for itself in the
+statutory group when the situation demands separations which endanger the community for everyone in the person of every third party
+and in the possibility of his breaking the unity, and relapsing into the
+statute of massified isolation. The common characteristic of the individual (or his being-in-the-group) becomes everyone's juridical power
+over organic individuality in himself and in every third party. But this
+power is still abstract: its abstraction is a measure of that of the group
+and of the common praxis. At the level of organisation, this abstract
+and fundamentally negative power (as the free inertia of freedom) is
+concrețised and changes sign: in fact, it defines itself for everyone, in
+the context of the distribution of tasks, by a positive content. It is
+function. As such, it remains an inert limit of the freedom of the third
+party, and, therefore, its basis is still Terror. And Terror can always
+re-emerge as a relation between pledged members when the conjuncture and the particular history of the organisation compromise the
+functions of the third party (or render them useless or parasitical) and
+reveal, from below, the danger of dislocation. The organisation then
+reverts to the less differentiated stage of the statutory group; and
+functions appear as little more than abstract significations with no
+reality. That is why, in certain historical conditions, Terror can appear
+as a regression and simplification.
+But in the normal exercise of organised activity, function is a positive
+definition of the common individual: either the group as a whole or
+some already differentiated 'organ' assigns it to him. It is a determination of individual praxis: an individual belongs to the group in so far
+as he carries out a certain task and only that task. In simple Terror,
+
+450 Book II
+however, the inert limit of possibilities remains abstract and purely
+negative: it is freedom freely renouncing the right to dissolve the group
+relation in any case of separation. Function is both negative and
+positive: in the practical movement, a prohibition (do not do anything
+else) is perceived as a positive determination, as a creative imperative:
+do precisely that. But in the milieu of the pledge, doing that is the right
+of each over all, just as it is a right of all over each: the definition of
+power, in so far as a concrete function particularises it, is that for
+everyone it is the right to carry out his particular duty. Thus, he must
+actualise everything that predetermines his function (the common
+objective, practical problems, the conjuncture, the state of techniques
+and instruments) in inertia (as an inert possibility defined by discourse,
+for example, and which it realises in repetition), in the milieu of
+sovereignty over things (the dialectical freedom of organic praxis) and
+of power over men (social freedom as a synthetic relation based on the
+pledge), in short, in freedom.
+If a football team is being formed, the function of goalkeeper, or
+forward, etc., appears as a predetermination for a new young player.
+He will be recruited by one of these functions; it will select him on the
+basis of his physical qualities (weight, height, strength, speed, etc.):
+but in so far as it designates him in his free praxis, that is to say, in so
+far as it produces a determination of inertia at the basis of his freedom,
+it is already power, and he lives it as exigency: the exigency of training,
+for example. The team in which he has been signified by this function is
+then obliged to raise him to a (physical and technical) level at which he
+will be capable of performing the actions which the group requires.
+This may also signify his right to refuse excessive training, badly
+organised and exhausting travel, matches played in bad conditions,
+etc. And it is as a common individual that he has these negative rights:
+in other words, his praxis freely reappropriates the exigencies of his
+function.
+At this level, there is no difference between rights and duties. The
+classical distinction - which tends to make duty into a right of other
+third parties over me, and to make right into the duty of other third
+parties towards me - was still valid at the previous level; but once the
+positive content of function has been defined, the distinction ceases to
+exist. There is no ground for stating a priori that the diet involved in
+the training of a particular sportsman is either a right of the Other (of
+the other members of the team) or his own right. If, as an organic
+individual, he were to resist following the diet, the Others would
+
+45г
+impose it on him (either because he needs to lose weight, or because he
+has a wrong attitude to his "job', or because he eats too much, or eats
+indigestible food) because each of them, as a function, in the praxis,
+requires every member of the team to reduce himself to his own
+function. On the other hand, if he adopts the prescribed diet without
+qualification, then, for the administration of the sport group (the
+'organisers') this is simply their duty to keep it for him as long as
+necessary; as a function of the group, he will require his fellow team
+members not to deflect him from his duty, or even help him to carry it
+out, and if necessary to force him to do so. It is clear that each formulation indicates only more clearly the increasing inextricability of right
+and duty. If one member of the team makes this exigency (to keep fit,
+to persevere with the training) into a power over another player or over
+the group, then it acquires a juridical and dialectical structure which is
+the complex organisation of all forms of imperative.
+Suppose that I am integrated into a group, and that there is another
+common individual, M, defined by a certain function. I require that M
+should receive from the group the necessary subsistence and training,
+etc., to enable him completely to fulfil the requirements of his job.
+Now, I require this not only for the group (that is to say, from the point
+of view of the common praxis), but also from the group (since it is the
+group which distributes the functions). 28a I require it for my own
+function, that is to say, for the guarantee which each and every member
+must freely offer me, and I also require it for everyone as a particular
+third party, and for anyone (both because member N or L as such will
+require that I require this guarantee for him: it is he, for example, who
+has most to lose in his functions through the failings of M - and because,
+for example, I am more seriously threatened through Nor Z by these
+failings); lastly, I require it because M himself, in the name of the
+pledge, requires of me (as a limit-power) that I require it of him. Now,
+all these abstract moments of concrete exigency are given together in
+my way of acting, of realising my function through my action and of
+basing my action on my powers: the right which the group has through
+me over all, and the duty towards the group as defined by all, the
+reciprocity of right (I have the right that you should assert your rights),
+as provided ise neera presentative tear rapain manage ero re
+conflicts are still masked or undeveloped, therefore, the group as a milieu of
+regulated heterogeneity realises itself through tension between functions; its
+internal structure is facetted (à facettes).
+
+452 Book II
+that of duty (my duty is to remind you of yours), that of right and duty
+(I have the right that you should allow me to do my duty), that of duty
+and right (I have the duty to respect your rights) - the infinite complication of these reciprocities (in the context of the complex reciprocities
+which we shall examine shortly), all these lines of force constitute the
+web of what might be called power as reality lived in and through
+praxis. According to circumstances, one or other of these lines of force
+may appear, as a form, against the synthetic background of all the
+others; but if they are not all present, the group will break up.
+for the sake of simplicity, let us consider the abstract case of an
+organisation which is not directly conditioned in its internal structure
+by exploitation (it may constitute itself either for the exploitation of
+Others or against the exploitation of its members by Others, but there
+will be no relations of exploitation between the third parties who
+comprise it) and a particular function of which consists in a certain
+operation performed with a particular tool and with some definite
+technique. The technique and the tool define the moment of the
+historical process in so far as it produces, penetrates, sustains and
+totalises this particular group within this developing totalisation. But
+the common individual perceives techniques and tools as his sovereignty
+in the practical field, that is to say, as an extension of his individual
+praxis. In this sense, tools and techniques (which are really one and the
+same object) are the group itself in so far as the common individual
+perceives it as his own social power over things. In other words,
+acting with tools reveals his dated historicity to him (it can also be
+defined as an inert negation - but from the abstract point of view of a
+diachronic totalisation) as practical sovereignty (over inorganic matter).
+It is at this level that the tool is a practical unveiling of the world to
+precisely the extent that the practical organism is a tool. By this I mean
+both that it changes the world by a reorganising transcendence, and
+that in this very transcendence it reveals it to be a world in the process
+of being reshaped.
+These themes have been discussed many times by many different
+authors: I shall only refer to the first technical agent to grasp, and fix
+in experience, the social moment of unveiling the world by a praxis
+involving tools: Saint-Exupéry and his book Terre des Hommes. 2 The
+astringent power of the aeroplane (as an instrument which reduces
+travelling time) is not only produced by a technician using an object
+29. Antoine de Saint Exupéry, Terre des Hommes, Paris, 1939. [Ed.]
+
+The Organisation 45з
+which has already been worked by men, but also, and inseparably,
+revealed as a real movement of contracting space. But this real movement in itself is revealed as a means of control, and can never be a matter
+of contemplative perception (except for the inert passenger who is
+being transported from one city to another). It also determines the
+speed of the operations to be carried out (including thoughts, as hypothetical actions and as constantly corrected syntheses of the practical
+field). In the context of the practico-inert, we saw how worked matter
+produces its own idea. Here, it is the other way round: activity involving tools defines itself through the instrument of society as a practical
+power (structured by the tool which it uses and transcends) of thinking
+the development of the world. This power comes to the third party
+through the group which produces (or acquires) the tool and defines
+the function. But though this enriching limitation may limit possibilities - as abstract determinations of the social future - it must also
+concretise them, that is to say, multiply the practical options by creating,
+through the task and the tool, differentiated structures amongst the
+possibilities or in other words, by defining sub-possibilities. It is obvious
+that the options do in fact impose themselves on the basis of real
+objectivity, or of the developing process; but the instrument, as
+practical perception, creates the permanent possibility that certain subpossibilities will inscribe themselves in praxis from the outside, and
+require an immediate option. The speed of the danger and of the
+defensive action, for example, are just as much a function of the speed
+of the plane, as of the nature of the possible dangers. But these imperative options present themselves to the agent (the pilot, for example)
+in terms of the world soliciting his own power; and the final choice30
+expresses his sovereignty.
+Here we encounter the organic individual as an isolated agent in the
+first moment of his concrete truth. It will be recalled that he was
+presented, in his pure abstraction, at the beginning of our dialectical
+investigation; we find him now in his complex relations with the
+30. It would be completely wrong to give the word 'choice' here an existential interpretation. It is really a matter of the concrete choices which present
+themselves to, for example, an airline pilot trying to save the passengers in his
+plane, two of whose four engines are out of action, which is losing fuel, etc. It
+would be taking Pavlovian obstinacy to the point of total blindness if one denied
+the specificity and irreducibility of these choices. The part played by routine is
+undeniable, but in cases of danger it is not sufficient; it is necessary to innovate or
+to take risks.
+
+454 Book II
+common individual. He loses himself through the pledge so that the
+common individual may exist (as an enriching limitation of the field
+of possibilities) and then he finds himself again at the level of concrete
+praxis, in relation to the common individual, that is to say, to the task
+(with the available instruments). And by 'organic individual, here, I
+do not mean some given individuality which distinguishes everyone
+from everyone else (individualities, as we have seen, are historical
+individualisations of material conditions; and in any case they do not
+concern us here); I mean free constituent praxis in so far as it is finally
+only signified by function; in fact, to the extent that the determination
+of the sub-possibilities becomes richer and richer in the context of function under the influence of tools, functional predetermination appears
+as a schematic adumbration of a sector of activity: in this sense the
+common individual, as function, remains mostly undetermined. To be
+a pilot, of course, is to be nothing but a pilot. But, in the course of the
+job, the variety of exigencies (revealed by the tool and in action) is so
+great, their urgency so evident, that it would be impossible to realise
+one's being-a-pilot as a totalised ensemble of practices confined within
+strict limits. A praxis, however, though completely unintelligible
+unless defined in terms of tools and techniques, of the common objective and the material circumstances, is only a free organisation of the
+practical field on the basis of the enriching limitations which have
+produced us. Of course, the individual action of a practical organism
+no longer has anything in common with that of another practical
+organism which possesses rudimentary tools and less developed techniques: it is true that the conditions of sovereignty are social. Everyone knows that the power of the plane is not that of the pilot. On the
+other hand, in so far as this power can be practically realised only
+through the specialised praxis of the pilot, that is to say, through the
+transcendence of inertia and the use of forces of exteriority, everybody
+also knows the opposite - that airline pilots, though identical as
+common individuals, are at the same time differentiated, for the group
+itself, by what is stupidly called their individual qualities, which is, in
+fact, simply the history of their technical choices as free dialectical
+agents. For an airline pilot in mortal danger, what is excluded is a set
+of possibilities, which are in any case completely unserviceable (to
+negate the common individual in him, the responsible individual, the
+?!. This is why, truth being circular, we shall find the organised group relapsing into the practico-inert field and dissolving into a new inertia.
+
+455
+sole master on board, all of whose initiatives must be aimed at saving
+the plane, and to relapse into fear, isolation and the irresponsibility
+which is characteristic of isolation located beneath any groupbeing). What is required, meanwhile, is to transcend the pure inertia
+of common-being by some action (if action is still possible) or to
+choose between two techniques, both tested, both of which have their
+defenders: thus, in function, the practical individual (as a constituent
+dialectic) reasserts himself by transcending common inertia in a praxis
+which preserves it by using it (which, as I have said, amounts to
+transcending the inertia of the instrument). The individual as organic
+praxis is below the common individual in so far as he grounds him with
+a pledge, and beyond him in so far as he is his practical individualisation.
+But in this new moment of his reality (still abstract, because we have
+not yet run through the moments of alienation and of the practicoinert in the reverse order), he is no more than the common praxis, in so
+far as it has to be actualised through individual acts which transcend it.
+It goes without saying that the common individual, in so far as he
+is produced by the group, is something more and something different
+than he at first appeared. For his function is a technical bond with a
+particular instrument. And of course the technique is the instrument
+itself in so far as it ha; been invested with meanings (significations)
+(mediations between the agent and the thing) by the labour of Others.
+But, of course, it is also the becoming-instrument of the specialised
+agent. Through training, professional instruction, etc., the instrument
+exists as an exis in the practical organism of anyone whose function
+makes him use it. Or, in other words, the exis of the specialist must
+correspond to the signifying inter-connections of the parts of a machine
+(or tool), as an inter-connection of assemblies. However, we are not
+at the level of alienation here: the group constituted itself in opposition
+to it and has not yet relapsed into it. And this inter-connection should
+not be seen as an inert instrumentality of man tied to the inert humanity
+of the machine. In fact, praxis is the temporalisation of exis in a situation which is always individual (or rather which always threatens to be
+so); this means that action defines itself here as the simultaneous
+transcendence of assemblies by the tool, of the tool by assemblies, and
+of the whole by a directed process which future possibilities have
+occasioned in the distant future. There can be no exis, no habit without
+practical vigilance, that is to say, without a concrete objective to
+determine them in their essential indetermination, and without a project to actualise them by specifying them. Thus exis, as an enriching
+
+45G Book II
+limitation of the common individual, manifests itself concretely only
+in and through a free practical temporalisation. Routine opposes
+initiative, of course, but this contradiction occurs at another level: it
+has meaning, in fact, only in the context of a complex historical conflict
+which opposes new means of production to old ones, forces of production to relations of production, etc. As such, routine corresponds to a
+total situation and expresses the overall attitude of particular groups
+and milieus (that is to say, it manifests itself in terms of a political and
+social alliance between these milieux and the conservative class). But,
+to take a routine practice (that of a Tennessee peasant in 1939 who
+refused to use electricity) as a particular action and in its positive
+relation to a specific objective (ploughing, sowing, breeding etc.), there
+is no difference between its structure and what we have just been
+describing: regardless of whether he uses electricity, votes for the
+Democrats or Republicans, and of whether (because of his lack of
+technical education) he is hostile to elementary forms of co-operation,
+the peasant, with his work tools, defines his practice in terms of a few
+concrete and constantly renewed objectives; he effects a real transformation of the practical field by adapting himself to difficulties with
+the means at his disposal.
+The main purpose of my examples was to show how the common is
+transcended in work itself. They were not intended to take us back to
+the simple groups which we were studying before. In effect, these were
+characterised not only by their integration, but also by the strictly
+common character of their objective and, consequently, of their
+praxis. However else they may differ, a football team and a group of
+armed rebels have one thing in common, from the present point of
+view: that the real objectification of the action of each member lies in
+the movement of common objectification. In the case of a football
+team, the action of every player is predetermined as an indefinite
+possibility by function, that is to say, in relation to a future objective
+which can realise itself only through an organised multiplicity of technical activities. Thus, function is for every member a relation to the
+objective as a totality to be totalised. In the match, every common
+individual will, in the light of the group's objective, effect a practical
+synthesis (orientation, schematic determination of possibilities, of
+difficulties, etc.) of the field in its present particularities (mud, perhaps,
+or wind, etc.); in this way, he tries to make himself generally prepared
+for the specific characteristics of the match. But he will realise this
+practical synthesis - which, ultimately, is a kind of mapping, a sort of
+
+45J
+totalising survey - not only for the group and on the basis of the
+group's objective but also on the basis of his own position, that is to
+say, in this case, of his function. From the moment when the real
+struggle begins, his individual actions (though they require initiative,
+daring, skill and speed, as well as discipline) no longer appear meaningful apart from those of the other members of his team (in so far, of
+course, as each team is also defined by the other) - not only in the
+abstract, in so far as each function presupposes the organisation of all
+functions, but also in the very contingency of the concrete, in so far as
+a particular player's slip or clumsiness at a particular point strictly
+conditions the movement of another player (or, of all the others) and
+gives it a teleological meaning which can be understood by the other
+players (and, though this is incidental here, by the spectators).
+Thus no particular movement, pass, or feint, is entailed by the
+function itself: function only defines the abstract possibility of making
+particular feints, and performing particular actions in a situation which
+is both limited and indeterminate. The action is irreducible: one cannot
+comprehend it unless one knows the rules of the game (that is to say,
+the organisation of the group on the basis of its objective, but it can
+never be reduced to these rules; it cannot even be understood on the
+basis of them unless one can also see the whole field. Thus, this
+particular act is contradictory. In itself it is in fact a complete individual
+action (it has a partial aim: to pass the ball; an assessment of the developing situation in terms of the future, a calculation of chances and a
+decision - which may be modified by new developments), which can
+either fail or succeed and whose success defines it as a self-sufficient
+dialectical process. In other words, if we assume that this particular individual had this particular objective (to pass the ball to the member of
+his team whom he thinks best placed to use it for the benefit for the
+entire group), the action, as a constituent praxis, irreducible to function, is completely intelligible. But in fact the impossibility of stopping
+at this partial objective is revealed to us in our investigation by the
+fact that the permanent reorganisation of the group continues (in accordance with general rules and with the particular exigencies of the
+situation) and that it absorbs every particular moment which conditions it. Thus the meaning of the particular undertaking - even if, as
+such, it is successful - lies in the use made of it elsewhere in the undertakings of other members of the team. And it may be worth remarking
+the practical justification of this past activity lies in the future: only the
+opening, the try, and possibly the goal will provide a definite justifica-
+
+458 Book II
+tion of the daring with which a particular individual tactic was adopted
+at a given moment. Thus individual praxis, as its transcends the common individual through its concrete temporalisation, is retrospectively
+modified by every other praxis in so far as they are all integrated into
+the development of the match as a common process. But is this a case
+of alienation!
+It will of course be noticed that the individual practice of the player
+integrates and objectifies itself in the real, living development of a
+common tactic (or in some cases, strategy); every practice, solicited by
+a moment of the common development, becomes engulfed in the
+moment which it helps to produce on the basis of the first. As we have
+seen, its justification and truth lie in the completed process. But as this
+validation is produced through successive mediations, that is to say,
+through successive suppressions of third parties in favour of the
+practical totalisation (one initiative is justified by another which it has
+enabled another player to take, but this initiative, in turn, will be
+mediated, in relation to the whole, by other initiatives), the objectification, as a mediation by the other and the mediation of this mediation
+etc., could be seen as a process of serial alienation. In this way we
+would come back to the schema of the moment of necessity: the action
+of the practical organism in objectifying itself is revealed as other both
+in its practical essence and in its results.
+But in fact, this alienation (at least at this level) is only apparent: my
+action develops, on the basis of a common power, towards a common
+objective; the fundamental moment which is characteristic of the
+actualisation of the power and the objectification of the praxis is that of
+free individual practice. But it determines itself as an ephemeral
+mediation between the common power and the common objective; in
+realising itself in the object, not only does it annul itself as an organic
+action, in favour of the common objectification which is in the process
+of completion, but also this annulment-towards-the-objective reveals
+the common praxis to it - not in it, as the ontological structure of the
+constituent project (in which case we would be back with some
+organicist magic), but outside it, as something whose developing
+objectification dissolves all individual work (that is to say, every
+individual objectification). But this common objectification is, in fact,
+simply the realisation of the objective: the group temporalises itself in
+an objectification which eliminates it32 as an active organisation in
+32. Either definitively (they separate) or temporarily (the winning team remains compact until the next match, but in an other way).
+
+459
+favour of the result as a produced reality. And this totalising elimination towards and in favour of the common objective is the common
+undertaking of every third party, in so far as it is lived as the indissoluble unity of right and duty. This common undertaking manifests
+itself in the individual act which actualises function on the basis of
+concrete circumstances and it is through this act that the undertaking
+advances to its end. Thus, the individual praxis is a self-suppressing
+mediation, or a mediation which negates itself for the sake of being
+transcended by a third party. But its unique and total aim is to produce
+a particular result as a means which has to be transcended towards the
+common end. He therefore produces his action in the light of the common objective, mediated by the future actions of the other members of
+the team, and, inseparable from the long term end, so as to dissolve in
+the common objectification. In fact - in a football match, for example -
+his action has a common past - namely the perpetual reorganisation of
+the field by the players - and this common field is precisely what, at a
+certain moment of common temporalisation, rouses him in turn, as a
+common individual, to action (indicating the common danger, the common possibilities, the weaknesses of the present organisation, etc.). This
+common individual, with his powers, his tools, and his acquired abilities
+suffers, in praxis itself, an alienation to freedom: he cannot, in fact, set
+himself a common aim without it immediately metamorphosing into
+the individual aim of a free constituent praxis (passing the ball, conceived in terms of the whole organised field and as a means of offensive
+reorganisation, becomes the occasion for combining the positions and
+movements of the individual organism in his individual relations with
+the ball, in terms of the individual tactics of an opponent who is trying
+to intercept him; the essential moment of the action becomes that of
+individual struggle. Even before passing the ball to another member of
+his team and seeing the outcome of his decision gradually emerging,
+the individual must have triumphed, through his personal qualities,
+over another individual, in the other team; who has the same function
+and who has therefore benefited, in principle, from the same training,
+etc.). But this transformation of practical power into isolated freedom
+is only a moment of the metamorphosis which leads up to the disclosure of common objectification; and this culmination is precisely the
+meaning of the transition to isolated freedom; this freedom is expressly
+designated as a mediation between the common individual (who is
+nevertheless defined fundamentally by an inert limit, to be reactualised
+
+460 Book II
+in freedom) and the common objectification which realises itself at the
+same time as the individual action (a reorganisation around the passing
+of the ball) and reflects the common objective back to the common individual. Through the mediation of everyone's individual praxis, the
+common individual objectifies himself as a common individual in the
+common objectification which produces him and which is produced by
+him. The moment of freedom has to be passed over in silence, since
+it would negate the team if it were to posit itself for itself.
+This indeed is what happens if one has no 'team spirit' - which is
+rare in sport, work or research, but frequent in some contradictory
+activities such as theatre. The 'great' actor, the sacred beast, has no
+team spirit: this does not mean that he relapses into his own individuality (that he arrives late, that he rehearses when it pleases him, or
+that he refuses to perform and pretends to be ill, etc.), or rather, since
+this does sometimes happen, it does not necessarily mean this. But it
+must mean that his free praxis posits itself for itself as an individuality
+from beyond. On the basis of the common aim, the common undertaking, the common organisation (every character being a function
+defined by actions, and speeches, which are strictly conditioned by the
+reciprocal organisation of times and places), he affirms himself alone.
+This already gives a hint of what is, as we shall soon see, usurpation: it
+changes the fixed places, the times of speeches, the order. Now, in
+individuality as power-beyond, this is not a return to seriality, but a
+confiscation of power for the sake of a single individual. He is not back
+in isolation; he is the group's actual unity. And in serving the common
+undertaking (Macbeth or Lear) everyone turns out to be serving him.
+We shall dwell on this point later.
+However, it should not be supposed that 'team spirit, that is to say,
+the strict interdependence of powers in connection with the common
+objective, results in the concrete agent being reduced to his function.
+This could not occur unless the situation - by its everyday banality -
+could itself be assimilated to an abstract generality (the weather is fine,
+not too hot, the wind has dropped, the local team is playing at home
+against another team from the same region, a team which it knows and
+which is clearly inferior). As soon as unexpected emergencies arise
+(which, in a sense, is normal) individual initiative takes on considerable
+importance; in the final objectification, that is to say, in the totalisation
+of the undertaking by its result, the group as a past totality defines
+itself not by the order of its functions, but by the real integration of
+individual actions into the common praxis and by the hierarchy of
+
+The Organisation 461
+individual initiatives in the context of the 'general' struggle. However,
+every third party appreciates the importance of a particular third party
+('It's lucky you were there...', 'If you hadn't been fast enough to...',
+etc.) in the total objectivity, that is to say, on the basis of the match as a
+totalisation which was developing and which has eliminated itself in an
+object (victory). This transcended totalisation (totality-in-the-past) is
+the concrete reality of organised praxis in all its contingencies and
+material accidents (due to accidental features of the environment), that
+is to say, of its historical temporalisation.
+By way of contrast, function (at the beginning of a match, for
+example) is, for everyone, a common and partially indeterminate
+signification of possibilities. So after his action, the individual manifests
+himself to the group as a concrete moment of the past totality, as a
+structure of irreversibility in its temporalisation, and therefore as a
+common individual. But this common individual is defined as a historical and concrete individual in so far as his action was an unforeseen
+(and, on the basis of function, unforseeable) moment of the common
+undertaking - or, to put it differently, of the reshaping of the group by
+the group. What is revealed as common by the group is the individual
+particularity of his action (in so far as his initiative was justified by subsequent developments). In him, the group becomes aware of having
+saved its common undertaking by a risky but successful manoeuvre.
+In other words, every third party becomes aware through him of
+practical freedom (the constituent freedom of praxis) as creative freedom
+in the common individual. This retrospective illusion is nevertheless a
+common structure: the group-totalisation turns back on itself as a
+transcended totality and, in this transcended totality, it perceives the free
+praxis of a given third party as the practical superiority of a given
+common individual. So-and-so, for example, is a good goalkeeper: he
+is good because on several occasions he has saved his team by his
+individual actions, that is to say by a transcendence of his powers in a
+creative practice. But if it is possible to speak of class-being, for
+example, in the practico-inert field, the reason is not hard to see: the
+complex system of alienations means that individual praxis realises its
+being in trying to transcend it. But it must be emphasised that in this
+case the opposite applies: the individual transcends his common-being
+in order to realise it; and being a goalkeeper or half-back is not like
+being a wage-earner. Function, as common-being, is an indeterminate
+determination which temporalises itself as a positive enrichment in
+circumstances which present themselves as concrete imperatives
+
+462 Book II
+requiring concrete choices; so, as soon as the common individual
+"makes' one of these choices, he transcends himself as a common individual in order to lose himself in the common objectification. What will
+later be called the goalkeeper, the centre-forward, etc., in the organised
+group (We have an excellent goalkeeper, but our backs are not that
+good', etc.), that is to say, the common individual in so far as his function
+is determined by his past acts (and, therefore, is characterised by his
+future possibilities: the team will count on the goalkeeper, will rely on
+him for a particular operation) possesses only past being. This being,
+who is the object of a non-temporal designation (even though the process is temporalised), reveals himself to the practical, retrospective perception of the common undertaking; but in the moment of temporalisation, he is not: he is free organic praxis transcending function so as to
+become annulled in the common objectification but who, in particular
+circumstances, appears as an irreducible signification of the transcended,
+structured totality. Function is abstract imitation, inertia transcended
+and preserved by the action, in the moment of temporalisation; or it is,
+so to speak, the particularity of common individuality in so far as the
+action, in the past, is confined within the limits it prescribes (not so as
+to have been incapable of realising anything but its own power, but so
+as to have deliberately set itself this realisation as an objective). In
+the organised group, in moments where the practical tension relaxes
+(though the group does not dissolve), the common individual perceives his function as his common individuality: the past meaning of
+his present is both his task as a prescription-pledge and his actions as
+actualisations of his task, transcended in the course of earlier undertakings; the future meaning of this same functional present is the
+determination of his power (in future undertakings) by concrete
+possibilities which define themselves simply as the projective transcendence of past actions and their metamorphosis into a future beyond
+of the right-duty couple: a good goalkeeper is individualised as a common individual in so far as he produces himself in the future through
+his past actions as capable of doing more than is expected of everyone at
+the normal level of organisation. He becomes capacity. Now, this
+capacity as determination of the possible future is simply the practical,
+constituent freedom of the organic individual lived as the free future
+individuality of the common individual; it is past, transcended praxis
+in so far as the member of the organised group lives it as the individualisation of his being-in-the-group; lived as future exis, it is past
+freedom. By allowing his free praxis to be absorbed by the common
+
+The Organisation 463
+totalisation, the common individual reappropriates his being-in-thegroup as a free determination, beyond the task and the pledge.
+Reciprocity and Active Passivity
+We have now grasped, for the first time, the complex relation between
+the practical organism and labour, and the common individual as
+function. But this investigation teaches us that the efficacity of the
+common individual, as an integrated member of the group, entirely
+depends on the mediating moment of organic praxis, even if this praxis
+in itself makes use of common instruments and reveals, through them,
+the common field defined by the group. This means that organisation
+is a real operation which the group performs on itself as a distribution
+of tasks in accordance with the common praxis. The common praxis,
+on the other hand, is the mutual or successive conditioning of functions
+in so far as a multiplicity of individual actions concretely inscribes them
+in a definite situation. The only direct and specific action of the
+organised group, therefore, is its organisation and perpetual reorganisation, in other words, its action on its members. By this, of course, I
+mean that common individuals settle the internal structures of the
+community rather than that the group-in-itself imposes them as
+categories. But the important point here is that, from this point of view,
+function defines itself both as a task to be carried out (an operation
+defined in terms of the transcendent object), and as a relation between
+each common individual and all the Others. This is not a pure, logical,
+formal relation; indeed, it is clear that it must always be some determination of the 'right-duty' tension which provides the objective and
+internal bond of a community in the process of organisation. In other
+words, the relation is originally synthetic and practical, since it specifies
+everyone's power over each and all; it must be defined as a human
+relation of interiority. But, by introducing this specification under the
+pressure of circumstances, the group being organised has to pass from
+fluid homogeneity (everyone being the same, here and everywhere) to
+a regulated heterogeneity. Alterity reappears explicitly in the community. Its origin may be transcendent (transcendante): if the community becomes differentiated, this is because, in the unity of a single
+
+4GA Book II
+threat, the danger and means of defence (or attack) are always other and
+vary according to spatial and temporal determinations. But the source
+of the differentiation may be internal: precisely to the extent that the
+instrumental complex which characterises a group (in its evolution)
+can be regarded as the immanent common object of this community; in
+this case, the objective of the distribution of tasks is either a better use
+of technical equipment or else a response to the pressure of new inventions and new tools. In any case, the important point is that the group
+reinteriorises alterity the better to struggle against it: either to dominate
+the complexities of an immanent object; or to confront a transcendent
+(transcendante) diversity. In the organised group, the alterity of the
+members is both induced and created. Following the pledge, in effect,
+every third party remains the same as the other third parties, even
+though the pledge is made with a view to a differentiation (still
+abstractly foreseen). In other words, the third party undertakes, by
+means of his pledge, to commit himself to negating any possibility of
+alterity, arising either from his own action as a practical individual, or
+from any exis whatever. (The young pledged member of a combat
+group is given a new exis by the situation: for example, he is the one
+who has never fought before, who has not known war, etc. That
+which, in the moment of civil peace, was only an abstract and purely
+logical determination, in praxis, through enemy pressure and through
+the common objectives, becomes an exis - a complex of negative
+possibilities, of being unable to shoot, of being afraid, etc. - and this
+exis distinguishes him from, for example, the old soldier who is making
+the pledge next to him; he is other than the old soldier. But by his
+pledge, the young fighter swears to put this alterity in brackets, and to
+render it accidental and negligible).
+But, in the dialectical development of a statutory group and in its
+transition to an organised group, it is clear that the function of the
+pledge (to exercise terror over the Other and, making a clean start, to
+establish the dictatorship of the Same in everyone) is to serve as the
+basis for the reintroduction of alterity. As Lévi-Strauss would say, it is
+suppressed as Nature, and reinteriorised as Culture. Alterity-Culture
+becomes a creation of man and a free means of preserving the free
+group when the group is able to make an indissoluble connection
+between the following two approaches: both affirming the radical lack
+of differentiation and strict equivalence of its members as common
+individuals (through the pledge); and itself producing functional
+alterities on the basis of this perfect equivalence - producing, that is,
+
+465
+alterities which define the Other in the Same by his task." Thus, to the
+extent that the group has so decided, everyone is Other in the group,
+just in so far as this alterity is a relation defined by a rule, in conformity
+with a praxis and in so far as this relation, to the extent that it has been
+established, is capable of being the object of practical understanding. As
+a member of a series, 1 do not understand why my neighbour is other;
+serial alteration reinforces accidental alterity (birth, organism) and
+renders it unintelligible; as a member of a living organisation, I understand that the Other is a practical and signifying creation of us-as-thesame (nous-les-mêmes). From this point of view, another team-member's
+relation to me is entirely comprehensible: he is, so to speak, the means,
+the object, and the principle of all practical understanding in the
+organised group. He is other because it is necessary (from the point of
+view of the common objective and of the common praxis which he
+indicates at the horizon) that this or that should be done, to allow the
+completion of some other task, which conditions the possibility of me
+carrying out mine.
+And the teleological link between these functions is immediately
+given in the functional action: there is no need to explain it in words or
+to take a contemplative view of it (which would in any case be impossible). Action and comprehension are one. In comprehending my own
+aim, I comprehend * the aim of the Other, and I understand both -
+and those of all the Others - in terms of the common objective. And,
+33. Ir fact, as we have seen, the real process is often more complicated than
+this, because the statutory group, when it is incomplete, develops and organises
+itself by creating functions in accordance with nature-alterities. "The strongest
+person will do this, etc. But it is sufficient simply to note this fact. Beneath the
+surface, the process is the same: it is just that in this new case, the common use of
+a natural difference suppresses it as nature (accident, chance, the negative and
+serialising influence of the individual past or of individual organic characteristics)
+and consecrates it as culture. A particular strong man becomes function and his
+power is his strength: the group consecrates it in him; and this is the original
+meaning of: 'Give away everything and everything will be rendered unto you.'
+This imperative is typical of the group, and means: negate negative alterity in
+yourself, cast it off to the common benefit of positive alterity (negate your youth,
+your fear; give away your vigour and agility), and you will be reborn as a common individual produced by the group without negative alterity; as for positive
+alterity, it is a power which the group has created and consecrated in you and, as
+such, it can be amplified (physical strength by training, by weapons, etc.). I note
+this in passing, but concentrate on simpler facts in order to grasp their intelligibility better (though more abstractly).
+34. I hope no one will raise as an objection the much more frequent case in
+
+466 Book II
+to precisely the extent that the group restores individual 'qualities' as a
+consecrated power, differences of training or physical strength which
+benefit some Other receive, so to speak, a statute of intelligibility: it is
+as if the group had at some point produced the strength and the brains
+it required. Hence my relation to this brain or these muscles will be
+primarily social, based on the ubiquity of the pledge and the equivalence
+of everyone who is the same (des mêmes). He is not primarily a stronger
+man than me; he is primarily a reinforcement of the common defences
+in a particular place which is more liable to attack than any other. But
+the express condition of this practical reinforcement is egalitarian
+fraternity; it is merely a special form of it: the pledged relation of
+fraternity is channelled by a functional relation. In fact, in small
+organised groups (without any direct relation to the appearance of
+command), the limits of everyone's powers, what falls within the
+competence of one third party and what into that of another, is always
+carefully and exactly determined. Conflicts within the group frequently
+arise because competences have remained indeterminate in some respect
+or other, or because some new circumstance, by creating a new problem, produces a provisional indeterminacy in certain functions (and
+therefore in the relation between men).
+Thus freedom, as common praxis, initially produced the bond of
+sociality in the form of the pledge; and now, it creates concrete forms
+of human relationship. Every function, as a relation between me and a
+particular Other or all the Others, defines itself negatively as a reciprocal
+(direct or indirect) limit of competences, and positively as the action
+which makes my action both necessary and possible. But function is the
+common individual, or everyone's being-in-the-group. At the level of
+the organisation, being-in-the-group is no longer an abstract, polyvalent determination of human relations; it is the organised relation
+which unites me to each and all. But this human relation, by concretely
+expressing a being, receives an inert rigidity from it. In fact it involves
+reciprocities of powers based on the pledge, that is to say, on the free
+negation of certain possibilities. In fact, the relations between common
+individuals, in so far as these relations present themselves as a temwhich, within a particular group, the common individual no longer understands
+the function of the others, or fails to understand that a particular function is fulfilled by an Other rather than by him. I would ask the reader to be patient, and
+recall that a dialectical investigation is circular. We shall get to it when the investigation leads us there.
+
+4GJ
+poralisation of their 'being' within definite limits, aim to leave nothing
+indeterminate. (This is clear when, for example, the first meetings of a
+society establish its office, secretaries, treasurer, committees, etc.; and
+still clearer when the relations are hierarchical). The determination of
+competences, being a distribution of tasks, implies that a given functional individual can never have a certain type of relation with another:
+this is the negative meaning of all 'rules'.
+In the organised group, human relations involve their own freely
+accepted limits. But, as we saw above in connection with the task, the
+concrete limitation of statutary relations corresponds to a positive
+enrichment: within the limits of hierarchical relations, for example,
+numerous sub-possibilities differentiate themselves, whereas in a
+pledged group, the only possibility, in its total abstraction and complete indeterminacy, was for everyone to preserve the group from all
+kinds of external and internal threats. It was the same thing (in a
+negative sense). But the hierarchical relation of superior to inferior, for
+example, consists precisely in avoiding internal ruptures (insubordination or slackness) by positive and adapted actions (a joint rejection of
+voluntarism and obedience, etc.). The aim of the parties to the pledge,
+on the other hand, was urgent but still vague: the Tennis Court oath is
+an example of this. Faced with a still imprecise threat, but with an
+increasing hostility from the aristocracy and court, the deputies of the
+Third Estate swore not to allow themselves to become divided. They did
+not know what their tactics should be. And in fact it was the people of
+Paris who resolved the problem. The unification of an organised
+group, in contrast, is always defined by its objective, which is concrete.
+The relations between common individuals must, therefore, te
+constantly created within the limits laid down by a concrete task and
+solely with a view to the successful completion of this task.
+Now, this relation is no longer the simple, indeterminate relation of
+each to each, with and through all: it is primarily a particular mediated
+reciprocity which unites an X to a Y (or to several Ys); the mediation is
+effected by the whole group as a developing totalisation (rather than
+as a complex of units), that is to say, as a common praxis laying down
+its own laws; and it is through the mediation of new reciprocities - this
+time uniting the Ys to the Ms, and thereby the Ms to the Ns, etc. - that
+the common term X relates to each and to all. Thus every common
+individual is specified, and his direct and indirect relations within the
+group are necessarily specific and established with specified other
+individuals. Furthermore, in this concatenation of specific relations
+
+468 Book II
+which unite an X to the Ys, then, through the Ys, to the Ms, and through
+the Ms to Ns, etc., the group intervenes, as a totalising praxis defined by
+its objective, in every new relation, in order to perform the mediation.
+However, the structure described here is too simple; and in fact, it
+complicates itself of itself. In fact, it should be noted that there is
+always a concrete possibility that the mediated relation between X
+and N will arise, at the same time and in the same connection, both by an
+indirect chain of specific relations and directly. If this possibility were
+realised, two sub-possibilities would remain: either the direct and the
+indirect relations between X and the Ns will not differ in their specification (the general has his orders transmitted to soldiers through the
+hierarchy, but in certain circumstances he may be in direct contact with
+a fighting unit and give them orders personally), or the specifications
+of the direct and indirect relations are different. (In principle - and
+setting aside for the moment the question of what actually happens -
+the hierarchical and indirect relation of a Soviet manager with 'bluecollar' and 'white-collar' workers is mirrored within the Party, of
+which the manager and many of the workers will certainly be members,
+by a direct relation in which the hierarchy is dissolved and replaced by
+another hierarchy. It is possible - though this is a purely logical
+hypothesis, and never actually happens - that the manager might
+indirectly command a local leader of the Party and, as a member,
+directly obey him, and find himself directly under his orders.) In fact
+it often happens that the two cases occur together and define the same
+power in relation to two different sub-groups. An X has direct and
+indirect relations of identical specification with Ms; and direct and
+indirect relations of different specifications with Ns. These various
+relations may be established with the distribution of tasks; and it is not
+rare for them to be specified in the course of common action. And it
+should be added that, if the group is numerous and relatively dispersed,
+indirect relations tend to disperse into indefiniteness; or else the limitation of competences may, for a whole interior zone, fail to determine
+the common relation which is to unite common individuals to specified
+powers: in either of these cases the original "Terror-Fraternity' relation
+reappears in all its starkness, generally in its positive form; the common
+individuals whose existence I am aware of, who work in the common
+praxis, and whom I cannot touch directly, are my brothers. But fraternity, as the affirmation that every Other is the Same, does not
+eliminate heterogeneity. Each of the workers, of the sportsmen or
+combatants is my brother in so far as by his differentiated function he
+
+469
+commands me and enables me to fulfil my function. Fraternity reveals
+itself as the immediate and fundamental relation which subsists in its
+abstract starkness between heterogeneous individuals in the absence of
+any specified relation. In direct or indirect functional relations this
+fundamental link subsists, as the synthetic bedrock on which all
+relations are built; but it does not allow itself to be grasped in its
+abstract strength, precisely because it is there to serve as a basis for
+differentiations. Thus two common individuals within a sub-group
+may well abstractly designate the bond between them as fraternity: but
+in fact - except when the historical conjuncture dissolves all specifications without breaking up the group - this is only a verbal determination. It is in their reciprocal action, in their function, in their specific
+relation as mediated, that they actualise the fundamental bond and
+transform it by affirming it. But at this level of praxis, discourse is
+practical and concrete: it is used to give orders or to name everyone's
+respective function.
+Furthermore, in arbitrarily considering 'an X' in his relation with
+the Ys, I have, for brevity, presupposed an absolute beginning. This
+has no importance provided we re-establish the true procedures of
+dialectical investigation, but it would be a mistake to stop at this way of
+classifying or of thinking: indeed, if it were necessary to begin arbitrarily with the sub-group of the Xs or the Ys or with any other subgroup in order to conceive the ensemble of mediated relations, one
+would have to admit that there was at least one case in which all
+functions are independent of each other: the case in which the group
+and its structures are explained in terms of any one of them. In fact,
+the relations of X to the sub-groups of Ys, Zs, etc., have meaning only
+in the true milieu of the organisation, that is to say in circularity. For
+the possibility of beginning the explanation of specific relations anywhere and everywhere really means that every relation is double: X has
+a functional link with Y and Z only in so far as the specific relations,
+both direct and indirect, of all the individuated powers of the group
+turn back on him and specify his power. In other words, I can, a priori,
+determine the powers of X on the basis of Y as well as those of Y on
+the basis of X. Of course this is a logical determination: actual praxis
+emphasises subordinations and co-ordinations, either temporarily or
+definitively. But if the practical structure of an organised group has an
+orientation, and if, practically, it is this orientation which I have to
+find ('Who is responsible?"
+', 'Who must I speak to?'
+", etc.), this vectoral
+reading does not destroy the circular structure: this structure, in effect,
+
+470
+is simply the determination of the milieu of 'Fraternity-Terror' by
+mediated reciprocity.
+In our investigation we have discovered that, whatever the organised
+group may be concretely, it is a complex circularity of mediated
+reciprocities, both direct and indirect. In this respect, it merely determines and enriches the reciprocity which we have seen to constitute the
+original bond of the fused group. But we cannot go any further unless
+we examine this new type of reciprocity - which is born of fundamental reciprocity, and is a construction of the group, and, in fact, a
+product of its work on the original relation.
+Now, the first effect of this work is that it inverts the fundamental
+relation. In the fused group, mediated reciprocity emerges from praxis
+itself as a relation of convergence between two third parties who come
+together in the generating movement of the group: I see the advent of
+myself in the other (the same) in so far as the other sees the advent of
+himself in me, and, through this very movement of regroupment,
+everyone becomes in turn a constituent and a constituted third party.
+Reciprocity is a direct, convergent, lived relation. As we have seen, the
+vicissitudes of action and the transformations of the situation gradually
+produce the diversity of tasks. Even at the level of the fused group
+(elsewhere is always here; but elsewhere, the enemy is other and behaves
+otherwise), this diversity is interiorised; and it is as a def ence against the
+dangers of differentiation that the group recreates its unity in the
+freedom of the pledge. But the pledge itself, as a fundamental relation
+between agents, is reciprocity. Only reciprocity can produce in me a
+tree limitation of my freedom: as 1 have already shown, 1 rediscover
+myself in myself as Other-Freedom in so far as, for the Other, 1am his
+guarantee of always being the Same as myself; and in so far as the
+Other's pledge is for me a guarantee of being the Same as him. There is
+reciprocity here but, in so far as it allows practical freedom to be
+affected by inertia, it is already a worked reciprocity. The pledged
+member uses mediation by the group so as to entirely transform the
+free spontaneous relation which appeared at the beginning of our
+investigation. As soon as the pledge is given, reciprocity becomes
+centrifugal: instead of being a lived, concrete bond, produced by the
+presence of two men (with or without mediation), it becomes the bond
+of their absence. In his isolation, or in the milieu of the sub-group,
+everyone derives his guarantees and imperatives from the inertia which
+affects common individuals whom he no longer sees. In this sense,
+reciprocity is no longer the living creation of bonds; it is, on the
+
+492
+contrary, reciprocal inertia. Through the pledge, man rebels against the
+separating power of inert materiality (spatio-temporal distances,
+obstacles, etc.), but at the same time, he interiorises it; and reciprocity,
+as an inert limit of freedom, comes to man from outside, as exteriority
+against exteriority, and it exists in him as worked matter. This very
+inertia, still in a crude state, is what is refined in everyone by functions,
+and transformed into precise tasks, into practical relations with instruments, with places, with enemies or with things.
+Since this inert reciprocity is established to serve as a basis for
+powers as alterity reappearing inside freedom, it is important to
+understand an apparent paradox: the heterogeneity of functions (even
+in a hierarchy) is simply a determination of inert reciprocity. I call this
+an apparent paradox because, at least from the point of view of positivist
+logic, relations which unite two heterogeneous terms and refer to them
+in their heterogeneity seem vectoral, that is to say univocal, relations.
+Between one common individual and another, it is possible to establish
+a double system of directed relations (in opposite directions). But their
+differences of function apparently make it impossible to merge the two
+systems into a single, two-directional system. A doctor treats the
+deputy mayor; and he votes for him in the municipal elections. Thus
+there is a set of relations proceeding from the doctor to the patient
+(treatment, the practical knowledge of his body and its deficiencies),
+and of others proceeding from the patient to the doctor (trust, fees,
+etc.). Now we can add another relational system: administrator →
+administered, elector → elected. Of course these circumstances all
+interact and the relations condition one another. Nevertheless, reciprocity seems to be excluded a priori: it would be absurd to say that
+the doctor is to the patient what the patient is to the doctor, and perhaps
+even more absurd to say that the doctor is to the patient what the
+administered is to the administrator.
+But this is because we have deliberately taken our example from a
+social situation which is not characterised (at least not necessarily) by
+the individuals belonging to the same organised group. Thus heterogeneity is to some extent (we shall see later how much) based on
+suffered, serial alterity. It may be that the doctor is treating the deputy
+mayor because they belong to the same political group (they met
+during an electoral campaign, etc.), but it is not true that he became a
+doctor in order that the other should become deputy mayor - nor
+conversely. In an organised group, however, heterogeneity derives
+from the needs of praxis; it is created on the basis of reciprocal sureties
+
+472
+and is a determination of mediated reciprocity. Sometimes it is incorrectly called interdependence. But interdependence, as we have
+seen, can be suffered in serial alterity: in an inert gathering, everyone
+depends on the others in so far as they are Others and in so far as he is
+himself an Other. But here, interdependence is a free overthrow of
+serial interdependence: everyone depends on the Other in so far as they
+are both the same. The mediation of functions is the common praxis:
+the group produces me as the power to realise a certain detail of the
+common praxis so that this praxis can be realised in its totality and
+differentiate itself (se détailler) in objectifying itself; by performing
+this function, and through the development of the common action, I
+allow every particular function to differentiate itself, and to realise itself
+as another detail of the objectification.
+Thus the reciprocity of two radically heterogeneous functions remains unintelligible as long as they are not mediated by the practical
+group, but its full intelligibility emerges as soon as both functions are
+understood in terms of the common praxis. But this should not be
+taken to mean that every organised group, or every agent, is indispensable. This obviously depends on the objective and on the circumstances:
+indeed the common individual has, as it were, a marginal utility,
+because, according to circumstances (lack of finances, of weapons, or
+of men), functions are eliminated in a certain order, which varies
+according to the praxis and its aim. But though such a reorganisation
+is always possible, in accordance with some scarcity, it is in fact the
+creation of some other group, with other means and, often, a more
+limited objective. The problem is not to determine who is and who is
+not indispensable to the common action; or rather this problem is
+practical rather than critical. The important point, for us, is that in a
+group in action, the organisation of powers and tasks creates a concrete
+internal milieu with its own structures, tensions, and immanent relations; and this internal milieu, in so far as it defines itself in relation to a
+transcendent objective, is the practical reality of the group, its physiognomy and internal objectivity. In so far as every function maintains
+this objective reality through particular events, and for a given multiplicity (and in fixed or only slightly variable conditions: budget, means
+of communication, etc.), it is the reciprocal counterpart of the others.
+That any particular function may atrophy or disappear when the
+situation is transformed is obvious: but this will only occur if the
+group proceeds to a rearrangement and modifies the internal relations
+of its members, and therefore its structure. Functions are reciprocal in
+
+473
+that all of them, in reciprocity, help preserve a particular internal
+physiognomy of the group in activity, that is to say, in so far as they
+have been defined by a practical plan which is the guiding schema of
+the action.
+A political group which undergoes a purge and survives it thereby
+demonstrates that the purged members were not indispensable to it:
+but, at the same time, it becomes other and the new statute which it
+gives itself defines it irreversibly. But most of the time, all functions are
+initially all equally indispensable: this is because they are established
+on the basis of certain techniques and instruments which themselves
+helped to define a particular type of action. Later, this action may
+appear wasteful and ineffective, but only from the point of view of
+other techniques and instruments. It is therefore impossible ever to
+make an absolute hierarchy of functions (which define themselves in a
+dated temporalisation). On the contrary, the fundamental character of an
+organised group is that all these functions are conditioned and guaranteed by the mediation of the developing common praxis. Hence every
+function becomes the signification of the other in so far as it is itself
+signified by the praxis; and every function contains the other in its
+practical activity. This is particularly evident in small, highly disciplined groups, like sports teams, in which every movement of a fellow
+member, seen in its functional differentiation, is decoded in the very
+movement which it occasions in another fellow member, as a differentiated function, through the practical field defined by the action of the
+group and as a function of all the other movements. 35 Mediation, for a
+given goalkeeper or centre-forward, is the pitch itself in so far as their
+common praxis has made it a common practical reality to be occupied
+or traversed with a variable co-efficient of instrumentality and adversity; and every developing reorganisation of the team on the field
+constitutes it through the pitch itself as functionally situated (in relation
+to the ball, to a particular opponent ahead of him, etc.). But as soon as
+he takes up this spatio-temporal situation and transcends it by his
+praxis (in accordance with his function), the common situation of the
+whole team is reciprocally modified. For a spectator, to understand a
+match is precisely to decode the functional and individualised
+35. In fact, in a football match, everything is complicated by the presence of
+the opposite team. The positive reciprocity between members of a team is closely
+connected with a negative and antagonistic reciprocity. But this complication
+does not alter our problem in any way.
+
+4JA Book II
+particularisations of mediated reciprocity as a perpetual totalisation on
+the basis of a known objective.
+But inert reciprocity as reciprocal inertia cannot be reduced to the
+simple forms just described. Of course, it is and remains centrifugal,
+and affirms itself in opposition to the void and to separation. But we
+have just seen its original structure: it is necessary for A to do what he
+does for the common praxis in order that B can do what he does, and
+conversely. This structure becomes complicated under the pressure of
+circumstances simply because it becomes a sort of inorganic materiality
+of freedom. Thus, in a way, through inert reciprocity, inorganic
+materiality again becomes the mediation between practical agents, like
+the worked thing (precious metal, etc.) in the practico-inert field. This
+means that the group acts constantly on itself in order to modify its
+possible counter-finalities and that it can act only by creating new
+reciprocities. In fact, or ganisation, as internal praxis, can neither produce
+nor preserve itself in the milieu of reciprocity unless it becomes a determination of this reciprocity as a free, inert relation of synthetic
+interiority.
+So far, we have always described organised groups as if they were
+composed of relatively homogeneous individuals or of ones who
+differed only in respect of some qualities whose very diversity corresponded harmoniously to the differentiation of their functions. But
+this would hardly apply even to selective groups, carrying out their
+own enrolment according to definite rules. But the organised group is
+a very broad genus of which the selective group is only a small species.
+In fact, organisation takes place on the spot, with whatever means and
+men are available (at least in most cases and in the living moment of
+constitutive activity). Thus the synthetic bond of unity and the rule of
+reciprocity - which distinguish the group from other multiplicities, into a particular, hitherto inert, multiplicity - positively reveal, within the
+resulting interiority, as a function of these bonds of interiority,
+differentiations which, outside the group, were simply inert relations of
+exteriority, and inside the group become involuntary reciprocities.
+An example may make this clearer: throughout this investigation we
+have maintained that a nation is not a group. Consequently the proportion of young and old in a nation depends on complex processes
+(which, as we shall see, alone represent the absolute concrete - that is
+to say, the perpetual conflict between group praxis and practico-inert
+processes, the presence of common structures even in seriality and of
+seriality even in organised groups) which, taken as a whole, cannot
+
+475
+correspond to any praxis. Amongst these processes, in fact, the demographer will attempt to designate, as immediate factors, sexual behaviour in the different classes of a particular society, progress of
+domestic hygiene and of medicine - in other words, medical technique
+in relation to the infant and old age mortality rates. And these data will
+be taken from a society which is already defined by the relation of its
+children to its old people, that is, a society which bequeathes to its new
+generation a certain demographic structure on the basis of which the
+demographic tendencies arising from new conditions will partially
+modify this inheritance. Of course, as Marx indicated in a passage
+quoted in The Problem of Method36 'population' is an abstraction: its
+variations refer us to all the material conditions and to the historical
+process. Thus the rise in the French birth rate after the Second World
+War is a process whose development can be studied without any
+complete understanding of its signification. (At first it was thought
+to be a temporary phenomenon, common to all post-war periods. But
+it has persisted and stabilised, which is somewhat paradoxical since it
+is, at least in some respects, peculiar to France.)
+But as soon as economic (or social, technical, or political) research
+turns to French production - or the redistribution of national income or
+the demographic demands of economic progress, etc. - and, using some
+constantly revised working hypothesis, decides to treat the active
+population, or various groups of workers (defined as primary, secondary or tertiary, or by class, or according to any other synthetic project) as a unified group, the relations of pure exterior contingency
+which apparently unite an Alsatian adult, living and working in Paris,
+to some old man born in Paris and to a fourteen-year-old boy from
+Nantes who passes them in the street, suddenly appear as structured in
+reciprocity. Within the group of producers, in effect, the old man and the
+boy become non-productive elements who have to be fed. However,
+for society, the child is an investment: society spends money to make
+him a worker. The old man is more or less a dead weight (it goes
+without saying that I am looking at these relations strictly from the
+point of view of contemporary economists and demographers). On
+this basis, we can see how adults (who, even in primitive society,
+36. The Problem of Method, p. 49. "The population is an abstraction if I leave
+out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an
+empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest. E.g. wage
+labour, capital, etc.' See Marx, Grundrisse, trans. Nicolaus, Penguin Books, 1973,
+p. 100. [Ed.]
+
+4JG Book lI
+confuse death and birth, childhood and old age: not primarily in the
+name of mysterious intuitions, but because they are useless mouths) are
+engaged in a double reciprocity: regardless of the social system, part of
+their product will in fact go to the child, and part to the old man. In the
+case of the child, the reciprocity is that of capital invested with interest:
+he is maintained so that one day he can take over and maintain others
+in turn; and he allows himself to be kept, controlled, and produced with
+a view to this future. The other reciprocity refers back to the past; it
+is a temporal reciprocity. The contract or pledge, without ever having
+given rise to any particular act, goes back to the period when the old
+man was an adult at the height of his powers and the adult of today a
+cuild. Thus we encounter the original situation again, though we live
+it in its consequences and thirty years later; and this shows that
+functions, as reciprocity, can succeed one another, the second appearing
+when the first no longer exists. But this is not what concerns us here.
+The important point is that if one totalises, then differences will be
+interiorised and lived as special characteristics of the common praxis,
+that is to say, as the internal physiognomy of the group. The French
+community considered as a productive group has its present structure,
+and a different future, because of the proportion of the young (under
+15, for example) to the old (over 60), that is to say, because of the
+proportion in it of useful work (production of goods, of future workers)
+to sacred work (pledged reciprocity, the maintenance of old workers).
+In reality, for the sake of simplicity, demographers, sociologists and
+economists choose to treat the active community as if it were an
+organised group: and this is quite justified as long as they see it merely
+as a heuristic hypothesis or a method of exposition and do not allow
+themselves to be taken in by it.
+But this example shows clearly to what extent, in the common act of
+pledged association and through the synthetic structure of reciprocity
+(the only fundamental structural bond of the group, the practical
+unification of a multiplicity into a group gives rise to heterogeneities
+which produce themselves in serial inertia as non-reciprocal but which,
+in the common praxis, have to be lived as reciprocities. This means
+that in the milieu of mediated reciprocity nothing can happen except
+in the form of reciprocity; but this means too that the heterogeneity
+constructed and sustained by the pledge reveals non-constructed and
+non-functional or pseudo-functional heterogeneities (that is to say,
+heterogeneities which determine themselves in this functional unity as
+functions or as counter-functions). Mediated reciprocity, as a free
+
+The Organisation 47J
+determination of the common praxis, is constantly traversed and is
+always in danger of being modified by secondary reactions of reciprocity developing from the distribution of tasks. These secondary
+reciprocities have the same structures as primary ones: they are
+mediated by the common praxis and through this mediation every
+individual characteristic becomes functional. In the case under consideration, for example, the totalisation of productive forces makes age
+a characteristic of the common individual. In this way, it helps give the
+group its physiognomy; praxis would be different if the proportion of
+old and young varied. But though these secondary reactions may be
+favourable to the common activity (it is not logically impossible), the
+fact that they arise from the pledge does not mean that their origin
+does not lie in the practico-inert. Thus, the possibility that they may
+impede, or slow down, or divert praxis is also present a priori. Besides,
+it is not out of the question that they will endanger the group even
+when they constitute an internal factor of acceleration.
+It is well known that Rakosi set out to liquidate the Hungarian petty
+bourgeoisie and proletarianise it. But a number of workers in Budapest
+were former members of the petty bourgeoisie, and as petty bourgeois
+they were deeply opposed to the régime. At the time of the rising, when
+the workers organised demonstrations, this group, through its common
+action, developed in reciprocity its internal contradiction. The proletarianised petty bourgeoisie accelerated the insurrectional movement
+and, in certain places and in certain cases, gave it a counter-revolutionary
+aspect. This did not in any way correspond to the action of the true
+workers (that is to say, workers of working-class or peasant origin),
+but it was used later as a pretext for justifying Soviet intervention.3? In
+so far as factory work could not escape the practico-inert, it was
+incapable of opposing the two groups of workers to each other. In
+short, these two groups did not exist and, given the temporary impossibility of even imagining an insurrection, the origin of a worker
+remained an accidental matter for the Others. In the unity of a praxis,
+however, the workers - who as alienated producers were all really
+members of the working class - grouped themselves as a class and
+37. I did not take account of this in my article Le Fantôme de Staline (Les
+Temps Modernes I29-30 [1956-7); reprinted in Situations VII; trans. The Spectre
+of Stalin, London, 1969. [Ed.]), because I was unaware of it. It was later - some
+weeks afterwards - that I learned of it from reliable witnesses. Need I say that this
+correction makes absolutely no difference to my conclusions and my position.
+
+478 Book II
+thereby caused class conflicts to reappear inside their practical community. The majority remained working-class, but the minority
+revealed itself to be petty bourgeois and demoralised. The violence of
+the hatred and despair produced a ferment; it triumphed, in so far as it
+was lived in reciprocity. But it also denatured. It is known that the
+insurrectional committees arose partly in order to struggle against this
+denaturing. Nevertheless the whole group had to live the contradiction of its minority, in which the condition of the workers opposed the
+class-being of the petty bourgeoisie. In other words, the group could not
+exclude by violence pledged members who were pursuing the common
+aim or at least seemed to be doing so, and perhaps believed they were
+too; but it was too late to do any effective rearrangement or reorganisation: there was not enough time, and the second intervention interrupted the reorganisation when it began.
+For a group which is organising itself in the reflexive awareness of its
+practical unity, the problem is not so much the neutralisation or
+elimination through violence of reactive reciprocities, as their reappropriation and their retrieval in the light of a consciously pursued
+objective. But although the abstract possibility cannot be ruled out a
+priori, and many examples of it could be cited, such reciprocities are not
+usually dissolved in freedom; as a rule, freedom tries, through the
+action of all common individuals, including those through whom a
+reciprocal counter-finality is manifested, to provide them with a
+foundation as free, created functions. Indeed, at this level, Freedom-
+Terror itself comes to be respected as a free, diversif ying integration:
+when counter-finality presents itself as a movement towards some more
+total integration, it is respected for showing the face of unity. This is
+why - particularly in combat groupings - sectarianism and all forms of
+violence initially manifest themselves in the form of respect, and then
+get the upper hand (for the point of view of a totally adapted praxis
+imposes itself only gradually). On the other hand, in so far as secondary
+reciprocities appear to threaten praxis with paralysis (or to threaten the
+group with serial dissolution), Terror, as the liquidation of interiorised
+differences, attempts the exclusion of third parties and the liquidation
+of pseudo-functions. In any case, these abstract considerations can only
+be meaningful in the context of a historical study of a particular group.
+I refer to them here simply in order to indicate the nature of the
+perpetual work which the group must perform upon itself. In fact, in so
+far as this work tends to transform interiorised alterities into functions,
+which is the usual case and the one which concerns us at present, it is
+
+479
+bound to effect this integration on the basis of the aim and of the
+primary reciprocities. But this immediately shows not only that the
+true work of organisation is the synthetic production and the distribution of tasks, but also that it must constantly effect the synthesis of the
+mediated reciprocities which arise in different layers of the common
+reality. The organised group cannot be practical and alive except as a
+progressive synthesis of a plurality of reciprocal fields. In other words,
+all common organisations are pluridimensional. In fact, as the task
+becomes more complicated and the volume of the group increases,
+systems of simple reciprocities are replaced by systems of composite
+reciprocities. In particular, the appearance of commutation (which is
+often destined to compensate for reactional alterity) introduces a
+successive system of temporalised reciprocities the function of each of
+whose intermediary relations is simply to mediate mediations between
+the initial and the terminal relation. This is not the place for an abstract
+logistical study of reciprocities, though such a project might tempt a
+mathematician. A calculus of reciprocals would obviously leave out of
+consideration practical totalisation as the mediation and foundation of
+this original, social relation; but, on the other hand, it would provide a
+rigorous elucidation of the typical organisations of the reciprocal, of
+their developments and interactions - and of substitutions of terms and
+transformations of elements in so far as these modifications of individuals leave the structures of the system intact.
+But if it really is possible to devise a theory of reciprocal multiplicities in organised groups,38 independently of all concrete, historical
+ends and of any particular circumstances, do we not immediately
+collapse in the face of an inert ossature of the organisation? And do we
+not abandon the terrain of liberating praxis and the dialectic and revert
+to some kind of inorganic necessity?
+Structures: the Work of Lévi-Strauss
+The entire question of the intelligibility of organised praxis arises at
+this level. There can in fact be no doubt that reciprocal relations can be
+38. In fact, this theory is adumbrated by cybernetics.
+
+480 Book II
+treated by the 'exact sciences': and they are already present, as a foundation, in the administration of a school when it decides the timetable for
+a particular class or in the strict arrangement (by the management of
+French Railways for example) of the train timetable of a particular
+network for the winter or summer period. But, on the other hand, it
+should be noticed that these calculated determinations nevertheless
+refer to actions (in railways, for example, they involve not only finished,
+'crystallised' work - machinery, rails, etc. - but also the actual work of
+the railwaymen, from engine drivers to ticket-collectors). Thus the
+peculiarity of this 'ossature' seems to be that it is both an inert relation
+and a living praxis. It should also be added that the permanence of the
+relation as such does not in any way imply the immutability of the terms
+or of their positions; there may be considerable changes, provided they
+take place in such a way that the specific determination of reciprocity is
+preserved. This has been explained admirably by Lévi-Strauss in his
+work on The Elementary Structures of Kinship. We should note in
+particular how his study of matrimonial classes led him to this crucial
+conclusion: "These classes are much less conceived of in extension, as
+groups of objectively designated individuals, than as a system of
+positions whose structure alone remains constant, and in which individuals may change position, and even exchange their respective positions, provided that the relationships between them are maintained.
+But above all Lévi-Strauss's work makes an important contribution
+to the study of those strange internal realities which are both organised
+and organising, both synthetic products of a practical totalisation and
+objects always susceptible of rigorous analytical study, both the lines
+of force of a praxis for every common individual and the fixed links
+between this individual and the group, through perpetual changes of
+both of them, both inorganic ossature and everyone's definite powers
+over everyone else, in short, both fact and right, mechanical elements
+and, at the same time, expressions of a living integration into a unitary
+praxis of those contradictory tensions of freedom and inertia which are
+known as structures. Function as lived praxis appears in the study of the
+group as objectivity in the objectified form of structure. And we shall
+not understand anything of the intelligibility of organised praxis as
+long as we do not raise the question of the intelligibility of structures.
+39. C. Lévi-Strauss, Les Structures Elémentaires de la Parenté, Paris, 1949,
+trans. von Sturmer The Elementary Structures of Kinship, London and Boston,
+1262, p. 113. [Ea.]
+
+482
+But let us quote Lévi-Strauss, one of whose examples will be helpful
+to us:
+'Suppose there are two patrilineal and patrilocal family groups,
+A and B, united by the marriage of a b girl and an a man. From the
+viewpoint of group A, the b woman represents an acquisition, while for
+group B, she represents a loss. Thus, for group A, which benefits, the
+marriage is expressed by a change to a debit position, and for group B,
+which is decreased by the loss of one female member to the profit of
+group A, by the acquiring of a credit. Similarly, the marriage of each of
+the men of group B and of group A represents a gain for his respective
+group, and thus places the group in general, and the family involved in
+particular, in the position of debtor. By contrast, the marriage of each
+of the a or b women represents a loss, and thus opens up a right to
+compensation. ... Each family descended from these marriages thus
+bears a sign, which is determined, for the initial group, by whether the
+children's mother is a daughter or a daughter-in-law. ... The sign
+changes in passing from the brother to the sister, since the brother gains
+a wife, while the sister is lost to her own family. But the sign also
+changes in passing from one generation to the next. It depends upon
+whether, from the initial group's point of view, the father has received
+a wife, or the mother has been transferred outside, whether the sons
+have the right to a woman or owe a sister. ...
+*Each couple bears a (+) or (-) sign, according to whether it results
+from a woman being lost to or acquired by line A or B. The sign
+changes in the following generation, the members of which are all
+cousins to one another. ... It is now only necessary to look at the
+cousins' generation to establish that all those in the relationship (+ +)
+or (- —) are parallel to one another, while all those in the relationship
+(+ -) or (- t) are cross. Thus, the notion of reciprocity allows the
+dichotomy of cousins to be immediately deduced. In other words, two
+male cousins who are both in the credit position towards their father's
+group (and in the debit position with regard to their mother's group)
+cannot exchange their sisters, any more than could two male cousins in
+a credit position with regard to their mothers' group. ... This intimate
+arrangement would leave somewhere outside not only groups which
+did not make restitution, but also groups which did not receive anything, and marriage in both would be a unilateral transfer. '40
+The interest of the proposed schema, which is in fact a deliberately
+40. Ibid., PP. 130-1.
+
+482 Book İI
+abstract summary of several concrete studies, is that it displays the
+structure as a complex reciprocity of credits and debts. These credits
+and debts, of course, depend on a basic dichotomy: they are reciprocities which unite two groups. But, from our point of view, there is
+no difference between groups-united-by-a-system-of-matrimonialrelations and sub-groups.41 Now, we can also see that a debt presupposes a power, a right acknowledged by the individual or the family
+and appropriated by some individual or family of the other sub-group,
+the system being a mediation between the two parties. Of course, this
+is a mediated reciprocity and, in a sense, a concrete relation between a
+demand (in the name of the common pledge) and a free will which has
+freely deprived itself of the freedom to refuse. In short, the debt of
+family group A (which has just acquired a daughter b by marriage) is a
+debt which is lived, created by actions, and accepted or even undertaken,
+though certain complex circumstances of family histories may cause it
+to be cancelled (hence violent conflicts between groups). In spite of
+this, the debt is capable of being represented by an algebraic sign
+associated with a symbolic designation of the group (A) or of the
+individual (a), and the same applies to the credit which corresponds
+to it. And their mutual, symmetrical relation can be expressed by an
+exact proposition: in the matrimonial system of 'cross-cousins', no
+individuals who (as a result of the system of filiation) possess the
+characters († †) and (- -) can be united; marriages can take place
+41. The abstract point of view of critique can obviously never be that of the
+sociologist or the ethnographer. It is not that we are denying or ignoring the
+concrete distinctions (the only real ones) which they establish: it is simply that
+we are at a level of abstraction at which they have no place. In order to connect
+with them, one would need the set of mediations which transform a critique into
+a logic and which, by specification and dialectical concretisation, redescend from
+logic to the real problems, that is to say, to the level at which real History,
+through the inversion which is to be expected of this abstract quest, becomes the
+developing totalisation which carries, occasions, and justifies the partial totalisation of critical intellectuals. In the very moment in which the ideologue (as we
+shall see) recognises his investigation as dated (1957, here and not elsewhere or at
+any other time, History takes back and transcends, but does not remove, the
+dialectical schemata which it has always had, but which he has only signified, and
+which designate him as a moment, as their passed signifier, and then allow him
+to sink into Being, while they become dialectical schemata, the intelligibility and
+objective rationality of the totalising movement, that is to say, the rational
+foundation and rule of development which illuminates concrete processes, but
+appears in them only in the form of the poorest and most removed layer of signification.
+
+483
+only between individuals who bear opposite signs (t -), that is to
+say, between cross-cousins. Here we have, as it were, the embryo of a
+strict proof (in the sense in which we have seen necessity intervene in
+demonstrative experience): Lévi-Strauss has already defined crosscousins: 'Members of the same generation are divided into two groups:
+on the one hand, cousins (whatever their degree) who are kinsmen
+descended from two collaterals of the same sex ... (parallel cousins),
+and, on the other hand, cousins descended from collaterals of different
+sex ... (cross-cousins) 42 This is a matter of the strict, universal
+definition of the constitution of a class (in the logical sense of the
+word). And the passage we have quoted offers us a deduction of a
+mathematical kind (mathematical not in its content but in its apodictic
+certainty) which from definitions produces two groups (t + or
+- - and t - or - †), and which thereby makes us see, in the alienating experience of necessity, that one group (+ + or - -) is strictly
+identical with the group of parallel cousins, while the other group
+(t - or - +) is identical with that of cross-cousins. But this demonstration - however rigorous and alienating, and therefore nondialectical, it may be - is no more than a mediation. Lévi-Strauss
+actually attempts to determine the true nature of marriage between
+cross-cousins. In the final analysis, therefore, cross-cousin marriage
+simply expresses the fact that marriage must always be a giving and a
+receiving, but that one can receive only from him who is obliged to
+give, and that the giving must be to him who has a right to receive, for
+the mutual gift between debtors leads to privilege, whereas the mutual
+gift between creditors leads inevitably to extinction. 43 Obviously this
+is not a matter of a common praxis, organised 'in the heat of the
+moment, like the one we have just studied. Later we shall see what
+kind of comprehension applies to this type of behaviour (common and
+individual). What is crucial for us is that in spite of everything these
+practices relate to a single aim: the exchange of women organised in
+such a way as to combat, as far as possible, scarcity and its consequences
+for the social ensemble. In opposition to privilege and extinction, every
+family, in the milieu of the pledge (the meaning of this will become
+clear later) claims its rights and recognises its duties in a single movement; and, as we have seen, these amount to the same thing.
+But at this level of power and of right, a strict formulation is both
+possible and necessary. The two (imperative) formulae of the exchange
+42. Lévi-Strauss, op. cit., Pp. 98-2.
+43. Ibid., p. 131. My italics.
+
+484 Book II
+of sisters and of the marriage of cross-cousins can be defined in these
+terms: 'A is to B as B is to A; or again, if A is to D as B is to C, C
+must be to D as B is to A.'44 Here we encounter some well known
+aporias (but ones which lack real consistency, and which the sociologist
+is right to ignore): right cannot be deduced from fact, fact cannot
+produce right, and right (as the ensemble of juridical practices, whether
+codified or not) is fact (it is a fact that one gets married in a particular
+society in one way rather than another), fact engenders right (in the
+organised community and when it takes place in accordance with
+juridical laws: a particular marriage between a man from group A and
+a woman from group B is a fact; they did get married, yesterday or
+last year; but this fact is lived by group A, for example, in the form of
+a complex of obligations, that is to say, of exigencies which come to
+it from the future). But in the perspective which the work of Lévi-
+Strauss has opened up, these superficial aporias are merely characteristics which are indissolubly linked and which constitute the intelligibility of the structure. Let us try to see them in their true relations.
+(i) Structure and Function
+The persuasiveness of Lévi-Strauss's rigorous demonstrations is due to
+more than the necessity of their conclusion; as a determination of our
+knowledge this necessity can have no basis except in a practical
+necessity, the necessity which makes a man from group A who marries
+a woman from B, for familial or personal reasons, into a debtor of B
+and which constitutes through him the whole of group A as debtor.
+We have already anticipated that in organisations we would encounter
+an apodictic experience on the part of the agent and that this would, at
+first sight, resemble that of alienation. The married man from group A
+constitutes himself as an other in relation to group B - and not as any
+other, but as a common individual designated by a new function (his
+debt). And we must go further, since the act of marriage will have the
+effect of constituting every child in a 'creditor-debtor' relation to the
+groups in question, and because, through him, this relation will strictly
+determine his future marriage possibilities (but in common, leaving his
+individual possibility undetermined). The son is born with an untrans-
+44. Ibid., P. I32.
+
+485
+cendable future, that is to say, with an untranscendable limit to some
+of his possibilities: he is designated on the basis of a free action of the
+previous generation (the father chose one woman or another from
+among the b women), and as a result of a concatenation of determinations
+which can be treated by a sort of ordinal algebra.
+Is this really alienation? Obviously not: the free choice of a wife, in
+the first generation, effectively involves, as a freely accepted condition,
+the inert negation of certain possibilities (in other words, the acceptance
+of the inert necessity of exogamy in some form or other) and this
+negation is itself based on the free production of a particular kind of
+mediated reciprocity. Obviously these characteristics (inert negation,
+inert possibility, lived reciprocity) are not, or need not be, explicit. In
+the very freedom of choosing a wife, they are reactualised and sustained. And debt, as a relation which constitutes a man a in relation to B,
+is the free production, through this choice, of a mediating function
+between A and B. Through a, A and B - debtors and creditors - are
+linked, and to some extent, the power of B over a is the power of a
+over A. Thus he has the right to require the group to keep the undertaking given by the common individual who, in his person, married
+a B woman.
+Thus these are genuinely free human relations (undertakings,
+pledges, powers, rights and duties, etc.). And if the son of an ab
+marriage is constituted with a double character even before being born
+and regardless of who he may be, this is because, even before his mother
+becomes pregnant, he is primarily a determinate possibility of the father
+and mother - that is to say, a limit which is as yet still only their limit,
+and which will remain theirs as long as the future child is no more than
+their own possibility. From birth onwards, the arrival of the child in
+the milieu of the pledge is the equivalent for him of making a pledge;
+anyone who arrives within a pledged group finds himself to be pledged
+- not as a passive object receiving his statute from outside, but as a free
+common agent who has been granted his freedom (the real function of
+baptisms, initiations, etc., is to reinteriorise the pledged function as a
+free pledge45). Later, we shall discuss this point at length: for this
+45. This explains the strange attitude which is current amongst many lukewarm or sceptical Catholics (or even free-thinkers). I call them Catholics because of their origin rather than their faith; but if a married couple in this category
+has children, they will have them baptised as a result of the following line of
+reasoning: "They must be left free: they can make their own choice when they
+come of age' For a long time I was surprised by this; I thought it concealed some
+
+486 Book II
+second pledge has special characteristics which need to be elucidated and,
+most importantly, is infinitely more widespread than the first.
+What is certain is that birth is a pledge to precisely the extent that
+the pledge is a birth. If birth is reproduced artificially (in an initiation,
+the group takes responsibility for it) then the young initiate will no
+longer distinguish between his social birth, his bodily birth, his powers
+and his pledge: in fact, initiations were originally associated with trials
+and ordeals; and at the same time, were expected and promised. The
+organic individual freely bore the expected ordeals in order to achieve
+the statute of the common individual (that is to say, in order to have
+and to exercise practical powers); and this undertaking - manifested by
+sort of conformist timidity, some fear. But in fact, from the point of view of the
+group, the reasoning is valid. As someone who had been baptised, but who had
+no real links with the Catholic group, it seemed to me that baptism was a mortgage of future freedom (especially as these same arguments often lead to the child
+being given a religious upbringing, going to his first communion, etc.). I thought
+that total indeterminacy was the true basis of choice. But from the point of view
+of the group (to which the lukewarm or unbelieving but respectful Catholics
+still belong, the cousin possibly being a seminarist, the maternal aunts being
+pious, etc.), the opposite is true: baptism is a way of creating freedom in the
+common individual at the same time as qualifying him by his function and his
+reciprocal relation to everyone; he interiorises common freedom as the true
+power of his individual freedom. He is, as it were, moved to a higher potential of
+efficacity and capacity. Thus the parents wish to place him at this higher level so
+that he can, with all his power and in complete knowledge, decide whether to
+remain in the group, whether to change his function (lukewarmness) in it, or
+whether to withdraw. It seems to the Christian non-believer that 'the born
+atheist' is only an individual and that he is unable to rise to the level of faith as
+common freedom, so as either to choose or criticise it, whereas the believer will
+have both the experience of religious power in the Christian community and also,
+through his doubts, if he has any, the experience of the lower level of isolation.
+I now realise that neither my own reasonings nor those of the respectful freethinker were correct. Whatever one does, in fact, one prejudges: in the eyes of
+Christians, atheists are isolated, and characterised by a simple negation; but
+atheists also form a group (with different statutes, looser bonds, etc.) and a child
+must submit either to the baptism of atheism or to that of Christianity. The truth,
+which is very hard for liberals - but then any truth is hard for tender liberal souls
+- is that it is necessary to decide the meaning of faith (that is to say, of the history
+of the world, of mankind) on behalf of the child, and without being able to consult him, and that whatever one does, and whatever precautions one takes, he will
+bear the weight of this decision throughout his life. But it is also true that it can
+mark him only to the extent that he has freely interiorised it and that it becomes
+the free self-limitation of his freedom rather than an inert limit assigned to him by
+his father.
+
+48}
+his very endurance - is precisely the second pledge. There can be no
+doubt that the individual lives it as an acquisition of merit: but it is
+equally certain that adults see it as an indication of commitment. It is as
+if, on the basis of this commitment, they were reserving the right to
+punish him if he should wish to leave the group - on the basis of this
+commitment; as if they wanted to be able to say to him: 'Your impatience for theinitiation, your courage during the ceremony committed
+us to you, and you had the right to ask us to install you as a common
+individual in the community. But, reciprocally, in committing us so
+wholeheartedly, you were committing yourself to us: your enthusiasm
+was a free determination of your future and you took upon yourself the
+burdens (exogamy, etc.) which have weighed upon you ever since your
+parents' marriage' Thus rites of passage, like marriage, are bi-lateral,
+symmetrical ceremonies: they actualise a reciprocity. It is therefore
+impossible for the child not to interiorise this future anterior which has
+been constituted for him a priori and not to interiorise it through positive
+acts (initiation procedures, choice of a wife, military prowess or, where
+appropriate, the struggle for power). This is still the meaning of the
+very true and constantly repeated sentence, 'No adult can say, "I did
+not ask to be born"'. Thus, ultimately, the organic individual grasps
+his contingency in every movement of his life. This means that he is
+not his own product; but as a common individual, his birth is indistinguishable from the arrival of his freedom and its determination by
+itself. To be born is to produce oneself as a specification of the group
+and as a complex of functions (burdens and powers, debts and credit,
+right and duty). The common individual produces himself as a new
+pledge within the group. 16
+But in the case both of the original pledge and of the secondary one,
+(in fact it is always, except in emergencies, a matter of secondary
+pledges), function depends on a veiled inertia, on what I just called the
+inorganic materiality of freedom. And the aim of the common individual within the group is to preserve the permanence of relations
+through changes in the position of individual terms; which means that
+46. It goes without saying that what we are considering here is the abstract
+case (or the elementary group) in which problems of exploitation or class struggle
+do not appear. We are proceeding slowly, and at the end of the journey we shall
+encounter the concrete, that is to say, the complex collection of practical organisations interfering with the practico-inert and the alienation of common action
+taken up by the passivity of the series. Only at this level will class struggle,
+exploitation, etc., take on their true meaning.
+
+488 Book II
+he modifies his praxis (and acquires new characteristics) in so far as
+other third parties (or all of them) are themselves led to change either
+by praxis or by the pressure of external circumstances. Thus the
+relation remains fixed in so far as it is preserved. And if, through
+a directed action, a system in movement is invoked, that is to say
+relations which produce one another, then these relations will arise as
+mathematical relations rather than as the moments of a dialectical
+praxis. As functions, in fact, they are still the condition for the praxis
+(of the common individual and of the totalising group), but they are
+not the praxis itself; on the contrary, it is their inert instrumentality (as
+the limitation of their possibilities) which conditions everyone's
+efficacity. This is how the efficacity of a goalkeeper, as well as his
+personal possibility of being good, very good, or excellent, depend on
+the set of prescriptions and prohibitions which define his role. The
+match would no longer have any meaning, and would become a formless scuffle if the goalkeeper could, as he wished, also play the role of
+half-back or centre-forward (and conversely). Once functions have
+been distributed, therefore, it is not a matter of them dialectically modifying themselves simply through belonging to the same whole (which
+is, however, the characteristic of actions in so far as they are produced
+by individuals - within certain limits, as we shall see). In fact, the creation of the functions was dialectical, although it was produced in the
+light of the multiplicity of agents and exigencies. But, although always
+capable of being rearranged, the functional organisation has to be put
+in question by the whole group, either through a reflexive attitude of
+each of its members, or by some specially differentiated organ, in order
+to realise the co-ordinations, modifications, adaptations, etc., when
+they come to be necessitated by the totalising praxis.*?
+47. What is deceptive today is the acceleration of History, due, as we know,
+to the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. The need to reduce costs in
+order constantly to create new outlets entails the constant transformation of the
+means of production; industry, from this point of view, is in a permanent state of
+revolution, which leads to a constant rearrangement of capitalist organisations
+and, rather more slowly, a perpetual transformation of trade-union organisations
+and of their praxis. But these transformations take place in spite of everything on
+the basis of reflexive totalisations (coming either from the base or from the summit), that is to say, on the basis of the questioning of the whole of praxis by the
+common individual (the unions will be described as failing to adapt to the new
+directives of the employers' policy'), rather than by a sort of interpenetration of
+activities, or, to put it differently, by a spontaneous reorganisation of all detailed
+action by all the others, under the pressure of new circumstances and beyond
+
+489
+We shall therefore call these structures, in so far as their inorganic
+materiality has been freely interiorised and reworked by the group, the
+necessity of freedom. This means that the inert (that is to say, different
+reciprocal limitations) comes into contact with itself in the group, and
+through the profound relations of interiority which unite each to all in
+mediated reciprocity, but that this contact of inertia with itself necessarily takes place according to the laws and the intelligibility proper to
+this sector of materiality; and this means that the conditioning of
+functions by each other (once their synthetic, reflexive determination is
+complete) takes place in exteriority, as in the physical world. However,
+it is important to recognise that this skeleton is sustained by all the
+common individuals and that it is always possible for the group, as
+totalising action, under the pressure of new circumstances, to dissolve
+it entirely. It should therefore be noted both that it is the free attachment of each individual to the community in so far as it is the inorganicbeing of each member and that this necessity, as exteriority structuring
+interiority, is simply the obverse of the practico-inert: the latter
+effectively appeared as passive activity, whereas the former constitutes
+itself as active passivity. Everyone's inor ganic-being, as we have seen,
+involves a considerable measure of indeterminacy: it is the foundation
+of my praxis, and it frames it and circumscribes it, it channels it and
+gives it everyone's guarantee along with the instrumental spring board
+it needs. But praxis itself, when completed, cannot be reduced to this
+skeleton: it is more and it is different; it is the free concrete realisation
+ofa particular task.
+We should not be surprised by the opposition of these two necessities: the second is the interiorisation of the first and its negation by
+organising labour. We have seen how the group acquires inertia in order
+to struggle against inertia; it absorbs the passivity which enables matter
+reflexive questioning. In other words, an organisation (whatever it may be) will,
+given an acceleration of the historical process, live its inertia as a perpetual dislocation which must always be compensated. But these rearrangements can occur
+only in the light of new functions which also owe their efficacity to the exact
+determination of their limits. In short, the action of reorganisation is praxis in so
+far as it redistributes tasks with a view to achieving the same total objective in
+varying circumstances. The same applies to the organic action of each common
+individual. But even if function were modified every day, it would, as a statute
+defined by the reflexive attitude and assumed by the effective action of the worker
+or fighter, remain a structure of inertia, and an object of logical analysis, and, as
+such, capable of being studied as a mechanical system.
+
+490 Book II
+to sustain the passive syntheses which it needs in order to survive; but
+it is precisely not, in itself, a passive synthesis, and its passivity sustains
+the active synthesis which is praxis. The practical comprehension of
+active passivity is given to everyone - regardless of his group - in the
+behaviour known as "freely agreeing to discipline'. The only error -
+which in any case is not so frequent as one might suppose - is due to
+language: there is a danger that the words will give the impression that
+the only effect of free consent is to bring behaviour into line with
+prescriptions. But in fact everyone discovers in his action that discipline affects him in his very freedom with a kind of being, that is to say,
+with a certain form of exteriority which, paradoxically, sustains his
+bonds of interiority with everyone else. But this means that exteriority
+as such, as the foundation of the action, is always external, or rather
+that it is at the extreme boundary which separates transcendence (la
+transcendance) from immanence: in the heat of battle, a soldier obeys
+the order of a superior in freedom, because he recognises its importance, because he transcends it towards the common aim; in a sense,
+therefore, this is a free reciprocity. Yet the hierarchical bond between
+the lieutenant and the private is entirely contained in this relation; in
+other words, the inert reciprocity of command underlies concrete
+action. The complex structure of this organised connection actually
+comprises three signifying layers which it is necessary to describe: the
+first is concrete praxis; this includes the second, which is power
+(freedom-terror) and function (right-duty); and this in turn includes
+the third, which is an inert skeleton. And the inert skeleton is in fact the
+most abstract of the three layers. The organising sub-group could not
+determine it - as a set of elements in a symbolic calculation - except on
+the concrete basis of a differentiated pledge, of rights-duties, of functions and of everyone's relation to the common objective. From the
+moment when, for example, an organisation selects its 'cadres", a
+problem immediately arises, one of whose aspects is purely quantitative
+- namely that of the numerical relation of cadres to militants (of
+officers and NCO's to privates) in a particular situation, in the light of
+specific objectives and on the basis of quite definite instrumental and
+technical resources (for example, in a state of international tension in
+which, as at present, there is an opposition between blocs' each
+characterised by a given level of armaments, presupposing a certain
+industrial capacity). And calculation enters into this quantitative
+problem as if all the relations involved were relations of exteriority. It
+should also be added that the creation of these cadres, if it takes place,
+
+The Organisation 491
+may lead to a qualitative change in relations of interiority (for example,
+a tightening of authority). But there would be no sense in working on
+the inertia of the group if it were simply a matter of rearranging inertia
+which has already been produced, as interiorised exteriority, in so far,
+that is, as it is sustained by relations of power, of rights, etc., which
+were differentiated through the pledge and which perpetuate the
+pledge which produced it.
+(ii) Structure and System
+In this sense, we can describe structure as having two sides: it is both
+an analytical necessity and a synthetic power. Power certainly constitutes itself by producing in everyone the inertia which is the basis of
+necessity. But, conversely, necessity is only the external appearance of
+this freely created inertia; it is, in other words, the index of this inertia
+seen in exteriority, either by an observer who does not belong to the
+group, or by a specialised sub-group which uses analytical methods
+and symbols for dealing with certain problems of apportionment and
+distribution, because the multiplicity which they treat (the group as
+plurality in circumstances of scarcity, scarcity of cadres or provisions,
+etc.) is only the external appearance of an interiority which alone makes
+the problem possible (not in its solution, but in its very formulation).
+Even to think of regarding individuals as organisms which have to be
+fed, in order to enumerate them, to establish the relation between
+provisions and the number of mouths to be fed, to establish provision
+centres or to bring the existing ones closer to the front etc., the army
+must already be a practical totalisation, a combat. But even this is not
+sufficient; certain functional relations and powers and discipline must
+be presupposed, so that, at a particular practical level, execution can be
+relied on. To say that the bases are too far away means that the
+Quarter-master is doing everything possible, and is not to be blamed.
+To say that they can be brought nearer (by a certain distance) means:
+we are increasing the power of the supply services; their efficacity will
+therefore increase accordingly - in short, they are entirely devoted to
+their functions.
+The other aspect of structure is, in effect, that of a mediated reciprocity. Furthermore, we have seen that this mediation is quite simply
+that of the totalising group. Thus, while structure is revealed, in
+
+492 Book II
+exteriority, as a mere skeleton which can be examined and reworked in
+itself on the mere tacit presupposition of the whole - that is to say, by
+silently ignoring the practical totalisation as the support and reason for
+the inertia at the moment of the combination of terms - it is, in
+interiority, an immediate relation to the totalisation. In fact the
+totalisation is closer, at each term of the reciprocity, than everyone is to
+each other, since everyone is linked to the other through it. Pouillon is
+right in saying: "The idea of structure is ... profoundly different from
+that of order. Only structure makes it possible to transform the
+vicious circle of which Pascal accuses Cartesian knowledge into, so
+to speak, a true circle. In a structure, each element is the particular
+expression of the totality immediately and totally reflected in it, rather
+than an intermediate stage in the constitution of the whole. There
+is no other way of avoiding the paradox of the simultaneous autonomy
+and dependence of an element in relation to the whole or of conceiving the synthesis of the heterogeneous'48
+But it is important to realise that what we are dealing with here is
+not a totality but a totalisation, that is to say, a multiplicity which
+totalises itself in order to totalise the practical field from a certain
+perspective, and that its common action, through each organic praxis,
+is revealed to every common individual as a developing objectification.
+In other words, the mediating group is already, in itself, a complex
+dialectic of praxis and inertia, of totalisations and already totalised
+elements. In fact, this is where the reflexive structure which is characteristic of the organised group as such needs to be more securely
+defined. It does not mean that a particular, collective illumination
+inhabits the group (a consciousness of collective consciousness), but
+only that every common individual (already common: through the
+pledge or the first action of the fused group) adopts practical behaviour
+which takes the group as its immediate objective on the basis of some
+distant objective. These practices produce the group as a quasi-object
+for its members. (For non-members, not only contemporaries, both
+enemies and allies, but also, subsequently, historians and sociologists,
+it is an object in any case and whatever its structure, but it is a practical
+and signifying object, which produces its own instrumentality around
+certain instruments.) The group has an internal objectivity; that is to
+say, the group exists through every common individual in two
+48. Jean Pouillon, 'Le Dieu caché ou l'Histoire visible', Les Temps Modernes,
+14I, p. 893.
+
+The Organisation 493
+radically distinct forms: prior to any functional determination, it is, for
+everyone, the security of each and all, which is once again present in
+him as the Other-Being of his own freedom.
+We have seen that, as the organisation becomes formed and constituted, this inertia, which can affect freedom only by using other
+freedoms, appears decreasingly as a negative limit and increasingly as
+the basis of powers. But obviously this unity of inertias will not of itself
+produce change in anyone except through someone's real, free praxis.
+The group as a totality or an objective reality does not exist; on this
+level it is simply the fact that the free production of inertia is the same
+and determines itself as such intentionally or, to put it differently, that
+there is a single pledge. And this does not mean that this pledge on its
+own is the transcendent unity of the pledged agents; on the contrary, it
+means that, in each common individual, there is no principle of individuation for the act of swearing: thus the individuals are diverse but their
+pledges - however distinct as spatio-temporal acts - are, through
+everyone, the pledge, an individual act of the common individual (in
+that it consolidates or produces this individual). But in the common
+decision to swear there is a presentiment of the exigencies of differentiation; and it is precisely the unfolding of these exigencies before the
+pledged individual which shows him the group as a means, and therefore as an end and an object. Every means is an end in the practical
+moment in which it has to be found or produced so that another
+means, and thereby the end, can be accomplished. And the group-means
+is revealed through circumstances: they indicate certain possibilities in
+the multiplicity in so far as it is subjected to and controlled by unity
+through each individual unification.
+Thus the creation of forms of differentiation treats the group as a
+transition from homogeneity to a calculated heterogeneity or, more
+commonly, from a less differentiated state to a more differentiated one.
+And, in so far as it reveals itself to the practical action of the organising
+third party, the group appears as a developing (or still to be achieved)
+totalisation, rather than as a completed totality. Nevertheless, it is an
+object; and this means that its instrumentality can be modified by work;
+through organisation, the organising third party produces or maintains tools (like a worker who whets or repairs his tool). And once
+again, for everyone, this practical object cannot be any more than a
+quasi-object, since it is both the matter which is to be differentiated by
+functions and the unity of the pledge which founds heterogeneity as
+the free, controlled use of multiplicity, and allows it to be reintroduced.
+
+494 Book II
+In other words, through the individuated practice of the common
+agent, the group is an object in one form and the foundation of the act
+(as pledged inertia) in another form. And this produces reflexivity as
+quasi-objectivity. (Individual reflexion also involves a single consciousness, but in so far as its relation to itself never allows it to be
+either one or two.) But it should be noted that once the organisation
+already exists and needs to be rearranged (possibly from top to
+bottom), the relative autonomy of functions (that is to say, of the
+limits of competence), by threatening to posit itself for itself in the
+individual function, accentuates the object character of the unified
+multiplicity and tends (without ever wholly succeeding) to simulate
+the impossibility of a total objectifying duality.
+In any case, radical duality is still out of the question: it is the same
+(the pledge as non-individuated in the common individual) which
+recurs practically as the still undifferentiated unity of this multiplicity.
+Even if he belongs to a specialised group, the organiser derives his
+power to organise from this relation of the group to itself (and to its
+end); if he tends to conceal his membership of the group in his behaviour, this is precisely to the extent that his work makes him treat
+structures and common individuals in exteriority (that is to say, as a
+numerical multiplicity and a relational skeleton which have to be
+rearranged). But in an organised group, the act of organising is only a
+means - often entrusted to specialists - of efficacity; and the essential
+practical relation is that of the individual agent fulfilling his task with
+the external object in which he realises the common objectification. It is
+at this level that tunction, as a relation to a given sub-group or -
+directly or indirectly - to all, is mediated by the group. And it is clear
+what group must mean here: a practical relation between the pledge as
+the same in everyone and the already unified multiplicity which it
+allows to become differentiated. This reflexivity determines every
+common individual in so far as he understands the utility of his task
+and the necessity of his being organised. This means that every functional differentiation, regardless of which individual or sub-group
+chose it, is reaffirmed in pledged freedom; in short it is adopted
+(assumée). In this sense, although every common individual may be
+transformed, disqualified, requalified, silenced, or displaced by new
+reorganisations according to the common objective, he can never
+produce himself, in his actions and his active passivity, as purely and
+simply an object of the group. It may in fact be true that the group
+treats him (or can treat him) as an object: his activity may be chosen
+
+495
+(and subsequently changed) according to a strict calculation. But, in so
+far as every pledged member is always the same, the organiser makes
+his decisions in so far as he is the same as the organised, and the
+organised adopts the decision in so far as he is the same as the organiser;
+this means that he sees his own common decision as a moment in a
+common, already differentiated process.
+A given activist, sent into a particular factory or collective farm, in
+order to explain a decision of the Soviet government to a group of
+workers must treat himself both as the inert object of a choice (his
+deployment does not necessarily take his capacities into consideration),
+and as an element in an immense process which realises itself in divergence (at the same moment thousands of activists are spreading out in
+order to go and perform the same act everywhere) and whose deep
+convergence of praxis will temporalise itself in the common objectification (the unification of reactions in all milieux everywhere). But he
+cannot grasp himself in his inertia and in his being as a discrete element
+of an objective process unless, by himself and in free, individual praxis
+he realises all the moments which affect him in this process (from the
+moment when he presents himself by some prescribed means of communication at his place of work to the moment when, on the basis of a
+set of principles, explanations, and unchanging evaluations, he produces the individual reply which he must give to a particular individual
+question). And it is precisely the free realisation of the common process
+which refers him back to the other free realisations of different propagandists and which reveal his localised action to him (he has persuaded
+people here, in a given town or province) as the common objective of a
+common praxis. In other words, structure as the exteriority of interiority is reinteriorised by functional activity without being dissolved
+by it. The agent conceives it, in his very activity, as the intersection of
+two planes: on the one hand, the work of instrumentalisation which the
+group performs on its multiplicity and, on the other hand, his own
+inertia as a free pledge and as a free adoption of his character as a
+discrete quantity on the basis of an indissoluble common unity. For
+him, exteriority signifies interiority and the multiplicity of inert relations is simply the practical determination of the common unity.
+This example still does not get us to structure, since essentially it
+concerns a very rapid event which is quickly reabsorbed into its
+objective: the propaganda which accompanies and follows a policy
+change. Nevertheless, if it is examined more closely, it becomes evident
+that it presupposes structure as an expression of the totalisation and as
+
+496 Book I
+the inorganic skeleton of organisation. It should be noted, in fact, both
+that any young activist, taken individually (that is to say every one of
+them) was produced by the Party, or by certain specialised organisations, to perform tasks of agitation and propaganda and, at the same
+time, that this productive action, performed by a sub-group (as an
+expression of the whole) over very young boys can temporalise itself
+only in reciprocity, that is to say, it must also be adopted and interiorised by the individual. He is the product of a given administrative
+group in so far as he is his own product and vice versa. If his mission is
+to train a group of workers and to increase output (as a team leader and
+Stakhanovite) he still has to make himself capable of raising norms by
+his own work. Conversely, if the administration selected him, this is
+for a set of aptitudes, linked to his loyalty to the régime and revealed
+through his praxis; and in any case, his selection can always be revoked.
+These two indissoluble actions, which together require that the product
+of the free, common organisation should, as a common individual, make
+himself his own product, eventually, in their reciprocal development,
+achieve the double, equally reciprocal result of producing the activist
+as an inert determination of multiplicity and as an individual expression
+of the developing totalisation. Then a particular mission will constitute
+him as a power-object, that is to say, as a unit which has to be transported to a particular place by a particular means of transport in order
+to make contact with specific sub-groups and as a real right-duty who
+may require of the local authorities or of certain individuals the means
+to carry out his duty. It is therefore the exercise of a function which
+develops in this particular event: and this function is structure in so far
+as it is seen as the potential and power of the group of activists. On the
+other hand, in this relatively simple case, and other things being equal,
+everyone is the same as everyone, and since every propagandist is conditioned in his very power by the interiorised multiplicity of his subgroup, 49 and, finally, since the group does not possess the metaphysical
+existence of a form or a Gestalt, of a collective consciousness or a
+49. The size of the regions to be covered, the number of meetings to be held,
+and, ultimately, the very efficacity of his work - as determined by his own fatigue
+as well as by the slowness of communications - are determined (at a variable level
+of the organisation, sometimes at the apex, from the outset, sometimes at the base,
+in the course of the operation) on the basis of the simultaneously quantitative and
+reciprocal relation (in definite circumstances and with definite instruments) of the
+multiplicity of the sub-group of activists and of the social ensemble which is to be
+'agitated' or persuaded.
+
+497
+created totality, each individual, as a common individual, is in himself
+the propaganda sub-group as a statutory unit of the interiorised multiplicity and his own activity is an expression of the totalising organisation. (The "totalising organisation' here means the synthetic ensemble
+of governmental and administrative services which have created these
+'organs' of agitation in the light of a certain objective, of certain
+mediations between the apex and the base, and of certain relations with
+the masses.)
+It is obvious - and we will come back to this at length, later in our
+investigation - that suffered inertia has infiltrated this ensemble, which
+includes a régime, in the form of revived seriality. But, at the present
+abstract level of our investigation, this inertia does not yet appear: it
+will emerge later, in dialectical circularity. The important point is to
+define the moments of the investigation in their purity, even if it is only
+logical, so as to avoid the danger of attributing to constituted realities
+characteristics which confused and hasty observation reveals to us, but
+which really belong to another moment of the dialectical process. It is
+therefore particularly dangerous to speak here of bureaucratic seriality,
+although it is obvious that in our example it affects everything, and
+primarily the creation of propaganda sub-groups. We shall also see
+that this seriality transforms, but certainly does not eliminate the
+character of practical expression which is concealed by function in the
+common individual: it extends this transformed expressiveness and
+produces the common as a signifier-signified in relation to society as a
+whole.
+At present, taking the sub-group and the totalising organisation in
+their pure state (that is to say, in the concrete struggle against a given,
+particularised threat of serial dissolution), there can be no doubt that
+this particular young activist, in his individual way of realising his
+powers, is not only autonomous, as Pouillon noted, but also a simple,
+detailed, practical expression of the total operation (and of the complex
+organisation which has foreseen and planned this kind of operation
+for a long time). He is autonomous simply to the extent that concrete
+circumstances (he is speaking to an audience defined by particular
+interests and jobs, by a particular culture and particular habits - in the
+sense of exis) are the other side of untranscendable inertia, that is to
+say, in so far as they always require him to mediate between the abstract
+determinations of his task and the particular difficulties he encounters.
+He is expression in so far as his whole undertaking is incomprehensible
+except from the point of view of a certain transcendent relation
+
+498 Book II
+between the leaders and the masses, which involves the social and
+political system of the USSR as a whole. From this point of view,
+tactical differences are themselves expressive since they never cast
+doubt on the basis. A kind of authoritarianism (which we need not
+define here) lies at the basis of their mission and their common-being
+(in so far as these products of the organised group produced themselves). And from the structural point of view it does not matter
+whether this authoritarianism manifests itself as a structured characteristic of the individual (which is sometimes incorrectly called a character
+trait) or whether it appears through a tactic which is apparently flexible
+and conciliatory but which really has no other aim than to realise the
+centralised authority while concealing it. Or rather, tactical differences
+do not reflect differences in the structure unless they arise at two
+different moments as two attitudes of the sub-group (rather than as
+individual variations). If the operations of the activists, as a unified
+multiplicity, are carried out in voluntaristic arrogance, they will, in one
+way or another, simply express the activities of the government and
+administration. so
+We shall therefore refer to the function of the sub-group or of a
+member of the sub-group as structure, in so far as its concrete exercise
+through the free praxis of the agent reveals it as a specification of the
+totalising rearrangement of the whole by itself. It should be clear that
+the word expression here refers to a fundamentally practical relation,
+that is to say, a reciprocity of constitution: free, individual praxis
+realises the previous totalisation as a positing of limits; it pursues the
+totalising operation by concretely objectifying itself in a concrete result
+which signifies the totalisation of results which are in the process of
+being objectified. Meanwhile the organised totalisation designates and
+solicits individual action, as function, as its inevitable concretisation; it
+constitutes a power and an instrumentality for it. Structure is this double
+constituent designation, in its two simultaneous and opposite orienta-
+5o. This does not mean that the arrogance of the activists necessarily signifies
+a return of central organisations to some form of dictatorship at any particular
+moment. On the contrary, it may - in concrete circumstances - signify a lack of
+coordination between organisations or a stubborn resistance to new policies from
+the structured past amongst the young activists. The ensemble determines the
+signification, as an expression of the totalising and totalised totality. My point is
+simply that this expression - which always appears in experience - is a necessary
+presence of the totalisation in the totalised part since the totalisation for this part
+is no more than function, that is to say, structure.
+
+499
+tions, either at the level of mere abstract potentiality (the level of power
+acknowledged by common individuals), or at the level of actualisation.
+It is obvious that this relation between the individual and the group
+(as an interiorised multiplicity in each and all) existed even in the fused
+group where, indeed, we laid stress on it. But one cannot yet speak of a
+structured relation, for the simple reason that the reciprocal bond has
+not yet been specified. Structure is a specific relation of the terms of a
+reciprocal relation to the whole and to each other through the mediation of the whole. And the whole, as a developing totalisation, exists
+in everyone in the form of a unity of the interiorised multiplicity and
+nowhere else.
+(iii) Structure and the Group's Idea of Itself
+In the reflexive context of the group, however, this structural relation
+must also arise as reflexive knowledge: in other words, the individual
+action of the common agent cannot realise itself as a determination of
+the indeterminate without conceiving function negatively in the
+transcendent object as exigency and as a negative adumbration (esquisse
+en creux) of behaviour and, positively, in interiority, as duty and power.
+The moment of mediation through organic praxis is also that of knowledge, that is to say, of the co-presence of all reciprocal implications;
+but of course this does not mean that this knowledge is explicit or
+thematised. But, if we consider all the characteristics, already enumerated, of knowledge in the organised group, we can immediately see
+that the organic individual produces and is aware of himself as a
+common individual: first, in so far as the object reflects the group to
+him as practice and as practical knowledge, that is to say, both on the
+basis of the common objective as the future revealing the present
+situation in the practical field and on the basis of conceiving one's work
+on the object as a particular detail of the common objectification; and,
+secondly, in so far as the whole, as a practical totalisation which is also
+performed by him, forces him, in functional determination, practically
+to conceive the transcendent object as common and the practical field
+as a common situation to be modified. Thus structure, considered, by
+way of abstraction, as knowledge, is simply the idea which the group
+produces of itself (and of the universe in so far as it is practically determined as a field of objectification). And the content and foundation of
+this reflexive idea is simply the common organisation as an objective
+
+500 Book 11
+system of relations; or rather, the organisation conditions it and becomes its internal norm. At this level of abstraction and purity (that is
+to say, in the absence of serial determination) the idea of the group is
+without alterity: it is the same everywhere as a pure expression of the
+here and now; and there is nothing surprising in this since it is a particular actualisation, under the pressure of specific exigencies, of
+structure as a relation of reciprocal expression between the part and the
+whole. But, at the same time, at this level of non-differentiation, it
+remains purely practical, that is to say, it is still both an organising
+reflexion and a pledge; or in other words, both the truth of the group as
+practical experience and its ethic, as the constitution of common
+individuals by imperatives and rights based on pledged inertia, are
+absolutely not differentiated and, indeed, the principle of their indissoluble unity lies in the very urgency of the common tasks. The idea of
+man, in an organised group, is simply the idea of the group, that is to
+say, of the common individual, and fraternity-terror, in so far as it is
+expressed by specific norms, derives this particular colouring from the
+real objective, that is to say, from needs or dangers. The material
+organisation of the group is indistinguishable from the organisation of
+its thoughts; the system of logical relations which constitutes the
+untranscendable principles of every mental operation for everyone is
+indistinguishable from the system of inert worked relations which
+characterises functions in exteriority. Invention and ideational discovery - as individual praxis - occur as free, reflexive action on the
+basis of an organised specification of freely adopted inertia; and it is
+one and the same thing to be unable to transcend a given practical
+organisation, or a given system of values or a given system of 'guiding
+principles'. However, the idea of man which is produced by the group
+as an idea of itself cannot be compared to the idea which is produced
+by the gold coin in the practico-inert field. s1 This in fact supports the
+ideas of the Other by its fundamental inertia; and so it cannot change.
+The idea of the group, on the other hand, as a structural determination
+of the indeterminate, must be invented, and remains infinitely variable
+within certain limits.
+But the double character of structure (an inert object of calculation
+when seen as ossature without taking account of totalisation, or an
+effective power actualised by the praxis of each and all) implies a double
+character in the idea. In one sense, it is the free comprehension every-
+5I. See above, p. 171. [Ed.]
+
+502
+where of functional activity in everyone in so far as its heterogeneity
+relates to the homogeneity of pledges on the one hand, and to the
+synthetic unity of the transcendent end on the other. It is at this still
+practical level that the group has a silent knowledge of itself through
+each common individual: but this understanding (évidence) is not
+available to those who do not share its objectives. As practical individuals, they may perceive these ends in the common action as it unfolds
+before them, and carry out a correct reconstruction of the praxis: but
+they will never perceive the common relation to the end concretely as
+an inter-individual relation, that is to say, as a milieu specified by
+organisation. It is at this level that complex knowledges may disconcert
+a sociologist or ethnographer who encounters them in underdeveloped
+societies, because they conceive them as theoretical knowledges
+derived from observation of an object, whereas they are really
+practical structures which are themselves lived in the interiority of a
+common action. Ethnographers have stressed the logical flexibility of
+primitive thought. Deacon has written about a matrimonial system:
+"The native is capable of pretty advanced abstract thought. 52 But this
+is not a good way of formulating the question; the point is not to
+discover whether they are capable of abstract thought in general, as if
+this thought were a universal capacity which everyone possesses to a
+greater or lesser degree, but to show within the investigation whether
+or not they are capable of comprehending the abstract structures of
+their matrimonial or kinship systems, which is perfectly clear today.
+In other words, we should avoid putting the cart before the horse by
+claiming that primitive people understand the abstract relations
+which constitute the organisation of their group because they are
+capable of abstract thought; on the contrary, we should say that their
+capacity for abstract thought is determined by the abstract relations
+which structure their society, that it is simply these relations themselves in so far as every common individual has to live them all in
+order practically to realise his relation to all in the unity of a common
+objective. In fact, functional relations determine not only the level of
+abstraction of thought but also the limits of its application: this relational system as the instrument and limit of ideational power constitutes itself as a generalised system of logical relations, which means
+52. A. B. Deacon, Malekula: A Vanishing People in the New Hebrides, ed.
+C. H. Wedgewood, London, 1934 (George Routledge and Sons), p. 132. Quoted
+in Lévi-Strauss, op. cit., p. 127.
+
+502 Book II
+both that it can be applied to a certain number of similar cases, well
+defined and forming part of the social, everyday life of the natives, and
+that its existence - as inertia - is by itself a sometimes invincible
+resistance to the elaboration of any other system. In this sense, in effect,
+truth is normative because fidelity to logical 'principles' is only a form
+of fidelity to the pledge.
+But, apart from this implicit understanding - which is simply a
+structure of power - there is, at least for certain specialised organs, a
+knowledge which is equally practical and reflexive, but which is of a
+logistical and combinatory kind, directed at function as inorganic
+inertia, that is to say, the relational system as ossature. I shall not dwell
+on this since I discussed it above: it is clear that totalisation as a pledged
+milieu which sustains this inertia is passed over in silence in the moment
+of calculation. But it should be noted that, although the totalisation is
+invisible, it occurs at the level of the organisers and calculators in that
+they know and acknowledge their right and power to calculate only to
+the extent that it is their specialised function: the basis for the calculation of discrete elements is, therefore, the lived comprehension of
+structure as the reciprocity of the whole and of the part (that is to say,
+the comprehension we have just been describing) in so far as it arises
+in the praxis of the organisers and in so far as it gives meaning to this
+praxis. The organiser therefore has an immediate, practical comprehension of the structures in all their complexity and this is the basis of
+the abstract analysis which he then performs on these structures as
+skeletons. In fact, the natives of Ambrym 'gave Deacon demonstrations, using diagrams. 53 They drew lines on the ground, and these,
+according to their length and position, represented one or other of the
+spouses, their sons, their daughters, etc., seen, of course, from the
+point of view of a complex matrimonial system. In this case, it is
+important to realise that in producing these relations in the domain of
+the absolute inert (earth or sand) and of perfect exteriority, they were
+not copying some model which they carried in their heads; and it
+would be equally incorrect to say that they project their synthetic
+practical consciousness of themselves and of everyone into the analytical milieu of the inanimate: such a projection, in fact, is impossible,
+since it would involve - roughly speaking - two distinct orders of
+rationality.
+I have shown that analytical rationality can be transcended and
+53. Ibid., p. I25.
+
+503
+integrated by synthetic rationality, but it is also clear that the opposite
+is not true: a dialectical proposition would lose its meaning and dissolve
+into relations of exteriority if it were 'projected' into the milieu of
+logical or mathematical calculation. In fact, the decision to make the
+kinship system into a fabricated, inorganic object (lines made on the
+ground) corresponds, for the native, to a practical attempt to win the
+support of inorganic materiality in order to produce the structures in
+the form of inert abstract schemata. The reason for this is that he is
+explaining them to a stranger who is situated in the exterior, and who
+therefore thinks in terms of exteriority: he therefore expresses pledged
+inertia not as an interiorised exteriority, but as a pure determination of
+universal exteriority. But in establishing this minimum schema, that is
+to say, in reducing structure to ossature, he is guided by the synthetic
+understanding which defines his membership of the group. Thus his
+task is not a matter of projection or transposition: he is simply creating
+an inert object which presents in exteriority, to a man from the exterior, a set of passive characteristics which retain only the inertia of
+these structures and which, indeed, falsify this inertia by presenting it
+as an elementary, suffered condition (whereas in fact it is produced by
+the pledge).
+It is obvious that this construction is not a thought: it is a piece of
+manual work controlled by a synthetic knowledge which it does not
+express. But this example enables us to understand the other work in
+exteriority, performed by a specialised sub-group on pledged inertia as
+an exteriority of structure, in and for the group. This work is also
+guided by a dialectical thematic and a comprehension of the whole
+which it does not seek to project or 'render', and it cannot, in the first
+instance, be regarded as a thought. It becomes one only through
+practice: the organiser creates analytical thought (and the rationalism
+which corresponds to it) with his hands; it is born within his hands
+because every praxis explains itself in terms of the objective and the
+object. Thus, at the level of calculation and redistribution, the 'transformations of ossature' which are performed on the basis of a functional and totalising power develop a set of guiding schemata which are
+simply the laws of inertia transformed into practical laws of organisation. Practical knowledge unfolds simultaneously on two planes and
+according to two types of rationality; and this is not surprising,
+especially in modern societies, where it is almost impossible to find the
+solution to a practical problem if the question is not treated at several
+levels simultaneously (in fact, as we shall see, the practico-inert field
+
+504 Book II
+reintroduces itself at the moment of the true concrete so producing a
+new complexity). But this does not constitute an unintelligibility or a
+split in thought, since dialectical Reason sustains, controls, and justifies
+all other forms of thought, because it explains them, puts them in their
+proper place and integrates them as non-dialectical moments which,
+in it, regain a dialectical value.
+
+Individual and Common Praxis: the Manhunt
+In the course of these preliminary observations we have not encountered
+any major difficulties. This is because we are trying to determine the
+meaning and scope of dialectical Reason. Now, at the level of these
+first approximations, we have not encountered any critical problems
+which are really new. True, the new necessity produced and sustained
+by organising freedom had to be analysed and elucidated; and the
+relation between the two aspects of structure (system and function) has
+had to be discussed in some detail. But, on the one hand, this has, on
+the whole, involved a very simple dialectical progression, which merely
+united into new syntheses factors which had already been discussed
+(the pledge, terror, inertia, reciprocity, objectification, reflexion, etc.)
+and, on the other hand, at the level we were occupying we rediscovered
+constituent organic praxis as the indispensable mediation between the
+common individual and the common objectification of the praxis of the
+group. So since praxis, when considered at the level of each function,
+is still individual action and, as such, a moment of the constituent
+dialectic - regardless of readjustments and the relation of common
+individuals elsewhere; and since the organised group acts only upon
+itself (in order to make everyone better able to carry out his share of
+the common task), and since this very action is done through the
+mediation of individual praxis, the real new modifications which have
+arisen before us have not raised the question of constituted intelligibility. In other words, the kind of dialectical intelligibility which we
+explained at the beginning of our critical investigation was sufficient to
+explain the practical relations of individual functions within the
+organised group. But this is because we ourselves were taking an
+insufficiently synthetic view of such groups. This was necessary in
+
+506 Book II
+order to explain its structures, but it meant postponing the real critical
+question: what type of existence or being characterises the common
+action of the organised group in so far as it is common (rather than in so
+far as it can be resolved into a multiplicity of functions): What kind of
+intelligibility does this action define? What is a constituted dialectic?
+What we have been studying, in fact, is the conditions of common
+action, rather than common action itself. This action can in fact be
+referred to by certain determinations of language: the people of Paris
+have taken the Bastille; the rebels have seized the radio building; the
+team has won a match; we have put a new locomotive into production,
+etc. In all these sentences, the subject is plural (or unified but multiple)
+and the action is singular, seen either as a temporalisation ('They took,
+they are taking') or in its common result: The storming of the Bastille,
+the people have taken ..., etc. Now, we have explained the interiorisation of plurality, but this gives us no guide to praxis as a common
+temporalisation or common objectification of the group. We have seen,
+in effect, that through the organisation it is realised through the
+mediation of organic individuals and of the individual dialectic. But, in
+opposition to this, it has a concrete unity, which implies an organisation
+of means in the light of the end and a realisation of the synthetic end
+through labour. Everything would be simple if, corresponding to
+praxis as the concrete, living temporalisation of the group, there was a
+living, concrete group - in short, a Gestalt or an organism or a hyperconsciousness - which temporalised and objectified itself. In fact, it is
+clear that the group, 'united' around an instrumentality or 'contained
+in appropriate locations, does not exist anywhere except everywhere,
+that is to say, it belongs to every individual praxis as an interiorised
+unity of multiplicity. And the ubiquity of the heres corresponds to the
+real practice of negating plurality. This totality does not circulate, it is
+not elsewhere; it is always and entirely both here and the same. But if
+we abandon every magical or mythical interpretation, then it is clear
+that this ubiquity does not mean in any way that a new reality is
+incarnated in every common individual, like a Platonic Idea in individuated objects; on the contrary, it means that there is a practical
+determination of everyone by everyone, by all and by oneself from
+the point of view of a common praxis. The proof is that this unified
+multiplicity re-emerges as inert exteriority within the group itself, that
+is to say, as ossature. However, the action is one as individual action,
+the objective is one, and the temporalisation and the rule it gives itself
+are one; so everything is as it would be if a hyperorganism had tem-
+
+50J
+poralised and objectified itself in a practical end, by unifying and unified
+labour of which every common individual with his constituent mediation would be a completely inessential moment. The thing seems
+even more paradoxical at the real level of action, that is to say when
+it is split, within the group itself, by deep conflicts of interest, by local
+(or generalised) revivals of seriality, or by accidents. Through all the
+well known incidents, disorders, accidents and misunderstandings the
+Parisian crowd stormed the Bastille. But though we are still only at the
+level of abstract purity, this synthetic signification of praxis at first
+appears paradoxical: the praxis is not in fact the temporalisation of an
+organic unity, but a negated and instrumentalised multiplicity which
+temporalises and unifies itself in the common praxis through the
+mediation of individual temporalisations. In other words, the only
+unity is practical unification, that is to say, the unity of every particular
+labour with all the Others. But then what is this unity of local, heterogeneous temporalisations? What kind of reality does it have? And
+what kind of intelligibility! Of course, everything is already organised;
+but is the common praxis, as a synthetic temporalisation of this
+organisation, organised or organic? And since its signification (its
+temporalisation as diachronic signification, and its final objective as
+synchronic signification) is and can only be one, 54 should its unity be
+regarded as homogeneous with the significations of individual, organic
+praxis or should we recognise that a signifying synthesis performed by
+the organised group is absolutely of a different order than an individual
+synthesis? If it is of the same order, how are we to explain the fact that
+the group produces a praxis which is individual and organic in character (even if it is distinct from individual actions in scope and power)?
+And if it is of a different order, shall we have to accept a hyper-dialectic,
+which means either regarding the group as a hyper-organism, or
+making the dialectic into a transcendent law imposed on the object? In
+fact how does it come about that I understand the meaning of a group
+action! Of course, I may be mistaken or mystified: but the existence of
+historical science is sufficient to convince me that it is possible, in the
+long term and given sufficient information, to understand a common
+signification in the course of individual research. The historian, as a
+solitary worker, can grasp the precise aim of some political action, that
+54. Of course, I am speaking from the abstract level of purity. I do not yet
+have the means which, later, will enable us to reveal a new alienation as a new
+apodictic experience and a new incarnation of common praxis.
+
+508 Book II
+is to say, the end pursued by a given organised group, even if this end
+was not realised. Scholars debate and disagree about the declaration of
+war in 1792 and about the behaviour of the Girondins. Sociologists like
+Lévi-Strauss grasp the functional signification of the incest taboo in
+certain societies, although this signification is normally hidden. Is
+there, therefore, any homogeneity of knowledge between the moment
+of individual praxis and that of the common project as a temporalisation which unifies the organised multiplicity! And what if there are
+structures and practical sub-reactions whose teleological signification
+must, a priori, escape me because the practical thought of the individual
+researcher is of a different order and, a priori, of a lower degree of
+complexity than the signifying action of the group? All these secondary
+problems are simply special ways of formulating the fundamental
+question of the constituted dialectic and its rationality.
+Now there is a false aporia which can be quickly disposed of: if I
+have a real understanding of the common activity of a group of which
+I am not a part, this must be because it does not transcend my possibilities as a practical individual; but, conversely, it is also because I approach
+it with the powers and in the function of a common individual. I mean
+by this that the historian is a product of a group, that his instruments,
+techniques and powers, as well as his knowledge, define him as a
+member of a research community and that he will understand the
+common undertaking of a historical group in so far as he himself
+belongs to a historical group which is defined by a particular common
+undertaking. And if he were a solitary researcher - which is really
+senseless unless it simply means that he is not a member of a university
+or does not have a degree - he would still be integrated into other.
+groups (economic, cultural, political, religious, etc.) and would therefore be a common individual, capable of understanding any common
+praxis.
+But the reciprocity between historical knowledge and its object
+postpones the problem rather than solving it. Since organic constituent
+praxis is an indispensable mediation between the common individual
+(as a limitation of possibilities in the light of a common objective and
+as the unification of a multiplicity by mediated reciprocity) and the
+practical exercise of a common function, how can this moment of pure
+practical individuality carry within itself a comprehension of the
+common scope of that which is realised by the individual organism? This
+can also be expressed from the point of view of historical research: the
+historian, of course, is function, power, and ability; but all this has to be
+
+509
+reactualised by a synthetic invention, that is to say, by and in a synthetic, individual decoding of the practical field: now, the practical
+field, in this case, is constituted by certain documents and monuments
+through which a common signification must be rediscovered. Thus it is
+clear that the historian would not have the capacities necessary for comprehending a common historical action if he were not the social product
+of an organised group. This implies that his experimental invention, as
+an individual mediation between his function and the object (the past
+group which he is reconstructing), must involve a double comprehension: that of the common function of the scholar and that of the common praxis of the past group. These observations point to the following
+conclusion: there is always a permanent possibility, even if it can occur
+only in the context of organised functions and powers, of the practical
+organism comprehending the praxis of an organisation.
+But as I showed in The Problem of Method, comprehension is not a
+faculty, or some kind of contemplative intuition: it is reducible to
+praxis itself to the extent that it is homogeneous with every other
+individual praxis and that it is situated by reference to any action performed in the practical field, and therefore in an immediate practical
+relation to it. This implies, therefore, that common action and individual praxis exhibit a real homogeneity. The individual would be
+unable to understand either his own common action in terms of the
+totalising praxis of the group, or that of a group external to himself, if
+the structures of common praxis were of a different order than those of
+individual praxis. If the objectives of the group had a hyper-individual
+character, then the individual would never be able to grasp them. This
+does not mean that the common action is an organic synthesis of the
+members of the group but, on the contrary, that the group, far from
+having hyper-individuality in its action, sets itself objectives of an
+individualised structure and can achieve them only through common
+operations which are individual in character.
+But there is a danger of very serious confusions if we do not explain
+these conclusions at once. The common aim is in fact always doubly
+common: it is the aim of everyone as a member of the group, and its
+signifying content is necessarily common. In any case, there is an interest
+which defines the group itself, which is valid only for the group and
+which is accessible only through it, and this is equally true for a group
+of rebels organising to resist government forces and for employers
+reaching an agreement against the workers' unions, etc. Indeed, a group
+is often established as a last resort on the basis of individual recognition
+
+510 Book II
+of impotence: the history of industrialisation in France shows a bitter
+resistance by family capitalism to all forms of capitalist association. In
+particular, the first mining companies appeared when it became
+absolutely impossible for landowners to exploit the sub-soil individually. In the same way, the common means, that is to say, the distribution of tasks and powers, the division of labour, the organisation of
+functions, are constituted by the transcendence of seriality, massification, individual antagonisms and isolations. And, as we have seen, it
+is circumstances, external pressures, which dissolve seriality in third
+parties and make it emerge in the group, that is to say, in a milieu of
+freedom and terror which they were unable even to conceive. In this
+sense, the group statute is indeed a metamorphosis of the individual.
+And the practical moment of the actualisation of the powers constitutes
+him, in himself, as fundamentally different from what he was on his
+own: adopted inertia, function, power, rights and duties, structure,
+violence and fraternity - he actualises all these reciprocal relations as his
+new being, his sociality. His existence is not, or is no longer, simply the
+temporalisation of organic need in a project: it arises in a field of
+violent but non-antagonistic tensions, that is to say, through a web of
+synthetic relations by which it is profoundly and fundamentally
+constituted as a mediated relation, that is to say, as terror and fraternity
+for all and for itself. Thus sociality comes to the individual through
+common totalisation and initially determines him through the curvature of internal social space here.
+But these essential reservations only serve to underline the fact that
+the formal structure of the objective and of the operations is still
+typically individual, in the original sense of the term, that is, in the
+sense in which the organic individual is characterised as a constitutive
+praxis and rearrangement of the practical field by an individual
+totalisation. If the objective of the group is, by definition, incapable of
+being realised by an isolated individual, then it can be posited by such
+an individual (on the basis of need, of danger, or of more complex
+forms). Although groups founded in this way seldom have much
+historical importance, it is quite common for an individual to conceive
+a common aim, and thereby to discover a community which ought to
+be formed and try to constitute a group because he also realises that he
+is unable to realise his undertaking on his own. Such isolated cases
+occur naturally in complex societies which present inert serialities,
+collectives, various groups, etc., alongside one another; and the very
+project of founding a group is conditioned by the real existence of
+
+similar groups. But the fact remains that practical action in this case is
+the individual's determination of a group which ought to be constituted
+for a common objective which he discovered on his own.55 It may be
+added that he already belongs in some way to other organised groups:
+this is certainly not false. But though he may be a common individual
+in these groups, he discovers the end as an isolated or serial individual.
+If an individual senses the need to start an international health organisation, then it can in fact be said that it is in his sociality, that is to say, in
+his relation to the society in which he lives, that he is affected by the
+external imperative. But he goes beyond this sociality towards a larger
+integration, because his membership of a given national community
+cannot by itself show him an international objective. On the contrary,
+this practical movement of disclosure can occur only in connection
+with his attempt to de-situate himself (to remove himself from a
+restricted situation and enter a broader one). This does not mean that
+everyone is always capable of grasping every common objective: that
+would be absurd. On the contrary, the problems arise in terms of
+objective contradictions. And, as we have seen, they can appear to all
+the Others in a series in the dissolution of this alterity. But here too
+what matters is that, through mediated reciprocities, through the play
+of the regulatory third party and of immanence-transcendence, the
+movement of comprehension appears in everyone as the individual
+transcendence of seriality towards community. Thereis no common aim
+that an individual cannot set himself, provided that, in the unity of the
+project, he tries to constitute a group to realise it.
+And precisely because the decision to group or to regroup is
+occasioned by the common objective as the exigency that it should be
+pursued and realised in common, it also appears that the constitution of
+a group is a means which is accessible to individual praxis. In fact, it
+is clear that the abstract individual whom we encountered in the first
+moment of our investigation perceives the Others as a multiplicity in
+his practical field. And we have also seen that his sovereign praxis, as a
+perpetual reorganisation of the field in the light of needs, realises the
+55. Obviously this objective must answer some need of the society under
+consideration and appear as an exigency in the historical circumstances which
+define the moment. Normally, there are individuals in different places who are
+unaware of one another but who are pursuing the same aim. But this does not
+mean that they are not individually subjected to a common exigency; and even if,
+as often happens, they eventually unite, they do not discover the social object as
+common individuals.
+
+512 Book II
+practical unity of this objective multiplicity. This unity may appear as
+mere serial alterity; but if there is an exterior group then, as we have
+seen, it reveals itself as a group to the extent that unification by the
+individual, though effected from outside, turns out to display an
+internal unification, realised in practical autonomy. But above all the
+practical agent performs totalising actions in relation to organic
+individuals as well as to inanimate objects: to flee from a marching
+crowd is to totalise it, to turn it into a group when it may have been
+only a series. Thus the action of forming a real group is already given in
+organic praxis, and given precisely to the extent that there has always
+been a possibility of unifying a discrete multiplicity, whatever it may
+be (whether inert or constituted by organisms). This possibility
+contains an indeterminacy because it is not yet settled whether the
+group is to be constituted from the outside (this can occur in the construction of a trap as the totalisation of an already constituted group as
+well as in a practice which defines a seriality - children, the sick, etc. -
+as a unified, receptive group which can be the object of my generosity)
+or whether it is to be constituted as a wrapping produced by the agent
+in order to envelop both himself and the others. But clearly this
+indeterminacy is logical rather than real. Practical priority is initially
+given to the group-object which is totalised from outside, since the
+primary movement is the sovereign reorganisation of the objective
+structures of the practical field. And anyone who tries to constitute a
+group in order to realise a common objective, useful to all, sees it
+initially, in the abstract moment in which he begins the undertaking, as
+his means of achieving his objective. It is only the progressive constitution of the community which gradually reveals to him that he is
+necessarily integrated into it. But this makes his comprehension of
+multiple activity even clearer and more obvious to us: in the moment
+in which he is still staying outside the group (which is as yet unconstituted or in the course of being constituted), he already grasps the
+unity of an interiorised multiplicity as a specific means from the point
+of view of an individual praxis. In fact, he also organises material
+objects: in the dialectical unity of his praxis, he creates material quasitotalities whose elements interact in such a way that, for example, they
+can transmit and amplify a movement which he makes at one point of
+the system to the intended objects. The transcendent, organisational
+movement is not in principle different when it is men who are being
+grouped; the difference emerges in the undertaking itself (and, in fact,
+there is no need for it really to begin: the abstract schema of the
+
+513
+synthetic movement is sufficient) in that the projected unity immediately appears as perpetuating itself through everyone's activity.
+This initial disclosure reveals two contradictory characteristics: the
+passivity of the inert object maintainsthe unity that has been forged, but
+it also covers up an infinite dispersal. On the other hand, the activity of
+a group in formation realises true unity as praxis, but thereby emphasises the real multiplicity of the pledged members as a multiplicity
+which is constantly being overcome by a produced inertia. On the other
+hand, the original difference between a group which is united from
+outside and a controlled mechanical system is not basically a matter of
+complexity and simplicity; the human system is a practical arrangement
+which produces its effects through itself. Thus, when the sovereign
+individual undertakes to rearrange the human multiplicities of his
+practical field as a group, he tries to produce an instrumental system
+whose elements are united and governed in accordance with a practical
+rule, and whose organisation differs from inert systematisation in one
+essential respect: autonomy as productive of passivity and of specifications. And the complexity of organised groups is generally connected
+with the complexity of the mechanical arrangements which the agents
+are capable of at that historical moment.
+These remarks are, of course, not intended to emphasise the individual as the producer of the group (this accidental case is of limited
+interest). They are only intended to show that the organic individual,
+simply in his movement to organise the practical field, develops a
+comprehension of the group-object as an instrumental construction.
+Anyone who can shelter behind rocks can also shelter behind those
+other masses - men. On this basis, if these men, for some reason,
+assume the task of protecting him, he will be able to comprehend that
+these new kinds of rocks make themselves into rocks by their reciprocal
+pledges and that they arrange their gathering as rocks by means of a
+reciprocity of functions. This means that they behave as though they
+were animated by his own will, and at the same time, that his will
+branches through them and produces innumerable divergencies, so as
+to converge, and that, complete everywhere, it opposes itself everywhere in order to recognise itself as the same. But these constantly
+resolved oppositions do not disconcert him from outside. Neither the
+ensemble (the group-object, integrated into his personal undertaking
+as a specific means and, consequently, illuminated by the objective
+itself), nor detailed rearrangements (the transformation of a simple
+musical notation into a chord, the amplification of the plan and its
+
+524 Book II
+plural realisation) can disconcert him. When danger threatens, the
+Pretorian guard arranges itself around the sovereign; but the danger
+threatens him, and the group-object, which is simply the means of
+avoiding the danger, is to be decoded in terms of the fears of the
+exalted personage, and it provides reassurance in so far as it rules them
+out as impossible; the sovereign 'fears' doors, windows, and everything
+that opens onto the outside world; his fears, diversified by the diversity
+of the practical field, are embodied in one instant as precautions in the
+diversity of the guards who go and position themselves at every
+possible entrance. In this moment, they become active and functional
+(inertia as active passivity, power in so far as it is defined by the
+objective constitution of the entrance to be guarded, etc.); and the
+individual who is being protected understands them as, for example, the
+simultaneous realisation of the actions which are required by the object
+and which, if he had been on his own, he would have had to perform
+successively.
+It is here, in fact, that the novelty of the group-object resides for the
+individual - here rather than in the praxis (of each and all) as such, for
+praxis is in fact always understood through praxis, at least as regards its
+formal reality (since what is involved here is precisely the comprehensibility of certain material supports). In its origin, the transformation lies in the possibility of realising in simultaneity, on the basis of
+reciprocal relations, what the individual would have to realise successively. But, apart from the fact that the basis for comprehending this
+simultaneity is given in the praxis of the organism itself (the simplest
+operation, for the individual, is the organisation of simultaneities: I hold
+the handle of one lever and push it with my right hand; and I pull
+another with my left hand; at the same time I bend or reach out, etc.),
+and apart from the fact that an adumbration of a practical redistribution
+of the group, in its objective interiority, is schematically provided by
+the organic posture and that this involves a comprehension of every
+practical, spontaneous metamorphosis of an object in response to a
+situation, the most important point to emphasise is that the arrangement of an instrumental (and inert) ensemble by one person involves,
+as an essential aim, the compression of a given practical temporalisation
+into simultaneity, so that the agent can transcend this flattened duration
+by a new temporalisation.
+This is what is called 'making time', and it is an exigency of time
+itself in that, in the world ofscarcity, everyone's time is scarce (although
+it is no more than practical temporalisation). In this way, one puts the
+
+525
+auxiliary tool 'within reach', another tool, to be used later, a little
+further away, near the object on which it will be used; and in this way,
+as I have said, inert interdependencies are constructed so that individual
+practical movements can be absorbed, divided, and distributed in
+several directions at once. In short, there is no visible contradiction -
+at least in elementary forms of sociality - between the group-instrument
+and the inert instrument. To the person who gives it its tasks, the main
+characteristic of the group-object (slaves, for example) appears to be
+its ability to absorb the praxis of the individual and to make it into its
+temporal and practical unity. For primitive societies and techniques,
+the inert instrument retains a magical, double residue of individual
+praxis: the past labour of the tool-maker and the past labour of its user
+coincide in the tool; and it has been established that in such societies,
+the maker and the user of the tool are generally the same person. For
+the primitive, therefore, this magical character derives from the fact
+that his own future praxis appears to him as a power inscribed in
+inertia and as an already given transcendence of this passivity towards
+the future. (Obviously the two moments - creation and use - interpenetrate in the indifferentiation of passivity.) Now, the instrument
+itself is not an indeterminate force: it is an organised reality (for example,
+it has a blade and a handle). So at this elementary level there is a homogeneity between, on the one hand, the group-object as it reinteriorises
+an individual's project and praxis and so becomes, as a means, his
+relation to the objective, and, on the other, the inert instrument as it
+absorbs a praxis which produces and constitutes it as a mediation
+between its owner and his aim. This is illustrated by the native's
+magical tendency to attribute mana to his weapons or tools (that is to
+say, a power as potential praxis and a mortgage against the future) and
+by the opposite tendency, in the outsider, to treat the organised group
+as a material object endowed with powers. In the extreme case, in the
+practico-inert field, the sanctified instrument and the totalised group
+are equivalent.
+Conversely, an individual who is tracked down in the practical field
+by a group organised for a man-hunt - and, specifically, for a hunt for
+him - experiences this organised praxis as the free project of an individuality which is wider, more flexible, and more powerful than his
+concrete individuality, but homogeneous with it. The practical field
+appears to him to be undermined by this freedom; it becomes the other
+meaning of every object in the field. And this other meaning becomes
+practical truth: the truth of a given exit (a gate or path) is no longer that
+
+5гG Book II
+of an exit, but that of a trap set by the group. The individual cannot
+attempt to break out of the circle unless he manages to reinteriorise his
+objectivity for the group, that is to say, to decipher his own acts in
+terms of the common freedom of his enemies: the action 1 am about to
+perform is precisely what they expect of the object that I am for them,
+etc. Thus he is immediately given an understanding of the common
+aim, since this common aim is himelf. And on the basis of the objective
+that he is, he can reconstruct in practice and in prospect the operations
+of the group (of which he is the negative and totalising unity) 56 and
+thereby assess his own action objectively from the practical point of
+view of escape or flight. Dialogue (in the sense of rational antagonism)
+is possible between the individual and the group that surrounds him.
+And both of them - he in his isolation, and the other either through
+each and all or through differentiated organs - can foresee, with some
+variable margin of error, how the other will act by treating for his own
+part his own acts as objects.
+We need to go beyond this and note that the hunted man realises
+in practice the truth of the group: except in the special case where he
+knows the names and characters of all his hunters (which can only
+apply in a very restricted multiplicity), he realises the group not as a
+hyper-organism, but as ubiquity in each structure and in everyone's
+praxis. Meanwhile the hunted man sees or guesses at human presences
+behind a door or trees and regards these presences as all the same; he
+sees their ruthless ferocity as transforming every elsewhere into a here.
+For him, the differentiation will depend entirely on the practical
+situation: the group is up there on an eminence so that it controls a
+whole region; the group is down there, behind some trees whose function it is to hide it, but which may also, by way of counter-finality,
+conceal certain presences from it. Thus, through the practical interiorisation of his objectivity for the group as practical freedom, he
+56. We have already seen how either a hostile extermination group or a
+'natural' danger can constitute themselves as the negative totalisation of a given
+group, via the destructive process which unites all the members in a common (and
+non-serial) extermination. But here the negative totalisation is different: by discovering himself as an objective and reinteriorising this objectivity, the individual
+becomes the outside-being (être-dehors) of the group which is pursuing him and,
+in so far as he is threatened with the danger of being killed, he sees death approaching him as a possibility which belongs to the enemy group and as the possibility that the success of the group will be realised (the annihilation of the individual) as a negative objectification (the result is an inert disappearance) and as a
+disruption of unity (the lynchers disperse after the lynching).
+
+51J
+reveals the truth of the function. By deciding to go behind the curtain
+of trees rather than cross the field without cover, he differentiates these
+sames (les mêmes) by means of the real situation, that is to say, through
+function: in these common individuals, behind the trees, the group is
+closer to him, but not so well placed to see him; in the person of those
+lying in wait on the hill, the group is further away but it can see further
+by means of an instrument (the hill is being used). And this differentiation of functions does not by any means prevent the fugitive from
+being trapped: and therefore function, reciprocity and structure are
+also revealed by the flight of the hunted man as the physiognomy of a
+freedom which is organised for extermination. In other words the
+hunted man, in the tension of being surrounded, sees those behind the
+trees as the same as those up on the hill in so far as both of them deprive
+him of the possibility of escape by their reciprocal positions; and the
+common praxis appears to him as a here in both places to the extent that
+the danger up there and the danger down there are a function of one
+another. But in the deliberate action of the man-hunt he sees this
+reciprocity everywhere as an intentional structure of the common
+praxis in every member of every sub-group. He acts, in fact, in the
+light of the ubiquity of the enemy's co-ordination: those up there are
+directly connected with those down there. If he is seen by those on the
+hill, they will force him towards the sub-groups who are concealed in
+the plain, etc.
+It is not necessary to develop this example any further. It must be
+admitted that, as moments of the dialectical investigation, these
+examples still do not show that the formal structure of the common
+praxis is the synthetic unity of the individual praxis - and this formulation is inaccurate anyway. But they do at least prove that an individual's understanding of praxis can remain of the same kind whether
+applied to the praxis of a group-object, to that of a group-subject or
+to that of a practical organism. In each case, the common end is
+practically conceived as that towards which the group transcends what
+is given; and this practical perception is itself an individual transcendence (dépassement); and in each case, the actions are decoded in a
+movement from the future to the present and each of them reveals
+itself in this regressive unity as a means, unified by the common
+objectification, to the end.
+There is nothing surprising about this: it is true that the objective
+of the group is common in so far as it appears only through each
+common, that is to say pledged and structured, individual; but it is also
+
+528 Book II
+true that the practical moment is realised through organic praxis and
+that this constitutes itself as the comprehension of its individual task
+in so far as the common task objectifies itself in it. This shows that the
+final, common objective can manifest itself only through individual
+action and as its common beyond, and that structure, as a relation to
+the totality, is lived as the deep meaning (signification) of the task
+being performed. Certain determinations of action in effect come to
+the individual from the group, as a new statute which, in his individual
+isolation, he could not have produced or even understood - in particular, and fundamentally, the pledge as a free limit of freedom. We
+have seen, in fact, that a praxis reduced to its individual translucidity
+cannot in any way commit an indeterminate future (that is to say, a
+future in which all the conditions of praxis are different); my own
+freedom turns against me as Other in so far as it is other for the
+Others. Thus the modality of action, its normative aspect, often eludes
+those who are not grouped, even if they live it themselves as members,
+in different circumstances, of another group.
+What people call fanaticism, blindness, etc., is really fraternity-terror
+as experienced in another group and in so far as we, as individuals, treat
+it as an emotional occurrence in individuals. But, on the one hand, a
+pledge is not produced by a hyper-dialectic; it is an incarnation of the
+inter-individual relation of reciprocity. And on the other hand, even if
+the modality of action eludes the non-grouped individual externally, it
+is still lived in the group through the mediation of individual praxis;
+and this means that power and the imperative, far from producing and
+qualifying this praxis, are adopted and interiorised by it in so far as
+they occasion it. In the process of concretely unfolding and adapting
+to circumstances, free praxis produces its own inertia, its own limitations, and keeps these determinations in Being. Moreover, individual
+praxis is immediately reciprocal, as we saw at the beginning of this
+investigation. And this reciprocity is the basis of the worked product -
+of freedom interiorising multiplicity - which we have called the pledge.
+The pledge is the practical comprehension of reciprocity as a means of
+constituting a group inertia in the same way that pledged praxis
+implies a common understanding of the group objective and of the
+pledge. From this point of view, apart from modality (it is still necessary to establish dialectically the formal conditions in which a nonmember of the group can recognise it in the group member), there is
+always a possible reciprocity between the member of the group and the
+non-member; it may be difficult for the first to explain the conditions of
+
+519
+common life to the second (but this difficulty appears a posteriori; the
+soldier will find it easy or difficult to explain the interior milieu of his
+unit to the non-soldier, depending on what type of war he is fighting),
+but he can always reveal his aim to him. In other words, they can communicate in so far as there is a formal homogeneity between the
+following three comprehensions: the comprehension of the groupobject by the subject who is not grouped (in the sense of being a subject of the individual, grouping action); the comprehension of the
+group-subject by the non-grouped as an object (that is to say, by the
+very process which interiorises its objectivity), and the comprehension
+of the group-praxis by each of its members, as a mediation of function
+and objectification.
+2 Spontaneity and Command
+But, far from making our task easier, the homogeneity of individual
+praxis and common praxis at first presents us with difficulties; it
+involves a kind of aporia, or impotence of the dialectic. Given that the
+group as an interiorised multiplicity is so profoundly different from the
+organic individual, that, in other words, we have avoided treating the
+group as an organism, except metaphorically, how can the group
+produce, in common, actions whose fundamental structure is the same
+as that of individual actions? It might be said that a limit is given a
+priori. Not a limitation adopted as pledged inertia, nor for that matter a
+limitation experienced and suffered as the insurmountable resistance of
+some inert materiality to a given undertaking: but rather a kind of
+breathlessness of the dialectic reproducing its original movement,
+regardless of the internal constitution of the agent who realises it. This
+involves a new kind of untranscendability, and it is necessary to explain
+it. In order to do this, we must make a closer examination of the process
+of organisation, not as a real constitution of a being-in-the-group based
+on the pledge, but as a distribution of tasks.
+It is common - for example, in periods of revolution - to contrast a
+centralising, authoritarian tendency coming from above, that is to say,
+from the elements who hold power for the time being, with a democratic, spontaneous tendency which grows from the base. The first is
+supposed to realise the organisation of the masses into hierarchised
+
+520 Book I/
+action groups from outside or, at least, on the basis of a frozen immanence-transcendence; and the second is supposed to realise groups
+through the free, common action of the multiplicity upon itself, and as
+such to represent true democratic self-determination in interiority. The
+difference between these kinds of organisation is supposed to be
+qualitative and radical; they are treated as two essentially opposed
+realities, only the second of which can really constitute the group as
+common self-creation. The implication of this fundamental contrast is
+that truly common objectives, operations and thoughts are produced in
+the autonomous process of the demassification of the masses by themselves and of their spontaneous organisation.
+This conception has political and ideological foundations which
+cannot be discussed here. I am not denying that politically it is of the
+greatest importance whether organisation is imposed from above or
+produced from below. Similarly, I admit that the social, ideological,
+ethical (and, primarily, material) consequences of a movement will be
+completely different depending on whether the popular movement
+produces its leaders as a temporary expression of its praxis and reabsorbs and transcends them through the development of this praxis or
+whether, on the contrary, a group detaches itself from the masses,
+specialises in the exercise of power and arranges the tasks in an authoritarian manner in the light of its own conception of the people's objectives. Of course it is obvious that the régime itself will be different in
+the two cases, as well as the relations of reciprocity between individuals.
+But the important point here is, quite apart from any political considerations, that the mode of regroupment and organisation is not
+fundamentally different according to whether it depends on centralisation from above or on a spontaneous liquidation of seriality within the
+series itself and on the common organisation which follows. In short,
+this is not and cannot be an issue about Blanqui, Jaurès, Lenin, Rosa
+Luxemburg, Stalin or Trotsky. And, just as a premeditated crime and
+an act of justified defence may, in spite of all the practical and legal
+differences between them, involve the same muscles and be realised in
+the same basic actions (the differences emerging at a higher level and
+from the point of view of a different praxis - that of a police investigation or a trial, for example), so, in the same way, the type of formal
+intelligibility and rationality can be the same with organisation from
+above as with organisation from below.
+It should in fact be recognised that the habit of speaking of dialectical transformations of the masses is always metaphorical. For
+
+521
+example, when Trotsky emphasises the qualitative transformation
+(especially from the point of view of revolutionary potential) caused by
+the first meetings of workers and soldiers, he is perfectly right. And
+today, when other writers take up these remarks and develop them in
+order to show the revolutionary character of the Hungarian rebels,
+showing that a truly revolutionary situation is characterised both by
+specific circumstances and by the constitution of insurrectional groups
+including workers, students and soldiers, they may be right historically,
+that is to say, at a level whose concrete determinations no longer fall
+within the area of our research. But we should avoid following certain
+historians or Marxists (whether Trotskyists or not) when, before or
+after the event, they give what is really a 'Gestaltist' description of these
+'typically revolutionary' meetings, as if an organic synthesis arose
+spontaneously out of them - based, of course on the quantitative
+relations of the three social groups involved, but transcending the
+quantitative relation towards a new qualitative differentiation. (For, as
+we have seen, Engels permitted every consistent Marxist to reveal the
+transformation of quantity into quality in the name of the external
+dialectic.) In fact, even if soldiers and workers do constitute the first
+organising committees of the rebellion (not only in Paris in 1789, with
+the encounter of the residents of the Quartier Saint-Antoine and the
+French guards, but also in Germany in 1918 and Russia in 1917), these
+relations are too universal and have to be specified in each case: universality is hard to find and define in a dialectical process.
+Whereas for analytical Reason this is concrete reality, as a relation
+which is indifferent to its terms, in a dialectical investigation it appears,
+as we shall see, either as an immediate, abstract appearance, as the first
+delusion to be dissolved, or else as the concrete, hidden conclusion of
+the entire investigation, and, as it were, as the totalising but ultimate
+foundation of rational development. And if, without prejudging the
+nature of a 'typically revolutionary' organisation, one imagines these
+groups in a particular concrete historical situation, for example, either
+St Petersburg in 1917 or Berlin in 1918, but not in both cities at once,
+then a concrete relation of reciprocity will re-establish itself. For the
+workers, given the situation in the country and the city at the time, and
+the special characteristics of the Navy and the Army, here and always,
+either the soldiers or the sailors (and each case must be examined
+separately - Kronstadt is not St Petersburg, etc.) are practical, irrefutable evidence against the government, and a defence against its attempts
+to smash the rebellion, a direct or indirect relation to other classes (in
+
+522 Book II
+particular, to the peasant class in so far as the peasants who had been
+mobilised outnumbered the rest, and also in so far as these war-weary,
+discontented servicemen were a mediation between the workers, the
+ex-peasants, and the countryside, of which the fighters in fact represented the most advanced section) and a proof of the collapse of the
+régime, a beginning of universalisation: these other exploited men
+appeared to them as representatives of all exploited people. But above
+all 'the soldiers are with us' took on, for and in everyone, a special
+meaning because ever since 1905 (not to mention earlier times) the
+soldiers had been, in spite of themselves, instruments of repression.
+Conversely, for a soldier who rejected external discipline, the workers
+represented the only possibility of integration and of fightingdiscipline; the workers, indeed, unlike the soldiers, knew that insurrections required practical organisation even more than strikes.
+These relations of reciprocity are exactly the reverse of the suggested
+'Gestaltist' syntheses: they establish themselves through a practical
+recognition within action, on the tacit basis of the pledge. And the given
+heterogeneity, which presides over the encounter, becomes a pledged
+homogeneity which guarantees a created heterogeneity. On the other
+hand, it would be absurd to deny the practical end of such organised
+groups: in each case there is a danger, and it is necessary to secure
+defences, to maintain vigilance, etc. And above all, whether one likes it
+or not, one has to go back to the truths established by the historians:
+the organisation selects its organisers. It may reject or reabsorb them,
+but it is undeniable that, generally speaking, it preserves them in their
+role by means of the pledge which supports function by adopting
+passivity. Historians of the French Revolution have established, for
+example, that there was a category of popular agitators, some of whom
+have been identified and traced, who, between 178g and 1794, were
+present at every important event, and whom the 'common individuals'
+of the sections regarded as their organisers and whose function, preserved by reciprocal inertia between the popular 'days', maintained a
+kind of passive organisational ossature in the everyday dispersal: the
+organisation would reform around them in moments of tension. These
+popular agitators were not leaders: it is primarily in this respect that
+their power differed from that of the actual leaders. They did not issue
+orders: but the group reconstituted itself around them, exalted them
+and communicated its power to them; it gave itself orders through
+them. They were in fact simply regulatory third parties whose regulatory activity became function on the tacit basis of the pledge. For this
+
+523
+reason it would be absurd to use them as an argument against the
+democracy of the popular organisation.
+But two important points should be noted. On the one hand this
+democracy is really fraternity-terror, that is to say, it is actually based on
+violence. For this reason Guérin is wrong to contrast it with the
+violence of authoritarianism from above. Although circumstances may,
+in fact, produce violent contradictions between the base and the apex,
+the only possible basis for violence from above is violence from below.
+But as we shall see, violence tends to become purer as it moves away
+from its origins, and what disappears is fraternity. On the other hand -
+and this is what is most important for us - by virtue of the pledged
+inertia of function, the organiser-agitator will remain, for some time,
+the means through which the group defines its praxis, and creates its
+own organisation. This does not mean that the organiser can impose
+a particular action or forbid another: he would immediately lose his
+power if he tried to issue orders. He is a medium and he knows it; and
+if he acts (some of them are corrupted) it is through the group, and in
+secret. But since the orders of the people issue from his mouth, since
+the reorganisation has to be carried out through his individual praxis,
+and since his exhortations and gestures indicate the common objective,
+we have to conclude that popular praxis is essentially capable of being
+created, understood and organised by an individual; which means, in
+other words, that the group can define its common action only through
+the mediation of an individual designation. In the tension of immanencetranscendence, the leader' proceeds to the reorganisation of the group
+as a quasi-object and distributes quasi-objective functions in accordance
+with the objective which he thereby defines. In this way, he constructs
+a practical device in quasi-objectivity which will preserve itself as it is
+through assumed inertia, just as an instrumental system in the inorganic
+world is given an organisation by individual praxis and supports it
+with its passivity. Of course, things are not really so simple: he is
+interrupted or warned, his invention is anticipated by someone else, a
+few people organise spontaneously in connection with everyone, and
+others suggest some rearrangement to him, etc. As I have said, he is, in
+a sense, a mediation. But the important point is that this mediation is
+necessary as long as the group itself, because of this mediation, is not
+finally constituted along with its organs of control, distribution, etc.
+And clearly, even then, whatever the system of self-administration
+(Soviets, revolutionary committees, etc.), the mediation of the individual will simply have been institutionalised. For example, if one votes
+
+524 Book II
+one will be voting for one motion and against another, for one amendment and against another, in short, for an individual, practical determination of discourse.
+The difference between a regulatory third party and a leader is that
+one is in charge and the other is not. We will come to the question of
+command shortly. But - except when contradictions become acute - it
+should not be supposed that the "transcendence-immanence' tension
+disappears. In fact, what distinguishes the leader from the agitator -
+apart from the coercive nature of his power - is, frequently, the number
+of mediations which separate him from the group. But in each case we
+come up against a strange limit of the dialectic: the organised group
+obtains results which no individual could achieve alone, even if his
+strength and skill were doubled; moreover, organisation as practical
+being is normally constituted in a more complex and better adapted
+way than any organism. To resemble a guard in a square formation, one
+would have to have eyes all round one's head, and arms in one's back;
+to resemble a combat unit which is protected by guards at night, one
+would have to be able to sleep and watch at the same time. Thus an
+organisation does not reproduce an organism, but is meant to be an
+improvement on it by means of human invention. It takes the practical
+unity of the organism as its ideal (though as we shall see it does not
+achieve it), but it dissolves the facticity of the living being. But these
+transformations do not extricate it from the inflexible necessity of being
+situated, that is to say, regardless of its instruments, of being designated
+as a practical point of view, as an anchorage defined by the very world
+it is trying to modify. And in order finally to achieve these supraindividual results, it must allow itself to be determined by the unifying
+unity of an individual praxis. Thus the individual cannot achieve the
+common objective on his own, but he can conceive it, signify it, and,
+through it, signify the reorganisation of the group, in the same way as
+he would carry out a rearrangement of his individual practical field.
+The individual integrates himself into the group and the group has its
+practical limit in the individual.
+Disagreements in Organisational Sub-groups
+No doubt it will be objected - quite rightly - that most organised
+
+525
+groups entrust planning, the distribution of tasks, supervision and
+administration not to individuals but to specific sub-groups. In such
+communities, everything is a common task and the individual as such
+apparently dissolves in a small sub-group; and then reciprocities exist
+only between sub-groups. But if the individuals of the organising subgroup sink into anonymity, the sub-group still does not transcend the
+framework of an individual conception in its common praxis. In other
+words, it is still impossible to determine a priori, that is to say, on
+simple inspection, whether the plan adopted is the work of one person
+or several: for, in order to construct it, several became one.
+Of course, disagreements within the organising group are inevitable
+and may even be violent. And the plan gets organised through these
+disagreements. In the most complex groups, rent by class struggles, by
+conflicts of interest or of point of view, and partly infected with seriality,
+it will no doubt be claimed that the several organisers, if they have been
+carefully selected, represent the diversity of tendencies - which no
+individual could do. But, apart from the fact that a synthesis is not
+usually achieved and that compromise proposals reflect in some form
+the deep impotence which results from divisions, such decaying or disunited groups do not belong to the present level of our investigation.
+People in a technical office or managerial department, etc., normally
+belong to the same class and milieu, share the same interests and have
+had the same technical training: however violent their disagreements
+may be, they are not a direct result of social conflicts and it would be
+ridiculous psychologistic scepticism to attribute them to personality
+conflicts or secret rivalries, although, of course, such conflicts and
+rivalries may be expressed in the contradictions which divide them.
+In fact, these contradictions are really just objective structures of the
+practical problem that has to be resolved. And when experts are trying
+to find a solution to a problem like traffic in a city, they are faced with a
+set of given, material incompatibilities, whose origins may be extremely
+varied: the constantly rising number of cars, the insufficient number of
+garages, the relative narrowness of most of the main roads, the necessity for car owners to use their cars for getting about and to have
+parking places, which is in itself contradictory since the number of cars
+lining the streets necessarily limits the speed and volume of traffic. The
+solution, if there is one, obviously has to transcend and resolve all
+these material conflicts; and it must emerge in a framework of scarcity,
+since the budget of the city (or state) does not permit any large
+expenditure. Any conflict between the members of the group will, in
+
+526 Book II
+fact, be due to the fact that in trying to transcend the objective contradictions everyone is, unintentionally, simply favouring one of the
+terms of the contradictory proposition in a false synthesis. One
+solution ignores the interests of traffic flow; another makes parking in
+the city impossible, and so makes the car useless and threatens to
+impede the expansion of the motor industry; and another, which
+revives an old plan of building wider roads, simply ignores the limitations of available resources. Each of these solutions is individual: by
+which I mean not only that it was proposed by an individual, but also
+that it determines and defines an individual in the group; if he favours
+one solution rather than another, it is not impossible that this is the
+result of certain pressures, or if he has discovered this solution amongst
+all the others, this may be because his fundamental project cleaves to
+certain possibilities and rejects all the others. But such practical 'predispositions' can do no more here than define an approach to the
+problem: the contradiction is in the object; it manifests itself spontaneously and it explodes in the final synthesis all the more violently if
+the synthesis neglects one term in favour of an other. Of course the
+contradiction may strike other experts, especially ones who are themselves proposing a partial synthesis, that is to say unintentionally
+expressing one contradiction while meaning to transcend others.
+Each of the solutions is an individual reality - an objective, individual failure - in so far as the mistake has to be attributed to individual
+limitations: a part was mistaken for the whole. But the limitations are
+themselves individual: by this I mean that people are limited here in
+relation to other individuals, better equipped than themselves, rather
+than in relation to the group or to mankind. However, this individual
+reality (in the ancient sense in which the individual is characterised by
+the degree of nothingness which he has interiorised) reveals, through
+false discourse, an objective, material contradiction which produced the
+false synthesis which favoured one term and neglected another. In
+other words, it represents the objective possibility of serving some
+interests while neglecting others (possibly in the same person); and this
+possibility is a structure of the problem in so far as it is really already
+expressed in the practice of certain groups of car users, garage owners
+or traffic police. Through them, one term attempts to destroy the other
+and impose itself; by lending the support of its common strength, the
+municipal authority may allow the attempted solution to 'hold', at
+least for a while. But since the contradiction would remain, with one
+term being favoured, it would reappear even more violently in some
+
+52]
+other form and the whole problem would recur. Thus, what a particular individual becomes responsible for is the contradiction as it
+exists in the practico-inert field: it is in this field that the increasing
+number of cars (a strictly serial phenomenon) comes up against the
+rigidity of urban structures (inorganic and serial inertias); and this
+contradiction, by becoming a structure of a technical problem, detaches itself from the milieu of seriality: it is at the centre of the practical
+field.
+But it should also be noticed that, as an individual, the expert serves
+a purpose, in that his own solution becomes his ideological interest, his
+being-outside-himself which he defends in the same way as he would
+defend himself, and because it is himself. Thus the conflicts between
+different solutions reactualise the contradictions as a permanent conflict,
+outside, of material forces. Every solution is really just a veiled attempt to
+make one term dominate the other. And the inter-individual violence
+of the conflict is inconceivable outside an organised group. In the
+milieu of the pledge, the Others must become the same again, for otherwise the calculated alterity of functions becomes a suffered alterity.
+Thus, above all from the practical point of view of finding a solution,
+the conflict between two individuals (a reciprocal antagonism) occurs
+ashaving to end with the destruction of one in favour of the other, or of
+both in favour of a third or of their reabsorption by the group. For
+these serene experts, of course, there is no threat of physical liquidation
+orofbrain washing; but though their individual lives are not in danger,
+their social being may perfectly well be annihilated (either in the form of
+with others, both of which define their being-outside-themsepuesio
+the-group. And this being-outside-themselves is not to be confused
+with the constitutive relation of the common individual: reputation is
+really the specification of power in so far as this specification arises as a
+common result in the interiority of the group and is functionally connected with the concrete exercise of this power). Thus the mediation of
+the individual was necessary in order to carry the objective contradiction into the group; but the common-being-in-the-group was necessary
+in order to restore the virulence of the contradiction through personal
+conflict. In fact, it is obvious that everyone has been aware of all the
+givens of the problem for a long time and that, in the course of a given
+session, the first reports will once again enumerate the difficulties,
+aporias, objective conflicts, etc. But these oppositions cannot manifest
+themselves in their truth as long as they are the object of a pure
+
+528
+enumeration or of a strictly verbal description (1 include diagrams,
+statistics, etc., under this heading). This is because the organising subgroup stands in a relation of immanence-transcendence to the surrounding group: a quasi-separation (or quasi-negation) conditions the
+relations between them in inertia (we shall return to this shortly) as long
+as the lived contradictions of the surrounding group (in the relations of
+its members in so far as they need to remain the same but are in danger
+of being disunited by the object) cannot be reinteriorised by the
+organising sub-group and lived at a level of abstraction and specialisation which is precisely that of the sub-group.
+Thus any expert, if he is a car-owner, can experience for himself the
+contradictions suffered by every member of the seriated-group (the
+meaning of this term will become clear when we examine it concretely)
+which is the Parisian population (in so far as some of its members are
+car-owners). But at this level, he either suffers or avoids the problem by
+some special expedient which is incapable of being generalised. In short,
+his own misfortunes determine his reactions as a Parisian, but they
+have practically no effect on his attitude as an expert (an individual
+defined by his power), though he may use them as examples or
+illustrations in his arguments. But his practical point of view is formed
+within a community of experts (or else in isolation, but only in so far
+as this isolation is simply one mode of being-in-the-group: for example,
+when working on his report in his office). Thus car accidents, impassable streets, traffic jams, etc., are reproduced in all their violence within
+the specialised sub-group when conflicts of material interest are taken
+up by individuals in the form of ideological interests. As a mediation of
+an antagonistic reciprocity, the sub-group controls its tension and
+defines the urgency of transcendence. Thanks to the fact that individuals are endangered in their being-in-the-group, and that the subgroup makes their conflict both possible and inevitable, the objective
+problem develops (or can develop) all its contradictions at the level
+where it ought to be possible to find a solution (of course there may not
+be any solution in present conditions). Besides, these inter-individual
+conflicts may become common conflicts, in so far as the individuals who
+suggest the solution become, for others, the regulatory third parties of
+an organising action which they had already guessed at though without
+seeing it quite clearly.
+But what purpose is served by this virulence? - To raise the question
+in all its forms and in all its complexity, or, in other words, to effect
+the becoming-question (le devenir-question) of the sub-group. Ihe
+
+The Constituted Dialectic 529
+maximum tension will be realised when the group, at its own level and
+in accordance wich its functions, becomes the traffic of Paris. Now this
+complexity bristles with contradictions and cannot sustain itself as
+such: it is a way of interiorising the problem, but as long as they remain
+divided, the common individuals will be paralysed; the moment of the
+interiorisation of the contradiction, in so far as it transforms those who
+are the same into others, must be transcended towards synthetic unity.
+The more integrated the sub-group, the more sensitive it is to the
+profound contradiction of the same and the other through all its
+members, and the more tempted it is to reach a solution through
+terror, that is to say, through requiring support for one of the proposed
+theses. In this case, it is not important whether or not a vote is taken:
+what matters is the elimination of the minority as such. And, above all,
+it must be made clear which thesis is being supported; if, as often
+happens, this is a thesis which has already been proposed, one which
+has just been explained, then, if one refuses to submit to the law of
+alterity, one is bound to give an arbitrary advantage to one or more of
+the terms of the objective contradictions, to the detriment of the others.
+There is no thought, in the sense of an 'organising practice', which
+selects a best (if not actually good) solution by a synthetic transcendence of the contradictions.
+The common action (or power to determine a reorganisation) therefore becomes defined as a common adoption of an individual proposal
+(made by a common individual). If thought does take place, however -
+that is to say, if someone proposes a best, if only temporary, solution -
+then it will obviously manifest itself as a regulatory praxis and through
+the regulatory third party. (It does not matter here whether there is one
+third party or several, or whether the solution is 'found' by several
+people at the same time; what is important is that everyone, in so far as
+he is a common individual mediated by organic practice, produces it as
+a free dialectical movement of his thought). What is involved, in fact,
+is a dialectical transcendence through a practical project: and it therefore presupposes a synthetic grasp of all contradictions, in short, a
+living reunification of the sub-group by the third party, taking the dissensions themselves as an instrument of reunification. The sub-group
+then becomes simply the synthetic unity of its own divisions, that is to
+say, it realises, through its dissensions, the objective contradictions
+which the whole group derives from its situation. And, by finding a
+solution, the individual posits himself as a regulatory third party, that
+is to say, he exhibits his solution as the opening to a possible future and
+
+530 Book II
+to a field of action which is conditioned by a new objective (in the short
+term, since the fundamental objective remains unchanged). And this
+solution presents itself both as an objective transcendence of objective
+contradictions and as a possible reorganisation of the sub-group itself
+in interiority. When the solution is adopted, factional divisions (in the
+most general sense) organise themselves into a structure of positive
+reciprocity: within the new unity, the contradictory terms are preserved as indissoluble elements of the new arrangement, and their
+mediated contradiction becomes an adopted heterogeneity.
+It does not matter in the least whether the solution was found in the
+course of meetings of the sub-group or through isolated work, since,
+as we have just seen, isolation is a particular functional relation between
+the individual and a sub-group to which he belongs. What is important,
+on the other hand, is that the practical development of the contradictions can and must take place through the regulatory third party: in so
+far as these contradictions realise themselves in the unity of the divided
+sub-group, he grasps them both within himself, and outside himself, in
+the common field, and in so far as he is a common individual (just as a
+footballer perceives the moving organisation of the practical field as it
+conditions and transforms him and so realises itself through him); and
+since these internal contradictions are the interiorisation of objective
+contradictions, he perceives them in the indissoluble unity of praxis as
+a problem of the objective organisation of the whole group in so far as
+the solution of this problem must effect a reorganisation of the organising sub-group. In other words, he not only sees the solution as necessarily involving a reorganisation of the sub-group, but also sees the
+reorganisation of the sub-group as having to be effected on the basis of
+a possible solution.
+And the practical conception is thought: which specifically means
+that it is a practical transcendence of the group's relations to the world
+and to itself and of the sub-group's relations to itself and to the group,
+in so far as these relations are the inert, pledged ossature of the community or, in other words, capable of being seen as the inert exteriority
+of interiority. Its thought is based on these relations, even if it has to
+modify some of them in the name of the whole; it is structured by
+them, and it preserves them by synthesising them through a project
+which transcends and uses them. At the same time, they lie before it in
+quasi-objectivity as the inert matter of an ordinal mathematics. Thus
+the structure and instruments of thought are common, but thought as
+praxis is a mediation of the practical organism and of the free, con-
+
+531
+stituent dialectic between these inert relations and the final objectification. Finding a solution is the synthetic, individual relation between
+structures brought together in living syntheses and the structural
+relations rearranged in response to this synthesis, in a practical field
+rent by contradictory exigencies. Since the discovery of a solution
+arises as a regulatory praxis of the third party, and since comprehension
+is this discovery in so far as it occurs in the other third party as regulated praxis, the action, as the unity of the reorganisation of the subgroup and of the new organisation of the group, occurs everywhere as
+the same, here, now.
+This is the crucial point: what we are touching on here is that
+essential structure of communities which epistemological idealism calls
+an agreement of minds. There are no such things as minds - any more
+than there are souls. This is already established. But the word 'agreement' is also misleading. Agreement presupposes, in effect, that
+different individuals or groups, with different horizons, and with
+characters and habits of totally different kinds, realise a contractual
+agreement in reciprocity on a minimum basis. Idealist optimism may
+then claim that this minimum will rise to a higher minimum, this
+minimum to another, so that, finally, agreement will reign in the whole
+of human knowledge or activity: but this is a philosophy of History. It
+is still always the case that the new agreement is the minimum for the
+given situation, even if it is based on previous agreements. At a given
+moment of its history, science can bring about the agreement of individuals who differ in age, sex, social condition, interests, language,
+nation, etc. (We shall come back to this later.) And these individuals
+will agree, for example, on Fresnel's theory or on the laws of thermodynamics and their proofs. At the same time, the object of the agreement becomes external to each of them: a communist physicist and an
+anti-communist physicist can agree on some experimental results and
+their interpretation, without any change in their sociality or organic
+individuality.
+And, in a way, this is what actually appears to happen; but this is
+because it involves a more complex structure than what we are examining at present: but what is really involved is a resurrection of unity
+through seriality and the creation of groups in the serial milieu without
+the dissolution of alterity. In fact, such induced unity is the degraded
+product of small, active groups whose activity, as we shall see, is
+refracted in seriality. The contradiction in the idealist conception is due
+to its assumption that truth can be the same in the other as Other. And
+
+532 Book II
+it would be impossible to claim that scientific agreement between two
+others is an example of basic human reciprocity (and that, consequently, alterity in its social and political forms, etc., is merely a
+secondary modality which will ultimately dissolve) without making
+an a priori judgement on the whole of History and, for example, simply
+rejecting class struggle and exploitation. For intellectual agreement
+about a scientific truth is always possible between an employer and one
+of his workers (all that is necessary is that both of them should have the
+desire and the opportunity to learn, which depends mainly on circumstances). But if a welder and the owner of a shipyard are both convinced of the truth of Archimedes' principle, each of their convictions is
+an other conviction, because it exists in a divided society and, as it
+were, at the two ends of an exploitative system. Here, an agreement
+about science is quite unimportant (just like an equally real agreement
+about the weather or the temperature. One might even say that it has
+no concrete reality, simply because the two individuals are such that a
+confrontation in knowledge is extremely unlikely, and would, in any
+case, be pointless. They are in fact two individuals whose concrete
+relations are governed by the mode and the relations of production and
+who, each for himself within a homogeneous group, reproduce the
+movement of thought of a given strict proof. In short, when individuals or groups are fundamentally other (and therefore inevitably
+opposed), 'an agreement of minds' as a permanent possibility of
+reciprocity remains abstract and quite inessential: after all, the artillery
+of two enemy armies will be in complete agreement about ballistics.
+On the other hand, both in organising and in heuristic groups
+(which includes active groups of scientists concretely working together), the appearance of a solution commits everyone much more
+totally and much more concretely than any 'agreement'.
+. An agreement,
+in effect, realises at one point the exterior unity of the Others as Others
+and thereby decomposes into a dust of identities: all the Others are
+identical at this particular point. When a solution is produced as the
+practical conduct of a regulatory third party (for this is what primarily
+it is: a determination of discourse, graphic proofs, the reproduction of
+experiments, etc.) and when it also reproduces itself through the praxis
+of every other third party, then it is in fact the temporalisation of
+everyone as the same in the ubiquity of a here. This means that comprehension is creation (and amongst such scientists or experts, it may
+happen that, as soon as the first words have been spoken the field of
+possibilities becomes illuminated, that the future immediately appears,
+
+533
+even more clearly than the regulatory action had intended to determine
+it); but it also means that the free creation does not occur in an Other
+as such but in a common individual who, momentarily altered (by the
+contradictory divisions) reconstitutes himself as the same by his practical
+activity in so far as this is one and the same thing for the whole of this
+interiorised multiplicity.
+Thus we have two descriptions of the act in question (a third party
+explaining a solution to his peers); and both of them are inadequate.
+The first is implicitly organicist: it presupposes that there is a synthetic
+act (the demonstration by the proposer) and that this single act realises
+itself through the audience as the unity of integration. This interpretation amounts to submerging all but one of the people involved into
+indistinct inessentiality and to constituting the originator as a totalising
+hyper-consciousness; it is based on superficial syntheses of perception
+which make the ensemble of listeners appear as a background from
+which the author stands out. T'he second interpretation, by contrast, is
+based on analytical rationality: it eliminates the group, replacing it by
+its multiplicity of exteriority, and resolves the act of understanding into
+a definite number of identical processes occurring in different organisms. The proposer's demonstration is then itself a process every term
+of which is governed by the preceding one and it serves as the inducer
+of identical reactions in external units (listeners, spectators).
+The concrete truth is much simpler than the two mistaken interpretations between which we constantly vacillate: the actual process
+of discovering the solution - even if it slightly precedes that of the
+exposition - still belongs to the process of common division: in fact it
+is, inevitably, primarily the appearance of one solution amongst others;
+and each of the false contradictory solutions has really been lived as a
+totalising reorganisation and has been realised as a new internal contradiction, dividing the group and signifying its author inhis individuality.
+When it comes to trials, the truly synthetic solution realises itself as a
+restructuring of the group. The trial may be experiment or calculation
+- as isolated work - or, in different circumstances, it may consist in the
+explanation of the solution. In any case, an isolated trial, however
+severe, is still inadequate: the truth is both a controlled, practical
+decoding of objectivity and a determination of sociality in interiority. 57
+57. There is no reason to expect these two operations to occur together or to
+follow one another in quick succession. Nevertheless, the first fixes certain abstract
+conditions for an integration which is the only possible source of its concrete
+meaning.
+
+534 Book I|
+Thus the operation is not the property of the regulatory third party any
+more than the storming of the Bastille was the responsibility of the
+first individual to shout: "To the Bastille! Run! It is performed by
+everyone, in three ways: a practical chain of abstract arguments (that is
+to say, of inert necessary relations whose necessity appears to everyone
+in all its persuasiveness, in so far as it is understood through the same
+relations united in the living structure; liquidation, through a totalising
+rearrangement, of their ideological separatism; and the realisation of the
+common practical field by and around them and by all in a strict and
+novel operation. This constructive liquidation takes place through
+three temporal ex-stases: past and future are mutually determining and
+the practical present, already illuminated by a global understanding
+(that is to say, by the future already prefigured as signification) occurs
+as a regressive determination of the mediations which unite this future
+to the past. It can therefore be said that the operation takes place
+everywhere, that the only way in which explaining is superior to
+comprehending is that it has the abstract privilege of regulatory action
+over regulated actions, that this operation - explaining and comprehending - is an individual praxis of the liquidation of practical contradictions on the basis of common structures: and that this individual
+praxis can never reproduce itself in the form of identical processes in
+each third party since it actually presupposes two mediated reciprocities: that between each comprehension and explanation through the
+medium of the developing totalisation (that is to say, of the rearrangement as everywhere) and that between everyone and everyone else and
+between everyone and all through the regulation of the third party (the
+solution being explained).
+But the synthetic bonds of reciprocity are here reduced to their
+simplest expression: reciprocity designates the comprehension of the
+other as the same as mine in so far as mine is the same as his. The
+abstract link simply amounts to a reinteriorisation of multiplicity and to
+its strict subordination to the different forms of synthetic unity. In
+fact - and this structure was explained above - there is not one comprehension, or ten, or thirty: this comprehension, everywhere the same,
+has no numerical determination. It is neither the explanation by the
+third party realising the group in the form of a totality-unity, nor a
+numerical plurality of acts. It is not the synthetic action of a hyperorganism; nor is it the individual, localised action of a particular practical organism: it is the action of a practical organism without any determination of individuality, to the extent that it mediates between
+
+535
+function and objectification and that it arises as ubiquity in the organised
+milieu. My comprehension is mine only in so far as it is that of my
+neighbour: and the multiplicity of identity disappears in so far as every
+understanding implies all the others and realises them; ubiquity is the
+reciprocity of unity as, with a single movement, it excludes both the
+multiple and the identical. This double exclusion is perfectly conveyed
+by language with the first person plural, when it expresses the interiorisation of the multiple: in the we, in fact, the multiple is not so
+much eliminated as disqualified; it is preserved in the form of ubiquity.
+True, one can say, 'We are two', just as one says, "They are two'; but
+in the second case, the enumeration is real, and expresses commutativity
+(either may be the second unit) whereas, in the first case, this commutativity is the non-explicit content of reciprocity.
+Thus before becoming an objective reorganisation, the discovery of
+the solution is an individual moment whose here is everywhere and
+which determines itself reciprocally by its reciprocal presence in every
+here. Of course, this is an abstract interpretation: as soon as seriality
+enters the group - however slightly - multiplicity tends to reappear.
+But there are intermediaries between the non-multiple or ubiquity and
+numerical multiplicity, and the latter really exists as such only when the
+group is completely dead: and then there will not even be any comprehensive construction of a solution, or if there is, it will no longer have
+the power to break the serial inertia. But for us the most important
+point is that the moment of synthesis is still that of individual performance; quite unlike a universal objective realising an agreement
+of minds while preserving their diversity, the individual performance
+realises nothing, but everyone realises himself as the same by realising it.
+The truth in its original sense, therefore, as sociality and within an
+integrated group, is the elimination of all alterity; it realises integration
+through the mediation of a regulatory third party. But this leads to an
+absolute impossibility of distinguishing between the truth as an
+individual performance and as a common one. This lack of differentiation through ubiquity between one and all finds expression in the fact
+that science will both name a law or principle after its discoverer -
+Ohm, Joule, Carnot, etc. - and also allow constructive work to develop
+anonymously. Not only is it impossible for common operations to
+transcend individual operations in their practical structure; in addition,
+as we shall see, the individual operation appears to the group as a
+practical ideal which it can never entirely achieve.
+But we must return to the organising sub-group. Let us suppose
+
+536 Book II
+that a schematic solution to its problem has been found. A solution has
+been outlined, and it is now necessary to consider matters of detail,
+concrete modalities of application, etc. At this level we encounter the
+heterogeneity of freedom once again: and it is based, in effect, on the
+common adoption of the regulatory plan of the solution, which has
+now assumed a new character: common structure. On the one hand, it
+is a comprehensible and pledged inertia; it is obeyed, and no one should
+try to question it. Thus, in itself, it represents a synthetic relation of
+omnipresent inertia. In everyone it is entirely the same, as a common
+basis, and it does not reside in anybody in particular, or even have any
+special position in its originator. On the other hand, as an organising
+schema (which controls the new organisation of the group through the
+sub-group), it defines the limits and powers of organising praxis:
+precisely because they are integrated, because everyone is the same and
+bases his own activities on the same overall plan, it is possible for any
+individual to create his own heterogeneity by means of a detailed
+proposal which presupposes, and contains, as its ossature, the inert
+relations of the overall plan. In the extreme case, everyone will make
+himself heterogeneous through his free, enriching proposal, while
+constituting this invention in the object as a moment of the totalising
+objectification which will have to be transcended. The progressive
+work of adapting the schema to the concrete therefore develops under
+the control of the plan, through heterogeneous moments each of which
+preserves and transcends the previous one.
+At this level (at least in theory, that is to say, at the level of abstract
+purity which we are now occupying), the contradictions do not affect
+the group itself; they are temporalised and surmounted in the light of a
+possible future unity, of the common praxis and the group itself. But,
+from the point of view of intelligibility, it should be recognised that
+the harmonious development of heterogeneity on a basis of unity again
+refers us to the practical unity of the organism. Even if the entire
+process were the product of different operations, performed by different individuals, every proposal that was suggested, contradicted,
+transcended along with its contradiction, and preserved, might, a
+priori, be a position that was transcended and preserved in the free,
+dialectical praxis of the organism. The only difference is that the
+constituted dialectic rests on a non-dialectical moment: that of adopted
+inertia. This inertia, in fact, makes common praxis possible in so far as
+it lays down untranscendable limits to the constituent dialectic. And of
+course every practical organism contains a structure of inertia - this is
+
+537
+why it can be the instrument of any instrumentality - but this has
+nothing in common with the inertia of freedom. In fact, free, organic
+transcendence is always a transcendence of material conditions; but the
+limits of action are prescribed by historical circumstances as a whole,
+rather than by a pledged inertia produced by praxis itself.
+This inert negation, however, is the necessary condition of common
+action: it is through it that the common individual exists as power,
+function, and structure; and dialectical praxis, as the mediation between
+the common individual and the object to be worked, itself differs from
+the free isolated praxis of an organism, in so far as it transcends, preserves, and actualises inertia, power and function - in short, the
+common individual. There is a synthetic, constitutive relation which, in
+the group itself, is the definition of each individual (in relation to
+everyone and to all); and the common individual, actualising himself
+through individual praxis, arises in a field of incredibly violent forces
+which form and deform him and involve him everywhere. In this sense,
+the concrete individual in the group is radically different from the
+organic individual and the common individual. At first sight, this
+makes it even more paradoxical when the group in action 'relapses' into
+its common praxis at the level of individual praxis, if not as regards the
+power and the efficacity of its action, at least in its formal structure. But
+the paradox disappears when one remembers that the group is an
+'antiphysis
+', that is to say, an undertaking, a systematic operation on
+the fundamental relations which unite men, and that the overall plan of
+this operation could only be the dialectical movement which produced
+it. In other words, the practical aim is not the group, but the common
+objective; the group organises itself in order to achieve the objective
+in common, but organisation constitutes it dialectically as an amplifier
+of dialectical praxis - in fact not only as a very powerful organism, but
+also as an organism which eliminates the contingencies of its constitution by a careful division of labour and a systematic differentiation of
+functions.
+Now these new characteristics do not prevent it from being situated
+and, consequently, they do not prevent external transformations from
+giving rise to contingency in its organisation (that is, to contingent
+limitations of its foresight). Nor do they mean that the plan of action
+cannot be the same for the group as a product of human labour and for
+the labour which produced it, except that the group as an object of
+labour must retain its determinations, as a worked thing, by a certain
+inertia, or that the only unity which a group can give itself - since the
+
+538 Book II
+hyper-organism is an illusion of idealism - does not oscillate between
+the false unity of worked matter (a coin which has been struck) and
+the synthetic, living unity of the organism. So we are now in a position
+to assert that the dialectical rationality of common praxis does not
+transcend (ne transcende pas) the rationality of individual praxis. On
+the contrary, individual praxis goes beyond it. And its special complexities, its knotted relations, and the formal concatenation of its
+structures derive precisely from the fact that the second rationality is
+constituted, that is to say, from the fact that the group is a product.
+In other words, the group constitutes and organises itself in response
+to the pressure of necessity in order to produce a dialectical action. And
+if it succeeded in becoming an organism, the organic unity of its action
+(assuming a hyper-conscious unity, etc.) would be different in kind and
+would have a different intelligibility: each organism might have some
+comprehension of the hyper-organism as a structure connected to the
+whole, but this would be very different from ours, which, in the
+organised group, aims at totalisation. In any case, the conjecture is so
+vague that it is impossible to settle whether this comprehension would
+apply to the hyper-organic whole, or to its hyper-action (which is
+itself a rearrangement), or to the one through the other, or whether
+there might be no comprehension at all. But precisely because it fails
+to become a totality, that is to say, to transcend individual praxis by a
+practical hyper-dialectic, it falls short of the level of the praxis which
+alone could provide it with a model of active unity, just as the organism
+itself provides its totalisation with a model and schema of ontological
+unity (a point to which we shall return). And the paradoxical tension
+which constitutes the praxis of a group is that it is in itself a metamorphosis conceived as the ubiquity of the individual through all the
+others, and therefore, in a way, a new statute of existence (power and
+'violence-fraternity') and that its action - which is the very reason and
+law of its constitution - does not differ from what can be projected by
+an organic individual who uses a group-object in order to carry out the
+project. But this factual untranscendability (which is not a necessity,
+but a permanent certainty of the investigation) necessarily refers to the
+impossibility of being a hyper-organism, which is the limitation of the
+group; and this impossibility itself is primarily simply the impossibility
+of acquiring an organic unity. The untranscendable connection between
+the group and the practical organism as Idea (Idea not in the sense of a
+determination of discourse, but as an unrealisable task which becomes
+regulatory by constantly positing itself as capable of being realised the
+
+539
+next day) is the changing signification of a perpetually rearranged and
+perpetually unsuccessful totalisation.
+The group is haunted by organicist significations because it is
+subject to this rigid law: if it were to achieve organic unity (which is
+impossible) it would therefore be a hyper-organism (because it would
+be an organism which produced itself in accordance with a practical
+law which excluded contingency); but since it is strictly forbidden this
+statute, it remains a totalisation, and a being which is subsidiary to the
+practical organism, and one of its products. In short, since the organic
+level cannot be transcended, it cannot be attained; and the organic
+state, as a threshold which would have to be crossed in order to reach
+hyper-organic unity, remains as the ontological and practical statute
+which serves to regulate the group. Similarly, the group constitutes
+itself through labour as a tool for producing a dialectical praxis, though
+this dialectic, forged through organisation, is constituted by the free
+dialectical actions of the organic individual and is modelled on them.
+The result is not only that the common action is capable of being
+recreated by a single individual (the leader, the 'organisation-man'
+etc.), but also that the intelligibility of the constituted dialectic is
+weighed down and degraded in comparison to the full intelligibility of
+the constituent dialectic.
+4 Praxis as Process
+We must now seek to explain why, though - as we shall see - it is still
+intelligible, common praxis lacks the translucidity of individual praxis.
+First of all, it is obvious that the fundamental reason is its adopted
+inertia: however extensively adopted it is, it will still come to everyone
+as his other freedom and consequently from the third party as Other,
+even though alterity arises here in its formal purity. If I run up against
+my own limits, against certain untranscendabilities (the fact that I have
+one function in the group rather than another), then I can obviously
+provide practical interpretations of them (recognising the reason for
+my function in circumstances and my abilities) and, rediscovering my
+original pledge, whether it was implicit or explicit, I can reproduce it
+in the urgency of the resuscitated past, and on this basis run through
+
+540 Book II
+the dialectical sequence which leads to this present, to this task. But
+negation and limitation as such cannot be dissolved even if I comprehend them, as I must, in terms of their instrumental function. And I can
+always rediscover the dialectical movement within the group, which
+produces all the determinations which are based on these - rights and
+duties, powers and structures - though they do not have the translucidity of my own pure organic praxis. Both my right and my duty
+appear with a dimension of alterity. Of course, these are relations with
+others, but still, translucid human relations do exist, and I spoke of
+them at the beginning of this work: I mean immediate reciprocities.
+What we have here is worked reciprocities. Right and duty, in their
+non-transparent certainty, appear to dialectical investigation, and to
+practical consciousness, as my free alienation from freedom. But, in
+fact, we know the aims of the pledge: the problem was to struggle
+against our multiplicity by interiorising it, that is to say, by constantly
+subjecting it to unity. Thus the problem of dialectical rationality as
+constituted Reason arises at the most basic level of integration, that of
+common action against multiplicity.
+Taking our investigation to a lower level of abstraction and purity
+(though it is still wholly abstract), we can immediately observe that the
+interiorisation of multiplicity constantly has to be redone, and is never
+successfully completed: this is due primarily to the actual circumstances
+of struggle and action, that is to say, not only to the totalising historical process, but also to the objective and the instruments. To begin
+with the latter, it is striking that, provided the group is not itself the
+whole of society (that is to say, practically always), the other intervenes
+in so far as the instrument of the group is the product of his labour.
+And worked matter, from within the group which is constituted upon
+it, thereby impregnates all interior organisations with a certain alterity.
+Whichever group is considered today, it takes no more than a strike
+affecting the post office (or telecommunications) for practical unity to
+be temporarily broken. Now, this unity has meaning only in the movement of action and in the urgency of the situation: if it is disrupted,
+this will not break a pledged fidelity between common individuals; it
+will simply force everyone to carry out his task in very unfamiliar
+circumstances, since he will be deprived of the information, instructions
+and orders which the group normally provides. The common individual subsists; he is the pledge and habits in everyone; but in the new
+situation he tends to reduce himself to a purely negative determination,
+a handicap of inertia: the organic individual is no longer a mediation
+
+The Constituted Dialectic 541
+between, on the one hand, a common-being which is alive (that is,
+sustained and nourished by the common milieu, by the given and
+maintained powers), though limited by inertia, and, on the other, the
+objectification of common praxis. Isolated, he identifies himself as a
+practical organism with the group, that is to say, he gives the group the
+statute of dialectical spontaneity which characterises his own organism.
+(As we shall see, this sudden isolation as rupture is not lived in the same
+way as those continuous functions which characterise the being-in-thegroup of the individual as isolation and which, consequently, produce
+isolated individuals as useful, necessary members who live their isolation as their practical community statute.)
+But it is obvious that this identification of the group with oneself
+contains two specific and opposed possibilities: sacrifice to the group,
+in spite of the unreliability of orders and information, and the use of the
+group by the individual. The danger that common individuals will
+dissolve, in this case, is not prior to the pledge (fear, 'private interest',
+etc., in so far as they threaten a group with disintegration), but subsequent to it: the group dissolves in the individual when he keeps the
+powers of the group and, in the absence of links, embodies the group
+in himself alone. Thus the problem of links (liaisons) is inseparable from
+that of organisation; or rather, it is a special aspect of it: the problem of
+the links of organisation is inseparable from that of the organisation of
+links. And if the developing organisation, through the general form it
+assumes, determines the general type of links, then conversely these
+links, depending on the difficulties they present (cost, relative slowness,
+scarcity of men, danger, etc.), act on the organisers and make them
+alter their plans. The connection between forms of government and
+administration and the possibilities of communication (that is to say,
+the real techniques and means of communicating) is revealed to us in
+its inflexible rigidity by the whole historical reconstruction.
+But, for us, the problem has two aspects: this dependence really
+gives the group, whatever it is, the depth of the world; which means that
+it is united to the serialities of the society in which it was engendered
+through the mediation of worked matter. It may be said that the
+individual also depends entirely on the social ensemble, that is to say,
+on the social circumstances of his materiality. This is true. And, ultimately, his class situation and, for example, the state of medical
+techniques, in so far as they reflect production as a whole, and affect
+him through the refractive index of his class, determine his practical
+possibilities in so far as they condition his organism from inside. But
+
+542 Book IT
+this is only a superficial analogy, just because biological reality is one.
+Certainly, there are linking organs (nerves, blood, endocrine secretions,
+etc.): and illnesses - occupational or other - may destroy some of these
+links while certain medicines may re-establish them and even, in
+certain cases, improve them. The differences must lie elsewhere, even
+if one imagines progress in medical techniques making it possible
+gradually to transform the organism. It is in this respect that the
+biological links are established through and between biological functions and in the biological milieu. The organism produces its own ways
+and these ways are themselves functions; the inorganic appears in it
+either as a substance which has been integrated into the whole or as a
+product of a secretion, but not as inert distance or as an inert vehicle
+whose speed is a function of some exterior operation. Within the
+organism, distance itself is organic; it allows itself to appear in its
+inorganic reality only through the degradation of the living being
+(slow reflexes in the sick and the old, etc.).
+With groups, however, the inorganic (as worked materiality) is an
+inert mediation between the functions of the community. This leads
+initially to the presence of an internal alterity not produced by the
+group and which, depending on circumstances (but independently of
+the objective, or, at least, without any practical link to it, established
+by the agents) appears as practically negligible or threatens to tear the
+community apart. ('Our supporters are not turning up, or are coming
+in smaller numbers because we are meeting too far from where they
+live, because transport is too expensive, etc. A particular revolutionary
+movement, which needs to manifest itself at several places in the
+country at the same time, may fail because links cannot be established. 58 A particular fighting group may be wiped out because its links
+with the army to which it belongs have been broken.) Such internal
+conditioning causes a reappearance of interiorised multiplicity; and,
+so to speak, re-exteriorises it in interiority. The group has eliminated
+facticity by setting itself a transcendent aim and by eliminating the
+organic hazards of its praxis; but then it encounters it again, within
+itself, in the form of a dispersive limit to its unification. But it should
+be noted that this facticity, unlike basic facticity, does not present itself
+as a special biological determination of unworked materiality, but
+rather as a contingent determination of the practico-inert field. This
+58. This is only an individual event: if fundamental contradictions produce an
+exigency for Revolution, the failure will only be incidental.
+
+The Constituted Dialectic 543
+determination is said to be contingent not because it lacks either strictness or intelligibility (given the practico-inert field on the basis of which
+the group arises, it is inevitable that the problem of links should present
+itself to the common practice in some way or other), but because it is
+external to the practice in so far as it organises the group in accordance
+with a particular objective.
+The second aspect of this dependence is of even more concern to
+our inquiry than the first: in so far as the group wishes to struggle,
+with contemporary techniques and tools, against the dispersive force
+of the practico-inert field, it must produce within itself apparatuses of
+mediation, supervision, and inspection, whose essential function is to
+put the sub-groups into relation either with one another (as with a
+tederal structure, tor example or with the central apparatus (with a
+centralised structure). The active function of such mediators - whether
+they are missi dominici, timekeepers in a factory or inspectors in
+secondary education - is to unite two inertias as such. And these
+inertias were not produced by pledged freedom; they came to the
+group through dispersal in exteriority and the mediating apparatus
+constitutes them as inertias which have been transcended and mediated
+by its mediation: and without this mediation the central administration
+would have no power over the local executive and vice versa; the
+mediating apparatus may of course be produced by the administration,
+but as soon as it has been produced, the administration is dependent on
+it, as well as the local executive. In such cases, a control body is often
+created to supervise the mediating organ. Of course, these remarks
+would be even more appropriate and complete in relation to a hierarchical group subject to controls. But we have not yet examined such
+a structure. But in any case, the link reveals and develops the inertia of
+exteriority while struggling against it by rearranging pledged inertias.
+The peculiarities of organised praxis are that it is constituted by a
+pyramid of inertias, both external and internal (through the exteriorisation of the inertia of interiority and through the interiorisation of the
+inertia of exteriority) and that the object of any apparatus (the subgroups which have to be linked together) appears as an externalinternal inertia and must be treated as such, while in its relations with
+other co-ordinated organs the same apparatus is treated as inertia by
+subordinate apparatuses.
+But means of communication are only one example of the separation
+of interiority. Depending on the task and the circumstances, it may
+also find expression in temporalisation: each particular task in its
+
+544 Book II
+particularity may be completed and be separated by a time-lag from
+the particular task which it makes possible in the development of the
+common action. In an industrial complex (either a socialist Kombinat
+or a capitalist organisation: we are not directly concerned with exploitation here, but rather with technical necessities which are the
+same everywhere, east and west), the extraction of raw materials or
+the manufacture of intermediate products (blast furnaces and forges;
+iron and steel, etc.) is objectified in a certain object (such as crude oil,
+or steel ingots) which absorbs labour just like 'commodities' and allows
+it to crystallise in it. The process will be resumed, the oil refined, the
+steel transformed into a crank-shaft, a drive shaft, etc., somewhere else
+(possibly nearby) and in a third process it will be enabled to perform
+its functions directly (the machine will be assembled out of its separate
+parts, etc.).
+But it is clear that the praxis of every sub-group is absorbed as an
+inert seal of worked materiality and transcended by a new operation.
+From the point of view of the economy of the firm, it is very important
+that workers, premises, organisers and managers should be integrated
+into a single complex. But to the sub-group which produces blast
+furnaces it is of very little importance whether the treated raw material
+was mined by a sub-group belonging to the complex or whether it was
+transported by train from some distant region. In the second case, the
+fact that the so-called 'raw material' is already worked (the fact that men
+have laboured in common to extract the mineral) is practically irrelevant. Even if the worker in the forge belongs to the same class as the
+miners, this class solidarity is not a structure of the group as such, at
+least not directly, and, besides, it affects the members of the class
+(whether they belong to the group or not) rather than the members of
+the group. For the worker, in fact, the inert exigency of the object may
+refer to those who have produced it, but, as we have seen, it may also
+be perceived as a sort of inhuman function of materiality. At this
+moment, it separates more than it unites, or rather it unites in seriality.
+But still we have not relapsed into seriality: the group loses its abstract
+purity, but it still has its efficacity and its structure of interiority. But
+the important point here is that in the technological complex under
+consideration, the task of the preceding agent is perceived - owing to
+the time-lag (the transportation of the product from one workshop to
+another, or from the mine to the forge, etc.) - as inverted and turned
+back into passivity by its basis of inert passivity. It becomes a mortgage
+of the future of the new worker, a limitation of his possibilities to
+
+The Constituted Dialectic 545
+which he must submit, whether it was done outside the group by others
+as Others or whether it was the result of an undertaking which was
+common to certain members who are invisible in so far as they are the same.
+There are many ways in which this reorganising correction can occur:
+the mediating sub-group may improve integration by increasing
+contacts between workers in different sectors; it may ensure that everyone understands the common praxis by giving theoretical instruction t
+enable every worker to see the meaning and importance of his owI
+function and also to learn to recognise the meaning of other tasks; or it
+may institute a system of rotation which puts everyone into each of
+the different jobs of the ensemble in the course of three or five years,
+etc.
+I am not mentioning these practices because of their social efficacity,
+but simply to show their common character: they take up organisation
+at the 'neutral' point at which it was left by temporal dislocation; and
+they treat the isolation of each sub-group or individual in relation to
+other individuals and sub-groups as an inert negation which has to be
+dissolved, and they treat each worker as a massified unit who has to be
+won back from emerging seriality. 59 By means either of a real rearrangement (rotation of jobs) or of a verbal action (teaching, explanation), they have a material effect on inorganic materiality. It is true that
+this work is intended to replace a cloud of isolations (such as time-lags)
+by a functional unity; but in terms of the common praxis of organisation, it shows that concrete organisation is a perpetual negation of the
+negation, that is to say, a practical, effective negation of the developing
+disorganisation. From this point of view, the heterogeneity of functions
+in a totally and abstractly pure group is, as we have seen, a creation of
+freedom. In a complex group, however (in which spatial distances and
+time-lags are constant sources of massifying dispersal), and from the
+point of view of totalisation, it is clear that differentiation, if it is
+determined both by the organising apparatus and by spatio-temporal
+'lag', can collapse, in a moment, into a statute of accidental heterogeneity (of exteriority). In an effective, practical, but real group, there
+is a constant danger that the current will cease to flow.
+And, as we have seen, what is true of the elements which are mediated
+by the apparatus is true also of the apparatus which mediates. The
+59. Obviously these mediating activities are inspired by different principles in
+the East (the humanism of labour, and political propaganda) and in the West
+(Human Engineering'). But this has little importance here.
+
+546 Book II
+group uses up part of its energy (the energy of its members, its
+numerical strength, credit, money, etc.) in maintaining itself in a state
+of relative fluidity. Thus by a scissiparity of reflection (which is highly
+intelligible since it involves mediating sub-groups and mediators
+between these sub-groups, etc.), the group as interiority, that is to say,
+as a developing to talisation, is in danger of being resolved (and will in
+fact be resolved) into a hierarchy and circularity (both of them, for
+reasons we shall discover later) of unifying actions which take actions
+and agents of a lower level 60 as inert quasi-objects, or, conversely, into
+a hierarchy of quasi-objects deriving their statute from an Other (a
+sub-group, or an individual considered as a quasi-subject) as a quasitranscendent determination of their suffered, adopted inertia. At this
+level, the group tends to have more in common with the kind of complex which is constituted by a machine and by the workers who use it
+for a particular job than with practical organisms which dialectically
+transcend every inert moment of the worked object, every inert organisation of the practical field; and this occurs without the moment of
+passive negation and arrest being directly produced by praxis, but, on
+the contrary, in so far as it returns from the worked object to the work
+as a limitation of the developing objectification which is immediately
+transcended by the inorganic statute of materiality. In fact, even if it is
+true that the group never relapses to the level of the machine (even
+that of a "feedback' machine as has been suggested), and if it is also true
+that it can never raise itself to an organic status, this is because it is
+actually a human product, that is to say, an instrument made by men in
+accordance with laws which make it possible to create automatic
+devices on the basis of the inorganic, and because it is simultaneously
+constituted by the free, dialectical praxis of human individuals, in so
+far as it acts in interiority on every member, and in exteriority on the
+common object.
+There can never be a social machine, because it would resolve into a
+massined plurality of organisms as soon as every practical organisn
+received a suffered statute of inertia in relation to the group; on the
+other hand, its operations become more machine-like as integration
+advances, that is to say, as the group, through the organisation of its
+structures, increasingly produces itself as a function of the practical
+organism (as a regulatory schema of the constructed relations of
+60. Inferiority, like hierarchy, being determined arbitrarily, that is to say in
+accordance with the conjuncture and the common praxis.
+
+The Constituted Dialectic 54J
+interiority). This in no way implies that this organisation, as an
+impossible mediation between the organic and the inorganic, is of
+itself unintelligible. But it does mean that it is a constituted dialectic;
+that is to say, there is no dialectical praxis here to realise the unity of
+individuals but, on the contrary, there are individual, constituent
+dialectics inventing and producing, through their work, a dialectical
+apparatus which encloses them and their instruments and which is
+determined in accordance with the aim. Within the apparatus, everyone
+is transformed with and through all the others, and the common
+individual as a structure of the totalisation appears as the highest level
+of integration which the group is capable of realising in its attempts to
+produce itself as an organism; but the group can be comprehended only
+as a particular dissolution of the practico-inert field at a certain degree
+of depth; and as such, it preserves the dissolved field, at least in the
+form of a constant danger of the resurrection of seriality and its very
+complication leads it towards the passive statute of inert things, of
+worked products. As I have said, even this is provisional: later, we
+shall examine the avatars of the group and what becomes of them when
+the group is reconquered by seriality. The important point here is that
+the common praxis is both an action and a process. 61
+Since every moment of the action, in so far as it is everywhere the
+same, is produced as a finished action by a practical organism as the
+mediation between function (common individual, structure) and
+objectification (inscribing the common work on the object), in common
+praxis, there is a common aim, objectification, labour, transcendence,
+reciprocal adaptation, etc., just as there is in individual praxis; and
+every partial result must be grasped in its constituent intelligibility as
+a free, practical realisation of one detail of the common aim. But the
+common aim itself, whether regarded as present in the structure of
+individuals or as the reflexive rule which governs the reorganisation of
+the whole by means of a differentiated apparatus, appears as a determination of the future by a project on the basis of concrete circumstances. At this level, the individual dialectic actually transcends itself
+towards another form of intelligibility, since it can already reproduce
+and comprehend the specific modalities of the group - which would be
+unknown to an isolated individual, if there could be such a thing - that
+is to say, structure, being-in-the-group, function, power and, ultimately,
+GI. This is, of course, before any description of alienation an an avatar of the
+group-praxis.
+
+548 Book II
+the pledge. The pledge, in fact, as a determination of mediated
+reciprocity, is incapable of being produced, or, therefore, comprehended, by an isolated freedom. And if everyone understands the
+group in this way, in so far as it appears to transcend itself towards a
+new form of integration, this is because membership of the group is
+given to concrete experience at the same time as practical-individual
+existence; thus there are not two separate moments of comprehension
+here, but rather two types of activity (practical and theoretical) which
+are always possible, either separately or together.
+But, as we have seen, at the moment in which the group transcends
+itself towards the organism through its individuals, it is still inoperative. It can go no further: being-in-common can produce new relations
+with others (and therefore with oneself) in everyone; but it cannot
+produce an integrating and integral organism; the totalisation cannot
+become a totality. And if the group is to remain an effective power to
+produce particular results, it will clearly be necessary that the number
+of readjustments and mediations in it should increase; that is to say, it
+should become within itself a practical multiplicity of points of view
+perceiving it in all its forms as an inertia which has to be transcended.
+This second procedure is simply the result of the failure of the first:
+since, at best, integration leads to the transformation of multiplicity
+into ubiquity, but never succeeds in replacing it with a new unity, this
+multiplicity without parts inevitably reproduces itself as a quantitative,
+discrete multiplicity, within the group itself, under other relations and
+through the mediation of the practico-inert.
+Circular recurrence does not yet establish itself on this basis, but the
+circularity of passivity always does, for the mediating organ must itself
+be mediated and it turns out to be split by the separations it mediates.
+Now, in this circular ensemble - and even when we introduce, as we
+soon shall, the functions of authority - everything occurs also as an
+autonomous result, positing itself for itself in the inertia of isolation,
+while its practical Reason lies in the mediation of a sub-group of
+reorganisation. At this level, passivity is given first - as an effective but
+isolated process (as the work of one machine in a group of machines) -
+and teleological activity is simply what comes, from above, to break
+up isolation and to restructure functions; totalisation constantly breaks
+down and is always re-established by others (who are now no longer
+quite the same; its free, practical reality comes to everyone as a passive
+recovery of his common individuality. From this point of view, which
+is also that of the interior practice of the group (and which tends to
+
+The Constituted Dialectic 549
+dominate as the difficulties increase), the common action becomes a
+directed process.
+What difference is there, then, between process and praxis? Both are
+dialectical: they are defined by their movement and their direction; they
+transcend the obstacles of the common field and transform them into
+stepping-stones, stages, steps marking and facilitating their develop
+ment. Both are defined in terms of a particular determination of the
+field of possibilities, by which the meaning of their different moments
+can be explained. Both are violence, fatigue, wear and a constant transformation of energy. But praxis is directly revealed by its end: the
+future determination of the field of possibilities is posited at the outset
+by a projective transcendence (dépassement) of material circumstances,
+that is to say, by a project; at each moment of the action, the agent
+produces himself in a particular posture, accompanied by a specific
+effort in accordance with present givens in the light of the future
+objective. I have called this praxis free for the simple reason that, in a
+given set of circumstances, on the basis of a given need or danger, it
+creates its own law, in the absolute unity of the project (as a mediation
+between the given, past objectivity and the objectification which is to
+be produced). The process is comparable neither to an avalanche or
+flood, nor to an individual action: it actually retains all the characteristics of individual action, since it is constituted by the directed action of
+a multiplicity of individuals; but at the same time these characteristics
+receive in it the modification of passivity because, through the resurrection of the multiple, every here presents itself as a passivity (and
+implies passivity as ubiquity in every here) and activity appears as the
+evanescent elsewhere, that is to say, as the dissolution here of suffered
+inertia in so far as this activity of the Other must, in another elsewhere
+and for Others, be an inertia which has to be dissolved by activity. In
+the group as common praxis, the pledged inertias are the forever
+concealed and veiled mediation between organic activities. In the
+group-process, practical activity, as an ungraspable, fleeting event,
+serves as an organising mediation between suffered inertias (in so far
+as it dissolves them temporarily).
+There cannot be any question of determinism in either case, since
+the development is concrete, and directed, and grows richer with each
+transcendence, and defines itself in terms of a particular future end. In
+the first case, that is to say when the group is manifested in its abstract
+purity as a living organisation, comprehension is quite simply the
+production of the member or of the transcendent (transcendant)
+
+55o Book I/
+spectator by himself in his being-in-the-group: this act is always
+possible because the organic individual is always a common individual.
+This understanding is richer than inter-individual understanding,
+because implicitly or explicitly it reproduces new dialectical structures
+as the pledge. And this pledge is still intelligibility, although it is, in
+everyone, other-freedom, because in itself it is a free operation performed on the fundamental relation of reciprocity. However, translucidity is effaced as a function of complexity: structures, law, and
+terror contain no mystery; these new determinations do not contain
+any opacity, and it is both possible and necessary to produce them
+dialectically in the explanation. However, in so far as they arise on the
+basis of a relation to the third party who I am not - and who, of course,
+appears as the same, here - and in so far as reciprocity bases them on
+inertia pledged by the other, that is to say, on abstract alterity as an inert
+pledge never to be other than myself, the certainty of the structures is
+based on an empty relation, whose other term is active in me in so far as
+it is not me and in so far as it denies itself the possibility of being totally
+itself in isolation. The action is intelligible because it is the same as my
+own; but I consider it in a vacuum because, in the ubiquity of the
+pledge, the same, everywhere, is not myself. We are therefore confronted with a negative limit of transparency rather than with a positive
+limitation (as by some irrational effusing of common manifestations).
+Apart from these two differences (comprehension is richer from one
+point of view, and poorer from another), a common action is intelligible
+to me as organic action, that is to say, through some graspable end
+which totalises us (or the group, if I am situated outside it) negatively.
+The totalisation of a multiplicity, whether this multiplicity is inert,
+living or practical, is effectively a fundamental operation of praxis as
+dialectic. And common praxis in its purity is understood on the model
+of organic praxis, that is to say, as the individual action of a community
+in the light of a common aim. For understanding, common praxis
+appears precisely as a mediation between the practical community and
+the common aim by the singular, just as the action of the individual
+organism is the constant mediation between the common individual
+and the common objectification. There should be nothing surprising in
+this comparison: the common praxis actually reveals itself through an
+organised multiplicity of free, individual undertakings (within the
+limits of functions and powers) and each of these presents itself as
+exemplary, that is to say, as the same as all. Thus the schema of
+intelligibility is not provided by some super-individual undertaking,
+
+The Constituted Dialectic 55г
+but, on the contrary, by the dialectical (and perfectly comprehensible)
+relation between pure, simple, individual action (modified by the
+relations mentioned above) and a common aim. Individual praxis is the
+synthetic mould into which common action must be poured.
+In the second case, the process manifests itself as an object. This does
+not mean that we perceive it as a totality; on the contrary. But, whether
+I am in the community or outside it, the movement which animates it is
+not of the kind that I can produce, as a practical organism; it belongs
+to the category of those which I suffer in so far as I have my beingoutside-myself-in-the-world. In other words, it reveals itself as a
+reality in relation to which I shall always be outside, even if it envelops
+me and leads me on; and which will always be outside me, even if, with
+everyone, I help to produce it. This reality is structured in interiority
+(for, in spite of everything, whether they are inert or isolated, functions
+subsist and function together), and yet it does not have interiority. It
+does not produce in immanence its own determinations: on the
+contrary, it receives them as a perpetual transformation of its inertia.
+But as these received determinations are themselves synthetic and
+internal', since they are always directed to a future end, and they
+represent a constant enrichment and an irreversibility of time, they
+proceed not from analytical Reason or the laws of exteriority but, if
+one is not to prejudge them, from an external law of interiority.
+This law might of course be referred to as destiny, since an irresistible movement draws or impels the ensemble towards a prefigured
+future which realises itself through it. But it is more interesting to see
+it as the celebrated external dialectic which was criticised and rejected
+at the beginning of this essay. Indeed, it is precisely this which appears
+as a transcendent law of interiority, and which is given as the movement of constituent reason and as destiny or fatality. And if one becomes its dupe, it makes 'processes' appear not as temporalisations, but
+as temporalised realities. And it is because of it that all projective and
+teleological structures are reabsorbed by necessity. The process
+develops in accordance with a law from outside which controls it in
+accordance with earlier conditions; but this necessity is still directed,
+the future is still prefigured, and the process retains its finality, though
+it is reversed, passivised and masked by necessity.
+many American sociologists. Lewin's Gestalt is based on a vision
+of praxis as process; there is destiny, totality (as an external law of
+
+552 Book II
+interiority), and the synthetic passive organisation of results. The works
+of Kardiner and Moreno, and the studies of the culturalists are always
+based on the directed, irreversible, and overblown passivity of an
+inert fatality which we have just seen; and the group-process is, from
+one point of view, a constant reality of our own investigation. Its
+characteristics are not their invention; they have not chosen to see only
+it and to study it at the level of its complete unintelligibility.
+This unintelligibility is simply a moment of intelligibility: it is the
+first appearance which certain groups display. Moreover, it becomes
+intelligibility at a level of greater complexity, which we shall soon
+reach, at the level at which the group interferes with the series. For the
+moment, it is better to present process as the permanent obverse of
+common praxis. Its intelligibility, taken on its own, comes from the
+fact that it can be dissolved and reversed; in fact, it simply represents
+the moment where the interior action of the group intensifies so as to
+counteract the multiplicity which begins to erode it. Everywhere reabsorbed by the inert, at every level, it tries to dissolve it everywhere;
+and if it escapes or flees, it is through its own negative character. It
+appears parasitical though it is in reality practical reality itself. And as
+long as the group, with its control mechanisms, remains effective and
+iverst spector process it simply wish to maever, co must remain
+of praxis. As long as one isolates it from the world in order to study it
+in its abstract purity, it will yield its intelligibility without transparency
+as an individual and common practice. When it is considered in the
+world without relation to anything except time and place, it will display
+new aspects: separations, scleroses, useless survivals, local wear,
+stratifications, the inertial force of apparatuses, fragmentation of the
+group, tendencies, antagonisms of function (carefully defined competences cease to be so as praxis develops, because of the need to adapt
+to new circumstances). And the negative praxis of mediating apparatuses which attempt to dissolve these callosities and knots is essentially
+in danger of being simply an ever anterior liquidation, a preparation for
+common action, a restoration of instrumental functions without any
+other positive connection with the praxis of the group in the common
+field.
+Thus, while continuing its real development, the group also appears
+as an object which is constantly being repaired and the teleological
+aspect of the repairing is lost through its very negativity: it appears
+to be subordinated to the inert structures which have to be maintained.
+
+The Constituted Dialectic 553
+The possibility of the group being seen inside out as an enormous,
+passive object, being dragged towards its destiny, and expending its
+energy in internal reactions, absorbing the human conduct of its
+members and subsisting by a sort of inert perseverance is still no more
+than an abstract limit of dialectical intelligibility. It simply shows that
+the group is constructed on the model of free individual action and that
+it produces an organic action without itself being an organism; that it
+is a machine for producing non-mechanical reactions and that inertia -
+like every human product - constitutes both its being and its raison
+d'être. And when we say that, considered as a process, it represents the
+limit of intelligibility, we do not mean that it is unintelligible in the
+depths of its inertia, but, on the contrary, that this fundamental inertia
+must be inserted into its very intelligibility; in other words, that the
+praxis-subject of a pledged community maintains itself in being as a
+process-object, and that this is its own materiality. The materiality of
+the group is suffered in so far as it is forged, and forged in so far as it
+is suffered: the pledge is a function of distance (becoming correspondingly more weak or inflexible); distance (as a reciprocal path which
+cannot be entered without difficulty, and an expenditure of strength
+and wear) is created by the pledge; and in the form of this double
+conditioning of inertias, it makes it possible to indicate the state of the
+group•
+By this, I do not mean either its being, which we shall come to shortly,
+or its constitution (as a structured ensemble: an exogamous system,
+or an administrative apparatus, but simply the relation between
+constituted inertia (suffered and pledged) and praxis, at any given
+moment. It is at this level that explanations will be found of such
+matters as the ageing of one part (that is to say, both the decline in
+recruitment and the stratification of the controlling organs) and the
+effect of scarcity on the possibilities open to a group (scarcity of men -
+empty classes, etc. - being either a national circumstance in the light of
+which the group determines itself, and which determines its density, or
+an event proper to the group itself and to its modalities of recruitment,
+renewal, etc., or an objective relation - both internal and external -
+between the objective of the group and the objectives of other groups
+or serial individuals in the society under consideration). 82 At this
+62. Scarcity of money is crucial and bound up in many ways with scarcity of
+men. (A shortage of money may be due to a shortage of men, and equally, a
+shortage of men may be due to a shortage of money. And this second meaning is
+
+554 Book II
+level, too, one can speak of softness, or, on the other hand, of hardening, of routine or of a frenzy of innovation; at this level it is possible to
+explain the difficulties of a given group in new circumstances, by
+showing, for example, that whereas all its structures were organised
+with a view to a defensive praxis, the conditions of struggle are forcing
+it to go on the offensive, etc. Examples could be multiplied indefinitely;
+it will be sufficient to remark that the state is not inertia as an inert
+foundation, as a sclerosis of structures, etc., but inertia as a condition
+of praxis, to the extent, that is, that it acts as an untranscendable limit
+(in which the suffered and the pledged are mingled and bound together
+in an indissoluble reciprocity) of any action which tries to negate it.
+It is at the level of the state - and we shall return to this - that the group
+is totally conditioned, in a form for which it was not prepared, by the
+practico-inert field which it attempts to modify: a particular action, in
+duplicated: (1) the men do not come because we do not have the means to pay
+them, (2) they come in large numbers but we turn them away because we cannot
+give them work - we are short of weapons or machines.) My reason for not discussing this here is that my purpose is not to study the concrete conditions of the
+'functioning' of a group, which would involve taking a real group at a given real
+time and tracing its historical evolution from beginning to end. But this work,
+however important and desirable it may be, goes well beyond the limits of the
+present problem. Money necessarily depends on the system of production, and on
+the relations which arise on the basis of it. The statement 'there is no historical
+group without money' (such as Labiche's La Cognotte) means: there is no group
+which does not reflect the true condition of man in that moment of History; there
+is no group of exploiters, for example, which did not arise in a milieu of exploitation and signify it in its very organisation, whether the aim of the organisation
+is to set up an amateur orchestra or a circulating library. I also admit that the
+investigation of a group in which there is no scarcity of money is in danger of
+being completely abstract. Nevertheless, a group of exploiters (as long as no
+crisis threatens their property) may be assured as a group that its expenses will be
+automatically covered by fees as long as they stay within reasonable limits: this
+applies to clubs (whether English or American). This amounts to saying that for
+certain groups in the exploiting class - and when the means of the members are
+far in excess of the needs of the group - money is no problem; it does not represent suffered inertia or restriction, but, on the contrary, power. It is for this
+main reason that I have not taken scarcity of money into account - that is to say,
+because, at least in theory and in certain special conditions, it may not be an essential and negative factor. There is another reason: this is that a group cannot exist
+in a pure state and that we shall shortly arrive at the concrete, that is to say, at the
+line of intersection of the group and seriality; and that, at this level, we shall once
+again encounter the real problems of a society, that is to say, precisely its
+system of production.
+
+The Constituted Dialectic 555
+a particular locality, may be aimed at intimidating, at improving wages;
+but it may appear inopportune, instructions may be ignored because
+the dangers which have to be avoided are not yet sufficiently clear and
+above all because the workers in the biggest firms are about to begin
+their paid holidays.
+We seem to be on the point of encountering seriality again. And in
+fact we shall encounter it. But, for the moment, it is sufficient to
+comprehend the group as constituted praxis. In it, through the determination of its members, the contradictory tension which opposes
+totalising praxis to the multiplicity of the agents can be seen arising
+as a dialectical conflict. However, it must be recognised that both the
+dialectical structures and the synthetic movement which produces the
+opposition proceed from organic praxis and that multiplicity is a factor
+of dialectical intelligibility only in so far as it manifests itself as untranscendable inertia, that is to say, as the explosive exteriority of the
+interiorisation of number. The group at work is individual praxis,
+initially exceeded and reified by the seriality of actions, and everywhere
+turning back on the amorphous multiplicity which conditions it in
+order to extract from it the serial, numerical statute, so as to negate it
+as discrete quantity and, in the same movement, to make it, in practical
+unity, a means of achieving the totalising objective. Praxis remains
+fundamentally individual because it is constituted as the same, that is
+to say, as the directed exploitation of multiplicity without parts. In this
+first moment, praxis does not treat this multiplicity differently from the
+inorganic gatherings of the practical field (when it combines them to
+make an instrument), but the crucial difference is that, after the pledged
+agreement, every detailed action (in so far as it is both the same and
+differentiated) turns out to make use of its own multiplicity, which
+becomes an interior feature (power, structure) of the individual unit.
+When, for the second time, this interiorised multiplicity is placed in
+exteriority, this does not mean that it has escaped common control, or
+removed itself from the multiple unity in everyone, so as to reconquer
+its quantity: this would be inconceivable except on the assumption that
+it had a dialectical power of its own. But the suppression of multiple
+inertia and of relations of exteriority has, quite simply, occurred
+practically, that is to say, in and through practical objectification, and
+yet the ontological statute of multiplicity (the plurality of organisms)
+is not affected by this. Under fire, the unit replaces dispersal with
+practical organisation; it encloses its multiplicity in itself. But first the
+unit is counted; and before long, it will count its wounded and its dead;
+
+556 Book II
+and the enemy, if they have observation posts, can always count the
+able-bodied soldiers it still has at its disposal. And this inertia as the
+ontological limit of integration (we shall see that there are other limits)
+is not a theoretical given of some passive knowledge: it is, in fact, the
+objective field of the unforeseen; through it, indeed, the passive action
+of the practico-inert is reintroduced into the free group which is
+organised to combat it; and this passive action reappears not as the
+action of an interior force but as an interior danger of dispersal; this
+pure exteriority is, so to speak, lived in interiority as a permanent
+threat and a permanent possibility of betrayal. Thus multiplicity is
+reactualised in its untranscendable objectivity by the practico-inert and
+the practico-inert is simply the activity of others in so far as it is
+sustained and diverted by inorganic inertia. Thus a passivised form of
+activity reactualises discrete multiplicity, and the group, as dialectical
+praxis, perceives it in its very dispersal as an internal danger, that is to
+say, as a dispersal produced by the unity of an action. (This action is passive activity, seen, through the unity of the praxis which it contradicts,
+as an active negation of this praxis by a directed counter-praxis. It is at
+this level that Manichaean explanations, in terms of English gold, the
+plot of the aristocrats, counter-revolutionary activity, etc., appear.) And
+it is in opposition to this action - which reactualises in itself discrete
+multiplicity as the ubiquity of the possibility of betrayal - that is to say
+against itself, that the organisation reorganises itself, breaking up old
+frameworks and, through mediating organs, etc., trying to reduce the
+passive act of multiplication to a simple, multiple, discrete inertia,
+ineradicable, but negligible from the point of view of action. Thus we
+rediscover organic praxis everywhere, in so far as it acts on its inert
+multiplicity; and this multiplicity manifests itself initially at every level
+of reflection as sustained by passive activity, in so far as it is the point
+at which practico-inert forces act.
+But we have seen that the practico-inert field is in itself a caricature
+of the dialectic and its alienating objectification. Thus, common praxis
+is organised at every level against the anti-dialectic, first by jointly
+settling the objective and the means of attaining it (dissolution of
+seriality), and then by perpetual rearrangements of its structures. And
+the internal life of the group manifests itself through the positive and
+negative consequences of these rearrangements, that is to say, through
+new determinations of the practico-inert in the interiority of the
+organisation and through the practical (and dialectical) reaction of the
+organising praxis to the common consequences of these determina-
+
+The Constituted Dialectic 55J
+tions; but, at the same time, every partial reinteriorisation of the
+multiple is a way of introducing it at another level as inert quantity and
+separating force. In this sense, the hostile group, if there is one, determines the enemy both as praxis and as process. It cannot actually be
+unaware of the enemy praxis as such; it must comprehend and anticipate
+it on the basis of its aim; but at the same time, if it wishes to prevent it
+from being achieved, it must strike the enemy at the level at which
+praxis is also the development of a process (destroying its supply-bases,
+cutting its lines of communication, etc.). And the group which is under
+attack, in so far as it anticipates the enemy, must appear to itself, in
+action, in the form of a process: this is the basis of reflection.
+The complex intelligibility of the constituted dialectic therefore
+arises from the fact that organic praxis, in everyone, works, with all, on
+multiplicity as a practico-inert determination so as to make it an
+instrument allowing action to become common while remaining individual. And, as work is the paradigm of dialectical activity, the group in
+action has to be understood in terms of two kinds of simultaneous
+activities, each of which is a function of the other: dialectical activity in
+immanence (reorganisation of the organisation) and dialectical activity
+as the practical transcendence (dépassement) of the common statute
+towards the objectification of the group (production, struggle, etc.).
+The object which is realised is (if we temporarily ignore the dangers
+of alienation) the expression in transcendence (transcendance) of the
+organisation as a structure of immanence, and conversely. There is,
+therefore, no ontologically common praxis: there are practical individuals constructing their multiplicity as an object on the basis of which
+everyone can perform his task in the free, agreed (and pledged)
+heterogeneity of common function, that is to say, by objectifying
+themselves in the common product as necessary details of the developing totalisation.
+But this does not mean that constituted intelligibility demands the
+dissolution of every common praxis into individual actions: such a
+dissolution would imply, in effect, that there was no intelligibility apart
+from constituent intelligibility; moreover, it would blind us to the real
+metamorphosis which the pledge causes in everyone and to the
+'fraternity-terror' relation as the foundation of all subsequent differentiations. On the contrary, there is such a thing as comprehending
+common praxis as such, that is to say, in so far as it is related to the
+group as a practical subject (in the sense in which one speaks of a
+'subject of History') rather than to the individuals who are integrated
+
+558 Book II
+into it. It is simply a matter of regarding the group as a product of
+human labour - that is to say, as an articulated system - and of seeing
+the common action as a determination in passivity (through the
+constructed instrument) of individual praxis. These precautions will
+make it possible to comprehend group praxis in terms of this reciprocity of inertia: the instrument as a positive and negative image of
+activity, and the final product as a definition-exigency of this same activity
+by the future.
+On this basis it will be possible to grasp the synthetic connection
+between the two permanent actions - reorganisation and production -
+in so far as each is the condition of the other; but the limit and specification of the constituted dialectic and of its intelligibility is that in it
+action is defined and carried by passivity and that the modifications of
+the common action occur in everyone. Originally, therefore, we can
+understand any common praxis because we are always an organic
+individuality which realises a common individual: to exist, to act and
+to comprehend are one and the same. This reveals a schema of universality which we can call constituted dialectical Reason, because it
+governs the practical comprehension of a specific reality which I shall
+call praxis-process, in so far as it is the rule both of its construction and
+of my comprehension (that is to say, of my production of myself, on
+the basis of the common, as a developing praxis-process.) Both as
+object and as subject of the constituted dialectic, the group produces
+itself in complete intelligibility, since it is possible to see how every
+determination in inertia transforms itself, in it and through it, into a
+counter-finality or a counter-structure (and, also, in the best cases, into
+structure and finality; this intelligibility is dialectical because it shows
+us the free, creative development of a practice. But its specificity as a
+constituted dialectic means that freedom is not the free activity of an
+autonomous organism but, from its origins, a conquest of alienation;
+moreover, the specificity of the object demands that freedom be sustained, channelled, and limited, both in interiority and in exteriority,
+by a pledged and suffered inertia which is simply the free determination
+- direct and indirect - of the field of passivity.
+The whole of this practical development produces undeniable
+results; in other words, it constitutes the first abstract determination of
+History as such - in relation either to the taking of the Bastille or to the
+silk-weavers' revolt; and these results - though directly susceptible to
+alienation, as we shall see - represent in reality the objectification of a
+community as such. In other words, the corstituted dialectic, as the
+
+The Constituted Dialectic 55g
+biquity of the same praxis penetrated with inertia, transcends itself •
+n the case of a practical success - in its result: the objectincation reall
+is common, to the extent that the objective was common. But as an
+organising, effective praxis, the untranscendable limit which it encounters is that of organic, practical individuality, precisely because
+this constitutes it and because, as a constituent dialectic, it is the
+regulatory schema and untranscendable limit of the constituted
+It is at this level, I think, that it is possible to grasp the strange
+circular conflict, where all synthesis is impossible, which is the untranscendable contradiction of History: the opposition and identity of
+the individual and the common. I would like to illustrate this conflict
+and this lack of distinction by means of an example. The one I have
+chosen is certainly neither pure nor abstract and it scarcely concerns
+the group (at least as homogeneity), because it was conditioned by the
+capitalist mode of production and the class struggle, and it occurred
+towards the end of the nineteenth century, on the eve of the second
+industrial revolution. But this has very little bearing on the formal
+researches which we are conducting. What I wish to show, in effect, is
+the identity of individual action and group action, of group action and
+ne the group and of machine, gait presa thie regulatore dri
+of the group and of machinery,
+opposition between the individual and the machine.
+5
+Taylorism
+Taylor was without any doubt the first of what we now call organisationmen. "s His aim was to increase output by eliminating wasted time. If a
+worker's task comprised five successive operations, then five operators,
+each performing one of these operations five times, would take up less
+time than five workers each performing one complete action. The
+ingenuity of the organiser here consists in replacing temporalisation by
+passive temporality. An action is a temporalising praxis. And, in a way,
+every elementary operation is also temporalised (in fact, it too is an
+03. In English in original. [Ed.]
+
+560
+Book //
+action, complete in its realisation, and incomplete in the common signification of its result). But what makes the living totality of the action
+disappear is that the five operations are separated both spatially and (at
+least) by a time-lag which is the time of waiting. (For operation z to
+begin, it is necessary and sufficient that operation I should once have
+taken place.) Thus every operation is passive in relation to the succeeding one, because it does not form part of the same temporal
+development, but each is separated from the other by a determination
+of time (and, incidentally, of space) through the negative exteriority of
+inertia. Moreover, every operation, in itself, in so far as it has been
+timed and in so far as its 'normal' duration has been established by
+means of a determination of exterior time (that is to say, of the nondialectical time of inorganic materiality, in so far as it is defined by
+specific practices of measurement), reintegrates a passivity into its free,
+practical realisation. Instead of being conditioned by the result which
+had to be achieved, and by the free organism in action, it temporalises
+itself dialectically by preserving, as its internal ossature, the passive
+temporality defined by the workshop clock.
+Thus the action is now constituted by five practices which are determined by the interiorisation of a passivity and separated by the passive
+flow of time (that is to say, by the abstract ossature of the time of
+Others: employers, other workers, customers, etc.). It disappears as
+an organic action; and, in isolated - and differentiated - work everyone
+is thereby disqualified as an individual practical agent: his operation is
+no longer an action. But at the same time he still becomes a common
+individual (but in alienation - this goes beyond the cases considered
+above) in so far as his operation depends on the first two, for example,
+and conditions the other two at a distance. In so far as he lives his
+labour and his solidarity as a member, with his comrades, of an
+exploited class, this interdependence may become power and function
+(but this is not very relevant here). In any case, clipped and mutilated
+and torn from his hands and muscles by an exterior rhythm, the operation is still his practical operation and, despite its determination in
+inertia, it realises itself dialectically through him, if only at the most
+elementary level. The important point is that the skilled job, destroyed
+by Taylor, expropriated from skilled workers and distributed to the
+four corners of the factory, regains objectivity in its totality as a
+manufactured product of five separate workers. The only difference is
+quantitative, so it must be taken as a simple determination of exteriority: five specialised workers, each performing a single unchanging
+
+The Constituted Dialectic 56г
+operation, produce n objects in a given period of time, while five
+skilled workers each performing the whole task from beginning to end
+will produce n-x. The reification of work is undeniable; it is simply a
+consequence of exploitation. What is striking is that this reified labour,
+in so far as it is the praxis of everyone, regains its synthetic character as
+a free determination of the practical field in inorganic matter. If we
+know that a particular product can, a priori (and given a certain level of
+technique), be made either by a single skilled worker, with years of
+apprenticeship, or by five unskilled workers, who have had apprenticeships of only a few months, there is no way of telling, without some
+other source of information, whether a given sample of the product
+was constituted by a multiplicity of actions, external to one another and
+determined in passivity, or by a single totalising process.
+This first moment of the example shows the absolute homogeneity
+between a dialectical action which composes itself, and an alienated,
+decomposed operation, between free temporalisation and expropriated
+temporality. This homogeneity does not manifest itself in the concrete
+moment of labour - which is very different in the two cases - but in the
+synthesis of objectification which is effected in the inertia of the product. The inorganic product, in effect, has this double character: by
+its passivity, it sustains but inverts the synthetic action which is
+inscribed in it; and endows it with a hidden exteriority; by its false
+unity, it holds together, and integrates into a single seal, various
+different operations, coming from different points in time and space;
+in it, the unity of a praxis becomes a false unity, and this false unity
+becomes a false integration, outside themselves, of an objective diversity of operations.
+This observation suggests another: no action is a priori incapable of
+being decomposed into several operations; these operations are
+passivised and can be grasped by analytical Reason. And some of them,
+such as the ossified structures of the group, can become the object of
+an ordinal mathematics. No analytical treatment of these operations is
+even conceivable if the synthetic point of view of the objective totality
+is not retained, that is to say, if they are not integrated in advance in the
+produced object as their totalisation: in the same way, analytical
+Reason can conceive a universal combinatory of functions in a given
+group; it will have the concrete ability to construct it only in so far as
+it is a special case of dialectical Reason, that is to say, a function produced, directed and controlled by it. There is no action so complex that
+it cannot be decomposed, dismembered, transformed, and infinitely
+
+562 Book II
+varied by an 'electronic brain'; it would be impossible to construct or
+use an 'electronic brain' except within the perspective of a dialectical
+praxis of which the operations under consideration were merely a
+moment.
+But it should be remembered that the deskilling brought about by
+Taylorism is soon followed by a second moment: that of specialised
+machines. For in so far as each operation becomes mechanical, each
+machine can perform an operation. And of course if this operation is
+performed by a man, it will be praxis; but this is because the practical
+organism has no reality apart trom organic praxis and because it
+realises everything it does in praxis. By itself the operation already has
+no specific character. Piling bricks into a truck is a human action if it is
+done by a man and a mechanical action if entrusted to a machine.
+Specialisation passes from man to machine, and a worker who is tied
+to his machine after an apprenticeship of a few weeks, sometimes a few
+days, is aware of his interchangeability. Finally, through automation,
+the individual operation, combined with all the others, becomes the task
+of the machine or of the complex of machines; in the end, human action
+is completely absorbed and re-exteriorised by the passive instrument.
+However, the product does not change, or at least not much: it presents
+itself in the synthetic unity of an instrument which is constructed by
+men, and appropriated by them for the needs and ends of other men.
+Its inert unity reflects to the consumer the creative power of human
+labour. And rightly so: for automation itself presupposes an analytical
+Reason which is sustained and guided, both in the inventor and in the
+producer, by a dialectical Reason; and also because the new machines,
+far from eliminating human tasks, merely distribute them differently.
+But there is still the objective interchangeability, as it can be observed
+in the product, of individual praxis, of the passive addition of common
+operations, of production by specialised machines and of automatic
+machines as a substitute for practical autonomy. From our point of
+view, this at least means that the original praxis of the organism
+serves as a model equally for machines and for groups. Constantly
+decomposable, and constantly deskilled, it remains untranscendable,
+and there is no other constituent schema, whatever the type of efficiency being sought. In automation, however, praxis becomes pure
+process, and, with laylorism,
+races, and, sait ail bum they alean cure lousine level of esc
+final objectification; they must be regarded as infra-transformations
+which leave the goal and the distant ends unchanged as determinations
+
+The Constituted Dialectic 563
+of the field of possibilities. The individual schema contains within itself
+everything that comes to man through man (with the exception of
+seriality); it is the practical category par excellence. And it is in it, and
+through its mediation, that the equivalence between the specialised
+group and the automatic machine can be affirmed.
+But, in addition, this example also shows that this practical category
+guides the analysis of tasks and the construction of instruments, but
+that it is necessarily negated by this analysis or by this construction -
+and also by the work of the pledged group on itself - in so far as neither
+the group, nor the addition of tasks, nor automation can of themselves
+realise the immediate integration of an action which gives itself its own
+rules by revealing them as exigencies in the object. Thus, in the case
+which concerns us here - and the only one which is relevant to the
+dialectic - the group both seeks and negates in its being the only translucid unity of active integration, that is to say, the unity of which the
+only example is the organism. It both seeks this unity and negates it,
+by the very means which ought to establish it, and at the same time it
+realises it by this very means in its objectification (construction, discovery, victory). Now this practical, dialectical, unity which was the
+group and which causes it to negate it in its very effort at integration, is
+simply what we have elsewhere called existence. The final problem of
+intelligibility arises on this basis: what must a group be in its being in
+order to negate existence in and of itself and in order to realise its own
+common ends in the object as the amplification of ends which have been
+freely posited by practical organisms as free dialectical existences?
+
+The Unity of the Group as
+Other: the Militant
+The group derives its unity from outside through others,
+and in this initial form its unity exists as other
+A group, as the erosion of a seriality, the practical unity of a developing
+objectification, and the manifestation, immediately suffered by the other,
+of a specific (positive or negative) efficacy, determines a negative,
+practical totality in external seriality: the totality of the non-grouped.
+And the not-being-grouped of every Other is the common relation of
+serial individuals to the grouping totalisation and to every non-grouped
+Other (as such) within the series. In other words, the Other is also
+determined, as Other, as a common individual. Obviously only the
+particular circumstances can determine, for a given historical group,
+whether the totality induced in seriality is just an abstract signification
+or whether the relation between the serial non-grouped and the grouped
+is a practical, concrete relation. The practical constitution of pigeonfancying or numismatics clubs, if it occasions any negative unity
+among the non-grouped, does so in a very abstract way. This is a case
+of a logical determination. On the other hand, the organised constitution of a fascist militia which specialises in surprise attacks may,
+according to circumstances, be the occasion of the negative unity of the
+unarmed population (fear), or even of positive anti-fascist regroupments.
+But, above all, when an institutionalised or quasi-institutionalised
+ensemble (in a few pages we shall see how the group leads to the
+institution) appears to have some public utility (given a more or less
+developed division of labour, where it takes on a given task, so relieving Others of it in so far as they are serial), it will produce a totality
+of dependence in the serial flight of the Other; in other words, it will
+
+The Unicy of the Group as Other
+565
+determine its consumers. These consumers may remain in a state of
+recurrence (the customers of the post office, for example) or else -
+in circumstances which we have already described - the inducing
+group may occasion an induced group (the state's quasi-monopoly
+of education induces a Parents' Association corresponding to the
+practical community of secondary education).
+In considering this new practical category, that of the non-grouped
+practically engendered by the group, we must recognise that it can take
+various concrete forms: the volunteers who march past with their
+arms, after the first victories of an insurrection, and who display themselves to the people who have not been fighting (but who, for the most
+part, support them) as 'those who defend, or liberate them', produce a
+lateral totalisation whose structure actually involves other groups: "the
+king's army'
+', or 'the bandits", are in fact the true inducing groups,
+having already totalised the population of a district or town (by
+attempting extermination). On the basis of this inducement, a group
+constitutes itself on seriality. But the passive ensemble (women,
+children, etc.) turns out to be designated by a double contradictory
+praxis: the enemy (at least this is the aim which is interiorised by the
+concrete certainty of the people, which, indeed, is always true - in a sense
+that will become clear later) totalises through a vacuum: the whole town
+will be razed to the ground; the group which resists the enemy totalises
+by the negation of a negation. But at the same time, as a totalising negation occasioned by and resisting the external negation, it reconstitutes
+the negative totality of the non-combatants into a seriality of impotence, in opposition to the exterminators; they will be those who are
+defended, but their relation within the town will still be either an inert
+gathering or molecular isolation (both these statutes exist, one when
+the housewife - whose husband is on the ramparts or the fortifications -
+is queueing for food, and the other when she tries, in her home, to
+preserve her family in conditions which become more difficult day by
+day). However, this seriality, haunted by a passive; induced unity, is
+thereby subject to a certain modification: the proof of this is that, if
+circumstances deteriorate, a new section of the population may be
+incorporated into the defence group and other sections may be
+organised to back up the first (a health committee, a supply comhie, lo, the in til liy of the noncom, cranes is he unity ef,
+as socialised impotence, amounts to the beginnings of a recognition of
+recurrence and of alterity.
+
+56G Book II
+The post office, on the other hand, as a public service which functions smoothly and permanently, initially constitutes its customers as a
+serial exigency, although its complex, totalising work becomes, for the
+"public', a common interest, that is to say, the basic possibility of
+totalising itself so as to protect or control the functioning of this
+organised group. In any case, whatever the induced relation, as a
+tension between seriality and unification, may be, the totalisation of the
+group is an inducer for the social ensemble (which, for the moment, we
+are treating as a set of groups and serialities). It is so as a purely formal
+determination, in so far as the group leaves the unity of the nongrouped outside itself by a negative totalisation; and it is so above all
+as a practical determination in so far as this same group has practical
+relations with the non-group; and lastly it is so - as we shall see later -
+in so far as the group - on the basis of a certain social volume, which
+varies according to circumstances - expresses in itself the society as a
+whole, in the form of a totalisation. Through this totalising relation of
+transcendent (transcendante) multiplicity, the group realises itself as
+the first historical mediation between the practico-inert and practical
+freedom as sociality. But it is not from this point of view that it
+concerns us at present. We are describing its effect on seriality only in
+order to explain how modified seriality reacts on the community which
+modifies it.
+Indeed, from the moment in which the group becomes a mediation
+between the non-grouped, they become - either in the individuality of
+each, or in the alterity of the collective, or in an initial developing
+totalisation - a mediation between the members or the sub-groups of
+the community. If I am a postal clerk, with the task of registering
+postal orders or parcels, my relation to my bosses passes through the
+mediation of others, of those who queue in front of my counter
+(seriality). And each of these individuals perceives the totalisation of
+the group as a completed, fully functioning totality; this totality is
+constituted, of course, as a totalisation of functions and instruments;
+and the serial individual's serial thought expires in the practico-inert
+field and implicitly conceives common individuals as instruments, and
+inorganic instruments as living functions, as absolutely equivalent.
+When a customer hands a registered parcel to a post-office clerk, or
+not an expres leer he epeal be for sue letter reared
+notion an operation which begins,
+tween men (though not necessarily with a human relation) and, in the
+other case, with a relation to inorganic instruments. But in both cases
+
+The Unity of the Group as Other 56J
+the entire operation presupposes both instruments and men to use them
+in a particular perspective. And for the customer the practical character
+of the juridical exigency is that the user makes no distinction between
+the instruments and the men. Ought we to say that in this respect he is
+conditioned by his practico-inert field! The answer is both yes and no:
+his practico-inert thought, as an interiorisation of his impotence,
+certainly encourages him to perceive the group as a unity which seals
+an inorganic passivity. But, on the other hand, his relation as a user
+to the common instrument and to the common individual is a free
+juridical relation; 4 and, from this point of view, his individual operation
+is narrowly confined within the operation of the clerk as a common
+individual: the clerk reads, corrects, or recopies the forms which the
+customer fills in in order to send his parcel, etc.; a reciprocity is established which qualifies him from a certain point of view as common (a
+common beneficiary and a common starting-point, that is to say,
+communised by the common aspect of the operation, its pledged
+inertia becoming its own past guaranteed by the pledge of the others
+and by a form or receipt which is handed to him).
+There is, therefore, a certain practical homogeneity between the
+customer and the clerk, to precisely the extent that the initial operation
+creates a practical reciprocity across the real limits of the group (and
+material ones, in the inorganic sense: for instance, the counter) and by
+connecting the exteriority of the customer to the interiority of the
+clerk. Now, from the point of view of this practical homogeneity (that
+is to say, from the free point of view of pledged faith), the customer
+will discover, as such, the active unity of men and instruments in the
+'service'. On this occasion unity is created in another sense, as the
+dissolution of instrumentality and multiplicity in the act. This is what
+one feels whenever one performs one of those everyday actions which
+involve a public service: posting a letter, in one sense, for a particular
+Parisian, is to put it in his uncle's letter-box in Marseilles, or, in other
+words, to put it into a hollow pipe which sucks it up like a vacuum
+cleaner and finally deposits it on the table of the addressee; and it is
+SO - since circumstances vary, for example one may learn that
+in any other form.
+
+568 Book II
+particular letter-box was closed in a particular part of Paris without the
+users being told and that hundreds of letters therefore went astray -
+to entrust an important message to the many hands of a free, pledged,
+but fallible organisation. The post office is my instrument, it is an extension of my arm, like a cane, a spade or a broom, or it is a free, pledged
+action which gives me a power but which may also fail me. What is
+involved here is not the two opposed terms of a dilemma, but rather
+two limits between which there are many possible intermediaries. And,
+in a sense we encounter once again process and praxis as we defined
+them above.
+However, precisely to the extent that the original relation is a power
+(of the customer over the group, or of the organised group over the
+inorganic gathering), those who are not grouped still recognise both
+aspects (or the synthesis of them) on the basis of a pledged inertia
+which constitutes for their practice the interior of the group. Whether
+instrument or organisation, the group must be responsive to the
+exigency of the customer (or the massified individual to the exigency
+of the group): if the instrument alone is visible (the plane for its
+passengers), it must function as a free common function; and if men
+appear in their mediated inertia, they must respond to the exigency.
+This second freedom is not transparent, individual praxis; it is common
+freedom, determined by its limits, grasped by a freedom which is
+common to every user (despite its preserved seriality). And this common
+freedom defines the character of the common praxis for the customer in
+so far as it is expressed by a tension which affects the whole group (the
+whole postal system and the whole of France is penetrated by the
+pledged praxis which carries a letter from Lille to Nice). Thus the
+Other (the customer) posits the grouped totality as a practical object
+whose exis is pledged freedom; he posits this totality as producing
+totalising actions and as manifesting itself as a whole in these practical
+expressions of itself. At the same time, the customer posits the individuals who compose it (and the instruments which are in them) as
+inessential particularities. Or rather: as he proceeds from need to th
+practical power which the group confers on him, and from this powe
+to the apparatuses which the group produces to give him satisfaction, he
+sees each person (as a common individual) as an a posteriori specification produced by the group in the course of its development. And this
+is not untrue, for the common individual is a product of the pledge;
+but at the same time the organic individual remains indeterminate for
+him: he sees the clerk as a human generality specified and signified by
+
+The Unity of the Group as Other 569
+the total group and does not (or not necessarily: in fact, very rarely)
+know the details of the individual and his free praxis. He does not see
+this praxis as an individual mediation between function and concrete
+result, but as the free production of a preliminary operation by the
+group through an individual organ: the phrases and letters which
+correspond to the recording of a number of parcels, and which are
+specified in contact with the individual parcel which is to be recorded,
+are traced as the group-praxis through the otherwise indistinguishable
+hands of these particular clerks. Generally speaking, individuality will
+be grasped as pure negativity (clumsiness, slowness, lack of intelligence
+or courtesy), in short as the brute resistance of matter to freedom.
+Furthermore, this is another case of a reciprocity (usually based on
+scarcity, and particularly on the scarcity of time, for in the moment at
+which the operation-exigency of the customer constitutes me as an
+inessential product of the community and treats function, in me, as an
+essential line of force of the totality as such, I, as the clerk, treat him as
+an interchangeable member of a series, who exists for me only as a
+support of a precise, general exigency (or as an inessential member
+produced by a grouped totality: for example, for me, as a teacher, or a
+representative of the Parents' Association). Of course the relations
+between the administrator and the customer can become individualised:
+this happens, for example, if the reciprocal operations take place
+frequently. But this individualisation reveals a free reciprocity with no
+practical relation to their practical, functional bonds.
+Thus by the mere juridical exigency of the customer, the user, etc.,
+the Other dissolves me into my group as a part into the totality and
+dissolves my free practice into the juridical freedom of common praxis.
+He then constitutes this totality, which digests and transforms external
+solicitations, and responds to it with a totalising and totalised operation
+as a being in interiority. In effect, the structure of the group, which must
+correspond to the power of the user, cannot be anything but pledged
+inertia, and consequently Being - but Being conceived as a norm (as the
+counterpart to a power). Thus, from the outset, we see the identification
+by the Other of Being and of having-to-be and this radical identity will
+constitute for the Other the ontological statute of the organised group.
+But this required-being is constituted through certain relations of interiority, since the customer understands the group, through his own
+idion, as ay ineva operation deined by is aim to by che ted or
+the Other, Being as pledged inertia arises in the form of totality (or, so
+
+570 Book /I
+to speak, the totality-object can exist only if inorganic inertia, seen as
+an invariable being, sustains it), but this inert totality is structured in
+interiority. So its inert being is produced in interiority as a norm of
+common freedom. On the basis of this norm, the totality produces its
+differentiations not as totalising efforts, but as diverse expressions of the
+totalised whole. The being of the whole, lived in interiority, becomes a
+normative scheme which occasions the production of total operations,
+and these operations, as interiorised practices, produce their own men and
+instruments. For the user, the public service is an object with an interior,
+that is to say, an internal miliel with its own tension, its index of refraction,
+its web, its spatio-temporal directions, its structures and its reflexivity.
+What is involved is, therefore, what might be called practical intersubjectivity as a milieu of the totalised totality. And this intersubjectivity does
+not relate to any abstract or "collective' consciousness: it is quite simply
+the reflexive structure of the group as seen by the user.
+Now the member of the group, that is to say, the common individual,
+the clerk, realises himself practically in the reciprocal operation which
+unites him to the customer or user as an inessential product of reflexive
+intersubjectivity: this means quite simply that the determination of
+inessentiality comes upon him on the basis of the Other and that he has
+to assume it through his operation itself. In short, I produce myself
+through the Other and for myself as an inessential, passing mode of the
+intersubjectivity of my group in so far as I operate with and on the
+Other on behalf of this group. And in the practice itself I perceive
+myself as an objective expression for the other of a totality, whereas the
+internal movement of the community which is not mediated by
+strangers is given reflexively as a simple developing totalisation.
+This will appear still more clearly when the other mediators between
+the members of the group become for each member, not only through
+their actions but also through their material density, the real factor of his
+separation, of his isolation; when their resistance (either inert and serial
+or organised) conditions the possibilities of his communicating with
+his comrades in the group. This happens very often: however close the
+internal bonds may be, it is rare for a group to be constantly actualised,
+that is to say, gathered together in its entirety in a particular place.
+Besides, in many cases, these plenary meetings are a priori impossible
+for example, the sheer size of the group may preclude any real gathering; political parties hold conferences in which each individual is the
+representative of several others. Thus each member of the group is
+temporarily or permanently set apart from the other members by the
+
+The Unity of the Group as Other
+5]ł
+forest of humanity. For example, a militant in a non-underground
+party is constituted - as a common individual - by his fidelities (the
+pledge) and by his practical functions (which assign him a given place
+of residence in a particular town). But at the same time the forest of
+humanity which surrounds him is, like Macbeth's, active and alive. Its
+density is material and practical: the human environment treats him
+(whether with favour, contempt, hostility, trust or mistrust, etc.) as a
+party militant. That is to say, the serial or common practice of the
+Others constitutes him on the basis of the political and social programme, of the present action and of the past history of his party. His
+individual practice - with its style and colour, its skill or incompetence,
+etc. - intervenes only a posteriori and lacks efficacity and therefore
+reality except within a very narrow framework (for example, in
+relationships with other militants or sympathisers or with a layer of
+sympathisers who hesitate to join). But in the first instance the overt
+militant is constituted in his being as a normative inertia in so far as, in
+a period of political tension, for example, the positions of Others are
+adopted, harden, and become unshakeable.
+However, it would be a mistake to think that these attitudes of trust
+or hostility are directed towards him as a particular Communist, for
+example, or a particular Socialist. The force or violence of these
+practices of themselves signify that they are directed at the Party
+through any inessential individual. When fascist terrorism or lynchings are directed against one Communist, in sole charge of some office,
+it is to the Communist that they are directed: that is to say, they are
+directed at the Party as a present and essential totality through an
+inessential individual whom they never consider in his individuality.
+But, to take a simpler and more everyday case, the political discussions
+between a given opponent or enemy and a particular militant are not
+aimed at convincing him, but at refuting the Party in his person; and
+the interlocutor systematically ignores the personal limitations of the
+individual (slowness, lack of education, lack of aggression, or poor
+projection: someone else might have given a better answer, or routed
+the enemy): in any case, his reactions are those of the group as a
+totality which is embodied in each of its temporary modalities. Conversely, the militant finds himself constrained by this practical separation, to which he is subjected by the human environment, to interiorise
+this relation between the inessential and the essential and between the
+part and the whole. He constitutes himself as a signifier to precisely the
+extent that he appears to all as signified. In effect, it becomes extremely
+
+572 Book II
+important for the common practice that it is impossible either to confound his free individual practice with the praxis of the Party as such,
+or to judge the latter in terms of the former. And since the ordinary
+manoeuvres of the entourage consist either in penetrating the acquired
+characteristics of the individual without seeing them in order to go
+straight to the Party as his sole profound reality or, on the other hand,
+in taking individual characteristics, and isolated weaknesses, and
+making them into the common reaction of the political group as a
+totality, the isolated militant tries to dissolve personal characteristics in
+himself so as to make himself merely the local presence of the Party in
+totality. It is irrelevant that the militant is fair-haired, and has a
+stammer, or that he is intelligent or stupid: he makes himself for all
+what all make him, namely, the non-specified embodiment of a centralised mass revolutionary Party, etc., which gets six million votes at
+each election and which takes up and elaborates the exigencies of its
+electors and members. He becomes exigency-being, accusation-being;
+and he learns the common thought both as a determination of memory
+and as a pledge, in such a way as to make certain that this normative
+inertia will be reproduced in him as the same as in all the other mouths
+of the Party. 65
+But this transformation, which happens concretely under the pressure of the Others, is not an individual initiative: it expresses what the
+group - through its organs of mediation, liaison and direction, and
+through each particular sub-group (cells, committees, or sections,
+whatever they may be called) - requires of each of its members in so far
+as they are all isolated and besieged. However, the formal rigidity of
+the identification with the hole is accompanied by complete confusion
+as to its material content. In so far as he has imprinted certain functional
+relations on himself, the militant has at his disposal an ideology which
+enables him always to take stock of the situation and which, through
+his mouth, gives the common interpretation of the historical situation
+by the militant totality as a determination of discourse. 66
+65. This is not a stratification of discourse in memory, but a stratification of
+the relations which determine discourse.
+66. This interpretation will have been devised by leaders in a specific subgroup, taking account of all the circumstances and, amongst other things, of the
+implicit exigencies of the practical community. These leaders may be perfectly
+competent; they may have public confidence and they may deserve it. But
+nothing can prevent a radical transformation when a militant who is isolated (or
+in an embattled minority) takes up - as a thought produced by the totality of the
+
+The Unity of the Group as Other
+573
+But, at the same time, individuals - through the indefinite recurrence
+crine a divert energe he signifest alich he giatin his
+practice and to the course of things, both here and for every same in
+every other here. Refracted by a dark density, bristling with projects
+and actions which elude him, these significations become indeterminate
+objects or - and this comes to the same thing - objects with thousands,
+or hundreds of thousands, of facets. When the militant publicly reaffirms the abstract, schematic determination of discourse, he immediately reveals, to everyone, the Party as a group-totality. But it
+remains schematic, and the more it identifies him with the group, the
+more it cuts him off from reality. It should be clear that what we are
+discussing here is not the political difficulties of any particular situation:
+I am simply trying to show that the forest of humanity - as materiality
+and as the praxis of isolation - must, for the militant, be interiorised as
+the ubiquity of the group. But we have seen that this ubiquity - which,
+despite the pledge and the heterogeneity produced, remains fluid as
+long as the relations of common individuals are direct - freezes and
+ossifies as soon as it is affirmed in opposition to the practice of the nongrouped. At the moment in which the group as a totality-object
+becomes an abstract schematisation for the militant, he becomes unable
+to comprehend either his own organic praxis, or that of the others, or
+the concrete course of events. But, at the same time, he refers to what
+he realises as his common reality constantly and for his every decision,
+that is to say, to the Party as a normative inertia and a completed
+totality, as pure objectivity and inter-subjectivity (that is to say,
+possessing an interiority), in short, as a substance which is total
+everywhere and which recreates its own instructions everywhere.
+But it should not be forgotten that this new constitution comes to
+the member of the group through Others. This means that it arises in the
+milieu of alterity and that he adopts it in accordance with his functional
+relations to the non-grouped. Thus this structure, as the practical
+instrument of his operations, represents in everyone his Being in the
+milieu of the Other and the practical reinteriorisation of the Other-
+Party', that is to say, as a totally expressive exis of this totality - a practical decision, taken by a few common individuals (in the name of all in virtue of their
+powers, of course) and reinteriorised in a practical movement of reorganisation
+by every common individual, that is to say, by each inessential embodiment of
+
+574 Book II
+Being of the group. For it is in its objectivity for the Other that the
+group can superficially appear as a totality. 87 And it is clear that in itself,
+as an internal relation, it becomes a totalisation. On the other hand, the
+structure of embodiment (the inessentiality of the individual, and the
+present essentiality of the whole) is not lived by the organised member
+for and in itself; he does not grasp it in the reflexive unity of an organising action which has the totalisation of the group as its direct objective:
+he produces it through the mediation of the Other as the controlling
+schema of his relations to the Other. Thus it is important to recognise
+that the practical and theoretical object, for the person in the group, is
+the Other and that he does not grasp his own reality as an inessential
+embodiment except as an implicit rule of action and as a signification
+which is discovered and projected onto the Other in the course of the
+antagonistic reciprocity of combat or of argument. This univocal relation to the Party or to the Group (his being-in-the-group being lived
+as the dissolution of the part in favour of the whole) can never be
+either the aim of his action or the object of any intuitive, practical
+certainty. Nor is it ever explicitly formulated, unless it is first formulated by others. It is an empty knowledge, and also an inertia which is
+received and suffered, but interiorised into an abstract pledge and reexteriorised into stereotyped actions (or rather actions whose relational
+structures tend to be stereotyped) and a sort of regressive intentionality aimed at relating every particular circumstance, as a pure accident,
+to the totality as a substance which digests and dissolves all concrete
+reality (as inessential). And, in a way, if one is careful to avoid equivocations, one can say that the praxis of the militant - when he is connected to other third parties by the mediation of the forest of humanity
+- brings a certain alienation to the group; this is because he experiences, as a bond of interiority to the totalising organisation, a relation
+of exteriority to the group-object (as an exterior object) which is
+67. It is worth recalling what was said above: that any grasp of a group in the
+practical field is a totalisation by the individual who is not grouped, and that this
+totalisation formally engenders a totality-object. But if the group is given in its
+actual operation, then, as we have seen, this totality proclaims itself as an appearance in so far as it makes it possible to perceive the object as a totalisation independent of the individual synthesis. The totality remains as what calls a halt both
+to investigation and to praxis when the group gets too large, too ramified, or too
+complex to offer itself in its entirety. Thus the sub-groups which are present,
+though they are totalisations, appear as inert embodiments of a totality which is
+referred to in a vacuum.
+
+The Unity of the Group as Other 5J5
+precisely the relation of the Other to the inert totality which he has
+reinteriorised as a defence.
+Nevertheless, he is constituted by a complex relation, composed of
+two opposite mediations: the Other's mediation between the common
+individual and the group-object; and the group-object's mediation
+between the common individual as an agent and the Uther as the object
+of his action. And the abstract meaning of this relation - as an empty,
+inert, and formal intention - is still fundamental: going back through
+the everyday practices of the agent in relation to pledged inertia, this
+relation indicates the immanence of the individual in the intersubjective
+totality, that is to say, the dissolution of the mode into the substance
+or, in other words, the fusion of individual organisms into a hyperorganism, as the future which has to be realised once the group as such
+is fully assembled.
+
+6
+In the interiority of the group, the movement of mediated reciprocity
+constitutes the unity of the practical community as a perpetual
+detotalisation engendered by the totalising movement
+Mediated Reciprocity in the Group
+When, at a Party conference or demonstration, the militant is put back
+into the midst of the group, or when the clerk, ceasing to communicate
+with his colleagues through the medium of the customers, turns back
+to them and rediscovers the direct bonds of the organisation, their
+expectations are disappointed and their relation to all is metamorphosed: for they rediscover the real milieu of immanence, to precisely
+the extent that it is impossible for them to dissolve into it; and, to
+precisely the extent that alienation to the group-object disappears with
+the Other, they rediscover a community which could never become a
+totality-subject. At this level, in effect, where the organisation takes
+itself as an immediate objective in the light of a transcendent aim,
+being-in-the-group is no longer, for everyone, mediated over there by
+the Other; instead it is mediated here by the same (by the negated
+multiplicity of every same). It would be pointless here to enumerate and
+describe the intermediate mediations which actually give the being-ofthe-group its inconceivable complexity: for example, I may, through
+the absent, abstract Other, communicate with the same (avec les
+mêmes) in a concrete, reciprocal relation (there have been complaints
+about a particular clerk and he has to explain his behaviour, etc.). It
+will be sufficient to contrast the two extreme, opposed relations: on the
+one hand, alienation to the totality and the false bond of interiority
+which constitutes the group through everyone as an inter-subjective
+substance whose Being is defined both by inertia and by having to be
+(le devoir-être); and on the other hand, the relation of true interiority
+
+through mediated reciprocity, the practical recognition of functions, of
+sub-groups and of individuals through totalising reorganisation.
+But if we examine this being-of-the-group in immanence more
+closely, we will discover a new statute of intelligibility. We have seen
+that organisations are based on a pledge. Everyone pledges himself to
+remain the same. This pledge occasions a first contradiction in that it
+becomes the basis of the heterogeneity of functions. And this contradiction produces another, since it is free individual praxis which,
+through individual action, realises the detail of the common objectification. Thus the urgency of danger and of need is reflected not only in
+'fraternity-terror,
+, as a relation of indissolubility and violence, but also
+in more complex structures whose necessary effect is to allay terror and
+mask fraternity. This would be unimportant; but as we have seen the
+fundamental integration of the third party into the group is performed
+through mediated reciprocity. And by fundamental integration, we
+mean both the individual's coming-to-the-group (as the initial movement
+of grouping) and the permanent act of totalisation which is carried out
+by and for everyone in various forms and through the complex evolution of the group in action. Now, this mediated reciprocity, despite
+mediation, retains its original structure as a detotalised duality (with
+a double centre); and this detotalised duality manifests itself here,
+within the movement of integration, and through a temporal dislocation of the totalisation, as reciprocal praxis. Indeed, when describing
+the fused group, we noted the main features of the regulatory third
+party, in particular what we called his relation of immanence-transcendence to the group of which he was a part. Let us return to this
+point, now that we are more familiar with common structures, and
+describe it more fully. And, in order to concentrate on one example, let
+us imagine that two individuals, A and B, in the course of a common
+action, totalise themselves reciprocally, both with and in the group,
+through mediated reciprocity.
+This totalisation is practical. We are not concerned here with ritual
+recognitions, which have no objective aim other than to preserve the
+bonds of interiority; we are concerned with reciprocities which are
+already organised and functional: the concrete relation between two
+powers which come together in order to produce a given result in the
+objective. In this sense, every function integrates the other into the
+differentiated totalisation through their heterogeneity seen as reciprocal. The regulatory act performed by A - that is to say, his practical
+behaviour as defined by the common individual A - does not arise in
+
+578 Book II
+B as such (unlike what happens in fused groups). But, through the
+reciprocal grasp of the common field, the act remains regulatory because it occurs in a signifying totalisation, the meaning of which is
+known to both agents, and because the two agents are themselves
+reciprocal products of the organisation: they have been formed, trained
+and equipped in such a way that B could see a forecast of his future
+action in that of A. (Thus in the common field of the football match,
+on the basis of the common game and the given conditions, each movement of each back is regulatory for the actions of the goalkeeper.)
+Now, the structure of the regulatory act is complex: it is, in a sense,
+a limited affirmation of sovereignty. By sovereignty, in effect, I mean
+the absolute practical power of the dialectical organism, that is to say,
+purely and simply its praxis as a developing synthesis of any given
+multiplicity in its practical field, whether inanimate objects, living
+things or men. This rearrangement - in so far as it is performed by
+the organic individual - is the starting-point and milieu of all action
+(whether successful or unsuccessful). I call it sovereignty because it is
+simply freedom itself as a project which transcends and unifies the
+material circumstances which gave rise to it and because the only way
+to deprive anyone of it, is to destroy the organism itself.68 In conditions in which this rearrangement of the diverse into a totalised field is
+also realised by action as material transformation of this field in its
+internal configuration and real content, sovereignty is not only absolute
+but also total. Now, at first sight, this regulatory action - whether it
+occurs in a fused group or in an organised group - resembles the
+exercise of absolute, total sovereignty. The play of A practically
+totalises the group: in fact, for its part and in this moment, it defines
+the orientation of the praxis and the momentary organisation of all;
+through individual readjustments and owing to the power of each over
+all, a particular run or breakthrough will arrange the entire team in a
+certain practical order (the meaning of which, for example, may be both
+to support the manoeuvre and to anticipate a counter-attack). Through
+this totalisation of the team and by means of it (for it) B will be inte-
+68. But it is very important not to conclude that one can be free in chains.
+Freedom is a complete dialectical development, and we have seen how it car
+become alienated or bogged down or allow itself to be caught by the traps of the
+Other and how simple physical constraint is enough to mutilate it. But still even
+the most oppressed slave, simply in order to be obedient to his master, both ca
+and must perform a synthesis of the practical field
+
+The Institution 579
+grated into the structured whole: he will realise this practical integration
+by determining his own position on the basis of the present state of
+play, of the tactics being used, of the order adopted by all and of his
+own special function. Thus, A's sovereignty will define the mode of
+integration of B into the group in his operation; and A will totalise B,
+C, D, E, etc., by means of his regulatory action.
+But if the exercise of sovereignty were complete, the sovereign
+would have to be external to the group and to totalise it as totalityobject in his practical field. We should then encounter a type of relation
+which we have already defined: either, in its crude, fundamental form,
+the univocal synthetic bond between the agent and the (material and
+human) environment or, in an elaborated form, the relation, both in
+interiority and in exteriority, of the customer as Other to the clerk. Now,
+we are aware of the limit of this sovereign synthesis: it is that the bond
+is not univocal but reciprocal, that the regulatory third party integrates
+himself into the group in so far as his regulatory action succeeds in
+integrating me into it. His practical field, and mine, and ours, are one
+and the same. Thus sovereignty is limited by its very reciprocity;
+everyone is sovereign: but it should not be inferred that no one is. Or
+the contrary: since each is sovereign over the sovereignty of all, at the
+same time as being the organised object of each practical synthesis in
+interiority, he ought to be described as quasi-sovereign and quasiobject; and the group itself, in so far as it is totalised by the practice of
+a given common individual, is an objective quasi-totality and, as a
+negated multiplicity of quasi-sovereignties, it is in a state of perpetual
+detotalisation. In fact, the dislocation which, in the practical temporalisation, separates the moment where A becomes the regulatory third
+party from the moment in which B in turn is a regulator, constitutes
+B's being-in-the-group, as well as A's, as an ambivalent statute of
+interiority. In so far as B adapts himself to the initiative of A, he defines
+himself practically as a restructured element of this collective materiality (suffered and pledged inertia) which each third party, as a third
+(that is to say, the action to be performed, as signified in interiority by
+ther third parties) therefore comes to him through A as quasi
+tion, which submissively realises the regulatory signification. Bu
+y submitting - and in conformity with intentions which have com
+from outside, by means of the Other and interiorised by himself - B
+tries to realise the unity of immanence as the fusion of the mode into
+
+580 Book II
+the substance; but in fact, this unity is destroyed by the simple fact that
+his action, as a free mediation between the common individual and the
+common objective, by a practical organism, realises the synthetic
+objectification of the group in the worked object by negating his
+interiority of immanence in and by his dialectical development, that is
+to say, by negating his being as an inessential mode in relation to the
+essential substance. Wherever the action develops freely, he posits
+himself as essential (if only as a detail) through its very development.
+At one and the same moment, therefore, B not only manifests his
+being-integrated-into-the-group as a practical and objective integratior
+based on his inability to integrate himself ontologically into a substance,
+but also, at the same time, in the mediated reciprocity which harnesses
+his actions to the regulatory action of A, he sees himself by and through
+A as an integrated element of a quasi-objective totalisation performed
+by a quasi-sovereignty.
+But this ambivalence - which is simply a developing contradiction -
+also refers B to his own sovereignty; in becoming the third party
+through whose mediation B will rediscover himself over there, merged
+and organised with the others in the inter-subjective substance, A
+forces B to recognise him, in a new movement of reciprocity, as the
+third party who has the power to integrate (and not as the abstract
+sovereignty of the individual organism), and therefore as a member of
+the group. In other words, B has to see A as a simple modality of intersubjectivity (a definite function as the specification of the substance by
+itself, and this will force him, in A and in all, to snatch himself away
+from the common substance - that is, away from the integrating
+operation - so as to become a mediation between the individual A and
+his common-being-in-the-group. A therefore becomes not only, for B
+(and by means of B), an alter ego (the same - positive reciprocity) but
+also an excluded third party (as a quasi-sovereignty: a quasi-exile, the
+tension of immanence-transcendence); and B, by means of A and in
+the same conditions, also becomes an excluded third party and an alter
+ego. Everyone can and must be determined over there in his inessentiality in relation to the group through the integrating sovereignty of
+the other - who becomes the provisional subject of the group. But in
+order for this operation to take place outside him by means of the
+alter-ego, everyone must posit himself in his irreducible essentiality as
+the one who (with all the others) guarantees the Other's membership
+of the group by means of his pledge, his powers and his action.
+Thus, in the pledge with which B becomes, through his practical
+
+581
+subjection to the regulatory action, the object of an integration which
+is mediated over there in A, he constitutes the group as detotalised (or
+helps to do so): through his obedience he produces A as a quasisovereign, and therefore as quasi-excluded; and in the moment in
+which he grounds this quasi-sovereignty by a mediated recognition of
+A's powers and functions - that is to say, of his concrete membership
+of the group - he produces himselt as regulatory (either for A or for
+Others; as when he acts as a guarantor for A and declares to the Uthers,
+in the name of his own powers: he must be followed, helped, obeyed,
+etc.), and so realises in his person the quasi-exile of quasi-sovereignty.
+However, it cannot be denied that the interiority of relations, my
+common being's intimate membership of the whole, the inessentiality
+of my own existence (in so far as we are the same) and the essentiality
+of my function as a structured relation to the totality, are all practical
+truths: and the proof of them is that, in a living group, they are realised
+and verified every day by concrete action; discipline, self-sacrifice, etc.,
+are practical affirmations of all these truths. But in fact, in the living
+milieu of interiority, these truths, as determinations of my ontological
+statute, appear only in a perspective of flight and as a quasi-transcendent
+meaning of immanence. My real membership of this particular group
+as a transcendent rule of my concrete life is realised in me as a lived
+impossibility that my group-being should merge with those of other
+members in an undifferentiated ontological totality. From this point of
+view, each of my regulatory actions appears as a false totalisation,
+detotalised, in fact, by the surety which all the Others give me; and my
+guaranteed sovereignty never becomes transcendent sovereignty; and
+none of my regulated actions ever succeeds in submerging me in
+immanence since it is itself a surety for the regulatory action which
+occasioned it. Being-in-the-group, in interiority, is manifested through a
+double, agreed failure: it is being unable to leave and also unable to
+integrate oneself into it; in other words, being unable either to dissolve
+it in oneself (pledged inertia), or to dissolve oneself in it (practical
+unity being the absolute contradiction of ontological unity. However,
+heleine that the group dos eifreedom beged inerie the same i
+mediation of the Other. But apart from the fact that this inert-being
+it is in fact a means of producing practical differentiations. To reduce
+
+582 Book II
+the being of the group to the set of its inertia-means (inerties-moyens)
+is to transform this basically practical organisation - which exists only
+through its action - into a skeleton of relations capable of being treated
+by an ordinal calculus. But the illusion remains as an essential structure
+of any community, for two fundamental reasons.
+First, the violence and coercive force of fraternity-terror as a true
+relation of interiority between the members of the group are based on
+the myth of rebirth; they define and produce the traitor as absolute evil
+to precisely the extent that they define him as the man who destroyed
+the previous unity. In other words, both terror and the pledge relate to
+the deep fear of a dissolution of unity. They therefore posit it as the
+essential security and as the justification of any repressive violence.
+But the basic contradiction of the group - which is not resolved by the
+pledge - is that its real unity lies in common praxis or, to be precise, in
+the common objectification of this praxis. When the community
+affirms itself as the reign of common freedom, it cannot in fact - whatever it does - either realise the free interpenetration of individual
+freedoms or find an inert being-one which is common to all freedoms.
+Secondly, for those who are not grouped and for other groups
+(rivals, enemies, allies, etc.), the group is an object. It is a living
+totality. And, as we have seen, it has to interiorise this objectivity. It
+would be pointless here to examine the dialectical relations between
+groups and show how they are determined through their oppositions,
+each in relation to the others, and how they are transformed by
+interiorising their being-for-the-other and even, in certain circumstances, the being-for-others of the other, as their own immanent
+being. This has already been done many times - though never very
+rigorously. The only point that has to be remembered is that, as we
+have seen, the group is seen in its totalised unity by the ensemble of the
+others and that this pressure is so strong that even in its relations of
+pure interiority it interiorises this unity as its being-from-behind (être-dederriêre), that is to say, in the last analysis, as the material but synthetic
+source which sustains and produces it. Thus, in its developing reorganisation, it perpetually refers to its deepest interiority which is in
+reality only its most abstract exteriority. There is a being-X of the
+group - as its transcendental reality - and this is produced at an
+infinite degree of compression and gathers together the totalised
+ensemble of its structures, of its past and of its future in so far as they
+are externally the common object of the ignorance of Others; and this
+being-X as the pure abstract object of a regressive intention becomes the
+
+The Institution 583
+interiorisation of the ignorance of Others, that is, the meaning and
+historical destiny of the group in so far as they are the object of its
+2
+Purges and Terror
+This untranscendable conflict between the individual and the common,
+which oppose and define each other and each of which returns into the
+other as its profound truth, is naturally manifested in new contradictions within the organised group; and these contradictions are expressec
+by a new transformation of the group; the organisation is transformed
+into a hierarchy, and pledges give rise to institutions. This is of course
+not a historical sequence; and indeed we shall see that - on account of
+dialectical circularity - any form can emerge either before or after any
+other and that only the materiality of the historical process can determine the sequence. The only purpose of arranging them in a series is
+to indicate the complex characteristics which are to be found in most
+concrete groups; our investigation proceeds from the simple to the
+complex because it is both formal and dialectical and it does so as it
+proceeds from the abstract to the concrete.
+If we look at it closely, we can see that the basis of terror is the fact
+that the group has not, and cannot have, the ontological statute which
+it claims in its praxis; conversely, it is that each and all are produced and
+defined in terms of this non-existent totality. There is a sort of internal
+vacuum, an unbridgeable and indeterminate distance, a sort of malaise
+in every community, large or small; and this uneasiness occasions a
+strengthening of the practices of integration, and increases with the
+integration of the group.
+It should be realised, in fact, that the conflict between the essential
+and inessential is not at all theoretical: it is a permanent danger both for
+the group and for the common individual. In fact the pledge posits the
+inessentiality of the organic individual by making it impossible for him
+to dissolve the group in himselt; besides it is obvious that, in every
+structure, the presence of the developing totalisation in the individual
+part also indicates the importance of every part and their interchangeability; finally, the Other treats the organic individual as a general
+
+584 Book I/
+reality which can be ignored, and tries simply to approach the group
+through the mediation of the common individual; and as we have seen,
+this inessentiality of exteriority is also interiorised. It is at this level
+that the group-individual is defined by the practices of all the members,
+within the community, as a common individual. He is a determinate
+function, power and competence: the practical relation with this
+contradictory being (freedom becoming a legal claim through the
+transcendence of free, pledged inertia) is juridical and ceremonious: even
+outside action, each relation within the group is a reciprocal recognition
+of attributions and of the system of 'rights and duties'.
+Attempts have sometimes been made to base the transition from the
+repressive to the restitutive, from violence to contract, from contempt
+for life to respect for the human person, on the historical differentiation
+of functions. The individual, as such, is presented as a product of the
+division of labour. But these arguments are senseless: they only express
+the common wish to reduce the practical organism to its social function.
+Now, conflict occurs precisely at this level; in relation to the common
+operation, each function has a relative importance and therefore the
+common individual is inessential or relatively essential; but in relation
+to carrying out this particular social task, the practical organism is an
+essential mediation. Of course this does not mean that any particular
+individual, as a specific product of History, is indispensable for the task
+which the group has assigned to him. This may happen in makeshift
+organisations, but in a group which itself produces the workers it
+requires, this dependence is automatically eliminated. But this means
+that - irrespective of the individual and even if he could be immediately replaced - the moment of praxis - that is, the essential
+moment - is always that of the free, individual dialectic and of the
+sovereign organisation of the practical field. No individual is essential
+to a group which is coherent, well integrated, and smoothly organised;
+but when anyone realises the mediation between the common individual (who has no real existence except through the organic life of the
+agent) and the object, he reaffirms his essentiality in opposition to the
+group. And this essentiality has nothing to do with the historical
+individuality of the operation (or not necessarily), but rather with
+practical freedom as an indispensable moment of any operation, even
+in the practico-inert field of alienation. The individual agent has no
+transcended or betrayed his pledge; he has executed his mission
+performed his function; and yet, in a way, he has created a new isolation for himself, as beyond the pledge, as a bracketing of inertia
+
+The Institution 585
+(Whether suffered or pledged). In short, through the powers and
+responsibilities which have actually transformed him, through the
+instrumentality which increases his power, he has returned to transparency and can realise his fidelity in the group only through a transcendence which removes him trom the common statute and projects
+him into the object outside. However it is lived, this contradiction will
+be objectively expressed as a permanent danger of exile, or even as
+real exile. And the fear of being exiled, in reciprocity, gives rise to the
+fear that the group may be dissolved, as inessential, in the essentiality
+of individual actions. This is not the fear which, in the fused group,
+occasioned the pledge: the fear then was that the group might be
+dissolved by default (negative behaviour, rout, abandonment of post,
+etc.). What is feared now is dissolution through excess, and a pledge
+has no power against this new danger, since it arises precisely from
+pledged fidelity.
+But although the structure in reciprocity already extends it to all,
+even if it is lived in the particularity of individual labour, the contradiction between the inessential and the essential would be no more than
+a simple cause of disquiet unless it were taken up and amplified by the
+relation between the regulatory and the regulated action. The counterpart of the integration of each third party into the group is, as we have
+seen, reciprocal exile; but as each member of the group is the third
+party through whom integration is effected, it follows from this that
+the practical realisation of this integration has as a counterpart a shifting
+exclusion, a circular succession of exiles for each and all. Through the
+permanent practice of integration and ritual recognition, the group
+resists the dangers of seriality. But it is precisely these continuous
+operations which, for everyone, occasion a way of living one's own
+being-in-the-group as a constant but masked separation, and the beingin-the-group of other third parties as a perpetual danger of secession.
+Particularly in the case of groups which can meet together or live in a
+particular place which gives material support to their unity, a contrait the emp sphere er ve go, for example, then may freysel.
+as being really in it, but this only means that I identify its being with
+that of its container.
+In one sense, such an identification is legitimate, since the container
+(in so far as it has been chosen, defined, and worked, and in so far as it
+occasions special conduct, etc.) clearly represents the practical materiality of this interiorised multiplicity. But, at the same time, in my
+
+586 Book II
+relations with the third parties I realise my own tension of immanencetranscendence as the truth of our human relations, and this truth is
+either that I am not really in the group or that my being-in-it cannot be
+taken in a naive way as a relation between content and container. Thus
+the interior of the place as such acts as a basis for my human relation and
+it aggravates my exile in interiority in so far as membership of the
+material whole, as a support and expression of the totalisation, is no
+longer lived as a security, and becomes secondary and slides towards
+annihilation, although being-in-the-group, as the practical interiority of
+relations, does not emerge in intuitive experience and as a new security:
+what is realised in everyone is interiority as a spatial bond between the
+container and its contents in its inadequacy and as an anonymous
+mystification. I am inside but I am still afraid that I may be outside. In
+other words, everyone grasps his quasi-sovereignty (which is nevertheless an indispensable moment of the reorganising re-totalisation)
+defiantly, as if it threatened to designate him as essential: in effect, the
+synthetic operation of regulation indicates him as the final term of the
+integration, but without integrating him: it therefore isolates him. This
+did not matter in the moment of the fused group, because differentiated
+functions had not yet been produced. But when quasi-sovereignty is
+realised as the exercise of any kind of concrete power over Others and
+as an individual practice which eludes the pledge (not by transcending
+it, but through being its basis), the regulatory action is revealed in all
+its contradictoriness: intercession-secession.
+And once freedom - seen as the free, organic negation of common
+freedom and as the free dissolution of deposits of inertia in everyone -
+becomes afraid of itself, and discovers in anguish its individual dimension, the dangers of impotence and the certainty of alienation which
+characterise it, and the regulatory third party has become a regulated,
+integrated, third party, integration by the Other will be revealed to
+it by dislocated reciprocity both as a danger to sovereignty (through
+the reification of the group within the practical field of a single individual) and as a danger of exile (which means a danger of being
+killed - for the third party seen in his implicit secession - as well as a
+danger of betrayal). What emerges at this level is that mediation by all
+is itself reciprocity between third parties, each of whom is, in himself, the perpetual explosive contradiction which we have called quasisovereignty. In this sense, mediated reciprocity relates to circularity
+in so far as the relation of the powers A and B depends not only on
+their reciprocal recognition but also on a series of sovereign recogni-
+
+58g
+tions each of which may, depending on concrete circumstances, be
+either essential or inessential to the unity of the group. (The power
+relations between two organising sub-groups actually depend on how
+those who are being reorganised acknowledge the powers of the two
+'organs'; on their giving one of them precedence over the other - even
+if the order of precedence has been fixed the other way round; or on
+their rejecting them both).
+Thus the being-one of the group (both as an abstract, ontological
+aim and as the concrete reality of the detailed objectification) depends
+on my individual freedom - that is to say, on the movement which
+constitutes exclusion, physical liquidation and betrayal as real possibilities tor me - in so far as my being-in-the-group eludes me and constitutes
+itself in the shifting circularity of regulatory actions (in so far as these
+can, in themselves, and as far as I can tell, become the liquidation of the
+group or the petrification of the community into an inorganic object). 69
+Separation as suffered inertia which comes to reinforce pledged inertia
+increases the tension between sovereign exile and impotent dependence:
+if the group goes beyond the boundaries of the place or of the container (or if, for some reason, relations within the place, the camp, or
+the city, are penetrated by distance, as happens, for example, with a
+clandestine action: the work of the enemy police, as the common action
+of a hostile group, is equivalent to being conditioned by spatiality as
+practico-inert extension), the quasi-sovereign third party is still my
+brother, but he is also almost or completely unknown. Yet his action
+does not cease to be regulatory: through the organs of mediation, I
+may learn that a particular common initiative has begun elsewhere in
+the spatio-temporal destiny of the practico-inert field, and with others
+who are present I will define our action as a sub-group in relation to this
+initiative. And of course elsewhere is still here; but it is a here whose
+special characteristics are essential (because I am anxious to know
+them) and whose universal ubiquity is an inessential abstraction.
+By this shifting flight of reciprocities, everything is finally put in its
+place, and thus the organised group can, through its own freedom,
+develop a circular form of seriality. And, though it may seem surprising,
+this appearance of the Other does not present itself as an alienation of
+69. This second possibility cannot correspond to any real operation; and it
+manifests itself to everyone as an expression of the freedom of the third party in
+so far as, through his own practical affirmation, it is a negation of reciprocities in
+and by a reciprocal act.
+
+588 Book II
+praxis to the practico-inert (though this alienation must occur elsewhere), but as the rediscovery of free individuality as the sole means
+and the sole obstacle for the constitution of an organised group. In
+fact, it is the new reaction of negated multiplicity.
+Of course, what we have been describing are dialectical possibilities
+of a purely formal order. By themselves and in their structural formalism, these implicit contradictions, which relate to structures common
+to all groups, do not and cannot give rise to a revival of seriality within
+unity, to betrayal or repression by Terror, or to the liquidation of the
+group. In fact, whatever happens, they have to be lived and produced,
+because they define the intimate contexture of the organised group,
+and because neither actions nor members can be produced in their
+concrete reality except through the internal curvatures proper to the
+groups which produce them. But it is the historical process as a whole
+and, in a totalising context, particular circumstances, the aims of a
+group, its past history, its relations with other groups, etc., which will
+settle how the reciprocal, serial connection of exile-secession will be
+lived in the concretely differentiated zones of a particular practical
+community. For example, it is obvious that a relatively small group,
+which organises the complexity of its apparatuses through a victorious
+praxis, cannot even live its reflexive contradictions in the form of
+uneasiness: real unity is transcendent and practical, it imposes itself
+from the future in real modifications of the common object, in the
+structures of the future revealed by the object (possibilities reveal themselves, facilities which absorb action like real exigencies, crevices in
+which praxis becomes lost, short-cuts, etc.). For the easier, the more
+urgent and the more glorious this objective future, the more it abridges
+the mediating behaviour of reflection inside the group: if the organisation can be clearly decoded in the object negatively (en creux), if it
+presents no difficulty in itself, and is indistinguishable from the transcendent operation, then it becomes a lateral interaction of reciprocities
+in the development of a common action. No doubt it will be necessary
+to sanction and reorganise it; but, for us, the important point is that,
+when successful, the object provides the ontological unity of the group,
+at least as the quasi-certainty of each of its members. And this quasicertainty is not a subjective determination: it is the character and
+modality which everyone's action has for him, in so far as he sees it
+produced as common in his hands. Failure or - to take a less extreme
+case - the difficulties of a slow, disappointing action, obviously give rise
+to reflexion (by raising the question of reorganisation) and make every
+
+The Institution 589
+individual or sub-group live separation as defiance: We here are doing
+what we can..., etc.. In the moment of free individual praxis, action
+displays its contradictions precisely to the extent that its individual
+success here is no longer immediately absorbed by the common success.
+In itself, personal, localised success tends to posit itself for itself as an
+essential moment all the more when common success seems compromised or more distant. And separation occurs in each individual
+agent to precisely the extent that the local success of his action produces in the object an incomplete determination which signifies
+nothing (since the true, intelligible meaning of the action, of the
+complete development of the practical individual, lies only in common
+realisation) and which demands (objective exigency) that the common
+object should adopt it and integrate it through broader modifications
+produced by the labour of all.?º Above all, everything depends on a
+complex ensemble which connects the members of the group, their
+multiplicity, their means of communication, their techniques, their
+instruments, the nature of their object and their aim in a single historical movement. For example, a group whose aim is a synthetic,
+unifying action (agitation, propaganda) and whose object is serial
+gatherings which go beyond it in every direction will find it easier to
+interiorise the objective seriality against which it struggles; thus one
+can see balances being established (generally damaging to the developing action) between the seriality-object which is in the process of
+dissolution and the group-subject (in the practical sense) which is in
+the process of serialisation. But it is sufficient to mention these well
+known examples. What is important is the relation of the common
+structures to their historical content (that is to say, to the temporalising
+temporalisation of the group by its individual praxis in relation to its
+temporalised temporalisation by the praxis of other groups); and this
+70. It goes without saying (though the example does not concern us here - in
+relation to the dialectical development, it appears accidental) that separation is
+seen more violently and in all its irrepressible negativity when a given individual
+in a group which is succeeding in its undertaking realises his own action as a
+failure (of detail). But all this has often been described by psychologists and novelists. I refer to it only as a reminder. Suffice it to say that the individual-failure
+becomes a pure object of common repression. The terror exercised over him is a
+common action (mediated reciprocity) aimed at destroying in him and with him
+the possibility, which is proper to everyone, of transforming suffered separation
+and revealed circularity into secession or exclusion. In a traitor, everyone finds -
+in reciprocity (for himself and for everyone) - his own permanent possibility of
+betraying and being betrayed, and believes he is destroying it for ever.
+
+590 Book II
+relation can be expressed as follows: circular serialities, as structures of
+secession-exclusion, cannot be a priori realities or reflexive determinations independent of History; they realise themselves as a temporalisingtemporalised moment of the life of the group, under the pressure of
+particular circumstances and in particularised forms (factional struggles,
+terror, internal anarchy, absenteeism, discouragement, etc.). But
+historialisation, in the form of internal conflicts - whether masked or
+explicit - of circular seriality as a proper product of the group, only
+temporalises, through the action of specific factors, the contradiction
+proper to communities; and this basic contradiction - which is to be
+found both beneath and beyond the pledge - is that their practical
+unity not only demands their ontological unity but also makes it
+impossible. Thus the group creates itself in order to create and destroys
+itself by creating itself.
+And being-in-the-group is a reality which is in itself complex and
+contradictory, because it is, in the past, the co-emergence in the group
+of pledged inertias through reciprocity and, in the temporalisation
+towards the future, the reaffirmation of this common emergence through
+organendence, regazenry and me ares it by living iras toes nradictory and simultaneous impossibility for the individual of being
+either completely inside the group or completely outside it. Thus
+being-in-the-group is an inert 'being-in-the-midst-of-the-group' seen
+as an untranscendable past and realised by a movement of integration
+neutralised by a movement of secession. And everyone's concrete
+operation, as a free adoption of pledged untranscendability, manifests
+itself in its full positivity as having been able to be a refusal to take up
+the pledge and as having freely reproduced this past inertia. Hence, to
+the extent that it replaces the pledge as a vivid opacity within the
+transparent freedom of commitment, it constitutes for it, in the future
+and simultaneously, both the pledged non-possibility of being transcended and the permanent possibility of dissolution. And, no doubt, it
+is my freedom as Other which swore in me: but any action, both as a
+concrete expression of my translucid freedom and as mine, reestablishes the priority of the constituent dialectic over the constituted
+dialectic and, precisely to the extent that it is subjected to my otherfreedom (liberté-autre), it indicates that behind this, in the past, there lies
+a moment of free transparency which, in a word, is the basis even of
+the other freedom (l'autre liberté). In fact, this moment was real because
+we experienced it as the reciprocal decision to pledge.
+
+59г
+The group reacts to this permanent danger, appearing at the level
+or organisation, with new practices: it produces itself in the form of
+an institutionalised group; which means that 'organs, functions and
+powers are transformed into institutions; that, in the framework of
+institutions, the community tries to acquire a new type of unity by
+institutionalising sovereignty, and that the common individual transforms himselfinto an institutional individual. But, since thene w internal
+constitution is intended to combat a re-emergence of seriality by
+strengthening inertia and even, as we shall see, by exploiting recurrence
+in order to consolidate pledged passivity, the interference between
+these two inorganic movements tends rather to produce degraded
+forms of community. 'Degraded', here, does not, of course, have
+anything to do with a system of values, even the ethical affirmation that
+freedom is the basis of values: I merely mean that the group - whose
+origin and end reside in an effort by the individuals who are gathered
+together to dissolve seriality in themselves - will, in the course of its
+struggle, actually reproduce alterity in itself and freeze into the
+inorganic so as to struggle against it within, so that it gradually gets
+closer to the "collective' statute. In other words, our dialectical investigation makes a turning here and goes back towards the practico-inert
+from which Freedom-Terror removed itself a little earlier: it is beginning to appear that the movement of the investigation may possibly
+be circular.
+There can be no doubt, in fact, that the new recurrence is perceived
+by the members of the group in and through the struggle which they
+wage against it. It is sufficient to recall the rising tide of mistrust within
+the Convention from September 1793 on, that is to say, from its first
+meeting. We can certainly see increasingly violent conflicts of interest
+emerging within this regularly constituted group. And these conflicts,
+which reflected the real conflicts which divided the country, inevitably
+split the elected Assembly. But still it is worth noting that the parliamentary system is established for the purpose of resolving conflicts
+within groups of electors or elected: the majority decides. This is a
+serial organisation, but this determination and the preservation of unity
+by action on seriality are nonetheless an organisation. Now, on the
+whole, past and present circumstances as well as the immediate future
+practically relegate the system of conciliation by vote to the level of
+pure pretext and replace it by integration-terror. This presents itself in
+fact as an exigency for unanimity and a rejection of opponents as
+traitors: the formal system of voting will be retained (and in certain
+
+592 Book II
+moments it may regain decisive power), but the Convention's real
+action on itself will occur in the heat of the moment, through violence,
+with the strength of the armed people.
+Besides, there can be no doubt that, if the Girondins ended up by
+representing the interests of the conservative bourgeoisie or even,
+unwittingly, of a section of the aristocracy, the differentiation of the
+groups (in particular of the Girondins and the Montagnards) was a slow
+process, involving a complex evolution whose moments have been
+well described by Lefebvre: in the beginning, questions of federalism,
+of hostility to Paris, and of social and political views did not arise.
+Everything was constituted in the course of the struggle and through
+irreversible episodes. The irremediable split in the Convention was a
+legacy of the Legislative Assembly: in fact everything - their social
+origins, their milieu, the professions they were engaged in before the
+elections of 1792, and their education - tended to give real homogeneity to the deputies of both Assemblies. So it would be a mistake to
+regard the Convention (and still less the Legislative Assembly) as
+primarily and fundamentally divided by social struggles, even class
+struggles, rather than as a homogeneous Assembly the overwhelming
+majority in which was constituted by petty-bourgeois intellectuals, and
+whose irremediable contradictions were the result of a slow past
+evolution, which gave each of them - in relation to his group, to his
+electors, to the nation, and to hostile groups - a pledged untranscendability. Every day, each of them adopted an inert alterity by repeatedly
+pledging himself to be other than those Others, those enemies who,
+frozen in inertia, regard him as the Other.
+Let there be no mistake: we are not dismissing the Montagnards and
+the Girondins together: the Girondins were entirely responsible for
+the violence of the conflict, first for having thrown the revolution into
+war, that is to say, for having produced Terror as the sole means of
+government, and secondly for having been the first to take an inflexible
+line, which inevitably led them to become representatives of particular
+nterests; and lastly, the Girondins were bad politicians and th
+Aontagnards good ones: they embodied the movement of a revolutio
+which was being radicalised by the pressure of circumstances; the
+inertia. Nevertheless the Montagnards made themselves, and were
+made, into pledged enemies of the Girondins through the development
+
+593
+of the revolutionary process and through the pledges of the Girondins
+themselves. There can be no doubt that the essential aim of the
+'May zist revolution' (of 1793) was to re-establish homogeneity within
+the Assembly, by eliminating the twenty-nine most prominent
+Girondins. The new, purged Assembly would be able to set up its own
+apparatuses of control, supervision, administration, etc.
+Now, this situation of false homogeneity is precisely what concerns
+us here. For the homogeneity of the renewed Convention was false:
+in the first place, as has been clearly shown by Georges Lefebvre, the
+majority of the deputies would never forgive the Montagnards for the
+humiliarion of 2 June; secondly, there were still many Girondins sitting
+in the Assembly; and lastly, new circumstances were to create deep
+divisions among the Montagnards. The difference comes to this, and
+this is what concerns us: before the first purge, the antagonistic groups
+in the Convention based their irreconcilable heterogeneity on the
+irreconcilability of their political actions; whereas after it, the ruling
+apparatuses gradually produced the unity of the common praxis. But
+this practical unity was scarcely sufficient to conceal an imperceptible,
+but irreconcilable heterogeneity which, this time, concerned individual
+people. This heterogeneity was not based either on individual practice
+or on organic individuals as factors of numerical multiplicity: it
+originated in the violence of the past (31 May, 2 June) in so far as this
+was connected, as suffered inertia, to the pledged inertia of the representative of the nation, that is to say, in so far as power as an untranscendable and pledged statute transmitted a statute of untranscendability
+to them (violence against power becomes violated power which has to
+be re-established in its purity by violence). In fact what we learn from
+historical experience, especially in recent years, is that though purges
+are intended to re-establish an internal homogeneity, they actually
+replace a quasi-structured heterogeneity (the function and powers of
+opposition) by a diffuse heterogeneity. Thus Terror begins after the
+purge.
+Once those who are the same again (they vote the same way and are
+committed to the realisation of the same policies) have become simultaneously and secretly Others, alterity becomes the secret truth of unity
+for everyone. Whatever the direct relations between each deputy and
+the Committee of Public Safety, other relations established themselves - if only through the necessity of living in the same district -
+between the deputies themselves. And these relations - which are
+normal while homogeneity is guaranteed - appear as other relations
+
+594
+Book I/
+(relations autres) which determine everyone in his alterity: in so far as
+he is other than his pure integration, that is to say, than his direct
+relation with the organising axis, he enjoys the relations of a free,
+practical individual with his neighbour in so far as this neighbour is
+other; and the reciprocity which is established between them is defined
+as a reciprocity of alterity in relation to the developing totalisation.
+And since these reciprocities are, or may be, mediated (since they
+establish themselves inside the group in activity, this means that
+everyone, in so far as he has no direct relation with his neighbours (but
+only relations of function, or of power, passing through the ruling
+apparatus and defined by it), comes to be determined in his common
+activity, and in his ability to carry out his task, and finally, in the
+depths of his being-in-the-group, by the direct or mediated relations
+between his neighbours. Hence a contradiction arises for everyone, as
+a member of the Assembly, between the undertaking of practical
+totalisation, which eliminates particular individuals in favour of an
+individualisation of functions, and circular seriality, which, in the form
+of the developing totalisation, constantly anticipates the same group
+relapsing into a collective. Unification as an organising praxis continues to elude everyone - in so far as he is a unifying agent - because
+of the other relations which the Others have with this unifying synthesis (are they not using them to lay a trap for him or for some
+Other! etc.).
+Far from realising its unity through its committees' efforts to unify
+it, the Convention became an object at precisely the point when totalisation broke against recurrence.? In fact there was one Convention
+because, in this practical group, the absence of an ontological statute
+for common individuals allowed the ontological statute of circular
+seriality to establish itself, as an indestructible foundation of impotence. There was one Convention in so far as the foundation of its
+unity was always based on the Other, that is to say, in so far as this
+71. The unspoken antagonism between its two ruling apparatuses - the
+Committee of Public Safety and the Committee of General Security - was
+necessarily a mediated, though negative, reciprocity. This relation actually presupposed that each sub-group opposed the other in so far as the deputies as a
+whole recognised its powers. But each apparatus therefore produced the entire
+Assembly as other for the other 'organ', and, for the entire Assembly, everyone
+was both positive and negative, at once the same and other. Thus the other-being
+of each of the Committees lay in the reciprocity of the deputies, when this reciprocity was mediated by the other Committee, as an other determination of unity.
+
+• 595
+unity fell outside the practical and was, in fact, simply the impossibility,
+endured by everyone, of either pursuing integration or escaping it. At
+this level, everyone was inside, to precisely the extent that all the Others
+were outside: the tension of immanence-transcendence was again
+degraded and passivised in the collectivised group; the collective object
+is me-in-the-group-without-me. In it, - feature as Other, and become
+the object of actions and determinations of which I am unaware; I
+either become the passive victim of projects which are concealed from
+me or, without being aware of it, I become involved with conspirators
+or with suspects through an interdependence which they frame without
+telling me, and perhaps without knowing it themselves; and it may be
+that within it I become an object of fear too; certainly as a means and
+possibly as a (relative or immediate) end.
+But it is impossible for me even to determine this imposed alterity
+in the abstract without effecting a synthesis in mediated reciprocity of
+the social field which passes through the mediation of the organising
+axes and which, at the same time, proclaims me in my own eyes as
+suspect: this practical synthesis is in fact a regulatory action. Hence, in
+the tension of immanence-transcendence, I find, in indissoluble connection, not only my being-outside-myself-in-the-group as an alterity
+of impotence, but also my impossible integration as a danger of exilesecession. In the purged Convention, the "collective' manifested from
+below the impossibility of the group being a subject (contrary to what
+Durkheim believed) and its degree of reality was directly proportional
+to this very impossibility. It is on this account that it had its own
+structures, laws and rigidity; it was on this account that it acted on its
+members - not as a consciousness, nor as a Gestalt, but as a real object,
+that is to say, as a structure of exteriority limiting our attempt at
+interiorisation, as an indirect counter-unity which is merely the
+negation of subjective unification and its inverted image; and lastly as
+the mark of the impossible integration. (If this was not even attempted,
+we would be back with the pure collective of dispersal - prices, the
+market, etc.; and if it were completely carried out - which is impossible - the group could no longer be an object for itself).
+However, in so far as everyone attempts to realise the group as a
+unified praxis, and in so far as he reveals the other-reality of the
+community as an unpredictable serial deviation to which his own
+regulatory action will be subjected in this milieu of alterity, he must
+strive to liquidate the Other as a factor of dispersive inertia and circular
+deviations; and as the Other is everyone as Other, fraternity has to be
+
+5g6 Book II
+imposed by violence. This means that everyone must risk being
+radically destroyed in so far as he supports any particular embodiment
+of the Other. The contradiction is blatant: integration-terror is supposed to eliminate the other; but the Other is indestructible. The Other
+is simply a particular relation which manifests itself in precisely those
+circumstances which also engender the attempt to destroy it; besides,
+everyone is Other in the Other. Thus terror would be a pointless
+circular course unless it did, in fact, suppress individuals in so far as
+they are themselves, that is to say, in so far as their free practical undertakings designate them as excluded regulatory third parties, always
+capable of lending themselves to the Other.
+Of the two negations of the group - individual praxis and seriality -
+the first, as we have seen, is accompanied by the realisation of the
+common undertaking; it is both an ontological negation and a practical
+realisation. The second is definitive and it was in opposition to it that
+the group originally constituted itself. Yet it is individual praxis which
+appears suspect to the apparatuses of terror. But this is because terror
+itself is suspect in its own eyes: in so far as it actually becomes the
+function and power of certain sub-groups and common individuals
+(public prosecutors, juries, judges in the revolutionary tribunal, the
+Committee of Public Safety, etc.), it is produced not only through
+deliberations and decisions which themselves create recurrence but also
+through processes which are realised in the tension of transcendenceimmanence. Through a purge - of whatever sort, whether exclusion or
+execution - the purger constitutes himself as suspect and as always
+liable to be purged; he produces himself as such in his own eyes and it
+is therefore the freedom of the regulatory third party which he everywhere pursues, confusing it with elusive alterity. And this free practice
+is undoubtedly capable of regrouping the opposition, of constituting a
+conspiracy, etc.: as such, in the moment of Terror, it appears to the
+apparatus as intolerable. And if it is at this moment - rather than earlier
+or later, when the régime is more relaxed - that it seems intolerable, this
+is because, on the basis of well defined exterior circumstances (invasion,
+disturbances in the provinces, the revolt in the Vendée, social unrest
+and the danger of famine), " terror established itself as the only means
+of governing. And, whatever the historical context in which we consider it,
+, it always arises in opposition to seriality, rather than to
+72. I am not putting these factors in any particular order but simply enumerating them.
+
+597
+freedom. In fact, both in its origins and in its manifestation, it is freedom
+liquidating the indefinite flight of the Other, that is to say, impotence,
+through violence.? In the Convention, Terror was born of the
+objective contradiction between the necessity for a common praxis,
+free and indivisible, and the objective but inconceivable - and, indeed,
+unformulated - divisions of a governing Assembly which remained
+chaotic and which was altered by the violence it had suffered. In this
+fundamental atmosphere free praxis was suspect: seriality mediated by
+freedom appeared as passive alterity, and practical freedom was
+73. Concerning this event (which, as we know, began on 14 July 1789), |
+repeat what I have mentioned at various points in this book: there is no Platonic
+Idea of Terror, but only different Terrors and if the historian wishes to identify
+characteristics which are common to them, he will have to do it a posteriori, on
+the basis of careful comparisons. What I am trying to describe here is not the
+development or the factors of the Terror-process (which does not exist either 'in
+itself' or 'in the mind'); nor is it some long historical sequence which people have
+chosen to call Terror (the Terror of 1793, the White Terror, the Red Terror,
+etc.). The Terror of 1789 to 1794 is inseparable from the Revolution itself and
+has meaning only within a totalising reconstruction effected by historians. All I
+want to do is to use an abstract example to show the connections between free
+praxis, the pledge, violence and recurrence inside organised groups. I am not
+attempting to set out the essential relations, even reduced to the utmost simplicity,
+which might constitute an essence of Terror: there is no such essence. I only wish
+to describe certain conditions - the dialectical chain of abstract determinations
+(infinitely indeterminate except at a particular point) - which is necessarily realised by the being-in-the-group of a common individual when Terror occurs as
+a historical development in specific circumstances. The plurality of Terrors even
+during the revolutionary lerror (1789 to 1794) seems to me so obvious that l
+have chosen for my example a limited and induced terror (the circular Terror in a
+homogeneous group which was being eroded by seriality), whereas the primary
+phenomenon (Terror as a fundamental relation between the French people and
+the Assembly as the government) was created in order to combat non-circular,
+indefinite seriality. In 1793, given that the first invasion had taken place, that
+several towns had precipitously surrendered to the enemy, and that the enemy
+occupation of border areas resulted in fraternisations in various places, and given
+that the idea of a nation was new whereas that of international solidarities between
+aristocracies was very old, the frontiers did not in any way make Frenchmen into
+a multiplicity contained in one place. At the frontiers there was the danger of
+treason as an anticipation of indefinite seriality (with a sudden or imperceptible
+transition - through treason - from being-French to being-German). The refraction of an order - as a synthetic process of organisation - in a case of mortal
+danger, into indefinite seriality gave rise, by itselj, to the practical necessity (the
+free necessity) of breaking seriality by violence (like breaking ice) to give a
+synthetic milieu of execution to the synthetic order.
+
+598 Book IT
+therefore denounced for generating alterity. All this could be lived as the
+diffuse reality of the group (integration refused to the newcomer: in the
+confined milieux of prisons, detention centres, houses of correction,
+etc., Genet has suffered and defined the permanent experience of terror;
+fraternity realised itself in only one form: against him). The experience
+can also be had if one experiences in oneself the praxis of specialised
+apparatuses (surveillance, police supervision, threats, arrests, etc.). In
+any case, everyone is both purger and purged, and Terror is never a
+system based on the will of a minority; it is the reappearance - in
+specific circumstances - of the fundamental group relation as an interhuman relation; subsequently, differentiation may or may not create a
+specialised organ whose function is to govern according to terror.
+In a terror-group, my bond with my brother is terror: the regulatory
+action by which he unites me to all gives me a respite for myself because
+1 am constituted in the group and because my exile dissolves; but he
+thereby determines it as lying at the limit of interiority and thereby
+shows the infinitesimal gap between the regulatory movement (that is
+to say, his quasi-sovereignty in the common praxis) and the true
+sovereignty of the absolute Other (enemy group or individual) whose
+synthetic activity may gather us together from outside as a herd-object
+in his practical field. We are united, but we are threatened by him.?4
+Thus as an arbitrary member of the group, I perceive, in the two forms
+of my praxis (regulated and regulatory), freedom, the non-being of the
+future which has to be made, as an indication of group non-being. And
+my individual terror behaviour consists in consolidating inertia within
+myself in so far as this reciprocal practice of consolidation is also
+realised in the other third party through the mediation of all the others.
+At this level, the pledge appears as a necessary but insufficient basis for
+common unity; it is the foundation stone on which unity as inert-beingeverywhere has to be based.
+However, this inert unity - at least as everyone can realise it in
+imself and, through himself, in others - must be very different fro
+rial inertia since it is the struggle of freedom against an intern
+revival of seriality. This systematic petrification, that is to say, the
+74. These indeterminate possibilities are concretely determined both in trust
+
+1509
+struggle of inertia against inertia, ought to be described as an inorganic,
+created, counter-seriality. There would be no point here in describing
+in detail the well known process by which everyone tries to expel from
+himself and from others the regulatory moment of immanence-transcendence, in order to be able to identify himself purely with the common producer of regulated action. The fundamental modification
+consists in transferring the common-being-of-the-group, regulatory
+freedom and impossible ontological unity to the praxis of the group as
+such. Since it is this, and this alone, which creates common unity and
+since the group requires the ontological statute in proportion as a
+revival of seriality threatens to dissolve it, everyone's reciprocal work
+consists in projecting ontological unity into practical unity: praxis
+becomes the being and the essence of the group; in praxis it will
+produce its men as inorganic instruments which it requires in order to
+develop. And freedom resides in the praxis, rather than in each individual action. This new structure of the group is not only the practice of
+Terror, but also a defensive reaction against Terror. It consists in a
+double relation of mediated reciprocity: everyone construes himself,
+through the Other and through all, as an inorganic tool by means of
+which action is realised. Everyone constitutes action as freedom itself
+in the form of terror-imperative. Ihis new structure gives a certain
+amount of vicarious freedom to its tools. But this vicarious freedom is
+not disturbing; it is the reflection of the common freedom onto a
+particular inorganic object rather than the practical freedom of an
+individual agent. It is at this level that the institution is defined; or -
+not to abandon our guiding thread - it is at this level that certain
+practices which are necessary for the organisation acquire a new
+ontological statute by institutionalising themselves.
+Institutionalisation and Inertia
+In the living moment of the group (of fusion in the first stages of
+organisation), the common individual is not inessential because he is
+the same in all, that is to say, the ubiquity of the group as multiplicity
+negated by a praxis; it would be better to say that everyone comes to
+everyone, through the community, as a bearer of the same essentiality.
+
+Goo Book II
+But, at the level of the degraded group, the individual, in his
+terrorist and terrorised negation of his own freedom, is constituted as
+inessential in relation to his function. Functions and powers are, of
+course, nothing but concrete determinations of the common individual.
+But, in the living group, a temporary balance was established between
+the common individual as a social product and organic freedom as the
+adoption of this individual-power and as the free execution of the
+common task with the common means. Through the undertaking of
+the pledge and through the concrete determination of the future,
+through pledged inertia, it actualised the power and sustained it in the
+milieu of freedom - thereby producing common freedom as constituted
+freedom - and, through its mediation (between the group and the
+object) it produced the common, here, as individual. On the other
+hand, freedom, conceived as a common transcendent subject, denies
+individual freedom and expels the individual from function; function,
+positing itself for itself, and producing individuals who will perpetuate
+it, becomes an institution.
+These purely abstract descriptions may give the impression that this
+is a matter of the idea working upon itself. But the changes we have
+described are, in fact, a product of real, concomitant transformations,
+one of which is suffered as an inorganic force while the other is a real
+act of differentiation.
+(First transformation.) An institution cannot result from a free
+determination of practice by itself. And if practice readopts the
+institution as a defence against terror, it does so in so far as its petrification is a metamorphosis which has been induced, and whose origin is
+elsewhere. And we are familiar with this origin: it is precisely the reemergence of seriality. For the institution has the contradictory
+characteristic, often remarked on by sociologists, of being both praxis
+and thing. As praxis, its teleological meaning can become obscured;
+but this is either because the institution is a mere carcass or because
+those who are institutionalised have a real comprehension of its aim
+but cannot or will not communicate it: in fact, whenever we acquire
+the means to decode it (for example, whenever we examine the institutions of a contemporary industrialised society), we discover its teleological characteristics, that is to say, a frozen dialectic of alienated ends,
+liberating ends and of the alienation of these new ends. On the other
+hand, however, the institution, as such, has a considerable force of
+inertia, not only because it is part of an institutional whole and is
+incapable of being modified unless all the others are modified too, but
+
+The Institution 602
+also, above all, in itself, because it posits itself, in and through its
+inert-being, as essentiality and defines men as the inessential means of
+its perpetuation.
+But this inessentiality does not come either from the institution to
+the individual or from the individual to the institution: it is actually
+practice isolating itself in so far as it is produced in a common milieu
+defined by new human relationships. These relationships are based
+quite simply on serial impotence: if I regard the institution as basically
+unalterable, this is because my praxis in the institutionalised group
+determines itself as incapable of changing the institution; and this
+impotence originates in my relation of circular alterity to the other
+members of the group. I error is practised against sub-groups - chietly
+against those which might form spontaneously under pressure of
+circumstances; and even, to a certain extent, against sub-groups which
+are organised and specialised by a common and reciprocal differentiation of the entire group (or against people who, as we shall see, are
+constituted by the authorities as the legitimate 'organs' of the entire
+community). And this, as we have seen, is simply because pledged
+heterogeneity, when merged with suffered separations, in the irreversibility of temporalisation, produces alterity as a revival of the practicoinert in interiority. When a group is invaded in this way, everyone lives
+mistrust as a reciprocity of impotence: I become suspect if 1 ask another
+third party to modify some structure, power, or practice, by joining
+with me and with others: what separates is not in fact the object to be
+changed so much as the possibility of founding a faction in the group
+as a negative determination, negated by the developing totalisation.
+Thus I do not dare make a proposal (take the initiative of the regulatory
+action) or, if I do make one, my proposition will elicit no response.
+Besides, I myself know that the other third parties are genuinely others
+and, with the possible exception of those who are closest to me, it is
+it will be deformed and diverted, and there is a danger that it will bring
+about results quite contrary to those I intended; it may damage the
+ommon object of the common practice (at least, as I discover it in my
+xperience); or it may be turned against me to destroy me. And thi
+very concrete reason always tends (according to the concrete conditions
+of this particular terror) to plunge me even deeper into silence. But
+still this is unimportant since it is only a matter of individual actions.
+But let us recall that separation, in whatever form, does a lot to raise
+
+6o2 Book IT
+the threshold of communication between third parties; and consequently, it is objectively more difficult - if not impossible - to make
+contact with them; and those who can be contacted might be unable to
+reach others. In a degraded group, to sum up, every proposal is
+'divisive', and its proposer is suspect - because he offers a glimpse of
+his freedom - and a divider; and any local regroupment, provided it is
+determined in interiority by the individuals present rather than by the
+others, elsewhere, who hold power, is a faction, because the inertia of
+the Others will make it into a separate group inside the group rather
+than a sub-group; any concrete proposal from individuals will be lost
+because - even if some Others are prepared to adopt it - the only
+possible means of communication with the Others, in so far as they have
+already been serialised, is the serial unity of the mass media:75 separation
+definitively eliminates 'orders passed on by word of mouth'.
+This impossibility of changing the practice in a given domain and
+adapting it to particular circumstances need not be directly perceived
+by the individual as a thwarted or failed attempt to bring about some
+particular change. His attitude to any given common activity, with its
+powers and functions, may well be positive. If I have stressed the
+impotence of the third party and treated it as the determining factor in
+the transition to the institution, this is only because this impotence, as a
+basic reciprocal relation between third parties in relation to a given
+practice, necessarily results in a modification of the attitude of each and
+all toward their operation; and this modification has as much to do
+with adhesion as with refusal. Both attitudes are, in effect, lived in the
+concrete mode of impotence. It is too bad if I do not agree: I shall have
+to come to terms with it. And ifI agree, so much the better: it is a fluke,
+an accident, crucial for me but indifferent for the practice itself, and
+might be expressed in these words: since it cannot be changed, it is
+just as well that I am willing to go along with it. Whether it is an
+internal practice of organisation, co-ordination, supervision, a struggle
+waged within the group against scarcity (of men, of money, or o
+ommunications), in short, a factor of integration, or whether it is
+detail of the common, transcendent action on the object or the enemy,
+the practice becomes an institution as soon as the group, as a unity
+which has been eroded by alterity, becomes powerless to change it
+without completely disrupting itself, that is to say, as soon as everyone
+comes to be conditioned by the shifting flight of the others. And this
+75. In English in original. (Ed.]
+
+The Institution 603
+metamorphosis does not in any way imply that it has become useless.
+Of course, it may be sustained either on the real basis of conflicts of
+interest between members of the group or, quite simply, as an integrating part of a practical group practice which gets older without being
+able to change (because of balances of opposing forces which reduce
+the ensemble to impotence in the midst of a society in the process of
+being transformed, etc.). But these different possibilities (which themselves refer from antagonism to alterity) should not be allowed to
+conceal the fact that the institution, as a detail of common action, can,
+at the level of the institutional group, retain its usefulness (either for the
+individuals as a whole - an exogamous system - or for a dominant
+fraction within the group). Similarly, as a detailed practice, it can and
+must realise itself through individuals who have been selected or
+produced by the group; it therefore presupposes powers, tasks, a
+system of rights and duties, a material localisation and an instrumentality. Thus it is characterised by the same features that enabled us
+to define organised practice: but, in so far as it is an institution, its real
+being and its strength come to it from emptiness, from separation, from
+inertia and from serial alterity; it is therefore the praxis as other.
+We have considered active passivity both as the regulated production of pledged inertia and as a condition for common activity; and, in
+the practico-inert field, we have also investigated passive activity as a
+result of alienation. We must now consider the institution in a declining
+group as the transition from one to the other. There can be numerous
+intermediaries between active passivity and passive activity, and it is
+impossible to know the statute of a given institution a priori: this can
+only be determined by its entire concrete history. The important point
+is that - at least as long as it still has its finality - it can never be entirely
+assimilated to the practico-inert: its meaning is still that of an action
+undertaken in the light of a certain objective (regardless of what
+counter-finalities may have developed); but on the other hand, the
+presence of alterity in it as suffered separation makes it impossible for it
+to become identical with the inert (if slight) forms of active passivity
+which are based simply on the pledged untranscendability of certai
+possibilities. At this level, the group is still entirely practical, despite
+the seriality which eats away at it, and the institution (or rather the
+institutional ensemble as systems of solidified relations) is simply the
+modality of its praxis. And the institutional character which is concealed by the common action is the strongest bond between the third
+parties, because its being is based on everyone's impotence, in other
+
+Goz Book II
+words, on the beginnings of a circular massification whose origin is
+the community's not-being-substance (non-être-substance).
+The being of the institution, as the geometrical locus of intersections
+of the collective and the common, is the non-being of the group, produced as a bond between its members. 7 The unity of the institution is
+the unity of alterity in so far as it is introduced into the group and used
+by the group to replace its own absent unity. But its relation to everyone is one of interiority, though it may define itself as praxis in
+exteriority: in fact, it determines everyone both in inertia and in
+practical obligation. Indeed, it transcends everyone in so far as it
+resides in all the Others, and is unpredictable and other in them, and
+dependent on this unpredictability. On the other hand, as an institutionalised praxis, it remains either a power over everyone (in the name
+of pledged faith) or, if everyone represents and maintains it, his own
+free power over the Others. This free power is now being challenged: for
+everyone, along with his power, will appear to everyone in the contradictory unity of the same and the Other. Thus recognition is challenge,
+and challenge is recognition. Permanent trade-union officials will
+appear worthy of trust if they are put to the test (thus the Other relates
+to the same and, ultimately, to freedom; but if the freedom appears too
+manifest, defiance will immediately be rekindled: it is necessary to
+identify a man who is at the service of his function, but the function
+must always have precedence over the man). But supposing they had
+deserved and won such trust, they would lose everything and be in
+danger of possibly serious violence if they were so inept as to oppose
+some wild-cat strike (or to try to impose some unpopular course of
+action); but by their violent reaction the workers would be acknowledging the power that they were challenging: they would react less
+strongly to the protests of a non-unionised worker.
+Thus the new statute of power emerges everywhere, even in the
+army, the archetypal institutional group. In the context of the organised
+group, we defined it as the right to do one's duty; but here it must be
+defined as the duty to do one's best in order to get one's right to do
+70. Here too it is necessary to rebut an idealist interpretation: institutions are
+generally sustained by the forces of order', that is to say, armed sub-group.
+enforce order by violence. But since not only these sub-groups, but also - as w
+shall see - sub-groups of authority, are institutions, it is still the case that the
+institutional system, including the coercion which maintains it, depends on the
+original reciprocal impotence of every third party in relation to every Other and
+
+The Institution G05
+one's duty recognised. Institutional man has to get this recognition by
+means of two opposed and simultaneous practices: on the one hand,
+when his institutional power is not directly threatened, his general
+tactic will be to liquidate the Other in himself so as to liquidate it in
+the Others (the officer who lives with his men and models his whole
+life on theirs); on the other hand, in the moment of exercising his
+power, institutional man will immediately constitute himself as the
+absolute Other, by adopting certain behaviour and dress; and he will
+base the firmness of the power exercised and of the decisions made, on
+his institution-being (être-institution), that is to say, on inertia and the
+total opacity of the alterity which has become the particular institution's presence in him, and, hence, the group's presence as common
+praxis. At this level, In tact, mystitcation is very probable: with the
+institution remaining a practice and che group not being dissolved, the
+institution, in its negative being (which is really only the ubiquity of
+non-being) appears, in appropriate circumstances, as the ontological
+statute of the community. This means that it refers to the whole of the
+institutional system as a relational totality of the synthetic determinations of the grouped multiplicity. Through the power-man (l'hommepouvoir) who reveals himself - through familiar rituals and dances - as
+institution-being, the organised individual believes he can see himself
+as integrated into the group through the institutional ensemble (and in
+fact this is what every citizen says and believes), whereas the institution
+can actually appear only at a particular moment in the involution of the
+group, and as an exact index of its disintegration. And, if the dance has
+been well done, if the power-man has, as he should, referred to the
+inorganic as the fundamental human reality, the order or decision will
+themselves appear as inorganic (unshakeable), and at the same time they
+will be obeyed in the name of pledged loyalty, that is to say, of pledged
+inertia. The freedom of the power-man, for the individual who
+acknowledges this power, is a pure mediation between the inertia of the
+institution and the inertia of the particular order. This is certainly a
+case of the abstract being transcended towards the concrete, but
+although this transcendence is acknowledged, it does not posit itself
+for itself, as in free practical labour: the mediation exhausts itself and
+disappears, remaining, for example, an inert determination of discourse,
+in that it is based on an inert, synthetic determination of human multiplicity and is addressed to the double inertia of organised individuals
+(pledged inertia based on serial impotence).
+In this moment, freedom is completely hidden or else appears as the
+
+6oG Book II
+inessential and ephemeral slave of necessity. Necessity, on the other
+hand, is absolute in the sense that its free, practical form (necessity
+produced by freedom) merges with its form as serial alienation. The
+imperative and impotence, terror and inertia are based on each other.
+The institutional moment, in the group, corresponds to what might be
+called the systematic self-domestication of man by man. The aim is, in
+effect, to create men who (as common individuals) will define themselves, in their own eyes and amongst themselves, by their fundamental relation (mediated reciprocity) with institutions. More than
+half of this task is carried out by circular seriality: everyone systematically acting on himself and on everyone else through all, resulting
+in the creation of the strict correlate of the man-institution, that is to
+say, the institutionalised man. In so far as the ossification of the ossified
+praxis which is the institution is due to our own impotence, it constitutes for each and for all a precise index of reification. This does not
+necessarily mean that we suffer it as a constraint, but rather that it is
+our own inorganic inertia in the social milieu. But the moment of
+common degradation in which the institution emerges is precisely that
+in which everyone aims to expel freedom from himself in order to
+realise the endangered unity of the declining group as a thing. So at
+this level of involution (under the pressure of exterior circumstances),
+the common individual tries to become a thing which is held against
+other things by the unity of a seal; the model for the institutional group
+is the forged tool. And everyone is implicated as such in institutionality.
+But on the other hand this is also because they are its victims even
+before they are born. The previous generation already defines their
+institutional future, as their external, mechanical destiny, that is to say,
+as determinations of untranscendability (or as determinations of their
+being), even before they are born. 'Obligations' - military, civic,
+professional, etc. - constitute in advance an untranscendability deep
+inside everyone who is born into the group; and of course, it is
+necessary to fulfil these obligations (not "play these roles' or 'adopt
+these attitudes' as the 'culturalists' would put it, indiscriminately
+mixing up material conditions with possibilities defined by the historical ensemble on the basis of these conditions and with institutional
+obligations). Being born into the group is a pledge (reiterated by rites
+of passage), and to make such a pledge is to take on the institutional
+inertia with which the others affect the child, in the form of a free
+commitment to realising the institution. From this point of view,
+institutional being is, in everyone, a prefabricated inertia of inorganic
+
+The Institution GoJ
+being, and will be transcended by a practical freedom whose pledged
+function will be to objectify itself in this same being as an inert determination of the future. The institution will produce its agents (organisers and organised) by giving them institutional determinations in
+advance, and institutionalised agents will then reciprocally identify
+themselves, in their relations of directed alterity, with the practical
+system of institutional relations, in so far as it is necessarily inscribed in
+a complex of worked objects of inorganic origins. Thus the institution as a stereotyped praxis (though, under the pressure of certain
+circumstances, its efficacity may reside in being stereotyped) adumbrates the future in its rigidity; and as the inert persistence of a reified
+organisation within a grouping which might well reorganise itself in
+any case, it constitutes itself as the elementary and abstract permanence
+of the social past as being, even, and above all, if the developing rearrangements reveal the perpetual changes of this past as signification."
+4 Institutionalisation and Sovereignty
+(Second transformation.) The institutional system as an exteriority of
+inertia necessarily refers to authority as its reinteriorisation; and
+authority, as a power over all powers and over all third parties through
+these powers, is itself established by the system as an institutional
+guarantee of institutions.
+The foundation of authority is in fact sovereignty, in so far as, after
+the stage of the fused group, it is the quasi-sovereignty of the regulatory third party. Thus the leader emerges at the same time as the group
+itself and produces the group which produces him, except that at this
+elementary moment of the investigation, the leader might be anyone.
+In other words, everyone's quasi-sovereignty is one of the constitutive
+bonds of the group. We then pointed out that if certain individuals
+became regulatory third parties more often or for longer periods of
+time than others this was on the basis of particular historical circumstances, and, as such, initially of accidental ones. Lastly we pointed out
+77. Which occurs whenever the institution is preserved while the common
+transformations around it give it another relation to all in the developing totalisation, in interiority and without even touching it.
+
+608 Book II
+that, in revolutionary periods, groups which appear and disappear
+within a day are organised and reorganised around quite specific
+individuals who may be trusted for long periods. Such 'agitators' are
+regulatory third parties, but they should not strictly be called leaders:
+they mimic or express for all the praxis which is implicitly defined
+everywhere, in the ubiquity of mediated reciprocity. At the level of the
+pledge and of the organisation, we have observed the emergence of
+powers. At that point we did not describe authority since powers (as
+reciprocal quasi-sovereignty) do not directly involve the specific
+power which is called authority. However, we did observe the emergence of a truly common relation of everyone to each and all - which is
+the diffuse power of life and death over the traitor, or, in other words,
+fraternity-terror as a basic determination of sociality.
+This permanent living structure of coercion is a necessary determination of sovereignty as authority. From the moment in which a
+regulatory third party (or a sub-group acting as a regulatory third
+party) becomes a pledged holder of the power of regulation as organised
+function, and when this third party receives and concentrates the
+internal violence of the group as a power to impose his regulation,
+everyone's shifting quasi-sovereignty is immobilised and becomes
+authority as a specific relation of one individual to all. This relation may
+appear at the level of organised groups; but, in so far as the group is
+alive, and therefore constantly being rearranged, the relation itself
+moves and passes from one to the other, according to the requirements
+of the situation. Authority does not emerge in its full development
+except at the level of institutions: institutions, that is to say, a rebirth
+of seriality and impotence, are necessary for the consecration of Power
+and for ensuring its de jure permanence; in other words, authority
+necessarily depends on inertia and seriality, in so far as it is constituted
+Power; but, on the other hand, its real efficacity must, through its
+coercive strength, tend to increase the power and number of institutions, as products of recurrence and massification and as the only
+effective common weapon in the struggle against factors of dispersal.
+Or, to look at it from the other point of view, the institutional system
+resents itself, by a permanent mystification, in its inorganic-being a
+he real unity of the declining group. But if the system is simpl
+revealed in itself, it will unfold as a multiplicity of diverse, non-totalised
+relations. We have seen in effect that the institutionalisation of functions occurs through the medium of a history, in otherwise disparate
+places, and that the diversity of circumstances and problems necessarily
+
+The Institution G09
+causes a local diversity of temporalisations. There are dislocations,
+delays, asymmetries: in one place the apparatuses of co-ordination will
+be directly established in an institutional form, while in another,
+mediating 'organs' will never reach the stage of institutionality (some
+disappear, and others survive). This kind of social solidification,
+therefore, does not present itself as a praxis, or even as a unifying
+process. Thus authority fulfils a definite function: as the synthetic
+power of a single individual (possibly, though not necessarily, as an
+expression of a united sub-group), it gathers up the multiplicity of
+institutional relations and gives them the synthetic unity of a real
+praxis. Institutions claim to be the inorganic being-one of the serialised
+community; the leader claims to be the dissolution and synthetic
+reunification of this external passivity in the organic unity of the
+regulatory praxis, that is to say, of the praxis of the group in so far as
+it is reflected to him as the common praxis of a person.
+But this is the essential contradiction of authority: the individual reincarnation of the fused group and of Freedom-Terror - the leader - himself as such enters the institutional multiplicity, since he is a real
+product of an institution. Thus the leader preserves institutions to
+precisely the extent that he apparently produces them as an internal
+exteriorisation of his interiority, and he dissolves their inert-being in
+his historical praxis. But this historical praxis - as the reciprocity of the
+sovereign and of common individuals - is itself produced by the inert
+eternity of institutional relations. This dialectical movement must
+be examined more closely: through it and on the basis of it, the
+search for the intelligibility proper to the institutional group will be
+completed.
+Now, the first point to notice is that, contrary to what is so often
+maintained, sovereignty in itself does not constitute any problem or
+require any foundation. The illusion that it does is due to the fact that
+the state of massification is normally regarded as logically and historically basic, and that the reified relationships which occur in
+societies based on exploitation are treated as the prototype of human
+relations. From the moment in which absence of relationship becomes
+the fundamental relation, one can ask how the type of synthetic
+relation known as Power can set itself up as the bond between the
+separate molecules. And all means of interpretation except two have
+been foresworn a priori. These two are, that Power emanates from
+God, and that Power emanates from certain intermittent metamorphoses which transform society into a totalised-totality, and that it
+
+G1o Book II
+expresses the constraints of collective representation, etc. Unfortunately, neither God nor the totalised group actually exist. If it were
+really necessary to find a foundation for sovereignty, we would be
+searching for a long time: for there is no such thing.
+There is none because there is no need for one: sovereignty is simply
+the univocal relation of interiority between the individual as praxis and
+the objective field which he organises and transcends towards his own
+end. There is no place for a foundation for the right of praxis by which
+man reproduces his life by freely rearranging the matter around him:
+on the contrary, this dialectical transcendence, which shows the
+becoming-praxis (le devenir-praxis) of need is itself the foundation of
+all rights. In other words, sovereignty is man himself as action, as
+unifying labour, in so far as he has a purchase on the world and is able
+to change it. Man zs sovereign. And, in so far as the material field is also
+a social field, the sovereignty of the individual extends without limit
+over all individuals: these material organisms have to be unified as his
+means in the total field of his sovereign action. The only limitation on
+man's sovereignty over all Others is simple reciprocity, that is to say,
+the total sovereignty of each and all over him. When this original
+relation is lived outside any institution, it just reconstitutes every
+person as an absolute for any other person, that is to say, as the untranscendable means of which everyone is both the means and the end
+to precisely the extent that every individual is the means to his own
+end and the end for every means. In this way, sovereignty is both the
+univocal bond already described and the basic relation of reciprocity
+(co-sovereignty).
+Sovereignty within the group, therefore, does not have to explain
+its positive power, but rather the negative and limiting determinations
+to which it is subjected. In fact, we have seen how it became quasisovereignty in the tension of 'transcendence-immanence'. And from our
+point of view, this limitation is still the foundation of Power: the
+teriority would break. An Assyrian King who had his prisoners of war
+(members of the other army) executed was exercising total sovereignty
+over them, but, at the same time, it was impossible for him to treat them
+as men; his sovereignty could express itself only as a univocal relation
+of violence with a given multiplicity, invading his practical field fron
+outside, which he had the material means to annihilate. On the othe
+hand, his relation to his own soldiers is one of quasi-sovereignty
+
+The Institution 6z1
+precisely because the relation of authority is no longer based on physical
+strength. Let there be no misunderstanding: discipline could not be
+more strict, supervision more vigilant, the organs of coercion more
+numerous, or the "forces of order' more powerful. But the 'forces of
+order' present themselves to the mutineers, or rebels, as the same to
+the same; the soldiers who shoot them are the same as those who are
+shot and there is no a priori way of assigning a given military subgroup to either of the two categories (marksmen, victims). Alterity
+makes them into forces of order, and this means that the primary
+relation of authority is a quasi-sovereignty of interiority, as violence
+creating its means, with sub-groups which - either through their
+interests or through the common interests of the group or through the
+specific connection between their interests and those of the group -
+define their coercive action as a function of its regulatory action. In the
+same way, the technical and instrumental superiority of the repressive
+group (in the service of authority) over the group as a whole is not
+always either obvious or necessary, especially to the army since the
+forces of order and the rebels have arms which are a priori similar. Of
+course, the "forces of order' will always, as long as order reigns, have
+heavy, common weapons (whether horses, artillery, or planes), but this
+is precisely because their relation of violence to the rebels is a power
+over the majority of third parties, lived and acknowledged by the nonrebels as a whole as right-duty.
+A 'public force' as the support of authority expresses itself as just
+violence only in the milieu of 'Freedom-Terror' and through the
+'Freedom-Terror' which is in any case going to destroy itself.
+Freedom-Terror' becoming specialised function - this (and, as we
+shall see, the seriality of impotence) is the relation of interiority for
+repressive groups. And interiorised withdrawal is precisely the common
+milieu of the group which, as long as it remains the same, gives repression a regular victory. The defeat of a rebellion is settled in the precise
+moment where it discovers its own limits in extension: this unity, and
+no more. It is these limits which pass sentence: and the sentence comes
+from the group. By remaining entirely what it is - an institutionalised
+group - regardless of its sympathies and of the individual sympathies
+of other soldiers for the rebels, within itself it constitutes the group of
+insurgents as its radical negation. In fact, and precisely to the exten
+hat the 'loyalists' resist any reorganisation of the group as a new
+totalisation proposed by the rebel group, that is to say, in so far as they
+see the group not as producing a new possibility for the future, but as
+
+612 Book II
+negating their own future, purely and simply (that is to say, the rigid
+future of institutionality), these 'loyalists' constitute the group as a pure
+internal weakening of unity, as a negative, corrosive power, as a threat
+of seriality and an inert force of negation. So, as the 'majority', they are
+the party which is linked to the public forces of destruction: they
+legitimate this annihilation by means of their fidelity and, furthermore,
+they make it materially possible either by abstaining or lending their
+support." Thus the bond between Power and the regulated third
+parties, in spite of and above all because of the failure to challenge the
+sovereignty of the leader, is based chiefly on the transformation of
+total sovereignty into quasi-sovereignty. This simply means that the
+leader, as a unifying, reshaping and repressive function, is inside the
+group itself. At the moment in which the group constitutes itself, under
+the presue of circumstance, y om the are viring.
+final stages of petrification, everyone makes himself quasi-sovereign
+and this determination in interiority of the regulatory third party, as a
+transition from the Other to the Same, is a fundamental structure of
+praxis as community.
+No, it is not sovereignty which has to be explained, or even the
+initial limitation which gives it its efficacity. It is the second constitutive
+negation: why, on what basis, in what external and internal circumstances, to what end, etc., is the circular reciprocity of quasi-sovereignties suddenly halted, and why is the common individual (or the subgroup), which is the material place at which the blockage occurs,
+defined as sovereign?
+The problem is often obscured by ascribing the sovereign's enormous actual power to him from the outset and by seeing it as a manifestation of some positive force (as if he were the incarnation or
+reflection of "collective sovereignty'). To do this is to forget that
+quasi-sovereignty, like the mediated reciprocity of each to all, is
+characterised by its ubiquity rather than by some synthetic virtue
+78. This does not in any way mean that the common individuals of the group
+support the policies of the leaders, the conduct of the war, etc. But it does at least
+mean that they regard the dissolution of institutional unity as a much more serious
+danger than any which might be incurred through the incompetence of the
+leaders. And in so far as this appraisal expresses the aberrant synthesis of the
+seriality of impotence and practical unity, it necessarily characterises the individuals who are institutionalised: once again, the meanings which are produced are
+basically structured by the relational statute of the group.
+
+The Institution 613
+which combines all the 'powers' of the group. In fact, it is the same
+everywhere because it is always, for everyone, the possibility of defining a here and defining oneself as a regulatory third party. Quasisovereignty is not, and never can be, a totalised power of the group
+over its members, nor can it be the successive power of each over all.
+Power enters with the first limitation, that is to say, with the pledge.
+Quasi-sovereignty was originally the following simple contradiction:
+in every third party the synthetic power of reorganising the practical
+field manifests itself as his membership of the rearranged group, and,
+therefore, as the same in everyone, now; thus the common praxis is
+realised everywhere at the same time and it is both means and end. Thus
+every quasi-sovereign, as a regulatory third party, transcends the
+grouped ensemble by a head, without ceasing to be integrated into it,
+and, as a regulated third party, he allows himself to be transcended by
+a himself who has emerged in some arbitrary here.
+The sovereign, by contrast, can be defined within the group by a
+statute peculiar to him, the basic reality of which is negation: no one
+can claim that he is outside the group, or that he has ceased to be a third
+party. Sovereignty-institution designates the common individual who
+exercises it as a non-transcendable third party, at least in the performance of his functions. If he is not transcendable, and if he still does
+not leave the group, his regulatory action (either actually performed or
+defined as an organised operation) is always determined as common
+praxis laying down its own laws before all. But untranscendability
+produces the untranscendable third party as the member of the group
+through whom this regulation always has to be carried out. Thus the
+existence of a sovereign is based negatively on the impossiblity
+(suffered or agreed or both: this has still to be determined) of every
+third party becoming directly regulatory again. This does not mean
+that every practical initiative, every attempt at reorganisation, every
+invention and discovery has to originate in the sovereign: it means that
+or the "mass media) because he has sole responsibility for communication. We have seen how the group, in the process of organising
+itself, produces apparatuses of control and mediation. But whatever
+their importance, these apparatuses are always specialised: the function
+of the sovereign is to ensure the mediation of all the mediations and to
+constitute himself as such as a permanent mediation between the
+
+614 Book II
+common individuals. But this mediation is aimed at more than the
+preservation of the unity of the group: it attempts to preserve it in the
+light of practical realisation of the common aim.
+Now, the fixity of the mediation arises as both a result and a condition of certain expropriations which are suffered and accepted by
+common individuals: in fact it constitutes the negation of direct reciprocity and the alienation of indirect reciprocity.? The negation of
+direct reciprocity is centralisation, as the necessity that two given
+sub-groups whose practices are complementary should go through 'the
+departments' or 'the Council' in order to adapt their actions reciprocally. The alienation of indirect reciprocity is that mediation is
+itself a modifying action on this reciprocity. Mediated reciprocity,
+which is the constitutive structure of the group, is direct and free as
+long as the mediation is done through all, that is to say, quite simply,
+within common praxis. It becomes an uncertain, other object when the
+common praxis, embodied in a single, untranscendable mediator,
+works as an individual activity on the reciprocal relation: in fact,
+communication may always be broken (by a break of any origin) or
+altered; reciprocity may return to everyone in the form of a task laid
+down by the central power on the basis of reciprocal relations, that is
+to say, in so far as they are revised and corrected by a third party. Thus
+the relation of the same to the same returns to everyone as Other.
+And this alterity is expressed in its new structure: it is either an
+order or a defence. The structure of 'Fraternity-Terror' and pledged
+inertia will no doubt already have determined a structure of alterity in
+each practical freedom, and this will have produced the imperative and
+power as structuring, structured relations of the statutory group and
+the organised group. But these free imperatives defined themselves
+through initiatives which were both assumed and controlled, and
+which were a direct function of the task to be done. But the stratified
+action of the sub-groups on the group as a quasi-object will already be
+marked by a certain passivity, through the multiplicity of rearrangements: it is this that transformed what was originally a pure common
+praxis into a praxis-process. But, in any case, the new mediation emphasises this movement. Thus the sovereign, being untranscendable,
+is other than everyone. It is no longer possible to say that all members
+79. I am referring to the relations between representatives of powers as such
+rather than to free relations of reciprocity (although, in special conditions, the
+latter may be seriously altered thereby).
+
+The Institution 615
+are the same or that every elsewhere is here. In effect, there is a common
+individual who, as a member of the group, is other than all because he
+cannot become a regulated third party. And this third party will of
+course be an institution, in that, like all the Others, he will be the inert,
+imperative, unity of all the institutionalised members. But, on the other
+hand, the paradox of this institution is that it has to realise itself through
+a free, organising praxis to which all are subjected by an Other. The
+praxis of the group becomes other in so far as it is manifested in a
+particular temporalisation and as an individual action: or rather, it
+becomes other in so far as the common project presents itself as
+individual will.
+And so, for every third party, the imperative which defines his
+power returns to him as the will of an Other, which he obeys because
+of his pledge. It is a new structure (the individualisation in a sovereign
+Other of the common imperative) which constitutes the command as
+such. In obeying the Other as Other in the name of the common praxis,
+everyone becomes other in so far as he is the same. This is the basic
+structure of obedience: it is realised in the milieu of 'Fraternity-Terror'
+and against a background of violence: in everyone, inert pledged
+being is an untranscendable negation of the possibility of not carrying
+out the imposed action; refusal would effectively mean the dissolution
+of the group (both as an organised group and as a pledged group); but,
+in so far as action is, in this case, an interiorisation of an other will
+(volonté autre), it introduces an induced passivity into it, and comes to
+be occasioned by an untranscendable sovereignty with no reciprocity;
+and the refusal to dissolve the group in oneself, that is to say, the
+legitimation of common violence (as repressive terror) by readopting
+the pledge becomes no more than submitting to the individual decisions
+of the untranscendable third party and to his quasi-sovereignty as
+violence without reciprocity.
+It is at this level that freedom in itself (and not only in its objectification) becomes alienated and hidden from its own eyes. Task and
+function, as imperatives, referred only to all and to the urgency of the
+job to be done: pledged inertia referred to everyone's free praxis (as
+other, admittedly, but formally, and not as the concrete freedom of one
+Other). Thus the imperative as such arose in the milieu of dialectical
+treedom and, in the completion of the task, revealed free organic
+action (as a mediation between the common individual and the object
+of the common praxis). Obedience to orders cuts out these references.
+But in spite of all the masks, organic praxis is still the only modality of
+
+616 Book II
+action; the most disciplined soldier, when he shoots on command, has
+to take aim, estimate distances, pull the trigger at the right time (that is
+to say, as soon as possible after the order, making allowance for special
+circumstances). But the sovereignty of the untranscendable third party
+expresses itself as an order through the will of an Other; and the pledged
+(and suffered) impossibility of not adopting the order becomes an
+interiorisation of the other will as the real unity of the practical temporalisation. In the moment of organic mediation, the free project of
+the transcended third party arises, with its own comprehension as an
+other project (projet autre) (or project of an Other) referring every
+ensemble not only to the community, to reciprocal powers, and to the
+remade pledge but also to a free praxis which is not mine, and which
+imposes itself on mine as regulatory, that is to say - because of its
+own untranscendability - as an individualisation of the common aim. In
+developing the Other's project in terror (that is to say, both under the
+constraint of the sovereign's coercive forces and in the climate of
+fraternity-violence, the two being ultimately identical), I deny myself
+in my organic individuality, so that the Other can accomplish his
+project in me.
+At this level, a double transformation takes place. (1) At the level of the
+commonindividual, my powersare conferred on me byall but only through
+the mediation of the Other; there is still reciprocal organisation, but it takes
+the form of a univocal rearrangement, without reciprocity; and
+common praxis manifests itself in the form of an untranscendable
+praxis of an individual in freedom. (2) At the level of my own individual activity, my freedom is stolen from me and I become the actualisation of the Other's freedom. This does not mean that I feel as though I
+were being subjected to some external or internal constraint; or that the
+Other manipulates me from a distance like a hypnotist; the specific
+structure is that my freedom is freely lost and divests itself of its translucidity so as to actualise, here, in my muscles, in my body at work, the
+Other's freedom in so far as it is elsewhere, in the Other, and in so far
+as it is lived, here, by me, as an alienating signification, as a rigid
+absence and as the absolute priority, everywhere, of interiorised
+alterity - everywhere, that is, except, in the untranscendable Other,
+who is other than all precisely in being alone in being able to be himself. 80
+80. Whatever the historical situation, there is a serious error which must be
+avoided. It would be absurd to define an order as an exigency in exteriority (the
+
+The Institution 61J
+master commanding the slave) based on force, and then to go on to derive institutional powers of authority from these initial relations. To do so would be completely to mistake the true structure of an order and of obedience, that complex
+dialectic in interiority, of the same and the other, of constraint and legitimacy.
+When a slave obeys his masters' orders, this does not in any way mean that he
+regards them as legitimate. Neither, of course,
+, does it mean, a priori, that he
+denies their legitimacy: the relation is in fact quite indeterminate. A given slave
+may be reconciled to his fate; he may be privileged in relation to the other slaves,
+born in the domus, etc., and, especially if he has personal relations with the
+master, he may regard the master's authority as legitimate, that is to say, he may
+almost unconsciously betray his fellow-slaves. But another, who is deeply rebellious, and conscious of the injustice of his condition, may obey either cynically
+and out of mere prudence or, possibly, in the expectation of a revolt which he
+will join. If one sets out from this absolute indeterminacy it will be impossible to
+comprehend why obedience, as a simple fact (a surrender to constraint) may sometimes appear as pledged faith, as a permanent legitimation of authority, etc. The
+rational order is in fact quite strict: authority, as a complex relation between an
+untranscendable third party and the common individuals who legitimate his
+powers by obeying him - this is what is given in the first instance. And the violent
+integration of new individuals into the group (for example, the slaves in familial
+exploitation) takes place in the name of this legitimate authority. Obviously the
+mystification is complete. But it results precisely from the juridical structure of
+the community: newcomers are introduced into it with a certain statute, certain
+functions, etc., and the sovereign (for example, the pater familias) demands their
+obedience in the name of a pledge which they never made but which they accept
+in spite of themselves, for the other members of the group, because it is the
+synthetic basis of all common relations and because they are in fact (through
+either capture or birth) integrated into the community. On the other hand, when
+the historical development of the oppressed class is just beginning, while it is
+paralysed by impotence and seriality, while individual antagonisms make any
+common action impossible, and, above all, when individuals are placed (by birth,
+for example) into a juridical group which exercises 'fraternity-terror' on itself
+through the mediation of a leader, obedience legitimates the sovereignty of the
+exploiters in the eyes of the exploited. As the case of the Lyon silk-weavers
+proves, revolt is not born of systematic questioning of the system but rather,
+amongst men who still respect and acknowledge the employers' right to own
+machines and to govern, of the sheer impossibility of survival. It is revolt - as
+permanent praxis, initially blind, imposed by need, and by the danger of death -
+which gradually creates the illegitimacy of public powers and in the end reduces
+class relations to a new and basic truth: that of power relations. Except in a case of
+suddenly instituted tyranny, of military occupation, etc., it is not and never can be
+the illegitimacy of the powers which occasions revolt. In other words, cynical
+obedience to orders which are regarded as illegitimate is a historical moment in
+the evolution of authority: that in which conflicts which are initially spasmodic
+and disordered, in the process of becoming more ordered, create an objective
+situation in which it is possible to reduce the relations of exploiters to exploited
+or of oppressors to oppressed to mere power relations.
+
+618 Book II
+In the light of these considerations, it is possible to establish the
+original finality of sovereignty as an institution as well as the formal
+conditions of its possibility. The problem of its historical emergence in
+each case is not our concern.
+We have seen how the group's common praxis can, through the
+institutional system, be conceived as its transcendent freedom and at
+the same time as its fundamental being. But we have also learnt that
+the institution is a practical relation (to the common object), based on
+impotence and separation, as the reified relationships between members
+of the group. Furthermore, we have observed that as soon as one tries
+to explain an institutional system, it tends to appear as an ensemble of
+relations in exteriority. Lastly, praxis as common freedom is no more
+than an index of the alienation of our individual freedom. However,
+the group remains effective and practical: the army may make use of
+the institutional relations which characterise it in order to define a local
+tactic or a strategy. Wherever common praxis retains its vitality and
+reality, the constituent dialectic - that is to say, organised practices -
+sustains the constituted dialectic, even beneath the thick stratifications
+of serial and institutionalised ensembles.
+Now, the contradiction which is proper to institutional systems (and
+which derives both from the fact that they are produced as the only
+practical instruments in the circumstances and from the fact they are
+produced through the resurrection of serialities) is that, in themselves,
+they represent both the irresistible force of transcendent praxis and the
+permanent possibility that it will break up into serial relations of
+seriality. This danger is increased by the fact that a group's tendency to
+define itself in terms of its institutions is proportional to the importance
+of the serialities which penetrate it. In practice, this means that the
+group is constantly threatened by the danger that an increase in its
+level of seriality may lead each institution to function for itself, as a
+pure practico-inert exis, and that their practical unity may explode into
+a mere exterior dispersal. In this light, it is possible to discern the true
+function of sovereignty: it is the institutional reinteriorisation of the
+exteriority of institutions or, in so far as the latter are reifying mediamodi between penised imes, And this institution as oned for any
+group consensus; on the contrary, it is based on the impotence of its
+nembers. Thus the sovereign is a reflexive synthesis of dead-practice
+vhich were tending to be separated in a centifugal movement. Througt
+his personal unity, he unifies them into a totalising project which
+
+The Institution G19
+individualises them; and this no longer has anything to do with relations
+tending towards the universal (like the taxation system, the military
+law, etc.), but instead with an individual historical ensemble of which
+every institution forms a part as an instrument of all, and whose
+totalisation is its practical employment for attaining the common
+objective. Of course, the sovereign and his praxis are products of the
+institutional system: in this sense, they participate in the exteriority of
+all the relations, in their analytical universality and in their inertia: not
+only is there an ensemble of laws specifying the mode of recruitment
+and professional training for the untranscendable third party, but also -
+since in himself he is no more than the institutional system lived in a
+reflexive synthesis of interiority - the limited field of his practical
+possibilities is simply a determination of his future by the unifying
+ensemble of institutional instruments.
+But we have already seen that these institutions are themselves the
+practical relations between the institutionalised third parties and that
+they define them in reciprocity in the endlessly repeated movement of a
+single process-practice. At this level military service is an objective
+process which can be studied in exteriority: each year, at a given time,
+X young men of such and such an age are called up for X months or
+X years. It is also a finality in the process of being passivised: the
+national group must be able to defend itself by arms. Lastly and, from
+our point of view, most important, it is a determination in inertia of the
+reciprocity between the people in the group (conscripts, those refused
+admission, or called up, or recalled, or granted deferment, or released,
+etc.), and this reciprocity is naturally practical because it creates
+diversities both of passive functions (postings, technical abilities) and
+of interest.
+Now, the institutional production of the sovereign represents the
+practical reinteriorisation of these determinations of exteriority. First,
+the passivised end of the military institution becomes a common
+objective and means of achieving some specific exterior end. The
+problem is really to keep the institution inside the framework of a
+concrete policy and as an indispensable means of maintaining it; if he
+is not prevented from doing so by his statute, the sovereign must be
+able (directly or indirectly) to modify the institution (increase the
+length of service, for example) in accordance with political needs, or to
+give an appearance of practical reor ganisation to processes which are
+conditioned by external changes (the development of industry and of
+reapons, the reorganisation of the army around new weapons). But
+
+620 Book II
+above all, the revival of free praxis, as un transcendable interiorisation,
+has the effect of referring this unified activity to the institutionalised
+third parties as the truth of their institutional being. Without the
+sovereign, it is impossible to dissolve their passivity: military service,
+in fact, becomes no more than a process. But free sovereign praxis
+presents itself as the meaning and the embodiment in freedom of the
+inert-being of the third parties. The institutional group, constituted
+reason, the dialectic imitated and already distorted by seriality, appears
+in the practical unity of the sovereign as constituent reason. Separation
+at the base remains necessarily what it is, but it transcends itself (elle
+se transcende) through everyone and returns to the apex, as a consequence of sovereign unity; impotence, as a relation of exteriority at the
+base, is conceived by everyone at the apex as a systematic and ordered
+deployment of the original synthesis. This is because, as we have seen,
+the institutional group alienates the practical freedoms of its members
+to the free praxis of the community. But this praxis exists only as the
+abstract, negative object of an empty intention. The institution of the
+untranscendable regulator has the effect of reinteriorising this common
+freedom and of giving it an ambivalent statute of both individuality
+and generality.
+In so far as the sovereign is one person in pursuit of the common
+objective and realising quite specific activities, this untranscendable
+third party refers this common action to the institutionalised third
+parties - who perform it without recognising it in themselves - in the
+strict form of an individual activity. Such is the first relation between
+the third party and the sovereign: in one way, it is a relation between
+two individuals (the first, inert and impotent, finds individual action in
+the second and finds his own justification in him, in the Other). On the
+other hand, the sovereign is signified by sovereignty-institution as a
+general and indeterminate individual who simply has to respond to
+certain conditions (relating to his mode of recruitment). And his power,
+orn of the institution itself, as a common product of the group a
+erial impotence, is in itself common; in other words, the sovereign is
+
+The Institution 622
+common, institutionalised individual as any arbitrary member of the
+group: his common reality is institutional-being (suffered impotence,
+pledged inertia), as producing its own power in inertia and freedom;
+and from this point of view, his actions always have a structure of
+generality: they apply to everyone, as an individual defined by his
+function, because they emanate from an individual who is himself
+defined by his function. The group rediscovers itself through everyone
+in the universalising power of their individual actions. Thus the
+sovereign-individual and the sovereign-institution are both present in
+every decision of sovereignty.
+But the institution of authority cannot prevent the dispersal of
+institutions as such: in itself, it is strictly homogeneous with all the
+others. In fact, only the realisation of the universal through an individual,
+historical action can reinteriorise the centrifugal exteriority of inertia.
+Every action practically reinteriorises the institutional system by employing it in its entirety for a synthetic complex of historical operations;
+every individual practice realises itself as a temporalisation. This
+merely means that the group cannot perceive itself as praxis in the
+sovereign, except in that highly suspect moment of the undertaking, in
+which free praxis acts as a mediation between the common individual
+and the object. Only the sovereign can and must be free; he alone has
+to produce his actions as moments of a free dialectical development.
+There is only one freedom for all the members of the group: that of the
+sovereign. And this ambiguous freedom is both the common freedom
+(in its institutional origins) and his individual freedom in the service of
+the community. But it is an organisational freedom: it rearranges the
+group by issuing orders; and these orders, as we have seen, have the
+effect of detaching everyone's free praxis - buried beneath institutionality - and at the same time of alienating it, by realising themselves
+as other through it. Now, at the level of this alienation, the presence of
+the Other is produced as a substitute for the ubiquity of the same: the
+sovereign is present in everyone as Other in the moment when he is
+obeyed. And everyone thereby distances himself slightly from the
+statute of alterity in relation to the Others, because he becomes the same
+as a bearer of the universal Other and as mediated by him in his
+relations with everyone.
+But the ambiguity of the obedient third party, in his relation to the
+Other will which he actualises, indicates sufficiently the function and,
+as it were, the failure of sovereignty as the practical reunification of an
+institutionalised group. The question whether the members of the
+
+622 Book Il
+group will be reunited in a common praxis rediscovered through particular orders and sovereign operations or whether they find their unity
+as organic individuality in the person of their sovereign, and then
+accept his own wishes as a common aim, cannot be settled a prior.
+Here again we encounter the absolute limits of the constituted dialectic:
+if the group seeks its common-being in the institution of sovereignty,
+its being will be dissipated in abstract exteriority; if it wishes to grasp
+its own ontological unity (which, as we have seen, does not exist) in
+the concrete, it will run up against an organic and untranscendable
+individuality; and this untranscendable individuality presents itself
+as a transcendence (dépassement) of every multiplicity of individuals
+(because it really emerges as the group, inside the group).
+Embodiment, as a fact of sovereignty, the production of the group
+by the group in the form of this particular person, with these individual
+characteristics, these ailments, this irreducible physiognomy, and of
+this particular age, is the manifestation of a constitutional impossibility
+which we observed long ago: it is impossible for a multiplicity, even
+if it is interiorised in each of its members and negated, to produce itself
+for itself, in itself, under any ontological statute other than those of
+dispersal through inertia and organic individuality. The latter form of
+being, maintained by the institution as a common reality but utterly
+inadequate to the group, presents itself to every member of the group
+not only as generality (institutionality), but also as a practical individuality, homogeneous with every separate individuality (though
+superior in power, dignity, etc.), and as a condensation of the common
+by means of an immense pressure which is liable to transform it into
+idiosyncracy. The future leader, son of the present one, has just been
+born: the third parties worship the group which they and their sons
+will compose in the future, in the form of a child. In fact, when the
+mode of recruitment is defined as the inheritance of functions, the
+group is reborn, materialised, concretised, and produced as the eldest sor
+by the leader; it is reborn by the flesh, recreated through the virility of
+one individual, and, within the reflexive structure, his inert-being comes
+back to him as transcended, and transformed into a living, physical
+unity. At the same time, he is the father, as an organic praxis with a
+common structure. The formal untranscendability of biological
+integration is concretely realised inside institutional groups by the
+untranscendability of the third party.
+Thus, in a group which is eroded by serialities, the sovereign (in his
+quasi-sovereignty) emerges initially as an organ of integration. He is
+
+The Institution 623
+untranscendable, and his quasi-sovereignty places him above recurrence; living and one, he reveals common unity to the half-dead group
+as a symmetrical synthesis of the human body. He is a universal
+mediation, and he destroys reciprocity wherever it exists, and relations
+between transcended third parties cannot establish themselves except
+through his mediation. But in fact he emerges in the moment where
+these relations are on the decline. His instituted presence undoubtedly
+contributes to their decline: at least, he re-establishes them as his own
+products (in other words, he creates a concrete, practical reciprocity
+between given sub-groups or individuals, sovereignly and by order).
+This relation solidifies in so far as its reason lies outside itself in the
+praxis of the Other, and in so far as this is its only reason for preserving
+itself. But the institutional individual mistrusts the free relations which
+reveal the threat of everyone's freedom everywhere as a dissolution of
+the institutional monolith: he sees integration as a petrification by
+vhich alterity will be merged into an inertia of homogeneity (which he
+takes to be the rediscovered Being of the group). At times of mistrust,
+the untranscendable third party in the mediated relation is a surety for
+every third party for the other; and everyone appears to the other as a
+common project in so far as its details are defined by an individual will.
+And when the sovereign organises new sub-groups - either directly
+or through official mediation - he is the body of the constituted body,
+his decree is the practical, imperative milieu in which every member of
+the sub-groups was reborn, from a point of view which is defined
+elsewhere, by the Other, and with powers which he derives from the
+group in so far as they are defined by the wishes of a particular individual. These reciprocities (and limits of competence, etc.), as others, are
+for everyone the concrete, or life itself, in so far as their still synthetic
+character and their alterity represent in and for everyone a protection
+against seriality (the victory of the inorganic over the practical organism), by the total and reciprocal alienation of all practical organisms to
+a single one. The last word is no longer dust (dust thou art and unto
+dust thou shalt return), but the living totality. And, in serial isolation
+itself, obedience to or reverence for the sovereign saves everyone from
+his sclerosis of inertia: unable to sustain relations with all or to realise
+the inessentiality of his person and the essentiality of the common
+being, everyone emerges - in respect, fear, unconditional fidelity, and
+sometimes in worship - as an inessential embodiment of the whole,
+that is to say, of the sovereign. Here the relation is inverted: the
+sovereign once embodied an impossible ontological unity as the
+
+624 Book II
+organic, individual unity of all in one; and conversely, everyone can
+relate concretely to the all-sovereign of whom he becomes both a
+constituted part and an inessential embodiment - and these amount to
+the same thing though their logical orientations may be different. The
+alienation of an individual to the individual-totality represents a
+further decline of the group as common praxis; but, at the same time,
+it revives the structural bond in a bastardised form. This bond defined
+itself, in practical unity and in it alone, as a synthetic relation of the
+part to the totalisation; and it seems to reproduce itself here as an
+ontological relation between an element in the process of massification
+and the totality which reaffirms itself as already created.
+But the practical perception of inessentiality comes to people when
+quasi-sovereignty, as untranscendability, constitutes them from outside
+as quasi-objects - not theoretically or through speeches or ceremonies
+(though there may well be some of these), but practically, through the
+perpetual rearrangements which the apparatuses of sovereignty make
+by order and which are carried out at all levels by the manipulation of
+each and all. Such a rearrangement should, in principle, advance the
+integration of the group in accordance with imposed transcendent
+objectives. It realises itself as a means within the closed world which is
+determined by the pencil of rays which unite the sovereign and the
+object (the exterior object which has to be produced, destroyed, etc.).
+Thus he encounters common praxis in both manipulation and command, but in the form of individualised will. But this does not matter:
+this will radiates from a single source, it is transmitted by specific
+apparatuses, and it determines a field of pure will in which every quasiobject recognises itself in its quasi-objectivity as a product, a point of
+application and transmitter of this other will. The important point for
+him is that this will should be one, that its practical development should
+simply be a temporalisation of the organic unity of the sovereign and,
+most important of all, that its immediate objective should be to impose
+(by his command, by constraint, and if need be by terror) biological
+unity at every level of dispersal, in opposition to the multiplicity of
+alterity and as the ontological statute of the totality.
+The sovereign is produced by terror, 81 and he has to become the
+81. It may be said that power is often far from bringing about a reign of terror.
+This is true and we shall see the reason for it. But what we are studying here is not
+sovereignty as it occurs in a historical society; we are considering it as an apparatus
+which constitutes itself inside groups which are institutionalising themselves.
+
+The Institution 625
+agent responsible for it: everyone abandons mistrust in favour of the
+untranscendable third party, on the understanding that he will express
+everyone's mistrust of everyone. In fact, there is still recurrence, and
+the shifting mistrust grows deeper because it has become power (the
+duty to betray one's neighbour to the apparatuses of sovereignty, the
+soverign power to liquidate anyone in particular); and, most important
+of all, serial circularity as a unity of flight becomes the object of a
+permanent, sovereign operation aimed at destroying it. The apparent
+progress of reflexivity here is due to the fact that the untranscendable
+third party, from his elevated position, believes that he has a synthetic
+view of the common field whereas, in fact, the means of transmission
+necessarily serialise his information (he thinks he can see but really sees
+nothing, apart from other, ready-solidified views, provided by others
+and originating at the common level). The politics of integration
+corresponds to these synthetic views: through his apparatuses, the
+sovereign tries to constitute the group not only as a practical object, but
+also as a living object. Forhim, as a product of mistrust and separation,
+who regards all plurality and alterity as suspect, and therefore as
+having to be liquidated immediately, the only non-suspect unity is his
+own practical unity and the ontological structures which develop in it:
+in short, the unity of the organism - his right hand trusts his left and
+no other.
+Through an intelligible inversion of the contradiction, this power,
+which is institutionally defined as a permanent reinteriorisation of the
+group in exteriorisation, already represents, both in itself and ontologically, the impossibility of common-being; but in the name of its
+practical function, integration, it makes an authoritarian attempt (using
+violence if necessary) to realise the organic-being which actually indicates the impossibility that the common praxis should be based on a
+common-being, as the common-being of the group. In the practices of
+authority, the impossibility of giving oneself an ontological statute
+becomes, within the group, a violent and vain reduction of third parties
+by the regulatory third party to an other ontological statute, by definition unrealisable. This at least is what the sovereign 'believes' he is
+doing, and what he is 'believed to do'. But here we confront once again
+the contradiction between the two ontological statutes: the mixing and
+manipulation of third parties with the object of constituting organic
+unities, actually produce inorganic quasi-objects whose inertia receives
+sovereign orders just as the inertia of wax receives the seal. And the
+conduct of every third party, as a molecule of the quasi-object, moves
+
+626 Book II
+from enthusiastic realisation of an other will to passive, resigned
+acceptance of this will. Thus the sovereign's praxis on the group,
+being both transcendent and immanent, is expressed, successively, or
+even, sometimes, simultaneously, in two kinds of determination of
+discourse. Thegoal may be expressed in terms of mechanical unity: the
+group is a machine which the sovereign sets in motion (perinde ac
+cadaver). Or the group may define itself as an extension of the sovereign,
+that is to say, as the arms, legs and eyes which he produces in order to
+realise the common objective. But, in fact, the second formulation
+relates to sovereignty-mystification, whereas the first necessarily
+reveals the function of the sovereign as dispossession, alienation and
+massification. The false unity of common quasi-objects (instrumentality) can in fact arise only on the basis of an accelerated process of
+passivisation; so that when constraint is relaxed, individuals revert to
+a molecular dispersal which separates them even more than their
+previous alterity.
+Could it be said that the sovereign is the group's chosen means of
+maintaining its unity in specific circumstances! The answer is both yes
+and no. The emergence of a sovereign is in fact the result of a process.
+In circular recurrence, the slightest short circuit will create sovereignty:
+and such short circuits occur, in given conditions, as reinforcements of
+the differential by recurrence. In universal impotence, this recurrence
+will run up against a sub-group or individual with differential characteristics which make reciprocity less obvious, and which are produced
+as univocal bonds of interiority. In fact, regardless of what these
+characteristics are, they cannot extract a future sovereign from the
+reciprocal relation until the group is eroded by alterity. On the other
+hand, in a group which is in the process of being institutionalised,
+impotence, as a shifting separation of peers, makes the actual power of
+certain individuals appear as untranscendability - not only because
+serial paralysis prevents everyone from acquiring these characteristics
+for themselves, but also, and most importantly, because - whatever
+the characteristics may be - the group (still effective in its transcendent
+objective, though affected with inertia in its internal relations) does not
+in fact have any common power with which to oppose the strength of a
+particular individual. This is the process: the possible sovereigns are
+installed and there is nothing for the third parties either to accept or to
+support, since they are incapable of refusing anything. When the
+sovereign takes power, he establishes himself as the free, directed
+transcendence of common passivity: and this will mean the re-emer-
+
+The Institution 62J
+gence of freedom as constituent Reason within the constituted
+group.
+De facto power - in so far as it is consolidated by recurrence - is
+prior to de jure power. But in order that untranscendability should
+move from fact to right, power must become institutionalised. Here,
+through institutions, a kind of passive finality re-emerges: the need
+which everyone feels either to allow the institutional system to lose
+itself in exteriority, without surety or internal unity, or to reinteriorise
+it as an instrumental system employed in a unique, individual temporalisation. This is the exigency of institutional practices as practiceprocesses maintained in their being by everyone's impotence and
+freedom. This means, then, that the movement of institutionalisation
+involves the institutionalisation of the practical individual as such as
+its only chance of completion; or, in other words, the institutionalisation of the freedom of a single individual as an institution. With the
+emergence of free praxis, in fact, the whole movement of institutionality turns in on itself and reverts to being a practical field and an
+instrument. Thus authority, as the internal unity of institutions, is
+required by their very being (by the contradiction between their
+practical efficacity and the inertia of their dispersal). The expulsion of
+individual freedom by inertia would become the occasion for a relapse
+into the practico-inert, unless common, transcendent freedom were
+embodied in the free praxis of an institutionalised organism; through
+the institution everyone sacrifices his freedom for the sake of inert
+efficiency, but he gets it back at the apex in the double, undifferentiated
+form of common and individual freedom; the order reincarnates it in
+him as the freedom of an Other actualising itself through him.
+The purpose of these last remarks is to show that the sovereignty of
+the untranscendable third party arises, in groups which are in the
+process of being institutionalised, when the empty, inert exigency of
+an institutional system in search of its unity coincides with an interruption of recurrence by some material, accidental superiority. There
+is an integration of de facto power with the generality of power and,
+therefore of a process of impotence which constitutes a given man or
+ensemble from outside as the strongest, or the richest, of the Others (or -
+as happened in the early stages of feudal authority - as the-man-with-
+a-horse) with a passive finality born in the institutional system of the
+till practical character of the institutionalised men. De facto powe
+ives a practical content to the institution: for the institution o
+sovereignty does not designate the sovereign as the passive unity of
+
+628 Book II
+the system, but as the unifying force which condenses, integrates, and
+changes it by making use of it. The institution, on the other hand, in so
+far as it preserves the exigencies of Terror and of violence, demands
+force and legitimates it. In the other functions, the power of each
+specialised individual may involve the right to call on force for support,
+though force itself is not the content of their power. On the contrary,
+the reunification of the institutional skeleton requires that the work
+done by the institutions (and if necessary against them) should be
+directly produced by sovereign force; unifying force is the immediate
+content of sovereign power. In this way, force is both the right and the
+duty of authority: it is the concentration in a single individual of
+Terror as the struggle against seriality. But this concentration would be
+no more than an idea or a material exigency of the system unless the
+regulatory third party already had the necessary strength. In short
+sovereignty does not create sovereign strength, but rather makes the
+sovereign's pre-existing strength sovereign.82 However, this positive
+strength is tiny compared with the real strength which the group would
+have if it were to dissolve its emerging seriality. Thus the relation of
+untranscendability is originally that of a relatively small strength to
+generalised impotence.
+At this level it is possible to discern one of the contradictions of
+sovereignty: the sovereign reigns through and over the impotence of all;
+their living practical union would make his function useless, and indeed
+impossible to perform. However, his proper activity is to struggle
+against the invasion of the group by seriality, that is to say, against the
+very conditions which make his office legitimate and possible. We have
+seen how the contradiction is resolved, in practice, by a new form of
+alienation: that of each and all to one person. In order to avoid relapsing into the practico-inert field, everyone becomes a passive object or
+an inessential actualisation for the freedom of the Other. By means of
+sovereignty, the group alienates itself to a single man so as to avoid
+alienating itself to the material and human ensemble; in fact everyone
+experiences his alienation as life (as the life of an Other, through his
+own life), instead of experiencing it as death (as a reification of all his
+relations).
+82. Of course, this applies only to the original moment in which sovereignty
+constitutes itself in opposition to recurrence. Once the powers of sovereignty
+have been strictly defined by tradition, executive powers will be transmitted from
+one sovereign to the other.
+
+The Institution 629
+However, the synthetic relation of the sovereign to all through
+institutions presents a new contradiction, due both to the immanencetranscendence' tension which produces a mere quasi-sovereignty in
+him and to his untranscendability which, though it does not remove
+him from the group, separates him from all the third parties. As it
+realises the integration, this quasi-sovereignty, being untranscendable,
+treats the group as a whole as a field of inorganic materiality or as an
+organised extension of his organs. The object of the exercise is to
+realise a praxis, to attain a transcendent objective; and the essential
+relation posits itself as that between the sovereign and the object. There is
+therefore no a priori answer to the question whether the practical
+objectification will be that of the sovereign by means of his group or
+that of the group through the mediation of the sovereign - whether, in
+other words, the aim is the object of the sovereign individual as such
+(in his practical individuality) achieved by common means (by setting
+to work a multiplicity of common individuals), or whether it is a
+common aim achieved by common action which has been planned,
+thought out, and organised by means of an untranscendable regulator.
+Is the object the objectification of a reign, or is it that of the men who
+have lived under it, maintained it, and created it? This indeterminacy
+is expressed in the phrase 'my people', which means both the people who
+belong to me and the people to whom I belong. It would not help to claim
+that the sovereign is a specific product of given institutions and that he
+sets himself constant aims (defined by circumstances and by the constant
+possibilities of geopolitics: to defeat the house of Austria, etc.), which
+he can achieve only by using specific instruments, namely institutions.
+We have already made this point, but it is not relevant to the present
+problem. Nor is it sufficient simply to claim that the sovereign, as a
+product of the group (considered as a practical multiplicity of individuals), expresses the deep relations, the conflicts, and the tensions
+within the group, in spite of himself, and that his praxis can be no more
+than the practical reinteriorisation of these human relations.
+But the problem is not so simple. To judge by the claims of those
+who wish to dispose of him, the sovereign apparently establishes his
+authority either over a fused group or over an organised group, that is
+to say, over free practical men, whose only inertia is pledged faith. If
+this were so, then the sovereign would effectively be no more than the
+medium of his group. But the sovereign does not exist at this stage of
+integration. Since his authority is based on serial impotence, and giver
+hat he exploits the inertia of internal relations in order to give the
+
+630 Book II
+group the greatest possible external efficiency, it must be acknowledged
+that his power is not based on consent (as a positive act of adhesion),
+but rather that consent to his power is an interiorisation of the impossibility of resisting it. In other words, he imposes himself through the
+impotence of all, and everyone accepts him as a way of bartering
+inertia for obedience. This element of nothingness, this 'Devil's Share',
+is the true support of sovereignty. Everyone obeys in seriality: not
+because he directly adopts an attitude of obedience, but because he is
+not sure whether his neighbour has undertaken to obey. This is far
+from preventing orders from being seen as legitimate: in fact it prevents the question of legitimacy from being raised. So if the sovereign
+works on the inorganic, it is not that 'his' group is using him as a
+reflexive medium, but rather it is himself using 'his' group in order to
+achieve certain ends.
+And of course the limits of his options and choices are indicated by
+institutions themselves, which are his instruments; that is to say, they
+are indicated by the petrified ensemble of institutionalised men. But,
+in the first place, within these limits, his power can vary according to
+institutions and circumstances; and this power may become quite large.
+But the most important point to grasp is that, in the course of the
+repressive Terror which he has to practise in the name of integration,
+certain stratifications, blockages, and regroupments constitute themselves, each of them calling a temporary halt at this level of Terror,
+that is to say, in more or less stable equilibrium, and which, as a whole,
+constitute a passive structuring of the group on the fringe of institutions - a sort of geological section which is nothing other than sovereign
+praxis maintained in its unity by the inertia of separation. And this
+structured ensemble which is dependent on the practice of the untranscendable individual is not only a material formation which he maintains
+and constantly engenders, and which will collapse when he dies, but
+also the ensemble of avenues and paths of his power: as he reigns the
+sovereign increases his power, because he produces the group in his
+own image. Naturally, the converse is also true: the group condenses
+into the indissoluble unity of an organism, and the sovereign dilates
+through the multiplicities of the group. Nevertheless, the group,
+through these acquired structures, performs an extra-institutional task
+on itself, and this is simply an inert extension of sovereign praxis. And
+these very conditions of sovereignty suffice to show that there is no
+a priori answer to the question. From the point of view of the group,
+the institutions, the circumstances, the common objective, etc., the
+
+The Institution 63z
+sovereign posits himself either as the medium of the group or as its
+end. And, on the second hypothesis, and depending on the situation, he
+may either posit himself in his practical, free individuality as a goal of
+the community, or regard the institutional system as essential in so far
+as he himself has the institutional power to reinteriorise it (while the
+multiplicity of institutionalised members is inessential). Whether it
+is the man or the apparatus which posit themselves, a new alienation
+results for the third parties: provided that the goal of the sovereign
+really is the common object of the group, no one will have any aim
+other than serving the sovereign himself, and everyone will pursue the
+common aim, not because it is common, but because it is the object of
+free sovereign praxis.
+This is the particular embodiment of sovereignty which is normally
+encountered in History. Its dialectical reason is simple, and we summarise it here only so as to reveal a few of the formal structures of
+sovereignty. And in fact our inquiry is leading to a new moment of our
+investigation: the institutional group coming into contact with the
+various serialities of the non-grouped. Several different objectives, in
+fact, are possible and logically definable; the aim of the group may be
+the production and reproduction of the life of its members, struggle
+against some other group, or direct action on collectives. This last
+category includes agitational and propaganda groups as well as
+publicity associations or groups of cadres, etc. Now, if a group which
+is still effective (though possibly eroded by seriality really acts on
+serial individuals, its action on the series is due to its unity. At this
+level, we are now in a position to complete a description which we gave
+at an earlier and more abstract level of our investigation, where we
+spoke of newspapers and the radio as collectives. And this was not a
+mistake, since everyone reads or listens to the opinions of the Others.
+But our description missed another aspect of its reality: the fact that
+what is lived and used as collective by the serial flight of alterity is also
+an organised group (the newspaper) or an institutional group (the state
+radio) which, in a common undertaking transcends itself (se transcende)
+towards collectives and inert gatherings as their own objectives.
+At this level, the group is capable of adapting to the collective: it has
+been through it; and each of its members is himself - in other moments,
+and in relation to other individuals - a serial being; besides, each of
+them, even inside the group, is already more than half serialised; and
+finally, experience in his job may have taught him the effect of a given
+item of news or of a given statement when it is reproduced in the
+
+632 Book I|
+privacy of a couple or of a family and appears as a collective opinion.
+At this level, group praxis (unless it is aimed at the dissolution of
+inertias of seriality in a given place) is, in itself and for all its members, a
+rational employment of recurrence. It is by starting from impotence
+and separation, in the knowledge that every thought in every individual
+is a thought of the Other, that they manipulate the inert material of
+their work. The group, as a practical totalisation, which organises itself
+in the unity of its directives through the practical thought which reveals and combines the elements of alterity outside it, becomes the free,
+synthetic unity of alterity as such, that is to say, it relies for the effectiveness of its action on the impotence and dispersal of its objects. An
+advertising project, or a film which has to be seen, or a view which has
+to be expressed, establishes itself in every Other with its own coefficient of alterity which, as we have seen, shows that the otherthought (la pensée-autre), in seriality, has to reinteriorise and reactualise
+the thought of the Other. Thus a group which works on an inert
+gathering produces itself both in relation to this gathering and in itself
+as a sovereign in an institutionalised group, except that, in our examples,
+its action is not institutional in character. This does not mean that
+collectives can simply be manipulated according to one's wishes. On
+the contrary, as we have seen, these serial flights have inflexible laws.
+But regardless of his range of choice, even the sovereign cannot
+manipulate the group just as he wishes, any more than workers or
+technicians can do what they like with their tools and materials. This is
+not the issue: the important point is that the group is active and that the
+practico-inert man is its passive object - not as a practical organism, but
+as an Other. It is also important that the action which rearranges the
+practical field has both the result and the aim of working inert gatherings so that the force of the inertia should itself produce the intended
+result. In this way, an organised group can exercise sovereignty over
+collectives, since it treats them as an individual treats the objects of his
+pracist sly and because races on thermis of cordance with their laws,
+In this sense, in the case of an institutionalised group which has a
+sovereign in some form or other, he becomes the sovereign of the
+collective in so far as he is the sovereign of the group. But there is one
+all-important reservation: this sovereignty is not itself institutionalised.
+But this is not important. Hearst, the magnate of the conservative press
+in America, with his newspaper chains, over which he exerted authoritarian control, was sovereign and reigned over public opinion. Besides,
+
+The Institution 633
+an inert gathering is more likely to accept the institutionality of the
+sovereign when it thinks of him in serial impotence and through
+indefinite alterity - which means that he appears to every member of
+the series as a benefactor of the indefinite recurrence which is known as
+public opinion. The sovereign is both man and infinite; he is outside
+the practico-inert, and his freedom opposes the suffered alienation of
+alterity. The action of the group on the gathering has to be conceived
+synthetically on the basis of knowledge of the serial and it is realised
+serially through the directed and controlled serialisation of agents. But
+when, in a gathering, separate individuals rise from produced seriality
+(press, radio, etc.) to an individual who directs the operation, this
+Other, who is other than all of them because of his organic and
+practical unity and his power, seems to them to determine - and actually
+does determine - their indefinite flight, so as to occasion an abstract,
+totalising unity in it: the whole indefinite series of the newspapers and
+the other readers is condensed in him; and, in him, recurrence is free
+temporalisation; in him, public opinion is one individual, historical
+thought, a free determination of discourse, though without ceasing to
+be multiplied to infinity in the practico-inert.
+All I have wanted to show by these formal remarks is that the unity
+of the sovereign, as the sole practical freedom of the group, occasions
+an abstract phantom of unity within the series, and that this relation is
+really no more than a degradation of his relation to the third parties of
+the community. For this reason, when an emergency threatens a
+concrete ensemble composed of a group and a gathering (the raw
+material of the group being the gathering), or when the division of
+functions makes some regulation necessary, the group may claim the
+power to distribute tasks to the members of the series, and the members
+can accept them, without escaping from seriality. In fact, it is worth
+remarking that the presence of constituted groups - except ones which
+are explicitly aimed at the dissolution of seriality - prevents the formation of fused groups out of the collective (or at least it makes it more
+difficult). Induced unity is sufficient; alterity is liquidated when there is
+no other means of struggle, and no other hope. When there is a group,
+orders are accepted partly from a simple inability to refuse and partly
+because the transcendent unity of the group creates an economy of
+dangerous unification for every other. The mobilising group may
+impose its institutions on the series because they are homogeneous
+with it in so far as they are still practices of impotence. But when they
+become serial, institutions decline a little further and they become
+
+634 Book II
+suffered processes whose concrete meaning is dissipated in the milieu
+of exteriority. For every Other in the gathering, it will suffice to know
+that the institutional ensemble takes on a meaning for the sovereign.
+In this sense, collectives and inert gatherings never legitimate either
+sovereignty or institutions: they accept them out of impotence and
+because they have already been legitimated by the Others (in the group).
+In one way, in the milieu of alterity, the mere fact that a group exists
+outside them and in its synthetic unity constitutes a basis for legitimacy.
+Not for them, however: for it. The group is legitimate because it has
+produced itself by a pledge in the synthetic milieu of practical freedom,
+that is to say, in the milieu which rejects the gathering on principle.
+In fact, through the other of alterity, the group as such (as its own
+production from the clay of seriality) is legitimate, because it both
+realises for itself and manifests for all (by determining impotence in
+depth) the action of freedom in opposition to necessity. This means
+that, through the group, the sovereignty of praxis over the practicoinert manifests itself to seriality as a basis for, and an impotent rejection
+of, passive activity. Free activity is manifested elsewhere to passive
+activity as the absolute reign of law,. And this absolute reign, as a
+negation of the practico-inert, involves, at least as an abstract connection, the univocal power bursting open the chains of seriality in every
+Other. In this sense, although the collective has no ability to confer
+sovereignty, and no structure to enable it to do so, it can grasp it as a
+mode of existence proper to certain practical forms of sociality, and
+may even, with an institutional group, go back to the origin of totalisation, to individual freedom conceived as the will of all. And its relation
+to the group (unless the group has produced hostile groups, rivalries
+or competition, etc.) may be a capitulation to inertia, not only because
+the Other is manipulated in everyone and because every Other sees the
+group in and through the Other as freedom creating itself, its legitimacy, and all legitimacy, and, in the same movement, the gathering as
+in principle foreign to every statute of legitimacy (neither justified nor
+unjustified: the question of justification does not arise, a priori, as far
+as it is concerned). Besides, though manipulated both as an inert object
+and as an Other, manipulation does not change every Other; but the
+intention of producing an effect by transforming the whole series may
+occasion, in the very locus of alterity, a kind of transcendent unity as
+Other; the relation of exteriority, worked on in the collective by the
+group, takes on a synthetic, impracticable meaning for every other: in
+so far as the group deigns to use it for its unitary undertaking, this
+
+635
+index of separation becomes, out there, in untranscendability, a hidden
+unity of alterity.
+5 States and Societies
+These remarks have nothing to do with the historical origins of
+sovereignty, but only with entirely abstract logical and dialectical
+relations, which must, however, be present as the intelligibility of any
+historical interpretation. Within groups, sovereignty is in fact at least
+relatively simple. But the ensembles in which sovereignty, in some
+form or other, manifests itself in its full development and power are
+societies. And we have already established that a society is not a group,
+nor a grouping of groups, nor even struggling groupings of groups.
+Collectives are both the matrix of groups and their grave; they remain
+as the indefinite sociality of the practico-inert, nourishing groups,
+maintaining them and transcending them everywhere by their indefinite multiplicity. Where there are several groups, the collective is
+either a mediation or battlefield.
+Society, which our dialectical investigation has, up to this moment
+of its development, approached only very abstractly, thus yields up its
+highly formal and indeterminate structure: in the material context of
+needs, dangers, instruments and techniques, there can be no such thing
+as society unless there are, in some way or other, human multiplicities
+united by a container or by a soil, unless these multiplicities are divided,
+by Historical development, into groups and series, and unless the basic
+internal relation of the society - whether production (division of
+labour), consumption (type of distribution) or defence against the
+nemy (division of tasks) - is ultimately that of groups to series. An
+mong the many differentiations of this internal bond, one of th
+easiest to grasp is the institutional ensemble, cloaked and reunited by
+the sovereign institution, by the State, in so far as a small group of
+organisers, administrators and propagandists take on the task of
+imposing modified institutions within collectives, as serial bonds which
+unite serialities. In short, what is known as the State can never be
+regarded as the product or expression of the totality of social individuals or even of the majority of them, since this majority is serial
+
+636 Book II
+anyway, and could not express its needs and demands without liquidating itself as a series, so as to become a large group (which either
+immediately opposes authority or else renders it completely inoperative). It is at this level of the large group that dissolving alterity
+permits concrete needs and objectives to constitute themselves as
+common realities. And the idea of a diffuse popular sovereignty becoming embodied in a sovereign is a mystification. There is no such thing
+as diffuse sovereignty: the organic individual is sovereign in the
+abstract isolation of his work; and in fact, he immediately becomes
+alienated in the practico-inert, where he learns of the necessity of
+impotence (or of impotence as a necessity at the basis of his practical
+freedom). At the level of the series, juridical and institutional power is
+completely denied to human multiplicities by the very structure of
+their relations of exteriority. Thus, inert gatherings do not have the
+power or nature either to consent to or to resist the State. Sovereignty
+does not rise from the collective to the sovereign; on the contrary,
+sovereignty (as command, as a phantom of unity, or as the legitimacy
+of freedom), descends through the sovereign to modify collectives,
+without changing their structure of passivity. As for the institution as
+such, and the concrete power which fills it, it is clear that they arise in
+the group when it is institutionalised and that what ensures its efficacy
+is a process-praxis which also preserves a certain unity in the community which is being serialised.
+Thus, within a given society, the State cannot be said to be either
+legitimate or illegitimate; it is legitimate within a group, because it is
+produced in a milieu of pledged faith. But it does not really have this
+legitimacy when it acts on collectives, since the Others have not sworn
+anything either to groups or to one another. However, as we have just
+seen, the Others do not claim that it is illegitimate, at least as long as
+they still do not themselves constitute a group. If they do not make
+such a demand, this is, in the first place, out of impotence: as a series,
+they have no means of either contesting or establishing legitimacy.
+Secondly, it is because the group, whatever it may be, appears to
+establish its own legitimacy in that it freely brings itself into being,
+when it is seen by the Other in alterity as the synthetic signification
+elsewhere of his bonds of exteriority and as the abstract and permanent
+possibility that the collective too should become a grouping.
+Something like acceptance may therefore occur; but in itself this is
+ineffectual since it exists in every other only as an awareness of impotent recurrence. I obey because I cannot do otherwise; and in itself
+
+The Institution 637
+this confers serial pseudo-legitimacy on the sovereign: his power to
+command proves that he has a different nature from mine, or, in other
+words, that he is freedom. But if I were a member of the group I
+would somehow find my freedom in that of the sovereign and even, as
+we have seen, in the alienation of the third party to the living organism
+of the untranscendable third party. Thus I am in league with the
+sovereign, and I can pursue his ends as though they were common
+ends, and therefore as my own, even if, for me, he is already, as the pure
+unity of integrating violence, my untranscendable end. But, given that
+the institution maintains itself in the series as pure inertia, and given
+that - once a skilful practice has imposed it - it belongs to the world
+of practico-inert constraints; given that it presents itself as an exigency
+rather than as a synthetic signification within a totalisation, it produces
+itself within the collective (as inert repetition) purely and simply as a
+reality (a de facto constraint), while retaining a character of sacred
+exteriority in so far as it relates, through empty intentions, to the free
+fulguration which created it. It is the realist element which predominates: resistance is futile and there is no point in trying to
+comprehend: "That's how things are.' From this point of view all
+negations which reduce to impotence are assimilated to one another -
+whether alienations originating in seriality itself, impossibilities resulting from the economic and social system in the conjuncture, or 'enforceable' or sovereign orders. Reality, as Mascolo rightly observed -
+though he did not understand why it was so - is, for the exploited, the
+unity of all the impossibilities which negatively define them. The State
+is therefore primarily a group which is constantly reorganising itself and
+altering its composition by means of a partial, discontinuous or
+continuous, renewal of its members. Within the group, the authority
+of the sovereign is based on institutions and their exigencies, on the
+need to ensure the strict unity of the apparatus in the face of the dispersal of series. In other words, this integrated group sets itself the aim
+of marisatinine calcives without ericaney orm from andio
+serial being. The impotence of the series as alterity in flight is both the
+origin and the limit of state power: always living, always commanding
+obedience here, authority is always threatened elsewhere, and in the very
+moment when the Other who is here obeys it.
+This radical heterogeneity of the State and of inert gatherings provides the real intelligibility of the historical development of sovereignty.
+If classes exist (that is to say, if practical, historical investigation reveals
+
+638 Book II
+them), then, in effect, the State institutes itself in their struggle as the
+organ of the exploiting class (or classes) and sustains, by constraint, the
+statute of the oppressed classes. In fact, as we shall soon see when we
+finally reach the concrete, classes are a shifting ensemble of groups and
+series; within each class, circumstances occasion practical communities
+which attempt regroupment, under pressure from certain specific
+emergencies, and which finish by relapsing, to some extent, into
+seriality. But if, as we have been assuming, such regroupments occur
+inside societies in which dominant and dominated classes confront one
+another, they differ radically according to which class they are in; if
+they occur within the dominant classes, then, whatever their aim, they
+necessarily participate in the process-practices of domination; and if
+they occur in the dominated classes, they will (even if, to Others, or in
+the light of subsequent developments, they may appear as complete
+betrayals) contain an initial, abstract negation of class domination as
+one of their basic determinations.
+Of course, this does not mean that the problem of sovereignty cannot arise within exploited classes (at least when they reorganise in order
+to intensify the class struggle); but it does imply that the formation of
+a State, as a permanent institution and as a constraint imposed by a
+group on all serialities, can occur only through a complex dialectic of
+groups and series within the dominant class. A revolutionary organisation may be sovereign. But the State constitutes itself as a mediation
+between conflicts within the dominant class, in so far as these conflicts
+run the risk of weakening it in the face of the dominated classes. It
+embodies and realises the general interest of the dominant class over
+and above the antagonisms and conflicts of particular interests. This
+amounts to saying that the ruling class produces its State (that its
+internal struggles produce the possibility and the exigency for a group
+to arise to defend the general interest) and that its institutional structures will define themselves in terms of concrete reality (that is to say,
+in the last analysis, in terms of the mode and relations of production).
+In this sense, for example, the nineteenth-century bourgeois state
+reflected the unity of bourgeois society: its molecular liberalism and its
+programme of non-intervention were not based on the fact that the
+molecular statute of the bourgeoisie was really given, but rather on the
+exigencies of a complex process which developed industrialisat1o1
+through the contradictions and antagonisms of competition. Order -
+negative here - is identical with the general interest of the capitalists as a
+negation of the powers of association and organisation of the exploited
+
+The Institution 639
+classes; they are realised in the relation of the dominant classes by
+means of a strenuous effort to subordinate the strength of the landed
+aristocracy to that of industrial and financial capital; lastly, within the
+most favoured class, they consolidate a hierarchy which has already
+been proclaimed - at least, it was in France before 1848 - and ensure
+the bankers' control of the country as a whole. This means that they
+absorb their de facto power as untranscendable third parties and transform it, through new institutions, into de jure power. Thus Marx was
+right when he wrote 'Only political superstition still imagines today
+that civil life must be held together by the state, whereas in reality, on
+the contrary, the state is held together by civil life'. 83
+Marx was right, subject to the qualification that there is a circular
+process at work here and that the State, being produced and sustained
+by the dominant, rising class, constitutes itself as the organ of the
+contraction and integration of the class. And of course this integration
+takes place through circumstances, and as a historical totalisation; but
+still, it takes place through the State, at least in part. Thus it would be
+wrong to see the State either as the concrete reality of society (as Hegel
+apparently wished to believe), or as a pure, epiphenomenal abstraction
+which merely gives passive expression to changes effected by the
+concrete development of its real society.
+This is particularly important in so far as the State cannot take on its
+functions without positing itself as a mediator between the exploiting
+and the exploited classes. The State is a determination of the dominant
+class, and this determination is conditioned by class struggle. But it
+affirms itself as a deep negation of the class struggle. Uf course, it
+derives its legitimacy from itself, and series have no alternative but
+to accept it. Moreover, they ought to accept it: it must appear to the
+dominated classes as their guarantee. It is absolutely wrong to ignore
+the fact that the government of Louis XIV, or of Hitler or of the
+Convention, claimed that it was the embodiment of the legitimate
+interests of the people (or the nation) as a whole. The State therefore
+exists for the sake of the dominant class, but as a practical suppression
+of class conflicts within the national totalisation. The term mystification
+is not appropriate to this new contradiction: in a sense, of course, it is
+a mystification, and the State maintains the established order; in class
+conflicts it intervenes to tilt the balance in favour of the exploiting
+83. The Holy Family in Marx and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 4, Lawrence
+&i Wishart, 1975, p. 121.
+
+G4o Book!/
+classes. But, in another sense, the State really does produce itself as a
+national institution; in the interest of the privileged, it takes a totalising
+view of the social ensemble; it sees beyond antagonistic individuals,
+and may devise a paternalistic social policy which it will subsequently
+impose on the dominant classes, even though it is created in their
+interest. Lenin noticed this when he said that the State arbitrates whenever power relations tend to a state of equilibrium. But this means that
+it already posits itself for itself in relation to the class from which it
+emanates: this united, institutionalised and effective group, deriving
+its internal sovereignty from itself and imposing it as accepted legitimacy, tries to produce itself and to preserve itself in and through itself
+as an essential national praxis, by acting in the interests of the class
+from which it emanates and, if necessary, against them. One need only
+look at the policies of the French monarchy between the fourteenth and
+the eighteenth centuries to see that it did not confine itself to providing
+mediation when forces were evenly balanced, but rather created this
+balance by perpetual changes of alliance, so that the bourgeoisie and
+the aristocracy would control each other, so as to produce itself, on the
+basis of this deadlock (which was due partly to social evolution and
+partly to the economic policies of the government) as an absolute
+monarchy.
+Thus, from our formal point of view, and regardless of the historical reasons for its development in any particular society, the State
+belongs to the category of institutionalised groups with a specified
+sovereignty; and if, amongst these groups, we make a distinction
+between those which work directly on an inorganic common object,
+those which are constituted to struggle against other groups, and those
+whose objectification demands the manipulation of inert serialities, etc.,
+it is obvious that the State belongs to the second class.84 Having
+emerged from a certain kind of seriality (the dominant class), the State
+remains heterogeneous with it, as with the dominated class, because its
+strength is based on its impotence and it appropriates the power of
+others (the dominant classes) over others (the dominated classes) by
+interiorising it and transforming it into right. It sets the unity of its own
+84. In fact, the categories are always more complex: seriality, the inorganic,
+the complexity of the real for oneself and at leisure.
+
+The Institution 642
+praxis in opposition to all classes, especially, perhaps (at least in
+capitalist societies), in opposition to employers who have long been
+paralysed by their mutual antagonisms, rather than to the proletariat,
+which is very ready to attempt to replace seriality by unity, that is to
+say, by its autonomy. And there can be no doubt that the most powerful
+private interests can always influence its decisions (as can the totalising
+evolution of circumstances). Coalitions of the privileged may destroy
+it or put it out of action, but on the whole its autonomy is preserved
+because, for the oppressed classes, it is the organ of legitimacy and
+because, in so far as they agree that it should be its own legitimation,
+the privileges and inequalities are also given a juridical statute. Whenever a ruling class has wished to attack the State, the ruled classes have
+quickly formed groups and carried forward the liquidating action
+against the classes which began it (the best known example being the
+aristocratic revolution which, in 1787, paved the way to the bourgeois
+revolution, which in turn led to the popular revolution).
+In fact, the overthrow of a State normally takes place within the
+State apparatus, as a crisis of sovereignty. The rich bourgeoisie was
+able to halt the Revolution when the final consequences of the Terror
+had lost the Committee of Public Safety the support of the sans culottes.
+But oth Thermidor was neither a surprise attack, nor a 'day' (journée)
+(unlike the 'days' of 31 May, 2 June, etc., which were popular and as
+such revolutionary): it was a legally and institutionally resolved crisis
+of authority within the government apparatus. Thus, there are many
+transformations of the possessing class, including ones which occur in
+the concrete domain of real society rather than in the abstract domain
+of civil society, which have to be publicly realised by the State acting
+on the citizens. And, until the exploited classes reach full revolutionary
+consciousness of themselves, this is because the passive legitimation of
+sovereignty by the popular classes becomes the State's guarantee
+against those who hold power. Though it is imposed by the exploiters
+as a cloak for exploitation, it is also guaranteed by the exploited. This
+position of autonomy, and heterogeneity of structure, and these
+possibilities of manoeuvre, lead it to posit itself for itself as the nation
+itself; it tries, as a sovereign institutional group, to become the creator
+of the objective which is common to all, the designer of the plans through
+which it will be achieved and the manipulator of all the series (each as
+a function of the others and simultaneously). This does not alter the
+fact that the supposed mediator favours one or more of the dominant
+classes (at the expense of the Others and of the dominated classes). And
+
+642 Book II
+we are now in a position to add the crucial point that the institutional
+group in so far, raines to preserve is being in the organic evelope
+ing the milieu of sovereignty, rather than to put its sovereignty at the
+service of a policy. The real contradiction of the State is that it is a class
+apparatus pursuing class objectives and, at the same time, positing itself
+for itself as the sovereign unity of all, that is, in the absolute Other-
+Being which is the nation.
+G
+Other-direction: the Top Ten, Racism and
+Anti-Semitism
+Having now reached the complex level where the group becomes a
+mediation between collectives and where collectives serve as intermediaries for groups, and where the immediate (or even absolute) goal
+of certain communities is the manipulation of series and of the masses
+as such (that is to say, of the practico-inert field in so far as men within
+it mediate between worked objects), we must now define, in their
+abstract intelligibility, the resulting new model of common praxis and
+the new long-term effects of this praxis on the sovereign group.
+The principle of the new praxis (propaganda, agitation, publicity,
+the diffusion of information which is more or less misleading - or at
+least selected with a view to action rather than truth - campaigns,
+slogans, the muted orchestration of terror as an accompaniment to
+orders, 'stuffing people's heads' with propaganda, etc.) is to exploit
+seriality by pushing it to an extreme so that recurrence itself will
+produce synthetic results (or results capable of being synthesised). The
+sovereign will rethink seriality in practice as a conditioning of indefinite
+flight, in the context of a total undertaking which is controlled dialectically. Alternatively - and by now we should be accustomed to this
+contradictory tension which constitutes practical thought - he will
+define the operation on the series as a unity of action which is serialised
+in the synthetic context of a broader totalisation. Thus serial Reason
+becomes a special case of dialectical Reason. But this practical view of
+ranscendent series cannot arise in a dialectical context unless the nonsynthetic unity of alterity is reproduced in the practical scheme with at
+
+The Institution 643
+least a formal appearance of synthetic unity. It must be possible to
+embrace this flight in the unity of a circular act. Now, this act is given
+in the group itself as a developing serialisation of the still efficacious
+praxis; effectively, the sovereign is born of circular recurrence and
+arises as an obstacle within it; and the relational system which constitutes the skeleton of his practical devices implies a constant incurvation of recurrence: it is by passing through blocked, circular recurrence
+towards indefinite seriality that he becomes able to see this seriality as
+the ubiquity of a circular, infinite recurrence whose centre is everywhere but whose circumference is nowhere.
+In fact, however, this seriality is not really of this kind. Nevertheless,
+this is how institutional agents working under the orders of the
+sovereign will constitute it: on a basic foundation of alterity, they will
+give it an artificial statute. This statute will consist in the fact that
+through the mediation of a directed operation, everyone's alterity by
+and for everyone will present itself as the index of refraction of a united
+social milieu whose law is that each of its practical features is produced
+through the determination of every Other (in alterity and through all
+the Others) and conversely. To allow this unitary milieu to exist fully
+through recurrent dispersal, it is necessary and sufficient that every
+Other should make himself completely other, that is to say, that he
+should direct his free praxis onto himself so as to be like the Others.
+This is what various American sociologists have aptly called 'otherdirection' 85 The third party, in each of the groups under consideration, effectively presents himself as inner-directed, by which I mean
+that his powers and actions are determined for him on the basis of an
+interior limitation of his freedom. And, through reciprocity, the other
+(as the formal alterity of my freedom) certainly figures in my pledge as
+pledged inertia. But it is still true that my own praxis, in so far as it is
+strictly subordinated to the interests of the group, is produced from
+within, on the basis of my own limitations and powers. It is not necessary either to do or to be like the Others, but simply to remain the
+Same here, through differentiations imposed by action and interiorised.
+Manipulated seriality, on the other hand, has no common aim - which
+is appropriate since its metamorphosis into a group is necessarily and
+fundamentally the beginning of a revolution; it derives its inertia from
+its impotence rather than from a pledge, and people are involved in it
+only in so far as their actions and thoughts come from Others. The
+85. See David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, Yale University Press, 1950. [Ed.]
+
+644 Book II
+praxis of the sovereign group therefore consists in conditioning
+everyone by acting on the Others. But this is not sufficient to create the
+passive quasi-unity of other-direction. In order to realise it, it is
+necessary to fixate every Other on an illusion: the totalisation of
+alterities (that is to say, the totalisation of the series). This is the trap
+of other-direction: the sovereign intends to act on the series so as to
+extract a total action from it in alterity itself; but he produces this idea
+of practical totality as a possibility of the series totalising itself while
+remaining the fleeting unity of alterity, whereas in fact the only possibility of totalisation for the inert gathering consists in dissolving
+seriality in itself.
+These considerations may seem very formal. I shall now give a
+simple example, which will illustrate two characteristics of otherdirection: the mediating action of the group which conditions every
+other through all the Others, and everyone's practical fixation on the
+illusion of totalised seriality.
+In 1946, when I was in the United States, several radio stations
+broadcast a list of the ten best selling records of the week every
+Saturday and, after each title, they played a few bars of the record they
+had just mentioned (usually the tune). A series of tests and comparisons
+revealed that this programme increased the sales of the ten records in
+the following week by between thirty and fifty per cent. In other
+words, without the programme at the weekend, the number of buyers
+for the ten records would have been between thirty and fifty per cent
+less. Thus the programme tended to preserve and perpetuate the
+previous week's result. But this result was itself statistical and serial. No
+doubt it was partly due to advertising campaigns: but these campaigns
+were in competition with one another, or at least - as when several
+bands belong to the same company - they served several records at
+once. Above all, they were attempts to determine a future action in
+everyone, that is to say, to define a possibility of his practical field.
+They did not give anything (everything was in the future: the record
+which you will like, etc.); or else they related to the action of some
+small group - the Top Record Prize, for example - and tried to
+persuade serials that the specialised group which awarded the prize was
+simply a channel for the expression of the opinion of all. In this case,
+there was already an attempt to establish an equivalence between a
+synthetic unity and alterity (the jury is the public. But the public does
+not really co-operate, except for a few prizes or choices whose legitimacy it accepts and, is subjected to. In any case, its relation to the small
+
+The Institution G45
+group is complex and ambivalent: the decision of the group must
+signify both the judgement of the nation (as a seriality of serialities)
+and the decision of those competent to judge. In one way, the jury
+represents the great dispersals of alterity in the astringent milieu of the
+group; it establishes how one should behave. Thousands of people are
+prepared in advance to behave in this way: it involves buying, or
+giving, and it remains abstract in everyone (as a fleeting relation of
+reciprocity) in so far as it lacks an object (a means and end). The jury
+therefore appears to live in symbiosis with serial alterity, and, indeed, it
+does have the power to choose which record will be bought. It should be
+observed that this power - like all powers which relate to seriality - is
+conferred on it by a small group, namely the group which organised it;
+the public merely accepts it. No doubt the public could have remained
+in a state of negative inertia (neither challenging nor accepting this
+legitimacy, which was none of its concern). If it chooses serial docility
+as Other, this is on account of concrete historical circumstances which
+we need not go into here. Formally, this very symbiosis is the beginning of fixation and this is what gives it its hold over the Other in inert
+gatherings. It apparently gives two different statutes to the same act:
+buying the record, because one always buys the 'Prize Record, and giving it (because it is the New Year present for music fans). Here we have
+a set of alienated actions based on alterity (the 'Prize Record' is acknowledged by the Other - by later generations; and then someone will
+hear the record at a later date, as belonging to this year, and when we
+meet he will expect me to have heard it). This behaviour not only constitutes the prize as an Eternal Return (and a socio-natural one: it corresponds to the beginning of winter as a social season) by making it return every year in a new form, but also leaves open the purchaser's value
+judgement (a different act) concerning the object he buys. As an act, the
+Prize is other and indeterminate; it is the annual (and only) relationship
+between 100,000 persons and music, mediated by a small group.
+And here we encounter the second characteristic of the group as seen
+by the series: it is a group of experts. This means that the evaluation of
+music is their profession. No one actually believes that the record is
+really the best of the year, but at least it must be 'worth listening to.
+The quality of being an expert is sovereignty in the milieu of alterity
+(that is to say, it is transcendent of seriality): and this sovereignty,
+which is expressed in one specific act, flows into one object and becomes
+a definite power in it, a right over a certain category of serial individuals.
+Here we can see precisely the mirage in its elementary form: the record,
+
+646 Book II
+in a shop window, fresh and new, unique amongst the other records, is
+the individual unity of interiority-objectification of the individual who
+produced it and of the small group which chose it. If I go into the shop,
+buy it and take it away, it is a record-seriality, a record which I must
+have because the Other has it, a record which I listen to as an Other,
+adapting my reactions to those which I anticipate in Others. 86 Mirage
+and metamorphosis: synthetic unity can manifest itself as an abstract
+determination, in a transcendent milieu, for individuals in an inert
+gathering; but once an object which has been produced in this way is
+introduced into the gathering, it acquires structures of alterity, and
+becomes, in itself, a factor of alterity.
+But although this initial behaviour towards the object which is prized
+or acclaimed is totally alienated, it does not determine the actions of
+small groups or of practical individuals, in so far as these elementary
+units lie below the level of seriality. There is a kind of pleasure or displeasure in the listener which, apart from his alienated evaluations,
+expresses either his personal valuation (that is to say, his power: in so
+far as it relates to some group to which he belongs elsewhere, or in so
+far as his free practical activity turns to evaluation through the very
+alienation which takes it away from him) or, perhaps, that of his family
+group. At this level, the group's choice is never in dispute: in order
+to be able actually to prefer another record, one would have to have
+heard it; and the opportunity to read two or three potential prizewinning books, of trying to anticipate the decision of the academicians
+or to prepare oneself in advance to criticise it, is obviously confined to
+a very small social category (the liberal professions, certain housewives,
+etc.). But their pleasure or disappointment are expressed in their
+assessments in rather the same way as by lovers of Burgundy; there are
+good years and bad years; the Prix Goncourt, for example, is an annual
+product which exists in its raw state before December and which is
+worked as a result of December's activities; and the deep identity of
+this annual product (a product of vegetable spontaneity and human
+labour) is subject to the same yearly variations as Beaujolais. "The
+Goncourt's pretty boring this year.' 'Oh, I quite liked it?
+
+The Institution G4J
+This last observation brings us back to the example of records. The
+Prix Goncourt, the Prix du Disque, the Prix de la Chanson: these
+initial operations extend the group's action at a distance on series
+through the sovereign unity which it gives itself and which is not
+challenged (it could be challenged, in fact, only by other, more powerful, more numerous groups, etc.); and the fact that it goes unchallenged
+appears to serial impotence simply as a security: and the Other, as an
+alienated individual, is in any case incapable of making a challenge in
+practice. But if real practical groups are either neutral or in favour,
+sovereignty as a causa sui will radiate from itself, up above, at the level
+of the jury. But this initial transcendent unification is not a case of
+other-direction: it conditions the series by producing its possible unity
+in transcendence (transcendance), but it does not yet employ intraserial behaviour as a unitary and fixating method of conditioning of
+other-behaviour in everyone. But with the radio programme, everything becomes quite different: the reflexivity whose only truth lies in
+the group (and then only at a given level of development) enters the
+series: an action-group (in this case concerned with advertising) shows
+the series what it is doing (of which it was necessarily unaware since
+every Other was lost in the milieu of the Uthers). In other words, the
+initial reaction of the series (to external and transcendent conditionings)
+is reflected back to it through the mediation of a group which is itself
+transcendent in its basic structure, and which is capable of establishing
+the fleeting series of actions by the means appropriate to seriality
+(statistics, averages, etc.) and of totalising them into one action, as far
+as its structure and its totalising function permit. The series becomes
+aware of what it has done. Thus it is produced as a whole (through the
+"mass media') for each of the Others who compose it. Cardinal becomes
+ordinal; quantity, quality: the quantitative relations between the sales
+figures of two or more particular records suddenly come to indicate a
+preference, and the objective ranking of the records sold becomes the
+objectivity of a system of values proper to the group. The systematic
+transmutation of quantity into quality is completed by connecting the
+name of the work (usually a 'catchy' name) with its individual quality
+(the fragment of a theme) and with the names of the performers
+(singers, etc.): a given song has a certain indefinable objective quality
+which puts it at the top of an equally objective hierarchy. And everyone
+sees the hierarchy as an expression of collective choices and as a unified
+system of values. The two aspects complement one another; a serial
+action expresses and sustains a hitherto hidden hierarchy.
+
+648 Book II
+In reality, it is clear that the group is lying when it tells the truth.
+The figures are correct, but they have no validity except in the domain
+of the Other: of course they may result partly from various unities of
+preferential choice in the individual cases of particular individuals or
+small groups. But, apart from the fact that as such this choice is the
+exception (the other-choice forces itself on one as a choice of the Other,
+through circumstances and through the concerted action of organised
+groups, propaganda, etc.), the failure to make any comparison with
+total record sales for the week (for it is crucial to know whether the
+record which is placed first represents five or fifty-five per cent of all
+the records sold) deprives this exception (if indeed it can be considered
+in isolation) of any real, that is to say differential, significance. In fact,
+the result that is given has no more than the false appearance of
+interiority: it is neither the choice of the group nor the choice of the
+Others; it is the Other as choice. In other words, it is the negation of
+choice as such (as free choice), or alienation produced as freedom. And
+its totalisation is the result of the hidden work of an advertising group
+which gave it its structure of pledged inertia and of practical unity.
+But, we should remember that this radio programme is addressed to
+Others in separation (as we noted above) and that it is aimed particularly at two categories of listeners: those who have not bought the
+"top ten' records (or not all of them) and those who have bought them
+(or at least - depending on their resources, who have bought some of
+them). For the first group, the "top ten' is an exigency: it indicates to the
+temporarily isolated individual that a broad social process of unification
+and agreement has taken place this week and that the listener at whom
+the broadcast is aimed has not taken part in it. This 'spontaneous'
+phenomenon is over (wages are received weekly in the USA, where the
+week is a unit of consumption: calculations are made by the week and not
+by the month; the week closes in on itself and displays the unity of the
+others to the non-buyer in this small individual exile (which becomes the
+expression of seriality for all exiles). In reality, the factors which prevented the purchase are purely negative: the man was sick, or absent, or busy,
+he did not notice the advertisements, etc. Or rather, the question has not
+arisen so far: his circumstances and behaviour presented themselves as
+a sort of positive process relating only to itself. It is because of the
+totalisation of serial results by the group that he now feels the need for
+an explanation: in relation to the number of top records sold, the
+words, 'I did not notice the advertisements' take on a negative meaning of quasi-interiority, whereas without the "top ten', they would
+
+The Institution G49
+indicate a mere relation of exteriority. But now, hearing the first bars of
+this guaranteed music, the serial individual experiences the information
+as an accusation: he was out of touch (if he did not buy any records
+that week); he had no taste (if he bought others which did not get into
+the top ten); or he was unlucky (if he did not notice the advertisements). Fortunately, records last more than a week; their owners will
+not tire of listening to them within a week. The guilty party can still
+make up for his mistake on Saturday afternoon: he will buy one or
+more of the records mentioned, depending on his resources. It is true
+that this serial action is not in time with the 'spontaneous' ceremony of
+purchase: but the ceremony of listening - that Mass of alterity - is
+always possible and he can repeat it on subsequent days as often as he
+likes.
+The contradiction here is due to the fact that the totalising power of
+the ceremonies comes from the mediated and actualised reciprocity of
+all the members in a group; but the isolated reactualisation of a unity
+which has never existed except in the concerted efforts of an advertising
+group, succeeds only in depicting unity and in realising alterity as
+separation: for the individual listens to the selected record through
+Others and through himself as Other. The "Top Record Prize' leaves
+him a little more independence: of course, he is overwhelmed by the
+opinion of the experts, but as we have seen, his own reaction takes the
+form either of mute dissatisfaction or of wholehearted endorsement.
+The case of the 'top ten' is quite different, since here the mystification
+consists in offering him, once he has bought the records, the otherchoice as though it were his own. There can be no doubt that the action
+of the advertising group produces in him the vague project of uniting
+with the Others by enjoying what they have enjoyed completely
+spontaneously in the depths of his own spontaneity; but the realisation
+of the project leads to total alienation, since the isolated ceremony
+consecrates him as Other even in his own feelings. This operation will
+trick him even in his social relations, because when he is in the office,
+or with friends, he will take himself to be communicating in reciprocity
+with some Other who has also bought the record, whereas - as we
+have seen - they are really just the instruments of well-organised
+collectives.
+But what is important for us is the praxis of the group. Its goal is
+synthetic: to sell as many records as circumstances permit. The means
+is to manipulate the practico-inert field so as to produce serial reactions
+which will be retotalised at the level of the common undertaking, that
+
+650 Book 1T
+is to say, reshaped and forged like inorganic matter. And the means to
+this means is to constitute the serial as a false totality for everyone.
+Recurrence, controlled from outside as a determination projected from
+everyone, through Others, into the false totality of a common field and,
+in reality, into pure reflexive flight, is what we shall call other-direction
+(l'extéro-conditionnement). This has two complementary aspects: from
+the point of view of the praxis of the transcendent group, it appears as
+a labour which transforms seriality into antiphysis; from the point of
+view of the serial individual, it is an illusory grasp of his Other-being
+as unifying itself in the totalisation of the common field, and the
+realisation of radical alterity (directed by the outside group) in him and
+in all the Others on the basis of this illusion. In short, other-direction
+takes alterity as far as it can go because it makes the serial individual do
+the same as the Others in order to become the same as them. But by
+doing the same as Others, he loses the chance of becoming the same,
+except in so far as everyone is other than the Others and other than
+himself. Now in the totalisation of the common field, lines of flight
+appear (as reflected by the "mass media") as characteristics, or as habits
+(in the sense of exis), or as customs:» Thus, by capitalising on their
+impotence everyone comes to be affected by these characteristics, habits
+and customs in so far as they are manifested, in the false unity which is
+given by the external group, as structures of totality. Thus his alterity
+for the Others is gradually constituted for him, and introduced to him:
+if he listens to the radio every Saturday and if he can afford to buy every
+week's No. I record, he will end up with the record collection of the
+Other, that is to say, the collection of no one. But the reflexive action
+of the advertising group, as it affects every other, gradually brings
+together no one's collection and everyone's collection. In the original
+state of recurrence, in effect, statistical results as such were not worked
+out systematically and had no tendency to perpetuate (or universalise)
+themselves; if figures for record sales in the United States were not
+published, then if one studied the annual figures there would be no a
+priori reason for supposing that the overall results should correspond
+to the contents of the majority of record collections: in fact it would be
+necessary to distinguish categories, levels of education, social contexts,
+fashions and the sectors where they were promoted, etc. Thus there
+would be several popular lists, and not just one; or rather, buying one
+record might appear incompatible with buying another, in a given social
+milieu. But the fact that a single list is constituted and carefully diffused
+every week has the effect of breaking down social and cultural barriers,
+
+65 г
+of creating homogeneity (by a double movement, both upward and
+downward), and of gradually assimilating regional lists to a universal
+list. Ultimately, the record collection which is no one's becomes
+indistinguishable from everyone's collection - though without ceasing
+to be no one's.
+The interest of this praxis is immediately obvious, at least in contemporary societies: transcendent action on seriality, in advanced
+capitalist countries, tends to constitute a distribution-pattern for the
+market (for everyone and no one, and therefore for every individual)
+and a control of consumption. Rivalries between advertisers then
+become irrelevant: at a national level the different sectors of industry
+and commerce reach a more or less tacit agreement to take advantage
+of rising incomes and to drive the masses (as inert gatherings): (I) to
+consume more, and (2) to adapt their budgets not only to their own
+needs or tastes, but also to the imperatives of national production. If
+a wage-earner, with long habits of prudence and, where possible, of
+saving (inner-direction) retains his thrift when wages rise, the techniques of other-direction will have to replace his inner directions by
+those of the Other. But this is not really possible unless the serial
+individual has been produced from childhood as other-directed. It has
+recently been shown, in fact, that in infant schools in America (and,
+of course, throughout the child's education), everyone learns to be the
+expression of all the Others and thereby of his whole social milieu, so
+that the slightest exterior serial change returns to him and conditions
+him from outside in alterity.
+Everyone has seen the newspaper competitions in which the names
+of ten buildings, artists, or cars, etc. are listed in a random order, and
+the object of the competition is to guess the hierarchy-pattern (which
+really means the average hierarchy) which will be established by collating the replies of all the Others. The competitor whose list is closest to
+this list is the winner. In fact whoever wins - that is to say, is chosen,
+selected, publicly named, and rewarded - does so because he has been
+more perfectly Other than all the Others. His practical individuality,
+in the milieu of seriality, is his ability (at least in this particular situation) to become the medium of the Other as a unit of the flight of
+alterities. Should we say that he was already this mediumistic product
+of recurrence, or is it that he made himself a pure prediction of seriality?
+The answer is, both of them inseparably. The ambivalent statute of
+prophetic being and passive activity is simply that of every otherdirected individual. This never arises at the level of production, even
+
+652 Book 1I
+alienated production, even within an exploitative system, simply
+because work defines itself in terms of need as a free practical operation,
+in spite of, or even because of, the fact that it may confront the worker
+as a hostile force. But still it would be a mistake to suppose that this is
+confined to consumers in heavily industrialised societies. In any
+society which is haunted by the need to predict and mutually adjust
+production and markets from a particular point of view, other-direction
+plays an increasingly important part; it represents a real and new
+statute of the massified individual, namely the direct hold on the
+masses of control, management and distribution groups.
+But to treat this new relation between the group and the mass as
+created ex nihilo, form and matter, would be a complete misunderstanding of dialectical rationality. What is new is the historical content
+and the circumstances which determine it; what is actualised, but
+permanent, is the synthetic form of unity which appears here. This
+formal link has in fact always been filled by a content; but what is
+apparent today, at this moment of History, in which the structures of
+other-direction are more manifest in and around us is, in fact, the crucial
+importance of these structures for the comprehension of historical
+events. There has been a regrettable tendency to see certain collective
+actions as the product of suddenly formed groups - of mass 'spontaneity' - or simply as the result of the more or less disguised activities
+of those in power. In many cases, both approaches are misleading.
+For example, there is the seriality of racism, which I have explained:
+it is always the attitude of the Other. But seriality - though it may cause
+lynchings or pogroms - is not a sufficient explanation of, for example,
+the active anti-semitism of the German petty bourgeoisie under the
+Nazi régime. Now some highly ingenious recent studies have shown
+that anti-semitism as a historical fact has to be interpreted in terms of
+the systematic other-direction of the racism of the Other, that is to say,
+in terms of the continuous action of a group on a series. And this
+action is defined primarily by its reflexivity: the group demonstrates
+racism to the series by producing within it practical signs of its hostility
+to Jews, or by causing them to be produced; these signs - caricatures,
+definitions endlessly repeated on the radio, in the newspapers and on
+walls, tendentious information, etc. - ultimately play the same role as
+the standard list for everyone and no one. In short (ignoring for the
+moment their deliberately Manichaean, projective and sadistic characteristics, etc.) they are both concrete designations of a particular
+monster and the created formula of the series as an indication of the
+
+The Institution 653
+masses as a totality. The hatred which these dummies excited in everyone belonged to the Other; but totalising propaganda constituted this
+hatred into other-direction as an exigency of a totalising ceremony.
+Then it depended on the government (that is to say, on the determination which it brought elsewhere to Others and which it then diffused
+as a possible unity of all through the "mass media'), whether the circumstances for this totalising ceremony would be created, that is to
+say, whether the petty-bourgeois masses would become the practicoinert agents of an induced pogrom. Anyway, the arrest or execution of
+a Jew on government orders passively realised the same ceremony of
+alterity in the masses; every act of violence was irreversible, not only
+because it destroyed human lives, but because it made everyone an
+other-directed criminal, adopting the leaders' crimes in so far as he had
+committed them elsewhere and as an other in an other. Conversely, the
+acceptance of the sovereign's acts of violence, as an exis in the milieu of
+other-direction, may always, through the transcendent action of the
+directing group, be reconverted into a pogrom, as the passive activity
+of a directed seriality.
+And this exis, along with the practical process which its reconversion
+may produce, remains a false unity for two essential reasons, both of
+which are dialectical in character. First, even the most enthusiastic
+consent only means the inability to offer resistance, and therefore separation. Secondly, and most important, the serial acceptance of this
+irreversible other-direction itself increases separations, impotence and
+the real index of alterity. In fact, both with an approved action and
+with the practical process seriality re-emerges (in a moment of looting
+or execution for example) as a force for separation, simply because
+there has been no real resistance from a hostile group, and no practical
+totalisation through threats of extermination, to occasion, as real
+negations, the dissolution of the serial in the Others. On the contrary,
+looting and firing of undefended shops are in themselves dispersive
+acts of destruction: they have nothing to do with unity of agents (on
+the contrary, violence is engendered by disorder) and, from outside,
+87. This does not mean that it is impossible for a particular individual's
+approval of the acts of violence to arise also on the basis of a possible challenge;
+but only that the practice of the sovereign group consists in intensitying separations in every domain, so that the illusion of unity (acceptance-pogrom) is
+manifested on the basis of a serial inability to realise any other unity. The pogrom
+becomes the only solution in so far as the police régime introduces mistrust as an
+additional factor of separation.
+
+654 Book ||
+they make everyone into the other who is responsible for the maximum
+violence committed in the gathering by an other. At the level at which
+"collective responsibility' is serial responsibility, its acceptance or
+rejection by a given other are simply two contradictory expressions (in
+discourse) of one and the same fact. And this serial responsibility - as
+the projection of a precise, totalising policy in the milieu of alterity -
+increases the power of the sovereign group to precisely the extent that
+it deepens everyone's impotence while sustaining the misleading
+scheme of the totalising ceremony.
+With this example, I have tried to show what differentiates a racist
+exis (which is what is usually studied) from an anti-semitic movement;
+I have tried above all to indicate that the government apparatus and its
+sub-groups for constraint and propaganda are careful not to occasion
+what might be called organised action within inert gatherings. Every
+organisation disturbs them in so far as it dissolves seriality. Thus the
+real problem, at this level, is to extract organic actions from the masses
+without disturbing their statute as non-organised. At this point, the
+problem of 'organised spontaneity' (l'encadrement) is bound to be
+raised: modern societies, both East and West, provide the example of
+organised demonstrations. A procession - on I May, 14 July, 1 October
+etc. - gives a serial public the spectacle of strict organisation. An order
+is given: soldiers, workers, peasants, intellectuals march in Peking
+according to some pre-existing plan; there are leaders who regulate the
+march, its speed, the number of stops, etc. But these supposed groups,
+in which everyone does the same as all the Others, and regulates his
+action by that of the Others, and whose leading feature is sheer quantity,
+have nothing in common with the structures of communities. It is true
+that the march is regulated from outside; but the result of this transcendent action of a member of the sovereign group is precisely to keep
+them under the statute of other-directedness. These few examples,
+though very superficially studied, enable one to see - though the point
+cannot be developed or proved here - that the relation of the State to
+concrete society can never, even in the best of cases, transcend otherdirection. 88
+88. Even if its mode of recruitment is 'democratic', it is still a matter of cooption: the sovereign group confronts series of series and it is its organs which
+determine them by reflecting their seriality to them in the form of standard lists.
+All kinds of electoral systems constitute the set of electors as a passive material
+for other-direction; and the election results no more represent the will of the
+country, than the top ten records represent the taste of the customers. The only
+
+The Institution 655
+I Bureaucracy and the Cult of Personality.
+Thus a sovereign group increases the inertia of collectives and governs
+by means of it. But, as I said above, it will be worth giving a brief
+bodies) forms a complex system whose apparatuses, at the base of the
+hierarchy, are in direct contact with the masses and constitute what are
+variously called, very misleadingly, cadres, nuclei, liaison organisations, etc. In reality, these are inorganic instruments whose very inertia
+constitutes the surtace which is in contact with serial inertia, and their
+role, defined by superior groups, is to manipulate the other-directedness of Others. I have already observed that these sub-groups are
+surrounded by series; and in separation, as I have shown, they in turn
+become serialised. Everyone becomes sovereign to himself alone; but,
+in the milieu of the Other, the sovereign elsewhere is other. On the
+other hand, other-directedness is based on the passivity of the masses;
+but this passivity conditions their own passivity: first, because for
+those who are other-directed they themselves become the embodiment
+of the standard lists, solidified exigencies, etc., and, in the unity of a
+single petrification, the representatives of the law - that is to say, of
+sovereignty-as-an-individual in so far asthisproduces itself as a universal
+power.
+By this double petrification, they mean either to eliminate change or
+to control it, depending on the case. These sub-groups retain a practical
+appearance as long as they can really act as a mediation between the
+central authorities and the series. But such mediation cannot establish
+itself as a permanent function: a group may become the mediation
+between two groups, an individual between two communities; but
+mediation between the series and the sovereign cannot continue if the
+sovereign praxis is determined to keep the series in impotence and
+possible manifestation of a will' amongst the masses is their revolutionary
+grouping against the inertia of institutions and against the sovereignty which is
+based on their impotence. As a passive means, elections may bring about changes
+- though insignificant ones - in the composition of the sovereign body; but they
+can never claim to modify government policy (unless the circumstances which
+accompany it are such as to modify it anyway).
+
+656 Book II
+alterity. Needs will be determined and, where possible, satisfied from
+outside, in so far as they can be measured by biologists, doctors, etc.,
+but not in so far as they are the object of a genuine demand. This is
+because their serial structure prevents individuals from forming a
+group on the basis of a demand, and because the task of other-direction
+is constantly to raise the threshold for eftecting regroupment. In the
+world of the Other (which is the world of government) violence,
+rejection, exigency and even riots, sometimes occur: but such disturbances, which are quickly repressed, never serve as a lesson, or as an
+indication of the depth of popular discontent, precisely because it is
+always the Other who rebels or makes a demand: the Other, the alien,
+the suspect, the trouble-maker. The notion of a trouble-maker, in
+particular, is senseless except for a member of the sovereign group,
+that is to say, for a functionary convinced that the only ontological
+statute of human multiplicities is other-directed passivity. He controls
+this passivity in the light of the general interest; and the trouble-maker
+is an anti-sovereign who controls the same passivity in the light of his
+individual interest (or some other sectional interest). At this point the
+leader who is criticising the trouble-maker makes a self-criticism on the
+back of an Other, that is to say, as Other.
+Thus there can never be any such thing as popular discontent from
+the point of view of the sub-group which is immediately responsible
+for arrangements, and this is for the good reason that discontent is the
+practice and exis of a group and that the serial statute rules out the
+possibility of regroupment. The relation between sub-groups and
+series becomes reified: they no longer do anything but act materially on
+the series by means of the serial combinatory, that is to say, the schemes
+which arise from a serial constitution and make it possible to interpret
+actions of seriality. The difference between the local leader and the led
+individual is almost imperceptible: they are both serialised, and both of
+them live, act and think serially; but the leader thinks the seriality of
+the Other and acts serially on other-directed series. Thus nothing can
+be transmitted from the local level to the top because there is no longer
+anything being transmitted from the popular series to the leader whom
+they have serialised. It is precisely for this reason that, for his superior,
+the local leader is the object of a sovereign and univocal praxis. He is
+a tool for stirring the human material, and no more than a piece of
+inorganic matter. His autonomy and powers could give rise to reciprocity, if, in virtue of his function, he were to express the people's
+demands to his superior as human exigencies. But these demands and
+
+The Institution 65J
+exigencies do not exist: which simply means that they are still the
+product of the living, suftering individual who is paralysed by alterity.
+If at some time in the future they do manifest themselves, it will be as
+those of a group which rejects all mediation and constitutes its own
+sovereignty; demands always become 'known' too late. This is either
+because they have no being, and emerge as revolutionary or because
+they
+remain unexpressed, depending on circumstances. For his
+superior, the local leader is an inert guarantee of the inertia of the
+masses and he becomes such because they do not offer him, nor does he
+accept, the counter-power of making demands to the sovereign on
+their behalf.
+Thus, the multiplicity of subordinate agents appears, to the next
+level 'up', as a superior instance of seriality; and their passivity becomes
+a material to be worked by other-direction. But this by no means
+prevents everyone from being suspect, in that his operations could be
+carried out as a free, practical initiative, or, in other words, assert themselves as an individual's individual sovereignty over the serialities
+which fill his practical field. Both other-direction and terror have the
+aim, in relation to local leaders, of replacing real activity by the inert
+practice of worked matter at every level. Thus each level treats the
+agents of an inferior level as inorganic objects governed by laws, and
+loses their guarantee and their free support in relation to the superior
+level; it, too, becomes serial in so far as it is effective. This means that
+throughout the hierarchy, objects which are governed by laws of
+exteriority govern other objects which are placed beneath them,
+according to these laws and other [in-Jorganic laws; and that the combination of laws which, at each level, makes it possible to move the
+material on the inferior level is itself produced within the leaders on
+this level by a combination of their laws which was created above them.
+The paralysis of the system necessarily rises from the series which are
+led to the top, the sovereign alone (whether a small group or an
+individual) remaining unaffected. Or rather he is affected with passivity as a totalising individual; he becomes inorganic from below,
+from the depths of the hierarchy; but there is no superior who can
+In this new constitution of the group, we can observe the following
+characteristics: at every level of the hierarchy, everyone is a possible
+sovereign over the agents of an inferior level or a possible regulatory
+third party (taking the initiative in agitation or in the formation of a
+group; but everyone denies these possibilities out of mistrust for his
+
+658 Book II
+peers and fear of being suspect in the eyes of his superiors. Towards his
+peers, indeed, he adopts the attitude of the pledge and binds himself to
+inertia in order to be able to lay claim to theirs: separation and recurrence both encourage the re-emergence of the discrete multiplicity
+which he rejects. The shifting alterity of his equals unravels interiorised
+plurality into relations of exteriority. The exteriorisation of relations
+which we observed above is realised in the one who is the institution
+(and through all his peers). But the structure of sovereignty produces
+itself at every level as an institutional reinteriorisation; and so everyone,
+looking towards the superior level, demands perpetual integration from
+the sovereign; he dissolves his organic individuality in himself as an
+uncontrollable factor of multiplicity, and merges with his peers in the
+organic unity of the superior, finding no guarantee for his individual
+existence other than the free individuality of an other.
+It is this triple relation - other-direction of the inferior multiplicity;
+mistrust and serialising (and serialised) terror at the level of the peers;
+and the annihilation of organisms in obedience to the superior organism
+- which constitutes what people call bureaucracy. We saw it emerge
+from sovereignty itself, when sovereignty was no more than an
+institutional moment of the group; and we now see it asserting itself as
+a total suppression of the human, except at a minute point at the top of
+the hierarchy, as a result of inertia at the bottom. Its form and dialectical
+meaning are obvious: the impotence of the masses is the support of
+sovereignty, and sovereignty undertakes to manipulate them by means
+of mechanical laws - that is to say, of other-direction - but this
+voluntarism (that is to say, the affirmation of the practical sovereignty
+of man over man and the concerted maintenance of the practico-inert
+statute at the bottom) necessarily implies the mineralisation of man at
+every level, except the highest. It asserts itself everywhere as the
+opposite of freedom and tries with all its strength to destroy itself.
+Thus the impotence of the masses becomes the impotence of the
+sovereign; it becomes impossible for the half-paralysed man or subgroup at the top to maintain the pyramid of mechanisms, each of which
+is supposed to set the other in motion. The historical conditions for a
+bureaucratisation of powers are of course defined in the course of the
+historical process and through temporal totalisation. But this is not our
+subiect. What relates to the dialectic from the point of view of temporalisation, can be expressed in a few words. Where the State is an
+apparatus of constraint in a society divided by class conflicts, bureaucracy - the constant threat to the sovereign - is easier to avoid than in
+
+The Institution 65g
+the building of a socialist society: tensions between classes, partial and
+more or less organised struggles, and groupings - as a developing
+dissolution of serialities - force the 'public powers' into a more complex
+action, and contront them with communities, however ephemeral,
+which challenge the sovereign. He has to define a flexible, living praxis
+towards them through the other-direction of Others: the scintillating
+life of the fused group will either reject the old worm-eaten sovereignty
+of the bureaucracy, or, if it has already manifested itself, as a permanent danger, it will prevent the sovereign from being constituted in
+the most bureaucratised form, namely, as police.
+The omnipotence of police, as an absolute petrification of the funcions of the sovereign group, is based on the separation of impotence
+such separation must exist for the police-state to maintain and use: ir
+a society which is 'hot' - in Lévi-Strauss's excellent phrase - that is to
+say, in a society in which all forms of class struggle are perpetually
+alive in opposition to the statute of seriality (among the oppressed and
+the oppressors), the action of the sovereign will be a politics. Repression, though always in the background, will not be used as much as
+antagonisms (other-direction will partially disappear and re-emerge in
+the classic form of 'divide and rule'), tactics and strategy will have to be
+worked out by apparatuses and the circulation of sovereignty will have
+to be ensured in both directions. The job of the subordinate functionary
+Is not, of course,
+inform, on chess or to spared ith decular, of peir demands. this wil
+assure him a sort of quasi-mediating function; the permanent danger
+that seriality will dissolve around him may confront him with a vital
+hostile praxis whose menace and urgency demand immediate action.
+Even if no such thing actually happens, the subordinate agent is
+defined in his possibilities as ca pable of taking such an initiative. On the
+other hand, a particular contradiction sets the sovereign group, as the
+unity of the individual and the universal positing itself for itself, in
+opposition to the dominant class which produces it and sustains it (pay
+it) as its own apparatus. The dependence of the sovereign is, as we have
+seen, beyond doubt; but so too is the perpetual affirmation of autonomy
+with respect to every level. This leads to a tension, which varies with
+circumstances, and which can determine various methods of reconquest,
+in the power-groups of the dominant class: osmosis (regulated exchanges between government officials and economic groups), infiltration, influence (direct and indirect), etc. The sovereign group defends
+itself against these methods, which are in general aimed at altering its
+
+660 Book II
+internal composition, by perpetual vigilance. But this vigilance, or
+white terror, does not have the paralysing eftects of real terror, since,
+in this particular case, the problem is to defend the sovereign against
+the over-solicitous concern of his original allies. Of course, they dream
+of denying either his legitimate sovereignty or the correctness of his
+praxis in the long term; but they do try to set aside (or suggest) shortem crushed , po propose some presain. etchis has ta be integrated
+by the sovereign group: it may take over the proposals, dissolve them
+in its praxis while appearing to accept them, etc., but it can neither
+reject them a priori nor ignore them. This bond of interiorisation
+between the wishes and common demands of the dominant class (as
+expressed by pressure groups) on the one hand, and sovereignty as
+praxis on the other, represents, so to speak, the class existence of the
+sovereign. It requires certain subordinate agents to become real
+mediations between at least one serial ensemble and the top: and this
+serial ensemble is just the dominant class, in so far as pressure groups
+form within it in order to create - in opposition to the policy of the
+government - independent sectors of other-direction.
+These remarks are not designed to prove the superiority of sovereign
+groups in bourgeois democracies, but rather to show that they derive
+their life from the social contradictions they express. When a sovereign
+group, with its implacable homogeneity, has integrated every practical
+grouping into itself, in other words when sovereignty has the monopoly
+of the group, and when this grouping of groupings defines itself in the
+last instance by its direct hold over passive serialities and its strict
+practices of other-direction, and when this sovereignty is not a class
+product (like a monarchical or bourgeois state) and is necessarily
+recruited by co-option, producing its legitimacy by and for itself, then
+the sovereign pyramid will turn on itself in the void, regardless of its
+transcendent tasks. It will elude the control of a dominant class (for
+example capital and will have to struggle only against itself, that is to
+say, against the dangers of separation and institutionalisation; and it is
+precisely this struggle against itself which will lead to bureaucratisation.
+No one today could believe that the first stage of a socialist revolution realises the dictatorship of the proletariat. But, in a perpetual state
+of extreme emergency, and in the light of well known gigantic tasks, a
+
+The Institution 662
+of other-direction. It should be understood, in fact, by means of
+dialectical Reason itself, that any creation by a sovereign institutional
+group of a supposed regroupment of serial individuals (whether trade
+unions or other regimented formations) can only be a new differentiation and extension of the group itself to the extent that its members are
+all bearers of the sovereign power and that regimentation, even at the
+lowest level, does not transform the Other-Being of serial individuals
+into being-in-the-group, but rather, by means of a false, fixating
+totalisation, defines a new sector of intensive other-direction. The limit
+on the real power of the most dictatorial State is that it cannot create a
+group outside itself: all it can do is, when circumstances permit, grow
+to some extent and differentiate itself (by producing new sub-groups).
+The only effect of the determinations which it directly produces within
+inert gatherings is that it transfers them - in a given place and situation
+- from the serial level to that of an 'other-directed zone'. Every group,
+in fact, in so far as its own totalising movement contains the abstract
+possibility of establishing its own sovereignty, constitutes itself either
+outside the State (even if it is more or less directly connected with it,
+through subventions, official encouragement, etc.), by positing the
+autonomy of its praxis, or, primarily in opposition to the State, as a
+denunciation and rejection of its transcendent sovereignty, through a
+practice of abstention, passive resistance, disobedience or revolt.
+The internal contradictions of the socialist world bring out, through
+the immense progress that has been made, the objective exigency for
+debureaucratisation, decentralisation, and democratisation: and this
+last term should be taken to mean that the sovereign must gradually
+abandon its monopoly of the group (the question arises at the level of
+workers' committees). In fact, in the USSR at least, the destruction of
+the Soviet bourgeoisie was completed long ago. This means that the
+'dictatorship of the proletariat' was an optimistic notion, constructed
+too hastily through misunderstanding the formal laws of dialectical
+Reason: there was once a time when it was too soon for such dictatorship
+in the USSR: the real dictatorship was that of a self-perpetuating group
+which, in the name of a delegation which the proletariat had not given
+it, exercised power over the bourgeois class which was in the process
+of being destroyed, over the peasant class and over the working class
+itself. From the point of view of the masses the sovereignty of this
+group was neither legitimate nor illegitimate: its practical legitimation
+was due to the fact that the sovereign constructed his own illegitimacy
+by his mistakes and crimes: this is the judgement of History. Today it
+
+662 Book II
+is too late, and the problem which really arises is that of the gradual
+withering-away of the State in favour of broader and broader regroupments of other-directed serialities.
+And the reason why the dictatorship of the proletariat (as a real
+exercise of power through the totalisation of the working class) never
+occurred is that the very idea is absurd, being a bastard compromise
+between the active, sovereign group and passive seriality. Historical
+experience has shown quite undeniably that the first moment in the
+construction of socialist society - to consider it at the still abstract level
+of power - could only be the indissoluble aggregation of bureaucracy,
+of Terror and of the cult of personality. This first stage seems to be
+approaching its end, despite some terrible setbacks; and, in any case,
+wherever a new socialist régime is established today, the developing
+socialisation of half the world will produce this new revolution in a
+conjuncture and historical totalisation quite different from those which
+characterised the revolution of 1917. From our point of view, the
+impossibility of the proletariat exercising a dictatorship is formally
+proved by the fact that it is impossible for any form of group to
+constitute itself as a hyper-organism. Bureaucratic terror and the cult
+of personality are just another expression of the relation between the
+constituent dialectic and the constituted dialectic, that is to say, of the
+necessity that a common action as such (through the multiple differentiation of tasks) should practically reflect upon itself so as
+constantly to control and unify itself in the untranscendable form of
+an individual unit. It is true that Stalin was the Party and the State; or
+rather, that the Party and the State were Stalin. But his violence is an
+expression, in a specific process, of the violent contradiction between
+the two dialectics, that is to say, of the impossibility that the group as
+constituted praxis should transcend the statute of this organic individuality which it contains within itself, and transforms and transcends
+in so far as it is, in common interiority, a function of multiplicity.
+However, the untranscendability of the ontological and practical
+statute of the regulatory third party is not a de facto and therefore
+unintelligible limit assigned to communities: we have seen how it
+arises, in the translucidity of the critical investigation, in the course of
+development of the constituent dialectic, as a free, organic praxis and
+as a human relation of reciprocity. In other words, the constituent
+dialectic, while producing itself as the Reason of action, and realising its
+structures in the light of temporalisation, already determines the
+possibilities and impossibilities of common praxis; it naturalises
+
+The Institution 663
+(nature) constituted Reason. Thus constituted Reason derives its very
+intelligibility - as the structured logic of common action - from
+constituent Reason: and if our critical investigation enables us to grasp
+the formal genesis of the second dialectic, in its double character as
+praxis and process, with its scope and its limits in terms of the practicoinert held and of dissolutions of seriality, this is enough.
+Our investigation has now arrived at a shifting flight of elucidations:
+the practical unity of the group which organises itself lies in its object,
+in groups external to it; it passes momentarily through every participant in an undertaking as an 'excluded third party' (tiers exclu); and it
+resurfaces theoretically and practically in the activity of the sovereign.
+But it is never really given inside the group itself, in the way that the
+unity of the moments of an individual action lies in the unity of an
+active development. On the other hand, we can immediately see the
+true power of the group in the impotence of each of its members: this
+impotence endows functions with a material force of inertia, and turns
+them into hard, heavy organs which are capable of striking, crushing,
+etc. T'hus the true efficacity of the group, as a praxis bogged down in
+matter, lies in its materiality - that is, in its becoming-process. But, in
+so far as praxis is process, goals lose their teleological character.
+Without ceasing to be genuine goals, they become destinies.
+
+7
+The Place of History
+Dialectical investigation as totalisation: the level of the concrete,
+the place of history
+The Reciprocity of Groups and Collectives
+The group emerges from the more or less complete dissolution of
+collectives and in the unity of a common praxis. And the object of this
+praxis can be defined only in relation to other groups, which may or
+may not be mediated by series, or to an inert gathering, which may or
+may not be mediated by other groups, or to worked matter, which may
+or may not be mediated by series and groups.
+But if the collective from which the group arises bears at least some
+superficial mark of its dissolving praxis, then the result of the common
+action, regardless of its other characteristics, must also be a determination of the collective and of worked matter. Thus, in a sense, the
+objective reality of the group (its practical objectification) is the
+collective and the inorganic. In other words, looking at the praxis of
+the group outside itself in the transcendent milieu of its objectification,
+we can see that it is defined by three principal characteristics.
+(1) It practically realises new and unifying realities in the social and
+physical material which constitutes its practical field. In the friendly or
+hostile groups which are adjacent to it it directly produces certain
+modifications which are both suffered and readopted in the course of
+nternal rearrangements. Indirectly, by its mere presence in the commo
+eld (as a practical field for every community at various levels).
+produces transformations at a distance, that is to say, induced reorangement the dept si he diseane is ef erively, the rotali trans.
+'ormation of the field. Since the field is
+practical totalisation, the distant appearance of another group as a non-
+
+The Place of History 665
+totalisable retotalisation of diversity (and as a totalising mutual reconditioning of elements in a sort of formidable, fleeting autonomy)
+confronts each group with the permanent threat of a radical alteration
+of all the internal references of the system and thus of the modification of
+the group itself through a retotalised totalisation at least as an unrealisable signification. The question whether these practical results represent a partial failure or a success need not concern us at present. What
+is obvious is that the efficacity of a praxis is directly linked to its
+concrete objective and that the different actions which it performs here
+are all unified within the common field at every level of investigation and
+by all groups present.
+(2) These synthetic results are necessarily alienated, although the
+moment where alienation appears is not necessarily that in which
+objectification occurs. The alienation of a free, isolated praxis - as it
+occurs in the practico-inert field - has to be immediate because this
+pseudo-isolation is already in itself a statute of impotence created
+through the mediation of the inorganic. But the objectification of
+common praxis can be an immediate, total success: since the group is
+the negation of impotence, its success is conditioned by the reigning
+relations of forces. An army may annihilate an enemy army and
+entirely occupy the defeated country. But in so far as this objectification
+is ultimately an inert object and an individual reality within the
+developing totalisation, it is necessarily appropriated and alienated.
+Even defeated groups in the practical field can manipulate this field
+itself, and endow it with a real polyvalence which deprives the object
+of any univocal, uncontested signification. In other words, the object
+which is produced is in itself pluri-dimensional and there is no guarantee that its different significations will not be contradictory. It is also
+clear that they present themselves to the group as unrealisable significations, related to an elsewhere. By means of an indirect, antagonistic
+reciprocity, the object returns marked by the developing totalisation of
+the totalising groups: the common field as a pluri-dimensional insecurity becomes the mediation between the object and the group. But
+since the truth of the group lies in its object, the practical plurality of
+the objective dimensions of the thing which is realised turns back on
+the active community and modifies it in turn, to precisely the extent
+hat its own victory has modified other communities
+This does not mean that we have to return to historical scepticism -
+on the contrary; but we must recognise that these multiple significations
+can be integrated only from a point of view in which it is possible to
+
+66G Book II
+integrate all the groups of the common field and all its practical determinations, that is to say, from a historical point of view. Nevertheless,
+even if the group survives this practical success, and even if it organises
+and maintains itself, we must abandon any idea of humanity historialising itself in the development of a single temporalisation which began
+with 'the first men' and which will finish with 'the last': the dialectical
+investigation establishes that here too, in the absence of a temporal
+hyper-organism, we have treated diachronic totalisation as though it
+were a free, individual temporalisation. Humanity treated as one Man:
+this is the illusion of the constituted dialectic. There are in fact several
+temporalisations; what I have in mind are those diachronic multiplicities known as generations. Each generation is a natural and social
+product of the previous generation; but each generation separates itself
+from the previous one and, as a material condition of its praxis, transcends the objectification of the previous praxis, that is to say, the being
+of the previous generation, in so far as this being becomes, through this
+very transcendence, an inert object which needs to be rearranged. Thus
+the temporal development of the objective process to which the group
+gives birth entirely eludes it as one moves further away from the
+moment in which it was realised by praxis: it becomes the condition
+for a new praxis within this praxis become object, the condition of a
+condition, material, etc. Of course this does not mean that new
+generations can, by their own praxis, arbitrarily assign it any signification and use, but it does mean that however rigorous its objective
+features, they will acquire their meaning only in the course of a process
+of dialectical development (of the totalising synthesis of various
+circumstances) which, being dialectical, must be not only inflexible but
+also, from the point of view of the first generation, completely unpredictable (at least given a certain time-lag, whose length will vary
+according to circumstances).
+The plurality of temporalisations together with temporal unification
+(a synthetic unification of the antecedent by the consequent, a present
+unification of the new multiplicity through old frameworks) actually
+constitute the evolution of humanity as the praxis of a diachronic
+group, that is to say, as the temporal aspect of the constituted dialectic.
+Synchronic groups are a work of unification of simultaneous multiplicities in the light of a common objective. Diachronic groups are the
+result of the retro-anterogressive unification of temporalisations; thus
+the temporality of a nation, for example, as a created unity and a
+constituted dialectic is to the living temporalisation of the members of
+
+The Place of History 66J
+one generation what common praxis is to free organic practice. We
+shall return to this point. What is certain is that the result achieved by
+the original group (original in the sense of being first on this occasion,
+rather than absolutely) is a quasi-object for the young and passes
+progressively to the total inertia of the inorganic object; similarly, the
+living temporalisation (or rather the mediated reciprocity of temporalisations) which produced it is transformed by the transcending
+praxis of the newcomers into an inert and finished determination of
+temporality (as a created process and a diachronic unity). Produced by
+the praxis of their parents, children reinteriorise their praxis, divert it,
+transcend it and make it other through its new results: they appropriate
+it. And there is no reason to suppose that defeated groups will not
+produce, through the changes caused by their defeat, sons who will take
+advantage of it and wipe out their conquerors. Thus objectified praxis
+must necessarily allow itself to be modified by a double alienation (both
+synchronic and diachronic).
+The costly French victory of 1918 was expressed on every level by
+a multiplicity of social transformations. Let me describe just two of
+them - perhaps not the most important - to illustrate these points. On
+the one hand, the first occurrence of total war (or national war, as it
+was called at the time) was expressed after the peace by a demographic
+fact which was (at least originally) of analmost mechanical nature: empty
+class-rooms. The military practice known as the 'strategy of a million'
+(stratégie du million d'hommes) re-emerged, alienated and passivised,
+as a simple numerical relation characterising the succeeding generations.
+But this numerical relation was itself preserved by the Malthusian
+practices of the survivors. These practices existed at the level of pure
+recurrence, being the object of religious and political prohibitions, but
+through the alterity of the collective they helped give the result an
+appearance of analytical necessity. The conditions of the war and of
+the post-war years - which were very different in Germany - led to an
+ncrease in the numerical superiority of the German population. Thu
+he victory of 1918 created in the common field of Europe the possi
+bility of the defeat of 1940.
+On the other hand, for the French children born between 19I4 and
+1920, the war lay behind them as a hideous object, a product of paternal
+madness. Most of them transcended it towards a militant pacifism or a
+dream of universal peace, precisely because it had ended in victory.
+The German defeat, in contrast, was transcended as a revolt against the
+defeated fathers and as a wish for revenge among young Germans
+
+668 Book II
+through the practice of Nazism. This reversal, which is often remarked
+on, therefore expresses a double alienation (synchronic and diachronic) of the French victory. Thus group action is always doomed to
+synchronic alienation89 except when the practical community is
+identical to all the individuals in the common field; then it is doomed
+without qualification to diachronic alienation. On this basis one can
+see counter-finalities re-emerging at the level of group praxis, and
+tearing up the common field (empty classrooms, in so far as they are
+produced with the mediation of Malthusianism as recurrence, manifest
+themselves as a counter-finality of total war and of victory, its objectification).
+(3) But, apart from these interactions, group action is of itself a
+radical transformation of the common statute in so far as its results,
+without losing their synthetic unity, imprint themselves on inorganic
+matter or become the strict determination of a collective (or of any
+practico-inert concretion). The practical unity of the group and the
+free pledged inertia of its members are reflected to it as the inorganic
+passivity of a pure physical or human materiality which retains, in itself
+and in the exteriority of its parts, the false unity of a seal. The group
+was constituted in opposition to recurrence; and it becomes the means
+of determining a serial process through the knowledge and application
+of laws of alterity. We have seen how the paralysis of seriality rises
+from other-directed gatherings towards the sovereign. But the embodiment of powers is a special case. As a general rule, the group develops
+counter-finalities which elude it in so far as it acts on the inorganic,
+either directly or through the mediation of collectives, and in so far as
+it acts indirectly on groups and brings about a serial process in a
+gathering. Such, ultimately, are the limits of its praxis: born to dissolve
+series in the living synthesis of a community, it is blocked in its spatiotemporal development by the untranscendable statute of organic
+individuality and finds its being, outside itself, in the passive determinations of inorganic exteriority which it had wished to repress in
+itself. It is formed in opposition to alienation, in so far as alienation
+ubstitutes the practico-inert field for the free practical field of th
+dividual; but it cannot escape alienation any more than the individu
+89. By this I do not mean that alienation must follow action immediately, but
+that it will occur in the historical temporalisation of the group and of its generation.
+
+The Place of History 669
+We have seen institutionalisation as petrified practice. But if we were
+to make a simple investigation of the social field around us, we would
+find plenty of examples of even more extreme petrification. In the
+extreme case, the group (as a praxis of other-direction) merges completely with its object; that is, it is not its praxis, but itself which passes
+entirely into objectified being. In particular, I would single out the
+studies of shop workers by American sociologists. Recent studies in the
+USA have examined the practical behaviour of such workers, as agents
+integrated into an organised economic group. Today they must undergo a real apprenticeship in order to learn techniques of manipulation:
+the customer (as a serial object) must be manipulated as a complex
+apparatus according to certain methods based on certain laws (which
+are also serial). But in order to manipulate his customers, the employee
+must first learn to manipulate himself (change his mood, put the
+customer in the right, etc.). The operation itself turns out to be the
+same: one manipulates oneself in order to manipulate others, or one
+manipulates Others in so far as one is manipulated oneself. For, ultimately, to manipulate oneself - as this study clearly demonstrates - is,
+for the employee himself, and without any possible doubt, to have been
+manipulated (apprenticeship) in such a way as to adopt practical selfdeterminations in particular circumstances and for a given aim. This
+manipulation, as a determination in exis of manipulative-being (l'être
+manipulatèur) relates to two indeterminates of seriality, one vertical
+(the hierarchical group, manipulations of manipulations, etc.) and the
+other horizontal (the exterior series of the manipulated). But each of
+them relates to the Other, and ultimately manipulation, which was
+originally simply a technique of treating the Other as Other, ° becomes
+the universal law of alterity. The only difference between the manipulating group and the manipulated series is that in the latter alterity is the
+constitutive law of the practico-inert field, and therefore a law which is
+obeyed in exteriority, whereas in the group it is the radical exteriorisation of a praxis which is organised in interiority, but which allows itself
+to be defined entirely by its object.
+Of course, the group's reversion to the collective statute does not
+90. The problem is to persuade the customer to buy what the Other is buying:
+that object which as a private individual he would reject. This 'privacy' has to be
+masked by treating him as an Other and, for this purpose, it is necessary to
+approach him as the Other. Manipulation consists in producing oneself as the
+Other in order to refer the customer to his alterity through the simple reciprocity
+of relations.
+
+GJO Book II
+necessarily take any particular period of time. It is determined by the
+historical process as a whole and by the special features of the undertaking: nevertheless, if the group were not already dissolved, constituted
+temporality would tend to make the group as an inert instrument of
+passive action equivalent to an acted-on gathering as the ena, reason and
+means of this practico-inert connection. It would be easy - but outside
+our subject - to show how the generalised practice of other-direction
+tends, in economically advanced societies, to constitute a new objectivity of the social object as an object of external, infinitely infinite
+conditioning, every part of which is itself induced in other objects by
+other conditioning. The absolute destruction, even in the conditioning
+groups (power-groups, propaganda-groups, pressure-groups, etc.) of
+common, totalising praxis, and its metamorphosis (through the sclerosis of the group and the multiplication of series) into a fleeting unity of
+alterity, have the effect of dissolving the unitary praxis of manipulation into the horizontal and vertical multiplicities of infinite seriality.
+At this level, the image of organic individuality as the untranscendable
+schema of the constituent and constituted dialectic either dissolves or
+remains as a crossroads of serialities. But the dialectical structure of
+action will also have inscribed itself in inertia as its law of exteriority:
+and the example of Taylor, as we have seen already, shows how a dialectical operation can be divided and redistributed between pure, inorganic inertias (specialised machines) through an analysis by positivist
+Reason. The total objectivity of man for himself, in so far as he is an
+Other-Being for and through the other, is not yet reinteriorised as a
+pure, transcended condition for a dialectical and unified act of integration: on the contrary, any employment of the other field (champ autre)
+transforms the group into an Other, that is to say, into a practico-inert
+unit of alterity. The historical and practical problem does not concern
+us here, though it is of crucial concern from the point of view of our
+real activity as concrete men. What concerned me was to lead the
+group through the triple character of realised praxis to the last of its
+incarnations, that is to say, to see it dissolve into seriality.
+
+The Place of History 671
+2
+The Circularity of Dialectical Investigation
+This enables us to reach the concrete at last, that is to say, to complete
+our dialectical investigation. We now confront not the real concrete,
+which can only be historical, but the set of formal contexts, curves,
+which the historical concrete must necessarily occur. Or rather - since
+nothing is settled except past being - we are at last encountering the set
+when it produces itself as a constituted dialectic in accordance with
+aws imposed by the constituent dialectic on the basis of this trans
+ended-being, so as to constitute themselves as the conditions for
+new praxis, with the same statute of transcended-being.
+And if it is asked how our basic investigation, as such, can be
+completed (that is to say, since it is also a praxis, why it can be completed and entirely identified with its results), our reply is that the
+obvious criterion of its totalising value is its circularity. In fact we have
+seen how the first and most concrete characteristics of the individual
+as an abstract reality lie in alienation to the practico-inert; but the
+practico-inert, as a non-dialectical thickening of Being, enables sociality to be created as the common work of groups on series, and allows
+alienated freedom to reappear as a violence exerted upon necessity. And
+this common praxis gave its practical truth to the field of serialities: it
+unveiled it and constituted it as what has to be dissolved. But our study
+of the different structures, in an order of increasing complexity, has
+hown inertia reappearing inside groups, at first as the free violence of
+reedoms against treedoms and then becoming a common being in
+reciprocally created inertia. This is what we have called freedom as
+necessity. On this basis, and through the force of inertia itself, this
+necessity, freely accepted under the pressure of increasingly urgent
+circumstances and in the milieu of scarcity, becomes pledged faith, and
+an agent of the re-exteriorisation of interiority (organised and institutionalised relations) until the most extreme mode of exteriority (the
+institution) produces in its own institutional statute the conditions
+and means of re-interiorisation.
+In fact, the sequence of the dialectical investigation has shown
+sovereignty as an agent of petrification, and as a consequence an
+essential factor of increasing seriality. And this seriality is not simply
+
+6J2 Book II
+the formal development of pledged inertia in material conditions which
+demand it (separation, etc.): in so far as the group constitutes itself in
+direct contact with inert gatherings, alterity rises into it from its
+radial. Here an a gas the naupe, so it ed reciprocity is promas
+the form of worked seriality which we have called other-direction.
+Thus the difference between a group whose unity becomes more and
+more like a seal impressed on a human wax which is solidifying, and a
+gathering whose very inertia turns into a source of energy, in so far
+as it is exploited for serial actions by a false unity which is induced
+within seriality, tends to disappear. So it appears that we left collectives
+in the moment where the group was extricating itself from them and
+where the common initiative (through its half-failure: practical success,
+or at least possibility of practical success, but ontological failure) forced
+us back to them, to the extent that the necessity of freedom implied the
+progressive alienation of freedom to necessity. But when we reach the
+end of our investigation, we do not find collectives as we left them:
+the mere constitution of a group at the epidermic surface of a series
+constitutes for other layers of seriality a kind of abstract, negative unity
+(that of the non-grouped); at every moment of the investigation, a
+group's practices and manipulations differentiate certain sectors of
+series by employing recurrence as a mystifying synthesis in the form of
+other-direction; and in the end petrified groups collapse into the
+series, their practical unity having become an inert seal of pure exteriority. In this way series preserve and serialise significations
+(totalisations which are either dead or else have become false totalities)
+just as worked matter preserves determinations produced by work or,
+in other words, series, in certain sectors, become inorganic, worked
+materiality.
+To go back to the deepest origin of the group, there can be no doubt
+that, whatever its manifest aim may be, it produces itself through the
+project of taking the inhuman power of mediation between men away
+from worked matter and giving it, in the community, to each and to all
+and constituting itself, as structured, as a resumption of control over
+the materiality of the practical field (things and collectives) by free
+communised praxis (the pledge, etc.). From its first appearance as the
+erosion of the collective, it is possible to see in it - to use Marxist
+terminology - the project of removing man from the statute of alterity
+which makes him a product of his product, in order to transform him,
+hot (à chaud), by appropriate practices, into a product of the group, that
+
+The Place of History 673
+is to say - as long as the group is freedom - into his own product. This
+double concrete undertaking is realised, of course, in concrete circumstances and in the basic context of need and scarcity. But this is a
+dialectical development; it asserts itself and gets lost in the antidialectical being of the practico-inert and produces itself anew as the
+very negation of this being; and consequently, although this conditioning by need is both indispensable and strict (directly or indirectly), it
+does not explain, in the sense of positivistic reason, the constitution of
+the particular reality which is the group. And, indeed, we have seen
+how threats and needs can give rise to a negative unity in those layers
+of the gathering which are inert in so far as they are already unified (by
+the enemy, by a natural but totalising threat, etc.): and it is on the
+basis of these abstract significations of synthetic unity that every Other
+acquires the ability to liquidate the Other in himself. Thus, in serial
+impotence, the negative possibility of the group produces itself
+everywhere as that which denies this impotence, or as that which is
+made temporarily impossible by this impotence. The group defines
+and produces itself not only as an instrument, but also as a mode of
+existence; it posits itself for itself - in the strict determination of its
+transcendent task - as the free milieu of free human relations; and on
+the basis of the pledge, it produces man as a free common individual,
+and confers new birth on the Other: thus the group is both the most
+effectiye means of controlling the surrounding materiality in the context of scarcity and the absolute end as pure freedom liberating men from
+alterity.
+These observations are intended to demonstrate the basic reciprocity between groups and the collectives. Since, in effect, the group
+constitutes itself with the Others of the collective, all the imposed
+external characteristics of the collective are transferred to the group
+itself, are interiorised and, having been adopted through the pledge,
+determine it in interiority. A revolutionary party, intent on liquidating
+certain prejudices and ideological tendencies (imposed on the exploited
+class by the exploiting class by means of propaganda), will be formed
+through the union of the exploited who are determined by such an
+ideology and such prejudices. In the concrete domain of the group,
+this passivity presents itself as Other-Being which remains an inertia
+in everyone and which has to be liquidated as such, by everyone and by
+specialised organisations. A resumption in freedom is therefore
+characterised - in this negative example - by rearranging the group so
+as to destroy the inherited characteristic. In this sense, it can be said
+
+6JA Book II
+that the tangle of passive determinations which constitutes the collective, is entirely reproduced within the group as a perspective for acting
+on itself (positively and negatively) in the context of a transcendent
+objective. The entire temporalisation of a practical community is
+characterised from within by the evolution of restructured alterities in
+so far as this evolution is conditioned by practice (that is to say, by
+acting on the objective and by its reactions). Thus, the First French
+Republic was proclaimed by royalists. Or rather, at the time of the
+flight to Varennes, the assemblies, clubs, etc., discovered their royalism
+as an unnoticed inertia and, in the course of the following year,
+reclassifications, liquidations, schisms and purges, conditioned by the
+movement of History, led these power-groups and pressure-groups to
+make themselves republican by proclaiming the Republic.
+Conversely, seriality, in so far as the group emerged from it, is profoundly determined by this separation. The unity of the grouping
+movement is perceived in alterity and negatively: it creates fear, and
+every Other imagines he will have to pay for the Others; and the
+action frightens the torpid. But, at the same time, it establishes its own
+legitimacy by reasserting its freedom and, at the same time, designates
+the exis of the Other as the inert ensemble which engulfs it in seriality
+(and which must either be liquidated or readopted in freedom). Now,
+the alienation of the Other is sustained and lived by everyone through
+an alienated freedom: alienated in its objectification, in its results, etc.,
+but free and constituent, in so far as it is lost so that the Other can
+exist. Thus for every practical freedom which exhausts itself in order
+to produce necessity as alienation, the group is the free possibility of
+integration (one can join it or sign on). Thus it depends, in alterity, on
+everyone's choice. And this individual in the series will thereby initiate,
+by himself and for himself (through the mediation of the group), a
+liquidation of alterity, according to circumstances and to the particular
+History; and the Other who strenuously rejects the group will have to
+adopt alterity as if it were the result of a free common praxis: he will
+have to behave as if Other-Being were a system of values and a practical
+organisation; and he will thereby negatively reflect the action of the
+group and contribute to the dissolution of alterity.
+Dialectical exchanges of an osmotic nature therefore concretely
+occur between groups and serialities: the series infects the group with
+its passivity, and either the group interiorises it and transforms it into
+instrumentality or it is ultimately destroyed by it; the group, in all its
+forms, forces the statute of alterity to emerge from immediacy, and
+
+The Place of History 675
+produces a reflexion in the collective as such. But we should not forget
+that the opposite reciprocal relation is possible: the series may show by
+still isolated agitations that it is approaching the point at which it will
+dissolve into a group; thus it may exert real pressure on the active
+community which 'represents' it, and the group which is in the process
+of petrification may become an obstacle to the dissolution of seriality
+in the collective on account of its own inertia. In any case, a directing
+group, as an epidermic emergence from the collective, produces a
+double structure of unity in it: one of them is positive but illusory, and
+is the mirage of totality in the milieu of other-direction; the other is
+real but negative and ambivalent, and is the totalisation of the nongrouped by their non-membership of the group, which will ultimately
+be lived by everyone either as an impotence which has to be transcended (a negation of the negative totalisation) or as a practical refusal
+to join the group (a constitution of alterity into a practical and totalising
+bond of interiority: counter-groups)."
+Through its decline and relapse into seriality, the group, at a distance, causes pseudo-synthetic or negatively synthetic variations in the
+collective. The induced, phantasmal unity of the collective from which
+a fused group has just extricated itself - as the immediate connection
+of impotence to action, of free praxis to suffered alterity, etc. - is
+completely different from the unities of other-direction. In so far as a
+small group knows how to produce them according to rule, it can use
+these unities to exploit the immense potentialities of an indefinite
+series (in the strictly physical sense of transformations of energy) so as
+to bring about specific changes in the social field by means of machines.
+Thus the group, as praxis, reproduces itself at every level with the
+21. Counter-groups cannot be groups, except when the sovereign integrates
+them into apparatuses of constraint. In themselves, they constitute by their unity
+the mirage of a hostile group. They may occasionally present themselves as
+directed groups (with guides, organisers, etc.). But despite these attributes of
+practical totalisation their structure is still serial. If they come into contact with an
+enemy group (but a genuinely practical one) they are immediately dispersed. The
+difference between them and pure seriality is simply due to the fact that everyone
+who is marching in step with the Others, and, in the last resort, in other-step, is
+ltimately atlected by a practical and adopted alterity. But these two character.
+stics, being 'practical' and being 'adopted', are induced: it is free praxis whicł
+from outside, forces inertia to become negative action, while the interiorisation
+of this determination becomes adopted alterity. In fact, nothing is adopted; it is
+simply that they remain other and try, as Other, to prevent the dissolution of the
+series in the Others.
+
+GJG Book II
+statute appropriate to each, in one case other-direction, at a lower level
+pure seriality, and lower still, the strict, directed equivalence of two
+physico-chemical states.
+The preceding paragraphs can be summed up by saying that the
+constituted dialectic presents itself as a double circularity. The first
+circularity is of a static order: we can observe that the group's structures
+and lines of action are defined by the features of the collective from
+which it has extricated itself; and at the same time, in its practical relation with the collective, the group reproduces itself as directed alterity
+and as the exploitation of passive activity at every level until it becomes
+purely and simply the movement of the machine and the rhythm of
+production.92. The second circularity is the perpetual movement
+which will sooner or later degrade actual groups and cause them
+to collapse back into collectives. I will recall here that this circularity is
+conditioned only by the movement of History and that, regardless of
+their statute, groups can either arise from the practico-inert field or be
+reabsorbed into it; and there is no formal law to compel them to pass
+through the succession of different statutes described above. A fused
+group may either dissolve instantaneously or be at the beginning of a
+long development which will lead to sovereignty; and in the complex
+world glimpsed here, the sovereign group itself may arise directly from
+the collective itself (or rather from its sector of other-direction). But it
+cannot really arise unless all the formal rules of its statute (separation,
+the institution, the exteriorisation of practices, and reinteriorisation by
+the untranscendable third party) are given simultaneously in their
+mutual conditioning. But in itself this should cause no surprise, and
+only the whole historical complex can determine whether the group
+will emerge already half-petrified, since in concrete reality, that is to
+say, in every moment of a temporalisation, all statutes of all groups,
+whether alive or dead, and all types of seriality (with all their induced
+unities, whether illusory or real, whether negative or positive) are
+given together as a tangle of strict relations and as the dispersed raw
+material of the developing totalisation.
+Thus every pledged group, which forms freely at the expense of a
+series, necessarily relates in itself to some less differentiated structures
+92. In the totalisation of the common field, every group does of course also
+ind its objectivity in every hostile or friendly group. But this horizontal circ
+arity is too obvious to be worth dwelling on. What is important for us is vertic
+circularity.
+
+The Place of History 6JJ
+and ultimately to the fused group, which is its fundamental form and its
+surety. But fusion, as the totalising moment of the regulatory/regulated
+third party, takes place in the pledge itself, or rather in the moment of
+the decision to pledge. The first third party to raise his hand immediately gives the series everywhere the opportunity to dissolve, and
+it dissolves through the pledge as ubiquity. The stage is not missed out;
+but it is the immediate basis of the second stage (and, if necessary, this
+of the third, etc.). In the same way, fusion and the pledge, with their
+masked crude violence, sustain the feeble contractual link of a group in
+the process of organisation: in fact we shall encounter them again in the
+intransigence of colleagues and leaders, in a period of rearrangement.
+It should also be added that, although all forms of group are in themselves created products, produced by human labour, each of them
+re-produces itself in practico-inert fields and in common fields which are
+already determined by analogous forms (dead or alive) and under the
+direct or indirect influence of their presence. And in fact we have just
+seen that no group of any form can produce itself without influencing
+all social fields, and that seriality itself is determined, either negatively
+or positively, by unitary schemata which will be taken up again by the
+practical movement of regroupment. It is this double circularity, static
+and dynamic, in so far as it is manifested in shifting relations at every
+level of every social concretion, which constitutes the final moment of
+thedialecticalinvestigation and, therefore, the concrete reality ofsociality.
+This concrete moment of the investigation reintegrates all the abstract
+moments which we have reached and transcended one after the other;
+it replaces them within the concrete in their concrete function. In the
+first place, the free praxis of the isolated individual loses its suspicious
+appearance as a Robinsonade; there is no such thing as an isolated
+individual (unless isolation is treated as a special structure of sociality).
+But within the historical totalisation, the real disappearance of the
+isolated individual and his replacement by the Other or by the common
+individual is based on organic praxis both as constituent dialectic and
+as a mediation (at another level between function and the transcendent
+that is to say
+as a basic absence of a group ontological statute and as the shifting
+exile of common individuals (Fraternity-Terror) and in the paradox
+that the group tries to dissolve the multiplicity of persons in the cult of
+personality. Thus we can now see that the concrete dialectic is that
+which is revealed through the common praxis of a group; but we also
+
+678 Book I/
+know that the impossibility (for a union of individuals) of transcending
+organic action as a strictly individual model is the basic condition of
+historical rationality, that is to say, that constituted dialectical Reason
+(as the living intelligibility of all common praxis) must always be
+related to its ever present but always veiled foundation, constituent
+rationality. Without the strict, permanent limitation of relating the
+group to this foundation, the community is no less abstract than the
+isolated individual: there are revolutionary pastorals on the group
+which are the exact counterpart of Robinsonades.
+But, in the same way, examining groups independently of series
+would be just as abstract as examining series independently of groups.
+In reality, the historical production of one or several groups determines a new kind of practical field, which we call the common field,
+whereas seriality defines the field which we have called practico-inert.
+But the circularity which we have just explained makes it possible to
+see why the dialectic - as a formal law of movement - remains silent on
+questions of priority. There is actually no a priori ground for supposing that seriality is an earlier statute than the group, although it is
+true that the group constitutes itself in and against it. Not only do we
+always find groups and gatherings together, but also, only dialectical
+investigation and experience will enable us to determine whether the
+seriality in question is an immediate gathering or whether it is constituted by old groups which have been serialised. Indeed, we have
+seen that sooner or later they return to the statute of inertia. But are
+we to regard the stuff of seriality as the inorganic as a foundation of
+object-sociality (socialité-objet), or should it be reduced to a dust of
+degenerate dead organisms? And - as we perceive it in everyday
+experience - is there not a perpetual double movement of regroupment
+and petrification? We can ignore such questions: our purpose was to
+explain the intelligibility of these possibilities; and this we have done.
+3
+The Working Class as Institution, Fused Group
+and Series
+At this level, it should be observed that the complex forms assumed, in
+and through circularity, by what are conventionally called social
+
+The Place of History 6J9
+realities, need not be confined to any one specific level of intelligibility,
+and that it may be impossible to confine them to any particular
+practico-ontological statute. This is not just because groups have a
+serial destiny even in the moment of their practical totalisation, or
+because a particular seriality may, in some circumstances, be transformed into a community. The most important reason is that the group
+is always marked by the series, that it becomes its reality in the milieu
+of freedom, and that a series is determined, even in its totally inorganic
+practico-inert layers, by the sovereign self-production of the group.
+It is therefore necessary to conceive of a specific statute for certain
+realities whose real unity is manifested as a bond of interiority between
+common and serial multiplicities. This applies, for example, to social
+classes (when defined within a system of exploitation).33 We have
+shown how class-being (for example, in the working class) is defined
+by the seriality of impotence in so far as it is qualified and determined
+by practico-inert exigencies: the primary, negative relation of the
+worker to the machine (non-ownership), the mystification of the free
+contract, and labour becoming a hostile force for the worker, on the
+basis of the wage system and the capitalist process. All this takes place
+in a milieu of serial dispersal and antagonistic reciprocities on the
+labour market. Alienation as a real and strict process within the system
+arises in and through alterity as infinite recurrence: it concretises the
+abstract structure in an entirely concrete historical movement; but the
+dispersive skeleton, as a relation of fleeting impotence amongst the
+workers themselves, is a necessary part of this concretisation. Industrialisation produces its proletariat; it drains it from the countryside, and
+regulates its birthrate. But, here as elsewhere, a statute of impotence is
+produced, through the serialisation of the proletarians.
+But this serial, practico-inert statute would not lead to class struggle
+if the permanent possibility of dissolving the series were not available
+to everyone; and we have seen how a first, abstract determination of
+this possible unity emerges through class interest, as a possible negation
+of destiny. However, the transformation of a class into an actualised
+group has never actually occurred, even in revolutionary periods. But
+we have seen that seriality is always being eroded by action groups
+constituted at various levels and pursuing variable objectives. Tradeunion organisation, as we saw above, is typical of the organised group
+93. But it does not apply to classes as defined by sociologists or ethnographers
+investigating 'primitive' societies.
+
+680 Book II
+which becomes institutional and sovereign (and is in constant danger of
+bureaucratisation). There can be no doubt, however, that in its free
+production of itself it takes on the inert characteristics which define, in
+untranscendability, the class-being of workers. I have tried to demonstrate this, in particular, for anarcho-syndicalism. The readoption of a
+constitution - generally in ignorance - helps to define inert limits to
+common action: this too we have seen. Thus, the entire class is clearly
+present in the organised group which constitutes itself within it; and
+its seriality as a collective, as a limitation, is the inorganic being of
+its practical community. It is genuinely a case of the class having two
+forms; the community is not to be regarded as a Spinozan mode of the
+proletariat-substance, because, on the contrary, it constitutes itself as
+its practical apparatus.
+But the relation between such apparatuses and the series from which
+they spring is more complex than is often supposed. Clearly it depends
+on the means of production; and for capitalists there is a necessity to
+transform these means constantly. Thus the bond changes with the
+type of machine. In fact, before 1914, with the universal machine, we
+can observe that trade-union practice was defined by the workers
+themselves as they practised their trades. Thus the dissolution of series
+appeared to be an accomplished fact. But really their unity was created
+at the top: it was that of the working-class élite (skilled workers produced by the universal machine); and each of them, as a member of the
+sovereign group, gathered around him the unskilled labourers who
+helped him in his work. But he did not form a true practical community with them (in union struggle), because they did not constitute
+a group in themselves and because they did not produce it inside the
+group, as instituted sovereign. In fact, trade unions as a union of the
+élite constituted their sovereignty in the very act which produced them;
+and this sovereignty, for unskilled workers, was neither legitimate nor
+illegitimate; it belonged to another world (that of the group), and in
+this other world it produced its own legitimation, and could only be
+accepted in impotence in the serial world. Grouped from outside by
+their foreman (l'ouvrier suzerain), the labourers remained serial - first
+among themselves, then in relation to other foremen (who, as the
+leading group, refused to allow them into the union), and then in
+relation to other labourers (in other workshops and other factories)
+linked to them only through the mediation of a group of which none
+of them were members. Thus they were doubly serial: serial because
+exploitation was always based on their competitive antagonism and
+
+The Place of History 681
+impotence, and serial because obedience and trust for other foremen by
+other labourers conditioned their trust here (participation in the strike,
+etc.). It would therefore be a mistake to claim that, in the first years of
+this century, the French working class itself had produced its apparatuses of protection and that a union militant (as a common individual of practical class-unity) was indistinguishable from the worker (as
+a member of a passive, exploited seriality). In fact, a particular category
+of workers - the foremen - had constituted themselves into a sovereign
+group, the practical embodiment of the working class. Through the
+mediation of its local agents this group imposed a common will on an
+unintegrated 'sub-proletariat' whose class-being was seriality. And the
+difference between these two modes was so great that the unions never
+noticed the new workers emerging from and amongst the unskilled
+labour force - the products of the second industrial revolution, the
+specialised workers who emerged as a result of the deskilling produced
+by specialised machines.
+In this sense, the development of the working class in the twentieth
+century, the new characteristics of labour (harassment, etc.), and the
+disappearance of a sector of skilled workers (in France) gave rise to a
+new formula for unity which has wrongly been supposed to be
+radically different from the preceding one. The work of the union
+militant and that of the specialised worker are practically incompatible.
+A specialisation is required: the working class produces its own permanent paid officials. The trade union therefore became, for the
+conservatives, a group which was foreign to the working class. It is true
+that the permanent official is no longer a worker: this is a truism, since
+he no longer works as a worker. Besides, he passes into the ranks of the
+institutionalised third parties (being an integrating part of the sovereign
+group). But we have just seen that the only way an anarcho-syndicalist
+skilled worker could turn the class into a group was by deciding that
+he alone was a worker and by practically excluding 80 per cent of
+workers from the proletariat. This difference is entirely in the interest
+of the permanent officials who made the proposals and addressed
+everyone; whereas the anarcho-syndicalist imposed the decision of the
+24. I say 'embodiment' rather than 'representation', because these workers
+considered that they were eminently the working class in so far as they still based
+their condemnation of exploitation on the skill of their work. For them, the
+skilled worker was a complete worker (and, one might say, a complete man);
+labourers were unfortunate and their condition was unworthy: but then they were
+not really workers.
+
+682 Book II
+few on the majority. Thus permanent officials avoided the statute of
+workers precisely to the extent that skill in work was no longer the
+basis of their demands, to the extent that individuals who are interchangeable in function recognise that they have the same needs. The
+sovereign's attempts to manifest a kind of authoritarianism reflect the
+very interchangeability which makes it necessary to tighten discipline
+and to carry out truly massive actions to prevent the immediate
+replacement of strikers. And this authoritarianism is simply Fraternity-
+Terror as it exists in the masses themselves when they dissolve their
+seriality (by means of a strike or demonstration). The permanent
+official is therefore precisely the product of the working class in so far
+as that class is characterised as a mass. Inside the sovereign group he
+realises a real exigency of the situation which mass movements constitute out of fused groups by liquidating seriality. In himself, apart
+from a few special characteristics due to the trade-union and professional ensembles which he represents, he is simply the sovereign,
+abstract invitation to unification. His very universality - he, too, is
+interchangeable, as a local permanent official - is the transposition of
+serialising interchangeability into the necessity for practical totalisation
+of the masses.
+Thus one can distinguish two stages, depending whether, in a
+working-class city at work - when the class is a collective - he represents possible unity in the abstraction of his institutional being (and is
+characterised by his relations with Paris rather than by his relations
+with the locality) or whether he becomes, in a tense situation, the
+practical schema and signification of the unity which is to be realised.
+However, when this unity is achieved, it excludes him. He will be
+listened to, provided his views accord with those of the constituted
+group; but he will be transcended and left behind if he tries to divert
+the group from its chosen course. It is therefore useful to consider the
+working class as defined by variable statutes (in space or time). The
+trade union is the working class objectified, exteriorised, institutionali sed,
+and possibly bureaucratised, but unrecognisable to its own eyes and
+realising itself as a pure practical schema of unity, 95 It is the sovereignty
+95. And the multiplicity of trade-union apparatuses - in France, for example -
+transposes the real divisions of the working class (divergences of interest, characterising certain partial ensembles 'within' the proletariat) into praxis. This means
+that these divisions, lived in the seriality of impotence by workers themselves
+become practical antagonisms when embodied in organised groups.
+
+The Place of History 683
+of the class, but it is cut off from it, and produces itself elsewhere, in the
+pure milieu of common praxis. This group - defined by a statute of
+separation (local permanent officials who 'go to Paris' from time to
+time, controlled on the spot by missi dominici, etc.) - usually has no
+control over masses in serial flight. In favourable circumstances, every
+agent attempts to determine local disturbances (improvised meetings,
+posters, etc.): this is what is called agitation; but in fact, such disturbances are simply circuits of recurrence. In this moment, the working
+class exists under a double statute since, in its dispersive seriality, the
+union officials (délégués) are external guarantors of its possible interiorisation. When, in a period of social conflict, the workers of a given
+city unite in a common decision (taken in an atmosphere of violencefreedom: public voting, and the obligation on the minority to dissolve
+in unanimity, the working class exists in fact as a practical totalisation.
+It might be disastrous if the 'movement' were not taken up in other
+cities: but, from a formal point of view, local unification through
+the praxis of a strike or insurrection is enough on its own to posit
+the group as a possible permanent statute for the proletariat, even
+though, for the actual proletariat and in present circumstances, this
+group may manifest itself as a fused group (or at most as a pledged
+group), and maintain its systems of organised, institutional relations
+outside itself. In fact it will never re-absorb the union or follow the
+instructions of the unionists; apart from the fact of being institutional,
+permanent officials seem rather similar to the agitators whom the
+people required to reflect their practical thought, between 1789 and
+1794•
+This will lead us, as a synchronic determination, to treat the working
+class - at any given moment of the historical process - not only as an
+institutionalised organisational group (the 'cadres'), but also as either a
+fused or a pledged group (the constitution of the soviets, in 1905,
+appears as an intermediary between a pledged group and an organised
+group), and as a seriality which is still inert (in certain sectors), but
+which is profoundly affected by the negative unity of the pledged
+groupings. The institutional group, as an abstract skeleton of the united
+class, is a permanent invitation to unity; indeed it is the sovereignty of
+the class if it is entirely serial; and, secondly, it may reflect their
+absolute sovereignty to the fused groups (and to their concrete developments) and display their decisions to them in the framework of a more
+distant future, in relation to indirect objectives. But this reflection is
+not done by a regulatory third party to a group to which he belongs,
+
+684 Book I|
+but by a member of a group - in so far as he is the signifier/signified of
+the group - to another group which produces its own sovereignty. In
+other words, the appearance of the group as a developing totalisation
+of the working class - even though it may be the result of the work of
+the unions, and even though the group may set itself objectives which
+are laid down by 'central organs' - immediately makes union
+sovereignty redundant, but without re-absorbing the institutional
+group (and it will play a part in the material organisation of strikes
+and in establishing contacts with the employers). Itis this concrete group,
+in fact, which becomes the concrete sovereignty of the working
+class, and which exercises it; the material conditions of conflict, and
+power relations with the other class and the apparatuses of constraint
+which it produces are all strictly determined through it, and they define
+the situation itself (as a relation of sovereign groups embodying hostile
+classes and as a relation between these groups and the serialities from
+which they arose).
+In effect, the real efficacity of the common praxis here will depend on
+the abstract, totalising action of the fused group on the series which
+surrounds it. In fact, each member of the group is, through innumerable complex relations, also a member of the series at the same time as
+belonging to the group. One can easily see this when one remembers
+that the member will belong to a family, to a residential area, to various
+associations and, through all these more or less inert communities, to
+series of alterity which extend everywhere. Thus if he is a member of
+the combat group this will determine these series, practically, though
+abstractly. Similarly, the mere production of the group, in so far as the
+organs of diffusion (possibly of the institutional group) spread the
+news of it, becomes the practical sovereign reunification of the working
+class in a here for any elsewhere of the series. The process as a whole
+will then be manifested either through the serial passivity of large
+working-class concentrations or through a shifting agitation which
+begins to dissolve collective impotence into a truly revolutionary
+unification. But the important point here is that the practical constitution of the group (that is to say, the Apocalypse) is - in itself and in
+its being-outside-itself - the production at a distance, through the
+series and throughout it, of a schema of totalisation as an abstract
+ubiquity (and a rigid obligation for everyone to adopt either seriality
+or unity, even if, in the place and function he occupies, his impotence
+is insurmountable). And the new groupings which are to be constituted in opposition to seriality (and within it) differ from the first
+
+The Place of History 685
+at least in that they are induced, and in that the totalising schema was
+already present in every Other as the possibility of rejecting all
+alterity. Ut course, this does not prevent the groups trom producing a
+new seriality (in separation, and in the variety of situations, of local
+interests, of circumstances of struggle, and of power relations -
+each group determining the other groups as others by its limited
+praxis,,
+As we saw in The Problem of Method, it was this seriality which aborted
+the peasant movement in Luther's Germany. In the case of the seriality
+of groups, the trade-union apparatus regained its importance, and its
+co-ordinating, organisational activities transformed isolated groups
+into organised sub-groups. But in itself it remained an other-group
+(groupe-autre) rather than an interior sovereignty. Similarly, the dissolution of series may often be the result of a serially propagated
+contagion (as with the strikes of 1930, when the working class came
+closest to a total synthetic unification). In this situation reflexivity does
+not occur till later, in the milieu of the resulting immense group; and
+the structure of a massive group (that is to say, a group which arises
+from the masses and is composed of them) has to be studied separately
+because it is characterised not only by a deep integration, but also, on
+occasion, by real separation. (Factory occupations in 1936 showed this
+double character: the occupation of a particular factory occurred
+within the practical awareness of totalisation and ubiquity; it was the
+same; everywhere the same, here. But they also made communications
+between sub-groups difficult; many intermediaries were necessary.)
+But the rebirth of seriality in its very dissolution may in turn occasion
+liquidating actions. I mention these abstract possibilities only in order
+to raise the question of the intelligibility of the concrete - in this case,
+of class. Of course, the terms of the problem are clear: class manifests
+itself not only as an institutionalised apparatus, but also as an
+ensemble (serial or organised) of direct-action groups, and as a
+collective which receives its statute from the practico-inert field
+(through and by productive relations with other classes) and which
+receives its universal schema of practical unification from the groups
+which constantly form on its surface. And these three simultaneous
+26. On the terrain of the struggle for reforms, of course.
+97. For greater simplicity, I am not taking account of workers' parties or
+of splits within the working class: these essential characteristics of historical pro.
+letariats are themselves material determinations. It does not make any difference
+
+686 Book II
+statutes arise in practical and dialectical connection with one another,
+through a process which is itself conditioned by the historical conjuncture as a whole. In fact, language always presents class too simply,
+either as always united and ranged against the exploiters, or as temporarily demobilised (having completely relapsed into seriality). May
+it not be that these imperfect and incomplete concepts are an accurate
+reflection of our inability to understand this unique triple reality of a
+developing historical class. May it not be that in this confrontation
+between groups as constituted dialectic and as series (as anti-dialectical),
+we run up against the very limits of intelligibility!
+I do not think so; and the incompleteness of these concepts or
+determinations of language simply expresses political attitudes (that of
+the militant, that of the oppositionists, etc.) which as such do not
+concern us here. But this presents no difficulties on either the ontological or the practical plane.
+On the ontological plane, there are not three beings, or three
+statutes of being: class-being is practico-inert, and defines itself as a
+determination of seriality, as we have seen. The two kinds of group
+(fused and pledged, organisational and institutional) have no innergroup-being; their statute is that their being-outside-themselves (the
+only group-being) lies in the series from which they have emerged and
+which sustains them (and which affects them even in their freedom). Of
+course, the fused group negates the series within itself since it dissolves
+it; but it also relates to it ontologically because it is its actions as a
+series, the activity for the whole series in a particular situation of this
+moving, changing, violent formation, whose future is still indeterminate, but which is the audacity of the series here, the success or
+failure of all who reject impotence, massification, and alterity here. In
+other words, the group's class-being lies outside it in the series, and
+inside the group the series is both the negation and the affirmation of
+its being through practical transcendence. We have seen how the
+practical individual always realises class-being in everyone; a workingclass woman who has an abortion carries out the sentence which the
+exploiting classes have passed on her. But in a common action (whether
+reformist or revolutionary), there is both a realisation of class-being
+and freedom: the working-class woman now recognises her being as a
+whether we are dealing with a trade union or a party; what is important is the
+relation of the objectified class (the trade union or any other institutionality) to
+
+The Place of History 68J
+worker - defined by her wages and her work - and she recognises it in
+the demands themselves; but she transcends it through the demand -
+however minimal - which is the common practice for bringing about a
+general change, and above all by grouping with a view to getting satisfaction.
+The dissolution of the serial may in certain cases be the act of uniting
+with others, or a total liquidation (at least a temporary one) of the
+previous seriality (especially in the case of what contemporary sociologists call 'micro-organisms'), but then it is just a matter of transcending
+seriality. However, this transcendence may be intended to last longer
+than a demonstration or even than a strike. It may manifest itself in a
+rebellious practice, and become a revolutionary action: and on this
+basis, especially if the Revolution is not a failure, and develops accordhit violin lavo here will bearadialmeamorphines and every.
+dominated against a dominant class, seriality will always be the
+product of exploitation and the statute which maintains it, even more
+than internal dissension. It is seriality which must be overcome in order
+to achieve even the smallest common result (such as averting too rapid
+a fall of purchasing power). But it is seriality too which sustains the
+group making demands, in its very passivity, as a source of possible
+energy - the group, in fact, from the practical point of view of its
+action, can no longer conceive it except in the synthetic form of
+potentiality. It is seriality which appears to it as producing it - to the
+extent, as I have shown, that it is still engulfed in it by the other serial
+relations of its members. It is seriality which the group totalises in
+exteriority, that is to say, for the group and in its connection with
+seriality, in so far as it conceives the serial unity (of dispersal) in terms
+of the dialectical reasons which engender it materially and dialectically
+(historical conditions of the capitalist process). Lastly, it is seriality
+which, in the dialectical perspective of union struggles and of everyday
+labour, defines its future as its death and permanent resurrection (the
+group will dissolve into seriality when the workers - victorious or
+defeated - resume work; and it will be reborn from seriality when
+having learnt from this experience, the workers become active again). a
+18. Although the lie is spread for purely propaganda purposes, it is not true
+social bonds remain (and a past too, as we shall see) and so does a class attitude
+
+688 Book II
+This means that class-being, as past, present, and future seriality, is
+always the ontological statute of the worker and that group praxis, as a
+surface dissolution of the relation of alterity inside the class (and therefore on the surface in the worker) and as a conservative transcendence
+of serial being, is either the present practical reality of the common
+individual or his future possibility as an induced signification and as an
+abstract unification coming to the series from the depths of the future.
+As for the institutional group (union, etc.), it practically represents this
+possibility in its permanence: and this means that the task of the
+institutionalised third parties who compose it is not only to maintain,
+through separation and by means of their centralised unity, this possible unity as a sovereignty, but also to realise, as far as possible, and
+in all circumstances, the local conditions which make this unity
+possible.ª
+From this point of view, the apparatus as a whole is the practical
+on the part of each and all. But it is either a lie or a dream to claim that this
+amounts to working-class pressure: workers exert pressure from the moment in
+which the threshold of the dissolution of seriality is crossed. Or at least in the
+ase of professional workers who are indispensable to the factory (which simply
+akes us back to the very special circumstances of pre-1914 syndicalism), suci
+pressure may be exerted during work through the intermediary of skilled representatives who negotiate on the basis of constantly possible but avoidable strikeaction. Or else, in the case of the masses, when circumstances, the pressure of
+need, etc., have already produced common praxis: negotiations with employers
+then turn on the concessions which they are prepared to make in order to prevent
+the workers' action. Victory (as in the case of the semi-official strike of the electric
+welders at Saint-Nazaire in 1954) obviously involves a new exis, that is to say,
+the threshold is lower, seriality is lived as temporary, and class attitudes are
+already the abstract connections of a community less [seriall than ever and always
+possible. This does not mean, however, that this attitude is as such revolutionary:
+and the proof of this is that the proud aggression of the anarcho-syndicalists
+(expanded production manifested and expressed itself in the fact that the proportion of successful strikes never fell below 5o per cent) had its final expression in the
+practice of reformism. And, above all, we must also accept the truth of the opposite case: which is that the failure of a strike (in particularly serious conditions)
+actually leads to a reinforcement of the serial statute (after an unsuccessful strike,
+a few years earlier, also at Saint-Nazaire, the unions lost nearly all their members
+and for a very long period the workers sank into almost total inertia). This all
+means that the militant action of the group is aware that even when they win,
+naked seriality is, like some "seasonal condition', one of the terms of the choice
+which limits the possibilities for the proletariat.
+29. This is not a question of politics: I do not need to determine whether they
+can do better or do something else. This is a pure problem of intelligibility.
+
+The Place of History 689
+unity of interiority (realising itself locally and in successive temporalisations) in so far as it is objectified, exteriorised and universalised.
+It is the sovereignty of the united proletariat, in so far as it produces
+itself in the milieu of integrating totalisation when it is in the milieu
+of seriality. But this objectifying exteriorisation, on the terrain of
+Being, does not raise any new questions: this institutional group has
+no being-one. If it were a fused group, its being would lie in inert
+seriality. Its apparent autonomy is due simply to its seriality. In effect,
+a trade union, as an institutional group, in itself presupposes structures
+of recurrence and alterity, grounded on separation and serial circularity; and these groups were investigated above. But the institutionalbeing of its members is simply inertia and can never act as group-being.
+This inertia - which has nothing to do with the way they apply themselves to their task or with their results - is precisely the basis of the
+permanence of working-class unity as a possibility which is always
+accessible to the series: the permanent official himself is this unity in so
+far as his mandate (whatever the mode of recruitment or appointment)
+is not connected in its institutional duration either with individual
+characteristics or with organic praxis. Elected or appointed for a two
+year period, for example, his activities, whatever their nature, are the
+transcendence and affirmation of a material and institutional inert unity
+which is both the Other-Being (being of seriality) of the sovereign in
+his local agent and the being-one of the series grasped in one of its
+members in so far as he has become Other. Thus the being of a permanent official is nothing like the being of an institutional group: this
+group-being has no reality: but as such the serial-being of the local
+official acts as an inert support (like wax to a seal) for the synthetic,
+sovereign unity of the class as a permanent possibility, that is to say,
+as the abstract, passive perseverence of being-one in his being. The
+unity of the exploited class is in fact practical: but if it is maintained in
+opposition to it, it is given an inert support which makes it resemble
+a being.
+Ontologically, the situation is perfectly simple: between the trade
+unionists and the working people there exists an agreed inertia; classbeing, which is serial, is an inert conditioning and tends to make unity
+appear as an other ontological statute: the being-unity of the class (the
+ue goal). The tension which mutually determines the serialise
+overeign and the series which inertly receives the inert sign of its unity
+makes the liquidation of seriality, under specific circumstances, permanently possible. It is on this basis that a group which exercises
+
+6go Book II
+its own sovereignty appears and destroys trade-union sovereignty
+(equally its own as other) while preserving the statute of an agitator for
+the permanent official. At the same time, it throws back its own inertia
+into the depths; but at least it retains its dependence on all in the form
+of transcended and preserved class-being.
+Practically, there is no problem either: the praxis of action groups
+will define itself dialectically in terms of seriality as resistance which has
+been or is to be transcended and in terms of trade-union instructions,
+as external objective significations which have to be either rejected,
+interiorised or transcended. The important point for us is that in
+everyday action, the working class defines its practical unity as a
+totalisation of objective but inert practical significations, issuing from a
+sovereign who himself exists only in exteriority and as a patient dissolution of serial forces of inertia which are also no more than the class
+itself in its being, in the course of a regroupment which is aimed at a
+transcendent objective which has to be defined as praxis-process. The
+working class is neither pure combativity, nor pure passive dispersal
+nor a pure institutionalised apparatus. It is a complex, moving relation
+between different practical forms each of which completely recapitulates
+it, and whose true bond with one another is totalisation (as a movement
+which each induces in the others and which is reflected by each to the
+others). 100
+From the point of view of dialectical intelligibility, the differences
+of statute which separate and unite this single reality in its various
+forms imply, in the first place, that a single praxis - even through the
+objective - produces itself differently at different practical levels. This
+means that - even in the exceptionally simple case in which it remains
+unchanged - it will differ at every level through temporalisation (speed,
+rhythm, etc.), in organisation and internal structures, in its real bond
+with its objective (through all the means involved) and, consequently,
+in the very objective which ensures its unity. And this objective itself
+refers, according to its level, to other more or less distant objectives. It
+is as if activity had a statute of plurality (with large social ensembles)
+and developed in every dimension at once. It is a single action, in a
+period of social conflict, which works the series (in the same sense as
+one can say that wood works [que le bois travaille]), and which manifests itself in activities of co-ordination and organisation which have
+100. In a chapter on diachronic totalisation in Volume Two we shall discuss
+what we shall call the memory of the group.
+
+The Place of History 691
+accrued to unionists (building up 'contacts', improvised, impromptu
+meetings, discussions of objectives with representatives of pledged
+groups, the determination of a practical plan, which will probably
+never be carried out, attempts to define the state of the forces involved,
+so as to give information to the masses, or, depending on the situation,
+to withold it from them, mediation between Paris and its general
+objectives concerning the French proletariat and local concentrations
+with their own interests, etc.) and which is encountered again at its own
+level of full efficacity, with no inertia other than pledged faith, in the
+common practice of workers. In these three forms, it is also indispensable to the practical struggle: in each of them, at various levels of
+practical importance, and with an appearance which refers to relational
+systems (alterity, concrete reciprocity, organisational systems), the
+same relations to the object, to the future, and to the transcendent
+world recur; it is just that the production of such relations in these
+practical mileux with their different indices is different, and their
+reality therefore becomes a heterogeneous and irreducible productionrefraction in everyone.
+The direct, concrete bond between action groups and the series from
+which they emerge is expressed for and in the group by internal
+production and by the reflexive grasp of its ontological connection
+with the proletariat; it is the proletariat, simultaneously active and
+inert, acting as a perpetual transcendence of its inertia as an exploited
+class.
+And this ontological structure of immanence-transcendence
+occurs in the really practical milieu of the determination of ends (to
+the extent that ontological and practical statutes condition one another
+in the closest unity, the latter being the practical actualisation and
+transcendence of the former). It is lived and transcended as a hierarchy
+of objectives (or fidelities, etc.): the group defines the struggle it will
+wage, and its exigencies, and it reveals itself at a certain inner 'temperature' in connection with its serial being-outside-itself. It is the
+suffering class, but above all it is the struggling class. In it, the suffering
+serial train do itse ten daunhe gro stole fist throug behe
+dissolution of seriality. In pure recurrence, in effect, class reality is, at
+most, lived in alienating dispersal. Thus the serial class is the group
+itself (as practice) and also more than the group (as a much large
+gathering). The serial class, for the group, is its very action, its struggle
+as a negation of its seriality and an embodiment of the serial ensemble in
+its sovereignty; the serial class is also its fidelity (it is faithful to the
+
+692 Book lI
+class in so far as it is an absence, in so far as it does not manifest itself
+entirely at its level of unity in struggle) and its danger (it must itself
+group, unite and struggle everywhere against eroding seriality; it may
+lose its battle because of seriality, not here but over there and everywhere, for lack of support). Thus concrete, local action, inside th
+group, unites the particular objective - the demand - with the total
+objective (the mobilisation of the working class). But the connection
+arises directly in fused and pledged groups: it is an ontological connection transcended as a practical connection. In acting for the common
+interest of some local workers, the group acts for the whole class: it is
+the class in action. It cannot even conceive of a direct, violent action
+betraying the interests of the working class: if it can be done, then it
+must be done (class exigency). Conversely, it is also unable to recognise
+seriality - except in its immediate environment, in the Others it is in
+contact with - as a betrayal of its struggle by the class (in so far as the
+seriality of impotence prevents the concerted undertakings which,
+from one concentration to another, might have assured their victory.
+There is in fact a deep relation of ontological identity, of practical
+ubiquity and of contradiction in movement; and, as a developing
+process, this is what, in Marxism, is called proletarian self-emancipation.
+But, in this case, although the most comprehensive and abstract
+objective is here, as with the institutionalised group, a foundation
+which will be determined by the immediate objective (the overthrow
+of the bourgeoisie and the accession of the working class as the meaning
+of the struggle are determined by the demand for a particular wageincrease, as the specific possibility which has to be realised in the
+existing context of the struggle), the relation within the combat group
+is immediate and always positive: the possibility that an action in
+support of some demand may go against the general interests of the
+proletariat (that it may compromise - for the present, though not for
+ever - the struggle for its accession to power), cannot be produced by
+the group and in the interiority of the group as a practical, reflected
+possibility, as a possible determination of the action undertaken, that
+is to say, as the object of a practice of control and study. On the other
+hand, a permanent official, in so far as he is sovereign in his institutionalised being, and in so far as he is in communication with Paris,
+that is to say, with the centre, produces himself in and through the
+organisation for which he is a local agent as the permanent working
+class. Inert and prodigiously active, his functions, abilities, and experience - all of which relate to the universal, that is to say, to the
+
+The Place of History 693
+partially indeterminate possibility of demands - link him directly with
+the class as a totalised inertia: he produces himself as the possibility
+that the class will challenge and destroy the destiny of the workers.
+Thus the local official is everywhere, because he is the class itself or - in
+other words - because he is everywhere in the form of another permanent official (an institutionalised being whose unity is with all the
+Others in Paris), the class in movement pre-exists in him in its beingeverywhere (at Oyonnax or Le Mans, at Nantes or Alès) in all the local
+agitations which are merely specifications which have to be considered
+and judged in themselves. The opportuneness of a local movement
+therefore appears as something which has to be questioned in terms of
+the overall situation (power relations in France between the working
+class as a whole and other classes, etc.). In short, the permanent official
+is identified with the class itself as a passivity of which he is the active
+sovereignty, and he affirms himself as qualified in his being to judge
+the immediate action of the class. Moreover, inertia as serial-classbeing cannot challenge the sovereignty of the institutionalised group.
+Thus the union produces itself as the permanent sovereignty of the
+class. On the other hand, the fused group puts paid to trade-union
+sovereignty: the permanent official becomes no more than a temporary
+agent. Thus a contradiction is immediately established between the
+class as institutionalised, and partially serialised, sovereignty and the
+class as a living combat group, particularised by its very action and
+producing through agitation its free, fraternal sovereignty. This group,
+from the standpoint of the institutional group, will appear as a particular determination of the class (and therefore as limitation and
+finitude), and as having to be governed by the sovereignty of the
+trade-union institution in accordance with the general interests of the
+class itself.
+This conflict of sovereignty therefore implies not only that praxis is
+different at every level, but also that these differences are produced
+fundamentally as contradictions whose effect is to constitute living
+oppositions, conflicts, transcendences, and struggles between the
+various forms of a single action - in short, to constitute action through
+a dialectic in depth in and through the same movement of dialectical
+transcendence which organises it in relation to its transcendent object
+On this basis, comprehension becomes increasingly complex for each
+level of praxis; practical development, at the level in question, produces
+itselt as a transcendence of certain structures (institutions, seriality,
+etc.), which themselves express certain material conditions at this level.
+
+694 Book II
+But as a temporalising tension, as an organised transcendence in a
+moving field of forces, in a directed transformation, it is determined
+from outside by each practical level, in so far as the whole process
+produces itself there in another form, at a different degree of compression, with other rhythms, etc. For example, the practical process
+of the pledged group, in the very milieu of its development, supports
+the abstract and sovereign activity of the institutional group. It supports this activity because it is itself produced as a transcendence of a
+material situation through the reorganisation of a common field which
+has been and still is organised by the sovereign activity as a class praxis
+which has become total objectivity.
+Thus the group is defined from outside through and by institutional
+practice (trade-union practice, for example): it sustains it within itself
+as a determination of its actions; and from this angle, the group may
+either support it as inertia, as its own inert exteriority (which may end
+up by dissolving it entirely and liquidating the exterior sovereign), or
+interiorise it as one of the internal relations of reciprocity which condition the development of the process. In effect, this interiorisation can
+occur only as a determination in reciprocity, since the group is always
+defined by its mediated reciprocities. But there is nothing magical
+about the projection of the practical institution into the objective act
+it simply occurs, in particular conditions, when certain third parties
+(whether a majority or a minority) adopt the practical maxim of the
+exterior sovereign and make him into the reciprocal connection which
+unites them within the pledged group as an organising sub-group.
+When this happens, it is possible to see how the sub-group may impose
+its common will (that is to say, the other-will (volonté-autre) of the
+objective other which has become a reflexive structure within the
+community). It is also possible - in the absence of any complete determination - that the interiorisation of transcendent sovereignty in one
+sub-group, far from giving an untranscendable authority to the subgroup thus constituted, occasions contradictions (violent or otherwise), and obstacles or splits within the pledged community and, with
+other tactors, leads it to a revival of seriality.
+These determinations appear only in the development of the historical event. For us, the important point is that these are all intelligible
+cendent sovereign is sustained and produced by the fused group (or
+
+The Place of History 695
+the pledged group) as a part, by a living totality, whether this signification remains on the surface of the group as its exteriority or is
+integrated into it as an interiorisation and a free re-creation. And in so
+far as che group is structured on the basis of inert characteristics which
+it has dissolved and readopted in common freedom, the sovereign
+action - whether exterior or interiorised - is itself deformed by the
+curvatures of the group, and can be determinant only by conforming
+to the lines of action, the practical vistas and the webs which constitute
+the community as the instrument of its own action. But at the same
+ume, as a determination which has been adopted by agents as common
+individuals and in the free reciprocity of internal exchanges, it is
+impossible that the sovereign action should not be a factor of constant
+modification both for the common praxis and for the curvatures of
+the internal space.
+Now, it should be added that this institutional action is not a passive
+determination deriving its only practical reality from the pledged community and living in the group only with the life of the group: it is in
+fact already praxis; it is the same praxis in the abstract milieu of the
+external institution. Thus its reproduction or reinteriorisation by the
+pledged group produces it not as the product of the group but as an
+intrusion into the group by an alien intention (by an alien free project). In so far as - for very simple, material reasons (that the "permanent official' has supporters and 'contacts' them, and that they
+establish a line of action within the pledged community, etc.) - the
+action of the other group (that is to say, of the class as other) is
+necessarily produced inside the pledged group as the emergence and
+development of an other-freedom, it transcends every signification
+which is directly produced by the common freedom (of every third
+party as the same); and, conversely, every initiative of the same can
+either transcend it, change it into a reified signification, or liquidate it.
+But in so far as this sovereignty still has to be supported by third
+parties who wish to remain the same and who claim to project themselves, as the same as all, through this interiorised project, the struggle
+takes place between two free, practical projects, each of which has the
+same abstract right as the Other. It is the concrete, material ensemble
+which will determine the winner, the compromise or the balance of
+impotence. I his last remark is simply meant to indicate the ambivalence
+of sovereign freedom when repeated inside the combat group: it is both
+the actual freedom of an Other and the immanent project of the third
+parties. The sub-group which proposes it as its own is the same as all;
+
+696 Book II
+but each third party knows it to be his own in so far as it is that of the
+Other. But there is nothing incomprehensible about this - on the
+contrary; and everyone has experienced it.
+It may be asked whether, given the formal intelligibility of these
+dialectical determinations, it is now possible to grasp the reciprocal
+transformations to which the two practical modalities (in our example,
+the institution and the struggling community) subject one another. Or
+should we now admit that they elude the mind because they are so
+complicated?
+The answer must be no. In fact, any re-production (whether external
+or interiorised) of the sovereign action must be comprehensible. This
+means that comprehending union instructions by reference to ends, to
+the future, to the relation to the working class both as an institution and
+as seriality, is no different from producing them as a possible regulation.
+But such comprehension is the temporalisation of common structures (of
+the pledged group; and so, though its principle may be invariant
+(being the dialectic itself), it particularises itself through practical
+schemata which ultimately express an inert or quasi-passive constitution. Thus the first necessity, for the situated investigator (assuming
+that he has the necessary information and that he is approaching his
+facts within a period whose main features are already known), is to
+comprehend the comprehension of the regulatory third party. He must
+grasp it as a free group praxis, that is to say, as a transcendence which
+preserves the conditions it transcends. Furthermore, he must comprehend the project of the Other (of the institution) in its real unity
+(within the institutional group) and on this basis he must be able to
+grasp the transcended conditions, in a new comprehension, as a determination within the pledged group of the comprehended project by
+the comprehension which re-produces it. But this operation (comprehending the comprehended signification to the degree that it is particularised by the particularities of a comprehension) is simply
+comprehension itself: there is only one single dialectical process in this
+grasp of free re-production and only the rigidity of language could
+make one suppose that there is some reduplication of comprehensions.
+The sole limitation on the power of comprehension here is due not to
+the complexity of the object, but to the position of the observer. This
+means that his comprehension determines a double objectivity: his own
+and that of the group which is his object. But this de jure and de facto
+limitation does nothing to diminish intelligibility - on the contrary;
+for the dialectic, if it is not to sink into the dogmatism of exteriority,
+
+The Place of History 697
+must produce itself as a practical relation between free, situated
+organisms. Moreover, in the present case, it is clearly as a situated
+organism that, through my situation as conditioning my project, I
+comprehend the comprehension of the Other and his dependence on
+his being-situated.
+On this basis, the conception of the pledged group as a milieu of
+comprehension makes it possible to treat the dialectic of projects (of the
+institutional project and the pledged practice) as an antagonistic
+relation of partial significations within a developing totalisation. The
+shifting oppositions between regulatory third parties within mediated
+reciprocity totalise themselves in these conflicts of significations, where
+every project tends to become identical with the signifying milieu as a
+whole so as to dissolve the Other in itself, and where everyone who is
+re-integrated into the Other becomes a negative force in him and
+destroys him. (The prudence and prevarication of the unions may, in a
+given case, be reinteriorised and become, within a more militant praxis,
+a system of obstacles and diversions. Conversely, an attempt to
+'contain' mass enthusiasm may be interiorised and act as a negative
+schema of totalisation; but it is by virtue of this totalisation that an
+insurrectional movement may suddenly erupt.) In fact, counter-finalities
+have practically the same structure as teleological practices: so even if
+they are not produced by any human intention, they may have the
+structure of a project and of intentional transcendence. We discovered
+this when we were dealing with the practico-inert field. Thus there is
+no difference between the comprehension of a finality and that of a
+counter-finality, except for one crucial point: the second has to include
+the negation of every author. Thus it is possible to comprehend, as a
+determination of a level of action by an Other, the signification and
+objectives of the reinteriorised praxis, the movement of dissolution
+which is initiated (contained insurrection) and the counter-finality of
+this reinteriorisation (the exasperation of the demonstrators, etc.). This
+is to prepare oneself for comprehending the sequence of 'operations",
+the attempts despite everything to reinforce sovereignty as unity from
+above, their failures, the counter-attempts, etc.: and, on this basis, to
+comprehend (at least in so far as the groups in question are its agents)
+the signification either of the slowing up, the defections, and the total
+or partial tailure of the undertaking or, on the other hand, that of the
+sudden eruption of an insurrection, of its propagation, and of its partial
+or total success, etc.
+However, if every moment of this development is in itself intel-
+
+698 Book II
+ligible, and if historical rationality is simply its comprehensibility, it
+must be acknowledged that the total development of the process is i
+danger of becoming non-signifying. But this is by no means necessary
+the action group may submit completely to the authority of the union
+leaders; on the other hand, it may eliminate them and choose its own
+regulatory third parties. We will find either obedience (as the unity of
+institutional groups), or praxis in fusion (as a perpetual re-creation of
+praxis by the group through the third parties); and in either case, we
+shall be dealing with what we have called praxis-processes. But unity
+at one level of action means suppression of the other level; when the
+levels of action remain alive and practical during the entire undertaking, the plurality of signifying systems and their perpetual attempts
+to envelop each other produce results which belong to no system (not
+to those which are in conflict, nor to a new one), since each particular
+moment of such a praxis is constituted by non-totalisable complexes of
+dimini shed significations (each being half dissolved in the Others). The
+demonstration will not be as violent as the demonstrators wish, and
+neither will it be as calm and level-headed as union leaders recommend.
+It will not achieve its goal but it will give the employers an opportunity
+to drive the government to repressive policies. But the result may not
+be either sufficiently serious or sufficiently clear-cut to be comprehended in reverse as a counter-finality: it will then become clear that
+the entire process, in its futility, with lost hours of work, possible
+demoralisation, etc., is practically devoid of meaning. This means that
+the synthetic ensemble of directed temporalisations will ultimately
+appear as a thing, or rather, as a series of irreversible transformations
+in a physico-chemical system. We should then return to analytical
+Reason: in fact, it is on the basis of these de-signified processes that
+positivist history establishes its "causal' sequences. It does not treat
+human non-signifying as a collection of truncated significations: on the
+contrary, it holds that signification is an epiphenomenon, an anthropomorphic illusion and that the processes without meaning are the positive truth of supposed human 'action'.
+The positivist point of view has to be accepted as a negative limit of
+constituted dialectical Reason, at the moment where, in numerous, but
+strictly defined cases, the objective process, considered at one level of
+History and from beginning to end, effectively appears in itself as
+on-dialectical result of an interior dialectic which has devoured itsel
+But this point of view corresponds only to an arrest of the total process
+of comprehension. It should be noted, in fact, that we have treated
+
+The Place of History 699
+action only at one level - that of the pledged group - and that we have
+examined it at this level only in so far as it is conditioned by one other
+level, without reciprocity. Now, it is obvious that the conditioning of
+the institutionalised agent and the combat group is reciprocal, the fate of
+the sovereign as such (and in relation to the central apparatus itself)
+depending necessarily on his relations to the pledged group. Thus, the
+success or failure of a particular strike is not just an essential date in
+working-class history (in general); it is also crucial for the history of
+the trade-union movement in a particular country. But we would come
+back to the irrational here - the 'chance' of the positivists - if we
+assumed that the fate of a particular social movement depended simply
+on the relation between the leadership and the demonstrators and
+strikers. In fact, the events we have studied occurred at a particular
+moment of the historical process, in a particular practical field defined
+by class struggle; and the class struggle itself takes place between men
+who are produced by the contemporary mode of production, and is
+determined by a situation which itself relates to conflicts of interest and
+power relations. Conversely the working class defines itself by and
+through this struggle by its degree of emancipation, that is to say, both
+by its practices and by its consciousness of itself (which amounts to
+the same thing). But in truth, the workers' tactics, the militancy of the
+proletariat and its degree of class-consciousness are determined not only
+by the nature, differentiation and importance of the apparatuses
+(unions, etc.) but also by the more or less immediate opportunity for
+serial individuals to dissolve their seriality in combat groups, and by the
+aggressiveness, violence, tenacity and discipline of these groups themselves in the course of the action they undertake. All this, of course,
+relates to class-being not only as a passive constitution of the proletariat by the machines it uses but also, as a consequence of what I said
+above, as a material condition of everyone's situation within a class and
+as a limit of his practical comprehension.
+We suggested earlier that, in relation to itself as a rapid regroupment
+for struggle, the working class as an institutionalised being (the permanent official, for example) adopted a particular attitude (which we
+arbitrarily assumed to be that of prudence tainted with mistrust). In
+fact, the attitude of a class-institution to the class-Apocalypse is always
+strictly conditioned by the entire process, but primarily by the relations
+of both to the class-collective. The relation between a union and
+workers who unite in order to strike must necessarily pass through its
+relations to the 'non-organised' masses. The percentage of workers
+
+J00 Book II
+unionised, their union practice and experience, discipline, and aggressiveness or passivity - all these are important; the present is deciphered
+in the light of recent struggles. Conversely, a trade-union militant will
+calculate with more or less precision the influence of the institution on
+the masses and, in particular, that of the tactics of agitation and struggle
+laid down by the central organs. To consider only the working class
+(and ignoring its power relations with employers in a particular case),
+the entire trade union will define its attitude to various groups in
+accordance with mass attitudes towards them and it. It may fear that in
+a period of decline, the most militant instructions will not really be
+followed; or equally, that some popular, 'wild' power - that of
+agitators, always the same but never 'elected' or in any way institutionalised - may substitute itself illegitimately' for the legitimate
+sovereignty of the union confederation. Or else, in contrast, it may
+notice - too late for its liking - that the wild elements have acquired an
+influence which it would be impolitic or disastrous to oppose, etc.
+In this sense we must say that the practice of the trade union, as such,
+is produced on the basis of seriality, as class-being. In so far as, at certain moments, and in certain periods, the proletariat tends to blame
+its representatives for everything - because the situation makes it
+initially conscious of its impotence - this very impotence is communicated to the sovereign and the institutional group becomes bureaucratised. In a fused proletariat, the trade-union agents either disappear
+or obey. They always represent permanence, and they fill the gap:
+their policy towards. the pledged group faithfully represents their
+comprehension of the situation. The contradictions will be sharper the
+more uncertainty there is in various quarters as to the general possibilities of mobilising the workers. If there is a temporary disappointment, the officials will use serial apathy to discourage group initiatives;
+but if there is agitation on a national scale, union resistance, if there is
+any, will be dissolved in the combat-groups. In fact, a 'wild' group
+itself comprehends its class as seriality in so far as it has just produced
+it as a group on the basis of series. This self-production immediately
+implies a comprehensive grasp either of the obstacles they have
+encountered or else of the encouragements and help they have received.
+They still feel in themselves the clay of which they are made. And this
+comprehension is a precise index of their militancy, that is to say, of
+their relations to the enemy class and to their own class as an institutionalised group. Thus the non-signifying process - which we just now
+located at the basis of analytical Reason, as a residue of contradictory
+
+The Place of History J0z
+interactions - is not devoid of meaning unless historical research stops
+at it. If we pursue it, however, the process is in itself the most valuable
+of indices: it defines the working class's deep relation to itself (that is
+to say, the relation of the institution to the 'wild' groups through the
+mediation of seriality and conversely, as well as the relations of 'wild'
+groups to seriality through the medium of unions, etc.). From this
+point of view, non-meaning itself has a profound meaning: the greater
+its contribution to the practical result, the more uncertain of itself the
+working class. What is supposed to be chance does not express a disorder of causes, but is, rather, produced by a common attitude:
+indecisiveness based on ignorance. Through this central index, we are
+referred back to the objective structures of labour, to the instruments,
+relations of production, etc., and, at the same time, to real wages,
+standards of living, and prices. At the same time, as I noted above, the
+indecisiveness of active groups is recapitulated in seriality as increased
+impotence; and this means that, in so far as he is other than the Others,
+everyone feels in the failures or semi-failures of the group the impossibility of dissolving the series. On the other hand, since it manifests
+the real timidity of the 'wild' committees in relation to the permanent
+officials, the failure strengthens the institution and bureaucratises or
+tends to bureaucratise it.
+The practice is therefore still entirely comprehensible, at the level at
+which we have chosen, provided that, having studied it in itself to the
+point of finding this final residue, we perceive in this residue an
+indication of the task to be done, that is to say, of the interpretation in
+totalisation. At whatever level it is taken, class action is not intelligible
+unless it is interpreted in terms of all the other levels and unless it is
+itself regarded as a practical signification of the relations between other
+levels. And this totalisation - which completed an initial approach to
+the concrete - does not fall from the sky or from any pre-established
+dialectical law: class is praxis and inertia, dispersal of alterity and
+common field. Now, under pressure of need and in the urgency of the
+class struggle, groups (whether spontaneous or institutional) which
+form on it can emerge only by totalising it. It is not only their praxis
+he infinite material of their practical field, and therefore the object ol
+their totalisation, but also the possible totalisation - still inert, but eroded
+by the phantom unity which they induce in it - of their diversity and
+separations. For the situated observer, the totalising movement is
+comprehension because in any moment of the class struggle the practical
+local action is always the totalising praxis of the proletariat.
+
+J02 Book II
+From this point of view, the various levels of action readily yield up
+their intelligibility, once it is understood that the praxis is both the
+same and other at every level: for in fact this vertical hierarchy
+dissimulates the reciprocal unity of circularity. The situated researcher
+must, in short, totalise the totalising action. At any given level, action
+has, so to speak, an abstract and superficial incomprehensibility (What
+are they waiting for.", 'Why are they letting us disperse without giving
+instructions?'
+'Why are they adhering to this demand given that
+another one makes it superfluous.", etc.) which relates to comprehension in depth (the determination of the action at each level by its
+production of itself at every other level). This comprehension would
+frequently lead to a new incomprehensibility if it were not that it
+reveals the circularity of the conditionings and if the action produced
+at every level did not manifest the real tensions which determine the
+class as a totality to be totalised. Thus the hierarchy of levels, a pure
+system of exteriority, curves in on itself and becomes their circularity.
+And the various "embodiments' of the action (at each level) are superimposed only in appearance (for example, for employers who sack
+unionised workers but who believe that when there is a dispute the only
+people worth talking to are the union delegates). The situated observer
+may, in the abstract, grasp the hierarchised unity of the different levels
+of action in the practical bond with the transcendent objective: it must
+be because of the local increase in transport costs; the class in a particular locality is affected by it at every level and especially in its
+passivity as a collective. The common project of acting on the municipal
+authorities to make them withdraw their pernicious measures, or on the
+employers to make them adjust wages to this new rise in the "cost of
+living', may be treated in exteriority as present at every level: lived as
+an impotence 'to be overcome' in seriality, as mobilisation in support of
+demands at the level of groups, and as a particular local objective which
+(in its urgency and in its relative importance) has to be settled in terms
+of more distant and more fundamental objectives (the working class in
+this locality, its chances of victory, the importance of this particular
+struggle for the future of local struggles, the struggle of the French
+proletariat as a whole, on all fronts) at the level of the apparatus.
+At the same time, it is clear that the limits of this hierarchical
+intelligibility lie in the hierarchy: after all, is it really the same object
+which is seen in the immediate struggle as an absolute exigency for the
+pledged parties while it is seen by the permanent official (even if he is
+thoroughly informed) as an immediate, limited and relative objective?
+
+The Place of History 103
+In fact, intelligibility is re-established if this structure of the object (as
+determined by the sovereign) is regarded as defined in actions (depending whether the union supports or obstructs the action in support of
+the demand), and once it is recognised that in this way it in fact
+objectifies the relation of the local concentration of workers to the
+French proletariat as a whole and the determination of this same
+proletariat (as an abstract practical object and as its own institutionalised-being) by the union leaders of the locality (and thereby by
+the centralised sovereign). But then it must be understood that class
+action cannot acquire its complete signification unless comprehension
+becomes totalising and grasps action in its circular development: for it
+is not the pure production of a group by a praxis and of a praxis by a
+group (a combat group, a 'wild-cat' strike). In the union context or in
+opposition to it, class-action constitutes itself in its reflexivity through
+the mediation of the permanent officials: as a local reflexivity (tactics or
+realistic demands are determined within the actual power relations),
+'spontaneous' action becomes 'experienced'. At the same time (depending whether it is helped or hindered by the actions of local or national
+union leaders), this absolute, immediate urgency reinserts itself into
+the tactical and strategic ensemble which is the practical determination
+of the class. This means that the action here receives its abstract knowledge of itself and of its objectivity in exteriority (either preserving it
+as a mark or interiorising it). But, at the same time, action at this level
+involves in itself a comprehension of the proletariat: not only as a
+seriality dissolving into a practical group (which is not distinguishable
+from the production of the group as itself), but also as a seriality without a future and which has been transcended (we shall come back to
+this), and whose acquired constitution - as the present condition of its
+being - determines and particularises the permanent possibility of its
+separating itself from its Other-Being (rate of transformation under a
+given pressure, in given circumstances, the possibility of horizontal
+and vertical expansion, etc.). In one way, this comprehension has the
+same object as the abstract knowledge of the sovereign, since, in effect,
+it is this object and knows it only in so far as it produces it in producing
+These two totalisations (each of which comprehends the other) may
+conflict even at the level of the pledged group: indeea, there is no
+reason why they should have the same content. But if it is true that
+even contradictions and confrontations threaten to make the process
+unintelligible in its residual abstraction, it is also true that the compre-
+
+J04 Book II
+hension which is given in the group and which corresponds to its
+transcendence of serial-being (and to the preservation of this being as
+the bond of alterity and immanence), through practice (involving
+either agreement with or resistance to the sovereign), involves a power
+of withdrawal which is a transcendence of its immediate presence
+proximate to Being. This is obviously a simple abstract form, but (if,
+for example, it contradicts union plans) its interiorisation realises the
+real action of the combat-group as aware of itself and judging itself in
+relation to all the forms and practical levels of the class. This does not
+mean, of course, that the practical knowledge, as a system of real
+possibilities of distance from oneself, of withdrawal, etc., cannot
+manifest itself in a dangerous action based on mistaken calculations.
+But practical knowledge (in so far as it regulates action in pursuit of
+demands by itself on the basis of a future totalisation of union knowledge and of the living comprehension of the group) relates to the
+developing experience of the class as a serial-being, realising itself not
+only (and in mutual conditioning) as a signification of the collective as it
+produces itself in and through its relations with the sovereign ('Ten
+years of union practice have taught me ..?, etc.), but also as a connection
+of interiority between the group and the series (the being-outside-itself of
+the former lies in the latter and lives this transcendence in interiority,
+and, thirdly, as an abstract possibility of the series negating itself and
+negating its impotence in favour of common freedom, in short as the
+intensity of the forces of massification and reification in so far as they
+are lived by everyone at the level of alienation.
+Obviously this third experience is also conditioned by the other
+experience which the series has of the groups which arise from it, and
+of their strength and multiplicity. At this level, the other becomes
+known in the collective through the undertakings of groups. And to
+become known obviously means knowing oneself - deciphering, through
+the groups themselves, through the multiplicity of actions, the violence
+which is still contained in impotence and the historical conditions which,
+for example, give a revolutionary aspect to the situation; but above all
+it means making oneself on the basis of the circumstances which condition the development. Thus praxis as totalisation has both the sense of
+a particular operation involving more or less important personnel and
+ones: I indicated the meaning of such ambiguities in The Problem of
+
+The Place of History 705
+Method) and of distinct practical structures - each level must engage
+with the reactions of the other two, in which its own reaction figures -
+as it knows - as the object of a bet.
+Is this one of those circuits of alterity which we noted in the practicoinert (anticipation of the conjuncture, etc.)? The answer is no; for
+there is constant communication and the other may always become the
+same (perhaps at a meeting of workers who recognise the union delegate
+because he is confined to the role of a regulatory third party, or in the
+reciprocal relations of two workers one of whom is committed to
+action while the other is still hesitating). In fact, this bet is made by
+the class on itself; it is the decision as a transcendence of an imperfectly
+known given and as a totalisation either in the negative unity of the
+conflicts, errors and failure, or in the mutual reinforcement of partial
+bets (at different levels) through the developing objectification and the
+final success. The action which forms the object of the bet in effect
+totalises itself in so far as it is determined not only as a short-term local
+undertaking, but also as the production of a concrete and temporalised
+relation between class-collective and class-conflict, and as the signifying
+mode of the class at a national level (an index of combativity, etc.).
+And the totalisation itself refers us, beyond the formations considered,
+to the comprehension (in reciprocity) which everyone has as a free,
+practical organism (who may be a permanent official, or aged and
+resigned) performing, in his whole praxis (even if it is a praxis of pure
+obedience), a totalising transcendence of every level by the other, and
+of all in the unity of common decisions. However, in so far as every
+practical organism remains inconceivable for the investigation (except
+abstractly and negatively), and concealed behind alienation, seriality,
+and the pledge or sovereignty as an institution, there is never a totality,
+but only a developing totalisation and we cannot discover any totalising
+apparatus and interrupt the circularity in it.
+Let us be quite clear about this: this totalisation is always an attempt
+to dissolve the other in the same (even the resignation of a sick or old
+man is realised only through a totalising evaluation and then negated);
+ind it is perforned on synthetic schemata de basis of i have pe past
+ated right to the depths of serialit
+(we shall come to this shortly), etc. So it is certainly a real and constant
+totalisation,
+inetias which have to be dissived, and no cradictions in this sen.
+the working class can be said to be a developing totalisation everywhere.
+At the present level of our investigation, this does not mean either that
+
+706 Book II
+it must or that it can attain a higher degree of integration or militancy;
+but it does not mean the opposite either. It is simply that we are not
+yet equipped to consider such a possibility. Before the perspectives of
+a History are given, a developing totalisation means that all levels of
+praxis are everywhere mediated and totalised by the inaccessible practical organism which they conceal and which, by means of its free
+individuality, sustains all the alienations which steal away its praxis and
+all the common functions which are imposed upon it (and therefore all
+groups in so far as they integrate it in Fraternity-Terror).
+The totalisation of the working class is therefore comprehensible: the
+synthetic action by which the situated witness or historian totalises
+effectively does no more than reproduce a praxis of totalisation towards
+various objectives, on the basis of given conditions. This totalisation
+consists not in transforming an infinite series into a group, but in
+creating a circularity of control and perpetual readaptation for the
+common action through the determination of its possibilities at every
+level in accordance with the others. The action is controlled in that, for
+example, the series (as a national collective) is the arbiter and mediation
+in conflicts between local leaders and 'spontaneous' groups: this means
+that the final action (whether an ordered praxis or an apparently incomprehensible disorder) is a three-dimensional process where the meaning
+of each dimension lies in the other two. It is possible to repress a
+working-class movement (that is, possible for its own leaders to do so),
+but only in some cases and through the dispersive complicity of the
+whole class; and in other cases, it is impossible for the same reasons,
+that is to say, because of the signification assumed by the local movement within the national class. And this possibility, or impossibility,
+does not affect the leaders and strikers from outside, as a fatum: it
+realises itself practically as their comprehension of their situation within
+the class. In other words, they do whatever they can and no more, but it
+is necessary for them to do it in the dialectic of a reciprocal and antagostic praxis, which, itself, is experienced by the freely totalisit
+dividual within serial alienation and totalised either as a reiection ‹
+seriality or as a resigned surrender to impotence. Let there be no
+mistake: in so far as the action of impossibility which is adopted by
+institutionalised and action groups is manifested by a disorder-index of
+praxis, it turns on alterity and is readopted within it in its serial dispersal as a new determination: but it is not possible to determine
+priori whether this negativity of assumed impotence will or will not
+result in a reinforcement, in the series, of the negation and passivity of
+
+The Place of History JoJ
+which it is the index. In fact it may bring about a positive regroupment:
+only the entire material circumstances - past and present - combined
+with the praxis of the enemy class, can, in each case, and in the context
+of a concrete historical development, provide the elements of an
+answer. What the formal investigation has to say is simply that class
+practice - even strictly localised actions - is comprehensible in a
+circular totalisation, as a new type of praxis: the praxis whose unitary
+and dialectical temporalisation (on the basis of its objective) develops
+in the unity of pluridimensional reciprocities between heterogeneous
+structures each of which contains the others. Or, metaphorically, the
+action of the free, practical organism - considered in itself and in the
+abstract - has no depth, and is temporalised in a two-dimensional
+space; but class-action - even ignoring the enemy class or diachronic
+determinations - develops in an n-dimensional space (we have observed three of them, but there are others, 101 though this is not relevant
+here). But the second is as comprehensible as the first, since, ultimately, it is produced by us, and, also, we are the pluridimensional
+space in which it temporalises itself. And this comprehension is based
+on the fact that everything is practice, that is to say, that the class
+practically recapitulates its class-being - and all the practico-inert
+characteristics it has been given - in the very movement of praxis as its
+orientation and its individual practical essence. The innovation of
+"factory occupations' for example, as a tactic in the struggle, is a
+practice which recapitulates and transcends the passive constitution of
+the proletariat-collective following the second industrial revolution
+(that is to say, here, the interchangeability of specialised workers).
+But this praxis is constituted: this is clear, and it is the very limit of
+its intelligibility. The plurality of its dimensions conflicts with the
+untranscendability of free, organic practice as constituent dialectic.
+This is precisely the free praxis which is produced as a totalisation of
+multiple dimensions in mediated reciprocity. Depending on the point
+of view, this means either that it stretches into the multiplicity of the
+dimensions and, in being stretched, preserves the organic unity of
+reciprocal, circular determinations, or that it folds itself back over a
+nascent dispersal as a reintegration of the signifying unity of interiority
+101. We have, in fact, remained in abstraction, because we have assumed that
+the interior milieu of the class is homogeneous and that it lacks contradictions
+(divergences or conflicts of interest between various permanent officials, specialised
+workers, etc.).
+
+708 Book II
+through a retotalisation through the various dimensions. And there is
+nothing surprising in this, since free praxis, as a dialectical temporalisation in a plane space, is a rearrangement of the transcendent through a
+three-dimensional practical field.102 This is why we have referred to
+class-action as "praxis-process': as a practical totalisation the comprehension of it can be the totalising praxis of an individual witness; but
+in so far as this totalisation, through its very objectivity (as it might
+appear to an observer situated in a space with n t i dimensions),
+eludes the agents as well as the observer, we can grasp it only as
+process, that is to say, as a limit of dialectical comprehension. In effect,
+the n + i dimensional observer does not and cannot exist; and, if he
+did exist, he would be completely alien to us. Yet it is to him alone that
+the practical reality of class would manifest itself as hyper-organic, if
+only this were not an absurdity; it is to him alone that an ontological statute of intelligibility might appear which would be inaccessible to the agents within this reality.
+For us, situated inside or outside the class, the hyper-organic statute
+does not exist; it does not in fact manifest itself in any practical effect
+either on the agents or on the action. But in order to establish its total
+objectivity, it would also be necessary to be able to totalise trom outside, that is to say, from a space of which this n-dimensional social
+space would be a particular case. The necessity and impossibility of
+grasping the class in struggle as a total objectivity produce within it
+a negative external limit or, so to speak, the possibility of having an
+exterior. And this exterior, as an abstract frontier which in principle
+102. Or n-dimensional: I gave examples of this in The Problem of Method.
+Iwo-dimensional praxis is an abstraction: Robinson Crusoe building his hut
+From the moment where we consider concrete man, his sociality, functions,
+powers, possibilities, etc., transform his project into a pluridimensional unity of
+homogeneity between common action (and the internal multiplicity of its interactions) and socialised individual action. Nevertheless, the conditions which are
+transcended in the project are connected and totalised by the project itself,
+whereas multiplicities of individuals totalise themselves by totalising the common
+praxzs. This is where comprehension comes to an end, both for the observer and
+within active groups, since this internal totalisation through interaction does not
+produce any new ontological statute in the group. In other words, the comprehension of class action by the observer who reproduces it is both sufficient and
+inadequate.
+
+The Place of History 709
+eludes us, is in fact the same as the frontier which separates dialectical
+Reason from analytical Reason when the conditions of knowledge
+prevent us from making the latter an integral part of the former. At this
+level, the process is the indeterminacy of the totalisation conceived in
+exteriority which cannot be either the pure, dialectical development of
+a free, individual praxis, or a totalised totality, or an irreversible and
+non-signifying series of determinations in exteriority. However, precisely because of this indeterminacy, it presents itself as the abstract
+possibility of the unity of all these characteristics: a strict and directed
+development, the complete determination of the present by the past
+and, equally, by the future, and therefore, over-determination; absolute
+necessity and free finality; a totality which is given (as inertia marked
+by a seal) and which produces its own temporality in exteriority as
+totalisation; practico-inertia conceived as praxis; the unity of the
+undertaking and of the outcome; and the unity of passive activity and
+active passivity.
+Thus, as a result of the multiple passivity which reinvades the level
+of the group and intensifies in a class, penetrating praxis with various
+layers of inertia and restricting it to its statute of constituted practice,
+process (as a pure negative limit of investigation) becomes, for many
+anthropologists, the other side of the coin, the obverse which they will
+reach one day, or which they believe can be reached, the hidden reality
+of men and societies, in which all contradictions merge into each other
+although they have not been joined together by any synthetic transcendence: that inhuman objectivity of the human in which finality
+and 'causality', necessity and freedom, exteriority and interiority
+interpenetrate. This hidden reality, a fusion of meaning and nonmeaning, is almost indistinguishable from Spinoza's substance. But it is
+absurd to substantify processes, giving a positive content to an abstract
+limit of comprehensibility and prematurely eliminating the contradictions in the investigation by looking at man from the point of view of
+God. The process is inseparable from the situation of the agent or
+observer: the process defines their situation negatively by reference to
+its limits and we cannot grasp it in itself without desituating ourselve
+in relation to everything. It also demonstrates the impossibility o
+integrating the project of a social multiplicity except by comprehending
+an individualising schema. Lastly, it relates to the exteriority which
+transfixes interiority from all sides, and to a set of facts which are
+purely physico-chemical (or at least capable of being abstractly treated
+as such), transmutations of energy and, at other levels, the destruction
+
+710 Book!
+and expenditure of energy in the practico-inert field, appearing as the
+projection of ensembles which are not only inorganic, but also organic
+and social, into the inorganic. It represents, as it were, the impossibility
+of grasping common action in terms of its multiplicity and passivities
+by means of a constituent, dialectical comprehension; and, on a practical
+level, it indicates the risks of any common action (which it may itself
+produce): alienation,
+exodual alience of the ate collectica into pracio. iere en, this
+non-dialectical (analytical Reason) as a permanent threat to the human
+cannot be grasped except from the standpoint of the situated-being,
+through praxis and as a living contradiction between constituent
+Reason and constituted Reason. This limitation of comprehensibility
+can be revealed only in and through the total practical success of
+comprehension itself. And I have made these remarks at this point
+4 Economism, Materialism and Dialectics
+he class's internal relations to itself at the level of class struggle without
+ntroducine into the schema of intelligibility the hostile action of th
+interior is gun ada transce id social the mas eat condition oth ah
+it is galy dear ta, pariar objectives diel a e modily of
+object, to modify it. But is there any intelligibility here? We have seen
+how a totalisation can occur in the working class because it bears on the
+same action at different levels and because the secondary conflicts are,
+ex hypothesi, subordinated to a basic agreement. But how can we
+
+The Place of History 712
+comprehend, that is to say, unite within a single totalisation, the results
+of an action by the employers and the significations which the praxis of
+the bourgeois class produces as alien realities within the proletariat
+itself? Above all, how can we assume - as dialectical rationality requires - that there is a larger totalisation, unifying these hostile,
+irreconcilable classes in negative reciprocity itself? It is to this problem
+that we must now turn.
+Now, the essential point is to establish whether there is any struggle.
+Engels makes fun of Dühring for speaking somewhat hastily of oppression. But, in trying to correct him, he goes to the opposite extreme:
+economism. If both classes are in themselves an inert, or even practicoinert, product of economic development, if both are created in similar
+ways by transformations of the mode of production, the exploiting
+class bearing its statute in passivity, as a constitutional law, the impotence of the haves reflecting that of the have-nots, then struggle will
+disappear: the two serialities will be completely inert, the contradictions
+of the system being realised through them, that is to say, through each
+as an other and in alterity. The resulting opposition between capitalists and wage-earners does net merit the name of struggle any more
+than that between the shutter and the wall it beats against. In Anti-
+Düring, moreover, Engels takes these schematic ideas to extremes,
+and goes so far as to disband class struggle in the moment where the
+rising class, securing the development of the means of production,
+groups the whole of society around itself. Disagreements will appear
+gradually, and the gap will widen until it splits the whole of society, to
+the extent that the mode of production itself produces and develops its
+contradictions. It would then be possible to speak of struggle - in the
+narrow and purely metaphorical sense of molecular agitations tending
+in two opposite directions and producing an average result - once the
+contradictions become explicit. The rest of the time, History would be
+determined by the development of the mode of production in its fragile
+unity and in so far as the consequences of this development produce
+differentiations within classes and cause various transformations in
+different human groups. The unity between two activities which are
+equally passive (induced), but one of which determines a particular
+form of action among the workers while the other determines a particular type of reorganisation of means of production amongst employers, would be quite simply the economic process.
+And, in a sense, this would provide History with complete intelligibility, in that the opposition between phenomena would be reduced to
+
+722 Book II
+the action of a single set of external forces on various objects. But this
+economistic intelligibility is a mere illusion; in the first place, it takes
+Engels back to analytical Reason. The dialectician crowns his success
+with the splendid result that he kills the dialectic twice over to make
+sure it is dead - the first time by claiming to have discovered it in
+Nature, and the second time by suppressing it within society. The result
+of both attacks is the same: claiming to have discovered the dialectic in
+physico-chemical sequences amounts to the same thing as claiming to
+be a dialectician while reducing human relations to the functional
+relations of quantitative variables. But, secondly, we do not even get the
+real direct intelligibility of number and continuous quantity, for we are
+thrown straight back into the practico-inert field. In other words, the
+conventional transformations and definitions of economic thought are
+intelligible as long as they are supported by the concrete movement of a
+human, historical dialectic, provided they are not seen as any more than
+a temporary employment of analytical Reason, and that analytical
+Reason is itself presented as an abstract moment of dialectical Reason
+(the moment in which human relations are alienated and reified, and
+can be treated in exteriority, from the point of view of reinteriorisation).
+But when they are presented as principles or as basic definitions, and
+when strange quantitative inversions are treated as natural facts (rather
+than as a superficially natural aspect of social facts), then language itself
+ceases to signify: economic inversions and all the determinations of
+discourse to which they lead derive from nothingness, directly, on the
+basis of physico-chemical and biological laws but without it being
+possible to identify any movement (dialectic of Nature) capable of
+producing this mutilated analytical Reason on the basis of the other.
+In short, if analytical Reason is to become economic Reason without
+losing its rationality, it must be within dialectical Reason, and as
+produced and supported by it. Thus economism as a fundamental
+rationality collapses into empirical irrationality ('This is how things
+are).
+Ubviously this does not mean dissolving objective, material contradictions (productive forces ‹ > means of production ‹ > mode of production ‹ → relations of production, etc.) in a kind of dialecticalidealism.
+reciprocal interiority combining free, practical organisms in the
+"episodic' ('à tiroirs') field of scarcity). But this reinteriorisation itself
+
+The Place of History J13
+transforms their signification: the line of economism thus resembles
+the abstract relational skeleton which the informant, a member of an
+exogamous society, draws on the sand for the ethnographer. Their
+concrete, intelligible reality, at the level of praxis, is worked matter
+as a mediation between practical organisms and as the alienation of
+to the other, or, in a word, of the collective. And the
+collective is neither dialectical nor analytical: it is anti-dialectical. It
+does not appear initially as a fundamental structure of human relations:
+but it constitutes itself through a complex dialectic, whose course we
+have traced as the dialectic running around and turning against itself,
+in short, as the anti-dialectic. And this anti-dialectic would not be intelligible if we did not produce it ourselves in the fleeting moment of
+false material unity, of alienated labour and serial flight. The practicoinert can be treated as a process (and this is already far removed from
+the pretensions of economism: for economic "facts' were simply
+physico-chemical phenomena made unintelligible by negations of
+interiority parading as determinations of exteriority, but this process,
+in so far as it is already passive action, presupposes the entire praxis (as
+a relation with the material, practical field and with the Others), which
+it reabsorbs and transforms in the object, while still being based on its
+real, abstract pullulation.
+In short, if the mode of production is the infrastructure of every
+society in human history, this is because labour - as a free, concrete
+operation which becomes alienated in the collective and which already
+produces itself as a transcendence of an earlier alienation to this collective - is the infrastructure of the practico-inert (and of the mode of
+production), not only in the sense of diachronic totalisation (and
+because a giyen machine with its special exigencies is itself the product
+of labour), but also synchronically since all the contradictions of the
+practico-inert and especially those of the economic process are necessarily constituted by the constant re-alienation of the worker in his
+labour, that is to say, by practice in general in this other world which it
+constructs, sacrificing itself so that it can exist (constituting its multiplicity into serial alterity through inorganic matter, and appropriating
+impotence with the full use of its sovereignty). From this viewpoint,
+if the foundation of the class struggle is to lie in the practico-inert, this
+is in so far as the obiective conflict of interests is both received and
+produced by passive activity and reveals itself in labour (or in all kinds
+of behaviour) as a reciprocity of antagonism - possibly in a petrified
+form and, for example, as an exigency of the tool or machine.
+
+71A Book II
+Circularity - as a structure of the social as a human product - produces its intelligibility through a double determination. On the one
+hand, it is obvious that thoughts and activities are inscribed in worked
+matter (in so far as it produces a system of alterity through the others).
+This is why racism is not a mere 'psychological defence' of the colonialist, created for the needs of the cause, to justify colonisation to
+the metropolitan power and to himself; it is in fact Other-Thought
+(Pensée-Autre) produced objectively by the colonial system and by
+super-exploitation: man is defined by the wage and by the nature of
+labour, and therefore it is true that wages, as they tend towards zero,
+and labour, as an alternation between unemployment and forced
+', reduce a colonised person to the sub-human which he is for
+the colonialist. 103 Racist thinking is simply an activity which realises
+in alterity a practical truth inscribed in worked matter and in the
+system which results from it. But, on the other hand, and conversely,
+since the elementary structures of the simplest forms are inscribed in
+inorganic matter, they refer to various activities (both past and present)
+which either indefinitely reproduce or have helped to produce these
+human seals as inert thoughts: and these activities are necessarily
+antagonistic. The racism which occurs to an Algerian colonialist was
+imposed and produced by the conquest of Algeria, and is constantly
+recreated and reactualised by everyday practice through serial alterity.
+Of course, the conquest of Algeria in itself can only be taken as a
+complex process dependent on a certain political and social situation
+in France as well as on the real relations between capitalist France and
+agricultural, feudal Algeria. Nevertheless, the colonial wars of the
+nineteenth century realised an original situation of violence for the
+colonialists as their fundamental relation to the natives; and this
+situation of violence produces and reproduces itself as the outcome of
+a collection of violent practices, that is to say, of intentional operations
+with precise aims, carried out by the army - as a group-institution -
+and by economic groups supported by public authority (by the
+delegates of the metropolitan sovereign). Of course, this violence, the
+cruelty towards Algerian tribes and the systematic operations which
+aimed at taking over their land, was itself no more than an expression
+of a still abstract racism. This was due primarily to the state of war
+103. There is just one difference: this sub-human is all human, and the colonialist, as a superman, is just a huge cripple. But this inversion will appear only in
+higher forms of the struggle.
+
+The Place of History 725
+('pacification' was long and bloody), which changed the statute
+because the fundamental relation was armed struggle; and this negative
+racism constituted the enemy as inferior rather than as a supposed
+'French citizen'. They were either 'devils' or 'mindless savages'
+depending whether they had won a victory, showing them in their
+activity or whether, on the contrary, they had suffered a temporary
+defeat, which is in itself an affirmation of the conqueror's superiority.
+Inciber case i Marchinen action, separali the hostle haps by.
+On the other hand, for reasons relating to its own history and to the
+development of capitalism within it, French society was at first quite
+undecided as to how to make use of its conquest. Colonial settlement!
+Penal colony! No practice had been defined up to 188o. Essentially,
+therefore, the Muslims still had to be respected, and subdued, and their
+slightest murmurs of revolt had to be suppressed. But they were more
+likely to be exterminated than employed - at least on a large scale. In
+any case, repressive practices, the policy of division and above all
+dispossession soon destroyed feudal structures and transformed this
+backward but structured society into an 'atomised crowd', and, before
+long, into an agricultural sub-proletariat. And this new (practico-inert)
+form of Muslim society is a real expression of violence; it objectively
+signifies the violence suffered by each of the serial Others, whom it
+produced. When our capital finally settled on capitalist colonisation as
+a partial solution to its problems and as a source of new profits, this
+new form of exploitation was explained, developed, diffused, and
+practised by pressure groups. There is an undeniable link between
+Leroy-Beaulieu's book,10% the politics of Jules Ferry,105 and the
+constitution of the first colonial banks and of sea transport. But, at the
+same time, other social milieux, with other interests, rose up in violent
+revolt against the policy of colonial conquest.
+What this implies is that the colonial system, as an infernal machine
+rhich was to develop its own contradictions right up to a hinal explo
+ion, corresponded to the obiective needs of the French capitalists i
+general, but contradicted many particular interests. If it was to be
+imposed and set in motion, it had to be promoted; and in! transitio!
+from obiective interest, as an empty exigency, to the construction o
+the system was produced by a common practice, and corresponded
+104. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, French liberal economist, 1843-1916. (Ed.]
+105. Jules Ferry, French statesman, 1832-93. [Ed.]
+
+Jı6 Book II
+historicaliy to a real, organised dialectic linking a number of financial
+groups, statesmen and theoreticians in one organised task. And it
+would be wrong to schematise everything by simply saying that these
+groups were the expression of the interests of their class. For, in one
+sense, this is indeed what they were, and even all that they were. But
+they were not mediums, puffed up by some kind of spiritual fulness,
+or dragons with the class spirit which filled them pouring from their
+throats: their class was necessarily determined by their common creation
+of the system. This does not mean - as a voluntarist idealism would
+assert - that the exposition of the system automatically transposed
+itself into a general practice of the class: on the contrary, it is well
+known that it took patient efforts to impose it (propaganda, victories
+to wipe out the memory of defeats, initial advantages, etc.). It means,
+quite simply, that by the practical unity of organisations and apparatuses which it had itself produced (the sovereign as the present
+temporalisation of the State, technicians or ideologists, and economic
+pressure groups), the class found itself in the process of elaborating
+new tasks, and, regardless of its divisions, also found that it was in a
+state of minimal resistance to the system it had created: in effect, it
+profited from the practical power of the most respected and active
+institutions and organisations (the subjection of the fiercest milieux
+was already the future fate of their resistance), from its precise, pluridimensional elaboration (ideology, action by public powers, initiatives
+of private groups) in the face of sporadic, uncertain, and often contradictory resistance, and lastly, from the light which these new practices
+threw on the economic and social problems of the metropolis (new
+outlets for production, special circuits of exchange from the colony to
+the metropolitan power, and conversely).
+5 Racism and Colonialism as Praxis and Process
+To make myself clear, I shall say that all the relations between the
+colonialists and the colonised throughout the colonial system are an
+actualisation of practico-inert characteristics which are introduced and
+defined by common actions - or in other words, that both sociology
+and economism must be dissolved in History. If some contemporary
+
+The Place of History JIJ
+work of sociology says that "pauperisation', as the destruction of the
+social structures of the Muslim community, was a necessary result of
+contact between two particular societies, one backward (or underdeveloped), agricultural and feudal, the other industrialised, then
+intelligibility and necessity are both absent from this type of determination. The two can be connected only in so far as the real, conscious
+activity of each colonialist (especially on the economic plane) is seen as
+realising, by itself, in particular cases, for limited objectives, but in the
+light of a common objective, the 'pauperisation' which the contact
+between two societies (those beings of reason) could not produce apart
+from individual contacts between the individuals who compose them.
+But this means that the term 'pauperisation' and the pseudo-concept
+which underlies it become utterly useless: they are both designed to
+take us modestly back to the process. But the sole intelligible reality, the
+praxis of men, puts paid to both of them; and it relates to two quite
+distinct types of action: past, transcended action and present action. In
+fact, what should be said first is that the contact between the industrial
+society and the agricultural society was achieved by Bugeaud's soldiers,
+and by the atrocious massacres perpetrated by these soldiers; and that
+the destruction of the forms of inheritance proper to the Muslim tribes
+did not emerge from some idealistic interpenetration of two different
+juridical systems, but from the fact that merchants, encouraged by the
+State and supported by our armies, imposed the code on the Muslims
+the better to rob them. Only on this basis can one comprehend that the
+colonial goal was to produce and to sell food106 to the metropolitan
+power at less than world rates and that the means of achieving this goal
+was the creation of a sub-proletariat of the desolate and the chronically
+unemployed (which itself explains the notion of pauperisation). And
+this operation was complemented by that of the commodity merchants
+- whom we have just mentioned - and by the policy of the military
+authorities (destroying all structures which might permit regroupment
+or resistance, maintaining a supposed feudality of collaborators and
+traitors, accomplices of the French, preserving the appearance of a
+locally-based sovereignty and exploiting, in their own interest and that
+of their masters, an impoverished, impotent mass which had been
+reduced to a molecular statute). Thus the system (as an infernal machine
+of the practico-inert field) became the undertaking of a nation through
+its institutional groups (war), through the 'hot' creation of a new form
+106. Or minerals and other 'raw materials'.
+
+718 Book II
+of imperialism based on a new politics (involving a new relationship
+between individuals and public powers), through the systematic,
+concerted destruction of a community and, of course, the installation
+of a new mechanism of exploitation (new colonialists) by appropriate
+organisations (banking, credit systems, government favours, etc.).
+Now, in all these practices, violence and destruction were an integral
+part of the desired objective. At the three different levels of this action,
+this involved (1) the physical liquidation of a number of Muslims and
+the dissolution of their institutions, while they were not allowed to
+'enjoy' ours; (2) depriving indigenous communities of land ownership
+and transferring it to the newcomers through the brutal and deliberately
+over-rapid application of the civil code; and (3) establishing the true
+bond between the colony and the metropolis (sales of colonial products at minimum prices, and purchases of manufactured goods from
+the metropolitan power at high prices) on the basis of systematic
+super-exploitation of the native. In other words, for the child of the
+colonialist, violence was present in the situation itself, and was a social
+force which produced him. The son of the colonialist and the son of the
+Muslim are both the children of the objective violence which defines
+the system itself as a practico-inert hell. But if this violence-object
+produces them, if they suffer it partly as their own inertia, this is
+because it used to be violence-praxis when the system was in the
+process of being installed. It is man who inscribed his violence in things
+as the eternal unity of this passive mediation between men.
+The proponents of 'pauperisation' may claim that the development
+of French society in the middle of the nineteenth century was precisely
+such as to prevent it from conceiving of any relationship to the
+Muslim peasants of Algeria other than one of violence. This is true,
+in that the bourgeois of the last century were very harmoniously
+ignoble in all their activities. And this ignominy was obviously partly
+due to the fact that the bourgeois were themselves alienated products
+of the capitalist system which characterised the metropolitan society:
+how could the objective characteristics of the system - the conditions
+of labour which he imposed on his workers, the senseless waste of
+human lives which was characteristic of the 'iron and coal period - fail
+to produce bourgeois who had no feelings for the natives of North
+Africa! If the bourgeois was a man, while the worker, his compatriot,
+was merely sub-human, how could an Algerian, a distant enemy, be
+But the answer must be first that sociology has inverted itself in
+
+The Place of History J19
+order to correspond to History: if bourgeois society pauperises feudal
+society, this is not a result of its superiority (acting on the Arab community, in fact, in spite of itself and by its mere existence) but of its
+inferiority, of the revolting brutality which so clearly characterised
+capitalism in its origins. And precisely because of this, the negation
+returns in the colonising class. Thus it necessarily refers to action:
+strictly speaking one might, from some idealist, Aristotelian point of
+view, countenance an attraction at a distance by the positive plenitude
+of an object which, in its distant connection with this plenitude,
+reinteriorises and reflects its inadequacies. But when negativity becomes
+the source in one object of modifications (either positive or negative)
+in the other, then this negativity will produce its effects only in an
+action or system of actions which determines itself on the basis of it and
+which preserves it in itself as the negative orientation of the expenditure
+of energy. It is true that the bourgeois are products (but when we
+shortly return to class we shall see that these products are also agents);
+it is also true that these children of violence were produced by the
+violent praxis of their fathers - which takes them back to the History
+from which they wished to escape.
+But it is also true that this rapacious violence was not a cerebral
+circumvolution, or a proper power of social institutions (although it is
+realised in institutions too). Either it is the capitalist process itself (to
+the extent that, as we shall see, the exploiter readopts the practico-inert)
+or, if there are new developments in the system (for example, in
+colonialism), it temporalises itself in common (or even individual) real
+activities which realise it in objectivity. Violence, as bourgeois exis,
+exists in the exploitation of the proletariat as an inherited relation of the
+dominant class to the dominated class (but we shall see that it is also a
+practice at this level); and violence, as the praxis of this bourgeois
+generation, lay in colonisation. But the exis, in itself, was no more than
+a diachronic mediation between two cycles of praxis. And colonial
+undertakings, as the plural temporalisation of bourgeois violence (as
+the violence of one class against another within a community) is also
+its dialectical enrichment and expansion. In new conditions, where
+exploitation must start on the basis of oppression, this violence renews
+itself; it will extend to mass extermination and torture. It must therefore
+trate ine in re i in in tel practical in ende to be used.
+immediately in the metropolitan power against the exploited masses as
+soon as there is a lull in the colonial war. As is well known, Bugeaud
+
+720 Book II
+appeared to the high bourgeoisie of 1848 as the dreamed-of destroyer
+of the Second Republic; and it is not an accident that Franco came
+from Morocco.
+The evolution of violence is clearly expressed here: first a structure
+of alienation in the practico-inert, it is actualised as praxis in colonisation; and its (temporary) victory presents itself as the objectification of
+the practical ensemble (army, capitalists,
+commodity merchants,
+colonialists) in a practico-inert system where it represents the fundamental structure of reciprocity between the colonialists and the
+colonised. But in alienation itself, this new serial exis cannot exist unless
+everyone realises and adopts it as other in his everyday praxis. This
+means, in the first place, that it becomes its own idea in the form of
+racism - in other words, that the colonialists constantly actualise the
+practices of extermination, robbery and exploitation which have been
+established by previous generations, and transcend them towards a
+system of other values, entirely governed by alterity. But still it would
+be no more than an ineffectual transcendence of the objective exis if the
+situation did not involve a reciprocity of violence. In other words, the
+colonialist discovers in the native not only the Other-than-man but
+also his own sworn Enemy (in other words, the Enemy of Man). This
+discovery does not presuppose resistance (open or clandestine), or
+riots, or threats of revolt: the violence of the colonialists itself emerges
+as an indefinite necessity or, to put it another way, the colonialist
+reveals the violence of the native, even in his passivity, as the obvious
+consequence of his own violence and as its sole justification. This
+discovery is made through hatred and fear, as a negative determination
+of the practical field, as a co-efficient of adversity affecting certain
+multiplicities in this field, in short, as a permanent danger which has to
+be avoided or prevented. Racism has to become a practice: it is not
+contemplation awakening the significations engraved on things; it is
+in itself self-justifying violence: violence presenting itself as induced
+violence, counter-violence and legitimate defence. The colonialist lives
+on an Island of Doctor Moreau, 107 surrounded by terrifying beasts
+lists, perfect men. The immediate practical attitude of a colonialist is
+107. Cf. H. G. Wells, The Island of Doctor Moreau, (1896), in which an
+island where gruesome experiments are conducted is described. [Ed.]
+
+The Place of History y22
+therefore that of a man confronted by a sly and vicious beast. First, one
+has to defend oneself against the blindness of the metropolitan power,
+which cannot distinguish false men from true. The colonialist phrase,
+'We know the Arab', like the Southerner's, "The Yankee doesn't know
+the nigger', is an action: a juridical (and intimidated) rejection of any
+possibility that the metropolitan power should find solutions to
+colonial problems in the metropolis. What this basically means is: the
+colonialist and the native are a couple, produced by an antagonistic
+situation and by one another. No one (except the army, if the colonialist
+calls on it as a weapon) can intervene in their duel. And this is precisely
+the theme of the racist propaganda that the colonialist spreads in the
+metropolitan power itself: his portrayal of the native (always negative)
+is designed to 'open people's eyes' and to disorientate metropolitan
+opinion. Furthermore, at a more complex level, the practical operation
+involves a rejection of any political solution to the colonial problem (the
+basis of the problem being, of course, social), 108 The colonialist wants
+the status quo because any change in the system (which, at the present
+time, is everywhere on the decline) can only hasten the end of colonisation: integration and assimilation (full recognition of all our rights for
+the colonised), as much as independence, immediately results in the end
+of super-exploitation, and therefore of low wages, and therefore of the
+low prices which are the raison d'être of the 'colony-metropolis'
+economic circuit. The activity of racism is a praxis illuminated by a
+'theory' ('biological, 'social", or empirical racism, it does not matter
+which) aiming to keep the masses in a state of molecular aggregation,
+and to use every possible means to increase the 'sub-humanity' of the
+natives (a religious policy favouring the most superstitious elements;
+an educational policy designed not to educate the natives in our culture
+and at the same time to deprive them of the possibility of becoming
+educated in their own culture, etc.).
+What is important to us here are the two following aspects of colonial
+praxes:
+(a) First, the praxis of oppression which we have just described
+complements the process of exploitation and merges into it. By 'process
+of exploitation' I mean the practico-inert functioning of the system
+108. Yet the colonialist prefers to evoke possibilities of social improvement
+because he knows that the demands of the natives are primarily political. And they
+are primarily political because the natives are aware that 'politics', in the colonies,
+is quite simply the installation and the regular functioning of an enormous repressive apparatus which alone permits super-exploitation,
+
+722 Book II
+once it has been installed: strictly speaking, the big (colonialist) landowner does not - at least in Algeria - force the natives to work for him
+for starvation wages; the deceptive system of free contract on which the
+capitalist process is based has been acclimatised in Algeria, or so it
+seems. In fact, demographic pressure is producing an under-nourished
+population, in a state of chronic unemployment (or semi-unemployment) and the natives come to offer themselves to the employers,
+poverty creating a competitive antagonism which forces them to
+accept, or even propose, the lowest wages. Owing to poor industrial
+development - which is also characteristic of the colonial system - this
+mainly agricultural sub-proletariat cannot overcome these antagonisms in a unity of demands. Working-class emancipation goes hand in
+hand with industrial concentration: in a colonised country, the
+pauperisation of the masses destroyed the structures of the old society,
+and removed the means for reconstituting another, based on different
+structures and on different relations of sociality.
+In this sense, therefore, it is possible to claim that exploitation by
+new generations of colonialists of new generations of natives realises
+itself as a process: in the framework of an economic and social system,
+wage levels will be settled on the basis of specific material conditions
+which elude the action of the colonialists as much as that of the natives
+(the economic conjuncture and the demographic thrust, for example,
+etc.). But the process is mainly conditioned by the atomisation of the
+native masses; and is based on the following duality: the disintegration
+of the old communities, and the constant dissolution of any new groups
+which attempt to form, and a rejection of integration into the colonising
+society. In short, it is necessary that the colonised people should be
+nothing, except a labour force which can be bought for less and less.
+Now this necessity, which conditions the entire process, may have
+manifested itself, in the great days of colonialism, as an inert exigency
+within the system. But, in fact, this exigency is fulfilled; and if it is
+fulfilled, this is specifically both because it is the object of an oppressive
+praxis and because it was the objective (now achieved and transcended)
+of past oppression. This oppressive praxis, past and present, with its
+objective future, did not initially set itself the long-term objective of
+producing a native statute which would favour the establishment and
+autonomous functioning of the colonial circuit. In fact, as we have
+seen, the violence of 'conquest' was accompanied by considerable
+uncertainty as to the aim of colonisation, and this uncertainty was
+partly due to the fact that the violence occurred at a moment before
+
+The Place of History 723
+that in which the economic organisation of France enabled it to define
+a colonial policy. But the fact remains that the practices of extermination and plunder atomised Muslim society and politico-financial committees created the system on the basis of this atomisation. In other
+words, the radical impotence and the poverty of the masses were at
+least implicit among the fundamental factors which the banks and the
+State combined and transcended in the project of a rational exploitation
+of the colonies. Thus, when one reaches the key-condition of the
+colonial undertaking, low wages, it is notable that the process on the
+basis of which they were settled was a necessity of the practico-inert
+only in so far as an oppressive praxis had deliberately produced a
+situation which made the process necessary. Or rather, the victory of
+arms was not enough; it had to be renewed every day. It would be even
+more effective and economical to maintain it by institutionalising it,
+that is to say, by endowing it, for the natives, with the character of a
+practico-inert statute: and this could not be done without affecting the
+Algerian army itself with institutional inertia. Inorganic inertia, as a
+permanent feature of the praxis-institution, reproduces itself as an inert
+perpetuation of untranscendable impotence among the natives. The
+molecular constitution of the masses, as a material, inorganic,
+, and
+necessary condition of the process of super-exploitation presents itself
+as the inert result of a strict determinism (and so one comes back to
+positivist reason): but in reality this inertia - however inorganic it may
+be - is constantly produced by the petrified violence which is constituted by the presence of the army. And the internal consequences of
+this induced impotence (poverty, disease, competitive antagonism, the
+birth-rate, etc.), though they present themselves as serial and as a
+determination of the practico-inert field, are, as a whole, a controlled
+process. The old violence is reabsorbed by the inertia-violence of the
+institution, and its uncertainties disappear in the objective certainty of
+colonialism, which is the thought of the army itself, that is to say, its
+raison d'être and the signification - both global and in detail - of its
+To the extent that the presence-institution of a metropolitan army is
+a praxis which occasions inorganic inertia amongst the colonised
+masses, the natives themselves will treat this inertia both as their destiny
+and as an oppressive practice of the enemy. Even if an individual
+interiorises it as a feeling of inferiority (adopting and accepting in
+immanence the sentence which the colonialists have passed), even if he
+sees his colonised-being as a negative determination and an original
+
+924 Book II
+statute of sub-humanity, and even if he tries to get closer to his
+conquerors, and to resemble them (in short, if he seeks to be assimilated), he does not cease to experience this condition, this ontological
+statute, as the inexorable and unforgivable violence done to him by a
+hard-hearted enemy. This is because this violence is specifically directed
+so as to deprive him of any possibility of reacting, even by admiring
+his oppressors and seeking to become like them. Thus, in their practical,
+everyday life, the exploited experience oppression through all their
+activities, not as alienation, but as a straightforward deliberate constraint of men by men. And to the extent that the army-institution 109 is
+a force which is displayed so that it need not be used (or so that it is
+immediately ready for use), the practical display is the common praxis
+of all soldiers and is expressed both in their group operations and in
+their individual relations with Muslims (so we re-encounter a practical
+racism - though at a different level and with a different meaning).
+A young soldier who 'did his military service' in Algeria (I am
+thinking of the heyday of colonialism, between 1910 and 1935) was
+himself ambivalent in his discovery of himself and of the Others: it was
+as an institutionalised being that he was there, in a given town, in a
+given barracks and even, in his "free-time', in a particular street or
+brothel. But, at the same time, the living historical praxis of the African
+army (which presents itself as an apparatus of counter-violence) appeared to him through the repeated operations he was made to perform,
+the instructions he received: the a-temporal inertia of institutionalised
+Being is realised and produced through a historical, practical orientation. This orientation was determined by the relations between
+colonialists and the natives everywhere, which are reflected by news of
+military exercises, on a given morning, in a particular barracks at
+Blidah or Philippeville, both as an index of the universal tension and
+as a concrete factor of it. The soldiers see this particular riot as the
+sign which enables them to decipher the other signs which have appeared directly in their experience, and as the enemy action which will
+determine their immediate fate ("confined to barracks', despatched
+with two other regiments, to restore order) or their long-term fate
+(insurrection is brewing, it will break out). Through such news, they
+are signified as agents of a common praxis (a repressive expedition,
+10g. An army is both an institution and an institutional group. If I refer here
+to an army-institution, this is in so far as the general functions of an army are
+specialised by institutions peculiar to Algeria (administrative functions, etc.).
+
+The Place of History 725
+battles, etc.); in other words, they see themselves - in so far as they
+have the power to unleash counter-violence - as sovereign members of
+the sovereign. Since this sovereignty is, in effect, being rejected by the
+natives - by the revolt in some other town - it reverts to being the
+pure, common power of the individual and the group to rearrange the
+practical field unconditionally. And as this power is real and concrete
+only in so far as it is limited, in reciprocity, by that of the Other, it
+becomes here an abstract violence, through the decision to treat the
+colonised masses as objects. They have destroyed the relationship,
+according to the sovereign ideology, by suddenly rejecting military
+sovereignty: and by this action, they have put themselves outside the
+of piles violence that is to say, orche bloody esposes of ment
+groups: for reciprocity takes place, for the sovereign, between two
+inertias, one of which is the pure, serial impotence of the native, while
+the other is the freely agreed passivity of the army which retains its
+force. The slightest regroupment, as a negation of serial inertia, is a
+breach of contract. But for the soldier, as institutionalised-being, the
+distant revolt gives a sort of negative unity to this molecular crowd, by
+defining (more or less exactly) the degree of tension between the troops
+and the colonised masses. It becomes wholly a group, or a possibility
+of producing armed groups, or an unfathomable sea concealing armed
+groups. Thus the point of application for counter-violence is really
+everywhere here, and the lived relationship between the soldier and the
+masses must everywhere be that of the sovereign to rebels. This means
+that the army, on the slightest suspicion, recognises itself in its entirety
+as a practical unit for repression, as an agent of the perpetual dissolution
+of communities in favour of serial alterity. Thus the impotence-revolt
+of the masses and the inertia-violence of the army both deserve the
+name of 'praxis-process'.
+The colonialists themselves, however, with or without military help
+(or rather with passive or active military help) had to defend the
+atomisation of the masses against any metropolitan initiatives. Here,
+the process was no longer the product of a praxis, but its autonomous
+development had to be protected by strenuous activities: political allies
+had to be found in the Assembly or in the government, support had to
+be found in economic groups uniting the big colonialists and certain
+metropolitan capitalists, and the acceptance of 'assimilating' or 'integrating' reforms had to be prevented. And if, in spite of everything,
+some law was passed which tended to 'liberalise' the régime and to
+
+726 Book II
+recognise Muslim political rights, its implementation would have to be
+prevented - for example, by organising rigged elections whenever the
+electors were consulted in Algeria. If social reforms were being proposed (redistribution of land, etc.), the colonialists might also be able
+to turn them to their own advantage. Lastly, since all these violent
+operations had to take place in a climate of violence - that is to say,
+they could be undertaken only by violent men - propaganda had to
+reflect this universal violence, and reflect his own violence to the
+colonialist as the simple manly courage, resolute in all things, of an
+embattled minority; and it had to present everyone with the otherviolence of the natives as constantly endangering the colonialists
+everywhere. That is to say, it struck permanent fear into the colonialists
+and presented this angry fear as pure courage. These indispensable
+operations as a whole required organisms and vigilance apparatuses,
+and these produced themselves, in specific circumstances, as a dissolution of seriality among the colonialists themselves. I have already said -
+when speaking of the practico-inert - that the colonialists (as a superexploiting class) - like the natives, by the play of competitive antagonisms and recurrence - were engaged in a series of series and that racism
+in this series was other thought (of and through the Other), in short,
+process-thought. But the common interest was always present for all in
+that they were engaged in a double relation to the metropolitan power
+and to the natives, and that they had either to disappear or to remain
+the sole necessary mediation between the two.
+Their basic contradiction lies at this level: the 'liberal' régime of the
+metropolitan power corresponds to the historical development of
+French capitalism, to the metropolitan bourgeoisie; and it is also useful
+for the colonialists, out there, when they are represented and defended
+in France, and when they try to create and finance pressure-groups in
+Paris. But such a régime - which is possibly the most practical kind for
+a society based on exploitation - is not at all suitable for a society based
+on super-exploitation. So, in the name of bourgeois democracy, the
+cores in he ner lot the here enter room in
+besieged, the rare liberal institutions in the colony must be besieged.
+This conflict, this complex praxis, the manifestation of class interest,
+of the interest of all classes of colonialists110 is concretised in groups of
+IIo. This interest common to all classes is manifested to all the colonialists in
+
+The Place of History 727
+violence at the slightest provocation. And by this I do not mean
+groups which realise real violence (though there are such groupings:
+provocateurs, counter-terrorists, etc.), so much as practical communities whose role is to perpetuate the climate of violence by making
+themselves violence incarnate. Such groupings can be regarded as
+having the function of systematically lowering the threshold of class
+seriality, so as to allow more effective groupings (economic groups and
+pressure-groups) to constitute themselves despite competitive antagonisms; they represent the extreme possibilities for the colonialist:
+the extermination of the natives and the extermination of the colonialists. In one respect, these possibilities are in fact equivalent: they both
+lead to the destruction of colonisation; it is precisely the colonialist's
+need for the super-exploited native which transformed the wasteful,
+uncontrolled violence of the colonial conquests into economic, controlled violence. But the violent groups embody the extreme possibilities
+and can be described as extremist in the sense that in the light of the
+conflict which they make permanent, any praxis of conciliation must
+appear as a terrible mistake: the only action which can bear fruit is one
+which is based on coercion and repression. Thus the organised groups
+formed a sort of one-way barrier: while constantly presenting violence
+to the colonialists as the very foundation of their situation and as the
+sole means of preserving it, they tended to create in Africa a milieu
+completely impenetrable to liberal institutions; but since they were
+based on French nationality, these organisations enabled every colonialist to defend his right to violence in Algeria, in terms of his rights as a
+free citizen of the metropolitan power. 111
+This operation of protection is indispensable if the process of superexploitation is to develop according to its practico-inert laws. But if we
+connect the past praxis which is preserved by the serial inertia of the
+exploiters and exploited, and which has become passive activity (inanimate matter as a mediation between men), to institutional praxis, as
+violence held in an inertia which is forever temporary, and also to
+extremist activities (agitation, propaganda, and the defence of the
+Algerian colony against the metropolitan power), then we can see
+super-exploitation as a process which realises itself on the basis of a
+the simple fact that in Algeria the average income of the colonialists is ten times
+higher than that of the natives.
+I11. He may also use these rights in order to claim economic aid from metropolitan France.
+
+728 Book II
+praxis which produced and directed it, under the protection of an
+institutional action and in non-reciprocal isolation which has been
+artificially produced by common practices. In short, it becomes the antidialectical moment determining itself in the milieu of the constituted
+dialectic or, so to speak, the practico-inert moment as the common
+objective of convergent practices and as their artificial product. And, of
+course, it is also their mediation or, in other words, the unity of their
+being-outside-it. But we also see that the groups in question are linked
+to one another by relations of interiority (there are diachronic and
+[synchronic] connections amongst the officers, and between them - as
+representatives of different generations and practices - and the soldiers;
+there are synchronic connections between extremist groups and the
+officers, etc.) and also to the colonialists in general (we shall come back
+to this in the next paragraph).
+Thus it is true that the process involves both the super-exploiters
+and the native sub-proletariat in an anti-dialectical movement which
+constitutes the future as an inexorable destiny for everyone and for
+every collective. It is true that, from this point of view, it is the system
+and the conjuncture which bring about the ruin of this particular
+colonial undertaking and, thereby, blindly, the unemployment of these
+particular Muslims, and their poverty, and the death of their children
+through malnutrition, etc. Thus, in a way, the entire apparatus of
+violence will have served to constitute a sort of closed field in which
+practico-inert forces crush the individual enterprise of certain colonialists. But this is itself the goal, since the problem is to sustain and isolate,
+as in a laboratory experiment, an 'economic world' which obeys rigid
+laws and is based, in reality, on the continued annihilation of the superexploited (on the practical refusal to treat them as subjects with
+rights, whatever the right). This 'economic world', in which superexploitation is meticulously concealed, and which presents itself in the
+vague guise of classical liberalism, is simply the abstract set of competitive or semi-competitive relations between colonialists, either
+directly or through the mediation of the metropolitan power. To take
+things on this terrain (that is to say, deliberately ignoring colonialism
+as a system and History as the basis of every human process, the
+repressive apparatus and the groups of violence must in effect protect
+the freedom to produce, to sell and to buy, and therefore the possibility
+that any given colonialist may be ruined, in specific circumstances and
+in accordance with very strict rules. On the other hand, this abstract,
+false economics is nothing but the common interest of the colonialists,
+
+The Place of History 729
+that is to say, it enables them to develop their individual antagonisms
+without these conflicts ever being able to benefit the over-exploited
+who have to pay the price.
+It is now clear that we must distinguish between three levels within
+colonisation as developing History: the play of flat appearances which
+can be studied by economic Reason has no intelligibility except in
+relation to the anti-dialectical system of super-exploitation. And this
+in turn is not intelligible unless one begins by seeing it as a product of
+human labour which created it and continues to control it. And, unlike
+the forged tool, or worked matter, it does not by itself introduce
+alterity and recurrence between the groups which supervise its autonomous development: in fact it realises itself as a complex ensemble of
+connections between series (super-exploiters and super-exploited, the
+connections between the former on the basis of their relations with the
+latter and conversely, the connections with metropolitan importers and
+exporters, etc.); but the groups which ensure its functioning are connected by relations of interiority - springing from their practical tasks -
+and therefore cannot be serialised by its mediation.112 Thus it is
+perfectly clear here that super-exploitation as a practico-inert process is
+nothing but oppression as a historical praxis realising itself, determining itself and controlling itself in the milieu of passive activity.
+(b) This brings us to our second observation: the relations between
+the oppressing groups are always the conditioned conditions of
+serialities of series, that is to say, of the inert gathering of the 'occupants. It should be noted, in fact, that they are aimed at a certain
+common objective through the various practices and in accordance with
+different assessments of the situation. Their racisms - though all of
+them are based equally on the sub-humanity of Muslims - are nevertheless divergent. The extremism of some - which arises from adopted
+function - can be contrasted with the apparent moderation of others
+(of the officers, or of some of them) which, apart from periods of
+disturbance and repression, appears as a quiet strength which is put on
+display so that it need not be used. On the other hand, the officers need
+not be 'colonials'; and if they are, they are not necessarily connected to
+any particular colony. Lastly, they are functionaries of the metropolitan
+112. Which does not mean that they cannot, in other connections, be serialised
+by the process itself: the virulent member of a group of violence may suffer his
+destiny (receiving the economic sentence which he causes to be passed on him by
+the system) in so far as he is also a producer of agricultural goods and suffers as a
+colonialist from the competition of large-scale mechanised production.
+
+J30
+Book 11
+power rather than landowners or shopkeepers who are established in
+Africa. 113
+But it should be stated quite specifically that the African army was
+the violence of the colonialists and that the colonialists were for the
+army the legitimacy of this violence. It should also be observed that the
+set of colonial exploiters includes all social categories and that all of
+them (from the French worker to the judge and the farmer) are bound
+by the same privilege, which the soldiers share with them: they are
+better paid than in France, and their relative comfort is based on the
+poverty of the Muslims. Thus the unity of all groups of colonialists
+(from accidental, ephemeral groups to institutional ones) was conditioned by the climate of the colony, that is to say, by the Other-Being
+of the series. To what extent could this Other-Being be dissolved in
+fused groups? And to what extent is it, on the contrary, unsurmountably rigid and passive? It is easy to imagine the array of intermediaries:
+to each moment there corresponds a different relation between the
+practical communities: opposition and tension - relaxation, quasiserial co-existence - the more or less advanced unity of integration. But
+the being of the series, in the world of violence, is determined on the
+basis of its relation of antagonistic reciprocity with the masses whom it
+oppresses. This relation, in effect, as a real antagonism, is in no way
+reducible to the practico-inert ensemble of the process of exploitation:
+but it cannot be regarded as a genuine reciprocal praxis of struggle
+since it pits against one another series still paralysed by alterity.
+This is, in fact, a tension which is both immediately detectable and
+impossible to determine, and which appears as a common signification
+of reciprocal individual actions. This common signification, however,
+is not directly realisable, since it does not in itself relate to any community of which any of the agents might form part as a common
+individual. It consists, rather, of actions which, in themselves and in
+their strict individuality, involve a negation of seriality: they appear
+seriality, but they are evidence of a change in the serial bonds - for
+example, the strength of everyone's anger - which is expressed in his
+113. And lastly, pressure groups, economic groups, etc., do not readily link
+themselves to extremists, although extremists help their work.
+
+The Place of History 732
+bearing - being derived from that which he attributes to the oppressed
+other and to all the others, as might happen, for example, the day after
+a mosque has been profaned by drunken soldiers, or after a brawl
+between soldiers and Muslims resulting in Muslim deaths. The employer114 was worried that day; the behaviour of his employees (or
+employee) appeared to him as a sign; and his anxiety was soon to turn
+into violence: and this transition from anxiety to the will to repress is
+itself an act of alterity. But it is on the basis of these reactions, each of
+which bases its violence on that of the other, that insurrectional or
+punitive groups can constitute themselves within the series itself. In
+effect, everyone's serial reaction consists in confusing community and
+series, and interpreting the behaviour of the enemy as the praxis of a
+group, of which this particular antagonist is a common individual. This
+supposition induces the group into each series as a negative unity, that
+is to say, as the sole means of struggling against the groups which are
+hidden in the Other. Of course, historical conditions as a whole will
+determine the liquidation of seriality here or there; what is certain is
+that the liquidation, wherever it takes place, immediately occasions a
+liquidation of the same order in the adversary. Thus pressure-groups,
+violent groups, and institutional groups, in their relation of reciprocity
+and reciprocal mediation, provide an exact index of the reciprocal
+determination, beyond the process, of colonialists and colonised, that
+is to say, an index of violence.
+But as tension increases, the unity of these heterogeneous groups
+tightens until it becomes a real unity of action. In this moment, this
+synchronic, pluri-dimensional praxis really becomes the praxis of the
+114. The employer may curse or beat his workers, for example. He does this
+because that is what one does; he is the Other, the fleeting, unrealisable character
+called the colonialist. The employee allows himself to be beaten, also in so far as
+he is an Other. If he were insulted or struck by a Muslim, he would react as a
+particular individual (or as a member of a particular family). But he feels the
+blows of the colonialist in so far as other men of his religion are, also, at that very
+minute, being beaten, like him; in so far as these provocations are addressed
+through his person to the native, a character who is as little realisable as the
+colonialist himself. Thus, through the two individuals, the Other relates to the
+Other; and both are alienated to serial unities which cannot even be realised here
+and which, dislocating and generalising, remove the event from itself and constitute it as the formula of the recurrence and as an archetype which exists elsewhere. But conversely, if the serial action of the colonialists is beating their
+servants and if a particular colonialist does not strike his, the serial and inert
+truth of his relationship to him is to strike him, and to be the Other who strikes.
+
+732 Book /I
+colonialist group. It adopts two serial determinations and takes them
+into itself in order to dissolve them: (1) Its deliberate violence cannot
+descend lower than that which the super-exploiters manifest every day
+in their relations to the exploited, and which constitutes what one might
+call a bond of inert interiority between the two serialities. Serial
+violence dissolves, like seriality, into minimal violence as a primary
+determination of praxis. (2) The group adopts, as its own project, the
+violence of the series in this precise moment of the history of the
+colony, turning it into its cohesion and the orientation of its praxis (in
+becoming the serial madness of a lynching, panic will be contained in
+the Others by army forces and will become, in the military group, in
+institutional forms (sanctions to be taken, etc.), the upper limit of its
+repressive activity ).
+Thus, the seriality of the colonialists is not dissolved elsewhere:
+everyone remains the Other, imprisoned in his impotent anger -
+whereas the groups as a whole (from the army and constituted bodies
+to the groups of violence) maintain the serial inertia of the Others (who
+are the passive individuals who have to be defended and whose def ence
+requires them to be confined in their passivity). But the practical unity
+of the constitutive bodies and organisations, in its temporalisation,
+thereby becomes the colony itself, as oppression and repressive violence.
+The apparatus transforms the violence of flight and panic into a
+synthetic, sovereign project for re-establishing order by violence; in
+the repressive violence of the apparatus, the Other recognises his own
+as Other, he discovers the blind lynching to be the serial signification
+of the summary execution. He remains external to the armed force
+which defends him; but in the dimension of the Other, that force
+becomes the unity of everyone and of the Others, as an other synthesis
+(other mode of Being); it becomes the activity of all the Others as the
+other side of their passivity. Thus inert violence, as frequentative and
+as the dated connection between colonialists and colonised, is recognised
+as sovereignty inside repressive practice; and the latter, legitimated by
+the need to defend the Others, gives violence-process its first statute of
+operation. But, to conclude, if violence becomes a praxis of oppression
+his is because it always was one. The first groupings of natives tha
+occasioned repressive practices themselves appeared against the background of their daily deteriorating situation; and this deterioration
+could occur only as long as their molecular non-being was forcibly held
+in the framework of a political and economic status quo while demographic pressure constantly lowered their standard of living. The
+
+The Place of History 733
+impossible, as the negative reality of their condition, was a product: it
+was molecular exile at the boundary of life and death. The only possible
+way out was to confront total negation with total negation, violence
+with equal violence; to negate dispersal and atomisation by an initially
+negative unity whose content would be defined in struggle: the Algerian
+nation. Thus the Algerian rebellion, through being desperate violence,
+was simply an adoption of the despair in which the colonialists maintained the natives; its violence was simply a negation of the impossible,
+and the impossibility of life was the immediate result of oppression.
+Algerians had to live, because colonialists needed a sub-proletariat, but
+they had to live at the frontier of the impossibility of life because wages
+had to be as close as possible to zero. The violence of the rebel was the
+violence of the colonialist; there was never any other. The struggle
+between the oppressed and oppressors ultimately became the reciprocal
+interiorisation of a single oppression: the prime object of oppression,
+interiorising it and finding it to be the negative source of its unity,
+appalled the oppressor, who recognised, in violent rebellion, his own
+oppressive violence as a hostile force taking him in turn as its object.
+And against his own violence as Other, he created a counter-violence
+which was simply his own oppression become repressive, that is to say,
+reactualised and trying to transcend the violence of the Other, in other
+words his own violence in the Other. We have thus shown, in the
+simple example of colonisation, that the relationship between oppressors and oppressed was, from beginning to end, a struggle, and that it
+was this struggle, as a double reciprocal praxis, which ensured - at
+least until the insurrectional phase - the rigid development of the
+process of exploitation.
+It will no doubt be objected that I have chosen the most favourable
+example: where exploitation is super-exploitation and where it is
+necessarily accompanied by conquest and oppression. The very fact of
+conquest presupposes military struggle. No doubt it will be said that
+what I have found at the end of my search is what I carefully put there
+at the outset. But in reality, - discussed the practice and system of
+colonialism because I wanted to show, by reference to a simple example
+he possible importance of substituting History for economic an
+sociological interpretations, or generally for all determinisms. For the
+hirst time in this investigation, I wanted to give an outline of an initial
+description of the formal structures of the concrete. Lastly, I wanted to
+show that we should no longer cheat with such precise and true words
+as praxis and struggle. Either we have endless equivocation, and praxis
+
+734 Book II
+signifies almost the same as 'process' and struggle as 'contrary double
+alienation of two serialities in the practico-inert'; in which case everything is definitively obscured: action and History lose their sense and
+words no longer have any meaning. Or else we allow words their
+meanings, defining praxis as an organising project which transcends
+material conditions towards an end and inscribes itself, through labour,
+in inorganic matter as a rearrangement of the practical field and a reunification of means in the light of the end. Then the idea of struggle
+between classes must be given its fullest meaning; in other words, even
+in the case of economic development within one country, even though
+the gradual constitution of the proletariat is taking place among the
+poorest sections of the peasant class, and even though the worker
+'freely' sells his labour power, exploitation must be inseparable from
+oppression, just as the seriality of the bourgeois class is inseparable
+from the practical apparatuses which it adopts for itself. Economism is
+false because it makes exploitation into no more than a particular
+result, whereas this result could not be maintained, and the process of
+capital could not develop, if they were not sustained by the project of
+exploitation. And I certainly mean that it is capital which is expressed
+through the mouths of capitalists and which produces them as projects
+of unconditional exploitation. But on the other hand it is capitalists who
+sustain and produce capital and who develop industry and the credit
+system through their project of exploiting in order to realise a profit.
+This is the circularity which we have encountered everywhere. We
+shall meet with it again. But we must recall its movement in order to
+understand the bond between process and praxis. We shall shortly be
+inquiring what type of intelligibility this bicephalous being called
+struggle can have, especially when it involves not individual combat,
+but practical contradiction splitting every nation and the world. But,
+above all, we must return to this notion of 'class struggle': if it is a
+practico-inert structure (a passive contradictory reciprocity of conditioning), or if it is exis, the human order is strictly comparable to the
+molecular order, and the only historical Reason is positivist Reason,
+which posits the unintelligibility of History as a definite fact. But, on
+the other hand, if it is praxis through and through, the entire human
+universe vanishes into a Hegelian idealism. In order to getout of the
+difficulty, let us attempt to employ all the discoveries which our investigation has given us, at every level of formal complexity.
+
+8
+Class Struggle and Dialectical
+Reason
+• Scarcity, Violence and Bourgeois Humanism
+The 'discovery' we have made in the course of our dialectical investigation (but is it really even a discovery? is it not the immediate comprehension of every praxis, individual and common, by any agent
+whether internal to the praxis or transcendent?) has revealed, at different levels, the double character of human relations: apart from the
+determinations of sociality, as simple relations between real but abstract individuals, they are immediately reciprocal. And this reciprocity
+- mediated by the third party, and then by the group - must be the
+basic structure of the community. But, on the other hand, reciprocity
+is neither contemplative nor affective. Or rather, affectivity and contemplation are the practical characteristics of particular actions in
+particular circumstances. Reciprocity is a praxis with a double (or
+multiple) epicentre. It can be either positive or negative. It is clear that
+its algebraic sign is determined by previous circumstances and by the
+material conditions which determine the practical field. And it is clear
+that the conditionings of antagonistic reciprocity are, as a whole, and
+in the abstract, based on the relation of the multiplicity of men to the
+field of action, that is, on scarcity. We have also seen that scarcity, as a
+mortal danger, produces everyone in a multiplicity as a mortal danger
+for the Other. The contingency of scarcity (that is to say, the fact that
+relations of immediate abundance between other practical organisms
+and other milieux are not inconceivable a priori) is reintericrised in the
+contingency of human reality. A man is a practical organism living with
+a multiplicity of similar organisms in a field of scarcity. But this
+scarcity, as a negative force, defines, in commutativity, every man and
+partial multiplicity as realities which are both human and inhuman: for
+instance, in so far as anyone may consume a product of primary
+
+736 Book II
+necessity for me (and for all the Others), he is dispensable: he threatens
+my life to precisely the extent that he is my own kind; he becomes inhuman, therefore, as human, and my species appears to me as an alien
+species.
+But, in reciprocity and commutativity, I discover the possibility, in
+the field of my own possibilities, of myself being objectively produced
+by the Others as a dispensable object or as the inhumanity of the
+human. We have already remarked that the primary determination of
+morality is Manichaeism: the intelligible and threatening praxis of the
+Other is what must be destroyed in him. But this praxis, as a dialectical
+organisation of means with a view to satisfying need, manifests itself
+as the free development of action in the Other. And it is clear that it is
+this freedom, as my freedom in the Other, which has to be destroyed
+if we are to escape the danger of death, which is the original relation
+between men through the mediation of matter. In other words, the
+interiorisation of scarcity as a mortal relation between men is itself
+performed by a free, dialectical transcendence of material conditions
+and, in this very transcendence, freedom manifests itself as a practical
+organisation of the field and as perceiving itself in the Other as otherfreedom, or as an anti-praxis and anti-value which has to be destroyed
+At the most elementary level of the 'struggle for life'
+', there is not blind
+instincts conflicting through men, but complex structures, transcendences of material conditions by a praxis which founds a morality
+and which seeks the destruction of the Other not as a simple object
+which is dangerous, but as a freedom which is recognised and condemned to its very root.
+It is precisely this that we have called violence, for the only conceivable violence is that of freedom against freedom through the
+mediation of inorganic matter. We have seen, in fact, that it can take
+on two aspects: free praxis may directly destroy the freedom of the
+Other, or place it in parentheses (mystification, stratagem) through the
+material instrument, or else it may act against necessity (the necessity
+of alienation), that is to say against freedom as the possibility of becoming Other (of relapsing into seriality), and this is Fraternity-Terror.
+Thus violence is always both a reciprocal recognition of freedom and a
+negation (either reciprocal or univocal) of this freedom through the
+intermediary, of the inertia of exteriority. Man is violent - throughout
+History right up to the present day (until the elimination of scarcity,
+should this ever occur, and occur in particular circumstances) - to the
+anti-human (that is to say, to any other man) and to his Brother in so
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 737
+far as he has the permanent possibility of becoming anti-human himself. This violence, contrary to what is always claimed, envelops a
+practical self-knowledge because it is determined by its object, that is
+to say, as the freedom to annihilate freedom. It is called terror when it
+defines the bond of fraternity itself; it bears the name of oppression
+when it is used against one or more individuals, imposing an untranscendable statute on them as a function of scarcity. This statute is
+always"15 abstractly constituted by the same practical determinations;
+given a scarcity of food and of labour certain groups will decide to
+constitute, with other individuals or groups, a community defined both
+by the obligation to do surplus labour and by the need to reduce
+themselves to controlled under-consumption. Now, this oppression
+constitutes itself as a praxis which is conscious of itself and of its
+object: whether or not it passes over the fact in silence, it will define
+the multiplicity of dispensable workers not despite their reality as free
+practical organisms, but because of it. The slave, the craftsman, the
+skilled worker, and the specialised worker are of course produced by
+the mode of production. But they are produced precisely as that more
+or less considerable area of free control, free direction or free supervision which must fill the gap between instrumental-being and man.
+It is certainly possible for a man to replace an animal in work which an
+animal could do (the gold carriers in the sixteenth century on the routes
+which crossed the isthmus of Panama). But this new distribution of
+tasks is constrained, self-conscious, and a deliberate choice based on
+scarcity. It is decided by the organisers and by those in charge that he
+who used to work as a man should freely make himself inferior to
+man. For constraint does not eliminate freedom (except by liquidating
+the oppressed); it makes freedom its accomplice while allowing it no
+option but obedience.
+These considerations are not intended to make oppression into the
+direct, historical origin of class division and exploitation. Far from it.
+On the contrary, ve recognise - because it is obvious - that the
+practico-inert field of exploitation constitutes itself, through counterfinalities and through the mediation of worked matter, as a passive
+synthesis of serial relations. Whether we are dealing with slavery as an
+institution or with the consequences of the division of labour, it is impossible to treat the material, technical, demographic, etc., development
+IIS. At least, as Engels would say, in historical societies. [Engels's note to
+the opening sentence of the Communist Manifesto. (Ed.)]
+
+738 Book II
+of a given society as the objectification of the free praxis of an
+individual or group. It is undoubtedly true that - as Engels says -
+slaves appear at the moment when the development of the techniques
+of agriculture makes them possible and necessary, that is to say, that an
+institution is a response to the practico-inert exigency of an already
+constituted field of passive activity. Nor can there be any doubt,
+though Engels is very simplistic on this point, that exploitation, in its
+many historical forms, is basically a process which corresponds to a
+differentiation of functions, that is to say, ultimately, to the development of the mode of production. When the iron and coal complex'
+began, the use of coal as a fuel determined the transformation of the
+system of mineral extraction from outside and as an other-exigency
+(that is to say, as an independent variable). 116 It was this demand for
+coal, as a serial process (propagated by a lateral competitive antagonism,
+and therefore by alterity rather than by common decision) which,
+within half a century, produced the mine-owners as major capitalists,
+owning a key-industry; this is what forced them - as we have seen - to
+introduce steam pumps to replace beasts of burden and men. Scientific
+discoveries, technical innovations immediately put to use, customers as
+seriality: no more was necessary for the mine to emerge as a fabulous
+inheritance, owned by one man; for the first machines to appear there,
+overthrowing techniques and imposing a set of exigencies and constraints on both capitalists and workers; for the need for labour to
+multiply the manual workers and for the contradiction which is at the
+root of capital to constitute itself in seriality. On the one hand there is
+the employer, the owner of the mine and the machines, whose interest
+is constantly to reduce costs, expand output and increase profits; on
+the other hand, there is the uprooted peasant, with no rights over the
+product of his labour and who receives in wages the minimum necessary for his subsistence. And to precisely the extent that the personnel
+at the mine are serialised by competitive antagonisms induced by
+material conditions as a whole, the employer is thrown into an equally
+serial competition, since his new power suddenly reveals other competitors to him, hundreds or thousands of miles away, whose power is
+as recent as his and who have suddenly been brought close to him by
+technical and economic changes.
+IIG. In fact, circularity reconditions the variable and the system has a "feedback' device. But at first, and for the mine-owners, it is demand which is the
+variable: it is demand which increases enormously and forces the mining industries to change.
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 739
+So there can be no doubt as to the practico-inert character of the
+process of exploitation. But this is not what concerns us at the moment.
+What concerns us is that this process established itself against a background of scarcity (scarcity of coal for customers, over-rapid exhaustion
+of coal seams forcing suppliers to sink new shafts, scarcity of time
+necessitating use of steam pumps) and by men (that is to say, by
+practical organisms who have interiorised and readopted scarcity in
+the form of Manichaean violence). The transformation of the mine
+owner comes to him from outside, but he has to interiorise it and realise
+it practically by transforming his mine and the techniques of extraction,
+which implies a reorganisation of the labour-force. Now this praxis is
+precisely that of a being of violence, which means that his tree response
+to the exigencies of the situation can be realised only in the form of
+oppression. When I speak of his free-praxis, I do not mean that he has
+a concrete possibility of refusing to make the necessary transformations: I simply mean that the necessary transformations will objectify
+themselves in the mine through a calculated adaptation of means to the
+end, and a set of dialectically organised actions, with the mine, the
+competitors, the exigencies of the market, etc., as their practical field.
+When I emphasise scarcity, at the very moment where our man is
+transformed into a fabulously rich heir, I do not mean that he is still
+at the stage at which famine and death threaten every individual.
+Scarcity here is expressed in terms of temporalisation as urgency;
+dispersal, poverty of means, and the resistance of matter constitute
+impediments which threaten to slow down a production which the
+exigencies of demand require to be considerably accelerated. For the
+heir, scarcity is the possibility of not coming into his inheritance unless
+he reorganises his field of action as soon as possible. In this way any
+antagonistic activity by an Other (from 'force of inertia' to active
+resistance), in threatening to increase these impediments, appears as the
+praxis of an anti-human. Indeed, it would be true to say that the classbeing of the worker (the pauper and future proletarian, who is as yet
+still wandering the roads or being fed by the village community) was
+already produced by the mine, just as that of the colonised native was
+produced by the colonial system. It is also true that, just as racism is a
+passive constitution in things before being an ideology, a certain idea
+of the working class is produced by technical changes. And this idea
+is simply class-being, in so far as it will be known and transcended by
+the owner, and known, adopted and negated by the working class.
+But, to be exact, this class-being could not be accepted and realised by
+
+740 Book II
+the praxis of the industrialist unless the worker represented another
+species, an anti-human. It is absurd to attempt to settle the question
+by referring to egoism or by declaring that the employer 'pursues selfinterest' blindly. For his interest - as being-outside-himself-in-thefactory - is constituted in and by the developing transformations; it is
+only for later generations that it will pre-exist whoever inherits the
+mine or factory as the very determination of his bourgeois-being. As
+for egoism, the word is devoid of meaning. First, it would have some
+semblance of significance only on the hypothesis of absolute social
+atomism (a creation of analytical Reason at the time of Condillac).
+And in any case, it cannot explain anything here, for it is not true that
+the employer was unconcerned about his workers and their situation;
+on the contrary, he concerned himself with them constantly, in that he
+incessantly took precautions against theft, sabotage, strikes and other
+'social troubles'.
+It should in fact be noted that the practice of the wage-contract
+"freely agreed' by both parties and characteristic of the industrial era
+posits the freedom of the worker as an absolute principle. Contractual
+reciprocity goes further because - at least formally - each freedom is
+guaranteed by that of the Other, and this presupposes that the employer
+would find in the worker a freedom equal to his own, or in other words,
+recognise him as a member of the human race. At first sight, this seems
+very different from racism in that colonial super-exploitation is based
+upon the 'sub-humanity' of the natives. In the case of racism, the
+contradiction derives from the fact that the colonialist finds himself
+forced to use the 'sub-human' whom he oppresses as such for properly
+human activities. The contradiction of early capitalism, however, is
+that the employer, under cover of a proclaimed reciprocity, treats the
+worker as an enemy: the free contract, at this period, concealed what
+was really forced labour. Labour was recruited by constraint, iron
+discipline was imposed on it, and employers protected themselves by
+perpetual blackmail and, frequently, by repression.
+The contradiction therefore is both to recognise that the worker is
+free and to introduce him by compulsion into a system in which it is
+also recognised that he will be reduced to a sub-human level. At the
+same time, the viciousness of preventive or repressive measures shows
+that the worker is condemned in advance for any possible tendency to
+revolt, while at the same time his protestations are apparently seen as
+legitimate. This takes us a long way from egoism and from the 'hardness' for which it is customary to reproach the capitalists of the "palaeo-
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 742
+technical' period, as if their barbarity had been buried with them. It is
+not a question of a character trait, but of a class-hatred which, for
+English employers, preceded the true development of the working
+class. Either they had to see this freedom, which they wished to use
+(and mystify) in the moment of the wage contract, in order to bind
+it later and crush it under constraints, as the freedom-for-evil of the
+anti-human, or they had to discover the Evil and the Inhuman in their
+own praxis, on the basis of the hatred of the exploited for them. In
+other words, what they primarily hated in the men whom they constituted as sub-human was the freedom which would define them as
+anti-human; and this hatred was practical: it was aimed at suppressing
+the freedom of the Other by constituting it practically as bad freedom
+or as the freedom of impotence. But, on the other hand, they could not
+destroy it (by constant physical compulsion or extermination) and
+treat their men as beasts: the process of alienation requires that the
+worker should be regarded as free at the moment of the contract, in
+order to be reduced to a commodity later.
+Thus man freely becomes a commodity: he sells himself. And this
+freedom is absolutely necessary: not on the superficial plane of law or
+civil society, but at a deeper level, because this freedom governs output. A slave, always fed, and always as badly fed, did not make a close
+connection between his need and his work for his master. Of course,
+he worked in order to be fed, in order to avoid blows, but still the
+quantitative relation between his output and the satisfaction of his
+needs was indeterminate: he did just enough to avoid punishment or
+inanition. Freedom of labour, in contrast, is to be found after the
+contract, as its consequence, even in the human-commodity, to
+precisely the extent that his own free effort (free in relation to physical
+constraints, though closely conditioned by his needs and by the
+situation) can increase his output. Within a strictly defined quantitative
+system, his wage will depend in effect on the increase of his production. 11? Thus the freedom of the manual worker, in other words his
+freedom: for it might, in effect, constitute itself through the group as a
+violent negation of alienation. This possibility is given a priori - even
+117. And, in any case, the 'skill' of his work is what will enable him to triumph
+in the market of competitive antagonisms.
+
+742 Book II
+if the historical conditions for consciousness are not all fulfilled - by
+the formal dialectic itself, which, always and everywhere, produces the
+group as a constituted negation on the basis of constituent praxis and
+its alienation.
+At this level, and from the earliest phase of the industrial revolution,
+the proletariat is the enemy in so far as its resistances are produced
+within the employer's enterprise as a restriction on the sovereign
+freedom of the proprietor through the other freedom of the wageearner. The incredible ferocity of English proprietors, the poor laws
+and the free forced labour which resulted from them, express an
+anticipation of hatred. The wastage of human lives, so stupefying for
+us (even from a purely economic point of view), corresponded to the
+universal wastage of the 'iron and coal' period; it was a kind of limited
+extermination of a non-human species in so far as it did not create an
+immediate crisis of man-power. I am not referring only to the socalled iron laws' of classical economics, but also to really wasteful
+practices - some negative, like the systematic refusal to reburn toxic
+fumes, others positive, like the use of children (which had the visible
+result of destroying them in two or three years and, with them, future
+workers). To the extent that, as Sauvy rightly says, a society chooses
+its dead, the extraordinary indifference of nineteenth-century society
+for the mortality which it produced and maintained in its working
+populations cannot be attributed to anything but a will to exterminate.
+The aim was in fact to defeat resistance by fear of dismissal and unemployment; and for unemployment to be really threatening, it had,
+quite simply, to signify mortal danger (either for the worker or for
+his family).
+On the other hand, repressive practices within factories (in particular the rule against speaking to one's neighbour, on pain of dismissal, which was common in English factories) make it perfectly clear
+that the employer already regarded the worker as a rebel; that is to say,
+he was already aware of creating an intolerable situation by employing
+him. A colonialist lawyer said to me recently: We have committed too
+many unpardonable errors, too many acts of cruelty, and too many
+crimes ever to hope that the Arabs can be reconciled to us, and love us;
+there is only one solution: terror' This state of mind is just the same
+as that of the English employer at the end of the eighteenth century and
+the beginning of the nineteenth; except that the formation of the
+English proletariat was itself preventive terror. We have seen one sign
+of this attitude in the fact that mechanisation appeared to many as a
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 743
+means of intimidating the masses. Of course, this is not what it was
+initially or primarily; above all, it enabled costs to be reduced and
+production increased. But in the practico-inert result of mechanisation
+(the reduction of costs), employers immediately actualised the practical
+and human element: technological unemployment, in so far as it
+created a constantly available mass which made every worker aware of
+his replaceability, that is to say, of the impotence of his freedom.
+So we can see that the first phase of the process of industrialisation,
+in so far as it was realised by individual employers, by pressure groups
+or by the State, manitested itselt in England as a praxis of systematic
+oppression. It is completely wrong to interpret the cruelty of the
+English employers as indifference, blindness or contempt: it was in
+fact quite deliberate. And if we speak of indifference or blindness in
+circumstances such as these, we shall be reverting to the belief that
+exploitation is a pure process and that the exploiters, its products, are
+completely separate from its other products, the exploited, and separated by a mere inert privation. The mistake of some Marxist theorists
+is, in fact, that they describe the practico-inert process either as producing workers in relation to their condition as wage-earning producers
+and, thereby, in relation to the employers' class in its historical reality,
+or as producing capitalists through the evolution of capital itself and,
+thereby, in relation to the contemporary determinations of the working
+class, but that they never mention (except perhaps as an epiphenomenon)
+the real action of the first on the second or of the second on the first.
+But the determinations which come to the employers from the working
+class do not come to them through practico-inert reality alone; nor do
+the determinations which come to the workers from the employers.
+What is involved is not two parallel modes with opposite signs whose
+substance is unity and which can never communicate except through
+their unity: in fact, the practico-inert system realises itself as the system
+of the other through the employers' real actions on the workers and
+those of tunderkers on herompis origins and precisely his lever ceas
+we must understand how,
+of exploitation is a practice of alienated and serialised oppression.
+Capitalist society is characterised by the systematic non-organisation
+of production (even if trusts, combines or partial planning enter its
+rivelopment sciolapie isini vie suf positivist rabile individua
+capitals. But, at the practico-inert level, our investigation shows that,
+regardless of the individual action of various capitals, the general
+
+744
+Book I/
+movement behaves as a unity. In particular, the total product is not, for
+the capitalists as a whole, the sum of the products of society: for the
+class taken as a whole, it is essential that this product should have a
+particular form of use - that it should include both means of production
+for the renewal of the labour process and means of consumption (for
+capitalists and workers). This necessarily implies that simple reproduction is incompatible with capitalist production. The total product of
+capitalist society implies 'expanded' reproduction, that is to say, the
+accumulation or allocation of an increasing portion of surplus value to
+functions of production.
+All this is true: the lack of coherence between individual enterprises
+is only apparent; their coherence is fundamental in so far as they all
+contribute to the total product. But it must be noted here that this
+coherence is serial. From this point of view the capitalist process is a
+collective. How could it be otherwise, seeing that total production
+differs precisely in its common organisation from non-organised production? Surplus-value, accumulation, competitive markets, and the
+circulation of commodities are relations of alterity. The mediation in
+fact is money, which represents the faux frais of the private economy
+and which the latter produces as a regulator of its anarchy. But money
+is matter-mediation and is necessarily the Other. The circulation of
+money is a reinforcement of seriality. I have made these points before,
+but it is necessary to return to them in order to recall that the process
+of capital, taken as a social ensemble, is not a whole, but a flight and that
+a totalising language can only mislead us here. The unity of the process
+always lies precisely in the other; and accumulation, in so far as it is
+aimed at increasing fixed capital at the expense of variable capital, has
+no aim other than lowering costs and increasing production in a competitive field which is entirely polarised by the other. Thus accumulation, at the level of the social ensemble rather than of the individual
+capitalist, is a profound alterity in its being, in so far as it is an infinite
+unity of seriality: it is a false totalisation, by a passage to infinity, of a
+triple alterity (manufacturers, consumers, producers). But precisely for
+this reason, this recurrent unity brings us back to the individual
+capitalist in that it regulates his praxis (alienation, alteration) and in
+that this praxis alone sustains the rule and the product. The other-action
+of the manufacturer comes to him as other in so far as everything in it
+is defined by the others: importing a machine because the Other (the
+competitor) has done so, or has not yet done so, or because the Other
+js a buyer (the customer as seriality), in a moment where events are
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 745
+inscribed in the conjuncture as other (expansion, recession, etc.), is
+precisely, for the individual manufacturer, to accumulate.
+But, to precisely the extent that this action eludes him wich its
+significations of alterity, it remains his free organised choice: in fact it
+implies consultations with experts and technicians, the formulation of
+a production schedule, discussions with subordinates, decisions, etc.
+It is, therefore, a direct action with marginal alienation: its serial meaning will be revealed to him later, through the development of an
+economy which is united in alterity, whether in the form of increased
+exigencies (accumulation requires its own increase) or, in a crisis, in
+the form of destiny. But in itself the operation presupposes speculation
+on the other by practical thought as other; and this thought itself - as
+an objective relational system of alterity - is used (like a calculating
+machine) by a direct, synthetic praxis which manipulates it (as we have
+seen at various levels of our investigation). At this moment, Other-
+Thought (la Pensée-Autre) is merely a means which is transcended
+towards a direct result: profit, as a direct result, is still conditioned by
+the Other; and this very praxis, despite its reflexive knowledge of the
+rules of alterity, will become alienated to the serialised process. The
+process is the lateral, material being which is produced in passivity from
+each individual praxis. And this individual praxis is in fact directly
+exercised by the employer over his workers. In choosing to import a
+machine or to buy one in his own country, the industrialist contributes,
+as an Other, to increasing the portion of social capital invested in
+means of production compared to the portion invested by society in
+wages. But directly, and in so far as he is the individual proprietor of a
+particular factory or plant, his action causes redundancy and consequent unemployment for a number of workers, possible deskilling and
+a reduction in wages for those who remain. The term 'cause' is itself
+improper, since this is not an unexpected result of his action, in some
+way external to his objective: in fact, it is the objective itself. To reduce
+costs is to cut the number of one's workers. In other words, it is
+directly with future unemployment that he purchases his machines; not,
+as is sometimes said, 'without caring what happens to them', but, on
+the contrary, caring explicitly, in so far as every employer in this
+period wished to create a reserve proletariat by increasing the number
+of unemployed.
+From a legal point of view, this action is irreproachable: in a society
+based on private property, the employer has the right not to renew the
+work contract (as, indeed, does the worker). At this time (the first half
+
+746 Book Il
+of the nineteenth century), the employers were so careful about
+legality that they even made daily contracts. But, at a deeper level,
+beneath liberal atomism, the manufacturer, by sovereignly withdrawing
+their real possibility and social power (power to purchase as a right
+which depended on fulfilling a function) from other free social organisms, perpetrated oppressive violence against them. Violence was
+constitutive of his act in so far as it was not only its means, but also its
+(partial) objective result and one of its immediate ends: the distress of
+those who were dismissed directly intimidating those who remained.
+Thus at the level of society (that is to say, of one or more nations, or of
+the whole world, depending on the moment under consideration),
+every action of the individual capitalist enters into the constitution of
+the social process, not as a free reciprocal contribution, but, on the
+contrary, in its transitivity, that is to say, in so far as, determined by
+others elsewhere, its sociality lies in the determinations which it brings
+to others elsewhere and in so far as this transitivity necessarily plunges
+it into anonymity - that is to say, into alterity - and prevents it from
+finding rest or consistency except in the process as the transfinite
+reality of recurrence, as this reality is revealed to praxis in a passage to
+a limit (the final operation of recurrent action). This transfinite reality
+is not accessible only to the historian, since, in a way, it is the foundation of all calculations of alterity (the point at infinity where all series
+meet): so in a way, and in so far as every praxis requires some rationalisation (the historical rationalisation which defines contemporary praxis
+and is defined in it), there is a univocal relation of polarisation between
+the individual capitalist and social capital, between individual practice
+and the overall process, and this relation is produced in and by action
+itself. Furthermore, accumulation as an aspect of an individual enterprise would be senseless and would in any case be a risk taken in
+ignorance (how could one tell whether social production of means of
+production and consumption would allow this accumulation to be
+maintained, and therefore to increase?), unless accumulation imposed
+itself on every manufacturer and on all as the essential characteristic
+of capital. Not only because this local increase of production requires
+overall expansion, but also because it necessarily contributes to it.
+When Marx says that capital speaks through the mouth of the
+capitalist, he must be taken as meaning that the practical economics of
+capitalism constitutes itself as seriality and expresses itself as a particular
+serial system of polarised relations in a transfinite unity. But although
+producers come into the calculation in the form of commodities and
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 74]
+therefore as pure quantities, capitalist thought - as the practical
+calculation of the manufacturer - like capitalist praxis (which involves
+practical calculation as its own knowledge), cannot exist except as
+the constant alienation, constantly lived and instrumentalised, of a
+constitutent praxis. Alienation is there at the beginning (in this capitalist
+world, it is always given for all as already there, with its exigencies and
+its characteristics - with the inherited mine whose value increases while
+its wealth begins to decline and the cost of extraction increases) and at
+the end; it is present as an individual operation in every moment and
+finally becomes the very calculation which makes it possible to estimate and predict results at the level of the Other. But, at the same time,
+direct free action unfolds in freedom. And free action is simply the
+practical organism who can and must be alienated in the collective
+through his objectification. Now, one man or a small group of men
+(family capitalism) can act on men in full self-consciousness through
+the mediation of worked matter; their action sovereignly selects this
+worked matter to deliver it from the freedom of the others (positively,
+because this freedom - which allows output to increase - is, also, what
+makes the human commodity more expensive than the machine; and
+negatively, because the possibility of replacing increasing numbers of
+workers by machines is equivalent to perpetual repression).
+This is the dual practical character of the individual action of
+capitalists: the production of free workers in the form of human
+commodities in rigid, reciprocal conditioning, with a systematic
+preference for the machine over human labour, wherever the latter can
+be replaced by the former. Now, this dual character of the operation as
+living praxis is precisely what defines oppression: the power given to
+worked matter of (double) compulsion over free individuals in so far
+as they have been recognised (the free contract) in their freedom remains fundamentally unchanged, whether this worked matter is a
+machine (or the money to buy one) or a gun. And this oppression can
+be realised only in the form of permanent violence, that is to say, in so
+far as it is practised against an anti-human species whose freedom is
+essentially the freedom to do evil. In the milieu of class seriality and as
+the transitive relation of the Other to the Other, this free, direct
+oppression gives itself its practico-inert being as exploitation, that is to
+say, as a process. In fact, in the milieu of the Other, that is to say, in the
+pseudo-totality of competitive flight, oppression turns into an inability not to oppress or, as it were, experiences its necessity: it is no
+longer I who oppress, but the Other; it is always the Other, in fact,
+
+748 Book II
+who makes use of machines or who is capable of using them. Finally,
+to grasp and produce this practical experience on the basis of the
+collective as transfinite, oppression is subordinated to exploitation as
+the infinite necessity of alterity, that is to say, as men being controlled
+by things (by laws of exteriority).
+Serial flight, seen as necessity, becomes 'the ruthless play of economic laws'. This 'ruthlessness' is mentioned by all sorts of writers and
+in all sorts of statements in the nineteenth century: it is a fundamental
+structure of liberal ideology. But it is not things which are ruthless,
+it is men. Thus alienation transfers the principal feature of oppression -
+which must be ruthless in order to exist - into the process itself and
+thereby betrays its human origin: it is only through the practico-inert
+(multiple actions deriving inertia from material, inorganic, mediation)
+that a necessity can be affected by the practical quality of ruthlessness.
+This is what misled Engels in his hasty replies to Dühring: the bourgeois, in effect, acts on two levels: he is ferocious to those who frighten
+him and whom he wishes to subjugate and, at the same time as realising
+and living this ferocity in the translucidity of his action, he lives it as
+necessity. He becomes the ferocity of the Other, that is to say, the
+indifference of natural law to human suffering. But, at the same time,
+he preserves this ferocity as Other and in seriality itself because, in the
+name of liberalism, his theorists offer him a political and social doctrine
+based on optimism. Liberalism, in fact, posits two contradictory
+principles. The first, based on the exteriority of 'economic laws', says
+that it is they, in their ruthless rigidity, which are responsible for any
+particular disaster (some people even went so far as to treat working
+class mortality rates and their increase in periods of recession in this
+light). The second, aligning itself with the point of view of social
+capital and its social product, aimed to treat society as a totality in
+which the 'natural laws' of the economy performed a regulatory function by means of a sort of constant readjustment of exchange, through
+the ruin or poverty of particular individuals or groups. This second
+principle expresses the correspondence which each capitalist requires
+between his own product and the social product which integrates and
+conditions it. Now this correspondence (as an abstract statute concealing insurmountable contradictions'18) cannot be realised except
+1I8. The correspondence exists at the level of production: each capitalist
+expects to find on the market the raw materials and machines which he needs to
+increase his production. And in fact he finds them - normally, at least - not
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 749
+through accumulation. Each capitalist requires accumulation as Other
+(that is to say, as a collective, at the same time as resisting it in his
+competitors). He considers it good because it is social enrichment, but
+at the same time he requires that the enrichment should be limited to
+the privileged classes. And, from the pseudo-totalitarian point of view
+of this enrichment, he dismisses, as negligible, the cost of crises and
+"readjustments' in human lives.
+Thus, in the bastard ideology (half analytic, and half falsely synthetic) which crowns the system (and which is simply the system
+thinking itself according to its own determinations and specific limitations), synthetic features are attributed to the analytic exteriority of
+legal relations: ruthless (exteriority adopted by individuals) and good
+(as structures of a false totality, their functions are to regulate, and they
+have the powers of an administration), these legal relations, which are
+really oppression turned into a process of exploitation by serial flight,
+bear the mark of the individual actions which they alienate and dissolve, as a pseudo-interiority of exteriority. And this duality is sufficient indication of the employers' profound acceptance of what would
+then be called the iron laws'. This acceptance was not in fact an act in
+itself, but it was the alienation of the reflexive and ethical commitment
+of each employer to his individual practices of oppression. In other
+words, oppression as a practical relation of the proprietor to his workers
+laterally preserved exploitation as a process and based itself on it; but
+it will never be able to dissolve the indelible marks of oppressive praxis
+and of the conscious consent of the employers to their own violence in
+its practico-inert necessity. As praxis absorbed into a process, the
+capitalism of accumulation can always be grasped here as oppression
+and its real foundation is always elsewhere as exploitation.
+Of course, oppression itself, as pure violence (and apart from its
+economic objective), becomes serialised: the thought of the worker-asthe-Other becomes of itself an other thought. Commonplaces circulate
+bout the worker as they do about the native. Or rather, they do no
+irculate. But, as we have shown, everyone becomes Other by r
+affirming them: and on this basis the government, in so far as it carries
+out a class politics, exploits their value for re-initiation and perpetual
+through some pre-established harmony, but through the practico-inert process of
+accumulation. But the first non-correspondence appears at the level of consumption. But we need not go into the details here.
+
+750 Book II
+re-cognition (of the Other by the Other as Other both in me and in the
+Other) as elements of other-direction. Now, it has to be recognised
+that, subject to the reservations outlined above, the State is the permanent apparatus of the bourgeois class - and that pressure-groups
+constantly form and dissolve in class seriality. And the constant reason
+for the existence of such groups is in effect the practico-inert evolution
+of capitalism with its counter-finalities: thus, in France at about the
+middle of the last century, a set of objective factors negatively adumbrated, in the object, the form of association known as a limited
+company' (société anonyme); and within seriality itself, the emergence
+of these companies, which threatened individual capitalism and 'family
+capitalism', gave rise to new groups, designed to maintain the power of
+the families. These might be called matrimonial associations: a whole
+exogamous system was formed, intended to create economic alliances
+(which in reality left everyone free) based on alliances between families.
+Sometimes these alliances served the general movement of horizontal
+concentration, while sometimes they were early adumbrations of what
+would later be called vertical concentration, of which the limited
+companies at the time did not have even an abstract idea. Thus these
+two types of groupings, both advanced and backward in relation to one
+another, developed in simultaneous struggle and interdependence.
+And this evolution, by clarifying divergences of interest within the
+dominant class, was to occasion a transcendence of the antagonisms
+between individual and homogeneous interests (competition), towards
+organised groupings whose interests (as the common interests of each
+organisation) are opposed in their heterogeneity (one sector of production requires protectionism, another Free Trade, etc.).
+Thus the internal contradictions of the class are never lived in
+seriality: when they emerge, it is in and through the praxis of groups
+(unions of individuals or sub-groups under threat). And if this praxis
+is not purely economic and technical, it takes the form either of pressure
+on the State or of pressure on series (that is to say, on one class, or on
+several classes, or on all). Of course, this also means the opposite:
+pressure on the State tends to occasion State pressure on the series;
+and pressure on series may tend to occasion pressure on the State by
+series. Thus the bourgeois class (in alliance with other classes, and
+therefore only partially, if it is taken in isolation from them) is the
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 75z
+tions which produce organised groups defending the interests of a
+particular milieu. It goes without saying that these groups themselves
+are, from a formal point of view, in an indeterminate relation: it may
+be that, on the basis of particular circumstances, various agreements,
+defeats, etc., will constitute a hierarchy; but it is also possible that their
+relations will remain antagonistic and (through these negative reciprocities) serial. Groups emerge from the series and a seriality of groups
+may be constituted in its turn, etc. But this is not what interests us here.
+For us, the essential thing is that these economic groups cannot determine their reciprocal action except other things being equal, that is to
+say, here, without having one fundamental object at the heart of their
+antagonism: keeping the proletariat in its statute of impotence. It is as
+if everyone's praxis had two components: one horizontal and opposed
+to the praxis of the adverse group; and the other vertical, an oppressive
+and repressive force against the proletariat. But this oppression by a
+group is never direct: it depends on mediation by the State, by public
+force or by the series themselves. So the series, which produced
+oppression as an activity of its individual members and alienated it to
+the collective process as exploitation, ultimately encounters it again,
+beyond exploitation, induced within it as other-direction. In so far as
+the groups (or the State, if they have control of it) determine the
+practice of oppression in everyone through the Other and as a means
+of being absorbed by the Other with all the Others (the bourgeois as
+Other), the practice returns to haunt the individual other (that is to say,
+the exploiter) as a legal ghost with a social function.
+In one way, in the milieu of individual praxis, exploitation becomes
+the mediation for everyone between oppression as a Manichaean
+sovereign practice, and other-oppression as an adumbration of a rightduty system which defines the other, everywhere, that is to say elsewhere, as a common individual. In reality, no individual is common
+except within a group. But common-being here is an objective illusion.
+It corresponds to a real determination, that is to say, to the solidarity in
+alterity which is produced in everyone by other-direction, and whose
+rule is oppression as the legitimate exercise of a function. At this level,
+every bourgeois considers his class both as an infinite decompression
+(molecularity) and as an always potential totality which, as an ever
+possible common future, produces him and the powers which define
+him. This potential totality is never actualised and the individual has
+an ambivalent attitude to it: if his class practice requires him to, he
+negates it in the name of positivist or serial Reason; but, if the resistance
+
+752 Book II
+of the workers seems more dangerous, he will regard the whole (the
+totalised class) as the only real possibility for the bourgeoisie, whose
+actualisation has always been negated, prevented by individuals, or by
+particular groups, antagonisms, mistakes, etc. Thus the power of
+oppression (that is to say, of repressing evil) and the common individuality which appears as a relation of interiority to all, remain merely
+potential determinations, indices of separation and impotence: 'Decent
+people are too stupid!' or "The bosses are too selfish, none of them sees
+anything but his own interest' - so say all decent people, that is to say,
+every employer as a common individual whose practical non-reality
+depends solely on the Others. But, at the same time, they signify for
+the organic individual his own individual praxis of oppression as a
+certain way of doing his whole duty despite the failings of Others and,
+thereby, of realising, in his own person and in opposition to the oppressed, his own class as a sovereign totality. At this level, we can trace
+the roots of bourgeois humanism, which is abstract violence and a rule
+of oppression, because it identifies the bourgeois with man in opposition to the other-species, that is to say, to the anti-human, the worker.
+Humanism is the counterpart of racism: it is a practice of exclusion.
+But, at the same time - like racism - it is a product of other-direction,
+of seriality. Unable to extricate his oppressive power from a real
+totality which appears to define him as the typical social sovereign (like
+the noble or the priest in systems of aristocratic or theocratic oppression), the bourgeois serialises and replaces the absent totality by the
+fleeting, abstract unity of a concept. In effect this immediately leads to
+two contradictions:
+(I) Individuals falling under the same concept stay, as such, side by
+side in an identity of indifference, whatever relations may subsequently
+be established between them. But we have seen that Other-Being and
+mere contiguity are two different statutes of co-existence. In fact, in a
+humanity which was a true totality, men would be men through each
+Other; which means that the concept of man would disappear. Anc
+nside the class, the bourgeois is bourgeois in so far as he is Other an
+flees to the Others; and so humanity is simply this infinite flight
+circular recurrence). A humanist bourgeois in the nineteenth centul
+ccepted his humanity as a practico-inert bond with the series ar
+chained o embrace i ate sence. Bly in face, it y use him in
+But this inertia itself had violence inscribed in it, as the violence of a
+hurricane or a cataclysm. Bourgeois humanism as a concept crumbles
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 753
+and disappears; as a practical inertia, it is a passive activity of exclusion
+and rejection.
+(2) It would be inaccurate to say that bourgeois humanism excludes
+the worker a priori: capitalist society, precisely because it is based on
+free contract, retains a relative homogeneity through class struggle and
+by means of it. On the one hand, the structure of the system, the single
+market, the circulation of commodities, money as a universally accepted
+system of signs; and on the other hand, the necessary equality of
+employer and employee in the abstract moment of the wage contract,
+in short, the set of conditions necessary for production - from the
+point of view of accumulation - all require a moment of equivalence
+and solidarity between classes. And, in fact, the bourgeois will never
+cease to proclaim this solidarity. In this abstract, fleeting instant, the
+worker is integrated into humanism: the bourgeois defines him as his
+fellow by the very act of transforming him into commodity. But the
+contradiction is realised in the next instant because the human commodity can no longer express his freedom except to negate his state of
+being a commodity, and therefore as a negation of the human order in
+which the worker freely became a worker by selling his labour power
+to the bourgeois. The freedom of the worker-commodity therefore
+conflicts with the human freedom of the worker before and during the
+signing of the contract, that is to say, with his human reality (fidelity to
+freely contracted commitments, etc.). Thus bourgeois humanism lays
+its contradictions at the door of the proletariat: the worker is the being
+who lays claim to humanity only to destroy the human in himself; he is
+anti-human: no one but himself has excluded him from bourgeois
+humanism. All that is indeterminate (circumstances alone will decide
+it) is whether the aim of repression will be to force him to remain
+human or whether it will be to treat him as anti-human.
+Bourgeois humanism, as a serial ideology, is solidified ideological
+violence. As such, it is a stereotyped determination of everyone by the
+other and this contagion spreads from industrialists to landowners, to
+liberal sections of the petty bourgeoisie, etc. It would be pointless to
+illustrate manifestations of this oppressive violence as a linguistic
+determination in the writers, judges, barristers, journalists, etc., and
+through the innumerable statements which have come down to us from
+the nineteenth century. I will just recall a curious article by the literary
+critic Saint-Marc Girardin, after the revolt of the silk-weavers: the
+author cynically acknowledges that the condition of the proletariat is
+intolerable; but it must be maintained: the proletarians are our
+
+754 Book II
+barbarians. So, in the name of the great civilising task of modern man
+(the man of culture, the humanist who has studied the humanities'),
+and in order to defend the cultural wealth of this limited humanity, it
+is necessary vigilantly to oppress new barbarians. This article and
+hundreds of others, read as other (collectives), will have been interiorised in inert anger, in permanent fear, in abstract vanity by their
+readers: and should danger threaten, they will allow the threshold for
+the dissolution of seriality to be lowered. We come across them in
+frozen shouts, in the angry written cries of Flaubert (a small landowner outside Rouen): like all others of his kind, he has 'eaten workers'
+without even knowing it, 119 without any relation of exploitation having
+been directly involved; simply because for the propertied classes as a
+whole, the action of groups caused seriality to be lived as complicity.
+2
+Malthusianism as the Praxis-Process of the
+Bourgeoisie
+(1) June 2848
+On this basis, we can comprehend how, through bourgeois dispersal
+and seriality, the practices of a group can become determinations of the
+collective, in such a way that a reciprocity of perspectives is created
+between the common praxis and the recurrent process. Elsewhere 1
+have tried to show how the Malthusianism of the French employers -
+seen in a national context - was a genuinely repressive practice whose
+rigin lay in the bloody repressions of the nineteenth century. On thi
+ubiect, readers have often asked what could be meant by Malthusian
+ism as the praxis-process of a class, given that I rejected both the idea
+of an agreement between individuals - which would have made the
+class into an actual group - and that of a hyper-organism whose
+individual actions would reflect hyper-individual decisions. In the light
+of the observations above, it is easy to answer these objections.
+I1g. He 'ate' the bourgeoisie too. But I will show in another work that he did
+so with less appetite.
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 755
+One characteristic which is common to exploitation and colonisation
+(as super-exploitation) is that the necessary limit of the rigorous
+repression of the dominated by the dominators lies in the latter's need
+for the former. Colonialism would be ended forever by the extermination of the Muslim population of Algeria. But this dependence still
+allows quite appalling acts of brutality. The peculiarity of the relation
+between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in nineteenth-century
+France was that the economic dependence of the former on the latter
+had been complemented by a political dependence since 178g. Certainly,
+as we have seen, the working class was in the process of formation, but,
+at the time of the Revolution, it was not sharply distinct from the
+craftsmen and petty bourgeois who were then referred to as 'the
+people. But, as historical development gave it a clearer political
+consciousness, economic development gradually gave it its statute as a
+proletariat. Its political victory of 183o was immediately appropriated
+by the liberal bourgeoisie: but the apparent solidarity of liberal
+bourgeois and the people against the great landowners prevented the
+French capitalists from recruiting by violence, as the English had been
+doing for thirty years; the praxis and ideology of repression were not
+to be manifested until the revolt of the Lyon silk-weavers. Then a new
+class alliance occurred in the political field: the petty bourgeoisie,
+excluded from public affairs, became republican and secretly united
+with the first workers' organisations. The crucial role of the French
+proletariat in the first half of the century developed and nourished the
+militancy and class-consciousness of the workers: its triumph was the
+February Revolution.
+But, to the extent that repression was suspended or restrained by
+political alliances, and in so far as one can follow Marx in contrasting
+the militancy of the French workers with the semi-passivity of the
+English workers, the basic character of oppression - always more or
+less concealed - suddenly had to explode in all its violence and find
+expression in real extermination. June 1848 represents the repressivedeath was revealed in all its brutality. And, to all appearances, this is
+what it would remain until the last years of the century: Louis-
+Napoleon Bonaparte's coup d'état and the systematic massacres of
+1871 were added to the June massacres. In the second half of the
+nineteenth century, the social policy of the bourgeoisie was aimed
+entirely at destroying the power (militancy, class consciousness) which
+
+756 Book II
+it had allowed its erstwhile political ally, the working class, to win.
+Bloodshed provokes hatred, and hatred reinforces hatred: and French
+employers distinguished themselves from employers in other countries
+by the peculiar character of their oppression. They sought the death of
+the working class, though they had to exploit it, and they lived the
+oppression-exploitation tension to the limit - that is to say, to the point
+where the first, carried to its extreme, was entirely contradicted by the
+second, its alienation. And by their bloody practices (against a class
+which was in the process of emancipation, and conscious of the role it
+had played since the beginning of the century), they had, in twenty-five
+years, made the French proletariat quite different from other proletariats. The French working class was conscious of itself as exploited
+by bloodthirsty employers - in so far as the economic fact of exploitation was immediately supported not by impersonal laws of classical
+economics, but by a government supported by troops.
+At the same time - as I have shown elsewhere - the treason of the
+petty bourgeoisie in 1848 discredited politics in the eyes of the exploited
+- all politics was bourgeois, even when practised by politicians who
+claimed to be socialists. This was the conviction of the skilled workers
+who would later become anarcho-syndicalists. The class-struggle must
+be waged in the field of work and by direct action, involving sometimes
+mortal danger. At the same time, the hatred aroused in the peasants by
+Catholic propaganda (the so-called partageux 20) convinced the
+proletariat of its isolation, and so made it interiorise its real situation:
+- isolated in French society, and confronted by an exploiting class which,
+with the complicity of other classes, practised naked, colonial violence
+against the producers. This consciousness, leading to an original
+practice of the class-struggle (from anarchistic terrorism to anarchosyndicalism) and supported by a particular structure of the contemporary proletariat (the skilled worker as an overlord to his labourers),
+appeared to the bourgeois in the other, in the class-object, in so far as
+he too became its object or might do so. This was not contemplative
+knowledge, but practice: the employer interiorised his bourgeois
+objective being when, on the occasion of social disturbances, and in
+particular circumstances, the proletariat showed its strength, that is,
+when a particular, isolated employer became its object. The strength of
+the proletariat includes the possibility of killing; the employer knows
+this, and he also knows that this possibility (which is implicit in all
+120. Partisans of equal distribution of wealth and property. [Ed.]
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 75J
+class struggle, though nowhere so obviously as in France and Italy 121)
+is simply an active temporalisation of a transcended past which the
+worker bears as a determination of his being (he is a son or brother of
+someone who was massacred in June 1848 or in the Commune). In
+1871, and for a long time afterwards - at least until today - when
+tension increases, the employer realises himself concretely (if only in
+the project of seeing his situation clearly) as an object of hatred (and as
+a criminal object, stained with blood) for his workers - and not as a
+particular individual, but as a common individual.
+Thus the past intervenes here (having been resuscitated and reproduced ever more violently by the present) to produce, despite seriality,
+the common-being of the bourgeoisie which, as we saw a little while
+ago, had hitherto been only an inert indetermination, an indication of
+an impossible task of regroupment. But it intervenes in a double form:
+as everyone's historical being (as the agent or beneficiary of repressive
+oppression), and as everyone's objective social being - in the eyes of
+the other class. Now, the members of the other class do not hesitate to
+attribute complete cohesion to the employers' class. They are as they
+were produced, in fact, by the action of the government in lending its
+military power to the bourgeoisie; this action made them, in their
+historical being, survivors of the massacre (or of the sons of the massacred, etc.). This systematically executed, deliberate action, which was
+approved by the majority in the Assembly, made them see the agent as
+an organised group. The workers knew very well that the process of
+exploitation involves antagonisms and possibly violent struggles
+within the possessing class: but they had also learnt what the class
+could do if it transcended its antagonisms and was suddenly unified by
+hatred and fear. In fact, we know that their seriality could not be
+dissolved and that the class supported its action by thinking and
+approving it in a serial dimension, through the thought and practice
+of recurrence (we shall come back to this, since it is precisely this
+question that has to be settled). The organised action was that of the
+State apparatus, thereby revealing itself as a class apparatus, whereas
+the bourgeoisie, terrified by universal suffrage and the rise of the petty
+bourgeoisie, was ready to disown it. But the worker was subjected to
+the action in so far as it was approved by the series, and thus he
+121. The problem arose in a similar form in Italy, with the political struggles
+of the nineteenth century uniting liberals, nationalists, bourgeois, and workers in
+secret societies.
+
+758 Book II
+interiorised it in his being as a class-action, as an actual totality (totalité
+en acte), or as the only possible totalisation of the bourgeois class:
+divided in the process of exploitation, it was one and indivisible in
+oppression.
+Thus every other bourgeois, through his object-being for the other
+class, saw himself as a co-responsible member of a concrete group
+which was none other than his class. Of course, the sign has to be
+reversed: the criminal member asserts himself as law-abiding and an
+upholder of social values. Nevertheless, hatred as the practice of the
+oppressed class constituted him as a common individual through a
+common past and future. But he cannot derive this common-being from
+the other class as such unless he himself regards it as an active totality,
+producing its actions and selecting its adversaries in the unity of a
+constituted practice. Now, on this point, his experience is confused:
+working-class concentrations frighten him, but he has tactics of
+massification to resist them; his workers offer him not only an image
+of dispersal and indefinite multiplicity of isolation, but also one of
+integrated members of more or less large and clandestine groups (union
+apparatuses did not yet exist). Inside the factory itself there are individual distinctions (he does not work with them himself, but he is aware
+of them): on the basis of competitive antagonisms in the labour
+market, he knows that some workers are good workers, while others
+are stubborn, or 'trouble-makers'; but it is the class as a whole (despite
+its heterogeneity - workers born peasants, workers born workers, etc.
+- of which he is perfectly aware), as a class, which strikes fear into him,
+for repression is used against it. He is bemused by this working-class
+reality which collapses, crumbles and turns to dust, and then reforms
+in some hidden union, or totalises itself in revolutionary action, etc.
+And to this bemusement there corresponds the vacillation of his own
+common being in so far as it is induced by the Other and interiorised.
+In other words, there is a perpetual indeterminacy in this structure of
+his common-being in so far as it reflects an indeterminacy in the totalbeing of the other-class and at the same time an empty signification
+coming from outside, through the praxis of the Other, to constitute
+this common-being as a permanent possibility.
+commom-indedating as a common, tr annended responsibily a past,
+preserved inert determination) in a historical praxis of repression. It
+can never be produced and preserved as an actual possibility of reconstituting the group. In fact it relates to a past group which, in the
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 759
+past present (le présent-passé), never existed. It refers to the historicalbeing of the employer after June 1848 as a sort of common re-birth of
+the employers' class today, a persistent and inert determination of
+everyone by seriality. In other words, the sociality of common-being
+for each employer depends on the historicity of this being as an
+ineradicable past common-being. But in the past - at the time of the
+massacres of June 1848 or of the military revenge of the Versaillais -
+this common-being was not a product of a total dissolution of the series
+or of a pledge: there was a change of class statute (an unveiling of
+oppression) occasioned by government action. And this action was
+itself brought about by pressure-groups. But at the same time it was
+supported by the series itself, in the classic form of passive activity:
+panic turning into violence without ceasing to be serial. If we examine,
+for example, the 1848 Revolution and its consequences in June, it is
+clear that it was the bourgeoisie of the notables which sparked it off;
+and it is also clear that it was this bourgeoisie rather than the insurgents
+who drove things to the point of revealing the concrete reality of class
+struggle, by forcing the workers either to be exterminated on the
+spot (or die of hunger in resignation) or to overthrow bourgeois
+power.
+But it must also be recognised that their aim was to regain their lost
+power and the property franchise (le régime censitaire) on which it was
+based, by separating the republican petty bourgeoisie from the workers
+and making them betray their allies. In reality, neither the organisation
+of labour advocated by Louis Blanc, nor the number and concentration
+of workers, nor the spread of orders and tactics of revolt were such as
+to genuinely disturb the proprietors. The fright of the upper bourgeoisie, as described by Tocqueville, was a panic which emerged, in
+seriality, in all the possessing classes, in the countryside and among the
+petty bourgeoisie. Lefebvre is right to compare this panic to the 'great
+fears' of the French Revolution: it arose from 'the possible mob'
+composed of the poorest elements of the population, under the double
+influence of the economic crisis and of direct provocation (the closing
+of the national workshops). The bourgeoisie did not themselves
+experience this great fear so much as exploit it; or rather pressuregroups were immediately formed within it to control it by otherdirection.!22 In the Assembly, Marrast, Trélat, Falloux, etc., became
+122. 'I had always believed that it would be wrong to hope to regulate the
+movement of the February Revolution gradually and peacefully, and that it
+
+J6O Book I
+their tools. But on this basis, and in a movement of directed (otherdirected) panic, the provincial national guard marched on Paris.
+May 15 sowed terror. After this provocation, the national guards of
+Amiens, Pontoise, Senlis, Rambouillet, Versailles, Melun and Meaux
+encamped in the city. They were to fight and continue the occupation
+even after the defeat of the insurrection. Others, like the volunteers
+from Coutances, were to arrive at the close of the battle.
+It seems that the bourgeoisie showed little militancy: their indignation was directed mainly at prisoners, whom they massacred without
+compunction. But, even in the field of repression, they were outstripped by the Gardes Mobiles, a lumpen proletariat engaged to oppose
+the Parisian population. Thus the attitude of the bourgeoisie (of the
+upper bourgeoisie manipulating the petty bourgeoisie) is historically
+ambivalent: it was really both an attitude of ferocity (clear recognition
+of the need to crush the popular forces and compromise the republicans, choosing the moment, deliberate provocation, the ruthlessness of
+the repression) and one of manipulated cowardice (exploited panic).
+The children of this bourgeoisie never finally settled the significance
+of this civil war. But what interests us here is that the panic - propagated in seriality - led to a determination of the Other: the provincial
+action was a forward flight but, as Other, it involved all the Others,
+all the national guards who did not leave and who were, over there,
+those other guards who were fighting; it produced practices of violence in
+everyone, normally verbal ones, and these were, here, as Others, the
+reality of the oppression by Others over there as a clash followed by a
+massacre. The reaction of the individual proprietor was to reinteriorise
+this unity of alterity: he took every (repressive) precaution to prevent
+any disturbances in his own factory appearing as the reality here of the
+insurrection of the Others.
+He had three links with this oppressive praxis. First, the action of
+the government and troops produced him here, at a distance, in the
+impotence-value of an end which had to be defended. And the end here
+being private property as the general interest of capitalism, this action
+determined the proprietor through a passive 'right-duty' system: the
+action of the sovereign reactualised the definition of the proprietor as
+could only be ended abruptly with a great battle waged in Paris. I said so immediately after February 24; what I saw then proved not only that the battle was
+inevitable, but also that the moment was near and that it would be best to wage it
+at the first opportunity! (Alexis de Tocqueville).
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason J6z
+a common individual. But this common-being is conferred on him by a
+sovereign group which acts on him by a synthetic operation (totalising
+those it defends in the practical movement which totalises those it
+oppresses) rather than by a genuine dissolution of seriality.
+The second link is the panic circulation of the Other. Strictly speaking this does not unite him with those who carried out the Paris
+massacres in a reciprocally devised and realised differentiation. Rather,
+it makes him one of the murderers - not that he approved of the
+massacres or even knew about them: the news from Paris may not yet
+have reached him - but because he carried them out. He did not go to
+Paris, but this omission was accidental (a matter of distance, diffiulties of communicatio
+Other: here he as atain, here, in reasons of some was nee
+proud in his bourgeois courage. This identity in alterity, which was
+described above, nevertheless continues through events of which he is
+still unaware: tomorrow he will learn that he has killed a man. This
+passive mark which is imprinted in his Other-Being is exactly what
+people have vainly attempted to capture with the term "collective
+responsibility'. Clearly this is impotence and an inert identification with
+the criminal. Its being depends on the absence of a negation: if he tried
+to regroup democratic bourgeois in order to protest against the
+massacres, and to oppose the repressive measures, he would escape this
+passive qualification. But we have seen that it is impossible to interpret
+or explain it by a negation in exteriority such as a pure absence (a
+signification revealed only to the historian). And this identity-alterity
+is really an opaque plenitude. And since his Other-Being merges with
+his class-being here, the class as a collective of oppression is produced
+in him as oppressive-being. This production takes place through a
+historical event: it affects him as an irreversible temporalisation: and
+it makes him Other in alterity. In alterity he reveals what he is as inert
+becoming through what he has done as passive activity.
+This brings us to the third link. Through the series, he is connected
+to the pressure-groups, that is to say, he implements their long-term
+policy through his panic action over there as Other, and the organised
+oppression which he initiates here in his factory. From our formal point
+of view, it is irrelevant whether he senses, guesses, or actually knows
+this policy. Either way, it is implemented. What is much more important
+s that it rigidly defines the class statute - whereas panic massacre
+reveal oppression in chaos - and that he is subject to this statute in s
+far as he is its means or passive agent as Other. The definition of the
+
+J62 Book II
+class by the pressure groups (through their use of directed seriality)
+becomes the meaning of the repression in Paris. Now, the meaning of
+repression, lived as Other-Being (class-being), is the concerted transcendence and exploitation of seriality for the purpose of a class praxis
+by an organised grouping (or a multiplicity of groups connected by
+definite relations). Thus everyone lives his practico-inert statute as
+transcended-being (transcended by a common praxis); and conversely,
+this praxis, which is not really his praxis and which transcends him only
+in so far as he is a tool of the group, becomes contaminated because he
+produces it passively (in the same sense as the instrument produces the
+operation through the use made of it by the worker), or because, so to
+speak, he is a passive mediation between a dissimulated action (an
+other, common action) and its effects. It becomes contaminated with
+instrumental inertia, and in the unbalanced unity of a tension between
+contradictory elements, it is a praxis which is also a being and conversely.
+Today this praxis is well known: there is a convergence of documents and evidence. The rebels were provoked by the closure of the
+national workshops, whose immediate objective had been to give work
+and bread to the workers. But on this basis, Louis Blanc had carefully
+defined more distant social objectives too: they were a first step towards
+the organisation of labour, towards a society which would take
+responsibility for its unemployed and provide them with systematic
+assistance; and he went even further, foreseeing that the state would
+co-operate in workers' production associations. These ideas were not
+socialist; on the contrary, they presupposed the capitalist process and
+would be meaningless outside bourgeois society. In a socialist society,
+state assistance to the unemployed would either be irrelevant (in the
+utopia where unemployment would necessarily be eliminated) or it
+would be such an obvious necessity that it could not be the object of a
+specific promise; in the same way, state aid to production associations
+is, from the purely schematic and abstract point of view of utopian
+socialism, either a truism or an absurd promise. But this depends on
+one's socialist dream: is it an enormous association of associations? But
+in this case (such is the anarchist dream) the State will have disappeared. And if it has not quite disappeared, if it is only in the process
+of regression, then its only function will be to destroy itself by strengthening the powers and freedoms of the free producing associations.
+On the other hand, if one regards it as necessary that the proletariat
+should exercise dictatorship through a State apparatus for a more or
+less extended period and if one hopes that the economy will be re-
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason J63
+organised by centralised action, then co-operatives and autonomous
+associations of producers might appear incompatible with the process
+of reorganisation. In fact, these supposedly socialist objectives were
+merely social: the basic idea of Louis Blanc, as expressed in these
+declarations, was that of a bourgeois society 'integrating' its proletariat
+while acknowledging its duties towards it and which, to this extent,
+would transform the dangers of Revolution into a vista of indefinite
+evolution.
+The systematic sabotage and destruction of the national workshops
+led directly to the expected insurrection. The immediate, concrete
+motive is well known: 'Work or bread!' At a real but more abstract
+level, the provocation drove the skilled workers (of whom there were
+many in the workshops) to revolt, because the work to which they
+would have been sent in the provinces would have had the same effect
+as systematic deskilling. And it is also true thatas this rebellious crowd
+organised itself, it glimpsed a more general, more distant goal - and
+one which, in the moment of struggle, was much more abstract. From
+their headquarters in the mairie of the 8th arrondissement, the rebels
+demanded the withdrawal of troops from Paris and 'free association of
+labour assisted by the State'. It was what Louis Blanc had promised - no
+more, no less. Looked at more closely, this meant accepting, in exchange for the creation of a co-operative sector in the economic field
+of capitalism, their subjection as a working class to the authority and
+close supervision of a capital-dispensing State. Socialism was wiped
+out by the sociality of the Republic. A bourgeoisie which had wished
+to cut its costs, and to set the proletariat on an endless path of controlled
+evolution, could now take the risk of negotiating.
+This is where pressure-groups came in. Their strange relations have
+been described countless times (the notables deprived of their franchise
+privileges over the petty bourgeoisie; the manufacturers against the
+bankers who reigned under Louis-Philippe and against the proletariat
+which they mobilised; a frantic petty bourgeoisie, doing the dirty
+work, through certain specific alliances of which we have evidence and
+whose exact circumstances might be revealed by a more detailed study.)
+The main thing is that they immediately stigmatised negotiation as a
+terrible crime; it was a betrayal which the proprietors at least could not
+accept without also renouncing their property rights. Everyone now
+knows that this is untrue, and that historical evolution has implemented most of Louis Bland's projects without the structure of capitalist property being modified (even by nationalisation). The evolution
+
+J64 Book II
+of property since the second industrial revolution has had very different
+causes, as we know. And after 1848 the upper bourgeoisie which these
+groups represented in their sovereignty were themselves not unaware
+of this. On the contrary, they knew that, if they sought a confrontation,
+this would lead irrevocably to a new and radically violent world. But
+Tocqueville's text shows that their 'experts' preferred confrontation to
+negotiation. One has only to read Guillemin's book on Le Coup du 2
+décembre123 to discover an abundant harvest of similar texts: thus the
+groups determined the position of the bourgeoisie as a class (and,
+consequently, particular agreements based on different interests) and
+made it radically negative. What they rejected a priori was sociality in
+all its forms; the paternalist idea of that memorable mystification which
+would, a hundred years later, be called "class collaboration', was not
+even conceivable for them, and neither was the idea of a community
+which, under an otherwise bourgeois régime, would take responsibility
+for its members. What they disliked most in the national workshops
+was the idea that a liberal State could take an interest in poverty and
+unemployment. The economic fact of poverty did not concern anyone
+apart from the pauper, and the priest who collected generous gifts for
+him. The only possible bond between employers and workers was the
+wage contract and this had to be respected in its entirety, though it
+was, in itself, a radical negation of human relations. Since, from the
+point of view of liberalism, economic crises represent a process of
+automatic readjustments of exchange; and since in any case it is
+normal that this beneficial process (for society as a whole) should mean
+poverty and death for many workers; and since, finally, this increased
+poverty and mortality were bound to drive the masses to desperation,
+and might in certain circumstances lead to armed revolt, the pressuregroups concluded that the government and the dominant classes could
+only take one course of action against poverty: ruthless repression
+which would allow the iron laws to do their work and benefit the
+survivors by increasing their market value and eliminating unemployment together with the unemployed. The role of the forces of order
+could be strictly defined: they were to act with poverty, which was the
+negative aspect of the process of readjustment, and against the wretches
+who would be selected by famine if they were resigned, and by
+controlled massacre if they revolted.
+What the bourgeoisie was defending was not even capitalist pro-
+123. Henri Guillemin, 'Le Coup du a Decembre', Paris, 1951. (Ed.]
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason J65
+perty; it was liberalism. And it was in terms of liberalism that the
+groups defined, quite precisely, the role of the State: non-intervention
+in the economic activities of the dominant class, and permanent
+repressive intervention against the working class. This interventionism
+would be practically invisible in a period of stability, provided the
+standard of living remained constant (so at least they believed); but it
+would manifest itself in all its harshness when 'numerical readjustments'
+of the working population became necessary. In short, the groups
+determined the intransigence of the French bourgeoisie: they claimed
+that capitalist economics required that the proletariat should be left
+entirely at the mercy of economic laws and that no attempts to attenuate
+their harshness should even be considered. In fact, they went beyond
+them: even then the capitalist economy, taken as a pure practico-inert
+process, did not require quite this; it required it only in the sense that
+it occasioned extremist action-groups within bourgeois seriality and
+that these defined and radicalised the class position. Without them, the
+class would have remained conditioned by economic and social events,
+like any series, and its intransigence would be expressed only as a
+danger signal. In other words, the class as a practico-inert process of
+exploitation, even if it had its own government and institutions (since
+they would be capable of positing themselves for themselves and
+partially acting against it), was in danger of suffering the effects of its
+passive activity as a destiny (and ultimately, if the balance of forces
+were reversed, as a sentence passed on it by the exploited class) - unless
+otherwise unreliable pressure-groups, emerging both from internal
+tensions and from contradictions with other classes, defined a common
+systematic practice of oppression in constantly questioned agreements,
+and undertook, in the reciprocal differentiation of tasks, to realise it not
+onlyby economic, social and political control of the executive apparatus
+and of the Assembly, but also by provocations (through government
+action) which would cause violent and more or less concerted reactions
+in the exploited classes, and by the systematic exploitation of panic anc
+other serial processes occasioned in their own class and in allied ones
+with a view to tightening their control over the executive and supporting government action by direct action.
+The Other, the provincial employer, may or may not know this, and
+mayor decade it in his case inkie Even ar
+will not describe it. In any case,
+becomes the instrument of the group's praxis, that is to say, in so far as
+he has in fact fought the workers demanding bread in Paris, or
+
+J6G Book Il
+condemned them in what he has said, thus making himself one of the
+murderers; to the extent that he, as an Other, has spread the calumnies
+invented in Paris about the cruelty of the rebels, or in so far as he has
+already accepted and repeated everywhere the idea, often whispered
+about before 1848, but suddenly trumpeted by Falloux from the
+Assembly rostrum, at least a week before the insurrection ("The
+workers are lazy. The workshops have failed because they could not
+succeed, owing to the sloth of the workers'); in short, in so far as he
+spread this new attribute of the anti-human, free to perpetrate Evil, as
+widely as he could, he glimpsed (or clearly saw, depending on his
+intelligence and his economic and political position in his province) the
+praxis of the groups as his class practical-being, and he discovered - as
+the obverse of his activities and as their class meaning, as a seal of their
+inert alterity - the radical negation of the proletariat as a radical
+necessity if his free activity as a manufacturer was to continue and if he
+was to enrich bourgeois society with his products, in the framework of
+the capitalism of accumulation. Thus there is a signification which is
+reflected to him by the future and which will henceforth be the meaning
+of all his activities: whatever he does, he must repress; the proletariat is
+Evil and the bourgeois class cannot compromise with it without
+destroying itself. This bourgeois, in his free, organic praxis as a
+captain of industry, will indefinitely recreate the radicalism of the
+groups as an abstract inertia and an untranscendable, but suffered,
+limitation on his own activity. The activity which once manipulated
+him by other-direction now appears to him as an inert class duty: the
+passive, but ever present, limitation of the oppression which is his
+daily individual practice lies in the permanent possibility that if there
+are new disturbances it will take the form of a social necessity for
+bloodshed. In a way, the June days presented him with extermination
+as the social truth of his practices of oppression. To sack workers by
+closing a workshop was a sovereign action which implicitly actualised
+he basic right to kill. The worker is of course, as Marx says, the secre
+of bourgeois society; but in France in 1848, the bourgeois first con
+stituted himself as the secret of the worker; he appeared to his wageearners as the necessity that they should live the impossibility of living,
+or as the impossibility of their struggling against poverty without
+running the risk of being exterminated on his orders. Thus the employer had either to confine the proletariat completely to anti-humanity
+or to allow the proletariat to cast him into it. The employer became a
+murderer; so the worker became a criminal.
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason J6J
+After 1848, therefore, employers were a curious historical product
+of the massacres for which they were collectively responsible without
+actually having committed them. They might have been employers,
+exploiters and oppressors before the February Revolution: but a sort
+of common upsurge - initiation, new birth - irrevocably produced
+them as active members of a group of murderers. However, though the
+murderers existed, the group did not (if it had done, it would have
+been the entire class). Thus they perceived their historicity as a sudden
+differentiation which produced and differentiated them on the basis of
+a synthetic unity which was completely illusory (that is to say, on the
+basis of the event as a unity of repressive oppression). Their class-being
+became historical through an initiation by murder. The initiation took
+place in three different directions: the employer was the absolute
+objective of the sovereign, and as such, his class-being was a legal
+entity, though his passive right was that of an object. Secondly he was
+the ambiguous Other, mad with fear and thirsty for blood - which he
+had never lived in all its homicidal madness, but which he found in all
+the Others just as the Others found it in him: in other words, he was
+the bourgeois in so far as this was defined as the victor of June (and the
+coward and the murderer). Lastly, as a manipulated instrument, he saw
+just beyond himself his use-truth (vérité d'usage) as the living truth of
+his relations with his workers; the foundation of these basically oppressive relations lay in bloodshed; it was a relationship of struggle and
+necessarily involved a reciprocity of hatred. And the hatred of the
+oppressor sentenced the oppressed: and the possibility of either killing
+or being killed became the extreme limit of the tension. We must
+therefore explain the relations between French capitalists and workers
+in the second half of the century not only in terms of the process of
+capital and exploitation, but also in terms of the historical impossibility
+that either should go back and undo the massacres, and therefore as a
+rigid determination of future struggles: it social disturbances reappeared, they would once again take the form of civil war and bloody
+conflict.
+It was structures based on this situation that were inherited by the
+second generation of employers. The transcended past of their parents,
+and their developed, irreversible class-being became for them an a priori
+starting-point to which they were bound (we shall come back to this)
+by an ambivalent link (interiority-exteriority): it was not his starting
+point, but that of his class; and this negation permitted a reflexive
+withdrawal by everyone in relation to his class-being (since there was
+
+768 Book II
+an incongruence between this being as a diachronic and a synchronic
+determination). But reflection presupposes an identity between the
+reflected and the reflector, in the case of a class as much as in that of a
+group or individual. It is the opposite of real division (as manifested, for
+example, in the reproduction of protozoa): in fact it should be considered
+as a praxis of interiority aimed at reproducing a limited scissiparity in
+order to increase its control of integration or totalisation. Reflection
+never gives the reflected to the reflector except as the quasi-object
+which it is. Thus the new employer, who, through an interiorisation of
+exteriority, has acquired an untranscendable class-being from memory,
+social training and everyday experience - on a basis of interests which
+he had even before his birth and in the light of a process which began
+before him and will continue after him and which assigns him his place
+today as a function of the overall movement - is forced by this contradiction of temporality to assume an abstract distance in relation to the
+quasi-object which he is for himself as himself. But the aim of the
+total operation is to destroy this contradiction: class-being as a nontemporal generality (that is to say, as an inertia with no temporal
+determination) has to be identified with class-being as an urgency
+which appears irreversibly through the behaviour-destiny of the
+parents. Reflection is the means of unifying; but, at the same time, it is
+itself the unifying praxis: through it, the free practical organism
+mediates between synchronic class-being and diachronic class-being
+from the point of view of a totalisation. This is enough to bring about
+pressie pana ange use truth, co bernied by sacre, a tempiralised
+class-being, that is to say, as an abstract ontological scheme. Of course,
+this synthesis is mythical in so far as the event becomes archetypal and
+temporality and evil are introduced into the peaceful eternity of the
+bourgeois paradise by the workers.
+But from our point of view this brings about an important internal
+lange: the reflexive totalisation is not characterised by class knowled
+since class is a quasi-object - but rather, expresses the gener
+schemata of a situated comprehension; and the relations we have
+analysed - oppression (historicity, praxis) and exploitation (process), the
+mortal struggle of killers and killed (in the light of the ever-possible
+reversal of relations), and negative radicalism as an affected inability to
+tolerate the slightest change in the régime - become orientations of
+comprehension. For the father, they were three distinct and irreducible
+levels of reality. For the son, they become operational indications
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 769
+which are always complementary: simply because any synthetic practical
+reinteriorisation of a practico-inert plurality always has the effect of
+dissolving the real multiplicity in favour of a negated, organised
+multiplicity. In other words, social praxis - whether it originates in an
+enterprise, a group, or a party - is always to be understood not in its
+pure, practical dialectic, but through the particular determinations
+which qualify and interpret it in its pluri-dimensional unity. Comprehension here means evaluating public action in relation both to the
+absolute necessity for the class never to surrender (either by abandoning one particular individual or by general withdrawal) and to the
+irrevocable past which constantly threatens to produce a future of
+death for the dominant class, in so far as these two practico-inert
+conditions necessitate a praxis of permanent oppression (the constitution of pressure-groups, control of the sovereign, and oppression as a
+social praxis supported by public forces of oppression). Thus when the
+massacres were reinteriorised, they took on a synthetic signification
+which they did not have for the generation which committed them; the
+pressure-groups which had been formed spontaneously in the time of
+the fathers became, in the reflection of the sons, a practice demanded by
+the situation. The absolute refusal to retreat, as a use-truth revealed by
+the action of the fathers, was adopted by the sons as a double inert
+limit, that is to say, as an impossibility and as a pledge.
+Of course, such an individual act of reflection did not and could not
+constitute the oppressive class as a group, either totally or partially.
+They were isolated operations, temporalised through the relation of
+each heir to his factory. And when this has effects, when their practical
+thought is thrown back to them by the 'mass media, or by a newspaper
+article, etc., this is always as an other-thought, that is to say, as alienated
+to the infinite flight of recurrence. As for the pledge, as an adopted
+impossibility of opting out, it is not in fact really made, since the
+structure of pledged faith presupposes the group and mediated reciprocity. It would be better to say that the collective class impossibility
+which everyone adopts as a ferocious refusal to withdraw or surrender
+constitutes itself as a quasi-pledged inertia. The pledge is not given to
+anyone, but the quasi-pledged structure is apparent in the fact that
+individual freedom, interiorising its collective limitation, appears - as
+in the case of pledged faith - to be the source of its own negative
+inertia. But in one way this reinforces alterity: since any concession is
+liable to spark off a fatal development, everyone is threatened in the
+Other: he may learn, in fury, that an employer (in another industry and
+
+JJO Book II
+another area has surrendered on one point to the demands of his
+workers. Conversely, he rejects them also as Other and because the
+fate of the Others is threatened in his person and by his praxis. The
+bourgeois (or the manufacturer) becomes the formula of the series, the
+Other acting elsewhere.
+(ii) Bourgeois 'Respectability' in the late Nineteenth Century
+But some kind of integration has occurred: the bourgeoisie has become
+aware of itself as a class. This means that the class is just Other-Being
+and that the praxis of every Other, through the limitations it assumes
+and claims to adopt, displays it and realises it for him as the significationexigency of whatever he undertakes and as a norm by which to judge
+what every Other does. Moreover, class as the limitation and norm of
+every praxis itself becomes the solidified intelligibility of every
+economic and social action, in the form of total praxis (everyone's
+simultaneous reinteriorisation of the irrevocability of the past and of
+the use-truth which becomes the objective which has to be achieved
+through the mediation of every real and present practice). This means
+that every capitalist has his individual, practical comprehension of
+every operation (his own and those of the Other) on the basis of
+oppression as historicity (past-future [passé-avenir]) and of exploitation
+as a process (the present and a prediction of later presents). Thus,
+whatever the other manufacturer does, he knows it immediately,
+because the Other also acts on the basis of an untranscendable refusal to
+surrender: he does him justice, and if, in its individuality, the action of
+the Other realises the oppressive praxis which History requires, he will
+recognise it - it will be his own over there. At this level, of course, the
+oppressive praxis in its particularity is expressed in various forms and
+through different actions: it is still the signification of individual
+actions in so far as they are performed in a milieu of alterity (the choice
+of markets, of a place to live, of clothes, social 'connections', and lifestyle).
+The bourgeoisie in the second half of the century had a lay-puritan
+attitude to life, and its signification was immediately oppressive:
+respectability (distinction). The respectable man is an object of choice (by
+superiors): he is an individual who is recruited by class co-option (or
+kept in his class by constant acknowledgement). But he is not born
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 772
+(even if he is in fact a bourgeois, a son of a bourgeois). The aristocracy
+derived its privileges from nature and from birth. However, in the
+'democratic' capitalist world, Nature represents universality, which
+means that, at first sight, the worker is a man just like the bourgeois.
+Respectability is anti-nature: the bourgeois becomes respectable
+(distingue) by suppressing his needs. In fact, he suppresses them partly
+by satisfying them and partly by concealing them (and sometimes by
+displaying a certain asceticism): he exercises a dictatorship over his
+body in the name of non-need; in other words, a dictatorship of culture
+over Nature. His clothing is constraining (corsets, stiff collars, top hats,
+etc.); he advertises his sobriety (young ladies eat beforehand when they
+go out to dinner, so that they can fast in public), and his wife does not
+conceal her frigidity. This constant violence against the body (which is
+real or fictitious depending on the individual: what is essential is that
+it should be public) is an attempt to crush and negate it in so far as it is
+universality, that is to say, in so far as, through the biological laws
+which govern its development and especially through the needs which
+are characteristic of it, it is the presence in the oppressor of the oppressed in person. The employer distinguishes himself from the workers
+by exercising his freedom in relation to his needs. But this freedom,
+as a real possibility of satisfying them at will, is not what he wishes to
+put on public display; and he conceals it by another power, which is
+in fact based on it: the supposed power of negating these needs. 124 Now
+this praxis was oppressive: in the first place, it enabled the bourgeoisie
+to affirm their Other-Being in relation to the exploited; they defined
+themselves by action and thought; they were culture without nature:
+respectability is bourgeois preciousness (préciosité). And preciousness
+is always a collection of practices in special milieux, intended to base
+the questionable prerogatives of the dominant class on a single, exquisite quality of its members. Secondly, the self-control which
+everyone is supposed to exercise serves as a justification of his control
+over his workers ('as hard on himself as on Others'); if he has vanquished flesh and need in his own body, he has the right to demand and
+124. I am not claiming that respectability (the style of bourgeois life in the
+second half of the nineteenth century) was a complete sham: it may be that some
+employers really practised a humanist puritanism and that they allowed only a
+minimum satisfaction of their needs. But it must be remembered that the problem
+of asceticism and regularity could only exist in an economic situation which gave
+ample and permanent assurance of the satisfaction of these needs. The ascetic is a
+man who is rich enough to be poor only of his own free will.
+
+JJZ
+require similar practices of the workers. Lastly, more directly and profoundly, the act of social oppression is itself repeated here together
+with all its significations: he is really oppressing the workers when he
+subjects the universality of his own body to countless constraints; it
+is the worker as the universal class that he destroys within himself or
+conceals under artificially produced particularities; and it is the repression of the workers' revolt against hunger, cold, fatigue, etc., which
+he exercises here against fatigue, cold and hunger, as revolts of his
+body.
+But what concerns us here is not so much the description of this
+life-style and its history (the transition from utilitarian to puritanical
+humanism with the expansion of the capital of accumulation [capital
+d accumulation]) as its universality in the upper bourgeoisie (and in the
+upper strata of the middle classes) in the period around 1880. Hou
+should we think of the being and the mode of appearance of this
+practice? How can we establish the relationship of respectability as a
+public attitude and its signification (oppression freely used by the
+oppressor against himself in so far as he thereby bases the oppression
+of the worker by the employer on the oppression of nature by culture)?
+Is it just us who see this meaning today through a diachronic totalisation of the last century! Or did the 'respectable' themselves see it as
+the common beyond of their peculiar practices? In the case of the heir,
+these two questions are easy to answer. In the first place, respectability
+is both individual praxis and seriality: individual praxis alienating itself
+to seriality and, conversely, the actualisation of seriality in everyone's
+individual creation. The respectability of a given individual, in fact,
+can exist only by and for the Other: what is at stake is public appearances (which at this time were often accompanied by very inadequate
+personal hygiene), and one became respectable through those who
+were respectable (this appearance was certainly not intended for the
+oppressed). But this reciprocity was a reciprocity of flight, since respectability never came from oneself alone to the Other alone (or
+vice versa); it always came to everyone through the Other, from Others
+- from me as Other and from my neighbour as respected by Others.
+Ultimately, one is respectable elsewhere in the respectability of the
+Other, and fashions are simply 'other-directions' enabling one to
+acquire a minimum respectability as serial conformity to certain readymade schemata.
+If one were attempting a historical study of respectability, the first
+thing to do would be to trace its origins to the individual activities of
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 773
+particular heirs, on the basis, in fact, not only of the material conditions
+constituted by the evolution of capital in a period of accumulation, but
+also of transformations in the class which were due to the fact that its
+class-being was an inherited-being. From this point of view, I would
+connect respectability with the increase of social (bourgeois) wealth,
+which enabled the dominant class to multiply the non-productive
+professions and which brought about the economic liberation of the
+manutacturer (enabling him to choose between more and more markets). But, above all, I would see it directly as a practice devised by
+heirs who wished to assert their right to their inheritance against the
+exploited classes and to deny the supposed birthright of the former
+dominant classes. The heirs could not in fact pride themselves on their
+birth (they were not born) or on their merit (since society would then
+prefer technical graduates). Their right had to be based on a merit
+which was birth and a birth which was merit, that is to say, on a nonacquired merit which would justify the class in maintaining them in
+their fathers' posts. But they had to find their immediate, distinctive
+merit in the historical situation where their class-being had become
+what it was: systematic oppression, justified by previous oppression
+and extermination, and positing itself as the only possible way of preserving exploitation as a practico-inert process. Apart from this, the
+heirs were not far from bourgeois utilitarianism, that supposed ethic
+which was simply based on the need to reinvest the largest possible
+share of profits in machines. The hardness of their fathers survived in
+their way of life, although they had the opportunity to live better. Thus
+the free individual praxis of respectability can easily be perceived in its
+movement: the new freedom (freedom for the proprietor to increase his
+unproductive consumption) will simply be the basis for the free resumption of paternal austerity. For their fathers and grandfathers, this
+austerity was a necessary means; readopted in the absence of economic
+necessity, it became a virtue but, at the same time, it was taken up and
+reactualised as a nature-against-nature, as a family exis transformed
+into praxis. And this self-control immediately became control over
+their workers: the employer's self-imposed living standards became an
+uncrossable threshold, and determined the various standards of living
+at the different wage levels. So this was an individual creation, a free
+practice. It was anticipated and required by the situation; if one transcended the given one would arrive at self-repressive austerity. Ultimately, everything was turned upside down: free austerity became the
+basis of their fathers' right to their property. Their fathers had denied
+
+774 Book II
+themselves so that their sons could adopt puritan humanism in freedom.
+Respectability justified the heir's inheritance.
+It is irrelevant for our purposes whether this simple, necessary
+practice was generalised from a few exemplary leaders of the bourgeoisie or from countless local innovations: only History and historical
+investigation could settle this question. What is important is that their
+praxis was immediately alienated. Respectability as serial reason became
+the dictatorship of the other. At first, I was oppressing my body; this
+became the oppression of my body by all the Others. Free innovation
+solidified into cant once it was propagated and serialised by imitation.
+Respectability became in everyone the right of inheritance of the entire
+class. The individual praxis was aimed at justifying the individual
+inheritance. But this justification involved the class as a whole, since
+it was to the class that the heir had to show his title-deeds. Thus the
+class as a whole, as the justification of each by all the Others, claimed,
+by a passage to infinity (already performed by every heir who wished
+to be accepted), to justify itself as the inheriting generation. In other
+words, the justification of each by all raises the question of the justification of all; but this justification is not totalising: by definition, it
+makes the transfinite Other (the bourgeois heir) the goal of serialised
+justification.
+We can now raise our second question, which is one that concerns
+us very deeply: once respectability has become practico-inert, once it
+has become the inert limit in everyone of his daily praxis, and an index
+of his serial dependence, does the respectable individual still see his
+social signification as a determination of what was, for his father, a
+use-truth? Can he interpret what is really only an individual activity
+which has been alienated in recurrence as the unitary action of his class
+considered as a political grouping? There can be no doubt as to the
+answer: he can do so, and, moreover, he cannot prevent himself from
+doing so. The totalising practice of pressure-groups, readopted in
+reflection, becomes the inert limitation and the guiding schema of his
+comprehension; and this means that he comprehends all class practice -
+and therefore the entire passive activity of seriality - both in recurrent
+flight (as we have just seen) and as a tactic of organised oppression. He
+must also be able to comprehend his clothes and his manners, as the
+'respectability' imposed by recurrent alterity, in terms of the untranscendable, solidified signification of the organised practice of classtotalisation. This practice is not directly translated into pressure against
+the enemy class: rather, it is a recurrent act of legal consecration. But
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 775
+in so far as the inert limitation which is the practical unity of the classtotalisation forces him to interpret everything in terms of radicalism
+(the intransigence which totalises a class-subject, and totalises the other
+class as its object), every respectable attitude (whether his own or that
+of an Other) is seen as a radical, oppressive negation of the working
+class by the bourgeois class. In any such attitude, he sees his class
+totalising itself in the form of culture and rejecting physical bodies
+from itself in the very movement by which it makes the workers keep
+their distance. And in any such attitude, he discovers and produces the
+following total determination: my body is simply one of my workers,
+and each of my workers is no more than a body.
+It would be easy to give further quotations and documents, but it
+would be pointless: it is clear from reading any declaration (whether in
+the Assembly, in a newspaper, in an employers' meeting, or in contemporary literature) that every bourgeois used his respectability as a
+legal foundation for class oppression and as an internal tactic of
+radicalisation. The difference between the diachronic and the synchronic totalisation here lies in the fact that the diachronic totalisation,
+being situated today in a developing evolution of capitalism and of
+classes, with very different methods of struggle, sees the signification
+of the respectable exis as a partial moment and as a privation whose
+truth lies in subsequent developments of the struggle. This signification thereby regains a negative, inert autonomy, and becomes an
+objective mystification, before finding its true place within a moment
+where it will dissolve. The synchronic totalisation, however, which
+does not in fact exist here, and is performed by everyone on the basis
+of a false past unity (the rebirth), is expressed implicitly in action itself
+(in each respectable practice) without even positing itself for itself, as
+a positive plenitude and as the totalising beyond of every practical
+moment. The extreme seriousness of the ceremonies of respectability
+would not even be comprehensible if we did not regard each celebrant
+as performing each gesture in the light of the unformulated beyond of
+the class's self-totalisation as justified oppression. But in fact, such
+ceremonies (salons, dinner parties, etc.) are never produced by groups:
+their place is taken by temporary atomisation through recurrence -
+balls, receptions and 'soirées' - mere collectives. But every other ir
+these collectives sees the circular recurrence of which he is an integral
+part as a temporarily serial embodiment of the class praxis as totalisa-
+The example of respectability enables us to go further and to define
+
+JJG Book II
+what might be called objective class spirit, provided the word 'spirit' is
+shorn of its spiritualistic associations so that it simply means a medium
+for the circulation of significations. And in so far as a general practice
+like respectability - which is simultaneously exis and praxis - is comprehended by everyone in the movement which actually produces it, as
+a particular moment of a total action (whose signification as a simple
+beyond goes before it), this total action exists as everyone's inert beyond
+and its untranscendability appears in everyone as common. But this
+does not mean that it avoids this serial being: an inert determination,
+even if it takes on a total form, cannot produce a community; it is the
+common dissolution of the serial which produces meanings as real
+unities of praxis. But its serialisation does not modify its structure,
+since it is no more than the sign of totality as the inert beyond of all
+activity (whether free and individual or passive). And ultimately, in
+the transcendence of recurrence, it presents itself as the other totality
+of the practices of the transfinite Other who is the bourgeois. The
+effect of this opposition between the serial and the total is simply that
+it creates a contradictory tension in the unity of alterity as the double
+beyond of all references. And, since the signification-totality is still
+the untranscendable beyond of every practice, it is not only the general
+practice (or exis) of respectability which the man of respectability
+relates to it, but also every other individual praxis, every small innovahese ever eral creations and rapid exams refer of themselves to
+generalised practice and through this to the totality-limitation which
+provides their full meaning. At this level, and from the serial point of
+view, it does not matter at all whether the innovation appears here or
+there, whether it is to be attributed to this individual or to that one,
+since it will always have been created elsewhere by the Other. Certain
+'expressions' may appear, and be used by every Other for a season, in
+so far as he has received them from Others; or rather - as I have said -
+they do not move, but are indices of recurrence to which every Other
+refers; a certain walk is adopted - by nobody; everyone adopts it and
+then it is abandoned; a particular painter or actor is in vogue for a
+period, and is then forgotten. Each of these small serial events is of
+course rigidly conditioned beneath its apparent indeterminacy - like
+'best-sellers', or personalities, characterised by some activity, immediately becoming alienated in the whole series, becoming objects of
+enthusiasm and then disappearing. The important point here is that
+everyone relates each of these manifestations to the untranscendable
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 7JJ
+totality as the basic meaning of which it is a particular actualisation.
+And in one sense this is not false, since those who produced these
+objects or actions did so in a milieu which was already polarised by
+this totality, which, it is clear, is simply the class becoming the radical
+negation of the Other. Thus an ability for everyone to penetrate all
+products and manifestations comes to be constituted, in the milieu of
+the Other, as an adaptation of comprehension to practice.
+Of course, the object is produced as other (through attempts to
+predict the taste of the Others by serial thinking or to determine it by
+other-direction) and it is comprehended and evaluated as other since
+everyone considers it from the point of view of whether it pleases the
+Others, and in order to make himself Other like them. This means that
+the structure of comprehension as practice remains unchanged, but that
+this practice becomes an other comprehension.125 However, the alterity
+here is simply class-being: thus one comprehends a given picture or
+book as a bourgeois. In this way, class practice (the inert beyond) is
+reaffirmed, and the object comprehended is the concrete mediation
+between the one and the other. The result is not communication and
+never can be: there is nothing to communicate, since the same comprehension is present in everyone. Rather, every class event has a circular,
+shifting permeability for everyone, and every class 'mode' has a
+solubility in the class-substance. This class-substance, of course, is
+simply the inertia of a totalising rejection of any possibility of living
+for the other class; but the mere fact that each event (for example, the
+increasing influence of the Church between June 1848 and the end of
+the century) occurs within this limitation and is radicalised within it,
+means that there is a kind of tension peculiar to the bourgeois event:
+125. This other-comprehension must not be confused with the comprehension
+of the Other. The latter, when direct, comprehends the Other as the same. I
+comprehend an action because I perform it or re-enact it. Complications may arise,
+especially when we try to base our comprehension on a situation or a history
+which is foreign to us. But in any case, if I make myself the Other by compre
+hension this is in order to transform him into myself. Other-comprehension, b:
+contrast, is indirect: one is not trying to grasp either the object or the act as an
+immediate and real manifestation, nor is one trying to grasp the real actions of
+the Other who comprehends them (as a teacher might do if he was trying to find
+out why a pupil made a mistake). What one seeks to comprehend is the new mani.
+festation; but one wants to do so through Others who have comprehended it anc
+by re-enacting their process of comprehension. In fact, the practical movement is
+still a free operation but, in so far as I am alienated to the series, its limits come
+from the Other rather than from the object.
+
+778 Book II
+whether as praxis or as process, it is lived, produced, and comprehended as impelling itself towards a limitation which in fact represents
+its inner power of affirmation, its practical efficacity. And as this event
+is necessarily elsewhere and will transform the here into an elsewhere
+if it appears here (whereas a real, practical totalisation makes every
+local event a here), the inert totality - as a correlative of serial-being -
+becomes the determination of a homogeneous milieu of circularity
+(which is actually produced by the circulation of commodities, money
+and people) in which the event, as an index of radicalisation, is produced
+by everyone as Other in the equivalence between every elsewhere and
+every here (in the dissolution of every here in every elsewhere). I become the author of an action performed elsewhere in so far as I readopt
+it in a radicalising transcendence. This kind of other-comprehension is
+in fact peculiar: it arises as a transcendence of the comprehended fact
+towards a sort of 'third kind' of knowledge of this fact (in fact, this
+knowledge-mirage can be reduced to oppression as a rejection of the
+transcendent Other) and hence as a transcendence of the individual
+who comprehends towards membership of the class-totality (this
+totality being the inheritance of an ancient murder).
+If I were to extend the study of this milieu (that of inert totalisation
+determining flight in alterity), I would refer to the various remarks I
+have made about serial thought at the practico-inert level of our
+investigation. All that needs to be observed here is that such thought
+contains a certain truth. In effect, the unity of radicalism, though it
+exists in the milieu of alterity, implies that the producers of the action
+or event (those directly responsible) completely transcend their own
+individual practice and passive activity to the degree that the other
+witnesses (those who are indirectly responsible) carry out this transcendence in comprehension. In the seriality of the heirs, comprehension
+and production are inseparable; especially as production very often
+involves reproduction. And, since we have already mentioned, in
+passing, the way people turned to the Church, especially after 1871
+(though we should remember the Falloux law126 after the June
+massacres), it is important to notice that there were always a few groups
+or individuals, from Thiers to Maurras, who cynically spelt out the
+meaning of the movement: a religion for the people. It should also be
+noticed that this signification-limitation (oppression through maintain-
+126. A law of March 1850, permitting state funds to be given to Church schools,
+named after its author, Alfred Frédéric, Comte de Falloux (181I-86). [Ed.]
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 279
+ing the people in superstition and ignorance) was communicated to the
+whole of the bourgeois class. In fact it had been present in all kinds of
+writings ever since Waterloo, beginning with Chateaubriand. Thus, as
+an inert and ancient shadow, it became a reference point, or in other
+words an Idea (in the Platonic sense), though an inert one, of the tasks
+which had to be performed elsewhere by Others (the priest, for example,
+who was responsible for supporting military oppression). But, at the
+same time, everyone became, as Other, a means of this Idea in the
+movement by which he comprehended it: he helped the Church. He
+made gifts to its local representatives and, like a government, tried to
+constitute their powers. Normally this was impossible unless the
+manufacturer himself became a Christian (so as not to be accused of
+Machiavellianism); in other words, his comprehension of the action of
+the sovereign and of quasi-official declarations was both that the
+proletariat had to be changed by the priests so as to avord changing the
+bourgeoisie, and that the bourgeoisie could not avoid change unless it
+changed itself and grounded the new authority of the priest on the
+dissolution in it of the (serial) movement of de-Christianisation and on
+the emergence of a different recurrence (that of faith). For some of
+them, this comprehension was cynical; and it could be cynical for all,
+since its cynical signification was already present as a simple, direct
+connection between the measures taken or planned and the totalised
+signification as an inert negation which guided them. But equally, it
+could be lived, by everyone, in non-cynicism: this depends entirely on
+the particular circumstances. The need for a religion for the people
+might be connected with individual feelings of frustration, anxiety, etc.
+In this case, the need would become man's need for a religion. But
+within this universalisation, the Christian bourgeois would be reasserting the class utility of faith in a way that was scarcely different:
+the worker who is also a believer is integrated, and his belief in heaven
+compensates for the vanity of his terrestrial existence; the wicked
+people who had infected the lower classes with atheism not only
+offended God, but also, necessarily, set the workers against the
+employers.
+In order to see how easy it was in the nineteenth century to make the
+transition from the one signification to the other, one need only read
+one of the first texts to pose the question - Altred de Musset's Confession d'un enfant du siècle. He attacks the bourgeois Revolution for
+having de-Christianised France: he sees this de-Christianisation as one
+of the main factors of the sickness of the age (that is, the bourgeois
+
+780 Book II
+sickness, his own anxiety) and, at the same time, as an attack both on the
+rights of the poor and on the social order; the poor had the right to a
+faith which promised those who deserved it an eternity of happiness.
+If they were deprived of this faith, there would be terrible disorders
+which would have to be repressed in order to save society. But did
+Musset regard this faith, the only right of the exploited, as a genuine
+revelation of religious truth, or simply as an illusion which should not
+be dissipated - which would bring him very close to cynicism? Alfred
+de Musset did not choose: he resented the atheists for being right and
+he resented God for justifying them by his silence; he saw an equivalence between the dissipation of his own life and the revolts of the
+workers: both would disappear if the Church were to regain its
+strength. This middle position involved a complete comprehension of
+the class signification of a given conversion or individual action. From
+one moment to another, and in a single individual, it can disintegrate
+either into a mysticism of pure isolation (for one moment), or into a
+negativity against the individual himself (Musset's ethylism was partly
+due to his 'loss of God') or else it may dessicate into Machiavellian
+cynicism: all for the sake of mystif ying the poor. But all these forms of
+objective class-spirit are equivalent in that they all contain the same
+determination to force the people to believe; and none of them - least
+of all the Machiavellian one - could claim to be the privileged form,
+expressing the relation of the practices to the signification-limitation
+in its purity: in effect, since this relation exists everywhere, all its
+practical realisations are equivalent. In other words, the relation:
+'religion for the people +» practice of oppression' is immediately given,
+but as the simple orientation of an indeterminate transcendence; the
+determinations will be equivalent a priori until one or other of them
+shows itself to be more effective as the religious means of oppression.
+It is not surprising that this comprehension on the part of the heirs
+made them open to every group practice aimed at maintaining oppression. In fact, its origin lies in the use-truth of the previous generation
+in so far as it is reinteriorised by the heirs as a free limitation on their
+freedom. And this use-truth was already grasped through the otherdirection of the other by pressure-groups (and possibly by the
+sovereign). Taken up as a totality-limitation (class obligations, oppression as everyone's duty towards the other, etc.), its community determination lies in the class action of a practical community. And through
+the comprehension of the common action, the other is determined as a
+common individual in seriality. This inert determination, received from
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 78z
+outside, does not change his statute, but it constitutes itself in alterity,
+as jointly responsible, in so far as he reinteriorises the praxis of the
+group (making it his own as Other). We have in fact seen the objective
+class-spirit defining itself in the form of a current; but, in that case, its
+origin was at infinity. In this new experience, however, seriality is
+manipulated by groups, that is to say, it is other-directed. The difference between the two generations is that the heirs are conscious of
+this other-direction and comprehend it in so far as they become its agent
+(by acting on themselves and on Others).
+If we now return to French Malthusianism as the practice of the
+heirs, we can now comprehend all the conditions of the problem. We
+did not see how this practice could have a common meaning grasped by
+all the agents, while it is realised partly in different production-groups
+and partly by seriality.
+(iii) Class Struggle in the Iwentieth Century
+At the end of the nineteenth century, class hatred in France was as
+virulent as ever and the third generation of employers saw themselves
+as constituted in their diachronic and past unity by two memorable
+massacres which themselves produced a future of bloodshed. But, on
+the other hand, material circumstances changed in the process of
+exploitation. Up to 1914, industry enjoyed a new period of expansion
+(owing to circumstances which have been thoroughly analysed by
+economists). The result was an intensification of the contradiction
+between oppression and exploitation. We have already seen how
+oppression supports and constitutes the process of exploitation in the
+milieu of the collectives. But of itself the movement of oppression leads
+to the extermination of the oppressed if they should revolt, while
+exploitation demands their (at least partial) co-operation as a work
+force. The contradiction was particularly acute since the entire social
+history of nineteenth-century France produced the exploited as objects
+of bloody violence and, consequently, as possible subjects of a ruthless
+insurrection at the moment when industrialisation and concentration
+were expanding the proletariat and increasing the value of the humancommodity (labour power). This contradiction was deepened after
+the I9I4-18 war, because the advent of specialised machines led to
+further deskilling: the employers gained from this transformation in so
+
+782 Book II
+far as it tended to destroy the old union structures and the practices of
+the anarcho-syndicalist struggle; and they lost partly because pre-war
+unionism had tended to demand State intervention, which entailed
+control of the unions by the sovereign apparatus, and partly because,
+if it continued unabated, deskilling would increase the homogeneity of
+the working class, so that the (relatively limited) activities of the skilled
+ace tes of the masses, which would alvaysbe more dangerous or
+the régime. On the other hand, the capitalist process itself - if it was
+not interfered with - would develop itself to the full - as the development of the United States in that period proved. How could there be
+limitation of exploitation without limitation of profits. This question is
+revealing: this limitation is imposed on the process from outside and is
+not produced by the process itself in its practico-inert development. On
+the contrary, this development, in its passive activity, leads to massproduction, the transformation of the working class and agreements
+between employers (trusts, cartels, etc.), etc. Malthusianism was an
+oppressive and radical response based on a rejection: French capitalists
+rejected the free development of the process in order to save their class.
+This rejection was already present, as an inert-limitation of any change;
+it appeared, so to speak, as an a priori determination of the objective
+spirit and as an immediate schema for the comprehension of the Other
+by the Other and for his radicalisation. This limitation on industrialisation had the significance of an oppression: it attempted to limit the
+increase of the working population, and, if possible, to reverse the
+demographic movement so as to reduce the danger of concentrations; it
+was aimed at halting the transformations of the working class which
+were developing under the influence of the means of production in such
+a way as to maintain heterogeneous sectors within it and to oppose
+these milieux with conflicts of interest; it was a refusal to perform its
+historical function (specialised machine +› mass exploitation-production) and to contribute to raising the standard of living, in so far as it
+had the power to prevent it. This effectively meant:
+(I) That the dominant class wished to have strict control of births
+in the working class. In fact, in spite of official hypocrisy, workingclass households were forced to adopt Malthusian practices in the interwar period. This explains the example given above. I said that the
+working woman who had an abortion was executing a sentence passed
+by the bourgeoisie. What we can now comprehend is why it is a
+sentence. The abortion is violence both to the woman and to a life, and
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 783
+it is the violence of bourgeois society. The woman herself, and the
+friend who finds help for her, and the nurse (faiseuse d'anges) if one can
+be found, will discover this violence (as fury and despair) only by
+interiorising the concerted impossibility of a working-class household
+providing for the needs of an additional child. Since the economic
+process, by leading to mass-production, increases the demand for
+manpower, halting the process, so as to keep labour under a perpetual
+threat of unemployment and so as to keep it always slightly larger than
+the number of jobs available, is an oppressive use of the right of life and
+death. This oppression is complemented, of course, by the attitude of
+the dominant classes to working-class mortality: as we know, every
+society selects its dead. But the choice is made at the level of the upper
+classes (both through the sovereign - overall policy, budget, improvement of working conditions, hygiene - and through class-seriality -
+the improvement of premises, hygiene, workers protection laws
+attempts to eliminate fatal risks or occupational diseases). 1 his mean
+that the French employers - in the historical perspective of a bloody
+struggle, which was never forgotten, and which might be resurrected
+at any time - proceeded, after the troubles of 1919, to a controlled
+extermination of the working class by controlling births and by
+deciding not to prevent deaths.
+(2) This practice was inseparable from the refusal to expand the
+market. Precisely because production remained the same, there was a
+convergence between industry's refusal to take on new workers and
+the deliberate and sustained impossibility of the working-class family
+having another child. If we approach this second aspect of the oppressive practice without referring to any of the recent, mistaken interpretations of the law of immiseration, and if, like Marx himself, we
+interpret it as relative, and recognise the undeniable fact that industrialisation raises everyone's standard of living, then it is important to
+recognise a truth which economism conceals from us: that the deliberately oppressive practice of the French bourgeoisie perpetuated an
+abnormally low standard of living (contradicting both the practicoinert consequences of the second industrial revolution and the standards
+of living of other 'advanced' capitalist countries). It oppressed the
+population as a whole in order to keep the working class in chains.
+(3) In the context of this managed scarcity (the deliberate intensification of scarcity as a negative force), the contradictions between the
+workers as individual sellers of their labour power, already overcome
+by union practice, were transformed into contradictions between
+
+784 Book /I
+different working-class milieux (skilled workers against specialised
+workers, state employees against workers in private industry, workers
+on fixed wages against workers on piece-rates, etc.) and the unions,
+confirming these splits with their own progressively petrifying
+sovereignty, themselves became agents of disunity for the working
+class. But they derived their destructive violence from the practice of
+the employers. Their conflicts installed the oppressive force which
+perpetuated the splits by impeding the economic process within the
+working class. The oppression, here, consisted in perpetuating temporary dissensions by perpetuating the French situation. It was a case
+of divide and rule. Aborting, starving and dividing, the bourgeois class
+continued the massacre. It arbitrarily expanded the already overfull
+tertiary strata at the expense of the secondary ones in order to aggravate
+the class tension between white-collar and blue-collar workers (employés et prolétaires). It reduced the enemy class to impotence, that is
+to say, to realising its class-being as a condemnation by the enemy.
+This radical oppression is obviously class-totality as praxis and as
+the untranscendable signification of every proprietor's activities. In this
+sense, it might be said that oppression in its new form is automatically
+defined for everyone as Other (as alienating his own activity) in terms
+of new circumstances and as a rigid exigency. Since there has to be a
+permanent, controlled adaptation of the proletariat to production (and
+of production to the proletariat), repressive extermination could not be
+accomplished by means of massacres: discontinuous, brutal bloodlettings such as these do not have the value of a constant readjustment
+and progressive diminution of the working class. What was required
+was clearly a permanent, controlled blood-letting. And above all, since
+the historical past of the working class gave it a considerable experience of violence and consequently an equal though only potential
+violence, French radicalism continued to define itself as the impossibility of change, as the obligation to maintain the status quo. Around
+1930 all employers interpreted all the practices of the Other employers
+in this teleological light.
+But we have now demonstrated the contradictory exigencies without
+explaining the praxis which transcends these contradictions. How
+could the rate of profit be sustained or even increased while the rate of
+production growth fell to zero!
+I have already explained elsewhere the Malthusian solution: largescale industry increases productivity without increasing production;
+thus it reduces costs and manpower. But in retaining its poor French
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 785
+markets - without bothering to seek other outlets - it made more or
+less clandestine pacts with the small manufacturers whom its Malthusianism preserved and who produced the same commodities at higher
+cost: large-scale industry would fix its prices to match those of these
+small, out-dated enterprises whose very existence was gradually
+damaging the French economy. Oppression took the form of a double
+mystification: for the public, the small enterprises were covers for the
+big firms which were guaranteed considerable profits through selling
+what cost them least at the highest price (which was the lowest from the
+point of view of the small manufacturers). By increasing individual
+productivity (purchases of improved machinery, rationalisation, productivity bonuses, etc.), while maintaining production at a constant
+level, the industrialists forced workers to become agents of the controlled extermination in their own class. In fact it was through the
+workers - through their efforts to earn as much as possible, thereby
+raising the norms for their kind of work - that the probability of any
+given worker finding employment in the totality of French industry
+was rigidly determined in the domain of serial alienation. And of course
+in all phases of capitalism, the engagement of one worker represented
+negatively for an Other the possibility of not getting any work (except
+in a period of full employment, that is to say, in specific circumstances
+and at very special times). But this was a mere truism and it was the
+worker as an inert commodity (even before he began work) who eliminated an other human-commodity. In the case of Malthusianism,
+this mystification led the worker to destroy, unwittingly, the possibility
+of life and work for some Other member of the working class since the
+effect of this would not have been - as in unimpeded mass-production
+- to develop production itself and indirectly to increase the manpower
+needs of an industry in full development; on the contrary, his free orrapiesed forion employers as a cand the mahines evas miremanis
+Such, then, was the device. By this I mean the real practice which
+resolved the modern contradictions between oppression and exploitation, between profit and the status quo, to the detriment of the working
+class and of the entire French population. There can be no doubt about
+its oppressiveness. Or rather oppression initially presented itself as a
+radical rejection of all change. Within this totalising obligation,
+various economic groups developed Malthusianism as the means for
+them (for a given large-scale industrial organisation) to surrender to
+the class exigency, and especially to secure their own control of their
+
+78G Book II
+workers. Here again, everything is perfectly intelligible: it is simply a
+matter of translating a determination which is already inscribed in the
+practico-inert into practice. But if this practice by certain groups became
+a class practice, involving all other groups (or individuals) as others,
+this is because it presented itself as immediately interpretable in the
+serial milieu of the objective class-spirit, and because everyone comprehended it and transcended it towards radical negation both as untranscendability and as the common end of the totalised class and of each
+group or person). But this comprehension must be the production over
+there of other action in so far as everyone, as Other, is the Other who
+produces it, and it must also be the re-production here (that is to say, in
+the elsewhere that contains my Other-Being for the Others), in so far
+as everyone is responsible to the class (for the radical rejection, as the
+limit which must never be crossed for fear of betraying the class), by
+and for all the Others. There was no conspiracy, no deliberation, no
+communication, and no common regroupment, except in the case of the
+powerful groups which created and inaugurated the practice. Everything took place serially, and Malthusianism as an economic process is
+seriality. But whenever possible, the activity of each local group or of
+each individual freely re-produced the movement of comprehension and
+was frequently indistinguishable from it.
+Thus we come back to the case of collective responsibility which we
+considered above. It was in fact the comprehension of the Malthusianism of the Others and the deliberate (and not just imposed) adaptation
+of production here (for example, as the production of objects of immediate consumption) to production over there and everywhere (Malthusian production in mining industries, in machine-tool factories and,
+ultimately, everywhere) which, in the domain of the Other, became
+the Malthusianism of everyone. The contraction of production was a
+circular phenomenon: everyone anticipated the Malthusianism of the
+Others in determining his own production, and he conditioned this
+Malthusianism by basing his own production (and the needs which it
+engendered) on it in advance. Through this circularity, every manufacturer or group of manufacturers not only created Malthusianism but
+also perceived it elsewhere as a process to which he had to adapt.
+Everyone's Malthusianism was induced: I could not produce any more
+because I would run out of raw materials, means of production, etc
+and, ultimately, of customers. But it also induces: I am the Other by
+reference to whom the Other will regulate his production. At the same
+time, everyone's mere adaptation to circular Malthusianism, as the
+
+78]
+practical comprehension of Malthusianism-praxis, is an act of oppression everywhere: everyone artificially limits production or its rate of
+increase by free practices of violence through which there appear two
+inert significations, one in laterality ('I must adapt myself to the other'),
+and the other as a totalised limit (I comprehend the activity and I
+contribute to it through the class imperative') and as the intelligible
+beyond of every living activity. Determined by the deliberate (but still
+careful) praxis of inducing groups, Malthusianism as the circular
+reduction of production (in that each producer regulates social production both by his own production and by the wages he pays) is
+realised and continued, as a process, by the ready comprehension of the
+original action, that is to say, by its reproduction as a brutal limit of
+spending power, and therefore of the workers' possibility of living.
+Malthusianism is oppression in so far as the a priori limit imposed by
+the factory on its production is determined for the manufacturers by
+the limit beyond which their class would no longer be possible, that is
+to say, by the limit which their class imposes on the other by oppression.
+Malthusianism is a praxis-process in so far as this historical particularisation of the praxis of oppression necessarily implies various practicoinert modifications in the process of exploitation. There are of course
+other forms of oppression, specifically in those countries which have
+experienced class oppression without civil war (paternalism and neopaternalism, 'human engineering', etc.). These have developed from
+existing circumstances, on the basis of existing conditions of production and power relations, and within perspectives which have been
+partially transformed by techniques and property relations. I will not
+describe them here (or even the attempts, in France itself in certain
+sectors of industry, to bring about, simultaneously, deconcentration,
+neo-paternalism and the destruction of Malthusianism). All we should
+notice here is that the individual practices of struggle (in a given
+society, organisation, etc.) necessarily support the marginal and
+circular process of exploitation, and that individual oppression itself is
+comprehended, quite innocently, as conditioned everywhere else (it is
+not me, it is the Others, I have no choice but to close this workshop) and
+also, in unitary good conscience, as the realisation here of untranscendable class-being, in so far as the individual praxis inscribes itself in an
+imperious and totalised practice.
+I have used the example of Malthusianism in order to illustrate the
+minimum meaning which must be given to class struggle if it is to be
+described as the motive-force of History (rather than simply saying
+
+788 Book Il
+that this motive-force lies in the economic process and its objective
+contradictions). In fact, this is the whole point. Although our dialectical investigation, having made its first approaches to the concrete, is
+very far from being complete, we can now say (without having even
+encountered historical fact yet, except as a simple temporalisation,
+solidified in the past and transcended), that it is possible to discover
+something like meaning in the development of societies and men
+provided we recognise that the reciprocal relations of groups, of classes
+and generally of all social formations (collectives, communities) are
+basically practical, that is to say, that they realise themselves through
+reciprocal activities of mutual aid, alliance, war, oppression, etc.,
+regardless of their type and mode of realisation apart from this (we
+have noticed the complexity of the practice of oppression, which
+constantly evolves with History and with the process). That reification
+will, in some circumstances, be one of the results (in alterity) of such a
+practical relation between multiplicities - whether structured or not -
+and that it should be interiorised everywhere as the absolute exteriority
+of human relations, in both the oppressed and the oppressing classes,
+and that the relation which unites the multiplicities (whether allied or
+a, an interiorise
+oteriority which of itself rends to reication all this is necessar ser
+rather, it is the necessity (as far as it is revealed) of universal alienation
+in practical multiplicities which are mediated by inorganic materiality.
+But if one were to reduce the relations of practical multiplicities to
+simple contradictory determinations, produced, whether simultaneously or not, by the development of a process - for example, if one
+were to suppose that the proletariat must be the coming destroyer of
+the bourgeoisie simply because the progressive diminution of variable
+and increase of fixed capital, by increasing the productivity of the
+worker and decreasing the overall spending power of the working
+class, will, from one crisis to another, produce the economic catastrophe in which the bourgeoisie will be engulfed - one would end up
+by reducing men to pure anti-dialectical moments of the practico-inert
+However, our dialectical investigation shows the double determina.
+tion of constituted praxis. At every level, even inside a group as soon
+as it ceases to be fused, constituted praxis is characterised by lateral
+flight, that is to say, by various forms of inertia, alterity and recurrence
+At the same time, and even in a collective, constituted praxis retains its
+basic character as a dialectical activity which transforms the practical
+field by an intelligible reorganisation of means for an end and which
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason J89
+sees the end as an objective determination of the field of future possibilities on the basis of needs, dangers, 'interests', etc., conditioned by
+previous circumstances as a whole. Praxis, as the action of a multiplicity, is far from being an opacity in dialectical rationality. On the
+contrary, dialectical rationality implies the basic priority of constituted
+praxis over Being and even over exis, simply because in itself this
+rationality is nothing but the praxis of the multiplicity in so far as it is
+maintained and produced by free organic praxis. Without constituted
+praxis, everything would disappear, including alienation, since there
+would no longer be anything, even reification, to alienate, since man
+would be an inert thing by birth, and it is impossible to reify a thing.
+This does not mean that there is no point in making a careful distinction, in each case, between individual praxis, common, constituted
+praxis and praxis-process. But it does mean that these three modalities of human action are in themselves distinct from the practico-inert
+process and that they are its foundation. It is even possible - as we have
+just shown - to see one and the same development both as a praxis
+(oppression) and as a process (exploitation), and that the process
+constantly conditions the praxis (the economic crisis of the last years
+of the July monarchy as an infantile illness of capitalism producing, for
+the bourgeois class, the need for repression and its avowed character
+as civil war). Provided one takes care to determine what modes of
+rationality one is employing, all of this is still completely intelligible -
+provided that analytical Reason and economic Reason are finally dissolved in the constituted dialectic or (and this amounts to the same
+thing) that the transformations and avatars of praxis are always resumed in circularity and that its alienations, at every level, as a series
+of necessities of which it is both the mystified victim and the fundamental support, are demonstrated. Whatever kind of multiplicity men
+may belong to, their individual and common relations, whether
+reified or not, are primarily practical. Whether it is mediated or not,
+what exists between them is a reciprocity. And this reciprocity may
+be either an alliance or a conflict.
+In a society in which one class owns the instruments of labour while
+others use them to produce commodities for a wage, it is precisely
+matter and the practico-inert object which mediate between men. And
+this is apparent in the investigation itself, since - insurrections and
+massacres apart - the pressure of each class on the Other is manifested
+in relation to machines: imports of English machines by French
+weavers in 1830, and of American semi-automatic machines about 1913,
+
+790 Book I/
+were determinations of the proletariat by the employers (wage cuts,
+deskilling); machine-breaking (as the uncontrolled reaction of a
+proletariat which was still unconscious of itself), the occupation of the
+factories in 1936 (as the devising of a tactic appropriate to a new
+situation) - these are all forms of working-class resistance. But the
+permanent presence of the forces of order is the real reason for these
+visible breakdowns: when they are outmanoeuvred, the employer and
+the worker stand face to face, without intermediary. Oppression, as a
+praxis based on the existence of armed forces, consists precisely in
+using this violence at rest (and not unleashing it unless it is unavoidable) so that the antagonistic relations remain at the level of the
+machine, that is to say, of the practico-inert, of necessity, etc.
+If the working class is able to respond, its response is anti-repressive,
+organised violence: strikes are violent - as I have shown elsewhere -
+in that they present themselves as a breach of contract. Of course,
+strikes are violence against violence, but in the context of bourgeois
+democracy, even when they are legal, they appear as the first violence.
+This violence is an action: not against the machines, but against
+the employer himself (and, through him, against the enemy class),
+in so far as he is identified with his interests (alienation) and in so
+far as he is capable, from this point of view, of a practical reassessment
+of the forces involved, the risks incurred, and the possible concessions.
+Finally, it is an innovation in that its form varies with the historical
+development of the process and the consequent changes in the working
+class. from this point of view, and to complement the example of
+Malthusianism, it would be possible to show how the strikes of 1936
+were both a serial transmission and an anti-repressive action of the
+working class. After years of recession and repression, the presence of
+popular parties in the government created everywhere an equivalent of
+class totality as the inert beyond of their activity. But on this basis the
+worker saw both the future of his class and his own future as an
+opening-up of the field of possibilities, that is to say, as a future to be
+made.
+After the compression of the previous years, this was the determination of future practice as common freedom. It was in this climate
+that the first strikes occurred; they were not immediately imitated, on
+account of the embarrassed semi-silence of the left-wing press; but as
+soon as the socialist and communist organs had been forced to reveal
+them, the movement spread to the whole of France. Now this was
+obviously a serial movement. Of course, the occupation of a particular
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 791
+factory represented a dissolution of the series in favour of a pledged
+group. Nevertheless, there was a seriality of groups, in so far as the
+material circumstances of the new practice separated each occupying
+group from every Other, not only by distance but also by the walls of
+the occupied factory. But what corresponded to the totalised class as
+the radicalism of everyone's comprehension was that the comprehension of the new practice was itself radical - first, because it was inseparable from the production by everyone of the particular group; secondly,
+because it appeared in serial alterity as the new tactic, and, in its real
+movement, defined not only the material conditions which it transcended (the struggle against the abstract interchangeability of specialised workers) but also the meaning of this transcendence as a
+compensation for the structures of weakness by a reorganisation of
+methods of struggle (the transformation of the practical constitution
+of strikes, etc.); and lastly, because it saw this restructuring of action
+in terms of the indefinite opening-up of the field of possibilities.
+In relation to the radicalisation of the exploiting class, this radicalising comprehension is the only true, living radicalisation, since it
+presents the totality of the exploited class in the light of an infinite task:
+up to that time, reality had merely been the necessity of living the
+impossibility of living, but it now became the need to attempt the
+practical realisation of a world where the impossibility of human life
+would be the only impossibility. And this realisation was not only
+entirely present as the complex meaning of the Popular Front and of the
+factory occupations (for the staff, occupying the factory is, ultimately:
+allowing oneself to be determined in the present by the future, as
+common freedom and no longer as destiny), but also the infinite beyond of every action for the individual and the constitution, by the
+future which was to be made, of the present activity as a beginning for
+the entire group. Everyone remembers that the occupation movement
+was accompanied, at least at the beginning, by disregard for union
+sovereignty. Consequently, an institutional, organised unification of
+the class, or attempt to transform the contagional tactics of the groups
+into a class strategy, was completely impossible. So there is no justi
+fication for comparing the working class to a practical community -
+though seriality was everywhere fused. Series of individuals were
+dissolved and series of groups were formed. And, from this point of
+view, that is to say from the point of view of the class ensemble, every
+organised praxis of occupation everywhere supported a process by
+which every group was affected as Other by the Others. Nevertheless:
+
+792 Book II
+(1) every member of every group discovered the objective class-spirit
+as the permeability of every common undertaking to comprehension;
+and (2) everyone saw his class totality as an infinite temporalisation,
+that is to say, both as a genuine task (whereas for the oppressors their
+inert totality is an illusion) and as common freedom; and (3) the
+practical unity of the occupations as praxes-processes (which were
+both contagious and realised by free pledged communities) lay in the
+receptivity of the other class, in so far as it suffered a complete cessation
+of production as a totalising negation (a counter-violence objectifying
+itself in the other class).
+In this last sense, if we reduce the number of classes to two in order
+to simplify the schema, we might say that each class finds its unity in
+the Other, in a double form and in perpetual disequilibrium - both as
+a unifying threat of extermination, and as a totalisation which is
+sovereignly totalised by the action-process whose objective unity lies
+in the totalised object. Now, the contradiction between these two
+unities (negative and positive, suffered and produced), the temporal
+development of this contradiction, the internal tension which it causes
+and the reciprocity of this existence-outside-oneself-in-the-other are
+intelligible only in and through the lived, practical bond of antagonistic
+reciprocity. In fact, in so far as the objectification of a praxis occurs in a
+hostile milieu and through the organisation and reorganisation of
+enemy groups (whether or not there is also a seriality of these groups),
+it is very different from any objectification which may arise through the
+physico-chemical determinations of inorganic matter or through the
+modifications of a collective (by work on the impotent inertia of
+seriality): it is, in fact, suffered and readopted. For example, the working
+class was able to grasp its own unity, through the action of the employers, during the strikes of 1936, that is to say - roughly speaking -
+through the Matignon agreements. In other words, the action of the
+defeated, being both free and totally constrained (or required), produced the free unity of the victor by free surrender and through this
+freedom. The victorious working class really was united in the exigencyconstraint which was maintained and produced as its limit by the action
+of the employers. The working class here was a totalising reinteriorisation of the serial propagation of strikes by the qualified
+delegates of the employers. It was united for itself, rather than for the
+employers - for it does not matter whether the emplayers believed in
+the real unity of the class or whether they believed that they were
+conceding to some passing disturbance; it does not matter much
+
+T93
+whether they were trying to prevent social revolution or whether they
+were making temporary concessions with the intention of winning
+them back one by one afterwards. What counts is what they did, and
+it was their real praxis of surrender which designated the proletariat to
+itself as a unity and a power. This was the unity which is produced by
+serial operations, and which returns to constitute them in and for
+themselves as a unified class praxis through the mediation of the Other.
+But the other unity (as a perpetual developing unification and as the
+danger of being exterminated or reduced to impotence and shaped as a
+collective which can be manipulated according to practico-inert laws)
+always manifested itself - even at the moment of temporary defeats - as
+the already reviving initiative of the other class, as a free praxis whose
+means and immediate objectives were still unknown or were only
+gradually revealing themselves: demobilised too soon by the unions
+and by associated parties, the working class after 1937 not only discovered its sovereign unity as a subject in the practices which it
+imposed on the employers, but also perceived the danger of being
+sovereignly totalised, in the disquieting and ever more numerous
+indications that the employers were gathering their forces for some
+underhand and uncontrollable action (price rises, etc.). At this level,
+in effect, the praxis of the employers was seen as a determination of the
+working class by and through its serial impotence, and the class found
+itself to be designated as though this impotence had been produced by
+the employers' praxis itself. The balance of forces constantly determined the tensions between the unity-power of the class-subject and
+the unity-impotence of the class-object. But in any case this double,
+contradictory unity came to each class through the Other and its tension
+indicated the objective dangers of the current undertaking, that is to
+say, the relations between the two extreme possibilities of total victory
+and total defeat. We have already seen how the objectifying totalisation
+(the project of extermination as a unity through the totalising praxis of
+annihilation) came to each series on the basis of the enemy group and
+by itself, caused a dissolution of seriality in fused groups. This is
+because the series, through every Other, perceived its negative totalisation as entirely imposed (practico-inert), whereas in reality, defeat was
+partly imposed (the massacres of June 1848) and partly reinteriorised
+and reproduced by free actions which were both demanded and
+inevitable. Thus the class was haunted by its totalised being as a
+collective in so far as it could always be produced by the Other as long
+as it accepted it in seriality. But, in reality, its defeat would be
+
+794 Book II
+temporalised in and by it through common actions (of submission, sham
+death, etc.) which would be performed in its name by a few groups, or
+by the sovereign group, where there was one.
+In this way, one can see that the unity of two struggling classes is a
+fact of antagonistic reciprocity and that this contradictory unity of each
+in the Other is occasioned by praxis and by praxis alone. In other
+words, it is conceivable - as a pure, formal, logical hypothesis - that
+there should be a Universe in which practical multiplicities would not
+form themselves into classes (for example, a Universe where scarcity
+would not be the basic relation between the practical agent and his
+environment). But if classes do exist, then it is necessary to make a
+choice: either they should be defined in inertia as strata of society with
+no more unity than the compact inertia revealed by geological sections;
+or their moving, changing, fleeting, ungraspable yet real unity comes
+to them from other classes in so far as each is bound to all the others
+porates the other unity as a practical factor of its own.
+3
+Class Struggle as a Conflict of Rationalities
+We have been considering two classes. In each we have observed
+three concrete types of multiplicity: the group-institution or sovereign;
+combat-groups (or pressure-groups, propaganda-groups, etc.); and
+seriality. And we have observed, in the first place, that for both classes
+each type of multiplicity is the mediation and the totalising significatio
+of the other two. I his has led us to see class unity not as a gatherin
+ogether of inert molecules through the efforts of an institutionalise
+sovereign, but as the circularity of a movement of mediation, containing reversals such as seriality itself, despite its fleeting being, becoming
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 795
+the mediating unity between sovereign groups and pledged groups. As
+we have said, unity, at all levels, exists in mediation; and the circularity
+of the mediations is expressed both by a circular simultaneity and by a
+cyclical movement of the unities. The former tends to remultiply unity,
+while the latter gives it its dialectical truth, which is temporalisation. But
+this dialectical, practical temporalisation will lack both meaning and
+effective reality unless it is a real action, and this real action cannot exist
+unless the need for it arises from the situation as defined by the action
+of the Other. Thus it is a reaction to an action of the hostile class aimed
+at totalising it as an inert object. But this reaction also leads it to
+experience itself in the index of tension which represents its contradictory unity (subject-object) in the enemy himself through the significations he produces in it and through the reinteriorisation of his
+practices. If, for example, the class, in the course of a victorious battle,
+perceives its freedom as the inert limitation which penetrates the freedom of the Other, it is through the circularity of synthetic mediations
+that it will perceive itself as a free common unity; that is, the synthetic
+freedom of the victorious praxis will itself be the unity of unifying
+mediations. But this unity (the sovereign as group and the series as
+sovereign both refer, through their diverse structures, to the sovereignty
+of their class over the Other) is necessarily in the Other since it is, in
+fact, the falsification and alteration of his freedom. Thus the class is
+connected to its transcendent unity through the mediation of the
+other class. It is united outside itself in the suffered freedom of the
+Other.
+But we have also seen the serial process of radical comprehension, in
+so far as it reproduces class actions on the basis of a radicalising
+totalisation, as the objective class spirit, or as the condition of the
+class's permeability to itself. This totalisation represents class-being as
+a limitation, that is to say, as a negation of the Other. And this negation
+is not only an inertia, but also a remanence, as a past particularisation
+of a particular class history, that is to say, of certain actions and their
+mortgages of the future. Now, it is precisely this transcended practice
+which creates the inert impossibility of surrender (the threshold which
+cannot be crossed (dépassé)) in so far as, in the past, it produced the
+other class and its history (as the inert unity of its temporalised temporalisation and of the mortgages of the future which it has engendered). The intransigence of French employers at the end of the
+nineteenth century was due to the massacres of 1848 and 1871. But this
+means that they comprehended in the other class what it is to have the
+
+796 Book II
+past of a massacred class. And, conversely, this impossibility of surrender gradually developed, through the actions of the bourgeoisie,
+working-class radicalism. On the basis of a past of civil war, this
+radicalism, as a concrete unity of practical comprehension (as the
+permeability of all action to every comprehension in the class), was
+the impossibility of tolerating the impossibility of living, that is to say,
+the necessity of creating another reality by destroying this present
+reality. By absolutely rejecting change, the bourgeoisie constituted
+change - any adjustment that might be called for here or there on the
+basis of the pressure of needs - as the radical rejection of the bourgeoisie, if not in its detailed aspect (a rise of X per cent still being
+perfectly possible within the framework of capitalist exploitation, and
+scarcely affecting the profits of the enterprise) then at least in a vista
+of infinite change.
+No doubt it will be objected that the radicalisation was mainly due
+to the discovery by the workers of their class situation, of the consequences of exploitation, and of the absolute necessity of transforming
+this situation. And there can be no doubt that the work of the militants
+(unionists and politicians) consisted throughout the nineteenth century
+in producing class reflexivity in the working class on the basis of the
+determinations which it suffered in impotence. And the first phase of
+this awareness was to be the systematic interpretation of practico-inert
+processes. But, in so far as the proletariat was a series, and thus affected,
+like all series, with impotence and with a tendency to limit action and
+to be satisfied with superficial, temporary advances; in so far as, in the
+field of appearance produced by bourgeois oppression, reality appeared
+to the proletariat as the impossibility of being other than it is; in so far
+as the concrete changes called for were always modest for everyone,
+the workers were affected by a spontaneous reformism. And this
+reformism simply expresses something which exists in everyone in his
+relations with every other (except for the oppressor in relation to the
+oppressed): the practice of conciliation (generally reinforced by the
+existence of mediating third parties). In a sense, the oppressed who
+were born into oppression, heirs of the oppressed, would be content
+with slight improvements: they would see these improvements as in
+themselves a total transformation of the situation. Obviously, in fact,
+they believed that they would be content with them. Nevertheless, an
+exploiting class which was immediately favourable to improvements
+(even after one or two generations) would have produced a completely
+different working class (with the same structures, but different internal
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 797
+relations, a different tension) and might perhaps have postponed
+revolutionary radicalisation for a time.
+The reformism of the British proletariat seems to be due to several
+related factors: I will just mention the colonial super-profits which
+prevented Britain from suffering international crises with the violence
+which, in France, produced the February revolution, and British
+foreign policy, which meant that it got involved in only a few, distant
+actions in Europe, with limited objectives, and that these never did, or
+even could, place the country itself in danger in the way that our war
+against Prussia did.127 In fact, the hypothesis of a progressive bourgeoisie is in itself absurd, at least as far as the nineteenth century is
+concerned. Today the possessing classes, through neo-paternalism and
+the practices of 'Human Engineering', attempt to reconcile the two
+roles in which they have cast the masses (as customers, and as wageearners). They attempt to construct a mobile and complex system in
+which concessions are always possible (and may even anticipate
+demands), thus concealing from the exploited the radicalism of the
+exploiter. But this neo-paternalism presupposes a certain level of
+industrial development; it was not conceivable in the nineteenth
+century and, in the scarcity which was so brutally revealed during
+crises (poverty in 1845-8, poverty and war in 1870-I), the bourgeoisie produced itself as having either to kill or to disappear. By
+taking this line (which was undoubtedly an interiorisation of the
+situation by heirs whose reaction was already determined by their
+interiorised past), the bourgeoisie produced at a stroke a reciprocity of
+radicalisation. (This might even, from an otherwise abstract and purely
+formal point of view, taking no account of inertia, appear as an infinite
+to-and-fro.) In any case, the inducing class was the bour geois class. And
+no doubt it will be said that accumulation (as a process) could not fail
+127. Each proletariat derives its constituted violence (what might be called its
+stolences araper to thenly fter, but reso from is of productio. and florious,
+structures proper to the worker,
+violent history of the French bourgeoisie and the glorious, violent history of the
+Italian bourgeoisie and people in the nineteenth century have been interiorise
+by the proletariats which have always been the real agents of social transforma
+landed aristocracy, is also expressed in the rather mild reformism of social
+
+798 Book II
+to cost millions of human lives, that it required the poverty of the
+worker as a condition for social enrichment. No doubt this is broadly
+true, but we can see that it is never quite true in detail (the refusal to
+reburn toxic smoke, for example). In other words, capitalists in this
+period assumed that it was necessary for Others to be poor; and to
+assume the poverty of others is to acquiesce in producing it, and thus
+to transcend the assumed necessity by a free adoption of its laws and
+its themes; it is to justify this free transformation of necessity into
+oppression
+in terms of a class Manichaeism which designates the
+oppressed as anti-humans who deserve their oppression, and thus to
+condemn them to it. Lastly, it is to make this necessity-freedom even
+more intolerable for the oppressed, in that it presents itself as a condemnation of the exploited (a free human sentence) by things (the
+"inexorable' laws of liberal economics).
+Oppression based on radicalisation (as an assumption of scarcity by
+a still undeveloped capitalism) was to be the real force permitting a
+radicalisation of the practices of workers' struggle. One important fact
+of nineteenth-century history is that the workers experienced the
+absolute intransigence of the employers. They wished (initially) to
+reach a mutual understanding as men; and they gradually realised that
+this was impossible, because, to their employers, they were not men. This
+class racism is essential for the comprehension of the workers' movement in the nineteenth century: at first it was animated by a respect for
+property, faith in the employers (those members of the bourgeoisie
+who, thanks to the strength of the working-class, had improved the
+political system and still claimed to be the universal class). In about
+1830, even the most advanced workers appear not even to have
+dreamed of introducing a socialist sector into the capitalist economy;
+he employers had or essert at or prom tire cries e anonse
+straight from the country, and they used to criticise the bourgeoisie
+for their atheism. But, in France, the reversal of their position, or its
+radicalisation, has a very obvious origin: between 1830 and 1871 the
+bourgeoisie passed sentence on them. This means that their policy of
+brutal oppression was carried out through compulsion and in the
+workers' milieu as their condemnation of the workers by the supreme
+ribunal. So from this point of view too, oppressive activity was
+rucial: it burnt signincations into the hearts of the oppressed class
+These significations were ethical judgements (as the abstract general
+form of the considerations which would be the basis of real judgements
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 799
+meted out after repressive trials in the name of the constitution and of
+religious or moral principles) and these judgements were supposed to
+involve the oppressed themselves: had he not voted, for example? Was
+he not represented in the Assembly and therefore in the government?
+Had he not broken the social compact by striking, rioting, or rebelling?
+Had he not himself provided a justification for the precautions by men
+of order against his disruption?
+This is how the judgement was formulated. The working class was
+thoroughly familiar with the system of values it related to and with the
+facts on which it was based. They learnt the first from propaganda, and
+the second was their own doing. The consequences of the assessment
+were widely diffused by newspapers: death sentences, imprisonments,
+deportation, etc. It was possible to mystify the proletariat: the worker
+appeared to have accepted the liberal system, Free Trade and the free
+wage contract; and since the employers apparently used no compulsion
+(no one is forced to work for him; and if someone makes trouble, the
+employer does not punish him, but simply regards the contract as
+broken, etc.), violence seems to arise in society, at times of crisis, from
+popular uprisings, strikes, etc. Did not, as Saint-Marc Girardin said,
+this original Barbarian violence justify apparatuses of permanent
+oppression (intended also, of course, to protect the workers against
+themselves)? In other words, we have seen how, for the oppressor,
+oppression is inseparable from the hatred he must feel for the oppressed. And this active hatred produces a number of significations and
+communicates them, through reciprocal violence, to the oppressed themselves. These unitary significations, at a certain level, represent a
+totalising conception of society, of classes and their respective roles.
+And, of course it is worth adding that the temporarily defeated class
+will always contain some individuals or even groups who will interiorise this conception.
+Thus in the mid-nineteenth century the practice of struggle créated
+in the working class the possibility of evaluating itself as the bourgeoisie did, that is to say of knowing itself, through the mediation of
+the Other and his Manichaeism, as the absolutely other Object; that is
+to say, as a servile-will, bound-to-do-evil, and ultimately as Other than
+man. When this characterisation was taken up and adopted, the mirage
+of the Other-Unity would disappear: this borrowed unity would
+dissolve into an anti-humanism whose universality would correspond
+point for point to bourgeois humanism and would justify it. But this
+synthetic ensemble of significations would still remain synthetic, since
+
+800 Book II
+class practice would interiorise it and then reject it. In fact, as a material
+and totalised ensemble, and as a system, it is its own negation, produced
+in it as an imperative by the Other (through concrete exigencies: for
+example denouncing a given strike or insurrection) both because it
+refuses to give the statute of man to all workers and because it creates
+new divisions amongst them by distinguishing between the troublemakers and the masses (who are stupid rather than vicious, between
+the bad worker (who is faithful to his class) and the good worker, who
+is a sort of tame animal who has achieved humanity by adopting the
+values and orders of the employers' humanism.
+Now, it would be utterly inconceivable that this system should be
+interiorised, that it should - even for an instant, at a particular time and
+for specific people - present itself as a temptation, unless it is seen as
+more than an epiphenomenal ideology arising amongst the employers
+through the process of exploitation. In fact, in the struggle, the employers really do see the workers as the absolute Other. Initially, this
+is the meaning and justification of their praxis in so far as every praxis
+produces its own justifications; but above all one of the objectives of
+the employers' praxis (and certainly not the least important) then
+becomes the introduction of splits and insecurities into the ranks of
+the workers by infecting the proletariat with a being-outside-itself in
+bourgeois class-consciousness taken as the absolute standard of what
+is human and what is not. Thus, for every grouped worker induced
+radicalisation is a radical negation of his being-for-the-bourgeoisie and
+this negation involves a set of difficult activities which are quite
+inseparable from one another: to refuse to define oneself as evil is to
+reject bourgeois Manichaeism; but this Manichaeism is simply another
+name for the humanism of the dominant class, and it has to be rejected
+as humanism. Now, an abstract rejection would still be an acceptance:
+in rejecting humanism as such, a worker would be admitting that he was
+non-human.
+positive humanism; and this presupposes that the worker takes away
+trom the bourgeoisie the privilege of stating the truth of man for all,
+that is to say, truth itself. However, the bourgeois claims to be human
+by virtue of intelligence, culture, scientific knowledge, technical
+abilities, etc.: and while these powers must belong to everyone, the
+workers partly lack them. Furthermore, the idealist intellectualism of
+the bourgeoisie depends on analytical Reason: analytical Reason
+
+801
+determines what is true. Thus the worker must either allow his class
+to be dissolved by a positivistic atomisation and allow himself to be
+defined as isolated in ignorance and malevolence or he must recreate
+Reason, dissolve analytical rationality in a larger complex and, without
+losing the hope of escaping ignorance some day, find non-intellectual
+criteria and foundations for truth. Of course, as Marx said, the problems are not formulated until the means of resolving them are present;
+but everything is already present: praxis as the measure of man and the
+foundation of truth, and dialectic as the permanent dissolution of
+analytical Reason. And then it must be recognised that the day-to-day
+expression of the radical reaction of the oppressed is in particular
+concrete skirmishes: and there is no need to be a Marxist in order to
+resist cuts in real wages. However, everyday practice itself would be
+affected by bourgeois propaganda unless the class which is totalised by
+the Other dissolved this alien unity by a real movement of totalisation.128
+This is the only point of view from which the effect of the oppressed
+class on the intellectuals from the petty bourgeoisie - a class which is
+in tutelage to the capitalist class - can be comprehended. It is through
+their new production of the universal as exigency that the oppressed
+class preys upon them and detaches them in the name of the incomplete
+humanism produced by the bourgeois class. We will not labour the
+point here: let us simply indicate the action in reciprocity without
+which this nurturing and attraction of the theoreticians would lose all
+practical signification. In other words, the fascination which the
+proletariat has for petty bourgeois intellectuals - which is not well
+described by Marx and the Marxists - does not derive from particular
+material interests, but from the fact that the universal is the general.
+material interest of any intellectual and that this universal is realised in
+potentiality (if not in actuality) by the working class. The intellectuals,
+in other words, are products of bourgeois universalism and they alone
+in the bourgeois class are aware of the contradictions of humanism,
+that is to say both of its unlimited extension (to all men) and of its
+limitations. But if, like Marx, the theorist produces a materialist and
+dialectical interpretation of History, it is because it is required by the
+materialist dialectic as a rule for working-class praxis and as sole
+foundation of true (that is to say future) universality. In other words,
+128. We shall see later, in a section on the 'Critique of Dialectical Investigation', how the dialectic can be historical Reason at the same time as being historialised at a particular moment of History.
+2C
+
+802 Book II
+it is because a circulating comprehension, as the permeability of every
+worker's praxis to all, is already anti-analytical, and because the dialectic, and its realisation, praxis, emerge as a reaction to analytical Reason
+by each and all, and as its dissolution.
+It must not be supposed that this provides an escape from the need
+for situated realism. This practical dialectic can be seen forming itself,
+for example, in the unity of the Lyon silk-weavers from 1830; and their
+very unity will manifest itself to them in the development of a praxis
+(to live working or to die struggling) which will leave them victorious
+and stunned. Dialectic and praxis are one and the same; in their
+indissolubility, they are the reaction of the oppressed class to oppression. Does this imply that oppression is really analytical? Obviously
+not. The bourgeois class conceals the operation of the dialectic under
+the atomising rationality of positivism, whereas a theorist of the
+proletariat will demand explanations in the name of the dialectic itself.
+Thus, at one level of abstraction, class conflict expresses itself as a
+conflict of rationalities. But let us be spared the classic imbecility which
+consists in contrasting science to bourgeois idealism. Science is not
+dialectic; and until the historical emergence of the USSR, it was
+exclusively bourgeois. Finally, in spite of the unfortunate theory of
+proletarian science, it remained the one area of agreement between
+Soviet and bourgeois scientists. This is not where the contradiction
+lies. The contradiction is between the bourgeois determination to stick
+at scientific positivism, and the progressive effort of the proletariat, of
+its theorists, and of socialist countries, to dissolve positivism in the
+dialectical movement of human praxis. In reality, this is simply a
+matter of the existence of a self-conscious dialectic in the movement of
+the working class, and of the tactical negation of this reason in the
+(actually dialectical) movement of the bourgeois class. In effect, it is
+dehumanisation by bourgeois oppression which leads the workers to
+unity and to organised praxis as constituted dialectic (that is to say, to
+a positive transcendence of abstract destructive Reason); conversely,
+this same dialectic as praxis-totalisation reinforces analytical Reason in
+the bourgeoisie. This is why abstract theoretical discussions between
+historians about particular events in the French Revolution (atomised
+crowds with 'ring-leaders', or totalising class-reactions?) are abstract
+expressions (and actually philosophically incomplete and false) of the
+deep conflicts between the totalisation (proletariat) and the dissolving
+faculty of analytical Reason (the action and propaganda of the bourgeoisie).
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 803
+We can conclude by saying that the dialectic, as the practical
+consciousness of an oppressed class struggling against its oppressor, is
+a reaction which is produced in the oppressed by the divisive tendency
+of oppression - but not at any arbitrary time or place: later we shall
+discover the material conditions which make this consciousness
+possible. But at any rate it is a transcendence of contemplative truth by
+effective practical truth, and of atomisation (accompanied by serial
+agreement) towards the synthetic unity of the combat-group. This
+practical comprehension of workers' activities by workers (however
+cloudy it may be and however erroneous it may remain) is actually the
+objective spirit of the working class in so far as it is created as an extreme
+need and a necessary negation of its de-humanity. But, unlike that of the
+bourgeois class, this spirit is not, in itself, alterity: it is an attempt
+everywhere to dissolve alterity. In his every action, the worker naturally
+discovers dialectical development: being exploited, he discovers the
+constituent dialectic as a creation through his work (which is finally
+alienated from him). Alongside other exploited men, he sees his work
+as determining, as Other, the work of the Others (through norms), and
+he discovers this from the point of view of the rejection of alterity. If
+a worker says, 'I shall avoid doing more than the Others, in order not
+to require the Others to do more than they can, and in order that I
+shall not be required to do more than I can by an Other', he is already
+a master of dialectical humanism, not as theory but as practice and in
+spite of the negative twists which characterise this rationality in its
+empirical beginnings, as a dissolving practice directed against analytical
+rationality. 129
+Our aim is to define the formal conditions of History; we need not
+dwell on the relations of material reciprocity between classes in their
+real historical development. What has been established by our
+129. This example illustrates how the dialectic is rejected, but then instrumentalised and exploited, by the employers, as well as the mystification of positivism. The employer sets out from the analytical point of view of atomisation
+and competition: everyone is free to work harder than his neighbour, if he can,
+and so to earn more; and the neighbour is free to compete with him. But dialectical
+Reason, as a carefully disguised mystery, actually ensures, on behalf of the employers, that if a work norm is increased for and by certain individuals, then it is
+increased (to a lesser degree) for all. This also applies to socialist societies: the
+bureaucracy pretends to be concerned with the improvement of output by individuals (Stakhanovism is positivist reason) but knows perfectly well that the
+activist will transform the production group as a whole (dialectical Reason proclaimed in theory, but negated in fact).
+
+804 Book II
+dialectical investigation is that for there to be any such thing as classes,
+they must be determined in reciprocity, whatever the mediating process
+may be. Besides, we know that the only intelligibility of their relationship is dialectical. From this point of view, analytical Reason can be
+seen to be an oppressive praxis for dissolving them, and its inevitable
+effect is to make the dialectic into the rationality of the oppressed class
+(on the basis of circumstances which have yet to be determined). The
+emergence of dialectical Reason in the working class as a dissolution of
+analytical Reason and as a determination of the bourgeois class in
+terms of its function and practice (exploitation-oppression) is induced;
+it is an aspect of the class struggle. But, conversely, if the bourgeois
+class clings theoretically to analytical Reason, dialectical Reason
+returns to it as its own fascination through its traitors (that is, its
+intellectuals) and it gradually becomes self-conscious in the very class
+which negates it. The permanent, but variable contradiction (increasing
+or diminishing tension) between these two types of rationality inside
+the bourgeoisie would merit a place of its own in a history of culture.
+Concrete examples would show not only positive Reason quietly
+being dissolved by the dialectic (in historians like Marc Bloch or even
+Georges Lefebvre), but also the dialectic being used officially and
+theoretically as a purely linguistic determination concealing an analytical
+calculation. (One of our best ethnographers uses the phrase, 'the
+dialectic of this dichotomy ..?, thus unintentionally reducing the
+dialectic to analysis.) But this is not relevant to our subject: what is
+important for us is to show that dialectic, as the controlled development of praxis, cannot experience itself (either as constituent or as
+constituted) except in and through the praxis of struggle, that is to say,
+antagonistic reciprocity. Of course, this does not mean that other
+practical organisms, in different worlds, differently constituted (without
+scarcity, for example), could not have a different consciousness of it
+(without the mediation of antagonistic reciprocity). But it does mean
+that in our world (governed by scarcity, it appears at the moment in
+which the group emerges from the oppressed series as a dictatorship of
+freedom. In other words, it is the praxis of the oppressed in so far as
+they are common individuals rooted in a seriality of impotence, and,
+in spite of their efforts, it cannot fail to be the practical reaction of the
+oppressors, in so far as they have to become dialectical Reason in order
+to foresee the behaviour of the oppressed. Exploitation as a practicoinert process is a reality which has to be dissolved both theoretically
+and practically in dialectical Reason, whereas it is struggle, as genuine
+
+805
+human praxis and reciprocity of antagonism, which produces the unity
+of everyone through the Other. It is the movement of dissolution (or
+extermination), as the unification of the attacker, which produces the
+dialectical practice of the attacked. The conclusion of this investigation
+is that the only possible intelligibility of human relations is dialectical and
+that this intelligibility, in a concrete history whose true foundation is
+scarcity, can be manifested only as an antagonistic reciprocity. So class
+struggle as a practice necessarily leads to a dialectical interpretation;
+and, moreover, in the history of human multiplicities, class struggle is
+necessarily produced on the basis of historically determined conditions,
+as the developing realisation of dialectical rationality. Our History is
+intelligible to us because it is dialectical and it is dialectical because the
+class struggle produces us as transcending the inertia of the collective
+towards dialectical combat-groups.
+4 The Intelligibility of History: Totalisation
+without a Totaliser
+Now it may be suggested that the struggle in itself, that is to say, the
+temporalisation of reciprocity, although it creates both dialectical
+experience and the consciousness of it, may transcend the dialectical
+comprehension of the agent, observer, or historian. The investigation
+has shown us the translucid rationality of constituent organic praxis;
+and it has also revealed that of common praxis (in so far as it is assumed
+to be objectifying itself in an inert or practico-inert material which
+passively accepts its determinations). But there is no proof that a
+praxis of antagonism and reciprocity still has its rationality because
+each group (or class) signifies in its free praxis the practical freedom of
+the Other, and vice versa. In other words, it involves a twin-headed
+temporalisation each moment of which represents not only a praxis, but
+also its negation by the other praxis, and the beginnings of the transformation of the former in order to outwit the latter and of the latter
+in order not to be outwitted by the former. But even if this strange
+reality, the practice of no one, can be related, in a divergent double
+intuition, to the two agents when two individuals are involved (thus
+we can comprehend a boxing match provided we are familiar with the
+
+806 Book II
+sport), can there be a dialectical comprehension of it? Is there not in
+fact a sort of private negation at the heart of this monster, each outwitting and mystifying the Other, seeking to disarm his freedom and
+make it his unwitting accomplice, and acknowledging the sovereignty
+of the Other only so as to get an opportunity of treating him as a
+thing? And then, even if this individual struggle (between individuals
+of the same profession, the same age, in a closed field) can really be
+decoded, will the same apply to the complex phenomenon which has
+to be described as a praxis-process and which sets classes in opposition
+to one another as circular totalisations of institutions, groups and
+serialities? Is it possible to have any clear comprehension of the
+complex modifications which each class derives from the Other
+(passively received and actively transformed) and which change the
+internal relations of different class structures to the degree that they are
+changed by them? Lastly, let us not forget that class, as such, is also a
+human product of a product and that, to this extent, its practical
+reactions temporalise the class-being of its members. Now, this classbeing - as practico-inert - belongs to the domain of the anti-dialectic.
+How are we to grasp the intelligibility of a praxis which has been
+mortgaged by a passive constitution?
+We must reply to these theoretical questions like Diogenes, by
+walking. Or rather, by recalling that we are constantly struggling for
+or against our class and that the intelligibility of the struggle is essential
+to the action of the combatants. This does not mean that the intelligibility is given equally clearly in institutional groups, on combat-
+(or pressure-) groups, and in series. There is a weakening corresponding to internal transformations. But it must be complete in the case of
+class circularity (not only for the sovereign group, for example, but
+also for it in so far as the series mediates between it and combat- or
+pressure-groups), for a very simple reason which is itself dialectical:
+if praxis ceases to be aware of its end, its means, of the means and end of
+its adversary, and of the means of opposing the hostile praxis, it simply
+becomes blind and therefore ceases to be praxis; it is simply an unconscious accomplice of the other action which overwhelms, manipulates and alienates it, and turns it against its own agent as a hostile
+force. (The simplest example is that of a lost regiment, cut off from the
+main army, fearing the enemy everywhere, imagining that everything
+is possible, but lacking any means of anticipating an unpredictable
+action. Such a regiment is no longer a group: it is a herd; but if it
+receives information and is able to locate the enemy troops, then - even
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 80J
+if the enemy are numerically superior - it becomes a practical community again.) Thus the common praxis - wherever it is manifested -
+determines itself in the dimension of alterity because it adapts to the
+free praxis of the Other (in so far as it can predict it). The difficulty is
+that this is not a matter of predicting a physical effect - an inert
+repercussion of human work - but of predicting a freedom which is
+itself predicting this prediction. But this is neither other-direction nor
+alterity: it is reciprocal freedom which is computed and predicted. But
+the prediction will, if possible, be based on circumstances, knowledge
+which it will have both of the opposite praxis and of the inert structures
+from which it emerged (as either sovereign freedom or as fraternityterror in a fused group). And though this prediction may be precise, it
+will still be dialectical in that it conceives material conditions, the
+situation, and knowledge as inert givens which are transcended by a
+freedom which retains them within it as its orientation and qualification. Thus the enemy is even more directly comprehended than the
+ally, although, of course, it depends entirely on material conditions
+whether such comprehension is possible, whether it is abstract and
+general or real and concrete (for example, information transmitted by
+intelligence agencies, indications of the relations of forces). And the
+enemy's comprehension of his enemy is also present in this fundamental comprehension (all traps and tricks presuppose such a comprehension in the Other). This means that our activity as a praxis-subject
+(I use this word to refer not to a subjectivity, but to activity itself as
+self-elucidating) must always include knowledge of itself as a praxisobject (that is to say, as objective movements of groups or troops, seen,
+for example, from an exclusively quantitative point of view130) and
+transcend this objectivity as a purely material condition. In a sense, the
+fundamental intelligibility of the struggle can be said to represent a
+development of dialectical comprehension: it necessarily implies that
+the praxis of each adversary is determined in accordance with his
+130. This applies to ambushes in classical warfare: the action of the enemy is
+from this point of view, in order to see whether the trap is to be set and worked
+(whether it is necessary to attack from both sides of the pass), one will - it one
+has sufficient information - come down to calculating inert quantities: the number
+of soldiers, weapons, etc. And of course the enemy has his own cards: he will
+foresee the trap and we will foresee his foresight.
+
+808 Book II
+objectivity for the Other. In other words, in the atomised, massified or
+serialised crowds which surround us, our reality as subjects remains
+abstract because we are paralysed by our practical impotence and our
+reality as objects resides in the evasion which is the Other. The subjectobject relation, however, as a variable but ever intense tension, though
+it is not, or need not be, expressible in words, is immediately given in
+the praxis of antagonistic reciprocity. But conversely, I comprehend
+the enemy through the object which I am for him. Or rather, the dialectical moments of the investigation merge into one another: I predict
+my objectivity for him on the basis of the objective structures which I
+know to exist in him; and, through costly mistakes, gradual corrections,
+etc., I predict what he is on the basis of his former actions on me (that
+is to say, of the predictions which are their intelligible signification).
+My knowledge is the best possible if I can make a prediction not only of
+what he will do, on the basis of what he is, but also of what he is on
+the basis of what he has done, and, finally, of what he will do (predictions based on previous experience).
+Thus reciprocal action is characterised, in its basic antagonistic
+structure, by the fact that it encloses the agent as an object and the
+Other as a subject in the prospect of a reversal which has to be produced (the Other becomes a pure passive object, the agent asserts
+himself as free praxis); in other words, the free practical dialectic of the
+one involves a grasp of the free dialectic of the other both as freedom
+and as a double means (a means of predicting the enemy action and thus
+outwitting it, and a means of making the Other an accomplice in an
+action aimed at subjecting him, by proposing a false goal for his
+freedom). In its basic principle, struggle is, for everyone, an opportunity to develop the multiplicity of human dimensions in a synthetic
+tension, since one has to be an object-subject for a subject-object who
+is the Other, and since one interiorises an other comprehended freedom within one's own freedom. But, this does not prevent one from
+being materialist. That is to say, it is essential to determine (a) the action
+of the Other on the basis of the inorganic reality of the conditions in
+which the Other exists, (5) one's own action against the Other on the
+basis of one's own initial material and inert conditions, and (c) the
+Other's prediction of the action undertaken on the basis of possibilities
+which have been calculated (or established as precisely as the situation
+allows) that the Other has precise information as to material conditions,
+Struggle is the only human practice which realises everyone's rela-
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 809
+tion to his object-being in urgency (and sometimes in mortal danger).
+And, of course, the object that I am for the Other is altered by the
+fundamental structures and material conditions which have given the
+Other a constitution as an object. However, objectivity for this other
+tends to approximate indefinitely to objectivity pure and simple (such
+that synchronic and diachronic totalisation can establish it in the very
+tension of their contradictions) in so far as it is not the Other determining it in me but myself tending to produce it under the pressure of
+the Other. In particular, on the relatively simple plane of military
+conflict, an army, through its leaders, must always have a strictly
+objective awareness of its being (number, arms, means of communication, relation to bases, and everyone's combativity - in connection not
+only with the past and, for example, with good or bad supplies, but also
+with the future, that is to say, with the real meaning of the struggle
+it is engaged in for each soldier) and this consciousness must be as
+lucid, and at least as strict as that of the enemy (for the enemy may be
+ignorant of certain weaknesses, it may be poorly informed). In short,
+an army which did not see its praxis and its limited range of choice as
+strictly defined by its object-being, and which, consequently, did not
+interiorise its entire objectivity as its being-outside-itself in the practical field, and which did not produce its action as a transcendence of
+this objectivity (in so far as it is strictly determined and known) - in
+short an army which was ignorant about itself in the way that an
+individual - apart from individual conflicts - is ignorant of himself
+(slightly, though not completely, by mistaking his own capacities,
+etc.) - would be heading for defeat. In fact, the practical project must
+also define, in a synthetic bond (the determination of a tactic or
+strategy) the objectivity of every army, through the praxis-subject of
+the Other; and this involves not only - though this is the basic structure
+- calculating the relation of forces, but also calculating it in the prospect
+of a particular action. In the same way, and in the same perspective,
+one not only has to realise one's own objectivity on the basis of a
+particular action by the enemy (the enemy attack on a particular formation, in a particular place, reveals this formation in its objective
+fragility as a point which may be breached and, as such, as needing
+reinforcements), but one also has to reassess the praxis-subject of the
+Other as object, that is to say, as the means of a praxis directed against
+the enemy (one allows him to advance in order to cut him off from his
+bases; thus one benefits from the enemy plan itself in so far as it is a
+project).
+
+810 Book II
+However, in so far as the enemy praxis is capable of becoming a
+means of its own failure, that is to say, in so far as it can become a
+praxis-object, it must itself be conditioned in itself by inertias, shortages, and ignorance - which of course is true of every praxis. Relative
+ignorance of the future and incomplete knowledge of the past are the
+material conditions enabling freedom to be treated as freedom-object
+(by a freedom which is better situated in relation to the past and the
+future). This is alienation, as a moment of struggle; but this alienation
+- which transforms the praxis of a group into passive activity, that is
+to say into a practico-inert process - comes to the praxis through the
+opposite praxis and through its action on the material conditions. The
+narrow pass is a passivity of the enemy praxis through the ignorance of
+the army leaders; the ambush transforms this passivity into a destiny
+instrumental process which presents itself to the soldiers doing the
+ambush (and, after a certain moment, to those who fall into the trap)
+as a passive activity produced by the manipulating group within the
+manipulated group.
+However, this freedom which has become a thing, that is to say
+freedom seen from the point of view of its alienation and through the
+realisation of this alienation, retains the signs of freedom as its seal. In
+fact this appropriated freedom, in so far as it has walked into the trap,
+becomes for both groups the means of its own liquidation as praxis. So
+from this point of view one can see an agreement about the object
+gradually being realised in the course of struggle. When the praxis of
+the surrounded group reveals its alienation, it still does not destroy
+itself; when it is surrounded, the organised group seeks to defend itself,
+to avoid extermination if possible, to hold out as long as it can, etc.;
+in short, it treats its own previous action as a past alienation which has to
+be transcended (if only in a hopeless battle or in surrender), and which
+therefore has to be preserved in the transcendence, at the very moment
+when the group which laid the ambush is trying to draw the consequences of this practico-inert activity of the Other, as the objective
+result of its own practice. Thus the agreement - which manifests itself
+in combat - arises, here, from the fact that alienated freedom has
+become for one of the groups and through the other the objective mediation between the two groups, that is to say, the object of antagonistic
+actions. (In this moment, any action by the surrounded group presupposes an admission of its own 'mistake' as a betrayal by common
+
+812
+freedom and a recognition of enemy praxis as constituting a dangerous
+passive activity which is identical with 'the mistake' and is simply a
+means of eradicating it).
+Thus we arrive at a first level of intelligibility in struggle in that the
+dialectical intelligibility of a project comprehends the comprehension
+of the project of the Other. This particular form of dialectical rationality
+is obviously an irreducible moment of the investigation: the bond
+between the two actions is both dialectical and anti-dialectical in each
+action considered on its own. It constitutes itself, in effect, as a negation
+of the Other to the degree that the Other is already in it as its negation.
+At this level this is not a genuine organic transcendence of an objective,
+existing condition, such as, for example, the transcendence by my
+project (by my praxis) of the previous moment of this praxis itself as
+mere transcended-being. The struggle is in itself the attempt by one
+free praxis to transcend another free praxis, and conversely; and consequently there can be no formal determination of the relationship
+between these two transcendences of transcendences, which necessarily
+include in themselves the permanent possibility (actualised in the
+moments of the struggle) of being transcended. For the transcendence
+itself is called into question by the Other, both in himself and in the
+Other, in so far as it only requires some lucky action which fully exploits the real situation to transform it, alive, into a practico-inert
+object (matter worked for the Other). Here in fact one can see, against
+the background of scarcity, the profound threat which man presents to
+man: man is the Being by whom (by whose praxis) man is reduced to
+the state of a haunted object - to the state of a worked matter whose
+functioning is determined and which is penetrated by ineffectual
+dreams (that is to say whose human transcendence (transcendance) would
+always be there, though as a self-confessed illusion which was incapable
+of disappearing)
+An individual undertaking may, of course, produce results which
+apparently resemble the action of a group on inanimate matter: a
+mountaineer may lose his way or make mistakes which lead him to fall
+into a crevasse. But in fact the resemblance is quite superficial: praxis,
+by definition, has ignorance and error as basic structures. In this case,
+the coefficient of adversity of matter is a special case of the adversity
+of the world as man's environment, and failure is still action proclaiming itself, if only in despair, as action. 131 Defeat in struggle, in contrast,
+131. A woman jumped out of a train. She fell under a carriage, and was
+
+812 Book II
+is produced by freedom and is comprehended as such. At this level,
+there is only one man: the man who realises himself as a man (as free
+praxis) by transforming the Other into a non-human object. And this
+man is in fact seen by his victim as the free realisation of humanity,
+producing itself through the de-humanisation of the Other. Thus
+struggle involves a reciprocal possibility that one of the two combatants
+will become a man and create the rule of man through the other's
+becoming-inert: and in the developing struggle, man and the destruction
+of man are given as abstract reciprocities which will be determined by
+concrete circumstances. It is this affirmation of dialectical Reason based
+on the negation of dialectical Reason in the Other (and comprehended
+as the possibility of being negated by the Reason of the Other) which
+we call the level of the anti-dialectic, that is to say, the irreducibility in
+each of the praxes of both.
+On the other hand, the praxis of the individual (or group) is always
+a comprehension of the Other (and tends to be a totalising comprehension: the limits are fixed only by the conditions of the struggle, and
+charady poduce ined fa transcendence dr the
+praxis in the light of its own objectives. In other words, the signification of an antagonistic action necessarily includes the signification of
+the Other, in that each of them is both signifier and signified. In the
+simplest and most theoretical case, that of a game of chess, the arrangement of the white pieces, at each move, defines its intelligibility through
+the double depth of the future: to comprehend a move is to see it in
+terms of the responses it ought to elicit from black (in so far as it is a
+specific modification of a determinate field in which the power relations
+are strict and completely known), but these responses themselves have
+practical significations only in so far as they allow white to occupy new
+positions. So there are, in principle, two series (two successions of
+moves, white and black). But in practice move No. I (by white) is made
+in the prospect of a complex of subsequent operations; and since these
+operations can be carried out only if the complex of black positions is
+rearranged, this first move (the first in this particular operation, not
+the first in the game) is played in order to elicit a certain response from
+terribly injured; she died saying over and over again: "I shouldn't have jumped,
+which was, in the midst of frightful agony, a pure and simple affirmation of the
+practical power of man over things.
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 813
+black (a displacement of pieces) to make way for move No. 2 by white.
+Now, this second move, which was planned from the very 'conception'
+of the project, is itself a means of provoking a certain defence by black
+whose function for white will be to make way for move No. 3,132 that
+is to say, the development of the attack, etc.
+Thus this is a miniature practical field which gains in rigour and
+precision what it loses in extension and complexity and which is always
+seen (by every adversary) both in its synchronic and in its diachronic
+totalisation. Every move is really a complete rearrangement, a transformation of the relations of all the pieces within the synthetic field.
+The future is relatively limited (in theory the game might go on for
+ever; but in practice the drama is quite short), but within the double,
+reciprocal temporalisation one can discern one series of successive
+objectives (each white move being directly aimed at a certain response
+by black, this response enabling white to achieve a second objective,
+etc.). Now, from the point of view of white, who is on the offensive, the
+temporal succession of white moves intertwines with that of black's
+responses until they become one: in effect, each position strictly implies
+the other. Thus, in so far as the options for black are gradually narrowed down to one (that is to say, to necessity), as in chess problems
+and 'end-games' and (this is partly the same thing) the more manifest
+the practical superiority of white, the whole operation will appear to
+reduce to the work of a single player on a material whose laws have
+been determined in advance. It suffices that the practical movement is
+defined by its end (check-mate), and this end by the rules of the game.
+Then it is possible to treat the black defence as a series of negative and
+predictable reactions, which can and must be governed, controlled, and
+elicited by white, that is to say, in short, as a negative, indirect instrumentality which white must be able to exploit in order to achieve his
+ends. At this level there is no longer any adversary: in chess problems,
+indeed, the player is usually alone, and exploits the black defence in
+order to reach the solution as quickly as possible: 'mate in three moves,
+etc. The way is open for a mathematics of games. But this mathematics
+is itself subordinate to action: it appears only when action is intentionally eliminated in favour of simple succession (that is to say, to
+132. But the project is really more complex: the choice of the Other intervenes
+as an intelligible possibility; after a given move, he may chose three replies. But i
+le chooses the first, I will reply by a particular attack, and if he chooses th
+second, he will be enabling me to make a particular manoeuvre, etc.
+
+814 Book II
+allow analytical Reason to determine certain relational systems which
+have to be reactualised by praxis).
+What concerns us in this example is not the abstract moment where
+praxis effaces itself before rigid relations; it is the moment where it
+becomes practically indifferent whether to attribute the complex of
+practical operations to a reciprocity of combat or to the isolated activity
+of an individual on an inert and strictly determined material. What is
+taking place? Simply this: if one of the adversaries is able to predict
+precisely the reactions of the other and elicit them by his action, and if
+his prediction corresponds for the enemy to the necessity of his reactions
+(that is to say, to their alienation), reciprocal and antagonistic action
+tends to become identical with individual action. But this can only mean
+that the dominated adversary has become no more than an object: and
+a basically similar transformation of the defeated takes place, only with
+less rigour, in the relations between a victorious army and a routed
+enemy. It is the relative unpredictability of the adversary - in so far as
+this unpredictability is comprehended and constitutes the ignorance of
+the Other - which allows struggle to retain its reciprocity. However,
+the mere fact that the limit-objective of everyone's action involves the
+integration of that of the Other as a simple indirect means shows that
+the comprehension of the other is the dialectical intelligibility of everyone's own action as its obverse, its organ of control, and its means of
+transcendence. And at the same time this comprehension posits itself
+as temporary because it takes place in the prospect of integrating the
+enemy into its victorious praxis and turning him into an inert, docile
+means of carrying victory to the limit.
+In short, between the two limit-possibilities (becoming an isolated
+agent, and being transformed into worked matter by enemy praxis,
+each of which reduces the struggle to a mere practical rearrangement
+of the field by the sovereign and which are also the goals pursued by
+each of the adversaries (and sometimes realised by one of them), the
+praxis of struggle arises in everyone as the comprehension of his objectbeing (in so far as it exists for the Other and threatens to enclose him
+one day in the Other) through his practical existence as a subject. In its
+attempted transcendence of this concrete objectivity (which only
+succeeds in so far as it is not prevented by the Other), the praxis of
+struggle awakens, actualises, comprehends and transcends (transcende)
+the constitutive praxis of the Other in so far as he is himself a practical
+subject; and in its action against the Other, on the completion of this
+very transcendence and through the mediation of the field of materiality,
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 815
+it reveals and produces the Other as an object. From this point of view,
+the anti-dialectical negation appears as a moment in a more complex
+dialectic. At first, in fact, this negation is precisely what is transcended:
+the praxis is constituted for both as the negation of a negation: not only
+through everyone's transcendence of his object-being, but practically
+through everyone's attempts to liquidate the practical subject in the
+Other outside and from the outside and to recover his objectivity
+through this transcendent (transcendante) destruction. Thus the
+antagonistic negation is grasped by everyone as a scandal which has to
+be transcended. But at the level of scarcity its origin does not lie in this
+revelation of scandal: it is a struggle for life; thus the scandal is not only
+grasped in its appearance as scandal, but also profoundly comprehended as the impossibility that the two should co-exist. Consequently the scandal is not, as Hegel supposed, the mere existence of the
+Other, which would take us back to a statute of unintelligibility. It lies
+in suffered (or threatened) violence, that is, in interiorised scarcity. In
+this respect, although the original fact is logically and formally contingent (scarcity is only a material given), its contingency is far from
+impairing the intelligibility of violence. What is important for the
+dialectical comprehension of the Other, is the rationality of his praxis.
+Now this rationality appears in violence itself, in so far as this is not the
+contingent ferocity of man, but everyone's intelligible reinteriorisation
+of the contingent fact of scarcity: human violence is meaningful
+(signifiante). And as this violence is a negation of the Other in everyone, negation, in its reciprocity, becomes meaningful in and through
+everyone, as scarcity turned practical agent, or in other words as
+human-scarcity. Thus practical negation is constituted as a negation of
+scandal-negation both in so far as the latter is the Other in everyone
+and in so far as this Other is interiorised scarcity.
+From this point of view, what is indissolubly negated by praxis is
+negation as the condition of man (that is to say, as a conditioning
+readopted in violence by the conditioned) and as the freedom of an
+Other. And in fact the scandal of the presence in me (as a mark of my
+object-being) of the Other's freedom as the freedom-negation of my
+treedom, is itselt a determination in rationality in so far as this negative
+freedom actualises in practice the impossibility of our co-existing in the
+held of scarcity. In short, on the basis of scarcity, and in the prospect
+of the amiatien of ho her, sue le is frene in a demeninge
+sense, is to grasp the praxis of the Other, through its ends and means,
+
+81G Book II
+as a simple, objective, transcendent (transcendante) temporalisation. To
+comprehend in struggle is to grasp the praxis of the Other in immanence, through its own objectivity and in a practical transcendence.
+I now comprehend the enemy through myself and myself through the
+enemy. His praxis does not appear as a pure transcendent (transcendante)
+temporalisation which I reproduce without participating in it; urgency
+forces me to discover my objectivity and adopt it in every detail; it
+forces me to penetrate, as far as concrete circumstances permit, the
+activity of the enemy. Comprehension is an immediate fact of reciprocity. But as long as this reciprocity remains positive, comprehension
+remains abstract and external. Struggle, in the field of scarcity, as
+negative reciprocity, engenders the Other as Other than man, or as
+anti-human; but at the same time I comprehend him, in the very springs
+of my praxis, as a negation of which I am a concrete practical negation,
+and as mortal danger.
+For each of the adversaries, this struggle is intelligible; or rather, at
+this level, it is intelligibility itself. Otherwise, reciprocal praxis would
+in itself have no meaning or goal. 133 But what concerns us is the
+general problem of intelligibility, particularly at the concrete level.
+Now, if a situated dialectic is possible, then social conflicts, battles, and
+regular conflicts, as complex events produced by the practices of
+reciprocal antagonism between two individuals or multiplicities, must
+in principle be comprehensible to the third parties who depend on them
+without participating, or to observers who see them from outside
+without being in any way involved. From this point of view, nothing
+is fixed a priori: the investigation has to be continued. In fact every
+adversary realises the intelligibility of the conflict because he totalises
+it for himself in and through his own press; but the reciprocal negation
+is, for the third party, the very reality of struggle. We have seen how
+133. Of course, this formal feature does not prevent there being varying
+degrees of reciprocal comprehension among enemies. This depends on circumstances; and people may be 'treated like children', 'tricked', etc.; or they may take
+part in absurd wars (as in the Late Middle Ages) in which the peculiar contradictions of the period resulted in the mutual incomprehension of the armies (who
+avoided confrontations). And as a result of failing to comprehend a technical
+improvement the French nobility were decimated by English archers. This much
+s obvious; or rather the enemy could always depend on a new weapon, an ur
+xpected, uncomprehended manoeuvre, to give it victory. But for this ver
+reason we should recognise that struggle as reciprocity is a function of reciprocity
+of comprehension. If one of the adversaries should cease to comprehend he
+would become the object of the Other.
+
+Class Struggle and Dialectical Reason 81J
+the mediation of the third party realises the transcendent (transcendante) objective unity of positive reciprocities. But is this unity still
+possible when each action is aimed at destroying that of the Other and
+when the observable results of this double negation are nil or - as usually happens - when the teleological significations which each adversary has inscribed in it have been partly erased or transformed by the
+Other, so that no trace of concerted activity is any longer to be seen?
+Similarly, to take the example of individual combat, each blow dealt by
+the one is dodged or parried or blocked by the Other - but not completely, unless they differ greatly in strength or skill. And the same observation - as we saw in The Problem of Method - applies to most of
+the historic 'days': they often ended indecisively. Thus the effects cannot be attributed entirely either to the rebels or to the government
+forces, and they have to be comprehended not as the realisation of a
+project, but in terms of how the action of each group (and also of
+chance, accident, etc.) prevented them from realising that of the Other,
+that is to say, to the extent that they are not practical significations, and
+that their mutilated, truncated meaning does not correspond to any
+one's practical plan so that, in this sense, they fall short of being human.
+But if this is what the historian recreating the "days' of 2o June or of 10
+August 1792 has to do, is it really appropriate to call this recreation
+intellection?
+These questions bring us at last to the real problem of History. If
+History really is to be the totalisation of all practical multiplicities and
+of all their struggles, the complex products of the conflicts and collaborations of these very diverse multiplicities must themselves be
+intelligible in their synthetic reality, that is to say, they must be comprehensible as the synthetic products of a totalitarian praxis. This means
+that History is intelligible if the different practices which can be found
+and located at a given moment of the historical temporalisation finally
+appear as partially totalising and as connected and merged in their very
+oppositions and diversities by an intelligible totalisation from which
+there is no appeal. It is by seeking the conditions for the intelligibility
+of historical vestiges and results that we shall, for the first time, reach
+the problem of totalisation without a totaliser and of the very foundations of this totalisation, that is to say, of its motive-forces and of its
+non-circular direction. Thus, the regressive movement of the critical
+investigation has demonstrated the intelligibility of practical structures
+and the dialectical relation which interconnects the various forms of
+active multiplicities. But, on the one hand, we are still at the level of
+
+828 Book II
+synchronic totalisation and we have not yet considered the diachronic
+depth of practical temporalisation; and on the other hand, the regressive movement has ended with a question: that is to say, it has to be
+completed by a synthetic progression whose aim will be to rise up to
+the double synchronic and diachronic movement by which History
+constantly totalises itself. So far, we have been trying to get back to the
+elementary formal structures, and, at the same time, we have located the
+dialectical foundations of a structural anthropology. These structures
+must now be left to live freely, to oppose and to co-operate with one
+another: and the reflexive investigation of this still formal project will
+be the object of the next volume. If the truth is one in its increasing
+internal diversification, then, by answering the last question posed by
+the regressive investigation, we shall discover the basic signification of
+History and of dialectical rationality.
+
+Sartre's Preface to The Problem of Method and Critique
+of Dialectical Reason
+I fear that the two works included in this volumet may appear to be
+unequal in importance and scope. Logically, the second should have
+come before the first, since it is intended to supply its critical foundations. But I was afraid that this mountain of notes might seem to have
+brought forth a mouse: why waste so much breath, use so much ink,
+or fill so much paper, simply to produce a few remarks about methodology! Moreover, since the second work did in fact grow from the
+first, it seemed best to preserve the chronological order - which, from
+a dialectical point of view, is always the most significant.
+The Problem of Method was an occasional piece - hence its somewhat
+hybrid character, and the fact that it seems to approach problems
+somewhat indirectly. A Polish journal decided to devote its Winter
+1957 issue to French culture, intending to give its readers a panorama
+of what we still refer to as 'nos familles d'esprit'. Many different writers
+were invited to participate, and I was asked to write on "The situation
+of Existentialism in 1957.
+I do not like speaking about existentialism. Inquiry ought to be
+indefinite: to give it a name and a definition is to button it up; and
+what remains of it then! A past, peripheral cultural fashion, not unlike
+a special brand of soap; in other words, an idea. I would not have
+accepted the Polish invitation if I had not seen it as an opportunity to
+explain, to a country with a Marxist culture, the present contradictions
+1. Sartre refers here to the French edition of The Problem of Method and
+Critique of Dialectical Reason. [Ed.]
+
+822
+of philosophy. From this point of view, I thought it might be possible
+to group the inner contlicts which divide philosophy around a single
+major opposition, between existence and knowledge. But my approach
+would have been more direct if arrangements for the special 'French'
+issue had not required me to concentrate on the existential ideology, a
+Marxist philosopher, Henri Lefebvre, having been invited to 'situate'
+the contradictions and development of Marxism in France in these
+years.
+My article was subsequently republished in the review Les Temps
+Modernes, but I altered it considerably to suit French readers. It is this
+version which is published here. The title has been changed from
+Existentialisme et Marxisme to Questions de Méthode (The Problem of
+Method).
+Finally, my intention is to raise one question, and only one: do we
+now possess the materials for constituting a structural, historical
+anthropology! This question is located within Marxist philosophy, for
+- as will become clear - I regard Marxism as the untranscendable
+philosophy for our time, and I believe that the ideology of existence,
+along with its 'comprehensive' method, is an enclave within Marxism
+itself, both produced and rejected by Marxism.
+The ideology of existence inherited two exigencies from the Marxism
+which revived it, and these in turn are derived from Hegelianism: if
+there is to be any such thing as a Truth in anthropology, it must have
+developed (devenue) and it must be a totalisation. Obviously this double
+exigency defines the movement of being and knowledge (or comprehension) which, since Hegel, has been known as 'dialectic'. Thus, in
+The Problem of Method, I have taken it for granted that such a totalisation is constantly developing both as History and as historical Truth.
+On this basic assumption, I have tried to explain the inner conflicts of
+philosophical anthropology, and at some points - in my chosen field
+of methodology - I have outlined provisional solutions to the problems. But obviously these contradictions, and the synthetic transcendence of them, will have no meaning or reality if History and Truth
+are not in fact totalising, and if - as positivists would claim - there are
+of humanity (une Vérité de l'Homme)?
+Not even empiricists have restricted the word 'Reason' to some
+kind of order amongst our thoughts. And any 'rationalism' would
+
+Annexe 823
+require that this 'order' should correspond to, or constitute, the order
+of being. From this point of view, if the correspondence (rapport)
+between the historical totalisation and the totalising Truth is possible,
+and if this correspondence is a double movement in both knowledge
+and being, we shall be justified in calling this changing relation Reason.
+Consequently the aim of my inquiry will be to establish whether the
+positivist Reason of the natural Sciences is the same as the Reason
+which is to be found in the development of anthropology, or whether
+the knowledge and comprehension of man by man involves not only
+special methods but also a new form of Reason, that is, a new relation
+between thought and its object. In other words, is there such a thing
+as dialectical Reason?
+But it is not a matter of discovering a dialectic: Dialectical thought
+became conscious of itself, historically, at the beginning of the last
+century; and besides, historical and ethnological investigations have
+themselves brought to light various dialectical domains in human
+activity. However, on the one hand, investigation cannot, in general,
+establish more than partial, contingent truths; and on the other, dialectical thought has, since Marx, directed its attention to its object rather
+than to itself. We are facing the same difficulty which confronted
+analytical Reason at the end of the eighteenth century, when it became
+necessary to prove its legitimacy. But our problem is made harder by
+the fact that we have the solution of critical idealism already behind us.
+Knowledge is a mode of being; but for a materialist it is out of the
+question to reduce being to knowledge.
+However: anthropology will continue to be a mere confusion of
+empirical data, positivistic inductions and totalising interpretations,
+until the legitimacy of dialectical Reason has been established, that is to
+say, until we have earned the right to study a person, a human group
+or a human object in the synthetic reality of their significations and of
+their relations to the developing totalisation; in other words, until we
+have proved that any isolated knowledge of men or their products must
+either transcend itself towards the totality or reduce to an error of
+incompleteness. Our approach will therefore be critical in that it will
+be an attempt to determine the validity and the limits of dialectical
+Reason, and this will mean identifying both the oppositions and the
+connections between this Reason and positivist, analytical Reason. But
+it must also be dialectical, since dialectic is necessary for dealing with
+dialectical problems. This is not a tautology, as I shall show later. In
+the first volume of this work, I shall simply outline a theory of practical
+
+824
+ensembles, that is to say, of series and groups as moments of the
+totalisation. In Volume Two, which will appear later, 1 shall approact
+he problem of totalisation itself, that is to say, of History in it
+development and of Truth in its becoming.
+
+Glossary
+alienation
+alterity
+analytical reason
+anti-dialectic
+class
+comprehension
+collective
+common individual
+constituent dialectic
+constituted dialectic
+the condition in which free praxis is taken
+over and controlled by the other or by the
+practico-inert.
+a relation of separation, opposed to
+reciprocity
+the form of reason appropriate to the
+external relations which are the object of
+the natural sciences
+the result of a praxis being turned against
+itself by the practico-inert
+the developing totalisation of three kinds
+of ensemble: institutionalised groups,
+pledged groups and series
+the understanding of a praxis in terms of
+the purposes of its agent or agents (cf.
+"intellection')
+a passive structure of the practico-inert
+corresponding to a series
+a member of a group (cf. 'group')
+the dialectic of individual praxis
+the dialectic of group praxis
+
+828 Glossary
+destiny
+dialectic
+ensemble
+exigency
+exis
+fraternity-terror
+fused group
+(groupe en fusion)
+gathering
+(rassemblement)
+group
+a future inscribed in the practico-inert
+(cf. 'interest")
+the intelligibility of praxis at every level
+a collection of individuals, however
+related
+a necessity imposed by the practico-inert
+an inert, stable condition opposed to
+prasis
+the relation of an individual to a pledged
+group to which he belongs
+a newly formed group, directly opposed
+to seriality, and unstructured
+a series which is capable of constituting a
+group
+an ensemble each of whose members is
+determined by the others in reciprocity
+(in contrast to a series)
+immanence-transcendence the ability at once to command a group
+and to merge with it, characteristic of
+members of a fused group
+institution
+a group which develops from a pledged
+group through the ossification of its
+structures and the emergence of sovereignty and seriality within it
+intellection
+the explanation of a praxis, not necessarily
+in terms of the purposes of its agent or
+agents (cf. 'comprehension'")
+
+interest
+investigation
+(expérience)
+multiplicity
+organised group
+other-direction
+(extéro-conditionnement)
+pledged group
+practico-inert
+praxis
+project
+scarcity
+(rareté)
+series
+sovereign
+statute
+Glossary 829
+being-outside-oneself in the practicoinert (cf. 'destiny")
+the process of understanding History, as
+corresponding to the historical process
+itself
+a collection of individuals, however
+related
+a group based on a pledge
+the manipulation of a series by a sovereign
+a group which develops from a fused
+group through an organised distribution
+of rights and duties enforced by a pledge
+matter in which past praxis is embodied
+the activity of an individual or group in
+organising conditions in the light of some
+end
+a chosen way of being, expressed in praxis
+the contingent impossibility of satisfying
+all the needs of an ensemble
+an ensemble each of whose members is
+determined in alterity by the others (in
+contrast to a group)
+an individual (or group) who (or which)
+manipulates series within an institutional
+group
+the condition of an individual (or ensemble) in so far as it is prescribed by the
+
+830 Glossary
+structure
+third party
+(tiers)
+totalisation
+transcendence
+(dépassement)
+transcendent
+(transcendant)
+univocal
+kind of ensemble to which he (or it)
+belongs
+an adopted inertia, characteristic of organised groups and open to investigation
+by analytical reason
+an individual who unifies a group by
+observing or commanding it
+the constantly developing (en cours)
+process of understanding and making
+history, (obscured, according to Sartre
+by the "scholastic" notion of totality
+employed by Lukács and others)
+the process of going beyond present
+conditions towards a future which at once
+negates and incorporates them
+escaping from given conditions
+one sided, non-reciprocal
+
+Abstraction, 324, 327-8
+'Agreement of minds', 531-3
+Algeria, 714-34
+Alienation, 64n, 66-7, 72n, 96, 153-
+220 (esp. 181, 186), 227, 292, 306-
+3071, 331, 336, 337-8, 378, 396, 435,
+455, 458, 484-5, 5477, 557, 578,
+587-8, 606, 615-16, 628, 631, 665-8,
+678, 704, 712, 741, 747, 788→2, 810
+Analytical Reason, 58-64, 190, 502-4,
+501-3, 698, 700, 710, 712, 739, 789,
+800-5,823
+Anti-semitism, 267-8, 652-3
+Apocalypse, 357, 382-3, 684
+Bachelard, Gaston, 20
+Baptism, 485-6n
+Bataille, Georges, 1o6n
+Being and Nothingness, 227n, 235
+'Bewitched Quantity', 173-6
+Biemel, Walter, 181
+Blanc, Louis, 759, 762-4
+Blanqui, Auguste, §20
+Bloch, Marc, 145, 345-6, 804
+Bonaparte, Louis Napoleon, 755
+Braudel, Fernand, 167-80, 225
+Bugeaud, Thomas, 717, 719
+Bureaucracy, 658
+Cardano, G., 19In
+Caus, S. de, IgIn
+Index
+Charles V of Spain, 166
+Chateaubriand F.-R. de, 779
+Circularity (of dialectical investigation), 68-79, 145, 100, 394, 071-8
+Class, 65, 67, 144-52, 1751, 195-6,
+204-5, 214-19, 228-52 (esp. 251),
+306-16 (esp. 312, 315), 348, 349,
+037-8, 678-710, 739-40, 757-8
+Class Struggle, 193-4, 679-80, 71I,
+734, 787-8, 794-805
+Collectives, 150, 231, 252, 253-341
+(esp. 255,288, 304n, 318), 631
+Colonialism, III, 300-31, 716-34
+Community, the common individual,
+382, 435-7-443-40 448-63, 486-81
+537-8, 599-600,678,751
+Comprehension, 74-6, 696, 701, 706,
+815-16
+Concepts, 262-3, 267, 5971, 752
+Condillac, E. B. de, 740
+Contradiction, 193
+Cult of Personality, 66z
+Deacon, A. B., 501, 502
+Deforestation in China, I6I-5, 225
+Destiny, 179, 197-219, 259, 551, 663
+Detotalisation, 280, 570, 579
+Dialectic, 15-76, 180, 318-19, 340-1,
+80I-5; dialectical intelligibility, 16o,
+316-24; dialectical logic, 86; dialectical reason, 69, 504, 561-3; anti-
+
+832 Index
+Dialecticcontd.
+dialectic (dialectic of passivity), 66,
+319-20, 348, 713; constituent (and
+constituted) dialectic, 66-2, 341,
+505-63 (esp. 505-6, 536-7,557-81,
+662, 665-6; external dialectic, 26-32,
+84,319, 521, 551; historical dialectic, 220-3; idealist dialectic, 345;
+materialist dialectic, 221-2, 30
+Dialectical Hyper-empiricism', 17, 35
+Dialectical Materialism, 21, 27, 3-
+Dialectic of Nature, 27-8, 71:
+Dictatorship of the Proletariat, 660-
+663
+Dühring, Eugen, 144, 148, 157, 7II
+Durkheim, Emile, 178, 355, 595
+"Economic laws', 748-9
+Economic World', 728-2
+Economism, 711-13, 716
+Engels, Friedrich, 27n, 29л, 31-2, 34,
+43,44, 471, 84, 82, 142-52, 153-8,
+320, 521, 711, 7371, 738
+Ethics, 132-4, 229, 247-50n, 735-6
+Exigency, 187-26, 326-7, 426, 449
+Existentialism, 231, 831-2
+Expression, 497-8
+Falloux, Frédéric, 759, 766, 778
+Faraday, Michael, 42
+February Revolution (1848), 755-70
+Ferry, Jules, 715
+Flammerment, Jules, 4II
+Flaubert, Gustave, 199, 226, 754
+Flesselle, J. de, 357
+Football teams, 450-1, 456-60, 473
+Foucault, Léon, 42
+Franco, Francisco, 720
+Franklin, Benjamin, 195
+Fraternity-Terror, 437-44,
+468-70,
+523,577,582, 608
+ree praxis, 739, 7
+reedom-Terror, 61
+French Revolution, 16, 293-306, 351-
+363,592-8
+Freud, Anna, 18
+Function, 448-63, 47
+Fused groups, 345-404 (esp. 357),
+405-13,418, 434, 449, 470
+Generations, 666
+Geometrical proof, 6I-41
+Girardin, St-Marc, 753, 79
+Groups, 65, 67, 68, 255, 345-51,
+664-76; see also, fused group, institution
+Grousset, René, 16I
+Guérin, Daniel, 523
+Guillemin, Henri, 764
+Gurvitch, Georges, 17
+Hamelin, Octave, 44
+Hamilton, Earl, 174
+Hardy, S.-P., 358-
+Haxthausen, August, 142
+Hearst, William Randolph, 632
+Hegel, Georg Wilhelm, 21, 23, 24, 29,
+30п, 31, 32, 44, 471, 50, 1711, 180,
+227,235, 285, 291, 331, 638, 815, 822
+Heidegger, Martin, 181, 227n
+Historical Materialism, 15, 19
+Hitler, Adolf, 639
+Hu41-g, oute coumanian of 2b24,
+799-801
+Husserl, Edmund, 35
+Hyper-organicism - see organicism
+Hyppolite, Jean, 22, 44, 3077
+Idea, as product of matter, 170-1,
+241; as serial, 299, 300 -6n, 363, 720;
+and structure, 499-504; and group
+praxis, 447-8, 538-9
+Imagination, 45
+Imitation (as a serial process), 353-5
+Immanence-Transcendence-see Transcendence-Immanence
+Individual praxis - see organic individuals
+Institutions and Institutional Groups,
+350, 3907, 570-663 (esp. 591)
+Intellection, 74-6, 817
+
+Interest,
+2582,
+178, 190, 197-218, 257,
+ideological
+interest,
+203-4,527-8
+Iron and Coal Complex, 239, 7389
+Isolation - as project, 257-8
+Jaurès, Jean, 16, 362, 520
+Juridical power, 440-7
+Kant, Immanuel, 22, 29, 35, 43, 65, 178
+Kardiner, A., IGon, 552
+Kierkegaard, Søren, 17-18n
+Labiche, Eugène, 554n
+Labour, 89-94
+Labrousse, Ernest, 169
+Lambesc, Charles, Prince de, 357
+Language, 98-100
+Lanzmann, Claude, 232
+Le Bon, Joseph, 390
+Le Chapelier, I.-R.-G., 292
+Lefebvre, Henri, 822
+Lefebvre, Georges, 16, I7, 295, 4II,
+592, 593, 759, 804
+Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, 520, 640
+Liberal Ideology, 748-9
+Lévi-Strauss,
+Claude,
+106-8,
+464,
+480-5,508
+Lewin, Kurt, 279, 551
+Logic, 17-18n
+Louis XIV, 639
+Louis XVI, 353
+Luxemburg, Rosa, 520
+Machinery, 206-19, 232-4, 308, 3II;
+universal
+vs. specialised,
+241-7,
+325-6
+Malraux, André, 357
+Malthus, Thomas, 147
+Malthusianism, 667, 754, 782-8
+Manichaeism, 132-4, 556, 736
+Marginalism, 176 7n
+Market, 281-90
+Marrast, Armand, 759
+Marx, Karl, 23, 29, 35, 50, 26, 140-52,
+154, I55, 171N, I76n, 216, 230, 233,
+234, 306, 475, 039, 740, 766, 783, 801
+Mascolo, Dionys, 637
+Index 833
+Massification, 06, 156, 175, 200, 212,
+225,257,258, 604, 609,704
+Maurer, G. L. von, 142
+Maurras, Charles, 77
+Lauss, Marcel, 10(
+Maxwell, James Clerk, 42
+Mediation (mediated reciprocity), 374-
+404 (esp. 392),576-83
+Medina, Bartolomeo de, 167
+Mendoza, Don Juan de, 177n
+Mirabeau, Honoré-Gabriel, 353
+Monism, 15-17, 25, 180
+Montjoye, F.-C.-L., 35'
+Moreno, J., 55:
+Murant, evis, 15
+Musset, Alfred de, 779-80
+Nasmyth, James, 214
+Nations, 474
+Naville, Pierre, 24n, 29-30, 44, 84
+Negation of the negation, 83-8, 89,
+lee, zen, Thomas, 19
+lewton, Isaac, 31-
+Objectification, 72п, 112, 153-97, 227,
+228, 316, 318-21, 378, 458-9, 665-8,
+Organic individuals (common), 453-
+463,499, 508-9, 564-75, 596; - and
+their comprehension of groups, $13
+Organicism, 345-8, 505-8, 520-1,
+538-9
+Organisation, organised groups, 209,
+445-504, 505-63; - "from above' vs.
+"from below', 519-24
+Other-Dire Gro 6, 2-39
+Papin, Denis, 192
+Philip II of Spain, I66, 170
+Pledge, 417-28, 486-95, 519, 584-5
+
+834 Index
+Potlatch, 106
+Pouillon, Jean, 492, 497
+Practico-inert, 67, 71, 318-20, 556-7,
+678,713
+Praxis, 79-94, 409, 7341, 789; - and
+process, 548-58,097,725
+Problem of Method, Ihe, I5, 18, 40, 51,
+74,97,135, I60n, 226, 238, 252, 257,
+3500, 475, 509, 685, 704, 708п, 817,
+Process, 299, 304n, 547
+Proletarian self-emancipation, 692
+Proust, Marcel, 257
+Primitive Thought, 501-4
+Psychoanalysis, I7n
+Quasi-sovereignty, quasi-totality, etc.,
+578-81, 607-8, 610-13
+Queues, as series, 250-70, 371-2
+Racism, III, 300-31, 652-4, 714-34,
+739-40,752
+Rakosi, Matyas, 477
+Reciprocity, 109-21, 374-404 (esp.
+392), 421-2, 614, 735, 804. See also
+Mediation
+Recurrence, 288, 291, 591, 627
+Reflection, 30
+Regulation, the regulatory third party,
+379-82, 576-29, 607-2
+Reification, 66n, 26, 176, 198, 606, 628,
+704,712, 788→9
+Representation, 351-2
+Reveillon, 358-2n
+Revolutionary praxis, 349
+Riesmann, David, 643n
+Rights and Duties, 450-2
+Sacred, 442-3
+Sainte-Claire Deville, Henri, 84n
+Saint-Exupéry, Antoine de, 452
+Sauvy, Alfred, 742
+Scandal, 277, 346-7
+Scarcity, 113, 261, 320, 735, 739, 794,
+815
+Seal, 71, 751, I6I
+Selective groups, 474
+Series, seriality, 65, 66-7, 68, 171, 255,
+256-69 (esp. 262-4), 596; - and class,
+306-18; serial identity, 259-64;
+serial flight, 267, 745-5I; formula of
+• series, 264, 260, 302n, 347, 35°
+643-59. (See also Collectives
+Sexual fantasy, 234-5
+Sieyès, E.-J., 363, 382-3
+Signification, 178-83
+Skill and deskilling, 241-7
+Slavery, 156-8
+Smith, Adam, 147
+Soboul, Albert, 38zn
+Society, 635-42
+Sociology, 715-16, 718-19
+Sovereignty, 187, 370, 452, 578, 607-35
+(esp. 609-10, 618-23), 655-63
+Spectre of Stalin, The, 477n
+Spinoza, Baruch, 85, 702, 778
+Stalinism, 50
+State, 178, 215, 635-42, 750-
+Statutory group, 405-44, 449, 464,
+465n (see also pledged group)
+Stendhal, M.-H. B., 395
+Storming the Bastille, 351-63, 398-9
+tructure, 448, 479-50
+upply and demand Curves, 282-
+Surviving groups, 414-17, 43
+Syndicalism, 242-'
+Taylor, Frederick, 559, 670
+Taylorism, 559-63
+"Team Spirit', 460
+Temporalisations, their plurality, 666
+Tennis court oath, 419, 467
+Terror, 430-44, 449, 583, 588, 593,
+597n
+Thiers, Adolphe, 778
+Third Party, 106-9, 114-21, 187, 339,
+366-73- 374-404, 405-44, 445-504,
+505-63 (esp. 529-31), 570-83
+Thought, 529-33, 631-2 (see also
+Idea
+Тор Теп, 642-54
+Tocqueville, Alexis de, 759, 764
+Totalisation, 45-7, 76, 366-73, 492,
+577, 744, 758, 817-18, 822; - without a totaliser, 64, 817
+
+Totality, 45-7, 492; detotalised, 286
+Transcendence-Immanence,
+371-82,
+523-4,577
+Trotsky, Leon, 520, 521
+"Trouble Makers', 656
+Unionism and skilled workers, 244,
+680-1
+Ure, Andrew, 214
+Index 835
+Violence, 719-21, 726-7, 736-7
+Waelhens, Anton de, 181
+Watt, James, 192, 196
+Weber, Max, 179
+Wells, H. G., 720n
+Women workers, 232-5
+Worked Matter, 179-83
+Zola, Émile, 170
+
+Comparative Pagination Chart
+English
+French
+IS
+135
+20
+140
+30
+149
+40
+158
+So
+166
+60
+17S
+184
+194
+English
+420
+430
+French
+SI9
+529
+539
+S47
+SS7
+566
+576
+585
+595
+603
+613
+622
+632
+886
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/5e7ab2596378ecf03260dce976efe06f291d1b18ff4a91b966d4ced89d0d00b0.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/5e7ab2596378ecf03260dce976efe06f291d1b18ff4a91b966d4ced89d0d00b0.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..08d1977bbfe055871eb8d055b21602d5abda6365
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/5e7ab2596378ecf03260dce976efe06f291d1b18ff4a91b966d4ced89d0d00b0.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -10986,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "5e7ab2596378ecf03260dce976efe06f291d1b18ff4a91b966d4ced89d0d00b0",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 3194,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "ef121cde805112eef000ee575368fd3faab5fc1e475715934920b15d23b0093e",
+  "output_sha256": "4bed96d2c58ec7c8db39efd0374a2c9f3f2cc3c2330e6a7f16e133d134893beb",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/64134f8ed757ecde01a57d99a3356f5ffda3fa8a99b6a7b6f033c874b15529e0.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/64134f8ed757ecde01a57d99a3356f5ffda3fa8a99b6a7b6f033c874b15529e0.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3e7acbe1bdff0eedbb0f253ee659630aa4820b9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/64134f8ed757ecde01a57d99a3356f5ffda3fa8a99b6a7b6f033c874b15529e0.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5348 @@
+GOTTLOR FREGE
+the foundations of arithmetic
+I lie foundations of artimete
+the foundations of arithmetic
+translated by J. L. Austin
+QA
+9
+F7514
+1960
+HARPER TORCHBOOKS
+The Science Library / TB 534 / $1.25
+
+QA
+9
+F7514
+1960
+Frege, Gottlob
+The foundations of
+arithmetic
+DATE DUE
+BORROWER'S NAME
+#10129
+ROOM
+NUMBER
+QA
+9
+F7514
+1960
+#10129
+Frege, Gottlob, 1848-1925.
+The
+foundations of
+arithmetic: a
+Logico-mathematical
+enquiry into the
+concept of
+number / Gottlob Frege;
+Translated by J. L• Austin• 2nd rev.
+ed. New York
+: Harper, 1960•
+Xxiiis 119 : 21
+em. (Harper
+torchbooks)
+Translation of: Grundlagen der
+Arithmetik•
+Includes
+bibiographical references•
+#10129 Gift $
+1. Number concept.
+2• Mathematics--
+Philosophy•
+mathematical•
+Logic,
+Symbolic and
+I• Title
+10 SEP 91
+1864616 NEWC*C
+A62-1847
+
+The
+FOUNDATIONS
+of
+ARITHMETIC
+DUE DATE
+Printed
+in USA
+THE LIBRARY
+NEW COLLEGE OF CALIFORNIA
+SO FELL STREET
+SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102
+(413) 626-4212
+
+HARPER TORCHBOOKS / The Cloister Library
+Tor Andrae
+Augustine/Przywara
+Roland H. Bainton
+Karl Barth
+Karl Barth
+Nicolas Berdyaev
+Nicolas Berdyaev
+J. H. Breasted
+Martin Buber
+MOHAMMED: The Man and His Faith TB/62
+AN AUGUSTINE SYNTHESIS
+TB/35
+THE TRAVAIL OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
+тв/30
+DOGMATICS IN OUTLINE
+THE WORD OF GOD AND THE WORD OF MAN
+THE BEGINNING AND THE END
+THE DESTINY OF MAN
+DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION AND THOUGHT IN ANCIENT EGYPT
+ECLIPSE OF GOD: Studies in the Relation Between Religion and
+Philosophy
+TB/12
+Martin Buber
+Martin Buber
+Martin Buber
+Jacob Burckhardt
+Edward Conze
+Frederick Copleston
+F. M. Cornford
+G. G. Coulton
+G. G. Coulton
+H. G. Creel
+Adolf Deissmann
+C. H. Dodd
+Johannes Eckhart
+Mircea Eliade
+Morton S. Enslin
+Morton S. Enslin
+G. P. Fedotov
+Ludwig Feuerbach
+Harry E. Fosdick
+Henri Frankfort
+Sigmund Freud
+Maurice Friedman
+O. B. Frothingham
+Edward Gibbon
+MOSES: The Revelation and the Covenant TB/27
+THE PROPHETIC FAITH
+TB / 73
+TWO TYPES OF FAITH
+TB/75
+THE
+CIVILIZATION OF THE RENAISSANCE IN ITALY [Illustrated Edition]: Vol. 1, TB/40 ; Vol. II, TB/41
+BUDDHISM: Its Essence and Development TB/58
+MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
+TB/76
+FROM RELIGION TO PHILOSOPHY: A Study in the Origins of Western
+Speculation
+MEDIEVAL FAITH AND SYMBOLISM [Part I of "Art and the Reformation"]
+THE FATE OF MEDIEVAL ART IN THE RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION
+[Part II of "Art and the Reformation"]
+CONFUCIUS AND THE CHINESE WAY
+PAUL: A Study in Social and Religious History TB/15
+THE AUTHORITY OF THE BIBLE
+MEISTER ECKHART: A Modern Translation
+COSMOS AND HISTORY: The Myth of the Eternal Return TB/50
+CHRISTIAN BEGINNINGS
+THE LITERATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT
+RUSSIAN RELIGIOUS MIND: Kievan Christianity, the roth to the
+13th Centuries
+TB/70
+THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY. Intro. by Karl Barth TB/II
+A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE BIBLE
+ANCIENT EGYPTIAN RELIGION: An Interpretation
+AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: Papers on the Psychology
+of Art, Literature, Love, Religion
+MARTIN BUBER: The Life of Dialogue
+TRANSCENDENTALISM IN NEW ENGLAND: A History
+THE END OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE IN THE WEST [J. B. Bury Edition,
+illus., Chapters 36-43]
+Edward Gibbon
+OF CHRISTENDOM IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE [J. B. Bury
+Edition, illus., Chapters 15-20]
+C. C. Gillispie
+GENESIS AND GEOLOGY: A Study in the Relations of Scientific
+Thought,
+Natural Theology, and Social Opinion in Great
+Britain, 1790-1850
+TB/51
+Maurice Goguel
+Maurice Goguel-
+Edgar J. Goodspeed
+H. J.
+C. Grierson
+William Haller
+Adolf Harnack
+Edwin Hatch
+Karl Heim
+F. H. Heinemann
+S. R. Hopper, ed.
+Johan Huizinga
+Aldous Huxley
+THE ORIGINS OF CHRISTIANITY I: Prolegomena to the
+Life of Jesus
+JESUS AND THE ORIGINS OF CHRISTIANITY II: The Life of Jesus
+TB/66
+A LIFE OF JESUS
+TB/ I
+CROSS-CURRENTS
+17TH
+CENTURY ENGLISH LITERATURE: The
+World, the Flesh, the Spirit
+TB /47
+THE RISE OF PURITANISM
+TB/22
+WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY? Intro. by Rudolf Bultmann TB/17
+THE INFLUENCE OF GREEK IDEAS ON CHRISTIANITY
+CIRISTIAN FAITH AND NATURAL SCIENCE
+EXISTENTIALISM AND THE MODERN PREDICAMENT
+SPIRITUAL PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE
+ERASMUS AND THE AGE OF REFORMATION. Illus.
+DEVILS OF LOUDUN: A Study in the Psychology
+Politics and Mystical Religion in the France of Cardinal Riche-
+Flavius Josephus
+Immanuel
+Kant
+of Power
+TB/74
+THE GREAT ROMAN-JEWISH WAR, With The Life of Josephus
+RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE
+(continued on next page)
+
+Alexandre Koyré
+Emile Mâle
+T. J. Meek
+H. Richard Niebuhr
+H. Richard Niebuhr
+Martin P. Nilsson
+H
+• J. Rose
+Josiah Royce
+Auguste Sabatier
+George Santayana
+George Santayana
+F. Schleiermacher
+H. O. Taylor
+Paul Tillich
+Ernst Troeltsch
+E. B. Tylor
+E. B. Tylor
+Evelyn Underhill
+Evelyn Underhill
+Johannes Weiss
+Wilhelm Windelband
+Wilhelm Windelband
+EDIFYING DISCOURSES: A Selection
+TB/32
+THE JOURNALS OF KIERKEGAARD: A Selection
+TB/52
+PURITY OF HEART
+TB/4
+FROM THE CLOSED WORLD TO THE INFINITE UNIVERSE
+TB/31
+THE GOTHIC IMAGE: Religious Art in France of the 13th Century.
+Illus.
+TB/44
+HEBREW ORIGINS
+TB /69
+CHRIST AND CULTURE
+TB/3
+THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN AMERICA
+GREEK FOLK RELIGION
+TB /78
+TB/49
+RELIGION IN GREECE AND ROME
+TB/55
+THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF PHILOSOPHY: A Critique of the Bases of
+Conduct and of Faith
+TB / 29
+OUTLINES OF A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION BASED ON
+PSYCHOLOGY
+AND HISTORY
+TB/23
+INTERPRETATIONS OF POETRY AND RELIGION
+TB/9
+WINDS OF DOCTRINE and PLATONISM AND THE SPIRITUAL LIFE TB/24
+ON RELIGION: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers
+TB /36
+THE EMERGENCE OF CHRISTIAN CULTURE IN THE WEST: The Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages
+TB/48
+DYNAMICS OF FAITH
+TB/42
+THE
+SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES. Intro. by H.
+Richard Niebuhr Vol. 1, TB/71; Vol. !!,
+THE by Faul Rad CULTURE [Part I of "Primitive Culture"]. Intro.
+TB/33
+RELIGION IN PRIMITIVE CULTURE [Part II of "Primitive Culture"].
+Intro. by Paul Radin
+TB / 34
+THE GOLDEN SEQUENCE: A Fourfold Study of the Spiritual Life
+WORSHIP
+TB/10
+EARLIEST CHRISTIANITY: A History of the Period A.D. 30-150. Intro.
+by F. C. Grant Vol. I, TB/53; Vol. II, TB/54
+A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY I: Greek, Roman,
+Medieval
+TB /38
+HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY II: Renaissance, Enlightenment, Modern
+HARPER TORCHBOOKS / The Science Library
+Angus d'A. Bellairs
+L. von Bertalanffy
+R. B. Braithwaite
+Louis de Broglie
+J. Bronowski
+A. J. Cain
+T. G. Cowling
+W. C. Dampier, ed.
+H. Davenport
+W. H. Dowdeswell
+C. V. Durell
+Arthur Eddington
+Alexander Findlay
+Gottlob Frege
+Max Jammer
+D. E. Littlewood
+J. E. Morton
+J. R. Partington
+H. T. Pledge
+John Read
+George Sarton
+Paul A. Schilpp, ed.
+PROBLEMS OF fL HA, Falation, nd SerBil, as and Scieno
+PROBLEMS OF LIFF: An
+tific Thought
+SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
+PHYSICS AND MICROPHYSICS. Foreword by Albert Einstein TB/514
+SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES
+TB/505
+ANIMAL SPECIES AND THEIR EVOLUTION. Illus.
+TB/519
+MOLECULES IN MOTION: An Introduction to the Kinetic Theory of
+Gases. Illus.
+TB/516
+READINGS IN THE LITERATURE OF SCIENCE. Illus.
+TB/512
+THE HIGHER ARITHMETIC: An Introduction to the Theory of Numbers
+TB/526
+THE MECHANISM OF EVOLUTION. Illus.
+TB /527
+READABLE RELATIVITY. Foreword by Freeman J. Dyson
+TB/530
+SPACE, TIME AND GRAVITATION: An Outline of the General Relativity
+Theory
+TB/510
+CHEMISTRY IN THE SERVICE OF MAN. Illus.
+TB/524
+THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARITHMETIC
+CONCEPTS OF SPACE. Foreword by Albert Einstein TB/533
+THE SKELETON KEY OF MATHEMATICS
+MOLLUSCS: An Introduction to their Form and Functions. Illus.
+TB/529
+A SHORT HISTORY OF CHEMISTRY. Illus. TB/522
+SCIENCE SINCE 1500: A Short Histor 506 Mathematics, Playsics,
+Chemistry, and Biology. Illus.
+A DIRECT ENTRY TO ORGANIC CHEMISTRY. Illus.
+ANCIENT SCIENCE AND
+MODERN
+CIVILIZATION
+1B/ 501
+ALBERT EINSTEIN: Philosopher-Scientist: Vol. I, TB/5oz; Vol. I,
+TB/503
+(continued on next page)
+
+P. M. Sheppard
+O. (
+G. Sutton
+NATURAL SELECTION AND HEREDITY. Illus. TB/528
+MATHEMATICS IN ACTION. Foreword by James R. Newman. Illus.
+TB/518
+Stephen Toulmin
+A. G. Van Melsen
+Friedrich Waismann
+THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: An Introduction
+FROM ATOMOS TO ATOM: The History of the Concept Atom
+INTRODUCTION TO
+MATHEMATICAL THINKING. Foreword by
+W. H. Watson
+G. J. Whitrow
+Edmund Whittaker
+UNDERSTANDING PHYSICS: An Analysis of the Philosophy of
+Physics. Intro. by Ernest Nagel
+THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF THE UNIVERSE: An Introduction
+to Cosmology. Illus.
+HISTORY OF THE
+THEORIES OF AETHER AND
+ELECTRICITY: Vol. I,
+Classical Theories,
+TB/531; Vol. I1, The
+Modern
+Theories,
+TB/532
+A. Wolf A HISTORY OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
+16TH AND 17TH CENTURIES. Illus. Vol. I, TB/508; Vol. II,
+TB/509
+HARPER TORCHBOOKS / The Academy Library
+James Baird
+Henri Bergson
+H. J. Blackham
+Walter Bromberg
+Abraham Cahan
+Helen Cam
+G. G. Coulton
+Wilfrid Desan
+ISHMAEL: A Study of the Symbolic Mode in Primitivism
+TB/1023
+TIME AND FREE WILL: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Conscious-
+MeSS
+SIX
+TB/1021
+EXISTENTIALIST THINKERS: Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Nietzsche,
+Marcel, Heidegger, Sartre
+TB/1002
+THE MIND OF MAN: A History of Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis
+TE/1003
+THE RISE OF
+DAVID LEVINSKY: A Novel. Intro. by John Higham
+TB/1028
+ENGLAND BEFORE ELIZABETH
+тв/ 1026
+MEDIEVAL VILLAGE, MANOR, AND MONASTERY
+Tв/1020
+THE TRAGIC FINALE: An Essay on the Philosophy of Jean-Paul
+John N. Figgis
+Editors of Fortune
+G. P. Gooch
+Francis J. Grund
+W. K. C. Guthrie
+Henry James
+Henry James
+Henry
+James
+Arnold Kettle
+L. S. B. Leakey
+Bernard Lewis
+Arthur O. Lovejoy
+Niccolo Machiavelli
+J. P. Mayer
+John U. Nef
+Robert Payne
+Samuel Pepys
+Georges Poulet
+Priscilla Robertson
+Ferdinand Schevill
+Bruno Snell
+W. H. Walsh
+W. Lloyd Warner
+Alfred N. Whitehead
+POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM GERSON TO GROTIUS: 1414-1625: Seven
+Studies. Intro. by Garrett Mattingly
+AMERICA IN THE SIXTIES: The Economy and the Society TB/1015
+DEMOCRATIC IDEAS
+SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
+TB/1006
+ARISTOCRACY IN AMERICA: A Study of Jacksonian Democracy
+TB / 1001
+THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS: From Thales to Aristotle TB/1008
+THE PRINCESS CASAMASSIMA: A Novel
+TB/1005
+RODERICK HUDSON: A Novel. Intro. by Leon Edel
+TB/1016
+THE TRAGIC MUSE: A Novel. Intro. by Leon Edel
+TB/ 1017
+AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH NOVEL: Vol. I, Defoe to George
+Eliot, TB/1011; Vol. II, Heury James to the Present, TB/1012
+ADAM'S ANCESTORS: The Evolution of Man and His Culture. Illus.
+THE ARABS IN HISTORY
+TB/1029
+THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A Study of the History of an Idea
+HISTORY OF FLORENCE AND OF THE AFFAIRS OF ITALY: From the
+Earliest Times to the Death of Lorenzo the Magnificent. Intro.
+by Felix Gilbert
+ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE: 4 Biographical Study in Political Science
+CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION TB/1024
+HUBRIS: A Study of Pride: Foreword by Herbert Read
+TB/1031
+DIARY OF SAMUEL PEPYS: Selections, ed. by O. F. Morshead;
+illus. by Ernest H. Shepard
+TB/1007
+STUDIES IN HUMAN TIME
+TB/1004
+REVOLUTIONS OF 1848: A Social History TB/1025
+THE MEDICI. Illus.
+DISCOVERY OF THE MIND: The Greek Origins of European
+Thought
+PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: An Introduction
+SOCIAL CLASS IN AMERICA: The Evaluation of Status
+TB/1013
+PROCESS AND REALITY: An Essay in Cosmology TB/1033
+
+The
+FOUNDATIONS
+of
+ARITHMETIC
+A logico-mathematical enquiry into
+the concept of number
+GOTTLOB FREGE
+Translated by J. L. Austin
+Second Revised Edition
+HARPER TORCHBOOKS / The Science Library
+HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK
+
+THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARITHMETIC
+Printed in the United States of America
+This volume was first published in 1950 by
+Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd. The revised edition
+of 1953 is here reprinted by arrangement.
+First HARPEr TorcHBOOk edition published 1960
+
+Translator's Note
+Words and footnotes in square brackets are insertions by the translator.
+The pagination of the German text is the same as in the original German
+edition, except that in the original the "Analysis of Contents" pages were
+not numbered.
+Some of Frege's references and quotations, which are not always accurate,
+have been corrected in the translated version.
+Translator's Preface to the Second Edition
+Though users of the first edition of this version will perhaps not be anywhere
+seriously misled in doctrine, a large number of passages in it have called, and
+some even howled, for improvements in fidelity or lucidity. The translator's
+thanks are due to several readers, and in particular to Mr. P. T. Geach, for their
+trouble in contributing emendations and suggestions: nothing could be more
+welcome than more of the same.
+There is justice in the general criticism that the version is too long. Here and
+there it has been possible to do something to correct this, but it is too late and
+too difficult now to strike a fresh compromise throughout between the claims of
+brevity and those of naturalness and clarity. Frege is an unusually, even at times
+an unduly, succinct writer, and the German text must be allowed to remain the
+final testimony to his style.
+The translations originally chosen for Frege's principal terms remain unchanged, except that Begriffswort has now become "concept word" instead of
+"general term" and wirklich "actual" instead of "existent." Critics of some
+others of these translations have perhaps not sufficiently realized that Frege's
+inherited philosophical vocabulary (at least as he was using it at this period) is
+a dated one. It is that which was Englished by his contemporaries, the "British
+Idealists': and they certainly used, for example, "idea" for Vorstellung and
+"proposition" for Satz, though not unnaturally they attached to those words
+meanings different from (and doubtless less clear than) those fashionable half a
+century later. Frege's thought cannot be reproduced accurately, nor can his
+terms be translated consistently, unless we are prepared to accept, even in him,
+something short of complete (or contemporary) sophistication.
+
+Analysis of Contents.
+; 1. Recent work in mathematics has shown a tendency towards rigour
+of proof and sharp definition of concepts.
+§ 2. This critical examination must ultimately extend to the concept
+of Number itself. The aim of proof.
+• 3. Philosophical motives for such an enquiry: the controversies as to
+whether the laws of number are analytic or synthetic, a priori or
+a posteriori. Sense of these expressions
+S 4. Task of the present work.
+I. Views of certain writers on the nature
+of arithmetical propositions.
+Are numerical formulae provable?
+3. Kant denies this, which Hankel justly calls a paradox
+S
+6. Leibniz's proof that 2 + 2 = 4 contains a gap. Grassmann's
+definition of a + b is faulty •
+7. Mill's view that the definitions of the individual numbers assert
+observed facts, from which the calculations follow, is without
+foundation.
+$ 8. These definitions do not require, for their legitimacy, the observation of his facts
+PAGE
+I
+2
+7
+9
+II
+
+vii
+Are the laws of arithmetic inductive truths?
+$ 9. Mill's law of nature. In calling arithmetical truths laws of nature,
+Mill is confusing them with their applications.
+1o. Grounds for denying that the laws of addition are inductive
+truths: numbers not all of the same sort; the definition of number
+does not of itself yield any set of common properties of numbers;
+probably the reverse is true and induction should be based on
+arithmetic
+$ II. Leibniz's term "innate"
+Are the laws of arithmetic synthetic a priori or analytic?
+$ 12. Kant. Baumann. Lipschitz. Hankel. Inner intuition as the
+ground of knowledge •
+13.
+Distinction between arithmetic and geometry.
+•
+14. Comparison between the various kinds of truths in respect of
+the domains that they govern
+•
+•
+Is. Views of Leibniz and W. S. Jevons
+; I6. Against them, Mill's ridicule of the "artful manipulation of
+language". Symbols are not empty simply because not meaning
+anything with which we can be acquainted
+$ 17. Inadequacy of induction. Conjecture that the laws of number
+are analytic judgments; what in that case is the use of them.
+Estimate of the value of analytic judgments
+•
+•
+•
+PAGE
+I 2
+14
+17
+17
+19
+20
+2I
+22
+23
+II. Views of certain writers on the
+concept of Number.
+$ 18. Necessity for an enquiry into the general concept of Number •
+I9. Its definition not to be geometrical
+$ 20. Is number definable? Hankel. Leibniz
+Is Number a property of external things?
+$ 21. Views of M. Cantor and E. Schröder
+$ 22. Opposite view of Baumann: external things present us with no
+strict units. Their number apparently dependent on our way of
+regarding them •
+$ 23.
+Mill's view untenable, that the number is
+a property of the
+agglomeration of things
+•
+24
+25
+26
+27
+28
+29
+
+viii
+PAGE
+$ 24.
+Wide range of applicability of number. Mill. Locke. Leibniz's
+immaterial metaphysical figure. If number were something
+sensible, it could not be ascribed to anything non-sensible.
+•
+30
+Mill's physical difference between 2 and 3. Number according
+to Berkeley not really existent in things but created by the mind. 32
+Is number something subjective?
+$ 26. Lipschitz's description of the construction of numbers will not
+do, and cannot take the place of a definition of the concept.
+Number not an object for psychology, but something objective
+27.
+Number is not, as Schloemilch claims, the idea of the position
+of an item in a series .
+33
+36
+Tbe set tbeory of Number.
+28. Thomae's name-giving
+38
+III. Views on unity and one.
+Does the number word "one" express a property of objects?
+$ 29. Ambiguity of the terms "ovás" and "unit". E. Schröder's
+definition of the unit as an object to be numbered is apparently
+pointless. The adjective "one" does not add anything to a
+description, cannot serve as a predicate .
+•
+39
+30. Attempts to define unity by Leibniz and Baumann seem to blur
+the concept completely
+•
+4I
+31. Baumann's criteria, being undivided and being isolated. The
+notion of unity not suggested to us by every object (as Locke) • 41
+32.
+Still, language does indicate some connexion with being undivided and isolated, with a shift of meaning however
+•
+$ 33. Indivisibility (G. Köpp) as a criterion of the unit is untenable •
+42
+43
+Are units identical with one another?
+34. Identity as the reason for the name "unit". E. Schröder.
+Hobbes. Hume. Thomae. To abstract from the differences
+between things does not give us the concept of their Number,
+nor does it make the things identical with one another.
+44
+
+ix
+S
+35. Indeed diversity is actually necessary, if we are to speak of
+plurality. Descartes. E. Schröder. W. S. Jevons
+3в.
+The view that units are different also comes up against difficulties.
+Different distinct ones in W. S. Jevons •
+37.
+Definitions of number in terms of the unit or one by Locke,
+Leibniz and Hesse
+"One" is a proper name, "unit" a concept word. Number
+cannot be defined as units. Distinction between "and" and + .
+39. The difficulty of reconciling identity of units with distinguishability is concealed by the ambiguity of "unit".
+Attempts to overcome the diffculty.
+$ 40. Space and time as means of distinguishing between units.
+Hobbes. Thomae. Against them: Leibniz, Baumann, W. S.
+Jevons
+•
+•
+41. The purpose not achieved •
+42. Position in a series as a means of distinguishing between units.
+Hankel's putting
+43. Schröder's copying of objects by the symbol I
+$ 44. Jevons' abstraction from the character of the differences while
+retaining the fact of their existence. o and I are numbers like
+the rest. The difficulty still remains
+Solution of the difficulty.
+$ 45. Recapitulation
+S 46. A statement of number contains an assertion about a concept.
+Objection that the number varies while the concept does not
+$ 47. That statements of number are statements of fact explained by
+the objectivity of concepts •
+$ 48. Removal of certain difficulties
+49. Corroboration found in Spinoza •
+so. E. Schröder's account quoted
+SI. Correction of the same
+32. Corroboration found in a German idiom
+53.
+Distinction between component characteristics of a concept and
+its properties. Existence and number
+S 34.
+Unit the name given to the subject of a statement of number.
+How indivisible and isolated. How identical and distinguishable .
+PAGE
+46
+48
+53
+54
+54
+58
+59
+60
+6I
+62
+62
+
+PAGE
+IV. The concept of Number.
+Every individual number is a self-subsistent object.
+$ s5. Attempt to complete the definitions of the individual numbers
+as given by Leibniz
+•
+•
+$ 56. The attempted definitions are unusable, because what they
+define is a predicate in which the number is only an element
+S 57. A statement of number should be regarded as an identity
+between numbers
+•
+$ 38. Objection that we can form no idea of number as a self-subsistent
+object. In principle number cannot be imagined
+$ 59.
+Because we cannot imagine an object, we are not to be debarred
+from investigating it •
+§ 6o. Even concrete things are not always imaginable. In seeking the
+meaning of a word, we must consider it in the context of a
+proposition.
+S 61. Objection that numbers are not spatial. Not every objective
+object is spatial
+To obtain the concept of Number, we must fix the sense of a numerical identity.
+$ 62. We need a criterion for numerical identity
+63. Possible criterion in one-one correlation. Doubt as to the logic
+of defining identity specially for the case of numbers
+$ 64. Examples of similar procedures: direction of a line, orientation
+of a plane, shape of a triangle
+§ 65. Attempt at a definition. A second doubt: are the laws of identity
+satisfied?
+$ 66. Third doubt: the criterion of identity fails to cover all cases
+$ 67. We cannot supplement it by taking as a defining characteristic
+of a concept the way in which an object is introduced
+$ 68. Number as the extension of a concept •
+$ 6g. Elucidation
+Our definition completed and its worth proved.
+$ 70. The relation-concept •
+§ 71. Correlation by means of a relation
+$ 72. One-one relations. The concept of Number
+68
+70
+71
+72
+73
+73
+74
+76
+77
+78
+79
+80
+8I
+83
+84
+
+xi
+$ 73. The Number which belongs to the concept F is identical with
+the Number which belongs to the concept G, if there exists a
+relation which correlates one to one the objects falling under F
+with those falling under G.
+$ 74. Nought is the Number which belongs to the concept "not
+identical with itself"
+75. Nought is the Number which belongs to a concept under which
+nothing falls. No object falls under a concept if nought is the
+Number belonging to that concept.
+$ 76. Definition of the expression "n follows in the series of natural
+numbers directly after m"/.
+S
+77. I is the Number which belongs to the concept "identical with o"
+78. Propositions to be proved by means of our definitions
+79. Definition of following in a series.
+80. Comments on the same. Following is objective
+81. Definition of the expression "x is a member of the -series ending
+with y"
+S
+82.
+Outline of the proof that there is no last member of the series
+of natural numbers
+S
+83.
+Definition of finite Number. No finite Number follows in the
+series of natural numbers after itself
+84.
+85.
+86.
+Infinite Numbers.
+The Number which belongs to the concept "finite Number" is an
+infinite Number •
+Cantor's infinite Numbers; "power." Divergence in terminology
+Cantor's following in the succession and my following in the
+series
+PAGE
+86
+88
+89
+90
+92
+92
+94
+94
+95
+97
+28
+V. Conclusion.
+S
+87. Nature of the laws of arithmetic
+88. Kant's underestimate of the value of analytic judgments .
+8g.
+Kant's dictum: "Without sensibility no object would be given to
+us." Kant's services to mathematics
+•
+•
+90. For the complete proof of the analytic nature of the laws of
+arithmetic we still need a chain of deductions with no link
+missing
+S g1. My concept writing makes it possible to supply this lack
+Other numbers.
+S 92. The sense, according to Hankel, of asking whether some
+number is possible
+$ 93. Numbers are neither outside us in space nor subjective •
+29
+99
+IOI
+IO2
+103
+104
+IOS
+
+xii
+$ 94. That a concept is free from contradiction is no guarantee that
+anything falls under it, and itself requires to be proved
+We cannot regard (c-b) without more ado as a symbol which
+solves the problem of subtraction
+96.
+97.
+28.
+99.
+$ 100.
+Not even the mathematician can create things at will
+Concepts are to be distinguished from objects
+Hankel's definition of addition
+The formalist theory defective
+Attempt to produce an interpretation of complex numbers by
+extending the meaning of multiplication in some special way
+The cogency of proofs is affected, unless it is possible to produce
+such an interpretation •
+•
+$ I02.
+The mere postulate that it shall be possible to carry out some
+operation is not the same as its own fulfilment.
+$ 103.
+Kossack's definition of complex numbers is only a guide
+towards a definition, and fails to avoid the importation of foreign
+elements. Geometrical representation of complex numbers
+S 104.
+What is needed is to fix the sense of a recognition-judgment for
+the case of the new numbers.
+•
+SIos. The charm of arithmetic lies in its rationality
+S 106-10g. Recapitulation .
+PAGE
+IOS
+106
+107
+108
+108
+109
+1IO
+III
+III
+I12
+II4
+IIS
+II5-119
+
+INTRODUCTION
+When we ask someone what the number one is, or what
+the symbol i means,* we get as a rule the answer "Why, a
+thing". And if we go on to point out that the proposition
+"the number one is a thing"
+is not a definition, because it has the definite article on one
+side and the indefinite on the other, or that it only assigns the
+number one to the class of things, without stating which
+thing it is, then we shall very likely be invited to select something for ourselves-anything we please-to call one. Yet if
+everyone had the right to understand by this name whatever
+he pleased, then the same proposition about one would mean
+different things for different people,-such propositions
+would have no common content. Some, perhaps, will decline
+to answer the question, pointing out that it is impossible to
+state, either, what is meant by the letter a, as it is used in
+arithmetic; and that if we were to say "a means a number,"
+this would be open to the same objection as the definition
+"one is a thing." Now in the case of a it is quite right to
+decline to answer: a does not mean some one definite number
+which can be specified, but serves to express the generality
+of general propositions. If, in a + a - a = a, we put for a
+* [I have tried throughout to translate Bedeutung and its cognates by "meaning" and Sinn and its cognates by "sense", in view of the importance Frege
+later attached to the distinction. But it is quite evident that he attached no
+special significance to the words at this period.]
+
+xiv
+some number, any we please but the same throughout, we
+get always a true identity.* This is the sense in which the letter
+a is used. With one, however, the position is essentially different. Can we, in the identity I + I = 2, put for I in both
+places some one and the same object, say the Moon? On the
+contrary, it looks as though, whatever we put for the first I,
+we must put something different for the second. Why is it
+that we have to do here precisely what would have been wrong
+in the other case? Again, arithmetic cannot get along with a
+alone, but has to use further letters besides (b, c and so on),
+in order to express in general form relations between different
+numbers. It would therefore be natural to suppose that the
+symbol I too, if it served in some similar way to confer generality on propositions, could not be enough by itself. Yet surely
+the number one looks like a definite particular object, with
+properties that can be specified, for example that of remaining
+unchanged when multiplied by itself? In this sense, a has no
+properties that can be specified, since whatever can be asserted
+of a is a common property of all numbers, whereas It = I
+asserts nothing of the Moon, nothing of the Sun, nothing of
+the Sahara, nothing of the Peak of Teneriffe; for what could be
+the sense of any such assertion?
+Questions like these catch even mathematicians for that
+matter, or most of them, unprepared with any satisfactory
+answer. Yet is it not a scandal that our science should be so
+unclear about the first and foremost among its objects, and one
+which is apparently so simple? Small hope, then, that we
+shall be able to say what number is. If a concept fundamental
+to a mighty science gives rise to difficulties, then it is surely
+an imperative task to investigate it more closely until those
+difficulties are overcome; especially as we shall hardly succeed
+in finally clearing up negative numbers, or fractional or
+complex numbers, so long as our insight into the foundation
+of the whole structure of arithmetic is still defective.
+*[Gleichung. This also means, and would often be more naturally translated,
+"equation". But I have generally retained "identity", because this is sometimes essential and because Frege does understand equations as identities.
+For similar reasons I have translated gleich "identical", though it can mean
+"equal" or even merely "similar". Cp. SS 34, 6s.]
+
+Many people will be sure to think this not worth the
+trouble. Naturally, they suppose, this concept is adequately
+dealt with in the elementary textbooks, where the subject
+is settled once and for all. Who can believe that he has anything still to learn on so simple a matter? So free from all
+difficulty is the concept of positive whole number held to be,
+that an account of it fit for children can be both scientific and
+exhaustive; and that every schoolboy, without any further
+reflexion or acquaintance with what others have thought,
+knows all there is to know about it. The first prerequisite
+for learning anything is thus utterly lacking-I mean, the
+knowledge that we do not know. The result is that we still
+rest content with the crudest of views, even though since
+HERBART's" day a better doctrine has been available. It is sad
+and discouraging to observe how discoveries once made are
+always threatening to be lost again in this way, and how much
+work promises to have been done in vain, because we fancy
+ourselves so well off that we need not bother to assimilate its
+results. My work too, as I am well aware, is exposed to this
+risk. A typical crudity confronts me, when I find calculation
+described as "aggregative mechanical thought"" I doubt
+whether there exists any thought whatsoever answering to this
+description. An aggregative imagination, even, might sooner
+be let pass; but that has no relevance to calculation. Thought
+is in essentials the same everywhere: it is not true that there are
+different kinds of laws of thought to suit the different kinds of
+objects thought about. Such differences as there are consist
+only in this, that the thought is more pure or less pure, less
+dependent or more upon psychological influences and on
+external aids such as words or numerals, and further to some
+1 Collected Works, ed. Hartenstein, Vol. X, part i, Umriss pädagogischer
+Vorlesungen, $ 252, n. 2: "Two does not mean two things, but doubling" etc.
+2 K. Fischer, System der Logik und Metaphysik oder Wissenschaftslebre, and edn.,
+$94.
+
+XVI
+extent too in the finer or coarser structure of the concepts
+involved; but it is precisely in this respect that mathematics
+aspires to surpass all other sciences, even philosophy.
+The present work will make it clear that even an inference
+like that from n to n + 1, which on the face of it is peculiar
+to mathematics, is based on the general laws of logic, and
+that there is no need of special laws for aggregative thought.
+It is possible, of course, to operate with figures mechanically,
+just as it is possible to speak like a parrot: but that hardly
+deserves the name of thought. It only becomes possible at all
+after the mathematical notation has, as a result of genuine
+thought, been so developed that it does the thinking for us,
+so to speak. This does not prove that numbers are formed
+in some peculiarly mechanical way, as sand, say, is formed out
+of quartz granules. In their own interests mathematicians
+should, I consider, combat any view of this kind, since it is
+calculated to lead to the disparagement of a principal object
+of their study, and of their science itself along with it. Yet
+even in the works of mathematicians are to be found expressions of exactly the same sort. The truth is quite the other way:
+the concept of number, as we shall be forced to recognize,
+has a finer structure than most of the concepts of the other
+sciences, even although it is still one of the simplest in arithmetic.
+In order, then, to dispel this illusion that the positive whole
+numbers really present no difficulties at all, but that universal
+concord reigns about them, I have adopted the plan of criticizing some of the views put forward by mathematicians and
+philosophers on the questions involved. It will be seen how
+small is the extent of their agreement—so small, that we find
+one dictum precisely contradicting another. For example, some
+hold that "units are identical with one another," others that
+they are different, and each side supports its assertion with arguments that cannot be rejected out of hand. My object in this is
+
+XVII
+to awaken a desire for a stricter enquiry. At the same time
+this preliminary examination of the views others have put
+forward should clear the ground for my own account, by
+convincing my readers in advance that these other paths
+do not lead to the goal, and that my opinion is not just one
+among many all equally tenable; and in this way I hope to
+settle the question finally, at least in essentials.
+I realize that, as a result, I have been led to pursue arguments
+more philosophical than many mathematicians may approve;
+but any thorough investigation of the concept of number is
+bound always to turn out rather philosophical. It is a task
+which is common to mathematics and philosophy.
+It may well be that the co-operation between these two
+sciences, in spite of many démarches from both sides, is not so
+flourishing as could be wished and would, for that matter,
+be possible. And if so, this is due in my opinion to the predominance in philosophy of psychological methods of argument, which have penetrated even into the field of logic.
+With this tendency mathematics is completely out of sympathy,
+and this easily accounts for the aversion to philosophical
+arguments felt by many mathematicians. When STRICKER,
+for instance, calls our ideas* of numbers motor phenomena
+and makes them dependent on muscular sensations, no mathematician can recognize his numbers in such stuff or knows
+where to begin to tackle such a proposition. An arithmetic
+founded on muscular sensations would certainly turn out
+sensational enough, but also every bit as vague as its foundation.
+No, sensations are absolutely no concern of arithmetic. No
+more are mental pictures, formed from the amalgamated traces
+of earlier sense-impressions. All these phases of -onsciousness
+are characteristically fluctuating and indefinite, in strong contrast to the definiteness and fixity of the concepts and objects of
+1 Studien über Association der Vorstellungen, Vienna 1883.
+* [Vorstellungen. I have translated this word consistently by "idea", and
+cognate words by "imagine", "imagination", etc. For Frege it is a psychological
+term, cp. p. xe below.]
+
+×VIl
+mathematics. It may, of course, serve some purpose to investigate the ideas and changes of ideas which occur during the
+course of mathematical thinking; but psychology should not
+imagine that it can contribute anything whatever to the
+foundation of arithmetic. To the mathematician as such these
+mental pictures, with their origins and their transformations,
+are immaterial. STRICKEr himself states that the only idea he
+associates with the word "hundred" is the symbol 1o0. Others
+may have the idea of the letter C or something else; does it
+not follow, therefore, that these mental pictures are, so far as
+concerns us and the essentials of our problem, completely
+immaterial and incidental—as incidental as chalk and blackboard, and indeed that they do not deserve to be called ideas
+of the number a hundred at all? Never, then, let us suppose
+that the essence of the matter lies in such ideas. Never let
+us take a description of the origin of an idea for a definition,
+or an account of the mental and physical conditions on
+which we become conscious of a proposition for a proof of
+it. A proposition may be thought, and again it may be true;
+let us never confuse these two things. We must remind
+ourselves, it seems, that a proposition no more ceases to
+be true when I cease to think of it than the sun ceases to
+exist when I shut my eyes. Otherwise, in proving Pythagoras' theorem we should be reduced to allowing for the
+phosphorous content of the human brain; and astronomers
+would hesitate to draw any conclusions about the distant
+past, for fear of being charged with anachronism,-with
+reckoning twice two as four regardless of the fact that our
+idea of number is a product of evolution and has a history
+behind it. It might be doubted whether by that time it had
+progressed so far. How could they profess to know that the
+proposition 2 X 2 = 4 was already in existence in that remote
+epoch? Might not the creatures then extant have held the proposition 2 × 2 = s, from which the proposition 2 X 2 = 4
+was only evolved later through a process of natural selection
+
+xiX
+in the struggle for existence? Why, it might even be that
+2 × 2 = 4 itself is destined in the same way to develop into
+2 X 2 = 3! Est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines! The
+historical approach, with its aim of detecting how things
+begin and of arriving from these origins at a knowledge of
+their nature, is certainly perfectly legitimate; but it has also its
+limitations. If everything were in continual flux, and nothing
+maintained itself fixed for all time, there would no longer be
+any possibility of getting to know anything about the world
+and everything would be plunged in confusion. We suppose,
+it would seem, that concepts sprout in the individual mind like
+leaves on a tree, and we think to discover their nature by
+studying their birth: we seek to define them psychologically, in
+terms of the nature of the human mind. But this account makes
+everything subjective, and if we follow it through to the end,
+does away with truth. What is known as the history of concepts is really a history either of our knowledge of concepts or
+of the meanings of words. Often it is only after immense intellectual effort, which may have continued over centuries, that
+humanity at last succeeds in achieving knowledge of a concept
+in its pure form, in stripping off the irrelevant accretions which
+veil it from the eyes of the mind. What, then, are we to say of
+those who, instead of advancing this work where it is not yet
+completed, despise it, and betake themselves to the nursery,
+or bury themselves in the remotest conceivable periods of
+human evolution, there to discover, like JoHN STUART MILL,
+some gingerbread or pebble arithmetic! It remains only to
+ascribe to the flavour of the bread some special meaning for
+the concept of number. A procedure like this is surely the very
+reverse of rational, and as unmathematical, at any rate, as it
+could well be. No wonder the mathematicians turn their
+backs on it. Do the concepts, as we approach their supposed
+sources, reveal themselves in peculiar purity? Not at all;
+
+XX
+we see everything as through a fog, blurred and undifferentiated. It is as though everyone who wished to know about
+America were to try to put himself back in the position of
+Columbus, at the time when he caught the first dubious glimpse
+of his supposed India. Of course, a comparison like this proves
+nothing; but it should, I hope, make my point clear. It may
+well be that in many cases the history of earlier discoveries is a
+useful study, as a preparation for further researches; but it
+should not set up to usurp their place.
+So far as mathematicians are concerned, an attack on such
+views would indeed scarcely have been necessary; but my
+treatment was designed to bring each dispute to an issue for
+the philosophers as well, as far as possible, so that I found
+myself forced to enter a little into psychology, if only to repel
+its invasion of mathematics.
+Besides, even mathematical textbooks do at times lapse
+into psychology. When the author feels himself obliged to give
+a definition, yet cannot, then he tends to give at least a description of the way in which we arrive at the object or concept
+concerned. These cases can easily be recognized by the fact
+that such explanations are never referred to again in the course
+of the subsequent exposition. For teaching purposes, introductory devices are certainly quite legitimate; only they should
+always be clearly distinguished from definitions. A delightful
+example of the way in which even mathematicians can confuse
+the grounds of proof with the mental or physical conditions
+to be satisfied if the proof is to be given is to be found in
+E. SCHRÖDER.! Under the heading "Special Axiom" he produces the following: "The principle I have in mind might well
+be called the Axiom of Symbolic Stability. It guarantees us
+that throughout all our arguments and deductions the symbols
+1 Lebrbuch der Arithmetik und Algebra, [Leipzig 1873).
+
+xXi
+remain constant in our memory-or preferably on paper,"
+and so on.
+No less essential for mathematics than the refusal of all
+assistance from the direction of psychology, is the recognition
+of its close connexion with logic. I go so far as to agree
+with those who hold that it is impossible to effect any sharp
+separation of the two. This much everyone would allow, that
+any enquiry into the cogency of a proof or the justification of a
+definition must be a matter of logic. But such enquiries
+simply cannot be eliminated from mathematics, for it is only
+through answering them that we can attain to the necessary
+certainty.
+In this direction too I go, certainly, further than is usual.
+Most mathematicians rest content, in enquiries of this kind,
+when they have satisfied their immediate needs. If a definition
+shows itself tractable when used in proofs, if no contradictions
+are anywhere encountered, and if connexions are revealed
+between matters apparently remote from one another, this
+leading to an advance in order and regularity, it is usual to
+regard the definition as sufficiently established, and few
+questions are asked as to its logical justification. This procedure has at least the advantage that it makes it difficult to miss
+the mark altogether. Even I agree that definitions must show
+their worth by their fruitfulness: it must be possible to use
+them for constructing proofs. Yet it must still be borne in
+mind that the rigour of the proof remains an illusion, even
+though no link be missing in the chain of our deductions, so
+long as the definitions are justified only as an afterthought, by
+our failing to come across any contradiction. By these methods
+we shall, at bottom, never have achieved more than an empirical certainty, and we must really face the possibility that
+we may still in the end encounter a contradiction which brings
+the whole edifice down in ruins. For this reason I have felt
+bound to go back rather further into the general logical
+foundations of our science than perhaps most mathematicians
+will consider necessary.
+
+xxii
+In the enquiry that follows, I have kept to three fundamental principles:
+always to separate sharply the psychological from the
+logical, the subjective from the objective;
+never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but
+only in the context of a proposition;
+never to lose sight of the distinction between concept
+and object.
+In compliance with the first principle, I have used the word
+"idea" always in the psychological sense, and have distinguished
+ideas from concepts and from objects. If the second principle
+is not observed, one is almost forced to take as the meanings
+of words mental pictures or acts of the individual mind, and
+so to offend against the first principle as well. As to the third
+point, it is a mere illusion to suppose that a concept can be
+made an object without altering it. From this it follows that a
+widely-held formalist theory of fractional, negative, etc., numbers is untenable. How I propose to improve upon it can be no
+more than indicated in the present work. With numbers of
+all these types, as with the positive whole numbers, it is a
+matter of fixing the sense of an identity.
+My results will, I think, at least in essentials, win the
+adherence of those mathematicians who take the trouble to
+attend to my arguments. They seem to me to be in the air,
+and it may be that every one of them singly, or at least something very like it, has been already put forward; though
+perhaps, presented as they are here in connexion with each
+other, they may still be novel. I have often been astonished
+at the way in which writers who on one point approach my
+view so closely, on others depart from it so violently.
+Their reception by philosophers will be varied, depending
+on each philosopher's own position; but presumably those
+
+ххіїі
+empiricists who recognize induction as the sole original
+process of inference (and even that as a process not actually
+of inference but of habituation) will like them least. Some one
+or another, perhaps, will take this opportunity to examine
+afresh the principles of his theory of knowledge. To those
+who feel inclined to criticize my definitions as unnatural, I
+would suggest that the point here is not whether they are
+natural, but whether they go to the root of the matter and are
+logically beyond criticism.
+I permit myself the hope that even the philosophers, if
+they examine what I have written without prejudice, will find
+in it something of use to them.
+
+$ I. After deserting for a time the old Euclidean
+standards of rigour, mathematics is now returning to them,
+and even making efforts to go beyond them. In arithmetic,
+if only because many of its methods and concepts originated
+in India, it has been the tradition to reason less strictly than in
+geometry, which was in the main developed by the Greeks.
+The discovery of higher analysis only served to confirm this
+tendency; for considerable, almost insuperable, difficulties
+stood in the way of any rigorous treatment of these subjects,
+while at the same time small reward seemed likely for the efforts
+expended in overcoming them. Later developments, however,
+have shown more and more clearly that in mathematics a
+mere moral conviction, supported by a mass of successful
+applications, is not good enough. Proof is now demanded
+of many things that formerly passed as self-evident. Again
+and again the limits to the validity of a proposition have been
+in this way established for the first time. The concepts of
+function, of continuity, of limit and of infinity have been
+shown to stand in need of sharper definition. Negative and
+irrational numbers, which had long since been admitted into
+science, have had to submit to a closer scrutiny of their
+credentials.
+In all directions these same ideals can be seen at workrigour of proof, precise delimitation of extent of validity, and
+as a means to this, sharp definition of concepts.
+
+2
+S 2. Proceeding along these lines, we are bound eventually to come to the concept of Number* and to the simplest
+propositions holding of positive whole numbers, which form
+the foundation of the whole of arithmetic. Of course, numerical
+formulae like 7 + s = 12 and laws like the Associative Law
+of Addition are so amply established by the countless applications made of them every day, that it may seem almost ridiculous to try to bring them into dispute by demanding a proof
+of them. But it is in the nature of mathematics always to
+prefer proof, where proof is possible, to any confirmation by
+induction. Euclid gives proofs of many things which anyone would concede him without question. And it was when
+men refused to be satisfied even with Euclid's standards of
+rigour that they were led to the enquiries set in train by the
+Axiom of Parallels.
+Thus our movement in favour of all possible rigour has
+already outstripped in many directions the demand originally
+raised, while the demand has itself continually grown in scope
+and urgency.
+The aim of proof is, in fact, not merely to place the truth
+of a proposition beyond all doubt, but also to afford us insight
+into the dependence of truths upon one another. After we have
+convinced ourselves that a boulder is immovable, by trying
+unsuccessfully to move it, there remains the further question,
+what is it that supports it so securely? The further we pursue
+these enquiries, the fewer become the primitive truths to
+which we reduce everything; and this simplification is in itself
+a goal worth pursuing. But there may even be justification for
+a further hope: if, by examining the simplest cases, we can
+bring to light what mankind has there done by instinct,
+and can extract from such procedures what is universally valid
+in them, may we not thus arrive at general methods for forming
+concepts and establishing principles which will be applicable
+also in more complicated cases?
+* [Anzahl, ie. cardinal number, cp. S4n. I have always used "Number"
+to translate this, and "number" for the more usual and general Zabl. Throughout most of the present work the distinction is not important, and Frege uses
+the two words almost indifferently.]
+
+3
+$ 3. Philosophical motives too have prompted me to
+enquiries of this kind. The answers to the questions raised
+about the nature of arithmetical truths—are they a priori
+or a posteriori? synthetic or analytic?—must lie in this same
+direction. For even though the concepts concerned may
+themselves belong to philosophy, yet, as I believe, no decision
+on these questions can be reached without assistance from
+mathematics-though this depends of course on the sense
+in which we understand them.
+It not uncommonly happens that we first discover the
+content of a proposition, and only later give the rigorous
+proof of it, on other and more difficult lines; and often this
+same proof also reveals more precisely the conditions restricting the validity of the original proposition. In general, therefore, the question of how we arrive at the content of a
+judgement should be kept distinct from the other question,
+Whence do we derive the justification for its assertion?
+Now these distinctions between a priori and a posteriori,
+synthetic and analytic, concern, as I see it, ' not the content of
+the judgement but the justification for making the judgement.
+Where there is no such justification, the possibility of drawing
+the distinctions vanishes. An a priori error is thus as complete
+a nonsense as, say, a blue concept. When a proposition is
+called a posteriori or analytic in my sense, this is not a judgement about the conditions, psychological, physiological and
+physical, which have made it possible to form the content of
+the proposition in our consciousness; nor is it a judgement
+about the way in which some other man has come, perhaps
+erroneously, to believe it true; rather, it is a judgement about
+the ultimate ground upon which rests the justification for holding it to be true.
+This means that the question is removed from the sphere
+of psychology, and assigned, if the truth concerned is a
+1 By this I do not, of course, mean to assign a new sense to these terms,
+but only to state accurately what earlier writers, Kant in particular, have meant
+by them.
+
+4
+mathematical one, to the sphere of mathematics. The problem
+becomes, in fact, that of finding the proof of the proposition,
+and of following it up right back to the primitive truths. If,
+in carrying out this process, we come only on general logical
+laws and on definitions, then the truth is an analytic one, bearing in mind that we must take account also of all propositions
+upon which the admissibility of any of the definitions depends.
+If, however, it is impossible to give the proof without making
+use of truths which are not of a general logical nature, but
+belong to the sphere of some special science, then the proposition is a synthetic one. For a truth to be a posteriori, it must
+be impossible to construct a proof of it without including an
+appeal to facts, i.e., to truths which cannot be proved and are
+not general, since they contain assertions about particular
+objects. But if, on the contrary, its proof can be derived
+exclusively from general laws, which themselves neither need
+nor admit of proof, then the truth is a priori.!
+$ 4. Starting from these philosophical questions, we
+are led to formulate the same demand as that which had
+arisen independently in the sphere of mathematics, namely
+that the fundamental propositions of arithmetic should be
+proved, if in any way possible, with the utmost rigour; for
+only if every gap in the chain of deductions is eliminated with
+the greatest care can we say with certainty upon what primitive
+truths the proof depends; and only when these are known shall
+we be able to answer our original questions.
+" If we recognize the existence of general truths at all, we must also admit
+the existence of such primitive laws, since from mere individual facts nothing
+follows, unless it be on the strength of a law. Induction itself depends on the
+general proposition that the inductive method can establish the truth of a law,
+or at least some probability for it. If we deny this, induction becomes nothing
+more than a psychological phenomenon, a procedure which induces men to
+believe in the truth of a proposition, without affording the slightest justification
+for so believing.
+
+)
+If we now try to meet this demand, we very soon come
+to propositions which cannot be proved so long as we do not
+succeed in analysing concepts which occur in them into
+simpler concepts or in reducing them to something of greater
+generality. Now here it is above all Number which has to be
+either defined or recognized as indefinable. This is the point
+which the present work is meant to settle. On the outcome of
+this task will depend the decision as to the nature of the laws
+of arithmetic.
+To my attack on these questions themselves I shall preface
+something which may give a pointer towards their answers.
+For suppose there should prove to be grounds from other
+points of view for believing that the fundamental principles
+of arithmetic are analytic, then these would tell also in favour
+of their being provable and the concept of Number definable;
+while any grounds for believing the same truths to be a
+posteriori would tell in the opposite direction. The rival
+theories here, therefore, may well be submitted first to a
+passing scrutiny.
+I. Views of certain writers on the nature of arithmetical
+propositions.
+Are numerical formulae provable?
+S s. We must distinguish numerical formulae, such as
+2 + 3 = s, which deal with particular numbers, from general
+laws, which hold good for all whole numbers.
+The former are held by some philosophers? to be unprovable and immediately self-evident like axioms. KANT?
+1 In what follows, therefore, unless special notice is given, the only "numbers"
+under discussion are the positive whole numbers, which give the answer to the
+question "How many?"
+& Hobbes, Locke, Newton. Cf. Baumann, Die Lebren von Zeit, Raum und
+Mashematik, [Berlin 1868, Vol. I], Pp. 241-42, 36s ff., 475-76. [Hobbes, Examinatio et Emendatio Mathematicae Hodiernae, Amsterdam 1668, Diall. I-III, esp.
+I, p. 19 and III, pp. 62-63; Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, esp. Cap. iv, S 6 and cap. vii,
+S5 6 and 10; Newton, Aritbmetica Universalis, Vol. I, cap. i-iii, esp. ili, n. 24.]
+3 Critique of Pure Reason; Collected Works, ed. Hartenstein, Vol. III, p. 157
+[Original edns. A 164/B2os].
+
+6
+declares them to be unprovable and synthetic, but hesitates
+to call them axioms because they are not general and because
+the number of them is infinite. HanKEL' justifiably calls this
+conception of infinitely numerous unprovable primitive
+truths incongruous and paradoxical. The fact is that it conflicts with one of the requirements of reason, which must be
+able to embrace all first principles in a survey. Besides, is it
+really self-evident that
+135664+37863 = 173527?
+It is not; and KANT actually urges this as an argument for
+holding these propositions to be synthetic. Yet it tells rather
+against their being unprovable; for how, if not by means
+of a proof, are they to be seen to be true, seeing that they are
+not immediately self-evident? Kant thinks he can call on
+our intuition of fingers or points for support, thus running
+the risk of making these propositions appear to be empirical,
+contrary to his own expressed opinion; for whatever our
+intuition of 37863 fingers may be, it is at least certainly not
+pure. Moreover, the term "intuition" seems hardly appropriate, since even io fingers can, in different arrangements,
+give rise to very different intuitions. And have we, in fact,
+an intuition of 135664 fingers or points at all? If we had, and
+if we had another of 37863 fingers and a third of 173527
+fingers, then the correctness of our formula, if it were unprovable, would have to be evident right away, at least as
+applying to fingers; but it is not.
+KANt, obviously, was thinking only of small numbers.
+So that for large numbers the formulae would be provable,
+though for small numbers they are immediately self-evident
+through intuition. Yet it is awkward to make a fundamental
+distinction between small and large numbers, especially as it
+would scarcely be possible to draw any sharp boundary
+between them. If the numerical formulae were provable
+1 Vorlesungen über die complexen Zablen und ibren Functionen, p. 53.
+
+7
+from, say, 1o on, we should ask with justice "Why not from
+s on? or from 2 on? or from I on?"
+§ 6. Other philosophers again, and mathematicians, have
+asserted that numerical formulae are actually provable.
+LEIBNIZ' says:
+"It is not an immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4; provided
+it be granted that 4 signifies 3 and I. It can be proved, as
+follows:
+Definitions: (1) 2 is I and I
+(2) 3 is 2 and I
+(3) 4 is 3 and I
+Axiom: If equals be substituted for equals, the equality
+remains.*
+Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + I + I (by Def. I) = 3 + I (by
+Def. 2) = 4 (by Def. 3).
+•• 2 + 2 = 4 (by the Axiom)."
+This proof seems at first sight to be constructed entirely
+from definitions and the axiom cited. And the axiom too could
+be transformed into a definition, as LEIBNIz himself does
+transform it in another passage.? It seems as though we need
+to know no more of I, 2, 3 and 4 than is contained in the
+definitions. If we look more closely, however, we can discover a gap in the proof, which is concealed owing to the
+omission of the brackets. To be strictly accurate, that is, we
+should have to write:
+2==a/(1t1)
+(2+1) +1=3+1 = 4.
+What is missing here is the proposition
+2+ (1+1) = (2+1) + I,
+which is a special case of
+a+ (b+ c) = (a +b) +c.
+If we assume this law, it is easy to see that a similar proof can
+1 Nouveaux Essais, IV, $ 10 (Erdmann edn., P. 363).
+= Non inelegans specimen demonstrandi in abstractis (Erdmann edn., P. 94).
+* [Mettant des choses égales à la place, l'égalité demeure.]
+
+8
+be given for every formula of addition. Every number, that
+means, is to be defined in terms of its predecessor. And
+actually I do not see how a number like 437986 could be given
+to us more aptly than in the way LeIbNIz does it. Even without having any idea of it, we get it by this means at our disposal
+none the less. Through such definitions we reduce the
+whole infinite set of numbers to the number one and increase
+by one, and every one of the infinitely many numerical
+formulae can be proved from a few general propositions.
+This opinion is shared by H. GRASSMANN and H. HANKEL.
+GRASSMANN attempts to obtain the law
+a+ (b+ 1) = (at b) + 1
+by means of a definition, as follows!:
+"If a and b are any arbitrary members of the basic series,
+then by the sum a + b is to be understood that member of the
+basic series for which the formula
+a+ (bte) = atbte
+is valid."
+e here is to be taken to mean positive unity. This definition
+can be criticized in two different ways. First, sum is defined in
+terms of itself. If we do not yet understand the meaning of
+a + b, we do not understand the expression a + (b + e) either.
+This criticism, however, can perhaps be evaded if we say
+(admittedly going against the text) that what he is intending to
+define is not sum but addition. In that case, the criticism
+could still be brought that a + b would be an empty symbol if
+there were either no member or several members of the basic
+series which satisfied the prescribed condition. That this
+does not in fact ever happen, GrassmAnN simply assumes
+without proof, so that the rigour of his procedure is only
+apparent.
+1 Lebrbuch der Mathematik für böbere Lehranstalten, Part i Arithmetike, p. 4.
+Stettin 1860 [= ges. Math. 4. Phys. Werke, ed. Engel, II, i, p. 301].
+
+9
+S 7. It might well be supposed that numerical formulae
+would be synthetic or analytic, a posteriori or a priori, according as the general laws on which their proofs depend are so.
+JOHN STUART MILL, however, is of the opposite opinion.
+At first, indeed, he seems to mean to base the science, like
+LEIbnIz, on definitions, since he defines the individual
+numbers in the same way as LEIBNIZ; but this spark of sound
+sense is no sooner lit than extinguished, thanks to his preconception that all knowledge is empirical. He informs us,
+in fact,? that these definitions are not definitions in the logical
+sense; not only do they fix the meaning of a term, but they also
+assert along with it an observed matter of fact. But what in
+the world can be the observed fact, or the physical fact (to
+use another of MiLL's expressions), which is asserted in the
+definition of the number 777864? Of all the whole wealth
+of physical facts in his apocalypse, MILL names for us only a
+solitary one, the one which he holds is asserted in the definition of the number 3. It consists, according to him, in this,
+that collections of objects exist, which while they impress
+the senses thus, °, may be separated into two parts, thus, oo o.
+What a mercy, then, that not everything in the world is nailed
+down; for if it were, we should not be able to bring off this
+separation, and 2 + I would not be 3! What a pity that MILL
+did not also illustrate the physical facts underlying the numbers
+o and Il
+"This proposition being granted," MILL goes on, "we
+term all such parcels Threes." From this we can see that it is
+really incorrect to speak of three strokes when the clock
+strikes three, or to call sweet, sour and bitter three sensations
+1 System of Logic, Bk. III, cap. xxiv, Ss (German translation by J. Schiel).
+" Op. cit., Bk. II, cap. vi, S 2.
+
+IO
+of taste; and equally unwarrantable is the expression "three
+methods of solving an equation." For none of these is a parcel
+which ever impresses the senses thus, °
+Now according to MILL "the calculations do not follow
+from the definition itself but from the observed matter of
+fact." But at what point then, in the proof given above of
+the proposition 2 + 2 = 4, ought LEIBNIZ to have appealed to
+the fact in question? MıLL omits to point out the gap in the
+proof, although he gives himself a precisely analogous proof
+of the proposition s † 2 = 7.1 Actually, there is a gap, consisting in the omission of the brackets; but MILL overlooks
+this just as LEIBNIZ does.
+If the definition of each individual number did really
+assert a special physical fact, then we should never be able
+sufficiently to admire, for his knowledge of nature, a man who
+calculates with nine-figure numbers. Meantime, perhaps MILL
+does not mean to go so far as to maintain that all these facts
+would have to be observed severally, but thinks it would
+be enough if we had derived through induction a general
+law in which they were all included together. But try to
+formulate this law, and it will be found impossible. It is not
+enough to say: "There exist large collections of things which
+can be split up." For this does not state that there exist
+collections of such a size and of such a sort as are required for,
+say, the number 1,000,000, nor is the manner in which they
+are to be divided up specified any more precisely. MILL's
+theory must necessarily lead to the demand that a fact should
+be observed specially for each number, for in a general law
+precisely what is peculiar to the number 1,000,000, which
+necessarily belongs to its definition, would be lost. On MILL's
+view we could actually not put 1,000,000 = 999,999 + I unless
+' Op. cit., Bk. III, cap, xxiv, S s.
+
+II
+we had observed a collection of things split up in precisely
+this peculiar way, different from that characteristic of any and
+every other number whatsoever.
+S 8. MILL seems to hold that we ought not to form the
+definitions=1I3=2I4=3Iao
+unless and until the facts he refers to have been observed. It is
+quite true that we ought not to define 3 as (2 + I), if we
+attach no sense at all to (2 † I). But the question is whether,
+for this, it is necessary to observe his collection and its separation. If it were, the number o would be a puzzle; for up to
+now no one, I take it, has ever seen or touched o pebbles.
+MiLL, of course, would explain o as something that has no
+sense, a mere manner of speaking; calculations with o would
+be a mere game, played with empty symbols, and the only
+wonder would be that anything rational could come of it.
+If, however, these calculations have a serious meaning, then
+the symbol o cannot be entirely without sense either. And the
+possibility suggests itself that 2 + I, in the same way as o,
+might have a sense even without Mit's matter of fact being
+observed. Who is actually prepared to assert that the fact
+which, according to MILL, is contained in the definition of an
+eighteen-figure number has ever been observed, and who is
+prepared to deny that the symbol for such a number has, none
+the less, a sense?
+Perhaps it is supposed that the physical facts would be
+used only for the smaller numbers, say up to io, while the
+remaining numbers could be constructed out of these. But
+if we can form 11 from 1o and I simply by definition, without
+having seen the corresponding collection, then there is no
+reason why we should not also be able in this way to construct
+2 out of i and I. If calculations with the number i1 do not
+follow from any matter of fact uniquely characteristic of that
+number, how does it happen that calculations with the number
+
+2 must depend on the observation of a particular collection,
+separated in its own peculiar way?
+It may, perhaps, be asked how arithmetic could exist, if
+we could distinguish nothing whatever by means of our senses,
+or only three things at most. Now for our knowledge, certainly, of arithmetical propositions and of their applications,
+such a state of affairs would be somewhat awkward-but
+would it affect the truth of those propositions? If we call a
+proposition empirical on the ground that we must have made
+observations in order to have become conscious of its content,
+then we are not using the word "empirical" in the sense in which
+it is opposed to "a priori". We are making a psychological
+statement, which concerns solely the content of the proposition; the question of its truth is not touched. In this sense,
+all Münchhausen's tales are empirical too; for certainly all sorts
+of observations must have been made before they could be
+invented.
+Are the laws of arithmetic inductive truths?
+$ 9. The considerations adduced thus far make it
+probable that numerical formulae can be derived from the
+definitions of the individual numbers alone by means of a few
+general laws, and that these definitions neither assert observed
+facts not presuppose them for their legitimacy. Our next task,
+therefore, must be to ascertain the nature of the laws involved.
+MILL' proposes to make use, for his proof (referred to
+above) of the formula s + 2 = 7, of the principle that "Whatever
+is made up of parts, is made up of parts of those parts." This
+he holds to be an expression in more characteristic language
+of the principle familiar elsewhere in the form "The sums of
+equals are equals." He calls it an inductive truth, and a law of
+nature of the highest order. It is typical of the inaccuracy of
+1 Op. cit., Bk. III, cap. xxiv, $ s.
+
+13
+his exposition, that when he comes to the point in the proof
+at which, on his own view, this principle should be indispensable, he does not invoke it at all; however, it appears that his
+inductive truth is meant to do the work of LEIBNIZ's axiom
+that "If equals be substituted for equals, the equality remains."
+But in order to be able to call arithmetical truths laws of nature,
+MILL attributes to them a sense which they do not bear.
+For example, he holds that the identity I = I could be false,
+on the ground that one pound weight does not always weigh
+precisely the same as another. But the proposition I = I is
+not intended in the least to state that it does.
+MıL understands the symbol † in such a way that it
+will serve to express the relation between the parts of a
+physical body or of a heap and the whole body or heap; but
+such is not the sense of that symbol. That if we pour z unit
+volumes of liquid into s unit volumes of liquid we shall have
+7 unit volumes of liquid, is not the meaning of the proposition
+s + 2 = 7, but an application of it, which only holds good
+provided that no alteration of the volume occurs as a result,
+say, of some chemical reaction. MILL always confuses the
+applications that can be made of an arithmetical proposition,
+which often are physical and do presuppose observed facts,
+with the pure mathematical proposition itself. The plus symbol
+can certainly look, in many applications, as though it corresponded to a process of heaping up; but that is not its meaning;
+for in other applications there can be no question of heaps or
+aggregates, or of the relationship between a physical body and
+its parts, as for example when we calculate about numbers of
+events. No doubt we can speak even here of "parts"; but then
+we are using the word not in the physical or geometrical sense,
+but in its logical sense, as we do when we speak of tyrannicides
+' Op. cit., Bk. II, cap. vi, $ 3.
+
+14
+as a part of murder as a whole. This is a matter of logical
+subordination. And in the same way addition too does not
+in general correspond to any physical relationship. It follows
+that the general laws of addition cannot, for their part, be laws
+of nature.
+S10.
+But might they not still be inductive truths nevertheless? I do not see how that is conceivable. From what
+particular facts are we to take our start here, in order to
+advance to the general? The only available candidates for the
+part are the numerical formulae. Assign them to it, and of
+course we lose once again the advantage gained by giving our
+definitions of the individual numbers; we should have to cast
+around for some other means of establishing the numerical
+formulae. Even if we manage to rise superior to this misgiving too, which is not exactly easy, we shall still find the
+ground unfavourable for induction; for here there is none of
+that uniformity, which in other fields can give the method a
+high degree of reliability. LEIBNIZ recognized this already:
+for to his Philalèthe, who had asserted that
+"the several modes of number are not capable of any other
+difference but more or less; which is why they are simple
+modes, like those of space,"*
+he returns the answer:
+"That can be said of time and of the straight line, but
+certainly not of the figures and still less of the numbers,
+which are not merely different in magnitude, but also dissimilar. An even number can be divided into two equal parts,
+an odd number cannot; three and six are triangular numbers,
+four and nine are squares, eight is a cube, and so on. And this
+is even more the case with the numbers than with the figures;
+for two unequal figures can be perfectly similar to each other,
+but never two numbers."
+We have no doubt grown used to treating the numbers
+1 Baumann, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 39 (Erdmann edn., p. 243).
+* [Derived from Locke, Essay, Bk. II, cap. xvi, Ss.]
+
+in many contexts as all of the same sort, but that is only because
+we know a set of general propositions which hold for all
+numbers. For the present purpose, however, we must put
+ourselves in the position that none of these has yet been
+discovered. The fact is that it would be difficult to find an
+example of an inductive inference to parallel our present case.
+In ordinary inductions we often make good use of the proposition that every position in space and every moment in time
+is as good in itself as every other. Our results must hold good
+for any other place and any other time, provided only that the
+conditions are the same. But in the case of the numbers this
+does not apply, since they are not in space or time. Position
+in the number series is not a matter of indifference like position
+in space.
+The numbers, moreover, are related to one another quite
+differently from the way in which the individual specimens of,
+say, a species of animal are. It is in their nature to be arranged
+in a fixed, definite order of precedence; and each one is formed
+in its own special way and has its own unique peculiarities,
+which are specially prominent in the cases of o, 1 and 2. Elsewhere when we establish by induction a proposition about a
+species, we are ordinarily in possession already, merely from
+the definition of the concept of the species, of a whole series of
+its common properties. But with the numbers we have difficulty in finding even a single common property which has not
+actually to be hrst proved common.
+The tollowing 1s perhaps the case with which our putative
+induction might most easily be compared. Suppose we have
+noticed that in a borehole the temperature increases regularly
+with the depth; and suppose we have so far encountered a
+wide variety of differing rock strata. Here it is obvious that
+we cannot, simply on the strength of the observations made
+at this borehole, infer anything whatever as to the nature of
+the strata at deeper levels, and that any answer to the question,
+whether the regular distribution of temperature would continue to hold good lower down, would be premature. There
+is, it is true, a concept, that of "whatever you come to by going
+on boring,
+" under which fall both the strata so far observed
+and those at lower levels alike; but that is of little assistance
+
+to us here. And equally, it will be no help to us to learn in
+the case of the numbers that these all fall together under the
+concept of "whatever you get by going on increasing by one."
+It is possible to draw a distinction between the two cases, on
+the ground that the strata are things we simply encounter,
+whereas the numbers are literally created, and determined in
+their whole natures, by the process of continually increasing
+by one. Now this can only mean that from the way in which a
+number, say 8, is generated through increasing by one all its
+properties can be deduced. But this is in principle to grant
+that the properties of numbers follow from their definitions,
+and to open up the possibility that we might prove the general
+laws of numbers from the method of generation which is
+common to them all, while deducing the special properties
+of the individual numbers from the special way in which,
+through the process of continually increasing by one, each one
+is formed. In the same way in the geological case too, we
+can deduce everything that is determined simply and solely
+by the depth at which a stratum is encountered, namely its
+spatial position relative to anything else, from the depth itself,
+without having any need of induction; but whatever is not so
+determined, cannot be learned by induction either.
+The procedure of induction, we may surmise, can itself
+be justified only by means of general propositions of arithmetic
+—unless we understand by induction a mere process of habituation, in which case it has of course absolutely no power whatever of leading to the discovery of truth. The procedure of the
+sciences, with its objective standards, will at times find a high
+probability established by a single confirmatory instance,
+while at others it will dismiss a thousand as almost worthless;
+whereas our habits are determined by the number and strength
+of the impressions we receive and by subjective circumstances, which have no sort of right at all to influence our
+judgement. Induction [then, properly understood,] must
+base itself on the theory of probability, since it can never
+render a proposition more than probable. But how probability
+
+17
+theory could possibly be developed without presupposing
+arithmetical laws is beyond comprehension.
+S II. LEIBNIZ' holds the opposite view, that the
+necessary truths, such as are found in arithmetic, must have
+principles whose proof does not depend on examples and
+therefore not on the evidence of the senses, though doubtless
+without the senses it would have occurred to no one to think
+of them. "The whole of arithmetic is innate and is in virtual
+fashion in us." What he means by the term "innate" is
+explained by another passage, where he denies "that Everything
+we learn is not innate. The truths of number are in us and yet
+we still learn them, whether it be by drawing them forth from
+their source when learning them by demonstration (which
+shows them to be innate), or whether it be ...".
+Are the laws of arithmetic synthetic a priori or analytic?
+S I2. If we now bring in the other antithesis between
+analytic and synthetic, there result four possible combinations,
+of which however one, viz.
+analytic a posteriori
+can be eliminated. Those who have decided with MILL in
+favour of a posteriori have therefore no second choice, so that
+there remain only two possibilities for us still to examine, viz.
+synthetic a prioti
+and
+analytic.
+KANt declares for the former. In that case, there is no
+1 Baumann, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 13-14 (Erdmann edn., Pp. 195, 208-9).
+" Baumann, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 38 (Erdmann edn., p. 212).
+
+18
+alternative but to invoke a pure intuition as the ultimate
+ground of our knowledge of such judgements, hard though
+it is to say of this whether it is spatial or temporal, or whatever
+else it may be. BAuMANN agrees with KaNt, although for
+rather different reasons. LIPSCHITZ, too, holds that certain
+propositions, namely that which asserts that Number is
+independent of the method of numbering and also the Commutative and Associative Laws of Addition, are derived from
+inner intuition. HanKEL bases the theory of real numbers
+on three fundamental propositions, to which he ascribes the
+character of "common notions" (notiones communes): "Once
+expounded they are perfectly self-evident; they are valid for
+magnitudes in every field, as vouched for by our pure intuition
+of magnitude; and they can without losing their character be
+transformed into definitions, simply by defining the addition
+of magnitudes as an operation which satisfies them." In the
+last statement here there is an obscurity. The definition can
+perhaps be constructed, but it will not do as a substitute for
+the original propositions; for in seeking to apply it the question
+would always arise: Are Numbers magnitudes, and is what
+we ordinarily call addition of Numbers addition in the sense of
+this definition? And to answer it, we should need to know
+already his original propositions about Numbers. Moreover,
+the expression "pure intuition of magnitude" gives us pause.
+If we consider all the different things that are called magnitudes: Numbers, lengths, areas, volumes, angles, curvatures,
+masses, velocities, forces, illuminations, electric currents, and
+so forth, we can quite well understand how they can all be
+brought under the single concept of magnitude; but the term
+"intuition of magnitude," and still worse "pure intuition of
+1 Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 66g.
+2 Lebrbuch der Analysis, Vol. I, p. I [Bonn 1877].
+s Op. cit., Pp. 54-55.
+
+19
+magnitude", cannot be admitted as appropriate. I cannot
+even allow an intuition of 100,000, far less of number in
+general, not to mention magnitude in general. We are all too
+ready to invoke inner intuition, whenever we cannot produce
+any other ground of knowledge. But we have no business,
+in doing so, to lose sight altogether of the sense of the word
+"intuition"
+KaNt in his Logic (ed. Hartenstein, vol. VIII, p. 88)
+defines it as follows:
+"An intuition is an individual idea (REPRÆSENTATIO
+SINGULARIS), a concept is a general idea (REPRÆSENTATIO PER
+NOTAS COMMUNES) OI an idea of reflexion (REPRÆSENTATIO
+DISCURSIVA)."
+Here there is absolutely no mention of any connexion
+with sensibility, which is, however, included in the notion of
+intuition in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and without which
+intuition cannot serve as the principle of our knowledge of
+synthetic a priori judgements. In the Critique of Pure Reason
+(ed. Hartenstein, vol. III, p. ss)* we read:
+"It is therefore through the medium of sensibility that
+objects are given to us and it alone provides us with intuitions."
+It follows that the sense of the word "intuition" is wider
+in the Logic than in the Transcendental Aesthetic. In the sense of
+the Logic, we might perhaps be able to call 100,000 an intuition;
+for it is not a general concept anyhow. But an intuition in
+this sense cannot serve as the ground of our knowledge of
+the laws of arithmetic.
+$ 13. We shall do well in general not to overestimate
+the extent to which arithmetic is akin to geometry. I have
+already quoted a warning to this effect from LEIBNIZ. One
+geometrical point, considered by itself, cannot be distinguished
+in any way from any other; the same applies to lines and planes.
+Only when several points, or lines or planes, are included
+together in a single intuition, do we distinguish them. In
+geometry, therefore, it is quite intelligible that general pro-
+* [Original edns., A1g/B33]
+
+positions should be derived from intuition; the points or lines
+or planes which we intuite are not really particular at all,
+which is what enables them to stand as representatives of the
+whole of their kind. But with the numbers it is different;
+each number has its own peculiarities. To what extent a
+given particular number can represent all the others, and at
+what point its own special character comes into play, cannot be
+laid down generally in advance.
+S 14. If, again, we compare the various kinds of truths
+in respect of the domains that they govern, the comparison
+tells once more against the supposed empirical and synthetic
+character of arithmetical laws.
+Empirical propositions hold good of what is physically
+or psychologically actual, the truths of geometry govern all
+that is spatially intuitable, whether actual or product of
+our fancy. The wildest visions of delirium, the boldest
+inventions of legend and poetry, where animals speak and
+stars stand still, where men are turned to stone and trees
+turn into men, where the drowning haul themselves up out
+of swamps by their own topknots—all these remain, so long
+as they remain intuitable, still subject to the axioms of geometry.
+Conceptual thought alone can after a fashion shake off this
+yoke, when it assumes, say, a space of four dimensions or
+positive curvature. To study such conceptions is not useless
+by any means; but it is to leave the ground of intuition entirely
+behind. If we do make use of intuition even here, as an aid, it
+is still the same old intuition of Euclidean space, the only
+space of which we have any picture. Only then the intuition
+is not taken at its face value, but as symbolic of something
+else; for example, we call straight or plane what we actually
+intuite as curved. For purposes of conceptual thought we
+can always assume the contrary of some one or other of the
+geometrical axioms, without involving ourselves in any selfcontradictions when we proceed to our deductions, despite
+
+21
+the conflict between our assumptions and our intuition. The
+fact that this is possible shows that the axioms of geometry
+are independent of one another and of the primitive laws of
+logic, and consequently are synthetic. Can the same be said
+of the fundamental propositions of the science of number?
+Here, we have only to try denying any one of them, and
+complete confusion ensues. Even to think at all seems no
+longer possible. The basis of arithmetic lies deeper, it seems,
+than that of any of the empirical sciences, and even than that of
+geometry. The truths of arithmetic govern all that is numerable. This is the widest domain of all; for to it belongs not
+only the actual, not only the intuitable, but everything thinkable. Should not the laws of number, then, be connected
+very intimately with the laws of thought?
+§ Is. Statements in LEIBNIZ can only be taken to mean
+that the laws of number are analytic, as was to be expected,
+since for him the a priori coincides with the analytic. Thus
+he declares that the benefits of algebra are due to its borrowings from a far superior science, that of the true logic. In
+another passage? he compares necessary and contingent truths
+to commensurable and incommensurable magnitudes, and
+maintains that in the case of necessary truths a proof or
+reduction to identities* is possible. However, these declarations lose some of their force in view of LEIBNIZ's inclination
+to regard all truths as provable: "Every truth", he says,
+"has its proof a priori derived from the concept of the terms,
+notwithstanding it does not always lie in our power to achieve
+this analysis." Though of course the comparison to commensurable and incommensurable magnitudes erects a fresh
+* Baumann, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 56 (Erdmann edn., P. 424).
+= Baumann, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 57 (Erdmann edn., p. 83).
+3 Baumann, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 57 (Pertz edn., Vol. II, p. ss [= Gerhardt edn.,
+pbil. Scbr., Vol. II, p. 6z)).
+* [Identitäten]
+
+22
+barrier between necessary and contingent truths, which for us
+at least is insuperable.
+A very emphatic declaration in favour of the analytic
+nature of the laws of number is that of W. S. Jevons': "I hold
+that algebra is a highly developed logic, and number but
+logical discrimination."
+S I6. But this view, too, has its difficulties. Can the great
+tree of the science of number as we know it, towering, spreading, and still continually growing, have its roots in bare
+identities*? And how do the empty forms of logic come to
+disgorge so rich a content?
+To quote MILL:? "The doctrine that we can discover
+facts, detect the hidden processes of nature, by an artful
+manipulation of language, is so contrary to common sense,
+that a person must have made some advances in philosophy to
+believe it."
+Very true-if it be supposed that during the artful
+manipulation we do not think at all. MiLL is here criticizing
+a kind of formalism that scarcely anyone would wish to
+defend. Everyone who uses words or mathematical symbols
+makes the claim that they mean something, and no one will
+expect any sense to emerge from empty symbols. But it is
+possible for a mathematician to perform quite lengthy calculations without understanding by his symbols anything intuitable, or with which we could be sensibly acquainted. And that
+does not mean that the symbols have no sense; we still .
+distinguish between the symbols themselves and their content,
+even though it may be that the content can only be grasped
+by their aid. We realize perfectly that other symbols might
+have been arranged to stand for the same things. All we
+need to know is how to handle logically the content as made
+sensible in the symbols and, if we wish to apply our calculus
+to physics, how to effect the transition to the phenomena.
+1 The Principles of Science, London I879, p. 156 [1874 edn., p. 174).
+< Op. cit., Bk. II, cap. vi, § 2.
+* [Identitäten]
+
+23
+It is, however, a mistake to see in such applications the real
+sense of the propositions; in any application a large part of
+their generality is always lost, and a particular element enters
+in, which in other applications is replaced by other particular
+elements.
+S 17. However much we may disparage deduction, it
+cannot be denied that the laws established by induction are
+not enough. New propositions must be derived from them
+which are not contained in any one of them by itself. No
+doubt these propositions are in a way contained covertly in
+the whole set taken together, but this does not absolve us from
+the labour of actually extracting them and setting them out
+in their own right. This seen, we can see also the following
+possibility. Instead of linking our chain of deductions direct
+to any matter of fact, we can leave the fact where it is,
+while adopting its content in the form of a condition. By
+substituting in this way conditions for facts throughout the
+whole of a train of reasoning, we shall finally reduce it to a
+form in which a certain result is made dependent on a certain
+series of conditions. This truth would be established by
+thought alone or, to use MILl's expression, by an artful
+manipulation of language. It is not impossible that the laws
+of number are of this type. This would make them analytic
+judgements, despite the fact that they would not normally
+be discovered by thought alone; for we are concerned here
+not with the way in which they are discovered but with the
+kind of ground on which their proof rests; or in LEIBNIZ'S
+words, "the question here is not one of the history of our
+discoveries, which is different in different men, but of the
+connexion and natural order of truths, which is always the
+same." It would then rest with observation finally to decide
+whether the conditions included in the laws thuś established
+are actually fulfilled. Thus we should in the end arrive at the
+same position as we should have reached by linking our chain
+1 Nouveaux Essais, IV, $ 9 (Erdmann edn., p. 36z).
+
+24
+of deductions direct to observed matters of fact. But the type
+of procedure here indicated is in many cases to be preferred,
+because it leads to a general proposition, which need not be
+applicable only to the facts immediately under consideration.
+The truths of arithmetic would then be related to those of logic
+in much the same way as the theorems of geometry to the
+axioms. Each one would contain concentrated within it a
+whole series of deductions for future use, and the use of it
+would be that we need no longer make the deductions one
+by one, but can express simultaneously the result of the whole
+series.! If this be so, then indeed the prodigious development
+of arithmetical studies, with their multitudinous applications,
+will suffice to put an end to the widespread contempt for
+analytic judgements and to the legend of the sterility of pure
+logic.
+This is not the first time that such a view has been put
+forward. If it could be worked out in detail, so rigorously
+that not the smallest doubt remained, that, it seems to me,
+would be a result not entirely without importance.
+II. Views of certain writers on the concept of
+Number.
+S 18. On turning now to consider the primary objects
+of arithmetic, we must distinguish between the individual
+numbers 3, 4 and so on, and the general concept of Number.
+1 It is remarkable that Milt too (op. cit., Bk. II, cap. vi, $ 4) seems to express
+this view. His sound sense, in fact, from time to time breaks through his
+prejudice in favour of the empirical. But this same prejudice as often brings
+everything back into a muddle, by making him confuse the physical applications
+of arithmetic with arithmetic itself. He seems to be unaware that a hypothetical
+judgement can be true even when the antecedent is not true.
+
+25
+Now we have already decided in favour of the view that the
+individual numbers are best derived, in the way proposed by
+LEIBNIZ, MILL, H. GRASSMANN and others, from the number
+one together with increase by one, but that these definitions
+remain incomplete so long as the number one and increase
+by one are themselves undefined. And we have seen that we
+have need of general propositions if we are to derive the
+numerical formulae from these definitions. Such laws cannot,
+just because of their generality, follow from the definitions of
+the individual numbers, but only from the general concept of
+Number. It is this concept that we shall now submit to a
+closer examination; in the course of this we may expect to have
+also to discuss the number one and increase by one, as a result
+of which in turn we shall expect to complete the definitions of
+the individual numbers.
+S I9. At this point I should like straight away to oppose
+the attempt to think of number geometrically, as a ratio
+between lengths or surfaces. Obviously, the thought behind
+this was to facilitate the numerous applications of arithmetic
+to geometry by putting the rudiments of both in the closest
+connexion from the outset.
+NEWTON' proposes to understand by number not so much
+a set of units as the relation in the abstract between any given
+magnitude* and another magnitude of the same kind which
+is taken as unity. It may be granted that this is an apt
+description of number in the wider sense, in which it includes
+[besides the integers] also fractions and irrational numbers;
+but it presupposes the concepts of magnitude and of relation
+in respect of magnitude. This should presumably mean that a
+definition of number in the narrower sense, or cardinal Number,
+will still be needed; for EucLID**, in order to define the identity
+of two ratios between lengths, makes use of the concept of
+equimultiples, and equimultiples bring us back once again
+1 Baumann, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 475 [Arithmetica Universalis, Vol. I, cap. ii, 3.]
+* [quantitas]
+** [Elements, Bk. V., Def. s.]
+
+26
+to numerical identity. However, let it be, as it may be, the
+case that identity of ratios between lengths can in fact be
+defined without any reference to the concept of number.
+Even so, we should still remain in doubt as to how the number
+defined geometrically in this way is related to the number of
+ordinary life, which would then be entirely cut off from
+science. Yet surely we are entitled to demand of arithmetic
+that its numbers should be adapted for use in every application made of number, even although that application is not
+itself the business of arithmetic. Even in our everyday sums,
+we must be able to rely on the science of arithmetic to provide
+the basis for the methods we use. And moreover, the question
+arises whether arithmetic itself can make do with a geometrical
+concept of number, when we think of some of the notions that
+occur in it, such as the Number of roots of an equation or of
+numbers prime to and smaller than a given number. On the
+other hand, the number which gives the answer to the
+question How many? can answer among other things how many
+units are contained in a length. And operations with negative,
+fractional and irrational numbers can all be reduced to operations with the natural numbers. Perhaps what NEWTON
+wished to understand by magnitudes, in defining number as a
+relation between magnitudes, was not geometrical magnitudes
+only, but also sets. In that case, however, his definition is
+useless for our purposes, since the expression "relation between
+a set and the unit of the set" tells us no more than the expression "number by which a set is determined."
+S 20. The first question to be faced, then, is whether
+number is definable. HanKEL! declares that it is not, in
+these words: "What we mean by thinking or putting a thing
+once, twice, three times, and so on, cannot be defined, because
+of the simplicity in principle of the concept of putting." But
+the point is surely not so much the putting as the once, twice
+and three times. If this could be defined, the indefinability
+" Op. cit., p. I.
+
+27
+of putting would scarcely worry us. LeInIz is inclined to
+regard number as an adequate idea, meaning one which is so
+clear that every element contained in it is also clear, or at least
+as an almost adequate one.
+If the general inclination is, on the whole, to hold that
+Number is indefinable, that is more because attempts to define
+it have failed than because anything has been discovered in
+the nature of the case to show that it must be so.
+Is Number a property of external things?
+f 21. Let us try at least to assign to Number its proper
+place among our concepts. In language, numbers most
+commonly appear in adjectival form and attributive construction in the same sort of way as the words hard or heavy
+or red, which have for their menings properties of external
+things. It is natural to ask whether we must think of the
+individual numbers too as such properties, and whether, accordingly, the concept of Number can be classed along with that,
+say, of colour.
+That it can, seems to be the view of M. CanTor,' when
+he calls mathematics an empirical science in so far as it begins
+with the consideration of things in the external world. On
+his view, number originates only by abstraction from objects.
+For E. SCHröDEr? number is modelled on actuality,
+derived from it by a process of copying the actual units with
+ones, which he calls the abstraction of number. In this copying,
+the units are only represented in point of their frequency, all
+1 Grundzüge einer Elementarmathematik, p. 2, S 4. Similarly Lipschitz, op. cit.,
+p. I.
+& Op. cit., pp. 6, 10-11.
+
+28
+other properties of the things concerned, such as their colour
+or shape, being disregarded. Here frequency is only another
+name for Number. It follows, therefore, that ScHröDer puts
+frequency or Number on a level with colour and shape, and
+treats it as a property of things.
+$ 22. BAUMANN' rejects the view that numbers are
+concepts extracted from external things: "The reason being
+that external things do not present us with any strict units;
+they present us with isolated groups or sensible points, but
+we are at liberty to treat each one of these itself again as a
+many." And it is quite true that, while I am not in a position,
+simply by thinking of it differently, to alter the colour or
+hardness of a thing in the slightest, I am able to think of the
+Iliad either as one poem, or as 24 Books, or as some large
+Number of verses. Is it not in totally different senses that we
+speak of a tree as having 1000 leaves and again as having
+green leaves? The green colour we ascribe to each single leaf,
+but not the number 1000. If we call all the leaves of a tree
+taken together its foliage, then the foliage too is green, but it is
+not 1000. To what then does the property 1ooo really belong?
+It almost looks as though it belongs neither to any single one
+of the leaves nor to the totality of them all; is it possible that it
+does not really belong to things in the external world at all?
+If I give someone a stone with the words: Find the weight of
+this, I have given him precisely the object he is to investigate.
+But if 1 place a pile of playing cards in his hands with the
+words: Find the Number of these, this does not tell him
+whether I wish to know the number of cards, or of complete
+packs of cards, or even say of honour cards at skat. To have
+given him the pile in his hands is not yet to have given him
+completely the object he is to investigate; I must add some
+1 Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 669.
+
+29
+further word-cards, or packs, or honours. Nor can we
+say that in this case the different numbers exist in the same
+thing side by side, as different colours do. I can point to the
+patch of each individual colour without saying a word, but I
+cannot in the same way point to the individual numbers. If I
+can call the same object red and green with equal right, it is a
+sure sign that the object named is not what really has the green
+colour; for that we must first get a surface which is green only.
+Similarly, an object to which I can ascribe different numbers
+with equal right is not what really has a number.
+It marks, therefore, an important difference between
+colour and Number, that a colour such as blue belongs to a
+surface independently of any choice of ours. The blue colour
+is a power of reflecting light of certain wavelengths and of
+absorbing to varying extents light of other wavelengths; to
+this, our way of regarding it cannot make the slightest difference. The Number I, on the other hand, or 100 or any other
+Number, cannot be said to belong to the pile of playing cards
+in its own right, but at most to belong to it in view of the way
+in which we have chosen to regard it; and even then not in
+such a way that we can simply assign the Number to it as a
+predicate. What we choose to call a complete pack is obviously
+an arbitrary decision, in which the pile of playing cards has
+no say. But it is when we examine the pile in the light of this
+decision, that we discover perhaps that we can call it two
+complete packs. Anyone who did not know what we call
+a complete pack would probably discover in the pile any other
+Number you like before hitting on two.
+$ 23. To the question: What is it that the number belongs
+to as a property? MILL' replies as follows: the name of a
+number connotes, "of course, some property belonging to the
+1 Op. cit., Bk. III, cap. xxiv, S s.
+
+30
+agglomeration of things which we call by the name; and that
+property is the characteristic manner in which the agglomeration is made up of, and may be separated into, parts."
+Here the definite article in the phrase "the characteristic
+manner" is a mistake right away; for there are very various
+manners in which an agglomeration can be separated into
+parts, and we cannot say that one alone would be characteristic.
+For example, a bundle of straw can be separated into parts by
+cutting all the straws in half, or by splitting it up into single
+straws, or by dividing it into two bundles. Further, is a heap
+of a hundred grains of sand made up of parts in exactly the
+same way as a bundle of 1oo straws? And yet we have the same
+number. The number word "one", again, in the expression
+"one straw" signally fails to do justice to the way in which
+the straw is made up of cells or molecules. Still more difficulty
+is presented by the number o. Besides, need the straws form
+any sort of bundle at all in order to be numbered? Must we
+literally hold a rally of all the blind in Germany before we can
+attach any sense to the expression "the number of blind in
+Germany"? Are a thousand grains of wheat, when once
+they have been scattered by the sower, a thousand grains of
+wheat no longer? Do such things really exist as agglomerations
+of proofs of a theorem, or agglomerations of events? And yet
+these too can be numbered. Nor does it make any difference
+whether the events occur together or thousands of years
+apart.
+S 24. This brings us to another reason for refusing to
+class number along with colour and solidity: it is applicable
+over a far wider range.
+MILL' maintains that the truth that whatever is made
+up of parts is made up of parts of those parts holds good for
+natural phenomena of every sort, since all admit of being
+Op. cit., Bk. III, сар. xxiv, $ s.
+
+31
+numbered. But cannot still far more than this be numbered?
+LockE' says: "Number applies itself to men, angels, actions,
+thoughts—everything that either doth exist or can be
+imagined." LEIBNIZ' rejects the view of the schoolmen that
+number is not applicable to immaterial things, and calls
+number a sort of immaterial figure, which results from the
+union of things of any sorts whatsoever, for example of God,
+an angel, a man and motion, which together are four. For
+which reason he holds that number is of supreme universality
+and belongs to metaphysics. In another passages he says:
+"Some things cannot be weighed, as having no force and
+power; some things cannot be measured, by reason of having
+no parts; but there is nothing which cannot be numbered.
+Thus number is, as it were, a kind of metaphysical figure."
+It would indeed be remarkable if a property abstracted
+from external things could be transferred without any change
+of sense to events, to ideas and to concepts. The effect would
+be just like speaking of fusible events, or blue ideas, or salty
+concepts or tough judgements.
+It does not make sense that what is by nature sensible
+should occur in what is non-sensible. When we see a blue
+surface, we have an impression of a unique sort, which
+corresponds to the word "blue"; this impression we recognize
+again, when we catch sight of another blue surface. In order
+to suppose that there is in the same way, when we look at a
+triangle, something sensible corresponding to the word
+"three", we should have to commit ourselves to finding that
+same thing again in three concepts too; so that something
+non-sensible would have in it something sensible. It may
+* Baumann, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 40g. [Essay, Bk. II, cap. xvi, $ 1].
+= Baumann, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 2-3 [Erdmann edn., p. 8].
+" Baumann, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 56 [Erdmann edn., p. I62].
+
+32
+certainly be granted that a sensible impression of a sort does
+correspond to the word "triangular"
+, but then the word
+must be taken as a whole. The three in it we do not see
+directly; rather, we see something upon which can fasten an
+intellectual activity of ours leading to a judgement in which
+the number 3 occurs. How is it after all that we do become
+acquainted with, let us say, the Number of figures of the
+syllogism as drawn up by Aristotle? Is it perhaps with our
+eyes? What we see is at most certain symbols for the syllogistic
+figures, not the figures themselves. How are we to be able to
+see their Number, if they themselves remain invisible? However, it may be argued that it is enough to see the symbols;
+their number is identical with the number of the figures.
+But then, how do we know this? For that, we must have
+already ascertained the number of the figures by some other
+means. Or is the proposition "The Number of figures of the
+syllogism is four" only another way of putting the proposition
+that "The Number of symbols for figures of the syllogism is
+four?" Of course it is not. There is no intention of saying
+anything about the symbols; no one wants to know anything
+about them, except in so far as some property of theirs directly
+mirrors some property in what they symbolize. Besides, the
+same thing can, without any logical fallacy, be symbolized by
+several different symbols, so that there is not even any need
+for the number of symbols to coincide with the number of
+things symbolised.
+S 25. While for MILt the number is something physical,
+for LoCKE and LeIbniz it exists only as a notion.* MILL! is,
+of course, quite right that two apples are physically different
+from three apples, and two horses from one horse; that they
+are a different visible and tangible phenomenon.? But are
+1 Op. cit., Bk. III, сар, ххіт, S s.
+& Strictly speaking we should add: provided that they are a phenomenon at
+all. For if someone has one horse in Germany and one in America (and no others),
+then he does possess two horses; yet these two horses do not form a
+phenomenon,—only each one of the two by itself could be so described.
+* [in der Idee]
+
+33
+we to infer from this that their twoness or threeness is something physical? One pair of boots may be the same visible
+and tangible phenomenon as two boots. Here we have a difference in number to which no physical difference corresponds;
+for two and one pair are by no means the same thing, as MILL
+seems oddly to believe. How is it possible, after all, for two
+concepts to be physically distinguishable from three concepts?
+To quote BERKELEy!: "It ought to be considered that
+number... is nothing fixed and settled, really existing in
+things themselves. It is entirely the creature of the mind,
+considering, either an idea by itself, or any combination of
+ideas to which it gives one name, and so makes it pass for a
+unit. According as the mind variously combines its ideas,
+the unit varies; and as the unit, so the number, which is only
+a collection of units, doth also vary. We call a window one,
+a chimney one, and yet a house in which there are many
+windows, and many chimneys, hath an equal right to be called
+one, and many houses go to the making of one city."
+Is number something subjective?
+$ 26. This line of thought may easily lead us to regard
+number as something subjective. It looks as though the way
+in which number originates in us may prove the key to its
+essential nature. The matter would thus become one for a
+psychological enquiry. This is indeed what LIpscHITz? is
+thinking of when he writes: "Anyone who proposes to make
+a survey of a number of things, will begin with some one
+particular thing and proceed by continually adding a new
+one to those previously selected." This seems to describe
+much better how we acquire say the intuition of a constellation
+than how we construct numbers. The intention to make a
+1 Baumann, op, cit., Vol. II, p. 428 [New Theory of Vision, S 109).
+& Op. cit., p. 1. I take it that Lipschitz means to refer to a mental process.
+
+34
+survey is not essential; for it will scarcely be maintained that
+it becomes any easier to survey a herd after we have learned
+how many head it comprises.
+No description of this kind of the mental processes which
+precede the forming of a judgement of number*, even if more
+to the point than this one, can ever take the place of a genuine
+definition of the concept. It can never be adduced in proof
+of any proposition of arithmetic; it acquaints us with none of
+the properties of numbers. For number is no whit more an
+object of psychology or a product of mental processes than,
+let us say, the North Sea is. The objectivity of the North Sea is
+not affected by the fact that it is a matter of our arbitrary choice
+which part of all the water on the earth's surface we mark
+off and elect to call the "North Sea". This is no reason for
+deciding to investigate the North Sea by psychological
+methods. In the same way number, too, is something objective. If we say "The North Sea is 10,000 square miles in extent"
+then neither by "North Sea" nor by "10,000" do we refer to
+any state of or process in our minds: on the contrary, we assert
+something quite objective, which is independent of our ideas
+and everything of the sort. If we should happen to wish, on
+another occasion, to draw the boundaries of the North Sea
+differently or to understand something different by "10,000",
+that would not make false the same content that was previously
+true: what we should perhaps rather say is, that a false content
+had now taken the place of a true, without in any way depriving
+its predecessor of its truth.
+The botanist means to assert something just as factual
+when he gives the Number of a flower's petals as when he
+gives their colour. The one depends on our arbitrary choice
+just as little as the other. There does, therefore, exist a certain
+similarity between Number and colour; it consists, however,
+not in our becoming acquainted with them both in external
+things through the senses, but in their being both objective.
+* [For Frege, a "judgement of number" (Zablurtheil), like its verbal expression,
+a "statement of number" (Zahlangabe), is one as to how many of something there
+are.]
+
+35
+I distinguish what I call objective from what is handleable
+or spatial or actual. The axis of the earth is objective, so is the
+centre of mass of the solar system, but I should not call them
+actual in the way the earth itself is so. We often speak of the
+equator as an imaginary line; but it would be wrong to call it
+an imaginary line in the dyslogistic sense; it is not a creature of
+thought, the product of a psychological process, but is only
+recognized or apprehended by thought. If to be recognized
+were to be created, then we should be able to say nothing
+positive about the equator for any period earlier than the date
+of its alleged creation.
+Space, according to KANt, belongs to appearance. For
+other rational beings it might take some form quite different
+from that in which we know it. Indeed, we cannot even know
+whether it appears the same to one man as to another; for we
+cannot, in order to compare them, lay one man's intuition of
+space beside another's. Yet there is something objective in
+it all the same; everyone recognizes the same geometrical
+axioms, even if only by his behaviour, and must do so if he
+is to find his way about the world. What is objective in it is
+what is subject to laws, what can be conceived and judged,
+what is expressible in words. What is purely intuitable is
+not communicable. To make this clear, let us suppose two
+rational beings such that projective properties and relations are
+all they can intuite—the lying of three points on a line, of four
+points on a plane, and so on; and let what the one intuites as a
+plane appear to the other as a point, and vice versa, so that what
+for the one is the line joining two points for the other is the
+line of intersection of two planes, and so on with the one
+intuition always dual to the other. In these circumstances they
+could understand one another quite well and would never
+realize the difference between their intuitions, since in projective
+geometry every proposition has its dual counterpart; any
+disagreements over points of aesthetic appreciation would not
+
+36
+be conclusive evidence. Over all geometrical theorems they
+would be in complete agreement, only interpreting the words
+differently in terms of their respective intuitions. With the
+word "point", for example, one would connect one intuition
+and the other another. We can therefore still say that this word
+has for them an objective meaning, provided only that by this
+meaning we do not understand any of the peculiarities of their
+respective intuitions. And in this sense the axis of the earth
+too is objective.
+The word "white" ordinarily makes us think of a certain
+sensation, which is, of course, entirely subjective; but even in
+ordinary everyday speech, it often bears, I think, an objective
+sense. When we call snow white, we mean to refer to an
+objective quality which we recognize, in ordinary daylight, by
+a certain sensation. If the snow is being seen in a coloured
+light, we take that into account in our judgement and say, for
+instance, "It appears red at present, but it is white." Even a
+colour-blind man can speak of red and green, in spite of the
+fact that he does not distinguish between these colours in his
+sensations; he recognizes the distinction by the fact that
+others make it, or perhaps by making a physical experiment.
+Often, therefore, a colour word does not signify our subjective
+sensation, which we cannot know to agree with anyone else's
+(for obviously our calling things by the same name does not
+guarantee as much), but rather an objective quality. It is in this
+way that I understand objective to mean what is independent
+of our sensation, intuition and imagination, and of all construction of mental pictures out of memories of earlier sensations, but not what is independent of the reason,—for what
+are things independent of the reason? To answer that would
+be as much as to judge without judging, or to wash the fur
+without wetting it.
+S 27. For that reason I cannot agree with SCHLOEMILCH
+1 Handbuch der alzebraischen Analysis, p. I.
+
+37
+either, when he calls number the idea of the position of an item
+in a series.! If number were an idea, then arithmetic would be
+psychology. But arithmetic is no more psychology than, say,
+astronomy is. Astronomy is concerned, not with ideas of the
+planets, but with the planets themselves, and by the same token
+the objects of arithmetic are not ideas either. If the number two
+were an idea, then it would have straight away to be private
+to me only. Another man's idea is, ex vi termini, another idea.
+We should then have it might be many millions of twos on
+our hands. We should have to speak of my two and your two,
+of one two and all twos. If we accept latent or unconscious
+ideas, we should have unconscious twos among them, which
+would then return subsequently to consciousness. As new
+generations of children grew up, new generations of twos
+would continually be being born, and in the course of millennia these might evolve, for all we could tell, to such a pitch
+that two of them would make five. Yet, in spite of all this, it
+1 Another possible objection is, that on this theory the same idea of a
+position in a series would have always to appear whenever the same number
+occurred, which obviously does not bappen. My arguments would be beside
+the point if he meant by idea an objective notion [Idee]; but in that case what
+distinction would there be between the idea of the position and the position
+itself?
+An idea in the subjective sense is what is governed by the psychological
+laws of association; it is of a sensible, pictorial character. An idea in the objective
+sense belongs to logic and is in principle non-sensible, although the word which
+means an objective idea is often accompanied by a subjective idea, which nevertheless is not its meaning. Subjective ideas are often demonstrably different in
+different men, objective ideas are the same for all. Objective ideas can be
+divided into objects and concepts. I shall myself, to avoid confusion, use "idea"
+only in the subjective sense. It is because Kant associated both meanings with
+the word that his doctrine assumed such a very subjective, idealist complexion,
+and his true view was made so difficult to discover. The distinction here drawn
+stands or falls with that between psychology and logic. If only these themselves
+were to be kept always rigidly distinctl
+
+38
+would still be doubtful whether there existed the infinite
+number of numbers that we ordinarily suppose. 1o°, perhaps,
+might be only an empty symbol, and there might exist no idea
+at all, in any being whatever, to answer to the name.
+Weird and wonderful, as we see, are the results of taking
+seriously the suggestion that number is an idea. And we
+are driven to the conclusion that number is neither spatial
+and physical, like MilL's piles of pebbles and gingersnaps,
+nor yet subjective like ideas, but non-sensible and objective.
+Now objectivity cannot, of course, be based on any senseimpression, which as an affection of our mind is entirely
+subjective, but only, so far as I can see, on the reason.
+It would be strange if the most exact of all the sciences
+had to seek support from psychology, which is still feeling its
+way none too surely.
+The set theory of Number.
+$ 28. Some writers define Number as a set or multitude
+or plurality. All these views suffer from the drawback that
+the concept will not then cover the numbers o and I. Moreover, these terms are utterly vague: sometimes they approximate in meaning to "heap" or "group" or "agglomeration"
+referring to a juxtaposition in space, sometimes they are so
+used as to be practically equivalent to "Number", only
+vaguer. No analysis of the concept of Number, therefore, is
+to be found in a definition of this kind. THoMAEl requires
+for the formation of number that item-sets which differ be
+given different names. By this he evidently means to refer to a
+process of bringing out more sharply the characteristics of the
+sets in question, of which the giving of names is only the
+external sign. The question is, just what is this process like?
+1 Elementare Theorie der analytischen Functionen, P. I.
+
+39
+Obviously, the notion of number would not result if, instead
+of "3 stars", "3 fingers" and "7 stars", we tried introducing
+names in which there were no recognizable common elements.
+It is not a matter simply of assigning names, but of symbolizing
+in its own right the numerical element. For this, we must
+needs have come to recognize that element in its peculiarity.
+Furthermore, it should be noted that there are two
+different views. Some call number a set of things or objects;
+others, following EucLID!, define it as a set of units. This last
+expression demands a separate discussion.
+II. Views on unity and one*.
+Does the number word "one" stand for a property of
+objects?
+$ 29. In the definitions which EucLID gives at the
+beginning of Book VII of the Elements, he seems to mean by
+the word "uovás" sometimes an object to be numbered,
+sometimes a property of such an object, and sometimes the
+number one. We can translate it consistently by the German
+"Einheit"
+, but only because that word itself shifts over the
+same variety of meanings.
+According to SCHRÖDER?: "Each of the things to be
+numbered is called a unit." We may well wonder why we
+must first bring the things under the concept of unity, instead
+of simply defining number right away as a set of things, which
+would throw us back once again onto the first of the two views.
+The most obvious answer is that in calling the things units we
+are supposed to be adding to our description of them; under
+the influence of the grammatical form, we are regarding "one"
+1 Movás EOTI, KaD nU EKaOTON TEv OuTWu êy déyeraL. 'Apuluòs 8è Tò ¿к
+MOVáSWr GUyKELLEVOr mAğgos. ["A unit is that by virtue of which each of the
+things that exist is called one. A number is a multitude composed of units."]
+= Op. cit., p. s.
+* [It is not possible in English to do entire justice to the ambiguities of the
+German Einheit, which covers both "unit" and "unity",
+, not to mention "oneness". Moreover Einheit is a verbal derivative of Ein (whereas "unit/y" is not
+derived directly from "one"), and derivatives of either word can be described
+alike as derivatives of Ein or "one". These facts make IS 29, 32 and 37, in particular, more plausible in German than in English.]
+
+40
+as a word for a property and taking "one city" in the same way
+as "wise man"
+• In that case a unit would be an object
+characterized by the property "one" and would stand to "one"
+in the same relation as "a sage" to the adjective "wise".
+Now reasons have already been given as conclusive against the
+view that number is a property of things; but there are several
+further arguments against the present suggestion in particular.
+It must strike us immediately as remarkable that every single
+thing should possess this property. It would be incomprehensible why we should still ascribe it expressly to a thing at all.
+It is only in virtue of the possibility of something not being
+wise that it makes sense to say "Solon is wise." The content
+of a concept diminishes as its extension increases; if its extension becomes all-embracing, its content must vanish altogether.
+It is not easy to imagine how language could have come to
+invent a word for a property which could not be of the slightest
+use for adding to the description of any object whatsoever.
+If it were correct to take "one man" in the same way as
+"wise man", we should expect to be able to use "one" also
+as a grammatical predicate, and to be able to say "Solon was
+one" just as much as "Solon was wise". It is true that "Solon
+was one" can actually occur, but not in a way to make it
+intelligible on its own in isolation. It may, for example, mean
+"Solon was a wise man", if "wise man" can be supplied from
+the context. In isolation, however, it seems that "one" cannot
+be a predicate.! This is even clearer if we take the plural.
+Whereas we can combine "Solon was wise" and "Thales was
+wise" into "Solon and Thales were wise", we cannot say
+"Solon and Thales were one". But it is hard to see why this
+1 Usages do occur which appear to contradict this; but if we look more
+closely we shall find that some general term has to be supplied, or else that "one"
+is not being used as a number word-that what it is intended to assert is the
+character (not of being unique, but) of being unitary.
+
+4I
+should be impossible, if "one" were a property both of Solon
+and of Thales in the same way that "wise" is.
+S 30. In line with this is the fact that no one has ever
+been able to give a definition of the property "one". LEIBNIZ'
+indeed says that "By one is meant whatever we grasp in one
+act of the understanding, " but this is to define "one" in terms
+of itself. Besides, surely we can also grasp what is many in
+one act of the understanding? LEIBNIZ admits as much in the
+same passage. BAuMANN? does no better when he says: "That
+is one, which we apprehend as one"
+, and further: "Whatever we take as a point, or refuse to take as further subdivided
+into parts, that we regard as one; but every one of outer intuition, whether empirical or pure, can also be regarded as a
+many. Every idea is one when isolated in contrast with
+another; but in itself it can again be distinguished into a many."
+This sweeps away every limit to the application of the concept imposed by the nature of the facts, and everything is
+made dependent on our way of regarding them. I ask once
+more: How can it make sense to ascribe the property "one" to
+any object whatever, when every object, according as to how
+we look at it, can be either one or not one? How can a science
+which bases its claim to fame precisely on being as definite and
+accurate as possible repose on a concept as hazy as this is?
+$ 3I. Now although BAUMANN bases the concept of one
+on inner intuition, he refers nevertheless, in the passage just
+cited, to certain criteria for being one, namely being undivided and being isolated. If this were correct, then we should
+have to expect animals, too, to be capable of having some sort
+of idea of unity. Can it be that a dog staring at the moon does
+have an idea, however ill-defined, of what we signify by the
+1 Opit, Vo. ci, Vol. 1, p. (Erdmann ed., p. 8).
+3 Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 66g.
+
+42
+word "one"? This is hardly credible-and yet it certainly
+distinguishes individual objects: another dog, its master, a
+stone it is playing with, these certainly appear to the dog every
+bit as isolated, as self-contained, as undivided, as they do to us.
+It will notice a difference, no doubt, between being set on by
+several other dogs and being set on by only one, but this is
+what MiL calls the physical difference. We need to know
+specifically: is the dog conscious, however dimly, of that
+common element in the two situations which we express by the
+word "one"
+', when, for example, it first is bitten by one larger
+dog and then chases one cat? This seems to me unlikely. I
+infer, therefore, that the notion of unity is not, as LOCKE!
+holds, "suggested to the understanding by every object without us, and every idea within", but becomes known to us
+through the exercise of those higher intellectual powers which
+distinguish men from brutes. Consequently, such properties
+of things as being undivided or being isolated, which animals
+perceive quite as well as we do, cannot be what is essential in
+our concept.
+S 32. Still, we may suspect that they have some sort of
+connexion with it. Language indicates as much by forming
+"united" as a derivative from "one". The more the internal
+contrasts within a thing fade into insignificance by comparison
+with the contrasts between it and its environment, and the
+more the internal connexions among its elements overshadow
+its connexions with its environment, the more natural it
+becomes for us to regard it as a distinct object. For a thing to
+be "united" means that it has a property which causes us, when
+we think of it, to sever it from its environment and consider it
+on its own. In the same way we can explain how the French
+"uni" comes to mean "even" or "smooth". 'The word "unity"
+too, is used in a similar manner, when we speak of the political
+1 Baumann, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 409 [Essay, Bk. II, cap. vii, $ 7].
+
+43
+unity of a country or the unity of a work of art. But in this
+sense "unity" is connected not so much with "one" as with
+"united" or "unitary". For when we say the Earth has one
+moon, we do not mean to point out that our satellite is isolated,
+or self-contained, or undivided; rather, we are contrasting the
+satellite system of the Earth with that of Venus or Mars or
+Jupiter. So far as being isolated goes, or being undivided,
+the moons of Jupiter could stand up quite well to our moon,
+and in that sense they are every bit as unitary.
+$ 33. Some writers go still further, and demand something not merely undivided but indivisible. G. Köpp? calls
+whatever is thought of as self-contained and incapable of
+dissection, whether we become acquainted with it through the
+senses or otherwise, an individual; and individuals which are
+to be numbered he calls ones, evidently using "one" here in
+the sense of "unit". BAUMANN too, when arguing for his view
+that external things do not present us with strict units on the
+ground that we are free to treat them as many, gives as a
+criterion of a strict unit that it must be incapable of dissection.
+Obviously, by tightening up its internal cohesion without
+limit, they hope to arrive at a criterion for their unit which is
+independent of any arbitrary way of regarding things. This
+attempt collapses because we are then left with practically
+nothing fit to be called a unit and to be numbered. The result
+is that we at once begin to retrace our steps, by giving as the
+criterion not that the thing itself should be incapable of dissection in fact, but that we should think of it as such. This brings
+us back once again to our way of regarding things, with all its
+fluctuations. And is it really of any advantage to think of
+things as being what they are not? On the contrary, any
+1 On the history of the word "unit" cf. Eucken, Geschichte der philosophischen
+Terminologie, pp. 122-23, 136, 220.
+& Schularithmetik, PP. S-6, Eisenach 1867.
+
+44
+conclusions drawn from a false assumption are liable to be
+false; while if there are no conclusions to be drawn from our
+unit's being incapable of dissection, why bother to assume that
+it is? If it does no harm, and in fact is actually necessary, to
+take our strict units none too strictly, what was the point of
+being strict? Unless perhaps all that was meant was that we
+should not think of the possibilities of dissection--as though
+lack of thought could get us anywhere! Besides, there are
+cases where we simply cannot avoid thinking of them, where a
+conclusion is actually based on the way in which a unit is
+made up of parts, as for instance in the problem: If there are
+24 hours in one day, how many are there in three days?
+Are units identical* with one another?
+$34. Every attempt to define "one" as a property
+having thus failed, we must finally abandon the view that in
+designating a thing a unit we are adding to our description
+of it. We come back once again to our question: Why do we
+call things units, if "unit" is only another name for thing, if
+any and every thing is a unit or can be regarded as one?
+E. SCHRÖDEr' gives as the reason, that the word is used for
+ascribing to the items that are to be numbered the necessary
+identity. But to begin with it is not easy to see why the words
+"thing" and "object" could not indicate this just as well. And
+further, it is natural to ask: Why do we ascribe identity to
+objects that are to be numbered? And is it only ascribed to
+them, or are they really identical? In any case, no two objects
+are ever completely identical. On the other hand, of course, we
+can practically always engineer some respect in which any two
+objects whatever agree. And with that we are back once more
+at our arbitrary way of regarding things, unless we are willing,
+regardless of truth, to ascribe to things an identity going
+beyond any they actually possess. In actual fact, many writers
+1 Op. cit., p. 5.
+* [gleich. See footnote on p. Ile above.]
+
+45
+do call units identical without any qualification. HOBBES'
+states that: "Number in the absolute sense in mathematics
+presupposes units identical* one with another out of which
+it is formed." HuMe? holds the component parts of quantity
+and number to be entirely similar. THoMae? calls the individual member of his set a unit, and says in so many words
+that units are identical with each other-though we might
+with as much or even more justice say that the individual
+members of his set must be different from each other. Now
+what has this alleged identity to do with number? The
+properties which serve to distinguish things from one another
+are, when we are considering their Number, immaterial and
+beside the point. That is why we want to keep them out of it.
+But we shall not succeed along the present lines. For suppose
+that we do, as THomAe demands, "abstract from the peculiarities
+of the individual members of a set of items"
+, or "disregard, in
+considering separate things, those characteristics which serve
+to distinguish them". In that event we are not left, as Lip-
+sCHITz maintains, with "the concept of the Number of the
+things considered"; what we get is rather a general concept
+under which the things in question fall. The things themselves
+do not in the process lose any of their special characteristics.
+If, for example, in considering a white cat and a black cat,
+I disregard the properties which serve to distinguish them,
+then I get presumably the concept "cat". Even if I proceed
+to bring them both under this concept and call them, I suppose,
+units, the white one still remains white just the same, and the
+black black. I may not think about their colours, or I may
+propose to make no inference from their difference in this
+respect, but for all that the cats do not become colourless
+and they remain different precisely as before. The concept
+"cat", no doubt, which we have arrived at by abstraction,
+1 Baumann, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 242 [op. cit., Dial. I, p. 16 = Molesworth
+edn., p. 18).
+" Baumann, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 568 [Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,
+Sect. XII, part iii, $ 131).
+8 Op. cir., p. I.
+* [aequales]
+
+46
+no longer includes the special characteristics of either, but of
+it, for just that reason, there is only one.
+S 35. We cannot succeed in making different things
+identical simply by dint of operations with concepts. But
+even if we did, we should then no longer have things in the
+plural, but only one thing; for, as Descartest says, the
+number (or better, the plurality) in things arises from their
+diversity. And as E. ScHröDEr? justly observes: "That
+things should be numbered is a reasonable demand only where
+the objects submitted appear clearly distinguishable from one
+another (for example, spatially and temporally separated) and
+isolated in contrast with one another." It does actually happen
+at times that too great similarity, for instance of the uprights
+in a railing, does make numbering difficult. W. S. JEVONs?
+makes this point with unusual force: "Number is but another
+name for diversity. Exact identity is unity, and with difference
+arises plurality." And again (p. 157)*: "It has often been said
+that units are units in respect of being perfectly similar to each
+other; but though they may be perfectly similar in some
+respects, they must be different in at least one point, otherwise
+they would be incapable of plurality. If three coins were so
+similar that they occupied the same place at the same time,
+they would not be three coins, but one."
+$ 36. However, the view that units must be different
+comes up, as soon transpires, against fresh difficulties. JEVONS
+defines a unit as "any object of thought which can be discriminated from every other object treated as a unit in the
+same problem." But this is to define unit in terms of itself,
+1 Baumann, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 103 [Principia, Part I, $ 60].
+= Op. cit., p. 3.
+3 Op. cit., p. 156 [1874 edn., p. 175].
+* [1874 edn., p. 176]
+
+47
+and the qualifying clause "which can be discriminated from
+every other object" fails to describe it any more precisely,
+because it goes without saying: we call them other objects
+simply and solely because we can discriminate them from the
+first mentioned. JEvons' goes on: "Whenever I use the symbol
+s I really mean
+ItI+I+I+I,
+and it is perfectly understood that each of these units is
+distinct from each other. If requisite I might mark them thus
+I'tI"+I''+I'''+I''"
+Certainly it is requisite to mark them differently, if they are
+different: otherwise the utmost confusion must result. For
+if a difference simply in the position in which the I appears
+were to be made to mean of itself a difference in the unit, this
+convention would have to be laid down as a rule without any
+exception, or else we should never know whether I + I was
+to be taken to mean 2 or I. Accordingly, we should have to
+give up the equation I = I and we should never, to our
+embarrassment, be able to mark the same thing twice. That
+obviously will not do. If, however, we adopt the alternative
+plan, of assigning different symbols to different things, it is
+hard to see why we still retain in our symbols a common
+element; why not write, instead of
+simply
+a+bt o+dte?
+Yet the case for identical units has already been finally
+abandoned as hopeless, and it helps not at all to point out that
+they are to some extent similar. So our one slips through our
+fingers; we are left with the objects in all their particularity.
+The symbols
+I', I", I'"'
+tell the tale of our embarrassment. We must have identity—
+' Op. cit., p. I62 [1874 edn., p. 182).
+
+48
+hence the i; but we must have difference-hence the strokes;
+only unfortunately, the latter undo the work of the former.
+$ 37. In other writers we meet with the same difficulty.
+In Locke' we read: "By the repeating ... of the idea of an
+unit, and joining it to another unit, we make thereof one
+collective idea, marked by the name two. And whosoever
+can do this and proceed on, still adding one more to the last
+collective idea which he had of any number, and give a name
+to it, may count." LEIBNIZ? defines number as I and i and i
+or as units. HEssES writes: "Anyone who can form for himself an idea of the unit which in algebra is expressed by the
+symbol I, ... can go on to conceive a second unit as good as
+the first, and then further units of the same sort. The union
+of the second with the first into a single whole yields the
+number 2."
+In these passages, the relation between the meanings of
+the words "unit" and "one" should be noticed. LEIBNIZ
+understands by unitas a concept under which this one and that
+one and the other one fall, or as he also puts it: "Abstractum
+ab uno est Unitas.". Locke and Hesse seem to use unit and
+one to mean the same. Indeed LEIBNIz, in the last analysis,
+does so too; for when he calls each individual object falling
+under his concept of unitas a unum, this word is being used to
+signify not the individual object but the concept under which
+they all fall.
+$ 38. However, if confusion is not to become worse
+confounded, it is advisable to observe a strict distinction
+1 Baumann, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 410-11 [Essay, Bk. II., cap. xvi, S 5].
+= Baumann, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 3 [Erdmann edn., p. 53].
+3 Vier Species [Leipzig 1872], p. z.
+
+49
+between unit and one. When we speak of "the number one",
+we indicate by means of the definite article a definite and unique
+object of scientific study. There are not divers numbers one,
+but only one. In I we have a proper name, which as such does
+not admit of a plural any more than "Frederick the Great"
+or "the chemical element gold". It is no accident, nor is it a
+notational inexactitude, that we write i without any strokes
+to mark differences. Jevons would rewrite the equation
+3 - 2 = I
+in some such way as this:
+(I+I"+I) - (I"+ I''= 1.
+But what would be the remainder of
+(I+I"+ I'') - (1''''+ I''''')?
+Certainly not I. It follows, therefore, that on his view there
+would be not only distinct ones but also distinct twos and so
+on; for I'''' + I''''' could not be substituted for I"+ I''.
+This puts us in a position to see quite clearly that number
+is not an agglomeration of things. Arithmetic would come
+to a dead stop, if we tried to introduce in place of the number
+one, which is always the same, different distinct things, however similar the symbols for them; yet to make the symbols
+identical would be, of course, a mistake, and surely we cannot
+suppose that the mainspring of arithmetic is a piece of faulty
+notation. It is therefore impossible to regard i as a symbol
+for different distinct objects, for Iceland, Aldebaran, Solon,
+and so on. The absurdity can be best brought out by taking
+the case of an equation which has three roots, namely 2, s and
+4. Suppose now with Jevons we write for 3
+I'+I"+ I'';
+and let us take I' and I" and I'" to be units, that is, still following Jevons, to be the objects currently under consideration.
+It follows that I' would here mean 2, and I"s, and I'"' 4.
+Then would it not be more intelligible, instead of I'+ I"+
+I'', to write
+
+2+s + 4?
+Only concept words can form a plural. If, therefore, we
+speak of "units"
+', we must be using the word not as equivalent
+to the proper name "one"
+, but as a concept word. If this term
+"unit" means "object to be numbered", then number cannot be
+defined as units. But if we understand by "unit" a concept
+which includes under it the number one and nothing else, a
+plural makes no sense, and it becomes impossible once more to
+define number, with LEIBNIZ, as units, or as I and I and I;
+for if "and" is used as in "Bunsen and Kirchhof", then 1 and I
+and I is not 3 but I, just as gold and gold and gold is never
+anything else but gold. The plus symbol in
+I+I+ I = 3
+must, therefore, be interpreted differently from the "and"
+which we use in symbolizing a collection or a "collective
+idea".
+$ 39. We are faced, therefore, with the following
+difficulty:
+If we try to produce the number by putting together
+different distinct objects, the result is an agglomeration in
+which the objects contained remain still in possession of precisely those properties which serve to distinguish them from
+one another; and that is not the number. But if we try to do it
+in the other way, by putting together identicals, the result runs
+perpetually together into one and we never reach a plurality.
+If we use i to stand for each of the objects to be numbered,
+we make the mistake of assigning the same symbol to different
+things. But if we provide the i with differentiating strokes, it
+becomes unusable for arithmetic.
+The word "unit" is admirably adapted to conceal this
+difficulty; and that is the real, though no doubt unconscious,
+reason why we prefer it to the words "object" and "thing".
+We start by calling the things to be numbered "units", without
+detracting from their diversity; then subsequently the concept
+
+SI
+of putting together (or collecting, or uniting, or annexing,
+or whatever we choose to call it) transforms itself into that of
+arithmetical addition, while the concept word "unit" changes
+unperceived into the proper name "one". And there we have
+our identity. If I annex to the letter a first an n and then a d,
+anyone can easily see that that is not the number 3. If, however, I bring the letters a, n and d under the concept "unit",
+and now, instead of "a and n and d"
+', say "a unit and a unit
+and a further unit" or "1 and I and i"
+, we are quite prepared
+to believe that this does give us the number 3. The difficulty is
+so well hidden under the word "unit", that those who have
+any suspicion of its existence must surely be few at most.
+Here, indeed, is an artful manipulation of language worthy
+of MILL's censure; for this is no outward manifestation of an
+inward process of thought, but only the illusion of one.
+Here we really do have the impression that words devoid of
+thought must possess some mysterious power, if what is
+different is to be made identical simply by being called a
+unit.
+Attempts to overcome the difficulty.
+$40. We consider next some detailed views which represent attempts to overcome this difficulty, although they have
+not always been produced with that end clearly and consciously in view.
+The first suggestion is to call for assistance on a certain
+property of time and space, as follows. One point of space,
+considered by itself, is absolutely indistinguishable from
+another, and so is a straight line, or a plane, or one of a number
+of congruent bodies or areas or line-segments: they are
+distinguishable only when conjoined as elements in a single
+
+52
+total intuition. Here, therefore, we seem to get identity
+combined with distinguishability. With the parts of time, the
+same applies. This is presumably why HobBes! holds it for
+hardly conceivable that the identity of units should result
+from anything but the division of the continuum. As THOMAE?
+puts it: "If we consider a set of individuals or units in space
+and number them one after the other, for which time is
+necessary, then, abstract as we will, there remain always as
+discriminating marks of the units their different positions in
+space and in the order of succession in time."
+The first doubt that strikes us about any such view is that
+then nothing would be numerable except what is spatial and
+temporal. LeIBnIz? long ago rebutted the view of the schoolmen that number results from the mere division of the continuum and cannot be applied to immaterial things. BAUMANN+
+dissociates number emphatically from time: he claims that the
+concept of the unit is thinkable even apart from time. JEvoNsS
+writes: "Three coins are three coins, whether we count them
+successively or regard them all simultaneously. In many cases
+neither time nor space is the ground of difference, but pure
+quality alone enters. We can discriminate, for instance, the
+weight, inertia, and hardness of gold as three qualities, though
+none of these is before or after the other, either in space or
+time. Every means of discrimination may be a source of
+plurality." I would add that, if the objects numbered do not
+follow one after another in actual fact, but it is only that they
+are numbered one after another, then time cannot be the ground
+of discrimination between them. For, if we are to be able to
+number them one after another, we must already be in posses-
+1 Baumann, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 242 [loc. cit., p. 45e above].
+& Op. cit., p. I.
+3 Baumann, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 2 [loc. cit., p. zie above].
+• Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 668.
+• Op. cit., p. 157 [1874 edn., p. 176].
+
+53
+sion of distinguishing marks. Time is only a psychological
+necessity for numbering, it has nothing to do with the concept
+of number. We do represent objects which are non-spatial
+and non-temporal by spatial or temporal points, and this may
+perhaps be of advantage in carrying out the procedure of
+numbering; but it presupposes, fundamentally, that the concept of number is applicable to the non-spatial and the nontemporal.
+$ 4I. But further, supposing we do disregard all distinguishing marks except those of space and time, do we then
+really succeed in combining distinguishability with identity?
+Not at all. We are not one step nearer a solution. Whether
+the objects are so much more similar or so much less is beside
+the point, if they have still to be kept separate in the end.
+I cannot
+here symbolize the individual points, or lines or
+whatever it may be, all alike by I, any more than for purposes
+of geometry I can call them one and all A; in the one case as
+in the other, it is essential to distinguish between them.
+It is only considered in themselves, and neglecting their spatial
+relations, that points of space are identical with one another;
+if I am to think of them together, I am bound then to consider
+them in their collocation in space, or else they fuse irretrievably together into one. Now points taken together as a
+group may perhaps fall into some pattern or other like a
+constellation or may equally arrange themselves somehow or
+other on a straight line; and a group of identical segments may
+lie perhaps with their end-points adjacent so as to combine
+into a single segment or perhaps at a distance from one another.
+Patterns produced in this way can be completely different while
+the number of their elements remains the same. So that here
+once again we should have different distinct fives, sixes, and
+so forth. Points of time, again, are separated by time intervals,
+long or short, equal or unequal. All these are relationships
+which have absolutely nothing to do with number as such.
+Pervading them all is an admixture of some special element,
+which number in its general form leaves far behind. Even a
+single moment itself has something sui generis, which serves to
+
+54
+distinguish it from, say, a point of space, and of which there
+is no trace in the concept of number.
+$ 42. Another way out is to invoke instead of spatial
+or temporal order a more generalized concept of series, but
+this too fails of its object; for their positions in the series cannot
+be the basis on which we distinguish the objects, since they
+must already have been distinguished somehow or other, for
+us to have been able to arrange them in a series. Any such
+arrangement always presupposes relations between the objects,
+whether spatial or temporal or logical relations, or relations
+of pitch or what not, which serve to lead us on from one
+object to the next and which are necessarily bound up with
+distinguishing between them.
+When HANKEL' speaks of our thinking or putting a thing
+once or twice or three times, this too seems to be an attempt to
+combine in the things to be numbered distinguishability with
+identity. But it is obvious too at once that it is not successful;
+for his ideas or intuitions of the same object must, if they are
+not to coalesce into one, be different in some way or other.
+Moreover we are, I imagine, entitled to speak of 45 million
+Germans without having first to have thought or put an
+average German 45 million times, which might be somewhat
+tedious.
+$ 43. It is probably in order to avoid the difficulties
+which JEvons runs into through making each symbol I mean
+one of the objects numbered, that E. ScHröder allows it only
+to copy the object. The consequence is that he gives a definition not of number but only of numerals. To give his own
+words?: "To arrive at a symbol capable of expressing how many
+1 Op. cit., p. I.
+= Op. cit., pp. s ff.
+
+of such units' are present, we direct our attention upon each
+one of them in turn once, and copy it by a stroke (a one),
+thus, 1; these ones we put in a row side by side, only linking
+them up to each other by the symbol + (plus) because otherwise III, for example, would be read, following the usual
+number notation, as one hundred and eleven. In this way we
+get a symbol such as:
+ItItI+I+I,
+the composition of which we can describe by saying:
+" A natural number is a sum of ones!"
+This passage shows that for ScHröDer number is a
+symbol. What the symbol expresses, which is what I have
+been calling number, is taken, with the words "how many of
+such units are present"
+, as already known. Even by the word
+"one" he understands the symbol i, not its meaning. The
+symbol + is introduced solely to serve as a visible mark,
+without any content of its own, for linking up the other
+symbols; only later does he define addition. He could indeed
+have put what he means more briefly by saying that we write
+down side by side as many symbols I as we have objects to be
+numbered, and link them up by the symbol t. Nought
+would be expressed by writing down nothing.
+$ 44. To avoid carrying over into number the distinguishing marks of the things numbered, Jevons? invokes
+abstraction: "There will now be little difficulty in forming a
+clear notion of the nature of numerical abstraction. It consists
+in abstracting the character of the difference from which
+plurality arises, retaining merely the fact. When I speak of
+1 Objects to be numbered.
+= Ор. січ., р. 158 [1874 edn., p. 177).
+
+three men I need not at once specify the marks by which each
+may be known from each. Those marks must exist if they are
+really three men and not one and the same, and in speaking of
+them as many I imply the existence of the requisite differences.
+Abstract number, then, is the empty form of difference."
+How are we to interpret this? Either we can abstract
+from the distinguishing properties of things before uniting
+them into a whole: or we can first form a whole and then
+abstract from the distinguishing properties. By the first
+method we should never get so far as to distinguish the things
+at all, and consequently could not retain the fact of the existence
+of the differences either; the second method seems to be what
+JEvoNs intends. But by it we should never, it seems to me,
+arrive at a number like 10,000, for it is beyond our powers to
+grasp so many differences at once and retain the fact of their
+existence; while to go through them one after another is not
+enough, for the number would never be complete. We do our
+numbering in time, of course; but that does not give us the
+number itself, it only tells us the number of whatever it is
+we are numbering. Moreover, to tell us how to abstract is not,
+in any case, to define for us what abstraction is.
+What are we to understand by "the empty form of difference"? Perhaps some proposition like
+"a is different from b"
+where a and b are left indefinite? Can this proposition be, say,
+the number 2? But does the proposition
+"The Earth has two poles"
+mean the same as
+"The North Pole is different from the South"?
+Obviously not. The second proposition could be true without
+the first being so, and vice versa. And for the number 10,000
+we should then have as many as
+
+1,000 • 999
+I. 2
+such propositions, each stating a difference.
+With the numbers o and i in particular, what JEVONS
+says simply will not work. What is it, in fact, that we are
+supposed to abstract from, in order to get, for example, from
+the moon to the number I? By abstraction we do indeed get
+certain concepts, viz. satellite of the Earth, satellite of a planet,
+non-self-luminous heavenly body, heavenly body, body, object.
+But in this series I is not to be met with; for it is no concept
+that the moon could fall under. In the case of o, we have
+simply no object at all from which to start our process of
+abstracting. It is no good objecting that o and i are not
+numbers in the same sense as 2 and 3. What answers the
+question How many? is number, and if we ask, for example,
+"How many moons has this planet?"
+, we are quite as much
+prepared for the answer o or I as for 2 or 3, and that without
+having to understand the question differently. No doubt
+there is something unique about o, and about I too; but the
+same is true in principle of every whole number, only the
+bigger the number the less obvious it is. To make out of this
+a difference in kind is utterly arbitrary. What will not work
+with o and i cannot be essential to the concept of number.
+Finally, by taking number to arise in this manner we do
+not by any means remove the difficulty encountered when we
+were considering the symbolization of s by
+This notation agrees well with what JevoNs says about the
+formation of number by abstraction; the strokes above the
+line, that is, indicate that a difference exists, without however
+specifying of what sort. But the mere existence of the difference is already enough, as we have seen, to produce on
+Jevons' view different distinct ones and twos and threes,
+
+58
+which is utterly incompatible with the existence of arithmetic.
+Solution of the difficulty.
+$ 45. It is time now to survey what has been so far
+established and the questions which still remain unanswered.
+Number is not abstracted from things in the way that
+colour, weight and hardness are, nor is it a property of things
+in the sense that they are. But when we make a statement of
+number*
+, what is that of which we assert something? This
+question remained unanswered.
+Number is not anything physical, but not is it anything
+subjective (an idea).
+Number does not result from the annexing of thing to
+thing. It makes no difference even if we assign a fresh name
+after each act of annexation.
+The terms "multitude"
+', "set" and "plurality" are unsuitable, owing to their vagueness, for use in defining number.
+In considering the terms one and unit, we left unanswered
+the question: How are we to curb the arbitrariness of our ways
+of regarding things, which threatens to obliterate every
+distinction between one and many?
+Being isolated, being undivided, being incapable of
+dissection—none of these can serve as a criterion for what we
+express by the word "one"
+If we call the things to be numbered units, then the
+assertion that units are identical is, if made without qualification, false. That they are identical in this respect or that is
+true enough but of no interest. It is actually necessary that
+the things to be numbered should be different if number is
+to get beyond I.
+We were thus forced, it seemed, to ascribe to units two
+contradictory qualities,
+namely identity and distinguishability.
+A distinction must be drawn between one and unit.
+The word "one", as the proper name of an object of mathe-
+* [See n. on p. 34e supra.]
+
+59
+matical study, does not admit of a plural. Consequently, it is
+nonsense to make numbers result from the putting together
+of ones. The plus symbol in 1 + I = 2 cannot mean such a
+putting together.
+$ 46. It should throw some light on the matter to consider
+number in the context of a judgement which brings out its
+basic use. While looking at one and the same external phenomenon, I can say with equal truth both "It is a copse" and
+"It is five trees", or both "Here are four companies" and
+"Here are soo men"
+. Now what changes here from one
+judgement to the other is neither any individual object, nor
+the whole, the agglomeration of them, but rather my terminology. But that is itself only a sign that one concept has been
+substituted for another. This suggests as the answer to the
+first of the questions left open in our last paragraph, that the
+content of a statement of number is an assertion about a
+concept. This is perhaps clearest with the number o. If I say
+"Venus has o moons"
+' there simply does not exist any moon
+or agglomeration of moons for anything to be asserted of;
+but what happens is that a property is assigned to the concept
+"moon of Venus", namely that of including nothing under it.
+If I say "the King's carriage is drawn by four horses",
+, then 1
+assign the number four to the concept "horse that draws the
+King's carriage".
+It may be objected that a concept like "inhabitant of
+Germany" would then possess, in spite of there being no
+change in its defining characteristics, a property which varied
+from year to yeai, if statements of the number of inhabitants
+did really assert a property of it. In reply to this, it is enough
+to point out that objects too can change their properties
+without that preventing us from recognizing them as the
+same. In this case, however, we can actually give the explanation more precisely. The fact is that the concept "inhabitant
+of Germany" contains a time-reference as a variable element
+in it, or, to put it mathematically, is a function of the time.
+
+60
+Instead of "a is an inhabitant of Germany" we can say "a
+inhabits Germany",
+", and this refers to the current date at the
+time. Thus in the concept itself there is already something
+fluid. On the other hand, the number belonging to the concept
+"inhabitant of Germany at New Year 1883, Berlin time" is
+the same for all eternity.
+$ 47. That a statement of number should express something factual independent of our way of regarding things can
+surprise only those who think a concept is something subjective like an idea. But this is a mistaken view. If, for example,
+we bring the concept of body under that of what has weight,
+or the concept of whale under that of mammal, we are asserting
+something objective; but if the concepts themselves were
+subjective, then the subordination of one to the other, being a
+relation between them, would be subjective too, just as a
+relation between ideas is. It is true that at first sight the
+proposition
+"All whales are mammals"
+seems to be not about concepts but about animals; but if we
+ask which animal then are we speaking of, we are unable to
+point to any one in particular. Even supposing a whale is
+before us, our proposition still does not state anything about it.
+We cannot infer from it that the animal before us is a mammal
+without the additional premiss that it is a whale, as to which
+our proposition says nothing. As a general principle, it is
+impossible to speak of an object without in some way designating or naming it; but the word "whale" is not the name of any
+individual creature. If it be replied that what we are speaking
+of is not, indeed, an individual definite object, but nevertheless an indefinite object, I suspect that "indefinite object" is
+only another term for concept, and a poor one at that, being
+
+self-contradictory. However true it may be that our proposition can only be verified by observing particular animals,
+that proves nothing as to its content; to decide what it is about,
+we do not need to know whether it is true or not, nor for what
+reasons we believe it to be true. If, then, a concept is something objective, an assertion about a concept can have for its
+part a factual content.
+$ 48. Several examples given earlier gave the false
+impression that different numbers may belong to the same
+thing. This is to be explained by the fact that we were there
+taking objects to be what has number. As soon as we restore
+possession to the rightful owner, the concept, numbers reveal
+themselves as no less mutually exclusive in their own sphere
+than colours are in theirs.
+We now see also why there is a temptation to suggest
+that we get the number by abstraction from the things. What
+we do actually get by such means is the concept, and in this we
+then discover the number. Thus abstraction does genuinely
+often precede the formation of a judgement of number.
+It would be an analogous confusion to maintain that the way
+to acquire the concept of fire risk is to build a frame house,
+with timber gables, thatched roof and leaky chimneys.
+The concept has a power of collecting together far superior
+to the unifying power of synthetic apperception. By means of
+the latter it would not be possible to join the inhabitants
+of Germany together into a whole; but we can certainly bring
+them all under the concept "inhabitant of Germany" and
+number them.
+The wide range of applicability of number also now
+becomes explicable. Not without reason do we feel it puzzling
+that we should be able to assert the same predicate of physical
+and mental phenomena alike, of the spatial and impural and
+of the non-spatial and non-temporal. But then, this simply
+is not what occurs with statements of number any more than
+elsewhere; numbers are assigned only to the concepts, under
+
+62
+which are brought both the physical and mental alike, both the
+spatial and temporal and the non-spatial and non-temporal.
+$ 49. Corroboration for our view is to be found in
+SPINoza, 1 where he writes: "I answer that a thing is called
+one or single simply with respect to its existence, and not
+with respect to its essence; for we only think of things in terms
+of number after they have first been reduced to a common
+genus. For example, a man who holds in his hand a sesterce
+and a dollar will not think of the number two unless he can
+cover his sesterce and his dollar with one and the same name,
+viz., piece of silver, or coin; then he can affirm that he has
+two pieces of silver, or two coins; since he designates by the
+name piece of silver or coin not only the sesterce but also the
+dollar." Unfortunately, he goes on: "From this it is clear,
+therefore, that nothing is called one or single except when
+some other thing has first been conceived which, as has been
+said, matches it"
+", and he holds further that we cannot properly
+call God one or single, because it would be impossible for us
+to form an abstract concept of his essence. Here he makes the
+mistake of supposing that a concept can only be acquired by
+direct abstraction from a number of objects. We can, on the
+contrary, arrive at a concept equally well by starting from
+defining characteristics; and in such a case it is possible for
+nothing to fall under it. If this did not happen, we should
+never be able to deny existence, and so the assertion of existence
+too would lose all content.
+$ 5o. E. SCHRÖDEr? calls attention to the fact that, if
+we are to be able to speak of the frequency of a thing, the
+name of the thing concerned must always be a generic name,
+a general concept word or notio communis; "So soon, that is, as
+we picture an object complete-with all its properties and in
+1 Baumann, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 16g [Epistolae doctorum quorundam virorum,
+No. 5o ad J. Jelles].
+& Op. cit., p. 6.
+
+63
+all its relations, it will present itself as unique in the universe,
+and there will no longer be anything to match it. The name
+of the object takes on at once the character of a proper name
+(nomen proprium), and the object itself cannot be thought of
+as one which is found more than once. But observe that
+this holds good not only of concrete objects, but generally of
+anything and everything, even where the idea of it arises
+through abstractions, provided only that this idea contains in it
+sufficient elements to constitute the thing concerned a completely determinate thing..."
+'. For a thing to be numbered
+"first becomes possible in so far as, for that purpose, we disregard or abstract from some of its peculiar characteristics
+and relations, which distinguish it from all other things;
+this has the effect of turning what was the name of the thing
+into a concept applicable to more than one thing."
+S sI. What is true in this account is wrapped up in
+such distorted and misleading language, that we are obliged
+to straighten it out and sort the wheat from the chaff. To
+start with, it will not do to call a general concept word the
+name of a thing. That leads straight to the illusion that the
+number is a property of a thing. The business of a general
+concept word is precisely to signify a concept. Only when
+conjoined with the definite article or a demonstrative pronoun
+can it be counted as the proper name of a thing, but in that
+case it ceases to count as a concept word. The name of a thing
+is a proper name. An object, again, is not found more than
+once, but rather, more than one object falls under the same
+concept. That a concept need not be acquired by abstraction
+from the things which fall under it has already been pointed
+out in criticizing SpINozA. Here I will add that a concept does
+not cease to be a concept simply because only one single
+thing falls under it, which thing, accordingly, is completely
+determined by it. It is to concepts of just this kind (for
+example, satellite of the Earth) that the number i belongs,
+
+64
+which is a number in the same sense as 2 and 3. With a
+concept the question is always whether anything, and if so
+what, falls under it. With a proper name such questions make
+no sense. We should not be deceived by the fact that language
+makes use of proper names, for instance Moon, as concept
+words, and vice versa; this does not affect the distinction
+between the two. As soon as a word is used with the indefinite
+article or in the plural without any article, it is a concept word.
+S 52. Further confirmation of the view that number is
+assigned to concepts is to be found in idiom; just as in English
+we can speak of "three barrel"
+', so in German we speak
+generally of "ten man"
+, "four mark" and so on. The use of the
+singular here may indicate that the concept is intended, not the
+thing. The advantage of this way of speaking is particularly
+noticeable in the case of the number o. Elsewhere, it must be
+admitted, our ordinary language does assign number not to
+concepts but to objects: we speak of "the number of the bales"
+just as we do of "the weight of the bales"
+• Thus on the face
+of it we are talking about objects, whereas really we are
+intending to assert something of a concept. This usage is
+confusing. The construction in "four thoroughbred horses"
+fosters the illusion that "four" modifies the concept "thoroughbred horse" in just the same way as "thoroughbred" modifies
+the concept "horse." Whereas in fact only "thoroughbred"
+is a characteristic used in this way; the word "four" is used to
+assert something of a concept.
+S 53. By properties which are asserted of a concept
+I naturally do not mean the characteristics which make up
+the concept. These latter are properties of the things which
+fall under the concept, not of the concept. Thus "rectangular"
+is not a property of the concept "rectangular triangle"; but
+the proposition that there exists no rectangular equilateral
+rectilinear triangle does state a property of the concept
+"rectangular equilateral rectilinear triangle"; it assigns to it
+the number nought.
+
+65
+In this respect existence is analogous to number. Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number
+nought. Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for the existence of God breaks down. But
+oneness* is not a component characteristic of the concept
+"God" any more than existence is. Oneness cannot be used in
+the definition of this concept any more than the solidity of a
+house, or its commodiousness or desirability, can be used in
+building it along with the beams, bricks and mortar. However, it would be wrong to conclude that it is in principle
+impossible ever to deduce from a concept, that is, from its
+component characteristics, anything which is a property of the
+concept. Under certain conditions this is possible, just as we
+can occasionally infer the durability of a building from the type
+of stone used in building it. It would therefore be going too
+far to assert that we can never infer from the component
+characteristics of a concept to oneness or to existence; what is
+true is, that this can never be so direct a matter as it is to assign
+some component of a concept as a property to an object
+falling under it.
+It would also be wrong to deny that existence and oneness can ever themselves be component characteristics of a
+concept. What is true is only that they are not components
+of those particular concepts to which language might tempt us
+to ascribe them. If, for example, we collect under a single
+concept all concepts under which there falls only one object,
+then oneness is a component characteristic of this new concept.
+Under it would fall, for example, the concept "moon of the
+Earth", though not the actual heavenly body called by this
+name. In this way we can make one concept fall under another
+higher or, so to say, second order concept. This relationship,
+however, should not be confused with the subordination of
+species to genus.
+$ 54. It now becomes possible to give a satisfactory
+definition of the term "unit". E. ScHröDer writes, on p. 7
+of his text book already referred to: "This generic name or
+* [I.e. the character of being single or unique, called by theologians "unity".]
+
+66
+concept will be called the denomination of the number formed
+by the method given, and constitutes, in effect, what is meant
+by its unit."
+Why not, in fact, adopt this very apt suggestion, and call a
+concept the unit relative to the Number which belongs to it?
+We can then achieve a sense for the assertions made about the
+unit, that it is isolated from its environment and is indivisible.
+For it is the case that the concept, to which the number is
+assigned, does in general isolate in a definite manner what falls
+under it. The concept "letters in the word three" isolates the
+t from the h, the h from the r, and so on. The concept "syllables
+in the word three" picks out the word as a whole, and as
+indivisible in the sense that no part of it falls any longer under
+that same concept. Not all concepts possess this quality.
+We can, for example, divide up something falling under the
+concept "red" into parts in a variety of ways, without the
+parts thereby ceasing to fall under the same concept "red"
+To a concept of this kind no finite number will belong.
+The proposition asserting that units are isolated and indivisible
+can, accordingly, be formulated as follows:
+Only a concept which isolates what falls under it in a
+definite manner, and which does not permit any arbitrary
+division of it into parts, can be a unit relative to a finite
+Number.
+It will be noticed, however, that "indivisibility" here
+has a special meaning.
+We can now easily solve the problem of reconciling
+the identity of units with their distinguishability. The word
+"unit" is being used here in a double sense. The units are
+identical if the word has the meaning just explained. In the
+proposition "Jupiter has four moons"
+, the unit is "moon of
+Jupiter". Under this concept falls moon I, and likewise also
+moon II, and moon III too, and finally moon IV. Thus we
+can say: the unit to which I relates is identical with the unit
+to which II relates, and so on. This gives us our identity.
+
+But when we assert the distinguishability of units, we mean
+that the things numbered are distinguishable.
+IV. The concept of Number.
+Every individual number is a self-subsistent object.
+Sss. Now that we have learned that the content of a
+statement of number is an assertion about a concept, we can
+try to complete the Leibnizian definitions of the individual
+numbers by giving the definitions of o and of I.
+It is tempting to define o by saying that the number o
+belongs to a concept if no object falls under it. But this
+seems to amount to replacing o by "no", which means the
+same. The following formulation is therefore preferable:
+the number o belongs to a concept, if the proposition that a
+does not fall under that concept is true universally, whatever
+a may be.
+Similarly we could say: the number I belongs to a concept
+F, if the proposition that a does not fall under F is not true
+universally, whatever a may be, and if from the propositions
+"a falls under F" and "b falls under F"
+it follows universally that a and bare the same.
+It remains still to give a general definition of the step
+from any given number to the next. Let us try the following
+formulation: the number (n + I) belongs to a concept F,
+if there is an object a falling under F and such that the number
+n belongs to the concept "falling under F, but not a".
+$ 56. These definitions suggest themselves so spontaneously in the light of our previous results, that we shall have
+to go into the reasons why they cannot be reckoned satisfactory.
+The most likely to cause misgivings is the last; for strictly
+speaking we do not know the sense of the expression "the
+
+68
+number n belongs to the concept G" any more than we do
+that of the expression "the number (n + 1) belongs to the
+concept F". We can, of course, by using the last two definitions together, say what is meant by
+"the number i t i belongs to the concept F"
+and then, using this, give the sense of the expression
+"the number I + i t i belongs to the concept F"
+and so on; but we can never-to take a crude exampledecide by means of our definitions whether any concept has
+the number JuLIus Caesar belonging to it, or whether that
+same familiar conqueror of Gaul is a number or is not. Moreover we cannot by the aid of our suggested definitions prove
+that, if the number a belongs to the concept F and the number
+b belongs to the same concept, then necessarily a = b. Thus
+we should be unable to justify the expression "the number
+which belongs to the concept F", and therefore should find it
+impossible in general to prove a numerical identity, since we
+should be quite unable to achieve a determinate number. It is
+only an illusion that we have defined o and i; in reality we have
+only fixed the sense of the phrases
+"the number o belongs to"
+"the number i belongs to";
+but we have no authority to pick out the o and i here as selfsubsistent objects that can be recognized as the same again.
+$ 57. It is time to get a clearer view of what we mean
+by our expression "the content of a statement of number is an
+assertion about a concept". In the proposition "the number o
+belongs to the concept F"
+, o is only an element in the predicate
+(taking the concept F to be the real subject). For this reason I
+have avoided calling a number such as o or I or 2 a property of a
+concept. Precisely because it forms only an element in what is
+asserted, the individual number shows itself for what it is,
+a self-subsistent object. I have already drawn attention above
+to the fact that we speak of "the number i"
+', where the definite
+article serves to class it as an object. In arithmetic this self-
+
+subsistence comes out at every turn, as for example in the
+identity I + I = 2. Now our concern here is to arrive at a
+concept of number usable for the purposes of science; we
+should not, therefore, be deterred by the fact that in the
+language of everyday life number appears also in attributive
+constructions. That can always be got round. For example,
+the proposition "Jupiter has four moons" can be converted
+into "the number of Jupiter's moons is four". Here the word
+"is" should not be taken as a mere copula, as in the proposition
+"the sky is blue". This is shown by the fact that we can say:
+"the number of Jupiter's moons is the number four, or 4"
+Here "is" has the sense of "is identical with" or "is the same
+as". So that what we have is an identity, stating that the
+expression "the number of Jupiter's moons" signifies the same
+object as the word "four". And identities are, of all forms of
+proposition, the most typical of arithmetic. It is no objection
+to this account that the word "four" contains nothing about
+Jupiter or moons. No more is there in the name "Columbus"
+anything about discovery or about America, yet for all that it
+is the same man that we call Columbus and the discoverer of
+America.
+$ 58. A possible criticism is, that we are not able to form
+of this object which we are calling Four or the Number of
+Jupiter's moons any sort of idea! at all which would make it
+something self-subsistent. But that is not the fault of the selfsubsistence we have ascribed to the number. It is easy, I
+know, to suppose that in our idea of four dots on a die there
+is to be found something which corresponds to the word
+"four"; but that is a misapprehension. We have only to think
+of a green field, and try whether the idea alters when we
+replace the indefinite article by the number word "one";
+nothing fresh is added— whereas with the word "green", there
+really is in the idea something which corresponds to it. If we
+1 "Idea" in the sense of something like a picture.
+
+70
+imagine the printed word "gold", we shall not immediately
+think of any number in connexion with it. If we now ask
+ourselves how many letters it contains, the number 4 is the
+result; yet the idea does not become in consequence any more
+definite, but may remain completely unaltered. Where we
+discover the number is precisely in the freshly added concept
+"letter in the word gold". In the case of the four dots on the
+die, the matter is rather more obscured, because the concept
+thrusts itself upon us so immediately, owing to the similarity
+of the dots, that we scarcely notice its intervention. We can
+form no idea of the number either as a self-subsistent object or
+as a property in an external thing, because it is not in fact
+either anything sensible or a property of an external thing.
+But the point is clearest in the case of the number o; we shall
+try in vain to form an idea of o visible stars. We can, of course,
+think of a sky entirely overcast with clouds; but in this there is
+nothing to correspond to the word "star" or to o. All we
+succeed in imagining is a situation where the natural judgement
+to make would be: No star is now to be seen.
+S 59. It may be that every word calls up some sort of
+idea in us, even a word like "only"; but this idea need not
+correspond to the content of the word; it may be quite different
+in different men. The sort of thing we do is to imagine a
+situation where some proposition in which the word occurs
+would be called for; or it may happen that the spoken word
+recalls the written word to our memory.
+Nor does this happen only in the case of particles. There is
+not the slightest doubt that we can form no idea of our distance
+from the sun. For even although we know the rule that we
+must multiply a measuring rod so and so many times, we still
+fail in every attempt to construct by its means a picture
+approximating even faintly to what we want. Yet this is no
+
+71
+reason for doubting the correctness of the calculation which
+established the distance, not does it prevent us in any way
+from taking that distance as a fact upon which to base further
+inferences.
+S 60. Even so concrete a thing as the Earth we are
+unable to imagine as we know it to be; instead, we content
+ourselves with a ball of moderate size, which serves us as a
+symbol for the Earth, though we know quite well it is very
+different from it. Thus even although our idea often fails
+entirely to coincide with what we want, we still make judgements about an object such as the Earth with considerable
+certainty, even where its size is in point.
+Time and time again we are led by our thought beyond
+the scope of our imagination, without thereby forfeiting
+the support we need for our inferences. Even if, as seems to
+be the case, it is impossible for men such as we are to think
+without ideas, it is still possible for their connexion with
+what we are thinking of to be entirely superficial, arbitrary
+and conventional.
+That we can form no idea of its content is therefore no
+reason for denying all meaning to a word, or for excluding it
+from our vocabulary. We are indeed only imposed on by the
+opposite view because we will, when asking for the meaning
+of a word, consider it in isolation, which leads us to accept
+an idea as the meaning. Accordingly, any word for which we
+can find no corresponding mental picture appears to have no
+content. But we ought always to keep before our eyes a
+complete proposition. Only in a proposition have the words
+really a meaning. It may be that mental pictures float before
+us all the while, but these need not correspond to the logical
+elements in the judgement. It is enough if the proposition
+taken as a whole has a sense; it is this that confers on its parts
+also their content.
+This observation is destined, I believe, to throw light
+
+72
+on quite a number of difficult concepts, among them that of the
+infinitesimal, and its scope is not restricted to mathematics
+either.
+The self-subsistence which I am claiming for number
+is not to be taken to mean that a number word signifies
+something when removed from the context of a proposition,
+but only to preclude the use of such words as predicates or
+attributes, which appreciably alters their meaning.
+§ 6I. But, it will perhaps be objected, even if the Earth
+is really not imaginable, it is at any rate an external thing,
+occupying a definite place; but where is the number 4?
+It is neither outside us nor within us. And, taking those
+words in their spatial sense, that is quite correct. To give
+spatial co-ordinates for the number 4 makes no sense; but the
+only conclusion to be drawn from that is, that 4 is not a spatial
+object, not that it is not an object at all. Not every object
+has a place. Even our ideas? are in this sense not within us
+(beneath our skin); beneath the skin are nerve-ganglia, blood
+corpuscles and things of that sort, but not ideas. Spatial
+predicates are not applicable to them: an idea is neither to the
+right nor to the left of another idea; we cannot give distances
+between ideas in millimetres. If we still say they are within us,
+then we intend by this to signify that they are subjective.
+Yet even granted that what is subjective has no position
+in space, how is it possible for the number 4, which is objective, not to be anywhere? Now I contend that there is no
+contradiction in this whatever. It is a fact that the number 4
+is exactly the same for everyone who deals with it; but that
+has nothing to do with being spatial. Not every objective
+object* has a place.
+1 The problem here is not, as might be thought, to produce a segment
+bounded by two distinct points whose length is dx, but rather to define the
+sense of an identity of the type
+df(x)=g(x)dx
+& Understanding this word in its purely psychological, not in its psychophysical, sense.
+* [objektives Gegenstand|
+
+73
+To obtain the concept of Number, we must fix the sense of a numerical
+identity.
+$ 62. How, then, are numbers to be given to us, if we
+cannot have any ideas or intuitions of them? Since it is only
+in the context of a proposition that words have any meaning,
+our problem becomes this: To define the sense of a proposition
+in which a number word occurs. That, obviously, leaves us
+still a very wide choice. But we have already settled that
+number words are to be understood as standing for selfsubsistent objects. And that is enough to give us a class of
+propositions which must have a sense, namely those which
+express our recognition of a number as the same again. If we
+are to use the symbol a to signify an object, we must have a
+criterion for deciding in all cases whether b is the same as a,
+even if it is not always in our power to apply this criterion.
+In our present case, we have to define the sense of the
+proposition
+"the number which belongs to the concept F is the same
+as that which belongs to the concept G";
+that is to say, we must reproduce the content of this proposition in other terms, avoiding the use of the expression
+"the Number which belongs to the concept F".
+In doing this, we shall be giving a general criterion for the
+identity of numbers. When we have thus acquired a means of
+arriving at a determinate number and of recognizing it again
+as the same, we can assign it a number word as its proper
+name.
+$ 63. HuMe long ago mentioned such a means: "When
+two numbers are so combined as that the one has always an
+unit answering to every unit of the other, we pronounce them
+equal." This opinion, that numerical equality or identity
+1 Baumann, op. cit., Vol. II, p. s6s Treatise, Bk. I, Part iii, Sect. I].
+
+74
+must be defined in terms of one-one correlation, seems in
+recent years to have gained widespread acceptance among
+mathematicians.' But it raises at once certain logical doubts
+and difficulties, which ought not to be passed over without
+examination.
+It is not only among numbers that the relationship of
+identity is found. From which it seems to follow that we
+ought not to define it specially for the case of numbers. We
+should expect the concept of identity to have been fixed first,
+and that then, from it together with the concept of Number,
+it must be possible to deduce when Numbers are identical
+with one another, without there being need for this purpose of
+a special definition of numerical identity as well.
+As against this, it must be noted that for us the concept of
+Number has not yet been fixed, but is only due to be determined in the light of our definition of numerical identity.
+Our aim is to construct the content of a judgement which can
+be taken as an identity such that each side of it is a number.
+We are therefore proposing not to define identity specially for
+this case, but to use the concept of identity, taken as already
+known, as a means for arriving at that which is to be regarded
+as being identical. Admittedly, this seems to be a very odd
+kind of definition, to which logicians have not yet paid enough
+attention; but that it is not altogether unheard of, may be
+shown by a few examples.
+S 64. The judgement "line a is parallel to line b", or,
+using symbols,
+a l /b,
+can be taken as an identity. If we do this, we obtain the
+concept of direction, and say: "the direction of line a is identical
+with the direction of line b". Thus we replace the symbol / / by
+1 Cf. E. Schröder, op. cit., Pp. 7-8; E. Kossak, Die Elemente der Aritmetik,
+Programı des Friedrichs-Werder' schen Gymnasiums, Berlin 1872, p. I6; G. Cantor,
+Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannichfaltigkeitslebre, Leipzig 1883.
+
+the more generic symbol =, through removing what is specific
+in the content of the former and dividing it between a and b.
+We carve up the content in a way different from the original
+way, and this yields us a new concept. Often, of course,
+we conceive of the matter the other way round, and many
+authorities define parallel lines as lines whose directions are
+identical. The proposition that "straight lines parallel to the
+same straight line are parallel to one another" can than be very
+conveniently proved by invoking the analogous proposition
+about things identical with the same thing. Only the trouble
+is, that this is to reverse the true order of things. For surely
+everything geometrical must be given originally in intuition.
+But now I ask whether anyone has an intuition of the direction
+of a straight line. Of a straight line, certainly; but do we
+distinguish in our intuition between this straight line and
+something else, its direction? That is hardly plausible. The
+concept of direction is only discovered at all as a result of a
+process of intellectual activity which takes its start from the
+intuition. On the other hand, we do have an idea of parallel
+straight lines. Our convenient proof is only made possible by
+surreptitiously assuming, in our use of the word "direction"
+what was to be proved; for if it were false that "straight lines
+parallel to the same straight line are parallel to one another"
+then we could not transform a | / b into an identity.
+We can obtain in a similar way from the parallelism of
+planes a concept corresponding to that of direction in the case
+of straight lines; I have seen the name "orientation"* used for
+this. From geometrical similarity is derived the concept of
+shape, so that instead of "the two triangles are similar" we
+say "the two triangles are of identical shape" or "the shape
+of the one is identical with that of the other". It is possible to
+derive yet another concept in this way, to which no name has
+yet been given, from the collineation of geometrical forms.
+* [Stellung]
+
+76
+S Gs. Now in order to get, for example, from parallelism!
+to the concept of direction, let us try the following definition:
+The proposition
+"line a is parallel to line b"
+is to mean the same as
+"the direction of line a is identical with the direction of
+line b.
+This definition departs to some extent from normal
+practice, in that it serves ostensibly to adapt the relation of
+identity, taken as already known, to a special case, whereas
+in reality it is designed to introduce the expression "the
+direction of line a", which only comes into it incidentally. It is
+this that gives rise to a second doubt—are we not liable,
+through using such methods, to become involved in conflict
+with the well-known laws of identity? Let us see what these
+are. As analytic truths they should be capable of being derived
+from the concept itself alone. Now LEIBNIZ's? definition is as
+follows:
+"Things are the same as each other, of which one can
+be substituted for the other without loss of truth"
+This I propose to adopt as my own definition of identity.
+Whether we use "the same"
+', as LEIBnIz does, or "identical", is
+not of any importance. "The same" may indeed be thought
+to refer to complete agreement in all respects, "identical'**
+only to agreement in this respect or that; but we can adopt a
+form of expression such that this distinction vanishes. For
+example, instead of "the segments are identical in length",
+we can say "the length of the segments is identical" or "the
+same",
+, and instead of "the surfaces are identical in colour",
+"the colour of the surfaces is identical". And this is the way
+in which the word has been used in the examples above.
+1 I have chosen to discuss here the case of parallelism, because I can express
+myself less clumsily and make myself more easily understood. The argument
+can readily be transferred in essentials to apply to the case of numerical identity.
+= Non inelegans specimen demonstrandi in abstractis (Erdmann edn., P. 94).
+* [Eadem sunt, quorum unum potest substitui alteri salva veritate.]
+** [Still more "equal" or "similar"
+', which the German gleich can also mean.]
+
+77
+Now, it is actually the case that in universal substitutability
+all the laws of identity are contained.
+In order, therefore, to justify our proposed definition of
+the direction of a line, we should have to show that it is
+possible, if line a is parallel to line b, to substitute
+"the direction of b"
+everywhere for
+"the direction of a".
+This task is made simpler by the fact that we are being taken
+initially to know of nothing that can be asserted about the
+direction of a line except the one thing, that it coincides with
+the direction of some other line. We should thus have to show
+only that substitution was possible in an identity of this one
+type, or in judgement-contents containing such identities as
+constituent elements.! The meaning of any other type of
+assertion about directions would have first of all to be defined,
+and in defining it we can make it a rule always to see that it
+must remain possible to substitute for the direction of any line
+the direction of any line parallel to it.
+$ 66. But there is still a third doubt which may make us
+suspicious of our proposed definition. In the proposition
+"the direction of a is identical with the direction of b"
+the direction of a plays the part of an object, and our definition
+affords us a means of recognizing this object as the same again,
+in case it should happen to crop up in some other guise, say
+as the direction of b. But this means does not provide for all
+" In a hypothetical judgement, for example, an identity of directions might
+occur as antecedent or consequent.
+& This is shown by the definite article. A concept is for me that which can
+be predicate of a singular judgement-content, an object that which can be subject of the same. If in the proposition
+"the direction of the axis of the telescope is identical with the direction
+of the Earth's axis"
+we take the direction of the axis of the telescope as subject, then the predicate
+is "identical with the direction of the Earth's axis". This is a concept. But the
+direction of the Earth's axis is only an element in the predicate; it, since it can
+also be made the subject, is an object.
+
+•78
+cases. It will not, for instance, decide for us whether England
+is the same as the direction of the Earth's axis—if I may be
+forgiven an example which looks nonsensical. Naturally no
+one is going to confuse England with the direction of the
+Earth's axis; but that is no thanks to our definition of direction.
+That says nothing as to whether the proposition
+"the direction of a is identical with q"
+should be affirmed or denied, except for the one case where
+q is given in the form of "the direction of b". What we lack
+is the concept of direction; for if we had that, then we could
+lay it down that, if g is not a direction, our proposition is to be
+denied, while if it is a direction, our original definition will
+decide whether it is to be denied or affirmed. So the temptation
+is to give as our definition:
+q is a direction, if there is a line b whose direction is q.
+But then we have obviously come round in a circle. For in
+order to make use of this definition, we should have to know
+already in every case whether the proposition
+"gis identical with the direction of 6"
+was to be affirmed or denied.
+$ 67. If we were to try saying: g is a direction if it is
+introduced by means of the definition set out above, then we
+should be treating the way in which the object q is introduced
+as a property of q, which it is not. The definition of an object
+does not, as such, really assert anything about the object,
+but only lays down the meaning of a symbol. After this has
+been done, the definition transforms itself into a judgement,
+which does assert about the object; but now it no longer
+introduces the object, it is exactly on a level with other assertions made about it. If, moreover, we were to adopt this way
+out, we should have to be presupposing that an object can only
+be given in one single way; for otherwise it would not follow,
+from the fact that q was not introduced by means of our definition, that it could not have been introduced by means of it. All
+identities would then amount simply to this, that whatever
+
+79
+is given to us in the same way is to be reckoned as the same.
+This, however, is a principle so obvious and so sterile as not
+to be worth stating. We could not, in fact, draw from it any
+conclusion which was not the same as one of our premisses.
+Why is it, after all, that we are able to make use of identities
+with such significant results in such divers fields? Surely it is
+rather because we are able to recognize something as the same
+again even although it is given in a different way.
+S 68. Seeing that we cannot by these methods obtain
+any concept of direction with sharp limits to its application,
+nor therefore, for the same reasons, any satisfactory concept
+of Number either, let us try another way. If line a is parallel
+to line b, then the extension of the concept "line parallel to
+line a" is identical with the extension of the concept "line
+parallel to line b"; and conversely, if the extensions of the two
+concepts just named are identical, then a is parallel to b. Let us
+try, therefore, the following type of definition:
+the direction of line a is the extension of the concept
+"parallel to line a";
+the shape of triangle t is the extension of the concept
+"similar to triangle t".
+To apply this to our own case of Number, we must
+substitute for lines or triangles concepts, and for parallelism
+or similarity the possibility of correlating one to one the objects
+which fall under the one concept with those which fall under
+the other. For brevity, I shall, when this condition is satisfied,
+speak of the concept F being equal* to the concept G; but I
+must ask that this word be treated as an arbitrarily selected
+symbol, whose meaning is to be gathered, not from its
+etymology, but from what is here laid down.
+My definition is therefore as follows:
+the Number which belongs to the concept F is the
+* [Gleichzablig-an invented word, literally "identinumerate" or "tautarithmic"; but these are too clumsy for constant use. Other translators have used
+"equinumerous"; "equinumerate" would be better. Later writers have used
+"similar" in this connexion (but as a predicate of "class" not of "concept").]
+
+80
+extension' of the concept "equal to the concept
+F".
+$ 6g. That this definition is correct will perhaps be
+hardly evident at first. For do we not think of the extensions
+of concepts as something quite different from numbers? How
+we do think of them emerges clearly from the basic assertions
+we make about them. These are as follows:
+I. that they are identical,
+2. that one is wider than the other.
+But now the proposition:
+the extension of the concept "equal to the concept F"
+is identical with the extension of the concept "equal
+to the concept G"
+is true if and only if the proposition
+"the same number belongs to the concept F as to the
+concept G
+is also true. So that here there is complete agreement.
+Certainly we do not say that one number is wider than
+another, in the sense in which the extension of one concept
+is wider than that of another; but then it is also quite impossible for a case to occur where
+the extension of the concept "equal to the concept F"
+would be wider than
+1 I believe that for "extension of the concept" we could write simply "concept". But this would be open to the two objections:
+I. that this contradicts my earlier statement that the individual numbers
+are objects, as is indicated by the use of the definite article in expressions
+like "the number two" and by the impossibility of speaking of ones, twos, etc.
+in the plural, as also by the fact that the number constitutes only an element
+in the predicate of a statement of number;
+2. that concepts can have identical extensions without themselves coinciding.
+I am, as it happens, convinced that both these objections can be met; but to do
+this would take us too far afield for present purposes. I assume that it is known
+what the extension of a concept is.
+
+8I
+the extension of the concept "equal to the concept G".
+For on the contrary, when all concepts equal to G are also
+equal to f, then conversely also all concepts equal to F are
+equal to G. "Wider" as used here must not, of course, be
+confused with "greater" as used of numbers.
+Another type of case is, I admit, conceivable, where the
+extension of the concept "equal to the concept F" might be
+wider or less wide than the extension of some other concept,
+which then could not, on our definition, be a Number; and
+it is not usual to speak of a Number as wider or less wide
+than the extension of a concept; but neither is there anything
+to prevent us speaking in this way, if such a case should
+ever occut.
+Our definition completed and its worth proved.
+S 70. Definitions show their worth by proving fruitful.
+Those that could just as well be omitted and leave no link
+missing in the chain of our proofs should be rejected as
+completely worthless.
+Let us try, therefore, whether we can derive from our
+definition of the Number which belongs to the concept F any
+of the well-known properties of numbers. We shall confine
+ourselves here to the simplest.
+For this it is necessary to give a rather more precise
+account still of the term "equality". "Equal" we defined in
+terms of one-one correlation, and what must now be laid
+down is how this latter expression is to be understood, since it
+might easily be supposed that it had something to do with
+intuition.
+We will consider the following example. If a waiter
+wishes to be certain of laying exactly as many knives on a
+table as plates, he has no need to count either of them; all he
+
+82
+has to do is to lay immediately to the right of every plate a
+knife, taking care that every knife on the table lies immediately
+to the right of a plate. Plates and knives are thus correlated
+one to one, and that by the identical spatial relationship.
+Now if in the proposition
+"a lies immediately to the right of A"
+we conceive first one and then another object inserted in place
+of a and again of A, then that part of the content which
+remains unaltered throughout this process constitutes the
+essence of the relation. What we need is a generalization of
+this.
+If from a judgement-content which deals with an object a
+and an object b we subtract a and b, we obtain as remainder a
+relation-concept which is, accordingly, incomplete at two
+points. If from the proposition
+"the Earth is more massive than the Moon"
+we subtract "the Earth", we obtain the concept "more massive
+than the Moon". If, alternatively, we subtract the object,
+"the Moon", we get the concept "less massive than the
+Earth". But if we subtract them both at once, then we are left
+with a relation-concept, which taken by itself has no [assertible] sense any more than a simple concept has: it has always
+to be completed in order to make up a judgement-content.
+It can however be completed in different ways: instead of
+Earth and Moon I can put, for example, Sun and Earth, and
+this eo ipso effects the subtraction.
+Each individual pair of correlated objects stands to the
+relation-concept much as an individual object stands to the
+concept under which it falls—we might call them the subject
+of the relation-concept. Only here the subject is a composite
+one. Occasionally, where the relation in question is convertible, this fact achieves verbal recognition, as in the proposi-
+
+tion "Peleus and Thetis were the parents of Achilles".1 But
+not always. For example, it would scarcely be possible to
+put the proposition "the Earth is bigger than the Moon"
+into other words so as to make "the Earth and the Moon"
+appear as a composite subject; the "and" must always indicate
+that the two things are being put in some way on a level.
+However, this does not affect the issue.
+The doctrine of relation-concepts is thus, like that of
+simple concepts, a part of pure logic. What is of concern to
+logic is not the special content of any particular relation,
+but only the logical form. And whatever can be asseried of
+this, is true analytically and known a priori. This is as true
+of relation-concepts as of other concepts.
+Just as
+"a falls under the concept F"
+is the general form of a judgement-content which deals with
+an object a, so we can take
+"a stands in the relation $ to b"
+as the general form of a judgement-content which deals with
+an object a and an object b.
+S 7I. If now every object which falls under the concept
+F stands in the relation $ to an object falling under the concept
+G, and if to every object which falls under G there stands in
+the relation $ an object falling under F, then the objects
+falling under F and under G are correlated with each other
+by the relation .
+It may still be asked, what is the meaning of the expression
+"every object which falls under F stands in the relation
+$ to an object falling under G"
+in the case where no object at all falls under F. I understand
+this expression as follows:
+1 This type of case should not be confused with another, in which the
+"and" joins the subjects in appearance only, but in reality joins two propositions.
+
+84
+the two propositions
+"a falls under F"
+and
+"a does not stand in the relation $ to any object
+falling under G"
+cannot, whatever be signified by a, both be true together;
+so that either the first proposition is false, or the second is, or
+both are. From this it can be seen that the proposition "every
+object which falls under F stands in the relation $ to an
+object falling under G" is, in the case where there is no object
+falling under F, true; for in that case the first proposition
+"a falls under F"
+is always false, whatever a may be.
+In the same way the proposition
+"to every object which falls under G there stands in
+the relation an object falling under F"
+means that the two propositions
+"a falls under G"
+and
+"no object falling under F stands to a in the
+relation $"
+cannot, whatever a may be, both be true together.
+S 72. We have thus seen when the objects falling under
+the concepts F and G are correlated with each other by the
+relation . But now in our case, this correlation has to be
+one-one. By this I understand that the two following
+propositions both hold good:
+I. If d stands in the relation to a, and if d stands in the
+relation $ to e, then generally, whatever d, a and e may
+be, a is the same as e.
+2. If d stands in the relation $ to a, and if b stands in the
+relation $ to a, then generally, whatever d, l and a may be,
+d is the same as b.
+This reduces one-one correlation to purely logical
+
+relationships, and enables us to give the following definition:
+the expression
+"the concept F is equal to the concept G"
+is to mean the same as the expression
+"there exists a relation $ which correlates one to one
+the objects falling under the concept F with the objects
+falling under the concept G.
+We now repeat our original definition:
+the Number which belongs to the concept F is the
+extension of the concept "equal to the concept F"
+and add further:
+the expression
+"n is a Number"
+is to mean the same as the expression
+"there exists a concept such that n is the Number
+which belongs to it".
+Thus the concept of Number receives its definition,
+apparently, indeed, in terms of itself, but actually without
+any fallacy, since "the Number which belongs to the concept
+F" has already been defined.
+$ 73. Our next aim must be to show that the Number
+which belongs to the concept F is identical with the Number
+which belongs to the concept G if the concept F is equal to
+the concept G. This sounds, of course, like a tautology.
+But it is not; the meaning of the word "equal" is not to be
+inferred from its etymology, but taken to be as I defined it
+above.
+On our definition [of "the Number which belongs to the
+concept F"], what has to be shown is that the extension of the
+concept "equal to the concept F" is the same as the extension
+of the concept "equal to the concept G", if the concept F
+is equal to the concept G. In other words: it is to be proved
+that, for F equal to G, the following two propositions hold
+good universally:
+if the concept His equal to the concept F,
+
+86
+then it is also equal to the concept G;
+and
+if the concept His equal to the concept G,
+then it is also equal to the concept F.
+The first proposition amounts to this, that there exists a
+relation which correlates one to one the objects falling under
+the concept H with those falling under the concept G, if
+there exists a relation & which correlates one to one the objects
+falling under the concept F with those falling under the
+concept G and if there exists also a relation & which correlates
+one to one the objects falling under the concept H with
+those falling under the concept F. The following arrangement
+of letters will make this easier to grasp:
+Such a relation can in fact be given: it is to be found in
+the judgement-content
+"there exists an object to which c stands in the relation
+We and which stands to b in the relation 4",
+if we subtract from it c and b-take them, that is, as the terms
+of the relation. It can be shown that this relation is one-one,
+and that it correlates the objects falling under the concept H
+with those falling under the concept G.
+A similar proof can be given of the second proposition
+also.! And with that, I hope, enough has been indicated of
+my methods to show that our proofs are not dependent at any
+point on borrowings from intuition, and that our definitions
+can be used to some purpose.
+$ 74. We can now pass on to the definitions of the
+individual numbers.
+1 And likewise of the converse: If the number which belongs to the concept
+F is the same as that which belongs to the concept G, then the concept F is
+equal to the concept G.
+
+Since nothing falls under the concept "not identical
+with itself", I define nought as follows:
+o is the Number which belongs to the concept "not
+identical with itself"
+Some may find it shocking that I should speak of a concept
+in this connexion. They will object, very likely, that it contains
+a contradiction and is reminiscent of our old friends the
+square circle and wooden iron. Now I believe that these old
+friends are not so black as they are painted. To be of any use
+is, I admit, the last thing we should expect of them; but at the
+same time, they cannot do any harm, if only we do not assume
+that there is anything which falls under them-and to that
+we are not committed by merely using them. That a concept
+contains a contradiction is not always obvious without
+investigation; but to investigate it we must first possess it
+and, in logic, treat it just like any other. All that can be
+demanded of a concept from the point of view of logic and
+with an eye to rigour of proof is only that the limits to its
+application should be sharp, that we should be able to decide
+definitely about every object whether it falls under that concept
+or not. But this demand is completely satisfied by concepts
+which, like "not identical with itself",
+, contain a contradiction;
+for of every object we know that it does not fall under any
+such concept.
+On my use of the word "concept",
+"a falls under the concept F"
+is the general form of a judgement-content which deals with
+1 The definition of an object in terms of a concept under which it falls is a
+very different matter. For example, the expression "the largest proper fraction"
+has no content, since the definite article claims to refer to a definite object. On
+the other hand, the concept "fraction smaller than 1 and such that no fraction
+smaller than one exceeds it in magnitude" is quite unexceptionable: in order,
+indeed, to prove that there exists no such fraction, we must make use of just
+this concept, despite its containing a contradiction. If, however, we wished to
+
+88
+an object a and permits of the insertion for a of anything
+whatever. And in this sense
+"a falls under the concept 'not identical with itself'"
+has the same meaning as
+"a is not identical with itself"
+oI
+"a is not identical with a".
+I could have used for the definition of nought any other
+concept under which no object falls. But I have made a point
+of choosing one which can be proved to be such on purely
+logical grounds; and for this purpose "not identical with itself" is the most convenient that offers, taking for the definition of "identical" the one from LEIbNIZ given above [S 6s)],
+which is in purely logical terms.
+S 75. Now it must be possible to prove, by means of
+what has already been laid down, that every concept under
+which no object falls is equal to every other concept under
+which no object falls, and to them alone; from which it follows
+that o is the Number which belongs to any such concept, and
+that no object falls under any concept if the number which
+belongs to that concept is o.
+If we assume that no object falls under either the concept
+F or the concept G, then in order to prove them equal we
+have to find a relation $ which satisfies the following conditions:
+every object which falls under F stands in the relation
+$ to an object which falls under G; and to every object
+which falls under G there stands in the relation ф an
+object falling under F.
+use this concept for defining an object falling under it, it would, of course, be
+necessary first to show two distinct things:
+I. that some object falls under this concept;
+2. that only one object falls under it.
+Now since the first of these propositions, not to mention the second, is false,
+it follows that the expression "the largest proper fraction" is senseless.
+
+89
+In view of what has been said above [(S 71)] on the
+meaning of these expressions, it follows, on our assumption
+[that no object falls under either concept], that these conditions are satisfied by every relation whatsoever, and therefore
+among others by identity, which is moreover a one-one
+relation; for it meets both the requirements laid down [in
+$ 72] above.
+If, to take the other case, some object, say a, does fall
+under G, but still none falls under F, then the two propositions
+"a falls under G"
+and
+"no object falling under F stands to a in the
+relation "
+are both true together for every relation $; for the first is
+made true by our first assumption and the second by our
+second assumption. If, that is, there exists no object falling
+under F, then a fortiori there exists no object falling under F
+which stands to a in any relation whatsoever. There exists,
+therefore, no relation by which the objects falling under F
+can be correlated with those falling under G so as to satisfy
+our definition [of equality], and accordingly the concepts Fand
+G are unequal.
+S 76. I now propose to define the relation in which
+every two adjacent members of the series of natural numbers
+stand to each other. The proposition:
+"there exists a concept F, and an object falling under it
+x, such that the Number which belongs to the concept
+F is n and the Number which belongs to the concept
+'falling under F but not identical with x'is m"
+is to mean the same as
+"n follows in the series of natural numbers directly
+after m".
+I avoid the expression "n is the Number following next
+after m"
+, because the use of the definite article cannot be
+justified until we have first proved two propositions. For
+1 See note on p. 8ye f.
+
+90
+the same reason I do not yet say at this point "n = m + 1,"
+for to use the symbol = is likewise to designate (m + I) an
+object.
+S 77. Now in order to arrive at the number I, we have
+first of all to show that there is something which follows in
+the series of natural numbers directly after o.
+Let us consider the concept—or, if you prefer it, the
+predicate-"identical with o". Under this falls the number o.
+But under the concept "identical with o but not identical with
+o", on the other hand, no object falls, so that o is the Number
+which belongs to this concept. We have, therefore, a concept
+"identical with o" and an object falling under it o, of which
+the following propositions hold true:
+the Number which belongs to the concept "identical
+with o" is identical with the Number which belongs to
+the concept "identical with o";
+the Number which belongs to the concept "identical
+with o but not identical with o" is o.
+Therefore, on our definition [S 76)], the Number which
+belongs to the concept "identical with o" follows in the
+series of natural numbers directly after o.
+Now if we give the following definition:
+I is the Number which belongs to the concept "identical
+with o",
+we can then put the preceding conclusion thus:
+I follows in the series of natural numbers directly
+after o.
+It is perhaps worth pointing out that our definition of
+the number i does not presuppose, for its objective legitimacy,
+any matter of observed fact.! It is easy to get confused over
+this, seeing that certain subjective conditions must be satisfied
+if we are to be able to arrive at the definition, and that sense
+experiences are what prompt us to frame it.? All this, how-
+1 Non-general proposition.
+• Cf. B. Erdmann, Die Axiome der Geometrie, p. 164.
+
+9I
+ever, may be perfectly correct, without the propositions
+so arrived at ceasing to be a priori. One such condition is,
+for example, that blood of the right quality must circulate
+in the brain in sufficient volume-at least so far as we know;
+but the truth of our last proposition does not depend on this;
+it still holds, even if the circulation stops; and even if all
+rational beings were to take to hibernating and fall asleep
+simultaneously, our proposition would not be, say, cancelled
+for the duration, but would remain quite unaffected. For a
+proposition to be true is just not the same thing as for it to
+be thought.
+$ 78. I proceed to give here a list of several propositions
+to be proved by means of our definitions. The reader will
+easily see for himself in outline how this can be done.
+I. If a follows in the series of natural numbers directly
+after o, then a is = I.
+2. If I is the Number which belongs to a concept, then
+there exists an object which falls under that concept.
+3. If I is the Number which belongs to a concept F; then,
+if the object x falls under the concept F and if y falls
+under the concept F, x is = y; that is, x is the same as y.
+4. If an object falls under the concept F, and if it can be
+inferred generally from the propositions that * falls
+under the concept F and that y falls under the concept F
+that x is = y, then I is the Number which belongs to the
+concept F.
+s. The relation of m to n which is established by the proposition:
+"n follows in the series of natural numbers directly
+after m"
+is a one-one relation.
+There is nothing in this so far to state that for every
+Number there exists another Number which follows
+directly after it, or after which it directly follows, in the
+series of natural numbers.
+
+92
+6. Every Number except o follows in the series of natural
+numbers directly after a Number.
+S 79. Now in order to prove that after every Number (n)
+in the series of natural numbers a Number directly follows, we
+must produce a concept to which this latter Number belongs.
+For this we shall choose the concept
+"member of the series of natural numbers ending
+with n,
+which requires first to be defined.
+To start with, let me repeat in slightly different words
+the definition of following in a series given in my Begriffsschrift [Concept Writing]*:
+The proposition
+'if every object to which * stands in the relation $
+falls under the concept F, and if from the proposition
+that d falls under the concept Fit follows universally,
+whatever d may be, that every object to which d stands
+in the relation $ falls under the concept F, then y
+falls under the concept F, whatever concept F may be"
+is to mean the same as
+"y follows in the o-series after x"
+and again the same as
+"x comes in the d-series before y".
+$ 80. It will not be time wasted to make a few comments
+on this. First, since the relation $ has been left indefinite, the
+series is not necessarily to be conceived in the form of a spatial
+and temporal arrangement, although these cases are not
+excluded
+Next, there may be those who will prefer some other
+definition as being more natural, as for example the following:
+if starting from * we transfer our attention continually from
+one object to another to which it stands in the relation , and
+if by this procedure we can finally reach y, then we say that y
+follows in the o-series after x.
+*[Cp. $ 21 and notes.]
+
+23
+Now this describes a way of discovering that y follows,
+it does not define what is meant by y's following. Whether, as
+our attention shifts, we reach y may depend on all sorts of
+subjective contributory factors, for example on the amount
+of time at our disposal or on the extent of our familiarity
+with the things concerned. Whether y follows in the d-series
+after * has in general absolutely nothing to do with our
+attention and the circumstances in which we transfer it; on
+the contrary, it is a question of fact, just as much as it is a fact
+that a green leaf reflects light rays of certain wave-lengths
+whether or not these fall into my eye and give rise to a sensation,
+and a fact that a grain of salt is soluble in water whether or not
+I drop it into water and observe the result, and a further fact
+that it remains still soluble even when it is utterly impossible
+for me to make any experiment with it.
+My definition lifts the matter onto a new plane; it is no
+longer a question of what is subjectively possible but of what
+is objectively definite. For in literal fact, that one proposition
+follows from certain others is something objective, something independent of the laws that govern the movements
+of our attention, and something to which it is immaterial
+whether we actually draw the conclusion or not. What I have
+provided is a criterion which decides in every case the question
+Does it follow after?, wherever it can be put; and however
+much in particular cases we may be prevented by extraneous
+difficulties from actually reaching a decision, that is irrelevant
+to the fact itself.
+We have no need always to run through all the members
+of a series intervening between the first member and some
+given object, in order to ascertain that the latter does follow
+after the former. Given, for example, that in the o-series b
+follows after a and 6 after b, then we can deduce from our
+definition that c follows after a, without even knowing the
+intervening members of the series.
+Only by means of this definition of following in a series
+is it possible to reduce the argument from n to (n + I), which
+on the face of it is peculiar to mathematics, to the general
+laws of logic.
+
+24
+S 81. If now we have for our relation ф the relation of
+m to n established by the proposition
+"n follows in the series of natural numbers directly
+after m,"
+then we shall say instead of "p-series" "series of natural
+numbers"
+I add the following further definition:
+The proposition
+"y follows in the d-series after x or y is the same as x"
+is to mean the same as
+"y is a member of the o-series beginning with x"
+and again the same as
+"x is a member of the d-series ending with y".
+It follows that a is a member of the series of natural
+numbers ending with n, if n either follows in the series of
+natural numbers after a or is identical with a.
+$ 82. It is now to be shown that—subject to a condition
+still to be specified-the Number which belongs to the
+concept
+"member of the series of natural numbers ending with n
+follows in the series of natural numbers directly after n.
+And in thus proving that there exists a Number which
+follows in the series of natural numbers directly after n, we
+shall have proved at the same time that there is no last member
+of this series. Obviously this proposition cannot be established
+on empirical lines or by induction.
+To give the proof in full here would take us too far afield.
+I can only indicate briefly the way it goes. It is to be proved
+that
+I. if a follows in the series of natural numbers directly after
+d, and if it is true of d that:
+1 If n is not a Number, then n itself is the only member of the series of natural
+numbers ending with n,—if that is not too shocking a way of putting it.
+
+95
+the Number which belongs to the concept
+"member of the series of natural numbers ending with d"
+follows in the series of natural numbers directly after d,
+then it is also true of a that:
+the Number which belongs to the concept
+"member of the series of natural numbers ending with a"
+follows in the series of natural numbers directly after a.
+It is then to be proved, secondly, that what is asserted of
+d and of a in the propositions just stated holds for the number
+o. And finally it is to be deduced that it also holds for n if n
+is a member of the series of natural numbers beginning with o.
+The argument here is an application of the definition I have
+given [(SS 79, 81)] of the expression
+"y follows in the series of natural numbers after x",
+taking for our concept F what is asserted above [in I.] of d
+and a conjointly, but with o and n substituted for d and a.
+S 83. In order to prove the proposition I. of the last
+paragraph, we must show that a is the Number which belongs
+to the concept "member of the series of natural numbers
+ending with a, but not identical with a". And for this, again,
+it is necessary to prove that this concept has an extension
+identical with that of the concept "member of the series of
+natural numbers ending with d". For this we need the proposition that no object which is a member of the series of natural
+numbers beginning with o can follow in the series of natural
+numbers after itself. And this must once again be proved by
+means of our definition of following in a series, on the lines
+indicated above.'
+* E. Schröder (op. cit., p. 63) seems to regard this proposition as a consequence of a system of notation which could conceivably be different. Here
+once more we must be struck by the drawback which vitiates his whole treat-
+
+96
+It is this that obliges us to attach a condition to the
+proposition that the Number which belongs to the concept
+"member of the series of natural numbers ending
+with n"
+follows in the series of natural numbers directly after n,-
+the condition, namely, that n must be a member of the series
+of natural numbers beginning with o. For this there is a
+convenient abbreviation, which I define as follows:
+the proposition
+"n is a member of the series of natural numbers beginning with o"
+is to mean the same as
+"n is a finite Number".
+We can thus formulate the last proposition above as
+follows: no finite Number follows in the series of natural
+numbers after itself.
+Infinite Numbers.
+S 84. Contrasted with the finite Numbers are the infinite
+Numbers. The Number which belongs to the concept "finite
+Number" is an infinite Number. Let us symbolize it by, say, 00 1•
+If it were a finite Number, it could not follow in the series of
+natural numbers after itself. But it can be shown that this is
+what 0o, does.
+About the infinite Number oo, so defined there is nothing
+mysterious or wonderful. "The Number which belongs to
+the concept F is oo, " means no more and no less than this: that
+there exists a relation which correlates one to one the objects
+falling under the concept F with the finite Numbers. In terms
+ment of this matter, —that we do not really know whether the number is a symbol
+and if so what its meaning is, or whether the number itself is the meaning of
+the symbol. He is not entitled to infer, from the fact that we arrange for our
+symbols to differ so that the same one never recurs, that the meanings of those
+symbols are therefore also different.
+
+97
+of our definitions this has a perfectly clear and unambiguous
+sense; and that is enough to justify the use of the symbol oo
+and to assure it of a meaning. That we cannot form any idea
+of an infinite Number is of absolutely no importance; the same
+is equally true of finite Numbers. So regarded, our Number 0o1,
+has a character as definite as that of any finite Number; it can
+be recognized again beyond doubt as the same, and can be
+distinguished from every other.
+S 8s. It is only recently that infinite Numbers have been
+introduced, in a remarkable work by G. CANTOR.! I heartily
+share his contempt for the view that in principle only finite
+Numbers ought to be admitted as actual. Perceptible by
+the senses these are not, nor are they spatial-any more than
+fractions are, or negative numbers, or irrational or complex
+numbers; and if we restrict the actual to what acts on our
+senses or at least produces effects which may cause senseperceptions as near or remote consequences, then naturally
+no number of any of these kinds is actual. But it is also true
+that we have no need at all to appeal to any such sense-perceptions in proving our theorems. Any name or symbol that
+has been introduced in a logically unexceptionable manner
+can be used in our enquiries without hesitation, and here our
+Number oo, is as sound as 2 or 3.
+While in this I agree, as I believe, with CaNToR, my
+terminology diverges to some extent from his. For my Number he uses "power", while his concept? of Number has
+reference to arrangement in an order. Finite Numbers,
+* Op. cit., p. 74e above.
+& This expression may seem to conflict with my earlier insistence on the
+objective nature of concepts; but all that I mean is subjective here is his use
+of the word.
+
+28
+certainly, emerge as independent nevertheless of sequence in
+series, but not so transfinite Numbers. But now in ordinary use
+the word "Number" and the question "how many?" have no
+reference to arrangement in a fixed order. CaNTor's Number
+gives rather the answer to the question: "the how-manyeth
+member in the succession is the last member?" So that it
+seems to me that my terminology accords better with ordinary
+usage. If we extend the meaning of a word, we should take
+care that, so far as possible, no general proposition is invalidated in the process, especially one so fundamental as that
+which asserts of Number its independence of sequence in
+series. For us, because our concept of Number has from
+the outset covered infinite numbers as well, no extension of
+its meaning has been necessary at all.
+$ 86. To obtain his infinite Numbers Cantor introduces
+the relation-concept of following in a succession, which differs
+from my "following in a series". On his account we should get
+a succession if, for example, we arranged the finite positive
+whole numbers in an order such that the odd numbers followed
+one another just as they do, among themselves, in the series of
+natural numbers, and similarly the even numbers, but with
+the further stipulation that every even number was to follow
+after every odd number. In this succession o, for instance,
+would follow after 13. But no number would come directly
+before o. Now this is a situation which cannot arise on my
+definition of following in the series. It can be strictly proved,
+without appeal to any axiom borrowed from intuition, that if y
+follows in the -series after x then there exists an object which
+comes in that series directly before y. Now it looks to me
+as though precise definitions of following in the succession
+and of Number in Cantor's sense are still wanting. Thus
+CANTOr appeals to the rather mysterious "inner intuition",
+where he ought to have made an effort to find, and indeed
+could actually have found, a proof from definitions. For I
+think I can anticipate how his two concepts could have been
+made precise. At any rate, nothing in what I have said is
+
+99
+intended to question in any way their legitimacy or their
+fertility. On the contrary, I find special reason to welcome in
+CANTOR's investigations an extension of the frontiers of
+science, because they have led to the construction of a purely
+arithmetical route to higher transfinite Numbers (powers).
+V. Conclusion.
+$ 87. I hope I may claim in the present work to have
+made it probable that the laws of arithmetic are analytic
+judgements and consequently a priori. Arithmetic thus
+becomes simply a development of logic, and every proposition
+of arithmetic a law of logic, albeit a derivative one. To apply
+arithmetic in the physical sciences is to bring logic to bear on
+observed facts;' calculation becomes deduction. The laws of
+number will not, as BauMANN? thinks, need to stand up to
+practical tests if they are to be applicable to the external
+world; for in the external world, in the whole of space and all
+that therein is, there are no concepts, no properties of concepts, no numbers. The laws of number, therefore, are not
+really applicable to external things; they are not laws of
+nature. They are, however, applicable to judgements holding
+good of things in the external world: they are laws of the laws
+of nature. They assert not connexions between phenomena,
+but connexions between judgements; and among judgements
+are included the laws of nature.
+$ 88. KaNt° obviously—as a result, no doubt, of defining
+them too narrowly-underestimated the value of analytic
+judgements, though it seems that he did have some inkling
+* Observation itself already includes within it a logical activity.
+= Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 67o.
+s Op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 39 ff. [Original edns., A6 f./B1o f.].
+
+CIOO
+of the wider sense in which I have used the term.' On the
+basis of his definition, the division of judgements into analytic
+and synthetic is not exhaustive. What he is thinking of is the
+universal affirmative judgement; there, we can speak of a
+subject concept and ask-as his definition requires—-whether
+the predicate concept is contained in it or not. But how can
+we do this, if the subject is an individual object? Or if the
+judgement is an existential one? In these cases there can
+simply be no question of a subject concept in KANt's sense.
+He seems to think of concepts as defined by giving a simple
+list of characteristics in no special order; but of all ways of
+forming concepts, that is one of the least fruitful. If we look
+through the definitions given in the course of this book, we
+shall scarcely find one that is of this description. The same
+is true of the really fruitful definitions in mathematics, such as
+that of the continuity of a function. What we find in these is
+not a simple list of characteristics; every element in the definition is intimately, I might almost say organically, connected
+with the others. A geometrical illustration will make the
+distinction clear to intuition. If we represent the concepts
+(or their extensions) by figures or areas in a plane, then the
+concept defined by a simple list of characteristics corresponds
+to the area common to all the areas representing the defining
+characteristics; it is enclosed by segments of their boundary
+lines. With a definition like this, therefore, what we do—in
+terms of our illustration—is to use the lines already given
+in a new way for the purpose of demarcating an area.? Nothing
+essentially new, however, emerges in the process. But the
+more fruitful type of definition is a matter of drawing boundary
+lines that were not previously given at all. What we shall be
+able to infer from it, cannot be inspected in advance; here,
+1 On p. 43 [B14] he says that a synthetic proposition can only be seen to be
+true by the law of contradiction, if another synthetic proposition is presupposed.
+& Similarly, if the characteristics are joined by "or".
+
+IOI
+we are not simply taking out of the box again what we have
+just put into it. The conclusions we draw from it extend
+our knowledge, and ought therefore, on KaNt's view, to be
+regarded as synthetic; and yet they can be proved by purely
+logical means, and are thus analytic. The truth is that they are
+contained in the definitions, but as plants are contained in their
+seeds, not as beams are contained in a house. Often we need
+several definitions for the proof of some proposition, which
+consequently is not contained in any one of them alone, yet
+does follow purely logically from all of them together.
+$ 89. I must also protest against the generality of
+Kant's' dictum: without sensibility no object would be
+given to us. Nought and one are objects which cannot be
+given to us in sensation. And even those who hold that the
+smaller numbers are intuitable, must at least concede that they
+cannot be given in intuition any of the numbers greater than
+1000 1000 1000, about which nevertheless we have plenty of
+information. Perhaps KaNt used the word "object" in a
+rather different sense; but in that case he omits altogether to
+allow for nought or one, or for our o1,-for these are not
+concepts either, and even of a concept KANT requires that we
+should attach its object to it in intuition.
+I have no wish to incur the reproach of picking petty
+quarrels with a genius to whom we must all look up with
+grateful awe; I feel bound, therefore, to call attention also
+to the extent of my agreement with him, which far exceeds
+any disagreement. To touch only upon what is immediately
+relevant, I consider Kant did great service in drawing the
+distinction between synthetic and analytic judgements. In
+calling the truths of geometry synthetic and a priori, he
+" Op. cit., Vol. III, p. 82 [Original edns., As /B7s.]
+
+IOZ
+revealed their true nature. And this is still worth repeating,
+since even to-day it is often not recognized. If KANt was
+wrong about arithmetic, that does not seriously detract, in
+my opinion, from the value of his work. His point was,
+that there are such things as synthetic judgements a priori;
+whether they are to be found in geometry only, or in arithmetic
+as well, is of less importance.
+S 90. I do not claim to have made the analytic character
+of arithmetical propositions more than probable, because it
+can still always be doubted whether they are deducible solely
+from purely logical laws, or whether some other type of
+premiss is not involved at some point in their proof without
+our noticing it. This misgiving will not be completely allayed
+even by the indications I have given of the proof of some of
+the propositions; it can only be removed by producing a chain
+of deductions with no link missing, such that no step in it
+is taken which does not conform to some one of a small
+number of principles of inference recognized as purely logical.
+To this day, scarcely one single proof has ever been conducted
+on these lines; the mathematician rests content if every transition to a fresh judgement is self-evidently correct, without
+enquiring into the nature of this self-evidence, whether it is
+logical or intuitive. A single such step is often really a whole
+compendium, equivalent to several simple inferences, and into
+it there can still creep along with these some element from
+intuition. In proofs as we know them, progress is by jumps,
+which is why the variety of types of inference in mathematics
+appears to be so excessively rich; for the bigger the jump, the
+more diverse are the combinations it can represent of simple
+inferences with axioms derived from intuition. Often, nevertheless, the correctness of such a transition is immediately
+self-evident to us, without our ever becoming conscious of
+the subordinate steps condensed within it; whereupon, since
+it does not obviously conform to any of the recognized types
+of logical inference, we are prepared to accept its self-evidence
+forthwith as intuitive, and the conclusion itself as a synthetic
+
+103
+truth-and this even when obviously it holds good of much
+more than merely what can be intuited.
+On these lines our synthetic based on intuition cannot
+possibly be cut cleanly away from our analytic. Nor shall we
+succeed in compiling with certainty a complete set of axioms
+of intuition, such that from them alone we can derive, by
+means of the laws of logic, every proof in mathematics.
+$ 91. The demand is not to be denied: every jump must
+be barred from our deductions. That it is so hard to satisfy
+must be set down to the tediousness of proceeding step by
+step. Every proof which is even a little complicated threatens
+to become inordinately long. And moreover, the excessive
+variety of logical forms that has gone into the shaping of our
+language makes it difficult to isolate a set of modes of inference
+which is both sufficient to cope with all cases and easy to take
+in at a glance.
+To minimize these drawbacks, I invented my concept
+writing. It is designed to produce expressions which are
+shorter and easier to take in, and to be operated like a calculus
+by means of a small number of standard moves, so that no step
+is permitted which does not conform to the rules which are
+laid down once and for all. It is impossible, therefore, for any
+premiss to creep into a proof without being noticed. In this
+way I have, without borrowing any axiom from intuition,
+given a proof of a proposition? which might at first sight be
+taken for synthetic, which I shall here formulate as follows:
+If the relation of every member of a series to its successor
+is one- or many-one, and if m and y follow in that series after
+*, then either y comes in that series before m, or it coincides
+with m, or it follows after m.
+" It is designed, however, to be capable of expressing not only the logical
+form, like Boole's notation, but also the content of a proposition.
+• Begriffsschrift, Halle a/S. 1879, p. 86, Formula 133.
+
+104
+From this proof it can be seen that propositions which
+extend our knowledge can have analytic judgements for their
+content.1
+Other numbers.
+S 92. Up to now we have restricted our treatment to
+the [natural] Numbers. Let us now take a look at the other
+kinds of numbers, and try to make some use in this wider
+field of what we have learned in the narrower.
+HANKEL, 2 in an attempt to make clear the sense of asking
+whether some particular type of number is possible, writes
+as follows:
+"Number to-day is no longer a thing, a substance, existing
+in its own right apart from the thinking subject and the
+objects which give rise to it, a self-subsistent element in the
+sort of way it was for the Pythagoreans. The question whether
+some number exists can therefore only be understood as
+referring to the thinking subject or to the objects thought
+about, relations between which the numbers represent. As
+impossible in the strict sense the mathematician counts only
+what is logically impossible, that is, self-contradictory. That
+numbers which are impossible in this sense cannot be admitted,
+needs no proof. But if the numbers concerned are logically
+possible, if their concept is clearly and fully defined and there-
+1 This proof will certainly still be found far too lengthy, a disadvantage
+which may, perhaps, be thought to be more than outweighed by the practically
+absolute certainty that it contains no mistake and no gap. My aim at that time
+was to reduce everything to the smallest possible number of the simplest possible
+logical laws. Consequently, I made use of only one principle of deduction.
+However, even at that time I noted in my Preface, p. vii, that for the further
+application of my writing it would be imperative to admit more such principles.
+This can be done without loosening any link in the chain of deduction, and it is
+possible to achieve in this way a remarkable degree of compression.
+= Op. cit., pp. 6-7.
+
+IOS
+fore free from contradiction, then the question whether they
+exist can amount only to this: Does there exist in reality or in
+the actual world given to us in intuition a substratum for these
+numbers, do there exist objects in which they-relations, that
+is, for the mind, of the type defined-can become phenomenal?"
+S 93. HANKEL's first sentence leaves it doubtful whether
+he holds that numbers exist in the thinking subject, or in the
+objects which give rise to them, or in both. In the spatial
+sense they are, in any case, neither inside nor outside either the
+subject or any object. But, of course, they are outside the subject
+in the sense that they are not subjective. Whereas each individual can feel only his own pain or desire or hunger, and can
+experience only his own sensations of sound and colour,
+numbers can be objects in common to many individuals,
+and they are in fact precisely the same for all, not merely
+more or less similar mental states in different minds. In
+making the question of the existence of numbers refer to
+the thinking subject, HANKEL seems to make it a psychological question, which it is not in any way. Mathematics
+is not concerned with the nature of our mind, and the answer
+to any question whatsoever in psychology must be for mathematics a matter of complete indifference.
+S 94. Further, exception must be taken to the statement
+that the mathematician counts as impossible only what is selfcontradictory. A concept is still admissible even though its
+defining characteristics do contain a contradiction: all that we
+are forbidden to do, is to presuppose that something falls
+under it. But even if a concept contains no contradiction, we
+still cannot infer that for that reason something falls under it.
+If such concepts were not admissible, how could we ever
+prove that a concept does not contain any contradiction?
+It is by no means always obvious; it does not follow that
+because we see no contradiction there is none there, nor
+does a clear and full definition afford any guarantee against
+
+106
+it. HanKEL! proves that any closed field of complex numbers
+of higher order than the ordinary, if made subject to all the
+laws of addition and multiplication, contains a contradiction.
+Now that is something that needs to be proved; it is not
+seen immediately. Before his proof was given, anyone could
+always, by using a number system of that type, have arrived
+at remarkable results, nor would they have been any worse
+founded than the theory of determinants, if, with HANKEL,?
+we base that on alternate numbers; for who can assure us
+that there is not some hidden contradiction in the concept
+of these numbers also? And moreover, even if we could
+exclude this possibility generally for as many alternate units
+as we please, it would still not follow that such units exist.
+Yet that is precisely what we need. We will take an example
+from EucLID's Elements, Book I, Theorem 18:
+In any triangle the greater side subtends the greater
+angle.
+To prove this, EuclId cuts off from the greater side AC
+a segment AD equal to the lesser side AB, making use for
+this purpose of a previously given construction. The proof
+would collapse, if there were no such point as D, and it is
+not enough that we discover no contradiction in the concept
+"point on AC whose distance from A is equal to B's". EUcLID
+proceeds to join BD. That there exists such a line is still
+another proposition on which the proof depends.
+S 9s. Strictly, of course, we can only establish that a
+concept is free from contradiction by first producing something that falls under it. The converse inference is a fallacy,
+and one into which Hanker falls. Referring to [the operation
+of finding x from] the equation x + b = c [(subtraction)] he
+says:3
+1 Op. cit., pp. 106-7.
+2 Op. cit., S 35, Pp. I21-4.
+3 Op. cit., p. s. Similarly E. Kossak, op. cit., p. 17 ad fin.
+
+107
+"It is obvious that, for b > 6, there is no number x in
+the series 1, 2, 3, ... which solves our problem; the subtraction
+is then impossible. There is nothing, however, to prevent us
+from regarding the difference (r-b) in this case as a symbol
+which solves the problem and which is to be operated with
+exactly as if it were a figure number in the series I, 2, 3..."
+Nevertheless, there is something to prevent us from
+regarding (2 - 3) without more ado as a symbol which solves
+the problem; for an empty symbol is precisely no solution;
+without some content it is merely ink or print on paper, as
+which it possesses physical properties but not that of making 2
+when increased by 3. Really, it would not be a symbol at all,
+and to use it as one would be a mistake in logic. Even for
+" > b, it is not the symbol ("'- b") that solves the problem,
+but its content.
+$ 96. We might just as well say this: among numbers
+hitherto known there is none which satisfies the simultaneous
+equations
+x+I=2
+x+2 = 1,
+but there is nothing to prevent us from introducing a symbol
+which solves the problem. Ah, but there is, it will be replied:
+to satisfy both the equations simultaneously involves a contradiction. Certainly, if we are requiring a real number or an
+ordinary complex number to satisfy them; but then all we have
+to do is to widen our number system, to create numbers
+which do meet these new requirements. Then we can wait and
+see whether anyone succeeds in producing a contradiction in
+them. Who can tell what may not be possible with our new
+numbers? Naturally (r-b) cannot then remain one-valued;
+but then Va likewise, if we wish to introduce negative
+numbers, has to cease to be one-valued; and with complex
+numbers log a too becomes many-valued.
+And why not create still further numbers which permit
+the summation of diverging series? But that will do,-even
+
+108
+the mathematician cannot create things at will, any more than
+the geographer can; he too can only discover what is there
+and give it a name.
+This is the error that infects the formalist theory of
+fractions and of negative and complex numbers.! It is made
+a postulate that the familiar rules of calculation shall still
+hold, where possible, for the newly-introduced numbers, and
+from this their general properties and relations are deduced.
+If no contradiction is anywhere encountered, the introduction
+of the new numbers is held to be justified, as though it were
+impossible for a contradiction still to be lurking somewhere
+nevertheless, and as though freedom from contradiction
+amounted straight away to existence.
+$ 97. That this mistake is so easily made is due, of
+course, to the failure to distinguish clearly between concepts
+and objects. Nothing prevents us from using the concept
+"square root of —I"; but we are not entitled to put the definite
+article in front of it without more ado and take the expression
+"the square root of—" as having a sense. Given that i = -I,
+we can give a proof of the formula expressing the sine of any
+multiple of the angle a in terms of sin a and cos a; but we
+ought not to forget that this proposition continues to imply
+the condition that i = —I, which we are not entitled to drop
+without remark. If there existed nothing at all of which the
+square was —I, then for all our proof was worth the formula
+might not be correct,? since the condition i = —I, on which
+its validity patently depends, would never be fulfilled. It
+would be as though in a geometrical proof we had made use
+of an auxiliary line which is quite impossible to construct.
+$ 98. HANKEL' introduces two sorts of operation, which
+he calls lytic and thetic, and which he defines by means of
+" CANtor's infinite Numbers are in like case.
+" It might always be possible to prove it strictly in some other way.
+3 Op. cit., p. 18.
+
+109
+certain properties that they are to possess. There is nothing
+against this, so long as it is only not presupposed that operations
+of these sorts and objects such as their results would be
+exist.! Later he symbolizes an operation which is thetic,
+one-valued* and associative by (a + b), and the corresponding
+lytic, and likewise one-valued*, operation by (a-b). An
+operation which etc.? But which one? Any we care to
+choose? Then that is not a definition of (a + b); and besides,
+what if none such exists? If the word "addition" had as yet no
+meaning, it would be quite in order logically to say: we propose
+to call an operation of this sort an addition; but what we cannot
+say is: we propose to call an operation of this sort the operation
+of addition, and to symbolize it by (a + b). For it has not yet
+been established that there is one and only one such operation.
+We cannot define by putting on one side of our identity the
+indefinite article and on the other the definite. HANKEL,
+however, goes on to speak next without more ado of "the
+modulus of the operation", without having proved that there
+is one and only one modulus.
+$ 29. In a word, this purely formalist theory is not
+sufficient. What is valuable in it is simply this. We can
+prove that if any operation possesses certain properties, such
+as that of being associative or commutative, then certain
+propositions hold good of it. So that if we go on to show
+that addition and multiplication, which are already known to
+us, possess these properties, we can then proceed immediately
+to assert our propositions of addition and multiplication,
+without repeating the proof at length for each case individually.
+Thus it is only after we have applied our formal theory to
+operations given from elsewhere, that we arrive at the
+familiar propositions of arithmetic. But we have not the
+slightest right to suppose that we can use it as a method
+for introducing addition and multiplication. It does not give
+1 This Hankel really does already by using the identity 0(c, b) = 6.
+= Op. cit., p. z9.
+* [Literally 'perfectly one-valued', a term defined by Hankel.)
+
+IIO
+their actual definitions, but only lays down the lines for them.
+We may say: the name "addition" is to be given only to an
+operation which is thetic, one-valued and associative, but there
+is nothing at all in this as yet to say which operation it is that is
+to be so called. So far as this goes, there is nothing to stop us
+calling multiplication addition and symbolizing it by (a +b),
+not could ariyone say definitely whether 2 + 3 was s or 6.
+$ 100. If we abandon this purely formal method of
+treatment, we may fasten instead on the circumstance that,
+simultaneously with the introduction of new numbers, the
+meanings of the words "sum" and "product" are extended.
+We take some object, let us say the Moon, and proceed by
+definition: Let the Moon multiplied by itself be —I. This
+gives us a square root of —I in the shape of the Moon. There
+seems to be nothing wrong with this definition, since the
+meaning hitherto assigned to multiplication says nothing as to
+the sense of a product such as the Moon into the Moon, so
+that as we now come to extend its meaning we can make it,
+for the Moon, whatever we choose. But we need also the product of a real number into the square root of —I. So let us
+choose instead as our square root of — the time-interval of
+one second, and let this be symbolized by i. Thus zi will mean
+the time-interval of 3 seconds, and so on.! What object shall
+we then symbolize by, say, 2 + зi? What meaning should be
+assigned to the plus symbol in this case? Now this must be
+* We should be equally entitled to choose as further square roots of -1 a
+certain quantum of electricity, a certain surface area, and so on; but then we
+should naturally have to use different symbols to signify these different roots.
+That we are able, apparently, to create in this way as many square roots of -1
+as we please, is not so astonishing when we reflect that the meaning of the
+square root of —1 is not something which was already unalterably fixed before
+we made these choices, but is decided for the first time by and along with them.
+
+IlI
+laid down generally for all such cases, which clearly is not
+going to be easy. However, let us just assume that we have
+successfully secured a sense for all symbols of the form a + bi,
+and a sense such that the familiar laws of addition hold good
+of it. What we should then have to do would be to lay it
+down further that in general
+(a+ bi) (c+ di) = ac - bd + i (ad + bc),
+thus defining the extended meaning of multiplication.
+$ I0I. We should now be able to prove the formula
+for cos (na), if we knew that from the identity of complex
+numbers the identity of their real parts can be inferred. That
+would have to result from the sense of a + bi, which we
+are here taking to have been made available. Our proof of the
+formula would thus hold only for complex numbers and their
+sums and products in the sense fixed by us. Now since for
+real integral n and real a i disappears completely from the
+identity in the formula, we are tempted to conclude therefore
+that it is quite immaterial whether i means a second or a millimetre or anything else, provided only that our laws of addition
+and multiplication hold good; everything depends on that,
+and the rest we need not bother about. Well, perhaps it is
+indeed possible to assign a whole variety of different meanings
+to a + bi, and to sum and product, all of them such that those
+laws continue to hold good; but it is not immaterial whether
+we can or cannot find some such a sense for those expressions.
+S 102. It is common to proceed as if a mere postulation
+were equivalent to its own fulfilment. We postulate that it
+shall be possible in all cases to carry out the operation of
+subtraction,' or of division, or of root extraction, and suppose
+that with that we have done enough. But why do we not
+postulate that through any three points it shall be possible to
+draw a straight line? Why do we not postulate that all the laws
+• Cp. Kossak, op. cit., p. 17.
+
+II2
+of addition and multiplication shall continue to hold for a
+three-dimensional complex number system just as they do for
+real numbers? Because this postulate contains a contradiction.
+Very well then, what we have to do first is to prove that these
+other postulates of ours do not contain any contradiction.
+Until we have done that, all rigour, strive for it as we will, is
+so much moonshine.
+In a geometrical theorem where a constructed line is used
+for the proof, the auxiliary line does not occur in the theorem.
+Perhaps more than one such line is possible, as for instance
+where we can select a point at will. But however much we
+can dispense with each and any of them individually, still the
+cogency of our proof depends on its being possible to draw
+some line of the required character. Merely to postulate it is
+not enough. So in our case likewise, it is not immaterial to the
+cogency of our proof whether "a t bi" has a sense or is
+nothing more than printer's ink. It will not get us anywhere
+simply to require that it have a sense, or to say that it is to
+have the sense of the sum of a and bi, when we have not
+previously defined what "sum" means in this case and when
+we have given no justification for the use of the definite article.
+S 103. Against the particular sense we have proposed
+to assign to "f" many objections can of course be brought.
+By it, we are importing into arithmetic something quite
+foreign to it, namely time. The second stands in absolutely
+no intrinsic relation to the real numbers. Propositions proved
+by the aid of complex numbers would become a posteriori
+judgements, or rather, at any rate, synthetic, unless we could
+find some other sort of proof for them or some other sense
+for i. We must at least first make the attempt to show that all
+propositions of arithmetic are analytic.
+KossAK's" account of complex number-"the composite
+" Op. cit., p. 17.
+
+II3
+idea of heterogeneous groups of identical elements"_
+appears to avoid importing anything foreign, but this appearance is only due to the vagueness of his terminology. We are
+given no answer at all to the question, what does I + i really
+mean? Is it the idea of an apple and a pear, or the idea of
+toothache and gout? Not both at once, at any rate, because
+then I † i would not be always identical with I + i. The
+temptation is to say: it depends on the special meaning we
+assign to it. Very well then, Kossak's statement once again
+does not yet give us any definition at all of complex number,
+it only lays down the general lines to proceed along. But we
+need more; we must know definitely what "i" means, and if
+we do proceed along his lines and try saying it means the idea
+of a pear, we shall once again be introducing something foreign
+into arithmetic.
+What is commonly called the geometrical representation of
+complex numbers has at least this advantage over the proposals
+so far considered, that in it i and i do not appear as wholly
+unconnected and different in kind: the segment taken to
+represent i stands in a regular relation to the segment which
+represents 1. Though I may add that, strictly, it is not correct
+that 1 here means a certain segment and i a segment perpendicular to it of the same length; on the contrary, "," means in
+all contexts the same. A complex number, on this interpretation, shows how the segment taken as its representation is
+reached, starting from a given segment (the unit segment),
+by means of operations of multiplication, division, and rotation? However, even this account seems to make every
+theorem whose proof has to be based on the existence of a
+complex number dependent on geometrical intuition and so
+synthetic.
+1 Cf. for the term "idea" S 27, for "group" what is said about "agglomeration" in S 23 and S2s, and for the identity of the elements SS 34-39.
+& For simplicity I neglect incommensurables here.
+
+114
+S 104. How are complex numbers to be given to us
+then, and fractions and irrational numbers? If we turn for
+assistance to intuition, we import something foreign into
+arithmetic; but if we only define the concept of such a number
+by giving its characteristics, if we simply require the number
+to have certain properties, then there is still no guarantee that
+anything falls under the concept and answers to our requirements, and yet it is precisely on this that proofs must be
+based.
+Well, how do things stand with the [natural] Numbers?
+Have we really no right to speak of 1000 1000 1000 until such time
+as that many objects have been given to us in intuition? Is it,
+till then, an empty symbol? Not at all. It has a perfectly
+definite sense, even although, psychologically speaking and
+having regard to the shortness of human life, it is impossible
+for us ever to become conscious of that many objects;! in spite
+of that, 1000 1000 1000 is still an object, whose properties we
+can come to know, even though it is not intuitable. To
+convince ourselves of this, we have only to show, introducing
+the symbol a" for the nt power of a, that for positive integral
+a and n this expression always refers to one and only one
+positive whole number. To give the proof of this in detail
+would take us too far afield for present purposes. A general
+idea of the way it goes can be gathered from the method used
+to define nought in S 74, one in $ 77, and the infinite Number co1
+in f84, and from the outline of the proof that after every finite
+Number in the series of natural numbers a Number directly
+follows (SS 82-3).
+In the same way with the definitions of fractions, complex
+numbers and the rest, everything will in the end come down
+to the search for a judgement-content which can be transformed into an identity whose sides precisely are the new
+1 A simple calculation shows that millions of years would not be time enough
+for that.
+
+IIS
+numbers. In other words, what we must do is fix the sense of a
+recognition-judgement for the case of these numbers. In doing
+so, we must not forget the doubts raised by such transformations, which we discussed in SS 63-68. If we follow the same
+procedure as we did there, then the new numbers are given
+to us as extensions of concepts.
+§ Ios. On this view of numbers' the charm of work on
+arithmetic and analysis is, it seems to me, easily accounted for.
+We might say, indeed, almost in the well-known words: the
+reason's proper study is itself. In arithmetic we are not
+concerned with objects which we come to know as something
+alien from without through the medium of the senses, but
+with objects given directly to our reason and, as its nearest kin,
+utterly transparent to it.z
+And yet, or rather for that very reason, these objects are
+not subjective fantasies. There is nothing more objective than
+the laws of arithmetic.
+S 106. Let us cast a final brief glance back over the
+course of our enquiry. After establishing that number is
+neither a collection of things nor a property of such, yet at the
+same time is not a subjective product of mental processes
+either, we concluded that a statement of number asserts something objective of a concept. We attempted next to define the
+individual numbers o, 1, etc., and the step from one number
+to the next in the number series. Our first attempt broke down,
+because we had defined only the predicate which we said was
+1 It too might be called formalist. However, it is completely different from the
+view criticized above under that name.
+= By this I do not mean in the least to deny that without sense impressions
+we should be as stupid as stones, and should know nothing either of numbers
+or of anything else; but this psychological proposition is not of the slightest
+concern to us here. Because of the ever-present danger of confusing two
+fundamentally different questions, I make this point once more.
+
+asserted of the concept, but had not given separate definitions
+of o or 1, which are only elements in such predicates. This
+resulted in our being unable to prove the identity of numbers.
+It became clear that the number studied by arithmetic must
+be conceived not as a dependent attribute, but substantivally.?
+Number thus emerged as an object that can be recognized
+again, although not as a physical or even a merely spatial
+object, nor yet as one of which we can form a picture by means
+of our imagination. We next laid down the fundamental
+principle that we must never try to define the meaning of a
+word in isolation, but only as it is used in the context of a
+proposition: only by adhering to this can we, as I believe, avoid
+a physical view of number without slipping into a psychological view of it. Now for every object there is one type of
+proposition which must have a sense, namely the recognitionstatement, which in the case of numbers is called an identity.
+Statements of number too are, we saw, to be considered as
+identities. The problem, therefore, was now this: to fix the
+sense of a numerica identity, that is, to express that sense
+without making use of number words or the word "number"
+The content of a recognition-judgement concerning numbers
+we found to be this, that it is possible to correlate one to one
+the objects falling under a concept F with those falling under a
+concept G. Accordingly, our definition had to lay it down
+that a statement of this possibility means the same as a
+numerical identity. We recalled similar cases: the definition of
+direction derived from parallelism of lines, that of shape
+derived from similarity of figures, and so on.
+$ 107. The question then arose: when are we entitled
+to regard a content as that of a recognition-judgement?
+For this a certain condition has to be satisfied, namely that it
+1 The distinction corresponds to that between "blue" and "the colour of the
+sky".
+
+117
+must be possible in every judgement to substitute without
+loss of truth the right-hand side of our putative identity for
+its left-hand side. Now at the outset, and until we bring
+in further definitions, we do not know of any other assertion
+concerning either side of such an identity except the one, that
+they are identical. We had only to show, therefore, that the
+substitution is possible in an identity.
+One doubt, however, still remained, which was this.
+A recognition-statement must always have a sense. But now
+if we treat the possibility of correlating one to one the objects
+falling under the concept F with the objects falling under the
+concept G as an identity, by putting for it: "the Number
+which belongs to the concept F is identical with the Number
+which belongs to the concept G", thus introducing the
+expression "the Number which belongs to the concept F",
+this gives us a sense for the identity only if both sides of it
+are of the form just mentioned. A definition like this is not
+enough to enable us to decide whether an identity is true or
+false if only one side of it is of this form. We were thus led
+to give the definition:
+The Number which belongs to the concept F is the
+extension of the concept "concept equal to the concept F"
+where a concept F is called equal to a concept G if there exists
+the possibility of one-one correlation referred to above.
+In this definition the sense of the expression "extension
+of a concept" is assumed to be known. This way of getting
+over the difficulty cannot be expected to meet with universal
+approval, and many will prefer other methods of removing
+the doubt in question. I attach no decisive importance even
+to bringing in the extensions of concepts at all.
+S 108. It now still remained to define one-one correlation; this we reduced to purely logical relationships. Next, we
+
+II8
+first gave an outline of the proof of the proposition: the
+number which belongs to the concept F is identical with the
+number which belongs to the concept G, if the concept Fis
+equal to the concept G; and then gave definitions of nought,
+of the expression "n follows in the series of natural numbers
+directly after m", and of the number I, showing that i follows
+in the series of natural numbers directly after o. After adducing
+a number of propositions which can easily be proved at this
+stage, we proceeded to go rather more closely into the following proposition, from which we learn that the number series
+is infinite:
+After every number there follows in the series of natural
+numbers a number.
+This led us to the concept "member of the series of
+natural numbers ending with n", with the aim of showing
+that the Number belonging to this concept follows in the
+series of natural numbers directly after n. We began by
+defining this in terms of the following of an object y after an
+object x in a series in general . The sense of this expression
+too was reduced to purely logical relationships. And by this
+means we succeeded in showing that the inference from n
+to (n t I), which is ordinarily held to be peculiar to mathematics, is really based on the universal principles of inference
+in logic.
+Now to prove that the number series is infinite, we
+needed to make use of the proposition that no finite number
+follows in the series of natural numbers after itself. And so
+we arrived at the concepts of finite and infinite number.
+We showed that fundamentally the latter is no less logically
+justified than the former. For the sake of comparison, CANTOR's
+infinite Numbers and his "following in the succession" were
+referred to, and at the same time the divergence in his terminology was pointed out.
+S 10g. From all the preceding it thus emerged as a very
+probable conclusion that the truths of arithmetic are analytic
+and a priori; and we achieved an improvement on the view of
+
+119
+KANT. We saw further what is still needed to raise this probability to a certainty, and indicated the path which must lead
+to that goal.
+Finally, we made use of our results in a critique of a
+formalist theory of negative, fractional, irrational and complex
+numbers, which made the inadequacy of the theory evident.
+We came to see that its error lies in taking it as proved that a
+concept is free from contradiction if no contradiction has
+revealed itself, and in taking freedom from contradiction in a
+concept as sufficient guarantee in itself that something falls
+under it. This theory imagines that all we need do is make
+postulates; that these are satisfied then goes without saying.
+It conducts itself like a god, who can create by his mere word
+whatever he wants. It had also to be censured for passing off
+as a definition what is only a guide towards a definition, and
+one which, if we followed it, would lead to the introduction
+into arithmetic of foreign elements; these do not, it is true,
+obtrude into the words of the "definition", but only because it
+remains a mere guide.
+The formalists are thus in danger of relapsing into an
+a posteriori or at any rate a synthetic theory, however high on
+the summits of abstraction they may seem to themselves to be
+floating.
+Now we, from our previous treatment of the positive
+whole numbers, have seen that it is possible to avoid all
+importation of external things and geometrical intuitions into
+arithmetic, without, for all that, falling into the error of the
+formalists. Here, just as there, it is a matter of fixing the content of a recognition-judgement. Once suppose this everywhere accomplished, and numbers of every kind, whether
+negative, fractional, irrational or complex, are revealed as no
+more mysterious than the positive whole numbers, which in
+turn are no more real or more actual or more palpable than
+they.
+
+GOTTLOR FREGE
+the foundations of ar
++
+the foundations of arithmetie
+she foundations
+of arithmetic
+a logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number
+"The name of Frege has become one of the most
+honoured in the history of mathematics. The central
+feature of the book is the development of the definition
+of number. There can be no doubt about the greatness
+of this work."
+-W. H. McCREA, Philosophy
+"It will be welcomed by all who are interested in
+mathematical logic and the foundations of mathematics.
+• Frege's style of exposition is a model for all who
+think and write about abstract topics."
+-WILLIAM KNEALE, Mind
+"Its epochal character in the attempt to put
+mathematical concepts on a rigorously logical basis
+has been realized in this country from the beginning
+of this century, thanks to the writings of Russell and
+Whitehead... the translation by J. L. Austin, a fellow
+of Magdalen College, Oxford, is likely to become as
+classical as Frege's exposition itself."
+-The Times [London] Literary Supplement
+HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK
+COVER DESIGN BY LAWRENCE RATZKIN
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/64134f8ed757ecde01a57d99a3356f5ffda3fa8a99b6a7b6f033c874b15529e0.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/64134f8ed757ecde01a57d99a3356f5ffda3fa8a99b6a7b6f033c874b15529e0.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2941ec395ef841cdd9083837c5f9f2f9454010bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/64134f8ed757ecde01a57d99a3356f5ffda3fa8a99b6a7b6f033c874b15529e0.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -509,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "64134f8ed757ecde01a57d99a3356f5ffda3fa8a99b6a7b6f033c874b15529e0",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 227,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "e3dd843fdaf2224b235b930abb90d1611a207b106937fc0b37b6fefd419133a6",
+  "output_sha256": "b96e9ae19837dc4c2955883bef97009fd402b1f7a5d1d69f986bddc656a96e0e",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/65d307b83acdc937b51089d010dbd37d467383af730d13bc205686fde537b00e.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/65d307b83acdc937b51089d010dbd37d467383af730d13bc205686fde537b00e.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d82e0701ed0d57431570a98fd7e66e0e65417e76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/65d307b83acdc937b51089d010dbd37d467383af730d13bc205686fde537b00e.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15844 @@
+INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY
+Logical
+Investigations
+Volume 1
+
+Logical Investigations
+Volume I
+
+International Library of Philosophy
+Edited by José Bermúdez, Tim Crane and Peter Sullivan
+Advisory Board: Jonathan Barnes, Fred Dretske, Frances Kamm,
+Brian Leiter, Huw Price and Sydney Shoemaker
+Recent titles in the ILP:
+The Facts of Causation
+D. H. Mellor
+The Conceptual Roots of Mathematics
+J. R. Lucas
+Stream of Consciousness
+Barry Dainton
+Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science
+Jody Azzouni
+Reason without Freedom
+David Owens
+The Price of Doubt
+N. M. L. Nathan
+Matters of Mind
+Scott Sturgeon
+Logic, Form and Grammar
+Peter Long
+The Metaphysicians of Meaning
+Gideon Makin
+Logical Investigations, Vols 1 & I|
+
+Logical Investigations
+Translated by J. N. Findlay
+from the Second German edition of Logische Untersuchungen
+with a new Preface by Michael Dummett
+and edited with a new Introduction by Dermot Moran
+Volume I
+Prolegomena to pure logic
+(Volume I of the German editions)
+Expression and meaning
+(Investigation I, Volume Il of the German editions)
+The ideal unity of the species and modern theories
+of abstraction
+(Investigation II, Volume Il of the German editions)
+K Routinge
+Taylor & Francis Group
+LONDON AND NEW YORK
+
+First published in German as Logische Untersuchungen
+by M. Niemeyer, Halle 1900/1901
+Second German edition, Vol. I and Vol. II, Part I, first published 1913
+First published in English 1970
+by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd
+Reprinted 1976, 1977, 1982
+This paperback edition first published 200l
+by Routledge
+2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OXI 4 4RN
+Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
+by Routledge
+270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016
+Reprinted 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008
+Transferred to Digital Printing 2008
+Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
+Translation © 1970 J. N. Findlay
+Preface © 2001 Michael Dummett
+Introduction and editorial matter © 2001 Dermot Moran
+Typeset in Times by Graphicraft Ltd, Hong Kong
+Printed and bound in Great Britain by
+TJI Digital, Padstow, Cornwall
+All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
+or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means,
+now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording.
+or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
+writing from the publishers.
+British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
+A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
+Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
+A catalog record for this book has been requested
+ISBN 978-0-415-24189-2 (Vol. I)
+ISBN 978-0-415-24190-8 (Vol. II)
+
+Dedicated to
+Carl Stumpf
+with Honour
+and
+in Friendship
+
+Contents
+Preface by Michael Dummett
+Introduction by Dermot Moran
+Select bibliography
+Translator's Introduction (Abridged)
+Foreword to First German Edition, Volume I (1900)
+Foreword to Second German Edition, Volume I (1913)
+PROLEGOMENA TO PURE LOGIC
+Volume I of the German Editions
+INTRODUCTION
+81 The controversy regarding the definition of logic and the
+essential content of its doctrines
+Necessity of a renewed discussion of questions of principle
+§3 Disputed questions. The path to be entered
+CHAPTER ONE
+Logic as a normative and, in particular, as a practical discipline
+§4 The theoretical incompleteness of the separate sciences
+§5 The theoretical completion of the separate sciences by
+metaphysics and theory of science
+§6 The possibility and justification of logic as theory of science
+§7 Continuation. The three most noteworthy peculiarities of
+grounded validations
+§8 The relation of these peculiarities to the possibility of science
+and the theory of science
+§9 Methodical modes of procedure in the sciences are in part
+validatory, in part auxiliary devices towards validations
+$10 The ideas of theory and science as problems of the theory of
+science
+XVII
+xxi
+Ixxiii
+Ixxvii
+1
+3
+9
+12
+15
+15
+16
+16
+19
+21
+23
+24
+
+vili Contents
+§11 Logic or theory of science as normative discipline and as
+technology
+§12 Relevant definitions of logic
+CHAPTER TWO
+Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines
+§13 The controversy regarding the practical character of logic
+§14 The concept of a normative science. The basic standard or
+principle that gives it unity
+§15 Normative disciplines and technologies
+§16 Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative
+disciplines
+CHAPTER THREE
+Psychologism, its arguments and its attitude to the usual
+counter-arguments
+§17 The disputed question as to whether the essential theoretical
+foundations of normative logic lie in psychology
+§18 The line of proof of the psychologistic thinkers
+§19 The usual arguments of the opposition and the psychologistic
+rejoinder
+820
+A gap in the psychologistic line of proof
+CHAPTER FOUR
+Empiricistic consequences of psychologism
+821 Characterizing two empiricistic consequences of the
+psychologistic standpoint, and their refutation
+§22 The laws of thought as supposed laws of nature which
+operate in isolation as causes of rational thought
+§23 A third consequence of psychologism, and its refutation
+§24 Continuation
+CHAPTER FIVE
+Psychological interpretations of basic logical principles
+§25 The law of contradiction in the psychologistic interpretation
+of Mill and Spencer
+§26 Mill's psychological interpretation of the principle yields no
+law, but a wholly vague, and scientifically unproven, empirical
+proposition
+Appendix to the last two sections: On certain basic defects of
+empiricism
+25
+26
+28
+28
+33
+37
+38
+40
+40
+41
+44
+46
+46
+48
+51
+54
+56
+56
+58
+59
+
+Contents ix
+§27 Analogous objections against remaining psychological
+interpretations of our logical principle. Ambiguities as
+sources of delusion
+§28 The supposed two-sidedness of the principle of contradiction,
+in virtue of which it should be taken both as a natural law of
+thinking, and as a normal law for its logical regulation
+§29 Continuation. Sigwart's doctrine
+CHAPTER SIX
+Syllogistic inferences psychologistically considered. Syllogistic and
+chemical formulae
+§30 Attempts at interpreting syllogistic principles psychologically
+§31 Syllogistic and chemical formulae
+CHAPTER SEVEN
+Psychologism as a sceptical relativism
+§32 The ideal conditions for the possibility of a theory as such.
+The strict concept of scepticism
+§33 Scepticism in the metaphysical sense
+§34 The concept of relativism and its specific forms
+§35 Critique of individual relativism
+§36 Critique of specific relativism and, in particular, of
+anthropologism
+§37 General observation. The concept of relativism in an
+extended sense
+§38 Psychologism in all its forms is a relativism
+§39 Anthropologism in Sigwart's Logic
+§40 Anthropologism in the Logic of B. Erdmann
+CHAPTER EIGHT
+§41 First prejudice
+§42 Elucidations
+§43 A look back at the opposed arguments of idealism. Their
+defects and their justified sense
+§44 Second prejudice
+§45 Refutation. Pure mathematics would likewise be made a
+branch of psychology
+§46 The research domain of pure logic is, like that of mathematics,
+an ideal domain
+§47 Confirmatory indications given by the basic notions of logic
+and the sense of logical laws
+848 The decisive differences
+61
+64
+67
+70
+70
+72
+75
+75
+76
+77
+78
+78
+82
+82
+83
+90
+101
+101
+103
+106
+108
+108
+109
+111
+113
+
+× Contents
+§49 Third prejudice. Logic as the theory of evidence
+§50 Transformation of logical propositions into equivalent
+propositions about the ideal conditions for the evidence of
+judgement. The resultant propositions are not psychological
+§51 The decisive points in this dispute
+CHAPTER NINE
+Logic and the principle of the economy of thought
+§52 Introductory
+§53 The teleological character of the principle of Mach and
+Avenarius and the scientific meaning of an 'economy of
+thought' (Denkökonomik)
+§54 Closer treatment of the justified ends of an 'economy of
+thought, in the sphere, mainly, of purely deductive
+methodology. Its relation to a logical technology
+§55 The meaninglessness of an economy of thought for pure logic
+and epistemology, and its relation to psychology
+§56 Continuation. The orspov pópov involved in any
+foundation of pure logic on an economy of thought
+CHAPTER TEN
+§57 Queries regarding readily formed misunderstandings of our
+logical endeavours
+858
+Our links with great thinkers of the past and, in the first place,
+with Kant
+859 Links with Herbart and Lotze
+§60 Links with Leibniz
+§61
+Need for special investigations to provide an epistemological
+justification and partial realization of the Idea of pure logic
+Appendix: References to F. A. Lange and B. Bolzano
+CHAPTER ELEVEN
+§62 The unity of science. The interconnection of things and the
+interconnection of truths
+§63 Continuation. The unity of theory
+§64 The essential and extra-essential principles that give science
+unity. Abstract, concrete and normative sciences
+§65 The question as to the ideal conditions of the possibility of
+science or of theory in general. A. The question as it relates
+to actual knowledge
+115
+116
+119
+123
+123
+123
+126
+129
+131
+134
+134
+135
+136
+138
+140
+141
+144
+144
+146
+147
+149
+
+Contents xi
+150
+§66 B. The question as it relates to the content of knowledge
+§67 The tasks of pure logic. First: the fixing of the pure categories
+of meaning, and pure categories of objects and their
+law-governed combinations
+§68 Secondly: the laws and theories which have their grounds in
+these categories
+§69 Thirdly: the theory of the possible forms of theories or the
+pure theory of manifolds
+870
+Elucidation of the Idea of a pure theory of manifolds
+§71 Division of labour. The achievement of the mathematicians
+and that of the philosophers
+§72 Broadening of the Idea of pure logic. The pure theory of
+probability as a pure theory of empirical knowledge
+VOLUME II, PART I OF THE GERMAN EDITIONS
+INVESTIGATIONS IN PHENOMENOLOGY AND
+KNOWLEDGE PART I
+INTRODUCTION
+§1 The necessity of phenomenological investigations as a
+preliminary to the epistemological criticism and clarification
+of pure logic
+82 Elucidation of the aims of such investigations
+§3 The difficulties of pure phenomenological analysis
+§4 It is essential to keep in mind the grammatical side of our
+logical experiences
+85 Statement of the main aims of the following analytical
+investigations
+§6 Additional Notes
+87 'Freedom from presuppositions' as a principle in
+epistemological investigations
+INVESTIGATION I
+EXPRESSION AND MEANING
+CHAPTER ONE
+§1 An ambiguity in the term 'sign'
+82 The essence of indication
+§3 Two senses of 'demonstration' ('indication' and 'proof')
+152
+154
+155
+156
+158
+160
+163
+163
+165
+165
+166
+170
+172
+173
+174
+177
+181
+183
+183
+183
+184
+
+xii Contents
+§4 Digression on the origin of indication in association
+§5 Expressions as meaningful signs. Setting aside of a sense of
+'expression' not relevant for our purpose
+§6 Questions as to the phenomenological and intentional
+distinctions which pertain to expressions as such
+§7 Expressions as they function in communication
+Expressions in solitary life
+§9 Phenomenological distinctions between the physical appearance
+of the expression, and the sense-giving and sense-fulfilling act
+§10 The phenomenological unity of these acts
+§11 The ideal distinctions between (1) expression and meaning as
+ideal unities
+§12 Continuation: the expressed objectivity
+§13 Connection between meaning and objective reference
+§14 Content as object, content as fulfilling sense and content as
+sense or meaning simpliciter
+815 The equivocations in talk of meaning and meaninglessness
+connected with these distinctions
+§16 Continuation: meaning and connotation
+CHAPTER TWO
+§17 Illustrative mental pictures as putative meanings
+§18 Continuation of the above. Arguments and counter-arguments
+819 Understanding without intuition
+§20 Thought without intuition and the 'surrogative function' of
+signs
+§21 A difficulty regarding our necessary recourse to corresponding
+intuitions in order to clarify meanings or to know truths
+resting on them
+§22 Varying marks of understanding and the 'quality of familiarity'
+§23 Apperception as connected with expression and with intuitive
+presentations
+CHAPTER THREE
+Fluctuation in meaning and the ideality of unities of meaning
+§24 Introduction
+§25 Relations of coincidence among the contents of intimation
+and naming
+826
+Essentially occasional and objective expressions
+§27 Other sorts of fluctuating expressions
+§28 Variations in meanings as variations in the act of meaning
+§29 Pure logic and ideal meanings
+186
+187
+188
+189
+190
+191
+193
+194
+196
+198
+199
+200
+203
+206
+206
+207
+209
+210
+211
+213
+213
+216
+216
+216
+217
+221
+222
+224
+
+Contents xili
+CHAPTER FOUR
+The phenomenological and ideal content of the experiences of meaning
+§30 The content of the expressive experience taken in its
+psychological sense and in the sense of a unified meaning
+§31 The act-character of meaning and the ideally unified meaning
+§32 The ideality of meanings is no ideality in the normative sense
+§33 The concepts meaning and concept (in the sense of species) do
+not coincide
+§34 In the act of meaning we are not conscious of meaning as an
+object
+§35 Meanings 'in themselves' and meanings expressed
+INVESTIGATION II
+THE IDEAL UNITY OF THE SPECIES AND
+MODERN THEORIES OF ABSTRACTION
+CHAPTER ONE
+Universal objects and the consciousness of universality
+§1 We are conscious of universal objects in acts which differ
+essentially from those in which we are conscious of individual
+objects
+§2 The indispensability of talk about universal objects
+§3 Must the unity of the Species be regarded as a spurious unity?
+Identity and exact likeness
+84 Objections to the reduction of ideal unity to dispersed
+multiplicity
+§5 Continuation. The controversy between John Stuart Mill and
+H. Spencer
+§6 Transition to the following chapters
+CHAPTER TWO
+§7 The metaphysical and psychological hypostatization of the
+universal. Nominalism
+§8 A deceptive line of thought
+§9 Locke's doctrine of abstract ideas
+810 Criticism
+§11 Locke's universal triangle
+812 The doctrine of generic images
+228
+228
+229
+231
+231
+232
+233
+235
+237
+239
+239
+240
+241
+242
+244
+246
+248
+248
+249
+250
+251
+254
+256
+
+xiy Contents
+CHAPTER THREE
+§13 Nominalistic theories which regard abstraction as an
+achievement of attention
+§14 Objections to any and every form of nominalism.
+(a) The lack of a descriptive fixation of aims
+813 (b) The origin of modern nominalism as an exaggerated
+reaction to Locke's doctrine of general ideas. The essential
+character of this nominalism, and of the theory of abstraction
+in terms of attention
+$16 (c) Generality of psychological function and generality as a
+meaning-form. Different senses of the relation of a universal
+to an extension
+§17 (d) Application to the critique of nominalism
+§18 The doctrine of attention as a generalizing power
+§19 Objections. (a) Exclusive attention to one attributive aspect
+does not remove its individuality
+§20 (b) Refutation of the argument from geometrical thought
+§21 The difference between attending to a non-independent
+moment of an intuited object and attending to the
+corresponding attribute in specie
+§22 Fundamental deficiencies in the phenomenological analysis of
+attention
+§23 Significant talk of attention embraces the whole sphere of
+thinking and not merely the sphere of intuition
+CHAPTER FOUR
+§24 The general idea as a device for economizing thought
+825 Whether general representation can serve as an essential
+characteristic of our general presentations
+§26 Continuation. The varying modifications of the consciousness
+of generality, and the sensuous intuition
+§27 The justifiable sense of general representation
+§28 Representation as substitution. Locke and Berkeley
+§29 Critique of Berkeley's doctrine of representation
+§30 Continuation. Berkeley's argument from geometrical
+demonstrations
+§31 The main source of the errors that we have indicated
+258
+258
+260
+262
+264
+266
+266
+268
+270
+271
+272
+274
+277
+277
+278
+280
+281
+282
+284
+285
+286
+
+Contents
+CHAPTER FIVE
+§32 Hume's dependence on Berkeley
+$33
+Hume's critique of abstract ideas and its supposed outcome.
+His ignoring of pivotal phenomenological issues
+§34 Reduction of Hume's investigation to two questions
+835 The guiding principle and outcome of Hume's doctrine of
+abstraction and the main thoughts in which it is worked out
+836
+Hume's doctrine of the distinctio rationis in its moderate and
+its radical interpretation
+§37 Objections to this doctrine in its radical interpretation
+Notes
+§38 Transference of our scepticism from abstract part-contents to
+all parts whatsoever
+§39 The extreme limit of scepticism and its refutation
+Appendix: Modern Humeanism
+CHAPTER SIX
+Separation of varying concepts of abstraction and abstract
+840 Confusion of concepts of abstraction and abstract concerned
+with non-independent part-contents, on the one hand, and
+Species on the other
+§41 Separation of concepts grouped about the concept of the
+non-independent content
+842 Separation of the concepts that group themselves about the
+concept of the Species
+Notes
+Index
+289
+289
+290
+291
+293
+294
+295
+299
+300
+301
+302
+308
+308
+309
+311
+314
+325
+
+Preface
+Edmond Husserl's Logical Investigations, little known to English-speaking
+students of philosophy but well known to most students of the subject with
+a different mother tongue, is a work of the first importance in the history of
+philosophy. It was written at a turning point in Husserl's philosophical
+development, between his earlier book, Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891),
+deeply embedded in the psychologism so prevalent in German philosophy of
+the time, and the Ideas towards a pure Phenomenology and phenomenological
+Philosophy (1913) in which the notion of noema was first presented and the
+programme of phenomenology was first set out. In Philosophy of Arithmetic
+Husserl had criticised Gottlob Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic from a
+psychologistic standpoint. Psychologism attempts to explain concepts by
+reference to the inner mental operations supposedly involved in attaining
+them or grasping them; Frege had engaged in denouncing this methodology
+- the intrusion of psychological considerations into logic and the analysis
+of meaning - from the Foundations of Arithmetic onwards. Husserl, whose
+previous relations with Frege had been fairly cordial, was deeply affronted
+by his savage, and in certain respects unfair, review in 1894 of the Philosophy
+of Arithmetic, and had no further contact with him for the next twelve years.
+Frege's review was his most sustained attack on psychologism; and although
+it was resented by Husserl for its unkindness, it is widely believed to have
+influenced him profoundly, albeit some reject this conjecture. However this
+may be, Husserl had completely changed his attitude to psychologism by 1900.
+His arguments against it in the Prolegomena often coincided with those used
+by Frege, although he elaborated them in far more detail. Yet while Frege's
+objections to psychologism had made little impact, that of Husserl's assault
+on it was overwhelming: the Prolegomena came close to killing off the influence of psychologism within German philosophy, although Husserl's old
+teacher Brentano remained bewildered by this turn of events.
+Attention to Husserl's famous book may help to correct the impression
+of 'German philosophy' often given by those who declare their enthusiasm
+for what they describe as the German tradition in the subject. This they see
+as originating in the work of Hegel and the idealist school generally and
+
+xviii
+Preface
+descending to Heidegger. Heidegger indeed began as a pupil of Husserl's,
+though he diverged from him so markedly; but the false impression of what
+the German philosophical tradition has been may be corrected by reading
+Husserl's disparaging remarks about Hegel, and the accompanying encomium of Bolzano, in the Appendix to Chapter 10 of the Prolegomena.
+Frege did not see himself as the founder of a school, although he was
+highly conscious of his divergence from the approaches of other philosophers
+contemporary with him. Yet nowadays he is recognised by all analytical
+philosophers as the grandfather of their school of philosophy - with Bolzano,
+whom Husserl so
+greatly admired, as its great-grandfather. Husserl, on the
+other hand, set out to be the inaugurator of a new philosophical method;
+and no one could deny him the title of founder of phenomenology. They
+were thus progenitors of two philosophical schools that have diverged
+so widely from one another that communication between them has until
+recently been almost impossible. Yet, at the time when Husserl's Logical
+Investigations were published, no one who knew the work of both men
+would have thought of them as belonging to radically different schools of
+philosophy; they had somewhat different interests, and a markedly different
+literary style, but they did not then appear any great distance apart in
+philosophical outlook. The moment of the publication of the Logical Investigations was that at which the views of the founders of the rival philosophical
+schools approximated most closely to one another.
+They even had quite similar opinions about the nature of logic. Husserl
+denied that logic is an essentially normative discipline; he held that any
+normative discipline must rest on a theoretical science. Frege is often described
+as having held that logic is essentially normative in character, and he did
+indeed say as much in one of his unpublished writings. He did so because,
+when commenting on its description as embodying the 'laws of thought', he
+repeatedly observed that it did not lay down laws governing the way we
+do think, but promulgated laws concerning how we ought to think. In
+fact, however, his view was essentially the same as Husserl's. He frequently
+described logic as concerned with the laws of truth; and in the Introduction
+to his Basic Laws of Arithmetic he says that these are laws about what is,
+independently of our judgements.
+Any analytical philosopher interested in how philosophy arrived at its
+present state thus needs to study the Logical Investigations to discover how
+the philosophical traditions that stemmed from the work of these two innovators came to diverge so widely: one investigating intuitions of essences,
+the other analysing language (to which Frege himself had so ambivalent an
+attitude). Recent work within the analytical tradition, from the late Gareth
+Evans onwards, has tended to reverse the explanatory priority which that
+tradition has historically given to language over thought. This suggests the
+possibility of a rapprochement; at the same time it may seem to threaten a
+relapse into psychologism. That such a relapse has not occurred is due to
+
+Preface xix
+the treatment of the structure of thoughts by adherents of this new tendency
+after the model of a Fregean semantic analysis of language. Do we have
+here a means of reconciling the two traditions? Or does the gulf between
+MICHAEL DUMMETT
+Oxford, April 2000
+
+The Logical Investigations (1900/1901)
+Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) published his Logische Untersuchungen
+(Logical Investigations) in two volumes in 1900 and 1901.' The first volume,
+Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (Prolegomena to Pure Logic) appeared from
+the publisher Max Niemeyer in July 1900. The second volume, subtitled
+Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis ('Investigations in Phenomenology and the Theory of Knowledge'), containing six
+long treatises or 'Investigations', appeared in two parts in 1901. This gargantuan work - which Husserl insisted was not a 'systematic exposition of
+logic' (eine systematische Darstellung der Logik, LI III, Findlay II: 3; Hua
+XIX/1: 228),' but an effort at epistemological clarification and critique of
+the basic concepts of logical knowledge - consisted of a series of analytical
+inquiries (analytische Untersuchungen) into fundamental issues in epistemology and the philosophy of logic, and also extensive, intricate philosophical
+discussions of issues in semiotics, semantics, mereology (the study of wholes
+and parts), formal grammar (the a priori study of the parts of any language
+whatsoever in regard to their coherent combination into meaningful unities),
+and the nature of conscious acts, especially presentations and judgements.
+In fact it was these latter detailed descriptive psychological analyses of the
+essential structures of consciousness, in terms of intentional acts, their contents, objects and truth-grasping character, especially in the last two Investigations, which set the agenda for the emerging discipline Husserl fostered
+under the name phenomenology.
+The Prolegomena appeared as a free-standing treatise dedicated to securing the true meaning of logic as a pure, a priori, science of ideal meanings
+and of the formal laws regulating them, entirely distinct from all psychological acts, contents and procedures. The Prolegomena offered the strongest
+possible refutation to the then dominant psychologistic interpretation of
+logic, propounded by John Stuart Mill and others, which Husserl viewed as
+leading to a sceptical relativism that threatened the very possibility of objective knowledge. Turning instead to an older tradition of logic stemming
+
+xxii Introduction
+from Leibniz, Kant, Bolzano and Lotze, Husserl defends a vision of logic as
+a pure theory of science - in fact, the 'science of science'
+, in the course of
+which he carefully elaborates the different senses in which this pure logic
+can be transformed into a normative science or developed into a practical
+discipline or 'technology' (Kunstlehre).
+The second volume of the Investigations (1901) was published in two
+parts: Part One contained the first Five Investigations and Part Two the
+long and dense Sixth Investigation, the writing of which had considerably
+delayed the appearance of the work as Husserl began to realise the depth of
+the phenomenological project he had uncovered. Whereas the Prolegomena
+was particularly influential in turning the tide against psychologism (Frege's
+efforts in the same direction being in relative obscurity at the time), it
+was the second volume of the Investigations in particular that had a major
+impact on philosophers interested in concrete analyses of problems of consciousness and meaning, leading to the development of phenomenology.
+Phenomenology, in line with a general turn away from idealism then
+current, was to be a science of 'concrete' issues. According to Husserl's
+Introduction, phenomenology aimed to avoid speculative constructions in
+philosophy (exemplified, in his view, by Hegel). The Investigations impressed
+its early readers as exemplifying a radically new way of doing philosophy,
+focusing directly on analysis of the things themselves - the matters at issue
+(die Sachen selbst) - without the usual detour through the history of philosophy, 'merely criticising traditional philosophemes' as Husserl put it (LI VI,
+Intro., Findlay II: 187; Hua XIX/2: 543), or making partisan declarations in
+favour of some philosophical system (such as empiricism, positivism, rationalism, Hegelianism or Neo-Kantianism).
+Within a decade, as Husserl's ground-breaking efforts came to be recognised, the Investigations had established itself as the foundational text of
+the nascent 'phenomenological movement' (a term Husserl himself regularly
+invoked) in Germany. The Investigations' influence subsequently spread
+throughout Europe, from Russia and Poland to France and Spain, such
+that eventually, it is no exaggeration to say that this work took on a status
+in twentieth-century European philosophy analogous to that of another
+foundational text - this time in psychoanalysis - Die Traumdeutung (Interpretation of Dreams),' published by Husserl's contemporary Sigmund Freud
+(1856-1939) in 1899. The Investigations continues to be a necessary startingpoint for anyone wanting to understand the development of European
+philosophy in the twentieth century, from Heidegger and Frege to Levinas,
+Gadamer, Sartre or Derrida.
+Given that the Logical Investigations is such a pivotal text in twentiethcentury philosophy, it remains something of a neglected masterpiece, remarkably little read, and where read, poorly understood. For some seventy
+years it remained untranslated into English. An American philosopher living
+in Europe, William B. Pitkin sought Husser's permission to translate it into
+
+xxili
+English in 1905, but he abandoned the effort when he could not get a publisher
+(see Hua XVIII: xxxvii; XIX/I: xxii). Seemingly, the philosopher William
+James, who was consulted on the project, advised the publisher not to proceed - suggesting that the last thing the world needed was another German
+textbook on logic, and so the project was abandoned, which grieved Husserl
+because he had been an admirer of James.' Marvin Farber, an American
+student of Husserl's, published a paraphrase of the Investigations in 1943,?
+but it was not until 1970 that John N. Findlay produced the first and only
+complete English translation of the Second Edition. With the hundredth
+anniversary of the Investigations' publication now upon us, it is important
+to make Findlay's translation available once again in an accessible form for
+the English-speaking reader.
+The emergence of phenomenology
+In the first edition of 1901, Husserl adopted the existing term "phenomenology'
+(Phänomenologie) - a term already in currency since Lambert, Kant and Hegel,
+but given new vigour by Brentano and his students - in a somewhat less
+than fully systematic way to characterise his new approach to the conditions
+of the possibility of knowledge in general. Husserl wrote in his Introduction:
+Pure phenomenology represents a field of neutral researches, in which
+several sciences have their roots. It is, on the one hand, an ancillary to
+psychology conceived as an empirical science. Proceeding in purely intuitive fashion, it analyses and describes in their essential generality
+- in the specific guise of a phenomenology of thought and knowledge -
+the experiences of presentation, judgement and knowledge, experiences
+which, treated as classes of real events in the natural context of zoological reality, receive a scientific probing at the hands of empirical
+psychology. Phenomenology, on the other hand, lays bare the 'sources'
+from which the basic concepts and ideal laws of pure logic "flow', and
+back to which they must once more be traced, so as to give them all the
+"clearness and distinctness' needed for an understanding, and for an
+epistemological critique, of pure logic.
+(LI, Findlay I: 166; Hua XIX/1: 6-7)
+The logician is not interested in mental acts as such, but only in objective
+meanings and their formal regulation, the phenomenologist on the other
+hand is concerned with the essential structures of cognition and their essential correlation to the things known. When Husserl says in this Introduction, 'we must go back to the things themselves' (Wir wollen auf die Sachen
+selbst' zurückgehen, LI, Findlay I: 168; Hua XIX/I: 10), he means particularly that the task of phenomenology is to clarify the nature of logical
+concepts by tracing their origins in intuition:
+
+xxiv Introduction
+Our great task is now to bring the Ideas of logic, the logical concepts and
+laws (die logischen Ideen, Begriffe und Gesetze), to epistemological clarity and definiteness. Here phenomenological analysis must begin.
+(LI, Findlay I: 168; Hua XIX/I: 9)
+More broadly, Husserl wants to document all matters that present themselves to consciousness in their diverse modes of intuitive givenness (and not
+restricting the sources of intuition arbitrarily in advance, as empiricism
+and other theories traditionally had done). Husserl initially characterised
+phenomenology ambiguously as either a parallel discipline to epistemology,
+or as a more radical grounding of epistemology, that sought to clarify the
+essences of acts of cognition in their most general sense. In analysing knowledge, Husserl wanted to do justice both to the necessary ideality (that is:
+self-identity and independence of space and time) of the truths known in
+cognition, and at the same time properly recognise the essential contribution
+of the knowing acts of the subject. Thus, looking back in 1925, Husserl
+described the aim of the Logical Investigations as follows:
+In the year 1900-01 appeared my Logical Investigations which were the
+results of my ten year long efforts to clarify the Idea of pure Logic
+by going back to the sense-bestowing or cognitive achievements being
+effected in the complex of lived experiences of logical thinking.®
+Husserl's overall aim is to lay down what he describes as the 'phenomenological founding of logic' (die phänomenologische Fundierung der Logik, LI,
+Findlay I: 175; Hua XIX/I: 22), a clarification of the essential nature of
+logical knowledge as a preliminary to systematic formal logic and to science
+in general? More narrowly, his 'phenomenology of the logical experiences'
+(Phänomenologie der logischen Erlebnisse, LI, Findlay I: 168; Hua XIX/1:
+10) aims to give descriptive understanding of the mental states and their
+'indwelling senses' (ihren einwohnenden Sinnes), with the aim of fixing the
+meanings of key logical concepts and operations, through elaborate and
+careful distinctions and clarifications. 'Phenomenology', in the First Edition,
+then, meant the efforts to inquire, radically and consistently, back from the
+categories of objectivities to the subjective acts, act-structures, experiential
+foundations in which the objectivities of the appropriate sorts come to be
+objects of consciousness and to evident self-givenness, working in the domain
+of pure intuition, rather than being a theoretical or hypothetical construction in the manner of naturalistic psychology. As Husserl put it in 1925, this
+'regressive inquiry' brings a new world to light.' This is the domain of the
+correlation between objectivity and subjectivity.
+In particular, Husserl wants carefully to analyse the intentional subject
+matter of expressive experiences (ausdrückliche Erlebnisse) where 'expression'
+
+XXV
+is understood as the articulating of meaning. His focus then is on the ideal
+sense of the objective intention (ihr intentionaler Gehalt, der ideale Sinn ihrer
+gegenständlichen Intention, LI, Findlay I: 174; Hua XIX/I: 21). In giving an
+account of the idea of meaning or expression, Husserl takes concepts apart
+and elaborates extensively on their many meanings before moving on to
+discuss other related concepts. Thus, for example, he carefully distinguishes
+the number of different senses of the term 'presentation' (Vorstellung), separating out its various psychological, logical and epistemological meanings.
+Likewise, he embarks on conceptual analyses of key concepts such as 'content', 'judgement' and 'consciousness'. Thus he recognises the need to sort
+out the many meanings of the term 'content' (Inhalt, sometimes Gehalt),
+a term particularly frequently invoked by logicians and psychologists of
+the day. In particular, the contrast between what Husserl terms in the First
+Edition real (reell) and ideal content, and later what he refers to as the
+distinction between phenomenological and intentional content (LI V §16). A
+typical example of the clarification Husserl is seeking is his differentiation in
+Sixth Investigation (§§30-5) of the kinds of unity and conflict of meaning
+contents that lay the basis for the logical laws of consistency and contradiction. It is these rigorous feats of analysis that won the admiration of early
+readers and, more recently, of analytic philosophers.
+While Husserl's own 'concrete' analyses were initially focused primarily
+on the foundations of arithmetic and logic, and the structures of knowledge,
+gradually he and his followers broadened phenomenology to address the
+a priori structures of consciousness in general, including affective, volitional,
+practical, evaluative, aesthetic, religious, legal, political and other forms of
+conscious awareness of meaning grasping and meaning articulating. Phenomenology was to be a science of essences and as such it was a pure, a priori
+discipline, attending to the nature of things as given in 'essential seeing'
+(Wesensschau). Phenomenology would broaden the sources of intuition
+further than previous philosophies had allowed, and clarify the fundamental
+relation of thought to truth.
+Quite early on, the Investigations attracted the attention of students of
+the Munich philosopher and psychologist Theodor Lipps (1851-1914), who
+himself had been criticised for psychologism in the Prolegomena and who, in
+consequence, altered his views to come largely into agreement with Husserl.
+Through Lipps's students, especially Johannes Daubert (1877-1947), the
+Logical Investigations became the leading philosophical text for a generation
+of German philosophers, including Alexander Pfänder (1870-1941), whose
+prize-winning, Habilitation thesis, written under Lipps at Munich, Phenomenology of Willing. A Psychological Analysis (Phänomenologie des Wollens.
+Eine psychologische Analyse, 1900), contained the word 'phenomenology' in
+the title, although the term does not occur elsewhere in the work." Subsequently, Max Scheler (1874-1928), Adolf Reinach (1883-1917), Edith Stein
+(1891-1942) and Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) were all drawn to this early
+
+XXVI
+conception of phenomenology with its strongly realist orientation and its
+promise of resolving philosophy's hitherto intractable disputes.
+The role of the Investigations in Husserl's
+development
+Husserl himself regarded his Logical Investigations as a '"break-through",
+not an end but rather a beginning' (ein Werk des Durchbruchs, und somit nicht
+ein Ende, sondern ein Anfang, LI Findlay I: 3; Hua XVIII: 8). ' In it, Husserl
+abandoned his earlier approaches to logic and mathematics expressed in
+his first book, Philosophie der Arithmetik (Philosophy of Arithmetic, 1891),!
+which had been judged psychologistic by its chief critic, Gottlob Frege (1848-
+1925). Husserl discovered a much more fruitful way of doing philosophy
+in a rigorously scientific way through the clarification of the essences of
+our fundamental cognitive achievements, eventually leading to his later
+transformation of phenomenology into a comprehensive transcendental
+philosophical outlook. Ever a restless innovator, he constantly reinterpreted
+the significance of his own contribution, and thus the Investigations played a
+singular role in his own philosophical development. Both in his lecture courses
+and in his private research manuscripts, he constantly reworked the ground
+covered in the Logical Investigations, for example, in his Göttingen lectures
+on logic (1906-7), on meaning (1907-8), on logic (1910-11), in his Freiburg
+lectures on logic and in Phenomenological Psychology (1925), in the lectures
+that eventually evolved into Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929), and
+even in his Crisis of European Sciences (1936) and the posthumously published Experience and Judgement (1938). Husserl's own 'breakthrough' seemed
+so surprising even to himself that it had to be constantly rethought.
+In later years, Husserl sought to distance himself from the common understanding of the work as solely an exercise in the philosophy of logic. He
+complained that he was being characterised rather limitedly as a logician,
+whereas he saw himself more broadly as a theorist of science in general, and
+as the founder of a new foundational science, first philosophy or phenomenology, which aimed at the careful description of all forms of making meaning
+and registering meaningfulness and hence the whole domain of subjectivity.
+He even claimed (in a letter to E. Spranger, 1918, quoted in Hua XVIII: xiii)
+that phenomenology had 'as little to do with logic as with ethics, aesthetics,
+and other parallel disciplines'.
+. In other words, Husserl would later suggest
+that it was simply an accident of personal biography that he happened
+to come to phenomenology through logical researches; he could just as
+easily have entered the field from another direction entirely. In a letter to
+Georg Misch of 16 November 1930, Husserl said that he lost interest in
+formal logic and real ontology when he made his breakthrough to the transcendental, and later concentrated on founding a theory of transcendental
+subjectivity and intersubjectivity. " Before analysing the Investigations in more
+
+xxvii
+detail, let us now turn, then, to a brief consideration of the author, Edmund
+Husserl.
+Edmund Husserl (1859-1938): life and writings
+Edmund Husserl was born in Prossnitz, Moravia (now Prostejov, Czech
+Republic), on 8 April 1859. He studied mathematics and physics at the
+universities of Leipzig and Berlin, where he was deeply influenced by the
+mathematician Carl Weierstrass (1815-97), before moving to the University
+of Vienna, where he completed his doctorate in mathematics in 1882. Following a brief period as Weierstrass' assistant and a term in the army, Husserl
+went back to Vienna to study philosophy with Franz Brentano from 1884 to
+1886. On Brentano's recommendation, Husserl then went to the university
+of Halle to study with Brentano's most senior student, Carl Stumpf (1848-
+1936), completing his Habilitation thesis, On the Concept of Number. Psychological Analyses with him in 1887.'S Husserl remained in Halle as a lowly,
+unsalaried Privatdozent from 1887 until 1901, the unhappiest years of his
+life, as he later confessed
+Although Husserl wrote research notes and manuscripts continuously and
+obsessively, he published few books during his lifetime." His first publication at Halle came in 1891 with the Philosophy of Arithmetic, whose opening
+chapters contained a revised version of his Habilitation thesis. The Logical
+Investigations took another ten years of difficult labour to write, during
+which Husserl sacrificed many of the routines of family life. Husserl always
+regarded its results as provisional. Nevertheless, writing the book 'cured'
+him, as he later said to Dorion Cairns. Its publication facilitated a move
+from Halle to a new salaried position at the university of Göttingen, a
+renowned centre of mathematics under David Hilbert (1862-1943). It was
+during his years at Göttingen that he began to attract both German and
+international students to pursue the practice and theory of phenomenology.
+However, Husserl still managed only two publications between 1901 and
+1916: an important long essay, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft (Philpublications
+osophy as a Rigorous Science'), commissioned by Heinrich Rickert for his
+new journal Logos in 1910/1911, in which Husserl outlined his opposition
+to all forms of naturalism and historicism (as he understood Dilthey's
+Weltanschauungsphilosophie to be); and a major book, Ideas Pertaining to
+a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy! (hereafter
+Ideas I), published in 1913, which offered an entirely new way of entering
+into phenomenology.
+To the great shock of Husserl's earlier realist followers (such as Ingarden
+and Pfänder), Ideas I quite deliberately espoused a form of transcendental
+idealism (involving a radicalisation of the projects of Kant and Descartes),
+an outlook Husserl would continue to maintain and develop throughout his
+career. Husserl himself, however, insisted that he really had this orientation
+
+xxvili
+in mind when he was developing phenomenology in the Investigations. In his
+Introduction to Ideas I, he said that readers of the Logical Investigations
+had misunderstood the work as an exercise in a kind of immanent psychology,
+whereas he had always intended a purer and more essential phenomenological
+approach:
+In supposed agreement with the Logische Untersuchungen, phenomenology has been conceived as a substratum of empirical psychology,
+as a sphere comprising "immanental' descriptions of psychical mental
+processes, a sphere comprising descriptions that - so the immanence
+in question is understood - are strictly confined within the bounds of
+internal experience. It would seem that my protest against this conception has been of little avail...
+(Ideas I: xvili; Hua III/l: 2)
+In other words, Husserl would later claim that transcendental phenomenology as a science of pure essential possibilities was entirely distinct from
+psychology in all its forms, including descriptive psychology (which he now
+treats as a branch of empirical psychology).
+In 1916, Husserl was appointed to the chair of philosophy at the University of Freiburg, which he held until his retirement in 1928. Here, as he
+recorded in his 1920 Foreword to the revision of the Sixth Investigation (LI,
+Findlay 1970: 661; Hua XIX/2: 533), he became deeply immersed in teaching and research, pursuing the ideal of a system of philosophy with phenomenology at its core, and published almost nothing, apart from an article on
+the renewal of philosophy in a Japanese journal Kaizo, a little article on
+Buddha, and a truncated version of his lectures on time, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1928), edited by his successor
+to the Freiburg Chair, Martin Heidegger, more or less as a counterpoint to
+the latter's own Being and Time (1927). ' During the last decade of his life,
+however, Husserl was extremely active, giving lectures in Germany, Holland
+and France, and publishing Formal and Transcendental Logic in 1929,
+20 and
+the French version of his Paris lectures, Méditations cartésiennes, in 1931,
+translated by Gabrielle Peiffer and Emmanuel Levinas.?' In part, Husserl's
+intense activity was spurred by his desire to offer a corrective to Heidegger's
+version of phenomenological ontology, which Husserl felt distorted and
+betrayed his own mission for a transcendental phenomenology.
+Following the coming to power of the National Socialists in January
+1933, Husserl and his family suffered under the increasingly severe anti-
+Semitic laws enacted in Germany, which led to the suspension of his emeritus rights and eventually (in 1935) to the withdrawal of German citizenship.
+While he continued to live in Freiburg, he was shunned by most of his
+former colleagues, apart from his assistant Eugen Fink (1905-75) and former
+student Ludwig Landgrebe (by then a professor in Prague). However, he set
+
+Introduction xxix
+about the task of preparing his extensive research manuscripts for publication. Despite meeting with official opposition, Husserl continued to write
+with new vigour against the crisis of the age, producing work of astonishing
+scope and originality, e.g., the Crisis of European Sciences, developed in
+ectures in Vienna and Prague and published in Belgrade in 1936 (publicaion in Germany being denied him)." After a period of illness, Husserl diec
+in Freiburg in 1938. His last work, Erfahrung und Urteil (Experience and
+Judgement) appeared posthumously, with the extensive editorial involvement of Ludwig Landgrebe, in 1938.3
+Through the intervention of a young Belgian philosophy graduate and
+priest, Fr Hermann Van Breda (1911-74), much of Husserl's Nachlass, including lecture notes and research manuscripts, amounting to some 45,000
+pages of hand-written material, composed in an obsolete German shorthand, the Gabelsberger system, was smuggled out of Nazi Germany and is
+now preserved in manuscript form in the Husserl Archives in Leuven, Belgium. Here, in cooperation with the sister archives in Cologne and Freiburg,
+researchers are carefully editing these manuscripts for publication in the
+Husserliana Gesammelte Werke series of which more than 30 volumes have
+already appeared, with more scheduled.
+The genesis of the Logical Investigations
+On his own admission, the origin of Husserl's Logical Investigations lay in the
+studies in mathematics, logic and psychology, he had been pursuing, inspired
+by his teachers Weierstrass, Brentano and Stumpf. As he put it, the Investigations originally grew out of his desire to achieve 'a philosophical clarification (eine philosophische Klärung) of pure mathematics' (Findlay I: 1; Hua
+XVIII: 5). It worried Husserl that mathematicians could produce good results and yet employ diverse and even conflicting theories about the nature
+of numbers and other mathematical operations. Their intuitive procedures
+needed philosophical grounding. In search of this grounding for mathematics,
+Husserl was led to consider formal systems generally, and ultimately to a
+review of the whole nature of meaningful thought, its connection with linguistic assertion, and its achievement of truth in genuinely evident cognitions.
+Husserl suggested that the Logical Investigations was originally inspired
+by Brentano's attempts to reform traditional logic. As he put it in his
+'Phenomenological Psychology' lectures of 1925:
+... the Logical Investigations are fully influenced by Brentano's suggestions, as should be readily understandable in view of the fact that I was
+a direct pupil of Brentano.24
+In lecture courses Husserl had attended, Brentano had proposed a reform of
+traditional Aristotelian syllogistic logic, restricting the range of significant
+
+XXX
+logical forms, effectively reducing all forms of quantification to existential
+quantification, reformulating the structure of logical judgements and recasting sentences in new ways to highlight the underlying logical structure distinct from the grammatical form. Despite its promise, Husserl recognised
+that Brentano's project was destined to fail, since it lacked a proper clarification of the nature of meaning in general. Only a complete clarification of
+the 'essential phenomenological relations between expression and meaning,
+or between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment' (Findlay I: 173; Hua
+XIX/1: 19) could steer the proper course between grammatical analysis and
+meaning analysis (Bedeutungsanalyse), Husserl claimed.
+Brentano's failed reform of logic alerted Husserl's attention to serious deficiencies in current accounts of the nature of logic, in J. S. Mill, C. Sigwart,
+W. Hamilton, B. Erdmann, T. Lipps, and others. Husserl's familiarity with
+- and deep critique of - the logical and mathematical developments of the
+nineteenth century are evident in his several critical reviews of logical literature, published in 1894, 1897, 1903 and 1904. While he fully recognised
+the importance of logic understood as a calculus of classes being developed
+by George Boole (1815-64) and by his German contemporary, Ernst
+Schröder, and the attempts to interpret logical deduction as a mechanical
+process made by William Stanley Jevons (1835-82) and others, including
+Gottlob Frege, Husserl harboured worries about the limitations of formal
+mathematical logic, which he saw as a refinement of logical technique
+rather than as a genuine philosophy of logic? In particular, Husserl saw
+a calculus purely as a formal device for mechanically transposing signs
+(or replacing them with equivalents) according to rules, and thus essentially
+different from proper logical deduction. Technical brilliance in mathematical logic still required critical theoretical insight in order to elevate it to
+science.
+For a more positive view of logic, Husserl revived 'pure logic', a conception deriving from Leibniz and Kant, but expressed most clearly in the
+Wissenschaftslehre of the neglected Austrian logician Bernard Bolzano (1781-
+1848),? and his followers (especially Frege's teacher Rudolf Hermann Lotze,
+1817-81), which saw logic as a purely formal 'science of science'. Husserl
+singled out Bolzano in particular as one of the greatest logicians and even as
+the unacknowledged forefather of modern mathematical logic:
+Logic as a science must ... be built upon Bolzano's work, and must
+learn from him its need for mathematical acuteness in distinctions, for
+mathematical exactness in theories. It will then reach a new standpoint
+for judging the mathematicizing theories of logic, which mathematicians, quite unperturbed by philosophic scorn, are so successfully constructing. These theories altogether conform to the spirit of Bolzano's
+logic, though Bolzano had no inkling of them.
+(LI, Prol. §61; Findlay I: 143; Hua XVIII: 228)
+
+Introduction xxxi
+Husserl would also credit Hermann Lotze with opening his eyes to the true
+nature of the ideal objectivities which logic studied, helping him to understand the domain of the ideal while avoiding Platonic hypostasization.
+Of course, as Husserl set out to write the Logical Investigations many
+other philosophical issues pressed on him, leading him considerably beyond
+what might be considered to belong strictly to the task of laying the foundations of logic and into broader questions of epistemology, semantics and
+even ontology. Husserl was drawn to inquire into the conditions of meaningful utterance and expression generally, beginning with the nature of signification in general, linguistic expression, the relation between individual
+and species, the a priori laws governing the whole-part structures generally,
+the formal laws governing linguistic sense and non-sense, the puzzling nature
+of intentional content and reference, and, finally, the nature and structure of
+conscious acts as such, and specifically the nature and structure of judgements which aim at truth and which were traditionally considered to be the
+vehicles of logical thought. These themes make up the six Investigations of
+the second volume.
+Husserl's struggle to rescue logic from psychology
+As Husserl acknowledged in the Foreword to the Investigations, his philosophical career began from Brentano's assumption that logical issues could
+only be clarified by psychology. However, his initial attempts at laying a
+"psychological foundation' (psychologsiche Fundierung, LI, Findlay I: 2; Hua
+XVIII: 6) for arithmetical and logical concepts and judgements quickly ran
+into problems. While psychology was undeniably useful for clarifying the
+practical procedures of human reasoning and in accounting for the origins
+of concepts, it failed completely to appreciate or handle the logical unity of
+the 'thought content' (Denkinhalt, Findlay I: 2; Hua XVIII: 6) involved,
+specifically, the complete independence of this content from all our psychical behaviour. The Pythagorean theorem stands as an independent valid
+truth whether anyone actually thinks it or not. Such thought contents possess an "ideality' that allow them to be instantiated in different thought
+processes of the same individual (LI, Intro. §2, Findlay I: 167; Hua XIX/I:
+8) or in diverse individuals' thoughts at different times. Psychological analysis could not accommodate this peculiar ideal unity of thought contents.
+Husserl therefore suspended his investigations into the philosophy of mathematics to grapple with the 'fundamental epistemological questions' (die
+Grundfragen der Erkenntnistheorie, Findlay I: 2; Hua XVIII: 7) thrown up
+by his recognition of the ideality of meanings. Mathematics and logic needed
+a thorough epistemological grounding; through a critique of knowledge'
+(Erkenntniskritik) to be carried out through the application of phenomenological essential insight, as Husserl would develop it.
+
+xxxii Introduction
+In the Investigations, then, Husserl aims at the very Idea (Idee) of meaning' and the 'Idea of knowledge' - the systematic conception of the essence
+of meaning and knowledge, which had been completely obscured in the
+psychologistic approach. He employed the term 'phenomenology' to express
+this kind of fundamental epistemological inquiry (see LI Intro. §7), which
+looked at the very structure of acts of thinking and knowing as well as at the
+objects of knowledge in terms of their essential meanings.
+Inspired by his intensive reading of Bolzano, Lotze and other logicians,
+and of contemporary Brentanians such as Kasimir Twardowski (1866-1938),
+Alois Höfler (1853-1922) and Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), Husserl came
+to question the idea of psychological grounding. Husserl came to reject the
+account in the Philosophy of Arithmetic of the genesis of arithmetic concepts
+as given which employed Brentanian descriptive psychology to trace the
+psychological genesis of numbers in acts of collecting and colligating. His
+much discussed interaction with the logician Gottlob Frege in the early
+1890s may also have helped to accelerate the shift that was already occurring in his thinking? It is at least clear that both philosophers separately
+were developing sophisticated accounts of the difference between the 'sense'
+(Sinn) of an expression and its objective reference. In Husserl's case this
+distinction would deepen his understanding of the structure of the intentional relation leading ultimately to his 'breakthrough' recognition of the
+essential correlation between thinking and its object, which he says occurred
+around 1898.29
+From the outset of his career, Husserl had regarded Brentano's rediscovery of intentionality (the 'aboutness' or 'directedness' of mental acts)
+as hugely significant for the analysis of cognitive acts and processes (which
+Husserl called 'Erlebnisse', lived experiences or mental processes), but, during the 1890s, he came to reject as unsatisfactory Brentano's account, which
+seemed embedded in Cartesian immanentist assumptions about the nature
+of ideas, and which left dangling the issue of the status of intentional obiects. Husserl was dissatisfied with Brentano's characterisation of the intentional object as 'inexistent' and as 'indwelling' in the act. This characterisation
+seemed to repeat the impasse of the modern representationalist account of
+knowledge in Locke and others, with its attendant problem of the ability
+of the mind to get beyond its own representations. Brentano had maintained
+that every presentation related to an object, but what about presentation
+that appeared to have no objects? Bolzano had discussed 'objectless presentations' and the problem of the status of thoughts that involved impossible
+or non-actual entities (round squares, golden mountains, and so on) had
+been bequeathed to Brentano's pupils, especially Twardowski and Meinong
+Do all thoughts refer to objects, even thoughts of impossible objects?
+In a number of studies throughout the 1890s Husserl carefully clarified his
+own understanding of the relations between the intentional act, its content
+and object, in, for example, his fragments discussing the differences between
+
+Introduction xxxiii
+'intuition' (Anschauung) and 'representation' (Repräsentation) in terms of the
+kind of 'fulfilment' (Erfüllung) involved, ® in his draft review of Twardowski's
+book On the Content and Object of Presentations, and in the several drafts of
+his never completed study, Intentionale Gegenstände ('Intentional Objects'),
+probably written in 1894 and re-worked up to 1898.32 The results of these
+investigations found their way into the second volume of the Investigations,
+especially the First and Fifth Investigations and the Appendix to the Sixth
+Investigation, where the issue of intentionality and Husser's distance from
+Brentano's conception of inner perception are treated at some length.
+Briefly, Husserl rejected Brentano's attempts to define psychical phenomena in distinction from physical phenomena and his account of 'immanent
+objectivity'. For Husserl, the main achievement of Brentano was that he
+identified the essential 'pointing-beyond-itself' (über-sich-hinausweisen) of
+the mental act. Twardowski's attempt to distinguish between the sensuous
+immanent content of the act, the act's intentional object, and the real object
+referred to, also suffered from a 'false duplication' of the object."3 Husserl's
+answer was to distinguish between the immanent sensuous 'reelle' contents
+of the mental act and the transcendent ideal meaning-content of the act,
+which guarantees we are speaking of the same meaning across repeated
+acts, and between these and the transcendent object of the act (and not as
+Twardowski considered it the immanent object). 34 By the late 1890s Husserl
+had developed the main elements of his account of the relations between
+signs and things signified, between intentions and their intuitive fulfilments,
+but it seems likely that his crucial distinction between sensuous acts and acts
+of categorial intuition did not emerge until he began writing the six Investigations themselves. This notion of categorial intuition, a distinct intuition
+of complexes founded on sensory intuition, opened up the proper domain of
+phenomenological viewing as Husserl would develop it after 1901.
+The results of Husserl's intensive research during his most active decade
+of the 1890s were brought together in a remarkable way in the Investigations.
+Thus, for instance, his 1894 article, Psychologische Studien zur elementaren
+Logik ('Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic'),35 sketched the distinction between dependent and independent contents that inaugurated the
+theory of parts and wholes later incorporated into the Third Investigation.
+But the first real start on writing the Investigations came in 1896 when
+Husserl delivered the lectures that formed the basis of the Prolegomena and
+in 1899 began to prepare the six Investigations themselves for the press.
+There is some evidence, chiefly his wife Malvine's account, that Husserl was
+still feverishly revising when the manuscript was wrested from his hands
+by Stumpf and sent to the publisher. Certainly, it is clear that Husserl
+was having difficulties containing the Sixth Investigation as it grew in length
+and complexity and forced him to rethink distinctions made in the earlier
+Investigations, including his account of the relation between demonstrative
+indication and fulfilment of meaning in cases of perception.
+
+xxxiv Introduction
+The published revisions of the Logical Investigations
+(1913, 1921)
+Almost as soon as the First Edition of the Logical Investigations appeared,
+Husserl began to express dissatisfaction with some of its formulations and
+began to revise. In his 1902/3 lectures on epistemology, he was already
+clarifying the distinction between phenomenology which he characterises as
+a 'pure theory of essences' (reine Wesenslehre) and descriptive psychology.37
+But his first public opportunities came in 1903, with his reply to a critic
+named Melchior Palágyi3 - where he made clear that his concept of ideality
+was drawn from Hermann Lotze, and that he was not opposed to the psychological explanation of concepts but only to the founding of logic upon
+such an explanation - and with his Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik
+in den Jahren 1895-1899 ('Report on German Writings in Logic from the
+Years 1895-1899'), where he repudiated his initial characterisation of the
+work as a set of investigations in 'descriptive psychology'." From around
+1905, as is evident from letters written to Scheler and others, Husserl clearly
+intended to publish a revised edition of the Investigations (see Hua XIX/1:
+xxili). In subsequent lecture courses at Göttingen, e.g., in 1906-7,40 1907-8,41
+and 1910-11, Husserl developed new conceptions of logic, semiotics, and
+semantics (including the theory of the forms of meanings begun in the Fourth
+Investigation, but which needed to be revised in the light of the Sixth),
+offering essential revising of aspects of the earlier tentative formulations, and
+leading ultimately to an entirely new theory of phenomenological meaning,
+publicly announced as the doctrine of the noema in Ideas I
+Also, from around 1905 and inspired by his reading of Kant and Descartes,
+Husserl was moving in a transcendental direction, embracing both Descartes'
+project of prima philosophia, first philosophy, and Kant's project of a 'critique of reason.43 Husserl was revising his thoughts on the nature of the
+flow of consciousness and on the conception of the pure ego, which he had
+repudiated as an unnecessary postulate in the First Edition (where he was
+satisfied with the empirical ego). He gradually came to see the need for a
+fundamental change of attitude (Einstellungsänderung) away from the
+'natural attitude' as a prerequisite for the proper phenomenological seeing
+of the essences of cognitive acts ('noetic' acts in general) and their objects
+understood as pure possibilities of any consciousness whatsoever. This
+reorientation shed new light on the correlation between the intentional act
+and its object, understood as what is intended in the manner in which it is
+intended, a conception that eventually would be named as the noema, which
+made its first published appearance in Ideas I.
+As Husserl engaged in this self-criticism and reorientation, the problem of
+relating these new concepts of phenomenology to his existing published
+work became evident. Around 1911, with the First Edition of the Investigations now out of print, and with misinterpretations gaining currency among
+
+Introduction xxxy
+his followers, Husserl began to think seriously about revising the whole work
+in the light of a new introduction to phenomenology and transcendental
+philosophy which he was planning, and which eventually appeared as Ideas
+I (1913).4 At first, Husserl harboured ambitious plans to offer a number of
+new expositions of phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy that
+would render the old Investigations obsolete (see his letter of 7 July 1912
+to W. E. Hocking, quoted in Hua XIX/1: xxvi). However, since Ideas I was
+a deliberately programmatic work, to complement it Husserl saw the need
+for examples of concrete phenomenological analyses - 'attempts at genuinely executed fundamental work on the immediately envisaged and seized
+things themselves' (Versuche wirklich ausführender Fondamentalarbeit an der
+unmittelbar erschauten und ergriffenen Sachen, Findlay I: 4; Hua XVIII: 9),
+as he puts it in the Foreword to the Second Edition. The six Investigations
+would remain the paradigm of these concrete phenomenological inquiries.
+Husserl began revising the text of the Logical Investigations in March
+1911, but only made real progress in spring 1913 after Ideas I went to press.
+However, even his relatively modest planned revision, done in the light of
+his new understanding of phenomenology (as expressed in Ideas I), proved
+too demanding, and he produced only a partially revised Second Edition in
+1913.45 This was Husserl's 'middle course' (Mittelweg), as he put it in his
+Foreword to the Second Edition, where he articulated three 'maxims' that
+guided the revision (Findlay I: 4-5; Hua XVIII: 10-11): namely, to leave
+individual errors standing as representing steps in his own path of thinking;
+to improve what could be improved, without altering the course and style of
+the original; to lift the reader level by level to newer and deeper insights.
+In the revision the Prolegomena, which was written with a single purpose,
+was left largely unchanged; but those passages in the Investigations that
+specifically discussed the nature of phenomenology, and the kind of essential insight involved, were extensively altered and expanded. In general, the
+Second Edition highlights the central discovery of phenomenology, a concept that had received only tangential and incidental treatment in the First
+Edition, and gives surer indications about its nature. Thus, invoking his
+1903 essay (quoted in Foreword to the Second Edition, Findlay I: 6; Hua
+XVIII: 13), Husserl claims that the chief error of the 1901 edition was to call
+phenomenology a 'descriptive psychology', whereas in fact, phenomenology
+knows nothing of personal experiences, of a self, or of others, similarly it
+neither sets itself questions, nor answers them, nor makes hypotheses. In
+1903, Husserl had claimed that this purely immanent phenomenology was
+to be free of all suppositions about the nature of the psychological, and
+furthermore, it would actually provide a critique of knowledge that might
+then be used as a basis for empirical psychology or other sciences. But,
+in itself, phenomenology is not identical with descriptive psychology.
+46
+This phenomenological approach brings to evidence the general essences
+of the concepts and laws of logic. While both descriptive psychology and
+
+xxxi Introduction
+phenomenology are a priori disciplines, phenomenology cuts all its ties with
+individual minds and real psychic processes, even those understood in the
+most exemplary manner (LI, Intro. §3, Findlay I: 171; Hua XIX/I: 16 -
+added in the Second Edition)
+Husserl is now more emphatic that this eidetic science relies entirely on
+the evidence of pure intuition, and operates within the 'sphere of immanence, bracketing all concerns with worldly existence and real psychological processes. Husserl thus imports into the text of the Investigations the
+notions of bracketing, epoché, and reduction, which had become central to
+his expositions of phenomenology only after 1905.4 Husserl now stresses the
+remoteness and unnaturalness of phenomenological reflection and expands
+the section (LI, Intro. §3) devoted to listing various difficulties that attach
+to how we move from naïve to reflexive understanding. Pure phenomenological seeing (Wesensschau) must be purged of its inherent world-positing
+tendency and associated beliefs that belong to what Husserl calls 'the
+natural attitude' (die natürliche Einstellung) with its assumption of real
+existence (empirisch-reales Dasein; see LI V §2, Findlay II: 82; Hua XIX/I:
+357 - paragraph added in the Second Edition). It was this purification of
+epistemology from the distortions imposed by the natural attitude that led
+Husserl to see phenomenology as essentially distinct from any psychology,
+including descriptive psychology. Instead, phenomenology was to be the
+'universal science of pure consciousness' 48 Husserl later stressed that the
+First Edition was already de facto 'analyses of essence', but that he gradually came to clearer self-consciousness regarding the purely eidetic nature of
+his inquiries.49
+The revisions of the Second Edition constantly underscore the pure a priori,
+eidetic character of phenomenology. Consider the following typical revision to
+the Third Investigation. The original sentence in the First Edition, referring
+to the relations of dependence holding between quality and intensity of a
+tone, reads: "And this is not a mere fact but a necessity'. The Second Edition
+reworks this sentence to read: 'Evidently this is no mere empirical fact, but
+an a priori necessity, grounded in pure essence' (LI III §4, Findlay II: 18;
+Hua XIX/I: 237). The pure a priori essential character of the laws uncovered by phenomenological insight is now sharply contrasted with the
+kind of empirical generalisation characteristic of the natural sciences. To
+clarify this further, Husserl replaced Section 12 of the Third Investigation
+(LI III §12), which had dealt with dependence relations between temporally
+coexisting and successive parts, with a completely rewritten section in the
+Second Edition, which specifies more exactly the nature of the distinction
+between analytic and synthetic propositions, whereby analytic propositions
+are purely formal and are not determined by their content in any way,
+whereas a priori laws which relate to contents are synthetic a priori.
+Phenomenology focuses on the essential features of conscious states in
+general (akin to Kant's concern with knowledge in general, Erkenntnis
+
+Introduction xxxvii
+überhaupt - a conception already elaborated in the First Edition) understood as pure possibilities rather than in terms of any empirical instantiation
+in animals, humans or other kinds of minds. In contrast with pure phenomenology, Husserl now more sharply characterises all psychology as
+empirical, as a causal science of physical organisms and their psychophysical states, e.g., 'as the empirical science of the mental attributes and states
+of animal realities' (als Erfahrungswissenschaft von psychischen Eigenschaften
+und Zuständen animalischer Realitäten, LI, Intro. §2, Findlay I: 169; Hua
+XIX/I: 12), the science which studies 'the real states of animal organisms in
+a real natural order' (LI Intro. §6, Findlay I: 176; Hua XIX/I: 23). Husserl
+distinguishes both empirical and its sub-branch descriptive psychology from
+pure phenomenology. While psychology is a valuable empirical science, the
+reduction of meanings to their psychological states, i.e., 'psychologism', is a
+natural, ever present temptation to the mind ('at first inevitable, since rooted
+in grounds of essence', LI, Intro. §2, Findlay I: 169; Hua XIX/I: 12), which
+can only be cured by phenomenological analysis. Only pure phenomenology, and not descriptive psychology, Husserl writes in the Second Edition,
+can overcome psychologism (LI, Intro. §2, Findlay I: 169; Hua XIX/I:
+11-12). Furthermore, Husserl departs from Neo-Kantianism, by stressing
+that the grasp of the conditions for the possibility of knowledge comes
+from insight into the essence of knowledge, that is from phenomenological
+viewing.
+In keeping with his new transcendental orientation, Husserl has more
+appreciation in the Second Edition of 'the pure ego' (das reine Ich, LI V §§5,
+8) of the Neo-Kantians (especially Natorp), which he had originally dismissed
+as an unnecessary postulate for the unification of consciousness (see LI V §8,
+Findlay II: 352; Hua XIX/I: 374). He also endeavours to improve his initial
+attempts at drawing a distinction between the quality and intentional matter
+of acts. In particular, he was unhappy with his original characterisation of
+the sensuous matter of the act and the manner in which it is taken up and
+interpreted in the act. His later account of the noema was offered as a
+corrective (see, e.g., LI V, §16, Findlay II: 354; Hua XIX/1: 411).
+In the First Edition, Husserl had characterised phenomenology as expanding or as clarifying epistemology (e.g., LI Intro. § Findlay I: 166; §2,
+I: 168), in that it offered a kind of 'conceptual analysis' (Begriffsanalyse),
+concerned with differentiating and disambiguating the different senses of
+basic epistemological concepts (such as "presentation', Vorstellung). In his
+Introduction to the Second Edition, Husserl is now more aware of a possible
+misunderstanding whereby this conceptual analysis would be misunderstood
+purely as an investigation of language, in short as linguistic analysis, whereas
+in fact Husserl is anxious to distinguish his 'analytical phenomenology'
+from linguistic analysis. Reliance on language can be misleading, Husserl
+believes, because linguistic terms have their home 'in the natural attitude'
+(in der natürlichen Einstellung) and may mislead about the essential character
+
+xxxviii Introduction
+of the concepts they express, whereas phenomenological thinking about
+consciousness takes place in the eidetic realm where all natural attitudes are
+bracketed. For Husserl, it is certainly true that the objects of logic - propositions or statements (Sätze) - are encountered only in their grammatical
+clothing, i.e., in linguistic assertions, and it is an obvious fact that the findings
+of science eventually take the form of linguistic utterances or sentences.
+Husserl, then, agrees with J. S. Mill that discussions of logic must begin
+with a consideration of language, though not issues of the nature of grammar
+or the historical evolution of language as such, but rather in relation to a
+theory of knowledge. Husserl is seeking a 'pure phenomenology of the experiences of thinking and knowing' (Findlay I: 166; Hua XIX/I: 6), experiences
+not to be understood as empirical facts, but rather grasped in 'the pure
+generality of their essence' (ibid.). Linguistic analysis is not a substitute for
+a fundamental analysis of consciousness (see LI I §21). In this sense, phenomenology clarifies our linguistic practice and not the other way round.
+Husserl's incomplete revisions of the Sixth
+Investigation
+In 1913 Husserl intended to revise the Sixth Investigation in a radical fashion, but became bogged down (see his letter of 23 June 1913 to Daubert,
+quoted in Hua XIX/I: xxv), and eventually withheld it when he sent the
+revised five Investigations to press. Husserl now recognised that his original
+account of categorial intuition with its realist commitments did not fit comfortably with his new transcendental idealist framework. He made various
+attempts at a complete reworking of this Investigation in late 1913 and
+again in 1914, but lost enthusiasm for these revisions during the war years
+(1914-18), when exhaustion prevented research 'on behalf of the phenomenology of logic' (für die Phänomenologie des Logischen, Findlay II: 177;
+Hua XIX/2: 533). As he recounted, he could only 'bear the war and the
+ensuing "peace"' by engaging in more general philosophical reflections,
+specifically the elaboration of his 'Idea of a phenomenological philosophy'
+(Idee einer phänomenologsiche Philosophie, Findlay II: 177; Hua XIX /2: 533).
+Meanwhile, he gave the manuscripts to Edith Stein who attempted to order
+them into two articles for the Jahrbuch, but she could not get Husserl to
+look over her work and the project stalled
+After the war, Husserl turned again to logic and eventually was prevailed
+upon to publish a limited revision of the Sixth Investigation in spring 1921.
+In his Foreword, dated Freiburg, October 1920, Husserl regrets that he was
+unable to produce the radically revised Sixth Investigation promised in 1913,
+and acknowledges that it was the pressure of friends (including, presumably,
+his new assistant, Martin Heidegger) that finally forced him to produce
+this new edition. In fact, Husserl was never satisfied with his revision and
+continued to work intermittently on a full revision of this crucial Investigation,
+
+Introduction xxxi
+leaving some drafts that remained unpublished at his death. These drafts
+attempt a complete rethinking of the nature of signs involving a distinction
+between signitive and significative intentions in attempting to specify the
+achievement of abstract symbolic thought." Husserl was also gradually coming to recognise the contextual aspect of meaning which would lead eventually to his discovery of 'genetic' phenomenology in the early 1920s.
+Husserl's 1920 Foreword is written in tones of exasperation and defensiveness
+regarding the many misunderstandings of his work then current. He details
+changes made, mainly in the second section of the Sixth Investigation, entitled
+Sinnlichkeit und Verstand (Sensibility and Understanding), where the concept
+of categorial intuition - originally introduced in the First Investigation - is
+treated at some length. Husserl maintains that his critics have misunderstood his talk of immediacy as relating to the immediacy of sensory intuition rather than to the nature of intuition generally. In particular he attacks
+the views of Friedrich Albert Moritz Schlick (1882-1936, founder of the
+Vienna Circle), as expressed in his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (General Theory
+of Knowledge, 1918) where he had argued that Husserl's Ideas I relied on a
+bizarre notion of non-physical intuition that required a peculiarly strenuous
+kind of study. Husserl replies that by 'strenuous study' he means no more
+than the application of a mathematician. Schlick's criticism typifies a more
+general unease in philosophical circles with Husser's emphasis on intuition
+which was seen by many as promoting an irrational intuitionism that could
+not be corrected. The Neo-Kantians voiced similar criticisms of Husserl's
+concept of categorial intuition, as is evident from Fink's reply to Husserl's
+critics." How could one have intuition of the categorial? Husserl, on the
+other hand, understood by intuition, cognitive experiences which are accompanied by adequate evidence. He wants always to emphasise that acts of
+knowing are essentially diverse and that their respective modes of intuitive
+fulfilment must be appreciated and appropriately distinguished.
+In his Foreword to the revision of the Sixth Investigation, Husserl also
+challenges an accusation - apparently widespread, but which he vehemently
+rejected - that he had rejected psychologism in the first volume of the In-
+vestigations only to fall back into it in the second (LI, Findlay II: 178; Hua
+XIX/2: 535). 54 Husserl believes these critics have failed to appreciate the true
+sense of his phenomenology, and have misunderstood it as a kind of introspectionist psychology. In order completely to separate phenomenology
+from introspectionism, psychology and indeed all natural sciences, Husserl
+emphasises the need to undertake the epoché and the reduction. It was only
+by removing all traces of the natural attitude in regard to our cognitive
+achievements that their true essences can come into view in an undistorted
+manner. This claim integrates the Logical Investigations into Husserl's later
+transcendental idealism, whose treatment is beyond the scope of this introduction. Let us now turn to examine in more detail the philosophical content of the work itself.
+
+xl Introduction
+Husserl's Kampfschrift: the Prolegomena
+In the Foreword to the Second Edition, Husserl records that the Prolegomena
+was a 'polemic on psychologism' (Streit um den Psychologismus, Findlay
+I: 6; Hua XVIII: 12), and major figures such as Paul Natorp, Wilhelm
+Dilthey and Wilhelm Wundt recognised it as such, so that the Prolegomena
+took on a life of its own and had an independent impact in German philosophy for its criticism of psychologism. Husserl, however, liked to emphasise
+its coherence with the second volume and wrote to Meinong that the
+critique of psychologism was central to his phenomenology of knowledge
+in general (letter of 27 August 1900, quoted in Hua XVIII: xvii). Others,
+including Wundt, could not so easily see the connection between the two
+volumes.
+According to the Foreword, the first draft of the Prolegomena originated as
+two series of lectures delivered at Halle in the summer and autumn of 1896
+(Findlay I: 5; Hua XVIII: 12) and written up in 1899. These 1896 lectures had
+already set out Husserl's conception of logic as a pure, formal, autonomous
+science of ideal meanings and the ideal laws which govern them, and offering a sharp differentiation of pure logic from the more traditional interpretation of logic as an 'art' or 'technique' (Kunstlehre) of thinking well. The
+Halle lectures, however, do not contain some of the more important parts of
+the Prolegomena, namely, the discussion of relativism (Prol. §§32-7), and the
+detailed criticisms of Mill, Spencer, Sigwart and Erdmann, and the discussion
+of 'thought-economy' associated with Mach and Avinarius (Prol. §852-6).
+As the Prolegomena was written entirely in one cast of mind, Husserl did
+not feel the need to make major revisions in the Second Edition.
+Husserl's negative aim was to demonstrate that the psychologistic interpretation of logic was a self-defeating, self-contradictory absurdity:
+the correctness of the theory presupposes the irrationality of its premises,
+the correctness of the premises the irrationality of the theory.
+(Prol. §26, Findlay I: 61; Hua XVIII: 95)
+Furthermore, whereas the study of traditional logic should have given a clear
+understanding of the 'rational essence of deductive science' and indeed be
+the 'science of science', in fact the logic of his time was not adequate to that
+task. Husserl's positive aim was to find out 'what makes science science'
+(Prol. §62, Findlay I: 144; Hua XVIII: 230), but the unclarity and confusion
+surrounding logical concepts put the whole project of exact scientific knowledge at risk:
+In no field of knowledge is equivocation more fatal, in none have confused concepts so hindered the progress of knowledge, or so impeded
+insight into its true aims, as in the field of pure logic.
+(Prol. §67, Findlay I: 154; Hua XVIII: 246)
+
+Introduction xli
+In his 1900 Selbstanzeige ('Author's Report') to the Prolegomena Husserl
+announced that he was defending logic as a pure, a priori, independent,
+theoretical science, reviving the older Bolzanian idea of a pure logic against
+the prevailing psychologistic misinterpretation of logic that leads to contradictions and absurdities, and ultimately to sceptical relativism. Husserl
+argues that logical laws and concepts belong to the realm of the ideal, being
+purely formal, that is, applied in general to every kind of content. In the
+Prolegomena Husserl makes an important distinction between empirical generalisation and the kind of formalisation required for idealisation in science
+and mathematics. He contrasts this pure theoretical logic with applied logic,
+understood as an art of thinking (Kunstlehre), drawing an analogy with the
+contrast between pure geometry and the art of land surveying (Feldmesskunst).
+Thus, in the Selbstanzeige Husserl defines pure logic as
+... the scientific system of ideal laws and theories which are purely
+grounded in the sense of the ideal categories of meaning; that is, in the
+fundamental concepts which are common to all sciences because they
+determine in the most universal way which makes sciences objective
+sciences at all: namely, unity of theory.s
+Science as such is for Husserl a regulated interconnection of ideal truths
+expressed in propositions. Logic deals with these propositions and their
+component meanings in their utmost generality, understood as pure categories. According to Husserl, following in the Kantian tradition, all logical
+distinctions are 'categorial' (LI II $1) and belong to 'the pure form of
+possible objectivities of consciousness as such' (LI II, Findlay I: 240; Hua
+XIX/I: 115). Furthermore, knowledge can be about many kinds of different
+things, there are multifarious objects of knowledge, not just real things, but
+ideal entities, relations, events, values. The conception of scientific knowledge
+must be sufficiently broad to accommodate this diversity of objects of knowledge. Husserl, then, wants a new account of logic as a pure a priori science,
+a mathesis universalis in the manner of Leibniz. It must be balanced with a
+new theory of the nature of objects in general, formal ontology, developed
+in the Third Investigation. In other words, pure logic has a counterpart, the
+pure theory of objects.
+Husserl's encounter with Frege - the issue of
+psychologism
+Since the rejection of psychologism and the defence of the ideal objectivity
+of logical laws is now more usually credited to Gottlob Frege rather than to
+Husserl, it is appropriate at this point to examine the relations between
+these two logicians. In fact, they corresponded with one another on various
+issues in mathematics and semantics in 1891 (and again in 1906). Husserl
+
+xlii Introduction
+was one of the first philosophers in Germany to recognise Frege's work,
+and, although he had criticised Frege's account of the nature of identity
+in the Philosophy of Arithmetic in 1891, relations between the two were
+collegial and mutually respectful. But, in 1894, Frege published an acerbic
+review of Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic, in which he accused Husserl of
+making a number of fundamental errors.s6
+According to Frege, Husserl
+treated numbers naïvely as properties of things or of aggregates rather than
+as the extensions of concepts (the extension of a concept is the set of objects
+the concept picks out)." Husserl had seen number as deriving from our
+intuition of groups or multiplicities and since neither one nor zero is a
+multiple, strictly speaking they were not positive numbers for Husserl. Frege
+criticised Husserl's account of zero and one as negative answers to the question: 'how many?' Frege states that the answer to the question, 'How many
+moons has the earth?, is hardly a negative answer, as Husserl would have
+us believe. Furthermore, Frege believed, Husserl seemed to be confusing the
+numbers themselves with the presentations of number in consciousness, analogous to considering the moon as generated by our act of thinking about
+it. Crucially for Frege, in identifying the objective numbers with subjective
+acts of counting, Husserl was guilty of psychologism, the error of tracing the
+laws of logic to empirical psychological laws. If logic is defined as the study
+of the laws of thought, there is always the danger that this can be interpreted to mean the study of how people actually think or ought to think;
+understanding necessary entailment, for example, as that everyone is so
+constituted psychologically if he believes p and if he believes that p implies
+q then he cannot help believing that q is true. For Frege, Husserl has
+collapsed the logical nature of judgement into private psychological acts,
+collapsing together truth and judging something as true.
+According to the journal kept by W. R. Boyce-Gibson, who studied with
+Husserl in Freiburg in 1928, Husserl later acknowledged that Frege's criticisms had 'hit the nail on the head'. On the other hand, there is considerable
+evidence that Husserl was already moving away from his own earlier
+psychologism when Frege's review was published, especially in his critique
+of Schröder's Algebra of Logic. Husserl was already embracing Bolzano's
+Wissenschaftslehre" with its doctrine of 'states of affairs' and 'truths in
+themselves, whose precise nature he then came to understand through his
+reading of Hermann Lotze's account of the Platonic Ideas, as he had reported
+in his reply to Melchior Palágyi in 1903. Given the supposedly crucial importance of Frege's review of Husserl, it is surprising that Frege receives
+only one mention in the Prolegomena in a footnote (Prol. §45, Findlay
+I: 318; Hua XVIII: 172 n. **) where Husserl writes: 'I need hardly say that
+I no longer approve of my own fundamental criticisms of Frege's antipsychologistic position set forth in my Philosophy of Arithmetic. Husserl
+now cites both Frege's Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations of Arithmetic, 1884) and the Preface to his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Fundamental
+
+Introduction xliti
+Laws of Arithmetic, 1893) as anti-psychologistic statements of which Husserl
+can now approve.
+In fact, Husserl had abandoned the approach of the Philosophy of Arithmetic almost as soon as it was published in 1891. He realised that the
+cardinal numbers were not the basis of all numbers, and in particular that
+the psychological approach could not handle the more complex numbers
+(e.g., the imaginary numbers). In the Prolegomena Husserl explicitly denies
+that numbers themselves are to be understood in terms of acts of counting
+although they can only be accessed through acts of counting:
+The number Five is not my own or anyone else's counting of five, it is
+also not my presentation or anyone else's presentation of five.
+(LI, Prol. §46, Findlay I: 109; Hua XVIII: 173-4)
+While it is only by counting that we encounter numbers, numbers are not
+simply products of the mind. This would deny objective status to mathematics. The psychological origin of arithmetic concepts does not militate against
+the independent ideal existence of these concepts as species quite distinct
+from 'the contingency, temporality and transience of our mental acts' (LI,
+Prol. §46, Findlay I: 110; Hua XVIII: 175). Two apples can be eaten but not
+the number two, Husserl says in his 1906/7 lectures. For Husserl, logical
+concepts contain nothing of the process by which they are arrived at, any
+more than number has a connection with the psychological act of counting.
+Numbers and propositions, such as the Pythagorean theorem, are ideal
+'objectivities' (Gegenständlichkeiten, Findlay: 'objective correlates'), which
+are the substrates of judgements just as much as any real object is. In
+contrast to 'real' entities that bear some relation to time, if not to space,
+the pure identities of logic are "irreal' or "ideal'. Husserl characterised them
+as 'species' in the Aristotelian sense, along side other 'unities of meaning', for
+example the meaning of the word 'lion', a word which appears only once in
+the language despite its multiple instantiations in acts of speaking and
+writing. What is logically valid is a priori applicable to all worlds. In the Prolegomena, then, Husserl, holds a view similar to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus
+- logic says nothing about the real world, the world of facts. It is a purely
+formal a priori science. Husserl, however, integrates logic into a broader
+conception of the theory of science.
+Whereas Husserl had begun in 1887 with the assumption that psychology
+would ground all cognitive acts, he ends the Foreword to his Investigations
+by quoting Goethe to the effect that one is against nothing so much as
+errors one has recently abandoned, in order to explain his 'frank critique'
+(die freimütige Kritik) of psychologism (LI, Findlay I: 3; Hua XVIII: 7).
+While in agreement with Frege concerning the dangers of psychologism for
+logic, Husserl was not persuaded by Frege's project for mathematical logic
+as, in general, he was, as we have seen, suspicious of the purely formal turn
+
+xliv
+to symbolic logic, exemplified in his day by the logical programmes of George
+Boole (see Hua XXIV: 162), William Stanley Jevons and Ernst Schröder,
+which for him contained theoretical flaws and confusions. That is not to say
+that Husserl thought of formalisation as unnecessary; in fact, he saw it as
+the only purely scientific way of advancing logic (LI, Prol. §71, Findlay I:
+158-9; Hua XVIII: 254). Thus he praised the elegance with which mathematicians were expanding and transforming the domain of traditional logic,
+and he criticised those who refused to recognise the proper role of mathematics in these matters. However, Husserl believed that this mathematical
+tendency was manifesting itself as a kind of technical ability that had not
+reflected on the nature of its founding concepts. Philosophy must try to
+think through the essential meanings of logical procedures:
+The philosopher is not content with the fact that we find our way about
+in the world, that we have legal formulae which enable us to predict the
+future course of things, or to reconstruct its past course: he wants to
+clarify the essence of a thing, an event, a cause, an effect, of space, of
+time, etc., as well as that wonderful affinity which this essence has with
+the essence of thought, which enables it to be thought, with the essence
+of knowledge, which makes it knowable, with meaning which make it
+capable of being meant etc.
+(Prol. §71, Findlay I: 159; Hua XVIII: 255)
+As Husserl put it in his 1906/7 lectures, 'Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge', one must distinguish between mathematical logic and
+philosophical logic (Hua XXIV: 163). Towards the end of his life Husserl
+would repeat this criticism in The Crisis of European Sciences, where he
+would criticise this 'idolization of a logic which does not understand itself'
+and claim that a formal deductive system is not in itself an explanatory
+system (Crisis, §55, Carr: 189; Hua VI: 193). For Husserl, purely extensionalist
+logic or calculus could never be more than a brilliant technique. From the
+Prolegomena onwards, Husserl offered a complex account of the full nature
+of what he called 'formal logic', utilising a much wider conception than is
+now current. In some respects his account of logic is quite traditional, being
+centred on the notion of judgement or assertion (Greek: apophansis) and
+hence is, following Aristotle, characterised as 'apophantic logic' (see LI, IV
+§14, Findlay II: 72; Hua XIX/1: 344). On the other hand, in Formal and
+Transcendental Logic (§812-15) Husserl articulated this mature vision of this
+"formal logic', which for him included formal grammar or what he called
+'the pure theory of forms of meaning' that laid down the conditions of
+meaning combination as such; then a second level of consequence-logic' or
+the logic of validity which is concerned with inference; and finally a logic
+of truth', which recognised that logic aims not only at formal validity but
+seeks to articulate truth. In the Prolegomena Husserl also saw the need for a
+
+Introduction xiv
+general 'theory of manifolds' or the theory of the possible forms of theories
+to complete his account of the nature of logic in general. We cannot deal
+with the complexities of Husserl's vision of logic here, except to note that in
+the Investigations Husserl was not pursuing an objectivist account of logic
+as his exclusive aim. Husserl recognised the essential 'two-sidedness' of the
+acts which are aimed at logical meanings, on the one hand there are the laws
+governing the meanings themselves, but there are also the judgings, inferrings,
+and other acts, which are oriented towards the subjective side, that need to
+be treated by phenomenology (Formal and Transcendental Logic §8). In other
+words, the aim of phenomenology is to study the essential correlations between acts of knowing and the objects known, something that became clearer
+to Husserl after he wrote the Investigations.
+The structure of the six Investigations
+While the Prolegomena was written with a single purpose and, by Husserl's
+standards, remains a relatively straightforward piece of writing, the six In-
+vestigations of the second volume at first sight seem much less unified and
+coherent, with most commentators testifying to their uneven, fragmentary
+and sprawling character. Husserl himself warned that the work could not
+be considered as a finished exposition of scientific results or as 'one book
+or work in the literary sense' (LI, Findlay I: 5; Hua XVIII: 11), but rather
+should be seen as a 'systematically bound chain of investigations', 'a series
+of analytical investigations' (eine Reihe analyticher Untersuchungen, LI,
+Findlay I: 173; Hua XIX/I: 20), which would need further elaboration
+through 'resolute cooperation among a generation of research-workers' (LI,
+Findlay I: 171; Hua XIX/1: 16-17). It had to be seen as a living development of philosophical ideas, a journal of philosophical discovery.
+A recent commentator, Kit Fine, has remarked (referring specifically to
+the Third Investigation but applicable with justice to the whole): 'Such is the
+range of the work that it is with a growing sense of excitement that one
+discovers the riches that lie beneath its rough and seemingly impenetrable
+exterior 6° David Bell has identified a threefold structure to the work, with
+the Prolegomena establishing the need for ideal unities in logic and knowledge generally, the first four Investigations clarifying issues of linguistics,
+semantics, formal ontology and formal grammar, while the final two Investigations were properly phenomenological, studying the nature of conscious
+acts and their claim to knowledge and truth. The Investigations, then, is
+more united than its outward appearance suggests, and rich in sophisticated
+philosophical insights, albeit embedded in Husserl's wordy and labyrinthine
+presentation. In part, the progressive structure of the work is obscured by
+Husserl's tendency to enter into exhaustive critiques of other positions in
+order to arrive at his own view in circuitous manner, and then set out again
+
+XIVI
+circumspectly and tentatively, warning always of the need for further analyses and distinctions to be borne in mind. One always has the sense of
+philosophising in progress rather than of a completed system, of listening to
+a great mind communing with itself. According to the author, the Investigations proceed by lifting the reader from lower to higher levels, moving in a
+'zig-zag' manner (im Zickzack, LI, Findlay I: 175; Hua XIX/I: 22), forced
+to employ concepts that would be clarified later in a reflective 'turning back'
+(zurückkehren). Indeed, Husserl's whole approach has the character of such
+'backward questioning' (Rückfragen).
+The six lengthy Investigations of the second volume are concerned with
+analysing elements of the form of knowledge, such notions as meaning,
+concept, proposition, truth (LI Prol. §71, Findlay I: 159-60; Hua XVIII:
+236-7). Husserl begins with the general structure of signs and meaningful
+expressions; then moves to analyse the status of universals (which he calls
+species) and the nature of abstraction; followed by a treatise on the laws
+governing the relations of dependence between parts and wholes; another
+mini-treatise on the relation between logic and grammar as a priori disciplines; the nature of consciousness, including the meaning of intentionality
+and the ambiguities surrounding the associated notions of content, object,
+presentation, and finally the nature of the identifying syntheses involved in
+judgement and its relation to truth. Along the way, he offers sharp criticisms
+of prevailing views, including a critique of J. S. Mill's account of connotation and denotation, a refutation of sensationalism, a rebuttal of empiricist
+theories of abstraction (Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill), a sharpened definition of the a priori including a new distinction between the formal (analytic)
+and material (synthetic) a priori which claims to be an advance on Kant,
+and careful discussions of Bolzano, Mill, Brentano and others, in terms of
+their views on logic, psychology and the nature of judgements and their
+contents.
+A basic assumption of Husserl's understanding of knowledge is that
+knowledge is essentially understood and communicated in the form of expressive statements, where a statement is a unified whole with a single,
+possibly complex, meaning, that says something about something. It refers
+to an object (whether an individual thing or a state of affairs) through a
+'sense' or 'meaning' (Husserl employs both Sinn and Bedeutung for 'meaning'). Of course, in the Logical Investigations, and indeed since 1891, Husserl
+was fully aware of Frege's distinction between Sinn ('sense') and Bedeutung
+('reference' or 'meaning'), but he does not observe it since it is at variance
+with ordinary German usage. Husserl prefers to use the terms Sinn, Bedeutung
+and also Meinung more or less as equivalent notions (see LI II §2, Findlay
+I: 240; Hua XIX/1: 115) although later, in Ideas I §124, he will restrict
+'Bedeutung' to linguistic meaning only and use 'Sinn' more broadly to include all meanings, including non-conceptual contents (e.g., perceptual sense).
+Both Frege and Husserl agree that the sense of a statement is an ideal unity
+
+Introduction xlvii
+not affected by the psychic act grasping it, nor by the psychic stuff (mental
+imagery, feelings, and so on) that accompanies the psychological episode.
+Logic (and mathematics and the other formal sciences) is concerned to
+process the laws governing these abstract ideal unities which Husserl characterises as having 'being in itself' (An-sich-sein, translated by Findlay as
+"intrinsic being') as unities in manifolds (Findlay I: 169; Hua XIX/I: 12) as
+well as a "being for' (Für-sich-sein) the thinker. In themselves, they are pure
+identities, remaining unchanged irrespective of their being counted, judged,
+or otherwise apprehended in psychic acts. As Husserl says in the Prolegomena, truths are what they are irrespective of whether humans grasp them at
+all (Prol. §65, Findlay I: 150; Hua XVIII: 240). Despite the fact that the
+objects of logic are ideal and transtemporal, nevertheless, they must also be
+accessible and graspable by the human mind, as Husserl later explains:
+... it is unthinkable that such ideal objects could not be apprehended in
+appropriate subjective psychic acts and experiences. 63
+We can imagine any such ideal meaning or Sinn being entertained or judged
+or considered in some way by a mind. It is simply a fact that these ideal
+meanings (Sinne) present themselves to us as something that is subjectively
+grasped: '
+... ideal objects confront us as subjectively produced formations
+in the lived experiencing and doing of the forming 64 This is their 'beingfor. They are always truths for some possible mind, subjective acts are
+'constituting acts' for these ideal objectivities. The question then becomes:
+how are these hidden psychic experiences correlated to the 'idealities"? Frege
+had answered in a naive manner: our minds simply grasp ideal thoughts.
+But Husserl wants to give an account that does justice to the essential twosidedness of our cognitive achievements by analysing the structure of this
+expressing and grasping of meaning.
+For Husserl, the primary interest of what he calls 'phenomenology' in
+the second volume of the Investigations does not lie in identifying the
+ideal nature of the idealities (numbers, logical entities, pure meanings) that
+are the focus of mathematics, logic, semantics and other sciences. Rather,
+Husserl is primarily interested in the mental acts correlated with these ideal
+objectivities and the laws governing these essential intentional correlations
+(see Hua XXIV: 172). Initially, he tended to understand these acts as psychological realities which instantiate pure essences in a kind of token/
+type relation. To get at their essential natures he initially thought he could
+use Brentanian descriptive psychology. After 1901 Husserl realised he was
+mistaken to characterise in psychological terms what were the essences of
+cognitive acts and their correlative objects. Psychic acts, like physical objects,
+are parts of the natural world and are governed by temporal relations, and
+other features of our contingent universe. The essential structures of acts of
+cognition, on the other hand, were not parts of the world, and hence could
+
+xiviii Introduction
+not be treated by psychology. Thus it was some four years after the Investigations, as Husserl recalled in the Crisis $70 (Carr: 243; Hua VI: 246), that
+he arrived at self-consciousness regarding the true nature of the phenomenological method uncovered in 1901. He then realised that pure or transcendental phenomenology has essentially to replace descriptive psychology and
+that real/ideal distinction had to be replaced by a purely essential study
+of the noetic/noematic structure of intentional experiences. Husserl thinks
+the intentional acts themselves can be isolated as true for all possible
+consciousnesses. Phenomenology does not discuss states of animals, but rather
+perceptions as such, willings as such, just as pure arithmetic deals with pure
+number and geometry deals with pure shapes, and not actual shapes as
+encountered in nature. For Husserl, it was the task of phenomenology to
+delineate in advance the possible forms of each intentional act and its limits.
+This is why phenomenology despite its descriptive rigour is actually an a
+priori science, not an empirical one.
+Husserl is aware that one cannot just assume one has a grasp of the concepts
+just because one understands the meanings of the words that express the
+concepts. There are concealed ambiguities in the linguistic expressions, and
+so it is necessary to fix our concepts through clear self-sustaining intuitions:
+We desire to render self-evident in fully-fledged intuitions that what is here
+given in actually performed abstractions is what the word-meanings in
+our expression of the law really and truly stand for.
+(LI, Findlay I: 168; Hua XIX/I: 10)
+The aim is to achieve clarity and distinctness in concepts by making whatever appropriate disambiguations as can be brought to intuitive clarity.
+For Husserl, questions concerning the relation of the objective to the
+subjective acts of the mind, questions of the meaning of the so-called adequatio
+rei ad intellectus, cannot be separated from issues in pure logic. Such questions as how these ideal objectivities come to be presented to the mind
+and grasped by it and so end up becoming something subjective must be
+addressed:
+How can the ideality of the universal qua concept or law enter the flux
+of real mental states and become an epistemic possession of the thinking person?
+(LI, Intro. §2, Findlay I: 169; Hua XIX/1: 13)
+How is there an adequatio rei et intellectus in the case of the relation between ideal concepts and human psychical acts? We have to pass over from
+a naive performance of acts to an attitude of reflection (Einstellung der
+Reflexion). Husserl wants to discover the a priori relations between meaning
+and its expression, and he sets out the basis of this in the First Investigation.
+
+Introduction xlix
+The First Investigation: the nature of
+meaningful expression
+Although, at first glance, the First Investigation appears to be an essay on
+signs (Zeichen), clearly influenced by Mill's Logic (LI I §16), and by linguistic studies by Brentanists such as Twardowski and Anton Marty, in fact
+Husserl intended it to have a 'merely preparatory character' (LI, Findlay
+I: 6-7; Hua XVIII: 13), aiming correctly to identify the elements of the
+meaning function (Bedeutungsfunktion) in conscious life. Although it contains discussions of proper names, common names, collective terms, demonstratives, speech acts, and so on, Husserl's interest was not in philosophy
+of language as such, but rather in specifying the structure of meaningful
+assertion, separating out the acts which go to make up the intentional expression and fulfilment of meaning. In this First Investigation (§9) Husserl
+develops his crucial distinction (held from early in his career) between
+meaning-intending and meaning-fulfilling acts and the 'unity of coincidence'
+or 'covering' (Deckungseinheit) between meant and fulfilled senses in those
+situations where a concrete intuition fills out the intending sense. As Husserl's
+conception of signification became more nuanced, this Investigation was
+considerably reworked in the Second Edition.
+Husserl begins from Mill's claim that, since all thought is expressed in
+language, a study of linguistic forms is a prerequisite to the clarification of
+logical forms. He departs from Mill, however, in his account of the manner
+in which proper names ('Schulze', 'Socrates') signify their referents. Drawing on and refining some traditional distinctions in then current semantics
+(e.g., Marty), Husserl distinguishes between the function of an expression to
+intimate (die kundgebende Funktion) something to someone, and its expression of an ideal sense or meaning (Sinn or Bedeutung) which is the same in
+different performances of the assertion or in acts of understanding it. Moreover, normally an act of expressing is directed beyond its meaning to its
+associated object or objectivity (zugehörige Gegenständlichkeit), through a
+specific manner of intentional reference (intentionale Beziehung). Finally,
+Husserl has a brief introductory discussion of the different kinds of 'objectivities' to which things can be directed, distinguishing between simple and
+categorial objectivities (LI I $12) - the focus of the Sixth Investigation.
+Husserl begins by distinguishing between signs functioning as indications
+(Anzeichen), which operate through linking one extant thing with another
+without a mediating meaning, e.g., smoke indicating fire, flag is a sign of a
+nation, a brand that marks a slave, chalk that marks out a house, and
+expressions (die Ausdrücke), in his specific sense, that require the mediation
+of a meaning or sense and refer to some object regardless of its existential
+status. As Husserl says: It is part of the notion of an expression to have a
+meaning' (LI I §15). A meaningless expression, e.g., 'abracadabra', would
+not be an expression at all. This is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment
+
+of signs and signification, but merely a distinction between different functions
+of signs. Husserl is interested in the mental act of meaningful expression,
+irrespective of whether it is uttered, written, or simply thought to oneself.
+His account is a semantics of speaker intention. Communication is not
+Husserl's concern, because, for him, logic is concerned only with the expression of ideal meanings. The pragmatics of communication or reception of
+meaning is a secondary matter, a concern for the philosopher of language.
+An expression may have a set of physical sounds or written marks or
+merely imagined utterance, but what makes it an expression (and not just a
+reproduction of sounds like a parrot) is the mental state (or act) that 'enlivens' or 'ensouls' it. Normally, in any expressive act, the inner fused unity
+(eine innig verschmolzene Einheit, LI I §10) of sign and thing signified, of
+word and object, is experienced. Our interest usually focuses on the object
+intended and not on either the meaning or any associated verbal chain
+(unless our interest is, let us say, in assonance or in grammar, e.g., if someone says, 'I done that', the speaker's attention may be directed at confirming
+having done something and not towards the poor grammatical form). This
+is not to say that the thought exists apart from its expression. Thoughts
+come to form in a linguistic way.
+There are many other features entwined with the act of expression. Husserl
+further distinguishes between what expression 'shows forth', conveys, or
+intimates (kundgibt) and what it means, and between what it means and what
+object it names (LI I §6). Typically, Husserl recognises the inherent complexities (even if he here does not focus on them), for instance, in communication, an expression both expresses a meaning and indicates something
+to the hearer. An expression functions as an indication when, for example,
+it indicates to the hearer the meaning intentions of the speaker (LI I §7).
+Through this intimating function other aspects of the communicative situation
+may be picked up, e.g., that the speaker is angry or is making a judgement.
+Expressions, then, have a communicative function in relation to others. A
+speaker endows a certain word-chain with a sense that can be understood
+by a hearer, with certain 'sense-giving acts' (sinnverleihende Akte, LI I §7).
+This, Husserl says, makes mental commerce (geistige Verkehr) possible. But
+besides their function in communication with others, expressions play a role
+in our individual, solitary, mental life, where communicating has no role,
+and therefore the act of meaning (Akt des Bedeutens) must be strictly distinguished from its intimation achievement' (die kundgebende Leistung, LI I
+§8). When an expression is articulated it normally directs interest away from
+itself towards what it intends to convey, but this directing away is not a
+form of indicating (§8). In silent soliloquy we may use imagined words
+rather than spoken words, we may even imagine the sounds of the words.
+Here we express our meanings although we do not intimate them to others.
+The expression of meaning, therefore, remains an issue even for the solitary
+thinker (LI I $8), where no indicative function is required.
+
+Nli
+Husserl distinguishes between expressions which function solely to name
+(nennen) and other more complicated forms, which Husserl calls 'predicatively
+formed complexes' which are essentially predicates. Husserl thinks that the
+referential power of proper names has been misunderstood by Mill, who
+views a proper name as non-connotative and directly denoting its 'subject'
+(in Mill's terminology) without the mediation of an abstract meaning (or
+"attribute').' Names do pick out their objects directly, but not through
+indication, rather they have an expressive function that allows the name to
+mean the object in different sentential formations.
+According to Husserl's fundamental distinction between meaning intentions and meaning fulfilments, 'meaning intentions' (Bedeutungsintentionen) or
+'meaning-conferring acts' (die bedeutungsverleihenden Akte) include all those
+acts involved in confirming, corroborating, illustrating (erfüllen, bestätigen,
+bekräftigen, illustrieren, LI I §9). An expression has to be consciously endowed with meaning to be a vehicle of meaning. The content or meaning of
+the thought expressed is furthermore an ideal unity, e.g., 'three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect in a point' (LI I §11). This meaning is something
+identical (das Identische), whose precise identity is preserved in repetition
+(Wiederholung) of the expression. In assertion, we are asserting that state of
+affairs 'holds' or 'obtains'. We commit ourselves to the 'objective validity'
+of the state of affairs, even though the state of affairs is what it is, whether we
+maintain its validity or not. It is a 'validity-unity in itself' (eine Geltungseinheit
+an sich). We judge that the state of affairs obtains because we see it to be so.
+Every expression says something 'of' or 'about' (über) something (LI I
+§11), but the object does not usually coincide with the meaning. Different
+names, e.g., 'victor of Jena'
+', 'vanquished at Waterloo', or 'London', "Londres'
+can refer to the same object (Napoleon, the city of London). Expressions
+may have different meanings but the same objective reference. Similarly,
+expressions with the same meaning may have different objective references,
+e.g., the expression 'horse' as applied to different horses, to both the individual 'Bucephalus' and to the type, the carthorse (§12). Proper names are
+'equivocal' for Husserl in that they can name something different only if they
+mean something different, they have multiple senses (§15). On the other
+hand, general names, words like 'horse' can have many different values but
+have the one meaning (§15). In general, Husserl wants to distinguish between the meaning (Bedeutung) of an expression and its power to name, that
+is, to direct itself to something objective (ein Gegenständliches). An expression names its object through (mittels) its meaning (LI I §13).
+In the First Investigation, Husserl distinguishes between objective expressions and those 'subjective' expressions whose meaning shifts with the occasion. This broad category, which includes pronouns (I', 'you'), demonstratives
+('this', 'that'), temporal adverbs like 'now', he terms 'essentially occasional
+expressions' (wesentlich okkasionelle Ausdrücke, LI I $26). These depend on
+the context for their specific meaning and yet also seem to have a fixed sense
+
+lii Introduction
+of their own. 'Now' means 'the present time'; 'I' means 'the person who is
+currently speaking'. But Husserl recognises that one cannot simply replace
+the word 'I' with 'the person who is currently speaking' in all contexts and
+preserve meaning (LI I §26). The term, however, is not wholly equivocal,
+but has layered elements, one of which depends on the context in which it is
+used (the "indicated meaning'), and the other meaning which shows an act
+of indicating or pointing is being performed (the 'indicative meaning', LI I
+§26; Findlay I: 219; Hua XIX/1: 89). In the First Edition, indexicals are
+treated as non-normal or derivative forms of meaning (unlike words like
+'lion'), which could, at least in theory, be replaced by non-indexical expressions (LI I §28), although Husserl recognises this may be practically impossible. Husserl saw the need to broaden this account in the Sixth Investigation
+(LI VI §5), so that indexicals stand at the basis of all empirical predication,
+a change of mind Husserl notes in the Second Edition (LI, Findlay I: 7; Hua
+XVIII: 13). In a sense, every statement must be located in a context before
+its precise meaning can be understood (e.g., referring to the "birth of Christ',
+or 'the sun' requires a certain deixis; see Husserl's notes, Hua XIX/2: 817). In
+1929, in Formal and Transcendental Logic (§80; Hua XVII: 207), Husserl
+says that in the First Edition of the Investigations he had not understood the
+'horizonal intentionality' at work whereby the understanding of a statement
+requires attention to its horizoning context. A formal system needs the support of context-relative elements.
+Husserl also discusses another kind of expression where the mental act
+the speaker is performing is announced in the expression itself, for example,
+in speech acts where the speaker promises, wishes, and so on. Husserl here
+identifies the class of speech acts, subsequently studied by his student, Adolf
+Reinach. Interest in speech acts was revived by John Austin and systematised by John Searle."
+An important part of the discussion in the First Investigation concerns
+Husserl's vigorous attempts to distinguish between the meaning of an expression and the various accompanying images, feelings and illustrations
+that intertwine with it. Husserl's aim is to distinguish the logical content of
+meaning from all accompanying psychological content (he remarks that
+even Descartes had distinguished the imaginative representation of a chiliagon
+from its conceptual meaning, LI I §18). A central issue of this Investigation
+is the distinction between expressions based on intuition and those which
+function through some kind of symbolisation. Seeing something in the case
+of perceiving an object and seeing it symbolically are different act functions
+for Husserl (LI I §20). Husserl was not satisfied with his account of expression in this Investigation and his advances in the Sixth Investigation forced
+him to rethink the very basis of his account in the years after 1901. His 1908
+lectures on meaning, for example, offer the basis for a revised account,
+which has a more sophisticated treatment of the relation between expressive
+act, meaning and empty or filled intention. In later years, Husserl would
+
+lili
+constantly return to the essential nature of meaning intending in its various
+forms.
+The Second Investigation: abstraction and the
+grasp of universals
+The Second Investigation treats of the nature of universal meanings or
+species (Spezies) as Husserl calls them. Understanding the true nature of
+abstraction is important for the foundations of logic, since logic utilises
+the crucial distinction between individual and general or universal objects
+(allgemeine Gegenstände). Husserl wants to develop empiricism by detending
+the need to recognise universal objects also, a view which is best understood
+as a kind of Aristotelianism. Some critics, however, accused Husserl of
+Platonism. In a remark added in the Second Edition, he concedes that his
+view may be termed idealism (LI II, Findlay I: 238; Hua XIX/I: 112),
+understood as a purely epistemological doctrine, which recognises the proper
+domain of the ideal (das Ideale) against psychologism. Husserl in fact thinks
+that the 'excesses of extreme conceptual realism' (Begriffsrealismus, LI II §2)
+have led philosophers to challenge not just the reality of general concepts
+but also their 'objectivity'
+In this Investigation Husserl offers primarily a historical critique of Locke,
+Berkeley, Hume and of abstractionist representationalism in general, with
+the overall aim of understanding the relation between meaning as an ideal
+unity and the act of meaning (das Bedeuten) expressing it. In the Prolegomena Husserl had already established that meanings are ideal unities, now
+he wants to specify the relation between this ideal unity of meaning and
+the expression which 'means' it, the significant or "meaning consciousness'
+(Bedeutungsbewusstsein). Husserl's claim (developed from Lotze) in the First
+Edition is that this relation is the same as that between species and individuals. Indeed, for Husserl, meaning is a kind of 'species' (Spezies) which is
+instantiated in a particular act. The traditional account says that we intend
+the species (e.g., 'horse' as opposed to an individual horse) by abstraction
+from the individual, but there are different accounts of the nature of this
+abstraction. One view he rejects is that abstraction is a kind of selective
+attention on one aspect of an object. In opposition to this view, Husserl
+wants to develop a proper concept of abstraction, freed from the distortions
+of the modern philosophical and psychological tradition. He calls this 'ideation' but revises his views in the Second Edition since, in Ideas I, Husserl
+had developed a new account of ideation now understood as essential seeing
+or essence inspection (Wesenserschauung, Ideas I $3).
+For Husserl, the difference between an act that intends an individual and
+one that intends the species becomes clear in reflecting on the manner in
+which evidence is fulfilled for such presentations (LI II §1). Husserl insists
+that intending the species is essentially different in kind from intending
+
+liv Introduction
+the individual qua individual. In both acts, the same concrete object (das
+Konkretum) may be given, with the same sense contents interpreted in exactly the same way (LI II §1), but we mean 'red' not 'red house', the species
+not the individual. In the act of individual reference, we intend this thing
+or property or part of the thing, whereas in the specific act we intend the
+species, that is, we intend not the thing or a property understood in the here
+and now, but rather the 'content' (Inhalt), the 'idea' (die Idee), that is 'red'
+as opposed to the individual 'red-moment' (LI II §1). As Husserl adds in the
+Second Edition (referring forward to the Sixth Investigation), this specific
+act is a founded (fundierte) act, involving a new 'mode of apprehension'
+(Auffassungsweise), which sets the species before us as a general object. When
+we mean the species we perform a distinct act which is oriented towards the
+species as such and not towards the individual thing or part.
+Husserl understands this relation between general and individual as that
+between species and individual instance (Einzelfall §1), between 'red' in general and this red 'moment' of an object. Husserl goes on to insist (§2) on an
+important difference between individual singular items, Einzelheiten (things of
+experience) and specific singulars (e.g., the number 2). He makes a parallel
+distinction between individual and specific universals, whereby individual
+universal judgements, e.g., 'all men are mortal', are distinguished from specific universal judgements, e.g., 'all propositions of logic are a priori'
+Husserl offers deep criticisms of the prevailing empiricist and nominalist
+accounts of the process by which universals are distinguished in our knowledge. Husserl ends by introducing his notions of abstract, dependent parts
+and concrete, independent parts, as a way of beginning to understand the
+true nature of abstraction in a phenomenological manner. This leads him to
+the theory of parts and wholes.
+The Third Logical Investigation - parts and wholes
+Husserl himself stressed the importance of the Third Investigation as offering the proper way into his thought, and, in his 1913 revision, was already
+lamenting its neglect. This Investigation sketches a 'pure theory of wholes
+and parts, called, in the Second Edition, 'formal ontology' (LI III, Findlay
+II: 3; Hua XIX/1: 228), inaugurating a discipline now known as mereology.
+With the specific view of clarifying the relations holding between the parts
+of meaningful acts of expression (in the Fifth and Sixth Investigations),
+Husserl here attempts to specify the a priori possibilities inherent in partwhole relations in general, i.e., the precise forms part-whole relations can
+take in advance of all empirical instances (LI III §1).
+Husserl is interested in the different ways in which something can be
+a part, and the laws governing the relation of parts to the whole, and of
+parts to other parts. Every object either is or can be a part. Wholes can
+be parts of larger wholes, and parts can have parts. Not all parts can be
+
+Introduction lv
+wholes however. Wholes and parts stand in various relations of dependency
+(Unselbstständigkeit) such that one part is founded on another. Husserl gives
+a strict sense to foundation (a notion already present in Meinong): when
+part A cannot be presented without a part B, A is said to be founded on B
+(LI III 814).
+Husserl's account recapitulates his studies of the early 1890s. His starting
+point (LI III §3) is his mentor Carl Stumpf's work on the relations between
+parts and wholes in psychological acts, specifically in relation to sensory
+concepts such as colour and extension, or the quality and intensity of sounds.
+Stumpf situated his discussion of part/whole relations specifically in relation
+to psychology, whereas Husserl wants to formalise to a pure theory of wholes
+and parts in the most general sense. Stumpf was influenced by Brentano's
+reflections on the subject in his lectures on Descriptive Psychology,
+,% and
+Husserl also acknowledges the independent investigations of Christian von
+Ehrenfels on 'form qualities' (Gestaltqualitäten, LI III §4), where items are
+grouped in specific ways, e.g., flocks, points seen against a background, and
+so on." Husserl even discovers whole/part analysis in the 'phenomenology
+of inner experience' of George Berkeley in his critique of Locke (LI III §2).
+Husserl begins somewhat misleadingly by discussing the different ways
+parts are presented and are differentiated in experience, but in fact wants a
+formal analysis of the manner in which parts and wholes of any objects whatsoever cohere or co-exist together. Anything that can be distinguished in an
+object is a part (Teil). Parts may be divided into 'independent' (selbstständig)
+and 'dependent' (unselbtständig), according as they can stand on their own
+or whether they require inherence in the whole of which they are a part.
+A part may be independently presented, e.g., head of a horse, and these
+Husserl terms 'pieces' (Stücke, LI III §2), e.g., the segments of an orange
+which can stand apart from one another and from the whole. But some
+parts are inseparable (untrennbar), e.g., colour and extension, and these
+Husserl calls 'moments'
+and which he sometimes characterises as 'abstract'
+parts in that they can only appear in the context of a larger whole. A
+dependent moment is one that depends, or, in Husserl's language, is founded
+on another whole or part. Thus, to give an example, Husserl will constantly
+repeat, the act-quality of a conscious experience is an abstract moment of
+the act (LI III §20), unthinkable detached from all matter. Of course, one
+can isolate parts within parts, so that the whole notions of dependence and
+independence are relativised (LI III §13). Husserl goes on to lay down six
+laws concerning parts and wholes (LI III §14), which have since been
+modified and expanded in a whole formal mereological theory. These laws
+include, for example, the law that: if a is dependent part of a whole W then
+it is also a dependent part of any other whole that has W as a part. In later
+writings (e.g., Experience and Judgement and Formal and Transcendental
+Logic), Husserl returns to part-whole relations in a somewhat different analysis but his part-whole analysis always remains central to his philosophy.
+
+Ivi Introduction
+The Fourth Investigation: formal grammar
+The Fourth Investigation, extensively revised and expanded in the Second
+Edition, is a study of what Husserl terms 'pure grammar' (Second Edition:
+"pure logical grammar'), ie., of the formal laws governing the combining or
+binding of meanings (Bedeutungen) into a senseful unity rather than simply
+yielding a nonsensical string of words, and is, generally speaking, an application of his part-whole theory to the field of semantics. He speaks of the
+'pure theory of forms of meanings' (die reine Formenlehre der Bedeutungen,
+LI IV §14). The aim is to provide a pure morphology of meaning that lays
+the basis by providing possible forms of logical judgements, whose objective
+validity is the focus of formal logic proper. Husserl is explicitly reviving the
+old idea of an a priori grammar against both the psychological interpretations of grammar dominant in his day and the empirical theorists who were
+imprisoned in a false paradigm (e.g., assuming Latin grammar as the paradigm, LI IV §14).
+Just as simple objects can be combined to produce complex objects, simple
+meanings combine to produce complex meanings (LI IV §2). Moreover,
+meaning-parts need not mirror parts of the object, and vice versa. Meaning
+has its own parts and wholes. Husserl maintains that all combinations are
+governed by laws; his aim is to find the least number of independent elementary laws (LI IV §13). It must be possible to identify the rules of all such
+possible valid combinations a priori, combinations that produce well-formed
+expressions as opposed to nonsense (such as "This careless is green', LI IV
+$10). Husserl famously distinguished (LI I §15 and LI IV §12) between nonsense (Unsinn) and countersense or absurdity (Widersinn). The concept of
+'square circle' is not senseless or non-sensical, but constitutes an absurdity,
+a contradiction in terms, a 'counter-sense' that cannot be realised. Formal
+grammar, on Husserl's account, can eliminate only nonsense not absurdity
+and is therefore not yet formal logic in the sense of specifying what can be
+objectively valid." In later writings, notably the Formal and Transcendental
+Logic and Experience and Judgment, Husserl continued to maintain that
+formal grammar provided the bedrock rules for meaningfulness which made
+possible formal logic, and is the basis for both the logic of inference
+(Konsequenzlogik) and what Husserl calls the 'logic of truth'. He is more
+careful in later writings to emphasise that he is dealing with formal combinations of meanings (e.g., 'A and B not if") rather than material combinations of
+meanings (e.g., 'round square'), whereas in the Fourth Investigation he tends
+misleadingly to employ examples drawn from the material sphere." The laws
+of formal meaning are purely analytic laws as opposed to synthetic a priori
+laws which govern such areas as geometry or mechanics. The core of Husserl's
+analysis is his use of a traditional distinction (but specifically developed by
+Anton Marty) between syncategorematic words (e.g., words like 'but', 'and',
+'to', 'if'), and categorematic words, e.g., nouns, verbs (but not complete
+
+Introduction lvii
+expressions) and his analysis of these in terms of independence and dependence relations. Husserl treats syncategorematic expressions as meaningful but
+dependent, incomplete parts of wholes, which in this case are well-formed
+expressions which are complete or 'closed' (geschlossen). Verbal parts can be
+distinguished in terms of those that are separately meaningful (like particles,
+e.g., 'bi-' as in "bi-sexual') or meaningless ('bi' as in "bite'). Husserl focuses
+on proper names and the manner in which they name the object in a 'single
+ray. The formal theory of meanings will lay down the formal laws that
+regulate how adjectives can become substantives, how a subject can shift to
+the predicate position and so on, and other rules of combination and 'modification' (a concept drawn from Twardowski, who studied the manner certain adjectives modify the noun, e.g., a false friend is not a friend at all.
+This Investigation had a profound influence on the work of the linguist
+Roman Jakobson (1896-1982), especially on his notion of phonemes as
+complex unities. It also influenced the Polish logician Stanislaw Lesniewski
+(1886-1939) in his account of categorial grammar, and indeed finds echoes
+in Noam Chomsky's project of a 'universal grammar' (a term Husserl himself invokes with approval, LI IV 814). For Husserl, however, the meaningfulness of linguistic combinations is distinct from the structural laws governing
+conscious acts and their contents, to which he turns in the Fifth Investigation.
+The Fifth Investigation: intentional experiences and
+their contents
+The Fifth Logical Investigation, subtitled 'International Experiences and
+Their "Contents"' is Husserl's attempt to sort out ambiguities in Brentano's
+descriptive psychological analysis of conscious acts, their contents and objects (in the Second Edition, these are restricted to 'pure immanence'). Husserl
+begins by specifying what he means by 'consciousness',
+, bracketing discussion of the relation of conscious acts to an ego, and focusing exclusively on
+the intentional character of conscious experiences deriving from Brentano's
+rediscovery of intentionality. However, Husserl regards Brentano's characterisation of intentionality as misleading and inadequate, trapped inside the
+old Cartesian dualism of subject and object and with all the problems inherent in that representationalist account. Under the notion of 'objectifying
+act' he offers a more precise account of what Brentano called 'presentation'
+and goes on to address what he calls 'cardinal problem of phenomenology,
+namely, the doctrine of judgement (LI, Findlay I: 7; Hua XVIII: 14), which
+is further treated in the Sixth Investigation. Husserl is especially critical of
+the many unresolved ambiguities in Brentano's foundational concept of 'presentation' (Vorstellung) and carefully differentiates between the many senses
+of the term (LI V 844), stressing however that logic must decide which
+meaning of 'presentation' is most appropriate for its own needs. Logic does
+not follow linguistic usage as logical definition is a kind of artifice (LI IV §3).
+
+Iviii
+In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), Brentano had held
+that all psychic acts are characterised by 'directedness' or 'aboutness':
+Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the
+Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object,
+and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to
+a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood
+here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity.?
+In a general sense, every psychic act intends an object, though not necessarily something existent. Husserl paraphrases: 'in perception something is
+perceived, in imagination, something imagined, in a statement something
+stated, in love something loved, in hate hated, in desire desired etc.? (LI V
+§$10, Findlay II: 95; Hua XIX/I: 380). Brentano himself came to realise that
+his expression "intentional inexistence', which he claimed he had used to
+express the concept of inherence or inesse of the Scholastics, had been misunderstood as a special kind of subsistence. In his later writings, he claimed
+he never intended to say that the intentional object is merely some kind of
+object in our minds, some purely immanent thing. Husserl rejects Brentano's
+attempt to distinguish between "psychical' and 'physical' phenomena, but
+sees his discovery of intentionality as having independent value (LI V §9).
+Husserl is cautious about using Brentano's term 'act' without qualification,
+but, above all, wants to avoid misleading talk of "immanent' objectivity. He
+insists that all objects of thought - including the objects of fantasy and
+memory - are mind-transcendent. Even when I am imagining something
+non-existent, e.g., if I am thinking of the mythical god Jupiter the God
+Jupiter is not inside my thought in any sense, it is not a real element or real
+part of the experience (LI V 811). Rather, even fictional objects are transcendent above our mental experiences; intentional experience always transcends itself towards the object, its character is a 'pointing beyond itself
+towards' (über sich hinausweisen) something
+Drawing on the older logical tradition, Husserl offers a new global distinction
+between the matter and the quality of intentional acts. Acts of different quality
+(judgings, wishings, questionings) may have the same matter. Not all our
+experiences are intentional in the sense of presenting something to our attention. According to Husserl, sensations in themselves are not intentional, they
+are not the object which we intend, rather they accompany the intentional
+act and fill it out. Sensations belong to the 'matter' (and are grasped as such
+only in reflection), whereas the act quality provides the form of the act.
+With an eye to distinctions made by Brentano's followers, especially Kasimir
+Twardowski, Husserl goes on to develop the differences between the contents
+of experience and the properties of the mind-transcendent object. When I
+see an object, I only ever see it from one side, in a certain kind of light, from
+a certain angle and so on. As I walk around the box for example, I see different
+
+lix
+'profiles' (Abschattungen) or 'aspects' of the box, and yet I know I am getting
+glimpses of the same object in the different perceptual acts. The same object
+is presenting itself to me in different modes. Husser's distinction in the
+Fifth Investigation (LI V 817) between the object which is intended and
+the particular mode under which it is intended forms the basis for his later
+distinction between noesis and noema in Ideas I. Furthermore, Husserl regards it as an a priori law that physical objects are displayed in Abschattungen.
+Whereas Brentano recognised only three basic classes of psychical acts
+(namely, presentations, judgements, and what he called 'phenomena of love
+and hate'), Husserl recognises myriad forms of intentional structure. He more
+carefully differentiates the fundamental structure of judgements in a manner opposed to Brentano, who had challenged the traditional notion of
+judgement as a synthesis of subject and predicate, and had interpreted the
+judgement 'the cat is black' as an asserting or positing of 'black cat'. Husserl
+denies that judgements can be treated as nominal acts, as simply naming
+complex states of affairs (LI V 817). We can, of course, turn a judgement
+into a nominal act, by nominalising the content of the judgement. This
+belongs as an a priori essential possibility to judgements (LI V $36). So, to
+the judgement 'the cat is black' corresponds the nominalisation 'the cat's
+being black' which can then function as the basis for further judgements.
+But this internal relation between judging and nominalising does not mean
+that they are essentially the same kind of act. Husserl, following Bolzano,
+declares judgements to be essentially different from presentations. Judgements assert something to be the case (LI V §33). A judgement articulates and
+specifies in a 'many-rayed act' the parts of the situation that a nominalising
+act presents in a 'single-rayed act', as Husserl puts it.? The relation between
+presentation and judgement is not as described by Brentano.
+Rather than operating with Brentano's simple and rather naïve distinction between the presenting act and presented content of an intention, or
+even using the broader notion of a 'nominal act', Husserl suggests that we
+ought to speak more generally of 'objectivating acts' (LI V §37) which include both the nominal and the judgemental act. Husserl thinks that the
+claim that all acts either are or are founded on objectifying acts is a more
+accurate reformulation of Brentano's basic law that all psychic acts are
+either presentations or founded on presentations. Husserl's clarification of
+the nature of presentation and judgement leads to his discussion of the
+manner in which these acts find intuitive fulfilment in the Sixth Investigation.
+The Sixth Logical Investigation: towards the
+phenomenology of knowledge
+The Sixth Investigation - by far the longest and most difficult - attempts to
+connect the previous analyses of the act of meaning to the notion of truth
+through a deeper exploration of the relations between the acts that intend
+
+Ix Introduction
+meaning and the various levels of possible fulfilment, as they feature in
+different kinds of conscious act, e.g., perceptions, imaginings, and acts of
+what Husserl calls 'signitive intention' where meanings are handled in a
+purely symbolic way without intuitive fullness. Husserl's target is knowledge
+and the connection with truth. In earlier Investigations Husserl had recognised a new class of categorial acts or acts of categorial intuition, founded
+on sensuous acts but with essentially different objects. The Sixth Investigation is the first full analysis of the nature of these categorial acts, including
+reviewing the relation of sensory matter to the content of the act as a whole.
+Husserl wants a 'phenomenology of the varying degrees of knowledge' (LI
+VI, Findlay II: 184; Hua XIX/2: 539), carefully discriminating between the
+many different senses in which something can be realised or fulfilled for us
+in an act of perception or imagination, the relation between concept and
+intuition, e.g., in the act of seeing a blackbird.
+Husserl sees the paradigm case of a successful intentional act as an act
+where the meaning is fulfilled by the presence in intuition of the intended
+object with full 'bodily presence' (Leibhaftigkeit). Thus, when I actually see
+something before my eyes, I have a fulfilled intuition. Later, I can relive this
+intuition but it is now a memory, still oriented to the object, but not presented with the same presence or immediacy. In memory or in other forms
+of 'calling to mind' or 're-presenting' (Vergegenwärtigung) we still may have
+a full intuition of the object, but now no longer with the distinctive bodily
+presence that characterises perception. There are other forms of intending
+which are merely 'empty' (Leermeinen), e.g., when I use words in a casual
+way without really thinking about what I am saying, when I talk about
+something without really thinking about it and so on. Empty or 'signitive'
+intendings, of course, constitute the largest class of our conscious acts, and,
+from the beginning of his career, Husserl had been fascinated as to how
+these kinds of intentions can function as knowledge.
+Husserl's interest in the manner in which meaning is expressed in different
+acts leads him to revise the account of meaning as species which was employed
+in the earlier Investigations. I can utter different sentences with different
+senses or meanings based on the same act of perceiving (LI VI 84). Furthermore, a listener can understand the meaning with enacting the act of perception or indeed re-enacting it in imagination. The listener can understand
+it as a report of my act of perceiving, i.e., 'he says that he sees a blackbird'. In
+the expression 'I see a blackbird' the sense or meaning of that expression is
+not carried by the perceptual act alone. For Husserl the sense of the statement can survive the elimination of the act of perception, in other words, I
+do not have actually to enact the act of seeing to grasp the meaning of the
+statement. The act of perception somehow anchors the meaning but does
+not embody it completely. This leads Husserl to revise his earlier discussion
+of 'essentially occasional expressions' (§5), recognising that meaning is not
+simply instantiated in an act, but that the act has its own specific form of
+
+Ixi
+intending where the meaning appears with its own mode of givenness which
+the instantiation model did not adequately handle.
+According to Kant, our experience has two components: a receptive element of sensory intuition and an element of reflective conceptuality (which
+Kant called 'spontaneity'). But Kant explicitly denied that humans had the
+capacity to intuit concepts. Husserl agrees with Kant concerning the sensory
+matter of most of our concepts, but holds that in higher order intuitions we
+do have the capacity to intuit ideal 'categorial' entities, from the 'mixed
+category' of the concept of colour, to pure categories, and at the highest
+level, logical categories such as unity, plurality and existence. Husserl treats
+'categorial intuition' (kategoriale Anschauung) as akin to a kind of perception. The first attempt to express it comes in the second section of the Sixth
+Investigation entitled 'Sense and Understanding' (§840-66). Categorial intuition involves a broadening of the concepts of perception and intuition.
+According to Husserl my intuition of a 'state of affairs' (Sachverhalt), e.g., 'I
+see that the paper is white', involves categorial intuition, a complex intuition
+that something is the case. In a judgement of this kind I intuit what is going
+on, as it were. How is this 'being the case' intuited? Husserl agrees with Kant
+that being is not a predicate, that is, that the existing situation is not a
+property of the individual object (the white paper). Saying that something is
+does not give us an intuition of a new property in a manner similar to
+learning 'something is red'. But this shows for Husserl that assertion of the
+category of being does not involve grasping a property or the object itself.
+Nor does it emerge from reflecting on the act of consciousness as some had
+thought, rather the categorial structure belongs to the ideal structure of the
+object, to the objectivity as such. Categorial acts yield up the grasp of the pure
+categorial concepts, 'if ... then',
+', 'and', 'or' and so on, which have no correlates in the objects of the perceptual acts themselves. For Husserl, moreover,
+categorial acts are founded on the sensory acts of perceiving, but do not reduce
+to them. For Husserl, categorial acts grasp states of affairs and in fact
+constitute them in the very categorial act. Thus it is not the case that I grasp
+sensuously the components of the judgement and synthesise them using
+some kind of subjective rules of the understanding as Kant suggests (according to Husserl's interpretation), rather we apprehend the state of affairs
+of which the non-sensuous categorial elements are necessary constituents.
+In the course of this complex investigation Husserl outlines a new conception of truth, re-thinking the classical correspondence account. It was
+this discussion of truth which attracted the interest of Heidegger and others
+(e.g., Ernst Tugendhat), but unfortunately we cannot treat it further here.
+The influence of the Logical Investigations
+Although, as the young Heidegger recognised, the Logical Investigations did
+not have an immediate impact on mainstream philosophy in Germany, within
+
+Ixii Introduction
+a decade it was recognised as a major philosophical achievement by leading
+figures such as Paul Natorp, Wilhelm Dilthey, Wilhelm Wundt and Heinrich
+Rickert? Husserl suspected that much of Meinong's work after 1901 owed
+a direct - but unacknowledged - debt to the Investigations, but Brentano
+ignored the work.
+In particular, the Prolegomena was credited with refuting psychologism.
+In a 1905 study, the elder statesman of German philosophy, Wilhelm Dilthey
+praised Husserl's Investigations as 'epoch-making' for its use of description
+in epistemology. The psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, too, accepted the Prolegomena's arguments against psychologism, but criticised Husserl's second
+volume as proposing an extreme 'logicism' and demanding a complete reform of psychology. Husserl rejected Wundt's criticism as a complete misunderstanding of the work, saying he neither advocated logicism (in Wundt's
+sense), nor said a word about the reform of psychology." In line with the
+Neo-Kantian tradition in general, Paul Natorp had been an early critic of
+psychologism. Indeed, Husserl had written to Natorp in 1897 announcing
+that he was working on a book to dispel the 'subjective-psychologising tendency' from logic. Natorp reviewed the Prolegomena favourably in Kant
+Studien in 1901, portraying Husserl as broadening the essentially Kantian
+inquiry into the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience.? Natorp
+predicted that Husserl would move towards Kant as he came to overcome
+his naïve opposition between the empirical psychological realm and the
+realm of abstract idealities. Husserl, however, always kept his distance
+from Neo-Kantianism, claiming that phenomenology was more radical.
+As we have seen, in his Göttingen years (1901-16), Husserl attracted
+many brilliant students, e.g., Johannes Daubert (1877-1947), Moritz Geiger
+(1880-1937), Adolf Reinach (1883-1917), Max Scheler (1874-1928), Hedwig
+Conrad-Martius (1888-1966), Roman Ingarden and Edith Stein, all drawn
+to Husserl's new way of approaching logical and epistemological problems
+which broke with the tradition. Around 1909, the young Freiburg seminarian Martin Heidegger encountered the Logical Investigations and poured
+over the work without being certain what it was that fascinated him. He
+later recalled:
+... both volumes of Husserl's Logical Investigations lay on my desk in
+the theological seminary ever since my first semester there... I had
+learned from many references in philosophical periodicals that Husserl's
+thought was determined by Franz Brentano... From Husserl's Logical
+Investigations, I expected a decisive aid in the questions stimulated by
+Brentano's dissertation.81
+Heidegger himself initially began reading Husserl to understand Brentano's
+account of the nature of being and was drawn especially to the Fifth and
+Sixth Investigations, especially Husserl's original accounts of categorial
+
+Introduction Ixili
+intuition and of truth. Heidegger saw in Husserl's account of categorial
+intuition not only a method for articulating the nature of the existential
+judgement but also the basis of a new way of thinking about the notion of
+truth and the meaning of being. Heidegger went on to read the Investigations in the seminars of Heinrich Rickert and Emil Lask, a young scholar
+who also worked on categorial intuition. Heidegger discussed the Logical
+Investigations in one of his first publications, a review of recent logical research published in 1912, where he recognises that Husserl had drawn out
+the theoretic incoherence of psychologism and its relativistic consequences.
+For Heidegger, Husserl had not only enlarged the scope of logic, but had
+made central the problematics of judgement and the nature of evidence.
+Indeed, it was Heidegger who, as Husserl's assistant at Freiburg from 1919,
+repeatedly urged Husserl to reprint the Sixth Investigation, to which Husserl
+finally agreed in 1920.
+News of the Logical Investigations spread outside Germany also, being
+translated into Russian as early as 1909, which version had a major influence on Roman Jacobson's conception of a formal science of language.
+Through Roman Ingarden, who reviewed it in Polish, the Investigations
+played an important role in Polish philosophy, influencing Stanislaw
+Lesniewski's development of mereology, for instance. It was translated into
+Spanish in 1929. A French translation of the Second Edition appeared in
+three volumes between 1959 and 1963,83 but Husserl's influence on French
+philosophy had begun much earlier through the efforts of his earlier
+Göttingen students, Jean Héring and later through the writings of Emmanuel
+Levinas, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur and
+Jacques Derrida, all of whom began their philosophical careers with critical
+studies of Husserl. Derrida, for instance, has acknowledged that his whole
+philosophical impetus arises out of his studies on Husserl, e.g., his study of
+Husserl's concept of genesis, written as a part of his doctoral research project
+in 1953-4.84 Since the publication of Derrida's influential interpretations
+and critique of Husserl's account of signs in the First Investigation, an
+argument has raged as to whether Derrida has misinterpreted - even wilfully
+distorted - Husserl's account.®5
+During his Freiburg years (1916-38), Husserl became a philosopher
+of international renown, in contact with prominent philosophers of his
+day, including Ernst Cassirer, Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap, Charles
+Hartshorne and William Kneale, among others. Among his own brilliant
+Freiburg students were Oskar Becker (1889-1964) and Fritz Kaufmann
+(1891-1958). Husserl's phenomenology also had a stimulating influence on
+philosophers who later came to be associated with the Frankfurt School,
+including Herbert Marcuse, Hannah Arendt, Theodor Adorno and Max
+Horkheimer (the latter of whom both wrote dissertations on Husserl). Husserl
+of course has been a major influence on both Ernst Tugendhat's and Karl-
+Otto Apel's philosophies of language, and his work in the Investigations
+
+Ixiv Introduction
+has been compared with the equally original breakthroughs of Ludwig
+Wittgenstein.
+In contrast to the situation in continental Europe, the Logical Investigations was somewhat slower to gain recognition in the English-speaking
+world. Bertrand Russell wrote to Husserl on 19 April 1920 saying that he
+had taken a copy of his Logical Investigations with him to jail, with the
+intent of reviewing it for Mind, but the review never appeared. However, in
+1924, Russell recognised the Logical Investigations as a 'monumental work',
+listing it alongside his own Principles of Mathematics (1903) and works
+by William James, Frege and G. E. Moore (who, incidentally, also admired
+Husserl's book),& for their efforts in the refutation of German idealism.®
+Indeed, as Findlay noted, the Logical Investigations have much in common
+with the practice of philosophy as understood by Bertrand Russell. Richard
+Rorty in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature has remarked: 'Russell
+joined Husserl in denouncing the psychologism which had infected the
+philosophy of mathematics, and announced that logic was the essence of
+philosophy 38 Indeed, one can find many themes in the Logical Investigations which are also treated in analytic philosophy, e.g., Husserl offers his
+own version of a solution to the problem of definite descriptions, famously
+treated by Russell.8
+Husserl himself visited England in 1922 intent on establishing relations
+with English philosophers (Husserl being the first German philosopher to
+visit England since the Great War). He delivered a number of lectures which
+were attended by Gilbert Ryle among others, but the lectures were not a
+success, despite his meeting well-known figures such as Broad, Stout and
+G. Dawes Hicks. The Logical Investigations has been discussed in relation
+to the history of analytic philosophy by Michael Dummett, David Bell and
+others. The logician Kurt Gödel studied the Logical Investigations after
+1959 and was especially impressed by the treatment of categorial intuition in
+the Sixth Investigation which he recommended to other logicians.?
+The contemporary relevance of the
+Logical Investigations
+The six Investigations stand as a vast resource of philosophical ideas, some
+tentatively sketched, others more confidently laid out. Of primary significance are Husserl's discussions of the meanings of key philosophical terms.
+He carefully differentiates between logical and psychological content, empty
+and filled intuitions, the difference between generalisation and formalisation, the meanings of signification and reference, the nature of nominal and
+categorial acts, and so on.
+Husserl's Prologemena is still of interest for its original conception of
+the nature and scope of pure logic and its discussion of the self-refuting
+character of psychologism, relativism (including 'anthropologism'). Husserl's
+critique of psychologism later expanded to a wide-ranging critique of natu-
+
+ralism, specifically the 'naturalisation of consciousness', in his 1911 essay
+'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science'
+', and these anti-naturalist arguments
+are still relevant to the contemporary debate between naturalists (e.g.,
+Quine, Dennett, Churchland) and anti-naturalists (e.g., Hilary Putnam,
+John McDowell, Robert Brandom). Indeed, Putnam regularly cites Husserl's
+critique of naturalism, especially as formulated in the Crisis, but which has
+its origins in the Investigations.
+The Investigations are an important resource for discussions of consciousness and other issues discussed in contemporary philosophy of mind. In
+particular, Husserl's account of intentionality in the Fifth Investigation has
+been hugely influential, but his views on the nature of perceptual content are
+also important and relevant to the work of Peacocke and others. Husserl
+has been seen as a strong defender of the subjective point of view and the
+ineliminability of consciousness from any full account of the nature of knowledge, themes which have more recently been treated by John Searle, Colin
+McGinn, Thomas Nagel and others." Indeed, John Searle's account of intentionality strongly resembles Husserl's, although Searle himself denies any
+direct influence. Other contemporary philosophers, e.g., Peter Simons, Barry
+Smith, Kevin Mulligan, are interested in developing morely precisely the
+formal ontology or descriptive metaphysics of the Investigations.
+The Investigations are also of crucial interest as a source text for anyone
+wishing to understand the nature of phenomenology as it was developed
+both by Husserl and by his followers. Heidegger's phenomenological writings of the period between 1919 and 1928 would not be comprehensible
+without a thorough understanding of Husserl's breakthrough work. As the
+meaning of the phenomenological tradition comes once more to be interrogated, a return to the Investigations to attempt to understand the precise
+nature of the phenomenology that appeared therein seems inevitable.
+John N. Findlay's translation
+Finally some words on the present translation. The publication of J. N.
+Findlay's translation of the Investigations helped to correct a view of Husserl
+which, up to 1970, had been based primarily on the availability of Gibson's
+translation of Ideas I. Findlay has produced a powerful and much admired
+translation, based on the Second Edition. In keeping with the nature of that
+edition, he does not usually indicate where the text departs from the First
+Edition. It is important to bear in mind that this (and subsequent editions
+up to the fourth) were the ones Husserl himself authorised and a critical
+edition did not appear in the Husserliana series until 1984, and thus was not
+available to Findlay.?3
+Inevitably, given both the size of the book and the need to find suitable
+English terms to render Husserl's many technical distinctions and innovations,
+Findlay's translation has its limitations. There is some sloppiness, with words,
+phrases, and even whole sentences being omitted. Some footnotes have been
+
+Ixvi Introduction
+dropped (e.g., LI IV §10; Hua XIX/1: 328), while others are incorporated
+into the main text. There are some unhappy construals (Gehalt as 'substance' rather than 'content'), some misunderstandings (e.g., ein Gewaltsreich
+rendered as 'tour de force' rather than 'act of violence'
+', Hua XVIII: 13), but
+in the main, the translation is serviceable and the prose smooth, clear, even
+elegant. While a new translation is certainly desirable, it will take some
+years, and in the meantime, students of Husserl need something in their
+hands right now. Given the limitations of a reprint of this kind, I have corrected only the more egregious errors, and do not claim to have identified
+them all. Although not all agreed with the project of reprinting Findlay,
+nevertheless I must record my gratitude to the following Husserl scholars
+for their assistance: Rudolf Bernet, lain Lyne, Sebastian Luft, Ullrich Melle,
+Kevin Mulligan, Karl Schuhmann, Peter Simons, Claire Ortiz Hill and Donn
+Welton.
+DERMOT MORAN
+Dublin, December 2000
+Notes
+1 E. Husserl Logische Untersuchungen, 2 vols (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1900-1). Four
+editions appeared in Husserl's lifetime: a revised Second Edition of the Prolegomena
+and first five Investigations in 1913, a revised edition of the Sixth Investigation in
+1921, a Third Edition with minor changes in 1922, and a Fourth Edition in 1928.
+A critical edition, which includes Husserl's written emendations and additions to
+his own copies (Handexemplar), has appeared in the Husserliana series in two
+volumes: Volume XVIII, Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. I: Prolegomena zur reinen
+Logik, text of the First and Second Edition, ed. Elmar Holenstein (The Hague:
+Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), and Volume XIX, Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II:
+Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, in two volumes,
+ed. Ursula Panzer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1984). The only English translation is:
+Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2 volumes, trans. J. N. Findlay (London/New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul/Humanities Press, 1970). Findlay translates from the Second Edition. Hereafter, the Investigations will be cited as 'LI'
+followed by the relevant Investigation number, section number, volume and page
+number of the present Routledge edition; followed by volume number and page
+number of the Husserliana (abbreviated to 'Hua') edition of the German text.
+2 Husserl had originally contracted with another publisher, Verlag Veit & Co.,
+Leipzig, and indeed some sample copies had already been printed before Niemeyer
+took over. Husserl, in his Selbstanzeige ('Author's Report'), claims some copies
+were available from the end of November 1899 ('Selbstanzeige', Vierteljahrschrift
+für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 24 (1900), 511; reprinted Hua XVIII: 262), but
+Karl Schuhmann thinks it is unlikely that any copies were available to the author
+before May 1900. The book did not appear from Niemeyer until July 1900, and
+the Foreword is dated Halle, 21 May 1900. See K. Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik.
+Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls, Husserliana Dokumente 1 (The Hague:
+Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 61. Hereafter cited as 'Chronik'.
+3 While not offering a 'system of logic' Husserl hoped (in the First Edition) at least
+to be able to lay the ground-work for a 'future construction (Aufbau) of logic',
+
+Introduction Ixvii
+see LI, Intro., §5; Hua XIX/1: 21 A edition. Findlay translates the emended
+Second Edition version, where Husserl says he hopes to lay the ground-work 'for
+a philosophical logic which will derive clearness from basic phenomenological
+sources' (Findlay I: 174).
+4 See Edmund Husserl, 'Selbstanzeige', pp. 511-12, reprinted in Hua XVIII: 261-
+after cited as 'Draft Preface'.
+5 Sigmund Freud, Die Traumdeutung (Leipzig/Vienna, 1899), now Gesammelte
+Werke vols 2-3 (London: Imago, 1952), new trans. by Joyce Crick, The Interpretation of Dreams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). This work first appeared
+in November 1899.
+6 See Schuhmann, Chronik, p. 363. But Pitkin's version has been contested,
+see H. Spiegelberg, 'What William James Knew About Husserl. On the Credibility of Pitkin's Testimony', in Lester E. Embree (ed.), Life-World and Consciousness. Essays for Aron Gurwitsch (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
+Press, 1972), pp. 407-22. It now seems likely that Pitkin never even began the
+translation.
+7 Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology (Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
+1943).
+8 Husserl, 'Task and Significance of the Logical Investigations', text taken from
+Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 20, trans. John Scanlon, Phenomenological Psychology.
+Hereafter cited as 'Phenomenological Psychology'
+9 Husserl has various formulas to express the aim: 'a philosophical laying down of
+the foundations of pure logic' (eine philosophische Grundlegung der reinen Logik,
+Findlay I: 237; Hua XIX/I: 112), the laying down of the "phenomenological
+foundations of pure logic' (phänomenologische Fundamentierung der reinen Logik,
+LI VI §34, Findlay II: 257; Hua XIX/2: 643).
+10 Phenomenological Psychology, p. 20; Hua IX: 28.
+11 Alexander Pfänder, Phänomenologie des Wollens. Eine psychologische Analyse
+(Leipzig: Johan Ambrosius Barth Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1900), 3rd edition reprinted in Alexander Pfänders gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 1 (Munich, 1963), the
+introduction to this work is translated in A. Pfänder, Phenomenology of Willing
+and Motivation and Other Phaenomenologica, trans. Herbert Spiegelberg (Evanston,
+IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967).
+12 See also Husserl, Draft Preface, p. 32.
+13 The critical edition is published in Husserliana, Volume XII, Philosophie der Arithmetik. Mit ergänzenden Texten (1890-1901), ed. L. Eley (The Hague: Martinus
+Nijhoff, 1970).
+14 Reprinted in E. Husserl, Briefwechsel, ed. Karl Schuhmann and Elizabeth
+Schuhmann. 10 vols (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), Vol. VI, p. 282.
+15 E. Husserl, Über den Begriff der Zahl, Psychologische Analysen, reprinted in Philosophie der Arithmetik: Mit ergänzenden Texten (1890-1901), op. cit.
+16 Husserl, in his letter of 3 January 1905 to Brentano, says that he was not a typical ambitious lecturer who sought to publish extensively.
+17 E. Husserl, 'Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft', Logos 1 (1911), 289-341, now
+collected in Husserl, Aufsätze und Vorträge 1911-1921, ed. H. R. Sepp and Thomas
+Nenon, Hua XXV (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1986), pp. 3-62, trans. as Philosophy as
+a Rigorous Science, in Quentin Lauer, Edmund Husserl. Phenomenology and the
+Crisis of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 71-147.
+
+Ixviii Introduction
+18 The critical edition is published in Husserliana Vol. III/1 as Ideen zu einer reinen
+Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Book 1: Allgemeine Ein-
+führung in die reine Phänomenologie First part: Text der 1-3. Auflage, ed. Karl
+Schuhmann (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), trans. by F. Kersten as Ideas
+Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First
+Book (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1983). Hereafter cited as 'Ideas I' followed by page
+number of English translation and Husserliana volume number and pagination
+of German.
+19 E. Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917), ed.
+R. Boehm, Hua X (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966; 2nd edn, 1969), trans.
+J. B. Brough, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Collected Works IV (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990). Husserl expressed dissatisfaction with
+Heidegger's edition of these time lectures more or less from their publication.
+20 Now Husserliana Vol. XVII: Edmund Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik.
+Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft. Mit ergänzenden Texten, ed. Paul
+Janssen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), trans. by D. Cairns as Formal and
+Transcendental Logic (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969).
+21 E. Husserl, Méditations cartésiennes: introduction à la phénoménologie, trans.
+G. Peiffer and E. Levinas (Paris: Almand Colin, 1931). The German text was
+not published until 1950 as Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge,
+ed. Stephan Strasser, Husserliana I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), trans.
+D. Cairns as Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology (Dordrecht:
+Kluwer, 1993). Hereafter 'CM' followed by page number of English translation,
+Husserliana volume and page number.
+22 Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
+Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, ed. W.
+Biemel, Husserliana VI (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), trans. David Carr,
+The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
+1970). Hereafter 'Crisis'.
+23 E. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen der Genealogie der Logik,
+ed. L. Landgrebe (Hamburg: Meiner, 1999), trans. James S. Churchill and Karl
+Ameriks as Experience and Judgment. Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic
+(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
+24 E. Husserl, 'The Task and the Significance of the Logical Investigations', in J. N
+Mohanty (ed.), Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations (The Hague:
+Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 207.
+25 These reports are collected in E. Husserl, Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890-1910),
+ed. B. Rang, Hua Vol. XXII (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), trans. Dallas
+Willard in Edmund Husserl, Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, Collected Works V (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), pp. 171-96 and 207-302.
+Hereafter cited as 'Early Writings' followed by English pagination and then
+Husserliana volume and page number.
+26 See Dallas Willard, 'Husserl's Critique of Extensionalist Logic: "A Logic That
+Does Not Understand Itself"'
+', Idealistic Studies 9, 2 (May 1979), 143-64.
+27 B. Bolzano, Wissenschaftslehre (1837; reprinted Sulzbach: Seidel), abridged and
+trans. by Rolf George as Theory of Science (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972).
+28 See J. N. Mohanty, Husserl and Frege (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982),
+and Claire Ortiz Hill and Guillermo Rosado Haddock, Husserl or Frege? Meaning, Objectivity and Mathematics (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 2000), and Michael
+Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics (London: Duckworth, 1991), pp.
+141-54.
+29 See Crisis §48, trans. Carr, p. 166n; Hua VI: 169 nl.
+
+Introduction Ixix
+30 E.g., 'Intuition and Repräsentation, Intention and Fulfilment', Hua XXII: 269-
+302, trans. Early Writings, pp. 313-44.
+31 K. Twardowski, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine
+psychologische Untersuchung (Vienna: Hölder, 1894; reprinted Munich: Philosophia
+Verlag), trans. R. Grossmann, On the Content and Object of Presentations. A Psychological Investigation (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977).
+32 See E. Husserl, 'Intentional Objects', Early Writings, pp. 345-87; Hua XXII:
+303-48. See also the draft translated by Robin Rollinger in his Husser's Position
+in the School of Brentano (Utrecht: University of Utrecht Publications, 1996),
+pp. 195-222.
+33 E. Husserl, 'Intentional Objects', Early Writings, p. 350; Hua XXII: 308.
+34 For a further discussion of these issues, see Dermot Moran, 'Heidegger's Critique
+of Husserl's and Brentano's Accounts of Intentionality', Inquiry 43 (2000), 39-66.
+35 E. Husserl, 'Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik', Philosophische
+Monatshefte 30 (1894), 159-91, reprinted in Hua XXII: 92-123, trans. Dallas
+Willard, 'Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic', in Husserl, Early Writings, pp. 139-79.
+36 Schuhmann, Chronik, p. 58.
+37 Two quotations (Ms. F I 26/83b and F I 26/12a) from the manuscript of Husserl's
+lectures on Erkenntnistheorie are reproduced in the Editor's Introduction to Hua
+XIX/1: xxx-xxxi.
+38 See E. Husserl's review of Melchior Palágyi's Der Streit der Psychologisten und
+Formalisten in der modernen Logik, Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie
+der Sinnesorgane 31 (1903), 287-94, reprinted in Hua XXII: 151-61, trans.
+Dallas Willard, 'Review of Melchior Palágyi's Der Streit der Psychologisten und
+Formalisten in der modernen Logik', Early Writings, pp. 197-206.
+39 E. Husserl, 'Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik in den Jahren 1895-1899',
+Archives für systematische Philosophie 9 (1903) and 10 (1904), reprinted Hua
+XXII: 162-258, trans. D. Willard, 'Report on German Writings in Logic from
+the Years 1895-1899, Early Writings, pp. 207-302.
+40 See E. Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07,
+ed. Ullrich Melle, Hua XXIV (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1985).
+41 See E. Husserl, Vorlesungen über Bedeutungslehre. Sommersemester 1908, ed.
+Ursula Panzer, Hua XXVI (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1986).
+42 See E. Husserl, Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie. Vorlesungen 1917/18, mit
+ergänzenden Texten aus der ersten Fassung 1910111, ed. Ursula Panzer, Hua XXX
+(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996).
+43 Husserl, XXIV 445; Early Writings, p. 493; see also Husserl, Die Idee der
+Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen, ed. W. Biemel, Hua II (The Hague: Martinus
+range Fig renter
+Nijhott, 1973), p. 22, trans. Lee Hardy as The Idea of Phenomenology. Husserl
+Collected Works VIII (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), p. 18.
+44 See Husserl's letter of 15 January 1911 to W. Windelband, and his letter to
+Daubert, 4 March 1911, both quoted in Hua XIX/I: xxiii.
+45 In his Foreword to the Second Edition, dated Göttingen, October 1913, Husserl
+records that the book had been out of print for some years, and he expresses
+uncertainty about the form in which it should now appear.
+46 E. Husserl, 'A Report on German Writings in Logic (1895-1899), in Early Writings, p. 251; Hua XXII: 206-7.
+47 Husserl explicitly laid out the method of epoché and reduction in his 1907 lectures, Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen, Hua II, op. cit., trans. by
+Lee Hardy as The Idea of Phenomenology, op. cit.
+48 See Husserl's 1906-7 Introduction to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge, Hua
+XXIV: 217-20.
+
+Ixx Introduction
+49 See E. Husserl, 'Entwurf einer "Vorrede" zu den Logischen Untersuchungen (1913)';
+ed. E. Fink, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 1, 1 (Feb. 1939), 107-33 and ibid., No. 2
+(May 1939), 319-39 (hereafter "Fink, Entwurf'), trans. Philip Bossert and Curtis
+Peters, Draft Preface. See especially, Fink, Entwurf §11, p. 329.
+50 Ulrich Melle of the Husserl-Archief, Leuven, is currently editing the manuscripts
+Husserl left of his 1913 and 1914 revisions of the Sixth Investigation for publication in Volume XX of the Husserliana series.
+51 I am grateful to Ullrich Melle for providing me with the typescript of his paper
+'Husserl's Unfinished Revision of the Sixth Logical Investigation', presented in
+Copenhagen, May 2000.
+52 M. Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, Vol. 1 (Berlin, 1918), 2nd edn trans.
+A. Blumberg, General Theory of Knowledge (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1974).
+53 E. Fink,
+"The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism', in R. O. Elveton (ed.), The Phenomenology of Husserl. Selected
+Critical Readings, 2nd edn (Seattle: Noesis Press, 2000), esp. pp. 79-80.
+54 Husserl seems particularly stung by this criticism which he returned to several
+times, including in Formal and Transcendental Logic §56, p. 152; Hua XVII:
+55 Selbstanzeige ('Author's Report') to the Prolegomena, trans. in Husserl, Draft
+Preface, ed. Fink, p. 4; Hua XVIII: 262.
+56 G. Frege, 'Rezension von: E. G. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik I', Zeitschrift
+für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik (1894), 313-32, reprinted in Frege, Kleine
+Schriften, ed. I. Angelelli (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1967), trans. by E. W. Kluge
+as 'Review of Dr. E. Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic', in Husserl. Expositions
+and Appraisals, ed. Frederick Elliston and Peter McCormick (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 314-24.
+57 More accurately, Frege defines numbers as follows: 'the Number which belongs
+to the concept F is the extension of the concept "equal to the concept F"', Frege,
+Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Breslau: Koebner, 1884), trans. J. L. Austin, The
+Foundations of Arithmetic, 2nd rev. edn (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
+Press, 1994), pp. 79-80.
+58 W. R. Boyce-Gibson, 'From Husserl to Heidegger: Excerpts from a 1928
+Diary by W. R. Boyce-Gibson', ed. H. Spiegelberg, Journal of the British So-
+ciety for Phenomenology 2 (1971), 58-83. For a full account of the debate regarding the supposed influence of Frege on Husserl, see Mohanty, Husserl and
+59 Ernest Hocking, a student of Husserl's from the early Göttingen days, reports
+how Husserl recommended his students to read Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre.
+See W. E. Hocking, 'From the early days of the "Logische Untersuchungen"', in
+H. L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux (eds), Edmund Husserl. 1859-1959. Recueil
+commémoratif à l'occasion du centenaire de la naissance du philosophe (The Hague:
+Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 3.
+60 K. Fine, 'Part-Whole', in Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Husserl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995),
+p. 464.
+61 David Bell, Husserl (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 85-6.
+62 Robert Sokolowski, 'The Structure and Content of Husserl's Logical Investigations', Inquiry 14 (1971), 318-50, esp. p. 319.
+63 Husserl, "Task and Significance of the Logical Investigations', Phenomenological
+Psychology, p. 18; Hua IX: 25.
+64 Husserl, Phenomenological Psychology, p. 18; Hua IX: 25.
+65 J. S. Mill, A System of Logic (London: John W. Parker, 1843), Vol. 1, Bk 1,
+Ch. 2, 85, p. 40.
+
+Introduction Ixxi
+66 See K. Mulligan and B. Smith, 'A Husserlian Theory of Indexicality', Grazer
+Philosophische Studien 28 (1996), 133-63. See also K. Schuhmann, 'Husserl's
+Theories of Indexicals', in F. M. Kirkland and D. P. Chattopadhyaya (eds),
+Phenomenology - East and West (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), pp. 111-27.
+67 John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). On Reinach, see K. Mulligan (ed.),
+Speech Act and Sachverhalt. Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology
+(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987).
+68 F. Brentano, Descriptive Psychology, trans. B. Müller (London: Routledge, 1995).
+In the background
+also is Bolzano's discussion of parts and wholes in his
+Wissenschaftslehre.
+69 See Barry Smith and K. Mulligan, 'Husserl's Third Logical Investigation: The
+Formal Ontology of the Part-Whole Relation', in B. Smith and K. Mulligan
+(eds), Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1992), pp. 35-45.
+70 A similar point is made by Rudolf Carnap, who may have been directly influenced by Husserl whose seminars he attended in 1924. See Y. Bar-Hillel, 'Remarks
+on Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language', in Paul Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy
+of Rudolf Carnap (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1963), pp. 519-43.
+71 See Suzanne Bachelard, A Study of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic,
+trans. Lester Embree (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 7.
+72 Roman Jakobson acknowledges the importance of Husserl's work for linguistics
+in his essays, 'Zur Struktur des Phonems' (1939) and in his Main Trends in the
+Science of Language (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), pp. 13-16. See Elmar
+Holenstein,
+"Jakobson's Contribution to Phenomenology', in Roman Jakobson:
+Echoes of His Scholarship, ed. David Armstrong and C. H. Van Schooneveld
+(Lisse: Peter De Ridder Press, 1977), pp. 145-62.
+73 F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. A. C. Rancurello,
+D. B. Terrell and L. L. McAlister, 2nd edn with new Introduction by Peter
+Simons (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 88.
+74 Nominalisation makes possible the shift from formal apophantics to formal
+ontology.
+75 For an account of some of the immediate reactions to Husserl's Investigations in
+Germany, see Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, op. cit., pp. 147-69.
+76 Wilhelm Dilthey, Studien zur Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften, Gesammelte Schritten VII (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1968), p. 14n: Suche ich nun hier
+diese meine Grundlegung einer realistisch oder kritisch objektiv gerichteten
+Erkenntnistheorie fortzubilden, so muss ich ein für allemal im ganzen darauf
+von Husserl
+(1900.1901) verdanke.' [If I am now seeking to develop further my foundation of
+a theory of knowledge with a realistically or critically objective orientation, I
+must first and foremost and in general mention how much I owe to the Logical
+Investigations of Husserl, which are epoch-making in the use of description for
+the theory of knowledge.]
+77 See W. Wundt, 'Psychologismus und Logizismus', in Kleine Schriften, Vol. 1
+(Leipzig, 1910) and Husserl's reply in his draft Preface of 1913 (in the new
+edition of Ullrich Melle), 'Zwei Fragmente zum Entwurf einer Vorrede zur zweiten
+Auflage der Logischen Untersuchungen', to appear in Husserliana series. Husserl
+is very critical of Wundt's misreading: exclaiming at one point: 'One cannot read
+the Logical Investigations like a newspaper'
+78 Paul Natorp, 'Zur Frage der logischen Methode. Mit Beziehung auf Edmund
+Husserls Prolegomena zur reinen Logik', Kant Studien 6 (1901), 270ff., reprinted
+
+Ixxii Introduction
+in H. Noack (ed.), Husserl (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1973),
+pp. 1-15, trans. as 'On the Question of Logical Method in Relation to Edmund
+Husserl's Prolegomena to Pure Logic', by J. N. Mohanty, in J. N. Mohanty
+(ed.), Readings on Edmund Husser/'s Logical Investigations (The Hague: Martinus
+Nijhoff, 1977), рр. 55-66.
+79 See Natorp, 'Zur Frage der logischen Methode', pp. 270ff, and Iso Kern, Husserl
+und Kant (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 31.
+80 Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), trans. as
+'My Way to Phenomenology, by Joan Stambaugh, in M. Heidegger, On Time
+and Being (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 74-82.
+81 Ibid., pp. 74-5.
+82 Martin Heidegger, 'Neuere Forschungen über Logik', Literarische Rundschau Jür
+das katholische Deutschland 38, 10 (1 Oct. 1912), cols 465-72; 11, cols 517-24;
+No. 12, cols 565-70, reprinted in M. Heidegger, Frühe Schriften (1912-1916), ed.
+F.-W. Von Hermann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), pp. 17-43.
+83 E. Husserl, Recherches logiques, trans. from the German by Hubert Elie, Arion
+L. Kelkel and René Schérer, 3 vols (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
+1959-63).
+84 J. Derrida, Le Problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl (Paris: Presses
+Universitaires de France, 1990).
+85 See J. Derrida, La Voix et le phénomène (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
+1967), ed. and trans. David Allison as Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays
+on Husserl's Theory of Signs (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
+For a critique of Derrida's interpretation see J. Claude Evans, Strategies of Deconstruction. Derrida and the Myth of the Voice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
+Press, 1991).
+86 W. R. Boyce-Gibson records in his diary that Moore admired the Investigations,
+see his From Husserl to Heidegger', ed. Spiegelberg, p. 66.
+87 B. Russell, Skeptical Essays (New York: W. W. Norton, 1928), pp. 70-1.
+88 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
+1980), p. 166.
+89 An indication of this recent analytic interest in Husserl is to be seen in Woodruff
+Smith (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Husserl.
+90 Michael Dummett, Origins of Analytic Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1993),
+pp. 43-56; Bell, Husserl.
+91 See Richard Tieszen, 'Gödel's Path from the Incompleteness Theorems (1931) to
+Phenomenology (1961), Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4, 2 (June 1998), 181-203.
+92 See John R. Searle, The Mystery of Consciousness (London: Granta, 1997), p. 5:
+'Consciousness so defined is an inner, first-person, qualitative phenomenon'; Colin
+McGinn, The Subjective View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), and
+Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986),
+whose central problem is the relation between the perspective of a person within
+the world and the objective view of the world which includes that person and
+his or her viewpoint. For Husserl's defence of the first-person, see David Carr,
+The Paradox of Subjectivity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 77:
+'[Husserl's] phenomenology is not just about experiences but about the firstperson standpoint itself'.
+93 See note 1 above. Even the critical edition has been criticised for not retaining
+Husserl's own particular orthographical conventions, and for taking the Second
+Edition (B text) as basic and showing the First Edition (A text) only in footnotes.
+Findlay began his translation of the Fifth and Sixth Investigations before the
+Second World War but was unable to gain the publishing permissions until 1961.
+
+Select bibliography
+Primary Sources
+Husserl, Edmund (1956- ) Gesammelte Werke. Husserliana. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
+Husserl, Edmund (1996) Gesammelte Schriften. Hamburg: Meiner.
+Husserl, Edmund (1999) Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen der Genealogie der
+Logik, hrsg. L. Landgrebe. Hamburg: Meiner.
+Husserl in Translation
+Husserl, Edmund (1964) Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, 1911, in Quentin
+Lauer, Edmund Husserl. Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, New
+York: Harper & Row.
+Husserl, Edmund (1967) Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns, The Hague:
+Martinus Nijhoff.
+Husserl, Edmund (1969) Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns,
+The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
+Husserl, Edmund (1970) The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
+Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David
+Carr, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
+Husserl, Edmund (1973) Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy
+of Logic, trans. J. S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks, Evanston, IL: Northwestern
+University Press.
+Husserl, Edmund (1975) Introduction to the Logical Investigations. Draft of
+a Preface to the Logical Investigations, ed. E. Fink, trans. P. J. Bossert and
+C. H. Peters, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
+Husserl, Edmund (1977) Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester 1925, trans. J. Scanlon, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
+Husserl, Edmund (1981) Husserl. Shorter Works, trans. and ed. Frederick Elliston
+and Peter McCormick, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
+Husserl, Edmund (1983) Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to
+a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, trans. F. Kersten, Dordrecht:
+Husser, Edmund (1989) Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer,
+Dordrecht: Kluwer.
+
+Ixxiv Select bibliography
+Husserl, Edmund (1990) On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal
+Time, trans. J.B. Brough, Collected Works IV, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
+Husserl, Edmund (1994) Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, trans. Dallas Willard, Collected Works V, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
+Husserl, Edmund (1997) Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907, trans. R. Rojcewicz,
+Collected Works VII, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
+Husserl, Edmund (1999) The Idea of Phenomenology,
+trans. Lee Hardy.
+Dordrecht: Kluwer.
+Husserl, Edmund (1999) The Essential Husserl, ed. Donn Welton, Bloomington,
+IN: Indiana University Press.
+Further Reading
+Bell, David (1990) Husserl, London: Routledge.
+Bernet, Rudolf, Iso Kern and Eduard Marbach (1993) An Introduction to Husserlian
+Phenomenology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
+DeBoer, Theodor (1978) The Development of Husser's Thought. The Hague: Martinus
+Nijhoff.
+Derrida, Jacques (1973) Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husser's Theory
+of Signs, ed. and trans. David Allison, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
+Press.
+Dreyfus, Hubert L. (ed.) (1982) Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIl Press.
+Dummett, Michael (1991) Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics, London: Duckworth.
+Dummett, Michael (1991) Frege and Other Philosophers, Oxford: Oxford University
+Press.
+Dummett, Michael (1993) Origins of Analytic Philosophy, London: Duckworth.
+Elveton, R. O. (ed.) (2000) The Phenomenology of Husserl. Selected Critical Readings, 2nd edn, Seattle: Noesis Press.
+Farber, Marvin (1943) The Foundation of Phenomenology, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
+Levinas, Emmanuel (1973) The Theory of Intuition in Husser's Phenomenology, trans.
+A. Orianne, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
+Mohanty, J. N. (ed.) (1977) Readings on Husser's Logical Investigations, The Hague:
+Martinus Nijhoff.
+Mohanty, J. N. (1982) Husserl and Frege, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
+Press.
+Moran, Dermot (2000) Introduction to Phenomenology. London and New York:
+Routledge.
+Moran, Dermot (2000) 'Heidegger's Critique of Husserl's and Brentano's Accounts
+of Intentionality, Inquiry 43: 39-66.
+Mulligan, Kevin and Smith, Barry (1986) 'Husserl's Logical Investigations', Grazer
+Philosophische Studien 27: 199-207.
+Ricoeur, Paul (1967) Husserl. An Analysis of his Philosophy, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
+Schérer, René (1967) La Phénoménologie des 'Recherches Logiques' de Husserl, Paris:
+Presses Universitaires de France.
+
+Select bibliography Ixxv
+Schuhmann, Karl (1977) Husserl-Chronik. Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls,
+Husserliana Dokumente 1, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
+Sepp, Hans Rainer (ed.) (1988) Edmund Husserl und die phänomenologische Bewegung.
+Zeugnisse in Text und Bild, Freiburg/Munich: Karl Alber Verlag.
+Smith, Barry and Woodruff Smith, David (eds) (1995) The Cambridge Companion to
+Husserl, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
+Sokolowski, Robert (1971) 'The Structure and Content of Husserl's Logical Investigations, Inquiry 14: 318-50.
+Sokolowski, Robert (2000) Introduction to Phenomenology, Cambridge: Cambridge
+Univesity Press.
+Spiegelberg, Herbert (1994) The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction, 3rd revised and enlarged edition with the assistance of Karl Schuhmann,
+Dordrecht: Kluwer.
+Ströker, Elizabeth (1993) Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology. Stanford, CA:
+Stanford University Press.
+Taminiaux, Jacques (1985) 'Heidegger and Husserl's Logical Investigations', in Dialectic and Difference, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 91-114.
+
+Translator's Introduction
+(Abridged)
+The Logical Investigations which is here translated is the work through
+which Edmund Husserl first established his reputation: it is also, in the
+opinion of many, including this translator, his greatest and most important
+philosophical work. First published in 1900-1, when Husserl was teaching
+at Halle, it was preceded by his Philosophy of Arithmetic (Volume 1 alone
+published, Halle, 1891), a surpassingly excellent but almost entirely forgotten work on the foundation of mathematics, and succeeded by a long series
+of brilliant works, some only published since Husserl's death in the series
+known as Husserliana (Nijhoff, The Hague), which expound a systematic
+position known as 'phenomenology', and of which the best known is the
+Ideas towards a pure Phenomenology and phenomenological Philosophy, first
+published in 1913, and translated into English by W. Boyce-Gibson (Muirhead
+Library, Allen and Unwin). The Logical Investigations occupies a position
+midway between the Philosophy of Arithmetic and the later, full-blown phenomenology, and while the word 'phenomenology' quite often occurs in its
+text, it is used in a somewhat different, simpler sense than that of the later
+system. It means only 'descriptive psychology': the study of what enters into
+the 'description'
+', the clarificatory analysis, of conscious experience and its
+various sub-species, rather than what may be involved in the actuality of
+consciousness in the world, and its causal and other relations to the body
+and to mundane existences generally.
+The text of the Logical Investigations underwent a few excisions, modifications and additions in the Second Edition of 1913 (The Prolegomena
+and Investigations I-V) and 1921 (Investigation VI), and they were mainly
+such as to bring it more into line with the later phenomenology. Fatigue and
+change of interest, however, prevented Husserl from carrying out the
+thorough revision of the text that he contemplated, and the Second and
+Third Editions of the Logical Investigations are not importantly different from
+the First. It was only in works like Formal and transcendental Logic (1929)
+that Husserl substantially developed the treatments of Logic which occur
+in the Logical Investigations. We may be glad that this is so. For the Logical
+Investigations has merits quite independent of its interesting relations to
+
+Ixxviii Translator's introduction
+the phenomenological system, or to the subsequent development of German philosophy. It is, despite much that is dated, and much that is drearily
+detailed and technical, a surpassingly good piece of philosophical work, and
+one that has a permanent interest for Anglo-Saxon philosophers, owing
+to its close relations, at many points, to traditional British empiricism, and
+to the analytic concerns which perturbed Russell and Moore. But it may
+also claim, particularly in its last two studies, 'On Intentional Experiences
+and their "Contents"' and 'Elements of a phenomenological Elucidation
+of Knowledge', to have reached an Aristotelian level of many-sided profundity, and to have sketched the basic grammar of conscious experience
+in a manner never before or since surpassed, or even equalled. Brentano
+may have led up to this remarkable consummation, and Husserl's later
+phenomenological writings may have developed it richly and variously, but
+it is here in its least controversial, best-argued form, free from the extraneous trappings of a 'system', and its dubious methodological and covertly
+metaphysical pretensions, and simply one of the prime achievements of
+philosophy. Husserl, a Jew or of Jewish origin, died dishonoured in 1938,
+forbidden to enter the university where he had taught, and forbidden entry
+(no doubt owing to political exigencies) by his own most famous pupil. It
+will not, however, be doubtful to anyone who carefully reads the Logical
+Investigations and many of the later works, that we have in him one of
+the small number of supreme contributors to philosophy, not unworthy
+of being spoken of in the same breath with Kant and Hegel, or with Plato
+and Aristotle.
+It is because I have found the writings of Husserl so superlatively valuable,
+and so deeply stimulating even when I rejected their detail, and because I so
+deeply regretted his inadequate accessibility in English - particularly when
+infinitely less important works were both translated and much discussed -
+that I undertook the present translation, which has occupied me during
+spells of reduced academic pressure over many years. It has proved very
+difficult, since I was determined that the result should be English, even if
+inevitably it had to be a somewhat heavy, Teutonic English, such as Husserl
+himself might have written, had he felt himself, authentically if extraneously, into the world of Anglo-Saxon culture. The task of teasing Husserl's
+richly redundant, serpentine style, with its multitude of higher-order expressions having no equivalent in our own linguistic stock-in-trade, into something that would flow, and have conciseness and clarity of form, even when
+its content was very difficult, has agitated me immensely, and I have no
+doubt that I have fallen short of perfect faithfulness or perfect English at
+many points. I do not, however, regard a translation, however good, as a
+substitute for the original, and believe that the attempt to make it such a
+substitute makes it less good as a translation than it could be. If I have
+made Husserl accessible to many who will make a profitable use of his ideas,
+instead of ranging them in a dreary chronological museum, leading up to a
+
+Translator's introduction Ixxix
+final show-case which enshrines pure Nothingness or pure Being - it scarcely
+matters which - I shall have achieved my purpose.
+Personal explanations and panegyric should not, however, extend beyond
+the first paragraphs of an Introduction. I must try to say, in general terms,
+why I think Husserl's Logical Investigations such an important work. It is
+important not because it can now count as
+a valuable contribution to the
+logical syntax of our language, but because it uses its investigations of logic
+to illuminate much more fundamental topics: the nature of meaning, the
+ontology which meaningful discourse presupposes, and, infinitely most
+important, the nature of those conscious acts in virtue of which alone our
+words point beyond themselves to things in the world, and in virtue of which
+alone there is a world for us and any fellows with whom we can communicate. Husserl's polemics in tavour of an adequate theory of meaning, of
+an 'objective' view of logical categories and of an 'intentional' analysis of
+consciousness, are directed against the contemporary idols of the theatre,
+the naturalisms and psychologisms of the time, which he thoroughly demolishes. They could, however, with equal point, have been directed against
+our own more elaborate naturalisms, which, intoxicated with new-found
+behaviouristic categories, and employing a sophistry of models rather than
+a sophistry of arguments - my reference here is to certain famous 'languagegames' - manage to divert attention from that central conscious subjectivity, and from its varied 'constitutive' activities, which not only can be rendered
+intelligible, whether in ourselves or in others, but in ignorance of which
+nothing whatever can be rendered intelligible at all.
+As regards Husserl's view of meaning, he is the first to attempt a study of
+its phenomenology, of the queer manner in which words, whether spoken or
+written or heard or seen, and so 'given in intuition'
+', yet bow themselves off
+the stage as prime terms of our references, and merely serve to introduce, or
+to help introduce, objects and connections other than themselves. And he is
+also the first to stress how words so used seem to clothe the objects to which
+they make reference possible, how they are phenomenologically inscribed
+upon the whole world around us and to what an extent knowing or cognizing an object consists in putting the right name to it, seeing it as called this
+or that. All this has many points of affinity with recent linguistic philosophy, but it is also profoundly different. For recent linguistic philosophy
+is a third-person, observer's analysis, which sees meaning only in the varied
+use made of words and combinations of words in many natural and social
+situations. This observer's analysis is of course both valuable and necessary,
+for the phenomenology of meaning would not be complete without a study
+of its behavioural working out, and its detailed exhibition in the conduct
+of persons in their environment. A life of meaningful references that had
+no "fulfilment' in responsiveness to what environs the person, would, in fact,
+be not merely not actual, but intrinsically impossible. But this does not
+affect the fact that a personal appropriation of meaning, a lived-through
+
+Ixxx Translator's introduction
+understanding of what it is that words are naming or communicating, is a
+central feature of the meaningful use of words, and that, in default of it,
+there could be no more genuine semiosis than there is in the case of a
+computer or a tape-recorder. Beings who faultlessly used the right words in
+the right circumstances, and who got about the world and helped other
+similar beings to get about it, but to whom the rationale, the sense of their
+proceedings was never a lived experience, totally embraced in each present
+and not spread out over tracts of time, nor referred hypothetically to the
+future - we shall not say that such a sense must always be so experienced -
+would not deserve to be called speakers or users of a language at all. Of
+them it would be right to say: Words they are moved by, but they hear not,
+words they utter, but they speak not, neither do they understand. The phenomenology of meaning has, of course, been carried much further than we
+find it in Husserl, particularly by phenomenologists like Roman Ingarden,
+but the all-important beginnings are there.
+As regards Husserl's contributions to ontology, the Logical Investigations
+introduces us to a richness of categorical distinctions such as we find in
+Aristotle, and such as only his great contemporary Meinong carried further.
+We have none of the misplaced economy, suitable in natural science, where
+it is all-important to have only a few explanatory ultimates or laws, carried
+over into the realm of thought-distinctions, where it encourages one to
+massacre some valuable concept, or to warp the expression of some wellunderstood principle, in order to satisfy the exigencies of a cheese-paring
+behest not to multiply entities, and which so fears the "jungle' of ramifying
+things of reason that it is prepared to sink into the Serbonian bog of enforced
+simplification. Obviously one does not lose, but gain, by noting all the
+iridescent variety which confronts one even at the categorial level, and which
+is indefeasibly part of the world as we deal with it through word and thought.
+There is the distinction between the thing and its parts, and between its
+separable parts and its inseparable 'sides' or 'moments', there is the distinction between the patterns instantiated in things and the detached patterns
+which they exemplify, there is the distinction between things and states of
+affairs concerning things, and among the many varied sorts of such states
+of affairs, and there is the distinction between the forms of things and states
+of affairs and the matter, the items bound together by those forms. A philosopher sensitive enough to point to the semantic and ontological difference
+between the passing postman and the fact that the postman is passing, is
+obviously sensitive to differences which a training of the economizing,
+reductive sort only serves to blunt. In the Logical Investigations one sees the
+beginnings of the doctrine that all the categorial distinctions recognized by
+logic extend beyond the limits of language and symbolism and are implicit
+in our unverbalized experience. This was afterwards to be carried further in
+such works as Erfahrung und Urteil, where a whole world of pre-predicative
+negations, modalities etc., was recognized in the primitive texture of human,
+
+Translator's introduction Ixxxi
+and even of animal experience. The heresy of 'pre-linguistic meanings', so
+much condemned by certain linguistic philosophers, is thus made the basis
+of an illuminating analysis. Husser's ontology, further, is not uniformist
+and monolithic, as in those modern ontologies where any case of quantification commits one to a whole range of 'entities'
+', which all, however, have
+being in precisely the same sense and manner. Like Aristotle, Husserl too
+has his analogy of being, where some things are there in a more foundational,
+primitive sense, while other entities have an essentially 'founded', secondary,
+derivative status. The developments of Husserl's ontology, and the changes
+induced in it by the idealistic positions of the later phenomenology, are not,
+however, matters that can be further discussed here.
+In Husserl's phenomenology, understood as a purely descriptive, internal
+analysis of consciousness and its varieties, we have, however, the supreme
+contribution of the Logical Investigations, as of the later, specifically sostyled, phenomenological writings. What Husserl clearly saw, and what later
+analysts of language have failed to see, is that the interpretation of speech
+always proceeds in two necessarily correlated, but in many respects deeply
+different, and often disparate dimensions: the interpretation of speech as
+referring to entities and situations in the world, or to ideal abstractions from
+these latter, and the interpretation of speech as revealing the 'references'
+that it thus embodies, the so-called 'acts' or 'conscious appearances' in which
+such entities and situations display themselves before us, are given separately or together, as making up or at least 'framing' our world, whether as
+possibilities or as limiting impossibilities. To talk of objects 'our there'
+, and
+their actual or possible predicates and relations, may not be to talk of our
+conscious awareness of such matters, but it is always to imply it, and to
+imply it in no vague, general fashion, but in one precisely proportioned and
+accommodated to the objective matters of which we are talking. There is
+nothing mysterious, puzzling in all this, or in the regular, natural swing-over
+from an external to an internal reference, in the passage from a situation as
+we think of it or perceive it, to the situation of our thought or perception of
+it: we are not suddenly translated from a world of limpid natural objects to
+the murky contents of the 'queer medium of the mind'. We have merely
+passed from the obverse to the reverse side of the same coin, and any limpidity which attaches to the objects and situations referred to, attaches also
+to our conscious, significant references to them. People are wont to speak as
+if there were some close-wrapped mystery about the inner, private side of
+things which does not apply to their outer, public side, as if one could be
+wholly clear about the latter and deeply confused or in doubt about the
+former. This is not the case at all. To perceive that the soap in one's bathroom is exhausted, or to understand what it is for one's bathroom soap to
+be exhausted, is to be able to perceive or understand what one's own perception or understanding of the exhaustion of one's bathroom soap is like, and
+to understand, further, what anyone's understanding of the same matter
+
+Ixxxii Translator's introduction
+must be like. We are not unclear as to what happens in a man's experience
+when he knows his bathroom soap to be exhausted, at least not in the respects
+in which that experience is directed to the domestic situation in question.
+There are of course other respects in which our understanding of the
+"inner' situation presents difficulties which our understanding of the 'outer'
+situation does not, difficulties which we perfectly understand in the light of
+the fact that it is an inner situation. There are mental pictures and feelings and
+attenuations of mental pictures and feelings, which have to be approached,
+if at all, through people's hesitant, analogical accounts of what they picture
+and feel, and it is clear that there are difficulties, if not ones of principle, in
+our access to such things. There are also philosophical puzzles connected
+with the manner into which our experience packs or reduces to unity what
+can only be spelt out or unpacked in a lengthy exegesis, difficulties which
+have led certain philosophers to explain our packed inner state as one of
+readiness to say or do certain things, or of readiness to behave in certain
+ways, all explanations which reduce the packed concentration of conscious
+life to the content or process of its unpacking. All such solutions spring
+from a peculiar inability to see that consciousness just is, or at least is, the
+bringing into a focus of indivisible contemporaneity of what, from another
+point of view may be successive and dispersed, and that a world in which,
+perhaps per impossible, there were only mutually external happenings in
+space and time, would be a world of which we could not be conscious, in
+which there could be no such thing as conscious experience at all. There are,
+therefore, and must be, corresponding to any well-formed, articulate tract
+of fully significant speech - and speech is of course not always fully significant - mental stances or appearances complete and consummated in the
+moment, and only spread over time in the sense of lasting and changing
+throughout that time, in which objects and situations are set before us in
+various definite or indefinite lights, which change and develop as we consider those objects and situations. It is to the analysis and classification and
+law-governed interconnection of these mental stances or appearances that
+phenomenology must be directed, and through which it must illuminate the
+mind and language and the world. The use of a language of acts, of things
+done, is in this context traditional, but Husserl makes clear, like Brentano
+and Meinong, that his use of the term has no special connection with activity. The mere presence of something to mind, its entry into consciousness
+in whatever unheralded manner, its mere turning up or appearance or
+Erscheinung, constitutes an 'act' in the sense relevant to Husserl's analysis.
+What it then becomes important to note are the wide variety of alternative species into which the one invariant thing, consciousness, differentiates
+itself, and in fact only is the one invariant thing consciousness because it can
+be thus differentiated. Of these differences of manner, the most fundamental
+is the difference between the empty manner in which things can be there for
+mere thought, for meaning-intention, and the fulfilled or seeing manner in
+
+Translator's introduction Ixxxiii
+which they can be there for illustrative intuition (Anschauung). Husserl is
+infinitely skilled in showing the vast number of differing manners and proportions in which the intuitive and emptily cogitative can be combined,
+and in stressing the fact that, except in the ideal limit, they are always so
+combined in our perception of physical objects, a physical object being
+always something that could be further and more richly seen and explored,
+however much of it is or has been present to our senses. Husserl also dwells
+by analogy on the intuitive grasp, the full givenness of ideal characters and
+states of affairs, as opposed to their imperfect presence to mind by way of
+symbols whose meaning or valid combination is only partially felt. And he
+stresses the case of 'fulfilment' by way of internal images and by way of
+external physical models or diagrams or pictures, which is only a surrogate
+for the more complete fulfilment when what we have before us is given as
+'the thing itself'. Nowhere in the literature of philosophy are these matters
+more subtly treated and more full of an evident clearness and rightness: it is
+only a pity that they have been so infrequently and so superficially studied.
+Husserl's analysis of consciousness derives, of course, from Brentano's
+concept of intentionality, but is in several respects superior. Husserl we may
+say was the first to stress a property of intentional reference which Brentano
+also stated in the first appendix to the 1911 edition of his Psychology, that
+conscious reference is not strictly speaking a real relation, since the object or
+state of affairs referred to need not exist at all. The God Jupiter, Husserl
+says in chapter 2 of the Fifth Investigation, is not a real constituent, is not
+really present, in my conscious reference to him: to think that he need be, or
+could be, is to misunderstand the nature of conscious reference altogether.
+This point was never understood by Meinong, who had to give a certain
+Vorhandenheit even to non-existent or absurd objects. It is not unlikely that
+Brentano got the first idea for his 1911 Appendix from the 1901 discussion
+of the God Jupiter in the Logische Untersuchungen, together, of course, with
+much that also infuriated him: certainly the example of the God Jupiter is
+cited by Kraus in his exposition of Brentano's doctrine.
+Husserl, however, did not fall into the prime error of making the possible
+non-existence of a thought-object the criterion of mentality, a mistake persisted in by Chisholm. For he is clearly aware, in the second place, that
+references that fail of a target imply the existence of references where the
+target is in the nature of things hit, is itself intuited or given - the meaning
+of intuition is simply that of an ultimate, perfect self-givenness - and given
+as it in itself is. Unless there was this limiting form of intentionality, there
+would be no meaning in saying that certain intentions fail of their mark,
+that they present their objects in an inadequate or distorted light, and not as
+they are, or not as they wholly are. Consciousness can only give sense to its
+inadequacies by contrasting them with an ultimate, inerrant adequacy or
+self-givenness. The notion of the self-evident or inwardly evident which in
+Brentano is no more than an internal index of our title to judge or believe
+
+Ixxxiv Translator's introduction
+something, is therefore for Husserl no more than the limiting state where
+doubt becomes senseless, irrelevant, since the standard of self-givenness has
+been reached. For Husserl therefore it is part of the notion of intentionality that there is a limiting state (ideal in the case of physical objects) in
+which the object as it is thought of or given simply fades out in, or achieves
+coincidence with, the object as it in and for itself is. The difficulties of this
+account of self-evidence, the many cases of seeming self-evidence which later
+require revision, is finely dealt with in the 1929 Formal and transcendental
+Logic which must certainly be studied if we are fully to evaluate the Logical
+Investigations.
+It is to be regretted that Husserl did not allow the implications of his own
+views on self-givenness to guide him away from the methodological ¿nOX
+or suspension of conviction which is preached in the later Ideas (§§31, 32
+et seq.). For there is arguably no clear sense to be given to a total suspension of belief in the entire world: it is only in the context of a limiting, if
+unattainable, complete givenness of all sides of physical realities that the
+notion of their doubtful, distorted, merely intended presence to consciousness
+can be significantly entertained, a point since made by many analytic philosophers. Husserl sees that we cannot accord a merely phenomenal, intentional
+status to the acts of consciousness in which physical objects are given, a
+point clear to Descartes as it was not clear to Kant, and he is also unwilling
+to accord a merely intended status to the experiences of others: he thinks,
+however, that he can significantly "bracket' the reality of all natural things,
+and even passes on from this to the idealistic conviction that physical things
+have, despite their transcendent status for consciousness, no more than a
+merely intended, phenomenal being, while consciousness itself exists in an
+'absolute' manner (Ideas, §841-6). To the extent that Husserl makes this
+move, he transforms his brilliant, original analysis of consciousness into one
+of those ordinary subjectivisms which comfort the shattered ego by assuring
+it, quite baselessly, that in some secret manner it has manufactured its own
+shattering world. Of this form of subjectivism, respectable only on a theistic
+background like Berkeley's, there is not a trace in the Logical Investigations.
+The examination of consciousness, and of how things are given to consciousness, goes with no implication that such things have no being other
+than their givenness to consciousness: the contrary implication is in fact
+without reservation taken to be part and parcel of consciousness itself.
+Room is of course left for metaphysical reversals, but a proper suspension
+of conviction and assertion is maintained on such possibilities. It is only in
+the Ideas, with its pretended methodological suspension of all conviction,
+that such a suspension is, in fact, not truly practised.
+A third respect in which Husserl's treatment of consciousness is greatly
+superior, lies in its acknowledgement of lived-through experiences or livedthrough moments of experience which are not intentional at all, which present
+nothing to consciousness, not even themselves. Our sensations, treated as
+
+Translator's introduction Ixxxv
+modifications of our own interior selfhood, are experienced moments of this
+type, and they are utterly to be distinguished from the properties of physical
+objects which appear in corresponding perceptions. There is, Husserl thinks,
+as Meinong does also, a redwise mode of interior experience which corresponds to the redness we perceive, whether validly or illusorily, out there in
+objects: this redwiseness we feel rather than perceive (in normal experience),
+but in feeling we can also pass to perceiving the objective redness which is as
+it were its 'other side'
+'. This use of interior experience to mediate objective
+reference is misleadingly described in a language of beseelende Auffassungen,
+animating conceptions or interpretations, which suggests the traditional
+theory, infinitely repugnant to Husserl, of causal inferences from immediate
+sense-data to unperceived physical objects. For Husserl the sensation (though
+sometimes called a 'datum') is not normally given at all, and its Auffassung
+or interpretation is a primary act of mind's self-transcendence and not
+therefore, properly speaking, an interpretation or an inference at all. What
+it reveals is also not any remote function of physics but the redness that
+is authentically perceived. The theory of 'inner felt sides' to the sensible properties of things has of course been adversely criticized by the few who have
+understood it properly, among whom G. E. Moore is to be reckoned: it is
+arguable that, though dubious on a first analysis, it becomes ever more acceptable on further examination. Husserl uses the same notion of representing
+contents which are not themselves presented, in his theory of categorial
+intuition. Through the mind's various acts of synthetic combination it can
+come to set before itself various forms of objective synthesis, e.g. the synthesis of properties in a thing, of items in a group, of identity in varying
+contexts etc. It is a pity that there have been so few people to understand
+and discuss these interesting doctrines.
+It is not possible, in an Introduction of this length, to do more than touch
+on some of the many questions of interpretation raised by Husserl's Logical
+Investigations. And it is not at all possible to trace the relations of the
+position of that work to those of the later phenomenology. The interpretation, criticism and evaluation of Husserl's vast, immensely hard, supremely
+rewarding corpus of writings is barely in its beginnings. What remains for
+me to do, however, is to give some account as to how I have rendered some
+of the key-terms of Husserl, an account which the use of the Index will
+improve. I have been largely, but not absolutely uniform, in my translation
+of these key-terms, since my aim has been to render their sense, which
+demands adaptation to their German or English context, rather than to
+provide a code from which the German can be uniformly inferred from the
+English. The German text is, after all, again available, even if, regrettably it
+was long out of print. And Husserl, despite his prolixity and technicality,
+
+Ixxxvi Translator's introduction
+conforms to the Keynesian description of a Cambridge philosopher as 'a
+prose writer, hoping to be understood; he is not a hierophant, requiring a
+word-for-word translation of his dark locutions in the hope that some of
+their doubtful sense will be preserved. I have translated Vorstellung almost
+uniformly by 'presentation'
+, recognizing that the latter is not really an English word: the concept expressed by Husserl's (and Brentano's) term is not
+an English concept either. 'Idea' is required for other purposes, and is in any
+case ambiguous, and 'representation', if anyone can tolerate it, is required
+for the cases where Husserl uses Repräsentation, Darstellung etc. Anschauung
+(anschaulich etc.) I have rendered by 'intuition' ('intuitive' etc.) since this is
+the traditional rendering of the term in translations of Kant, and since the
+word has no proper equivalent in English. I have occasionally varied this
+use by substituting or adding such terms as 'envisage', illustrate'
+?, 'picture'
+'see', and their derivatives. Einsicht etc., which more properly means 'intuition' as understood in English, I have translated by 'insight' etc., though
+sometimes I have talked of 'perspicuity' etc. I have translated Idee by Idea'
+and Spezies by 'Species', capitalizing both terms where ideal entities are in
+question. I have sometimes capitalized terms, e.g. 'Perception', where ideal
+notions were intended, but in general I have been inconsistently sparing
+with capitals, as I believe that they readily become tyrannous and obfuscate
+sense. I have translated Erlebnis (erleben etc.) by 'experience'
+, though I have
+sometimes substituted 'lived experience', 'live through' etc.; I have not devised a separate word for Erfahrung, since Husserl often uses the words
+interchangeably, and since the English word is used in two ways, clear in the
+context, and is in fact practically two words. 'Having an experience' and
+'learning by experience' obviously involve two distinct, though cognate, uses
+of the word 'experience'. I have translated psychisch by 'mental' in informal
+contexts like the Prolegomena where 'psychical' would be strained, but I
+have used 'psychical' where Brentano's technical use, and its contrast with
+physisch, was in question. I have indicated the difference between real and
+reell (meaning 'in the world of natural things' and 'actually part of' respectively) by putting the German word in brackets after an English use of
+'real'. I am not convinced that Husserl meant much by his solemn distinction of these two terms, and I regret the necessity of translating wirklich by
+"actual', when 'real' is often more suitable. It is curious that Husserl should
+have used the word real of a thing-like status which need not involve reality' in the sense of genuine existence, and which he came afterwards to hold
+never involved 'reality' in the English sense. I have translated schlicht by
+'straightforward', and eigentlich (in technical contexts) by 'authentic', and I
+have translated unselbständig by 'non-independent', since the English word
+"dependent' has less negativity and more relativity than unselbständig. Sometimes I have also had traffic with 'self-sufficient' for selbständig, instead
+of 'independent'. Inhalt I have, of course, translated by 'content, but this
+makes difficulties in the case of other words for which 'content' alone seems
+
+Translator's introduction Ixxxvii
+suitable: Gehalt, e.g. has been badly translated by 'substance'. Fundieren,
+fundierte etc., are of course 'found', "founded' (though sometimes I have
+yielded to the charms of 'basing', 'based' etc.) but fundierend has varied
+from 'foundational' to 'underlying' according to context or euphony. Moment
+I have usually translated as "moment', but sometimes, in less technical contexts, as 'side' or 'aspect'. Bedeutung in the sense of significant content I have
+translated by 'meaning', less commonly by 'sense': Husserl does not follow
+Frege in keeping the two words distinct, and neither ever means the object
+of a reference. The word bedeuten I have translated by 'act of meaning' or
+simply by the verb 'to mean', though I have sometimes used 'refer, 'reference' as an equivalent. Husserl in the main tends to say that we mean
+objects, not meanings, by way of the meanings which words have rather than
+mean, and I have followed his usage in English, with which it on the whole
+agrees, rather than trying to introduce distinctions into my translation which
+have only recently been thought necessary. Wahrnehmen, Wahrnehmung etc.,
+I have translated by "perceive', "perception', the established equivalents,
+though when a Wahrnehmung means an individual act, I have, for the sake
+of shortness, translated it by 'percept'. Innere Wahrnehmung has been translated by 'inner', 'inward' or 'internal perception' quite without principle,
+and the same holds mutatis mutandis of aüssere Wahrnehmung. Erkennen,
+Erkenntnis I have generally translated by 'know'
+', 'knowledge', though there
+are contexts, particularly in the Sixth Investigation where 'cognize'
+'; 'cognition'
+?, "recognize', 'recognition' seemed more suitable. Evidenz and its derivatives I have rendered by 'self-evidence', 'inward evidence' according to
+context: there are cases of Evidenz, e.g. those of innere Wahrnehmung, which
+have no self-evidence in the English sense. The adjective evident I have
+sometimes translated by 'evident, but in general I have found that the
+forensic and documentary associations of the English word 'evidence' are
+fatal to understanding. Many students are permanently bewildered by these
+associations. That a similar thing holds of 'reflection', 'reflective' etc., used
+to translate the German word where it has to do with introspection, and not
+with 'reflection' as we ordinarily understand it, has not led me to depart
+from the use in question. After all, Locke's similar use of reflection' has
+misled, and always will mislead, countless incautious and forgetful students.
+I have translated begründen, Begründung etc., by 'grounding' etc., also by
+'prove' ('proof'), 'demonstrate' ('demonstration'), 'validate' ('validation'). It
+expresses a reversed view of argument more usual to Continental than to
+British intellectuals. With these explanations, it is to be hoped that Husserl
+can speak for himself.
+J. N. FINDLAY
+Yale University
+
+Foreword
+(First Edition)
+The logical Investigations whose publication begins with these Prolegomena,
+have arisen out of unavoidable problems which have constantly hindered,
+and finally interrupted, the progress of my efforts, spread over many years,
+at achieving a philosophical clarification of pure mathematics. Together
+with questions regarding the origin of the basic concepts and insights of
+mathematics, these efforts were especially concerned with difficult questions of mathematical theory and method. The expositions of the traditional
+logic, so often reformulated, should have succeeded in providing us with an
+intelligible and perspicuous account of the rational essence of deductive
+science, with its formal unity and symbolic methodology. A study of the actually given deductive sciences, however, left all these things problematic and
+obscure. The deeper that my analyses penetrated, the more conscious I
+became that the logic of our time was not adequate to that actual science
+which it was none the less its function to elucidate.
+I was plunged into peculiar difficulties by my logical researches into formal arithmetic and the theory of manifolds, a discipline and method which
+stretches far beyond all peculiarities of the special forms of number and
+extension. They forced me into discussions of a very general sort, which
+lifted me above the narrow sphere of mathematics, and pushed me towards
+a universal theory of formal deductive systems. There were many sets of
+problems that then bore down upon me, of which I shall here mention only
+a single one.
+There were evidently possibilities of generalizing (transforming) formal
+arithmetic, so that, without essential alteration of its theoretical character
+and methods of calculation, it could be taken beyond the field of quantity,
+and this made me see that quantity did not at all belong to the most universal essence of the mathematical or the formal', or to the method of calculation which has its roots in this essence. I then came to see in 'mathematicizing
+logic' a mathematics which was indeed free from quantity, while remaining
+none the less an indefeasible discipline having mathematical form and method,
+
+2 Foreword
+which in part dealt with the old syllogisms, in part with new forms of inference
+quite alien to tradition. Important problems then loomed before me regarding the universal essence of the mathematical as such, and the natural
+connection, or the possible boundaries, between systems of quantitative and
+non-quantitative mathematics, and especially, e.g., regarding arithmetical
+and logical formality. Naturally, I also had to go on from this point to more
+fundamental questions regarding the essence of the form of knowledge in
+contradistinction to its matter, and the sense of the distinction between
+formal (pure) and material properties, truths and laws.
+But in another quite different direction I also found myself involved in
+problems of general logic and epistemology. I began work on the prevailing
+assumption that psychology was the science from which logic in general,
+and the logic of the deductive sciences, had to hope for philosophical clarification. For this reason psychological researches occupy a very large place in
+the first (the only published) volume of my Philosophy of Arithmetic. There
+were, however, connections in which such a psychological foundation never
+came to satisfy me. Where one was concerned with questions as to the origin
+of mathematical presentations, or with the elaboration of those practical
+methods which are indeed psychologically determined, psychological analyses seemed to me to promote clearness and instruction. But once one had
+passed from the psychological connections of thinking, to the logical unity
+of the thought-content (the unity of theory), no true continuity and unity
+could be established. I became more and more disquieted by doubts of
+principle, as to how to reconcile the objectivity of mathematics, and of all
+science in general, with a psychological foundation for logic. In this manner
+my whole method, which I had taken over from the convictions of the
+reigning logic, that sought to illuminate the given science through psychological analyses, became shaken, and I felt myself more and more pushed
+towards general critical reflections on the essence of logic, and on the relationship, in particular, between the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity of the content known. Logic left me in the lurch wherever I hoped it
+would give me definite answers to the definite questions I put to it, and I
+was eventually compelled to lay aside my philosophical-mathematical investigations, until I had succeeded in reaching a certain clearness on the basic
+questions of epistemology and in the critical understanding of logic as a
+science.
+If I now publish these essays, the product of many years of work, on a
+new foundation of pure logic and epistemology, I do so in the conviction that
+I shall not be misunderstood for independently choosing a path remote
+from that of prevailing logical trends, in view of the grave, factually based
+motives that have inspired me. The course of my development has led to my
+drawing apart, as regards basic logical convictions, from men and writings
+to whom I owe most of my philosophical education, and to my drawing
+rather closer to a group of thinkers whose writings I was not able to estimate
+
+Foreword 3
+rightly, and whom I consulted all too little in the course of my labours. I
+have had, however, unfortunately to abstain from any subsequent insertion
+of comprehensive literary and critical references to researches having an
+iffinity with my own. As regards my frank critique of the psychologisti
+ogic and epistemology, I have but to recall Goethe's saying: There is noth
+ing to which one is more severe than the errors that one has just abandoned.
+E. HUSSERL
+Halle a. d. S. May 2lst 1900
+(Second Edition)
+The question as to the form in which I should undertake to republish the
+present work, out of print for some years, has caused me no little concern.
+My Logical Investigations were my 'break-through', not an end but rather a
+beginning. When the work had been printed, my studies continued forthwith. I tried to give a fuller account of the meaning, the method and the
+philosophical scope of phenomenology, to pursue the woven threads of my
+problems further in every direction, and to track down and tackle parallel
+problems in all ontic and phenomenological fields. Understandably, as the
+horizon of my research widened, and as I became better acquainted with
+the intentional 'modifications' so perplexingly built on one another, with the
+multiply interlacing structures of consciousness, there came a shift in many of
+the conceptions formed in my first penetration of the new territory. Remaining obscurities were cleared up, ambiguities removed, isolated observations
+to which at the start no special importance could be given, gained fundamental meaning as one passed over into larger contexts. Everywhere, in brief,
+there were not merely supplementations but transvaluations in one's original
+field of research, and from the point of view of one's widened, deepened
+knowledge, even the arrangement of one's treatments no longer seemed
+quite adequate. The sense and the extent of these forward steps, and their
+widening effect on one's field of research comes out in the recently published
+First Book of my Ideas towards a pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological
+Philosophy, printed in the first volume of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und
+phänomenologische Forschung (1913), and the publication of the two remaining Books, which will follow immediately, will show this still better.
+I originally cherished the hope that, after discovering and exploring the
+radical problems of pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy,
+I should be able to present a series of systematic expositions that would
+render a reprinting of the old work unnecessary, in so far as its content, not
+at all jettisoned, but purged and divided according to subject, would come
+into its own in association with the new work. But when execution began, a
+
+4 Foreword
+serious objection at once raised itself. Many years would be needed for the
+carrying out of the extensive, difficult task of imposing literary unity on our
+Investigations: though they stood there complete and concrete, they would
+have for the most part to be expounded anew and to have their difficulties
+ironed out. I therefore decided first of all to plan my Ideas. They were to
+give a universal, yet contentful presentation of the new phenomenology,
+based throughout on actually executed work, a presentation of its method, of
+its systematic field of problems, of its function in making possible a strictly
+scientific philosophy, as well as a reduction to rational theory of empirical
+psychology. After all this, the Logical Investigations would be republished,
+and that in a better form, adapted to the standpoint of the Ideas, and so
+helping to introduce the reader to the nature of genuinely phenomenological
+and epistemological work. For if these Investigations are to prove helpful
+to those interested in phenomenology, this will be because they do not offer
+us a mere programme (certainly not one of the high-flying sort which so
+encumber philosophy) but that they are attempts at genuinely executed fundamental work on the immediately envisaged and seized things themselves.
+Even where they proceed critically, they do not lose themselves in discussions of standpoint, but rather leave the last word to the things themselves,
+and to one's work upon such things. The Ideas ought in effect to rest on the
+work of the Logical Investigations. If, through the latter, the reader has been
+brought openly to investigate and concern himself with a group of fundamental questions, then the Ideas, with their policy of illuminating method
+from ultimate sources by putting a sketch of the main structures of pure
+consciousness before one, by systematically locating one's work-problems in
+the latter, could assist him to a further, independent advance.
+The carrying out of the first part of my plan was relatively easy, though
+the unexpected length of the first two Books of the Ideas, essential for my
+purposes and undertaken by me in one piece, forced me to divide their
+publication, so that the First Book alone had to suffice provisionally. But
+the fullment of my second aim was far harder. Anyone who knows the old
+work, will see the impossibility of lifting it entirely on to the level of the
+Ideas. That would mean a complete recasting of the work, and a postponement to the Greek kalends. It seemed to me, on the other hand, to be a comfortable rather than a conscientious decision, in view of the aims justifying a
+new edition, to abandon all revision and merely reprint the work mechanically. Was I entitled to mislead the reader once more, through all my omissions,
+waverings and self-misunderstandings, which, however unavoidable and
+pardonable in the first edition of such a work, would yet put unnecessary
+difficulties in the way of a clear grasp of essentials?
+All that remained possible was to attempt a middle course, and in a
+manner to let myself go in attempting it. It meant leaving untouched certain
+unclarities, and even errors, which were part and parcel of the unified style
+of the work. The following maxims guided my revision:
+
+Foreword 5
+1. To allow nothing into the new edition regarding which I was not fully
+persuaded that it deserved thorough study. In this respect single errors could
+be left standing, since I could allow them to count as natural steps towards
+a truth that would transform their good intentions. I could say to myself in
+all this: Readers who stem from general philosophical drifts of the present -
+which are in essence the same as those in the decade of this work's origin -
+can, like the work's author, only at first gain access to what are mere steps
+towards certain phenomenological (logical) positions. Only when they have
+gained sure mastery over the style of phenomenological research, do they
+see the fundamental meaning of certain distinctions which appeared previously to be insignificant nuances.
+2. To improve all that could be improved, without altering the course and
+style ot the old work, and, above all, to bring to most detinite expression the
+new thought-motives that had their 'break-through' in the old work, but
+which had, in the first edition, been at times sharply stressed, at times blurred,
+by the hesitant and timid author.
+3. To lift the reader gradually, in the course of the expositions, to a relatively rising total level of insight, following in this the original peculiarity of
+the work. We must here voice the reminder that the work was a systematically bound chain of investigations but not, properly speaking, one book or
+work in a literary sense. There is in it a regular ascent from a lower to a
+higher level, and a working of oneself into ever new logical and phenomenological insights, which never leave the previously achieved ones quite
+untouched. Ever new phenomenological strata swim into our view and add
+determination to our conceptions of the earlier ones. This character of the old
+work made a kind of revision seem possible, which consciously leads the
+reader onward and upward, in such a way that, in the final Investigation, the
+level of the Ideas is in essentials reached, so that the previous unclearnesses
+and half-truths, that we had to put up with, appear perspicuously clarified.
+I went ahead in the sense of these maxims, and have the impression as
+regards both provisionally published pieces (the Prolegomena and the first
+part of the Second Volume) that the big efforts I made have not been wasted.
+I have naturally had to add here, and strike out there, at times to rewrite
+single sentences, and at times whole paragraphs and chapters. The thoughtcontent has become more packed and full in extent: the total extent of the
+work, more specifically that of the Second Volume, has grown unavoidably,
+despite all suppression of critical supplementation, so that this volume has
+had to be divided.
+Regarding the individual Investigations and their reconstructed form, the
+following should be said. The Prolegomena to Pure Logic is, in its essential
+content, a mere reworking of two complementary series of lectures given at
+Halle in the summer and autumn of 1896. To this the greater liveliness of the
+exposition is due, which has assisted its influence. The piece is, moreover,
+written in one cast of thought, and I therefore thought I ought not to revise
+
+6 Foreword
+it radically. But I found I could, on the other hand, from about the middle
+on, carry out many quite large improvements in presentation, could expunge
+slips and put main points into sharper light. Some very essential, if partial,
+insufficiencies - such as the concept of a 'truth in itself' which is too onesidedly oriented to verites de raison - had to be left, since they were part of
+the unified level of the piece. The Sixth Investigation (now the Second Part
+of the Second Volume) brings in necessary clarification in this respect.
+To burden the polemic on psychologism with new criticisms and countercriticisms (which would not have introduced the least new thought-motive)
+did not seem very appropriate to me. I must emphasize the relation of this
+piece to 1899, the precise date at which I merely rewrote it. (The printing of
+the Prolegomena, minus the Foreword, was already complete in November
+1899. See my self-reference in the Vierteljahrschr. f. wiss. Philosophie, 1900,
+p. 512 f.) Since its appearance, some authors that I looked on as representing logical psychologism have essentially changed their position. Th. Lipps,
+e.g., in his extremely significant, original writings, has since 1902 not at all
+been the man that is here quoted. Other authors have, in the meantime,
+sought different foundations for their psychologistic position, a point not to
+be ignored, since my presentation takes no account of it.
+As regards the Second Volume of the new edition, the hesitant Introduction, so little true to the essential sense and method of the actually written
+Investigations, was radically revised. I felt its defects immediately after its
+appearance, and also found immediate occasion (in a review in the Archiv
+f. system. Philos. XI (1903), p. 397 ff.) to object to my misleading account of
+phenomenology as descriptive psychology. Some of the main points of
+principle are there briefly but sharply characterized. The psychological description performed in inner experience appears as put on a level with the
+description of external events in nature performed in external description,
+but it is, on the other hand opposed to phenomenological description, from
+which all transcendent interpretations of immanent data, even those of
+psychical acts and states of a real ego, are entirely excluded. The descriptions
+of phenomenology are said (p. 399) to deal neither with lived experiences
+nor classes of lived experiences of empirical persons ... phenomenology
+knows nothing of persons, of my experiences or those of others, and surmises
+nothing regarding them: it raises no questions in regard to such matters,
+attempts no determinations, constructs no hypotheses'. The complete reflective clarity that I had achieved in these and following years regarding the
+essence of phenomenology, which led gradually to the systematic doctrine
+of 'phenomenological reduction' (cf. Ideas, 1, Section 2), was of use in the
+rewriting of this Introduction, and also in the text of all the following In-
+vestigations, thereby raising the whole work to an essentially higher level of
+clarity.
+Of the five Investigations which occupy the First Part of the Second
+Volume, the first, Expression and Meaning, retains its merely preparatory
+
+Foreword 7
+character in the new edition. It stimulates thought, it directs the gaze of the
+phenomenological beginner to the initial, already most difficult problems of
+the consciousness of meaning, without doing full justice to them. The manner
+in which it deals with occasional meanings (to which, however, in strictness,
+all empirical predications belong) is an act of violence - the enforced consequence of the imperfect conception of the essence of 'truth in itself' in the
+Prolegomena.
+As a further defect of this Investigation, only understood and corrected at
+the end of the volume, we must note that it has no regard to the distinction
+and parallelism between the 'noetic' and the 'noematic': the fundamental
+role of this distinction in all fields of consciousness is first fully laid bare in
+the Ideas, but comes through in many individual arguments in the last
+Investigation of the old work. For this reason, the essential ambiguity of
+'meaning' as an Idea is not emphasized. The noetic concept of meaning is
+one-sidedly stressed, though in many important passages the noematic concept is principally dealt with.
+The Second Investigation concerning The Ideal Unity of the Species and
+Modern Theories of Abstraction, had a style and limitation of theme, a certain
+completeness, which made a few detailed amendments, but no thoroughgoing reconstructions, desirable. As before, there is no discussion of the
+various types of Ideas, with their demand for a deep separation of essence,
+to which naturally Ideations, as deeply and essentially separate, correspond.
+All that this Investigation is concerned with, is the fact that one can learn to
+see Ideas, represented, e.g. by the Idea Red, and that one can become clear
+as to the essence of such 'seeing'.
+The Third Investigation On the Doctrine of Wholes and Parts has undergone very thorough revision, though in its case no unsatisfactory compromises needed to be made, and no subsequent corrections or deepenings
+were necessary. All that was here needed was to assist the inner sense of
+the Investigation, and what I thought were its important results, to better
+operation and to remove numerous imperfections of statement. I have the
+impression that this Investigation is all too little read. I myself derived great
+help from it: it is also an essential presupposition for the full understanding
+of the Investigations which follow.
+The position of the Fourth Investigation, On the Distinction between
+independent and non-independent Meanings and the Idea of Pure Grammar,
+is similar to that of the Third. My position in this case is also unaltered. I
+not only amended, but also in many places enriched, the content of the text,
+changes which point to future publications from my lectures on logic.
+The Fifth Investigation, On intentional Experiences and their 'Contents'
+had to undergo deep-going revision. In it cardinal problems of phenomenology (those in particular of the phenomenological doctrine of judgement)
+were tackled: in these it was possible to achieve a considerably higher level
+of clarity and insight without needing to alter the structure and essential
+
+8 Foreword
+content of the Investigation. I no longer approve of the rejection of the pure
+ego, but left the arguments in question in a shortened and formally improved form, as being the basis of P. Natorp's interesting polemic in his new
+Allgemeine Psychologie, volume 1, 1912. I have completely excised the much
+cited, very unclear, and, in the context, quite dispensable §7, 'Reciprocal
+Demarcation of Psychology and Natural Science'
+. I was perhaps all too
+conservative in retaining the quite unsuitable term 'nominal presentation':
+I was afraid in general of tampering with the terminology of the old work.
+The revised version of the Sixth Investigation, now in the press, is designed as the Second Part of the Second Volume: it is the most important
+Investigation from a phenomenological point of view. In this case I soon
+persuaded myself that it would not be enough to revise the old content,
+following the original content paragraph by paragraph. Its fund of problems still were my pace-setter, but I had advanced considerably in regard
+to them, and the sense of my 'maxims' would not permit a further use of
+compromises in regard to them. I accordingly went along quite freely, and,
+in order to give scientific treatment to the great themes so imperfectly dealt
+with in the first edition, I added whole series of new chapters, which increased
+the bulk of this Investigation very considerably.
+As in the Prolegomena I did not, in my second volume (my Fourth Investigation made a small exception) go into the many criticisms which rest, I
+am sorry to say, almost exclusively on misunderstandings of the sense of my
+positions. I therefore thought it more useful to discuss in universal form,
+and in their historical position, the typical misunderstandings of my philosophical endeavours, and that at the end of the Second Volume, in an
+epilogue, so to say. It will be a good thing if the reader has a look at this
+Appendix immediately after reading the Prolegomena, so as to guard himself in time against such apparently natural misunderstandings.
+A full index will be added to the work, prepared with great care by my
+doctoral candidate Rudolf Clemens. I must express my heartfelt thanks for
+much friendly assistance, and, in the hrst place, to the Privatdozent Dr Adolt
+Reinach, who helped me with his zeal and knowledge when, two years
+go, I first went thoroughly into deliberations concerning the possibilitie
+f revision. The labours of correction were greatly lightened by the help
+Dr Hans Lipps and by the doctoral candidate Jean Hering.
+E. HUSSERL
+Göttingen October 1913
+
+Prolegomena to
+Pure Logic
+Volume I of the German Editions
+
+Volume I of the German Editions
+§I The controversy regarding the definition of logic
+and the essential content of its doctrines
+"There is accordingly as much difference of opinion in regard to the definition
+of logic as there is in the treatment of the science itself. This was only to be
+expected in the case of a subject, in regard to which most writers have only
+employed the same words to express different thoughts' (John Stuart Mill,
+Logic, Introduction, §1). Many decades have passed since John Stuart Mill
+introduced his valuable work on logic with these sentences, and important
+thinkers here and beyond the Channel have devoted their best powers to logic
+and have enriched its literature with ever new presentations. But even today
+these sentences could serve as a suitable expression of the state of logical science,
+even today we are very far from complete agreement as to the definition of
+logic and the content of its essential doctrines. Contemporary logic, of course,
+wears quite a different face from the logic of the mid-century. Owing particularly to the influence of the distinguished thinker just mentioned, the
+first of the three main tendencies that we find in logic, the psychological, has
+definitely come to prevail over the formal and the metaphysical tendencies, both as regards the number and the importance of its exponents. But
+the other two tendencies are still carried on, and the disputed questions of
+principle, reflected in different definitions of logic, are still disputed, while it
+is still true, and perhaps more true than ever, that different writers merely
+employ the same words to express different thoughts. This is not merely true
+of expositions stemming from different philosophical 'camps'.
+. The side on
+which most life is to be found, that of psychological logic, manifests unity of
+conviction only in regard to the demarcation of the discipline, its essential
+aims and methods. But one could scarcely be blamed for exaggerating if
+one applied the phrase bellum omnium contra omnes to the doctrines put forth,
+and, in particular, to the opposed interpretations of traditional formulae
+and doctrines. It would be vain to seek to delimit a sum total of substantial
+propositions or theories in which one might see the hard core of our epoch's
+logical science and the heritage bequeathed by it to the future.
+
+12 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+§2 Necessity of a renewed discussion of questions
+of principle
+In this state of the science, which does not permit one to separate individual
+conviction from universally binding truth, a reversion to questions of principle remains a task that must ever be tackled anew. This holds particularly
+as regards the questions which play a decisive role in the dispute among
+logical 'tendencies' and, together with this, in the dispute as to the correct
+demarcation of the science. The interest in just these questions has certainly
+cooled off in the last decades. After Mill's brilliant attacks on the logic of
+Hamilton, and the no less famous, but not so fruitful, logical investigations
+of Trendelenburg, these questions seemed to have been fully dealt with. But
+with the great resurgence of psychological studies, the psychologistic tendency in logic also gained dominance, and all effort centred in the systematic
+building up of the discipline upon principles presumed valid. The fact,
+however, that so many attempts made by such important thinkers to put
+logic on the sure path of a science, have not led to any shattering success,
+suggests that the ends in view have perhaps not been sufficiently clarified to
+allow successful investigation.
+One's conception of the aims of a science find expression in its definition.
+We naturally do not think that successful work on a discipline demands a
+prior conceptual demarcation of its field. The definitions of a science mirror
+the stages of that science's development; knowledge of the conceptual character of a science's objects, of the boundaries and place of its field, follow
+the science and progress with it. None the less, the degree of adequacy of
+such definitions, or of the views of the field they express, react on the progress
+of the science itself, and, according to the direction in which such definitions
+depart from truth, such a reaction can have a slight, or a very important
+influence on the development of the science. The field of a science is an
+objectively closed unity: we cannot arbitrarily delimit fields where and as we
+like. The realm of truth is objectively articulated into fields: researches must
+orient themselves to these objective unities and must assemble themselves
+into sciences. There is a science of numbers, a science of spatial figures, of
+animal species etc., but there are no special sciences of prime numbers,
+of trapezia, or of lions, nor of all three taken together. Where a group of
+discoveries and problems impresses us as "belonging together', and leads to
+the setting up of a science, inadequate demarcation can consist merely in the
+fact that the field-concept is at first too narrow for what is given, and that
+concatenations of grounding connections stretch beyond the delimited field,
+and only draw together in a closed unity over a much wider field. Such
+limitations of horizon need not be prejudicial to the flourishing progress of
+the science. It may be that theoretical interest finds its first satisfaction in the
+narrower field, and that work that can be done without regard to deeper
+and wider logical ramifications, is what is needed in the first instance.
+
+Introduction 13
+There is another, much more dangerous fault in field-delimitation: the confusion of fields, the mixture of heterogeneous things in a putative field-unity,
+especially when this rests on a complete misreading of the objects whose investigation is to be the essential aim of the proposed science. Such an unnoticed
+HETáßaris Eis ändo yévos can have the most damaging consequences: the
+setting up of invalid aims, the employment of methods wrong in principle,
+not commensurate with the discipline's true objects, the confounding of logical
+levels so that the genuinely basic propositions and theories are shoved, often
+in extraordinary disguises, among wholly alien lines of thought, and appear
+as side-issues or incidental consequences etc. These dangers are considerable in
+the philosophical sciences. Questions as to range and boundaries have, therefore, much more importance in the fruitful building up of these sciences than
+in the much favoured sciences of external nature, where the course of our
+experiences forces territorial separations upon us, within which successful
+research can at least be provisionally established. It was Kant who uttered
+the famous special words on logic which we here make our own: 'We do not
+augment, but rather subvert the sciences, if we allow their boundaries to run
+together. The following Investigation hopes to make plain that all previous
+logic, and our contemporary, psychologically based logic in particular, is
+subject, almost without exception, to the above-mentioned dangers: through
+its misinterpretation of theoretical principles, and the consequent confusion
+of fields, progress in logical knowledge has been gravely hindered.
+§3 Disputed questions. The path to be entered
+The traditionally disputed questions which concern the demarcation of logic
+are the following:
+1. Is logic a theoretical or a practical discipline (a 'technology')?
+2. Is it independent of other sciences, and, in particular, of psychology
+and metaphysics?
+3. Is it a formal discipline? Has it merely to do as usually conceived, with
+the "form of knowledge', or should it also take account of its matter?
+4. Has it the character of an a priori, a demonstrative discipline or of an
+empirical, inductive one?
+All these disputed questions are so intimately bound up together, that to
+take up a stance on one of them, is to some extent at least to be determined,
+or factually influenced, in the stance one takes up on the others. There are
+really only two parties. Logic is a theoretical discipline, formal and demonstrative, and independent of psychology: that is one view. For the other it
+counts as a technology dependent on psychology, which of course excludes
+the possibility of its being a formal, demonstrative discipline like the other
+side's paradigm arithmetic.
+Since we do not really mean to become involved in these traditional disputes, but rather to clarify the differences of principle at work in them, and
+
+14 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+to work towards a clarification of the essential aims of a pure logic, we shall
+proceed as follows: we shall start from the almost universally accepted contemporary treatment of logic as a technology, and shall pin down its sense
+and its justification. This will naturally lead on to the question of the theoretical foundations of this discipline, and of its relations, in particular, to
+psychology. This question coincides in essence, in the main if not entirely,
+with the cardinal question of epistemology, that of the objectivity of knowledge. The outcome of our investigation of this point will be the delineation
+of a new, purely theoretical science, the all-important foundation for any
+technology of scientific knowledge, and itself having the character of an a
+priori, purely demonstrative science. This is the science intended by Kant
+conded and depred by ts om a regards is ure log , bod scope the coal
+as regards its content and scope. The final
+outcome of these discussions is a clearly circumscribed idea of the disputed
+discipline's essential content, through which a clear position in regard to the
+previous mentioned controversies will have been gained.
+
+Chapter I
+Logic as a normative and, in
+particular, as a practical discipline
+§4 The theoretical incompleteness of the
+separate sciences
+It is a common experience that the excellence of an artist's mastery over his
+material, and the decisive certainty with which he judges and assesses works
+in his art, is only quite exceptionally based on a theoretical knowledge of the
+rules which prescribe direction and order to his practice, and determine
+the standards of value on which the perfection or imperfection of the complete
+work must be assessed. Normally the practising artist is not the man who
+can who can inform us rightly regarding the principles of his art. He follows
+principles neither in his creation nor his evaluation. In his creation he
+follows the inner activity of his harmoniously trained powers, in his judgement his finely formed artistic taste and feeling. This is not merely so in the
+case of fine art, of which one may first have thought, but in that of the arts
+generally, in the widest sense of the word. It therefore holds for the activities
+of scientific creation and the theoretical evaluation of their results, for the
+scientific demonstrations of facts, laws, theories. Even the mathematician,
+the physicist and the astronomer need not understand the ultimate grounds
+of their activities in order to carry through even the most important scientific performances. Although their results have a power of rational persuasion for themselves and others, yet they cannot claim to have demonstrated
+all the last premisses in their syllogisms, nor to have explored the principles
+on which the success of their methods reposes. The incomplete state of all
+sciences depends on this fact. We do not here mean the mere incompleteness
+with which the truths in a field have been charted, but the lack of inner
+clarity and rationality, which is a need independently of the expansion of
+the science. Even mathematics, the most advanced of all sciences, can in this
+respect claim no special position. Though often still treated as the ideal of
+all science as such, how little it really is such is shown by the old, yet never
+finally composed disputes as to the foundations of geometry, or as to the
+justification of the method of imaginaries. The same thinkers who sustain
+marvellous mathematical methods with such incomparable mastery, and
+
+16 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+who add new methods to them, often show themselves incapable of accounting satisfactorily for their logical validity and for the limits of their
+right use. Though the sciences have grown great despite these defects, and
+have helped us to a formerly undreamt of mastery over nature, they cannot
+satisfy us theoretically. They are, as theories, not crystal-clear: the function
+of all their concepts and propositions is not fully intelligible, not all of their
+presuppositions have been exactly analysed, they are not in their entirety
+raised above all theoretical doubt.
+§5 The theoretical completion of the separate
+sciences by metaphysics and theory of science
+To reach this theoretical goal we first need, as is fairly generally admitted, a
+type of investigation which belongs to the metaphysical realm.
+Its task is to pin down and to test the untested, for the most part not even
+noticed, yet very significant metaphysical presuppositions that underlie
+at least all those sciences that are concerned with actual reality. Such presuppositions are, e.g., that an external world exists, that it is spread out in
+space and time, its space being, as regards its mathematical character, threedimensional and Euclidean, and its time a one-dimensional rectilinear
+manifold; that all process is subject to the causal principle etc. These presuppositions, all to be found in the framework of Aristotle's First Philosophy, are
+at present ranked under the quite unsuitable rubric of 'epistemology'.
+Such a metaphysical foundation is not, however, sufficient to provide the
+desired theoretical completion of the separate sciences. It concerns, moreover,
+only such sciences as have to do with actual reality, which does not include
+all sciences, certainly not the purely mathematical sciences whose objects are
+numbers, manifolds etc., things thought of as mere bearers of ideal properties
+independent of real being or non-being. The case is different in regard to another
+class of investigations whose theoretical completion is plainly an indispensable
+postulate in our quest for knowledge, investigations which concern all sciences
+equally, since they concern, in brief, whatever makes sciences into sciences.
+This names the field of a new, and, as we shall see, complex discipline, whose
+peculiarity it is to be the science of science, and which could therefore be
+most pointedly called theory of science (Wissenschaftslehre).
+§6 The possibility and justification of logic as
+theory of science
+The possibility and justification of such a discipline - a normative and
+practical discipline relating to the Idea of science - can be shown by the
+following considerations.
+Science is concerned, as its name indicates, with knowing, but this does
+not mean that it itself consists of a sum or tissue of acts of knowing. Science
+
+Logic as
+a normative and, in particular,
+as a practical discipline 17
+exists objectively only in its literature, only in written work has it a rich
+relational being limited to men and their intellectual activities: in this form it
+is propagated down the millennia, and survives individuals, generations and
+nations. It therefore represents a set of external arrangements, which, just as
+they arose out of the knowledge-acts of many individuals, can again pass
+over into just such acts of countless individuals, in a readily understandable
+manner, whose exact description would require much circumlocution. For
+us it is here sufficient that science provides, or should provide, certain more
+immediate preconditions of acts of knowing, real possibilities of knowing,
+whose realization by the 'normal' or 'suitably endowed' individual in wellknown, 'normal' circumstances can be looked on as an attainable goal of his
+endeavour. In this sense, therefore, science aims at knowledge.
+In knowledge, however, we possess truth. In actual knowledge, to which
+we see ourselves ultimately referred back, we possess truth as the object of a
+correct judgement. But this alone is not enough, since not every correct
+judgement, every affirmation or rejection of a state of affairs that accords
+with truth, represents knowledge of the being or non-being of this state of
+affairs. Rather we may say that, if it is to be called 'knowledge' in the
+narrowest, strictest sense, it requires to be evident, to have the luminous
+certainty that what we have acknowledged is, that what we have rejected is
+not, a certainty distinguished in familiar fashion from blind belief, from
+vague opining, however firm and decided, if we are not to be shattered on
+the rocks of extreme scepticism. Common talk does not, however, stay put
+in this strict concept. We also speak, e.g. of an act of knowing where the
+judgement we pass is associated with a clear memory that we previously
+passed a judgement of precisely the same content accompanied with inner
+evidence. This happens particularly where our memory also concerns a
+demonstrative thought-process out of which this inner evidence grew, and
+that we are sure we can reproduce with such evidence. (I know that the
+Pythagorean theorem is true - I can prove it': instead of the second half, one
+can of course also say 'but I have forgotten the proof".)
+We therefore conceive 'knowledge' in a wider, but not wholly loose sense:
+we separate it off from baseless opinion, by pointing to some 'mark' of the
+presumed state of affairs or for the correctness of the judgement passed by
+us. The most perfect 'mark' of correctness is inward evidence, it counts as
+an immediate intimation of truth itself. In the vast majority of cases we lack
+such absolute knowledge of truth, in whose place we make use - one need
+only think how memory functions in the above examples - of the inner
+evidence for a higher or lower degree of probability for our state of affairs,
+with which, if probability-levels become high enough, a firm judgement is
+usually associated. The inward evidence of the probability of a state of
+affairs A will not serve to ground the inward evidence of its truth, but it will
+serve to ground those comparative, inwardly evident value-assessments,
+through which, in accordance with positive or negative probability-values,
+
+18 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+we can distinguish the reasonable from the unreasonable, the better-founded
+from the worse-founded assumptions, opinions and surmises. Ultimately,
+therefore, all genuine, and, in particular, all scientific knowledge, rests on
+inner evidence: as far as such evidence extends, the concept of knowledge
+extends also.
+There is none the less a remaining duality in the concept of knowing or
+knowledge. Knowledge in the narrowest sense of the word is the being
+inwardly evident that a certain state of affairs is or is not, e.g. that Sis Por
+that it is not P. If it is evident that a certain state of affairs is probable to
+this or that degree, then we have knowledge in the strictest sense of such a
+probability, but, in regard to the being of the state of affairs itself, and not
+of its probability, we only have knowledge in a wider, modified sense. It is
+in this latter sense, with an eye to degrees of probability, that one speaks
+of a greater or lesser degree of knowledge. Knowledge in the pregnant sense
+- its being quite evident that S is P - then counts as the absolutely fixed,
+ideal limit which the graded probabilities for the being-P of S approach
+asymptotically.
+But the concept and task of science covers more than mere knowledge. If
+we live through and recognize the presence of inner percepts, singly or in
+groups, we have knowledge, but are far removed from science: the same
+applies generally to all incoherent groups of acts of knowing. A group of
+isolated bits of chemical knowledge would certainly not justify talk of a
+science of chemistry. More is plainly required, i.e. systematic coherence in
+the theoretical sense, which means finding grounds for one's knowing, and
+suitably combining and arranging the sequence of such groundings.
+The essence of science therefore involves unity of the foundational
+connections: not only isolated pieces of knowledge, but their grounded
+validations themselves, and together with these, the higher interweavings of
+such validations that we call theories, must achieve systematic unity. The
+aim is not merely to arrive at knowledge, but knowledge in such degree and
+form as would correspond to our highest theoretical aims as perfectly as
+possible.
+That we look upon, and practically strive after, systematic form as the purest
+embodiment of the Idea of science, does not evince some merely aesthetic
+trait in our nature. Science neither wishes nor dares to become a field for
+architectonic play. The system peculiar to science, i.e. to true and correct
+science, is not our own invention, but is present in things, where we simply
+find or discover it. Science seeks to be a means towards the greatest possible
+conquest of the realm of truth by our knowledge. The realm of truth is,
+however, no disordered chaos, but is dominated and unified by law. The
+investigation and setting forth of truths must, therefore, likewise be systematic, it must reflect the systematic connections of those truths, and must use
+the latter as a ladder to progress and penetrate from the knowledge given to,
+or already gained by us to ever higher regions of the realm of truth.
+
+Logic as
+a normative and, in particular, as a practical discipline 19
+Science can never do without this helpful ladder. The inward evidence on
+which all knowledge ultimately reposes, is no gift of nature, appearing
+together with the mere idea of states of affairs without any methodically
+artful set-up. People would otherwise never have thought of building up
+sciences. The longueurs of method would lose their sense if to intend meant
+to succeed. Why should one search into relations of entailment or construct
+proofs, if one shared in truth through immediate intimation? The inward
+evidence, moreover, which stamps one presented state of affairs as having
+real being, or the absurdity which stamps it as having no being at all (and the
+same, likewise, in regard to probability and improbability) is, in fact, only
+immediately felt in the case of a relatively quite limited group of primitive
+facts. Countless true propositions are only grasped by us as true when we
+methodically validate them. In their case, a mere regard to our propositional
+thought, will not induce inward evidence, even if it does induce judgemental
+decision. Both are, however, induced, certain circumstances being normal,
+where we set forth from certain known truths, and tread a certain path in
+thought to our intended proposition. There may be many ways of establishing the same proposition, starting from these or those bits of knowledge. It
+is, however, a characteristic and essential circumstance that there are infinitely many truths which could never be transformed into knowledge without
+such methodical procedures.
+That this is the case, that we need grounded validations in order to pass
+beyond what, in knowledge, is immediately and therefore trivially evident,
+not only makes the sciences possible and necessary, but with these also a
+theory of science, a logic. All sciences proceed methodically in the pursuit of
+truth, employ more or less artificial aids in order to bring to knowledge
+truths or probabilities that would otherwise remain hidden, and in order to
+use the obvious or the already established as a lever for achieving what is
+remote and only mediately attainable. The comparative treatment of these
+methodical aids, in which the insights and experiences of countless generations of thinkers are stored up, should provide the means for setting up
+general norms for such procedures and likewise rules for their inventive
+construction in various classes of cases.
+§7 Continuation. The three most noteworthy
+peculiarities of grounded validations
+Let us penetrate somewhat more deeply into this matter, and reflect on the
+most noteworthy peculiarities of the remarkable thought-sequences called
+by us 'validations'.
+They have in the first place the character of a fixed structure in relation to
+their content. We cannot, in order to reach a given piece of knowledge, that,
+e.g. of the Pythagorean theorem, choose our starting point at random among
+the pieces of knowledge immediately given to us, nor can we add or subtract
+
+20 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+any thought-items at will, if the evidence of the proposition to be validated
+is to burst forth genuinely, the validation to be a genuine validation.
+A second point is at once evident. It might seem thinkable a priori, i.e.
+before we glance at, and compare instances of validation streaming in on
+us abundantly from every quarter that each validation should be unique
+both in content and in form. A whim of nature - this might at first seem a
+tenable thought - might have framed our psychic constitution so wantonly
+that our familiar talk of a multiplicity of modes of validating matters might
+have lacked all sense. The only thing that could be pronounced common to
+any validations that we might compare would be that a proposition S, itself
+lacking inner evidence, achieves an evident character if it appears in combination with certain known truths Pi, P2... truths whose relevance to it is
+a non-recurrent matter not subject to a rational rule. This is not how the
+matter stands, however. A blind caprice has not bundled any set of truths
+Ps, Pr... S together and then so instituted the human mind that it must
+necessarily (or in 'normal' circumstances) connect the knowledge of S with
+the knowledge of P,, Pz... In no single case is this so. Connections of
+validation are not governed by caprice or chance, but by reason and order,
+i.e. by regulative laws. We hardly need an example to illuminate the point. If
+in a mathematical problem relating to a certain triangle ABC, we apply the
+proposition An equilateral triangle is equiangular, we carry out a validation
+which, made explicit, runs: Every equilateral triangle is equiangular; the
+triangle ABC is equilateral, and is therefore equiangular. If we set beside
+this the arithmetical argument: Every decimal number with an even last
+digit is an even number, 364 is a decimal number with an even last digit, and
+is therefore an even number, we note at once that the 'establishments' have
+something in common, an inner constitution of like type, which is intelligibly
+expressed in the syllogistic form 'Every A is B, X is A, so X is B'. Not only
+have these two arguments this same form, but countless others have it as
+well. Our syllogistic form further represents a class-concept, under which
+falls an infinite multitude of sentence-combinations all with the constitution
+that this form pointedly expresses. There is also an a priori law, making any
+putative validation that follows this form, also actually a correct one, provided, that is, that it proceeds from correct premisses.
+This holds in general. Wherever we ascend by an establishing argument from
+given pieces of knowledge to new ones, a certain form resides in our modes of
+validation, which is common to countless other validating arguments, and
+which stands in a certain relation to a general law that allows us to justify
+all these single validations at one 'go'. No validating procedure - such is the
+quite remarkable fact - stands in isolation. None ties bits of knowledge up
+with other bits of knowledge, unless in their external mode of association, or
+in this together with the inner structure of the separate propositions, a definite
+type is brought out, a type which, if conceptually generalized, at once leads
+to a general law applying to an infinity of possible cases of validation.
+
+Logic as a normative and, in particular, as a practical discipline 21
+A third remarkable feature deserves emphasis. A priori, i.e. before one
+compares validating arguments in different sciences, one might think it a
+possible thought that forms of validation should be bound up with territories of knowledge. Though the appropriate validations do not vary with
+types of object, it might still be the case that they divide sharply along
+certain highly general class-lines, the lines perhaps that demarcate varying
+scientific fields. Is it not the case that there is no pattern of validation
+common to two sciences, to mathematics, e.g. and chemistry? But this too is
+plainly not so, as our above example shows. There is no science where laws
+are not applicable to individual cases, where we do not therefore have
+syllogisms of the form illustrated above. The same holds of many other types
+of syllogism. We may in fact say of all other types of syllogism that they
+may be so generalized, so purely conceived, as to be free of all essential
+relation to some conceivably limited field of knowledge.
+88 The relation of these peculiarities to the
+possibility of science and the theory of science
+These peculiarities of our validations, whose remarkable character escapes us
+since we are all too little disposed to turn everyday matters into problems,
+are visibly related to the possibility of a science and, further, of a theory of
+science.
+That there are validating arguments is not in this connection enough. If
+they were formless and lawless, if it were not a fundamental truth that all
+validating arguments have certain indwelling 'forms', not peculiar to the
+simple or indefinitely complex arguments set before us here and now, but
+typical of a whole class of arguments, and that the correctness of this whole
+class of arguments is guaranteed just by their form - if the contrary of all
+this were true, there would be no science. Talk about a method, about a
+systematically regulated progress from one bit of knowledge to another,
+would be senseless, and all progress would be fortuitous. The propositions
+P1, Pz... which were fitted to confer evident truth on the proposition S,
+might fortuitously come up together in our consciousness, and this evident
+truth would then become duly luminous. It would no longer be possible to
+learn anything at all from a validating argument for future use on new
+validating arguments with novel material. No validating argument could
+serve as a paradigm for any other, none could embody a type, and no set
+of judgements, conceived as a system of premisses, could have anything
+typical about it which could (without conceptual high-lighting or recourse
+to explicit 'inference-forms') crop up, on the occasion of a new case with
+quite novel materials, and help us on to a fresh gain in knowledge. It would
+be senseless to look for a proof of a given proposition. How indeed could
+one attempt it? Should one try out all possible sets of propositions to see
+if they could be employed as premisses for the proposition in question?
+
+22 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+The cleverest man would here have no advantage over the stupidest, and it
+may be questioned whether he would have any essential advantage over him
+at all. A rich imagination, a comprehensive memory, a capacity for close
+attention etc., are fine things, but they have intellectual meaning only in the
+case of a thinking being, whose validation and invention falls under laws
+and forms.
+It is generally true, in fact, that in all mental compounding, combinatory
+forms as well as mere elements have their associative or reproductive effect.
+The form, therefore, of our theoretical thoughts and thought-combinations
+may well prove useful. As, e.g., the form of certain premisses makes the
+emergence of appropriate conclusions much easier, since former inferences
+of like form have succeeded, so the form of some proposition to be proved
+may recall certain validating forms that have formerly yielded conclusions
+of the same form. If this is no clear, genuine case of memory, it is none the
+less analogous to the latter, and to some extent latent memory, an 'unconscious excitation' (in the sense of B. Erdmann). It is in any case something
+that greatly promotes proofs (and this not only in fields like mathematics
+that are dominated by arguments in form). The trained thinker finds proofs
+more readily than the untrained one. Why is this so? Because types of proof
+have been ever more deeply engraved on his mind through a varied experience, and so must operate more readily for him and determine the direction
+of his thought. To a certain extent any sort of scientific thought gives us
+practice in scientific thinking, but it is true also that to a peculiar degree and
+extent mathematical thought predisposes to what is mathematical, physical
+thought to what is physical etc. The former rests on the existence of typical
+forms common to all sciences, the latter on the existence of other forms,
+perhaps to be characterized as peculiarly structured complexes of the former
+- which are peculiarly related to what is peculiar to the separate sciences.
+The unique features of scientific flair, of anticipatory intuition and divination, hang together with this. We speak of a philological, of a mathematical
+flair and eye etc., and who possesses them? The trained philologist, mathematician etc., with his many years of practice. In the general nature of the
+objects of each realm certain forms of factual connection are rooted; these
+in their turn determine typical peculiarities of forms of validation that predominate in this realm. Herein we have the foundation for the pioneering
+hunches of science. All testing, invention and discovery therefore rests on
+regularities of form.
+If all this shows that it is regular form that makes possible the existence of
+sciences, so, on the other hand, it is the wide degree of independence of form
+from a field of knowledge that makes possible a theory of science. Were there
+no such independence, there would only be coordinated logics separately
+corresponding to the separate sciences, but no general logic. In fact both are
+needed: investigations into the theory of science concerning all sciences
+equally, and, supplementary to these, particular investigations concerning
+
+Logic as a normative and, in particular, as a practical discipline 23
+the theory and method of the separate sciences which endeavour to search
+into what is peculiar to them.
+To stress the peculiarities revealed by the comparative treatment of validating arguments, is not therefore without use in casting light on our discipline
+itself, on logic in the sense of a theory of science.
+§° Methodical modes of procedure in the sciences
+are in part validatory, in part auxiliary devices
+towards validations
+Certain points must still be added, first in regard to the restriction of our
+treatment to validations, which plainly do not exhaust the notion of methodical procedure. Validations have, however, a central significance that will
+justify our provisional restriction.
+One can in fact say that all scientific methods which do not themselves
+have the character of actual validating arguments (whether simple or of any
+degree of complexity) are, on the one hand, abbreviations and substitutes
+for such validating arguments, used to economize thought, since, having
+themselves once and for all received sense and value from such validation,
+their application now in practice does the work of validation without its
+charge of cogitative insight. They may, on the other hand, represent more or
+less complex auxiliary devices, which serve to prepare for, to facilitate, to
+ensure or to render possible future processes of validation without themselves being able to claim a significance which is of like value with, or
+independent of, these basic scientific processes.
+To take up the latter group of methods, it is, e.g. an important prerequisite for securing one's validations that one's thoughts are adequately
+expressed by readily distinguishable, unambiguous signs. Language offers
+the investigator a widely applicable sign-system to express his thoughts, but,
+though no one can do without it, it represents a most imperfect aid towards
+strict research. The pernicious influences of ambiguities on the validity of
+syllogistic inferences are familiar. The careful thinker will not therefore use
+language without artificial precautions; to the extent that the terms he uses
+are not unambiguous and lack sharp meaning, he must define them. The
+definition of names we therefore see as a methodical auxiliary procedure
+towards ensuring validations, the latter being one's primary, truly theoretical procedures.
+The same is true of nomenclature. Brief, characteristic symbols for the
+more important, recurrent concepts are - to mention only one point - indispensable wherever the expression of such concepts, by means of one's
+original stock of defined expressions would be unduly circumstantial. Involved
+expressions with such inbuilt Chinese-box complexity impede validatory
+operations or render them unperformable.
+The method of classification can be treated from similar points of view etc.
+
+24 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+Examples of the first group of methods are provided by the extraordinarily fruitful algorithmic methods, whose peculiar function is to save us as
+much genuine deductive mental work as possible by artificially arranged
+mechanical operations on sensible signs. Whatever marvels these methods
+may achieve, their sense and justification depends on validatory thought.
+Here also belong what are literally mechanical methods - one may think of
+the apparatus for mechanical integration, calculating machines etc. - as well
+as the methodical procedures for establishing objectively valid empirical judgements, such as the various methods of determining the position of a star,
+electrical resistance, inert mass, refractive index, the gravitational constant etc.
+Each such method represents a set of provisions whose choice and arrangement is fixed by a validatory context, which shows, in general, that such a
+procedure, even when blindly performed, must necessarily lead to an objectively valid individual judgement.
+But enough of examples. It is plain that each actual advance in science is
+performed in an act of validation: to this all those methodical precautions and
+devices relate, which logic considers in addition to processes of validation.
+To this relation their typical character is likewise due, which is essentially
+involved in the Idea of method. On account of this typical character they
+too have a place in the discussions of the previous paragraph.
+§10 The ideas of theory and science as problems of
+the theory of science
+Something more must be added. The theory of science, as here shown up, is
+not merely concerned to investigate the forms and laws of isolated validations,
+and the auxiliary devices which go with these. Isolated validations also occur
+beyond the boundaries of science: clearly, therefore, isolated validations
+- and loosely piled heaps of such validations - do not make up science.
+Science requires, as said above, a certain unity of validatory interconnection, a certain unity in the stepwise ascent of its validatory arguments, and
+this form of unity has itself a lofty teleological meaning in the attainment of
+the highest goal of knowledge for which all science strives: to advance as far
+as possible in the research into truth, i.e. not in the research into separate
+truths, but into the realm of truth or its natural provinces.
+The task of the theory of science will therefore also be to deal with the sciences as systematic unities of this or that sort in other words, with the formal
+features that stamp them as sciences, with the features that determine their
+mutual boundaries and their inner articulation into fields, into relatively
+closed theories, with the features which fix their essentially different species
+or forms etc.
+This systematic tissue of validatory arguments can in fact be subordinated
+to the concept of method, so that science's task is not merely to deal with
+the methods of knowledge in the sciences, but also with such methods as are
+
+Logic as a normative and, in particular, as a practical discipline 25
+themselves styled sciences. Its task is not merely to separate off valid from
+invalid demonstrations, but also valid from invalid theories and sciences.
+The task thus assigned it is plainly not independent of the one previously
+mentioned, but to a considerable extent presupposes a prior carrying out of
+the former. Research into the sciences as systematic unities is unthinkable
+without prior research into their validatory procedures. Both at least enter
+into the notion of a science of science as such.
+§I| Logic or theory of science as normative discipline
+and as technology
+From our discussions up to this point logic - in the sense of the theory of
+science here in question - emerges as a normative discipline. Sciences are
+creations of the spirit which are directed to a certain end, and which are
+for that reason to be judged in accordance with that end. The same holds
+of theories, validations and in short of everything that we call a 'method'.
+Whether a science is truly a science, or a method a method, depends on
+whether it accords with the aims that it strives for. Logic seeks to search
+into what pertains to genuine, valid science as such, what constitutes the
+Idea of Science, so as to be able to use the latter to measure the empirically
+given sciences as to their agreement with their Idea, the degree to which they
+approach it, and where they offend against it. In this logic shows itself to be
+a normative science, and separates itself off from the comparative mode of
+treatment which tries to conceive of the sciences, according to their typical
+communities and peculiarities, as concrete cultural products of their era,
+and to explain them through the relationships which obtain in their time.
+For it is of the essence of a normative science that it establishes general
+propositions in which, with an eye to a normative standard, an Idea or
+highest goal, certain features are mentioned whose possession guarantees
+conformity to that standard, or sets forth an indispensable condition of the
+latter. A normative science also establishes cognate propositions in which
+the case of non-conformity is considered or the absence of such states of
+affairs is pronounced. Not as if one had to state general marks in order to
+say what an object should be to conform to its basic norm: a normative
+discipline never sets forth universal criteria, any more than a therapy states
+universal symptoms. Special criteria are what the theory of science particularly gives us, and what it alone can give us. If it maintains that, having
+regard to the supreme aim of the sciences and the human mind's actual
+constitution, and whatever else may be invoked, such and such methods
+My, Mz.... arise, it states general propositions of the form: 'Every group of
+mental activities of the sorts AB ... which realize the combinatory form M,
+(or Mz...) yield a case of correct method', or, what amounts to the same
+'Every (soi-disant) methodical procedure of the form M, (or M2...) is a
+correct one' If one could really formulate all intrinsically possible valid
+
+26 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+propositions of this and like sort, our normative science would certainly
+possess a measuring rod for every pretended method, but then also only in
+the form of special criteria.
+Where the basic norm is an end or can become an end, the normative
+discipline by a ready extension of its task gives rise to a technology. This
+occurs in this case too. If the theory of science sets itself the further task of
+investigating such conditions as are subject to our power, on which the
+realization of valid methods depends, and if it draws up rules for our procedure in the methodical tracking down of truth, in the valid demarcation
+and construction of the sciences, in the discovery and use, in particular, of
+the many methods that advance such sciences, and in the avoidance
+of errors in all of these concerns, then it has become a technology of science.
+This last plainly includes the whole normative theory of science, and it is
+therefore wholly appropriate, in view of the unquestionable value of such
+a technology, that the concept of logic should be correspondingly widened,
+and should be defined in its sense.
+§12 Relevant definitions of logic
+The definition of logic as a technology was much favoured by tradition, but
+closer determinations of it left much to be desired. Definitions such as 'technology of judgement, of reasoning, of knowing, of thinking' (l'art de penser)
+are misleading, and in any case too narrow. If we restrict the vague meaning
+of the word 'thinking' in the last-mentioned definition (in use to this day) to
+the concept of correct judgement, our definition reads: "the technology of
+correct judgement'. But that this definition is too narrow is plain from the
+fact that the aim of scientific knowledge does not follow from it. If one says
+that 'the aim of thinking is first perfectly fulfilled in science', this is without doubt right, but it concedes that not thought or knowledge is really the
+end of the technology in question, but that towards which thought itself is a
+means.
+Other definitions are open to similar objections. They are open to the
+objection recently revived by Bergmann that the technology of an activity,
+e.g. painting, singing, riding, would be expected above all 'to show what one
+must do to perform the relevant activity correctly, e.g. how one must hold
+and wield the brush in painting, how one must use the chest, throat and
+mouth in singing, how one must pull and relax the reins in riding and press
+with one's legs'. This would admit into the field of logic doctrines wholly
+alien to it.'
+Schleiermacher's definition of logic as the technology of scientific knowledge certainly comes closer to the truth. For obviously in a discipline so
+defined one would have to consider only what is peculiar to scientific knowledge, and to probe its possible demands: the further preconditions which
+in general favour the emergence of knowledge would be left to pedagogy,
+
+Logic as a normative and, in particular, as a practical discipline 27
+hygiene etc. But Schleiermacher's definition does not plainly say that this
+technology should also set up rules for the demarcation and construction
+of the sciences, whereas this aim, on the other hand, includes the aim of scientific knowledge. Excellent thoughts towards the circumscription of our
+discipline are to be found in Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre, but rather in his
+preliminary critical searchings than in the definition he himself espouses.
+This last sounds oddly enough: the theory of science (or logic) is 'the science
+which shows us how to present the sciences in convenient textbooks'?
+
+Theoretical disciplines as the
+foundation of normative disciplines
+§13 The controversy regarding the practical
+character of logic
+Our last discussions have given so obvious a justification to the view of logic
+as a technology, that it might seem remarkable that there should ever have
+been controversy on this point. A practically oriented logic is an indispensable postulate of all the sciences, and this corresponds to the historical fact
+that logic arose out of practical motives connected with the business of
+science. This we know happened in those thought-stirring times when the
+young, budding science of the Greeks was in danger of succumbing to the
+attacks of sophists and subjectivists, when all its future success depended on
+finding objective criteria of truth, which might destroy the cheating illusions
+of the sophistical dialectic.
+In modern times, mainly under the influence of Kant, there have been
+repeated denials that logic is a technology, though such a characterization
+has, on the other hand, been held to have some value: this dispute cannot
+have turned on the mere question whether it is possible to give logic practical aims, and so to conceive of it as a practical discipline. Kant himself
+spoke of an applied logic which should have as its task the regulation of the
+use of the understanding 'under the contingent conditions of the subject,
+which might hinder or assist it' (Critique of Pure Reason: Intro. to Trans.
+Logic, I, last paragraph A54/B78-9), and from which we might learn 'what
+promotes the correct use of the understanding, what assists it and what
+cures it from logical mistakes and errors' (Kant's Logik, Introduction II,
+Hartenstein's edition 1867, VIll, p. 18). Though he is not willing to let it
+rank, with pure logic, as an authentic science, though he even thinks that
+'it should not properly be called logic' (Critique of Pure Reason, Werke, ed.
+Hartenstein, III, p. 83), everyone is none the less at liberty to extend the
+aim of logic so as to include applied, practical logic.' It may in any case
+be disputed, as has in fact frequently happened, whether great gain can be
+hoped for from logic as a practical theory of science, whether, e.g. one could
+really hope for such great revolutions and advances from an extension of
+the old logic (which could only serve to test given knowledge) into an ars
+
+Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines 29
+inventiva, a 'logic of discovery'
+, as Leibniz is known to have believed etc.
+This dispute, however, concerns no point important in principle, and it is
+settled by the clear maxim that even the moderate probability of a future
+advance in the sciences justifies us in working on a normative discipline
+pledged to this end, without regard to the fact that the rules we deduce
+represent a valuable enrichment of knowledge.
+The genuinely disputed question of important principle, to which neither
+side has given precision, lies in quite a different direction: whether the definition of logic as a technology really touches its essential character. We ask,
+in other words, if it is only a practical standpoint that establishes the right
+of logic to count as a peculiar scientific discipline, while, from a theoretical
+standpoint, all the findings accumulated by logic consist, on the one hand,
+in purely theoretical propositions having their original home in otherwise
+known theoretical sciences, and mainly in psychology, and, on the other
+hand in rules based on these theoretical propositions.
+The essence of Kant's conception of logic does not, in fact, lie in the fact
+that he disputes the practical character of logic, but that he believes in the
+possibility and the epistemologically basic character of a certain delimitation or restriction of logic, which would make of it a wholly independent
+science, one which, in comparison with otherwise known sciences, is wholly
+new and entirely theoretical, and which, like mathematics, stands outside of
+any thought of possible application, in being an a priori, purely demonstrative
+discipline.
+The restriction of logic to its theoretic knowledge-content leads, on the
+prevailing form of the doctrine opposed to Kant's, to psychological and
+perhaps also grammatical and other propositions, i.e. to small excerpts from
+otherwise delimited, and, let us add, empirical sciences. Whereas, on Kant's
+view, we rather dig down to an internally closed, independent and, let us
+add, a priori field of theoretical knowledge, to pure logic.
+It is apparent that other weighty oppositions are at work in these doctrines;
+whether logic should count as an a priori or an empirical science, as an
+independent or dependent science, as a demonstrative or non-demonstrative
+science. If we drop these questions as remote from our immediate interests,
+only the above mentioned point of dispute remains: on one side we abstract
+the assertion that under every logic thought of as a technology lies a peculiar
+theoretical discipline, a pure logic, whereas, on the other view, all theoretical
+doctrines admitted into the logical technology are held to be classifiable in
+otherwise known theoretical sciences.
+The second point of view was stoutly defended by Beneke, and J. Stuart
+Mill stated it clearly in his Logic which has also been influential in this
+respect.? Sigwart's Logik, the leading contribution to recent logical work in
+Germany, also stands on similar ground. Clearly and decisively it is there said:
+"The highest task of logic, and the one which constitutes its real essence, is
+to be a technical discipline'.*
+
+30 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+On the other side we have, in addition to Kant, principally Herbart, and
+a large number of their disciples.
+How easily the most extreme empiricism accords in this respect with Kant's
+conception is seen from Bain's Logic which, constructed as a technology,
+expressly acknowledges, and claims to include, a logic which is a peculiar,
+abstract, theoretical discipline — a science of the same sort as mathematics.
+This theoretical discipline is held by Bain to rest on psychology; it is not
+thought of, as by Kant, to precede all other sciences as an absolutely independent science. But it remains a science on its own account: it is not, as
+Mill would have it, a mere assemblage of psychological chapters, offered
+with the intention to regulate knowledge practically.S
+In the many treatments which logic has received this century, the point
+of difference here in question has hardly ever been clearly emphasized and
+carefully considered. Since the practical treatment of logic accords with
+either standpoint, and is generally admitted to be useful on either, the whole
+dispute as to the essentially practical or theoretical character of logic has
+seemed meaningless to many. They have never in fact been clear as to how
+the standpoints differ.
+We are not required by our purposes to go critically into the disputes of
+older logicians as to whether logic is an art or a science or both, and whether,
+in the second case, it is a practical or speculative science or both. On these
+questions, and on the value of these questions, Sir William Hamilton has
+pronounced as follows:
+The controversy... is perhaps one of the most futile in the history of
+speculation. In so far as Logic is concerned, the decision of the question
+is not of the very smallest import. It was not in consequence of any diversity of opinion in regard to the scope and nature of this doctrine, that philosophers disputed by what name it should be called. The controversy
+was, in fact, only about what was properly an art, and what was properly
+a science; and as men attached one meaning or another to these terms,
+so did they affirm Logic to be an art, or a science, or both, or neither.
+(Lectures on Logic, ed. III, Vol. I (1884), pp. 9-10)
+One must note, however, that Hamilton himself did not dig very deeply into
+the content and value of the distinctions and controversies in question. If
+there were appropriate agreement as to the way to treat logic, and the content of the doctrines to be attributed to it, the question if and how the
+concepts art and science entered into its definition, would be of minor importance, though by no means a mere question of labelling. But the dispute
+over the definition (as we have already maintained) is really a dispute regarding the science itself, and one not regarding the completed science but
+the provisionally pretended one, the one still in progress, whose methods,
+doctrines, in short everything, are still in doubt. Even in Hamilton's day,
+
+Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines 31
+and long before, men differed considerably as to the essential content, the
+scope and the manner of treatment of logic. One need only compare the
+works of Hamilton, Bolzano, Mill and Beneke. And how the differences have
+grown since then. Put together Erdmann and Drobisch, Wundt and Bermann,
+Schuppe and Brentano, Sigwart and Uberweg, and ask whether one then
+has a single science, or only a single name. One might settle for the latter, if
+there were not occasionally some more comprehensive groups of common
+themes, though in respect of the doctrine, and even the problems, no two
+logicians reach a tolerable understanding among themselves. If we associate
+with this the point stressed in the Introduction, that definitions of logic
+merely express beliefs as to its essential tasks and methodical character, and
+that errors and prejudices on these points can help to mislead so retarded
+a science on to wrong paths of research. We shall certainly not agree with
+Hamilton in saying that the decision of the question is not of the very
+smallest import.
+Confusion has not a little been promoted by the fact that even distinguished protagonists of the autonomy of a pure logic, such as Drobisch and
+Bergmann, have put the normative character of the discipline among the
+features essential to its notion. Their opponents saw in this a patent inconsequence, even a contradiction. Has not the concept of normativity got an
+inherent relation to a guiding aim, and to activities devoted to it? Does not
+a normative science mean exactly the same as a technology?
+The manner in which Drobisch introduces and conceives his determinations
+merely confirms these impressions. In his ever valuable Logic we read: •There
+are two angles from which thought can be made the object of a scientific
+investigation: as an activity of mind whose conditions and laws may be
+looked into, and as a tool for acquiring mediate knowledge, permitting both
+of a correct and a faulty use, and leading in the one case to true, in the other
+to false results. There are therefore both natural and normal laws for thinking, and the latter are prescriptions (norms) to which one must direct oneself
+to reach these results. The investigation of the natural laws of thinking is a
+task for psychology, whereas the establishment of its normal rules is the
+task of logic' (Neue Darstellung der Logik, §2, p. 3). And to this the further
+more than sufficient explanation is added: 'Normal rules always regulate an
+activity in conformity with a certain end.'
+On the other hand one might say: here nothing is said to which Beneke
+or Mill could not subscribe, and which they could not adapt to their own
+advantage. If we grant the identity of the concepts 'normative discipline' and
+"technology', it is obvious that, as in the case of technologies in general, it is
+not the mutual connectedness of matters but our guiding aim which serves
+to bind and unite logical truths into a discipline. It is then plainly wrong to
+set logic bounds as narrow as those of the traditional Aristotelian logic,
+since 'pure' logic certainly goes beyond these. It is absurd to set logic a goal,
+and then to exclude from it classes of norms and normative investigations
+
+32 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+that pertain to this goal. The exponents of pure logic still live under the spell
+of tradition; the marvellous magic distilled by the hollow formularies hawked
+about by the school logic down the ages, still works powerfully in them.
+Such is the list of obvious objections likely to turn modern interest from a
+closer discussion of the objective reasons which have weighed with great,
+independent thinkers in favour of an autonomous science of pure logic, and
+which still call for serious probing. The worthy Drobisch may have gone
+wrong in his statement, but this does not prove that his position, or that of
+his master Herbart, or that ultimately of his prime inspirer Kant, was in
+essence misguided. It does not even rule out the possibility that a valuable
+thought, that has not achieved conceptually clear expression, may lie hidden
+under his imperfect statement. Let us dwell on the coordination of logic with
+pure mathematics, of which the champions of pure logic are so fond. The
+mathematical disciplines also yield a basis for technologies. To arithmetic
+corresponds the practical art of calculation, to geometry the art of landsurveying. Technologies are similarly connected, though somewhat differently,
+with the abstract theoretical natural sciences, physical technologies with
+physics, chemical technologies with chemistry. This readily suggests the view
+that it is the true sense of our supposed pure logic to be an abstract theoretical discipline providing a basis for a technology just as the previously mentioned disciplines do, its technology being logic in the ordinary, practical
+sense. And just as technologies sometimes have one main, basic, theoretical
+discipline from which their norms flow, sometimes several such basic disciplines, so logic, taken as a technology, might depend on a plurality of such
+disciplines, and have pure logic merely as one, though perhaps the most
+important one, of its basic disciplines. Possibly it could be further shown
+that logical laws and forms, in the pregnant sense of these words, belong to
+a theoretically closed round of abstract truth, that cannot in any way be
+fitted into previously delimited theoretical disciplines and so must themselves be regarded as the pure logic in question. We should then be led to
+suppose that defects in the conceptual definition of this discipline, and the
+inability to present it in its purity, and clearly state its relation to logic as a
+technology, have favoured its confusion with this technology, and have
+made possible the dispute as to whether logic should be defined as being
+essentially a theoretical or a practical discipline. While the one party trained
+its sights on purely theoretical propositions that were logical in the pregnant
+sense, the other party stuck to the vulnerable definitions of the pretended
+theoretical science, and the manner in which it was actually carried out.
+To object that we are attempting to restore the Aristotelian-scholastic
+logic, on whose worthlessness history has pronounced judgement, will not
+perturb us. Possibly it may yet appear that the discipline in question is by no
+means so narrow in scope, and so poor in profound problems, as it is here
+reproached with being. Possibly traditional logic was merely a highly imperfect, distorted realization of the Idea of Pure Logic, but none the less sound
+
+Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines 33
+and respectable as a first onslaught and initiative. One may also ask whether
+our scorn for the traditional logic is not perhaps an unjustifiable after-effect
+of renaissance attitudes, whose motives no longer touch us. It is understandable that the historically justified, but in reality often foolish battle, against
+scholastic science, should be above all directed against its logic, its characteristic doctrine of method. But that formal logic should, in the hands of
+scholasticism, particularly decadent scholasticism, have taken on the character of a false methodology, perhaps only shows the lack of a correct philosophical understanding of logical theory, as so far developed. The practical
+use of this logic therefore entered mistaken pathways, and methodological
+achievements were attributed to it for which it is in essence unqualified. In
+the same way, number-mysticism proves nothing against arithmetic. The
+logical polemics of the renaissance are well known to have been void of
+substance or effect: they are the utterances of passion, not of insight. Why
+should we still yield ourselves to the guidance of such scornful utterances? A
+theoretically creative mind like Leibniz, in whom the enthusiastic reformatory zeal of the renaissance went together with a sober, scientific, modern
+spirit, would hear nothing of a baiting or harrying of scholasticism. With
+warm words he took the despised Aristotelian logic to his bosom, however
+much he thought it needed extension and improvement. We can in any case
+quietly leave aside the reproach that pure logic represents a revival of
+'hollow, formal, scholastic truck', while we have not yet become clear as to
+the sense and content of the discipline in question, nor as to the justification
+of the surmises that have suggested themselves to us.
+In order to test these surmises, we do not intend to assemble and to
+subject to a critical analysis any and every argument historically advanced for
+this or that conception of logic. This would not be a way to give new interest
+to an old dispute. The oppositions of principle which were not properly
+sorted out in this dispute, have, however, their own interest, and this interest
+rises above the empirical limitations of the disputants. It is these oppositions
+that we have to track down.
+§14 The concept of a normative science. The basic
+standard or principle that gives it unity
+We begin by concentrating on a proposition that is of decisive importance
+for our further investigation: that every normative and likewise every practical discipline rests on one or more theoretical disciplines, inasmuch as its
+rules must have a theoretical content separable from the notion of normativity (of the 'shall' or 'should'), whose scientific investigation is the duty of
+these theoretical disciplines.
+To clear up this point, let us first discuss the concept of a normative science
+in its relation to that of a theoretical science. The laws of the former tell us
+(it is usually held) what shall or should be, though perhaps, under the actual
+
+34 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+circumstances, it neither is nor can be. The laws of the latter, contrariwise,
+merely tell us what is. We must now ask what is meant by such a 'shall be'
+or 'should be' as opposed to what is.
+The original sense of 'shall' or 'should', which relates to a certain wish or
+will, a certain demand or command, is plainly too narrow, e.g. You shall
+listen to me, X shall come to me. As we speak in a wider sense of a demand,
+where there is no one who demands, and perhaps no one on whom demand
+is made, so we frequently speak of a 'shall' or a 'should' which is independent of anyone's wishing or willing. If we say 'A soldier should be brave', this
+does not mean that we or anyone else are wishing or willing, commanding
+or requiring this. One might rather suppose that a corresponding wishing
+and requiring would be generally justified, i.e. in relation to every soldier,
+though even this is not quite right, since it is surely not necessary that we
+should here be really evaluating a wish or a demand. 'A soldier should be
+brave' rather means that only a brave soldier is a 'good' soldier, which
+implies (since the predicates 'good' and 'bad' divide up the extension of the
+concept 'soldier') that a soldier who is not brave is a 'bad' soldier. Since this
+value-judgement holds, everyone is entitled to demand of a soldier that he
+should be brave, the same ground ensures that it is desirable, praiseworthy
+etc., that he should be brave. The same holds in other instances. 'A man
+should practise neighbourly love', i.e. one who omits this is no longer a
+'good' man, and therefore eo ipso is (in this respect) a 'bad' man. 'A drama
+should not break up into episodes' - otherwise it is not a 'good' drama, not
+a 'true' work of art. In all these cases we make our positive evaluation, the
+attribution of a positive value-predicate, depend on a condition to be fulfilled, whose non-fulfilment entails the corresponding negative predicate.
+We may in general, take as identical or at least as equivalent the forms
+'An A should be B' and 'An A that is not B is a bad A', or 'Only an A which
+is a B is a good A'
+The term 'good' naturally functions in the widest sense of what is in any
+way valuable: in the concrete propositions ranged under our formula it is to
+be understood in the specific sense of the valuations it presupposes, e.g. as
+useful, beautiful, moral etc. There are as many ways of speaking of a 'should'
+as there are different species of valuations, as there are, in consequence,
+actual or presumed values.
+Negative statements of what should not be are not to be taken as negations
+of the corresponding affirmative statements, as, too, in the ordinary sense,
+the denial of a demand does not amount to a prohibition. 'A soldier should
+not be cowardly' does not mean that it is false that a soldier should be
+cowardly, but that a cowardly soldier also is a bad one. The following forms
+are therefore equivalent: 'An A should not be B', and 'An A which is B is in
+general a bad A' or 'Only an A which is not B is a good A'.
+That 'should' and 'should not' are mutually exclusive follows formally
+from their interpretations, and the same holds of the proposition that
+
+Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines
+35
+judgements regarding what should be entail no assertion regarding what
+correspondingly is.
+The just clarified judgements of normative form are plainly not the only
+ones that one would allow to count as such, even if the word 'should' or
+'shall' does not occur in their expression. It is inessential if, instead of saying
+'A should (or should not) be B' we also are able to say 'A must (or may not)
+be B'
+. We touch more substance if we point to the two new formulae 'A
+need not be B' and 'A may be B', which are in contradictory opposition to
+the above forms. 'May not' is therefore the negation of 'should', or, what is
+the same, of 'must; 'may' the negation of 'should not' or, what is the same,
+of 'may not', as can readily be seen from the interpreting value-judgements:
+'An A need not be B' = 'An A that is not B is not therefore a bad A'; 'An A
+may be B' = 'An A that is B is not therefore a bad A'.
+There are yet other propositions that must be reckoned with here, e.g.
+'For an A to be a good A it suffices (or does not suffice) that it is B'
+Whereas our former propositions are about certain necessary conditions for
+attributing or denying positive or negative value-predicates, our concern in
+the present proposition is with sufficient conditions. Other further propositions aim at stating what are at once necessary and sufficient conditions.
+We have thus run through the essential forms of general normative propositions. To them of course correspond forms of particular and singular
+value-judgement which contribute nothing of importance to our analysis,
+and of which the latter at least do not count for our purposes. They have
+always a nearer or remoter relation to certain normative generalities: in
+abstract normative disciplines, they can only occur in relation to their governing generalities. Such disciplines are as such located beyond all individual existence, their generalities are "purely conceptual', they have a lawlike
+character in the strict sense of the word 'law'.
+We see from these analyses that each normative proposition presupposes
+a certain sort of valuation or approval through which the concept of a 'good
+or 'bad' (a value or a disvalue) arises in connection with a certain class of
+objects: in conformity with this, objects divide into good and bad ones. To
+be able to pass the normative judgement 'A soldier should be brave', I must
+have some conception of a 'good' soldier, and this concept cannot be founded
+on an arbitrary nominal definition, but on a general valuation, which permits
+us to value soldiers as good or bad according to these or those properties.
+Whether or not this valuation is in any sense 'objectively valid', whether we
+can draw any distinction between the subjectively and objectively 'good,
+does not enter into our determination of the sense of should-propositions. It
+is sufficient that something is held valuable, that an intention is effected
+having the content that something is valuable or good.
+If, conversely, a pair of value-predicates has been laid down for an appropriate class, following upon a certain general valuation, then the possibility
+of normative judgements is given: all forms of normative proposition have
+
+36 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+then definite sense. Every constitutive property B of the 'good' A yields, e.g.
+a proposition of the form 'An A should be B', every property incompatible
+with B, a proposition 'An A may not (should not) be B' etc.
+Finally, as regards the concept of the normative judgement we can, following our analysis, describe it as follows: In relation to a general underlying
+valuation, and the content of the corresponding pair of value-predicates
+determined by it, every proposition is said to be 'normative' that states a
+necessary, or a sufficient, or a necessary and sufficient condition for having
+such a predicate. If we have once drawn a distinction between 'good' and
+'bad' in our valuations in a particular sense, and so in a particular sphere,
+we are naturally concerned to decide the circumstances, the inner or outer
+properties that are or are not guarantees that a thing is good or bad in this
+sense: what properties may not be lacking if an object from that sphere is to
+be accorded the value of 'good'.
+Where we speak of good and bad, we also usually make comparative
+valuational distinctions between better and best or between worse and worst.
+If pleasure is our good, then the more intense, and again the more enduring,
+pleasure is better. If knowledge counts as our good, not every piece of
+knowledge will therefore count as 'equally good'. We value the knowledge
+of laws more highly than the knowledge of singular facts: the knowledge of
+more general laws, e.g. 'Every equation of the nth degree has n roots', more
+highly than the knowledge of the special laws that fall under them - 'Every
+equation of the fourth degree has four roots'. There are therefore normative
+questions relating to relative value-predicates just as there are in the case
+of absolute value-predicates. If the constitutive content of what is to be
+esteemed good or bad is fixed, one must ask what, in comparative valuation,
+will count constitutively as better or worse, and, further, what are the nearer
+and the more remote, the necessary and the sufficient conditions for the
+relative predicates, laying down the content of the better and worse, and
+ultimately of the relatively best. The constitutive contents of positive and
+relative value-predicates are, so to say, the metric units in terms of which
+objects of the relevant sphere are measured.
+The sum total of these norms plainly forms a closed group, determined by
+our fundamental valuation. The normative proposition which demands
+generally of the objects of a sphere that they should measure up to the
+constitutive features of the positive value-predicate to the greatest extent
+possible, has a central place in each group of mutually coherent norms, and
+can be called their basic norm. This role is, e.g., played by the categorical
+imperative in the group of normative propositions which make up Kant's
+Ethics, as by the principle of the 'greatest possible happiness of the greatest
+possible number' in the Ethics of the Utilitarians.
+The basic norm is the correlate of the definition of 'good' and 'bad' in
+the sense in question. It tells us on what basic standard or basic value all
+normativization must be conducted, and does not therefore represent a
+
+Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines 37
+normative proposition in the strict sense. The relationship of the basic norm
+to what are, properly speaking, normative propositions, is like the relation
+between so-called definitions of the number-series and the arithmetical
+theorems about the relations of numbers which are always referred back to
+these. The basic norm could also be called a 'definition' of the standard conception of good -eg. of the morally good - but this would mean departing
+from the ordinary logical concept of definition.
+If, in relation to such a 'definition', or fundamental and universal valuation, we make it our aim to conduct scientific researches into a sum total
+of mutually relevant normative propositions, we come upon the Idea of a
+Normative Discipline. Each such discipline is therefore unambiguously
+characterized by its basic norm, or by the definition of what shall count as
+'good' in such a discipline. If, e.g. the production, maintenance, increase and
+intensification of pleasure counts as our good, we shall ask by what objects,
+or in what subjective and objective circumstances, pleasure is excited. We
+shall enquire generally into the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
+emergence, maintenance, increase etc., of pleasure. These questions taken as
+targets for our scientific discipline yield a hedonic: this hedonic is normative
+ethics in the sense of the hedonists. The valuation directed to the arousal of
+pleasure yields the basic norm which determines the unity of the discipline
+and distinguishes it from every other normative discipline. Every normative
+discipline therefore has its own basic norm which is in each case its unifying
+principle. Theoretical disciplines do not have this central reference of all
+researches to a fundamental valuation as the source of a dominant normative interest. The unity of their researches, and the coordination of what
+they know, is determined exclusively by a theoretical interest directed to
+investigating matters that really belong together theoretically, in virtue of
+the inner laws of things, and which must therefore be investigated together
+in their mutual coherence.
+§15 Normative disciplines and technologies
+A normative interest is naturally dominant in the case of real (realen) objects,
+as the objects of practical valuations. Hence the undeniable tendency to
+identify the notion of a normative discipline with that of a practical discipline or a technology. It is easy to see, however, that such an identification
+cannot be sustained. Schopenhauer, e.g., who is led by his doctrine of inborn character to reject in principle all practical moralizing, has an ethics in
+the sense of a normative science, which he himself works out. For he does
+not at all abandon distinctions in moral value. A technology represents a
+particular case of a normative discipline which arises when the basic norm
+consists in achieving a universal practical aim. Plainly, therefore, every technology includes in itself an entire normative discipline, which is not itself a
+practical discipline. For its task presupposes that, altogether apart from
+
+38 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+everything relating to practical attainment, the narrower task of fixing norms
+has first been carried out, norms by which we can assess the adequacy to the
+general notion of the end to be achieved, or the possession of the properties
+characteristic of the class of values in question. Every normative discipline,
+conversely, whose fundamental valuation is transformed into a corresponding teleological prescription, widens out into a technology.
+§16 Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of
+normative disciplines
+It is now easy to see that each normative, and, a fortiori, each practical
+discipline, presupposes one or more theoretical disciplines as its foundations, in the sense, namely, that it must have a theoretical content free from
+all normativity, which as such has its natural location in certain theoretical
+sciences, whether these are already marked off or yet to be constituted.
+The basic norm (or basic value, or ultimate end) determines, we saw, the
+unity of the discipline: it also is what imports the thought of normativity
+into all its normative propositions. But alongside of this general thought of
+measurement in terms of a basic norm, these propositions have their own
+theoretical content, which differs from one case to another. Each expresses
+the thought of a measuring relation between norm and what it is a norm for,
+but this relation is itself objectively characterized - if we
+abstract from
+valuational interest - as a relation between condition and conditioned, which
+relation is set down as existent or non-existent in the relevant normative
+propositions. Every normative proposition of, e.g., the form 'An A should
+be B' implies the theoretical proposition 'Only an A which is B has the
+properties C', in which 'C" serves to indicate the constitutive content of the
+standard-setting predicate 'good' (e.g. pleasure, knowledge, whatever, in
+short, is marked down as good by the valuation fundamental to our given
+sphere). The new proposition is purely theoretical: it contains no trace of
+the thought of normativity. If, conversely, a proposition of the latter form is
+true, and thereupon a novel valuation of a C as such emerges, and makes a
+normative relation to the proposition seem requisite, the theoretical proposition assumes the normative form 'Only an A which is B is a good A'.
+'An A should be B'. Normative propositions can therefore make an appearance even in theoretical contexts: our theoretical interest in such contexts
+attaches value to the being of a state of affairs of a sort - to the equilateral
+form, e.g., of a triangle about to be determined - and then assesses other
+states of affairs, e.g. one of equiangularity, in relation to this: If the triangle
+is to be equilateral, it must be equiangular. Such a modification is, however,
+merely passing and secondary in theoretical sciences, since our last intention
+is here directed to the theoretical coherence of the things themselves. Enduring results are not therefore stated in normative form, but in the forms of
+this objective coherence, in the form, that is, of a general proposition.
+
+Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines 39
+It is now clear that the theoretical relations which our discussion has
+shown to lie hidden in the propositions of normative sciences, must have
+their logical place in certain theoretical sciences. If the normative science is
+to deserve its name, if it is to do scientific work on the relations of the facts
+to be normatively considered to their basic norms, it must study the content
+of the theoretical nucleus of these relations, and this means entering the
+spheres of the relevant theoretical sciences. In other words: Every normative
+discipline demands that we know certain non-normative truths: these it takes
+from certain theoretical sciences, or gets by applying propositions so taken
+to the constellation of cases determined by its normative interest. This
+naturally holds, likewise, in the more special case of a technology, and plainly
+to a greater extent. The theoretical knowledge is there added which will
+provide a basis for a fruitful realization of ends and means.
+One point should be noted in the interest of what follows. Naturally these
+theoretical sciences may share in very different degrees in the scientific foundation and elaboration of the normative discipline in question. Their significance for it can also be greater or less. It may become plain that, to satisfy
+the interests of a normative discipline, the knowledge of certain sorts of
+theoretical connection has a prime urgency, and that the development and
+bringing closer of the theoretical field of knowledge to which they belong
+therefore plays a decisive part in making such a normative discipline possible. In building up such a discipline, it may be that certain sorts of theoretical
+knowledge play a useful and perhaps very weighty role, but none the less are
+of secondary significance, since their removal would only narrow, but not
+wholly destroy, the field of the discipline. One may think, e.g., of the relation between merely normative and practical ethics (see above, $15). All the
+propositions which have to do with making practical realization possible, do
+not effect the sphere of the pure norms of ethical valuation. If these norms,
+or the theoretical knowledge underlying them, were to fall away, ethics
+would vanish altogether. If the former propositions were to drop out, there
+would be no possibility of ethical practice (or no possibility of a technology
+of ethical conduct).
+It is in relation to such distinctions that talk of the essential foundations
+of a normative science must be understood. We mean thereby the theoretical sciences that are absolutely essential to its construction, perhaps also the
+relevant groups of theoretical propositions which are of decisive importance
+in making the normative discipline possible.
+
+Psychologism, its arguments
+and its attitude to the usual
+counter-arguments
+§17 The disputed question as to whether the essential
+theoretical foundations of normative logic lie in
+psychology
+If we now apply the general results arrived at in the last chapter to logic as a
+normative discipline, a first, very weighty question arises: Which theoretical
+sciences provide the essential foundations of the theory of science? And to this
+we forthwith add the further question: Is it correct that the theoretical truths
+we find dealt with in the framework of traditional and modern logic, and above
+all those belonging to its essential foundations, have their theoretical place in
+the sciences that have been already marked off and independently developed?
+Here we encounter the disputed question as to the relation between
+psychology and logic, since one dominant tendency of our time has a ready
+answer to the questions raised: The essential theoretical foundations of logic
+lie in psychology, in whose field those propositions belong - as far as their
+theoretical content is concerned - which give logic its characteristic pattern.
+Logic is related to psychology just as any branch of chemical technology is
+related to chemistry, as land-surveying is to geometry etc. This tendency
+sees no need to mark off a new theoretical discipline, and, in particular, not
+one that would deserve the name of logic in a narrower and more pointed
+sense. Often people talk as if psychology provided the sole, sufficient,
+theoretical foundation for logical technology. So we read in Mill's polemic
+against Hamilton: 'Logic is not a science separate from and coordinate with
+psychology. To the extent that it is a science at all, it is a part or branch
+of psychology, distinguished from it on the one hand as the part is from the
+whole, and on the other hand as the art is from the science. It owes all its
+theoretical foundations to psychology, and includes as much of that science
+as is necessary to establish the rules of the art' (An Examination of Sir
+William Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 461). According to Lipps it even seems
+that logic is to be ranked as a mere constituent of psychology for he says:
+"The fact that logic is a specific discipline of psychology distinguishes them
+satisfactorily from one another' (Lipps, Grundzüge der Logik (1893), §3).
+
+Psychologism, its arguments and its attitude to the usual counter-arguments
+§18 The line of proof of the psychologistic thinkers'
+If we ask for the justification of such views, a most plausible line of argument is offered, which seems to cut off all further dispute ab initio. However
+one may define logic as a technology - as a technology of thinking, judging,
+inferring, knowing, proving, of the courses followed by the understanding in
+the pursuit of truth, in the evaluation of grounds of proof etc. - we find
+invariably that mental activities or products are the objects of practical
+regulation. And just as, in general, the artificial working over of a material
+presupposes the knowledge of its properties, so this will be the case here too,
+where we are specially concerned with psychological material. The scientific
+investigation of the rules according to which this stuff should be worked
+over, naturally leads back to the scientific investigation of these properties.
+Psychology therefore provides the theoretical basis for constructing a logical
+technology, and, more particularly, the psychology of cognition.?
+Any glance at the contents of logical literature will confirm this. What is
+being talked of throughout? Concepts, judgements, syllogisms, deductions,
+inductions, definitions, classifications etc. - all psychology, except that they
+are selected and arranged from normative and practical points of view.
+Draw the bounds of pure logic as tightly as one likes, it will not be possible to
+keep out what is psychological. This is implicit in the concepts constitutive
+for logical laws: truth and falsehood, affirmation and negation, universality
+and particularity, ground and consequent etc.
+§19 The usual arguments of the opposition and the
+psychologistic rejoinder
+Remarkably enough, the opposition believes that it can base a sharp separation of the two disciplines on precisely the normative character of logic.
+Psychology, it is said, deals with thinking as it is, logic with thinking as it
+should be. The former has to do with the natural laws, the latter with the
+normative laws of thinking. It reads in this sense in Jäsche's version of
+Kant's Lectures on Logic: 'Some logicians presuppose psychological principles for logic, but to introduce such principles into logic, is as absurd as to
+derive morality from Life. If we take principles from psychology, i.e. from
+observations of our understanding, we shall only see how thought proceeds,
+and what happens under manifold subjective hindrances and conditions.
+Those would only lead to a knowledge of merely contingent laws. Logic
+does not however ask after contingent, but after necessary laws - not how
+we think but how we ought to think. The rules of logic must therefore be
+taken, not from the contingent, but from the necessary use of reason, which
+one finds in oneself apart from all psychology. In logic we do not wish to
+know what the understanding is like and how it thinks, nor how it has
+hitherto proceeded in its thinking, but how it ought to proceed in its thinking.
+
+42 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+It should teach us the correct use of the understanding, the use in which it
+is consistent with itself' (Introduction, I. Concept of Logic. Kant's Werke,
+ed. Hartenstein, 1867, VIII, p. 14). Herbart takes up a similar position when
+he objects to the logic of his time and 'the would be psychological stories
+about understanding and reason with which it starts', by saying that this is
+as badly in error as a moral theory which tried to begin with the natural
+history of human tendencies, urges and weaknesses, and by pointing to
+the normative character of logic as of ethics (Herbart, Psychologie als
+Wissenschaft, II, §119, original ed. II, p. 173).
+Such arguments do not dismay the psychologistic logicians. They answer:
+A necessary use of the understanding is none the less a use of the understanding, and belongs, with the understanding itself, to psychology. Thinking as it should be, is merely a special case of thinking as it is. Psychology
+must certainly investigate the natural laws of thinking, the laws which hold
+for all judgements whatever, whether correct or false. It would, however, be
+absurd to interpret this proposition as if such laws only were psychological
+as applied with the most embracing generality to all judgements whatever,
+whereas special laws of judgement, like the laws of correct judgement, were
+shut out from its purview. (Cf., e.g. Mill, An Examination, p. 459 f.) Or does
+one hold a different opinion? Can one deny that the normative laws of
+thinking have the character of such special laws? This also will not do.
+Normative laws of thought, it is said, only try to say how one must proceed
+provided one wants to think correctly. We think correctly, in the material
+sense, when we think of things as they are. But for us to say, certainly and
+indubitably, that things are like this or like that, means that the nature of
+our mind prevents us from thinking of them otherwise. For one need not
+repeat what has been so often uttered, that one can obviously not think of a
+thing as it is, without regard to the way in which one must think of it, nor
+can one make of it so isolated an object of knowledge. The man, therefore,
+who compares his thought of things with the things themselves can in fact only
+measure his contingent thinking, influenced by custom, tradition, inclination and aversion, against a thinking that is free from such influences, and
+that heeds no voice but that of its own inherent lawfulness.
+"The rules, therefore, on which one must proceed in order to think rightly
+are merely rules on which one must proceed in order to think as the nature
+of thought, its specific lawfulness, demands. They are, in short, identical
+with the natural laws of thinking itself. Logic is a physics of thinking or it is
+nothing at all.' (Lipps, 'Die Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie'
+, Philos. Monatshefte, XVI (1880), p. 530 f.)
+It may perhaps be said from the antipsychologistic side: Of course the
+various kinds of presentations, judgements, syllogisms etc., also have a place
+in psychology as mental phenomena and dispositions, but psychology has
+a different task in regard to them than logic. Both investigate the laws of
+these activities, but 'law' means something quite different in the two cases.
+
+Psychologism, its arguments and its attitude to the usual counter-arguments 43
+The task of psychology is to investigate the laws governing the real connections of mental events with one another, as well as with related mental
+dispositions and corresponding events in the bodily organism. 'Law' here
+means a comprehensive formula covering coexistent and successive connections that are without exception and necessary. Such connections are causal.
+The task of logic is quite different. It does not enquire into the causal origins
+or consequences of intellectual activities, but into their truth-content: it
+enquires what such activities should be like, or how they should proceed, in
+order that the resultant judgements should be true. Correct judgements and
+false ones, evident ones and blind ones, come and go according to natural
+laws, they have causal antecedents and consequences like all mental phenomena. Such natural connections do not, however, interest the logician; he
+looks rather for ideal connections that he does not always find realized, in
+fact only exceptionally finds realized in the actual course of thoughts. He
+aims not at a physics, but an ethics of thinking. Sigwart therefore rightly
+stresses the point that, in the psychological treatment of thought, 'the
+opposition of true and false has as little part to play as the opposition of
+good or bad in human conduct is a psychological matter.4
+We cannot be content - such will be the psychologistic rejoinder - with
+such half-truths. The task of logic is of course quite different from that of
+psychology: who would deny it? It is a technology of knowledge, but how
+could such a technology ignore questions of causal connection, how could
+it look for ideal connections without studying natural ones? 'As if every
+"ought" did not rest on an "is"
+', every ethics did not also have to show itself
+a physics.' (Lipps, 'Die Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie', op. cit. p. 529.) 'A
+question as to what should be done always reduces to a question as to what
+must be done if a definite goal is to be reached, and this question in its turn
+is equivalent to a question as to how this goal is in fact reached' (Lipps,
+Grundzüge der Logik, §1). That psychology, as distinct from logic, does not
+deal with the opposition of true and false 'does not mean that psychology
+treats these different mental conditions on a like footing, but that it renders
+both intelligible in a like manner' (Lipps, op. cit. §3, p. 2). Theoretically
+regarded, Logic therefore is related to psychology as a part to a whole. Its
+main aim is, in particular, to set up propositions of the form: Our intellectual activities must, either generally, or in specifically characterized circumstances, have such and such a form, such and such an arrangement, such
+and such combinations and no others, if the resultant judgements are to
+have the character of evidence, are to achieve knowledge in the pointed
+sense of the word. Here we have an obvious causal relation. The psychological character of evidence is a causal consequence of certain antecedents.
+What sort of antecedents? This is just what we have to explore.
+The following often repeated argument is no more successful in shaking
+the psychologistic ranks: Logic, it is said, can as little rest on psychology as
+on any other science; since each science is only a science in virtue of its
+
+44 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+harmony with logical rules, it presupposes the validity of these rules. It would
+therefore be circular to try to give logic a first foundation in psychology.®
+The opposition will reply: That this argument cannot be right, is shown
+by the fact that it would prove the impossibility of all logic. Since logic itself
+must proceed logically, it would itself commit the same circle, would itself
+have to establish the validity of rules that it presupposes.
+Let us, however, consider more closely what such a circle could consist in.
+Could it mean that psychology presupposes the validity of logical laws?
+Here one must notice the equivocation in the notion of 'presupposing'. That
+a science presupposes the validity of certain rules may mean that they serve
+as premisses in its proofs: it may also mean that they are rules in accordance
+with which the science must proceed in order to be a science at all. Both are
+confounded in our argument for which reasoning according to logical rules,
+and reasoning from logical rules, count as identical. There would only be a
+circle if the reasoning were from such rules. But, as many an artist creates
+beautiful works without the slightest knowledge of aesthetics, so an investigation may construct proofs without ever having recourse to logic. Logical
+laws cannot therefore have been premisses in such proofs. And what is true
+of single proofs is likewise true of whole sciences.
+§20 A gap in the psychologistic line of proof
+In these and similar arguments the anti-psychologistic party seem undoubtedly to have got the worst of it. Many think the battle quite at an end, they
+regard the rejoinders of the psychologistic party as completely victorious.
+One thing only might arouse our philosophical wonder, that there was and
+is such a battle at all, that the same arguments have repeatedly been adduced
+while their refutations have not been acknowledged as cogent. If everything
+really were so plain and clear as the psychologistic trend assures us, the
+matter would not be readily understandable, since there are unprejudiced,
+serious and penetrating thinkers on the opposite side as well. Is this not
+again a case where the truth lies in the middle? Has each of the parties not
+recognized a valid portion of the truth, and only shown incapacity for its
+sharp conceptual circumscription, and not even seen that they only had part
+of the whole? Is there not perhaps an unresolved residuum in the arguments
+of the anti-psychologists - despite much unclearness and error in detail which
+has made refutation easy; are they not informed by a true power, which
+always re-emerges in unbiased discussion? I for my part would answer 'Yes'.
+It seems to me that the greater weight of truth lies on the anti-psychologistic
+side, but that its key-thoughts have not been properly worked out, and are
+blemished by many mistakes.
+Let us go back to the question we raised above regarding the essential
+foundations of normative logic. Have the arguments of psychologistic thinkers
+really settled this? Here a weak point at once appears. The argument only
+
+Psychologism, its arguments and its attitude to the usual counter-arguments 45
+proves one thing, that psychology helps in the foundation of logic, not that
+it has the only or the main part in this, not that it provides logic's essential
+foundation in the sense above defined ($16). The possibility remains open
+that another science contributes to its foundation, perhaps in a much more
+important fashion. Here may be the place for the 'pure logic' which on the
+other party's view, has an existence independent of all psychology, and is a
+naturally bounded, internally closed-off science. We readily grant that what
+Kantians and Herbartians have produced under this rubric does not quite
+accord with the character that our suggested supposition would give it. For
+they always talk of normative laws of thinking and particularly of conceptformation, judgement-framing etc. Proof enough, one might say, that their
+subject-matter is neither theoretical nor wholly unpsychological. But this
+objection would lose weight if closer investigation confirmed the surmise
+suggested to us above in §13, that these schools were unlucky in defining
+and building up the intended discipline, yet none the less approached it
+closely, in so far as they discerned an abundance of interconnected theoretical truths in traditional logic, which did not fit into psychology, nor into
+any other separate science, and so permitted one to divine the existence of a
+peculiar realm of truth. And if these were the truths to which all logical
+regulation in the last resort related, truths mainly to be thought of when
+'logical truths' were in question, one could readily come to see in them what
+was essential to the whole of logic, and to give the name of 'pure logic' to
+their theoretical unity. That this hits off the true state of things I hope
+actually to prove.
+
+Empiricistic consequences of
+psychologism
+§21 Characterizing two empiricistic consequences of
+the psychologistic standpoint, and their refutation
+Let us place ourselves for the moment on the ground of the psychologistic
+logic, and let us assume therefore that the essential theoretical foundations
+of the prescriptions of logic lie in psychology. However the latter discipline
+may be defined - as the science of psychic phenomena, of the facts of
+consciousness, of the facts of internal experience, of experiences in their
+dependence on the experiencing individual, or whatever - it is universally
+agreed that psychology is a factual and therefore an empirical science. We
+shall also not be controverted it we add that psychology has so far lacked
+genuine and therefore exact laws, and that the propositions in it which are
+dignified with the name of laws, are merely vague,' even if valuable, generalizations from experience. They are statements about approximate regularities of coexistence and succession, which make no claim to determine, with
+infallible, unambiguous definiteness, what will go together or will follow in
+exactly described relationships. One may look to the laws of the association
+of ideas, to which association-psychology wished to accord the position and
+importance of basic psychological laws. As soon as one takes the trouble
+adequately to formulate their empirically justified sense, they at once lose
+the pretended character of laws. This being granted, most serious consequences arise for the psychologistic logicians.
+The first is that only vague rules could be based on vague theoretical
+foundations. If psychological laws lack exactness, the same must be true of
+the prescriptions of logic. It cannot be doubted that many of these prescriptions are infected with empirical vaguenesses. But precisely the laws which
+are pointedly called "logical', which as laws of proof make up the real core
+of all logic - the logical 'principles', the laws of syllogism, the laws of many
+other kinds of inference, as, e.g. equational inferences, the Bernoullian argument from n to n + 1, the principles of probability-inferences etc. - are of
+absolute exactness. Every interpretation that would base them on empirical indefinitenesses, make them depend for their validity on vague 'circumstances',
+
+Empiricistic consequences of psychologism 47
+would fundamentally alter their true sense. Plainly they are genuine laws,
+and not 'merely empirical', i.e. approximate, laws.
+If, as Lotze thought, pure mathematics is merely an independently developed branch of logic, the above-mentioned sphere of exact logical laws
+will also cover the inexhaustible wealth of the laws of pure mathematics. In
+all further objections we must keep our eye on the sphere of pure mathematics
+together with our sphere of logic.
+In the second place, were one to seek to counter our first objection by
+denying the thoroughgoing inexactness of psychological laws, and try to
+found norms of the above-mentioned type on supposedly exact natural laws,
+little would have been gained
+No natural laws can be known a priori, nor established by sheer insight.
+The only way in which a natural law can be established and justified, is by
+induction from the singular facts of experience. Induction does not establish
+the holding of the law, only the greater or lesser probability of its holding;
+the probability, and not the law, is justified by insight. Logical laws must,
+accordingly, without exception, rank as mere probabilities. Nothing, however, seems plainer than that the laws of 'pure logic' all have a priori validity. They are established and justified, not by induction, but by apodeictic
+inner evidence. Insight justifies no mere probabilities of their holding, but
+their holding or truth itself.
+The Law of Contradiction does not tell us that one must surmise that one
+of two contradictory judgements is true, one false, the mood Barbara does not
+tell us that when two propositions of the form 'All A's are B's' and 'All B's
+are C's' are true, it is to be surmised that a corresponding proposition of the
+form 'All A's are C's' is true. And so generally, and in the field of mathematics as well. Otherwise we should have to treat it as an open possibility
+that such a surmise would fail to be confirmed by an extension of our ever
+limited horizon of experience. Perhaps our logical laws are mere 'approximations' to genuinely valid laws of thought that are beyond our reach. Such
+possibilities are seriously and rightly weighed in the case of natural laws.
+Though the law of gravitation is recommended by the most comprehensive
+inductions and verifications, no investigator of nature would now look on it
+as an absolutely valid law. New gravitational formulae are occasionally
+tried out: it was shown, e.g. that Weber's basic law for electrical phenomena
+could quite well function as the basic law of gravity. The differentiating factor
+in both formulae conditions differences in calculated values not exceeding the
+field of unavoidable observational error. Innumerable factors of this sort are,
+however, thinkable; hence we know a priori that endlessly many laws could
+and must do the same work as the Newtonian law of gravitation, recommended only by its peculiar simplicity. We know that, in view of ineliminable
+observational imprecision, it would be foolish to look for a uniquely true law.
+Such is the situation in the exact factual sciences, but by no means in logic. The
+justified possibility of the former becomes the open absurdity of the latter.
+
+48 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+We have insight into, not merely the probability, but the truth of the logical
+laws. We see the truth of the principles of the syllogism, of Bernoullian
+induction, of arguments in probability, of general arithmetic etc. We grasp
+their very truth, so that talk of zones of inexactness, of mere approximations etc., loses all possible sense. But if what follows from a demand for a
+psychological validation of logic is absurd, this validation is itself absurd.
+Against the truth that is itself grasped with insight, the strongest psychologistic argument cannot avail: probability cannot wrestle with truth, nor
+surmise with insight. If anyone likes to stay in a sphere of general discussions, he may allow the psychologistic arguments to deceive him. But a mere
+glance at any logical principle, at its real meaning and the full insight with
+which it is seen as true in itself, must abolish such deceit.
+How plausible the ready suggestions of psychologistic reflection sound.
+Logical laws are laws for validations, proofs, What are validations but
+peculiar human trains of thought, in which, in normal circumstances, the
+finally emergent judgements seem endowed with a necessarily consequential
+character. This character is itself a mental one, a peculiar mode of mindedness
+and no more. And, obviously, none of these mental phenomena is isolated,
+but is a single thread in the tangled web of mental phenomena, of mental
+disposition and organic process, called human life. How could anything
+beyond empirical generalities result in such circumstances? Where has psychology yielded more?
+We reply: Psychology certainly does not yield more, and cannot for this
+reason yield the apodeictically evident, and so metempirical and absolutely
+exact laws which form the core of all logic.
+§22 The laws of thought as supposed laws of nature
+which operate in isolation as causes of rational thought
+Here is also the place to take up an attitude towards a widely held conception of logical law, which characterizes correct thought by its contormity
+with certain laws of thought (however we may formulate them), but is
+disposed at the same time to interpret such conformity in the following
+psychologistic manner: The laws of thought count as natural laws characterizing the peculiarity of our mind qua thinking, and the essence of the
+conformity, as definitory of correct thinking, lies in the pure operation of
+these laws, their non-disturbance by alien mental influences (such as custom,
+inclination, tradition). (Cf. the citations above in §19 from Lipps' article on
+the task of epistemology.)
+We need only instance one of the grave consequences of this doctrine.
+Laws of thought, as causal laws governing acts of knowledge in their mental
+interweaving, could only be stated in the form of probabilities. On this
+basis, no assertion could be certainly judged correct, since probabilities,
+taken as the standard of all certainty, must impress a merely probabilistic
+
+Empiricistic consequences of psychologism 49
+stamp on all knowledge. We should stand confronted by the most extreme
+probabilism. Even the assertion that all knowledge was merely probable
+would itself only hold probably: this would hold of this latter assertion, and
+so on in infinitum. Since each successive step reduces the probability level of
+the previous one a bit, we should become gravely concerned about the
+worth of all knowledge. One may hope, however, that, with some luck, the
+probability-levels of these infinite series may always have the character of a
+Cantorian 'fundamental series', of such a sort that the final limiting value or
+the probability of the knowledge to be judged is a real number > 0. Sceptical
+awkwardnesses would of course vanish if one looked on the laws of thought
+as matters of direct insight. But how should one have insight into causal laws?
+Even if this difficulty were removed, we could still ask: Where on earth is
+the proof that the pure operation of these laws (or any other laws) would
+yield correct laws of thinking? Where are the descriptive and genetic analyses which entitle us to explain the phenomena of thought by two sorts of
+natural law, one exclusively determining such causal sequences as allow
+logical thought to emerge, whereas others help to determine alogical thought?
+Does the assessment of thoughts by logical laws amount to a proof of their
+causal origin in these same laws as laws of nature?
+It seems that certain ready confusions have here opened the way to
+psychologistic errors. Logical laws have first been confused with the judgements, in the sense of acts of judgement, in which we may know them: the
+laws, as 'contents of judgement' have been confused with the judgements
+themselves. The latter are real events, having causes and effects. Judgements
+whose contents are laws are, in particular, frequently operative as thoughtmotives, directing the course of our thought-experience, as those contents,
+the laws of thinking, prescribe. In such cases the real order and connection
+of our thought-experiences conforms to that which we think generally in
+our governing knowledge of the law: it is a concrete individual instance of
+that general law. If, however, the law is confused with the judgement or
+knowledge of the law, the ideal with the real, the law appears as a governing
+power in our train of thought. With understandable ease a second confusion
+is added to the first: we confuse a law as a term in causation with a law as
+the rule of causation. In other fields, too, we familiarly employ mythic talk of
+natural laws as presiding powers in natural events - as if the rules of causal
+connection could themselves once more significantly function as causes,
+i.e. as terms in just such connections. The serious confusion of things so
+essentially dissimilar has plainly been favoured in the case before us by the
+previous confusion of a law with the knowledge of a law. Logical laws
+already appeared as motive powers in thinking. They presided causally, it
+was imagined, over the course of our thoughts - they were accordingly
+causal laws of thinking. They expressed how we must think in consequence
+of the nature of our mind, they characterized the human mind as a thinking
+mind in the pointed sense. If at times we think otherwise than these laws
+
+50 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+require, we are not, properly speaking, 'thinking' at all, we are not judging
+as the natural laws of thinking, or the nature of our mind qua thinking,
+requires, but as other laws determine (once more causally). We are following the disturbing leads of custom, passion etc.
+Other motives of course may have suggested the same conception. The
+empirical fact that persons performing normally in a given sphere, e.g. scientists in their fields, usually judge in a logically correct manner, seems to
+demand, as a natural explanation, that the logical laws by means of which
+the correctness of thinking is assessed, also determine the course of thinking,
+, in the manner of causal laws, while isolated deviations from the norm
+may readily be put to the account of the troubling influences stemming from
+other psychological sources.
+Against this the following argument should suffice. Let us imagine an
+ideal person, in whom all thinking proceeds as logical laws require. Naturally the fact that this occurs must have its explanatory ground in certain
+psychological laws, which govern the course of the mental experiences of
+this being, starting from certain initial 'collocations'
+. I now ask: Would the
+natural laws and the logical laws in this assumed situation be one and the
+same? Obviously the answer is 'No'
+' Causal laws, according to which thought
+must proceed in a manner which the ideal norms of logic might justify, are
+by no means identical with those norms. If a being were so constituted as
+never to be able to frame contradictory judgements in a unified train of
+thought, as never to be able to perform inferences which defy the syllogistic
+moods, this would not mean that the law of contradiction, the Modus Barbara
+etc., were laws of nature explanatory of this being's constitution. The example of a computer makes the difference quite clear. The arrangement and
+connection of the figures which spring forth is regulated by natural laws
+which accord with the demands of the arithmetical propositions which fix
+their meanings. No one, however, who wants to give a physical explanation
+of the machine's procedures, will appeal to arithmetical instead of mechanical laws. The machine is no thought-machine, it understands neither itself
+nor the meaning of its performances. But our own thought-machine might
+very well function similarly, except that the real course of one kind of thought
+would always have to be recognized as correct by the insight brought forward in another. This latter thinking could be the product of the same or
+other thought-machines, but ideal evaluation and causal explanation would
+none the less remain disparate. The 'initial collocations' should also not be
+forgotten: indispensable in causal explanation, they are senseless for ideal
+evaluation.
+The psychologistic logicians ignore the fundamental, essential, never-tobe-bridged gulf between ideal and real laws, between normative and causal
+regulation, between logical and real necessity, between logical and real
+grounds. No conceivable gradation could mediate between the ideal and the
+real. It is characteristic of the low state of logical insights in our time, that a
+
+Empiricistic consequences of psychologism
+51
+thinker of Sigwart's stature should dare, in connection with the fiction of
+an intellectually ideal being like that discussed above, to maintain that,
+for such a being, 'logical necessity would also be a real necessity that engenders real thinking, or that he should make use of the concept of thoughtcompulsion to elucidate the notion of 'logical ground' (Sigwart, Logik, I,
+p. 259 J.). The same holds of Wundt when he sees in the law of sufficient
+reason the "basic law of the dependence of our thought-acts on one another'
+(Wundt, Logik, 1, p. 573). That one is really concerned in these connections
+with basic errors in logic will, one hopes, become a certainty, even to the
+prejudiced, in the course of further investigations.
+§23 A third consequence of psychologism,
+and its refutation
+A third consequence (see §21 above) for the psychologistic logician is that, if
+the laws of logic have their epistemological source in psychological matter
+of fact, if, e.g., as our opponents generally say, they are normative transformations of such facts, they must themselves be psychological in content,
+both by being laws for mental states, and also by presupposing or implying
+the existence of such states. This is palpably false. No logical law implies
+a 'matter of fact', not even the existence of presentations or judgements or
+other phenomena of knowledge. No logical law, properly understood, is a
+law for the facticities of mental life, and so not a law for presentations (as
+experiences), nor for judgements (experiences of judging), nor for our other
+mental experiences.
+Most psychologistic thinkers are too deeply enthralled by their general
+prejudice even to try to verify it in the case of the definitely acknowledged
+logical laws. If such laws must be psychological, why try to show in detail
+that they really are so? No one sees that a consistent psychologism would
+force one to interpret logical laws in a manner quite alien to their true sense.
+One fails to see that these laws, naturally understood, presuppose nothing
+mental, no facts of psychic life, whether in their establishment or their content. They do so no more than the laws of pure mathematics do so.
+If psychologism were on the right track, one should, in treating of syllogisms, expect only rules of the following type: It is an empirical fact that, in
+circumstances X, conclusions of the form C, stamped with apodeictically
+necessary consequence, attend upon premisses of the form P. To syllogize
+'correctly', i.e. to achieve judgements of this distinctive stamp through
+syllogizing, one must proceed in this manner, one must see that the circumstances really are X, and the premisses P. Mental matters of fact would then
+be the matters regulated, the existence of such matters would be presupposed in the grounding of such laws, and would be part of their content. But
+no single syllogistic rule is of such a type. What, e.g., does the mood Barbara
+tell us? Only this: that, if in the case of any class-terms A, B, C'all A's are B's
+
+52 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+and all B's C's, then all A's will be C's. The Modus Ponens, likewise, written
+out in full, reads: It is a valid law for any propositions P, Q, that if P is the
+case, and it also is the case that if P is the case Q is so, then & also is
+the case. These and all similar laws are as little psychological as they are empirical. They were of course set up by traditional logic to serve as norms
+for our judging activities. But do they implicitly say anything about a single
+actual judgement, or about any other mental phenomenon? If anyone thinks
+they do let him prove it. Whatever a proposition implicitly asserts can be
+inferred from it in a valid syllogism. But what forms of syllogism permit us
+to deduce facts from a pure law?
+It is irrelevant to object that talk of logical laws never could have arisen had
+we not actually experienced presentations and judgements, and abstracted
+the relevant, basic logical concepts from them, or that, wherever we understand and assert such laws, the existence of presentations and judgements is
+implied, and can therefore be inferred. We need hardly observe that this does
+not follow from our law, but from the fact that we understand and assert such
+a law, and that a like consequence could be inferred from every assertion.
+One ought not, further, to confuse the psychological presuppositions or components of the assertion of a law, with the logical 'moments' of its content.
+'Empirical laws' have, eo ipso, a factual content. Not being true laws, they
+merely say, roughly speaking, that certain coexistences or successions obtain
+generally in certain circumstances, or may be expected, with varying probability, in varying circumstances. But even the strict laws of the natural
+sciences are not without factual content. They do not merely concern facts,
+but also imply their existence.
+We must, however, be more precise. Exact laws, as normally formulated,
+are pure laws: they exclude all factual content. But, if we consider the proofs
+to which they owe their scientific justification, it is at once clear that we
+cannot justify them as pure laws, in their normal formulation. The law of
+gravitation, as formulated in astronomy, has never really been proved. What
+has been proved is a proposition of the form: Our knowledge up to date
+serves to found a probability of the highest theoretical dignity to the effect
+that, in so far as experience yields to the instruments on hand, either
+Newton's law, or one of the endlessly many conceivable mathematical laws
+whose differences from Newton's law lie within the limits of unavoidable
+experimental error is true. This truth carries its big load of factual content,
+and is not at all a law in the strict sense of the word. It also plainly includes
+several vaguely delimited concepts.
+All laws of fact in the exact sciences are accordingly genuine laws, but,
+epistemologically considered, no more than idealizing fictions with a fundamentum in re. They fulfil the task of rendering those theoretical sciences
+possible, which bring the ideal of science as near as may be to actuality, and
+so realize, to the extent that this can be within the unsurmountable limits of
+human knowledge, the ideal of explanatory theory, of law-governed unity,
+
+Empiricistic consequences of psychologism 53
+the highest theoretical aim of all scientific research into facts. Instead of the
+absolute knowledge that is denied us, we use our insight on individual and
+general facts of experience, and from these first work out those apodeictic
+probabilities (so to speak) in which all attainable knowledge of the real is
+comprehended. We then reduce these probabilities to certain exact thoughts
+having the genuine form of laws, and so succeed in building up formally perfect systems of explanatory theory. Such systems as theoretical mechanics,
+theoretical acoustics, theoretical optics, theoretical astronomy etc., really
+only hold as ideal possibilities with a fundamentum in re; they do not exclude
+countless other possibilities, but even include these within limits. This, however, concerns us no further, nor are we concerned to discuss the practical
+functions in knowledge of these ideal theories, their feats of successfully
+predicting future facts or reconstructing past ones, and their technical feats
+of enabling us to master nature practically. We return to the case we were
+considering.
+If, as we have shown, pure law remains a mere ideal in the realm of factual
+knowledge, it is realized in the realm of 'purely conceptual' knowledge. In
+this sphere our purely logical laws belong, as well as the laws of mathesis pura.
+Their origin, or, rather, their justifying proof, is not an inductive one, and so
+they are free from that existential content which attaches to all probabilities
+as such, even to such as are the highest and most valuable. What they say
+has entire validity: they themselves in their absolute exactness are evident
+and proven, and not, in their stead, certain other assertions of probability
+of obviously vague constitution. The law we have is not one of countless
+theoretical possibilities within a certain factually delimited sphere. It is the
+single, sole truth which excludes all other possibilities and which, being
+established by insight, is kept pure from fact in its content and mode of
+proof.
+The above considerations show how intimately the two halves of the
+psychologistic case hang together: that logical laws do not merely entail
+existential assertions of mental tacts, but are also laws for such tacts. We
+have just refuted the first half of their case. But the following argument
+suggests that our refutation also covers the second half. For just as each law
+established empirically and inductively from singular facts, is a law for such
+facts, so, conversely, each law for facts is a law established empirically and
+inductively, and from such a law, as has been shown, assertions with existential content are inseparable.
+We ought of course to exclude from factual laws such general assertions
+as merely apply pure conceptual propositions - which state universally valid
+relations on a basis of pure concepts - to matters of fact. If 3 > 2, then the
+three books on this table also exceed the two books in this cupboard, and so
+for any things whatever. But our pure proposition of number does not refer
+to things, but to numbers in their pure generality - it is the number 3 that is
+greater than the number 2 - and it applies not merely to individual, but to
+
+54 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+'general' objects, e.g. to species of colour or sound, to types of geometrical
+figure and to suchlike timeless generalities.
+If all this is admitted, it is of course impossible to regard logical laws
+(considered in their purity) as the laws either of mental activities or of
+mental products.
+§24 Continuation
+Many would perhaps try to evade our conclusion by objecting: Not every
+law for facts has an empirico-inductive origin. We should rather draw a
+distinction. All knowledge of law rests on experience, but not all such knowledge arises out of experience inductively, by the well-known logical process
+which goes from singular facts, or empirical generalities of lower level, to
+general laws. The laws of logic are, in particular, empirical, but not inductive laws. The basic notions of logic are abstracted from psychological
+experience together with the purely conceptual relations given with them.
+What we find true in the individual case, we recognize at a glance to be true
+universally, since based upon abstracted contents. Experience accordingly
+yields an immediate awareness of the law-governed character of our mind.
+And since we have no need of induction, our conclusion is likewise free
+from inductive imperfection: it has no mere character of probability, but
+one of apodeictic certainty. It is not vague, but precise in sense, it in no way
+includes assertions having existential content.
+What is here objected will not, however, do. Undoubtedly our knowledge
+of logical laws, considered as an act of mind, presupposes an experience of
+individuals, has its basis in concrete intuition. But one should not confuse
+the psychological 'presuppositions' and 'bases' of the knowledge of a law,
+with the logical presuppositions, the grounds and premisses, of that law: we
+should also, therefore, not confuse psychological dependence (e.g. dependence of origin) with logical demonstration and justification. The latter conforms to an insight into the objective relation of ground and consequence,
+whereas the former relates to mental links of coexistence and succession. No
+one can seriously hold that the concrete singular cases before us, on which
+our insight into a law is 'grounded', really function as logical grounds or
+premisses, as if the mere existence of such singulars entailed the universality
+of law. Our intuitive grasp of the law may require two psychological steps:
+one glance at the singulars of intuition, and a related insight into law. Logically, however, only one step is required. The content of our insight is not
+inferred from singulars.
+All knowledge "begins with experience', but it does not therefore 'arise'
+from experience. What we assert is that each law for facts arises from experience, which means that it can only be inductively based on individual
+experiences. If there are laws known by insight, these cannot (immediately)
+be laws for facts. Where in the past immediate self-evidence has been claimed
+
+Empiricistic consequences of psychologism 55
+for factual laws, it is clear that men have been confusing genuine factual
+laws, i.e. laws of coexistence and succession, with ideal laws to which a
+reference to definite times is alien, or that they have been confusing the
+lively persuasive force of familiar empirical generalities, with the insight
+only found in the realm of pure concepts.
+Should such an argument not seem decisive, it can none the less serve to
+strengthen other arguments. Another such argument will be here added.
+Hardly anyone would deny that all laws of pure logic are of one and the
+same character. If we can show, in the case of some of them, that they
+cannot possibly be regarded as laws for facts, the same must hold for all of
+them. Among logical laws there are, however, some which concern truths,
+which have truths as their regular 'objects'. It is the case, e.g., that for every
+truth A, its contradictory opposite is no truth. It is the case, for each pair of
+truths A, B, that their conjunctions and disjunctions are truths, and that if
+three truths A, B, Care so related that A is a ground for B, B for C, that A
+is also a ground for C. It is, however, absurd to treat laws which hold for
+truths as such, as laws for facts. No truth is a fact, i.e. something determined as to time. A truth can indeed have as its meaning that something is,
+that a state exists, that a change is going on etc. The truth itself is, however,
+raised above time: i.e. it makes no sense to attribute temporal being to it,
+nor to say that it arises or perishes. This absurdity is clearest in the case of
+the laws of truth themselves. If they were 'real' laws, they would be rules for
+the coexistence and succession of facts, i.e. of such facts as are truths, and to
+these facts, which they govern, they themselves as truths would belong. A
+law would therefore ascribe a 'coming and going' to certain facts called
+truths, among which, as one among others, the law would itself be found.
+The law would arise and perish in conformity with the law, a patent absurdity. The case is similar if we treat the law of truth as a law of coexistence, as
+temporally singular and yet fixing a general rule for each and every existence
+in time. Such absurdities are unavoidable if the fundamental distinction
+between ideal and real objects, and the corresponding distinction between
+ideal and real laws, is disregarded or misunderstood. We shall see repeatedly
+how this distinction settles the disputes which divide psychologistic logic
+from pure logic.
+
+Chapter 5
+Psychological interpretations of
+basic logical principles
+§25 The law of contradiction in the psychologistic
+interpretation of Mill and Spencer
+We have said above that a consistent carrying out of the notion of logical laws
+as laws which concern mental facts, must lead to essential misinterpretations
+of these laws. The logic which at present prevails has, however, generally been
+afraid of consistency, on this point as on all others. One might almost say
+that it is only inconsistency that keeps psychologism alive: to think it out to
+the end, is already to have given it up, unless extreme empiricism affords an
+example of the greatly superior strength of ingrained prejudices to the most
+certain deliverances of insight. What we have said in objection to this logical
+position - that on it logical truths must lose their a priori guarantee, and
+their wholly exact, purely conceptual character, and must become more or
+less vague probabilities resting on experience and induction, concerned with
+matters of fact in the mental life of man - all this, if we ignore its emphasis
+on vagueness, is what empiricism expressly teaches. We cannot attempt an
+exhaustive criticism of such an epistemological trend. But we have a special
+interest in the psychological interpretation of logical laws which this school
+has fostered, and whose bemusement has also spread beyond its borders.!
+John Stuart Mill,' it is well known, held the principle of contradiction to
+be 'one of our earliest and most familiar generalizations from experience'. Its
+original foundation is taken by Mill to be the fact 'that belief and disbelief
+are two different mental states' which exclude one another. This we know -
+we follow him verbatim - by the simplest observation of our own minds. And
+if we carry our observation outwards, we find that here too light and darkness, sound and silence, equality and inequality, precedence and subsequence,
+succession and simultaneity, any positive phenomenon, in short, and its
+negation, are distinct phenomena, in a relation of extreme contrariety, and
+that one of them is always absent when the other is present. 'I consider the
+axiom in question', he remarks, 'to be a generalization from all these facts.'
+Where the fundamental principles of his empiricistic prejudices are at
+stake, all the gods seem to abandon Mill's otherwise keen intelligence. Only
+
+Psychological interpretations of basic logical principles 57
+one thing is hard to understand: how such a doctrine could have seemed
+persuasive. It is obviously false to say that the principle that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true, and in this sense exclude one
+another, is a generalization from the 'facts' cited, that light and darkness,
+sound and silence etc., exclude one another, since these are not contradictory propositions at all. It is quite unintelligible how Mill thinks he can
+connect these supposed facts of experience with the logical law. In vain one
+looks for light among Mill's parallel statements in his polemic against
+Hamilton. Here he approvingly quotes 'the absolutely constant law' on which
+the like-minded Spencer bases the logical principle in question, i.e. 'that the
+appearance of any positive mode of consciousness cannot occur without
+excluding a correlative negative mode: and that the negative mode cannot
+occur without excluding the correlative positive mode'. Who can fail to see
+that this law is a pure tautology, since mutual exclusion enters into the
+definition of the correlative terms "positive and negative phenomenon"? The
+law of contradiction, on the other hand, is by no means tautologous. We
+do not define contradictory propositions by saying that they are mutually
+exclusive, and, even if the principle in question makes them so, the converse
+does not hold: not every pair of mutually exclusive propositions is a contradictory pair - proof enough that one should not confuse our principle with the
+above tautology. Mill himself does not want it to be taken as a tautology,
+since he locates its original source in an induction from experience.
+The empirical sense of the principle is not illuminated by Mill's barely
+intelligible references to non-coexistences among the data of outer experiasic logical lass sued by treated as inherent necessies of thought, ace
+original part of our mental constitution', 'laws of our thoughts by the native
+structure of our minds', or if they are not perhaps laws of thought merely
+'because we perceive them to be universally true of observed phenomena'
+an issue on which Mill does not, however, care to pronounce positively. We
+read in regard to these laws:
+They may or may not be capable of alteration by experience, but the
+conditions of our existence deny to us the experience which would be
+required to alter them. Any assertion, therefore, which conflicts with
+one of these laws, any proposition, for instance, which asserts a contradiction, though it were on a subject wholly removed from the sphere of
+our experience, is to us unbelievable. The belief in such a proposition is,
+in the present constitution of nature, impossible as a mental fact.*
+We conclude from this passage that the inconsistency expressed in the
+law of contradiction, the impossibility of the joint truth of contradictory
+propositions, is seen by Mill as an incompatibility of such propositions
+in our belief. In other words, he substitutes for the impossibility that the
+
+58 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+propositions should both be true, the real incompatibility of the corresponding acts of judgement. This also fits in with Mill's repeated assertion that acts
+of belief are the only things that can properly be called true and false. The
+principle must be interpreted as saying: Two contradictorily opposed acts of
+belief cannot coexist.
+§26 Mill's psychological interpretation of the principle
+yields no law, but a wholly vague, and scientifically
+unproven, empirical proposition
+All sorts of difficulties now rise up. The expression of the principle is certainly incomplete. What are the circumstances, we should have to ask, in
+which opposed acts of belief cannot coexist? Opposed judgements can very
+well coexist in different individuals. We ought therefore to be more precise,
+and at the same time to set forth the sense of real coexistence, by saying that
+in the same individual, or rather in the same consciousness, contradictory
+acts of belief are incapable of lasting for any time, however short. But is
+this really a law? Can we really utter it with such boundless generality?
+What are the psychological inductions which justify its acceptance? May
+there not have been people, and may there not still be people who, deceived
+by fallacies, contrive at times to believe contradictories together? Has the
+occurrence of contradictions, even quite obvious ones, been scientifically
+investigated in the case of the insane? What happens in hypnotic states, in
+delirium tremens etc.? Does this law also hold for animals?
+Possibly the empiricist will escape these objections by suitably qualifying
+his law, e.g. by saying that it only applies to normal individuals of the genus
+homo, having a normal mental constitution. It is sufficient to raise the insidious question of the exact definition of the concepts 'normal individual', and
+'normal mental constitution' to see how imprecise and complex the content
+of the law, as now stated, has become.
+We need not carry our discussions further, though the law's reference to
+time might, e.g., provide occasion to do so: they are enough to leave us with
+the amazing result that our familiar principle of contradiction, which has
+always counted as a wholly exact, self-evident, exceptionless law, is the very
+paradigm of a grossly imprecise, unscientific proposition, that can only be
+raised to the status of a plausible surmise after its seemingly exact content
+has been rendered quite vague by numerous corrections. This must indeed
+be the truth if empiricism is right in regarding the incompatibility mentioned in the principle, as the real non-coexistence of contradictory acts
+of judgement, if the principle is itself to be treated as a generalization of
+empirical psychology. Mill's brand of empiricism does not even think of
+scientifically delimiting and proving his extraordinarily imprecise proposition, the immediate outcome of his psychological interpretation: it takes it
+in all its native imprecision, as being 'one of the earliest and most familiar
+
+Psychological interpretations of basic logical principles 59
+generalizations from experience'
+, i.e. as being what a rough generalization
+from pre-scientific experience might be expected to be. At the very point
+where the last foundations of all science are in question, we have recourse to
+this naïve empiricism with its blind mechanism of association. Persuasions
+begotten without insight, through psychological mechanisms, and with no
+better justification than widespread prejudices, whose origin rules out all
+fixed, tenable delimitation, and which, taken literally, include manifest falsehood - these are to be the last grounds on which all strictly scientific knowledge is to be justified.
+The matter need not be pursued further. It is, however, important to
+touch on the basic mistake in the doctrines we are attacking, by asking
+whether our proposition about acts of belief can, in any formulation, be the
+proposition we make use of in logic. It tells us: In certain subjective circumstances X (unfortunately not further investigated nor capable of being
+completely specified) two acts of belief having a Yes-No opposition cannot
+coexist in the same consciousness. Is this what logicians really mean when
+they say that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true? We need
+only look at the cases where our law serves to regulate our activities of
+judging to see that it means something quite different. In its normative form
+it plainly says one thing and one thing only: Whatever pairs of opposed acts
+of belief we may select, whether belonging to one or to several individuals,
+whether coexisting in the same time-stretch or separated by time-stretches,
+it holds strictly, and absolutely, and without exception, that not both
+members of each such pair are correct, or in accordance with truth. I do not
+think that even an empiricist could question the validity of this norm. Logic
+at all events, when it speaks of 'laws of thought', is concerned only with
+these second, logical laws, not with our former vague 'laws' of psychology,
+whose content is totally different, and has not even yet been formulated.
+Appendix to the last two sections
+On certain basic defects of empiricism
+Since empiricism and psychologism are intimately linked, we may perhaps
+permit ourselves a small digression to expose the basic errors of empiricism.
+Extreme empiricism is as absurd a theory of knowledge as extreme scepticism. It destroys the possibility of the rational justification of mediate know!-
+edge, and so destroys its own possibility as a scientifically proven theory. It
+admits that there is mediate knowledge, the product of various validating
+connections, and it does not reject principles of validation. It not only
+admits that there is a logic, but itself helps to construct it. If, however, all
+proof rests on principles governing its procedure, and if its final justification
+involves an appeal to such principles, then we should either be involved in a
+circle or in an infinite regress if the principles of proof themselves required
+
+60 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+further proof, in a circle if the principles of proof used to justify the principles of proof were the same as the latter, in a regress if both sets of principles
+were repeatedly different. Plainly, therefore, the demand for a fundamental
+justification of all mediate knowledge can only have a sense if we can both
+see and know certain ultimate principles on which all proof in the last
+instance rests. All principles which justify possible proofs must therefore
+be deductively inferrible from certain last, immediately evident principles,
+so that even the principles of the deduction in question all themselves occur
+among such principles.
+Extreme empiricism, therefore, since it only basically puts full trust in
+singular judgements of experience - a quite uncritical trust since it ignores
+the difficulties which so richly attend upon such singular judgements - eo
+ipso abandons all hope of rationally justifying mediate knowledge. It will
+not acknowledge as immediate insights, and as given truths, the ultimate
+principles on which the justification of mediate knowledge depends; it thinks
+it can do better by deriving them from experience and induction, i.e. by
+justifying them mediately. But if one asks what principles justify such a
+derivation, empiricism, forbidden to appeal to immediately evident universal principles, appeals rather to naïve, uncritical, everyday experience, which
+it thinks to dignify more highly by explaining it psychologically in Humean
+fashion. It therefore fails to see that, having no insightful justification for
+our mediate assumptions, no justification, therefore, for the relevant proofprocedures from the immediately evident general principles that they follow, its whole psychological theory, its whole mediately known doctrine of
+empiricism, is without rational foundation, is, in fact, a mere assumption,
+no more than a common prejudice.
+It is extraordinary that empiricism should give a readier credence to a
+theory so loaded with absurdities than to the fundamental trivialities of
+logic and arithmetic. As a genuine psychologism, it tends always to confuse
+the psychological origin of certain general judgements in experience, on
+account of some supposed 'naturalness', with a justification of the same
+judgements.
+It is worth noting that it goes no better with Hume's moderate empiricism
+which, despite bouts of psychologistic confusion, still tries to keep for the
+pure spheres of logic and mathematics, an a priori justification, and only
+surrenders the factual sciences to experience. Such an epistemological standpoint can likewise be shown up as untenable, even absurd, for a reason
+similar to that brought by us against extreme empiricism. Mediate judgements of fact - we may compress the sense of Hume's theory into this
+phrase - never permit of rational justification, only of psychological explanation. One need then but ask how this applies to the rational justification of
+the psychological judgements (about custom, association of ideas etc.) on
+which the theory itself rests, and the factual arguments that it itself employs.
+One then at once sees the self-evident conflict between the sense of the
+
+Psychological interpretations of basic logical principles 6l
+proposition that the theory seeks to prove, and the sense of the deductions
+that it employs to prove it. The psychological premisses of the theory are
+themselves mediate judgements of fact, and therefore lack all rational justification in the sense of the thesis to be established. In other words: the
+correctness of the theory presupposes the irrationality of its premisses, the
+correctness of the premisses the irrationality of the theory (or thesis). (Hume's
+doctrine is on this showing also a sceptical one, in the pointed sense to be
+defined in chapter vIl.)
+§27 Analogous objections against remaining
+psychological interpretations of our logical principle.
+Ambiguities as sources of delusion
+It is easy to see that objections like those raised in our last section must
+touch every psychological misinterpretation of the so-called laws of thought,
+and all laws which depend on them. There is no route of escape from the
+demand for definition and proof by an appeal to the 'self-confidence of
+reason'
+, or to the self-evidence which these laws have in logical thinking.
+Our insight into the logical laws is assured. But in so far as their thoughtcontent is seen as psychological, their original sense, to which our insight
+into them attaches, has been wholly altered. Exact laws have, as we saw,
+been turned into vague, empirical generalities: if their range of indefiniteness
+is duly noted, they may claim validity, but they are quite removed from selfevidence. Following their natural thought-trends, though without a clear
+consciousness of them, psychological theorists of knowledge no doubt at
+first understand the laws in question in an objective sense - before, that is,
+their arts of philosophical interpretation are brought into play. They then
+make the mistake of thinking that they can appeal to the self-evidence attaching to the properly interpreted formulae, a self-evidence guaranteeing
+their absolute validity, even when subsequent reflection has imposed wholly
+new senses on the logical formulae in question. If there is any case where
+one can justifiably speak of an insight through which truth itself is directly
+perceived, the statement that of two contradictory statements not both are
+true, is a case in point, but, if we are to deny justification to such talk, we
+may plainly do so in regard to all psychologizing reinterpretations of the
+same (or of its equivalents), e.g. 'that affirmation and negation exclude one
+another in our thought, 'that judgements recognized to be contradictory
+cannot coexist in a single consciousness, 'that it is impossible for us to
+believe an explicit contradiction', that no one can take something to be and
+not to be at the same time, and so forth
+Let us dwell for a while, to leave no residual unclarity, on all these shimmering wordings. Regarded more closely, they at once reveal the misleading
+influence of ambiguities, as a result of which the true law, or its equivalent normative transformation, is confused with psychological assertions. Affirmation
+
+62 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+and denial exclude one another in thought. The term 'thought, which in
+its wider sense covers all intellectual activities, is in the usage of certain
+logicians by preference applied to rational, 'logical' thought, to correct judgement. That in correct judgement, Yes and No exclude one another, is plain, but
+this is merely an equivalent of the logical law, and not at all a psychological
+proposition. It tells us that no judgement is correct in which the same state
+of affairs is at once affirmed and denied: it says nothing regarding a possible
+coexistence of contradictory acts of judgement, whether in one consciousness,
+or in several. (Even Höfler and Meinong's Logic, 1890, p. 133, inadvertently
+substitutes the thought of non-coexistence for our logical principle.)
+The second formula - 'that judgements recognized as contradictory cannot coexist in a single consciousness' - is likewise excluded if consciousness
+is interpreted as 'consciousness as such'
+, as a timeless, normal consciousness.
+A primitive logical principle can of course not presuppose a notion like
+'normality', since this cannot even be formulated without regard to such a
+principle. It is plain, further, that if our proposition is thus misunderstood,
+and is kept free from all metaphysical hypostatization, it is merely an equivalent rewriting of our logical principle, and has nothing whatever to do with
+psychology.
+An ambiguity similar to that in our first formulation occurs in our third
+and fourth. No one can believe in a contradiction, no one can take something both to be and not to be - no one, that is, who is rational, to add an
+obvious qualification. The impossibility concerns anyone who wishes to judge
+rightly and no one else. It does not therefore express a psychological compulsion, but our insight that contradictory propositions are not both true,
+that the states of affairs corresponding to them cannot both coexist, so that,
+if anyone claims to judge rightly, i.e. to treat the true as the true, and the
+false as the false, he must judge as this law prescribes. Actual judgements
+may be quite different: no psychological law drives the judging subject
+under the yoke of logical laws. We therefore again have before us an equivalent restatement of the logical law, infinitely far from the thought of
+psychological laws which govern judgement-phenomena. But this thought
+forms the essential kernel of the psychological interpretation. This last arises
+when 'cannot believe etc. is taken to mean a non-coexistence of judgements
+instead of the incompatibility of the corresponding propositions, i.e. a necessary non-realization of their joint truth.
+The proposition: No 'reasonable' (or merely 'responsible') individual can
+believe a contradiction, permits of yet another interpretation. We call a man
+'reasonable', if we credit him with an habitual tendency to judge rightly, in
+his own sphere, of course, and in a normal frame of mind. A man regularly
+capable, when normal, of hitting off "the obvious', what lies to hand, is a
+'responsible thinker' in the sense here in question. The avoidance of explicit
+contradiction is naturally included in the (quite vague) range of the 'obvious'.
+If we carry out this subsumption, the statement 'No responsible, reasonable
+
+Psychological interpretations of basic logical principles 63
+person can believe in contradictions', does no more than trivially apply a
+general principle to a particular case. We should of course not call a thinker
+"responsible', if the case were otherwise. Here again there is no reference to
+a psychological law.
+But we have not reached the end of possible interpretations. There is a
+grave ambiguity in the word 'impossibility', which not only points to a union
+excluded by objective law, but also to a subjective incapacity to unify factors:
+this ambiguity serves to reinforce our psychologistic tendencies. I cannot
+believe that contradictories coexist: try as hard as I will, my attempt shivers
+itself upon an unconquerable, felt resistance. This incapacity for belief is
+arguably an inwardly evident experience: I see belief in contradictories to
+be impossible for me, as for any being that I must think of by analogy with
+myself. I therefore have evident insight into a psychological law of which
+the principle of contradiction is the expression.
+To limit ourselves to the new errors in this argument, we may answer as
+follows: Experience shows that, once we have passed judgement on an issue,
+the attempt to give up the conviction now flooding us, and to embrace
+some opposed alternative, is vain, even if new thought-motives come up,
+retrospective doubts arise, old convictions at variance with our present ones
+haunt us, we are often assailed by an obscure 'feeling' of upsurging, embattled
+thought-masses. The 'vain attempt', the 'felt resistance' etc., are individual
+experiences, limited as to person and time, bound up with definite, if not
+exactly specifiable circumstances. How could they provide inner evidence
+for a universal law which transcends persons and times? One ought not to
+confuse the assertoric inner evidence for the existence of a single experience,
+with the apodeictic inner evidence for the holding of a general law. Can the
+evidence for the existence of a feeling which we interpreted as one of incapacity, provide the insight that what we now in fact do not bring off will be for
+ever denied us by law? One should note how impossible it is to specify the
+circumstances which play so essential a role in the situation. Often enough
+we make mistakes on the matter, though deep conviction as to the reality of
+a fact A pushes us to say: It is unthinkable that anyone should judge not-A.
+It is in this same sense that we are able to say: 'It is unthinkable that anyone
+should not accept the law of contradiction' (of which we are most firmly
+convinced), or 'No one can manage to believe in two contradictory propositions at the same time'. It may be that multiplied testing by examples has
+engendered a lively empirical judgement to this effect, but the inner evidence
+that this always and necessarily happens we do not possess at all
+The true situation can be set forth thus: we have apodeictic inner evidence,
+insight in the pointed sense, in regard to the not-both-being-true of contradictory propositions or the not-both-being-the-case of opposed states of
+affairs. This law of incompatibility is the true principle of contradiction.
+Apodeictic inner evidence then extends itself to a useful psychological application: we can also see that two judgements of contradictory content, both
+
+64 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+merely setting forth in judgement what their intuitive foundations offer,
+cannot coexist. We can also see that pairs of contradictory judgements having either assertoric inner evidence, or apodeictic inner evidence, can coexist
+neither in a single consciousness, nor dispersed among several consciousnesses. All this merely tells us that states of affairs which, as contradictory,
+are objectively incompatible, can also in fact never be thought together in the
+sphere of anyone's intuition or insight - which does not at all mean that he
+cannot hold them to be coexistent. We have, on the other hand, no apodeictic
+inner evidence in regard to contradictory judgements in general: we only empirically know that, within the limits of practically familiar classes of cases,
+sufficiently defined for practical purposes, contradictory acts of judgement
+in fact exclude one another.
+§28 The supposed two-sidedness of the principle of
+contradiction, in virtue of which it should be taken
+both as a natural law of thinking, and as a normal law
+for its logical regulation
+In our psychologically obsessed age, few logicians have been quite able to
+steer clear of psychological misinterpretations of logical principles, even if
+they have stood out against attempts to found logic on psychology, and
+even if they would, on other grounds, resent the charge of 'psychologism'.
+What is not psychological is not accessible to psychological illumination,
+and each well-meant attempt to use psychological researches to throw light on
+the essence of 'laws of thinking', presupposes a psychological reinterpretation of those laws. If one reflects on these truths, one will have to count all
+German logicians who have followed the lead of Sigwart among such psychological reinterpreters, even if they have been far from expressly formulating, or characterizing, logical laws as psychological, and even if they have
+strongly opposed them to other psychological laws. If such conceptual shifts
+are not expressed in the chosen formulations of the laws, they more certainly
+appear in the accompanying elucidations, or in the whole expository context.
+Very remarkable attempts have been made to give the principle of contradiction a double status, in virtue of which it is, on the one hand, a natural
+law which determines our actual judging, while, on the other hand, it is a
+normal law, serving as a foundation to all logical rules. This conception is
+most attractively presented by F. A. Lange in his Logische Studien, a brilliant work whose aim is not to contribute to a psychologistic logic à la Mill,
+but to lay 'new foundations for formal logic'.
+. But if one looks more closely
+at these 'new foundations', one reads that the truths of logic, like those of
+mathematics, derive from our intuition of space (op. cit. (1877), p. 130), and
+that, 'since the simple foundations of these sciences guarantee the strict
+correctness of all knowledge whatsoever'
+', they are 'the foundations of our
+intellectual organization', and that the 'lawfulness we admire in them, springs
+
+Psychological interpretations of basic logical principles 65
+from ourselves... from our own unconscious foundations' (op. cit. p. 148).
+When we read this, we cannot fail to classify Lange's view as a psychologism,
+even if of another sort, to which Kant's formal idealism - on the prevailing
+interpretation - as well as all other forms of the doctrine of innate faculties
+and innate sources of knowledge, belong.
+Lange writes on this point as follows:
+The law of contradiction is the point at which the natural laws of thought
+come into touch with the normative laws. The ever-active psychological
+conditions of our idea-formation bring forth truth and error in ever
+burgeoning abundance in our natural, unregulated thinking, but they
+are supplemented, restricted, and employed towards a definite end, by
+the fact that we cannot combine contradictory elements in our thought,
+when once they have been made (as it were) to coincide. The mind
+swallows the grossest contradictions as long as the contradictory elements can be kept apart in different thought-compartments. Only when
+a statement and its contradictory relate to the same object, do we lose
+our power to combine them: we either become quite unsure of ourselves or one of the two assertions has to yield. Psychologically such an
+elimination of contradiction may be temporary, since the immediate
+coincidence of the contradictions is temporary. What has deep roots in
+different departments of thought cannot simply be destroyed, if mere
+inferences have shown it to be contradictory. At the point where the
+consequences of the two propositions are brought to immediate coincidence, this result certainly follows, but it does not filter back through
+the whole deductive chain to the seat of the original conflict. Doubt as
+to the validity of this deductive chain or as to the identity of its object
+often serve to protect error. And even when such error is disturbed for
+the moment, it springs once more from the familiar round of associated
+ideas, and lives on for as long as repeated assaults do not finally lay
+it low.
+Despite this toughness of error, the psychological law which rules out
+the union of immediate contradictions must continue to exert great
+influence on our thought. It is the sharp edge by which, in the course of
+experience, untenable combinations of ideas are destroyed while the
+more tenable combinations survive. It is the destructive principle in the
+natural progress of human thought, which, like the progress of organisms, depends on the fact that ever new combinations of ideas are being
+produced, of which the main mass are continually destroyed, while the
+better ones survive and have further effects.
+This psychological law of contradiction is given immediately by our
+organism, and operates prior to all experience, as a condition of all
+experience. Its mode of action is objective, and it need not first be
+brought to consciousness in order to act.
+
+66 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+If we
+now wish to conceive of the same law as the foundation of
+logic, if we wish to acknowledge it as the normative law of all thought,
+as it also has been operative as a law of nature without our acknowledgement, then we certainly have need of typical intuitions to convince
+us, as in the case of all other axioms.
+(op. cit. p. 27 f.)
+What is the essential element in logic, when all psychological additions
+have been stripped away? Only the fact of the continual removal of
+contradictories. It is a mere pleonasm in our intuitively based schema if
+one denies that contradiction can exist, as if there were yet another
+necessity behind the ground of the necessary. The fact is that a contradiction does not exist, that each judgement which oversteps the limits of
+this notion, is at once superseded by an opposed, better founded judgement. But this factual supersession is for logic the ultimate ground of all
+rules. Psychologically regarded, it can itself again be called 'necessary',
+in that it is seen as a special case of a more general law of nature. With
+this, however, logic has nothing to do, since it originates at the same
+point as its law of contradiction.
+(op. cit. p. 49)
+These doctrines of F. A. Lange have, in particular, had a plain influence on
+K. Kroman (Unsere Naturerkenntnis, trans. by Fischer-Benzon, Copenhagen,
+1883) and G. Heymans (Die Gesetze und Elemente des wissenschaftlichen
+Denkens, Leipzig, 1890, 1894). To the latter we owe a systematic attempt to
+base epistemology on psychology in the most thoroughgoing manner. As
+an almost pure thought-experiment it must be warmly welcomed: we shall
+have occasion to go into it more fully. Similar notions have been expressed
+by O. Liebmann (Gedanken und Tatsachen, vol. I (1882), pp. 25-7), to our surprise in the course of a discussion which quite correctly attributes to logical
+necessity an 'absolute validity for every rational, thinking being, whether or
+not the rest of his constitution agrees with ours or not'
+It is plain from the above what our objections to these doctrines are. We
+do not deny the psychological facts mentioned in Lange's penetrating exposition, but we find nothing to justify talk of a law of nature. If we compare
+the various formulations of the supposed law with the facts, they reveal
+themselves as very careless expressions of the latter. If Lange had tried to
+describe and delimit these familiar experiences in an exact conceptual manner, he must have seen that they could not qualify as particular instances
+of an exact law, in the sense in which logical principles are such laws. What
+we have before us as a 'natural law of contradiction' is, in fact, a rough,
+empirical generalization, which suffers from a quite unspecifiable degree of
+indefiniteness. It relates, moreover, merely to normal individual minds, for
+how abnormal minds behave is something on which the everyday experience
+
+Psychological interpretations of basic logical principles 67
+here adduced has nothing to tell us. We miss, in short, the strictly scientific
+attitude, which is quite indispensable if pre-scientific judgements of experience are to be used for scientific purposes. We protest vigorously against the
+mixing up of a vague empirical generalization with an absolutely exact,
+purely conceptual law, which has its place in logic alone. We think it absurd
+to identify the one with the other, or to deduce the one from the other, or to
+weld both into the supposedly two-sided law of contradiction. Only sheer
+ignoring of the plain content of the logical law could permit us to ignore the
+further fact that this content is not at all relevant, directly or indirectly, to
+the actual elimination of contradiction in thought. This actual elimination
+plainly only concerns the judgement experienced by one and the same individual in one and the same time and act: it does not concern affirmation if
+divided among different individuals and in different times and acts. For the
+factual element here relevant such distinctions are essential, but they do not
+affect the logical law at all. For this says nothing concerning the conflict
+among contradictory judgements, among real, dated acts of this or that
+character; it only speaks of the law-based incompatibility of the timeless
+ideal unities we call contradictory propositions. The truth that the members
+of such a pair of propositions are not both true, contains no shadow of an
+empirical assertion about any consciousness and its acts of judgement. I think
+that one has only to make this quite clear to oneself, and take it seriously, to
+see the wrongness of the whole notion that we are now criticizing.
+§29 Continuation. Sigwart's doctrine
+Eminent thinkers before Lange have inclined to this disputed attribution of
+a double character to the basic laws of logic. Even Bergmann (Reine Logik,
+end of §2), otherwise little disposed to make concessions to psychologism,
+does so in one chance remark, but Sigwart above all is guilty. His wide
+influence over modern logic justifies a narrower discussion of the relevant
+passages.
+On the view of this important logician
+the principle of contradiction is a normative law in no other sense than
+it is a natural law, a law which simply establishes the meaning of negation. As a natural law, it merely says that it is impossible consciously
+to affirm that A is B and that A is not B at a given moment, but as a
+normative law it is applied to the whole range of standing concepts to
+which the unity of consciousness extends. Seen in this regard, it underlies the Principle of Contradiction ordinarily so called, which is not,
+however, to be coordinated with the Law of Identity (in the sense of
+the formula A is A) since it presupposes the fulfilment of this law, i.e. the
+absolute constancy of our concepts.
+(Sigwart, Logik, F
+, p. 358, 845,5)
+
+68 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+Parallel things are said in the statements regarding the Law of Identity
+(interpreted as a principle of agreement):
+The difference between the principle of agreement treated as a natural and
+a normative law, does not lie in its own nature, but in the presupposition
+of its application. In the former case it is applied to what is present to
+consciousness: in the latter case to the ideal state of a persistent, unchanging presence of all ordered, presentative content to a single consciousness, a state which is empirically incapable of complete fulfilment.
+(Sigwart, Logik, I'
+, p. 383, 845,2)
+To this we object: How can a proposition which (as law of contradiction)
+'establishes the meaning of negation'
+', have the character of a law of nature?
+Sigwart of course does not mean that the law is a nominal definition which
+lays down the sense of the word 'negation'
+•, but only that it is rooted in the
+sense of 'negation', that it sets forth what pertains to the concept's meaning:
+Sigwart in other words only wants to say that to give up the law is to give
+up the meaning of 'negation'.
+. This, however, can never make up the thoughtcontent of a law of nature, and, in particular, not of that law which Sigwart
+formulates in the following words: 'It is impossible consciously to affirm that
+A is B and that A is not B at a given moment.' Propositions whose roots lie
+in concepts (not mere applications of such conceptually rooted propositions to
+facts) can say nothing as to what we can or cannot consciously do at a given
+moment. If, as Sigwart elsewhere teaches, they are timeless, there can be nothing
+in their essential content which concerns the temporal, and which therefore
+concerns the factual. To drag facts into propositions of this sort is always to
+destroy their genuine sense. All this makes it clear that the natural law which
+concerns matters in time, and the normative law, the true principle of contradiction, that concerns timeless matters, differ completely in kind, and that
+we cannot accordingly be dealing with a single law which, with unchanged sense
+merely functions diferently or has a different sphere of application. It the disputed view were correct, there should further be a general formula concerning
+both the law concerning facts and the law concerning ideal objects. A man
+who believes in a single law here, must have a single, definite conception of
+it. We see, however, that it is quite vain to ask for this unitary conception.
+To this objection I shall add another. The normative law of contradiction
+is thought to presuppose absolute constancy among our concepts. The law
+would then only hold on condition that we always used expressions with the
+same meaning, and where this condition was not fulfilled, it would not hold.
+This cannot be what the famous logician seriously believes. The empirical
+application of the law certainly presupposes that the concepts or propositions which function as the meanings of our expressions really are the same,
+since the law ideally extends to all possible pairs of propositions of opposed
+quality but identical subject-matter. But this of course is no condition of the
+
+Psychological interpretations of basic logical principles 69
+law's validity, as if this were merely hypothetical, but conditions the possible
+application of the law to previously given instances. Just as it is a precondition
+for applying a numerical law, that we have, in a given case, numbers actually before us, and numbers of such a character as the law expressly refers
+to, so it is a precondition for applying the logical law of contradiction that
+propositions are before us; that they are propositions of identical subjectmatter is also expressly stipulated.
+It does not seem to me helpful, furthermore, to relate the law to the
+Consciousness in General sketched by Sigwart. In such a concept all concepts (more exactly all expressions) would be used with absolutely identical
+meanings: there would be no flux of meanings, no ambiguities or quaterniones
+terminorum. The laws of logic have, however, no intrinsic, essential relation
+to this ideal, which we rather construct to fit them. The constant reference
+to an ideal consciousness makes us feel disagreeably that the logical laws
+perhaps only strictly hold for fictitious ideal cases, and not for such as we
+encounter in experience. The sense in which the laws of pure logic 'presuppose' identity of concepts has just been discussed. If our conceptions are in
+flux, if the same expression recurs with an altered content, we no longer
+have the same concept in the sense of logic, but a second one, and a new one
+for each further alteration. But each single concept is in itself a supraempirical unity, and falls under the logical rules which apply to its form. As
+the flux of empirical colour-contents and the imperfect identification of
+qualities do not affect colour-differentiations as species of qualities, as one
+species has ideal identity over against its manifold possible cases (which are
+not themselves colours, but instances of one colour), so meanings or concepts
+have identity in relation to the conceptions of which they are the 'contents'.
+Our capacity to ideate universals in singulars, to have a 'seeing' grasp of a
+concept in an empirical presentation, and to be assured of the identity of
+our conceptual intentions in repeated presentation, is presupposed by the
+possibility of knowledge. Just as, in the act of ideation, we intuitively lay
+hold of one concept - as the single species, whose unity over against actual
+instances, or instances thought of as actual, is given with insight - so we can
+apprehend the inward evidence of the logical laws as relating to concepts
+formed in this or that manner. Among concepts, in the sense of ideal unities,
+are also to be found the 'propositions' of which the principle of contradiction speaks, and so also the meanings of the algebraic signs used in the
+formal expression of logical principles. Wherever acts of conceptual presentation are carried out, we encounter concepts: our presentations have their
+'contents'.
+', their ideal meanings, which we can lay hold of abstractively, in
+ideational abstraction, and this means that we can apply logical laws everywhere. The validity of these laws is, however, absolutely unrestricted, nor
+does it depend on our power, nor on anyone's power, to achieve acts of
+conceptual presentation, nor to sustain or repeat such acts in the consciousness that they have the same intention.
+
+Chapter 6
+Syllogistic inferences
+psychologistically considered.
+Syllogistic and chemical formulae
+§30 Attempts at interpreting syllogistic principles
+psychologically
+The discussions of our last chapter have mainly been on the ground of the
+law of contradiction, since in its case, as in the case of all fundamental
+logical principles, psychologistic interpretations are very tempting. The
+thought-motives that push our thinking in this direction have, in fact, a
+strong air of obviousness. Empiricistic doctrines are less often specially applied to the laws of the syllogism: their reducibility to the basic logical principles makes it seem needless to take further trouble with them. If the logical
+axioms are psychological laws, and the syllogistic rules follow in a purely
+deductive manner from these axioms, these syllogistic rules must also count
+as psychological. It might be thought that each fallacious inference would
+furnish a decisive counter-example, and that the deduction here in question
+would provide us with an argument against any psychological interpretation
+of the logical axioms. It might further be thought that the care needed in laying down, whether in thought or word, the supposed psychological content
+of the axioms, would convince the empiricists that such interpretations can
+contribute nothing whatever to proving the syllogistic formulae. Wherever
+such a proof succeeds, its premisses and conclusions alike have the status of
+laws, which differ toto caelo from what are called laws in psychology. But
+even the clearest refutations break upon the complacent conviction of the
+psychologistic doctrine. G. Heymans in his recent elaborate development of
+the doctrine, is so little dismayed by the existence of fallacious arguments,
+that he even regards his psychological view as confirmed by the possibility
+of pointing out such fallacies. For this pointing out does not consist in
+bettering our thought-habits, which do not as yet conform to the law of
+contradiction, but in drawing attention to an unnoticed contradiction in our
+wrong syllogism. One might well ask whether contradictions that pass unnoticed are not genuine contradictions, and whether our logical law merely
+affirms the impossibility of unifying contradictions that are noticed, while
+allowing unnoticed contradictions to be jointly true. Again, one need only
+
+Syllogistic inferences psychologistically considered
+71
+reflect on the difference between psychological and logical incompatibility,
+to be quite clear that we are once more lost in the thick fog of the aforementioned ambiguities.
+It would not profit us greatly to say that talk of 'unnoticed' contradictions in fallacious arguments is improper: that the contradiction first emerges
+as a novelty in the course of the thought-train that refutes it, that this
+emergence has as a further (psychological) consequence that we feel ourselves bound to reject this argument as invalid. One thought-movement has
+one consequence, another another: no psychological law connects a refutation with a fallacy. The fallacy makes an appearance on countless occasions
+without the refutation, and retains our conviction. What right has one
+thought-shift, which only follows the fallacy in certain psychological circumstances, to attribute absolute contradiction to the latter, and not merely to
+say that it is an invalidity in the circumstances, but that it is an objective,
+absolute invalidity? The same naturally holds in regard to the correct syllogistic forms in relation to their justifying demonstration through the logical
+axioms. How can the demonstrative thought-train that only arises in certain
+mental circumstances, rise to the claim that the syllogistic form it justifies is
+absolutely valid? The psychologistic doctrine has no acceptable answer to
+such questions. Here as elsewhere it lacks the capacity to make sense of the
+claim made by logical truths to objective validity, and therewith also their
+functioning as absolute norms of correct and false judgement. How often
+has it been observed and objected that the identification of logical with
+psychological law would also destroy every difference between correct and
+incorrect thinking, since the incorrect modes of judgement are no less governed by psychological laws than the correct ones? Or should we perhaps
+follow an arbitrary convention, and treat the outcome of certain laws as
+correct, of others as incorrect? How does the empiricist counter such objections? "The thought that is directed to truth no doubt strives to achieve
+thought-combinations that are free from contradiction, but the value of
+these non-contradictory thought-combinations again plainly resides in the
+circumstance that the non-contradictory alone can be asserted, that the law
+of contradiction is therefore a natural law of thinking." Thought is here
+credited with an extraordinary nisus towards the non-contradictory, when
+there are, and can be, no other than non-contradictory combinations, if,
+indeed, there really is a law of nature to such an effect. Or is the argument
+any better if one says: 'We have no reason to condemn the combination of
+two mutually contradictory judgements as incorrect, beyond the fact that
+we instinctively and immediately experience it as impossible to assert two
+such judgements together? If one seeks to show, independently of this fact,
+that only the non-contradictory may be asserted, one finds repeatedly that
+the proof always presupposes what it has to prove' (op. cit. p. 69). One at
+once sees the operation of the ambiguities analysed above: our insight into
+the logical law that contradictory propositions are not both true, is identified
+
+72 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+with the instinctive, supposedly immediate 'sensation' of psychological inability to perform contradictory acts of judgement at the same time. Self-evidence
+and blind conviction, exact and empirical generality, logical incompatibility
+of states of affairs and psychological incompatibility of acts of belief, impossibility of joint truth and impossibility of joint belief, all run together.
+§31 Syllogistic and chemical formulae
+Heymans has tried to lend plausibility to the doctrine that syllogistic formulae
+express 'empirical laws of thinking' by likening them to chemical formulae.
+Just as the chemical formula 2H, + O2 = 2H,O only expresses the general
+fact that, in suitable circumstances, two volumes of Hydrogen combine
+with one volume of Oxygen to form two volumes of water, so the logical
+formula
+MaX + MaY = YiX + XiY
+merely expresses the fact that, in suitable circumstances, two universal
+affirmative judgements with a common subject, produce two new particular judgements in consciousness, in which the predicate-concepts
+of the original judgement appear both as predicate- and as subjectconcepts. Why in this case two new judgements are produced, but not in
+the case of the combination Mex + MeY, we are at present ignorant.
+Repeated experiment will, however, assure us of the irrefragable necessity
+which governs these relationships, a necessity which compels us to affirm
+the conclusion when we have conceded the premisses.
+(Heymans, op. cit. p. 62)
+The institution of these experiments of course demands 'an exclusion of disturbing influences'
+', and this consists in 'representing the premiss-judgements
+to oneselt as clearly as possible, letting the mechanısm of thought operate,
+and then waiting for the generation or non-generation of a new judgement'.
+If a new judgement really arises, one must look closely to see whether there
+are not any intermediate stages in consciousness beside the beginning- and
+end-point, and must take note of these latter as exactly and completely as
+possible (op. cit. p. 57).
+What astonishes us in this conception is the assertion that, in the case of
+combinations excluded by logicians, no new judgements are generated. If we
+consider every fallacy of, e.g. the form
+XeM + MeY = XeY
+we shall have to say that generally, in suitable circumstances, two judgements
+of the forms XeM and MeY generate a new judgement in consciousness.
+The analogy with the chemical formulae fits just as correctly or as badly as
+
+Syllogistic inferences psychologistically considered 73
+in the other cases. Naturally one is not permitted to reply that the 'circumstances' are unlike in the two cases. They are psychologically of equal interest, and the corresponding empirical propositions of equal value. Why then
+do we draw such a fundamental distinction between the two classes of
+formulae? If the question were put to us, we should naturally reply: Because
+we see in the case of the one that what they express are truths, while, in the
+case of the other, they are falsehoods. The empiricist, however, cannot give
+this answer. On the interpretations he accepts, the empirical propositions
+corresponding to fallacious inferences are valid in the same way as are those
+which correspond to other inferences.
+The empiricist appeals to the experience of 'irrefragable necessity, which, 'if
+the premisses are conceded, compels us also to hold the conclusion to be true.
+But all syllogisms, whether logically justified or not, come about with psychological necessity, and the felt compulsion (when it is felt) is always the
+same. One who incurs a fallacy, and sustains it against critical objections,
+feels 'irrefragable necessity', the compulsion of not being able to think otherwise, in exactly the same way as the man who draws a correct conclusion
+and continues to recognize its correctness. Like all judgement, the drawing
+of conclusions is no arbitrary matter. This felt irrefragability so little proves
+real irrefragability that it may yield to the force of new reasons, even in the
+case of correctly drawn conclusions recognized as such. It should therefore not
+be confused with the genuine logical necessity that pertains to every syllogistic
+inference, which means, and can mean, nothing beyond the insightfully knowable (though not actually known by each judging person) validity of the
+syllogism, with its governance by ideal law. The law-governed character of
+this validity certainly first makes itself known in the insight with which we
+apprehend the syllogistic principle. In comparison with this, the insight accompanying a conclusion drawn here and now, seems to be an insight into
+the necessary validity of the particular case, i.e. a validity grounded in the law.
+The empiricist thinks that 'we are as yet ignorant' why the combinations
+of premisses condemned by Logic 'yield no conclusion'. Does he expect to
+discover more as knowledge widens? One would imagine that here at least
+we know everything that can be known, for here we see that each possible
+form of conclusion, i.e. each conclusion falling in the framework of syllogistic combinations, will combine with the combinations of premisses in
+question to yield a false syllogistic law. One would think that, in such a case,
+even an infinitely perfect intelligence could have nothing more to know.
+To such and like objections, one of another sort may be added; it is no
+less powerful, but seems less important for our purposes. It cannot be doubted
+that the analogy with chemical formulae does not reach far, not far enough,
+I consider, for us to treat very seriously the psychological laws that have
+been confused with the logical laws. In the chemical case, we know the
+circumstances in which the syntheses expressed in the formulae take place,
+they can be very precisely stated: this is why we count chemical equations as
+
+74 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+among the most valuable inductions of natural science. In the psychological
+case, on the other hand, our knowledge of the circumstances amounts to so
+little, that we have in the end nothing more to say than that people quite
+often think in conformity with logical laws. Circumstances which cannot
+be specified exactly, such as a certain 'concentration of attention', a certain
+'mental freshness',
+', a certain 'preparedness' etc., are favourable conditions
+for the emergence of a logical act of inference. The circumstance or conditions (in the strict sense), from which the inferential act of judgement follows with causal necessity, are entirely hidden from us. The situation being
+what it is, it is quite understandable that no psychologist has so far thought
+of introducing, one by one, into psychology, generalizations which can be
+connected with syllogistic formulae, and which involve the vague circumstances just mentioned. Nor has any psychologist tried to dignify such generalizations with the title of 'laws of thought'.
+After all this, we may count as a 'hopeless' undertaking, in the sense of
+Kant, Heymans' interesting attempt - full of stimulating points that have
+not been mentioned here - at a 'theory of knowledge that could also be
+called a chemistry of judgements', and that is 'nothing more than a psychology of thinking'. It will at least not make us swerve from our rejection of
+psychologistic interpretations. Syllogistic formulae do not have the empirical content men attribute to them: their true sense is plainest when we state
+them in the equivalent form of ideal incompatibilities, e.g. It is universally
+the case that two propositions having the forms 'All M's are X' and 'No P
+is M' are not true unless a proposition having the form 'Some X are not P'
+is also true. And so in every case. Nothing is here said about a consciousness or the acts and circumstances of its judgement etc. If one keeps the true
+content of the syllogistic formulae in mind, one will vanquish the illusion
+that makes the experimental production of the insightful judgement which
+recognizes the syllogistic principle, into an experimental proof of that principle, or into something that can lead to such a proof.
+
+Chapter 7
+Psychologism as a sceptical
+relativism
+§32 The ideal conditions for the possibility of a
+theory as such. The strict concept of scepticism
+The worst objection that can be made to a theory, and particularly to a
+theory of logic, is that it goes against the self-evident conditions for the
+possibility of a theory in general. To set up a theory whose content is explicitly or implicitly at variance with the propositions on which the sense
+and the claim to validity of all theory rests, is not merely wrong, but basically mistaken.
+There are two respects in which one can here talk of the self-evident
+'conditions of the possibility' of any theory whatever. One can talk of these
+in a subjective respect. Here one's concern is with the a priori conditions
+upon which the possibility of immediate and mediate knowledge' depends,
+as also the possibility of rationally justifying any theory. The theory which
+validates knowledge is itself a piece of knowledge: its possibility depends on
+certain conditions, rooted, in purely conceptual fashion, in knowledge and
+its relation to the knowing subject. It is, e.g. part of the notion of knowledge,
+in the strict sense, that it is a judgement that does not merely claim
+to state truth, but is also certain of this claim's justification, and actually
+possesses the justification in question. If the judging person were never in a
+position to have direct personal experience and apprehension of his judgement's self-justifying character, if all his judgements lacked that inner
+evidence which distinguishes them from blind prejudices, and yields him
+luminous certainties, it would be impossible to provide a rational account
+and a foundation for knowledge, or to discourse on theory and science. A
+theory therefore violates the subjective conditions of its own possibility as
+a theory, when, following our example, it in no way prefers an inwardly
+evident judgement to a blind one. It thereby destroys the very thing that
+distinguishes it from an arbitrary, unwarranted assertion.
+It is plain that, by the subjective conditions of possibility, we do not here
+mean real conditions rooted in the individual judging subject, or in the
+varied species of judging beings (e.g. of human beings), but ideal conditions
+
+76 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+whose roots lie in the form of subjectivity as such, and in its relation to
+knowledge. We shall distinguish them by speaking of noetic conditions.
+In an objective respect, talk of the conditions for the possibility of any
+theory do not concern the theory as a subjective unity of items of knowledge, but theory as an objective unity of truths or propositions, bound
+together by relations of ground and consequent. The conditions here are all
+the laws whose foundation lies purely in the notion of theory, or more
+specifically, in the notions of truth, of proposition, of object, of property, of
+relation etc., the notions, i.e. which enter essentially into the concept of theoretical unity. To deny these laws amounts to an assertion that all such terms
+- theory, truth, object, property etc. - lack a coherent sense. A theory is selfdestroying, in this logico-objective respect, if its content offends against the
+laws without which theory as such can have no rational, no coherent sense.
+The logical offences of such a theory can lie in its presuppositions, in its
+forms of theoretic connection, or in the thesis that it sets forth. The violation
+of logical conditions is at its grossest when the sense of the theoretic thesis
+involves a rejection of those laws on which the rational possibility of any
+thesis, and the proof of any thesis, depend. The same holds of noetic conditions and of theories which violate them. We may distinguish (without attempting a classification) between false, nonsensical, logically and noetically
+absurd, and finally sceptical theories. The last cover all theories whose theses
+either plainly say, or analytically imply, that the logical or noetic conditions
+for the possibility of any theory are false.
+The term 'scepticism' is thus connected with a clear concept and is clearly
+divided into logical and noetic scepticism. The concept of such scepticism
+applies to the ancient forms of scepticism with theses such as: There is no
+truth, no knowledge, no justification of knowledge etc. Our previous treatments have shown' that empiricism, whether moderate or extreme, is an
+instance of our pregnant concept of scepticism. That it is of the essence of a
+sceptical theory to be nonsensical, is at once plain from its definition.
+§33 Scepticism in the metaphysical sense
+The term 'scepticism' is commonly used with some vagueness. Ignoring its
+popular sense, we find that philosophical theories are called 'sceptical' if
+they try to limit human knowledge considerably and on principle, and especially if they remove from the sphere of possible knowledge wide fields of
+real being, or such especially precious sciences as metaphysics, natural science,
+or ethics as a rational discipline.
+Among such inauthentic forms of scepticism there is one which is readily
+confused with the purely epistemic scepticism here defined, which would
+limit knowledge to mental existence, and would deny the existence or
+knowability of 'things in themselves'.
+. Such theories are plainly metaphysical,
+they have no connection with scepticism proper, their thesis is free from
+
+Psychologism as a sceptical relativism 77
+logical and noetic absurdity, their claim to validity is a mere question of
+arguments and proofs. Confusions and genuinely sceptical modifications
+then only arise from the paralogistic influence of tempting ambiguities or of'
+sceptical convictions elsewhere fostered. If, e.g., a metaphysical sceptic states
+his view in the form "There is no objective knowledge' (i.e. no knowledge of
+things in themselves), or 'All knowledge is subjective' (i.e. all factual knowledge is merely the knowledge of facts of consciousness), there is a great
+temptation to yield to the ambiguity of the subject-object terminology, and
+to transform the original sense which suits our metaphysical standpoint into
+a noetic-sceptical sense. The proposition 'All knowledge is subjective' becomes the totally new assertion 'All knowledge as a conscious phenomenon
+is subject to the laws of human consciousness: the so-called forms and laws
+ot knowledge are merely functional forms of consciousness, or laws governing such functional forms, i.e. psychological laws'. When metaphysical
+scepticism thus wrongly favours epistemological scepticism, the latter, contrariwise, if taken to be self-evident, seems to provide powerful arguments
+for the former. People reason, e.g.:
+Logical laws, as laws for our functions of knowing, lack 'real meaning';
+we can at least never know if they agree with things in themselves. To
+assume a "
+preformation-system' is wholly gratuitous. If the comparison
+of an item of knowledge with its object (needed to establish an adequatio
+rei et intellectus) is excluded by the notion of the thing-in-itself, this
+applies also to the comparison of the subjective laws of our conscious
+functions with the objective being of things and their laws. If there are
+things in themselves, we can know nothing whatever about them.
+Metaphysical questions do not concern us here. We have mentioned them
+only to have before us at an early stage, an instance of the confusion between
+metaphysical and logico-noetic scepticism.
+§34 The concept of relativism and its specific forms
+In order to criticize psychologism we have yet to discuss the concept of
+subjectivism or relativism which also is part of the above-mentioned metaphysical theory. One of its original forms is caught in the Protagorean formula: "Man is the measure of all things', provided this last is interpreted as
+saying 'The individual man is the measure of all truth.' For each man that is
+true which seems to him true, one thing to one man and the opposite to
+another, if that is how he sees it. We can therefore also opt for the formula
+'All truth (and knowledge) is relative - relative to the contingently judging
+subject. If, however, instead of such a subject, we make some contingent
+species of judging beings the pivot of our relations, we achieve a new form
+of relativism. Man as such is then the measure of all human truth. Every
+
+78 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+judgement whose roots are to be found in what is specific to man, in the
+constitutive laws of man as species - is a true judgement, for us human
+beings. To the extent that such judgements belong to the form of common
+human subjectivity, the term 'subjectivism' is in place here too (in talk of
+the subject as the ultimate source of knowledge etc.). It is best to employ the
+term 'relativism', and to distinguish individual from specific relativism. The restriction of the latter to the human species, stamps it as anthropologism. We
+turn to criticism. Our interests demand that it should be very careful.
+§35 Critique of individual relativism
+Individual relativism is such a bare-faced and (one might almost say) 'cheeky'
+scepticism, that it has certainly not been seriously held in modern times. It
+is a doctrine no sooner set up than cast down, though only for one who
+recognizes the objectivity of all that pertains to logic. One cannot persuade
+the subjectivist any more than one can the open sceptic, a man simply lacking the ability to see that laws such as the law of contradiction have their
+roots in the mere meaning of truth, that from these it follows that talk of a
+subjective truth, that is one thing for one man and the opposite for another,
+must count as the purest nonsense. He will not bow to the ordinary objection that in setting up his theory he is making a claim to be convincing to
+others, a claim presupposing that very objectivity of truth which his thesis
+denies. He will naturally reply: My theory expresses my standpoint, what is
+true for me, and need be true for no one else. Even the subjective fact of his
+thinking, he will treat as true for himself, and not as true in itself. That we
+should, however, be able to convince the subjectivist personally, and make
+him admit his error, is not important: what is important is to refute him in
+an objectively valid manner. Refutation presupposes the leverage of certain
+self-evident, universally valid convictions. Such are those trivial insights on
+which every scepticism must come to grief, insights which show up sceptical
+doctrines as in the strictest, most genuine sense nonsensical. The content of
+such assertions rejects what is part of the sense or content of every assertion
+and what accordingly cannot be significantly separated from any assertion.
+§36 Critique of specific relativism and, in particular,
+of anthropologism
+In the case of subjectivism, it is doubtful whether anyone seriously holds it.
+Modern and recent philosophy leans, however, so strongly towards specific
+relativism, and, in particular, towards anthropologism, that it is quite rare
+to encounter a thinker free from the taint of such erroneous doctrines. But
+such doctrines are, however, sceptical in the sense defined above, and so
+suffer from the grossest absurdities conceivable in a theory: we find in them,
+too, slightly masked, an evident contradiction between the sense of their
+
+Psychologism as a sceptical relativism 79
+thesis, and that which cannot be separated from the sense of any thesis qua
+thesis. It is not hard to show this in detail:
+1. Specific relativism makes the assertion: Anything is true for a given species
+of judging beings that, by their constitution and laws of thought, must count
+as true. This doctrine is absurd. For it is part of its sense that the same proposition or content of judgement can be true for a subject of the species homo,
+but may be false for another subject of a differently constituted species. The
+same content of judgement cannot, however, be both true and false: this
+follows from the mere sense of 'true' and 'false'. If the relativist gives these
+words their appropriate meaning, his thesis is in conflict with its own sense.
+It is plainly a vain evasion to plead that the words of the adduced principle of contradiction were incomplete, but that, when we unfolded the sense
+of the words 'true' and 'false'
+, it was the humanly true and false that were in
+question. For the ordinary subjectivist could likewise plead that talk about
+the true and the false was inexact, and that truth (or falsehood) for the
+individual were what was really meant. And one would of course answer
+him by saying: An evidently valid law cannot have a plainly absurd meaning, and talk of what is true for this one or that one is absurd. It is absurd to
+regard it as an open possibility that the same judged content - with dangerous ambiguity we say 'the same judgement' - should be alike true and false,
+as one or other judges it. There will be a corresponding answer to specific
+relativism: "Truth for this or that species'.
+', e.g. for the human species, is, as
+here meant, an absurd mode of speech. It can no doubt be used in a good
+sense, but it then means something wholly different, i.e. the circle of truths
+to which man as such has access. What is true is absolutely, intrinsically
+true: truth is one and the same, whether men or non-men, angels or gods
+apprehend and judge it. Logical laws speak of truth in this ideal unity, set
+over against the real multiplicity of races, individuals and experiences, and it
+is of this ideal unity that we all speak when we are not confused by relativism.
+2. We saw that the principles of contradiction and excluded middle tell us
+what pertains to the mere sense of the words 'true' and 'false'. In this regard
+it is possible to restate our objection in the words: If the relativist says that
+there could be beings not bound by these principles - this assertion is easily
+seen as equivalent to the relativistic formula stated above - he either means
+that there could be propositions or truths, in the judgements of such beings,
+which do not conform to these principles, or he thinks that the course of
+judgement of such beings is not psychologically regulated by these principles. If he means the latter, his doctrine is not at all peculiar, since we
+ourselves are such beings. (One need only recall our objections to the
+psychologistic interpretation of logical principles.) But if he means the former,
+we may simply reply: Either such beings understand the words true' and
+'false' in our sense, in which case it is irrational to speak of logical principles
+not holding, since they pertain to the mere sense of these words as understood
+by us. We should never dream of calling anything true or false, that was at
+
+80 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+variance with them. Alternatively, such beings use the words 'true' and
+'false' in some different sense, and the whole dispute is then one of words.
+If, e.g., they call those things 'trees' which we call 'propositions', then the
+statements in which the logical laws are expressed of course do not hold, but
+they will also have lost the sense in which we asserted them. It therefore
+comes out that the sense of the word 'truth' has been totally altered by
+relativism, which yet pretends to talk of truth in the sense laid down by the
+logical laws, which is the only sense we all employ when we talk of truth. In
+a single sense there is only a single truth, in an equivocal sense there are
+naturally as many 'truths' as there are equivocal uses.
+3. The constitution of a species is a fact: from a fact it is only possible to
+derive other facts. To base facts relativistically on the constitution of the
+species therefore means to give it a factual character. This is absurd. Every
+fact is individually and therefore temporally determinate. In the case of
+truth, talk of temporal determination only makes sense in regard to a fact
+posited by a truth (provided, that is, that it is a truth about facts): it makes
+no sense in regard to the truth itself. It is absurd to think of truths as being
+causes or effects, as we have already indicated. If someone wished to argue
+from the fact that a true judgement, like any judgement, must spring from
+the constitution of the judging subject in virtue of appropriate natural laws,
+we should warn him not to confuse the "judgement', qua content of judgethe formers at we many en we speak of the judement 2X2=4, which
+is the same whoever passes it. One should likewise not confuse the true
+judgement, as the correct judgement in accordance with truth, with the truth
+of this judgement or with the true content of judgement. My act of judging
+that 2 × 2 = 4 is no doubt causally determined, but this is not true of the
+truth 2 × 2 = 4.
+4. If, as anthropologism says, all truth has its source in our common human
+constitution, then, if there were no such constitution, there would be no truth.
+The thesis of this hypothetical assertion is absurd, since the proposition There
+is no truth' amounts in sense to the proposition "There is a truth that there is
+no truth'. The absurdity of the thesis entails the absurdity of the hypothesis,
+but, since the hypothesis represents the negation of a valid proposition, having
+factual content, it admits of falsehood but not of absurdity. No one has in
+fact ever thought of rejecting as absurd those geological and physical theories which give the human race a beginning and an end in time. The stigma of
+absurdity therefore taints the whole hypothetical statement, since it connects
+an antecedent having a coherent ("logically possible') sense with an absurd
+(logically impossible') consequent. The same stigma then taints anthropologism, and extends naturally, mutatis mutandis, to the wider form of relativism.
+5. On a relativistic view the constitution of a species might yield the 'truth'
+valid for the species, that no such constitution existed. Must we then say that
+there is in reality no such constitution, or that it exists, but only for us? But
+
+Psychologism as a sceptical relativism 8l
+what if all men, and all species of judging beings, were destroyed, with the
+exception of the species in question? We are obviously talking nonsense. The
+notion that the non-existence of a certain constitution should be based on this
+very constitution, is a flat contradiction: that the truth-conditioning, and
+therefore existent constitution should condition the truth (among other truths)
+of its own non-existence. The absurdity is not greatly lessened if we substitute
+existence for non-existence, and apply our arguments, not to an imaginary
+species, which from a relativistic standpoint is possible, but to our human
+species. Our contradiction then vanishes, but not the absurdity associated with
+it. The relativity of truth means that, what we call truth, depends on the constitution of the species homo and the laws which govern this species. Such a
+dependence will and can only be thought of as causal. The truth that such
+a constitution and such laws subsist must then have its real explanation in
+the fact of this subsistence: the principles of our explanation must be identical
+with such laws - again mere nonsense. Our constitution would be causa sui
+in respect of laws, which would cause themselves in virtue of themselves etc.
+6. The relativity of truth entails the relativity of cosmic existence. For the
+world is merely the unified objective totality corresponding to, and inseparable from, the ideal system of all factual truth. One cannot subjectivize
+truth, and allow its object (which only exists as long as truth subsists) to
+count as absolutely existent, or as existent 'in itself'. There would therefore
+be no world "in itself", but only a world for us, or for any other chance
+species of being. This may suit some, but it becomes dubious once we point
+out that the ego and its conscious contents also pertain to the world. That I
+am, and that I am experiencing this or that, might be false if my specific
+constitution were such as to force me to deny these propositions. And there
+would be absolutely no world, not merely no world for this or that one, if
+no actual species of judging beings in the world was so constituted as to
+have to recognize a world (and itself in that world). If we confine ourselves
+to the only species actually known to us, animal species, then a change in
+their constitution would mean a change in the world, and that although
+animal species are thought to be evolutionary products of the world. We are
+playing a pretty game: man evolves from the world and the world from
+man; God creates man and man God.
+The essential core of this objection lies in the self-evident conflict between
+relativism and the inner evidence of immediately intuited existence, i.e. with
+the evidence of 'inner observation' in the legitimate, indispensable sense.
+The inner evidence of judgements resting on intuition is rightly contested
+when such judgements intentionally transcend the content of the actual data
+of consciousness. They have true inward evidence when their intention rests
+on this content itself, and finds fulfilment in it, just as it is. This inner
+evidence is not attainted by the vagueness of all such judgements: one need
+only think of the ineliminable vagueness of the determination of time, and
+perhaps also of place, in any immediate judgement of intuition.
+
+82 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+§37 General observation. The concept of relativism
+in an extended sense
+Our two forms of relativism are special cases of relativism in the widest
+sense of the word, as a doctrine which somehow derives the pure principles
+of logic from facts. Facts are 'contingent': they might very well not have
+been the case, they might have been different. If the facts then differ, logical
+principles also will differ; they will also be contingent, with a being relative
+to the facts on which they are founded. I do not wish to counter this by
+merely bringing in the apodeictic inner evidence of logical laws, points argued
+for in former chapters: I wish to bring in another point which is more
+important in this context (cf. §32 of the present chapter). Anyone can see
+from my statements up to this point that for me the pure truths of logic
+are all the ideal laws which have their whole foundation in the 'sense',
+the 'essence' or the 'content, of the concepts of Truth, Proposition, Object,
+Property, Relation, Combination, Law, Fact etc. More generally stated,
+they have their whole foundation in the sense of the concepts which make
+up the heritage of all science, which represent the categories of constituents
+out of which science as such is essentially constituted. Laws of this sort
+should not be violated by any theoretical assertion, proof or theory, not
+because such a thing would render the latter false - so would conflict with
+any truth - but because it would render them inherently absurd. An assertion, e.g., whose content quarrels with the principles whose roots lie in
+the sense of truth as such, is self-cancelling. For to assert, is to maintain the
+truth of this or that content. A proof whose content quarrels with the principles rooted in the sense of the relation of ground and consequent, is selfcancelling. For to prove, is to state that there is such and such a relation of
+ground and consequent etc. That an assertion is 'self-cancelling', is "logically
+absurd, means that its particular content (sense, meaning) contradicts the
+general demands of its own, pertinent meaning-categories, contradicts what
+has its general root in the general meaning of those categories. It is now
+clear that, in this pregnant sense, any theory is logically absurd which deduces
+logical principles from any matters of fact. To do so is at variance with the
+general sense of the concepts of 'logical principle' and "fact', or, to speak
+more precisely and more generally, of the concepts of 'truth based on the
+mere content of concepts' and 'truth concerning individual existence'. It is
+easy to see that the objections against the above discussed relativistic theory
+are, in the main, objections to relativism in the most general sense.
+§38 Psychologism in all its forms is a relativism
+In our attacks on relativism, we have of course had psychologism in mind.
+Psychologism in all its subvarieties and individual elaborations is in fact the
+same as relativism, though not always recognized and expressly allowed to
+
+Psychologism as a sceptical relativism 83
+be such. It makes no difference whether, as a formal idealism, based on a
+'transcendental psychology'
+', it seeks to save the objectivity of knowledge,
+or whether, leaning on empirical psychology, it accepts relativism as its
+ineluctable fate.
+Every doctrine is ipso facto relativistic, a case of specific relativism, if,
+with the empiricists, it treats the pure laws of logic as empirical, psychological laws. It is likewise relativistic, if, with the apriorists, it deduces these
+laws, in more or less mythic fashion, from certain 'original forms' or 'modes
+of functioning' of the (human) understanding, from consciousness as such,
+conceived as generic (human) reason, from the psycho-physical constitution
+of man, from the intellectus ipse which, as an innate (generically human)
+disposition, precedes all actual thought and experience. All the objections
+we have made to specific relativism also affect such doctrines. One must of
+course take the somewhat shifting key-words of apriorism, e.g. 'understanding', 'reason', 'consciousness', in the natural sense which gives them an
+essential connection with the human species. It is the curse of the theories
+under consideration that they at one time give these words a real, at another
+time an ideal sense, and so weave an inextricable tangle of true and false
+statements. Aprioristic theories, to the extent that they yield to relativistic
+motives, must be counted as relativistic. Such relativism is no doubt restricted, i.e., to the realm of mathematics and natural science, when, as in
+the case of some Kantian thinkers, certain logical principles are set aside as
+principles of 'analytic' judgements, but sceptical absurdities are not thereby
+avoided. For, in their narrower field, they still deduce truth from generic
+human nature, the ideal from the real, or, more precisely, the necessity of
+laws from the contingency of facts.
+We are, however, more interested in the extreme, consistent psychologism
+which permits no such restrictions. To such a psychologism the main English
+empiricists, as well as the more recent German logicians, belong, i.e. thinkers such as Mill, Bain, Wundt, Sigwart, Erdmann and Lipps. To criticize all
+such works is neither possible nor desirable. In view, however, of the reformatory aims of these Prolegomena, I do not wish to pass over the main
+works of modern German logic, and especially not the important work of
+Sigwart, which, more than any other, has pushed logic in the last decades
+into psychological channels.
+§39 Anthropologism in Sigwart's Logic
+Isolated statements of a psychologistic tone and character are to be found,
+as passing misunderstandings, in thinkers whose logical works have a consciously antipsychologistic tendency. This is not so in the case of Sigwart.
+Psychologism is in his case not an unessential, eliminable addition, but the
+systematically dominant, basic conception of his work. Right at the beginning of this work, he expressly denies 'that the norms of logic (not merely
+
+84 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+technical, methodological rules, but the principles of pure logic, the law of
+contradiction, of sufficient ground etc.) can be otherwise known than by
+studying the natural powers and types of functioning that these norms are
+to regulate' (Logik, f, p. 22). His whole mode of treating the discipline
+accords with this conception. Logic, according to Sigwart, is divided into an
+analytic, a law-giving and a technical part. If we ignore this last, as not
+concerning us here, the analytic part has as its task 'to investigate the nature
+of the function for which rules must be found'. On this the law-giving part is
+built, which has to set up the conditions and laws of its normal functioning'
+(op. cit. §4, p. 16). The 'demand that our thought should be necessarily and
+universally valid'
+, if 'kept to the known functions of the judgement in all
+its factors and conditions
+', yields 'definite norms which judgement must
+satisfy. These demands are concentrated in two points: '(1) that the elements of the judgement should be completely definite, conceptually fixed, and
+(2) that the act of judging should arise necessarily out of its presuppositions.
+This part therefore embraces the doctrine of concepts and syllogisms as
+the whole set of normative laws for the formation of perfect judgements'
+(op. cit. p. 20 f.). In other words, this part contains all the principles and
+laws of pure logic (to the extent that these are envisaged by the traditional
+or the Sigwartian logic), and to Sigwart these principles and laws really have
+a psychological foundation.
+His detailed statements agree with this programme. Nowhere does he
+remove the laws and theorems of pure logic, and the objective elements
+out of which they are constituted, from the flux of psychological and practical research into knowledge. Sigwart always talks of our thought and its
+functions, where he is trying to characterize logical necessity, with its ideal
+legality, as opposed to psychological contingencies. Pure laws like that of
+contradiction or sufficient ground, are constantly called 'laws of functioning' or 'fundamental forms of the movement of our thought' (op. cit. p. 184
+and the whole context of pp. 184-5). We read, for instance: "Though negation is rooted in a movement of our thought which goes beyond reality, and
+applies contents to one another that cannot be combined, yet there can be
+no doubt that Aristotle's principle only purports to touch the nature of our
+thought (op. cit. p. 253). "The absolute validity of the law of contradiction,
+and of the consequent laws which deny a contradictio in adjecto, we read in
+another passage, rests 'on our immediate consciousness that we always do
+and always will do the same thing when we deny' (op. cit. p. 386). The same
+holds, on Sigwart's view, of the law of identity (as "principle of agreement'),
+and of all purely conceptual propositions and propositions of pure logic.*
+We read statements like the following:
+If we reject the possibility of knowing something as it is in itself, if being
+is no more than one of the ideas produced by ourselves, it still remains
+the case that objectivity is attributed by us to such ideas as we produce
+
+Psychologism as a sceptical relativism 85
+with a consciousness of necessity, and that, whenever we treat anything
+as existent, we assert thereby that all other thinking beings, even purely
+hypothetical ones, endowed with the same nature as ourselves, must
+produce it with the same necessity.
+(op. cit.p.7f.)
+The same anthropological tendency pervades all the statements relative
+to basic logical concepts, and in the first place to the concept of truth. It
+is, says Sigwart, 'a fiction ... that a judgement could be true if we abstract
+from the fact that some intelligence thinks such a judgement. A philosopher
+who speaks in this manner has accepted a psychologistic reinterpretation of
+truth. On Sigwart's view, it would be a fiction to speak of truths that hold in
+themselves unknown to anyone, e.g. such truths as transcend men's capacity
+for knowledge. An atheist, at least, who rejects superhuman intelligences,
+could not speak in this fashion, nor could such as we, before we have proofs
+that there are such intelligences. The judgement expressed in the formula of
+gravitation was not true before the time of Newton, which makes it, strictly
+speaking, a self-contradictory and wholly false utterance, since an unrestricted validity for all times is plainly part of what it means to assert.
+To go further into Sigwart's many statements which concern the notion
+of truth would involve us in an inadmissibly long treatment. But it would
+at least show that we were right in taking the passage we quoted literally.
+Sigwart resolves truth into conscious experiences: though he often talks of
+objective truth, he renounces its true objectivity, which depends on its
+supraempirical ideality. Experiences are real particulars, temporally determinate, which come into being and pass away. Truth, however, is 'eternal',
+or, better put, it is an Idea, and so beyond time. It makes no sense to give
+truth a date in time, nor a duration which extends throughout time. Naturally one says of truth that on occasion it 'comes to mind', and is accordingly
+'apprehended' or 'experienced' by us. But such 'apprehension',
+, 'experiencing' and 'coming to consciousness',
+', are spoken of in quite a different sense
+in relation to ideal being, from what they have in relation to empirical,
+individualized being. We do not 'apprehend' truth as we apprehend some
+empirical content which comes up, and again vanishes, in the stream of
+mental experiences: truth is not a phenomenon among phenomena, but is an
+experience in that totally different sense in which a universal, an Idea, is an
+experience. We are conscious of truth, as we are in general conscious of a
+Species, e.g. of 'the Colour Red.
+A red object stands before us, but this red object is not the Species
+Red. Nor does the concrete object contain the Species as a 'psychological' or
+'metaphysical' part. The part, the non-independent moment of red, is, like
+the concrete whole object, something individual, something here and now,
+something which arises and vanishes with the concrete whole object, and
+which is like, not identical, in different red objects. Redness, however, is an
+
+86 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+ideal unity, in regard to which it is absurd to speak of coming into being
+or passing away. The part (moment) red is not Redness, but an instance
+of Redness. And, as universal objects differ from singular ones, so, too, do
+our acts of apprehending them. We do something wholly different if, looking at an intuited concretum, we refer to its sensed redness, the individual
+feature it has here and now, and if, on the other hand, we refer to the
+Species Redness, as when we say that Redness is a Colour. And just as,
+while regarding some concrete case, we refer, not to it, but to its universal,
+its Idea, so, while regarding several acts of such Ideation, we rise to the
+inwardly evident recognition of the identity of these ideal unities which are
+meant in our single acts. These unities have identity in the authentic, strictest sense: they are identical Species, or are Species of the same Genus, etc.
+Truth now is likewise an Idea: like any other Idea it is given in an act of
+Ideation based upon an intuition - this last naturally is the act of insight -
+and we are evidently clear as to truth's unity and identity over against the
+dispersed multitude of concrete, compared cases of inwardly evident judgement. And just as, in other cases, the being or 'holding' of something general amounts to an ideal possibility - i.e. a possibility in regard to the being
+of empirical cases falling under the general Idea - so too in this case: the
+statements 'It is the truth that..? and 'There could have been thinking
+beings having insight into judgements to the effect that..?, are equivalent.
+If there are no intelligent beings, if the natural order excludes them, or if
+they are, in a real sense, impossible - or if there are no beings capable of
+knowing certain classes of truths - then such ideal possibilities remain
+without fulfilling actuality. The apprehension, knowledge, bringing to consciousness of truth (or of certain classes of truths), is nowhere ever realized.
+Each truth, however, remains in itself what it is, it retains its ideal being: it
+does not hang somewhere in the void, but is a case of validity in the timeless
+realm of Ideas. It belongs to the realm of the absolutely valid, into which we
+fit all cases of validity into which we have insight or at least well-founded
+surmises, and in which we further locate the vaguely presented range of
+things indirectly and indefinitely thought valid, ie. the cases of validity not
+as yet known to us, and perhaps never to be known.
+In this situation, Sigwart does not seem to me to press forward to a clear
+position. He would like to save the objectivity of truth, and not let it sink
+under the tide of subjective phenomenalism. But, if we enquire just how
+Sigwart's psychological epistemology hopes to penetrate to the objectivity
+of truth, we come upon statements like the following:
+The certainty of keeping to a judgement, of the irrevocability of a
+synthesis, that I shall always say the same things - this certainty can
+only be present when I see that it does not rest on momentary, variable,
+psychological motives, but on something that stays unalterably the same
+wherever I think, and is immune from all change. This, on the one hand,
+
+Psychologism as a sceptical relativism 87
+is my self-consciousness itself, the certainty that I am and that I think, that
+I am I, the being who now thinks and who has thought, who thinks of
+this and that. On the one hand, it is what I judge about, what I think of,
+in its invariant content: recognized as identical by myself: which is quite
+independent of the individual states of the thinker.
+(op. cit. §39.2, p. 310)
+A psychologism consistent in its relativism will naturally here reply: Not
+merely individual variation, but pervasive constancies, such as the whole
+invariant content and the abiding functional laws that govern it, are psychological facts. If there are such traits and laws essentially common to all
+men, then they make up the specific nature of man. All truth in its universal
+validity is therefore relative to the human species, or, more generally, to
+some species or other of thinking beings. If species differ, so do truths and
+laws of thought.
+We for our part would say: Universal likeness of content, and constant
+functional laws of nature which regulate the production of such content, do
+not constitute a genuine universal validity, which rather rests upon ideality.
+If all creatures of a genus are constitutionally compelled to judge alike, they
+are in empirical agreement, but, in the ideal sense demanded by a supraempirical logic, there might as well have been disagreement as agreement.
+To define truth in terms of a community of nature is to abandon its notion.
+If truth were essentially related to thinking intelligences, their mental functions and modes of change, it would arise and perish with them, with the
+species at least, if not with the individual. With the genuine objectivity of
+truth, the objectivity of being, even the objectivity of subjective being or the
+being of the subject, would be gone. What if, e.g., no thinking being were
+capable of seriously postulating its own being? Then such thinking beings
+would be and also not be. Truth and being are 'categories' in the same
+sense, and plainly correlative: truth cannot be relativized, while the objectivity of being is maintained. The relativization of truth presupposes the objective
+being of the point to which things are relative: this is the contradiction in
+relativism.
+Sigwart's doctrine of universality is in harmony with the rest of his
+psychologism: we must treat it here, since the ideality of truth presupposes
+the ideality of the universal, the conceptual. On occasion he says in jest that
+'the universal as such is only in our heads' (op. cit. p. 103 Note): more
+seriously he remarks that it is something purely inward... depending on
+nothing but the inner power of our thought' (op. cit. $45.9, p. 388). One may
+undoubtedly say this of our conceptual presentation, as a subjective act
+having this or that psychological content. But the 'what' of such presentation, the concept, can in no sense be regarded as a real part of this psychological content, as something here and now, which comes and goes with the
+act. It can be meant, but not produced, in our thought.
+
+88 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+Sigwart is consistent in practising the same relativization he uses on the
+notion of truth on the very closely connected concepts of ground and necessity. 'A logical ground', he says, 'that is unknown to us, is, in strictness a
+contradiction, for a ground only becomes a logical ground when we know
+it' (op. cit. §32.2, p. 248). The statement that mathematical theorems have
+their ground in mathematical axioms therefore relates, 'in strictness'
+, to a
+fact of human psychology. Could we still hold this fact to be a fact whether
+or not anyone knew, knows or will know it? The usual manner of speaking,
+which gives objectivity to relations of ground and consequent, and talks of
+their discovery, must accordingly be mistaken.
+Despite Sigwart's earnest attempts to distinguish essentially different
+notions of ground, and the acuteness he shows therein - an acuteness only
+to be expected in so eminent a thinker - he is still hindered by the psychologistic tendency of his thought from making the most essential distinction
+of all, one which presupposes a sharp sundering of ideal from real. When he
+opposes the 'logical ground' or 'ground of truth' to the 'psychological ground
+of certainty, he finds the former merely in a certain universal alikeness,
+alikeness of what is presented, 'since only this, not an individual's mood etc.,
+can be common to all'. We need not reiterate the objections raised above.
+The fundamental distinction between a purely logical ground of truth and
+a normatively logical ground of judgement is not to be found in Sigwart. On
+the one hand, a truth (not a true judgement, but the ideally valid unity), has
+a ground, which is tantamount to saying that there is a theoretical proof
+which deduces the truth from this objective, theoretical ground. The principle of sufficient ground is to be taken in this sense, and in this alone. And
+on this acceptation of ground, it is not at all the case that every judgement
+has a ground, let alone that it 'implicitly asserts' such a ground. Every principle of inference, every genuine axiom, is in this sense groundless, as in the
+opposite direction likewise every judgement of fact. Only the probability of
+a fact can be grounded, not the fact itself, or the judgement of fact. The
+expression 'ground of judgement'
+, on the other hand - if we ignore the
+psychological 'grounds' or causes of judging and their motivating contents®
+- means no more than our logical right to judge. In this sense, every judgement certainly 'claims' this right (though there are objections to saying that
+the right is 'implicitly asserted'). This means that we may demand of each
+judgement that it should declare to be true what is true. As craftsmen of
+knowledge, i.e. logicians in the ordinary sense, we must demand many things
+of our judgements with an eye to the further growth of knowledge. If these
+are unfulfilled, we reproach a judgement with logical imperfection, with
+'groundlessness': the latter expression certainly involves a stretching of the
+word's ordinary meaning.
+There are similar objections to Sigwart's statements about necessity. We
+read: 'If we are to talk intelligibly, all logical necessity ultimately presupposes the existence of a thinking subject whose nature it is to think in this
+
+Psychologism as a sceptical relativism 89
+manner' (op. cit. §33.7, p. 262). Or we may follow up his statements regarding the difference between assertoric and apodeictic judgements, which
+Sigwart thinks unessential, 'since in every judgement uttered in full consciousness, the necessity of uttering it is also asserted' (op. cit. §31.1, p. 230 ff.).
+Sigwart has not given reciprocal distinctness to two totally different concepts of necessity. The subjective necessity, the compulsive conviction, which
+colours every judgement (or rather, appears in each such judgement when,
+remaining under its sway, we try to assert its contrary) is not distinguished
+from entirely different concepts of necessity, from apodeictic necessity, in
+particular, the peculiar consciousness in which we apprehend law, or conformity to law, with insight. The latter (really twofold) concept of necessity
+is really quite lacking in Sigwart. He quite ignores the fundamental equivocation which permits us to apply the term 'necessary'
+, not only to our
+apodeictic consciousness of necessity, but also to its objective correlate, i.e.
+the law, or the conformity to the law, of which this consciousness represents
+the insight. It is only in the latter sense that the expressions It is necessary
+that...
+• and 'It is a law that ..' gain their objective equivalence, and likewise
+the expressions 'S is necessarily P' and 'S's being P is grounded on a law'
+It is naturally the second, purely objective, ideal notion, which underlies
+all apodeictic judgements in the objective sense of pure logic: it alone
+dominates and constitutes all theoretical unity, it determines the meaning of
+a hypothetical combination as an objectively ideal form of propositional
+truth, it connects the conclusion as a 'necessary' (ideally law-governed) consequence with the premisses.
+How little Sigwart does justice to these differences, how deeply he is
+enmeshed in his psychologism, is shown by his treatments of Leibniz's fundamental distinction between vérités de raison et celles de fait. The 'necessity' of both sorts of truth, Sigwart thinks, is 'ultimately hypothetical', for
+'from the fact that the contrary of a factual truth is not impossible a priori,
+it does not follow that it is not necessary for me to assert it, once the fact
+has occurred, or that the opposite assertion would be possible for one who
+knows the fact' (op. cit. §31.6, p. 239). And again: 'On the other hand, our
+possession of universal concepts on which propositions of identity rest, is
+ultimately a factual matter, which has to be there before the principle of
+identity can be applied to it, and so can generate a necessary judgement'.
+From which he thinks he can conclude that Leibniz's distinction 'in respect
+of necessity, breaks down' (op. cit. p. 240).
+What is here maintained at the outset is quite correct. Every judgement,
+while I make it, represents a necessary assertion for me, as its denial, while
+I remain sure of my judgement, represents an impossibility for me. But does
+Leibniz intend this psychological necessity when he denies necessity, rationality to factual truths? It is likewise certain that one can know no law
+without possessing the universal concepts out of which it is built. This possession, certainly, like the whole knowledge of a law, is a factual matter. But
+
+90 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+did Leibniz call the knowing of a law 'necessary', and not rather the truth of
+the law that we know? The necessity of the vérité de raison surely accords
+quite well with the contingency of the act of judgement, to the extent that
+this amounts to insight and knowledge. Only through a confusion of two
+essentially different concepts of knowledge, a subjective, psychologistic concept and Leibniz's objective, idealistic one, can Sigwart wind up his argument
+by holding that Leibniz's distinction 'in respect of the character of necessity
+breaks down'. There is undeniably a subjective, experiential distinction
+which corresponds to the fundamental objective-ideal distinction between
+law and fact. If we never had experienced the consciousness of rationality,
+of apodeicticity in its characteristic distinction from the consciousness of
+facticity, we should not have possessed the concept of law, nor been able to
+distinguish fact from law. We should not have been able to distinguish
+generic (Ideal, law-determined) generality from universal (factual, contingent) generality, nor necessary (i.e. law-determined, generic) implication from
+factual (i.e. contingently universal) implication. This follows from the fact
+that concepts not given as combinations of known concepts (nor as combinations of known forms of combination) could only have arisen in us from
+an intuition of individual instances. Leibniz's vérités de raison are merely the
+laws, i.e. the ideal truths in the pure and strict sense, which are solely rooted
+in our concepts, which are given and known to us in pure, apodeictically
+evident generalizations. Leibniz's vérités de fait are individual truths; they
+form a sphere of propositions which, even if expressed in universal form,
+e.g. 'All southerners are hot-blooded', are, above all, assertions of existence.
+§40 Anthropologism in the Logic of B. Erdmann
+Sigwart provides us with no explicit discussion of the relativistic consequences implicit in his whole treatment of the fundamental concepts and
+problems of logic. The same holds of Wundt. Wundt's Logic gives even
+freer rein to psychological motives than Sigwart's: it contains long epistemological chapters, but hardly touches on ultimate doubts of principle. The
+same is true of Lipps, in whose Logic psychologism is so originally and
+consistently sustained, so free from compromise and so thoroughly carried
+out in all branches of the discipline, as has not been the case since the time
+of Beneke.
+Erdmann is in a quite different case. At considerable length, and with
+instructive consistency, he decidedly comes down on the side of relativism,
+and points to possible changes in the laws of thought as a counter to the
+presumption 'which thinks that it can overleap the limits of our thought
+and find a standpoint for us beyond ourselves' (B. Erdmann, Logik, I'
+:, §60,
+Nr. 370, p. 378 f.). It will be useful to consider his teaching further.
+Erdmann begins by refuting the opposed standpoint. 'By a great majority, we read,
+
+Psychologism as a sceptical relativism
+it has been maintained, since Aristotle, that the necessity of these (logical) principles is unconditional, their validity therefore eternal ... The
+decisive reason for this has been sought in the impossibility of thinking judgements that contradict them. But this only proves that these
+principles mirror the essence of our presentation and thinking. For if
+they reveal this, it will not be possible to carry out their contradictories,
+since these seek to abolish the condition to which all our presentation
+and thinking, and so all our judgement, is bound.
+(op. cit. Nr. 369, p. 375)
+Some words on the sense of this argument, which seems to run: From the
+impossibility of successfully denying these principles, it follows that they
+mirror the essence of our presentation and thought, for, if they do so, this
+impossibility will necessarily follow. This cannot be the argument. For I
+cannot conclude from the fact that A follows from B, that B follows from A.
+The thought plainly is only that the impossibility of denying logical principles is explained by supposing that these principles 'mirror the essence
+of our presentation and thought'. By this last we mean that they are laws
+stating what generally pertains to human presentation and thought as such,
+'that they state conditions to which all our presentation and thinking are
+bound'. Because they do this, judgements which contradict and deny them
+cannot, on Erdmann's view, be entertained
+I can, however, neither approve this inference, nor the assertions which enter
+into it. It seems quite possible to me that, just on account of those laws to
+which all a creature's (e.g. a man's) thinking is subject, individual judgements
+may be framed denying the validity of these laws. The denial of these laws contradicts their assertion, but the denial as a real act is quite compatible with the
+objective validity of the laws, or with the real operation of the conditions on
+which the laws pronounce generally. If contradiction is an ideal relation
+among the contents of judgements, we are here dealing with a real relation
+between an act of judgement and its governing conditions. If it were the case
+that the laws of the association of ideas basically governed human presentation and judgement, as the association-psychology actually taught, should we
+then, we may ask, have to reject as absurd and impossible that a judgement
+denying these laws should itself arise through their working? (Cf. §22 above.)
+But even if the argument were sound, it must fail of its purpose. For the
+logical absolutist (sit venia verbo) could rightly object: The laws of thought of
+which Erdmann speaks, are either not those laws of which I and everyone
+else speaks, in which case my thesis is untouched, or he attributes a character to them which is quite at variance with their sense. And again he would
+object: The impossibility of thinking the negation of these laws, which those
+laws themselves are thought to entail, is either what I and everyone mean by
+such an impossibility, in which case it supports my conception, or it is something different, in which case I am again untouched.
+
+92 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+As regards the former alternative, the principles of logic only express
+certain truths whose roots are to be found in the mere sense (content) of
+such concepts as Truth, Falsehood, Judgement (Proposition) etc. But
+Erdmann calls them 'laws of thought', laws which express the essence of our
+human thinking. He thinks they state the conditions by which all human
+presentation and thinking are bound, that they would change, as he thereupon explicitly says, with a change in human nature. They accordingly
+have, on Erdmann's view, a real content. This, however, contradicts their
+character as purely conceptual propositions. No proposition whose roots lie
+in mere concepts, which merely states what those concepts contain, and
+what is given with them, makes an assertion about the real. One need only
+consider the genuine sense of the laws of logic to see that they do not do
+this. Even where they speak of judgements, they do not refer to what psychological laws seek to indicate by this word, i.e. judgements as real experiences, but they mean judgements in the sense of statement-meanings in
+specie, meanings which retain their identity whether serving to found actual
+acts of assertion or not, and without regard as to who asserts them. If
+logical laws are treated as laws of the real (Realgesetze) which, like natural
+laws, govern our real presentation and judgement, their whole sense is
+altered, as has been discussed at length above.
+One sees the danger of calling the principles of logic "laws of thought'.
+They are only laws of thought, as we shall show more precisely in the next
+chapter, in the sense of being laws that have a part to play in the governance
+of our thinking, a mode of expression that shows that we are dealing with a
+practical function, a mode of use, and not with something that enters into
+their content. That they express the 'essence of thought' could be given a
+good sense in view of their normative function, provided the condition were
+fulfilled that in them lay the necessary and sufficient criteria for assessing
+the correctness of each judgement. Thus the matter was conceived by traditional rationalism, which never became clear that logical principles are no
+more than trivial generalities, with which our assertions may not clash on
+pain of being absurd, and that the harmony of thought with these norms
+guarantees no more than its formal consistency. On this ground it would be
+quite unfitting to go on speaking in this ideal sense of the 'essence of thinking', and to define it in terms of these laws' which, as we know, only keep us
+free from formal absurdity. It is a residue of rationalist prejudice that, even
+in our time, men speak of formal truth instead of formal consistency, a most
+deplorable, because misleading, play on the word 'truth'.
+Let us pass, however, to our second point. The impossibility of denying
+the laws of thought is conceived by Erdmann as the impossibility of performing such a denial. But we logical absolutists think these two concepts so
+little identical, that we deny the non-performability altogether, while maintaining the impossibility. It is not the act of denial that is impossible - this
+would mean, since it pertains to something real, that it is a real-impossibility
+
+Psychologism as a sceptical relativism 93
+- but it is the negative proposition which forms its content that is impossible, and this content, being ideal, is ideally impossible, which means that
+it is absurd, and therefore self-evidently false. This ideal impossibility of
+the negative proposition does not clash with the real possibility of the
+negative act of judgement. The last remaining equivocation should thus be
+eliminated, and we should say, with complete clarity, that the proposition is
+absurd, but that the act of judging it is not causally ruled out.
+In the actual thought of normal persons the actual denial of a law of
+thought does not usually occur, but it can scarcely be said that it cannot
+thus occur, since great philosophers like Epicurus and Hegel have denied
+the law of contradiction. Perhaps genius and madness are in this respect
+allied, perhaps there are also lunatic rejecters of the laws of thought: these
+Will certainly also have to count as men. One should also reflect that it is
+in the same sense impossible to think the negation of the consequences of
+primitive logical principles as the negation of these principles themselves. It
+is well-known, however, that we can be mistaken regarding complicated
+syllogistic or arithmetical theorems, and this too is an unassailable argument. These are, however, disputed questions that do not touch anything
+essential. Logical impossibility, as absurdity of an ideal content of judgement,
+and psychological impossibility, as the non-performability of the corresponding act of judgement, are heterogeneous notions, even if the latter were to go
+with the former in all human cases, and the acceptance of absurdities were
+ruled out by natural laws. (Cf. the discussions of 822 in chapter Iv.)
+The logical absolutist makes use of the genuine logical impossibility of
+contradicting the laws of logic as an argument for the 'eternity' of these
+laws. What does such talk of eternity mean? Only that every judgement is
+bound by the pure laws of logic without regard to time and circumstances,
+or to individuals and species. This being bound is not meant psychologically
+in the sense of a thought-compulsion, but in the ideal sense of a norm:
+whoever judges differently, judges quite wrongly, no matter what species of
+mental creatures he may belong to. A relation to mental creatures plainly
+puts no restriction upon universality: norms for judgements bind judging
+beings, not stones. This is part of their sense, and so it would be ridiculous
+to treat stones and similar entities as in this respect exceptions. The logical
+absolutist's proof is now very simple. He will simply say: The following
+thought chain is one into which I have insight. Such and such principles are
+valid, and their validity depends merely on unfolding the content of their
+concepts. Any proposition, i.e. any possible content of judgement in the
+ideal sense, is therefore absurd, if it either immediately or mediately clashes
+with such principles. Such a mediate clash merely means that a purely deductive chain runs from the hypothetical truth of such contents of judgement to the consequent untruth of the principles in question. If then such
+contents of judgement are absurd, and as such false, any actual judgement
+which has them as its contents will be incorrect, since a judgement is called
+
+94 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+'correct'
+when what it judges, i.e. its content, is true, and incorrect when this
+content is false.
+I stress the reference to every judgement, to make plain that the sense
+of this strict universality rules out any restriction eo ipso, and so also the
+restriction to human or other kinds of judging persons. I can compel nobody
+to see what I see. But I myself cannot doubt; I once more see, here where I
+have insight, i.e. am embracing truth itself, that all doubt would be mistaken.
+I therefore find myself at a point which I have either to recognize as the
+Archimedean point from which the world of doubt and unreason may be
+levered on its hinges, or which I may sacrifice at the peril of sacrificing all reason
+and knowledge. I see that this is the case, and that in the latter case - if it
+were then still reasonable to speak of reason or unreason - I should have to
+pack in all rational striving for truth, all assertion and all demonstration.
+On all these points I find myself in conflict with our distinguished thinker
+who (following on the above citations) proceeds as follows:
+The necessity thus established of the formal logical laws could only be
+an unconditional one ... if our knowledge of it were such as to guarantee that the essence of the thought we find in ourselves and expressed in
+them, were unchangeable, or were the only possible essence of thinking,
+that these conditions of our thinking were the conditions of any possible
+thinking. But we only know about our own thinking. We are not in a
+position to construct the picture of a thought different from our own,
+nor therefore that of a genus of thought for all these different sorts of
+thinking... Words that appear to describe such a genus have no sense
+that we can work out which would satisfy the claims raised by such an
+appearance. For every attempt to work out what they describe is bound
+to the conditions of our presentation and thinking, moves within their
+limits.
+If we lend to tempting expressions such as that of the 'essence of our
+thinking' a currency in purely logical contexts, if, following our analyses, we
+interpret them as the sum total of ideal laws which determine the formal
+consistency of our thinking, we should naturally also claim to give a strict
+proof of what Erdmann thinks unproveable: that the essence of thought is
+unchangeable, that it is unique in its possibility etc. It is clear, however, that
+Erdmann, in denying all this, does not stick to the only justifiable sense of
+'essence of thinking', it is clear - as the quotation below will show more
+blatantly - that he thinks the laws of thought express the real essence of our
+thinking, that they are accordingly real laws, through which we have an
+immediate insight into the cognitive side of our common human constitution. This is unfortunately not the case. How could propositions which
+breathe no word regarding reality, which merely elucidate what is inseparably asserted in certain verbal or statement-meanings of great generality,
+
+Psychologism as a sceptical relativism 95
+guarantee important real knowledge regarding (as we read a little further
+on) the 'essence of mental events, and, in short, of our soul"?
+If, on the other hand, such laws or others did give us insight into the real
+essence of thinking, we should come to quite other conclusions than our
+esteemed thinker. 'We only know about our thinking' More precisely, as
+scientific psychologists we not only know about our own individual thinking, but a little about human thought in general, and a little less about
+animal thinking. A type of thinking which differs from ours in this real
+sense, and species of thinking beings that exemplify it, are at least things
+that we can conceive: they admit of a significant description, just as this is
+possible in the case of imaginary natural species. Böcklin has painted most
+magnificent centaurs and water-sprites with the most concrete naturalness -
+we believe in them, at least aesthetically. Who can say it the laws of nature
+allow of such? If, however, we enjoyed final insight into the law-governed
+ways in which organic elements could be combined to constitute the organism's living unity, if we knew what laws keep the stream of becoming in its
+typically formed channels, we could form scientifically exact concepts of
+many objectively possible species, and add these to those that are actual,
+and such possibilities could be as squarely discussed as are imaginary types
+of gravitation in the writings of theoretical physicists. The logical possibility
+of such fictions is at least unassailable, whether in the field of natural science
+or that of psychology. Only when we make a Heráßaris dis ändo yévos, and
+mix up the realm of psychological laws of thought with those of pure logic,
+and, further, misinterpret the latter psychologistically, will there be a shadow
+of justification for asserting our incapacity to imagine other modes of thinking, and for denying to the words that seem to describe these any achievable
+sense. Quite possibly we can form 'no real idea' of such modes of thinking,
+quite possibly this is unachievable for us, but such unachievability in no
+case amounts to impossibility in the sense of what is senseless or absurd.
+Possibly the following discussion will assist understanding. Theorems belonging to the theory of Abelian transcendents have no 'achievable sense'
+for babies in arms, or for 'babies in mathematics'
+', as mathematicians jestus laymen, so a higher species of thinking beings, e.g. of angels, could stand
+to men. Such words and concepts have no achievable sense for us, since
+certain peculiarities of our mental constitution stand in the way. A normal
+man takes about five years to understand the theory of Abelian functions or
+even to grasp its concepts. It might be the case that a millennium would be
+needed for a humanly constituted being to grasp angelic functions, though
+he can hardly hope to live as long as a century. But such an absolute
+unattainability, rooted in the natural limits of a specific constitution, would
+not be the one that absurdities and senseless statements offer. We are in one
+case concerned with propositions absolutely beyond our comprehension,
+though possibly consistent, and even valid in themselves. In the other case
+
+96 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+we understand propositions very well, but they are absurd, and we therefore
+'cannot believe them', i.e. we see that, as absurd, they ought to be rejected.
+Let us now look at the extreme consequences which Erdmann deduces
+from his premisses. Basing ourselves on the 'empty postulate of an intuitive
+thought, we must, on his view, 'admit the possible existence of a thought
+differing in essence from our own', from which he draws the conclusion that
+logical laws only hold within the limits of our thinking, without our
+being able to guarantee that this thinking might not alter in character.
+For it is possible that such a transformation should occur, whether
+affecting all or only some of these laws, since they are not all analytically derivable from one of them. It is irrelevant that this possibility is
+unsupported by the deliverances of our self-consciousness regarding
+our thinking. Though nothing presages its actualization, it remains a
+possibility. We can only take our thought as it now is, and are not in
+a position to fetter its future character to its present one. We are, in
+particular, incapable of so grasping the essence of our mental states,
+in brief of our soul, that we can deduce therefrom the unalterability of
+thought as it is given to us.®
+According to Erdmann,
+we cannot help admitting that all the propositions whose contradictories
+we cannot envisage in thought, are only necessary if we presuppose the
+character of our thought, as definitely given in our experience: they are
+not absolutely necessary, or necessary in all possible conditions. On this
+view our logical principles retain their necessity for our thinking, but
+this necessity is not seen as absolute, but as hypothetical [in our sense,
+as relative]. We cannot help assenting to them - such is the nature of
+our presentation and thinking. They are universally valid, provided our
+thinking remains the same. They are necessary, since to think means for
+us to presuppose them, as long, that is, as they express the essence of
+our thinking.
+(cf. op. cit. Nr. 370, p. 378)
+I need not say, after my previous statement, how little I think these consequences are valid. It is certainly possible that there is a mental life essentially different from our own. Certainly we can only take our thinking for
+what it is, and it would certainly be stupid to try to deduce and permanence
+from 'the essence of our mental states, in brief of our soul'. But from this
+the totally different possibility does not follow, that changes in our specific
+constitution could affect all or some logical principles, and that such principles have a merely hypothetical necessity. All this is absurd, absurd in the
+pregnant sense which has always been employed here, a sense strictly scientific
+
+Psychologism as a sceptical relativism 97
+and free from emotive tincture. It is the curse of our ambiguous logical
+terminology that such doctrines can still come up and can deceive serious
+thinkers. If the primitive conceptual distinctions of elementary logic had
+been completed, and terminology clarified on their basis, and we no longer
+dragged around with the wretched equivocations that attach to all logical
+terms - law of thought, form of thought, real and formal truth, presentation,
+judgement, proposition, concept, character, property, ground, necessity etc.
+- it would not be possible for absurdities as gross as relativism to be theoretically represented in logic and epistemology, nor could they have the plausibility
+by which even eminent thinkers are blinded
+Talk of the possibility of variable 'laws of thought', as psychological laws
+of presentation and judgement differing in many respects for varying species
+of mental being, and even from time to time for one and the same species -
+all this has a good sense. For psychological 'laws' are for us 'empirical laws',
+approximate generalities of coexistence and succession, relating to matters
+of fact which may in one case be thus, in another case otherwise. We even
+gladly allow the possibility of varying normative laws of presentation and
+judgement. Normative laws can certainly be adapted to the specific constitution of judging beings, and so vary with them. This obviously affects the
+rules of practical logic as a doctrine of method, as well as the methodological
+prescriptions of the separate sciences. Mathematical angels may no doubt
+use other methods of calculation than ours - does this mean that they may
+have different axioms and theorems? This question carries us further. Talk
+of variable laws of thought only becomes absurd when we are referring
+to the laws of pure logic (to which may be added the pure laws of the theory
+of numbers, of ordinals, of sets etc.). The vague phrase 'normative laws of
+thought' by which these are likewise designated, favours the general temptation to dump them all in together with our former psychologically founded
+rules of thinking. They, however, are purely theoretical truths, ideal in character, rooted in their own semantic content and not straying beyond it. They
+can accordingly not be affected by any actual or imagined change in the
+world of 'matter of fact.
+We must here keep in mind a threefold opposition: not merely the opposition between practical rule and theoretical law, or that between ideal law and
+real law, but also the opposition between an exact law and an empirical law
+(i.e. a statement of for-the-most-part or average universality, governed
+by the principle 'No law without its exception'). If our insight extended to
+the exact laws of mental process, these too would be eternal and unchangeable, as are the laws of theoretical natural science; they would therefore
+hold even if there were no mental processes at all. If all gravitating masses
+were eliminated, the law of gravitation would not thereby be suspended: it
+would merely lack the possibility of factual application. For it tells us nothing regarding the existence of gravitating masses, only regarding what pertains to gravitating masses as such. (No doubt, as acknowledged above, an
+
+98 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+idealizing fiction plays its part in the setting up of exact laws of nature: here
+we ignore this, confining ourselves to the mere intention of such laws.) As
+soon as the exact character of logical principles is conceded, and they are
+seen in their exactness, the possibility of their being changed by changes in
+the collocations of what actually is, and of consequent transformations of
+zoological and mental species, is ruled out, and the 'eternal' validity of such
+principles guaranteed.
+A defender of psychologism could here oppose our position by saying
+that the truth of logical principles, like all truth, has its seat in knowledge,
+and that knowledge as a mental experience is of course subject to psychological laws. But, without exhaustive discussion of the sense in which truth
+has its seat in knowledge, I yet point out that no change in psychological
+facts can turn knowledge into error, or error into knowledge. The arising
+and the perishing of phenomenal cases of knowledge, no doubt depends on
+psychological conditions, as does the arising and perishing of other mental
+phenomena, e.g. sensory ones. But, as no mental happenings can cause the
+Red I intuit not to be a Colour, but a Tone, or the lower of two tones to be
+the higher, or, more generally, as what rests on the general nature of an
+experience is elevated above all possible change, since all change affects
+what is individual, and makes no sense in regard to concepts, so the same
+holds of 'contents' of acts of knowledge. It pertains to the notion of knowledge that its content has the character of truth, a character which does not
+pertain to the evanescent phenomena of knowledge, but to their selfsame
+content, to the ideal, universal element we have in mind when we say, e.g., I
+know that a + b = b + a, and countless other persons know it too. Of course
+errors can develop out of cases of knowledge, e.g. through fallacious inferences, but this does not turn knowledge as such into error, for one is merely
+causally tied up with the other. It may likewise be the case that a species of
+beings capable of judgement may develop no knowledge, that what they
+suppose true may always be false, and what they suppose false true. This
+would leave truth and falsehood intrinsically unaffected: they are essentially
+properties of the contents of such judgements, not of judgements as acts.
+They pertain to such contents even if no one recognizes their presence.
+Colours, Tones, Triangles etc., always have the essential properties of Colours,
+Tones, Triangles etc., whether anyone in the world knows such a fact or not.
+The possibility, therefore, that Erdmann has sought to establish, that
+other beings might have quite different logical principles, cannot be accepted. An absurd possibility is an impossibility. One need only try to think
+out what his doctrine implies: that there might be peculiar beings, logical
+supermen, as it were, for whom our logical principles do not hold, but rather
+quite different principles, so that every truth for us is a falsehood for them.
+For them it is the case that the mental phenomena they are experiencing are
+not experienced by them. That we and they exist may be true for us, but is
+false for them etc. We everyday logicians would say: Such beings are mad,
+
+Psychologism as a sceptical relativism 99
+they talk of truth, yet destroy its laws, they say they have their own laws of
+thought, but they deny those on which the possibility of any such laws depends.
+They make assertions, yet countenance the denial of what they assert. Yes
+and No, truth and error, existence and non-existence, lose all their distinctness in their thought. Only they fail to notice their absurdities, which we
+notice, and see to be absurd in the most luminous fashion. Someone who
+tolerates such possibilities is divided only by a hairbreadth from the extremest
+scepticism: the subjectivity of truth is applied to the species instead of to the
+individual person. He is a specific relativist in the sense defined above, and is
+exposed to the objections we developed, which we shall not here repeat. For
+the rest I see no reason why we should stop at the boundaries of imaginary
+racial differences. Why not recognize real racial differences, differences between sanity and insanity, and all individual differences, as having an equal
+right?
+Perhaps a relativist will object to our appeal to inner evidence, to the
+evidence with which we see the absurdity of the possibility here suggested,
+by repeating what we quoted above, 'that it is irrelevant that this possibility
+is unsupported by our self-observation', since it is obvious that our thought
+cannot be at variance with its own forms. Ignoring such psychologistic interpretation of our thought-forms, which was refuted above, we shall merely
+point out that such an expedient means absolute scepticism. If we have lost
+faith in the inwardly evident, how can we rationally make and sustain assertions? Perhaps, inasmuch as other people may be constituted as we are, and
+may incline to similar judgements in virtue of identical laws of thinking? But
+how can we know this, if we can know nothing whatever? Without insight,
+there can be no knowledge.
+It is really odd that men are prepared to put their trust in statements so
+dubious as those regarding what is common to human beings, but not in those
+mere trivialities, which though offering us only the slenderest instruction,
+grant us the clearest insight into what little they say. In this we can at least
+find nothing which relates to thinking beings and their specific peculiarities.
+The relativist cannot secure a temporarily improved position by saying
+that he is being treated as an extreme relativist: he is only a relativist as
+regards logical principles, while leaving other truths unassailed. This will
+not enable him to escape the general objections to specific relativism. For, if
+one relativizes the basic truths of logic, one relativizes all truth whatever. It
+is enough to consider the content of the law of contradiction and to draw
+some immediate consequences.
+Erdmann keeps far from such half-measures: he has founded his Logic on
+the relativistic concept of truth which his doctrine demands. His definition
+runs: "The truth of a judgement consists in the fact that the logical immanence is subjectively, more specifically put, objectively, certain, and that the
+predicative expression of this immanence represents a necessity for thought'
+(op. cit. Nr. 278, p. 275). For an object is for Erdmann what is presented to
+
+100 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+us, and this in its turn is expressly identified with our presentation. In the
+same way, his 'objective or universal certainty' is only apparently objective,
+since it is 'based on the general agreement of judging subjects' (op. cit. p. 274).
+The expression 'objective truth' is to be found in Erdmann's writing, but he
+identifies it with 'universal validity, ie. validity for all. This is divided for
+him into certainty for all, and, if I understand him rightly, also into a
+necessity of thought for all. This is just what is meant by the above definition. It might seem a problem how, on this definition, we should ever rise to
+the justified assertion of even a single case of objective truth, and how we
+can escape the infinite regress that his definition demands, and of which the
+distinguished thinker is fully conscious. He does not, unfortunately, tell us
+enough on this point. The judgements in which we assert that others will
+agree with us are of course not, as he says, this agreement itself, but how
+does this help us? And how are we helped by our subjective certainty regarding such agreement? Our assertion would only be justified if we knew of the
+agreement, and this means if we perceived its truth. One might also ask how
+one ever came to be subjectively certain of the agreement of everyone, and,
+Ignoring this difficulty, whether it is at all proper to demand such universal
+certainty, and whether truth may not rather be the appurtenance of a select
+few than possessed by everyone.
+
+Chapter 8
+So far our attack has been mainly upon the consequences of psychologism.
+We now turn against its arguments: we shall try to show that what it regards
+as obvious truths are in fact delusive prejudices.
+§41 First prejudice
+A first prejudice runs: Prescriptions which regulate what is mental must
+obviously have a mental basis. It is accordingly self-evident that the normative
+principles of knowledge must be grounded in the psychology of knowledge.
+One's delusion vanishes as soon as one abandons general argumentation
+and turns to the 'things themselves'.
+We must first put an end to a distorted notion which both parties share,
+by pointing out that logical laws, taken in and for themselves, are not normative propositions at all in the sense of prescriptions, i.e. propositions which
+tell us, as part of their content, how one should judge. One must always
+distinguish between laws that serve as norms for our knowledge-activities,
+and laws which include normativity in their thought-content, and assert its
+universal obligatoriness.
+Let us take as an example the well-known syllogistic principle we expressed in the words: A mark of a mark is also a mark of the thing
+itself. This statement would be commendably brief if its expression were
+not also an obvious falsehood.' To express it concretely, we shall have to
+adjust ourselves to a few more words. 'It is true of every pair of characters
+A, B, that if every object which has the character A also has the character B,
+and if any definite object S has the character A, then it also has the character B.' That this proposition contains the faintest thought of normativity
+must be strongly denied. We can employ our proposition for normative
+purposes, but it is not therefore a norm. Anyone who judges that every A
+is also B, and that a certain Sis A, ought also to judge that this Sis B.
+Everyone sees, however, that this proposition is not the original proposition
+of logic, but one that has been derived from it by bringing in the thought of
+normativity.
+
+102 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+The same obviously holds of all syllogistic laws, as of all laws of pure
+logic as such.' But not of such laws alone. A capacity for normative use is
+shared by the truths of other theoretical disciplines, and above all by those
+of pure mathematics, which are usually kept separate from logic.? The wellknown principle
+(a+b) (a-b)=a-b2
+tells us, e.g. that the product of the sum and the difference of any two
+numbers equals the difference of their squares. Here there is no reference to
+our judging and the manner in which it should be conducted; what we have
+before us is a theoretical law, not a practical rule. If, however, we consider
+the corresponding practical proposition: To arrive at the product of the
+sum and difference of two numbers, one should find the difference of their
+squares, we have conversely uttered a practical rule and not a theoretical
+law. Here, too, the transformation of law into rule involves a bringing in of
+the notion of normativity; the rule is the obvious, apodeictic consequence
+of the law, but it none the less differs from it in thought-content.
+We can even go further. It is clear that any theoretical truth belonging to
+any field of theory, can be used in a like manner as the foundation for a universal norm of correct judgement. The laws of logic are not at all peculiar in
+this respect. In their proper nature, they are not normative but theoretical
+truths, and as such we can employ them, as we can the truths of all other
+disciplines, as norms for our judgement.
+We cannot, however, treat the general persuasion that the laws of logic
+are norms of thinking as quite baseless, nor the obviousness with which it
+impresses us as a mere delusion. These laws must have some intrinsic prerogative in the regulation of our thought. But does this mean that the idea
+of regulation, or of an 'ought, must therefore form part of the content of
+such laws? Can it not follow from that content with self-evident necessity?
+In other words: May not the laws of logic and pure mathematics have a
+distinctive meaning-content which gives them a natural right to regulate our
+thought?
+This simple treatment shows us how both sides have made their mistakes.
+The anti-psychologists went wrong by making the regulation of knowledge the 'essence'
+', as it were, of the laws of logic. The purely theoretical
+character of formal logic, and its identity of character with formal mathematics, were thereby insufficiently recognized. It was correctly seen that the
+set of laws treated in traditional syllogistic theory were remote from psychology. Their natural right to regulate knowledge was recognized, for which
+reason they must be made the kernel of all practical logic. The difference
+between the proper content of these laws, and their function, their practical
+application, was, however, ignored. Men failed to see that so-called basic
+laws of logic were not in themselves norms, though they could be used
+normatively. Concern with this normative use had led men to speak of such
+
+103
+laws as laws of thought, and so it appeared that these laws, too, had a psychological content, and that their only difference from what are ordinarily
+called psychological laws lay in this normative function, not possessed by
+other psychological laws.
+The psychologistic thinkers, on the other hand, went wrong in putting
+forward a presumed axiom whose invalidity we may expose in a few words:
+It is entirely obvious that each general truth, whether psychological or not,
+serves to found a rule for correct judgement, but this not only assures us of
+the meaningful possibility, but even of the actual existence of rules of judgement which do not have their basis in psychology.
+Not all rules which set standards for correct judgement are on that account
+logical rules. It is, however, evident that, of the genuinely logical rules which
+form the nucleus of a technology of scientific thinking, only one set permits
+and demands a psychological establishment: the technical precepts specifically adapted to human nature concerning the acquisition and criticism of
+scientific knowledge. The remaining, much more important group consists
+of normative transformations of laws, which belong solely to the objective
+or ideal content of the science. Psychological logicians, even such as are of
+the stature of a Mill or a Sigwart, treat science from its subjective side (as a
+methodology of the specifically human acquisition of knowledge), rather
+than from its objective side (as the Idea of the theoretical unity of truth),
+and therefore lay one-sided stress on the methodological tasks of logic. In
+doing so they ignore the fundamental difference between the norms of pure
+logic and the technical rules of a specifically human art of thought. These are
+totally different in character in their content, origin and function. The laws
+of logic, seen in their original intent, concern only what is ideal, while these
+methodological propositions concern only what is real. If the former spring
+from immediately evident axioms, the latter spring from empirical facts,
+belonging mainly to psychology. If the formulation of the former promotes
+our purely theoretical interests, and gives only subsidiary practical help, the
+latter, on the other hand, have an immediate practical aim, and they only
+give indirect help to our theoretical interests, in so far as they aim at the
+methodical progress of scientific knowledge.
+§42 Elucidations
+Every theoretical statement, we saw above, permits of a normative transformation. But the rules for correct judgement which thus arise, are not, in
+general, such as logic, considered as a technology, requires: few of them are,
+as it were, predestined to normativity. If such a logical technology is to be of
+real help in our scientific endeavours, it must not presuppose that full
+knowledge of the complete sciences which we hope to achieve by its means.
+We shall not be helped by the mechanical restatement of all given theoretical
+knowledge as norms: what we need are general norms, extending beyond all
+
+104 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+particular sciences to the critical evaluation of theoretical knowledge and its
+methods in general, as well as practical rules for its promotion.
+This is exactly what logic as a technology aims at, and if it aims at this as
+a scientific discipline, it must itself presuppose certain items of theoretical
+knowledge. It is clear from the start that it must attach exceptional worth to
+all knowledge resting only on the notions of Truth, Proposition, Subject,
+Predicate, Object, Property, Ground and Consequent, Relation and Relatum
+etc. For all science in its objective, theoretical aspects, i.e. in respect of what
+it tells us, consists of truths, truth pertains to propositions, all propositions
+have subjects and predicates, and refer by way of these to things or properties, propositions are connected as grounds and consequents etc. Those truths,
+it is now clear, which have their roots in such essential constituents of all
+science considered as an objective theoretical unity, truths which, accordingly,
+cannot be thought away without thinking away all that gives science as such
+its objective purchase and sense, such truths obviously provide the fundamental standards by which we can decide whether anything claiming to be
+a science, or to belong to one, whether as premiss, conclusion, syllogism,
+induction, proof or theory, really lives up to its intentions, or does not
+rather stand in an a priori conflict with the ideal conditions of the possibility
+of theory and science as such. Men should admit that truths which have
+their roots in the concepts which constitute the objectively conceived Idea
+of Science, cannot also belong to the field of any particular science. They
+should see that such truths, being ideal, cannot have their home-ground in
+the sciences of matter of fact, and therefore not in psychology. If these facts
+were realized, our case would be won, and it would be impossible to dispute
+the existence of a peculiar science of pure logic, absolutely independent of
+all other scientific disciplines, which delimits the concepts constitutive of the
+Idea of System or of theoretical unity, and which goes on to investigate the
+theoretical connections whose roots lie solely in these concepts. This science
+would have the unique peculiarity of itself, qua form, underlying the content
+of its laws; the elements and theoretical connections of which it, as a systematic unity of truths, consists, are governed by the very laws which form part
+of its theoretical content.
+That the science which deals with all sciences in respect of their form,
+should eo ipso deal with itself, may sound paradoxical, but involves no inner
+conflict. The simplest example will make this clear. The law of contradiction
+governs all truth, and since it is itself a truth, governs itself. To realize what
+such self-government means one need only apply the law of contradiction to
+itself: the resultant proposition is an obvious truism, having none of the
+marks of the remarkable or the questionable. This is invariably the case
+where pure logic is used to regulate itself.
+This pure logic is therefore the first and most essential foundation of
+methodological logic. The latter, however, has other quite different foundations contributed by psychology. Every science, as we stated above, permits
+
+105
+of a double treatment: it is, on the one hand, an aggregate of human devices
+for acquiring, systematically delimiting and expounding this or that territory
+of truth. These devices are called methods, e.g. calculation by abacus or
+slide-rule, by written signs on a slate, by this or that computer, by logarithmic, sine- or tangent-tables, astronomical methods involving cross-wires or
+telescopes, physiological methods involving microscopy, staining etc. All
+these methods, and also all forms of exposition, are adapted to the human
+constitution as it at present normally is, and are in fact in part expressive of
+contingent, national features. Even physiological organization has a not
+unimportant part to play. Would our most refined optical instruments be
+of much use to a being whose sense of sight was attached to an end-organ
+differing considerably from our own?
+But all science permits of quite another treatment; it can be considered in
+regard to what it teaches, in regard to its theoretical content. What each
+statement states is - in the ideal case - a truth. No truth is, however, isolated
+in science: it occurs in combination with other truths in theoretical connections bound by relations of ground and consequent. This objective content
+of science, to the extent that it really lives up to its intent, is quite independent of the scientist's subjectivity, of the peculiarities of human nature in
+general. It is objective truth.
+Pure logic aims at this ideal side of science, in respect of its form. It does
+not aim at the peculiar material of the various special sciences, or the peculiarity of their truths and forms of combination: it aims at what relates to
+truths and theoretical combinations of truths as such. For this reason every
+science must, on its objective, theoretical side, conform to the laws of logic,
+which are of an entirely ideal character.
+In this way these ideal laws acquire a methodological significance, which
+they also have since mediate justification is provided by proofs whose norms
+are merely normative transformations of the ideal laws whose sole grounds
+lie in logical categories. The characteristic peculiarities of proofs mentioned
+in the first chapter of this work (§7) all have their origin and complete
+explanation in the fact that inner evidence in demonstration - whether in
+the syllogism, in connected, apodeictic proof, or in the unity of the most
+comprehensive, rational theory, or also in the unity of an argument in probabilities - is simply our consciousness of an ideal law. Purely logical reflection, whose first historic awakening occurred in the genius of Aristotle,
+abstracts the underlying law itself, and then brings the multiplicity of laws
+discoverable in this manner, and at first seen in isolation, under primitive
+basic laws, and so creates a scientific system which, in a purely deductive
+order, permits the derivation of all possible laws of pure logic, all possible
+forms of syllogisms, proofs etc. The forms of logic transform themselves
+into norms or rules telling us how we should conduct proofs, and - in
+relation to possible illegal formations - into rules telling us how we should
+not conduct them.
+
+106 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+Norms accordingly fall into two classes. One class of norms regulates
+all proof and all apodeictic connection a priori; it is purely ideal, and only
+relates to our human knowledge by way of a self-evident application. The
+other class is empirical, and relates essentially to the specifically human side
+of the science. It consists of what might be called mere auxiliary devices or
+substitutes for proofs (above §9). It has its roots in our general human constitution, in the main, in our mental constitution, since this is more important for logical technology, but also in part in our physical constitution.4
+§43 A look back at the opposed arguments of
+idealism. Their defects and their justified sense
+In the dispute over a psychological or objective foundation for logic, I,
+accordingly, occupy an intermediate position. The antipsychologists looked
+by preference on the ideal laws, called by us 'purely logical', while the psychologistic part fixed their gaze on the methodological rules that we have
+classed as 'anthropological'. This difference of orientation barred mutual
+understanding. The psychologistic party were little inclined to do justice to
+the worthwhile core of their opponents' arguments, but this is understandable when we reflect how psychological motives and confusions played their
+part in these arguments, despite all pretensions to avoid them. The actual
+content of works which claim to expound 'formal' or 'pure' logic, must have
+confirmed the psychologistic party in their negative attitude, and must have
+made them feel that the projected discipline really only dealt with a piece of
+shamefaced, and therefore arbitrarily restricted psychology of cognition, or
+with a set of rules for cognition founded upon this. The antipsychologistic
+party were not at least in a position to put stress in their argument on the
+fact that psychology deals with laws of nature, whereas logic deals with
+normative laws (cf. above §19, and the citation from Drobisch in §13). The
+opposite of a law of nature, as an empirically based rule regarding what in
+fact is and occurs, is not a normative law or a prescription, but an ideal law,
+in the sense of one based purely on concepts, Ideas, purely conceived essences, and so not empirical. To the extent that formal logicians, in their
+talk of normative laws, were concerned with this purely conceptual, a priori
+character, their arguments hit on a point that was undoubtedly correct. But
+they overlooked the theoretical character of the laws of pure logic, they
+failed to recognize the difference between theoretical laws destined by their
+content to the regulation of cognition, and normative laws which are intrinsically and essentially prescriptive.
+It is not even correct to say that the opposition between truth and falsehood is irrelevant to psychology, for truth is certainly apprehended in knowledge, and the ideal thereby becomes a determination of a real experience.
+But the propositions, on the other hand, which treat of this determination
+in its conceptual purity are not laws of real psychical happenings: the
+
+The psychologistic prejudices 107
+psychologistic party were wrong in this regard. Ignoring the essence of the
+ideal in general, they also ignored the ideality of truth. This important point
+will require further and fuller discussion.
+The final argument of the antipsychologistic party likewise combines truth
+with error. Since no logic, whether formal or methodological, can provide
+criteria by which every truth can be recognized as a truth, there is no circle
+in seeking a psychological basis for logic. It is, however, one thing to ask for
+such a psychological basis for logic (understanding 'logic' in the usual sense
+of a technology), and quite a different thing to seek such a basis for the
+theoretically closed group of logical propositions, that we styled 'purely
+logical'. It is in this respect quite repugnant (though only in a few circular
+cases) to deduce propositions rooted in the essential constituents of all theory,
+and so in the conceptual form of the systematic content of science as such,
+from the contingent content of some special science, and a factual science
+at that. Let one but conceive the principle of contradiction clearly, and
+then seek its foundation in some special science, let one conceive of a truth
+which rests on the sense of truth as such, and then base it on truths about
+numbers, stretches etc., or even about physical or mental matters of fact.
+The repugnance of such proceedings was at least clear to the exponents of
+formal logic, except that their confusion of purely logical with normative
+laws or criteria, obscured their good ideas and rendered them inoperative.
+The repugnancy consists basically in the fact that propositions relating to
+mere form (i.e. to the conceptual elements of scientific theory as such) were
+to be deduced from propositions having a wholly heterogeneous content. In
+the case of primitive principles like the law of contradiction, the modus
+ponens etc., this repugnancy would plainly amount to a circle in so far as the
+deduction of these principles would involve steps that presupposed them -
+not in the form of premisses, but in the form of deductive principles upon
+whose validity the sense and validity of the deduction depends. One could,
+in this respect, speak of a reflective circle, as against the usual, direct circulus
+in demonstrando, where premisses and conclusions overlap.
+Of all sciences only pure logic escapes such objections, since its premisses
+are homogeneous in respect of their objects with the conclusions they establish. Pure logic further escapes circularity in that, in a given deduction, it
+never proves principles which the deduction itself presupposes, and that it
+never proves principles that every deduction presupposes, but that it simply
+lays them down as axioms at the summit of all its deductions. Pure logic,
+therefore, has the extraordinarily difficult task of analytically ascending to
+such axioms as are indispensable starting-points for deduction, and are also
+irreducible to one another without a direct or a reflective circle, and then
+constructing and arranging a deduction for the theorems of logic - of which
+the rules of the syllogism form a small part - so that at each step, not only
+the premisses, but also the principles of our deductive transitions, are either
+among our axioms, or among our previously proven theorems.
+
+108 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+§44 Second prejudice
+To confirm his first prejudice that rules for cognition must rest on the psychology of cognition, the psychologistic party appeals to the actual content
+of logic (cf. the arguments of 815 above, p. 52, par. 2). What is logic about?
+Everywhere it concerns itself with presentations and judgements, with syllogisms and proofs, with truth and probability, with necessity and possibility,
+with ground and consequent, and with other closely related or connected
+concepts. But what can be thought of under such headings but mental phenomena and formations? This is obvious in the case of presentations and
+judgements. Syllogisms, however, are proofs of judgements by means of
+judgements, and proof is plainly a mental activity. Talk of truth, probability, necessity, possibility etc., likewise concerns judgements: what they refer
+to can only be manifested or experienced in judgements. Is it not, therefore,
+strange that one should wish to exclude from psychology propositions and
+theories which relate to psychological phenomena? In this regard the distinction between purely logical and methodological propositions is pointless,
+the objection affects both equally. Every attempt, therefore, to extrude even
+a part of logic from psychology, on ground of its pretended 'purity', must
+count as radically mistaken.
+§45 Refutation. Pure mathematics would likewise be
+made a branch of psychology
+Obvious as all this may seem, it must be mistaken. This is shown by the
+absurd consequences which, as we know, psychologism cannot escape. There
+is, however, another reason for misgiving: the natural affinity between purely
+logical and mathematical doctrine, which has often led to an assertion of
+their theoretical unity.
+We have already mentioned by the way that even Lotze taught that mathematics must be regarded as 'an independently developed branch of general
+logic. 'Only a practically motivated division of teaching' can, he thinks,
+blind us to the fact that mathematics 'has its whole home-ground in the
+general field of logic' (Logik, ed. 2, 818, p. 34 and §112, p. 138). To which
+Riehl adds that 'one could well say that logic coincides with the general
+part of purely formal mathematics (taken in the sense of H. Hankel)' (A.
+Riehl, Der philosophische Kritizismus und seine Bedeutung für die positive
+Wissenschaft, vol. II, Part I, p. 226). However this may be, an argument that
+is correct for logic must be approved in the case of arithmetic as well.
+Arithmetic sets up laws for numbers, for their relations and combinations:
+numbers, however, are the products of colligation and counting, which are
+mental activities. Relations arise from relating activities, combinations from
+acts of combination. Adding and multiplying, subtracting and dividing -
+these are merely mental processes. That they require sensuous supports makes
+
+109
+no difference, since this is true of any and every act of thinking. Sums,
+products, differences and quotients, and whatever may be determined in
+arithmetical propositions, are merely mental processes, and must as such
+obey mental laws. It may be highly desirable that modern psychology with
+its earnest pursuit of exactness should be widened to include mathematical
+theories, but it would hardly be much elevated by the inclusion of mathematics itself as one of its parts. For the heterogeneity of the two sciences
+cannot be denied. The mathematician, on the other hand, would merely
+smile if psychological studies were pressed upon him as supposedly providing a better and deeper grounding for his theoretical pronouncements. He
+would rightly say that mathematics and psychology belong to such different
+worlds, that the very thought of interchange among them was absurd: here,
+if anywhere, talk of a Metáßaois eis ändo yévos is applicable.'
+§46 The research domain of pure logic is, like
+that of mathematics, an ideal domain
+These objections may have taken our argument far afield, but, when we attend
+to their content, they help us to state the basic errors of our opponents'
+position. The comparison of pure logic with pure mathematics, its mature sister
+discipline, which no longer needs fight for its right to independent existence,
+provides us with a reliable Leitmotiv. We shall first glance at mathematics.
+No one regards the theories of pure mathematics, e.g. the pure theory of
+numbers, as 'parts or branches of psychology', though we should have no
+numbers without counting, no sums without addition, no products without
+multiplication etc. The patterns of all arithmetical operations refer back to
+certain mental acts of arithmetical operation, and only in reflection upon
+these can we 'show' what a total, sum, product etc., is. In spite of the
+"psychological origin' of arithmetical concepts, everyone sees it to be a fallacious ustáßoois to demand that mathematical laws should be psychological.
+How is this to be explained? Only one answer is possible. Counting and
+arithmetical operation as facts, as mental acts proceeding in time, are of
+course the concern of psychology, since it is the empirical science of mental
+facts in general. Arithmetic is in a totally different position. Its domain of
+research is known, it is completely and exhaustively determined by the
+familiar series of ideal species 1, 2, 3... In this sphere there can be no
+talk of individual facts, of what is temporally definite. Numbers, Sums
+and Products and so forth are not such casual acts of counting, adding and
+multiplying etc., as proceed here and there. They also differ obviously from
+presentations in which they are given. The number Five is not my own or
+anyone else's counting of five, it is also not my presentation or anyone else's
+presentation of five. It is in the latter regard a possible object of acts of
+presentation, whereas, in the former, it is the ideal species of a form whose
+concrete instances are found in what becomes objective in certain acts of
+
+110 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+counting, in the collective whole that these constitute. In no case can it be
+regarded without absurdity as a part or side of a mental experience, and so
+not as something real. If we make clear to ourselves what the number Five
+truly is, if we conceive of it adequately, we shall first achieve an articulate,
+collective presentation of this or that set of five objects. In this act a collection is intuitively given in a certain formal articulation, and so as an instance of the number-species in question. Looking at this intuited individual,
+we perform an 'abstraction', i.e. we not only isolate the non-independent
+moment of collective form in what is before us, but we apprehend the Idea
+in it: the number Five as the species of the form swims into our conscious
+sphere of reference. What we are now meaning is not this individual instance, not the intuited object as a whole, not the form immanent in it, but
+still inseparable from it: what we mean is rather the ideal form-species,
+which is absolutely one in the sense of arithmetic, in whatever mental act it
+may be individuated for us in an intuitively constituted collective, a species
+which is accordingly untouched by the contingency, temporality and transience of our mental acts. Acts of counting arise and pass away and cannot
+be meaningfully mentioned in the same breath as numbers.
+Arithmetical propositions are concerned with such ideal unities ('lowest
+species' in a heightened sense quite different from that of empirical classes),
+and this holds both of numerical propositions (arithmetical singulars) and
+of algebraic propositions (arithmetical generalizations). They tell us nothing
+about what is real, neither about the real things counted, nor about the real
+acts in which they are counted, in which such and such indirect numerical
+characteristics are constituted for us. Concrete numbers and numerical propositions belong in the scientific fields to which the relevant concrete units
+belong: propositions about arithmetical thought-processes belong in psychology. In strict propriety, arithmetical propositions say nothing about
+'what is contained in our mere number-presentations': as little as they speak
+of other presentations, do they speak of ours. They are rather concerned
+with absolute numbers and number-combinations in their abstract purity
+and ideality. The propositions of universal arithmetic - the nomology of
+arithmetic we may call it - are laws rooted in the ideal essence of the genus
+Number. The ultimate singulars which come within the range of these laws,
+are ideal singulars: they are the determinate numbers, i.e. the lowest specific
+differences of the genus number. It is to these singulars that arithmetically
+singular propositions relate, propositions which belong to the arithmetic of
+definite numbers. These arise through the application of universal arithmetical laws to numerically specific numbers, they express what is purely part of
+the ideal essence of these numbers. None of these propositions reduces to
+one that has empirical generality, not even to the widest case of such generality, one that applies without exception to the entire real world.
+What we have here said in regard to pure arithmetic carries over at all
+points to pure logic. In the latter case too, we accept as obvious the fact that
+
+logical concepts have a psychological origin, but we deny the psychologistic
+conclusion to which this seems to lead. In consideration of the domain that
+must be granted to logic in the sense of a technology of scientific knowledge,
+we naturally do not doubt that logic is to a large extent concerned with our
+mental states. Naturally the methodology of scientific research and proof
+must take full cognizance of the nature of the mental states in which research and proof take their course. Logical terms such as 'presentation',
+"concept', "judgement', 'syllogism', 'proof", 'theory',
+"necessity', 'truth' etc.,
+may therefore, and must therefore, come up as general names for psychical
+experiences and dispositions. We deny, however, that this ever occurs in the
+purely logical parts of logical technology. We deny that the theoretical discipline of pure logic, in the independent separateness proper to it, has any
+concern with mental facts, or with laws that might be styled 'psychological'.
+We saw that the laws of pure logic, e.g. the primitive 'laws of thought', or
+the syllogistic formulae, totally lose their basic sense, if one tries to interpret
+them as psychological. It is therefore clear from the start that the concepts
+which constitute these and similar laws have no empirical range. They cannot,
+in other words, have the character of those mere universal notions whose
+range is that of individual singulars, but they must be notions truly generic,
+whose range is exclusively one of ideal singulars, genuine species. It is clear,
+for the rest, that the terms in question, and all such as function in purely
+logical contexts, must be equivocal; they must, on the one hand, stand for
+class-concepts of mental states such as belong in psychology, but, on the
+other hand, for generic concepts covering ideal singulars, which belong in a
+sphere of pure law.
+§47 Confirmatory indications given by the basic
+notions of logic and the sense of logical laws
+Our view is confirmed even by a passing look over historically existent
+treatments of logic, if we pay especial attention to the fundamental distinction between the subjective-anthropological unity of knowledge and the
+objective-ideal unity of its content. Equivocations then become apparent,
+and explain the deceptive appearance of an internal homogeneity and pervasive psychological character in the materials dealt with under the traditional
+rubric of the 'doctrine of terms'
+Under this rubric it is presentations that are principally discussed, for the
+most part in psychological fashion; the apperceptive events in which presentations arise, are plumbed as deeply as possible. As regards differences
+in the essential 'forms' of presentations, a gulf soon emerges in the mode of
+treatment, which is continued in the doctrine of judgement-forms, and yawns
+most widely in the doctrine of the forms of syllogisms, and of the pertinent
+laws of thinking. The term 'presentation' suddenly loses the character of a
+psychological class-concept. This becomes plain as soon as we enquire into
+
+112 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+the instances that are to fall under the concept in question. If the logician
+pins down differences like that between singular and general presentations,
+between Socrates and Man in General, or between the Number Four and
+Number in General, or between an attributive and a non-attributive presentation - Socrates, Whiteness, as opposed to a Man, a Colour - or if he
+enumerates various modes of combining presentations to form new presentations, such as the conjunctive, disjunctive or determinative combinations
+etc., or if he classifies essential relations of presentations such as those between intension and extension - everyone must here perceive that he is not
+dealing with phenomenal, but with specific singulars. Suppose someone makes
+use of the following sentence as a logical illustration: "The presentation
+Triangle includes the presentation Figure, and the extension of the latter
+includes the extension of the former'.
+?. Is he talking at all about someone's
+subjective experiences, or about the real inclusion of phenomena in phenomena? Does the extension of what we here, and in all similar contexts, call a
+'presentation' cover as distinct members the presentation of a triangle had
+now and one to be had an hour hence? Is not the Presentation Triangle one
+of its members, and in similar, singular fashion, the Presentation Socrates,
+the Presentation Lion etc.?
+Throughout logic there is much talk of judgements, but here again such
+talk is equivocal. In the psychological parts of logical technology, 'judgements'
+are spoken of as affirmations, one is therefore speaking of definite
+sorts of conscious experiences. In the logical parts there is no mention of
+these. 'Judgement' has the same meaning as 'proposition', the latter understood, not as a grammatical, but as an ideal meaning-unit. This is true of all
+the distinctions of judgement-acts or forms, which provide the necessary
+bases for the laws of pure logic. Categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive or
+existential judgements, and however else we may call them, are not in pure
+logic titles for classes of judgements, but for ideal forms of propositions.
+The same holds of the forms of syllogism, of the existential syllogism, the
+categorical syllogism, etc. The relevant analyses are analyses of meaning,
+and not in any degree psychological ones. Not individual phenomena, but
+forms of intentional unities are subjected to analysis, not experiences of
+syllogizing, but syllogisms. If a logical analyst remarks: "The categorical
+judgement God is just has God as its subject-presentation', he is certainly not
+speaking of the judgement as a mental experience, which he or someone else
+has had, nor about some included mental act which the word 'God' arouses.
+He is rather speaking of the proposition God is just, which is one proposition
+despite the multitude of possible experiences of it, and of the presentation
+God which is likewise single, as must be the case in regard to the single parts
+of one single whole. When the logician accordingly speaks of 'every judgement', he means, not every act of judging, but every objective proposition. The
+extension of the logical concept Judgement does not impartially cover the
+judgement 2 × 2 = 4 now experienced by me, and the judgement 2 × 2 = 4
+
+113
+experienced yesterday or at whatever other time or by whatever other person. None of these acts enters the extension in question, but only 2 × 2=4
+and alongside of it, e.g. The earth is a cube, the theorem of Pythagoras etc.,
+and each only in the singular. The same is obviously true if one says 'The
+judgement S follows from the judgement P'
+, and so in all similar cases.
+We can thereby pin down the true sense of logical laws, and make it such
+as we have said it to be in our previous analyses. The principle of contradiction, we are told, is a judgement about judgements. But, in so far as "judgements' are taken to mean mental experiences, acts of affirmation, believing
+etc., this conception can have no validity. To utter the principle is to judge,
+but neither the principle, nor what it judges about, are judgements. If someone says: 'Of two contradictory judgements, one is true and one false', he
+means (if he does not misunderstand himself, as subsequent interpretation
+may well lead him to do) no law for acts of judgement, but a law for the
+contents of judging, in other words for the ideal meanings which we call
+'propositions'. He would have done better to say: 'Of two contradictory
+propositions, one is true and the other false'.? It is also clear that we require
+nothing, in order to understand the law of contradiction, beyond conceiving
+the sense of opposed propositional meanings. We need not think of judgements as real acts; they are in no sense our relevant objects. One need only
+look in order to see that only judgements in an ideal sense fall within the
+range of this logical law: 'the' judgement 2 × 2 = 5 is one judgement, 'the'
+judgements There are dragons another, 'the' proposition about the sum of
+the angles etc., another, but not one of the actual or imaginary acts of
+judgement falls within it, that in their endless multiplicity, correspond to
+each of these ideal unities. The case of all purely logical propositions, e.g.
+the laws of syllogism, is exactly parallel.
+The distinction between the psychological mode of treatment, whose terms
+function as class-terms for mental states, and the objective or ideal mode of
+treatment where the same terms stand for ideal genera and species, is not a
+subsidiary, or a merely subjective distinction. It determines the difference
+between essentially distinct sciences. Pure logic and arithmetic, as sciences
+dealing with the ideal singulars belonging to certain genera (or of what is
+founded a priori in the ideal essence of these genera) are separated from
+psychology, which deals with the individual singulars belonging to certain
+empirical classes.
+§48 The decisive differences
+We shall conclude by stressing the decisive differences on whose recognition
+or non-recognition one's total response to the psychologistic line of argument depends. These are as follows:
+1. There is an essential, quite unbridgeable difference between sciences of
+the ideal and sciences of the real. The former are a priori, the latter empirical.
+
+114
+The former set forth ideal general laws, grounded with intuitive certainty in
+certain general concepts: the latter establish real general laws, relating to a
+sphere of fact, with probabilities into which we have insight. The extension
+of general concepts is, in the former case, one of lowest specific differences, in the latter case one of individual, temporally determinate singulars.
+Ultimate objects are, in the former case, ideal species, in the latter case,
+empirical facts. The essential differences between natural laws and ideal
+laws, between universal propositions of fact (perhaps disguised as general
+propositions: 'All ravens are black', "The raven is black') and genuine
+generalizations (such as the universal propositions of pure mathematics),
+between the notion of an empirical class and that of an ideal genus etc. A
+correct assessment of these differences presupposes the complete abandonment of the empiricistic theory of abstraction, whose present dominance
+renders all logical matters unintelligible. We shall have to speak in detail of
+this matter later on (cf. Investigation 11).
+2. In all knowledge, and particularly in all scientific knowledge, there are
+three fundamentally distinct patterns of connection:
+(a) A pattern of connection of cognitive experiences, in which science is
+subjectively realized, a psychological pattern of connection among the presentations, judgements, insights, surmises, questions etc., in which research
+is carried out, in which a theory already discovered receives its insightful
+thinking out.
+(b) A pattern of connection among the matters investigated and theoretically known in the science, which constitute its sphere a territory. The pattern
+of connection of investigation and knowing is plainly quite different from
+that of what is investigated and known.
+(c) The logical pattern of connection, i.e. the specific pattern of connection
+of the theoretical Ideas in which the unity of the truths of a scientific discipline, and those, in particular, of a scientific theory or proof or inference,
+are constituted (the unity of concepts in a true proposition, of simple truths
+in truth-combinations etc.).
+In the case, e.g., of physics we distinguish between the pattern of connection of the mental states of the physical thinker from that of the physical
+nature that he knows, and both from the ideal pattern of connection
+of the truths in physical theory, e.g. in the unity of analytical mechanics, of
+theoretical optics etc. Even the form of an argument in probability, which
+governs the connection between facts and hypotheses, is part of this logical
+line. The logical pattern of connection is the ideal form for the sake of
+which we speak in specie of the same truth, the same syllogism or proof,
+the same theory and rational discipline, by whomsoever these 'same things'
+may be thought. This unity of form is one of legal validity, of the validity of
+laws under which all these 'same things' stand, the validity, i.e. of the laws
+of pure logic, which accordingly overshadow all science, and do so, not in
+respect of the psychological or objective content of science, but in respect of
+
+115
+its ideal meaning-load. The peculiar patterns of combination of the concepts, propositions and truths which form the ideal unity of a particular
+science, can of course only be called "logical', in so far as they are instances
+talling under logic. They do not belong among the actual parts of logic.
+The three patterns of combination just distinguished naturally concern
+logic and arithmetic like all other sciences. Only in their case, the matters
+investigated are not, as in physics, real matters of fact, but ideal species. The
+specific nature of logic involves the previously noted peculiarity that the
+ideal patterns of combination which make up its theoretical unity are themselves subordinate instances of the laws that it sets up. Logical laws are at
+once parts and rules of such patterns of combination: they belong to the
+theoretical structure, but at the same time to the field, of logical science.
+§49 Third prejudice. Logic as the theory
+of evidence
+We shall state a third prejudice - one particularly to the fore in the arguments of chapter 11, 819 - in the following words: All truth pertains to
+judgement. Judgement, however, is only recognized as true when it is inwardly evident. The term 'inner evidence' stands, it is said, for a peculiar
+mental character, well-known to everyone through his inner experience,
+peculiar feeling which guarantees the truth of the judgement to which it
+attaches. If logic is the technology which will assist us to know the truth,
+logical laws are obviously psychological propositions. They are, in fact,
+propositions which cast light on the psychological conditions on which the
+presence or absence of this 'feeling of inner evidence' depends. Practical
+prescriptions are naturally connected with such propositions, and help us to
+achieve judgements having this distinctive character. Such psychologically
+based rules of thought must surely be meant where we speak of logical laws
+or norms.
+Mill hits on this conception when he attempts to draw a line between
+logic and psychology, and says: 'The properties of thought which concern
+logic are some of its contingent properties, those namely on the presence of
+which depends good thinking as distinguished from bad' (An Examination
+of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 462). In his further statements, he
+repeatedly calls logic the (psychologically conceived) 'theory' or 'philosophy
+of evidence' (op. cit. pp. 473, 475-6, 478) he was of course not immediately
+concerned with the propositions of pure logic. In Germany this point of
+view occasionally crops up in Sigwart. 'Logic', he says, 'can only proceed by
+becoming conscious of the way this subjective feeling of necessity [the "inner
+feeling' of the evident of our previous paragraph] makes its appearance, and
+then expressing these conditions in a general manner' (Logik, 1, ed. 2, p. 16).
+Many statements of Wundt's tend in a similar direction. We read, e.g., in his
+Logik that 'the properties of self-evidence and universal validity involved in
+
+116 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+certain thought-connections, permit us to derive the logical from the psychological laws of thought'. The normative character of the former 'has its
+sole foundation in the fact that certain psychological thought-connections
+actually do have self-evidence and universal validity, without which it would
+not be possible for us to approach thought with the demand that it should
+satisfy the conditions of the self-evident and universally valid'. 'The conditions that must themselves be fulfilled if we are to have self-evidence and
+universal validity are called the logical laws of thought.' But Wundt emphasizes that 'psychological thinking is always the more comprehensive form of
+thinking'®
+In the logical literature at the end of last century the interpretation of
+logic as a practically applied psychology of the inwardly evident certainly
+became more penetrating and more widely entertained. The Logik of Höfler
+and Meinong here deserves special mention, since it may be regarded as the
+first properly carried out attempt to make a thorough, consistent use of
+the notion of the psychology of inward evidence over the whole field of logic.
+Höfler says that the main task of logic is the investigation of 'those laws,
+primarily psychological, which express the dependence of emergent inward
+evidence on the particular properties of our presentations and judgements'
+(Logik, Vienna 1890, p. 16). 'Among all actually given thought-phenomena,
+or even such as we can conceive possible, logic must pick out the types or
+forms of thinking to which inner evidence attaches directly, or which are
+necessary conditions for the emergence of inner evidence' (op. cit. p. 17).
+The seriousness of such psychologism is shown by the rest of the treatment.
+Thus the method of logic, in its concern with the theoretical groundwork of
+correct thinking, is said to be the same method that psychology applies to
+all mental phenomena: it must describe such phenomena, in this case those
+of correct thinking, and reduce them as far as may be to simple laws, i.e.
+explain more complex laws by way of simple ones (op. cit. p. 18). Further
+on, one reads that the logical doctrine of the syllogism is given the task of
+"formulating the laws, which tell us what features in our premisses determine whether a certain judgement can be deduced from them with inward
+evidence'.
+. Etc. etc.
+§50 Transformation of logical propositions into
+equivalent propositions about the ideal conditions for
+the evidence of judgement. The resultant propositions
+are not psychological
+We turn to criticism. We are far from regarding as unobjectionable the
+nowadays commonplace, but far from clear assumption with which the
+argument starts, that all truth lies in our judgements. We do not of course
+doubt that to know truth and to utter it justifiably, presupposes the prior
+seeing of it. Nor do we doubt that logic as a technology must look into the
+
+117
+psychological conditions in which inner evidence illuminates our judgements.
+We may even go a further step in the direction of the conception we are
+refuting. While we seek to preserve the distinction between purely logical
+and methodological propositions, we expressly concede that the former have
+a relation to the psychological datum of inner evidence, that they in a sense
+state its psychological conditions.
+Such a relation must, however, be regarded as purely ideal and indirect.
+The pure laws of logic say absolutely nothing about inner evidence or its
+conditions. We can show, we hold, that they only achieve this relation through
+a process of application or transformation, the same sort of process, in fact,
+through which every purely conceptual law permits application to a generally conceived realm of empirical cases. The propositions about inner evidence
+which arise in this manner keep their a priori character, and the conditions
+of inner evidence that they assert bear no trace of the psychological or the
+real. They are purely conceptual propositions, transformable, as in every
+like case, into statements about ideal incompatibilities or possibilities.
+A little reflection will make matters clear. Every law of pure logic permits
+of an (inwardly evident) transformation, possible a priori, which allows one
+to read off certain propositions about inward evidence, certain conditions
+of inward evidence, from it. The combined principles of contradiction and
+excluded middle are certainly equivalents to the proposition: One and only
+one of two mutually contradictory judgements can manifest inner evidence?
+The mood Barbara is likewise certainly equivalent to the proposition: The
+inner evidence of the necessary truth of a proposition of the form All A's are
+C's (more precisely, its truth as a necessary consequence), may appear in a
+syllogizing act whose premisses are of the forms All A's are B's and All B's
+are C's. The like holds of every proposition of pure logic. Understandably so,
+since there evidently is a general equivalence between the proposition A is
+true and It is possible for anyone to judge A to be true in an inwardly evident
+manner. The propositions, therefore, whose sense lies in stating what necessarily is involved in the notion of truth, that the truth of propositions of certain
+forms determines the truth of propositions of corresponding other forms,
+can certainly be transformed into equivalent propositions which connect the
+possible emergence of inner evidence with the forms of our judgements.
+Our insight into such connections will, however, provide us with the means
+to refute the attempt to swallow up pure logic in a psychology of inner
+evidence. In itself, plainly, the proposition A is true does not state the same
+thing as the equivalent proposition It is possible for anyone and everyone to
+judge that A is the case. The former says nothing about anyone's judgement, not
+even about judgements of anyone in general. The position here resembles
+that of propositions of pure mathematics. The statement that a + b= b + a
+states that the numerical value of the sum of two numbers is independent
+of their position in such a sum, but it says nothing about anyone's acts
+of counting or addition. The latter first enters the picture in an inwardly
+
+118 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+evident, equivalent transformation. It is an a priori truth that no number
+can be given in concreto unless we count, and no sum unless we add.
+But even when we abandon the original forms of the propositions of
+pure logic, and turn them into corresponding equivalents regarding inward
+evidence, nothing results which psychology could claim as its own. Psychology is an empirical science, the science of mental facts, and psychological
+possibility is accordingly a case of real possibility. Such possibilities of inner
+evidence are, however, real ones, and what is psychologically impossible
+may very well be ideally possible. The solution of the generalized '3-body
+problem', or n-body problem' may transcend all human cognitive capacity,
+but the problem has a solution, and the inner evidence which relates to it
+is therefore possible. There are decimal numbers with trillions of places, and
+there are truths relating to them. No one, however, can actually imagine
+such numbers, nor do the additions, multiplications etc., relating to them.
+Inward evidence is here a psychological impossible, yet, ideally speaking, it
+undoubtedly represents a possible state of mind.
+The turning of the notion of truth into the notion of the possibility of
+evident judgement has its analogue in the relation of the concepts Individual
+Being and Possibility of Perception. The equivalence of these concepts, if
+by 'perception' we mean adequate perception, is undeniable. A perception is
+accordingly possible, in which the whole world, with the endless abundance
+of its bodies, is perceived at one glance. But this ideal possibility is of course
+no real possibility, we could not attribute it to any empirical subject, particularly since such a vision would be an endless continuum of vision: unitarily
+conceived, it would be a Kantian Idea.
+Though we stress the ideality of the possibilities of evident judgement
+which can be derived from logical principles, and which we see to reveal
+their a priori validity in cases of apodeictic self-evidence, we do not deny
+their psychological utility. If we take the law that, out of two contradictory
+propositions, one is true and one is false, and deduce from it the truth that,
+one only out of every pair of possible contradictory judgements can have
+the character of inward evidence, we may note this to be a self-evidently
+correct deduction, if self-evidence be defined as the experience in which the
+correctness of his judgement is brought home to a judging subject, the new
+proposition utters a truth about the compatibilities or incompatibilities of
+certain mental experiences. In this manner, however, every proposition of pure
+mathematics tells us something about possible and impossible happenings
+in the mental realm. No empirical enumeration or calculation, no mental
+act of algebraical transformation or geometrical construction,
+is possible
+which conflicts with the ideal laws of mathematics. These laws accordingly
+have a psychological use.
+We can read off from each of them a priori
+possibilities and impossibilities relating to certain sorts of mental acts, acts
+of counting, of additive and multiplicative combination etc. These laws are
+not thereby made into psychological laws. Psychology, the natural science
+
+119
+concerned with what we mentally live through, has to look into the natural
+conditions of our experience. In its field are specifically to be found the
+empirically real relationships of our mathematical and logical activities, whose
+ideal relations and laws make up an independent realm. This latter realm is
+set up in purely universal propositions, made up out of 'concepts' which are
+not class-concepts of mental acts, but ideal concepts of essence, each with its
+concrete foundation in such mental acts or in their objective correlates. The
+number Three, the Truth named after Pythagoras etc., are, as our discussion
+showed, neither empirical singulars nor classes of singulars: they are ideal
+objects ideationally apprehended in the correlates of our acts of counting, of
+inwardly evident judging etc.
+In relation to inner evidence, psychology has therefore merely the task
+of tracking down the natural conditions of the experiences which fall under
+this rubric, of investigating the real contexts in which, as experience shows,
+inward evidence arises and perishes. Such natural conditions are concentration of interest, a certain mental freshness, practice etc. Their investigation
+does not lead to knowledge which is exact in its content, to inwardly evident, truly lawlike generalizations, but only to vague, empirical generalizations.
+The inward evidence of our judgements does not merely depend on such
+psychological conditions, conditions that one might also call external and
+empirical, since they are rooted not purely in the specific form and matter
+of our judgement, but in its empirical context in mental life: it depends also
+on ideal conditions. Each truth stands as an ideal unit over against an
+endless, unbounded possibility of correct statements which have its form
+and its matter in common. Each actual judgement, which belongs to this
+ideal manifold, will fulfil, either in its mere form or in its matter, the ideal
+conditions for its own possible inward evidence. The laws of pure logic are
+truths rooted in the concept of truth, and in concepts essentially related
+to this concept. They state, in relation to possible acts of judgement, and
+on the basis of their mere form, the ideal conditions of the possibility or
+impossibility of their inner evidence. Of these two sorts of conditions of the
+inwardly evident, the former relates to the special constitution of the sorts
+of psychical being which the psychology of the period recognizes, psychological induction being limited by experience. The other conditions, however, have the character of ideal laws, and hold generally for every possible
+consciousness.
+§51 The decisive points in this dispute
+A final clearing-up of our present dispute depends likewise on a correct
+discernment of the most fundamental of epistemological distinctions, the
+distinction between the real and the ideal, or the correct discernment of all
+the distinctions into which this distinction can be analysed. We are here
+concerned with the repeatedly stressed distinctions between real and ideal
+
+120 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+truths, laws, sciences, between real and ideal (individual and specific) generalities and also singularities etc. Everyone, no doubt, has some acquaintance
+with these distinctions: even so extreme an empiricist as Hume draws a
+fundamental distinction between 'relations of ideas' and 'matters of fact'
+a distinction which the great idealist Leibniz drew before him, using the
+rubrics vérités de raison and vérités de fait. To draw an epistemologically
+important distinction does not, however, mean that one has as yet grasped
+its epistemological essence. One must clearly grasp what the ideal is, both
+intrinsically and in its relation to the real, how this ideal stands to the real,
+how it can be immanent in it and so come to knowledge. The basic question
+is whether ideal objects of thought are - to use the prevailing jargon - mere
+pointers to 'thought-economies'
+, verbal abbreviations whose true content
+merely reduces to individual, singular experiences, mere presentations and
+judgements concerning individual facts, or whether the idealist is right in
+holding that such an empiricistic doctrine, nebulous in its generality, can
+indeed be uttered, but in no wise thought out, that all attempts to reduce
+ideal unities to real singulars are involved in hopeless absurdities, that its
+splintering of concepts into a range of singulars, without a concept to unify
+such a range in our thought, cannot be thought etc.
+The understanding of our distinction between the real and the ideal 'theory
+of inner evidence' presupposes, on the other hand, correct concepts of inner
+evidence and truth. In the psychologistic literature of the last decades we
+have seen inner evidence spoken of as a casual feeling which attends on
+certain judgements, and is absent from others, which at best has a universally human linkage with certain judgements and not with others, a linkage
+in every normal human being in normal circumstances of judgement. There
+are certain normal circumstances in which every normal person feels selfevidence in connection with the proposition 2 + 1 = 1 + 2, just as he feels
+pain when he gets burnt. One might then well ask what gives such a special
+feeling authority, how it manages to guarantee the truth of our judgement,
+"impress the stamp of truth' on it, 'proclaim its truth', or whatever other metaphor one cares to use. One might also ask what such vague talk of normal
+endowment and normal circumstances precisely covers, and might point to
+the fact that even this recourse to normality will not make inwardly evident
+judgements coincide with true ones. It is in the last resort undeniable that
+even the normal man in normal circumstances must pass, in an unnumbered
+majority of cases, possible correct judgements which lack inner evidence.
+One would surely not wish to conceive the 'normality' in question in such a
+way that no actual human being, and no possible human being living in our
+finite natural conditions, could be called 'normal".
+Empiricism altogether misunderstands the relation between the ideal and
+the real: it likewise misunderstands the relation between truth and inner
+evidence. Inner evidence is no accessory feeling, either casually attached, or
+attached by natural necessity, to certain judgements. It is not the sort of
+
+121
+mental character that simply lets itself be attached to any and every judgement of a certain class, i.e. the so-called 'true' judgements, so that the
+phenomenological content of such a judgement, considered in and for itself,
+would be the same whether or not it had this character. The situation is not
+at all like the way in which we like to conceive of the connection between
+sensations and the feelings which relate to them: two persons, we think,
+have the same sensations, but are differently affected in their feelings. Inner
+evidence is rather nothing but the 'experience' of truth. Truth is of course
+only experienced in the sense in which something ideal can be an experience
+in a real act. Otherwise put: Truth is an Idea, whose particular case is an actual
+experience in the inwardly evident judgement. The inwardly evident judgement is, however, an experience of primal givenness: the non-self-evident
+judgement stands to it much as the arbitrary positing of an object in imagination stands to its adequate perception. A thing adequately perceived is
+not a thing merely meant in some manner or other: it is a thing primarily
+given in our act, and as what we mean it, i.e. as itself given and grasped
+without residue. In like fashion what is self-evidently judged is not merely
+judged (meant in a judging, assertive, affirmative manner) but is given in
+the judgement-experience as itself present - present in the sense in which a
+state of affairs, meant in this or that manner, according to its kind, whether
+singular or general, empirical or ideal etc., can be 'present'.
+'. The analogy
+which connects all experiences of primal givenness, then leads to analogous
+ways of speaking, and inner evidence is called a seeing, a grasping of the
+self-given (true) state of affairs, or, as we say with tempting equivocation, of
+the truth. And, as in the realm of perception, the unseen does not at all
+coincide with the nonexistent, so lack of inward evidence does not amount
+to untruth. The experience of the agreement between meaning and what is
+itself present, meant, between the actual sense of an assertion and the selfgiven state of affairs, is inward evidence: the Idea of this agreement is truth,
+whose ideality is also its objectivity. It is not a chance fact that a propositional
+thought, occurring here and now, agrees with a given state of affairs: the
+agreement rather holds between a self-identical propositional meaning, and
+a self-identical state of affairs. 'Validity' or 'objectivity', and their opposites,
+do not pertain to an assertion as a particular temporal experience, but to the
+assertion in specie, to the pure, self-identical assertion 2 × 2 = 4 etc.
+This conception alone accords with the fact that it makes no difference
+whether we perform a judgement (a judgement with the content, the meaning J) insightfully, or whether we have insight into the truth, the being of J.
+We accordingly also have insight into the fact that no one's insight can be at
+variance with our own (to the extent that either of us really has insight).
+This has its source in the essential relation between the experience of truth
+and truth. Our conception alone escapes the doubt which the conception of
+inner evidence as a casually connected feeling never can escape, and which
+plainly amounts to a complete scepticism: the doubt whether, when we have
+
+122 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+insight that J is the case, another might not have the insight that J', incompatible with J, is the case, that insights in general might not clash with
+insights, without a hope of settlement. We understand, accordingly, why the
+'feeling' of inner evidence has no other essential precondition but the truth
+of the judged content in question. It is obvious that where there is nothing,
+nothing can be seen, but it is no less obvious that where there is no truth,
+there can be no seeing something to be true, ie. no inward evidence (cf.
+Investigation vi, chapter 5).
+
+Chapter 9
+Logic and the principle of the
+economy of thought
+§52 Introductory
+We now turn to another empiricistic attempt to find a basis for logic and
+epistemology, closely related to the psychologism which we have hitherto
+sought to refute, and which has won wide acceptance in recent years: the
+attempt to provide a biological basis for these disciplines, either through the
+Principle of Least Action, as Avenarius styles it, or through the principle of
+the Economy of Thought, as Mach calls it. That this new tendency ends up
+by being a psychologism, is made very clear in the Psychologie of Cornelius.
+In that work the principle in question is expressly given the position of 'the
+basic law of the understanding', of 'a universal, basic law of psychology'
+(H. Cornelius, Psychologie, pp. 82, 86). Psychology - the psychology of cognitive processes in particular - when built upon this basis, will also yield us
+the foundations of all philosophy (op. cit. pp. 3-9).
+It seems to me that, by these theories of thought-economy, ideas welljustified and fruitful in their due limits, are given a twist that, if universally
+accepted, would entail the corruption of all genuine logic and epistemology,
+as well as of all psychology.'
+We shall first consider the principle of Avenarius and Mach in the teleological guise of a principle of adaptation. In this we shall see its worthwhile
+content, and the justified goal of the investigations that might spring from
+it, both in psychological anthropology and the practical theory of science.
+We shall go on to show how little it is able to provide foundations for
+psychology, or to assist us in pure logic and the theory of knowledge.
+§53 The teleological character of the principle of
+Mach and Avenarius and the scientific meaning of an
+'economy of thought' (Denkökonomik)
+However we may express our principle, it is a principle of evolution or adaptation: its concern is to conceive science as the most purposive (economical,
+power-saving) adaptation of thought to the varied fields of phenomena.
+
+124 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+Avenarius, in the preface to his Habilitationsschrift (Philosophy as thought
+about the world according to the Principle of Least Action. Prolegomena to a
+Critique of Pure Experience (Leipzig, 1876), p. iii f.), expresses his principle as
+follows: "The change imposed by the mind on its presentations when new impressions enter, is always the least possible. Immediately afterwards he says:
+Since the mind is subject to the conditions of organic existence and its
+purposive demands, the principle cited becomes a principle of development. The mind uses only as much energy as it needs to use in an
+apperception, and, where there are many possible apperceptions, prefers that one which achieves more with the same expenditure of energy.
+In favourable circumstances, the mind even prefers a temporary spurt
+of effort, to a momentary reduction of energy, with which, however, a
+lesser effectiveness or duration of effect would be connected, a temporary spurt which promises so many more, and so much longer enduring,
+effective advantages.
+The increase in abstraction, due to Avenarius's introduction of the notion
+of 'apperception'
+, with all its sweeping vagueness and emptiness, is dearly
+bought. Mach rightly gives a central position to a fact which in Avenarius
+seems the outcome of tortuous and generally dubious deductions: the fact
+that science achieves as complete an orientation as possible in each relevant
+empirical field, and also the most economical of possible adjustments of
+thought to such a field. He is further not fond, and quite rightly, of speaking
+of a principle, but simply of the 'economical character' of scientific research, of
+the 'thought-economies' achieved by concepts, formulae, theories, methods etc.
+We have not therefore to do, in the case before us, with a principle in the
+sense of a rational theory, with an exact law capable of functioning as
+the ground for a rational explanation (as the laws of pure mathematics or
+of mathematical physics can function), but with one of those valuable teleological viewpoints, which are of great use in the biological sciences in general, and which may all be attached to the general notion of development.
+The relation to self-preservation and preservation of the species is obvious. Animal actions are determined by presentations and judgements, and if
+these were insufficiently adapted to the course of events, if past experience
+could not be put to use, if novelties could not be anticipated, means and
+ends not properly adjusted - at least on an average, in the life-situations of
+the individuals concerned, and in relation to threats of injury and advantageous utilities - their self-preservation would not be possible. A creature
+resembling man, but who only experienced sense-contents, who formed no
+associative and no imaginative habits, and who accordingly lacked all capacity
+to interpret sense-contents objectively, to perceive external things and events,
+to anticipate them through custom, or reconstitute them in memory, and
+who could not rely on average success in all these acts of experience - how
+
+Logic and the principle of the economy of thought 125
+could such a creature survive? Even Hume spoke in this connection of 'a sort
+of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the sequence
+of our ideas' (An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sect. v, part II),
+and the modern theory of development has prompted further pursuit of this
+viewpoint, as well as detailed investigation of the relevant teleologies of our
+mental constitution. It will without doubt be a point of view as fruitful for
+psychological biology as it has long been for physical biology.
+This viewpoint not only presides over the sphere of 'blind' thinking, but
+also over the sphere of logical, of scientific thinking. Man's superiority lies
+in his intelligence. He is not solely a being who brings perception and experience to bear on external situations: he also thinks, employs concepts, to
+overcome the narrow limits of his intuition. Through conceptual knowledge
+he penetrates to rigorous causal laws, which permit him to foresee the course
+of future phenomena, to reconstruct the course of past phenomena, to calculate the possible reactions of environing things in advance, and to dominate them practically, and all this to a vastly greater extent, and with vastly
+more confidence, than would otherwise be possible. Science d'où prévoyance,
+prévoyance d'où action, as Comte tellingly remarks. Whatever misery the
+one-sidedly overstrained yearning to know may bring to the individual
+thinker, and that not seldom, the fruits, the treasures of science ultimately
+accrue to the whole of humanity.
+In what we have said the 'economy of thought' has not as yet been mentioned. This notion, however, crops up as soon as we go into the question of
+what the notion of adaptation involves. A creature obviously will have a
+more purposive constitution, be better adapted to its living conditions, the
+more rapidly it can perform the acts needed for, or favourable to, its own
+maintenance, and the less energy it expends on such performance. It will
+become more quickly ready for, and more successful in avoiding the injuries, or pursuing the advantages, that occur with a certain average frequency
+in a given sphere: it will also pile up a larger stock of superfluous power to
+avoid new injuries or compass new advantages. We are of course only dealing here with vague, roughly coordinated, roughly assessable relations: they
+are none the less such as can be talked of with sufficient definiteness, and
+can, at least in certain fields, be instructively, if sketchily, weighed.
+This is certainly true of the field of mental performances. Having recognized them as promoting survival, one can treat them from an economic
+standpoint, and can test men's actual performances from a teleological angle.
+One can also, so to speak, a priori, show certain excellences to be demanded
+by an economy of thought, and then show them to be realized in the forms
+and manners of our thought-procedures, whether in general, or in advanced
+minds, or in the methods of scientific research. We have here, in any case, a
+field of extensive, rewarding, instructive investigations. The field of mind is
+a sub-field of biology, and accordingly has room, not merely for abstract
+psychological researches, aimed, like physical researches, at elementary laws,
+
+126 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+but also for concrete, psychological investigations, and, in particular, for
+teleological ones. The latter make up mental anthropology as the necessary
+counterpart of physical anthropology; they deal with man in the living human
+community, as well as in the wider community of all life on earth.
+§54 Closer treatment of the justified ends of an
+'economy of thought', in the sphere, mainly, of purely
+deductive methodology. Its relation to a logical
+technology
+The standpoint of a 'thought-economy', applied especially to the sphere
+of science, may achieve important results: it may throw clear light on the
+anthropological grounds of varying methods of research. Many of the most
+fruitful and characteristic methods of the most advanced sciences, only
+achieve satisfactory intelligibility if we look to the peculiarities of our mental
+constitution. As Mach excellently remarks on this point: "To do mathematics
+without achieving clearness in this regard, is often to have the disagreeable
+impression that one's paper and pencil are cleverer than oneself."?
+The following points merit consideration. Men's intellectual powers are
+severely limited, and there is, in particular, a narrow sphere within which
+complex, abstract notions can be fully understood: there is also a vast effort
+involved in the mere understanding of genuine complexities of this sort. We are
+also similarly restricted in our genuine grasp of the sense of even moderately
+complex propositional combinations, and even more restricted in our power
+to grasp and genuinely carry out deductions of even moderate complexity.
+The sphere in which active research originally moves in full comprehension,
+and operating with the thoughts themselves, is a fortiori a small one. When
+all these facts are considered, it is quite astonishing that the more comprehensive rational theories and sciences should have been developed at all.
+It is, e.g., a most serious problem how mathematical disciplines are possible,
+disciplines not conducted in terms of relatively simple thoughts, but in which
+veritably towering thought-piles, and thought-combinations intertwined in
+a thousand ways, are moved about with the most sovereign freedom, and
+are spawned in ever increasing intricacy by our researches.
+All this is due to art and method. They overcome the defects of our
+mental constitution, and permit an indirect achievement by way of symbolic
+processes from which the intuitive element, as well as all true understanding and inner evidence are absent, but which are rendered secure because
+a general proof of the efficiency of the method has been once and for all
+guaranteed. All the arts which belong here, and which are generally had in
+mind when there is talk of 'method' in a certain pointed sense, have the
+character of devices which economize thought. They arise in history, and in
+the individual case, out of certain natural processes of thought-economy: the
+thinker's practical reflection makes him see the advantages of these processes,
+
+Logic and the principle of the economy of thought 127
+they are then perfected in full consciousness, and artificially constructed,
+and they are thus made into more complex but infinitely more efficient pieces
+of machinery than the natural processes ever were. Following such a path
+of insight, and with constant reference to the peculiarities of our mental constitution, the pioneers of research discover methods which they justify once
+and for all. When this has been done, such methods can be used without insight, so to say mechanically, in each given case: an objectively correct result
+is assured.
+This far-reaching reduction of insight to mechanism in our thoughtprocesses leads to an indirect mastery over those endlessly winding paths of
+thought that admit of no direct mastery: such a reduction rests on the
+psychological nature of signitive-symbolic thinking. It plays an immeasurable
+role in the construction of blind mechanisms, e.g. the rules for the four
+arithmetical operations, and for higher operations with decimals, where a
+result emerges, perhaps with the help of logarithmic or geometric functional
+tables, but without assistance from insight. But it also plays a part in contexts where insight guides our researches and our proofs. We might mention
+here, e.g., the remarkable duplication of all concepts of pure mathematics,
+and in particular those of arithmetic, so that the original arithmetical signs
+which at first signify the correlated number-concepts, with which definition has connected them, subsequently function as merely operational signs,
+whose meaning is wholly determined by external types of operation, each
+sign counting as a mere something-or-other to which this or that definite thing
+can be done on paper.* These surrogative, operational concepts which turn
+signs into a kind of counters, preside exclusively over the most extensive
+fields of arithmetical thought and research. They represent a vast easing of
+the latter, they take them down from the exhausting heights of abstraction to
+comfortable, intuitive ways, where imagination, guided by insight, can move,
+within the limits of rules, with freedom and with relative effortlessness, as in
+regulated games.
+One should point, in this connection, to the revolutionary thought-economy
+which occurs in the purely mathematical disciplines, when genuine thought
+is replaced by surrogative, signitive thinking, an economy which leads imperceptibly to formal generalizations of our original thought-trains, and
+even of our sciences. In this manner, almost without specially directed mental labour, deductive disciplines arise having an infinitely enlarged horizon.
+Out of arithmetic, the original theory of numbers and numerical magnitudes,
+a generalized, formal arithmetic arises in more or less spontaneous fashion:
+in this numbers and magnitudes no longer count as basic concepts, but
+merely as chance objects of application. Fully conscious reflection now takes
+over, and the pure theory of manifolds emerges as a further extension. In its
+form this covers all possible deductive systems: the form-system of formal
+arithmetic is merely one of its special instances. (See under this head some
+points in chapter xI, §§69, 70.)
+
+128 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+To analyse these and like types of method, and fully to clarify their achievement, is perhaps the most beautiful and least developed field in the theory of
+science, the extremely important, instructive theory of deductive method (ot
+mathematical method in the widest sense). We do not of course get to do this
+through mere generalities, through vague talk of the surrogative function of
+signs, of mechanisms which save energy etc.: deep-going analyses are everywhere needed. Each typically different method must be genuinely investigated, and its economic achievement actually shown and precisely explained.
+Once the meaning of the task here set us has been clearly grasped, the
+problems of an economy of thought in pre-scientific or extra-scientific
+thinking also acquire new light and a new form. Survival requires a certain
+adaptation to external nature, it demands, we said, the capacity to judge
+things more or less rightly, to foresee the course of events, to assess causal
+consequences correctly etc. Real knowledge of all this is achieved first, if
+at all, in science. But how can we in practice judge and infer without the
+insight which only science, the possession of so few, can offer? The practical
+needs of pre-scientific life are subserved by many highly complex, efficient
+procedures - one need only think of the decimal system of numbers. If they
+are not discovered by insight, but naturally developed, one must ponder the
+question of their possibility, as to how the operation of blind mechanism
+can coincide in outcome with the demands of insight.
+Considerations such as those indicated above show us the way. To throw
+light on the teleology of pre-scientific or extra-scientific procedures, one
+must first carefully analyse the combinations of presentations and judgements in question, and the dispositions at work: one must establish the
+actual facts, the psychological mechanism of the thought-procedure in
+question. The economy of thought achieved is made plain when we show
+our procedure to be one whose results can, in logically perspicuous fashion,
+be indirectly proved to accord with the truth (whether of necessity, or with
+a certain, not too small, probability). If the natural origin of the machinery
+which economizes thought is not to remain a miracle - or, what is the same,
+a product of a peculiar, creative act of divine intelligence - we shall have to
+start with a careful analysis of the naturally dominant circumstances and
+motives of the ordinary man's ideas (perhaps of a savage's or animal's
+ideas), and show on this basis how a procedure which has had such success
+could and must have issued spontaneously out of purely natural causes.
+In this manner, the idea of an economy of thought, which to me seems welljustified and fruitful, has been given some definiteness and clarity: we have given
+an outline of the problem that it must solve, and the main paths that it must
+enter upon. Its relation to logic, in the practical sense of a technology of knowledge, is immediately understandable. It plainly yields an important foundation
+for such a technology, it gives essential aids towards constituting the Idea of
+technical methods of human knowledge, towards useful specifications of such
+methods, and to the deduction of rules for their assessment and discovery.
+
+Logic and the principle of the economy of thought 129
+§55 The meaninglessness of an economy of thought
+for pure logic and epistemology, and its relation to
+psychology
+To the extent that these thoughts coincide with those of R. Avenarius and
+E. Mach, we have no differences: 1 gladly agree with them. I am genuinely
+convinced, in particular, that we owe a vast amount of logical illumination
+to the historical-methodological labours of E. Mach, and that this is the
+case where one cannot altogether (or altogether cannot) agree with his conclusions. E. Mach, unfortunately, does not seem to me to have tackled the
+most fruitful problems of the economy of thought, the problems I tried to
+formulate above in a somewhat brief but quite sufficient fashion. His failure
+to do this is, in any case, partly due to the epistemological misinterpretations that he thought of as necessary foundations for his investigations.
+Mach's writings have, however, had an immense influence in respect of
+these very misinterpretations. This is the side of his thought that he shares
+with Avenarius, in respect of which I must here oppose him.
+Mach's doctrine of an economy of thought, like Avenarius's doctrine of
+least action, relates, as we saw, to certain biological facts: ultimately we are
+dealing with a branch of the theory of evolution. This fact makes plain why
+such researches throw light on practical epistemology, on the methodology
+of scientific research, but not at all on pure epistemology, and especially
+not on the ideal laws of pure logic. Per contra, the writings of the school of
+Mach and Avenarius, seem to aim at an epistemology rooted in an economy
+of thought. Against such a conception, or such a use of the economy of
+thought, we must train the whole arsenal of objections which we above
+opposed to psychologism and relativism. Attempts to found epistemology
+on an economy of thought ultimately reduce to attempts to found it on
+psychology: we need not here repeat, nor specially apply, our arguments.
+Cornelius increases the plain incongruities of his case by endeavouring to
+derive elementary psychological laws from a teleological principle of mental
+anthropology, which itself presupposes and is derived from these facts. He
+also tries, through the instrumentality of psychology, to provide an epistemological foundation for philosophy. This so-called principle, I must further
+remark, is not at all an ultimate, explanatory, rational principle, but a mere
+assemblage, a mass of facts regarding adaptation, facts ideally in need of an
+ultimate reduction to elementary facts and laws, whether we are able to
+provide such or not.
+To underpin psychology with teleological principles as its "basic laws',
+principles devised to explain our varied mental functions, does not promise
+much for the progress of the science. No doubt it is instructive to point out
+the teleological significance of our mental functions, and of our more important mental structures, to show in detail, therefore, how and why the
+actually formed combinations of our mental elements have the utilitarian
+
+130 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+relation to survival that we expect a priori. But to treat the descriptively
+given facts as 'necessary consequences' of such principles, so as to seem to
+be giving a real explanation of these facts, and that particularly in contexts
+whose main aim is to lay bare the last foundations of psychology, all this
+can only breed confusion.
+A psychological or epistemological law concerned with an endeavour to
+achieve as much as possible in this or that respect, is a chimera. In the pure
+sphere of fact, there is no maximum possibility, in the sphere of law no
+endeavour. What happens in each case, as psychological matter of fact, is
+quite definite: there is so much of it and no more.
+The factual element in the principle of economy reduces to the fact that there
+are such things as presentations, judgements and other thought-experiences,
+which are further connected with feelings that, in the form of pleasure,
+promote certain directions of thought-formation, in the form of pain, discourage them. One can then assert, with rough generality, the existence of a
+progressive formation of presentations and judgements which lead first to
+the formation of single experiences (Erfahrungen) out of originally senseless elements, and then to the combination of such experiences into a
+single, more or less orderly, unity of experience. Psychological laws determine
+the emergence, out of our first roughly agreeing mental collocations, of the
+presentation of the single world common to everyone, and of an empirically
+blind belief in its existence. One should, however, note that this world is
+not the same for everyone, but only so 'on the whole'; it is the same only to
+an extent which affords a sufficient practical guarantee for our common
+presentations and actions. It is not the same for the ordinary man and the
+scientific research-worker: for the former it is a system merely approximate
+in its regularity, and shot through with countless accidents, whereas for the
+latter it is a nature ruled throughout by absolutely strict law.
+It is plainly an undertaking of great scientific import to show up the
+psychological ways and means through which the idea of a world as an
+object of experience, an idea sufficient for the needs of practical life and for
+survival, should have been developed and established, and, following this,
+to show up the psychological ways and means through which an objectively
+adequate Idea of a unified experience should have grown up in the minds
+of scientific research-workers, the Idea of a unified experience governed
+by strict laws, and embracing an ever enriched scientific content. This whole
+investigation is,
+however, irrelevant to epistemology. It can only have a
+highly indirect use for the latter, in assisting us to criticize epistemological
+prejudices, in whose case psychological motives really count. The question is
+not how experience, whether naïve or scientific, arises, but what must be its
+content if it is to have objective validity: we must ask on what ideal elements
+and laws such objective validity of knowledge of the real is founded - more
+generally, on what any knowledge is founded - and how the performance
+involved in knowledge should be properly understood. We are, in other
+
+Logic and the principle of the economy of thought
+13l
+words, not interested in the origins and changes of our world-presentation,
+but in the objective right which the world-presentation of science claims as
+against any other world-presentation, which leads it to call its world the
+objectively true one. Psychology looks for perspicuous explanations of the
+formation of world-presentations. World-science (the sum total of the different sciences of the real) wishes to know perspicuously what obtains in
+reality, what makes up the true, the actual world. Epistemology, however,
+wishes to grasp perspicuously, from an objectively ideal standpoint, in what
+the possibility of perspicuous knowledge of the real consists, the possibility
+of science and of knowledge in general.
+§56 Continuation. The Üotepov pótepov involved in
+any foundation of pure logic on an economy of
+thought
+We seem, in the case of the principle of economy, to be dealing with an
+epistemological or a psychological principle: this appearance mainly stems
+from confusion between the factually given and the logically ideal, the former
+being tacitly substituted for the latter. We perspicuously see it to be the
+supreme goal, the ideally justified drift of all explanation which transcends
+mere description, that it should arrange facts which are in themselves 'blind
+(facts at first found in a conceptually delimited field) under laws which are
+as general as possible, and that it should in this sense bring them together
+with the maximum possible rationality. This 'maximization' of the work
+of 'bringing together' is here quite clear: it is the ideal of a pervasive, allembracing rationality. If all matters of fact obey laws, there must be some
+minimum set of laws, of the highest generality and maximum deductive
+independence, from which all other laws can, by mere deduction, be derived.
+These 'basic laws' are, accordingly, laws of supreme coverage and efficacy,
+whose knowledge yields the absolute maximum of insight in some field,
+which permits the explanation of all that is in any way explicable in that
+field - idealizing the matter, we here assume that there are no limits to our
+power to deduce and subsume. In this manner the axioms of geometry are
+basic laws explaining and covering all the facts of space: through them every
+general spatial truth (i.e. every geometrical truth) achieves a self-evident
+reduction to its final explanatory grounds.
+This goal or principle of maximum rationality we recognize with insight to
+be the supreme goal of the rational sciences. It is self-evident that it would be
+better for us to know laws more general than those which, at a given time,
+we already possess, for such laws would lead us back to grounds deeper and
+more embracing. Plainly, however, our principle is no mere biological principle, or principle of thought-economy: it is a purely ideal principle, an
+eminently normative one. It accordingly permits no resolution or reinterpretation into facts of our mental life, or the life of human society. To identify
+
+132 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+the drift towards maximum possible rationality with a drift towards biological adaptation, or to derive it from the latter, to saddle it in addition with
+the function of a basic mental force - all this is a mass of confusions only
+paralleled by the psychologistic misreadings of the laws of logic, and their
+conception as laws of nature. To say that our mental life is in fact swayed by
+this principle is to run counter to obvious truth. Our actual thinking does not
+in fact conform to its ideals - as if ideals were some sort of natural forces.
+The ideal drift of logical thinking is as such towards rationality. The
+thought-economist (sit venia verbo) turns it into a dominant real drift of
+human thought, bases it on the vague principle of power-saving, and ultimately on adaptation, and imagines that he has cleared up the norm that we
+should think rationally, has explained the objective sense and worth of rational science in general. Certainly one is justified in talking of an economy
+in thinking, of an economy of thought in the 'embrace' of facts by general
+propositions, of subordinate generalizations by higher ones, and the like.
+One is, however, only justified in that one compares one's actual thought
+with a perspicuously recognized ideal norm, which is accordingly pótepov
+TÃ qúoEl. The ideal validity of this norm is presupposed by all meaningful
+talk of an economy of thinking; it is not therefore a possible explanatory
+outcome of a theory of such economy. We measure our empirical by our ideal
+thinking, and we then say that the former to some extent runs as if guided
+by insight into these ideal principles. We are accordingly right in speaking of
+a natural teleology of our mental organization, according to which our presentations and judgements proceed 'on the whole' (i.e. proceed sufficiently
+for the average advantage of living) as if they were logically governed. With
+the exception of the few cases of truly perspicuous thinking, thought bears
+in itself no hall-mark of logical validity, it is not intrinsically perspicuous,
+nor purposively, if indirectly, steered by prior insight. As a matter of fact,
+thought achieves a certain show of rationality, to an extent which allows us
+"thought-economists'
+', reflecting on the ways of our empirical thinking, to
+prove perspicuously that such ways must lead to results that - roughly and
+on an average - coincide with those of strict logic. We have in fact discussed
+the matter above.
+The otepov pótepov is therefore unmasked. Before all economizing of
+thought, we must already know our ideal, we must know what science
+ideally aims at, what law-governed connections, what basic laws and derived
+laws etc., ideally are and do, before we can discuss and assess the thoughteconomical function of knowing them. Certainly we have vague notions of
+these Ideas before we explore them scientifically, and so we can talk of
+economizing thought even before a science of pure logic is constructed. But
+the essential fact is not changed thereby: pure logic is in itself prior to all such
+thought-economics, and it remains absurd to base the former on the latter.
+One last point. Naturally all scientific grasp and explanation proceeds on
+psychological laws, in the sense of a thought-economics. It is, however, an
+
+Logic and the principle of the economy of thought 133
+error to think that one can therefore play down the distinction between
+logical and natural thought, that one can treat scientific activity as a mere
+'continuation' of natural, blind activity. One may, though it is not quite
+unobjectionable, talk of 'natural' as well as logical 'theories'
+• But one must
+not forget that a logical theory in no sense does the same thing as a natural
+one, or only does this in a 'higher' manner. It has not the same aim: or
+rather, it has an aim, which we for the first time import into the natural
+theory. We measure, as shown above, certain natural thought-processes (by
+which we here mean processes lacking insight) by comparing them to logical
+theories properly so called, and we call such thought-processes natural
+theories, since they have certain psychological fruits which are just as they
+would be if they were really theories, the logical products of perspicuous
+thought. Our nomenclature, however, leads us into the error of attributing
+the essential traits of actual theories to such natural ones, to the 'seeing' of
+authentic theory, as it were, in the latter. These analogues of theories may, as
+mental processes, be very similar to actual theories, but they remain basically different. A logical theory is a theory on account of the ideal, necessary
+connection that dominates it, while what is here called a natural theory is a
+mere course of chance presentations or convictions, not tied together by
+insight, without binding power, but which has for the most part a utility in
+practice, just as if it has a theoretical basis.
+The errors of this trend toward thought-economics, are due in the end to
+the fact, that those who go with it, like all psychologistic thinkers, have an
+interest in knowledge which stops short at the empirical side of science.
+They fail in a certain manner to see the wood for the mere trees. They
+concern themselves with science as a biological phenomenon, and do not
+see that they are touching upon the epistemological problem of science as
+ideally unified, objective truth. The epistemology of the past, which still
+reckoned the ideal among its problems, seems to them in error. It can only
+be made a worthy object of scientific concern for them in one fashion: by
+showing it to have had, relatively speaking, the function of economizing
+thought at a more profound level of philosophical thinking. But the more
+that it becomes a philosophical fashion to judge the main drifts of epistemology in this manner, the more must research protest against it, and the more
+necessary it is to discuss the basic points of dispute in as many-sided a manner
+as possible. We must, in particular, go as deep as we can into the basically
+different thought-trends in the spheres of the ideal and the real, thereby
+opening the way for that perspicuous clarification which is the presupposition for a final foundation of philosophy. The present work is a small
+contribution towards this end.
+
+Chapter 10
+§57 Queries regarding readily formed
+misunderstandings of our logical endeavours
+Our investigations up to this point have been predominantly critical. We
+have, we think, established the untenability of any form of empiricistic or
+psychologistic logic, whatever its character. Logic in the sense of a methodology of science has its main foundations outside of psychology. The idea of
+a 'pure logic', a theoretical science independent of everything empirical, and
+hence also of psychology, a science which first renders possible a technology
+of scientific knowledge which logic in the theoreticopractical sense is, must
+be admitted as sound, and the indispensable task of its independent construction must be tackled seriously. May we content ourselves with these
+results, and may we hope to see them recognized as results? The logic of our
+time, so sure of its success, so much worked upon by such important thinkers, and so widely recognized, will not readily be admitted to be treading
+vain paths of futile endeavour.' Idealistic criticism may awaken displeasure
+where problems of principle are discussed, but a mere glance at the proud
+array of important works from Mill to Erdmann and Lipps, will be enough to
+re-establish most people's shaken confidence. It will be said that there must
+be some way of resolving the arguments and bringing them into harmony with
+the content of our flourishing science; if this is not so, one may be dealing
+with a merely epistemological transvaluation of that science, which, even if
+important, will not have the revolutionary result of destroying its essential
+content. At most it will be a question of conceiving many things more
+precisely, of suitably limiting some careless statements, or altering the order
+of one's investigations. There is perhaps something really to be said for keeping a few propositions of pure logic together in their purity, and separating
+them off from the empirical-psychological statements of logical technology.
+Such reflections will satisfy many who feel the force of our idealistic arguments, without having the courage to draw the necessary conclusions.
+The radical transformation which logic, in the sense of our conception,
+must necessarily undergo, might further encounter mistrust and antipathy,
+
+135
+since it might readily appear, superficially regarded, to be a case of pure
+reaction. That this is not our intention, that our reattachment to the justified
+trends of older philosophies does not aim at the restoration of traditional
+logic, should surely have emerged from a close study of the content of our
+analyses. We can scarcely hope, however, that such indications will overcome all mistrust, and will guard against the misreading of our intentions.
+§58 Our links with great thinkers of the past and, in
+the first place, with Kant
+That we are in a position to appeal to the authority of great thinkers like
+Kant, Herbart and Lotze, and, before these, to Leibniz, will not help us. It
+may even help to strengthen mistrust against us.
+We are led back, in the most general terms to Kant's distinction between
+pure and applied logic. We may indeed approve of his most notable utterances on this point, but only with suitable provisos. We shall naturally not
+accept Kant's confusing, mythic concepts of understanding and reason, by
+which he sets such store, and which he uses in such questionable demarcations, as being, in a proper sense, faculties of the soul. Understanding or
+reason, as the dispositions of a certain normal thought-attitude, presuppose
+pure logic - which defines normality - in their concept: if we therefore have
+serious recourse to them, we shall be no wiser than if, in like case, we try to
+explain the art of dancing by the dancing faculty, i.e. the faculty of dancing
+artfully, the art of painting by the painting faculty etc. We rather take the
+terms 'understanding' and 'reason' as merely indicating a direction to the
+'form of thinking' and its ideal laws, which logic, as opposed to an empirical
+psychology of knowledge, must follow. After such reservations, interpretations, closer qualifications, we accordingly feel close to Kant's doctrine.
+Must such an agreement not have the effect of compromising our concept
+of logic? Pure logic, which in truth is alone science, ought, according to
+Kant, to be "brief and dry', 'as is required by the scholastic exposition of a
+theory of the elements of the understanding' (Critique of Pure Reason, Introduction to Tr. Logic, 1 A54/B78). Everyone is familiar with Kant's lectures,
+published by Jäsche, and knows to what a questionable extent they fulfil this
+characteristic demand. Shall this unutterably defective logic be the model we
+should strive to imitate? No one will look kindly on the thought of pushing
+science back to the standpoint of the Aristotelian-Scholastic logic, which
+seems what Kant's treatment amounts to, since he himself says that logic
+has had the character of a closed science since the time of Aristotle. A
+scholastic elaboration of syllogistics, prefaced by some solemnly pronounced
+conceptual definitions, is surely no inspiring programme.
+To this we should of course reply that the fact that we feel ourselves more
+akin to Kant's conception of logic than to that of, say, Mill or Sigwart, does
+not mean that we approve of its complete content, nor of the particular
+
+136
+manner in which Kant has worked out his idea of a pure logic. We agree
+with Kant in his main drift, though we do not find that he clearly espied the
+essence of his intended discipline, nor set it forth in accordance with its
+adequate content.
+§59 Links with Herbart and Lotze
+We are closer to Herbart than to Kant, particularly so because he sharply
+stresses one cardinal point, and makes explicit use of it in distinguishing
+pure logic from psychology. This is indeed the crucial point which decides
+the matter: the objectivity of the 'concept', of the presentation in the sense of
+pure logic. 'Everything thought of', Herbart says in, e.g., his main work on
+psychology (Psychologie als Wissenschaft, II, 120) 'is, qualitatively treated, a
+concept in the sense of logic? In this connection
+nothing relates to the thinking subject, to which concepts can only be
+attributed in
+a psychological sense, whereas the concept of Man, of
+Triangle etc., is no one's property. Each concept in its logical meaning
+is in fact only once present, which could not be the case, if the number
+of concepts increased with the number of subjects conceiving them, or
+even with the number of distinct acts of thinking through which, psychologically speaking, a concept is produced and brought forth.
+"The entia of the traditional philosophers, even those of Wolff', we read on
+in the same paragraph,
+are merely concepts in the logical sense... the old proposition essentiae
+rerum sunt immutabiles belongs here. It merely means that concepts
+are wholly timeless things, which is true of them in all their logical
+relationships, in consequence of which the scientific propositions and
+syllogisms that they form are and remain true for the ancients as for
+us - and in heaven as on earth. But concepts in this sense, in which
+they are a common knowledge for all men and epochs, are nothing
+psychological... Psychologically a concept is a presentation which has
+the logically understood concept as its praesentatum: it is that through
+which the latter (the thing to be presented) really is presented. In this
+sense everyone certainly has his own concepts: Archimedes investigated
+his own concept of a circle, and Newton likewise his own. These were
+two concepts in the sense of psychology, though logically there was only
+one concept for all mathematicians.
+Similar statements are made in Section 2 of his Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in
+die Philosophie (§34, p. 77). The very first sentence runs: 'All our thoughts
+can be dealt with from two sides, as activities of mind and as regards what is
+
+137
+thought through them. In the latter respect we call them concepts. This word,
+meaning what is conceived, enjoins abstraction from the manner in which we
+receive, produce or reproduce thoughts.' In §35 Herbart denies that two
+concepts can be exactly alike, "for they would then not differ in respect of
+what is thought by them, and not therefore as concepts at all. As against this,
+the thinking of one and the same concept can be often repeated, produced and
+recalled on very different occasions, performed by countless rational beings,
+without thereby making the concept many'. He warns us in a note 'to keep
+in mind that concepts are neither real objects nor real acts of thinking. The
+second error is still alive: many accordingly make of logic a natural history
+of the understanding, and think they recognize in logic the understanding's
+innate laws and forms of thought, thereby corrupting psychology. 'One can,
+if need be, prove by a complete induction', he remarks in another passage,
+that not one of all the doctrines which belong indisputably to logic,
+from the oppositions and subordinations of concepts to syllogistic sorites,
+presupposes anything psychological. The whole of pure logic has to do
+with relations of what is thought, of the content of our presentations
+(though not specifically with this content itself): nowhere does it deal
+with the activity of thinking, or with the psychological or metaphysical
+possibility of such thinking. Applied logic, like applied ethics, first requires psychological knowledge, in so far as the character of the material must be discussed that one desires to shape to the prescriptions given.
+(Psychol. als Wiss. §119)
+In this regard, we find many instructive and important pronouncements
+which modern logic has rather pushed aside than seriously considered. Our
+link-up with Herbart's authority must not, however, be misunderstood. It
+does not at all mean a return to the idea and mode of treatment of logic which
+Herbart envisaged, and which his worthy pupil Drobisch so eminently carried out.
+Herbart certainly had great merits, particularly in the respect mentioned
+above, his emphasis on the ideality of the concept. Even his formation of
+the concept deserves praise, whether one agrees with his terminology or not.
+On the other hand, however, Herbart seems to me never to have risen above
+quite isolated, immature suggestions; many misguided but, alas, very influential thoughts, thoroughly distorted his best intentions.
+It was a pity that Herbart failed to notice the fundamental ambiguity of
+expressions like 'content', 'what is presented', 'what is thought of": on one
+hand, they stand for the ideal, self-same meaning-content of the corresponding expressions, on the other hand, for the varying presented objects. Herbart,
+as far as 1 can see, never said the one thing that could clear up the concept
+of a concept: that a concept or presentation in the logical sense is nothing
+but the self-identical meaning of the corresponding expressions.
+
+138 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+Herbart's basic mistake was more important: he located what is essential
+to the ideality of the logical concept in its normality, thus shifting the sense
+of true, genuine ideality, of unified meaning, into the dispersed multiplicity
+of experiences. The fundamental sense of ideality, which puts an unbridgeable
+gulf between ideal and real, is thereby lost, and the notion of normality
+which is substituted for it, confuses the basic conceptions of logic. (Cf. on
+this point the study which concerns the unity of the Species in the present
+work.) Closely connected with this error is Herbart's belief that he has
+found a saving formula when he opposes logic as the morals of thought to
+psychology as the natural history of the understanding (Lehrbuch der
+Psychologie, $180). Of the pure, theoretic science which underlies such
+'morals' (and likewise underlies 'morals' in the ordinary sense) he has no idea,
+and still less of the extent and natural boundaries of this science, and of its
+intimate unity with pure mathematics. In this respect therefore, Herbart's
+logic deserves the reproach of poverty, just as do the logics of Kant and
+Aristotle and the schoolmen, superior as in other respects it shows itself in
+virtue of its practice of independent, exact research within its narrow circle.
+Linked up with this fundamental mistake, is the error of Herbart's theory of
+knowledge: it shows a complete inability to recognize the apparently profound problem of the harmony of the subjective course of logical thinking
+with the real course of external actuality, for what it is, and for what we
+shall later show it to be: a pseudoproblem bred by unclarity.
+All this is true of the logicians in Herbart's sphere of influence, and especially of Lotze, who took up many of Herbart's suggestions, thought them
+out penetratingly, and carried them further with originality. We owe him a
+great deal, but regrettably find that even his fine approaches are brought
+to nought by his Herbartian confusion between specific and normative
+ideality. His great logical work, rich as it is in original thoughts, all worthy
+of a great thinker, hereby becomes a jarring mixture of psychologism and
+pure logic.?
+§60 Links with Leibniz
+Leibniz was mentioned above as one of the great philosophers to whom our
+present conception of logic looks back. Our relation to him is relatively of
+the closest. Herbart's logical opinions, likewise, are only closer to ours than
+Kant's, to the extent that Herbart, as against Kant, revived Leibnizian ideas.
+But Herbart proved himself incapable even of an approximate exhaustion of
+all the valuable material to be found in Leibniz. He lags far behind the conceptions of the mighty thinker, for whom mathematics and logic form a single
+science. These conceptions stir a particular sympathy in us, and deserve a
+few words.
+The driving motive which set modern philosophy going, the Idea of the
+completion and transformation of the sciences, inspired Leibniz too to work
+
+139
+unremittingly on a reformed logic. More penetrating than his predecessors,
+he did not heap scorn on scholastic logic as empty, formal rubbish, but saw
+in it a valuable step towards the true logic, which could truly help thought
+despite its incompleteness. (See, e.g. Leibniz's elaborate defence of traditional logic, although it is 'hardly a shadow' of logic as 'he would wish it', in
+his letter to Wagner, Opera Philosophica, Erdmann, 418 ff.) The development of this logic into a discipline of mathematical form and strictness, into a
+universal mathematic in the highest and most comprehensive sense is the goal
+towards which his efforts are continually devoted
+I here follow the indications in Nouveaux Essais, Book IV, chapter XVII, cf.
+e.g. §4, Opera philosophica, Erdmann, 395ª, where the doctrine of syllogistic
+forms, extended into a quite general doctrine of argumens en forme, is called
+'une espèce de mathématique universelle, dont l'importance n'est pas assez
+connue'. 'Il faut savoir, he says there,
+que par les argumens en forme je n'entends pas seulement cette manière
+scolastique d'argumenter, dont on se sert dans les collèges, mais tout
+raisonnement qui conclut par la force de la forme, et où l'on n'a
+besoin de suppléer aucun article; de sorte qu'un sorites, un autre tissu
+de syllogisme, qui évite la répétition, même un compte bien dressé, un
+calcul d'algèbre, une analyse des infinitésimales me seront à peu près des
+argumens en forme, puisque leur forme de raisonner a été prédémontrée,
+en sorte qu'ou est sûr de ne s'y point tromper.
+The sphere of the mathématique universelle here conceived would also be
+very much wider than that of the logical calculus to whose construction
+Leibniz devoted great pains, without quite reaching its boundaries. Leibniz
+ought rightly to have included in this universal mathematics the whole
+mathesis universalis in the usual quantitative sense (which constitutes the
+narrowest of Leibniz's concepts of mathesis universalis), especially since
+he had repeatedly called pure mathematical arguments argumenta in forma
+even in other contexts. The Ars combinatoria, seu Speciosa generalis,
+seu doctrina de formis abstracta (cf. the mathematical writings in Pertz's
+edition, vol. vIl, pp. 24, 49 ff., 54, 159, 205 ff.) should also likewise have
+been included in universal mathematics: it forms the fundamental part
+of mathesis universalis in a wider sense (though not in the above widest
+sense), while mathesis universalis is distinguished from logic as a subordinate
+territory. Leibniz defines his Ars combinatoria (Pertz, VII, p. 61), which is of
+particular interest to us, as 'doctrina de formulis seu ordinis, similitudinis,
+relationis, etc. expressionibus in universum'. It is here opposed as 'scientia
+generalis de qualitate' to the 'scientia generalis de quantitate'
+, which is universal mathematics in the ordinary sense. Compare with this the valuable
+passage in Gerhardt's edition of Leibniz's philosophical writings, vol. VII,
+p. 297 f:
+
+140 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+Ars combinatoria speciatim mihi illa est scientia (quae etiam generaliter
+characteristica sive speciosa dici posset) in qua tractatur de rerum formis
+sive formulis in universum, hoc est de qualitate in genere, sive de simili
+et dissimili, prout aliae atque aliae formulae ex ipsis a, b, c etc. (sive
+quantitates
+sive aliud quoddam representent) inter se combinatis
+oriuntur, et distinguitur ab algebra quae agit de formulis ad quantitatem
+applicatis, sive de aequali et inequali. Igitur Algebra subordinatur
+Combinatoriae, eiusque regulis continue utitur, quae tamen longe
+generaliores sunt, nec in Algebra tantum sed in arte deciphratoria, in
+variis ludorum generibus, in ipse geometria lineariter ad veterum morem
+tractata, denique in omnibus ubi similitudinis ratio habetur locum habent.
+The intuitions of Leibniz, which speed forth so far beyond their time, seem
+sharply defined and highly admirable to a modern acquainted with 'formal'
+mathematics and mathematical logic. This applies also, I must expressly
+note, to Leibniz's fragments on scientia generalis or the calculus ratiocinator,
+in which Trendelenburg's elegant but superficial criticism could pick out so
+little that was of use (Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie, vol. Il).
+Leibniz likewise points, in repeated, express pronouncements, to the need
+to widen logic so as to include a mathematical theory of probabilities. He
+demands of mathematicians an analysis of the problems which lie hidden
+in games of chance, and expects great resultant advances in empirical thinking, and the logical criticism of it. Leibniz, in short, had intuitions of genius:
+he foresaw the most splendid gains which logic has had to register since
+the time of Aristotle, the theory of probabilities and mathematical analyses
+of (syllogistic and non-syllogistic) arguments. The latter first matured in the
+second half of the nineteenth century. Through his Combinatoria he is also
+the intellectual father of the pure theory of manifolds, a discipline close to
+pure logic and in fact intimately one with it (cf. below §869-70).
+In all this Leibniz bases himself on the same Idea of pure logic as we here
+support. Nothing is further from him than to think that the essential foundations of a fruitful art of knowledge could be found in psychology. They
+are for him altogether a priori. They constitute a discipline mathematical in
+form, which as such, just like, e.g. pure arithmetic, immediately includes a
+vocation for the practical regulation of knowledge.*
+§61 Need for special investigations to provide an
+epistemological justification and partial realization of
+the Idea of pure logic
+The authority of Leibniz must, however, count even less for us than that of
+Kant or Herbart, since he could not give to his great intentions the weight
+of completed achievements. He belongs to a past age, beyond which modern
+science feels that it has travelled a long way. Authorities do not in fact carry
+
+141
+much weight as opposed to the broad advance of a science supposedly rich
+and secure in its results. Their influence must be less, in so far as they lack
+a sufficiently clarified, positively elaborated concept of the discipline in
+question. Clearly, if we do not want to stick half way, and to run the risk
+that our critical reflections may be barren, we must take up the task of constructing the Idea of pure logic on a sufficiently broad basis. Only in a series
+of meaty individual treatments, which will provide a more precise idea of
+the content and character of the essential logical researches, and which will
+work out the notion of logic more definitely, can one remove the prejudice
+which sees logic as an insignificant field of more or less trivial statements. As
+against this, we shall see that our discipline extends far and wide, not merely
+in respect of its content of systematic theories, but above all in regard to the
+difficult and important investigations needed for its philosophical foundation and assessment.
+But even the putative triviality of the field of purely logical truths, would
+in itself be no argument for its treatment as a mere aid towards a logical
+technology. The interests of pure theory require us to treat what constitutes
+a unified whole of theory in a theoretically closed manner, and not as a mere
+aid towards external ends. Our investigations so far have, we hope, made
+plain that a correct grasp of the essence of pure logic, and of its unique
+position in relation to all other sciences, is one of the most important questions in the whole of epistemology. If this is plain, it is likewise of vital
+interest to this fundamental philosophical science, that pure logic should be
+fully expounded in purity and independence. Epistemology must, of course,
+not be taken to be a discipline following upon or coinciding with metaphysics, but one which precedes metaphysics, as it precedes psychology and all
+other disciplines.
+Appendix
+References to F. A. Lange and B. Bolzano
+Wide as is the gulf which divides my logic from F. A. Lange's, I am in
+agreement with him, and regard him as having done the discipline a service,
+in that, in a period when pure logic was mainly despised, he definitely stood
+out for the view that 'science may expect important advances from attempts
+at a separate treatment of the purely formal elements of logic' (Logische
+Studien, p. 1). Our agreement extends further: in the most general features it
+also applies to the Idea of the discipline, which Lange could not indeed
+bring to essential clarity. He has good grounds for regarding the hiving off
+of pure logic as the hiving off of the doctrines which he calls the apodeictic
+element in logic'
+', i.e. "the doctrines which, like mathematical theorems, can
+be developed in an absolutely cogent manner'
+'. His next remarks are well
+worth remembering:
+
+142 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+The mere fact of the presence of cogent truths is so important, that every
+trace of such truths must be carefully followed up. To omit such an
+investigation on account of the small value of formal logic, or its inadequacy as a theory of human thought, would have to be rejected from
+this point of view as a confusion of theoretical with practical aims. Such
+an objection would be as if a chemist refused to analyse a compound
+because in its compounded state it was very valuable, whereas its single
+constituents were unlikely to have any value.
+(op. cit. p. 7J.)
+He is just as right in another passage: 'Formal logic as an apodeictic science,
+has a value totally independent of its validity: every system of truths which
+hold a priori, deserves the highest respect' (op. cit. p. 127).
+While Lange warmly supported the Idea of a purely formal logic, he had
+no notion that this Idea had already been realized to a relatively high degree.
+I am of course not referring to the many expositions of formal logic, which
+flourished especially in the schools of Kant and Herbart, and which did so
+little to live up to their own claims. I am referring to Bernhard Bolzano's
+Wissenschaftslehre, published in 1837, a work which, in its treatment of the
+logical 'theory of elements'.
+, far surpasses everything that world-literature
+has to offer in the way of a systematic sketch of logic. Bolzano did not, of
+course, expressly discuss or support any independent demarcation of pure
+logic in our sense, but he provided one de facto in the first two volumes of
+his work, in his discussions of what underlay a Wissenschaftslehre or theory
+of science in the sense of his conception; he did so with such purity and
+scientific strictness, and with such a rich store of original, scientifically confirmed and ever fruitful thoughts, that we must count him as one of the
+greatest logicians of all time. He must be placed historically in fairly close
+proximity to Leibniz, with whom he shares important thoughts and fundamental conceptions, and to whom he is also philosophically akin in other respects. Even he, however, did not quite exhaust the rich inspiration of Leibniz's
+logical intuitions, especially not in regard to mathematical syllogistics and
+to mathesis universalis. Too few of Leibniz's posthumous writings were, however, known at the time, and there was no 'formal' mathematics or theory of
+manifolds to provide a key to their understanding.
+In each line of his wonderful book, Bolzano shows himself to be an acute
+mathematician, who lets the same spirit of scientific strictness rule in logic
+which he himself first introduced into the theoretical treatment of the basic
+concepts and propositions of mathematical analysis, which thereby acquired
+a new foundation. For this the history of mathematics has not forgotten to
+grant him a famous place. Of the ambiguous profundity of that systematic
+philosophy, which rather aimed at thinking out world-conceptions and a worldwisdom, and which hindered the progress of scientific philosophy so badly
+by its unholy blend of discordant intentions, Bolzano - the contemporary of
+
+143
+Hegel - shows no trace. His thought-patterns are of mathematical straightforwardness and plainness, but also of mathematical clearness and strictness. Only when one has gone more deeply into the sense and aim of these
+patterns throughout the whole discipline, does one find what great mental
+work and achievement lie hidden behind plain statements and formularızed
+expositions. To philosophers bred in the prejudices, in the thought- and
+speech-habits of the idealistic schools - not all of us have completely outgrown
+such influences - such a scientific approach readily seems shallow and void of
+ideas, as well as ponderous and pedantic. Logic as a science must, however,
+be built upon Bolzano's work, and must learn from him its need for mathematical acuteness in distinctions, for mathematical exactness in theories. It
+will then reach a new standpoint for judging the mathematicizing theories of
+logic, which mathematicians, quite unperturbed by philosophic scorn, are so
+successfully constructing. These theories altogether conform to the spirit of
+Bolzano's logic, though Bolzano had not an inkling of them. It will at least
+be impossible for a future historian of logic to be so wrong as the otherwise
+thorough Ueberweg, who treats a work of the rank of the Wissenschaftslehre
+on a level with - Knigge's Logic for Females (Logik für Frauenzimmer).›
+Much as Bolzano's achievement is 'cast in one piece'
+, it cannot be regarded (as such a deeply honest thinker would be the first to admit) as in
+any way final. To mention only one point, one particularly feels his defects
+in epistemological directions. There are either no investigations, or else only
+quite insufficient ones, which give genuine philosophical intelligibility to
+logical thought-achievements, and so provide a philosophical estimate of
+logic as a discipline. Such questions can be evaded by a thinker who, like a
+mathematician, is building theories upon theories, without having to bother
+himself about questions of underlying principle. They cannot be evaded
+by someone who undertakes to make clear, to those who either fail to see
+or to admit a discipline's validity, or who mix up essential tasks with quite heterogeneous ones, what the inherent justification of such a discipline really
+Is, and what the nature of its tasks and objects may be. Our comparison of
+these present Logical Investigations with Bolzano's work is meant to make
+clear, not that our Investigations are in any sense mere commentaries upon,
+or critically improved expositions of, Bolzano's thought-patterns, but that
+they have been crucially stimulated by Bolzano (as also by Lotze).
+
+Chapter 1I
+Wishing to gain a provisional image, sketched with a few characteristic
+touches, of the goal aimed at by the individual discussions which follow
+these Prolegomena, we shall now try to bring conceptual clarity to that Idea
+of Pure Logic, for which our critical discussions up to this point have more
+or less prepared us.
+§62 The unity of science. The interconnection of
+things and the interconnection of truths
+Science is, in the first place a unified item in anthropology: it is a unity
+of acts of thinking, of thought-dispositions, as well as of certain external
+arrangements pertinent thereto. What makes this unified whole anthropological, and what especially makes it psychological, are not here our concern.
+We are rather interested in what makes science science, which is certainly
+not its psychology, nor any real context into which acts of thought are fitted,
+but a certain objective or ideal interconnection which gives these acts a
+unitary objective relevance, and, in such unitary relevance, an ideal validity.
+More definiteness and clearness are, however, needed at this point. Two
+meanings can be attached to this objective interconnection which ideally
+pervades scientific thought, and which gives 'unity' to such thought, and so
+to science as such: it can be understood as an interconnection of the things to
+which our thought-experiences (actual or possible) are intentionally directed,
+or, on the other hand, as an interconnection of truths, in which this unity of
+things comes to count objectively as being what it is. These two things are
+given together a priori, and are mutually inseparable. Nothing can be without being thus or thus determined, and that it is, and that it is thus and thus
+determined, is the self-subsistent truth which is the necessary correlate of the
+self-subsistent being. What holds of single truths, or single states of affairs,
+plainly also holds of interconnections of truths or of states of affairs. This
+self-evident inseparability is not, however, identity. In these truths or interconnections of truths the actual existence of things and of interconnections
+of things finds expression. But the interconnections of truths differ from the
+
+The idea of Pure Logic 145
+interconnections of things, which are 'truly' in the former; this at once
+appears in the fact that truths which hold of truths do not coincide with
+truths that hold of the things posited in such truths.
+To forestall misunderstandings, I must expressly emphasize the fact that I
+use the words 'objectivity', 'object', 'thing' etc., always in the widest sense,
+in accordance, therefore, with my preferred sense of the term "knowledge'
+An object of knowledge may as readily be what is real as what is ideal, a
+thing or an event or a species of a mathematical relation, a case of being or
+of what ought to be. This applies automatically to expressions like 'unified
+objectivity'
+', 'interconnection of things' etc.
+Both sorts of unity are given to us, and can only by abstraction be thought
+apart, in judgement or, more precisely, in knowledge - the unity of objectivity, on the one hand, and of truth, on the other. The expression 'knowledge'
+is wide enough to cover both simple acts of knowing, as well as logically
+unified interconnections of knowledge, however complicated: either of these,
+considered as a whole, is a cognitive act. If now we perform an act of
+cognition, or, as I prefer to express it, live in one, we are 'concerned with the
+object' that it, in its cognitive fashion, means and postulates. If this act is
+one of knowing in the strictest sense, i.e. if our judgement is inwardly evident, then its object is given in primal fashion (originär). The state of affairs
+comes before us, not merely putatively, but as actually before our eyes, and
+in it the object itself, as the object that it is, ie. just as it is intended in this
+act of knowing and not otherwise, as bearer of such and such properties, as
+the term of such relations etc. It is not merely putatively, but actually thus,
+and as actually thus it is given to our knowledge, which means that it is not
+merely thought (judged) but known to be such. Otherwise put, its being
+thus is a truth actually realized, individualized in the experience of the
+inwardly evident judgement. If we reflect on this individualization, we perform an ideational abstraction, and the truth itself, instead of our former
+object, becomes our apprehended object. We hereby apprehend the truth as
+the ideal correlate of the transient subjective act of knowledge, as standing
+opposed in its unity to the unlimited multitude of possible acts of knowing,
+and of knowing individuals.
+To the interconnections of knowledge there ideally correspond interconnections of truths. Suitably understood, these are not merely complexes of
+truths, but complex truths, which therefore themselves in their totality fall
+under the concept of truth. There also the sciences belong, the word understood objectively in the sense of unified truth. In the general correlation
+which subsists between truth and objectivity, there is a unitary objectivity
+which corresponds to the unity of truth in one and the same science: this
+is the unity of the scientific field. In relation to this, all the singular truths
+of the same science belong together in their subject-matter, an expression
+which, as we shall see later, seems to be here used in a wider sense than
+usual (ct. the end of §64).
+
+146 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+§63 Continuation. The unity of theory
+We may now ask what constitutes the unity of a science, and therewith the
+unity of its field. For not every putting of truths together in a single association of truths, which might remain an entirely external one, constitutes a
+science. To a science, as we said in our first chapter,' a certain unified interconnection of demonstration pertains. This too, however, is not enough: it
+points to demonstration, to proof as something essentially pertaining to the
+Idea of Science, but fails to say what sort of unity of proof constitutes a
+science.
+To reach clearness, we begin by making certain general pronouncements.
+Scientific knowledge is, as such, grounded knowledge. To know the ground
+of anything means to see the necessity of its being so and so. Necessity as an
+objective predicate of a truth (which is then called a necessary truth) is
+tantamount to the law-governed validity of the state of affairs in question.
+To see a state of affairs as a matter of law is to see its truth as necessarily
+obtaining, and to have knowledge of the ground of the state of affairs or
+of its truth: all these are equivalent expressions.? A natural equivocation, of
+course, leads us to call every general truth that itself utters a law, a necessary truth. Corresponding to our first defined sense, it would have been
+better to call it the explanatory ground of a law, from which a class of
+necessary truths follows.
+Truths divide into individual and general truths. The former contain (whether
+explicitly or implicitly) assertions regarding the actual existence of individual
+singulars, whereas the latter are completely free from this, and only permit
+us to infer (purely from concepts) the possible existence of what is individual.
+Individual truths are as such contingent. If in their case one speaks of
+a grounded explanation, one is concerned with a proof of their necessity
+under certain presupposed circumstances. If the interconnection of one fact
+with others is one of law, then its existence, resting on the laws which
+govern interconnections of the sort in question, and on the assumption of
+the pertinent circumstances, is determined as a necessary existence.
+If we are not dealing with the proof of a factual, but of a general truth
+(which again has the character of a law in respect of its possible application
+to facts falling under it) we are referred to certain general laws, which,
+by way of specialization (not individualization) and deductive consequence
+yield the proposition to be proved. The proof of general laws necessarily
+leads to certain laws which in their essence, i.e. intrinsically, and not merely
+subjectively or anthropologically, are not further proveable. These are called
+basic laws. The systematic unity of the ideally closed sum total of laws
+resting on one basic legality (Gesetzlichkeit) as their final ground, an arising
+out of it through systematic deduction, is the unity of a systematically complete theory. This basic legality may here either consist of one basic law or a
+conjunction of homogeneous basic laws.
+
+The idea of Pure Logic 147
+We possess theories in this strict sense in universal arithmetic, in geometry, in analytical mechanics, in mathematical astronomy etc. Our concept
+of theory is usually a relative one, i.e. a theory is relative to a multiplicity of
+single items that it governs, for which it provides the explanatory grounds.
+Universal arithmetic gives us an explanatory theory for numerical and
+concrete number-propositions, analytical mechanics for mechanical facts,
+mathematical astronomy for the facts of gravitation etc. The possibility of
+taking on the function of explanation is an obvious consequence of the
+essence of a theory in our absolute sense. In a looser sense, we mean by a
+theory a deductive system in which the last grounds are not basic laws in the
+strict sense of the word, but, as genuine grounds, take us closer to these. In
+the gradations of a closed theory, a theory in this relaxed sense forms a step.
+We also note the following difference: every explanatory interconnection
+is deductive, but not every deductive interconnection is explanatory. All
+grounds are premisses, but not all premisses are grounds. Every deduction is
+indeed necessary, i.e. it obeys laws: but that its conclusions follow according
+to laws (the laws of inference) does not mean that they follow from laws
+which in a pregnant sense serve to 'ground' them. One tends, indeed, to call
+every premiss, and especially a universal one, a 'ground' for the consequences
+which flow from it, a noteworthy equivocation.
+§64 The essential and extra-essential principles
+that give science unity. Abstract, concrete and
+normative sciences
+We are now in a position to answer the question raised above: What makes
+truths belong together in a single science, what constitutes their unity of
+'subject-matter"?
+The principle of unity may be of two sorts, essential and extra-essential.
+The truths of a science are essentially one if their connection rests on what
+above all makes a science a science: a science is, as we know, grounded
+knowledge, i.e. explanation or proof (in the pointed sense). Essential unity
+among the truths of a single science is unity of explanation. But all explanation points to a theory, and has its goal in the knowledge of the basic laws,
+the principles of explanation. Unity of explanation means, therefore, theoretical unity, which means, on what was said above, homogeneous unity of
+legal base, and, lastly, homogeneous unity of explanatory principles.
+The sciences whose field is determined by the standpoint of theory, of
+unity of principle, which embrace in ideal closure all possible facts and
+general items whose principles of explanation have a single legal base, are
+called, not very suitably, abstract sciences. The best name for them would
+really be theoretical sciences. This expression is, however, used in opposition
+to practical and normative sciences, and we too have used it above in this
+sense. Following a suggestion of J. von Kries, one could say, almost as
+
+148 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+characteristically, that these sciences are nomological, in so far as their unifying principle, as well as their essential aim of research, is a law. The name
+'explanatory science' which we have used from time to time, will also do,
+provided it is used to stress the unity reached by explanation, rather than
+explanation itself.
+There are, in the second place, external standpoints which range truths into
+one science: the nearest to hand is the unity of the thing in a more literal sense.
+One connects all the truths whose content relates to one and the same individual
+object, or to one and the same empirical genus. This is the case in regard to
+the concrete, or, to use von Kries's term, the ontological sciences, such as
+geography, history, astronomy, natural history, anatomy etc. The truths of
+geography are united by their relation to the earth, the truths of meteorology
+concern, even more restrictedly, the weather-phenomena of the earth etc.
+These sciences are also often called 'descriptive', and this name is allowable, since the unity of description is fixed by the empirical unity of the
+object or the class, and it is this descriptive unity which, in the sciences here
+involved, determines the science's unity. But the word should of course not
+be so understood as if descriptive sciences aimed at mere description, which
+would contradict our guiding concept of science.
+Since it is possible that explanation which is directed towards empirical unities, leads to widely divergent, or quite heterogeneous theories and
+theoretical sciences, we rightly call the unity of the concrete science an
+'extra-essential' one.
+It is at any rate clear that the abstract or nomological sciences are the
+genuine, basic sciences, from whose theoretical stock the concrete sciences
+must derive all that theoretical element by which they are made sciences.
+Quite understandably, it is enough if the concrete sciences attach the objects
+they describe to the lower rungs of law in the nomological sciences, and at
+best indicate the main direction of ascending explanation. For the reduction
+to principles, and the general build-up of explanatory theories, is the proper
+field of the nomological sciences; it already exists in such sciences, where
+fully developed, in the most universal form and as a finished achievement.
+We are of course not pronouncing on the relative worth of the two sorts of'
+sciences; our interest in theory is not our only interest, nor the sole determinant of value. Aesthetic, ethical, and, in a wider sense, practical interests
+can attach to what is individual, and impart the highest value to its detailed
+description and explanation When, however, our purely theoretical interest
+sets the tone, the single individual and the empirical connection do not
+count intrinsically, or they count only as a methodological point of passage
+in the construction of a general theory. The theoretical natural scientist, or
+the natural scientist in the context of purely theoretic, mathematicizing
+discussion, sees the earth and stars quite differently from the geographer
+and the astronomer. They are to him per se indifferent and count merely as
+examples of gravitating masses in general.
+
+The idea of Pure Logic 149
+We must finally make mention of yet another extra-essential principle of
+scientific unity: the principle which grows out of a unitary evaluative interest, which is therefore objectively determined by a unitary basic value (or by
+a unitary basic norm) as has been fully discussed in chapter It, §14. This
+constitutes 'mutual belongingness' as regards subject-matter among the truths
+in the normative sciences, or the unity of the field in question. Talk of
+"mutual belongingness as regards subject-matter' is most naturally taken to
+mean a belongingness grounded in things, in subject-matters themselves.
+Here only a unity in terms of theoretical law or of the concrete thing will be
+relevant, and our conception will place normative unity over against unity
+of subject-matter in a single opposition.
+As appears from our previous discussion, normative sciences depend on
+theoretical sciences - above all on sciences theoretical in the narrowest sense of
+being nomological - so that we can again say that they derive the theoretical
+element, which alone renders them scientific, from those theoretical sciences.
+§05 The question as to the ideal conditions of
+the possibility of science or of theory in general.
+A. The question as it relates to actual knowledge
+We now raise an important question as to the 'conditions of the possibility
+of science in general'. Since the essential aim of scientific knowledge can
+only be achieved through theory, in the strict sense of the nomological
+sciences, we replace our question by a question as to the conditions of the
+possibility of theory in general. A theory as such consists of truths, and its
+form of connection is a deductive one. To answer our question is therefore
+also to answer the more general question as to the conditions of the possibility of truth in general, and again of deductive unity in general. The historical
+echoes in the form of our question are of course intentional. We are plainly
+concerned with a quite necessary generalization of the question as to the
+'conditions of the possibility of experience' (Erfahrung). The unity of an
+experience is for Kant the unity of objective legality: it falls, therefore, under
+the concept of theoretical unity.
+The sense of our question needs, however, to be more precisely fixed. It
+might very well be at first understood in the subjective sense, in which case
+it would be better expressed as a question as to the conditions of the possibility of theoretical knowledge in general, or, more generally, of inference
+in general or knowledge in general, and in the case of any possible human
+being. Such conditions are in part real, in part ideal. We shall ignore the
+former, the psychological conditions. Naturally the possibility of knowledge
+in a psychological regard embraces all the causal conditions on which our
+thinking depends. Ideal conditions for the possibility of knowledge may, as
+said before,' be of two sorts. They are either noetic conditions which have
+their grounds, a priori, in the Idea of Knowledge as such, without any regard
+
+150 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+to the empirical peculiarity of human knowledge as psychologically conditioned, or they are purely logical conditions, i.e. they are grounded purely in
+the 'content' of our knowledge. It is evident a priori, as regards the former,
+that thinking subjects must be in general able to perform, e.g., all the sorts
+of acts in which theoretical knowledge is made real. We must, in particular,
+as thinking beings, be able to see propositions as truths, and to see truths as
+consequences of other truths, and again to see laws as such, to see laws as
+explanatory grounds, and to see them as ultimate principles etc. But it is also,
+on the other hand, inwardly evident that truths are what they are, and that,
+in particular, laws, grounds, principles are what they are, whether we have
+insight into them or not. Since they do not hold in so far as we have insight
+into them, but we can only have insight into them in so far as they hold, they
+must be regarded as objective or ideal conditions of the possibility of our
+knowledge of them. A priori laws, accordingly, relating to truth as such, to
+deduction as such and to theory as such (i.e. to the universal essence of these
+ideal unities) must be characterized as laws which express the conditions for
+knowledge in general, or for deductive and theoretical knowledge in general,
+conditions which have their 'pure' foundation is the 'content' of knowledge.
+Plainly we are here concerned with a priori conditions of knowledge,
+which can be discussed and investigated apart from all relation to the thinking subject and to the Idea of Subjectivity in science. The laws in question
+have a meaning-content which is quite free from such relation, they do not
+talk, even in ideal fashion, of knowing, judging, inferring, representing,
+proving etc., but of truth, concept, proposition, syllogism, ground and consequent etc., as we fully said above (847). Obviously these laws may undergo
+self-evident transformations through which they acquire an express relation
+to knowledge and the knowing subject, and now themselves pronounce on
+real possibilities of knowledge. Here as elsewhere, a priori assertions regarding ideal possibilities arise through the transferred application of ideal relationships (expressed in purely general propositions) to empirical instances
+(cf. the arithmetical example in §23 above)
+The ideal conditions of knowledge which we have called 'noetic' as
+opposed to those which are logically objective, are, basically, no more than
+such modifications of the insights, the laws which pertain to the pure content of knowledge, as render them fruitful for the criticism of knowledge,
+and, by further modifications, for practical, logical normativity. For the
+normative modifications of the laws of pure logic, which we spoke of above,
+also come in here.
+§66 B. The question as it relates to the content
+of knowledge
+Our treatment has shown that questions as to the ideal conditions of
+the possibility of knowledge in general, and of theoretical knowledge in
+
+151
+particular, ultimately lead us back to certain laws, whose roots are to be
+found purely in the content of knowledge, or of the categorial concepts that
+it falls under, and which are so abstract that they contain no reference to
+knowledge as an act of a knowing subject. These laws (or the categorial
+concepts which enter into them) are what are to be understood as constituting the conditions of the possibility of theory in general, in the objectively
+ideal sense. For it is possible to raise questions as to the conditions of
+possibility, not only in regard to theoretical knowledge, as we have so far
+done, but also in regard to its content, i.e. we can raise them directly in
+regard to theory itself. We then understand by 'theory', let us again stress, a
+certain ideal content of possible knowledge, just as in the case of 'truth'
+'law' etc. There is a single truth, which corresponds to the multitude of
+individual acts of knowledge having the same content, which is just their
+ideally identical content. In like manner, the ideally identical content of a
+theory corresponds to the multitude of individual knowledge-combinations,
+in each of which - whether occurring now or then, in these subject or in
+those - the same theory comes to be known. It is accordingly not made up of
+acts but of purely ideal elements, of truths, and that in purely ideal forms,
+those of ground and consequent.
+If we now directly relate our question as to conditions of possibility,
+to theory in the objective sense and to theory in general, such a possibility
+can only have the sense which applies to other objects of pure conception.
+From such objects, we are led back to concepts, and 'possibility' means no
+more than the 'obtaining' (Geltung) or rather essentiality (Wesenhaftigkeit) of
+the concepts in question. This is what is often called the 'reality' as opposed
+to the 'imaginariness' of concepts, which latter could better be called
+'essencelessness'. In such a sense, one speaks of real definitions which guarantee the possibility, the 'obtaining', the reality of the defined concept, and
+again of the opposition between real and imaginary numbers, geometrical
+figures etc. Talk of possibility in regard to concepts becomes equivocal
+through a transter. What is in an authentic sense possible is the existence of
+objects falling under the relevant concepts, a possibility guaranteed a priori
+through knowledge of conceptual essence, which flashes upon us, e.g., as the
+result of such an object's being intuitively presented. The essentiality of
+the concept is then likewise spoken of as a possibility in a transferred sense.
+In this connection questions as to the possibility of a theory as such, and
+as to the conditions on which such possibility depends, gain an easily grasped
+sense. The possibility or essentiality of a theory in general is assured by our
+perspicuous knowledge of some definite theory. The wider question will
+however be: What are the universal, law-governed conditions of this possibility of theory in general? What therefore constitutes the ideal essence of
+theory as such? What are the primitive 'possibilities' out of which the possibility of theory is constituted, or, what is the same, what are the primitive
+essential concepts out of which the concept of theory, itself an essential
+
+152 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+concept, is constituted? And further: What are the pure laws which, rooted
+in these concepts, impart unity to all theory as such, laws which pertain to
+the form of theory as such, and which determine, in a priori fashion, the
+possible (essential) modifications or species of theory?
+If these ideal concepts or laws delimit the possibility of theory in general,
+if, in other words, they express what essentially pertains to the Idea of Theory, it immediately follows that each putative theory only is a theory to the
+extent to which it accords with these concepts or laws. The logical justification of a concept, i.e. of its ideal possibility, is achieved by going back to its
+intuitive or deducible essence. Logical justification of a given theory as such,
+i.e. justification in virtue of its pure form, demands that we go back to the
+essence of its form, and so to the concepts and laws which are ideal constituents of theory in general (the 'conditions of its possibility'), which regulate,
+in a priori, deductive fashion, all specialization of the Idea of Theory in its
+possible kinds. Things are here as they are in the wider field of deduction,
+e.g. in the case of simple syllogisms. Though they may be intrinsically illuminated by insight, they none the less receive their final, deepest justification
+by recourse to the formal, syllogistic law which imparts insight into the a
+priori ground of syllogistic interconnection. The same holds in the case of
+any deduction, however complicated, and especially in the case of a theory.
+In perspicuous, theoretical thought we gain insight into the grounds of some
+state of affairs explained: but the deeper-going insight into the essence of the
+theoretical linkage which itself constitutes the theoretical content of such
+thought, and the a priori laws on which such thought-achievement depends,
+are first reached when we track down the form, the law, and the interweavings
+of theory, at the quite different level of knowledge to which they belong.
+To point to profounder insights and justifications, serves to bring out
+the supreme value of the theoretical investigations which help to solve our
+suggested problem. We are dealing with systematic theories which have their
+roots in the essence of theory, with an a priori, theoretical, nomological science
+which deals with the ideal essence of science as such, and which accordingly
+has parts relating to systematic theories whose empirical, anthropological
+aspect it excludes. In a profound sense, we are dealing with the theory of
+theory, with the science of the sciences. Its achievement in enriching our
+knowledge must, of course, be kept separate from its problems themselves,
+and from the proper content of their solution.
+§67 The tasks of pure logic. First: the fixing of the
+pure categories of meaning, the pure categories of
+objects and their law-governed combinations
+Having provisionally fixed the Idea of the a priori discipline whose deeper
+understanding will be the goal of our efforts, we may now summarize the
+tasks that we shall assign to it. Three sets of tasks must be distinguished.
+
+153
+We must, first of all, lay down the more important concepts, in particular
+all the primitive concepts which 'make possible' the interconnected web of
+knowledge as seen objectively, and particularly the web of theory. We must
+also clarify these concepts scientifically. We are, in other words, concerned
+with the concepts which constitute the Idea of unified theory, or with the
+concepts which are connected with these through ideal laws. Into such a constitution second-order concepts, i.e. concepts of concepts and of other ideal
+unities, naturally enter. A given theory is a certain deductive combination
+of given propositions which are themselves certain sorts of combinations of
+given concepts. The Idea of the pertinent 'form' of the theory arises if we
+substitute variables for these given elements, whereby concepts of concepts
+and of other Ideas, replace straightforward concepts. Here belong the concepts: Concept, Proposition, Truth etc.
+The concepts of the elementary connective forms naturally play a constitutive role here, those connective forms, in particular, which are quite generally constitutive of the deductive unity of propositions, e.g. the conjunctive,
+disjunctive, hypothetical linkage of propositions to form new propositions.
+Such a role is also played by the forms of connection of inferior elements of
+meaning into one simple proposition, which in their turn lead to the varied
+subject-forms, predicate-forms, forms of conjunctive and disjunctive connection, plural forms etc. Fixed laws govern the gradual complications
+through which an unending multiplicity of ever new forms emerges out of
+our primitive set. These laws of complication make possible a sweeping oversight of the concepts derivable from the primitive concepts and forms; these
+naturally belong, together with this sweeping oversight itself, in the field of
+research dealt with here. (Cf. Investigation Iv in vol. Il.)
+In close connection with the concepts so far mentioned, i.e. the categories
+of meaning, and married to them by ideal laws, are other correlative concepts such as Object, State of Affairs, Unity, Plurality, Number, Relation,
+Connection etc. These are the pure, the formal objective categories. These
+too must be taken into account. In both cases we are dealing with nothing
+but concepts, whose notion makes clear that they are independent of the
+particularity of any material of knowledge, and under which all the concepts, propositions and states of affairs that specially appear in thought,
+must be ordered. They arise therefore solely in relation to our varying
+thought-functions: their concrete basis is solely to be found in possible acts
+of thought, as such, or in the correlates which can be grasped in these. (See
+§62 above and Investigation VI, 844 in vol. II.)
+All these concepts must now be pinned down, their 'origin' must in each
+case be investigated. Not that psychological questions as to the origin of the
+conceptual presentations or presentational dispositions here in question,
+have the slightest interest for our discipline. This is not what we are enquiring into: we are concerned with a phenomenological origin or - if we prefer to
+rule out unsuitable talk of origins, only bred in confusion - we are concerned
+
+154 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+with insight into the essence of the concepts involved, looking methodologically to the fixation of unambiguous, sharply distinct verbal meanings.
+We can achieve such an end only by intuitive representation of the essence in
+adequate Ideation, or, in the case of complicated concepts, through knowledge of the essentiality of the elementary concepts present in them, and of
+the concepts of their forms of combination.
+All these are seemingly trivial, preparatory tasks. To a large extent they
+are necessarily clothed in the form of discussions of terminology, and readily seem to the layman to be barren, pettifogging word-exercises.
+But as long
+as concepts are not distinguished and made clear to ideational intuition, by
+going back to their essence, further effort is hopeless. In no field of knowledge is equivocation more fatal, in none have confused concepts so hindered
+the progress of knowledge, or so impeded the insight into its true aims, as
+in the field of pure logic. The critical analyses of these Prolegomena have
+everywhere shown this.
+It is impossible to overestimate the importance of this first group of problems; it is doubtful whether they do not in fact involve the greatest difficulties
+in the whole discipline.
+§68 Secondly: the laws and theories which have their
+grounds in these categories
+Our second group of problems lies in the search for the laws grounded in the
+two above classes of categorial concepts, which do not merely concern possible forms of complication and transformation of the theoretical items they
+involve (see Investigation Iv), but rather the objective validity of the formal
+structures which thus arise: on the one hand, the truth or falsity of meanings
+as such, purely on the basis of their categorial formal structure, on the other
+hand (in relation to their objective correlates), the being and not being of
+objects as such, of states of affairs as such, again on the basis of their pure,
+categorial form. These laws, which concern meanings and objects as such, with
+the widest universality conceivable, the universality of logical categories, are
+in themselves theories. (See Investigation I, §29.) We have, on the one side,
+the side of meaning, theories of inference, e.g. syllogistics, which is however
+only one such theory. On the other side, the side of the correlates, we have
+the pure theory of pluralities, which has its roots in the concepts of a plurality, the pure theory of numbers, which has its roots in the concept of a
+number - each an independently rounded-off theory. All the laws here belonging lead to a limited number of primitive or basic laws, which have their
+immediate roots in our categorial concepts. They must, in virtue of their
+homogeneity, serve to base an all-comprehensive theory, which will contain
+the separate theories just mentioned, as relatively closed elements in itself.
+We are here concerned with the territory of those laws, which in formal universality span all possible meanings and objects, under which every particular
+
+The idea of Pure Logic 155
+theory or science is ranged, which it must obey if it is to be valid. Not that
+every such theory presupposes every such law as the ground of its possibility
+and validity. The ideal completeness of the categorial theories and laws in
+question, rather yields the all-comprehensive fund from which each particular valid theory derives the ideal grounds of essential being appropriate to
+its form. These are the laws to which it conforms, and through which, as a
+theory validated by its form, it can be ultimately justified. In so far as theory
+is an all-embracing unity built out of single, interwoven truths, it is plain
+that the laws governing the concept of truth, as well as the laws governing
+the possibility of single combinations of this or that form, will be included
+in the delimited territory. In spite of, or rather on account of, the fact that
+theory is the narrower notion, the task of exploring the conditions of its
+possibility, comprehends more content than the corresponding task in the
+case of truth in general, and in the case of the primitive forms of propositional
+combinations (cf. above, §65).
+§69 Thirdly: the theory of the possible forms of
+theories or the pure theory of manifolds
+When all these investigations have been concluded, we shall have done justice
+to the Idea of a science of the conditions of the possibility of theory in
+general. We see at once, however, that this science points beyond itself to a
+completing science, which deals a priori with the essential sorts (forms) of
+theories and the relevant laws of relation. The Idea therefore arises, all of this
+being taken together, of a more comprehensive science of theory in general.
+In its fundamental part, the essential concepts and laws which pertain constitutively to the Idea of Theory will be investigated. It will then go over to
+differentiating this Idea, and investigating possible theories in a priori fashion, rather than the possibility of theory in general.
+The tasks mentioned have been carried out to a sufficient extent, and it is
+possible to construct, out of purely categorial concepts, many definite concepts of possible theories or pure 'forms' of theories, whose essential status
+has been deduced from laws. These distinct forms are not mutually unrelated. There will be a definite, ordered procedure which will enable us to
+construct the possible forms of theories, to survey their legal connections,
+and to pass from one to another by varying their basic determining factors
+etc. There will be universal propositions, if not for the forms of theory
+generally, then at least for forms of theory belonging to defined classes,
+which will govern the legal connection, the transformation and the mutual
+interchange of these forms.
+The propositions that must here be affirmed will plainly be of a different
+content and character from the basic propositions and theorems of theories
+of the second group, from, e.g., syllogistic or arithmetical laws. It is, however, clear from the start that the deduction of such propositions (for there
+
+156 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+can be no true basic laws in this case) must have their entire basis in the
+previously, mentioned theories.
+This is a last, highest goal for a theoretical science of theory in general.
+It is also not indifferent from the point of view of the practical side of
+knowledge. To fit a theory into its formal class may rather be of the greatest
+methodological importance. For, with the extension of the deductive, theoretical sphere, the liveliness and freedom of theoretical research also
+increases: there is increased richness and fruitfulness of method. The solution
+of problems raised within a theoretical discipline, or one of its theories, can
+at times derive the most effective methodical help from recourse to the
+categorial type or (what is the same) to the form of the theory, and perhaps
+also by going over to a more comprehensive form or class of forms and to
+its laws.
+§70 Elucidation of the Idea of a pure theory
+of manifolds
+These indications will perhaps seem somewhat obscure. That we are not
+here dealing with vague fantasies, but with conceptions definite in their
+content, is shown by 'formal mathematics' in a most entirely general sense,
+or by the 'theory of manifolds', the fine flower of modern mathematics.
+The theory is in fact none other than the partial realization, correlatively
+transformed, of the ideal just sketched: this is not to say, of course, that
+mathematicians themselves, guided and likewise limited by interests which
+concern the field of number and magnitude, have correctly discerned the
+ideal essence of the new discipline, or have risen to the height of abstraction
+of an all-comprehensive theory. The objective correlate of the concept of a
+possible theory, definite only in respect of form, is the concept of a possible
+field of knowledge over which a theory of this form will preside. Such a field is,
+however, known in mathematical circles as a manifold. It is accordingly a
+held which is uniquely and solely determined by falling under a theory of
+such a torm, whose objects are such as to permit of certain associations
+which fall under certain basic laws of this or that determinate form (here the
+only determining feature). The objects remain quite indefinite as regards
+their matter, to indicate which the mathematician prefers to speak of them
+as "thought-objects'. They are not determined directly as individual or specific singulars, nor indirectly by way of their material species or genera, but
+solely by the form of the connections attributed to them. These connections
+are therefore as little determined in content as are their objects, only their
+form is determined, and determined through the forms of the elementary
+laws which are assumed to hold of them. These laws then, as they determine
+a field and its form, likewise determine the theory to be constructed, or,
+more correctly, the theory's form. In the theory of manifolds, eg. '+' is not
+the sign for numerical addition, but for any connection for which laws of
+
+The idea of Pure Logic 157
+the form a + b = b + a etc., hold. The manifold is determined by the fact that
+its thought-objects permit of these 'operations' (and of others whose compatibility with these can be shown a priori).
+The most general Idea of a Theory of Manifolds is to be a science which
+definitely works out the form of the essential types of possible theories or
+fields of theory, and investigates their legal relations with one another. All
+actual theories are then specializations or singularizations of corresponding
+forms of theory, just as all theoretically worked-over fields of knowledge are
+individual manifolds. If the formal theory in question is actually worked out
+in the theory of manifolds, then all deductive theoretical work in constructing all actual theories of the same form has been done.
+This is a point of view of the highest methodological importance, without
+which there can be no talk of understanding the method of mathematics.
+Not less important than such a going back to pure form, is the closely
+related ranging of each such form in more comprehensive forms or classes
+of forms. That we here have a central item in the wonderful, methodological
+art of mathematics, becomes plain if we look, not merely at the theories of
+manifolds which arose from generalizations of geometric theory and its
+forms, but at the first, simplest case of this sort, the extension of the field of
+real numbers (i.e. of the corresponding form of theory, the "formal theory
+of real numbers') into the formal, two-dimensional field of ordinary complex numbers. In this concept we indeed have the key to the only possible
+solution of the problem that has not as yet been cleared up: how, e.g., in the
+field of numbers impossible (essenceless) concepts can be methodically treated
+like real ones. This is not, however, the place to discuss this more closely.
+When I spoke above of theories of manifolds which arose out of generalizations of geometric theory, I was of course referring to the theory of
+n-dimensional manifolds, whether Euclidean or non-Euclidean, to Grassmann's
+theory of extensions, and, among others, to the related theories of a W.
+Rowan Hamilton, which can be readily purged of anything geometric. Lie's
+theory of transformation-groups and G. Cantor's investigations into numbers and manifolds also belong here.
+The manner in which variation of curvature makes the various sorts of
+space-like manifolds pass into one another, gives the philosopher who has
+familiarized himself with the elements of the Riemannian-Helmholtzian
+theory a certain picture of the manner of the mutual legal connection among
+pure forms of theory of determinately distinct types. It would be easy to
+show that a knowledge of the true intention of such theories, as pure
+categorial forms of theory, would banish all metaphysical fog and all mysticism from the mathematical investigations in question. If we use the term
+'space' of the familiar type of order of the world of phenomena, talk of
+'spaces' for which, e.g. the axiom of parallels does not hold, is naturally
+senseless. It is just as senseless to speak of differing geometries, when 'geometry' names the science of the space of the world of phenomena. But if we
+
+158 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+mean by 'space' the categorial form of world-space, and, correlatively, by
+'geometry' the categorial theoretic form of geometry in the ordinary sense,
+then space falls under a genus, which we can bound by laws, of pure,
+categorially determinate manifolds, in regard to which it is natural to speak
+of 'space' in a yet more extended sense. Just so, geometric theory falls under
+a corresponding genus of theoretically interrelated theory-forms determined
+in purely categorial fashion, which in a correspondingly extended sense
+can be called 'geometries' of these 'spatial' manifolds. At any rate, the theory
+of n-dimensional spaces forms a theoretically closed piece of the theory of
+theory in the sense above defined. The theory of a Euclidean manifold
+of three dimensions is an ultimate ideal singular in this legally interconnected
+series of a priori, purely categorial theoretic forms (formal deductive systems). This manifold itself is related to 'our' space, i.e. space in the ordinary
+sense, as its pure categorial form, the ideal genus of which the latter represents so to say an individual singular rather than a specific difference.
+Another fine example is the theory of complex number-systems, within which
+the theory of 'ordinary' complex numbers is a single item, a last specific
+difference. In relation to such theories, the arithmetics of number, of ordinal
+number, of magnitude, of quantité dirigée etc., are more or less like mere
+individual singulars. To each a formal generic Idea corresponds, a theory
+of absolute integers, of real numbers, of ordinary complex numbers etc., in
+whose case 'number' is to be taken in a generalized, formal sense.
+§71 Division of labour. The achievement of the
+mathematicians and that of the philosophers
+These therefore are the problems that we range in the field of pure or formal
+logic in the above defined sense: we thereby give this field its widest possible
+extension compatible with the Idea sketched by us of a science of theory in
+general. A considerable part of the theories which belong here has been
+developed as 'pure analysis' or, better, as formal mathematics, and is worked
+on by mathematicians together with other disciplines not in the full sense
+pure (i.e. formal), such as geometry (as the science of 'our' space), analytical
+mechanics etc. The nature of the case really demands a thoroughgoing
+division of labour here. The construction of theories, the strict, methodical
+solution of all formal problems, will always remain the home domain of the
+mathematician. Peculiar methods and set-ups of research are here presupposed, and are essentially the same in all pure theories. Even the elaboration
+of syllogistic theory, long enthroned in the very home territories of philosophy and thought to be completed long ago, has recently been taken over by
+mathematicians, in whose hands it has received undreamt of developments.
+Theories of new types of inference, ignored or misunderstood by the traditional logic, have at the same time been discovered and worked out with
+true mathematical elegance. No one can debar mathematicians from staking
+
+The idea of Pure Logic 159
+claims to all that can be treated in terms of mathematical form and method.
+Only if one is ignorant of the modern science of mathematics, particularly
+of formal mathematics, and measures it by the standards of Euclid or
+Adam Riese, can one remain stuck in the common prejudice that the essence
+of mathematics lies in number and quantity. It is not the mathematician,
+but the philosopher, who oversteps his legitimate sphere when he attacks
+"mathematicizing' theories of logic, and refuses to hand over his temporary
+foster-children to their natural parents. The scorn with which philosophical
+logicians like to speak of mathematical theories of inference, does not alter
+the fact that the mathematical form of treatment is in their case (as in the
+case of all strictly developed theories in the proper sense of this word) the
+only scientific one, the only one that offers us systematic closure and completeness, and a survey of all possible questions together with the possible
+forms of their answers.
+If the development of all true theories falls in the mathematician's field,
+what is left over for philosophers? Here we must note that the mathematician is not really the pure theoretician, but only the ingenious technician,
+the constructor, as it were, who, looking merely to formal interconnections,
+builds up his theory like a technical work of art. As the practical mechanic
+constructs machines without needing to have ultimate insight into the essence of nature and its laws, so the mathematician constructs theories of
+numbers, quantities, syllogisms, manifolds, without ultimate insight into the
+essence of theory in general, and that of the concepts and laws which are its
+conditions. The like holds of all 'special sciences': what is póTEpov Tũ qÚơEI
+is not at all what is pótepov pos nuãs. It is not, fortunately, essential
+insight which makes science, in the common, practically most fruitful sense,
+possible, but scientific instinct and method. For this very reason the ingenious, methodical work of the special sciences, more concerned with practical
+results and mastery than with essential insight, is in need of a continuous
+'epistemological' reflection which only the philosopher can provide, which
+allows only the interest of pure theory to dominate, and helps it to claim its
+rights. Philosophical investigation has quite other ends, and therefore presupposes quite other methods and capacities. It does not seek to meddle in
+the work of the specialist, but to achieve insight in regard to the sense and
+essence of his achievements as regards method and manner. The philosopher is not content with the fact that we find our way about in the world,
+that we have legal formulae which enable us to predict the future course of
+things, or to reconstruct its past course: he wants to clarify the essence of a
+thing, an event, a cause, an effect, of space, of time etc., as well as that
+wonderful affinity which this essence has with the essence of thought, which
+enables it to be thought, with the essence of knowledge, which makes it
+knowable, with meanings which make it capable of being meant etc. And if
+science constructs theories in the systematic despatch of its problems, the
+philosopher enquires into the essence of theory and what makes theory as
+
+160 Prolegomena to Pure Logic
+such possible etc. Philosophical research so supplements the scientific achievements of the natural scientist and of the mathematician, as for the first time
+to perfect pure, genuine, theoretical knowledge. The ars inventiva of the
+special investigator and the philosopher's critique of knowledge, are mutually complementary scientific activities, through which complete theoretical
+insight, comprehending all relations of essence, first comes into being.
+The following individual investigations preparatory to the philosophical
+side of our discipline, will further elucidate what the mathematician will not,
+and cannot do, but what must nevertheless be done.
+§72 Broadening of the Idea of pure logic. The pure
+theory of probability as a pure theory of empirical
+knowledge
+The concept of pure logic so far developed covers a theoretically closed
+circle of problems, essentially relate, to the Idea of Theory. To the extent
+that no science is possible without grounded explanation, i.e. without theory, pure logic covers the ideal conditions of the possibility of science in
+general in the most general manner. It must, however, be noted that logic so
+regarded does not include, as a special case, the ideal conditions of empirical
+science in general. To enquire into these conditions is of course a more
+restricted enquiry: empirical science is also science, and naturally falls, in regard to its theories, under the laws of the sphere delimited above. But ideal
+laws do not determine the unity of the empirical sciences merely in the form
+of the laws of deductive unity, since empirical
+science cannot be reduced
+merely to its theories. Theoretical optics, i.e. the mathematical theory of
+optics, does not exhaust the science of optics: mathematical mechanics is not
+the whole of mechanics etc. The whole complex apparatus of knowledgeprocesses in which the theories of the empirical sciences arise, and are frequently modified in the course of scientific progress, is certainly not merely
+subject to empirical, but also to ideal laws.
+All theory in the empirical sciences is merely putative theory. It explains
+by means of basic laws which are not for our insight certain, but which are
+only for this insight probable. The theories themselves only have perspicuous probability; they are provisional, not final theories. The same is in a
+manner true of the facts which require explanation in theory. We start with
+such facts, they are taken as given; all that we want is to 'explain' them. But
+when we rise to the explanatory hypotheses and, after deduction, verification and perhaps repeated modification, accept them as probable laws,
+facts themselves do not remain quite unchanged; they too change as the
+process of knowledge progresses. The added knowledge due to hypotheses
+that have proved workable, enables us to press ever deeper into the 'true
+essence' of real being: we progressively correct our conceptions, more or less
+tainted with inconsistencies, of phenomenal things. Facts are originally 'given'
+
+The idea of Pure Logic 161
+to us only in the sense of being perceived (and likewise in the sense of being
+remembered). In perception things and events themselves putatively confront us, seen and grasped, so to say, without intervening partition. And
+what we see before us, we utter in judgements of perception: these are the
+immediate 'given facts' of science. But, as knowledge progresses, the actual
+factual content that we concede to perceptual appearances gets altered. The
+intuitively given things - the things with 'secondary qualities' - come to
+count as 'mere appearances'
+?. To determine the true element in them at a
+given time, or, in other words, to determine the empirical object of knowledge
+objectively, we need a method adjusted to the sense of this objectivity, and a
+field of scientifically known laws to be gained and steadily extended by this
+method
+All the scientific procedures of the objective sciences of fact are governed,
+as Descartes and Leibniz saw, not by psychological contingency, but by an
+ideal norm. We claim that, at any time, there is only one correct attitude in
+the assessment of the laws which are to explain, and in the fixing of the true
+facts, and that this is the case at each step in science. When a probable law
+or theory is rendered untenable by an increment of new empirical instances,
+we do not conclude that the scientific grounding of this theory must have
+been mistaken. In the field of our previous experience the previous theory
+was the 'only right' one, in the field of extended knowledge the theory that
+we now must try to establish is the 'only right' one, the one that must be
+justified by correct empirical consideration. We perhaps judge, conversely,
+that an empirical theory has been wrongly established, even if it becomes
+plain, in another objectively right way, that it is the only suitable theory in
+the given state of empirical knowledge. From this we must conclude that
+there must be ideal elements and laws even in the field of empirical thinking, in
+the sphere of probabilities. In these the possibility of empirical science in
+general, of the probable knowledge of the real, has its a priori basis. This
+sphere of pure laws does not relate to the Idea of Theory or to the more
+general Idea of Truth, but to the Idea of the Empirical Unity of Explanation, the Idea of Probability. This yields us a second great foundation for
+logical technology, which is included in the field of pure logic in a sense to
+which corresponding width must be given.
+In the following individual Investigations we limit ourselves to the
+narrower field, which also comes first in the essential arrangement of our
+subject-matter.
+
+Investigations into
+phenomenology and the
+theory of knowledge,
+part l
+Volume II, Part I of the
+German Editions
+
+Volume II, Part I of the German Editions
+§1 The necessity of phenomenological investigations
+as a preliminary to the epistemological criticism and
+clarification of pure logic
+The necessity that we should begin logic with linguistic discussions has often
+been acknowledged from the standpoint of a logical technology. 'Language'
+we read in Mill, "is evidently one of the principal instruments or helps of
+thought; and any imperfection in the instrument, or in the mode of employing it, is confessedly liable, still more than in almost any other art, to confuse and impede the process, and destroy all ground of confidence in the
+result. For a mind not previously versed in the meaning and right use of
+the various kinds of words, to attempt the study of methods of philosophizing,
+would be as if some one should attempt to become an astronomical observer, having never learnt to adjust the focal distance of his optical instruments so as to see distinctly." A deeper ground for this necessity of beginning
+logic with linguistic analysis is, however, seen by Mill in the fact that it
+would not otherwise be possible to investigate the meaning of propositions,
+a matter which stands 'at the threshold' of logical science itself.
+This last remark of our distinguished thinker indicates a point of view
+regulative for pure logic, and, be it noted, for pure logic treated as a philosophical discipline. I assume accordingly that no one will think it enough to
+develop pure logic merely in the manner of our mathematical disciplines, as
+a growing system of propositions having a naively factual validity, without
+also striving to be philosophically clear in regard to these same propositions, without, that is, gaining insight into the essence of the modes of
+cognition which come into play in their utterance and in the ideal possibility
+of applying such propositions, together with all such conferments of sense
+and objective validities as are essentially constituted therein. Linguistic discussions are certainly among the philosophically indispensable preparations
+for the building of pure logic: only by their aid can the true objects of logical
+research - and, following thereon, the essential species and differentiae of
+such objects - be refined to a clarity that excludes all misunderstanding. We
+
+166 Investigations into phenomenology and of knowledge
+are not here concerned with grammatical discussions, empirically conceived
+and related to some historically given language: we are concerned with discussions of a most general sort which cover the wider sphere of an objective
+theory of knowledge and, closely linked with this last, the pure phenomenology of the experiences of thinking and knowing. This phenomenology, like
+the more inclusive pure phenomenology of experiences in general, has, as its
+exclusive concern, experiences intuitively seizable and analysable in the pure
+generality of their essence, not experiences empirically perceived and treated
+as real facts, as experiences of human or animal experients in the phenomenal world that we posit as an empirical fact. This phenomenology must
+bring to pure expression, must describe in terms of their essential concepts
+and their governing formulae of essence, the essences which directly make
+themselves known in intuition, and the connections which have their roots
+purely in such essences. Each such statement of essence is an a priori statement in the highest sense of the word. This sphere we must explore in
+preparation for the epistemological criticism and clarification of pure logic:
+our investigations will therefore all move within it.
+Pure phenomenology represents a field of neutral researches, in which
+several sciences have their roots. It is, on the one hand, an ancillary to
+psychology conceived as an empirical science. Proceeding in purely intuitive
+fashion, it analyses and describes in their essential generality - in the specific
+guise of a phenomenology of thought and knowledge - the experiences of
+presentation, judgement and knowledge, experiences which, treated as classes
+of real events in the natural context of zoological reality, receive a scientific
+probing at the hands of empirical psychology. Phenomenology, on the other
+hand, lays bare the 'sources' from which the basic concepts and ideal laws of
+pure logic 'flow'
+', and back to which they must once more be traced, so as to
+give them all the 'clearness and distinctness' needed for an understanding,
+and for an epistemological critique, of pure logic. The epistemological or
+phenomenological groundwork of pure logic involves very hard, but also
+surpassingly important researches. To revert to what we set forth as the
+tasks of pure logic in the first volume of these Investigations, we have taken
+it upon us to give firm clarity to notions and laws on which the objective
+meaning and theoretical unity of all knowledge is dependent.?
+§2 Elucidation of the aims of such investigations
+All theoretical research, though by no means solely conducted in acts of
+verbal expression or complete statement, none the less terminates in such
+statement. Only in this form can truth, and in particular the truth of theory,
+become an abiding possession of science, a documented, ever available treasure for knowledge and advancing research. Whatever the connection of
+thought with speech may be, whether or not the appearance of our final
+judgements in the form of verbal pronouncements has a necessary grounding
+
+167
+in essence, it is at least plain that judgements stemming from higher intellectual regions, and in particular from the regions of science, could barely arise
+without verbal expression.
+The objects which pure logic seeks to examine are, in the first instance,
+therefore given to it in grammatical clothing. Or, more precisely, they come
+before us embedded in concrete mental states which further function either
+as the meaning-intention or meaning-fulfilment of certain verbal expressions
+- in the latter case intuitively illustrating, or intuitively providing evidence for,
+our meaning - and forming a phenomenological unity with such expressions.
+In these complex phenomenological unities the logician must pick out
+the components that interest him, the characters of the acts, first of all, in
+which logical presentation, judgement and knowledge are consummated: he
+must pursue the descriptive analysis of such act-types to the extent that this
+helps the progress of his properly logical tasks. We cannot straightway
+leap, from the fact that theory realizes' itself in certain mental states, and has
+instances in them, to the seemingly obvious truth that such mental states
+must count as the primary object of our logical researches. The pure logician
+is not primarily or properly interested in the psychological judgement, the
+concrete mental phenomenon, but in the logical judgement, the identical
+asserted meaning, which is one over against manifold, descriptively quite
+different, judgement-experiences.? There is naturally, in the singular experiences which correspond to this ideal unity, a certain pervasive common
+feature, but since the concern of the pure logician is not with the concrete
+instance, but with its corresponding Idea, its abstractly apprehended universal,
+he has, it would seem, no reason to leave the field of abstraction, nor to
+make concrete experiences the theme of his probing interest, instead of Ideas.
+Even if phenomenological analysis of concrete thought-experiences does
+not fall within the true home-ground of pure logic, it none the less is indispensable to the advance of purely logical research. For all that is logical
+must be given in fully concrete fashion, if, as an object of research, it is to be
+made our own, and if we are to be able to bring to self-evidence the a priori
+laws which have their roots in it. What is logical is first given us in imperfect
+shape: the concept as a more or less wavering meaning, the law, built out of
+concepts, as a more or less wavering assertion. We do not therefore lack
+logical insights, but grasp the pure law with self-evidence, and see how it
+has its base in the pure forms of thought. Such self-evidence depends, however, on the verbal meanings which come alive in the actual passing of the
+judgement regarding the law. Unnoticed equivocation may permit the subsequent substitution of other concepts beneath our words, and an appeal on
+behalf of an altered propositional meaning may quite readily, but wrongly,
+be made on the self-evidence previously experienced. It is also possible,
+conversely, that a misinterpretation based on equivocation may distort the
+sense of the propositions of pure logic (perhaps turning them into empirical, psychological propositions), and may tempt us to abandon previously
+
+168 Investigations into phenomenology and of knowledge
+experienced self-evidence and the unique significance of all that belongs to
+pure logic.
+It is not therefore enough that the Ideas of logic, and the pure laws set up
+with them, should be given in such a manner. Our great task is now to bring
+the Ideas of logic, the logical concepts and laws, to epistemological clarity and
+definiteness.
+Here phenomenological analysis must begin. Logical concepts, as valid
+thought-unities, must have their origin in intuition: they must arise out of
+an ideational intuition founded on certain experiences, and must admit
+of indefinite reconfirmation, and of recognition of their self-identity, on the
+reperformance of such abstraction. Otherwise put: we can absolutely not
+rest content with 'mere words', i.e. with a merely symbolic understanding of
+words',
+, such as we first have when we reflect on the sense of the laws for
+'concepts', 'judgements', 'truths' etc. (together with their manifold specifications) which are set up in pure logic. Meanings inspired only by remote,
+confused, inauthentic intuitions - if by any intuitions at all - are not enough:
+we must go back to the 'things themselves'. We desire to render self-evident
+in fully-fledged intuitions that what is here given in actually performed
+abstractions is what the word-meanings in our expression of the law really
+and truly stand for. In the practice of cognition we strive to arouse dispositions in ourselves which will keep our meanings unshakably the same, which
+will measure them sufficiently often against the mark set by reproducible
+intuitions or by an intuitive carrying out of our abstraction. Intuitive illustration of the shifting meanings which attach to the same term in differing
+propositional contexts likewise convinces us of the fact of equivocation: it
+becomes evident to us that what a word means in this or that case has its
+fulfilment in essentially different intuitive 'moments' or patterns, or in essentially different general notions. By distinguishing among concepts confounded
+by us, and by suitably modifying our terminology, we then likewise achieve
+a desired 'clearness and distinctness' for our logical propositions.
+The phenomenology of the logical experiences aims at giving us a suthciently wide descriptive (though not empirically-psychological) understanding of these mental states and their indwelling sense, as will enable us to
+give fixed meanings to all the fundamental concepts of logic. Such meanings
+will be clarified both by going back to the analytically explored connections
+between meaning-intentions and meaning-fulfilments, and also by making
+their possible function in cognition intelligible and certain. They will be such
+meanings, in short, as the interest of pure logic itself requires, as well as the
+interest, above all, of epistemological insight into the essence of this discipline. Fundamental logical and noetic concepts have, up to this time, been
+quite imperfectly clarified: countless equivocations beset them, some so pernicious, so hard to track down, and to keep consistently separate, that they
+yield the main ground for the very backward state of pure logic and theory
+of knowledge.
+
+169
+We must of course admit that many conceptual differentiations and circumscriptions of the sphere of pure logic can become evident to the natural
+attitude without phenomenological analysis. The relevant logical acts are
+carried out and adequately fitted to their fulfilling intuitions, though there is
+no reflection on the phenomenological situation itself. What is most completely evident can, however, be confused with something else, what it apprehends can be misconstrued, its assured directives can be rejected. Clarifying
+researches are especially needed to explain our by no means chance inclination to slip unwittingly from an objective to a psychological attitude, and to
+mix up two bodies of data distinguishable in principle however much they
+may be essentially related, and to be deceived by psychological misconstructions and misinterpretations of the objects of logic. Such clarifications can,
+by their nature, only be achieved within a phenomenological theory of the
+essences of our thought- and knowledge-experiences, with continuous regard
+to the things essentially meant by, and so belonging to the latter (in the precise manners in which those things are as such 'shown forth'.
+', 'represented'
+etc.). Psychologism can only be radically overcome by a pure phenomenology, a science infinitely removed from psychology as the empirical science
+of the mental attributes and states of animal realities. In our sphere, too, the
+sphere of pure logic, such a phenomenology alone offers us all the necessary
+conditions for a finally satisfactory establishment of the totality of basic
+distinctions and insights. It alone frees us from the strong temptation, at first
+inevitable, since rooted in grounds of essence, to turn the logically objective
+into the psychological.
+The above mentioned motives for phenomenological analysis have an
+obvious and essential connection with those which spring from basic questions
+of epistemology. For if these questions are taken in the widest generality, i.e.
+in the formal' generality which abstracts from all matter of knowledge - they
+form part of a range of questions involved in the full clarification of the
+Idea of pure logic. We have, on the one hand, the fact that all thought and
+knowledge have as their aim objects or states of affairs, which they putatively 'hit' in the sense that the 'being-in-itself' of these objects and states
+is supposedly shown forth, and made an identifiable item, in a multitude of
+actual or possible meanings, or acts of thought. We have, further, the fact
+that all thought is ensouled by a thought-form which is subject to ideal laws,
+laws circumscribing the objectivity or ideality of knowledge in general. These
+facts, I maintain, eternally provoke questions like: How are we to understand the fact that the intrinsic being of objectivity becomes 'presented',
+'apprehended' in knowledge, and so ends up by becoming subjective? What
+does it mean to say that the object has 'being-in-itself'
+', and is 'given' in
+knowledge? How can the ideality of the universal qua concept or law enter
+the flux of real mental states and become an epistemic possession of the
+thinking person? What does the adequatio rei et intellectus mean in various cases of knowledge, according as what we apprehend and know, is
+
+170 Investigations into phenomenology and of knowledge
+individual or universal, a fact or a law etc.? These and similar questions can,
+it is plain, not be separated from the above-mentioned questions regarding
+the clarification of pure logic, since the task of clarifying such logical Ideas
+as Concept and Object, Truth and Proposition, Fact and Law etc., inevitably leads on to these same questions. We should in any case have to tackle
+them so that the essence of the clarification aimed at in phenomenological
+analyses should not itself be left obscure.
+§3 The difficulties of pure phenomenological analysis
+The difficulties of clearing up the basic concepts of logic are a natural
+consequence of the extraordinary difficulties of strict phenomenological
+analysis. These are in the main the same whether our immanent analysis aims
+at the pure essence of experiences (all empirical facticity and individuation being excluded) or treats experiences from an empirical, psychological
+standpoint. Psychologists usually discuss such difficulties when they consider introspection as a source of our detailed psychological knowledge,
+not properly however, but in order to draw a false antithesis between introspection and 'outer'
+perception. The source of all such difficulties lies in the
+unnatural direction of intuition and thought which phenomenological analysis
+requires. Instead of becoming lost in the performance of acts built intricately on one another, and instead of (as it were) naïvely positing the existence of the objects intended in their sense and then going on to characterize
+them, or of assuming such objects hypothetically, of drawing conclusions
+from all this etc., we must rather practise reflection'
+, i.e. make these acts
+themselves, and their immanent meaning-content, our objects. When objects
+are intuited, thought of, theoretically pondered on, and thereby given to
+us as actualities in certain ontic modalities, we must direct our theoretical
+interest away from such objects, not posit them as realities as they appear
+or hold in the intentions of our acts. These acts, contrariwise, though
+hitherto not objective, must now be made objects of apprehension and of
+theoretical assertion. We must deal with them in new acts of intuition and
+thinking, we must analyse and describe them in their essence, we must
+make them objects of empirical or ideational thought. Here we have a
+direction of thought running counter to deeply ingrained habits which
+have been steadily strengthened since the dawn of mental development.
+Hence the well-nigh ineradicable tendency to slip out of a phenomenological
+thought-stance into one that is straightforwardly objective, or to substitute
+for mental acts, or for the 'appearances' or 'meanings' immanent in them,
+characters which, in a naive performance of such acts, were attributed to
+their objects. Hence, too, the tendency to treat whole classes of genuinely
+subsistent objects, e.g. Ideas - since these may be evidently given to us in
+ideating intuitions - as phenomenological constituents of presentations
+of them.
+
+171
+A much discussed difficulty - one which seems to threaten in principle
+all possıble immanent description of mental acts or indeed all phenomenological treatment of essences - lies in the fact that when we pass over from
+naïvely performed acts to an attitude of reflection, or when we perform
+acts proper to such reflection, our former acts necessarily undergo change.
+How can we rightly assess the nature and extent of such change? How
+indeed can we know anything whatever about it, whether as a fact or as a
+necessity of essence?
+In addition to this difficulty of reaching firm results, capable of being
+self-evidently reidentified on many occasions, we have the further difficulty
+of stating such results, of communicating them to others. Completely selfevident truths of essence, established by the most exact analysis, must be
+expounded by way of expressions whose rich variety does not compensate
+tor the tact that they only fit tamilar natural objects, while the experiences
+in which such objects become constituted for consciousness, can be directly
+referred to only by way of a few highly ambiguous words such as 'sensation',
+"perception', 'presentation' etc. One has, further, to employ expressions which
+stand for what is intentional in such acts, for the object to which they are
+directed, since it is, in fact, impossible to describe referential acts without
+using expressions which recur to the things to which such acts refer. One
+then readily forgets that such subsidiarily described objectivity, which is
+necessarily introduced into almost all phenomenological description, has
+undergone a change of sense, in virtue of which it now belongs to the sphere
+of phenomenology.
+If we ignore such difficulties, others emerge concerned with the persuasive
+communication of our resultant insights to others. These insights can be
+tested and confirmed only by persons well-trained in the ability to engage in
+pure description in the unnatural attitude of reflection, trained in short to
+allow phenomenological relations to work upon them in full purity. Such
+purity means that we must keep out the falsifying intrusion of all assertions
+based on the naive acceptance and assessment of objects, whose existence
+has been posited in the acts now receiving phenomenological treatment. It
+likewise prohibits any other going beyond whatever is essential and proper
+to such acts, any application to them of naturalistic interpretations and
+assertions. It forbids us, i.e., to set them up as psychological realities (even
+in an indefinitely general or exemplary fashion), as the states of 'mindendowed beings' of any sort whatsoever. The capacity for such researches is
+not readily come by, nor can it be achieved or replaced by, e.g., the most
+elaborate of trainings in experimental psychology.
+Serious as are the difficulties standing in the way of a pure phenomenology in general, and of the phenomenology of the logical experiences in
+particular, they are by no means such as to make the whole attempt to
+overcome them appear hopeless. Resolute cooperation among a generation
+of research-workers, conscious of their goal and dedicated to the main issue,
+
+172 Investigations into phenomenology and of knowledge
+would, I think, suffice to decide the most important questions in the field,
+those concerned with its basic constitution. Here we have a field of attainable discoveries, fundamentally involved in the possibility of a scientific
+philosophy. Such discoveries have indeed nothing dazzling about them: they
+lack any obviously useful relation to practice or to the fulfilment of higher
+emotional needs. They also lack any imposing apparatus of experimental
+methodology, through which experimental psychology has gained so much
+credit and has built up such a rich force of cooperative workers.
+§4 It is essential to keep in mind the grammatical
+side of our logical experiences
+Analytic phenomenology, needed by the logician in his preparatory laying
+of foundations, is concerned, among other things, with 'presentations' and
+with them primarily; it is, more precisely, concerned with those presentations to which expression has been given. In the complex objects of its study,
+its primary interest attaches to the experiences lying behind 'mere expressions'
+', experiences which perform roles either of meaning-intention or of
+meaning-fulfilment. It cannot, however, quite ignore the sensuous-linguistic
+side of its complex objects (the element of 'mere expression' in them) nor the
+way in which this element is associated with the meaning that 'ensouls' it.
+Everyone knows how readily and how unnoticeably an analysis of meaning can be led astray by grammatical analysis. Since the direct analysis of
+meaning is, however, difficult, we may welcome each aid, however imperfect, that indirectly anticipates its results, but grammatical analysis is even
+more important in virtue of the errors its use promotes when it replaces a
+true analysis of meaning, than for any positive aid. Rough reflection on our
+thoughts and their verbal expression, conducted by us without special schooling, and often needed for the practical ends of thinking, suffice to indicate a
+certain parallelism between thinking and speaking. We all know that words
+mean something, and that, generally speaking, different words express different meanings. If we could regard such a correspondence as perfect, and
+as given a priori, and as one particularly in which the essential categories of
+meaning had perfect mirror-images in the categories of grammar, a phenomenology of linguistic forms would include a phenomenology of the meaningexperiences (experiences of thinking, judging etc.) and meaning-analysis
+would, so to speak, coincide with grammatical analysis.
+Deep reflection is not, however, needed to show that a parallelism satisfying such far-reaching demands has as little foundation in grounds of
+essence as it obtains in fact. Grammatically relevant distinctions of meaning
+are at times essential, at times contingent, according as the practical aims of
+speech dictate peculiar forms for essential or contingent differences of meaning. (The latter are merely such as have a frequent occurrence in human
+intercourse.)
+
+173
+It is well-known, however, that differentiation of expressions does not
+merely depend on differences of meaning. I need point only to 'shades' of
+meaning, or to aesthetic tendencies which fight against any bare uniformity
+of expression, or against discord in speech-sound or rhythm, and so demand
+an abundant store of available synonyms.
+The rough concomitances among verbal and thought-differences, and
+particularly among forms of words and thoughts, makes us naturally tend
+to seek logical distinctions behind expressed grammatical distinctions. It
+is, therefore, an important matter for logic that the relation between expression and meaning should be made analytically clear. We should perceive clearly
+that, in order to decide whether a distinction should, in a given case, count
+as logical or merely grammatical, we must go back from vague acts of meaning to the correspondingly clear, articulate ones, acts saturated with the
+fulness of exemplary intuition in which their meaning is fulfilled.
+It is not enough to have the common knowledge, easily garnered from
+suitable examples, that grammatical differences need not coincide with logical ones. The common knowledge that such distinctions do not always go
+hand in hand - that languages, in other words, express material differences
+of meaning, widely used in communication, in forms as pervasive as the
+fundamental logical differences having their a priori roots in the general
+essence of meanings - such common knowledge may open the way to a
+dangerous radicalism. The field of logical forms may be unduly restricted. A
+wide range of logically significant forms may be cast forth as merely grammatical: only a few may be kept, such as suffice to leave some content to
+traditional syllogizing. Brentano's attempted reform of formal logic, valuable
+as it no doubt still is, plainly suffered from this exaggeration. Only a complete clearing-up of the essential phenomenological relations between expression and meaning, or between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment,
+can give us a firm middle stance, and can enable us to give the requisite
+clearness to the relations between grammatical and meaning-analysis.
+§5 Statement of the main aims of the following
+analytical investigations
+We accordingly pass to a series of analytic investigations which will clear
+up the constitutive Ideas of a pure or formal logic, investigations which
+relate in the first place to the pure theory of logical forms. Starting with the
+empirical connection between meaning-experiences and expressions, we
+must try to find out what our variously ambiguous talk about 'expressing'
+or 'meaning' really amounts to. We must try to see what essential phenomenological or logical distinctions apply a priori to expressions, and how we may
+in essence describe, and may place in pure categories, the experiences - to
+deal first with the phenomenological side of expressions - that have an a
+priori fitness for the meaning-function. We must find out how the 'presenting'
+
+174 Investigations into phenomenology and of knowledge
+and "judging' achieved in such experiences stand to their corresponding
+"intuition', how they are 'illustrated', or perhaps 'confirmed' or 'fulfilled', in
+the latter, or rendered 'evident' by it etc. It is not hard to see that investigations of such matters must precede all clarifications of the basic concepts
+and categories of logic. Among our introductory investigations we shall
+have to raise fundamental questions as to the acts, or, alternatively, the
+ideal meanings, which in logic pass under the name of "presentations'
+(Vorstellungen). It is important to clarify and prise apart the many concepts
+that the word 'presentation' has covered, concepts in which the psychological,
+the epistemological and the logical are utterly confused. Similar analyses deal
+with the concept of judgement in the sense in which logic is concerned with
+it. So-called "judgement-theory' neglects this task: it is in the main, in respect
+of its essential problems, a theory of presentation. We are naturally not
+interested in a psychological theory, but in a phenomenology of presentationand judgement-experiences as delimited by our epistemological interests.
+As we probe the essence of the expressive experiences, we must also dig
+more deeply into their intentional subject-matter, their objective intention's
+ideal sense, i.e. into the unity of its meaning and the unity of its object. We
+must, above all, dwell upon the enigmatic double sense or manner, the twosided context, in which the same experience has a 'content'
+, and the manner
+in which in addition to its real (reell) and proper content, an ideal, intentional content must and can dwell in it.
+Here also belong questions relating to the 'object-directedness' or 'objectlessness' of logical acts, to the sense of the distinction between intentional
+and true objects, to the clarification of the Idea of truth in relation to the
+Idea of judgemental self-evidence, to the clarification of the remaining, closely
+connected logical and noetic categories. These investigations in part cover
+the same ground as those dealing with the constitution of logical forms, to
+the extent, of course, that we settle questions as to the acceptance or rejection
+of putative logical forms, or doubts as to their logical or merely grammatical
+distinctness from forms already recognized, in the course of our clarification
+of form-giving, categorial concepts.
+We have thus vaguely indicated the range of problems to which the ensuing investigations will be oriented. These investigations make no claim to be
+exhaustive. Their aim is not to provide a logical system, but to do the initial
+spadework for a philosophical logic which will derive clearness from basic
+phenomenological sources. The paths taken by such an analytic investigation
+will also naturally differ from those suitable to a final, systematic, logically
+ordered statement of established truth.
+§6 Additional Notes
+Note 1 Our investigations will often inevitably take us beyond the narrow
+phenomenological sphere whose study is really required for giving direct
+
+175
+evidence to the Ideas of logic. This sphere is itself not given to us initially,
+but becomes delimited in the course of our investigation. We are, in particular, forced beyond this sphere of research when we prise apart the many
+confused concepts obscurely confounded in our understanding of logical
+terms, and when we find which of them are truly logical.
+Note 2 The phenomenological founding of logic involves the difficulty that
+we must, in our exposition, make use of all the concepts we are trying to
+clarify. This coincides with a certain wholly irremovable defect which affects
+the systematic course of our basic phenomenological and epistemological
+investigations. If a type of thought requires prior clarification, we should
+not make uncritical use of its terms or concepts in that clarification itself.
+But one should not expect that one should only be required to analyse such
+concepts critically, when the actual interconnection of one's logical materials has led up to them. Or, put differently, systematic clarification, whether
+in pure logic or any other discipline, would in itself seem to require a stepwise
+following out of the ordering of things, of the systematic interconnection in
+the science to be clarified. Our investigation can, however, only proceed
+securely, if it repeatedly breaks with such systematic sequence, if it removes
+conceptual obscurities which threaten the course of investigation before the
+natural sequence of subject-matters can lead up to such concepts. We search,
+as it were, in zig-zag fashion, a metaphor all the more apt since the close
+interdependence of our various epistemological concepts leads us back again
+and again to our original analyses, where the new confirms the old, and the
+old the new.
+Note 3 If our sense of phenomenology has been grasped, and if it has not
+been
+given the current interpretation of an ordinary 'descriptive psychology, a part of natural science, then an objection, otherwise justifiable, will
+fall to the ground, an objection to the effect that all theory of knowledge,
+conceived as a systematic phenomenological clarification of knowledge,
+is built upon psychology. On this interpretation pure logic, treated by us
+as an epistemologically clarified, philosophical discipline, must in the end
+likewise rest upon psychology, if only upon its preliminary descriptive researches into intentional experiences. Why then so much heated resistance
+to psychologism?
+We naturally reply that if psychology is given its old meaning, phenomenology is not descriptive psychology: its peculiar 'pure' description, its
+contemplation of pure essences on a basis of exemplary individual intuitions
+of experiences (often freely imagined ones), and its descriptive fixation of
+the contemplated essences into pure concepts, is no empirical, scientific description. It rather excludes the natural performance of all empirical (naturalistic) apperceptions and positings. Statements of descriptive psychology
+regarding 'perceptions', "judgements', 'feelings', 'volitions' etc., use such names
+
+176 Investigations into phenomenology and of knowledge
+to refer to the real states of animal organisms in a real natural order, just as
+descriptive statements concerning physical states deal with happenings in a
+nature not imagined but real. All general statements have here a character
+of empirical generality: they hold for this nature. Phenomenology, however,
+does not discuss states of animal organisms (not even as belonging to a
+possible nature as such), but perceptions, judgements, feelings as such, and
+what pertains to them a priori with unlimited generality, as pure instances of
+pure species, of what may be seen through a purely intuitive apprehension
+of essence, whether generic or specific. Pure arithmetic likewise speaks of
+numbers, and pure geometry of spatial shapes, employing pure intuitions in
+their ideational universality. Not psychology, therefore, but phenomenology,
+underlies all clarifications in pure logic (and in all forms of rational criticism). Phenomenology has, however, a very different function as the necessary
+basis for every psychology that could with justification and in strictness be
+called scientific, just as pure mathematics, e.g. pure geometry and dynamics,
+is the necessary foundation for all exact natural science (any theory of empirical things in nature with their empirical forms, movements etc.). Our
+essential insights into perceptions, volitions and other forms of experience
+will naturally hold also of the corresponding empirical states of animal
+organisms, as geometrical insights hold of spatial figures in nature.
+Translator's Additional Note 4 The above Note 3 is a typical account of
+what Husserl had come to mean by 'phenomenology' by the time that the
+Second Edition of the Logical Investigations was published in 1913. It replaces the following Note, which indicates what he meant by the term when
+the First Edition was published in 1901:
+Phenomenology is descriptive psychology. Epistemological criticism is
+therefore in essence psychology, or at least only capable of being built
+on a psychological basis. Pure logic therefore also rests on psychology -
+what then is the point of the whole battle against psychologism!
+The necessity of this sort of psychological foundation of pure logic,
+i.e. a strictly descriptive one, cannot lead us into error regarding the
+mutual independence of the two sciences, logic and psychology. For
+pure description is merely a preparatory step towards theory, not theory
+itself. One and the same sphere of pure description can accordingly
+serve to prepare for very different theoretical sciences. It is not the full
+science of psychology that serves as a foundation for pure logic, but
+certain classes of descriptions which are the step preparatory to the
+theoretical researches of psychology. These in so far as they describe the
+empirical objects whose genetic connections the science wishes to pursue, also form the substrate for those fundamental abstractions in which
+logic seizes the essence of its ideal objects and connections with inward
+evidence. Since it is epistemologically of unique importance that we
+
+177
+should separate the purely descriptive examination of the knowledgeexperience, disembarrassed of all theoretical psychological interests, from
+the truly psychological researches directed to empirical explanation and
+origins, it will be good if we rather speak of 'phenomenology' than of
+descriptive psychology. It also recommends itself for the further reason
+that the expression 'descriptive psychology'
+, as it occurs in the talk of
+many scientists, means the sphere of scientific psychological investigation, which is marked off by a methodological preference for inner
+experience and by an abstraction from all psychophysical explanation.
+§7 'Freedom from presuppositions' as a principle in
+epistemological investigations
+An epistemological investigation that can seriously claim to be scientific
+must, it has often been emphasized, satisfy the principle of freedom from
+presuppositions. This principle, we think, only seeks to express the strict
+exclusion of all statements not permitting of a comprehensive phenomenological realization. Every epistemological investigation that we carry out
+must have its pure foundation in phenomenology. The 'theory' that it aspires
+to, is no more than a thinking over, a coming to an evident understanding
+of, thinking and knowing as such, in their pure generic essence, of the specifications and forms that they essentially have, of the immanent structures
+that their objective relations involve, of the meaning of 'validity, 'justification', "mediate' and 'immediate evidence', and their opposites, as applied to
+such structures, of the parallel specifications of such Ideas in relation to
+varying regions of possible objects of knowledge, of the clarified sense and
+role of the formal and material 'laws of thought' seen in their a priori
+structural connections with the knowing consciousness etc. If such a 'thinking over' of the meaning of knowledge is itself to yield, not mere opinion,
+but the evident knowledge it strictly demands, it must be a pure intuition of
+essences, exemplarily performed on an actual given basis of experiences of
+thinking and knowing. That acts of thought at times refer to transcendent,
+even to non-existent and impossible objects, is not to the case. For such
+direction to objects, such presentation and meaning of what is not really
+(reell) part of the phenomenological make-up of our experiences, is a descriptive feature of the experiences in question, whose sense it should be
+possible to fix and clarify by considering the experiences themselves. In no
+other way would it be possible.
+We must keep apart from the pure theory of knowledge questions concerning the justifiability of accepting 'mental' and 'physical' realities which
+transcend consciousness, questions whether the statements of scientists regarding them are to be given a serious or unserious sense, questions whether
+it is justifiable or sensible to oppose a second, even more emphatically transcendent' world, to the phenomenal nature with which science is correlated,
+
+178 Investigations into phenomenology and of knowledge
+and other similar questions. The question as to the existence and nature of
+'the external world' is a metaphysical question. The theory of knowledge, in
+generally clearing up the ideal essence and valid sense of cognitive thought,
+will of course deal with general questions regarding the possibility and manner of a knowledge or rational surmise about 'real' objective things, things
+in principle transcending the experiences which know them, and regarding
+the norms which the true sense of such a knowledge requires: it will not
+enter upon the empirically oriented question as to whether we as men really
+can arrive at such knowledge from the data we actually have, nor will it
+attempt to realize such knowledge. On our view, theory of knowledge, properly described, is no theory. It is not science in the pointed sense of an
+explanatorily unified theoretical whole. Theoretical explanation means an
+ever increased rendering intelligible of singular facts through general laws,
+and an ever increased rendering intelligible of general laws through some
+fundamental law. In the realm of facts, our task is to know that what happens under given groups of circumstances, happens necessarily, i.e. according to natural laws. In the realm of the a priori our task is to understand the
+necessity of specific, lower-level relationships in terms of comprehensive
+general necessities, and ultimately in terms of those most primitive, universal
+relational laws that we call axioms. The theory of knowledge has nothing
+to explain in this theoretical sense, it neither constructs deductive theories
+nor falls under any. This is clear enough if we consider the most general, the
+so-to-say formal theory of knowledge that came before us in our Prolegomena
+as the philosophical completion of pure mathematics conceived in absolute
+width as including all a priori, categorial knowledge in the form of systematic theories. This theory of theories goes together with, and is illuminated
+by, a formal theory of knowledge which precedes all empirical theory,
+which precedes, therefore, all empirical knowledge of the real, all physical
+science on the one hand, and all psychology on the other, and of course all
+metaphysics. Its aim is not to explain knowledge in the psychological or
+psychophysical sense as a factual occurrence in objective nature, but to shed
+light on the Idea of knowledge in its constitutive elements and laws. It does
+not try to follow up the real connections of coexistence and succession with
+which actual acts of knowledge are interwoven, but to understand the ideal
+sense of the specific connections in which the objectivity of knowledge may
+be documented. It endeavours to raise to clearness the pure forms and laws
+of knowledge by tracing knowledge back to an adequate fulfilment in intuition. This 'clearing up' takes place in the framework of a phenomenology of
+knowledge, a phenomenology oriented, as we saw, to the essential structures
+of pure experiences and to the structures of sense (Sinnbestände) that belong
+to these. From the beginning, as at all later stages, its scientific statements
+involve not the slightest reference to real existence: no metaphysical, scientific and, above all, no psychological assertions can therefore occur among
+its premisses.
+
+179
+A purely phenomenological 'theory' of knowledge naturally has an application to all naturally developed, and (in a good sense) 'naïve' sciences, which
+it transforms into 'philosophical' sciences. It transforms them, in other words,
+into sciences which provide us with clarified, assured knowledge in every
+sense in which it is possible to desire the latter. As regards the sciences of
+"reality'
+, such epistemological clarification can as much be regarded as a
+'scientific' as a 'metaphysical' evaluation.
+The investigations which follow aspire solely to such freedom from metaphysical, scientific and psychological presuppositions. No harm will of course
+be done by occasional side-references which remain without effect on the
+content and character of one's analyses, nor by the many expository devices
+addressed to one's public, whose existence (like one's own) is not therefore
+presupposed by the content of one's investigations. Nor does one exceed
+one's prescribed limits if one starts, e.g., from existent languages and discusses the merely communicative meaning of their many forms of expression, and so on. It is easily seen that the sense and the epistemological worth
+of the following analyses does not depend on the fact that there really are
+languages, and that men really make use of them in their mutual dealings,
+or that there really are such things as men and a nature, and that they do
+not merely exist in imagined, possible fashion.
+The real premisses of our putative results must lie in propositions satisfying the requirement that what they assert permits of an adequate phenomenological justification, a fulfilment through evidence in the strictest sense.
+Such propositions must not, further, ever be adduced in some other sense
+than that in which they have been intuitively established.
+
+Investigation I
+Expression and meaning
+
+Chapter I
+§I An ambiguity in the term 'sign'
+The terms 'expression' and 'sign' are often treated as synonyms, but it will
+not be amiss to point out that they do not always coincide in application
+in common usage. Every sign is a sign for something, but not every sign
+has 'meaning', a 'sense' that the sign 'expresses". In many cases it is not
+even true that a sign 'stands for' that of which we may say it is a sign. And
+even where this can be said, one has to observe that 'standing for' will
+not count as the 'meaning' which characterizes the expression. For signs
+in the sense of indications (notes, marks etc.) do not express anything,
+unless they happen to fulfil a significant as well as an indicative function.
+If, as one unwillingly does, one limits oneself to expressions employed in
+living discourse, the notion of an indication seems to apply more widely
+than that of an expression, but this does not mean that its content is the
+genus of which an expression is the species. To mean is not a particular
+way of being a sign in the sense of indicating something. It has a narrower
+application only because meaning - in communicative speech - is always
+bound up with such an indicative relation, and this in its turn leads to a
+wider concept, since meaning is also capable of occurring without such a
+connection. Expressions function meaningfully even in isolated mental life,
+where they no longer serve to indicate anything. The two notions of sign do
+not therefore really stand in the relation of more extensive genus to narrower species.
+The whole matter requires more thorough discussion.
+§2 The essence of indication
+Of the two concepts connected with the word 'sign', we shall first deal with
+that of an indication. The relation that here obtains we shall call the indicative relation. In this sense a brand is the sign of a slave, a flag the sign of a
+nation. Here all marks belong, as characteristic qualities suited to help us in
+recognizing the objects to which they attach.
+
+184 Expression and meaning
+But the concept of an indication extends more widely than that of a mark.
+We say the Martian canals are signs of the existence of intelligent beings on
+Mars, that fossil vertebrae are signs of the existence of prediluvian animals
+etc. Signs to aid memory, such as the much-used knot in a handkerchief
+memorials etc., also have their place here. If suitable things, events or their
+properties are deliberately produced to serve as such indications, one calls
+them 'signs' whether they exercise this function or not. Only in the case
+of indications deliberately and artificially brought about, does one speak of
+standing for, and that both in respect of the action which produces the
+marking (the branding or chalking etc.), and in the sense of the indication
+itself, i.e. taken in its relation to the object it stands for or that it is to signify.
+These distinctions and others like them do not deprive the concept of
+indication of its essential unity. A thing is only properly an indication if and
+where it in fact serves to indicate something to some thinking being. If we
+wish to seize the pervasively common element here present we must refer
+back to such cases of 'live' functioning. In these we discover as a common
+circumstance the fact that certain objects or states of affairs of whose reality
+someone has actual knowledge indicate to him the reality of certain other
+objects or states of affairs, in the sense that his belief in the reality of the one
+is experienced (though not at all evidently) as motivating a belief or surmise
+in the reality of the other. This relation of 'motivation' represents a descriptive unity among our acts of judgement in which indicating and indicated
+states of affairs become constituted for the thinker. This descriptive unity is
+not to be conceived as a mere form-quality founded upon our acts of judgement, for it is in their unity that the essence of indication lies. More lucidly
+put: the 'motivational' unity of our acts of judgement has itself the character
+of a unity of judgement; before it as a whole an objective correlate, a unitary
+state of affairs, parades itself, is meant in such a judgement, appears to be in
+and for that judgement. Plainly such a state of affairs amounts to just this:
+that certain things may or must exist, since other things have been given.
+This 'since', taken as expressing an objective connection, is the objective
+correlate of 'motivation' taken as a descriptively peculiar way of combining
+acts of judgement into a single act of judgement.
+§3 Two senses of 'demonstration' ('indication'
+and 'proof')
+We have sketched the phenomenological situation so generally that what we
+have said applies as much to the 'demonstration' of genuine inference and
+proof, as to the 'demonstration' of indication. These two notions should,
+however, be kept apart. Their distinctness has already been suggested by
+our stress on the lack of insight in indications. In cases where the existence
+of one state of affairs is evidently inferred from that of another, we do not
+in fact speak of the latter as an indication or sign of the former, and,
+
+Essential distinctions 185
+conversely, we only speak of demonstration in the strict logical sense in the
+case of an inference which is or could be informed by insight. Much, no
+doubt, that is propounded as demonstrative or, in the simplest case, as
+syllogistically cogent, is devoid of insight and may even be false. But to
+propound it is at least to make the claim that a relation of consequence
+could be seen to hold. This is bound up with the fact that there is an
+objective syllogism or proof, or an objective relationship between ground
+and consequent, which corresponds to our subjective acts of inferring and
+proving. These ideal unities are not the experiences of judging in question,
+but their ideal 'contents', the propositions they involve. The premisses prove
+the conclusion no matter who may affirm the premisses and the conclusion,
+or the unity that both form. An ideal rule is here revealed which extends
+its sway beyond the judgements here and now united by 'motivation'; in
+supraempirical generality it comprehends as such all judgements having a
+like content, all judgements, even, having a like form. Such regularity makes
+itself subjectively known to us when we conduct proofs with insight, while
+the precise rule is made known to us through ideative reflection on the
+contents of the judgements experienced together in the actual context of
+"motivation', in the actual inference and proof. These contents are the propositions involved.
+In the case of an indication there is no question of all this. Here insight and
+(to put the matter objectively) knowledge regarding the ideal connections
+among the contents of the judgements concerned, is quite excluded. When one
+says that the state of affairs A indicates the state of affairs B, that the existence
+of the one points to that of the other, one may confidently be expecting to
+find B true, but one's mode of speech implies no objectively necessary connections between A and B, nothing into which one could have insight. The
+contents of one's judgements are not here related as premisses are to a conclusion. At times no doubt we do speak of 'indications' even in cases where
+there is an objective relation of entailment (a mediate one, in fact). A mathematician may make use (so he says) of the fact that an algebraic equation
+is of uneven order as a sign that it has at least one real root. To be more
+exact, we are here only concerned with the possibility that someone who
+fails to carry out and see the cogency of the relevant thought-chain, may
+make use of a statement about an equation's uneven order as an immediate,
+blind motive for asserting the equation to have some necessarily connected
+property which he needs for his mathematical purposes. In such situations,
+where certain states of affairs readily serve to indicate others which are, in
+themselves, their consequences, they do not function in thought as logical
+grounds of the latter, but work through connections which previous actual
+demonstration, or blind learning on authority, has established among our convictions, whether as actual mental states or as dispositions for such. Nothing
+is of course altered in all this by the possible presence of an accompanying
+merely habitual knowledge of an objectively present rational connection.
+
+186 Expression and meaning
+If an indication (or the connection of 'motivation' in which such a soidisant objective relation makes its appearance) is without essential relation
+to a necessary connection, the question arises whether it may not claim to be
+essentially related to a connection of probability. Where one thing indicates
+another, where belief in the one's existence furnishes one with an empirical
+motive or ground - not necessary but contingent - for belief in the existence
+of the other, must the motivating belief not furnish a ground of probability
+for the belief it motivates? This is not the place for a close discussion of this
+pressing question. We need only observe that the question may correctly
+be answered in the affirmative in so far as such empirical 'motivations' all
+fall under an ideal jurisdiction in virtue of which they may be spoken of
+as "justified' or 'unjustified', or, objectively expressed, in which they may be
+spoken of as real, i.e. valid, motivations which lead to a probability or perhaps to an empirical certainty, or per contra, as merely apparent, i.e. invalid,
+motivations, which do not lead to such a probability. One may, e.g., cite the
+controversy as to whether volcanic phenomena do or do not indicate that
+the earth's interior is molten, and so on. One thing is sure, that to talk
+of an indication is not to presuppose a definite relation to considerations of
+probability. Usually such talk relates not to mere surmises but to assured
+judgements. The ideal jurisdiction to which we have here accorded authority
+must first demand, therefore, that we should scale down our confident judgements to modest surmises.
+I shall here observe, further, that we cannot avoid talking about 'motivation' in a general sense which covers strict demonstration as much as empirical indication. Here in fact we have a quite undeniable phenomenological
+affinity, obvious enough to register itself in ordinary discourse. We commonly speak of reasoning and inference, not merely in the sense of logic,
+but in a sense connected with empirical indications. This affinity plainly
+extends more widely: it covers the field of emotional, and, in particular, of
+volitional phenomena, to which talk of 'motives
+was at first alone confined.
+Here too because' has a part to play, covering as wide a linguistic territory
+as does the most general sense of 'motivation'
+'. I cannot therefore approve
+of Meinong's censure of Brentano's terminology, which I have here adopted.'
+But I entirely agree with him that in perceiving something as 'motivated' we
+are not at all perceiving it as caused.
+§4 Digression on the origin of indication in association
+The mental facts in which the notion of indication has its 'origin', i.e. in
+which it can be abstractively apprehended, belong to the wider group of
+facts which fall under the historical rubric of the 'association of ideas.
+Under this rubric we do not merely have those facts which concern the
+'accompaniment' and 'reactivation' of ideas stated in the laws of association,
+but the further facts in which association operates creatively, and produces
+
+Essential distinctions 187
+peculiar descriptive characters and forms of unity? Association does not
+merely restore contents to consciousness, and then leave it to them to
+combine with the contents there present, as the essence or generic nature
+of either may necessarily prescribe. It cannot indeed disturb such unified
+patterns as depend solely on our mental contents, e.g. the unity of visual
+contents in the visual field. But it can create additional phenomenological
+characters and unities which do not have their necessary, law-determined
+ground in the experienced contents themselves, nor in the generic forms
+of their abstract aspects. If A summons B into consciousness, we are not
+merely simultaneously or successively conscious of both A and B, but we
+usually feel their connection forcing itself upon us, a connection in which
+the one points to the other and seems to belong to it. To turn mere coexistence into mutual pertinence, or, more precisely, to build cases of the former
+into intentional unities of things which seem mutually pertinent, is the constant result of associative functioning. All unity of experience, all empirical
+unity, whether of a thing, an event or of the order and relation of things,
+becomes a phenomenal unity through the felt mutual belongingness of the
+sides and parts that can be made to stand out as units in the apparent object
+before us. That one thing points to another, in definite arrangement and
+connection, is itself apparent to us. The single item itself, in these various
+forward and backward references, is no mere experienced content, but an
+apparent object (or part, property etc., of the same) that appears only in so
+far as experience (Erfahrung) endows contents with a new phenomenological
+character, so that they no longer count separately, but help to present an
+object different from themselves. In this field of facts the fact of indication
+also has its place, in virtue whereof an object or state of affairs not merely
+recalls another, and so points to it, but also provides evidence for the latter,
+fosters the presumption that it likewise exists, and makes us immediately
+feel this in the manner described above.
+§5 Expressions as meaningful signs. Setting aside of a
+sense of 'expression' not relevant for our purpose
+From indicative signs we distinguish meaningful signs, i.e. expressions. We
+thereby employ the term 'expression' restrictively: we exclude much that
+ordinary speech would call an 'expression' from its range of application.
+There are other cases in which we have thus to do violence to usage, where
+concepts for which only ambiguous terms exist call for a fixed terminology.
+We shall lay down, for provisional intelligibility, that each instance or part
+of speech, as also each sign that is essentially of the same sort, shall count as
+an expression, whether or not such speech is actually uttered, or addressed
+with communicative intent to any persons or not. Such a definition excludes
+facial expression and the various gestures which involuntarily accompany
+speech without communicative intent, or those in which a man's mental
+
+188 Expression and meaning
+states achieve understandable 'expression' for his environment, without the
+added help of speech. Such 'utterances' are not expressions in
+the sense in
+which a case of speech is an expression, they are not phenomenally one with
+the experiences made manifest in them in the consciousness of the man who
+manifests them, as is the case with speech. In such manifestations one man
+communicates nothing to another: their utterance involves no intent to put
+certain 'thoughts' on record expressively, whether for the man himself, in
+his solitary state, or for others. Such 'expressions'.
+, in short, have properly
+speaking, no meaning. It is not to the point that another person may interpret our involuntary manifestations, e.g. our 'expressive movements', and that
+he may thereby become deeply acquainted with our inner thoughts and
+emotions. They 'mean' something to him in so far as he interprets them, but
+even for him they are without meaning in the special sense in which verbal
+signs have meaning: they only mean in the sense of indicating.
+In the treatment which follows these distinctions must be raised to complete conceptual clarity.
+§6 Questions as to the phenomenological and
+intentional distinctions which pertain to expressions
+as such
+It is usual to distinguish two things in regard to every expression:
+1. The expression physically regarded (the sensible sign, the articulate
+sound-complex, the written sign on paper etc.);
+2. A certain sequence of mental states, associatively linked with the expression, which make it be the expression of something. These mental states
+are generally called the 'sense' or the 'meaning' of the expression, this being
+taken to be in accord with what these words ordinarily mean. But we shall
+see this notion to be mistaken, and that a mere distinction between physical
+signs and sense-giving experiences is by no means enough, and not at all
+enough for logical purposes.
+The points here made have long been observed in the special case of
+names. We distinguish, in the case of each name, between what it 'shows
+forth' (i.e. mental states) and what it means. And again between what it
+means (the sense or 'content' of its naming presentation) and what it names
+(the object of that presentation). We shall need similar distinctions in the
+case of all expression, and shall have to explore their nature precisely. Such
+distinctions have led to our distinction between the notions of 'expression'
+and 'indication', which is not in conflict with the fact that an expression in
+living speech also functions as an indication, a point soon to come up for
+discussion. To these distinctions other important ones will be added which
+will concern the relations between meaning and the intuition which illustrates meaning and on occasion renders it evident. Only by paying heed to
+these relations, can the concept of meaning be clearly delimited, and can the
+
+189
+fundamental opposition between the symbolic and the epistemological function of meanings be worked out.
+§7 Expressions as they function in communication
+Expressions were originally framed to fulfil a communicative function: let
+us, accordingly, first study expressions in this function, so that we may be
+able to work out their essential logical distinctions. The articulate soundcomplex, the written sign etc., first becomes a spoken word or communicative
+bit of speech, when a speaker produces it with the intention of 'expressing
+himself about something' through its means; he must endow it with a sense
+in certain acts of mind, a sense he desires to share with his auditors. Such
+sharing becomes a possibility if the auditor also understands the speaker's
+intention. He does this inasmuch as he takes the speaker to be a person, who
+is not merely uttering sounds but speaking to him, who is accompanying
+those sounds with certain sense-giving acts, which the sounds reveal to the
+hearer, or whose sense they seek to communicate to him. What first makes
+mental commerce possible, and turns connected speech into discourse, lies
+in the correlation among the corresponding physical and mental experiences
+of communicating persons which is effected by the physical side of speech.
+Speaking and hearing, intimation of mental states through speaking and
+reception thereof in hearing, are mutually correlated
+If one surveys these interconnections, one sees at once that all expressions
+in communicative speech function as indications. They serve the hearer as
+signs of the 'thoughts' of the speaker, i.e. of his sense-giving inner experiences, as well as of the other inner experiences which are part of his communicative intention. This function of verbal expressions we shall call their
+intimating function. The content of such intimation consists in the inner
+experiences intimated. The sense of the predicate 'intimated' can be understood more narrowly or more widely. The narrower sense we may restrict to
+acts which impart sense, while the wider sense will cover all acts that a hearer
+may introject into a speaker on the basis of what he says (possibly because
+he tells us of such acts). If, e.g., we state a wish, our judgement concerning
+that wish is what we intimate in the narrower sense of the word, whereas the
+wish itself is intimated in the wider sense. The same holds of an ordinary
+statement of perception, which the hearer forthwith takes to belong to some
+actual perception. The act of perception is there intimated in the wider
+sense, the judgement built upon it in the narrower sense. We at once see that
+ordinary speech permits us to call an experience which is intimated an experience which is expressed.
+To understand an intimation is not to have conceptual knowledge of it,
+not to judge in the sense of asserting anything about it: it consists simply
+in the fact that the hearer intuitively takes the speaker to be a person who
+is expressing this or that, or as we certainly can say, perceives him as such.
+
+190 Expression and meaning
+When I listen to someone, I perceive him as a speaker, I hear him recounting, demonstrating, doubting, wishing etc. The hearer perceives the intimation in the same sense in which he perceives the intimating person - even
+though the mental phenomena which make him a person cannot fall, for
+what they are, in the intuitive grasp of another. Common speech credits us
+with percepts even of other people's inner experiences; we "see' their anger,
+their pain etc. Such talk is quite correct, as long as, e.g., we allow outward
+bodily things likewise to count as perceived, and as long as, in general, the
+notion of perception is not restricted to the adequate, the strictly intuitive
+percept. If the essential mark of perception lies in the intuitive persuasion
+that a thing or event is itself before us for our grasping - such a persuasion
+is possible, and in the main mass of cases actual, without verbalized, conceptual apprehension - then the receipt of such an intimation is the mere
+perceiving of it. The essential distinction just touched on is of course present
+here. The hearer perceives the speaker as manifesting certain inner experiences, and to that extent he also perceives these experiences themselves:
+he does not, however, himself experience them, he has not an 'inner' but an
+'outer' percept of them. Here we have the big difference between the real
+grasp of what is in adequate intuition, and the putative grasp of what is on
+a basis of inadequate, though intuitive, presentation. In the former case we
+have to do with an experienced, in the latter case with a presumed being, to
+which no truth corresponds at all. Mutual understanding demands a certain
+correlation among the mental acts mutually unfolded in intimation and in
+the receipt of such intimation, but not at all their exact resemblance.
+§8 Expressions in solitary life
+So far we have considered expressions as used in communication, which last
+depends essentially on the fact that they operate indicatively. But expressions also play a great part in uncommunicated, interior mental life. This
+change in function plainly has nothing to do with whatever makes an expression an expression. Expressions continue to have meanings as they had
+before, and the same meanings as in dialogue. A word only cases to be a
+word when our interest stops at its sensory contour, when it becomes a mere
+sound-pattern. But when we live in the understanding of a word, it expresses
+something and the same thing, whether we address it to anyone or not.
+It seems clear, therefore, that an expression's meaning, and whatever else
+pertains to it essentially, cannot coincide with its feats of intimation. Or
+shall we say that, even in solitary mental life, one still uses expressions to
+intimate something, though not to a second person? Shall one say that in
+soliloquy one speaks to oneself, and employs words as signs, i.e. as indications, of one's own inner experiences? I cannot think such a view acceptable.
+Words function as signs here as they do everywhere else: everywhere they
+can be said to point to something. But if we reflect on the relation of
+
+19|
+expression to meaning, and to this end break up our complex, intimately
+unified experience of the sense-filled expression, into the two factors of word
+and sense, the word comes before us as intrinsically indifferent, whereas the
+sense seems the thing aimed at by the verbal sign and meant by its means:
+the expression seems to direct interest away from itself towards its sense,
+and to point to the latter. But this pointing is not an indication in the sense
+previously discussed. The existence of the sign neither 'motivates' the existence of the meaning, nor, properly expressed, our belief in the meaning's
+existence. What we are to use as an indication, must be perceived by us as
+existent. This holds also of expressions used in communication, but not for
+expressions used in soliloquy, where we are in general content with imagined rather than with actual words. In imagination a spoken or printed word
+floats before us, though in reality it has no existence. We should not, however, confuse imaginative presentations, and the image-contents they rest
+on, with their imagined objects. The imagined verbal sound, or the imagined
+printed word, does not exist, only its imaginative presentation does so. The
+difference is the difference between imagined centaurs and the imagination
+of such beings. The word's non-existence neither disturbs nor interests us,
+since it leaves the word's expressive function unaffected. Where it does make a
+difference is where intimation is linked with meaning. Here thought must not
+be merely expressed as meaning, but must be communicated and intimated.
+We can only do the latter where we actually speak and hear.
+One of course speaks, in a certain sense, even in soliloquy, and it is
+certainly possible to think of oneself as speaking, and even as speaking to
+oneself, as, e.g., when someone says to himself: 'You have gone wrong, you
+can't go on like that.' But in the genuine sense of communication, there is
+no speech in such cases, nor does one tell oneself anything: one merely
+conceives of oneself as speaking and communicating. In a monologue words
+can perform no function of indicating the existence of mental acts, since
+such indication would there be quite purposeless. For the acts in question
+are themselves experienced by us at that very moment.
+§9 Phenomenological distinctions between the
+physical appearance of the expression, and the
+sense-giving and sense-fulfilling act
+If we now turn from experiences specially concerned with intimation, and
+consider expressions in respect of distinctions that pertain to them equally
+whether they occur in dialogue or soliloquy, two things seem to be left over:
+the expressions themselves, and what they express as their meaning or sense.
+Several relations are, however, intertwined at this point, and talk about
+'meaning', or about 'what is expressed', is correspondingly ambiguous. If we
+seek a foothold in pure description, the concrete phenomenon of the senseinformed expression breaks up, on the one hand, into the physical phenomenon
+
+192 Expression and meaning
+forming the physical side of the expression, and, on the other hand, into the
+acts which give it meaning and possibly also intuitive fulness, in which its
+relation to an expressed object is constituted. In virtue of such acts, the
+expression is more than a merely sounded word. It means something, and in
+so far as it means something, it relates to what is objective. This objective
+somewhat can either be actually present through accompanying intuitions,
+or may at least appear in representation, e.g. in a mental image, and where
+this happens the relation to an object is realized. Alternatively this need not
+occur: the expression functions significantly, it remains more than mere
+sound of words, but it lacks any basic intuition that will give it its object.
+The relation of expression to object is now unrealized as being confined to a
+mere meaning-intention. A name, e.g., names its object whatever the circumstances, in so far as it means that object. But if the object is not intuitively
+before one, and so not before one as a named or meant object, mere meaning is all there is to it. If the originally empty meaning-intention is now
+fulfilled, the relation to an object is realized, the naming becomes an actual,
+conscious relation between name and object named
+Let us take our stand on this fundamental distinction between meaningintentions void of intuition and those which are intuitively fulfilled: if we
+leave aside the sensuous acts in which the expression, qua mere sound of
+words, makes its appearance, we shall have to distinguish between two
+acts or sets of acts. We shall, on the one hand, have acts essential to the
+expression if it is to be an expression at all, i.e. a verbal sound infused with
+sense. These acts we shall call the meaning-conferring acts or the meaningintentions. But we shall, on the other hand, have acts, not essential to the
+expression as such, which stand to it in the logically basic relation of fulfilling (confirming, illustrating) it more or less adequately, and so actualizing
+its relation to its object. These acts, which become fused with the meaningconferring acts in the unity of knowledge or fulfilment, we call the meaningfulfilling acts. The briefer expression 'meaning-fulfilment' can only be used
+in cases where there is no risk of the ready confusion with the whole experience in which a meaning-intention finds fulfilment in its correlated intuition.
+In the realized relation of the expression to its objective correlate," the senseinformed expression becomes one with the act of meaning-fulfilment. The
+sounded word is first made one with the meaning-intention, and this in its
+turn is made one (as intentions in general are made one with their fulfilments)
+with its corresponding meaning-fulfilment. The word 'expression' is normally understood - wherever, that is, we do not speak of a 'mere' expression
+- as the sense-animated expression. One should not, therefore, properly say
+(as one often does) that an expression expresses its meaning (its intention).
+One might more properly adopt the alternative way of speaking according to which the fulfilling act appears as the act expressed by the complete
+expression: we may e.g., say, that a statement 'gives expression' to an act of
+perceiving or imagining. We need not here point out that both meaning-
+
+193
+conferring and meaning-fulfilling acts have a part to play in intimation in
+the case of communicative discourse. The former in fact constitute the
+inmost core of intimation. To make them known to the hearer is the prime
+aim of our communicative intention, for only in so far as the hearer attributes them to the speaker will he understand the latter.
+§10 The phenomenological unity of these acts
+The above distinguished acts involving the expression's appearance, on the
+one hand, and the meaning-intention and possible meaning-fulfilment, on
+the other, do not constitute a mere aggregate of simultaneously given items
+in consciousness. They rather form an intimately fused unity of peculiar
+character. Everyone's personal experience bears witness to the differing
+weight of the two constituents, which reflects the asymmetry of the relation
+between an expression and the object which (through its meaning) it expresses
+or names. Both are 'lived through', the presentation of the word and the
+sense-giving act: but, while we experience the former, we do not live in such
+a presentation at all, but solely in enacting its sense, its meaning. And in so
+far as we do this, and yield ourselves to enacting the meaning-intention and
+its further fulfilment, our whole interest centres upon the object intended in
+our intention, and named by its means. (These two ways of speaking have in
+fact the same meaning.) The function of a word (or rather of an intuitive
+word-presentation) is to awaken a sense-conferring act in ourselves, to point
+to what is intended, or perhaps given intuitive fulfilment in this act, and to
+guide our interest exclusively in this direction.
+Such pointing is not to be described as the mere objective fact of a regular
+diversion of interest from one thing to another. The fact that two presented
+objects A and B are so linked by some secret psychological coordination
+that the presentation of A regularly arouses the presentation of B, and that
+interest is thereby shifted from A to B - such a fact does not make A the
+expression of the presentation of B. To be an expression is rather a descriptive aspect of the experienced unity of sign and thing signified.
+What is involved in the descriptive difference between the physical signphenomenon and the meaning-intention which makes it into an expression,
+becomes most clear when we turn our attention to the sign qua sign, e.g. to
+the printed word as such. If we do this, we have an external percept (or
+external intuitive idea) just like any other, whose object loses its verbal
+character. If this object again functions as a word, its presentation is wholly
+altered in character. The word (qua external singular) remains intuitively
+present, maintains its appearance, but we no longer intend it, it no longer
+properly is the object of our 'mental activity'. Our interest, our intention,
+our thought - mere synonyms if taken in sufficiently wide senses - point
+exclusively to the thing meant in the sense-giving act. This means,
+phenomenologically speaking, that the intuitive presentation, in which the
+
+194 Expression and meaning
+physical appearance of the world is constituted, undergoes an essential phenomenal modification when its object begins to count as an expression.
+While what constitutes the object's appearing remains unchanged, the intentional character of the experience alters. There is constituted (without need
+of a fulfilling or illustrative intuition) an act of meaning which finds support
+in the verbal presentation's intuitive content, but which differs in essence
+from the intuitive intention directed upon the word itself. With this act, the
+new acts or act-complexes that we call 'fulfilling' acts or act-complexes are
+often peculiarly blended, acts whose object coincides with the object meant
+in the meaning, or named through this meaning.
+In our next chapter we shall have to conduct additional researches into
+the question as to whether the 'meaning-intention',
+', which on our view characteristically marks off an expression from empty 'sound of words' consists
+in the mere association of mental imagery of the intended object with the
+sounded words, or at least necessarily involves such an act of fancy, or
+whether, on the other hand, mental imagery lies outside of the essence of an
+expression, and rather performs a fulfilling role, even if only of a partial,
+indirect or provisional character. In order not to blur the main outlines of
+our thought, we shall not here enter more deeply into phenomenological
+questions. In this whole investigation, we need only do as much phenomenology as is required to establish essential, primary distinctions.
+The provisional description so far given will have shown how complex is
+the correct description of a phenomenological situation. Such complexity
+appears inevitable once we clearly see that all objects and relations among
+objects only are what they are for us, through acts of thought essentially
+different from them, in which they become present to us, in which they stand
+before us as unitary items that we mean. Where not the phenomenological,
+but the naïvely objective interest dominates, where we live in intentional
+acts without reflecting upon them, all talk of course becomes plain sailing
+and clear and devoid of circumlocution. One then, in our case, simply speaks
+of 'expression' and of 'what is expressed', of name and thing named, of the
+steering of attention from one to the other etc. But where the phenomenological interest dominates, we endure the hardship of having to describe
+phenomenological relationships which we may have experienced on countless occasions, but of which we were not normally conscious as objects, and
+we have also to do our describing with expressions framed to deal with
+objects whose appearance lies in the sphere of our normal interests.
+§11 The ideal distinctions between (I) expression and
+meaning as ideal unities
+We have so far considered 'the well-understood expression' as a concrete
+experience. Instead of considering its two types of factor, the expression's
+appearance and the sense-conferring or sense-fulfilling experience, we wish
+
+Essential distinctions 195
+to consider what is, in a certain fashion, given 'in' these: the expression
+itself, its sense and its objective correlate. We turn therefore from the real
+relation of acts to the ideal relation of their objects or contents. A subjective treatment yields to one that is objective. The ideality of the relationship between expression and meaning is at once plain in regard to both its
+sides, inasmuch as, when we ask for the meaning of an expression, eg
+'quadratic remainder', we are naturally not referring to the sound-pattern
+uttered here and now (hic et nunc), the vanishing noise that can never recur
+identically: we mean the expression in specie. 'Quadratic remainder' is the
+same expression by whomsoever uttered. The same holds of talk about
+the expression's meaning, which naturally does not refer to some meaningconferring experience.
+Every example shows that an essential distinction must here be drawn.
+If I sincerely say - we shall always presume sincerity - "The three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect in a point, this is of course based on the fact
+that I judge so. If someone hears me and understands my assertion, he
+likewise knows this fact; he 'apperceives' me as someone who judges thus.
+But is the judging here intimated the meaning of my assertion, is it what my
+assertion asserts, and in that sense expresses? Plainly not. It would hardly
+occur to anyone, if asked as to the sense or meaning of my assertion, to
+revert to my judgement as an inner experience. Everyone would rather reply
+by saying: What this assertion asserts is the same whoever may assert
+it, and on whatever occasion or in whatever circumstances he may assert it,
+and what it asserts is precisely this, that the three perpendiculars of a triangle
+intersect in a point, no more and no less. One therefore repeats what is in
+essence 'the same' assertion, and one repeats it because it is the one, uniquely
+adequate way of expressing the same thing, i.e. its meaning. In this selfsame
+meaning, of whose identity we are conscious whenever we repeat the statement, nothing at all about judging or about one who judges is discoverable.
+We thought we were sure that a state of affairs held or obtained objectively,
+and what we were
+sure of we expressed by way of a declarative sentence.
+The state of affairs is what it is whether we assert that it obtains or not. It is
+intrinsically an item, a unity, which is capable of so obtaining or holding.
+But such an obtaining is what appeared before us, and we set it forth as it
+appeared before us: we said 'So the matter is'. Naturally we could not have
+done this, we could not have made the assertion, if the matter had not so
+appeared before us, if, in other words, we had not so judged. This forms
+part of an assertion as a psychological fact, it is involved in its intimation.
+But only in such intimation; for while what is intimated consists in inner
+experiences, what we assert in the judgement involves nothing subjective.
+My act of judging is a transient experience: it arises and passes away. But
+what my assertion asserts, the content that the three perpendiculars of a
+triangle intersect in a point, neither arises nor passes away. It is an identity in
+the strict sense, one and the same geometrical truth.
+
+196 Expression and meaning
+It is the same in the case of all assertions, even if what they assert is false
+and absurd. Even in such cases we distinguish their ideal content from the
+transient acts or affirming and asserting it: it is the meaning of the assertion, a
+unity in plurality. We continue to recognize its identity of intention in evident acts of reflection: we do not arbitrarily attribute it to our assertions,
+but discover it in them.
+If 'possibility' or 'truth' is lacking, an assertion's intention can only be
+carried out symbolically: it cannot derive any 'fulness' from intuition or
+from the categorial functions performed on the latter, in which 'fulness' its
+value for knowledge consists. It then lacks, as one says, a "true', a 'genuine'
+meaning. Later we shall look more closely into this distinction between
+intending and fulfilling meaning. To characterize the various acts in which
+the relevant ideal unities are constituted, and to throw light on the essence
+of their actual 'coincidence' in knowledge, will call for difficult, comprehensive studies. It is plain, however, that each assertion, whether representing
+an exercise of knowledge or not - whether or not, i.e., it fulfils or can fulfil
+its intention in corresponding intuitions, and the formative acts involved in
+these - involves an intention, in which intention, as its unified specific character, its meaning is constituted
+It is this ideal unity men have in mind when they say that 'the' judgement
+is the meaning of 'the' declarative sentence. Only the fundamental ambiguity
+of the word 'judgement' at once tends to confuse the evidently grasped ideal
+unity with the real act of judging, to confuse what the assertion intimates
+with what it asserts.
+What we have here said of complete assertions readily applies also to
+actual or possible parts of assertions. If I judge If the sum of the angles in a
+triangle does not equal two right angles, the axiom of parallels does not hold,
+the hypothetical antecedent is no assertion, for I do not say that such an
+inequation holds. None the less it says something, and what it says is once
+more quite different from what it intimates. What it says is not my mental
+act of hypothetical presumption, though 1 must of course have performed
+this in order to speak sincerely as I do. But it is rather the case that, when
+this subjective act is intimated, something objective and ideal is brought to
+expression: the hypothesis whose conceptual content can appear as the same
+intentional unity in many possible thought-experiences, and which evidently
+stands before us in its unity and identity in the objectively-ideal treatment
+characteristic of all thinking
+The same holds of the other parts of our statements, even of such as do
+not have the form of propositions.
+§12 Continuation: the expressed objectivity
+Talk of what an expression expresses has, in the discussion so far, several
+essentially different meanings. It relates, on the one hand, to intimation in
+
+Essential distinctions 197
+general, and especially in that connection to sense-giving acts, at times also
+to sense-fulfilling acts (if these are present at all). In an assertion, e.g., we
+express our judgement (we intimate it), but we also express percepts and
+other sense-fulfilling acts which illustrate our assertion's meaning. On the
+other hand, such talk relates to the 'contents' of such acts, and primarily to
+the meanings, which are often enough said to be 'expressed'.
+It is doubtful whether the examples analysed, in our last section, would
+suffice even to lend provisional intelligibility to the notion of meaning, if
+one could not forthwith introduce a new sense of 'expression' for purposes
+of comparison. The terms "meaning', 'content, 'state of affairs' and all
+similar terms harbour such powerful equivocations that our intention, even
+if expressed most carefully, still can promote misunderstanding. The third
+sense of being expressed', which we must now discuss, concerns the objective correlate meant by a meaning and expressed by its means.
+Each expression not merely says something, but says it of something: it
+not only has a meaning, but refers to certain objects. This relation sometimes
+holds in the plural for one and the same expression. But the object never
+coincides with the meaning. Both, of course, only pertain to an expression
+in virtue of the mental acts which give it sense. And, if we distinguish
+between 'content' and object in respect of such 'presentations'
+, one's distinction means the same as the distinction between what is meant or said, on the
+one hand, and what is spoken of, by means of the expression, on the other.
+The necessity of distinguishing between meaning (content) and object
+becomes clear when a comparison of examples shows us that several expressions may have the same meaning but different objects, and again that
+they may have different meanings but the same object. There is of course
+also the possibility of their differing in both respects and agreeing in both.
+The last occurs in the cases of synonymous expressions, e.g. the corresponding expressions in different languages which mean and name the same thing
+('London', 'Londres'; 'zwei, 'deux', 'duo' etc.).
+Names offer the plainest examples of the separation of meaning from
+the relation to objects, this relation being in their case usually spoken of as
+'naming'. Two names can differ in meaning but can name the same object,
+eg. 'the victor at Jena' - 'the vanquished at Waterloo'; 'the equilateral
+triangle' - 'the equiangular triangle'. The meaning expressed in our pairs
+of names is plainly different, though the same object is meant in each case.
+The same applies to names whose indefiniteness gives them an 'extension'.
+The expressions 'an equilateral triangle' and 'an equiangular triangle' have the
+same objective reference, the same range of possible application.
+It can happen, conversely, that two expressions have the same meaning but
+a different objective reference. The expression 'a horse' has the same meaning in whatever context it occurs. But if on one occasion we say 'Bucephalus
+is a horse', and on another 'That cart-horse is a horse', there has been a
+plain change in our sense-giving presentation in passing from the one state-
+
+198 Expression and meaning
+ment to the other. The expression 'a horse' employs the same meaning to
+present Bucephalus on one occasion and the cart-horse on the other. It is
+thus with all general names, i.e. names with an 'extension'. 'One' is a name
+whose meaning never differs, but one should not, for that reason, identify
+the various 'ones' which occur in a sum: they all mean the same, but they
+differ in objective reference.
+The case of proper names is different, whether they name individual or
+general objects. A word like 'Socrates' can only name different things by
+meaning different things, i.e. by becoming equivocal. Wherever the word has
+one meaning, it also names one object. The same holds of expressions like
+'the number two', 'redness' etc. We therefore distinguish equivocal names
+that have many meanings from general or class-names that have many values.
+The same holds of other types of expression, though in their case talk of
+objective reference involves certain difficulties in virtue of its manifoldness.
+If we consider, e.g., statements of the form 'S is P' we generally regard the
+subject of the statement as the object about which the statement is made.
+Another view is, however, possible, which treats the whole state of affairs
+which corresponds to the statement as an analogue of the object a name
+names, and distinguishes this from the object's meaning. If this is done
+one can quote as examples pairs of sentences such as 'a is bigger than b' - 'b
+is smaller than a', which plainly say different things. They are not merely
+grammatically but also 'cogitatively' different, i.e. different in meaningcontent. But they express the same state of affairs: the same 'matter'
+predicatively apprehended and asserted in two different ways. Whether we
+define talk of the 'object' of a statement in one sense or the other - each has
+its own claims - statements are in either case possible which differ in meaning while referring to the same object.
+§13 Connection between meaning and
+objective reference
+Our examples entitle us to regard the distinction between an expression's
+meaning and its power to direct itself as a name to this or that objective
+correlate - and of course the distinction between meaning and object itself -
+as well-established. It is clear for the rest that the sides to be distinguished in
+each expression are closely connected: an expression only refers to an objective correlate because it means something, it can be rightly said to signify or
+name the object through its meaning. An act of meaning is the determinate
+manner in which we refer to our object of the moment, though this mode of
+significant reference and the meaning itself can change while the objective
+reference remains fixed.
+A more profound phenomenological clarification of this relation can
+be reached only by research into the way expressions and their meaningintentions function in knowledge. This would show that talk about two
+
+Essential distinctions 199
+distinguishable sides to each expression, should not be taken seriously, that
+the essence of an expression lies solely in its meaning. But the same intuition
+(as we shall show later) can offer fulfilment of different expressions: it can
+be categorially apprehended in varying ways and synthetically linked with
+other intuitions. Expressions and their meaning-intentions do not take their
+measure, in contexts of thought and knowledge, from mere intuition - I
+mean phenomena of external or internal sensibility - but from the varying
+intellectual forms through which intuited objects first become intelligibly
+determined, mutually related objects. And so expressions, even when they
+function outside of knowledge, must, as symbolic intentions, point to categorially formed unities. Different meanings may therefore pertain to the same
+intuitions regarded in differing categorial fashion, and may therefore also
+pertain to the same object. But where a whole range of objects corresponds
+to a single meaning, this meaning's own essence must be indeterminate: it
+must permit a sphere of possible fulfilment.
+These indications may suffice for the moment. They must guard in advance
+against the error of seriously thinking that sense-giving acts have two distinct sides, one which gives them their meaning, while the other gives them
+their determinate direction to objects.
+§14 Content as object, content as fulfilling sense and
+content as sense or meaning simpliciter
+Relational talk of 'intimation', 'meaning' and 'object' belongs essentially to
+every expression. Every expression intimates something, means something
+and names or otherwise designates something. In each case, talk of 'expression' is equivocal. As said above, relation to an actually given objective
+correlate, which fulfils the meaning-intention, is not essential to an expression. If this last important case is also taken into consideration, we note
+that there are two things that can be said to be expressed in the realized relation to the object. We have, on the one hand, the object itself, and the object
+as meant in this or that manner. On the other hand, and more properly, we
+have the object's ideal correlate in the acts of meaning-fulfilment which
+constitute it, the fulfilling sense. Wherever the meaning-intention is fulfilled
+in a corresponding intuition, i.e. wherever the expression actually serves to
+name a given object, there the object is constituted as one 'given' in certain
+acts, and, to the extent that our expression really measures up to the intuitive data, as given in the same manner in which the expression means it.
+In this unity of coincidence between meaning and meaning-fulfilment, the
+essence of the meaning-fulfilment corresponds with, and is correlative, to
+the essence of meaning: the essence of the meaning-fulfilment is the fulfilling
+sense of the expression, or, as one may also call it, the sense expressed by the
+expression. One says, e.g., that a statement of perception expresses a perception, but also that it expresses the content of a perception. We distinguish, in
+
+200 Expression and meaning
+a perceptual statement, as in every statement, between content and object;
+by the 'content' we understand the self-identical meaning that the hearer can
+grasp even if he is not a percipient. We must draw the same distinction in
+the case of fulfilling acts, in the case, therefore, of perceptions and their
+categorial formations. Through these acts the objective correlate of our act
+of meaning stands before us intuitively as the very object we mean. We
+must, I say, distinguish again, in such fulfilling acts, between their content,
+the meaning-element, as it were, in the categorially formed percept, and the
+object perceived. In the unity of fulfilment, the fulfilling content coincides
+with the intending content, so that, in our experience of this unity of coincidence, the object, at once intended and 'given',
+, stands before us, not as
+two objects, but as one alone. The ideal conception of the act which confers
+meaning yields us the Idea of the intending meaning, just as the ideal conception of the correlative essence of the act which fulfils meaning, yields
+the fulfilling meaning, likewise qua Idea. This is the identical content which,
+in perception, pertains to the totality of possible acts of perception which
+intended the same object perceptually, and intend it actually as the same
+object. This content is therefore the ideal correlate of this single object,
+which may, for the rest, be completely imaginary.
+The manifold ambiguities in talk about what an expression expresses, or
+about an expressed content, may therefore be so ordered that one distinguishes between a content in a subjective, and a content in an objective sense.
+In the latter respect we must distinguish between:
+The content as intending sense, or as sense, meaning simpliciter,
+the content as fulfilling sense, and
+the content as object.
+§15 The equivocations in talk of meaning and
+meaninglessness connected with these distinctions
+The application of the terms 'meaning' and 'sense'
+, not merely to the content of the meaning-intention inseparable from the expression, but also to
+the content of the meaning-fulfilment, engenders a most unwelcome ambiguity. It is clear from previous indications, where we dealt with the fact of
+fulfilment, that the acts on either side, in which intending and fulfilling sense
+are constituted, need not be the same. What tempts us to transfer the same
+terms from intention to fulfilment, is the peculiar way in which the unity of
+fulfilment is a unity of identification or coincidence: the equivocation which
+one hoped a modifying adjective might render innocuous, can scarcely be
+avoided. We shall continue, of course, to understand by 'meaning' simpliciter
+the meaning which, as the identical element in our intention, is essential to
+the expressions as such.
+
+201
+'Meaning' is further used by us as synonymous with 'sense'
+. It is agreeable to have parallel, interchangeable terms in the case of this concept,
+particularly since the sense of the term 'meaning' is itself to be investigated.
+A further consideration is our ingrained tendency to use the two words as
+synonymous, a circumstance which makes it seem rather a dubious step if
+their meanings are differentiated, and if (as G. Frege has proposed) we use
+one for meaning in our sense, and the other for the objects expressed. To
+this we may add that both terms are exposed to the same equivocations,
+which we distinguished above in connection with the term 'expression'
+, and
+to many more besides, and that this is so both in scientific and in ordinary
+speech. Logical clarity is much impaired by the manner in which the sense
+or meaning of an expression is, often in the same thought-sequence, now
+looked upon as the acts intimated by it, now as its ideal sense, now as the
+objective correlate that it expresses. Since fixed terminological landmarks
+are lacking, the concepts themselves run confusedly into one another.
+Fundamental confusions arise from these facts. General and equivocal
+names are, e.g., repeatedly lumped together, since both can be predicatively
+referred to a plurality of objects. Lacking fixed concepts, men did not know
+how to distinguish the multiple senses of the equivocal names from the
+multiple values of the general ones. Here we also meet with the frequent
+unclearness as to the true essence of the difference between collective and
+general names. For, where collective meanings are fulfilled, we intuit a
+plurality of items: fulfilment is articulated into a plurality of individual
+intuitions, and so, if intention and fulfilment are not kept apart, it may well
+seem that the collective expression in question has many meanings.
+It is more important for us to set forth precisely the most detrimental
+equivocations in talk which concerns meaning and sense, on the one hand, or
+meaningless or senseless expressions, on the other. If we separate the blurred
+concepts, the following list emerges:
+1. It is part of the notion of an expression to have a meaning: this precisely
+differentiates an expression from the other signs mentioned above. A meaningless expression is, therefore, properly speaking, no expression at all: it is
+at best something that claims or seems to be an expression, though, more
+closely considered, it is not one at all. Here belong articulate, word-like
+sound-patterns such as 'Abracadabra',
+, and also combinations of genuine
+expressions to which no unified meaning corresponds, though their outer
+form seems to pretend to such a meaning, e.g. 'Green is or'
+2. In meaning, a relation to an object is constituted. To use an expression
+significantly, and to refer expressively to an object (to form a presentation
+of it), are one and the same. It makes no difference whether the object exists
+or is fictitious or even impossible. But if one gives a very rigorous interpretation to the proposition that an expression, in so far as it has meaning,
+relates to an object, i.e. in a sense which involves the existence of the object,
+then an expression has meaning when an object corresponding to it exists, and
+
+202 Expression and meaning
+it is meaningless when no such object exists. Meanings are often spoken
+of as signifying the objects meant, a usage that can scarcely be maintained
+consistently, as it springs from a confusion with the genuine concept of
+meaning.
+3. If the meaning is identified with the objective correlate of an expression, a
+name like 'golden mountain' is meaningless. Here men generally distinguish
+objectlessness from meaninglessness. As opposed to this, men tend to use
+the word "senseless' of expressions infected with contradiction and obvious
+incompatibilities, e.g. 'round square', or to deny them meaning by some
+equivalent phrase. Sigwart?
+, e.g., says that a self-contradictory formula such
+as 'square circle' expresses no concept we can think, but that it uses words
+to set up an insoluble task. The existential proposition "There is no square
+circle, on his view denies the possibility of connecting a concept with these
+words, and by a concept he expressly wants us to understand (if we get him
+right) the 'general meaning of a word', which is just what we mean by it.
+Erdmann® has similar opinions in regard to the instance 'A square circle is
+frivolous'. We should, in consistency, have to apply the word 'senseless', not
+merely to expressions immediately absurd, but to those whose absurdity is
+mediate, i.e. the countless expressions shown by mathematicians, in lengthy
+indirect demonstrations, to be objectless a priori. We should likewise have
+to deny that concepts like regular decahedron etc., are concepts at all.
+Marty raises the following objection to the thinkers just mentioned. 'If
+the words are senseless, how could we understand the question as to whether
+such things exist, so as to answer it negatively? Even to reject such an
+existence, we must, it is plain, somehow form a presentation of such contradictory material"
+...'If such absurdities are called senseless, this can only
+mean that they have no rational sense'.!° These objections are clinching, in
+so far as these thinkers' statements suggest that they are confusing the true
+meaninglessness mentioned above under 1, with another quite different meaninglessness, i.e. the a priori impossibility of a fulfilling sense. An expression
+has meaning in this sense if a possible fulfilment, i.e. the possibility of a
+unified intuitive illustration, corresponds to its intention. This possibility is
+plainly meant ideally. It concerns no contingent acts of expression or fulfilment, but their ideal contents: meaning as an ideal unity, here to be called
+'intending meaning', on the one hand, and fulfilling meaning, standing to it
+in a certain relation of precise adequacy, on the other. We apprehend this
+ideal relation by ideative abstraction based on an act of unified fulfilment. In
+the contrary case we apprehend the real impossibility of meaning-fulfilment
+through an experience of the incompatibility of the partial meanings in the
+intended unity of fulfilment.
+The phenomenological clarification of these relationships calls for long,
+difficult analyses, as will appear in a later investigation.
+4. If we ask what an expression means, we naturally recur to cases where it
+actually contributes to knowledge, or, what is the same, where its meaning-
+
+203
+intention is intuitively fulfilled. In this manner the 'notional presentation',
+i.e. the meaning-intention, gains clarity, it shows itself up as 'correct, as
+'really' capable of execution. The draft it makes on intuition is as it were
+cashed. Since in the unity of fulfilment the act of intention coincides with
+the fulfilling act, and fuses with it in the most intimate fashion - if indeed
+there is any difference left over here at all - it readily seems as if the expression first got its meaning here, as if it drew meaning from the act of
+fulfilment. The tendency therefore arises to treat the fulfilling intuitions -
+categorially formative acts are here in general passed over - as meanings.
+But fulfilment is often imperfect - we shall have to devote closer study to all
+such possibilities - and expressions often go with remotely relevant, only
+partially illustrative intuitions, if with any at all. Since the phenomenological
+differences of these cases have not been closely considered, men have come
+to locate the significance of expressions, even of such as could make no
+claim to adequate fulfilment, in accompaniments of intuitive imagery. This
+naturally led to a total denial of meaning to absurd expressions.
+The new concept of meaning therefore originates in a confusion of meaning with fulfilling intuition. On this conception, an expression has meaning
+if and only if its intention - we should say its 'meaning-intention' - is in
+fact fulfilled, even if only in a partial, distant and improper manner. The
+understanding of the expression must be given life through certain 'ideas of
+meaning' (it is commonly said), i.e. by certain illustrative images.
+The final refutation of highly attractive, opposed notions is an important
+task which requires lengthy discussions. These we shall postpone to the next
+chapter, and here go on enumerating different concepts of meaning.
+§16 Continuation: meaning and connotation
+Another equivocation in our talk about meaninglessness was introduced
+by John Stuart Mill, and again rests on a new, fifth concept of meaning. He
+locates the essence of the meaning of names in their connotation, and therefore treats non-connotative names as meaningless. (Sometimes he says, more
+carefully but less clearly, that they are meaningless in the 'proper' or 'strict'
+sense.) It is well-known that by 'connotative names' Mill understands such
+as designate a subject and imply an attribute, by 'non-connotative names"
+such as designate a subject without (as it is here more clearly put) indicating
+an attribute as attaching to it." Proper names are non-connotative and so
+too are names of attributes (e.g. 'whiteness'). Mill compares proper names
+to the distinctive chalk-marks which the robber, in the well-known tale from
+the Arabian Nights, made on the house.! And he goes on to say: 'When we
+impose a proper name, we perform an operation in some degree analogous
+to what the robber intended in chalking the house. We put a mark, not
+indeed upon the object itself, but upon the idea of the object. A proper
+name is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in our minds with the
+
+204 Expression and meaning
+idea of the object, in order that whenever the mark meets our eyes or occurs
+to our thoughts, we may think of that individual object... When we predicate
+of anything its proper name; when we say, pointing to a man, this is Brown
+or Smith, or pointing to a city, this is York, we do not, merely by so doing,
+convey to the reader any information about them, except that those are
+their names... It is otherwise when objects are spoken of by connotative
+names. When we say, "The town is built of marble"
+", we give the hearer what
+may be entirely new information, and this merely by the signification of the
+many-worded connotative name "built of marble"
+. Such names... are not
+mere marks, but more, that is to say significant marks; and the connotation
+is what constitutes their significance. "3
+If we set our own analyses alongside of these utterances of Mill's, we
+cannot help seeing that he confuses distinctions that should in principle be
+kept apart. Above all, he blurs the distinction between indicating and expressing. The chalk-mark of the robber is a mere indication, while a proper
+name is an expression.
+Like every expression a proper name functions as an indication, i.e. in its
+intimating role. Here there is a real analogy with the robber's chalk-mark. If
+the robber sees the chalk-mark he knows: This is the house I must rob.
+If I hear a proper name uttered, the corresponding presentation is aroused
+in me, and I know: This is the presentation the speaker is framing in his
+mind, and that he likewise wishes to arouse in mine. A name, however, has
+an additional expressiveness to which the intimating function is merely
+auxiliary. A man's presentation is not of primary importance: we are not
+concerned to direct interest to it but to the object it presents, to what it
+refers to and therefore names, and to set this before us as such. In a statement it makes its first appearance as the object about which something is
+asserted, in a wish-sentence as the object about which something is wished
+etc. Only in order to perform this task will a proper name, like any other
+name, become an element in complex, unified expressions, in statements,
+wish-sentences and the like. But in its relation to its object the proper name
+is not an index. This is at once clear when we reflect on the fact that it is of
+the essence of an index to point to a fact, an existence, whereas the object
+named need not be taken to exist at all. When Mill extending his analogy,
+holds a proper name to be associated with the idea of the person it names in
+essentially the same manner as the chalk-mark is associated with the house,
+but at once adds that the point of the association is that we may think of the
+individual object whenever the sign meets our eye or enters our thought, his
+addition cracks the analogy wide asunder.
+Mill correctly stresses the difference between names that are a means
+towards 'knowing' an object and names which are not, but neither this distinction, nor the equivalent distinction between connotative and non-connotative
+names, has anything to do with the distinction between the meaningful and
+the meaningless. The first-mentioned pair of differences are in fact not merely
+
+Essential distinctions 205
+logically equivalent but identical. The difference is simply one of attributive and non-attributive names: to mediate the 'knowledge' of a thing and
+to mediate its attributes mean exactly the same. It is, no doubt, important,
+whether a name means a thing directly or only by way of the attributes that
+pertain to it. But this is a difference within the unitary genus Expression,
+just as the very important, parallel difference between nominal meanings
+(or logical 'presentations') which are attributive and those which are not
+attributive, is a difference within the unitary genus Meaning.
+Mill after a fashion 'feels' the difference in question by being at times
+obliged to speak of a meaning of proper names in a sense contrasting with
+the 'strict' and 'proper sense ascribed to the meaning of connotative names.
+He would have done better had he introduced a wholly new sense of meaning (though not, we may say, one to be recommended). The way, at least, in
+which the distinguished logician brings in his valuable distinction between
+connotative and non-connotative names has done much to confuse the quite
+different distinctions we have here been discussing.
+One must note, further, that Mill's distinction between what a name denotes and what it connotes must not be confused with the merely cognate
+distinction between what a name names and what it means. This confusion is
+greatly aided by Mill's exposition.
+How important all these distinctions are, and how little it helps to treat
+them with superficial contempt as being 'merely grammatical', will be shown
+in further investigations. These will make plain, we hope, that if one blurs
+the straightforward distinctions we have proposed, we cannot hope for a
+trustworthy elaboration of the concepts of Presentation and Judgement, in
+the sense relevant to logic.
+
+Towards a characterization of the
+acts which confer meaning
+§17 Illustrative mental pictures as putative meanings
+We have oriented our concept of meaning, or meaning-intention, towards
+the phenomenological character essential to an expression as such, which
+distinguishes it descriptively in consciousness from a merely sounded word.
+Such a character is, on our view, possible, and quite often actual, though the
+expression does not help us to know anything, does not stand in the loosest,
+remotest relation to sensualizing intuitions. It is now time to take up our
+stance towards a widely held, perhaps almost dominant conception, which,
+as against our own, sees the whole role of the expression, with all its living
+meaning, in the arousal of certain images which regularly accompany it.
+To understand an expression means, on this view, to meet with pertinent
+mental pictures. Where these are absent, an expression is void of sense.
+These mental pictures are themselves often said to be the meanings of words,
+and those who say so, claim to be getting at what ordinary speech means by
+the 'meaning of an expression'
+It shows the retarded state of descriptive psychology that such speciously
+obvious doctrines should be entertained, and entertained despite longstanding objections urged against them by unprejudiced thinkers. Verbal
+expressions are no doubt often accompanied by images, which may stand in
+an intimate or a distant relation to their meanings, but to treat such accompaniments as necessary conditions for understanding runs counter to the
+plainest facts. Thereby we know that the meaningfulness of an expression -
+let alone its very meaning - cannot consist in the existence of such images,
+and cannot be disturbed by their absence. A comparison of a few casually
+observed imaginative accompaniments will soon show how vastly they vary
+while the meanings of words stay constant, and how they often are only
+very distantly related to the latter, whereas true illustrations, which genuinely carry out or confirm the meaning-intention of our expression, can
+often only be evoked with difficulty or not at all. Let a man read a work in
+an abstract field of knowledge, and understand the author's assertions perfectly, and let him then try to see what more there is to such reading than the
+
+207
+words he understands. The circumstances of observation are most favourable to the view we reject, since an interest in finding images tends psychologically to evoke images, while the tendency to read back the findings of
+reflection into the original situation, makes us include all new images which
+stream in during the observation in the psychological content of our expression. Despite these favouring circumstances, the view we oppose, which sees
+the essence of the meaningful in accompanying imagery, must at least cease to
+look for introspective confirmation in the sort of case in question. Take, e.g.,
+well-understood algebraical signs, or complete formulae, or verbal propositions such as 'Every algebraical equation of uneven grade has at least one
+real root, and carry out the needful observations. To report my own findings
+in the last case: I see an open book which I recognize as Serret's Algebra, I
+see the sensory pattern of an algebraical equation in Teubnerian type, while
+accompanying the word 'root, I see the familiar V. I have however read the
+sentence very many times and have understood it perfectly, without experiencing the slightest trace of accompanying images that have anything to do
+with its presented object. The same happens when expressions like 'culture',
+'religion', 'science'
+, 'art', 'differential calculus' etc., are intuitively illustrated.
+We may further point out that what we have said applies not only to
+expressions which stand for highly abstract objects, mediated by complex
+relations, but to names of individual objects, well-known persons, cities,
+landscapes. A readiness for intuitive representation may be present, but it
+remains unfulfilled at the moment in question.
+§18 Continuation of the above. Arguments and
+counter-arguments
+Should someone object that there are highly evanescent images even in such
+cases, that a mental picture emerges only to disappear forthwith, we reply
+that the full understanding of words, their complete living sense, persists after
+such an image has vanished, and cannot therefore consist in its presence.
+If the objecter shifts to saying that the mental image has become
+unobservable, perhaps always was so, but that, whether observable or not,
+it still exists, and makes continued understanding possible, we need not be
+in doubt as to our answer. We reply that whether or not such an assumption
+is necessary or plausible on grounds of genetic psychology, this is not anything that need be gone into here. It is quite irrelevant to our essentially
+descriptive question. Let us grant that there often are unobservable images.
+Despite this, however, an expression can quite often be understood, and quite
+observably so. But surely it is absurd to suppose that an abstract, sensemaking aspect of an image should be observable, while the whole complete,
+concrete image-experience remains unobservable? How does the matter stand,
+further, in cases where our meaning is absurd? Unobservability can here not
+depend on the contingent limits of mental capacity, since such an image
+
+208 Expression and meaning
+cannot exist at all: if it could, it would provide us with a self-evident guarantee
+of the possibility, the semantic consistency, of the thought in question.
+It can, or course, be pointed out that we do, after a fashion, illustrate
+even absurdities, such as a straight line enclosing a space, or triangles the
+sum of whose angles is greater or less than two right angles. In metageometric
+treatises there are even drawings of such forms. No one would, however,
+dream of taking intuitions of this sort as truly illustrating the concepts
+in question, or of letting them pass as owning such verbal meanings. Only
+in cases where the image of a thing meant is really adequate to it, are we
+tempted to seek the sense of our expression in such an image. But if we rule
+out absurd expressions - which none the less have their sense - are images
+normally adequate? Even Descartes cited his 'chiliagon' to shed light on his
+distinction between imaginatio and intellectio. Our imaginative idea of a
+chiliagon is no more adequate than are our images of space-enclosing straight
+lines or intersecting parallels: in both cases we have rough, merely partial
+illustrations of a thing thought of, not complete exemplifications. We speak
+of a closed straight line, and draw a closed curve, thereby only illustrating
+the curvature. In the same fashion we think of a chiliagon, while we imagine
+any polygon with 'many' sides.
+We need not look for recondite geometrical illustrations to prove the
+inadequacy of illustration even in the case of consistent meanings. It is a
+well-known fact that no geometrical concept whatsoever can be adequately
+illustrated. We imagine or draw a stroke, and speak or think of a straight
+line, and so in the case of all figures. The image everywhere provides only a
+foothold for intellectio. It offers no genuine instance of our intended pattern,
+only an instance of the sort of sensuous form which is the natural startingpoint for geometrical 'idealization'
+. In these intellectual thought-processes
+of geometry, the idea of a geometrical figure is constituted, which is then
+expressed in the fixed meaning of the definitory expression. Actually to
+perform this intellectual process may be presupposed by our first formation
+of primitive geometrical expressions and by our application of them in knowledge, but not for their revived understanding and their continued significant
+use. Elusive sensuous pictures function, however, in a phenomenologically
+graspable and describable manner, as mere aids to understanding, and not
+as themselves meanings or carriers of meaning.
+Our conception will perhaps be censured for its extreme nominalism, for
+identifying word and thought. To many it will seem quite absurd that a
+symbol, a word, a sentence, a formula should be understood, while in our
+view nothing intuitive is present beyond the mindless sensible body of thought,
+the sensible stroke on paper etc. But we are far from identifying words and
+thoughts, as our statements in the previous chapter show. We do not at all
+think that, where symbols are understood without the aid of accompanying
+images, the mere symbol alone is present: we think rather that an understanding, a peculiar act-experience relating to the expression, is present, that
+
+Towards a characterization of the acts which confer meaning 209
+it shines through the expression, that it lends it meaning and thereby a relation to objects. What distinguishes the mere word, as a sense-complex, from
+the meaningful word, is something we know full well from our own experience. We can indeed ignore meaning and pay attention only to a word's
+sensuous character. It may also be the case that some sensible feature first
+arouses interest on its own account, and that its verbal or other symbolic
+character is only then noted. The sensuous habit of an object does not change
+when it assumes the status of a symbol for us, nor, conversely, does it do so
+when we ignore the meaning of what normally functions as a symbol. No
+new, independent content is here added to the old: we do not merely have a
+sum or association of contents of equal status before us. One and the same
+content has rather altered its psychic habit: we are differently minded in
+respect of it, it no longer seems a mere sensuous mark on paper, the physical
+phenomenon counts as an understood sign. Living thus understandingly, we
+perform no act of presentation or judgement directed upon the sign as a
+sensible object, but another act, quite different in kind, which relates to the
+thing designated. It is in this sense-giving act-character - which differs entirely
+according as our interest plays on the sensible sign or the object presented
+through it, with or without representative imagery - that meaning consists.
+§19 Understanding without intuition
+In the light of our conception it becomes wholly understandable that an
+expression should be able to function significantly without illustrative intuition. Those who locate the meaning-aspect of symbols in intuition, must
+find purely symbolic thinking insolubly enigmatic. Speech without intuition
+must likewise be senseless to them. But truly senseless speech would be no
+speech at all: it would be like the rattle of machinery. This we of course meet
+with in the case of verses or prayers learnt by rote and repeated unthinkingly, but not in the cases which here require explanation. Popular comparisons with the squawking of parrots or the cackling of geese, the well-known
+adage 'Where ideas fail us, words come up at the right moment' and so
+on, are not, soberly considered, to be taken literally. Expressions such as
+"talk without judgement' or 'senseless talk' may and should certainly not
+be otherwise interpreted than such expressions as 'a heartless', 'brainless'
+'empty-headed man' etc. "Talk without judgement' plainly does not mean
+talk unbacked by judgements, but talk backed by judgements not based on
+independent, intelligent consideration. Even "senselessness'.
+, understood as
+absurdity or nonsense, is significantly constituted: the sense of an absurd
+expression is such as to refer to what cannot be objectively put together.
+The opposite view can now only take refuge in the strained hypothesis
+of unconscious, unnoticed intuitions. How little this helps becomes plain
+if we consider what basic intuition achieves in cases where it is noticeably
+present. In the vast majority of cases it is by no means adequate to our
+
+210 Expression and meaning
+meaning-intention, a fact, which, on our conception, presents no problem.
+If the meaningful is not to be found in intuition, speech without intuition
+need not be speech deprived of thought. If intuition lapses, an act like that
+which otherwise hangs about intuition, and perhaps mediates the knowledge
+of its object, continues to cling to the sense-given expression. The act in
+which meaning is effective is therefore present in either case.
+§20 Thought without intuition and the 'surrogative
+function' of signs
+It should be quite clear that over most of the range both of ordinary, relaxed thought and the strict thought of science, illustrative imagery plays
+a small part or no part at all, and that we may, in the fullest sense, judge,
+reason, reflect upon and refute positions, without recourse to more than
+symbolic presentations. This situation is quite inadequately described if one
+talks of the 'surrogative function of signs', as if the signs themselves did
+duty for something, and as if our interest in symbolic thinking were directed
+to the signs themselves. Signs are in fact not objects of our thought at all,
+even surrogatively; we rather live entirely in the consciousness of meaning,
+of understanding, which does not lapse when accompanying imagery does
+so. One must bear in mind that symbolic thinking is only thinking in virtue
+of a new, intentional act-character: this distinguishes the meaningful sign
+from the mere sign, i.e. the sounded word set up as a physical object in our
+mere presentations of sense. This act-character is a descriptive trait in the
+sign-experience which, stripped of intuition, yet understands the sign.
+It will perhaps be objected to our present interpretation of symbolic thinking that it conflicts with quite certain facts involved in the analysis of arithmetical symbolic thought, facts that I myself have stressed elsewhere (in my
+Philosophy of Arithmetic). In arithmetical thought mere signs genuinely do
+duty for concepts. "The reduction of the theory of things to the theory of
+signs' (to quote Lambert) is what all calculation achieves. Arithmetical signs
+are 'so selected and perfected, that the theory, combination, transformation
+etc. of signs can do what would otherwise have to be done by concepts."
+Looked at more closely, however, it is not signs, in the mere sense of
+physical objects, whose theory, combination etc., would be of the slightest
+use. Such things would belong to the sphere of physical science and practice,
+and not to that of arithmetic. The true meaning of the signs in question
+emerges if we glance at the much favoured comparison of mathematical
+operations to rule-governed games, e.g. chess. Chessmen are not part of the
+chess-game as bits of ivory and wood having such and such shapes and
+colours. Their phenomenal and physical constitution is quite indifferent, and
+can be varied at will. They become chessmen, counters in the chess-game,
+through the game's rules which give them their fixed games-meaning. And
+so arithmetical signs have, besides their original meaning, their so-to-say
+
+21l
+games-meaning, a meaning oriented towards the game of calculation and its
+well-known rules. If one treats arithmetical signs as mere counters in the
+rule-sense, to solve the tasks of the reckoning game leads to numerical signs
+or formulae whose interpretation in their original, truly arithmetical senses
+also represents the solution of corresponding arithmetical problems.
+We do not therefore operate with meaningless signs in fields of symbolicarithmetical thought and calculation. For mere signs, in the sense of physical
+signs bereft of all meaning, do duty for the same signs alive with arithmetical meaning: it is rather that signs taken in a certain operational or gamessense do duty for the same signs in full arithmetical meaningfulness. A system
+of natural, and, as it were, unconscious equivocations bears endless fruit,
+and the much greater mental work which our original array of concepts
+demanded is eased by 'symbolic' operations employing a parallel array of
+games-concepts.
+Naturally such a procedure must be logically justified and its boundaries
+reliably fixed: here we were only concerned to remove confusions readily
+caused by misunderstanding of the nature of such 'merely symbolical' mathematical thought. If one grasps the sense, set out above, in which the 'mere
+signs' of arithmetic do duty for arithmetical concepts (or for signs in their
+full arithmetical meaning) it is clear that talk of the surrogative function of
+arithmetical signs is irrelevant to our present question, the question whether
+an expression of thought is or is not possible without an accompaniment of
+illustrative, instantiating or demonstrative intuitions. Non-intuitive symbolic
+thought in the sense just mentioned, and symbolical thought in the sense
+of thought which employs surrogative operational concepts, are two quite
+different things.
+§21 A difficulty regarding our necessary recourse to
+corresponding intuitions in order to clarify meanings
+or to know truths resting on them
+One might here ask: If the sense of expressions functioning purely symbolically lies in an act-character which distinguishes the understanding grasp of a
+verbal sign from the grasp of a sign stripped of meaning, why is it that we
+have recourse to intuition when we want to establish differences of meaning,
+to expose ambiguities, or to limit shifts in our meaning-intention?
+Again one might ask: Why, if our conception of meaning is right, do we
+employ corresponding intuitions in order to know purely conceptual truths,
+i.e. truths known through an analysis of meanings? One can say in general,
+that in order to be quite clear as to the sense of an expression (or as to the
+content of a concept) one must construct a corresponding intuition: in this
+intuition one sees what the expression 'really means'.
+But an expression functioning symbolically also means something, and
+means the same thing as an expression intuitively clarified. Meaning cannot
+
+212 Expression and meaning
+first have been acquired through intuition: otherwise we should have to say
+that much the greater part of our experience in speaking and reading is
+merely an external perceiving or imagining of optic and auditory complexes.
+We need not again stress that this plainly conflicts with the phenomenological
+data, that we mean this or that with our spoken or written signs, and that
+this meaning is a descriptive character of intelligent speech and hearing, even
+when these are purely symbolic. Our first question is answered by observing
+that purely symbolic meaning-intentions often do not clearly keep themselves apart, and do not permit of the easy, sure distinctions and identifications which are needed for practically useful judgements, even if these are
+not self-evident. To recognize differences of meaning such as that between
+'moth' and 'elephant', requires no special procedures. But where meanings
+shade unbrokenly into one another, and unnoticed shifts blur boundaries
+needed for firm judgement, intuitive illustration naturally promotes lucidity.
+Where an expression's meaning-intention is fulfilled by divergent, conceptually disparate intuitions, the sharp difference in the direction of fulfilment
+shows up the cleavage of meaning-intentions.
+Answering our second question, we recall that all self-evidence of judgement (all realized knowledge in the strong sense of the word) presupposes
+meanings that are intuitively fulfilled. Where there is talk of a knowledge
+'springing from the analysis of the mere meanings of words', more is meant
+than these words suggest. The knowledge meant is one whose self-evidence
+calls only for pure representation of the "conceptual essences'
+', in which
+the general word-meanings find their perfect fulfilments: all question as to
+the existence of objects corresponding to such concepts, or falling under
+such conceptual essences, is ruled out. But these 'conceptual essences' are not
+the verbal meanings themselves, so that the phrases 'based purely on the concepts (essences)', and 'springing from a mere analysis of word-meanings',
+are only by equivocation equivalent. Conceptual essences are rather the
+fulfilling sense which is 'given' when the word-meanings (i.e. the meaningintentions of the words) terminate in corresponding, directly intuitive presentations, and in certain cogitative elaborations and formations of the same.
+Such analysis is not therefore concerned with empty thought-intentions,
+but with the objects and forms by which they are fulfilled. What it therefore offers us are not mere statements concerning elements or relations of
+meanings, but evident necessities concerning the objects thought of in these
+meanings, and thought of as thus and thus determined.
+These discussions point to a field of phenomenological analyses which
+we have already repeatedly seen to be unavoidable, analyses which bring
+self-evidence into the a priori relations between meaning and knowing, or
+between meaning and clarifying intuition. They will therefore also have
+to bring complete clarity into our concept of meaning, both by distinguishing meaning from fulfilling sense, and by investigating the sense of such
+fulfilment.
+
+: 213
+§22 Varying marks of understanding and the
+'quality of familiarity'
+Our conception presupposes a certain separation, even if not quite a sharp
+one, among the act-characters which confer meaning even in cases which
+lack intuitive illustration. One cannot indeed think that the 'symbolic presentations' which govern the grasp or the significant application of signs, are
+descriptively equivalent, that they consist in one undifferentiated character,
+the same for all expressions, as if only the sound of the words, the chance
+sensuous carriers of meaning, made all the difference. Examples of equivocal expressions readily show that we can effect and can recognize sudden
+changes of meaning, without in the least needing accompanying illustrations. The descriptive difference, here evidently apparent, cannot be the
+sensuous sign, which remains the same: it must concern the act-character,
+which is specifically altered. One can likewise point to cases where meaning
+remains identical while a word changes, in the case, e.g., of mere differences
+of idiom. Sensuously different signs here count as equivalent (we perhaps
+even speak of the 'same' word, only occurring in different languages), they at
+once greet us as the same, even before reproductive fancy can furnish images
+that illustrate their meaning.
+Such examples reveal the untenability of the view, plausible at first, that
+the note of understanding is no more ultimately than what Riehl called
+the 'character of familiarity', and what Höffding, not so suitably, called the
+'quality of familiarity. Words not understood are just as capable of coming
+before us in the form of old acquaintances: well-memorized Greek verses
+stick in our memories longer than our understanding of their sense, they
+appear familiar but are no longer understood. The missing grasp often comes
+in a flash afterwards, possibly some time before mother-tongue translations
+or other aids come up in memory, and the note of understanding now adds
+its obvious novelty to the note of familiarity, not altering the content sensuously, yet giving it a new mental character. One may similarly recall the
+way in which the reading or recitation of familiar poetry, unthinking at first,
+suddenly becomes charged with understanding. There are countless other
+examples which make evident the peculiar character of understanding.
+§23 Apperception as connected with expression and
+with intuitive presentations
+The grasp of understanding, in which the meaning of word becomes effective, is, in so far as any grasp is in a sense an understanding and an interpretation, akin to the divergently carried out 'objective interpretations' in which,
+by way of an experienced sense-complex, the intuitive presentation, whether
+percept, imagination, representation etc., of an object, e.g. an external thing.
+arises. The phenomenological structure of the two sorts of 'grasp' is, however,
+
+214 Expression and meaning
+somewhat different. If we imagine a consciousness prior to all experience,
+it may very well have the same sensations as we have. But it will intuit
+no things, and no events pertaining to things, it will perceive no trees and no
+houses, no flight of birds nor any barking of dogs. One is at once tempted to
+express the situation by saying that its sensations mean nothing to such a
+consciousness, that they do not count as signs of the properties of an object,
+that their combination does not count as a sign of the object itself. They are
+merely lived through, without an objectifying interpretation derived from
+experience. Here, therefore, we talk of signs and meanings just as we do in
+the case of expressions and cognate signs.
+To simplify comparison by restricting ourselves to the case of perception,
+the above talk should not be misread as implying that consciousness first
+looks at its sensations, then turns them into perceptual objects, and then
+bases an interpretation upon them, which is what really happens when we
+are objectively conscious of physical objects, e.g. sounded words, which
+function as signs in the strict sense. Sensations plainly only become presented objects in psychological reflection: in naïve, intuitive presentations
+they may be components of our presentative experience, parts of its descriptive content, but are not at all its objects. The perceptual presentation arises
+in so far as an experienced complex of sensations gets informed by a certain
+act-character, one of conceiving or meaning. To the extent that this happens, the perceived object appears, while the sensational complex is as little
+perceived as is the act in which the perceived object is as such constituted.
+Phenomenological analysis teaches us, further, that sense-contents provide,
+as it were, the analogical building-stuff for the content of the object presented by their means. Hence talk of colours, extensions, intensities etc., as,
+on the one hand, sensed, and as, on the other hand, perceived or imagined.
+Examples readily show that what corresponds in the two cases is in no sense
+the same, but only generically allied. The uniform colouring of a sphere as
+seen by us (i.e. perceived, imagined etc.), was never sensed by us.
+Signs in the sense of expressions rest on a similar 'interpretation'
+in their fre concepion. In the simpler case where an expression is understony,
+but is not as yet given life by intuitive illustrations, this first conception makes
+the mere sign appear before us as a physical object, e.g. as a sounded word,
+given here and now. On this first conception, however, a second is built,
+which goes entirely beyond the experienced sense-material, which it no longer
+uses as analogical building-material, to the quite new object of its present
+meaning. The latter is meant in the act of meaning, but is not presented in
+sensation. Meaning, the characteristic function of the expressive sign, presupposes the sign whose function it is. Or to talk pure phenomenology:
+meaning is a variously tinctured act-character, presupposing an act of intuitive presentation as its necessary foundation. In the latter act, the expression
+becomes constituted as a physical object. It becomes an expression, in the
+full, proper sense, only through an act founded upon this former act.
+
+215
+What is true in this simplest case of an expression understood and not as
+yet intuitively illustrated, must also hold in the more complex case where an
+expression is bound up with a corresponding intuition. One and the same
+expression, significantly used with or without illustrative intuition, cannot
+derive its meaningfulness from different sorts of act.
+It is certainly not easy to analyse the descriptive situation in certain finer
+gradations and ramifications that have been passed over here. It is extremely
+hard to achieve a right conception of the part played by illustrative presentations in confirming meaning-intentions or in conferring self-evidence on
+them, as well as their relation to the characteristic note of understanding or
+meaning, the experience which lends sense to an expression even in default
+of intuition. Here we have a broad field for phenomenological analysis,
+a field not to be by-passed by the logician who wants to bring clarity into
+the relations between meaning and object, between judgement and truth,
+between vague opinion and confirmatory evidence. The analysis in question
+will receive a thoroughgoing treatment later.®
+
+Fluctuation in meaning and the
+ideality of unities of meaning
+§24 Introduction
+In our last chapter we dealt with the act of meaning. But among the conclusions of our first chapter was a distinction between the act of meaning, on
+the one hand, and meaning itself, on the other, the ideal unity as against the
+multiplicity of possible acts. This distinction, like the others which go along
+with it - the distinction between expressed content taken in a subjective, and
+the same taken in an objective sense, and, in the latter respect, the distinction between content as significatum and content as nominatum - are in
+countless cases undoubtedly clear. This holds of all expressions which occur
+in the context of an adequately expounded scientific theory. There are, however, cases where the situation is different, which require particular consideration if they are not to plunge all our hard-won distinctions back into
+confusion. Expressions whose meaning shifts, especially such as are occasional or vague, here raise serious problems. To solve these problems by
+distinguishing between shifting acts of meaning, on the one hand, and ideal
+units of meaning, on the other, is the theme of the present chapter.
+§25 Relations of coincidence among the contents of
+intimation and naming
+Expressions may relate to the contemporary mental state of the person
+using them as much as they relate to other objects. They accordingly divide
+into those that also intimate what they name (or what they generally stand
+for), and those in whose case named and intimated contents fall asunder.
+Instances of the former class are interrogative, optative and imperative sentences, of the latter, statements relating to external things, to one's own past
+experiences, to mathematical relationships etc. If someone utters the wish
+'I should like a glass of water', this serves to indicate to the hearer the
+speaker's wish, which is also the object of the statement. What is intimated
+and what is named here coincide in part. I say 'in part', since the intimation
+obviously goes further. It extends to the judgement expressed in the words I
+
+Fluctuation in meaning and the ideality of unities of meaning 217
+should like etc.?. The like naturally holds of statements about the ideas,
+judgements, and surmises of the speaker which are of the forms I imagine
+that...
+', 'I am of the opinion that..?, 'I judge that..., 'I conjecture
+that..
+. A case even of total coincidence seems at first sight possible, in,
+e.g., the words 'the state of mind intimated by the words I am now uttering,
+though the interpretation of our example breaks down on closer examination. But intimation and the state of affairs asserted fall quite apart in
+statements such as 2 × 2 = 4'
+'. This statement does not say what is said by I
+judge that 2 × 2 = 4'. They are not even equivalent statements, since the one
+can be true when the other is false.
+One must of course stress that if the notion of 'intimation' is given the
+narrower sense defined above, the objects named in the above examples are
+not among the experiences they intimate. A man saying something about his
+contemporary mental state, communicates its presence through a judgement. Only as intimating such a judgement (whose content is that he wishes,
+hopes etc., this or that) is the man apperceived by the hearer as one who
+wishes, hopes etc. The meaning of such a statement lies in this judgement,
+whereas the inner experiences in question are among the objects judged
+about. If we limit intimation in the narrower sense to experiences which
+carry an expression's meaning, the contents of intimation and naming remain as distinct here as they are generally.
+§26 Essentially occasional and objective expressions
+The expressions which name the momentary content of intimation belong
+to a wider class of expressions whose meaning varies from case to case. This
+happens, however, in so peculiar a manner, that one hesitates to speak of
+'equivocation' in this case. The same words 'I wish you luck' which express
+my wish, can serve countless other persons to express wishes having 'the
+same' content. Not only do the wishes themselves differ from case to case,
+but the meanings of the wish-utterances do so too. At one time a person A
+confronts a person B, at another time a person M confronts a person N. If
+A wishes B 'the same' that M wishes N, the sense of the wish-utterances,
+which includes the idea of the confronting persons, is plainly different. This
+ambiguity is, however, quite different from that of the word 'dog' which at
+one time means a type of animal, and at another a foot or a grate.' The class
+of ambiguous expressions illustrated by this last example are what one usually
+has in mind when one speaks of 'equivocation'
+'. Ambiguity in such cases
+does not tend to shake our faith in the ideality and objectivity of meanings.
+We are free, in fact, to limit our expression to a single meaning. The ideal
+unity of each of the differing meanings will not be affected by their attachment to a common designation. But how do things stand in the case of
+the other expressions? Can we there still stick to self-identical meaningunities, elsewhere made clear in their opposition to varying persons and
+
+218 Expression and meaning
+their experiences, when here our meanings must vary with such persons and
+their experiences? Obviously we are here dealing with a case of unavoidable
+rather than chance ambiguity, one that cannot be removed from our language by an artificial device or convention.
+To promote clearness we shall define the following distinction between
+essentially subjective and occasional expressions, on the one hand, and objective expressions, on the other. For simplicity's sake we shall deal only with
+expressions in their normal use.
+We shall call an expression objective if it pins down (or can pin down) its
+meaning merely by its manifest, auditory pattern, and can be understood
+without necessarily directing one's attention to the person uttering it, or to
+the circumstances of the utterance. An objective expression may be in varying ways equivocal: it may stand in the stated relation to several meanings,
+so that it depends on the psychological context (on the chance drift of
+the hearer's thoughts, on the tenor of the talk already in progress and the
+tendencies it arouses etc.) which of these meanings it arouses and means. It
+may be that a glance at the speaker and his situation may help all this. But
+whether or not the word can be understood in one or other of such meanings does not depend on this glance as a sine qua non.
+On the other hand, we call an expression essentially subjective and occasional, or, more briefly, essentially occasional, if it belongs to a conceptually
+unified group of possible meanings, in whose case it is essential to orient
+actual meaning to the occasion, the speaker and the situation. Only by
+looking to the actual circumstances of utterance can one definite meaning
+out of all this mutually connected class be constituted for the hearer. Since
+we regularly understand such expressions in normal circumstances, the very
+idea of these circumstances, and of their regular relation to the expression,
+involves the presence of generally graspable, sufficiently reliable clues to
+guide the hearer to the meaning intended in the case in question.
+Among objective expressions we have, e.g., all expressions in theory, expressions out of which the principles and theorems, the proofs and theories
+of the 'abstract' sciences are made up. What, e.g., a mathematical expression
+means, is not in the least affected by the circumstances of our actual use of
+it. We read and understand it without thinking of a speaker at all. The case
+is different with expressions which serve the practical needs of ordinary life
+and with expressions which, in the sciences, prepare the way for theoretical
+results. I mean by the latter expressions with which the investigator accompanies his own thought, or acquaints others with his considerations and
+endeavours, with his methodical preparations and his provisional beliefs.
+Every expression, in fact, that includes a personal pronoun lacks an objective
+sense. The word 'I' names a different person from case to case, and does so
+by way of an ever altering meaning. What its meaning is at the moment, can
+be gleaned only from the living utterance and from the intuitive circumstances
+which surround it. If we read the word without knowing who wrote it, it is
+
+Fluctuation in meaning and the ideality of unities of meaning
+219
+perhaps not meaningless, but is at least estranged from its normal sense.
+Certainly it strikes us differently from a wanton arabesque: we know it to
+be a word, and a word with which whoever is speaker designates himself.
+But the conceptual meaning thus evoked in not what the word 'I' means,
+otherwise we could simply substitute for it the phrase 'whatever speaker is
+designating himself'. Such a substitution would lead to expressions, not only
+unusual, but also divergent in sense, if, e.g., instead of saying 'I am pleased'
+I said 'Whatever speaker is now designating himself is pleased'. It is the
+universal semantic function of the word 'I' to designate whoever is speaking,
+but the notion through which we express this function is not the notion
+immediately constitutive of its meaning.
+In solitary speech the meaning of 'I' is essentially realized in the immediate
+idea of one's own personality, which is also the meaning of the word in
+communicated speech. Each man has his own I-presentation (and with it
+his individual notion of I) and this is why the word's meaning ditters from
+person to person. But since each person, in speaking of himself, says I', the
+word has the character of a universally operative indication of this fact.
+Through such indication the hearer achieves understanding of the meaning,
+he takes the person who confronts him intuitively, not merely as the speaker,
+but also as the immediate object of this speaker's speech. The word 'I' has
+not itself directly
+• the power to arouse the specific I-presentation;
+this becomes fixed in the actual piece of talk. It does not work like the
+word 'lion' which can arouse the idea of a lion in and by itself. In its case,
+rather, an indicative function mediates, crying as it were, to the hearer
+'Your vis-à-vis intends himself'
+We must, however, add something to what has been said. Properly speaking, we should not suppose that the immediate presentation of the speaker
+sums up the entire meaning of the word I. The word is certainly not to be
+regarded as an equivocal expression, with meanings to be identified with all
+possible proper names of persons. Undoubtedly the idea of self-reference,
+as well as an implied pointing to the individual idea of the speaker, also
+belong, after a certain fashion, to the word's meaning. We shall have to admit
+that two meanings are here built upon one another in peculiar fashion. The
+one, relating to the word's general function, is so connected with the word
+that its indicative function can be exercised once something is actually presented: this indicative function is, in its turn, exercised for the other, singular
+presentation, and, by subsumption, makes the latter's object known as what
+is here and now meant. The former meaning can be called the indicating
+meaning, the latter the meaning indicated.
+What is true of personal pronouns is of course also true of demonstratives.
+If someone says 'this', he does not directly arouse in the hearer the idea of
+what he means, but in the first place the idea or belief that he means something lying within his intuitive or thought-horizon, something he wishes to
+point out to the hearer. In the concrete circumstances of speech, this thought
+
+220 Expression and meaning
+is an adequate guide to what is really meant. 'This' read in isolation likewise
+lacks its proper meaning, and is understood only to the extent that it arouses
+the notion of its demonstrative function (which we call its indicating meaning). In each case of normal use, its full, actual meaning can only grow out
+of the prominent presentation of the thing that it makes its object.
+We must grant, of course, that a demonstrative often works in a manner
+that can claim equivalence with an objective use. A 'this' in a mathematical
+context points to something determined in a conceptually fixed manner, that
+is understood as meant in this manner, without our needing to regard the
+actual utterance. A mathematical exposition, after expressly stating a proposition, may go on to say 'This follows from the fact that ...
+?. Here the
+proposition in question could itself have been substituted for the word 'this'
+without greatly altering the sense; this follows from the exposition's objective sense. One must of course attend to the continuous exposition since, not
+the intended meaning, but only the thought of an indication, belongs to the
+demonstrative considered by itself. Mediation by indicating meanings merely
+promotes brevity and increases mastery over the main drift of one's thoughtintentions. The same plainly does not apply in the common case where the
+demonstrative 'this' and similar forms stand for the house confronting
+the speaker, for the bird flying up before him etc. Here individual intuition,
+varied from case to case, must do duty: it is not enough to look back to previously uttered objective thoughts.
+In the sphere of essentially occasional expressions one has also the subjectbound determinations 'here', 'there', 'above', "below'
+' 'now', 'yesterday',
+"tomorrow'
+', 'later' etc. 'Here' (to think out a last example) designates the
+speaker's vaguely bounded spatial environment. To use the word is to refer
+to one's place on the basis of an intuitive, believing presentation of one's
+own person and location. This changes from case to case, and changes
+likewise from person to person, though each can say 'here'. It is again the
+general function of the word to name the spatial environment of the speaker,
+so that the genuine meaning of the word is first constituted in the variable
+presentation of this place. The meaning of 'here' is in part universal and
+conceptual, inasmuch as it always names a place as such, but to this universal element the direct place-presentation attaches, varying from case to case.
+In the given circumstances of speech, it acquires heightened intelligibility by
+subsumption under the conceptual indicating presentation of 'here'
+An essentially indicating character naturally spreads to all expressions
+which include these and similar presentations as parts: this includes all the
+manifold speech-forms where the speaker gives normal expression to something concerning himself, or which is thought of in relation to himself. All
+expressions for percepts, beliefs, doubts, wishes, fears, commands belong
+here, as well as all combinations involving the definite article, in which the
+latter relates to something individual and merely pinned down by class- or
+property-concepts. When we Germans speak of the Kaiser we of course
+
+Fluctuation in meaning and the ideality of unities of meaning
+221
+mean the present German Kaiser. When we ask for the lamp in the evening,
+each man means his own.
+Note. Expressions with essentially occasional meaning, as dealt with in
+this section, do not fit into Paul's useful division of expressions into those of
+usual and those of occasional meaning. His division is based on the fact
+'that the meaning which a word has in each application need not coincide
+with what usage accords in it in and for itself' (H. Paul, Prinzipien der
+Sprachgeschichte, p. 68). Paul has, however, included our essentially occasional expressions in his treatment, for he says: 'There are some words in
+occasional use which are essentially framed to designate the concrete, but
+which none the less lack their own relation to a definite concretum till
+individual application gives them one. Here belong personal pronouns,
+possessive and demonstrative adjectives, demonstrative adverbs, also words
+like "now".
+' "today", "yesterday" " It seems to me that occasional expressions
+in this sense fall outside of Paul's definitory antithesis. For it pertains to the
+usual sense of this class of expressions, that they owe their determinate
+meaning to the occasion, and are therefore occasional in a somewhat different sense. Expressions of usual meaning (in Paul's sense) can be divided
+into those usually univocal and those usually equivocal, and the latter into
+expressions usually varying among definite meanings assignable in advance
+(such as the casual equivoca 'cock', 'bear' etc.) and those in which this is not
+so, since their meaning is oriented in each case to the individual instance,
+though the manner of this orientation is a matter of usage.
+§27 Other sorts of fluctuating expressions
+The variation of essentially occasional expressions is heightened by the
+incompleteness with which they often express the speaker's meaning. The
+distinction between essentially occasional and objective expressions cuts across
+many other distinctions standing for new forms of ambiguity, the distinctions, e.g., between complete and incomplete (enthymematic) expressions,
+between expressions functioning normally and expressions functioning
+abnormally, between exact and vague expressions. The impersonalia of
+ordinary speech are good examples as to how apparently firm, objective
+expressions really vary subjectively in virtue of enthymematic abbreviation.
+No one would understand the sentence 'There are cakes' as he understands
+the mathematical sentence 'There are regular solids'. In the first case we do
+not mean that cakes exist absolutely and in general, but that there are cakes
+here and now - for coffee. 'It is raining', likewise, does not have the general
+meaning that rain is falling, but that it is doing so now, outside. What the
+expression lacks is not merely unspoken, it is not even expressly thought: it
+certainly belongs, however, to what our speech means. If additions are made,
+we plainly get expressions that must be called 'essentially occasional' in the
+sense defined above.
+
+222 Expression and meaning
+There is an even greater difference between the properly expressed content of speech, i.e. the content picked out and pinned down by the uniform
+meaning-functions of the words involved, and its meaning on occasions when
+expressions are so shortened as not to express complete thoughts without
+the aids given to understanding by the fortuitous occasion, e.g. 'Onward!',
+'You!'
+', 'Man alive!', 'But my dear, my dear' etc. Through the common intuitive situation in which both speaker and hearer find themselves, these last
+can supplement or differentiate mutilated and subjectively indeterminate
+meanings: the defective expressions thus become understandable.
+Among the distinctions relating to ambiguity of expressions, we mentioned those between exact and vague expressions. Most expressions used in
+ordinary life, such as 'tree'
+, "shrub'
+', 'animal', 'plant' etc., are vague, whereas
+all expressions integral to pure theories and laws are exact. Vague expressions have no single meaning-content, the same in all cases of their application: their meaning is oriented towards types, only partially conceived with
+clearness and definiteness, types which tend to vary from case to case, perhaps even in a single train of thought. The types, stemming from what
+are, or from what seem to be, genuinely unified fields, yield a number of
+concepts, more or less cognate or related, which emerge in turn according
+to the circumstances of our talk and its varied thought-promptings. These
+do not permit, for the most part, of definite identifications and distinctions
+such as might guard against unnoticed confusions among closely connected
+concepts.
+Similar to the haziness of such vague expressions, is the haziness of expressions standing for relatively simple genera and species of phenomenal
+properties, which shade continuously into one another, whether spatially,
+temporally, qualitatively or intensively. The typical characters which press
+in upon us in perception and experience, characters, e.g., of space-and timepattern, of colour- and tone-pattern etc., lead to significant expressions which,
+in virtue of the fluid transitions among such types (i.e. among their higher
+genera) must themselves be fluid. Within certain ranges and limits their
+application is unhesitant, i.e. in fields where the type appears clearly, where
+it can be evidently identified and evidently distinguished from remotely
+unlike characters, e.g. 'signal-red' and 'coal-black', andante and presto. But
+these fields have vague borders, and flow over into correlative spheres comprehended in the same genus, and so give rise to transitional regions where
+application varies and is wholly uncertain.
+§28 Variations in meanings as variations in the
+act of meaning
+We have become acquainted with various classes of expressions changeable in meaning, which count as subjective and occasional, since chance
+circumstances of speaking influence their change. To these expressions other
+
+Fluctuation in meaning and the ideality of unities of meaning
+223
+expressions stand opposed, which are, in a correspondingly wide sense,
+objective and fixed, their meaning being normally free from all variation. If
+we take this freedom from all variation quite strictly, only exact expressions
+are ranged on this side, whereas vague expressions and expressions which,
+for differing reasons, vary with the occasion, stand ranged on the other side.
+We have now to consider whether these important facts of fluctuation
+of meaning are enough to shake our conception of meanings as ideal (i.e.
+rigorous) unities, or to restrict its generality significantly. Those ambiguous
+expressions we called essentially subjective, in particular, as also our distinction between vague and exact expressions, might make us doubtful on this
+point. Do meanings themselves divide into objective and subjective, into
+meanings fixed and meanings changeable on occasion? Must we, in other
+words, so interpret this difference, with seeming obviousness, that it becomes one between meanings that are ideal unities, on the one hand, fixed
+species untouched by the flux of our subjective picturing and thinking, and
+such, on the other hand, as live submerged in the flux of subjective mental
+experiences, and are transitory events, at one time there, and at the next
+moment not?
+We shall have to look on such a notion as invalid. The content meant by
+the subjective expression, with sense oriented to the occasion, is an ideal unit
+of meaning in precisely the same sense as the content of a fixed expression.
+This is shown by the fact that, ideally speaking, each subjective expression is
+replaceable by an objective expression which will preserve the identity of
+each momentary meaning-intention.
+We shall have to concede that such replacement is not only impracticable,
+for reasons of complexity, but that it cannot in the vast majority of cases, be
+carried out at all, will, in fact, never be so capable.
+Clearly, in fact, to say that each subjective expression could be replaced
+by an objective expression, is no more than to assert the unbounded range of
+objective reason. Everything that is, can be known 'in itself". Its being is a
+being definite in content, and documented in such and such 'truths in themselves'. What is, has its intrinsically definite properties and relations, and if
+it has natural, thinglike reality, then it has also its quite definite extension
+and position in space and time, its quite definite ways of persisting and
+changing. But what is objectively quite definite, must permit objective determination, and what permits objective determination, must, ideally speaking,
+permit expression through wholly determinate word-meanings. To being-initself correspond truths-in-themselves, and, to these last, fixed, unambiguous assertions. Of course, to be able to say all this actually, would require,
+not merely the necessary number of well-distinguished verbal signs, but a
+corresponding number of expressions having precise meanings - in the strict
+sense of expressions. We must be able to build up all expressions covering
+all meanings entering into our theory, and to identify or distinguish such
+meanings with self-evidence.
+
+224 Expression and meaning
+We are infinitely removed from this ideal. One need only think of the
+defective way in which we pin down time- and space-positions, our necessary recourse to relations to previously given individual existents, these last
+themselves inaccessible to an exact pinning down without making use of
+expressions having an essentially subjective sense. Strike out the essentially
+occasional expressions from one's language, try to describe any subjective
+experience in unambiguous, objectively fixed fashion: such an attempt is
+always plainly vain.
+Plainly therefore, considered as such, meanings do not differ essentially
+among themselves. Actual word-meanings are variable, often changing in a
+single spell of thought, by their nature mainly adjusted to the occasion.
+Rightly seen, however, such change in meanings is really change in the act
+of meaning. In other words, the subjective acts which confer meaning on
+expressions are variable, and that not merely as individuals, but, more particularly, in respect of the specific characters in which their meaning consists.
+But the meanings themselves do not alter: this is in fact an absurd manner
+of speech if we adhere to our view of meanings as ideal unities, whether in
+the case of equivocal, subjectively defective expressions, or in the case of
+univocal, objectively fixed ones. This is not merely a view demanded by our
+ordinary orientation to fixed expressions, and by our talk of meanings which
+stay the same, whenever anyone uses the same expression; it fits in with the
+whole guiding aim of our analyses.
+§29 Pure logic and ideal meanings
+Pure logic, wherever it deals with concepts, judgements, and syllogisms, is
+exclusively concerned with the ideal unities that we here call 'meanings'. If
+we take the trouble to detach the ideal essence of meanings from their
+psychological and grammatical connections, if we try, further, to clear up
+their a priori relations of adequacy, founded in this essence, to the objective
+correlates that they mean, we are already within the domain of pure logic.
+This is clear from the start if we first think of the position logic takes up
+to the many sciences, the position of nomological science, concerned with
+the ideal essence of science as such, or, what is the same, the position of
+nomological science, of scientific thought in general, taken purely in its
+theoretic content and connection. It is clear, secondly, when we note that the
+theoretic content of a science is no more than the meaning-content of its
+theoretical statements, disembarrassed of all contingent thinkers and occasions of judgement, and that such statements are given unity by the theory's
+pattern, which in its turn acquires objective validity through the ideally
+guaranteed adequacy of its unified meaning to the objective correlate meant
+by it (which is 'given' to us in self-evident knowledge). Undeniably what we
+call 'meaning' in this sense covers only ideal unities, expressed through manifold expressions, and thought of in manifold act-experiences, but none the
+
+Fluctuation in meaning and the ideality of unities of meaning
+225
+less clearly separable from such chance expressions and from such chance
+experiences of thinking subjects.
+If all given theoretic unity is in essence a unity of meaning, and if logic is
+the science of theoretic unity in general, then logic evidently is the science
+of meanings as such, of their essential sorts and differences, as also of the
+ideal laws which rest purely on the latter. Among such essential differences
+we have those between meanings which have, and meanings which have no
+objects, between true and false meanings, and, among such laws, we have
+the pure 'laws of thought', which express the a priori connection between
+the categorial form of meanings and their objectivity or truth.
+This notion of logic as a science of meanings is of course at odds with the
+mode of speech and treatment of the traditional logic, which operates with
+psychological or psychologically slanted terms such as 'idea', "judgement',
+"affirmation', 'denial", "presupposition', 'inference' etc., and which thinks it
+is really only establishing differences of psychology and tracking down
+psychological laws relating to these. After the critical investigations of
+our Prolegomena we can no more be taken in by all this. It only shows how
+far logic still is from a proper understanding of the objects which make up
+its own true field of research, and how much it has still to learn from the
+objective sciences, whose essence it none the less claims to make theoretically intelligible.
+Where the sciences unfold systematic theories, when they no longer merely
+communicate the progress of personal research and proof, but set forth the
+objectively unified, ripe fruit of known truth, there is absolutely no talk of
+judgements, ideas and other mental acts. The objective researcher of course
+defines his expressions. He says: By 'vis viva', by 'mass'
+', by an 'integral', by
+a 'sine' etc., this or that is meant. But he only points thereby to the objective
+meaning of his expressions, he indicates what 'contents' he has in mind,
+which play their part as constitutive moments in the truths of his field. He is
+not interested in understanding, but in the concepts, which are for him ideal
+unities of meaning, and also in the truths, which themselves are made up out
+of such concepts.
+The investigator then propounds propositions, and naturally, in so doing,
+he asserts or judges. But he has no wish to speak of his own or of anyone
+else's judgements, but of the correlated states of affairs, and when his critical
+discussions concern propositions, he means by the latter the ideal meanings
+of statements. He does not say that judgements are true or false, but that propositions are so: his premisses are propositions, and so are his conclusions.
+Propositions are not constructed out of mental acts of presentation or belief: when not constructed out of other propositions, they ultimately point
+back to concepts.
+Propositions are themselves the elements of inferences. Here too there is a
+distinction between acts of inferring and their unified contents, syllogisms,
+i.e. the self-identical meanings of certain complex statements. The relation of
+
+226 Expression and meaning
+necessary consequence in which the form of an inference consists, is not an
+empirical-psychological connection among judgements as experiences, but
+an ideal relation among possible statement-meanings, among propositions.
+It 'exists' or 'subsists',
+', i.e. it is valid, and such validity is something without
+essential relation to an empirical thinker. If a natural scientist deduces a
+machine's working from the laws of the lever, gravitation etc., he no doubt
+experiences all sorts of subjective acts. What, however, he thinks of, and
+what he knits together in unity, are concepts and propositions together with
+their objective relations. An objective unity of meaning, i.e. one adequate to
+the objectivity which is self-evidently 'given'
+:, thereby corresponds to his subjective thought-connections: this is whatever it is, whether anyone realizes
+this in thought or not.
+This holds in general. Though the scientific investigator may have no
+reason to draw express distinctions between words and symbols, on the one
+hand, and meaningful thought-objects, on the other, he well knows that
+expressions are contingent, and that the thought, the ideally selfsame meaning, is what is essential. He knows, too, that he does not make the objective
+validity of thoughts and thought-connections, of concepts and truths, as if
+he were concerned with contingencies of his own or of the general human
+mind, but that he sees them, discovers them. He knows that their ideal
+being does not amount to a psychological 'being in the mind': the authentic
+objectivity of the true, and of the ideal in general, suspends all reality, including such as is subjective. If some scientists at times think differently on this
+point, they do so, not in their professional scientific settings, but on subsequent reflection. If, with Hume, we may hold that men's true beliefs are
+better documented by their deeds than by their words, then we may twit
+such thinkers with not understanding themselves. They pay no unprejudiced
+heed to what they think in their unreflective enquiries and demonstrations,
+but are led astray by the supposed authority of logic, with its psychologistic
+fallacies and subjectively distorted terminology.
+All theoretical science consists, in its objective content, of one homogeneous
+stuff: it is an ideal fabric of meanings. We can go even further and say that
+the whole, indefinitely complex web of meanings that we call the theoretical
+unity of science, falls under the very category that covers all its elements: it
+is itself a unity of meaning.
+If meaning, rather than the act of meaning, concept and proposition,
+rather than idea and judgement, are what is essential and germane in science, they are necessarily the general object of investigation in the science
+whose theme is the essence of science. Everything that is logical falls under
+the two correlated categories of meaning and object. If we speak in the
+plural of logical categories, we have only to do with the pure species distinguishable a priori within the genus of meaning, or with the correlated forms
+of categorially considered objectivity. In such categories the laws formulable
+in logic have their foundation. We have, on the one hand, such laws as
+
+Fluctuation in meaning and the ideality of unities of meaning
+227
+abstract from the ideal relations between meaning-intention and meaningfulfilment, and so from any possible knowledge-use of meanings, and consider only how meanings can be compounded to form novel meanings
+(whether 'real' or "imaginary')." We have, on the other hand, logical laws, in
+the more emphatic sense, which consider meanings in respect of their having
+or not having objects, in respect of their truth or their falsity, their consistency or their absurdity, to the extent that such things are merely determined
+by the categorial form of such meanings. Corresponding with these latter
+laws, we have equivalent, correlated laws for objects in general, objects determined in thought by mere categories. All valid assertions regarding existence
+and truth, that are capable of being framed in abstraction from all material
+of knowledge on a mere foundation of meaning-forms, find their place among
+such laws.
+
+The phenomenological and ideal
+content of the experiences of
+meaning
+§30 The content of the expressive experience taken
+in its psychological sense and in the sense of a
+unified meaning
+The essence of meaning is seen by us, not in the meaning-conferring experience, but in its 'content', the single, self-identical intentional' unity set
+over against the dispersed multiplicity of actual and possible experiences of
+speakers and thinkers. The 'content' of a meaning-experience, in this ideal
+sense, is not at all what psychology means by a 'content, i.e. any real part
+or side of an experience. If we understand a name - whether standing for
+what is individual or general, physical or psychic, existent or non-existent,
+possible or impossible - or if we understand a statement - true in content or
+false, consistent or absurd, believed or figmentary - then what either expression 'says' - the meaning which forms its logical content and which,
+in contexts of pure logic, is called either an idea or concept, or a judgement
+or proposition - is nothing which could, in a real sense, count as part of
+our act of understanding. This experience naturally has its psychological
+components, is a content, consists of contents, in the ordinary sense of psychology. Here belong primarily all the sensuous elements of our experience,
+the appearances of words, in their purely visual, auditory or motor content,
+and, in the next place, the acts of objective reference which locate such
+words in space and time. The psychic stuff here involved is well-known to be
+vastly manifold, varying greatly from one individual to the next, and for the
+same individual from one moment to another, even in respect of 'one and
+the same' word. The verbal presentations which accompany and support my
+silent thinking sometimes involve picturings of words spoken by my own
+voice, sometimes of letters written by me in shorthand or longhand - all
+these are individual peculiarities, and belong merely to the psychological
+content of my presentational experience.
+Among contents in this psychological sense are also many differences in respect of act-character, not
+always easily seized descriptively, such as the subjective difference which
+constitutes reference or understanding. If I hear the name 'Bismarck' it
+makes not the slightest difference to my understanding of the word's unified
+
+The phenomenological and ideal content of the experiences of meaning
+: 229
+meaning, whether I imagine the great man in a felt hat or coat, or in a
+cuirassier's uniform, or whatever pictorial representation I may adopt. It is
+not even of importance whether any imagery serves to illustrate my consciousness of meaning, or to enliven it less directly.
+Battling against a seductive notion, we laid it down that the essence of
+expression lies in a meaning-intention, and not in the more or less perfect,
+more or less close or remote, illustration that accompanies or fulfils that
+intention. If, however, such illustrations are present, they will be intimately
+fused with the meaning-intention. It is therefore understandable that our
+unified experience of the meaningfully functioning expression should, from
+case to case, reveal considerable psychological differences even on the meaning side, whereas its meaning remains strictly the same. We have also shown
+that there is something in the correlated acts which really corresponds to
+such selfsameness of meaning, that what we call a meaning-intention is not
+an undifferentiated character to which a connection with fulfilling intuitions
+first imparts an external differentiation. Meaning-intentions of intrinsically
+different character belong rather with differing meanings, or with expressions used with differing meanings, whereas all expressions understood with
+like sense are clothed with the same meaning-intention as an invariant
+mental character. Through this character, expressive experiences strongly
+differing in psychological make-up first become experiences endowed with
+the same meaning. Fluctuation of meaning here certainly involves restrictions which make no essential difference.
+§31 The act-character of meaning and the ideally
+unified meaning
+We have opposed what is psychologically common to what is psychologically variable, but we have not thereby hit off the distinction we wanted
+to clarify: that between the psychological and logical content of our expressions and expressive acts. For the psychological content as much includes what is constant from case to case as what varies with the occasion. It
+is not, therefore, our doctrine that an act-character which stays the same in
+all cases, is itself our meaning. What, e.g., the statement ' is a transcendental
+number'
+says, what we understand when we read it, and mean when we say
+it, is no individual feature in our thought-experience, which is merely repeated
+on many occasions. Such a feature is always individually different from case
+to case, whereas the sense of the sentence should remain identical. If we or
+others repeat the same sentence with like intention, each of us has his own
+phenomena, his own words and his own nuances of understanding. Over
+against this unbounded multiplicity of individual experiences, is the selfsame element expressed in them all, 'selfsame' in the very strictest sense.
+Multiplication of persons and acts does not multiply propositional meanings; the judgement in the ideal, logical sense remains single.
+
+230 Expression and meaning
+That we here insist on the strict identity of what is meant, and oppose it
+to the constant mental character of meaning it, does not spring from our
+personal fondness for subtle distinctions,
+, but from the firm theoretical belief'
+that so alone can we do justice to a fact fundamental for the understanding
+of logic. We are not here dealing with a mere hypothesis, justifiable only by
+explanatory fruitfulness; we are appealing to an immediately graspable truth,
+following in this the self-evidence which is the final authority in all questions
+of knowledge. I see that in repeated acts of presentation and judgement I
+mean, or can mean, the same concept or proposition: I see that, wherever
+there is talk of the proposition or truth that i is a transcendental number,
+there is nothing I have less in mind than an individual experience, or a
+feature of an individual experience of any person. I see that such reflective
+talk really has as its object what serves as a meaning in straightforward talk.
+I see lastly that what I mean by the sentence in question or (when I hear it)
+grasp as its meaning, is the same thing, whether I think and exist or not, and
+whether or not there are any thinking persons and acts. The same holds
+of all types of meanings, subject-meanings, predicate-meanings, relational
+and combinatory meanings etc. It holds, above all, in the case of the ideal
+properties which pertain primarily to meanings. Here belong, to mention a
+few only of the most important, the predicates true and false, possible and
+impossible, general and singular, determinate and indeterminate etc.
+The genuine identity that we here assert is none other than the identity of
+the species. As a species, and only as a species, can it embrace in unity
+(fUMBá)hEIv Eis Ev), and as an ideal unity, the dispersed multiplicity of individual singulars. The manifold singulars for the ideal unity Meaning are
+naturally the corresponding act-moments of meaning, the meaning-intentions.
+Meaning is related to varied acts of meaning - Logical Presentation to
+presentative acts, Logical Judgement to acts of judging, Logical Syllogism
+to acts of syllogism - just as Redness in specie is to the slips of paper which
+lie here, and which all 'have' the same redness. Each slip has, in addition to
+other constitutive aspects (extension, form etc.), its own individual redness,
+i.e. its instance of this colour-species, though this neither exists in the slip
+nor anywhere else in the whole world, and particularly not 'in our thought,
+in so far as this latter is part of the domain of real being, the sphere of
+temporality.
+Meanings constitute, we may say further, a class of concepts in the sense
+of 'universal objects'. They are not for that reason objects which, though
+existing nowhere in the world, have being in a Tótos oupávios or in a divine
+mind, for such metaphysical hypostatization would be absurd. If one has
+accustomed oneself to understand by 'being' only real being, and by
+'objects' only real objects, then talk of universal objects and of their being,
+may well seem basically wrong; no offence will, however, be given to one who
+has first used such talk merely to assert the validity of certain judgements,
+such in fact as concern numbers, propositions, geometrical forms etc., and
+
+The phenomenological and ideal content of the experiences of meaning 231
+who now
+asks whether he is not evidently obliged, here as elsewhere, to
+affix the label 'genuinely existent object' to the correlate of his judgement's
+validity, to what it judges about. In sober truth, the seven regular solids,
+are, logically speaking, seven objects precisely as the seven sages are: the principle of the parallelogram of forces is as much a single object as the city of
+Paris.?
+§32 The ideality of meanings is no ideality in the
+normative sense
+The ideality of meanings is a particular case of the ideality of what is specific
+in general. It has not the sense of normative ideality, as if we were here
+dealing with an ideal of perfection, an ideal limiting value, over against
+particular cases which realized it more or less approximately. No doubt the
+'logical concept'.
+, i.e. the term in the sense of normative logic, is an ideal in
+respect of its meaning. For the demand of the craft of knowledge runs: 'Use
+words with an absolutely selfsame meaning: exclude all meaning-variations.
+Distinguish meanings and keep them distinct in declarative thought, and
+employ sharply distinct sensible signs.'
+This prescription relates, however, as it only can relate, to the formation
+of meaningful terms, to care in the subjective sifting out and expression of
+one's thoughts. Meanings 'in themselves' are, as we have argued, specific
+unities, however much the act of meaning may vary: they themselves are not
+ideals. Ideality in the ordinary, normative sense does not exclude reality. An
+ideal is a concrete original that may exist, and that may confront one in
+reality, as when a young artist takes the work of a great master as the ideal
+that he relives and that he strives after in his own creations. Even where an
+ideal is not realizable, it is at least an individual in our presentative intention. The ideality of what is specific is, contrariwise, the complete opposite
+of reality or individuality; it represents no end of possible endeavour, its
+ideality lies in a 'unity in multiplicity'. Not the species itself, but the individual falling under it, can be a practical ideal.
+§33 The concepts meaning and concept (in the sense
+of species) do not coincide
+Meanings, we said, constitute a class of 'universal objects' or species. Each
+species, if we wish to speak of it, presupposes a meaning, in which it is
+presented, and this meaning is itself a species. But the meaning in which an
+object is thought, and its object, the species itself, are not one and the same.
+Just as in the sphere of individuals, we distinguish, e.g., between Bismarck
+himself and presentations of Bismarck, e.g. Bismarck - the greatest of German statesmen etc., so also, in the field of species, we distinguish between,
+
+232 Expression and meaning
+e.g., the number 4 itself and the presentations, i.e. meanings, which have 4
+as their object, as, e.g., the number 4 - the second even number in the numberseries etc. The universality that we think of, does not therefore resolve itself
+into the universality of the meanings in which we think of it. Meanings,
+although as such they are universal objects, fall, in respect of the objects to
+which they refer, into individual and specific meanings, or (to conform to a
+readily understandable linguistic preference) into individual and general meanings. Individual presentations, e.g., are therefore generalia, qua unities of
+meaning, though their objects are individualia.
+§34 In the act of meaning we are not conscious of
+meaning as an object
+In the actual experience of meaning an individual feature, a singular case of
+the species (we said) corresponds to the unitary meaning, just as to the
+specific difference Redness the aspect of red in the object corresponds. If we
+perform the act and live in it, as it were, we naturally refer to its object and
+not to its meaning. If, e.g., we make a statement, we judge about the thing it
+concerns, and not about the statement's meaning, about the judgement in
+the logical sense. This latter first becomes objective to us in a reflex act of
+thought, in which we not only look back on the statement just made, but
+carry out the abstraction (the Ideation) demanded. This logical reflection
+is not an act that takes place only under exceptional, artificial conditions: it
+is a normal component of logical thinking. What is characteristic of such
+thought is the context of theory, and the theoretical consideration of the
+latter, which is carried out in step-by-step reflections on the contents of the
+thought-acts just performed. A very common form of thoughtful pondering
+may serve as an instance: 'Is S P? That could very well be. But from this
+proposition it would follow that M is the case. This cannot be, and so what
+I first thought possible, that S' is P, must be false etc.' The italicized words
+should be noted, as well as the idealizations they express. This proposition,
+that S is P, which is the pervasive theme of discussion, is plainly not the
+fleeting moment of meaning in the thought-act in which the notion first
+occurred to us. Logical reflection rather sets in at later stages, and an identical propositional meaning is continuously meant in it, idealized and identhed in our unified thought-context, and thought of as one and the same.
+The same is the case wherever a unified theoretical demonstration is being
+wound up. We could utter no 'therefore' unless there was also a glance at
+the meaning-content of the premisses. In judging the premisses, we not
+merely live in our judgements, but reflect on their contents: only by glancing
+back at these does the conclusion appear 'motivated'. Thus and only thus
+can the logical form of the premisses - which of course is not stressed in that
+universal, conceptual way that finds expression in syllogistic formulae -
+determine with insight the drawing of the conclusion.
+
+The phenomenological and ideal content of the experiences of meaning
+233
+§35 Meanings 'in themselves' and meanings expressed
+We have so far preferred to speak of meanings which, as the normal, relational sense of the word suggests, are meanings of expressions. There is,
+however, no intrinsic connection between the ideal unities which in fact
+operate as meanings, and the signs to which they are tied, i.e. through which
+they become real in human mental life. We cannot therefore say that all
+ideal unities of this sort are expressed meanings. Wherever a new concept
+is formed, we see how a meaning becomes realized that was previously
+unrealized. As numbers - in the ideal sense that arithmetic presupposes
+neither spring forth nor vanish with the act of enumeration, and as the
+endless number-series thus represents an objectively fixed set of general
+objects, sharply delimited by an ideal law, which no one can either add to or
+take away from, so it is with the ideal unities of pure logic, with its concepts,
+propositions, truths, or in other words, with its meanings. They are an
+ideally closed set of general objects, to which being thought or being expressed are alike contingent. There are therefore countless meanings which,
+in the common, relational sense, are merely possible ones, since they are
+never expressed, and since they can, owing to the limits of man's cognitive
+powers, never be expressed.
+
+Investigation lI
+The ideal unity of the
+species and modern
+theories of abstraction
+
+'ollowing the discussions of the last Investigation, we grasp the ideal unit
+of a meaning in the lieht of the act-character of signification: this sienifica
+tion's peculiar 'tincture' distinguishes the meaning-consciousness of a given
+expression from that of one which differs in meaning. This does not of
+course mean that this act-character is the concrete reality upon whose basis
+the meaning as Species is constituted for us. The relevant concrete reality is
+rather the total experience of the understood expression, which is informed
+by this act-character as its animating 'tincture'. The relation between the
+meaning and the significant expression (or its 'meaning-tincture') is the same
+as the relation, e.g., between the Species Red and a red object of intuitive
+experience (or the 'moment' of red which appears in this object). When we
+mean Red in specie, a red object appears before us, and in this sense we look
+towards the red object to which we are nevertheless not referring. The moment
+of red is at the same time emphasized in this object, and to that extent we
+can again say that we are looking towards this moment of red. But we are
+not referring to this individually definite trait in the object, as we are referring
+to it when, e.g., we make the phenomenological observation that the moments
+of red in the separate portions of the apparent object's surface are themselves
+separate. While the red object and its emphasized moment of red appear
+before us, we are rather 'meaning' the single identical Red, and are meaning
+it in a novel conscious manner, though which precisely the Species, and not
+the individual, becomes our object. The same would apply also to a meaning
+in its relation to an expression, and an expression's meaningful orientation,
+whether this expression relates to a corresponding intuition or not.
+Meaning as a Species therefore arises out of the above-mentioned background through abstraction, but not through abstraction in that improper
+sense by which empiricist psychology and epistemology are dominated, a
+sense which altogether fails to seize what is specific, and whose inability to
+do so is even counted as a virtue. The issue of abstraction has a twofold
+relevance to a philosophical laying down of the foundations of pure logic. It
+is relevant in the first place since among the categorial distinctions of meanings which pure logic must essentially consider, we find a distinction which
+
+238 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+corresponds to
+the opposition between individual and universal objects.
+But it also has, in the second place, a particular relevance, since meanings
+as such, ie. meanings in the sense of specific unities, constitute the domain
+of pure logic, so that to misread the essence of the Species must in each case
+be to strike at the very essence of logic. It will accordingly not be unsuitable
+to tackle the problem of abstraction even at this early point in our introductory series of investigations, so as to assure the basic foundations of pure
+logic and epistemology by defending the intrinsic right of specific (or ideal
+objects to be granted objective status alongside of individual (or real) objects.
+This is the point on which relativistic, empiricistic psychologism differs from
+idealism, which alone represents the possibility of a self-consistent theory of
+knowledge.
+To talk of "idealism' is of course not to talk of a metaphysical doctrine,
+but of a theory of knowledge which recognizes the 'ideal' as a condition for
+the possibility of objective knowledge in general, and does not 'interpret it
+away' in psychologistic fashion.
+
+Chapter 1
+Universal objects and the
+consciousness of universality
+§I We are conscious of universal objects in acts
+which differ essentially from those in which we are
+conscious of individual objects
+Our own position has been indicated above in a few words; its justification
+should require few additional explanations. All that we maintain - the validity of the distinction between specific and individual objects, and the difference of the manner in which each type of objects is present to us, is brought
+clearly before our consciousness - has the guarantee of self-evidence. This
+self-evidence automatically emerges as soon as the relevant presentations
+are clarified. We need only refer to cases where individual or specific presentation are intuitively 'fulfilled', to be utterly clear as to the sorts of objects
+'meant' by such presentations, and as to what counts as an essential homogeneity or disparity in their sense. Reflection on both classes of acts simply
+makes plain whether or not there are essential differences in the manner in
+which they are performed.
+In the latter regard comparison shows that the act in which we mean the
+Species, is in fact essentially different from the act in which we mean the
+individual, whether, in this later case, we refer to a whole concrete thing,
+or to an individual piece or property attaching to it. There are, of course,
+certain phenomenal communities in either case. In either case the same concrete thing makes its appearance, and to the extent that it does so, the same
+sense-contents are given and interpreted in an identical manner, i.e. the same
+course of actually given sense and image-contents serves as a basis for the
+same 'conception' or 'interpretation', in which the appearance of the object
+with the properties presented by those contents is constituted for us. But the
+same appearance sustains different acts in the two cases. In the first case it
+provides the presentative basis for an act of individual reference, i.e. for an
+act in which we apply ourselves to the apparent thing itself, and 'mean' this
+thing or this feature, this part of the thing. In the latter case it provides the
+presentative basis for an act of conception and reference directed to a Species: i.e. while the thing appears, or rather the feature in the thing, it is not
+
+240 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+this objective feature, this feature here and now, that we mean. We mean its
+content, its 'Idea; we mean, not this aspect of red in the house, but Red as
+such. This act of meaning is plainly an act 'founded' on underlying apprehensions (see Investigation VI, 845); a new mode of apprehension has been
+built on the intuition of the individual house or of its red aspect, a mode of
+apprehension constitutive of the intuitive presence of the Idea of Red. And
+as the character of this mode of apprehension sets the Species before us as a
+universal object, so too there develop, in intimate connection with such an
+object, formations like 'red thing' (thing containing an instance of red), 'this
+case of red' (the red of this house) etc. The primitive relation between Species and Instance emerges: it becomes possible to look over and compare a
+range of instances, and perhaps to judge with self-evidence: In all these
+cases individual moments differ, but in each the same Species is realized:
+this Red is the same as that - specifically treated it is the same colour - and
+yet again this red differs from that one - i.e. individually treated, it is a
+different objective individual feature'. This distinction, like all fundamental
+logical distinctions, is categorial. It pertains to the pure form of possible
+objects of consciousness as such. (See also Investigation vI, ch. 6f.)
+§2 The indispensability of talk about universal objects
+The excesses of conceptual realism have led men to dispute, not merely the
+reality, but the objectivity of the Species. This is certainly quite wrong. The
+question as to whether it is possible or necessary to treat Species as objects
+can plainly only be answered by going back to the meaning (the significance,
+the sense) of the names standing for Species, and to the meaning of the
+assertions claiming to hold for Species. If these names and assertions can be
+interpreted as making the true objects of our intention individual, if the
+intention of the nominal and propositional thoughts which give them meaning can be thus understood, then we must yield to our opponents' doctrine.
+But it this is not so, it the semantic analysis of such experiences, shows that
+their direct, true intention is plainly not directed upon individual objects,
+and if in particular their universal relation to a range of individual objects is
+plainly shown up as merely an indirect pointing to logical connections whose
+content (sense) will first be unfolded in new thoughts, or which will require
+new expressions - then our opponents' doctrine is evidently false. Now
+in fact we cannot at all help distinguishing between individual singulars,
+like the 'things' of experience, and specific singulars, like the numbers and
+manifolds of mathematics, or like the presentations and judgements (the
+concepts and propositions) of pure logic. Number is a concept which, as has
+often been stressed, has 1, 2, 3 ... as its subordinate singulars. A number
+is, e.g., the number 2, not any group of two individual objects. If we mean
+these, even quite indefinitely, we should also say so; our thought will then at
+least march with our expression.
+
+Universal objects and the consciousness of universality 24l
+The difference between individual and specific singulars corresponds to
+the no less essential difference between individual and specific universals (or
+between individual and specific universality). These differences at once carry
+over into the field of judgement, and run through the whole of logic. Singular judgements divide into individually singular judgements such as Socrates
+is a man, and specifically singular judgements such as Two is an even number,
+or A Round Square is a nonsensical concept. Universal judgements divide
+into individually universal judgements such as All men are mortal, and specifically universal judgements such as All analytic functions can be differentiated,
+or All propositions of pure logic are a priori.
+These distinctions and others like them are quite irremovable. We are not
+merely dealing with abbreviated expressions: we cannot eliminate such difterences through any elaboration or circumscription.
+Inspection of each instance will, for the rest, yield the conviction that a
+Species really becomes an object in knowledge, and that judgements of the
+same logical forms are possible in relation to it, as is the case with individual
+objects. We may choose an instance from the group that concerns us particularly. Logical ideas, unitary meanings as such, are, as we said, ideal
+objects, whether they present what is universal or what is individual, e.g. the
+city of Berlin as an identical sense which recurs in talk and reference, or the
+direct idea of the theorem of Pythagoras (whose explicit utterance need not
+be carried out), or this very idea the theorem of Pythagoras.
+We, from our point of view, would point out that each such meaning
+certainly counts as a unit in our thought and that on occasion we pass evident
+judgements upon it as a unit: it can be compared with other meanings and
+distinguished from them. It can be an identical subject for numerous predicates, an identical term in numerous relations. It can be summed together
+with other meanings and can be counted as a unit. As self-identical, it can in
+its turn serve as the object for many new meanings. All these things are the
+same in its case as in the case of other objects, e.g. horses, stones, mental
+acts etc., that are not meanings. A meaning can be treated as self-identical
+only because it is self-identical. This argument we find unassailable: it
+applies of course to all specific unities, even to such as are not meanings.
+§3 Must the unity of the Species be regarded as a
+spurious unity? Identity and exact likeness
+We wish to follow tradition in upholding a strict view of the identity of the
+Species, in contrast with prevailing doctrines which pin their faith on the wide
+diffusion of improper uses of 'identity'. Very often we speak of the same thing
+in the case of exactly like things. We speak, e.g., of 'the same cupboard', 'the
+same dress', 'the same hat' in the case of exactly similar products framed on
+the same pattern, products, i.e., exactly like one another in such respects as
+interest us in connection with such things. We speak in this sense of 'the
+
+242 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+same conviction', 'the same doubt', 'the same question', 'the same wish' etc.
+etc. Such impropriety of usage is thought likewise to be present in talk of
+the 'same Species' and, in particular, in talk of the 'same meaning'
+• We speak
+of 'the same meaning' ('the same concept', 'the same proposition') in relation
+to a pervasively like meaning-experience, we speak of 'the same red' (red in
+general) 'the same blue' etc., in respect to a pervasively like colouring.
+Against this argument I object, that an improper use of identity in the
+case of like things, refers us back, through its very impropriety, to a proper
+use of the same term, i.e. to an identity. We find in fact that wherever things
+are 'alike', an identity in the strict and true sense is also present. We cannot
+predicate exact likeness of two things, without stating the respect in which
+they are thus alike. Each exact likeness relates to a Species, under which the
+objects compared, are subsumed: this Species is not, and cannot be, merely
+'alike' in the two cases, if the worst of infinite regresses is not to become
+inevitable. If we specify the respect of our comparison, we point by way of
+a more general class-term to the range of specific differences among which
+the one which appears in our compared members is to be found. If two
+things are 'alike' as regards form, then the Form-Species in question is the
+identical element, if they are 'alike' as regards colour, the Colour-Species is
+this element etc. etc. Not every Species has of course an unambiguous verbal
+expression, and so at times a suitable expression for a 'respect' is lacking,
+and to state it clearly might be difficult. We none the less keep it in view,
+and it governs our talk of 'alikeness'. It would of course appear as a total
+inversion of the true state of things, were one to try to define identity, even
+in the sensory realm, as being essentially a limiting case of 'alikeness'. Identity is wholly indefinable, whereas 'alikeness' is definable: 'alikeness' is the
+relation of objects falling under one and the same Species. If one is not
+allowed to speak of the identity of the Species, of the respect in which there
+is 'alikeness', talk of 'alikeness' loses its whole basis.
+§4 Objections to the reduction of ideal unity to
+dispersed multiplicity
+We now direct attention to another point. Should anyone wish to reduce talk
+about a single attribute to a subsistence of certain relations of exact likeness,
+we ask him to consider the difference which comes out in the following
+opposition. We make a comparison between:
+1. Our intention, when we grasp any group of intuitively like objects in
+unitary fashion, or when we recognize their exact likeness at a single glance,
+or when in single acts of comparison we recognize the likeness of one definite
+object to certain others and ultimately to all objects in the group,' and
+2. Our intention when, possibly basing ourselves on the same intuitive
+foundations, we apprehend as an ideal unity the attribute which constitutes
+the respect in which the things are alike or are compared.
+
+Universal objects and the consciousness of universality
+243
+It is plain that, in our two cases, the target of our intention, the object
+meant and named as subject of our assertion, is quite different. However
+many like objects may float before us in intuition or comparison, they and
+their 'alikenesses' are certainly not what we mean in our second case. What
+we mean is the 'universal, the ideal unity, and not these units and pluralities.
+The two intentional situations are utterly different, not merely logically, but
+also psychologically. In the second case no intuition of likeness, not even a
+comparison, is at all needed. I recognize this paper as paper and as white, and
+thereby make clear to myself the general sense of the expressions 'paper' and
+'white as such', but I need not carry out any intuitions of likeness nor any
+comparisons. One can say for the rest, no doubt, that these conceptual ideas
+would never have arisen had like objects never appeared together, nor been
+intuitively related by their likeness. This psychological fact is, however, totally
+irrelevant here, where the question weighed concerns what an attribute counts
+as in knowledge, and what it should count as in the full light of 'evidence'
+It is clear, further and lastly, that when we try to make plain an intention to
+a Species by somehow presenting singulars as belonging to groups of exact
+similars, such presented singulars only comprise a few members of such
+groups, and can never exhaust their total range. One may then well ask what
+will give unity to this range, what will make it a possible object for awareness
+and knowledge, if the unity of the Species altogether lapses, and together
+with it the thought-form of 'allness'
+', which gives the Species a bearing on
+the whole host of A's represented in our thought, which we refer to through
+the sense of the expression 'the totality of A's'. To point to the 'same"
+universally shared moment will of course not help us at all. It is numerically
+present as often as there are single objects represented within the range of
+the Species. How can anything unify if it must itself first be unified?
+We can also derive no assistance from the objective possibility of recognizing all members of the range to be like one another: it cannot give unity
+to this range for our thought and knowledge. For, as a possibility, it is
+nothing for our consciousness, unless we think of it and grasp it. But such a
+grasp would, on the one hand, presuppose the thought of the unity of the
+range, and this range would itself also confront us as an ideal unity. Each
+attempt to transform the being of what is ideal into the possible being of
+what is real, must obviously suffer shipwreck on the fact that possibilities
+themselves are ideal objects. Possibilities can as little be found in the real
+world, as can numbers in general, or triangles in general.
+The empiricistic attempt to dispense with Species as objects by having
+recourse to their extensions can therefore not be carried out. It cannot tell
+us what gives unity to such extensions. The following objection makes this
+particularly clear. The conception we are criticizing operates with 'circles of
+similars',
+', but makes too much light of the difficulty that each object belongs
+to a plurality of 'circles of similars', and that we must be in a position to say
+what distinguishes these 'circles of similars' among themselves. It is plain
+
+244 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+that, in default of a previously given Specific Unity, we cannot avoid a
+regress in infinitum. An object A is similar to other objects, to one object in
+the respect a, to another in the respect b etc. But such 'respects' do not
+imply that a Species is there, which effects unity. What then unifies the circle
+of similars determined, e.g., by Redness, as against the circle determined by
+Triangularity? The empiricistic conception only says: These are differing
+similarities. If A and B are similar in respect of red, and A and C in respect
+of triangularity, these similarities must differ in kind. But here we again
+come up against kinds. Similarities are compared, and form genera and
+species, just as their absolute members do. We should then have to have
+recourse to similarities of such similarities, and so on in infinitum.
+§5 Continuation. The controversy between John
+Stuart Mill and H. Spencer
+It has doubtless been felt often enough that psychologistic approaches which
+splinter specific unities into the multiplicity of their subordinate objects
+involve some difficulties: men have, however, acquiesced too readily in
+'solutions' of such difficulties. It is interesting to observe how J. Stuart Mill,?
+in opposition to his own psychologistic doctrine, wants to keep to talk about
+the identity of attributes, and to justify it against Spencer, who is much
+more consistent in only wanting to permit talk of exactly similar attributes.?
+The sight of different people does not arouse identical sensations in us, but
+only exactly similar ones: Spencer therefore thinks that the humanity in each
+such person must be a different attribute. The same should, however, apply,
+Mill objects, to the humanity of the same man at this moment, and a halfhour later. 'No', he says,
+if every general conception instead of being 'the One in the Many', were
+considered to be as many different conceptions as there are things to
+which it is applicable, there would be no such thing as general language.
+A name would have no general meaning, if 'man' connoted one thing
+when predicated of John and another though closely resembling thing
+when predicated of William.*
+The objection is valid, but it affects Mill's own doctrine no less. For a few
+lines further on he says: "The meaning of any general name is some outward
+or inward phenomenon, consisting in the last resort of feelings; and these
+feelings, if their continuity is for an instant broken, are no longer the same
+feelings in the sense of individual identity? Mill thinks he can easily escape
+the difficulty he has so sharply emphasized. 'What then,' he asks,
+is the common something which gives a meaning to the general name?
+Mr Spencer can only say: it is the similarity of the feelings, and I rejoin,
+
+Universal objects and the consciousness of universality
+245
+the attribute is precisely the similarity. The names of attributes are in
+their ultimate analysis names for the resemblances of our sensations
+(or other feelings). Every general name, whether abstract or concrete,
+denotes or connotes one or more of these resemblances.
+An extraordinary solution. Connotation therefore no longer consists in
+attributes in the ordinary sense of the word, but in these similarities. What
+has been achieved by this change-over? Each such similarity does not mean
+a momentary, individual feeling of similarity, but an identical one-in-many;
+it therefore presupposes what it should explain away. We have not even
+reduced the number of such inexplicabilities, since a distinct similarity corresponds to each distinct attribute. But to what extent can we even speak of
+a single similarity, since to each single case of comparison a particular similarity corresponds, so that an indefinite number of similarities pertains to
+each attribute? This leads to the question discussed above, as to what may
+underlie the unitary mutual belongingness of all these similarities, a question that need only be raised to show up the wrongness of the relativistic
+conception.
+Mill himself feels how dubious his explanation is, for he makes the following statements:
+It will not, probably, be denied, that if a hundred sensations are
+undistinguishably alike, their resemblance ought to be spoken of as one
+resemblance, and not a hundred resemblances that merely resemble one
+another. The things compared are many, but the something common to
+all of them must be conceived as one, just as the name is conceived as
+one, though corresponding to numerically different sensations of sound
+each time it is pronounced.
+Remarkable self-deception: as if by laying down a mode of speech we could
+decide whether a unitary thought-object corresponds to a multitude of acts
+or not, and as if our talk did not derive its unitary sense from an ideal unity
+of intention. Certainly there are many compared 'things' and certainly we
+must conceive what is common to them as one: but this 'must' plainly rests
+on the fact that this common element is one. And if this is true of the
+similarities, it is true of the undisguised attributes themselves, which must in
+this respect be essentially kept apart from the "feelings'. One must therefore
+cease to speak as if one were doing psychology where concepts are being
+investigated.
+'The question between Mr Spencer and me,' says Mill,
+is merely one of language, for neither of us believes an attribute to be a
+real thing, possessed of objective existence; we believe it to be a particular mode of naming our sensations, or our expectations of sensation,
+
+246 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+when looked at in their relation to an external object which excites them.
+The question raised by Mr Spencer does not, therefore, concern the
+properties of any really existent thing, but the comparative appropriateness, for philosophical purposes, of two different ways of using a name.
+We also, of course, do not believe in the reality of attributes, but we demand
+a somewhat keener analysis of what lies behind such 'ways of using a name',
+and of what establishes the 'appropriateness of names for philosophical
+purposes'.
+. Mill fails to see that the unitary sense of a name, and of every
+expression, is a Specific Unity, and we merely push the problem back a stage
+when we reduce the Unity of the Species to the unity of a verbal meaning.
+§6 Transition to the following chapters
+We have, in our last treatment, been forced to react critically to conceptions
+opposed to ours. In this we encountered a line of thought common to all
+forms of empiricistic theories of abstraction, however much they may otherwise differ in content. It seems necessary, however, to grant greater play to
+such criticism, so as to draw more profit from our conception of the essence
+of universal objects and universal presentations, in analysing and testing the
+various main types of modern theories of abstraction. Critically to point out
+errors in other thinkers' views will provide an opportunity to round off and
+complete our own conception, and at the same time to test its reliability.
+The empiricistic 'theory' of abstraction', like most parts of modern epistemological theory, suffers from the mixture of two essentially different
+scientific interests, one concerned with the psychological explanation of experiences, the other with the 'logical' classification of their thought-content or
+sense, and the criticism of their possible achievement as acts of knowing. In
+the former regard we seek to establish empirical bonds tying the thoughtexperiences in question to other facts in the flux of real happenings, facts
+responsible for them causally, or on which they exert effects. In the latter
+regard we are intent upon the 'origin of the concepts' which pertain to our
+words: we seek to clarify their 'true meaning' or significance through plainly
+establishing their intention in the sense of their fulfilments, which are first
+realized when suitable intuitions are adduced. To study the essence of these
+phenomenological connections is to lay bare the indispensable foundation
+for an epistemological clarification of the 'possibility' of knowledge. It is
+also, in our case, to give essential clearness to the possibility of making valid
+assertions regarding universal objects (or regarding individual objects as
+objects of corresponding universal concepts) and, in connection therewith,
+to set forth in self-evident fashion the correct sense in which a universal
+counts as an 'entity', and an individual as a thing ranged under universal
+predicates. If a theory of abstraction is to have an epistemological function, if
+it is to clarify knowledge, it must set forth the immediate descriptive situation
+
+Universal objects and the consciousness of universality 247
+in which a Species comes to consciousness, it must through this clarify the
+sense of names of attributes, and thence go on to resolve perspicuously the
+many misinterpretations that the essence of the Species has suffered. It will
+go astray from the start if it loses itself in empirical-psychological analyses
+of the abstractive process and its cause and effects, and if, rapidly dismissing
+the descriptive content of the abstractive consciousness, it directs its main
+concern to unconscious dispositions and hypothetical associative linkages.
+What generally happens in such cases is that the essential immanent content
+of the consciousness of universality, which could have been classified properly without more ado, goes disregarded and unmentioned.
+And, even if a theory of abstraction aims at the field of what is immanently discoverable in all true (and therefore intuitive) abstraction, and steers
+clear of the misguided confusion between essential (1.e. epistemologically
+claritying) and empirical (i.e. psychologically explanatory) analysis, it will
+still go astray from the start if it falls into the other confusion (strongly
+suggested by ambiguous talk of 'general representation') between phenomenological and objective analysis. What our acts of meaning merely assign to
+their objects, will be assigned to these acts themselves as their real (reelles)
+constituent. Here the regulative field of consciousness and its immanent
+essence are again covertly abandoned, and all given over to confusion.
+The following analyses will show that our sketchy characterization fits the
+most influential modern theories of abstraction, and that these really go
+astray for reasons that we have just summarily stated.
+
+The psychological hypostatization
+of the universal
+§7 The metaphysical and psychological
+hypostatization of the universal. Nominalism
+Two misunderstandings have dominated the development of doctrines concerning universal objects:
+First: the metaphysical hypostatization of the universal, the assumption
+that the Species really exists externally to thought.
+Secondly: the psychological hypostatization of the universal, the assumption that Species really exists in thought.
+The older nominalism, whether of an extreme or a conceptualistic type,
+attacked the first misunderstanding, the misunderstanding which underlies
+Platonic realism (in the sense in which this is traditionally conceived). To
+combat the second misunderstanding, especially in the form of Locke's
+abstract ideas, has inspired the development of the modern theory of abstraction since Berkeley's time, and has given it its definite trend towards extreme
+nominalism (which is now usually called 'nominalism'
+simpliciter, and
+opposed to conceptualism). It was thought needful, to avoid the absurdities
+of Locke's abstract ideas, altogether to reject universal objects as peculiar
+thought-unities, and universal presentations as peculiar acts of thought. Ignoring the difference between universal intuitions on the one hand - among
+which not only such abstract ideas, but the general images of traditional
+logic belong - and universal meanings on the other, men rejected 'conceptual
+presentations'
+', with their peculiar presentative intentions, if not in word,
+then at least in the sense of these words, and replaced them by individual
+presentations merely functioning in an extraordinary manner.
+Nominalism therefore adds itself, as a third misunderstanding, to our
+previous two: in various forms it seeks to transform what is universal in
+object and act of thought, into what is individual.
+These misunderstandings, in so far as they are still of actual interest, must
+be gone through in order. It lies in the nature of our subject-matter, as
+our discussions up to this point have made plain, that we cannot separate
+vexed issues regarding the essence of universal objects from issues regarding the essence of universal presentations. It is vain to seek to make out a
+
+249
+persuasive case validating talk about universal objects, if one does not also
+remove doubts as to how such objects can be presented, and if one does not
+further refute theories apparently proving, by scientific psychological analysis,
+that only individual presentations exist, that only individual objects therefore
+can be, and ever have been brought to consciousness, and that talk about
+universal objects can only be understood as fictitious or as gravely improper.
+We may leave aside, as long disposed of, the misunderstandings of Platonic
+realism. But the thought-motives pressing towards a psychologizing realism are
+obviously still operative, as appears particularly in the manner in which Locke
+tends to be criticized. We must go deeper into such motives in this chapter.
+§8 A deceptive line of thought
+The following line of thought might be opposed to our conception, not so
+much out of serious conviction, as in order to give an apagogic proof of the
+untenability of talk about Species as universal objects:
+If Species are nothing real (reales), and if they are also nothing in thought,
+then they are nothing at all. How can we talk about something if it does not
+at least exist in our thought? The being of the ideal is therefore obviously a
+being in consciousness; the name 'content of consciousness' rightly applies
+to it. As opposed to this, real being (reales Sein) is no mere being in consciousness, or being-a-content: it is being-in-itself, transcendent being, being
+outside of consciousness.
+We do not wish to lose ourselves in the erring paths of such a metaphysics. For us what is 'in' consciousness counts as real (real) just as much as
+what is 'outside' of it. What is real (real) is the individual with all its constituents: it is something here and now. For us temporality is a sufficient mark
+of reality. Real being and temporal being may not be identical notions, but
+they coincide in extension. We do not, of course, suppose that psychical
+experiences are in a metaphysical sense 'things'. But even they belong to a
+thinglike unity, if the traditional metaphysical conviction is right in holding
+that all temporal existents must be things, or must help to constitute things.
+Should we wish, however, to keep all metaphysics out, we may simply define
+'reality' in terms of temporality. For the only point of importance is to
+oppose it to the timeless "being' of the ideal.
+It is further clear that the universal, as often as we speak of it, is a thing
+thought of by us: it is not therefore a thought-content in the sense of a real
+(realen) constituent in our thought-experiences, and likewise not a thoughtcontent in the sense of an intension, but is rather an object that we think of.
+Is it not obvious that an object, even when real (real) and truly existent,
+cannot be conceived as a real part of the act which thinks it? And isn't
+even the fictitious and the absurd, whenever we speak of it, something we
+think of?
+It is naturally not our intention to put the being of what is ideal on a level
+with the being-thought-of which characterizes the fictitious of the nonsensical?
+
+250 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+The latter does not exist at all, and nothing can properly be predicated of it:
+if we none the less speak of it as having its own, 'merely intentional' mode
+of being, we see on reflection that this is an improper way of speaking.
+There are, in fact, merely certain necessary and valid connections among
+"objectless ideas'
+', whose analogy with truths governing ideas having objects,
+has prompted this talk of objects merely presented which do not genuinely
+exist. Ideal objects, on the other hand, exist genuinely. Evidently there is not
+merely a good sense in speaking of such objects (e.g. of the number 2, the
+quality of redness, of the principle of contradiction etc.) and in conceiving
+them as sustaining predicates: we also have insight into certain categorial
+truths that relate to such ideal objects. If these truths hold, everything presupposed as an object by their holding must have being. If I see the truth
+that 4 is an even number, that the predicate of my assertion actually pertains to the ideal object 4, then this object cannot be a mere fiction, a mere
+façon de parler, a mere nothing in reality.
+This does not exclude the possibility that the sense of this being, and the
+sense also of this predication, does not coincide exactly with their sense in
+cases where a real (reales) predicate, a property is asserted or denied of a real
+subject. Otherwise put: we do not deny but in fact emphasize, that there is a
+fundamental categorial split in our unified conception of being (or what is
+the same, in our conception of an object as such); we take account of this
+split when we distinguish between ideal being and real being; between being
+as Species and being as what is individual. The conceptual unity of predication likewise splits into two essentially different sub-species according
+as we affirm or deny properties of individuals, or affirm or deny general
+determinations of Species. This difference does not, however, do away with
+a supreme unity in the concept of an object, nor with the correlated concept
+of a categorial propositional unity. In either case something (a predicate)
+pertains or does not pertain to an object (a subject), and the sense of this
+most universal pertinence, together with the laws governing it, also determines the most universal sense of being, or of an object, as such; exactly as
+the more special sense of generic predication, with its governing laws, determines (or presupposes) the sense of an ideal object. If everything which has
+being is rightly recognized as having being, and as having such and such
+a being, in virtue of the evidence with which, in thought, we apprehend it
+as being, then without doubt we may not reject the self-justifying claims of
+ideal being. No interpretative skill in the world can in fact eliminate ideal
+objects from our speech and our thought.
+§9 Locke's doctrine of abstract ideas
+The psychological hypostatization of the universal in Locke's philosophy
+had, as we saw, an extraordinary historical influence. It grew out of the
+following line of thought:
+
+The psychological hypostatization of the universal 25l
+In actual reality nothing like a universal exists; only individual things, arranged into genera and species by their exact or less exact resemblances, have
+real existence. If we remain within the sphere of what is immediately given
+and experienced, in the sphere of "ideas' in Locke's sense, phenomenal things
+are complexes of "simple ideas, in which the same simple ideas, the same
+phenomenal attributes, recur simply or in groups. Things now receive names,
+and not merely proper names, but for the most part common names; the fact
+that many things can be unambiguously named by one and the same universal
+name, shows that a universal sense or "idea' must correspond to such a name.
+If we consider how the general name applies to the objects of the pertinent class, it becomes plain that it does so because one and the same attribute
+(or complex of attributes) is common to all these objects. The univocality of
+the universal name extends only as far as objects are named by way of this
+and no other attribute (or idea of an attribute).
+The universal thought carried out in such universal meanings therefore
+presupposes that we have the power of abstraction, ie. the power to separate off partial ideas, ideas of such attributes, from the phenomenal things
+given to us as complexes of attributes, and to associate them with words of
+which they are the general meanings. The possibility and actuality of such
+separation is guaranteed by the fact that each universal name has its own
+meaning, conveys an attributive idea exclusively bound up with itself; as
+also by the fact that we can at will pick out any attributes and make them
+the specific meanings of new general names.
+The formation of 'abstract' or 'universal ideas, those 'creations' and 'artefacts' of the word, is indeed not without difficulty:
+they do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For
+example: does it not require some pains and skill to form the general
+idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive and difficult) for it must be neither oblique, nor rectangle, neither
+equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once.
+In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist, an idea wherein
+some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together.
+It is true, the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas, and
+makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of communication
+and enlargement of knowledge... But yet one has reason to suspect
+such ideas are marks of our imperfection.
+§10 Criticism
+In this line of thought several fundamental errors are intertwined. The basic
+defect of Locke's theory of knowledge, and of the English theory of knowledge in general, its unclear concept of 'idea', is very plainly revealed in its
+consequences. We note the following points:
+
+252 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+1. An 'idea' is defined as any object of interior perception: 'Whatever the
+mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought or
+understanding, that I call idea.* By a ready extension - perception need not
+actually follow - every possible object of interior perception, and finally
+every content in the immanent-psychological sense, is ranged under the rubric
+of 'idea'.
+2. 'Idea' also has for Locke the narrower sense of presentation, in the
+sense which marks out a very restricted class of experiences, i.e. intentional
+experiences. Each idea is an idea of something, it presents something.
+3. Locke confuses presentation with what is as such presented, appearance with what appears, the act or act-phenomenon, as a really immanent
+element in the stream of consciousness, with the object intended. The apparent object therefore becomes an idea, its attributes partial ideas.
+4. The confusion mentioned in 3 is connected with the fact that Locke
+confounds the attributes pertaining to the object with the immanent contents constituting the sensuous kernel of the presentative act, the sensations
+on which the interpretative act puts an objective interpretation, or by way of
+which it putatively perceives, or otherwise envisages, the object's attributes.
+5. Under the rubric of 'general idea, properties as specific attributes, and
+properties as objective aspects, are confused
+6. It is of great significance, lastly, that Locke altogether fails to distinguish
+between an idea in the sense of an intuitive presentation (a phenomenon, a
+floating image), and an idea in the sense of a significant reference. This latter
+likewise can be interpreted either as meaning-intention or as a meaningfulfilment, for these two also are never separated by Locke.
+These confusions (still rampant in contemporary epistemology) gave
+Locke's doctrine of abstract general ideas an air of obviousness which could
+impose on its author. Objects of intuitive presentation, animals, trees etc.,
+conceived as they appear to us, and not as being the patterns of 'primary
+qualities' and "powers' which real things are for Locke - these certainly
+are not the things which appear in our intuitive presentation - cannot be
+allowed by us to be complexes of 'ideas, and therefore themselves 'ideas.
+They are not objects of possible 'interior perception', as if they constituted a
+complex phenomenological content in consciousness, in which they could be
+picked out as real data.
+We should not be led astray by the fact that we make an equivocal use
+of the same words to refer to the sensuously apparent determinations of
+things, and to the presentative aspects of our percepts, and that we at one
+time speak of 'colour, 'smoothness', 'shape' etc., in the sense of objective
+properties, and at another time in the sense of sensations. An opposition of
+principle divides the two. Sensations, animated by interpretations, present
+objective determinations in corresponding percepts of things, but they are not
+themselves these objective determinations. The apparent object, as it appears
+in the appearance, transcends this appearance as a phenomenon. We may be
+
+253
+led by certain reasons to distinguish apparent determinations into merely
+apparent and genuine ones, perhaps as in the sense of the traditional distinction between secondary and primary qualities. The subjectivity of the secondary qualities can never amount to the nonsensical assertion that they are
+real constituents of phenomena. The apparent objects of external intuition
+are meant unities, not "ideas' or complexes of ideas in the Lockean sense of
+these terms. Naming by means of universal names does not, moreover, consist
+in picking out particular universal ideas from such complexes of ideas, and
+attaching them to words as their 'meanings'. The naming which, in the true
+sense of the word, rests on intuition, may direct itself specially to an isolated
+attribute, but this self-direction is an act of meaning in a sense analogous to
+the sense in which the self-direction to the concrete object is itself such an
+act of meaning. This act of meaning means something for itself, which, in
+the meaning of the concrete object, is, we may say, meant along with something else. But this does not mean that it achieves a separation.
+We may say generally: what an intention is directed to, is thereby made
+the intention's peculiar object. But to say that it is made the intention's
+peculiar object, and to say that it is made an object separated from all other
+objects, are two totally different assertions. Properties understood as attributive aspects, are plainly inseparable from their concrete basis. Contents of
+this sort cannot exist independently, but they can none the less be independently meant. The intention does not separate, but it refers, and what it refers
+to, it eo ipso shuts off to the extent that it means this and nothing else. This
+holds of every sort of meaning, and one must be clear that not every meaning is an intuitive beholding, and not every intuition an adequate beholding
+of its object, embracing that object perfectly and exhaustively in itself.
+All this does not suffice to decide our question. The single individual
+objective aspect is not the attribute in specie. If the former, the aspect, is
+meant, the meaning is individual in character, if the Species is meant, the
+meaning is specific in character. Naturally again the emphasis which the
+attributive aspect receives, does not mean a separation of the same. Our
+meaning, in the latter case, certainly in a fashion directs itself to the apparent aspect, but in an essentially new manner; the intuitive foundation being
+identical, the act-character makes all the difference. Similar differences are
+observable between the generic idea in the usual sense (e.g. tree, horse etc.),
+and direct presentations of things or concrete realities in general. Everywhere we must distinguish between simple intuitions, whether total or partial, which form our foundation, and the changing act-characters, which, as
+thoughts, are built on this foundation, without the least change in their
+sensuous, intuitive basis.
+For a closer analysis we should here have to start discussing many more
+distinctions of acts than we need in criticizing Locke. The intuitively-singular
+is on one occasion directly meant as that thing there, on another occasion as
+sustaining a universal, as subject of an attribute or as individual member of
+
+254 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+an empirical class, on yet another occasion the universal itself is meant, e.g.
+the Species of an attribute stressed in a partial intuition, or, yet again, such
+a species is meant as a sub-species of an ideal genus etc. One and the same
+sensuous intuition can on occasion serve as a basis for all these modes of
+conceiving.
+To these differences of genuine thought, in which manifold categorial forms
+are actually constituted, correspond the symbolic intentions of our expressions. As merely asserting and meaning, we can say and mean everything
+which we perhaps do not actualize at all in the genuine, intuitively fulfilled
+manner. Our 'thought' is then of a 'merely symbolic', 'non-authentic' sort.
+Locke cannot do justice to this phenomenological state of things. The
+sensuous-intuitive image, through which the significant intention fulfils itself,
+is taken by Locke, as said above (sixth confusion), for the meaning itself.
+Our last assertion confirms and explains our objection. For Locke's identification is inept, whether we understand by a 'meaning' the intending or the
+fulfilling variety. The former lies in an expression as such; its significant
+intention constitutes a universal presentation in the sense of a universal
+meaning, and as such it is possible without any actual intuitive foundation.
+If fulfilment now enters, our discussions show that the sensuous-intuitive
+image is not the fulfilment of meaning itself, but the mere foundation for
+this fulfilling act. To the universal thought, merely symbolically realized, i.e.
+the mere meaning of the universal word, the 'authentically' carried out
+thought corresponds, which in its turn rests on an act of sensuous intuition,
+without being identical with the latter.
+Now we completely see the deceptive confusions in Locke's train of thought.
+From the obvious truth that each universal name has its own peculiar universal meaning, he passes on to assert that a general idea corresponds to
+every general name, which idea is for him simply a separate intuitive presentation (a separate appearance) of an attribute. This follows necessarily from
+the fact that he confuses the word's meaning, whose fulfilment tests this
+appearance, with the appearance itself: the separated meaning (whether
+intending or fulfilled) of the attribute, becomes a separated intuition of this
+attribute. Since Locke fails to hold apart an attribute's appearance from
+the attribute which appears (Confusion 3), and as little holds apart an attributive aspect from an attribute specifically understood (Confusion 5), he
+indeed achieves a psychological hypostatization of the universal in his 'general
+idea, he makes of the universal a real datum in consciousness.
+§I1 Locke's universal triangle
+These errors avenge themselves in the absurdities into which, in his example
+of the universal idea of a triangle, they plunge the great thinker. This idea is
+the idea of a triangle which is neither rectangular nor acute-angled etc. So
+it readily seems, if one first takes the universal idea of the triangle for the
+
+The psychological hypostatization of the universal 255
+universal meaning of the name, and then replaces the latter in consciousness
+by the separated intuitive presentation, or by the intuited separate existence
+of the attributive complex in question. Thus we might have an interior image
+which is triangular and no more, the generic attributes torn adrift from their
+specific differences, and turned into a psychic reality.
+That this conception is not merely false but nonsensical, need scarcely be
+said. The inseparability of the universal, its incapacity for being made real,
+holds a priori, it is rooted in the essence of the Genus as such. One might
+perhaps say more impressively, with Locke's example in view, that geometry
+uses the definition of 'triangle' to prove a priori that every triangle is either
+acute-angled or obtuse-angled or right-angled, etc. It knows no distinction
+between triangles 'in reality' and triangles 'in idea'.
+•, i.e., triangles floating as
+pictures before the mind. What is incompatible a priori, is absolutely so, and
+so also in a picture. The adequate picture of a triangle is itself a triangle.
+Locke therefore is deceived when he thinks to combine his express recognition of the plain non-existence of a real universal triangle, with its existence
+in our presentations. He forgets that mental existence is also real existence,
+and that, when being-presented is opposed to being-real one does not and
+ought not to point to the opposition between the mental and the extramental, but to the opposition between what is presented, in the sense of
+being merely meant, and what is true, in the sense of corresponding to such
+a meaning. To be meant does not, however, mean to have mental reality.
+Locke should, above all, have reminded himself that a triangle is something which has triangularity, but that triangularity is not itself something
+that has triangularity. The universal idea of triangle, as an idea of triangularity, is therefore the idea of what every triangle as such possesses, but it is
+not therefore itself the idea of a triangle. If one calls the general meaning a
+concept, the attribute itself the concept's content, and every subject having
+this attribute the concept's object, one can put the point in the form: It is
+absurd to treat a concept's content as the same concept's object, or to
+include a concept's content in its own conceptual extension.°
+One sees further how Locke piles up his absurdities in not only thinking
+of the universal triangle as a triangle stripped of all specific differences, but
+also as a triangle which unites all such differences together, and so puts into
+the content of the concept of triangle the extension of the sub-species which
+divide it. This is, however, merely a passing lapse in Locke. It is plain at
+least that difficulties regarding universal meanings give no ground for
+serious complaints regarding the 'imperfections' of the human mind.
+Note: How little the errors of the Lockean doctrine of general ideas have
+been clarified up to date, is shown among other things by the recent treatment of the doctrine of universal objects, which, following Erdmann, are
+now accorded a place alongside of individual objects, though not indeed in
+our sense. Thus Twardowski thinks that, what is presented in the universal
+idea "is an object' specifically peculiar to it' and that this is 'a group of
+
+256 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+constituents which several objects have in common. The object of the
+universal idea is 'a part of the object of an idea subordinated to it, which
+stands in relation of exact likeness to definite parts of the objects of other
+individual ideas'. The general idea is "to this extent spurious' that it is held
+by many to be incapable of an actual carrying-out.
+But that there nevertheless are such ideas, must be granted by the man
+who sees that we can say something about their objects. This we plainly
+can do. No one can represent a universal triangle intuitively, a triangle
+neither right-angled, nor obtuse-angled nor acute-angled, which is without colour or definite size, but it is as plain that we have an indirect idea
+of such triangles as that we have indirect ideas of a female stallion' or of
+a steel cannon made of wood etc.
+We read further that 'Plato's ideas are no more than objects of universal
+ideas. Plato attributes existence to these objects. This we no longer do. The
+object of the universal idea is represented by us, but does not exist..?1°
+Here it is clear that Locke's absurdities are with us again. We certainly
+have an 'indirect presentation' of 'a universal triangle'
+', for this merely refers
+to the meaning of that nonsensical expression. But one would not grant that
+the universal presentation of the triangle is this indirect presentation of
+a universal triangle, or that it is the presentation of a triangle concealed in
+all triangles, but without being acute-angled, obtuse-angled etc. Twardowski
+is consistent in rejecting the existence of universal objects - he is right in so
+regarding the absurd objects he has substituted for them. But what is the
+case in regard to such existential propositions as There are concepts, There
+are propositions, There are algebraic numbers etc. For Twardowski as for us,
+existence does not mean the same as real (reale) existence.
+It is also hard to understand how the universal object, which is supposed
+to be a "constituent' of the subsumed concrete object, should lack intuitive
+givenness, and should not rather share in the intuitive quality of this concrete object. If a total content is intuited, all its single traits are intuited
+together with, and in it, and many are independently noted, 'set in relief',
+and so made objects of their own proper intuitions. May we no longer say
+that we see the tree's green colouring in the tree precisely as we see the green
+tree? The notion of Green can indeed not be seen, whether this be the notion
+in the sense of the meaning of 'green', or the notion in the sense of the attribute green, the Species Green. But it is also absurd to treat concept as a part
+of the individual object, the 'object of the concept'.
+§12 The doctrine of generic images
+The above discussions have made clear without further analysis that the other
+way of hypostatizing the universal, which has played its part in traditional
+
+257
+logic under the rubric of 'generic images', is infected with the same absurdities as Locke's notion and has grown out of similar confusions. The vagueness and elusiveness of generic images in respect of specitic differences makes
+no difference to their concreteness. Vagueness is a definite feature of certain
+contents, it consists in a certain mode of continuity in qualitative transition.
+And as to elusiveness, it makes no difference to the concreteness of each
+rapidly changing content. The essence of the matter does not reside in changing contents, but in the unity of an intention directed to constant attributes.
+
+§13 Nominalistic theories which regard abstraction
+as an achievement of attention
+We now pass on to analyse an influential theory of abstraction, first framed
+by J. S. Mill in his polemic against Hamilton, according to which abstraction is merely an achievement of attention. There are, it is held, neither general presentations nor general objects, but we may, while forming intuitive
+presentations of individual concrete things, devote exclusive attention or
+exclusive interest to various parts and sides of our object. The attribute
+which neither can actually exist 'in and for itself', i.e. separately, nor be
+represented as such, can be regarded by itself, can become the object of an
+exclusive interest which ignores all associated attributes. The double use of
+the word 'abstraction', positive in one content and negative in another,
+thereby becomes understandable.
+These main lines of thought are then supplemented by treatments of the
+associative linkage of general names with stressed traits of intuited objects,
+and of the influence which names exert on such traits, whether by arousing
+them reproductively, or by habitually concentrating attention on them. It is
+pointed out how they dominate and direct the drift of further association
+through the content of such stressed attributes, and so promote unity of
+theme in the course of our thinking. The detailed execution of these thoughts
+is best taken from the above-mentioned polemic of Mill, who for the rest
+borrows his notion of abstraction as a function of attention from his conceptualistic opponent Hamilton. We read: "The formation of a concept,
+does not consist of separating the attributes which are said to compose it
+from all other attributes of the same object, and enabling us to conceive
+those attributes, disjoined from any others. We neither conceive them, nor
+think them, nor cognize them in any way, as a thing apart, but solely as
+forming, in combination with numerous other attributes, the idea of an
+individual object. But, though thinking them only as part of a larger ag
+glomeration, we have the power of fixing our attention on them, to the
+neglect of the other attributes with which we think them combined. While
+
+259
+the concentration of attention actually lasts, if it is sufficiently intense, we
+may be temporarily unconscious of any of the other attributes, and may
+really, for a brief interval, have nothing present to our mind but the attributes constituent of the concept. In general, however, the attention is not
+so completely exclusive as this: it leaves room in consciousness for other
+elements of the concrete idea: though of these the consciousness is faint, in
+proportion to the energy of the concentrative effort, and the moment the
+attention relaxes, if the same concrete idea continues to be contemplated, its
+other constituents come out into consciousness. General concepts, therefore, we have, properly speaking, none; we have only complex ideas of
+objects in the concrete: but we are able to attend exclusively to certain parts
+of the concrete idea: and by that exclusive attention, we enable those parts
+to determine exclusively the course of our thoughts as subsequently called
+up by association; and are in a condition to carry on a train of meditation
+or reasoning relating to those parts only, exactly as if we were able to
+conceive them separately from the rest.
+'What principally enables us to do this is the employment of signs, and
+particularly the most efficient and familiar kind of signs, viz., Names."
+We read further, in connection with a passage from Hamilton's Lectures:?
+The rationale of this is, that when we wish to be able to think of objects
+in respect of certain of their attributes - to recall no objects but such as
+are invested with those attributes, and to recall them with our attention directed to those attributes exclusively - we effect this by giving to
+that combination of attributes, or to the class of objects which possess
+them, a specific name. We create an artificial association between those
+attributes and a certain combination of articulate sounds, which guarantees to us that when we hear the sound, or see the written characters
+corresponding to it, there will be raised in the mind an idea of some
+object possessing those attributes, in which idea those attributes alone
+will be suggested vividly to the mind, our consciousness of the remainder of the concrete idea being faint. As the name has been directly
+associated only with those attributes, it is as likely, in itself, to recall
+them in any one concrete combination as in any other. What combination it shall recall in the particular case, depends on recency of experience, accidents of memory, or the influence of other thoughts which
+have been passing, or are even then passing, through the mind: accordingly, the combination is far from being always the same, and seldom
+gets itself strongly associated with the name which suggests it; while the
+association of the name with the attributes that form its conventional
+signification is constantly becoming stronger. The association of that particular set of attributes with a given word, is what keeps them together
+in the mind by a stronger tie than that with which they are associated
+with the remainder of the concrete image. To express the meaning in
+
+260 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+Sir W. Hamilton's phraseology, this association gives them an unity in
+our consciousness. It is only when this has been accomplished, that we
+possess what Sir W. Hamilton terms a concept: and this is the whole of
+the mental phenomenon involved in the matter. We have a concrete representation, certain of the component elements of which are distinguished
+by a mark, designating them for special attention; and this attention, in
+cases of exceptional intensity, excludes all consciousness of the others.
+§14 Objections to any and every form of nominalism.
+(a) The lack of a descriptive fixation of aims
+We see from the above, and from similar expositions, how, despite great
+elaboration, no attempt has really been made to pin down what is descriptively given and what demands clarification, and to relate the two to one
+another. Let us once more run through our own undoubtedly clear, natural
+train of thought. What we are given are certain differences in the field of
+names: among others, the difference between such names as name what is
+individual, and such as name what is specific. If we confine ourselves, for
+the sake of simplicity to direct names ('proper names' in an extended sense
+of the word), names like 'Socrates' or "Athens', on the one hand, stand
+opposed to names like 'Four' (the number-Four as a single member of the
+number-series), 'C' (the note C as one member of the musical scale), 'Red'
+(as the name of one colour), on the other. To these names certain meanings
+correspond, and through these we refer to objects. What these named objects
+are can, one would imagine, not be in doubt. In the one case it is the person
+Socrates, the city of Athens, or any other individual object, in the other case
+the Number Four, the note C, the colour Red, or any other ideal object.
+What we mean by the significant use of words, what objects we name by
+them, and what these objects count as when we name them, this no one can
+dispute with us. It is accordingly evident that when I say 'Four' in the
+generic sense, as, e.g., in the statement 'Four is a prime number relatively to
+seven', I am meaning the Species Four, I have it as object before my logical
+regard, and am passing judgement on it, and not on anything individual. I
+am not judging about any individual group of four things, nor about any
+constitutive moment, piece or side of such a group, for each part, qua part
+of what is individual, is itself likewise individual. But to make an object of
+something, to make it a subject of predications or attributions, merely differs in name from having a presentation of it, and having a presentation in
+a sense which, while not the only one, is none the less the standard one for
+logic. We therefore assert with self-evidence: There are 'universal presentations', i.e. presentations of what is specific, just as there are presentations of
+what is individual.
+We spoke of self-evidence, but self-evidence in respect of objective differences of meanings implies that we go beyond the merely symbolic use of
+
+expressions and refer ourselves to corresponding intuitions for final correction. Basing ourselves on intuitive presentations, we carry out the fulfilments
+of meanings corresponding to our merely significant intentions, we realize
+their 'genuine' purport. If we do this in our present case, some individual
+group of four units certainly floats pictorially before us, and to that extent
+underlies our presentation and our judgement. But we do not pass judgement on this group of four, we do not mean it in the subject-idea of our
+above example. Not the pictured group, but the number Four, the Specific
+Unity is our subject, and it is of this that we say that it is prime relatively to
+Seven. Strictly speaking, this Specific Unity is likewise nothing in, or attached
+to, the apparent group, for, if it were, it would be something individual, a
+thing here and now. But our reference, though itself existing now, refers to
+nothing less than what is now, it refers to Four, the ideal, timeless unity.
+Reflecting on our experiences of individual and specific meaning - whether
+purely intuitive, purely symbolic, or at once a symbolic and a fulfilled significant intention - we must now carry out further phenomenological descriptions. Their task would be to lay bare the relations, fundamental to a
+clarification of knowledge, which hold between blind (or pure symbolic
+reference) and intuitive (or authentic) reference, and in the case of the latter
+to show the varying manner in which individual images function in consciousness, according as we intend what is individual or what is specific.
+This would enable us, e.g., to answer questions as to how, and in what case,
+the universal is brought to subjective awareness in the individual act of
+thought, and perhaps achieves self-evident givenness, and how it can acquire a connection with the boundless sphere of individual cases ranged
+under it, of which we can of course form no adequate pictorial presentation.
+In Mill's exposition, as in all similar expositions, there is no question of
+simply recognizing evident data and consequently proceeding on the path
+we have just sketched. What should have been a fixed point in reflective
+clarification, is pushed aside unnoticed; the theory therefore misses its target, which it had lost sight of betore, or rather never clearly seen. What it
+tells us may be informative in regard to this or that psychological precondition or component of our intuitively achieved consciousness of universality,
+or in regard to the psychological role of signs in directing unitary trains of
+thought etc. etc. This has, however, no immediate relevance to the objective
+use of universal meanings, and to the undoubted truth enshrined in talk
+about universal objects (subjects, singulars) and in predications which relate
+to these; that it has mediate relevance must first be established. Mill's conception, like all empiricistic conceptions, can indeed not appeal to such
+evident starting-points or goals, since its whole concern is to prove the
+nullity of what such self-evidence shows to have genuine subsistence, namely
+universal objects and the universal presentations in which such objects are
+constituted for consciousness. Expressions such as 'universal object', 'universal presentation' certainly arouse memories of old, burdensome errors. But,
+
+262 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+however much they may have been historically misinterpreted, they must
+still have a normal interpretation which justifies them. Empirical psychology
+cannot teach us this normal meaning: we can learn it only by going back to
+the self-evident sense of propositions which are built upon general presentations and which relate to general objects as subjects of their predications.
+§15 (b) The origin of modern nominalism as an
+exaggerated reaction to Locke's doctrine of general
+ideas. The essential character of this nominalism, and
+of the theory of abstraction in terms of attention
+The theory of abstraction held by Mill and his empiricist followers, like the
+theories of abstraction held by Berkeley and Hume, gets stuck in its attack
+on the error of 'abstract ideas'.
+. It gets stuck by allowing itself to be misled
+by the chance circumstance that Locke, in his interpretation of general ideas,
+hit on his absurd general triangle: it thinks that serious talk of such ideas
+necessarily demands Locke's absurd interpretation. The fact is overlooked
+that this error is especially due to the unclarified ambiguity of the word
+'idea' (and of the German word Vorstellung), and that what is absurd for
+one concept of 'idea' is possible and justifiable for another. How could
+this fact be apparent to Locke's opponents, when their notion of an idea'
+remained in the same obscurity that had misled Locke? In consequence of
+this fact, men fell into that modern nominalism, whose essence no longer lies
+in the rejection of realism, but of what is, properly speaking, conceptualism. Not
+only did men reject the absurd general ideas of Locke, but also general concepts in the full, true sense of the word, in the sense, that is, that is evidently
+revealed by an analysis of the objective meaning-content of our thinking as
+constitutive of the Idea of what is a unity-for-thought (Denkeinheit).
+Such a view is fostered by wrongly interpreted psychological analyses.
+We tend naturally to turn our gaze among logical phenomena to whatever
+has primary intuitive palpability; we are then misled into taking the inner
+pictures which are found to accompany our names as the meanings of those
+names. If we become clear, however, that a meaning is merely what we
+mean, or what we understand by an expression, we cannot maintain such a
+conception. For if meaning consisted in the intuitive individual presentations which "illustrate' the sense of general names, the objects of such presentation, precisely as they are intuitively presented, would be just what we
+meant by those names, and each name would be an equivocal proper name.
+To cope with such differences, intuitive individual presentations are said to
+sustain new psychological functions when they occur in association with
+general names: they determine other trains of ideas, they fit otherwise into
+the course of our thoughts, they influence this course in a different fashion.
+All this is quite irrelevant to the phenomenological facts. Here and now,
+at the very moment that we significantly utter a general name, we mean what
+
+Abstraction and attention 263
+is general, and our meaning differs from our meaning when we mean what is
+individual. This difference must be pinned down in the descriptive content of
+the isolated experience, in the individually and actually performed general
+assertion. What things are causally connected with such an experience, what
+psychological consequences may follow from it, all this does not concern us.
+Such things concern the psychology of abstraction, not its phenomenology.
+The nominalistic currents of our time have certainly threatened to change
+our notion of conceptualism so that the nominalism of John Stuart Mill,
+avowed by him so decisively, has lately been disputed. We should not, however, see it as the essence of nominalism that, in its attempted clarification of
+the sense and theoretical achievement of universals, it loses itself in a blind
+associative play of names as mere verbal noises; its essence lies in the fact
+that its attempted clarifications overlook the peculiar consciousness exemplified in our living sense of the meaning of signs, in our actual understanding
+of them, in the grasped sense of our assertions, and also exemplified in
+correlative acts of fulfilment, which yield us the 'true' Idea of the universal,
+the wholly evident ideation in which the universal 'itself" is given to us. This
+consciousness means what it means to us, whether or not we know anything
+about psychology, or about mental antecedents and consequences, associative dispositions, etc. If the nominalist wishes to give an empirical explanation of this consciousness of the universal, as a fact of our human nature, if
+he wishes to connect it causally with such and such factors, such and such
+previous experiences, such and such unconscious dispositions, we should
+not object in principle. We should merely deny the interest, for pure logic and
+epistemology, of such empirical psychological facts. Instead of this, however, the nominalist says that to differentiate general ideas from individual
+ones, and to oppose the former to the latter, is really to talk senselessly. He
+denies that there is abstraction in the sense of a peculiar consciousness of
+the universal which lends evidence to general names and meanings: in reality
+only individual intuitions exist, some with an interplay of conscious and
+unconscious happenings, which never take us beyond the sphere of what
+is individual, nor constitute, i.e. bring to awareness and perhaps to selfpresentation, any essentially new sort of objectivity.
+Each thought-experience, like every mental state, has, empirically treated,
+its descriptive content, as well as its causal antecedents and consequents; it
+makes itself felt in the rush of life, and exercises its productive functions. But
+in the field of phenomenology and, above all, in the sphere of epistemology -
+the phenomenological clarification of ideal thought- and knowledge-unities
+- only essence and sense matter: what we mean when we make assertions,
+what object is set up for us by our act of meaning as such, in virtue of its
+sense, what partial meanings enter essentially into the make-up of our act of
+meaning, what essential forms and differences it exhibits, and so on. What is
+of interest to epistemology, must be shown up exclusively in the content of
+the meaning-experiences and the fulfilment-experiences themselves, and be
+
+264 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+shown up as essential. If we also find, in the range of what can be thus
+evidently shown up, the distinction between universal presentations and
+individual, intuitive presentations (which we undoubtedly do), then no talk
+of genetic functions and associations can be relevant to such a distinction,
+or contribute a jot to its clarification.
+It carries the matter no further and fails to remove our objections, if, like
+Mill, we look on exclusive attention to some single attribute (or dependent
+feature) of the intuited object, as being the act which, in our actual consciousness, in the supposed genetic situation, gives the name its 'generic?
+meaning. Though recent thinkers, who share Mill's ideas without sharing
+his extreme empiricist tendencies, may call themselves 'conceptualists', thinking that the interest which turns 'attributes' into objects will also guarantee
+the existence of general meanings - their doctrine is and remains essentially
+nominalistic.
+Generality remains for them a matter of the associative function of signs,
+it consists in the psychologically regulated association of 'the same sign'
+with 'the same' objective feature - or rather with the feature which always
+recurs in the same determinate form and is at times emphasized by attention. This generality of a psychological function is, however, quite removed
+from the generality which belongs to the intentional content of the logical
+experiences themselves, or which, described objectively and ideally, belongs
+to our meanings and our meaning-fulfilments. This last generality escapes
+nominalism entirely.
+§16 (c) Generality of psychological function and
+generality as a meaning-form. Different senses
+of the relation of a universal to an extension
+To bring complete clearness to this important distinction between generality
+of psychological function, and generality as pertaining to a significant content itself, we must pay heed to the differing logical functions of general
+names and meanings, and in connection therewith to the differing senses of
+talk of their generality, or of their relation to a range of particulars.
+Let us set the following three forms side by side: an A, all A, A in general,
+e. g. a triangle, all triangles, the triangle, the last taken as in the sentence 'The
+triangle is a species of figure'*
+The expression 'an A' can function predicatively as the predicate of innumerable categorical assertions, and the aggregate of the true, or intrinsically
+possible assertions of this sort, determines all the possible subjects to which
+being an A either actually pertains, or could without contradiction pertain,
+in other words the actual or possible 'range' ('extension') of the 'concept' A.
+This universal concept A, or the universal predicate 'an A', applies to all the
+objects in this range - we take for the sake of simplicity the range to which
+it applies truly - i.e., the assertions in the aggregate in question are all true:
+
+265
+there are, phenomenologically speaking, as possibilities, self-evident judgements with a corresponding content. This generality belongs, therefore, to
+the logical function of the predicate; it is not represented in the individual
+act, the single case where the meaning an A is enacted, or where we mean
+the corresponding adjectival predicate. It appears in these only as a form
+of indefiniteness; the word 'A' expresses a form, which evidently pertains
+to our meaning-intention or our meaning-fulfilment, and is connected with
+what either intends. This form is a wholly irreducible moment; its peculiarity
+can only be recognized, not explained away by any sort of psychologicalgenetic treatment. Ideally put: the word 'A' expresses a primitive logical
+form. The same plainly holds of the formation 'an A', which likewise represents a primitive logical structure.
+The generality of which we are here speaking, belongs, we say, to the
+logical function of predicates, it consists in the logical possibility of propositions of a certain sort. We stress the logical character of this possibility, to
+show that we are concerned with a possibility that can be seen a priori to
+belong to meanings as Specific Unities, not to psychologically contingent
+acts. If we see that Red is a universal predicate, one associable with many
+possible subjects, our meaning no longer relates to something whose existence
+is in a real (realen) sense governed by those natural laws which govern the
+coming and going of experiences in time. We are not talking of experiences
+at all, but of the single self-identical predicate Red, and of the possibility of
+certain sentences, each single in the same sense, in which this same predicate
+occurs.
+If we now pass to the form 'all A's', generality pertains to the form of the
+act itself. We expressly mean all A's, to all such A's our presentation and
+predication relates in the universal judgement, though perhaps no single A is
+'itself' 'directly' presented. This idea of a range, is however, no complex of
+the ideas of the members of this range; so little is this the case, that such
+individual presentations as perhaps float before us have nothing at all to
+do with the significant intention to all A's. Here also the word 'all' points to
+a peculiar semantic form: we leave aside the question whether it can be
+resolved into simpler forms or not.
+If we deal finally with the form the A (in specie), generality again pertains
+to our significant content itself. Here, however, we encounter a wholly ditferent sort of universality, the universality of the Species, which, while it
+may have the closest logical relations to universality of range, none the less
+evidently differs from the latter. The forms the A and all A's - likewise any A,
+no matter which are not the same in meaning: theirs is no mere grammatical
+difference, determined in the end by mere verbal noise. They are logically
+distinct forms, giving expression to essential differences of meaning. The
+consciousness of Specific Generality must count as an essentially new mode
+of 'presentation', as one, namely, that does not merely present individual
+singulars in a new manner, but makes us aware of a new sort of singulars,
+
+266 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+i.e. Singular Species. What sort of singulars these are, and how they stand
+a priori to individual singulars, or how they differ from these latter, must
+of course be gleaned from the logical truths which, grounded in pure
+forms, govern both sorts of singulars and their mutual a priori relations
+(i.e. their relations of essence or Idea. Here there is no obscurity or possible
+error as long as one keeps to the straight sense of these truths, or, what
+is the same, to the straight sense of the meaning-forms in question, whose
+self-evident interpretations are called truths of logic. Only an erroneous
+sideslip into psychologistic and metaphysical trains of thought produces
+obscurity; it creates pseudo-problems and frames pseudo-theories to solve
+them.
+§17 (d) Application to the critique of nominalism
+If we now look back on the nominalistic theory of abstraction, we see from
+the above that its main error lies in quite ignoring the irreducible peculiarities of the forms of consciousness (of the forms of our intentions and of
+their correlative fulfilments). Its defective descriptive analysis makes it blind
+to the fact that the forms of logic are no more than these forms of significant intention which have themselves been made objects of a consciousness
+which treats them as unities, and so turns them into Ideal Species. Generality is also to be found among these forms. Nominalism further confuses the
+various concepts of generality that we have separated above. It one-sidedly
+prefers the generality which belongs to concepts in their predicative function, as a possibility of associating the same concept predicatively with
+several subjects. Being blind to the logically ideal character of this possibility, with its roots in semantic form, it puts psychological associations in
+its place, associations necessarily alien to, even incommensurable with, the
+predicates and propositions in question. Since it claims to have completely
+cleared up the nature of general meanings through such psychological analyses, its confusions grossly distort the generality of universal and specific
+presentations; this generality we saw belonged to the semantic essence of
+the individual act as such, as an indwelling meaning-form. What belongs
+phenomenologically to the immanent essence of the individual act, is turned
+into a psychological play of events, that throw no light, whether as causes
+or effects, on the individual act in which the entire total consciousness of
+universality comes alive.
+§18 The doctrine of attention as a generalizing power
+One last critical observation will of course not affect certain recent followers
+of Mill (or, more remotely, of Berkeley), who recognize a distinct problem
+in the emergence of the Species as an undifferentiated unity opposed to its
+manifold cases, and who do not attempt to solve it by having recourse to the
+
+• 267
+generality of associative functioning, or to the general application of the
+same name and concept to all objects in their range.
+Their idea runs as follows:
+Abstraction as exclusive concern eo ipso produces generalization. The abstracted attribute is de facto an element in the appearance of the individual
+complex of attributes that we call the phenomenal object. But the 'same'
+attribute, ie. one fully agreeing with it in content, can occur in countless
+such complexes. What distinguishes the repetitions of this same attribute
+from case to case, is uniquely and solely their individualizing association.
+Abstraction, therefore, as exclusive concern, causes the distinction, the individualization, of what is abstracted to vanish. The reverse side of our concentrated concern is the ignoring of all individualizing aspects, which yields
+the attribute as what is everywhere one and the same, since it cannot present
+itself as different to the abstraction performed in each case.
+In this conception, it is said, we have all we need for the understanding of
+general thinking. Here it will be best to let the inspired Bishop of Cloyne
+speak, since it was he who first inspired the doctrine in question, though his
+own doctrine also gave influence to other thoughts than are here touched
+upon. It seems, he thinks, to be a difficulty
+how we can know any proposition to be true of all particular triangles,
+except we have first seen it demonstrated of the abstract idea of a triangle
+which equally agrees to all. For, because a property may be demonstrated to agree to some one particular triangle, it will not thence follow
+that it equally belongs to any other triangle, which in all respects is
+not the same with it. For example, having demonstrated that the three
+angles of an isosceles rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones,
+I cannot therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles,
+which have neither a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore
+that, to be certain this proposition is universally true, we must either
+make a particular demonstration for every particular triangle, which is
+impossible, or once for all demonstrate it of the abstract idea of a
+triangle, in which all the particulars do indifferently partake, and by
+which they are all equally represented.
+To which 1 answer, that though the idea I have in view whilst I make
+the demonstration, be, for instance, that of an isosceles rectangular
+triangle, whose sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless
+be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort of
+bigness whatsoever. And that, because neither the right angle, nor the
+equality, nor the determinate length of the sides, are at all concerned
+in the demonstration. It is true, the diagram I have in view includes all
+these particulars, but then there is not the least mention made of them
+in the proof of the proposition. It is not said, the three angles are equal
+to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, or because the
+
+268 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+sides comprehending it are of the same length. Which sufficiently shows
+that the right angle might have been oblique, and the sides unequal, and
+for all that the demonstration have held good. And for this reason it is,
+that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which
+I had demonstrated of a particular right-angled, equicrural triangle; and
+not because I demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a
+triangle. And here it must be acknowledged, that a man may consider
+a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular qualities
+of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he may abstract: but this
+will never prove that he can frame an abstract general inconsistent idea
+of a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so far forth as man,
+or so far forth as animal, without framing the forementioned abstract
+idea, either of man or of animal, inasmuch as all that is perceived is not
+considered.
+§19 Objections. (a) Exclusive attention to one
+attributive aspect does not remove its individuality
+That we must reject this conception, so attractive at first sight, is clear when
+we envisage the aim that a theory of abstraction must subserve, i.e. the
+clarification of the difference between general and individual meanings, the
+setting forth of its intuitive essence. We must envisage those intuitive acts in
+which mere verbal intentions, symbolic meanings, are intuitively fulfilled,
+and so fulfilled that we can see what is 'really meant' by our expressions and
+our meanings. Abstraction must here be the act, in which the consciousness
+of universality, as fulfilment of the intention of general names, is achieved.
+We must bear this in mind. Let us now consider whether selective attention
+is capable of the performance just set forth, and particularly on the assumption so essential to the theory: that the content which abstractive attention
+selects is a constitutive aspect of the concrete object of intuition, a property
+really present in it.
+However attention may be characterized, it is a function which, in a
+descriptively peculiar fashion, prefers certain objects of consciousness, and
+which (apart from certain differences of degree) only differs from one case
+to another in virtue of the objects to which it gives this preference. The
+theory, therefore, which identifies abstraction with attention, can see no
+essential difference between the meaning of the individual which pertains
+to the intention of proper names, and the meaning of the universal which
+attaches to the names of attributes. The difference consists merely in the fact
+that, in the one case, our mind's eye, as it were, fixates the whole individual
+object, in the other case, only the attribute. We must ask, however, whether
+the attribute which, in the sense of the theory, forms a constituent property
+of the object, must not be as precisely and individually singular as the whole
+
+Abstraction and attention 269
+object. Suppose we concentrate attention on the green of the tree which
+stands before us. If this can be done, let us increase our concentration till we
+achieve the complete unawareness of associated aspects which Mill thought
+possible. Then, it is said, all graspable points from which individualizing
+distinction can be carried out have vanished. If another object with exactly
+the same colouring were suddenly substituted, we should see no difference;
+the green, which we are exclusively minding, would for us be one and the
+same. Suppose all this is so. Would this green, however, really be the same as
+the other? Can our forgetfulness or deliberate blindness towards all that is
+distinctive, alter the fact that what is objectively distinct is still as distinct as
+before, and that the objective aspect we are heeding in this aspect which
+exists here and now and no other?
+We surely cannot doubt that such a difference really exists. Comparison
+of two concrete, separated phenomena of the same quality, e.g. green,
+evidently shows that each has its own green. The two phenomena have not
+individually identical. The green of the one is rather as much separated from
+the green of the other, as are the concrete wholes in which these 'greens' are.
+How else could there be qualitatively patterned unities in which the same
+quality occurs repeatedly, and what would it mean to speak of the spread
+of a colour over a whole surface? Each geometrical fragmentation of the
+surface evidently corresponds to a fragmentation of the unitary colouring,
+even though, when the colouring is exactly alike, we say, and say rightly,
+that 'the' colour is the 'same'
+everywhere.
+Our theory therefore does not throw light on the sense of talk about an
+identically single attribute, about the Species as a unity in multiplicity. Such
+talk, it is clear, means something different from the objective aspect, the
+instance of the Species which occurs in the sensuous phenomenon. Assertions significant and true for the instance are false and even nonsensical for
+the Species. The colouring has its place and its time, it is spread out and
+has its intensity, it arises and vanishes. Applied to the colour as Species
+these predicates yield complete nonsense. When a house burns down, all its
+parts burn down: its individual forms and qualities, its constituent parts and
+aspects, all are gone. Shall we say that the relevant geometrical, qualitative
+and other Species have been burnt? Is such talk not the height of absurdity?
+To sum up, if the attention-theory of abstraction is correct, if, as it supposes, attention to the whole object, and attention to its parts and aspects,
+are in essence one and the same act, only distinct in respect of the objects to
+which this act is directed, then there are no Species for our consciousness,
+for our knowledge, or for our statements. However we distinguish or shift
+matters around, consciousness always directs itself to what is individually
+singular, which is present to it as individually singular. One cannot, however, deny that we speak of Species in a distinct sense, that in countless cases
+
+270 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+we both mean and give a name, not to the individual, but to its Idea, that
+we can make assertions having what is ideally one as their subject, just as we
+can make assertions about what is individually singular. Our theory has
+therefore missed its target, its aim was to clarify our consciousness of the universal, and it has managed to lose sight of this consciousness in the course
+of its clarifications.
+§20 (b) Refutation of the argument from
+geometrical thought
+How do matters stand in regard to the advantages claimed for the theory
+as making general thinking understandable? Is Berkeley not right in insistiny bacase, ve prove a propal trianglainin all triangles we have on
+and that we only make use of the features that characterize a triangle as
+a triangle, while ignoring all others? 'We only make use of these features'
+means that we attend to them only, make them objects of an exclusive
+attention. We can therefore get along without assuming general ideas.
+We can certainly get along without general ideas if by the latter we mean
+the general ideas of Locke's doctrine. But to avoid this shoal we need not
+lose ourselves in the false paths of nominalistic theory. We may in essentials
+approve of Berkeley's account while we reject the interpretation he puts
+upon it. He confuses the basis of abstraction with what is abstracted, the
+concrete instance, from which our consciousness of the universals draws
+intuitive fulness, with the object our thought intends. Berkeley speaks as if
+geometrical proofs were conducted for the triangle drawn in ink on the
+paper or in chalk on the blackboard, as if the chance singulars which float
+before us in general thought, were not mere aids to our thought's intention,
+but its actual objects. A geometrical procedure that took its lead from the
+drawn figure in Berkeley's sense, might yield astonishing results, but scarcely
+very happy ones. No geometrical proposition holds for the drawn figure as
+a physical object, since the latter is not really rectilinear, nor a geometrical
+figure at all. We can find no ideal geometrical properties in it, as colour is
+found in an intuited coloured object. Certainly the mathematician looks at
+the drawing, which appears to him just as other intuited objects do. In none
+of his acts of thought, however, does he refer to this drawing, nor to any
+individual feature in it. He refers, if he does not wander, to 'a rectilinear
+figure as such'. This thought forms the subject-member of his theoretical proof.
+What we therefore attend to, is neither the concrete object of intuition,
+nor an
+'abstract partial content' (i.e. a non-independent aspect) in the latter;
+it is an Idea, in the sense of a Specific Unity, as abstractum in the logical
+sense. In logic and epistemology, therefore, abstraction must not be said to
+be a mere stress on a partial content, but a peculiar consciousness which, on
+an intuitive basis, directly apprehends a Specific Unity.
+
+271
+§21 The difference between attending to a
+non-independent moment of an intuited object and
+attending to the corresponding attribute in specie
+It will not be profitless to explore the difficulties of our contested theory
+a little further. Our own conception will become clearer when its whole
+contrast with this theory has been worked out.
+Concentrated attention to an attributive moment is looked on as intuitively fulfilling (as yielding the 'true sense') of the general meaning attaching
+to the name of the corresponding attribute. To mean the Species intuitively,
+and to perform an act of concentrated attention, are looked on as one and
+the same. But how do things stand, we may ask, in cases where we expressly
+refer to the individual moment? What differentiates the two types of case? If
+we are struck by an individual trait of an object, by its peculiar colouring,
+e.g., or by its noble form etc., we pay special attention to this trait, and yet
+have no general presentation. The same question applies to complete concrete things. What is the difference between exclusive attention to the individually apparent statue, and the intuitive grasp of the corresponding Idea,
+that could be realized in countless real statues?
+Our opponents might reply: in individual treatment, individualizing moments enter our sphere of interest, in specific treatment, they are shut out.
+Our interest is confined to what is general, i.e. to a content which in itself
+provides no individual distinctions. Instead of pressing our previous objection - whether attention to individuating determinations creates individuality, while inattention destroys it - we ask rather whether, in individual
+treatment, we also necessarily mean the individuating moments, which it is
+held must be concurrently noticed? Does an individual proper name also
+implicitly name individuating determinations, those, e.g., of time and place?
+Here is my friend Hans and I call him 'Hans'. He is no doubt individually
+determined, he is always at a particular point in space and time. If these
+determinations were, however, concurrently meant, the name 'Hans' would
+change its meaning with every step that my friend takes, on every occasion
+that I address him by name. Such a thing can scarcely be maintained, nor
+would one care to take refuge in saying that a proper name is really general.
+For the peculiar generality in respect of the varied times, positions, situations of the same individual thing differs in form from the specific generality
+of the thing's attribute or of the generic Idea 'thing in general'.
+Often enough, at least, we are indifferent to the here and the now in attending to some part or characteristic trait of an object. We do not therefore
+consider it in specie, as we certainly do not mean to perform an 'abstraction'
+in the sense of a general presentation.
+Perhaps one might here have recourse to the assumption that individuating
+determinations are marginally noticed. This cannot give much help. A great
+deal is marginally noticed, but is not for that reason really meant. Where the
+
+272 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+consciousness of the universal is intuitively achieved, as a true and genuine
+abstraction, the individual object of the underlying intuition certainly has a
+subsidiary place in consciousness, but is not at all meant. Mill's talk about
+our unconsciousness of the determinations that we abstract from is a useless, strictly speaking an absurd fiction.® In the numerous cases where, looking to some singular intuitive fact, we utter the corresponding generality, the
+singular element stays before our eyes, we do not suddenly become blind to
+what is individual in our case; this certainly does not happen when, e.g., we
+look at this jasmine in bloom, and inhaling its scent, say 'Jasmine has a
+heady scent.
+If finally one grasps at a new evasion and admits that the individuating
+element is not specially picked out like the preferred point of our interest,
+not even marginally noticed, as are objects lying outside of our main interest, but that it is rather subsidiarily noticed (mitbeachtet), as being part of
+our main interest and peculiarly implied in its intention - then the whole
+ground of the theory is abandoned. For the theory claimed to make do with
+the mere emphasis of regard towards the concrete given object, or a peculiar
+feature given in it, and it now ends by postulating a variety of forms of
+consciousness that it should surely have dispensed with.
+§22 Fundamental deficiencies in the
+phenomenological analysis of attention
+This leads us at once to the weakest point of the theory; which is to be
+found in the question 'What is attention?' We are of course not reproaching
+the theory for failing to offer us a pertected phenomenology and psychology
+of attention, but for failing to clear up the nature of attention to an extent
+absolutely required by its aims. It should have ascertained what gives the
+word 'attention' its unitary sense, in order to see how far its range of application extends, or what the objects in each case are that we can (in a normal
+sense) claim to attend to. Above all, it should have inquired into the relation
+of attention to the meaning or reference which gives names and other expressions their significance. The sort of theory of abstraction just disputed,
+is possible only through the Lockean prejudice according to which the
+objects to which consciousness in its acts is immediately and properly directed, and the objects, particularly, of attention, must necessarily be mental
+contents, real occurrences in consciousness. It seems perfectly obvious that
+an act of consciousness can immediately act only on what is actually (wirklich)
+given in consciousness, ie. on contents that it really (reell) includes among
+its elements. What is outside consciousness can only be the mediate object
+of a conscious act; and this occurs simply when the immediate content of
+the act, its primary object, serves as a representation, an image, a sign, of
+what is beyond consciousness.
+
+Abstraction and attention 273
+Once accustomed to this mode of approach, one readily tries to clear up
+the objective relations and forms inherent in the intention of acts, by looking predominantly to their present conscious contents as their supposedly
+immediate objects, and, misled by the seeming intelligibility of talk about
+representations and signs, entirely ignores the true, supposedly mediate
+objects of the acts. Unthinkingly one credits to contents everything which
+acts, in their straightforward reference, place in the object; its attributes, its
+colours, forms etc., are forthwith called 'contents'
+and actually interpreted
+as contents in the psychological sense, e.g. as sensations.
+How far this whole conception is at odds with the plain phenomenological
+situation, and how thoroughly it has debauched epistemology, we shall yet
+have many opportunities to observe. Here it may suffice to point out that
+when, e.g., we have a presentation or judgement about a horse, it is a horse,
+not our sensations of the moment, that is presented and judged about. Our
+sensations are only presented and judged about in psychological reflection,
+whose modes of conception should not be read into the immediate situation.
+That an appropriate train of sensations or images is experienced, and is in
+this sense conscious, does not and cannot mean that this is the object of an
+act of consciousness, in the sense that a perception, a presentation or a
+judgement is directed upon it.
+This mistaken conception has further had a detrimental effect on the theory of abstraction. Led astray by the seemingly obvious, one takes experienced
+contents to be the normal objects to which one pays attention. The concrete
+phenomenal thing is treated as a complex of contents, i.e. of attributes
+grown together in a single intuitive image. And it is then said of these attributes, taken as experienced mental contents, that their non-independence
+precludes their separation from the concretely complete image: they can
+only be noticed in the latter. How could such a theory of abstraction intelligibly account for the formation of abstract ideas of that class of attributive
+determinations which are indeed perceived, but which by their nature never
+are adequately perceived, which cannot be given in the form of a mental
+content? I need only mention three-dimensional spatial shapes, in particular
+closed surfaces of solids or complete solids, such as the sphere and the cube.
+And how does the matter stand with the myriads of conceptual presentations, perhaps realized with the help of sensuous intuition, but which no
+intuitive aspect, even from the sphere of inner sense, instantiates? Here one
+can certainly not talk of a mere heeding of what is given in (sensuous)
+intuition, nor of a heeding of experienced contents.
+Our own point of view inclines us first to draw a distinction in the sphere
+of sensuous abstraction - the sphere usually stressed for simplicity's sake -
+between acts in which an attributive aspect is intuitively 'given', and acts
+built upon these, which are not mere acts of attention to such an aspect, but
+rather acts of a new kind, referring in general fashion to the corresponding
+Species. Whether intuition presents the attributive aspect adequately or in-
+
+274 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+adequately, is beside the point. We should then draw the further distinction
+between cases of sensuous abstraction, i.e. of an abstraction straightforwardly and perhaps adequately adjusted to sensuous intuition, and cases of
+non-sensuous or of at most partially sensuous abstraction, i.e. cases where the
+realized consciousness of the universal is at most only partially built on acts
+of sensuous intuition, and for the rest on non-sensuous acts, and accordingly related to thought-forms or categories whose nature does not permit
+of sensuous fulfilment. Suitables examples of the former, are unmixed concepts from outer or inner sense, such as colour, noise, pain, judgement, will,
+of the latter, concepts such as series, sense, disjunctive member, identity, being
+etc. etc. This difference will again seriously engage us in future investigations.
+§23 Significant talk of attention embraces the
+whole sphere of thinking and not merely the
+sphere of intuition
+The unitary sense to talk of 'attending' so little calls for 'contents' in the
+psychological sense (as the objects to which we attend), that it ranges
+beyond the sphere of intuition, and embraces the whole sphere of thinking.
+It makes no difference how thought is conducted, whether on an intuitive
+basis or in pure symbols. If we are theoretically concerned with the culture
+of the Renaissance, with ancient philosophy, with the development of astronomical ideas, with elliptical functions, with curves of the nth order, with
+laws of algebraic operations etc., we attend to all these matters. If our judgement is of the form All A's are B's, our attention is given to this universal
+state of affairs, we are concerned with allness, and not with this or that
+single matter. And so in general. Each thought, or at least each consistent
+thought, can no doubt become intuitive, to the extent that it is built in a
+certain fashion on 'corresponding' intuition. But the attention performed
+on such an intuition, whether of inner or outer sense, does not amount to
+attention to that intuition's phenomenological content, and just as little
+to attention to the object apparent in it. The a certain, or the any, the all
+and the each, the and, the or, the not, the if and the then etc., are not things
+we can point to in an object of basic sensuous intuition, that can be 'had'
+sensationally or externally represented or painted. Certain acts naturally
+correspond to all of them. The words have their meaning; in understanding
+them we realize certain forms pertaining to our objective intention. But
+these acts are not the objects that we mean: they are the activity of meaning
+or presenting, which only becomes objective to psychological reflection.
+The object we mean is variously the universal state of affairs All A's are B's,
+or the generic state of affairs The A (in specie) is a B, or the indefinitely
+singular state of affairs Any A is a B etc. We do not attend to the individual
+intuition, which perhaps accompanies our thought-presentations, and on
+which their evidence is founded: we do not attend to those act-characters
+
+275
+which either give our intuition form, or which find their fulfilment in formed
+intuition. What we attend to are the objects of our thinking, the objects and
+states of affairs seen by thought in this or that manner, which are revealed
+to our insight when we perform such acts on such a foundation. And an
+abstraction in which we seize some point of conception or meaning, where
+we do not merely look to what is individual and intuitive (perceiving it
+attentively and what not), means no more than that we perform certain
+thought-acts with insight, acts sometimes of one form and sometimes of
+another.
+The range of the unitary notion of attention is therefore so wide that it
+doubtless embraces the whole field of intuitive and cogitative reference
+(Meinens), the field of presentation (Vorstellens) in a well-defined but sufficiently wide sense, which comprehends both intuition and thought. Ultimately it extends as far as the concept: Consciousness of something. To
+talk distinctively of attention, as of a certain selectivity in the sphere of
+consciousness, takes account therefore of a certain difference which is not
+dependent on the species of our mode of consciousness (on the manner of
+our consciousness). We have certain 'presentations' while not 'concentrating'
+on their objects, but upon the objects of other presentations.
+Attending is thus represented as a straightforward, not further describable way in which contents, otherwise lost in the undivided flow of consciousness, achieve separate consciousness, in which they are 'emphasized'
+or 'discovered' by us. If, in a similar sense, all differences in the manner of
+presentation are denied, attention is then seen as an illuminating and indicative function operating within this field. But all this involves an extreme
+narrowing of concepts whose wider meanings cannot be eliminated, and to
+which one must unavoidably have recourse. Dazed by the confusion between object and mental content, one forgets that the objects of which we
+are 'conscious'.
+', are not simply in consciousness as in a box, so that they can
+merely be found in it and snatched at in it; but that they are first constituted
+as being what they are for us, and as what they count as for us, in varying
+forms of objective intention. One forgets that, from the mere finding of a
+mental content, i.e. the pure immanent intuition of such a content, up to the
+external perception and imagination of objects neither found immanently
+in consciousness, nor capable of being so found, and from these on to the
+loftiest thought-formations with their manifold categorial forms and appropriately correlated semantic forms, an essentially single concept runs
+continuously: in all cases, whether we intuit in perceptual, fancying or remembering fashion, or whether we think in empirical and logico-mathematical
+forms, an intending, or reference (Vermeinen) is present, that aims at an
+object, a consciousness is present that is the consciousness of this object.
+The mere existence of a content in the psychic interplay is, however, not at
+all this being-meant or being-referred-to. This first arises when this content
+is 'noticed', such notice being a look directed towards it, a presentation of
+
+276 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+it. To define the presentation of a content as the mere fact of its being
+experienced, and in consequence to give the name 'presentations' to all experienced contents, is one of the worst conceptual distortions known to
+philosophy. It is without doubt responsible for an untold legion of epistemological and psychological errors. If we stick to the intentional concept of
+presentation, which alone sets a standard for epistemology and logic, we
+shall be unable to judge that all differences between presentations reduce to
+differences in their presented 'contents'. It is clear, on the contrary, and
+particularly in the field of pure logic, that to each primitive logical form a
+peculiar 'manner of consciousness', a peculiar 'manner of presentation', corresponds. In so far, of course, as each new mode of intentional reference always
+in a manner also concerns objects, i.e. constitutes novel forms with which the
+object is brought to consciousness, one can no doubt say that all difference
+in presentation lies in what is presented. One must carefully note, however,
+that there are two sorts of differences in the object, in what is presented,
+differences of categorial form and differences in the 'thing itself"; this thing'
+can be brought to consciousness as the same in a variety of forms. More will
+be said on these heads in later Investigations.
+
+§24 The general idea as a device for economizing
+thought
+There is an error originating from mediaeval nominalism which likes to
+represent general concepts and names as mere devices in an economy of
+thinking, devices which will spare us the individual consideration and naming of all individual things. The function of concepts, it is said, is to enable
+the thinking mind to transcend the limits set it by the unsurveyable multiplicity of individual singulars; their economizations of thinking enable the
+mind to reach its goal of knowledge indirectly, as it could never have reached
+it directly. General concepts make it possible for us to treat things in bundles
+as it were, to make assertions about whole classes of objects at a single 'go';
+we can therefore talk about countless objects, instead of conceiving and
+judging each object 'on its own'.
+Locke brings this thought into modern philosophy when he says, e.g., in
+the last part of Book ill, chapter Ill of his Essay... 'that men making abstract ideas, and settling them in their minds with names annexed to them,
+do thereby enable themselves to consider things, and discourse of them as it
+were in bundles, for the easier and readier improvement and communication
+of their knowledge; which would advance but slowly were their words and
+thoughts confined only to particulars!
+This exposition reveals itself as nonsensical if one reflects that, without
+general meanings, one can make no assertions at all, not even such as are
+singular, and that one cannot talk of thinking, judging or knowing, in a sense
+relevant to logic, on a mere foundation of the direct presentations of individuals. The most ideal adaptation of the human mind to the multiplicity of
+individual things, the genuine, effortless realization of adequate individual
+conceptions, would not render thought superfluous. For performances attainable in this manner are not performances of thinking.
+Along intuitive pathways, e.g., no laws come to light. A knowledge of
+laws may very well promote the survival of thinking beings, it may usefully
+govern the formation of forward looking intuitive presentations, and may
+
+278 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+be much more useful in this respect than the natural pull of association.
+But the relation of the function of thought to the preservation of thinking
+beings, i.e. of human beings, has its place in psychological anthropology,
+not in the theory of knowledge. What is performed by a law as an ideal
+unity, its logical embrace of innumerable instances in a general propositional
+meaning, is something that no intuition can perform, not even the universal
+intuition of a God. For to intuit is plainly not to think. The perfection of
+thought lies doubtless in intuitive, i.e. in 'authentic' thinking, in that knowledge in which our thought-intention is 'satisfied' (as it were) by passing
+over into intuition. Even the brief discussions of the previous chapter permit
+us, however, to speak of a grave misinterpretation of this fact, when intuition
+- understood in the usual sense of acts of external or internal sense - is
+regarded as the proper intellectual function, and when the true role of conceptual thought is taken to be its use of indirect devices which economize
+intuition, and overcome the all too narrow limits of the latter. Certainly we
+are accustomed to using an all-seeing mind as a logical ideal, but only
+because we quietly add to its all-seeing capacities, capacities for knowing
+and thinking all. We imagine this mind as one not merely active in mere
+intuitions, i.e. in intuitions perhaps adequate but none the less unthinking,
+but as also casting these intuitions into categorial forms and combining
+them synthetically, and finding in such formed, combined intuitions the
+ultimate fulfilment of its thought-intentions, thereby realizing the ideal of
+all-inclusive knowledge. We shall, therefore have to say: Not mere intuition,
+but adequate, categorially formed intuitions, completely accommodated to
+thought, or conversely, thought which draws its evidence from intuition,
+constitute the goal of true knowledge. The 'economy of thought' only makes
+sense, and has its rich field within the sphere of thought and knowledge: it is
+in fact really an economy of knowledge.?
+§25 Whether general representation can serve as an
+essential characteristic of our general presentations
+The notion just sketched of general concepts as thought-saving devices is
+more fully elaborated in the theory of representation. There are, it is held,
+really only intuitive, individual presentations, and in these all thinking is
+carried on. Need or comfort, however, leads us to substitute certain ideas to
+do duty for the presentations that we ought properly to have. The ingenious
+device of a general representation which relates to a whole class has the same
+results as if the proper presentations were present, or results rather in concentrated performances which sum up all the individual results that could
+ever be reached through actual presentation.
+This doctrine, likewise, is naturally refuted by our previous objections. But
+the thought of representation plays a part, also, in doctrines of abstraction
+that attach little or no weight to the supposedly valuable thought-economies
+
+279
+that such a representative function effects. It may be asked whether the
+thought of such a representation, freed from all doctrines of thoughteconomy, might not be of some use in characterizing the essence of general
+meanings. The word representation' has in any case a shifting multiplicity
+of senses, One could certainly say that the general name, or the individual
+intuition on which it reposes, serves to 'represent' the class. One must, however, see whether the various meanings of the word are not mutually confusing, and whether its use in a characterization does not promote confusion
+and definite error rather than clarity.
+Our discussions have shown that the mark which distinguishes general
+presentations - whether we understand by these general meaning-intentions
+or the corresponding fulfilments of meaning - from intuitive individual
+presentations, can be no mere difference of psychological function, no mere
+difference in the part played by certain individual presentations of inner or
+outer sense in the continuous stream of mental life. We need not, accordingly, pay any further attention to expositions of the theory of representation merely as such a psychological function, and say nothing about the
+fundamental phenomenological fact, the new modes of consciousness responsible for the whole character of our individual experiences of general
+expression and thinking. This cardinal point may be touched on here and
+there in passing: individual utterances show that the phenomenological facts
+are not wholly ignored. Such theorists would in most cases reply to our
+remonstrances that what we emphasize is, likewise, what they think. Naturally the representative function will reveal itself by way of some phenomenally peculiar character. A general presentation is thereby only an individual
+presentation, but one tinged in a somewhat distinctive manner: what is intuitively presented, when tinged in this fashion, counts as a representative of a
+whole class of mutually resembling individuals. Such a concession will not
+help much, if what is logically and epistemologically most important gets
+treated as a trivial addition to an individual intuition, making no important
+difference to the descriptive content of such an experience. The new type of
+act which animates word and illustrative image with thought, may not be
+wholly overlooked, but is not thought to require special descriptive interest
+directed upon itself: superficial talk of 'representation' is treated as quite
+sufficient. Men do not see that everything that relates to logic is summed up
+in this, and in similar characters of acts, that wherever we talk logically
+about 'presentations' and 'judgements' and about their manifold forms, acts
+of this sort alone determine our concepts. Men do not see that it is the
+immanent essence of such act-characters that makes them the consciousness
+of what is general, and that all types of intended generality which are of
+concern to pure logic, whether in its forms or its laws, only come to be given
+by way of corresponding forms of such intentional characters. Men also
+fail to see that while individual intuitions in a certain manner provide the
+basis for the novel acts of cogitative presentation that we build upon them
+
+280 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+- whether these be acts of 'symbolic' or of 'authentic' presentation - they
+themselves, with their own sensuous-intuitive intention, do not enter into
+the content of our thought at all, so that one simply does not have what talk
+of representation, in its prevailing sense, implies, the sense upheld by those
+who defend a theory of such representation.
+§26 Continuation. The varying modifications of
+the consciousness of generality, and the sensuous
+intuition
+A closer treatment will here be useful. Each new conception which gives to
+a name or an image a representative character is, we emphasized, a new type
+of presentative act; in the act of meaning (and not merely the act of general
+meaning) we achieve what, in relation to mere intuition, whether of 'outer'
+or 'inner sense', is a new mode of reference, with a sense, and also often with
+an object, quite different from those of the reference occurring in mere
+intuition. The content of this new reference varies (as we have already noted
+by the way);' it undergoes multiple differentiation of its descriptive essence
+in accordance with the logical function of the general name, with the semantic context in which this name occurs, and which it helps to bring to expression. What is individually intuited is no longer simply referred to as it
+appears before us: but on one occasion we refer to the species in its ideal
+unity (the pitch C, the number 3, e.g.), on another, to the class as sum total
+of the individual items which share in a universal (all tones of this pitch,
+or, formally, all A's), on yet another, to an unspecified individual of this
+sort (an A), or coming from this class (one of the A's), and on yet another
+occasion to this intuited individual, but thought of as exhibiting the attribute (this A over here) etc. Each such modification alters the 'content' or
+'sense' of our intention: there is, in other words, at each step, an alteration
+in our 'presentation' in the logical sense of this word, ie. in the presented
+thing as it is logically grasped and meant. It does not matter whether our
+accompanying individual intuition remains constant or varies continually:
+the logical presentation changes if its meaning (the sense of our expression)
+changes, and stays the same as long as its meaning does so. We need scarcely
+stress the fact that the phenomenon which serves as basis for all this may
+drop out altogether.
+The distinction between the cogitative and the sensuous 'conception' is
+one of essence. It is not like a case where, e.g., we conceive 'the same object'
+as at one time a wax-figure and at another time (caught in illusion) as a
+living person, as if two individually-intuitive 'conceptions' were merely being
+exchanged. Nor should we be led astray by the fact that our presentative
+intention in the form of a cogitative individual presentation, of a presentation of plurality and one of totality, can likewise be directed to individual
+items (to one, to several, or to all of a kind). It is indeed evident that the
+character of the intention, and with it that of the semantic content, differs
+
+Abstraction and representation 28l
+totally from that of any intuitive (sensuous) presentation. To refer to an A is
+a different thing from representing an A in simple intuition without the thought
+of an A, and a different thing again from referring to it in an act of direct
+meaning and naming, ie. by way of proper names. The presentation a man
+differs from the presentation Socrates, and just so also the presentation the
+man Socrates differs from both of them. The presentation some A's is not
+a series of intuitions of these or those A's, not an act of collection which
+gathers previously presented individual intuitions together (though such a
+unification, with its objective correlate the aggregate, is an additional performance transcending the sphere of sensuous intuition). Where such a sum
+or collection of intuitions underlies our presentation and serves to exemplify
+it, we are not concerned with the individuals that appear before us, nor with
+the aggregate they form: what we mean is 'some A's', and this cannot be
+spied out by an external or even by an internal act of sense. The same
+naturally holds of other general meaning-forms, of number-forms, e.g., such
+as 'two' or 'three', or again of an exhaustively universal form such as 'all
+A's'. We have a presentation of exhaustive universality in the logical sense
+of this term whenever we understand the expression 'All A's' and apply it
+significantly. Exhaustive universality is therefore presented by way of a unitary thought; and it can only be brought to consciousness as exhaustive
+universality in this or in some corresponding 'authentic' form of thinking.
+For we can only intuit a this or a that. However many individual items we
+may run through, and however zealously we may collect them, we can at
+best - if we really have exhausted our concept's range of application - only
+have presentations of all A's, which would not mean that we had the presentation of All A's, that we had really achieved this logical presentation. If,
+however, we do achieve such a presentation, we may try to intuit its content, and may both hope for and achieve clarification by doing so. One sees,
+however, that a sensuous-intuitive assembling of the objects presented, in
+this case the sum total of the A's, cannot bring before us 'what we really
+meant'. Our thought-intention must rather, in virtue of the demands made
+by its form and its content, both relate to intuition and also fulfil itself in
+such intuition, thereby giving rise to a complex act, superior in clarity and
+insight, yet not dispensing with thought, nor replacing it with a mere picture.
+These provisional, more or less superficial indications will have to suffice
+at this point. We shall have to clear up the distinction between thought and
+intuition, between presentation of an 'authentic' and a 'non-authentic' sort,
+by instituting a comprehensive set of analyses in the last Investigation in this
+book. In the course of these analyses a new notion of intuition will present
+itself, differing from the usual notion of sensuous intuition.
+§27 The justifiable sense of general representation
+After these discussions we might feel little inclined to be kind to the longcherished talk of the representative function of general signs and intuitive
+
+282 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+pictures. This talk is so ambiguous that, especially in its common acceptation,
+it can contribute nothing toward an elucidatory characterization of the
+thought which is deployed in general forms.
+Generality of presentation (Vorstellung) consists, it is held, in generality of representation (Repräsentation). If we could interpret the latter as
+the new modes of consciousness which we build on an intuitive basis,
+varying modifications in which the consciousness of generality is characterized as consciousness of the Species, consciousness of all cases, or
+as indefinite consciousness of a case or of cases etc., all would be in order.
+Talk of the representative function of an intuitive picture would to this
+extent be applicable, that the intuitive picture presents only one single
+individual from the species in question, but serves as point d'appui for the
+conceptual consciousness built upon this, so that through it the intention
+towards the Species, towards the total objective range of the concept, towards an unspecified individual of the sort in question, comes into being.
+The intuitive object could then itself be regarded and spoken of as being
+a representative of the Species, of the class, of the unspecified intended
+individual etc.
+What holds of the illustrative intuitive picture holds also of names which
+function representatively' without illustrative aids. As the consciousness
+of meaning may be developed on an inadequate intuitive basis, which may
+be far from exemplifying properly, it may do so also on the basis of a mere
+name. That the name represents something, means only that its physical
+manifestation serves to carry the significant intention, in which the conceived object is intended.
+Such a conception would exclude nominalism. Thought in its view no
+longer reduces to any external manipulation of names and individual ideas,
+nor to unconscious associative mechanisms which cause individual items
+to jump up in their places, as numbers jump up from a computer. There
+exists for it a conceptual presentation which differs descriptively from an
+intuitive presentation (from a reference directly related to some phenomenal
+object before us): a reference of a fundamentally new sort, to which the
+forms some X or some X's, or two or three, or something or other in general,
+or all etc., essentially pertain. Among these forms is also one in which the
+Species is made to function as a presented object, and so as a subject for
+possible attributions and predications.
+§28 Representation as substitution. Locke and
+Berkeley
+Talk of general representation was not, however, given the sense expounded
+above - the only sense it can correctly have, though the name representation' does not fit it very well - in the historical treatment of abstraction. It
+rather meant that the sign did duty for the thing signified.
+
+Abstraction and representation 283
+Locke had already made such substitution play an essential role in his
+doctrine of abstract ideas, and the theory of abstraction held by Berkeley
+and his successors took this over from Locke. We read, e.g., in Locke:*
+It is plain ... that general and universal belong not to the real existence
+of things; but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding,
+made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or
+ideas. Words are general... when used for signs of general ideas, and
+so are applicable indifferently to many particular things: and ideas are
+general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular
+things ... their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are
+put into by the understanding, of signifying or representing many particulars; for the signification they have is nothing but a relation that by
+the mind of man is added to them.
+Berkeley's lively attacks on Locke's theory of abstraction concern these
+'abstract ideas; but he transfers the representative functions which Locke
+accords to such ideas to our individual ideas at the moment or to general
+names in their own right. Let me recall the following passages from the
+Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge:
+Now if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what
+we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which,
+considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. To make
+this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the
+method of cutting a line into two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a
+black line of an inch in length, this which in itself is a particular line is
+nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it is there
+used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever: for what is there demonstrated of it, is demonstrated of all lines or, in other words, of a line in
+general. And as that particular line becomes general, by being made a
+sign, so the name line which taken absolutely is particular, by being a
+sign is made general. And as the former owes its generality, not to its
+being the sign of an abstract or general line, but of all particular right
+lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its
+generality from the same cause, namely, the various particular lines which
+it indifferently denotes.
+Universality, so far as I can comprehend, does not consist in the absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it
+bears to the particulars signified or represented by it: by virtue whereof
+it is that things, names or notions, being in their own nature particular,
+are rendered universal.
+
+284 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+But it seems that a word becomes general by being made the sign, not of
+an abstract general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which
+it indifferently suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said the
+change of motion is proportional to the impressed force, or that whatever
+has extension is divisible, these propositions are to be understood of
+motion and extension in general, and nevertheless it will not follow that
+they suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a body moved,
+or any determinate direction and velocity... it is only implied that,
+whatever motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular,
+horizontal or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it
+holds equally true. As does the other of every particular extension ..?
+§29 Critique of Berkeley's doctrine of
+representation®
+Against these contentions the following objections are in place. No acceptable sense can be given to Berkeley's assertion that an individual idea
+is used to represent all other individual ideas of the same kind, in view of
+the normal meaning of the word 'represent'. We speak of something representing another where one object takes over performances (or undergoes
+performances) which another object would otherwise perform (or undergo).
+Thus the attorney who has been granted full powers represents his clients
+and carries out their business, the ambassador represents the ruler, the
+symbolic abbreviation represents the complex algebraical expression etc. We
+may, however, ask, in our case, whether the individual idea in its momentary life likewise functions representatively, whether it takes over a performance, which another individual idea, or perhaps every individual idea in its
+class, could properly be called on to perform? This certainly fits in with the
+plain letter of what Berkeley says, but there can be no question of its being
+true. Obviously we can only maintain that the performance which our present
+individual idea carries out could as well have been carried out by any other
+individual idea; each could have served as well as a basis for our abstraction, as an intuitive foundation for our general meaning. The thought of
+representation first arises from the reflection that each individual idea is
+equivalent in respect of this function, and that when one has been chosen,
+any other could replace it, and conversely. Wherever a general meaning
+is carried out intuitively, such a thought is possible, but it is not for that
+reason actual, above all since it presupposes the general concept that it is
+designed to replace. Individual ideas are therefore merely possible, not actual,
+representatives for other similar individual ideas.
+But Berkeley takes representation seriously and takes his stand, on the
+one hand, on the sense of general assertions, on the other hand, on the part
+played by figures in geometrical proofs. The former applies to the above
+quotation from paragraph xi of the Introduction of his Principles. If we
+
+285
+judge that 'whatever is extended is divisible' we mean that whatever extended
+thing we may deal with will show itself to be divisible. The general name (or
+possibly the accompanying individual idea represents, in conformity with
+the simple sense of our sentence, every individual extended thing, no matter
+which - the individual idea in question therefore 'suggests indifferently to
+the mind' every other individual idea which belongs to the class of extended
+things.
+In all this Berkeley has confused two essentially different things:
+1. That the sign (name or individual idea is a representative of each
+individual falling within our concept's range, whose presentation Berkeley
+says that it suggests.
+2. That the sign has as its meaning the sense all A's or any A whatsoever.
+In regard to the latter there can be no question of representation in the
+sense of replacement. One or more A's may be suggested or presented with
+intuitive fullness, but the individual I look at (without intending to look at
+it) refers me to no other individual for which it serves as a substitute, let
+alone to every individual of the same kind. All A's, or every A whatsoever,
+are represented in a wholly different sense: they are presented in thought. We
+achieve the consciousness of all A's in a single pulse, in a homogeneous,
+peculiar act, in an act which has no components directed to all the individual A's, and which can neither be reconstituted nor replaced by a sum or
+combination of individual acts or individual suggestions. This act refers to
+each member of its range in virtue of its 'content, in virtue of its ideally
+seizable sense; it does not do so in a real (realer), but in an ideal, i.e. in a
+logical manner. What we assert of all A's, i.e. what we assert in a unitary
+sentence of the form 'All A's are B's', obviously holds with a priori force of
+every A that definitely comes before me. An inference from universal to
+singular can be carried out in each given case, and the predicate B ascribed
+with logical correctness to A. The universal judgement does not for this
+reason include the particular judgement in itself, nor the general presentation the individual presentation that falls under it, or it does not do so in a
+psychologically or phenomenologically 'real' (reell) manner, and so not in
+the fashion of a bundle of 'representations'. The mere infinity of the range
+of all pure general concepts, i.e. concepts unmixed with empirical assertions
+of existence, such as Number, Spatial Figure, Colour, Intensity, shows such
+a misinterpretation to be nonsensical.
+§30 Continuation. Berkeley's argument from
+geometrical demonstrations
+Berkeley appeals in the second place to the instance of the drawn line, which
+assists the geometer in his proof. He here allows himself to be misled by his
+empiricist tendency to give preference to the sensuous individual case (or
+rather to the sensuous analogon of such an individual case) over genuine
+
+286 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+objects of thought: this tendency shows itself, here as elsewhere, in his treatment of the sensuous individual case, which lends support to mathematical
+thought, as the subject of his proot. As it we went through the proot to
+apply it to the stroke on paper, to the triangle chalked up on the board, and
+not to the straight line or the triangle 'as such' or "in general'. This error has
+already been corrected above; we have shown that the proof is not in reality
+conducted on behalf of the individual in the drawing, but has from the start
+a general application. It applies to all straight lines whatever, grasped in a
+single act of thought. Nothing is changed in all this by the geometer's mode
+of speech, when he enunciates his proposition generally and perhaps starts
+his proof with the words: 'Let AB be any straight line...
+' This does not at
+all mean that the proof is in the first instance performed for this single
+straight line AB (or for a particular ideal straight line that it represents), and
+that this single straight line then functions as representing every other straight
+line; it only says that AB must render presentable, through intuitive symbolism, an instance which then may serve to catch, as intuitively as possible,
+the thought of a straight line in general, which thought constitutes the true,
+the continuously pervasive theme of our logical context.
+How little 'representation' helps to clear up the nature of general thought,
+appears from the question: What is the position of the general presentations
+that would have to appear for the straight line on the paper in the given
+proof? The intuitive data which correspond to them are surely not to be
+taken as objects of our demonstrative thought? For we should otherwise fail
+to set up a single proposition: we should have only representative individual
+ideas, but no thinking. Does anyone think that a conglomeration of such
+individual items can give rise to a predication? The function of a general
+name in the predicate certainly differs from its function in the subject, and
+its function varies, as noted above, according to our logical forms, to the
+forms of the thought-combinations into which our general meanings are
+welded, keeping a selfsame semantic nucleus, but varying with their varied
+syntactical functions (cf. the note to p. 371). How could all these forms, in
+which the make-up of 'thought' is as such manifest, or in which (to use
+objective language) the ideal essence of meaning is unfolded a priori (as the
+essence of number is unfolded in the forms of the numbers), how could one
+hope to cover all these matters by the one blanket phrase of 'representing"?
+§31 The main source of the errors that we
+have indicated
+One would be going too far were one to reproach Locke and Berkeley for
+altogether overlooking the descriptive difference between an individual idea,
+as part of an individual intention, and the same idea as part of a general
+intention (as serving to found a conceptual consciousness). One is assured,
+with many turns of phrase, that it is the 'mind' which gives such ideas their
+
+Abstraction and representation 287
+representative function, that it is the 'mind' that applies individual appearances as representatives; that all these mental activities are conscious
+activities, and so fall into the sphere of reflection, would certainly have been
+admitted by these great thinkers. Their fundamental epistemological errors
+or obscurities spring from a source that we have already laid bare:'° in their
+phenomenological analysis, they stick almost exclusively to the intuitive
+individual, to the palpable side, as it were, of our thought-experiences, to
+names and illustrative intuitions, while they are quite unable to do anything
+with 'act-characters', since these are not at all 'palpable'. They therefore
+go on in quest of further sensuous details, and of sensuously presentable
+manipulations of such details, so as to give thought the sort of reality that
+they favour, and that flatly refuses to show itself in the actual phenomenon.
+They cannot bring themselves to take acts of thought for what they show
+themselves in pure phenomenological examination; they cannot let them
+count as wholly new 'act-characters', as new modes of consciousness opposed to direct intuition. They cannot see what is quite plain to anyone who
+approaches the matter unconfused by traditional prejudices, that these 'actcharacters' are modes of meaning, modes having this or that significant
+content, behind which nothing whatever may be looked for that either differs
+or could differ from meaning, significant reference.
+What 'meaning' is, is a matter as immediately given to us as is the nature
+of colour and sound. It cannot be further defined, it is ultimate in description: whenever we perform or understand an act of expression, it means
+something to us, we have an actual consciousness of its sense. This understanding, meaning, enactment of sense, is not the hearing of the spoken
+word nor the experiencing of some contemporaneous image. Just as plainly
+as phenomenological differences between apparent sounds are self-evidently
+given to us, so are differences among meanings likewise self-evidently given.
+This is not of course the last word in the phenomenology of meanings, it is
+only its beginning. One will have, on the one hand, to pin down the distinction, fundamental for epistemology, between symbolical, 'empty' meanings
+and meanings having intuitive 'fulfilment", and one will have, on the other
+hand, to devote study to the essential kinds of meaning and to the modes in
+which meanings are combined. This is the sphere of actual meaning-analysis.
+Its problems are solved when we represent to ourselves the acts concerned
+and the things given in them. Pure phenomenological identification and
+distinction, combination and separation, as well as generalizing abstraction,
+will lead us on to the essential species and forms of meaning: one will get
+down, in other words, to the logically elementary concepts which are merely
+the idealized forms of primitive semantic differences.
+Instead, however, of analysing meanings phenomenologically in order
+to determine the basic forms of logic, or instead, conversely, of becoming
+clear that the basic forms of logic are merely the typical characters of our
+acts and their forms of combination (in the build-up of complex intentions),
+
+288 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+people engage in logical analysis in the ordinary sense of the word, they
+consider what these meanings objectively intend, and then seek what is
+thus objectively meant as something really present in the act. One thinks in
+meanings and not about meanings: one concerns oneself with states of
+affairs presented or judged about, not with their presentations and judgements (i.e. not with nominal and propositional meanings). One claims and
+thinks that one has carried out a descriptive analysis of acts, though the
+territory of reflection has been long left, and objective has been substituted
+for phenomenological analysis. Even purely logical analysis is objective when
+it investigates 'what is contained in our mere concepts or meanings, i.e. what
+must be attributed a priori to objects, in so far as these are thought of in
+such forms. The act-analysis of meaning investigates 'what is contained in
+our meanings' in a totally different sense. Here alone such a mode of expression is appropriate: meanings are reflected upon and made objects of investigation, their real parts and forms are enquired into, not what is true of their
+objects. The manner in which Locke arrives at his doctrine of general ideas
+and, among other things, at his doctrine of representation: the manner,
+likewise, in which Berkeley applies and defends this doctrine, and especially
+his approach to the meaning of general propositions - cf. his analyses of the
+examples quoted on p. 395 from paragraph xI of the Introduction to the
+Principles - merely confirm what we have said.
+
+Chapter 5
+Phenomenological study of Hume's
+theory of abstraction
+§32 Hume's dependence on Berkeley
+One need not nowadays stress the fact that Hume's conception of abstraction is not at all the same as Berkeley's.' Nonetheless, the two notions are
+so closely akin, that it is quite comprehensible that Hume at the start of
+his exposition in Part 1, Section vIl of the Treatise, should have gone so
+far as simply to attribute his thesis to Berkeley. 'A great philosopher,' he
+tells us,
+has disputed the received opinion... and has asserted that all general
+ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term which
+gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon
+occasion other individuals which are similar to them...I look upon
+this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has
+been made of late years in the republic of letters.
+This is plainly not quite Berkeley's view, who does not, like Hume, want to
+attribute to general names the primary power of making individual presentations that accompany them into representations of other individual presentations of the same class. On Berkeley's view, general names may function
+representatively in isolation from corresponding individual presentations,
+individual presentations may also function representatively without names,
+and both may, lastly, occur together, in which case, however, the name has
+no special advantage in its association with the representative presentation.
+Nonetheless the main point remains the same; generality consists in representation, and this is expressly conceived by Hume as a 'doing duty' by
+an individual item before us for other individual items, which, in Berkeley's
+mode of expression, are mentally 'suggested' by the former, or in Hume's
+straight phrase, are 'recalled to memory'.
+Hume is accordingly hit by all our objections to Berkeley, and more
+severely hit, since in Berkeley the literal treatment of representation, and
+of the evocation of represented individual presentations, still floats in
+
+290 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+obscure suspense, whereas in Hume it appears with unveiled sharpness and
+clearness.
+§33 Hume's critique of abstract ideas and its
+supposed outcome. His ignoring of pivotal
+phenomenological issues
+The spirit of Berkeley's doctrine therefore lives on, as regards its main features, in Hume. Hume, however, does not merely reproduce this doctrine but
+extends it further: he tries to elaborate it more exactly and especially to
+deepen it psychologically. In this regard the arguments Hume directs against
+the doctrine of abstract ideas are not so important as the associationistpsychological discussion that he appends to them. The arguments in question do not go essentially beyond Berkeley's circle of ideas, and are, for one
+that fixes the aim of the proof correctly, quite irrefragable. The impossibility
+of abstract ideas in the sense of Locke's philosophy, ie. of abstract images
+formed by disengaging ideas of properties from concrete images, has certainly
+been proved. Hume himself sums up his result in the proposition: 'Abstract
+ideas are therefore in themselves individual, however they may become general
+in their representation. The image in the mind is only that of a particular
+object; though the application of it in our reasoning be the same as if it were
+universal." These propositions could naturally not be proved by Hume's
+critique which showed abstract images to be impossible, and which tried to
+conclude from this that, if we nonetheless speak of general ideas, ideas
+belonging to general names as their meanings or meaning-fulfilments, something must be added to our concrete images to create such generality of
+meaning. This added element - so the discussion should properly have continued - cannot consist in new concrete ideas, and therefore not in the ideas
+of names: a conglomeration of concrete images can do no more than present
+just those objects whose images it contains. We must not overlook the fact
+that generality of meaning - whether this be generality of meaning-intention
+or generality of meaning-fulfilment - is something felt as immanent in each
+individual case where a general name is understood, and is applied to
+intuition in accordance with its sense, and that it is something which, in
+immediately evident fashion, distinguishes such a case from an individual
+intuition. It only, therefore, remains to argue that it must be the manner of
+consciousness, the manner of our intention, that makes the difference. A new
+type of reference makes its appearance, in which we neither mean the intuitively apparent object as such, nor the object of our verbal idea, nor that of
+our accompanying thing-idea, but the quality or form exemplified in the latter,
+which we understand in general fashion as a unity in the sense of a Species.
+Hume, however, remains attached to Berkeley's thought of representation,
+and externalizes it completely. Instead of looking to the semantic character
+of meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment, he loses himself in the genetic
+
+Phenomenological study of Hume's theory of abstraction 29l
+connections which give names an associative relation to the objects of a
+class. He quite fails to mention, and does not see with operative lucidity,
+that generality evinces itself in our subjective experience, and, as previously
+stressed, in each single enactment of a general meaning. Still less does he
+note, that what is here evinced exhibits sharp descriptive differences: that
+our consciousness of 'generality' at one time takes on a generic character, at
+another time a character of universal application, or that it becomes otherwise tinged in virtue of this or that 'logical form'.
+Modes of consciousness, acts in the sense of intentional experiences, certainly cause discomfort to a psychology and epistemology of 'ideas, which
+aims at reducing everything to 'impressions' (sensations), and associative
+concatenations of 'ideas' (images, the enfeebled shadows of 'impressions').
+I recall here Hume's vain efforts over belief, and how he repeatedly has
+recourse to treating this character of our acts as an intensity, or as an analogue
+of intensity, in our ideas. 'Representation', likewise, must in some manner
+be reduced to something seizable. This is what a genetic-psychological analysis
+must achieve: it must show how, in our judgements, we come to apply the
+mere individual image that we experience, 'beyond its own nature', and 'as if
+it were general'.
+This last-mentioned turn of speech shows, to an extraordinary extent, the
+characteristic obscurity of Hume's position. With his 'as if, Hume fundamentally concedes to his great predecessor Locke that his theory of general
+ideas - if such ideas were possible - would achieve its purpose. He does not
+perceive that Locke's general ideas, as fragments torn from concrete contents, would themselves again be individual singulars, and that the fact that
+they were inseparable from other similar ideas (whether torn from or immanent in concrete ideas) would not yet endow them with the generality of
+thought. He does not perceive that peculiar acts, peculiar manners of referring or meaning, are necessary to do all this. Even if we accept Lockean
+abstracta, we still need the form of thought about 'all' in order to intend an
+infinite range of individual singulars not really presented. The self-identical
+unity of the genus was likewise first set up for consciousness by an act of
+generic thinking, and so on. An objective relation of exact similarity, that
+exists, yet is not subjectively revealed, will obviously not alter the single
+similar individual set before consciousness: only thought can give this individual a thought-relation to such a circle of similars.
+§34 Reduction of Hume's investigation to
+two questions
+If we now cast a glance at the content of Hume's psychological analyses, we
+can express what he hoped to achieve in the two following questions:
+1. How does the individual idea come by its representative function?
+Through what psychological processes does it become capable of functioning
+
+292 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+as a substitute for other similar ideas, and ultimately for every possible idea
+of the same class?
+2. The same individual idea fits into many circles of similarity, though in
+each definite thought-context it only represents ideas from one such circle.
+What circumstance picks out this circle of representation in a given context,
+what limits the representative function of the individual idea in this manner
+and so makes unity of sense possible?
+It is clear that these psychological questions retain their good sense if one
+here drops the guiding concept of representation, and substitutes for it the
+well-understood, genuine concept of a general presentation as being an act
+of general meaning or meaning-fulfilment (cf. general intuition in the sense
+of Investigation vI, $52). That general presentations have emerged genetically out of intuitive, individual ones is generally accepted. But though the
+consciousness of the universal is repeatedly kindled by individual intuition,
+and derives clarity and self-evidence from the latter, it is not therefore a
+direct product of individual intuition. How then did we ever manage to go
+beyond individual intuition, to mean something quite other than the singular
+phenomenon before us, a universal instantiated in the latter, and yet not
+really contained in it? And how did we get all those forms which diversify
+the objective relations of the universal, and constitute differing logical kinds
+of presentation? If associative connections are now brought in to explain
+this, we are at once introduced to dispositional groups of similars and the
+signs we externally attach to them. This makes the second question a real
+one, how the circles of similars can maintain their fixed internal coherence,
+and not be mutually confounded in our thinking.
+In this situation we do not contradict ourselves if, on the one hand, we
+say Hume's treatment of abstraction was an extreme case of error, and yet
+vindicate for it the glory of having shown the way to a psychological theory
+of abstraction. It is an extreme case of error from the angle of logic and
+epistemology, for which it is important that experiences of knowing should
+be investigated in a purely phenomenological manner, that acts of thought
+should be treated as what they intrinsically are and contain in themselves,
+so that we may bring clearness to the fundamental concepts of knowledge.
+Hume's genetic analyses certainly cannot claim theoretical completeness and
+finality, since they lack a foundation in an adequate descriptive analysis.
+This does not, however, mean that they do not contain valuable trains of
+thought, which could not escape notice and have also had a fruitful effect.
+On his complete lack of a strictly descriptive analysis of thinking (or on
+his substitution of empirical-psychological for epistemological investigations)
+the further fact depends that Hume likewise imagines that to think of thought
+as having an economical function in knowledge yields a standpoint from
+which thought can be epistemologically illuminated. In this regard Hume is
+the true pupil of Locke and his philosophy. The objections to this point of
+view have been sufficiently canvassed in a previous section (824).
+
+293
+§35 The guiding principle and outcome of Hume's
+doctrine of abstraction and the main thoughts in
+which it is worked out
+The guiding principle of Hume's psychological exposition is stated in the
+following words: 'If ideas be particular in their nature, and at the same time
+finite in number,
+'tis only by custom they can become general in their representation, and contain an infinite number of other ideas under them.'
+Hume's conclusion runs as follows: 'A particular idea becomes general by
+being annexed to a general term, that is to a term which from a customary
+conjunction has a relation to many other particular ideas, and readily recalls
+them in the imagination.'
+The main thoughts in which this doctrine is worked out are set forth in
+the quotation:
+The application of ideas beyond their nature proceeds from our collecting all their possible degrees of quantity and quality in such an imperfect manner as may serve the purposes of life... When we have found a
+resemblance among several objects that often occur to us, we apply the
+same name to all of them, whatever differences we may observe in the
+degrees of their quantity and quality, and whatever other differences
+may appear among them. After we have acquired a custom of this kind,
+the hearing of that name revives the idea of one of these objects, and
+makes the imagination conceive it with all its particular circumstances
+and proportions. But as the same word is supposed to have been frequently applied to other individuals, that are different in many respects
+from that idea which is immediately present to the mind, the word not
+being able to revive the idea of all these individuals, only touches the
+soul, if I may be allowed so to speak, and revives that custom which we
+have acquired by surveying them. They are not really and in fact present
+to the mind, but only in power: nor do we draw them all out distinctly
+in the imagination, but keep ourselves in a readiness to survey any of
+them, as we may be prompted by a present design or necessity. The
+word raises up an individual idea, along with a certain custom; and that
+custom produces any other individual one for which we may have occasion. But as the production of all the ideas, to which the name may be
+applied is in most cases impossible, we abridge that work by a more
+partial consideration, and find but few inconveniences to arise in our
+reasoning from that abridgement.
+These quotations may serve to recall the gist of Hume's theory with
+sufficient completeness for our purposes. We need not here proceed to
+analyse them critically, since genetic problems fall outside the limits of
+our task.
+
+294 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+§36 Hume's doctrine of the distinctio rationis in its
+moderate and its radical interpretation
+Of particular interest for us is Hume's doctrine of the distinctio rationis,
+which also indirectly yields an answer to the second question formulated
+above. The question is how we are able to distinguish abstract 'moments'
+from intuitive objects: the former can of course be made into ideas in their
+own right, i.e. not through an abstraction in the Lockean sense of a separation. How do we rise to a distinction between the white sphere we have just
+intuited and whiteness (or sphericity), since 'whiteness' and 'sphericity' cannot count as ideas in the Lockean sense, which are contained in the concrete
+idea as particular parts separable from it. Berkeley had answered this question by pointing to the emphatic power of attention. Hume here attempts to
+penetrate further, and provides the following solution:
+If we compare a white sphere with a black sphere and on the other hand
+with a white cube, we notice two differing resemblances. Through repeated
+comparisons of this sort, objects sort themselves out for us into 'circles of
+resemblance' and ever strengthening habits teach us to consider each object
+"in different aspects', according to the resemblances that permit its placing in
+different, but definite circles. That in one case we direct our gaze to colour
+only, does not mean that we have separated colour, but that we accompany
+what is in fact a unitary and indivisible presentation 'with a kind of reflection, of which custom renders us in a great measure insensible'. In this obscure
+consciousness, a white cube perhaps floats before us, and so brings out a resemblance (i.e. that in respect of colour) to which we turn our inner gaze, so
+that the white sphere we perceive is only given a place in the resemblancecircle of colour. According to the manner of this reflection (or the resemblances that govern it), a different 'moment' in the same intuitive object is
+noted; or, what is in essence the same, the same intuition serves as a basis
+for the so-called abstraction of general presentations. With each circle of
+resemblance a particular name is associatively linked, so that the inner reflection, together with its characteristic 'angle' of treatment, also fixes the
+general name.
+We are not here engaged in psychological research, and it is not therefore
+for us to set forth critically what is good, and what is also crude, in such a
+theoretical attempt. Up to a point, however, we must consider it, in view of
+a paradoxical thought that seems to have inspired Hume's exposition, which
+modern Humeans have been the first to profess in undisguised crudity. This
+thought can be expressed as follows:
+Characters, inner properties, are not truly immanent in the objects that
+'have' them. The distinct, mutually inseparable "sides' or 'moments' of an
+intuitive content, e.g. its colour, form etc., that we think we apprehend as
+being 'there' (vorhanden) in it, are not really in it at all. There are rather only
+one kind of real parts, the parts, namely, that we can also isolate, in other
+
+Phenomenological study of Hume's theory of abstraction 295
+words, the thing's pieces. So called abstract part-contents, of which it is said
+that they can indeed not be on their own account, (or be so intuited), but
+that they can be attended to by themselves, are to some extent a mere fiction
+cum fundamento in re. There is neither colour in a coloured thing, not form
+in a thing formed, but there are really only circles of resemblances in which the
+object in question has its place, and certain habits tied to our intuition of it.
+Considered more carefully, our doubt certainly is twofold; it is both objective and subjective. Objectively, it concerns the objects apparent before us in
+regard to their intrinsic properties, subjectively it concerns the appearance
+itself (taken as immanent experience) in relation to its inner load of sensation and sensuous content in general, ie. to the contents which receive
+objectifying 'interpretation' (apperception) in our act of intuition. It is in
+the 'interpretation' that the appearance of the corresponding objective
+characters or properties is realized. On the one hand, therefore, we are concerned with the sphere itself and its inner properties, e.g. its uniform white
+colouring: on the other hand we are concerned with the appearance of the
+sphere and the complex of sensations immanent in it, among which is, e.g.,
+the continuously graded sensation of white - the subjective correlate of the
+objective white which is uniformly apparent in perception. Here as elsewhere, Hume left this difference quite unnoticed; for him appearance and
+the apparent phenomenon coalesce.
+I am not really sure whether I have hit off Hume's own view in the theses
+formulated above; perhaps he only means, as against the Lockeans, that the
+concrete object is quite simple in respect of its characters, simple in the sense
+that we cannot break it up into such characters, though these characters
+as 'corresponding features'
+still are something really present in individual
+objects of the same sort. If this interpretation is right, Hume agrees with
+Berkeley on the matter, and only goes on to give a psychological elucidation
+of the manner in which the distinctio rationis comes into being
+Plainly the problem has a good sense, even if one holds abstract 'moments' to be genuinely immanent. One may ask how individual properties,
+which can only appear in the most intimate mutual penetration, and never
+in isolation, can nonetheless become exclusive objects of intuitions or of
+thought-intentions. What explanation can there be in the former case of
+that preferential attention which dispenses its favouring notice to differing
+properties at different times?
+§37 Objections to this doctrine in its radical
+interpretation
+The objections raised by a moderate interpretation of Hume's statement
+need not be considered here: psychological interests should not lure us from
+our cause. We need only say that Hume's thoughts, suitably modified, provide a basis on which a workable theory may very well be built. One need
+
+296 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+not, above all, take his mythical 'inner reflection' seriously. G. E. Müller (in
+the dictated notes published by F. Schumann)* has worked out the Humean
+theory more closely, with very great clearness and penetration, and though
+he himself prefers the radical interpretation, his restatement nonetheless
+plainly shows the fruitfulness of Hume's germinal suggestions.
+Let us now turn to criticism of the radical interpretation of Hume's doctrine. It occupies a central place in our sphere of epistemological interest.
+The difficulties in which consistent development involves it, are not small.
+If the abstract contents which correspond to the absolute properties are
+themselves simply 'nothing' in concrete intuition, associative and relational
+contents will even be more absolutely 'nothing' in our intuition of an aggregate with the corresponding form of unity. The problem of the distinctio
+rationis, and the principle of its solution, is plainly one and the same for all
+abstract contents. It is therefore the same for relational and associative
+contents as for absolute contents. One cannot therefore answer questions as
+to the way in which colour was seemingly found in, or distinguished in (or
+from) a coloured object, by having recourse to the finding of a similarity
+between the coloured object and other coloured objects. Since such a finding
+would, if the explanation is consistently pursued, lead to the finding of a
+similarity of this similarity with other similarities (in the case or colour, to
+a group of similar similarities such as subsist among coloured objects). The
+explanatory principle would again have to be applied to this further similarity, and so on.
+This argument carries over from abstract contents, understood as really
+experienced (reell erlebte) moments in the unity of a concrete intuition, to
+presentations of properties and modes of composition in 'external' objects.
+We therefore make use of a distinction which we emphasized against
+Hume, a distinction between concrete intuition, as the really (reell) present
+appearance or givenness of the object (as experience), and the object intuited
+(perceived, imagined etc.). We must here note that nothing scientifically
+or metaphysically transcendent should be substituted for this object; by 'the
+object' we meant the object as it appears in this intuition, as it counts (so to
+say for this intuition. To the sphere's appearance or givenness the apparent
+sphere therefore stands opposed. Just so to the sensed contents of the sphere's
+appearance (moments phenomenologically discoverable by descriptive analysis), the perceived, or imagined parts or sides of the apparent sphere stand
+opposed: to the sensation of white, e.g., the sphere's apparent whiteness.
+All this having been granted, we may say: Should anyone wish to declare
+all talk of the intuitive presentation of abstract, objective determinations
+to be senseless, and to maintain that when we think we perceive, e.g., the
+property of white, we really only perceive, or otherwise present to ourselves,
+a resemblance between the apparent object and other objects, then such a
+man has involved himself in an infinite regress, since talk of this presented
+resemblance calls for a corresponding reinterpretation.
+
+Phenomenological study of Hume's theory of abstraction 297
+We here at once see the absurdity of the conception we are criticizing in
+the fact that, in the face of all self-evidence, an object self-evidently different
+from our intentional object has been substituted for it. The thing comprised
+in my intuition's intention, the thing I think that I am grasping perceptually
+or constructing imaginatively, stands by and large above all dispute. I may
+be deceived as to the existence of the object of perception, but not as to the
+fact that I do perceive it as determined in this or that way, that my percept's
+target is not some totally different object, a pine-tree, e.g., instead of a
+cockchafer. This self-evidence in characterizing description (or in identification and distinction of intentional objects), has, no doubt, its understandable
+limits, but it is true and genuine self-evidence. Without it even the far-famed
+self-evidence of inner perception (introspection), with which it is usually confused - wherever, that is, 'inner perception' is understood as the perception of
+intentional experience - would be wholly useless: when expressive talk begins,
+and the descriptive distinction of inwardly perceived experiences is carried out,
+this self-evidence is presupposed, since the distinction and description of intentional experiences without regard to their intentional objects is impossible.
+This self-evidence helps us at this point. There is a self-evident difference
+between intuiting this object's redness and intuiting any relation of resemblance. If the latter intuition is relegated to the unnoticed or the unconscious,
+one merely adds to one's malaise, since one is sacrificing the self-evidently
+given intention in favour of what is unobservable.
+Our previous discussion runs over into our present discussion of apparent
+objects, to the extent that contents become perceived objects for reflective
+phenomenological analysis. Though we would not and should not call the
+appearance of the sphere (qua experience) a thing, nor call its abstract,
+immanent contents properties or characters, the descriptive situation as regards the points here relevant remains the same. The differences between
+thing and property are ontological differences, not characters of experience.
+They correspond to nothing in the phenomenon momentarily given, they
+are not real moments entering into this phenomenon and discoverable in it.
+They point rather to combinations of conscious experiences in which they
+appear conjointly, in which we have experience of them and can pin them
+down scientifically.
+Surveying this whole situation, we can appeal to the self-evidence which
+holds for the distinction of intentional objects in general in the special case
+of the intentional distinction of interior data. In this limiting case, where the
+object meant itself belongs to the real content of the experience (taken in its
+complete concreteness), the self-evidence of 'inner'
+perception comes into
+action; we do not merely have a self-evidence as to the difference of our
+intended data, but self-evidence as to their actual existence. When we direct
+our analytic interest not so much to the apparent sphere as to the sphere's
+appearance (qua experience), and distinguish parts or sides in the latter,
+while deliberately not noticing what such sensed contents mean, it is not
+
+298 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+merely self-evident that our colour-content, our total content etc. is perceived, it is also self-evident that it really exists. We may not always be
+successful in ignoring meaning, nor in carrying the analysis of experienced
+contents as far as one might wish; broadly and roughly, however, both may
+be achieved. Just as the self-evident difference of our intentional objects is
+not shaken by the fact that we may readily deceive ourselves regarding our
+intentions once we leave the sphere of grosser differences - just as the difference between a cockchafer and a pine-tree (both taken purely as they
+announce themselves to consciousness, intentional objects of our intentions)
+has genuine self-evidence - so there is a genuine self-evidence by which we
+often know that a colour-moment, a sensation, is really there in our unitary
+intuition, that it helps to build up the latter, and that it is quite different
+from the moment of shape that is likewise present. The situation is not
+affected by the fact that the separation of these moments, their independent
+being without inherence or being possessed, is unthinkable.
+One does not do justice to this self-evident situation if one says: 'Certain
+mental events exist in themselves, certain unnoticed arousals of series of similars, which impart a certain character to the absolutely simple concrete things
+in question, a certain colouring, a Jamesian "fringe"! In the first place such
+'fringes' have their reality quite as much as the supposed unconscious events,
+which are in any case wholly irrelevant for pure phenomenology. In the
+second place, "fringes' are mere appendages which may equally well be present
+or absent. If we therefore identify these supposed 'fringes' with the moments
+self-evidently noticed in the concrete thing, these 'fringes'
+would all become
+mere appendages of a carrier, a carrier quite of the type of the wonderful,
+featureless 'substance' that no one any longer takes seriously.
+The self-evident fact that the sensory moments, the colour-moment, the
+shape-moment and other immanent determinations, really belong to the
+unity of intuition, are moments making it up, cannot in any manner be
+interpreted away. One can no doubt explain them as the results of certain
+fusions, as products really but unnoticeably embracing their factors, but,
+however interesting this may be from the psychological standpoint, it does
+not affect our immediate descriptive findings, which alone have relevance
+for the clarification of our concepts and acts of knowing. Theoretically to
+conjure abstract contents, and with them abstract concepts, out of existence,
+is to try to expose as fictions, what we really presuppose in all insight,
+whether in our thoughts or our proofs.
+Possibly one may defer to hypercritical doubts, and object that a distinctio
+rationis is only given by way of a judgement. On one side stands the
+absolutely unitary phenomenon, to which our assertion accedes, attributing
+inner differences to it, which do not prove that the phenomenon really has
+inner differences.
+We should reply: obviously where we pass judgement on an experience,
+two things are present, the experience and our assertion. The assertion,
+
+Phenomenological study of Hume's theory of abstraction 299
+however, may be correct, and it is correct when accompanied by insight. If
+one wants to approve a case as valid where containment is genuinely given
+and experienced, one can only do so on the basis of self-evidence. If ever
+self-evidence spoke for such a containment, it certainly does so in the present
+case. The notion of containment should not be unnecessarily restricted, not
+restricted, i.e. to the concept of articulation into discrete 'pieces'. If one
+keeps to this narrower concept the word is rendered inapplicable,
+, but the
+fact is still clear.
+Notes
+1. We encountered a line of thought similar to the one just dealt with on
+a previous occasion. We there dealt with the question whether Species could
+be treated as objects, whether it was not more correct to say that there are in
+reality only individual objects, variously ordered according to their similarities. But in our last discussions we were not dealing with Species but
+with their instances. There is not merely a denial that one can speak of Red
+in general as an object of thought, but also that one can speak of an instance
+of red, of red as a 'moment' of an intuition which occurs here and now. We
+could not achieve the self-evident consciousness of generality, in which
+the Species is (as it were) given in person, if the instance, whose intuitive
+givenness is presupposed in the actual performance of abstraction, were
+reinterpreted in relativistic fashion. The parallel arguments are therefore
+essentially connected.
+2. I note subsequently that A. von Meinong, in his valuable essay
+'Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren
+Wahrnehmung' (which unfortunately appeared too late to be of assistance
+to me in these Logical Investigations) has devoted some discussion to the
+relation between the self-evident recognition of immanent objects and inner
+perception (Zeitsch. f. Phil. u. Psych. d. S. Bd. 21, Section 2, p. 205 ff.). If I
+understand him rightly, Meinong makes the former case of self-evidence
+coincide with that of the inner perception relating to the existence of the
+presentation concerned. In that case he cannot have meant the self-evidence
+that we meant in the text. That the so-called immanent object is not in a
+serious sense an object in our presentation (as Twardowski still put it), is
+naturally my definite opinion too: on the side of the presentation nothing
+exists but the reference-to-this-object, the significant scope (Bedeutungsgehalt),
+as it were, of the presentation. But the self-evidence of the fact that I mean
+a pine-tree in my presentation of pine-tree, a tree of a sort determined
+by such and such features, and not possibly a cockchafer or anything else -
+is not what can be attributed to a mere percept, even to one relating to
+the mere experience of presentation. One is here dealing with the selfevidence of assertions, whose complex meaning-intention is fulfilled on a
+basis of numerous acts, of numerous presentations, and of identifications
+
+300 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+and differentiations which connect them. Even if we ignore the acts to be found
+on the intentional side, it is quite impossible to make do with mere acts of
+inner perception in the case of fulfilment. The inner perception of the acts of
+identification and differentiation just mentioned is obviously not adequate
+to account for the self-evident subsistence of identities and differences.
+§38 Transference of our scepticism from abstract
+part-contents to all parts whatsoever
+Scepticism in regard to abstract part-contents is paralleled by possible scepticism in regard to concrete part-contents, ie. 'pieces'. A homogeneous white
+surface we take to be a divisible object; all parts that can be distinguished
+by us in actual division are treated as pre-existent parts in the surface. This
+practice we carry over to the case of sensation. The contents we actually
+experience in dealing with the white surface are bits analogously related to
+the total content as the objective bits of the surface are to the total surface.
+If it is pointed out that, in the intuitive presentation of the surface, we 'allow
+our glance to glide over it, thereby experiencing a multitude of continuously differing contents, we are not at a loss. We simply transfer our conception to each such content.
+But how do we know that the content is really composite? If we imagine
+divisions in the unbroken white surface, the corresponding sense-content
+may really exhibit connected parts, but such imaginative intrusions do not
+leave our original content unaltered. The complex, discontinuously fragmented content we now have is not the same as the original, quite single,
+inwardly undivided one. "The parts, into which one can think such a unity
+broken up, are fictitious parts. ® Certain activities of imagination and judgement have been superimposed on an indivisible content of consciousness,
+and what the former produce we credit to the latter.
+Doubt grips us further, if we turn to consider a case, at first unassailed,
+where the intuitive content already exhibits divisions. Does our experience
+in such a case not first offer us a certain unitary content, that we afterwards
+say is compounded of parts, and is our saying this not due to a prior
+performance of certain novel operations? We pay attention, it is commonly
+said, now to one part, now to another, and now to yet another part of the
+content. But with each step our experience alters. Our tendency to confuse
+sense-contents with perceived or imagined objects, makes us substitute quite
+different contents for our original content at each step. The part we are
+attending to at the moment not merely lies in our focus of attention but
+also, more literally, in our focus of vision, and so yields sensations differing
+from those that it yields when remaining in the background. Keeping more
+strictly to contents, we may say that the content we momentarily pick out is
+surrounded only by an obscure, wholly chaotic mass, a fringe, a penumbra,
+or however one may wish to name the unnameable. It is not separated from
+
+1301
+the latter, but 'inwrought' with it. As one passes from part to part, the
+situation remains generally the same, though always differing in content:
+this is the case even when we do not let our glance wander. It would be a
+crude account of the descriptive situation were one to speak of this or that
+indirectly seen part (or of the corresponding experiential part) as if it were
+merely made individually noticeable in an identical unity of content, without suspicion of accompanying changes in the experience itself. Here, as in
+the case of abstract contents, genetic grounds point to certain connections in
+past experience which render selective notice possible, and whose effects are
+also shown in other facts of consciousness. What we see indirectly operates
+as a sign for anything coming from a sphere of similars bounded by past
+experience: the emphasis of attention involves, further, an interpretation,
+and with this, generally a change in content (an 'elaboration in fancy').
+But if we object that repeated revival and comparison of experienced
+contents teaches us that it is right to talk of a division even in the case of
+such contents, the sceptic may well point to the abiding illusions to which
+such comparisons are subject, to the confusions between apparent things
+and experienced contents, between comparisons of objects and comparisons
+of contents etc.
+§39 The extreme limit of scepticism and its refutation
+If we persist in this sceptical direction, we shall have to doubt whether there
+are parts of any sort; and in consequence whether there is ever a plurality of
+concrete contents, since ultimately (if we may still presume to judge the
+matter) the contents which appear in co-existence and succession are always
+in a manner unified. Our scepticism would at length be crowned by the
+assertion: consciousness is something quite unitary, regarding which we can
+at least not know, whether it has partial contents at all, or whether it in any
+way unfolds itself in simultaneous or temporally successive experiences.
+Such a scepticism, it is plain, would render all psychologies impossible?
+How one must combat it need not be said after our previous explanations.
+Whatever the flux of immanent phenomena, it does not rule out the possibility of first grasping these phenomena in vague but quite clear concepts
+(clear because directly formed on an intuitive basis), and then, based on
+such concepts, of making many decisions, rough in fact but self-evident,
+which are quite enough to render psychological research possible.
+As regards the white surface - I am not here referring to the white surface
+itself, treated as a thing, but to the 'conscious content' - we see very well
+how it changes, but also how, despite all such changes, it stays alike, even
+identical. The boundaries added by imagination do not constitute its pieces
+originally; they merely bound them. It is self-evident to us that these pieces
+really were present in the unity of the content 'white surface'. The content,
+held without boundaries in an identical intention, coincides with the same
+
+302 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+content changed only by such imagined boundaries; the two coincide in
+respect of the outlined parts. The parts were, and always are, in the whole,
+not however as separated unities in their own right. A certain fluctuation
+and flux of contents, the uncertainty, even the impossibility, of keeping
+them just the same, does not destroy the self-evidence of these judgements.
+Like all purely descriptive judgements passed on intuitive data as such in a
+faithfully 'expressive' manner, they hold within a certain range of variability, with a certain index, therefore, of vagueness. ' Naturally we only adduce
+examples where all relationships exhibit gross differences, and so really fall
+within the sphere of the gross self-evidence spoken of above.
+Self-evidence is also present if we proceed in the opposite direction, and
+remove in thought a fragmentation that is actually present. If a surface
+divides into a white and a red section, then, if there are merely qualitative
+changes, the identity of the two extended parts is maintained. If we now
+think of the white of the one, and the red of the other, as shading continuously into one another, both parts now coalesce in an inwardly undivided
+unity. But however this may come about, the result is evidently not an
+absolutely simple unity, but a homogeneous one, in which alone all inner
+separations have been blurred. The parts are self-evidently there, but, though
+each part has its own quality and every condition of concreteness, it still
+lacks qualitative discontinuity to set itself off, and with this the character of
+shutting itself off from the parts which melt into it.
+If we make empirical concepts and relations into precise ones, if we frame
+ideal concepts of extension, surface, qualitative alikeness and continuity
+etc., we arrive at exact, a priori propositions which set forth what is founded
+on the intentions of such strict concepts. Compared with these, merely descriptive assertions are inexact approximations. Though the vague sphere of
+singular phenomenal individuality in general, does not fall within the sphere
+of exact knowledge (which operates merely with ideals), it is none the less
+not at all excluded from the general sphere of knowledge.
+From this we see also the stand we must take up against doubts which go
+further, and which lead ultimately to the denial of all parts and differences.
+In individual cases the flux of sense-experiences, or also of specific mental
+experiences, may very well leave room for doubt: this is not possible in all
+cases. Where differences are gross, a self-evidence is attainable which renders
+all doubt unjustifiable.
+Appendix
+Modern Humeanism
+Hume's philosophy, with its richly brilliant psychological analyses, and its
+systematically applied psychologism in epistemology, corresponds so closely
+to tendencies dominant in our time, that it could scarcely fail to have a
+
+Phenomenological study of Hume's theory of abstraction 303
+lively influence. One can perhaps even say that Hume has never been more
+influential than he is now, and one could even apply the name 'modern
+Humeans' to quite a fair number of contemporary thinkers. Here again one
+may note that, in this spread of historical influence, the errors have spread
+as much as, or more than, the good features. Particularly as regards the
+doctrine of the distinctio rationis, recent writings often offer us utterances or
+explanations which fit in with the radical sense of this doctrine." H. Cornelius
+has, however, taken up this doctrine in a peculiarly wholehearted, articulate
+manner: his Psychologie is an attempt to work out a fully-developed, psychologistic theory of knowledge, in the most extreme manner so far conceived,
+on the basis of modern psychology. To the extent that his work really is
+psychology, it contains many highly interesting, stimulating expositions
+of detail. To the extent, however, that it is epistemology, I think I may say
+that Cornelius confuses matters pertaining to the intentional content of
+knowledge (to knowledge's ideal sense, to what knowledge means and what
+is therefore necessarily posited along with it), with matters pertaining to
+the intentional object of knowledge, and both with matters pertaining to the
+mere psychological constitution of the knowledge-experience (perhaps only
+to mere phenomenal accompaniments of our intention, or to its unconscious,
+unnoticed genetic grounds). These confusions, I should say, have never been
+so richly represented in the literature, and have never stamped themselves
+so strongly on the whole treatment of problems of knowledge, as in the
+expositions of Cornelius.'? This is particularly plain in the type of questions
+which here concern us. In the interests of truth, we shall here linger a little
+and prove our point by way of a few quotations, partly from the Psychologie,
+partly from a supplementary treatise of our author. To show that a scientific
+movement has gone astray, nothing is more instructive than to study its
+consequences as worked out by its adherents, and so to convince oneself
+that the final theory they think they have gained, has rather involved them
+in self-evident contradictions.
+In regard to the dictated notes of G. E. Müller, of whose content Cornelius
+wholly approves, he says:'3
+the distinction of differing features... is based... on the fact that the
+contents are gathered into groups according to their similarities, and are
+named with common names. There is therefore nothing else that we
+mean when we talk of the varying features of a content, than the fact that
+this content belongs to various such groups of contents, all mentally
+similar and therefore called by the same name.
+Nothing so definite is to be found in Hume: the great thinker would probably have hesitated before accepting this proposition. 'What we mean' is
+surely our sense, and can one say even for an instant that the sense of the
+proposition "This tone is faint' is the same as the sense of the proposition.
+
+304 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+'This tone belongs to a group (of whatever sort) of similars?' If someone
+says that, in order to speak of the tone's faintness, one must necessarily
+imagine tones similar in their faintness, we need not dispute what he says. It
+may be so. But do we mean that the tone belongs to this group, one consisting perhaps of n objects? And if the infinitely many similar objects could
+stand before our eyes as a single group, and actually did so stand, would
+the sense of our expression be the membership of this group? Naturally the
+utterances 'A tone is faint' and 'A tone belongs to the sum total of objects
+alike in their faintness' are semantically equivalent, but equivalence is not
+identity. If someone says that talk about faintness of tones could arise only
+if we had noticed similarities among faint tones, and that, further, the
+memory-traces of such previous experiences are somehow excited when we
+meaningfully speak of such tones, and that their dispositional after-effects
+determine the character of our present experience, he may well be right. But
+what has all this to do with our sense, with what we mean by our words? My
+reference is plainly an immediately given, present experience. How this experience, with its evident content, may have arisen; what may be necessarily
+true of it from the genetic standpoint; what may underlie it physiologically
+or psychologically, whether in the marginal or the unconscious - all these
+are interesting themes for enquiry. But it is absurd to seek information
+about our meaning along such paths. It is an error more or less analogous
+to the common materialism that seeks to assure us that tones really are
+air-vibrations, excitations of the acoustic nerve etc. Here, too, theoretical
+hypotheses which explain the given genetically, are substituted for the given.
+That we are not here dealing with a passing looseness of expression on
+Cornelius' part, is shown by his further statements. We read:
+We need hardly say that, on the theory just set forth, this 'common feature' of simple contents cannot be used generally to explain the similarity
+among these contents - as one is accustomed to reduce the similarity
+of two carpets to an exact match of colour. For to assert such a match of
+colour is on the present theory nothing but to assert the similarity of both
+contents with other previously known contents.
+The one assertion is the other (this is stressed by Cornelius), they are therefore the same assertion. It would therefore harmonize with the sense of our
+statement that the assertion of this colour-match had a different sense for
+each man, and a different sense at different times. It would depend on the
+'otherwise known' contents, and thus on previously experienced contents,
+which plainly differ from man to man, and from time to time.
+When Cornelius adds that the 'meaning of predicates need not appear
+in the form of separate presentations on each occasion, but can be given
+in "rudimentary association", we are not greatly helped: what actual associations cannot do, 'rudimentary' association, brought in as a substitute,
+
+Phenomenological study of Hume's theory of abstraction 305
+cannot do either. Cornelius so darkens facts with theory that he even says14
+that the expression 'abstract content' or 'abstract presentation' are 'abbreviations' for 'presentation of the similarity in a certain respect of one content to others'.
+. Which of the various features of a content is spoken of at
+a time, in which direction or respect the content is treated, depends on
+'which of these differing similarities will be brought to consciousness (will be
+"inwardly perceived" by us)'.!
+Cornelius will not permit us to call his conception 'nominalistic'. Yet
+extreme nominalism has always thought that similarity mediated the relation between a general name and the class it applies to, and for Cornelius, as
+for such nominalism, general names are in a manner equivocal. Psychological
+grounds (the theory maintains) limit the application of a name to a class,
+but the name's meaning consists in particular similarities experienced from
+moment to moment, and therefore varies from case to case. The ideal unity
+of the class sets bounds to this multiplicity of meanings, but it does not and
+cannot create the single meaning of the univocal concept. But how we should
+know anything of this ideal unity, of the group of objects which one similarity encompasses, remains, on the theory, mysterious. ' The content of the
+theory liquidates its own presupposition.
+A certain sense that the consciousness of generality also makes itself felt
+descriptively and demands explanation, shows itself in several passages in
+Cornelius. We read, e.g., that a predicate-word, in virtue of its origin and
+meaning, does not stand for this or that individual content, nor for a certain
+number of particular contents, but rather for something common to all
+these contents. "The general idea associated with the predicate, which determines its meaning, is the memory of the similarity binding all those contents
+together, a thing not further describable, but immediately known to internal
+perception.' Of course the 'thing not further describable but immediately
+known to internal perception' is the peculiar consciousness of meaning, the
+act of general meaning: but the words certainly manage to describe this
+indescribable, and, it seems to me, in an incorrect fashion, since they substitute a sense-content for an 'act-character'
+•, and a fictitious sense-content
+at that, one at least that eludes phenomenological scrutiny.
+If we do not take this passage quite literally, let us seek closer guidance in
+Cornelius' exposition of psychology, to see how Cornelius does justice to
+the meaning-conferring character of acts: this, as the thing really requiring
+explanation, should be sharply focused, distinguished in regard to its essential modifications, and set up in these fixed differences to illuminate genetic
+analysis. Here two fundamental confusions may be noted. The first is the
+confusion of the objective fact, that the general name is confined by associative connections to the circle of similarity, with the subjective fact, that we
+mean the universal in the individual act, and so refer ourselves in our intention to the class, or to an indefinite individual as member of that class, or to
+the unitary species etc. This is the confusion on which extreme nominalism
+
+306 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+is, as it were, nourished: it alone makes such nominalism possible, with it
+such nominalism stands and falls. Mixed up with this first confusion, there
+is a second confusion in Cornelius's Psychologie which runs basically different things together, the confusion of the inexactness of memory, of the
+indistinctness and fluidity of 'obscurely' reproduced images, with the character of generality which characterizes the consciousness of generality as its
+act-form, or with the indefiniteness of content in our intention which makes
+up the definite meaning of the 'indefinite' article. The following quotations
+may serve to prove our point:
+'The more that similar contents have been experienced, the less will ... their
+memory images refer back to temporally definite contents, and the more will
+they achieve the character of general presentations, and so be able to serve
+as symbols of any content whatever within definite limits of similarity.'? Next
+to this we put the following passage:
+A word heard for the first time cannot as yet be understood, but as soon
+as any of the other contents which occurred together with the verbal
+sound-complex we once heard, is recalled together with it, this word's
+first meaning is given...
+18 Corresponding to the .... inexactitude of recall, the word's meaning will at first likewise be inexact. Since the memory
+presentation associated with the word does not merely serve to symbolize a completely determined experience, but leaves its properties undetermined within certain limits, the word likewise must be rendered ambiguous
+through its association with this memory presentation. A later content,
+conversely, will likewise be in a position to be associated with the word
+as long as its difference from the content previously bound up with this
+word, does not go beyond these limits... When the meaning of a word
+thus emerges... an abstract, ambiguous symbol is necessarily created,
+standing equally for a series of different contents alike in a particular
+respect. The word obtains conceptual meaning to the extent that, in virtue
+of the emergence of its meaning, it serves the individual as a symbol for
+all contents lying within certain limits in a definite similarity-series."
+At the close of the same section we read further:20
+We find ... that not only words, but also presentations can be general
+(and are in fact always general within limits) in the sense in which
+conceptualism asserts such generality. This generality, however, remains
+bound within limits fixed by our acquired fineness of discrimination,
+whereas the generality of the word is in no way limited by the limited
+generality of the associated image.
+That there is no presentation of a triangle in which the properties
+of the acute-angled and obtuse-angled triangle are united, we can
+unconditionally grant to Berkeley as against Locke, but that in every
+
+Phenomenological study of Hume's theory of abstraction 307
+presentation of a triangle completely definite relations of sides and angles
+are presented could be denied as definitely. We can as little frame the
+image of a triangle with a definite, wholly exact proportion of sides, as
+we are in a position to draw it. The presentation just spoken of is impossible since the differences of form between acute and obtuse-angled
+triangles are too gross and familiar, for us to be in any possible doubt
+regarding the corresponding properties in the case of a triangular form.
+The fully-executed presentation of a completely determinate triangle is
+also impossible for the reason that our discrimination of triangular forms
+can never be quite exact - small differences at least are lost in memory.
+The confusions noted above at once spring out in the above quotation. A
+symbol for a single item, which, through our regular confusion of this single
+item with similar singulars, stands for each member of a range of similars,
+and can presumably recall each such member, is, on the view of Cornelius,
+a general symbol. The indifference of the general concept towards such
+features of its object as do not fall within its content, is further identified
+with the vagueness of the memory-image. And, in his final passage, Cornelius
+thinks that he can mediate in the Berkeleyan-Lockean dispute over the
+general triangle, by substituting for a question about the sensuous presentability of a triangle having conflicting properties (Locke's idea of a triangle),
+the quite different question as to the possibility of framing a precise mental
+image of a geometrically definite triangle of given proportions, or of recognizing one so framed as corresponding to our geometrical ideal, and of
+distinguishing it from others slightly different. In this indefiniteness, taken
+as vagueness, seems confused with inexactness in the exemplification of
+an ideal. Cornelius thinks that a sensuous triangle can unite contradictory
+properties, infinitely many of these in fact: it must only avoid trying to unite
+large differences, like those between being obtuse-angled and being acuteangled. One would hardly care to accept such a psychologistic rehabilitation
+of Locke's idea of a triangle, even when confined to such finer differences.
+We cannot agree to believe something to be psychologically possible if it is
+logically and geometrically absurd.
+
+Chapter 6
+Separation of varying concepts of
+abstraction and abstract
+§40 Confusion of concepts of abstraction and abstract
+concerned with non-independent part-contents, on
+the one hand, and Species on the other
+The 'attentional' theory of abstraction presupposes, what the doctrine of the
+distinctio rejects, that there is a certain difference in our contents themselves,
+corresponding to the difference between abstract and concrete. On the distinctio
+rationis doctrine there are only one kind of parts, i.e. 'pieces'.
+', parts capable of
+separation or of being presented as separated. On the former view, however,
+one distinguishes between 'independent' parts (in Stumpf's terminology),
+on the one hand, and non-independent 'part-contents', on the other. Among
+the latter we count the inner determinations of a content (exclusive of its
+"pieces'), and among these also the forms of unity discernible in this content
+(or, objectively regarded, present in it), through which its parts are combined to make up the unity of the whole. In relation to this same distinction,
+one speaks also of concrete and abstract contents or parts of contents.'
+In the theory of abstraction since Locke, the problem of abstraction in the
+sense of an emphatic pointing to 'abstract contents' has been mixed up with
+the problem of abstraction in the sense of concept-formation. In regard to the
+latter, we are concerned to give a descriptive analysis of the essence of
+the act in which we are self-evidently aware of a Species, or to clarify the
+meaning of general names by recourse to fulfilling intuitions. From an
+empirical, psychological viewpoint, we must try to explore the corresponding
+psychological facts in the context of human consciousness, the genetic origin
+of men's general presentations in the natural process of naive, unconsidered
+living or in the artificial process of deliberate, logical concept-formation.
+The abstract presentations which are here in question, are presentations
+whose intention is to Species and not to non-independent or abstract contents. Should these intentions be intuitively fulfilled, concrete intuitions
+with (as it were) stressed part-contents will serve as their foundation. The
+intended Species are not, however, these latter part-contents; however much
+we may stress the latter in our consciousness of generality, they do not
+
+Separation of varying concepts of abstraction and abstract 309
+become our intended objects themselves, nor are they objects of separate
+contemplation. There is, however, a constant confusion, as can be seen
+from our present critical investigation, between abstract, non-independent
+moments in the object, and the Species, or between the corresponding subjectively experienced abstract contents and abstract concepts (the meanings
+of certain names), or also between the acts of emphasis or regarding of these
+abstract contents, and the acts of general presentation. Locke, e.g., wants
+abstract ideas to be general meanings, but they are described as features of
+objects, and psychologized as abstract sense-contents torn from concrete
+intuitions. The 'attentional' theory likewise points to the possibility of a
+peculiar notice paid to such abstract contents (without a tearing of them
+from their context), and thinks that it has thereby shed light on the origin of
+our general concepts (as meanings). In the same vein some deny the intuitive
+character of abstract contents,' though, as aspects of concrete intuitions,
+they must be intuited with the latter: this error occurs since men are led
+astray by the inaccessibility of general concepts to sensuous intuition. If it is
+absurd to try to paint tones, or to represent colours by smells, or, generally,
+to represent one heterogeneous content by another, it is doubly absurd to
+try to represent what is essentially non-sensuous sensuously.
+We may say in general that there are differing concepts of abstract
+and abstraction that call for distinction: our present task is to pursue their
+distinctions.
+§41 Separation of concepts grouped about the
+concept of the non-independent content
+If we adhere to the talk of 'contents' favoured by recent theories of abstraction, we may say:
+(a) 'Abstract' contents are non-independent contents, 'concrete' contents
+are independent. We think of this difference as objectively determined, perhaps, as follows: concrete contents are by their nature such as to be capable
+of existing in and for themselves, whereas abstract contents are only possible
+in or attached to concrete contents.?
+It is plain that this talk about contents can and must be carried further
+than it is in the phenomenological sense of real (reellen) elements in consciousness. The phenomenal external object which appears, but which is not
+a real datum of consciousness - at least if one does not falsely interpret the
+"intentional' or merely intended object, as a real constituent of the experience in which the intention takes place - is as a whole concrete: its immanent determinations, colour, form etc., understood as moments constituting
+its unity, are abstract. This objective distinction between abstract and concrete is the more general, since immanent contents are only a special class of
+objects (which naturally does not mean of things). The difference in question
+could therefore more suitably be called a difference between abstract and
+
+310 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+concrete objects or parts of objects. If I here still continue to talk of 'contents', I do so as not to give persistent offence to most of my readers. The
+distinction has arisen in the field of psychology, where intuitive illustration
+naturally grasps at sensuous examples. Here the interpretation of the word
+'object' to mean
+a thing, is so dominant, that to call a colour or form an
+object might be felt disturbing or even confusing. We must, however, bear
+in mind that talk about contents is not here at all restricted to the sphere of
+contents of consciousness in any real (reellen) sense, but embraces all individual objects and parts of objects as well. We do not even restrict ourselves to
+the sphere of objects which are intuitive to us. The restriction has, rather, an
+ontological significance: objects are certainly possible, that in fact lie beyond
+the phenomena accessible to any human consciousness. The distinction, in
+short, concerns individual objects as such with unrestricted generality, its
+true place is in the framework of an a priori formal ontology.
+(b) Taking the objective (ontological) concept of 'abstract contents' as
+our foundation, we may mean by 'abstraction' the act through which an
+abstract content is distinguished, i.e. through which it is not prised loose,
+but none the less made the peculiar object of an intuitive presentation
+directed upon it. It appears in and with the relevant concretum, from which
+it is abstracted, but it is specially meant, and further not merely meant (as in
+"indirect' merely symbolic presentation) but also intuitively given as what it
+is meant as being
+(c) Here we must, however, take account of an important difference that
+has been more than once previously emphasized.* If we pay attention to
+one of the side-surfaces of a cube which appears before us, this surface is
+the 'abstract content' of our intuitive presentation. But the genuinely experienced content, which corresponds to this phenomenal side-surface, itself
+differs from the latter: it only forms the basis of an 'interpretation', through
+which, while it is sensed, a side of the cube differing from itself manages to
+appear. The sensed content is not in this case the object of our intuitive presentation: it first becomes such an object in psychological or phenomenological 'reflection'. Descriptive analysis none the less teaches us that it is not
+merely contained in the total concrete appearance of the cube, but that it is
+in a certain fashion set in relief, accented as against all other contents, which
+in their presentation of the side-surface in question do not function representatively. It naturally remains so emphasized, when it becomes itself the
+object of a presentative intuition peculiarly directed to it, except that then
+(in reflection) this intuition is added. This setting-in-relief of the content,
+which itself is no act, but a descriptive peculiarity of the phenomenal side of
+the acts in which the content becomes the bearer of its own intention, could
+likewise be called 'abstraction'. We should thus have laid down a totally
+new concept of abstraction.S
+(d) If one assumes that abstraction is a peculiar act or (in general) a
+descriptively peculiar experience, responsible for setting the abstract content
+
+Separation of varying concepts of abstraction and abstract 31|
+in relief from its concrete background, or if one sees in the manner of such
+setting in relief the essence of the abstract content as such, one comes to yet
+another concept of the abstract. Its difference as against the concrete, is
+not sought in the intrinsic nature of its contents, but in the manner in which
+they are given. A content is said to be abstract, in so far as it is abstracted,
+concrete in so far as it is not abstracted.
+It will readily be noted that the tendency to characterize a difference
+in content by having recourse to acts, stems from a confusion with more
+advanced concepts of abstract and concrete, in which the essence of the
+matter certainly lies in the acts.
+(e) If one understands by abstraction, in the positive sense, the preferential
+notice paid to a content, by abstraction in the negative sense the ignoring of
+simultaneously given contents, the word loses its exclusive relation to abstract,
+in the sense of non-independent, contents. Even in the case of concrete
+contents one speaks, certainly only in a negative sense, of abstraction: one
+attends, e.g., to such contents 'in abstraction from their background'.
+§42 Separation of the concepts that group themselves
+about the concept of the Species
+(a) One distinguishes abstract and concrete concepts: by 'concepts' one
+understands the meanings of names. To this distinction there accordingly
+corresponds a distinction of names: in a nominalistic logic only this grammatical distinction tends to be drawn. We may very well start with grammar. Names can name individuals, e.g. 'man', 'Socrates'
+', likewise attributes,
+eg. 'virtue", 'whiteness'
+', 'similarity'. The former are called 'concrete', the latter
+"abstract
+names. Predicative expressions corresponding to the latter, e.g.
+'virtuous', 'white', 'similar', count as concrete names. More precisely we
+should have to say that they are concrete when the possible subjects to
+which they relate are concrete subjects. This is not always the case. Names
+like 'attribute', 'colour, 'number' etc., relate predicatively to attributes (as
+specific singulars) and not to individuals, or at least only mediately to individuals, and with an alteration in predicative sense.
+Behind this grammatical distinction there is plainly a logical one, the
+distinction, namely, between nominal meanings directed to attributes and nominal meanings directed to objects in so far as they share in such attributes. If
+one follows Herbart in calling all logical presentations (this means, we hold,
+all nominal meanings) 'concepts', their concepts in this sense divide into
+abstract and concrete. But if one prefers to talk of concepts in another sense,
+which puts concept = attribute, we have a distinction among the meanings
+which present concepts as such, and which present the objects of concepts.
+This is a relative distinction in so far as objects of concepts can, in relation
+to certain new objects, have the character of concepts. This cannot, however, continue in infinitum, and we necessarily come at last to the absolute
+
+312 The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction
+distinction between concepts on the one hand, and those objects of concepts, that can no more function as concepts, on the other. On one side
+there will therefore be attributes, on the other side objects that 'have' attributes without themselves being attributes. To the distinction of meanings
+there accordingly corresponds a distinction in the field of objects, the
+distinction, in other words, between individual and specific (i.e. 'general')
+objects. General objects and general presentations or meanings, i.e. direct
+presentations of general-objects, are alike called concepts, but equivocally
+so. The concept of Redness is either Redness itself - as when its manifold
+objects, i.e. red things, are opposed to this concept - or it is the meaning of
+the name 'redness'. Both plainly stand in the same relation to one another as
+do the meaning Socrates and Socrates himself. The word 'meaning' is no
+doubt likewise equivocal, so that men do not hesitate at times to call the
+object of a presentation a 'meaning', and at times to say the same of its
+'content' (the sense of its name). To the extent that a meaning is also called
+a 'concept, the relative talk of concept and object of concept likewise becomes ambiguous. At one time one is dealing with the relation, just now
+taken as basic, between the attribute (Redness) and the object to which this
+attribute belongs (the red house), at another time with the totally different
+relation between the logical presentation (the meaning, e.g., of the word
+'redness', or of the proper name "Thetis') and the presented object (the
+attribute Redness and the goddess Thetis).
+(b) The distinction between concrete and abstract presentations can also
+be interpreted in another fashion: a presentation can be called concrete when
+it directly presents an individual object, without the mediation of conceptual
+(attributive) presentations, abstract in the contrary case. On the one side, in
+the realm of meanings, we shall then have the meanings of proper names, on
+the other side all other nominal meanings.
+(c) To the above marked off meanings of the word 'abstract, there corresponds a new range of meanings for talk of 'abstraction'. This will include
+the acts through which abstract 'concepts' arise. Put more precisely, we are
+dealing with the acts in which general names achieve their direct relation to
+specific unities, and also with the acts which belong with these names in their
+attributive or predicative function, in which, therefore, forms like an A, all
+A, some A, S which is A etc., are constituted; and lastly with the acts in
+which the objects apprehended in these manifold forms of thought are selfevidently 'given', with the acts, in other words, in which our conceptual
+intentions are fulfilled, achieve self-evidence and clarity. Thus we directly
+apprehend the Specific Unity Redness on the basis of a singular intuition of
+something red. We look to its moment of red, but we perform a peculiar act,
+whose intention is directed to the 'Idea', the 'universal". Abstraction in the
+sense of this act is wholly different from the mere attention to, or emphasis
+on, the moment of red; to indicate this difference we have repeatedly spoken
+of ideational or generalizing abstraction. This is the act aimed at by traditional
+
+Separation of varying concepts of abstraction and abstract 313
+talk of 'abstraction': through 'abstraction' in this sense we do not get at
+individual traits, but at general concepts (direct presentations of attributes
+as unities for thought). The same talk possibly extends to conceptual presentations of the more complex forms indicated; in the presentation an
+A, several A's etc., there is an abstraction from all other properties. The
+abstract presentation A takes on new 'forms', but acquires no new 'matter'.
+
+Notes
+I Logic as a normative and, in particular, as a practical
+discipline
+1 Bergmann, Die Grundlagen der Logik (1895), p. 78. Cf. also Bolzano's
+Wissenschaftslehre (Sulzbach 1837), 1, p. 24: 'Is the question whether coriander
+helps to strengthen memory a logical question? It surely should be if logic is an
+ars rationis formandae in the complete meaning of the words'
+2 Bolzano, Wissenschaftslehre, 1, p. 7. The fourth volume of the Wissenschaftslehre
+is indeed specially devoted to the task which the definition expresses. But it
+strikes one as strange that the incomparably more important disciplines which
+the first three volumes treat of, should be represented merely as aids to a technology of scientific textbooks. Naturally, too, the value of this by no means as yet
+sufficiently valued work, which is, in fact, almost unused, rests on the researches
+of these earlier volumes.
+2 Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative
+disciplines
+1 Kant thinks there is a contradictio in adjecto in a general logic with a practical
+part, and therefore rejects the division of logic into theoretical and practical logic
+(Logik, Introduction II). This does not, however, prevent us from regarding as
+practical logic what he calls 'applied logic'. A 'practical logic', spoken of as we
+ordinarily use the expression, by no means necessarily presupposes 'the knowledge of a certain sort of objects to which it is applied', but the knowledge of a
+mind whose efforts after knowledge it will promote. Application can occur in
+two directions. Logical rules can help us in a particular field of knowledge: this
+pertains to a particular science and the methodology connected with it. But it is
+also thinkable that, with the aid of laws of pure logic, independent of the peculiarities of the human mind (if such laws there be) we might deduce rules having
+peculiar regard to the nature of man (in specie). In that case we should have a
+universal and yet practical logic.
+2 The belief in the essentially practical character of logic is even expressed in the
+titles of Beneke's expositions of Logic - Textbook of Logic as Technology of
+Thinking (1832), System of Logic as Technology of Thinking (1842). See with
+reterence to this matter the Foreword, Introduction and particularly the polemic
+against Herbart in the System, I, p. 21 f.
+
+Notes 315
+3 For the present question Mill's polemic against Hamilton is more relevant than
+his principal work on logic. Necessary references follow below.
+4 Sigwart, Logik, ed. 3, p. 10.
+5 Cf. Bain, Logic, I (1879), §50, p. 34 f.
+6 Kant himself, though he opposes logical laws, as 'necessary rules' which say
+'how the understanding should proceed in thought', to psychological laws which
+say 'what the understanding is like and how it thinks' (cf. Vorlesungen über
+Logik, Hart. ed. VIII, p. 14), did not ultimately wish to regard logic as a normative discipline (in the sense of one that measures adequacy in relation to set ends).
+This is decisively shown by his coordination of logic and aesthetic to accord with
+the two 'basic sources of the mind', the latter being the (rational) "science of the
+rules of sensibility in general', the former the correlative 'science of the rules of
+the understanding in general'. Logic in this Kantian sense can, no more than
+Aesthetics, count as a regulative discipline guided by goals. (Cf. Critique of Pure
+Reason, Introduction to the Transcendental Logic I, end of paragraph 2.)
+3 Psychologism, its arguments and its attitude to the usual
+counter-arguments
+1 I use the expressions 'psychologist', 'psychologism', and so on, without any evaluative 'colouring', similar to Stumpf in his Psychology and Theory of Knowledge.
+2 'Logic is a psychological discipline just as surely as knowing only arises in the
+mind, and as thinking which terminates in knowledge is a mental happening.'
+Lipps, op. cit.
+3 Cf., e.g. W. Hamilton's Lectures In, p. 78, Drobisch, Neue Darstellung der Logik,
+ed. Iv, §2; cf. also B. Erdmann, Logik I, p. 18
+4 Logik, vol. I, p. 10. Sigwart's own way of treating logic (as we shall see in Ch. VIll)
+is altogether on psychologistic lines.
+5 This point of view is expressed with increasing clearness in the works of Mill,
+Sigwart, Wundt, and Höfler-Meinong. Cf. on this the quotations and criticisms
+in Ch. vill, 849 f.
+6 Cf. Lotze's Logik, ed. II, §332, pp. 543-4; Natorp 'Über objektive und subjektive
+Begründungen der Erkenntnis', Philos. Monatshefte xxII, p. 264; Erdmann's Logik,
+vol. I, p. 18. As against this cf. Stumpf 'Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie',
+p. S (Proceedings of Kais. Bay. Akad. d. Wiss., I Kl., vol. XIX, Section II, p. 469).
+That Stumpt is discussing epistemology, not logic, obviously makes no essential
+difference.
+4 Empiricistic consequences of psychologism
+1 I employ the term 'vague' in contrast to 'exact'. I do not in the least mean to
+express any depreciation of psychology by it; to pick holes in psychology is
+remote from my intention. Even natural science has vague 'laws' in many disciplines, particularly in such as are concrete. Meteorological laws, e.g., are vague yet
+very valuable.
+2 I mean by these the senses of the propositions 'A and B', i.e. both hold, and 'A or
+B', i.e. one holds - which does not imply that only one holds.
+3 Cf. the systematic discussions of Ch. vill of this work regarding the scepticalrelativistic absurdity of all conceptions which make logical principles depend on
+facts.
+
+316 Notes
+5 Psychological interpretations of basic logical principles
+1 A general discussion of the main defects of empiricism, carried as far as seemed
+likely to help our idealistic intentions in logic, is given in the Appendix to this
+and the following section.
+2 Logic, Book II, ch. vIl, §4
+3 Mill, An Examination, ch. XXI, p. 491. Mill slips in not noticing that Spencer's
+reference is not to the law of contradiction but to that of excluded middle.
+4 Mill, op. cit. p. 491. Cf. also p. 487: 'It is the generalization of a mental act, which
+is of continual occurrence, and which cannot be dispensed with in reasoning.'
+5 In the pointed sense of 'scepticism' developed in ch. VIl, empiricism is therefore
+called a sceptical theory. Windelband tellingly applies the Kantian term 'hopeless
+attempt' to empiricism - it is the hopeless attempt 'to establish by an empirical
+theory what is itself presupposed by every theory' (Präludien', p. 261).
+6 Formulations of Heymans (Die Gesetze und Elemente des wissenschaftlichen
+Denkens, 1', §§19-20. Sigwart's formulation in Logik, I, p. 419, resembles H's
+second formulation: It is impossible consciously to affirm and deny the same
+proposition.'
+7 Cf. the end of our quotation from Mill's polemic against Hamilton in §25 above.
+On p. 484 op. cit. Mill likewise writes 'two assertions, one of which denies what
+the other affirms, cannot be thought together
+' in which 'thought' is immediately
+equated with 'believed'.
+8 It is well-known that Kant's theory of knowledge has sides in which it strives and
+successfully gets beyond the psychologism of mental faculties as sources of knowledge. Here it is enough to stress that it also has prominent sides which fall within
+this psychologism, which of course does not preclude lively polemics against other
+forms of the psychologistic founding of knowledge. Not merely Lange, but most
+Kantianizing philosophers, fall in the field of psychologizing epistemologists,
+however little they may fancy the name. For even transcendental psychology also
+is psychology.
+6 Syllogistic inferences psychologistically considered. Syllogistic
+and chemical formulae
+1 Heymans, op. cit. I, p. 70. F. A. Lange likewise said (cf. the last paragraph of the
+long citation from the Logische Studien, above, §28) that the factual elimination
+of contradictions in our judgements was the ultimate ground of logical rules.
+7 Psychologism as a sceptical relativism
+1 Please note that the term 'knowledge' is, in this work, not restricted, as it usually
+is restricted, to objects that are real.
+2 See Ch. v, Appendix to 8825-6.
+3 His view should recommend itself to those who think to separate subjective from
+objective truths by denying an objective character to judgements of introspection.
+time be a being-in-itself, that subjectivity in the psychological sense excludes
+objectivity in the logical sense.
+4 Cf. op. cit. p. 411: 'These propositions must be a priori certainties in the sense
+that we only recognize in them a constant and unavoidable function of our thought'.
+I may quote this passage though in its context it does not refer to the laws of
+logic. I am justified by the whole sense of Sigwart's statements (see I', 848), and
+
+Notes
+= 317
+by the fact that, on the same page I have quoted, the law of contradiction
+is expressly compared with the certainties in question.
+5 Can I ever say this with certainty? The irrevocability in question does not concern the actual, but the ideal. It is not the certainty of my judgement that is
+unchangeable (as Sigwart has just maintained) but its validity or its truth.
+6 Cl. Sigwart's excellent distinction between the occasion of a connection and the
+ground of a decision (op. cit. p. 250).
+7 I am here thinking of all pure logical principles taken together. With the two or
+three 'laws of thought' in the traditional sense, the concept of formally consistent thought is not even defined, and everything traditionally said on this head I
+(and not only I) regard as erroneous. Each formal absurdity can be reduced to a
+e.g. syllogistic, arithmetical etc. Even in syllogistics there are at least a dozen
+principles. They can all be wonderfully proved - in sham proofs that presuppose
+y an at be wonderly rid in am pod the prays.
+themselves or equivalent propositions.
+8 Cf. op. cit. Nr. 369, sub e, pp. 377-8. Once men had accustomed themselves to
+the notion of a change in logical thinking, the thought of its development was
+not far. According to G. Ferrero, Les lois psychologiques du Symbolisme,
+Paris
+1895 - I read from a report by A. Larson in the Zeitschr. f. Philos. vol. 113, p. 85
+- 'Logic should become positive and should present rules of inference in connection with the period and stage of a culture, since even logic alters with the
+development of the brain... That pure logic and deductive methods were previously preferred, is due to mental laziness. Metaphysics has remained the colossal
+monument to this mental laziness up to this day, fortunately only operative
+among a few retarded thinkers.
+8 The psychologistic prejudices
+1 A mark of a mark is, generally speaking, plainly not a mark of the thing. If the
+principle meant what it literally says, we could infer: This blotting-paper is red,
+Red is a colour, therefore this blotting-paper is a colour.
+2 In this view, that the normative notion of ought' does not form part of the content
+of logical laws, I am glad to find myself in agreement with Natorp, who has recently made the brief and clear remark in his Sozialpädagogik (Stuttgart, 1899), §4,
+that 'logical principles, we maintain, are as little about what people actually think
+in such and such circumstances, as they are about what they ought to think'. He
+says of the equational reasonings 'If A = B and B = C, A = C that 'I perceive its
+truth when only the terms to be compared, and the relations given together with
+them, are before me, without having to think in the least of the actual or proper
+conduct of some corresponding act of thought' (pp. 20-1). There are certain other
+equally important rapprochements between these Prolegomena and the distinguished
+thinker's present work, which unhappily came too late to assist in forming and
+expounding these thoughts. Iwo previous writings of Natorp, the above quoted
+article from Phil. Monatshefte, XXIII and the Einleitung in die Psychologie, stimulated me, however - though other points in them provoked me to controversion.
+3 'Pure' or 'formal' mathematics, as I use the term, includes all pure arithmetic and
+theory of manifolds, but not geometry. Geometry corresponds in pure mathematics to the theory of a three-dimensional Euclidean manifold. This manifold
+is the generic Idea of space, but not space itself.
+4 Elementary arithmetic provides good examples of this last. A being that could
+intuit three-dimensional arrangements (with difference of sign) as clearly and with
+as much practical mastery as men are able to intuit two-dimensional arrangements would possibly have quite different methods of calculation. My Philosophie
+
+318 Notes
+der Arithmetik deals with such questions, and, in particular, with the influence of
+physical circumstances on methodical set-up, pp. 275 f., 312 ff.
+5 The impossibility of theoretical connections between heterogeneous fields, and
+the nature of the heterogeneity in question, has of course not been sufficiently
+investigated in logic.
+6 See in addition the fine statement of Natorp 'Über objektive und subjektive
+Begründung der Erkenntnis', Philos. Monatshefte, XXIII, p. 265 J. Cf. also G.
+Frege's stimulating work Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884), p. vi f. (I need
+hardly say that I no longer approve of my own fundamental criticisms of Frege's
+antipsychologistic position set forth in my Philosophie der Arithmetik, 1, pp. 129-
+32). I may here take the opportunity, in relation to all of the discussions of these
+Prolegomena, to refer to the Preface of Frege's later work Grundgesetze der
+Arithmetik, vol. I (Jena, 1893).
+7 The law of contradiction should not be confused with the normative proposition for judgements which is its evident consequence: 'Of two contradictory
+judgements, one is correct.' The concept of correctness is correlative with that
+of truth. A judgement is correct when it treats what is true as true, a judgement,
+therefore, whose 'content' is a true proposition. The logical predicates True
+and False, taken in their proper sense, only concern propositions in the sense of
+the ideal meanings of assertions. The concept of a contradictory judgement is
+again correlated with that of a contradictory proposition. Judgements are called
+'contradictory' in the noetic sense, if their 'contents', their ideal meanings stand
+in the descriptively definite relation which, in the sense of formal logic, we call
+'contradiction'
+8 Wundt, Logik, I, 2nd ed., p. 91. Wundt regularly couples inner evidence with universal validity in this passage. As regards the latter, he distinguishes between a
+subjective form of universal validity, a mere consequence of inner evidence, and
+an objective form, which also covers the postulate of the intelligibility of experience. But as the justification and adequate fulfilment of this postulate itself rests
+on inner evidence, it does not seem feasible to drag in 'universal validity' into
+discussions of basic principles.
+9 If we really had to interpret the theory of inner evidence in the manner of Höfler
+on p. 133, op. cit., it would have been corrected by our previous critique of empiricistic misunderstandings of logical principles (see §23). Höfler's statement
+prince. A smila misc sips no the danton of the cared.
+tives 'ground' and "consequence': if it were correct, it would falsify all syllogistic
+rules. It runs: 'A judgement C is the consequence of a ground G, if the belief
+in the falsity of C is incompatible with the (imagined) belief in the truth of G
+(op. cit. p. 136). Note that Höfler explains incompatibility in terms of evident
+non-coexistence (op. cit. p. 129). He plainly confuses the ideal non-coexistence (i.e.
+lack of joint truth) of the propositions in question, with the real non-coexistence
+of the corresponding acts of affirmation, presentation etc.
+9 Logic and the principle of the economy of thought
+1 My negative criticism, in this chapter, of one main tendency in Avenarius's
+philosophy, does not mean that I do not deeply respect him as a thinker torn all
+too early from the labours of science, and that I do not likewise respect the solid
+seriousness of his scientific works.
+2 E. Mach, Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung (1883), p. 460. The passage is worth
+quoting in full. It goes on: 'Mathematics taught in this manner has barely more
+
+Notes 319
+educational value than absorption in the Kabbala or in mystic squares. It necessarily breeds a mystical tendency, which on due occasion bears its fruits.'
+3 This of course does not mean: "with the help of scientific psychology'
+4 If, instead of the external forms of operation, one takes, so to say, the internal ones, and understands signs in the sense of 'certain objects of thought'.
+which stand in 'certain' relations, permit of 'certain' combinations, so that, in the
+corresponding formal sense, the laws of operation and relation hold for them,
+e.g. a +b = b + a etc. - a new set of concepts emerges. These are the concepts
+which lead to the 'formal' generalization of our original disciplines, which will be
+immediately discussed in the text above.
+5 No example throws more light on the essence of the briefly indicated problems
+here posed than the natural number-series. Because I thought it so instructive, I
+treated it in extenso in chapter XII of my Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891), to
+illustrate the manner in which I thought such investigations should be conducted.
+10 End of our critical treatments
+1 O. Külpe in his Einleitung in die Philosophie (1895), p. 44, says of logic that it is
+'not only, without doubt, one of the best-developed philosophical disciplines, but
+also one of the surest and most complete. This may be true, but in view of my
+own estimate of logic's scientific certainty and completeness, 1 must also regard it
+as a sign of the abysmal state of the scientific philosophy of our day. To this I
+would add the question: Could one not gradually make an end to this sorry state
+of things, if all scientific energies of thought were devoted to solving the clearly
+formulable problems, soluble with almost exact certainty, no matter how limited,
+banal and perhaps even trivial these seem in themselves? Pure logic and epistemology are here quite plainly in the forefront of our concern. Here there is abundance of exact work to be attacked with certainty and finished once for all: one
+need only get to grips with it. The 'exact sciences' (among which one would one
+day like to reckon the disciplines in question) plainly owe their whole greatness
+to this modesty which preters smallest things, and, to adapt a well-known phrase,
+'concentrates its whole power on the smallest point'. Beginnings small from the
+point of view of the whole, but which are certain, repeatedly prove in such
+sciences to be springboards for immense advances. This attitude certainly operates in all recent philosophy, but, as I have learnt to see, mainly in the wrong
+direction. The best energies of science are directed to psychology, i.e. psychology
+as an explanatory natural science, which is no more, and no differently interesting to philosophy than are the sciences of physical events. This, however, is not
+allowed, and great advances are spoken of in finding psychological bases for
+philosophical disciplines, and not least in the case of logic. A quite widely diffused view of things is, as I imagine, expressed in Elsenhans's recent dictum: 'If
+contemporary logic has increased its success in grappling with logical problems,
+it above all owes such success to its psychological immersion in its subject
+(Zeitschr. J. Psychologie, vol. 109 (1896), p. 203). I should probably have said
+exactly the same before beginning my present investigations, or before realizing
+the insoluble difficulties in which I was plunged by a psychologistic view of the
+philosophy of mathematics. Now, however, having the best reasons to see the
+error of such a view, I can rejoice and take the liveliest interest in the otherwise
+very promising development of scientific psychology, but not as one who, expects
+philosophical enlightenment from it. I must, however, add, to guard against misunderstanding, that I sharply distinguish empirical psychology from the phenomenology (taken as a pure theory of the essences of experiences) that underlies it
+
+320 Notes
+(as epistemology underlies it in a wholly different manner). This will become
+clear in the actual Investigations which follow these Prolegomena.
+2 In the first edition I promised to deal with Lotze's epistemology in an Appendix
+to volume II of this work. This was not printed, owing to lack of space.
+3 Cf. Nouveaux Essais, Bk. Iv, ch. XVI, §5, Opp. phil., Erd., p. 388 J.; Bk. IV, ch. II, §14,
+op. cit. p. 343. Cf. also the fragments on scientia generalis, op. cit. pp. 84-5 etc.
+4 Leibniz, e.g. makes mathesis universalis in the narrowest sense coincide with the
+logica mathematicorum (Pertz, op. cit. vol. VII, p. 54), which he also called logica
+mathematica (op. cit. p. 50): both are Ars judicandi atque inveniendi circa quantitates.
+This of course can be extended to mathesis universalis in the wider and widest
+sense.
+5 Ueberweg can find as much to mention about both of them: their titles. Some
+day men will regard an historical treatment of logic, oriented, like Ueberweg's, to
+the 'great philosophy', an extraordinary anomaly.
+1l The idea of Pure Logic
+1 Cf. §6, p. 13. We were there no doubt concerned under the rubric of 'science',
+with a narrower concept, that of theoretical explanatory abstract science. This,
+however, makes no essential difference, especially in view of the eminent position
+of the abstract sciences, that we shall be discussing immediately below.
+2 We are therefore not concerned with a subjective psychological character of the
+judgement in question, e.g. a feeling of necessitation, etc. How ideal objects, and
+with them ideal predicates of such objects, stand to our subjective acts has been
+more or less indicated in §39. More in the following Investigations.
+3 J. von Kries, Die Prinzipien der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung (1886), pp. 85 J. and
+Vierteljahrschrift für wiss. Philosophie, XVI (1892), p. 255. Von Kries is, however,
+drawing a distinction among judgements, not, as here, among sciences, when he
+used the terms 'nomological' and 'ontological'.
+4 Cf. above §32. Above, when I pinned down the pointed notion of scepticism,
+there was no place for so subtle a distinction, and I merely opposed the noetic
+conditions of theoretical knowledge to the objectively logical conditions of theory
+itself. But here, where all relevant relationships must be brought to complete
+clearness, it seems proper to treat the logical conditions, in the first place, as
+being conditions of knowledge as well, and then only to give them a direct relation to objective theory itself. This of course has no effect on anything essential to
+our conception, which rather achieves a clearer unfolding. The like holds in
+regard to the inclusion in our scope of the empirical, subjective conditions of
+knowledge together with the noetic, purely logical ones. We are profited in all
+this by our treatment of logical self-evidence: see above, §50. Self-evidence is
+indeed nothing other than the character of knowledge as such.
+Logical Investigations, Volume I|
+1 Logic, Book I, ch. 1, §1.
+2 See the final chapter of the Prolegomena, $§66-7 in particular.
+3 Cf. §11 of Investigation I.
+
+Notes 32l
+Investigation I: Expression and meaning
+1 Essential distinctions
+1 A. V. Meinong, Göttinger gel. Anz. (1892), p. 446.
+2 To use personification and to talk of association as 'creating' something, and to
+employ other similar figurative expressions in common use, is too convenient to
+be abandoned. Important as a scientifically exact but circumlocutory description
+of the relevant facts may be, ready understanding absolutely requires that we talk
+etc., is a meant or intentional object. This point will be further discussed in
+Investigation V.
+4 I often make use of the vaguer expression 'objective correlate' (Gegenständlichkeit,
+'objectivity') since we are here never limited to objects in the narrower sense, but
+have also to do with states of affairs, properties, and non-independent forms etc.,
+whether real or categorial.
+5 Cf. with this Twardowski's assumption of a 'presentative activity moving in two
+directions' in his work Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen
+(Vienna 1894), p. 14.
+6 G. Frege, Uber Sinn und Bedeutung, Zeitschr. f. Philos. u. philos. Kritik, vol. 100, p. 25.
+7 Die Impersonalien, p. 62.
+8 B. Erdmann, Logik, 1, p. 233.
+9 A. Marty, 'Uber subjektlose Sätze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zur Logik
+und Psychologie', Art. VI, Vierteljahrschrift J. wiss. Phil. XIX, 80 J.
+10 Ibid. p. 81 note. Ct. Art. V, Vol. xvill, p. 464.
+I1 J. Stuart Mill, Logic, Book 1, ch. 2, §5.
+12 System of Logic, Book 1, ch. 2, 85.
+13 Op. cit., Book 1, ch. 2, $5.
+2 Towards a characterization of the acts which confer meaning
+1 Lambert, Neues Organon (1764), Vol. I1, §§23-4, p. 16. (Lambert is not referring
+expressly to arithmetic.)
+2 A. Riehl, Der philosophische Kritizismus, Vol. I, Part I, p. 199.
+3 H. Höffding, 'Über Wiedererkennen, Assoziation und psychische Aktivität',
+Vierteljahrschrift f. wiss. Philos. Vol. xI, p. 427.
+4 As against this cf. Volkelt, Erfahrung und Denken, p. 362.
+5 I am not here restricting the use of the word 'understanding' to the hearerspeaker relation. The soliloquizing thinker 'understands' his words, and this
+understanding is simply his act of meaning them
+6 See Investigation VI.
+3 Fluctuation in meaning and the ideality of unities of meaning
+1 Husserl's example is of the German word Hund meaning both a dog and a truck
+used in mines.
+2 The restriction to concreta is not essential. Demonstratives, e.g., can also refer to
+abstracta.
+3 Cf. B. Erdmann, 'Theorie der Typeneinteilungen', Philos. Monatshefte, Vol. xxx.
+4 More on this point in Investigation Iv.
+
+322 Notes
+4 The phenomenological and ideal content of the experiences
+of meaning
+1 The word 'intentional' is so framed as to permit application both to the meaning
+and the object of the intentio. Intentional unity does not therefore necessarily
+mean the intended, the objective unity.
+2 Regarding the question of the essence of universal objects see Investigation II.
+Investigation II: The ideal unity of the species and modern
+theories of abstraction
+I Universal objects and the consciousness of universality
+1 For more detailed treatment of the intuitive apprehensions of collections see my
+Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891), ch. XI, on the intuitive cognition of likeness,
+p. 233 in particular.
+2 Mill, Logic, Book II, ch. II, §3, Final note.
+3 See Spencer, Psychology, II, §294, Note.
+4 Mill, Logic, Book II, ch. II, §3, Final note.
+5 Ibid.
+6 It is not suitable to speak of a theory when, as the following treatments will
+show, there is nothing at all to be theoretically treated, i.e. to be explained
+2 The psychological hypostatization of the universal
+1 [It would have been possible for Husserl here to have used his other term reellen,
+signifying an actual part, not something intended or meant.]
+2 As against this see B. Erdmann, Logik, 1, pp. 81-5, and K. Twardowski, Zur
+Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, p. 106.
+3 Locke's Essay, IV, vii.
+4 Essay, II, vili. Cf. the second Epistle to the Bishop of Worcester 'he that thinks
+must have some immediate object of his mind in thinking, i.e. must have ideas.
+5 It is very remarkable that even Lotze to whose interpretation of Plato's theory of
+forms we are deeply indebted, fell into the error of psychologically hypostatizing
+the universal. See the discussions in the Logic of 1874, p. 509 ff., especially §316.
+6 I should not therefore think it correct to say with Meinong (Humestudien, 1, p. 5)
+that Locke confuses the content and the extension of the concept.
+7 Twardowski, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellingen, p. 109.
+8 Twardowski, loc. cit. p. 105.
+9 Weisser Rappe, = white black-horse, in the original.
+10 Twardowski, loc. cit. p. 106.
+3 Abstraction and attention
+1 J. S. Mill, An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, pp. 393 f.
+2 Loc. cit. p. 394.
+3 See A. v. Meinong, Hume-Studien, 1, p. 68.
+4 The word symbolized by letter 'A' in such combinations, must count as syncategorematic. The expressions: 'the lion', 'a lion', 'this lion' 'all lions' etc. certainly
+independent sense except as clerming if one of these orms. if eare s
+
+Notes 323
+whether one of these meanings is not contained in all the rest, whether the direct
+idea of the Species corresponding to A does not lie hidden in the other meanings,
+we must answer 'No'. The Species A lies hidden' in these meanings, but only
+potentially and not as a meant object.
+5 Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction XVI.
+6 It is easy to see that as a result of this supposed 'unconsciousness' the absurd
+xopiouós, of Locke's general idea returns. What is not 'conscious' cannot be a
+differentia of what is conscious. If exclusive attention to the moment of triangularity was possible, in a manner which made the differentiating characters vanish
+from consciousness, then the 'conscious', intuitive object would be the triangle as
+such and no more.
+4 Abstraction and representation
+1 Cf. also the end of the quotation in §9 of the present Investigation. Among
+modern philosophers I may mention Rickert, 'Zur Theorie der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung', Vierteljahreschrift für wiss. Philos. XVIII.
+2 Cf. the Prolegomena to Pure Logic, ch. IX.
+3 Above ch. III, §16.
+4 Essay, III.111.II.
+5 Introduction, XII.
+6 'Things or notions.' "Things' for Berkeley, as is well-known, are no more than
+complexes of "ideas. As regards his 'notions', they mean, at least in this place,
+presentations relating to mind and its activities, or presentations where objects
+'include' such activities as all relations do. These presentations, which Berkeley
+separates and radically distinguishes from ideas of sense, and will not allow us to
+call 'ideas
+' are therefore identical with Locke's ideas of reflection. Berkeley's
+concept of a 'notion' can for the rest not be given a single exact and clear sense.
+7 Introduction, xv.
+8 Introduction, XI.
+9 Cf. §20, p. 378. Cf. also Locke, Essay, IV, 1.9.
+10 815, p. 368.
+5 Phenomenological study of Hume's theory of abstraction
+1 Cf. Meinong's Hume Studien, I, 36 (218).
+2 Treatise, I, VII.
+3 Treatise, Book 1, 87.
+4 F. Schumann, 'Zur Psychologie der Zeitanschauung', Zeitschrift für Psychologie
+und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, Bd. 17, pp. 107 ff.
+5 Cf. the note at the end of this section.
+6 Cf. ch. I of this Investigation.
+7 In the treatise that I have repeatedly criticized above, but which is nonetheless a
+most careful and thorough work.
+8 F. Schumann, Z. f. Psych. Vol. 17, p. 130.
+9 If 1 am right, Schumann is drifting towards such a scepticism in his endeavour, praiseworthy in itself, towards maximum strictness and freedom from
+presuppositions.
+10 Closer investigations are undoubtedly required here.
+11 Cf. also, e.g. B. Erdmann, Logik, 1, p. 80.
+12 Cornelius took over from W. James his attack on 'mosaic-psychology', and his
+doctrine of 'fringes
+
+324 Notes
+genius for observation in the field of the descriptive psychology of presentational
+experience entails psychologism, can be seen from the present work. For the
+advance in descriptive analysis that I owe to this distinguished thinker have only
+facilitated my release from the psychologistic standpoint.
+13 H. Cornelius, 'Uber Gestaltqualitäten', Zeitschr. f. Psychol. u. Physiol. d. Sinnesorgane, Vol. 22, p. 103.
+14 Loc. cit. p. 108.
+15 Loc. cit. p. 107.
+16 This would seem in essentials to be Meinong's argument (Zeitsch I. Psych.
+vol. 21, p. 235), though his theory also leaves out the ideal consciousness of
+unity. Only a consideration of the identity of our intention, and of its peculiar
+form, will make Meinong's objection cogent.
+17 Psychologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft, p. 58
+18 Does the circumstance that an a recalls aß, make B the 'meaning' of the expression? If so, the church is the 'meaning' of the presbytery etc.
+19 Following on this, meaning is defined as the range covered by the possible application of a name - in contrast with talk of the 'emergence of meaning' which deals
+with a sense of words which comes alive in each individual case. But the distinction between meaning as sense, and meaning as naming, is never completely
+brought out by Cornelius.
+20 Loc. cit. p. 66 ff.
+6 Separation of varying concepts of abstraction and abstract
+1 Investigation Ill is devoted to closer research into this distinction, with a necessary
+extension of the distinction to abstract objects and parts of objects in general.
+2 See, e.g. Höfler-Meinong Logik, p. 25. Cf. also my critical remark regarding
+Twardowski, above p. 360 f.
+3 There will be more about the justification and content of this assertion in the
+next Investigation.
+4 Cf. also Investigation VI, §15.
+5 In the strict sense to be laid down in Investigation V, §9 ff.
+
+Index
+a fortiori 38, 126
+assertion 82, 90, 91, 196, 206, 223, 240,
+a priori 13-14, 20, 21, 29, 47, 56, 75,
+263, 285, 298, 304
+83, 89, 106, 113, 117-18, 125, 130,
+association 186-7, 194, 304-5
+142, 144, 149-52, 155, 158, 166, 172,
+attention 258-60, 262-4, 268-9, 300,
+173, 177, 202, 212, 224, 225, 226,
+309; deficiencies 272-4; as
+255, 265, 286, 302
+generalizing power 266-8; unitary
+abbreviations 23
+274-6
+abstract 308-13
+attributes, attribution 244-6, 253, 258,
+abstraction 124, 125, 147, 232, 237,
+268-9, 270-2, 273, 282, 312
+246, 248, 250-1, 258-60, 262-4, 267, authentic 151; forms 281; presentation
+268, 272, 273, 277, 283-4, 298, 306,
+280
+308-13; critique 290-1
+auxiliary devices 23-4
+absurdity 96, 98-9, 109
+Avenarius, R. 123-4, 129
+act-analysis 288
+act-character 209, 213, 214, 228,
+229-31, 237, 253, 279, 287, 305
+acts 151, 195, 198-9, 208-9, 210,
+216, 232, 239, 252, 266, 285, 291,
+298
+adaptation 123, 125, 128
+affirmation 41, 61, 67, 225
+algorithmic methods 24
+allness 243
+ambiguity 61-4, 71, 137, 171, 183, 211,
+217, 221-2, 262
+anthropologism 83-90; critique 78-82;
+Erdmann's 90-100
+bad 35-7
+Bain, A. 30, 83
+being, non-being 17, 84-5, 223, 230,
+249-50, 275
+belief 56, 57-9, 63, 72, 130, 184
+Beneke, F. E. 29, 31
+Bergmann, H. 26, 31, 67
+Berkeley, G. 262, 266, 267, 283-6, 288,
+289-90,306
+Böcklin, A. 95
+Bolzano, B. 27, 31, 142-3
+boundaries 301-12
+Brentano, F. 31, 173, 186
+anthropology 126
+apodeictic 89, 102, 106, 142
+apperception 124, 213-15
+Aristotle 16, 31-3, 84, 10S, 135, 140
+arithmetic 127, 147, 155, 176, 210-11
+Ars combinatoria (Leibniz) 139-40
+ars inventiva 29
+as if 291
+Cantor, G. 157
+categorial forms 151, 154-5, 174, 199,
+254
+categories 87, 152-4, 226, 237
+causality 49-50
+certainty 100
+character 97
+
+326 Index
+chemical formulae 72-4
+circles of similars 243-4, 292
+classification 23-4, 76, 246
+Cloyne, Bishop of 267
+cognition 106, 114, 168
+communication 173, 187, 189-203
+complexity 126, 128, 194; of
+expressions 23
+Comte, A. 125
+concepts 16, 69, 82, 97, 111-12, 137,
+151, 153-4, 168-9, 175, 224, 230-42,
+255, 264, 311; cogitative/sensuous
+280-91; formation 258-9, 308
+concrete: concepts 311-12; contents
+308; idea 259, 269, 290; images 290;
+intuition 296, 308; things 298
+conditions 119
+connection 76, 114, 121, 153, 291;
+apodeictic 102, 106
+connotation 203-5
+consciousness 57, 59, 62, 67, 69, 77,
+83, 85, 127, 177, 214, 247, 249, 252,
+263, 266, 268, 269, 272, 279-81,
+290-1, 305
+consequence 104, 108
+constitution 80-1
+content 108-15, 185, 199-200, 222, 228,
+253, 265, 273, 275, 297, 300-1, 305,
+309; knowledge 150-2
+contingency 41, 42, 82, 83, 107, 146
+contradiction 47, 56-8, 61-4, 70-1,
+78-9,81,91, 104, 107, 113; double
+status 64-7; Sigwart's doctrine 67-9
+Cornelius, H. 123, 129, 303-7
+deduction 126-8, 155
+definite article 220-1
+delusion 61-4
+demonstration 184-6
+demonstratives 219-20
+Descartes, R. 161, 208
+descriptive: analysis 292, 310; assertion
+302; distinction 297; psychology
+175-6, 206; science 148
+disbelief 56
+disciplines 37-9, 45
+dispersed multiplicity 242-4
+distinctio rationis 294-5, 303, 308
+doctrine of terms 111
+Drobisch, W. 31, 32, 137
+economy of thought 277-8; facts/ideal
+131-3; justified ends of 126-8;
+meaninglessness of 129-31; scientific
+meaning 123-6
+empiricism 30, 46-8, 55, 56-7, 58-9,
+67, 68, 70, 73, 76, 120, 133, 160-1,
+166, 243-4, 262; defects 59-61
+epistemology 14, 16, 29, 51, 86, 120,
+129-31, 133, 141, 169, 263, 292
+equivalence 213
+equivocation 217
+Erdmann, B. 22, 31, 83, 90-100, 134, 255
+error 98, 99, 107, 133, 251, 261, 262,
+266, 286-8, 292, 309
+essence 94-5, 102, 147, 151-2, 154, 212,
+224-5, 246, 263, 279
+essentially occasional expressions
+217-21
+ethics 36
+evidence 19, 177, 179
+existence 90
+experience 54, 56, 57, 63, 85, 92, 106,
+118, 130, 149, 166, 168, 171, 186-7,
+212, 222, 263, 273, 298, 310
+explanation 50, 60, 81, 131, 132, 147-8,
+161,246
+expression 172-3, 187-8, 194, 199,
+206, 211, 213-15, 222-4, 228-9,
+237, 287; in communication 189-90;
+fluctuating 221-2; as ideal unity
+194-6; objective correlate of 196-8;
+phenomenological/intentional
+distinctions 188-9; in solitary life
+190-1
+extension 264-6
+external objects 124, 296
+facts 53-4, 57, 80, 82-3, 88, 89-90, 97,
+131-3, 160-1
+fallacies 73
+falsehood 41, 43, 51, 58, 59, 71, 79-80,
+82, 92, 98, 101, 106, 113, 240
+familiarity 213
+fields 12-13
+fixation of aims 260-2
+
+forms 21, 22, 264-6, 281, 286, 288, 312;
+of presentation 111-12; of theory
+155, 156-7
+formulae 61, 70, 77; chemical 72-4
+Frege, G. 201, 318
+fulfilment 179, 199-200, 212, 246, 263,
+287,290
+function 84
+games-meaning 210-11
+general: concepts 277-82; names 289;
+objects 312; presentation 312
+generality 53, 55-6, 58-9, 67, 114, 169,
+266, 271, 280-2, 289, 291, 305; of
+associative functioning 267; of ideas
+262-4; as meaning-form 264-6; of
+psychological function 264-6
+generic images 256-7
+geometry 15, 147, 157-8, 176, 255, 270,
+285-7
+good 35-7
+grammar 172-3, 311
+ground 97, 104, 108, 147, 154; logical
+88
+grounded knowledge 146
+Hamilton, Sir W. 12, 30-1, 40, 57, 157,
+258, 259-60
+Herbart, J. 30, 32, 42, 135, 136-8
+Heymans, G. 66, 70, 72
+Höffding, H. 213
+Höfler, A. 116
+Hume, D. 60-1, 125, 226, 262, 289-99,
+302-3
+hypostatization 248-57
+Idea (ideation) 232, 240, 250-2, 262,
+270, 293, 312; formal logic 141-2;
+general 262-4; individual 284; of
+Knowledge 149-50; of Manifolds
+157; of method 24; of normative
+discipline 37; of Science 25; of
+Subjectivity 150; of System 104; of
+Theory 152; of truth 86; unified
+experience 130
+ideal objects 250
+ideal unity 242-4
+idealism 106-7, 238
+Index 327
+ideality 50-1, 65, 68-9, 75-6, 83, 87,
+89, 92, 110-11, 113-14, 118, 119-22,
+131-3, 151-2, 230, 231
+identity 67-8, 84, 87, 89, 230, 241-2, 244
+image-contents 239
+images, illustrative 203
+imagination 151, 208
+imagined objects 300
+incapacity 63
+incompatibility 63
+indication 183-6; associative origın
+186-7
+individual: idea 284; objects 239-40
+individuality 271
+induction 56, 58, 60
+inference 46, 88, 225-6
+inner evidence 17-18, 63, 81, 82, 115-22,
+126, 150
+insight 55, 61, 73, 86, 95, 99, 127, 171,
+176, 184-5
+intention 35, 69, 193, 265, 290-1, 301,
+309
+interconnections 144
+interpretation 214, 239; basic principles
+56-69
+intimation 189-90, 192-3, 195, 216-17
+intuition 54, 81, 96, 140, 168, 170, 174,
+193-4, 196, 203, 209-15, 229, 243, 248,
+252-3, 261, 273-6, 277-8, 279, 282,
+287,292, 295, 308; of sense 280-1
+intuitive representation 154
+irrefragable necessity 73
+is-ought 102
+Jäsche, 41, 135
+judgements 12-13, 17, 19, 21, 42, 43,
+49, 58, 60-2, 03-4, 67, 71, 75, 78,
+80-1,84,85, 86, 88-9, 91, 92, 93-4,
+97,100, 102-3, 115-22, 130, 145,
+166-7, 174, 184, 195, 205, 212, 215,
+224-5, 230, 260, 265, 274, 298;
+assertoric/apodeictic 89; normative
+35-6; universal 241
+justification 75
+Kant, I. 13, 14, 28-30, 32, 36, 41-2, 65,
+74, 135-6
+knowing 18, 204, 298
+
+328 Index
+knowledge 16-19, 21, 22, 26-7, 29, 39,
+43,49,53, 54-5, 60, 64, 75, 88,89,
+98,99, 101-7, 128, 130, 145, 149-50,
+150-2, 160-1, 166, 175, 178-9, 204,
+206, 246, 251, 292, 303
+Kries, J. von 147-8
+Kroman, K. 66
+Lange, F. A. 64-6, 141-2
+language 23, 165-6, 244, 245
+laws 20, 22, 31, 33-4, 41, 42-4, 47-8,
+57,58, 64, 66-7, 70, 71, 77, 79,81,
+84, 89-90, 92, 97-8, 101-3, 105-6,
+111-13, 116, 129, 150, 152, 277-8;
+approximate 46-7; basic 146; of
+complication 153; of Contradiction
+47; empirical 52; exact 52, 61; factual
+53; genuine 52-3; ideal 153;
+knowledge of 54-5; natural 31,
+48-51, 68, 80; pure 51-2, 53, 54; of
+thought 48-51, 73-4, 92, 97; vague
+59,61
+least action 123, 129
+Leibniz, G. W. 29, 33, 89-90, 135,
+138-40, 161
+Liebmann, O. 66
+likeness 241-2, 243
+Lipps, T. 40, 83, 90, 134
+Locke, J. 248, 250-1, 252, 254-6,
+262-4, 270, 277, 283-4, 292, 306,
+308
+logic 40, 43-4, 47-8, 83, 115, 224-5;
+applied 28-9; definitions 11, 26-7,
+30-1; demarcation 13-14; formal 14,
+33, 106-7, 142; practical character
+28-33
+Lotze, H. 47, 135, 138
+Mach, E. 123, 124, 126, 129
+manifolds 155-8, 167, 220, 228, 254
+mathematics 15-16, 22, 32, 47, 95, 97,
+108-11,117, 127-8, 138, 139-40,
+142-3, 156, 158-60, 176, 220
+meaning 154, 167-8, 170, 171, 174, 177,
+188-9, 198-9, 211-12, 215, 217,
+228-9, 231-2, 233, 240, 241, 261,
+281, 287-8, 306; connotation 203-5;
+equivocations 200-3; ideal 224-7; as
+object 232; occasional 217-21; unified
+229-31; usual 221; variations 222-4
+meaning simpliciter 199-200
+meaning-content 170, 221
+meaning-fulfilment 167, 192-4, 196,
+199-200, 290
+meaning-intention 167, 192-4, 199,
+202-3, 206, 210, 211, 227, 229, 252,
+279,290
+meaninglessness 200-3
+Meinong, A. von 116, 186, 299
+memory 22, 124, 306
+mental phenomena 48, 95, 96, 97, 98,
+110, 113, 118-19, 125, 129, 169, 170,
+188
+metaphysical hypostatization 248-9
+metaphysics 16, 76-7, 179
+method 24, 25-6, 33, 10S, 111, 126,
+128, 158
+Mill, J. S. 11, 29, 30, 31, 40, 56-9, 58,
+83, 103, 115, 134, 135, 165, 203-5,
+244-6, 258, 261, 263, 264, 266, 269,
+272
+mind 49, 57, 66-7, 286-7
+moments 294-5, 298, 299
+morality 37
+motivation 184, 186, 232
+Müller, G. E. 296, 303
+names 197-8, 203-5, 216-17, 228, 240,
+244-6, 258, 260, 311; general 262-3
+nature 48-51, 66, 87, 88-9, 98, 106
+necessity 73, 88-91, 94, 97, 108
+negation 41, 57, 61, 68, 91, 93
+noetic 76, 77, 150, 168
+nomenclature 23
+nominalism 248-9, 259-60, 282, 305-6;
+critique 266; objections to 260-2;
+origin of modern 262-4
+nomological sciences 148
+nomology 152, 224
+nonsense 78
+normativity 16-17, 19, 25-6, 31-2,
+44-5, 50, 58, 62, 68, 83-4, 97, 101-3,
+106, 131, 138, 149, 230; concept
+33-7; disciplines/technologies 37-8;
+foundation 38-9
+norms 103-6
+
+object-directedness 171
+objective: analysis 247; categories 153;
+conditions 76, 77; correlate 196-8,
+202; expression 217-21; laws 63;
+reference 198-9; validity 154
+objectivity 86, 87, 104, 121, 145, 161,
+169,178,217,295, 305
+objects 169, 212, 215, 230, 239-40, 250,
+273, 275, 297, 309; apparent 252-3
+observation 57, 207
+ontology 148
+opposition 97, 106, 121, 238, 255
+ought/is 43
+particularity 41
+parts 294-5, 300-1
+Paul, H. 221
+perception 57, 121, 171, 176, 189-90,
+199, 222, 295, 296-7, 305
+personal pronoun 218-19
+phenomenological analysis 247
+phenomenology 153, 165-8, 176-9,
+193-4, 263, 272, 298; analytic 168-72
+philosophy 129, 133, 158-60
+pictures 206-9
+Plato 256
+positive mode 57
+possibility 108, 151-2, 243, 246
+predicate, predication 104, 260, 262,
+265,269,282, 304
+prejudices 101-3; content 108-15;
+judgement 115-22; knowledge 101-7
+prescription 31
+presentation 111-12, 171, 174, 177, 205,
+213-15, 228, 230, 248, 252, 261, 264,
+275, 289, 292, 306, 308; general 282
+presupposition 44, 54, 177-9, 225
+principles 46, 48, 60, 70-2, 91-2, 113
+probability 48-9, 56, 88, 108, 114, 140,
+160-1,186
+proof 22, 46, 49, 53, 59-60, 71, 74, 82,
+108, 111, 114, 126, 146, 185, 225,
+proper names 260, 271, 281
+properties 104, 252, 253, 297
+propositions 11, 16, 19-20, 25-6, 29,
+38, 46, 52, 51-8, 68-9, 77, 89, 92,
+94-6,97, 101-3, 104, 136, 155-6,
+Index 329
+179,225, 265, 303-4; normative
+33-7; transformation of 116-19
+pseudo-problems 266
+pseudo-theories 266
+psychological hypostatization 248-57
+psychological theory 291-2
+psychologism 11, 14, 29, 40, 129, 169,
+302; anti- 106-7; consequences
+46-54; empiricist consequences 46-8;
+gap in proof 44-5; interpretations
+56-69; like relativism 82-3; line of
+proof 41; opposition to 41-4;
+prejudices 101-22; Sigwart's logic
+83-90
+psychology 11, 14, 29, 77, 88, 104, 106,
+118, 129-31, 166, 170, 175, 272, 303
+pure logic 14, 28, 29, 31-3, 41, 45, 55,
+69,84,97, 104-5, 107, 110-11, 113,
+117, 131-3, 134, 136, 140-1, 165-6,
+175, 224-7, 237, 279; achievements in
+158-60; broadening of theory 160-1;
+ideal conditions 149-50;
+interconnections 144-S; knowledge
+content 150-2; manifolds 156-8;
+tasks 152-6; unity of theory 146-9
+rationality 48-51, 83, 89, 131-2
+realism 249
+reality 50-1, 88, 94, 113, 114, 119-22,
+151, 171, 177, 184, 249, 250
+reflection 170, 172, 196, 232, 310
+reflective circle 107
+relation 104
+relativism 129, 133; critique 78-82;
+extended sense 82; individual 78; like
+psychologism 82-3; specific 77-82
+relatum 104
+representation 278-80, 289, 291-2;
+critique 284-6; general 281-2; as
+substitution 282-4
+Riehl, A. 108, 213
+rules 41, 44, 46, 70, 84, 97, 103
+scepticism 17, 49, 61, 83; limit 301-2;
+metaphysical sense 76-7; refutation
+301-2; strict concept 75-6;
+transference 300-1
+Schleiermacher, F. 26-7
+
+330 Index
+scholasticism 33, 135, 138
+Schopenhauer, A. 37
+Schuppe, W. 31
+science 30, 104-5, 128, 133, 134, 138,
+141, 145, 169, 224; aims 12; fields
+12-13; logic as 16-19; possibility of
+21-3; theory of 16-19, 21-3, 24-5,
+27
+science of science (Wissenschaftslehre)
+16-19,21-3, 24-5, 27
+second-order concepts 153
+self-evidence 61, 72, 75, 77, 78, 81, 93,
+102, 116, 118, 167-8, 171, 174, 208,
+212, 223, 226, 230, 239, 246, 260-1,
+265,266, 292, 297-300, 301-2
+self-identical 241
+sensation 171
+sense 200-1, 206, 209, 213-14, 250,
+263,264-6,273,280-1
+sense-contents 124, 239, 300
+shall-should 34-5, 102
+sign(s) 183, 187-8, 193, 210-11, 214,
+261,264,281,285
+Sigwart, C. 29, 31, 43, 51, 64, 67-9,
+83-90,103, 115,135
+singulars 213, 240-1, 243, 265-6
+space 64, 157-8, 222, 224
+species 230, 231-2, 237-8, 239, 241-2,
+243, 247, 250, 265-6, 269, 271, 273,
+282, 299, 308, 311-13; external to
+thought 248; as objects 240-1,
+243-4; in thought 248; unity of
+241-2
+specific unity 261, 270
+Spencer, H. 57, 244-6
+subjective conditions 75-6, 77
+subjective incapacity 63
+subjectivity 77-9, 89, 104, 149-50, 253,
+295, 305
+substitution 23, 282-4
+surrogative function 210-11
+syllogism 15, 20, 21, 46, 48, 51-2, 84,
+105, 108, 114, 136, 139, 152, 155,
+224, 230; and chemical formulae
+12-4; principles /0-2
+symbolic: intentions 254; meaning 261;
+presentation 280; thought 211
+systematic unity 24-5
+technology 25-6, 29-32, 37-8, 103,
+116, 126-8, 134
+teleology 124, 128
+theoretical disciplines 37, 38-9
+theory 33-4, 40, 61, 75-6, 83, 107, 133,
+147, 151-2, 153, 167, 224, 272; forms
+155-7; general 149-50
+thing 77, 101, 249, 275, 295, 297
+thing in general 271
+thinking 22, 23, 26, 31, 41-2, 45, 48,
+50, 64, 71, 88-9, 91, 92, 95, 116, 125,
+127, 232, 274-6
+thought 22, 23, 26, 41, 48-51, 57, 59,
+61-3, 71, 73-4,84, 91-2, 93, 97,
+98-9, 102, 111, 137, 153, 166, 177,
+210-11, 212, 226, 263, 275, 286, 291
+thought-acts 274
+thought-content 246, 249
+thought-intention 281
+time 222, 224
+Trendelenburg, A. 12
+triangles 254-6, 264, 267, 268, 270,
+286, 306-7
+truth(s) 17, 18, 19. 20, 21, 28, 31, 32,
+41, 43, 45, 48, 55, 58, 59, 62, 71-2,
+73, 77-82, 85-7, 92, 94, 97, 98.
+99-100, 102, 104, 108, 113, 117, 119,
+131, 142, 196, 211-12, 215, 223, 250,
+266; general 146, 149; individual 146;
+interconnection 144-5
+Uberweg, F. 31
+unconscious 22, 65, 209, 271, 287
+understanding 42, 51, 83, 96, 209-10,
+213, 228-9
+uniformity 214
+unity 76, 86, 104, 138, 167, 217, 226,
+269; of acts 193-4; essential/
+extra-essential 147-9; of experience
+186-7; ideal 194-6, 229-31; of
+knowledge 111-13; of science 144-5,
+146-7, 149; spurious 241-2
+unity-for-thought 262
+universal(s) 41, 53, 60, 86, 87, 100, 114,
+155, 232, 240-1, 253-4, 264-6, 283,
+292; object 239-41, 26l; presentation
+261; psychological hypostatization of
+248-57; triangle 254-6
+
+Index 331
+vagueness 257
+validation 18-19, 69, 73, 78, 84, 86, 91,
+96, 100, 114, 116, 121, 154, 177, 226,
+249; arguments 21-3; central
+significance 23-4; features 19-21;
+isolated 24
+value-predicates 35-6
+vérités de raison/vérites de fait 89-90, 120
+wish-utterances 217
+wordless recognition 208-9
+Wundt, W. 31, 51, 83, 90,
+115-16
+yes-no opposition 59, 62
+zones of inexactness 48
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/65d307b83acdc937b51089d010dbd37d467383af730d13bc205686fde537b00e.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/65d307b83acdc937b51089d010dbd37d467383af730d13bc205686fde537b00e.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7311e32671c147424cf6fc58015679c589be2e48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/65d307b83acdc937b51089d010dbd37d467383af730d13bc205686fde537b00e.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -6024,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "65d307b83acdc937b51089d010dbd37d467383af730d13bc205686fde537b00e",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1824,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "9a176ce3503e9c30225387ab45f8009835d68ecb931841c6f51c463262378824",
+  "output_sha256": "7eed6357daf337b8131c53b7b916851ba6802e7a127a681b7347024cf7265cb0",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/6bcf4b2c61549db6fcf7781e66ea7219bfa94ad6b1c8916e04448bf5d77589eb.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/6bcf4b2c61549db6fcf7781e66ea7219bfa94ad6b1c8916e04448bf5d77589eb.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d6431695dd7a972f82c194df5173989700c8f530
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/6bcf4b2c61549db6fcf7781e66ea7219bfa94ad6b1c8916e04448bf5d77589eb.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5851 @@
+... brilliant and very influential... stands up as an impressive and
+enduring work of philosophy, outstanding in its sweep, clarity and
+penetration.' Colin McGinn, Times Higher Education Supplement
+"(when) these lectures were first published eight years ago (in a
+collection), they stood analytic philosophy on its ear. Everybody
+was either furious,
+or exhilarated, or thoroughly perplexed. No one
+was indifferent. This welcome republication in a separate volume
+(with a helpful new preface, but no substantive changes) provides
+a chance to look back at a modern classic, and to say something
+about why it was found so shocking and liberating.' Richard Rorty,
+London Review of Books
+"Naming and Necessity' has had a great and increasing influence. It
+redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions of natural
+and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these
+and theories of naming, and of identity. This seminal work, to
+which today's thriving essentialist metaphysics largely owes its
+impetus, is here reissued in a newly corrected form with a new
+preface by the author. If there is such a thing as essential reading in
+metaphysics, or in philosophy of language, this is it.
+Also by Saul Kripke
+Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
+Basil Blackwell
+ISBN 0 631 12801 8
+NA
+NECE
+KRIF
+*KI
+Naming
+and Necessity
+SAUL KRIPKE
+
+Saul A. Kripke
+Basil Blackwell
+
+1616
+PrAs
+Copyright c: Saul A. Kripke 1972. 1980
+First published in
+G. Harman and D. Davidson (editors). Semantics of Natural Language
+(D. Reidel Publishing Co..
+Dordrecht. Netherlands and Boston. USA. 1972)|
+Revised and enlarged edition first published 1980
+Paperoack contion 1981
+Reprinted 1984. 1986. 1988. 1990
+Basil Blackwell Lid
+108 Cowley Road. Oxford OX4 IJF. UK
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
+reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted.
+in any form or by any means, clectronic. mechanical, photocopying.
+recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of
+Rasi Blackwell Limited.
+Except in the United States of America. this book is sold
+subject to the condition that it shall not. by way of trade or
+otherwise. be lent. re-sold. hired out, or otherwise circulated
+without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or
+cover other than that in which it is published and without a
+similar condition including this condition being imposed on the
+subsequent purchaser.
+British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
+A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from
+the British Library.
+ISBN 0-631-10151-9
+ISBN 0-631-12801-8 Pbk
+Printed in Great Britain by Billing & Sons Lid. Worcester
+for
+MARGARET
+
+CONTENTS
+Preface
+Lecture I
+Lecture II
+Lecture
+III
+Addenda
+22
+71
+106
+ISO
+
+PREFACE
+Originally I had intended to revise or augment Naming and
+Necessity extensively. Considerable time has elapsed, and I have
+come to realize that any extensive revision or expansion would
+delay the appearance of a separate, less expensive edition of
+Naming and Necessity indefinitely. Further, as far as revision is
+concerned, there is something to be said for preserving a work
+in its original form, warts and all. I have thus followed a very
+conservative policy of correction for the present printing.
+Obvious printing errors have been corrected, and slight changes
+have been made to make various sentences or formulations
+clearer.' A good indication of my conservative policy is in
+fo note 56. In that footnote the letter-nomenclature for the
+various objects involved, inexplicably garbled in the original
+printing, has been corrected; but I make no mention of the fact
+that the argument of the footnote now seems to me to have
+problems which I did not know when I wrote it and which
+at least require further discussion.?
+The same considerations lead me to give up any serious
+attempt to use this preface to amplify my previous argument,
+to fill in lacunae, or to deal with serious criticisnis or difficulties.
+" I thank Margaret Gilbert for her valuable help in this editing.
+= Although I have not had time for careful study of Nathan Salmon's criticism (Joumal of Philosophy (1979), pp. 703-25) of this footnote, it seems likely
+that his criticism of the argument, though related to mine, is not the same and
+reconstructs it in a way that does not correspond to my exact intent and makes
+the argument unnecessarily weak. Also, I think I had no ambition in this short
+footnote rigorously to prove 'essentialism from the theory of reference' alone.
+The footnote was so compressed that readers might casily reconstruct the
+details in differing ways.
+
+Obviously, aside from such amplification in the preface, there
+are passages in the monograph other than just footnote s6 that
+I might modify. I do stand by the principal theses of my work,
+and the pressure for much revision is not intense. I will, however, use this preface briefly to describe the background and
+genesis of the leading ideas of this nonograph, and to discuss
+a few misapprehensions that seem to be common. I am afraid
+that I must disappoint those readers who already found the
+exposition in the monograph satisfactory on these points.
+Relatively little will be added to deal with what I see as the
+more substantive problems of the monograph. The issues
+explained further-mostly related to
+modality and rigid
+designation—may already have been clear to most readers. On
+the other hand, those readers who felt sympathetic to some
+of the objections mentioned here may well be justified in
+wishing for a more thorough treatment. I fear that in most
+cases, the treatment of disputed points allowable in the space of
+a preface is simply too short to convince many readers who
+were inclined to believe the objections. To some extent, brief
+treatments of objections may do more harm than good, since
+the reader who was confused may think that if this is all that
+can be replied, the original objection must have been cogent.
+Nevertheless, I thought I should register briefly why I think
+certain reactions are misconceived. I hope that in some cases I
+will be able to write at greater length. Here I must plead that a
+thorough discussion is impossible within the bounds of this
+preface.
+Readers who are new to this book can use the preface for
+further clarification of certain points, and for a brief history of
+their genesis. I would recommend that such readers not read
+» Thus some published criticisms are not discussed here because they are
+so frivolous that I hope they are not given wide credence; others because they
+are too substantive; and yet other: simply for lack of space. I leave it to the
+reader to decide which category subsumes any particular example.
+NAMINC AND NECASSITY
+the preface first, but that they return to it for clarification (if
+necessary) after they have read the main text. The preface is
+not written in such a way as to be completely self-contained.
+The ideas in Naming and Necessity evolved in the early sixties
+—most of the views were formulated in about 1963-64. Of
+course the work grew out of earlier formal work in the model
+theory of modal logic. Already when I worked on modal logic
+it had seemed to me, as Wiggins has said, that the Leibnitzian principle of the indiscernibility of identicals* was as selfevident as the law of contradiction. That some philosophers
+could have doubted it always seemed to me bizarre. The model
+theoretic study of modal logic ('possible worlds' semantics)
+could only confirm this conviction—the alleged counterexamples involving modal properties always turned out to
+turn on some confusion: the contexts involved did not express
+genuine properties, scopes were confused, or coincidence between individual concepts was confused with identity between
+individuals. The model theory made this completely clear,
+though it should have been clear enough on the intuitive level.
+Waiving fussy considerations deriving from the fact that x need
+not have necessary existence, it was clear from (x) [ (*= x)
+and Leibnitz's law that identity is an 'internal relation:
+(x) (y) (x = y > • x = y). (What pairs (x, y) could be counterexamples? Not pairs of distinct objects, for then the antecedent
+is false; nor any pair of an object and itseli, for then the consequent is true.) If 'a' and "b' are rigid designators, it follows
+that 'a = b', if truc, is a necessary truth. If 'a' and 'b' are not
+rigid designators, no such conclusion follows about the statement 'a = b' (though the objects designated by 'a' and 'b' will
+be necessarily identical).
+In speaking of rigid designators, we are speaking of a
+The principle that identicals have all properties in common; schematicall
+s) (x)(x = y ^ Fx. >. Fy). Not to be confused with the identity of indisce
+nibles.
+
+possibility that certainly exists in a formal modal language.
+Logically, we as yet are committed to no thesis about the status
+of what we ordinarily call 'names' in natural language. We
+must distinguish three distinct theses: (i) that identical objects
+are necessarily identical; (ii) that true identity statements between rigid designators are necessary; (iii) that identity statements between what we call 'names' in actual language are
+necessary. (i) and (i) are (self-evident) theses of philosophical
+logic independent of natural language. They are related to
+each other, though (i) is about objects and (ii) is metalinguistic.
+(i) roughly follows' from (i), using substitution of rigid
+designators for universal quantifiers—I say 'roughly' because
+delicate distinctions about rigidity are relevant, see page 21 n. 21;
+the analogous deduction for nonrigid designators is fallacious.)
+From (ii) all that strictly follows about so-called 'names' in
+natural language is that either they are not rigid or true identities
+between them are necessary. Our intuitive idea of naming
+suggests that names are rigid, but I suppose that at one time I
+vaguely supposed, influenced by prevailing presuppositions, that
+since obviously there are contingent identities between ordinary
+so-called names, such ordinary names must not be rigid. However, it was already clear from (i) —without any investigation of
+natural language-that the supposition, common to philosophical discussions of materialism at that time, that objects can be
+"contingently identical", is false. Identity would be an internal
+relation even if natural language had contained no rigid
+designators. The confused reference to objects as 'contingently
+identical" served illegitimately as a philosophical crutch: It
+enabled philosophers simultaneously to think of certain designators as if they were non-rigid and hence found in 'contingent
+identities") and as if they were rigid, the conflict being muddled
+over by thinking of the corresponding objects as 'contingently
+identical". Even before I clearly realized the true situation
+regarding proper names, I felt little sympathy for the dark
+doctrine of à relation of "contingent identity'. Uniquely
+identifying properties can coincide contingently, but objects
+cannot be 'contingently identical".
+Eventually I came to realize-this realization inaugurated the
+aforementioned work of 1963-64—that the received presuppositions against the necessity of identities between ordinary
+names were incorrect, that the natural intuition that the names
+of ordinary language are rigid designators can in fact be upheld." Part of the effort to make this clear involved the distinction between using a description to give a meaning and using it
+to fix a reference. Thus at this stage I rejected the conventional
+description theory as an account of meaning, though its
+validity as an account of the fixing of a reference was left untouched. Probably I let myself be content with this position
+momentarily, but the natural next step was to question whether
+the description theory gave a correct account even of how the
+references of names were fixed. The result appears in the second
+of these lectures. It was a short step to realize that similar
+remarks applied to terms for natural kinds. The other leading
+¡deas came naturally as things 'fit into place'.
+Let me not pay inadequate tribute to the power of the then
+prevailing complex of ideas, emanating from Frege and from
+Russell, that I then abandoned. The natural and uniform
+manner by which these ideas appear to account for a variety of
+philosophical problems--their marvelous internal cohcrenceis adequate explanation for their long appeal. I myself have been
+shocked at the prevalence of some ideas in the philosophical
+community which to me have little or no appeal, but I have
+never placed the description theory of proper names in such a
+category. Although I, with others, always felt some strain in
+this edifice, it took some time to get free of its seductive power.
+• It also became clear that a symbol of any actual or hypothetical language
+that is not a rigid designator is so unlike the names of ordinary language that
+it ought not to be called a 'name'. In particular, this would apply to a hypothetical abbreviation of a nonrigid definite description.
+
+Although the idea is now a familiar one, I will give a brief
+restatement of the idea of rigid designation, and the intuition
+about names that underlies it. Consider:
+(1)
+Aristotle was fond of dogs.
+A proper understanding of this statement involves an understanding both of the (extensionally correct) conditions under
+which it is in fact true, and of the conditions under which a
+counterfactual course of history, resembling the actual course
+in some respects but not in others, would be correctly (partially) described by (1). Presumably everyone agrces that there
+is a certain man—the philosopher we call 'Aristotle'-such
+that, as a matter of fact, (I) is true if and only if he was fond
+of dogs." The thesis of rigid designation is simply-subtle
+points aside'-that the same paradigm applies to the truth
+conditions of (r) as it describes counterfactual situations. That is,
+(I) truly describes a counterfactual situation if and only if the
+same aforementioned man would have been fond of dogs, had
+that situation obtained. (Forget the counterfactual situations
+where he would not have existed.) By contrast, Russell thinks
+that (1) should be analyzed as something like:®
+• That is everyone, even Russell, would agree that this is a true material
+equivalence, given that there really was an Aristotle.
+"In particular, we ignore the question what to say about counterfactual
+situations in which Aristotle would not have existed. See page 21 note 21.
+" Taking 'the last great philosopher of antiquity' to be the description
+Russell associates with 'Aristotle'. Let admirers of Epicureanism, Stoicism,
+etc., not be offended; if any reader thinks that someone later than Aristotle is
+the true referent of the description given, let that reader substitute another one.
+I assume Russell is right in that definite descriptions can at least sometimes
+be interpreted nonrigidly. As I mention on page 59 footnote 22, some
+philosophers think that, in addition, there is a rigid sense of definite descriptions. As I say in the latter footnote, I am not convinced of this, but if these
+philosophers are right, my principal thesis is not affected. It contrasts names
+with nonrigid descriptions, as advocated by Russell. See Section 2, pp. 258-61
+of my paper, 'Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference', Midwest Studies
+in Philosophy, II (1977), pp.
+255-76; also in Contemporary Perspectives in
+the Philosophy of Language, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uchling,
+2)
+The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of
+dogs,
+and that this in turn should be analyzed as
+(3)
+Exactly one person was last among the great philosophers of antiquity, and any such person was fond
+of dogs.
+The actual truth conditions of (3) agree extensionally with those
+mentioned above for (1), assuming that Aristotle was the last
+great philosopher of antiquity. But counterfactually, Russell's
+conditions can vary wildly from those supposed by the
+rigidity thesis. With respect to a counterfactual situation where
+someone other than Aristotle would have been the last great
+philosopher of antiquity, Russell's criterion would make that
+other person's fondness for dogs the relevant issue for the
+correctness of (I)!
+So far I have said nothing that I did not think I had made
+clear before. But it should be apparent from the explanation
+that some criticisms are misunderstandings. Some have thought
+that the simple fact that two people can have the same name
+refutes the rigidity thesis. It is true that in the present monograph I spoke for simplicity as if each name had a unique
+bearer. I do not in fact think, as far as the issue of rigidity is
+concerned, that this is a major oversimplification. I believe
+that many important theoretical issues about the semantics of
+names (probably not all) would be largely unaffected had our
+conventions required that no two things shall be given the
+same name. In particular, as I shall explain, the issue of rigidity
+would be unaffected.
+For language as we have it, we could speak of names as
+having a unique referent if we adopted a terminology, anal-
+, and Howard K. Wettstein, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapo
+79), pp. 6-27) for a brief discussion of the relation of the idea of rig
+definite descriptions to Donnellan's 'referential" descriptions. I also discuss the
+relation of both of these to the notion of scope.
+
+ogous to the practice of calling homonyms distinct "words,
+according to which uses of phonetically the same sounds to
+name distinct objects count as distinct names. This terminology
+certainly does not agree with the most common usage, ° but
+I think it may have a great deal to recommend it for theoretical
+purposes.
+But the main point is that, however a philosophical theory
+may treat such 'homonymous'" names, the issue is irrelevant to
+the question of rigidity. As a speaker of my idiolect, I call only
+one object 'Aristotle', though I am aware that other people,
+including the man I call 'Onassis' or perhaps 'Aristotle Onassis,
+had the same given name. Other readers may use 'Aristotle' to
+name more than one object (person, or pct animal) and for
+them (1) has no unambiguous truth conditions. When I spoke
+of 'the truth conditions' of (1), I perforce assumed a particular
+reading for (I). (So of course, does the classical description
+theorist; this is not an issue between us. Classical description
+theorists, too, tended to speak for simplicity as if names had
+• Actually, the criterion should be subtler, and depends on one's theoretical
+views. Thus, on the picture advocated in this monograph, two totally distinct
+'historical chains' that by sheer accident assign phonetically the same name to
+the same man should probably count as creating distinct names despite the
+identity of the refcrents. The identity may well be unknown to the speaker, or
+express a recent discovery. (Similarly, a description theorist who counts
+names in the way suggested presumably would regard two phonetically
+identical names with distinct associated descriptions as distinct, even if the
+two descriptions happen uniquely to be true of the same object.) But distinctness of the referents will be a sufficient condition for distinctness of the names.
+I should stress that I am not demanding or even advocating this usage, but
+mention it as a possibility to which I am sympathetic. The point that rigidity
+has nothing to do with the question of two people having phonetically the
+same name holds whether this convention is adopted or not.
+10 But perhaps one use of 'How inany names are there in this telephone
+book?' is an exception (Anne Jacobson).
+" By using this term, I do not mean to commit the analysis to a particular
+view (see also the next footnote), though I suggest my own. I mean simply that
+two people can have phonctically the same name.
+unique references.) In practice it is usual to suppose that what
+is meant in a particular use of a sentence is understood from
+the context. In the present instance, that context made it clear
+that it was the conventional use of "Aristotle' for the great
+philosopher that was in question. Then, given this fixed understanding of (1), the question of rigidity is: Is the correctness of
+(t), thus understood, determined with respect to each counterfactual situation by whether a certain single person would have
+liked dogs (had that situation obtained)? I answer the question
+affirmatively. But Russell seems to be committed to the
+opposite view, even when what (I) expresses is fixed by the
+context. Only given such a fixed understanding of (1) would
+Russell read (I) as (3)—not if "Aristotle' meant Onassis!-but
+the rigidity requirement is violated. This question is entirely
+unaffected by the presence or absence in the language of other
+readings of (1). For each such particular reading separately, we
+can ask whether what is expressed would be true of a counterfactual situation if and only if some fixed individual has the
+appropriate property. This is the question of rigidity.
+Let me recapitulate the point, ignoring for this exposition
+the delicate problems about 'propositions' to be mentioned at
+the end of this preface. To speak of 'the truth conditions' of a
+sentence such as (1), it must be taken to express a single proposition-otherwise its truth conditions even with respect to
+the actual world are indeterminate. Thus ambiguous words or
+homonyms (perhaps 'dog' in (r)) must be read in a determinate way (canine!), indexicals must be assigned determinate
+references, syntactic ambiguities must be resolved, and it must
+be fixed whether "Aristotle' names the philosopher or the
+shipping magnate. Only given such a reading can Russell
+propose an analysis such as (3)—rightly, no one ever faulted
+him on this score. Then my objection to Russell is that all the
+many propositions expressed by various readings of (r) (assuming that in all rcadings 'Aristotle' is a proper name) would, if
+
+he were right, fail to conform to the rule of rigidity. That is, no
+such proposition conforms to the rule that there is a single
+individual and a single property such that, with respect to
+every counterfactual situation, the truth conditions of the
+proposition are the possession of the property by that individual, in that situation. (I am relying on the fact that in
+practice Russell invariably interprets ordinary names nonrigidly.) That more than one proposition may be expressed
+by (1) is irrelevant: the question is whether each such proposition is cvaluated as I describe, or is it not. The view applies
+to each such proposition taken separately. Detailed questions
+as to how the theory should incorporate the fact that our
+linguistic practice allows two things to have phonetically the
+same name need not be settled for this to be clear.!?
+Another misconception concerns the relation of rigidity to
+scope, which apparently I treated too briefly. It seems often to
+be supposed that all the linguistic intuitions I adduce on behalf
+of rigidity could just as well be handled by reading names in
+various sentences as nonrigid designators with wide scopes,
+analogously to wide scope descriptions. It would, indeed, be
+possible to interpret some of these intuitions as results of scope
+ambiguities instead of rigidity-this I recognize in the monograph. To this extent the objection is justified, but it seens to
+me to be wrong to suppose that all our intuitions can be handled
+in this way. I dealt with the question rather briefly, on page 62
+and in the accompanying footnote 2s, but the discussion seems
+to have been overlooked by many readers. In the footnote I
+1 For example, some philosophers would assimilate proper names to
+demonstratives. Their reference varies from utterance to utterance the way
+that of a demonstrative does. This does not affect the issues discussed, since
+he reference of a demonstrative must be given for a definite proposition to
+›e expressed. Although I did not discuss the question in the present mono
+graph, of course it was part of my view (p. 49 n. 16) that 'this", T, 'you', etc.,
+are all rigid (even though their refcrences obviously vary with the context of
+uttcrance). The rigidity of demonstratives has been stressed by David Kaplan.
+II
+adduce some linguistic phenomena that, I think, support the
+rigidity intuition as opposed to an explanation in terms of
+scope. Many of these readers even seem to have overlooked
+the intuitive test for rigidity, as emphasized on pages 48-49.
+I will not repeat or elaborate these considerations in this
+preface, even though they seem to have been stated too briefly.
+Exigencies of a preface may make the following remarks too
+brief as well, but I shall discuss the scope question in the light
+of the present explanation of rigidity.
+It has even been asserted that my own view itself reduces to a
+view about scopc, that the doctrine of rigidity simply is the
+doctrine that natural language has a convention that a name,
+in the context of any sentence, should be read with a large
+scope including all modal operators.t3 This latter idca is particularly wide of the mark; in terms of modal logic, it represents
+a technical error. Let me deal with it first. (1) and (2) are
+'simple' sentences. Neither contains modal or other operators,
+so there is no room for any scope distinctions." No scope
+convention about more complex sentences affects the interpretation of these sentences. Yet the issue of rigidity makes
+13 See Michael Dummett, Frege (Duckworth, 1973), p. 128. Unfortunately,
+many of Dummett's other ideas or remarks on the relation of rigidity to scope
+are technically erroneous-for example, on the same page he says that I hold
+that descriptions are never (?) rigid and equates this view with the claim
+that 'within a modal context, the scope of a definite description should always
+be taken to exclude the modal operator. Also, some of his comments on
+linguistic intuitions seem to me to be in error. I cannot deal with these matters
+here.
+* Actually the sentences in question are tensed and therefore can be interpreted in a formal language with tense opcrators. If we treat tense this way
+(it can be treated in other ways), then other scope questions can arise owing to
+the tense operators. The question at issue, however, is about the relation of
+scope to modal operators, which does not arise in these sentences even if tense
+operators are used in their analysis. The assertion that the sentences in question
+give rise to no scope questions can be made literally true either by treating
+tense without using operators or (better) by taking the copula in (r) and (2) to
+be tenseless.
+
+I2
+sense as applied to both. My view is that 'Aristotle' in (I) is
+rigid, but 'the last great philosopher of antiquity' in (2) is not.
+No hypothesis about scope conventions for modal contexts
+expresses this view;! it is a doctrine about the truth conditions,
+with respect to counterfactual situations, of (the propositions
+expressed by) all sentences, including simple sentences.
+This shows that the view that reduces rigidity to scope in the
+manner stated is simply in error. It also indicates one weakness
+of the (rather more understandable) reaction that attempts to
+use scope to replace rigidity. The doctrine of rigidity supposes
+that a painting or picture purporting to represent a situation
+correctly described by (I) must ipso facto purport to depict
+Aristotle himself as fond of dogs. No picture, purporting to
+represent someone else and his fondness for dogs, even if it
+depicts the other individual as possessing all the properties we
+use to identify Aristotle, represents a counterfactual situation
+correctly described by (1). Doesn't this, in itself, obviously
+represent our intuitions regarding (1)? The intuition is about
+the truth conditions, in counterfactual situations, of (the proposition expressed by) a simple sentence. No wide-scope interpretation of certain modal contexts can take its place. To the
+extent that a theory preserves this intuition, so much the better
+for it.
+Another remark, not so directly relying on counterfactual
+situations, may illuminate matters. In the monograph I argued
+that the truth conditions of It might have been the case that
+Aristotle was fond of dogs' conform to the rigidity theory:
+no proof that some person other than Aristotle might have been
+18 The thesis that names are rigid in simple sentences is, however, equivalent
+(ignoring complications arising from the possible nonexistence of the object)
+to the thesis that if a modal operator governs a simple sentence containing a
+name, the two readings with large and small scopes are equivalent. This is not
+the same as the doctrine that natural language has a convention that only the
+large scope reading is allowed. In fact, the equivalence makes sense only for a
+language w here both readings are admissible.
+13
+both fond of dogs and the greatest philosopher of antiquity
+is relevant to the truth of the quoted statement. The situation is
+unchanged if we replace 'the greatest philosopher of antiquity'
+by any other (nonrigid) definite description thought of as
+identifying Aristotle. Similarly, I held, 'It might have been the
+case that Aristotle was not a philosopher' expresses a truth,
+though It might have been the case that the greatest philosopher of antiquity was not a philosopher' does not, contrary
+to Russell's theory. (An analogous example could be given for
+any other nonrigid identifying description.) Now the last
+quoted sentence would express a truth if the description used
+were read, contrary to my intent, with wide scope. So perhaps
+it might be supposed that the problem simply arises from an
+(unaccountable!) tendency to give "Aristotle' a wide scope
+reading while the descriptions are given a small scope reading;
+sentences with both names and descriptions, however, would
+be subject in principle to both readings. My point, however,
+was that the contrast would hold if all the sentences involved
+were explicitly construed with small scopes (perhaps by inserting a colon after 'that'). Further, I gave examples (referred to
+above) to indicate that the situation with names was not in fact
+parallel to that with large scope descriptions. Proponents of
+the contrary view often seem to have overlooked these
+examples, but this is not my point here. The contrary view
+must hold that our language and thought are, somehow, impotent to keep the distinction straight, that it is this which is
+responsible for the difficulty. It is hard to see how this can be:
+how did we make the distinction if we cannot make it? If the
+formulation with a that clause really is so tangled that we are
+unable to distinguish one reading of it from another, what
+about:
+(4)
+What (1) expresses might have been the case.
+Doesn't this express the desired assertion, with no scope
+ambiguities? If not, what would do so? (The formulation
+
+14
+might be a bit more natural in a dialogue: "Aristotle was fond
+of dogs. "That's not the case, though it might have been.)
+Now my claim is that our understanding of (4) conforms to the
+theory of rigidity. No possible situation in which anyone but
+Aristotle himself was fond of dogs can be relevant.
+My main remark, then, is that we have a direct intuition of
+the rigidity of names, exhibited in our understanding of the
+truth conditions of particular sentences. In addition, various
+secondary phenomena, about 'what we would say', such as
+the ones I mention in the monograph and others, give indircct
+evidence of rigidity. How did Russell, for one, propose a
+theory plainly incompatible with our direct intuitions of
+rigidity? One rcason is that, here as elsewhere, he did not
+consider modal questions; and the question of the rigidity of
+names in natural language was rarely explicitly considcred
+after him. Second, it seemed to Russell that various philosophical arguments necessitated a description theory of names and
+an eliminative theory of descriptions. Russell acknowledged
+that his views were incompatible with our naive reactions
+(though the rigidity issue was not mentioned), but powerful
+philosophical arguments seemed to him to compel adoption of
+his theory. Regarding the question of rigidity, my own reply
+took the form of a thought experiment, along the lines
+sketched briefly for "identity and schmidentity' on page 108 of
+the present monograph. In the present case I imagined a
+hypothetical formal language in which a rigid designator a is
+introduced with the ceremony, 'Let "a" (rigidly) denote the
+unique object that actually has property F, when talking about
+any situation, actual or counterfactual.' It seced clear that if
+a speaker did introduce a designator into a language that way,
+then in virtuc of his very linguistic act, he would be in a position
+to say 'I know that Få, but nevertheless 'Fa' would express a
+contingent truth (provided that F is not an essential property
+of the unique object that possesses it). First, this showed that
+IS
+epistemic questions should be separated from questions of
+necessity and contingency, and that to fix a reference is not to
+give a synonym. More important, this situation indicated that
+the evidence ordinarily adduced to show that names were
+synonymous with descriptions could instead be rationalized by
+this hypothetical model. In addition, the model satisfied our
+intuitions of rigidity. Given this, the burden of the argument
+scened to fall heavily on the philosopher who wished to deny
+our natural intuition of rigidity. As I said above, the further
+observation that ordinarily speakers do not even fix references
+by identifying descriptions of the usual type came later.
+I will say somcthing briefly about "possible worlds", ' (I hope
+to claborate elsewhere.) In the present monograph I argued
+against those misuses of the concept that regard possible worlds
+as something like distant planets, like our own surroundings
+but somehow existing in a different dimension, or that lead to
+spurious problems of 'transworld identification'. Further, if
+one wishes to avoid the W'eltangst and philosophical confusions
+that many philosophers have associated with the 'worlds'
+terminology, I recommended that "possible state (or history)
+of the world', or "counterfactual situation' might be better.
+One should even remind oneself that the 'worlds' terminology
+can often be replaced by modal talk—-'It is possible that ...'
+1 Some of the worst misinterpretations of rigidity would have had much
+less currency if the relevant philosophical discussions had been conducted in
+the context of a rigorous presentation in terms of "possible worlds semantics'.
+I did not do this in the present monograph both because I did not wish to
+rest the argument heavily on a formal model and because I wished the presentation to be philosophical rather than technical. To readers who are thoroughly
+familiar with intensional semantics the rough outline of a presentation of my
+views in these terms should be clear without an explicit development. Nevertheless, some misunderstandings of the rigidity concept-including some
+aspects of these mentioned in this preface--led me to think that a technical
+presentation might eliminate some misconceptions. Eventually considerations
+of time and space led me to decide against including such material, but I may
+give such a formal exposition elsewhere.
+
+16 l
+But I do not wish to leave any exaggerated impression that I
+repudiate possible worlds altogether, or even that I regard
+them as a mere formal device. My own use of them should
+have been extensive enough to preclude any such misunderstanding. In fact, there are some conceptions of 'possible
+worlds that I repudiate and some I do not. An analogy from
+school—in fact, it is not merely an analogy-will help to
+clarify my view. Two ordinary dice (call them die A and die B)
+are thrown, displaying two numbers face up. For each die,
+there are six possible results. Hence there are thirty-six possible
+states of the pair of dice, as far as the numbers shown face-up
+are concerned, thougli only one of these states corresponds to
+the way the dice actually will come out. We all learned in
+school how to compute the probabilities of various events
+(assuming equiprobability of the states). For example, since
+there are just two states--(die A, s; die B, 6) and (die A, 6;
+die B, 5) —that yield a total throw of eleven, the probability
+of throwing eleven is 2/36 = 1/18.
+Now in doing these school exercises in probability, we were
+in fact introduced at a tender age to a set of (miniature) 'possible
+worlds'. The thirty-six possible states of the dice are literally
+thirty-six "possible worlds', as long as we (fictively) ignore
+everything about the world except the two dice and what
+they show and ignore the fact that one or both dice might
+not have existed). Only one of these miniworlds-the one
+corresponding to the way the dice in fact come up-is the
+actual world', but the others are of interest when we ask how
+probable or improbable the actual outcome was (or will be).
+Now in this elementary case, certain confusions can be
+avoided. We have assumed that the dice actually do fall, that
+some one of the thirty-six states is actual. Now the 'actual world'
+in this case is the state of the dice that is actually realized.
+Another entity, more 'concrete' than this state, is the Lesniewskian-Goodmanian physical entity which is the 'sum' of the
+I7
+two dice. This complex physical entity ('the dice,' thought of
+as a single object) is before me on the table, after the throw,
+and its actual position determines the actual state of the (two)
+dice. But when we talk in school of thirty-six possibilities, in
+no way do we need to posit that there are some thirty-five
+ther entities, existent in some never-never land, corresponding
+to the physical object before me. Nor need we ask whethe
+these phantom entities are composed of (phanton) 'counterparts' of the actual individual dice, or are somehow composed
+of the same individual dice themselves but in 'another dimension'. The thirty-six possibilities, the one that is actual included,
+are (abstract) states of the dice, not complex physical entities.
+Nor should any school pupil receive high marks for the
+question 'How do we know, in the state where die A is six
+and die B is five, whether it is die A or die B which is six?
+Don't we need a "criterion of transstate identity" to identify
+the die with a six—not the die with a five-with our die A?'
+The answer is, of course, that the state (die A, 6; die B, s) is
+given as such (and distinguished from the state (die B, 6; die A,
+s)). The demand for some further 'criterion of transstate
+identity' is so confused that no competent schoolchild would
+be so perversely philosophical as to make it. The "possibilities'
+simply are not given purely qualitatively (as in: one die, 6, the
+other, 5). If they had been, there would have been just twentyone distinct possibilities, not thirty-six. And the states are not
+phantom dice-pairs, viewed from afar, about which we can
+raise epistemically meaningful questions of the form, 'Which
+die is that?' Nor, when we regard such qualitatively identical
+states as (A, 6; B, s) and (A, s; B, 6) as distinct, need we
+suppose that A and B are qualitatively distinguishable in some
+other respect, say, color. On the contrary, for the purposes
+of the probability problem, the numerical face shown is
+thought of as if it were the only property of each die. Finally,
+in setting up this innocent little exercise regarding the fall of
+
+18
+the dice, with possibilities that are not described purely qualitatively, we make no obscure metaphysical commitment to dice
+as 'bare particulars", whatever that might mean."
+'Possible worlds'
+are little more than the miniworlds of
+school probability blown large. It is true that there are problems
+in the general notion not involved in the miniature version.
+The miniature worlds are tightly controlled, both as to the
+objects involved (two dice), the relevant properties (number
+on face shown), and (thus) the relevant idea of possibility.
+"Possible worlds' are total 'ways the world might have been',
+or states or histories of the entire world. To think of the totality
+of all of them involves much more idealization, and more
+mind-boggling questions, than the less ambitious elementary
+school analogue. Certainly the philosopher of " possible worlds'
+must take care that his technical apparatus not push him to ask
+questions whose meaningfulness is not supported by our
+original intuitions of possibility that gave the apparatus its
+point. Further, in practice we cannot describe a complete
+counterfactual course of events and have no need to do so. A
+practical description of the extent to which the 'counterfactual
+situation' differs in the relevant way from the actual facts is
+sufficient; the "counterfactual situation' could be thought of as
+a miniworld or a ministate, restricted to features of the world
+relevant to the problem at hand. In practice this involves less
+idealization both as to considering entire world histories and
+as to considering all possibilities. For present purposes, however, the elementary analogue gives a fine model for the
+1 With respect to possible states of the entire world, I do not mean to
+assert categorically that, just as in the case of the dice, there are qualitatively
+identical but distinct (counterfactual) states. What I do assert is that if there
+is a philosophical argument excluding qualitatively identical but distinct
+worlds, it cannot be based simply on the supposition that worlds must be
+stipulated purely qualitatively.
+What I defend is the propriety of giving
+possible worlds in terms of certain particulars as well as qualitatively, whether
+or not there are in fact qualitatively identical but distinct worlds.
+19
+appropriate morals regarding "possible worlds'. There is
+nothing wrong in principle with taking thesc, for philosophical
+or for technical purposes, as (abstract) entities—the innocence
+of the grammar school analogue should allay any anxieties on
+that score.'® (Indeed the general notion of 'sample space' that
+fornıs the basis of modern probability theory is just that of
+such a space of possible worlds.) However, we should avoid
+the pitfalls that seem much more tempting to philosophers
+with their grand worlds than to schoolchildren with their
+modest versions. There are no special grounds to suppose that
+possible worlds must be given qualitatively, or that there need
+be any genuine problem of 'transworld identification'-the
+fact that larger and more complex states are involved than in
+the case of the dice makes no difference to this point. The
+'actual world'-better, the actual state, or history of the world
+-should not be confused with the enormous scattered object
+18 I do not think of "possible worlds' as providing a reductive analysis in any
+philosophically significant sense, that is, as uncovering the ultimate nature,
+from either an epistemological or a metaphysical point of view, of modal
+operators, propositions, etc., or as 'explicating' them. In the actual development of our thought, judgments involving directly expressed modal locutions
+(it might have been the case that") certainly come earlier. The notion of a
+"possible world", though it has its roots in various ordinary ideas of ways the
+world might have been, comes at a much greater, and subsequent, level of
+abstraction. In practice, n1o one who cannot understand the idea of possibility
+is likely to understand that of a 'possible world' either. Philosophically, we
+by no means need assume that one type of discourse is 'prior to' the other,
+independently of the purposes at hand. The main and the original motivation
+for the 'possible worlds analysis'-and the way it clarified modal logic—-was
+that it enabled modal logic to be treated by the same set theoretic techniques
+of model theory that proved so successful when applied to extensional logic.
+It is also useful in making certain concepts clear.
+To reiterate another point: the notion of all states of the entire world that
+are possible in the broadest (metaphysical) sense involves a certain amount of
+idealization, as well as philosophical questions I have not discussed. If we
+restrict the worlds to a narrower class of miniworlds, essentially all the issues
+regarding say, rigid designators, remain the same. So do the questions of
+modal semantics.
+
+20
+that surrounds us. The latter might also have been called 'the
+(actual) world', but it is not the relevant object here. Thus the
+possible but not actual worlds are not phantom duplicates of
+the 'world' in this other sense. Perhaps such confusions would
+have been less likely but for the terminological accident that
+possible worlds' rather than "possible states", or 'histories", of
+the world, or "counterfactual situations' had been used. Certainly they would have been avoided had philosophers adhered
+to the common practices of schoolchildren and probabilists."
+A final issue: Some critics of my doctrines,
+and some
+sympathizers, seem to have read them as asserting, or at least
+implying, a doctrine of the universal substitutivity of proper
+names. This can be taken as saying that a sentence with 'Cicero'
+in it expresses the same "proposition' as the corresponding one
+with "Tully, that to believe the proposition expressed by the
+one is to believe the proposition expressed by the other, or that
+they are equivalent for all semantic purposes. Russell does seem
+to have held such a view for "logically proper names', and it
+seems congenial to a purcly 'Millian'
+picture of naming, where
+only the referent of the name contributes to what is expressed.
+But I (and for all I know, even Mill) never intended to go so
+far. My view that the English sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'
+could sometimes be used to raise an empirical issue while
+"Hesperus is Hesperus' could not shows that I do not treat the
+sentences as completely interchangeable. Further, it indicates
+that the mode of fixing the reference is relevant to our epistemic
+1• Compare, c.g., the 'moderate realism' regarding possible worlds of Robert
+Stalnaker, 'Possible Worlds', Noßs, vol. 10 (1976), Pp. 65-75.
+30 Michael Lockwood (On Predicating Proper Names', The Philosophical
+Review, vol. 84, no. 4, October, 1975, PP. 471-498) points out (P. 491) that
+Mill does not take 'Cicero is Tully' to mean the same as 'Cicero is Cicero' but
+rather holds the view that it means that 'Cicero' and "Tully' are codesignative.
+He also points out (p. 490) that Mill sces such a metalinguistic component in
+all assertions involving names. I have not investigated the interpretation of
+Mill further, so I have no view as to his exact doctrine.
+2I
+attitude toward the sentences expressed. How this relates to
+the question what 'propositions' are expressed by these sentences, whether these 'propositions' are objects of knowledge
+and belief, and in general, how to treat names in epistemic
+contexts, are vexing questions. I have no 'official doctrine'
+concerning them, and in fact I am unsure that the apparatus of
+"propositions' does not break down in this area." Hence, I
+sidestepped such questions; no firm doctrine regarding the
+point should be read into my words.
+" Reasons why I find these questions so vexing are to be found in my 'A
+Puzzle About Belief', in Meaning and Use (ed. A. Margalit), Reidel, 1979,
+pp. 239-283. Of course there may be more than one notion of "proposition",
+depending on the demands we make of the notion. The thesis of rigidity does
+of course imply interchangeability of codesignative names in modal contexts,
+subject to the usual caveat about possible nonexistence.
+Concerning rigidity: In many places, both in this preface and in the text of
+this monograpi, I deliberately ignore delicate questions arising frons the
+possible nonexistence of an object. I also ignore the distinction between 'de
+jure rigidity, where the reference of a designator is stipulated to be a single
+object, whether we are speaking of the actual world or of a counterfactual
+situation, and mere 'de facto' rigidity, where a description 'the x such that Ex'
+happens to use a predicate "F' that in each possible world is true of one and the
+same unique object (e.g., 'the smallest prime' rigidly designates the number
+two). Clearly my thesis about names is that they are rigid de jure, but in the
+monograph I am content with the weaker assertion of rigidity. Since names
+are rigid de jure-see p. 78 below-I say that a proper name rigidly designates
+its referent even when we speak of counterfactual situations where that
+referent would not have existed. Thus the issues about nonexistence are
+affected. Various people have persuaded me that all these questions deserve a
+more careful discussion than I gave them in the monograph, but I must leave
+them here.
+
+LECTURE I: JANUARY 20, 1970°
+I hope that some people see some connection between the two
+philosophy today, our views on these topics really have wide-
+1 In January of 1970, I gave three talks at Princeton University transcribed
+here. As the style of the transcript makes clear, I gave the talks without a
+written text, and, in fact, without notes. The present text is lightly edited
+rom the verbatim transcript; an occasional passage has been added to expanc
+he thought, an occasional sentence has been rewritten, but no attempt ha:
+been made to change the informal style of the original. Many of the footnotes
+have been added to the original, but a few were originally spoken asides in the
+talks themselves.
+Thope the reader will bear these facts in mind as he reads the text. Imagining
+it spoken, with proper pauses and emphases, may occasionally facilitate comprehension. I have agreed to publish the talks in this form with some reservations. The time allotted, and the informal style, necessitated a certain amount
+of compression of the argument, inability to treat certain objections, and the
+like. Especially in the concluding sections on scientific identities and the
+mind-body problem thoroughness had to be sacrificed. Some topics essential
+to a full presentation of the viewpoint argued here, especially that of existence
+statements and empty names, had to be omitted altogether. Further, the
+informality of the presentation may well have engendered a sacrifice of clarity
+at certain points. All these defects were accepted in the interest of carly
+publication. I hope that perhaps I will have the chance to do a more thorough
+job later. To repeat, I hope the reader will bear in mind that he is largely
+reading informal lectures, not only when he encounters repetitions or infelicities, but also when he encounters irreverence or com.
+23
+ranging implications for other problems in philosophy that
+traditionally might be thought far-removed, like arguments
+over the mind-body problem or the so-called "identity thesis'.
+Materialism, in this form, often now gets involved in very
+intricate ways in questions about what is necessary or
+contingent in identity of properties-questions like that.
+So, it is really very important to philosophers who may
+want to work in many domains to get clear about these
+concepts. Maybe I will say something about the mind-body
+problem in the course of these talks. I want to talk also at some
+point (I don't know if I can get it in) about substances and
+natural kinds.
+The way I approach these matters will be, in some ways,
+quite different from what people are thinking today (though it
+also has some points of contact with what some people have
+been thinking and writing today, and if I leave people out in
+informal talks like this, I hope that I will be forgiven). Some
+of the views that I have are views which may at first glance
+strike some as obviously wrong. My favorite example is this
+(which I probably won't defend in the lectures—-for one thing
+it doesn't ever convince anyone): It is a common claim in contemporary philosophy that there are certain predicates which,
+though they are in fact empty-have null extension —have it
+" Given a chance to add a footnote, I shall mention that Rogers Albritton,
+Charles Chastain, Keith Donnellan, and Michael Slote (in addition to philosophers mentioned in the text, especially Hilary Putnam), have independently
+expressed views with points of contact with various aspects of what I say
+here. Albritton called the problems of necessity and a prioricity in natural
+kinds to my attention, by raising the question whether we could discover that
+lemons were not fruits. (I am not sure he would accept all my conclusions.)
+I also recall the influence of early conversations with Albritton and with Peter
+Geach on the essentiality of origins. The apology in the text still stands; I am
+aware that the list in this footnote is far from comprehensive. I make no
+attempt to enumerate those friends and students whose stimulating conversations have helped me. Thomas Nagel and Gilbert Harman deserve
+special thanks for their help in editing the transcript.
+
+24
+as a matter of contingent fact and not as a matter of any sort of
+necessity. Well, that I don't dispute; but an example which is
+usually given is the example of unicorn. So it is said that though
+we have all found out that there are no unicorns, of course
+there might have been unicorns. Under certain circumstances
+there would have been unicorns. And this is an example of
+something I think is not the case. Perhaps according to me the
+truth should not be put in terms of saying that it is necessary
+that there should be no unicorns, but just that we can't say
+under what circumstances there would have been unicorns.
+Further, I think that even if archeologists or geologists were to
+discover tomorrow some
+fossils conclusively showing the
+existence of animals in the past satisfying everything we know
+about unicorns from the myth of the unicorn, that would
+not show that there were unicorns. Now I don't know if I'm
+going to have a chance to defend this particular view, but it's
+an example of a surprising one. (I actually gave a seminar in
+this institution where I talked about this view for a couple of
+sessions.) So, some of my opinions are somewhat surprising;
+but let us start out with some area that is perhaps not as surprising and introduce the methodology and problems of these
+talks.
+The first topic in the pair of topics is naming. By a name here
+I will mean a proper name, i.e., the name of a person, a city, a
+country, etc. It is well known that modern logicians also are
+very interested in definite descriptions: phrases of the forms 'the
+× such that ox', such as 'the man who corrupted Hadleyburg'.
+Now, if one and only one man ever corrupted Hadleyburg,
+then that man is the refcrent, in the logician's sense, of that
+We will use the term "name' so that it does not
+include definite descriptions of that sort, but only those things
+which in ordinary language would be called 'proper names'. If
+we want a common term to cover names and descriptions, we
+may use the term "designator'.
+25
+It is a point, made by Donnellan, that under certain circumstances a particular speaker may use a definite description to
+refer, not to the proper referent, in the sense that I've just
+defined it, of that description, but to something else which he
+wants to single out and which he thinks is the proper referent
+of the description, but which in fact isn't. So you may say,
+"The man over there with the champagne in his glass is happy',
+though he actually only has water in his glass. Now, even
+though there is no champagne in his glass, and there may be
+another man in the room who does have champagne in his
+glass, the speaker intended to refer, or maybe, in some sense of
+'refer', did refer, to the man he thought had the champagne in
+his glass. Nevertheless, I'm just going to use the term 'referent
+Keith Donnellan, 'Reference and Definite Descriptions, Philosophical
+Review 75 (1966), Pp. 281-304. See also Iconard Linsky, 'Reference and
+Referents', in Philosophy and Ordinary Language (ed. Caton), University of
+Illinois Press, Urbana, 1963. Donnellan's distinction seems applicable to
+names as weil as to descriptions. Two men glimpse someone at a distance and
+think they recognize him as Jones. 'What is Jones doing? "Raking the leaves'.
+If the distant leaf-raker is actually Smith, then in some sense they are referring
+to Smith, even though they both use "Jones' as a name of Jones. In the text, I
+speak of the 'referent' of a name to mean the thing named by the name-e.g.,
+Jones, not Smith-even though a speaker may sometimes properly be said to
+use the name to refer to somcone else. Perhaps it would have been less misleading to use a technical term, such as "denote' rather than 'refer". My use of
+'refer' is such as to satisfy the schema, "The referent of "X" is X', where 'X'
+is replaccable by any name or description. I am tentatively inclined to believe,
+in opposition to Donnellai, that his remarks about reference have little to do
+with semantics or truth-conditions, though they may be relevant to a theory
+of speech-acts. Space limitations do not permit nie to explain what I mean by
+this, much less defend the view, except for a brief remark: Call the referent
+of a name or description in my sense the "semantic referent'; for a name, this
+is the thing named, for a description, the thing uniquely satisfying the
+description.
+Then the speaker may refer to something other than the semantic referent if
+he has appropriate false beliefs. I think this is what happens in the naming
+(Smith-Jone:) cases and also in the Donnellan 'champagne' case; the one
+requires no theory that names are ambiguous, and the other requires no
+modification of Russell's theory of descriptions.
+
+26
+NAMING AND NECBSSITY
+of the description' to mean the object uniquely satisfying the
+conditions in the definite description. This is the sense in which
+it's been used in the logical tradition. So, if you have a description of the form 'the x such that ox', and there is exactly one x
+such that ox, that is the referent of the description.
+Now, what is the relation between names and descriptions?
+There is a well known ductrine of John Stuart Mill, in his book
+A System of Logic, that names have denotation but not connotation. To use one of his examples, when we use the name
+'Dartmouth' to describe a certain locality in England, it may
+be so called because it lies at the mouth of the Dart. But even,
+he says, had the Dart (that's a river) changed its course so that
+Dartmouth no longer lay at the mouth of the Dart, we could
+still with propriety call this place "Dartmouth', even though
+the name may suggest that it lies at the mouth of the Dart.
+Changing Mill's terminology, perhaps we should say that a
+name such as 'Dartmouth' does have a 'connotation' to some
+people, namely, it does connote (not to me—-I never thought of
+this that any place called 'Dartmouth' lies at the mouth of the
+Dart. But then in some way it doesn't have a "sense'. At least,
+it is not part of the meaning of the name 'Dartmouth' that the
+town so naned lies at the mouth of the Dart. Someone who
+said that Dartmouth did not lie at the Dart's mouth would not
+contradict himself.
+It should not be thought that every phrase of the form 'the
+* such that Ex' is always used in English as a description rather
+than a name. I guess everyone has heard about The Holy
+Roman Empire, which was neither holy, Roman nor an
+empire. Today we have The United Nations. Here it would
+seem that since these things can be so-called even though they
+are not Holy Roman United Nations, these phrases should be
+regarded not as definite descriptions, but as names. In the case
+of some terms, people might have doubts as to whether they're
+names or descriptions; like 'God'—does it describe God as the
+27
+unique divine being or is it a name of God? But such cases
+needn't necessarily bother us.
+Now here I am making a distinction which is certainly made
+in language. But the classical tradition of modern logic has
+gone very strongly against Mill's view. Frege and Russell both
+thought, and seemed to arrive at these conclusions independently of each other, that Mill was wrong in a very strong
+sense: really a proper name, properly used, simply was a
+definite description abbreviated or disguised. Frege specifically
+said that such a description gave the sense of the name.*
+Now the reasons against Mill's view and in favor of the
+alternative view adopted by Frege and Russell are really very
+powerful; and it is hard to see-—though one may be suspicious
+of this view because names don't seem to be disguised descriptions—how the Frege-Russell view, or some suitable variant,
+can fail to be the case.
+Let me give an example of some of the arguments which
+seem conclusive in favor of the view of Frege and Russell. The
+basic problem for any view such as Mill's is how we can
+determine what the referent of a name, as used by a given
+" Strictly speaking, of course, Russell says that the names don't abbreviate
+descriptions and don't have any sense; but then he also says that, just because
+the things that we call "names' do abbreviate descriptions, they're not really
+names. So, since Walter Scott, according to Russell, does abbreviate a description, 'Walter Scott' is not a name; and the only names that really exist in
+ordinary language arc, perhaps, demonstratives such as 'this' or 'that', used
+on a particular occasion to refer to an object with which the speaker is
+"acquainted' in Russell's sense. Though we won't put things the way Russell
+does, we could describe Russell as saying that names, as they are ordinarily
+called, do have sense. They have sense in a strong way, namely, we should be
+able to give a definite description such that the referent of the name, by
+definition, is the object satisfying the description. Russell himself, since he
+climinates descriptions from his primitive notation, seems to hold in 'On
+Denoting' that the notion of 'sense' is illusory. In reporting Russell's views,
+we thus deviate from him in two respects. First, we stipulate that 'names' shall
+be names as ordinarily conceived, not Russell's "logically proper names';
+second, we regard descriptions, and their abbreviations, as having sensc.
+
+28
+speaker, is. According to the description view, the answer is
+clear. If Joe Doakes' is just snort for 'the man who corrupted
+Hadleyburg', then whoever corrupted Hadleyburg uniquely is
+the referent of the name 'Joe Doakes'. However, if there is not
+such a descriptive content to the name, then how do people
+ever use names to refer to things at all? Well, they may be in a
+position to point to some things and thus determine the
+references of certain names ostensively. This was Russell's
+doctrine of acquaintance, which he thought the so-called
+genuine or proper names satisfied. But of course ordinary
+names refer to all sorts of people, like Walter Scott, to whom
+we can't possibly point. And our reference here seems to be
+determined by our knowledge of them. Whatever we know
+about then determines the referent of the name as the unique
+thing satisfying those properties. For example, if I use the
+name "Napoleon', and someone asks, "To whom are you
+referring?', I will answer something like, 'Napoleon was
+emperor of the French in the early part of the nineteenth
+century; he was eventually defeated at Waterloo', thus giving
+a uniquely identifying description to determine the referent of
+the name. Frege and Russell, then, appear to give the natural
+account of how reference is determined here; Mill appears to
+give none.
+There are subsidiary arguments which, though they are
+based on more specialized problems, are also motivations for
+accepting the view. One is that sometimes we may discover
+that two names have the same referent, and express this by an
+identity statement. So, for example (I guess this is a hackneyed
+example), you see a star in the evening and it's called 'Hesperus'.
+(That's what we call it in the evening, is that right?—I hope it's
+not the other way around.) We see a star in the morning and
+call it 'Phosphorus'. Well, then, in fact we find that it's not a
+star, but is the planet Venus and that Hesperus and Phosphorus
+are in fact the same. So we express this by 'Hesperus is Phos-
+29
+phorus'. Here we're certainly not just saying of an object that
+it's identical with itself. This is something that we discovered.
+A very natural thing to say is that the real content [is that] the
+star which we saw in the evening is the star which we saw in
+the morning (or, more accurately, that the thing which we
+saw in the evening is the thing which we saw in the morning).
+This, then, gives the real meaning of the identity statement
+in question; and the analysis in terms of descriptions does
+Also we may raise the question whether a name has any
+reference at all when we ask, c.g., whether Aristotle ever
+existed. It seems natural here to think that what is questioned
+is not whether this thing (man) existed. Once we've got the
+thing, we know that it existed. What really is queried is
+whether anything answers to the properties we associate with
+the name—-in the case of Aristotle, whether any one Greek
+philosopher produced certain works, or at last a suitable
+number of them.
+It would be nice to answer all of these arguments. I am not
+entirely able to sce my way clear through every problem of
+this sort that can be raised. Furthermorc, I'm pretty sure that I
+won't have time to discuss all these questions in these lectures.
+Nevertheless, I think it's pretty certain that the view of Frege
+and Russell is false.
+" When I speak of the Frege-Russell view and its variants, I include only
+those versions which give a substantive theory of the reference of names. In
+particular, Quine's proposal that in a 'canonical notation' a name such as
+'Socrates' should be replaced by a description 'the Socratizer' (where 'Socratizes' is an invented predicate), and that the description should then be
+eliminated by Russell's method, was not intended as a theory of reference for
+names but as a proposed rcform of language with certain advantages. The
+problems discussed here will all apply, mutatis mutandis, to the reformed
+language; in particular, the question, 'How is the reference of "Socrates"
+determined?" yields to the question, 'How is the extension of "Socratizes"
+determined? Of course I do not suggest that Quine has ever claimed the
+
+30
+NAMUNG AND NECESSITY
+Many people have said that the theory of Frege and Russell
+is false, but, in my opinion, they have abandoned its letter
+while retaining its spirit, namely, they have used the notion of
+a cluster concept. Well, what is this? The obvious problem for
+Frege and Russell, the one which comes immediately to mind,
+is already mentioned by Frege himself. He said,
+In the case of genuinely proper names like "Aristotle' opinions as
+regards their sense may diverge. As such may, e.g., be suggested:
+Plato's disciple and the teacher of Alexander the Great. Whoever
+accepts this sense will interpret the meaning of the statement
+"Aristotle was born in Stagira', differently from one who interpreted
+the sense of "Aristotle' as the Stagirite teacher of Alexander the
+Great. As long as the nominatum remains the same, these fluctuations in sense are tolerable. But they should be avoided in the system
+of a demonstrative science and should not appear in a perfect
+language.®
+So, according to Frege, there is some sort of looseness or
+weakness in our language. Some people may give one sense to
+the name "Aristotle', others may give another. But of course
+it is not only that; even a single speaker when asked 'What
+description are you willing to substitute for the naine?' may
+be quite at a loss. In fact, he may know many things about
+him; but any particular thing that he knows he may feel clearly
+expresses a contingent property of the object. If 'Aristotle'
+meant the man who taught Alexander the Great, then saying
+"Aristotle was a teacher of Alexander the Great' would be a
+mere tautology. But surely it isn't; it expresses the fact that
+Aristotle taught Alexander the Great, something we could
+discover to be false. So, being the teacher of Alexander the Great
+cannot be part of [the sense of] the name.
+• Gottlob Frege, 'On Sense and Nominatum", translated by Herbert Feigl
+in Readings in Philosophical Analysis (ed. by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars),
+Appleton Century Crofts, 1949, p. 86.
+The nost common way out of this difficulty is to say 'really
+it is not a weakness in ordinary language that we can't substitute a particular description for the name; that's all right.
+What we really associate with the name is a family of descriptions.' A good example of this is (if I can find it) in Philosophical
+Investigations, where the idea of family resemblances is introduced and with great power.
+Consider this example. If one says 'Moses did not exist", this may
+mean various things. It may mean: the Israelites did not have a
+single leader when they withdrew from Egypt—or: their leader was
+not called Moses—or: there cannot have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses-... But when I make a
+statement about Moses, —am I always ready to substitute some one
+of those descriptions for 'Moses"? I shall perhaps say: by 'Moses' I
+understand the man who did what the Bible relates of Moses, or at
+any rate, a good deal of it. But how much? Have I decided how
+much must be proved false for me to give up my proposition as
+false? Has the name 'Moses' got a fixed and unequivocal use for me
+in all possible cases?'
+According to this view, and a locus classicus of it is Searle's
+article on proper names,° the referent of a name is determined
+not by a single description but by some cluster or family.
+Whatever in some sense satisfies enough or most of the family
+is the referent of the name. I shall return to this view later. It
+may seem, as an analysis of ordinary language, quite a bit more
+plausible than that of Frege and Russell. It may seem to keep
+all the virtues and remove the defects of this theory.
+Let me say (and this will introduce us to another new topic
+before I really consider this theory of naming) that there are
+two ways in which the cluster concept theory, or even the
+Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M.
+Anscombe, MacMillan, 1953,
+•John R. Scarle, 'Proper Names', Mind 67 (1958), 166-73.
+
+32
+theory which requires a single description, can be viewed. Onc
+way of regarding it says that the cluster or the single description
+actually gives the meaning of the name; and when someone
+says 'Walter Scott', he means the man such that such and such
+and such and such.
+Now another view might be that even though the description in some sense doesn't give the meaning of the name, it is
+what determines its reference and although the phrase Walter
+Scott' isn't synonymous with 'the man such that such and such
+and such and such', or even maybe with the family (if something can be synonymous with a family), the family or the
+single description is what is used to determine to whom someone is referring when he says 'Walter Scott'. Of course, if
+when we hear his beliefs about Walter Scott we find that
+they are actually much more nearly true of Salvador Dali,
+then according to this theory the refcrence of this name is
+going to be Mr. Dali, not Scott. There are writers, I think,
+who explicitly deny that names have mcaning at all even more
+strongly than I would but still use this picture of how the
+referent of the name gets determined. A good case in point is
+Paul Ziff, who says, very emphatically, that names don't have
+meaning at all, [that] they are not a part of language in some
+sense. But still, when he talks about how we determine what
+the reference of the name was, then he gives this picture. Un-
+fortunately I don't have the passage in question with me, but
+this is what he says.?
+• Ziff's most detailed statement of his version of the cluster-of-descriptions
+theory of the reference of names is in 'About God", reprinted in Philosophical
+Turnings, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, and Oxford University Press,
+London, 1966, PP 94-96. A briefer statement is in his Semantic Analysis,
+Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1960, PP. 102-05 (esp. Pp. 103-04). The
+latter passage suggests that names of things with which we are acquainted
+should be treated somewhat differently (using ostension and baptism) from
+names of historical figures, where the reference is determined by (a cluster of)
+associated descriptions. On p. 93 of Semantic Analysis Ziff states that simple
+33
+The difference between using this theory as a theory of
+meaning and using it as a theory of reference will come out a
+little more clearly later on. But some of the attractiveness of
+the theory is lost if it isn't supposed to give the meaning of the
+name; for some of the solutions of problems that I've just
+mentioned will not be right, or at least won't clearly be right,
+if the description doesn't give the meaning of the name. For
+example, if somcone said "Aristotle does not exist' means "there
+is no man doing such and such', or in the example from
+Wittgenstein, 'Moses does not exist', means 'no man did such
+and such', that might depend and in fact, I think, does depend)
+on taking the theory in question as a theory of the meaning of
+the name 'Moses', not just as a theory of its reference. Well, I
+don't know. Perhaps all that is immediate now is the other
+way around: if "Moses' means the same as 'the man who did
+such and such' then to say that Moses did not exist is to say
+that the man who did such and such did not exist, that is, that
+no one person did such and such. If, on the other hand, 'Moses'
+is not synonymous with any description, then even if its
+reference is in some sense determined by a description, statements containing the name cannot in general be analyzed by
+replacing the name by a description, though they may be
+materially equivalent to statements containing a description.
+So the analysis of singular existence statements mentioned
+above will have to be given up, unless it is established by some
+special argument, independent of a general theory of the meaning of names; and the same applies to identity statements. In
+any casc, I think it's false that 'Moses exists' means that at all.
+strong generalization(s) about proper
+names' are impossible; 'one can only
+say what is so for the most part ... Nevertheless Ziff clearly states that a
+cluster-of-descriptions theory is a reasonable such rough statement, at least
+for historical figures. For Ziff's view that proper names ordinarily are not
+words of the language and ordinarily do not have meaning, see pp. 85-89
+and 93-94 of Semantic Analysis.
+
+34
+So we won't have to see if such a special argument can be
+drawn up. 1°
+Before I go any further into this problem, I want to talk
+about another distinction which will be important in the
+methodology of these talks. Philosophers have talked (and, of
+course, there has been considerable controversy in recent
+years over the meaningfulness of these notions) [about] various
+categories of truth, which are called "a priori",
+'analytic',
+"necessary'-and sometimes even 'certain' is thrown into this
+batch. The terms are often used as if whether there are things
+answering to these concepts is an interesting question, but we
+might as well regard them all as meaning the same thing. Now,
+everyone remembers Kant (a bit) as making a distinction between 'a priori" and 'analytic'. So maybe this distinction is still
+made. In contemporary discussion very few people, if any,
+distinguish between the concepts of statements being a priori
+and their being necessary. At any rate I shall not use the terms
+"a priori" and 'necessary' interchangeably here.
+Consider what the traditional characterizations of such terms
+as 'a priori" and 'necessary' are. First the notion of a prioricity is a
+concept of epistemology. I guess the traditional characterization
+from Kant goes something like: a priori truths are those which
+can be known independently of any experience. This introduces
+another problem before we get off the ground, because there's
+another modality in the characterization of 'a priori", namely,
+it is supposed to be something which can be known independently of any experience. That means that in some sense it's
+possible (whether we do or do not in fact know it independently
+of any experience) to know this independently of any experience. And possible for whom? For God? For the Martians?
+10 Those determinists who deny the importance of the individual in history
+may well argue that had Moses never existed, someone else would have arisen
+to achieve all that he did. Their claim cannot be refuted by appealing to a
+correct philosophical theory of the meaning of 'Moses exists'.
+35
+Or just for people with minds like ours? To make this all clear
+might [involve) a host of problems all of its own about what
+sort of possibility is in question here. It might be best therefore,
+instead of using the phrase "a priori truth', to the extent that one
+uses it at all, to stick to the question of whether a particular
+person or knower knows something a priori or believes it true
+on the basis of a priori evidence.
+I won't go further too much into the problems that might
+arise with the notion of a prioricity here. I will say that some
+philosophers somehow change the modality in this characterization from can to must. They think that if something belongs to
+the realm of a priori knowledge, it couldn't possibly be known
+empirically. This is just a mistake. Something may belong in
+the realm of such statements that can be known a priori but still
+may be known by particular people on the basis of experience.
+To give a really common sense example: anyone who has
+worked with a computing machine knows that the computing machine may give an answer to whether such and such
+a number is prime. No one has calculated or proved that the
+number is prime; but the machine has given the answer: this
+number is prime. We, then, if we believe that the number is
+prime, believe it on the basis of our knowledge of the laws of
+physics, the construction of the machine, and so on. We therefore do not believe this on the basis of purely a priori evidence.
+We believe it (if anything is a posteriori at all) on the basis of a
+posteriori evidence. Nevertheless, maybe this could be known
+a priori by someone who made the requisite calculations. So
+'can be known a priori" doesn't mean 'must be known a priori".
+The second concept which is in question is that of necessity.
+Sometimes this is used in an epistemological way and might
+then just mean a priori. And of course, sometimes it is used in a
+physical way when people distinguish between physical and
+logical necessity. But what I am concerned with here is a notion
+which is not a notion of epistemology but of metaphysics,
+
+36
+in some (I hope) nonpejorative sense. We ask whether something might have been true, or might have been false. Well,
+if something is false, it's obviously not necessarily true. If it
+is true, night it have been otherwise? Is it possible that, in
+this respect, the world should have been different from the
+way it is? If the answer is "no', then this fact about the world is
+a necessary one. If the answer is 'yes", then this fact about the
+world is a contingent one. This in and of itself has nothing to
+do with anyone's knowledge of anything. It's certainly a
+philosophical thesis, and not a matter of obvious definitional
+equivalence, either that everything a priori is necessary or that
+everything necessary is a priori. Both concepts may be vague.
+That may be another problem. But at any rate they are dealing
+with two different domains, two different areas, the epistemological and the metaphysical. Consider, say, Fermat's last
+theorem—or the Goldbach conjecture. The Goldbach conjecture says that an even number greater than 2 must be the
+sum of two prime numbers. If this is true, it is presumably
+necessary, and, if it is false, presumably necessarily false. We
+are taking the classical view of mathematics here and assume
+that in mathematical reality it is either true or false.
+If the Goldbach conjecture is false, then there is an even
+number, n, greater than 2, such that for no primes pe and pa,
+both < n, does n= pr + pa. This fact about n, if true, is verifiable by direct computation, and thus is necessary if the results
+of arithmetical computations are necessary. On the other hand,
+if the conjecture is true, then every even number exceeding 2 is
+the sum of two primes. Could it then be the case that, although
+in fact every such even number is the sum of two primes, there
+might have been such an even number which was not the sum
+of two primes? What would that mean? Such a number would
+have to be one of 4, 6, 8, 10, ...; and, by hypothesis, since we
+are assuming Goldbach's conjecture to be true, each of these
+can be shown, again by direct computation, to be the sum of
+37
+two primes. Goldbach's conjecture, then, cannot be contingently true or false; whatever truth-value it has belongs to
+it by necessity.
+But what we can say, of course, is that right now, as far as
+we know, the question can come out either way. So, in the
+absence of a mathematical proof deciding this question, none
+of us has any a priori knowledge about this question in either
+direction. We don't know whether Goldbach's conjecture is
+true or false. So right now we certainly don't know anything
+a priori about it.
+Perhaps it will be alleged that we can in principle know a
+priori whether it is true. Well, maybe we can. Of course an
+infinite mind which can search through all the numbers can or
+could. But I don't know whether a finite mind can or could.
+Maybe there just is no mathematical proof whatsoever which
+decides the conjecture. At any rate this might or might not be
+the case. Maybe there is a mathematical proof deciding this
+question; maybe every mathematical question is decidable by
+an intuitive proof or disproof. Hilbert thought so; others have
+thought not; still others have thought the question unintelligible unless the notion of intuitive proof is replaced by that
+of formal proof in a single system. Certainly no one formal
+system decides all mathematical questions, as we know from
+Gödel. At any rate, and this is the important thing, the question
+is not trivial; even though someone said that it's necessary, if
+true at all, that every even number is the sum of two primes, it
+doesn't follow that anyone knows anything a priori about it. It
+doesn't even seem to me to follow without some further
+philosophical argument (it is an interesting philosophical
+question) that anyone could know anything a priori about
+it. The "could", as I said, involves some other modality. We
+mean that even if no one, perhaps even in the future, knows
+or will know a priori whether Goldbach's conjecture is
+right, in principle there is a way, which could have been
+
+38
+used, of answering the question a priori. This assertion is not
+trivial.
+The terms 'necessary' and a priori", then, as applied to statements, are not obvious synonyms. There may be a philosophical
+argument connecting them, perhaps even identifying them; but
+an argument is required, not simply the observation that the
+two terms are clearly interchangeable. (I will argue below that
+in fact they are not even coextensive-that necessary a posteriori truths, and probably contingent a priori truths,
+both
+exist.)
+I think people have thought that these two things must mean
+the same for these reasons:
+First, if something not only happens to be true in the actual
+world but is also true in all possible worlds, then, of course,
+just by running through all the possible worlds in our heads,
+we ought to be able with enough effort to see, if a statement
+is necessary, that it is necessary, and thus know it a priori. But
+really this is not so obviously feasible at all.
+Second, I guess it's thought that, conversely, if something
+is known a priori it must be necessary, because it was known
+without looking at the world. If it depended on some contingent feature of the actual world, how could you know it
+without looking? Maybe the actual world is one of the possible
+worlds in which it would have been false. This depends on
+the thesis that there can't be a way of knowing about the actual
+world without looking that wouldn't be a way of knowing
+the same thing about every possible world. This involves
+problems of epistemology and the nature of knowledge; and
+of course it is very vague as stated. But it is not really trivial
+either. More important than any particular example of something which is alleged to be necessary and not a priori or a priori
+and not necessary, is to see that the notions are different, that
+it's not trivial to argue on the basis of something's being something which maybe we can only know a posteriori, that it's not
+39
+a necessary truth. It's not trivial, just because something is
+known in some sense a priori, that what is known is a necessary
+truth.
+Another term used in philosophy is 'analytic. Here it won't
+be too important to get any clearer about this in this talk. The
+common examples of analytic statements, nowadays, are like
+bachclors are unmarried. Kant (someone just pointed out to
+me) gives as an example 'gold is a yellow metal", which seems
+to me an extraordinary one, because it's something I think
+that can turn out to be false. At any rate, let's just make it a
+matter of stipulation that an analytic statement is, in some
+sense, true by virtue of its meaning and true in all possible
+worlds by virtue of its meaning.
+Then something which is
+analytically truc will be both necessary and a priori. (That's
+sort of stipulative.)
+• Another category I mentioned was that of certainty. Whatever certainty is, it's clearly not obviously the case that everything which is necessary is certain. Certainty is another
+epistemological notion. Something can be known, or at least
+rationally believed, a priori, without being quite certain.
+You've read a proof in the math book; and, though you think
+it's correct, maybe you've made a mistake. You often do make
+mistakes of this kind. You've made a computation, perhaps
+with an error.
+There is one more question I want to go into in a preliminary way. Some philosophers have distinguished between
+essentialism, the belief in modality de re, and a mere advocacy
+of necessity, the belicf in modality de dicto. Now, some people
+say: Let's give you the concept of necessity." A much worse
+"By the way, it's a common attitude in philosophy to think that one
+shouldn't introduce a notion until it's been rigorously defined (according to
+some popular notion of rigor). Here I am just dealing with an intuitive notion
+and will keep on the level of an intuitive notion. That is, we think that some
+things, though they are in fact the case, might have been otherwise. I might
+not have given these lectures today. If that's right, then it is possible that I
+
+4°
+thing, something creating great additional problems, is whether
+we can say of any particular that it has necessary or contingent
+properties, even make the distinction between necessary and
+contingent properties. Look, it's only a statement or a state of
+affairs that can be either necessary or contingent! Whether a
+particular necessarily or contingently has a certain property
+depends on the way it's described. This is perhaps closcly
+rclated to the view that the way we refer to particular things
+is by a description. What is Quinc's famous example? If we
+consider the number 9, does it have the property of necessary
+oddness? Has that number got to be odd in all possible worlds?
+Certainly it's true in all possible worlds, Ict's say, it couldn't
+have been otherwisc, that nine is odd. Of course, 9 could also
+be cqually well picked out as the number of planets. It is not
+necessary, not true in all possible worlds, that the number of
+plancts is odd. For example if there had been cight planets, the
+number of planets would not have been odd. And so it's
+thought: Was it necessary or contingent that Nixon won the
+election? (It might scem contingent, unless one has some view
+of some incorable processes....) But this is a contingent
+proporty of Nixon only relative to our referring to him as
+'Nixon' (assuming 'Nixon' docsn't mean 'the man who won
+the election at such and such a time'). But if we designate
+Nixon as 'the man who won the clection in 1968", then it will
+be a necessary truth, of course, that the man who won the
+clection in 1968, won the clection in 1968. Similarly, whether
+an object has the same proporty in all possible worlds depends
+wouldn't have given these lectures today. Quite a diffcrent question is the
+epistemological question, how any particular person knows that I gave these
+lectures today. 1 suppose in that case he does know this is a posteriori. But, if
+someone were born with an innate belief that I was going to give these lectures
+today, who knows? Right now, anyway, let's suppose that people know this
+a posteriori. At any rate, the two questions being asked are different.
+4I
+not just on the object itself, but on how it is described. So it's
+argued.
+It is even suggested in the literature, that though a notion of
+necessity may have some sort of intuition behind it (we do
+ink some things could have been otherwise; other thing
+e don't think could have been otherwise), this notion [of
+distinction between necessary and contingent properties) is just
+a doctrine made up by some bad philosopher, who (I guess)
+didn't realize that there are several ways of rcferring to the same
+thing. I don't know if some philosophers have not realized
+this; but at any rate it is very far from being true that this idea
+[that a property can meaningfully be held to be essential or
+accidental to an object independently of its description] is a
+notion which has no intuitive content, which means nothing
+to the ordinary man. Suppose that someone said, pointing to
+Nixon, 'That's the guy who might have lost. Someone else
+says 'Oh no, if you describe him as "Nixon", then he might
+have lost; but, of course, describing him as the winner, then it
+is not true that he might have lost'. Now which one is being
+the philosopher, here, the unintuitive man? It scems to me
+obviously to be the second. The second man has a philosophical
+theory. The first man would say, and with great conviction,
+'Well, of course, the winner of the election might have been
+someone else. The actual winner, had the course of the campaign
+been different, might have been the loser, and someone else
+the winner; or there might have been no clection at all. So,
+such terms as "the winner" and "the loser" don't designate the
+same objects in all possible worlds. On the other hand, the
+term "Nixon" is just a name of this man'. When you ask
+whether it is necessary or contingent that Nixon won the
+election, you are asking the intuitive question whether in some
+counterfactual situation, this man would in fact have lost the
+ciection. If someone thinks that the notion of a necessary or
+contingent property (forget whether there are any nontrivial
+
+42
+necessary properties [and consider) just the meaningfulness of the
+notion'?) is a philosopher's notion with no intuitive content,
+he is wrong. Of course, some philosophers think that something's having intuitive content is very inconclusive evidence in
+favor of it. I think it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself. I really don't know, in a way, what more conclusive evidence one
+can have about anything, ultimately
+speaking. But, in any event, people who think the notion of
+accidental property unintuitive have intuition
+reversed, I
+think.
+Why have they thought this? While there are many motivations for people thinking this, one is this: The question of
+essential properties so-called is supposed to be equivalent (and
+it is equivalent) to the question of 'identity across possible
+worlds'. Suppose we have someone, Nixon, and there's another
+possible world where there is no one with all the properties
+Nixon has in the actual world. Which one of these other people,
+if any, is Nixon? Surely you must give some criterion of
+identity here! If you have a criterion of identity, then you just
+look in the other possible worlds at the man who is Nixon;
+and the question whether, in that other possible world, Nixon
+has certain properties, is well defined. It is also supposed to be
+well defined, in terms of such notions, whether it's true in all
+possible worlds, or there are some possible worlds in which
+Nixon didn't win the election. But, it's said, the problems of
+giving such criteria of identity are very difficult. Sometimes
+12 The example I gave asserts a certain property—-clectoral victory-to be
+accidental to Nixon, independently of how he is described. Of course, if the
+notion of accidental property is meaningful, the notion of essential property
+must be meaningful also. This is not to say that there are any essential properties
+-though, in fact, I think there are. The usual argument questions the meaningfulness of essentialism, and says that whether a property is accidental or
+essential to an object depends on how it is described. It is thus not the view
+that all properties are accidental. Of course, it is also not the view, held by
+some idealists, that all properties are essential, all rclations internal.
+43
+in the case of numbers it might seem casier (but even here it's
+argued that it's quite arbitrary). For example, one might say,
+and this is surely the truth, that if position in the series of
+numbers is what makes the number 9 what it is, then if (in
+another world) the number of planets had been 8, the number
+of planets would be a different number from the one it actually
+is. You wouldn't say that that number then is to be identified
+with our number 9 in this world. In the case of other types of
+objects, say people, material objects, things like that, has
+anyone given a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for
+identity across possible worlds?
+Really, adequate necessary and sufficient conditions for
+identity which do not beg the question are very rare in any
+case. Mathematics is the only case I really know of where they
+are given even within a possible world, to tell the truth. I don't
+know of such conditions for identity of material objects over
+time, or for people. Everyone knows what a problem this is.
+But, let's forget about that. What seems to be more objectionable is that this depends on the wrong way of looking at what
+a possible world is. One thinks, in this picture, of a possible
+world as if it were like a foreign country. One looks upon it as
+an observer. Maybe Nixon has moved to the other country
+and maybe he hasn't, but one is given only qualities. One
+can observe all his qualities, but, of course, one doesn't observe
+that someone is Nixon. One observes that something has
+red hair (or green or yellow) but not whether something
+is Nixon. So we had better have a way of telling in terms
+of propertics when we run into the same thing as we saw
+before; we had better have a way of telling, when we
+come across one of these other possible worlds, who was
+Nixon.
+Some logicians in their formal treatment of modal logic may
+encourage this picture. A prominent example, perhaps, is
+myself. Nevertheless, intuitively speaking, it seems to me not
+
+44
+to be the right way of thinking about the possible worlds. A
+possible world isn't a distant country that we are coming
+across, or viewing through a telescope. Generally speaking,
+another possible world is too far away. Even if we travel
+faster than light, we won't get to it. A possible world is given
+by the descriptive conditions we associate with it. What do we
+mean when we say 'In some other possible world I would not
+have given this lecture today?' We just imagine the situation
+where I didn't decide to give this lecture or decided to give it
+on some other day. Of course, we don't imagine everything
+that is true or falsc, but only those things rclevant to my giving
+the lecture; but, in theory, everything needs to be decided to
+make a total description of the world. We can't really imagine
+that except in part; that, then, is a 'possible world. Why can't
+it be part of the description of a possible world that it contains
+Nixon and that in that world Nixon didn't win the election? It
+might be a question, of course, whether such a world is possible.
+(Here it would seem, prima facie, to be clearly possible.) But,
+once we see that such a situation is possible, then we are given
+that the man who might have lost the clection or did lose the
+election in this possible world is Nixon, because that's part of
+the description of the world. 'Possible worlds' are stipulated,
+not discovered by powerful telescopes. There is no reason why
+we cannot stipulate that, in talking about what would have
+happened to Nixon in a certain counterfactual situation, we
+are talking about what would have happened to him.
+Of course, if somcone makes the demand that every possible
+world has to be described in a purcly qualitative way, we can't
+say, "Suppose Nixon had lost the clection', we must say, instead, something like, 'Suppose a man with a dog named
+Checkers, who looks like a certain David Frye impersonation,
+is in a certain possible world and loses the clection.' Well, does
+he resemble Nixon enough to be identified with Nixon? A
+very explicit and blatant example of this way of looking at
+45
+things is David Lewis's counterpart theory,' but the literature
+on quantified modality is replete with it.! Why need we
+make this demand? That is not the way we ordinarily think of
+counterfactual situations. We just say suppose this man had
+13 David K. Lewis, 'Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic',
+Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 113-126. Lewis's elegant paper also suffers
+from a purely formal difficulty: on his interpretation of quantified modality,
+the familiar law (y) ((x) A(x) > A(y)) fails, if A(x) is allowed to contain modal
+operators. (For example, (Jy) ((x) 0 (x#y is satisfiable but (3y) 0 (y ‡y)
+is not.) Since Lewis's formal model follows rather naturally from his philosophical views on counterparts, and since the failure of universal instantiation for
+modal properties is intuitively bizarre, it seems to me that this failure constitutes an additional argument against the plausibility of his philosophical
+views. There are other, lesser, formal difficulties as well. I cannot elaborate
+here.
+Strictly speaking, Lewis's view is not a view of 'transworld identification'.
+Rather, he thinks that similarities across possible worlds determine a counterpart relation which need be neither symmetric nor transitive. The counterpart
+of something in another possible world is never identical with the thing itself.
+Thus if we say 'Humphrey might have won the election (if only he had done
+such-and-such), we are not talking about something that might have happened
+to Humphrey but to soneone else, a "counterpart". Probabiy, however,
+Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, no matter how much
+resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world. Thus,
+Lewis's view seems to me even more bizarre than the usual notions of transworld identification that it replaces. The important issucs, however, are
+common to the two views: the supposition that other possible worlds are like
+other dimensions of a more inclusive universe, that they can be given only by
+purely qualitative descriptions, and that therefore cither the identity relation
+or the counterpart relation must be established in terms of qualitative
+resemblance.
+Many have pointed out to me that the father of counterpart theory is
+probably Leibnitz. I will not go into such a historical question herc. It would
+also be interesting to compare Lewis's views with the Wheelr-Everett
+interpretation of quantum mechanics. I suspect that this view of plysics may
+suffer from philosophical problems analogous to Lewis's counterpart theory;
+it is certainly very similar in spirit.
+1 Another locus classicus of the views I am criticizing, with more philo
+sophical exposition than Lewis's paper, is a paper by David Kaplan on transworld identification. Unfortunately, this paper has never been published. It
+does not represent Kaplan's present position.
+
+46
+lost. It is given that the possible world contains this man, and
+that in that world, he had lost. There may be a problen about
+what intuitions about possibility come to. But, if we have such
+an intuition about the possibility of that (this man's electoral
+loss), then it is about the possibility of that. It need not be
+identified with the possibility of a man looking like such and
+such, or holding such and such political views, or otherwise
+qualitatively described, having lost. We can point to the man,
+and ask what might have happened to him, had events been
+different.
+It might be said 'Let's suppose that this is true. It comes
+down to the same thing, because whether Nixon could have
+had certain properties, different from the ones he actually has,
+is equivalent to the question whether the criteria of identity
+across possible worlds include that Nixon does not have these
+properties. But it doesn't really come to the same thing.
+because the usual notion of a criterion of transworld identity
+demands that we give purcly qualitative necessary and sufficient
+conditions for someone being Nixon. If we can't imagine a
+possible world in which Nixon doesn't have a certain property, then it's a necessary condition of someone being Nixon.
+Or a necessary property of Nixon that he [has] that property. For example, supposing Nixon is in fact a human
+being, it would scem that we cannot think of a possible
+counterfactual situation in which he was, say, an inanimate
+object; perhaps it is not even possible for him not to have been
+a human being. Then it will be a necessary fact about Nixon
+that in all possible worlds where he exists at all, he is human or
+anyway he is not an inanimate object. This has nothing to do
+with any requirement that there be purely qualitative sufficient
+conditions for Nixonhood which we can spell out. And should
+there be? Maybe there is some argument that there should be,
+but we can consider these questions about necessary conditions
+without going into any question about sufficient conditions.
+47
+Further, even if there were a purely qualitative set of necessary
+and sufficient conditions for being Nixon, the view I advocate
+would not demand that we find these conditions before we
+can ask whether Nixon might have won the election, nor does
+it demand that we restate the question in terms of such conditions. We can simply consider Nixon and ask what might
+have happened to him had various circumstances been different.
+So the two views, the two ways of looking at things, do seem
+to me to make a difference.
+Notice this question, whether Nixon could not have been a
+human being, is a clear case where the question asked is not
+epistemological. Suppose Nixon actually turned out to be an
+automaton. That might happen. We might need evidence
+whether Nixon is a human being or an automaton. But that is
+a question about our knowledge. The question of whether
+Nixon might have not been a human being, given that he is
+one, is not a question about knowledge, a posteriori or a priori.
+It's a question about, even though such and such things are
+the case, what might have been the case otherwise.
+This table is composed of molecules. Might it not have been
+omposed of molecules? Certainly it was a scientific discover
+f great moment that it was composed of molecules (o
+atoms). But could anything be this very object and not be
+composed of molecules? Certainly there is some feeling that
+the answer to that must be 'no'. At any rate, it's hard to imagine
+under what circumstances you would have this very object and
+find that it is not composed of molecules. A quite different
+question is whether it is in fact composed of molecules in the
+actual world and how we know this. (I will go into more
+detail about these questions about essence later on.)
+I wish at this point to introduce something which I need in
+the methodology of discussing the theory of names that I'm
+talking about. We need the notion of identity across possible
+worlds' as it's usually and, as I think, somewhat mislcadingly
+
+48
+called, 1° to explicate one distinction that I want to make now.
+What's the difference between asking whether it's necessary
+that 9 is greater than 7 or whether it's necessary that the
+number of plancts is greater than 7? Why does one show anything more about cssence than the other? The answer to this
+might be intuitively 'Well, look, the number of planets might
+have been different from what it in fact is. It doesn't make any
+sense, though, to say that nine might have been different from
+what it in fact is. Let's use some termis quasi-technically. Let's
+call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it
+designates the same object, a nonrigid or accidental designator if
+that is not the casc. Of course we don't require that the objects
+exist in all possible worlds. Certainly Nixon might not have
+existed if his parents had not gotten married, in the normal
+course of things. When we think of a property as essential to
+an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any
+case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a
+necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.
+One of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these talks is
+that names are rigid designators. Certainly they seem to satisfy
+the intuitive test mentioned above: although someone other
+than the U.S. President in 1970 might have been the U.S.
+President in 1970 (c.g., Humphrey might have), no one other
+than Nixon might have been Nixon. In the same way, a
+1s Misleadingly, because the phrase suggests that there is a special problem of
+"transworld identification', that we cannot trivially stipulate whom or what
+we are talking about when we imagine another possible world. The term
+"possible world' may also mislead; perhaps it suggests the "foreign country"
+picture. I have sometimes used 'counterfactual situation' in the text; Michael
+Slote has suggested that 'possible state (or history) of the world' might be less
+misleading than "possible world'. It is better still, to avoid confusion, not to say,
+In some possible world, Humphrey would have won' but rather, simply,
+'Humphrey might have won'. The apparatus of possible words has (I hope)
+been very useful as far as the set-theoretic model-theory of quantified modal
+logic is concerned, but has encouraged philosophical pseudo-problems and
+misleading pictures.
+49
+designator rigidly designates a certain object if it designates
+that object wherever the object exists; if, in addition, the object
+is a necessary existent, the designator can be called strongly rigid.
+For example, 'the President of the U.S. in 1970' designates a
+certain man, Nixon; but someone else (e.g., Humphrey) might
+have been the President in 1970, and Nixon might not have;
+so this designator is not rigid.
+In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names
+are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not
+have been the President, it is not the case that he might not
+have been Nixon (though he might not have been called
+'Nixon'). Those who have argued that to make sense of the
+notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense
+of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the
+cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon,
+and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened
+to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identifications are unproblematic in such cases.1°
+The tendency to demand purely qualitative descriptions of
+counterfactual situations has many sources. One, perhaps, is
+the confusion of the epistemological and the metaphysical,
+between a prioricity and necessity. If someone identifies
+necessity with a prioricity, and thinks that objects are named
+by means of uniquely identifying properties, he may think
+that it is the properties used to identify the object which, being
+known about it a priori, must be used to identify it in all
+possible worlds, to find out which object is Nixon. As against
+this, I repeat: (1) Generally, things aren't "found out' about a
+counterfactual situation, they are stipulated; (z) possible worlds
+1 Of course I don't imply that language contains a name for every object.
+Demonstratives can be used as rigid designators, and free variables can he used
+as rigid designators of unspecified objects. Of course when we specify a
+counterfactual situation, we do not describe the whole possible world, but
+only the portion which interests us.
+
+need not be given purely qualitatively, as if we were looking at
+them through a telescope. And we will see shortly that the properties an object has in every counterfactual world have nothing
+to do with properties used to identify it in the actual world."
+Does the "problem' of 'transworld identification' make any
+sense? Is it simply a pseudo-problem? The following, it seems
+to me, can be said for it. Although the statement that England
+fought Germany in 1943 perhaps cannot be reduced to any
+statement about individuals, nevertheless in some sense it is
+not a fact 'over and above' the collection of all facts about
+persons, and their behavior over history. The sense in which
+facts about nations are not facts 'over and above' those about
+persons can be expressed in the observation that a description
+of the world mentioning all facts about persons but omitting
+those about nations can be a complete description of the world,
+from which the facts about nations follow. Similarly, perhaps,
+facts about material objects are not facts 'over and above' facts
+about their constituent molecules. We may then ask, given a
+description of a non-actualized possible situation in terms of
+people, whether England still exists in that situation, or whether
+a certain nation (described, say, as the one where Jones lives)
+which would exist in that situation, is England. Similarly, given
+certain counterfactual vicissitudes in the history of the molecules
+of a table, T, one may ask whether T would exist, in that
+situation, or whether a certain bunch of molecules, which in
+that situation would constitute a table, constitute the very same
+table T. In each case, we seck criteria of identity across possible
+worlds for certain particulars in terms of those for other, more
+"basic', particulars. If statements about nations (or tribes) are
+not reducible to those about other more "basic' constituents, if
+there is some 'open texture' in the relationship between them,
+we can hardly expect to give hard and fast identity criteria;
+1' See Lecture I, p. 53 (on Nixon), and Lecture II, pp. 74-7.
+SI
+nevertheless, in concrete cases we may be able to answer
+whether a certain bunch of molecules would still constitute T,
+though in some cases the answer may be indeterminate. I think
+similar remarks apply to the problem of identity over time;
+here too we are usually concerned with determinacy, the
+identity of a 'complex' particular in terms of more "basic' ones.
+(For example, if various parts of a table are replaced, is it the
+same object?)
+Such a conception of 'transworld identification, however,
+differs considerably from the usual one. First, although we can
+try to describe the world in terms of molecules, there is no
+impropriety in describing it in terms of grosser entities: the
+statement that this table might have been placed in another
+room is perfectly proper, in and of itself. We need not use the
+description in terms of molecules, or even grosser parts of the
+table, thouglı we may. Unless we assume that some particulars
+are 'ultimate', "basic' particulars, no type of description need
+be regarded as privileged. We can ask whether Nixon might
+have lost the election without further subtlety, and usually no
+further subtlety is required. Second, it is not assumed that
+necessary and sufficient conditions for what kinds of collections
+18 There is some vagueness here. If a chip, or molecule, of a given table had
+been replaced by another one, we would be content to say that we have the
+same table. But if too many chips were different, we would seem to have a
+different one. The same problem can, of course, arise for identity over time.
+Where the identity relation is vague, it may seem intransitive; a chain of
+apparent identities may yield an apparent non-identity. Some sort of 'counterpart notion (though not with Lewis's philosophical underpinnings
+of
+resemblance, foreign country worlds, etc.), may have some utility here. One
+could say that strict identity applies only to the particulars (the molecules), and
+the counterpart relation to the particulars 'composed' of them, the tables. The
+counterpart relation can then be declared to be vague and intransitive. It
+seems, however, utopian to suppose that we will ever reach a level of ultimate,
+basic particulars for which identity relations are never vague and the danger of
+intransitivity is eliminated. The danger usually does not arise in practice, so
+we ordinarily can speak simply of identity without worry. Logicians have not
+developed a logic of vagueness.
+
+of molecules make up this table are possible; this fact I just
+mentioned. Third, the attempted notion deals with criteria of
+identity of particulars in terms of other particulars, not qualities.
+I can refer to the table before me, and ask what might have
+happened to it under certain circumstances; I can also refer to
+its molecules. If, on the other hand, it is demanded that I
+describe each counterfactual situation purely qualitatively, then
+I can only ask whether a table, of such and such color, and so on,
+would have certain properties; whether the table in question
+would be this table, table T, is indeed moot, since all reference
+to objects, as opposed to qualities, has disappcared. It is often
+said that, if a counterfactual situation is described as one which
+would have happened to Nixon, and if it is not assumed that
+such a description is reducible to a purely qualitative onc, then
+mysterious 'bare particulars' are assumed, propertyless substrata underlying the qualities. This is not so: I think that Nixon
+is a Republican, not merely that he lies in back of Republicanism, whatever that means; I also think he might have been a
+Democrat. The same holds for any other properties Nixon
+may possess, except that some of these properties may be
+essential. What I do deny is that a particular is nothing but a
+'bundle of qualities', whatever that may miean. If a quality is
+an abstract object, a bundle of qualities is all object of an even
+higher degree of abstraction, not a particular. Philosophers
+have come to the opposite view through a false dilemma: they
+have asked, are these objects behind the bundle of qualities, or
+is the object nothing but the bundle? Neither is the case; this
+table is wooden, brown, in the room, etc. It has all these
+properties and is not a thing without properties, behind them;
+but it should not therefore be identified with the set, or 'bundle',
+of its properties, nor with the subset of its essential properties.
+Don't ask: how can I identify this table in another possible
+world, except by its properties? I have the table in my hands,
+I can point to it, and when I ask whether it might have been in
+53
+another room, I am talking, by definition, about it. I don't
+have to identify it after seeing it through a telescope. If I am
+talking about it, I am talking about it, in the same way as when
+I say that our hands might have been painted green, I have
+stipulated that I am talking about greenness. Some properties
+of an object may be cssential to it, in that it could not have
+failed to have them. But these properties are not used to
+identify the object in another possible world, for such an
+identification is not needed. Nor need the essential properties
+of an object be the properties used to identify it in the actual
+world, if indeed it is identified in the actual world by means of
+properties (I have up to now left the question open).
+So: the question of transworld identification makes some
+sense, in terms of asking about the identity of an object via
+questions about its component parts. But these parts are not
+qualities, and it is not an object resembling the given one which
+is in question. Theorists have often said that we identify objects
+across possible worlds as objects resembling the given one in
+the most important respects. On the contrary, Nixon, had he
+decided to act otherwise, might have avoided politics like the
+plague, though privately harboring radical opinions. Most
+important, even when we can replace questions about an object
+by questions about its parts, we need not do so. We can refer
+to the object and ask what might have happened to it. So, we
+do not begin with worlds (which are supposed somehow to be
+real, and whose qualities, but not whose objects, are perceptible to us), and then ask about criteria of transworld
+identification; on the contrary, we begin with the objects,
+which we have, and can identify, in the actual world. We can
+then ask whether certain things might have been true of the
+objects.
+Above I said that the Frege-Russell view that names are
+introduced by description could be taken either as a theory of
+the meaning of names (Frege and Russell seemed to take it this
+
+S4
+way) or merely as a theory of their reference. Let me give an
+example, not involving what would usually be called a proper
+name,' to illustrate this. Suppose someone stipulates that 100
+degrees centigrade is to be the temperature at which water
+boils at sea level. This isn't completely precise because the
+pressure may vary at sea level. Of course, historically, a more
+precise definition was given later. But let's suppose that this
+were the definition. Another sort of example in the literature
+is that one meter is to be the length of S where S is a certain
+stick or bar in Paris. (Usually people who like to talk about these
+defuitions then try to make 'the length of' into an 'opcrational"
+concept. But it's not important.)
+Wittgenstein says something very puzzling about this. He
+says: "There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is
+one meter long nor that it is not one meter long, and that is
+the standard meter in Paris. But this is, of course, not to ascribe
+any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar
+role in the language game of measuring with a meter rule.'"
+This seems to be a very 'extraordinary property', actually, for
+any stick to have. I think he must be wrong. If the stick is a
+stick, for example, 39•37 inches long (I assume we have some
+different standard for inches), why isn't it one meter long?
+Anyway, let's suppose that he is wrong and that the stick is
+one meter long. Part of the problem which is bothering
+Wittgenstein is, of course, that this stick serves as a standard of
+length and so we can't attribute length to it. Be this as it may
+(well, it may not be), is the statement stick S is one meter
+long', a necessary truth? Of course its length might vary in
+time. We could make the definition more precise by stipulating
+that one meter is to be the length of Sat a fixed time fo. Is it
+then a necessary truth that stick S is one meter long at time to?
+Someone who thinks that everything one knows a priori is
+necessary might think: "This is the definition of a meter. By
+10 Philosophical Investigations, $ so.
+sS
+definition, stick S is one meter long at fo. That's a necessary
+truth.' But there seems to me to be no reason so to conclude,
+even for a man who uses the stated definition of 'one meter'.
+For he's using this definition not to give the meaning of what he
+called the "meter', but to fix the reference. (For such an abstract
+thing as a unit of length, the notion of reference may be
+unclear. But let's suppose it's clear enough for the present
+purposes.) He uses it to fix a reference. There is a certain length
+which he wants to mark out. He marks it out by an accidental
+property, namely that there is a stick of that length. Someone
+else might mark out the same reference by another accidental
+property. But in any case, even though he uses this to fix the
+reference of his standard of length, a meter, he can still say, 'if
+heat had been applied to this stick Sat fo, then at to stick S
+would not have been one meter long.
+Well, why can he do this? Part of the reason may lie in some
+people's minds in the philosophy of science, which I don't want
+to go into here. But a simple answer to the question is this:
+Even if this is the only standard of length that he uses,?° there is
+an intuitive difference between the phrase 'one meter' and the
+phrase 'the length of S at to'. The first phrase is meant to
+designate rigidly a certain length in all possible worlds, which
+in the actual world happens to be the length of the stick S at fo.
+On the other hand 'the length of S at to does not designate
+anything rigidly. In some counterfactual situations the stick
+might have been longer and in some shorter, if various stresses
+and strains had been applied to it. So we can say of this stick,
+the same way as we would of any other of the same substance
+and length, that if heat of a given quantity had been applied to
+it, it would have expanded to such and such a length. Such a
+30 Philosophers of science may see the key to the problem in a view that
+'one meter' is a 'cluster concepr. I am asking the reader hypothetically to
+suppose that the 'definition' given is the only standard used to determine the
+metric system. I think the problem would still arise.
+
+56
+counterfactual statement, being true of other sticks with
+identical physical properties, will also be true of this stick.
+There is no conflict t: ween that counterfactual statement and
+the definition of 'one meter' as 'the length of S at to', because
+the "definition", properly interpreted, does not say that the
+phrase 'one meter' is to be synonymous (even when talking about
+counterfactual situations) with the phrase 'the length of S at
+to, but rather that we have determined the reference of the phrase
+'one meter' by stipulating that 'one meter' is to be a rigid
+designator of the length which is in fact the length of S at to.
+So this does not make it a necessary truth that S is one meter
+long at fo. In fact, under certain circumstances, S would not
+have been one meter long. The rcason is that one designator
+('one meter') is rigid and the other designator ('the length of
+Sat to') is not.
+What then, is the epistemological status of the statement Stick
+S is one meter long at fo', for someone who has fixed the metric
+systenı by reference to stick S? It would scem that he knows it
+a priori. For if he used stick S to fix the reference of the term
+'one meter', then as a result of this kind of "definition' (which
+is not an abbreviative or synonymous definition), he knows
+automatically, without further investigation, that S is one
+meter long." On the other hand, even if S is used as the
+standard of a meter, the metaphysical status of 'S is one meter
+long' will be that of a contingent statement, provided that
+"one meter' is regarded as a rigid designator: under appropriate
+stresses and strains, heatings or coolings, S would have had a
+length other than one meter even at fo. (Such statements as
+'Water boils at 100°C at sea levl' can have a similar status.)
+So in this sense, there are contingent a priori truths. More
+important for present purposes, though, than accepting this
+= Since the truth he knows is contingent, I choose not to call it 'analytic",
+stipulatively requiring analytic truths to be both necessary and a priori. See
+footnote 63.
+57
+example as an instance of the contingent a priori, is its illustration of the distinction between 'definitions' which fix a
+reference and those which give a synonym.
+In the case of names one might make this distinction too.
+Suppose the reference of a name is given by a description or a
+cluster of descriptions. If the name means the same as that
+description or cluster of descriptions, it will not be a rigid
+designator. It will not necessarily designate the same object in
+all possible worlds, since other objects might have had the
+given properties in other possible worlds, unless (of course) we
+happened to usc essential properties in our description. So
+suppose we say,
+'Aristotle is the greatest man who studied
+with Plato'. If we used that as a definition, the name 'Aristotle'
+is to mean 'the greatest man who studied with Plato'. Then
+of course in some other possible world that man night not
+have studied with Plato and some other man would have
+been Aristotle. If, on the other hand, we merely use the
+description to fix the referent then that man will be the referent
+of 'Aristotle' in all possible worlds. The only use of the description will have been to pick out to which man we mean to
+refer. But then, when we say counterfactually suppose Aristotle
+had never gone into philosophy at all', we need not mean
+"suppose a man who studied with Plato, and taught Alexander
+the Great, and wrote this and that, and so on, had never gone
+into philosophy at all', which might seem like a contradiction.
+We need only mean,
+'suppose that that man had never gone
+into philosophy at all'.
+It seems plausible to suppose that, in some cases, the reference
+of a name is indeed fixed via a description in the same way that
+the metric system was fixed. When the mythical agent first
+saw Hesperus, he may well have fixed his reference by saying,
+'I shall use "Hesperus" as a name of the heavenly body appcaring in yonder position in the sky. He then fixed the reference
+of 'Hesperus' by its apparent celestial position. Does it follow
+
+58
+that it is part of the meaning of the name that Hesperus has
+such and such position at the time in question? Surely not:
+if Hesperus had been hit earlier by a comet, it might have
+been visible at a different position at that time. In such a
+counterfactual situation we would say that Hesperus would
+not have occupied that position, but not that Hesperus would
+not have been Hesperus. The reason is that "Hesperus' rigidly
+designates a certain heavenly body and 'the body in yonder
+position' does not—a different body, or no body might have
+been in that position, but no other body might have been
+Hesperus (though another body, not Hesperus, might have
+been called 'Hesperus'). Indeed, as I have said, I will hold that
+names are always rigid designators.
+Frege and Russcll certainly seem to have the full blown
+theory according to which a proper name is not a rigid
+designator and is synonymous with the description which
+replaced it. But another theory might be that this description
+is used to determine a rigid reference. These two alternatives
+will have different consequences for the questions I was asking
+before. If 'Moses' means 'the man who did such and such",
+then, if no one did such and such, Moses didn't exist; and maybe 'no one did such and such' is even an analysis of "Moses
+didn't exist. But if the description is used to fix a reference
+rigidly, then it's clear that that is not what is meant by 'Moses
+didn't exist", because we can ask, if we speak of a counterfactual case where no one did indeed do such and such, say,
+lead the Israclites out of Egypt, does it follow that, in such a
+situation, Moses wouldn't have existed? It would seem not.
+For surely Moses might have just decided to spend his days
+more pleasantly in the Egyptian courts. He might never have
+gone into either politics or religion at all; and in that case
+maybe no one would have done any of the things that the
+Bible relates of Moses. That doesn't in itself mean that in such
+a possible world Moses wouldn't have existed. If so, then
+59
+'Moses exists' means something different from 'the existence
+and uniqueness conditions for a certain description are fulfilled'; and therefore this does not give an analysis of the
+singular existential statement after all. If you give up the idea
+that this is a theory of meaning and make it into a theory of
+reference in the way that I have described, you give up some
+of the advantages of the theory. Singular existential statements
+and identity statements between names need some other
+analysis.
+Frege should be criticized for using the term "sense' in two
+senses. For he takes the sense of a designator to be its meaning;
+and he also takes it to be the way its reference is determined.
+Identifying the two, he supposes that both are given by definite
+descriptions. Ultimately, I will reject this second supposition
+too; but even were it right, I reject the first. A description may
+be used as synonymous with a designator, or it may be used to
+fix its reference. The two Fregean senses of "sense' correspond
+to two senses of 'definition' in ordinary parlance. They should
+carefully be distinguished.
+" Usually the Fregean sense is now interpreted as the meaning, which must
+be carefully distinguished from a 'reference fixer'. We shall see below that
+for most spcakers, unless they are the ones who initially give an object its
+name, the referent of the name is determined by a 'causal' chain of communication rather than a description.
+In the formal semantics of modal logic, the 'sense' of a term f is usually taken
+to be the (possibly partial) function which assigns to cach possible world H the
+referent of t in H. For a rigid designator, such a function is constant. This
+notion of 'sense' relates to that of 'giving a meaning', not that of fixing a
+reference. In this use of "sense", 'one meter" has a constant function as its sense,
+though its reference is fixed by 'the length of S, which does not have a
+constant function as its sense.
+Some philosophers have thought that descriptions, in English, are ambiguous, that sometimes they non-rigidly designate, in each world, the object
+(if any) satisfying the description, while sometimes they rigidly designate the
+object actually satisfying the description. (Others, inspired by Donnellan, say
+the description sometimes rigidly designates the object thought or presupposed
+to satisfy the description.) I find any such alleged ambiguities dubious. I know
+
+60
+I hope the idea of fixing the reference as opposed to actually
+defining one term as meaning the other is somewhat clear.
+There is really not enough time to go into everything in great
+detail. I think, even in cases where the notion of rigidity versus
+accidentality of designation cannot be used to make out the
+difference in question, some things called definitions really
+intend to fix a reference rather than to give the meaning of a
+phrase, to give a synonym. Let me give an example. a is
+supposed to be the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its
+diameter. Now, it's something that I have nothing but a vague
+intuitive feeling to argue for: It seems to me that here this
+Greek letter is not being used as short for the phrase 'the ratio
+of the circumference of a circle to its diameter' nor is it even
+used as short for a cluster of alternative definitions of t, whatever that might mean. It is used as a name for a real number,
+which in this case is necessarily the ratio of the circumference
+of a circle to its diameter. Note that here both 't' and 'the ratio
+of the circumference of a circle to its diameter'
+are rigid
+designators, so the arguments given in the metric case are
+inapplicable. (Well, if someone doesn't see this, or thinks it's
+wrong, it doesn't matter.)
+Let me return to the question about names which I raised.
+As I said, there is a popular modern substitute for the theory of
+Frege and Russell; it is adopted even by such a strong critic of
+many views of Frege and Russell, especially the latter, as
+of no clear evidence for them which cannot be handled either by Russell's
+notion of scope or by the considerations alluded to in footnote 3, p. 25.
+If the ambiguity does exist, then in the supposed rigid sense of the length of
+S', 'one meter' and 'the length of S' designate the same thing in all possible
+worlds and have the same (functional) sense.
+In the formal semantics of intensional logic, suppose we take a definite
+description to designate, in each world, the object satisfying the description.
+It is indeed useful to have an operator which transforms cach description into
+a term which rigidly designates the object actually satisfying the description.
+David Kaplan has proposed such an operator and calls it 'Dthat.
+6I
+Strawson." The substitute is that, although a name is not a
+disguised description it either abbreviates, or anyway its
+reference is determined by, some cluster of descriptions. The
+question is whether this is true. As I also said, there are stronger
+and weaker versions of this. The stronger version would say
+that the name is simply defined, synonymously, as the cluster of
+descriptions. It will then be necessary, not that Moses had any
+particular property in this cluster, but that he had the disjunction of them. There couldn't be any counterfactual situation in which he didn't do any of those things. I think it's clear
+that this is very implausible. People have said it—or maybe they
+haven't been intending to say that, but were using 'necessary'
+in some other sense. At any rate, for example, in Searle's article
+on proper names:
+To put the same point differently, suppose we ask, 'why do we have
+proper names at all?' Obviously to refer to individuals. "Yes but
+descriptions could do that for us'. But only at the cost of specifying
+identity conditions every time reference is made: Suppose
+agree to drop 'Aristotle' and use, say, 'the teacher of Alexander',
+then it is a necessary truth that the man referred to is Alexander's
+teacher-but it is a contingent fact that Aristotle ever went into
+pedagogy (though I am suggesting that it is a necessary fact that
+Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of properties
+commonly attributed to him)."
+Such a suggestion, if 'necessary' is used in the way I have been
+using it in this lecture, must clearly be false. (Unless he's got
+me very interesting essential property commonly attribute
+› Aristotle.) Most of the things commonly attributed t
+Aristotle are things that Aristotle might not have done at all.
+In a situation in which he didn't do them, we would describe
+that as a situation in which Aristotle didn't do them. This is not
+a distinction of scopc, as happens sometimes in the case of
+*3 P. F. Strawson, Individuals, Methuen, London, 1959, Ch. 6.
+"Searle, op. cit. in Caton, Philosophy and Ordinary Language, p. 160.
+
+62
+descriptions, where someone might say that the man who
+taught Alexander might not have taught Alexander; though it
+could not have been true that: the man who taught Alexander
+didn't teach Alexander. This is Russell's distinction of scope. (I
+won't go into it.) It seems to me clear that this is not the case
+here. Not only is it true of the man Aristotle that he might not
+have gone into pedagogy; it is also true that we use the term
+"Aristotle' in such a way that, in thinking of a counterfactual
+situation in which Aristotle didn't go into any of the fields and
+do any of the achievements we commonly attribute to him,
+still we would say that was a situation in which Aristotle did not
+do these things.?5 Well there are some things like the date, the
+period he lived in, that might be more imagined as necessary.
+Maybe those are things we commonly attribute to him. There
+are exceptions. Maybe it's hard to imagine how he could have
+lived soo years later than he in fact did. That certainly raises at
+least a problem. But take a man who doesn't have any idea of
+the date. Many people just have some vague cluster of his
+most famous achievements. Not only each of these singly, but
+the possession of the entire disjunction of these properties,
+is just a contingent fact about Aristotle; and the statement
+25 The facts that 'the teacher of Alexander' is capable of scope distinctions
+in modal contexts and that it is not a rigid designator are both illustrated when
+one observes that the teacher of Alexander might not have taught Alexander
+(and, in such circumstances, would not have been the teacher of Alexander).
+On the other hand, it is not true that Aristotle might not have been Aristotle,
+although Aristotle might not have been called 'Aristotle', just as 2 × 2 might
+not have been called 'four'. (Sloppy, colloquial speech, which often confuses
+use and mention, may, of course, express the fact that someone might have
+been called, or not have been called, 'Aristotle' by saying that he might have
+been, or not have been, Aristotlc. Occasionally, I have heard such loose usages
+adduced as counterexamples to the applicability of the present theory to
+ordinary language. Colloquialisms like these seem to me to create as little
+problem for my theses as the success of the 'impossible Missions Force' creates
+for the modal law that the impossible does not happen.) Further, although
+under certain circumstances Aristotle would not have taught Alexander, these
+are not circumstances under which he would not have been Aristore
+63
+that Aristotle had this disjunction of properties is a contingent
+truth.
+A man might know it a priori in some sense, if he in fact fixes
+the reference of Aristotle as the man who did one of these
+things. Still it won't be a necessary truth for him. So this sort of
+example would be an example where a prioricity would not
+necessarily imply necessity, if the cluster theory of names were
+right. The case of fixing the reference of 'one meter' is a very
+clear example in which someone, just because he fixed the
+reference in this way, can in some sense know a priori that the
+length of this stick is a meter without regarding it as a necessary
+truth. Maybe the thesis about a prioricity implying necessity
+can be modified. It does appear to state some insight which
+might be important, and truc, about epistemology. In a way
+an example like this may seem like a trivial counterexample
+which is not really the point of what some people think when
+they think that only necessary truths can be known a priori.
+Well, if the thesis that all a priori truth is necessary is to be
+immune from this sort of counterexample, it needs to be
+modified in some way. Unmodified it leads to confusion about
+the nature of reference. And I myself have no idea how it
+should be modified or restated, or if such a modification or
+restatement is possible.2
+26 If someone fixes a meter as "the length of stick S at lo', then in some sense
+he knows a priori that the length of stick S at 1, is one meter, even though he
+uses this statement to express a contingent truth. But, merely by fixing a
+system of measurement, has he thereby learned some (contingent) information
+about the world, some new fact that he did not know before? It seems plausible
+that in some sense he did not, even though it is undeniably a contingent fact
+that S is one meter long. So there may be a case for reformulating the thesis
+that everything a priori is necessary so as to save it from this type of counterexample. As I said, I don't know how such a reformulation would go; the
+reformulation should not be such as to make the thesis trivial (e.g., by defining
+a priori as known to be necessary (instead of truc) independently of experience);
+and the converse thesis would still be false.
+Since I will not attempt such a reformulation, I shall consistently use the
+
+64
+Let me state then what the cluster concept theory of names
+is. (It really is a nice theory. The only defect I think it has is
+probably common to all philosophical theories. It's wrong.
+You may suspect me of proposing another theory in its place;
+but I hope not, because I'm sure it's wrong too if it is a theory.)
+The theory in question can be broken down into a number of
+theses, with some subsidiary theses if you want to see how it
+handles the problem of existence statements, identity statements, and so on. There are more theses if you take it in the
+stronger version as a theory of meaning. The speaker is A.
+(1) To every name or designating expression 'X', there
+corresponds a cluster of properties, namely the family
+of properties a such that A believes pX'.
+This thesis is true, because it can just be a definition. Now, of
+course, some people might think that not everything the
+speaker believes about X has anything to do with determining the reference of 'X'. They might only be interested in a
+subset. But we can handle this later on by modifying some of
+the other theses. So this thesis is correct, by definition. The
+theses that follow, however, are all, I think, false.
+(2)
+One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely.
+This doesn't say that they do pick out something uniquely,
+just that A believes that they do. Another thesis is that he is
+correct.
+(3) If most, or a weighted most, of the o's are satisfied by
+one unique object y, then y is the referent of 'X'.
+Well, the theory says that the referent of 'X' is supposed to be
+the thing satisfying, if not all the properties, 'enough of them.
+term 'a priori" in the text so as to make statements whose truth follows from a
+referenco-fixing 'definition' a priori.
+65
+Obviously A could be wrong about some things about X. You
+take some sort of a vote. Now the question is whether this vote
+should be democratic or have some inequalities among the
+properties. It seems more plausible that there should be some
+weighting, that some properties are more important than
+others. A theory really has to specify how this weighting goes.
+I believe that Strawson, to my surprise, explicitly states that
+democracy should rule here, so the most trivial properties are
+of equal weight with the most crucial." Surely it is more
+plausible to suppose that there is some weighting. Let's say
+democracy doesn't necessarily rule. If there is any property
+that's completely irrelevant to the reference we can disenfranchise it altogether, by giving it weight O. The properties can
+be regarded as members of a corporation. Some have more
+stock than others; some may even have only non-voting stock.
+If the vote yields no unique object, 'X' does not refer.
+(5) The statement, To eques ben has es no refere.
+ø's' is known a priori by the speaker.
+(б)
+The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the
+p's' expresses a necessary truth (in the idiolect of the
+speaker).
+(6) need not be a thesis of the theory if someone doesn't think
+that the cluster is part of the meaning of the name. He could
+think that though he determines the reference of "Aristotle' as
+the man who had most of the o's, still there are certainly
+possible situations in which Aristotle wouldn't have had most
+of the o's.
+As I indicated, there are some subsidiary theses, though I
+won't go into them in detail. These would give the analyses of
+singular existential statements like, '"Moses exists" means
+# Strawson, op. cit., pp. I91-92. Strawson actually considers the case of
+everal speakers, pools their properties, and takes a democratic (equally
+weighted) vote. He requires only a sufficiently plurality, not a majority.
+
+66
+"enough of the properties o are satisfied"'. Even the man who
+doesn't use the theory as a theory of meaning has some of these
+theses. For example, subsidiary to thesis 4, we should say that
+it is a priori true for the speaker that, if not cnough of the o's
+are satisfied, then X does not exist. Only if he holds the view
+as a theory of meaning, rather than of reference, would it also
+be necessarily true that, if not enough of the o's are satisfied, X
+does not exist. In any case it will be something he knows a
+priori. (At least he will know it a priori provided he knows the
+proper theory of names.) Then there is also an analysis of
+identity statements along the same lines.
+The question is, are any of these true? If true, they give a
+nice picture of what's going on. Preliminary to discussing these
+thescs, let me mention that, often, when people specify which
+properties o are relevant, they seem to specify them wrongly.
+That's just an incidental defect, though it is closcly related to
+the arguments against the theory that I will give presently.
+Consider the example from Wittgenstein. What does he say
+the relevant properties are? 'When one says "Moses does not
+exist",
+, this may mean various things. It may mean: the
+Israelites did not have a single Icader when they withdrew from
+Egypt-or: their leader was not called Moses-or: there cannot
+have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible relates
+of Moses...' The gist of all this is that we know a priori that,
+if the Biblical story is substantially false, Moses did not exist. I
+have already argued that the Biblical story does not give
+necessary properties of Moses, that he might have lived without
+doing any of these things. Here I ask whether we know a priori
+that if Moses existed, he in fact did some or most of them. Is
+this rcally the cluster of properties that we should use here?
+Surely there is a distinction which is neglected in these kinds of
+remarks. The Biblical story might have been a complete
+legend, or it might have been a substantially false account of a
+real person. In the latter case, it seems to me that a scholar
+67
+could say that he supposes that, though Moses did exist, the
+things said of him in the Bible are substantially false. Such
+things occur in this very field of scholarship. Suppose that
+someone says that no prophet ever was swallowed by a big
+fish or a whale. Does it follow, on that basis, that Jonah did
+not exist? There still seems to be the question whether the
+Biblical account is a legendary account of no person or a
+legendary account built on a real person. In the latter case, it's
+only natural to say that, though Jonah did exist, no one did the
+things commonly related to him. I choose this case because
+while Biblical scholars generally hold that Jonah did exist, the
+account not only of his being swallowed by a big fish but even
+going to Nineveh to preach or anything else that is said in the
+Biblical story is assumed to be substantially false. But nevertheless there are reasons for thinking this was about a real prophet.
+If I had a suitable book along with me I could start quoting out
+of it: 'Jonah, the son of Amittai, was a real prophet, however
+such and such and such'. There are independent reasons for
+thinking this was not a pure legend about an imaginary
+character but one about a rcal character.28
+28 Sce, for example, H. L. Ginsberg, The Five Megilloth and Jonah, The
+Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969, p. 114: "The "hero" of this tale,
+the prophet Jonah the son of Amittai, is a historical personage ... (but) this
+book is not history but fiction.' The scholarly consensus regards all details about
+Jonah in the book as legendary and not even based on a factual substratum,
+excepting the bare statement that he was a Hebrew prophet, which is hardly
+uniquely identifying. Nor need he have been called "Jonah' by the Hebrews;
+the 'J' sound does not exist in Hebrew, and Jonah's historical existence is
+independent of whether we know his original Hebrew name or not. The fact
+that we call him Jonah cannot be used to single him out without circularity.
+The evidence for the historicity of Jonah comes from an independent reference
+to him in II Kings; but such evidence could have been available in the absence
+of any such other references-e.g., evidence that all Hebrew legends were
+about actual personages. Further, the statement that Jonah is a legend about a
+real person might have been true, even if there were no evidence for it. One
+may say, 'The Jonah of the book never existed,' as one may say, 'The Hitler
+of Nazi propaganda never existed.' As the quotation above shows, this usage
+
+68
+These examples could be modified. Maybe all we believe is
+that the Bible relates of him that such and such. This gives us
+another problem, because how do we know whom the Bible
+is referring to? The question of our reference is thrown back
+to the question of reference in the Bible. This leads to a condition which we ought to put in explicitly.
+(C) For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The
+properties which are used in the vote must not themselves involve
+the notion of reference in a way that it is ultimately impossible to
+eliminatc.
+Let me give an example where the noncircularity condition is
+clearly violated. The following theory of proper names is due
+to William Kneale in an article called 'Modality, De Dicto
+and De Re'.2 It contains, I think, a clear violation of noncircularity conditions.
+Ordinary proper names of people are not, as John Stuart Mill
+supposed, signs without sense. While it may be informative to tell
+a man that the most famous Greek philosopher was called Socrates,
+it is obviously trifing to tell him that Socrates was called Socrates;
+and the reason is simply that he cannot understand your use of the
+word 'Socrates' at the beginning of your statement unless he already
+knows that 'Socrates' means "The individual called "Socrates" ' 30
+Jere we have a theory of the reference of proper names
+Socrates' just means 'the man called "Socrates"! Actually, of
+course, maybe not just one man can be called 'Socrates', and
+need not coincide with the historian's view of whether Jonah ever existed.
+Ginsberg is writing for the lay reader, who, he assumes, will find his statement
+intelligible.
+* In Ernest Nagel, Patrick Suppes, and Alfred Tarski, Logic, Methodology
+and the Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress,
+Stanford University Press, 1962, 622-33.
+30 Loc. cit., pp. 629-30.
+69
+some may call him "Socrates' while others may not. Certainly
+that is a condition which under some circumstances is uniquely
+satisfied. Maybe only one man was called 'Socrates' by me on
+a certain occasion.
+Kneale says it's trifling to tell someone that Socrates was
+called 'Socrates'. That isn't trifling on any view. Maybe the
+Greeks didn't call him 'Socrates'. Let's say that Socrates is
+called 'Socrates' by us—-by me anyway. Suppose that's trifling.
+(I find it surprising that Kneale uses the past tense here; it is
+dubious that the Greeks did call him "Socrates'-at least, the
+Greek name is pronounced differently. I will check the accuracy
+of the quotation for the next lecture.)
+Kneale gives an argument for this theory. 'Socrates' must
+be analyzed as 'the individual called "Socrates"', because how
+else can we explain the fact that it is trifling to be told that
+Socrates is called 'Socrates? In some cases that's rather trifling.
+In the same sense, I suppose, you could get a good theory of
+the meaning of any expression in English and construct a
+dictionary. For example, though it may be informative to tell
+someone that horses are used in races, it is trifling to tell him
+that horses are called 'horses'. Therefore this could only be the
+case because the term 'horse', means in English 'the things
+called "horses". Similarly with any other expression which
+might be used in English. Since it's trifling to be told that
+sages are called "sages', "sages' just means 'the people called
+"sages"'. Now plainly this isn't really a very good argument,
+nor can it therefore be the only explanation of why it's trifling
+to be told that Socrates is called 'Socrates'. Let's not go into
+exactly why it's trifling. Of course, anyone who knows the
+use of 'is called' in English, even without knowing what the
+statement means, knows that if 'quarks' means something
+hen 'quarks are called "quarks"" will express a truth. He may
+not know what truth it expresses, because he doesn't know
+what a guark is. But his knowledge that it expresses a truth
+
+70
+does not have much to do with the meaning of the term
+'quarks".
+We could go into this actually at great length. There are
+interesting problems coming out of this sort of passage. But
+the main rcason I wanted to introduce it here is that as a theory
+of reference it would give a clear violation of the noncircularity
+condition. Somcone uses the name 'Socrates'. How are we
+supposed to know to whom he refers? By using the description
+which gives the sense of it. According to Kncalc, the description
+is 'the man called "Socrates"'. And here, (presumably, since
+this is supposed to be so trifling!) it tells us nothing at all.
+Taking it in this way it seems to be no theory of reference at all.
+Weask, 'To whom does he refer by "Socrates"?' And then the
+answer is given, 'Well, he refers to the man to whom he refers.
+If this were all there was to the meaning of a proper name, then
+no reference would get off the ground at all.
+So there's a condition to be satisfied; in the case of this particular theory it's obviously unsatisfied. The paradigm,
+amazingly enough, is even sometimes used by Russell as the
+descriptive sense, namely: 'the man called "Walter Scott"'.
+Obviously if the only descriptive senses of names we can
+think of are of the form 'the man called such and such', 'the
+then willed Vice so in i raily sens."
+the reference and not any description like 'the man called
+"Socrates" .
+LECTURE II: JANUARY 22, 1970
+Last time we ended up talking about a theory of naming which
+is given by a number of theses here on the board.
+I) To every name or designating expression 'X', there
+corresponds a cluster of properties, namely the family
+of those propertics o such that A believes oX'.
+One of the propertics, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely.
+(3)
+If most, or a weighted most, of the o's are satisfied by
+one unique object y, then y is the referent of 'X'.
+(4)
+(s)
+If the vote yields no unique object, 'X' does not refer.
+The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the p's'
+is known a priori by the speaker.
+(6)
+The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the
+o's expresses a necessary truth (in the idiolect of the
+spcaker).
+(C) For any successful theory, the account must not be
+circular. The properties which are used in the vote
+must not themsclves involve the notion of reference
+in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to
+eliminate.
+(C) is not a thesis but a condition on the satisfaction of the other
+theses. In other words, Theses (1) -(6) cannot be satisfied in a
+way which leads to a circle, in a way which does not lead to
+any independent determination of reference. The example I
+
+72
+gave last time of a blatantly circular attempt to satisfy these
+conditions was a theory of names mentioned by William
+Kneale. I was a little surprised at the statement of the theory
+when I was reading what I had copied down, so I looked it up
+again. I looked it up in the book to see if I'd copied it down
+accurately. Kneale did use the past tense. He said that though
+it is not trifling to be told that Socrates was the greatest
+philosopher of ancient Greece, it is trifling to be told that
+Socrates was called 'Socrates'. Therefore, he concludes, the
+name "Socrates' must simply
+mean 'the individual called
+"Socrates"'. Russell, as I've said, in some places gives a similar
+analysis. Anyway, as stated using the past tense, the condition
+wouldn't be circular, because one certainly could decide to
+use the term "Socrates' to refer to whoever was called 'Socrates'
+by the Greeks. But, of course, in that sense it's not at all trifling
+to be told that Socrates was called 'Socrates'. If this is any kind
+of fact, it might be false. Perhaps we know that we call him
+"Socrates'; that hardly shows that the Greeks did so. In fact, of
+course, they may have pronounced the name differently. It
+may be, in the case of this particular name, that transliteration
+from the Greek is so good that the English version is not
+pronounced very differently from the Greek. But that won't
+be so in the general case. Certainly it is not trifling to be told
+that Isaiah was called "Isaiah'. In fact, it is false to be told that
+Isaiah was called 'Isaiah'; the prophet wouldn't have recognized
+this name at all. And of course the Greeks didn't call their
+country anything like 'Greece'. Suppose we amend the thesis
+so that it reads: it's trifling to be told that Socratcs is called
+'Socrates' by us, or at least, by me, the speaker. Then in some
+sense this is fairly trifling. I don't think it is necessary or analytic.
+In the same way, it is trifling to be told that horses are called
+"horses', without this leading to the conclusion that the word
+'horse' simply means 'the animal called a "horse"'. As a theory
+of the reference of the name 'Socrates' it will lead immediately
+73
+to a vicious circle. If one was determining the referent of a
+name like 'Glunk' to himself and made the following decision,
+'I shall use the term "Glunk" to refer to the man that I call
+"Glunk"", this would get one nowhere. One had better have
+some independent determination of the referent of 'Glunk'.
+This is a good example of a blatantly circular determination.
+Actually sentences like 'Socrates is called "Socrates"' are very
+interesting and one can spend, strange as it may seem, hours
+talking about their analysis. I actually did, once, do that. I
+won't do that, however, on this occasion. (See how high the
+seas of language can rise. And at the lowest points too.) Anyway
+this is a useful example of a violation of the noncircularity
+condition. The theory will satisfy all of these statements,
+perhaps, but it satisfies them only because there is some
+independent way of determining the reference independently
+of the particular condition: being the man called 'Socrates'.
+I have already talked about, in the last lecture, Thesis (6).
+Theses (s) and (6), by the way, have converses. What I said for
+Thesis (5) is that the statement that if X exists, X has most of
+the p's, is a priori true for the speaker. It will also be true under
+the given theory that certain converses of this statement hold
+true also a priori for the speaker, namely: if any unique thing
+has most of the properties o in the properly weighted sense,
+it is X. Similarly a certain converse to this will be necessarily
+true, namely: if anything has most of the properties o in the
+properly weighted sense, it is X. So really one can say that it is
+both a priori and necessary that something is X if and only if it
+uniquely has most of the properties o. This really comes from
+the previous Theses (I)-(4), I supposc. And (s) and (6) really
+just say that a sufficiently reflective speaker grasps this theor!
+of proper names. Knowing this, he therefore sces that (s) and
+(6) are true. The objections to Theses (s) and (6) will not be
+that some speakers are unaware of this theory and therefore
+don't know these things.
+
+74
+What I talked about in the last lecture is Thesis (6). It's been
+observed by many philosophers that, if the cluster of properties
+associated with a proper name is taken in a very narrow sense,
+so that only one propcrty is given any weight at all, let's say one
+definite description to pick out the referent—for example,
+Aristotle was the philosopher who taught Alexander the
+Great-then certain things will seem to turn out to be necessary
+truths which are not necessary truths—in this case, for example,
+that Aristotle taught Alexander the Great. But as Searle said,
+it is not a necessary truth but a contingent one that Aristotle
+ever went into pedagogy. Therefore, he concludes that one
+must drop the original paradigm of a single description and
+turn to that of a cluster of descriptions.
+To summarize some things that I argued last tinie, this is not
+the correct answer (whatever it may be) to this problem about
+necessity. For Searle goes on to say,
+Suppose we agree to drop "Aristotle' and use, say, 'the teacher of
+Alexander', then it is a necessary truth that the man referred to is
+Alexander's teacher—-but it is a contingent fact that Aristotle ever
+went into pedagogy, though I am suggesting that it is a necessary
+fact that Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of
+properties commonly attributed to him... 31
+This is what is not so. It just is not, in any intuitive sense of
+necessity, a necessary truth that Aristotle had the properties
+conmonly attributed to him. There is a certain theory, perhaps
+popular in some views of the philosophy of history, which
+might both be deterministic and yet at the same time assign a
+great role to the individual in history. Perhaps Carlyle would
+associate with the meaning of the name of a great man his
+achievements. According to such a view it will be necessary,
+once a certain individual is born, that he is destined to perform
+31 Searle, 'Proper Names, in Caton, op. cit., p. 160.
+75
+various great tasks and so it will be part of the very nature of
+Aristotle that he should have produced ideas which had a great
+influence on the western world. Whatever the merits of such
+a view may be as a view of history or the nature of great men,
+it does not seem that it should be trivially true on the basis of a
+theory of proper names. It would seem that it's a contingent
+fact that Aristotle ever did any of the things commonly
+attributed to him today, any of these great achievements that
+we so much admire. I must say that there is something to this
+fecling of Searle's. When I hear the name 'Hitler', I do get an
+illusory 'gut feeling' that it's sort of analytic that that man was
+evil. But really, probably not. Hitler might have spent all his
+days in quiet in Linz. In that case we would not say that then
+this man would not have been Hitler, for we use the name
+'Hitler' just as the name of that man, even in describing other
+possible worlds. (This is the notion which I called a rigid
+designator in the previous talk.) Suppose we do decide to pick
+out the reference of 'Hitler', as the man who succeeded in
+having more Jews killed than anyone else managed to do in
+history. That is the way we pick out the reference of the
+name; but in another counterfactual situation where some one
+else would have gained this discredit, we wouldn't say that in
+that case that other man would have been Hitler. If Hitler had
+never come to power, Hitler would not have had the property
+which I am supposing we use to fix the reference of his name.
+Similarly, even if we define what a meter is by reference to
+the standard meter stick, it will be a contingent truth and not a
+necessary one that that particular stick is one meter long. If it
+had been stretched, it would have been longer than one meter.
+And that is because we use the term
+'one meter' rigidly to
+designate a certain length. Even though we fix what length
+we are designating by an accidental property of that length,
+just as in the case of the name of the man we may pick the man
+out by an accidental property of the man, still we use the name
+
+76
+to designate that man or that length in all possible worlds. The
+property we use need not be one which is regarded in any way
+as necessary or essential. In the case of a yard, the original way
+this length was picked out was, I think, the distance when
+the arm of King Henry I of England was outstretched from
+the tip of his finger to his nose. If this was the length of a yard,
+it nevertheless will not be a necessary truth that the distance
+between the tip of his finger and his nose should be a yard.
+Maybe an accident might have happened to foreshorten his
+arm; that would be possible. And the reason that it's not a
+necessary truth is not that there might be other criteria in a
+"cluster concept' of yardhood. Even a man who strictly uses
+King Henry's arm as his one standard of length can say,
+counterfactually, that if certain things had happened to the
+King, the exact distance between the end of one of his fingers
+and his nose would not have been exactly a yard. He need not
+be using a cluster as long as he uses the term 'yard' to pick
+out a certain fixed reference to be that length in all possible
+worlds.
+These remarks show, I think, the intuitive bizarreness of a
+good deal of the literature on 'transworld identification' and
+counterpart theory'. For many theorists of these sorts, believing, as they do, that a 'possible world' is given to us only
+qualitatively, argue that Aristotle is to be "identified in other
+possible worlds', or alternatively that his counterparts are to be
+identified, with those things in other possible worlds who most
+closcly resemble Aristotle in his most important properties.
+(Lewis, for example, says: "Your counterparts ... resemble
+you.
+..in important respects... more closely than do
+the other things in their worlds... weighted by the importance of the various respects and by the degrees of the similarities.'32) Some may equate the important properties with those
+33 D. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 114-IS.
+77
+properties used to identify the object in the actual world.
+Surely these notions are incorrect. To me Aristotle's most
+important properties consist in his philosophical work, and
+Hitler's in his murderous political role; both, as I have said,
+might have lacked these properties altogether. Surely there
+was no logical fate hanging over either Aristotle or Hitler
+which made it in any sense inevitable that they should have
+possessed the properties we regard as important to thens; they
+could have had careers completely different from their actual
+ones. Important properties of an object need not be essential,
+unless "importance' is used as a synonym for essence; and an
+object could have had properties very different from its most
+striking actual properties, or from the properties we use to
+identify it.
+To clear up one thing which some people have asked me:
+When I say that a designator is rigid, and designates the same
+thing in all possible worlds, I mean that, as used in our language,
+it stands for that thing, when we talk about counterfactual
+situations. I don't mean, of course, that there mightn't be
+counterfactual situations in which in the other possible worlds
+people actually spoke a different language. One doesn't say
+that 'two plus two equals four' is contingent because people
+might have spoken a language in which 'two plus two equals
+four' meant that seven is even. Similarly, when we speak of a
+counterfactual situation, we speak of it in English, even if it is
+part of the description of that counterfactual situation that we
+were all speaking German in that counterfactual situation. We
+say, 'suppose we had all been speaking German' or 'suppose we
+had been using English in a nonstandard way. Then we are
+describing a possible world or counterfactual situation in which
+people, including oursclves, did speak in a certain way different
+from the way we speak. But still, in describing that world, we
+use English with our meanings and our references. It is in this
+sense that I speak of a rigid designator as having the same
+
+78
+reference in all possible worlds. I also don't mean to imply
+that the thing designated exists in all possible worlds, just that
+the name refers rigidly to that thing. If you say 'suppose Hitler
+had never been born' then 'Hitler' refers here, still rigidly, to
+something that would not exist in the counterfactual situation
+described.
+Given these remarks, this means we must cross off Thesis (6)
+as incorrect. The other theses have nothing to do with necessity
+and can survive. In particular Thesis (s) has nothing to do with
+necessity and it can survive. If I use the name 'Hesperus' to
+refer to a certain planetary body when seen in a certain celestial
+position in the evening, it will not therefore be a necessary
+truth that Hesperus is ever seen in the evening. That depends
+on various contingent facts about people being there to see
+and things like that. So even if I should say to myself that I will
+use 'Hesperus' to name the heavenly body I see in the evening
+in yonder position of the sky, it will not be necessary that
+Hesperus was ever seen in the evening. But it may be a priori
+in that this is how I have determined the referent. If I have
+determined that Hesperus is the thing that I saw in the evening
+over therc, then I will know, just from making that determination of the referent, that if there is any Hesperus at all it's
+the thing I saw in the evening. This at least survives as far as
+the arguments we have given up to now go.
+How about a theory where Thesis (6) is eliminated? Theses
+(z), (3), and (4) turn out to have a large class of counterinstances. Even when Theses (2)-(4) are true, Thesis (s) is usually
+false; the truth of Theses (3) and (4) is an empirical 'accident',
+which the speaker hardly knows a priori. That is to say, other
+principles rcally determine the speaker's reference, and the
+fact that the referent coincides with that determined by (2)-(4)
+is an 'accident', which we were in no position to know a priori.
+Only in a rare class of cases, usually initial baptisins, are all of
+(2)-(s) true.
+79
+What picture of naming do these Theses ((t)-(s)) give you?
+The picture is this. I want to name an object. I think of some
+way of describing it uniquely and then I go through, so to
+speak, a sort of mental ceremony: By 'Cicero' I shall mean the
+man who denounced Catiline; and that's what the reference of
+'Cicero' will be. I will use "Cicero' to designate rigidly the
+man who (in fact) denounced Catiline, so I can speak of
+possible worlds in which he did not. But still my intentions are
+given by first, giving some condition which uniquely determines an object, then using a certain word as a name for the
+object determined by this condition. Now there may be
+some cases in which we actually do this. Maybe, if you want
+to stretch and call it description, when you say: I shall call that
+heavenly body over there 'Hesperus. 33 That is really a case
+where the theses not only are true but really even give a correct
+picture of how the reference is determined. Another case, if
+you want to call this a name, might be when the police in
+London use the name 'Jack' or 'Jack the Ripper' to refer to the
+man, whoever he is, who committed all these murders, or
+most of them. Then they are giving the reference of the name
+33 An even better case of determining the reference of a name by description,
+as opposed to ostension, is the discovery of the planet Neptune. Neptune was
+hypothesized as the planet which caused such and such discrepancies in the
+orbits of certain other planets. If Lewerrier indeed gave the name 'Neptune"
+to the planet before it was ever seen, then he fixed the reference of 'Neptune'
+by means of the description just mentioned. At that time he was unable to
+see the planet even through a telescope. At this stage, an a priori material
+equivalence held between the statements "Neptune exists' and 'some one
+planet perturbing the orbit of such and such other planets exists in such and
+such a position", and also such statements as 'if such and such perturbations are
+caused by a planet, they are caused by Neptune' had the status of a priori
+truths. Nevertheless, they were not necessary truths, since "Neptune was
+introduced as a name rigidly designating a certain planet. Leverrier could well
+have believed that if Neptune had been knocked off its course one million
+years earlier, it would have caused no such perturbations and even that some
+other object might have caused the perturbations in its place.
+
+80
+by a description.3 But in many or most cases, I think the
+theses are false. So let's look at them.35
+Thesis (1), as I say, is a definition. Thesis (2) says that one of
+the properties believed by A of the object, or some conjointly,
+are believed to pick out some individual uniquely. A sort of
+example people have in mind is just what I said: I shall use the
+term "Cicero' to denote the man who denounced Catiline (or
+first denounced him in public, to make it unique). This picks
+out an object uniqucly in this particular reference. Even some
+writers such as Ziff in Semantic Analysis, who don't believe that
+names have meaning in any sense, think that this is a good
+picture of the way reference can be determined.
+Let's see if Thesis (2) is true. It seems, in some a priori way,
+that it's got to be true, because if you don't think that the
+properties you have in mind pick out anyone uniquely-let's
+say they're all satisfied by two people-then how can you say
+which one of them you're talking about? There seem to be no
+grounds for saying you're talking about the one rather than
+about the other. Usually the properties in question are supposed
+to be some famous deeds of the person in question. For
+example, Cicero was the man who denounced Catiline. The
+average person, according to this, when he refers to Cicero, is
+3 Following Donnellan's remarks on definite descriptions, we should add
+that in some cases, an object may be identified, and the refcrence of a name
+fixed, using a description which may turn out to be false of its object. The
+case where the reference of 'Phosphorus' is determined as the 'morning star",
+which later turns out not to be a star, is an obvious example. In such cases, the
+description which fixes the reference clearly is in no sense known a priori to
+hold of the object, though a more cautious substitute may be. If such a more
+cautious substitute is available, it is really the substitute which fixes the
+reference in the sense intended in the text.
+36 Some of the theses are sloppily stated in respect of fussy matters like use
+of quotation marks and related details. (For example, Theses (s) and (6), as
+stated, presuppose that the speaker's language is English.) Since the purport of
+the theses is clear, and they are false anyway, I have not bothered to set these
+things straight.
+8I
+saying something like 'the man who denounced Catiline' and
+thus has picked out a certain man uniquely. It is a tribute to
+the education of philosophers that they have held this thesis
+for such a long time. In fact, most people, when they think
+of Cicero, just think of a famous Roman orator, without any
+pretension to think either that there was only one famous
+Roman orator or that one must know something else about
+Cicero to have a referent for the name. Consider Richard
+Feynman, to whom many of us are able to refer. He is a leading
+contemporary theoretical physicist. Everyone here (I'm sure!)
+can state the contents of one of Feynman's theories so as to
+differentiate him from Gell-Mann. However, the man in the
+street, not possessing these abilities, may still use the name
+'Feynman'. When asked he will say: well he's a physicist or
+something. He may not think that this picks out anyone
+uniquely. I still think he uses the name "Feynman' as a name
+for Feynman.
+But let's look at some of the cases where we do have a
+description to pick out someone uniquely. Let's say, for example, that we know that Cicero was the man who first
+denounced Catiline. Well, that's good. That really picks
+someone out uniquely. However, there is a problens, because
+this description contains another name, namely 'Catiline'. We
+must be sure that we satisfy the conditions in such a way as to
+avoid violating the noncircularity condition here. In particular,
+we must not say that Catiline was the man denounced by
+Cicero. If we do this, we will really not be picking out anything
+uniquely, we will simply be picking out a pair of objects A and
+B, such that A denounced B. We do not think that this was
+the only pair where such denunciations ever occurred; so
+we had better add some other conditions in order to satisfy
+the uniqueness condition.
+If we say Einstein was the man who discovered the theory of
+relativity, that certainly picks out someone uniquely. One can
+
+82
+be sure, as I said, that everyone here can make a compact and
+independent statement of this theory and so pick out Einstein
+uniquely; but many people actually don't know enough about
+this stuff, so when asked what the theory of relativity is, they
+will say: "Einstein's theory', and thus be led into the most
+straightforward sort of vicious circle.
+So Thesis (z), in a straightforward way, fails to be satisfied
+when we say Feynman is a famous physicist without attributing
+anything else to Feynman. In another way it may not be
+satisfied in the proper way even when it is satisfied: If we say
+Einstein was 'the man who discovered relativity theory', that
+docs pick someone out uniquely; but it may not pick him out
+in such a way as to satisfy the noncircularity condition, because
+the theory of relativity may in turn be picked out as Einstein's
+theory'. So Thesis (z) seenis to be falsc.
+By changing the conditions o from those usually associated
+with names by philosophers, one could try to improve the
+theory. There have been various ways I've heard; maybe I'll
+discuss these later on. Usually they think of famous achievements of the man named. Certainly in the case of famous
+achievements, the theory doesn't work. Some student of mine
+once said, 'Well, Einstein discovered the theory of relativity';
+and he determined the reference of the theory of relativity'
+independently by referring to an encyclopedia which would
+give the details of the theory. (This is what is called a transcendental deduction of the existence of encyclopedias.) But it
+seems to me that, even if someone has heard of encyclopedias,
+it really is not essential for his reference that he should know
+whether this theory is given in detail in any encyclopedia. The
+reference might work even if there had been no encyclopedias
+at all.
+Let's go on to Thesis (3): If most of the p's, suitably weighted,
+are satisfied by a unique object y, then y is the referent of the
+name for the speaker. Now, since we have already established
+83
+that Thesis (z) is wrong, why should any of the rest work? The
+whole theory depended on always being able to specify
+unique conditions which are satisfied. But still we can look at
+the other theses. The picture associated with the theory is that
+only by giving some unique properties can you know who
+someone is and thus know what the reference of your name is.
+Well, I won't go into the question of knowing who someone
+is. It's really very puzzling. I think you do know who Cicero is
+if you just can answer that he's a famous Roman orator.
+Strangely enough, if you know that Einstein discovered the
+theory of relativity and nothing about that theory, you can
+both know who Einstein is, namely the discoverer of the
+theory of relativity, and who discovered the theory of relativity,
+namely Einstein, on the basis of this knowledge. This seems to
+be a blatant violation of some sort of noncircularity condition;
+but it is the way we talk. It therefore would seem that a picture
+which suggests this condition must be the wrong picture.
+Suppose most of theo's are in fact satisfied by a unique object.
+Is that object necessarily the referent of 'X' for A? Let's suppose
+someone says that Gödel is the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, and this man is suitably well educated
+and is even able to give an independent account of the incompleteness theorem. He doesn't just say, 'Well, that's
+Gödel's theoren', or whatever. He actually states a certain
+theorem, which he attributes to Gödel as the discoverer. Is it
+the case, then, that if most of the p's are satisfied by a unique
+object y, then y is the referent of the name 'X' for A? Let's take
+a simple case. In the case of Gödel that's practically the only
+thing many people have heard about him—-that he discovered
+the incompleteness of arithmetic. Does it follow that whoever
+discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic is the referent of
+'Gödel'?
+Imagine the following blatantly fictional situation. (I hope
+Professor Gödel is not present.) Suppose that Gödel was not in
+
+84
+fact the author of this theorem. A man named "Schmidt',
+whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in question. His
+friend Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and it was
+thereafter attributed to Gödel. On the view in question, then,
+when our ordinary man uses the name 'Gödel", he really means
+to refer to Schmidt, because Schmidt is the unique person
+satisfying the description, 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Of course you might try changing
+it to the man who published the discovery of the incompleteness
+of arithmetic'. By changing the story a litile further one can
+make even this formulation false. Anyway, most people might
+not even know whether the thing was published or got
+around by word of mouth. Let's stick to 'the man who
+discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. So, since the
+man who discovered the incompleteness of arithnietic is in fact
+Schmidt, we, when we talk about "Gödel", are in fact always
+referring to Schmidt. But it seems to me that we are not. We
+simply are not. One reply, which I will discuss later, might be:
+You should say instead, 'the man to whom the incompleteness
+of arithmetic is commonly attributed', or something like that.
+Let's see what we can do with that later.
+But it may seem to many of you that this is a very odd
+example, or that such a situation occurs rarely. This also is a
+tribute to the education of philosophers. Very often we use a
+name on the basis of considerable misinformation. The case of
+mathematics used in the fictive example is a good case in point.
+What do we know about Peano? What many people in this
+room may 'know' about Peano is that he was the discoverer of
+certain axioms which characterize the sequence of natural
+numbers, the so-called 'Peano axioms. Probably some people
+can even state them. I have been told that these axioms were
+not first discovered by Peano but by Dedekind. Peano was of
+course not a dishonest man. I am told that his footnotes
+85
+include a credit to Dedekind. Somehow the footnote has been
+ignored. So on the theory in question the term 'Peano', as we
+use it, really refers to-now that you've heard it you see that
+you were really all the time talking about--Dedekind. But
+you were not. Such illustrations could be multiplied indefinitely.
+Even worse misconceptions, of course, occur to the layman.
+In a previous example I supposed people to identify Einstein
+by reference to his work on relativity. Actually, I often used to
+hear that Einstein's most famous achievement was the invention
+of the atomic bomb. So when we refer to Einstein, we refer
+to the inventor of the atomic bomb. But this is not so. Columbus was the first man to realize that the earth was round. He
+was also the first European to land in the western hemisphere.
+Probably none of these things are true, and therefore, when
+people use the term 'Columbus' they really refer to some
+Greek if they use the roundness of the earth, or to some
+Norseman, perhaps, if they use the 'discovery of America'.
+But they don't. So it does not seem that if most of the o's are
+satisfied by a unique object y, then y is the referent of the name.
+This seems simply to be falsc. 36
+3 The cluster-of-descriptions theory of naming would make 'Peano discovered the axioms for number theory' express a trivial truth, not a misconception, and similarly for other misconceptions about the history of
+science. Some who have conceded such cases to me have argued that there are
+other uses of the same proper names satisfying the cluster theory. For example,
+it is argued, if we say, 'Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic,' we
+are, of course, referring to Gödel, not to Schmidt. But, if we say, 'Gödel
+relied on a diagonal argument in this step of the proof,' don't we here, perhaps,
+refer to whoever proved the theorem? Similarly, if someone asks, 'What did
+Aristotle (or Shakespeare) have in mind here?", isn't he talking about the
+author of the passage in question, whoever he is? By analogy to Donnellan's
+usage for descriptions, this might be called an "attributive' use of proper
+names. If this is so, then assuming the Gödel-Schmidt story, the sentence
+"Gödel proved the incompleteness theorem' is false, but 'Gödel used a diagonal
+argument in the proof' is (at least in some contexts) true, and the reference of
+the name "Gödel" is ambiguous. Since some counterexamples remain, the
+
+86
+Thesis (4): If the vote yields no unique object the name does
+not refer. Really this case has been covered before—has been
+covered in my previous examples. First, the vote may not
+yield a unique object, as in the case of Cicero or Feynman.
+Secondly, suppose it yields no object, that nothing satisfies
+most, or cven any, substantial number, of the p's. Does that
+mean the name doesn't refer? No: in the same way that you
+may have false beliefs about a person which may actually be
+true of someone else, so you may have false beliefs which are
+true of absolutely no onc. And these may constitute the totality
+of your beliefs. Supposc, to vary the example about Gödel, no
+one had discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic-perhaps
+the proof simply materialized by a random scattering of atoms
+on a piece of paper-the man Gödel being lucky enough to
+have been present when this improbable event occurred.
+Further, suppose arithmetic is in fact complete. One wouldn't
+really expect a random scattering of atoms to produce a correct
+proof. A subtle crror, unknown through the decades, has still
+been unnoticed-or perhaps not actually unnoticed, but the
+friends of Gödel.... So even if the conditions are not satisfied
+cluster-of-descriptions theory would still, in general, be false, which was my
+main point in the text; but it would be applicable in a wider class of cases than I
+thought. I think, however, that no such ambiguity need be postulated. It is,
+perhaps, true that sometimes when someone uses the name 'Gödel", his main
+interest is in whoever proved the theorem, and perhaps, in some sense, he
+'refers' to him. I do not think that this case is diffcrent from the case of Smith
+and Jones in n. 3, p. 25. If I mistake Jones for Smith, I may refer (in an appropriate sense) to Jones when I say that Smith is raking the leaves; nevertheless I
+do not use 'Smith' ambiguously, as a name sometimes of Smith and sometimes
+of Jones, but univocally as a name of Smith. Similarly, if I crroneously think
+that Aristotle wrote such-and-such passage, I may perhaps sometimes use
+'Aristotle' to refer to the actual author of the passage, even though there is no
+ambiguity in my use of the name. In both cases, I will withdraw my original
+statement, and my original use of the name, if apprised of the facts. Recall
+that, in these lectures, 'referent' is used in the technical sense of the thing
+named by a name (or uniquely satisfying a description), and there should be
+no Contion.
+87
+by a unique object the name may still refer. I gave you the
+case of Jonah last weck. Biblical scholars, as I said, think that
+Jonah really existed. It isn't because they think that someone
+ever was swallowed by a big fish or even went to Nineveh
+to preach. These conditions may be true of no one whatsoever and yet the name 'Jonah' really has a referent. In the
+case above of Einstein's invention of the bomb, possibly
+no one really deserves to be called the 'inventor' of the
+device.
+Thesis s says that the statement "If X exists, then X has most
+of the p's', is a priori true for A. Notice that even in a case
+where (3) and (4) happen to be true, a typical speaker hardly
+knows a priori that they are, as required by the theory. I think
+that my belief about Gödel is in fact correct and that the
+"Schmidt' story is just a fantasy. But the belief hardly constitutes a priori knowledge.
+What's going on here? Can we rescue the theory??? First,
+one may try and vary these descriptions-not think of the
+famous achievements of a man but, let's say, of something
+elsc, and try and use that as our description. Maybe by enough
+futzing around someone might eventually get something out
+" It has been suggested to me that someone might argue that a name is
+associated with a 'referential' use of a description in Donnellan's sense. For
+example, although we identify Gödel as the author of the incompleteness
+theorem, we are talking about him even if he turns out not to have proved the
+theorem. Theses (2)-(6) could then fail; but nevertheless each name would
+abbreviate a description, though the role of description in naming would
+differ radically from that imagined by Frege and Russell. As I have said above,
+I am inclined to reject Donnellan's formulation of the notion of referential
+definite description. Even if Donnellan's analysis is accepted, however, it is
+clear that the present proposal should not be. For a referential definite description, such as 'the man drinking champagne', is typically withdrawn when the
+speaker realizes that it does not apply to its object. If a Gödelian fraud were
+exposed, Gödel would no longer be called 'the author of the incompleteness
+theorem' but he would still be called 'Gödel". The name, therefore, does not
+abbreviate the description.
+
+88
+of this; 3 however, most of the attempts that one tries are open
+to counterexamples or other objections. Let me give an
+example of this. In the case of Gödel one may say,
+'Well,
+"Gödel" doesn't mean "the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic"'. Look, all we really know is that most
+people think that Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, that Gödel is the man to whom the incompleteness of
+arithmetic is commonly attributed. So when I determine the
+referent of the name 'Gödel", I don't say to myself, 'by "Gödel"
+I shall mean "the man who proved the incompleteness of
+arithmetic, whoever he is"'. That might turn out to be
+Schmidt or Post. But instead I shall mean 'the man who most
+people think proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'.
+Is this right? First, it seems to nie that it's open to counterexamples of the same type as I gave before, though the counterexamples may be more recherché. Suppose, in the case of
+Peano mentioned previously, unbeknownst to the speaker,
+most people (at least by now) thoroughly realize that the
+number-thcoretic axioms should not be attributed to him.
+Most people don't credit them to Peano but now correctly
+ascribe them to Deckind. So then even the man to whom this
+thing is commonly attributed will still be Dedekind and not
+Peano. Still, the speaker, having picked up the old outmoded
+38 As Robert Nozick pointed out to me, there is a sense in which a description theory must be trivially true if any theory of the reference of names,
+spelled out in terms independent of the notion of reference, is availabie. For if
+such a theory gives conditions under which an object is to be the referent of
+a name, then it of course uniquely satisfies these conditions. Since I am not
+pretending to give any theory which eliminates the notion of reference in
+this sense, i am not aware of any such trivial fulfillment of the description theory
+and doubt that one exists. (A description using the notion of the reference of a
+name is easily available but circular, as we saw in our discussion of Kneale.) If
+any such trivial fulfilment were available, however, the arguments I have
+given show that the description must be one of a completely different sort
+from that supposed by Frege, Russell, Searle, Strawson and other advocates of
+the description theory.
+89
+belief, may still be referring to Peano, and hold a false belief
+about Peano, not a true belief about Dedekind.
+But second, and perhaps more significantly, such a criterion
+violates the noncircularity condition. How is this? It is true
+that most of us think that Gödel proved the incompleteness of
+arithmetic. Why is this so? We certainly say, and sincerely,
+'Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. Does it
+follow
+from that that we believe that Gödel proved the
+incompleteness
+of arithmetic-that we
+attribute the incompleteness of arithmetic to this man? No. Not just from
+that. We have to be referring to Gödel when we say 'Gödel
+proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. If, in fact, we were
+always referring to Schmidt, then we would be attributing the
+incompleteness of arithmetic to Schmidt and not to Gödelif we used the sound 'Gödel' as the name of the man whom I
+amn calling "Schmidt'.
+But we do in fact refer to Gödel. How do we do this? Well,
+not by saying to ourselves, 'By "Gödel" I shall mean the man
+to whom
+the incompleteness of arithmetic is commonly
+attributed'. If we did that we would run into a circle. Here we
+are all in this room. Actually in this institution some people
+have met the man, but in many institutions this is not so. All
+of us in the community are trying to determine the reference
+by saying 'Gödel is to be the man to whom the incompleteness
+of arithmetic is commonly attributed'. None of us will get
+started with any attribution unless there is some independent
+criterion for the reference of the name other than 'the man to
+whom the incompleteness of arithmetic is commonly attributed'. Otherwise all we will be saying is,
+'We attribute this
+achievement to the man to whom we attribute it, without
+saying who that man is, without giving any independent
+criterion of the refcrence, and so the determination will be
+circular. This then is a violation of the condition I have
+30 Princeton University.
+
+90
+marked 'C', and cannot be used in any theory of refcrence.
+Of course you might try to avoid circularity by passing the
+buck. This is mentioned by Strawson, who says in his footnote
+on these matters that one man's reference may derive from
+another's.
+The identifying description, though it must not include a reference
+to the speaker's own reference to the particular in question, may
+include a reference to another's reference to that particular. If a
+putatively identifying description is of this latter kind, then, indeed,
+the question, whether it is a genuinely identifying description, turns
+on the question, whether the reference it refers to is itself a genuinely
+identifying reference. So one reference may borrow its credentials,
+as a genuinely identifying reference, from another; and that from
+another. But this regress is not infinite.*
+I may then say, 'Look, by "Gödel" I shall mean the man Joe
+thinks proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Joe may then
+pass the thing over to Harry. One has to be very careful that
+this doesn't come round in a circle. Is one really sure that this
+won't happen? If you could be sure yourself of knowing such
+a chain, and that evcryone else in the chain is using the proper
+conditions and so is not getting out of it, then maybe you could
+get back to the man by referring to such a chain in that way,
+borrowing the refcrences one by one. However, although in
+general such chains do exist for a living man, you won't know
+what the chain is. You won't be sure what descriptions the
+other man is using, so the thing won't go into a circle, or
+whether by appealing to Joe you won't get back to the right
+man at all. So you cannot use this as your identifying description with any confidence. You may not even remember
+from whom you heard of Gödel.
+What is the true picture of what's going on? Maybe reference
+doesn't really take place at all! After all, we don't really know
+*° Strawson, op. cit., p. 182 n.
+9I
+that any of the properties we use to identify the man are right.
+We don't know that they pick out a unique object. So what
+does make my use of 'Cicero' into a name of him? The picture
+which leads to the cluster-of-descriptions theory is something
+like this: One is isolated in a room; the entire community of
+other speakers, everything else, could disappear; and one
+determines the reference for himself by saying—-'By "Gödel"
+I shall mean the man, whoever he is, who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Now you can do this if you want
+to. There's nothing really preventing it. You can just stick to
+that determination. If that's what you do, then if Schmidt
+discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic you do refer to
+him when you say 'Gödel did such and such'.
+But that's not what most of us do. Someone, let's say, a baby,
+is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about
+him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through various
+sorts of talk the nane is spread from link to link as if by a chain.
+A speaker who is on the far end of this chain, who has heard
+about, say Richard Feynman, in the market place or elsewhere,
+may be referring to Richard Feynman even though he can't
+remember from whom he first heard of Feynman or from
+whom he ever heard of Feynman. He knows that Feynman
+is a famous physicist. A certain passage of communication
+reaching ultimately to the man himself does reach the speaker.
+He then is referring to Feynman even though he can't identify
+him uniquely. He doesn't know what a Feynman diagram is,
+he doesn't know what the Feynman theory of pair production
+and annihilation is. Not only that: he'd have trouble distinguishing between Gell-Mann and Feynman. So he doesn't
+have to know these things, but, instead, a chain of communication going back to Feynman himself has been established,
+by virtue of his membership in a community which passed
+the name on from link to link, not by a ceremony that
+he makes in private in his study: "By "Feynman" I shall
+
+92
+mean the man who did such and such and such and such'.
+How does this view differ from Strawson's suggestion,
+mentioned before, that one identifying reference may borrow
+its credentials from another? Certainly Strawson had a good
+insight in the passage quoted; on the other hand, he certainly
+shows a difference at least in emphasis from the picture I
+advocate, since he confines the remark to a footnote. The
+main text advocates the cluster-of-descriptions theory. Just
+because Strawson makes his remark in the context of a description theory, his view therefore differs from mine in one
+important respect. Strawson apparently requires that the
+speaker must know from whom he got his reference, so that he
+can say: 'By "Gödel" I mean the man Jones calls "Gödel"'. If
+he does not remember how he picked up the reference, he
+cannot give such a description. The present theory sets no such
+requirement. As I said, I may well not remember from whom I
+heard of Gödel, and I may think I remember from which
+people I heard the name, but wrongly.
+These considerations show that the view advocated here can
+lead to consequences which actually diverge from those of
+Strawson's footnote. Suppose that the speaker has heard the
+name 'Cicero' from Smith and others, who use the name to
+refer to a famous Roman orator. He later thinks, however,
+that he picked up the name from Jones, who (unknown to the
+speaker) uses 'Cicero' as the name of a notorious German spy
+and has never heard of any orators of the ancient world. Then,
+according to Strawson's paradigm, the speaker must determine
+his reference by the resolution, I shall use "Cicero" to refer to
+the man whom Jones calls by that name', while on the present
+view, the referent will be the orator in spite of the speaker's
+false impression about where he picked up the name. The
+point is that Strawson, trying to fit the chain of communication
+view into the description theory, relies on what the speaker
+thinks was the source of his reference. If the speaker has for-
+93
+gotten his source, the description Strawson uses is unavailable
+to him; if he misremembers it, Strawson's paradigm can give
+the wrong results. On our view, it is not how the speaker
+thinks he got the reference, but the actual chain of communication, which is relevant.
+I think I said the other time that philosophical theories are
+in danger of being false, and so I wasn't going to present an
+alternative theory. Have I just done so? Well, in a way; but
+my characterization has been far less specific than a real set of
+necessary and sufficient conditions for reference would be.
+Obviously the name is passed on from link to link. But of
+course not every sort of causal chain reaching from me to a
+certain man will do for me to make a reference. There may be
+a causal chain from our use of the term "Santa Claus' to a
+certain historical saint, but still the children, when they use
+this, by this time probably do not refer to that saint. So other
+conditions must be satisfied in order to make this into a really
+rigorous theory of reference. I don't know that I'm going to
+do this because, first, I'm sort of too lazy at the moment;
+secondly, rather than giving a set of necessary and sufficient
+conditions which will work for a term like reference, I want to
+present just a better picture than ihe picture presented by the
+received views.
+Haven't I been very unfair to the description theory? Here
+I have stated it very preciselymore precisely, perhaps, than
+it has been stated by any of its advocates. So then it's easy to
+refute. Maybe if I tried to state mine with sufficient precision
+in the form of six or seven or eight theses, it would also turn
+out that when you examine the theses one by one, they will
+all be false. That might even be so, but the difference is this.
+What I think the examples I've given show is not simply that
+there's some technical crror here or some mistake there, but
+that the whole picture given by this theory of how reference is
+determined seems to be wrong from the fundamentals. It
+
+94
+seems to be wrong to think that we give ourselves some
+properties which somehow qualitatively uniquely pick out an
+object and determine our reference in that manner. What I am
+trying to present is a better picture-a picture which, if more
+details were to be filled in, might be refined so as to give more
+exact conditions for reference to take place.
+One might never reach a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. I don't know, I'm always sympathetic to Bishop
+Butler's 'Everything is what it is and not another thing'-in
+the nontrivial sense that philosophical analyses of some concept
+like reference, in completely different terms which make no
+mention of reference, are very apt to fail. Of course in any
+particular case when one is given an analysis one has to look
+at it and see whether it is true or false. One can't just cite this
+maxim to oneself and then turn the page. But more cautiously,
+I want to present a better picture without giving a set of
+necessary and sufficient conditions for reference. Such conditions would be very complicated, but what is true is that it's
+in virtue of our connection with other speakers in the community, going back to the referent himself, that we refer to a
+certain man.
+There may be some cases where the description picture is
+true, where some man really gives a name by going into the
+privacy of his room and saying that the referent is to be the
+unique thing with certain identifying properties. Jack the
+Ripper' was a possible example which I gave. Another was
+'Hesperus'. Yet another case which can be forced into this
+description is that of meeting someone and being told his
+name. Except for a belief in the description theory, in its
+importance in other cases, one probably wouldn't think that
+that was a case of giving oneself a description, i.e., 'the guy
+I'm just meeting now'. But one can put it in these terms if one
+wishes, and if one has never heard the name in any other way.
+Of course, if you're introduced to a man and told, 'That's
+95
+Einstein, you've heard of hi.i before, it may be wrong, and
+so on.
+But maybe in soine cases such a paradigm worksespecially for the man who first gives someone or something
+a name. Or he points to a star and says,
+That is to be Alpha
+Centauri". So he can really make himself this ceremony: 'By
+"Alpha Centauri" I shall mean the star right over there with
+such and such coordinates'. But in general this picture fails. In
+general our reference depends not just on what we think ourselves, but on other people in the community, the history of
+how the name reached one, and things like that. It is by following such a history that one gets to the reference.
+More exact conditions are very conplicated to give. They
+seem in a way somehow different in the case of a famous man
+and one who isn't so famous. For example, a teacher tells his
+class that Newton was famous for being the first man to think
+there's a force pulling things to the earth; I think that's what
+little kids think Newton's greatest achievement was. I won't
+say what the merits of such an achievement would be, but,
+anyway, we may suppose that just being told that this was the
+sole content of Newton's discovery gives the students a false
+belief about Newton, even though they have never heard of
+him before. If, on the other hand, " the teacher uses the name
+'George Smith'-a man by that name is actually his next door
+neighbor-and says that George Smith first squared the circle,
+does it follow from this that the students have a false belief
+about the teacher's neighbor? The teacher doesn't tell them
+that Smith is his neighbor, nor does he believe Smith first
+squared the circle. He isn't particularly trying to get any
+belief about the neighbor into the students' heads. He tries to
+inculcate the belief that there was a man who squared the
+circle, but not a belief about any particular man—he just pulls
+out the first name that occurs to him—as it happens, he uses
+his neighbor's name. It doesn't seem clear in that case that the
+"The essential points of this example were suggested by Richard Miller.
+
+90
+students have a false belief about the neighbor, even though
+there is a causal chain going back to the neighbor. I am not sure
+about this. At any rate more refinements need to be added to
+make this even begin to be a set of necessary and sufficient
+conditions. In that sense it's not a theory, but is supposed to
+give a better picture of what is actually going on.
+A rough statement of a theory might be the following: An
+initial "baptism' takes place. Here the object may be named by
+ostension, or the reference of the name may be fixed by a
+description. 12 When the name is "passed from link to link',
+the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns
+it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he
+heard it. If I hear the name 'Napoleon' and decide it would be
+a nice name for my pet aardvark, I do not satisfy this condition. 43 (Perhaps it is some such failure to keep the reference
+• A good example of a baptism whose reference was fixed by means of a
+description was that of naming Neptune in n. 33, p. 79. The case of a baptism
+by ostension can perhaps be subsumed under the description concept also.
+Thus the primary applicability of the description theory is to cases of initial
+baptism. Descriptions are also used to fix a reference in cases of designation
+which are similar to naming except that the terms introduced are not usually
+called 'names". The terms one meter", '100 degrees Centigrade', have already
+been given as examples, and other examples will be given later in these
+lectures. Two things should be emphasized concerning the case of introducing
+a name via a description in an initial baptism. First, the description used is not
+synonymous with the name it introduces but rather fixes its reference. Here
+we differ from the usual description theorists. Second, most cases of initial
+baptism are far from those which originally inspired the description theory.
+Usually a baptizer is acquainted in some sense with the object he names and is
+able to name it ostensively. Now the inspiration of the description theory lay
+in the fact that we can often use names of famous figures of the past who are
+long dead and with whom no living person is acquainted; and it is precisely
+these cases which, on our view, cannot be correctly explained by a description
+theory.
+13 1 can transmit the name ot the aaravark to oner people. For cach ot these
+people, as for me, there will be a certain sort of causal or historical connection
+between my use of the name and the Emperor of the French, but not one of
+the required type.
+97
+fixed which accounts for the divergence of present uses of
+"Santa Claus' from the alleged original usc.)
+Notice that the preceding outline hardly eliminates the notion
+of reference; on the contrary, it takes the notion of intending
+to use the same reference as a given. There is also an appeal to
+an initial baptism which is explained in terms either of fixing a
+reference by a description, or ostension (if ostension is not to be
+subsumed under the other category).* (Perhaps there are other
+possibilities for initial baptisms.) Further, the George Smith
+case casts some doubt as to the sufficiency of the conditions.
+Even if the teacher does refer to his neighbor, is it clear that he
+has passed on his reference to the pupils? Why shouldn't their
+belief be about any other man named 'George Smith'? If he
+says that Newton was hit by an apple, somehow his task of
+transmitting a reference is easier, since he has communicated a
+common misconception about Newton.
+To repeat, I may not have presented a theory, but I do think
+that I have presented a better picture than that given by
+description theorists.
+I think the next topic I shall want to talk about is that of statements of identity. Are these necessary or contingent? The
+matter has been in some dispute in recent philosophy. First,
+" Once we realize that the description used to fix the reference of a name is
+not synonymous with it, then the description theory can be regarded as presupposing the notion of naming or reference. The requirement I made that
+the description used not itself involve the notion of reference in a circular
+way is something else and is crucial if the description theory is to have any
+value at all. The reason is that the description theorist supposes that each
+speaker essentially uses the description he gives in an initial act of naming to
+determine his reference. Clearly, if he introduces the name 'Cicero' by
+the determination, 'By "Cicero" I shall refer to the man I call "Cicero",' he
+has by this ceremony determined no reference at all.
+Not all description theorists thought that they were eliminating the notion
+of reference altogether. Perhaps some realized that some notion of ostension,
+or primitive reference, is required to back it up. Certainly Russell did.
+
+98
+everyone agrees that descriptions can be used to make contingent identity statements. If it is true that the man who
+invented bifocals was the first Postmaster General of the United
+States—-that these were one and the same—it's contingently
+true. That is, it might have been the case that one man invented
+bifocals and another was the first Postmaster General of the
+United States. So certainly when you make identity statements
+using descriptions—when you say 'the x such that ox and the
+* such that x are one and the same —that can be a contingent
+fact. But philosophers have been interested also in the question
+of identity statements between names. When we say "Hesperus
+is Phosphorus' or 'Cicero is Tully', is what we are saying
+necessary or contingent? Further, they've been intercsted in
+another type of identity statement, which comes from scientific
+theory. We identify, for example, light with electromagnetic
+radiation between certain limits of wavelengths, or with a
+stream of photons. We identify heat with the motion of
+molecules; sound with a certain sort of wave disturbance in
+the air; and so on. Concerning such statements the following
+thesis is commonly held. First, that these are obviously contingent identities: we've found out that light is a stream of
+photons, but of course it might not have been a stream of
+photons. Heat is in fact the motion of molecules; we found
+that out, but heat might not have been the motion of molecules. Secondly, many philosophers feel damned lucky that
+these examples are around. Now, why? These philosophers,
+whose views are expounded in a vast literature, hold to a thesis
+called 'the identity thesis' with respect to some psychological
+concepts. They think, say, that pain is just a certain material
+state of the brain or of the body, or what have you-say the
+stimulation of C-fibers. (It doesn't matter what.) Some people
+have then objected, 'Well, look, there's perhaps a correlation
+between pain and these states of the body; but this must just be
+a contingent correlation between two different things, because
+99
+it was an empirical discovery that this correlation ever held.
+Therefore, by "pain" we must mean something different from
+this state of the body or brain; and, therefore, they must be
+two different things.
+Then it's said, 'Ah, but you see, this is wrong! Everyone
+knows that there can be contingent identities. First, as in the
+bifocals and Postmaster General case, which I have mentioned
+before. Second, in the case, believed closer to the present
+paradigm, of theoretical identifications, such as light and a
+stream of photons, or water and a certain compound of
+hydrogen and oxygen. These are all contingent identities. They
+might have been false. It's no surprise, therefore, that it can be
+true as a matter of contingent fact and not of any necessity that
+feeling pain, or seeing red, is just a certain state of the human
+body. Such psychophysical identifications can be contingent
+facts just as the other identities are contingent facts. And of
+course there are widespread motivations—-ideological, or just
+not wanting to have the 'nomological dangler' of mysterious
+connections not accounted for by the laws of physics, one to
+one correlations between two different kinds of thing, material
+states, and things of an entirely different kind, which lead
+people to want to believe this thesis.
+I guess the main thing I'll talk about first is identity statements between names. But I hold the following about the
+general case. First, that characteristic theoretical identifications
+like 'Heat is the motion of molecules', are not contingent
+truths but necessary truths, and here of course I don't mean just
+physically necessary, but necessary in the highest degreewhatever that means. (Physical necessity, might turn out to be
+necessity in the highest degree. But that's a question which I
+don't wish to prejudge. At least for this sort of example, it
+might be that when something's physically necessary, it always
+is necessary tout court.) Second, that the way in which these
+have turned out to be necessary truths does not seem to me to
+
+NAMING AND NECFSSITY
+be a way in which the mind-brain identities could turn out to
+be either necessary or contingently true. So this analogy has to
+go. It's hard to see what to put in its place. It's hard to see
+therefore how to avoid concluding that the two are actually
+Let me go back to the more mundane case about proper
+names. This is already mysterious enough. There's a dispute
+about this between Quine and Ruth Barcan Marcus. * Marcus
+says that identities between names are necessary. If someone
+thinks that Cicero is Tully, and really uses 'Cicero' and "Tully'
+as names, he is thereby committed to holding that his belief is a
+necessary truth. She uses the term 'mere tag'. Quine replies as
+follows, 'We may tag the planet Venus, some fine evening,
+with the proper name "Hesperus". We may tag the same
+planet again, some day before sunrise, with the proper name
+'Phosphorus". When we discover that we have tagged the
+same planet twice our discovery is empirical. And not because
+the proper names were descriptions. * First, as Quine says
+when we discovered that we tagged the same planet twice, our
+discovery was empirical. Another example I think Quine gives
+in another book is that the same mountain sech from Nepal
+and from Tibet, or somcthing like that, is from one angle
+called 'Mt. Everest' (you've heard of that); from another it's
+supposed to be called "Gaurisanker'. It can actually be an
+empirical discovery that Gaurisanker is Everest. (Quine says
+at the example is actually false. He got the example fror
+rwin Schrödinger. You wouldn't think the inventor of wav
+mechanics got things that wrong. I don't know where the
+mistake is supposed to come from. One could certainly imagine
+this situation as having been the case; and it's another
+" Ruth Barcan Marcus, 'Modalities and Intensional Languages' (comments
+by W. V. Quine, plus discussion) Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science,
+volume I, Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, 1963, pp. 77-116.
+• p. IOI.
+IOI
+good illustration of the sort of thing that Quine has in mind.)
+What about it? I wanted to find a good quote on the other
+side from Marcus in this hook but I am having trouble locating
+one. Being present at that discussion, I remember" that she
+advocated the view that if you really have names, a good
+dictionary should be able to tell you whether they have the
+same reference. So someone should be able, by looking in the
+dictionary, to say that Hesperus and Phosphorus are the same.
+Now this does not seem to be true. It does seem, to many
+people, to be a consequence of the view that identities between
+names are necessary. Therefore the view that identity statements between names are necessary has usually been rejected.
+Russell's conclusion was somewhat different. He did think
+there should never be any empirical question whether two
+names have the same reference. This isn't satisfied for ordinary
+names, but it is satisfied when you're naming your own sense
+datum, or something like that. You say, 'Here, this, and that
+(designating the same sense datum by both demonstratives)'
+So you can tell without empirical investigation that you're
+naming the same thing twice; the conditions are satisfied. Since
+this won't apply to ordinary cases of naming, ordinary "names'
+cannot be genuine names.
+What should we think about this? First, it's true that someone
+can use the name 'Cicero' to refer to Cicero and the name
+"Tully' to refer to Cicero also, and not know that Cicero is
+Tully. So it seems that we do not necessarily know a priori that
+an identity statement between names is true. It doesn't follow
+from this that the statement so expressed is a contingent one if
+true. This is what I've emphasized in my first lecture. There is
+a very strong feeling that leads one to think that, if you can't
+know something by a priori ratiocination, then it's got to be
+contingent: it might have turned out otherwise; but nevertheless I think this feeling is wrong.
+'p. Its.
+
+I02
+Let's suppose we refer to the same heavenly body twice, as
+'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'. We say: Hesperus is that star
+over there in the evening; Phosphorus is that star over there
+in the morning. Actually, Hesperus is Phosphorus. Are there
+really circumstances under which Hesperus wouldn't have been
+Phosphorus? Supposing that Hesperus is Phosphorus, let's try
+to describe a possible situation in which it would not have
+been. Well, it's easy. Someone goes by and he calls two
+different stars 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'. It may even be
+under the same conditions as prevailed when we introduced
+the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'. But are those circumstances in which Hesperus is not Phosphorus or would not
+have been Phosphorus? It seems to me that they are not.
+Now, of course I'm committed to saying that they're not,
+by saying that such terms as 'Hesperus and "Phosphorus,
+when used as names, are rigid designators. They refer in every
+possible world to the planet Venus. Therefore, in that possible
+world too, the planet Venus is the planet Venus and it doesn't
+matter what any other person has said in this other possible
+world. How should we describe this situation? He can't have
+pointed to Venus twice, and in the one case called it "Hesperus'
+and in the other "Phosphorus', as we did. If he did so, then
+'Hesperus is Phosphorus' would have been true in that situation
+too. He pointed maybe neither time to the planet Venus-at
+least one time he didn't point to the planet Venus, let's say
+when he pointed to the body he called 'Phosphorus'. Then in
+that case we can certainly say that the name "Phosphorus'
+might not have referred to Phosphorus.
+We can even say
+that in the very position when viewed in the morning that
+we found Phosphorus, it might have been the case that
+Phosphorus was not there—-that something else was there, and
+that even, under certain circumstances it would have been
+called 'Phosphorus'. But that still is not a case in which Phosphorus was not Hesperus. There might be a possible world in
+I03
+which, a possible counterfactual situation in which, "Hesperus'
+and 'Phosphorus' weren't names of the things they in fact are
+names of. Someone, if he did determine their reference by
+identifying descriptions, might even have used the very
+identifying descriptions we used. But still that's not a case in
+which Hesperus wasn't Phosphorus. For there couldn't have
+been such a case, given that Hesperus is Phosphorus.
+Now this seems very strange because in advance, we are
+inclined to say, the answer to the question whether Hesperus
+is Phosphorus might have turned out either way. So aren't
+there really two possible worlds—-one in which Hesperus was
+Phosphorus, the other in which Hesperus wasn't Phosphorus
+—in advance of our discovering that these were the same?
+First, there's one sense in which things might turn out either
+way, in which it's clear that that doesn't imply that the way it
+finally turns out isn't necessary. For example, the four color
+theoren might turn out to be true and might turn out to be
+false. It might turn out either way. It still doesn't mean that
+the way it turns out is not necessary. Obviously, the "might'
+here is purely 'epistemic'—it merely expresses our present state
+of ignorance, or uncertainty.
+But it seems that in the Hesperus-Phosphorus case, something
+even stronger is true. The evidence I have before I know that
+Hesperus is Phosphorus is that I see a certain star or a certain
+heavenly body in the evening and call it "Hesperus', and in the
+morning and call it 'Phosphorus'. I know these things. There
+certainly is a possible world in which a man should have seen a
+certain star at a certain position in the evening and called it
+"Hesperus' and a certain star in the morning and called it
+"Phosphorus'; and should have concluded—should have found
+out by empirical investigation—that he names two different
+stars, or two different heavenly bodies. At least one of these
+stars or heavenly bodies was not Phosphorus, otherwise it
+couldn't have come out that way. But that's true. And so it's
+
+I04
+true that given the evidence that someone has antecedent to
+his empirical investigation, he can be placed in a sense in
+exactly the same situation, that is a qualitatively identical
+epistemic situation, and call two heavenly bodies 'Hesperus'
+and "Phosphorus', without their being identical. So in that
+sense we can say that it might have turned out either way. Not
+that it might have turned out either way as to Hesperus's being
+Phosphorus. Though for all we knew in advance, Hesperus
+wasn't Phosphorus, that couldn't have turned out any other
+way, in a sense. But being put in a situation where we have
+exactly the same evidence, qualitatively speaking, it could
+have turned out that Hesperus was not Phosphorus; that is, in
+a counterfactual world in which 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'
+were not used in the way that we use them, as names of this
+planet, but as names of some other objects, one could have had
+qualitatively identical evidence and concluded that "Hesperus'
+and 'Phosphorus' named two different objects, * But we, using
+the names as we do right now, can say in advance, that if
+Hesperus and Phosphorus are one and the same, then in no
+other possible world can they be different. We use 'Hesperus'
+as the name of a certain body and 'Phosphorus' as the name of
+a certain body. We use them as names of those bodies in all
+possible worlds. If, in fact, they are the same body, then in any
+other possible world we have to use them as a name of that
+object. And so in any other possible world it will be true that
+Hesperus is Phosphorus. So two things are true: first, that we
+do not know a priori that Hesporus is Phosphorus, and are in no
+position to find out the answer excopt empirically. Second,
+this is so because we could have evidence qualitatively indistinguishable from the evidence we have and determine the
+reference of the two names by the positions of two planets in
+the sky, without the planets being the same.
+4 There is a more elaborate discussion of this point in the third lecture,
+where its relation to a certain sort of counterpart theory is also mentioned.
+IOS
+Of course, it is only a contingent truth (not true in every
+other possible world) that the star seen over there in the
+evening is the star seen over there in the morning, because
+there are possible worlds in which Phosphorus was not
+visible in the morning. But that contingent truth shouldn't
+be identified with the statement that Hesperus is Phosphorus.
+It could only be so identified if you thought that it was a
+necessary truth that Hesperus is visible over there in the evening
+or that Phosphorus is visible over there in the morning. But
+neither of those are necessary truths even if that's the way we
+pick out the planet. These are the contingent marks by which
+we identify a certain planet and give it a name.
+
+LECTURE III: JANUARY 29, 1970
+What's been accomplished, if anything, up to now? First, I've
+argued that a popular view about how names get their reference
+in general doesn't apply. It is in general not the case that the
+reference of a name is determined by some uniquely identifying
+marks, some unique properties satisfied by the referent and
+known or believed to be true of that referent by the speaker.
+First, the properties believed by the speaker need not be
+uniquely specifying. Second, even in the case where they are,
+they may not be uniquely true of the actual referent of the
+speaker's use but of something else or of nothing. This is the
+case where the speaker has erroneous beliefs about some person.
+He does not have correct beliefs about another person, but
+erroneous beliefs about a certain person. In these cases the
+reference actually seems to be determined by the fact that the
+speaker is a member of a community of speakers who use
+the name. The name has been passed to him by tradition from
+link to link.
+Second, I've argued, even if in some special cases, notably
+some cases of initial baptism, a referent is determined by a
+description, by some uniquely identifying property, what that
+property is doing in many cases of designation is not giving a
+synonym, giving something for which the name is an abbreviation; it is, rather, fixing a reference. It fixes the reference by
+some contingent marks of the object. The name denoting that
+107
+object is then used to refer to that object, even in referring to
+counterfactual situations where the object doesn't have the
+properties in question. An example was the case of a meter.
+Finally, at the end of the talk last time we were talking about
+statements of identity. Statements of identity should seem very
+simple but they are somehow very puzzling to philosophers. I
+cannot be sure in my own case whether I have all the possible
+confusions that can be generated by this relation straightened
+out. Some philosophers have found the relation so confusing
+that they change it. It is, for example, thought that if you have
+two names like 'Cicero' and "Tully' and say that Cicero is
+Tully, you can't really be saying of the object which is both
+Cicero and Tully that it is identical with itself. On the contrary, 'Cicero is Tully' can express an empirical discovery, as
+we mentioned before. And so some philosophers, even Frege
+at one early stage of his writing, have taken identity to be a
+relation between names. Identity, so they say, is not the relation
+between an object and itself, but is the relation which holds
+between two names when they designate the same object.
+This occurs even in the more recent literature. I didn't bring
+the book along, but J. B. Rosser, the distinguished logician,
+writes in his book, Logic for Mathematicians, *° that we say that
+× = y if and only if 'x' and 'y' are names for the same object.
+He remarks that the corresponding statement about the object
+itself, that it in no way differs from itself, is of course trivial;
+and so, presumably, cannot be what we mean. This is an
+especially unusual paradigm of what the identity relationship
+should be because it would apply very rarely. As far as I know,
+outside the militant black nationalist movement no one has
+ever been named 'x'. Seriously speaking, of course, "x' and 'y'
+in the open sentence "x = y' are not names at all, they are
+variables. And they can occur with identity as bound variables
+in a closed sentence. If you say for cvery x and y, if x = y then
+• New York, McGraw-Hill (1953), see Chapter VII, 'Equality'.
+
+108
+y = x, or something like that—no names occur in that statement at all, nor is anything said about names. This statement
+would be true even though the human race had never existed
+or, though it did exist, never produced the phenomenon of
+names.
+If anyone ever inclines to this particular account of identity,
+let's suppose we gave him his account. Suppose identity were a
+relation in English between the names. I shall introduce an
+artificial relation called 'schmidentity' (not a word of English)
+which I now stipulate to hold only between an object and
+itself. 5° Now then the question whether Cicero is schmidentical
+with Tully can arise, and if it does arise the same problems will
+hold for this statement as were thought in the case of the
+original identity statement to give the belief that this was a
+relation between the names. If anyone thinks about this
+seriously, I think he will see that therefore probably his
+original account of identity was not necessary, and probably
+not possible, for the problems it was originally meant to solve,
+and that therefore it should be dropped, and identity should
+just be taken to be the relation between a thing and itself. This
+sort of device can be used for a number of philosophical
+problems.
+We have concluded that an identity statement between
+names, when true at all, is necessarily true, even though one
+may not know it a priori. Suppose we identify Hesperus as a
+80 Of course, the device will fail to convince a philosopher who wants to
+argue that an artificial language or concept of the supposed type is logically
+impossible. In the present casc, some philosophers have thought that a relation,
+being essentially two-termed, cannot hold between a thing and itself. This
+position is plainly absurd. Someone can be his own worst enemy, his own
+severest critic and the like. Some relations are reflexive such as the relation
+'no richer than'. Identity or schmidentity is nothing but the smallest reflexive
+relation.
+I hope to elaborate on the utility of this device of imagining a hypothetical
+language elsewhere.
+100
+certain star seen in the evening and Phosphorus as a certain
+star, or a certain heavenly body, seen in the morning; then
+there may be possible worlds in which two different planets
+would have been seen in just those positions in the evening and
+morning. However, at least one of them, and maybe both,
+would not have been Hesperus, and then that would not have
+been a situation in which Hesperus was not Phosphorus. It
+might have been a situation in which the planet seen in this
+position in the evening was not the planet seen in this position
+in the morning; but that is not a situation in which Hesperus
+was not Phosphorus. It might also, if people gave the names
+'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' to these plancts, be a situation in
+which some planet other than Hesperus was called 'Hesperus'.
+But even so, it would not be a situation in which Hesperus
+itself was not Phosphorus. 51
+Some of the problems which bother people in these situations, as I have said, come from an identification, or as I would
+put it, a confusion, between what we can know a priori in
+advance and what is necessary. Certain statements-and the
+identity statement is a paradigm of such a statement on my
+view—if true at all must be necessarily true. One does know
+a priori, by philosophical analysis, that if such an identity statement is true it is necessarily true.
+One qualification: when I say "Hesperus is Phosphorus'
+is necessarily true, I of course do not deny that situations
+might have obtained in which there was no such planet as
+Venus at all, and therefore no Hesperus and no Phosphorus.
+In that casc, there is a question whether the identity statement
+'Hesperus is Phosphorus' would be true, false, or neither true
+" Recall that we describe the situation in our language, not the language
+that the people in that situation would have used. Hence we must use the terms
+"Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' with the same reference as in the actual world.
+The fact that people in that situation might or might not have used these
+names for different planets is irrelevant. So is the fact that they might have
+done so using the very same descriptions as we did to fix their references.
+
+IIO
+nor false. 52 And if we take the last option, is "Hesperus =
+Phosphorus' necessary because it is never false, or should we
+require that a necessary truth be true in all possible worlds? I
+am leaving such problenis outside my considerations altogether.
+If we wish to be somewhat more careful, we could replace the
+statement 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' by the conditional, 'If
+Hesperus exists then Hesperus is Phosphorus', cautiously taking
+only the latter to be necessary. Unfortunately this conditional
+involves us in the problem of singular attributions of existence,
+one I cannot discuss here. In particular, philosophers sympathetic to the description theory of naming often argue that
+one cannot ever say of an object that it exists. A supposed
+statement about the existence of an object really is, so it's
+argued, a statement about whether a certain description or
+property is satisfied. As I have already said, I disagrce.
+Anyway, I can't really go into the problems of existence
+here.
+I want to mention at this point that other considerations
+about de re modality, about an object having essential properties,
+can only be regarded correctly, in my view, if we recognize
+the distinction between a prioricity and necessity. One night
+very well discover essence empirically.
+There are some examples of alleged essential properties in
+an article by Timothy Sprigge.
+The internalist [which means the believer that there are some
+essential properties] says that the Queen must have been born of
+royal blood. (He means that this person must have been of royal
+blood.] The anti-essentialist says there would be no contradiction
+in a news bulletin asserting that it had been established that the
+Queen was not in fact the child of her supposed parents, but had
+been secretly adopted by them, and therefore the proposition that
+she is of royal blood is synthetic...
+52 The same three options exist for "Hesperus is Hesperus', and the answer
+must be the same as in the case of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'.
+III
+For a time the anti-essentialist) is winning. Yet there comes a time
+when his claims appear a trifle too far fetched. The internalist
+suggests that we cannot imagine that particular we call the Queen
+having the property of at no stage in her existence being human. If
+the anti-internalist admits this, admits that it is logically inconceivable that the Queen should have had the property of, say,
+always being a swan, then he admits that she has at least one
+internal property. If on the other hand he says that it's only a
+contingent fact that the Queen has ever been human, he says what
+it is hard to accept. Can we really consider it as conceivable that she
+should never have been human?sa
+'At no stage in her existence' and 'always' are justifications
+Sprigge presumably introduces to allow such possibilities as
+her right now being changed into a swan—by a wicked witch,
+I guess. (Or a benign witch.)
+One confusion I find in this discussion is that in the first case
+Sprigge talks about whether there would be any contradiction
+in supposing that we had an announcement that the Queen was
+born of parents different from the ones she actually had. And
+in that there is no contradiction. Similarly, though, there is no
+contradiction in an announcement that the Queen, this thing we
+thought to be a woman, was in fact an angel in human form,
+or an automaton cleverly constructed by the royal family, who
+did not want the succession to pass to that bastard so-and-so, or
+something. Neither of these announcements represent things
+that we couldn't possibly discover, either. What is the question
+we are asking when we ask whether it's necessary, concerning
+this woman, that she should either have been of royal blood or
+have been human? Royal blood is a little complicated, because
+in order for it to be necessary for her to have been of royal
+blood it has to be necessary that this particular family line at
+some time attained to royal power; but the latter fact seems to
+ss 'Internal and External Properties', Mind 7x (April, 1962), pp. 202-03.
+
+NAMING AND NECESSILY
+be contingent. Therefore I suppose it is contingent that her
+blood should ever have been royal.
+Let's try and refine the question a little bit. The question
+really should be, let's say, could the Queen--could this woman
+herself have been born of different parents from the parents
+from whom she actually came? Could she, let's say, have been
+the daughter instead of Mr. and Mrs. Truman? There would
+be no contradiction, of course, in an announcement that (I hope
+the ages do not make this impossible), fantastic as it may
+sound, she was indeed the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Truman.
+I suppose there might even be no contradiction in the discovery
+that—it seems very suspicious anyway that on either hypothesis
+she has a sister called Margaret-that these two Margarets
+were one and the same person flying back and forth in a clever
+way. At any rate we can imagine discovering all of these
+things.
+But let us suppose that such a discovery is not in fact the
+case. Let's suppose that the Queen really did come from these
+parents. Not to go into too many complications here about
+what a parent is, let's suppose that the parents are the people
+whose body tissues are sources of the biological sperm and egg.
+So you get rid of such recherché possibilities as transplants of
+the sperm from the father, or the egg from the mother, into
+other bodies, so that in one sense other people might have
+been her parents. If that happened, in another sense her parents
+were still the original king and queen. But other than that, can
+we imagine a situation in which it would have happened that
+this very woman came out of Mr. and Mrs. Truman? They
+might have had a child resembling her in many properties.
+Perhaps in some possible world Mr. and Mrs. Truman even
+had a child who actually became the Queen of England and
+was even passed off as the child of other parents. This still would
+not be a situation in which this very woman whom we call
+'Elizabeth II' was the child of Mr. and Mrs. Truman, or so it
+111
+seems to me. It would be a situation in which there was some
+other woman who had many of the properties that are in fact
+true of Elizabeth. Now, one question is, in this possible world,
+was Elizabeth herself ever born? Let's suppose she wasn't ever
+born. It would than be a situation in which, though Truman
+and his wife have a child with many of the properties of
+Elizabeth, Elizabeth herself didn't exist at all. One can only
+become convinced of this by reflection on how you would
+describe this situation. (That, I suppose, means in many cases
+that you won't become convinced of this, at least not at the
+moment. But it is something of which I personally have been
+convinced.)
+How could a person originating from different parents,
+from a totally different sperm and egg, be this very woman?
+One can imagine, given the woman, that various things in her
+life could have changed: that she should have become a
+pauper; that her royal blood should have been unknown, and
+so on. One is given, let's say, a previous history of the world
+up to a certain time, and from that time it diverges considerably
+from the actual course. This seems to be possible. And so it's
+possible that even though she were born of these parents she
+never became queen. Even though she were born of these
+parents, like Mark Twain's characters* she was switched off
+with another girl. But what is harder to imagine is her being
+born of different parents. It seems to me that anything coming
+from a different origin would not be this object.
+In the case of this table, ' we may not know what block of
+wood the table came from. Now could this table have been
+made from a completely different block of wood, or even of
+water cleverly hardened into ice--water taken from the
+Thames River? We could conceivably discover that, contrary
+to what we now think, this table is indeed made of ice from
+0 In The Prince and The Pauper.
+" Of course I was pointing to a wooden table in the room.
+
+the river. But let us suppose that it is not. Then, though we can
+imagine making a table out of another block of wood or even
+from ice, identical in appearance with this one, and though we
+could have put it in this very position in the room, it seems to
+me that this is not to imagine this table as made of wood or ice,
+but rather it is to imagine another table, resembling this one in
+all external details, inade of another block of wood, or even
+of ice. 50, 52
+50 A principle suggested by these examples is: If a material object has its origin
+from a certain hunk of matter, it could not have had its origin in any other matter.
+Some qualifications might have to be stated (for example, the vagueness of the
+notion of hunk of matter leads to some problems), but in a large class of cases
+the principle is perhaps susceptible of something like proof, using the principle
+of the necessity of identity for particulars. Let 'B' be a name (rigid designator)
+of a table, let 'A' name the piece of wood from which it actually came. Let
+'C' name another piece of wood. Then suppose B were made from A, as in
+the actual world, but also another table D were simultaneously made from C.
+(We assume that there is no relation between A and C which makes the
+possibility of making a table from one dependent on the possibility of making
+a table from the other.) Now in this situation B ÷ D; hence, even if D were
+made by itself, and no table were made from A, D would not be B. Strictly
+speaking, the "proof' uses the necessity of distinctness, not of identity. However, the same types of considerations that can be used to establish the latter
+can be used to establish the former. (Suppose X‡ Y; if Xand Y were both
+identical to some object Z in another possible world, then X = Z, Y= Z,
+hence X = Y.) Alternatively, the principle follows from the necessity of
+identity plus the "Brouwersche' axiom, or, equivalently, symmetry of the
+accessibility rclation between possible worlds. In any event, the argument
+applies only if the making of D from C does not affect the possibility of
+making B from A, and vice-versa.
+57 In addition to the principle that the origin of an object is essential to it,
+another principle suggested is that the substance of which it is made is essential.
+Several complications exist here. First, one should not confuse the type of
+essence involved in the question 'What properties must an object retain if it is
+not to cease to exist, and what properties of the object can change while the
+object endures?", which is a temporal question,
+with the question What
+(timeless) properties could the object not have failed to have, and what
+properties could it have lacked while still (timelessly) existing?, which
+concerns necessity and not time and which is our topic here. Thus the question
+of whether the table could have changed into ice is irrelevant here. The question
+IIS
+These are only examples of essential properties.58 I won't
+whether the table could originally have been made of anything other than wood
+is relevant. Obviously this question is related to the necessity of the origin of
+the table from a given block of wood and whether that block, too, is essentially
+wood (even wood of a particular kind). Thus it is ordinarily impossible to
+imagine the table made from any substance other than the one of which it is
+actually made without going back through the entire history of the universe,
+a mind-boggling feat. (Other possibilities of the table not having been wooden
+originally have been suggested to me, including an ingenious suggestion of
+Slote's, but I find none of them really convincing. I cannot discuss them here.)
+A full discussion of the problems of essential properties of particulars is
+impossible here, but I will mention a few other points: (1) Ordinarily when
+we ask intuitively whether something might have happened to a given object,
+we ask whether the universe could have gone on as it actually did up to a
+certain time, but diverge in its history from that point forward so that the
+vicissitudes of that object would have been different from that time forth.
+Perhaps this feature should be erected into a general principle about essence.
+Note that the time in which the divergence from actual history occurs may be
+sometime before the object itself is actually created. For example, I might have
+been deformed if the fertilized egg from which I originated had been damaged
+in certain ways, even though I presumably did not yet exist at that time. (2) I
+am not suggesting that only origin and substantial makeup are essential. For
+example, if the very block of wood from which the table was made had
+instead been made into a vase, the table never would have existed. So (roughly)
+being a table seems to be an essential property of the table. (3) Just as the
+question whether an object actually has a certain property (e.g. baldness) can
+be vaguc, so the question whether the object essentially has a certain property
+can be vague, even when the question whether it actually has the property is
+decided. (4) Certain counterexamples to the origin principle appear to exist
+in ordinary parlance. I am convinced that they are not genuine counterexamples, but their exact analysis is difficult. I cannot discuss this here.
+58 Peter Geach has advocated (in Mental Acts, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
+London, 1957, Section 16, and elsewhere) a notion of "nominal essence'
+different from the type of essential property considered here. According to
+Geach, since any act of pointing is ambiguous, someone who baptizes an
+object by pointing to it must apply a sortal property to disambiguate his
+reference and to ensure correct criteria of identity over time-for example,
+someone who assigns a reference to 'Nixon' by pointing to him must say. "I
+use "Nixon" as a name of that man', thus removing his hearer's temptations
+to take him to be pointing to a nose or a time-slice. The sortal is then in some
+sense part of the meaning of the name; names do have a (partial) sense after all,
+though their senses may not be complete enough to determine their references,
+
+IIO
+dwell on them further because I want to go on to the more
+general casc, which I mentioned in the last lecture, of some
+identitics betwen terms for substances, and also the properties
+of substances and of natural kinds. Philosophers have, as I've
+said, been very interested in statements expressing theoretical
+identifications; among them, that light is a stream of photons,
+that water is HO, that lightning is an electrical discharge, that
+gold is the element with the atomic number 79.
+To get clear about the status of these statements we must
+first maybe have some thoughts about the status of such substances as gold. What's gold? I don't know if this is an example
+which has particularly interested philosophers. Its interest in
+financial circles is diminishing because of increased stability of
+currencies. ° Even so gold has interested many people. Here
+as they are in description and cluster-of-descriptions theories. If I understand
+Geach correctly, his nominal essence should be understood in terms of a
+prioricity, not necessity, and thus is quite different from the kind of essence
+advocated here (perhaps this is part of what he means when he says he is
+dealing with 'nominal", not "real", essences). So 'Nixon is a man', 'Dobbin
+is a horse', and the like would be a priori truths.
+I need not take a position on this view here. But I would briefly mention
+the following: (1) Even if a sortal is used to disambiguate an ostensive reference,
+surely it need not be held a priori to be true of the object designated. Couldn't
+Dobbin turn out to belong to a species other than horses (though superficially
+he looked like a horse), Hesperus to be a planet rather than a star, or Lot's
+guests, even if he names them, to be angels rather than men? Perhaps Geach
+should stick to more cautious sortals. (2) Waiving the objection in (I), surely
+there is a substantial gap between premise and conclusion. Few speakers do in
+fact learn the reference of a given name by ostension; and, even if they picked
+up the name by a chain of communication leading back to an ostension, why
+should the sortal allegedly used in the ostension be, in any sense, part of the
+"sense' of the name for them? No argument is offered here. (An extreme case:
+A mathematician's wife overhears her husband muttering the name 'Nancy".
+She wonders whether Nancy, the thing to which her husband referred, is a
+woman or a Lie group. Why isn't her use of "Nancy" a case of naming? If it
+isn't, the reason is not indefiniteness of her reference.)
+5 I may have spoken too soon. That is what some financial pages said when
+these lectures were delivered, January, 1970.
+117
+is what Immanuel Kant says about gold. (He was a wealthy
+spcculator who kept his possessions under his bed.) Kant is introducing the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements, and he says: "All analytic judgements depend wholly
+on the law of contradiction, and are in their nature a priori
+cognitions, whether the concepts that supply them with matter
+be empirical or not. For the predicate of an affirmative analytic
+judgement is already contained in the concept of the subject,
+of which it cannot be denied without contradiction...
+For this very reason all analytic judgements are a priori even
+when the concepts are empirical, as, for example,
+"Gold is a
+yellow metal"; for to know this I require no experience beyond my concept of gold as a yellow metal. It is, in fact, the
+very concept, and I need only analyze it without looking
+beyond it. "6° I should have looked at the German. 'It is in fact
+the very concept' sounds as if Kant is saying here that "gold'
+just means 'yellow metal'. If he says that, then it's especially
+strange, so let's suppose that that is not what he's saying. At
+least Kant thinks it's a part of the concept that gold is to be a
+yellow metal. He thinks we know this a priori, and that we
+could not possibly discover this to be empirically false.
+Is Kant right about this? First, what I would have wanted to
+do would have been to discuss the part about gold being a
+metal. This, however, is complicated because first, I don't
+know too much chemistry. Investigating this a few days ago
+in just a couple of references, I found in a more phenomenological account of metals the statement that it's very difficult to
+say what a metal is. (It talks about malleability, ductility, and
+the like, but none of these exactly work.) On the other hand,
+something about the periodic table gave a description of
+80 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Preamble Section z.b. (Prussian
+Academy edition, p. 267). My impression of the passage was not changed by a
+subsequent cursory look at the German, though I can hardly lay claim to any
+real competence here.
+
+II8
+elements as metals in terms of their valency properties. This
+may make some people think right away that there are really
+two concepts of metal operating here, a phenomenological
+one and a scientific one which then replaces it. This I reject,
+but since the move will tempt many, and can be refuted only
+after I devclop my own views, it will not be suitable to use
+'Gold is a metal' as an example to introduce these views.
+But let's consider something casier-the question of the
+yellowness of gold. Could we discover that gold was not in
+fact yellow? Suppose an optical illusion were prevalent, due to
+peculiar properties of the atmosphere in South Africa and
+Russia and certain other arcas where gold mines are common.
+Suppose there were an optical illusion which made the substance appear to be yellow; but, in fact, once the peculiar
+properties of the atmosphere were removed, we would see
+that it is actually blue. Maybe a demon even corrupted the
+vision of all those entering the gold mines (obviously their
+souls were already corrupt, and thus made them believe that
+this substance was yellow, though it is not. Would there on
+this basis be an announcement in the newspapers: "It has
+turned out that there is no gold. Gold does not exist. What
+we took to be gold is not in fact gold."? Just imagine the world
+financial crisis under these conditions! Here we have an undrcant of source of shakiness in the monetary system.
+It seems to me that there would be no such announcement.
+On the contrary, what would be announced would be that
+though it appeared that gold was yellow, in fact gold has
+turned out not to be yellow, but blue. The reason is, I think,
+that we usc 'gold' as a term for a certain kind of thing. Others
+have discovered this kind of thing and we have heard of it.
+We thus as part of a community of speakers have a certain
+connection between ourselves and a certain kind of thing. The
+kind of thing is thought to have certain identifying marks. Some
+of these marks may not really be true of gold. We might
+1I9
+discover that we are wrong about them. Further, there might
+be a substance which has all the identifying marks we commonly attributed to gold and used to identify it in the first
+place, but which is not the same kind of thing, which is not
+the same substance. We would say of such a thing that though
+it has all the appearances we initially used to identify gold, it is
+not gold. Such a thing is, for example, as we well know, iron
+pyrites or fool's gold. This is not another kind of gold. It's a
+completely different thing which to the uninitiated person
+looks just like the substance which we discovered and called
+gold. We can say this not because we have changed the meaning
+of the term gold, and thrown in some other criteria which
+distinguished gold from pyrites. It seems to me that that's not
+true. On the contrary, we discovered that certain properties
+were true of gold in addition to the initial identifying marks
+by which we identified it. These propertics, then,
+being
+characteristic of gold and not true of iron pyrites, show that
+the fool's gold is not in fact gold.
+We should look at this in another example. It says somewhere in here:® 'I say "The word "tiger' has meaning in
+English.
+.. If I am then asked "What is a tiger?" I might
+reply "A tiger is a large carnivorous quadrupedal feline, tawny
+yellow in color with blackish transverse stripes and white
+belly," (derived from the entry under "tiger" in the Shorter
+Oxford English Dictionary.)' And now suppose someone says
+'You have just said what the word "tiger" means in English'
+And Ziff asks, 'Is that so?' and he says, correctly, 'I think not.'
+fis example is, Suppose in a jungle clearing one says "look, :
+hree-legged tiger!
+must one be confused? The phrase "a
+three-legged tiger" is not a contradictio in adjecto. But if "tiger"
+in English meant, among other things, either quadruped or
+quadrupedal, the phrase "a three-legged tiger" could only be a
+• Paul Ziff, Semantic Analysis, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1960, PP.
+184-85.
+
+I20
+contradictio in adjecto.' So, his example shows that if it is part of
+the concept of tiger that a tiger has four legs, there couldn't be
+a three-legged tiger. This is the sort of case which many
+philosophers tend to explain as a "cluster concept'. Is it even a
+contradiction to suppose that we should discover that tigers
+never have four legs? Suppose the explorers who attributed
+these properties to tigers were deceived by an optical illusion,
+and that the animals they saw were from a three-legged species,
+would we then say that there turned out to be no tigers after
+all? I think we would say that in spite of the optical illusion
+which had deceived the explorers, tigers in fact have three legs.
+Further, is it true that anything satisfying this description in
+the dictionary is necessarily a tiger? It seems to me that it is
+not. Suppose we discover an animal which, though having all
+external appearances of a tiger as described herc, has an internal
+structure completely different from that of the tiger. Actually
+the word 'felinc' was put in here, so it is not entirely fair. Let's
+suppose it were left out, for this example. That a tiger belongs
+to any particular biological family, anyway, was something
+we discovered. If 'feline' means just having the appearance of a
+cat, let's suppose that it does have the appearance of a big cat.
+We night find animals in some part of the world which,
+though they look just like a tiger, on examination were discovered not even to be mammals. Let's say they were in fact
+very peculiar looking reptiles. Do we then conclude on the
+basis of this description that some tigers are reptiles? We don't.
+We would rather conclude that these animals, though they
+have the external marks by which we originally identified
+tigers, are not in fact tigers, because they are not of the same
+species as the species which we called 'the species of tigers'. Now
+this, I think, is not because, as some people would say, the old
+concept of tiger has been replaced by a new scientific definition.
+I think this is true of the concept of tiger before the internal
+structure of tigers has been investigated. Even though we don't
+I2I
+knou the internal structure of tigers, we suppose—-and let us
+suppose that we are right-that tigers form a certain species or
+natural kind. We then can imagine that there should be a
+creature which, though having all the external appearance of
+tigers, differs from them internally enough that we should say
+that it is not the same kind of thing. We can imagine it without
+knowing anything about this internal structure-what this
+internal structure is. We can say in advance that we use the
+term "tiger' to designate a species, and that anything not of
+this species, even though it looks like a tiger, is not in fact a tiger.
+Just as something may have all the properties by which we
+originally identified tigers and yet not be a tiger, so we might
+also find out tigers had none of the properties by which we
+originally identified them. Perhaps none are quadrupedal, nonc
+tawny yellow, none carnivorous, and so on; all these properties
+turn out to be based on optical illusions or other errors, as in
+the case of gold. So the term "tiger", like the term 'gold", does
+not mark out a "cluster concept' in which most, but perhaps
+not all, of the properties used to identify the kind must be
+satisfied. On the contrary, possession of most of these properties need not be a necessary condition for membership in
+the kind, nor need it be a sufficient condition.
+Since we have found out that tigers do indeed, as we
+suspected, form a single kind, then something not of this kind
+is not a tiger. Of course, we may be mistaken in supposing
+that there is such a kind. In advance, we suppose that they
+probably do form a kind. Past experience has shown that
+usually things like this, living together, looking alike, mating
+together, do form a kind. If there are two kinds of tigers that
+have something to do with each other but not as much as we
+thought, then maybe they form a larger biological family. I€
+they have absolutely nothing to do with each other, then there
+are really two kinds of tigers. This all depends on the history
+and on what we actually find out.
+
+The philosopher I find most to recognize this sort of consideration (our thoughts on these matters developed independently) is Putnam. In an article called 'It Ain't Necessarily
+So' 82 he says of statements about species, that they are "less
+necessary' (as he cautiously says) than statements like "bachelors
+aren't married'. The example he gives is "cats are animals.
+Cats might turn out to be automata, or strange demons (not
+his example) planted by a magician. Suppose they turned out
+to be a species of demons. Then on his view, and I think also
+my view, the inclination is to say, not that there turned out to
+be no cats, but that cats have turned out not to be animals as
+we originally supposed. The original concept of cat is: that
+kind of thing, where the kind can be identified by paradigmatic
+instances. It is not something picked out by any qualitative
+dictionary definition. However, Putnam's conclusion is that
+statements like "cats are animals' are 'less necessary' than statements like "bachelors are unmarried'. Certainly I agree that
+the argument indicates that such statements are not known a
+priori, and hence are not analytic; ® whether a given kind is a
+" Journal of Philosophy, 59, No. 22 (October 25, 196z), Pp. 658-71. In
+subsequent work on natural kinds and physical properties, which I have not
+had a chance to see at the time of this writing, Putnam has done further work,
+which (I gather) has many points of contact with the viewpoint expressed
+here. As I mentioned in the text, there are some divergencies between Putnam's approach and mine; Putnam does not base his considerations on the
+apparatus of necessary versus a priori truths which I invoke.
+In his earlier
+paper, "The Analytic and the Synthetic", Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
+Science, 'vol. III, pp. 358-97, he seems closer to the 'cluster concept' theory in
+some respects, suggesting, for example, that it applies to proper names.
+I should emphasize again that it was an example of Rogers Albritton which
+called my attention to this complex of problems, though Albritton probably
+would not accept the theories I have developed on the basis of the example.
+*3 I am presupposing that an analytic truth is one which depends on meanings
+in the strict sense and therefore is necessary as well as a priori. If statements
+whose a priori truth is known via the fixing of a reference are counted as
+analytic, then some analytic truths are contingent; this possibility is excluded
+in the notion of analyticity adopted here. The ambiguity in the notion of
+123
+species of animals is a matter for empirical investigation.
+Perhaps this episteinological sense is what Putnam means by
+'necessary'. The question remains whether such statements are
+necessary in the non-epistemological sense advocated in these
+lectures. So the next thing to investigate is (using the concept
+of necessity that I talked about): are such statements as "cats
+are animals, or such statements as "gold is a yellow metal",
+necessary?
+So far I've only been talking about what we could find out.
+I've been saying we could find out that gold was not in fact
+yellow, contrary to what we thought. If one went in more
+detail into the concept of metals, let's say in terms of valency
+properties, one could certainly find out that though one took
+gold to be a metal, gold is not in fact a metal. Is it necessary or
+contingent that gold be a metal? I don't want to go into detail
+on the concept of a metal-as I said, I don't know enough
+about it. Gold apparently has the atomic number 79. Is it a
+necessary or a contingent property of gold that it has the atomic
+number 79? Certainly we could find out that we were mistaken. The whole theory of protons, of atomic numbers, the
+whole theory of molecular structure and of atomic structure,
+on which such views are based, could all turn out to be false.
+Certainly we didn't know it from time immemorial. So in that
+sense, gold could turn out not to have atomic number 79.
+Given that gold does have the atomic number 79, could
+something be gold without having the atomic number 79?
+analyticity of course arises from the ambiguity in the usual uses of such terms
+as "definition' and 'sense'. I have not attempted to deal with the delicate
+problems regarding analyticity in these lectures, but I will say that some
+(though not all) of the cases often adduced to discredit the analytic-synthetic
+distinction, especially those involving natural phenomena and natural kinds,
+should be handled in terms of the apparatus of fixing a reference invoked here.
+Note that Kant's example, 'gold is a yellow metal", is not even a priori, and
+whatever necessity it has is established by scientific investigation; it is thus
+far from analytic in any sense.
+
+I24
+Let us suppose the scientists have investigated the nature of
+gold and have found that it is part of the very nature of this
+substance, so to speak, that it have the atomic number 79.
+Suppose we now find some other yellow metal, or some other
+yellow thing, with all the properties by which we originally
+identified gold, and many of the additional ones that we have
+discovered later. An example of one with many of the initial
+properties is iron pyrites, 'fool's gold.' As I have said, we
+wouldn't say that this substance is gold. So far we are speaking
+of the actual world. Now consider a possible world. Consider
+a counterfactual situation in which, let us say, fool's gold or
+iron pyrites was actually tound in various mountains in the
+United States, or in areas of South Africa and the Soviet Union.
+Suppose that all the areas which actually contain gold now,
+contained pyrites instead, or some other substance which
+counterfeited the superficial properties of gold but lacked its
+atomic structure.6* Would we say, of this counterfactual
+situation, that in that situation gold would not even have been
+an element (because pyrites is not an element)? It seems to me
+that we would not. We would instead describe this as a situation
+in which a substance, say iron pyrites, which is not gold,
+would have been found in the very mountains which actually
+contain gold and would have had the very propertics by which
+we commonly identify gold. But it would not be gold; it
+would be something else. One should not say that it would
+still be gold in this possible world, though gold would then
+lack the atomic number 79. It would be some other stuff,
+some other substance. (Once again, whether people counterfactually would have called it 'gold' is irrelevant. We do not
+describe it as gold.) And so, it seems to me, this would not
+be a case in which possibly gold might not have been an
+" Even better pairs of ringers exist; for example, some pairs of elements of a
+single column in the periodic table which resemble each other closely but
+nevertheless are different elements.
+I2S
+element, nor can there be such a case (except in the epistemic
+sense of possible'). Given that gold is this element, any other
+substance, even though it looks like gold and is found in the
+very places where we in fact find gold, would not be gold. It
+would be some other substance which was a counterfeit for
+gold. In any counterfactual situation where the same geographical areas were filled with such a substance, they would
+not have been filled with gold. They would have been filled
+with something else.
+So if this consideration is right, it tends to show that such
+statements representing scientific discoveries about what this
+stuff is are not contingent truths but necessary truths in the
+strictest possible sense. It's not just that it's a scientific law, but
+of course we can imagine a world in which it would fail. Any
+world in which we imagine a substance which does not have
+these properties is a world in which we imagine a substance
+which is not gold, provided these properties form the basis of
+what the substance is. In particular, then, present scientific
+theory is such that it is part of the nature of gold as we have it
+to be an element with atomic number 79. It will therefore be
+necessary and not contingent that gold be an element with
+atomic number 79. (We may also in the same way, then,
+investigate further how color and metallic properties follow
+from what we have found the substance gold to be: to the
+extent that such properties follow from the atomic structure of
+gold, they are necessary properties of it, even though they unquestionably are not part of the meaning of 'gold' and were
+not known with a priori certainty.)
+Putnam's example "cats are animals comes under the same
+sort of heading. We have in fact made a very surprising discovery in this case. We have in fact found nothing to go
+against our belief. Cats are in fact animals! Then is this truth a
+necessary truth or a contingent one? It seems to me that it is
+necessary. Consider the counterfactual situation in which in
+
+126
+place of these creatures-these animals--we have in fact little
+demons which when they approached us brought bad luck
+indeed. Should we describe this as a situation in which cats
+were demons? It seems to me that these demons would not be
+cats. They would be demons in a cat-like form. We could
+have discovered that the actual cats that we have are demons.
+Once we have discovered, however, that they are not, it is part
+of their very nature that, when we describe a counterfactual
+world in which there were such demons around, we must say
+that the demons would not be cats. It would be a world
+containing demons masquerading as cats. Although we could
+say cats might turn out to be demons, of a certain species, given
+that cats are in fact animals, any cat-like being which is not an
+animal, in the actual world or in a counterfactual onc, is not
+a cat. The same holds even for aninials with the appearance of
+cats but reptilic internal structure. Were such to exist, they
+would not be cats, but 'fool's cats.
+This has some relation also to the essence of a particular
+object. The molecular theory has discovered, let's say, that
+this object here is composed of molecules. This was certainly
+an important cipirical discovery. It was something we didn't
+know in advance; maybe this might have been composed, for
+all we knew, of some ethercal entelechy. Now imagine an
+object occupying this very position in the room which was ar
+ethcreal entclechy. Would it be this very object here? It might
+have all the appearance of this object, but it seems to me that
+it could not ever be this thing. The vicissitudes of this thing might
+have been very different from its actual history. It might have
+been transported to the Kremlin. It might have already been
+hewn into bits and no longer exist at the present time. Various
+things might have happened to it. But whatever we imagine
+counterfactually having happened to it other than what actually
+did, the one thing we cannot imagine happening to this thing
+is that it, given that it is composed of molecules, should still
+I27
+have existed and not have been composed of molecules. We
+can imagine having discovered that it wasn't composed of
+molecules. But once we know that this is a thing composed of
+molecules-that this is the very nature of the substance of
+which it is made-we can't then, at least if the way I see it is
+correct, imagine that this thing might have failed to have been
+composed of molecules.
+According to the view I advocate, then, terms for natural
+kinds are much closer to proper names than is ordinarily
+supposed. The old term "common name' is thus quite appropriate for predicates marking out species or natural kinds, such
+as 'cow' or 'tiger'. My considerations apply also, however, to
+certain mass terms for natural kinds, such as gold', 'water',
+and the like. It is interesting to compare my views to those of
+Mill. Mill counts both predicates like 'cow', definite descriptions, and proper names as names. He says of 'singular' names
+that they are connotative if they are definite descriptions but
+non-connotative if they are proper names. On the other hand,
+Mill says that all "general' names are connotative; such a
+predicate as 'human being' is defined as the conjunction of
+certain properties which give necessary and sufficient conditions
+for humanity-rationality, animality, and certain physical
+features. & The modern logical tradition, as represented by
+Frege and Russell, seems to hold that Mill was wrong about
+singular names, but right about general names. More recent
+philosophy has followed suit, except that, in the case of both
+proper names and natural kind terms, it often replaces the
+notion of defining properties by that of a cluster of properties,
+only some of which need to be satisfied in each particular case.
+My own view, on the other hand, regards Mill as more-or-less
+right about 'singular' names, but wrong about 'general' names.
+Perhaps some "general' names ('foolish', 'fat', 'yellow') express
+" Mill, op. cit.
+
+128
+properties. In a significant sense, such general names as "cow'
+and 'tiger' do not, unless being a cow counts trivially as a
+property. Certainly 'cow' and "riger' are not short for the
+conjunction of properties a dictionary would take to define
+them, as Mill thought. Whether science can discover empirically that certain properties are necessary of cows, or of
+tigers, is another question, which I answer affirmatively.
+Let's consider how this applies to the types of identity statements expressing scientific discoveries that I talked about
+before-say, that water is HO. It certainly represents a
+discovery that water is HO. We identified water originally
+by its characteristic feel, appearance and perhaps taste, (though
+the taste may usually be due to the impurities). If there were a
+substance,
+even actually, which had a completely different
+atomic structure from that of water, but resembled water in
+these respects, would we say that some water wasn't H,O? I
+think not. We would say instead that just as there is a fool's
+gold there could be a fool's water; a substance which, though
+having the properties by which we originally identified water,
+would not in fact be water. And this, I think, applies not only
+to the actual world but even when we talk about counterfactual situations. If there had been a substance, which was a
+fool's water, it would then be fool's water and not water. On
+the other hand if this substance can take another form-such
+" I am not going to give any criterion for what I mean by a 'pure property
+r Fregean intension. It is hard to find unquestionable examples of what i
+meant. Yellowness certainly expresses a manifest physical property of an
+object and, relative to the discussion of gold above, can be regarded as a
+property in the required sense. Actually, however, it is not without a certain
+referential element of its own, for on the present view yellowness is picked
+out and rigidly designated as that external physical property of the object
+which we sense by means of the visual impression of yellowness. It does in this
+respect resemble the natural kind terms. The phenomenological quality of the
+sensation itself, on the other hand, can be regarded as a quale in some pure
+sense. Perhaps I am rather vague about these questions, but further precision
+seems unnecessary here.
+129
+as the polywater allegedly discovered in the Soviet Union,
+with very different identifying marks from that of what we
+now call water—it is a form of water because it is the same
+substance, even though it doesn't have the appearances by
+which we originally identified water.
+Let's consider the statement "Light is a stream of photons' or
+'Heat is the motion of molecules. By referring to light, of
+course, I mean something which we have some of in this room.
+When I refer to heat, I refer not to an internal sensation that
+someone may have, but to an external phenomenon which
+we perceive through the sense of feeling; it produces a characteristic sensation which we call the sensation of heat. Heat is
+the motion of molecules. We have also discovered that increasing heat corresponds to increasing motion of molecules,
+or, strictly speaking, increasing average kinetic energy of
+molecules. So temperature is identified with mean molecular
+kinetic energy. However I won't talk about temperature
+because there is the question of how the actual scale is to be set.
+It might just be set in terms of the mean molecular kinetic
+energy.® But what represents an interesting phenomenological
+discovery is that when it's hotter the molecules are moving
+faster. We have also discovered about light that light is a stream
+of photons; alternatively it is a form of electromagnetic
+radiation. Originally we identified light by the characteristic
+internal visual impressions it can produce in us, that make us
+able to see. Heat, on the other hand, we originally identified
+by the characteristic effect on one aspect of our nerve endings
+or our sense of touch.
+Imagine a situation in which human beings were blind or
+their eyes didn't work. They were unaffected by light. Would
+that have been a situation in which light did not exist? It seems
+• Of course, there is the question of the relation of the statistical mechanical
+notion of temperature to, for example, the thermodynamic notion. I wish to
+leave such questions aside in this discussion.
+
+I30
+to me that it would not. It would have been a situation in
+which our eyes were not sensitive to light. Some creatures may
+have eyes not sensitive to light. Among such creatures are
+unfortunately some people, of course; they are called "blind'.
+Even if all people had had awful vestigial growths and just
+couldn't see a thing, the light might have been around; but it
+would not have been able to affect people's eyes in the proper
+way. So it seems to me that such a situation would be a
+situation in which there was light, but people could not see it.
+So, though we may identify light by the characteristic visual
+impressions it produces in us, this seems to be a good example
+of fixing a reference. We fix what light is by the fact that it is
+whatever, out in the world, affects our eyes in a certain way.
+But now, talking about counterfactual situations in which
+let's say, people were blind, we would not then say that since,
+in such situations, nothing could affect their eyes, light would
+not exist; rather we would say that that would be a situation
+in which light-the thing we have identified as that which in
+fact enables us to see-existed but did not manage to help us
+see due to some defect in us.
+Perhaps we can imagine that, by some miracle, sound waves
+somehow enabled some creature to see. I mean, they gave him
+visual impressions just as we have, maybe exactly the same
+color sense. We can also imagine the same creature to be
+completely insensitive to light (photons). Who knows what
+subtle undreamt of possibilities there may be? Would we say
+that in such a possible world, it was sound which was light,
+that these wave motions in the air were light? It seems to me
+that, given our concept of light, we should describe the
+situation differently. It would be a situation in which certain
+creatures, maybe even those who were called people and
+inhabited this planet, were sensitive not to light but to sound
+waves, sensitive to them in exactly the same way that we are
+sensitive to light. If this is so, once we have found out what
+I3I
+light is, when we talk about other possible worlds we are
+talking about this phenomenon in the world, and not using
+'light' as a phrase synonymous with 'whatever gives us the visual
+impression—whatever helps us to see'; for there might have
+been light and it not helped us to see; and even something else
+might have helped us to see. The way we identified light fixed
+a reference.
+And similarly for other such phrases, such as "hear'. Here heat
+is something which we have identified (and fixed the reference
+of its name) by its giving a certain sensation, which we call 'the
+sensation of heat.
+We don't have a special name for this
+sensation other than as a sensation of heat. It's interesting that
+the language is this way. Whereas you might suppose it, from
+what I an saying, to have been the other way. At any rate, we
+identify heat and are able to sense it by the fact that it produces
+in us a sensation of heat. It might here be so important to the
+concept that its reference is fixed in this way, that if someone
+else detects heat by some sort of instrument, but is unable to
+feel it, we might want to say, if we like, that the concept of
+heat is not the same even though the referent is the same.
+Nevertheless, the term "heat' doesn't mean 'whatever gives
+people these sensations'. For first, people might not have been
+sensitive to heat, and yet the heat still have existed in the
+external world. Secondly, let us suppose that somehow light
+rays, because of some difference in their nerve endings, did give
+them these sensations. It would not then be heat but light which
+gave people the sensation which we call the sensation of heat.
+Can we then imagine a possible world in which heat was not
+molecular motion? We can imagine, of course, having discovered that it was not. It seems to me that any case which
+someone will think of, which he thinks at first is a case in which
+heat—-contrary to what is actually the case—-would have been
+something other than molecular motion, would actually be a
+case in which some creatures with different nerve endings from
+
+132
+ours inhabit this planet (maybe even we, if it's a contingent
+fact about us that we have this particular neural structure), and
+in which these creatures were sensitive to that something else,
+say light, in such a way that they felt the same thing that we
+feel when we fcel heat. But this is not a situation in which, say,
+light would have been heat, or even in which a stream of
+photons would have been heat, but a situation in which a
+stream of photons would have produced the characteristic
+sensations which we call 'sensations of heat'.
+Similarly for many other such identifications, say, that
+lightning is electricity. Flashes of lightning are flashes of
+electricity. Lightning is an electrical discharge. We can imagine,
+of course, I suppose, other ways in which the sky might be
+illuminated at night with the same sort of flash without any
+electrical discharge being present. Here too, I am inclined to
+say, when we imagine this, we imagine something with all the
+visual appearances of lightning but which is not, in fact,
+lightning. One could be told: this appeared to be lightning
+but it was not. I suppose this might even happen now. Someone
+might, by a clever sort of apparatus, produce some phenomenon in the sky which would fool people into thinking that
+there was lightning even though in fact no lightning was
+present. And you wouldn't say that that phenomenon, because
+it looks like lightning, was in fact lightning. It was a different
+phenomenon from lightning, which is the phenomenon of
+an electrical discharge; and this is not lightning but just something that deceives us into thinking that there is lightning.
+What characteristically goes on in these cases of, let's say,
+"heat is molecular motion'? There is a certain referent which
+we have fixed, for the real world and for all possible worlds,
+by a contingent property of it, namely the property that it's
+able to produce such and such sensations in us. Let's say it's a
+contingent property of heat that it produces such and such
+sensations in people. It's after all contingent that there should
+133
+ever have been people on this planet at all. So one doesn't
+know a priori what physical phenomenon, described in other
+terms—in basic terms of physical theory—is the phenomenon
+which produces these sensations. We don't know this, and
+we've discovered eventually that this phenomenon is in fact
+molecular motion. When we have discovered this, we've discovered an identification which gives us an essential property of this phenomenon. We have discovered a phenomenon
+which in all possible
+worlds will be molecular motionwhich could not have failed to be molecular motion, because
+that's what the phenomenon is.® On the other hand, the
+property by which we identify it originally, that of producing
+such and such a sensation in us, is not a necessary property but
+a contingent one.
+This very phenomenon could have existed,
+but due to differences in our neural structures and so on, have
+failed to be felt as heat. Actually, when I say our neural structures, as those of human beings, I'm really hedging a point
+which I made earlier; because of course, it might be part of
+the very nature of human beings that they have a neural
+structure which is sensitive to heat. Therefore this too could
+turn out to be necessary if enough investigation showed it.
+This I'm just ignoring,
+for the purpose of simplifying the
+discussion. At any rate it's not necessary, I suppose, that this
+" Some people have been inclined to argue that although certainly we
+cannot say that sound waves 'would have been heat' if they had been felt by
+the sensation which we feel when we feel heat, the situation is different with
+respect to a possible phenomenon, not present in the actual world, and distinct
+from molecular motion. Perhaps, it is suggested, there might be another form
+of heat other than 'our heat", which was not molecular motion; though no
+actual phenomenon other than molecular motion, such as sound,
+would
+qualify. Similar claims have been made for gold and for light. Although I am
+disinclined to accept these views, they would make relatively little difference
+to the substance of the present lectures. Someone who is inclined to hold
+these views can simply replace the terms "light", "heat", 'pain', etc., in the
+examples by 'our light", 'our heat", 'our pain' and the like. I therefore will not
+take the space to discuss this issue here.
+
+134
+planet should have been inhabited by creatures sensitive to
+heat in this way.
+I will conclude with some remarks about the application of
+the foregoing considerations to the debate over the mind-body
+identity thesis. Before I do so, however, I wish to recapitulate
+the views I have developed, and perhaps add a point or two.
+First, my argument implicitly concludes that certain general
+terms, those for natural kinds, have a greater kinship with
+proper names than is generally realized. This conclusion holds
+for certain for various species names, whether they are count
+nouns, such as 'cat", 'tiger', 'chunk of gold', or mass termis such
+as "gold', 'water', 'iron pyrites'. It also applies to certain terms
+for natural phenomena, such as 'heat', "light', "sound", 'lightning', and, presumably, suitably elaborated, to corresponding
+adjectives— hot, 'loud, red".
+Mill, as I have recalled, held that although some singular
+names, the definite descriptions, have both denotation and
+connotation, others, the genuine proper names, had denotation
+but not connotation. Mill further maintained that "general
+names", or general terms, had connotation. Such terms as
+'cow' or "human' are defined by the conjunction of certain
+properties which pick out their extension—a human being, for
+example, is a rational animal with certain physical characteristics. The hoary tradition of definition by genus and differentia
+is of a piece with such a conception. If Kant did, indeed,
+suppose that 'gold' could be defined as 'yellow metal", it may
+well be this tradition which led him to the definition. ("Metal'
+would be the genus, 'yellow' the differentia. The differentia
+could hardly include "being gold' without circularity.)
+The modern logical tradition, as represented by Frege and
+Russell, disputed Mill on the issue of singular names, but endorsed him on that of general names. Thus all terms, both
+singular and general, have a "connotation' or Fregean sense.
+More recent theorists have followed Frege and Russell, modi-
+135
+fying their views only by replacing the notion of a sense as
+given by a particular conjunction of properties with that of a
+sense as given by a 'cluster' of properties, only enough of which
+need apply. The present view, directly reversing Frege and
+Russell, (more or less) endorses Mill's view of singular terms, but
+disputes his view of general terms.
+Second, the present view asserts, in the case of species terms
+as in that of proper names, that one should bear in mind the
+contrast between the a priori but perhaps contingent properties
+carried with a term, given by the way its reference was fixed,
+and the analytic (and hence necessary) properties a term may
+carry, given by its meaning. For species, as for proper nanes,
+the way the reference of a term is fixed should not be regarded
+as a synonym for the term. In the case of proper names, the
+reference can be fixed in various ways. In an initial baptism it
+is typically fixed by an ostension or a description. Otherwise,
+the reference is usually determined by a chain, passing the
+name from link to link. The same observations hold for such
+a general term as 'gold'. If we imagine a hypothetical (admittedly somewhat artificial) baptism of the substance, we
+must imagine it picked out as by some such 'definition' as,
+"Gold is the substance instantiated by the items over there, or
+at any rate, by almost all of them'. Several features of this
+baptism are worthy of note. First, the identity in the 'definition'
+does not express a (completely) necessary truth: though each
+of these items is, indeed, essentially (necessarily) gold," gold
+might have existed even if the items did not. The definition
+does,
+however, express an a priori truth, in the same sense
+as (and with the same qualifications applied as) "I meter =
+length of S': it fixes a reference. I believe that, in general,
+• Assuming, of course, that they are all gold; as I say below, some may be
+fool's gold. We know in advance, a priori, that it is not the case that the items
+are typically fool's gold; and all those items which are actually gold are, of
+course, essentially gold.
+
+136
+terms for natural kinds (e.g., animal, vegetable, and chemical
+kinds) get their reference fixed in this way; the substance is
+defined as the kind instantiated by (almost all of) a given
+sample. The 'almost all' qualification allows that some fools'
+gold may be present in the sample. If the original sample has a
+small number of deviant items, they will be rejected as not
+really gold. If, on the other hand, the supposition that there is
+one uniform substance or kind in the initial sample proves
+more radically in error, reactions can vary: sometimes we may
+declare that there are two kinds of gold, sometimes we may
+drop the term 'gold'. (These pessibilities are not supposed to
+be exhaustive.) And the alleged new kind may prove illusory
+for other reasons. For example, suppose some items (let the
+set of them be I) are discovered and are believed to belong to
+a new kind K. Suppose that later it is discovered that the items
+in I are indeed of a single kind; however, they belong to a
+previously known kind, L. Observational error led to the
+false initial belief that the items in I possessed sume characteristic
+C excluding them from L. In this case we would surely say
+that the kind K does not exist, in spite of the fact that it was
+defined by reference to a uniform initial sample. (Note that
+if L had not previously been identified, we might well have
+said that the kind K did exist, but that we were in error in supposing it to be associated with the characteristic C!) To the
+extent that the notion 'same kind' is vaguc, so is the original
+notion of gold. Ordinarily, the vagueness doesn't matter in
+practice.
+In the case of a natural phenomenon perceptible to the
+senses, the way the reference is picked out is simple: 'Heat =
+that which is sensed by sensation S'. Once again, the identity
+fixes a reference: it therefore is a priori, but not necessary,
+since heat might have existed, though we did not. 'Heat', like
+'gold, is a rigid designator, whose reference is fixed by its
+"definition'. Other natural phenomena, such as clectricity, are
+I37
+originally identified as the causes of certain concrete experimental effects. I do not attempt to give exhaustive characterizations here, only examples.
+Third, in the case of natural kinds, certain properties, believed to be at least roughly characteristic of the kind and
+believed to apply to the original sample, are used to place new
+itens, outside the original sample, in the kind. ("Properties' is
+used here in a broad sense, and may include larger kinds: for
+example animality and felinity, for tigers.) These properties
+need not hold a priori of the kind; later empirical investigation
+may establish that some of the properties did not belong to the
+original sample, or that they were peculiarities of the original
+sample, not to be generalized to the kind as a whole. (Thus the
+yellowness of gold may be an optical illusion; or, more
+plausibly, though the gold originally observed was indeed
+yellow, it could turn out that some gold is white.) On the
+other hand, an item may possess all the characteristics originally
+used and fail to belong to the kind. Thus an animal may look
+just like a tiger, and fail to be a tiger, as mentioned above;
+distinct clements in the same column of the periodic table
+may resemble each other rather closely. Such failures are the
+exception; but, as in the periodic table, they do arise. (Sometimes a failure of the initial sample to have the characteristics
+associated with it may lead us to repudiate the species, as in
+the I-K-L case above. But this phenomenon is not typical, let
+alone universal; see the remarks on the yellowness of gold, or
+whether cats are animals.) A priori, all we can say is that it is
+at empirical matter whether the characteristics originally
+associated with the kind apply to its members universally, or
+even ever, and whether they are in fact jointly sufficient for
+membership in the kind. (The joint sufficiency is extremely
+unlikely to be necessary, but it may be true. In fact, any animal
+looking just like a tiger is a tiger—as far as I know—-though it
+is (metaphysically) possible that there should have been animals
+
+138
+that resenbled tigers but were not tigers. The universal applicability, on the other hand, may well be necessary, if true.
+"Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth. Indeed
+of many such statements, especially those subsuming one
+species under another, we know a priori that, if they are true
+at all, they are necessarily true.)
+Fourth, scientific investigation generally discovers characteristics of gold which are far better than the original set. For
+example, it turns out that a material object is (pure) gold if and
+only if the only element contained therein is that with atomic
+number 79. Here, the 'if and only if' can be taken to be strict
+(necessary). In general, science attempts, by investigating basic
+structural traits, to find the nature, and thus the essence (in the
+philosophical sense) of the kind. The case of natural phenomena
+is similar; such theoretical identifications as 'heat is molecular
+motion' are necessary, though not a priori. The type of property
+identity used in science seems to be associated with necessity,
+not with a prioricity, or analyticity: For all bodies x and y, x is
+hotter than y if and only if * has higher mean molecular
+kinetic energy than y. Here the coextensiveness of the predicates
+is necessary, but not a priori. The philosophical notion of
+attribute, on the other hand, seems to demand a priori (and
+analytic) coextensiveness as well as necessary coextensiveness.
+Note that on the present view, scientific discoveries of species
+essence do not constitute a 'change of meaning'; the possibility
+of such discoveries was part of the original enterprise. We
+need not even assume that the biologist's denial that whales
+are fish shows his "concept of fishhood' to be different from
+that of the layman; he simply corrects the layman, discovering
+that 'whales are mammals, not fish' is a necessary truth. Neither
+'whales are mammals' nor 'whales are fish' was supposed to be
+a priori or analytic in any case.
+Fifth, and independently of the scientific investigations just
+mentioned, the 'original sample' gets augmented by the dis-
+139
+covery of new items." (In the case of gold, men applied
+tremendous effort to the task. Those who doubt the natural
+scientific curiosity of Man should consider this case. Only such
+anti-scientific fundamentalists as Bryan cast aspersions on the
+effort.) More important, the species-name may be passed from
+link to link, exactly as in the case of proper names, so that
+many who have seen little or no gold can still use the term.
+Their reference is determined by a causal (historical) chain,
+not by use of any items. I will make even less effort here
+to spell out an exact theory than in the case of proper
+names.
+Usually, when a proper name is passed from link to link,
+the way the reference of the name is fixed is oflittle importance
+to us. It matters not at all that different speakers may fix the
+reference of the name in different ways, provided that they
+give it the same referent. The situation is probably not very
+different for species names, though the temptation to think
+that the metallurgist has a different concept of gold from the
+man who has never seen any may be somewhat greater. The
+interesting fact is that the way the reference is fixed seems overwhelmingly important to us in the case of sensed phenomena:
+a blind man who uses the term "light', even though he uses it
+as a rigid designator for the very same phenomenon as we,
+seens to us to have lost a great deal, perhaps enough for us to
+declare that he has a different concept. ('Concept' here is used
+non-technically!) The fact that we identify light in a certain
+way seems to us to be crucial, even though it is not necessary;
+the intimate connection may create an illusion of necessity. I
+think that this observation, together with the remarks on
+property-identity above, may well be essential to an under-
+10 Obviously, there are also artificialities in this whole account. For example,
+it may be hard to say which items constitute the original sample. Gold may
+have been discovered independently by various people at various times. I do
+not feel that any such complications will radically alter the picture.
+
+I40
+standing of the traditional disputes over primary and secondary
+qualities."
+Let us return to the question of theoretical identification.
+Theoretical identities, according to the conception I advocate,
+are generally identities involving two rigid designators and
+therefore are examples of the necessary a posteriori. Now in
+spite of the arguments I gave before for the distinction between
+necessary and a priori truth, the notion of a posteriori necessary
+truth may still be somewhat puzzling. Someone may well be
+inclined to argue as follows: 'You have admitted that heat
+might have turned out not to have been molecular motion,
+and that gold might have turned out not to have been the
+element with the atomic number 79. For that matter, you also
+* To understand this dispute, it is especially important to realize that
+yellowness is not a dispositional property, although it is related to a disposition.
+Many philosophers for want of any other theory of the meaning of the term
+"yellow", have been inclined to regard it as expressing a dispositional property.
+At the same time, I suspect many have been bothered by the 'gut feeling' that
+yellowness is a manifest property, just as much right out there as hardness or
+spherical shape. The proper account, on the present conceprion is, of course,
+that the reference of "yellowness' is fixed by the description "that (manifest)
+property of objects which causes them, under normal circumstances, to be
+seen as yellow (i.e., to be sensed by certain visual impressions)'; "yellow", of
+course, does not mean 'tends to produce such and such a sensation'; if we had
+had different neutral structures, if atmospheric conditions had been different,
+if we had been blind, and so on, then yellow objects would have done no such
+thing. If one tries to revise the definition of 'yellow' to be, 'tends to produce
+such and such visual impressions under circumstances C*, then one will find
+that the specification of the circumstances C either circularly involves yellowness or plainly makes the alleged definition into a scientific discovery rather
+than a synonymy. If we take the 'fixes a reference' view, then it is up to the
+physical scientist to identify the property so marked out in any more fundamental physical terms that he wishes.
+Some philosophers have argued that such terms as "sensation of yellow',
+"sensation of heat", 'sensation of pain', and the like, could not be in the language
+unless they were identifiable in terms of external observable phenomena, such
+as heat, yellowness, and associated human behavior. I think that this question
+is independent of any view argued in the text.
+I4I
+have acknowledged that Elizabeth Il might have turned out
+not to be the daughter of George VI, or even to originate in
+the particular sperm and egg we had thought, and this table
+might have turned out to be made from ice made from water
+from the Thames. I gather that Hesperus might have turned
+out not to be Phosphorus. What then can you mean when you
+say that such eventualities are impossible? If Hesperus might
+have turned out not to be Phosphorus, then Hesperus might
+not have been Phosphorus. And similarly for the other cases: if
+the world could have turned out otherwise, it could have been
+otherwise. To deny this fact is to deny the self-evident modal
+principle that what is entailed by a possibility must itself be
+possible. Nor can you evade the difficulty by declaring the
+"might have" of "might have turned out otherwise" to be
+merely epistemic, in the way that "Fermat's Last Theorem
+might turn out to be true and might turn out to be false"
+merely expresses our present ignorance, and "Arithmetic might
+have turned out to be complete» signals our former ignorance.
+In these mathematical cases, we may have been ignorant, but
+it was in fact mathematically impossible for the answer to turn
+out other than it did. Not so in your favorite cases of essence
+and of identity between two rigid designators: it really is
+logically possible that gold should have turned out to be a
+compound, and this table might really have turned out not to
+be made of wood, let alone of a given particular block of wood.
+The contrast with the mathematical case could not be greater
+and would not be alleviated even if, as you suggest, there may
+be mathematical truths which it is impossible to know a priori.
+Perhaps anyone who has caught the spirit of my previous
+remarks can give my answer himself, but there is a clarification
+of my previous discussion which is relevant here. The objector
+is correct when he argues that if I hold that this table could not
+have been made of ice, then I must also hold that it could not
+have turned out to be made of ice; it could have turned out that P
+
+....
+I42
+entails that P could have been the case. What, then, does the
+intuition that the table might have turned out to have been
+made of ice or of anything else, that it might even have turred
+out not to be made of molecules, amount to? I think that it
+means simply that there might have been a table looking and
+feeling just like this one and placed in this very position in the
+room, which was in fact made of ice. In other words, I (or
+some conscious being) could have been qualitatively in the same
+epistemic situation that in fact obtains, I could have the same
+sensory evidence that I in fact have, about a table which was
+made of ice. The situation is thus akin to the one which inspired
+the counterpart theorists; when I speak of the possibility of
+the table turning out to be made of various things, I am
+speaking loosely. This table itself could not have had an origin
+different from the one it in fact had, but in a situation qualitatively identical to this one with respect to all the evidence I had
+in advance, the room could have contained a table made of ice in
+place of this one. Something like counterpart theory is thus
+applicable to the situation, but it applies only because we are
+not interested in what might have been true of this particular
+table, but in what might or might not be true of a table given
+certain evidence. It is precisely because it is not true that this
+table might have been made of ice from the Thames that we
+must tun here to qualitative descriptions and counterparts. To
+apply these notions to genuine de re modalities is, from the
+present standpoint, perverse.
+The general answer to the objector can be stated, then, as
+follows: Any necessary truth, whether a priori or a posteriori,
+could not have turned out otherwise. In the case of some
+necessary a posteriori truths, however, we can say that under
+appropriate qualitatively identical evidential situations,
+an
+appropriate corresponding qualitative statement might have
+been false. The loose and inaccurate statement that gold might
+have turned out to be a compound should be replaced (roughly)
+143
+by the statement that it is logically possible that there should
+have been a compound with all the properties originally known
+to hold of gold. The inaccurate statement that Hesperus might
+have turned out not to be Phosphorus should be replaced by
+the true contingency mentioned earlier in these lectures: two
+distinct bodies might have occupied, in the morning and the
+evening, respectively, the very positions actually occupied by
+Hesperus-Phosphorus-Venus.' The reason the example of
+Fermat's Last Theorem gives a different impression is that
+here no analogue suggests itself, except for the extremely
+general statement that, in the absence of proof or disproof, it is
+possible for a mathematical conjecture to be either true or false.
+I have not given any general paradigm for the appropriate
+corresponding qualitative contingent statement. Since we are
+concerned with how things might have turned out otherwise,
+our general paradigm is to redescribe both the prior evidence
+and the statement qualitatively and claim that they are only
+contingently related. In the case of identities, using two rigid
+designators, such as the Hesperus-Phosphorus case above, there
+is a simpler paradigm which is often usable to at least approximately the same effect. Let "R,' and 'R,' be the two rigid
+designators which flank the identity sign. Then 'R, = Ro' is
+necessary if true. The references of "R,' and 'R', respectively,
+may well be fixed by nonrigid designators 'D,' and 'D?', in the
+Hesperus and Phosphorus cases these have the form 'the
+heavenly body in such-and-such position in the sky in the
+evening (morning)". Then although 'R, = Rs' is necessary,
+" Some of the statements I myself make above may be loose and inaccurate
+in this sense. If I say, 'Gold might turn out not to be an element,' I speak
+correctly; 'might' here is epistemic and expresses the fact that the evidence does
+not justify a priori (Cartesian) certainty that gold is an element. I am also
+strictly correct when I say that the clementhood of gold was discovered a
+posteriori. If I say, 'Gold might have turned out not to be an element,' I scem to
+mean this metaphysically and my statement is subject to the correction noted
+in the text.
+
+-..
+144
+'D, = D,' may well be contingent, and this is often what leads
+to the erroneous view that 'R, = R¿' might have turned out
+otherwise.
+I finally turn to an all too cursory discussion of the application
+of the foregoing considerations to the identity thesis. Identity
+theorists have been concerned with several distinct types of
+identifications: of a person with his body, of a particular
+sensation (or event or state of having the sensation) with a
+particular brain state (Jones's pain at 06 : 00 was his C-fiber
+stimulation at that time), and of types of mental states with the
+corresponding types of physical states (pain is the stimulation of
+C-fibers). Each of these, and other types of identifications in
+the literature, present analytical problems, rightly raised by
+Cartesian critics, which cannot be avoided by a simple appeal
+to an alleged confusion of synonymy with identity. I should
+mention that there is of course no obvious bar, at least (I say
+cautiously) none which should occur to any intelligent thinker
+on a first reflection just before bedtime, to advocacy of some
+identity theses while doubting or denying others. For example,
+some philosophers have accepted the identity of particular
+sensations with particular brain states while denying the possibility ofidentities between mental and physical types? I will
+concern myself primarily with the type-type identities, and the
+philosophers in question will thus be immune to much of the
+discussion; but I will mention the other kinds ofidentities briefly.
+Descartes, and others following him, argued that a person or
+mind is distinct from his body, since the mind could exist without the body. He might equally well have argued the same
+* Thomas Nagel and Donald Davidson are notable examples. Their views
+are very interesting, and I wish I could discuss them in further detail. It is
+doubtful that such philosophers wish to call themselves 'materialists'. Davidson,
+in particular, bases his case for his version of the identity theory on the supposed impossibility of correlating psychological properties with physical ones.
+The argument against token-token identification in the text does apply to
+these views.
+145
+conclusion from the premise that the body could have existed
+without the mind." Now the one response which I regard as
+plainly inadmissible is the response which cheerfully accepts
+the Cartesian premise while denying the Cartesian conclusion.
+Let 'Descartes' be a name, or rigid designator, of a certain
+person, and let 'B' be a rigid designator of his body. Then if
+Descartes were indeed identical to B, the supposed identity,
+being an identity between two rigid designators, would be
+necessary, and Descartes could not exist without B and B could
+not exist without Descartes. The case is not at all comparable to
+the alleged analogue, the identity of the first Postmaster
+General with the inventor of bifocals. True, this identity
+obtains despite the fact that there could have been a first
+Postmaster General even though bifocals had never been
+invented. The reason is that 'the inventor of bifocals' is not a
+rigid designator; a world in which no one invented bifocals is
+not ipso facto a world in which Franklin did not exist. The
+alleged analogy therefore collapses; a philosopher who wishes
+76 Of course, the body does exist without the mind and presumably without
+the person, when the body is a corpse. This consideration, if accepted, would
+already show that a person and his body are distinct. (See David Wiggins, 'On
+Being at the Same Place at the Same Time', Philosophical Review, Vol. T7
+(1968), pp. go-s.) Similarly, it can be argued that a statue is not the hunk of
+matter of which it is composed. In the latter case, however, one might say
+instead that the former is 'nothing over and above' the latter; and the same
+device might be tried for the relation of the person and the body. The difficulties in the text would not then arise in the same form, but analogous difficulties
+would appear. A theory that a person is nothing over and above his body in
+the way that a statue is nothing over and above the matter of which it is
+composed, would have to hold that (necessarily) a person exists if and only if
+his body exists and has a certain additional physical organization. Such a thesis
+would be subject to modal difficulties similar to those besetting the ordinary
+identity thesis, and the same would apply to suggested analogues replacing the
+identification of mental states with physical states. A further discussion of this
+matter must be left for another place. Another view which I will not discuss,
+although I have little tendency to accept it and am not even certain that it has
+been set out with genuine clarity, is the so-called functional state view of
+psychological concepts.
+
+I46
+to refute the Cartesian conclusion must refute the Cartesian
+premise, and the latter task is not trivial.
+Let 'A' name a particular pain sensation, and let 'B' name
+the corresponding brain state, or the brain state some identity
+theorist wishes to identify with A. Prima facie, it would seem
+that it is at least logically possible that B should have existed
+(Jones's brain could have been in exactly that state at the time
+in question) without Jones feeling any pain at all, and thus
+without the presence of A. Once again, the identity theorist
+cannot admit the possibility cheerfully and proceed from there;
+consistency, and the principle of the necessity of identities
+using rigid designators, disallows any such course. If A and B
+were identical, the identity would have to be necessary. The
+difficulty can hardly be evaded by arguing that although B
+could not exist without A, being a pain is merely a contingent
+property of A, and that therefore the presence of B without
+pain does not imply the presence of B without A. Can any
+case of essence be more obvious than the fact that being a pain is
+a necessary property of each pain? The identity theorist who
+wishes to adopt the strategy in question must even argue that
+being a sensation is a contingent property of A, for prima facie it
+would seem logically possible that B could exist without any
+sensation with which it might plausibly be identified. Consider
+a particular pain, or other sensation, that you once had. Do you
+find it at all plausible that that very sensation could have existed
+without being a sensation, the way a certain inventor (Franklin)
+could have existed without being an inventor?
+I mention this strategy because it seems to me to be adopted
+by a large number of identity theorists. These theorists, believing as they do that the supposed identity of a brain state
+with the corresponding mental state is to be analyzed on the
+paradigm of the contingent identity of Benjamin Franklin
+with the inventor of bifocals, realize that just as his contingent
+activity made Benjamin Franklin into the inventor of bifocals,
+147
+so some contingent property of the brain state must make it
+into a pain. Generally they wish this property to be one
+statable in physical or at least 'topic-neutral' language, so that
+the materialist cannot be accused of positing irreducible nonphysical properties. A typical view is that being a pain, as a
+property of a physical state, is to be analyzed in terms of the
+'causal role' of the state,? in terms of the characteristic stimuli
+(e.g., pinpricks) which cause it and the characteristic behavior
+it causes. I will not go into the details of such analyses, even
+though I usually find them faulty on specific grounds in
+addition to the general modal considerations I argue here. All
+I need to observe here is that the "causal role' of the physical
+state is regarded by the theorists in question as a contingent
+property of the state, and thus it is supposed to be a contingent
+property of the state that it is a mental state at all, let alone that
+it is something as specific as a pain. To repeat, this notion seems
+to me self-evidently absurd. It amounts to the view that the
+very pain I now have could have existed without being a mental
+state at all.
+I have not discussed the converse problem, which is closer to
+the original Cartesian consideration—namely, that just as it
+seems that the brain state could have existed without any pain,
+so it seems that the pain could have existed without the
+corresponding brain state. Note that being a brain state is
+evidently an essential property of B (the brain state). Indeed,
+even more is true: not only being a brain state, but even being
+a brain state of a specific type is an essential property of B. The
+configuration of brain cells whose presence at a given time
+constitutes the presence of B at that time is essential to B, and
+in its absence B would not have existed. Thus someone who
+76 For example, David Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London
+and New York, 1968, see the discussion review by Thomas Nagel, Philosophical
+Review 79 (1970), PP. 394-403; and David Lewis, 'An Argument for the
+Identity Theory, The Journal of Philosophy, pp. 17-25.
+
+148
+wishes to claim that the brain state and the pain are identical
+must argue that the pain A could not have existed without a
+quite specific type of configuration of molecules. If A = B,
+then the identity of A with B is necessary, and any essential
+property of one must be an essential property of the other.
+Someone who wishes to maintain an identity thesis cannot
+simply accept the Cartesian intuitions that A can exist without
+B, that B can exist without A, that the correlative presence of
+anything with mental properties is merely contingent to B,
+and that the correlative presence of any specific physical
+properties is merely contingent to A. He must explain these
+intuitions away, showing how they are illusory. This task
+may not be impossible; we have seen above how some things
+which appear to be contingent turn out, on closer examination,
+to be necessary. The task, however, is obviously not child's
+play, and we shall see below how difficult it is.
+The final kind of identity, the one which I said would get the
+closest attention, is the type-type sort of identity exemplified
+by the identification of pain with the stimulation of C-fibers.
+These identifications are supposed to be analogous with such
+scientific type-type identifications as the identity of heat with
+molecular motion, of water with hydrogen hydroxide, and
+the like. Let us consider, as an example, the analogy supposed
+to hold between the materialist identification and that of heat
+with molecular motion; both identifications identify two types
+of phenomena. The usual view holds that the identification of
+heat with molecular motion and of pain with the stimulation
+of C-fibers are both contingent. We have seen above that
+since 'heat' and "molecular motion' are both rigid designators,
+the identification of the phenomena they name is necessary.
+What about 'pain' and 'C-fiber stimulation'? It should be clear
+from the previous discussion that "pain' is a rigid designator of
+the type, or phenomenon, it designates: if something is a pain
+it is essentialiy so, and it seems absurd to suppose that pain
+149
+could have been some phenomenon other than the one it is.
+The same holds for the term 'C-fiber stimulation', provided
+that 'C-fibers' is a rigid designator, as I will suppose here. (The
+supposition is somewhat risky, since I know virtually nothing
+about C-fibers, except that the stimulation of them is said to
+be correlated with pain.?" The point is unimportant; if 'C-
+fibers' is not a rigid designator, simply replace it by one which
+is, or suppose it used as a rigid designator in the present
+context.) Thus the identity of pain with the stimulation of
+C-fibers, if true, must be necessary.
+So far the analogy between the identification of heat with
+molecular motion and pain with the stimulation of C-fibers
+has not failed; it has merely turned out to be the opposite of
+what is usually thought-both, if true, must be necessary. This
+means that the identity theorist is committed to the view that
+there could not be a C-fiber stimulation which was not a pain
+nor a pain which was not a C-fiber stimulation. These consequences are certainly surprising and counterintuitive, but let
+us not dismiss the identity theorist too quickly. Can he perhaps
+show that the apparent possibility of pain not having turned out
+to be C-fiber stimulation, or of there being an instance of one of
+" I have been surprised to find that at least one able listener took my use of
+such terms as "correlated with', "corresponding to', and the like as already
+begging the question against the identity thesis. The identity thesis, so he said,
+is not the thesis that pains and brain states are correlated, but rather that they
+are identical. Thus my entire discussion presupposes the anti-materialist
+position that I set out to prove. Although I was surprised to hear an objection
+which concedes so little intelligence to the argument, I have tried especially to
+avoid the term 'correlated' which seeins to give rise to the objection. Nevertheless, to obviate misunderstanding, I shall explain my usage. Assuming, at
+least arguendo, that scientific discoveries have turned out so as not to refute
+materialism from the beginning, both the dualist and the identity theorist
+agree that there is a correlation or correspondence between mental states and
+physical states. The dualist holds that the "correlation' relation in question is
+irreflexive; the identity theorist holds that it is simply a special case of the
+identity relation. Such terms as 'correlation' and 'correspondence' can be used
+neutrally without prejudging which side is correct.
+
+Iso
+the phenomena which is not an instance of the other, is an
+illusion of the same sort as the illusion that water might not
+have been hydrogen hydroxide, or that heat might not have
+been molecular motion? If so, he will have rebutted the
+Cartesian, not, as in the conventional analysis, by accepting
+his premise while exposing the fallacy of his argument,
+but
+rather by the reverse-while the Cartesian argument, given
+its premise of the contingency of the identification, is granted
+to yield its conclusion, the premise is to be exposed as superficially plausible but false.
+Now I do not think it likely that the identity theorist will
+succeed in such an endeavor. I want to argue that, at least, the
+case cannot be interpreted as analogous to that of scientific
+identification of the usual sort, as exemplified by the identity of
+heat and molecular motion. What was the strategy used above
+to handle the apparent contingency of certain cases of the
+necessary a posteriori? The strategy was to argue that although
+the statement itself is necessary, somcone could, qualitatively
+speaking, be in the same epistemic situation as the original,
+and in such a situation a qualitatively analogous statement could
+be false. In the case of identities between two rigid designators,
+the strategy can be approximated by a simpler one: Consider
+how the references of the designators are determined; if these
+coincide only contingently, it is this fact which gives the
+original statement its illusion of contingency. In the case of
+heat and molecular motion, the way these two paradigms
+work out is simple. When someone says, inaccurately, that
+heat might have turned out not to be molecular motion, what
+is true in what he says is that someone could have sensed a
+phenomenon in the same way we sense heat, that is, feels it by
+means of its production of the sensation we call 'the sensation
+of heat' (call it "S'), even though that phenomenon was not
+molecular motion. He means, additionally, that the planet
+might have been inhabited by creatures who did not get S
+ISI
+when they were in the presence of molecular motion, though
+perhaps getting it in the presence of something else. Such
+creatures would be, in some qualitative sense, in the same
+pistemic situation as we are, they could use a rigid designator
+for the phenomenon that causes sensation S in them (the rigid
+designator could even be "heat'), yet it would not be molecular
+motion (and therefore not heat!), which was causing the
+Now can something be said analogously to explain away
+the feeling that the identity of pain and the stimulation of
+C-fibers, if it is a scientific discovery, could have turned out
+otherwise? I do not see that such an analogy is possible. In the
+case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might
+have existed in the absence of heat, what seemed really possible
+is that molecular motion should have existed without being
+felt as heat, that is, it might have existed without producing
+the sensation S, the sensation of heat. In the appropriate
+sentient beings is it analogously possible that a stimulation of
+C-fibers should have existed without being felt as pain? If this
+is possible, then the stimulation of C-fibers can itself exist
+without pain, since for it to exist without being felt as pain is
+for it to exist without there being any pain. Such a situation
+would be in flat out contradiction with the supposed necessary
+identity of pain and the corresponding physical state, and the
+analogue holds for any physical state which might be identified
+with a corresponding mental state. The trouble is that the
+identity theorist does not hold that the physical state merely
+produces the mental state, rather he wishes the two to be identical
+and thus a fortiori necessarily co-occurrent. In the case of
+molecular motion and heat there is something, namely, the
+sensation of heat,
+which is an intermediary between
+the
+external phenomenon and the observer. In the mentalphysical case no such intermediary is possible, since here the
+physical phenomenon is supposed to be identical with the
+
+I§2
+internal phenomenon itself. Someone can be in the same
+epistemic situation as he would be if there were heat, even in
+the absence of heat, simply by feeling the sensation of heat;
+and even in the presence of heat, he can have the same evidence
+as he would have in the absence of heat simply by lacking the
+sensation S. No such possibility exists in the case of pain and
+other mental phenomena. To be in the same epistemic situation
+that would obtain if one had a pain is to have a pain; to be in
+the same epistemic situation that would obtain in the absence
+of a pain is not to have a pain. The apparent contingency of
+the connection between the mental state and the corresponding brain state thus cannot be explained by some sort of
+qualitative analogue as in the case of heat.
+We have just analyzed the situation in terms of the notion of
+a qualitatively identical epistemic situation. The trouble is that
+the notion of an epistemic situation qualitatively identical to
+one in which the observer had a sensation S simply is one in
+which the observer had that sensation. The same point can be
+made in terms of the notion of what picks out the reference of
+a rigid designator. In the case of the identity of heat with
+molecular motion the important consideration was that although 'heat' is a rigid designator, the reference of that
+designator was determined by an accidental property of the
+referent, namely the property of producing in us the sensation
+S. It is thus possible that a phenomenon should have been
+rigidly designated in the same way as a phenomenon of heat,
+with its reference also picked out by means of the sensationS,
+without that phenomenon being heat and therefore without
+its being molecular motion. Pain, on the other hand, is not
+picked out by one of its accidental properties; rather it is
+picked out by the property of being pain itself, by its immediate phenomenological quality. Thus pain, unlike heat, is
+not only rigidly designated by 'pain' but the reference of the
+designator is determined by an essential property of the
+153
+referent. Thus it is, not possible to say that although pain is
+necessarily identical with a certain physical state, a certain
+phenomenon can be picked out in the same way we pick out
+pain without being correlated with that physical state. If any
+phenomenon is picked out in exactly the same way that we
+pick out pain, then that phenomenon is pain.
+Perhaps the same point can be made more vivid without
+such specific reference to the technical apparatus in these
+lectures. Suppose we imagine God creating the world; what
+does He need to do to make the identity of heat and molecular
+motion obtain? Here it would seem that all He needs to do is
+to create the heat, that is, the molecular motion itself. If the
+air molecules on this earth are sufficiently agitated, if there is a
+burning fire, then the earth will be hot even if there are no
+observers to see it. God created light (and thus created streams
+of photons, according to present scientific doctrine) before He
+created human and animal observers; and the same presumably holds for heat. How then does it appear to us that the
+identity of molecular motion with heat is a substantive scientific
+fact, that the mere creation of molecular motion still leaves God
+with the additional task of making molecular motion into
+heat? This feeling is indeed illusory, but what is a substantive
+task for the Deity is the task of making molecular motion felt
+as heat. To do this He must create some sentient beings to
+insure that the molecular motion produces the sensation S in
+them. Only after he has done this will there be beings who can
+Icarn that the sentence 'Heat is the motion of molecules' expresses an a posteriori truth in precisely the same way that we do.
+What about the case of the stimulation of C-fibers? To create
+this phenomenon, it would seem that God need only create
+beings with C-fibers capable of the appropriate type of physical
+stimulation; whether the beings are conscious or not is
+irrelevant here. It would seem, though, that to make the C-fiber
+stimulation correspond to pain, or be felt as pain, God must
+
+154
+do something in addition to the mere creation of the C-fiber
+stimulation; He must let the creatures feel the C-fiber stimulation as pain, and not as a tickle, or as warmth, or as nothing, as
+apparently would also have been within His powers. If these
+things in fact are within His powers, the relation between the
+pain God creates and the stimulation of C-fibers cannot be
+identity. For if so, the stimulation could exist without the pain;
+and since 'pain' and 'C-fiber stimulation' are rigid, this fact
+implies that the relation between the two phenomena is not
+that of identity. God had to do some work, in addition to
+making the man himself, to make a certain man be the inventor
+of bifocals; the man could well exist without inventing any
+such thing. The same cannot be said for pain; if the phenomenon exists at all, no further work should be required to
+make it into pain.
+In sum, the correspondence between a brain state and a
+mental state seems to have a certain obvious element of contingency. We have seen that identity is not a relation which
+can hold contingently between objects. Therefore, if the
+identity thesis were correct, the element of contingency would
+not lie in the relation between the mental and physical states.
+It cannot lie, as in the case of heat and molecular motion, in
+the relation between the phenomenon (= heat = molecular
+motion) and the way it is felt or appears (sensation S), since in
+the case of mental phenomena there is no 'appearance' beyond
+the mental phenomenon itself.
+Here I have been emphasizing the possibility, or apparent
+possibility, of a physical state without the corresponding mental
+state. The reverse possibility, the mental state (pain) without
+the physical state (C-fiber stimulation) also presents problems
+for the identity theorists which cannot be resolved by appeal
+to the analogy of heat and molecular motion.
+I have discussed similar problems more briefly for views
+equating the self with the body, and particular mental events
+ISS
+with particular physical events, without discussing possible
+countermoves in the same detail as in the type-type case.
+Suffice it to say that I suspect that the considerations given
+indicate that the theorist who wishes to identify various
+particular mental and physical events will have to face problems
+fairly similar to those of the type-type theorist; he too will be
+unable to appeal to the standard alleged analogues.
+That the usual moves and analogies are not available to solve
+the problems of the identity theorist is, of course, no proof
+that no moves are available. I certainly cannot discuss all the
+possibilities here. I suspect, however, that the present considerations tell heavily against the usual forms of materialism.
+Materialism, I think, must hold that a physical description of
+the world is a complete description of it, that any mental facts
+are 'ontologically dependent' on physical facts in the straightforward sense of following from them by necessity. No
+identity theorist seems to me to have made a convincing
+argument against the intuitive view that this is not the case."
+"Having expressed these doubts about the identity theory in the text, I
+should emphasize two things: first, identity theorists have presented positive
+arguments for their view, which I certainly have not answered here. Some of
+these arguments seem to me to be weak or based on idcological prejudices, but
+others strike me as highly compelling arguments which I am at present unable
+to answer convincingly. Second, rejection of the identity thesis does not imply
+acceptance of Cartesian dualism. In fact, my view above that a person could
+not have come from a different sperm and egg from the ones from which he
+actually originated implicitly suggests a rejection of the Cartesian picture. If
+we had a clear idea of the soul or the mind as an independent, subsistent,
+spiritual entity, why should it have to have any necessary connection with
+particular material objects such as a particular sperm or a particular egg? A
+convinced dualist may think that my views on sperms and eggs beg the
+question against Descartes. I would tend to argue the other way; the fact that
+it is hard to imagine me coming from a sperm and egg different from my
+actual origins seems to me to indicate that we have no such clear conception
+of a soul or self. In any event, Descartes' notion seems to have been rendered
+dubious ever since Hume's critique of the notion of a Cartesian self. I regard
+the mind-body problem as wide open and extremely confusing.
+
+ADDENDA
+These addenda represent certain amplifications of the original
+text which I have added either in response to questions or for
+the sake of clarification or sketchy amplification.
+(a) Unicorns, pp. 23-4. In the light of the remarks on natural
+kinds made in the third lecture, I shall try to give a brief
+explanation of the strange view of unicorns advocated in the
+text. There were two theses: first, a metaphysical thesis that no
+counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which
+there would have been unicorns; second, an epistemological
+thesis that an archeological discovery that there were animals
+with all the features attributed to unicorns in the appropriate
+myth would not in and of itself constitute proof that there
+were unicorns.
+As to the metaphysical thesis, the argument basically is the
+following. Just as tigers are an actual species, so the unicorns
+are a mythical species. Now tigers, as I argue in the third
+lecture, cannot be defined simply in terms of their appearance;
+it is possible that there should have been a different species
+with all the external appearances of tigers but which had a
+different internal structure and therefore was not the species of
+tigers. We may be misled into thinking otherwise by the fact
+that actually no such 'fool's tigers' exist, so that in practice
+external appearance is sufficient to identify the species. Now
+there is no actual species of unicorns, and regarding the several
+I57
+distinct hypothetical species, with different internal structures
+(some reptilic, some mammalian, some amphibious), which
+would have the external appearances postulated to hold of
+unicorns in the myth of the unicorn, one cannot say which of
+these distinct mythical species would have been the unicorns.
+If we suppose, as I do, that the unicorns of the myth were
+supposed to be a particular species, but that the myth provides
+insufficient information about their internal structure to
+determine a unique species, then there is no actual or possible
+species of which we can say that it would have been the species
+of unicorns.
+The epistemological thesis is more casily argued. If a story
+is found describing a substance with the physical appearance of
+gold, one cannot conclude on this basis that it is talking about
+gold; it may be talking about fools gold'. What substance is
+eing discussed must be determined as in the case of proper
+names: by the historical connection of the story with a certain
+substance. When the connection is traced, it may well turn
+out that the substance dealt with was gold, 'fools' gold", or
+something else. Similarly, the mere discovery of animals with
+the properties attributed to unicorns in the nyth would by no
+means show that these were the animals the myth was about:
+perhaps the myth was spun out of whole cloth, and the fact
+that animals with the same appearance actually existed was
+mere coincidence. In that casc, we cannot say that the unicorns
+of the myth really existed; we must also establish a historical
+connection that shows that the myth is about these animals.
+I hold similar views regarding fictional proper names. The
+mere discovery that there was indeed a detective with exploits
+like those of Sherlock Holmes would not show that Conan
+Doyle was writing about this man; it is theoretically possible,
+though in practice fantastically unlikcly, that Doyle was
+writing pure fiction with only a coincidental resemblance to the
+actual man. (See the characteristic disclaimer: "The characters
+
+158
+in this work are fictional, and any resemblance to anyone,
+living or dead, is purely coincidental.') Similarly, I hold the
+metaphysical view that, granted that there is no Sherlock
+Holmes, one cannot say of any possible person that he would
+have been Sherlock Holmes, had he existed. Several distinct
+possible people, and even actual ones such as Darwin or Jack
+the Ripper, might have performed the exploits of Holmes,
+but there is none of whom we can say that he would have been
+Holmes had he performed these exploits. For if so, which one?
+I thus could no longer write, as I once did, that Holmes does
+not exist, but in other states of affairs, he would have existed.'
+(See my 'Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic', Acta
+Philosophica Fennica, Vol. 16 (1963) PP. 83-94; reprinted in L.
+Linsky (ed.), Reference and Modality, Oxford University Press,
+(1971; p. 65 in the Linsky reprint.) The quoted assertion gives
+the erroneous impression that a fictional name such as 'Holmes'
+names a particular possible-but-not-actual individual. The substantive point I was trying to make, however, remains and is
+independent of any linguistic theory of the status of nanies in
+fiction. The point was that, in other possible worlds "some
+actually existing individuals may be absent while new individuals ... may appear' (ibid, p. 6s), and that if in an open
+formula A (x) the free variable is assigned a given individual as
+value, a problem arises as to whether (in a model-theoretic
+treatment of modal logic) a truth-value is to be assigned to the
+formula in worlds in which the individual in question does not
+exist.
+I am aware that the cryptic brevity of these remarks dininishes whatever persuasiveness they may otherwise possess. I
+expect to elaborate on then elsewhere, in a forthcoming work
+discussing the problems of existential statements, empty names,
+and fictional entities.
+(b) Can to must, first paragraph of p. 35. An unpublished
+paper by Barry I. Stroud has called my attention to the fact
+I59
+that Kant himself. makes a closely related mistake. Kant
+says,
+'Experince teaches us that a thing is so and so, but
+not that it cannot be otherwise. First, then, if we have a
+proposition which in being thought is thought as necessary,
+it is an a priori judgement... Necessity and strict universality
+are thus sure criteria of a priori knowledge'. (Critique of
+Pure Reason B3-4, pp. 43-4 in the Kemp Smith translation,
+Macmillan, 1956.) Kant thus appears to hold that if a proposition is known to be necessary, the mode of knowledge not
+only can be a priori but must be. On the contrary, one can
+learn a mathematical truth a posteriori by consulting a computing machine, or even by asking a mathematician. Nor can
+Kant argue that experience can tell us that a mathematical
+proposition is true, but not that it is necessary; for the peculiar
+character of mathematical propositions (like Goldbach's conjecture) is that one knows (a priori) that they cannot be
+contingently true; a mathematical statement, if true, is
+necessary.
+All the cases of the necessary a posteriori advocated in the text
+have the special character attributed to mathematical statements: Philosophical analysis tells us that they cannot be
+contingently true, so any empirical knowledge of their truth is
+automatically empirical knowledge that they are necessary.
+This charactcrization applies, in particular, to the cases of
+identity statements and of essence. It may give a clue to a
+general characterization of a posteriori knowledge of necessary
+truths.
+I should mention that if the possibility of knowing a mathematical truth by consulting a computer were the only objection
+to Kant offered, it would still be open to him to hold: (1) that
+every necessary truth is knowable a priori; or, more weakly,
+(2) that every necessary truth, if known at all, must be knowable a priori. Both (1) and (2) involve the obscure notion of the
+possibility of a priori knowledge, but to the extent that the
+
+Ібо
+notion is clarified by restricting it to a priori knowledge of a
+standard human sort, I argue against both (1) and (2) in the
+text. In fact, of course, I hold that propositions that contemporary philosophers would properly count as 'empirical
+can be neccssary and be known to be such.
+Perhaps I should mention also that I have been unable to
+find the characterization of a priori truth as truth which can be
+known independently of experince in Kant; as far as 1 can
+sec, Kant refers only to a priori knowiedge of particular statements, which does not involve the extra modality. (In the text,
+I incautiously ascribed this common characterization of a
+priori truth to Kant.) And, of course, when Kant uses "necessary'
+for a type of proposition and 'a priori' for a mode of knowledge
+he cannot possibly be guilty of the common contemporary
+practice of treating the two terms as interchangeable synonyms.
+It is clear from the opening pages of the Critique that he regards
+the thesis that knowledge that something is necessary must be
+a priori knowledge as an important, though obvious, substantive thesis.
+(c) Some remarks that I have heard lead me to suppose that
+the noncircularity condition could use further clarification.
+First, my remark on p. 68 has been misunderstood to say
+that a definition such as "Jonah is the man referred to by that
+name in the Bible' necessarily violates the noncircularity
+condition. It does not, provided that the description theory can
+give an account of the Biblical authors' reference which is
+independent of our own. When I discuss Strawson, I explicitly
+acknowledge that a speaker may use a description of this sort
+which "passes the buck' and that the procedure is noncircular
+provided that the other speaker's description does not ultimately
+involve the references made by the original speaker. Thus I
+can say, 'Let "Glumph" be a name of the thing Jones calls
+"Glumph", provided that Jones does not simultaneously say,
+Let "Glumph" be a name of the thing Kripke calls "Glumph"!
+ıбI
+The objection to such noncircular determinations of reference
+as Let "Glumph" be the man Jones calls "Glumph" and,
+Let Gödel be the man to whom the experts attribute the
+incompleteness theorem' (said by a layman) is otherwise: In
+general, a speaker cannot be sure from whom he picked up
+his reference; and as far as he knows 'the experts' may well
+realize that Schmidt, not Gödel, proved the incompleteness
+theorem even though the inexpert speaker still attributes it to
+Gödel. Thus such determinations of the referent may well give
+the wrong result, and the speaker surely cannot be said to
+know a priori (as in Thesis s) that they do not. (See my criticisms
+of Strawson in the text.) If, on the other hand, the speaker
+attempts to avoid the possibility of such error by using his
+own reference as the paradigm, as in such determinations as
+'Let Glumph be the man I call "Glumph" (now)' or 'Let
+Gödel be the man I believe to have proved the incompleteness
+theorem,' the determination of the reference is circular (unless
+the speaker has already determined his reference in some other
+way, in which case that is the determining condition and not
+the one stated). Often the determination of the reference risks
+falling afoul both of circularity and of vulnerability to error,
+for the speaker may not know whether those others to whom
+he 'passes the buck' may not in turn pass the buck to him.
+Blatant cases of vulnerability to both types of criticisms is to be
+found in such determinations as, 'Let "Glumph" denote the
+man all of us in Community C call "Glumph"; or 'Let
+"Gödel" denote the man presently generally believed in
+Community C to have proved the incompleteness theorem,'
+if this determination is supposed to be the one used throughout
+Community C. For an individual speaker may err in such a
+determination if the community in gencral has been apprised
+of the Gödel-Schmidt fraud but the speaker has not; and even
+if the possibility of error is waived, the determination will be
+circular if it is supposed that all, or even the large majority, of
+
+162
+the speakers of Community C use it to determine their
+reference.
+All these points are stated in the text, but misunderstandings
+have led me to believe that a summary restatement could
+conceivably do some good. Quite a different way of deterinining the reference would be, 'Let "Glumph" denote the man
+called "Glumph" by the people from whom I got it (whoever
+they are), provided that my present determination of the
+reference satisfies the conditions sketched in
+"Naming and
+Necessity" and whatever other conditions need be satisfied'.
+As I said in footnote 38, such a determination would constitute
+a trivial fulfillment of the description theory in terms of the
+present view if only the present view were not somewhat
+loose and did not already involve the notion of the speaker's
+own reference (in terms of his intention to agree in reference
+with those from whom he picked up the name). Even if both
+these problems were surmounted, the resulting description
+would hardly be one of the type which occurs to a speaker
+when he is asked such a question as, 'Who is Napoleon?, as
+the description theorists intended. It would occur only to those
+speakers who have mastered a complex theory of reference,
+and it would be this theory, of course, and not the speaker s
+knowledge of a description, which gave the true picture of
+how the reference was determined.
+(d) Initial baptism', p. g6. In footnote 70 on natural kind
+terms, I mention that the notion of an initial sample appealed
+to there gives an oversimplified picture of the case. Analogously
+for proper names, of course I recognize that there need not
+always be an identifiable initial baptism; so the picture is
+oversimplified. Of course I also think, analogously to footnote
+70, that such complications will not radically alter the picture.
+It is probably true, however, that in the case of proper names,
+examples with no identifiable initial baptism are rarer than in
+the species case.
+163
+(e) Santa Claus, p. 93 and pp. 96-7. Gareth Evans has pointed
+out that similar cases of reference shifts arise where the shit is
+not from a real entity to a fictional one, but from one real
+entity to another of the same kind. According to Evans,
+'Madagascar' was a native name for a part of Africa; Marco
+Polo, erroneously thinking that he was following native usage,
+applied the name to an island. (Evans uses the example to
+support the description theory; I, of course, do not.) Today
+the usage of the name as a name for an island has become so
+widespread that it surely overrides any historical connection
+with the native name. David Lewis has pointed out that the
+same thing could have happened even if the natives had used
+'Madagascar' to designate a mythical locality. So real reference
+can shift to another real reference, fictional reference can shift
+to real, and real to fictional. In all these cases, a present intention
+to refer to a given entity (or to refer fictionally) overrides the
+original intention to preserve reference in the historical chain
+of transmission. The matter deserves extended discussion. But
+the phenomenon is perhaps roughly explicable in terns of the
+predominantly social character of the use of proper names
+emphasized in the text: we use names to communicate with
+other speakers in a common language. This character dictates
+ordinarily that a speaker intend to use a name the same way as
+it was transmitted to him; but in the 'Madagascar' case this
+social character dictates that the present intention to refer to
+an island overrides the distant link to native usage. (Probably
+Miller's case, 'George Smith' vs. 'Newton' is similarly explicable.) To state all this with any precision undoubtedly
+requires more apparatus than I have developed here; in particular, we must distinguish a present intention to use a name
+for an object from a mere present belief that the object is the
+only one having a certain property, and clarify this distinction.
+I leave the problem for further work.
+(f) I perhaps should mention (amplifying p. 23 n. 2) that
+
+164
+the historical acquisition picture of naming advocated here is
+apparently very similar to views of Keith Donnellan. (Charles
+Chastain also made similar suggestions, but they had a greater
+admixture of the old description theory.) David Kaplan's
+investigation of 'Dthat', mentioned in footnote 22, has been
+extended to a 'logic of demonstratives' in which, he says, a
+good deal of the argument of this paper can be given a formal
+representation. Indeed a good deal of this paper suggests a
+certain formal apparatus, though the present presentation is
+informal.
+(g) The third lecture suggests that a good deal of what contemporary philosophy regards as mere physical necessity is
+actually necessary tout court. The question how far this can be
+pushed is one I leave for further work.
+INDEX
+Albritton, Rogers, 23n, 122n
+Alpha Centauri, 95
+Analytic truth, 34, 39, són, I17,
+I22, 135
+A posteriori truth, see A priori
+truth, Necessary a posteriori
+truth
+A priori truth (a prioricity), as
+epistemological notion, 34-9,
+63, 122-3, 158-60; Kant's
+views on, 34, I17, I58-60;
+see also Contingent a priori
+truth, Necessary a posteriori
+truth
+Aristotle, 6-14, 29-30, 57, 61-3,
+65,74-s
+Armstrong, David, 147n
+Atomic number, 116, 123-S,
+138,I40; see also Gold
+Attribute, 138
+"Baptism', initial, 78, 96-7, 106,
+135-40, 162
+"Bare particulars, 18, 52
+Bifocals, the inventor of, 98,
+145-6,154
+Brain state, see Mind-body
+identity thesis
+Cartesian dualism, Issn
+Catiline, 79-81
+Cats, 122-3, 125-6, 134
+Causal chain (in reference), see
+Chain of communication
+Causal role (of mental states), 147
+Certainty, 34, 39
+C-fibers, 98, 144, 148-54
+Chain of communication (in
+reference), 8n, s9n, 9I-7, 106,
+тІбп, І3S, 139, I57, 163-4;
+and shift of reference, 93-7,
+163-4
+Chastain, Charles, 23n, 164
+Cicero, 20, 79-81, 92, 97n, 98,
+I00-1, 107-8
+Cluster concept, ssn, 6o, 76,
+I20-I, 122n
+'Cluster of descriptions' theory
+of proper names, see Description theory of proper names
+Columbus, C., 85
+Connotation (Mill), 26, 127, 134
+Contingent a priori truth, I4-IS,
+54-7, 63, 66, 75-6, 78-9, 80-
+91 passim, gón, 135-8; see also
+Fixing the reference of a term,
+Rigid designators
+
+166
+INDEX
+78-97, 106-7
+76-7,142
+48-9
+6I-2
+129
+Gold
+101, 164
+properties
+ISS
+propertics
+Everest, 100
+143
+I34-S
+INDEX
+167
+Gaurisanker, 100
+Geach, Peter, 23n, II Sn
+Gell-Mann, Murray 81, 91
+General term, 127-8, 134-40;
+see also Natural kinds, Natural
+phenomena
+Gilbert, Margaret, I
+Ginsberg, H. L., 67n
+'Glumph', 'Glunk', 73, 160-2
+God, 26-7, 153-4
+Gödel, K., 37, 83-92, 161
+Gold, 39, 116-19, 123-S, 127,
+134-40, 142-3, 157; fool's, see
+Iron pyrites
+Goldbach's conjecture, 36-8, 159
+Hadleyburg, the man who corrupted, 24,28
+Heat, 98-2, 129, 131-4, 136, 138,
+140,148-54
+Henry 1, 76
+Hesperus, 20, 28-9, 57-8, 78-9,
+94,98, 100-5, 108-10, IIOn
+Hilbert, D., 37
+Historical connection (of term
+with referent), see Chain of
+communication
+Hitler, A., 75, 77-8
+H,O, 99, 116, 128-9, 134, 148,
+150; see also Water
+Holmes, Sherlock, 157-8
+Holy Roman Empire, The, 26
+Humphrey, H., 45n, 48-9
+Identifying marks (properties) of
+a natural kind, original, I18-
+122, 124-6, 128-2, 137-8, 156
+Identity, 'across possible worlds',
+see "Transworld identification;
+criterion of, 17, 42-53, 1ISn;
+
+168
+INDEX
+139, IS3
+, 116, 126-31, 134.
+SO-I
+135
+128, 134-S
+thesis
+INDEX
+I09
+39-53
+properties
+Nancy', riốn
+Tigers, etc.
+Light
+IISn, I40-2
+тт, бо
+Peano, G., 84-s, 88-»
+Person, and identity with body,
+
+170
+Person-cont.
+144-6; see also Mind-body
+identity thesis
+Phosphorus (pianet), 20, 28-9,
+80n, 98, 100-s, 108-10
+Photons, 98-9, 116, 129, 130,
+132,153
+Physical phenomena, see Natural
+phenomena
+INDEX
+proper names
+duals, 158
+137-8, 156
+stipwated, not discovered, 44,
+49
+Postmaster General of the
+Unites States, first, 98-2, 145
+Proper names, correct picture of
+ary, 140
+reference of, 91-7,98-164
+passim; description theory of,
+see Description theory of
+proper names; in epistemic
+contexts, 20-1; in fiction and
+legend, 66-7,93,96-7, 157-8,
+163: "homonymous, 7-10;
+and identity statements, see
+Identity, necessity of; as
+rigid designators, see Rigid
+designators; and scope distinctions, 10-14, 6I-2; shift of
+reference of, 93-7, 163-4; and
+sortals, 11gn; and terms for
+850, 87n
+6I-2
+171
+20-1
+54-6, 96л
+IS0-7
+148-55
+
+172
+Unicorns, 24, 157-8
+United Nations, The, 26
+Venus, 28, 100-s; see also
+Hesperus
+Water, boiling temperature of,
+54-6, gon; molecular structure
+of, 99, 116, 126-9, 134, 148,
+ISO
+INDEX
+Whales, 138
+Wiggins, David, 3, I450
+Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 31, 33,
+54,66
+Yard, 76
+Yellow, 118-19, 128n, 134, 140n
+Ziff, Paul, 32, 80, 119-20
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/6bcf4b2c61549db6fcf7781e66ea7219bfa94ad6b1c8916e04448bf5d77589eb.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/6bcf4b2c61549db6fcf7781e66ea7219bfa94ad6b1c8916e04448bf5d77589eb.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ce6512035e77a46f484ad5eea7845ec3b756b6ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/6bcf4b2c61549db6fcf7781e66ea7219bfa94ad6b1c8916e04448bf5d77589eb.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -3828,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "6bcf4b2c61549db6fcf7781e66ea7219bfa94ad6b1c8916e04448bf5d77589eb",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 298,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "5c3656265d4ea51a6c5c359a61f9e4a2c46ff90a830da9c0811b2f8f1cb6bfd2",
+  "output_sha256": "2043bbd8f539daf0f9d36795e58c744460d9846596c0553ec3469daa6c9d605b",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/75e86a34029669e4db655ee8a2bfee239f3b50e0e37e73bd4361c18cf04e308b.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/75e86a34029669e4db655ee8a2bfee239f3b50e0e37e73bd4361c18cf04e308b.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c1c358d6b1b2d520c40441a75eb56f5106c8a7d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/75e86a34029669e4db655ee8a2bfee239f3b50e0e37e73bd4361c18cf04e308b.md
@@ -0,0 +1,9104 @@
+in the Present
+MAX HORKHEIMER &
+THEODOR W. ADORNO
+DIALECTIC of
+ENLIGHTENMENT
+Philosophical Fragments
+Edited by GUNZELIN SCHMID NOERR
+Translated by EDMUND JEPHCOTT
+
+DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
+
+in
+the
+Present
+Mieke Bal and Hent de Vries,
+, Editors
+
+DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
+Philosophical Fragments
+MAX HORKHEIMER and
+THEODOR W. ADORNO
+Edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr
+Translated by Edmund Jephcott
+STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
+STANFORD, CALIFORNIA
+2002
+
+Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments is translated from Volume s
+of Max Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften: Dialektik der Aufklärung und
+Schriften 1940-1950, edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, O1987 by S. Fishcher
+Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt am Main.
+Asterisks in the text and display material mark editorial notes created for the
+German edition. They include variant readings and other textual concerns.
+They are keyed in the reference matter section via the number of the page on
+which the asterisk appears and the preceding word. Numbered notes are those
+created by Horkheimer and Adorno themselves.
+English translation ©2002 by the Board of Trustees
+of the Leland Stanford Junior University
+Horkheimer, Max, 1895-1973
+[Philosophische Fragmente. English]
+Dialectic of enlightenment : philosophical fragments / Max Horkheimer and
+Theodor W. Adorno; edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr; translated by
+Edmund Jephcott.
+р. ст. — (Cultural memory in the present)
+Includes bibliographical references.
+1. BRN 08047-363-4 arno a peodor SEN 0-80-47-3633-2. Schmid paper
+I. Philosophy. I. Adorno, Theodor W., 1903-1969.
+Gunzelin. III. Title. IV. Series.
+B3279.H8473 PSI3 2002
+I93—dC2I
+
+Printed in the United States of America
+Original Printing 2002
+Last figure below indicates year of this printing:
+I 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03
+02
+Typeset at Stanford University Press in I1/13.5 Adobe Garamond
+
+For Friedrich Pollock*
+
+Contents
+Preface to the New Edition (1969)
+Preface to the Italian Edition (I962/1966)
+Excursus I: Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment
+Excursus II: Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality
+The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception
+Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment
+XI
+xili
+xiv
+I
+35
+24
+137
+173
+The Disappearance of Class History in "Dialectic of
+Enlightenment': A Commentary on the lextual Variants
+(1944 and 1947), by Willem van Reijen and Jan Bransen
+Notes
+217
+248
+253
+
+Preface to the New Edition (1969)
+Dialectic of Enlightenment was published in 1947 by Querido in
+Amsterdam. The book, which found readers only gradually, has been out
+of print for some time. We have been induced to reissue it after more than
+twenty years not only by requests from many sides but by the notion that
+not a few of the ideas in it are timely now and have largely determined our
+later theoretical writings. No one who was not involved in the writing
+could easily understand to what extent we both feel responsible for every
+sentence. We dictated long stretches together; the Dialectic derives its vital
+energy from the tension between the two intellectual temperaments which
+came together in writing it.
+We do not stand by everything we said in the book in its original
+form. That would be incompatible with a theory which attributes a temporal core to truth instead of contrasting truth as something invariable to
+the movement of history. The book was written at a time when the end of
+the National Socialist terror was in sight. In not a few places, however, the
+formulation is no longer adequate to the reality of today. All the same,
+even at that time we did not underestimate the implications of the transition to the administered world.
+In a period of political division into immense blocs driven by an
+objective tendency to collide, horror has been prolonged. The conflicts in
+the third world and the renewed growth of totalitarianism are not mere
+historical interludes any more than, according to the Dialectic, fascism was
+at that time. Critical thought, which does not call a halt before progress
+itself, requires us to take up the cause of the remnants of freedom, of tendencies toward real humanity, even though they seem powerless in face of
+the great historical trend
+The development toward total integration identified in the book has
+
+xii Preface to the 1969 Edition
+been interrupted but not terminated; it threatens to be consummated by
+means of dictators and wars. Our prognosis regarding the associated lapse
+from enlightenment into positivism, into the myth of that which is the
+case, and finally of the identity of intelligence and hostility to mind, has
+been overwhelmingly confirmed. Our concept of history does not believe
+itself elevated above history, but it does not merely chase after information
+in the positivist manner. As a critique of philosophy it does not seek to
+abandon philosophy itself.
+From America, where the book was written, we returned to Germany with the conviction that, theoretically and practically, we would be
+able to achieve more there than elsewhere. Together with Friedrich
+Pollock, to whom the book is dedicated on his seventy-fifth birthday as it
+was then on his fiftieth, we built up the Institut für Sozialforschung once
+again, with the idea of taking further the concepts formulated in Dialectic.
+In continuing to develop our theory, and in the common experiences connected with it, Gretel Adorno has given us the most valuable assistance, as
+she did with the first version.
+We have made changes far more sparingly than is usual with re-editions of books dating back several decades. We did not want to retouch
+what we had written, not even the obviously inadequate passages. To bring
+the text fully up to date with the current situation would have amounted
+to nothing less than writing a new book. That what matters today is to
+preserve and disseminate freedom, rather than to accelerate, however indirectly, the advance toward the administered world, we have also argued in
+our later writings. We have confined ourselves here to correcting misprints
+and suchlike matters. This restraint has made the book a piece of documentation; we hope that it is also more.
+Max Horkheimer Theodor W. Adorno
+Frankfurt am Main, April 1969
+
+Preface to the Italian Edition* (I962/1966)
+The German text of Dialectic of Enlightenment is a fragment. Begun
+as early as 1942, during the Second World War, it was supposed to form the
+introduction to the theory of society and history we had sketched during
+the period of National Socialist rule. It is self-evident that, with regard to
+terminology and the scope of the questions investigated, the book is
+shaped by the social conditions in which it was written.
+In keeping with its theme, our book demonstrates tendencies which
+turn cultural progress into its opposite. We attempted to do this on the
+basis of social phenomena of the 1930s and 1940s in America. However, to
+construct a systematic theory which would do justice to the present economic and political circumstances is a task which, for objective and subjective reasons, we are unable to perform today. We are therefore happy
+that the fragment is appearing in a series devoted predominantly to philosophical questions.
+M.H. and T.W.A.
+Frankfurt am Main, March 1966
+
+When* we began this work, the first samples of which we dedicate to
+Friedrich Pollock, we hoped to be able to present the whole book on his
+fiftieth birthday. But the further we proceeded with the task the more we
+became aware of the mismatch between it and our own capabilities. What
+we had set out to do was nothing less than to explain why humanity,
+instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of * barbarism. We underestimated the difficulty of dealing with the subject
+because we still placed too much trust in contemporary consciousness.
+While we had noted for many years that, in the operations of modern science, the major discoveries are paid for with an increasing* decline of theoretical education, we nevertheless believed that we could follow those
+operations to the extent of limiting our work primarily to a critique or a
+continuation of specialist theories. Our work was to adhere, at least thematically, to the traditional disciplines: sociology, psychology, and epistemology.
+The fragments we have collected here show, however, that we had to
+abandon that trust. While attentive cultivation and investigation of the
+scientific heritage—especially when positivist new brooms have swept it
+away as useless lumber—does represent one moment of knowledge, in the
+present collapse of bourgeois civilization not only the operations but the
+purpose of science have become dubious. The tireless self-destruction of
+enlightenment hypocritically celebrated by implacable fascists and implemented by pliable experts in humanity* compels thought to forbid itself
+its last remaining innocence regarding the habits and tendencies of the
+Zeitgeist. If public life has reached a state in which thought is being turned
+inescapably into a commodity and language into celebration of the commodity, the attempt to trace the sources of this degradation must refuse
+
+XV
+obedience to the current linguistic and intellectual demands before it is
+rendered entirely futile by the consequence of those demands for world
+history.
+If the only obstacles were those arising from the oblivious instrumentalization of science, thought about social questions could at least
+attach itself to tendencies opposed to official science. Those tendencies,
+too, however, are caught up in the general process of production. They
+have changed no less than the ideology they attacked. They suffer the fate
+which has always been reserved for triumphant thought. If it voluntarily
+leaves behind its critical element to become a mere means in the service of
+an existing order, it involuntarily tends to transform the positive cause it
+has espoused into something negative and destructive. The eighteenthcentury philosophy which, defying the funeral pyres for books and people, put the fear of death into infamy, joined forces with it under Bonaparte. Finally, the apologetic school of Comte usurped the succession to
+the uncompromising encyclopédistes, extending the hand of friendship* to
+all those whom the latter had opposed. Such metamorphoses of critique
+into affirmation do not leave theoretical content untouched; its truth
+evaporates. Today, however, motorized history is rushing ahead of such
+intellectual developments, and the official spokesmen, who have other
+concerns, are liquidating the theory to which they owe their place in the
+sun* before it has time to prostitute itself completely.*
+In reflecting on its own guilt, therefore, thought finds itself deprived
+not only of the affirmative reference to science and everyday phenomena
+but also of the conceptual language of opposition. No terms are available
+which do not tend toward complicity with the prevailing intellectual
+trends, and what threadbare language cannot achieve on its own is precisely made good by the social machinery. The censors voluntarily maintained by the film factories to avoid greater costs have their counterparts
+in all other departments. The process to which a literary text is subjected,
+if not in the automatic foresight of its producer then through the battery
+of readers, publishers, adapters, and ghost writers inside and outside the
+editorial office, outdoes any censor in its thoroughness. To render their
+function entirely superfluous appears, despite all the benevolent reforms,
+to be the ambition of the educational system. In the belief that without
+strict limitation to the observation of facts and the calculation of probabilities the cognitive mind would be overreceptive to charlatanism and
+
+xVI
+superstition, that system is preparing arid ground for the greedy acceptance of charlatanism and superstition. Just as prohibition has always
+ensured the admission of the poisonous product, the blocking of the theoretical imagination has paved the way for political delusion. Even when
+people have not already succumbed to such delusion, they are deprived by
+the mechanisms of censorship, both the external ones and those implanted within them, of the means of resisting it.
+The aporia which faced us in our work thus proved to be the first
+matter we had to investigate: the self-destruction of enlightenment. We
+have no doubt—and herein lies our petitio principii-that freedom in
+society is inseparable from enlightenment thinking. We believe we have
+perceived with equal clarity, however, that the very concept of that thinking, no less than the concrete historical forms, the institutions of society
+with which it is intertwined, already contains the germ of the regression*
+which is taking place everywhere today. If enlightenment does not assimilate reflection on this regressive moment, it seals its own fate. By leaving
+consideration of the destructive side of progress to its enemies, thought in
+its headlong* rush into pragmatism is forfeiting its sublating character,
+and therefore its relation to truth. In the mysterious willingness of the
+technologically educated masses to fall under the spell of any despotism,
+in its self-destructive affinity to nationalist paranoia, in all this uncomprehended senselessness the weakness of contemporary theoretical understanding is evident.
+We believe that in these fragments we have contributed to such
+understanding by showing that the cause of enlightenment's relapse into
+mythology is to be sought not so much in the nationalist, pagan, or other
+modern mythologies concocted specifically to cause such a relapse as in
+the fear of truth which petrifies enlightenment itself. Both these terms,
+enlightenment and truth, are to be understood as pertaining not merely to
+intellectual history but also to current reality. Just as enlightenment expresses the real movement of bourgeois society as a whole from the perspective of the idea embodied in its personalities and institutions, truth
+refers not merely to rational* consciousness but equally to the form it takes
+in reality. The loyal son of modern civilization's fear of departing from the
+facts, which even in their perception are turned into clichés by the prevailing usages in science, business, and politics, is exactly the same as the
+fear of social deviation. Those usages also define the concept of clarity in
+
+xV11
+language and thought to which art, literature, and philosophy must conform today. By tabooing any thought which sets out negatively from the
+facts and from the prevailing modes of thought as obscure, convoluted,
+and preferably foreign, that concept holds mind captive in ever deeper
+blindness. It is in the nature of the calamitous situation existing today that
+even the most honorable reformer who recommends renewal in threadbare
+language reinforces the existing order he seeks to break by taking over its
+worn-out categorial apparatus and the pernicious power-philosophy lying
+behind it. False clarity is only another name for myth. Myth was always
+obscure and luminous at once. It has always been distinguished by its
+familiarity and its exemption from the work of concepts.
+The enslavement to nature of people today cannot be separated from
+social progress. The increase in economic productivity which creates the
+conditions for a more just world also affords the technical apparatus and
+the social groups controlling it a disproportionate advantage over the rest
+of the population. The individual is entirely nullified in face of the economic powers. These powers are taking society's domination over nature
+to unimagined heights. While individuals as such are vanishing before the
+apparatus they serve, they are provided for by that apparatus and better
+than ever before. In the unjust state of society the powerlessness and pliability of the masses increase* with the quantity of goods allocated to them.
+The materially considerable and socially paltry rise in the standard of living of the lower classes is reflected in the hypocritical propagation of intellect. Intellect's true concern is a negation of reification. It must perish
+when it is solidified into a cultural asset and handed out for consumption
+purposes. The flood of precise information and brand-new amusements
+make people smarter and more stupid at once.
+What is at issue here is not culture as a value, as understood by critics of civilization such as Huxley, Jaspers, and Ortega y Gasset, but the
+necessity for enlightenment to reflect on itself if humanity is not to be
+totally betrayed. What is at stake is not conservation of the past but the
+fulfillment of past hopes. Today, however,* the past is being continued as
+destruction of the past. If, up to the nineteenth century, respectable education was a privilege paid for by the increased sufferings* of the uneducated, in the twentieth the hygienic factory is bought with the melting
+down of all cultural entities in the gigantic crucible.* That might not even
+be so high a price as those defenders of culture believe if the bargain sale
+
+xvili Preface (1944 and 1947)
+of culture did not contribute to converting economic achievements into
+their opposite.
+Under the given circumstances the gifts of fortune themselves
+become elements of misfortune. If, in the absence of the social subject, the
+volume of goods took the form of so-called overproduction in domestic
+economic crises in the preceding period, today, thanks to the enthronement of powerful groups as that social subject, it is producing the international threat of fascism: progress is reverting to regression. That the
+hygienic factory and everything pertaining to it, Volkswagen* and the
+sports palace, are obtusely liquidating metaphysics does not matter in
+itself, but that these things are themselves becoming metaphysics, an ideological curtain,* within the social whole, behind which real doom is gathering, does matter. That is the basic premise of our fragments.
+The first essay, the theoretical basis of those which follow, seeks to
+gain greater understanding of the intertwinement of rationality and social
+reality, as well as of the intertwinement, inseparable from the former, of
+nature and the mastery of nature. The critique of enlightenment given in
+this section is intended to prepare a positive concept of enlightenment
+which liberates it from its entanglement in blind domination.
+The critical part of the first essay can be broadly summed up in two
+theses: Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology. These theses are worked out in relation to specific subjects in the
+two excurses. The first traces the dialectic of myth and enlightenment in
+the Odyssey, as one of the earliest representative documents of bourgeois
+Western civilization. It focuses primarily on the concepts of sacrifice and
+renunciation, through which both the difference between and the unity of
+mythical nature and enlightened mastery of nature become apparent. The
+second excursus is concerned with Kant, Sade, and Nietzsche, whose
+works represent the implacable consummation of enlightenment. This
+section shows how the subjugation of everything natural to the sovereign
+subject culminates in the domination of what is blindly objective and natural. This tendency levels all the antitheses of bourgeois thought, especially that between moral rigor and absolute amorality.
+The section "The Culture Industry" shows the regression of enlightenment to ideology which is graphically expressed in film and radio. Here,
+enlightenment consists primarily in the calculation of effects and in the
+technology of production and dissemination; the specific content of the
+
+XIX
+ideology is exhausted in the idolization of the existing order and of the
+power by which the technology is controlled. In the discussion of this contradiction the culture industry is taken more seriously than it might itself
+wish to be. But because its appeal to its own commercial character, its confession of its diminished truth, has long since become an excuse with
+which it evades responsibility for its lies, our analysis is directed at the
+claim objectively contained in its products to be aesthetic formations and
+thus representations of truth. It demonstrates* the dire state of society by
+the invalidity of that claim. Still more than the others, the section on the
+culture industry is fragmentary.*
+The discussion, in the form of theses, of "Elements of Anti-
+Semitism" deals with the reversion of enlightened civilization to barbarism
+in reality. The not merely theoretical but practical tendency toward selfdestruction has been inherent in rationality from the first, not only in the
+present phase when it is emerging nakedly. For this reason a philosophical
+prehistory of anti-Semitism is sketched. Its "irrationalism" derives from
+the nature of the dominant reason and of the world corresponding to its
+image. The "elements" are directly related to empirical research by the
+Institute of Social Research, * the foundation set up and kept alive by Felix
+Weil, without which not only our studies but the good part of the theoretical work of German emigrants carried forward despite Hitler would
+not have been possible. We wrote the first three theses jointly with Leo
+Löwenthal, with whom we have collaborated on many scholarly questions
+since the first years in Frankfurt.
+In the last section we publish notes and sketches which, in part, form
+part of the ideas in the preceding sections, without having found a place
+in them, and in part deal provisionally with problems of future work.
+Most of them relate to a dialectical anthropology.*
+Los Angeles, California, May 1944
+The book contains no essential changes to the text completed during the
+war. Only the last thesis of "Elements of Anti-Semitism" was added subsequently.
+Max Horkheimer Theodor W. Adorno
+June 1947
+
+The Concept* of Enlightenment
+Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of
+thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and
+installing them as masters. Yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with
+triumphant calamity. Enlightenment's program was the disenchantment
+of the world.* It wanted to dispel myths, to overthrow fantasy with knowledge. Bacon, "the father of experimental philosophy,"' brought these motifs together. He despised the exponents of tradition, who substituted belief for knowledge and were as unwilling to doubt as they were reckless in
+supplying answers. All this, he said, stood in the way of "the happy match
+between the mind of man and the nature of things," with the result that
+humanity was unable to use its knowledge for the betterment of its condition. Such inventions as had been made—Bacon cites printing, artillery,
+and the compass—had been arrived at more by chance than by systematic enquiry into nature. Knowledge obtained through such enquiry would
+not only be exempt from the influence of wealth and power but would
+establish man as the master of nature:
+Therefore, no doubt, the sovereignty of man lieth hid in knowledge; wherein many
+things are reserved, which kings with their treasure cannot buy, nor with their force
+command; their spials and intelligencers can give no news of them, their seamen
+and discoverers cannot sail where they grow: now we govern nature in opinions,
+but we are thrall unto her in necessity: but if we would be led by her in invention,
+we should command her by action.?
+
+2
+Although not a mathematician, Bacon well understood the scientific temper which was to come after him. The "happy match" between human
+understanding and the nature of things that he envisaged is a patriarchal
+one: the mind, conquering superstition, is to rule over disenchanted
+nature. Knowledge, which is power, knows no limits, either in its enslavement* of creation or in its deference to worldly masters. Just as it serves all
+the purposes of the bourgeois economy both in factories and on the battlefield, it is at the disposal of entrepreneurs regardless of their origins.
+Kings control technology no more directly than do merchants: it is as
+democratic as the economic system* with which it evolved. Technology is
+the essence of this knowledge. It aims to produce neither concepts nor
+images, nor the joy of understanding, but method, exploitation of the
+labor of others,* capital. The "many things" which, according to Bacon,
+knowledge still held in store are themselves mere instruments: the radio as
+a sublimated printing press, the dive bomber as a more effective form of
+artillery, remote control as a more reliable compass. What human beings
+seek to learn from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and
+human beings. Nothing else counts. Ruthless toward itself, the Enlightenment has eradicated the last remnant of its own self-awareness. Only
+thought which does violence to itself is hard enough to shatter myths.
+Faced by the present triumph of the factual mentality, Bacon's nominalist
+credo would have smacked of metaphysics and would have been convicted of the same vanity for which he criticized scholasticism. Power and
+knowledge are synonymous. For Bacon as for Luther, "knowledge that
+tendeth but to satisfaction, is but as a courtesan, which is for pleasure, and
+not for fruit or generation." Its concern is not "satisfaction, which men call
+truth," but "operation," the effective procedure. The "true end, scope or
+office of knowledge" does not consist in "any plausible, delectable, reverend or admired discourse, or any satisfactory arguments, but in effecting
+and working, and in discovery of particulars not revealed before, for the
+better endowment and help of man's life.
+"4 There shall be neither mystery
+nor any desire to reveal mystery.
+The disenchantment of the world means the extirpation of animism.
+Xenophanes mocked the multiplicity of gods because they resembled their
+creators, men, in all their idiosyncrasies and faults, and the latest logic
+denounces the words of language, which bear the stamp of impressions, as
+counterfeit coin that would be better replaced by neutral counters. The
+
+world becomes chaos, and synthesis salvation. No difference is said to exist
+between the totemic animal, the dreams of the spirit-seer,* and the absolute
+Idea. On their way toward modern science human beings have discarded
+meaning. The concept is replaced by the formula, the cause by rules and
+probability. Causality was only the last philosophical concept on which scientific criticism tested its strength, because it alone of the old ideas still
+stood in the way of such criticism, the latest secular form of the creative
+principle. To define substance and quality, activity and suffering, being and
+existence in terms appropriate to the time has been a concern of philosophy since Bacon; but science could manage without such categories. They
+were left behind as idola theatri of the old metaphysics and even in their
+time were monuments to entities and powers from prehistory. In that distant time life and death had been interpreted and interwoven in myths.
+The categories by which Western philosophy defined its timeless order of
+nature marked out the positions which had once been occupied by Onus
+and Persephone, Ariadne and Nereus. The moment of transition is recorded in the pre-Socratic cosmologies. The moist, the undivided, the air and
+fire which they take to be the primal stuff of nature are early rationalizations precipitated from the mythical vision. Just as the images of generation
+from water and earth, that had come to the Greeks from the Nile, were
+converted by these cosmologies into Hylozoic principles and elements, the
+whole ambiguous profusion of mythical demons was intellectualized to become the pure form of ontological entities. Even the patriarchal gods of
+Olympus were finally assimilated by the philosophical logos as the Platonic
+Forms. But the Enlightenment discerned the old powers in the Platonic
+and Aristotelian heritage of metaphysics and suppressed the universal categories claims to truth as superstition. In the authority of universal concepts
+the Enlightenment detected a fear of the demons through whose effigies
+human beings had tried to influence nature in magic rituals. From now on
+matter was finally to be controlled without the illusion of immanent powers or hidden properties. For enlightenment, anything which does not conform to the standard of calculability and utility must be viewed with suspicion. Once the movement is able to develop unhampered by external
+oppression, there is no holding it back. Its own ideas of human rights then
+fare no better than the older universals. Any intellectual resistance it encounters merely increases its strength. The reason is that enlightenment
+also recognizes itself in the old myths. No matter which myths are invoked
+
+against it, by being used as arguments they are made to acknowledge the
+very principle of corrosive rationality of which enlightenment stands accused. Enlightenment is totalitarian.
+Enlightenment has always regarded anthropomorphism, the projection of subjective properties onto nature, as the basis of myth. The supernatural, spirits and demons, are taken to be reflections of human beings
+who allow themselves to be frightened by natural phenomena. According
+to enlightened thinking, the multiplicity of mythical figures can be
+reduced to a single common denominator, the subject. Oedipuss answer
+to the riddle of the Sphinx— "That being is man" —is repeated indiscriminately as enlightenment's stereotyped message, whether in response to a
+piece of objective meaning, a schematic order, a fear of evil powers, or a
+hope of salvation. For the Enlightenment, only what can be encompassed
+by unity has the status of an existent or an event; its ideal is the system
+from which everything and anything follows. Its rationalist and empiricist
+versions do not differ on that point. Although the various schools may
+have interpreted its axioms differently, the structure of unitary science has
+always been the same. Despite the pluralism of the different fields of
+research, Bacon's postulate of una scientia universalis is as hostile to anything which cannot be connected as Leibniz's mathesis universalis is to discontinuity. The multiplicity of forms is reduced to position and arrangement, history to fact, things to matter. For Bacon, too, there was a clear
+logical connection, through degrees of generality, linking the highest principles to propositions based on observation. De Maistre mocks him for
+harboring this "idolized ladder." Formal logic was the high school of unification. It offered Enlightenment thinkers a schema for making the world
+calculable. The mythologizing equation of Forms with numbers in Plato's
+last writings expresses the longing of all demythologizing: number became
+enlightenment's canon. The same equations govern bourgeois justice and
+commodity exchange. "Is not the rule, 'Si indequalibus dequalia addas,
+omnia erunt indequalia, [If you add like to unlike you will always end up
+with unlike] an axiom of justice as well as of mathematics? And is there
+not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive justice, and
+arithmetical and geometrical proportion? " Bourgeois society is ruled by
+equivalence. It makes dissimilar things comparable by reducing them to
+abstract quantities. For the Enlightenment, anything which cannot be
+resolved into numbers, and ultimately into one, is illusion; modern posi-
+
+tivism consigns it to poetry. Unity remains the watchword from Parmenides to Russell. All gods and qualities must be destroyed.
+But the myths which fell victim to the Enlightenment were themselves its products. The scientific calculation of events annuls the account
+of them which thought had once given in myth. Myth sought to report,
+to name, to tell of origins—but therefore also to narrate, record, explain.
+This tendency was reinforced by the recording and collecting of myths.
+From a record, they soon became a teaching. Each ritual contains a representation of how things happen and of the specific process which is to be
+influenced by magic. In the earliest popular epics this theoretical element
+of ritual became autonomous. The myths which the tragic dramatists drew
+on were already marked by the discipline and power which Bacon celebrated as the goal. The local spirits and demons had been replaced by
+heaven and its hierarchy, the incantatory practices of the magician by the
+carefully graduated sacrifice and the labor of enslaved men mediated by
+command. The Olympian deities are no longer directly identical with elements, but signify them. In Homer Zeus controls the daytime sky, Apollo
+guides the sun; Helios and Eos are already passing over into allegory. The
+gods detach themselves from substances to become their quintessence.
+From now on, being is split between logos—which, with the advance of
+philosophy, contracts to a monad, a mere reference point-and the mass
+of things and creatures in the external world. The single distinction
+between man's own existence and reality swallows up all others. Without
+regard for differences, the world is made subject to man. In this the Jewish
+story of creation and the Olympian religion are at one: "... and let them
+have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and
+over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that
+creepeth upon the earth."0 "O Zeus, Father Zeus, yours is the dominion
+of the heavens; you oversee the works of men, both the wicked and the
+just, and the unruly animals, you who uphold righteousness."II "It is so
+ordained that one atones at once, another later; but even should one
+escape the doom threatened by the gods, it will surely come to pass one
+day, and innocents shall expiate his deed, whether his children or a later
+generation." 2 Only those who subject themselves utterly pass muster with
+the gods. The awakening of the subject is bought with the recognition of
+power as the principle of all relationships. In face of the unity of such reason the distinction between God and man is reduced to an irrelevance, as
+
+6
+reason has steadfastly indicated since the earliest critique of Homer. In
+their mastery of nature, the creative God and the ordering mind are alike.
+Man's likeness to God consists in sovereignty over existence, in the lordly
+gaze, in the command.
+Myth becomes enlightenment and nature mere objectivity. Human
+beings purchase the increase in their power with estrangement from that
+over which it is exerted. Enlightenment stands in the same relationship to
+things as the dictator to human beings. He knows them to the extent that
+he can manipulate them. The man of science knows things to the extent
+that he can make them. Their "in-itself" becomes "for him." In their
+transformation the essence of things is revealed as always the same, a substrate of domination. This identity constitutes the unity of nature. Neither
+it nor the unity of the subject was presupposed by magical incantation.
+The rites of the shaman were directed at the wind, the rain, the snake outside or the demon inside the sick person, not at materials or specimens.
+The spirit which practiced magic was not single or identical; it changed
+with the cult masks which represented the multiplicity of spirits. Magic is
+bloody untruth, but in it domination is not yet disclaimed by transforming itself into a pure truth underlying the world which it enslaves. The
+magician imitates demons; to frighten or placate them he makes intimidating or appeasing gestures. Although his task was impersonation he did
+not claim to be made in the image of the invisible power, as does civilized
+man, whose modest hunting ground then shrinks to the unified cosmos,
+in which nothing exists but prey. Only when made in such an image does
+man attain the identity of the self which cannot be lost in identification
+with the other but takes possession of itself once and for all as an impenetrable mask. It is the identity of mind and its correlative, the unity of
+nature, which subdues the abundance of qualities. Nature, stripped of
+qualities, becomes the chaotic stuff of mere classification, and the all-powerful self becomes a mere having, an abstract identity. Magic implies specific representation. What is done to the spear, the hair, the name of the
+enemy, is also to befall his person; the sacrificial animal is slain in place of
+the god. The substitution which takes place in sacrifice marks a step
+toward discursive logic. Even though the hind which was offered up for
+the daughter, the lamb for the firstborn, necessarily still had qualities of its
+own, it already represented the genus. It manifested the arbitrariness of
+the specimen. But the sanctity of the hic et nunc, the uniqueness of the
+
+7
+chosen victim which coincides with its representative status, distinguishes
+it radically, makes it non-exchangeable even in the exchange. Science puts
+an end to this. In it there is no specific representation: something which is
+a sacrificial animal cannot be a god. Representation gives way to universal
+fungibility. An atom is smashed not as a representative but as a specimen
+of matter, and the rabbit suffering the torment of the laboratory is seen not
+as a representative but, mistakenly, as a mere exemplar. Because in functional science the differences are so fluid that everything is submerged in
+one and the same matter, the scientific object is petrified, whereas the rigid
+ritual of former times appears supple in its substitution of one thing for
+another. The world of magic still retained differences whose traces have
+vanished even in linguistic forms.!3 The manifold affinities between existing things are supplanted by the single relationship between the subject
+who confers meaning and the meaningless object, between rational significance and its accidental bearer. At the magical stage dream and image
+were not regarded as mere signs of things but were linked to them by
+resemblance or name. The relationship was not one of intention but of
+kinship. Magic like science is concerned with ends, but it pursues them
+through mimesis, not through an increasing distance from the object. It
+certainly is not founded on the "omnipotence of thought," which the
+primitive is supposed to impute to himself like the neurotic;'4 there can be
+no "over-valuation of psychical acts" in relation to reality where thought
+and reality are not radically distinguished. The "unshakable confidence in
+the possibility of controlling the world"S which Freud anachronistically
+attributes to magic applies only to the more realistic form of world domination achieved by the greater astuteness of science. The autonomy of
+thought in relation to objects, as manifested in the reality-adequacy of the
+Ego, was a prerequisite for the replacement of the localized practices of the
+medicine man by all-embracing industrial technology.*
+As a totality set out in language and laying claim to a truth which
+suppressed the older mythical faith of popular religion, the solar, patriarchal myth was itself an enlightenment, fully comparable on that level to
+the philosophical one. But now it paid the price. Mythology itself set in
+motion the endless process of enlightenment by which, with ineluctable
+necessity, every definite theoretical view is subjected to the annihilating
+criticism that it is only a belief, until even the concepts of mind, truth,
+and, indeed, enlightenment itself have been reduced to animistic magic.
+
+The principle of the fated necessity which caused the downfall of the
+mythical hero, and finally evolved as the logical conclusion from the oracular utterance, not only predominates, refined to the cogency of formal
+logic, in every rationalistic system of Western philosophy but also presides
+over the succession of systems which begins with the hierarchy of the gods
+and, in a permanent twilight of the idols, hands down a single identical
+content: wrath against those of insufficient righteousness.* Just as myths
+already entail enlightenment, with every step enlightenment entangles
+itself more deeply in mythology. Receiving all its subject matter from
+myths, in order to destroy them, it falls as judge under the spell of myth.
+It seeks to escape the trial of fate and retribution by itself exacting retribution on that trial. In myths, everything that happens must atone for the
+fact of having happened. It is no different in enlightenment: no sooner has
+a fact been established than it is rendered insignificant. The doctrine that
+action equals reaction continued to maintain the power of repetition over
+existence long after humankind had shed the illusion that, by repetition,
+it could identify itself with repeated existence and so escape its power. But
+the more the illusion of magic vanishes, the more implacably repetition, in
+the guise of regularity, imprisons human beings in the cycle now objectified in the laws of nature, to which they believe they owe their security as
+free subjects. The principle of immanence, the explanation of every event
+as repetition, which enlightenment upholds against mythical imagination,
+is that of myth itself. The arid wisdom which acknowledges nothing new
+under the sun, because all the pieces in the meaningless game have been
+played out, all the great thoughts have been thought, all possible discoveries can be construed in advance, and human beings are defined by selfpreservation through adaptation-this barren wisdom merely reproduces
+the fantastic doctrine it rejects: the sanction of fate which, through retribution, incessantly reinstates what always was. Whatever might be different is made the same. That is the verdict which critically sets the boundaries to possible experience. The identity of everything with everything is
+bought at the cost that nothing can at the same time be identical to itself.
+Enlightenment dissolves away the injustice of the old inequality of
+unmediated mastery, but at the same time perpetuates it in universal
+mediation, by relating every existing thing to every other. It brings about
+the situation for which Kierkegaard praised his Protestant ethic and which,
+in the legend-cycle of Hercules, constitutes one of the primal images of
+
+9
+mythical violence: it amputates the incommensurable. Not merely are
+qualities dissolved in thought, but human beings are forced into real conformity. The blessing that the market does not ask about birth is paid for
+in the exchange society by the fact that the possibilities conferred by birth
+are molded to fit the production of goods that can be bought on the market. Each human being has been endowed with a self of his or her own,
+different from all others, so that it could all the more surely be made the
+same. But because that self never quite fitted the mold, enlightenment
+throughout the liberalistic period has always sympathized with social coercion. The unity of the manipulated collective consists in the negation of
+each individual and in the scorn poured on the type of society which could
+make people into individuals. The horde, a term which doubtless* is to be
+found in the Hitler Youth organization, is not a relapse into the old barbarism but the triumph of repressive égalité, the degeneration of the equality of rights into the wrong inflicted by equals. The fake myth of fascism
+reveals itself as the genuine myth of prehistory, in that the genuine myth
+beheld retribution while the false one wreaks it blindly on its victims. Any
+attempt to break the compulsion of nature by breaking nature only succumbs more deeply to that compulsion. That has been the trajectory of
+European civilization. Abstraction, the instrument of enlightenment,
+stands in the same relationship to its objects as fate, whose concept it eradicates: as liquidation. Under the leveling rule of abstraction, which makes
+everything in nature repeatable, and of industry, for which abstraction prepared the way, the liberated finally themselves become the "herd" (Trupp),
+which Hegel' identified as the outcome of enlightenment.
+The distance of subject from object, the presupposition of abstraction, is founded on the distance from things which the ruler attains by
+means of the ruled. The songs of Homer and the hymns of the Rig Veda
+date from the time of territorial dominion and its strongholds, when a
+warlike race of overlords imposed itself on the defeated indigenous population.' The supreme god among gods came into being with this civil
+world in which the king, as leader of the arms-bearing nobility, tied the
+subjugated people* to the land while doctors, soothsayers, artisans, and
+traders took care of circulation. With the end of nomadism the social order
+is established on the basis of fixed property. Power and labor diverge. A
+property owner like Odysseus "controls from a distance a numerous, finely graded personnel of ox herds, shepherds, swineherds, and servants. In
+
+IO
+the evening, having looked out from his castle to see the countryside lit up
+by a thousand fires, he can go to his rest in peace. He knows that his loyal
+servants are watching to keep away wild animals and to drive away thieves
+from the enclosures which they are there to protect."18 The generality of
+the ideas developed by discursive logic, power in the sphere of the concept,
+is built on the foundation of power in reality. The superseding of the old
+diffuse notions of the magical heritage by conceptual unity expresses a
+condition of life defined by the freeborn citizen and articulated by command. The self which learned about order and subordination through the
+subjugation of the world soon equated truth in general with classifying
+thought, without whose fixed distinctions it cannot exist. Along with
+mimetic magic it tabooed the knowledge which really apprehends the
+object. Its hatred is directed at the image of the vanquished primeval world
+and its imaginary happiness. The dark, chthonic gods of the original
+inhabitants are banished to the hell into which the earth is transformed
+under the religions of Indra and Zeus, with their worship of sun and light.
+But heaven and hell were linked. The name Zeus was applied both
+to a god of the underworld and to a god of light in cults which did not
+exclude each other," and the Olympian gods maintained all kinds of commerce with the chthonic deities. In the same way, the good and evil powers, the holy and the unholy, were not unambiguously distinguished. They
+were bound together like genesis and decline, life and death, summer and
+winter. The murky, undivided entity worshipped as the principle of mana
+at the earliest known stages of humanity lived on in the bright world of
+the Greek religion. Primal and undifferentiated, it is everything unknown
+and alien; it is that which transcends the bounds of experience, the part of
+things which is more than their immediately perceived existence. What
+the primitive experiences as supernatural is not a spiritual substance in
+contradistinction to the material world but the complex concatenation of
+nature in contrast to its individual link.* The cry of terror called forth by
+the unfamiliar becomes its name. It fixes the transcendence of the unknown in relation to the known, permanently linking horror to holiness.
+The doubling of nature into appearance and essence, effect and force,
+made possible by myth no less than by science, springs from human fear,
+the expression of which becomes its explanation. This does not mean that
+the soul is transposed into nature, as psychologism would have us believe;
+mana, the moving spirit, is not a projection but the echo of the real pre-
+
+II
+ponderance of nature in the weak psyches of primitive people. The split
+between animate and inanimate, the assigning of demons and deities to
+certain specific places, arises from this preanimism. Even the division of
+subject and object is prefigured in it. If the tree is addressed no longer as
+simply a tree but as evidence of something else, a location of mana, language expresses the contradiction that it is at the same time itself and
+something other than itself, identical and not identical.2° Through the
+deity speech is transformed from tautology into language. The concept,
+usually defined as the unity of the features of what it subsumes, was rather,
+from the first, a product of dialectical thinking, in which each thing is
+what it is only by becoming what it is not. This was the primal form of the
+objectifying definition, in which concept and thing became separate, the
+same definition which was already far advanced in the Homeric epic and
+trips over its own excesses in modern positive science. But this dialectic
+remains powerless as long as it emerges from the cry of terror, which is the
+doubling, the mere tautology of terror itself. The gods cannot take away
+fear from human beings, the petrified cries of whom they bear as their
+names. Humans believe themselves free of fear when there is no longer
+anything unknown. This has determined the path of demythologization,
+of enlightenment, which equates the living with the nonliving as myth
+had equated the nonliving with the living. Enlightenment is mythical fear
+radicalized. The pure immanence of positivism, its ultimate product, is
+nothing other than a form of universal taboo. Nothing is allowed to remain outside, since the mere idea of the "outside" is the real source of fear.
+If the revenge of primitive people for a murder committed on a member
+of their family could sometimes be assuaged by admitting the murderer
+into that family,?' both the murder and its remedy mean the absorption of
+alien blood into one's own, the establishment of immanence. The mythical dualism does not lead outside the circle of existence. The world controlled by mana, and even the worlds of Indian and Greek myth, are issueless and eternally the same. All birth is paid for with death, all fortune
+with misfortune. While men and gods may attempt in their short span to
+assess their fates by a measure other than blind destiny, existence triumphs
+over them in the end. Even their justice, wrested from calamity, bears its
+features; it corresponds to the way in which human beings, primitives no
+less than Greeks and barbarians, looked upon their world from within a
+society of oppression and poverty. Hence, for both mythical and enlight-
+
+I2
+ened justice, guilt and atonement, happiness and misfortune, are seen as
+the two sides of an equation. Justice gives way to law. The shaman wards
+off a danger with its likeness. Equivalence is his instrument; and equivalence regulates punishment and reward within civilization. The imagery of
+myths, too, can be traced back without exception to natural conditions.
+Just as the constellation Gemini, like all the other symbols of duality, refers
+to the inescapable cycle of nature; just as this cycle itself has its primeval
+sign in the symbol of the egg from which those later symbols are sprung,
+the Scales (Libra) held by Zeus, which symbolize the justice of the entire
+patriarchal world, point back to mere nature. The step from chaos to civilization, in which natural conditions exert their power no longer directly
+but through the consciousness of human beings, changed nothing in the
+principle of equivalence. Indeed, human beings atoned for this very step
+by worshipping that to which previously, like all other creatures, they had
+been merely subjected. Earlier, fetishes had been subject to the law of
+equivalence. Now equivalence itself becomes a fetish. The blindfold over
+the eyes of Justitia means not only that justice brooks no interference but
+that it does not originate in freedom.
+The teachings of the priests were symbolic in the sense that in them
+sign and image coincided. As the hieroglyphs attest, the word originally
+also had a pictorial function. This function was transferred to myths. They,
+like magic rites, refer to the repetitive cycle of nature. Nature as self-repetition is the core of the symbolic: an entity or a process which is conceived
+as eternal because it is reenacted again and again in the guise of the symbol. Inexhaustibility, endless renewal, and the permanence of what they
+signify are not only attributes of all symbols but their true content.
+Contrary to the Jewish Genesis, the representations of creation in which
+the world emerges from the primal mother, the cow or the egg, are symbolic. The scorn of the ancients for their all-too-human gods left their core
+untouched. The essence of the gods is not exhausted by individuality.
+They still had about them a quality of mana; they embodied nature as a
+universal power. With their preanimistic traits they intrude into the
+enlightenment. Beneath the modest veil of the Olympian chronique scandaleuse the doctrine of the commingling and colliding of elements had
+evolved; establishing itself at once as science, it turned the myths into figments of fantasy. With the clean separation between science and poetry
+
+13
+the division of labor which science had helped to establish was extended
+to language. For science the word is first of all a sign; it is then distributed
+among the various arts as sound, image, or word proper, but its unity can
+never be restored by the addition of these arts, by synaesthesia or total art.*
+As sign, language must resign itself to being calculation and, to know
+nature, must renounce the claim to resemble it. As image it must resign
+itself to being a likeness and, to be entirely nature, must renounce the
+claim to know it. With advancing enlightenment, only authentic works of
+art have been able to avoid the mere imitation of what already is. The prevailing antithesis between art and science, which rends the two apart as
+areas of culture in order to make them jointly manageable as areas of culture, finally causes them, through their internal tendencies as exact opposites, to converge. Science, in its neopositivist interpretation, becomes aestheticism, a system of isolated signs devoid of any intention transcending
+the system; it becomes the game which mathematicians have long since
+proudly declared their activity to be. Meanwhile, art as integral replication
+has pledged itself to positivist science, even in its specific techniques. It
+becomes, indeed, the world over again, an ideological doubling, a compliant reproduction. The separation of sign and image is inescapable. But if,
+with heedless complacency, it is hypostatized over again, then each of the
+isolated principles tends toward the destruction of truth.
+Philosophy has perceived the chasm opened by this separation as the
+relationship between intuition and concept and repeatedly but vainly has
+attempted to close it; indeed, philosophy is defined by that attempt.
+Usually, however, it has sided with the tendency to which it owes its name.
+Plato banished poetry with the same severity with which positivism dismissed the doctrine of Forms. Homer, Plato argued, had procured neither
+public nor private reforms through his much-vaunted art, had neither won
+a war nor made an invention. We did not know, he said, of any numerous
+followers who had honored or loved him. Art had to demonstrate its usefulness.? The making of images was proscribed by Plato as it was by the
+Jews. Both reason and religion outlaw the principle of magic. Even in its
+resigned detachment from existence, as art, it remains dishonorable; those
+who practice it become vagrants, latter-day nomads, who find no domicile
+among the settled. Nature is no longer to be influenced by likeness but
+mastered through work. Art has in common with magic the postulation of
+a special, self-contained sphere removed from the context of profane exis-
+
+tence. Within it special laws prevail. Just as the sorcerer begins the ceremony by marking out from all its surroundings the place in which the
+sacred forces are to come into play, each work of art is closed off from reality by its own circumference. The very renunciation of external effects by
+which art is distinguished from magical sympathy binds art only more
+deeply to the heritage of magic. This renunciation places the pure image
+in opposition to corporeal existence, the elements of which the image sublates within itself. It is in the nature of the work of art, of aesthetic illusion, to be what was experienced as a new and terrible event in the magic
+of primitives: the appearance of the whole in the particular. The work of
+art constantly reenacts the duplication by which the thing appeared as
+something spiritual, a manifestation of mana. That constitutes its aura. As
+an expression of totality art claims the dignity of the absolute. This has
+occasionally led philosophy to rank it higher than conceptual knowledge.
+According to Schelling, art begins where knowledge leaves humans in the
+lurch. For him art is "the model of science, and wherever art is, there science must go."23 According to his theory the separation of image and sign
+"is entirely abolished by each single representation of art."24 The bourgeois
+world was rarely amenable to such confidence in art. Where it restricted
+knowledge, it generally did so to make room for faith, not art. It was
+through faith that the militant religiosity of the modern age, of Torquemada, Luther, and Mohammed, sought to reconcile spirit and existence. But faith is a privative concept: it is abolished as faith if it does not
+continuously assert either its opposition to knowledge or its agreement
+with it. In being dependent on the limits set to knowledge, it is itself limited. The attempt made by faith under Protestantism to locate the principle of truth, which transcends faith and without which faith cannot exist,
+directly in the word itself, as in primeval times, and to restore the symbolic
+power of the word, was paid for by obedience to the word, but not in its
+sacred form. Because faith is unavoidably tied to knowledge as its friend
+or its foe, faith perpetuates the split in the struggle to overcome know!-
+edge: its fanaticism is the mark of its untruth, the objective admission that
+anyone who only believes for that reason no longer believes. Bad conscience is second nature to it. The secret awareness of this necessary, inherent flaw, the immanent contradiction that lies in making a profession of
+reconciliation, is the reason why honesty in believers has always been a
+sensitive and dangerous affair. The horrors of fire and sword, of counter-
+
+The Concept of Enlightenment 15
+Reformation and Reformation, were perpetrated not as an exaggeration
+but as a realization of the principle of faith. Faith repeatedly shows itself
+of the same stamp as the world history it would like to command; indeed,
+in the modern period it has become that history's preferred means, its special ruse. Not only is the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century inexorable, as Hegel confirmed; so, too, as none knew better than he, is the
+movement of thought itself. The lowest insight, like the highest, contains
+the knowledge of its distance from the truth, which makes the apologist a
+liar. The paradox of faith degenerates finally into fraud, the myth of the
+twentieth century* and faith's irrationality into rational organization in the
+hands of the utterly enlightened as they steer society toward barbarism.
+When language first entered history its masters were already priests
+and sorcerers. Anyone who affronted the symbols fell prey in the name of
+the unearthly powers to the earthly ones, represented by these appointed
+organs of society. What preceded that stage is shrouded in darkness.
+Wherever it is found in ethnology, the terror from which mana was born
+was already sanctioned, at least by the tribal elders. Unidentical, fluid
+mana was solidified, violently materialized by men. Soon the sorcerers had
+populated every place with its emanations and coordinated the multiplicity of sacred realms with that of sacred rites. With the spirit-world and its
+peculiarities they extended their esoteric knowledge and their power. The
+sacred essence was transferred to the sorcerers who managed it. In the first
+stages of nomadism the members of the tribe still played an independent
+part in influencing the course of nature. The men tracked prey while the
+women performed tasks which did not require rigid commands. How
+much violence preceded the habituation to even so simple an order cannot be known. In that order the world was already divided into zones of
+power and of the profane. The course of natural events as an emanation of
+mana had already been elevated to a norm demanding submission. But if
+the nomadic savage, despite his subjection, could still participate in the
+magic which defined the limits of that world, and could disguise himself
+as his quarry in order to stalk it, in later periods the intercourse with spirits and the subjection were assigned to different classes of humanity:
+power to one side, obedience to the other. The recurring, never-changing
+natural processes were drummed into the subjects, either by other tribes
+or by their own cliques, as the rhythm of work, to the beat of the club and
+the rod, which reechoed in every barbaric drum, in each monotonous rit-
+
+ual. The symbols take on the expression of the fetish. The repetition of
+nature which they signify always manifests itself in later times as the permanence of social compulsion, which the symbols represent. The dread
+objectified in the fixed image becomes a sign of the consolidated power of
+the privileged.* But general concepts continued to symbolize that power
+even when they had shed all pictorial traits. Even the deductive form of
+science mirrors hierarchy and compulsion. Just as the first categories represented the organized tribe and its power over the individual, the entire
+logical order, with its chains of inference and dependence, the superordination and coordination of concepts, is founded on the corresponding
+conditions in social reality, that is, on the division of labor.? Of course,
+this social character of intellectual forms is not, as Durkheim argues, an
+expression of social solidarity but evidence of the impenetrable unity of
+society and power. Power confers increased cohesion and strength on the
+social whole in which it is established. The division of labor, through
+which power manifests itself socially, serves the self-preservation of the
+dominated whole. But this necessarily turns the whole, as a whole, and the
+operation of its immanent reason, into a means of enforcing the particular interest. Power confronts the individual as the universal, as the reason
+which informs reality. The power of all the members of society, to whom
+as individuals no other way is open, is constantly summated, through the
+division of labor imposed on them, in the realization of the whole, whose
+rationality is thereby multiplied over again. What is done to all by the few
+always takes the form of the subduing of individuals by the many: the
+oppression of society always bears the features of oppression by a collective. It is this unity of collectivity and power, and not the immediate social
+universal, solidarity, which is precipitated in intellectual forms. Through
+their claim to universal validity, the philosophical concepts with which
+Plato and Aristotle represented the world elevated the conditions which
+those concepts justified to the status of true reality. They originated, as
+Vico put it, in the marketplace of Athens; they reflected with the same
+fidelity the laws of physics, the equality of freeborn citizens, and the inferiority of women, children, and slaves. Language itself endowed what it
+expressed, the conditions of domination, with the universality it had
+acquired as the means of intercourse in civil society. The metaphysical
+emphasis, the sanction by ideas and norms, was no more than a hypostatization of the rigidity and exclusivity which concepts have necessarily
+
+17
+taken on wherever language has consolidated the community of the rulers
+for the enforcement of commands. As a means of reinforcing the social
+power of language, ideas became more superfluous the more that power
+increased, and the language of science put an end to them altogether.
+Conscious justification lacked the suggestive power which springs from
+dread of the fetish. The unity of collectivity and power now revealed itself
+in the generality which faulty content necessarily takes on in language,
+whether metaphysical or scientific. The metaphysical apologia at least
+betrayed the injustice of the established order through the incongruence of
+concept and reality. The impartiality of scientific language deprived what
+was powerless of the strength to make itself heard and merely provided the
+existing order with a neutral sign for itself. Such neutrality is more metaphysical than metaphysics. Enlightenment finally devoured not only symbols but also their successors, universal concepts, and left nothing of metaphysics behind except the abstract fear of the collective from which it had
+sprung. Concepts in face of enlightenment are like those living on unearned income in face of industrial trusts:* none can feel secure. If logical
+positivism still allowed some latitude for probability, ethnological positivism already equates probability with essence. "Our vague ideas of
+chance and quintessence are pale relics of that far richer notion,"27 that is,
+of the magical substance.
+Enlightenment as a nominalist tendency stops short before the
+nomen, the non-extensive, restricted concept, the proper name. Although
+it cannot be established with certainty whether proper names were originally generic names, as some maintain, the former have not yet shared the
+fate of the latter. The substantial ego repudiated by Hume and Mach is not
+the same thing as the name. In the Jewish religion, in which the idea of
+the patriarchy is heightened to the point of annihilating myth, the link
+between name and essence is still acknowledged in the prohibition on
+uttering the name of God. The disenchanted world of Judaism propitiates
+magic by negating it in the idea of God. The Jewish religion brooks no
+word which might bring solace to the despair of all mortality. It places all
+hope in the prohibition on invoking falsity as God, the finite as the infinite, the lie as truth. The pledge of salvation lies in the rejection of any
+faith which claims to depict it, knowledge in the denunciation of illusion.
+Negation, however, is not abstract. The indiscriminate denial of anything
+positive, the stereotyped formula of nothingness as used by Buddhism,
+
+18
+ignores the ban on calling the absolute by its name no less than its opposite, pantheism, or the latters caricature, bourgeois skepticism. Explanations of the world as nothingness or as the entire cosmos are mythologies,
+and the guaranteed paths to redemption sublimated magical practices.
+The self-satisfaction of knowing in advance, and the transfiguration of
+negativity as redemption, are untrue forms of the resistance to deception.
+The right of the image is rescued in the faithful observance of its prohibition. Such observance, "determinate negation,"2' is not exempted from the
+enticements of intuition by the sovereignty of the abstract concept, as is
+skepticism, for which falsehood and truth are equally void. Unlike rigorism, determinate negation does not simply reject imperfect representations of the absolute, idols, by confronting them with the idea they are
+unable to match. Rather, dialectic discloses each image as script. It teaches us to read from its features the admission of falseness which cancels its
+power and hands it over to truth. Language thereby becomes more than a
+mere system of signs. With the concept of determinate negation Hegel
+gave prominence to an element which distinguishes enlightenment from
+the positivist decay to which he consigned it. However, by finally postulating the known result of the whole process of negation, totality in the
+system and in history, as the absolute, he violated the prohibition and
+himself succumbed to mythology.
+That fate befell not only his philosophy, as the apotheosis of advancing thought, but enlightenment itself, in the form of the sober matter-offactness by which it purported to distinguish itself from Hegel and from
+metaphysics in general. For enlightenment is totalitarian as only a system
+can be. Its untruth does not lie in the analytical method, the reduction to
+elements, the decomposition through reflection, as its Romantic enemies
+had maintained from the first, but in its assumption that the trial is prejudged. When in mathematics the unknown becomes the unknown quantity in an equation, it is made into something long familiar before any
+value* has been assigned. Nature, before and after quantum theory, is what
+can be registered mathematically; even what cannot be assimilated, the
+insoluble and irrational, is fenced in by mathematical theorems. In the
+preemptive identification of the thoroughly mathematized world with
+truth, enlightenment believes itself safe from the return of the mythical. It
+equates thought with mathematics. The latter is thereby cut loose, as it
+were, turned into an absolute authority. "An infinite world, in this case a
+
+world of idealities, is conceived as one in which objects are not accessible
+individually to our cognition in an imperfect and accidental way but are
+attained by a rational, systematically unified method which finally apprehends each object—in an infinite progression—fully as its own initself. ... In Galileo's mathematization of nature, nature itself is idealized
+on the model of the new mathematics. In modern terms, it becomes a
+mathematical manifold.
+"30 Thought is reified as an autonomous, automatic process, aping the machine it has itself produced, so that it can finally be replaced by the machine. Enlightenment'' pushed aside the classical
+demand to "think thinking" —Fichte's philosophy is its radical fulfillment-because it distracted philosophers from the command to control
+praxis, which Fichte himself had wanted to enforce. Mathematical procedure became a kind of ritual of thought. Despite its axiomatic self-limitation, it installed itself as necessary and objective: mathematics made
+thought into a thing—a tool, to use its own term. Through this mimesis,
+however, in which thought makes the world resemble itself, the actual has
+become so much the only concern that even the denial of God falls under
+the same judgment as metaphysics. For positivism, which has assumed the
+judicial office of enlightened reason, to speculate about intelligible worlds
+is no longer merely forbidden but senseless prattle. Positivism-fortunately for it—does not need to be atheistic, since objectified thought cannot even pose the question of the existence of God. The positivist sensor
+turns a blind eye to official worship, as a special, knowledge-free zone of
+social activity, just as willingly as to art—but never to denial, even when
+it has a claim to be knowledge. For the scientific temper, any deviation of
+thought from the business of manipulating the actual, any stepping outside the jurisdiction of existence, is no less senseless and self-destructive
+than it would be for the magician to step outside the magic circle drawn
+for his incantation; and in both cases violation of the taboo carries a heavy
+price for the offender. The mastery of nature draws the circle in which the
+critique of pure reason holds thought spellbound. Kant combined the
+doctrine of thought's restlessly toilsome progress toward infinity with
+insistence on its insufficiency and eternal limitation. The wisdom he
+imparted is oracular: There is no being in the world that knowledge cannot penetrate, but what can be penetrated by knowledge is not being.
+Philosophical judgment, according to Kant, aims at the new yet recognizes
+nothing new, since it always merely repeats what reason has placed into
+
+20
+objects beforehand. However, this thought, protected within the departments of science from the dreams of a spirit-seer,* has to pay the price:
+world domination over nature turns against the thinking subject itself;
+nothing is left of it except that ever-unchanging "I think," which must
+accompany all my conceptions. Both subject and object are nullified. The
+abstract self, which alone confers the legal right to record and systematize,
+is confronted by nothing but abstract material, which has no other property than to be the substrate of that right. The equation of mind and world
+is finally resolved, but only in the sense that both sides cancel out. The
+reduction of thought to a mathematical apparatus condemns the world to
+be its own measure. What appears as the triumph of subjectivity, the subjection of all existing things to logical formalism, is bought with the obedient subordination of reason to what is immediately at hand. To grasp
+existing things as such, not merely to note their abstract spatial-temporal
+relationships, by which they can then be seized, but, on the contrary, to
+think of them as surface, as mediated conceptual moments which are only
+fulfilled by revealing their social, historical, and human meaning-this
+whole aspiration of knowledge is abandoned. Knowledge does not consist
+in mere perception, classification, and calculation but precisely in the
+determining negation of whatever is directly at hand. Instead of such
+negation, mathematical formalism, whose medium, number, is the most
+abstract form of the immediate, arrests thought at mere immediacy. The
+actual is validated, knowledge confines itself to repeating it, thought
+makes itself mere tautology. The more completely the machinery of
+thought subjugates existence, the more blindly it is satisfied with reproducing it. Enlightenment thereby regresses to the mythology it has never
+been able to escape. For mythology had reflected in its forms the essence
+of the existing order—cyclical motion, fate, domination of the world as
+truth-and had renounced hope. In the terseness of the mythical image,
+as in the clarity of the scientific formula, the eternity of the actual is confirmed and mere existence is pronounced as the meaning it obstructs. The
+world as a gigantic analytical judgment, the only surviving dream of science, is of the same kind as the cosmic myth which linked the alternation
+of spring and autumn to the abduction of Persephone. The uniqueness of
+the mythical event, which was intended to legitimize the factual one, is a
+deception. Originally, the rape of the goddess was directly equated with
+the dying of nature. It was repeated each autumn, and even the repetition
+
+2I
+was not a succession of separate events, but the same one each time. With
+the consolidation of temporal consciousness the process was fixed as a
+unique event in the past, and ritual assuagement of the terror of death in
+each new cycle of seasons was sought in the recourse to the distant past.
+But such separation is powerless. The postulation of the single past event
+endows the cycle with a quality of inevitability, and the terror radiating
+from the ancient event spreads over the whole process as its mere repetition. The subsumption of the actual, whether under mythical prehistory
+or under mathematical formalism, the symbolic relating of the present to
+the mythical event in the rite or to the abstract category in science, makes
+the new appear as something predetermined which therefore is really the
+old. It is not existence that is without hope, but knowledge which appropriates and perpetuates existence as a schema in the pictorial or mathematical symbol.
+In the enlightened world, mythology has permeated the sphere of
+the profane. Existence, thoroughly cleansed of demons and their conceptual descendants, takes on, in its gleaming naturalness, the numinous
+character which former ages attributed to demons. Justified in the guise of
+brutal facts as something eternally immune to intervention, the social
+injustice from which those facts arise is as sacrosanct today as the medicine
+man once was under the protection of his gods. Not only is domination
+paid for with the estrangement of human beings from the dominated
+objects, but the relationships of human beings, including the relationship
+of individuals to themselves, have themselves been bewitched by the
+objectification of mind. Individuals shrink to the nodal points of conventional reactions and the modes of operation objectively expected of them.
+Animism had endowed things with souls; industrialism makes souls into
+things.* On its own account, even in advance of total planning, the economic apparatus endows commodities with the values which decide the
+behavior of people. Since, with the ending of free exchange, commodities
+have forfeited all economic qualities except their fetish character, this character has spread like a cataract across the life of society in all its aspects.
+The countless agencies of mass production and its culture* impress standardized behavior on the individual as the only natural, decent, and rational one. Individuals define themselves now only as things, statistical elements, successes or failures. Their criterion is self-preservation, successful
+or unsuccessful adaptation to the objectivity of their function and the
+
+22
+schemata assigned to it. Everything which is different, from the idea to
+criminality, is exposed to the force of the collective, which keeps watch
+from the classroom to the trade union. Yet even the threatening collective
+is merely a part of the deceptive surface, beneath which are concealed the
+powers which manipulate the collective as an agent of violence. Its brutality, which keeps the individual up to the mark, no more represents the true
+quality of people than value* represents that of commodities. The demonically distorted form which things and human beings have taken on in the
+clear light of unprejudiced knowledge points back to domination, to the
+principle which already imparted the qualities of mana to spirits and
+deities and trapped the human gaze in the fakery of sorcerers and medicine men. The fatalism by which incomprehensible death was sanctioned
+in primeval times has now passed over into utterly comprehensible life.
+The noonday panic fear in which nature suddenly appeared to humans as
+an all-encompassing power has found its counterpart in the panic which
+is ready to break out at any moment today: human beings expect the
+world, which is without issue, to be set ablaze by a universal power which
+they themselves are and over which they are powerless.
+Enlightenment's mythic terror springs from a horror of myth. It
+detects myth not only in semantically unclarified concepts and words, as
+linguistic criticism imagines, but in any human utterance which has no
+place in the functional context of self-preservation. Spinozas proposition:
+"the endeavor of preserving oneself is the first and only basis of virtue,"32
+contains the true maxim of all Western civilization, in which the religious
+and philosophical differences of the bourgeoisie are laid to rest. The self
+which, after the methodical extirpation of all natural traces as mythological, was no longer supposed to be either a body or blood or a soul or even
+a natural ego but was sublimated into a transcendental or logical subject,
+formed the reference point of reason, the legislating authority of action. In
+the judgment of enlightenment as of Protestantism, those who entrust
+themselves directly to life, without any rational reference to self-preservation, revert to the realm of prehistory. Impulse as such, according to this
+view, is as mythical as superstition, and worship of any God not postulated by the self, as aberrant as drunkenness. For both—worship and selfimmersion in immediate natural existence—progress holds the same fate
+in store. It has anathematized the self-forgetfulness both of thought and of
+
+23
+pleasure. In the bourgeois economy the social work of each individual is
+mediated by the principle of the self; for some this labor is supposed to
+yield increased capital, for others the strength for extra work. But the more
+heavily the process of self-preservation is based on the bourgeois division
+of labor, the more it enforces the self-alienation of individuals, who must
+mold themselves to the technical apparatus body and soul. Enlightened
+thinking has an answer for this, too: finally, the transcendental subject of
+knowledge, as the last reminder of subjectivity, is itself seemingly abolished and replaced by the operations of the automatic mechanisms of
+order, which therefore run all the more smoothly. Subjectivity has
+volatilized itself into the logic of supposedly optional rules, to gain more
+absolute control. Positivism, which finally did not shrink from laying
+hands on the idlest fancy of all, thought itself, eliminated the last intervening agency between individual action and the social norm. The technical process, to which the subject has been reified after the eradication of
+that process from consciousness, is as free from the ambiguous meanings
+of mythical thought as from meaning altogether, since reason itself has
+become merely an aid to the all-encompassing economic apparatus.*
+Reason serves as a universal tool for the fabrication of all other tools, rigidly purpose-directed and as calamitous as the precisely calculated operations of material production, the results of which for human beings escape
+all calculation. Reason's old ambition to be purely an instrument of purposes has finally been fulfilled. The exclusivity of logical laws stems from
+this obdurate adherence to function and ultimately from the compulsive
+character of self-preservation. The latter is constantly magnified into the
+choice between survival and doom, a choice which is reflected even in the
+principle that, of two contradictory propositions, only one can be true and
+the other false. The formalism of this principle and the entire logic established around it stem from the opacity and entanglement of interests in a
+society in which the maintenance of forms and the preservation of individuals only fortuitously coincide. The expulsion of thought from logic
+ratifies in the lecture hall the reification of human beings in factory and
+office. In this way the taboo encroaches on the power imposing it, enlightenment on mind, which it itself is. But nature as true self-preservation is
+thereby unleashed, in the individual as in the collective fate of crisis and
+war, by the process which promised to extirpate it. If unitary knowledge*
+is the only norm which theory has left, praxis must be handed over to the
+
+24
+unfettered operations of world history. The self, entirely encompassed by
+civilization, is dissolved in an element composed of the very inhumanity
+which civilization has sought from the first to escape. The oldest fear, that
+of losing one's own name, is being fulfilled. For civilization, purely natural
+existence, both animal and vegetative, was the absolute danger. Mimetic,
+mythical, and metaphysical forms of behavior were successively regarded
+as stages of world history which had been left behind, and the idea of
+reverting to them held the terror that the self would be changed back into
+the mere nature from which it had extricated itself with unspeakable exertions and which for that reason filled it with unspeakable dread. Over the
+millennia the living memory of prehistory, of its nomadic period and even
+more of the truly prepatriarchal stages, has been expunged from human
+consciousness with the most terrible punishments. The enlightened spirit
+replaced fire and the wheel by the stigma it attached to all irrationality
+which led to perdition. Its hedonism was moderate, extremes being no less
+repugnant to enlightenment than to Aristotle. The bourgeois ideal of naturalness is based not on amorphous nature but on the virtue of the middle way. For this ideal, promiscuity and asceticism, superfluity and hunger,
+although opposites, are directly identical as powers of disintegration. By
+subordinating life in its entirety to the requirements of its preservation, the
+controlling minority guarantees, with its own security, the continuation of
+the whole. From Homer to modernity the ruling spirit has sought to steer
+between the Scylla of relapse into simple reproduction and the Charybdis
+of unfettered fulfillment; from the first it has mistrusted any guiding star
+other than the lesser evil. The German neopagans and administrators of
+war fever want to reinstate pleasure.* But since, under the work-pressure
+of the millennium now ending, pleasure has learned to hate itself, in its
+totalitarian emancipation it remains mean and mutilated through selfcontempt.* It is still in the grip of the self-preservation inculcated in it by
+the reason which has now been deposed. At the turning points of Western
+civilization, whenever new peoples and classes have more heavily repressed
+myth, from the beginnings of the Olympian religion to the Renaissance,
+the Reformation, and bourgeois atheism, the fear of unsubdued, threatening nature—a fear resulting from natures very materialization and objectification—has been belittled as animist superstition, and the control of
+internal and external nature has been made the absolute purpose of life.
+Now that self-preservation has been finally automated, reason is dismissed
+
+25
+by those who, as controllers of production, have taken over its inheritance
+and fear it in the disinherited. The essence of enlightenment is the choice
+between alternatives, and the inescapability of this choice is that of power.
+Human beings have always had to choose between their subjugation to
+nature and its subjugation to the self. With the spread of the bourgeois
+commodity economy the dark horizon of myth is illuminated by the sun
+of calculating reason, beneath whose icy rays the seeds of the new barbarism are germinating. Under the compulsion of power, human labor has
+always led away from myth and, under power, has always fallen back
+under its spell.
+The intertwinement of myth, power, and labor is preserved in one
+of the tales of Homer. Book XII of the Odyssey tells how Odysseus sailed
+past the Sirens. Their allurement is that of losing oneself in the past. But
+the hero exposed to it has come of age in suffering. In the multitude of
+mortal dangers which he has had to endure, the unity of his own life, the
+identity of the person, have been hardened. The realms of time have been
+separated for him like water, earth, and air. The tide of what has been has
+receded from the rock of the present, and the future lies veiled in cloud on
+the horizon. What Odysseus has left behind him has passed into the world
+of shades: so close is the self to the primeval myth from whose embrace it
+has wrested itself that its own lived past becomes a mythical prehistory. It
+seeks to combat this by a fixed order of time. The tripartite division is
+intended to liberate the present moment from the power of the past by
+banishing the latter beyond the absolute boundary of the irrecoverable and
+placing it, as usable knowledge, in the service of the present. The urge to
+rescue the past as something living, instead of using it as the material of
+progress, has been satisfied only in art, in which even history, as a representation of past life, is included. As long as art does not insist on being
+treated as knowledge, and thus exclude itself from praxis, it is tolerated by
+social praxis in the same way as pleasure. But the Sirens' song has not yet
+been deprived of power as art. They have knowledge "of all that has ever
+happened on this fruitful earth and especially of what has befallen
+Odysseus himself: "For we know all that the Argives and the Trojans suffered on the broad plain of Troy by the will of the gods."34 By directly
+invoking the recent past, and with the irresistible promise of pleasure
+which their song contains, the Sirens threaten the patriarchal order, which
+gives each person back their life only in exchange for their full measure of
+
+26 The Concept of Enlightenment
+time. When only unfailing presence of mind wrests survival from nature,
+anyone who follows the Sirens' phantasmagoria is lost. If the Sirens know
+everything that has happened, they demand the future as its price, and
+their promise of a happy homecoming is the deception by which the past
+entraps a humanity filled with longing. Odysseus has been warned by
+Circe, the divinity of regression to animal form, whom he has withstood
+and who therefore gives him the strength to withstand other powers of dissolution. But the lure of the Sirens remains overpowering. No one who
+hears their song can escape. Humanity had to inflict terrible injuries on
+itself before the self—the identical, purpose-directed, masculine character
+of human beings—was created, and something of this process is repeated
+in every childhood. The effort to hold itself together attends the ego at all
+its stages, and the temptation to be rid of the ego has always gone handin-hand with the blind determination to preserve it. Narcotic intoxication,
+in which the euphoric suspension of the self is expiated by deathlike sleep,
+is one of the oldest social transactions mediating between self-preservation
+and self-annihilation, an attempt by the self to survive itself. The fear of
+losing the self, and suspending with it the boundary between oneself and
+other life, the aversion to death and destruction, is twinned with a promise
+of joy which has threatened civilization at every moment. The way of civilization has been that of obedience and work, over which fulfillment
+shines everlastingly as mere illusion, as beauty deprived of power.
+Odysseuss idea, equally inimical to his death and to his happiness, shows
+awareness of this. He knows only two possibilities of escape. One he prescribes to his comrades. He plugs their ears with wax and orders them to
+row with all their might. Anyone who wishes to survive must not listen to
+the temptation of the irrecoverable, and is unable to listen only if he is
+unable to hear. Society has always made sure that this was the case. Workers must look ahead with alert concentration and ignore anything which
+lies to one side. The urge toward distraction must be grimly sublimated in
+redoubled exertions. Thus the workers are made practical. The other possibility Odysseus chooses for himself, the landowner, who has others to
+work for him. He listens, but does so while bound helplessly to the mast,
+and the stronger the allurement grows the more tightly he has himself
+bound, just as later the bourgeois denied themselves happiness the closer
+it drew to them with the increase in their own power. What he hears has
+no consequences for him; he can signal to his men to untie him only by
+
+27
+movements of his head, but it is too late. His comrades, who themselves
+cannot hear, know only of the danger of the song, not of its beauty, and
+leave him tied to the mast to save both him and themselves. They reproduce the life of the oppressor as a part of their own, while he cannot step
+outside his social role. The bonds by which he has irrevocably fettered
+himself to praxis at the same time keep the Sirens at a distance from praxis: their lure is neutralized as a mere object of contemplation, as art. The
+fettered man listens to a concert, as immobilized as audiences later, and his
+enthusiastic call for liberation goes unheard as applause. In this way the
+enjoyment of art and manual work diverge as the primeval world is left
+behind. The epic already contains the correct theory. Between the cultural heritage and enforced work there is a precise correlation, and both are
+founded on the inescapable compulsion toward the social control of
+nature.
+Measures like those taken on Odysseus's ship in face of the Sirens are
+a prescient allegory of the dialectic of enlightenment. Just as the capacity
+to be represented is the measure of power, the mightiest person being the
+one who can be represented in the most functions, so it is also the vehicle
+of both progress and regression. Under the given conditions, exclusion
+from work means mutilation, not only for the unemployed but also for
+people at the opposite social pole. Those at the top experience the existence with which they no longer need to concern themselves as a mere
+substrate, and are wholly ossified as the self which issues commands. Primitive man experienced the natural thing only as the fugitive object of
+desire, "but the lord, who has interposed the bondsman between it and
+himself, takes to himself only the dependent aspect of the thing and has
+the pure enjoyment of it. The aspect of its independence he leaves to the
+bondsman, who works on it."3s Odysseus is represented in the sphere of
+work. Just as he cannot give way to the lure of self-abandonment, as owner
+he also forfeits participation in work and finally even control over it, while
+his companions, despite their closeness to things, cannot enjoy their work
+because it is performed under compulsion, in despair, with their senses
+forcibly stopped. The servant is subjugated in body and soul, the master
+regresses. No system of domination has so far been able to escape this
+price, and the circularity of history in its progress is explained in part by
+this debilitation, which is the concomitant of power. Humanity, whose
+skills and knowledge become differentiated with the division of labor, is
+
+28
+thereby forced back to more primitive anthropological stages, since, with
+the technical facilitation of existence, the continuance of domination demands the fixation of instincts by greater repression. Fantasy withers. The
+calamity is not that individuals have fallen behind society or its material
+production. Where the development of the machine has become that of
+the machinery of control, so that technical and social tendencies, always
+intertwined, converge in the total encompassing of human beings, those
+who have lagged behind represent not only untruth. Adaptation to the
+power of progress furthers the progress of power, constantly renewing the
+degenerations which prove successful progress, not failed progress, to be
+its own antithesis. The curse of irresistible progress is irresistible regression.
+This regression is not confined to the experience of the sensuous
+world, an experience tied to physical proximity, but also affects the autocratic intellect, which detaches itself from sensuous experience in order to
+subjugate it. The standardization of the intellectual function through
+which the mastery of the senses is accomplished, the acquiescence of
+thought to the production of unanimity, implies an impoverishment of
+thought no less than of experience; the separation of the two realms leaves
+both damaged. A consequence of the restriction of thought to organization and administration, rehearsed by the those in charge from artful
+Odysseus to artless chairmen of the board, is the stupidity which afflicts
+the great as soon as they have to perform tasks other than the manipulation of the small. Mind becomes in reality the instrument of power and
+self-mastery for which bourgeois philosophy has always mistaken it. The
+deafness which has continued to afflict the submissive proletarians since
+the myth is matched by the immobility of those in command. The overripeness of society lives on the immaturity of the ruled. The more complex and sensitive the social, economic, and scientific mechanism, to the
+operation of which the system of production has long since attuned the
+body, the more impoverished are the experiences of which the body is
+capable. The elimination of qualities, their conversion into functions, is
+transferred by rationalized modes of work to the human capacity for experience, which tends to revert to that of amphibians. The regression of the
+masses today lies in their inability to hear with their own ears what has not
+already been heard, to touch with their hands what has not previously
+been grasped; it is the new form of blindness which supersedes that of van-
+
+29
+quished myth. Through the mediation of the total society, which encompasses all relationships and impulses, human beings are being turned back
+into precisely what the developmental law of society, the principle of the
+self, had opposed: mere examples of the species, identical to one another
+through isolation within the compulsively controlled collectivity. The
+rowers, unable to speak to one another, are all harnessed to the same
+rhythms, like modern workers in factories, cinemas, and the collective. It
+is the concrete conditions of work in society* which enforce conformism—not the conscious influences which additionally render the oppressed stupid and deflect them from the truth. The powerlessness of the
+workers is not merely a ruse of the rulers but the logical consequence of
+industrial society, into which the efforts to escape it have finally transformed the ancient concept of fate.
+This logical necessity, however, is not conclusive. It remains tied to
+domination, as both its reflection and its tool. Its truth, therefore, is no less
+questionable than its evidence is inescapable. Thought, however, has
+always been equal to the task of concretely demonstrating its own equivocal nature. It is the servant which the master cannot control at will.
+Domination, in becoming reified as law and organization, first when
+humans formed settlements and later in the commodity economy, has had
+to limit itself. The instrument is becoming autonomous: independently of
+the will of the rulers,* the mediating agency of mind moderates the immediacy of economic injustice.* The instruments of power-language,
+weapons, and finally machines—which are intended to hold everyone in
+their grasp, must in their turn be grasped by everyone. In this way, the
+moment of rationality in domination also asserts itself as something different from it. The thing-like quality of the means, which makes the
+means universally available, its "objective validity" for everyone, itself
+implies a criticism of the domination from which thought has arisen as its
+means. On the way from mythology to logistics, thought has lost the element of reflection on itself, and machinery mutilates people today, even if
+it also feeds them. In the form of machines, however, alienated reason is
+moving toward a society which reconciles thought, in its solidification as
+an apparatus both material and intellectual, with a liberated living element, and relates it to society itself as its true subject. The particularist
+origin and the universal perspective of thought have always been inseparable. Today, with the transformation of the world into industry, the per-
+
+30
+spective of the universal, the social realization of thought, is so fully open
+to view that thought is repudiated by the rulers themselves as mere ideology. It is a telltale manifestation of the bad conscience of the cliques in
+whom economic necessity is finally embodied* that its revelations, from
+the "intuitions" of the Fübrer to the "dynamic worldview," no longer
+acknowledge their own atrocities as necessary consequences of logical regularities, in resolute contrast to earlier bourgeois apologetics. The mythological lies about "mission" and "fate"* which they use instead do not even
+express a complete untruth: it is no longer the objective laws of the market which govern the actions of industrialists and drive humanity toward
+catastrophe. Rather, the conscious decisions of the company chairmen*
+execute capitalism's old law of value, and thus its fate, as resultants no less
+compulsive than the blindest price mechanisms. The rulers themselves do
+not believe in objective necessity, even if they sometimes call their machinations by that name. They posture as engineers of world history. Only
+their subjects accept the existing development, which renders them a
+degree more powerless with each prescribed increase in their standard of
+living, as inviolably necessary. Now that the livelihood of those still* needed to operate the machines can be provided with a minimal part of the
+working time which the masters of society have at their disposal, the
+superfluous remainder, the overwhelming mass of the population, are
+trained as additional guards of the system, so that they can be used today
+and tomorrow as material for its grand designs. They are kept alive as an
+army of unemployed. Their reduction to mere objects of administration,
+which preforms every department of modern life right down to language
+and perception, conjures up an illusion of objective necessity before which
+they believe themselves powerless. Poverty* as the antithesis between
+power and impotence is growing beyond measure, together with the
+capacity permanently to abolish poverty. From the commanding heights
+of the economy* to the latest professional rackets,* the tangled mass of
+cliques and institutions which ensures the indefinite continuation of the
+status quo is impenetrable to each individual. Even for a union boss, to say
+nothing of a manager, a proletarian is no more than a superfluous specimen, should he catch his notice at all, while the union boss in turn must
+live in terror of his own liquidation.
+The absurdity of a state of affairs in which the power of the system
+over human beings increases with every step they take away from the
+
+power of nature denounces the reason of the reasonable* society as obsolete. That reason's necessity is illusion, no less than the freedom of the
+industrialists, which reveals its ultimately compulsive nature in their
+inescapable struggles and pacts. This* illusion, in which utterly enlightened humanity is losing itself, cannot be dispelled by a thinking which, as
+an instrument of power, has to choose between command and obedience.
+Although unable to escape the entanglement in which it was trapped in
+prehistory, that thinking* is nevertheless capable of recognizing the logic
+of either/or, of consequence and antinomy, by means of which it emancipated itself radically from nature, as that same nature, unreconciled and
+self-estranged. Precisely by virtue of its irresistible logic, thought, in whose
+compulsive mechanism nature is reflected and perpetuated, also reflects
+itself as a nature oblivious of itself, as a mechanism of compulsion. Of
+course, mental representation is only an instrument. In thought, human
+beings distance themselves from nature in order to arrange it in such a way
+that it can be mastered. Like the material tool which, as a thing, is held
+fast as that thing in different situations and thereby separates the world, as
+something chaotic, multiple, and disparate, from that which is known,
+single, and identical, so the concept is the idea-tool which fits into things
+at the very point from which one can take hold of them. Thought thus
+becomes illusory whenever it seeks to deny its function of separating, distancing, and objectifying. All mystical union remains a deception, the
+impotently inward trace of the forfeited revolution. But while enlightenment is right in opposing any hypostatization of utopia and in dispassionately denouncing power as division, the split between subject and object,
+which it will not allow to be bridged, becomes the index of the untruth
+both of itself and of truth.* The proscribing of superstition has always signified not only the progress of domination but its exposure. Enlightenment is more than enlightenment, it is nature made audible in its
+estrangement. In mind's self-recognition as nature divided from itself,
+nature, as in prehistory, is calling to itself, but no longer directly by its supposed name, which, in the guise of mana, means omnipotence, but as
+something blind and mutilated. In the mastery of nature, without which
+mind does not exist, enslavement to nature persists. By modestly confessing itself to be power and thus being taken back into nature, mind rids
+itself of the very claim to mastery which had enslaved it to nature.
+Although humanity may be unable to interrupt its flight away from neces-
+
+32
+sity and into progress and civilization without forfeiting knowledge itself,
+at least it no longer mistakes the ramparts it has constructed against necessity, the institutions and practices of domination which have always
+rebounded against society from the subjugation of nature, for guarantors
+of the coming freedom. Each advance of civilization has renewed not only
+mastery but also the prospect of its alleviation. However, while real history is woven from real suffering, which certainly does not diminish in proportion to the increase in the means of abolishing it, the fulfillment of that
+prospect depends on the concept. For not only does the concept, as science, distance human beings from nature, but, as the self-reflection of
+thought—which, in the form of science, remains fettered to the blind economic tendency —it enables the distance which perpetuates injustice to be
+measured. Through this remembrance of nature within the subject, a
+remembrance which contains the unrecognized truth of all culture,
+enlightenment is opposed in principle to power, and even in the time of
+Vanini the call to hold back enlightenment was uttered less from fear of
+exact science than from hatred of licentious thought, which had escaped
+the spell of nature by confessing itself to be natures own dread of itself.
+The priests have always avenged mana on any exponent of enlightenment
+who propitiated mana by showing fear before the frightening entity which
+bore that name, and in their hubris the augurs of enlightenment were at
+one with the priests. Enlightenment in its bourgeois form had given itself
+up to its positivist moment long before Turgot and d'Alembert. It was
+never immune to confusing freedom with the business of self-preservation. The suspension of the concept, whether done in the name of progress
+or of culture, which had both long since formed a secret alliance against
+truth, gave free rein to the lie. In a world which merely verified recorded
+evidence and preserved thought, debased to the achievement of great
+minds, as a kind of superannuated headline, the lie was no longer distinguishable from a truth neutralized as cultural heritage.
+But to recognize power even within thought itself as unreconciled
+nature would be to relax the necessity which even socialism, in a concession to reactionary common sense, prematurely confirmed as eternal.* In
+declaring necessity the sole basis of the future and banishing mind, in the
+best idealist fashion, to the far pinnacle of the superstructure, socialism
+clung all too desperately to the heritage of bourgeois philosophy. The relationship of necessity to the realm of freedom was therefore treated as
+
+33
+merely quantitative, mechanical, while nature, posited as wholly alien, as
+in the earliest mythology, became totalitarian, absorbing socialism along
+with freedom. By sacrificing thought, which in its reified form as mathematics, machinery, organization, avenges itself on a humanity forgetful of
+it, enlightenment forfeited its own realization. By subjecting everything
+particular to its discipline, it left the uncomprehended whole free to rebound as mastery over things against the life and consciousness of human
+beings. But a true praxis capable of overturning the status quo depends on
+theory's refusal to yield to the oblivion in which society allows thought to
+ossify. It is not the material preconditions of fulfillment, unfettered technology* as such, which make fulfillment uncertain. That is the argument
+of sociologists who are trying to devise yet another antidote, even a collectivist one, in order control that antidote.36 The fault lies in a social context which induces blindness. The mythical scientific respect of peoples
+for the given reality, which they themselves constantly create, finally
+becomes itself a positive fact, a fortress before which even the revolutionary imagination feels shamed as utopianism, and degenerates to a compliant trust in the objective tendency of history. As the instrument of this
+adaptation, as a mere assemblage of means, enlightenment is as destructive as its Romantic enemies claim. It will only fulfill itself if it forswears
+its last complicity with them and dares to abolish the false absolute, the
+principle of blind power. The spirit of such unyielding theory would be
+able to turn back from its goal even the spirit of pitiless progress. Its herald, Bacon, dreamed of the many things "which kings with their treasure
+cannot buy, nor with their force command, Lof which] their spials and
+intelligencers can give no news."* Just as he wished, those things have been
+given to the bourgeois, the enlightened heirs of the kings. In multiplying
+violence through the mediation of the market, the bourgeois economy has
+also multiplied its things and its forces to the point where not merely kings
+or even the bourgeoisie are sufficient to administrate them: all human
+beings are needed. From the power of things they finally learn to forgo
+power. Enlightenment consummates and abolishes itself when the closest
+practical objectives reveal themselves to be the most distant goal already
+attained, and the lands of which "their spials and intelligencers can give no
+news"—that is, nature misunderstood by masterful science—are remembered as those of origin. Today, when Bacon's utopia, in which "we should
+command nature in action," has been fulfilled on a telluric scale, the
+
+34
+essence of the compulsion which he ascribed to unmastered nature is
+becoming apparent. It was power itself. Knowledge, in which, for Bacon,
+"the sovereignty of man" unquestionably lay hidden, can now devote itself
+to dissolving that power. But in face of this possibility enlightenment, in
+the service of the present, is turning itself into an outright deception of the
+masses.
+
+Excursus I: Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment
+Just as the story of the Sirens illustrates the intertwinement of myth
+and rational labor, the Odyssey as a whole bears witness to the dialectic of
+enlightenment. In its oldest stratum, especially, the epic shows clear links
+to myth: the adventures are drawn from popular tradition. But as the
+Homeric spirit takes over and "organizes" the myths, it comes into contradiction with them. The familiar equation of epic and myth, which in
+any case has been undermined by recent classical philology, proves wholly misleading when subjected to philosophical critique. The two concepts
+diverge. They mark two phases of an historical process, which are still visible at the joints where editors have stitched the epic together. The
+Homeric discourse creates a universality of language, if it does not already
+presuppose it; it disintegrates the hierarchical order of society through the
+exoteric form of its depiction, even and especially when it glorifies that
+order. The celebration of the wrath of Achilles and the wanderings of
+Odysseus is already a nostalgic stylization of what can no longer be celebrated; and the hero of the adventures turns out to be the prototype of
+the bourgeois individual, whose concept originates in the unwavering
+self-assertion of which the protagonist driven to wander the earth is the
+primeval model. Finally, the epic, which in terms of the philosophy of
+history is the counterpart of the novel, exhibits features reminiscent of
+that genre, and the venerable cosmos of the Homeric world, a world
+charged with meaning, reveals itself as an achievement of classifying rea-
+
+36
+son, which destroys myth by virtue of the same rational order which is
+used to reflect it.
+Understanding of the element of bourgeois enlightenment in
+Homer has been advanced by the German late-Romantic interpretation of
+antiquity based on the early writings of Nietzsche. Like few others since
+Hegel, Nietzsche recognized the dialectic of enlightenment. He formulared the ambivalent relationship of enlightenment to power. Enlightenment
+must be "drummed into the people, so that the priests all turn into priests
+with a bad conscience-and likewise with the state. That is the task of
+enlightenment: to show up the pompous behavior of princes and statesmen as a deliberate lie."' However, enlightenment had always been a
+means employed by the "great artists of government (Confucius in China,
+the Roman Empire, Napoleon, the Papacy, when it was concerned with
+power and not just with the world) ... The self-deception of the masses
+in this respect—for instance, in all democracies —is highly advantageous:
+making people small and governable is hailed as 'progress''"' As this
+(wofold character of enlightenment emerged more clearly as a basic motif
+of history, its concept, that of advancing thought, was traced back to the
+beginning of recorded history. However, whereas Nietzsche's attitude to
+enlightenment, and thus to Homer, remained ambivalent; whereas he perceived in enlightenment both the universal movement of sovereign mind,
+whose supreme exponent he believed himself to be, and a "nihilistic," lifedenying power, only the second moment was taken over by his pre-fascist
+followers and perverted into ideology. This ideology became a blind eulogy of blind life, which imposes a praxis by which everything living is suppressed. This is seen in the cultural fascists' attitude to Homer. In the
+Homeric depiction of feudal conditions they detect a democratic element,
+brand the work a product of seafarers and traders, and condemn the
+lonian epic for its of overly rational discourse and its communication of
+the commonplace. Nevertheless, che evil eye of these sympathizers with all
+seemingly immediate power, who reject mediation and "liberalism" of any
+degree, discerns an element of truth. Connections with reason, liberality,
+and middle-class qualities do indeed extend incomparably further back
+than is assumed by historians who date the concept of the burgher from
+the end of medieval feudalism. In identifying the burgher where earlier
+bourgepis humanism had imagined some pristine dawn of culture, which
+was tiken to legitimize that humanism, the neo-Romantic reaction
+
+37
+equates world history with enlightenment. The fashionable ideology,
+whose most urgent concern is to liquidate enlightenment, thus pays it
+involuntary homage. It is forced to acknowledge enlightened thinking
+even in the remotest past. For the bad conscience of present-day devorees
+of the archaic it is especially the earliest traces of enlightenment which
+threaten to unleash the process they seek to hold back, but which they
+themselves obliviously promote.
+But a recognition of Homers antimythological, enlightened character, his opposition to chthonic mythology, remains untrue because limited. Rudolf Borchardt, * for example, the most prominent and therefore the
+most impotent of the esoteric apologists of German heavy industry, prematurely breaks off his analysis in the service of repressive ideology. He
+fails to perceive that the primal powers he extols themselves represent a
+stage of enlightenment. By indiscriminately denouncing the epic as a form
+of novel he overlooks what epic and myth actually have in common:
+power and exploitation. The ignoble qualities he condemns in the epic,
+mediation and circulation, are only a further development of the dubious
+nobility he idolizes in myth: naked force. The alleged authenticity of the
+archaic, with its principle of blood and sacrifice, is already tainted by the
+devious bad conscience of power characteristic of the "national regeneration" today, which uses primeval times for self-advertising. The original
+myth itself contains the moment of mendacity which triumphs in the
+fraudulent myth of fascism and which the latter imputes to enlightenment. But no work bears more eloquent witness to the intertwinement of
+enlightenment and myth than that of Homer, the basic text of European
+civilization. In Homer, epic and myth, form and subject matter do not
+simply diverge; they conduct an argument. The aesthetic dualism of the
+work gives evidence of the historical-philosophical tendency. "The
+Apollonian Homer is merely a continuation of the general human artistic
+process to which we owe individuation."
+Myths are precipitated in the different strata of Homer's subject matter; but at the same rime the reporting of them, the unity imposed on the
+diffuse legends, traces the path of the subject's flight from the mythical
+powers. This is already true, in a profound sense, of the Iliad. The anger
+of the mythical son of a goddess against the rational* warrior king and
+organizer; the hero's undisciplined inactivity; finally, che enlistment of the
+victorious, doomed hero in a cause which is national, Hellenic, and no
+
+38
+longer tribal, an allegiance mediated by mythic loyalty to his dead comrade—all these reflect the intertwinement of history and prehistory. The
+same development is still more vividly present in the Odyssey, since it is
+closer in form to the picaresque novel. The contrast berween the single surviving ego and the multiplicity of fate reflects the antithesis between
+enlightenment and myth. The hero's peregrinations from Troy to Ithaca
+trace the path of the self through myths, a self infinitely weak in comparison to the force of nature and still in the process of formation as self-consciousness. The primeval world is secularized as the space he measures out;
+the old demons populate only the distant margins and islands of the civilized Mediterranean, retreating into the forms of rock and cave from
+which they had originally sprung in the face of primal dread. The adventures bestow names on each of these places, and the names give rise to a
+rational overview of space. The shipwrecked, tremulous navigator anticipares the work of the compass. His powerlessness, leaving no part of the
+sea unknown, aims to undermine the ruling powers. But, in the eyes of
+the man who has thus come of age, the plain untruth of the myths, the
+fact that sea and earth are not actually populated by demons but are a
+magic delusion propagated by traditional popular religion, becomes something merely "aberrant" in contrast to his unambiguous purpose of selfpreservation, of returning to his homeland and fixed property. All the adventures Odysseus survives are dangerous temptations deflecting the self
+from the path of its logic. Again and again he gives way to them, experimenting like a novice incapable of learning—sometimes, indeed, out of
+foolish curiosity, like a mime insatiably trying our roles. "But where danger threatens / That which saves from it also grows"* the knowledge which
+makes up his identity and enables him to survive has its substance in the
+experience of diversity, distraction, disintegration; the knowing survivor is
+also the man who exposes himself most daringly to the threat of death,
+thus gaining the hardness and the strength to live. That is the secret underlying the conflict between epic and myth: the self does not exist simply in
+rigid antithesis to adventure but takes on its solidity only through this
+antithesis, and its unity through the very multiplicity which myth in its
+oneness denies.' Odysseus, like the heroes of all true novels after him,
+throws himself away, so to speak, in order to win himself; he achieves his
+estrangement from nature by abandoning himself to nature, trying his
+strengrh against it in all his adventures; ironically, it is implacable nature
+
+39
+that he now commands, which triumphs on his return home as the implacable judge, avenging the heritage of the very powers he has escaped.
+At the Homeric stage, the identity of the self is so much a function of the
+nonidentical, of dissociated, unarticulated myths, that it must derive itself
+from them. The element which shapes and organizes individuality internally, time, is still so weak that the unity of the adventures remains an ourward one, their sequence being formed by the spatial changes of scene, the
+succession of sites of local divinities on which the hero is flung by the
+storm. Whenever, at later historical stages, the self has again experienced
+such weakness, or narration has presupposed it in the reader, the manner
+of depicting life has slipped back into the form of successive adventures.
+Laboriously and revocably, in the image of the journey, historical time has
+detached itself from space, the irrevocable schema of all mythical time.
+The faculty by which the self survives adventures, throwing itself
+away in order to preserve itself, is cunning. The seafarer Odysseus outwits
+the natural deities as the civilized traveler was later to swindle savages,
+offering them colored beads for ivory. It is true that Odysseus is only occasionally seen bartering, when gifts of hospitality are given and received. In
+Homer the gift which accompanies hospitality falls midway between
+exchange and sacrifice. Like a sacrificial act it is intended to compensate
+for wrongfully spilled blood, whether of the stranger or of settlers defeated by pirates, and represents an oath of truce. At the same time, however,
+the gift to the host anticipates the principle of equivalence: the host
+receives really or symbolically the equivalent value of the service he has
+performed, while the guest takes away provisions which, in principle, are
+intended to enable him to reach home. Even though the host receives no
+direct compensation for this, he can expect the same treatment to be given
+to him or his kinsmen one day: as a sacrifice to elemental deities the hospitality gift is at the same rime a rudimentary insurance against them. The
+extensive but perilous nautical activities of the early Greeks were the pragmatic reason for the custom. Even Poseidon, Odysseuss elemental foe,
+thinks in terms of equivalence, constantly complaining that the gifts
+received by Odysseus at the stations of his journey are worth more than his
+full share of the spoils of Troy would have been had he been allowed to
+carry it home without hindrance from Poseidon. And in Homer this kind
+of rationalization can be traced back to the sacrificial acts themselves.
+Hecatombs of a certain size are intended to secure the goodwill of partic-
+
+40
+ular deities. If exchange represents the secularization of sacrifice, the sacrifice itself, like the magic schema of rational exchange, appears as a human
+contrivance intended to control the gods, who are overthrown precisely by
+the system created to honor them.
+The moment of fraud in sacrifice is the prototype of Odyssean cunning, just as many of Odysseus's ruses are wrapped up, as it were, in an
+offering to natural deities.? The deities are duped not only by the hero bur
+also by the solar gods. Odysseus's Olympian friends take advantage of
+Poseidon's sojourn among the Ethiopians, the backwoodsmen who still
+worship him and offer him bloody sacrifices, in order to escort Odysseus
+in safery. Even the sacrifice which Poseidon is glad to accept involves
+deception: the amorphous sea-god's confinement to a certain locality, the
+sacred precinct, also restricts his power, and in exchange for sating himself
+on Ethiopian oxen he is denied the opportunity to cool his temper on
+Odysseus. All sacrificial acts, deliberately planned by humans, deceive the
+god for whom they are performed: by imposing on him the primacy of
+human purposes they dissolve away his power, and the fraud against him
+passes over seamlessly into that perpetrated by unbelieving priests against
+believing congregations. Cunning originates in the cult. Odysseus himself
+acts as both victim and priest. By calculating the risk he incurs as victim,
+he is able to negate che power to which the risk exposes him. By such bargaining he retrieves the life he has staked. However, deceprion, cunning,
+and rationality do not form a simple antithesis to the archaism of sacrifice.
+()nly the moment of fraud in sacrifice, perhaps the innermost reason for
+the illusory character of myth, is raised to self-consciousness through
+(Odysseus. The awareness that the symbolic communication with the deity
+through sacrifice was not real must have been age-old. The representative
+character of sacrifice, glorified by fashionable irrationalists, cannot be separated from the deification of the sacrificial victim, from the fraudulent
+priestly rationalization of murder through the apotheosis of the chosen
+victim. Something of this fraud, which elevates the perishable person as
+bearer of the divine substance, has always been derectable in the ego,
+which owes its existence to the sacrifice of the present moment to the
+furure. Its substance is as illusory as the immortality of the slaughtered victim. Nor without reason was Odysseus regarded by many as a deity.*
+For as long as individuals are sacrificed, for as long as the sacrifice
+contains the antithesis berween collective and individual, deception is
+
+4I
+objectively implicit in it. If the belief in the representative character of sacrifice springs from recollection of the nonoriginal quality of the self, from
+its emergence through the history of domination, at the same time, in relation to the fully developed self, this belief becomes untruth: the self is precisely the human being to whom the magic power of representation is no
+longer attributed. The formation of the self severs the fluctuating connection with nature which the sacrifice of the self is supposed to establish.
+Each sacrifice is a restoration of the past, and is given the lie by the historical reality in which it is performed. The venerable belief in sacrifice is
+probably itself a behavior pattern drilled into the subjugated, by which
+they reenact against themselves the wrong done to them in order to be able
+to bear it. Sacrifice as representative restoration does not reinstate immediate communication, which had been merely interrupred, as present-day
+mythologies claim; rather, the institution of sacrifice is itself the mark of
+an historical catastrophe, an act of violence done equally to human beings
+and to nature. Cunning is nothing other than the subjective continuation
+of the objective untruth of sacrifice, which it supersedes. That untruth
+may not have been always only untruth. At one stage® of prehistory sacrificeş may have possessed a kind of bloody rationality, which even then,
+however, could hardly have been separated from the thirst for privilege.
+The theory of sacrifice prevalent today relates it to the idea of a collective
+body, the tribe, into which the spilled blood of the tribes sacrificed member is supposed to flow back. While totemism was an ideology even in its
+own time, it nevertheless marks a real state in which the dominant reason
+required sacrificial victims. It is a state of archaic shortage, in which
+human sacrifice can hardly be distinguished from cannibalism. At some
+times the numerically increased collective can keep itself alive only by consuming human flesh; perhaps, in some ethnic and social groups, pleasure
+was linked in some way to cannibalism, a link to which only the aversion
+to human flesh now bears witness. Customs from later times, such as the
+ver sacrum, whereby a whole age-group of young men was forced into exile
+with accompanying rites at times of hunger, bear clear traces of such barbaric, idealized rationality. Long before the emergence of mythical popular religions, that rationality must have revealed itself as illusory; as sysrematic hunting provided the tribe with enough animals to make devouring its own members superfluous, it must have been the medicine men
+who deluded the shrewd hunters and trappers into believing that people
+
+42 Excursus I
+still needed to be consumed.? The magic, collective interpretation of sacrifice, which entirely denies the rationality of sacrifice, is its rationalization; but the straightforward assumption of enlightened thinking that
+what today is ideology may once have been truth is too uncritical: the
+newest ideologies are a mere reprise of the oldest, which long antedate
+those hitherto known, in the same way as the development of the class
+sociery refures the previously sanctioned ideologies. The frequently cited
+irrationality of sacrifice is no more than an expression of the fact that the
+praxis of sacrifice outlasted its rational necessity, which was replaced by
+particular interests. This split between the rational and the irrational
+aspects of sacrifice gave cunning a point at which to take hold.
+Demythologization always takes the form of the irresistible revelation of
+the futility and the superfluity of sacrifices.
+If the principle of sacrifice was proved transient by its irrationality,
+at the same time it survives through its rationality. This rationality has
+transformed itself, not disappeared. The self wrests itself from dissolution
+in blind nature, whose claims are constantly reasserted by sacrifice. But it
+still remains trapped in the context of the natural, one living thing seeking to overcome another. Bargaining one's way out of sacrifice by means
+of self-preserving rationality is a form of exchange no less than was sacrifice itself. The identical, enduring self which springs from the conquest of
+sacrifice is itself the product of a hard, petrified sacrificial ritual in which
+the human being, by opposing its consciousness to its natural contexr, celebrates itself. That much is true of the famous stoky in Nordic mythology
+according to which Odin was hung from a tree as a sacrifice to himself,
+and of Klages's thesis that every sacrifice is a sacrifice of the god to the god,
+as is still apparent in Christology, the monotheistic disguise of myth." The
+difference is that the stratum of mythology in which the self manifests
+itself as a sacrifice to itself expresses not so much the original conception
+of popular religions as the absorption of myth into civilization. In class
+sociery, the self's hostility to sacrifice included a sacrifice of the self, since
+it was paid for by a denial of nature in the human being for the sake of
+mastery over extrahuman nature and over other human beings. This very
+denial, the core of all civilizing rationality, is the germ cell of proliferating
+mythical irrationaliry: with the denial of nature in human beings, not only
+the reles of the external mastery of nature but also the telos of ones own
+life becomes confused and opaque. At the moment when human beings
+
+43
+cut themselves off from the consciousness of themselves as nature, all the
+purposes for which they keep themselves alive—social progress, the
+heightening of material and intellectual forces, indeed, consciousness
+itself-become void, and the enthronement of the means as the end,
+which in late capitalism is taking on the character of overt madness, is
+already detectable in the earliest history of subjectivity: The human being's
+mastery of itself, on which the self is founded, practically always involves
+the annihilation of the subject in whose service that mastery is maintained,
+because the substance which is mastered, suppressed, and disintegrated by
+self-preservation is nothing other than the living entity, of which the
+achievements of self-preservation can only be defined as functions—in
+other words, self-preservation destroys the very thing which is to be preserved. The antireason of totalitarian capitalism, whose rechnique of satisfying needs, in their objectified form determined by domination, makes
+the satisfaction of needs impossible and tends toward the extermination of
+humanity—this antireason appears prototypically in the hero who escapes
+the sacrifice by sacrificing himself. The history of civilization is the history of the introversion of sacrifice—in other words, the history of renunciation. All who renounce give away more of their life than is given back to
+them, more than the life they preserve. This process unfolds within the
+framework of wrong society. In that society everyone is one too many, and
+is cheated. But society's predicament* is that the person who escaped the
+universal, unequal, and unjust exchange, who did nor renounce bur
+immediately seized the undiminished whole, would thereby lose everything, even the meager residue of oneself granted by self-preservation. All
+the superfluous sacrifices are needed: against sacrifice. Even Odysseus is a
+sacrificial victim, the self which incessantly suppresses its impulses,' and
+thus he lets slip his own life, that he saves only to recall it as a path of error.
+Nevertheless, he is sacrificed, also, for che abolition of sacrifice. His lordly
+renunciation, as a struggle with myth, is representative of a society which
+no longer needs renunciation and domination —which masters itself not
+in order to do violence to itself and others but for the sake of reconciliation.
+The transformation of the sacrificial victim into subjectivity is done
+under the aegis of the same cunning which always had its share in sacrifice. In che untruth of guile the deception inherent in sacrifice becomes an
+element of character; it becomes the mutilation of the chear (Ver-
+
+schlngener), whose shifty look still cowers from the blows [Schläge] selfpreservation has brought down on him. This look expresses the relation of
+mind to physical strength. The bearer of mind, the one who issues commands—as Odysseus almost always appears—is in all cases physically
+weaker than the primeval powers with which he has to wrestle for his life,
+despite all the reports of his heroic deeds. The occasions when naked bodily strength is celebrated, the fistfight with the beggar Irus instigated by
+the Suitors and the drawing of the great bow, are sporting in nature. Selfpreservation and physical strength have diverged: Odysseus's athletic
+accomplishments are those of the gentleman who, free of practical cares,
+can train himself in lordly self-mastery. Precisely the strength which is
+detached from self-preservation benefits self-preservation: in the struggle
+with the feeble, gluttonous, undisciplined vagabond or with those who
+have basked in idleness, Odysseus inflicts on the stay-at-homes symbolically what organized landowning has long since done to them in reality,
+and legitimizes himself as a nobleman. But when he encounters primeval
+powers which are neither domesticated nor weakened by indolence, he
+faces a harder test. He can never engage the exotically persisting mythical
+powers in physical combat. He has to accept as a given reality the sacrificial ceremony in which he is repeatedly caught up: he is unable to break
+il. Instead, he makes sacrifice the formal precondition of his own rational
+decision. This decision is always carried our within the terms of the
+primeval judgment on which the sacrificial situation is based. That the old
+sitcrifice has meanwhile become irrational presents itself to the cleverness
+of the weaker party as the stupidity of ritual. The ritual remains accepted,
+its letter is strictly observed. But its now senseless judgment refutes itself,
+since its terms constantly leave scope for evasion. The superiority of nature
+in the competicive struggle is repeatedly confirmed by the very mind
+which has mastered nature. All bourgeois enlightenment is agreed in its
+demand for sobriety, respect for facts, a correct appraisal of relative
+strength. Wishful thinking is banned. The reason, however, is that all
+power in class society is beset by the gnawing consciousness of its powerlessness in face of physical nature and its social successor, the many. Only
+deliberate adaptarion to it brings nature under the power of the physicals
+ly weaker. The reason that represses mimesis is not merely its opposite. Il
+is inself mingesis: of death. The subjective mind which disintegrates che
+spiritualization of nature masters spiritless nature only by imitating it
+
+45
+rigidity, disintegrating itself as animistic. Imitation enters the service of
+power when even the human being becomes an anthropomorphism for
+human beings. The pattern of Odysseuss guile is mastery of nature by
+such adaptation. In the assessment of power relationships that admits
+defeat in advance and makes survival virtually dependent on death, the
+principle of bourgeois disillusionment, the external schema for the internalization of sacrifice, is already latent. The nimble-witted man survives
+only at the cost of his own dream, which he forfeits by disintegrating his
+own magic along with that of the powers outside him. He can never have
+the whole, he must always be able to wait, to be patient, to renounce; he
+may not eat the lotus or the cattle of Hyperion, and when he steers
+through the narrows he must include in his calculation the loss of the
+companions snatched from the ship by Scylla. He wriggles through-that
+is his survival, and all the renown he gains in his own and others' eyes
+merely confirms that the honor of heroism is won only by the humbling
+of the urge to attain entire, universal, undivided happiness.
+The formula for Odysseus's cunning is that the detached, instrumental mind, by submissively embracing nature, renders to nature what is
+"hers and thereby cheats her. The mythical monsters under whose power he
+falls represent, as it were, petrified contracts and legal claims dating from
+primeval times. In the developed patriarchal era the earlier popular religion manifests itself in these scattered relics: beneath the Olympian heaven they have become figures of abstract fate, of a necessity remote from
+sensuous experience. The fact that it would be impossible to choose any
+route other than that between Scylla and Charybdis may be interpreted
+rationalistically as the mythical representation of the preponderant power
+of sea currents over the little ships of ancient times. But translated into the
+objectifying language of myth, it means that the natural relationship
+between strength and powerlessness has already taken on the character of
+a legal relationship. Scylla and Charybdis have a claim on whatever comes
+between their teeth, just as Circe has a right to metamorphose those who
+are not immune, or Polyphemus a right to the bodies of his guests. Every
+mythical figure is compelled to do the same thing over and over again.
+Each of them is constituted by repetition: its failure would mean their end.
+They all bear features of the fate which, in the myths of punishment in the
+underworld, is meted out by Olympian judgment to Tantalus, Sisyphus,
+and the Danaids. They are figures of compulsion: the horrors they com-
+
+16
+mit are the curse which has fallen on them. Mythical inevitability is
+defined by the equivalence berween the curse, the abominable act which
+expiates it, and the guilt arising from that act, which reproduces the curse.
+All law in history up to now bears the trace of this pattern. In myth each
+moment of the cycle pays off the preceding moment and thereby helps to
+establish the continuity of guilt as law. Against this Odysseus fights. The
+self represents rational universality against the inevitability of fate. But as
+it finds the universal and the inevitable already inextricably entwined, its
+rationality necessarily takes a restrictive form, that of an exception. It has
+lo extricate itself from the legal terms encompassing and threatening it,
+rerms which, in a sense, are inscribed in every mythical figure. Odysseus
+satisfies the legal statutes, but in such a way that by conceding their power
+he deprives them of it. It is impossible to hear the Sirens and not succumb
+to them: they cannot be defied. Defiance and beguilement are one and the
+same, and whoever defies them is lost to the very myth he challenges.
+Cunning, however, is defiance made rational. Odysseus does not try to
+steer a different course to the one past the Sirens island. Nor does he try
+i insist on the superiority of his knowledge and listen freely to the
+temptresses, believing his freedom protection enough. He cowers, the ship
+takes its preordained, fateful course, and he realizes that however he may
+consciously distance himself from nature, as a listener Hörender] he remains under its spell. He complies with the contract of his bondage
+(Hörigkeit] and, bound to the mast, struggles to throw himself into the
+arms of the seductresses. But he has found a loophole in the agreement,
+through which he eludes it while fulfilling its terms. The primeval contract
+did not specify whether the mariner sailing past should be bound or
+unbound while listening to the song. The use of bonds belongs to a later
+cra, in which prisoners were not killed straightaway. Technically enlightened, Odysseus acknowledges the archaic supremacy of the song by having himself bound. By yielding to the song of pleasure he thwarts both it
+and death. The bound listener is drawn to the Sirens like any other. But
+he has taken the precaution not to succumb to them even while he succumbs. Despite the power of his desire, which reflects the power of the
+demigoddesses themselves, he cannot go to them, just as his companions
+it the pars, their ears stopped with wax, are deaf not only to the demigoddesses bur to the desperate cries of their commander. The Sirens have a life
+of their own, bur in this bourgeois prehistory it has already been peutral-
+
+47
+ized as the yearning of those who pass it by. The epic does not say what
+happens to the singers once the ship has passed. But in a tragedy this
+would have been their last hour, as it was for the Sphinx when Oedipus
+solved the riddle, fulfilling her command and thereby causing her downfall. For the law of the mythical figures, being that of the stronger, depends
+on the impossibility of fulfilling their statutes. If they are fulfilled, then the
+myths are finished, down to their most distant descendants. Since the happily hapless meeting of Odysseus with the Sirens all songs have ailed; the
+whole of western music suffers from the absurdity of song in civilization,
+yet the motive force of all art-music is song.
+With the dissolution of the contract through its literal fulfilment a
+change occurs in the historical situation of language: it begins to pass over
+into designation. Mythical fate had been one with the spoken word.
+Within the sphere of ideas in which mythical figures executed the unalterable edicts of fate, the distinction berween word and object was
+unknown. The word was thought to have direct power over the thing,
+expression merged with intention. Cunning, however, consists in exploiting the difference. One clings to the word in order to change the thing. In
+this way consciousness arises out of intention: in his extremity Odysseus
+becomes aware of dualism, as he discovers that an identical word can mean
+different things. Since the name Udeis can mean either "hero" or "по-
+body," the hero is able to break the spell of the name. Unchangeable words
+remain formulae for the implacable continuities of nature. In magic their
+fixity was intended to challenge that of fate, which it reflected. The opposition berween the word and what it imitated was already implicit in
+this challenge. At the Homeric stage that opposition became decisive.
+Odysseus discovered in words what in fully developed bourgeois society is
+called formalism: their perennial ability to designate is bought at the cost
+of distancing themselves from any particular content which fulfills them,
+so that they refer from a distance to all possible contents, both to nobody
+and to Odysseus himself. From the formalism of mythical names and
+statures, which, indifferent like nature, seek to rule over human beings
+and history, emerges nominalism, the prototype of bourgeois thinking.
+Self-preserving guile lives on the argument berween word and thing.
+Odysseus's iwo contradictory actions in his meeting with Polyphemus, his
+obedience to his name and his repudiation of it, are really the same thing.
+He declares allegiance to himself by disowning himself as Nobody; he
+
+48 Excursus I
+saves his life by making himself disappear. This adaptation to death
+through language contains the schema of modern mathematics.
+Cunning as a means of exchange, in which everything is done correctly, the contract is fulfilled yet the other party is cheated, points back to
+a form of economic activity which is found, if not in mythical prehistory,
+at least in early antiquity: the ancient practice of "occasional exchange"
+between self-sufficient households. "Surpluses are occasionally exchanged,
+but provisions are predominantly produced by the consumers themselves."'3 The behavior of the adventurer Odysseus recalls that of the parries to the occasional exchange. Even in the pathetic guise of the beggar
+the feudal lord bears features of the oriental merchant'4 who returns home
+with untold wealth because he has once, against tradition, stepped outside
+the confines of the domestic economy and "put to sea." The adventurous
+element in his undertaking is, in economic terms, nothing other than the
+irrational aspect his reason takes on in face of the prevailing traditional
+cconomic forms. This irrationality of reason has been precipitated in cunning, as the adaptation of bourgeois reason to any unreason which confronts it as a stronger power. The lone voyager armed with cunning is
+already homo economicus, whom all reasonable people will one day resemble: for this reason the Odyssey is already a Robinsonade. Both these prototypical shipwrecked sailors make their weakness— that of the individual
+who breaks away from the collective— their social strength. Abandoned to
+the vagaries of the waves, helplessly cut off, they are forced by their isolation into a ruthless pursuit of their atomistic interest. They embody the
+principle of the capitalist economy* even before they make use of any
+worker" but the salvaged goods they bring with them to the new venture
+idealize the truth that the entrepreneur* has always entered the competition armed with more than the industry of his hands. Their powerlessness
+in face of nature already functions as an ideology for their social predominance. Odysseus's defenselessness against the foaming sea sounds like a
+legitimation of the enrichment of the voyager at the expense of indigenous
+inhabitants. Bourgeois economics later enshrined this principle in the concept of risk: the possibility of foundering is seen as a moral justification for
+profit.* From the standpoint of the developed exchange society and its
+individuals, the adventures of Odysseus are no more than a depiction of
+the risks which line the path to success. Odysseus lives according to the
+anciem principle which originally constituted bourgeois, sociery. One had
+
+49
+to choose berween cheating and going under. Fraud was the stigma of reason, which betrayed its particular interest. The universal socialization for
+which the globetrotter Odysseus and the solo manufacturer Robinson
+Crusoe provide a preliminary sketch was attended from the first by the
+absolute loneliness which at the end of the bourgeois era is becoming
+overt. Radical socialization means radical alienation. Both Odysseus and
+Crusoe deal in totality: the former measures it our; the latter fabricates it.
+They can do so only in total isolation from all other human beings, who
+appear to both men only in estranged forms, as enemies or allies, but
+always as instruments, things.
+One of the first adventures in the nostos* proper does, admittedly,
+originate much further back, far beyond even the barbaric age of demonic masks and gods of magic. It is the story of the Lotus-eaters. Whoever
+tastes their food is as much in thrall as those who listen to the Sirens' song
+or are touched by the wand of Circe. But no harm is done to those who
+succumb: "Now it never entered the heads of these natives to kill my
+Friends."IS They are threatened only by forgetfulness and loss of will. The
+curse condemns them to nothing worse than a primal state exempt from
+labor and struggle in the "fertile land": I6 "As soon as each had eaten the
+honeyed fruit of the plant, all thoughts of reporting to us or escaping were
+banished from his mind. All they now wished for was to stay where they
+were with the Lotus-eaters, to browse on the lotus, and to forget that they
+had a home to return to." Self-preserving reason cannot permit such an
+idyll—reminiscent of the bliss induced by narcotics, by which subordinate
+classes have been made capable of enduring the unendurable in ossified
+social orders—among its own people. And indeed, it is only an illusion of
+bliss, a dull aimless vegetating, as impoverished as the life of animals. Ar
+best, it would be an absence of the awareness of unhappiness. Bur happiness contains truth within itself. It is in essence a result. It unfolds from
+suffering removed. The enduring Odysseus is therefore right not to endure
+life among the Lotus-eaters. Against them he asserts their own cause, the
+realization of utopia through historical work, whereas simply abiding
+within an image of bliss deprives them of their strength. But in being
+exerted by rationality, by Odysseus, this right is inevitably drawn into the
+realm of wrong. His immediate action is one which reasserts domination.
+Self-preserving reason can no more tolerate this bliss "near the rim of the
+world"'" than the more dangerous form it takes in later stages. The indo-
+
+50
+lent defectors are ferched back to the galleys: "I had to use force to bring
+them back to the ships, and they wept on the way, but once on board I
+dragged them under the benches and left them in irons."'' Lotus is an oriental food. Its thin-cut slices still play a part in Chinese and Indian cooking. Perhaps the temptation ascribed to it is no other than that of regression to the stage of gathering the fruits of the earth*® and the sea, older
+than agriculture, cattle-rearing, or even hunting—older, in short, than
+any production. It is hardly an accident that the epic connects the idea of
+the life of idleness with the eating of flowers, whereas no such use is associated with them today. The eating of flowers, as is still customary during
+dessert in the East and is known to European children from baking with
+rosewater and from candied violets, bears the promise of a state in which
+the reproduction of life is independent of conscious self-preservation, the
+bliss of satiety uncoupled from the utility of planned nutrition. The memory of the remote and ancient joy which flashes up before the sense of
+smell is still inseparable from the extreme proximity of ingestion. It points
+back to earliest prehistory. No matter how copious the torments endured
+by the people of that time, they cannot conceive of a happiness not nourished by the image of that primal age: "So we left that country and sailed
+on sick at heart."21
+The next figure on whose shore Odysseus is cast up (verschlagen) —
+being cast up and being cunning [verschlagen] are equivalents in Homer—
+is the Cyclops Polyphemus, who wears his single wheel-sized eye as a trace
+of the same primal world: the singleness of the eye suggests the nose and
+mouth, more primitive than the symmetry of eyes and ears" without
+which, and the combining of their dual perceptions, no ideptification,
+depth, or objectivity is possible. But, compared to the Lotus-eaters, he represents a later, truly barbaric age, one of hunters and shepherds. For
+Homer, the definition of barbarism coincides with that of a state in which
+no systematic agriculture, and therefore no systematic, time-managing
+organization of work and society, has yet been achieved. He calls the
+Cyclopes "fierce, uncivilized people"23 because-and his words seem to
+conrain a secret confession of the guilt of civilization itself—they "never
+lift a hand to plant-or plough but put their trust in Providence. All the
+crops they require spring up unsown and untilled, wheat and barley and
+the vines whose generous clusters give them wine when ripened for them
+by the timely rains."? Abundance needs no law, and civilization's accusa-
+
+SI
+tion of anarchy sounds almost like a denunciation of abundance: "The
+Cyclopes have no assemblies for the making of laws, nor any settled customs, but live in hollow caverns in the mountain heights, where each man
+is lawgiver to his children and his wives, and nobody cares a jot for his
+neighbors."25 This is already a patriarchal sociery based on kinship and the
+suppression of the physically weaker, but it is not yet organized on the
+model of fixed property and its hierarchy; it is the lack of contact between
+the cave dwellers which is the true reason for the absence of objective laws
+and which calls forth Homers accusation of their mutual disregard and
+their state of savagery. In a later passage, however, the narrator's pragmatic fidelity to his story contradicts his civilized judgment: despite their disregard for one another, the tribe gather round the blinded Polyphemuss
+cave when they hear his anguished cry, and only Odysseus's trick with his
+name prevents the simpletons from coming to his aid. " Stupidity and lawlessness share a common definition: when Homer calls the Cyclops a "lawless-minded monster"2 he does not mean simply that the Cyclops does
+not respect the laws of morality bur that his thinking itself is lawless,
+unsystematic, rhapsodic—as when he is unable to perform the straightforward mental task of working out how his uninvited guests are able to
+leave his cave, by clinging underneath the sheep instead of riding on them;
+or to decipher the sophistic double meaning in Odysseuss false name.
+Polyphemus, although he trusts in the power of the Immortals, is a cannibal; accordingly, he refuses to show reverence for the gods despite his trust
+in them: "Stranger, you must be a fool, or must have come from very far
+afield"—in later times fools and strangers were less scrupulously distinguished, and ignorance of custom, like all foreignness, was branded
+straight away as folly—"to preach to me of fear or reverence for the gods.
+We Cyclopes care not a jot for Zeus with his aegis, nor for the rest of the
+blessed gods, since we are much stronger than they."2 "We are stronger,"
+Odysseus mockingly reports; but what the giant really meant was: "We are
+older." The power of the solar system is acknowledged, but much as a feudal lord might acknowledge that of bourgeois wealth, while tacitly regarding himself as more noble and failing to perceive that the wrong done to
+him is of the same kind as the wrong he himself represents. The nearby
+sea-god Poseidon, Polyphemus's father and Odysseus's enemy, is older than
+the universal Zeus in his remote heaven, and the feud berween the elemental popular religion and the logocentric religion of laws is fought out,
+
+52 Excursus I
+so to speak, on the backs of the subjects. However, the lawless Polyphemus
+is not simply the villain he appears to be according to the taboos of civilization and as the giant Goliath appears in the fables of enlightened childhood. In the meager domain in which his self-preservation has taken on
+orderly habits, he is not without redeeming traits. When he puts the young
+sheep and goats to their mothers' udders, this practical action shows a concern for creaturely life itself, and the famous speech of the blinded
+Polyphemus in which he calls the leading ram his friend, asking whether
+it is the last to leave the cave because it is grieving for its master's eye, has
+a power and poignancy equaled only at the highest point of the Odyssey,
+when the homecoming Odysseus is recognized by the old dog Argus—
+despite the appalling brutality with which the speech ends. The giant's
+behavior has not yet been objectified as character. When Odysseus begs for
+hospitality he does not reply simply with an expression of savage hatred
+but only by refusing to respect a law which does not yet apply to him. He
+says merely that "it would not occur to him"" to spare Odysseus and his
+companions, and it is open to question whether his next question, about
+the whereabouts of Odysseus's ship, is as devious as Odysseus reports it to
+be. Boastful and beguiled, the drunken Polyphemus promises Odysseus
+gifts of hospitality, and it is only the notion of Odysseus as Nobody that
+gives him the malicious idea of showing his hospitality by eating the leader
+last—perhaps because he has called himself Nobody and thus may be considered nonexistent in terms of the Cyclops's feeble wit." The physical
+crudity of the overpowerful creature is the source of his gullible trust. In
+this way the observance of the mythical law, always an injustice to the
+judged, also becomes an injustice to the natural power which imposes that
+law. Polyphemus and the other monsters that Odysseus ourwits are models for the stupidly litigious devils of the Christian era, right down to Shylock and Mephistopheles. The giant's stupidity, the basis of his barbaric
+brutality as long as his cause prospers, represents something better once it
+is overthrown by one who should know better. Odysseus insinuates himself into Polyphemus's trust and thus subverts the captor's right to human
+flesh, according to the artful schema whereby the statute is breached in the
+observance: "Here, Cyclops, have some wine to wash down that meal of
+human flesh, and find our-for yourself what kind of vintage was stored
+away in our ship's hold,"* the bearer of culture recommends.
+However, the adaptation of reason to its opposite, a sjate of con-
+
+sciousness in which no firm identity has yet crystallized-represented by
+the bungling giant—culminates in the stratagem of the name. This is a
+widespread motif in folklore. In the Greek version it is a play on words; in
+a single word the name-Odysseus-and the intention-nobody-diverge. To modern ears Odysseus and Udeis still sound similar, and it is conceivable that in one of the dialects in which the story of the return to
+Ithaca was handed down, the name of the island's king did indeed sound
+the same as "nobody." The calculation that, once the deed was done,
+Polyphemus would answer "Nobody" when the tribe asked who was to
+blame, thus allowing the perpetrator to escape pursuit, is a thin rationalistic screen. In reality, Odysseus, the subject, denies his own identity,
+which makes him a subject, and preserves his life by mimicking the amorphous realm. He calls himself nobody because Polyphemus is not a self,
+and confusion of the name with the thing prevents the duped barbarian
+from escaping the trap: his cry for retribution remains magically tied to
+the name of the one on whom he wants to avenge himself, and this name
+condemns the cry to impotence. For by inserting his own intention into
+the name, Odysseus has withdrawn it from the magical sphere. Bur his
+self-assertion, as in the entire epic, as in all civilization, is self-repudiation.
+Thereby the self is drawn back into the same compulsive circle of natural
+connections from which it sought through adaptation to escape. The man
+who, for the sake of his own self, calls himself Nobody and manipulates
+resemblance to the natural state as a means of controlling nature, gives
+way to hubris. The artful Odysseus cannot do otherwise: as he flees, while
+still within the sphere controlled by the rock-hurling giant, he not only
+mocks Polyphemus but reveals to him his true name and origin, as if the
+primeval world still had such power over Odysseus, who always escaped
+only by the skin of his teeth, that he would fear to become Nobody again
+if he did not reestablish his own identity by means of the magical word
+which rational identity had just superseded. His friends try to restrain him
+from the folly of proclaiming his cleverness but do not succeed, and he
+narrowly escapes the hurled rocks, while the mention of his name probably brings down on him the hatred of Poseidon—who is hardly presented
+as omniscient. The cunning by which the clever man assumes the form of
+stupidity reverts to stupidity as soon as he discards that form. That is the
+dialectic of eloquence. From antiquity to fascism, Homer has been criticised for garrulousness—both in the hero and in the narrator. But the
+
+lonian has proved himself prophetically superior to Spartans old and new
+in his depiction of the doom which the fluency of the sly fox, the middleman, brings down on the latter. The speech which gets the better of physical strength is unable to curb itself. Its spate accompanies the stream of
+consciousness, thought itself, like a parody: thought's unwavering autonomy takes on a moment of manic folly when it enters reality as speech, as
+if thought and reality were synonymous, whereas the former has power
+over the latter only through distance. Such distance, however, is also suffering. For this reason the astute hero is always tempted to ignore the
+proverbial wisdom that silence is golden. He is driven objectively by the
+fear that, if he does not constantly uphold the fragile advantage the word
+has over violence, this advantage will be withdrawn by violence. For the
+word knows itself to be weaker than the nature it has duped. By talking
+woo much he gives away the principle of violence and injustice underlying
+discourse and provokes in the feared adversary the very action he fears.
+The mythical compulsion acting on language in prehistory is perpetuated
+in the calamity which enlightened language brings on itself. "Udeis," who
+compulsively proclaims himself to be Odysseus, already bears features of
+the Jew who, in fear of death, continues to boast of a superiority which
+itself stems from che fear of death; revenge on the middleman stands not
+only at the end of bourgeois society but at its beginning, as the negative
+utopia toward which coercive violence tends in all its forms.
+Unlike the stories of the escape from myth as an escape from barbaric cannibalism, the magical tale of Circe points back once more to the
+stage of actual magic. Magic disintegrates the self which falls back into its
+power and thus into the form of an earlier biological species. The power
+which causes the self's dissolution is, again, that of oblivion. With the
+fixed order of rime, it gains control of the fixed will of the subject, which
+is based on that order. Circe seduces Odysseus's men into abandoning
+themselves to instinct, with which the animal form assumed by the victims
+has always been associated, while Circe has become the prototype of the
+courtesan, probably on the strength of the words of Hermes, which take
+her erotic initiatives for granted: "She will shrink from you in terror and
+invite you to her bed. Nor must you hesitate to accept the goddess'
+favors.
+".!! Circe's signature is ambiguity, and in the story she appears by
+turns as corrupter and helper; ambiguity is expressed even in her lineage:
+she is the daughier of Helios and the granddaughter of Oceanus." In her
+
+the elements of fire and water are not yet separated, and it is this indeterminacy —in contrast to the primacy of a particular aspect of nature,
+whether matriarchal or patriarchal—which constitutes the essence of
+promiscuity and of the courtesan, reappearing as a watery lunar reflection
+even in the gaze of a nineteenth-century prostitute. The hetaera both
+bestows joy and destroys the autonomy of its recipient-that is her ambiguity. But she does not necessarily destroy the recipient himself: she holds
+fast to an older form of life. 6 Like the Lotus-eaters, Circe does not cause
+lethal harm to her guests, and even those she has turned into wild beasts
+are peaceable: "Prowling about the place were mountain wolves and lions,
+actually the drugged victims of Circe's magic, for they not only refrained
+from attacking my men but rose on their hind legs to caress them, with
+much wagging of their long tails, like dogs fawning on their master, as he
+comes from table, for the tasty bits they know he always brings."37 The
+bewitched humans behave in a similar way to the wild animals which listen to the playing of Orpheus. The mythical command to which they have
+been subjected at the same time liberates the very nature which is suppressed in them. What is revoked by their relapse into myth is myth itself.
+The suppression of instinct which constitutes them as selves and separates
+them from beasts was the introverted form of the repression existing within the hopelessly closed cycle of nature, to which, according to an earlier
+theory, the name Circe alludes. But, as the idyll of the Lotus-eaters had
+done earlier, the violent magic which recalls them to an idealized prehistory not only makes them animals but brings abour, in however delusive
+a form, a semblance of reconciliation. But because they were once men the
+civilizing epic cannot present their fate as anything other than a calamitous lapse, and in Homers account there is hardly a trace of the pleasure
+which went with it. It is all the more emphatically expunged the more civilized the victims themselves are. Odysseus's companions are not turned
+into sacred crearures of the wilderness, like earlier guests, but into squalid
+domestic animals, swine. The story of Circe may contain echoes of the
+chthonic cult of Demeter, for whom the pig was sacred. But perhaps it
+is also the humanoid anatomy of the pig and its nakedness which explain
+this motif: as if the same taboo on mingling with the blood of similar
+species, which has survived among the Jews, already existed among the
+Ionians. Finally, one may think of the prohibition on cannibalism, since,
+as in Juvenal, the taste of human flesh has repeatedly been compared to
+
+that of pigs. At any rate, later civilizations have always liked to apply the
+name of pig or swine to anyone whose impulses tended toward other
+pleasures than those sanctioned by society for its purposes. Magic and
+countermagic in the metamorphoses of Odysseus's companions are linked
+to herbs and wine, as intoxication and waking are to the sense of smell,
+which is increasingly suppressed and repressed and is closest not only to
+sex bur ro the remembrance of prehistory.*° In the image of the pig, however, the joy of scent is distorted into the unfree snuffling" of someone
+who has his nose to the ground and has renounced the upright posture. It
+is as if, in the ritual to which she subjects the men, the sorceress-courtesan
+were reenacting the one to which she herself is repeatedly subjected by
+patriarchal society. Like her, women are predisposed, under the pressure of
+civilization, to adopt its judgment on women and to denigrate sex. In the
+conflict between enlightenment and myth, the traces of which are preserved in the epic, the powerful seductress is at the same time weak, obsolete, and vulnerable and needs the enslaved beasts as her escort. *2 As a representative of nature, woman in bourgeois society has become an enigma
+of irresistibility 3 and powerlessness. Thus she reflects back the vain lie of
+power, which substitutes the mastery over nature for reconciliation with it.
+Marriage is society's middle way in dealing with this question: womin remains powerless in that her power is mediated to her only through
+her husband. Something of this is reflected in the defeat of the courtesangodless of the Odyssey, while the fully evolved marriage with Penelope,
+more recent in literary terms, represents a later stage in the objective structure of patriarchal arrangements. With the arrival of Odysseus on Aeaea,*
+the double meaning of the relationship of man to woman, of yearning to
+command, already takes on the form of an exchange underpinned by contracts. Odysseus resists Circe's magic. And he therefore receives actually
+what her magic promises only deceptively to those who fail to resist.
+(clysseus sleeps with her. But beforehand he makes her swear a solemn
+(alth by the blessed gods. The oath is intended to protect the male from
+the mutilation which avenges the ban on promiscuity and male dominalion-—although that domination, as a permanent suppression of instinct,
+symbolically performs the self-mutilation of the man in any case. Because
+of his resistance to metamorphosis, Circe accuses Odysseus of having "a
+heart in his| breast which nothing enchants."4 But she is also willing to
+submit to the man who has resisted her, the master, the self: "I beg you
+
+57
+now to put up your sword and come with me to my bed, so that in love
+and sleep we may learn to trust each other."" The price she places on the
+pleasure she bestows is the condition that pleasure should first have been
+spurned; the last hetaera emerges as the first female character. In the transition from legend to history she makes a decisive contribution to the
+bourgeois chill. Her behavior puts into effect the ban on love which later
+became all the more powerful the more love as ideology was obliged ro dissimulate the hatred between the competing partners. In the world of
+exchange the one who gives more is in the wrong; but the one who loves
+is always the one who loves more. While the lover's sacrifice is glorified,
+the making of that sacrifice is jealously enforced. It is precisely in love itself
+that the lover is incriminated and punished. The inability to master himself and others demonstrated by his love is reason enough to deny him fulfillment. With society, loneliness reproduces itself on a wider scale. The
+mechanism operates even within the tenderest ramifications of feeling,
+until love itself, in order to have contact with another person at all, is
+forced to assume such coldness that it shatters at the moment of its realization. Circe's power, which subjugates men as her slaves, gives way to her
+enslavement to the man who, through renunciation, has refused to submit. The goddess Circe's influence over nature, ascribed to her by the poet,
+is reduced to priestly soothsaying and even to clever foresight with regard
+to coming nautical difficulties. This lives on in the caricature of feminine
+wisdom. In the end, the prophecies of the disempowered sorceress regarding the Sirens, Scylla, and Charybdis merely serve the purposes of male
+self-preservation.
+How high a price was paid for the establishing of orderly arrangements for procreation is hinted at by the obscure passage on the behavior
+of Odysseus's friends when Circe had transformed them back into men as
+required by her contractual lord. First we read that "they not only became
+men again but looked younger and much handsomer and taller than
+before."46 But those who are thus confirmed and strengthened in their
+manhood are not happy: "We were so moved that we all wepr for happiness. It was a strange sound for those walls to echo." The earliest wedding song, the accompaniment of the feast celebrating the rudimentary
+marriage which lasts only a year, may have sounded like this. The actual
+marriage to Penelope has more in common with it than might be supposed. Harlor and wife are complementary forms of female self-alienation
+
+$8
+in the patriarchal world: the wife betrays pleasure to the fixed order of
+life and property, while the harlot, as her secret accomplice, brings within the property relationship that which the wife's property rights do not
+include—pleasure—by selling it. Circe and Calypso, the courtesans, are
+introduced as diligent weavers, thus resembling both mythical powers of
+fate and bourgeois housewives, ' while Penelope, like a harlor, mistrustfully scrutinizes the returning Odysseus to make sure he is not really just
+an old beggar or even a god trying his luck. The much-lauded recognition
+scene is a truly patrician encounter: "For a long while Penelope, overwhelmed by wonder, sat there without a word. But her eyes were busy, at
+one moment resting full on his face, and at the next falling on the ragged
+clothes that made him seem a stranger once again."4' There is no spontaneous upsurge of feeling; she is determined to avoid a mistake, which she
+can hardly afford under the weight of the order bearing down on her. This
+annoys the young Telemachus, who has not yet fully adapted himself to
+his future position yet already feels man enough to admonish his mother.
+By reproaching her with obstinacy and hardness, he exactly repeats the
+accusation of Circe against Odysseus. If the hetaera makes the patriarchal
+world order her own, the monogamous wife is not satisfied even with this
+and cannot rest until she has made herself conform to the male character.
+In this way the spouses settle their differences. The test she sets Odysseus
+concerns the immovable position of the marriage bed which her husband,
+as a young man, had constructed around an olive tree, a symbol of the
+unity of sex and property. With touching artfulness she refers to this bed
+as if it could be moved from the spot, whereupon her husband, "flaring
+up" and "rounding on" his wife, proceeds ro give a circumstantial account
+of his durable amateur handiwork: as a protorypical bourgeois he is smart
+cnough to have a hobby. It consists in a resumption of the craft work from
+which, within the framework of differentiated property relations, he has
+long since been exempted. He enjoys this occupation, as his freedom to
+perform superfluous tasks confirms his power over those who have to do
+such work in order to live. By this the ingenious Penelope recognizes him,
+flatrering him with praise of his exceptional intelligence. But her flattery,
+which is nor without a touch of mockery, is followed, in an abrupt caesura,
+by words which seek the reason for the suffering of all spouses in the gods'
+envy of the happiness guaranteed only by marriage, the "confirmation of
+the conceps of permanence":" "All our unhappiness is due to the gods,
+
+who couldn't bear to see us share the joys of youth and reach the threshold of old age together."s! Marriage represents not only the account-balancing order of the living but also solidarity and steadfastness in face of
+death. In it reconciliation grows up around subjugation, just as in history
+up to now true humanity has flourished only in conjunction with the barbaric element which is veiled by "humane values." Even if the contract
+berween the spouses sets aside the old hostility only with difficulty, nevertheless the couple aging in peace merges into the image of Philemon and
+Baucis, as the smoke from the sacrificial altar is transmuted into that rising beneficently from the hearth. Undoubtedly, marriage forms part of the
+primal rock of myth at the base of civilization. But its mythic solidity and
+permanence jut from myth, as the small island realm rises from the endless sea.
+The farthest point reached on the odyssey proper is no such homely refuge. It is Hades. The images which appear to the adventurer in the
+first visit to the Underworld* are of matriarchal shades 2 who have been
+banished by the religion of light: his own mother, before whom Odysseus
+forces himself to maintain a purposive patriarchal hardness, 3 is followed
+by heroines from primeval times. The image of the mother, however, is
+powerless, blind, and speechless, a phantom, like epic narrative at the
+moments when language gives way to images. Sacrificial blood is required
+as a pledge of living memory before the shades can speak, breaking free,
+however vainly and ephemerally, from mythic muteness. Only when subjectivity masters itself by recognizing the nullity of images does it begin to
+share the hope which images vainly promise. The Promised Land for
+Odysseus is not the archaic realm of images. Finally, all the images reveal
+their true essence as shades in the world of the dead, as illusion. Having
+recognized them as dead he dismisses chem with the lordly gesture of selfpreservation, banishing them from the sacrifice which he reserves for those
+who grant him knowledge which benefits his life. In such knowledge the
+power of myth, transposed into mental forms, survives only as imagination. The realm of the dead, where the disempowered myths gather, is farthest from his homeland, with which it can communicate only from the
+remorest distance. If one follows Kirchhoff in supposing that Odysseus's
+visit to the Underworld forms part of the oldest stratum of the epic, composed of actual legends," then this oldest stratum also contains a tendency which—as in che rradition of the journeys to the Underworld of
+
+6о Excursus I
+Orpheus and Heracles—most decisively transcends myth. Indeed, the
+motif of forcing the gates of hell, of abolishing death, is the innermost cell
+of all antimythological thought. This antimythological element is contained in Teiresias's prophecy of the possible placation of Poseidon. Odysseus is to wander ever farther, carrying on his shoulder an oar, until he
+reaches a people "who know nothing of the sea and never use salt with
+their food."S When he meets another traveler who refers to the oar on his
+shoulder as a "winnowing fan," he will have reached the proper place to
+offer a sacrifice to Poseidon. The core of the prophecy is the mistaking of
+the oar for a winnowing fan. This must have struck the Ionian as compellingly comic. However, this comic effect, on which the reconciliation is
+made to depend, cannot have been directed at humans but at the wrathful Poseidon." The misunderstanding is meant to amuse the fierce elemental god, in the hope that his anger might be dispersed in laughter.
+That would be analogous to the neighbor's advice in Grimm, explaining
+how a mother can rid herself of a changeling: "She should carry the
+changeling into the kitchen, set it on the hearth, light the fire and boil
+water in two eggshells. That would make the changeling laugh, and if he
+laughed then that would make an end of him."s® If laughter up to now*
+has been a sign of violence, an outbreak of blind, obdurate nature, it nevertheless contains the opposite element, in that through laughter blind
+nature becomes aware of itself as such and thus abjures its destructive violence. This ambiguity of laughter is closely related to that of name; perhaps names are nothing but petrified laughter, as nicknames still are—the
+only ones in which the original act of name-giving still persists. Laughter
+is in league with the guilt of subjectivity, but in the suspension of law
+which it announces it also points beyond that complicity. It promises a
+passage to the homeland. It is a yearning for the homeland which sets in
+motion the adventures by which subjectivity, the prehistory of which is
+narrated in the Odyssey, escapes the primeval world. The fact thatdespite the fascist lies to the contrary—the concept of homeland is
+opposed to myth constitutes the innermost paradox of epic. Precipitated
+in the epic is the memory of an historical age in which nomadism gave way
+to settlement, the precondition of any homeland. If the fixed order of
+property implicit in settlement is the source of human alienation, in which
+all hopesickness and longing spring from a lost primal state, at the same
+time it is toward settlement and fixed property, on which alone the con-
+
+GI
+cept of homeland is based, that all longing and homesickness are directed.
+Novalis's definition according to which all philosophy is homesickness
+holds good only if this longing is not dissipated in the phantasm of a lost
+original state, but homeland, and nature itself, are pictured as something
+that have had first to be wrested from myth. Homeland is a state of having escaped. For this reason the criticism that the Homeric legends "withdraw from the earth" is a warranty of their truth. They "turn to men."""
+The transposition of myths into the novel, as in the adventure story, does
+not falsify myth so much as drag it into the sphere of time, exposing the
+abyss which separates it from homeland and reconciliation. The vengeance
+wreaked by civilization on the primeval world has been terrible, and in this
+vengeance, the most horrifying document of which in Homer is to be
+found in the account of the mutilation of the goatherd Melanthios, civilization itself resembles the primeval world. It is not in the content of the
+deeds reported that civilization transcends that world. It is in the selfreflection which causes violence to pause at the moment of narrating such
+deeds. Speech itself, language as opposed to mythical song, the possibility
+of holding fast the past atrocity through memory, is the law of Homeric
+escape. Not without reason is the fleeing hero repeatedly introduced as
+narrator. The cold detachment of narrative, which describes even the horrible as if for entertainment, for the first time reveals in all their clarity the
+horrors which in song are solemnly confused with fate. Bur when speech
+pauses, the caesura allows the events narrated to be transformed into
+something long past, and causes to flash up a semblance of freedom that
+civilization has been unable wholly to extinguish ever since. Book, XXII of
+the Odyssey describes the punishment meted our by the son of the island's
+king to the faithless maidservants who have sunk into harlotry. With an
+unmoved composure comparable in its inhumanity only to the impassibilité of the greatest narrative writers of the nineteenth century, the fate of
+the hanged victims is described and expressionlessly compared to the
+death of birds in a trap; and, as of the numb pause surrounding the narration at this point, it can truly be said that the rest of all speech is silence.
+This is followed by a statement reporting that "For a little while their feet
+kicked out, but not for very long."" The exactitude of the description,
+which already exhibits the coldness of anatomy and vivisection," keeps a
+record, as in a novel, of the twitching of the subjugated women, who,
+under the aegis of justice and law, are thrust down into the realm from
+
+62
+Excursus 1
+which Odysseus the judge has escaped. As a citizen reflecting on the execution, Homer comforts himself and his listeners, who are really readers,
+with the certified observation that the kicking did not last long—a
+moment, and all was over. " But after the words "not for long" the inner
+flow of the narrative comes to rest. "Not for long?" the narrator asks by
+this device, giving the lie to his own composure. In being brought to a
+standstill, the report is prevented from forgetting the victims of the execution and lays bare the unspeakably endless torment of the single second in
+which the maids fought against death. No echo remains of the words "not
+for long" except Cicero's Quo us que tandem ["How much longer (will you
+try our patience)?"), which later rhetoricians unwittingly desecrated by
+claiming that patience for themselves. But in the report of the infamous
+deed, hope lies in the fact that it is long past. Over the raveled skein of
+prehistory, barbarism, and culture, Homer passes the soothing hand of
+remembrance, bringing the solace of "once upon a time." Only as the
+novel is the epic transmuted into fairy tale.
+
+Excursus Il: Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality
+Enlightenment, in Kant's words, is "the human being's emergence
+from self-incurred minority. Minority is inability to make use of ones own
+understanding without direction from another." "Understanding without
+direction from another" is understanding guided by reason. That amounts
+to saying that the mind combines its individual cognitions into a system
+in accordance with its own internal logic. "Reason has ... as its sole object
+the understanding and its effective application."' It posits "a certain collective unity as the goal of the activities of the understanding," and this
+unity is the system. Reason's rules are instructions for a hierarchical ordering of concepts. For Kant, as for Leibniz and Descartes, rationality consists in "processes of ascending to the higher genera and of descending to
+the lower species [by which] we obtain the idea of systematic connection
+in its completeness."' The "systematization" of knowledge lies in "the connection of its parts in conformity with a single principle." Thinking, as
+understood by the Enlightenment, is the process of establishing a unified,
+scientific order and of deriving factual knowledge from principles,
+whether these principles are interpreted as arbitrarily posited axioms,
+innate ideas, or the highest abstractions. The laws of logic establish the
+most universal relationships within the order and define them. Unity lies
+in self-consistency. The principle of contradiction is the system in nuce.
+Knowledge consists in subsumption under principles. It is one with judgment, by which perceptions are incorporated into the system. Any think-
+
+64 Excursus |I
+ing not guided by the system is directionless or authoritarian. Reason contributes nothing but the idea of systematic unity, the formal elements of
+fixed conceptual relationships. Any substantial objective which might be
+put forward as a rational insight is, according to the Enlightenment in its
+strict sense, delusion, falsehood, "rationalization," no matter what pains
+individual philosophers may take to steer us away from this conclusion
+and toward a reliance on philanthropic feeling. Reason is "a faculty of
+deducing the particular from the universal." According to Kant, the
+homogeneity of the general and the particular is guaranteed by the "schematism of pure understanding," by which he means the unconscious activity of the intellectual mechanism which structures perception in accordance with the understanding. The intelligibility which subjective judgment discovers in any matter is imprinted on that matter by the intellect
+as an objective quality before it enters the ego. Without such a schematism—in short, without the intellectual element in perception—no
+impression would conform to the corresponding concept, no category to
+the particular example; thought, not to speak of the system toward which
+everything is directed, would be devoid of unity. To establish this unity is
+the conscious task of science. If "all empirical laws [are] only special determinations of the pure laws of understanding," research must always
+ensure that the principles are properly linked to the factual judgments.
+"This harmony of nature with our cognitive faculty is presupposed a priori by the Judgment."® It is the "guiding thread" of organized experience.
+The system must be kept in harmony with nature; just as facts are
+predicted from the system, so they must confirm it. Facts, however, form
+part of praxis; they everywhere characterize the contact of-the individual
+subject with nature as social object: experience is always real action and
+suffering. In physics, to be sure, the perception by which a theory can be
+proved is usually reduced to the electrical spark appearing in the experimental apparatus. Its nonappearance is generally of no practical consequence; it merely destroys the theory or, at most, the career of the research
+• assistant responsible for setting up the experiment. However, laboratory
+conditions are the exception. A thinking which fails to maintain agreement betwęen system and perception does not merely violate isolated visual impressions; it conflicts with real praxis. Nor only does the expected
+event fail to occur bur the unexpected happens: the bridge collapses, the
+crop fails, the medicine causes illness. The spark which most conclusively
+
+Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality 65
+indicates a lack of systematic thinking, a violation of logic, is not a fleeting perception but sudden death. The system which enlightenment aims
+for is the form of knowledge which most ably deals with the facts, most
+effectively assists the subject in mastering nature. The system's principles
+are those of self-preservation. Immaturity amounts to the inability to survive. The bourgeois in the successive forms of the slave-owner, the free
+entrepreneur, and the administrator is the logical subject of enlightenment.
+The difficulties within this concept of reason, arising from the fact
+that its subjects, the bearers of one and the same reason, are in real opposition to each other, are concealed in the Western Enlightenment behind
+the apparent clarity of its judgments. In the Critique of Pure Reason, however, those difficulties make themselves apparent in the unclear relationship of the transcendental to the empirical ego and in the other irreconcilable contradictions. Kants concepts are ambiguous. Reason as the transcendental, supraindividual self contains the idea of a free coexistence in
+which human beings organize themselves to form the universal subject
+and resolve the conflict between pure and empirical reason in the conscious solidarity of the whole. The whole represents the idea of true universality, utopia. At the same time, however, reason is the agency of calculating thought, which arranges the world for the purposes of self-preservation and recognizes no function other than that of working on the
+object as mere sense material in order to make it the material of subjugation. The true nature of the schematism which externally coordinates the
+universal and the particular, the concept and the individual, case, finally
+turns out, in current science, to be the interest of industrial society. Being
+is apprehended in terms of manipulation and administration. Everything—including the individual human being, not to mention the animal—becomes a repeatable, replaceable process, a mere example of the
+conceptual models of the system. Conflict between administrative, reifying science, between the public mind and the experience of the individual,
+is precluded by the prevailing circumstances. The senses are determined
+by the conceptual apparatus in advance of perception; the citizen sees the
+world as made a priori of the stuff from which he himself constructs it.
+Kanr intuitively anticipated what Hollywood has consciously put into
+practice: images are precensored during production by the same standard
+of understanding which will later determine their reception by viewers.
+
+66
+The perception by which public judgment feels itself confirmed has been
+shaped by that judgment even before the perception takes place. Although
+the secret utopia harbored within the concept of reason may have
+glimpsed the repressed identical interest which lies beyond the diverse
+accidental interests of subjects, reason, operating under the pressure of
+purposes merely as systematic science, not only levels out the differences
+but standardizes the identical interest. It acknowledges no determination
+other than the classifications of che social operation. No one is different to
+the purpose for which he has been produced: a useful, successful, or failed
+member of professional and national groups. He is a single, random representative of his geographical, psychological, and sociological type. Logic
+is democratic: in this respect the great have no advantage over the most
+menial. The former are counted as prominent citizens while the latter are
+prospective objects of welfare relief. Science stands in the same relationship to nature and human beings in general as insurance theory stands to
+life and death in particular. Who dies is unimportant; what matters is the
+ratio of incidences of death to the liabilities of the company. It is the law
+of large numbers, not the particular case, which recurs in the formula. Nor
+is the concordance of general and particular concealed any longer within
+an intellect which always perceives the particular as a case of the general
+and the general only as the aspect of the particular by which it can be
+grasped and manipulated. Science itself has no awareness of itself; it is
+merely a tool. Enlightenment, however, is the philosophy which equates
+truth with the scientific system. Kant's attempt to justify this identity,
+which was still made with a philosophical intention, gave rise to concepts
+which have no meaning for science, since they are not simply instructions
+for performing manipulations according to certain rules. The notion of the
+self-understanding of science conflicts with the concept of science itself.
+Kant's work transcends experience as mere operation, and for that reason—and in accordance with its own principles —is rejected as dogmatic
+by enlightenment today. In confirming the scientific system as the embodiment of truth-the result arrived at by Kant-thought sets the seal on its
+own insignificance, because science is a technical operation, as far removed
+from reflection on its own objectives as is any other form of labor under
+the pressure of the system.
+The moral teachings of the Enlightenment bear witness to the hopelessness of attempting to replace enfeebled religion by an intellectual
+
+67
+motive for enduring within society when material interest no longer suffices. As solid citizens, philosophers ally themselves in practice with the
+powers they condemn in theory. The theories are logical and hard while
+the moral philosophies are propagandistic and sentimental, even when rigorous in tone, or else the moral philosophies are acts of violence performed
+in the awareness that morality is nondeducible, like Kant's recourse to
+treating moral forces as facts. His attempt to derive the duty of mutual
+respect from a law of reason, although more cautious than any other such
+undertaking in Western philosophy, has no support within the Critique. It
+is the usual endeavor of bourgeois thought to ground the respect without
+which civilization cannot exist on something other than material interest—an attempt more sublime and paradoxical than any that went before,
+but just as ephemeral. The citizen who renounced a profit out of the
+Kantian motive of respect for the mere form of the law would not be
+enlightened but superstitious—a fool. The root of Kantian optimism,
+according to which moral actions are reasonable even when base ones are
+likely to prosper, is a horror of relapsing into barbarism. If-Kant writes
+in response to Haller''-one of these great moral forces, reciprocal love
+and respect, were to collapse, "then nothingness (immorality) with gaping
+maw would drink the whole realm of (moral) beings like a drop of water."
+But, according to Kant, from the standpoint of scientific reason moral
+forces are neutral drives and forms of behavior, no less than immoral ones,
+which they immediately become when no longer directed at that hidden
+possibility but at reconciliation with power. Enlightenment expels difference from theory. It considers "human actions and desires exactly as if I
+were dealing with lines, planes, and bodies."'' The totalitarian order has
+put this into effect in utter seriousness. Freed from supervision by ones
+own class, which had obliged the nineteenth-century businessman to
+maintain Kantian respect and reciprocal love, fascism,* which by its iron
+discipline relieves its peoples of the burden of moral feelings, no longer
+needs to observe any discipline. Contrary to the categorical imperative,
+and all the more deeply in accord with pure reason, it treats human beings
+as things, centers of modes of behavior. The rulers sought to shield the
+bourgeois world from the flood of naked violence, which now has broken
+over Europe, only for as long as economic concentration was insufficiently advanced. Previously only the poor and savages had been exposed to the
+untrammeled force of the capitalist elements. But the rotalitarian order has
+
+68
+granted unlimited rights to calculating thought and puts its trust in science as such. Its canon is its own brutal efficiency.* From Kant's Critique
+to Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, the hand of philosophy had traced the
+writing on the wall; one individual put that writing into practice, in all its
+details. The work of the Marquis de Sade exhibits "understanding without
+direction from another"-that is to say, the bourgeois subject freed from
+all tutelage.
+Self-preservation is the constitutive principle of science, the soul of
+the table of categories, even if, as in Kant, it has to be deduced idealistically. Even the ego, the synthetic unity of apperception, the agency which
+Kant calls the highest point, from which the whole of logic must be suspended, " is really both the product and the condition of material exisrence. Individuals, in having to fend for themselves, develop the ego as the
+agency of reflective foresight and overview; over successive generations it
+expands and contracts with the individual's prospects of economic autonomy and productive ownership. Finally it passes from the expropriated cirizens to the totalitarian trust-masters, whose science has become the quintessence of the methods by which the subjugated mass society reproduces
+itself. Sade erected an early monument to their planning skills. The conspiracy of rulers against peoples, implemenred by relentless organization,
+finds che Enlightenment spirit since Machiavelli and Hobbes no less compliant than the bourgeois republic. That spirit is hostile to authority only
+when authority lacks the strength to enforce obedience, and to violence
+only when violence is not an established fact. As long as one does not ask
+who is applying it, reason has no greater affinity with violence than with
+mediation; depending on the situation of individuals and groups, it presents either peace or war, tolerance or repression, as the given stare of
+affairs. Because it unmasks substantial goals as asserting the power of
+nature over mind and as curtailing its own self-legislation, reason, as a
+purely formal entity, is at the service of every natural interest. Becoming
+simply an organ, thinking reverts to nature. For the rulers, however,
+human beings become mere material, as the whole of nature has become
+material for society. After the brief interlude of liberalism in which the
+bourgeois kept one another in check, power is revealing itself as archaic
+terror in a fascistically rationalized form.* "The religious chimeras," says
+the Prince of Francavilla at the court of King Ferdinand of Naples, "must
+he replaced by urmost terror. The people must be freed from the fear of a
+
+Juliette o Enlightenment and Morality
+69
+future Hell. Once that is destroyed they will abandon themselves to anything. But that chimerical fear must be replaced by penal laws of enormous severity, which apply, of course, only to the people, since they alone
+cause unrest in the state. Malcontents are born only to the lower classes.
+What do the rich care for the idea of a leash they will never feel themselves, if this empty semblance gives them the right to grind down those
+living under their yoke? You will find no one in that class who will not permit the darkest shadow of tyranny to fall on him, provided it really falls
+on others."3 Reason is the organ of calculation, of planning; it is neutral
+with regard to ends; its element is coordination. More than a century
+before the emergence of sport, Sade demonstrated empirically what Kant
+grounded transcendentally: the affinity between knowledge and planning
+which has ser its stamp of inescapable functionality on a bourgeois existence rationalized even in its breathing spaces. The precisely coordinated
+modern sporting squad, in which no member is in doubt over his role and
+a replacement is held ready for each, has its exact counterpart in the sexual teams of Juliette, in which no moment is unused, no body orifice
+neglected, no function left inactive. In sport, as in all branches of mass culture, a tense, purposive bustle prevails, although none but the wholly initiated observer could fathom the different combinations or the meaning
+of the game's changing fortunes, governed by arbitrarily chosen rules. The
+special architectonic structure of the Kantian system, like the gymnasts'
+pyramids in Sade's orgies and the formalized principles of early bourgeois
+freemasonry—cynically reflected in the strict regime of the libertine society of the 120 Days of Sodom-prefigures the organization, devoid of any
+substantial goals, which was to encompass the whole of life. What seems
+to matter in such events, more than pleasure itself, is the busy pursuit of
+pleasure, its organization; just as in othęr demythologized epochs, imperial Rome, the Renaissance, and the Baroque, the schema of activity counted for more than its content. In the modern period enlightenment has
+released the ideas of harmony and perfection from their hypostatization in
+a religious Beyond and made them available as criteria for human endeavor within the form of the system. Once the utopia which inspired the
+hopes of the French Revolution had been absorbed, potently and impotently, into German music and philosophy, the established bourgeois order
+entirely functionalized reason. It became a purposiveness without purpose,
+which for that very reason could be harnessed to any end. It is planning
+
+70
+considered as an end in itself. The totalitarian state manipulates nations.
+"Just so," replies the Prince in Sade to the speaker just quoted, "the government itself must control the population. It must possess the means to
+exterminate the people, should it fear them, or to increase their numbers,
+should it consider that necessary. And nothing should weigh in the balance of its justice except its own interests or passions, together only with
+the passions and interests of those who, as we have said, have been granted just enough power to multiply our own."4 The Prince points the path
+which imperialism, reason in its most terrible form, has always followed.
+"Take away its god from the people you wish to subjugate and you will
+demoralize it. As long as it has no other god than yours, you will always
+be its master... Grant it in return the widest, most criminal license.
+Never punish it, except when it turns against you."15
+As reason posits no substantial goals, all affects are equally remote to
+it. They are merely natural. The principle according to which reason is
+simply opposed to everything unreasonable underlies the true opposition
+berween enlightenment and mythology. The latter recognizes spirit only
+as something immersed in nature, a natural power. For it, inward impulses, like ourward forces, are living powers of divine or demonic origin.
+Enlightenment, by contrast, relocates context, meaning, and life entirely
+within a subjectivity which is actually constituted only by this relocation.
+For enlightenment, reason is the chemical agent which absorbs the real
+substance of things and volatilizes it into the mere autonomy of reason. In
+order to escape the superstitious fear of nature, enlightenment has presented effective objective entities and forms without exception as mere
+veils of chaotic matter and condemned matters influence on the human
+agent as enslavement, until the subject, according to its own concept, had
+been turned into a single, unrestricted, empty authority. The whole förce
+of nature became a mere undifferentiated resistance to the abstract power
+of the subject. The particular mythology which the Western Enlightenment, including Calvinism, had tò do away with was the Catholic doctrine of the ordo and the pagan popular religion which continued to flourish beneath it. To liberate human beings from such beliefs was the objective of bourgeois philosophy. However, the liberation went further than its
+humane originators had intepded. The market economy it unleashed. was
+a duce the prevailing form of reason and the power which ruined reason.
+The Romantic reactionaries only expressed what the bourgeois themselves
+
+7ł
+had realized: that freedom in their world tended toward organized anarchy. The Catholic counterrevolution's critique of the Enlightenment
+proved no less valid than the Enlightenment's critique of Catholicism. The
+Enlightenment had pinned its colors to liberalism. If all affects are of equal
+value, then self-preservation, which dominates the form of the system in
+any case, seems to offer the most plausible maxims for action. It was to be
+given free rein in the free economy. The somber writers of the early bourgeois period, such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Mandeville, who spoke up
+for the egoism of the self, thereby recognized society as the destructive
+principle and denounced harmony before it was elevated to the official
+doctrine by the bearers of light, the classicists. The former writers exposed
+the totality of the bourgeois order as the horrifying entity which finally
+engulfed both, the general and the particular, society and the self. With the
+development of the economic system* in which the control of the economic apparatus by private groups creates a division between human
+beings, self-preservation, although treated by reason as identical, had become the reified drive of each individual citizen and proved to be a destructive natural force no longer distinguishable from self-destruction.
+The iwo principles combined in a murky fusion. Pure reason became
+unreason, a procedure as immune to errors as it was devoid of content.
+However, with the revolutionary avant-garde, the utopia which proclaimed the reconciliation between nature and the self emerged from its
+hiding place in German philosophy as something at once irrational and
+reasonable, as the idea of the community of free individuals*-and
+brought down on itself the full fury of reason. In society as it is, despite
+feeble moralistic attempts to propagate humanity as the most rational
+means, self-preservation remains unencumbered by a utopia denounced as
+myth. For those at the top, shrewd self-preservation means the fascist
+struggle for power, and for individuals it means adaptation to injustice at
+any price. Enlightened reason no more possesses the means of measuring
+one drive within itself against others than of ordering the universe into
+spheres. It rightly exposes the notion of hierarchy in nature as a reflection
+of medieval society, and later attempts to demonstrate a new order of values bear the unmistakable taint of mendacity. The irrationalism which is
+evident in such futile reconstructions is far from opposing industrial reason.* Whereas great philosophy, in Leibniz and Hegel, had recognized a
+claim to truth even in subjective and objective forms of expression —feel-
+
+72
+ings, institutions, works of art—which do not amount to actual ideas, irrationalism, here as elsewhere showing its kinship to the last dregs of the
+Enlightenment, modern positivism, draws a strict line between feeling, in
+the form of religion and art, and anything deserving the name of knowledge. Although irrationalism restricts cold reason in favor of immediate
+life, it turns the latter into a principle merely hostile to thought. Under
+cover of this illusory enmity feeling, and finally all human expression,
+indeed culture itself, is stripped of any responsibility to thought and transformed into the neutralized element of the all-embracing rationality of an
+economic system* long since grown irrational. From the first, that reason
+has been unable to rely on its attractive power alone and has supplemented it with the cult of emotions. In appealing to this cult, it rurns against
+its own medium, thought, which was always suspect to this self-estranged
+form of reason. The tender effusions of lovers in films already function as
+a blow against dispassionate theory, and that is taken further in the sentimental argument against any thought which attacks injustice. This elevation of feelings to an ideology does not abolish the contempt in which
+they are really held. The fact that, compared to the starry heights into
+which ideology transposes them, they appear all the more vulgar merely
+contributes to their ostracism.. The verdict on feelings was already implicit in the formalization of reason. Even self-preservation, as a natural drive
+like other impulses, has a bad conscience; only bustling efficiency and the
+institutions created to serve it—mediation, apparatus, organization, sysrematization as ends in themselves—enjoy che esteem, in practice as in
+theory, of being deemed reasonable; the emotions are incorporated into
+this spurious reason.
+The Enlightenment of the modern age has been marked from the
+first by radicalism: This fact distinguishes it from all earlier stages of
+demythologization. As a rule, whenever a new religion and a new mentality have won a place in world history, bringing a new mode of social exisrence, the old gods have been cast into the dust together with the old classes, tribes, and peoples. But especially when a people, such as the Jews, has
+taken on a new form of social life as a result of its own fare, its venerable
+customs, sacred actions, and objects of worship have been magically transformed into abominable misieeds and terrifying specters. The phobias
+and idiosyncrasies of today, the character traits which are most despised
+and derided, can be deciphered as marks of a huge advance in human
+
+73
+development. From the disgust aroused by excrement and human flesh to
+the contempt for fanaticism, idleness, and poverty, both spiritual and
+material, a line connects behavioral forms which were once adequate and
+necessary to those which are abominated. This line is at once that of
+destruction and of civilization. Each step has been an advance, a stage of
+enlightenment. But whereas all the earlier changes, from preanimism to
+magic, from matriarchal to patriarchal culture, from the polytheism of the
+slave traders to the Catholic hierarchy, replaced the older mythologies
+with new albeit enlightened ones, the Great Mother with the God of
+Hosts, the totem with the veneration of the Lamb, in the glare of enlightened reason any devotion which believed itself objective, grounded in the
+matter at hand, was dispelled as mythological. All preexisting ties were
+tabooed by this verdict, not excluding those which were necessary to the
+existence of the bourgeois order itself. The instrument by means of which
+the bourgeoisie had come to power, the unfettering of forces, universal
+freedom, self-determination—in short, enlightenment—turned against
+the bourgeoisie as soon as that class, as a system of rule, was forced to suppress those it ruled. By virtue of its principle, enlightenment does not stop
+short at the minimum of belief without which the bourgeois world could
+not exist. It does not render to power the reliable services which had
+always been performed for it by the old ideologies. Its antiauthoritarian
+tendency, which communicates, if only subterraneously, with the utopia
+contained in the concept of reason, finally made it as inimical to the established bourgeoisie as to the aristocracy, with which, indeed, it lost no time
+in forming alliances. Ultimately, the antiauthoritarian principle necessarily becomes its own antithesis, the agency opposed to reason: its abolition
+of all absolute ties allows power to decree and manipulate any ties which
+suit its purposes. After civic virtue and charity, for which it never offered
+good reasons, philosophy proclaimed authority and hierarchy as virtues,
+when enlightenment had long since revealed them as lies. But against such
+perversion of itself enlightenment, too, had no arguments, since pristine
+truth has no advantage over distortion, or rationalization over reason, unless it can demonstrate a practical one as well. With the formalization of
+reason, theory itself, if it seeks to be more than a cipher for neutral procedures, becomes an incomprehensible concept, and thought is deemed
+meaningful only after the sacrifice of meaning. Once harnessed to the
+dominant mode of production, enlightenment, which strives to under-
+
+74
+mine any order which has become repressive, nullifies itself. This is
+expressed in the early attacks of the current form of enlightenment on the
+"all-crushing" Kant. Just as Kant's moral philosophy set limits to his
+enlightened critique in order to rescue the possibility of reason, unreflecting enlightened thinking has always sought, for its own survival, to cancel
+itself with skepticism, in order to make room for the existing order.
+In contrast to such precautions, the work of Sade, like that of
+Nietzsche, is an intransigent critique of practical reason, beside which
+even that of Kant himself appears like a revocation of his own thought. It
+pushes the scientific principle to annihilating extremes. Kant, to be sure,
+had so purified the moral law within the self of any heteronymous belief
+that respect, despite his assurances, could be no more than a psychological fact of nature, as the starry sky above the self was a physical one. "A fact
+of reason," he called it, ' while Leibniz termed it "a general instinct of sociery.")? But.facts count for nothing where they do not exist. Sade does not
+deny their occurrence. Justine, the virtuous sister, is a martyr to the moral
+law. Juliette, however, draws the conclusion the bourgeoisie sought to
+avoid: she demonizes Catholicism as the latest mythology, and with it civilization as a whole. The energies previously focused on the sacrament are
+now devored, perversely, to sacrilege. This inversion is extended to community in general. In all chis Juliette does nor proceed fanatically, as
+Catholicism had done with the Incas, but merely attends to the business
+of sacrilege in the efficient, enlightened way that Catholics, too, still had
+in their blood from archaic times. The primeval forms of behavior which
+had been tabooed by civilization, and had grown destructive under the
+stigma of bestiality, had led an underground life. Juliette revives them in
+their ourlawed, not their natural form. She compensates the value judgment against them—which, like all value judgments, was unfounded—by
+its opposite. Thus, when she reenacts the primitive reactions they are no
+longer primitive bur bestial. In psychological terms Juliette, not unlike
+Merteuil in Les Liaisons Dangereuses, '® embodies neither unsublimated nor
+regressive libido bur intellectual pleasure in regression, amor intellectualis
+diaboli, the joy of defeating civilization with its own weapons. She loves
+systems and logic. She wields the instrument of rational thought with consuinmate skill. As far as self-mastery is concerned, her instructions sometimes stand in the same relation to Kant's as the special application does
+ro the principle. "Virtue," writes the latter," "in so far as it is grounded on
+
+75
+inner freedom, also contains an affirmative imperative for men, namely to
+place all their capacities and inclinations under the power [of reason] and
+therefore under the authority over oneself, which imperative is added to
+the interdiction on allowing oneself to be commanded by one's feelings
+and inclinations [the duty of apathy]. For unless reason takes the reins of
+government into its hands, those feelings and inclinations will play the
+master over men." Juliette teaches as follows on the self-discipline of the
+criminal: "First, reflect on your plan for several days in advance. Consider
+all its consequences, paying attention to what can be useful to you ... and
+what might possibly betray you. Weigh these things just as soberly as if
+you were sure to be discovered."2° The murderer's face must show utmost
+calm. "Let your features show calm and indifference. Try to acquire the
+greatest possible callousness in this situation... If you are unsure of being
+free of pangs of conscience-and you will gain such certainty only
+through the habit of crime—if you are unsure of this, I say, then you will
+labor in vain to master the play of your features." To be free of the stab
+of conscience is as essential to formalistic reason as to be free of love or
+hate. Remorse posits the past—which, contrary to popular ideology, has
+always meant nothing to the bourgeoisie—as something which exists; it is
+a relapse, to prevent which, for bourgeois praxis, would be remorse's only
+justification. Spinoza, following the Stoics, states the matter as follows:
+"Repentance is not a virtue, or, in other words, it does not arise from reason, but he who repents of an action is twice as unhappy or as weak as
+before."? But he goes on at once, quite in the spirit of Francavilla: "If the
+mob is not in fear, it threatens in its turn,'
+"23 chus maintaining, as a good
+student of Machiavelli, that modesty and remorse, like fear and hope, are
+undoubredly useful, however contrary to reason. "Apathy (considered as a
+strength) is a necessary presupposition of virtue," writes Kant, 24 distinguishing, nor unlike Sade, berween this "moral apathy" and insensibility
+in the sense of indifference to sensory stimulation. Enthusiasm is bad
+Calm and resolution constitute the strength of virtue. "That is the state of
+health in moral life, whereas the affect, even when it is excited by the idea
+of the good, is a momentarily lustrous phenomenon which leaves behind
+lassitude."' Juliette's friend Clairwil makes exactly the same observation
+with regard to vice.?6 "My soul is hardened, and I am far from preferring
+sensibility to the happy indifference I now enjoy. Oh Juliette... perhaps
+you are deceiving yourself about the dangerous sensibility prized by so
+
+76
+many fools." Apathy arises at the turning points in bourgeois history, as in
+the history of antiquity, when the pauci beati become aware of their powerlessness in face of the overwhelming historical tendency. It marks the
+retreat of the individual's spontaneity into the private sphere, which is thus
+established as the truly bourgeois form of existence. Stoicism-which is
+the bourgeois philosophy—makes it easier for the privileged to look what
+threatens them in the eye by dwelling on the suffering of others. It affirms
+the general by elevating private existence, as protection from it, to che starus of a principle. The private sphere of the bourgeois* is an upper-class
+cultural asset which has come down in the world
+Juliette's credo is science. She abominates any veneration which cannot be shown to be rational: belief in God and his dead son, obedience to
+the Ten Commandments, preference of the good to the wicked, salvation
+to sin. She is attracted by those reactions which have been proscribed by
+the legends of civilization. She manipulates semantics and logical syntax
+like the most up-to-date positivist, but unlike that employee of the latest
+administration she does not direct her linguistic criticism primarily against
+thought and philosophy but, as a daughter of the militant Enlightenment,
+against religion. "A dead God!" she says of Christ. "Nothing is more comical than this nonsensical combination of words from the Catholic dictionary: God, which means eternal; death, which means not eternal. Idiotic
+Christians, what do you intend to do with your dead God?" The conversion of what is condemned without scientific proof into something to
+be striven for, and of what is respected without proof into an object of
+revulsion, the transvaluation of values, the "courage to do the forbidden,"2" though without the telltale histrionics of Nietzsche's "Woblan!"
+[Onward!] and without his biological idealism, is her specific passion. "Are
+pretexts needed, to commit crimes?" asks Princess Borghese, Juliette's
+friend, quite in Nietzsche's spirit. " Nierzsche proclaims the quintessence
+of her doctrine. "Let the weaklings and failures go to ruin: the first principle of our philanthropy. And we should help them on their way. What
+is more damaging than any vice? The pity of active people for the unsuccessful and the weak—Christianity."31 The latter, "with its curious interest in overthrowing tyrants and making_ them submit to principles of
+brotherhood ... plays the game of the weak. It represents the weak, and
+has to speak like them. ... We may be sure that such fraternal bonds were
+not only proposed but put in place by the weak, when, priestly power had
+
+77
+chanced to fall into their hands."32 This contribution to the genealogy of
+morals is made by Noirceuil, Juliette's mentor. Nietzsche maliciously celebrates the mighty and their cruelty when it is directed "outside their circle," that is, against everything alien to themselves. "Once abroad in the
+wilderness, they revel in the freedom from social constraint and compensate for their long confinement in the quietude of their own community.
+They revert to the innocence of wild animals: we can imagine them
+returning from an orgy of murder, arson, rape, and torture, jubilant and
+at peace with themselves as though they had committed a fraternity
+prank-convinced, moreover, that the poets for a long time to come will
+have something to sing abour and praise. ... This "boldness' of noble
+races, so headstrong, absurd, incalculable, sudden, improbable, ... their
+urter indifference to safety and comfort, their terrible pleasure in destruction, their taste for cruelty,"33 this boldness, stridently proclaimed by
+Nierzsche, has also taken hold of Juliette. "Live dangerously" is her message, too: "Dare henceforth to do anything without fear."34 There are the
+strong and the weak, there are classes, races, and nations which dominate
+and others which are subjected. "Where, I ask you," cries Verneuil, "is the
+mortal stupid enough in face of all the evidence to claim that all men are
+born equal, in law and in fact? It was left to a misanthropist like Rousseau
+to pur forward such a paradox, since, being extremely weak, he wanted to
+pull down those to whose level he was unable to raise himself. What
+effrontery did it take, I ask you, for this pygmy four feet two inches tall to
+compare himself to the model of stature and strength whom nature had
+endowed with the strength and figure of a Hercules? Is that not the same
+as comparing a fly to an elephant? Strength, beaury, stature, eloquence:
+those are the virtues which were decisive when authority passed to the
+rulers at the dawn of sociery.
+"35 "To expect that strength will not manifest
+itself as strength," Nietzsche goes on,36 "as the desire to overcome, to appropriate, to have enemies, obstacles, and triumphs, is every bit as absurd
+as to expect thar weakness will manifest itself as strength."— "How do you
+really expect" says Verneuil, "a man endowed by nature with the highest
+predisposition for crime, whether through his superior strength, che refinement of his senses or as a result of an education fitting to his class or his
+wealth-how, I ask, do you expect this individual to be judged by the
+same law as those whom everything constrains to act virtuously and moderately? Would the law be more just if it punished both in the same way?
+
+78
+Is it natural for someone whom everything invites to do evil to be treated
+like someone whom everything impels to behave with prudence?"
+Once the objective order of nature has been dismissed as prejudice
+and myth, nature is no more than a mass of material. For Nietzsche there
+is no law "which we not only recognize but recognize over us."3B To the
+extent that the understanding, which was formed against the standard of
+self-preservation, recognizes any law of life, it is that of the stronger. While
+reason, because of its formalism, is unable to yield any necessary model for
+humanity, it has the advantage of actuality, in contrast to mendacious ideology. It is the weak who are guilty, according to Nietzsches doctrine,
+since they use cunning to circumvent the natural law. "It is the diseased
+who imperil mankind, and not the 'beasts of prey.' It is the predestined
+failures and victims who undermine the social structure, who poison our
+faith in life and our fellow men." They have spread throughout the world
+the Christianity which Nietzsche hates and abominates no less than Sade.
+"It is not the reprisals of the weak against the strong which truly conform
+to nature. They exist in the mental realm, not the physical. To carry out
+such reprisals the weak man would need strength he has not been given.
+He would have to assume a character which is by no means his—in a cerrain way he would do violence to nature. What is truthful in the laws of
+this wise mother is that the strong are allowed to injure the weak, since, to
+act in this way, they must only use the gifts they have received. The strong
+individual does not, like the weak, disguise himself with a character other
+than his own. He merely expresses in action what he has received from
+nature. Everything which follows from that is therefore natural: his
+oppression, his violence, his cruelties, his tyrannies, his injustices ... are
+pure, like the hand which has imprinted them on him. And if the strong
+person exercises all his rights to oppress and pillage the weak, he is only
+doing the most natural thing in the world.... We should never, therefore,
+have scruples over what we are able to take from the weak, since it is not
+we who are committing the crime. Rather, it is the defense or revenge of
+the weak which are characteristic of crime."° If a weak person defends
+himself, he does wrong, "the wrong of stepping outside his own character
+of weakness, which nature has impressed on him. She created him to be a
+slive, and poor. He refuses to submit; that is his wrong.""" In such magis--
+rerial speeches Dorval, the leader of a respectable Paris gang, expounds for
+Juliete the secret creed of all ruling classes, a creed to which Nierzsche,
+
+79
+proclaiming it to his own time, added the psychology of resentment. Like
+Juliette he admired "the beautiful terribleness of the deed,"42 even though,
+as a German professor, he differed from Sade in rejecting criminality, because its egoism "is restricted to such base goals. If its goals are lofty
+humanity has a different standard, judging 'crime,' even when committed
+with the most terrible means, not to be such."4 The enlightened Juliette
+is still free of such prejudice in favor of greatness, a prejudice which,
+indeed, is characteristic of the bourgeois world; for her the racketeer is not
+less admirable than the minister because his victims are fewer. For the
+German, however, beauty is a function of size, and amid the twilight of
+the idols he cannot shake off the idealistic habit of wanting to see the petty
+thief hanged while imperialist raids are transfigured into world-historical
+missions. By elevating the cult of strength to a world-historical doctrine,
+German fascism took it to its absurd conclusion. As a protest against civilization the master morality perversely upheld the oppressed: hatred of
+stunted instincts objectively exposes the true nature of the slave masters,
+which reveals itself only in their victims. But, in the guise of a great power
+and a state religion, the master morality places itself entirely in the service
+of the civilizing powers that be, of the solid majority, of resentment and
+everything it once opposed. The realization of Nietzsche's doctrines both
+refutes them and reveals their truth—a truth which, despite his yea-saying affirmation of life, was hostile to the spirit of reality.
+If remorse was contrary to reason, pity was outright sin. Anyone who
+yields to it "perverts the general law; whence it follows that piry, far from
+being a virtue, becomes truly a vice as soon as it induces us to interfere
+with the inequality required by the laws of nature."44 Sade and Nietzsche
+realized that once reason had been formalized pity was left behind as a
+kind of sensuous awareness of the identity of general and particular, as
+naturalized mediation. It then forms a highly compelling prejudice: "compassion... does not appertain to the use of reason ... although it seems
+to bear in it a sort of piety," writes Spinoza," and "he who is moved neither by reason nor pity to help others is rightly called inhuman.
+»46
+Commiseratio is humanity in its immediate form, but at the same time
+"bad and useless,"* since it is the opposite of the manly competence
+which, from Roman virtus through the Medici to efficiency under the
+Fords, has always been the true bourgeois virtue. Womanish and childish,
+Clairwil calls pity, vaunting her own "stoicism," the "tranquility of the pas-
+
+80 Excursus II
+sions" which enables her "to accomplish and endure everything without
+agitation."48 "Pity is anything but a virtue. It is a weakness, born of fear
+and misfortune, a weakness that must be overcome most of all if one is
+striving to conquer excessive nervous sensibility, which is irreconcilable
+with the maxims of philosophy."4) Women are the source of "outbursts of
+unrestrained compassion."S Sade and Nietzsche knew that their doctrine
+of the sinfulness of pity was an old bourgeois heritage. The latter speaks
+of "strong times" and "aristocratic cultures," while the former refers to
+Aristotle" and the Peripatetics." Pity could not withstand the scrutiny of
+philosophy. Nor did Kant make an exception. Pity was, he said, "a certain
+soft-heartedness" and lacked "the dignity of virtue."53 He failed to notice,
+however, that the principle of "general benevolence toward the human
+race,"4 by which, in contrast to Clairwil's rationalism, he sought to replace
+pity, falls under the same curse of irrationality as "this well-meaning passion" which can easily seduce a person into becoming "a tender-hearted
+idler." Enlightenment cannot be duped; for it the general has no advantage over the particular fact, or an all-embracing love over a limited one.
+Pity stands in disrepute. Like Sade, Nietzsche cites the Ars poetica in passing judgment. "According to Aristotle, the Greeks often suffered an excess
+of pity: hence its necessary discharge through tragedy. We can see how suspect this inclination appeared to them. It endangers the state, takes away
+the necessary hardness and discipline, makes heroes howl like women."s
+Zarathustra preaches: "I see as much weakness as goodness. As much
+weakness as justice and pity."S6 Pity has, in fact, a moment which conflicts
+with justice, although Nietzsche lumps the two together. It confirms the
+rule of inhumanity by the exception it makes. By limiting the abolition of
+injustice to fortuitous love of one's neighbor, pity accepts as unalterable the
+law of universal estrangement which it would like to alleviate. It is true
+that the person who shows pity upholds as an individual the claim of the
+general, that is, the claim to life, against the general in the form of nature
+and society, which deny it. But the unity with the general as something
+inward, practiced by such an individual, is shown to be deceptive by his
+own weakness. It is not the softness but the restrictive nature of pity which
+makes it questionable—it is always too little. Just as the Stoic indifference
+on which bourgeois coldness, the counterpart of pity, has modeled itself
+was shore loyal, however wretchedly, to the universal it had rejected chan
+the compassionate baseness which adapted itself to the world, so it was
+
+81
+those who unmasked pity who, however negatively, espoused the Revolution. The narcissistic deformations of pity, like the effusions of philanthropists and the moral complacency of the social welfare worker, are still
+an internalized endorsement of the difference between rich and poor. Ad-
+mittedly, by imprudently confessing the joys of hardness, philosophy has
+put itself at the disposal of those who least forgive it the admission. The
+fascist masters* of the world translated the vilification of pity into that of
+political respect and the appeal to martial law, in which they were at one
+with Schopenhauer, the metaphysician of pity. For him the establishment
+of a humane order was the presumptuous delusion of someone who could
+hope only for misfortune. The enemies of piry were unwilling to equate
+humanity with misfortune. For them, the existence of misfortune was a
+scandal. With their impotent delicacy, they could not bear to see humanity pitied. In desperation their powerlessness switched to the glorification
+of power, while disowning it in practice whenever it gave them leave.
+Kindness and good deeds become a sin, domination and suppression
+virtue. "All good things have at one time been considered evil; every original sin has, at some point, turned into an original virtue." In the new
+epoch Juliette applies this principle in earnest, for the first time consciously performing the transvaluation of all values. After the destruction
+of all ideologies she elevates as her own morality what Christianity, in its
+ideology if not always in its practice, held to be abominable. As a good
+philosopher she remains cool and reflective. All is done without illusions.
+To Clairwil's proposal for a sacrilegious act she responds: "Now that we do
+not believe in God, my dear, ... the desecrations you desire.are no more
+than useless childish games.... I may be still firmer in my disbelief than
+you; my atheism is unshakable. So do not imagine that I need the childish pranks you propose to confirm it. I shall take part because it amuses
+you, but only for entertainment"—the American murderess Annie Henry* would have said "just for fun"-"and never as something necessary,
+either to strengthen my way of thinking, or to convince others of it."s8
+Though swayed by momentary kindness toward her accomplice, she still
+upholds her principles. Even injustice, hatred, and destruction become
+merely operations, now that the formalization of reason has stripped all
+goals of the character of necessity and objectivity, which is dismissed as
+illusion. Magic passes into mere activity, into the means—in short, into
+industry. The formalization of reason is merely the intellectual expression
+
+82 Excursus II
+of mechanized production. The means is fetishized: it absorbs pleasure.
+Just as the goals with which the old system of rule had veiled itself are rendered illusory by enlightenment in theory, the possibility of abundance
+removes their justification in practice. Domination survives as an end in
+itself, in the form of economic power. Pleasure itself shows traces of the
+outdated, the irrelevant, like the metaphysics which forbade it. Juliette
+speaks of the motives of crime." She herself is no less ambitious and avaricious than her friend Sbrigani, but she idolizes the forbidden. Sbrigani, a
+man devoted to the means and to duty, is more advanced. "To enrich ourselves—that is what matters. It would be the height of guilt if we failed to
+reach that goal. Only if one is truly on the way to becoming wealthy is one
+permitted to reap one's pleasures: until then one must forget them." For
+all her rational superiority, Juliette still clings to one superstition. While
+she recognizes the naivety of sacrilege, in the end it still gives her pleasure.
+But every pleasure betrays idolization: it is self-abandonment to an Other.
+Nature actually does not know pleasure: it does not go beyond the satisfaction of needs. All pleasure is social, in the unsublimated affects no less
+than in the sublimated. It springs from alienation. Even when enjoyment
+is ignorant of the prohibition it infringes, it owes its origin to civilization,
+to the fixed order from which it yearns to return to the very nature from
+which that order protects it. Only when dream absolves them of the compulsion of work, of the individual's attachment to a particular social function and finally to a self, leading back to a primal state free of domination
+and discipline, do human beings feel the magic of pleasure. It was the
+homesickness of those enmeshed in civilization, the "objective despair" of
+those who had to turn themselves into elements of the social order, which
+nourished the love of gods and demons; to them as transfigured nature this
+love turned in adoration. Thought arose in the course of liberation from
+terrible nature, which is finally subjugated utterly. Pleasure, so to speak, is
+nature's revenge. In it human beings divest themselves of thought, escape
+from civilization. In earlier societies such homecoming was provided by
+communal festivals. Primitive orgiès are the collective origin of pleasure.
+"The interlude of universal confusion represented by the festival," writes
+Roger Caillois, "seems truly like the moment when the world's order is suspended. All excesses are permitted. Rules must be broken, everything
+must be turned upside down. In the mythic epoch the course of time was
+reversed: one was born aged, died as a child. ... All the precepts protect-
+
+83
+ing the good, natural, and social order are systematically violated." One
+abandons oneself to the transfigured powers of origin; but from the standpoint of the suspended interdiction these actions appear as dissipated and
+insane." Only with increasing civilization and enlightenment do the
+strengthened self and the secure system of power reduce the festival to
+farce. The rulers introduce pleasure as a rational measure, a tribute paid to
+imperfectly subdued nature; they seek at once to detoxify it and to preserve it in higher culture; to administer it to their subjects in controlled
+doses where it cannot be entirely withdrawn. Pleasure becomes an object
+of manipulation, until it finally perishes in the administrative arrangements. This development extends from the primitive feast to the holiday.
+"The more dominant the complex social organism becomes, the less it rolerates interruptions of the ordinary course of life. Today as yesterday,
+tomorrow as today, everything must follow the same course. The general
+overflowing is no longer possible. The period of turbulence has been individualized. Holidays have supplanted the feast."62 In fascism they are supplemented by the collective fake intoxication, concocted from radio, headlines, and Benzedrine.* Sbrigani has a presentiment of this. He grants
+himself amusements "on the road to fortune," as vacations. Juliette, by
+contrast, still emulates the ancien régime. She deifies sin. Her libertinism
+is in thrall to Catholicism as the nuns ecstasy is to paganism.
+Nietzsche is aware of the still mythical nature of pleasure. In its
+abandonment to nature pleasure renounces the possible, just as pity
+renounces the transformation of the whole. Both contain a moment of resignation. Nietzsche tracks down pleasure in all its hiding places, as narcissism in solitude, as masochistic enjoyment in the depressions of the selftormentor. "Against all who merely enjoy!"63 Juliette tries to rescue pleasure by rejecting love in its bourgeois form as devotion, which, as resistance to the bourgeoisie's own shrewdness, is characteristic of that class in
+its last century. In love, pleasure was linked to the deification of the person who bestowed it and was the truly human passion. It is being finally
+revoked as a value judgment conditioned by sexuality. In the enraptured
+adoration of the lover, as in the boundless admiration shown in return by
+the beloved, the actual servitude of the woman was endlessly transfigured.
+Again and again, the sexes were reconciled on the basis of their recognition of this servitude: the woman seemed freely to accept her defeat, the
+man to grant her victory. Under Christianity the hierarchy of the sexes, the
+
+84
+yoke placed on the feminine character by the masculine order of property,
+was idealized as the union of hearts in marriage, and the memory of sexuality's better, prepatriarchal past appeased. Under big industry* love is
+annulled. The decline of middle-class property, the downfall of the free
+economic subject, affects the family: it is no longer the celebrated cell of
+society it once was, since it no longer forms the basis of the citizen's economic existence. For adolescents the family no longer marks out the horizon of their lives; the autonomy of the father is vanishing and with it resistance to his authority. Earlier, the girl's servitude in the paternal home
+inflamed in her the passion which seemed to lead to freedom but was fulfilled neither in marriage nor anywhere outside. As the prospect of a job
+opens for the girl, that of love is closed. The more universally the system
+of modern industry* requires everyone to enter its service, the more all
+those who do not form part of the ocean of "white trash,"* which is
+absorbing the unqualified employed and unemployed, are turned into
+petty experts, into employees who must fend for themselves. In the form
+of skilled work the autonomy of the entrepreneur, which is over, is spreading to all those admitted as producers, including the "working" woman,
+and is becoming their character. Their self-respect grows in proportion to
+their fungibility. Defiance of the family is no more an act of daring than
+the leisure-time relationship with the boyfriend is the gateway to heaven.
+People are taking on the rational, calculating attitude to their own sexuality long since proclaimed as ancient wisdom by Juliette's enlightened circle. Mind and body are being separated in reality, just as those indiscreet
+bourgeois libertines demanded: "It appears to me," Noirceuil stares rationalistically "that love and pleasure are two very different things...
+because tender feelings correspond to relationships of caprice and decorum, but in no way spring from the beauty of a neck or the pretty curve
+of a hip. And these objects, which, in accordance with our taste, can keenly excite our physical affects, have, it seems to me, no rights over our mental affections. To complete my thought, Bélize is ugly, is forty years old,
+entirely lacks grace of person, is without regular features or any physical
+charm. But Bélize has intelligence, a precious character, a million things
+which attach my feelings and preferences. I shall never wish to sleep with
+Bélize, but I shall love her to the point of madness, whereas I shall lust
+afiur Araminche bur heartily detest her as soon as the fever of desire is
+pilst." Here, the inevitable consequence implicit in the Cartesian division
+
+85
+of the human being into thinking and extensive substance is expressed
+with total clarity as the destruction of Romantic love. The latter is taken
+to be a mask, a rationalization of the physical drive, "a false and always
+dangerous metaphysics,"S as Count Belmor explains in his great speech
+on love. For all their libertinism, Juliette's friends conceive of sexuality, as
+against tenderness, of earthly as against heavenly love, not just as a degree
+too powerful but also as oversimplified. The beauty of a neck or the curve
+of a hip acts on sexuality not as unhistorical, merely natural facts but as
+images in which the whole of social experience is contained; this experience harbors an intention toward something different to nature, a love not
+restricted to sexuality. But even the most incorporeal tenderness is transformed sexuality; the hand stroking the hair, the kiss on the brow, which
+express the rapture of spiritual love, are in pacified form the beating and
+biting which accompany the sexual act among Australian aborigines. The
+distinction is abstract. Metaphysics, Belmor teaches, falsifies the factual
+situation, it prevents the beloved from being seen as he or she is; it stems
+from magic, it is a veil. "And I am not to snatch it from our eyes? That
+would be weakness ... cowardice. Let us analyze her when the pleasure is
+over, this goddess who has just blinded me."66 Love itself is an unscientific concept: "False definitions are always leading us astray," Dolmance
+declares in the memorable fifth dialogue of La Philosophie dans le Boudoir,
+"I don't know what it is—the heart. I simply use that term for weakness
+of mind."67 "If we spend one moment in what Lucretius calls the "background of life, "—meaning, in cold analysis—"we find that neither the
+elevation of the beloved nor romantic feeling withstands analysis. ... It is
+the body alone that I love, and it is the body alone that I lament, although
+I can have it again at any time."68 What is true in all this is the insight into
+the dissociation of love, the work of progress. This dissociation, which
+mechanizes pleasure and distorts longing into a deception, attacks love at
+its core. By turning her praise of genital and perverted sexuality into condemnation of what is unnatural, immaterial, illusory, the libertine Julierte
+has thrown in her lot with the normality which belittles and restricts not
+only the utopian exaltation of love but physical pleasure, not only the loftiest joy bur that which is nearest at hand. The cynical roué whose side she
+takes has metamorphosed, with the help of the sex educator, the psychoanalyst, and the hormone physiologist, into the open-minded practical
+man who extends his affirmation of sport and hygiene to include the sex
+
+86 Excursus II
+life. Juliette's critique contains the same inner discord as the Enlightenment itself. In so far as the criminal violation of taboos, which once made
+common cause with the bourgeois revolution, has not been simply
+absorbed into the new matter-of-factness, it lives on, with sublime love, as
+fidelity to the utopia brought near by the availability of physical pleasure
+to all.
+"The ridiculous enthusiasm" which attached us to a particular individual as the only one, the elevation of woman in love, can be traced back
+beyond Christianity to matriarchal stages. "It is certain that our spirit of
+chivalrous courtship, which comically offers our homage to an object
+made only to satisfy our need—it is certain, I say, that this spirit stems
+from the reverence our ancestors once had for women because of their profession as prophetesses in town and country. Through terror, aversion
+became worship, and chivalry was nurtured in the womb of superstition.
+But this reverence never existed in nature, and it would be a waste of time
+to seek it there. The inferiority of that sex to ours is too well founded ever
+to give us a sound motive to respect it, and the love which arises from that
+blind reverence is, like it, a prejudice."6 It is on power, however legalistically veiled, that the social hierarchy ultimately rests. The mastery of
+nature is reprodüced within humanity. Christian civilization, which used
+the idea of protecting the physically weak to justify exploitation of the
+strong bondsman, never entirely won the hearts of the converted peoples.
+The principle of love was too strongly disavowed by the sharp intellect and
+the still sharper weapons of the Christian masters, until Lutheranism abolished the antithesis berween state and doctrine by making the sword and
+rod the Gospel's quintessence. It directly equated spiritual freedom with
+the affirmation of actual oppression. But woman bears the stigma of weakness; her weakness places her in a minority even when she is numerically
+superior to men. As with the subjugated original inhabitants in early forms
+of state, the indigenous population of colonies, who lack the organization
+and weapons of their conquerors, as with the Jews among Aryans, her
+defenselessness legitimizes her oppression. Sade expresses as formulae the
+reflections of Strindberg. "Let us not doubt that there is a difference
+berween man and woman no less certain and important than that between
+pran and the apes of the förest. We would have just as good reason to deny
+woman membership of our species as to refuse to acknowledge brotherhond with the apes. Examine carefully a naked woman beside a man of
+
+87
+the same age, naked like her, and you will be readily convinced of the considerable difference (disregarding the sex which exists between the two
+creatures and will clearly see that the woman is merely a lower degree of
+the man. The differences likewise exist within, and anatomical dissection
+of one and the other, if done with painstaking care, will bring this truth to
+lighr."7° Christianity's attempt to compensate the suppression of sexuality
+ideologically by the veneration of woman, and thus to sublimate the memory of the archaic instead of merely repressing it, is annulled by its rancor
+against the woman thus elevated and against theoretically emancipated
+pleasure. The affect which corresponds to the practice of oppression is
+contempt, not veneration, and lurking behind the love of one's neighbor
+throughout the Christian centuries has been the forbidden, compulsive
+hatred of the object which continually brought to mind the futility of that
+exertion: woman. Women paid for the cult of the Madonna with the
+obsessive belief in witches, the revenge taken on the memory of the pre-
+Christian prophetess who secretly called into question the sanctified patriarchal system of power. The woman excites the savage rage of the half-converted man who is required to honor her, just as the weak in general can
+count on the mortal enmity of the superficially civilized strong who are
+supposed to spare them. Sade brings this hatred to consciousness. "I have
+never believed," says Count Ghigi, the Roman chief of police, "that the
+union of two bodies could ever give rise to the union of two hearts. I see
+in this physical union strong reasons for contempt..., for revulsion, but
+not a single one for love."" And when a girl terrorized by Saint-Fonds, the
+royal minister, bursts into tears, he exclaims: "That is how I like women.
+... Why cannot I reduce them all to such a state with a single word?"72
+Man as ruler refuses to do woman the honor of individualizing her.
+Socially, the individual woman is an example of the species, a representative of her sex, and thus, wholly encompassed by male logic, she stands for
+nature, the substrate of never-ending subsumption on the plane of ideas
+and of never-ending subjection on that of reality. Woman as an allegedly
+natural being is a product of history, which denatures her. But the desperate, destructive urge directed against everything which embodies the
+lure of nature, everything which is physiologically, biologically, nationally,
+or socially inferior, indicates that Christianity's attempt has failed. "Que ne
+puis-je, d'un mot, les réduire toutes en cet état!" To eradicate utterly the
+hated but overwhelming temptation to lapse back into nature—that is the
+
+88
+cruely which stems from failed civilization; it is barbarism, che other side
+of culture. "Them all!" For destruction tolerates no exceptions; the will to
+destroy is totalitarian, and totalitarianism springs from that will alone. "I
+have reached the point," Juliette tells the Pope, "where I can say with
+Tiberius: if only the whole of mankind had only one head, so that I could
+have the pleasure of cutting it off with a single blow!"73 The signs of powerlessness, hasty uncoordinated movements, animal fear, swarming masses, provoke the lust for murder. The explanation for the hatred of woman
+as the weaker in mental and physical power, who bears the mark of domination on her brow, is the same as for the hatred of the Jews. Women and
+Jews show visible evidence of not having ruled for thousands of years.
+They live, although they could be eliminated, and their fear and weakness,
+the greater affinity to nature produced in them by perennial oppression, is
+the element in which they live. In the strong, who pay for their strength
+with their strained remoteness from nature and must forever forbid themselves fear, this incites blind fury. They identify themselves with nature by
+calling forth from their victims, multiplied a thousandfold, the cry they
+may not utter themselves. "These senseless creatures!" writes President
+Blammont of women in Aline et Valcour, "How I love to see them struggling in my hands! They are like lambs in the jaws of the lion."" And in
+the same letter: "It is the same as conquering a city. You must occupy the
+heights... establish yourself at all the commanding points and then
+launch your attack without any fear of resistance." A creature which has
+fallen attracts predators: humiliation of those already visited by misfortune
+brings the keenest pleasure. The less the danger to the one on cop, the
+more unhampered the joy in the torments he can now inflict: only through
+the hopeless despair of the victim can power become pleasure and triumphantly revoke its own principle, discipline. Fear averted from the self
+bursts out in hearty laughter, the expression of a hardening within the
+individual which can only be fully lived out through the collective.
+Ringing laughter has always denounced civilization. "Of all the lava
+spewed forth from the crater of the human mouth, the most calamitous is
+merriment," writes Victor Hugo in the chapter headed "Storms of men are
+worse than storms of oceans."6 "It is on misfortune," Juliette teaches,?
+"that the full weight of our malice must fall. The tears wrung from
+wretchedness have a keenness, which profoundly thrills our nervous substance."'" Rather than with tenderness, pleasure makes its pact with cru-
+
+ely, and sexual love becomes what according to Nieresche" it alwiys was:
+"in its means, war; and ar its basis the mortal hatred of the sexes." "With
+both the male and the female," zoology teaches us, ""love', or sexual attracrion, is originally and preeminently 'sadie; it is positively gratified by the
+infliction of pain; it is as cruel as hunger.* Thus, as its final result, civilization leads back to the terrors of nature. The lethal love on which Sade's
+work is constantly focused, Nietzsche's impudently solicitous magnanimity in seeking to spare the victim humiliation at any price: cruelty and the
+idea of greatness deal no less harshly with human beings on the plane of
+play and imagination than German fascism* was to do on that of reality.
+However, whereas the unconscious colossus of real existence, subjectless
+capitalism, inflicts its destruction blindly, the deludedly rebellious subject
+is willing to see that destruction as its fulfillment, and, together with the
+biting cold it emits toward human beings misused as things, it also radiates the perverted love which, in the world of things, takes the place of
+love in its immediacy. Sickness becomes the symptom of recovery. In
+transfiguring the victims, delusion accepts their degradation. It makes
+itself resemble the monster of domination which it cannot physically overcome. Imagination seeks as horror to withstand horror. The Roman
+proverb that harshness is true pleasure expresses not merely the brutality
+of slave drivers bur the indissoluble contradiction of order, which, when it
+sanctions happiness, turns it into self-parody and creates it only through
+proscribing it. While they perpetuated this contradiction, Sade and
+Nietzsche also contributed to its clarification.
+To reason, devotion to the adored creature appears as idol worship.
+The demise of idolatry follows necessarily from the ban on mythology
+pronounced by Jewish monotheism and enforced against the changing
+objects of adoration in the history of thought by that monotheism's secularized form, enlightenment. The decay of economic reality, which has
+always been at the basis of superstition, released specific forces of negation.
+Christianity, however, propagated love: the pure adoration of Jesus. It
+sought to elevate the blind sexual drive by the hallowing of marriage, as it
+also tried to bring the crystalline radiance of law closer to earthly life by
+the idea of heavenly grace. The reconciliation of civilization with nature
+which it sought prematurely to purchase with the doctrine of the crucified
+God remained as alien to Judaism as to the rigorism of the Enlightenment.
+Neither Moses nor Kant proclaimed emotion; their icy law knew neither
+
+love nor sacrificial pyres. Nietzsche's attack on monotheism dealt a heavier blow to Christian than to Jewish doctrine. While he repudiated the
+Law he pledged himself to the "higher self,"") a self no longer natural but
+more-than-natural. He wanted to replace God by the "Overman" because
+monotheism, in its broken, Christian form, had transparently become
+mythology. Bur just as, in the service of this higher self, the old ascetic
+ideals are extolled by Nietzsche as self-overcoming in the interest of developing "dominant power,"82 so the higher self turns out to be a desperate
+attempt to rescue the God who was dead. In this, Nietzsche renews Kant's
+endeavor to transform the divine law into an autonomous principle, to
+rescue European civilization from giving up the ghost in English skepticism. Kant's principle: "that everything be done from the maxim of one's
+will as a will that could at the same time have as its object itself as giving
+universal law, "83 is also the secret of the Overman. His will is no less
+despotic than the categorical imperative. Both principles aim at independence from external powers, at the unconditional freedom from tutelage
+which defines the essence of enlightenment. However, as the fear of falsehood, a fear which even in his most "enlightened" moments Nietzsche
+decried as "a piece of Quixotism,"* replaced the Law with self-legislation,
+so that everything was made transparent as one great unmasked superstition, enlightenment itself, indeed, truth in any form, became an idol, and
+we realize that "even we knowing ones of today, the godless and antimeraphysical, still take our fire from the conflagration kindled by a belief millennia old, the Christian belief, which was also the belief of Plato, that
+God is truth, that the truth is divine." Science itself, therefore, is open to
+the same criticism as metaphysics. The denial of God contains an irresolvable contradiction; it negates knowledge itself. Sade did not drive the
+idea of enlightenment to this point, where it turns against itself. The
+reflection of science on itself, the work of the Enlightenment's conscience,
+was left to philosophy, meaning German philosophy. For Sade, enlightenment was not so much an intellectual as a social phenomenon. He carried
+forward the dissolution of bonds—which Nietzsche idealistically believed
+could be overcome by the higher self—and the critique of solidarity with
+sociery, office, familys" to the point of proçlaiming anarchy. His work lays
+bare the mythological nature, of the principles on which civilization was
+based after the demise of religion: those of the Decalogue, of paternal
+authority, of property. It is che exact inversion of the social theory elabo-
+
+rated by Le Play a hundred years later. Each of the Ten Commandments
+is declared void before the tribunal of formal reason. They are revealed
+without exception as ideologies. At Juliette's request the Pope himself
+pleads the case for murder. He finds it easier to rationalize un-Christian
+acts in the light of natural reason than it had ever been to justify the
+Christian principles according to which those acts were devilish. The
+"mitered philosopher" has less need of sophistry in advocating murder
+than Maimonides and St Thomas Aquinas in condemning it. Roman reason is even more inclined than the god of the Prussians to side with the
+bigger bartalions. The Law, however, has been dethroned, and the love
+which was supposed to humanize it is unmasked as a reversion to idolatry.
+It is not just romantic sexual love which has been condemned as metaphysics by science and industry but love of any kind, for no love can withstand reason: neither that between wife and husband nor between lover
+and beloved, nor the love between parents and children. The Duc de
+Blangis announces to his subjects that those related to the rulers, daughters and wives, should be treated as harshly, indeed, still more harshly, than
+others, "in order to show you how deeply we despise the bonds by which
+you may think us fertered."' Woman's love is abolished like that of man.
+The rules of libertinage passed on by Saint-Fonds to Juliette are to apply
+to all women." Dolmance voices the materialistic disenchantment of
+parental love. "These latter ties originate in the parents' fear of being abandoned in old age, and the self-interested concern they show for us in our
+childhood is intended to earn them the same consideration in old age.""
+Sade's argument is as old as the bourgeoisie. Democritus already
+denounced parental love as economic.? Sade, however, applies the same
+disenchantment even to exogamy, the foundation of civilization.
+According to him, there are no rational grounds to oppose incest,? and
+the hygienic argument formerly used has now been invalidated by advanced science, which ratifies Sade's cold judgment. "It has by no means
+been proved that children born of incest have a greater tendency than others to suffer from cretinism, deaf-muteness, rickets, etc."** The family,
+held together not by romantic sexual love but by maternal love, which
+forms the basis of all tenderness and social feelings," conflicts with society itself. "Do not imagine you will make good republicans as long as you
+isolate children, who should belong only to the whole community, within
+your families. ... Whereas there are great disadvantages in allowing chil-
+
+dren to be absorbed into family interests which often diverge strongly
+from those of the nation, very great benefits lie in separating them from
+them." "Conjugal ties" must be destroyed for social reasons; children are
+to be "absolurely forbidden" knowledge of their fathers, since they are
+"uniquement les enfants de la patrie"," the anarchy and individualism
+which Sade proclaimed in the struggle against laws culminate in the
+absolute rule of the generality, the republic. Just as the deposed god returns
+as a more repressive idol, the old, undemanding bourgeois state reappears
+in the violence of the fascist collective. Sade thought through to the end
+the state socialism whose first steps brought the downfall of Saint-Just and
+Robespierre. If the bourgeoisie sent them, its most loyal politicians, to the
+guillotine, it banished its most outspoken writer to the hell of the Bibliothèque Nationale. For the chronique scandaleuse of Justine and Juliette
+which, turned our as if on a production line, prefigured in the style of the
+eighreenth century the sensational literature of the ninereenth and the
+mass literature of the wentieth is the Homeric epic after it has discarded
+its last mythological veil: the story of thought as an instrument of power.
+In taking fright at the image in its own mirror, that thought opens to view
+what lies beyond it. It is not the harmonious social ideal, which even Sade
+glimpsed dimly in the future: "gardez vos frontières et restez chez vous"?' it
+is not even the socialist uropia developed in the story of Zamé:!0° it is the
+fact that Sade did not leave it to its enemies to be horrified by the
+Enlightenment which makes his work pivotal to its rescue.
+The dark writers of the bourgeoisie, unlike its apologists, did not
+seck to avert the consequences of the Enlightenment with harmonistic
+doctrines. They did not pretend that formalistic reason had a closer affinity to morality than to immorality. While the light-bringing writers prorected the indissoluble alliance of reason and atrocity, bourgeois society
+and power, by denying that alliance, the bearers of darker messages pitilessly expressed the shocking truth. "Into hands stained by the murder of
+spouses and children, sodomy, killing, prostitution, and infamy, heaven
+has placed these riches to reward me for such abominations,"
+says Clairwil
+in her summary of her brother's life.''' She exaggerates. The justice of bad
+domination is not quite so consistent as to reward only infamy. But only
+exaggeration is true. The essential character of prehistory* is the appearande of utmost horror in the individual derail. A statistical compilation of
+those slaughtered in a pogrom, which also includes mercy killings, con-
+
+23
+ceals its essence, which emerges only in an exact description of the exceprion, the most hideous torture. A happy life in a world of horror is ignominiously refuted by the mere existence of that world. The latter therefore
+becomes the essence, the former negligible. No doubt, the ruling group in
+the bourgeois era did not engage in killing their own children and spouses, or in prostitution and sodomy, as frequently as their subjects, who took
+over the morals of the rulers of earlier times. However, when power was at
+stake, the rulers have piled up mountains of corpses even in recent centuries. Compared to the mentality and actions of the rulers under fascism,
+in which power has come fully into its own, the enthusiastic description
+of the life of Brisa-Testa-although those rulers are recognizable in it—
+pales to harmless banality. In Sade as in Mandeville, private vices are the
+anticipatory historiography of public virtues in the totalitarian era. It is
+because they did not hush up the impossibility of deriving from reason a
+fundamental argument against murder, but proclaimed it from the
+rooftops, that Sade and Nietzsche are still vilified, above all by progressive
+thinkers. In a different way to logical positivism, they both took science at
+its word. In pursuing the implications of reason still more resolutely than
+the positivists their secret purpose was to lay bare the uropia which is conrained in every great philosophy, as it is in Kant's concept of reason: the
+utopia of a humanity which, itself no longer distorted, no longer needs
+distortion. In proclaiming the identity of power and reason, their pitiless
+doctrines are more compassionate than those of the moral lackeys of the
+bourgeoisie. "Where are thy greatest dangers?," Nietzsche once asked,'02
+"In pity." With his denial he redeemed the unwavering trust in humanity
+which day by day is betrayed by consoling affirmation.
+
+The Culture Industry:
+The sociological view that the loss of support from objective religion
+and the disintegration of the last precapitalist residues, in conjunction
+with technical and social differentiation and specialization, have given rise
+to cultural chaos is refuted by daily experience.
+infecting
+unes form a
+vir itself and all are unanimous togem-
+Even the aesthetic manifestations of political opposites proclaim the
+same inflexible rhythm. The* decorative administrative and exhibition
+buildings of industry differ little between authoritarian and other countries. The bright monumental structures shooting up on all sides show off
+the systematic ingenuity of the state-spanning combines, toward which
+the unfettered entrepreneurial system, whose monuments are the dismal
+residential and commercial blocks in the surrounding areas of desolate
+cities, was already swiftly advancing. The older buildings around the concrete centers already look like slums, and the new bungalows on the outskirts, like the flimsy structures at international trade fairs, sing the praises of technical progress while inviting their users to throw them away after
+short use like tin cans. But the town-planning projects, which are supposed to perpetuate individuals as autonomous units in hygienic small
+apartments, subjugate them only more completely to their adversary, the
+total power of capital.* Just as. rhe occupants of city centers are uniformly
+summoned there for purposes of work and leisure, as producers and con-
+
+25
+sumers, so the living cells crystallize into homogenous, well-organized
+complexes. The conspicuous unity of macrocosm and microcosm confronts human beings with a model of their culture: the false identity of
+universal and particular.
+All mass culture under monopolys
+and
+the contours of its skeleton, the conceptual armature fabricated by monopoly, are beginning to stand our. Those in charge no longer take much trouble to conceal the structure, the power of which increases the more bluntly its existence is admitted. Films and radio no longer need to present
+themselves as art. The truth that they are nothing but business is used as a
+ideology to legitimize the trash they intentionall
+produ
+. They call themselves industries, and che published figures for their directors' incomes quell
+any doubts abour the social necessity of their finished products.
+Interested parties like to explain the culture industry in technological terms. Its millions of participants, they argue, demand reproduction
+processes which inevitably lead to the use of standard products to meet the
+same needs at countless locations. The technical antithesis between few
+production centers and widely dispersed reception necessitates organization and planning by those in control. The standardized forms, it is
+claimed, were originally derived from the needs of the consumers: that is
+why they are accepted with so little resistance. In rea
+e oh mant
+lation and retroactive need is unifying the system
+ever more tightly. What
+is not mentioned is that the basis on which technology is gaining power
+over society is the power of those whose economic position in society is
+strongest.*
+TaC
+onality today is the rationality of domination. T
+is the com
+of a society alienated from itself. Auromobiles,
+bombs, and films hold the totality together until their leveling element
+demonstrates its power against the very system of injustice it served. For
+the present the technology of the culture industry confines itself to standardization and mass production and sacrifices what once distinguished
+the logic of the work from that of society. These adverse effects, however,
+should not be attributed to the internal laws of technology itself but to its
+function within the economy coday.* Any need which might escape the
+central control is repressed by thar of individual consciousness. The step
+from telephone to radio has clearly distinguished the roles. The former libcrally permitted the participant to play the role of subject. The latter
+democratically makes everyone equally into listeners, in order to expose
+chem in authoritarian fashion to the same programs put out by different
+
+stations. No mechanism of reply has been developed, and private transmissions are condemned to unfreedom. They confine themselves to the
+apocryphal sphere of "amateurs," who, in any case, are organized from
+above. Any trace of spontaneity in the audience of the official radio is
+steered and absorbed into a selection of specializations by talent-spotters,
+performance competitions, and sponsored events of every kind. The talents belong to the operation long before they are put on show; otherwise
+they would not conform so eagerly. The mentality of the public, which
+allegedly and actually favors the system of the culture industry, is a part of
+the system, not an excuse for it. If a branch of art follows the same recipe
+as one far removed from it in terms of its medium and subject matter; if
+the dramatic denouement in radio "soap operas"* is used as an instructive
+example of how to solve technical difficulties—which are mastered no less
+in "jam sessions" than at the highest levels of jazz—or if a movement from
+Beethoven is loosely "adapted" in the same way as a Tolstoy novel is adapted for film, the pretext of meeting the public's spontaneous wishes is mere
+hot air. An explanation in terms of the specific interests of the technical
+apparatus and its personnel would be closer to the truth, provided that
+apparatus were understood in all its details as a part of the economic
+mechanism of selection.* Added to this is the agreement, or at least the
+common determination, of the executive powers to produce or let pass
+nothing which does not conform to their tables, to their concept of the
+consumer
+or, above all, to themselves
+If the objective social tendency of this age is incarnated in the obscure subjective intentions of board chairmen, this is primarily the case in
+the most powerful sectors of industry: steel, petroleum, electricity, chemicals. Compared to them the culture monopolies are weak and dependent.
+They have to keep in with the true wielders of power, to ensure that their
+sphere of mass society, the specific product of which still has too much of
+cozy liberalism and Jewish intellectualism abour it, is not subjected to a
+series of purges.* The dependence of the most powerful broadcasting
+company on the electrical industry, or of film on the banks, characterizes
+the whole sphere, the individual sectors of which are themselves economically intertwined. Everything is so tightly clustered that the concentration
+of intellect reaches a level where it overflows the demarcations between
+contpany names and technical sectors. The relentless unity of the culture
+industry bears wirness to the emergent unity of politics. Sharp distinctions
+
+97
+like those between A and B films, or berween short stories published in
+magazines in different price segments, do not so much reflect real differences as assist in the classification, organization, and identification of consumers. Somerbing is provided for everyone so that no one can escape; diferences are hammered home and propagated. The hierarchy of serial
+qualities purveyed to the public serves only to quantify it more completely. Everyone is supposed to behave spontaneously according to a "level"
+determined by indices and to select the category of mass product manufactured for their type. On the charts of research organizations, indistinguishable from those of political propaganda, consumers are divided up as
+statistical material into red, green, and blue areas according to income
+group
+The schematic nature of this procedure is evident from the fact that
+the mechanically differentiated products are ultimately all the same. That
+the difference between the models of Chrysler and General Motors is fundamentally illusory is known by any child, who is fascinated by that very
+difference. The advantages and disadvantages debated by enthusiasts serve
+only to perpetuate the appearance of competition and choice. It is no different with the offerings of Warner Brothers and Metro Goldwyn Mayer.
+But the differences, even berween the more expensive and cheaper products from the same firm, are shrinking—in cars to the different number
+of cylinders, engine capacity, and details of the gadgets, and in films to the
+different number of stars, the expense lavished on technology, labor and
+costumes, or the use of the latest psychological formulae. The unified standard of value consists in the level of conspicuous production, the amount
+of investment put on show. The budgeted differences of value in the culture industry have nothing to do with actual differences, with the meaning of the product itself. The technical media, too, are being engulfed by
+an insatiable uniformiry. Television aims at a synthesis of radio and film,
+delayed only for as long as the interested parties cannot agree. Such a synthesis, with its unlimited possibilities, promises to intensify the impoverishment of the aesthetic material so radically that the identity of all induscrial cultural products, still scantily disguised today, will triumph openly
+tomorrow in a mocking fulfillment of Wagner's dream of the total art
+work. The accord between word, image, and music is achieved so much
+more perfectly than in Tristan because the sensuous elements, which compliantly document only the surface of social reality, are produced in prin-
+
+28 The Culture Industry
+ciple within the same technical work process, the unity of which they
+express as their true content. This work process integrates all the elements
+of production, from the original concept of the novel, shaped by its sidelong glance at film,* to the last sound effect. It is the triumph of invested
+capital. To impress the omnipotence of capital on the hearts of expropriated job candidates as the power of their true master is the purpose of all
+films, regardless of the plot selected by the production directors.
+Even during their leisure time, consumers must orient themselves
+according to the unity of production. The active contribution which
+Kantian schematism still expected of subjects —that they should, from the
+first, relate sensuous multiplicity to fundamental concepts—is denied to
+the subject by industry. It purveys schematism as its first service to the customer. According to Kantian schematism, a secret mechanism within the
+psyche preformed immediate data to fit them into the system of pure reason. That secret has now been unraveled. Although the operations of the
+mechanism appear to be planned by those who supply the data, the culrure industry, the planning is in fact imposed on the industry by the inertia of a society irrational despite all its rationalization, and this calamitous
+tendency, in passing through the agencies of business. takes on the
+shrewd intentionality peculiar to them. For the consumer there is nothing
+left-to classify, since the classification has already been preempted by the
+schematism of production. This dreamless art for the people fulfils the
+dreamy idealism which went too far for idealism in its critical form. Everything comes from consciousness —from that of God for Malebranche and
+Berkeley, and from earthly production management for mass art. Not only
+do hit songs, stars, and soap operas conform to types recurring cyclically
+as rigid invariants, but the specific content of productions, the seemingly
+variable element, is itself derived from those types. The details become
+interchangeable. The brief interval sequence which has proved catchy in a
+hit song, the hero's temporary disgrace which he accepts as a "good sport,"
+the wholesome slaps the heroine reçeives from the strong hand of the male
+star, his plain-speaking abruptness toward the pampered heiress, are, like
+all the details, ready-made clichés, to be used here and there as desired and
+always completely defined by the purpose they serve within the schenta.
+To confirm the schema by acting as its constituents is their sole raison
+«'être. In a film, the outcome can invariably be predicted at the start—who
+
+29
+will be rewarded, punished, forgotten-and in light music the prepared
+ear can always guess the continuation after the first bars of a hit song and
+is gratified when it actually occurs. The average choice of words in a short
+story must not be tampered with. The gags and effects are no less calculated than their framework. They are managed by special experts, and their
+slim variety is specifically tailored to the office pigeonhole. The culture
+industry has developed in conjunction with the predominance of the
+effect, the tangible performance, the technical detail, over the work, which
+once carried the idea and was liquidated with it. By emancipating itself,
+the detail had become refractory; from Romanticism to Expressionism it
+had rebelled as unbridled expression, as the agent of opposition, against
+organization. In music, the individual harmonic effect had obliterated
+awareness of the form as a whole; in painting the particular detail had
+obscured the overall composition; in the novel psychological penetration
+had blurred the architecture.
+brough totality, the culture industry is
+putting an ends@ all chat. Although operating only with effects, it subdues
+chet unruliness and subordinates them to the formula which supplants
+the work. It crushes equally the whole and the parts. The whole confronts
+the details in implacable detachment, somewhat like the career of a successful man, in which everything serves to illustrate and demonstrate a
+success which, in fact, it is no more than the sum of those idiotic events.
+The so-called leading idea is a filing compartment which creates order, not
+connections. Lacking both contrast and relatedness, the whole and the de
+railwook alike. Their harmony, guaranteed in advance, mocks the painfully achieved harmony of the great bourgeois works of art. In Germany even
+the most carefree films of democracy were overhung already by the graveyard stillness of dictatorship.
+The whole world is passed through the filter of the culture industry.
+The familiar experience of the moviegoer, who perceives the street outside
+as a continuation of the film he has just left, because the film seeks strictly to reproduce the world of everyday perception, has become the guideline of production. The more densely and completely its techniques duplicate empirical objects, the more easily it creates the illusion that the world
+outside is a seamless extension of the one which has been revealed in the
+cinema. Since the abrupt introduction of the sound film, mechanical
+duplication has become entirely subservient to this objective. According to
+this tendency, life is to be made indistinguishable from the sound film. Far
+
+102)
+Thre Cinere lombury
+more strongly than the theatre of illusion, film denies its audience any
+dimension in which they might roam freely in imagination==contained
+by the film's framework bur unsupervised by its precise actualities- withour losing the threads thus it trains those exposed to it to identify film
+directly with reality. The withering of imagination and spontaneity in the
+consumer of culture today need not be traced back to psychological mechanisms. The products themselves, especially the most characteristic, the
+sound film, cripple those faculties through their objective makeup. They
+are so constructed that their adequate comprehension requires a quick, observant, knowledgeable cast of mind but positively debars the spectator
+from thinking, if he is not to miss the fleeting facts. This kind of alertness
+is so ingrained that it does not even need to be activated in particular
+cases, while still repressing the powers of imagination. Anyone who is so
+absorbed by the world of the film, by gesture, image, and word, that he or
+she is unable to supply that which would have made it a world in the first
+place, does not need to be entirely transfixed by the special operations of
+the machinery at the moment of the performance. The required qualities
+of attencion have become so familiar from other films and other culture
+products already known to him or her that they appear automatically. The
+power of industrial society* is imprinted on people once and for all. The
+products of the culture industry are such that
+they can
+be alertly consumed even in a state of distraction. But each one is a model of the gigantic economic machinery,* which, from the first, keeps everyone on their
+toes, both at work and in the leisure time which resembles it. In any sound
+film or any radio broadcast something is discernible which cannot be
+attributed as a social effect to any one of them, but to all together. Each
+single manifestation of the culture industry inescapably reproduces
+human beings:as what the whole has made them. And all its agents, from
+the producer to the women's organizations, are on the alert to ensure that
+the simple-reproduction of mind does nor lead on to the expansion of
+mind.
+The complaints of art historians and cultural attorneys over the
+exhaustion of the energy which created artistic style in the West are frighteningly unfounded. The routine wanstation of exerything usafehat
+has not yet been thought, into the schema of mechanical reproducibility
+goes beyond the rigor and scope of any true style —the concept with
+which culture lovers idealize the precapitalist past as an organic era. No
+
+Enlighrenmen as Nas Perspeion
+101
+Palestrina coull have eliminated the unprepared or unresolved dissonance
+more puristically than the jazz arranger excludes any phrase which does
+not exactly fit the jargon. If he jazzes up Mozart, he changes the music not
+only where it is too difficult or serious but also where the melody is merely harmonized differently, indeed, more simply, than is usual today. No
+medieval patron of architecture can have scrutinized the subjects of church
+windows and sculptures more suspiciously than the studio hierarchies
+examine a plot by Balzac or Victor Hugo before it receives the imprimatur
+of feasibility. No cathedral chapter could have assigned the grimaces and
+torments of the damned to their proper places in the order of divine love
+more scrupulously than production managers decide the position of the
+torture of the hero or the raised hem of the leading lady's dress within the
+litany of the big film. The explicit and implicit, exoteric and esoteric caralog of what is forbidden and what is tolerated* is so extensive that it not
+only defines the area left free but wholly controls it. Even the most minor
+details are modeled according to this lexicon. Like its adversary, avantgarde art, the culture industry defines its own language positively, by -
+means of prohibitions applied to its syntax and vocabulary. The permanent compulsion to produce new effects which yet remain bound to the
+old schema, becoming additional rules, merely increases the power of the
+tradition which the individual effect seeks to escape. Every phenomenon
+is by now so thoroughly imprinted by the schema that nothing can occur
+that does not bear in advance the trace of the jargon, that is not seen at
+first glance to be approved. But the true masters, as both producers and
+reproducers, are those who speak the jargon with the same free-and-easy
+relish as if it were the language it has long since silenced. Such is the industry's ideal of naturalness. It asserts itself more imperiously the more the
+perfected technology reduces the tension berween the culture product and
+everyday existence. The paradox of routine travestied as nature is detectable in eve
+utterance of the culture industry, and in many is quite blatant. A jazz musician who has to play a piece of serious music, Beethoven's
+simplest minuet, involuntarily syncopates, and condescends to start on
+the beat only with a superior smile. Such "naturalness," complicated by
+the ever more pervasive and exorbitant claims of the specific medium, constitutes the new style, "a system of nonculture to which one might even
+concede a certain 'unity of style' if it made any sense to speak of a stylized
+barbarism.
+"1
+
+IO2
+The general influence of this stylization may already be more binding than the official rules and prohibitions; a hit song is treated more
+leniently today if it does not respect the thirty-two bars or the compass of
+the ninth than if it includes even the most elusive melodic or harmonic
+detail which falls outside the idiom. Orson Welles is forgiven all his
+offences against the usages of the craft because, as calculated rudeness,
+they confirm the validity of the system all the more zealously. The compulsion of the technically conditioned idiom which the stars and directors
+must produce as second nature, so that the nation may make it theirs,
+relates to nuances so fine as to be almost as subde as the devices used in a
+work of the avant-garde, where, unlike those of the hit song, they serve
+truth. The rare ability to conform punctiliously to the obligations of the
+idiom of naturalness in all branches of the culture industry becomes the
+measure of expertise. As in logical positivism, what is said and how it is
+said must be verifiable against everyday speech. The producers are experts.
+The idiom demands the most prodigious productive powers, which it
+absorbs and squanders. Saranically, it has rendered cultural conservatism's
+distinction berween genuine and artificial style obsolete. A style might
+possibly be called artificial if it had been imposed from outside against the
+resistance of the intrinsic tendencies of form. But in the culture industry
+the subject matter itself, down to its smallest elements, springs from the
+same apparatus as the jargon into which it is absorbed. The deals struck
+between the art specialists and the sponsor and censor over some all-toounbelievable lie tell us less about internal, aesthetic tensions than about a
+divergence of interests. The reputation of thé specialist, in which a last
+residue of actual autonomy still occasionally finds refuge, collides with the
+business policy of the church or the industrial combine producing the culture commodity. By its own nature, however, the matter has already been
+reified as negotiable even before the various agencies come into conflict.
+Even before Zanuck* acquired her, Saint Bernadette gleamed in the eye of
+her writer as an advert aimed at all the relevant consortia. To this the
+impulses of form have been reduced. As a result, the style of the culture
+industry, which has no resistant material to overcome, is at the same time
+the negation of style. The reconciliation of general and particular, of rules
+and the specific demands of the subject, through which alone style takes
+on substance, is nullified by the absence of tension berween the poles: "the
+extremes which touch" have become a murky idencity in which the gener-
+• ill can replace the particular and vice versi.
+
+I03
+Nevertheless, this caricature of style reveals something about the
+genuine style of the past. The concept of a genuine style becomes transparent in the culture industry as the aesthetic equivalent of power. The
+notion of style as a merely aesthetic regularity is a retrospective fantasy of
+Romanticism. The uniry of style not only of the Christian Middle Ages
+but of the Renaissance expresses the different structures of social coercion
+in those periods, not the obscure experience of the subjects, in which the
+universal was locked away. The great artists were never those whose works
+embodied style in its least fractured, most perfect form but those who
+adopted style as a rigor to set against the chaotic expression of suffering,
+as a negative truth. In the style of these works expression took on the
+strength without which existence is dissipated unheard. Even works which
+are called classical, like the music of Mozart, contain objective tendencies
+which resist the style they incarnate. Up to Schönberg and Picasso, great
+artists have been mistrustful of style, which at decisive points has guided
+them less than the logic of the subject matter. What the Expressionists and
+Dadaists attacked in their polemics, the untruth of style as such, triumphs
+today in the vocal jargon of the crooner, in the adept grace of the film star,
+and even in the mastery of the photographic shot of a farm laborer's hovel.
+every work of art, style is a promise. In being absorbed through style
+into the dominant form of universality, into the current musical, pictorial, or verbal idiom, what is expressed seeks to be reconciled with the idea
+of the true universal. This promise of the work of art to create truth by
+impressing its unique contours on the socially transmitted forms is as necessary as it is hypocritical. By claiming to anticipate fulfillment through
+their aesthetic derivatives, it posits the real forms of the existing order as
+absolute. To this extent the claims of art are always also ideology. Yer it is
+only in its struggle with tradition, a struggle precipitated in style, that art
+can find expression for suffering The moment in the work of art by which
+it transcends reality cannot, indeed, be severed from style; that moment,
+however, does not consist in achieved harmony, in the questionable unity
+of form and content, inner and outer, individual and society, but in those
+traits in which the discrepancy emerges, in the necessary failure of the passionate striving for identity. Instead of exposing itself to this failure, in
+which the style of the great work of art has always negated itself, the inferior work has relied on its similarity to others, the surrogate of identity.
+he cuture industry has finally posited this imitation as absolute. Being
+nothing other than style, it divulges styles secret: obedience to the social
+
+104
+hierarchy. Aesthetic barbarism today is accomplishing what has threatened
+intellectual formations since they were brought together as culture and
+neutralized. To speak about culture always went against the grain of culture. The general designation "culture" already contains, virtually, the
+process of identifying, cataloging, and classifying which imports culture
+into the realm of administration. Only what has been industrialized, rigorously subsumed, is fully adequate to this concept of culture. Only by
+subordinating all branches of intellectual production equally to the single
+purpose of imposing on the senses of human beings, from the time they
+leave the factory in the evening to the time they clock on in the morning,
+the imprint of the work rourine which they must sustain throughout the
+day, does this culture mockingly fulfill the notion of a unified culture.
+which the philosophers of the individual personality held our against mass
+culture.
+The culture industry, the most inflexible style of all, thus proves to
+be the goal of the very liberalism which is criticized for its lack of style.
+Not only did its categories and contents originate in the liberal sphere, in
+domesticated naturalism no less than in the operetta and the revue, bur
+the modern culture combines are the economic area in which a piece of
+the circulation sphere otherwise in the process of disintegration, together
+with the corresponding entrepreneurial types, still tenuously survives. In
+that area people can still make their way, provided they do not look too
+closely at their true purpose and are willing to be compliant. Anyone who
+resists can survive only by being incorporated. Once registered as diverging from the culture industry, they belong to it as the land reformer does
+to capitalism. Realistic indignation is the trademark of those with a new
+idea to sell. Public authority in the present society* allows only those complaints to be heard in which the attentive ear can discern the prominent
+figure under whose protection the rebel is suing for peace. The more
+immeasurable the gulf berween chorus and leaders, the more certainly is
+there a place among the latter for anyone who demonstrates superiority by
+well-organized dissidence. In this way liberalism's tendency to give free
+rein to its ablest members survives in the culture industry. To open that
+industry to clever people is the function of the otherwise largely regulated
+market, in which, even in its heyday, freedom was the freedom of the stupid to starve, in art as elsewhere. Not for nothing did the system of the
+
+IOS
+culture industry originate in the liberal industrial countries, just as all its
+characteristic media, especially cinema, radio, jazz, and magazines, also
+triumph there. Its progress, however, stems from the general laws of capital. Gaumont and Pathé,* Ullstein and Hugenberg* did not follow the
+international trend to their own disadvantage; Europe's economic dependence on the USA after the war and the inflation also made its contribution. The belief chat the barbarism of the culture industry is a result of
+"cultural lag." of the backwardness of American consciousness in relation
+to the state of technology, is quite illusory. Prefascist Europe was backward
+in relation to the monopoly of culture. But it was precisely to such backwardness that intellectual activity owed a remnant of auronomy, its last
+exponents their livelihood, however meager. In Germany the incomplete
+permeation of life by democratic control had a paradoxical effect. Many
+areas were still exempt from the market mechanism which had been
+unleashed in Western countries. The German educational system, including the universities, the artistically influential theatres, the great orchestras, and the museums were under patronage. The political powers, the
+state and the local authorities who inherited such institutions from absolutism, had left them a degree of independence from the power of the
+marker as the princes and feudal lords had done up to the nineteenth cencury. This stiffened the backbone of art in its late phase against the verdict
+of supply and demand, heightening its resistance far beyond its actual
+degree of protection. In che marker itself the homage paid to not yet marketable artistic quality was converted into purchasing power, so that reputable literary and musical publishers could support authors who brought
+in little more than the respect of connoisseurs. Only the dire and incessant
+threat of incorporation into commercial life as aesthetic experts finally
+brought the artists to heel. In former times they signed their letters, like
+Kant and Hume, "Your most obedient servant," while undermining the
+foundations of throne and altar. Today they call heads of government by
+their first names and are subject, in every artistic impulse, to the judgment
+of their illiterate principals. The analysis offered by de Tocqueville a hundred years ago has been fully borne out in the meantime. Under the private monopoly of culture tyranny does indeed "leave the body free and
+sets to work directly on the soul. The ruler no longer says: "Either you
+think is I do or you die.' He says: 'You are free not to think as I do; your
+life, your property—all that you shall keep. But from this day on you will
+
+106
+be a stranger among us."" Anyone who does net conform is condemned
+to an economic impotence which is prolonged in the intellectual powertessness of the eccentric loner. Disconne
+from
+he is
+zity sonvicted of inadece
+Whereas the mechanism of supply and
+demand is today disintegrating in material production, in the superstructure it acts as a control on behalf of the rulers. The consumers are the
+workers and salaried employees, the farmers and petty bourgeois.
+Capitalist production hems them in so tightly, in body and soul, that they
+unresistingly succumb to whatever is proffered to them. However, just as
+the ruled have always taken the morality dispensed to them by the rulers
+more seriously than the rulers themselves, the defrauded masses today
+cling to the myth of success still more ardently than the successful. They,
+too, have their aspirations. They insist unwaveringly on the ideology by
+which they are enslaved. The pernicious love of the common people for
+the harm done to them outstrips even the cunning of the authorities. It
+surpasses the rigor of the Hays Office,* just as, in great epochs, it has
+inspired renewed zeal in greater agencies directed against it, the terror of
+the tribunals. It calls for Mickey Rooney* rather than the tragic Garbo,
+Donald Duck rather than Betty Boop. The industry bows to the vote it
+has itself rigged. The incidental costs to the firm which cannot turn a profit from its contract with a declining star are legitimate costs for the system
+as a whole. By artfully sanctioning the demand for trash, the system inaugurates total harmony. Connoisseurship and expertise are proscribed as the
+arrogance of those who think themselves superior, whereas culture distributes its privileges democratically to all. Under the ideological truce
+berween them, the conformism of the consumers, like the shamelessness
+of the producers they sustain, can have a good conscience. Both content
+themselves with the reproduction of sameness.
+Unending sameness also governs the relationship to the past. What
+is new in the phase of mass culture compared to that of late liberalism is
+the exclusion of the new. The machine is rotating on the spot. While it
+already determines consumption, it rejects anything untried as a risk. In
+film, any manuscript which is not reassuringly based on a best-seller is
+viewed with mistrust. That is why there is incessant talk of ideas, novelty
+and surprises, of what is both totally familiar and has never existed before.
+'Tempo and dynamism are paramount. Nothing is allowed to stay as it was,
+everything must be endlessly in mótion. For only
+-universal victory
+
+I07
+the rhythm of mechanical production and reproduction promises that
+nothing will change, that nothing unsuitable will emerge»To add anything
+to the proven cultural inventory would be too speculative. The frozen genres—sketch, short story, problem film, hit song—represent the average of
+late liberal taste threateningly imposed as a norm. The most powerful of
+the culture agencies, who work harmoniously with others of their kind as
+only managers do, whether they come from the ready-to-wear trade or*
+college, have long since reorganized and rationalized the objective mind.
+It is as if some omnipresent agency* had reviewed the material and issued
+an authoritative catalog tersely listing the products available. The ideal
+forms are inscribed in the cultural heavens where they were already numbered by Plato-indeed, were only numbers, incapable of increase or
+change.
+Amusement and all the other elements of the culture industry existed long before the industry itself. Now they have been taken over from
+above and brought fully up to date. The culture industry can boast of having energetically accomplished and elevated to a principle the often inept
+transposition of art to the consumption sphere, of having stripped amusement of its obtrusive naiveties and improved the quality of its commodities. The more all-embracing the culture industry has become, the more
+pitilessly it has forced the outsider into either bankruptcy or a syndicate;
+at the same time it has become more refined and elevated, becoming finally a synthesis of Beethoven and the Casino de Paris.* Its victory is twofold:
+whar is desecoyed muthoutside its sphere can-be reproduced indefinitewithin it as lies.
+"Light" art as such, entertainment, is not'a form of
+decadence. Those who deplore it as a betrayal of the ideal of pure expression harbor illusions about society.* The purity of bourgeois art, hypostatized as a realm of freedom contrasting to material praxis, was bought
+from the outset with the exclusion of the lower class; and art keeps faith
+with the cause of that class, the true universal, precisely by freeing itself
+from the purposes of the false. Serious art has denied itself to those for
+whom the hardship and oppression of life make a mockery of seriousness
+and who must be glad to use the time nor spent at the production line in
+being simply carried along. Light art has accompanied autonomous art as
+its shadow. It is the social bad conscience of serious art. The truth which
+the latter could not apprehend because of its social premises gives the former an appearance of objective justification. The split berween them is
+
+108
+itself the truth: it expresses at least the negativity of the culture which is
+the sum of both spheres. The antithesis can be reconciled least of all
+absorbing light art into serious or vice versa» That, however, is what the
+culture industry attempts. The eccentricity of the circus, the peep show, or
+the brothel in relation to society is as embarrassing to it as that of Schön-
+berg and Karl Kraus. The leading jazz musician Benny Goodman therefore has to appear with the Budapest String Quartet, more pedantic rhythmically chan any amateur clarinetist, while the quartet play with the saccharine monotony of Guy Lombardo.* What is significant is not crude
+ignorance, stupidity or lack of polish. The culture industry has abolished
+the rubbish of former times by imposing its own perfection, by prohibiting and domesticating dilettantism, while itself incessantly committing
+the blunders without which the elevated style cannot be conceived. What
+is new, however, is that the irreconcilable elements of culture, art, and
+amusement have been subjected equally to the concept of purpose and
+thus brought under a single false denominator: the totality of the culture
+industry. Its element is repetition. The fact that its characteristic innovations are in all cases mere improvements to mass production is not extraneous to the system. With good reason the interest of countless consumers
+is focused on the technology, not on the rigidly repeated, threadbare and
+half-abandoned content. The social power revered by the spectators manifests itself more effectively in the technically enforced ubiquity of stereotypes than in the stale ideologies which the ephemeral contents have to
+endorse.
+Nevertheless, the culture industry remains the entertainmen busiaeSS
+Ters
+mediated
+and its hold
+will not be broken by outright dictate but by the hostiliry inherent in the
+principle of entertainment to anything which is more than itself.
+encies
+are turned into the flesh and blood of
+the public by the social process as a whole, those tendencies are reinforced
+by the survival of the market in the indestry. Demand has not yet been
+replaced by simple obedience. The major reorganization of the film industry shortly before the First World War, the material precondition for its
+expansion, was a deliberate adaptation to needs of the public registered at
+the ricket office, which were hardly thought worthy of consideration in the
+pioneering days of the screen. That view is still held by the captains of the
+film industry, who accepr only more or less phenomenal box-office success
+
+109
+as evidence and prudently ignore the counterevidence, truth. Their ideolss. In this they are right to the extent that the
+weed and not in simple
+antithesis to it—or even in the antithesis between omnipotence and powerlessness. Entertainment is the prolongation of work under late capitalism. It is sought by those who want to escape the mechanized labor process so that they can cope with it again. At the same time, however, mechanization
+has such
+проу
+over leisure and its happiness
+mines
+horoughly the fabrease
+É entertainment commoditie
+that the offduty worker can experience nothing but after-images of the work process
+itself. The ostensible content is merely a faded foreground; what is imprinted is the automated sequence of standardized tasks. The only escapefrom the made process in faceory and office is through adaptation to it in
+leisure time. This is the incurable sickness of all entertainment. Amusement congeals into boredom, since, to be amusement, it must cost no
+effort and therefore moves strictly along the well-worn grooves of associat
+tion. The spectator must need no thoughts of his own: the product prescribes each reaction, not through any actual coherence—which collapses
+once exposed to thought-bur through signals. Any logical connection
+presupposing mental capacity is scrupulously avoided. Developments are
+to emerge from the directly preceding situation, not from the idea of the
+whole. There is no plot which could withstand the screenwriters' eagerness
+to extract the maximum effect from the individual scene. Finally, even the
+schematic formula seems dangerous, since it provides some coherence of
+meaning, however meager, when only meaninglessness is acceptable.
+Often the plot is willfully denied the development called for by characters
+and theme under the old schema. Instead, the next step is determined by
+what the writers take to be their most effective idea. Obtusely ingenious
+surprises disrupt the plot. The product's tendency to fall back perniciously on the pure nonsense which, as buffoonery and clowning, was a legitimate part of popular art up to Chaplin and the Marx brothers, emerges
+most strikingly in the less sophisticated genres. Whereas the films of Greer
+Garson and Bette Davis can still derive some claim to a coherent plot from
+the unity of the socio-psychological case represented, the tendency to subvert meaning has taken over completely in the text of novelty songs,* suspense films, and cartoons. The idea itself, like objects in comic and horror
+films, is massacred and mutilated. Novelty songs have always lived on con-
+
+IIO
+tempt for meaning, which, as both ancestors and descendants of psychoanalysis, they reduce to the monotony of sexual symbolism. In crime and
+adventure films the spectators are begrudged even the opportunity to witness the resolution. Even in nonironic examples of the genre they must
+make do with the mere horror of situations connected in only the most
+perfunctory way.
+Cartoon and stunt films were once exponents of fantasy against
+rationalism. They allowed justice to be done to the animals and things
+electrified by their technology, by granting the mutilated beings a second
+life. Today they merely confirm the victory of technological reason over
+truth. A few years ago they had solid plots which were resolved only in the
+whirl of pursuit of the final minutes. In this their procedure resembled
+that of slapstick comedy. But now the temporal relations have shifted. The
+opening sequences state a plot motif so that destruction can work on it
+throughout the action: with the audience in gleeful pursuit the protagonist is tossed about like a scrap of litter. The quantity of organized amusement is converted into the quality of organized cruelty.* The self-elected
+censors of the film industry, its accomplices, monitor the duration of the*
+atrocity prolonged into a hunt. The jollity dispels the joy supposedly conferred by the sight of an embrace and postpones satisfaction until the day
+of the pogrom. To the extent that cartoons do more than accustom the
+senses to the new tempo, they hammer into every brain the old lesson that
+continuous attrition, the breaking of all individual resistance, is the condition of life in this sociery. Donald Duck in the cartoons and the unfortunate victim in real life receive their beatings so that the spectators can
+accustom themselves to theirs.
+The enjoyment of the violence done to the film character turns into
+violence against the spectator, distraction becomes exertion. No stimulant
+concocted by the experts may escape the weary eye; in face of the slick presentation no one may appear stupid even for a moment; everyone has to
+keep up, emulating the smartness displayed and propagated by the production. This makes it doubtful whether the culture industry even still fulfils its self-proclaimed function of distraction. If the majority of radio stations and cinemas were shut down, consumers probably would not feel too
+much deprived. In stepping from the street into the cinema, they no
+longer enter the world of dream in any case, and once the use of these
+institutions was no longer made obligatory by their mere existence, the
+
+III
+urge to use them might not be so overwhelming.* Shutting them down in
+this way would not be reactionary machine-wrecking. Those who suffered
+would not be the film enthusiasts but those who always pay the penalty in
+any case, the ones who had lagged behind. For the housewife, despite the
+films which are supposed to integrate her still further, the dark of the cinema grants a refuge in which she can spend a few unsupervised hours, just
+as once, when there were still dwellings and evening repose, she could sit
+gazing out of the window. The unemployed of the great centers find freshness in summer and warmth in winter in these places of regulated temperature. Apart from that, and even by the measure of the existing order,
+the bloated entertainment apparatus does not make life more worthy of
+human beings. The idea of "exploiting" the given technical possibilities,*
+of fully utilizing the capacities for aesthetic mass consumption, is part of
+an economic system which refuses to utilize capacities when it is a question of abolishing hunger.
+he culture
+ustry endlessly cheats its consumers out of what it
+endlesslypromises. The promissory note of pleasure issued by plot and
+packaging is indefinitely prolonged: the promise, which actually comprises the entire show, disdainfully intimates that there is nothing more to
+come, that the diner must be satisfied with reading the menu. The desire
+inflamed by the glossy names and images is served up finally with a celebration of the daily round it sought to escape. Of course, genuine works
+of art were not sexual exhibitions either. But by presenting denial as negative, they reversed, as it were, the debasement of the drive and rescued by
+mediation what had been denied. That is the secret of aesthetic sublimation: to present fulfillment in its brokenness. The culture industry* does
+not sublimate: it suppresses. By constantly exhibiting the object of desire,
+the breasts beneath the sweater, the naked torso of the sporting hero, it
+merely goads the unsublimated anticipation of pleasure, which through
+the habit of denial has long since been mutilated as masochism. There is
+no erotic situation in which innuendo and incitement are not accompanied by the clear notification that things will never go so far. The Hays
+Office* merely confirms the ritual which the culture industry has staged
+in any case: that of Tantalus. Works of art are ascetic and shameless; the
+culture industry is pornographic and prudish. It reduces love to romance.
+And, once reduced, much is permitted, even libertinage as a marketable
+specialty, purveyed by quota with the trade description "daring." The mass
+
+II2
+production of sexuality automatically brings about its repression. Because
+of his ubiquity, the film star with whom one is supposed to fall in love is,
+from the start, a copy of himself. Every tenor now sounds like a Caruso
+record, and the natural faces of Texas girls already resemble those of the
+established models by which they would be typecast in Hollywood. The•
+mechanical reproduction of beauty-which, admittedly, is made onlymore inescapable by the reactionary culture zealots with their methodical
+¡dolization of individuality—no longer leaves any room for the unconscious idolatry with which the experience of beauty has always been
+tinked. The triumph over beauty is completed by humor, the malicious
+pleasure elicited by any successful deprivation. There is laughter because
+there is nothing to laugh about. Laughter, whether reconciled or terrible,
+always accompanies the moment when a fear is ended." It indicates a
+release, whether from physical danger or from the grip of logic. Reconciled
+laughter resounds with the echo of escape from power; wrong laughter
+copes with fear by defecting to the agencies which inspire it, It echoes the
+inescapability of powerd un is a medicinal bath which the entertainment
+industry never ceases to prescribe. It makes laughter the instrument for
+cheating happiness. To moments of happiness laughter is foreign; only
+operettas, and now films, present sex amid peals of merriment. But
+Baudelaire is as humorless as Hölderlin. In wrong society laughter is a
+sickness infecting happiness and drawing it into society's worthless totality. baughter
+nething is a
+yays
+aghter at it, and the vital force
+which, according to Bergson, bursts through rigidity in laughter is, in
+truth, the irruption of barbarity, the self-assertion which, in convivial sertings, dares to celebrate its liberation from scruple. The collective of those
+who laugh parodies humanity. They are monads, each abandoning himself to the pleasure—at the expense of all others and with the majority in
+support—of being ready to shrink from nothing. Their harmony presents
+a caricature of solidarity. What is infernal about wrong laughter is that it
+compellingly parodies what is best, reconciliation. Joy, however, is austere:
+res severa verum gaudium.* The ideology of monasteries, that it is not
+asceticism but the sexual act which marks the renunciation of attainable
+bliss,, is negatively confirmed by the gravity of the lover who presciently
+pins his whole life to the fleeting moment. The culture industry replaces
+pain, which is present in ecstasy no less than in asceticism, with jovial
+denial. Its supreme law is that its consumers shall at no price be given what
+
+II3
+they desire: and in that very deprivation they must take their laughing satisfaction. In each performance of the culture industry the permanent
+denial imposed by civilization is once more inflicted on and unmistakably
+demonstrated to its victims. To offer them something and to withhold it
+is one and the same. That is what the erotic commotion achieves. Just
+because it can never take place, everything revolves around the coitus. In
+film, to allow an illicit relationship withour due punishment of the culprits
+is even more strictly tabooed than it is for the future son-in-law of a millionaire to be active in the workers' movement. Unlike that of the liberal
+era, industrial no less than nationalist culture can permit itself to inveigh
+against capitalism, but not to renounce the threat of castration. This threat
+constitutes its essence.* It outlasts the organized relaxation of morals toward the wearers of uniforms, first in the jaunty films produced for them
+and then in reality. What is decisive today is no longer Puritanism, though
+it still asserts itself in the form of women's organizations, but che necessity, inherent in the system,* of never releasing its grip on the consumer, of
+not for a moment allowing him or her to suspect that resistance is possible. This principle requires that while all needs should be presented to
+individuals as capable of fulfillment by the culture industry, they should
+be so set up in advance that individuals experience themselves through
+their needs only as eternal consumers, as the culture industry's object. Not
+only does it persuade them that its fraud is satisfaction; it also gives them
+to understand that they must make do with what is offered, whatever it
+may be. The flight from the everyday world, promised by the culture
+industry in all its branches, is much like the abduction of the daughter in
+the American cartoon: the father is holding the ladder in the dark. The
+culture industry presents that same everyday world as paradise. Escape,
+like elopement, is destined from the first to lead back to its starting point.
+Entertainment fosters the resignation which seeks to forget itself in entertainment.
+Amusement, free of all restraint, would be not only the opposite of
+art but its complementary extreme. Absurdity in the manner of Mark
+Twain, with which the American culture industry flirts from time to time,
+could be a corrective to art. The more scriously art takes its opposition to
+existence, the more it resembles the scriousness of existence, its antithesis:
+the more it labors to develop strictly according to its own formal laws, the
+more labor it requires to be understood, whereas its goal had been pre-
+
+II4
+cisely to negate the burden of labor. In some revue films, and especially in
+grotesque stories and "funnies,'* the possibility of this negation is
+momentarily glimpsed. Its realization, of course, cannot be allowed. Pure
+amusement indulged to the full, relaxed abandon to colorful associations
+and merry nonsense, is cut short by amusement in its marketable form: it
+is disrupted by the surrogate of a coherent meaning with which the culture industry insists on endowing its products while at the same time slyly
+misusing them as pretexts for bringing on the stars. Biographies and other
+fables stitch together the scraps of nonsense into a feeble-minded plor. It
+is not the bells on the fool's cap that jingle but the bunch of keys of capicalist reason, which even in its images harnesses joy to the purpose of getting ahead. Every kiss in the revue film must contribute to the career of
+the boxer or hit-song expert whose success is being glorified. The deception is not that the culture industry serves up amusement but that it spoils
+the fun by its business-minded attachment to the ideological clichés of the
+culture which is liquidating itself. Ethics and taste suppress unbridled
+:musement as "naive"— naivety being rated no more highly than intellectualism—and even restrict its technical possibilities. The culture industry
+is corrupt, not as a sink of iniquity but as the cathedral of higher gratification. At all its levels, from Hemingway to Emil Ludwig,* from Mrs.
+Miniver* to the Lone Ranger,* from Toscanini to Guy Lombardo,* intellectual products drawn ready-made from art and science are infected with
+untruth. Traces of something better persist in those features of the culture
+industry by which it resembles the circus-in the stubbornly purposeless
+expertise of riders, acrobats, and clowns, in the "defense and justification
+of physical as against intellectual art." But the hiding places of mindless
+artistry, which represents what is human against the social mechanism, are
+heing relentlessly ferreted out by organizational reason, which forces
+everyrhing to justify itself in terms of meaning and effect. It is causing
+meaninglessness to disappear at the lowest level of art just as radically as
+meaning is disappearing at the highest.
+The fusion of culture and entertainment is brought about today not
+only by the debasement of culture but equally by the compulsory intelleccalization
+amusement. This is already evident in the fact that amusement is now experienced only in facsimile, in the form of cinema photography or the radio recording. In the age of liberal expansion amusement
+wins sustained by an unbroken belief in the future: things would stay the
+
+TIS
+same yet get better. Today, that belief has itself been intellectualized,
+becoming so refined as to lose sight of all actual goals and to consist only
+in a golden shimmer projected beyond the real. It is composed of the extra
+touches of meaning—running exactly parallel to life itself—applied in the
+screen world to the good guy, the engineer, the decent girl, and also to the
+ruthlessness disguised as character, to the sporting interest, and finally to
+the cars and cigarettes, even where the entertainment does not directly
+serve the publicity needs of the manufacturer concerned but advertises the
+system as a whole. Amusement in
+self becomes an ideal, taking the place of
+the higher values it eradicates from the masses by repeating them in an
+even more stereotyped form than the advertising slogans paid for by
+private interests. Inwardness, the subjectively restricted form of truth, was
+always more beholden to the ourward rulers than it imagined. The culture
+industry is perverting it into a barefaced lie. It appears now only as the
+high-minded prade tolerated by consumers of religious bestsellers, psychological films, and women's serials* as an embarrassingly agreeable ingredient, so that they can more reliably control their own human emotions. In this sense entertainment is purging the affects in the manner once
+attributed by Aristotle to tragedy and now by Mortimer Adler* to film.
+The culture industry reveals the truth not only about style but also about
+atharsis
+The more strongly the culture industry entrenches itself, the more it
+can do as it chooses with the needs of consumers—producing, controlling, disciplining them; even withdrawing amusement altogether: here, no
+limits are set to cultural progress. But the tendency is immanent in the
+principle of entertainment itself, as a principle of bourgeois enlighrenment. If the need for entertainment was largely created by industry, which
+recommended the work to the masses through its subject matter, the oleograph through the delicate morsel it portrayed and, conversely, the pudding mix through the image of a pudding, entertainment has always borne
+the trace of commercial brashness, of sales talk, the voice of the fairground
+huckster. But the original affinity between business and entertainment
+reveals itself in the meaning of entertainment itself: as society's apologia.
+To be entertained means to be in agreement. Entertainment makes itself
+possible only by insulating itself from the totality of the social process,
+making itself stupid and perversely renouncing from the first the in-
+
+ІІб
+escapable claim of any work, even the most trivial: in its restrictedness to
+reflect the whole. Amusement always means putting things out of mind,
+forgetting suffering, even when it is on display. At its root is powerlessness.
+It is indeed escape, but not, as it claims, escape from bad reality but from
+the last thought of resisting that reality. The liberation which amusement
+promises is from thinking as negation. The shamelessness of the rhetorical question "What do people want?" lies in the fact that it appeals to the
+very people as thinking subjects whose subjectivity it specifically seeks to
+annul. Even on those occasions when the public rebels against the pleasure
+industry it displays the feebleness systematically instilled in it by chat
+industry. Nevertheless, it has become increasingly difficult to keep the
+public in submission. The advance of stupidity must not lag behind the
+simultaneous advance of intelligence. In the age of statistics the masses are
+too astute to identify with the millionaire on the screen and too obtuse to
+deviate even minutely from the law of large numbers. Ideology hides itself
+in probability calculations. Fortune will not smile on all—just on the one
+who draws the winning ticket or, rather, the one designated to do so by a
+higher power—usually the entertainment industry itself, which presents
+itself as ceaselessly in search of talent. Those discovered by the talent
+scouts and then built up by the studios are ideal types of the new, dependent middle classes. The female starlet is supposed to symbolize the secretary, though in a way which makes her seem predestined, unlike the real
+secretary, to wear the flowing evening gown. Thus she apprises the female
+spectator not only of the possibility that she, too, might appear on the
+screen but still more insistently of the distance berween them. Only one
+can draw the winning lot, only one is prominent, and even though all have
+mathematically che same chance, it is so minimal for each individual that
+it is best to write it off at once and rejoice in the good fortune of someone
+else, who might just as well be oneself but never is. Where the culture
+industry still invites naïve identification, it immediately denies it. It is no
+longer possible to lose oneself in others. Once, film spectators saw their
+own wedding in that of others. Now the happy couple on the screen are
+specimens of the same species as everyone in the audience, but the sameness posits the insuperable separation of its human elements. The perfected similarity is the absolute difference. The identity of the species prohibits that of the individual cases. The culture industry" has sardonically
+realized man's species being. Everyone amounts only to those qualities by
+
+II7
+which he or she can replace everyone else: all are fungible, mere specimens.
+As individuals they are absolutely replaceable, pure nothingness, and are
+made aware of this as soon as time deprives them of their sameness. This
+changes the inner composition of the religion of success, which they are
+sternly required to uphold. The path per aspera ad astra, which presupposes need and effort, is increasingly replaced by the prize. The element of
+blindness in the routine decision as to which song is to be a hit, which
+extra a heroine, is celebrated by ideology. Films emphasize chance. By imposing an essential sameness on their characters, with the exception of the
+villain, to the point of excluding any faces which do not conform-for
+example, those which, like Garbo's, do not look as if they would welcome
+the greeting "Hello, sister" —the ideology does, it is true, make life initially easier for the spectators. They are assured that they do not need to
+be in any way other than they are and that they can succeed just as well
+withour having to perform tasks of which they know themselves incapable. But at the same time they are given the hint that effort would not
+help them in any case, because even bourgeois success no longer has any
+connection to the calculable effect of their own work. They take the hint.
+Fundamentally, everyone recognizes chance, by which someone is sometimes lucky, as the other side of planning.* Just because society's energies
+have developed so far on the side of rationality that anyone might become
+an engineer or a manager, the choice of who is to receive from society the
+investment and confidence to be trained for such functions becomes
+entirely irrational. Chance and planning become identical since, given the
+sameness of people, the fortune or misfortune of the individual, right up
+to the top, loses all economic importance. Chance itself is planned; not in
+the sense that it will affect this or that particular individual but in that
+people believe in its control. For the planners it serves as an alibi, giving
+the impression that the web of transactions and measures into which life
+has been transformed* still leaves room for spontaneous, immediate relationships between human beings. Such freedom is symbolized in the various media of the culture industry by the arbitrary selection of average
+cases. In the detailed reports on the modestly luxurious pleasure trip organized by the magazine for the lucky competition winner—preferably a
+shorthand typist who probably won through contacts with local powersrhat-be—the powerlessness of everyone is reflected. So much are the
+masses mere material that those in control* can raise one of them up to
+
+118
+their heaven and cast him or her out again: let them go hang with their
+justice and their labor. Industry* is interested in human beings only as its
+customers and employees and has in fact reduced humanity as a whole,
+like each of its elements, to this exhaustive formula. Depending on which
+aspect happens to be paramount at the time, ideology stresses plan or
+chance, technology or life, civilization or nature. As employees people are
+reminded of the rational organization and must fit into it as common
+sense requires. As customers they are regaled, whether on the screen or in
+the press, with human interest stories demonstrating freedom of choice
+and the charm of not belonging to the system. In both cases they remain
+objects.
+The less the culture industry has to promise and the less it can offer
+a meaningful explanation of life, the emptier the ideology it disseminates
+necessarily becomes. Even the abstract ideals of the harmony and benevolence of society are too concrete in the age of the universal advertisement.
+Abstractions in particular are identified as publicity devices. Language
+which appeals to mere truth only arouses impatience to get down to the
+real business behind it. Words which are not a means seem meaningless,
+the others seem to be fiction, untruth. Value judgments are perceived
+either as advertisements or as mere chatter. The noncommittal vagueness
+of the resulting ideology does not make it more transparent, or weaker. Its
+very vagueness, the quasiscientific reluctance to be pinned down to anything which cannot be verified, functions as an instrument of control.
+Ideology becomes the emphatic and systematic proclamation of what is.
+Through its inherent tendency to adopt the tone of the factual report, the
+culture industry makes itself the irrefutable prophet of the existing order.
+With consummate skill it maneuvers between the crags of demonstrable
+misinformation and obvious truth by faithfully duplicating appearances,
+the density of which blocks insight. Thus the omnipresent and impenetrable world of appearances is set up as the ideal. Ideology is split between
+the photographing of brute existence and the blatant lie about its meaning, it lie which is not articulated directly but drummed in by suggestion.
+The mere cynical reiteration of the real is enough to demonstrate its divinity. Such, photological proof* may not be stringent, bur it is overwhelming. Anyone who continues to doubt in face of the power of monotony is
+a fool. The culture industry sweeps aside objections to itself along with
+those to the world it ne trally duplicates. One has only the choice of con-
+
+1I9
+forming or being consigned to the backwoods: the provincials who oppose
+cinema and radio by falling back on eternal beaury and amateur theatricals have already reached the political stance toward which the members
+of mass culture are still being driven. This culture is hardened enough
+either to poke fun at the old wishful dreams, the paternal ideal no less than
+unconditional feeling, or to invoke them as ideology, as the occasion
+demands. The new ideology has the world as such as its subject. It exploits
+the cult of fact by describing bad existence with utmost exactitude in order
+to elevate it into the realm of facts. Through such elevation existence itself
+becomes a surrogate of meaning and justice. Beat
+isswhate
+the camparadaces. The disappointed hope that one might oneself be the
+employee who won the world trip is matched by the disappointing appearance of the exactly photographed regions through which the journey
+might have led. What is offered is not Italy but evidence that it exists. The
+film can permit itself to show the Paris in which the young American
+woman hopes to still her longing as a desolately barren place, in order to
+drive her all the more implacably into the arms of the smart American boy
+she might equally well have met at home. That life goes on at all, that the
+system, even in its most recent phase, reproduces the lives of those who
+constitute it instead of doing away with them straight away, is even credited to the system as its meaning and value. The ability to keep going at
+all becomes the justification for the blind continuation of the system,
+indeed, for its immutability. What is repeated is healthy-the cycle in
+nature as in industry. The same babies-grin endlessly from magazines, and
+endlessly the jazz machine pounds. Despite all the progress in' the techniques of representation, all the rules and specialties, all the gesticulating
+bustle, the bread on which the culture industry feeds humanity, remains
+the stone of stereotype. It lives on the cyclical, on the admittedly wellfounded amazement that, in spite of everything, mothers still give birth to
+children, that the wheels have not yet come completely to a halt. All this
+consolidates the immutability of the existing circumstances. The swaying
+cornfields at the end of Chaplin's film on Hitler give the lie to the antifascist speech about freedom. They resemble the blond tresses of the
+German maidens whose outdoor life in the summer wind is photographed
+by Ufa. Nature, in being presented by society's control mechanism as the
+healing antithesis of sociery, is itself absorbed into that incurable society
+and sold off. The solemn pictorial affirmation that the trees are green, the
+
+I2O
+sky is blue, and the clouds are sailing overhead already makes them cryptograms for factory chimneys and gasoline stations. Conversely, wheels
+and machine parts are made to gleam expressively, debased as receptacles
+of that leafy, cloudy soul. In this way both nature and technology are
+mobilized against the alleged stuffiness, the faked recollection of liberal
+society as a world in which people idled lasciviously in plush-lined rooms
+instead of taking wholesome open-air baths as they do today, or suffered
+breakdowns in antediluvian Benz models instead of traveling at rocket
+speed from where they are in any case to where it is no different. The triumph of the giant corporation* over entrepreneurial initiative is celebrated by the culture industry as the perpetuity of entrepreneurial initiative.
+The fight is waged against an enemy who has already been defeated, the
+thinking subject.* The resurrection of Hans Sonnenstößer,* the enemy of
+bourgeois philistines, in Germany, and the smug coziness of Life with
+Father* have one and the same meaning.
+On one matter, however, this hollow ideology is utterly serious:
+everyone is provided for. "No one must be hungry or cold. Anyone failing
+to comply goes to a concentration camp." The joke from Hitler's Germany
+might well shine out as a maxim above all the portals of the culture industry. With naïve shrewdness it anticipates the situation characteristic of the
+latest society:* that it knows how to identify its true supporters. Formal
+freedom is guaranteed for everyone. No one has to answer officially* for
+what he or she thinks. However, all find themselves enclosed from early
+on within a system of churches, clubs, professional associations, and other
+relationships which amount to the most sensitive instrument of social control. Anyone who wants to avoid ruin must take care not to weigh too little in the scales of this apparatus. Otherwise he will fall behind in life and
+finally go under. The fact that in every career, and especially in the liberal
+professions, specialist knowledge as a rule goes hand in hand with a prescribed set of attitudes easily gives the misleading impression that expert
+knowledge is all that counts. In reality, it is a feature of the irrationally sysrematic nature of this society that it reproduces, passably, only the lives of
+its loyal members. The gradations in the standard of living correspond
+very precisely to the degree by which classes and individuals inwardly
+adhere to the system. Managers can be relied on; even the minor employce Dagwood," who lives in reality no less than in the comic strip, is reli-
+
+I2I
+able. Bur anyone who goes hungry and suffers from cold, especially if he
+once had good prospects, is a marked man. He is an outsider, and—with
+the occasional exception of the capital crime—to be an outsider is the
+gravest guilt. In films such a person is, at best, an eccentric, an object of
+maliciously indulgent humor; but mostly he is a villain and is identified as
+such on his very first appearance, long before the action requires it, to forestall even the momentary misapprehension that society turns against those
+of good will. In fact, a kind of welfare state on a higher level is being established* today. To assert their positions people keep in motion an economy
+in which the extreme development of technology has made the masses in
+principle superfluous as producers in their own country. According to the
+ideologiea illusion, the workers, the tue providers, are fed by the leaders
+of industry
+whom the
+feed.
+Thus the position of the individual becomes
+precarious. Under liberalism the poor were regarded as lazy; today they are
+automatically suspect. Anyone who is not provided for outside the concentration camp belongs inside it, or at any rate in the hell of the most
+demeaning labor and the slums. The culture industry, however, reflects
+society's positive and negative provision* for those it administers as direct
+human solidarity in the world of honest folk. No one is forgotten, everywhere are neighbors, social welfare officers, Dr Gillespies, and armchair
+philosophers with their hearts in the right place who, with their kindly
+man-to-man interventions, turn the socially perpetuated wretchedness
+into remediable individual cases, unless even that is ruled out by the personal depravity of those concerned. The managed provision of friendly
+care, administered by every factory as a means of increasing production,
+brings the last private impulse under social control; by being given the
+appearance of immediacy, the relationships of people within production
+are returned to the private sphere. Such "winter aid"* casts its conciliatory shadow over the films and broadcasts of the culture industry long before
+such care is transferred in totalitarian style from the factory to society
+itself. The great helpers and benefactors of humanity, whose scholarly and
+scientific achievements have to be embellished by scriptwriters as simple
+acts of compassion to wring from them a fictitious human interest, function as stand-ins for the leaders of nations, who ultimately decree the abolition of compassion and succeed in preventing all infections by exterminating the last of the sick.
+The emphasis on the heart of gold is society's way of admitting the
+
+122
+suffering it creates: everyone knows that they are helpless within the system, and ideology must take account of this. Far from merely concealing
+the suffering under the cloak of improvised comradeship, the culture
+industry stakes its company pride on looking it manfully in the eye and
+acknowledging it with unflinching composure. This posture of steadfast
+endurance justifies the world which that posture makes necessary. Such is
+the world—so hard, yet therefore so wonderful, so healthy. The lie does
+not shrink back even from tragedy. Just as toralitarian society does not
+abolish the suffering of its members, but registers and plans it, mass culcure does the same with tragedy. Hence the persistent borrowings from art.
+Art supplies the tragic substance which pure entertainment cannot provide
+on its own yet which it needs if it is to adhere to its principle of meticulously duplicating appearance. Tragedy, included in sociery's calculations
+and affirmed as a moment of the world, becomes a blessing. It deflects the
+charge that truth is glossed over, whereas in fact it is appropriated with
+cynical regret. It imparts an element of interest to the insipidity of censored happiness and makes that interest manageable. To the consumer
+who has seen culturally better days it offers the surrogate of long-abolished
+depth, and to regular moviegoers the veneer of culture they need for purposes of prestige. To all it grants the solace that human fate in its strength
+and authenticity is possible even now* and its unflinching depiction inescapable. The unbroken surface of existence, in the duplication of which
+ideology consists solely today, appears all the more splendid, glorious, and
+imposing the more it is imbued with necessary suffering. It takes on the
+aspect of fate. Tragedy is leveled down to the threat to destroy anyone who
+does not conform, whereas its paradoxical meaning once lay in hopeless
+resistance to mythical threat. Tragic fate becomes the just punishment into
+which bourgeois aesthetics has always longed to transform it. The moralily of mass culture has come down to it from yesterday's children's books.
+In the first-class production the villain is dressed up as the hysteric who,
+in a study of ostensibly clinical exactitude, seeks to trick her more realistic
+rival our of her life's happiness and who herself suffers a quite uncheatrical
+death. To be sure, only at the top are things managed as scientifically as
+this. Further down, the resources are scarcer. There tragedy has its teeth
+drawn without social psychology. Just as any honest Hungarian-Viennese
+operetta must have its tragic finale in the second act, leaving nothing for
+the third but the righting of misunderstandings,
+gives
+
+I23
+tragedy perranent emplovenearetrime. The obvious existence of a formula is enough in itself to allay the concern that tragedy might still be
+untamed. The housewife's description of the recipe for drama as "getting
+into trouble and out again" encompasses the whole of mass culture from
+the weak-minded women's serial* to its highest productions. Even the
+worst outcome, which once had better intentions, still confirms the established order and corrupts tragedy, whether because the irregular lover pays
+for her brief happiness with death or because the sad end in the picture
+makes the indestructibility of actual life shine all the more brightly. Tragic
+cinema is becoming truly a house of moral correction. The masses, demoralized by existence under the pressure of the system* and manifesting civilization only as compulsively rehearsed behavior in which rage and rebelliousness everywhere show through, are to be kept in order by the spectacle of implacable life and the exemplary conduct of those it crushes.
+Culture has always contributed to the subduing of revolutionary as well as
+of barbaric instincts. Industrial culture does something more. It inculcates
+the condirions on which implacable life is allowed to be lived at all.
+Individuals must use their general satiety as a motive for abandoning
+themselves to the collective power of which they are sated. The permanently hopeless situations which grind down filmgoers in daily life are
+transformed by their reproduction, in some unknown way, into a promise
+that they may continue to exist. One needs only to become aware of one's
+nullity, to subscribe to one's own defeat, and one is already a party to it.
+Society is made up of the desperate and thus falls prey to rackets. In a few
+of the most significant German novels of the prefascistic era, such as Berlin
+Alexanderplarz and Kleiner Mann, was nun?, this tendency was as vividly
+evident as in the mediocre film and in che procedures of jazz. Fundamentally, they all present the self-mockery of man. The possibility of
+becoming an economic subject, an entrepreneur, a proprietor, is entirely
+liquidated. Right down to the small grocery, the independent firm on the
+running and inheriting of which the bourgeois family and the position of
+its head were founded, has fallen into hopeless dependence. All have
+become employees, and in the civilization of employees che dienic ofthe
+father, dubious in any case, ceases to be. The behavior of the individual
+toward the racker, whether commercial, professional, or political, both
+before and after admittance to it; the gestures of the leader before the
+masses, of the lover before the woman he woos, are taking on peculiarly
+
+124
+masochistic traits. The attitude all are forced to adopt in order to demonstrate ever again their moral fitness for this society is reminiscent of that
+of boys during admission to a tribe; circling under the blows of the priest,
+they wear stereotypical smiles. Existence in late capitalism is a permanent
+rite of initiation. Everyone must show that they identify wholeheartedly
+with the power which beats them. This is inherent in the principle of syncopation in jazz, which mocks the act of stumbling while elevating it to
+the norm. The eunuch-like voice of the radio crooner, the handsome suitor of the heiress, who falls into the swimming pool wearing his ruxedo, are
+models for those who want to make themselves into that to which the system* breaks them. Everyone can be like the omnipotent society, everyone
+can be happy if only they hand themselves over to it body and soul and
+relinquish their claim to happiness. In their weakness society recognizes its
+own strength and passes some of it back to them. Their lack of resistance
+certifies them as reliable customers. Thus is tragedy abolished. Once, the
+antithesis between individual and society made up its substance. Tragedy
+glorified "courage and freedom of feeling in face of a mighty foe, sublime
+adversity, a problem which awakened dread." Today tragedy has been disthe void of the false identity of society and subject, the horror
+fleetingly visible in the vacuous semblance of r
+But the miracle of integration, the permanent benevolence of those in
+command,* who admit the unresisting subject while he chokes down his
+unruliness—all this signifies fascism. Fascism lurks in the humaneness
+with which Döblin allows his protagonist Biberkopf to find refuge, no less
+than in films with a social slant. The ability to slip through, to survive
+one's own ruin, which has superseded tragedy, is ingrained in the new gencration; its members are capable of any work, since the work, process
+allows them to become attached to none. One is reminded of the sad pliability of the soldier returning home, unaffected by the war, of the casual
+laborer who finally joins the clandestine groups and the paramilitary organizations. The liquidation of tragedy confirms the abolition of the individual.
+It is not only the standardized mode of production-of-the-culture
+industry which makes the individual illusory in its products. Individuals
+are tolerated only as far as their wholehearted identity with the universal
+is beyond question. From the standardized improvisation in jazz to the
+
+125
+original film personality who must have a lock of hair straying over her
+eyes so that she can be recognized as such, pseudoindividuality reigns. The
+individual trait is reduced to che ability of the universal so completely to
+mold the accidental that it can be recognized as accidental. The sulky taciturnity or the elegant walk of the individual who happens to be on show
+is serially produced like the Yale locks which differ by fractions of a millimeter. The peculiarity of the self is a socially conditioned monopoly
+commodity misrepresented as natural. It is reduced to the moustache, the
+French accens, the deep voice of the prostitute, the "Lubitsch touch"— like
+a fingerprint on the otherwise uniform identity cards to which the lives
+and faces of all individuals, from the film star co the convict, have been
+reduced by the power of the universal. Pseudoindividuality is a precondicion for apprehending and detoxifying tragedy: only because individuals
+are none buc, mere intersections of universal tendencies is it possible to
+reabsorb them smoothly into the universal. Mass culture thereby reveals.
+che fictitious quality which has characterized the individual throughout
+the bourgeois era and is wrong only in priding itself on this murky harmony between universal and particular. The principle of individuality was.
+contradictory from the ourser. Firss...no individuation was ever really
+achieved. The class-determined form of self-preservation. maintained
+everyone at the level of mere species being. Every bourgeois* character
+expressed the same thing, even and especially when deviating from it: the
+harshness of competitive society. The individual, on whom society_ was
+supported, itself bore society's taint; in the individuals apparent freedom
+he was the product of society's economic and social apparatus. Power has
+always invoked che existing power relationships when seeking the approval
+of those subjected to power. At the same time, the advance of bourgeois
+society has promoted the development of che individual. Against che will
+of those controlling it, technology has changed human beings from children into persons. But all such progress of individuation has been at che
+expense of the individuality in whose name it took place, leaving behind
+nothing excepr individuals' determination to pursue their own purposes
+alone. The citizens whose lives are split berween business and private. life,
+their privare life berween ostentation and intimacy, their intimacy between
+the sullen community of marriage and the bitter solace of being. entirely
+alone, ar odds with chemselves and with everyone, are virtually already.
+Nazis, who are at once enthusiastic and fed up, or the ciry dwellers of
+
+126
+coday, who can imagine friendship only as "social contact" berween the
+inwardly unconnected. The culture industry can only manipulate individ
+mality so successfully because the frac
+nature of socicE
+always
+reen reproduced within it. In the ready-made faces of film heroes and private persons fabricated according to magazine-cover stereotypes, a semblance of individuality—in which no one believes in any case—is fading,
+and the love for such hero-models is nourished by.!
+the secret satisfaction
+that the effort of individuation is at last being replaced by the admittedly
+more breathless one of imitation. The hope that the contradictory, disintegrating person could not survive for generations, that the psychological
+fracture within it must split the system itself, and that human beings
+might refuse to tolerate the mendacious substitution of the stereotype for
+the individual-that hope is vain. The unity of the personality has been
+recognized as illusory since Shakespeare's Hamlet. In the synthetically
+manufactured physiognomies of today the fact that the concept of human
+life ever existed is already forgotten. For centuries society has prepared for
+Victor Mature and Mickey Rooney.* They come to fulfill the very individuality they destroy.
+The heroizing of the average forms part of the cult of cheapness. The
+highest-paid stars resemble advertisements for unnamed merchandise.
+Not for nothing are they often chosen from the ranks of commercial models. The dominant taste derives its ideal from the advertisement, from
+commodified beaury. Socrates' dictum that beauty is the useful has at last
+been ironically fulfilled. The cinema publicizes the cultural conglomerate*
+as a totality, while the radio advertises individually the products for whose
+sake the cultural system exists. For a few coins you can sce the film which
+cost millions, for even less you can buy the chewing gum behind which
+stand the entire riches of the world, and the sales of which increasé those
+riches still further. Through universal suffrage the vast funding of armies
+is generally known and approved, if in absentia, while prostitution behind
+the lines is not permitted. The best orchestras in the world, which are
+none, arc delivered free of charge to the home. All this mockingly resembles the land of milk and honey as the national community apes the
+human one. Something is served up for everyone.* A provincial visitor's
+comment on the old Berlin Metropoltheater that "it is remarkable what
+can he done for the money" has long since been adopted by the culture
+industry and elevated to the substance of production itself. Not only is a
+
+I27
+production always accompanied by triumphant celebration that it has
+been possible at all, but to a large extent it is that triumph itself. To put
+on a show means to show everyone what one has and can do. The show is
+still a fairground, but one incurably infected by culture. Just as people
+lured by the fairground crier overcame their disappointment inside the
+booths with a brave smile, since they expected it in any case, the moviegoer remains tolerantly loyal to the institution. But the cheapness of massproduced luxury articles, and its complement, universal fraud
+i, are changing the commodity character of art itself. That character is not new: it is
+the fact that arr now dutifully admits to being a commodity, abjures its
+autonomy and proudiy takes its place among consumer goods, that has the
+charm of novelty. Art was only ever able to exist as a separate sphere in its
+bourgeois form. Even its freedom, as negation of the social utility which is
+establishing itself through the market, is essentially conditioned by the
+commodity economy. Pure works of art, which negated the commodity
+character of sociery by simply following their own inherent laws, were at
+the same time always commodities. To the extent that, up to the eighreenth century, artists were protected from the market by patronage, they
+were subject to the patrons and their purposes instead. The purposelessness of the great modern work of art is sustained by the anonymity of the
+market. The latter's demands are so diversely mediated that the artist is
+exempted from any particular claim, although only to a certain degree,
+since his autonomy, being merely tolerated, has been attended throughout
+bourgeois history by a moment of untruth, which has culminated now in
+the social liquidation of art. The mortally sick Beethoven, who flung away
+a novel by Walter Scott with the cry: "The fellow writes for money," while
+himself proving an extremely experienced and tenacious businessman in
+commercializing the last quartets—works representing the most extreme
+repudiation of the market—offers the most grandiose example of the
+unity of the opposites of market and autonomy in bourgeois art. The
+artists who succumb to ideology are precisely those who concealithis contradiction instead of assimilating it into the consciousness of their own
+productior as Beethoven did: he improvised on "Rage over a Lost Penny"
+and derived the metaphysical injunction "It must be," which seeks aesthetically to annul the world's compulsion by taking that burden onto
+irself, from his housekeepers demand for her monthly wages. The principle of idealist aesthetics, purposiveness without purpose,* reverses the
+
+128
+schema socially adopted by bourgeois art: purposelessness for purposes
+dictated by the market. In the demand for entertainment and relaxation,
+purpose has finally consumed the realm of the purposeless. But as the
+demand for the marketability of art becomes total, a shift in the inner economic composition of cultural commodities* is becoming apparent. For
+the use which is made of the work of art in antagonistic society is largely
+that of confirming the very existence of the useless, which art's total subsumption under usefulness has abolished. In adapting itself entirely to
+need, the work of art defrauds human beings in advance of the liberation
+from the principle of utility which it is supposed to bring abour. What
+might be called use value in the reception of cultural assets is being
+replaced* by exchange value; enjoyment is giving way to being there and
+being in the know, connoisseurship by enhanced prestige. The consumer
+becomes the ideology of the amusement industry, whose institutions he or
+she cannot escape.* One has to have seen Mrs. Miniver,* just as one must
+subscribe to Life and Time. Everything is perceived only from the point of
+view that it can serve as something else, however vaguely that other thing
+might be envisaged. Everything has value only in so far as it can be exchanged, not in so far as it is something in itself. For consumers the use
+value of art, its essence, is a fetish, and the fetish
+-the social valuation
+which they mistake for the merit of works of artbecomes its only use
+value, the only quality theyienjoy. In this way the commodity character of
+art disintegrates just as it is fully realized. de becomessaspecies ofconfimodity,
+worked up and adapted to industrial
+roducton,
+saleable and
+changelble, but art as the species of commodity which exists in order to
+be sold yet not for sale becomes somerhing hypocritically unsaleable as
+soon as the business transaction is no longer merely its intention but its
+sole principle. The Toscanini performance on the radio is, in a sense,
+unsaleable. One listens to it for nothing, and each note of the symphony
+is accompanied, as it were, by the sublime advertisement that the symphony is not being interrupted by advertisements-"This concert is
+brought to you as a public service." The deception* takes place indirectly
+vin the profit of all the united automobile and soap manufacturers, on
+whose, payments the stations survive, and, of course, via the increased sales
+of the electrical industry as che producer of the receiver sets. Radio, the
+progressive latecomer to mass culture, is drawing conclusions which film's
+pscudomarker at present denies that industry. The technical structure of
+
+129
+the commercial radio system* makes it immune to liberal deviations of the
+kind the film industry can still permit itself in its own preserve. Film is a
+private enterprise which already represents the sovereign whole,* in which
+respect it has some advantages over the other individual combines.*
+Chesterfield is merely the nation's cigarette, but the radio is its mouthpiece. In the total assimilation of culture products into the commodiry
+sphere radio makes no attempt to purvey its products as commodities. In
+America it levies no duty from the public. It thereby takes on the deceptive form of a disinterested, impartial authority, which fits fascism like a
+glove. In fascism radio becomes the universal mouthpiece of the Fübrer:
+in the loudspeakers on the street his voice merges with the howl of sirens
+proclaiming panic, from which modern propaganda is hard to distinguish
+in any case. The National Socialists knew that broadcasting gave their
+cause stature as the printing press did to the Reformation. The Führers.
+metaphysical charisma, invented by the sociology of religion,* rurned our
+finally to be merely the omnipresence of his radio addresses, which
+demonically parodies that of the divine spirit. The gigantic fact that the
+speech penetrates everywhere replaces its content, as the benevolent act of
+the Toscanini broadcast supplants its content, the symphony. No listener
+can apprehend the symphony's true coherence, while the Führers address
+is in any case a lie. To posit the human word as absolute, che false commandment, is the immanent tendency of radio. Recommendation becomes command. The promotion of identical commodities under different brand names, the scientifically endorsed praise of the laxative in the
+slick voice of the announcer between the overtures of La Traviata and
+Rienzi, has become untenable if only for its silliness. One day the Diktat
+of production, the specific advertisement, veiled by the semblance of
+choice, can finally become the Führer's overt command. In a sociery of
+large-scale fascistic rackets which agree among themselves on how much
+of the national product is to be allocated to providing for the needs of the
+people, to invite the people to use a particular soap powder would, in the
+end, seem anachronistic. In a more modern, less ceremonious style, the
+führer directly orders both the holocaust and the supply of trash.
+Today works of art, suitably packaged like political slogans, are
+pressed on a reluctant public at reduced prices by the culture industry;
+they are opened up for popular enjoyment like parks. However, the erosion of their genuine commodity character does not mean that they would
+
+be abolished in the life of a free society but that the last barrier to their
+debasement as cultural assets has now been removed. The abolition of
+educational privilege by disposing of culture at bargain prices does not
+admit the masses to the preserves from which they were formerly excluded but, under the existing social conditions, contributes to the decay of
+education and the progress of barbaric incoherence. Someone who in the
+nineteenth or early twentieth century spent money to attend a drama or a
+concert, paid the performance at least as much respect as the money spent.
+The citizen who wanted a return for his outlay might occasionally try to
+establish some connection to the work. The guidebooks to Wagner's music
+dramas or the commentaries on Faust bear witness to this. They form a
+transition to the biographical glaze applied to works of art and the other
+practices to which works of art are subjected today. Even when the art
+business was in the bloom of youth, use value* was not dragged along as
+a mere appendage by exchange value but was developed as a precondition
+of the latter, to the social benefit of works of art. As long as iowas expensive, art kept the citizen within some bounds. That is now over. Arts unbounded proximity to those exposed to it, no longer mediated by money,
+completes the alienation between work and consumer, which resemble
+each other in triumphant reification. In the culture industry respect is vanishing along with criticism: the latter gives way to mechanical expertise,
+the former to the forgetful cult of celebrities. For consumers, nothing is
+expensive any more. Nevertheless, they are dimiy aware that the less something costs, the less it can bera gift to them. The twofold mistrust of traditional culture as ideology mihgles with that of industrialized culture as
+fraud. Reduced to mere adjuncts, the degraded works of art are secretly
+rejected by their happy recipients along with the junk the medium has
+made them resemble. The public should rejoice that there is so much to
+see and hear. And indeed, everything is to be had. The "screenos"* and
+cinema vaudevilles, the competitions in recognizing musical extracts, the
+free magazines, rewards, and gift articles handed out to the listeners of certain radio programs are not mere accidents, but continue what is happening to the culture products themselves. The symphony is becoming the
+prize for listeniog so the radio at all, and if the technology had its way the
+film would already be delivered to the apartment on the model of the
+radio.* It is moving towards the commercial system. Television points the
+way to a development which easily enough could push the Warner broth-
+
+I3I
+ers* into the doubtless unwelcome position of little theatre performers and
+cultural conservatives. However, the pursuit of prizes has already left its
+imprint on consumer behavior. Because culture presents itself as a bonus,
+with unquestioned private and social benefits, its reception has become a
+matter of taking one's chances. The public crowds forward for fear of missing something. What that might be is unclear, but, at any rate, only those
+who join in have any chance. Fascism, however, hopes* to reorganize the
+gift-receivers trained by the culture industry into its enforced adherents.
+Culture is a paradoxical commodity. It isso completely subject to the
+law of exchange that it is no longer exchanged unis so blindly equated with
+use that it can no longer be used. For this reason it merges with the advertisement. The more meaningless the latter appears under monopoly, the
+more omnipotent culture becomes. Its motives are economic enough.
+That life could continue without the whole culture industry is too certain;
+the satiation and apathy it generates among consumers are too great. It can
+do litcle to combat this from its own resources. Adventisingmies clixir of
+lifer But because its product ceaselessly reduces the pleasure it promises as
+a commodity to that mere promise, it finally coincides with the advertisement it needs on account of its own inability to please. In the competitive
+society advertising performed a social service in orienting the buyer in the
+market, facilitating choice and helping the more efficient but unknown
+supplier to find customers. It did not merely cost labor time, but saved it.
+Today, when the free market is coming to an end, those in control of the
+system are entrenching themselves in advertising.* It strengthens the bond
+which shackles consumers to the big combines. Only those who can keep
+paying the exorbitant fees charged by the advertising agencies, and most
+of all by radio itself, that is, those who are already part of the system or are
+co-opted into it by the decisions of banks and industrial capital, can enter
+the pseudomarket as sellers. The costs of advertising, which finally flow
+hack into the pockets of the combines,* spare them the troublesome task
+of subduing unwanted outsiders; they guarantee that the wielders of influence remain among their peers, not unlike the resolutions of economic
+councils* which control the establishment and continuation of businesses
+in the totalitarian state.
+dvertising rodaylis a negative principle, a blockanything which does not bear its seal of approval is economi-
+All-pervasive advertising is certainly not needed to acquaint
+
+132
+people with the goods on offer, the varieties of which are limited in any
+case. It benefits the selling of goods only directly. The termination of a
+familiar advertising campaign by an individual firm represents a loss of
+prestige, and is indeed an offence against the discipline which the leading
+clique imposes on its members. In wartime, commodities which can no
+longer be supplied continue to be advertised merely as a display of industrial power. Ar such times the subsidizing of the ideological media is more
+important than the repetition of names.* Through their ubiquitous use
+under the pressure of the system, advertising techniques have invaded the
+idiom, the "style" of the culture industry. So complete is their triumph
+that in key positions it is no longer even explicit: the imposing buildings
+of the big companies,* floodlit advertisements in stone, are free of advertising, merely displaying the illuminated company initials on their pinnacles, with no further need of self-congratulation. By contrast, the buildings
+surviving from the nineteenth century, the architecture of which still
+shamefully reveals their utility as consumer goods, their function as accommodation, are covered from basement to above roof level with hoardings and banners: the landscape becomes a mere background for signboards and symbols. Advertising becomes simply the art.. with which
+Goebbels presciently equated it, l'art pour fart; advertising. for advertising's sake, the pure representation of social power. In the influential
+American magazines Life and Fortune the images and texts of advertisements are, at a cursory glance, hardly distinguishable from the editoria!
+section. The enthusiastic and unpaid picture story about che living habits
+and personal grooming of celebrities, which wins them new fans, is editorial, while the advertising pages rely on photographs and data so factual
+and lifelike that they represent the ideal of information to which the editorial section only aspires. Every film is a preview of the next, which
+promises yet again to unite the same heroic couple under the same exotic
+sun: anyone arriving late cannot tell whether he is watching the trailer or
+the real thing. The montage character of the culture industry, the syntheric, controlled manner in which its products are assembled—factory-like
+not only in the film studio but also, virtually, in the compilation of the
+cheap biographies, journalistic novels, and hit songs—predisposes it to
+advertising: the individual moment, in being detachable, replaceable,
+estranged even technically from any coherence of meaning, lends itself to
+purposes ourside the work. Thé special effect, the trick, the isolated and
+
+133
+repeatable individual performance have always conspired with the exhibition of commodities for advertising purposes, and today every close-up of
+a film actress is an advert for her name, every hit song a plug for its tune.
+Advertising and the culture industry are merging technically no less than
+economically. In both, the same thing appears in countless places, and the
+mechanical repetition of the same culture product is already that of the
+same propaganda slogan. In both, under the dictate of effectiveness, technique is becoming psychotechnique, a procedure for manipulating human
+beings. In both, the norms of the striking yet familiar, the easy but catchy,
+the worldly wise but straightforward hold good; everything is directed at
+overpowering a customer conceived as distracted or resistant.
+Through the language they speak, the customers make their own
+contribution to culture as advertising. For the more completely language
+coincides with communication, the more words change from substantial
+carriers of meaning to signs devoid of qualities; the more purely and transparently they communicate what they designate, the more impenetrable
+they become. The demythologizing of language, as an element of the total
+process of enlightenment, reverts to magic. In magic word and content
+were at once different from each other and indissolubly linked. Concepts
+like melancholy, history, indeed, life, were apprehended in the word which
+both set them apart and preserved them. Its particular form constituted
+and reflected them at the same time. The trenchant distinction which
+declares the word itself fortuitous and its allocation to its object arbitrary
+does away with the superstitious commingling of word and thing. Anything in a given sequence of letters which goes beyond the correlation to
+the event designated is banished as unclear and as verbal metaphysics. As
+a result, the word, which henceforth is allowed only to designate something and not to mean it, becomes so fixated on the object that it hardens
+to a formula. This affects language and subject matter equally. Instead of
+raising a matter to the level of experience, the purified word exhibits it as
+a case of an abstract moment, and everything else, severed from now
+defunct expression by the demand for pitiless clarity, therefore withers in
+reality also. The outside-left in football, the blackshirt,* the Hitler Youth
+member, and others of cheir kind are no more than what they are called.
+If, before its rationalization, the word had set free not only longing but
+lies, in its rationalized form it has become a straightjacket more for longing chan for lies. The blindness and muteness of the data to which posi-
+
+134
+tivism reduces the world passes over into language itself, which is limited
+to registering those data. Thus relationships themselves become impenetrable, taking on an impact, a power of adhesion and repulsion which
+makes them resemble their extreme antithesis, spells. They act once more
+like the practices of a kind of sorcery, whether the name of a diva is concocted in the studio on the basis of statistical data, or welfare government
+is averted by the use of taboo-laden words such as "bureaucracy" and "intellectuals," or vileness exonerates itself by invoking the name of a homeland. The name, to which magic most readily attaches, is today undergoing a chemical change. It is being transformed into arbitrary, manipulable designations, the power of which, although calculable, is for that reason as willful as that of archaic names. First names, the archaic residues,
+have been brought up to date either by stylizing them into advertising
+brands—film stars' surnames have become first names—or by standardizing them collectively. By contrast, the bourgeois, family name which,
+instead of being a trademark, individualized its bearers by relating them to
+their own prehistory, sounds old-fashioned. In Americans it arouses a curious unease. To conceal the uncomfortable distance existing between particular people* they call themselves Bob and Harry, like replaceable members of teams. Such forms of interaction reduce human beings to the
+brotherhood of the sporting public, which protects them from true fraternity. Signification, the only function of the word admitted by semantics,
+is consummated in the sign. Its character as sign is reinforced by the speed
+with which linguistic models are put into circulation from above. Whether
+folksongs are rightly or wrongly called upper-class culture which has come
+down in the world, their elements have at least taken on their popular
+form in a long, highly mediated process of experience. The dissemination
+of popular songs, by contrast, is practically instantaneous. The American
+term "fad" for fashions which catch on epidemically-inflamed by the
+action of highly concentrated economic powers-referred to this phenomenon long before totalitarian advertising bosses had laid down the
+general lines of culture in their countries, If the German fascists launch a
+word like "intolerable" [Untragbar) over the loudspeakers one day, the
+wholenarion is saying "intolerable" the next. On the same pattern, the
+nations against which the German Blitzkrieg was directed have adopred it
+in their own jargon. The universal repetition of the term denoting such
+measures makes the measures, too; familiar, just as, at the time of the free
+
+I35
+market, the brand name on everyones lips increased sales. The blind and
+rapidly spreading repetition of designated words links advertising-to the
+totalitarian slogan. The layer of experience which made words human like
+those who spoke them has been stripped away, and in its prompt appropriation language takes on the coldness which hitherto was peculiar to
+billboards and the advertising sections of newspapers. Condess people
+use words and expressions which they either have ceased to understand. at.
+all or use only according to their behavioral functions, just as trademarks
+adhere all the more compulsively to their objects the less their linguistic
+meaning is apprehended. The Minister of Public Education speaks ignorantly of "dynamic forces," and the hit songs sing endlessly of "reverie"
+and "rhapsody," hitching their popularity to the magic of the incomprehensible as if to some deep intimation of a higher life. Other stereotypes,
+such as "memory," are still partly comprehended, but become detached
+from the experience which might fulfill them. They obtrude into the spoken language like enclaves. On the German radio of Flesch and Hitler
+they are discernible in the affected diction of the announcer, who pronounces phrases like "Goodnight, listeners," or "This is the Hitler Youth
+speaking," or even "the Führer" with an inflection which passes into the
+mother tongue of millions. In such turns of phrase the last bond between
+sedimented experience and language, which still exerted a reconciling influence in dialect in the nineteenth century, is severed. By contrast, in the
+hands of the editor whose supple opinions have promoted him to the status of Schriftleiter,* German words become petrified and alien. In any
+word one can distinguish how far it has been disfigured by the fascist
+"folk" community. By now, of course, such language* has become universal, totalitarian. The violence done to words is no longer audible in them.
+The radio announcer does not need to talk in an affected voice; indeed, he
+would be impossible if his tone differed from that of his designated listeners. This means, however, that the language and gestures of listeners
+and spectators are more deeply permeated by the patterns of the culture
+industry than ever before, in nuances still beyond the reach of experimental methods. Today the culture industry has taken over the civilizing inheritance of the frontier and entrepreneurial democracy, whose receptivity to
+intellectual deviations was never too highly developed. All are free to
+dance and amuse chemselves, just as, since the historical neutralization of
+religion, they have been free to join any of the countless sects. But frec-
+
+136
+dom to choose an ideology, which always reflects economic coercion,
+everywhere proves to be freedom to be the same. The way in which the
+young girl accepts and performs the obligatory date, the tone of voice used
+on the telephone and in the most intimate situations, the choice of words
+in conversation, indeed, the whole inner life compartmentalized according
+to the categories of vulgarized depth psychology, bears witness to the attempt to turn oneself into an apparatus meeting the requirements of success, an apparatus which, even in its unconscious impulses, conforms to
+the model presented by the culture industry. The most intimate reactions
+of human beings have become so entirely reified, even to themselves, that
+the idea of anything peculiar to them survives only in extreme abstraction:
+personality means hardly more than dazzling white teeth and freedom
+from body odor and emotions. That is the triumph of advertising in the
+culture industry: the compulsive imitatiom by consumers of cultural commodities which, at the same time, they recognize as false
+
+Elements of Anti-Semitism:
+I
+Anti-Semitism today is for some a question affecting human destiny
+and for others a mere pretext. For the fascists the Jews are not a minority
+but the antirace, the negative principle as such; on their extermination the
+world's happiness depends. Diametrically opposed to this is the thesis that
+the Jews, free of national or racial features, form a group through religious
+belief and tradition and nothing else. Jewish traits relate to Eastern Jews,
+and only to those not yet assimilated. Both doctrines are true and false at
+the same time.
+The first is true in the sense that fascism has made it true. The Jews
+are today the group which, in practice and in theory, draws to itself the
+destructive urge which the wrong social order spontaneously produces.
+They are branded as absolute evil by absolute evil. In this sense they are
+indeed the chosen people. Now that power is no longer needed for economic reasons,* the Jews are designated as its absolute object, existing
+merely for the exercise of power. The workers,* who are the real target, are
+understandably not told as much to their faces; the blacks must be kept in
+their place, but the Jews are to be wiped from the face of the earth, and
+the call to exterminate them like vermin finds an echo among the prospeclive fascists of all countries. In the image of the Jew which the racial
+nationalists hold up before the world they express their own essence. Their
+craving is for exclusive ownership, appropriation,* unlimited power, and
+
+138
+at any price. The Jew, burdened with his tormentors' guilt, mocked as their
+lord, they nail to the cross, endlessly repeating a sacrifice in whose power
+they are unable to believe.
+The other, liberal thesis is true as an idea. It contains an image of the
+society in which rage would no longer reproduce itself or seek qualities on
+which to be discharged.* But by assuming the unity of humanity to have
+been already realized in principle, the liberal thesis serves as an apology for
+the existing order. The attempt to avert the direst threat by minority policies and other democratic measures is ambiguous as is the defensive strategy of the last liberal citizens. Their powerlessness attracts the enemy of
+powerlessness. The mode of life and appearance of the Jews compromise
+the existing universal by deficient adaptation. Their inflexible adherence to
+their own order of life has placed them in an insecure relationship to the
+prevailing one. They expected to be sustained by that order without subscribing to it. Their relationship to the dominant nations was one of greed
+and fear. Yet whenever they sacrificed their difference to the prevailing
+mode, the successfully adapted Jews took on in exchange the cold, stoical
+character which existing society* imposes on human beings. The dialectical intertwinement of enlightenment and power, the dual relationship of
+progress to both cruelty and liberation, which has been brought home to
+the Jews no less by the great exponents of enlightenment than by democratic popular movements, manifests itself in the makeup of the assimilared Jews themselves. The enlightened self-control with which adapted Jews
+effaced within themselves the painfúl scars of domination by others, a
+kind of second circumcision, made them forsake their own dilapidated
+conmunity and wholeheartedly embrace the life of the modern bourgeoisie, which was already advancing ineluctably toward a reversion to
+pure oppression and reorganization into an exclusively racial entity. Race
+is not, as the racial nationalists claim, an immediate, natural peculiarity.
+Rather, it is a regression to nature as mere violence, to the hidebound particularism which, in the existing order,* constitutes precisely the universal.
+Race today is the self-assertion of the bourgeois individual, integrated into
+the barbaric collective. The harmonious society to which the liberal Jews
+declared their allegiance has finally been granted to them in the form of
+the national community. They believed that only anti-Semitism disfigured
+this order, which in reality cannot exist without disfiguring human beings.
+
+139
+The persecution of the Jews, like any persecution, cannot be separated
+from that order.* Its essence, however it may hide itself at times, is the violence which today is openly revealed.
+II
+Anti-Semitism as a popular movement has always been driven by the
+urge of which its instigators accuse the social democrats: to make everyone
+the same. Those without the power to command must fare no better than
+ordinary people. From the German civil servant to the Negroes in Harlem, those avidly emulating their betters have always known that they
+would really gain nothing but the satisfaction of seeing others no better off
+than themselves. The Aryanization of Jewish property, which in any case
+primarily benefited those at the top, enriched the masses in the Third
+Reich hardly more than the wretched booty pillaged from Jewish quarters
+enriched the Cossacks. The real benefit it brought was a half-understood
+ideology. That the demonstration of its economic futility heightened rather than moderated the attraction of the racialist panacea points to its true
+nature: it does not help human beings but assuages their urge to destroy.
+The actual advantage enjoyed by the racialist comrade is that his rage will
+be sanctioned by the collective. The less he gains in any other way, the
+more obstinately, against better knowledge, he clings to the movement.
+Anti-Semitism has proved immune to the charge of inadequate profitability. For the common people it is a luxury.
+Its usefulness for the rulers is evident. It serves as a distraction, a
+cheap means of corruption, a terrorist warning. The respectable rackets
+condone it, the disreputable ones* carry it out. But the form of the mentality, both social and individual, which manifests itself in anti-Semitism,
+the primeval-historical entrapment from which it is a desperate attempt to
+escape, remains wholly obscure. If a malady so deeply embedded in civilization is not properly accounted for by knowledge, the individual, too,
+though he may be as well intentioned as the victim himself, cannot mitigate it through understanding. The plausibly rational, economic, and
+political explanations and counterarguments—however correct their individual observations—cannot appease it, since rationality itself, through its
+link to power, is submerged in the same malady. Whether blindly dealing
+
+140
+our blows or blindly fending them off, persecutors and victims form part
+of the same calamitous cycle. Anti-Semitic behavior is unleashed in situations in which blinded people, deprived of subjectivity, are let loose as subjects. Their actions—for those involved—are lethal yet meaningless reactions, of the kind which behaviorists register but fail to interpret. Anti-
+Semitism is a well-rehearsed partern, indeed, a ritual of civilization, and
+the pogroms are the true ritual murders. They demonstrate the impotence
+of what might have restrained them-reflection, meaning, ultimately
+truth. The mindless pastime of beating people to death confirms the drab
+existence to which one merely conforms.
+The blindness of anti-Semitism, its lack of intention, lends a degree
+of truth to the explanation of the movement as a release valve. Rage is
+vented on those who are both conspicuous and unprotected. And just as,
+depending on the constellation, the victims are interchangeable: vagrants,*
+Jews, Protestants, Catholics, so each of them can replace the murderer, in
+the same blind lust for killing, as soon as he feels the power of representing the norm. There is no authentic anti-Semitism, and certainly no born
+anti-Semite. The older adults to whom the call for Jewish blood has
+become second nature are as ignorant of the reason as the young people
+who have to shed it. The high-placed instigators, who know the reason,
+neither hate the Jews nor love their own followers. The latter, however,
+who always go short, economically and sexually, hate without end; they
+find relaxation unbearable because they do not know fulfillment. Indeed,
+the organized robbers and murderers are animated by a kind of dynamic
+idealism. Setting out on their pillages, they construct a grandiose ideology for what they do, with fatuous talk of saving the family, the fatherland,
+humanity. But as they remain the dupes they secretly suspect themselves
+to be, their pitiful rational motive, the theft which was supposed to rationalize the deed, is finally discarded entirely, and the rationalization
+becomes truthful against its will. The obscure impulse which was always
+more congenial to them than reason takes them over completely. The
+rational island sinks beneath the flood, and those desperately floundering
+now appear only as defenders of truth, restorers of the earth, which has to
+be reformed to its farthest corners. All living things become material for
+their ghastly duty, which now flinches at nothing. Action becomes a purpose in itself, cloaking its own purposelessness. Anti-Semitism always
+starts with an appeal to complete thé task. Anti-Semitism and totality have
+
+I4I
+always been profoundly connected. Blindness encompasses everything
+because it comprehends nothing.
+Liberalism had granted the Jews property, but without the authority
+to command. The purpose of human rights was to promise happiness even
+where power was lacking. Because the cheated masses are dimly aware that
+this promise, being universal, remains a lie as long as classes exist, it arouses their anger; they feel themselves scorned. They must constantly repress
+the thought of that happiness, even as a possibility, an idea, and they deny
+it all the more fiercely the more its time has come. Wherever it appears to
+be realized amid the systematic deprivation, they must reenact the suppression which has been applied to their own longing. Whatever that reenactment is directed against, however unhappy it may itself be— Ahasuerus
+and Mignon, exoticism which evokes the promised land, beauty which
+summons the thought of sex, the animal whose hint of promiscuity condemns it as repulsive-draws down on itself the destructive fury of the
+civilized, who can never fully complete the painful process of civilization.
+To those who compulsively control it, tormented nature provocatively
+reflects back the appearance of powerless happiness. The idea of happiness
+without power is unendurable because it alone would be happiness. The
+fantasy of the conspiracy of lascivious Jewish bankers who finance
+Bolshevism is a sign of innate powerlessness, the good life an emblem of
+happiness. These are joined by the image of the intellectual, who appears
+to enjoy in thought what the others deny themselves and is spared the
+sweat of toil and bodily strength. The banker and the intellectual, money
+and mind, the exponents of circulation, are the disowned wishful image of
+those mutilated by power, an image which power uses to perpetuate itself.
+III
+The present sociery, in which primitive religious feelings, new cults,
+and the legacy of revolutions are peddled in the market, in which the fascist leaders barter the land and lives of nations behind locked doors while
+the public lulled by their radio sets calculate the cost; this society in which
+even the word which unmasks it doubles as an invitation to join a political racket; in which no longer is politics merely business bur business is the
+whole of politics —this society is scandalized by the Jew with his obsolete
+shopkeepers mannerisms, labeling him a materialist, a haggler, who should
+
+142
+make way for the pioneering spirit of those who have elevated business to
+an absolute.
+Bourgeois anti-Semitism has a specific economic purpose: to conceal
+domination in production. If in earlier epochs the rulers were direcdy
+repressive, so that they not only left work exclusively to the lower orders
+but declared it the ignominy it always was under domination, in the age
+of mercantilism the absolute monarch transformed himself into the supreme master of manufactories. Production became presentable at court.
+Finally, as bourgeois, the masters replaced their colorful robes with civilian dress. Work is no disgrace, they said —the more rationally to take possession of* that of others. Aligning themselves with the productive elements, they remained the parasites of old.* The factory owner ventured
+and raked in like a great merchant or banker. He calculated, procured,
+bought, sold. In the market he competed with the merchants and bankers
+for the profit due to his capital. But he grabbed not merely from the market but from the source: as a functionary of the class system he took care
+not to go short of the fruits of his workers labor. The workers had to deliver as much as possible. Like a true Shylock he insisted on his contract. By
+virtue of owning the machines and materials, he forced the others to produce. He called himself the producer, but he and everyone secretly knew
+the truth. The productive work of the capitalist, whether he justified his
+profit as the reward of enterprise, as under liberalism, or as the director's
+salary, as today, was the ideology which concealed the nature of the labor
+contract and the rapacity of the economic system in general.*
+That is why people shout: "Stop thief!" —and point at the Jew. He
+is indeed the scapegoat, not only for individual maneuvers and machinations but in the wider sense that the economic injustice of the whole class
+is attributed to him. The factory owner has his debtors, the workers, under
+observation in his factory and can check their performance before he parts
+with his money. They only find our the true nature of the exchange only
+when they see what they can buy with it: the smallest magnate has access
+to a quantity of services and goods available to no ruler before him; but
+the workers receive what is called the cultural minimum. Not content with
+letting the market tell them how few goods can be theirs, the salesman
+sings the praises of those they cannot afford. Only the relationship of
+wages to prices expresses whar is withheld* from the workers. With their
+winges they have accepted the principle of just remuneration. The mer-
+
+143
+chant presents them with the promissory note they have signed on behalf
+of the manufacturer. The merchant is the bailiff for the whole system, taking upon himself the odium due to the others. That the circulation sphere
+is responsible for exploitation is a socially necessary illusion.
+The Jews had not been the only people active in the circulation
+sphere. But they had been locked up in it too long not to reflect in their
+makeup something of the hatred so long directed at that sphere. Unlike
+their Aryan colleagues, they were largely denied access to the source of
+added value. Only at a late stage and with difficulty were they allowed to
+gain ownership of the means of production. To be sure, in the history of
+Europe, and even in imperial Germany, baptized Jews had reached high
+positions in administration and industry. But they always had to justify
+this with redoubled devotion and diligence, and stubborn self-denial.
+They were only admitted if, through their behavior, they tacitly adopted
+and confirmed the verdict on the other Jews: that is the purpose of baptism. All the great achievements of their prominent members were not
+enough to allow Jews to be admitted to the peoples of Europe; having
+been prevented from putting down roots they were then criticized as roorless. They always remained the protected Jews, dependent on emperors,
+princes, or the absolutist state. These patrons were economically more
+advanced than the rest of the population. To the extent that they could
+make use of the Jew as an intermediary, they protected him against the
+masses who had to foot the bill for progress. The Jews were the colonizers
+of progress. Having helped as merchants to disseminate Roman civilization throughout Gentile Europe, they became, in keeping with their patriarchal religion, representatives of urban, civic, and finally industrial conditions. As bearers of capitalist modes of existence from country to country they earned the hatred of those who suffered under that system. For
+the sake of the economic progress which today is their downfall the Jews
+were from the first a thorn in the side of the craftsmen and farmers whose
+status capitalism undermined. Now it is their turn to bear the brunt of its
+exclusive, particularist character. They, who always wanted to be first, are
+left far behind. Even the Jewish head of an American entertainment trust
+is hopelessly defensive amid his wealth. The caftan was the ghostly residue
+of ancient civic dress. Today it is a sign that its wearers have been flung to
+the margins of a society* which, now wholly enlightened, is exorcising the
+spirits of its prehistory. They who propagated individualism, abstract law,
+
+144
+the concept of the person, have been debased to a species. They who were
+never allowed untroubled ownership of the civic right which should have
+granted them human dignity are again called "the Jews" without distinction. Even in the nineteenth century the Jew remained dependent on an
+alliance with the central authority. The general law, protected by the state,
+was the guarantor of his safety, and the exceptive law the specter which
+ensured his docility. He remained an object, dependent on grace and
+favor, even when claiming his rights. Trade was not his vocation, it was his
+fate. The Jews were the trauma of the knights of industry, who have to
+masquerade as productive creators.* In the Jewish jargon they detect what
+they secretly despise in themselves: their anti-Semitism is self-hate, the bad
+conscience of the parasite.
+IV
+Nationalist anti-Semitism seeks to disregard religion. It claims to be
+concerned with purity of race and nation. Its exponents notice that people have long ceased to trouble themselves about eternal salvation.* The
+average believer today is as crafty as only cardinals were in former times.
+To accuse the Jews of being obdurate unbelievers is no longer enough to
+incite the masses. But the religious hostility which motivated the persecution of the Jews for iwo millennia is far from completely extinguished.
+Rather, anti-Semitism's eagerness to deny its religious tradition indicates
+that that tradition is secretly no less deeply embedded in it than secular
+idiosyncrasy once was in religious zealotry. Religion has been incorporated as cultural heritage, not abolished. The alliance between enlightenment
+and power has debarred from consciousness the moment of truth in religion while conserving its reified forms. Both circumstances finally benefit
+fascism: the unchanneled longing is guided into racial-nationalist rebellion, while the descendants of the evangelistic zealots are converted into
+conspirators of blood communities and elite guards, on the model of the
+Wagnerian knights of the Grail. In this way religion as an institution is
+partly meshed directly into the system and partly transposed into the
+pomp of mass culture and parades. The fanatical faith on which leader and
+followers pride themselves is no other than the grim doctrine which was
+earlier used to discipline the desperate, except that its content has gone
+astray. Thar content lives on only as hatred of those who do not share the
+
+145
+faith. Among the "German Christians,"* all that remained of the religion
+of love was anti-Semitism.
+Christianity is not only a regression beyond Judaism. The latter's
+God, in passing from a henotheistic to a universal form, did not entirely
+shed the features of the nature demon. The terror originating in remote
+preanimist times passes from nature into the concept of the absolute self
+which, as its creator and ruler, entirely subjugates nature. Despite the ineffable power and splendor in which such alienation clothes it, that ruler is
+still attainable to thought, which becomes universal through this very relationship to something supreme, transcendental. God as spirit is the principle opposed to nature; it not only stands for nature's blind cycle as do all
+the mythical gods, but offers liberation from it. But in its remote abstractness, the incommensurable has at the same time become more terrible,
+and the pitiless statement: "I am who am," which colerates nothing beside
+itself, surpasses in its inescapable power the blinder and therefore more
+ambiguous judgment of anonymous fate. The God of Judaism demands
+what he is owed and settles accounts with the defaulter. He enmeshes his
+creatures in a tissue of debt and credit, guilt and merit. In contrast,
+Christianity emphasized the moment of grace, although that, too, is contained in Judaism, in God's covenant with men and in the Messianic
+promise. It softened the terror of the absolute by allowing the creature to
+find itself reflected in the deity: the divine mediator is called by a human
+name and dies a human death. His message is: fear not; the law yields
+before faith; love becomes greater than any majesty, the only commandment.
+But by virtue of the same moments by which it lifted the spell of
+nature religion, Christianity is producing ideology once again, in a spiritualized form. To the same degree as the absolute is brought closer to the
+finite, the finite is made absolute. Christ, the incarnated spirit, is the deified sorcerer. The human self-reflection in the absolute, the humanization
+of God through Christ, is the proton pseudos [first substitution]. The progress beyond Judaism is paid for with the assertion that the mortal Jesus was
+God. The harm is done precisely by the reflective moment of Christianity,
+rhe spiritualization of magic. A spiritual essence is attributed to something
+which mind identifies as natural. Mind consists precisely in demonstrating che contradiction inherent in such pretensions of the finite. Bad conscience is therefore obliged to present the prophet as a symbol, the magi-
+
+146
+cal practice as transubstantiation. It is that which makes Christianity a
+religion, and, in a sense, the only one: an intellectual link to something
+intellectually suspect, a special sphere of culture. Like the great Asiatic
+belief systems, pre-Christian Judaism was hardly separable from national
+life, from collective self-preservation. The reshaping of the heathen ritual
+of sacrifice not only took place in worship and in the mind but determined
+the form of the labor process. In providing the schema for the latter, sacrifice becomes rational. The taboo is transformed into the rational organization of the work process. It regulates administration in war and peace,
+sowing and harvesting, food preparation and slaughter. Although the rules
+may not arise from rational reflection, rationality arises from them. The
+effort of primitive peoples to free themselves from immediate fear engendered among them the institution of ritual; this was refined by Judaism
+into the sanctified rhythm of family and national life. The priests were
+appointed to watch over the proper observance of custom. Their function
+within the power structure was clearly displayed in theocratic practice;
+Christianity, however, wanted to remain spiritual even where it aspired to
+power. In ideology it repudiated self-preservation by the ultimate sacrifice, that of the man-god, but thereby relegated devalued life to the sphere
+of the profane: it abolished the law of Moses but rendered what was
+theirs unto both God and Caesar. Secular authority is either confirmed or
+usurped, while Christianity acquires a license to manage salvation. Selfpreservation is to be conquered though the imitation of Christ-by order.
+In this way self-sacrificing love is stripped of its naivety, severed trom natural love and turned to account as credit. The love médiated by ecclesiastical knowledge is presented as immediate love, in which nature and the
+supernatural are reconciled. Therein lies its untruth: in the fraudulently
+affirmative interpretation of self-forgetting.
+That interpretation is fraudulent because the church depends for its
+existence on people's belief that they will attain salvation by following its
+teaching, whether that teaching demands works like the Catholic version
+or faith like the Protestant, yet cannot guarantee that goal. The nonbinding nature of the religious promise of salvation, the Jewish and negative
+moment in the Christian doctrine, by which magic and finally the church
+itself are relativized, is tacitly ignored by naive believers, for whom
+Christianiry, supranaturalism, becomes a magic ritual, a nature religion.
+They believe only by forgering their belief. They convince themselves of
+
+147
+the certainty of their knowledge like astrologers or spiritualists. That is not
+necessarily worse than spiritualized theology. The old Italian lady who
+with devour simplicity consecrates a candle to St Gennaro to protect her
+grandson in the war may be closer to the truth than the high priests and
+pontiffs who, untainted by idolatry, bless the weapons against which St
+Gennaro is powerless. To the simple, however, religion itself becomes a
+substitute for religion. Christianity had some awareness of this from its
+earliest days, but it was only the paradoxical Christians, the antiofficial
+thinkers from Pascal through Lessing and Kierkegaard to Barth, who
+made it the keystone of their theology. In this awareness they were not
+only che radical Christians but che tolerant ones. The others, who repressed that knowledge and with bad conscience convinced themselves of
+Christianity as a secure possession, were obliged to confirm their eternal
+salvation by the worldly ruin of those who refused to make the murky sacrifice of reason. That is the religious origin of anti-Semitism. The adherents of the religion of the Son hated the supporters of the religion of the
+Father as one hates those who know better. This is the hostility of spirit
+hardened as faith in salvation for spirit as mind. What is vexatious for the
+Christian enemies of the Jews is the truth which withstands evil without
+rationalizing it, and clings to the idea of unearned beatitude in disregard
+of worldly actions and the order of salvation which allegedly bring it
+abour. Anti-Semitism is supposed to confirm that the ritual of faith and
+history is justified by ritually sacrificing those who deny its justice.
+V
+"I simply can't abide you-so don't forget it," says Siegfried to
+Mime, who is trying to win his love. The stock reply of all anti-Semites is
+the appeal to idiosyncrasy. Society's emancipation from anti-Semitism
+depends on whether the content of that idiosyncrasy is raised to the level
+of a concept and becomes aware of its own senselessness. But idiosyncrasy
+attaches itself to the peculiar. The universal, that which fits into the conrext of social utility, is regarded as natural. But anything natural which has
+mu been absorbed into utility by passing through the cleansing channels
+of conceptual order—the screech of stylus on slate which sets the teeth on
+elge, the haul goût which brings to mind filth and corruption, the sweat
+which appears on the brow of the diligent—whatever is not quite assimi-
+
+148
+lared, or infringes the commands in which the progress of centuries has
+been sedimented, is felt as intrusive and arouses a compulsive aversion.
+The motifs which trigger such idiosyncrasy are those which allude
+to origin. They recreate moments of biological prehistory: danger signs
+which made the hair stand on end and the heart stop. In the idiosyncratic aversion individual organs escape the subject's control, autonomously
+obeying fundamental biological stimuli. The self which experiences itself
+in such reactions—rigidity of the skin, muscles, and limbs—is not quite
+master of them. For a few moments they mimic the motionlessness of surrounding nature. But as what is mobile draws closer to the immobile,
+more highly developed life to mere nature, it is also estranged from it,
+since immobile nature, which living creatures, like Daphne, seek with urmost agitation to become, is capable only of the most external, spatial relationships. Space is absolure alienation. Where the human seeks to resemble nature, at the same time it hardens itself against it. Protection as perrified terror is a form of camouflage. These numb human reactions are
+archaic patterns of self-preservation: the tribure life pays for its continued
+existence is adaptation to death.
+Civilization replaced the organic adaptation to otherness, mimetic
+behavior proper, firstly, in the magical phase, with the organized manipulation of mimesis, and finally, in the historical phase, with rational praxis,
+work. Uncontrolled mimesis is proscribed. The angel which, with fiery
+sword, drove humans out of paradise and on to the path of technical
+progress, is itself the symbol of that progress. The severity with which, over
+the centuries, the rulers have prevented both their own successors and the
+subjugated masses from relapsing into mimetic behavior—from the religious ban on graven images through the social ostracizing of actors and
+gypsies to the education which "cures" children of childishness—is the
+condition of civilization. Social and individual education reinforces the
+objectifying behavior required by work and prevents people from submerging themselves once more in the ebb and flow of surrounding nature.
+All distraction, indeed, all devotion has an element of mimicry. The ego
+has been forged by hardening itself against such behavior. The transition
+from reflecting mimesis to controlled reflection completes its formation.
+Bodily adaptation to nature is replaced by "recognition in a concept,"* the
+subsuming of difference under sameness. However, the constellation under
+which sameness is established, both the direct sameness of mimesis and the
+
+149
+indirect sameness of synthesis, the adaptation of the self to the thing in the
+blind act of living no less than the comparison of reified elements in scientific conceptualization—that constellation remains terror. Society perpetuates the threat from nature as the permanent, organized compulsion
+which, reproducing itself in individuals as systematic self-preservation,
+rebounds against nature as society's control over it. Science is repetition,
+refined to observed regularity and preserved in stereotypes. The mathematical formula is consciously manipulated regression, just as the magic
+ritual was; it is the most sublimated form of mimicry. In technology the
+adaptation to lifelessness in the service of self-preservation is no longer
+accomplished, as in magic, by bodily imitation of external nature, but by
+automating mental processes, turning them into blind sequences. With its
+triumph human expressions become both controllable and compulsive. All
+that remains of the adaptation to nature is the hardening against it. The
+camouflage used to protect and strike terror today is the blind mastery of
+nature, which is identical to farsighted instrumentality.
+In the bourgeois mode of production the ineradicable mimetic heritage present in all praxis is consigned to oblivion. The pitiless ban on
+regression appears like an edict of fate; the denial is so total that it is no
+longer registered consciously. Those blinded by civilization have contact
+with their own tabooed mimetic traits only through certain gestures and
+forms of behavior they encounter in others, as isolated, shameful residues
+in their rationalized environment. What repels them as alien is all too
+familiar.' It lurks in the contagious gestures of an immediacy suppressed
+by civilization: gestures of touching, nestling, soothing, coaxing. What
+makes such impulses repellent today is their ourmodedness. In seeking to
+win over the buyer with flattery, the debtor with threats, the creditor with
+supplication, they appear to translate long-reified human relationships
+back into those of personal power. Any emotion is finally embarrassing;
+mere excitement is preferable. All unmanipulated expression appears like
+the grimace which the manipulated expression-of the film actor, the
+lynch mob, the Führer's speech—always was. Undisciplined mimicry is
+the brand burned by the old domination into the living substance of the
+dominated, and is inherited through an unconscious process of imitation
+in early childhood from generation to generation, from the Jewish ragsanel-bones man to the banker. Such mimicry provokes anger, because it
+purs on show, in face of the new relationships of production, the old fear
+
+ISO
+which one has had to forget in order to survive chem. It is the compulsive
+moment in behavior, the rage of the tormentor and of the tormented,
+reappearing indistinguishably in the grimace, that criggers the specific rage
+of civilized people. Impotent appearance is answered by deadly reality,
+play by seriousness.
+The grimace seems like play-acting because, instead of performing
+serious work, it prefers to portray displeasure. It appears to evade che seriousness of life by admitting it without restraint: cherefore it is false. But
+expression is the painful echo of overwhelming power, violence which
+finds utterance in complaint. It is always overdone, no matter how heartfelt it may be, because, as in each work of art, the whole world seems conrained in every plaintive sound. Only activity is proportionate. It, and nor
+mimesis, can bring an end to suffering. Bur its consequence is che rigid,
+unmoved visage, culminating, at che end of chis age, in the baby faces of
+the practical men, the politicians, priests, managing directors, racketeers.
+The strident voices of fascist rabble-rousers and camp commanders show
+the reverse side of the same social condition. The screaming is as coldblooded as business. Even the plaintive sounds of nature are appropriated
+as an element of technique. The bellowing of these orators is to the
+pogrom what its howling klaxon is to the German flying bomb: the cry of
+terror which announces terror is mechanically switched on. The screamers
+deliberately use the wail of the victim, which first called violence by its
+name, and even the mere word which designates the victim-Frenchman,
+Negro, Jew-to induce in themselves the desperation of the persecuted
+who have to hit our. They are the false likeness of the terrified mimesis.
+They reproduce within chemselves the insatiability of the power of which
+they are afraid. Everything must be used, everything must belong to them.
+The mere existence of the other is a provocation. Everyone else "gers in the
+way" and must be shown their limits—the limits of limitless horror. No
+one who seeks shelter shall find it; those who express what everyone
+craves—peace, homeland, freedom—will be denied it, just as nomads and
+traveling players have always been refused rights of domicile. Whatever
+someone fears, that is done to him. Even the last resting place shall be
+none. The despoiling of graveyards is nor an excess of anti-Semitism; it is
+anti-Semitism itself. Those evicted compulsively arouse the lust to evict
+chem even here. The marks left on chem by violence endlessly inflame violence. Anything which merely wants to vegetate must be rooted out. The
+
+Limits of Enlightenmem
+15l
+chaotically regular flight reactions of the lower animals, che patterns of
+swarming crowds, the convulsive gestures of the tortured—all these express what wretched life can never quite control: the mimetic impulse. In
+the death throes of the creature, at the furthest extreme from freedom,
+freedom itself irresistibly shines forth as the thwarted destiny of matter. It
+is against this freedom that the idiosyncratic aversion, the purported mocive of anti-Semitism, is ultimately directed.
+The psychic energy harnessed by political anti-Semitism is this rationalized idiosyncrasy. All the gesticulations devised by the Führer and his
+followers are pretexts for giving way to the mimetic temptation without
+openly violating the reality principle—with honor, as it were. They detest
+the Jews and imitate them constantly. There is no anti-Semite who does
+not feel an instinctive urge to ape what he takes to be Jewishness. The
+same mimetic codes are constantly used: the argumentative jerking of the
+hands, the singing tone of voice, which vividly animates a situation or a
+feeling independently of judgment, and the nose, that physiognomic principium individuationis, which writes the individual's peculiarity on his
+face. In the ambiguous partialities of the sense of smell the old nostalgia
+for what is lower lives on, the longing for immediate union with surrounding nature, with earth and slime. Of all che senses the act of
+smelling, which is attracted without objectifying, reveals most sensuously
+the urge to lose oneself in identification with the Other. That is why smell,
+as both the perception and the perceived—which are one in the act of
+olfaction—is more expressive chan other senses. When we see we remain
+who we are, when we smell we are absorbed entirely. In civilization, therefore, smell is regarded as a disgrace, a sign of the lower social orders, lesser races, and baser animals. The civilized person is allowed to give way to
+such desires only if the prohibition is suspended by rationalization in the
+service of practical purposes, real or apparent. One is allowed to indulge
+the outlawed drive if acting with the unquestionable aim of expunging it.
+This is manifested in the practical joke. It is a wretched parody of fulfillment. The mimetic function is sneeringly enjoyed as something despised
+and self-despising. Anyone who sniffs out "bad" smells in order to extirpate them may imitate to his heart's content the snuffling which takes its
+unrationalized pleasure in the smell itself. Disinfected by the civilized sniffers absolute identification with the prohibiting agency, the forbidden
+impulse eludes the prohibition. If it crosses the threshold, the response is
+
+laughter. That is the schema of the anti-Semitic reaction. The anti-Semites
+gather to celebrate the moment when authority lifts the ban; that moment
+alone makes them a collective, constituting the community of kindred
+spirits. Their ranting is organized laughter. The more dreadful the accusations and threats, the greater the fury, the more withering is the scorn.
+Rage, mockery, and poisoned imitation are fundamentally the same thing.
+The purpose of the fascist cult of formulae, the ritualized discipline, the
+uniforms, and the whole allegedly irrational apparatus, is to make possible
+mimetic behavior. The elaborate symbols proper to every counterrevolutionary movement, the death's heads and masquerades, the barbaric drumming, the monotonous repetition of words and gestures, are so many
+organized imitations of magical practices, the mimesis of mimesis. The
+Führer, with his ham-actor's facial expressions and the hysterical charisma
+turned on with a switch, leads the dance. In his performance he acts out
+by proxy and in effigy what is denied to everyone else in reality. Hitler can
+gesticulate like a clown, Mussolini risk false notes like a provincial tenor,
+Goebbels talk as glibly as the Jewish agent whose murder he is recommending, Coughlin* preach love like the Savior himself, whose crucifixion he impersonates for the sake of yet more bloodshed. Fascism is also
+totalitarian in seeking to place oppressed nature's rebellion against domination directly in the service of domination.
+This mechanism needs the Jews. Their artificially heightened visibility acts on the legitimate son of Gentile civilization like a kind of magnetic
+field. In being made aware, through his very difference from the Jew, of
+the humanity they have in common, the rooted Gentile is overcome by a
+feeling of something antithetical and alien. In this way the tabooed
+impulses which run counter to work in its dominant form are converted
+into conforming idiosyncrasies. Against this the economic position of the
+Jews, the last defrauded fraudsters of the liberal ideology, offers no reliable
+protection. Because they are so eminently suited to generating these inductive psychic currents they are unresistingly allocated to such functions.
+They share the fate of the rebellious nature for which fascism substitutes
+them, being put to use with the perspicuity of the blind. It makes little difference whether the Jews as individuals really display the mimetic traits
+which cause the malign infection or whether those traits are merely impured. If the holders of economic power have once overcome their fear of
+employing fascist agents, in face of the Jews the harmony of the national
+
+153
+community is automatically established. They are sacrificed by the dominant order when, through its increasing estrangement from nature, it has
+reverted to mere nature. The Jews as a whole are charged with practicing
+forbidden magic and bloody rituals. Disguised as an accusation, the subliminal craving of the indigenous population to revert to mimetic sacrificial practices is joyously readmitted to their consciousness. Once the horror of the primeval age, sent packing by civilization, has been rehabilitated as a rational interest through projection onto the Jews, there is no holding back. It can be acted our in reality, and the evil which is acted our surpasses even the evil content of the projection. The popular nationalist fantasies of Jewish crimes, of infanticide and sadistic excesses, of racial poisoning and international conspiracy, precisely define the anti-Semitic
+dream, and fall short of its realization. Once things have gone so far, the
+mere word Jew appears like the bloody grimace whose image-skull and
+mangled cross in one—is unfurled on the swastika flag; the fact that
+someone is called a Jew acts as a provocation to set about him until he
+resembles that image.
+Civilization is the triumph of society over nature—a triumph which
+transforms everything into mere nature. The Jews themselves, over the
+millennia, have played their part in this, with enlightenment no less than
+with cynicism. As the oldest surviving patriarchy, the incarnation of
+monotheism, they converted taboos into maxims of civilization while the
+others were still enmeshed in magic. The Jews appeared to have successfully achieved what Christianity had attempted in vain: the disempowerment of magic by means of its own strength, which, as worship of God, is
+turned against itself. They have not so much eradicated the adaptation to
+nature as elevated it to the pure duties of ritual. In this way they have preserved its reconciling memory, without relapsing through symbols into
+mythology. They are therefore regarded by advanced civilization as both
+backward and too advanced, like and unlike, shrewd and stupid. They are
+pronounced guilty of what, as the first citizens, they were the first to subdue in themselves: the susceptibility to the lure of base instincts, the urge
+toward the beast and the earth, the worship of images. Because they
+invented the concept of the kosher, they are persecuted as swine. The anti-
+Semites appoint themselves executors of the Old Testament: they see to it
+that the Jews, having eaten of the Tree of Knowledge, unto dust shall
+return.
+
+1S4
+VI
+Anti-Semitism is based on false projection. It is the reverse of genuine mimesis and has deep affinities to the repressed; in fact, it may itself
+be the pathic character trait in which the latter is precipitated. If mimesis
+makes itself resemble its surroundings, false projection makes its surroundings resemble itself. If, for the former, the outward becomes the
+model to which the inward clings, so that the alien becomes the intimately known, the latter displaces the volatile inward into the outer world,
+branding the intimate friend as foe. Impulses which are not acknowledged
+by the subject and yet are his, are attributed to the object: the prospective
+victim. For the ordinary paranoiac the choice of victim is not free; it obeys
+the laws of his illness. In fascism this behavior is adopted by politics; the
+object of the illness is declared true to reality, the system of delusions the
+reasonable norm in a world which makes deviation neurosis. The mechanism which the totalitarian order takes into its service is as old as civilization. The sexual impulses suppressed by humanity survived in both individuals and peoples and asserted themselves in the imaginary transformation of the surrounding world into a diabolic system. Those impelled by
+blind murderous lust have always seen in the victim the pursuer who has
+driven them to desperate self-dcfense, and the mightiest of the rich have
+experienced their weakest neighbor as an intolerable threat before falling
+upon him. The rationalization was both a ruse and a compulsion. The person chosen as foe is already perceived as foe. The disorder lies in the subject's faulty distinction between his own contribution to the projected
+material and that of others.
+In a certain sense, all perception is projection. The projection of
+sense impressions is a legacy of animal prehistory, a mechanism for the
+purposes of defense and obtaining food, an extension of the readiness for
+combat with which higher species reacted actively or passively to movements, regardless of the intention of the object. Projection has been automated in man like other forms of offensive or defensive behavior which
+have become reflexes. In this way his objective world has been constituted as a product of "an art concealed in the depths of the human soul,
+whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze." The system of things, the fixed universal order of which science is merely an abstract expression, is, if Kant's
+
+ISS
+critique of knowledge is applied anthropologically, the unconscious product of the animal tool in the struggle for existence—it is the automatic
+projection. In human society, however, where both the affective and the
+intellectual life grow complex with the formation of che individual, projection must be increasingly controlled; individuals must learn both to
+refine and to inhibit it. As economic compulsion teaches them to distinguish berween their own thoughts and feelings and those of others, a distinction emerges berween outer and inner, the possibility of detachment
+and of identification, self-consciousness and conscience. More precise
+reflection is needed to understand this controlled form of projection and
+its degeneration into the false projection which is essential to anti-
+Semitism.
+The physiological theory of perception, which has been despised by
+philosophers since Kant as naively realistic and as a circular argument,
+holds the world of perception to be a reflection, guided by the intellect, of
+the data received from real objects by the brain. According to this view,
+punctual indices, or impressions, are registered physiologically and then
+ordered by the mind. Although the Gestalt people may insist that the
+physiological substance receives not merely points but structure, Schopenhauer and Helmholtz, despite or even because of the circularity of their
+view, knew more about the intermeshed relationship of subject and object
+than is reflected in the official logical consistency of the schools, whether
+neopsychological or neo-Kantian: the perceptual image does indeed conrain concepts and judgments. Berween the actual object and the indubitable sense datum, berween inner and outer, yawns an abyss which the
+subject must bridge at its own peril. To reflect the thing as it is, the subject must give back to it more than it receives from it. From the traces the
+thing leaves behind in its senses the subject recreates the world outside it:
+the unity of the thing in its manifold properties and states; and in so
+doing, in learning how to impart a synthetic unity not only to the ourward
+impressions but to the inward ones which gradually separate themselves
+from chem, it retroactively constitutes the self. The identical ego is the
+most recent constant product of projection. In a process which could only
+he accomplished historically when the powers of the human physiological
+institution were fully developed, this self has emerged as a unified and,
+l the same time, an eccentric function. But even as an autonomously
+objectified subject it is only whar che objective world is for it. The inner
+
+depth of the subject consists in nothing other than the delicacy and richness of the outer perceptual world. If this intermeshing is broken, the self
+petrifies. If it is confined, positivistically, to registering the given without
+itself giving, it shrinks to a point, and if, idealistically, it projects the world
+out of the bottomless origin or its own self, it exhausts itself in monotonous repetition. In both cases it gives up the ghost—in this case the mind
+or spirit. Only mediation, in which the insignificant sense datum raises
+thought to the fullest productivity of which it is capable, and in which,
+conversely, thought gives itself up without reservation to the overwhelming impression—only mediation can overcome the isolation which ails the
+whole of nature. Neither the certainty untroubled by thought, nor the preconceptual unity of perception and object, but only their self-reflective
+antithesis contains the possibility of reconciliation. The antithesis is perceived in the subject, which has the external world within its own consciousness and yet recognizes it as other. Reflection on that antithesis,
+therefore, the life of reason, takes place as conscious projection.
+The pathic element in anti-Semitism is not projective behavior as
+such but the exclusion of reflection from that behavior. Because the subject is unable to return to the object what it has received from it, it is not
+en riched but impoverished. It loses reflection in both directions: as it no
+longer reflects the object, it no longer reflects on itself, and thereby loses
+the ability to differentiate. Instead of the voice of conscience, it hears voices; instead of inwardly examining itself in order to draw up a protocol of
+its own lust for power, it attributes to others the Protocol of the Elders of
+Zion. It overflows at the same time as it dries up. It invests the outside
+world boundlessly with what is within itself; but what it invests is something utterly insignificant, an inflated accumulation of mere means, relationships, machinations, a grim praxis unilluminated by thought. Domination itself which, even as absolute power, is inherently only a means,
+becomes in untrammeled projection the purpose both of oneself and of
+others, purpose as such. In the sickness of the individual, humanity's
+sharpened intellectual apparatus is turned once more against humanity,
+regressing to the blind instrument of hostility it was in animal prehistory, and as which, for the species, it has never ceased to operate in relation
+to the rest of nature. Just as, since its rise, the human species has manifested itself toward others as developmentally the highest, capable of the
+most terrible destruction; and just as, within humanity, the more ad-
+
+Limits of Enlighsenmen
+157
+vanced races have confronted the more primitive, the technically superior
+nations the more backward, so the sick individual confronts the other individual, in megalomania as in persecution mania. In both cases the subject
+is at the center, the world a mere occasion for its delusion; it becomes the
+impotent or omnipotent quintessence of what is projected on to it. The
+opposition of which the paranoiac complains indiscriminately at every
+step is the result of the lack of resistance, of the emptiness which the encapsulated subject generates around itself. The paranoiac cannot stop. The
+idea, having no firm hold on reality, insists all the more and becomes the
+fixation.
+Because paranoiacs perceive the outside world only in so far as it corresponds to their blind purposes, they can only endlessly repeat their own
+self, which has been alienated from them as an abstract mania. This naked
+schema of power as such, equally overwhelming toward others and toward
+a self at odds with itself, seizes whatever comes its way and, wholly disregarding its peculiarity, incorporates it in its mythic web. The closed circle
+of perpetual sameness becomes a surrogate for omnipotence. It is as if the
+serpent which told the first humans "Ye shall be as gods" had kept his
+promise in the paranoiac. He creates everything in his own image. He
+seems to need no living thing yet demands that all shall serve him. His will
+permeates the whole universe; nothing may be unrelated to him. His systems know of no gaps. As astrologer, he endows the stars with powers
+which bring abour the ruin of the unsuspecting, whether it is the ruin of
+others in the preclinical stage or of his own ego in the clinical stage. As
+philosopher, he makes world history the executor of inescapable catastrophes and downfalls. As completely insane or absolutely rational, he annihilates those marked down as victims either by the individual act of terror
+or by the well-considered strategy of extermination. In this way he succeeds. Just as women adore the unmoved paranoid man, nations fall to
+their knees before totalitarian fascism. The paranoid element in the devorees responds to the paranoiac as to the evil spirit, their fear of conscience
+to his utter lack of scruples, for which they feel gratitude. They follow the
+man who looks past them, who does not treat them as subjects but hands
+them over to the operations of his many purposes. Like everyone else,
+these women have made the occupation of greater or lesser positions of
+power their religion, and themselves the malign creatures society takes
+them for. And so the gaze which reminds them of freedom must strike
+
+158
+them as that of the over-naive seducer. Their world is inverted. But at the
+same time they know, like the ancient gods who shunned the gaze of the
+faithful, that something lifeless resides behind their veil. In the trusting
+look of the nonparanoid they are reminded of the spirit which has died in
+them, because they see outside them only the cold means of their selfpreservation. To be touched in this way awakens in them shame and rage.
+Yet the madman does not reach them, even though he may stare them in
+the face like the Führer. He merely inflames them. His proverbial gaze
+straight into the eyes, unlike the free gaze, does not preserve individuality. It fixates. It binds others to one-sided loyalty, by confining them to the
+windowless monadic fortress of their own person. It does not awaken conscience, but prematurely imposes responsibility. The penetrating look and
+the one that goes past you, the hypnotic and the disregarding gaze, are of
+the same kind: in both, the subject is extinguished. Because in both looks
+reflection is absent, the unreflecting are electrified by them. They are betrayed: the women cast away, the nation incinerated. Thus, the self-encapsulated figure remains a caricature of divine power. Just as his lordly gesture is entirely without creative power in reality, so, like the devil, he lacks
+the attributes of the principle he usurps: mindful love and freedom secure
+within itself. He is malignant, driven by compulsion, and as weak as he is
+strong. If divine omnipotence is said to draw creation unto itself, this
+satanic, imagined omnipotence draws everything into its impotence. That
+is the secret of its rule. The compulsively projecting self can project nothing except its own unhappiness, from the cause of which, residing in itself,
+it is yet cut off by its lack of reflection. For this reason the products of false
+projection, the stereotyped schemata of both thought and reality, bring
+calamity. For the ego, sinking into the meaningless abyss of itself, objects
+become allegories of ruin, which harbor the meaning of its own downfall.
+The psychoanalytic theory of pathic projection has identified the
+transference of socially tabooed impulses from the subject to the object as
+the substance of that projection. Under the pressure of the superego, the
+ego projects aggressive urges emanating from the id which, through their
+strength, are a danger to itself, as malign intentions onto the outside
+world, and succeeds in ridding itself of them as reactions to that outside
+world, either in fantasy by identification with the alleged malefactor or in
+reality by ostensible self-defense. The proscribed material converted into
+aggression is usually homosexual in nature. Through fear of castration,
+
+159
+obedience toward the father preempts castration by adapting the conscious
+emotional life to that of a little girl, and hatred of the father is repressed
+as endless rancor. In paranoia, this hatred is intensified to a castration wish
+expressed as a universal urge to destroy. The sick subject regresses to an
+archaic confusion between love and dominance. It is concerned with physical closeness, with taking possession, finally with relationship at any price.
+Because it cannot acknowledge desire within itself, it assails the other with
+jealousy or persecution, as the repressed sodomite hounds the animal as
+hunter or driver. The attraction stems from excessive attachment or develops at first sight; it can emanate from great figures, as in the case of malcontents and murderers of presidents, or from the most wretched as in the
+pogrom itself. The objects of the fixation are replaceable like father figures
+in childhood; whatever it hits on fits its purpose; the delusion of relatedness strikes out unrelatedly. Pathic projection is a desperate exertion by an
+ego which, according to Freud has a far weaker resistance to internal than
+to external stimuli: under the pressure of pent-up homosexual aggression
+the psychic mechanism forgets its most recent phylogenetic attainment,
+the perception of self, and experiences that aggression as an enemy in the
+world, the better to master it.
+This pressure acts also, however, on the healthy cognitive process as
+a moment of its unreflecting naivery, which tends roward violence.
+Wherever intellectual energies are concentrated on an external intention,
+wherever it is a matter of pursuing, ascertaining, grasping—of exerting
+those functions which have been sublimated from the primitive overpowering of animals into the scientific methods of controlling nature-the
+subjective process is easily overlooked in the schematization, and the system is posited as the thing itself. Objectifying thought, like its pathological counterpart, has the arbitrariness of a subjective purpose extraneous to
+the matter itself and, in forgetting the matter, does to it in thought the violence which later will be done in practice. The unconditional realism of
+civilized humanity, which culminates in fascism, is a special case of paranoid delusion which depopulates nature and finally nations themselves. In
+rhe abyss of uncertainty, which every objectifying act must bridge, paranoia installs itself. Because there is no absolutely compelling argument
+•gainst materially false judgments, the distorted perception in which they
+lurk cannot be healed. Every percept unconsciously contains conceptual
+rements, just as every judgment contains unclarified phenomenalistic
+
+Ibo
+ones. Because imagination is involved in truth, it can always appear to this
+damaged imagination that truth is fantastic and its illusion the truth. The
+maimed subject lives on the element of imagination immanent in truth by
+ceaselessly putting it on show. Democratically, he insists on equal rights
+for his delusion, because, in fact, not even truth is stringent. While the citizen may admit that the anti-Semite is in the wrong, he requires the victim to be guilty too. Thus Hitler demands the right to practice mass murder in the name of the principle of sovereignty under international law,
+which tolerates any act of violence in another country.* Like every paranoiac he takes advantage of the hypocritical identity of truth and
+sophistry; the distinction berween them is as uncompelling as it nevertheless is strict. Perception is only possible in so far as the thing is already
+apprehended as determinate-for example, as a case of a genus or type. It
+is a mediated immediacy, thought infused with the seductive power of sensuality. It blindly transfers subjective elements to the apparent givenness of
+the object. Only the self-conscious work of thought-that is, according to
+Leibnizian and Hegelian idealism, only philosophy—can escape this hallucinatory power. As, in the course of cognition, thought identifies the
+conceptual moments which are immediately posited in perception and are
+therefore compelling, it progressively takes them back into the subject and
+strips them of their intuitive power. In this process every earlier stage,
+including science, turns out to be, in comparison to philosophy, a kind of
+percept, an estranged phenomenon permeated with unrecognized intellectual elements; persistence at this stage, without negation, forms part of
+the pathology of cognition. The subject which naively postulates absolutes, no matter how universally active it may be, is sick, passively succumbing to the dazzlement of false immediacy.
+Such blindness is, however, a constitutive element of all judgment, a
+necessary illusion. Every judgment, even negative, is reassuring. However
+much a judgment may stress its own isolation and relativity for the purpose of self-correction, it must assert its own content, no matter how cautiously formulated, as something not merely isolated and relative. That
+constitutes its nature as judgment, whereas the clause merely entrenches a
+claim. Truth, unlike probability, has no gradations. The negating step
+beyond the individual judgment, which rescues its truth, is possible only
+in so far as it takes itself to be truth and in that sense is paranoid. True
+derangement lies only in the immovable, in thought's incapacity for the
+
+Iбı
+negation in which, unlike the fixed judgment, thought actually consists.
+The paranoid over-consistency, the bad infinity of never-changing judgment, is a lack of consistency in thought; instead of conceptually carrying
+through the failure of the absolute claim and thereby continuing to qualify his or her judgment, the paranoiac clings obdurately to the claim which
+has caused the judgment to fail. Instead of going further by penetrating its
+subject matter more deeply, thought places itself entirely in the hopeless
+service of the particular judgment. The latter's irresistibility is the same as
+its intact positivity, and the paranoiac's weakness is that of thought itself.
+For reflection, which in the healthy subject breaks the power of immediacy, is never as compelling as the illusion it dispels. As a negative, reflective
+movement nor directed straight ahead, it lacks the brutality inherent in the
+positive. If the psychic energy of paranoia stems from the libidinal dynamic laid bare by psychoanalysis, its objective impregnability is founded on
+the ambiguity inseparable from the objectifying act; indeed, the latter's
+hallucinatory power will have been originally decisive. To clarify, it can be
+said in the language of natural selection theory that during the formative
+period of the human sensorium those individuals survived in whom the
+power of the projective mechanisms extended most deeply into their rudimentary logical faculties, or was least moderated by the premature onset
+of reflection. Just as, even today, practically fruitful scientific enterprises
+call for an unimpaired capacity for definition, for shutting down thought
+at a point designated by social need, for demarcating a field which is then
+investigated in the minutest detail without passing outside it, paranoiacs
+cannot step ourside a complex of interests designated by their psychological fare. Their mental acureness consumes itself within the circle drawn
+by their fixed idea, as human ingenuity is liquidating itself under the spell
+of technical civilization. Paranoia is the shadow of cognition.
+So calamitous is the mind's tendency to false projection that, as the
+isolated schema of self-preservation, such projection threatens to dominate
+everything which goes beyond self-preservation: culture. False projection
+is the usurper in the realm of freedom as of culture; paranoia is the sympcom of the half-educated. For such people, all words become a system of
+delusion, an attempt mentally to occupy the regions to which their experience does not extend, violently to give meaning to a world which makes
+them meaningless, but at the same time to denigrate the intellect and the
+experience from which they are excluded and to burden them with the
+
+ı62
+guilt really borne by the society which has brought about that exclusion.
+The half-educated who, unlike the merely uneducated, hypostatize limited knowledge as truth, cannot endure the breach between inward and ourward, individual fate and social law, appearance and essence, which for
+them is heightened to unbearable levels. To be sure, their suffering does
+contain an element of truth, compared to the mere acceptance of the given
+to which superior understanding has sworn allegiance. Nevertheless, the
+half-educated reach our stereotypically in their fear for che formula which
+suits their need, now to justify the disaster which has happened, now to
+predict the catastrophe still to come, which is sometimes disguised as a
+regeneration. The explanation, in which their own desires appear as an
+objective power, is always as external and meaningless as the isolated event
+itself, at once feeble-minded and sinister. The obscurantist systems of
+today bring abour what the devil myth of the official religion enabled people to do in the Middle Ages: to imbue the outside world with an arbitrary
+meaning, which the lone paranoiac now constructs according to a private
+schema shared by no one, and which only for that reason appears actually
+mad. Relief is provided by the dire conventicles and panaceas which put
+on scientific airs while cutting off thought: theosophy, numerology, naturopathy, eurhythmy, teetotalism, Yoga, and countless other sects, compering and interchangeable, all with academies, hierarchies and specialist jargon, the fetishized officialese of science and religion. When confronted by
+an educated public, they remained apocryphal and disreputable. But today, when education itself is withering for economic reasons, unprecedented conditions are created for che paranoia of che masses. The belief
+systems of the past, which were embraced by the populace as self-contained paranoid forms, had wider meshes. Just because they were so rationally elaborated and specific, they left room, at least above them, for culture and mind, which, conceived as spirit, were their true medium.
+Indeed, to an extent they counteracted paranoia. Freud calls neuroses—
+even righly in this instance-"asocial formations"; "they endeavor to
+achieve by private means what is affected in society by collective effort."3
+Those belief systems retain something of the collectivity which preserves
+individuals from pathological symptoms. The sickness is socialized: in che
+intoxication of the communal ecstasy—indeed, as itself a communityblindness becomes a relationship and the paranoid mechanism is made
+controllable, without losing the power to strike terror. Perhaps that was
+
+ı63
+one of the major contributions of religions to the survival of the species.
+Paranoid forms of consciousness rend to give rise to leagues, factions, rackets. Their members are afraid to believe their madness on their own.
+Projecting it, they everywhere see proselytizing and conspiracy. The established group has always taken a paranoid stance toward others; in this the
+great empires, indeed, organized humanity as a whole, are no better than
+headhunters. Those who were excluded from humanity against their will,
+like those who excluded themselves from it our of longing for humanity,
+knew that the pathological cohesion of the established group was strengthened by persecuting them. Its normal members relieve their paranoia by
+participating in the collective one, and cling passionately to the objectified, collective, approved forms of delusion. The horror vacui with which
+they devote themselves to their confederacies welds them together and
+gives them their almost irresistible power.
+With bourgeois property, education and culture spread, driving
+paranoia into the dark corners of society and the psyche. But as the real
+emancipation of humanity did not coincide with the enlightenment of the
+mind, education itself became sick. The less social reality kept pace with
+educated consciousness, the more that consciousness itself succumbed to
+a process of reification. Culture was entirely commoditized, disseminated
+as information which did not permeate those who acquired it. Thought
+becomes short-winded, confines itself to apprehending isolated facts.
+Intellectual connections are rejected as an inconvenient and useless exerlion. The developmental moment in thought, its whole genetic and intensive dimension, is forgotten and leveled down to what is immediately prevent, to the extensive. The present order of life allows the self no scope to
+draw intellectual or spiritual conclusions. Thought, stripped down to
+knowledge, is neutralized, harnessed merely to qualifying its practitioner
+for specific labor markets and heightening the commodity value of the
+personality. In this way the self-reflection of the mind, which counteracts
+puranoia, is disabled. Finally, under the conditions of late capitalism, the
+half-educated condition has become the objective spirit. In the totalitari-
+•ll phase of government its exponents reinstate the provincial charlatans of
+politics, and with chem the system of delusion, as the ultima ratio, impos-
+": is on the majority of the administered, who have already been softened
+up by big politics and the culture industry.* The absurdity of the present
+*seem of rule is so transparent to healthy consciousness that it needs sick
+
+I64
+consciousness to keep itself alive. Only chose suffering from persecution
+mania can colerate the persecution which domination inevitably becomes,
+provided they are allowed to persecute others.
+In fascism, where the responsibility for wife and child painfully
+inculcated by bourgeois civilization is being obscured by the individual's
+insistent conformity to regulations, conscience is being liquidated in any
+case. Contrary to the ideas of Dostoievski and the German apostles of
+inwardness, conscience consisted in the self's devotion to something substantial outside itself, in the ability to make the true concerns of others
+one's own. This ability involves reflection as an interpenetration of receptivity and imagination. Because the abolition of the independent economic subject by big industry*-partly by absorbing free entrepreneurs and
+partly by transforming the workers* into objects of trades unions—is irresistibly eroding the basis of moral decisions, reflection, too, must wither.
+The soul, as the possibility of guilt aware of itself, decays. Conscience is
+deprived of objects, since individuals responsibility for themselves and
+their dependents is replaced —although still under the old moral title-by
+their mere performance for the apparatus. The internal conflict of drives,
+in which the agency of conscience is formed, can no longer be worked
+through. If internalized, the social injunctions would not only be made
+both more binding and more open but also would be emancipated from
+society and even turned against it; instead, the individual identifies himself or herself promptly and directly with the stereotyped scales of values.
+The exemplary German woman, who has a monopoly on femininity as the
+true German man has on masculinity, and their counterparts elsewhere,
+are conformist, asocial human types. Despite and because of its obvious
+deficiency, the system of power has become so preponderant chat powerless individuals can avert their fate only through blind compliance.
+In face of such power, it is left to chance—guided by the Parry-o
+decide where despairing self-preservation is to project the guilt for its terror. The Jews are the predestined target of this guided chance. The circulation sphere, in which they once held positions of economic power, is
+vanishing. The liberal form of commercial enterprise once endowed fragmented wealth with political influence. Now, no sooner emancipated, its
+owners are merged with the state apparatus and placed at the mercy of
+capital powers which have outgrown competition. No matter what the
+makeup of the Jews may be in reality, their image, that of the defeated, has
+
+I65
+characteristics which must make totalitarian rule their mortal enemy: happiness without power, reward without work, a homeland without frontiers, religion without myth. These features are outlawed by the ruling
+powers because they are secretly coveted by the ruled. The former can survive only as long as the latter turn what they yearn for into an object of
+hate. They do so through pathic projection, since even hatred leads to
+union with the object—in destruction. It is the negative of reconciliation.
+Reconciliation is Judaism's highest concept, and expectation its whole
+meaning. The paranoid reaction stems from the incapacity for expectation. The anti-Semites are realizing their negative absolute through power,
+by transforming the world into the hell they have always taken it to be. A
+radical change would depend on whether the ruled, in face of absolute
+madness, could master themselves and hold the madness back. Only the
+liberation of thought from power, the abolition of violence, could realize
+the idea which has been unrealized until now*: that the Jew is a human
+being. This would be a step away from the anti-Semitic society, which
+drives both Jews and others into sickness, and roward the human one.
+Such a step would fulfill the fascist lie by contradicting it: the Jewish question would indeed prove the turning-point of history.* By conquering the
+sickness of the mind which flourishes on the rich soil of self-assertion unhampered by reflection, humanity would cease to be the universal antirace
+and become the species which, as nature, is more than mere nature, in that
+it is aware of its own image. The individual and social emancipation from
+domination is the countermovement to false projection, and no longer
+would Jews seek, by resembling it, to appease the evil senselessly visited on
+them as on all the persecuted, whether animals or human beings.
+vI*
+But there are no longer any anti-Semites. The last of them were lib-
+"rals who wanted to express their antiliberal opinions. By the end of the
+nineteenth century the old-style conservative aloofness of the nobility and
+the officer corps toward the Jews was merely reactionary. The people
+breast of the times were the Ahlwardts and the Knüppelkunzes.* They
+drew cheir followers from the same groups as the Führer, but their support
+,.ume from troublemakers and malcontents throughout the country. When
+people voiced anti-Semitic attitudes, they felt they were being bourgeois
+
+I66
+and rebellious at the same time. Their nationalistic grumbling was still a
+distorted form of civil freedom. The beer hall politics of the anti-Semites
+exposed the lie of German liberalism, on which it fed and whose demise
+it finally brought about. Even though they used their own mediocrity as a
+license to subject the Jews to beatings in which universal murder was
+already latent, they were economically farsighted enough to weigh the risks
+of the Third Reich against the advantages of a hostile form of tolerance.
+Anti-Semitism was still a competing motif within a range of subjective
+choices. But the outcome related specifically to it. The whole chauvinistic
+vocabulary was implied from the start in the adoption of the völkisch thesis. Anti-Semitic views always reflected stereotyped thinking. Today only
+that thinking is left. People still vote, but only between totalities. The anti-
+Semitic psychology has largely been replaced by mere acceptance of the
+whole fascist ticker,* which is an inventory of the slogans of belligerent big
+business. Just as, on the ballot paper of the mass party, voters are presented with the names of people remote from their experience for whom they
+can only vote en bloc, the central ideological concepts have been codified
+into a small number of lists. One has to opt for one of them en bloc if one's
+own position is not to seem as futile as splinter votes on polling day in face
+of the statistical mammoths. Anti-Semitism has practically ceased to be an
+independent impulse and has become a plank in the platform: anyone
+who gives fascism its chance subscribes to the settlement of the Jewish
+question along with the breaking of the unions and the crusade against
+Bolshevism. The anti-Semite's conviction, however mendacious it may be,
+has been absorbed into the preconditioned reflexes of the subjectless exponents of a particular standpoint. When the masses accept the reactionary
+ticket containing the clause against the Jews, they are obeying social mechanisms in which individual people's experiences of Jews play no part. It has
+been shown, in fact, that anti-Semitism's prospects are no less good in
+"Jew-free"* areas than in Hollywood itself. Experience is replaced by
+cliché, the imagination active in experience by diligent acceptance. The
+members of each class have to absorb their quota of guidelines on pain of
+rapid downfall. Just as they need to be instructed on the technical merits
+of a particular aircraft, so do they, too, on their allegiance to one of the
+prescribed agencies of power.
+In the world of mass production, stereotypes replace intellectual car-
+"gories. Judgment is no longer based on a real act of syn thesis but on blind
+
+i67
+subsumption. If, at an early historical stage, judgment consisted in the
+swift decision which immediately unleashed the poisoned arrow, in the
+meantime exchange and the institutions of law have taken their effect. The
+act of judgment passed through a stage of deliberation which afforded the
+judging subject some prorection from brutal identification with the predicate. In late-industrial society there is a regression to judgment without
+judging. When, in fascism, the protracted legal process was replaced by an
+accelerated procedure in criminal trials, up-to-date people had been economically prepared for this development. They had learned to see things
+unreflectingly, through ready-made thought models, the termini technici
+which provide them with iron rations following the decay of language.
+The perceiver is no longer present in the process of perception. He or she
+is incapable of the active passivity of cognition, in which caregorial elements are appropriately reshaped by preformed conventional schemata
+and vice versa, so that justice is done to the perceived object. In the field
+of the social sciences, as in that of individual experience, blind intuition
+and empty concepts are brought cogether rigidly and without mediation.*
+In the age of the "chree hundred basic words" the ability to exercise judgment, and therefore to distinguish berween true and false, is vanishing.
+Thinking, where it is not merely a highly specialized piece of professional
+equipment in chis or that branch of the division of labor, is suspect as an
+old-fashioned luxury: "armchair thinking." It is supposed to "produce"
+something. The more superfluous physical labor is made by the development of technology, che more enthusiastically it is ser up as a model for
+mental work, which must not be tempted, however, to draw any awkward
+conclusions. That is the secret of advancing stupidity, on which anti-
+Semitism thrives. If, even within the field of logic, the concept stands
+opposed to the particular as something merely external, anything which
+sands for difference within society itself must indeed tremble. Everyone is
+labeled friend or foe. The disregard for the subject makes things easy for
+the administration. Ethnic groups are transported to different latitudes;
+individuals labeled "Jew" are dispatched to the gas chambers.
+The indifference to the individual expressed in logic draws its con-
+• lusions from che economic process. The individual had become an
+Impediment to production. The lack of synchronicity between technical
+ul human development, the "cultural lag" which used to exercise che
+minds of sociologists, is beginning to disappear. Economic rationality, che
+
+I68
+vaunted principle of the smallest necessary means, is unremittingly
+reshaping the last units of the economy: businesses and human beings.
+The most advanced form at a given time becomes the predominant one.
+Once, the department store expropriated the old-style specialist shop. The
+latter, having outgrown mercantilist regulation, had absorbed initiative,
+control, and organization within itself and become, like the old mill and
+smithy, a little factory, a free enterprise. Its mode of operation was complicated, expensive, risky. Competition therefore replaced it by the more
+efficient, centralized form of retail shop, the department store. The psychological small business—the individual—is meeting che same fate. It
+came into being as the power cell of economic activity. Emancipated from
+the rurelage of earlier economic stages, individuals fended for themselves
+alone: as proletarians by hiring themselves out through the labor market
+and by constant adaptation to new technical conditions, as entrepreneurs
+by tirelessly realizing of the ideal type of homo economicus. Psychoanalysis
+has portrayed the internal small business which thus came into being as a
+complex dynamic of unconscious and conscious elements, of id, ego, and
+superego. In its negotiations with the superego, the ego, the agency of
+social control within the individual, keeps the drives within the limits set
+by self-preservation. The areas of friction are large and neuroses, the incidental expenses of such a drive economy, inevitable. Nevertheless, this
+complex psychical apparatus made possible the relatively free interplay of
+subjects which constituted the market economy. In the era of large combines and world wars, however, the mediation of the social process by innumerable monads is proving obsolete. The subjects of the drive economy
+are being psychologically expropriated, and the drive economy is being
+more rationally operated by society itself. The individual no longer has to
+decide what he or she is supposed to do in a given situation in a painful
+inner dialogue between conscience, self-preservation, and drives. For the
+human being as wage earner the decision is taken by a hierarchy extending from trade associations to the national administration; in the private
+sphere it is taken by the schema of mass culture, which appropriates even
+the most intimate impulses of its forced consumers. The committees and
+stars function as ego and superego, and the masses, stripped of even the
+semblance of personality, are molded far more compliantly by the carchwords and models than ever the instincts were by the internal censor. If,
+in liberalism, the individuation of a section of the, population was neces-
+
+Limits of Enligheennen
+18y
+sary for the adaptation of society as a whole to the state of technology,
+today the functioning of the economic apparatus demands that the masses be directed withour che hindrance of individuation. The economically
+determined direction of the whole society, which has always governed the
+mental and physical constitution of human beings, is causing the organs
+which enabled individuals to manage their lives autonomously to atrophy.
+Now that chinking has become a mere sector of the division of labor, the
+plans of the authorized experts and leaders have made individuals who
+plan their own happiness redundant. The irrationality of the unresisting
+and eager adaptation to reality becomes, for the individual, more reasonable than reason. If, previously, the bourgeois had introjected the compulsions of conscience and duty into themselves and the workers, now the
+entire human being has become at once the subject and the object of
+repression. In the progress of industrial society, which is supposed to have
+conjured away the law of increasing misery it had itself brought into
+being, the concept which justified the whole—the human being as person, as the bearer of reason—is going under. The dialectic of enlightenment is culminating objectively in madness.
+This is also a madness of political reality. As a dense web of modern communications, the world has become so standardized that the differences between diplomatic breakfasts in Dumbarton Oaks and Persia
+have to be specially devised as an expression of national character, while
+actual national peculiarity is experienced primarily by the millions hungering for rice who have fallen through the narrow meshes. Although the
+abundance of goods which could be produced everywhere and simultaneously makes the struggle for raw materials and markets seem ever more
+anachronistic, humanity is nevertheless divided into a small number of
+armed power blocs. They compete more pitilessly chan the firms involved
+in the anarchy of commodity production ever did, and strive toward
+mutual liquidation. The more senseless the antagonism, the more rigid the
+blocs. Only the total identification of the population with these monstrosities of power, so deeply imprinted as to have become second nature
+and stopping all che pores of consciousness, maintains the masses in the
+vate of absolute apathy which makes them capable of their miraculous
+•chievements. As far as any decisions are still left to individuals, they are
+rflectively decided in advance. The irreconcilability of the ideologies
+trumpeted by the politicians from the different camps is itself just one
+
+I70
+more ideology of the blind constellation of power. Ticket thinking, a
+product of industrialization and its advertising, is being extended to international relations. Whether a citizen chooses the communist or the fascist
+ticket depends on whether he happens to be more impressed by the Red
+Army or the laboratories of the West. The reification by virtue of which
+the power structure, made possible solely by the passivity of the masses,
+appears to those same masses as an iron reality, has been consolidated to
+the point where any spontaneity, or even the ability to conceive of the true
+state of affairs, has necessarily become an eccentric utopia, an irrelevant
+sectarianism. Illusion has become so concentrated that to see through it
+objectively assumes the character of hallucination. To vote for a ticket, by
+contrast, means to practice adaptation to illusion petrified as reality, which
+endlessly reproduces itself through such adaptation. The reluctant voter is
+therefore ostracized as a deserter. Since Hamler, hesitation was for modern
+people a sign of reflection and humanity. The wasted time at once represented and mediated the gap berween individual and universal, as circulation does between consumption and production in the economy. Today
+individuals receive their tickets ready-made from the powers that be, as
+consumers receive their automobiles from the sales outlets of factories.
+Conformity to reality, adaptation to power, are no longer the result of a
+dialectical process between subject and reality but are produced directly by
+the cogs and levers of industry. The process is one of liquidation instead
+of sublation, of formal instead of determinate negation. The unleashed
+colossi of production have subdued the individual not by granting him or
+her full satisfaction, but by extinguishing the subject. Precisely therein lies
+their perfect rationality, which coincides with their insanity. The extreme
+disproportion between collective and individual eliminates tension, but
+the untroubled harmony between omnipotence and impotence is itself
+unmediated contradiction, the absolute antithesis of reconciliation.
+For this reason the psychological determinants of the individual—
+which have always been the internal human agencies of wrong society—
+have not disappeared with the individual itself. However, these character
+types are now being assigned to their mathematically exact positions within the coordinates of power. Both their efficiency and their coefficient of
+friction are included in the calculation. The ticket acts as a gearwheel in
+this process. Anything in the old psychological mechanism which was
+compulsive, unfree, and irrational is precisely adjusted to it. The reac-
+
+171
+tionary ticker which includes anti-Semitism is suited to the destructiveconventional syndrome. It is not so much that such people react originally against the Jews as that their drive-structure has developed a tendency
+toward persecution which the ticket then furnishes with an adequate
+object. The "elements of anti-Semitism" once derived from experience and
+now rendered inoperative by the loss of experience reflected in ticket
+thinking, are remobilized by the ticket. Being already corrupted, these elements also provide the neo-anti-Semite with the bad conscience and thus
+with the insatiability of evil. Just because the psychology of the individual
+can now construct itself and its content only from the synthetic schemata
+supplied by society, contemporary anti-Semitism takes on its empty but
+impenetrable character The Jewish middleman fully becomes the image of
+the devil only when economically he has ceased to exist. Victory is thus
+made easy, and the anti-Semitic family man becomes the spectator,
+exempt from responsibility, of an irresistible historical tendency, intervening only when called to do so by his role as an employee of the Party or
+the Zyklon gas factories. As they designate obsolete sections of the population for extermination, the administrations of totalitarian states are
+merely the executors of economic verdicts passed long ago. Members of
+other branches of the division of labor can look on with the indifference
+of people reading newspaper reports on clean-up operations at the scene
+of yesterday's catastrophe. The peculiarities for the sake of which the victims are killed have long been effaced. Those who fall within the terms of
+the decree as Jews have to be identified by means of elaborate questionnaires, now that the antagonistic religions which once differentiated them
+have been successfully remodeled and assimilated as cultural heritage
+under the leveling pressure of late-industrial society. The Jewish masses
+themselves are no more immune to ticket thinking than the most hostile
+youth organization. In this sense fascist anti-Semitism is obliged to invent
+its own object. Paranoia no longer pursues its goal on the basis of the individual case history of the persecutor; having become a vital component of
+society it must locate that goal within the delusive context of wars and economic cycles before the psychologically predisposed "national comrades"
+can support themselves on it, both inwardly and outwardly, as patients.
+The tendency according to which anti-Semitism now exists only as
+one item on an interchangeable ticket gives irrefutable reason to hope for
+its end. The Jews are being murdered at a time when the leaders could
+
+172
+replace the anti-Semitic plank in their platform just as easily as their followers can be transplanted from one location of wholly rationalized production to another. The development which leads to ticket thinking is
+based, in any case, on the universal reduction of every specific energy to
+the one, identical, abstract form of labor, from the battlefield to the studio. However, the transition from those conditions to a more human state
+cannot take place, because benign and malign tendencies suffer the same
+fate. The freedom on the progressive ticket is as far removed from the
+existing political power structures, to which progressive decisions necessarily lead, as hostility to the Jews is external to the chemical cartel. To be
+sure, the psychologically more humane are attracted to freedom, but the
+advancing loss of experience is finally turning even the supporters of the
+progressive ticket into enemies of difference. It is not just the anti-Semitic
+ticket which is anti-Semitic, but the ticket mentality itself. The rage
+against difference which is teleologically inherent in that mentality as the
+rancor of the dominated subjects of the domination of nature is always
+ready to attack the natural minority, even though it is the social minority
+which those subjects primarily threaten. The socially responsible elite is in
+any case far harder to pin down than other minorities. In the murky intertwinement of property, ownership, control, and management it successfully eludes theoretical definition. The ideology of race and the reality of
+class both equally reveal only an abstract difference from the majority. But
+although the progressive ticket tends to produce something worse than its
+content, the content of the fascist ticket is so vacuous that it can be mainrained as a substitute for something berter only by desperate efforts on the
+part of the deceived. Its horror is that of the blatant but insistent lie. While
+it admits no truth by which it might be measured, its absurdity is so monstrous as to bring truth negatively within reach, so that it can be kept apart
+from those deprived of judgment only by their total abstention from
+thought. Enlightenment itself, having mastered itself and assumed its own
+power, could break through the limits of enlightenment.
+
+AGAINST KNOWINGNESS
+One of the lessons of the Hider period is the stupidity of cleverness.
+How many were the expert arguments with which Jews dismissed the likelihood of Hitler's rise, when it was already as clear as daylight. I recall a
+conversation with an economist who demonstrated the impossibility of
+Germany's militarization from the interests of Bavarian brewers. And in
+any case, according to the clever people, fascism was impossible in the
+West. Clever people have always made things easy for barbarians, because
+they are so stupid. It is the well-informed, farsighted judgments, the prognoses based on statistics and experience, the observations which begin: "I
+happen to be an expert in this field," it is the well-founded, conclusive
+statements which are untrue.
+Hider was against intellect and humanity. But there is also an intellect which is against humanity: it is distinguished by well-informed superiority.
+Postscript
+That cleverness is becoming stupidity is inherent in the historical
+tendency. To be reasonable, in the sense used by Chamberlain when he
+called Hitler's demands at Bad Godesberg* unreasonable, means to insist
+thar there be equivalence between giving and taking. Such reason is modeled on exchange. Objectives may be attained only through the mediation
+
+174
+of a kind of market, in the little advantages that power can steal while
+respecting the rule by which one concession is exchanged for another.
+Cleverness is helpless as soon as power disregards that rule and simply
+appropriates directly. The medium of traditional bourgeois intelligence,
+discussion, is in decline. Even individuals can no longer converse, and
+know it; that is why they have turned card games into a serious, responsible institution that calls on all cheir powers, so that although there are no
+conversations, the silence goes unheard. It is no different on the big stage.
+A fascist does not like to be spoken to. When others have their say, he takes
+it as an impudent interruption. He is impervious to reason because he recognizes it only in concessions made by others.
+The contradiction of the stupidity of cleverness is necessary. For
+bourgeois reason is obliged to claim universality while its own development curtails it. Just as, in an exchange, each party receives its due but
+social injustice nevertheless results, the exchange economy's form of reflection, the prevalent rationality, is just, universal, and particularistic, the
+instrument of privilege within equality. Fascism makes it pay the price. It
+openly represents the particular interest, thus unmasking reason, which
+wrongly flaunts its universality, as itselflimited. That this turns clever people all at once into dunces convicts reason of its own unreason.
+But the fascist, too, suffers under the contradiction. For bourgeois
+reason is not only particularistic but also, indeed, universal, and in denying its universality fascism defeats itself. Those who came to power in
+Germany were smarter than the liberals and more stupid. The "progress
+coward the new order" has been carried largely by people whose consciousness progress has left behind—bankrupts, sectarians, fools. They are
+exempt from error as long as their power precludes all competition. In the
+competition berween states, however, the fascists not only are just as capable of making mistakes but—with qualities such as myopia, bigotry, ignorance of economic forces, and, above all, the inability to perceive the negative and include it in their assessment of the situation as a whole-are
+also impelled subjectively toward the catastrophe which, in their hearts,
+they have always expected.
+
+Notes and Skerines
+1%5
+TWO WORLDS
+In this country* there is no difference between a person and that person's economic fate. No one is anything other than his wealth, his income,
+his job, his prospects. In the consciousness of everyone, including its wearer, the economic mask coincides exactly with what lies beneath it, even in
+its smallest wrinkles. All are worth as much as they earn, and earn as much
+as they are worth. They find our what they are through the ups and downs
+of their economic life. They know themselves as nothing else. If the materialist critique of society once opposed idealism by asserting that it is not
+consciousness which determines being but being consciousness, and that
+the truth abour society is to be found not in its idealistic notions of itself
+bur in its economy, up-to-date self-consciousness has meanwhile discarded such idealism. People judge their own selves by their market value and
+find out who they are from how they fare in the capitalist economy. Their
+fate, however sad it may be, is for them not something external: they
+acknowledge it. A Chinese, taking leave,
+Spoke with rear-dimmed rones: On me, my friend
+The smile of worldly fortune did not fall.
+And now I leave to wander mountain paths
+Seeking my heart's peace in their loneliness.*
+"I am a failure," says the American—and that is that.
+THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE IDEA
+INTO POWER
+Familiar tendencies from recent cimes are sometimes found prefigured in ancient, exotic history, where distance lends them a heightened
+clarity.
+In his commentary on the Isa-Upanishad, Deussen' argues that in
+that work Indian thought took a step beyond what had gone before in the
+same way as Jesus in the Gospel according to St. Matthew went beyond
+St. John the Baptist, and the Stoics beyond the Cynics. However, this
+observation is historically one-sided because the uncompromising ideas of
+John the Baptist and of the Cynics, no less chan the views against which
+the first lines of the Isa-Upanishad are supposed to represent progress,?
+
+176
+look much more like left-wing secessionist tendencies which have split off
+from powerful cliques and parties chan central tendencies of historical
+movements, from which European philosophy, Christianity, and the living Vedic religion themselves branched off. Accordingly, as Deussen himself notes, the Isa-Upanishad is usually placed at che beginning of Indian
+collections, long before the writings it is said to have gone beyond. Yet this
+first work itself shows traces of a betrayal of youthful radicalism, of treachery against revolutionary opposition to the dominant reality.
+Vedantism, Stoicism, and Christianity took the step which made
+them capable of organization when they began to participate in social reality and to construct unified theoretical systems. That step was mediated
+by the doctrine that an active role in life need not be harmful to the salvation of the soul, provided one has the right spiritual outlook. To be sure,
+Christianity reached this point only with St Paul. The idea which discances itself from the existing order turns into religion. Those who refused
+to compromise were censured. They stood aloof "from che desire for children, the desire for wealth, the desire for the world, and wandered about
+as beggars. For the desire for children is a desire for property, and the
+desire for property is a worldly desire; and both alike are vain."" Those
+who express such views may speak the truth according to che upholders of
+civilization, bur chey do not keep step with the course of social life. They
+cherefore became madmen, and did indeed resemble John che Baptist. He
+"was clothed with camel's hair, and had a girdle of skin about his loins; and
+he did eat locusts and wild honey."' "The cynics," says Hegel, "have little
+philosophical training and never managed to produce a system, a science.
+Only later was their system made a philosophical discipline, by the
+Stoics."" "Swinish, shameless beggars," he called these successors.
+The uncompromising figures of whom history has left some record
+did not entirely lack an organized following; otherwise not even their
+names would have come down to us. They set up at least some part of a
+systematic doctrine or a code of behavior. Even che more radical
+Upanishads, attacked by che Isa-Upanishad, were verses and sacrificial formulae used by priestly guilds;® John the Baptist may not have inaugurated a religion, bur he did found an order.' The Cynics formed a school of
+philosophers; its founder, Antisthenes, even sketched the ourlines of a theory of the state.' But the theoretical and practical systems of such historical outsiders were unstructured, without a center, and differed from the
+
+177
+successful systems by a streak of anarchy. The idea and the individual
+mean more to them than administration and the collective. They therefore
+provoke anger. Plato, the champion of power, had the Cynics in his sights
+when he railed against equating the office of king with that of a common
+shepherd and compared a loose organization of humanity without national frontiers to a state of swine." The uncompromising spirits may have
+been willing to unite and cooperate, but they lacked the skill to construct
+a solid hierarchy closed to those from below. Neither in their theory,
+which was without uniformity or consistency, nor in their practice, which
+lacked the cohesion to make an impact, did they themselves reflect the
+world as it actually was.
+That was the formal difference between the radical and the conformist movements in religion and philosophy, which did not lie in their
+content in isolation. The sect of the ascetic Gautama conquered the Asiatic
+world. During his lifetime he showed a great talent for organization. Even
+if he did not, like the reformer Cankara, exclude the lower orders from the
+communication of his doctrine,'? he expressly acknowledged property in
+human beings and prided himself on the "sons of noble families" who
+joined his order, in which pariahs, "if present at all, appear to have been
+rare exceptions.
+"13 From the first, his disciples were differentiated on the
+Brahmin model.' Cripples, the sick, criminals, and many others were
+denied admission.!S Have you, applicants were asked, "leprosy, scrofula,
+white leprosy, consumption, epilepsy? Are you a human being? Are you a
+man? Are you your own master? Are you without debts? Are you not in the
+king's service?" and so on. Fully in keeping with India's brutal patriarchalism, women were admitted only reluctantly to the original Buddhist order.
+They had to subjugate themselves to the men and remained in effect
+minors.! The entire order enjoyed the patronage of the rulers and fitted
+admirably into Indian life.
+Asceticism and materialism, those opposites, are ambiguous in the
+same way. Asceticism as a refusal to participate in the bad existing order
+coincides, in face of oppression, with the material demands of the masses,
+just as, conversely, asceticism as an agent of discipline, imposed by cliques,
+aims at adaptation to injustice. The materialistic acceptance of the status
+quo, individual egoism, has always been linked to renunciation, while the
+gaze of the unworldly zealot, roving beyond the existing order, rests materialistically on the land of milk and honey. Asceticism is sublated in true
+
+178
+materialism, and materialism in true asceticism. The history of those
+ancient religions and schools, like that of the modern parties and revolutions, can reach us that the price of survival is practical complicity, the
+transformation of the idea into power.
+THE THEORY OF GHOSTS
+Freud's theory that the belief in ghosts comes from the evil thoughts
+of the living about the dead, from the memory of old death wishes, is too
+narrow. The hatred of the dead is jealousy as much as a feeling of guilt.
+Those left behind feel abandoned, and attribute their pain to the deceased
+who causes it. At the stages of humanity's development when death still
+appeared as a direct continuation of life, the abandonment of the living in
+death seemed necessarily like a betrayal, and even in enlightened times the
+ol belief is not quite extinguished. It runs counter to consciousness to
+conceive of death as absolute nothingness; absolute nothingness cannot be
+thought. And as the burden of life falls back on those left behind, the situation of the dead can readily seem the better state. The way in which
+some bereaved people entirely reorganize their lives after the death of one
+close to them, the busy cult of the deceased or, inversely, the forgerting
+rationalized as tact, are the modern counterpart to the belief in ghosts
+which, in unsublimated form, continues unabated in spiritualism. Only
+when the horror of annihilation is raised fully into consciousness are we
+placed in the proper relationship to the dead: that of unity with them,
+since we, like them, are victims of the same conditions and of the same disappointed hope.
+Postscript
+The disturbed relationship to the dead—who are forgotten and
+embalmed—is one of the symptoms of the sickness of experience today. It
+might almost be said that the concept of human life itself, as the unity of
+al person's history, has become invalid: the individual's life is now defined
+merely by its opposite, annihilation, but has lost all concordance, all continuity berween conscious remembrance and involuntary memorymeaning. Individuals are reduced to a mere succession of instantaneous
+presents, which leave behind no trace, or rather, the trace of which they
+hate as something irrational, superfluous, utterly obsolete. Just as any
+
+179
+book which has not been published recently is suspect; just as the idea of
+history, outside the specialized activities of the academic discipline, makes
+up-to-date people nervous, the past of a human being makes them furious. What someone was and experienced earlier is annulled in face of what
+he is now, or of the purpose for which he can be used. The threateningly
+well-meaning advice frequently given to emigrants that they should forget
+the past because it cannot be transplanted, that they should write off their
+prehistory and start an entirely new life, merely inflicts verbally on the
+spectral intruders the violence they have long learned to do to themselves.
+They repress history in themselves and others, out of fear that it might
+remind them of the disintegration of their own lives, a disintegration
+which itself consists largely in the repression of history. The fate which
+befalls all feelings, the ostracizing of what has no market value, is applied
+most harshly to something which cannot even contribute to a psychological restoration of labor power, mourning. It is becoming the stigma of civilization, an asocial sentimentality which reveals that human beings have
+not yet been made to swear absolute allegiance to the realm of purposes.
+Therefore mourning, more than all else, is disfigured, deliberately turned
+into the social formality which, for the hardened survivors, the beautiful
+corpse has always been. In the funeral home and the crematorium, where
+the deceased are processed into transportable ashes, into a burdensome
+possession, it is indeed untimely to let oneself go, and the young girl who,
+proudly describing the first-class funeral of her grandmother, added: "A
+pity that Daddy lost control," because he had shed a few tears, precisely
+expresses the current state of affairs. The dead are in truth subjected to
+what for the ancient Jews was the most grievous curse: To thee shall no
+thoughts be turned. The living vent on the dead their despair that they no
+longer give thought to themselves.
+QUAND MÊME
+External pressure has forced human beings to overcome their own
+inertia, to produce material and intellectual works. Thinkers from
+Democritus to Freud are not wrong in believing this. The resistance of
+external nature, to which the pressure can finally be traced back, propagates itself in society through the classes, acting on all human beings from
+childhood onward as the callousness of their fellows. People are gentle
+
+180
+when they want something from those who are stronger, and harsh when
+the weaker want something from them. That has been the key to the
+nature of the person in society up to now.
+The conclusion drawn by conservatives, that terror and civilization
+are inseparable, is well founded. What could enable human beings to
+develop the ability to master complex stimuli, if not their own developmental exertions, which have to be spurred on by external resistance? The
+resistance which drives them is first embodied in the father; later it grows
+a thousand heads: teachers, superiors, customers, competitors, the representatives of social and state powers. Their brutality stimulates individual
+spontaneity.
+That this harshness might be moderated in the future, that the bloody
+punishments by which humanity has been tamed in the course of centuries
+could be replaced by the establishment of sanatoria, seems no more than a
+dream. Simulated compulsion is powerless. Culture has evolved under the
+shadow of the executioner; Genesis, which tells of the expulsion from
+Paradise, and the Soirées de Petersbourg* are in agreement on this. Work and
+pleasure take place under the shadow of the executioner. To contradict this
+is to fly in the face of all science, all logic. One cannot abolish terror and
+retain civilization. Even to relax the former means the beginning of disintegration. The most diverse conclusions can be drawn from this: from the
+worship of fascist barbarism to a flight into the circles of Hell.* There is one
+other possibility: to scorn logic, if it is against humanity.
+ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY*
+A large dog stands beside the highway. If he walks trustfully onto it
+he will be run over. His peaceful expression indicates that normally he is
+better looked after—a per which no one harms. Bur do the sons of the
+upper bourgeoisie, whom no one harms, have peaceful expressions on
+their faces? They have not been worse looked after than the dog, which is
+now run over.
+FOR VOLTAIRE
+Your reason is one-sided, whispers one-sided reason; you have done
+power an injustice. You have trumpeted the scandal of tyranny eloquent-
+
+I8I
+ly, tearfully, sarcastically, thunderously; but the good that power has
+brought about—on that you have kept silent. Without the security which
+only power could establish, that good would never have come into being.
+Beneath the wings of power, life and love have played; even your own happiness has been wrested from hostile nature by power. Thoughts inspired
+by apologetics are true and false at once. Despite its great accomplishments, only power can commit injustice, for only the executed judgment
+is unjust, not the lawyer's unexecuted plea. Only when discourse aims at
+oppression, defending power instead of powerlessness, does it contribute
+to the general wrong. But power, one-sided reason now whispers, is represented by human beings. By exposing the former, you make a target of the
+latter. And after them, worse perhaps will come. The lie speaks truth.
+When fascist murderers are waiting, one should not incite the people
+against the weak government. But even the alliance with the less brutal
+power does not imply that one should keep silent abour infamies. The
+likelihood that good causes might be damaged by denunciation of the
+injustice which protects them from the devil has always been ourweighed
+by the advantage the devil gains if the denunciation of injustice is left solely to him. How far must a society have sunk in which only scoundrels still
+speak the truth—and Goebbels reminds us that the lynch mob is still happily at work. Not the good but the bad is the subject marter of theory.
+Theory presupposes the reproduction of life in its existing forms. Its element is freedom, its theme oppression. Where language grows apologetic,
+it is already corrupted; by its nature it can be neither neutral nor practical.—Could you not portray the good sides of life and proclaim love as a
+principle, instead of endless bitterness? —There is only one expression for
+truth: the thought which repudiates injustice. If insistence on the good
+sides of life is not sublated in the negative whole, it transfigures its own
+opposite: violence. With words 1 can intrigue, propagate, suggest; that is
+the attribute which entangles them, as it entangles all activity in the world,
+and is the only one which is understood by the lie. It insinuates that even
+when one contradicts the existing order, one is acting in the service of
+other, emergent powers, competing bureaucracies, and rulers. In its nameless fear, it can and will see only what resembles itself. Anything which is
+absorbed into its medium, language as mere instrument, becomes identical to the lie as objects become indistinguishable in darkness. But
+although it is true that there is no word which could not ultimately be
+
+I82
+used by the lie, the word's temper never gleams in the lie but only in the
+thought hardened in the fight against power. Uncompromising hatred of
+the terror inflicted on the last of the earth's creatures legitimizes che gratirude of those who are spared. Invocation of the sun is idolatry. Only the
+spectacle of the tree withered in its heat gives a presentiment of the
+majesty of the day which will not scorch the world on which it shines.
+CLASSIFICATION
+General concepts coined by means of abstraction or axiomatically by
+individual sciences form the material of representation no less than che
+names of individual objects. Opposition to general concepts is absurd.
+There is more to be said, however, about the starus of the general. What
+many individual things have in common, or what constantly recurs in one
+individual thing, needs not be more stable, eternal, or deep than the parricular. The scale of categories is not the same as that of significance. That
+was precisely the error of the Eleatics and all who followed them, with
+Plato and Aristotle at their head.
+The world is unique. The mere repetition in speech of moments
+which occur again and again in the same form bears more resemblance to
+a futile, compulsive litany than to the redeeming word. Classification is a
+condition of knowledge, not knowledge itself, and knowledge in rurn dissolves classification.
+AVALANCHE"
+The present time is without turning points. A curn of events is
+always for the better. But when, as today, calamity is at its height, the heavens open and hurl their fire on those who are lost in any case.
+This impression is communicated first of all by what was commonly called the social and political sphere. At one rime, the front pages of
+daily newspapers seemed strange and vulgar to happy women and children—newspapers reminded them of alehouse swagger—until the bold
+headline finally crossed their chreshold as a real threat. Rearmament, overseas affairs, tension in the Mediterranean, and who knows what other
+grandiose phrases put genuine fear into people, until the First World War
+broke our. Then, with its ever more dizzying figures, came inflarion.
+
+183
+When it paused in its course, that did not mean a turning point but still
+greater misfortune: rationalization, closures, demolition. When Hitler's
+vote went up, modestly at first but insistently, it was already clear that its
+motion was that of an avalanche. Voting figures are, indeed, characteristic
+of that phenomenon. When, on the evening of the prefascist election day,
+the first results came in from the districts an eighth, a sixteenth of the
+votes already anticipated the whole. If ten or twenty districts turn en masse
+in a certain direction, the remaining hundred will not oppose them.
+Already a uniform mentality exists. The essence of the world coincides
+with the statistical law by which its surface is classified.
+In Germany, fascism triumphed under a crassly xenophobic, anticultural, collectivist ideology. Now that it has devastated the earth, nations
+must fight against it; there is no other way. Bur when all is over, a spirit of
+freedom need not spread across Europe; its nations may become as xenophobic, as hostile to culture, and as pseudocollectivist as the fascism
+against which they had to defend themselves. Even its defeat will not necessarily break the motion of the avalanche.
+The fundamental principle of liberal philosophy was that of
+both/and. Today the principle of either/or seems to apply, bur in such a
+way that the decision has already been taken for the worse.
+ISOLATION BY COMMUNICATION
+That communication media cause isolation is true not only in the
+intellectual sphere. Not only does the mendacious idiom of the radio
+announcer fix itself in the brain as an image of language itself, preventing
+people from speaking to one another; not only does the voice advertising
+Pepsi-Cola drown out the leveling of continents; not only does the ghostly image of the cinema hero model the embraces of adolescents, and later
+adultery. Progress keeps people literally apart. The little counter at the railroad station or the bank allowed the clerks to whisper to their colleagues
+and share their meager secrets; the glass partitions of modern offices, the
+huge rooms in which countless employees sitting together can be easily
+supervised both by the public and by their managers, no longer countenance private conversations and idylls. Even in offices, the taxpayer is now
+protected from wasting of time by wage earners, who are isolated in their
+collective. Bur the means of communication also isolate people physically.
+
+184
+The railroad has been supplanted by cars. The making of travel acquaintances is reduced by the private automobile to half-threatening encounters
+with hitchhikers. People travel on rubber tires in strict isolation from one
+another. What is talked abour in one family automobile is the same as in
+another; in the nuclear family, conversation is regulated by practical interests. Just as every family with a certain income spends the same percentage on housing, cinema, cigarettes, exactly as statistics prescribe, the subject matter of conversations is schematized according to the class of automobile. When they meet on Sunday outings or in restaurants, the menus
+and décor of which are identical to others in the same price category, the
+guests find that with increasing isolation they have become more and
+more alike. Communication makes people conform by isolating them.
+ON THE CRITIQUE OF THE PHILOSOPHY
+OF HISTORY
+The human species is nor, as has been asserted, a freak event in natural history, an incidental and abnormal formation produced by hypertrophy of the cerebral organ. That assertion is true only of reason in certain individuals, or perhaps even of a few countries over short periods,
+when the economy has allowed maneuvering space to such individuals.
+The cerebral organ, human intelligence, is firmly established enough to
+constitute a regular epoch of the earth's history. In this epoch, the human
+species, including its machines, chemicals, and organizational powers—
+for why should they not be seen as a part of it as teeth are a part of the
+bear, since they serve the same purpose and merely function better? —is
+the last word in adaptation. Humans have not only overtaken their immediate predecessors but have eradicated them more thoroughly than almost
+any other recent species, not excluding the carnivorous saurians.
+In face of this it seems somewhat whimsical to try to construe world
+history, as did Hegel, in terms of categories such as freedom and justice.
+These categories do indeed originate in eccentric individuals, who are
+insignificant in relation to the general course of the whole, unless it be that
+chey help to bring about transient historical conditions in which especially large quantities of machines and chemicals are produced to strengthen
+the species and subjugate others. According to this serious history, ill
+
+185
+ideas, prohibitions, religions, and political creeds are of interest only insofar as, arising from diverse conditions, they increase or decrease the natural survival prospects of the human species on the earth or within the universe. The liberation of citizens from the injustice of the feudal and absolutist past served, through liberalism, to unleash machinery, just as the
+emancipation of women has culminated in their being trained as a branch
+of the armed forces. The mind, and all that is good in its origins and existence, is hopelessly implicated in this horror. We owe the serum which the
+doctor administers to the sick child to the attack on defenseless creatures.
+In the endearments of lovers, as in the most sacred symbols of Christianity, we can detect the lust for the flesh of the kid, just as the ambiguous respect for the totem animal is discernible in that lust. Even our complex understanding of cooking, church, and cheater is a consequence of
+the sophisticated division of labor, which exists at the expense of nature
+within and outside human society. The historical function of culture lies
+in retroactively heightening this form of organization. That is why genuine
+thought, which detaches itself from that function, reason in its pure form,
+takes on the trait of madness which down-to-earth people have never
+failed to observe. If that kind of reason were to win a decisive victory within humanity, the predominance of the species would be threatened. The
+"freak event" theory would finally turn out to be true. But that theory,
+which cynically sought to support a critique of the anthropocentric philosophy of history, is itself too anthropocentric to hold true. Reason acts
+as an instrument of adaptation and not as a sedative, as might appear from
+the use sometimes made of it by individuals. Its ruse consists in making
+humans into beasts with an ever-wider reach, and not in bringing about
+the identity of subject and object.
+A philosophical interpretation of world history would have to show
+how, despite all the detours and resistances, the systematic domination
+over nature has been asserted more and more decisively and has integratrel all internal human characteristics. Economic, political, and cultural
+forms* would have to be derived from this position. The idea of the superhuman can be applicable only in the sense of a transition from quantity to
+quality. Just as the airman with the toxic spray, who in a few flights can
++ leanse the last continents of the last free animals, might be called supermun in comparison to the troglodyte,* a human super-amphibian might
+, me into being for whom the airman of today would seem like a harm-
+
+I86
+less swallow. But it is doubtful whether a species one stage higher than
+man can emerge as a genuine product of natural history. For anthropomorphism contains a measure of truth in that natural history did not reckon with the happy throw of the dice it accomplished in engendering the
+human being. The human capacity for destruction promises to become so
+great that—once this species has exhausted itself—a tabula rasa will have
+been created. Either the human species will tear itself to pieces or it will
+take all the earth's fauna and flora down with it, and if the earth is still
+young enough, the whole procedure—to vary a famous dicrum*—will
+have to start again on a much lower level.
+By attributing humane ideas as active powers to history, and presenting them as history's culmination, the philosophy of history stripped
+them of the naivery inherent in their content. The poor figure always cur
+by such ideas when the economy—that is, when power—was not with
+them* makes a mockery of everything weak, and in this way their authors
+have unwittingly identified themselves with the oppression they sought to
+abolish. The philosophy of history repeats what happened in Christianity:
+the good, which in reality remains at the mercy of suffering, is dressed up
+as a force which determines the course of history and finally triumphs. It
+is deified as the World Spirit or as an immanent law. But not only is history thereby turned into its direct opposite, but the idea, which was supposed to break the necessity, the logical course of events, is itself distorted.
+The danger of the "freak event" is averted. Impotence mistaken for power
+is denied a second time by such elevation, as if erased from memory. In
+this way, Christianity, idealism, and materialism, which in themselves contain truth, also bear guilt for the villainies committed in their name. In
+proclaiming power-even a benign power-they became themselves
+highly organized historical powers, and as such played their bloody role in
+the real history of the human species: as instruments of organization.
+Because history as the correlative of unified theory, as something
+capable of interpretation, is not the good but, in fact, the horror, thought
+is in reality a negative element. The hope for better conditions, insofar as
+it is not merely an illusion, is founded less on the assurance that those conditions are guaranteed, sustainable, and final than on a lack of respect for
+what is so firmly ensconced amid the general suffering. The infinite
+patience, the tender, never-extinguished impulse of creaturely life roward
+expression and light, which seems to soften and, pacify within itself the
+
+187
+violence of creative evolution, does not, like the rational philosophies of
+history, prescribe a certain praxis as beneficial, not even that of nonresistance. The light of reason, which dawned in that impulse and is reflected
+in the recollecting thought of human beings, falls, even on the happiest
+day, on its irresolvable contradiction: che calamity which reason alone cannot avert.
+MONUMENTS TO HUMANITY
+Humanity has always been more at home in France than elsewhere.
+But the French were no longer aware of the fact. What their books conrained was ideology recognized by all. The better qualities led a segregated existence of their own: in the inflection of voice, the turn of phrase, the
+artful cuisine, the existence of brothels, the cast-iron pissoirs. But the
+Blum government* already declared war on such respect for the individual, and even the conservatives did little to protect its monuments.
+FROM A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL*
+... Like the criminal, imprisonment was a bourgeois affair. In the
+Middle Ages incarceration was reserved for the offspring of princes who
+symbolized an inconvenient hereditary claim. Criminals were tortured to
+death, to instill a respect for order and law in the mass of the population,
+since the example of severity and cruelty teaches the severe and cruel to
+love. Regular imprisonment presupposes a rising need for labor power.* It
+reflects the bourgeois mode of life as suffering. The rows of cells in a modern prison represent monads in the true Leibnizian sense. "The Monads
+have no windows, through which anything could come in or go our.
+Accidents cannot separate themselves from substances nor go about ourside them, as the 'sensible species' of che Scholastics used to do. Thus neither substance nor accident can come into a Monad from outside."? The
+monads have no direct influence on one another; their lives are regulated
+and coordinated by God, or the prison administration.'® The absolute
+loneliness, the enforced reliance on a self whose whole being consists in
+the mastering of material and the monotonous rhythm of work, spectrally prefigure human existence in the modern world. The radical isolation
+und the radical reduction to an unchanging, hopeless nothingness are
+
+188 Notes and Sketches
+identical. The human being in jail is the virtual image of the bourgeois
+type he has yet to make himself in reality. Those who fail to achieve this
+outside have it inflicted on them with terrible purity inside. The rationalization of prison life through the need to segregate the criminal from society, or even to improve him, does nor go to the root of the matter. Prisons
+are the image of the bourgeois working world thought through to the end,
+set up as an emblem in the world by the hatred of human beings for what
+they are forced to make themselves become. The weak, the retarded, the
+brutalized must suffer in modified form the order of life to which others
+have lovelessly adapted themselves; the introverted violence of the latter is
+grimly repeated against the former. The criminal, in whose crime selfpreservation was paramount, has in reality the weaker, more labile self; the
+habitual offender is an enfeebled being.
+Prisoners are invalids. Their weakness has brought them into a situation which has undermined them in body and mind and continues to do
+so. Most were already sick when they committed the crime which put
+them in prison—sick through their constitution and their circumstances.
+Other acted as any healthy person would in the same constellation of
+stimuli and motives but were simply unlucky. A residue were more malevolent and cruel than most free people—s malevolent and cruel in their
+persons as the fascist world rulers are through their positions. The deed of
+the common criminal is petty, personal, directly destructive. The probability is that even in the case of the most extreme crimes the living substance, which is the same in everyone, could not, in any embodiment,
+have escaped the pressure of bodily constitution and individual fate from
+birth onward which led the criminal to the crime; and that you and I, but
+for the grace of the insight granted to us through a chain of circumstances,
+would have acted like the person who committed murder. And now, as
+prisoners, they are mere invalids, and the punishment meted our to them
+is blind, an alien event, a misfortune like cancer or the collapse of a house.
+Imprisonment is a lingering illness. This is revealed by prisoners' expressions, their caurious gait, their circumstantial way of thinking. Like the
+sick, they can talk only of their sickness.
+When, as today, the boundaries between respectable and illegal rackets are objectively fluid, psychological figures also merge. But as long as
+criminals were still invalids, as in the nineteenth century, custody represented a reversal of their weakness. The strength to stand out as an indi-
+
+189
+vidual against ones environment and, at the same time, to make contact
+with it through the approved forms of intercourse and thereby to assert
+oneself within it—in criminals this strength was eroded. They represented a tendency deeply inherent in living things, the overcoming of which is
+the mark of all development: the tendency to lose oneself in one's surroundings instead of actively engaging with them, the inclination to let
+oneself go, to lapse back into nature. Freud called this the death impulse,
+Caillois le mimétisme." Addiction of this kind permeates anything which
+runs counter to unswerving progress, from crime, which cannot take the
+detour through the current forms of labor, to the sublime work of art. The
+yielding attitude to things without which art cannot exist is not so far
+removed from the clenched violence of the criminal. The inability to say
+No which causes the young girl to succumb to prostitution also tends to
+determine the career of the criminal. He is characterized by a negation
+which lacks the power of resistance. Against such deliquescence, which—
+without definite consciousness, timid and impotent even in its most brutal form—at the same time imitates and destroys pitiless civilization, the
+latter sets the solid walls of prisons and workhouses, its own stony ideal.
+Just as, according to de Tocqueville, bourgeois republics, unlike monarchies, do not violate the body but set to work directly on the soul, punishments of this kind attack the spirit. Those they torture no longer die
+broken on the wheel over long days and nights but perish mentally, as
+silent, invisible examples in the great prison buildings, which differ from
+lunatic asylums almost only in name.
+Fascism absorbs both institutions. The concentration of com'mand
+throughout production is causing society to revert to the stage of direct
+rule. As the detour of power via the internal markets of nations disappears,
+so, too, do intellectual mediations, including law. Thinking, which had
+developed though transactions, as a result of egoism's need to negotiate, is
+now given over wholly to the planning of violent appropriation. The fascist mass murderer has emerged as the pure essence of the German factory owner, no longer distinguished from the criminal by anything but
+power. The detour has become unnecessary. Civil law, which continued to
+function in regulating differences between entrepreneurs surviving in the
+shadow of big industry, has become a kind of tribunal against the lower
+orders, a justice which no longer upholds, however badly, the interests of
+victims—a mere instrument of terror. However, the legal protection
+
+190
+which is now disappearing once defined property. Monopoly, as the consummation of private property, is annihilating the latter's concept. Of the
+international and social contract, which fascism* in its dealings with states
+is replacing by secret agreements, only the compulsion of the universal is
+allowed to apply in internal affairs, a compulsion its servants then liberally administer to the rest of humanity. In the totalitarian state* punishment
+and crime are being liquidated as superstitious residues, and a naked eradication of opponents, certain of its political goal, is spreading across
+Europe under the regime of criminals. Next to the concentration camp,
+the penitentiary seems like a memory of the good old days, much as the
+old-style advertiser, though it already betrayed truth, appears beside the
+glossy magazine, the literary content of which-even if it concerns
+Michelangelo—performs the function, still more than the advertisements,
+of business report, emblem of authority and publicity medium. The isolation once inflicted on prisoners from outside has by now implanted itself
+universally in the flesh and blood of individuals. Their well-trained souls
+and happiness are as bleak as the prison cells which the rulers can already
+do without, since the entire labor force of nations has fallen to them as
+spoils. The penal sentence pales beside the social reality.
+LE PRIX DU PROGRÈS
+In a recently discovered letter by the French physiologist Pierre
+Flourens, who once had the unhappy distinction of being elected to the
+Académie Française in preference to Victor Hugo, a curious passage
+occurs:
+I still cannor bring myself to assent to the use of chloroform in general surgical practice. As you may know, I have devored extensive study to this drug and
+as a result of animal experiments have been one of the first to describe its specific characteristics. My scruples are based on the simple fact that operations under
+chloroform, and probably also under the other known forms of narcosis, amount
+to a deception. The agents act only on certain motor and coordination centers and
+on the residual capacity of the nerve substance. Under the influence of chloroform it loses a significant part of its ability to record traces of impressions but not
+the capacity for feeling as such. On the contrary, my observations indicate that in
+conjunction with a general paralysis of innervation, pain is felt still more keenly
+than in the normal state. The deceprion of the public results from the inabiliry of
+
+19I
+the patient to remember the events once the operation is completed. If we told
+our patients the truth, it is likely that none of them would opt for the drug,
+whereas now, as a result of our silence, they generally insist on its use.
+But even disregarding the fact that the only, dubious benefit is a loss of
+memory regarding the time of the intervention, the spread of this practice seems
+to me to bring with it a far more serious danger. Given the increasing superficiality of the general academic training of our doctors, medicine might be encouraged
+by an unlimited use of the drug heedlessly to undertake ever more complicated
+and serious surgical interventions. Instead of carrying out such experiments on
+animals in the service of research, we should then make our patients che unwitting subjects of experiments. It is conceivable that the painful excitations which,
+in view of their specific nature, may exceed all known sensations of this kind,
+would cause lasting psychical damage to the patient, or might even lead to an
+indescribably agonizing death under narcosis, the peculiarities of which would
+remain for ever hidden from family members and the world. Would that not be
+altogether too great a price to pay for progress?
+If Flourens were right in this letter, the obscure workings of the
+world's divine governance would at least for once be justified. The animal
+would be avenged by the sufferings of its executioner: each operation a
+vivisection. A suspicion would arise that our attitude toward human
+beings, and toward all creatures, is no different to that toward ourselves
+after a successful operation: blindness to torment. For cognition, the space
+separating us from others would mean the same thing as the time between
+us and the suffering in our own past: an insurmountable barrier. But the
+perennial dominion over nature, medical and nonmedical technology, derives its strength from such blindness; it would be made possible only by
+oblivion. Loss of memory as the transcendental condition of science. All
+reification is forgetting.*
+VAIN TERROR
+The gaze fixed on calamity has an element of fascination. But therefore of secret complicity. So strong are the social bad conscience of all who
+have a part in injustice, and the hatred of fulfilled life, that in critical situations they turn directly against self-interest as an immanent revenge.
+There was in the French bourgeois a fatal agency which ironically resem-
+Iled the heroic ideal of the fascists: they rejoiced in the triumph of their
+likeness, as expressed in Hitler's rise, even though it threatened them with
+
+192
+ruin; indeed, they took their own ruin as evidence of the justice of the
+order they represented. A precursor of this behavior is found in the atticude of many rich people to impoverishment, the image of which they
+conjure up under the rationalization of parsimony: it is their latent tendency, even while they fight tenaciously for every penny, suddenly to give
+up all their possessions without a fight or irresponsibly to gamble them
+away. In fascism they achieve the synthesis of power-craving and self-hare,
+and their vain terror is always accompanied by che qualification: I always
+saw it coming.
+INTEREST IN THE BODY
+Beneath the known history of Europe there runs a subterranean one.
+It consists of the fate of the human instincts and passions repressed and
+distorted by civilization. From the vantage point of the fascist present, in
+which the hidden is coming to light, the manifest history is also revealing
+its connection to that dark side, which is passed over in the official legend
+of nation states, and no less in its progressive critique.
+Most mutilated of all is che relationship co the body. Under the division of labor, in which the benefits accrued to one side and labor to the
+other, brute strength was anathematized. The less the masters could do
+without the labor of the rest, the more base labor was declared to be. Like
+the slave, work received a stigma. Christianity celebrated labor but, in
+compensation, vilified the flesh as the source of all evil. In collusion with
+the unbeliever Machiavelli, it rang in the modern bourgeois order by
+extolling work, which in the Old Testament had been designated a curse.
+For the Desert Fathers, Dorotheus, Moses the Robber, Paul the Simple,
+and others of the poor in spirit, labor was still a direct means of entering
+the Kingdom of Heaven. For Luther and Calvin the link berween work
+and salvation was already so convoluted that che relentless injunction to
+work seems almost like mockery, the boor grinding the worm into che
+dust.
+The princes and patricians could console themselves for the religious
+gulf which had opened between their earthly days and their eternal vocacion with the thought of che revenues they would derive from the labor
+rime of others. For che irrationality of the doctrine of election left the possibility of redemprion open to them. But on che ochers che pressure
+
+193
+weighed all the more heavily. They were dimly aware that the mortification of the flesh by power was nothing other than the ideological reflection of the oppression practiced on them. The fate of the slaves of
+Antiquiry was endured by victims up to the modern colonial peoples: they
+counted as inferior. There were by nature two races: the higher and the
+lower. The emancipation of the European individual took place in conjunction with a general cultural transformation by which the split within
+the emancipated penetrated more deeply the more the external physical
+compulsion abated. The exploited body was to be regarded by the lower
+orders as the bad and the mind, for which the others had leisure, as the
+highest good. This development made Europe capable of its most sublime
+cultural achievements, but, at the same time as the control over the body
+was increased, the hint of fraud which had been detectable from the first
+also intensified the obscene malice, the love-hate toward the body which
+permeated the mentality of the masses over the centuries and found its
+authentic expression in the language of Luther. In the relationship of individuals to the body, their own and that of others, is reenacted the irrationality and injustice of power as cruelty; and that irrationality is as far
+removed from judicious insight and serene reflection as power is from freedom. In Nietzsche's theory of cruelty, and still more in the work of Sade,
+the extent of this connection is recognized, while in Freud's doctrines of
+narcissism and the death impulse it is interpreted psychologically.
+Love-hate for the body colors the whole of modern culture. The
+body is scorned and rejected as something inferior, enslaved, and at the
+same time is desired as forbidden, reified, estranged. Only culture treats
+the body as a thing that can be owned, only in culture has it been distinguished from mind, the quintessence of power and command, as the
+object, the dead thing, the corpus. In humanity's self-abasement to the corpres nature takes its revenge for the debasement of the human being to an
+object of power, to raw material. The compulsion toward cruelty and
+destruction stems from the organic repression of proximity to the body,
+much as, according to Freud's inspired intuition, disgust came into being
+when, with the adoption of the upright stance and the greater distance
+from the earth, the sense of smell, which attracted the male animal to the
+menstruating female, fell victim to organic repression. In Western civilizarion, and probably in any civilization, what pertains to the body is
+labooed, a subject of attraction and revulsion. Among the Greek rulers,
+
+194
+and in feudalism, the relationship to the body was also conditioned by
+power, through the need for personal physical prowess. The cultivation of
+the body had a naively social objective. The kalos kagathos was only partly
+an illusion; in part the gymnasium was needed for the actual maintenance
+of personal power, at least as training in the lordly posture. With the complete transition of power to the bourgeois form mediated by trade and
+communications, and still more with the rise of industry, a formal change
+occurred. Instead of to the sword, humanity has enslaved itself to the
+gigantic apparatus, which, to be sure, ultimately forges the sword. The
+rational purpose of enhancing the male body thereby disappeared; the
+Romantic attempts to achieve a renascence of the body in the nineteenth
+and iwentieth centuries merely idealize something dead and mutilated.
+Nietzsche, Gauguin, George, and Klages recognized the nameless stupidity which is the result of progress. But they drew the wrong conclusion.
+They did not denounce the wrong as it is but transfigured the wrong as it
+was. The rejection of mechanization became an embellishment of industrial mass culture, which cannot do without the noble gesture. Against
+their will, artists reworked the lost image of the unity of body and mind
+for the advertising industry. The celebration of paragons of vitality, from
+the Blond Beast to the south-sea islanders, culminates ineluctably in the
+"sarong film," the advertisements for vitamins and skin cream, which are
+only stand-ins for the immanent goal of publicity: the new, big, beautiful,
+noble human type—the leaders and their troops. The fascist leaders again
+take the implements of murder into their hands, executing their prisoners
+with pistol and horsewhip, not as a result of their superior strength but
+because the gigantic apparatus and the real holders of power, who still
+abstain from such acts, deliver the victims of reason of state to the basement of their headquarters.
+The body cannot be turned back into the envelope of the soul. It
+remains a cadaver, no matter how trained and fit it may be. The transformation into dead matter, indicated by the affinity of corpus to corpse, was
+a part of the perennial process which turned nature into stuff, material.
+The achievements of civilization are a product of sublimation, of the
+acquired love-hate for body and earth, from which domination has violently severed all human beings. The spirit's reaction to the corporealization of humanity is productive in medicine, while its reaction to the reification of the whole of nature is productive in technology. Bur the mur-
+
+195
+derer, the killer, the brutalized colossi who are used by the ruling powers,
+legal and illegal, great and small, as their clandestine enforcers, the violent
+men who are always on hand when there is someone to be dispatched, the
+lynchers and clan members, the bruiser who steps in when someone
+answers back, the terrible figures to whom everyone is delivered up as soon
+as the protective hand of power is withdrawn from them, a soon as they
+lose wealth and position, all the werewolves lurking in the darkness of history and sustaining the fear without which there is no domination: in
+them the love-hate for the body is crude and direct; they desecrate what
+they touch, they destroy what they see in the light, and this destruction is
+a rancor against reification; in blind rage they repeat against the living
+thing what they cannor make undone: the splitting of life into mind and
+its object. The human being irresistibly attracts them, they want to reduce
+him or her to the body, nothing shall be allowed to live. This enmity of
+the lowest for the life withered within them, an enmity once carefully
+implanted and nurtured by those at the top, whether secular or clerical,
+and to which the lowest relate themselves, homosexually and paranoiacally, by killing, has always been an indispensable instrument of the art of
+government. The hostility of the enslaved to life is an inexhaustible source
+of history's dark side. Even the puritanical excess, hitting the booze, takes
+despairing revenge on life.
+The love of nature and fate proclaimed by totalitarian propaganda is
+merely a superficial reaction to fixation at the level of the body, to the failure of civilization to fulfill itself. Being unable to escape it, one praises the
+body when not allowed to hit it. The "tragic" world-view of the fascists* is
+the ideological stag party on the eve of the real blood wedding. Those who
+excolled the body in Germany, the gymnasts and ourdoor sports enthusiasts, always had an intimate affinity to killing, as nature lovers have to
+hunting. They see the body as a mobile mechanism, with its hinged links,
+the flesh upholstering the skeleton. They manipulate the body, actuating
+the limbs as if they were already severed. The Jewish tradition instills an
+dIversion to measuring human beings with a yardstick, because the dead are
+measured—for the coffin. That is what gives the body-manipulators their
+enjoyment. Unaware, they measure the other with the eye of the coffin
+maker. The truth comes out when they state the result, calling the person
+tall (in German: long), short, fat, heavy. They are interested in illness,
+unicipating their fellow diner's deach in what he eats, their interest being
+
+196
+only thinly rationalized by concern for his health. Language keeps in step
+with them. It has converted the stroll into exercise and food into calories,
+just as in English and French che name for a throng of living trees is synonymous with "timber." Along with the mortality rate, society is reducing
+life to a chemical process.
+In the fiendish humiliation of prisoners in che concentration camps,
+which-for no rational reason-the modern executioner adds to the death
+by torture, the unsublimated yet repressed rebellion of despised nature
+breaks our. Its full hideousness is vented on the martyrs of love, the alleged
+sexual offenders and libertines, for sexuality is the body unreduced; it is
+expression, that which the butchers secretly and despairingly crave. In free
+sexuality the murderer fears the lost immediacy, the original oneness, in
+which he can no longer exist. It is the dead thing which rises up and lives.
+He now makes everything one by making it nothing, because he has to sti-
+Ale that oneness in himself. For him che victim represents life which has
+survived the schism; it must be broken and the universe must be nothing
+but dust and abstract power.
+MASS SOCIETY
+Complementing the cult of stars is the social mechanism of the notables, which levels anything that stands out; the stars and dignitaries are
+mere patterns for the ready-made world, and for che scissors of juridical
+and economic justice, which snip off the last loose ends.
+Postscript
+The view that the leveling and standardization of people in general,
+on the one hand, is matched, on the other, by a heightening of individuality in the so-called leader figures, in keeping with their power, is erroneous and itself a piece of ideology. The fascist masters of today are not so
+much supermen as functions of their own publicity apparatus, intersections of the identical reactions of countless people. If, in the psychology of
+the present-day masses, the leader no longer represents the farher so much
+as the collective, monstrously enlarged projection of the impotent ego of
+each individual, then the leader figures do indeed correspond to what they
+represent. Not by accident do they resemble hairdressers, provincial
+actors, and gurter journalists. A part of their moral influence lies precisely
+
+197
+in the fact that, while in themselves as powerless as all the rest, they
+embody on the latter's behalf the whole abundance of power without
+being anything more than the blank spaces which power has happened to
+occupy. It is not so much that they are exempt from the decay of individuality as that decayed individuals triumph in them and are in some way
+rewarded for their decay. The leaders have become fully what they always
+were slightly throughout the bourgeois era, actors playing leaders. The distance berween the individuality of Bismarck and of Hitler is hardly less
+than that between the prose of Gedanken und Erinnerungen and the gibberish of Mein Kampf. In the struggle against fascism, not the least concern is to reduce che bloated leader images to the true scale of their
+insignificance. At least in the similarity between the ghetto barber and the
+dictator, Chaplin's film* hit on something essential.
+CONTRADICTIONS
+A moral system, with axioms, corollaries, and iron logic, and reliable
+application to every moral dilemma—that is what is demanded of philosophers. As a rule, they have fulfilled the expectation. Even when they have
+not set up a practical system or a fully developed casuistry, they have managed to derive obedience to authority from their theories. Usually they
+have justified once again the whole scale of values already sanctioned by
+public praxis, with all the comforts of sophisticated reasoning, demonstration, and evidence. "Honor the gods through the traditional native
+religion," said Epicurus,?° and Hegel said it after him. A philosopher who
+hesitates to make such a profession is all the more energetically required
+to deliver a general principle. If thought does not simply reaffirm the
+prevalent rules, it must appear yet more self-assured, universal, and
+authoritative chan if it had merely justified what was already in force. You
+consider the prevailing power unjust; would you rather have no power at
+all, but chaos? You criticize the standardization of life and progress; should
+we then light wax candles in the evening and have our cities filled with the
+stink of refuse, as in the Middle Ages? You do not like slaughterhouses;
+should society henceforth eat raw vegetables? The positive answers to such
+questions, however absurd, find willing listeners. Political anarchism, the
+reacrionary arts and crafts movement, radical vegetarianism, eccentric
+sects and parties have "advertising appeal." The doctrine need only be gen-
+
+198
+eral, self-assured, universal, and imperative. What people cannot endure is
+the attempt to evade the either/or, the mistrust of abstract principles,
+steadfastness without a doctrine.
+Two young people are having a conversation:
+A. You don't want to be a doctor?
+B. By cheir profession doctors have a lot to do with dying people; that desensitizes them. Moreover, with advanced institutionalization the doctor represents
+business and its hierarchy vis-à-vis the patient. He is often tempted to act as an
+advocate of death. He becomes an agent of big business* against consumers. If one
+is selling automobiles it's not so bad, but if the commodity being administered is
+life and the consumers are the sick, that's a situation I'd prefer not to be in. The
+profession of family doctor may have been more innocuous, bur chat is in decline.
+A. So you think there shouldn't be any doctors, or the old charlatans ought
+to come back?
+B. I did not say that. I just have a horror of being a doctor myself, and especially a senior consultant with power of command over a mass hospital. Nevertheless, I do, of course, think it better to have doctors and hospitals than to leave
+sick people to die. I would not want to be a public prosecutor, yer giving a free
+run to armed robbers would seem to me a far greater evil than the existence of the
+body of people who put them in prison. Justice is reasonable. I am not against reason; I only want to investigate the form it has taken.
+A. You are in contradiction with yourself. You yourself constantly make use
+of the advantages provided by doctors and judges. You are as guilty as they are. It
+is just that you don't want to be burdened with the work which others do for you.
+Your own life presupposes the principle you are trying to evade.
+B. I do not deny it, but contradiction is necessary. It is a response to the
+objective contradiction of sociery. In a division of labor as complex as that of
+today, horror can manifest itself in one place and bring down guilt on everyone.
+If word of it gor abour, or if even a small proportion of people were aware of it,
+lunatic asylums and penal institures might be humanized and courts of justice
+might finally be superfluous. But that is not the reason why 1 want to be a writer.
+I just want to be clearer abour the terrible state in which everything is.
+A. If everyone thought as you do, and no one wanted to get his hands dirty,
+there would be neither doctors nor judges, and the world would be even more
+dreadful.
+B. That is just what I find questionable; for if everyone thought as I do,
+then I hope that not just the means of opposing evil would be reduced, bur evil
+inself. Humanity has orher possibilities. I am nor the whole of humanity, and I
+cannor simply represent it in my thought. The moral precept that each of my
+
+199
+actions ought to provide a general maxim is very problematic. It bypasses history.
+Why should my disinclination to be a doctor be equivalent to the view that there
+should be no doctors? In reality there are many people who would make good
+doctors and have a good chance of becoming one. If they behave morally within
+the limits to which their profession is subject today, they have my admiration.
+Perhaps they may even contribure to reducing the deficiencies I have pointed our
+to you; bur perhaps they will deepen them, despite all their professional skill and
+morality. My life as I imagine it, my horror and my desire for knowledge, seem to
+me as justified as the profession of doctor, even though I cannot help anyone
+directly.
+A. Bur if you knew that by studying medicine you might one day save the
+life of a loved person which would quite certainly be lost withour you, would you
+not take it up at once?
+B. Probably, but by now you can see for yourself that with your love of
+implacable logic you are forced to offer the most absurd examples, while I, with
+my impractical obstinacy and my contradictions, have remained within the
+bounds of common sense.
+This conversation is repeated wherever someone refuses to give up
+thought in face of praxis. Such a person finds logic and consistency always
+on the other side. Anyone who is against vivisection ought not to draw a
+single breath which might cost che life of a bacillus. Logic places itself in
+the service of progress and of reaction, and at all events of reality. And yer,
+in an age when education is radically focused on reality, conversations have
+become rarer, and the neurotic interlocutor B needs superhuman strength
+in order not to become healthy.
+MARKED
+People in their forties are apt to make a curious observation. They
+discover that most of chose with whom they have grown up and kept in
+contacr show disorders in their habits and their consciousness. One allows
+his work to deteriorate so far that his business collapses; another destroys
+his marriage through no fault of his wife; another embezzles. But even
+those who escape such drastic changes bear signs of decomposition.
+(conversation with them becomes shallow, bombastic, fatuous. Whereas
+carlier the person growing older received intellectual stimulus from others,
+now he finds himself almost the only one who voluntarily displays objecrive interest.
+
+200
+To begin with he is inclined to regard the development of his coevals
+as an unpleasant accident. They have simply changed for the worse. Perhaps it has to do with their generation and its special outward face. Finally
+he discovers that this experience is already familiar to him, but from a different perspective: that of his youth in relation to grown-ups. Was he not
+convinced then, too, that something was amiss with this or that teacher,
+with his uncles and aunts, the friends of his parents, and, later, with the
+university professors or the trainee's manager? It may have been that they
+displayed some ridiculous tic or that their presence was especially barren,
+oppressive, disappointing.
+Ar chat time he did not think further abour it, accepting che inferiority of grown-ups as simply a fact of nature. But now he finds it confirmed that under che existing conditions the mere act of living while
+maintaining specific technical or intellectual skills leads even in the prime
+of life to cretinism. Not even the worldly-wise are exempt. It is as if human
+beings, as punishment for betraying the hopes of their youth and accommodating themselves to the world, are marked by premature decay.
+Postscript
+The decay of individuality today not only teaches us to regard that
+category as historical but also raises doubts concerning its positive nature.
+The inherent principle of the phase of competition was the wrong done to
+che individual. This relates, however, not only to che function of che individual and its particularistic interests in society but also to the inner composition of individuality itself. The tendency toward human emancipation
+emerged under the aegis of individuality but at the same time was the
+result of the very mechanism from which humanity was to be emancipated. In the autonomy and uniqueness of the individual, the resistance to
+the blind, repressive power of the irrational whole was crystallized. But
+chat resistance was made historically possible only by the blindness and
+irrationality of the autonomous and unique individual. Conversely, however, that which, as particularistic, was absolutely opposed to the whole
+remains perniciously and opaquely attached to the existing order. The radically individual, unassimilated features of a human being are always both
+at once: residues not fully encompassed by the prevailing system and still
+happily surviving, and marks of the mutilation inflicted on its members by
+that system. In these traits, basic determinants of the system are repcated
+
+20I
+in exaggerated form: miserliness, for example, magnifies the principle of
+fixed property, hypochondria that of unreflecting self-preservation. Be-
+cause the individual seeks desperately, through such traits, to assert itself
+against the compulsions of nature and society—sickness and bankruptcy— the traits themselves necessarily take on a compulsive quality. Within
+its innermost cell the individual encounters the same power from which it
+has fled within itself. This makes its flight a hopeless chimera. Molière's
+comedies show awareness of this curse no less than Daumier's caricatures;
+but the National Socialists, who are abolishing the individual, feed contentedly on it and set up Spitzweg as their classical painter.
+Only in relation to hardened society, and not absolutely, does the
+hardened individual represent something better. Its hardness bears witness
+to the shame called forth by what the collective ceaselessly does to the
+individual and by what ensues when there are no longer individuals. The
+acolytes of today, bereft of self, are the necessary consequence of the splenetic apothecaries, the passionate rose growers and political cripples of yesterday.
+PHILOSOPHY AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR
+The place of science in the social division of labor is readily identified. Its task is to accumulate facts and functional connections between
+facts in the largest possible quantities. The storage system must be easily
+surveyed. It must enable individual industries immediately to locate the
+desired intellectual commodity in the required variety. Already the compilation is largely made with an eye for certain industrial contracts.
+Historical works, too, are required to contribute material. Its utility
+is to be sought not directly in industry but indirectly in administration.
+Just as Machiavelli wrote for the purposes of princes and republics, historians of today work for economic and political committees. Admittedly,
+the historical form has become an impediment to such use; the material is
+better arranged straight away in terms of a specific administrative task: to
+manipulate commodity prices or the emotions of the masses. In addition
+i administration and industrial consortia, trade unions and political parries are potential customers.
+Official philosophy serves the science which functions in this way. It
+is supposed, like a kind of inrellectual Taylorism, to improve scientific pro-
+
+202
+duction methods, to rationalize the accumulation of knowledge, and prevent the waste of mental energy. It has its allotted place in the division of
+labor, like chemistry or bacteriology. The few philosophical residues which
+hark back to the divine worship of the Middle Ages or the contemplation
+of eternal essentialities are still tolerated at secular universities because they
+are so reactionary. In addition, a few historians of philosophy continue to
+propagate themselves by tirelessly expounding Plato and Descartes while
+pointing our their obsoleteness. They are accompanied here and there by a
+veteran of sensualism or an expert personalist who keeps the field of science free of any dialectical weeds that might otherwise spring up.
+Unlike its custodians, philosophy refers, among other things, to
+thinking which refuses to capitulate to the prevailing division of labor and
+does not accept prescribed tasks. The existing order coerces people not
+merely by physical force and material interests but by overwhelming suggestion. Philosophy is not a synthesis, a basic science, or an overarching
+science but an effort to resist suggestion, a determination to protect intellectual and actual freedom.
+In this effort, the division of labor which has emerged under domination is not ignored. Philosophy detects the lie which domination
+inescapably brings with it. Refusing to be hypnotized by the preponderant
+power, it pursues it into all its hiding-places in the social machinery, which
+by its nature cannot be taken by storm, or placed under different control,
+but must be understood in freedom from the spell which it casts. When
+the officials which industry maintains in its intellectual departments—the
+universities, churéhes, and newspapers —challenge philosophy to produce
+credentials by which to legitimate its snooping, it finds itself fatally at a
+loss. It acknowledges no abstract norms or goals which could be a practicable alternative to those in force. Its exemption from the suggestive influence of the existing order lies precisely in the fact that, without favoring
+them, it accepts the bourgeois ideals, whether those which that order's
+exponents still proclaim, in however distorted a form, or those which are
+still discernible as the objective purpose of institutions, both technical and
+cultural, despite all the manipulation. It believes that the division of labor
+exists for the sake of human beings and that progress leads to freedom.
+That is why it is liable to come into conflict both with the division of labor
+and with progress. It gives voice to the contradiction between belief and
+reality, paying close arrention to phenomena conditioned by the time.
+Unlike the press, ir does not attach more importance to gigancic mass
+
+203
+murder than to the liquidation of a few asylum inmates. It does not place
+the intrigues of the statesman compromised by fascism above the modest
+lynching, or the advertising frenzy of the film industry above the intimate
+funeral announcement. The taste for the grandiose is foreign to it. Thus it
+is at the same time remote from the existing order and deeply complicit
+with it. It lends its voice to its subject, against che latter's will; it is the voice
+of the contradiction which otherwise would nor be heard, bur would triumph silently.
+THOUGHT
+It is, of course, mistaken to believe that the truth of a theory is the
+same as its fruitfulness. There are some, however, who appear to assume
+the opposite. For them, theory has so little need to find application in
+thought that it should dispense with thinking altogether. They misinterpret every utterance as a final profession of belief, an injunction, or a
+taboo. They seek to submit to the idea as to a god or attack it as an idol.
+They lack freedom in relation to it. But it is in the nature of truth that one
+is involved in it as an active subject. People may hear propositions which
+in themselves are true; but they experience their truth only by thinking as
+they hear and by continuing to think.
+This fetishism manifests itself in a drastic form today. One is called
+to account for one's thoughts, as if they applied directly to praxis.* For this
+reason, nor only is the utterance which attacks power found intolerable
+but the one which gropes forward experimentally, playing with the possibility of error. Yet to be unfinished and to know it is the mark even of the
+thought which opposes power, and especially of the thought for which it
+would be worth dying. The proposition that the true is the whole* proves
+1o be the same as its antithesis, that truth exists only as a part. The most
+wretched of the excuses which intellectuals have found for executioners—
+und in the last century they have not been idle in finding them—is that
+the chinking for which the victim was murdered was fallacious.
+MAN AND BEAST
+Throughour European history the idea of the human being has been
+expressed in contradistincrion to the animal. The latter's lack of reason is
+the proof of human digniry. So insistendly and unanimously has chis
+
+204
+antithesis been recited by all the earliest precursors of bourgeois thought,
+the ancient Jews, the Stoics, and the Early Fathers, and then through the
+Middle Ages to modern times, that few other ideas are so fundamental to
+Western anthropology. The antithesis is acknowledged even today. The
+behaviorists only appear to have forgotten it. That they apply to human
+beings the same formulae and results which they wring without restraint
+from defenseless animals in their abominable physiological laboratories,
+proclaims the difference in an especially subtle way. The conclusion they
+draw from the mutilated animal bodies applies, not to animals in freedom,
+but to human beings today.* By mistreating animals they announce that
+they, and only they in the whole of creation, function voluntarily in the
+same mechanical, blind, automatic way as the twitching movements of the
+bound victims made use of by the expert. The professor at the dissection
+table defines such movements scientifically as reflexes; the soothsayer at
+the altar would have proclaimed them a sign from his gods. Humans possess reason, which pitilessly follows its path; the animals from which they
+draw their bloody conclusions have only unreasoning terror, the impulse
+to take flight on a path which is cut off.
+The lack of reason has no words. Its possession, which dominates
+manifest history, is eloquent. The whole earth bears witness to the glory
+of man. In war and peace, arena and slaughterhouse, from the slow death
+of the elephant overpowered by primitive human hordes with the aid of
+the first planning to the perfected exploitation of the animal world today,
+the unreasoning creature has always suffered at the hands of reason. This
+visible course of évents conceals from the executioners the invisible one:
+existence without the light of reason, the actual life of animals. It would
+be the proper subject matter for psychology, for only the life of animals
+runs its course according to inner impulses; where psychology has to
+explain human beings, they are already regressive and destroyed. When
+the help of psychology is sought among human beings, the meager field
+of their immediate relationships is narrowed still further, and even within
+it they are made into things. Psychology used to explain others is impertinent, and to explain one's own motives sentimental. Animal psychology,
+meanwhile, has lost sight of its object; engrossed with the chicanery of its
+traps and labyrinths, it has forgotten that to speak of and acknowledge a
+psyche or soul (Seele) is appropriate precisely and only in the case of animals. Even Aristotle, who attributed a soul ro them, if an inferior one, pre-
+
+205
+ferred to speak of the bodies, parts, movements, and procreation of animals rather than the life peculiar to them.
+The world of animals is without concepts. There is no word to hold
+fast the identical in the flux of phenomena, the same genus in the succession of specimens, the same thing in changing situations. Although the
+possibility of recognition is not absent, identification is restricted to vital
+patterns. There is nothing in the flux* that could be defined as lasting, and
+yet everything remains one and the same, because there is no fixed knowledge of the past and no clear prospect into the future. The animal
+responds to its name and has no self, it is enclosed in itself yet exposed,
+one compulsion is followed by another, no idea extends beyond it. Its loss
+of solace is not balanced by a reduction in fear, its lack of awareness of
+happiness by the absence of mourning and pain. For happiness to become
+substantial, for life to be endowed with death, identifying remembrance is
+needed, assuaging knowledge, the religious or philosophical idea, in short,
+the concept. There are happy animals, but how short-lived is that happiness! The animal's experience of duration, uninterrupted by liberating
+thought, is dreary and depressive. To escape the gnawing emptiness of
+existence some resistance is needed, and its backbone is language. Even the
+strongest animal is infinitely feeble. Schopenhauers doctrine according to
+which the pendulum of life oscillates berween pain and boredom, between
+brief moments of sated impulse and endless craving, is true of the animal,
+which cannot interrupt the fatal cycle with cognition. In the animal's soul
+the individual feelings and needs of human beings are vestigially present,
+without the stability which only organizing reason confers. The best days
+flit past in a bustling medley like a dream, which the animal can hardly
+distinguish from waking in any case. It is without the clear division
+berween play and seriousness, the happy awakening from nightmare to
+reality.
+In popular fairy tales the metamorphosis of humans into animals is
+a recurring punishment. To be imprisoned in an animal body is regarded
+as damnation. To children and peoples, the idea of such transformations
+is immediately comprehensible and familiar. Believers in the transmigrarion of souls in the earliest cultures saw the animal form as punishment
+and torment. The mute wildness in the animal's gaze bears witness to the
+horror which is feared by humans in such metamorphoses. Every animal
+recalls to them an immense misfortune which took place in primeval
+
+206
+times. Fairy tales express this dim human intuition. But whereas the
+prince in the fairy tale retained his reason so that, when the time came, he
+could tell of his woe and the fairy could release him, the animal's lack of
+reason holds it eternally captive in its form, unless man, who is one with
+it through his past, can find the redeeming formula and through it soften
+the stony heart of infinity at the end of time.
+For the being endowed with reason, however, concern for the unreasoning animal is idle. Western civilization has left that to women. They
+have no autonomous share in the capabilities which gave rise to this civilization. The man must go out into hostile life, must act and strive.* The
+woman is not a subject. She does not produce but looks after the producers, a living monument to the long-vanished time of the self-sufficient
+household. The division of labor imposed on her by the man was unfavorable. She became an embodiment of biological function, an image of
+nature, in the suppression of which this civilization's claim to glory lay. To
+dominate nature boundlessly, to turn the cosmos into an endless hunting
+ground, has been the dream of millennia. It shaped the idea of man in a
+male society. It was the purpose of reason, on which man prided himself.
+Woman was smaller and weaker, berween her and man there was a difference she could not overcome, a difference set by nature, the most shaming, degrading agency possible within the male society. When domination
+of nature is the true goal, biological inferiority remains the ultimate stigma, the weakness imprinted by nature, the mark which invites violence.
+The church, which in the course of history has hardly missed an opportunity to take a leading voice in popular institutions, whether they be slavery, crusades, or simply pogroms, sided with Plato, despite the Ave Maria,
+in the assessment of woman. The image of the Mother of Sorrows was a
+concession to matriarchal residues. Yet the church used the very image
+which was supposed to redeem woman from her inferiority to sanction it.
+"The influence of Divine Law in a Christian land,"
+proclaimed de
+Maistre, that law's legitimate son, "need only be extinguished or weakened
+ro a certain degree by tolerating the freedom of women which has arisen
+from it, and freedom, though noble and moving in itself, will degenerate
+soon enough into shamelessness. Women would become the fatal instruments of a general decline, which would swiftly undermine the vital
+organs of the state. Engulfed by corruption, the state would spread shame
+and rerror in its fiery ruin."" The witch trials used by the allied feudal
+rackets to terrorize the populace when they found themselves threatened
+
+207
+were at the same time a celebration and confirmation of the victory of
+male domination over primeval matriarchal and mimetic stages of development. The autos-da-fé were the Church's pagan bonfires, a triumph of
+nature in the form of self-preserving reason, to the glory of reason's domination over nature.
+The bourgeoisie reaped the benefit of feminine virtue and modesty
+as reaction formations of the matriarchal rebellion. Woman gained admission to the world of mastery on behalf of the whole of exploited nature,
+but in a broken form. Subjugated, she mirrors her conqueror's victory in
+her spontaneous submission, reflecting defeat back to him as devotion,
+despair as the beautiful soul, the violated heart as the loving breast. At the
+price of radical exclusion from praxis and withdrawal into a charmed circle, nature receives homage from the lord of creation. Art, morality, and
+sublime love are masks of nature, in which nature reappears transformed
+and becomes expressive as its own antithesis. Through its masks it acquires the gift of speech; in its distortion it manifests its essence; beauty is
+the serpent which displays the wound where once the fang was implanted.
+Yet behind man's admiration for beauty lurks always the ringing laughter,
+the boundless scorn, the barbaric obscenity vented by potency on impotence, with which it numbs the secret fear that it is itself enslaved to impotence, to death, to nature. When the deformed jesters whose capers and
+foolscaps once enacted the mournful gaiety of broken nature had escaped
+the service of kings, the planned cultivation of beauty was entrusted to
+women. Modern puritanical woman zealously took up the task, identifying herself fully with the fait accompli, with nature not in its wildness but
+in its domestication. What was left of the fans, songs, and dances of
+Roman slave girls was definitively reduced in Birmingham to piano playing and other handicrafts, until the last residues of female wantonness had
+been entirely sublimated as emblems of patriarchal civilization. Under che
+pressure of universal* advertising, powder and lipstick, rejecting their origin among courtesans, became skin care, the bathing suit an attribute of
+hygiene. Nothing can escape. Even love, through the mere fact that it
+lakes place within the completely organized system of domination,* has
+the system's trademark imprinted on it. In Germany those entrapped by
+the existing order now demonstrate their obedience to it by promiscuity,
+is carlier by modesty, affirming by indiscriminate performance of the sexual act their rigid subordination to the dominant reason.*
+Juring into the present like a fossil of the bourgeois esteem for
+
+208
+woman is the termagant, the shrew. For measureless ages her nagging has
+avenged, within her own house, the wretchedness which has befallen her
+sex. Outside it, too, in the absence of the genuflection she fails to receive,
+the malevolent crone barks at the absent-minded man who fails to rise to
+his feet in her presence, knocking off his hat. That the head itself must
+roll, come what may, she has always demanded in politics, whether in rem-
+• iniscence of the manadic past or through outbidding man and his order
+in her impotent rage. The bloodthirstiness of women in pogroms eclipses
+that of men. The oppressed woman as Fury has outlived her time, continuing to display the grimace of mutilated nature in an age when domination is molding the well-trained bodies of both sexes, in whose uniformity the grimace has been effaced. Against the background of such mass production, the scolding of the shrew, who at least retained her own distinguishing face, becomes a sign of humanity, her ugliness a trace of spirit. If
+in past centuries the young girl wore her subjection in her melancholy features and her devoted love, an alienated image of nature, an aesthetic cultural object, at least the harridan of today has finally discovered a new
+female profession. As a social hyena she actively pursues cultural goals.
+Her ambition runs after honors and publicity, but her understanding of
+male culture is not yet sufficiently sharpened to prevent her, amid the
+injuries done her, from committing faux pas and showing that she is not
+yet at home in the civilization of men. Isolated, she seeks refuge in conglomerates of science and magic, misbegotten offspring of the idealistic
+privy councilor and the Nordic clairvoyante. She feels herself drawn to
+mischief. The last female opposition to the spirit of male sociery is degenerating in a morass of trivial rackets, sects, and hobbies, is turning into the
+perverted aggression of social work and theosophical gossip, venting its
+petry rancor in good works and Christian Science. In this quagmire, solidarity with creaturely life expresses itself not so much in the animal protection league as in neo-Buddhism and the Pekinese, whose distorted visage, now as in early paintings, reminds us of the physiognomy of the court
+jester left behind by progress. Like the hunchback's ungainly leaps, the little dog's features still represent mutilated nature, while mass industry and
+mass culture have learned to prepare the bodies of breeding bulls and
+humans according to scientific methods. The standardized masses are now
+so little aware of their own transformation, in which they have desperately collaborated, that they no longer require its symbolic display. Among
+
+209
+the lesser news items on the second and third pages of newspapers, the
+front pages of which are filled with the horrifying exploits of human
+beings, circus fires and the poisoning of large animals are sometimes
+reported. We are reminded of animals when their last specimens, of the
+same species as the medieval fool, perish in endless torment, a capital loss
+to their owner who was unable to provide the loyal creatures with fire prorection in an age of concrete buildings. The tall giraffe and the wise elephant are oddities which can no longer provide amusement for wised-up
+schoolboys. In Africa, the last part of the earth which has vainly sought to
+protect their poor herds from civilization, they form traffic obstacles to
+bombers landing in the latest war. They are being eradicated entirely. On
+an earth made reasonable there is no longer a need for the aesthetic reflection. The demons are driven out by directly imprinting humans. Domination no longer needs numinous images; it produces them industrially,
+the more reliably to insinuate itself into human beings.
+The distortion which is inherent in every work of art, as mutilation
+is inherent in the luster of feminine beauty, the maiming which puts on
+show the wound in which subjugated nature recognizes itself-that
+maiming is again being done by fascism, but no longer as mere appearance. It is inflicted directly on the damned. In this society there is no
+longer any sphere in which domination can profess its contradictions, as it
+does in art; there is no longer any means of duplication by which the distortion might be expressed. But in earlier times such expression was called
+not only beaury but thought, intellect, language itself. Today language calculates, designates, betrays, initiates death; it does not exprèss. The culture industry* has, like science, its own precise, external means of measurement by which to judge itself: facts. Film stars are experts, their performances are records of natural behavior, classifying modes of reaction;
+the directors and scriptwriters produce models of adapted behavior. The
+precision work of the culture industry* precludes distortion as a mere
+fault, an accident, something defectively subjective and natural. The deviation is analyzed to discover the practical cause which would link it back
+in rationality. Only then is it forgiven. Along with the reflection of power
+by nature, the tragic, like the comic, has disappeared; the rulers become
+serious in proportion to the resistance to be overcome, and humorous in
+proportion to the despair they perceive. Intellectual enjoyment used to be
+confined to the presentation of suffering, bur they play with horror itself.
+
+210
+Sublime love attached itself to strength appearing through weakness, in
+woman's beaury, but they attach themselves directly to power: the idol of
+today's society is the masculine face which exhibits a certain rakish lordliness. The woman is used for work, childbearing; or, if presentable, she
+enhances the status of her mate. No longer does she sweep the man away
+in rapture. Adoration reverts to self-love. The world and its purposes
+demand the whole of man. None can give away any part of himself; he
+must keep it all within. But, in the eyes of praxis, nature is all that is without and underneath, an object—as the girl, in vulgar parlance, has always
+been for the soldier. Feeling confines itself to power in relation to power.
+As woman did earlier, man now lays down his arms before man, but with
+dark, unswerving coldness. He becomes a woman, with eyes only for power. In the fascist collective,* with its teams and work camps, everyone from
+tender youth is a prisoner in solitary confinement, which breeds homosexuality. Even the beast must wear the lordly features. The distinctive
+human face, which humiliatingly recalls our origin in nature and our
+enslavement to it, irresistibly invites expert homicide. The caricature of
+the Jew has always relied on this, and even Goethe's aversion to apes
+marked our the limits of his humanity. When captains of industry and fascist leaders have animals around them, they are not domestic poodles but
+Great Danes and lion cubs. They are there to add spice to power through
+the terror they inspire. So blind is the murderous fascist colossus in face of
+nature that he conceives of animals only as means of humiliating humans.
+Nierzsche's unjust accusation of Schopenhauer and Voltaire, that they
+"knew how to disguise [their] hatred of certain men and things as pity
+toward animals,"22 applies truly to the fascist butcher. The precondition of
+the fascists' pious love of animals, nature, and children is the lust of the
+hunter. The idle stroking of children's hair and animal pelts signifies: this
+hand can destroy. It tenderly fondles one victim before felling the other,
+and its choice has nothing to do with the victim's guilt. The caress intimates that all are the same before power, that they have no being in themselves. For domination's bloody purposes the creature is only material.
+Thus the Führer flaunts his concern for innocents, who are plucked out
+without merit as others are killed without desert. Nature is filth. Only the
+devious strength which survives is in the right. But that strength itself is
+only nature; the whole ingenious machinery of modern industrial society
+is no more than nature dismembering itself. There is no longer any
+
+2II
+medium through which this contradiction can find expression. It unfolds
+with the glum obstinacy of a world from which art, thought, and negativity have vanished. Human beings are so radically estranged from themselves and from nature that they know only how to use and harm each
+other. Each is merely a factor, the subject or object of some praxis, something to be reckoned with or discounted.
+In this world liberated from appearance—in which human beings,
+having forfeited reflection, have become once more the cleverest animals,
+which subjugate the rest of the universe when they happen not to be tearing themselves apart—to show concern for animals is considered no
+longer merely sentimental but a betrayal of progress. In the best reactionary tradition Göring linked animal protection to racial hatred, the
+Lutheran-Germanic joys of the happy murderer with the genteel fair play
+of the aristocratic hunter. The fronts are clearly drawn; anyone who opposes Hearst* and Göring is on the side of Pavlov and vivisection; anyone
+who hesitates between the two is fair game for both. Such a person is told
+to follow reason. The choice is obligatory and inescapable. Anyone who
+wants to change the world should at all costs avoid finishing up in the
+morass of petty rackets, where political sectarians, utopians, and anarchists
+go to ruin along with the spiritualists. Intellectuals whose thought is unattached to any active historical power, and orientates itself by neither of the
+poles toward which industrial society is heading, lose their substance; their
+thought becomes baseless.* The real is the rational. Anyone who does not
+join in, the progressives also tell them, is of no help to anyone. Everything
+depends on society, and thought, no matter how precise, must align itself
+with the powerful social tendencies, without which it becomes mere
+whimsy. This consensus unites all the righteous realists, who declare their
+allegiance to human society as to a mass racket within nature. The thought
+which does not pursue the aims of any of their departments incurs their
+boundless wrath. It reminds them that something which exists only to be
+smashed still has a voice: nature, with which the lies of the nationalist folklore-lovers are full to overflowing. When its sound interrupts, even for a
+moment, their chanting chorus, the dread they seek to drown with their
+voices, and which lives on in their rationalized, broken hearts as in every
+animal, makes itself heard. The tendencies brought into daylight by the
+expression of such thoughts are omnipresent and blind. Nature in itself is
+neither good, as was believed by the old Romanticism, nor noble, as is
+
+2I2
+asserted by the new. As a model and goal it signifies anti-intellectualism,
+lies, bestiality; only when apprehended as knowledge does it become the
+urge of the living toward peace, the consciousness which, from the beginning, has inspired the unerring resistance to Führer and collective. What
+threatens the prevailing praxis and its inescapable alternatives is not
+nature, with which that praxis coincides, but the remembrance of nature.
+PROPAGANDA
+Propaganda directed at changing the world—what an absurdity!
+Propaganda turns language into an instrument, a lever, a machine.
+Propaganda fixes the composition which human beings have taken on
+under social injustice, by stirring them. It counts on their ability to be
+counted on. All people know in their innermost awareness that through
+this medium they are turned into media, as in a factory. The rage they feel
+in following it is the old rage against the yoke, reinforced by the dim
+knowledge that the way out pointed by propaganda is the wrong one.
+Propaganda manipulates human beings; when it screams freedom it contradicts itself. Mendacity is inseparable from it. It is the community of lies
+in which the leader and the led come together, even when its content as
+such is correct. In it even truth becomes a mere means, to the end of gaining adherents; it falsifies truth simply by taking it into its mouth. That is
+why true resistance is without propaganda. Propaganda is antihuman. It
+presupposes thac the principle that politics should spring from communal
+insight is no more than a form of words.
+In a society which prudently sets limits to the threatening abundance, what is recommended to everyone by others deserves mistrust. The
+warning against commercial advertisements, that no company gives anything away, is applicable everywhere, and, after the merger of business and
+politics, especially to the latter. The degree of eulogy increases with the
+decrease in quality: the Volkswagen, unlike the Rolls-Royce, depends on
+advertising. The interests of industry and consumers do not harmonize
+even when the former seriously has something to offer. Even propaganda
+for freedom can be a source of confusion in that it necessarily effaces the
+difference between theory and the particular interests of its addressees.
+The workers' leaders murdered in Germany were cheated even of the truth
+of their own action, since fascism belied their solidarity by the selectivity
+
+213
+of its revenge. When intellectuals are tortured to death in concentration
+camps, that does nor necessarily make the workers outside worse off.
+Fascism was nor the same for Ossierzky and for the proletariar. Propaganda cheated both.
+What is suspect is not, of course, the depiction of reality as hell but
+the routine invitation to break our of it. If that invitation can be addressed
+to anyone today, it is neither to the so-called masses nor to the individual,
+who is powerless, but rather to an imaginary witness, to whom we bequeath it so that it is not entirely lost with us.
+IN THE GENESIS OF STUPIDITY
+The emblem of intelligence is the feeler of the snail, the creature
+"with the fumbling face," with which, if we can believe Mephistopheles, 3
+it also smells. Meeting an obstacle, the feeler is immediately withdrawn
+into the protection of the body, it becomes one with the whole until it
+timidly ventures forth again as an autonomous agent. If the danger is still
+present, it disappears once more, and the intervals between the attempts
+grow longer. Mental life in its earliest stages is infinitely delicate. The
+snail's sense is dependent on a muscle, and muscles grow slack if their
+scope for movement is impaired. The body is crippled by physical injury,
+the mind by fear. In their origin both effects are inseparable.
+The higher animals have themselves to thank for their greater freedom; their existence is evidence that feelers were once stretched out in new
+directions and not repulsed. Each of their species is a monument to countless others whose attempts to develop were blocked at the outset, which
+gave way to fright if only a single feeler stirred in the path of their evolurion. The suppression of possibilities by the direct resistance of surrounding nature is extended inwardly by the wasting of organs through fright.
+Each time an animal looks out with curiosity a new form of the living
+dawns, a form which might emerge from the clearly formed species to
+which the individual creature belongs. But it is not only this specific form
+which holds it back in the security of the old state; the force which its look
+encounters is the resistance, millions of years old, which has imprisoned it
+at its present stage from the first, and which, constantly renewed, inhibits
+very step which goes beyond thar stage. Thar first, tentative look is always
+casily repulsed; behind it stand goodwill, fragile hope, but no continuous
+
+214
+energy. In the direction from which it has been definitely scared off the
+animal becomes shy and stupid.
+Stupidity is a scar. It can relate to one faculty among many or to
+them all, practical and mental. Every partial stupidity in a human being
+marks a spot where the awakening play of muscles has been inhibited
+instead of fostered. With the inhibition, the vain repetition of unorganized, awkward attempts originally began. The child's endless questions
+are already a sign of a secret pain, a serious question to which it has found
+no answer and which it cannot frame in its proper form.4 The repetition
+half resembles playful determination, as when a dog endlessly leaps against
+a door it has not learned how to open, finally giving up if the handle is too
+high, and half corresponds to hopeless compulsion, as when a lion paces
+endlessly up and down in its cage or a neurotic repeats the defense reaction which has already proved futile. If the child has wearied of its repetitions, or if the thwarting has been too brutal, its attention can curn in
+another direction; the child is richer in experience, as one says, but at the
+point where its impulse has been blocked a scar can easily be left behind,
+a slight callous where the surface is numb. Such scars lead to deformations.
+They can produce "characters," hard and capable; they can produce stupidity, in the form of deficiency symptoms, blindness, or impotence, if
+they merely stagnate, or in the form of malice, spite, and fanaticism, if
+they turn cancerous within. Goodwill is turned to ill will by the violence
+it suffers. And not only the forbidden question bur the suppressed imitation, the forbidden weeping or the forbidden reckless game, can give rise
+to such scars. Like the genera within the series of fauna, the intellectual
+gradations within the human species, indeed, the blind spots within the
+same individual, mark the points where hope has come to a halt and in
+their ossification bear witness to what holds all living things in thrall.
+
+Reference Matter
+
+The Position of "Dialectic of Enlightenment"
+in the Development of Critical Theory
+Horkheimer's and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment is undoubredly the most influential publication of the Critical Theory of the
+Frankfut School, and one of its most compressed theoretical statements.
+The book was written during the Second World War, between 1939 and
+1944, and first published in 1944 in a limited edition, as a hectographic
+typescript of the Institute for Social Research, on the occasion of Friedrich
+Pollock's fiftieth birthday. It was published as a printed edition by Querido
+of Amsterdam, the most important publisher of German writers in exile,
+in 1947.
+"Whar we had set our to do," the authors wrote in the Preface, "was
+nothing less than to explain why humanity, instead of entering a truly
+human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism." Yet the work goes
+far beyond a mere critique of contemporary events. Historically remote
+developments, indeed, the birth of Western history and of subjectivity
+itself from the struggle against natural forces, as represented in myths, are
+connected in a wide arch to the most threatening experiences of the present. It is true that the book scarcely forms a unity in the formal sense. It
+consists of five highly unconnected chapters, together with a number of
+shorter notes, the subjects of which at first sight appear somewhat heterogeneous. The various analyses relate to phenomena such as the way in
+which science has become detached from practical life, formalized morality, an entertainment culture which has reverted to manipulation, and a
+
+218
+paranoid behavioral structure, as expressed in aggressive anti-Semitism,
+which marks the limits of enlightenment. The common element which
+the authors perceive in these phenomena is the tendency toward the selfdestruction of enlightenment's own guiding criteria which had been inherent in enlightenment thought from the beginning. The historical analyses
+are intended to elucidate the present. For this reason, the two historical
+chapters, concerned with decisive thresholds of enlightenment in Homeric Greece and in Central Europe in the eighteenth century, are relegated
+to the status of "excurses," although they are indispensable to the argument of the book as a whole. In this way, against the background of a prehistory of subjectivity, the authors show why the National Socialist terror
+was not an aberration of modern history but was rooted deeply in the fundamental characteristics of Western civilization.
+The self-destruction of Western reason is seen to be grounded in an
+historical and fateful dialectic of the domination of external nature, internal nature, and society. Enlightenment, which split these spheres apart, is
+traced back to its mythical roots. Enlightenment and myth are not seen,
+therefore, as irreconcilable opposites but as dialectically mediated qualities
+of both real and intellectual life. "Myth is already enlightenment, and:
+enlightenment reverts to mythology."' This paradox is the fundamental
+thesis of the book. Reason appears as inextricably entangled with domination. Since the beginnings of history, liberation from the compulsions of
+external nature has been achieved only by introducing a power relationship of second degree. Both the repression of the internal nature of human
+drives, and social domination, are already at work in myth. Finally, fascism
+and the modern culture industry are the forms taken by a return of
+repressed nature. In the service of an advancing rationalization of instrumental thought modeled on the domination of nature and serving its purposes, enlightened reason is progressively hollowed out until it reverts to
+the new mythology of a resurrected relationship to nature, to violence.
+This theme is summed up in the opening sentences of the book: "Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has
+always aimed ar liberating human beings from fear and installing them as
+masters. Yet the wholly enlighrened earth is radiant with triumphant
+calamity."'
+The book took a considerable time to reach a wide audience, not
+least because of the peculiarly dense, allusive, and demanding nature of
+
+219
+the text. Bur it has now become one of the most intensively read and widely discussed writings of Critical Theory. This is not the place to offer yer
+another critical or systematic discussion of the theoretical problems it raises. Instead, three questions relating to editorial matters, which can in part
+be clarified by reference to materials in the posthumous papers, will be
+examined in detail here. First: What were the specific individual contributions of the authors to the rext they jointly composed? Second: Which
+especially important theoretical implications and, in particular, internal
+revisions to Critical Theory, present bur not fully worked out in the text,
+are significant for its interpretation? This will also involve clarifying where
+Dialectic of Enlightenment is to be located in the development, in particular, of Horkheimer's theoretical thinking. However useful it may be to
+divide Horkheimer's development into "historical" periods, such an approach risks hypostatizing those periods. An overprecise diagnosis of disconcinuities in the author's thought obstructs perception of the transitions
+within it, and therefore of the preconditions of those discontinuities. This
+account should therefore be seen as a counterweight to an often overschematic reception of Horkheimer's thought, its identity, and its changes.
+The discussion will therefore take account of a number of shorter pieces
+written in the 1940s which are thematically related to Dialectic of
+Enlightenment. Third, and last, there is the question of how the textual
+variations berween the printed edition of 1947 and hectographic edition of
+1944 are to be evaluated. The reasons for the prolonged resistance of the
+authors, especially Horkheimer, to a reedition of the book will also be considered-reasons bound up with their own later evaluation of their work.
+1. Authorship and the "Tension Between
+Two Intellectual Temperaments"
+The aurhors of Dialectic of Enlightenment repeatedly stressed their
+joint responsibility for the entire work. In the Preface to the new edition
+of 1969 they write: "No one who was nor involved in the writing could
+easily understand to what extent we both feel responsible for every sentence. We dictated long stretches together; the Dialectic derives its vital
+energy from the tension between the rwo intellectual temperaments which
+came together in writing it." That the authors did not make this assertion
+for reasons of academic politics or because of other strategic and external
+
+220
+considerations is demonstrated by the following letter from Adorno to
+Horkheimer of 2 June 1949: "Dear Max, I am enclosing copies of two critical comments sent to me by their author, Karl Thieme of Basel. I immediately corrected the nonsensical contention that I am the author of
+'Elements of Anti-Semitism.' People seem unable to resist the temptation
+to keep us apart, although I wrote to Thieme in February that Dialectic of
+Enlightenment is 'the joint work of Horkheimer and myself, to the extent
+that every sentence belongs to us both.' Warm regards, Teddie."s
+The collaboration between the two was not confined to this book.
+Records from the years 1931/32 and 1938 to 1946 bear witness to intensive
+theoretical discussions." Numerous essays and memoranda from that period, and from the 195os, and even as late as the 196os, bear traces of their
+joint work, as is clear from handwritten corrections to the rypescripts.
+When the two writers decided to return to Frankfurt after the end of the
+war and thought about publishing again in German journals, it is clear
+that they planned for a time to combine their works once and for all vis-
+i-vis the public. The correspondence between the two demonstrates that
+the initiative came primarily from Adorno. In 1949 he drafted the following declaration-which, however, remained unpublished: "As our entire
+scholarly work, both theoretical and empirical, has for years been so fused
+ingether that our contributions cannot be separated, it seems timely for us
+" declare publicly that all our philosophical, sociological, and psychological publications should be regarded as composed by us jointly and that we
+share responsibility for them. This also applies to work signed by us individually."
+Indisputable as it is that Horkheimer and Adorno successfully engaged over long periods in a collaboration of which Dialectic of Enlightrumen is only the best-known and historically most influential product, it
+is extremely doubtful whether both theories really form a seamless unity,
+is asserted in this declaration. Viewed from a temporal distance, the declaration throws less light on the actual relationship between the two
+authors than on their ideal, which they had approached so closely through
+joint work during the 194os that the differences could largely be overlooked. With characteristic exuberance, Adorno proclaimed the complete
+idenrity berween their views at the start of a new phase of collaboration at
+the Institut für Sozialforschung, reestablished in Frankfurt, as if he wanteel to make permanent that period of joint writing, securing it against all
+countervailing tendencies.
+
+22I
+With the work on Dialectic of Enlightenment the thought of the two
+authors drew together more closely than before or immediately afterward
+All the same, the book had very different functions in the individual
+developments of the two authors. Reference to the manuscripts for
+Dialectic of Enlightenment preserved in the posthumous papers of the
+authors, and to recorded comments on the question of the books authorship, provides a basis for answering the more far-reaching question concerning theoretical agreements, differences, and developments. Regardless
+of that, however, the fact remains that the authorship of the book, which
+cannot necessarily be reduced to the act of writing the text, must ultimately be attributed to both together. Any motives of playing one author
+off against the other, that may have been involved in similar exercises during their lifetimes, automatically cease to apply from the present historical
+distance.
+In determining the respective contributions of the two authors to
+their communal text, two kinds of sources are available: the preliminary
+drafts contained in the posthumous papers (A) and comments transmitted
+verbally (B).
+(A) Posthumous papers
+(I) "Preface": This is present among Horkheimer's posthumous
+papers in a number of typed sections which bear numerous handwritten
+corrections and additions by Horkheimer and a few corrections by
+Adorno.® No draft is to be found in Adorno's posthumous papers.?
+(2) "The Concept of Enlightenment": In the 1944 version the chap-'
+ter has the title "Dialectic of Enlightenment," and in the typescripts it is
+titled "Myth and Enlightenment." Handwritten notes and text passages
+relating to this chapter by Horkheimer and, in smaller quantities, by
+Adorno, are preserved in Horkheimer's posthumous papers; fragments of
+typewritten versions with handwritten corrections by both authors are present in similar proportions." Adorno's posthumous papers contain nothing relating to chis chapter.
+(3) "Excursus I: Odysseus or Myth and Enlighrenment": Horkheimer's posthumous papers have no material on this chapter, while
+Adorno's contain a typescript with numerous handwritten corrections and
+additions.
+(4) "Excursus II: Julierre or Enlightenment and Morality": the typescript is in Horkheimer's posthumous papers and has the title "Enlighten-
+
+222
+ment and Rigorism."'' Adorno's posthumous papers contain nothing on
+this chapter.
+(5) "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception":
+Horkheimers posthumous papers contain two versions of this chapter
+with the title "The Schema of Mass Culture."12 The earlier of the two versions is marked "Second Draft," is dated "October 1942,"
+and bears the
+name Max Horkheimer (on the cover page of the notebook) and the inirials M.H. in his own handwriting (on the title page). This typescript has
+eighty-nine pages, the first forty-five having numerous handwritten corrections and additions by Horkheimer. Only the part of the chapter
+revised up to that point was included in the editions of 1944 and I947.
+This version corresponds to the second typescript of the chapter in
+Horkheimer's posthumous papers. In the printed version it closes with the
+note "To be continued," which was, however, omitted from the new edition of 1969. The surviving drafts for this chapter show in exemplary form
+the problems which arise when trying to draw conclusions about authorship from the form of the material. They also give us deeper insight into
+the way the two authors worked. To anticipate the result: despite indicarions pointing to Horkheimer, Adorno is probably the author of the first
+version (not extant) of the chapter. His posthumous papers also include
+the typescript known as the "Second Draft"; it is in triplicate, one copy
+being uncorrected, another showing a few handwritten corrections by
+Adorno—it has the handwritten initials T. W.A. on the title page—and
+the third having numerous handwritten corrections and additions by
+Adorno on the first forty-five pages. Some of these notes agree word for
+word with those of Horkheimer, while others diverge from them. Judging
+from the materials, therefore, the contributions of the two authors to the
+secondary revision were abour equal. Only recorded verbal comments can
+throw light on the authorship of the first draft, and they refer to Adorno
+as the author. If the form of the materials is taken as the basis, the course
+of work on this chapter could be reconstructed as follows: after Adorno,
+on the basis of discussions and notes no longer accessible, had produced a
+"Second Draft" and hurriedly corrected it, the two authors discussed the
+typescript sentence by sentence, at the same time inserting the corrections
+on which they agreed. Independently of each other—beforehand or afterward—cach of them made handwritten revisions to the typescript. This
+process of revision came to an end at page 45 of the typescript, for con-
+
+223
+tingent reasons. The printed version was produced as a compilation of the
+two revised versions of the first part. According to this interpretation, the
+abbreviations M.H. and T.W.A. clearly do not refer to the author but to
+the "owner" of the typescript at the time, the reviser. The insertion of
+"Max Horkheimer" as the author's name on the cover sheet was not made
+by Horkheimer himself and appears to be a later, mistaken addition by a
+secretary. This reconstruction is the decisive reason why the Editor decided not to include the second, unrevised part of the chapter in Horkheimer's posthumous writings. "3
+(6) "Elements of Anti-Semitism. Limits of Enlightenment": No
+typescript of this chapter ready for publication is to be found in Horkheimer's posthumous papers, which do, however, contain numerous typewritten fragments, mostly with handwritten corrections and additions by
+Horkheimer, together with rext passages handwritten by Horkheimer.'
+One of these handwritten texts follows directly after three pages written
+by Gretel Adorno (probably under dictation). This bundle also includes a
+few handwritten notes by Adorno and a six-page typescript by Adorno
+with the title "Draft." It also contains reports of discussions berween the
+two authors on anti-Semitism.' Thesis VII of this chapter, not added
+until the printed version of 1947, is also to be found in several versions as
+a typescript with handwritten corrections and additions by Horkheimer.l
+Attached to this is a three-page typescript by Adorno, "Remarks on Thesis
+VII," with the date "Sept. 4 / 46" handwritten by him.! Adorno's posthumous papers contain no further materials for this chapter.
+(7) "Notes and Sketches": These are to be found in Horkheimer's
+posthumous papers, each one usually in several typescript versions, with
+handwritten corrections by Horkheimer. ' The parts added as "Postscripts"
+to some of the notes are missing. The aphorisms are collected in several
+bundles. Of the typescripts present here only abour half were included in
+the printed version of Dialectic of Enlightenment. The notes not included
+in ir'" are brought together in two bundles, one of which is marked with
+the abbreviations M.H. and Dr. H. The other, the contents of which coincide largely with those of the first, is bound as a typescript and bears the
+ritle "Notes As an Addition to the Festschrift for Friedrich Pollock" and is
+preceded by the remark: "The notes have not been revised. They were
+excluded from the Nores and Skerches of the Festschrift as being too provisional."'" The "Notes and Sketches" are the oldest parts of Dialectic of
+
+224
+Enlightenment. Those which are dated were written in 1939, 1940, and
+1942. Adorno's posthumous papers contain no manuscripts or typescripts
+relating to them.
+(B) Oral comments
+(I) "The authorship of the individual chapters," writes Jürgen
+Habermas, "is by no means indivisible. Gretel Adorno once confirmed my
+conjecture, which, in any case, is obvious to a careful reader, that the title
+essay and the Sade chapter were written predominantly by Horkheimer,
+while the chapters on Odysseus and the culture industry can be attributed
+primarily to Adorno. This conclusion is based not only on stylistic differ -
+ences."21
+(2) More precise and comprehensive is a report by Rolf Tiedemann,?
+based on a verbal communication by Adorno. It is consistent with the evidence from the materials of the posthumous papers. According to this
+remark the two authors dictated the chapter on the "Concept of En-
+lightenment" jointly. (The materials indicate a certain preponderance of
+drafts by Horkheimer.) The first excursus, "Odysseus or Myth and
+Enlightenment," according to this report, was written almost exclusively
+by Adorno, while the second, "Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality,"
+can be attribured to the same degree to Horkheimer. The chapter "The
+Culture Industry: Enlightenment As Mass Deception" is based on a draft
+by Adorno, which, however, was so intensively revised by Horkheimer that
+the contributions of both should be regarded as practically equal. The
+reverse is the case with the chapter "Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of
+Enlighten ment," which was originally written by Horkheimer and intensively revised by Adorno. In addition, the "Preface" of 1944 refers to a considerable contribution by Leo Löwenthal to the formulation of the first
+three theses of this chapter.? According to this report the "Notes and
+Sketches" were written by Horkheimer and contain no interventions by
+Adorno. Adorno wrote the "Postscripts," which were not revised by
+Horkheimer.
+2. Genesis of the Work: Theoretical Implications
+Whereas Dialectic of Enlightenment fits more or less seamlessly into
+Adorno's acre, in Horkheimer's case it represents the most pronounced
+expression of a phase in his intellectual development which differs sharply
+
+225
+from that of the 1930s. Whereas the essays for Zeitschrift were still borne
+up by the confidence that it was possible to translate the central ideas of
+the philosophical and political Enlightenment into materialist terms and
+to realize them practically, Critical Theory now seems to hope for little
+more than to preserve the memory of those ideas in the vortex of an overwhelming process of disintegration. The critique derives its incisiveness
+from being directed against a modern concept of reason which took its
+standard from the progress of productive forces and still formed the basis
+of the most advanced critique of the relations of production which had
+existed up to then. Enlightenment thus becomes enlightenment on the
+origins and consequences of enlightenment. The change in the development of Horkheimer's Critical Theory first shows itself in the essays "The
+Authoritarian Stare" and "The End of Reason"24 and is emphatically present in Dialectic of Enlightenment.
+Since the early 1930s Horkheimer had been developing the idea of a
+materialism to be implemented in an interdisciplinary way. The journal he
+published, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, illustrates how a critical theory of
+society guided by philosophy and underpinned historically and psychologically was to articulate and develop theoretically the practical interest in
+the abolition of individual suffering and social injustice. According to this
+conception, the only political groups which had the strength to bring
+about a revolutionary transformation of society were those which were
+able to make use of a comprehensive theory which employed the most
+advanced scholarly instruments.
+The form of this theory, however, and especially its philosophical
+foundations, were by no means clearly outlined. Toward the end of the
+1930s, therefore, Horkheimer planned an extensive work on dialectics in
+which he aimed to elaborate further the philosophical content of his articles published in Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. In a letter of Io November
+1938 Adorno wrote to Benjamin regarding Horkheimer: "He is currently
+in an extremely overburdened state connected with his move to Scarsdale.
+In the next few years he wants to free himself from all his administrative
+work in order to devore his undivided energy to the book on the dialecric." We know about the plan for this book from a memorandum writlen by Horkheimer abour the same time on "The Idea, Activities and
+I'rogram of the Institur für Sozialforschung," which, however, was not
+published at that time. The planned work is mentioned there under the
+inle of a "dialectical logic": "This is nor a formalistic epistemology but a
+
+226
+materialist theory of categories. The scholarly and political discussion of
+social problems makes use of categories abour which differences of opinion arise as soon as closer definition is requested. They include concepts
+such as causality, tendency, progress, law, necessiry, freedom, class, culture,
+value, ideology, dialectic, etc. [...J The definition of philosophical concepts is always at the same time a description of human society in its historically given embodiment. In this respect the planned book conceives of
+logic in a similar way to Hegel in his great work, not as a collection of
+abstract modes of thought but as a definition of the most important substantial categories of progressive consciousness in the present cime."26
+Bur it was not until spring 1941, when he moved to California, that
+the book on dialectics took shape—though not, admittedly, as a "theory
+of caregories." Nevertheless, even now Horkheimer connected his undertaking with che aim of producing a major philosophical work. In a letter
+to Pollock of 27 November 1942 he wrote abour his efforts, his moments
+of success, his ambitions and his awareness of the limits of his work: "It is
+true, the subjects which I am dealing with are the most difficult ones that
+exist, but the pains you suffer by working on them are at the same time
+the greatest experience you can have in life. [...] There is no doubr chat
+the studies, which I am undertaking now and which are really the fulfillment of what we have dreamt to be our raison d'être when we were very
+young, cannot be achieved in one or two years. [...] If Husser needed ten
+years to write his Logical Investigations and another thirteen years to publish his Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, not to speak of more famous
+works on philosophy and related subjects, and if you take my poor forces,
+education, and routine into consideration, you will appreciate what 1 am
+in for. What I definitely know, however, and what makes me happy, is that
+I am really doing what I can. Ultra posse nemini obligatio. We are really on
+our way.
+'27
+Even after his move from New York to California in spring 1941,
+Horkheimer was unable to withdraw to the extent he wished from the
+administrative tasks mentioned by Adorno. His original plan for a materialist reformulation of Hegel's Logic was changed, suspended, or abandoned
+in favor of other considerations. However, far more responsible for his
+decision was the circumstance that Horkheimer's intellectual position and
+self-reflection were being accompanied by a number of significant political and theoretical experiences and by ourward and inward changes in his
+
+Editor's Afterward
+227
+life. These changes concerned not merely the planned book but-notwithstanding the continuity of his philosophical intention—Horkheimer's
+thinking as a whole.
+If one looks exclusively at the difference between "Traditional and
+Critical Theory" and Dialectic of Enlightenment, one risks misinterpreting
+these changes as an abrupt break. A closer examination of his less wellknown publications, of the records of the history of the Institute for Social
+Research which have now been collected, and of writings from Horkheimer's posthumous papers from that time reveals a number of intermediate steps and mediating links which make the transformation comprehensible.
+In Horkheimer's view the twofold linkage of a philosophically orientated, critical theory of sociery with traditional research, on the one
+hand, and with political action, on the other, became weaker and weaker
+during the 1930s. Adorno had originally tried to draw a sharp dividing line
+berween research in individual disciplines and philosophical interpretarion.? Now, from the perspective of a sketch of a dialectical logic, or of a
+dialectic of enlightenment and myth from the point of view of the philosophy of history, this division cast crucial doubt on the philosophical
+self-consistency of the categories within individual disciplines." Critical
+Theory could no longer draw on individual disciplines in the same way as
+previously. Finally, in the Preface to Dialectic of Enlightenment, the authors
+write on this point: "In the present collapse of bourgeois civilization not
+only the operations but the purpose of science have become dubious. "30
+The status of Critical Theory as an immanent critique of traditional theory is thus also called increasingly into question.
+The full scope of the particular considerations and doubts relating to
+the purpose of science becomes clear only from the posthumous papers
+and lerters of the two authors. Important examples of these doubts are
+Horkheimer's public reflections on the philosophy of language from 1939
+onward, which are now published in Vol. 12 of his Gesammelte Schriften.
+They continue from earlier critical discussions of the ideological aspect of
+language, especially with regard to the conception of language of Logical
+Positivism, to be found in a number of essays from the 193os. Horkheimer
+now radicalizes this earlier standpoint, making it into an aporetic critique
+of the concept itself. The critique remains aporetic because, by interprering language as che preponderan relarionship of the subject to the object,
+
+228
+it renders obsolere its own standard of a language which is not instrumentally stunted. Language, Horkheimer writes in one of these notes
+from 1946, contains, inextricably mixed, both the power to suppress the
+particular and the strength to liberate it from that suppression, to reconcile the particular with the universal. Both the negative and the positive
+sides of this critique appear in Dialectic of Enlightenment, but without
+mediation. The thesis of the universality of blindness implies the complementary thesis that the spell could be lifted at a stroke from humans and
+things if only the redeeming word were spoken. The critique of a reason
+which reverts to myth requires as its background not only an historical
+philosophy of reconciliation but also a utopia of true language. In the
+notes from the 194os in his posthumous papers, Horkheimer even seems
+to be aiming at a sublation of the philosophy of history in a critical philosophy of language."
+In Critical Theory, reflections of this kind on the concept of language
+and on the concept itself never have the self-satisfied character of solutions
+to the special problems of individual disciplines or of specialist philosophy.
+Rather, they are persistently seen by Horkheimer and Adorno in their relationship to social theory, and indeed to historical-political experience. The
+positivist conception of language, in the view of the two authors, concerned merely the real function of language within monopolistic society, a
+function which it misinterpreted. Not least because language threatened to
+forfeit its capacity conceptually to transcend the existing order, the unity
+of theory and political praxis—no matter how mediated-appeared to
+them to be irremediably shattered by the beginning of the 194os. The hope
+for a radical transformation of conditions, indeed, any confidence in the
+possibility of historical progress at all, seemed to be without substance. The
+failure of a proletarian revolution to occur in the developed capitalist societies, the subjugation of workers' organizations to a consolidated and
+expanding fascism, the manipulative power of monopolistic mass sociery
+in the West and of state socialism on the Stalinist model in the East-all
+these political experiences lent impetus to the transition from the Critical
+Theory of the igos to the critique of instrumental reason during the
+194os, a critique which became at the same time theoretically more radical
+and practically more conservative. In addition, there were internal changes
+at the Institute which went hand in hand with the theoretical transformittions. Especially significant in this context were, first, the break berween
+
+229
+Fromm and the other members of the Institute and, second, Adorno's
+move from Oxford to New York, which began the phase of particularly
+intensive collaboration between him and Horkheimer.
+In the early 193os Fromm had played a leading part in the elaboration of a concept of analytic social psychology by the Institute. The function of psychoanalysis in this project was, above all, to identify the psychical forces opposing rational interests which aimed at social change,
+forces which "form, as it were, the cement without which sociery would
+not hold together and which contribute to the production of the great
+social ideologies in all cultural spheres."33 Horkheimer drew on this sketch
+for the general conception of Studien über Autorität und Familie, 34 according to which the authoritarian attitude mediated through family or state
+institutions should be understood as the medium by which individuals are
+adapted to the structures of social domination. Fromm took further the
+critique, contained in these studies, of Freud's conception of himself as a
+natural scientist in his later publications concerning a critique of the psychoanalytic theory of libido. The assumption of a basic sexual drive was to
+be replaced by the wider conception of a drive toward social connection.
+At the same time Fromm sharpened the criticism he had expressed earlier
+of Freud's pessimistic anthropology, which he regarded as a hypostatizarion of bourgeois-patriarchal family structures."
+By contrast, Horkheimer's evaluation of psychoanalysis changed in
+the opposite direction, one might say, during the same period. Against
+fromm, whom he accused of lapsing into a psychology of common sense,
+he adhered more emphatically than ever to the Freudian theory of drives.
+However, he now interpreted this theory in a different way, as a precise
+expression of the disempowerment of the subject, which he saw as bound
+up with the decay of liberalism. Against the theoretical categories and the
+practical, therapeutic maxims of psychoanalytic ego-psychology he
+unphasized the socially critical implications of Freud's biological, physicalist materialism. Freud's pessimism regarding the possibility of subjugaring destructive forces, founded on the theory of drives, appeared to
+Horkheimer all the more convincing the less he himself was able to attach
+sch hopes to the abolition of domination by concrete social movements.
+How important such an interpretation of psychoanalysis—orthodox
+vet reading Freud, so to speak, against the grain—was for the conception
+ol lialecsic of Enlighrenmen can he seen from records of talks between
+
+230
+Horkheimer and Adorno from 1939, which can be regarded as preliminary
+discussions on the work they were planning together.36 It appears that at
+times the authors had considered planning their joint work entirely or
+partly as a critique of psychoanalysis. This is indicated negatively by a formulation concerning the revision of such a plan: "Instead of the orientation to analysis, - propose orienting the book toward currently outlawed
+concepts like that of the saboteur."3 In these discussions psychoanalysis is
+seen, on the one hand, as a variety of positivist thinking ultimately tending toward a false reconciliation between the mutilated individual and the
+social agencies to which it owes its suffering. On the other hand, however, the psychoanalytic concepts spring from an Enlightenment tradition of
+asserting truth against illusions and taboos, on which the authors wished
+to draw. Critical Theory was to subject the scientific concepts of "bourgeois" thought to a change of function corresponding to Marx's procedure
+with regard to classical political economy. Those concepts contained standards by which their failure to be realized in existing society was to be
+measured. They were to be stripped of their illusory ahistorical appearance.
+In the case of psychoanalysis, this applied, for example, to the concept of
+the individual: "The Progressive moment of analysis consists in the contributions it has made to an understanding of the individual as an arena.
+It might be said that the analytic categories, however distorted, are conducive to the insight that the individual itself is a history of class struggles.'*38
+However, in Dialectic of Enlightenment itself the dispute with psychoanalysis is carried on much more behind the scenes. It is present in
+central ideas of the book even though it may not be visible at first sight.
+The psychoanalytic category of the return of the repressed, for example,
+itself returns in the dialectic of the domination of nature, in the thesis that:
+"the subjugation of everything natural to the sovereign subject culminates
+in the domination of what is blindly objective and natural. This tendency
+levels out all the antitheses of bourgeois thought, especially that between
+moral rigor and absolute amorality." The proximity of Horkheimer's and
+Adorno's argumentation to psychoanalytic theory and empirical practice is
+unmistakable, above all, in the chapters on the culture industry and anti-
+Semitism. The culture industry is the regression, operating with enlightenment means in restricted form, from the effort of cultural sublimation.
+In anti-Semitism this regression reveals its deadly, seriousness. It is based
+
+231
+on the triumph of the projective manipulation of the world over the differentiations and inhibitions of rational thought and behavior: "Impulses
+which are not acknowledged by the subject and yet are his are attributed
+to the object: the prospective victim."40
+In their Preface the authors stress the close connection between the
+chapter on anti-Semitism and the studies in social psychology of the
+Institute for Social Research during the 1940s, which were published in
+the five volumes of Studies in Prejudice."' The chapter "Elements of Anti-
+Semitism" should therefore be read as the historical, philosophical, and
+theoretical background to the empirical studies on prejudice, which in
+their turn were an attempt to translate the theory into quantitative invesrigations. Moreover, Adorno refers expressly to this connection in an essay
+from 1968; "The chapter 'Elements of Anti-Semitism' in Dialectic of
+Enlightenment, which Horkheimer and I wrote jointly in the strictest
+sense, that is to say, we literally dictated it together, strongly influenced my
+contribution to the investigations carried out later with the Berkeley
+Public Opinion Study Group. The Authoritarian Personality was the literary outcome of those investigations. [.. .) 'Elements of Anti-Semitism'
+placed racial prejudice theoretically in the context of an objectively oriented, critical theory of society. Admittedly, in contrast to a certain economic orthodoxy, we did not take an aloof attitude toward psychology but
+gave it its due place in our sketch as a moment of enlightenment. Never,
+however, did we leave any doubt as to the precedence of objective factors
+over psychology. I...J We regarded social psychology as a subjective mediation of the objective social system: without its mechanisms subjects could
+not have been kept in their place."*2
+Despite Adorno's stress on the connection berween empirical work
+and the general theory of anti-Semitism, the gulf between the two, measured by Horkheimers original program for an interdisciplinary materialism, cannot be overlooked." Unlike earlier attempts to mediate between
+philosophical, sociological, and psychological knowledge, Horkheimer
+and Adorno contended that the split between these conceptual spheres
+corresponded to an actual breach between individual and society and
+therefore would be merely short-circuited by a purely conceptual approach. This had the result, however, that their evaluation of anti-Semilism was not wholly consistent in both areas. For example, whereas the
+empirical investigations into the authoritarian character limit its destruc-
+
+232
+tive potential by conceding the possibility of a nonrepressive education
+within existing society, the "Elements" chapter emphatically relates it to
+"the nature of the dominant reason and of the world corresponding to its
+image."44 An end to prejudice could therefore be expected only from a radical break with the logic of the civilizing process up to now. In the empirical studies, therefore, the counterpart to the authoritarian, intolerant, and
+prejudice-ridden personality is represented by a subject type which, within the framework of Dialectic of Enlightenment, appears to be almost inextricably entangled with the principles of self-preservation, of the domination of internal and external nature.
+In the extracts cited above from the report on the studies of the
+1940s, Adorno points to a second strand of theory which, compared to
+psychoanalysis, was still more important for Dialectic of Enlightenment:
+economics, meaning the critique of Marx and his successors. But however decisive the link to the critique of political economy may have been, no
+less characteristic was its relegation to the level of the merely implicit. This
+was done still more thoroughly than in the case of psychoanalysis. Whereas, in the discussions of 1939 already cited, the authors were still considering an historical-materialist reformulation of the psychoanalytic concept of
+the individual as a "history of class struggles," the explanatory principle
+underlying the Marxian concept of history is largely absent from Horkheimer's and Adorno's historical-philosophical sketch. Its place is taken by
+the more general antagonism between domination of nature and enslavement to it.
+The authors attempt to show how reason, having regressed to instrumental rationality, has combined in the present era with the domination
+of nature and social control to form a quasimythical compulsion. In the
+modern varieties of totalitarianism, only the always-calamitous intertwinement of reason and power is manifested. The historical phenomenon
+of fascism no longer appears, as in the orthodox Marxist view, as the last
+political stage of monopoly capitalism but is related in manifold ways to
+overarching structures of bourgeois thought and action. National
+Socialism, which needed military expansion and terror to achieve internal
+stability yet was bound to miss its goal by using these means, is interpreted as an unstable barbaric interlude on the way to the historically and
+generically irrevocable goal of the "administered world."
+This does not mean, however, that the Marxian approach compris-
+
+233
+ing a dialectic of productive forces and relations of production has been
+simply replaced by a general analysis of technological rationality. Rather,
+an abundance of links to the Marxist critique of political economy still
+remain. To give an example from "Elements of Anti-Semitism" just quored: the role of the Jews is interpreted there not least as a socioeconomic
+function of the distribution sphere and its loss of power in monopoly capitalism, and anti-Semitism as a projective obfuscating of the nonequivalent
+exchange of equivalents in the sale of labor power. Such an interpretation
+is based on the continuing attempts of the Institut during the late 193os to
+redefine the concept of monopoly capitalism and, on that basis, the concept of fascism. A decisive influence on Dialectic of Enlightenment in this
+respect was Pollock's thesis that fascism and bureaucratic socialism were
+variants of a new order of capitalism which differed fundamentally both
+from earlier private capitalism and from modern monopoly capitalism,
+and which he called "state capitalism."45 In a contribution which follows
+this Afterword, Willem van Reijen and Jan Bransen discuss in more detail
+this thesis and its importance for the discussions at the Institute for Social
+Research.
+The pessimism regarding the possibility of socialist politics dominant in Horkheimer's thought since the early 194os has its economic foundation in the theory of state capitalism, its political foundation in the connected theory of "rackets" as a "basic form of domination."46 According to
+Pollock's thesis there is in state capitalism no structural conflict between
+political objectives and economic necessities. In the "command economy"
+the productive forces and the laws of the market are stripped of their
+autonomy and thus of their explosive potential. The planned economy has
+become inevitable; the only decisive political question is whether it will be
+democratic or totalitarian, that is, the question as to how access to the
+administrative control of the economy and thus to the new ruling class is
+regulated. This provides the starting point for Horkheimer's theory of
+rackets, according to which social power, in keeping with its own economic principle, is transformed from the form mediated by exchange, via
+the form conferred on it by economic monopolies, into direct domination
+by force. By rackets Horkheimer means the groups, cliques, councils,
+boards, or committees formed in the most diverse epochs whose social
+function is largely supplanted by the imperative to preserve and increase
+their own power. The theory of rackets, which grew out of the discussions
+
+234
+on the applicability of Marxian theory to the present form of society, is
+first of all an attempt to escape the myth of a revolutionary subject without falling back into illusory cultural criticism behind the screen of a critique of political economy. Beyond that, it aims to construct a theory of
+power which reveals the historically limited model of the rule of liberalism
+regulated by market laws to be a special case of the monopolization of
+advantages on the basis of social performance.
+For Horkheimer, the topical application of the racket theory was to
+be found in the transfer of traditional class antagonism to the field of
+international relations, on the one hand, and to institutionally determined
+antitheses within the classes themselves, on the other. In postliberal capitalism, according to this theory, new forms of conflict conceal the basic
+contradiction between capital and labor. With state capitalism mechanisms have come into being to mitigate the economic crises which earlier
+had the potential to disintegrate the system. In this way the economic
+"base" loses its role in supporting the social totality. National Socialism
+and bureaucratic socialism or, more generally, a new "integral statism," can
+no longer be described only in terms of economic basic categories. Political
+analysis takes on greater importance to the extent that liberalism appears
+as an historical episode, after the downfall of which society reverts to direct
+methods of domination no longer mediated via the marker. The fundamental economic factors leading to crisis are tending to become controllable by measures of state intervention, which can range from compensatory welfare legislation to overt terror.
+This new form of the "primacy of politics" does not leave untouched
+the concept of the political itself, in comparison to its function in general
+capitalism. Above all, it should not be confused with the positivist substitution of historical, political, or psychological laws for economic ones. In
+a fragment written by Horkheimer about 1942, he describes politics in
+postliberalism as an illusion which affects not only the dominated masses
+bur the political agents themselves: "Politics, the rediscovery of which in
+the Renaissance was a theoretical advance, has become, in thinking under
+monopoly, even more an ideological category than the laws of the market
+under liberalism: with its aid the surface is hypostatized. The dominated
+masses attribute world events to politics. They hear the appeal and the
+decree, they are informed about the lives of the powerful, which consist of
+facts in no need of theory; the masses experience the direct consequences
+
+235
+of political actions, of negotiations between rackets, they feel the effects of
+emergency aid, of rising prices, of the new job, of war, and perceive big
+politics as fare and nature just as they earlier perceived the economic
+depression. And the protagonists share this belief: They know that they
+hold key positions; just as the entrepreneur mistook his business ventures,
+calculations and speculations, that he undertook on the basis of the economic cycle, for freedom, the presidents of unions and governments misconstrue their decisions as the beginnings of causal chains. Government,
+however, must bow to the same necessities as buying and selling: to the
+requirements of the reproduction of society within the power relationships
+as they are. This is not so different in the rwo periods. The opacity of the
+market which gave rise to the self-deception about freedom merely expressed the fact that the relationships of entrepreneurs among themselves
+were not rational but were governed by individual self-assertion. Today the
+struggles take place within much stronger groups, amid movements of
+highly concentrated masses of capital. The governments are executive
+mechanisms which cannot rationally understand the actual state of the
+forces on which they depend, but merely feel their concrete effects."47
+The state capitalist "primacy of politics" can be understood as a perversion of the socialist idea of the planned economy which was supposed
+to replace the anarchy of private appropriation by rational decisions in the
+generalizable interest of society as a whole. What is expressed in fascism,
+in especially brutal form, is merely what characterizes democratic state
+capitalism as well as bureaucratic socialism of the Soviet kind: the end of
+liberal, legal agencies of mediation under the power polities of competing
+ruling cliques. These groups take over the now necessary planning of the
+economic process, whether that process is still democratically legitimized
+or is already an almost openly planned and organized piracy.
+The starting point of the racket theory is therefore an analysis of
+contemporary society as a conglomerate of organized groups under the
+Icadership of bureaucratic or quasibureaucratic elites. The relationship of
+a clique to its clientele is structured on the principle of protection in exchange for obedience. Since the individual rackets no longer even pretend
+to pursue intellectual ideals or objectives relating to society as a whole, the
+¡raditional ideologies, which used to make particularist interests appear
+universal, also disappear. They are replaced by the unashamedly pragmatit objecrives of manipulation and the preservation of power. The ability to
+
+236
+impose these objectives decides the selection and careers of the leading
+personnel within a racket.
+Beyond that, this approach aims to produce an historically generalizable theory of relations of class and domination: "Under the conditions
+of monopolism and total domination," Horkheimer writes in 1943, "the
+permanence of oppression, its parasitic nature, becomes manifest. Every
+ruling class has always been monopolistic to the extent that it excluded the
+overwhelming majority of human beings. The structure corresponded to
+that of competing rackets. Even the socially useful functions which the
+ruling classes used to perform have been transformed into weapons against
+the oppressed population and against competing groups within their own
+class. The racket pattern, which used to be typical of the behavior of rulers
+toward the ruled, is now representative of all human relationships, even
+those within the working class. The difference between the racket within
+capital and the racket within labor lies in the fact that in the capitalist
+racket the whole class profits, whereas the racket of labor functions as a
+monopoly only for its leaders and for the worker-aristocracy. The laboring
+masses are the objects of both forms; they merely have to pay for the whole
+system. The similarity between the most highly respected historical formations, such as the medieval hierarchies, to the modern rackets is obvious. The concept of the racket applies to both large and small enterprises;
+they all struggle for the largest possible share of added value. In this
+respect the highest capitalist corporations resemble the small interest
+groups which operate among the lowliest strata of the population, both
+within and outside the legal boundaries. (...] A true sociology of the racket as the living element of the ruling class in history could serve both a
+political and a scientific purpose. It could help to clarify the goal of political praxis: a society with a pattern different to that of the racket, a racket-less society. It could contribute to defining the idea of democracy which
+still leads a shadowy life in the heads of human beings. [...] Expressed in
+scientific terms, a more appropriate philosophy of history could evolve
+from the sociology of the racket. [...) The modern concept contributes
+to describing social relationships of the past. "The human anatomy is the
+key to the anatomy of the ape.'"48
+The political and economic basis for a theory of rackets and of state
+capitalism was developed within the Institute primarily by Horkheimer
+and Pollock; dissenting voices were not lacking among their colleagues,
+
+237
+particularly those of Neumann and Kirchheimer. Although Horkheimer
+adhered fundamentally to the thesis, the criticism may have retarded early
+publication of his reflections on racket theory. Adorno's contribution, "9
+too, remained unpublished. These beginnings of the theory were not elaborated in detail later.
+They were, however, the decisive factor in the transition from the
+earlier form of Critical Theory, represented by the essays in Zeitschrift fir
+Sozialforschung during the 193os, to an historical and generic critique of
+instrumental reason, of which Dialectic of Enlightenment is the most important document. But the specific economic and political arguments do
+not appear, or appear only in rudimentary form, in this book. Nevertheless, they provide the background of social theory against which the scientific, moral, cultural, and psychological phenomena of the self-destruction of enlightenment were interpreted. Since the authors limit the application of the Marxian categories essentially to liberalism—which, especially with regard to the, at least partial, achievement of bourgeois freedom, is presented as a transient episode in a history of power always dominated by the law of the racket—it is understandable why those categories
+are pushed into the background in Dialectic of Enlightenment. Racket theory, of course, has as its occasion and subject the fate of the once oppositional workers' organizations. It shows how far the class struggle had
+been transformed under monopoly capitalism into a system of transactions between monopolistic units and thus into a medium of adaptation.
+3. Textual Variants. Theoretical Revisions and Misgivings
+Regarding the Dissemination of the Theory
+The reason for the decision initially not to commit Dialectic of En-
+lightenment to print was certainly not only the slender financial means and
+uncertain academic, political, and geographical future of the Institute in
+the mid-194os. This is indicated by the facts that the hectographic edition
+was limited to about soo copies and distributed only to specific recipients;
+that an American edition was not seriously considered; and, finally, that
+the text for the printed edition published three years later was subjected to
+thorough revision. None of this is surprising in the case of authors who
+were always concerned to ensure that their own theoretical utterances or
+those of others never became entirely detached from their systematic, his-
+
+238
+torical, and social contexts. All the more revealing from the historical
+standpoint, therefore, are the revisions to the content and terminology of
+the text undertaken not only in that first period bur also more than two
+decades later. In this edition, these changes, when they go beyond mere
+orthographic corrections and minor changes of wording, are indicated in
+the form of footnotes. These were produced on the basis of comparisons
+berween the different editions (1944, 1947, and 1969) made by Willem van
+Reijen and Jan Bransen. In their commentary, which follows this Afterword, they relate the textual changes (berween 1944 and 1947) to the evolution of the economic and political theory underlying them.
+Clearly, there are a number of different motives for the later interventions in the text. That becomes clear if the textual variants are classified. The following groups of revised formulations can be distinguished.
+(I) Formulations which tie the text directly to its time of origin.
+These include editorial explanations ("When, two years ago, we began this
+work..."'"), qualifications reflecting contemporary history ("fascist present"52), or overly specialized historical on geographical examples ("The
+German and Russian pavilions at the Paris World Exposition seemed of
+the same essence,"53 "the monumental buildings of monopoly, the skyscrapers of Wrigley and Rockefeller"54).
+(2) Obscure or elaborate formulations which required stylistic simplification or unraveling, but without replacing theoretically or politically
+loaded terms (for example, "the official spokesmen |...] are repudiating
+the thought to which they owe their place in the sun" becomes "the official spokesmen [...] are liquidating the theory to which they owe their
+place in the sun"s').
+Terminological changes based on theoretical considerations, such as
+the replacement of the expression "mass culture" originally used by "the
+culture industry," can be included in this group.
+(3) Formulations in which monopoly capitalism, totalitarianism, and
+fascism were equated too indiscriminately. In these cases what had been
+said in general terms abour "class society," "monopolism," or the "totalitarian order" is made more concrete and is restricted to "fascism" or
+"German fascism."s? There is clearly also an intention to soften excessively crass judgments on Western democracy or liberalism. ® Two formularions referring especially critically and inclusively to Jewish functionaries
+and Christian churches can also he included in this group."
+
+239
+(4) Formulations in which certain theoretically, historically, or politically loaded terms from Marxian or Marxist theory were used. This group
+not only preponderates quantitatively—it includes more than half the
+amended passages—bur is also far more interesting historically than the
+others. The politico-economic terms are replaced as a rule by neutral economic, sociological, or moral-practical expressions—for example, "proletarians" by "workers," 60 "capitalist" by "entrepreneur,"6) "throughout class
+history" by "until today,"62 "exploitation" by "suffering.'
+"63 More than half
+of these offending formulations include a single concept, that of "monopoly" (and, again, the great majority of these cases is found in the chapter
+on "The Culture Industry").
+One important motive for such reformulations was undoubtedly the
+concern to avoid making political enemies, which might possibly have had
+threatening consequences for the Institute or individual members of it. As
+early as the 1930s Horkheimer had had serious doubts about the lasting
+sustainability of a liberal right of asylum in face of opposition from interest groups involved in domestic or foreign politics. The terminological
+changes, therefore, do not reflect a single break but rather a continuum in
+Horkheimer's thinking. Even the terminology from this period relating to
+the proletariat and the revolution was characteristically modified in the
+publications of the Zeitschrift. And even as late as the 195os and I96os in
+postwar Germany he constantly anticipated the possibly fatal consequences of ill-considered utterances; indeed, he even feared the return of
+a situation in which people would be able to communicate only, as it were,
+in whispers."
+Such "translations" of Marxist concepts in keeping with the tradition
+of philosophical and political enlightenment were all the more natural
+since Critical Theory, starting with its name, represented a reaction to the
+repudiation of Marxian theory by the authoritarian forms of socialism.
+The use of language, and reference to the "classics," especially under integral statism of the Soviet kind, had, in the authors' view, lost any truly critical power and, indeed, had itself become a means of repression. For this
+reason Critical Theory not only was able to draw on the established disciplines and concepts of scholarly tradition but also considered the "tendencies opposed to official science". to have become obsolete. For, as they
+write, alluding to Sovier Marxism, "They suffer the fate which has always
+been reserved for triumphant thoughs. If it voluntarily leaves behind its
+
+240
+critical element to become a mere means in the service of an existing order,
+it involuntarily tends to transform the positive cause it has espoused into
+something negative and destructive." This interpretation is fundamental
+to Dialectic of Enlightenment but was not carried out in the book itself. In
+his "Remarks on Thesis VII [of "Elements of Anti-Semitism")," Adorno
+noted critically in 1946 that in Dialectic of Enlightenment the authoritarian "ticket thinking"
+present in Bolshevism was neglected: "The thesis
+applies there in its classical form. [...] This whole process of the extermination of humanity in the name of socialism was untouched in the
+Fragments 6 It is, however, essential to an understanding of the situation
+as a whole and can no longer be ignored."" As early as "The Authoritarian
+State" Horkheimer had criticized bureaucratic socialism as the most
+advanced form of authoritarian rule, and there was no lack, subsequently,
+of unmistakable statements regarding Soviet Marxism by both authors.
+But they never produced a comprehensive critique of that system and
+therefore were constantly in fear of being confused with it.
+Independently of such questions concerning the prejudiced reception the book might receive, however, there was also a more narrowly theoretical motive. The change in their evaluation of Marxian theory and its
+applicability to state capitalism and integral statism, on the one hand, and
+of economic and political reality, of the political tendencies and the
+chances of changing them, on the other, needed to be reflected in the terminology. The elimination of fascist rule in Central Europe as a result of
+the war required a redefinition of certain terms which earlier had implicitly equated totalitarianism, fascism, and monopoly capitalism; and the
+regular focus of the diagnosis of the present on "monopoly" in the earlier
+version of the text suggested an indiscriminately economistic or subjectivist approach which stood in flat contradiction to the acuity of their
+analysis elsewhere: economic monopoly could neither causally explain the
+dialectic of enlightenment in its full breadth nor identify the historical
+subject of the fateful history of the species. And, not least important, it
+was necessary to address the thesis that the monopoly capitalism which
+had existed up to then was in the process of undergoing a qualitative
+change to become "state capitalism." In this respect the racket theory held
+an ambiguous position. On the one hand, the identification of fascist rule
+as an unmediated form of power and at the same rime the legitimate heir
+of bourgeois monopoly capitalism" prepared the way for a generalized
+
+241
+racket theory of domination which went beyond the limited model of the
+criminal gang. On the other, however, such a theory was in danger—as
+Horkheimer himself was aware"—of merely replacing an oversimplified
+economic concept ("monopoly") by an oversimplified political one ("rackets"). Probably for this reason, the textual changes affected both terms:
+"monopoly" is replaced by "the influential clique"72 and "rackets" by "the
+completely organized system of domination."73
+Despite this critical distance, at the time of the book's first publication in printed form the authors continued to regard themselves as
+Marxists. In the report of a discussion in 1946 about the planned continuation of their joint work after the completion of the printed version,
+Horkheimer writes: "We see this moment of unity [in the analysis of politics and philosophy. in holding fast to the radical impulses of Marxism
+and, in fact, of the entire Enlightenment—for the rescue of the Enlightenment is our concern—but without identifying ourselves with any empirically existing party or group. Our position is, in a sense, a materialism
+which dispenses with the prejudice of regarding any moment of existing
+material reality as directly positive. The paradox, the dialectical secret of a
+true politics, consists in choosing a critical standpoint which does not
+hypostatize itself as the positive standpoint. [...] IVe are |...] Stoics
+because there is no party."74
+Adorno objected to this stoic conception of oneself on the grounds
+that it was inappropriate to an advanced technology which could now
+eliminate all material poverty. His counterproposal for their continuing
+work was, however, no closer to the reality of politics. For he went back to
+the original conception of a materialist theory of categories dating from
+1938. Political and economic questions should not be taken as the starting
+point for philosophical analyses, as Horkheimer envisaged; rather, "one
+should begin by analyzing logical and epistemological categories. The task
+would be to subject categories like concept, judgment, subject, substanriality, essence, and suchlike to the kind of examination that was already
+begun in the Fragments. This should include not only purely logical but
+also historical and social discussions. The historical and social substance of
+the categories and their present status should be determined from their
+immanent meanings, and such an analysis would lead on to a judgment
+on the correct and false moments of the caregories concerned."75
+The no auchors failed to agree, however, on the question of the
+
+242
+proper relationship between political and philosophical analysis. Horkheimer, from the outset, placed greater emphasis on the political. To which
+Adorno responded: "What you fear is a heavy chunk of professorial philosophy. My fear is that the leap from logic to reality will be made in a
+dogmatic or analogistic way."76 Perhaps this dissent should be seen as one
+of the-undoubtedly numerous—reasons why the planned continuation
+of Dialectic of Enlightenment did not materialize. Horkheimer put the
+emphasis on the question of how his intention to "rescue the Enlightenment"" was to be reconciled with the radical nature of a self-referential
+critique of reason: "I should like to see one main theme, e.g.: What can
+theory do in the present situation? What is its place? Or: How can the
+abstractness of the concept be overcome by the concept itself?"/ Adorno,
+for his part, came down much more squarely on the negative side of this
+aporia: "[...] reason is its own sickness."79
+In this way Dialectic of Enlightenment also remained a fragment in
+the sense that its planned continuation did not come about. It formed the
+indispensable starting point and reference point for Horkheimer's thought
+during the two decades after his return from emigration.8° But this reference point remained latent, and of uncertain usefulness. On the one hand,
+the epochs of fascism and postwar democracy in Western countries,
+despite their deep-seated differences, were, for Horkheimer, connected by
+a continuum: the preponderance of bureaucratic structures over the free
+subject, which they buried beneath them. On the other, he saw in Western
+democracies very serious possibilities of opposing this tendency, which he
+regarded as irreversible in the history of the species; to preserve the scope
+for freedom which, despite everyching, still existed, was for him a practical postulate. To express this contradiction, the resolution of which he did
+not believe possible, he coined, and applied to himself, the notion of a
+complementarity of theoretical pessimism and practical optimism.
+This dichotomy is also present in a similar form in the relationship
+of Critical Theory to science. The rejection of established and departmentalized science announced in the Preface to Dialectic of Enlightenment is
+anything but consistently carried through in the book itself, in which the
+authors continue frequently to base their argument, whether affirmatively
+or critically, on the findings of individual disciplines. Irrespective of the
+philosophical reflection which rejects both sense data and judgments as
+mediated immediacies, they concede even here that "practically fruitful
+
+243
+scientific enterprises call for an unimpaired capacity for definition, for
+shutting down thought at a point designated by social need, for demarcating a field which is then investigated in the minutest detail without
+passing outside ir." From this point of view, the empirical research projecrs which the Institute had planned from the early 194os and carried out
+until the end of that decade belie the radical nature of their rejection of
+science. And after their return to Frankfurt both the reestablishment of
+the Institut and Horkheimer's and Adorno's intensive academic work and
+involvement in educational politics during the 19sos and I96os bear witness to their continuing and vigorous confidence in the enlightening
+potential of science. Nevertheless, all these concessions to the "business"
+of science are subject to a general reservation: science, Horkheimer writes
+in one of his notebooks in the early I9sos, is inherently subject to "standards adapted to the purpose of domination,"*3 and the true philosophy
+which aims to resist the negative course of the world must beware of
+secretly wishing to submit to scientific standards.
+The question whether a new edition of Dialectic of Enlightenment
+should be published did not arise until the early 196os—up to then copies
+of the first edition had still been available. At that time the initial decision
+on such matters was in the responsibility of Pollock. In January 1961 he
+compiled, for the first time, a list of "problematic" passages and expressions in the text and noted: "Reacquaintance with Dialectic of Enlightenment leads distressingly to two conclusions: How many significant ideas
+are contained in it, and in an adequate and convincing form; and how little or, rather, how much less than fifteen years ago, one can say without
+incurring the fury of the mob. I...J My question marks and crosses predominantly indicate misgivings about the too-unguarded use of language.
+Only in a few places did I think it necessary to express doubts, as an expert,' on the correctness of the content. All in all, I come to the dismal
+conclusion that the content of Dialectic is not suitable for mass circulation.
+However, individual chapters, somewhat amended here and there, should
+be republished in the planned collection." It is reported that Adorno did
+not share such misgivings to the same extent as Horkheimer and that he
+tried, vainly at first, to persuade the latter to agree to a largely unamended new edition. The particular reasons for Horkheimer's hesitation have
+not been recorded; but they were, no doubt, political concerns which
+probably are approximately reflected in Pollock's formulations. That Ador-
+
+244
+no, too, shared such misgivings, at least in part, is shown by a draft he produced for a letter, written in summer 1962, in which he and Horkheimer
+jointly replied to Marcuse, who had emphatically supported the idea of a
+new edition. In this draft he writes: "The situation is simply that, on the
+one hand, there are certain hazardous formulations, especially concerning
+organized religion, that we are afraid about, should the book achieve the
+circulation which is now to be expected; on the other hand, we wish to
+keep the text intact and not to water it down because of any concerns and
+considerations. [...] One gradually grows too old to be able to pay overmuch attention to matters of security. The 'pro' for republication is therefore beginning to tilt the scales against the "contra"" However, in the
+final text of the letter redrafted by Horkheimer, this is replaced by the general formulation: "The well-known reasons which had deterred us from
+agreeing to the second edition become less weighty with each year that we
+get older."
+By now an Italian translation had been ready for printing for some
+time—the authors had agreed to its production, by Renato Solmi, as early
+as 1955;®? it finally came out in 1966. In this text, and in line with the preceding misgivings, a considerable number of changes were made, which
+Pollock justified in a draft for a preface, written for Horkheimer and
+Adorno, and certainly after agreeing to the content with them. Because
+chis draft clearly characterizes the authors' political self-understanding at
+this time, as well as their view of the context of the book's production, it
+will be quoted in full here:
+The German text of Dialectic of Enlightenment is a fragment. Abour the end
+of the war it was intended to form the introduction to the theory of history and
+society which we had conceived during the National Socialist period of rule. The
+attempt to use Hitler's regime to accelerate the regression to the bourgeois-individualistic world, because the power struggles in the new period of world history,
+in both war and peace, require an absence of economic and administrative friction which is difficult to achieve under the conditions of democracy, had failed
+The rapacious nationalism of the East had not been eliminated by its crazy halfbrother in the West; rather, war had unleashed developments in Asia, Africa, and
+South America from which nationalism finally benefits. Life in Europe is threarenedby a new migration of peoples which overshadows the earlier one in violence
+and terror. If physical resistance finally gives way, at least something of its capacity for experience, for reflection and critical consciousness shall live on, just as che
+critique of power lived on at the end of Antiquity.
+
+245
+That was the mood in which the fragment was written—and we do not disclaim it today. However, instead of developing the theory further we moved back
+to Germany to try to assist by teaching, despite the dark horizon. Meanwhile the
+calamity which seems to hang over Europe has been symbolically concretized in
+the divided Germany. In the Eastern regions people live like slaves, while in the
+West they subordinate everything else to the will to protect themselves from such
+slavery. Culture threatens to become a mere means. That is why we believe the
+book to be still copical today. Bur the terror inflicted by the National Socialist
+murderers in the 194os lives on in the more up-to-date and historically more powerful form which the tyrants of the Eastern mass empires disseminate today.
+This has affected the content of the book with no intervention from us. The
+terminology used in our critique of totalitarian terror has hardened through its use
+by terror's representatives in the East to a litany which contradicts what it once
+meant. No word is immune to its own history. We sincerely thank the translator,
+Dr Renato Solmi, for the dedication to which his work bears witness. As far as we
+can judge, he has masterfully fulfilled our request to convey the book's meaning.
+Our analysis of cultural phenomena from the 1930s and 1940s, which we in
+no way intend to moderate, is supplemented by our hope that the overthrow of
+che totalitarian Nazi rule has awakened forces which, despite everything, will
+resist the temptation which will not fail to emerge one day in every country.
+Through its theme, our book points out the regressive tendencies which arise
+from economic, social, and cultural progress itself. We know of no linguistic
+sphere which contains a more sensitive organ for this task than the Italian.®a
+Solmi responded by advising urgently against most of the textual changes
+and asked Horkheimer, as the latter writes to Adorno, "almost on bended
+knee," "to omit the substantive discussion [in the Preface], because it
+would unleash political controversy." Horkheimer, however, attribured
+these misgivings mainly to concerns about the political tendency of the
+publishing house. The authors therefore insisted on the textual changes,
+but dispensed with the substantive preface on the grounds that "it does no
+good to encourage the reader to start searching for changes." In the
+event, no Italian reviewer noticed the changes to begin with; they were discovered only about ten years later and subjected, in some cases, to political debate." In Germany, however, twenty-nine amended passages were
+painstakingly listed as early as 1967, in an article in a Frankfurt students'
+newspaper, refuting the assurances in the prefaces that no essential
+changes had been made. Annoyance at what was taken to be an abandonment of Marxism was unavoidable: "What is left of Critical Theory's claim
+
+246
+to be critical if its sting is removed in the way indicated by the Italian edition? "2
+This experience with the Italian edition is unlikely, on the one hand,
+to have exactly encouraged the authors to bring out a new German edition
+but probably did, on the other hand, contribute to the fact that, when the
+new edition finally appeared in 196g, it was largely spared further interventions in the content. A year earlier, in his "Letter to S. Fischer Verlag,"
+Horkheimer had unequivocally distanced himself from the hopes regarding the future that he had expressed in his early writings but without abandoning the intention which underlay those essays: "My hesitation [regarding republication] springs from the difficulty of reexpressing the old ideas,
+which were not independent of that time, without harming what seems to
+me true today: the need to renounce the belief in the imminent realization
+of the ideas of Western civilization and yet to advocate those ideas—without Providence, indeed, against the progress attributed to them."93 In fact,
+Horkheimer had already renounced the belief in the imminent "realization
+of the ideas of Western civilization," as he here paraphrases the proletarian revolution in terms of cultural philosophy, in Dialectic of Enlightenment. Nevertheless, this statement also throws light on his evaluation of
+his critique of society and reason in the 1940s. For common to both phases of Horkheimer's Critical Theory is the impulse to withstand the contradiction of "expressing the frightening tendencies of the present while
+not giving up the idea of something different.
+194
+But it was not only external pressures or the pirated editions of the
+text already in circulation which are likely to have induced Horkheimer
+finally to agree to the new, authorized publication. Another decisive factor
+may have been that in the course of the 1g6os Horkheimer's thinking once
+more drew closer to the theoretical standpoint of Dialectic of Enlightenment. In chis period, as we can read in Notizen 1950-1969, his thinking was
+marked by a deep-seated skepticism with regard to reason, which took up
+some features of those earlier ideas and radicalized them further. Adorno,
+on his return to Frankfurt, had been able to connect directly with this text
+and the other work from those years in his new writing. It was not until
+the end of the 1950s, however—the year of his retirement, 1959, could be
+mentioned as the decisive moment—that Horkheimer returned to a position extremely close in some respects to that of Adorno." However, he
+expressed this position only in the Notizen, which were unpublished in his
+
+247
+lifetime. In these notes, negative metaphysics and negative religion are
+joined in a precarious unity. The "true yearning for something different"
+springs from the fundamental experience of ineradicable suffering in the
+social context and of a metaphysical, global negation of meaning. Philosophy seems possible only in the vanishing private sphere. It has thus become obsolete in face of historical progress. Such reflections, however,
+must set themselves philosophical demands if they are not to remain
+trapped in empry skepticism. Horkheimer's late philosophy is marked by
+chis contradiction, already prefigured in Dialectic of Enlightenment: to recognize that the path to the realization of reason in history is blocked and
+yer, despite all che criticism, to assume the purpose and possibility of enlightenment.
+
+The Disappearance of Class History in
+"Dialectic of Enlightenment"
+A Commentary on the Textual Variants (1947 and 1944)
+by Willem van Reijen and Jan Bransen
+Since the early 194os scholars at the Institute for Social Research had
+devoted themselves with special intensity to analyzing the causes and consequences of fascist rule, with the aim of carrying out extensive research
+projects. In the course of this work two opposed views emerged. On one
+side, Horkheimer, Adorno, Pollock, and Löwen thal developed the thesis
+that National Socialism, as compared to traditional capitalism, represented a new order. While they regarded fascist state capitalism as the most
+recent outcome of capitalist logic, they believed that this outcome manifested a new quality: the dominance of politics over economics. In his
+essay entitled "Is National Socialism a New Order?" Pollock, on whose
+specialist knowledge of economics the other advocates of this view relied,
+answered this question in the affirmative. On the other side, Neumann,
+Kirchheimer, and Gurland supported the thesis that the National Socialist
+ecortomic order was a continuous development of capitalism, so that one
+could not speak of a new order. This controversy over the primacy of politics or economics in postliberal capitalism, as authors such as Dubiel and
+Söllner or Brick and Postone show,' impinged deeply on the theoretical
+self-understanding of the members of the Institute for Social Research.
+Pollock's study of the development of capitalism had been a permanent part of the Institute's work since the early 1930s. In his carly essays!
+
+A Commentary on the Textual Variants
+249
+he followed Marx in locating the contradictions threatening the capitalist
+system in the growing tension between productive forces and the relations
+of production. He argued that the quality of the new economic crisis
+demonstrated that liberal capitalism, with its attempts to regulate crises
+through the marker, must fail. It was therefore time for a transition to a
+new economic order which, although based on the old one and therefore
+to be seen as a development of it, exhibited the novel quality of a planned
+economy. The latter, according to Pollock, was possible in two forms: as a
+capitalist planned economy on the basis of private ownership of the means
+of production, or as a Socialist planned economy on the basis of socialized
+ownership of the means of production. Pollock contradicted the Marxian
+theory of the collapse of capitalism and went still further in prophesying
+its permanence: "What is coming to an end is not capitalism but only its
+liberal phase."*
+In the early 1940s Pollock refined and sharpened his analysis.' He
+now applied the term "state capitalism" both to the National Socialist economy and to the economy of the Soviet Union. Both were totalitarian forms
+of the economic order. Typical of both these forms of state capitalism was
+the "fusion of leading bureaucracies from the worlds of business, state, and
+party"6 to form a new ruling class. By contrast, in the democratic form of
+state capitalism to be found in the USA, for example, the state apparatus
+was, to be sure, controlled by the people but had in common with the
+totalitarian varieties the fact that state activity rendered the key function of
+the market inoperative. While there were still profits, prices, and wages,
+these no longer predominantly determined economic actions. And the
+influence on decisions of the private ownership of the means of production
+had disappeared. The individual capitalist, separated from the centralized
+decision-making agencies and "overruled" by the state administration, had
+become a mere recipient of annuities? There were no longer any autonomous economic problems, only administrative problems. For this reason
+impulses for social change no longer emanated from the economic sphere.
+It had become static. All initiatives issued from politics-unless problems
+of political legitimation arose, for example, in connection with unemployment or the failure of the standard of living to rise. Pollock therefore
+replaced the tension berween the relations of production and the productive forces, regarded as fundamental by Marx, by the tension between the
+relations of production and distribution. The switch from the primacy of
+
+250
+The Disappearance of Cless Hissory
+economics to that of politics takes place within the distribution sphere: it
+is the switch from unconscious to conscious distribution and control. In
+both cases Pollock assumed a primacy of the mode of distribution."
+The concept of "state capitalism" did not remain uncontested within the Institute. Neumann, in particular, took a critical view.' His position
+makes clear the theory of the paramount role of economics which is also
+implicit in Dialectic of Enlightenment. For Neumann continued to advance
+the thesis of continuity in the development from liberal capitalism to
+National Socialism. Neumann considered Pollock's concept to be a contradictio in adjecto. Either, he argued, National Socialist society is capitalist—in which case marker, competition, and profit continue to function
+as before; or the state determines economic processes —in which case society is not capitalist in the Marxian sense. Unlike Pollock, Neumann pur
+the emphasis on the fact that the contradictions in developed capitalism
+had not been resolved but intensified. As empirical evidence he cited various measures of totalitarian rule and economic regulation which did not
+curtail the importance of competition and profit.
+Bur Neumann's work, roo, contains a number of ideas by which he
+sought to account for the qualitative changes in the relationship of monopoly capitalism to totalitarian rule. He did not dispure the functional
+increase of politics compared to economics which he, too, perceived as
+continuing in the postfascist states and in which he saw a "developmental
+product of capitalism."'° Finally, he attempted to incorporate Pollock's
+analyses, in reinterpreted form, in his own approach: "Control over the
+state apparatus is [...] the pivot on which everything turns. This is the
+only possible meaning of the primacy of politics over economics."'' In
+arguing this, however, he did not mean to call into question the fundamentally capitalist mode of operation of "totalitarian monopoly capitalism," to use his expression, which has remained a standard term until
+today.
+Naturally, Horkheimer's own work was not uninfluenced by this
+controversy. In 1937 he still unquestioningly accepted the Marxian thesis
+of the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of
+production; what had changed under fascism was, above all, that the techniques of power and manipulation had been perfected. The culture taken
+over by fascism, Horkheimer argued, no longer held resources for criticism
+and opposition. In 1942, in the essay "The Authoritarian State," however,
+
+A Commonery on the level Varians
+he based himself on Pollock's theory of stare capitalism. National Socialism and bureaucratic Socialism of the Sovier kind were discinguished, all
+most, by the composition of the ruling cliques, but in both cases politics
+had gained dominance over economics. As "integral statism" the Soviet
+system appeared as the most logical form of the authoritarian state.
+If the two versions of Dialectic of Enlightenment are compared—the
+mimeographic publication of the Institute of Social Research of 1944 and
+the first printed copy of 1947—it is clear how deeply the debate over the
+primacy of economics over politics had affected the self-understanding of
+its two authors. To be sure, Horkheimer and Adorno assert in their Preface
+to the book edition, which follows the original Preface, that "The book
+contains no essential changes to the text completed during the War."? Bur
+few things are more open to dispute than the question as to what is essential; the textual changes made for the book edition of 1947 can be called,
+at least, significant. This will be shown by a few representative passages:
+Throughout the book the authors replaced terms such as "monoprly," "capital," and "profir," which had become charged with specific meanings through the debate over state capitalism, with less charged expressions.
+"Monopoly" becomes "the economic apparatus";!3 or the term is replaced
+by "the agencies of mass production," '4 "the system of modern industry,"'
+"the culture industry,"|6 "those in control,"? or, more neutrally, "the system."18 However, the term "monopoly" is not infrequently replaced by
+"trusts" and "combines."' The "monopoly rulers" are transformed into
+"managing directors."2o "Capital" becomes "the economy,"21 its "power"
+the "power of the economically strongest,"22 or "capitalism" disappears
+complerely, 33
+From the postwar perspective in which the printed version was produced, fascist phenomena are more precisely qualified, whereas earlier they
+had been referred to generally as economic phenomena: the "collective of
+the totalitarian monopoly" becomes the "fascist collective,
+$24 "monopoly"
+becomes "fascism."25 There is an increasing distance from Marxian terminology. The "relations of production" become "economic forms,"26 "class
+domination" becomes "domination,"27 "exploiration" becomes the more
+neutral "enslavement,"' "control" becomes "urilization,"2) "those in control" become "leaders."30 "Class history" disappears complerely."' "Mo-
+nopoly" becomes "industry'"32 or no longer appears at all.33
+The almost complete elimination of the term "monopoly" from all
+
+252
+The Disappearance of Class History
+important passages, and the transformation of "capital" into "economy"
+and similar terms in most places, are nor sufficiently explained by political misgivings and considerations alone. Rather —and this is more important for a theoretical and systematic understanding of Dialectic of Enlightenment-they show that in the mid-194os Horkheimer and Adorno, in
+keeping with Pollock's analyses, had distanced themselves definitively
+from a form of Marxism which assumed the primacy of economics. In-
+stead, the importance of control through politics and the culture industry
+moves clearly into the foreground.
+It would nevertheless be mistaken to conclude that Horkheimer and
+Adorno had thereby turned their backs on Marxian theory altogether. The
+references to fascism, which emerged more emphatically in the book version than in the first publication, should be understood not only as anxious reminders that the dangers issuing from fascism still persisted but also
+as evidence of the authors view that capitalism and fascism were still intertwined as social principles and that capitalism continued to have the tendency to prevent the realization of che "realm of freedom." Horkheimer
+and Adorno decisively rejected a mechanistic interpretation of Marx of the
+kind adopted by theoreticians of the Second International and by the
+Soviet orthodoxy, but they did not deny the fundamental importance of
+the economic order for the totaliry of social orders in the modern period.
+For this reason the Marxian approach continued to be fundamental to
+Critical Theory.
+
+Notes
+[Bracketed numbers are the page numbers on which asterisk notes appear; other
+numbers refer to the numbered notes. "Ir. tr." = from the Italian translation.]
+DEDICATION
+[vii] "Pollock" / 1944: Pollock for his fiftieth birthday on 22 May 1944; 1947:
+"Pollock for his fiftieth birthday."
+PREFACES
+[xili) "Preface to the Italian Edition": Translated from the Italian by Philipp
+Rippel wich reference to the German draft by M.H. and T.W.A.
+[xiv) "When" / 1944/47: "When, rwo years ago."
+[xiv) "a... of" / 1944: "renewed."
+[xiv] "wich an increasing" / 1944: "readily with the."
+[xiv) "The tireless ... humanity" / 1944: "The end of enlightenment by its
+own hand, hypocritically celebrated by crude advocates of the totalitarian order
+in their propaganda speeches and naively executed by the smart attorneys of the
+victims in their respective branches of the culture industry."
+[xv] "friendship" / 1944: "friendship, in the Action Française."— "Action Fran-
+çaise": extreme right-wing movement in France between 1898 and 1944.
+[xv] "place in ... sun": allusion to an imperialist slogan coined in Wilhelmine
+Germany.
+[xv] "liquidating ... complerely." / 1944: "repudiating the thought to which
+they owe their place in the sun before it has had time to prostitute itself completely in the service of those now basking there."
+
+254
+Notes to Pages xvi-ix
+[xvi] "the regression" / 1944: "its reversal."
+[xvi] "headlong" / 1944: "in such a way."
+[xvi] "rational" / 1944: "a rational."
+[xvii] "In the ... increase" / 1944: "The powerless and pliability of the masses increase."
+[xvii] "Today, however," / 1944: "In the name of enlightenment."
+[xvii] "increased sufferings" / 1944: "increased exploitation."
+[xvii] "melring down ... crucible" / 1944: "application of the national melting
+por to all cultural entities.
+"
+[xviii] "Volkswagen" / 1944: "chewing gum."
+[xviii] "curtain" / 1944: "veil."
+[xix] "demonstrates" / 1944: "defines."
+[xix] "fragmentary" / 1944: "fragmentary. Large parts, written long before,
+need only final editing. In them the positive aspects of mass culture will also be
+dealt with."—The second part of the chapter, not finally edited at that time, has
+now been published with the title "Das Schema der Massenkultur" as an appendix to Dialektik der Aufklärung in Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. III, Frankfurt am Main 1981, pp. 299ff.
+[xix] "empirical ... Research" / 1944: "the research project of the Institute of
+Social Research."
+[xix] "anthropology" / I944: "anthropology.
+In selecting the fragments from the work of the previous wo years we opted
+for those with clear internal coherence and unity of language. We excluded all
+English works produced in the same period, regardless of their thematic connecrion to the fragments. We would mention che lecture series "Sociery and Reason";
+the essays "Sociology of Class Relations" and "The Revival of Dogmatism"; the
+extensive analysis of anti-Semitic propaganda, "The Psychological Technique of
+Martin Luther Thomas' Radio Addresses," and our other studies in contributions
+to the project on anti-Semitism. Collaboration in this study carried our in New
+York, Los Angeles, and Berkeley cook at least half our time. — Of the German preliminary studies to the whole work, which include che fragments chemselves, we
+left our the pieces on logic, among others. The already formulated parts of the
+planned section concerned with a critique of sociology are also omitted.
+If the good fortune of being able to work on such questions withour the
+unpleasant pressure of immediate purposes should continue, we hope to complete the whole work in the not too distant future. We are encouraged to believe
+this by the confidence, undeflected by the vicissitudes of the time, of the person
+to whom the part completed so far is now dedicated."
+"Society and Reason": under chis general ride Horkheimer gave five lectures at
+Columbia University, New York, in February and March 1944. They were later
+
+Notes to Pages I-5
+255
+used as the basis of Eclipse of Reason (New York 1947), German ridle Zur Kritik der
+instrumentellen Vernunft, Frankfurt am Main 1967.
+"Sociology of Class Relations": essay by Horkheimer from 1943 now published
+with the tide "Zur Soziologie der Klassenverhältnisse" in Gesammelte Schriften,
+Vol. XII, Frankfurt am Main 1985, pp. 7sff.
+"The Revival of Dogmatism. Remarks on Neo-Positivism and Neo-Thomism": Horkheimer's manuscripr with his rice later formed the basis of Chapter 2
+of Eclipse of Reason.
+THE CONCEPT OF ENLIGHTENMENT
+[x] "The concept" / 1944: "The dialectic."
+[r) "disenchantment of the world": "allusion to a formulation of Max Weber's;
+of. Weber, "Wissenschaft als Beruf" (1919) in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschafislebre, Tübingen 1968, p. 594.
+1. Voltaire, Lettres philoso phiques, ed. F. A. Taylor, London 1992, p. 36.
+2. "In Praise of Knowledge," in Francis Bacon, ed. Arthur Johnston, London
+196s, p. IS.
+[2] "enslavement" / 1944: "exploitation."
+[2) "economic system" / 1944: "capitalism."
+[z] "exploitation ... others" / 1944: "control of foreign work."
+3. Cf. Bacon, Novum Organum, The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. Basil Monragu, London 1825, Vol. XIV, p. 31.
+4. Bacon, "Valerius Terminus: Of the Interpretation of Nature." Miscellaneous
+Tracts upon Human Knowledge, Works, Vol. I, p. 28L.
+[3) "spirit-seer": allusion to Kant's dispure with Swedenborg: "Dreams of a
+spirit-seer elucidated by dreams of metaphysics" in Kant, Theoretical Philosophy,
+trans. David Walford, Cambridge/New York 1992.
+s. Cf. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford 1977, pp.
+33rf.
+6. Xenophanes, Montaigne, Hume, Feuerbach, and Salomon Reinach are at
+one here. Cf. Reinach, Orpheus, trans. F. Simmons, London and New York 1909,
+PP. Gff.
+7. Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum, Works, Vol. VIII, p. 15z.
+8. J. de Maistre, "Les Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg." sième entretien, Oeuvres
+complètes, Lyon 189I, Vol. IV, p. 256.
+9. Bacon, Advancement of Learning, Works, Vol. II, p. 126.
+I0. Genesis I, 26
+II. Archilochus, fr. 87, quoted by Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. II, Pt. I, Leipzig 19II, p. 18.
+12. Solon, fr. 13.25 et seq., quoted by Deussen, op. cit., p. 20.
+
+256
+Notes to Pages 7-16
+I3. Cf. Robert H. Lowie, An Introduction co Culsural Anthropology, New York
+1940, pp. 344f.
+14. Cf. Freud, Totem and Taboo, in The Complese Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey, London 1991, pp. 8sff.
+Is. Ibid., p. 89.
+[7] "industrial technology" / 1944: "the technology of monopoly."
+[8] "insufficient righteousness": allusion to the positivists' charge that metaphysical philosophers lacked sufficient correctness, honesry, and uprightness, a
+charge generally leveled by "enlightened" thought against the preceding philosophical systems. (It. tr.)
+[a] "doubtless" / 1944: (missing).
+16. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, op. cit., p. 342 (where Trupp is translated
+more neutrally as "group").
+17. Cf. W. Kirfel, "Geschichte Indiens," in Propyläenweltgeschichte, Vol. III,
+pp. 26rff, and G. Glorz, "Histoire Grècque," Vol. I, in Histoire Ancienne, Paris
+1938, pp. 137f
+[b] "subjugated people" / 1944: "objects of exploitation."
+18. G. Glorz, op. cit., p. 140.
+19. Cf. Kurt Eckermann, Jahrbuch der Religionsgeschichte und Mythologie,
+Halle 1845, Vol. I, p. 241, and O. Kern, Die Religion der Griechen, Vol. I, Berlin
+1926, pp. I8If.
+[Io] "link" / 1944: "link" (n. 20 here).
+20. Hubert and Mauss describe the nature of "sympathy" or mimesis as follows: "L'un est le rout, tour est dans l'un, la nature triomphe de la nature." H.
+Hubert and M. Mauss, "Théorie générale de la Magie," in L'Année Sociologique
+1902-3, p. I00.
+21. Cf. Westermarck, Ursprung der Moralbegriffe, Leipzig 1913, Vol. I, p. 402.
+[13] "total art" / an allusion to Richard Wagner's concept of the total art work
+(Gesmtkunstwerk) (It. tr.).
+22. Cf. Plato, The Republic, Book Io.
+23. Schelling, Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie. S.s, Werke,
+Abr. I, Vol. Il, p. 623.
+24. Ibid., p. 626.
+[Is] "wentieth century": allusion to Alfred Rosenberg's Der Mythos des
+zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts (1930).
+[I6] "the consolidated ... privileged" / 1944: "class domination."
+25. Cf. E. Durkheim, "De quelques formes primitives de classification,"
+L'Année Sociologique, Vol. IV, 1903, pp. 66ff.
+26. Cf. The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. 3rd ed. Thomas Goddard
+Bergin and M'ax Harold Fisch, New York 1961.
+
+Notes to Pages 17-30
+257
+[17] "industrial trusts" / 1944: "social upheaval caused by monopoly."
+27. Hubert and Mauss, op. cit., p. 118.
+28. Cf. Tönnies, "Philosophische Terminologie," in Psychologisch-Soziologische
+Ansicht, Leipzig 1908, p. 31.
+29. Hegel, Phenomenology, op. cit., p. SI.
+[18] "value" / 1944: "word."
+30. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
+Phenomenology, an Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr,
+Evanston, 1970.
+31. Cf. Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena, trans. E. F. J. Payne, Oxford
+1974, Vol. Il, $356, p. GIo.
+[20] "spirit-seer": Cf. note (6), p. 255.
+(21] "industrialism... things." / 1944: "industry makes souls into things. The
+rule of the monopolists, as of individual capitalists earlier, is not expressed directly in che commands of the rulers."
+[21) "The councless ... culture" / 1944: "Monopoly."
+[22) "value" / 1944: "exchange value."
+32. Spinoza, Ethics, trans. A. Boyle, London/New York 1948, Part IV, Propos.
+XXII, Coroll.
+[23) "merely an aid ... apparatus" / 1944: "an apparatus in the perpetuating
+monopoly."
+[23) "unitary knowledge": The "unity of knowledge" postulated by the Vienna Circle, especially Neurath and Carnap.
+[24] "pleasure": allusion to the National Socialist promotion of physical culrure for racial, genetic ends, which went hand in hand with the lifting of certain
+caboos in the private sexual sphere ("Strength Through Joy," "Lebensborn e.V,"
+erc. Cf. Friedrich Pollock, "Is National Socialism a New Order." in Studies in
+Philosophy and Social Science, Vol. IX, 1941, pp. 448f.
+[24) "The German ... self-contempr" / 1944: "Pleasure, which the neopagans
+and administrators of war fever wanted to set free, has, on its way to totalitarian
+emanciparion, internalized meanness as self-contempr."
+33. Homer, Odyssey, trans. E. V. Rieu (antended), Harmondsworth 1965, p.
+194.
+34. Ibid.
+35. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, op cit., p. 116.
+[29] "society" / 1944: "class society."
+[29] "rulers" [Lenker] / 1944: "those in control" [Verfügende].
+(29] "of... injustice" | 1944: "of exploitacion."
+[30] "of the cliques... embodied" / 1944: "of monopoly, the last incarnation
+of economic necessiry.
+
+258 Notes to Pages 30-38
+[30] "Intuitions," "dynamic worldview," "mission," and "fate" were common
+terms in "educated" National Socialist jargon.
+[3o] "company chairmen" / 1944: "monopoly controllers."
+[3o] "of those still" / 1944: "the hands needed to operate the increasing fixed
+capital."
+[3o] "Poverty" / 1944: "Increasing misery."
+[3o "the economy" / I944: "capital."
+[30] "rackets": Systems for extorting protection money; in a wider sense,
+groups securing the system of power. Also see Editor's Afterword, pp. 233ff.
+[31] "the reason of the reasonable" / 1944: "this."
+[3r] "industrialists ... This" / 1944: "those in power ... This rwofold."
+[31] "that thinking": Refers to the Marxian concept of the period of history
+preceding the socialist society.
+[3] "truth": The authors are paraphrasing the scholastic formulation: "verum
+index sui et falsi" (It. tr.).
+[32] "eternal": Cf. Marx, Capital. A Critique of Political Economy, trans. David
+Fernbach. Harmondsworth 1991, Vol. III.
+[33] "unfettered technology" / 1944: "the unfettered technical forces of production."
+36. "The supreme question which confronts our generation today—the question to which all other problems are merely corollaries—is whether technology can
+be brought under control ... Nobody can be sure of the formula by which this
+end can be achieved... We must draw on all the resources to which access can be
+had ..." (The Rockefeller Foundation. A Review for 1943. New York 1944, PP. 33ff).
+(33] Cf. note 2, p. 255.
+EXCURSUS I
+1. Nietzsche, Nachlass, Werke, Vol. XIV, Leipzig 1904, p. 206.
+2. Ibid., Vol. XV, p. 235.
+[37) "Borchard": An earlier draft of the manuscript (Theodor W. Adorno Ar-
+chiv) contains a reference to Borchardt's afterword to his translation of the poems
+of Pindar Pindarische Gedichte, Munich 1929/30 (private impression), pp. 29, 103,
+and 93; cf. "Einleitung in das Verständnis der Pindarischen Poesie," in Gesammelte
+Werke, Prosa II, Stuttgart 1959, pp. I6Iff.
+3. Ibid., Vol. IX, p. 282.
+[37] "rational" / 1944/47: "more rational."
+4. Hölderlin, "Patmos," Poems and Fragments, trans. Michael Hamburger,
+Cambridge and New York 1980, p. 463.
+s. Direct evidence in support of this argument is found early in Book XX
+Odysseus notes, the maids' nightly visits to the beds of the Suitors. "Odysseus'
+
+Note to Page 38
+259
+gorge rose within him. Yet he was quite uncertain what to do and he debated
+long. Should he dash after them and pur them all to death; or should he let chem
+spend this one last night in the arms of their profligate lovers? The thought made
+him snarl with repressed fury, like a bitch that snarls and shows fight as she takes
+her stand above her helpless puppies when a stranger comes by. So did Odysseus
+groan to himself in sheer revolt at these licentious ways. But in the end he brought
+his fist down on his heart and called it to order. 'Patience, my heart"' he said. 'You
+had a far more loathsome thing than this to put up with when the savage Cyclops
+devoured those gallant men. And yet you managed to hold out, till cunning got
+you clear of the cave where you had thought your end had come? But though he
+was able by such self-rebuke to quell all mutiny in his heart and steel it to endure,
+Odysseus nevertheless could not help tossing to and fro on his bed..." (The
+Odyssey, op. cit., p. 304). The subject is not yet articulated to form a firm inner
+identity. Affects, courage, the "heart" still rise up independently. "At the beginning of this episode, his heart, kradie or etor (the wo words are synonyms for
+"heart," 17.22), snarls and growls within him, and Odysseus beats his breast, that
+is, his heart, and addresses it. His heart beats violently; this part of his body is stirring against his will. That he speaks to it is not, therefore, a mere formal device,
+as when hand or foot is addressed in Euripides to set them in motion; his heart
+acts autonomously" (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Die Heimkehr des Odysseus, Berlin 1927, p. 189). The affect is equated with an animal which the human being is
+subduing: The meraphor of the birch forms part of the same stratum of experience as the metamorphosis of Odysseus's companions into swine. The subject, still
+split and forced to do violence to nature both within himself and outside, "punishes" his heart, compelling it to be patient and denying it direct satisfaction in
+che present for che sake of a more distant future. Beating one's breast later became
+a gesture of triumph: What the victor really expresses is that his victory is over his
+own nature. The achievement is accomplished by self-preserving reason. "
+... the
+speaker thought first of his wildly beating heart; his metis (cunning), which is thus
+seen a separate inner force, was able to master it, and saved Odysseus. Later philosophers would have contrasted it as nus [mind] or logistikon (reasoning] to che
+unreasoning parts of the body" (Wilamowitz, op. cit., p. 190). But the "self"-
+auros—is not mentioned until line 24, after the impulse has been successfully
+mastered by reason. If the choice and sequence of the words are taken as evidence,
+the identity-forming self is regarded by Homer as resulting from a mastery of
+nature within the human being. This new self trembles inwardly, as a ching, the
+body, when the heart within it is punished. At any rate, Wilamowitz's juxtaposing of separately analyzed moments of the psyche, which often speak to each
+other, seems to confirm the loose cohesion of the subject, whose substance consists only in the coordination of these moments.
+
+260 Notes to Pages 40-41
+6. In contrast to Nietzsche's materialistic interpretation, Klages understood
+sacrifice and exchange entirely in terms of magic: "The general necessicy to offer
+sacrifices affects everyone, because everyone, as has been seen, receives his or her
+share of life, and all the goods of life they can obtain—the original suum cuique
+only chrough the constant exchange of gifts. This, however, is not exchange in the
+ordinary sense of exchanging goods (although at the very beginning char, too, was
+consecrated by the idea of sacrifice) but of exchanging fluids or essences by abandoning one's own soul to the supporting and nurturing life of the world" (Ludwig
+Klages, Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele, Leipzig 1932, Vol. III, Part 2, p. 1409).
+However, the rwofold character of sacrifice—the magic self-abandonment of the
+individual to the collective (in whatever form) and the self-preservation achieved
+through the rechnology of this magic—implies an objective contradiction which
+necessitates further development of the rational element in sacrifice. Still under
+the influence of magic, rationality, as the behavior of the performer of the sacrifice, becomes cunning. Klages himself, the zealous apologist of myth and sacrifice, came up against this contradiction and found himself obliged, even within
+the ideal image of Pelagianism, to distinguish berween genuine and false communication with nature. However, he was unable to derive from mythical thinking itself any opposing principle to ser against the illusion of the magical mastery
+of nature, because that very illusion constitutes the essence of myth. "It is no
+longer merely pagan belief bur pagan superstition which compels the king of che
+gods, on ascending his chrone, to swear that henceforth he will cause the sun to
+shine and the field to be covered in fruits" (Klages, op. cir., p. 1408).
+7. In keeping with chis, human sacrifices in the literal sense do not occur in
+Homer. The epic's civilizing tendency is manifested in the selection of the incidents narrated. "With one exception... both Iliad and Odyssey are completely
+expurgated of the abomination of Human Sacrifice" (Gilbert Murray, The Rise of
+the Greek Epic, Oxford 1911, p. 150).
+140] "The representative character ... deity." / 1944: "The idea of magic representation implied in sacrifice, which he affirms, cannot be separated from the
+victim's status as the elect. But this status results from the priests' transposition of
+the victim to the heaven of the gods. An element of this projection, which elevates
+the perishable person as the bearer of the divine substance, has always been
+detectable in the ego, which owes its origin to projection. It bears the features of
+the idolized victim: not without reason was Odysseus continually regarded as a
+secularized deiry."
+8. Probably not at the earliest stages. "The custom of human sacrifice ... is
+far more widespread among barbarous and half-civilized peoples than among true
+savages, and it is hardly found at all at the lowest levels of culture. It has been
+observed that in some peoples this custom has become increasingly predominant
+
+Notes to Page 42
+261
+in the course of time" —on the Society Islands, in Polynesia, in India, among the
+Aztecs. "With regard to Africa Winwood Read states that 'the mightier che nation
+the more prominent the custom of sacrifice" (Eduard Westermarck, Ursprung
+und Entwicklung der Moralbegriffe, Leipzig 1913, Vol. I, p. 363).
+2. Among cannibal peoples like those of West Africa, "neither women nor
+adolescents ... were allowed to taste the delicacy" (Westermarck, op cit., Leipzig
+1902, Vol. Il, p. 459).
+1o. Wilamowiz places nus in "sharp opposition" to logos (Glaube der Hellenen,
+Berlin 1931, Vol. I, pp. 4if). For him myth is "a story one tells oneself," a fairy tale,
+an untruth, but also, withour distinction from that, che ultimate, undemonstrable truth, as in Plato. While Wilamowiz is aware of the illusory character of
+myths, he equates them with poetry. In other words, he looks for myths only in
+significative language, which has already come into objective contradiction with
+its intention, and seeks to resolve it as poetry: "Myth is in the first place spoken
+discourse; the words are indifferent to the content" (ibid.). By hypostarizing chis
+late concept of myth, which presupposes reason as its explicit counterpart, he
+arrives—in an implicit polemic against Bachofen, whom he dismisses as merely
+fashionable without mentioning him by name—at a clear distinction between
+mythology and religion (op. cit., p. 5), whereby myth appears nor as the older but
+the younger state: "I attempt ... to trace the evolution, the transformations and
+the transition from faith to myth" (op. cit., p. I). The Hellenistic scholar's rigid
+departmental arrogance blocks his perception of the dialectic of myth, religion,
+and enlightenment: "I do not know the languages from which the currently modish words taboo,' 'totem,' mana,'
+'and 'orenda' are taken but consider it legitimate
+to confine myself to the Greeks, and to think abour Greek matters in Greek
+terms" (op. cit., p. 10). How his unexplained contention that "the germ of the
+Platonic deity" was present "in the earliest Hellenic culture" is therefore to be reconciled with the historical view, pur forward by Kirchhoff and taken over by
+Wilamowirz, that the earliest core of the Odyssey is contained in the mythical
+encounters of the nostos, remains unclear, just as the central concept of myth itself
+lacks adequate philosophical articulation in Wilamowitz. Nevertheless, his opposition to the irrationalism which idolizes myth and his insistence on the untruch
+of myths reveal unmistakable insight. His repugnance for primitive thinking and
+prehistory shows up all the more clearly the tension which has always existed
+berween the deceprive word and truth. The arbitrariness of fabrication which
+Wilamowitz criticizes in later myths must already have been contained in the earliest ones, by virtue of the pseudos [substitute] of sacrifice. This pseudos is related
+to precisely the Platonic deity which Wilamowitz dates back to archaic Hellenism.
+II. The conception of Christianity as a pagan sacrificial religion is fundamental to Werner Hegemann's Geresserer Christus (Potsdamn 1928).
+
+262
+Notes to Pages 43-50
+[43] "society's predicament" / 1944: "the predicament of the whole of class history."
+12. For example, when he refrains from killing Polyphemus at once (IX, 302);
+when he has to endure the mistreatment of Antinous in order not to give himself
+away (XVII, 46off). Also compare the episode of the winds (X, soff) and Teiresias's prophecy in the first visit to the Underworld (XI, Iosff), which makes his
+homecoming dependent on mastery of his heart. To be sure, Odysseus's renunciation is more a postponement than a final state; he usually performs the deeds of
+vengeance all the more thoroughly for having delayed them; his endurance is
+patience. His behavior still displays relatively openly, as a natural objective, something which was later concealed in cotal, imperative renunciation, thereby taking
+on the irresistible violence which subjugated everything natural. Through being
+transposed inside the subject and emancipated from its mythical content, this
+subjugation becomes "objective," confronting the special purposes of humans as
+an independent entity and becoming the universal rational law. In Odysseuss
+patience quite clearly after the death of the Suitors—vengeance is already turning into judicial procedure: the ultimate fulfillment of the mythical impulse becomes the objective instrument of domination. Law is vengeance which is capable of renunciation. Bur since this judicial patience is generated by something
+ourside itself, the longing for the homeland, it takes on human traits, almost a
+quality of trust, which point beyond vengeance postponed. In fully developed
+bourgeois society, however, both are annulled: with the idea of vengeance longing, too, is tabooed-thereby, of course, enthroning vengeance, mediated as the
+self's revenge on itself.
+13. Max Weber, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Munich and Leipzig 1924, p. 3.
+14. Victor Bérard has strongly emphasized the Semitic element in the Odyssey,
+though not without some apocryphal interpretation. Cf. the chapter "Les Phéniciens et l'Odyssée" in La Résurrection d'Homère, Paris 1930, pp. IIIff.
+[48] "capitalist economy" / 1944: "exploitation."
+148] "make use... worker" / I944: "have anyone to exploit."
+[48] "entrepreneur" | 1944: "capiralist."
+[48] "moral ... profit" / I944: "moral justification for the plunder raked in by
+the privileged."
+(49] nostos: Greek: "journey," "homecoming."
+Is. Odyssey, Book IX, op. cit., p. I41.
+I6. Ibid., p. 349.
+17. Ibich, p. 141.
+18. Jacob Burckhardt, History of Greek Culture, trans. Palmer Hilty, London
+1963, p. 180.
+1). Oryssey, ор. сів., р. 141.
+
+Notes to Pages 50-56
+263
+20. In Indian mythology Lotus is the earth goddess. (Cf. Heinrich Zimmer,
+Maja, Stuttgart and Berlin 1936, pp. 10sf.) If there is a connection berween chis
+and the mythical tradition on which the old Homeric nostos is based, the
+encounter with the Lotus-eaters might be characterized as a stage in the struggle
+with the chthonic powers.
+21. Odyssey, o. сі., p. 142.
+22. According to Wilamowirz the Cyclopes are "really animals" (Glaube der
+Hellenen, Vol. I, p. 14).
+23. Odyssey, op. cir., p. 148.
+24. Ibid., p. 142.
+25. Ibid.
+26. Ibid., p. 15o.
+27. Ibid., p. IsI (adapted).
+28. Ibid., p. 146.
+29. Ibid., p. 146.
+30. Ibid., p. 149
+31. "The mindless creature's frequent stupidities might be seen as a kind of
+stillborn humor" (Klages, op. cit., p. 1469).
+32. Odyssey, op. cir., p. 148.
+33. Ibid., p. 163.
+34. Cf. ibid., p. 1s9. Cf. F. C. Bauer, Symbolik und Mythologie, Sturgart 1824,
+Vol. I, p. 47.
+35. Cf. Baudelaire, "Le vin du solitaire," Les Fleurs du Mal.
+36. Cf. J. A. K. Thomson, Studies in the Odyssey, Oxford 1914, p. 153.
+37. Odyssey, op. cir., p. I6i.
+38. Murray refers to the "sexual expurgations" to which the poems of Homer
+were subjected while being edited (cf. op. cit., pp. 14rff).
+39. "Pigs are in general the sacrificial animals of Demeter" (Wilamowitz-
+Moellendorff, Der Glaube der Hellenen, Vol. II, p. 53).
+40. Cf. Freud, Complete Psychological Works, trans. James Strachey, Vol. XXI,
+London 1978, p. 99, fn. I.
+4I. In a nore Wilarowitz points to a surprising connection berween the
+notions of snuffling and of noos, autonomous reason: "Schwyzer has very convincingly linked noos to snorting and snuffling" (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Die
+Heimkehr des Odysseus, op. cit., p. 191). Wilamowitz doubts, however, whether che
+etymological relationship contributes to elucidating the meaning.
+42. Odyssey, op. cit., p. I6т.
+43. The consciousness of her irresistibility was later expressed in the cult of
+Aphrodite Pcithon, "whose magic brooks no refusal" (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,
+Der Glaube der Hellenen, op. cir., Vol. II, p. I52).
+
+264
+Notes to Pages 56-60
+[s6] "Aeaea": Circe's island; old name for Colchis.
+44. Odyssey, p. 164.
+45. Ibid.
+46. Ibid., p. 166.
+47. Ibid.
+48. Cf. Bauer, op. cit., Pp. 47, 49.
+49. Odyssey, p. 343.
+so. Goethe, Wilhelm Meister's Years of Apprenticeship, trans. H. M. Waidson,
+London 1977, p. 6z.
+S1. Odyssey, p. 346.
+[sa] "Underworld": Greek: sacrifice offered for the dead; Greek title of Book
+Xl of the Odyssey.
+52. Cf. Thomson, op. cit., p. 28.
+53. "My eyes filled with tears when I saw her there, and I was stirred to compassion. Yet, deeply moved though I was, I would not allow her to approach the
+blood out of turn, before I had had speech with Teiresias" (Odyssey, p. 173).
+54. "I see the soul of my dead mother over chere. She sits in silence by the
+blood and cannot bring herself to look her own son in the face or say a single word
+to him. Tell me, my prince, is there no way to make her know that I am he" (ibid.,
+p. 175)?
+ss. "I cannor avoid believing that the whole of Book XI, with the exception of
+a few passages... is a fragment of the old nostos and therefore of the oldest part
+of the poem" (Kirchhoff, Die homerische Odyssee, Berlin 1879, p. 226).
+56. Odyssey, p. 174.
+57. He was originally the "husband of the earth" (cf. Wilamowitz, Glaube der
+Hellenen, Vol. I, pp. IIzff) and only became the sea god at a late stage. Tiresiass
+prophecy may be an allusion to his rwofold nature. It is conceivable that his propitiarion by means of an earthly sacrifice far from any sea implies a symbolic
+restoration of his chthonic power. This restoration might reflect the superseding
+of the sea voyage in search of booty by agriculture: The cults of Poseidon and
+Demeter merged (cf. Thomson, op. cit., p. 26, fn).
+58. Translated from Grimm, Kinder- und Hausmärchen, Leipzig n.d., p. 208.
+Closely related motifs are passed down from antiquity, especially regarding De-
+meter. "Demeter came to Eleusis in search of her daughter after she had been abducted and was given lodging by Dysaules and his wife Baubo; but in her great
+sorrow she refused to touch food or drink. Thereupon her hostess Baubo made
+her laugh by suddenly lifting up her dress and exposing her body" (Freud,
+Complete Psychological Works, Vol. XIV, London 1962, p. 338; cf. Salomon Reinach,
+Cules, Myches et Religions, Paris 1912, Vol. IV, pp. risff).
+160) "up to now" / 1944: "throughour class history."
+
+Notes to Pages 6I-71
+265
+59. Hölderlin, "Autumn," Poems and Fragments, op. cit., p. 595.
+6o. Odyssey, p. 340.
+6I. Wilamowitz considers that the execution was "carried our with satisfaction
+by the poet" (Die Heimkehr des Odysseus, op. cit., p. 67). Bur when the authoritarian scholar enthuses over the simile of the snares, which "conveys the dangling
+of the maids' corpses in an apt and modern way" (ibid., also cf. ibid., p. 76), the
+satisfaction appears to be largely his own. Wilamowitz's writings are among the
+most striking documents of the German intermingling of barbarism and culture,
+which is fundamental to modern Philhellenism.
+62. Gilbert Murray draws attention to the consoling intention of this line.
+According to his theory, scenes of torture have been expunged from Homer by
+civilizing censorship. The deaths of Melanthios and the maids have been rerained
+(op.cit., p. 146).
+EXCURSUS II
+1. Kant, "An answer ro the question: What is Enlightenment?" Practical
+Philosopby, trans. Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge 1996, p. 17.
+2. Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith,
+London 1973, p. 533.
+3. Ibid.
+4 Ibid., p. s42.
+s. Ibid., p. 534.
+6. Ibid.
+7. Ibid., p. 148.
+8. Kant's Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard, London and New York
+1892, p. 24.
+9. Ibid., p. zs.
+10. Metaphysische Anfänge der Tugendlebre, Kants Werke. Akademie-Textausgabe,
+Berlin 1968-, Vol. Vl, p. 449.
+II. Spinoza, Ethics, trans. A. Boyle, London/New York 1948, Pr. III, Pref., p.
+84.
+[67] "Fascism" / 1944: "monopoly."
+[68] [German text:] Leisungfähigkeit / 1944: "efficiency."
+12. Critique of Pure Reason, and ed., op cit., p. 154.
+[68] "is revealing... form." / 1944: "monopoly is outgrowing itself in a fascistically rationalized form."
+13. Translated from de Sade, Histoire de Juliette, Holland 1797, Vol. V, pp. 319f.
+14. Ibid., pp. 322f.
+Is. Ibid., p. 324.
+[71l "economic systen" / 1944: "capitalism."
+
+266 Notes to Pages 71-79
+[71] "as... individuals": An allusion co Marx's formulation in Capical (Marx,
+Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 35, London 1996, p. 89).
+[zi] "industrial reason" / 1944: "monopoly and its reason."
+[72] "'system" / 1944/47: "system, the reason of capiral."
+16. E.g. Critique of Practical Reason, Kant, Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J.
+Gregor, Cambridge 1996, p. IGs.
+17. Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain, ed. Erdmann, Berlin 1840,
+Book I, Ch. II, S 9, p. 21s.
+18. Cf. Heinrich Mann's introduction to the Insel Verlag edition.
+19. Metaphysische Anfange der Tugendlebre, op. cit., p. 408.
+20. Juliette, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 58.
+21. Ibid., pp. 6of.
+22. Spinoza, Ethics, Pr. IV, Prop. LIV, op. cit., p. 178.
+23. Spinoza, ibid.
+24. Metaphysische Anfange der Tugendlebre, op. cit., p. 408.
+25. Ibid., p. 409.
+26. Juliette, op. cit., Vol. II, p. II4.
+(76) "bourgeois" / 1944: "bourgeois in democracy."
+27. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 282.
+28. Nietzsche, Umwertung aller Werte. Werke, Kröner, Vol. VIII, p. 213.
+29. Juliette, op. cir., Vol. IV, p. 204.
+30. E. Dühren pointed our this affinity in Neue Forschungen, Berlin 1904, pp.
+453ff.
+31. Nietzsche, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 218.
+32. Juliette, op. cit., Vol. I, PP. 3I5f.
+33. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Francis
+Golffing, New York 1956, pp. 174f.
+34. Juliette, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 300.
+35. Histoire de Justine, Holland 1797, Vol. IV, p. 4 (also quoted by Dühren, op.
+cit., p. 452).
+36. Genealogy of Morals, op. cit., p. 178.
+37. Justine, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 7.
+38. Nachlass, op. cir., Vol. XI, p. 214.
+39. Genealogy of Morals, op. cit., p. 258.
+40. Juliette, Vol. I, p. 208ff.
+41. Ibid., pp. zuf.
+42. Beyond Good and Evil, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, London (Penguin Classics)
+1990, p. 97.
+43. Nachlass, op. cit., Vol. XII, p. 108.
+44. Juliente, opí cit., Vol. I, p. 313.
+
+Notes to Pages 79-87
+267
+45. Ethics, Pt. IV, Appendix, XVI, op. cit., p. 194.
+46. Ibid., Pr. IV, Prop. L, Note, p. 176.
+47. Ibid., Prop. L, p. 175.
+48. Juliette, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 12s.
+49. Ibid.
+so. Nierzsche contra Wagner, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 204.
+s1. Juliette, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 313.
+52. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 216.
+53. Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen undErhabenen, op. cit., Vol. II,
+pp. 21sf.
+54. Ibid.
+5s. Nachlass, op. cit., Vol. XI, pp. 227f.
+56. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth 1984, p. 189.
+[81] "fascist masters" / 1944: "masters."
+57. Genealogy of Morals, op. cit., p. 249.
+[81] "Annie Henry": In 1940 she shot a man by whom she and a companion
+had been taken for a walk, after having threatened him with a pistol and humiliated him for hours; cf. Los Angeles Examiner, 29.11.1942.
+58. Juliette, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 78F.
+59. Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 126f.
+6o. R. Caillois, "Théorie de la fêre," Nouvelle Revue Française, Jan. 1940, p. 49.
+61. Cf. ibid.
+62. Cf. ibid., pp. 58f.
+[83) "Benzedrine": A strong stimulant administered by the Nazi commanders
+to their troops (It. tr.).
+63. Nachlass, op. cit., Vol. XII, p. 364.
+[84] "appeased ... industry" / 1944: "hypostatized as an accomplished reconciliation. Under monopoly."
+[84] "system ... industry" / 1944: "monopoly."
+[84] "white trash"; derogatory expression for white workers.
+64. Juliette, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 8If.
+6s. Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 172f.
+66. Ibid., pp. 176f.
+67. Private edition by Helpey, p. 267.
+68. Juliette, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 176f.
+69. Ibid., pp. 178f.
+70. Ibid., pp. 188-29.
+71. Juliette, op. cie., Vol. IV, p. 26I.
+72. Ibid., Vol. Il. p. 273.
+
+268
+Notes to Pages 88-94
+73. Ibid., Vol. TV, p. 379.
+74. Aline et Valcour, Brussels 1883, Vol. I, p. 58.
+75. Ibid., p. 57.
+76. Victor Hugo, The Laughing Man, Book VIII, Ch. 7.
+77. Juliette, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 199.
+78. Cf. Les 120 Journées de Sodome, Paris 1935, Vol. II, p. 308.
+79. Der Fall Wagner, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 1o.
+80. R. Briffault, The Mothers, New York 1927, Vol. I, p. 119.
+[89) "German fascism" / 1944: "the class society."
+81. Nachlass, op. cit., Vol. XI, p. 216.
+82. Ibid., vol. XIV, p. 273.
+83. Kant, Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge 1996, p. 8z.
+84. Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, trans. Thomas Common, New York 1973, p.
+279.
+85. Ibid.
+86. Cf. Nietzsche, Nachlass, op. cit., Vol. XI, p. 216.
+87. Cf. Le Play, Les ouvriers européens, Paris 1879, Vol. I, esp. pp. 133ff.
+88. Juliette, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 303ff.
+89. Les 120 Journées de Sodome, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 72.
+20. Cf. Juliette, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 235, n.
+21. La Philosophie dans le Boudoir, op. cit., p. I8s.
+92. Cf. Democritus, Diels Fragment 278, Berlin 1912, Vol. II, pp. 117f.
+93. La Philosophie dans le Boudoir, op. cit., p. 242.
+94. S. Reinach, "La prohibition de l'inceste et le sentiment de la pudeur," in
+Cultes, Mythes et Religions, Paris 190s, Vol. I, p. 157.
+95. La Philosophie dans le Boudoir, op. cit., p. 238.
+26. Ibid., PP. 238-49.
+97. Ibid.
+28. Juliette, op. cit., Vol. IV, PP. 240-44.
+99. La Philosophie dans le Boudoir, op. cit., p. 263.
+100. Aline et Valcour, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. I8iff.
+101. Juliette, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. I8iff.
+[92] "prehistory": Cf. note [31], p. 258 ("that thinking").
+102. Nierzsche, Joyful Wisdom, trans. Thomas Common, New York 1973, p.
+209.
+THE CULTURE INDUSTRY
+194] "The" / 1944: "The German and Russian pavilions at the Paris World
+Exposition (of 1937, Ed.) scemed of the same essence, and the."
+1941 "the rotal power of capital" / 1944: "inonopoly."
+
+Notes to Pages 95-III
+269
+[95] "those whose ... strongest" / 1944: "capital."
+[9s] "economy today" | 1944: "profit economy."
+[96] "Soap operas": alludes to the fact chat such programs were originally
+broadcast at times when housewives were at home doing their washing (Ir. tr.).
+[96] "selection" / 1944: "selection. The operations of the large studios, including the quality of the highly paid human material populating them, is a product
+of the monopoly system into which it is integrated."
+[96] "subjected ... purges" / 1944: "expropriated even before fascism."
+(98] "at film" / 1944: "at the film monopoly."
+[98) "agencies ... business" / 1944: "monopolistic agencies."
+[1oo] "industrial society" / 1944: "the machinery."
+[100] "gigantic economic machinery" / 1944: "gigantic machinery of monopoly."
+[1o1] "tolerated" / 1944: "tolerated, used by monopoly."
+1. Nierzsche, Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen. Werke, Leipzig 1917, Vol. I, p. 187.
+[102] "Zanuck": Film producer, cofounder of zoth Century Pictures.
+[104) "present society" / 1944: "monopoly sociery."
+[Ios] "Pathé": French film magnates.
+[Ios] "Hugenberg": Founders of German publishing combines.
+2. A. de Tocqueville, De la Démocratie en Amérique, Paris 1864, Vol. II, p. ISI.
+[106] "Hays Office": Voluntary censorship agency (It. tr.), set up in 1934 in
+Hollywood.
+[106) "Mickey Rooney": See note [126), p. 271.
+[107) "ready-to-wear trade or" / 1944: "Jewish clothing trade or the Episcopal."
+[107] "some omnipresent agency" / 1944: "a Rockefeller Institure, only slightly more omnipresent chan the one in Radio City," - "Radio City": the name given
+since the early 193os to a part of the Rockefeller Center in New York containing
+several theatres, radio studios, and the Radio City Music Hall.
+[107) "Casino de Paris": Music hall in Paris, famous for its luxurious furnishings.
+[107] "society" / 1944: "class sociery."
+(108] "Lombardo": Orchestra leader especially known for his annual musical
+broadcasts on New Year's Eve.
+[109] "novelty songs": Hit songs with comic elements.
+(ito) "cruelty" / 1944: "lust for murder."
+[ı1o] "of the" / 1944: "of the kiss, but not of the."
+.. overwhelming": The idea expressed here dates from a time when
+television was not in widespread use (It. tr.).
+[ı11] "possibilities" / 1944: "productive forces."
+
+270
+Notes to Pages III-IZI
+[ıı] "culture industry" / 1944: "mass culture."
+[ı1I] "Hays Office": See note (106), p. 26g.
+[112] "Laughter ... ended": On this cwofold function of laughter cf. pp. Gof
+(IL. Tr.).
+[112) "res... gaudium": Seneca, Letter 23; letters to Lucilius (Letters from a
+Stoic, trans. Robin Campbell, Harmondsworth 1969).
+[113) "constitutes its essence": Cf. Adorno, "Über Jazz" (1937), in Gesammelse
+Schriften, Vol. 17, Frankfurt am Main 1982, p. 28.
+[I13] "the system" / 1944: "prevailing in monopolistic sociery."
+(114) "funnies": Amusement pages in newspapers with jokes and comic strips.
+[114] "Ludwig": Primarily a writer of popular biographies.
+[114] "Mrs. Miniver": Leading role in a radio family serial; also filmed.
+[114) "Lone Ranger": Title figure in a radio western serial, che rype of che lone
+cowboy fighting for the good; also filmed.
+(II4) "Lombardo": See note (108), p. 269.
+3. Frank Wedekind, Gesammelte Werke, Munich 1921, Vol. IX, p. 426.
+[us] "women's serials": Light novels in women's magazines.
+[urs] "Adler": Neo-Thomist popular philosopher who defended film with arguments from scholastic philosophy (Ir. tr.) —Cf. Horkheimer, "Neue Kunst und
+Massenkultur," in Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 4.
+[116] "the culture industry" / 1944: "the monopoly system."
+[117] "planning" / 1944: "monopoly planning."
+[117] "life has been transformed" / 1944: "monopoly has transformed life."
+[117] "those in control" / 1944: "monopoly."
+[118] "Industry" / 1944: "Monopoly."
+[118] "proof": A play on che various philosophical-theological ontological,
+cosmological, etc.) proofs of the existence of God.
+[i20] "giant corporation" / 1944: "monopoly."
+(120] "the chinking subject" / 1944: "liberalism."
+[120] Hans Sonnenstößßers Höllenfahrt. Ein beiteres Traumspiel. Radio play by
+Paul Apel (1931), revised version by Gustaf Gründgens (1937).
+[120] "Life with Father": Popular American radio family serial after a stage play
+by Clarence Day.
+[120] "the latest society" / 1944: "monopoly sociery."
+[120| "Formal freedom ... answer officially" / 1944: "Bourgeois democracy
+guarantees formal freedom for everyone. No one is officially responsible to che
+government."
+|120| "Dagwood": Character in the comic strip Blondie.
+1121| "established" / 1944: "established by monopoly."
+1121] "leaders of industry" / 1944: "monopolists."
+
+Notes to Pages I2I-I3I
+271
+[121] "provision" / 1944: "provision by the monopoly."
+[121] "winter aid": Winterbilfswerk: National Socialist organization to support
+the unemployed and other needy persons under the direction of the Ministry of
+Propaganda.
+[122) "even now" / 1944: "even under monopoly."
+[123) "women's serial": See note (IIS), p. 270.
+(123) "the pressure of the system" / 1944: "monopoly."
+[124) "the system" / 1944: "monopoly."
+4 Nietzsche, Götzendämmerung, Werke, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 136.
+124) "those in command" / 1944:
+[126) "Mature... Rooney": Well-known film actors, embodiments of the
+hero and the antihero.
+[126] "cultural conglomerate" / 1944: "cultural conglomerate and monopoly."
+(126] "Something ... everyone" / 1944: "Monopoly serves up something for
+everyone."
+[127) "The ... purpose": Cf. Kant, Critique of Judgment, op. cit., p. 68.
+(128) "inner... commodities" / 1944: "composition of cultural commodities
+in terms of use value and exchange value."
+[128] "Whar... replaced" / 1944: "Use value is being replaced in the reception of cultural assets."
+[128) "The consumer ... escape." / 1944: (missing).
+[128] "Mrs. Miniver": See note (114), p. 270.
+(128] "deception" / 1944: "swindle."
+(129] "the commercial radio system" / 1944: "broadcasting."
+[129) "the sovereign whole" / 1944: "monopoly as the sovereign whole."
+[129] "combines" / 1944: "monopolies."
+[129) "invented by the sociology of religion": Allusion to Max Weber's concept
+of charismatic authority; cf. Economy and Society, Vol. I, ed. Guenther Roth and
+Claus Wittich, Berkeley 1978, pp. 24Iff.
+[130] "Even ... use value" / 1944: "Use value."
+[130] "screenos": Bingo games played by the audience between pictures.
+[130] "radio": Television was still in its infancy when the authors were writing
+(It. ir.).
+[131) "the Warner brothers": Owners of large film studios.
+[131) "hopes" / 1944: "waits."
+[131] "labor time ... in advertising" / 1944: "social labor time, bur saved it.
+Today, when the free market is at an end, monopoly is entrenching itself in advertising."
+(131] "'the combines" / 1944: "monopoly."
+
+272
+Notes to Pages I31-I44
+[131] "wielders of influence ... economic councils" / 1944: "class remains
+among its peers, as a preliminary form of the resolutions of economic councils of
+industrialists."
+[132] "It benefits ... names." / 1944: "Its termination by an individual firm
+represents only a loss of prestige, in fact an offence against the class discipline
+which monopoly imposes on its members. In wartime, commodities which can
+no longer be supplied continue to be advertised merely in order to keep the institution, and naturally also the war economy, in operation."
+(132] "the big companies" / 1944: "monopoly, the skyscrapers of Wrigley and
+Rockefeller."
+[133) "blackshiri": A term for fascists, after the black shirts of their uniforms,
+especially in Italy bur also in other countries.
+(134] "people" / 1944: "people, which still determines life in monopoly sociery."
+[135) "Schriftleiter": The term Schrifileiter [lit. director of writing] was preferred by the National Socialists to the "foreign" word Redakteur (Ir. rr.).
+[135) "such language" / 1944: "the language of monopoly."
+[136) "False." / 1944/47: "false." After paragraph break: "(to be continued)."
+ELEMENTS OF ANTI-SEMITISM
+(137) "Now that ... reasons," / 1944: "In the age when political domination
+is obsolete."
+[137) "workers" / 1944: "proletarians."
+[137) "appropriation" / 1944: "exploitation."
+(138] "discharged." / 1944: "discharged. That would be the classless society."
+[138] "existing society" / 1944: "the class society."
+[138] "the existing order" / 1944: "capitalism."
+(139) "that order" / 1944: "class society."
+[139) "The respectable ... disreputable ones" | 1944: "Monopoly, the
+respectable rackets, condone it, and the fascists, the disreputable ones."
+[140) "vagrants" / 1944: "Negroes, Mexican wrestling clubs."
+[142] "take possession of" / 1944: "appropriate."
+[142) "parasites of old": Allusion to the Nazis' anticapitalist propaganda distinction berween "productive" [schaffend) and "parasitic" (raffend; lir. "grasping"]
+capital, i.e., between industrial and bank capital; cf. Franz Neumann, Behemoth
+(1942), Frankfurt/Main 1977, p. 376.
+[142] "of the economic system in general" / 1944: "of all capital."
+[142) "what is withheld" / 1944: "what capital withholds."
+[143) "society" / 1944: "class."
+[144] "knights of industry... creators" / 1944: "capitalist bloodsucker who has
+to justify himself as a crèator."
+
+Nures to l'ages 169-8-175
+273
+[144] "'salvation." | 1944/47: "salvation, now that the churches have been
+reduced entirely to the function of social control."
+[145) "German Christians": The Protestant movement "Deursche Christen"
+sought a union berween Church and National Socialism.
+(148] "recognition in a concept": Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., pp.
+72ff [B 103).
+1. Cf. Freud, "The Uncanny," The Complete Psychological Works, op. cit., Vol.
+XVII, pp. zagff
+[152) "Coughlin": Charles Edward Coughlin, Catholic priest, demagogic anti-
+Semitic radio preacher.
+2. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, op. cir., p. 183 [B 180f].
+[16o] "any... country" / 1944: "even lynching."
+3. Freud, Totem and Taboo, op. cit., Vol. XIII, p. 73.
+[163) "culture industry" / 1944: "economic and cultural monopoly."
+[164] "big industry" / 1944: "monopoly."
+[164] "workers" / 1944: "prolerarians."
+[IGs] "until now" / 1944: "in liberalism."
+[165)"
+*... turning-point of history": Allusion co Mart's "Zur Judenfrage," in
+Aus den Deutsch-Französischen Jahrbüchern 1843/44.
+[I65] "VII": The whole of section VII ("Bur ... of enlightenment.") was not
+contained in the 1944 edition.
+(I65] "the Ahlwardts and the Knüppelkunzes": Hermann Ahlwardt: auchor of
+anti-Semitic pamphlets, Reichstag deputy at the end of the nineteenth century;
+for years his appearances were accompanied by uproar and scandal.
+Hermann Kunze: reacher at the Cader School, Chairman of the Deutsch-
+Soziale Partei, anti-Semitic demagogue; his nickname [Knüppel; stick, cudgel]
+resulted from the frequent brawls at his meetings.
+[166) "ricker": single list of a party's candidates in the American electoral system.
+(I66) "Jew-free": From the National Socialist term judenrein.
+[167) "
+•.. withour mediation": Allusion to Kant's proposition: "Thoughts
+withour content are empry, intuitions withour concepts are blind," Critique of
+Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 93 [A sI).
+NOTES AND SKETCHES
+(173) "Chamberlain ... Bad Godesberg": Chamberlain met Hitler three times
+in September 1938; the second meeting took place in Bad Godesberg.
+(175] "In this country": In America (It. tr.).
+(175) "Spoke ... loneliness": Translated from Die chinesische Flöte, Nachdichrungen von Hans Berhge, Insel-Bücherei, p. 17 (Ic. cr.).
+
+274
+Notes to Pages 175-187
+1. Paul Deussen, Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda. Leipzig 1905, p. 524.
+2. Matthew 2, 17-19. [I chink it should be ch. II—tr.]
+3. Above all Brhad-aranyaka Upanishad 3, 5, 1 and 4, 4, 22. Deussen, op. cit.,
+pp. 436f and 479f.
+4. Op. cit., p. 436.
+5. Mark, I, 6.
+G. Translated from Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 2,
+Werke, Vol. XIV, pp. 159f.
+7. Ibid., p. 168.
+8. Cf. Deussen, op. cit., p. 373.
+y. Cf. Eduard Meyer, Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums, Sturtgart/Berlin
+1921, Vol. I, p. 20.
+Io. Diogenes Laertius, IV, IS.
+II. Cf. Politeia, 372; Politikos, 267ff and Eduard Zeller, Die Philosophie der
+Griechen, Leipzig 1922, Part 2, Section I, pp. 325f note.
+12. Cf. Deussen, Das System des Vedanca, Leipzig 1906, and ed., pp. G3ff.
+13. Hermann Oldenberg, Buddha, Stuntgart/Berlin 1914, pp. 174f.
+14. Ibid., p. 386.
+IS. Ibid., pp. 393f.
+16. Cf. ibid., pp. 184ff and pp. 424ff.
+[18o] "Soirées de Petersbourg": Joseph de Maistre, Les Soirées de Saint Petersbourg (1821).
+(180) "circles of Hell": Allusion to Dante's Divine Comedy, Inferno III, 4fF (It.
+tr.).
+[180] "Animal psychology"': In the 1944 edition this entry comes directly after
+"Against knowingness."
+(185) "Economic... forms" / 1944: "Relations of production, forms of class
+domination, culture."
+[185) "troglodyte": Paleolithic cave dweller.
+(186] "dictum": Cf. Marx, Die deutsche Ideologie, in Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 3,
+Berlin 1969, pp. 34f.
+(186) "The poor figure ... them": Cf. Marx, Engels, Die Heilige Familie, in
+Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 2, Berlin 1958, p. 85; also Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," in Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. I, Berlin 1957, pp. 385f.
+[187) "Blum government": Popular front government 1936-37, introduced
+extensive social reforms.
+(187) "From a theory of the criminal": Cf. the full rext, "Theorie des Verbrechers," in Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 12, Frankfurt/Main 198s, pp. 266ff.
+(187) "rising... labor power" / 1944: "à regular need for labor power, increased
+producrion."
+
+Noses 10 Pages 187-297
+275
+17. Leibniz, The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings, trans. Robert
+Larta, Oxford 1925, S 7, pp. 219f.
+18. Cf. ibid., S s1.
+19. Cf. R. Caillois, Le Mythe et l'Homme, Paris 1938, pp. 12sff.
+(190] "fascism" / 1944: "monopoly."
+[190] "state" / 1944: "order."
+[191] "executioner: each operation ... forgerting." / 1944: "executioner. Bur
+that is not to say enough. Is nor death the radical loss of the 'residual capacity of
+the nerve substance? Life would not be a dream bur a narcosis. We would behave
+toward other people, not to mention all other creatures, as, in Flourens's view, the
+patient behaves towards the interval when he or she was under the influence of
+the drug: deludedly. The narcosis acts like the principium individuationis. The
+positivists, however, could learn from this how far they have advanced with their
+science: their note taking would be limited in principle to the postnarcotic period. It would be the urterance of a life which had forgotten itself under the influence of narcotics, or rather of death, from which one can remember nothing.
+They would, in their thing-language, have "mortificated" it. Reality would be left
+to metaphysics and to antiquated French physiologists. Admittedly, a test of the
+objective justification of such speculations would call for a discriminating analysis of Schopenhauer's notion, which still contributes too much to Flourens's positivism."
+[195) "The "tragic' world-view of the fascists": An allusion to the vulgarized
+reception of Nietzsche by some National Socialist authors in the early 1930s.
+[197) "Chaplin's film": The Great Dictator (1940).
+20. Translated from Die Nachsokratiker, ed. Wilhelm Nestle, Jena 1923, Vol. I.
+72a, p. 195.
+(198] "big business" / 1944: "monopoly."
+[203] "praxis." / 1944: "praxis. In Europe there is now hardly a country in
+which one would not be shot for a slip of the tongue."
+(203) "The proposition... the whole": Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, op.
+cit., p. II.
+[204] "today" / 1944: "under monopoly."
+(205) "flux" / 1944: "transience."
+(206] "The man ... strive": Allusion to Schiller's poem, "Das Lied von der
+Glocke."
+21. Cf. Eclaircissement sur les Sacrifices. Oeuvres, Lyon 1892, Vol. V, pp. 322f.
+[207] "universal" / 1944: "monopolistic."
+[207] "completely ... domination" / 1944: "system of big rackets."
+(207) "In Germany ... reason": Cf. note (24), p. 257 ("pleasure").
+(207| "presen" / 1244: "fasciss present, in which she no longer needs meta-
+
+276
+Notes to Pages 209-222
+phorically to put on mannish trousers because she is already in desexualized
+slacks, machining bombs."
+[209) "'culture industry" / 1944: "mass culture."
+(210] "fascist collective" / 1944: "collective of the totalitarian monopoly."
+22. Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., p. 136.
+[211] "Hearst": William Randolph Hearst, founder of the USA's largest press
+conglomerate.
+[211] "baseless" / I944: "baseless; on this Heidegger and Lukács agree."
+23. Goethe, Faust, Part I, 4068.
+24. Cf. Karl Landauer, "Intelligenz und Dummheir," in Das Psychoanalytische
+Volksbuch, Bern 1939, p. 172.
+EDITOR'S AFTERWORD
+I. P. xiv of this edition.
+2. P. xvili of this edition.
+3. P. I of this edition.
+4. P. xi of this edition.
+s. Max-Horkheimer Archiv der Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek Frankfurt
+am Main (abbreviated henceforth to MHA): VI ID.21o.
+6. Published in Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 12, Frankfurt am
+Main 1985.
+7. MHA: VI ID.66—The declaration was to be issued in connection with the
+publication of essays by both authors in the periodical Der Monat. As contributions by Horkheimer, "Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung" (Engl: "The End of Reason," see n. 24, Afterword], "Autorität und Familie in der Gegenwart" [Engl.:
+"Authoritarianism and the Family Today," in The Family: Its Function and Destiny,
+ed. R. N. Anshen, New York 1942, pp. 359-374), or a section from Eclipse of
+Reason (Oxford 1947) were considered (cf. MHA: VI 1 D.158, I6IA). However,
+Horkheimer then withdrew his permission. The joint declaration, too, was nor
+published. The reasons for chis emerge only pardly from the correspondence
+berween Horkheimer and Adorno. They have to do, above all, with misgivings
+about a further political declaration which was to be combined with this first one.
+However, there is no reason to assume that the rwo authors were unwilling to
+endorse the content and formulation of the first declaration.
+8. MHA: XI 6.86.
+9. My thanks go to Rolf Tiedemann for information on the content of
+Adorno's posthumous papers here and elsewhere.
+10. MHA: XI 6.2.
+11. MHA: XI G.3.
+12. MHA: XI 6.4.
+
+Notes to Pages 223-227
+277
+13. It is to be found under the title "Das Schema der Massenkultur" as an appendix :o Dialektik der Aufklärung in Theodor W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften,
+Vol. 3, Frankfurt am Main 1981, pp. 299ff.
+14. MHA: X 17.1-17.
+15. Published in Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 12, pp. 587 ff.
+I6. MHA: XI 6.64.
+I7. MHA: XI 6.65.
+18. MHA: XI 6.5-110; XI 6a.1-3: XI 7a.3-5.
+19. Now published in Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 12. The designation Fragments, which Dialectic of Enlightenment bears as its subtitle (and as its
+main tide in the original version of 1944), therefore has not only the metaphorical meaning of a kind of thinking opposed to the compulsion of a system bur also
+the literal meaning that the printed version does not include everything initially
+written for it. Adorno also wanted to include The Philosophy of Modern Music as
+an excursus for Dialectic of Enlightenment; cf. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften Vol.
+12, Frankfurt am Main 1975, p. II.
+20. MHA: XI 6.43-62.
+21. Jürgen Habermas, "Bemerkungen zur Enrwicklung des Horkheimerschen
+Werkes" in Max Horkheimer heute: Werk und Wirkung, ed. Alfred Schmidt and
+Norberı Alwicker, Frankfurt am Main 1986, p. 171.
+22. Verbal communication to the Editor on 22.10.1985.
+23. Cf. p. xix of rhis edition.
+24. 'The Authoritarian State," tr. The People's Translation Service, Berkeley, in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, pp. 95-117, New York 1982; German: "Auroritärer Staar," in Gesammelte
+Schriften, Vol. s, Frankfurt am Main 1987, pp. 293ff; "The End of Reason," The
+Essential Frankfurt School Reader, op. cit., pp. 26-48; German: "Vernunft und
+Selbsterhaltung," in Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. s, Frankfurt am Main 1987, pp.
+320 ff.
+25. Theodor W. Adorno, Uber Walter Benjamin, Frankfurt am Main 1970, p.
+143. The straightforward identification by the editor of thar volume, Rolf Tiedemann, of the "book on the dialectic" mentioned in the letter with the later book
+Dialectic of Enlightenment, seems ro me questionable, especially in the light of the
+memorandum abour to be cited
+26. 'Idee, Aktivirät und Programm des Instituts für Sozialforschung," in
+Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. I2, Frankfurt am Main 1985, pp. I56f.
+27. MHA: VI 33.62-63.
+28. Cf. Adorno, "Die Aktualitär der Philosophie" (1931), in Gesammelte
+Schriften, Vol. I, Frankfurt am Main 1973.
+29. Cf. Horkheimer, Adorno, "Diskussion über die Differenz zwischen Posi-
+
+278
+Notes to Pages 227-233
+rivismus und materialistischer Dialektik," in Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften,
+Vol. 12, pp. 467ff.
+30. P. xiv of chis edition.
+31. Cf. Horkheimer "Vertrauen auf Geschichre," in Gesammelte Schriften, Vol.
+I2, op. cit. Also compare the more detailed interpretation in Gunzelin Schmid
+Noerr, "Wahrheit, Macht und die Sprache der Philosophie. Zu Horkheimers
+sprachphilosophischen Reflexionen in seinen nachgelassenen Schriften zwischen
+1939 und 1946," in Max Horkheimer heute: Werk und Wirkung, op. cit.
+32. Cf. Martin Jay, Dialektische Phantasie, Frankfurt am Main 1973, pp. 125ff,
+and Wolfgang Bonß, "Psychoanalyse als Wissenschaft und Kritik. Zur Freudrezeption der Frankfurter Schule," in Sozialforschung als Kritik, ed. Wolfgang
+Bonf and Axel, Honneth, Frankfurt am Main 1982, esp. PP. 39Iff.
+33. Erich Fromm, "Über Methode und Aufgabe einer analytischen Sozialpsychologie," in Zeitschrift fir Sozialforschung, Vol. I, 1932, p. so.
+34. Paris 1936.
+35. Cf. Horkheimer, "Ernst Simmel und die Freudsche Philosophie," Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. s, Frankfurt am Main 1987, pp. 396ff.
+36. Horkheimer, Adorno, "Diskussionen über die Differenz zwischen Positivismus und materialistischer Dialekrik," in Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol.
+12, esp. pp. 433-451; "Diskussionen über Sprache und Erkenntnis, Naturbeherrschung am Menschen, politische Aspekte des Marxismus," ibid., pp. s1o-s1z.
+37. Horkheimer, Adorno, "Diskussionen über die Differenz zwischen Positivismus und materialistischer Dialektik," op. сіt., p. 443.
+38. Ibid.
+39. P. xviii of chis edition.
+40. I. 154 of chis edition.
+41. New York 1949-50; one of these volumes is The Authoritarian Personality
+(New York 1950), written by Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel J. Levinson,
+and R. Nevitt Sanford, mentioned by Adorno and in the following quotation.
+42. Adorno, "Wissenschaftliche Erfahrungen in Amerika," in Gesammelte
+Schriften, Vol. 10.2, Frankfurt am Main 1977, PP. 721-723.
+43. Martin Jay discusses chis in more detail in "The Frankfurt School in
+lixile," in Perspectives in American History, Vol. VI, pp. 348-355.
+14. P. xix of this edition.
+4s. Cf. especially Pollock, "State Capitalism," in Studies of Philosophy and So-
+cial Science IX, 1941, and "Is National Socialism a New Order?" ibid. Horkheimer
+himself explains this concept in his essay "The Authoritarian State" [see n. 24,
+Afterwordl.
+1f. "Aufzeichnungen und Entwürfe zur Dialektik der Aufklärung 1939-1942,"
+in Ciesummelle Schriften, Vol. 12, op. cit., p. 287.
+
+Notes to Pages 235-240
+279
+47. "Zur Ideologie der Politik heute (Fragment)," in Gesammelte Schriften,
+Vol. I2, op. cit., pp. 317f.
+48. "Zur Soziologie der Klassenverhältnisse," in Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 12,
+op. cit., pp. 101-104. That Horkheimer's theory of rackets, which, in the end, was
+developed to only a rudimentary level, aimed to go far beyond a sociological
+analysis in the narrower sense becomes clear from an analogy with his reflections
+on linguistic philosophy mentioned earlier. In an essay of 1946 he described the
+function of the concept on the basis of the racket model, protection in exchange
+for oppression: "In the concept fulfillment is inseparable from suffering. Its fixity
+only faithfully reflects the society which serves life by oppressing it, which develops human beings by mutilating them and knows of homeland only as the prorection which suppresses the protected." (Vertrauen auf Geschichte," in Ge-
+sammelte Schriften, Vol. 12, op cit., p. 124).
+49. "Reflexionen zur Klassencheorie" (1942), in Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften,
+Vol. 8, Frankfurt am Main 1972.
+so. Cf. Horkheimer, "Zur Soziologie der Klassenverhältnisse,"
+op. cit., pp.
+7sff.
+SI. P. xiv of this edition.
+52. P. 207 of this edition.
+53. P. 94 of this edition.
+54. P. 132 of this edition.
+5s. P. av of this edition.
+56. E.g., p. 209 of this edition.
+57. E.g., p. 67 and p. 89 of chis edition.
+58. E.g., p. 76 and p. 120 of this edition.
+59. I. 107 and p. 144 of this edition.
+6o. P. 137 of this edition.
+GI. P. 48 of this edition.
+62. P. Go of this edition.
+63. P. xvii of this edition.
+64. For example, in a note written probably in the early 1930s and at any rate
+not later than 1935, Horkheimer writes of the "independence of the revolutionary
+fighter" (MHA: XI 16.4a, p. s). The nore was incorporated in "Bemerkungen zur
+philosophischen Anthropologie," published in 1935, where, however, he writes of
+the "independence of the person who pursues this goal [of a free humanity"
+(Zeitschrift fir Sozialforschung, Vol. V, 1935, p. 16).
+6s. According to a verbal communication to the Editor from Rudolph Hirsch
+in November 1983.
+66. P. xv of this edition.
+67. I. xv of this edition.
+
+280
+Notes to Pages 240-246
+68. The original main title of the book was Philosophical Fragments.
+69. MHA: XI 6.65.
+70. Cf. "Reason and Self-Preservation," op. cit.
+71. Cf. "Zur Ideologie der Politik heure (Fragment)," in Gesammelte Schriften,
+Vol. 12, op. cit., pp. 3i6ff. This rext reads like a critique of a positivistically abbreviated reading of Pollock's theory of state capitalism.
+72. E.g., p. 131 of this edition.
+73. P. 207 of this edition.
+74. Horkheimer, Adorno, "Rettung der Aufklärung. Diskussion über eine
+geplante Schrift zur Dialektik" (1946), in Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol.
+12, op. cit., pp. 597-599.
+75. Ibid., p. 600.
+76. Ibid., p. 604.
+77. Ibid., pp. 594,598.
+78. Ibid., p. GoI.
+79. Ibid., p. 602.
+80. Cf. The Editors Afterword to Vols. 7 and 8 of Horkheimers Gesammelte
+Schriften, in Vol. 8, esp. pp. 461-465.
+81. Cf. e.g., "Kritische Theorie gestern und heure" (1969/72), in Gesammelte
+Schriften, Vol. 8, Frankfurt am Main 1985, p. 353; "Pessimismus heute" (1971), in
+Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 7, Frankfurt am Main 1985, p. 232; "Das Schlimme
+erwarten und doch das Gute versuchen. Gespräch mit Gerhard Rein" (1972/76),
+ibid., p. 467.
+82. P. I6I of this edition.
+83. Notizen 1950 bis 196g, Frankfurt am Main 1974, p. 12.
+84. MHA: VI 40.245 c.
+85. MHA: VI 4.146.
+86. MHA: V 118.3.
+87. Cf. Solmis letter to Horkheimer of 5.7.1961 (MHA: V 61.21).
+88. MHA: V 61.13-14.
+89. Letter of 26.2.1962 (MHA: VI 4.181).
+90. Letter from Horkheimer to Solmi of 15.8.1962 (MHA: V 61.1). In che
+Italian edition Solmis name finally no longer appeared bur was replaced by che
+pseudonym Lionello Vinci-clearly a sign of distancing.
+g1. My thanks go to Furio Cerurti of Florence for this information.
+92. Nico Pasero, Rudolph Bauer, "Aufklärung auf Italienisch," in Diskres.
+Frankfurter Studentenzeitung, Vol. 17, July 1967, p. 4.
+93. In Kritische Theorie, Vol. II, Frankfurt am Main 1968, p. XI.
+24. Ibid., p. IX.
+
+Noses do Pages 2of8 251
+281
+95. Cf. Alfred Schmidt, "Die geistige Physiognomic Max Horkheimers," Introsduction to Horkheimer, Notizen 1950-1y8y, Prankfurt am Main 1974. pp. XLIX,
+L, LXVIII.
+THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CLASS HISTORY
+1. In Studies in Philosophy and Socind Scienir, Vol. IX, 1941, pp. 264ft.
+2. Helmut Dubiel, Alfons Söllner, "Die Nationalsozialismusforschung des In-
+stituts für Sozialforschung —ihre wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Stellung und ihre gegenwärtige Bedeutung," in Wireschali, Reche unel Staas im Nationalsozialismus...,
+op. cit., pp. 7ff; Barbara Brick, Moishe Postone, "Kritischer Pessimismus und die
+Grenzen des traditionellen Marxismus," in Sozialforschung als Kritik, ed. Wolfgang Bonß and Axel Honneth, Frankfurt am Main 1982, pp. 179ff. In what follows we base ourselves substantially on these texts, without discussing them in
+detail. Regarding the context described in these works cf. also: Martin Jay, Dialektische Phantasie, Frankfurt am Main 1981, Ch. V, and Alfons Söllner, Geschichte
+und Herrschaft, Frankfurt am Main 1979, Ch. 3.3.6.
+3. "Die gegenwärtige Lage des Kapitalismus und die Aussichten einer planwirtschaftlichen Neuordnung," in Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung, Vol. I, pp. 8ff;
+"Bemerkungen zur Wirtschaftskrise," ibid., Vol. II, pp. 32rff.
+4. Quoted from Brick, Postone, op. cit., p. 184.
+s. Cf. "State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations," in Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, Vol. IX, 1941, pp. 20off.
+6. Quoted from Brick, Postone, op. cit., p. 18s.
+7. Cf. ibid.
+8. Cf. ibid., pp. 189f.
+9. Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942.
+1o. Quoted from Dubiel, Söllner, op. cit., p. 18.
+II. Ibid.
+12. P. xix of this edition.
+13. P. 23 of this edition.
+14. P. 21 of this edition.
+Is. P. 84 of this edition.
+16. P. IIG of this edition.
+17. P. II7 of this edition.
+18. P. 124 of this edition.
+I9. P. 17 of this edition.
+20. P. 30 of this edition.
+21. P. 3o0 of this edition.
+22. P. as of this edition.
+23. P. 138 of this edition.
+
+282
+Notes to Page 251
+24. P. 210 of this edition.
+25. P. 190 of this edition.
+26. P. 185 of this edition.
+27. Ibid.
+28. P. 2 of this edition.
+29. Ibid.
+30. P. 29 of this edition.
+31. Pp. 43 and 6o of this edition.
+32. P. 118 of this edition.
+33. Pp. 100, 101, 104, and 118 of this edition.
+
+in the Presem
+Herlinde Pauer-Studer, ed., Conserucions of Practical Reason: Philosophical Talks
+Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given That: Toward « Phenomenology of Givenness
+lan Balfour, The Rhetoric of Romantic Prophecy
+Martin Stokhof, World and Life as One: Ethics and Ontology in Wittgenstein's
+Early Thought
+Gianni Vattimo, Nietzsche: An Introduction
+Jacques Derrida, Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971-1998, ed.
+Elizabeth Rottenberg
+Brett Levinson, The Ends of Literature: The Latin American "Boom" in the
+Neoliberal Marketplace
+Timothy J. Reiss, Against Autonomy: Cultural Instruments, Mutualities, and the
+Fictive Imagination
+Hent de Vries and Samuel Weber, eds., Religion and Media
+Niklas Luhmann, Theories of Distinction: Re-Describing the Descriptions of
+Modernity, ed. and introd. William Rasch
+Johannes Fabian, Anthropology with an Attitude: Critical Essays
+Michel Henry, 1 am che Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity
+Gil Anidjar, "Our Place in Al-Andalus": Kabbalah, Philosophy, Literature in Aral
+Jewish Letters
+Hélène Cixous and Jacques Derrida, Veils
+F. RAnkersmir, Historical Representation
+F. R. Ankersmit, Political Representation
+Elissa Marder, Dead Time: Temporal Disorders in the Wake of Modernity
+(Baudelaire and Flaubert)
+Reinhart Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing
+Concepts
+Niklas Luhmann, The Kralisy of else Mass Medi
+
+Hubert Damisch, A Childhood Memory by Piero della Francesca
+Hubert Damisch, A Theory of /Cloudl: Toward a History of Painting
+Jean-Luc Nancy, The Speculative Remark: (One of Hegel's bon mots)
+Jean-François Lyotard, Soundproof Room: Malraux's Anti-Aesthetics
+Jan Patocka, Plato and Europe
+Hubert Damisch, Skyline: The Narcissistic City
+Isabel Hoving, In Praise of New Travelers: Reading Caribbean Migrant Women Writers
+Richard Rand, ed., Futures: Of Jacques Derrida
+William Rasch, Niklas Lubmann's Modernity: The Paradoxes of Differentiation
+Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle, Of Hospitality
+Jean-François Lyorard, The Confession of Augustine
+Kaja Silverman, World Spectators
+Samuel Weber, Institution and Interpretation: Expanded Edition
+Jeffrey S. Librett, The Rhetoric of Cultural Dialogue: Jews and Germans in the
+Epoch of Emancipation
+Ulrich Baer, Remnants of Song: Trauma and the Experience of Modernity in
+Charles Baudelaire and Paul Celan
+Samuel C. Wheeler III, Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy
+David S. Ferris, Silent Urns: Romanticism, Hellenism, Modernity
+Rodolphe Gasché, Of Minimal Things: Studies on the Notion of Relation
+Sarah Winter, Freud and the Instilution of Psychoanalyric Knowledge
+Samuel Weber, The Legend of Freud: Expanded Edition
+Aris Fioretos, ed., The Solid Letter: Readings of Friedrich Hölderlin
+J. Hillis Miller / Manuel Asensi, Black Holes / J. Hillis Miller; or, Boustrophedonic
+Reading
+Miryam Sas, Fault Lines: Cultural Memory and Japanese Surrealism
+Peter Schwenger, Fantasm and Fiction: On Textual Envisioning
+Didier Maleuvre, Museum Memories: History, Technology, Art
+Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other; o, The Prosthesis of Origin
+Andrew Baruch Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and
+Culiaral Politics in Yugoslavia
+Niklas Luhmann, Love as Passion: The Codification of Intimacy
+Micke Bal, ed., The Practice of Cultura, Analysis: Exposing Interdisciplinary
+Interprecacion
+Jacques Derrida and Gianni Varrimo, eds., Religion
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/75e86a34029669e4db655ee8a2bfee239f3b50e0e37e73bd4361c18cf04e308b.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/75e86a34029669e4db655ee8a2bfee239f3b50e0e37e73bd4361c18cf04e308b.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9f718b9bd4371a2b15976c8d476f962f0138aa6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/75e86a34029669e4db655ee8a2bfee239f3b50e0e37e73bd4361c18cf04e308b.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -9677,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "75e86a34029669e4db655ee8a2bfee239f3b50e0e37e73bd4361c18cf04e308b",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 2061,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "1a810f96eeef5a76332a7d01ce049d1f639ab34e358eb5f787cf88674af98caf",
+  "output_sha256": "6a04c11085b607b7655100a4b133b8dfa134ef93a64ed9514756e2b1a991f3dd",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/77381f4ae92411ffc55c33d0c1d4b225500abda93ffa0505877db8e976c6e7e4.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/77381f4ae92411ffc55c33d0c1d4b225500abda93ffa0505877db8e976c6e7e4.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c6eb0a303ded5db481d92e8a18baa9dd242a3ae4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/77381f4ae92411ffc55c33d0c1d4b225500abda93ffa0505877db8e976c6e7e4.md
@@ -0,0 +1,26189 @@
+PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED
+PROCESSING
+Explorations in
+ognition
+Polume 2: Psycholoplcht and Biological Modes
+JAMES L. MCCLECLAND, PAVID E RUMELHART 2)
+AND THE POP RESEARCH GROOP
+
+file:///C|/New%20Text%20Document.txt
+lable of Contents
+Preface to Volume 2
+Addresses of the PDP Research Group
+IV PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+14 Schemata and Sequential Thought Processes in PDP Models
+D.E. Rumelhart, P. Smolensky, J.L. McClelland, and G.E. Hinton
+15 Interactive Processes in Speech Perception: The TRACE Model
+J.L. McClelland and J.L. Elman
+16 The Programmable Blackboard Model of Reading
+J.L. McClelland
+17 A Distributed Model of Human Learning and Memory
+J.L. McClelland and D.E. Rumelhart
+18 On Learning the Past Tenses of English Verbs
+D.E. Rumelhart and J.L. McClelland
+19 Mechanisms of Sentence Processing: Assigning Roles to Constituents
+J.L. McClelland and A.H. Kawamoto
+V BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+20 Certain Aspects of the Anatomy and Physiology of the Cerbral Cortex
+file:///C|/New%20Text%20Document.txt (1 of 2)9/25/2008 5:08:55 PM
+
+file:///C//New%20Text%20Document.txt
+F.H.C. Crick and C. Asanuma
+21 Open Questions About Computation in Cerebral Cortex
+T.J. Sejnowski
+22 Neural and Conceptual Interpretation of PDP Models
+P. Smolensky
+23 Biologically Plausible Models of Place Recognition and Goal Location
+D. Zipser
+24 State-Dependent Factors Influencing Neural Plasticity: A Partial Account of the Critical Period
+P. W. Munro
+25 Amnesia and Distributed Memory
+J.L. McClelland and D.E. Rumelhart
+VI CONCLUSION
+26 Reflections on Cognition and Parallel Distributed Processing
+D.A. Norman
+Future Directions
+References
+Index
+file:///C|/New%20Text%20Document.txt (2 of 2)9/25/2008 5:08:55 PM
+
+Preface
+The chapters in this volume continue the explorations of parallel distributed processing that we began in Volume I. The accompanying
+table lays out the organization of both volumes.
+. Part IV, which begins
+this volume, presents parallel distributed processing (PDP) models of
+psychological processes, and Part V explores the biological mechanisms
+of parallel distributed processing in the brain. Part VI provides a brief
+retrospective discussion of the whole book and our thoughts about
+future directions.
+The various parts of this book are interrelated, but they can generally
+be read in any order, and indeed most of the chapters can be understood without reference to the rest of the book. However, readers may
+find it useful to read some of the chapters in Part I before delving into
+the specific topics covered in the chapters of Parts IV and V. A discussion of the contents of each chapter and the background that is relevant
+to, it may be found in the introductory section at the beginning of each
+part of the book.
+Primary support for both volumes of the book came from the System
+Development Foundation and the Office of Naval Research. The System Development Foundation has provided direct support for the PDP
+research group through a grant to Norman and Rumelhart, and has also
+supported several of the individual members of the group (Crick, Hinton, Sejnowski, and Zipser). ONR contracts that have contributed support include N00014-79-C-0323, NR 667-437; N00014-85-K-0450, NR
+667-548; and N00014-82-C-0374, NR 667-483.
+Several other sources have contributed to the support of individual
+members of the group. These include the National Institute of Mental
+
+X PREFACE
+A CONDENSED TABLE OF CONTENTS
+VOLUME I
+1. THE PDP PERSPECTIVE II. BASIC MECHANISMS
+1. The Appeal of PDP
+• Competitive Learnin
+2. A Framework for PDP
+• Harmony Theory
+3. Distributed
+• Boltzmann Machine:
+Representations
+. Learning by
+4. General Issues
+Error Propagation
+IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL
+PROCESSES
+14. Schemata and PDP
+15. Speech Perception
+16. Model of Reading
+17. Learning and Memory
+18. Morphology Acquisition
+19. Sentence Processing
+VOLUME II
+V. BIOLOGICAL
+MECHANISMS
+20. Anatomy and
+Physiology
+21. Computation in
+the Brain
+22. Neural and
+Conceptual Levels
+23. Place Recognition
+24. Neural Plasticity
+25. Amnesia
+TIll. FORMAL ANALYSES
+9. Linear Algebra
+10. Activation Functions
+11. The Delta Rule
+12. Resource Requirements
+13. Parallel Network
+Simulator
+VI. CONCLUSION
+26. Reflections
+Future Directions
+Health, through a Career Development Award-PHS-MH-00385-10
+McClelland and postdoctoral fellowships to Paul Smolensky and Paul
+Munro under Grant PHS-MH-14268 to the Center for Human Information Processing at UCSD. Smolensky received support in the form of a
+fellowship from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and some of
+McClelland's work was supported by a grant from the National Science
+Foundation (BNS-79-24062). These and other sources of support for
+specific individuals or projects are acknowledged in the appropriate
+chapters.
+Once again we would like to acknowledge the support of the Institute
+for Cognitive Science at UCSD and of all of the people at UCSD and
+elsewhere who have helped us bring this work to completion. These
+people are mentioned individually in the acknowledgments section of
+Volume 1, which applies to both volumes.
+December 1985
+David E. Rumelhart
+LA JOLLA, CALIFORNIA
+PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA
+
+Addresses of the PDP Research Group
+Chisato Asanuma
+Francis H. C. Crick
+Jeffrey L. Elman
+Geoffrey E. Hinton
+Michael I. Jordan
+Alan H. Kawamoto
+Salk Institute
+P.O. Box 85800
+San Diego, CA 92138
+Salk Institute
+P.O. Box 85800
+San Diego, CA 92138
+Department of Linguistics
+University of California, San Diego
+La Jolla, CA 92093
+Department of Computer Science
+Carnegie-Mellon University
+Pittsburgh, PA 15213
+Department of Computer and
+Information Science
+University of Massachusetts
+Amherst, MA 01003
+Department of Psychology
+Carnegie-Mellon University
+Pittsburgh, PA 15213
+
+Xii ADDRESSES OF THE PDP RESEARCH GROUP
+Paul W. Munro
+Donald A. Norman
+Daniel E. Rabin
+David E. Rumelhart
+Terrence J. Sejnowski
+Paul Smolensky
+Gregory O. Stone
+Ronald J. Williams
+David Zipser
+Department of Psychology
+Carnegie-Mellon University
+Pittsburgh, PA 15213
+Department of Information Science
+University of Pittsburgh
+Pittsburgh, PA 15260
+Institute for Cognitive Science
+University of California, San Diego
+La Jolla, CA 92093
+Intellicorp
+1975 El Camino Real West
+Mountain View, CA 94040
+Institute for Cognitive Science
+University of California, San Diego
+La Jolla, CA 92093
+Department of Biophysics
+Johns Hopkins University
+Baltimore, MD 21218
+Department of Computer Science
+University of Colorado
+Boulder, CO 80309
+Center for Adaptive Systems
+Department of Mathematics
+Boston University
+Boston, MA 02215
+Institute for Cognitive Science
+University of California, San Diego
+La Jolla, CA 92093
+Insitute for Cognitive Science
+University of California, San Diego
+La Jolla, CA 92093
+
+PART IV
+The chapters in this section are designed to show how parallel distributed processing has changed the way we think about the mechanisms of
+cognition. Each chapter describes a model of some mental process.
+Each shows how the model captures some basic aspects of the process.
+And each offers an alternative to other, earlier ways of thinking about
+aspects of the process.
+The models described in these chapters were motivated by a number
+of different considerations. Quite often, they were motivated by the
+feeling that parallel distributed processing mechanisms provide a very
+natural and appropriate set of mechanisms for dealing with some aspect
+of cognition that has not been dealt with successfully by other
+approaches. Quite often, they were motivated by an attempt to meet
+computational challenges posed by the processes they address.
+quite often, they were motivated by attempts to extend the domain of
+PDP models, to encompass processes and phenomena we did not know
+how to model at the outset.
+The first chapter of the section, Chapter 14, explains how parallel
+distributed processing can take us beneath the surface of schemata, to a
+level of description that allows us to see how we can preserve the desirable characteristics of schemata and at the same time make them more
+flexible, more sensitive to context, more adaptable. This chapter also
+begins to show how PDP mechanisms can be used as the building
+blocks from which we may construct sequential thought processes, such
+as problem solving.
+
+2 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+The next two chapters consider issues in perception. Chapter 15
+presents a model of speech perception and shows how it provides a unified framework for capturing a number of aspects of speech. Here, the
+goal was to develop a model that accounts in detail for psychological
+data on the process of speech perception and, at the same time, to
+begin to deal with several computational problems that make the extension of PDP models to speech a challenging and stimulating task. The
+model introduces a processing structure called the Trace, a dynamic
+working memory, in which units that stand for hypotheses about the
+contents of an utterance at different points in time can interact.
+The
+parallel distributed processing that occurs in the Trace allows the model
+to account for contextual influences on phoneme identification, and the
+simple competitive interactions among hypotheses representing competing interpretations of the same portion of an utterance allow the model
+to segment and identify the words in an utterance in a simple and
+integrated fashion. The model accounts for a wide range of data in a
+direct and coherent way, and shows how PDP mechanisms offer new
+ways of interpreting several phenomena, such as categorical perception
+and the perception of phonologically regular nonwords.
+The model described in Chapter 15 purchases its parallel processing
+capabilities by duplicating the same hardware to cover each time-slice of
+the Trace. This idea seems incorrect; in general, it seems more plausible to view the Trace not as a fixed processing structure, but as one
+that is dynamically configured
+I in the course of processing, using
+knowledge of contingencies between hypotheses to construct the Trace
+on the fly. Chapter 16 develops a model called the Programmable
+Blackboard Model of Reading (PABLO for short) that does just this,
+though for printed, as opposed to spoken input. This model is based
+on the idea of connection information distribution -roughly, the idea is to
+use information stored in one part of a processing system to set or program connections in another part of the same system. Two related
+simulation models based on this idea are applied to a number of aspects
+of reading that could not be addressed by the interactive activation
+model of word recognition, which was described in Chapter 1.
+Neither TRACE nor PABLO really extend above the word level to
+deal with the larger syntactic and semantic structures that organize
+words into sentences; these levels are considered in Chapter 19, which
+we will describe a bit more below.
+Chapters 17 and 18 describe distributed models of different aspects
+of learning and memory. Chapter 3 (on Distributed Representations)
+provides useful background for these chapters, as well as for Chapter
+19. Chapter 17 considers an existing dilemma for models of
+memory-whether to store summary representations in memory or
+whether to store an enumeration of specific experiences. The chapter
+
+INTRODUCTION TO PART IV 3
+points out that with distributed representations, you can have it both
+ways. In the model, the (long-term) memory trace of an event is the
+change or increment to the connections that results from the event.
+Functional equivalents of summary representations (e.g., prototypes)
+emerge naturally from the superimposition of memory traces of specific
+events. Traces of recent or often-repeated events can coexist with the
+summary representation. The chapter also illustrates that the same composite memory trace can learn several different prototypes from exemplars, without ever being informed-and indeed, without having to "figure out"- which exemplars belong to each category. The model uses
+the delta rule (examined in Chapters 2, 8, and 11) for adjusting connection strengths and has some advantages over some distributed
+memory models, but it contains no hidden units, and so is not capable
+of overcoming what we call the "linear predictability constraint" on the
+set of patterns it can learn. At the end of the chapter, we illustrate
+with a simple example simulation how the model can be extended with
+hidden units that are trained with the aid of the generalized delta rule
+discussed in Chapter 8.
+Chapter 18 draws out some other implications of distributed models
+of learning and memory. It considers how knowledge underlying the
+lawful use of language might be represented in a PDP model and how
+that knowledge might be acquired. More generally, it shows how distributed representations provide an alternative to the conventional view
+that linguistic knowledge is represented in the form of explicit (though
+inaccessible) rules. The chapter considers a paradigm case of rule
+learning from the language acquisition literature-the acquisition of the
+past tense by children acquiring English as their first language. This
+case is often cited as an instance of rule acquisition par excellence
+because of the fact that children "regularize" irregular verbs at one
+stage, often saying "goed," for example. The model we describe in this
+chapter exhibits this and many other aspects of the acquisition process,
+and it does this by using very simple learning mechanisms. Lawful
+behavior emerges from the superposition of changes to connection
+strengths. The representation of the rules of past-tense formation is
+implicit in the resulting connection strengths and is acquired without
+the aid of any device that relies on the formulation and testing of
+explicit but inaccessible rules.
+Many of the chapters we have been describing deal with aspects of
+language, but none of them get much beyond the processing of individual words. Does this indicate that PDP models are inappropriate for
+capturing higher levels of language structure and processing? We think
+not. Indeed, one of our goals has been to work toward the development of PDP models of sentence processing. As Chapter 19 indicates,
+much of the groundwork has now been laid. That chapter describes a
+
+4
+distributed model that brings the benefits of parallel distributed processing to the processing of simple sentences, and shows how a PDP
+network can be configured to produce a representation that can capture
+the underlying case structure of simple sentences. The model exhibits
+a number of very nice properties. It can assign arguments of sentences
+to the appropriate case roles based on word-order information, based on
+the mutual selectional constraints imposed by the different words in the
+sentence, and based on word-order and mutual constraints working
+together; it can choose the appropriate "case frame" for a verb on the
+basis of the content and configuration of the arguments in the sentence; it can choose the appropriate reading of a semantically ambiguous word based on constraints imposed by the other arguments in the
+sentence; it can fill in default values for missing arguments; and it can
+generalize its case-role assignments to novel verbs if it is given a
+representation of some of the semantic features of the verb. The
+model has not yet reached the stage where it can process sentences with
+embedded clauses, but we suggest three ways in which it might be
+extended to do so, including one that relies on the use of the connection information distribution mechanism described in Chapter 16 and
+one that involves "true" recursion. These suggestions indicate that
+PDP mechanisms are capable of processing recursively defined structures, contrary to prevalent belief.
+Similarities and Differences Between Models
+Each of the models described in these chapters differs in detail from
+all of the others. One model uses continuous-valued, asynchronous
+units; several others use continuous, sychronous units; still others use
+stochastic units. In some models, activation values can range from 1 to
+- 1; in others, they can only range from 1 to 0, or slightly below 0. All
+the models, however, are examples of the class of PDP models, as
+described in Chapter 2, and their minor differences are in most cases
+incidental to their behavior. Where these detailed assumptions seem to
+make a difference, we point it out, but in general, we do not think that
+much hinges on these differences.
+One characteristic that differentiates some of the models from the
+others requires some comment: The models in Chapters 15 and 16 use
+local representations, while the models in the other chapters use distributed representations. Even this does not reflect a fundamental difference in the philosophy of the models; rather, they reflect differences in
+the points we wanted to make and the issues we wanted to raise in the
+different chapters. In fact, we believe that both the TRACE model and
+
+INTRODUCTION TO PART IV
+5
+the models described in Chapter 16 could be made more efficient by
+the use of distributed rather than local representations, for reasons discussed in Chapters 3 and 12. It is also true that nearly all of the
+models can be seen as either local or distributed, depending on one's
+point of view. They are local, in the sense that each unit generally
+stands for a particular conceptual object or feature, or perhaps a (coarse
+coded) conjunction of features. They are distributed, in the sense that
+any given stimulus object—a phoneme, a word, a sentence, a sceneproduces a pattern of activation over a very large number of units.
+Whether we see the models as distributed or local is primarily a matter
+of whether we are looking at the forest or the trees.
+Stepping Stones
+Most of the models we present represent the result of a long series
+of explorations. In some cases, we learned a great deal from our earlier
+attempts, and the problems we had with them lead natually to better
+formulations. In other cases, our early attempts were failures we did
+not know at first how to overcome. For example, an early version of
+the model of past tense learning could be made to produce overgeneralization errors, but it could only process verbs consisting of a consonant,
+a vowel, and a consonant. It took us two years to formulate a better
+representation.
+We think the models we describe in these chapters demonstrate progress in the development of PDP models of psychological processes.
+But none of the models is the final word. Each model has its
+weaknesses, as well as its strengths.
+We have not solved all the problems; rather, we have suggested an approach that shows promise of
+leading us closer to their solution. We offer these models in that spirit:
+as stepping stones along the way to a deeper understanding of the
+microstructure of cognition.
+
+CHAPTER 14
+Schemata and
+Sequential Thought Processes in PDP Models
+D. E. RUMELHART, P. SMOLENSKY, J. L. McCLELLAND
+and G. E. HINTON
+One of our goals for this book is to offer an alternative framework
+for viewing cognitive phenomena. We have argued that talk at the
+level of units and activations of units is the preferable way to describe
+discussing cognitive phenomena. In this chapter we wish to address the
+relationship between some of the key established concepts and our
+parallel distributed processing models. There are many important concepts from modern cognitive science which must be explicated in our
+framework. Perhaps the most important, however, is the concept of
+the schema or related concepts such as scripts, frames, and so on.
+These large scale data structures have been posited as playing critical
+roles in the interpretation of input data, the guiding of action, and the
+storage of knowledge in memory. Indeed, as we have argued elsewhere
+(cf. Rumelhart, 1980), the schema has, for many theorists, become the
+basic building block of our understanding of cognition. Yet, the PDP
+language we are proposing is devoid of terms such as schemata, scripts,
+frames, and so forth. Instead, we have proposed building blocks at a
+much more microlevel-at the level of units, activations, and similar
+"low-level" concepts. Interestingly, it was struggling with the concept
+of the schema and some of its difficulties that led one of us (DER) to
+an exploration of PDP models to begin with. It was therefore with
+
+8
+some priority that we began to develop an interpretation of the schema
+in the language of parallel distributed processing.'
+Perhaps the first thought that comes to mind is to map the notion of
+the schema onto the notion of the unit. This does, indeed, capture
+some of the important aspects of the schema.
+In particular, the unit is
+an element, like the schema, which monitors its inputs searching for a
+good fit and takes on a value which represents how well its inputs fits
+its own internal criteria. However, such an identification misses much
+of what makes the schema a powerful conceptual tool. In particular,
+there is no analog to the variable or default values. There is no notion
+of the internal structure of the schema nor many of the other important
+aspects of schemata. Moreover, the scale is wrong. Schema theorists
+talk of schemata for rooms, stories, restaurants, birthday parties, and
+many other high-level concepts. In our parallel distributed processing
+models, units do not tend to represent such complex concepts. Instead,
+units correspond to relatively simple features or as Hinton (198la) calls
+them microfeatures. If we are to do justice to the concept of the
+schema, we are going to have to look beyond the individual unit. We
+are going to have to look for schemata as properties of entire networks
+rather than single units or small circuits. In the following sections we
+show how features of networks can capture the important features of
+schemata. Since our interpretation is clearest in the subset of PDP
+models that can be characterized as constraint satisfaction networks, it
+will be useful to first describe that class of models and provide a
+language for talking about their properties.
+PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING MODELS AS
+CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION NETWORKS
+It is often useful to conceptualize a parallel distributed processing
+network as a constraint network in which each unit represents a
+hypothesis of some sort (e.g., that a certain semantic feature, visual
+feature, or acoustic feature is present in the input) and in which each
+connection represents constraints among the hypotheses. Thus, for
+example, if feature B is expected to be present whenever feature A is,
+1 All of the authors have contributed to the ideas expressed in this chapter.
+Smolensky's slightly different framework is sketched in Chapter 6. Hinton's view of the
+microstructure of symbols is sketched in J. A. Anderson and Hinton (1981, pp. 29-32),
+and McClelland (1981) shows how PDP networks can be employed to fill default values
+(see the discussion in Chapter 1). While we all agree with the flavor of the current discussion not all of us endorse the exact details.
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT 9
+there should be a positive connection from the unit corresponding to
+the hypothesis that A is present to the unit representing the hypothesis
+that B is present. Similarly, if there is a constraint that whenever A is
+present B is expected not to be present, there should be a negative connection from A to B. If the constraints are weak, the weights should be
+small.
+If the constraints are strong, then the weights should be large.
+Similarly, the inputs to such a network can also be thought of as constraints.
+A positive input to a particular unit means that there is evidence from the outside that the relevant feature is present. A negative
+input means that there is evidence from the outside that the feature is
+not present. The stronger the input, the greater the evidence. If such
+a network is allowed to run it will eventually settle into a locally optimal
+state in which as many as possible of the constraints are satisfied, with
+priority given to the strongest constraints. 2 The procedure whereby
+such a system settles into such a state is called relaxation. We speak of
+the system relaxing to a solution. Thus, a large class of PDP models,
+including the interactive activation model of word perception, are constraint satisfaction models which settle on locally optimal solutions
+through the process of relaxation.
+Figure 1 shows an example of a simple 16-unit constraint network.
+Each unit in the network represents a hypothesis concerning a vertex in
+a line drawing of a Necker cube. 3 The network consists of two interconnected subnetworks-one corresponding to each of the two global
+interpretations of the Necker cube. Each unit in each network is
+assumed to receive input from the region of the input figure-the
+cube-corresponding to its location in the network. Each unit in the
+Figure is labeled with a three letter sequence indicating whether its vertex is hypothesized to be front or back (F or B), upper or lower (U or
+L), and right or left (R or L). Thus, for example, the lower left-hand
+unit of each subnetwork is assumed to receive input from the lower
+left-hand vertex of the input figure. The unit in the left-hand network
+represents the hypothesis that it is receiving input from a lower lefthand vertex in the front surface of the cube (and is thus labeled FLL),
+whereas the one in the right subnetwork represents the hypothesis that
+it is receiving input from a lower left vertex in the back surface (BLL).
+2 Actually, these systems will in general find a locally best solution to this constraint
+satisfaction problem. It is possible under some conditions to insure that the "globally"
+best solution is found through the use of stochastic elements and a process of annealing
+(cf. Chapters 6 and 7 for a further discussion).
+3 J. A. Feldman (1981) has proposed an analysis of the Necker cube problem with a
+somewhat different network. Although the networks are rather different, the principles
+are the same. Our intention here is not to provide a serious account of the Necker cube
+phenomena, but rather to illustrate constraint networks with a simple example.
+
+10
+FUL
+BUL-BUA
+- FUR BUL
+→ FUR
+FLL)
+(BLL.
+-(FLR
+-BLA
+ELL+
+→(FLR
+BLL)BLA)
+FIGURE 1. A simple network representing some of the constraints involved in perceiving the Necker cube.
+Since there is a constraint that each vertex has a single interpretation,
+these two units are connected by a strong negative connection. Since
+the interpretation of any given vertex is constrained by the interpretations of its neighbors, each unit in a subnetwork is connected positively
+with each of its neighbors within the network. Finally, there is the constraint that there can only be one vertex of a single kind (e.g., there
+can only be one lower left vertex in the front plane FLL). There is a
+strong negative connection between units representing the same label in
+each subnetwork. Thus, each unit has three neighbors connected positively, two competitors connected negatively, and one positive input
+from the stimulus. For purposes of this example, the strengths of connections have been arranged so that two negative inputs exactly balance
+three positive inputs. Further, it is assumed that each unit receives an
+excitatory input from the ambiguous stimulus pattern and that each of
+these excitatory influences is relatively small. Thus, if all three of a
+unit's neighbors are on and both of its competitors are on, these effects
+would entirely cancel out one another; and if there was a small input
+from the outside, the unit would have a tendency to come on. On the
+other hand, if fewer than three of its neighbors were on and both of its
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT 1]
+competitors were on, the unit would have a tendency to turn off, even
+with an excitatory input from the stimulus pattern.
+In the last paragraph we focused on the individual units of the networks. However, it is often useful to focus not on the units, but on
+entire states of the network. In the case of binary (on-off or 0-1) units,
+there is a total of 216 possible states in which this system could reside.
+That is, in principle, each of the 16 units could have the value either O
+or 1. In the case of continuous units, in which each unit can take on
+any value between 0 and 1, the system can, in principle, take on any of
+an infinite number of states. Yet, because of the constraints built into
+the network, there are only a few of those states in which the system
+will settle. To see this, consider the case in which the units are updated
+asynchronously, one at a time. During each time slice, one of the units
+is chosen to update. If its net input exceeds 0 its value will be pushed
+toward 1, otherwise its value will be pushed toward 0, using the activation rule from the word perception model:
+net; (1 - aj (t)) net; > 0
+aj (t + 1) = a; (t) +
+net; a; (t)
+otherwise.
+Here, a; (t) stands for the activation of unit j at time t, and net, (t)
+stands for the net input to unit j at t. net; (t) is simply the sum of the
+excitatory and inhibitory influences on unit j:
+e; (t) +
+izj
+where e, (t) is the external input to unit j at t and wii is the weight on
+the connection to unit j from unit i.
+Imagine that the system starts with all units off. A unit is then
+chosen at random to be updated. Since it is receiving a slight positive
+input from the stimulus and no other inputs, it will be given a positive
+activation value. Then another unit is chosen to update. Unless it is in
+direct competition with the first unit, it too will be turned on. Eventually, a coalition of neighboring units will be turned on. These units will
+tend to turn on more of their neighbors in the same subnetwork and
+turn off their competitors in the other subnetwork. The system will
+(almost always) end up in a situation in which all of the units in one
+subnetwork are fully activated and none of the units in the other subnetwork are activated. That is, the system will end up interpreting the
+Necker cube as either facing left or facing right. Whenever the system
+gets into a state and stays there, the state is called a stable state or a
+fixed point of the network
+Figure 2 shows the output of three runs of a simulation based on this
+network. The size of the square indicates the activation values of each
+
+12
+Run 1
+Left Right
+Subnet Subnet
+Run 2
+Left
+Right
+Subnet Subnet
+Run 3
+Left
+Right
+Subnet
+Subnet
+•.
+Time
+C
+Interpretations
+FIGURE 2. Three runs of a simulation based on this network. The size of the square
+indicates the activation value of each unit. The units are arranged in the shape of the subnetwork with each square shown in its position corresponding to the vertex of the cube
+from which it is receiving input. The states are shown after every second update.
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT 13
+unit. The units are arranged in the shape of the subnetwork with each
+square shown in its position corresponding to the vertex of the cube
+from which it is receiving input. The system begins with a zero activation value on all units-represented by single dots. Then, once each
+time slice, at most one unit is changed. On each run the system winds
+up in a state in which each unit has a value of either 0 or 1 (designated
+by a large square). The first two runs are most typical of the system.
+In this case, the inputs are low relative to the strength of the constraints among units. When low inputs are involved, the system virtually always winds up either in the state in which all of the units in the
+left-hand network are turned on and all of the units in the right-hand
+are off or vice versa. These final stable states correspond to the
+interpretations of a left-facing and right-facing cube as illustrated in the
+figure for the first and second run respectively. The third example of
+simulation results is much more aberrant and was generated with a high
+input value. With a high input value, the system can occasionally get a
+third interpretation of the Necker cube. This is the "impossible" cube
+with two front faces illustrated in the figure. Thus, of the 216 possible
+states of the system, only two are ever reached with low input values
+and only three are ever reached at all. The constraints implicit in the
+pattern of connections among the units determines the set of possible
+stable states of the system and therefore the set of possible interpretations of the inputs.
+Hopfield (1982) has shown that it is possible to give a general
+account of the behavior of systems such as this one (with symmetric
+weights and asynchronous updates). In particular, Hopfield has shown
+that such systems can be conceptualized as minimizing a global measure
+which he calls the energy of the system through a method of gradient
+descent or, equivalently, maximizing the constraints satisfied through a
+method of hill climbing. In particular, Hopfield has shown that the system operates in such a way as to always move from a state that satisfies
+fewer constraints to a state that satisfies more constraints, where the
+measure of constraint satisfaction is given by4
+G(t) = 22 Wija, (1)a, (1) + L input, (1) a, (1).
+4 Note, the question of what to call this constraint satisfaction function is difficult.
+Hopfield uses the negation of this function and, by analogy to thermodynamics, calls it
+energy. This system can thus be said to settle into states of minimum energy. Similarly,
+Hinton and Sejnowski (Chapter 7) use the same terminology. Smolensky (Chapter 6)
+has a similar function which he calls harmony to emphasize that increasing values
+correspond to more harmonious accounts of the inputs. In this chapter we have chosen
+to use the language of constraint satisfaction and call the function G for measure of the
+goodness-of-fit of the state to its constraints.
+
+14 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+Essentially, the equation says that the overall goodness-of-fit is given
+by the sum of the degrees to which each pair of units contribute to the
+goodness plus the degree to which the units satisfy the input constraints. The contribution of a pair of units is given by the product of
+their activation values times the weights connecting them. Thus, if the
+weight is positive, each unit wants to be as active as possible-that is,
+the activation values for these two units should be pushed toward 1. If
+the weight is negative, then as least one of the units should be 0 to
+maximize the pairwise goodness. Similarly, if the input constraint for a
+given unit is positive, then its contribution to the total goodness-of-fit
+is maximized by being the activation of that unit toward its maximal
+value. If it is negative, the activation value should be decreased toward
+0. Of course, the constraints will generally not be totally consistent.
+Sometimes a given unit may have to be turned on to increase the function in some ways while decreasing it in other ways. The point is that it
+is the sum of all of these individual contributions that the system seeks
+to maximize. Thus, for every state of the system-every possible pattern of activation over the units-the pattern of inputs and the connectivity matrix W determines a value of the goodness-of-fit function.
+The system processes its input by moving upward from state to adjacent
+state until it reaches a state of maximum goodness. When it reaches
+such a stable state or fixed point it will stay in that state and it can be
+said to have "settled" on a solution to the constraint satisfaction problem or alternatively, in our present case, "settled into an interpretation"
+of the input
+It is important to see, then, that entirely local computational operations, in which each unit adjusts its activation up or down on the basis
+of its net input, serve to allow the network to converge towards states
+that maximize a global measure of goodness or degree of constraint
+satisfaction. Hopfield's main contribution to our present analysis was
+to point out this basic fact about the behavior of networks with symmetrical connections and asynchronous update of activations.
+In general, since there are so many states, it is difficult to visualize
+the goodness-of-fit function over which the system is moving. In the
+present case, however, we can get a reasonably good image of this
+landscape. To begin, we can limit our consideration to those states in
+which a particular unit is either on or off since the system always ends
+up in such states.
+We can consider the states arrayed along two dimensions. One dimension corresponds to the number of units turned on in
+the left subnetwork and the other dimension corresponds to the
+number of units turned on in the right subnetwork. Thus, at (0,0) we
+locate the state in which no units are turned on. Clearly, by the above
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT 15
+equation such a state will have zero goodness of fit. S At (8,8) we have
+the state in which all of the units are turned on. At location (8,0) we
+have the state in which the units on the left network are all turned on
+and those on the right network are all off. At position (0,8) we have
+the state in which those in the left network are all off and those in the
+right network are all on. Each of those locations contain unique states.
+Now, consider the location (1,0) in which one unit from the left subnetwork and zero units in the right subnetwork are turned on. There
+are eight different states, corresponding to the eight different units in
+the left subnetwork that might have been turned on. In order to plot
+the goodness-of-fit landscape for this state space, we have plotted only
+the states at each location of the two-dimensional space with highest
+goodness-of-fit-i.e., the best state at each location. Figure 3 shows
+the landscape. In the figure, we are viewing the goodness landscape
+from about the (0,0) corner, the start state. Thus, the peak to the right
+corresponds to the goodness of the state in which all of the units in the
+left subnetwork are turned on and all in the right subnetwork are
+turned off. The peak at the upper left portion of the figure
+goodness
+(0,8)
+(8,0)
+(0,0)
+# of units on
+in left subnetwork
+FIGURE 3. The goodness-of-fit surface for the Necker-cube network. The low point at
+the (0,0) corner corresponds to the start state. The peaks on the right and left
+correspond to the standard interpretations of the Necker cube, and the peak in the center
+corresponds to the impossible Necker cube illustrated in the previous figure.
+5 Note, zero goodness-of-fit is not the minimum goodness-of-fit attainable. In general,
+goodness-of-fit can be negative as well as positive.
+When there is negative goodness-offit, the system can always be made better by turning off all of the units.
+
+16 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+corresponds to the state (0,8). The two peaks in the graph at (8,0) and
+(0,8) correspond to the two primary interpretations of the Necker cube.
+It should be clear that if we start a system at (0,0) and allow it to "hill
+climb" it will almost always end up at one of these two peaks. It might
+be noted, that there are three smaller peaks right in the middle of the
+surface. These local peaks are very hard to get to because the system is
+almost always swept from the start state uphill to one of the two major
+peaks. It is possible, by having large input values, to reach location
+(4,4). This peak corresponds to the impossible Necker cube illustrated
+in the previous figure.
+The input to the system can be conceptualized as systematically
+modifying or sculpting the goodness landscape. This effect is illustrated
+in Figure 4. In this case, the same landscape has been plotted, except
+the units corresponding to the interpretation of the Necker cube as
+facing to the left receive more input than the corresponding units on
+the other subnetwork. (This could perhaps be done by slightly shading
+that face of the Necker cube.) What we see is a "sloping" goodness surface with the peak associated with the interpretation of the Necker cube
+as left facing.
+To summarize, then, there is a large subset of parallel distributed
+processing models which can be considered constraint satisfaction
+models. These networks can be described as carrying out their information processing by climbing into states of maximal satisfaction of the
+goodness
+(0,8)
+(8,0)
+(0,0)
+FIGURE 4. The distortions of the goodness landscape when a large input is given to the
+units corresponding to the front face of a left-facing cube. The figure shows only one
+major peak corresponding to the view of the left-facing cube.
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT 17
+constraints implicit in the network. A very useful concept that arises
+from this way of viewing these networks is that we can describe the
+behavior of these networks, not only in terms of the behavior of individual units, but in terms of properties of the network itself. A primary concept for understanding these network properties
+is the
+goodness-of-fit landscape over which the system moves. Once we have
+correctly described this landscape we have described the operational
+properties of the system-it will process information by moving uphill
+toward goodness maxima. The particular maximum that the system
+will find is determined by where the system starts and by the distortions of the space induced by the input. One of the very important
+descriptors of a goodness landscape is the set of maxima which the system can find, the size of the region that feeds into each maximum, and
+the height of the maximum itself. The states themselves correspond to
+possible interpretations, the peaks in the space correspond to the best
+interpretations, the extent of the foothills or skirts surrounding a particular peak determines the likelihood of finding the peak, and the height
+of the peak corresponds to the degree that the constraints of the network are actually met or, alternatively, to the goodness of the interpretation associated with the corresponding state.
+CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION AND SCHEMATA
+In the previous section we recounted a perspective on parallel distributed processing systems.
+In this section we address, again, the nature
+of the schema and relate it to constraint satisfaction systems and PDP
+models. We will proceed by first recounting some of the history of the
+concept of schemata, then by offering an interpretation of the schema
+in terms of PDP models, by giving a simple example, and finally showing how the various properties attributed to schemata are, in fact, properties of the PDP networks of the kind we have been discussing.
+The schema, throughout its history, has been a concept shrouded in
+mystery. Kant's (1787/1963) use of the term has been provocative but
+difficult to understand. Bartlett's (1932) usage has long been decried
+for its vagueness. Piaget (1952) used the term schema, but it was difficult to come up with a consistent interpretation of Piaget's own views
+on the matter. Throughout most of its history, the notion of the
+schema has been rejected by mainstream experimental psychologists as
+being too vague. As a result, the concept of the schema was largely
+shunned until the mid-1970s. The concept was then revived by an
+attempt to offer a more clearly specified interpretation of the schema in
+
+18 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+terms of explicitly specified computer implementations or, similarly,
+formally specified implementations of the concept. Thus, Minsky
+(1975) postulated the concept of the frame, Schank and Abelson
+(1977) focused on the concept of the script, and Bobrow and Norman
+(1975) and Rumelhart (1975) developed an explicit notion of the
+schema. Although the details differed in each case, the idea was essentially the same. Perhaps Minsky (1975) was clearest in the motivation:
+It seems to me that the ingredients of most theories both in
+artificial intelligence and in psychology have been on the whole
+too minute, local, and unstructured to account-either practically or phenomenologically-for the effectiveness of common
+sense thought. The "chunks" of reasoning, language, memory,
+and "perception" ought to be larger and more structured, and
+their factual and procedural contents must be more intimately
+connected in order to explain the apparent power and speed of
+mental activities. (p. 211)
+Minsky and the others argued that some higher-level "suprasentential" or, more simply, conceptual structure is needed to represent the
+complex relations implicit in our knowledge base. The basic idea is that
+schemata are data structures for representing the generic concepts
+stored in memory. There are schemata for generalized concepts underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions, and
+sequences of actions. Roughly, schemata are like models of the outside
+world. To process information with the use of a schema is to determine which model best fits the incoming information. Ultimately, consistent configurations of schemata are discovered which, in concert,
+offer the best account for the input. This configuration of schemata
+together constitutes the interpretation of the input.
+Different theorists have proposed more or less concrete specifications
+of the exact nature of these higher-level structures, but somehow none
+of them has ever really been adequate.
+None of them ever captured all
+of the qualitative characteristics that schemata were supposed to have.
+For example, a schema is supposed to be a kind of generative thing,
+which is flexible but which can produced highly structured interpretations of events and situations.
+Many representational formats have
+been proposed in an attempt to meet these criteria. For example,
+Rumelhart (1975) chose as a representation for the schema, a notation
+rich in generative capacity, namely, the rewrite rules from generative
+linguistics. Although the generativity of the rewrite rules and the idea
+that the structure is "constructed" in the process of interpretation is
+well captured by the rewrite rules, the nonprocedural character of such
+a system seems wrong. Some more active representation seems
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT 19
+necessary. Moreover, the important notions of "default values," variables, and so forth are poorly represented by the rewrite notation. Minsky (1975) and Schank and Abelson (1977) employed passive data
+structures with slots and explicit default values. These representations
+are better but are not active and seem to lack the flexibility and generativity that the schema requires. Rumelhart (1977) proposed a representation in which schemata are special kinds of procedures. This view
+was most completely explicated in Rumelhart (1980). Attempts to
+build explicit models employing this view, however, have proven
+unsuccessful. The representation is simply too unwieldy.
+It should be clear from the foregoing that there are two distinct ways
+in which the term schema can be used. On the one hand, it is used to
+refer to an idea which is common to the work of Kant, Bartlett, Piaget,
+Minsky, Schank and Abelson, Norman and Bobrow, Rumelhart and
+Ortony, and many others. This is an idea that has evolved over the
+years and through the eyes of many different theorists. Many people
+have sought to clarify and further develop the idea. On the other hand,
+the term schema is used to refer to one of a large number of instantiations of the general idea of the schema. These explicit schema models
+are always only pale representations of the underlying intuitions.
+Whenever a new instantiation of the schema idea is developed, a new
+perspective is offered on the underlying idea. What we hope to do in
+this chapter is to propose an alternative to the conventional representation of the schema and at the same time, through the development of a
+new perspective on schemata, sharpen the idea and develop a system
+which better captures our intuitions of the nature of the human
+information-processing system.
+One important feature of schemata proposed by Rumelhart and
+Ortony (1977) has never actually been included in any implementation
+of the idea. This involves the nature of variable constraints and the
+filling of default values. The variable constraints associated with each
+variable serve two functions. On the one hand, they are important for
+determining whether a particular candidate is an allowable assignment
+for a variable and, if the variable remains unfilled, are used in the
+assignment of a default value. These constraints should not be considered absolute. Rather it was proposed that variable constraints
+should be considered as distributions of possible values. The nearer to
+the mode of the distribution, the better the variable filler.
+Moreover,
+the mode could itself be considered the default value.
+Importantly,
+however, there are interdependencies among the possible slot fillers. If
+one variable is filled with a particular value then it changes the default
+for the other variables. It was therefore proposed that the variable constraints (and the fillers of the default values) should be considered
+multivariate distributions in which the default value for a particular
+
+20 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+variable is determined by the values filling the other slots. This idea
+was difficult to integrate with any of the conventional semantic networks or similar representational formats for schemata. As we shall
+see, this is a central feature of the PDP analog to schemata.
+If schemata are to work as a basis for models of cognitive processing,
+they must be very flexible objects-much more flexible than they really
+ever have been in any actual implementations. This is a sort of
+dilemma. On the one hand, schemata are the structure of the mind.
+On the other hand
+I, schemata must be sufficiently malleable to fit
+around most everything. None of the versions of schemata proposed to
+date have really had these properties. How can we get a highly structured schema which is sufficiently rich to capture the regularities of a
+situation and to support the kinds of inferences that schemata are supposed to support and at the same time is sufficiently pliable to adapt to
+new situations and new configurations of events?
+On our current view, the answer is simple. Schemata are not
+"things." There
+is no representational object which is a schema.
+Rather, schemata emerge at the moment they are needed from the
+interaction of large numbers of much simpler elements all working in
+concert with one another. Schemata are not explicit entities, but rather
+are implicit in our knowledge and are created by the very environment
+that they are trying to interpretas it is interpreting them. ' Roughly,
+the idea is this:
+Input comes into the system, activating a set of units.
+These units are interconnected with one another, forming a sort of constraint satisfaction network. The inputs determine the starting state of
+the system and the exact shape of the goodness-of-fit landscape. The
+system then moves toward one of the goodness maxima.
+When the
+system reaches one of these relatively stable states, there is little tendency for the system to migrate toward another state.
+The states themselves are the product of the interaction among many
+groups of units. Certain groups, or subpatterns of units tend to act in
+concert. They tend to activate one another and, when activated, tend
+to inhibit the same units. It is these coalitions of tightly interconnected
+units that correspond most closely to what have been called schemata.
+The stable pattern as a whole can be considered as a particular configuration of a number of such overlapping patterns and is determined by
+6 Hofstadter (1979) expresses essentially the same view in his book Gödel, Escher, Bach
+when the Anteater says:
+My "symbols" are ACTIVE SUBSYSTEMS of a complex system, and they are composed of lower-level active subsystems ... They are therefore quite different from
+PASSIVE symbols, external to the system, such as letters of the alphabet of musical
+notes, which sit there immobile, waiting for an active system to process them.
+(p. 324)
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT 21
+the dynamic equilibrium of all of these subpatterns interacting with one
+another and with the inputs.
+Thus, the maxima in the goodness-of-fit
+space correspond to interpretations of the inputs or, in the language of
+schemata, configurations of instantiated schemata.
+In short, they are
+those states that maximize the particular set of constraints acting at the
+moment. Depending on the context and the inputs, the system will be
+closer to one or another of the peaks in the goodness-of-fit function at
+the outset and will usually find the closest one. This interpretation, we
+believe, captures almost all of the important aspects of the schema with
+a view that is at once more flexible than the previous interpretations
+and yet highly structured. The degree of structure depends on the
+tightness of the coupling among the coalitions of units which
+correspond to the schemata in question. Thus, the language of schemata and schema theories should be considered an approximation to
+the language of PDP. In those cases in which there are coalitions of
+units that tend to work together, we have a rather close correspondence
+to the more conventional notion of a schema. In those cases in which
+the units are more loosely interconnected, the structures are more fluid
+and less schema-like. Often, knowledge is structured so that there are
+relatively tight connections among rather large subsets of units. In
+these cases, the schema provides a very useful description.
+One important difference between our interpretation of schemata and
+the more conventional ones is that in the conventional story, schemata
+are stored in memory. Indeed, they are the major content of memory. In
+our case, nothing stored corresponds very closely to a schema. What is
+stored is a set of connection strengths which, when activated, have
+implicitly in them the ability to generate states that correspond to
+instantiated schemata. This difference is important-especially with
+regard to learning. There is no point at which it must be decided to
+create this or that schema. Learning simply proceeds by connection
+strength adjustment, according to some simple scheme such as those we
+discuss in various places in this book. As the network is reorganized as
+a function of the structure of its inputs, it may come to respond in a
+more or less schema-like way.
+We now turn to an example to illustrate the various aspects of these
+PDP networks and show that many of those features that prompted the
+invention of schemata in the first place are present in these networks.
+At the same time, we show that certain features that are problematic
+with conventional representations of schemata are better dealt with in
+the PDP language.
+
+22 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+An Example
+Consider our knowledge of different kinds of rooms. We all have a
+clear idea of what a typical kitchen or bathroom or living room or bedroom or office looks like. We know that living rooms have sofas and
+easy chairs, but they don't usually have ovens or bathtubs and that
+offices have desks and typewriters, but they don't usually have beds.
+On the other hand, kitchens, living rooms, and offices might all very
+well have telephones, carpets, etc. Our default bathroom is very small,
+our default kitchen is somewhat larger but still probably small relative
+to our default living room. We chose our knowledge of rooms and
+types of rooms as the primary example to illustrate the PDP representation of schemata. To begin, we need a constraint network that
+embodies the constraints implicit in our knowledge of rooms. We built
+our constraint network in the following way. We chose a set of 40
+descriptors of rooms. These descriptors are listed, in Table 1. We
+asked two subjects to imagine an office and then, for each of the 40
+descriptors asked if the descriptor was accurate of that office. We then
+asked subjects to imagine a living room and asked about the 40 descriptors again. We then asked about a kitchen, a bathroom, and a bedroom.
+After finishing these five types of rooms we asked subjects to
+imagine another office, etc. We collected a total of sixteen judgments
+of the 40 descriptors on each of the five room types. This data served
+as the basis for creating our network. ' In principle, we could imagine
+presenting each of these 80 room descriptions to the system and have it
+ceiling
+large
+telephone
+books
+sofa
+drapes
+cupboard
+toilet
+walls
+medium
+bed
+desk-chair
+easy-chair
+stove
+sink
+scale
+THE FORTY ROOM DESCRIPTORS
+door
+windows
+small
+very-small
+typewriter
+bookshelf
+clock
+picture
+coffee-cup
+ashtray
+coffeepot
+refrigerator
+dresser
+television
+oven
+computer
+very-large
+desk
+carpet
+floor-lamp
+fireplace
+toaster
+bathtub
+clothes-hanger
+7 This was not designed to be a formal experiment of any kind. Rather it was conceptualized as a method of quickly getting a reasonable data base for building an example
+Some slight modifications in the data base were made in order to emphasize certain
+points in our example.
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT 23
+learn according to one or another learning rule we have discussed.
+Rather than doing that, however, we simply set the weights according
+to the following equation:
+p(x; =0&x;= 1)p(x = 1& x; = 0)
+Wij =-In
+p(x=1&x; = 1)p(x; = 0 & x; = 0)•
+This equation is derived from a Bayesian analysis of the probability that
+unit x; should be on given unit x; is on and vice versa (see Hinton &
+Sejnowski, 1983). Four aspects
+of the weight equation should be
+noted:
+• If the two units tend to be on and off together (i.e., the probability that x; = x; is much greater than the probability that
+x; # x;), then the weight will be a large positive value.
+• If, on the other hand, the probability that the two units take on
+different values (i.e., x; # x;) is much greater than the probability that they take on the same values (i.e., x, = x;), then the
+weight takes on a large negative value.
+• If the two units come on and off independently (i.e., if
+p(=1&x=v= p(x; = Vp)p(x; - v2)), then the weight
+between the two units is zero.
+• The weights are symmetric (i.e., Wij = Wji).
+In addition, each unit has a bias (constant input) which is given by
+p (x; = 0)
+bias; = - In
+p(x; = 1)
+Note that if the unit is usually off, it has a negative bias; if it is usually
+on, it has a positive bias; and if it is equally often on or off, it has a
+zero bias. 8 The weight matrix estimated by this means is shown in
+Figure 5. The figure uses the method of Hinton and Sejnowski
+(Chapter 7) to display the weights. Each unit is represented by a
+square. The name below the square names the descriptor represented
+by each square.
+Within each unit, the small black and white squares
+represent the weights from that unit to each of the other units in the
+8 With a finite data base some of the probabilities mentioned in these two equations
+might be 0. In this case the values of weights are either undefined or infinite.
+estimating these probabilities we began by assuming that everything occurs with
+very small probability (.00001). In this way the equation led to finite values for all
+
+24
+•O
+60°
+ceiling
+walls
+door
+window
+arge
+medium
+small
+very-large
+D•
+:18
+••••••
+telephone
+typewriter
+bookshelf
+carpet
+floor-amp
+Bota
+easy-chair
+very-small
+DO •
+• D
+books
+coffee-cup
+desk
+desk-chair
+clock
+bed
+picture
+• D
+ash-tray
+drapes
+stove
+sink
+refrigerator
+oaster
+cupboord
+coffee-pot
+dresser
+television
+bathtub
+toilet
+scale
+coat-hanger
+computer
+oven
+FIGURE 5. The figure uses the method of Hinton and Sejnowski (Chapter 7) to display
+the weights. Each unit is represented by a square. The name below the square names
+the descriptor represented by each square. Within each unit, the small black and white
+squares represent the weights from that unit to each of the other units in the system.
+The relative position of the small squares within each unit indicates the unit with which
+that unit is connected.
+system. The relative position of the small squares within each unit
+indicates the unit with which that unit is connected. For example, the
+white square on the lower right-hand portion of the refrigerator units
+represents the strength of the connection between refrigerator and oven.
+White squares
+represent positive connections and black squares
+represent negative connections. The size of the square represents the
+strength of the connection. Thus, the fact that the square representing
+the connection from the refrigerator unit to the stove unit is large and
+white represents the fact that there is a strong positive weight between
+the two.
+It should be noted that each of the units in this example is a visible
+unit in the sense that each can directly receive inputs from outside the
+network. There are no hidden units receiving inputs only from other
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT
+25
+units in the network. We consider this example to be a simplified case.
+It is possible to imagine hidden units which respond to patterns among
+the input units. In the general case, we, of course, recognize that hidden units would be required to give different coalitions enough coherence. As we have pointed out elsewhere in the book (cf. Chapter 2 and
+Chapter 8), multilayer systems containing hidden units are sometimes
+required to carry out certain computations. In the present instance,
+however, the existence of hidden units would not change the basic
+properties of the network which we wish to illustrate. Such higher-level
+units are not required for the basic schema-like behavior of these networks and, in no case should such a unit be confused with a schema.
+It should also be noted that we have chosen a rather high level of
+abstraction for this example. We have taken such features as has television as a microfeature. In a more realistic example, we would expect
+television to itself be a particular pattern over a set of units that are used
+to represent many different varieties of television. There might be
+many variations on the television pattern corresponding to variations
+among televisions. Moreover, since televisions in bedrooms may be
+systematically different (perhaps smaller) than televisions in living
+rooms, we would expect that these correlations would be picked up and
+there would be a context dependency between the particular version of
+television and the remaining objects in the room.
+In such a case the
+units that participate in the representation of television would play the
+role of a slot in a schema, and the particular pattern of activation on
+these units would represent the characteristics of the slot filler.
+Figure 6 shows several examples of the processing of this network.
+These runs started by "clamping" one of the descriptors on (that is, by
+setting the value to 1 and not letting it change) and then letting the system find a goodness-of-fit maximum. In the first example, the descriptor oven was clamped on. In such a case, we expect that the system will
+bring those units most tightly bound to the oven unit on and turn off
+those units negatively correlated to oven or other units that it turns on.
+On the assumption that oven is a central feature of the kitchen schema,
+the pattern the system eventually turns on is just that which might be
+said to correspond to the default kitchen schema. The strengths of each
+of the 40 units is shown along with the "goodness-of-fit" of the state
+after every 20 updates. The system begins with oven and ceiling on and
+then adds coffee-cup (weakly), then sink and refrigerator, concludes that
+the room is small, adds toaster and coffeepot and finally ends up at a
+maximum with ceiling, walls, window, small, telephone, clock, coffee-cup,
+drapes, stove, sink, refrigerator, toaster, cupboard, coffeepot, and oven. In
+other words, it finds the default or prototype kitchen. Similarly, runs
+of the system starting with desk, bathtub, sofa, or bed clamped lead to
+goodness maxima corresponding to the prototype or default office,
+
+26
+bathroom, living room, or bedroom, respectively. It is, as previously
+noted, these maxima that we believe correspond roughly to instantiations of schemata for kitchens, offices, bathrooms, living rooms, and
+bedrooms. The system receives input in the form of having some of
+the descriptors clamped from the outside.
+It then finds the best
+interpretation of the input through this process of hill climbing. As it
+climbs, the system "fills in" the relevant descriptors of the scene in
+question.
+In the case of the network we created for this example, there are
+essentially five maxima-one corresponding to each of the different
+room types. There are 240 possible binary states in which the system
+could potentially settle, but, in fact, when it is started by clamping
+exactly one descriptor, it will only settle into one of five states. This
+roughly corresponds to the view that this data base contains five schemata defined over the set of 40 descriptors. There are, as we shall see,
+numerous subschemata which involve subpatterns within the whole
+pattern.
+
+000
+
+• 0000000000000
+oven
+computer
+coat-hanger
+scale
+toilet
+bathtub
+television
+dresser
+coffee-pot
+cupboard
+toaster
+refrigerator
+sink
+stove
+drapes
+fire-place
+asn-tra'
+coffee-cup
+easy-cnall
+sofi
+Toor-lamp
+picture
+clock
+desk-chair
+books
+carpet
+bookshelf
+typewriter
+bed
+elepnon
+0 0 0 00 000000000
+• DODOO
+1000
+very-small
+small
+medium
+large
+very-large
+window
+door
+walls
+ceiling
+FIGURE 6. Five runs of the network from five different starting places. In each case,
+type for the type of room most closely related to the clamped units.
+
+30000
+00000000O
+LZ
+0 0 0
+0000
+5400Q
+DIOS
+YUIS
+uano
+J0000 • •
+1590
+70
+·200
+dш0/-10011
+DIOS
+00000 • •
+•0000 •
+XDJ7-YSD
+Эло15
+quis
+
+0559\0
+1901
+изло
+
+28 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+If it was difficult to visualize the landscape for the case of the Necker
+Cube model described above with 216 states, it is even more difficult
+with the 24° states of this example. It is, however, possible to get some
+idea of the landscape in the region of the maxima by plotting the goodness function over a small subset of the goodness landscape. It should
+be recalled that the states of a system with 40 units can be considered
+to be a vector in 40-dimensional space. If, as in the present case, the
+units have a minimum and maximum value, then each point in the 40-
+dimensional hypercube is a possible state of the system. The states of
+the system in which all units are at their minimum or maximum values
+(the binary states of the system) correspond to the corners of the
+hypercube. Now, each maximum of our network falls at one corner of
+this 40-dimensional cube. The intersection of a plane and the hypercube will pick out a two-dimensional subset of all of the possible states
+of the system. Finally, since three points determine a plane, we chose
+subsets of three of
+the maxima and plotted the goodness-of-fit
+landscape for those states falling on the plane passing through those
+three points. Figure 7 shows the landscape for the plane passing
+through the maxima for bedroom, office, and kitchen. Note that there are
+three peaks on the graph, one corresponding to each of the maxima on
+the plane. Note also that there are "ridges" connecting the two maxima. These correspond to simple mixtures of pairs of concepts. The
+fact that the ridge connecting bedroom and office is higher than those
+connecting kitchen to either of the others indicates that kitchen is more
+office
+kitchen
+bedroom
+goodness
+FIGURE 7. The value of the goodness function for the states on the plane passing
+through the three goodness maxima corresponding to the prototypes for kitchen, bedroom,
+and office.
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT 29
+distinctive from the other two than they are from each other. Figure 8
+shows the plane containing office, bedroom, and bathroom. In this case
+we see that the goodness function sinks much lower between the
+office-bedroom axis and bathroom. This occurs because bathroom is
+much more different from the other two than is kitchen. In any of
+these cases, it should be recognized that given the starting configuration of the system it will simply find one of these maxima and thereby
+find one of these interpretations of the input. By contrast, Figure 9
+shows the goodness-of-fit landscape on the plane passing through bedroom, office, and living-room. In order to get a clearer perspective on
+the surface, the angle of viewing was changed so we are looking at the
+figure from between bedroom and office. Clearly, the whole graph is
+greatly elevated. All points on the plane are relatively high. It is a sort
+of goodness plateau. These three points are essentially three peaks on a
+much larger mountain containing all three maxima. Finally, Figure 10
+shows the goodness landscape on the plane containing the three most
+distinct prototypes-bedroom, kitchen, and bathroom. The goodness
+function dips well below zero in this plane. Mixtures of kitchens,
+living-rooms, and bathrooms are poor rooms indeed.
+, office
+-bedroom
+goodness
+bathroom
+FIGURE 8. The value of the goodness function for the states on the plane passing
+through the three goodness maxima corresponding to the prototypes for bathroom, bedroom, and office.
+
+30
+living room
+- office
+bedroom→
+goodness
+FIGURE 9. The value of the goodness function for the states on the plane passing
+through the three goodness maxima corresponding to the prototypes for living-room, bedroom, and office.
+It should be mentioned that there are essentially two assumptions
+that can be made about the input. Under one assumption, inputs are
+clamped to either their minimum or maximum value and aren't allowed
+to move. That was the way inputs were treated in the present examples. Other times, it is convenient to imagine that inputs are merely
+biases feeding input into certain of the units. This is the way inputs
+were treated in the Necker cube example. These two ways of viewing
+inputs can be combined by assuming that the case of clamping
+corresponds to very, very strong biasing. So strong that internal constraints can never
+overcome the external evidence.
+The case of
+clamping is simpler, however. In this case there is no distortion of the
+goodness-of-fit landscape; certain states are simply not available. The
+system is forced to move through a different part of the state space. In
+addition to its effects on the region of the state space that is accessible,
+the input (along with the context) determines where the system begins
+its processing and therefore, often, which of the maxima it will find.
+Figure 11 illustrates this point. The figure shows the goodness function
+on the set of states on the plane passing through the start state, the
+bedroom maximum, and the kitchen maximum for two different inputs.
+In Figure 11A we have clamped the bed unit to be on. In Figure 11B
+we have clamped the oven unit on. It should be noted that to move
+from the start state to the kitchen peak in the first case involves climbing through a dip in goodness-of-fit. Since the system strictly goes
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT
+31
+-kitchen
+e-bedroom
+goodness
+bathroom
+FIGURE 10. The value of the goodness function for the states on the plane passing
+through the three goodness maxima corresponding to the prototypes for kitchen, bedroom,
+and bathroom.
+"uphill" it will be unable to reach the kitchen maximum and will move
+instead monotonically uphill toward the bedroom peak. Similarly, in
+Figure 11B with oven clamped there is a dip separating the start state
+from the bedroom maximum but a monotonically increasing slope flowing into the kitchen peak. Figure 11C shows, for comparison, the
+landscape from the start state when no units are clamped on. In this
+case, there is no dip separating the start state from either peaks, so the
+system can move to either maximum.
+To summarize, we have argued that the maxima in the goodness-offit landscapes of our networks correspond to configurations of instantiated schemata. We have shown how these maxima are determined by
+coalitions among units and how the inputs determine which of the maxima the system will find. It should be clear that the multivariate distributions proposed by Rumelhart and Ortony are readily captured in the
+PDP framework. The values of each variable determine what values
+will be filled in for the other variables. We have yet to show that the
+kind of PDP system we have been describing really has all of the
+important properties of schemata. In the following section, we use the
+present example to illustrate these properties and discuss some of the
+advantages of our formulation over previous formulations of the
+schema idea.
+
+32 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+kitchen.
+- bedroom
+goodness
+- start
+B
+kitchen
++ "bed"
+- bedroom
+goodness
++ start + "bed"
+FIGURE 11.
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT
+33
+kitchen.
+bedroom
++ "oven"
+goodness
+C
+start + "oven"
+FIGURE 1. The goodness function over the set of states on the plane passing through
+the start state, the bedroom maximum, and the kitchen maximum for two different inputs
+In A we have clamped the bed unit to be on. In B we have clamped the oven unit on. C
+shows the landscape from the start state when no units are clamped on.
+Properties of Schemata and Maxima in Constraint Satisfaction
+Networks
+Rumelhart and Ortony (1977; Rumelhart, 1980) have outlined a set
+of properties which characterize schemata. In this section we consider
+each of these properties and show how they map onto features of the
+PDP networks we are now outlining.
+Schemata have variables. Essentially, the variables of a schema
+correspond to those parts of the pattern that are not completely determined by the remainder of the structure of the pattern itself. It is
+these parts that vary from one situation to another in which, nevertheless, the bulk of the units corresponding to the schema is active. On
+this account, the binding of a variable amounts to filling in a variable
+subpattern.
+Default values represent variable subpatterns that tend to
+get filled-in in the absence of any specific input. Since patterns tend to
+complete themselves, default values tend to be automatically filled in
+by the process of settling into an interpretation. In some cases, there
+are sets of units that are mutually inhibitory so that only one can be
+active at a time but any of which could be combined with most other
+units. Such a set of units can be considered to constitute a slot which is
+
+34 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+filled in in the processing of the input. Perhaps the best example from
+our current data base is what might be called the size slot. In this case,
+the very-large, large, medium, small,and very-small units are all mutually
+inhibitory. (See the weight matrix in Figure 6). The different maxima
+have different default values for these slots. The bathroom has a
+default value of very-small, the kitchen has a default value of small, the
+bedroom has a default value of medium, the office is large, and the
+default living-room is very-large. Interestingly, when the input contains
+information that descriptors other than the default descriptors apply,
+the default size changes as well. For example, Figure 12 shows a case
+in which bed and sofa were both clamped. What we get in such a case
+is a room which might best be described as a large, fancy bedroom.
+The size variable is filled in to be large, it also includes an easy-chair, a
+
+
+• • • c
+0 O
+
+00
+0C
+
+•0000000
+
+oven
+computer
+coat-hanger
+scale
+toilet
+bathtub
+television
+dresser
+coffee-pot
+cupboard
+toaster
+refrigerator
+sink
+stove
+drapes
+fire-place
+ash-tray
+cottee-cup
+easy-chair
+sofa
+floor-lamp
+picture
+clock
+desk-chair
+books
+carpet
+bookshelt
+typewriter
+bed
+telephone
+des
+very-small
+small
+medium
+large
+very-large
+window
+door
+walls
+ceiling
+FIGURE 12. The output of the room network with bed, sofa, and ceiling initially
+clamped. The result may be described as a large, fancy bedroom.
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT 35
+foor-lamp, and a fireplace. Similarly, the setting of the size variable
+modifies the default values for the other descriptors. In this case, if we
+set the size variable to large we get a bedroom with a fireplace.
+Schemata can embed. In structural interpretations of schemata, it is
+useful to think of a schema as a kind of tree structure in which
+subschemata correspond to subtrees that can fill variable slots.
+Under
+our interpretation, subschemata correspond to small configurations of
+units which cohere and which may be a part of many different stable
+patterns (and therefore constitute a schema on their own right). Each
+stable subset of cohering units can be considered a schema. Large
+schemata will often consist of patterns of coherence among these
+coherent subsets. There are several instances of this in our example.
+For example, the easy-chair and floor-lamp constitute a subschema, the
+desk and desk-chair, the window and drapes, and other similar combinations constitute small schemata that can be either present or absent in
+several different configurations. Consider, for example, the case of
+window and drapes. These two elements almost always appear together
+and either both appear or neither appear. We will refer to this pattern
+as the window schema. Figure 13 shows the effect of adding drapes
+and/or window to the office schema. The default value for this schema
+involves no windows. The highest peak, at the origin of the graph,
+corresponds to the office maximum. One axis corresponds to the
+office without
+window & drapes
+office with
+window &
+drapes
+goodness
+drapes
+window
+FIGURE 13. The goodness landscape for office as a function of the activation value of
+the drapes unit and the window unit. The function shows that it is maximum when either
+both are 0 or both are 1. This pattern of interaction is consistent with the view that the
+combination window-drapes form a subschema.
+
+36 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+amount of drapes added to the schema (i.e., to the activation value for
+the drapes unit). The second axis corresponds to the amount of window
+added. The third axis, of course, corresponds to the goodness-of-fit for
+each of the states. It should be noted that the low points on the graph
+correspond to those cases in which one of the two units of the window
+subschema is on and the other is off. The high points on the graph,
+corresponding to goodness maxima, occur when either neither (at the
+origin) or both of the units are on. The case where neither is on
+corresponds to a slightly higher peak than when both are on. Thus, the
+default office probably doesn't have a window, but if the input indicates
+that either one of the units (window or drapes) is on, turning the other
+one on is best. To conclude, large schemata such as the office schema
+can be conceptualized as consisting, in part, of a configuration of
+subschemata which may or may not be present as wholes. Having parts
+of these subschemata is worse than having either the entire subschema
+or none of it.
+Schemata represent knowledge at all levels. They should represent
+encyclopedic knowledge rather than definitional information. This
+amounts to the claim that all coherent subpatterns should be considered
+schemata as well as the whole stable pattern. It also suggests that
+knowledge of all sorts should be represented in the interconnections
+among the constituent units.
+Schemata are active processes. This is obviously true of the the
+PDP system we are describing.
+They are a kind of organic element
+which grows and fulfills itself within its environment.
+Schemata are recognition devices whose processing is aimed at the
+evaluation of their goodness-of-fit to the data being processed. This
+feature is obviously also a part of the idea outlined here.
+The
+goodness-of-fit is roughly determined by the height of the peak in
+goodness space. The processing of the system is aimed toward climbing
+uphill along the goodness-of-fit gradient. The stable points correspond
+to local maxima in this space. The height of the peak corresponds to
+the goodness-of-fit.
+Some additional features of our interpretation. There are three
+major difficulties with the conventional representation of schemata that
+are naturally overcome in the PDP approach.
+In the conventional
+approaches, decisions must be made about which aspects of a given
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT 37
+schema are constant and which are variable. The PDP solution is
+essentially that all aspects are variable; some aspects are simply more
+tightly constrained than others. Secondly, in a conventional representation, one has to decide exactly which aspects of the situation are part of
+the schema and which are not. In our PDP approach, units may cohere
+more or less strongly to their mates and in this sense be more or less a
+part of the schema. Finally, on the conventional view a decision must
+be made about whether a certain set of relationships should be put
+together to form a schema at all. Again, in the PDP formulation no
+such decision needs to be made. One can have schemata of varying
+degrees of existence. The rigidity of the schema is determined by the
+tightness of bonding among the units that constitute the schema. The
+tighter the bond, the more strongly the constituent elements activate
+one another, and the more rigid the structure. The weaker the bonds,
+the more fluid the structure, and the more easily a system can flow
+among states. This degree of fluidity depends on the shape of the
+goodness-of-fit landscape. Tightly rigid schemata have sharp peaks in
+goodness space; fluid schemata with many variable parts correspond to
+rounded hilltops. The goodness landscape, in turn, depends on the
+knowledge base that lies beneath it. If the knowledge is tightly interconstrained so that one part strongly predicts other parts, then we have
+a rigid schema. We can't easily get just part of it active. If part of it
+becomes active, the part will pull in the whole and suppress the activity
+of aspects that are not part of it. On the other hand, if the knowledge
+is only loosely interrelated, the schema will be a relatively weak organizer of the information and will be a pressure for structuring the input,
+but it will flow easily from one pattern to another. Moreover, within a
+schema itsell, some aspects will be tightly bound together while other
+aspects will be only more loosely tied to the body of the schema. Input
+situations that demand an interpretation that breaks up the tightly
+bound clusters are going to be more difficult for the system to attain
+than those that require breaking up much more loosely interconnected
+elements.
+Finally, we point out one way in which these ideas about schemata
+might be elaborated to overcome one apparent deficiency of the network we have thus far been considering. The network uses a fixed set
+of units to represent each type of object that might be present in a particular instantiation of a schema. This is clearly an oversimplification
+since it is often necessary to be able to think about two different instantiations of the same subschema within a larger overall schema-for
+example, there is often more than one chair in a living room. To capture such situations, it is necessary to imagine that the network may
+contain several subsets of units, each capable of representing a different
+possible chair. The subsets would correspond to different roles the
+
+38
+different chairs might play in the overall room schema. This would
+also allow the representation to capture the assignment of a particular
+object to a particular role.
+PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING MODELS AND
+THINKING
+In the previous section we offered an interpretation of the schema in
+terms of the emergent properties of simple PDP networks. From there,
+we believe that we can make contact with much of the cognitive science
+literature. There are central issues, however, which remain difficult to
+describe within the PDP framework. We have particularly in mind
+here, the process of thinking, the contents of consciousness, the role of
+serial processes, the nature of mental models, the reason for mental
+simulations, and the important synergistic role of language in thinking
+and
+in shaping our thought. These issues are especially important
+because these are issues that PDP approaches do not, on first blush,
+seem to have much to say about. In this section we attack some of
+those problem areas. We don't claim to have solutions to them, rather
+we can outline a story that represents our current understanding of
+these processes.
+The story is overly simplistic but it does give an idea
+of where we are in our thinking on these critical issues.
+It should be noted here that the account of mental processing we
+have been developing offers an interesting perspective on the relations
+between parallel and serial processing. The "parallel" in "parallel distributed processing" is intended to indicate that, as a basic architectural
+design principle, processing is carried out, in so far as possible, in
+parallel. Parallel algorithms are employed rather than serial ones. At
+the same time, however, the "distributed" in "parallel distributed processing" brings a serial component to PDP systems. Since it is patterns
+of activations over a set of units that are the relevant representational
+format and since a set of units can only contain one pattern at a time,
+there is an enforced seriality in what can be represented. A given set
+of units can, however, be seen as representing a sequence of events.
+Since we assume that the system is moving toward a maximum goodness solution every time a new input comes into the system, the system
+operates in the following way. An input enters the system, the system
+relaxes to accommodate the new input. The system approaches a relatively stable state which represents the interpretation of the input by
+the system. The system then occupies this state until the stimulus conditions change. When a new input arrives, the system relaxes to a new
+state. Looking at the system over a short time frame, it is dominated
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT 39
+by the relaxation process in which all units work cooperatively to "discover" an interpretation of a new input. Looking over a somewhat
+longer time frame, we see the system as sequentially occupying a series
+of relatively stable states-one for each change in input. Roughly, if
+we imagine that the relaxation process takes on the order of a few
+tenths of a second and that the time spent in essentially the same stable
+state is on the order of a half of a second or so, we could see events
+requiring less than about a halt second to be essentially a parallel process, and those requiring several seconds to involve a series of such
+processes and therefore to have a serial component.
+The Contents of Consciousness
+It isn't necessary for the arguments that follow, but for the sake of
+concreteness, we suppose that there is a relatively large subset of the
+total units in the system whose states of activity determine the contents
+of consciousness. We imagine that the time average of the activities of
+these units over time periods on the order of a few hundred milliseconds correspond to the contents of consciousness. Since we imagine that our systems must be such that they reach equilibrium in about
+this amount of time, the contents of consciousness are dominated by
+the relatively stable states of the system. Thus, since consciousness is
+on the time scale of sequences of stable states, consciousness consists
+of a sequence of interpretations-each represented by a stable state of
+the system. Typically, consciousness contains a single interpretation
+(i.e., a single pattern representing its inputs) and consists of a sequence
+of such interpretations. On occasions in which the relaxation process is
+especially slow, consciousness will be the time average over a dynamically changing set of patterns and thus would be expected to lead to
+"fuzzy" or unclear phenomenal impressions.
+The Problem of Control
+One common critique of the kind of model we have sketched so far
+is that it can't really change without external prodding. Suppose that
+we are in a fixed stimulus environment. In this case, the system will
+relax
+into an interpretation for that environment and stay there. Our
+conscious experience will be of a fixed interpretation of a fixed
+stimulus. Until the world changes there is no change to the system nor
+to the contents of our consciousness. Obviously this is an incorrect
+
+40 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+conclusion. How can such a system do something? Perhaps the first
+thing that comes to mind is that the environment never really is fixed.
+It is always changing and therefore the contents of our consciousness
+must always be changing to interpret the current state of affairs. A
+good example of this might be the movies. We sit in the movies and
+watch. Our system reaches a sequence of interpretations of the events
+on the screen. But, since the movie is always continuing, we are driven
+to continue to interpret it. Surely, what is true of a movie is also true
+of life-to some extent. This may be part of the story, but it would
+appear to be rather more passive than we might want.
+We don't just sit
+passively by and let the world change and then passively monitor it.
+Rather we act on the world.
+A second answer to the problem of a system fixated on a particular
+interpretation becomes apparent in realizing that our interpretation of
+an event often dictates an action which, in turn, changes the environment. The environmental change can then feed back into the system
+and lead to another interpretation and another action. Figure 14 illustrates how this feedback loop can continuously drive the system from
+state to state. A paradigm case for this is playing a game. We can imagine that we are playing a game with someone; our input consists of a
+board configuration, and we settle into a state which includes a specification of a response. It would be quite easy to build a relaxation network that would take as input a description of a current board situation
+and produce, as part of the state to which it relaxed, a specification of
+the response. It would simply require that, for each game situation, the
+system relaxes to a particular state. Certain units of the state represent
+the action (or class of actions) that should be taken. Upon taking these
+actions, the opponent makes a play which in turn leads to a new set of
+constraints to which the system relaxes. In this way, the system can
+make a sequence of moves. Indeed, as we describe below, we have
+built such a network that can play tic-tac-toe. Other more complex
+games, such as checkers or chess require rather more effort, of course,
+but can, in principle, be dealt with in the same way. Although this is a
+much more activist view, it is still a "data-driven" view. The system is
+entirely reactive-given I am in this state, what should I do?
+Mental Models
+Suppose, for arguments sake, that the system is broken into two
+pieces -two sets of units. One piece is the one that we have been discussing, in that it receives inputs and relaxes to an appropriate state
+that includes a specification of an appropriate action which will, in turn,
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT
+Interpretation
+Network
+Internal Units
+Output
+Units
+Input
+Units
+Environment
+Inputs
+Outputs
+FIGURE 14. The inputs to the PDP system should be considered as partially due to the
+effects that the output of the system has had on the environment. In this way, the output of the system can drive it from state to state.
+change the inputs to the system. The other piece of the system is similar in nature, except it is a "model" of the world on which we are acting. This consists of a relaxation network which takes as input some
+specification of the actions we intend to carry out and produces an
+interpretation of "what would happen if we did that." Part of this
+specification would be expected to be a specification of what the new
+stimulus conditions would be like. Thus, one network takes inputs
+from the world and produces actions; the other takes actions and
+predicts how the input would change in response. This second piece of
+the system could be considered a mental model of the world events.
+This second portion, the mental model of the world, would be expected
+to be operating in any case, in as much as it is generating expectations
+
+42 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+about the state of the world and thereby "predicting" the outcomes of
+actions.
+Now, suppose that the world events did not happen. It would be possible to take the output of the mental model and replace the stimulus
+inputs from the world with inputs from our model of the world. In this
+case, we could expect that we could "run a mental simulation" and imagine the events that would take place in the world when we performed
+a particular action. This mental model would allow us to perform
+actions entirely internally and to judge the consequences of our actions,
+interpret them, and draw conclusions based on them. In other words,
+we can, it would seem, build an internal control system based on the
+interaction between these two modules of the system. Indeed, as we
+shall show, we have built a simple two-module model of tic-tac-toe
+which carries out exactly the process and can thereby "imagine" playing
+tic-tac-toe. Figure 15 shows the relationships between the interpretation networks, the inputs, the outputs, and the network representing a
+model of the world and the process of "mental simulations."
+Mental Simulations and Mental Practice
+One nice feature of this model is that it ties into the idea of mental
+simulations and learning through mental practice. Performance in the
+task involves two parts—a system that determines what to do in any
+given situation and a system that predicts what will happen if any given
+action is carried out. If we have a reasonably good model of the
+"world" we could learn from our model the various consequences of
+our actions —just as if we were carrying them out in the real world. It
+may very well be that such a feature accounts for the improvement that
+occurs in mentally practicing complex motor tasks.
+Conversations: Actual and Imagined
+Imagine a situation in which we had a relaxation network which
+would take as input a sentence and produce an interpretation of that
+sentence as well as the specifications for a response to that input. It is
+possible to imagine how two individuals each with such a network could
+carry out a conversation. Perhaps, under appropriate circumstances
+they could even carry out a logical argument. Now, suppose that we
+don't actually have another participant, but instead have a mental
+model of the other individual. In that case, we could imagine carrying
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT
+Interpretation
+Network
+Internal Units
+43
+Input
+Units
+Output
+Units
+/////
+From
+Environment
+To
+Environment
+Model of World
+Internal Units
+Output
+Units
+Input
+Units
+FIGURE 15. The relationships among the model of the world, the interpretation network, the inputs, and the outputs for the purpose of mental simulations.
+out a conversation with someone else. We could hold an imaginary
+argument with someone else and perhaps even be convinced by it!
+Indeed, this brings up the last move that we wish to suggest. Suppose
+that we don't have a model of another person at all. Suppose that
+instead we simply use our one single model to both produce and react
+to imagined linguistic inputs. This description is, it would seem, consistent with Vygotsky's (1934/1962) view of thinking and is consistent
+with the introspections about a certain kind of thinking and "internal
+speech." Note, this does not suggest that thinking is simply internal
+speech. More generally, thinking, as we have argued, involves a
+sequence of states of consciousness. There are a number of ways of
+controlling that sequence. One way involves running "mental simulations."
+Another way involves recycling linguistic inputs. Note, this
+gives language an interesting, almost Whorfian, role however. Suppose
+that the interpretation that led to the production of the internal speech
+was much richer than the linguistic forms could possibly suggest. Thus,
+
+44
+the linguistic forms pick out aspects of the entire interpretation to
+emphasize. Once this emphasis has taken place and the new input has
+been processed, the next state will be strongly affected by the new
+input and our new interpretation will be shaped, to some extent, by the
+words we chose to express our first idea. Thus, our thinking about a
+topic will be, sometimes strongly, affected by the language tools we
+have for expressing our ideas.
+External Representations and Formal Reasoning
+If the human information-processing system carries out its computations by "settling" into a solution rather than applying logical operations, why are humans so intelligent? How can we do science,
+mathematics, logic, etc.? How can we do logic if our basic operations
+are not logical at all? We suspect the answer comes from our ability to
+create artifacts-that is, our ability to create physical representations
+that we can manipulate in simple ways to get answers to very difficult
+and abstract problems.
+The basic idea is that we succeed in solving logical problems not so
+much through the use of logic, but by making the problems we wish to
+solve conform to problems we are good at solving. People seem to
+have three essential abilities which together allow them to come to logical conclusions without being logical. It is these three abilities that
+have allowed us to accomplish those uniquely human achievements of
+formal reasoning. These abilities are:
+• We are especially good at pattern matching. We seem to be
+able to quickly "settle" on an interpretation of an input pattern.
+This is an ability that is central to perceiving, remembering,
+and comprehending. Our ability to pattern match is probably
+not something which sets humans apart from other animals, but
+is probably the essential component to most cognitive behavior.
+• We are good at modeling our world. That is, we are good at
+anticipating the new state of affairs resulting from our actions
+or from an event we might observe. This ability to build up
+expectations by "internalizing" our experiences is probably crucial to the survival of all organisms in which learning plays a
+key role.
+• We are good at manipulating our environment. This is another
+version of man-the-tool-user, and we believe that this is
+perhaps the crucial skill which allows us to think logically, do
+mathematics and science, and in general build a culture.
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT 45
+Especially important here is our ability to manipulate the
+environment so that it comes to represent something. This is
+what sets human intellectual accomplishments apart from other
+animals.
+Roughly speaking, the view is this: We are good at "perceiving"
+answers to problems. Unfortunately, this is not a universal mechanism
+for solving problems and thinking, but as we become more expert, we
+become better at reducing problem domains to pattern-matching tasks
+(of the kind best accomplished by PDP models). Thus, chess experts
+can look at a chess board and "see" the correct move. This, we
+assume, is a problem strictly analogous to the problem of perceiving
+anything. It is not an easy problem, but it is one that humans are especially good at. It has proven to be extraordinarily difficult to duplicate
+this ability with a conventional symbol-processing machine. However,
+not all problems can be solved by immediately "seeing" the answer.
+Thus, few (if any) of us can look at a three-digit multiplication problem
+(such as 343 times 822) and see the answer. Solving such problems
+cannot be done by our pattern-matching apparatus, parallel processing
+alone will not do the trick; we need a kind of serial processing mechanism to solve such a problem. Here is where our ability to manipulate
+our environment becomes critical. We can, quite readily, learn to write
+down the two numbers in a certain format when given such a problem.
+343
+822
+Moreover, we can learn to see the first step of such a multiplication
+problem. (Namely, we can see that we should enter a 6 below the 3
+and 2)
+343
+822
+6
+We can then use our ability to pattern match again to see what to do
+next. Each cycle of this operation involves first creating a representation through manipulation of the environment, then a processing of
+this (actual physical) representation by means of our well-tuned perceptual apparatus leading to a further modification of this representation.
+9 As we have argued before, it is because experts have such a powerful patternmatching capability that expert systems that rely only on pattern matching (albeit not
+nearly as powerful as the human system) are as successful as they are.
+
+46 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+By doing this we reduce a very abstract conceptual problem to a series
+of operations that are very concrete and at which we can become very
+good. Now this applies not only to solving multiplication problems. It
+applies as well to solving problems in logic (e.g., syllogisms), problems
+in science, engineering, etc. These dual skills of manipulating the
+environment and processing the environment we have created allow us
+to reduce very complex problems to a series of very simple ones. This
+ability allows us to deal with problems that are otherwise impossible.
+This is real symbol processing and, we are beginning to think, the primary symbol processing that we are able to do. Indeed, on this view,
+the external environment becomes a key extension to our mind.
+There is one more piece to the story. This is the tricky part and, we
+think, the part that fools us. Not only can we manipulate the physical
+environment and then process it, we can also learn to internalize the
+representations we create, "imagine" them, and then process these imagined representations-just as if they were external. As we said before,
+we believe that we are good at building models of our environment so
+that we can anticipate what the world would be like after some action or
+event takes place. As we gain experience with the world created by our
+(and others') actions we develop internal models of these external
+representations. We can thus imagine writing down a multiplication
+problem and imagine multiplying them together. If the problem is simple enough, we can actually solve the problem in our imagination and
+similarly for syllogisms. Consider, for example, a simple syllogism: All
+A are B and no Care B. We could solve this by drawing a circle for A,
+a larger circle including all of the A's around the first circle to represent
+the B's, and a third disjoint circle standing for the C's. We could then
+"see" that no A's are C. Alternatively, we need not actually draw the
+circles, we can merely imagine them. We believe that this ability to do
+the problem in our imagination is derivative from our ability to do it
+physically, just as our ability to do mental multiplication is derivative
+from our ability to do multiplication with pencil and paper. The argument that external representations play a crucial role in thought (or,
+say, in solving syllogisms) is sometimes challenged on the ground that
+we don't really have to draw Venn diagrams (or whatever) to solve
+them since we can solve them in our head. We argue that the major
+way we can do that is to imagine doing it externally. Since this imagination is, we argue, dependent on our experience with such representations externally, the argument that we can solve them mentally loses its
+force against the view that external symbols are important for thought
+processes. Indeed, we think that the idea that we reason with mental
+models is a powerful one precisely because it is about this process of
+imagining an external representation and operating on that.
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT 47
+It is interesting that it is apparently difficult to invent new external
+representations for problems we might wish to solve. The invention of
+a new representation would seem to involve some basic insight into the
+nature of the problem to be solved.
+It may be that the process of
+inventing such representations is the highest human intellectual ability.
+Perhaps simply creating an external representation sufficient to support
+problem solving of a particular kind is evidence of a kind of abstract
+thinking outside of the simple-minded view sketched here. That may
+be, but it seems to us that such representational systems are not very
+easy to develop. Usually they are provided by our culture. Usually
+they have evolved out of other simpler such systems and over long
+periods of time. Newer ones, when they are developed, usually involve
+taking an older system and modifying it to suit new needs. One of the
+critical aspects of our school system would seem to be teaching such
+representational schemes. The insights into the nature of the problem
+become embedded in the representations we learn to use to solve the
+problems.
+Language plays an especially tricky and interesting role in all of this.
+Perhaps the internal/external issue is not too important with language.
+The notion we have here is one of "self-instruction." This follows
+Vygotsky's (1934/1962) view, we believe. We can be instructed to
+behave in a particular way. Responding to instructions in this way can
+be viewed simply as responding to some environmental event. We can
+also remember such an instruction and "tell ourselves" what to do. We
+have, in this way, internalized the instruction. We believe that the process of following instructions is essentially the same whether we have
+told ourselves or have been told what to do. Thus, even here, we have
+a kind of internalization of an external representational format (i.e.,
+language). We don't want to make too much of this point since we
+recognize that the distinction between external and internal when we
+ourselves produce the external representation is subtle at best, but we
+don't really think it differs too much from the case in which we write
+something down and therefore create a real, physical, viewable
+representation. Saying something out loud creates a hearable representation. There are interesting cases in which people talk to themselves
+(for example, solving difficult problems in noisy environments leads
+people to literally talk to themselves and instruct themselves on the
+problems they are solving).
+Before leaving this topic, one more important aspect of external
+representations (as opposed to internal representations) should be
+noted. External representations allow us to employ our considerable
+perceptual/motor abilities in solving abstract problems. This allows us
+to break problems into a sequence of relatively simple problems.
+Importantly, once an external representation is created, it can be
+
+48
+reinterpreted without regard to its initial interpretation. This freedom
+allows us to discover solutions to problems without "seeing" our way to
+the end. We can inspect intermediate steps and find alternative solutions which might be better in some ways. In this way, we can discover
+new features of our representations and slowly extend them and make
+them more powerful.
+Goal Direction in Thinking
+Our discussion thus far has left one central issue undiscussed,
+namely, the role of goals in thought and problem solving. Clearly it is
+not the case that the same perceptual stimulus always drives the system
+to react in a consistent way. Rather, our goals or intentions interact
+with the stimuli (internal and external) that provide the inputs to the
+thinking process. Further, goals organize whole sequences of thoughts
+into a coherent problem-solving activity, and the notion that there is a
+hierarchy of goals is certainly important for understanding these
+coherent sequences.
+While we have not stressed the importance of goals, it is not difficult
+to see how they could be incorporated into our framework. Goals can
+be explicitly represented as patterns of activation and can thus provide
+one source of input to the thinking process. Nor is it difficult to imagine how a PDP network could learn to establish specific subgoal patterns in response to particular superordinate goals and inputs.
+Summary
+These ideas are highly speculative and detached from any particular
+PDP model. They are useful, we believe, because they suggest how
+PDP models can be made to come into contact with the class of
+phenomena for which they are, on the face of it, least well suited-that
+is, essentially sequential and conscious phenomena.
+Even in these
+cases, however, they lead us to view phenomena in new ways.
+An Example
+In these last few sections, we have been talking at a very general
+level. We often find it useful to be concrete about our
+ideas.
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT 49
+Therefore, to illustrate the notion of thought as mental simulation
+more concretely, we created two relaxation networks that can be connected together to mentally simulate playing a game of tic-tac-toe. The
+two networks are very similar. The first is a system which, given a pattern representing the board of a tic-tac-toe game, will relax to a solution
+state that fills in an appropriate response. The second module is nearly
+identical to the first; it takes as input a board position and a move and
+settles to a prediction of the opponent's responding move.
+In short, it
+is a "mental model" of the opponent. When the output of the first is
+fed, as input, to the second and the output to the second is fed, as
+input, to the first, the two networks can simulate a game of tic-tac-toe.
+Figure 16 illustrates the basic structure of the tic-tac-toe playing network. The network consists of a total of 67 units. There are nine units
+representing the nine possible responses.
+These are indicated by the
+nine dots at the top of the figure. There is one unit for each of the
+nine possible moves in tic-tac-toe. Since only one response is to be
+Response
+Units
+Line
+Detector
+Units
+Board
+Units
+Player
+Pieces
+Opponent
+Pieces
+FIGURE 16. The basic structure of the tie-tac-toe playing network.
+
+50 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+made at a time, these units are mutually inhibitory. This is indicated
+by the heavy black line feeding back from the top plane in the figure to
+itself. There are a total of 18 units representing the board configuration.
+These are divided into two groups of nine: one group for the
+positions of the friendly or player pieces on the board and one group
+representing the positions of the opponent's pieces. Since if any square
+is occupied, it is not a possible move, each board unit strongly inhibits
+its corresponding output unit. This strong inhibition is indicated by the
+heavy black lines connecting the board units to the response units. In
+addition to these 9 output units and 18 input units, there is a total of 40
+hidden units which detect patterns in the board units and activate the
+various response alternatives. These 40 units can be divided into eight
+classes corresponding to the eight possible ways of getting three x's or
+o's in a row. In the figure, one of each such category of units is illustrated. The receptive field of each unit is indicated by the line inside
+the circle representing that unit. Thus, there is one unit for each of the
+three horizontal lines, one for each of the three vertical lines, and one
+for each of the two possible diagonal lines. For each of the eight
+classes of hidden units, there are five different pattern types that different units are responsive to. For example, some units are responsive
+to empty regions. That is, they respond just in case none of the board
+units from which it receives inputs is turned on. This is implemented
+by making them be inhibited by any activity in their receptive field and
+by giving them a negative threshold. We call this an empty line detector.
+All things being equal, it is better to move into an empty row, column,
+or diagonal; therefore these units weakly activate their respective output units. At the start of the game these are the only units which are
+active and therefore the sole criterion for the first move is the number
+of possible strings of three the square is a member of. Since the center
+square intersects the largest number, it will usually be chosen by the
+system for its first move. On later moves, there are other units feeding
+into the decision, but these units also contribute. Another unit type
+will respond whenever two or more units of the same kind occur in its
+regions. This is the kind of unit illustrated in the figure. It receives
+strong inhibitory input from one set of board units (in this case the
+opponent's pieces) and excitatory inputs from the other set. It has a
+rather high positive threshold so that it will not come on until at least
+two units are on in its row. We call this a friendly doublet detector.
+Whenever this unit comes on it means that the system can make a winning move by playing in that row. Therefore, it is strongly positively
+connected to its respective output units. If such a move is possible, the
+system will make it. There are similar units which respond to two or
+more units from the representation of the opponent's pieces are active
+in its receptive field. We call this an opponent doublet detector. If such a
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT
+51
+unit comes on, it means that the opponent could win by a move in this
+region, so it excites its response units very strongly as well. Unless
+there is a winning move somewhere else, the blocking response will
+become the most active. Finally, there are units which respond to one
+or more friendly pieces or one or more opponent pieces in an otherwise
+open line. We call these friendly singleton and opponent singleton deteclors.
+It is generally good to extend your own singleton or block an
+opponent's singleton if there is nothing more pressing, so these units
+also activate their respective output units, only rather more weakly than
+the units detecting doublets. Thus, the net input arriving at any given
+unit is the weighted sum of all of these urgencies detected by the hidden units. Because of the direct inhibition from the board units, only
+those response units corresponding to open squares receive positive
+input. The mutual inhibition insures that the strongest unit will usually
+win. In order that this system truly climb in overall goodness-of-fit, all
+weights are symmetric and the update is done asynchronously at random. This means that when there isn't much difference between the
+possible response alternatives, a weaker one will sometimes get the
+upper hand and win the competition. This never happens, however,
+when a unit is receiving very strong input, as with the case of an open
+double for a win or to be blocked.
+The simplest case is when the system simply is given a board position, settles on a move, is given the next board position incorporating
+the opponent's response, settles on a move for that position, etc., until
+a game is finished. This involves only one network and
+• presumably
+would be the basic modality for the system to run in. Figure 17 shows
+a sample run of such a situation. The activation levels of each of the
+67 units is shown in each column. Successive activation states are
+shown from left to right. At the start, it should be noted that there is a
+friendly piece in the center square and two enemy pieces, one in each
+corner of the upper row. It is the system's move. The system starts
+with the units corresponding to the board position clamped on and all
+other units off. The figure shows the strengths for each of the units
+after every 50 asynchronous updates. By the second time slice, the system is beginning to extract the relevant features of the board position.
+The five groups of eight units shown in each column following the
+response units and board position display the line-detector units. Each
+group of eight is laid out with three units across the top corresponding
+to the top, middle, and bottom lines from left to right. The second row
+of the eight corresponds to the left and right diagonals, and the bottom
+row of each eight corresponds to the left, middle, and right columns.
+Thus, we see that the system has, by the second time slice, begun to
+discover that the bottom row is empty, that it has a singleton in the
+middle row, that the opponent has a singleton in the left column, and
+
+52
+units
+friendly
+pieces
+enemy
+pieces
+empty line
+detectors
+friendly
+singleton
+detectors
+enemy
+singleton
+detectors
+friendiy
+doubleton
+detectors
+enemy
+doubleton
+detectors
+• D
+• •
+• . .
+L
+FIGURE 17. A sample run of the tic-tac-toe playing network.
+L
+L
+that the opponent has a doubleton in the top row. Then the system
+discovers a friendly singleton in the middle column, an enemy singleton in the top row, and an enemy singleton in the right column. Based
+on this, the blocking response in the top-middle position begins to gain
+strength. As the observation that the opponent has an open double
+increases in strength, the activation level of the blocking response gains
+strength even faster. Finally, the strength of a response unit exceeds
+criterion and the system detects that it has settled on a move. At this
+point, we assume a motor system (or the like) would be invoked and
+the move actually made. Upon having made the move, the world has
+process could begin again.
+Here we have a system that can take a board position and decide on a
+move. When we make our move and present the system with the new
+board position, it can make its next move, etc., until the game is finished. Here we see a kind of sequential behavior of our relaxation system driven by changes in the outside which are, in turn, the result of
+the activity of the system itself. Nothing is different; we see that
+sequential processing results simply from the addition of the systems
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT
+53
+own responding to the environmental process of generating a sequence
+of stimuli. This is a very common form of control of sequential
+behavior and involves no special mechanism. The case of "mental
+simulations" involves a bit more machinery. We need a "model of the
+world" to predict the environment's response to any action that might
+be taken. In the case of tic-tac-toe, this involves a network which
+models the opponent. In general, the model of the opponent may be
+arbitrarily different from that used by the system to make its own
+response. In our case, however, it is sufficient to build an identical network for the opponent. The only difference is that in the opponent's
+network, the board is interpreted differently: The opponent's board
+position of the original network setup drives the friendly board position
+in the model of the opponent, and the friendly board position in the
+original network drives the opponent board position in the model of the
+opponent. Figure 18 shows a run of the system "mentally simulating"
+the play of a game. The state of the units are shown after every 100
+updates. First, the state of the original network is shown as it settles
+on its move, then the state of the model of the opponent is shown as it
+settles on its move. This continues until the game reaches a conclusion. In this instance, the "simulated player" makes a "mistake" in its
+response to the system's opening. Successive moves show the system
+taking advantage of its own mistake and winning the game.
+CONCLUSION
+We have argued in this book that the analysis of psychological
+phenomena in terms of units, activations of units, connections among
+units, and the action of large coalitions of such units leads us to many
+insights that have not been possible in terms of the language that has
+recently been more popular in cognitive science. In that sense, we may
+be perceived as throwing out the insights gained from the more conventional language and concepts. We are not throwing out such
+insights. In this chapter, we attempt to show the relationship between
+two such insights and our models. At start, we argue that the concept
+of the schema has a correspondence in the PDP framework. In particular, we argue that a schema is best viewed as a coalition of units which
+cohere and that configurations of such coalitions determine the
+interpretations that the system can attain. These stable states
+correspond to instantiated configurations of schemata that can be
+characterized in terms of goodness-of-fit maxima that the system can
+move into. Such processing systems, we argue, have all of the features
+of schemata and more. Among the advantages of this view is that the
+
+units
+friendly
+pieces
+enemy
+pieces
+detety line
+friendly i
+singleton
+detectors
+enemy
+singleton
+detectars
+friendly
+doubleton
+detectars
+enemy
+doubleton
+detectors
+friendly
+pieces
+enemy
+pieces
+empty line
+detectors
+friendly
+singleton
+detectors
+AnemV
+singleton
+detectars
+friendly
+doubleton
+detectors
+enerny
+doubleton
+detectors
+units
+friendly
+pieces
+enemy
+pieces
+empty line
+detectors
+friendly
+singleton
+detectors
+enemy
+singleton
+detectors
+friendly
+daubleton
+detectors
+enemy
+doubleton
+detectars
+units
+friendly
+pieces
+enemy
+pieces
+empty line
+detectors
+friendly
+singleton
+detectors
+enemy
+singleton
+detectors
+friendly
+doubleton
+detectors
+enemy
+doubleton
+detectors
+54
+
+units
+friendly
+pieces
+enemy
+pieces
+empty line
+detectors
+friendly
+singleton
+detectors
+enemy
+singleton
+detectors
+00 9;
+9, 9 9
+• 0
+Po d
+• O
+doubleton
+detectors
+friendly
+pieces
+enemy
+pieces
+mectors
+singleton
+detectors
+enemy i
+singlemon g
+detectors
+triubleton
+detectors
+donemon o
+detectors
+80. 80
+08
+80: 80
+•0
+• =
+Bicy 8 80 8 8 80 80
+• O
+empty line
+friendly
+Sintectors
+enemy
+sinaleton
+detectors
+friendeton
+detectors
+enemy
+doubleton
+detectors
+00: :
+00: : i
+09. : 9
+0 :
+• Q
+• .
+FIGURE 18. The tic-tac-toe system
+mentally simulating the play of a game.
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT
+55
+
+56 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+schema becomes much more fluid and flexible and able to accommodate itself to inputs.
+In more conventional representations there is a
+strong distinction between variables and slots and the bulk of the
+schema. Under our interpretation an aspect of the schema is more or
+less a variable. Even central aspects of the schema can be missing and
+the system can still find a reasonably low energy stable state. If very
+rigid schemata are implicit in the knowledge base, this will show up as
+narrow peaks in the goodness landscape. If more fluid and variable
+schemata are required, the landscape will contain broad plateaus which
+allow for a good deal of movement in the region of the maximum.
+We see the relationship between our models and schema theory as
+discussed by other researchers as largely a matter of levels of analysis.
+This is roughly analogous to the relationship between the level of discussion of fluid dynamics and an underlying level of description involving statistical mechanics. It is often useful to theorize at the level of
+turbulence and different kinds of turbulence, and such a description
+will do for many purposes. However, we can often run up against
+phenomena in which our high-level descriptions will not do, we must
+describe the system in terms of the underlying processes in order to
+understand its behavior. Another feature of this example is our understanding of the phenomena of emergent properties. Turbulence is not
+predicted by the knowledge of the elements of the system; it is inherent
+in the interactions among these elements. Similarly, we do not believe
+that single-unit activity is the appropriate level of analysis. Properties
+of networks "emerge" from the interactions of the elements. Indeed,
+such properties as goodness maxima, etc., are emergent in just this way.
+In general, we see cognitive phenomena as emergent from the interactions of many units. Thus, we take the symbolic level of analysis to
+provide us with an approximation to the underlying system. In many
+cases these approximations will prove useful; in some cases they will be
+wrong and we will be forced to view the system from the level of units
+to understand them in detail.
+We also discussed the relationship between PDP models and the
+more conventional sequential processing systems.
+We believe that
+processes that happen very quickly-say less than .25 to 5 secondsoccur essentially in parallel and should be described in terms of parallel
+models. Processes that take longer, we believe, have a serial component and can more readily be described in terms of sequential
+information-processing models. For these processes, a process description such as a production would, we imagine, provide a useful approximate description. We would caution, however, that when one chooses
+a formalism such as production systems and attempts to use it not only
+to describe the conscious sequential processes that occur at this slow
+time scale, it is important not to fall into the trap of assuming that the
+
+14. SCHEMATA AND SEQUENTIAL THOUGHT
+57
+microstructure of these sequential processes should also be described in
+the same terms. Production systems have the power of Turing
+machines and people often attempt to describe phenomena at this faster
+time scale in terms of the same sequential formalism that seems
+appropriate for the slower time scale. We believe that it will turn out
+that this approach is wrong, that the power of the formalism has led us
+astray. In these cases we suspect that the unit level of analysis will be
+required
+Finally, we showed how the important notion of mental models and
+the related notion of mental simulations play important roles in the
+sequential behavior of a PDP system. We illustrated this point with a
+system which could use a "model of its opponent" to "mentally simulate" a tic-tac-toe game. We suspect that this process will turn out to
+be important when we begin to apply our models to temporally
+extended reasoning and problem-solving tasks.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+This research was supported by Contracts N00014-79-C-0323, NR
+667-437 and N00014-85-K-0450, NR 667-548 with the Personnel and
+Training Research Programs of the Office of Naval Research, by grants
+from the System Development Foundation, and by a NIMH Career
+Development Award (MH00385) to the third author.
+
+CHAPTER 15
+Interactive Processes in
+Speech Perception: The TRACE Model
+J. L. McCLELLAND and J. L. ELMAN
+Consider the perception of the phoneme /g/ in the sentence She
+received a valuable gift. There are a large number of cues in this sentence to the identity of this phoneme. First, there are the acoustic cues
+to the identity of the /g/ itself. Second, the other phonemes in the
+same word provide another source of cues, for if we know the rest of
+the phonemes in this word, there are only a few phonemes that can
+form a word with them.
+Third, the semantic and syntactic context
+further constrain the possible words that might occur, and thus limit
+still further the possible interpretation of the first phoneme in gift.
+There is ample evidence that all of these different sources of information are used in recognizing words and the phonemes they contain.
+Indeed, as R. A. Cole and Rudnicky (1983) have recently noted, these
+basic facts were described in early experiments by Bagley (1900) over
+80 years ago. Cole and Rudnicky point out that recent work (which we
+consider in detail below) has added clarity and detail to these basic
+findings but has not lead to a theoretical synthesis that provides a satisfactory account of these and many other basic aspects of speech
+perception.
+In this chapter, we describe a model that grew out of the view that
+the interactive activation processes that can be implemented in PDP
+This chapter is a condensed version of the article "The TRACE Model of Speech Perception" by J. L. McClelland and J. L. Elman, which appeared in Cognitive Psychology,
+1986, 18, 1-86. Copyright 1986 by Academic Press, Inc. Adapted with permission.
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL 59
+models provide a natural way to capture the integration of multiple
+sources of information in speech perception. This view was based on
+the earlier success of the interactive activation model of word perception (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982)
+in accounting for integration
+of multiple sources of information in
+recognizing letters in words.
+In attempting to apply the ideas embodied in the interactive activation model of word perception to speech, it soon became apparent that
+speech provided many challenges. The model we have come up with,
+the TRACE model, is a response to many of these challenges and
+demonstrates how they can be met within the PDP framework. After
+we developed the model, we discovered many aspects of its behavior
+that are consistent with facts about speech. Thus, we were gratified to
+discover that the search for a mechanism that was sufficient to meet
+many of the challenges also lead to a model that provided quite close
+accounts of a number of basic aspects of the literature on speech perception.
+In what follows, we begin by reviewing several facts about speech
+that played a role in shaping the specific assumptions embodied in
+TRACE. We then describe the structure of the TRACE model and the
+salient features of the two versions we have developed to handle different aspects of the simulations. Following this, we describe how the
+model accounts for a considerable body of psychological data and meets
+some of the computational challenges facing mechanisms of speech perception. The discussion section considers some reasons for the success
+of the model, explains its limitations, and indicates how we plan to
+overcome these in future work.
+SOME IMPORTANT FACTS ABOUT SPEECH
+Our intention here is not to provide an extensive survey of the
+nature of speech, but rather to point to several fundamental aspects of
+speech that have played important roles in the development of the
+TRACE model. A very useful discussion of several of these points is
+available in Klatt (1980).
+Temporal Nature of the Speech Stimulus
+It does not, of course, take a scientist to observe one fundamental
+characteristic of speech: It is a signal that is extended in time.
+This
+differentiates speech perception from most other perceptual applications
+
+60 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+of PDP models, which have generally been concerned with visual
+stimuli.
+The sequential nature of speech poses problems for the modeling of
+contextual influences, in that to account for context effects, it is necessary to keep a record of the context.
+It would be a simple matter to
+process speech if each successive portion of the speech input were processed independently of all of the others, but, in fact, this is clearly not
+the case. The presence of context effects in speech perception requires
+a mechanism that keeps some record of that context, in a form that
+allows it to influence the interpretation of subsequent input.
+Left and Right Context Effects
+A further point, and one that has been much neglected in certain
+models, is that it is not only prior context, but also subsequent context,
+that influences perception. (This and related points have recently been
+made by Grosjean & Gee, 1984; Salasoo & Pisoni, 1985; and Thompson, 1984). For example, Ganong (1980) reported that the identification of a syllable-initial speech sound that was constructed to be
+between /g/ and /k/ was influenced by whether the rest of the syllable
+was / Is/ (as in kiss) or /ift/ (as in gift). Such right context effects
+(Thompson, 1984) indicate that the perception of what comes in now
+both influences and is influenced by the perception of what comes in
+later. This fact suggests that the record of what has already been
+presented cannot be a static representation but should remain in a
+malleable form, subject to alteration as a result of influences arising
+from subsequent input.
+Lack of Boundaries and Temporal Overlap
+A third fundamental point about speech is that the cues to successive
+units of speech frequently overlap in time. The problem is particularly
+severe at the phoneme level. A glance at a schematic speech spectrogram (Figure 1) clearly illustrates this problem. There are no separable
+packets of information in the spectrogram like the separate feature bundies that make up letters in printed words.
+Because of the overlap of successive phonemes, it is difficult, and we
+believe counterproductive, to try to divide the speech stream up into
+separate phoneme units in advance of identifying the units. A number
+of other researchers (e.g., Fowler, 1984; Klatt, 1980) have made much
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+61
+FREQUENCY
+TIME
+FIGURE 1. A schematic spectrogram for the syllable bag, indicating the overlap of the
+information specifying the different phonemes.
+(From "The Grammars of Speech and
+Language" by A. M. Liberman, 1970, Cognitive Psychology, 1, P. 309. Copyright 1970 by
+Academic Press, Inc. Reprinted by permission.)
+the same point. A superior approach seems to be to allow the phoneme
+identification process to examine the speech stream for characteristic
+patterns, without first segmenting the steam into separate units.
+The problem of overlap is less severe for words than for phonemes,
+but it does not go away completely. In rapid speech, words run into
+each other, and there are no pauses between words. To be sure, there
+are often cues that signal the locations of boundaries between wordsstop consonants are generally aspirated at the beginnings of stressed
+words in English, and word initial vowels are generally preceded by
+glottal stops, for example. These cues have been studied by a number
+of investigators, particularly Lehiste (e.g., Lehiste, 1960, 1964) and
+Nakatani and collaborators. Nakatani and Dukes (1977) demonstrated
+that perceivers exploit some of these cues, but found that certain utterances do not provide sufficient cues to word boundaries to permit reliable perception of the intended utterance. Speech errors often involve
+errors of word segmentation (Bond & Garnes, 1980), and certain segmentation decisions are easily influenced by contextual factors (R. A.
+Cole & Jakimik, 1980). Thus, it is clear that word recognition cannot
+count on an accurate segmentation of the phoneme stream into separate
+word units, and in many cases such a segmentation would perforce
+exclude from one of the words a shared segment that is doing double
+duty in each of two successive words.
+
+62 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+Context Sensitivity of Cues
+A fourth major fact about speech is that the cues for a particular unit
+vary considerably with the context in which they occur. For example,
+the transition of the second formant carries a great deal of information
+about the identity of the stop consonant /b/ in Figure 1, but that formant would look quite different had the syllable been big or bog instead
+of bag. Thus, the context in which a phoneme occurs restructures the
+cues to the identity of that phoneme (Liberman, 1970).
+Not only are the cues for each phoneme dramatically affected by
+preceding and following context, they are also altered by more global
+factors such as rate of speech (J. L. Miller, 1981), by morphological
+and prosodic factors such as position in the word and in the stress contour of the utterance, and by characteristics of the speaker such as size
+and shape of the vocal tract, fundamental frequency of the speaking
+voice, and dialectical variations (see Klatt, 1980, and Repp & Liberman, 1984, for discussions).
+A number of different approaches to the problem have been tried by
+different investigators. One approach is to try to find relatively
+invariant-generally relational-features (e.g., Stevens & Blumstein,
+1981). Another approach has been to redefine the unit so that it
+encompasses the context, and therefore becomes more invariant
+(Fujimura & Lovins, 1982; Klatt, 1980; Wickelgren, 1969). While
+these are both sensible and useful approaches, the first has not yet succeeded in establishing a sufficiently invariant set of cues, and the
+second may alleviate but does not eliminate the problem: Even units
+such as demisyllables (Fujimura & Lovins, 1982), context-sensitive
+allophones (Wickelgren, 1969), or even whole words (Klatt, 1980) are
+still influenced by context. We have chosen to focus instead on a third
+possibility: that the perceptual system uses information from the context in which an utterance occurs to alter connections dynamically,
+thereby effectively allowing the context to retune the perceptual
+mechanism in the course of processing.
+Noise and Indeterminacy in the Speech Signal
+To compound all the problems alluded to above, there is the additional fact that speech is often perceived under less than ideal circumstances. While a slow and careful speaker in a quiet room may produce sufficient cues to allow correct perception of all of the phonemes
+in an utterance without the aid of lexical or other higher-level
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL 63
+constraints, these conditions do not always obtain. People can correctly
+perceive speech under quite impoverished conditions if it is semantically coherent and syntactically well-formed (G. A. Miller, Heise, &
+Lichten, 1951). This means that the speech mechanisms must be able
+to function, even with a highly degraded stimulus. In particular, as
+Grosjean and Gee (1984), Norris (1982), and Thompson (1984) have
+pointed out, the mechanisms of speech perception cannot count on
+accurate information about any part of a word. As we shall see, this
+fact poses a serious problem for one of the best current psychological
+models of the process of spoken word recognition, the COHORT model
+of Marslen-Wilson and Welsh (1978).
+Many of the characteristics that we have reviewed differentiate
+speech from print-at least, from very high quality print on white
+paper-but it would be a mistake to think that similar problems are not
+encountered in other domains. Certainly, the sequential nature of spoken input sets speech apart from vision, in which there can be some
+degree of simultaneity of input. However, the problems of ill-defined
+Central pro, coms i vision just ases, and as sey died spinan dee
+Ballard, Hinton, & Sejnowski, 1983; Barrow & Tenenbaum, 1978;
+Marr, 1982). Thus, though the model we present here is focused on
+speech perception, we would hope that the ways in which it deals with
+the challenges posed by the speech signal will be applicable in other
+domains.
+The Importance of the Right Architecture
+All of the considerations listed above played an important role in the
+formulation of the TRACE model. The model is an instance of a PDP
+model, but it is by no means the only instance of such a model that we
+have considered or that could be considered.
+Other formulations we
+considered simply did not appear to offer a satisfactory framework for
+dealing with these central aspects of speech (see Elman & McClelland,
+1984, for discussion). Thus, the TRACE model hinges on the particular processing architecture it proposes for speech perception as well as
+on the PDP mechanisms that implement the interactive activation
+processes that occur within it.
+Sources of TRACE's architecture. The inspiration for the architecture of TRACE goes back to the HEARSAY speech understanding system (Erman & Lesser, 1980; Reddy, Erman, Fennell, & Neely, 1973).
+HEARSAY introduced the notion of a Blackboard, a structure similar
+
+64 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+to the Trace in the TRACE model. The main difference is that the
+Trace is a dynamic processing structure that is self-updating, while the
+Blackboard in HEARSAY was a passive data structure through which
+autonomous processes shared information. The architecture of TRACE
+also bears a resemblance to the neural spectrogram proposed by Crowder
+(1978; 1981) to account for interference effects between successive
+items in short-term memory.
+THE TRACE MODEL
+The TRACE model consists primarily of a very large number of
+units, organized into three levels, the feature, phoneme, and word levels.
+Each unit stands for an hypothesis about a particular perceptual
+object-feature, phoneme, or word-occurring at a particular point in
+time defined relative to
+• the beginning of the utterance. Thus, the
+TRACE model uses local representation.
+A small subset of the units in TRACE II, the version of the model
+with which we will be mostly concerned, is illustrated in Figures 2, 3,
+and 4. Each of the three figures replicates the same set of units, illustrating a different property of the model in each case. In the figures,
+each rectangle corresponds to a separate processing unit. The labels on
+the units and along the side indicate the spoken object (feature,
+phoneme, or word) for which each unit stands. The left and right
+edges of each rectangle indicate the portion of the input the unit spans.
+At the feature level, there are several banks of feature detectors, one
+for each of several dimensions of speech sounds. Each bank is replicated for each of several successive moments in time, or time slices.
+At the phoneme level, there are detectors for each of the phonemes.
+There is one copy of each phoneme detector centered over every three
+time-slices. Each unit spans six time slices, so units with adjacent
+centers span overlapping ranges of slices. At the word level, there are
+detectors for each word. There is one copy of each word detector centered over every three feature slices. Here, each detector spans a
+stretch of feature slices corresponding to the entire length of the word.
+Again, then, units with adjacent centers span overlapping ranges of
+slices.
+Input to the model, in the form of a pattern of activation to be
+applied to the units at the feature level, is presented sequentially to the
+feature-level units in successive slices, as it would be if it were a real
+stream of speech. Mock-speech inputs on the three illustrated dimensions for the phrase tea cup (/tik p/) are shown in Figure 2. At any
+instant, input is arriving only at the units in one slice at the feature
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+65
+Pilli!!!
+Phonemes
+Features
+Acuteness Diffuseness
+Vocalic
+..Z.0.z'ö.z
+10
+-
+^p -
+FIGURE 2. A subset of the units in TRACE II. Each rectangle represents a different
+unit. The labels indicate the item for which the unit stands, and the horizontal edges of
+the rectangle indicate the portion of the Trace spanned by each unit. The input feature
+specifications for the phrase tea cup, preceded and followed by silence, are indicated for
+the three illustrated dimensions by the blackening of the corresponding feature units.
+level. In terms of the display in Figure 2, then, we can visualize the
+input being applied to successive slices of the network at successive
+moments in time. However, it is important to remember that all the
+units are continually involved in processing, and processing of the input
+
+66 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+клр
+-
+P
+Fi!!
+Phonemes
+k
+1 K
+Vocalic
+Features
+Diffuseness
+Acuteness
+FIGURE 3. The connections of the unit for the phoneme /k/, centered over Time-Slice
+24. The rectangle for this unit is highlighted with a bold outline. The / k/ unit has mutually excitatory connections to all the word- and feature-level units colored either partly or
+wholly in black. The more coloring on a unit's rectangle, the greater the strength of the
+connection. The /k/ unit has mutually inhibitory connections to all of the phoneme-level
+units colored partly or wholly in grey. Again, the relative amount of inhibition is indicated by the extent of the coloring of the unit; it is directly proportional to the extent of
+the temporal overlap of the units.
+arriving at one time is just beginning as the input is moved along to the
+next time slice.
+The entire network of units is called the Trace, because the pattern of
+activation left by a spoken input is a trace of the analysis of the input at
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+67
+Phonemes
+621020>* ‹ ..
+Features
+Vocalic
+Diffuseness
+Acuteness
+FIGURE 4. The connections of the highlighted unit for the high value on the vocalic
+feature dimension in Time-Slice 9 and for the highlighted unit for the word /k p/ starting
+in Slice 24. Excitatory connections are represented in black, inhibitory connections in
+gray, as in Figure 3.
+each of the three processing levels. This trace is unlike many traces,
+though, in that it is active since it consists of activations of processing
+elements, and these processing elements continue to interact as time
+goes on.
+The distinction between perception and (primary) memory is
+completely blurred since the percept is unfolding in the same structures
+that serve as working memory, and perceptual processing of older portions of the input continues even as newer portions are coming into the
+
+68 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+system. These continuing interactions permit the model to incorporate
+right context effects and allow the model to account directly for certain
+aspects of short-term memory, such as the fact that more information
+can be retained for short periods of time if it hangs together to form a
+coherent whole.
+Processing takes place through the excitatory and inhibitory interactions of the units in the Trace. Units on different levels that are mutually consistent have mutually excitatory connections, while units on the
+same level that are inconsistent have mutually inhibitory connections.
+All connections are bidirectional. Thus, the unit for the phoneme /k/
+centered over Feature-Slice 24 (shown in Figure 3) has bidirectional
+excitatory connections to feature units that would be activated if the
+input contained that phoneme centered on Time-Slice 24. It also has
+bidirectional excitatory connections to all the units at the word level for
+words containing /k/ at Time-Slice 24.
+The connections of illustrative
+feature- and word-level units are shown in Figure 4. Units on the same
+level are mutually incompatible, and hence mutually inhibitory, to the
+extent that the input patterns they stand for would overlap with each
+other in time. That is to say, units on the same level inhibit each other
+in proportion to the extent of the overlap of their temporal spans, or
+windows. At the feature level, units stand for the content of only a
+single time slice, so they only compete with units standing for other
+values on the same dimension (see Figure 4). At the phoneme and
+word level, however, there can be different degrees of overlap, and
+hence of mutual inhibition. The extent of the mutual inhibition
+between the / k/ in Slice 24 and other phoneme-level units is indicated
+in Figure 3 by the amount of shading that falls over the rectangle for
+the other unit. Similarly, the extent of mutual inhibition between the
+unit for /k p/ starting in Slice 24 and other word-level units is indicated in Figure 4.
+Context-Sensitive Tuning of Phoneme Units
+The connections between the feature and phoneme levels determine
+what pattern of activations over the feature units will most strongly
+activate the detector for each phoneme. To cope with the fact that the
+features representing each phoneme vary according to the phonemes
+surrounding them, the model uses multiplicative connections of the
+kind proposed by Hinton (1981b) and discussed in Chapters 4 and 16.
+These multiplicative connections essentially adjust the connections from
+units at the feature level to units at the phoneme level as a function of
+activations at the phoneme level in preceding and following time slices.
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+69
+For example, when the phoneme / t/ is preceded or followed by the
+vowel /i/, the feature pattern corresponding to the / t/ is very different
+than it is when the /t/ is preceded or followed by another vowel, such
+as /al. Accordingly, when the unit for /i/ in a particular slice is active,
+it changes the pattern of connections for units for /t/ in preceding and
+following slices.
+TRACE I and TRACE II
+In developing TRACE and in trying to test its computational and
+psychological adequacy, we found that we were sometimes led in rather
+different directions.
+We wanted to show that TRACE could process
+real speech, but to build a model that did so, it was necessary to worry
+about exactly what features must be extracted from the speech signal,
+about differences in duration of different features of different
+phonemes, and about how to cope with the ways in which features and
+feature durations vary as a function of context. Obviously, these are
+important problems, worthy of considerable attention. However, concern with these issues tended to obscure attention to the fundamental
+properties of the model and the model's ability to account for basic
+aspects of the psychological data obtained in many experiments.
+To cope with these conflicting goals, we have developed two different versions of the model, called TRACE I and TRACE II. Both
+models spring from the same basic assumptions, but focused on different aspects of speech perception. TRACE I was designed to address
+some of the challenges posed by the task of recognizing phonemes
+from real speech. This version of the model is described in detail in
+Elman and McClelland (in press). With this version of the model, we
+have been able to show that the TRACE framework could indeed be
+used to process real speech-albeit from a single speaker uttering isolated monosyllables at this point. We have also demonstrated the efficacy of the idea of using multiplicative connections to adjust featureto-phoneme connections on the basis of activations produced by surrounding context.
+The second version of the model, TRACE II, will be the main focus
+of this chapter. We developed this version of the model to account for
+lexical influences on phoneme perception and for what is known about
+on-line recognition of words, though we will use it to illustrate how certain other aspects of phoneme perception fall out of the TRACE framework. This version of the model is actually a simplified version of
+TRACE I. Most importantly, we eliminated the connection-strength
+adjustment facility, and we replaced the real speech inputs to TRACE I
+
+70
+with mock speech. This mock-speech input consisted of overlapping
+but contextually invariant specifications of the features of successive
+phonemes. Thus, TRACE II sidesteps many of the issues addressed by
+TRACE 1, but it makes it much easier to see how the mechanism can
+account for a number of aspects of phoneme and word recognition. A
+number of further simplifying assumptions were made to facilitate
+examination of basic properties of the interactive activation processes
+taking place within the model.
+Implementation Details
+The material in this section is included for completeness, but the
+basic line of development may be followed without reading it. Readers
+uninterested in these details may wish to skip to the section on factors
+influencing phoneme identification.
+Units and their dynamics. The dynamic properties of the units in
+TRACE are the same as those used in the interactive activation model
+of visual word perception; these are described in detail in Chapter 2. In
+brief, the model is a synchronous model, in that all the units update
+their activation at the same time, based on the activations computed in
+the previous update cycle. Each unit takes a sum of the excitatory and
+inhibitory influences impinging on it. Each influence is essentially the
+product of the output of the influencing unit and the weight on the
+connection between it and the receiver. If this net input is positive, it
+drives the activation of the unit upward in proportion to the distance
+left to the fixed maximum activation level; if the net input is negative,
+it drives the activation of the unit down in proportion to the distance
+left to the fixed minimum. Activations also tend to decay back to their
+resting activation level, which was fixed at O for all units. The output
+of a unit is O if the activation is less than or equal to O; otherwise it is
+equal to its activation.
+TRACE I. The inputs to TRACE 1 are sets of 15 parameter values
+extracted at 5 msec intervals from syllables spoken by a male native
+speaker of English. The bulk of the TRACE I simulations have been
+done with a set of CV syllables consisting of an unvoiced stop consonant (/p/, /t/, or /k/) followed by one of the vowels /al, /il, and
+/u/, as in the words shah, tea, and who. At the feature level, TRACE I
+consists of detectors for each of eight different value ranges on each of
+the 15 input parameters.
+There is a complete set of detectors for each
+5 msec time slice of the input. Since there are 100 slices, the model is
+capable of processing 500 msec samples of speech.
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+71
+There are no word-level units in TRACE I. However, there are
+phoneme-level units for each successive 15 msec time slice of the
+speech. The connections from the feature to the phoneme units were
+determined by using the perceptron convergence procedure (see
+Chapter 2) under two different conditions. First, in the invariant connections condition, a single set of connection strengths was found for
+each phoneme, using tokens of the phoneme spoken in all different
+contexts. In the context-sensitive connections condition, separate sets
+of connection strengths were found for each stop consonant in the context of each of the vowels.
+TRACE I can be tested either using the invariant connections or
+using the multiplicative context-sensitive connections described above.
+In the latter case, the weights coming into a particular phoneme are
+weighted according to the relative activation of other phonemes in the
+surrounding context. Consider an arbitrary phoneme unit which we
+will designate, for now, the target unit. The strengths of the connections coming into this unit can be designated by the vector w, where
+the elements of the vector are just the individual weights from each
+feature unit to the phoneme unit. This vector is the average over all
+context phonemes k of the context-specific weight vectors appropriate
+for the target phoneme in the context of k, where the contribution of
+each of these context-specific weight vectors is proportional to the
+exponential of the activation of phoneme k summed over the time
+slices adjacent to the target phoneme unit (see Elman & McClelland,
+1986, in press, for further details).
+TRACE II. Inputs to TRACE II are not real speech, but mock
+speech of the kind illustrated in Figure 2. The mock speech is a series
+of specifications for inputs to units at the feature level, one for each 25
+msec time slice of the mock utterance. These specifications are generated by a simple computer program from a sequence of to-bepresented segments provided by the human user of the simulation program. The allowed segments consist of the stop consonants /b/, /p/,
+/d/, /t/, /g/, and /k/; the fricatives /s/ and /S/ (sh as in ship); the
+liquids /1/ and /r/; and the vowels /a/ (as in pot), /i/ (as in beet)
+/u/
+(as in boot), and /^/ (as in but). /^/ is also used to represent reduced
+vowels such as the second vowel in target. There is also a "silence"
+segment represented by /-/. Special segments, such as a segment halfway between /b/ and /p/, can be constructed as well.
+A set of seven dimensions is used in TRACE II to represent the
+feature-level inputs. Of course, these dimensions are intentional simplifications of the real acoustic structure of speech, in much the same
+way that the font used by McClelland and Rumelhart (1981) in the
+interactive activation model of visual word recognition
+was an
+
+72 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+intentional simplification of the real structure of print. Each dimension
+is divided into eight value ranges. Each phoneme has a value on each
+dimension; the values on the vocalic, diffuseness, and acuteness
+dimensions for the phonemes in the utterance / tik p/ are shown in
+Figure 2. The dimensions and the values assigned to each phoneme on
+each dimension are indicated in Table 1. Numbers in the cells of the
+table indicate which value on the indicated dimension is most strongly
+activated by the feature pattern for the indicated phoneme. Values
+range from 1 (very low) to 8 (very high). The last two dimensions
+were altered for the categorical perception and trading relations simulations, as described below.
+Values are assigned to approximate the values real phonemes would
+have on these dimensions and to make phonemes that fall into the
+same phonetic category have identical values on many of the dimensions. Thus, for example, all stop consonants are assigned the same
+values on the power, vocalic, and consonantal dimensions. We do not
+claim to have captured the details of phoneme similarity exactly.
+Indeed, one cannot do so in a fixed feature set because the similarities
+vary as a function of context. However, the feature sets do have the
+property that the feature pattern for one phoneme is more similar to
+the feature pattern for other phonemes in the same phonetic category
+(stop, fricative, liquid, or vowel) than it is to the patterns for phonemes
+PHONEME POW
+PHONEME FEATURE VALUES USED IN TRACE II
+voC
+DIF
+ACU CONS VOl
+1
+2
+2
+b
+d
+g
+S
+7
+BUR
+8
+7
+6
+A un
+3
+4
+6
+6
+4
+4
+7
+7
+6
+1
+8
+4
+2
+8
+8
+8
+8
+8
+8
+POW = power, VOC = vocalicness, DIF = diffuseness, ACU = acuteness,
+CON = consonantal, VOI = voicing, BUR = burst amplitude. Only the
+stops have values on this last dimension.
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+73
+in other categories. Among the stops, those phonemes sharing place of
+articulation or voicing are more similar than those sharing neither
+attribute.
+The feature specification of each phoneme in the input stream
+extends over 11 time slices of the input. The strength of the pattern
+grows to a peak at the sixth slice and falls off again, as illustrated in
+Figure 2. Peaks of successive phonemes are separated by six slices.
+Thus, specifications of successive phonemes overlap, as they do in real
+speech (Fowler, 1984; Liberman, 1970).
+Generally, there are no cues in
+the speech stream to word
+boundaries -the feature specification for the last phoneme of one word
+overlap with the first phoneme of the next in just the same way feature
+specifications of adjacent phonemes overlap within words. However,
+entire utterances presented to the model for processing-be they individual syllables, words, or strings of words-are preceded and followed
+by silence. Silence is not simply the absence of any input; rather, it is a
+pattern of feature values, just like the phonemes. Thus, a ninth value
+on each of the seven dimensions is associated with silence.
+These
+values are actually outside the range of values that occurred in the
+phonemes themselves so that the features of silence are completely
+uncorrelated with the features of any of the phonemes.
+TRACE II contains a unit for each of the nine values on each of the
+seven dimensions, in each time slice of the Trace.
+At the phoneme
+level, each Trace contains a detector for each of the 15 phonemes and a
+detector for the presence of silence. The silence detectors are treated
+like all other phoneme detectors. Each member of the set of detectors
+for a particular phoneme is centered over a different time-slice at the
+feature level, and the centers are spaced three time-slices apart. The
+unit centered over a particular slice receives excitatory input from
+feature units in a range of 11 slices, extending both forward and backward from the slice in which the phoneme unit is located. It also sends
+excitatory feedback down to the same feature units in the same range
+of slices.
+The connection strengths between the feature-level units and a particular phoneme-level
+unit exactly
+match the feature pattern the
+phoneme is given in its input specification. Thus, as illustrated in
+Figure 3, the strengths of the connections between the unit for /k/
+centered over Time-Slice 24 and the units at the feature level are
+exactly proportional to the pattern of input to the feature level produced by an input specification containing the features of /k/ centered
+in the same time slice
+TRACE Il also contains detectors for the 211 words found in a computerized phonetic word list that met all of following criteria: (a) The
+word consisted only of phonemes in the list above; (b) it was not an
+
+74 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+inflection of some other word that could be made by adding ed, s, or
+ing; and (c) the word together with its ed, s, and ing inflections
+occurred with a frequency of 20 or more per million in the Kucera and
+Francis (1967) word count. It is not claimed that the model's lexicon is
+an exhaustive list of words meeting these criteria since the computerized phonetic lexicon was not complete, but it is reasonably close to
+this. To make specific points about the behavior of the model, detectors for the following three words not in the main list were added:
+blush, regal, and sleet. The model also has detectors at the word level
+for silence (/-/), which is treated like a one-phoneme word.
+Presentation and processing of an utterance. Before processing of
+an utterance begins, the activations of all of the units are set at their
+resting values. At the start of processing, the input to the initial slice
+of feature units is applied. Activations are then updated, ending the
+initial time cycle. On the next time cycle, the input to the next slice of
+feature units is applied, and excitatory and inhibitory inputs to each
+unit resulting from the pattern of activation left at the end of the previous time slice are computed
+It is important to remember that the input is applied, one slice at a
+time, proceeding from left to right as though it were an ongoing stream
+of speech "writing on" the successive time slices of the Trace. The
+interactive activation process is occurring throughout the Trace on each
+time slice, even
+though the external input is only coming in to the
+feature units one slice at a time. Processing interactions can continue
+even after the left to right sweep through the input reaches the end of
+the Trace. Once this happens, there are simply no new input specifications applied to the Trace; the continuing interactions are based on
+what has already been presented. This interaction process is assumed
+to continue indefinitely, though for practical purposes it is always terminated after some predetermined number of time cycles has elapsed.
+Activations and overt responses. Activations of units in the Trace
+rise and fall as the input sweeps across the feature level. At any time, a
+decision can be made based on the pattern of activation as it stands at
+that moment. The decision mechanism can, we assume, be directed to
+consider the set of units located within a small window of adjacent
+slices within any level. The units in this set then constitute the set of
+response alternatives, designated by the identity of the item for which
+the unit stands (note that with several adjacent slices included in the
+set, several units in the alternative set may correspond to the same
+overt response). Word-identification responses are assumed to be
+based on readout from the word level, and phoneme-identification
+responses are assumed to be based on readout from the phoneme level.
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+75
+As far as phoneme identification is concerned, then, a homogeneous
+mechanism is assumed to be used with both word and nonword stimuli.
+The decision mechanism can be asked to make a response either (a) at
+a critical time during processing, or (b) when a unit in the alternative
+set reaches a critical strength relative to the activation of other alternative units. Once a decision has been made to make a response, one of
+the alternatives is chosen from the members of the set. The probability
+of choosing a particular alternative i is then given by the Luce (1959)
+choice rule:
+p (R;) =
+ES;
+where j indexes the members of the alternative set, and S; = eka;
+i. The
+exponential transformation ensures that all activations are positive and
+gives great weight to stronger activations; the Luce rule ensures that
+the sum of all of the response probabilities adds up to 1.0. Substantially the same assumptions were used by McClelland and Rumelhart
+(1981).
+Parameters. At the expense of considerable realism, we have tried
+to keep both TRACE I and TRACE II simple by using homogeneous
+parameters wherever possible. The strength of the total excitation coming into a particular phoneme unit from the feature units is normalized
+to the same value for all phonemes, thus making each phoneme equally
+excitable by its own canonical pattern. Other simplifying assumptions
+should be noted as well. For example, there are no differences in connections or resting levels for words of different frequency. It would
+have been a simple matter to incorporate frequency as McClelland and
+Rumelhart (1981) did, and a complete model would, of course, include
+some account for the ubiquitous effects of word frequency. We left
+it out here to facilitate an examination of the many other factors
+that appear to influence the process of word recognition
+in speech
+perception.
+Even with all the simplifications described above, TRACE II still has
+10 free parameters; these are listed in Table 2. There was some trial
+and error in finding the set of parameters used in the reported simulations, but, in general, the qualitative behavior of the model is remarkably robust under parameter variations, and no systematic search of the
+space of parameters is necessary.
+In all the reported simulations using TRACE II, the parameters were
+held at the values given in Table 2. The only exception to this
+occurred in the simulations of categorical perception and trading relations. Since we were not explicitly concerned with the effects of feedback to the feature level in any of the other simulations, we set the
+
+76
+PARAMETERS OF TRACE II
+Parameter
+Feature-Phoneme Excitation
+Phoneme-Word Excitation
+Word-Phoneme Excitation
+Phoneme-Feature Excitation
+Feature-Level Inhibition
+Phoneme-Level Inhibition*
+Word-Level Inhibition*
+Feature-Level Decay
+Phoneme-Level Decay
+Word-Level Decay
+Value
+.02
+.05
+.03
+.00
+.04
+.04
+.03
+01
+.03
+.05
+*Per 3 time slices of overlap.
+feedback from the phoneme level to the feature level to zero to speed
+up the simulations in all other cases. In the categorical perception and
+trading relations simulations this parameter was set at 0.05. Phonemeto-feature feedback tended to slow the effective rate of decay at the
+feature level and to increase the effective distinctiveness of different
+feature patterns. Rate of decay of feature level activations and strength
+of phoneme-to-phoneme competition were set to 0.03 and 0.05 to compensate for these effects. No lexicon was used in the categorical perception and trading relations simulations, which is equivalent to setting
+the phoneme-to-word excitation parameter to zero. In TRACE 1, the
+parameters were tuned separately to compensate for the finer time scale
+of that version of the model.
+FACTORS INFLUENCING PHONEME IDENTIFICATION
+We are ready to examine the performance of TRACE, to see how
+well it can account for psychological data on the process of speech perception and, to determine how well it can cope with the computational
+challenges posed by speech. In this section we consider the process of
+phoneme identification. In the next section we examine several aspects
+of word recognition. The sections may be read independently, in either
+order.
+In the introduction, we motivated the approach taken in the TRACE
+model in general terms. In this section, we will see that the simple
+concepts that lead to TRACE provide the basis for a coherent and synthetic account of a large number of different kinds of findings on the
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL 77
+perception of phonemes. Previous models have been able to provide
+fairly accurate accounts of a number of these phenomena. For example, Massaro and Oden's feature integration model (Massaro, 1981;
+Massaro & Oden, 1980a, 1980b; Oden & Massaro, 1978) accounts in
+detail for a large body of data on the influences of multiple cues to
+phoneme identity, and the
+Pisoni/ Fujisaki-Kawashima model of
+categorical perception (Fujisaki & Kawashima, 1968; Pisoni, 1973,
+1975) accounts for a large body of data on the conditions under which
+subjects can discriminate sounds within the same phonetic category.
+Marslen-Wilson's COHORT model (Marslen-Wilson & Welsh, 1978)
+can account for the time course of certain aspects of lexical influences
+on phoneme identification. Recently Fowler (1984) has proposed an
+interesting account of the way listeners cope with coarticulatory influences on the acoustic parameters of speech sounds. Here we will show
+that TRACE brings these phenomena, and several others not considered by any of these other models, together into a coherent picture
+of the process of phoneme perception as it unfolds in time.
+This section consists of four main parts. The first focuses on lexical
+effects on phoneme identification and the conditions under which these
+effects are obtained. The second part of this section focuses on the
+question of the role of phonotactic rules-that is, rules specifying which
+phonemes can occur together in English-in phoneme identification.
+Here,
+we see how TRACE mimics the apparently rule-governed
+behavior of human subjects, in terms of a "conspiracy" of the lexical
+items that instantiate the rule. The third part focuses on two aspects of
+phoneme identification often considered quite separately from lexical
+effects-namely, the contrasting phenomena of cue tradeoffs in
+phoneme perception and categorical perception. The simulations in the
+first three parts were all done using TRACE II. The fourth part
+describes our simulations with TRACE I, illustrating how the
+connection-modulation mechanisms embedded in that version of the
+model account for the fact that listeners appear to alter the cues they
+use to identify phonemes in different contexts.
+Lexical Effects
+You can tell a phoneme by the company that it keeps. ' In this section, we describe a simple simulation of the basic lexical effect on
+1 This title is adapted from the title of a talk by David E. Rumelhart on related
+phenomena in letter perception. These findings are described in Rumelhart and McClelland (1982).
+
+78 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+phoneme identification reported by Ganong (1980). We start with this
+phenomenon because it, and the related phonemic restoration effect,
+were among the primary reasons why we felt that the interactive activation mechanisms provided by PDP models would be appropriate for
+speech perception, as well as visual word recognition and reading
+For the first simulation, the input to the model consisted of a feature
+specification which activated /b/ and /p/ equally, followed by (and partially overlapping with) the feature specifications for /1/, then /^/, then
+/g/. Figure 5 shows phoneme- and word-level activations at several
+points in the unfolding of this input specification. Each panel of the
+figure represents a different point in time during the presentation and
+concomitant processing of the input. The upper portion of each panel is
+used to display activations at the word level; the lower panel is used for
+activations at the phoneme level. Each unit is represented by a rectangle labeled with the identity of the item the unit stands for. The horizontal extension of the rectangle indicates the portion of the input
+spanned by the unit. The vertical position of the rectangle indicates the
+degree of activation of the unit. In this and subsequent figures, activations of the phoneme units located between the peaks of the input
+specifications of the phonemes (at Slices 3, 9, 15, etc.) have been
+deleted from the display for clarity. The input itself is indicated below
+each panel, with the successive phonemes positioned at the temporal
+positions of the centers of their input specifications. The "^" along the
+x-axis represents the point in the presentation of the input stream at
+which the snapshot was taken.
+The figure illustrates the gradual build-up of activation of the two
+interpretations of the first phoneme, followed by gradual build-ups in
+activation for subsequent phonemes. As these processes unfold, they
+begin to produce word-level activations. It is difficult to resolve any
+word-level activations in the first few frames, however, since in these
+frames, the information at the phoneme level simply has not evolved to
+the point where it provides enough constraint to select any one particular word. It is only after the /g/ has come in that the model has information telling it whether the input is closer to plug, plus, blush, or blood
+(TRACE's lexicon contains no other words beginning with /pl / or
+/bl /). After that point, as illustrated in the fourth panel, plug wins the
+competition at the word level, and through feedback support to /p/,
+causes /p/ to dominate / b/ at the phoneme level. The model, then,
+provides an explicit account for the way in which lexical information
+can influence phoneme identification.
+Factors influencing the lexical effect. There is now a reasonable
+body of literature on lexical effects on phoneme identification. One
+important property of this literature is the fact that the lexical effect is
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+79
+Word
+0.45+
+0.30
+0.15
+pEg
+Activation
+-
+-
+-
+-T
+d
+1-g-
+P
+B'
+r
+-
+b
+1-g-
+฿
+g
+-
+-
+a
+d
+b
+1-g-
+P
+-
+a
+-
+b
+1-g-
+FIGURE 5. Phoneme- and word-level activations at several points in the unfolding of a
+segment ambiguous between /b/ and /p/, followed by /1/. /^/, and /g/. See text for a
+full explanation.
+often somewhat difficult to obtain. For example, Fox (1982, 1984)
+found that the lexical effect can be eliminated by time pressure.
+Ganong reported that the lexical effect only shows up with segments
+that are ambiguous; we know that in running speech, people often perceived as correctly pronounced words with deliberate errors (Marslen-
+Wilson & Welsh, 1978), but at the beginnings of isolated words lexical
+influences appear to lead to misperceptions of unambiguous tokens of
+phonemes. In reaction time studies, it has been observed by Foss and
+Blank (1980) that there is no lexical effect on the reaction time to
+detect word-initial phonemes.
+Many of these findings have been taken as evidence against the view
+that top-down influences really play a role in normal perceptual processing (Foss & Gernsbacher, 1983), and only come into play in a postperceptual stage of processing (Fox, 1982). However, we observe the
+same results in simulations with TRACE, where top-down influences
+are always at work. The reason why lexical effects do not emerge until
+late in processing for word-initial targets is simply that the contextual
+information is not available until then. The reason why lexical effects
+do not emerge with word-initial targets that are not ambiguous is simply
+that the bottom-up information is there to identify the target, long
+before the contextual information would be available.
+Simulations
+demonstrating the absence of lexical effects for word-initial segments
+
+80
+under speeded conditions or when the segment is unambiguous are
+described in McClelland and Elman (in press)
+The crucial observations concern what happens with lexical effects on
+word-final segments. It is well known that lexical effects are larger
+later in words than they are at the beginnings of words (Marslen-
+Wilson & Welsh, 1978) and can be obtained in reaction time studies
+even with unambiguous segments (Marslen-Wilson, 1980).
+TRACE produces stronger lexical effects when the target comes late
+in the word, simply because the context is already providing top-down
+support for the target when it starts to come in under these circumstances.
+We illustrate by comparing response strength for the
+phoneme / t/ in / sikr^t/ (the word secret) and in the nonword /g^ ld't/
+(guldut) in Figure 6. The figure shows the strength of the / t/ response
+as a function of processing cycles, relative to all other responses based
+on activations of phoneme units centered at Cycle 42, the peak of the
+input specification for the /t/. Clearly, response strength grows faster
+for the /t/ in / sikrt/ than for the / t/ in /g^ ld^t/; picking an arbitrary
+threshold of 0.9 for response initiation, we find that the / t/ in / sikr^ t/
+reaches criterion about 3 cycles or 75 msec sooner than the / t/ in
+/ğldt/. The size of the effect Marslen-Wilson (1980) obtains is quite
+comparable to the effect observed in Figure 6.
+t
+Strength
+1.00
+0.80
+0.60
+-
+0.40
+-
+0.20
+0.00
+sikr-t
+g-ld-t
+6
+12
+LLIL
+18 24 30 36 42
+48
+54
+Processing Cycles
+60
+66
+72
+FIGURE 6. Probability of the /t/ response as a function of processing cycles, based on
+acia erica lines teets ate pele of the hpur pam eris or responding do the stes-
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL 81
+Are Phonotactic Rule Effects the Result of a Conspiracy?
+Recently, Massaro and M. M. Cohen (1983) have reported evidence
+they take as support for the use of phonotactic rules in phoneme identification. In one experiment, Massaro and Cohen's stimuli consisted of
+phonological segments ambiguous between /r/ and /1/ in different contexts. In one context (/t_i/), /r/ is permissible in English, but /1/ is
+not. In another context (/s_i/), /I/ is permissible in English but / r/ is
+not. In a third context (/f_i/), both are permissible, and in a fourth
+(/v_il), neither is permissible.
+Massaro and Cohen found a bias to
+perceive ambiguous segments as /r/ when /r/ was permissible, or as
+/1/ when /1/ was permissible. No bias appeared in either of the other
+two conditions.
+With most of these stimuli, phonotactic acceptability is confounded
+with the actual lexical status of the item; thus /fli/ and / fri/ (flee and
+free) are both words, as is /tri/ but not / tli/. In the / s_i/ context,
+however, neither / sli/ or / sri/ are words, yet Massaro and Cohen
+found a bias to hear the ambiguous segment as /1/, in accordance with
+phonotactic rules.
+It turns out that TRACE produces the same effect, even though it
+lacks phonotactic rules. The reason is that the ambiguous stimulus produces partial activations of a number of words (sleep and sleet in the
+model's lexicon; it would also activate sleeve, sleek, and others in a
+model with a fuller lexicon). None of these word units gets as active as
+it would if the entire word had been presented. However, all of them
+(in the simulation, there are only two, but the principle still applies) are
+partially activated, and all conspire together and contribute to the
+activation of /1/. This feedback support for the /1/ allows it to dominate the /r/, just as it would if / sli/ were an actual word, as shown in
+Figure 7.
+The hypothesis that phonotactic rule effects are really based on word
+activations leads to a prediction: We should be able to reverse these
+effects if we present items that are supported strongly by one or more
+lexical items even if they violate phonotactic rules. A recent experiment by Elman (1983) confirms this prediction. In this experiment,
+ambiguous phonemes (for example, halfway between /b/ and /d/)
+were presented in three different types of contexts. In all three types,
+one of the two (in this case, the /d/) was phonotactically acceptable,
+while the other (the /b/) was not. However, the contexts differed in
+their relation to words. In one case, the legal item actually occurred in
+a word (bwindle/dwindle). In a second case, neither item made a word,
+but the illegal item was very close to a word (bwacelet/dwacelet). In a
+third case, neither item was particularly close to a word (bwiffle/dwiffle).
+
+82
+Is L
+§slit?
+-s
+-5
+[si
+Est
+-s i-
+st
+-
+-
+-
+- S
+r'-
+- s!
+1 -
+1
+-S
+i -
+- S
+i-
+FIGURE 7. State of the Trace at several points in processing a segment ambiguous
+between /1/ and /r/ in the context/s_il. The units for sleep (/slip/) and sleet (/ slit/)
+are boxed together since they take on identical activation values.
+Results of the experiment are shown in Table 3. The existence of a
+word identical to one of the two alternatives or differing from one of
+the alternatives by a single phonetic feature of one phoneme strongly
+influenced the subjects' choices between the two alternatives. Indeed,
+in the case where the phonotactically irregular alternative (bwacelet)
+was one feature away from a particular lexical item (bracelet), subjects
+tended to hear the ambiguous item in accord with the similar lexical
+item (that is, as a /b/) even though it was phonotactically incorrect.
+TABLE 3
+PERCENT CHOICE OF PHONOTACTICALLY IRREGULAR CONSONANT
+Percentage of Identifications
+as "Illegal" Phoneme (/ b/)*
+Stimulus Type
+Legal word/ illegal nonword
+Legal nonword/illegal nonword
+Legal nonword/ illegal near-word
+Example
+dwindle/bwindle
+dwiffle/bwiffle
+dwacelet/ bwacelet
+37%
+46%
+55%
+*F(2,34) = 26.414, p < .001
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL 83
+To determine whether the model would also produce such a reversal
+of the phonotactic rule effects with the appropriate kinds of stimuli, we
+ran a simulation using a simulated input ambiguous between /p/ and
+/t/ in the context /_luli/. /p/ is phonotactically acceptable in this context, but /t/ in this context makes an item that is very close to the
+word truly. The results of this run, at two different points during processing, are shown in Figure 8. Early on in processing, there is a slight
+bias in favor of the /p/ over the / t/ because at first a large number of
+/pl/ words are slightly more activated than any words beginning with
+/t/. Later, though, the /t/ gets the upper hand as the word truly comes
+to dominate at the word level. Thus, by the end of the word or shortly
+thereafter, the closest word has begun to play a dominating role, causing the model to prefer the phonotactically inappropriate interpretation
+of the ambiguous initial segment.
+Of course, at the same time the word truly tends to support /r/ rather
+than /1/ for the second segment. Thus, even though this segment is
+not ambiguous and the /1/ would suppress the / r/ interpretation in a
+more neutral context, the /r/ stays quite active.
+truli
+trul
+tt rut
+rul
+trut
+-
+#FaR
+1
+r
+ti tr
+-
+1
+ari
+Pr
+pr
+a
+-
+-
+r
+-
+a
+-
+a
+-
+-
+-11011-
+FIGURE 8. State of the Trace at several points in processing an ambiguous / p/-/1/ segment followed by / luli/.
+
+84 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+Trading Relations and Categorical Perception
+In the simulations considered thus far, phoneme identification is
+influenced by two different kinds of factors: featural and lexical. When
+one sort of information is lacking, the other can compensate for it.
+The image that emerges from these kinds of findings is of a system that
+exhibits great flexibility by being able to base identification decisions on
+different sources of information. It is, of course, well established that
+within the featural domain each phoneme is generally signaled by a
+number of different cues and that human subjects can trade these cues
+off against each other. The TRACE model exhibits this same flexibility, as we shall detail shortly.
+But there is something of a paradox. While the perceptual mechanisms exhibit great flexibility in the cues that they rely on for phoneme
+identification, they also appear to be quite "categorical" in nature. That
+is, they produce much sharper boundaries between phonetic categories
+than we might expect based on their sensitivity to multiple cues; and
+they appear to treat acoustically distinct feature patterns as perceptually
+equivalent, as long as they
+are identified as instances of the same
+phoneme.
+In this section, we illustrate that in TRACE, just as in human speech
+perception, flexibility in feature interpretation coexists with a strong
+tendency toward categorical perception.
+For these simulations, the model was stripped down to the essential
+minimum necessary so that the basic mechanisms producing cue tradeoffs and categorical perception could be brought to the fore.
+The word
+level was eliminated altogether, and at the phoneme level there were
+only three phonemes, /al, /g/, and /k/, plus silence (/-/). From
+these four items, inputs and percepts of the form /-ga-/ and /-ka-/
+could be constructed. The following additional constraints were
+imposed on the feature specifications of each of the phonemes: (a) the
+/a/ and / -/ had no featural overlap with either /g/ or /k/ so that neither /a/ nor /-/ would bias the activations of the / g/ and /k/ phoneme
+units where they overlapped with the consonant in time; (b) /g/ and
+/k/ were identical on five of the seven dimensions and differed only on
+the remaining two dimensions.
+The two dimensions which differentiated /g/ and /k/ were voice
+onset time (VOT) and the onset frequency of the first formant (FIOF).
+These dimensions replaced the voicing and burst amplitude dimensions
+used in all of the other simulations.
+Figure 9 illustrates how FIOF
+tends to increase as voice onset time is delayed.
+Trading relations. TRACE quite naturally tends to produce trading
+relations between features since it relies on the weighted sum of the
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+85
+FREQUENCY
+2000
+1500
+1000
+500
+50
+100
+TIME
+150
+300
+FIGURE 9. Schematic diagram of a syllable that will be heard as / ga/ or / kal, depending on the point is the syllable at which voicing begins. Before the start of voicing, F2
+(top curve) and F3 are energized by aperiodic noise sources, and Fl is "cut back"
+noise source has little or no energy in this range). Because of the fact that Fl rises over
+time after syllable onset (as the vocal tract moves from a shape consistent with the consonant into a shape consistent with the vowel), its frequency at the onset of voicing is
+higher for later values of VOT. Parameters used in constructing this schematic syllable
+are derived from Kewley-Port (1982).
+excitatory inputs to determine how strongly the input will activate a
+particular phoneme unit. All else being equal, the phoneme unit
+receiving the largest sum bottom-up excitation will be more strongly
+activated than any other and will therefore be the most likely response
+when a choice must be made between one phoneme and another.
+Since the net bottom-up input is just the sum of all of the inputs, no
+one input is necessarily decisive in this regard.
+Generally, experiments demonstrating trading relations between two
+or more cues manipulate each of the cues over a number of values
+ranging between a value more typical of one of two phonemes and a
+value more typical of the other. Summerfield and Haggard (1977) did
+this for VOT and FIOF and found the typical result, namely, that the
+value of one cue that gives rise to 50% choices of /k/ was affected by
+the value of the other cue: The higher the value of FIOF, the shorter
+the value of VOT needed for 50% choices of /k/. Unfortunately, they
+did not present full curves relating phoneme identification to the values
+used on each of the two dimensions. In lieu of this, we present curves
+in Figure 10 from a classic trading relations experiment by Denes
+(1955). Similar patterns of results have been reported in other studies,
+using other cues (e.g., Massaro, 1981), though the transitions are often
+somewhat steeper.
+
+86
+PERCENTAGE
+F VOICELESS.
+JUDGME
+VOWEL
+DURATION
+• 50 MSEC
+• 100 MSEC
+150 MSEC
+A 200 MSEC
+100
+150
+200
+FRICATION DURATION (MSEC)
+250
+FIGURE 10. Results of an experiment demonstrating the trade-off between two cues to
+the identity of /s/ and /z/. Data from Denes, 1955, reprinted and fitted by the model of
+Massaro and Cohen. (From "The Contribution of Voice-Onset Time and Fundamental
+Frequency as Cues to the / zi/-/si/ Distinction" by D. W. Massaro and M. M. Cohen,
+1977, Perception & Psychophysics, 22, p. 374. Copyright 1977 by the Psychonomic Society.
+Reprinted by permission.)
+To demonstrate that TRACE would simulate the basic tradeoff
+effect, we generated a set of 25 intermediate phonetic segments made
+up by pairing each of five different intermediate patterns on the VOT
+dimension with each of five different intermediate patterns on the
+FIOF dimension. The different feature patterns used on each dimension are shown in Figure 11, along with the canonical feature patterns
+for /g/ and /k/ on each of the two dimensions. On the remaining five
+dimensions, the intermediate segments all had the common canonical
+feature values for /g/ and /k/.
+The model was tested with each of the 25 stimuli, preceded by
+silence (/-/) and followed by /a-/. The peak on the intermediate
+phonetic segment occurred at Slice 12, the peak of the following vowel
+occurred at Slice 18, and the peak of the final silence occurred at Slice
+24. For each input presented, the interactive activation process was
+allowed to continue through a total of 60 time slices, well past the end
+of the input. At the end of the 60th time slice, we recorded the activation of the units for /g/ and /k/ in Time-Slice 12 and the probability of
+choosing /g/ based on these activations. It makes no difference to the
+general pattern of the results if a different decision time is used.
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+87
+1.00
+Strength of Input
+/g/ 12345 /k/
+0.75
+0.50
+0.25
+0.00
+-
+2
+3
+LIL
+4
+5
+6
+Voice Onset Time
+8
+9
+10
+1.00
+/g/ 12345
+/k/
+0.75
+0.50
+0.25
+0.00
+1
+2
+3
+5
+6
+7
+F1 Onset Frequency
+8
+9
+10
+FIGURE 11. Canonical feature level input for /g/ and /k/, on the lwo dimensions that
+distinguish them, and the patterns used for the five intermediate values used in the trading relations simulation. Along the abscissa of each dimension, the nine units for the
+nine different value ranges of the dimension are arrayed. The curves labeled /g/ and /k/
+indicate the relative strength of the excitatory input to each of these units produced by
+the indicated phoneme. The canonical curves also indicate the strengths of the feature to
+phoneme connections for /g/ and /k/ on these dimensions.
+Response probabilities computed using the formulas given earlier are
+shown in Figure 12 for each of the 25 conditions of the experiment.
+The pattern of results is quite similar to that obtained in Denes' (1955)
+experiment on the /s/-/z/ continuum. The contribution of each cue is
+approximately linear and additive in the middle of the range, and the
+curves flatten out at the extremes, as in the Denes (1955) experiment.
+More importantly, the model's behavior exhibits the ability to trade one
+cue off against another. In terms of Summerfield and Haggard's measure, the value of VOT needed to achieve 50% probability of reporting
+
+88
+Probability of Choosing /k/
+1.00
+0.40
+0.00
+3
+1
+2
+3
+Voice Onset Time
+6
+FIGURE 12. Simulated probability of choosing / k/ at Time-Slice 60, for each of the 25
+stimuli used in the trading relations simulation experiment. Numbers next to each curve
+refer to the intermediate pattern on the FIOF continuum used in the 5 stimuli contributing to each curve. Higher numbers correspond to higher values of FIOF.
+/k/, we can see that the VOT needed increases as the FIOF decreases,
+just as these investigators found.
+Categorical perception. In spite of the fact that TRACE is quite
+flexible in the way it combines information from different features to
+determine the identity of a phoneme, the model is quite categorical in
+its overt responses. This is illustrated in two ways: First, the model
+shows a much sharper transition in its choices of responses as we move
+from /g/ to /k/ along the VOT and FIOF dimensions than we would
+expect from the slight changes in the relative excitation of the /g/ and
+/k/ units. Second,
+the model tends to obliterate differences between
+different inputs which it identifies as the same phoneme, while sharpening differences between inputs assigned to different categories. We
+will consider each of these two points in turn, after we describe the
+stimuli used in the simulations.
+Eleven different consonant feature patterns were used, embedded in
+the same simulated /-_a-/ context as in the trading relations simulation.
+The stimuli varied from very low values of both VOT and FIOF, more
+extreme than the canonical /g/, through very high values on both
+dimensions, more extreme than the canonical / k/. All the stimuli were
+spaced equal distances apart on the VOT and FIOF dimensions. The
+locations of the peak activation values on each of these two continua
+are shown in Figure 13.
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+89
+/g/
+/k/
+1 2 3 4 56 7 8 91011
+2
+voice Ônset Time
+7
+8
+/g/
+/k/
+12 3 4 5 6 7 8 91011
+1
+FI Onset Frequency
+8
+FIGURE 13. Locations of peak activations along the VOT and FIOF dimensions, for
+each of the 11 stimuli used in the categorical perception simulation.
+Figure 14 indicates the relative initial bottom-up activation of the /g/
+and /k/ phoneme units for each of the 11 stimuli used in the simulation. The first thing to note is that the relative bottom-up excitations
+of the two phoneme units differ only slightly. For example, the canonical feature pattern for /g/ sends 75% as much excitation to /g/ as it
+sends to /k/. The feature pattern two steps toward /g/ from /k/
+(stimulus number 5), sends 88% as much activation to /g/ as to /k/.
+The figure also indicates, in the second panel, the resulting activations of the units for /g/ and /k/ at the end of 60 cycles of processing.
+The slight differences in net input have been greatly amplified, and the
+activation curves exhibit a much steeper transition than the relative
+bottom-up excitation curves.
+There are two reasons why the activation curves are so much sharper
+than the initial bottom-up excitation functions. The primary reason is
+competitive inhibition. The effect of the competitive inhibition at the
+phoneme level is to greatly magnify the slight difference in the excitatory inputs to the two phonemes. It is easy to see why this happens.
+
+90
+/g/
+/k/
+Init
+al
+Exci
+tion
+1.00
+0.75
+0.50
+0 25
+0.00
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+7
+8
+Stimulus Number
+9
+10
+11 12
+Phoneme Node Activation
+1.00
+075
+/g/
+/k/
+0.50
+0.25
+0.00
+-0.25
+1
+2
+3
+4
+6
+Stimulus Number
+9
+10
+11
+12
+FIGURE 14. Effects of competition on phoneme activations. The first panel shows relative amounts of bottom-up excitatory input to /g/ and /k/ produced by each of the 11
+stimuli used in the categorical perception simulation. The second panel shows the activations of units for /g/ and /k/ at Time-Cycle 60.
+Stimuli 3 and 9 correspond to the
+canonical /g/ and /k/, respectively.
+Once one phoneme is slightly more active than the other, it exerts a
+stronger inhibitory influence on the other than the other can exert on
+it. The net result is that "the rich get richer." This general property of
+competitive inhibition mechanisms has
+been noted many times
+(Grossberg, 1976; Levin, 1976; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981). A
+second cause of the sharpening of the activation curves is the
+phoneme-to-feature feedback, which we will consider in detail in a
+moment.
+The identification functions that result from applying the Luce choice
+rule to the activation values shown in the second panel of Figure 14 are
+shown in Figure 15 along with the ABX discrimination function, which
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL 91
+ID Prob / FC Accuracy
+1.00
+0.80
+0.60
+0.40
+0.20
+0.00
+-0.20
+/g/
+/k/
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+Stimulus
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+FIGURE 15. Simulated identification functions and forced-choice accuracy in the ABX
+will be discussed later. The identification functions are even sharper
+than the activation curves; there is only a 4% chance that the model
+will choose /k/ instead of /g/ for Stimulus 5, for which /k/ receives
+88% as much bottom-up support as /g/. The increased sharpness is
+due to the properties of the response strength assumptions. These
+assumptions essentially implement the notion that the sensitivity of the
+decision mechanism, in terms of d' for choosing the most strongly
+activated of two units, is a linear function of the difference in activation
+of the two units. When the activations are far enough apart, d' will be
+sufficient to ensure near-100% correct
+units have greater than zero activation. Performance, even though both
+In TRACE, the categorical output of the model comes about only
+after an interactive competition process that greatly sharpens the differences in the activation of the detectors for the relevant units. This
+interactive process takes time. In the simulation results reported here,
+we assumed that subjects waited a fixed time before responding. But, if
+we assume that subjects are able to respond as soon as the response
+strength ratio reaches some critical level, we would find that subjects
+2 Many readers will note that the apparent sharpness of the identification functions
+shown in Figure 15 contrasts with the much shallower functions shown previously in the
+trading relations simulations. The reason for this is simply that the stimuli are spaced
+more closely together in the trading relations simulation than in the categorical perception
+case. This follows the standard experimental practice of emphasizing gradualness in
+trade-off experiments and sharpness in categorical perception experiments (Lane, 1965).
+
+92 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+would be able to respond more quickly to stimuli near the prototype of
+each category than they can to stimuli near the boundary. This is
+exactly what was found by Pisoni and Tash (1974).
+There is another aspect to categorical perception as exhibited by
+TRACE. This is the fact that feedback from the phoneme to the
+feature level tends to cause the model to obliterate the differences
+between input feature patterns that result in the identification of the
+same phoneme. This allows the model to account for poor withincategory discrimination and good between-category discrimination-the
+second hallmark of categorical perception. 3 The way it works is this.
+When a feature pattern comes in, it sends more excitation to some
+phoneme units than others; as they become active, they begin to compete, and one gradually comes to dominate the others. This much we
+have already observed. But as this competition process is going on,
+there is also feedback from the phoneme level to the feature level.
+Thus, as a particular phoneme becomes active, it tends to impose its
+canonical pattern of activation on the feature level. The effect of the
+feedback becomes particularly strong as time goes on since the feature
+input only excites the feature units very briefly; the original pattern of
+activation produced by the phoneme units is, therefore, gradually
+replaced by the canonical pattern imposed by the feedback from the
+phoneme level. The result is that the pattern of activation remaining at
+the feature level after 60 cycles of processing has become assimilated to
+the prototype. In this way, feature patterns for different inputs
+assigned to the same category are rendered nearly indistinguishable.
+This effect is illustrated in Figure 16, which shows how different
+pairs of patterns of activation at the feature level are at the end of 60
+cycles of processing.
+The measure of ditference is simply 1 - lab,
+where rab stands for the correlation of the patterns produced by stimuli
+a and b. Only the two dimensions which actually differ between the
+canonical /g/ and /k/ are considered in the difference measure.
+3 Strictly speaking, at least as defined by Liberman, Cooper, Shankweiler, and
+Studdert-Kennedy (1967), true categorical perception is only exhibited when the ability to
+discriminate different sounds is no better than could be expected based on the assumption that the only basis a listener has for discrimination is the categorical assignment of
+the stimulus to a particular phonetic category. However, it is conceded that "true"
+categorical perception in this sense is never in fact observed (Studdert-Kennedy, Liberman, Harris, & Cooper, 1970). While it is true that the discrimination of sounds is much
+better for sounds that perceivers assign to different categories than for sounds they assign
+to the same category, there is also at least a tendency for discrimination to be somewhat
+better than predicted by the identification function, even between stimuli that are always
+assigned to the same category. TRACE II produces this kind of approximate categorical
+perception.
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+93
+0.40
+0.30
+Difference
+(1
+0.20
+0.10
+0.00
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+Stimulus Number
+FIGURE 16. Differences between patterns of activation at the feature level at Cycle 60,
+for pairs of stimuli one step apart along the /g/-/k/ continuum used for producing the
+identification functions shown previously in Figure 15.
+To relate the difference between two stimuli to probability correct
+choice performance in the ABX task generally used in categorical perception experiments, we once again use the Luce (1959) choice model.
+The probability of identifying stimulus x with alternative a is given by
+Sax
+P(Ry=a) = -
+Sax + Sox
+where Sax is the "strength" of the similarity between a and x. This is
+given simply by the exponential of the correlation of a and x,
+Sax = ekrax
+and similarly for So. Here, k, is the parameter that scales the relation
+between correlations and strengths. The resulting response probabilities
+are shown in Figure 15.
+Basically, the figures show that the effect of feedback is to make the
+feature patterns for inputs well within each category more similar than
+those for inputs near the boundary between categories. Differences
+between stimuli near the prototype of the same phoneme are almost
+obliterated. When two stimuli straddle the boundary, the feature level
+patterns are much more distinct. As a result, the probability of
+correctly discriminating stimuli within a phoneme category is much
+lower than the probability of discriminating
+stimuli in different
+categories.
+
+94 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+Like the completion process considered earlier, the process of
+"canonicalization" of the representation of a speech sound via the feedback mechanism takes time. During this time, two things are happening: One is that the activations initially produced by the speech input
+are decaying; another is that the feedback, which drives the representation toward the prototype, is building up. In the simulations, we
+allowed a considerable amount of time for these processes before computing similarities of different activation patterns to each other. Obviously, if we had left less time, there would not have been as much of
+an opportunity for these forces to operate. Thus, TRACE is in agreement with the finding that there tends to be an increase in withincategory discrimination when a task is used that allows subjects to base
+their responses on judgments of the similarity of stimuli spaced closely
+together in time (Pisoni & Lazarus, 1974).
+It should be noted that it would be possible to account for categorical
+perception in TRACE without invoking feedback from the phoneme
+level to the feature level. All we would need to do is assume that the
+feature information that gives rise to phoneme identification is inaccessible, as proposed by the motor theory of speech perception (Liberman,
+Cooper, Shankweiler, & Studdert-Kennedy, 1967), or is rapidly lost as
+proposed by the dual code model (Fujisaki & Kawashima, 1968; Massaro, 1975, 1981; Pisoni, 1973, 1975). The dual code model has had
+considerable success accounting for categorical perception data and
+accounts for all the aspects of categorical perception discussed thus far.
+Both feedback models and dual code models can also accommodate
+the fact that vowels show less of a tendency toward categorical perception than consonants (Fry, Abramson, Eimas, & Liberman, 1962;
+Pisoni, 1973). It is simply necessary to assume that vowel features are
+more persistent than consonant features (Crowder, 1978, 1981; Fujisaki
+& Kawashima, 1968; Pisoni, 1973, 1975). However, the two classes of
+interpretations do differ in their predictions of performance in discriminating two stimuli, both away from the center of a category, but still
+within it. Here, TRACE tends to show greater discrimination than it
+shows between stimuli squarely in the middle of a category. Standard
+interpretations of categorical perception can account for increases in
+discriminability near the boundary between two categories (where identification may in fact be somewhat variable) by assuming that marginal
+stimuli are more likely to give rise to different category labels. But
+TRACE can account for increases in discriminability at extreme values
+of feature continua which would not give rise to different category
+labels. In TRACE, the reason for this increase in discriminability is
+that the activation of the appropriate item at the phoneme level is
+weaker, and therefore the feedback signal is weaker than it is when the
+input occurs near the center of the category. This results in less
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL 95
+canonicalization of the extreme stimuli and produces a W-shaped
+discrimination function, as shown in Figure 16. Few studies of categorical perception use stimuli that extend far enough into the extreme
+ranges of each phonetic category to observe reliable W-shaped curves;
+however, Samuel (1977) did carry out such a study and obtained just
+such W-shaped discrimination curves.
+In summary, TRACE appears to provide a fairly accurate account of
+the phenomena of cue trade-offs and categorical perception of speech
+sounds. It accounts for categorical perception without relying on the
+notion that the phenomenon depends on read-out from an abstract
+level of processing; it assumes instead that the feature level, like other
+levels of the system, is subject to feedback from higher levels which
+actually changes the representation as it is being retained in memory,
+pushing it toward a canonical representation of the phoneme most
+strongly activated by the input.
+Retuning of Phoneme Detectors by Context
+In our simulations of trading relations, we have shown that the boundary between phonetic categories on one dimension can be affected by
+inputs on other dimensions. Other factors also influence the phoneme
+perceived as a result of particular featural input. The identity of
+phonemes surrounding a target phoneme, the rate of speech of a syllable in which a particular feature value occurs, as well as characteristics
+of the speaker and the language being spoken all influence the interpretations of features. See Repp and Liberman (1984) for a review of
+these effects.
+In TRACE,
+we account for local, coarticulatory influences on
+phoneme identification by assuming that activations of phoneme units
+can modulate the feature to phoneme connections among units in adjacent time slices. This idea provides one way of implementing what
+Fowler (1984) has called a factoring of coarticulatory influences out of
+the pattern of activation produced by a feature pattern at the phoneme
+level. The modulation of connections can also account for the fact that
+phoneme boundaries shift as a function of local phonetic context
+(Mann & Repp, 1980). In simulations using TRACE I, we were able to
+improve the performance of the model in identifying the correct consonant at the beginning of a CV syllable from 79% correct without
+using connection modulation to 90% correct with connection modulation in place. Interestingly, the model is capable of generalizing from
+the connection strengths appropriate for the vowels it has been trained
+
+96 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+on to other vowels, such as /e/, which fall between those on which it
+was trained. Figure 17 shows phoneme-level activations produced by
+the same token of the syllable / de/ with connection modulation turned
+on, in the upper panel, and off, in the lower panel. Though other units
+are activated in both cases, units for /d/ tend to dominate in the
+former case, but not the latter.
+It has been suggested by J. L. Miller, Green, and Schermer (1984)
+that lexical effects and semantic and syntactic influences on phoneme
+identification may be due to a different mechanism than influences of
+such variables as speech rate and coarticulatory influences due to local
+phonetic context. The assumptions we have incorporated into TRACE
+d
+d
+phoneme node activation
+d
+t
+i
+P
+i
+dodddddddde
+-
+e e
+-
+-
+- -
+k
+d
+P d
+P
+-
+t
+daddadddadeeeeeeee e e
+FIGURE 17. Activation of phoneme units resulting from the input /de/, with variable
+connection strengths enabled, in the upper panel, and disabled, in the lower panel. The
+/d/ units are depicted using a larger font just to increase their visibility.
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+97
+make a similar distinction. Lexical effects are due to the additional
+source of input to the phoneme level provided by units at the word
+level. This is quite different from the connection modulation mechanism we have used to account for coarticulatory influences. In the discussion, we will consider ways of extending the connection modulation
+idea to
+accommodate effects of variations
+rate and speaker
+parameters.
+Summary of Phoneme Identification Simulations
+We have considered a number of phenomena concerning the identification and perception of phonemes. These include lexical influences on
+phoneme
+identification and the lack
+thereof
+under certain circumstances; phonotactic rule effects on phoneme identification and the
+role of specific lexical items in influencing these effects; the integration
+of multiple cues to phoneme identity; and the categorical nature of the
+percept that results from this integration. We have also seen how connection modulation can be used to implement context-sensitive
+phoneme detectors, thereby allowing the model to improve its performance in identifying real speech and to account for effects of phonetic
+context on boundaries between phonemes. TRACE integrates all of
+these phenomena into a single account that incorporates aspects of the
+accounts offered for particular aspects of these results by other models.
+In the next section, we show how TRACE can also encompass a
+number of phenomena concerning the recognition of spoken words.
+THE TIME COURSE OF SPOKEN WORD RECOGNITION
+The study of spoken word recognition has a long history, and many
+models have been proposed. Morton's now-classic logogen model
+(Morton, 1969) was the first to provide an explicit account of the
+integration of contextual and sensory information in word recognition.
+Other models of this period (e.g., Broadbent, 1967) concentrated primarily on effects of word frequency. Until the midseventies, however,
+there was little explicit consideration of the time course of spoken word
+recognition. Several studies by Marslen-Wilson and his collaborators
+(Marslen-Wilson, 1973; Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1975), and by
+R. A. Cole and
+I his collaborators (Cole, 1973; Cole & Jakimik, 1978,
+1980) pioneered the investigation of this problem.
+
+98 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+Marslen-Wilson's COHORT model (Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980;
+Marslen-Wilson & Welsh, 1978) of speech perception was based on this
+early work on the time course of spoken word recognition. The
+COHORT model was one of the sources of inspiration for TRACE for
+two main reasons. First, it provided an explicit account of the way
+top-down and bottom-up information could be combined to produce a
+word recognition mechanism that actually worked in real time. Second,
+it accounted for the findings of a number of important experiments
+demonstrating the on-line character of the speech recognition process.
+However, several deficiencies of the COHORT model have been
+pointed out, as we shall see.
+Because TRACE was motivated in large part by a desire to keep what
+is good about COHORT and improve upon its weaknesses, we begin
+this section by considering the COHORT model in some detail. First
+we review the basic assumptions of the model, then consider its
+strengths and weaknesses.
+There appear to be four basic assumptions of the COHORT model:
+1. The model uses the first sound (in Marslen-Wilson & Tyler,
+1980, the initial consonant-cluster-plus-vowel) of the word to
+determine which words will be in an initial cohort or candidate
+set.
+2. Once the candidate set is established, the model eliminates
+words from the cohort immediately,
+as each
+successive
+phoneme arrives, if the new phoneme fails to match the next
+phoneme in the word. Words can also be eliminated on the
+basis of semantic constraints, although the initial cohort is
+assumed to be determined by acoustic input alone.
+3. Word recognition occurs immediately, as soon as the cohort has
+been reduced to a single member; in an auditory lexical decision task, the decision that an item is a nonword can be made
+as soon as there are no remaining members in the cohort.
+4. Word recognition can influence the identification of phonemes
+in a word only after the word has been recognized.
+There is a considerable body of data that supports various predictions
+of the COHORT model. It has been observed in a variety of paradigms
+that lexical influences
+on phoneme identification responses are much
+greater later in words than at their beginnings (Bagley, 1900; R. A.
+Cole & Jakimik, 1978, 1980; Marslen-Wilson, 1980; Marslen-Wilson
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL 99
+* Welsh, 1978). We considered some ot this evidence in earlier sections. Another important finding supporting COHOR is the tact that
+the reaction time to decide that an item is a nonword is constant when
+measured from the occurrence of the first phoneme that rules out the
+last remaining word in the cohort (Marslen-Wilson, 1980).
+Perhaps the most direct support for the basic word-recognition
+assumptions of COHORT comes from the gating paradigm, introduced
+first by Grosjean (1980). In this paradigm, subjects are required to
+guess the identity of a word after hearing successive presentations of
+the word. The first presentation is cut off so that the subject hears only
+the first N msec (N = 30 to 50 in different studies). Later presentations are successively lengthened in N msec increments until eventually
+the whole word is presented. The duration at which half the subjects
+correctly identify the word is called the isolation point. Considerably
+more input is required before subjects are reasonably sure of the identity of the word; that point is termed the acceptance point. Grosjean's
+initial study confirmed many basic predictions of COHORT, though it
+also raised a few difficulties for it (see below). In a more recent study
+using the same method, Tyler and Wessels (1983) carried out a very
+close analysis of the relation between the empirically determined isolation point and the point at which the input the subject has received is
+consistent with one and only one remaining item-the point at which
+recognition would be expected to occur in the COHORT model. They
+report that the isolation point falls very close to this theoretically
+derived recognition point, strongly supporting the basic immediacy
+assumptions of the COHORT model.
+It should be noted that the gating task is not a timed task, and so it
+does not provide a direct measure of what the subject knows as the
+speech input is unfolding. However, it is now in fairly wide use, and
+Cotton and Grosjean (1984) have established that the basic patterns of
+results obtained in Grosjean's (1980) pioneering gating experiment do
+not depend on the presentation of successively longer and longer
+presentations of the same stimulus.
+A dilemma for COHORT. Though the COHORT model accounts
+for a large body of data, there are several difficulties with it. We consider first the one that seems the most serious: as stated, COHORT
+requires accurate, undistorted information about the identity of the
+phonemes in a word up to the isolation point. Words cannot enter into
+consideration unless the initial consonant-cluster-plus-vowel is heard,
+and they are discarded from it as soon as a phoneme comes along that
+they fail to match. No explicit procedure is described for recovering
+words into the cohort once they have been excluded from it or when
+
+100 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+the beginning of the word is not accurately perceived due to noise or
+elision.
+These aspects of COHORT make it very difficult for the model to
+explain recognition of words with distorted beginnings, such as dwibble
+(Norris, 1982), or words whose beginnings have been replaced by noise
+(Salasoo & Pisoni, 1985). From a computational point of view, this
+makes the model an extremely brittle one; in particular, it fails to deal
+with the problem of noise and underspecification which is so crucial for
+recognition of real speech (Thompson, 1984).
+The recognizability of distorted items like dwibble might be taken as
+suggesting that all we need to do is liberalize the criterion for entering
+and retaining words in the cohort. Thus, the cohort could be defined
+as the set of words consistent with what has been heard or mild deviations (e.g., one or two features) from what has been heard. This would
+allow mild distortions like replacing /r/ with /w/ not to disqualify a
+word from the cohort. It would also allow the model to cope with cases
+where the beginning of the word is underspecified; in these cases, the
+initial cohort would simply be larger than in the case where the input
+clearly specified the initial phonemes.
+However, there is still a problem. Sometimes we need to be able to
+rule out items that mismatch the input on one or two dimensions and
+sometimes we do not. Consider the items pleasant and blacelet. In the
+first case, we need to exclude present from the cohort, so the slight
+difference between /1/ and / r/ must be sufficient to rule it out; in the
+second case, we do not want to lose the word bracelet, since it provides
+the best fit overall to the input. Thus, in this case, the difference
+between /1/ and / r/ must not be allowed to rule a word candidate out.
+Thus the dilemma: On the one hand, we want a mechanism that will
+be able to select the correct word as soon as an undistorted input specifies it uniquely, to account for the Tyler and Wessels results. On the
+other hand, we do not want the model to completely eliminate possibilities that might later turn out to be correct. We shall shortly see that
+TRACE provides a way out of this dilemma.
+Another problem for COHORT. Grosjean (1985) has recently
+pointed out another problem for COHORT, namely, the possibility that
+the subject may be uncertain about the location of the beginning of
+each successive word. A tacit assumption of the model is that the subject goes into the beginning of each word knowing that it is the beginning. In the related model of R. A. Cole and Jakimik (1980), this
+assumption is made explicit. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to
+know in advance where one word starts and the next word ends. As we
+discussed in the introduction, acoustic cues to juncture are not always
+reliable, and in the absence of acoustic cues, even an optimally efficient
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+101
+mechanism cannot always know that it has heard the end of one word
+until it hears enough of the next to rule out the possible continuations
+of the first word.
+What is needed, then, is a model that can account for COHORT's
+successes and overcome these two important deficiencies. The next
+two sections show that TRACE does quite well on both counts. The
+first of these sections examines TRACE's behavior in processing words
+whose beginnings and endings are clearly delineated for it by the pres
+ence of silence. The second considers the processing of multiword
+inputs, which the model must parse for itself.
+One Word at a Time
+In this section, we see how TRACE resolves the dilemma facing
+COHORT, in that it is immediately sensitive to new information but is
+still able to cope with underspecified or distorted word beginnings. We
+also consider how the model accounts for the preference for short-word
+responses early in processing a long word. The section concludes with a
+discussion of ways the model could be extended to account for word
+frequency and contextual influences.
+Competition
+vs. bottom-up inhibition.
+TRACE deals with
+COHORT's dilemma by using competition
+rather than phoneme-toword inhibition. The essence of the idea is simply this: Phoneme units
+have excitatory connections to all the word units they are consistent
+with. Thus, whenever a phoneme becomes active in a particular slice
+of the Trace, it sends excitation to all the word units consistent with
+that phoneme in that slice. The word units then compete with each
+other; items that contain each successive phoneme in a sequence dominate all others, but, if no word matches perfectly, a word that provides
+a close fit to the phoneme sequence can eventually win out over words
+that provide less adequate matches.
+Consider, from this point of view, our two items pleasant and blacelet
+again. In the first instance, pleasant will receive more bottom-up excitation than present and so will win out in the competition. We have
+already seen, in our analysis of categorical perception at the phoneme
+level, how even slight differences in initial bottom-up excitation can be
+magnified by the joint effects of competition and feedback; but the real
+beauty of the competition mechanism is that this action is contingent
+on the activation of other word candidates. Thus, in the case of blacelet, since there is no word blacelet, bracelet will not be suppressed.
+Initially, it is true, words like blame and blatant will tend to dominate
+
+102 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+bracelet, but, since the input matches bracelet better than any other
+word, bracelet will eventually come to dominate the other possibilities.
+This behavior of the model is illustrated
+using examples from its
+restricted lexicon in Figure 18.
+In one case, the input is legal, and the
+word regal is completely dominated by legal. In the other case, the
+input is lugged, and the word rugged eventually dominates because there
+is no word lugged (pronounced to rhyme with rugged-the word lug is
+not in the model's lexicon). Here, rugged must compete with other partial matches of lugged, of course, and it is less effective in this regard
+than it would be if the input exactly matched it, but it does win out in
+the end.
+It should be noted that the details of what word will be most strongly
+activated in such cases depend on a number of factors, including, in
+particular, the distinctiveness of mismatching phonemes. Also, it is
+possible to find cases in which a word that correctly spans a part of a
+longer string dominates a longer word that spans the whole string but
+misses out on a phoneme in one place or another. An item like
+vigorette may or may not be a case in point. In such cases, though, the
+most important thing might not turn out to be winning or losing, but
+rather the fact that both tend to stay in the game. Such neologisms can
+suggest a poetic conjunction of meanings, if used just right: "He walked
+briskly down the street, puffing his vigorette."
+Time course of word recognition in TRACE. So far we have shown
+how TRACE overcomes a difficulty with the COHORT model in cases
+where the beginning of a word has been distorted. In earlier sections
+on phoneme processing, some of the simulations illustrate that the
+model is capable of recognizing words with underspecified (i.e., ambiguous initial phonemes. In this section, we examine how well TRACE
+emulates the COHORT model in cases where the input is an undistorted representation of some particular word. In particular, we wanted
+to see how close TRACE would come to behaving in accord with
+COHORT's assumption that incorrect words are dropped from the
+cohort of active candidates as soon as the input diverges from them.
+To examine this process, we considered the processing of the word
+product (/ prad" ct/). Figure 19 shows the state of the Trace at various
+points in processing this word, and Figure 20 shows the response
+strengths of several units relative to the strength of the word product
+itself, as a function of time relative to the arrival of the successive
+phonemes in the input. In the latter figure, the response strength of
+product is simply given as 1.0 at each time slice and the response
+strengths of units for other words are given relative to the strength of
+product. The curves shown are for the words trot, possible, priest, progress, and produce; these words differ from the word product (according
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+103
+Tig -1
+Lig
+i
+g
+ra
+и а
+ig - 1-
+Tig
+Elat
+- 118.
+a
+-lig-l-
+E1-K
+tigh
+- 1iB-,-
+-
+-
+r
+-lig- 1-
+-
++2
+I -K
+I-ki
+I -KS-ri
+p Fa,
+FaK-
+g
+-
+k d
+- r
+a t
+฿
+-1-g-d-
+-1-
+g'a-
+~d-
+g
+฿
+a
+k
+-
+-
+-
+-1-g~d-
+-1-g-d-
++2
+FIGURE 18. State of the Trace at three points during the processing of legal and lugged.
+
+104
+Prad -kt
+Er
+pradus
+Bradust
+rad
+pradust
+-
+- P
+- P
+ra
+- P
+rad-k
+a
+-
+r
+g
+g
+-
+b
+d
+ub
+g
+-prad-kt-
+-prad-kt-
+-prad-kt-
+-prad-kt-
+FIGURE 19. State of the Trace at various points in processing the word product
+(/prad kt/).
+seches murd, fo pron, amd sires less enced, refectively. Figure 20
+shows that these items begin to drop out just after each successive
+phoneme comes in. Of course, there is nothing hard and fast or absolute about dropping a candidate in TRACE. What we see instead is that
+mismatching candidates simply begin to fade as the input diverges from
+them in favor of some other candidate. This is just the kind of
+behavior the COHORT model would produce in this case, though, of
+course, the drop-off would be assumed to be an abrupt, discrete event."
+There is one aspect of TRACE's behavior which differs from
+COHORT: Among those words that are consistent with the input up to
+a particular point in time, TRACE shows a bias in favor of shorter
+words over longer words. Thus, priest has a slight advantage before the
+/a/ comes in, and produce is well ahead of product until the / / comes
+in (in phonemes, produce is one shorter than product).
+4 The data reported by Tyler and Wessels actually appears to indicate an even more
+immediate drop-off than is seen in this simulation. However, it should be remembered
+that the curves shown in Figure 20 are on-line response strength curves, and thus reflect
+the lags inherent in the percolation of input from the feature to the word level. The gating task, on the other hand, does not require subjects to respond on-line. If the input is
+simply turned off at the peak of each phoneme's input specification and then allowed to
+run free for a few cycles, the dropout point shifts even earlier.
+
+Relative Response Strength
+d
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+t
+105
+0.00
+18
+24 30 36 4248
+54
+60
+66
+72
+Processing Cycles
+FIGURE 20. Response strengths of the units for several words relative to the response
+strength of the unit for product (/ prad kt/), as a function of time relative to the peak of
+the first phoneme that fails to match the word. The successive curves coming off of the
+horizontal line representing the normalized response strength of product are for the words
+trot, possible, priest, progress, and produce, respectively. In our lexicon they are rendered
+as/trat//pas b'l/,/prist/,/ pragrs/, and/pradus/, respectively.
+This advantage for shorter words is due to the competition mechanism. Recall that word units compete with each other in proportion to
+the overlap of the sets of time slices spanned by each of the words.
+Overlap is, of course, symmetrical, so long and short words inhibit each
+other to an equal extent; but longer words suffer more inhibition from
+other long words than short words do. For example, progress and probable inhibit product more than they inhibit priest and produce. Thus,
+units for longer words are generally subjected to extra inhibition, particularly early on in processing when many candidates are active, and so
+they tend to suffer in comparison to short words as a result.
+We were at first somewhat disturbed by this aspect of the model's
+behavior, but it turns out to correspond quite closely with results
+obtained in experiments by Grosjean (1980) and Cotton and Grosjean
+(1984) using the gating paradigm. Both papers found that subjects
+hearing the beginnings of words like captain tended to report shorter
+words consistent with what they had heard (e.g., cap). However, we
+should observe that in the gating paradigm, when the word captain is
+truncated just after the /p/, it will sound quite a bit like cap followed by
+silence. In TRACE, this silence would activate silence units at the
+phoneme and word levels, and the word-level silence units would compete with units for words that extend into the silence. The silence will
+reinforce the preference of the model for short-word interpretations
+
+106 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+because the detection of the silence will inhibit the detector for the
+longer word. Thus, there are actually two reasons why TRACE might
+favor short-word interpretations over long-word interpretations in a gating experiment.
+Whether human subjects show a residual preference
+for shorter interpretations over longer ones in the absence of a following silence during the course of processing is not yet clear from available data.
+We should point out that the experimental literature indicates that
+the advantage of shorter words over longer ones holds only under the
+special circumstances of gated presentation and then only with early
+gates, when shorter words are relatively more complete than longer
+ones would be. It has been known for a long time that longer words
+are generally more readily recognized than shorter ones when the whole
+word is presented for identification against a background of noise (Licklider & Miller, 1951). Presumably, the reason for this is simply that
+longer words generally provide a larger number of cues than shorter
+words do, and hence are simply less confusable.
+Frequency and context effects. There are, of course, other factors
+that influence when word recognition will occur, beyond those we have
+considered thus far. Two very important ones are word frequency and
+contextual predictability. The literature on these two factors goes back
+to the turn of the century (Bagley, 1900). Morton's (1969) logogen
+model effectively deals with several important aspects of this huge
+literature, though not with the time course of these effects.
+We have not yet included either word frequency or higher-level contextual influences in TRACE, though, of course, we believe they are
+important. Word frequency effects could be accommodated, as they
+were in the interactive activation model of word recognition, in terms
+of variation in the resting activation level of word units or in terms of
+variation in the strength of phoneme-to-word connections. Contextual
+influences can be thought of as supplying activation to word units from
+even higher levels of processing than the word level. In this way, basic
+aspects of these two kinds of influences can be captured. We leave it
+to future research, however, to determine to what extent these elaborations of TRACE would provide a detailed account of the data on the
+roles of these factors. For now, we turn to the problem of determining
+where one word ends and the next one begins.
+Lexical Basis of Word Segmentation
+How do we know when one word ends and the next word begins?
+This is by no means an easy task, as we noted in the introduction. To
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL 107
+recap our earlier argument, there are some cues in the speech stream,
+but as several investigators have pointed out (R. A. Cole & Jakimik,
+1980; Grosjean & Gee, 1984; Thompson, 1984), they are not always
+sufficient, particularly in fluent speech. It would appear that there is an
+important role for lexical knowledge to play in determining where one
+word ends and the next word begins, as well as in identifying the
+objects that result from the process of segmentation. Indeed, as Reddy
+(1976) has suggested, segmentation and identification may simply be
+joint results of the mechanisms of word recognition.
+R. A. Cole and Jakimik (1980) discuss these points and present evidence that semantic and syntactic context can guide segmentation in
+cases where the lexicon is consistent with two readings (car go vs.
+cargo). Our present model lacks syntactic and semantic levels, so it
+cannot make use of these higher-level constraints; but it can make use
+of its knowledge about words, not only to identify individual words in
+isolation, but to pick out a sequence of words in continuous streams of
+phonemes. Word identification and segmentation emerge together
+from the interactive activation process as part and parcel of the process
+of word activation.
+This section considers several aspects of the way in which word segmentation emerges from the interactive activation process, as observed
+in simulations with TRACE II. Before we consider these, it is worth
+recalling the details of some of the assumptions made about the
+bottom-up activation of word units and about competitive inhibition
+between word units. First, the extent to which a particular phoneme
+excites a particular word unit is independent of the length of the word.
+Second, the extent to which a particular word unit will inhibit another
+word unit is proportional to the temporal overlap of the two word units.
+This means that words which do not overlap in time will not inhibit
+each other but will gang up on other words that partially overlap each
+of them. These two assumptions form most of the basis of the effects
+we will observe in the simulations.
+The boundary is in the ear of the "behearer." First, we consider the
+basic fact that the number of words we will hear in a sequence of
+phonemes can depend on our knowledge of the number of words the
+sequence makes. Consider the two utterances she can't and secant.
+Though we can say either item in a way that makes it sound like a single word or like two words, there is an intermediate way of saying them
+so that the first seems to be two words and the second seems like only
+one.
+To see what TRACE II would do with single and multiple word
+inputs, we ran simulation experiments with each individual word in the
+main 211-word lexicon preceded and followed by silence, and then with
+
+108 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+211 pairs of words, with a silence at the beginning and at the end of the
+entire stream. The pairs were made by simply permuting the lexicon
+twice and then abutting the two permutations so that each word
+occurred once as the first word and once as the second word in the
+entire set of 211 pairs.
+We stress, of course, that real speech would
+tend to contain cues that would mark word boundaries in many cases;
+the experiment is simply designed to show what TRACE can do in
+cases where these cues are lacking.
+With the individual words, TRACE made no mistakes-that is, by a
+few slices after the end of the word, the word that spanned the entire
+input was more strongly activated than any other word. An example of
+this is shown using the item / parti/ in Figure 21. The stream / parti/
+might be either one word (party) or two (par tea, or par tee-the model
+knows of only one word pronounced /ti/). At early points in processing the word, par dominates over party and other longer words for reasons discussed in the previous section. By the time the model has had
+a chance to process the end of the word, however, party comes to dominate.
+Why does a single longer word eventually win out over two shorter
+ones in TRACE? There are two main reasons. First of all, a longer
+word eventually receives more bottom-up support than either shorter
+word, simply because there are more phonemes activating the longer
+word than the shorter word. The second reason has to do with the
+parti
+Apart
+ipar
+par
+palk
+Baft
+parti
+parkhi
+parti
+part
+parti
+ISHt
+- P
+a
+- P
+art
+i-
+art
+i
+U1P
+-
+-
+ul u
+- parti-
+- parti-
+- parti-
+-parti-
+FIGURE 21. The state of the Trace at various points during processing of / parti/.
+-
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+109
+sequential nature of the input. In the case of / parti/, by the time the
+/ ti/ is coming in, the word party is well enough established that it keeps
+/ti/ from getting as strongly activated as it would otherwise. This
+behavior of the model leads to the prediction that short words imbedded in the ends of longer words should not get as strongly activated as
+shorter words coming earlier in the longer word. This prediction could
+be tested using the gating paradigm or a cross-modal priming paradigm
+such as the one used by Swinney (1982).
+However, it should be noted that this aspect of the behavior of the
+model can be overridden if there is bottom-up information favoring the
+two-word interpretation. Currently, this can only happen in TRACE
+through the insertion of a brief silence between the par and the tea. As
+shown in Figure 22, this results in par and tea dominating all other
+word candidates.
+What happens when there is no long word that spans the entire
+stream, as in / barti/? In this case, the model settles on the two word
+interpretation bar tea, as shown in Figure 22. Note that other words,
+such as art, that span a portion of the input, are less successful than
+either bar or tea. The reason is that the interpretations bar and art
+overlap with each other, and art and tea overlap with each other, but
+bar and tea do not overlap. Thus, art receives inhibition from both bar
+parti
+ip a ri
+ba r
+parki
+E
+it i
+parti
+par tr
+art
+part i
+bark
+kip
+partit
+_.Par'i
+_Par-ti-
+-arti
+- Par
+-
+parti-
++3
+-
+-
+- par-ti-+3
+-
+P
+-
+-barti-
++3
+-
+-
+-parki-
++3
+FIGURE 22. State of the Trace after processing the streams / parti/, / par-ti/, / barti/,
+and / parki/.
+
+110 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+and tea, while bar and tea each receive inhibition only from art. Thus,
+two words that do not overlap with each other can gang up on a third
+word that each overlaps with partly and drive it out.
+These remarkably simple mechanisms of activation and competition
+do a very good job of word segmentation without the aid of any syllabification, stress, phonetic word-boundary cues, or semantic and syntactie constraints. In 189 of the 211 word pairs tested in the simulation
+experiment, the model came up with the correct parse, in the sense
+that no other word was more active than either of the two words that
+had been presented. Some of the failures of the model occurred in
+cases where the input was actually consistent with two parses, either a
+longer spanning word rather than a single word (as in party) or a different parse into two words, as in part rust for par trust. In such cases
+TRACE tends to prefer parses in which the longer word comes first.
+There were, however, some cases in which the model did not come up
+with a valid parse, that is, a pattern than represents complete coverage
+of the input by a set of nonoverlapping words. For example, consider
+the input / parki/. Though this makes the two words par and key, the
+word park has a stronger activation than either par or key, as illustrated
+in Figure 22.
+This aspect of TRACE I's behavior indicates that the present version of the model is far from the final word on word segmentation. A
+complete model would also exploit syllabification, stress, and other cues
+to word identity to help eliminate some of the possible interpretations
+of TRACE II's simple phoneme streams. The activation and competition mechanisms in TRACE Il are sufficient to do quite a bit of the
+word segmentation work, but we do not expect them to do this perfectly in all cases without the aid of other cues.
+Some readers may be troubled by a mechanism that does not insist
+upon a parse in which each phoneme is covered by one and only one
+word. Actually, though, this characteristic of the model is often a virtue, since in many cases, the last phoneme of a word must do double
+duty as the first phoneme of the next, as in hound dog or brush shop.
+While speakers tend to signal the doubling in careful speech, the cues
+to single vs. double consonants are not always sufficient for disambiguation, as is clear when strings with multiple interpretations are used
+as stimuli. For example, an utterance intended as no notion will sometimes be heard as known notion (Nakatani & Dukes, 1977). The model
+is not inclined to suppress activations of partially overlapping words,
+even when
+a nonoverlapping parse is available. This behavior of
+TRACE is illustrated with /b' stap/ (bus top or bus stop) in Figure 23.
+In this case, higher levels could provide an additional source of information that would help the model choose between overlapping and
+nonoverlapping interpretations.
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+111
+E
+16-8 ta pl
+tap
+BrAS
+Sap
+p i
+a
+-
+-b-stap-
+-br-Sap-
+FIGURE 23. State of the Trace at the end of the streams / bustap/ (bus stop or bus top)
+and / bruSap/ (brush shop).
+Thus far in this section, we have considered the general properties of
+the way in which TRACE uses lexical information to segment a speech
+stream into words, but we have not considered much in the way of
+empirical data that these aspects of the model shed light on. However,
+there are two findings in the literature which can be interpreted in
+accordance with TRACE's handling of multiword speech streams.
+Where does a nonword end? A number of investigators (e.g., R. A.
+Cole & Jakimik, 1980) have suggested that when one word is identified, its identity can be used to determine where it ends and, therefore,
+where the next word begins. In TRACE, the interactive activation process can often establish where a word will end even before it actually
+does end, particularly in the case of longer words or when activations at
+the word level are aided by syntactic and semantic constraints. However, it is much harder to establish the end of a nonword since the fact
+that it is a nonword means that we cannot exploit any knowledge of
+where it should end to do so.
+This fact may account for the finding of Foss and Blank (1980) that
+subjects are much slower to respond to target phonemes at the beginning of a word preceded by a nonword than at the beginning of a word
+
+112 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+preceded by a word. For example, responses to detect word-initial / d/
+were faster in stimuli such as the following:
+At the end of last year, the government decided
+than they were when the word preceding the target phoneme (in this
+case, government) was replaced by a nonword such as gatabont. It
+should be noted that the targets were specified as word-initial segments.
+Therefore, the subjects had not only to identify the target phoneme;
+they had to determine that it fell at the beginning of a word as well.
+The fact that reaction times were faster when the target was preceded
+by a word suggests that subjects were able to use their knowledge of
+where the word government ends to help them determine where the
+next word begins.
+An example of how TRACE allows one word to help establish where
+its successor begins is illustrated in Figure 24. In the example, the
+model receives the stream possible target or pagusle target, and we imagine that the target is word-initial /t/. In the first case, the word possible
+is clearly established, and competitors underneath it have been completely crushed by the time the initial / t/ in target becomes active at the
+phoneme level (second panel in the upper part of the figure), so there
+is no ambiguity about the fact that this / t/ is at the beginning of the
+next word. (The decision mechanism would, of course, be required to
+note that the model had established the location of the end of the
+preceding word. We have not yet incorporated explicit assumptions
+about how this would be done.) In the second case, words beginning
+and ending at a number of different places, including some that overlap
+with the location of the / t/, are partly activated. Thus, a listener would
+have to wait until the input is well into the word target before it
+becomes clear that the first / t/ in target is in fact a word-initial /t/.
+In reality, the situation is probably not as bleak for the perceiver as it
+appears in this example because in many cases there will be cues in the
+manner of pronunciation and the syllabification of the input that will
+help to indicate the location of the word boundary. However, given the
+imprecision and frequent absence of such cues, it is not surprising that
+the lexical status of one part of a speech stream plays an important role
+in helping listeners determine where the beginning of the next word
+must be.
+The long and short of word identification. One problematic feature
+of speech is the fact that it is not always possible to identify a word
+unambiguously until one has heard the word after it. Consider, for
+example, the word tar. If we are listening to an utterance and have gotten just to the / r/ in The man saw the tar box, though tar will tend to be
+
+Pas - b- 1
+Epas-bm
+papa
+pas - b- l
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+113
+pas -b-1
+LEP:
+-
+-
+1
+-pas-b-ltarg-t-
+#e-+
+-Pas b
+-
+t
+a
+-pas-b-ltarg-t-
+Epak - d
+pap ~
+_Pas""
+g
+ul
+-pas-ballarg^t
+Epak-t
+papa
+Pal-s i
+Pap-Es LiP
+It fatur
+5- T
+- P
+g
+t
+a
+-
+a59%
+-
+r
+p" K
+-pag-s-ltarg-t-
+-pag-s-ltarg-t-
+-pag-s-ltarg-t-
+FIGURE 24. State of the Trace at several points during the processing of possible target
+and pagusle target.
+the preferred hypothesis at this point, we do not have enough information to say unequivocally that the tar will not turn out to be target or
+tarnished or one of several other possibilities. It is only after more time
+has passed, and we have perceived either a silence or enough of the
+next word to rule out any of the continuations of /tar/, that we can
+decide we have heard the word tar. This situation,
+as it arises in
+TRACE with the simple utterance /tarbaks/ (tar box)
+, is illustrated in
+Figure 25. Though tar is somewhat more active than the longer word
+target when the / r/ is coming in, it is only when the word box emerges
+as the interpretation of the phonemes following tar that the rival target
+finally fades as a serious contender.
+
+114
+Tarbaks
+tar
+Blarget
+tar
+targ- t
+star
+baks
+Is LaF
+LaEg -t
+1st a r
+- t.
+..t
+alb
+ar
+-'arb
+5-
+a h
+r
+p"g"
+put
+-
+-
+-
+•tarbaks-
+-tarbaks-
+- tarbals
+- tarbaksle -tar
+g-tari
+g-tarbaks)
+k= t
+gard
+baks
+bab
+E la rit
+-bat
+g
+"8-t
+a r
+_Gn'a" ak
+s-
+a
+b
+a k
+r
+8488
+" 1
+g
+pu
+i a
+"g-tarbaks-
+-g-tarbaks-
+-g-tarbaks-
+-g-tarbaks-
+FIGURE 25. State of the Trace at several points in processing tar box and guitar box.
+With longer words the situation is different. As we have already
+seen in another example, by the time the end of a longer word is
+reached it is much more likely that only one word candidate will
+remain. Indeed, with longer words it is often possible to have enough
+information to identify the word unambiguously well before the end of
+the word. An illustration of this situation is provided by a simulation
+using the utterance guitar box / g tarbaks/. By the time the / T/ has
+registered, guitar is clearly dominant at the word level
+and can be
+unambiguously identified without further ado.
+Recently, an experiment by Grosjean (1985) has demonstrated these
+same effects empirically. Grosjean presented subjects
+: with long or
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+115
+short words followed by a second word and measured how much of the
+word and its successor the subject needed to hear to identify the target.
+With longer words, subjects could usually guess the word correctly well
+before the end of the word; and by the end of the word, they were
+quite sure of the word's identity. With monosyllabic words, on the
+other hand, many of the words could not be identified correctly until
+vell is id hity until about the end of suits e or not sere in e
+the one after. As Grosjean (1985) points out, a major reason for this is
+simply that the spoken input often does not uniquely specify the identity of a short word. In such cases, the perceptual system is often
+forced to process the short word and its successor at the same time.
+Recognizing the words in a short sentence. One last example of
+TRACE Il's performance in segmenting words is illustrated in Figure
+26. The figure shows the state of the Trace at several points during the
+processing of the stream / SiS' t baks/. By the end, the words of the
+phrase she shut a box, which fits the input perfectly with no overlap,
+dominate all others.
+This example illustrates how far it is sometimes possible to go in
+parsing a stream of phonemes into words without even considering syntactic and semantic constraints, or stress, syllabification, and juncture
+cues to word identification. The example also illustrates the difficulty
+the model has in perceiving short, unstressed words like a. This is, of
+course, just an extreme version of the difficulty the model has in processing monosyllabic words like tar and is consistent with Grosjean's
+data on the difficulty subjects have with identifying short words. In
+fact, Grosjean and Gee (1984) report pilot data indicating that these
+difficulties are even more severe with function words like a and of. It
+should be noted that TRACE makes no special distinction between content and function words per se, and neither do Grosjean and Gee.
+However, function words are usually unstressed and considerably
+shorter than content words. Thus, it is not necessary to point to any
+special mechanisms for closed versus open class morphemes to account
+for Grosjean and Gee's results.
+Summary of Word Identification Simulations
+While phoneme identification has been studied for many years, data
+from on-line studies of word recognition is just beginning to accumulate. There is an older literature on accuracy of word identification in
+noise, but it has only been quite recently that useful techniques have
+been developed for studying word recognition in real time.
+
+116
+#SIT
+Sip
+1s- t - 1
+i
+•Sis
+- Sis"
+b
+-
+a
+• Sis-t-baks.
+su
+-Sis t-baks-
+sPad
+-Sis-t-baks.
+is - 0
+siS-t Baks
+aga k si
+- sis t-bak
+isis-tabatspugs
+Pu
+g
+Pu
+-Sis-t-baks-
+-SIS-t-baks-
+-SiS-t-baks-
+FIGURE 26. The state of the Trace at several points during the processing of the stream
+/ SiS" 1 baks/ (she shut a box).
+What evidence there is, though, indicates the complexity of the word
+identification process. While the word identification mechanism is sensitive to each new incoming phoneme as it arrives, it is nevertheless
+robust enough to recover from underspecification or distortion of word
+beginnings. And, it appears to be capable of some simultaneous processing of successive words in the input stream. TRACE appears to
+capture these aspects of the time course of word recognition. In these
+respects, it improves upon the COHORT model, the only previously
+extant model that provides an explicit account of the on-line process of
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+117
+word recognition. And, the mechanisms it uses to accomplish this are
+the same ones that it used for the simulations of the process of
+phoneme identification described in the preceding section.
+GENERAL DISCUSSION
+Summary of TRACE's Successes
+In this chapter, we have seen that TRACE can account for a number
+of different aspects of human speech perception. We begin by listing
+the major correspondences between TRACE and what we know about
+the human speech understanding process.
+1. TRACE, like humans, uses information from overlapping portions of the speech wave to identify successive phonemes.
+2. The model shows a tendency toward categorical perception of
+phonemes, as do human subjects. The model's tendency
+toward categorical perception is affected by many of the same
+parameters that affect the degree of categorical perception
+shown by human subjects; in particular, the extent to which
+perception will be categorical
+increases with time between
+stimuli that must be compared.
+3. The model combines feature information from a number of different dimensions and exhibits cue trade-offs in phoneme identification.
+4. The model augments information from the speech stream with
+feedback from the lexical level in reaching decisions about the
+identity of phonemes. These lexical influences on phoneme
+identification occur in conditions similar to those in which lexical effects have been reported, but do not occur in conditions
+in which these effects have not been obtained.
+5. Like human subjects, the model exhibits apparent phonotactic
+rule effects on phoneme identification, though it has no explicit
+representation of the phonotactic rules.
+The tendency to
+prefer phonotactically regular interpretations of ambiguous
+phonemes can be overridden by particular lexical items, just as
+it can in the human perceiver.
+
+118
+6. Our simulations with TRACE I show that the model is able to
+use activations of phoneme units in one part of the Trace to
+adjust the connection strengths determining which features will
+activate which phonemes in adjacent parts of the Trace. In this
+way the model can adjust as human subjects do to coarticulatory
+influences on the acoustic properties of phonemes (Fowler,
+1984; Mann & Repp, 1980).
+7. In processing unambiguous phoneme sequences preceded by
+silence, the model exhibits immediate sensitivity to information
+favoring one word interpretation over another. It shows an initial preference for shorter words relative to longer words, but
+eventually a sequence of phonemes that matches a long word
+perfectly will be identified as that word, overturning the initial
+preference for the short-word interpretation. These aspects of
+the model are consistent with human data from gating experiments.
+8. Though the model is heavily influenced by word beginnings, it
+can recover from underspecification or distortion of a word's
+beginning.
+9. The model can use its knowledge of the lexicon to parse
+sequences of phonemes into words and to establish where one
+word ends and the next one begins when cues to word boundaries are lacking.
+10. Like human subjects, the model sometimes cannot identify a
+word until it has heard part of the next word. Also like human
+subjects, it can better determine where a word will begin when
+it is preceded by a word rather than a nonword.
+11. The model does not demand a parse of a phoneme sequence
+that includes each phoneme in one and only one word. This
+allows it to cope gracefully with elision of phonemes at word
+boundaries. It will often permit several alternative parses to
+remain available for higher-level influences to choose among.
+There is, of course, more data on some of these points than others.
+It will be very interesting to see how well TRACE will hold up against
+the data as further empirical studies are carried out.
+
+15. THE TRACE MODEL
+119
+Reasons for TRACE's Successes
+We think there are two main reasons why TRACE has worked so
+well. The first is its use of massively parallel, interactive processing.
+The second is the Trace architecture.
+We do not believe that the model
+would have worked without both of these characteristics. The Trace
+provides a processing structure that lays out the hypotheses about the
+contents of an utterance in a way that captures directly the task to be
+performed-to find an interpretation of the utterance consisting of a
+sequence of units on each of several processing levels. Appropriate
+competition within levels and mutual facilitation between levels is quite
+naturally arranged in such a situation. This is important, but it would
+not work without the parallel, interactive processing that is provided by
+the PDP framework.
+There is evidence to support both parts of this point. One source
+comes from our early attempts to model speech perception without
+adopting the Trace architecture. Our early model (described in Elman
+& McClelland, 1984) failed to provide a straightforward representation
+of the temporal structure of the speech stream.
+It is a commonplace observation in the field of artificial intelligence
+that success in modeling depends on having the right representation,
+and Marr (1982) made very much of this point. But it is also true that
+one must have the right kind of processing system to exploit the architecture. The fact that the HEARSAY speech understanding system was
+not terribly successful attests to this. HEARSAY had the right
+architecture-a better one, in fact, in some ways, than we have in the
+current version of TRACE (see Chapter 16). But HEARSAY lacked
+the massively parallel, interactive capabilities of PDP models.
+Some Deficiencies of TRACE
+Although TRACE has had a number of important successes, it also
+has a number of equally important deficiencies. One fundamental deficiency is the fact that the model requires reduplication of units and
+connections, copying over and over again the connection patterns that
+determine
+which features activate which phonemes and which
+phonemes activate which words. One reason why this is a problem has
+to do with learning. Learning in PDP models involves tuning connections between pairs of units based on both of their states. This kind of
+learning is inherently local to the specific connections between the
+specific units involved. Given TRACE's architecture, such learning
+would not generalize from one part of the Trace to another and so
+
+120 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+would not be accessible for inputs arising at different locations in the
+Trace.
+A second problem is that the model, as is, is insensitive to
+variation in global parameters such as speaking rate, speaker characteristics and accent, and ambient acoustic characteristics. A third deficiency is that it fails to account for the fact that one presentation of a
+word has an effect on the perception of it a very short time later (Nusbaum & Slowiaczek, 1982). These two presentations, in the current
+version of the model, simply excite separate tokens for the same word
+in different parts of the Trace.
+All these deficiencies reflect the fact that the Trace consists of a large
+set of independent tokens of each feature, phoneme, and word unit.
+What appears to be called for instead is a model in which there is a single stored representation of each phoneme and each word in some central representational structure. If this structure is accessed every time
+the word is presented, then we could account for repetition priming
+effects. Likewise, if there were a single central structure, learning
+could occur in just one set of units, as could dynamic retuning of
+feature-phoneme and phoneme-word connections to take account of
+changes in global parameters or speaker characteristics.
+However, it remains necessary to keep straight the relative temporal
+location of
+different feature, phoneme, and word activations as we
+argued just above. Thus, it will not do to simply abandon the Trace in
+favor of a single set of
+units consisting of just one copy of each
+phoneme and one copy of each word.
+It seems that we need to have things both ways: We need a central
+representation that plays a role in processing every phoneme and every
+word and that is subject to learning, retuning, and priming. We also
+need to keep a dynamic trace of the unfolding representation of the
+speech stream so that we can continue to accommodate both left and
+right contextual effects. The next chapter describes a model of reading
+that has some of these characteristics. It uses connection information
+stored in a central PDP network to set connections in a processing
+structure
+much like the Trace, thereby effectively programming this
+structure in the course of processing. The next step in the development of TRACE is to apply these ideas to speech perception. Some
+comments about how this might be done are included at the end of the
+next chapter.
+CONCLUSION
+Our aim in this chapter has been to show that parallel distributed
+processing mechanisms provide a natural framework for developing
+models capable of meeting the computational challenges posed by
+
+IS. THE TRACE MODEL
+121
+speech and of accounting for the data on human speech perception.
+The TRACE model does quite well on both counts. Though the architecture of the model is partially responsible for its successes, we have
+argued that the successes of the model depend at least as much on the
+parallel distributed processing operations that take place within the
+architecture. TRACE does have some limitations, but it successes so far
+have been quite encouraging. Just how easy it will be to overcome the
+limitations is a matter for future research.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+The work reported here was supported in part by a contract from the
+Office of Naval Research (N-00014-82-C-0374, NR 667-483), in part
+by a grant from the National Science Foundation (BNS-79-24062), and
+in part by a Research Scientist Career Development Award to the first
+the
+National Institute of Mental
+Health
+(5-K01-
+MH00385).
+
+CHAPTER 16
+The Programmable Blackboard Model of Reading
+J. L. McCLELLAND
+In 1975, Rumelhart outlined a model of reading called the interactive
+model. That model, inspired by the HEARSAY model of speech understanding (Reddy, Erman, Fennell, & Neely, 1973), supposed that reading involved simultaneous processing at a large number of levels,
+including visual feature, letter, word, syntactic, and semantic levels.
+Hypotheses at each level were activated when active hypotheses on
+adjacent levels suggested them
+and competed with
+alternative
+hypotheses at the same level. This model, of course, was a precursor
+of the interactive activation model of word recognition and of the
+approach that underlies this whole book.
+In the interactive model of reading, the activation of hypotheses was
+guided by a set of structures called "knowledge sources," each of which
+had expertise with respect to a particular aspect of reading. For example, a lexical knowledge source that contained knowledge of the letter
+sequences that made up each word was proposed, along with a syntactic
+knowledge source, a semantic knowledge source, and an orthographic
+knowledge source containing knowledge of the appearance of the
+letters.
+An important aspect of the interactive model of reading was parallel
+processing. Processing was supposed to occur in parallel both within
+and between levels, so that hypotheses could influence and be influenced by other hypotheses spanning large stretches of the input. However, no specific implementation of the mechanism was proposed. In
+HEARSAY, although the conception was parallel, the reality was quite
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+123
+sequential-each knowledge source could only be directed to a single
+small part of HEARSAY's BLACKBOARD at a time. The result was a
+model that was computationally very cumbersome and excruciatingly
+slow.
+Eventually, HEARSAY was abandoned in favor of a model in
+which the knowledge that guided processing was precompiled, by brute
+force, into a Markov chain.
+PDP models such as the interactive activation model of word perception and the TRACE model of speech perception have tried to capture
+the parallelism inherent the conception of HEARSAY. (See Chapter
+15.) However, these models differ from HEARSAY in a fundamental
+way. Instead of having a knowledge source that can be applied to an
+input, they build the knowledge into the connections between the units
+out of which the mechanisms are built. Thus, for example, in the word
+perception model, the knowledge that guides processing is built into the
+connections between the units. By making several copies of the same
+connection information, it is possible to allow parallel processing.
+To make this point clear and to emphasize some of the properties of
+this aspect of the model, a sketch of the model is presented in Figure 1.
+TIME
+Word
+Letter
+Feature
+Input
+FIGURE 1. A sketch of the interactive activation model of word perception. Units
+within the same rectangle stand for incompatible alternative hypotheses about an input
+pattern, and are all mutually inhibitory. The bidirectional excitatory connections between
+levels are indicated for one word and its constituents. (From "Putting Knowledge in its
+Place: A Scheme for Programming Parallel Processing Structures on the Fly" by J. L
+McClelland, 1985, Cognitive Science, 9, p. 115. Copyright 1985 by Ablex Publishing.
+Reprinted by permission.)
+
+124 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+The figure brings out the fact that the model achieves parallel processing of all of the letters in a four-letter display by having four separate
+copies of the feature and letter units, and four separate copies of the
+connections between them. Parallel processing of more than one word
+at a time would require creating another copy of the entire network. In
+the TRACE model Elman and I did just this, creating a large number of
+copies of the entire connection network.
+Now, the parallel processing permitted in models like the word perception model and the TRACE model are important to the functioning
+of these models, since parallel processing permits exploitation of
+mutual constraints, and to a large extent it is the exploitation of mutual
+constraints that parallel distributed processing is all about. But the massive reduplication of hardwired connection information leaves something to be desired as a way of providing a mechanism to exploit these
+mutual constraints. For one thing, it dedicates a lot of hardware to a
+single task. Also, even if we were willing to give up all the hardware,
+there would still be a serious problem with learning. In models of this
+sort, learning amounts to changing the strengths of the connections
+among units, based on their simultaneous activation. This kind of
+learning is, as was stressed in Chapter 1, local to the particular connections in which it occurred. Thus, any learning that occurred in one
+letter-processing channel of the word perception model would not be
+available for processing letters in other channels.
+I was not pleased with this state of affairs. It seemed to me that if
+parallel distributed processing was going to prove viable, some way
+would have to be found to have a central knowledge representation,
+such as in HEARSAY, that could be made available for processing
+items occurring at different places in a visual display or at different
+points in time.
+One obvious solution is just to "go sequential," and put the
+knowledge in a central location and map inputs into it one at a time.
+We have already reviewed a way that this can be done within the PDP
+framework in the introduction to this section of the book. The trouble
+with this solution is that it eliminates parallel processing, and thus the
+benefits thereof.
+Obviously, at some point we will have to go
+sequential —and I will start to do so at a later point in this chapter. But
+I was not happy with the possibility that the only way we could achieve
+parallel
+processing was through the reduplication of connection
+information. I sought, in short, a mechanism for achieving parallel
+processing without reduplication of connection information. This
+chapter reports on the results of my explorations in search of such a
+mechanism.
+The organization of the chapter is as follows. The first section
+develops a model for processing two words at a time, using a single
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+125
+central representation of the knowledge of the letter patterns that make
+up words. The model is applied to some recent data collected by Mozer
+(1983) on the processing of two-word displays. The second section
+extends the ideas developed in the first part to a more complex processing structure called the programmable blackboard, a structure analogous
+to the Blackboard in HEARSAY. That model is applied to a number of
+phenomena in word recognition not covered by the original interactive
+activation model. It also gives an account of several important aspects
+of reading a line of print, including the integration of information over
+successive fixations in reading. The final section discusses the proposed mechanisms in more general terms, and describes how they
+might be extended to the processing of the syntactic and semantic content of sentences.
+CONNECTION INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION
+This section describes a simple system for programming parallel processing structures in response to ongoing task demands and applies it to
+the processing of words in one- and two-word displays. The system
+consists of a set of programmable modules. Each module is a network
+of processing units very similar to those in other PDP models, such as
+the interactive activation model of word perception. The difference is
+that these units are not dedicated permanently to stand for particular
+hypotheses, and the knowledge that determines the pattern of excitatory and inhibitory interactions is not hardwired into the connections
+between them. Rather, the connections in the network are programmable by inputs from a central network in which the knowledge that
+guides processing is stored.
+The first part of this section describes an individual programmable
+network. Later parts describe the structures needed to program such
+networks in response to ongoing processing demands.
+A Programmable Network
+Figure 2 presents a very simple hardwired network. The task of this
+section is to see how we could replace this hardwired network with one
+that could be programmed to do the same work. The network shown in
+the figure is a very simple interactive activation system, consisting only
+of a letter and a word level. The figure is laid out differently from the
+previous figure to highlight the excitatory connections between the
+
+126
+5
+Word Units
+First Position
+Letter Units
+Second Position
+Letter Units
+FIGURE 2. An extremely simple connectionist mechanism, capable of processing one
+two-letter string made up of the letters 1, N, O, and S. The model knows only the five
+words that can be made of two of these letters, namely IN, IS, NO, ON, and SO. No
+top-down connections are included in this simple model. Units bracketed together are
+mutually inhibitory. (From "Putting Knowledge in its Place: A Scheme for Programming
+Parallel Processing Structures on the Fly" by J. L. McClelland, 1985, Cognitive Science, 9,
+p. 118. Copyright 1985 by Ablex Publishing. Reprinted by permission.)
+units and lay them out in a way which will be convenient as we
+proceed.
+In this simple network, there are detectors only for the letters I, N,
+O, and S in each of two letter positions. At the word level, there is a
+detector for each of the English words that can be made out of two of
+these letters. For simplicity, this model contains only letter-to-word
+connections; another matrix would be needed to capture word-to-letter
+feedback. Units that are in mutual competition are included in the
+same square brackets. This is just a shorthand for the bidirectional
+inhibitory connections, which could also be represented in another connection matrix.
+In this diagram, letter units are shown having output lines that
+ascend from them. Word units are shown having input lines that run
+from left to right. Where the output line of each letter unit crosses the
+input line of each word unit, there is the possibility of a connection
+between them.
+The knowledge built into the system, which lets it act as a processor
+for the words IN, IS, NO, ON, and SO, is contained in the excitatory
+connections between the letter and word units. These are represented
+by the filled triangles in the figure.
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+127
+Now we are ready to see how we could build a programmable network, one that we could instruct to behave like the hardwired network
+shown in Figure 2. Suppose that instead of fixed connections from
+specific letter units to particular word units, there is a potential connection at the junction between the output line from each letter unit and
+the input line to each word unit. Then all we would need to do to "program" the network to process the words IN, IS, NO, ON, and so
+correctly would be to send in signals from outside turning on the connections that are hardwired in Figure 2. This proposal is illustrated in
+Figure 3.
+Multiplicative interactions yield programmable connections. At first
+glance, the notion of sending instructions to connections may seem to
+be adding a new kind of complexity to the basic processing elements
+out of which connectionist mechanisms are built. Actually, though, all
+we really need to do is to let each connection multiply two signals
+before passing along the result.
+This point may be appreciated by considering the following equation.
+For the standard connections used in most connectionist models, the
+FIGURE 3. A programmable version of the simplified activation model shown in Figure
+2. Each triangle represents a programmable connection that can be turned on by a signal
+coming from the central knowledge store, shown here as lying outside the figure to the
+upper right. If the triangular connections pass the product of the two signals arriving at
+their base along to the receiving unit, the lines coming into the matrix from above can be
+thought of as programming the network. (From "Putting Knowledge in its Place: A
+Scheme for Programming Parallel Processing Structures on the Fly" by J. L. McClelland,
+1985, Cognitive Science, 9, p. 119. Copyright 1985 by Ablex Publishing. Reprinted by
+permission.)
+
+128
+time-varying signal to some unit i from some unit j is multiplied by
+the fixed weight or connection strength wij to determine the value of
+the input to i from j:
+inpuri; (t) = signal; (t) X
+Wij.
+All we are assuming now is that the signal from unit j is multiplied by
+a second time-varying signal, for example, the signal arising from some
+other unit k instead of the fixed connection strength wij:
+inputi; (1) = signal; (t) X signalk (t).
+We can think of the signal from unit k as setting the strength of the
+connection to i from j. When the value of the second signal is greater
+than 0, we will say that the connection to i from j is active.
+Function and implementation of programmable connections. Multiplicative connections of the kind proposed here were introduced in
+Chapter 2, and the increase in computational capability that their introduction affords is considered in Chapter 10. The specific idea of using
+a second signal to modulate connections has been used in other connectionist models. Hinton (1981b) used such a scheme to map inputs
+from local (retinocentric) feature detectors onto central (objectcentered) feature detectors in a viewpoint-dependent way. My use of
+multiplicative connections here was inspired by Hinton's. J. A. Feldman and Ballard (1982) have also suggested the idea of making connections contingent on the activation of particular units. The general
+notion of using one set of signals to structure the way a network
+processes another set of signals has previously been proposed by
+Sejnowski (1981) and Hinton (1981a).
+Let us briefly consider the functional significance of programmable
+connections. In essence, what connections do in PDP models of perceptual processing is specify contingencies between hypotheses. ' A positive weight on the connection to unit i from unit j is like the conditional rule, "if j is active, excite i." Fixed connections establish such
+contingencies in a fixed, permanent way. Programmable connections
+allow us to specify what contingencies should be in force, in a way
+which is itself contingent on other signals. By using multiplicative
+interactions between signals, in place of fixed connections, we now
+have a way of setting from outside a network the functional connections or contingencies between the units inside the network. This
+means that we can dynamically program processing modules in response
+1 I would like to thank Geoff Hinton for pointing out the relation between connections
+and contingencies
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL 129
+to expectations, task demands, etc. The little module shown in Figure
+3 could be used for a variety of different processing tasks, if different
+connection patterns were sent into it at different times. For example, if
+we sent in different signals from outside, we could reprogram the
+module so that the word units would now respond to the two-letter
+words in some other language. In conjunction with reprogramming the
+connections from feature level units to the letter units, we could even
+assign the network the task of processing words in a language with a
+different alphabet or of processing completely different kinds of
+patterns.
+At a neurophysiological level, multiplicative or quasi-multiplicative
+interactions between signals can be implemented in various ways. Neurons can implement multiplication-like interactions by allowing one signal to bring the unit's activation near threshold, thereby strongly
+increasing the extent to which another signal can
+make the unit fire
+(Sejnowski, 1981). There are other possibilities as well. A number of
+authors (e.g., Poggio & Torre, 1978) have suggested ways in which
+multiplication-like interactions could take place in subneuronal structures. Such interactions could also take place at individual synapses,
+though there is little evidence of this kind of interaction in cortex. For
+a fuller discussion of these issues, see Chapters 20 and 21.
+The Connection Information Distribution Mechanism
+We are now ready to move up to a complete Connection Information
+Distribution (CID) mechanism containing a number of programmable
+modules along with the structures required to program them. The basic
+parts of the mechanism are shown and labeled in Figure 4; they are
+shown again, with some of the interconnections, in Figure S.
+The CID mechanism consists of a central knowledge store, a set of
+programmable modules, and connections between them. The structure
+is set up in such a way that all of the connection information that is
+specific to recognition of words is stored in the central knowledge store.
+Incoming lines from the programmable modules allow information in
+each module to access the central knowledge, and output lines from the
+central knowledge store to the programmable modules allow connection
+activation information to be distributed back to the programmable
+modules.
+The two programmable modules are just copies of the module shown
+in Figure 3. It is assumed that lower-level mechanisms, outside of the
+model itself, are responsible for aligning inputs with the two modules,
+so that when two words are presented, the left word activates
+
+130
+Central Module
+Connection Activation System
+° 0
+0%
+005
+0 0 0°0
+0000
+0 050
+00 O
+00 0O
+0 00 0
+O
+CW Units
+CA Units
+CL Units
+Programmable Modules
+HE S
+PW Units
+FETAO
+[0000][0000] l
+PW Units
+PL Units
+PL Units
+FIGURE 4. A simplified example of a connection information distribution (CID)
+mechanism, sufficient for simultaneous bottom-up processing of two two-letter words.
+The programmable modules consist of the programmable letter (PL) units, programmable word (PW) units, and programmable connections between them (open triangles)
+The central module consists of a set of central letter (CL) units, a set of central word
+(CW) units, and hardwired connections between them (filled triangles). The connection
+activation system includes the central word units, a set of connection activation (CA)
+units, and hardwired connections between them. Connections between the central
+knowledge system (central module plus connection activation system) and the programmable modules are shown in the next figure. (From "Putting Knowledge in its Place: A
+Scheme for Programming Parallel Processing Structures on the Fly" by J. L. McClelland,
+1985, Cognitive Science, 9, p. 122. Copyright 1985 by Ablex Publishing. Adapted by permission.)
+appropriate programmable letter units in the left module, and the right
+one activates appropriate programmable letter units in the right module.
+The central knowledge store. The knowledge store in the CID
+mechanism is shown at the top of Figure 4. This is the part of the
+mechanism that contains the word-level knowledge needed to program
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+131
+-0
+гобовтобоб
+-0
+14
+[ocooloodo]
+FIGURE S. Each CA unit projects to the corresponding connection in both programmable modules, and each central letter unit receives projections from the corresponding
+programmable letter unit in both programmable modules. The inputs to two central
+letter units and the outputs from two CA units are shown. (From "Putting Knowledge in
+its Place: A Scheme for Programming Parallel Processing Structures on the Fly" by J. L
+McClelland, 1985, Cognitive Science, 9, p. 124. Copyright 1985 by Ablex Publishing.
+Reprinted by permission.)
+the programmable modules. It consists of two parts. One part is called
+the central module, and the other part is called the connection activation
+system.
+The central module consists of central letter units, central word
+units, and connections between the central letter units and the central
+word units. The letter units in the local modules project to the letter
+units in the central module, so that whenever a particular letter unit is
+active in either programmable module, the corresponding central letter
+unit is also (Figure 5). Note that the correspondence of local and central letter units is quite independent of what letters these units stand
+for.
+The central letter units are connected to the central word units via
+connections of the standard, hardwired type. These connections allow
+patterns of activation at the letter level to produce corresponding activations at the word level, just as in the original interactive activation
+
+132 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+model. However, it should be noted that the central word unit activations are based on a superposition of the inputs to each of the two programmable modules. Thus, the activations in the central letter units do
+not specify which module the letters came from, though relative position within each module is preserved. Thus, activations in the central
+module do not distinguish between the input IN SO and the input SO
+IN or even SNIO. In short, the central module cannot correctly determine which aspects of its inputs belong together.
+The second part of the central knowledge system, the connection
+activation system, also consists of two sets of units and their interconnections. One of these sets of units is the set of central word unitsthey belong both to the central module and to the connection activation
+system. The other set is the set of connection activation (CA) units.
+The purpose of the connection activation system is to translate activations of central word units into activations of connections appropriate
+for processing the corresponding words in the local modules. The CA
+units serve as a central map of the connections in each of the programmable modules, and provide a way to distribute connection information
+to all of the programmable modules at the same time. (The CA units
+are not strictly necessary computationally, but they serve to maintain
+the conceptual distinction between that part of the mechanism that contains the knowledge about words and the parts that simply distribute
+that knowledge to the local modules). There is one CA unit
+corresponding to the connection between a particular programmable
+letter unit and a particular programmable word unit. I have arranged
+the CA units in Figure 4 to bring out this correspondence. Each CA
+unit projects to the corresponding connection in both programmable
+modules. I have illustrated the projections of two of the CA units in
+Figure 5. For example, the top-left CA unit corresponds to the connection between the left-most programmable letter unit and the top-most
+programmable word unit. This CA unit projects to its corresponding
+connection in each of the programmable modules and provides one of
+that connection's two inputs. So, when a particular CA unit is active, it
+activates the corresponding connection in all of the programmable
+modules. In this way it acts as a master switch.
+At a functional level, we can see each CA unit as standing for a contingency between two activations. Thus, if we index the programmable
+letter units by subscript i, and the programmable word units by j, the
+thd unit i ause he can think of the der units as cive genie
+activati a CA sia to a certain need we are imp mising the cove
+tingency it represents (with a corresponding strength) in both of the
+programmable modules at once.
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+133
+The central word units, of course, are responsible for activating the
+CA units. There are excitatory connections from each word unit to
+each of the CA units for the connections needed to process the word.
+For example, the central word unit for IN activates two CA units. One
+is the CA unit for the connection between the left-most programmable
+letter unit and the top-most programmable word unit. The other is the
+CA unit for the connection from the sixth programmable letter unit
+from the left to the same programmable word unit. These connections
+effectively assign the top programmable word unit to be the detector
+for IN (assuming, of course, that lower levels of processing have been
+arranged so that 1 in the first position and N in the second position
+activate the appropriate programmable letter units).
+In summary, the CID mechanism consists of (a) the programmable
+modules; (b) the central knowledge store, including the central
+module and the connection activation system; (c) converging inputs to
+the central knowledge store from the programmable modules; and
+(d) diverging outputs from the central knowledge store back to the programmable modules.
+We can now see how this mechanism allows the programmable
+modules to be programmed dynamically in response to current inputs.
+When an input causes activations in some of the programmable letter
+units in one of the programmable modules (say, the programmable
+letter units for 1 in the first position and N in the second position of
+the left programmable module), these activations are passed to the
+corresponding central letter units. From the central letter units they
+activate the central word unit for IN. Central word units for patterns
+that overlap partially with the input (such as IS and ON) also receive
+excitation, but only in proportion to their overlap with the input. The
+central word units pass activation to the CA units, and these in turn
+pass activation back to the connections in both programmable modules.
+Connections are only turned on to the extent that they are consistent
+with the input. When different patterns are presented to each programmable module, connections appropriate for both patterns are turned on,
+thereby programming both programmable modules to process either
+pattern. Central word units-and therefore connections-are also
+turned on for any words that appear in the superimposed input from
+the two programmable modules. However, the results of processing in
+each programmable module still depend on the activations of the programmable letter units. Thus the appropriate programmable word unit
+will tend to be the most active in each local module. Although the output of the central module does not specify which word was presented to
+which local module, this information is represented (though with some
+tendencies to error, as we shall see) in the outputs of the local
+modules.
+
+134
+The correspondence between programmable and central units in the
+CID mechanism illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 may lead some readers to
+feel that the local units are really dedicated to process the particular
+word I have said that the mechanism programs it to process. This is an
+artifact of the use of one unit to represent each word. If distributed
+representations are used instead, each local output unit unit can be programmed in different ways on different occasions, depending on which
+of a large number of different distributed patterns the local modules are
+programmed to produce. The discussion that follows is generally applicable to both local and distributed CID mechanisms; I chose to use the
+local case because I thought it was generally easier to grasp intuitively.
+The main difference between local and distributed CID mechanisms is
+that the latter make much more efficient use of the units in the programmable modules, as discussed in Chapter 12.
+Computer Simulation of Word Recognition Using the
+CID Mechanism
+To examine the behavior of CID mechanisms in more detail, l
+implemented a CID version of the interactive activation model of word
+perception. The model, which I just call CID ("Sid"), is scaled-up from
+the example we have been considering so that it can process two strings
+of four letters each. Only three or four different letter alternatives
+were allowed in each position within each string. These were B, L, P,
+and S in the first position; A, E, I, and O in the second position; N, R,
+and V in the third position; and D, E, and T in the fourth position.
+The lexicon used in the simulation consisted of the 32 words shown in
+Table 1.
+Like the smaller-scale version shown in the figures, the model consisted of two programmable modules, one for each of the two-letter
+strings, and a central knowledge store consisting of the central module
+and the connection activation system. Each programmable module had
+16 programmable letter units and 32 programmable word units. The
+programmable letter units were grouped into four groups of four, with
+each group to be used for letters in one display location. The members
+of each group had mutual, hardwired, inhibitory connections. Similarly, all of the programmable word units in each module were mutually
+inhibitory. Each programmable module contained 16x 32 = 512 programmable connections, and there were 512 CA units, one for each
+each programmable connection. The central module contained 16 letter
+and 32 word units, like the programmable modules. There were no
+inhibitory connections either between the central word units or between
+the central letter units. The connections between the central letter
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+135
+BAND
+BIRD
+LAND
+LINE
+LORD
+PART
+PORE
+SAVE
+THE 32 WORDS USED IN THE SIMULATIONS
+BARE
+BEND
+BOND
+BONE
+LANE
+LARD
+LINT
+LIVE
+LOVE
+PANE
+PINE
+PINT
+PORT
+SAND
+SEND
+SORE
+BIND
+BORE
+LEND
+LONE
+PANT
+POND
+SANE
+SORT
+Note: From "Putting Knowledge in its Place: A Scheme for Programming Parallel Processing Structures on the Fly" by J. L. McClelland,
+1985, Cognitive Science, 9, p. 126. Copyright 1985 by Ablex Publishing.
+Reprinted by permission.
+units and the central word units and the connections from the central
+word units to the appropriate CA units were hardwired with the connection information needed to make the central letter units activate the
+right central word units and to make the central word units activate the
+right CA units.
+Inputs to the simulation model were simply specifications of bottomup activations to the programmable letter units in either or both programmable modules. Inputs were presented when all the units in the
+model were at their resting activation values and turned off after some
+fixed number of time cycles.
+The only substantive difference between CID and the original
+interactive activation model is in the strengths of the excitatory connections between units. In CID, these strengths vary as a function of the
+current input, while in the original model they were fixed. Highly simplified activation rules are used to capture the essence of the connection activation process via the central letter units, central word units,
+and CA units. The activation of a particular central letter unit is simply
+the number of input units projecting to it that have activations greater
+than 0. Thus, the activation of a particular central letter unit just gives a
+count of the corresponding programmable letter units that are active.
+The activation of a central word unit is just the sum of the active central letter units that have hardwired connections to the central letter
+unit. The activation of a CA unit is just the activation of the central
+word unit that projects to it, and this value is transmitted unaltered to
+the corresponding programmable connection
+in each programmable
+module.
+
+136 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+The net effect of these assumptions is to make the activation of the
+connections coming into a particular programmable word unit proportional to the number of active units for the letters of the word,
+summed over both modules.
+Active letter units count only if they
+stand for letters in appropriate positions within the programmable
+module of origin.
+Output. So far we have said nothing about how the activations that
+arise in the programmable modules might give rise to overt responses.
+Following the original interactive activation model, I assume there is a
+readout mechanism of unspecified implementation which translates
+activations at either the letter or the word level into overt responses. 2
+The readout mechanism can be directed to the word or the letter level
+of either module, and at the letter level it can be directed to a particular
+letter position within a module. In cases where more than one stimulus
+is to be identified on the same trial, the readout of each of the items is
+independent.
+The probability of choosing a particular response depends on the
+strength of the unit corresponding to that response divided by the sum
+of the strengths of all the relevant alternatives (e.g., units for words in
+the same position) following the formulas introduced in Chapter 15.
+The main import of these assumptions for present purposes is that
+the probability of a particular response is solely a function of the activations of units relevant to the response. All interactions between display
+items are thus attributed to the unit and connection activation mechanisms, and not to the readout mechanisms themselves.
+RESULTS OF THE SIMULATIONS
+Two principle findings emerged from working with the simulation
+model. First, when processing a single word, the CID mechanism
+causes the model to behave as though it were sharply tuned to its
+inputs, thereby mimicking the benefits of the bottom-up inhibition
+used in the original word perception model without actually incurring
+any' of its deficiencies. Second, when processing two words at a time,
+the connection activation scheme causes the model to make errors similar to those made by human subjects viewing two-word displays. These
+2 There must be coordination between the readout mechanism and the CID mechanism. For example, it would not do for the system to program the top-most letter unit to
+represent the word BAND, say, if the readout mechanism took this unit to correspond to
+some other word. The problem is a general one and is no different in programmable networks than it is in standard ones.
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+137
+errors arise as a result of the essential characteristics of the CID
+mechanism.
+One Word at a Time: The Poor Get Poorer
+In the original word perception model, bottom-up inhibition from the
+letter level to the word level was used to sharpen the net bottom-up
+input to word units. For example, consider a display containing the
+word SAND. Due to bottom-up inhibition, units for words matchin
+only three of the four letters shown (e.g., LAND) would receive less
+than 3/4 as much net bottom-up excitation as the unit for the word
+SAND itself.
+The CID version of the model closely emulates this feature of the
+original, even though it lacks these bottom-up inhibitory connections.
+In CID, the activation of the connections coming into a word unit varies
+with the number of letters of the word that are present in the input. At
+the same time, the number of inputs to these same connections from
+the programmable letter units also varies with the number of letters in
+the input that match the word. The result is that in the CID version of
+the model, the amount of bottom-up activation a programmable word
+unit receives varies as the square of the number of letters in common
+with the input. Poorer matches get penalized twice.
+In working with the original model, Rumelhart and I picked values
+for the bottom-up excitation and inhibition parameters by trial and
+error as we searched for a set of parameters that allowed the model to
+fit the results of a large number of experiments. The values we hit
+upon put the strength of bottom-up inhibition at 4/7 the strength of
+bottom-up excitation. For words that share two, three, or all four
+letters in common with the input, this ratio produces almost exactly the
+same relative amounts of net bottom-up activation as is produced by
+the CID mechanism (Table 2). Words with less than two letters in
+common received net bottom-up inhibition in the old version, whereas
+in the CID version they receive little or no excitation. In both cases
+their activation stays below zero due to competition, and thus they have
+no effect on the behavior of the model.
+This analysis shows that the CID version of the model can mimic the
+original, and even provides an unexpected explanation for the particular
+value of bottom-up inhibition that turned out to work best in our earlier simulations. As long as the bottom-up input to the letter level was
+unambiguous, the correspondence of the CID version
+and a nofeedback version of the original model is extremely close.
+When the bottom-up input to the letter level is ambiguous, however,
+there is a slight difference in the performance of the two versions of
+
+138 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+ONE WORD AT A TIME: BOTTOM-UP ACTIVATIONS OF SEVERAL
+WORD UNITS IN THE ORIGINAL AND CID VERSIONS OF THE
+INTERACTIVE ACTIVATION MODEL
+Input: SAND
+Original
+CID Version
+Unit
+Letters
+Shared
+w/Input
+Relative
+Activation
+Ratio
+Relative
+Activation
+Ratio
+SAND
+LAND
+LANE
+2
+4
+3 - 4/7
+2 - 8/7
+21
+4×4
+3×3
+2x2
+.25
+Note: Ratio is the net bottom-up activation of the unit, divided by the net boltom-up
+activation of the unit for SAND. From "Putting Knowledge in its Place: A Scheme
+for Programming Parallel Processing Structures on the Fly" by J. L. McClelland, 1985,
+Cognitive Science, 9, p. 129. Copyright 1985 by Ablex Publishing. Reprinted by
+permission.
+the model. This actually reveals an advantage of eliminating bottom-up
+inhibition similar to some of the advantages discovered in the discussion of the TRACE model (see the previous chapter). Consider the
+input to a word unit from the letter units in a particular letter position.
+In the original model, if three or more letter candidates were active,
+two of them would always produce enough bottom-up inhibition to
+more than outweigh the excitatory effect any one of them might have
+on the word. For example, if E, F, and C are equally active in the
+second letter position, F and C together would inhibit the detectors for
+words with E in second position more than E will excite them. Thus, if
+three letters are active in all four letter positions, no word would ever
+receive a net excitatory input. This problem does not arise in the CID
+version because there is no bottom-up inhibition. Thus, the CID version can pull a word out of a highly degraded display in which several
+letters are equally compatible with the feature information presented,
+while the original model cannot. It thus appears that CID gives us the
+benefits of bottom-up inhibition without the costs.
+Two Words at a Time: Interference and Crosstalk
+So far we have seen how CID retains and even improves on some of
+the important aspects of the behavior of the original model. Now, I
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+139
+will show how CID captures important aspects of the data obtained in
+experiments in which subjects are shown two words at a time. Here the
+CID architecture becomes essential, since simultaneous processing of
+two patterns introduces considerations that do not arise in the processing of one pattern at a time.
+When letters are presented to both modules, all of the letters are
+combined to turn on connections that are distributed to both of the programmable modules. The result is that the connections appropriate for
+the word presented in one module are turned on in the other module as
+well. This biases the resulting activations in each module. The programmable word unit for the word presented to a particular module will
+generally receive the most activation. However, the activation of programmable word units for words containing letters presented to the
+other module is enhanced. This increases the probability that incorrect
+responses to one of the words will contain letters presented in the
+other.
+At first this aspect of the model disturbed me, for I had hoped to
+build a parallel processor that was less subject to crosstalk between
+simultaneously presented items. However, it turns out that human
+subjects make the same kinds of errors that CID makes.
+Thus, though
+CID may not be immune to crosstalk, its limitations in this regard seem
+to be shared by human subjects. I'll first consider some data on human
+performance, and then examine in detail why CID behaves the same
+way.
+The data come from a recent experiment by Mozer (1983). In his
+paradigm, a pair of words (e.g, SAND LANE) is displayed, one to the
+left and one to the right of fixation. The display is followed by a patterned mask which occupies the same locations as the letters in the
+words that were presented. In addition, the mask display contains a
+row of underbars to indicate which of the two words the subject is to
+report. Subjects were told to say the word they thought they saw in the
+cued location or to say "blank" in case they had no idea.
+In his first experiment, Mozer presented pairs of words that shared
+two letters in common.
+The pairs of words had the further property
+that either letter which differed between the two words could be transposed to the corresponding location in the other word and the result
+would still be a word. In our example SAND-LANE, SAND and LANE
+have two letters in common, and either the L or the E from LANE can
+be moved into the corresponding position in SAND, and the result
+would still be a word (LAND and SANE). Of course, it was also always
+true with these stimuli that the result would be a word if both letters
+"migrated." The duration of the two-word display was adjusted after
+each counterbalanced block of trials in an attempt to home in on a
+duration at which the subject would get approximately 70% of the
+
+140 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+whole-word responses correct. Thus, the overall error rate was fixed by
+design, though the pattern of errors was not.
+The principal results of Mozer's experiment are shown in Table 3.
+Of the trials when subjects made errors, nearly half involved what
+Mozer called "migration errors" —errors in which a letter in the context
+word showed up in the report of the target. To demonstrate that these
+errors were truly due to the presentation of these letters in the context,
+Mozer showed that these same error responses occurred much less frequently when the context stimulus did not contain these letters. Such
+"control" errors are referred to in the table as pseudo-migration errors.
+As I already suggested, migration errors of the type Mozer reported
+are a natural consequence of the CID mechanism. Since the letters
+from both words are superimposed as they project onto the central
+module, the connections for words whose letters are present (in the
+correct letter position) in either of the two input strings are strongly
+activated in both programmable modules. The result is that programmable units for words containing letters from the context are more
+easily activated than they would be in the absence of the input
+presented to the other module.
+Table 4 compares relative programmable word unit activations for
+various words, for two different cases: In one case, the word SAND is
+TABLE 3
+METHOD AND RESULTS OF MOZER (1983), EXPERIMENT 1
+Method:
+Example Display
+Target Cue
+Results:
+Response Type
+Correct response
+Single migration
+Double migration
+Other
+Total
+Pseudo-migration*
+Example
+(SAND)
+(SANE or LAND)
+(LANE)
+SAND LANE
+% of Total
+69.0
+13.3
+0.5
+17.2
+100.0
+5.3
+*Pseudo-migration rate is the percentage of reports of the given single migration
+responses (SANE,LAND) when a context word which does not contain these letters is
+presented. In this example, the context string might have been BANK. From "Puttin
+Knowledge in its Place: A Scheme for Programming Parallel Processing Structures o
+the Fly" by J. L. McClelland, 1985, Cognitive Science, 9, p. 131. Copyright 1985 by
+Ablex Publishing. Reprinted by permission.
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+141
+presented alone; in the other, it is presented in the context of the word
+JANE. When ›AND is presented alone, all words that share three
+etters with it receive (3/4) or 9/16 as much bottom-up activation ar
+the unit for SAND itself-we already explored this property of the CID
+model in the previous section. When SAND is presented with LANE,
+however, words fitting the pattern (L or S)-A-N-(D or E) all have their
+connections activated to an equal degree because of the pooling of the
+input to the connection activation apparatus from both modules. These
+strings, there are 6 occurrences of the letters of each of these words
+(the A and the N each occur twice). The result is that the excitatory
+input to the programmable word units in the left module for LAND and
+SANE is 3/4 of that for SAND, as opposed to 9/16. Other words having three letters in common with the target have their connections less
+activated. Their bottom-up activation is either 5/8 or 1/2 that of
+SAND, depending on whether two of the letters they have in common
+with the target are shared with the context (as in BAND) or not (as in
+SEND). Thus, we expect LAND and SANE to be reported more often
+than other words sharing three letters in common with SAND.
+The reader might imagine that the effect would be rather weak. The
+difference between 3/4 and 5/8 or 1/2 does not seem strikingly large.
+However, a raw comparison of the relative bottom-up activation does
+not take into account the effects of within-level inhibition. Within-level
+inhibition greatly amplifies small differences in bottom-up activation.
+TABLE 4
+TWO WORDS AT A TIME: CROSSTALK.
+RELATIVE BOTTOM-UP ACTIVATIONS PRODUCED BY SAND
+PRESENTED EITHER ALONE OR WITH LANE AS CONTEXT
+alone
+with LANE
+activation
+SAND
+LAND
+BAND
+SEND
+LANE
+4x4
+3×3
+3×3
+3×3
+2x2
+ratio
+.56
+.56
+.16
+activation
+4x6
+3×6
+3×5
+3×4
+2×6
+ratio
+.62
+.50
+.50
+Note: Ratio refers to the bottom-up activation of the unit, divided by bottom-up
+
+142 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+This is especially true when two or more units are working together at
+the same level of activation. In this case, the units for LAND and
+SANE act together. Neither can beat out the other, and both "gang up"
+on those receiving slightly less bottom-up activation, thereby pushing
+these other alternatives out. This "gang effect" was also observed in
+the original version of the word perception model. The results of this
+feature of the model are illustrated in Figure 6. Through the mutual
+inhibition mechanism, SAND and LANE come to dominate other words
+that share three letters in common with the target. Some of these, in
+turn, dominate words that have only two letters in common with the
+target, including, for example, LANE, even though the connections for
+LANE are strongly activated. This result of the simulation agrees with
+the experimental result that double or "whole-word" migrations are
+quite rare in Mozer's experiment, as shown in Table 3
+Mozer (1983) reported several additional findings in his study of the
+processing of two-word displays. A full discussion of these effects can
+be found in McClelland (1985). Suffice it to say here that the major
+findings of Mozer's experiments are consistent with what we would
+expect from CID.
+Activation
+0.9
+0.7
+0.5
+0.3
+0.1
+-0.1
+-sand
+-Sand
+_band
+FIGURE 6. Activation curves for various programmable word units in the module to
+represens Dis shytes frohe ine onto hothe modules display he homontalis
+Knowledge in its Place: A Scheme for Programming Parallel Processing Structures on the
+Fly" by J. L. McClelland, 1985, Cognitive Science, 9, p. 133. Copyright 1985 by Ablex
+Publishing. Reprinted by permission.)
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+143
+THE PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+The model described in the previous section provides an illustrative
+example of the way in which knowledge in a central processing structure can be used to program local processing structures in response to
+ongoing processing demands, but it is a long way from a fully adequate
+model of the reading process, even excluding syntactic and semantic
+processing levels above the word. This section describes a more sophisticated
+model. The model is incomplete, but I believe it takes us
+several steps further toward a complete model of the reading process.
+Overlapping the Programmable Processing Structures
+In the preceding section, as in the original word perception model,
+we considered words of a fixed length, and we assumed that some
+mechanism not included in the model would solve the problem of
+aligning the inputs appropriately with the programmable letter units in
+each of the local modules.
+Obviously, any plausible model of reading must be capable of accommodating arbitrary strings of text, including words of different lengths,
+without requiring prealignment of each word with a specific location in
+a module.
+In the TRACE model described in the previous chapter, Elman and I
+dealt with this problem by allowing units in adjacent slots to have overlapping "receptive fields." The ideas from that model can be applied to
+reading as follows. Suppose we have several sets of letter units, one for
+each of a reasonably large number of letter positions in a string of text.
+Each of these sets of units will be the top end of a position-specific
+letter-processing channel, like the ones in the original word perception
+model. Let's suppose we can present letter strings so that the left letter
+projects to any one of the letter channels and adjacent letters in the
+string activate letter units in adjacent slots. Then the model would be
+able to process words starting in any slot if there were a number of
+overlapping word processing channels, one starting in every slot. If a
+string like BINK/ 4 was shown (BINK starting in the fourth letter position), units for BLINK/3, INK/5, BIN/4, and SLINK Y/ 3 would all be
+activated, along with units for BIND/4, SINK / 4 and others than would
+have been activated in the original model. These units would all produce feedback to the units for the letters they contain in the appropriate
+positions. This would allow conspiracies of partial activations of words
+of various lengths. The word units could also compete with each other
+
+144 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+to the extent that they spanned overlapping letter sequences, thereby
+allowing the model to settle on the best interpretation of each substring
+of letters separately. A hardwired version of this idea was implemented
+in the TRACE model of speech perception; the task now is to apply the
+same idea to a programmable processing structure.
+The extension of the connection information distribution scheme to
+overlapping modules introduces a new problem. To see the problem,
+let's first look at a simple example of a hardwired word perception
+model with overlapping slots. Figure 7 illustrates such
+a case-a
+hardwired "blackboard" set up for processing the two-letter I-N-O-S
+words IN, IS, NO, ON, and SO, starting in any one of several letter
+positions. Each set of word units receives inputs from two adjacent sets
+of letter units. Members of each letter slot are mutually inhibitory.
+Members of word slots are mutually inhibitory to the extent that the
+words they stand for overlap at the letter level. As in the TRACE
+model, the idea is that word units should only compete in so far as they
+represent alternative interpretations of the contents of the same
+location.
+A two-letter word can be presented to letter units in any two adjacent
+letter slots. The appropriate unit in the appropriate word slot will then
+become active. Thus, the second letter slot can represent the second
+letter of a two-letter word starting in the first position or the first letter
+of a word starting in the second position.
+Let us consider what is involved in making a programmable version
+of this model. First, we would need to replace the hardwired connections in the figure with programmable connections. We would need a
+[INOS)
+INOS
+LINOSS
+(INOS)
+(mos)
+FIGURE 7. A hardwired processing structure for bottom-up processing of the words IN,
+IS, NO, ON, and SO presented to any two adjacent letter slots. Note that each letter slot
+participates in two different word slots, except at the edges.
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+145
+lexical knowledge source, or central knowledge system, consisting of
+two sets of letter units, one for the first letter of the word and one for
+the second letter, and a set of word units. In addition, we would need
+a set of connection activation units, one for each programmable connection in each overlapping
+word-processing channel. Finally, we
+would need converging input lines coming into the central knowledge
+structure and diverging output lines from the CA units to the programmable connections.
+A problem arises with the converging input lines. Since each letter
+slot can contain letters in either role within the word, the letter units in
+each letter slot would have to send outputs to the central letter units in
+each central letter channel. The problem with this would be that every
+occurrence of a particular letter, regardless of what role it turned out to
+play within a word, would turn on the connections for words which
+have that letter in them anywhere. Consider, for example, the display
+-ON- (dashes indicate blanks in the display). This will turn on the
+connections for all words having O in them anywhere, since the O will
+be treated as a potential first letter of a word beginning in the second
+position and as a potential second letter of a word beginning in the first
+position. Similarly, the N will turn on the weights for all words having
+N in them anywhere, since it will be treated as a potential first letter of
+a word beginning in the third position and a potential second letter of a
+word beginning in the second position. For this example, then, the
+connections for NO will be turned on just as much as the connections
+for ON. When multiple words are presented, this would tend to cause
+the model to make migration errors for nonhomologous positions. For
+example, in a version of the model with a forth overlapping module,
+the display IS-NO would activate the connections for the word IN just
+as much as the display IS-ON. We would therefore expect subjects to
+report IN as an incorrect report of the contents of the first two letter
+positions equally often in these two cases. More generally, migration
+errors would not be expected to honor relative position
+within the
+word. Analyses reported in Shallice and McGill (1978) reveal that
+nonhomologous migration errors are quite rare indeed.
+Role-specific letter units. It appears that we need to have some way
+of treating letters differently depending on their role within the word.
+One poor way to do this would be to imagine that there is a separate
+detector in each letter channel for each letter in every role it might
+play. For our two-letter word case, letters can occur in either of two
+roles-as the first letter in a two-letter string, or as the last. So, if we
+went with role-specific letter detectors, each letter slot would contain
+eight letter units, one for each letter
+as the first letter in a word, and
+one for each letter as the second letter in a word.
+
+146
+Obviously this solution has serious weaknesses. For one thing, it
+duplicates units ad nauseam. If we wished to process longer words, we
+would need very large numbers of role-specific units in each letter slot.
+Coarse coding. There is a better way. Suppose that each letter is
+represented, not as an activation of a single unit, but as a pattern of
+activation involving several active units. With such an encoding, we
+would imagine that a given letter-say, the letter I-produces a slightly
+different pattern when it occurs in different roles. All these different
+patterns will represent different versions of the letter 1, and to the
+degree that they are similar they will have similar effects, but their
+differences can be used to produce a sufficient degree of differentiation
+of letters in different contexts to allow our model to work and to
+reduce the incidence of nonhomologous migration errors. This idea is
+an instance of the idea of coarse coding, which is described more fully
+in Chapter 3.
+In the present application of the coarse coding idea, there are four
+detectors for each letter. Each detector serves as a partial specification
+of a letter/ role combination. One of the detectors is activated when
+the letter is preceded by a blank; one when it is preceded by any other
+letter; one when it is followed by a blank; and one when it is followed
+by any other letter.
+With this scheme, the pattern of active letter/ role
+units can indicate whether a particular letter is a separate string unto
+itself (blanks on both sides); the first letter in a string (blank on left,
+letter on right); the last letter in a string (letter on left, blank on right);
+or an internal letter in a string (letters on both sides).
+Notationally, I will designate particular units by the letter they stand
+for in upper case, preceded or followed by an underbar to indicate a
+blank or by an x to indicate any letter. The code for a letter in a particular role would be given by two such specifications in the same
+parentheses, with a space between them. The code for an entire word is
+given by a series of letter codes in square brackets. For example, the
+word EVE would be coded | (E Ex) (xV Vx) (xE E) ].
+One property of this coding scheme is that similar letter roles produce overlapping patterns of activation. For example, the code for the
+letter 1 at the beginning of a word, (_1 Ix), overlaps with the code for
+the same letter in medial position, (xl Ix). It also overlaps with the
+code for the same letter in isolation, (_11_). Similarly, the code for a
+letter in final position, (xl |_), overlaps with the code for the same
+letter in medial position, (xl Ix), and with the code for the letter in isolation. However, there is no overlap of the codes for initial and final
+letters-disjoint subsets of units are activated in the two cases.
+Similarly, there is no overlap of codes for isolated letters and medial letters
+in strings of three letters or more.
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+147
+Obviously this particular code could be improved upon to make all
+occurrences of a particular letter have something in common and to
+make nonterminal letters in different positions differ from each other.
+However, this scheme captures the essence of the coarse coding idea
+and works surprisingly well for words up to four letters long, so we will
+stick with it for now.
+For our two-letter word example, this coding scheme does not buy us
+much. The advantages of the scheme only begin to emerge with longer
+words. However, for visualization, I represent a version sufficient for
+the two letter I-N-O-S words in Figure 8; some of the connections from
+the CA units to two of the programmable modules are shown in Figure
+9. For two-letter words, we don't need all four different role specifications, so I've only included the _x and x_ units where y stands for I, N,
+0, 01S.
+With these coarse-coded letter/ role units in each letter channel, the
+units in each programmable letter channel project to a single central
+letter channel. Different role specifications are still preserved, so that
+the word ON will activate no central units in common with the
+word NO.
+Other Enhancements in the Programmable Blackboard Model
+Feedback. In describing CID, I did not discuss word-to-letter level
+feedback, although a version of that model has been implemented that
+incorporates this. For the programmable blackboard model, I wished to
+incorporate feedback to illustrate how the overlapping modules in CID
+allow feedback from activations of words of different lengths appropriately aligned with the input. I assume feedback is implemented by
+another set of programmable connections running from the programmable word units back down to the programmable letter units. (It is
+important to distinguish the connection activation process from wordto-letter level feedback. They are different things serving very different roles in the model). Because of the symmetry of the bottomup and top-down activations, the very same set of CA units can be used
+to program both the bottom-up and the top-down connections. That is,
+the same CA unit that turns on the bottom-up connection from a particular letter unit to a particular word unit can also turn on the connection from that same word unit to the same letter unit.
+Shifting the focus of attention. While there is some reason to
+believe we process more than one word at a time, it is clear that we do
+not process whole pages or even whole lines of text at a time. In reading, the eyes make saccadic jumps from word to word, stopping for
+
+148
+Central Knowledge System
+Central Module
+in
+no
+Connection
+Activation Units
+Programmable Blackboard
+Programmable Word Slots
+One Slot's
+Programmable
+Connections
+I NOS
+Programmable Letter Slots
+FIGURE 8. A simplified
+programmable blackboard sufficient for processing the twoletter I-N-O-S words, using coarse coded
+representations at the letter level.
+hardwired connections between the central letter and word units are illustrated, as are the
+connections from the central word units to the CA units for the connections needed to
+process two of these words. The programmable letter units in each letter channel project
+to the central letter units, and the CA units project back to the programmable connections between the letter units and the word units. Some of these projections are shown
+in the next figure.
+200-500 msec about once a word. Shorter words may be skipped and
+longer words may be fixated twice.
+From these data, we might infer that the reading process is proceeding in a strictly sequential fashion, one word at a time. For certain
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+149
+IN/4
+-I-N
+_I _N
+IN/3
+IN/4
+FIGURE 9. A replica of Figure 8, with the outgoing connections from the central word
+unit for IN to two of the programmable modules via the CA units. Also shown are the
+units for
+_ and N
+in the third, fourth, and fifth letter slots, and the unit for IN in the
+fourth programmable word slot. The programmable letter units in each letter channel
+project to the central letter units, and the CA units project back to the programmable
+connections between the letter and the word units, but these connections are not actually
+shown.
+purposes, as an approximation, it may not be unreasonable to treat it
+so. But there is evidence that we can process more than one word per
+fixation, though there is some degradation of performance with an
+increase in the contents of the display. Of course, this finding is compatible with sequential processing within fixations, but I will assume
+that within a fixation, all processing activity is taking place in parallel.
+However, I will assume that the higher resolution of the fovea and the
+
+150 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+focusing of attention to the right of fixation causes some parts of the
+contents of the fixation to be processed more successfully and more
+completely than others.
+A sketch that may help visualize these assumptions is shown in
+Figure 10. Several sets of programmable word and letter units are illustrated, with schematic illustrations of the connections between and
+within slots. Along the bottom, a fragment of a possible line of text is
+displayed with the letters lined up below the letter slots. The assumption is that the letters lying within the foveal region and the right
+penumbra are mapped into successive slots in the programmable blackboard. Converging inputs from these slots, and only these slots, are
+sent to the central letter units, and connection activations from the connection activation structures are projected back to the programmable
+connections in these slots only.
+Connection activations are assumed to be "sticky": That is, it is
+assumed that once a connection has been programmed by the central
+knowledge structures, it stays that way. This allows interactive activation processes to continue
+in older parts of the programmable
+i
+-
+n
+-
+h
+e
+Left
+Penumbra
+X
+Point of fixation
+Right
+Penumbra
+F'ovea
+- focus of attention
+FIGURE 10. Schematic illustrations of the programmable blackboard, with illustrations
+of the fovea, the left and right penumbras, and the span of the focus of attention during
+a fixation in reading.
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+151
+blackboard while they are being set up in newer parts as the eye moves
+along from left to right. So, what has already been processed in earlier
+fixations can continue to influence the processing of the contents of the
+current fixation, and, in case of unresolved ambiguities, can be influenced by the new information coming in.
+To make this model work, we would need to imagine that when the
+eye moves, we change the mapping from a low-level, retinocentric
+representation of the contents of the current fixation into the programmable blackboard. The mapping mechanism proposed by Hinton
+(1981b) would be appropriate for doing this, assuming the activations
+of the "mapping units" could be updated in tandem with the commands
+to move the eyes. Hinton's scheme can also be used to map from
+the programmable letter units into the central letter units and from
+the connection activation units to the appropriate programmable
+connections.
+Details of the Simulation Model
+The simulation model developed to embody these assumptions is
+called PABLO, an approximate acronym for Programmable Blackboard
+PABLO uses an alphabet of 9 letters, including blank (written as "_")
+and the letters A, C, D, E, H, I, N, and T. Its lexicon consists of all
+the words of one to four letters made up only of those letters that were
+found in a large computerized dictionary. Archaic forms, past tenses,
+plurals, proper nouns and abbreviations were deleted, leaving a lexicon
+of 92 words, as shown in Table 5. Also, blank was treated as a (special) one-letter word. As in TRACE (Chapter 15), blanks served to
+provide competition against words that would otherwise tend to invade
+the spaces between words.
+PABLO contained a sufficient programmable blackboard to read lines
+of text 20 characters long. To accomplish this, it contained 20 overlapping programmable modules, each capable of being programmed for
+processing all of the words in the lexicon. Each module consisted of a
+set of programmable word units, four sets of programmable letter units
+shared with adjacent modules, and two sets of programmable connections between the letter units and the word units. One set of connections was used for bottom-up connections from the letter to the word
+level, the other for top-down connections from the word to the letter
+level.
+There were 93 word units in each module, one for each of the 93
+words (including blank). Each letter slot consisted of a complete set of
+letter/ role specification units. Each set contained four units for each of
+
+152 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+AD
+ANT
+CANT
+CHIN
+DEAD
+DIE
+EAT
+HATE
+HI
+ICE
+ITCH
+NIT
+TEEN
+THE
+TINE
+ACE
+ADD
+ANTE
+CAT
+CHIT
+DEAN
+DIET
+EDIT
+HE
+HIDE
+IDEA
+NEAT
+TACT
+TEN
+THEN
+TINT
+TABLE S
+THE WORDS USED IN PABLO
+ACHE
+ACID
+AID
+AT
+AIDE
+CAD
+CEDE
+CENT
+CITE
+DEED
+DAD
+DEN
+DIN
+DINE
+END
+ETCH
+HEAD
+HEAT
+HIND
+HINT
+IN
+INCH
+NEED
+NET
+TAD
+TAN
+TEND
+TENT
+THIN
+TIDE
+ACNE
+AN
+CAN
+CHAT
+DATA
+DENT
+DINT
+HAND
+HEED
+HIT
+INN
+NICE
+TEA
+THAN
+TIE
+ACT
+AND
+CANE
+CHIC
+IT
+NINE
+TEE
+THAT
+TIN
+the nine letters, one for each partial role specification described above.
+Thus, there were 36 letter/ role units in each letter slot.
+Each complete programmable module included four letter slots.
+Thus, module i included letter slots i, i + 1, i + 2, and i + 3.
+As in TRACE, competition between word units depends upon the
+extent of the overlap of the words the units represent. That is, each
+word unit inhibits every other word unit once for every letter position
+in which they overlap. Thus CAT/ 1 and HAT/ 1, which overlap in all
+three letter positions, inhibit each other three times. CAT/1 and
+ATE/ 2, which overlap
+in two letter positions, inhibit each other twice.
+Again, for simplicity, these inhibitory connections are hardwired. 3
+In addition to these programmable processing structures, there is a
+central knowledge structure consisting of a central module and a connection activation system. The central module consists of one set of
+central letter units, one set of 93 central word units, and one hardwired
+3 For these connections to be hardwired, knowledge of the length of the word the local
+word units will be allocated to must be built into the local modules. This state of affairs
+would obviously be unacceptable in the ultimate version of the model. These inhibitory
+interactions could, of course,
+be programmed, as suggested earlier. An alternative
+scheme, in which patterns of activation are coarse-coded at the word as well as the letter
+level, would get around the problem by using a kind of "natural competition" that occurs
+between patterns competing for activation over the same set of units.
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL 153
+connection matrix linking the central letter units to the central word
+units. The central unit for each word also has hardwired connections to
+the CA units appropriate for activating both bottom-up and top-down
+connections between the programmable letter units and the programmable word unit for this word.
+An input to be presented to the model for processing could be a
+sequence of letters up to twenty letters long. The sequence could
+include blanks (represented by "_"). The blanks were treated as characters just as the letters were. The sequence of blanks and letters were
+used to specify which letter/role units should receive external excitatory input in each letter slot. The "_" character always activated the
+same two letter/role units no matter what preceded or followed it. So,
+letter/ role units for
+third letter slot, xT and T_ in the fourth letter slot, and to the two
+letter/ role units for "_" in the first and fifth slots.
+Single and Multiple Fixations
+The simulation model was studied in two modes: One involved short
+displays-one or at most two short words-which were presented for
+processing within a single fixation. The second mode involved whole
+lines of text.
+For the latter, I assumed that PABLO "read" them from
+left to right with one fixation per word. Fixation durations were fixed,
+for simplicity, though we know that they can be influenced by visual
+and linguistic factors (Just & Carpenter, 1980).
+First I will describe the assumptions made for the multiple fixation
+case. It was assumed that, on each fixation, the spotlight of attention
+consisted of two regions: a center and a penumbra. The center of the
+spotlight consisted of several letter positions in the input centered
+around the point of fixation. The penumbra of the spotlight consisted
+of several more letter positions further to the right. Note that the
+parafoveal region to the left of the point of fixation is not included in
+the spotlight of attention. Evidence from a number of sources (e.g.,
+Rayner, 1975) suggests that information in this region is not utilized.
+Letters in both the center and the penumbra of the spotlight of attention are projected to the corresponding letter units. To keep things simple, I assume for present purposes that the letters in the penumbra simply produce weaker bottom-up activations than those in the center of
+the spotlight. A more realistic assumption would be that letters in the
+penumbra produce less precise activations (i.e., activations that encompass all the letters in the same shape-class) but I have foregone this
+assumption for now to keep things simple and as clear as possible.
+
+154
+The spotlight of attention falls on a particular place in the input text,
+and its contents are projected to the corresponding region in the programmable blackboard. This region is called the illuminated region. The
+programmable letter units in this part of the blackboard project to the
+protral maule cand chion mene on activated regions project back to the
+In single fixation mode, I assumed that both the display and the
+spotlight of attention were centered on the fovea. For simplicity, the
+entire display was assumed to fall within the center of the spotlight so
+that each letter in the display was given equal weight.
+Details of activation dynamics. The rules for updating programmable letter and word unit activations were the same as in CID. However, the introduction of coarse coding and overlapping slots necessitated a number of changes in the quantitative parameters. The values I
+used were chosen so that PABLO would produce approximately the
+same behavior with single four-letter words as CID.
+The activation assumptions for units in the connection programming
+loop (the central letter and word units, and the connection activator
+units), and for the programmable connections themselves, were kept
+simple as before. Two modifications were introduced, however. First,
+letter-level activations in the penumbra of attention were treated as
+weaker inputs to the central letter units than letter-level activations in
+the center: They only turned on the corresponding central letter units
+half as much as those in the center of attention. Second, activations of
+central word units were normalized by the length of the word. This was
+done so that that the connections for a word would be turned on to the
+same extent, regardless of word length, whenever all the letters of the
+word were present in the center of attention. For example, the activation of the central word unit for the word CAT is just a count of the
+active letter/ role units for CAT (_C, Cx, XA, Ax, xT, and T_) in the
+center of the illuminated zone, plus.5 times a count of the active
+letter/ role units in the penumbra, divided by 6. With the display
+_CAT_, centered in the fovea, this number would therefore be 1.0.
+As before, each CA unit simply multiplies the activation value it
+receives from its CW unit by the appropriate global excitatory constant,
+4 An alternative conception would be to imagine that the contents of the fixation are
+always projected directly to the central module and to the illuminated region of the programmable blackboard. There are reasons for preferring this view, one of which is that it
+opens up the possibility that the information projected into the central module might be
+of higher grain than that projected to the programmable blackboard. This is desirable
+because higher fidelity is needed in the connection activation process than in the programmable blackboard once the correct connections have been activated. (See Chapter
+12.)
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+155
+depending on whether the connection
+is letter-to-word or word-toletter, and passes the result on as the activation of the programmable
+connections it projects to in each local matrix. Projections into the
+penumbra were assumed to be half strength.
+Finally, as noted above, the model assumes that programmable connection activations are "sticky" -they tend to retain the values programmed into them when the spotlight of attention moves on. For
+simplicity, I adopted the most radical version of this assumption. Input
+from the central module can increase the activation of a programmable
+connection, and, once activated to a level, it stays at that level while
+the rest of the line of text is processed. At the beginning of a new line,
+of course, the slate is wiped clean.
+One Fixation at a Time
+Simultaneous resolution of two tokens of the same ambiguous character. Consider the ambiguous character in THE CHT. Let us see
+what happens when this display is presented to PABLO.
+We assume
+that the whole display, with blanks on both sides, fits inside the center
+of attention, with the first T lined up with the second input position, so
+that each letter activates all of the appropriate letter/ role units in the
+appropriate positions. For the two slots to which the A character is
+presented, we assume that xH and Ax and A and Ax are all activated
+to equal degrees. PABLO will end up selecting xH and Hx for the first
+A and xA and Ax for the second H, in parallel.
+Once the letter/role units have been activated in the appropriate
+letter level slots, they will activate the central word units for various
+words to various degrees. For example, the central word unit for the
+word THE will receive eight excitatory inputs: from the _Tand Tx at
+the beginning of THE, from the xH and Hx in THE, from the E
+and
+xE at the end of THE, and from the xH and Hx in the middle of CHT.
+The central word unit for the word CAT will receive eight excitatory
+inputs as well: two from the initial C of CHT, two from the final T of
+CHT, and two from each (possible) medial A. Normalizing for length,
+the central word units for both words end up getting an activation value
+of 8/6 or 1.33.
+The central word units for other words will also be turned on to
+some extent. For example, the unit for the word HAT will receive
+eight excitatory inputs as well. The two Hx units activated by the H
+figures will each contribute one input, the two xA and the two Ax
+activated by the two H figures will each contribute one input, and the
+xT and T_ occurring at the end of CHT will each contribute one input.
+
+156 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+Note that the medial H turns on the weights for HAT half as much as
+an initial H would because it only has one letter-form feature in common with the initial H pattern of the word HAT. In any case, when we
+normalize again for length, the CW unit for HAT ends up getting an
+activation value of 8/6 or 1.33 as well.
+The CW units for THAT and CHAT will be set at activation values of
+1.25. The display contains a total of 10 tokens of the eight letter/ role
+elements of each of these two words, and the denominator for each is
+8. It is important to remember that the activation of central word units
+do not directly determine what is seen; they simply turn on connections
+in the programmable blackboard and thereby permit local letter units to
+interact with local word units. We now examine the activations that
+result from these interactions.
+Letter and word activations resulting from THE CHT after 10 cycles
+of processing are shown in Figure 11. The model has successfully completed the first word as THE and the second as CAT by the end of 10
+thet catt
+Leh a t
+t
+t
+e a
+-h - a -
+a
+h
+THE CHT
+FIGURE I1. Word- and letter-level activations in PABLO in response to THE CHT. At
+the word level (upper panel), each rectangle represents a word unit. The vertical position
+of the rectangle indicates the activation of the unit, and the horizontal placement relative
+to the input shown at bottom indicates the portion of the input that the unit spans. Al
+the letter level (lower panel), the height of each square represents the average activation
+of the two active letter/ role units representing the letter inscribed in the square.
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+157
+cycles and is in the process of reinforcing the correct interpretation of
+the H figure in each position through feedback. Words such as HAT
+whose weights are strongly activated play a stronger role in the competition than words such as CAN, which contain letters that do not occur
+anywhere in the input string, but even HAT, as well as THAT and
+CHAT, are eventually driven out. After 30 cycles (not shown) THE/ 2
+and CAT/ 6 are the only word units left active, and, at the letter level,
+the H has beaten A in THE while A has beaten H in CHT.
+Conspiracies of Words of Different Lengths
+So far what we have illustrated could have been done in a three-letter
+word version of CID, though the details about what words got activated
+would have been somewhat different. Now, however, we can present
+the words starting in any letter position -as long as they do not fail off
+either end of our series of overlapped modules-and they can be of any
+length up to the maximum length allowed by the structural parameters
+of the model. An even more important advantage of PABLO is that,
+when nonwords are shown, they can profit from conspiracy effects arising from words of different lengths. The mechanism causes the activations of the conspirators to be aligned appropriately with the input.
+PABLO has been tested with each of the words that it knows and
+with pseudowords made from each word by replacing either a vowel
+with a vowel or a consonant with a consonant. In all cases, the letter
+string was presented alone, surrounded by blanks. The model works
+well with either words or pseudowords. When a word of any length is
+shown surrounded appropriately by blanks, the appropriate word unit
+always wins the competition. When an nonword is shown, both shorter
+and longer strings can participate, as shown in Figure 12. In the figure,
+several representative conspiracies are shown for nonwords of four,
+three, and two letters in length. Though in some cases one word the
+model knows is a much better match than all the others, and therefore
+dominates the competition, in other cases there is a much more homogeneous conspiracy. Generally speaking, words both longer and shorter
+than the item shown get into the act-though of course no words
+longer than four letters are activated, because they have not been
+included in the model.
+Within-word crosstalk. One idiosyncrasy of PABLO needs to be
+mentioned. It has a tendency to activate words that have repetitions of
+the same letter more strongly than words that do not, even when only
+one copy of the letter is shown. For example, DAT activated DATA
+
+Icede
+Linch
+Ф
+tider
+Ф
+tant
+Inn-
+158
+NPSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+{hana
+facia
+fast
+lacher
+Leach
+dach
+fint
+Tich]
+-tant-
+-enit-
+-inth-
+- tede-
+- han-
+-cid-
+-ach-
+-ni--
+-end
+-Hentant
+- еп -
+- ir-
+FIGURE 12. The sets of conspirators active at the word level 10 cycles after presentation of the display shown at the bottom of each column.
+Relative height corresponds to activation. There are several cases in which two or more words are overprinted on each other, particularaly in
+the cases of HAN (where RAN, TAN, PAN, CAN, HAT, HAD, and HEN are all active) and TANT (where RANT, CANT, PANT, TART, TACT,
+TENT, and TINT are all active).
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+159
+more strongly than it activated DATE. The reason is that the xA unit
+activated by DAT turns on the weights for DATA two times-that is,
+there is a double excitatory link from this letter/role unit to the CW
+unit for DATA. At the present, I know of no data to indicate whether
+this characteristic is consistent with human behavior or not.
+There is another kind of within-word crosstalk that occurs in PABLO
+for which there is evidence. Connections for words that are anagrams of
+the display are strongly activated, particularly if they involve switches of
+the two internal letters. For example, the display CLAM activates the
+connections for CALM as much as the connections for CLAM, and the
+display BCAK activates the weights for BACK as much as BACK itself
+does. These connection activations make CALM a reasonably likely
+error response when CLAM is shown and make BACK a very likely
+error response when BCAK is shown. Johnston, Hale, and van Santen
+(1983) have reported evidence of such "transposition" errors in word
+perception. Generally, such errors are attributed to imprecise positional
+specificity, so that letters in one position activate detectors for words
+having these same letters in adjacent positions. In PABLO, such effects
+occur for a slightly different reason: It is not that the model does not
+keep straight which letter occurred where, it is just that the description
+of a letter that is projected into the central module is very similar to the
+description that would be projected by the same letter in a similar role.
+The results of simulations illustrating these effects are shown in Figure
+13. One feature of these data was originally puzzling when Johnston et
+al. first reported them. On the one hand, it seemed that subjects had
+very accurate letter position information, since they only rarely rearranged letters in real words to make other real words. On the other
+hand, they acted as though they had poor letter position information
+when the rearrangement of the string formed a word but the display
+itself did not. In PABLO, the reason for the difference is simply that
+in the first case, there is a word that matches the input better than the
+transposition word; due to competitive inhibition, the correct word
+dominates the transposition word. When there is no correct word, the
+transposition word is not dominated, so it may become quite strongly
+activated. This effect is clearly illustrated in the simulation shown in
+Figure 13.
+Effects of Display Length on Amount of Feedback
+One additional feature of PABLO is that shorter displays receive less
+benefit from feedback than longer displays. This is true, even though I
+have normalized the activation of central word units, and therefore of
+
+160 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+[drat
+1Pa thi
+trat
+pith
+Idar t
+DRAT
+PIAH
+FIGURE 13. Word-level activations produced by two displays which can be made into
+words by rearranging the central two letters.
+connection strengths, for word length. The reason for this is simply
+that shorter displays activate fewer letter/ role units than longer ones,
+and therefore provide less excitatory input to the word level than longer
+displays. Word units are less strongly activated than they are by longer
+displays. Consequently, less feedback is generated. This occurs both
+for word and for pronounceable nonword displays. The activations
+shown in Figure 12 illustrate this aspect of the model in the case of
+pronounceable nonword displays.
+At first I found this characteristic of the model undesirable. However, recent evidence collected by Samuel, van Santen, and Johnston
+(1982) is consistent with the model as it is. Samuel et al. examined
+accuracy of letter identification for letters in one-, two-, three-, and
+four-letter words and random letter strings and found that letter identification accuracy increased as a function of word-length for letters in
+words but not for letters in random strings. The advantage for letters
+in words over letters in random strings was either very small or nonexistent for one-letter words and grew as the words grew longer, up to
+about four or five letters. Thus, the data appear to support this aspect
+of the model's behavior. It should be noted that this aspect of the
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+161
+model does not depend on the connection activation aspects of PABLO
+but would occur in a hardwired version of the original model, as long as
+the net excitatory input to the word unit from a complete specification
+of the word varied linearly with the length of the word.
+Sequences of Fixations
+Up to now I have examined the behavior of PABLO within single
+fixations. Now, we will examine the model as it reads along a line of
+text. The present version of the model is fairly rudimentary, and there
+are a lot of important properties of human reading that it does not capture. However, it does read in a limited sense: It makes a series of fixations, and builds up a representation of the letters and words in its
+programmable blackboard as it moves along, as illustrated in Figure 14.
+PABLO's reading in this simulation is not affected by semantic and
+syntactic constraints since it lacks these higher levels. Furthermore, as
+it presently stands, PABLO does not even monitor its own performance. Instead, each fixation lasts a fixed number of cycles. PABLO
+does adjust the point of its fixation for the word it is viewing, however:
+It fixates on the center of words containing an odd number of letters,
+or the middle of the letter before the center for words containing an
+even number of letters. S
+Although it lacks many of the features of Thibadeau, Just, and
+Carpenter's (1982) READER model, PABLO does show one property
+that READER does not: It integrates information over successive fixations. That is, while it is looking at one word in a particular fixation, it
+is also gathering some information about the next word. This is, of
+course, something that human readers do also (Rayner, 1975; for a
+dissenting view, see McConkie, Zola, Blanchard, & Wolverton, 1982).
+We can see that PABLO is picking up information from peripheral
+vision in Figure 14, but it is hard to tell from the figure how much
+difference this makes. To get a handle on this matter, I repeated with
+PABLO the same experiment Rayner (1975) did to demonstrate the
+pickup of peripheral information in human readers. That is, I adjusted
+the display during PABLO's saccade, so that what the model saw in the
+periphery and what it saw when it later fixated the previously peripheral
+location was not necessarily the same. Rayner showed that when the
+5 The reader should be clear about the fact that PABLO's fixation shifting apparatus is
+not simulated using interactive activation processes, though I think it could be. A saccade
+for PABLO simply amounts to moving a pointer into the array of input letters and
+another into the programmable blackboard.
+
+162 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+the
+the
+Ite eth a 4E
+[cat
+-thetead gif
+-catcat-
+did-
+-the
+THE CAT DID THAT
+THE CAT DID THAT
+that
+[caT
+did
+the
+[cat
+that
+dad that
+- did-
+-that
+that
+-cat
+-did
+the
+cat
+THE
+CAT DID THAT
+THE CAT DID THAT
+FIGURE 14. Pattern of activation at the letter and word level in PABLO, at the end of
+each fixation, as the model reads along a line of text. Location of the fovea and penum.
+ora of the spotlight of attention is indicated with underbars.
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+163
+information in peripheral vision differed from the information later fixated directly, subjects spent longer fixating the word than they did in
+the normal case in which the preview and the foveal view were the
+same. Other experiments have shown that subjects can name the fixated word more quickly if it matches the preview than if the preview is
+different (Rayner, McConkie, & Ehrlich, 1978).
+Figure 15 illustrates PABLO's behavior in the following experiment.
+The model was given a two-word phrase and read it in two successive
+fixations. During the second fixation, when the fixation point was centered on the second word, the two-word phrase was always CAR RIDE.
+During the first fixation, however, there were different versions of the
+second word. In one case, the second word was intact on the first fixation. In the second case, the two internal letters were replaced with
+other letters having the same general shape. In the third case, all four
+letters were changed.
+The figure shows that the activation of the word RIDE is greater at
+the end of the second fixation in the first case than in the other two
+cases.
+In the third case, the activation of RIDE is considerably less at
+the end of the second fixation than it would be without any preview of
+the second word at all (indicated by the curve marked XXXX in the
+figure). Generally, PABLO shows a facilitation, as it does in this
+example, when the preview matches the target. It also generally shows
+an interference effect when there is a gross mismatch between preview
+Activation
+1.0
+0.8
+0.6
+0.4
+0.2
+0.0
+- 0.2
+RIDE
+XXXX
+RNHE
+NPCH
+10
+20
+30
+40
+50
+Processing Cycles
+FIGURE 15. Time course of activation of the programmable word unit for the word
+RIDE in the sixth word channel of the programmable blackboard when the preview was
+RIDE, XXXX, RNHE, or NPCH. The XXXX marks the case of no preview information at
+all, as though there had never been a first display.
+
+164 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+and target. For intermediate cases, it can show either a facilitation or
+an interference, depending on the target and the exact distortion of it.
+On the average, the intermediate condition shows a slight interference
+effect when two letters are changed, as in the example shown in the
+figure.
+To relate these results to Rayner's, we would begin by assuming that
+human readers, unlike PABLO, move on to the next fixation when
+their certainty of the contents of one fixation reaches a satisfactory
+level. In the simulation, PABLO has a fixed duration for each fixation,
+but if the fixation was terminated when the activation of one of the
+words reached some criterion, then the duration of the fixation on the
+target would have been shortest in the case where the preview matches
+the target and longest in the case where the two differ the most, just as
+Rayner found.
+Thus, PABLO integrates information over successive fixations, and
+conforms to the main result of Rayner's experiment. Though PABLO
+does not capture all the details, I would expect it to capture more of
+them if some of the simplifying assumptions were replaced with more
+realistic ones. For example, end letters appear to be more critical to
+human readers than to PABLO, and people are sensitive to the similarity of shape between original and replacement letters.
+A more elaborate version of PABLO, including a real feature level, would surely
+show these effects.
+DISCUSSION
+I have described two models that rely on the same basic principles of
+connection information distribution from a central knowledge source to
+local, programmable modules. CID, the first model, illustrated some
+basic properties of the connection information distribution scheme, but
+it had serious limitations because of its fixed-length, nonoverlapping
+programmable modules. PABLO overcame this deficiency of CID and
+provided a framework for beginning to think about the problem of
+reading by a series of fixations and integrating information from one
+fixation to the next.
+Benefits of Connection Information Distribution
+At this point, it is appropriate to step back from these particular
+models and take a look at the more general implications of the idea of
+connection information distribution. I believe this is quite a powerful
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+165
+idea. Connection information distribution allows us to instruct parallel
+processing structures from outside the network, making their behavior
+contingent on instructions originating elsewhere in the network. This
+means, for example, that the way a network responds to a particular
+input can be made contingent on the state of some other network in
+the system, thereby greatly increasing the flexibility of parallel processing mechanisms.
+Perhaps the most general way of stating the benefit of connection
+information distribution is to note that it is analogous, in a way, to the
+invention of the stored program.
+• 6 Before programs were invented,
+special-purpose logic circuits were built to carry out particular tasks;
+the invention of the computer program made it possible for a single,
+general-purpose machine to carry out any one of a huge number of
+tasks. The use of centrally stored connection information to program
+local processing structures is analogous. This allows the very same processing structures to be programmed to perform a very wide range of
+different tasks.
+More specifically, there are two computational problems facing PDP
+models to which connection information distribution can be beneficially
+addressed. Connection information distribution allows multiple tokens
+of the same type to be active at once. PABLO, for example, would
+have no difficulty processing the same word twice if it occurred in two
+different locations in the programmable blackboard, and higher levels
+would be able to make different choices from alternative word activations in different places, just as the word level in PABLO was able to
+make different choices between A and H for the two instances of the H
+character in THE CHT. The ability to treat different tokens of the
+same type separately is, of course, very important in such domains as
+sentence processing, in which several tokens of the same kind of object
+(e.g., noun phrase, sentence, etc.) must be kept straight and assigned
+to appropriate roles in larger structures.
+Connection information distribution also carries out a form of what is
+known in production systems as "resolution," binding the right tokens
+in the blackboard together into higher-order structural patterns. In
+PABLO, we have the following situation: Activations from everywhere
+in the programmable blackboard (analogous for present purposes to the
+working memory in production system models) are projected into the
+central knowledge system (analogous to the production memory). Central word units (analogous to productions) are activated to the extent
+the input from anywhere in the programmable blackboard activates
+them. The problem faced in production systems is to avoid spuriously
+6 I thank Gary Cottrell for pointing out this analogy.
+
+166
+firing productions when the activations in working memory lack the
+proper overall organization and to bind the correct pieces together, so
+that each production has the correct set of arguments rather than a
+mélange of arguments coming from different places. If spurious activations occur and the bindings are done improperly, the consequence will
+be that the wrong things will be added to the working memory. The
+ultimate problem faced in PABLO is analogous. We need to avoid
+allowing the wrong word units to get activated in the programmable
+blackboard by spurious conjunctions of letters. PABLO solves this
+problem, not by explicitly binding productions to particular elements
+and checking that they occur in the right conjunctions, but by distributing connection information so that when and if the right combination
+of elements occurs, the appropriate word unit will be activated. This
+allows different elements to be bound to different higher-order structures in parallel, as we saw in the case of THE CHT; one of the H's was
+"bound" to an appropriate "instantiation" of THE, and the other to an
+appropriate instantiation of CAT. This scheme does involve some
+crosstalk, as we saw, but the crosstalk is of about the same kind and
+magnitude as the crosstalk shown by human subjects when they have to
+process more than one pattern in parallel. In short, it looks as though
+the CID model captured pretty well some of the features of the way
+elements are bound together in human information processing.
+Costs of Connection Information Distribution
+At first glance, it may seem that the ability to program parallel processing structures is being purchased at a very high price. For it
+appears that, wherever we had a connection in a hardwired PDP model,
+we now need a lot of extra circuitry to program that connection. The
+cost appears particularly high in terms of connection activation units
+and programmable connections. If there are n ×n units in a programmable module, it appears that we need n' programmable connections
+and the same number of CA units to activate the programmable connections. This can get very expensive very quickly as processing structures get to realistic sizes.
+Actually, however, the situation is not as bleak as this observation
+seems to suggest. It turns out that with programmable modules, it is
+possible to process patterns with far fewer units than we would need in
+a hardwired parallel processing structure. The reason is that the size of
+a module required to process a pattern without error depends on the
+number of patterns the module must be prepared to process at one
+time. To see this, consider a module which must either be hardwired
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL 167
+to process three different languages or which can be programmed to
+process any one of them. Clearly, we can get by with a smaller module
+in the latter case. More generally, if we use distributed representations,
+simple mathematical analyses show that the more patterns a module is
+set up to process, the larger it must be to avoid errors in processing any
+one pattern that might be presented on a particular occasion. The reason why this fact is relevant is that in conventional, hardwired PDP
+mechanisms, the model is programmed to process all of the patterns
+that it knows, all of the time.
+With programmable modules, on the
+other hand, the module only gets loaded with the connection information relevant to processing the patterns whose central representations
+are active. Since this number is vastly smaller than the number of total
+patterns a person might know, the size of the programmable processing
+structure can be very much smaller than a hardwired processing structure would have to be to do the same work. A full discussion of these
+issues is presented in Chapter 12 on the resource requirements of PDP
+models.
+One interesting result of the analysis of the resource requirements of
+connection information distribution is the fact that the required number
+of units and connections varies with the number of different patterns
+the network is being programmed to process at a particular time. This
+fact means that for a CID mechanism of a given size, there is a limit of
+the amount of parallelism it can handle (quite independently of the
+number of programmable modules). But the limit is in programming
+the modules, not in their actual parallel operation once they have been
+set up. Thus if we can program each module separately, we can let
+them run in parallel; though we are forced to go sequential at the level
+of programming the modules, they can still be allowed to process
+simultaneously and to mutually constrain each other though interactions with higher-level processing structures. We therefore get the main
+benefit we wanted parallel distributed processing for-simultaneous,
+mutual constraint-without reduplicating hardwired knowledge or paying an undue price in terms of programmable connections and connection activation units.
+Extensions of Connection Information Distribution
+A programmable version of TRACE. In PABLO, we programmed
+the programmable blackboard sequentially, in fixation-sized blocks. In
+extending the basic ideas inherent in PABLO to speech, we notice
+immediately that the speech signal forces seriality on us by its very
+sequential nature. We argued, though, in Chapter 15, for a dynamic
+
+168
+parallel processing structure in which we could exploit both forward and
+backward interactions, simply allowing new constraints to be added
+from the input at the right edge of the Trace, as the speech input
+unfolded in time. Now, to make the Trace into a programmable parallel processing structure, we can use the seriality of speech to program
+the Trace sequentially, as the speech comes in, thereby minimizing the
+resource requirements of the connection information distribution
+apparatus.
+There would be several advantages to implementing a programmable
+version of TRACE. One is that retuning, priming, and learning effects
+could be accounted for by adjustment of the strengths of connections in
+the central knowledge source. Another is that the rather high cost of
+the connection modulation scheme for tuning feature-phoneme connections based on phoneme activations in the context could be born just
+once in the central knowledge structures. A third is that the central
+knowledge source could be retuned by global variables such as rate,
+etc., thereby allowing it to create in the Trace just the right pattern of
+interconnections to fit the expected form different possible utterances
+might take in the given situation. Such a model might be seen as performing an analysis of the speech signal by synthesis of the appropriate
+connection information, capturing some of the flexibility and context
+sensitivity which Halle and Stevens (1964) noted that speech perception
+calls for in their seminal article on " Analysis by Synthesis."
+Processing syntactic structures. Introducing programmable connections into the TRACE model of speech perception will be a challenging
+task. Equally challenging will be the problem of extending the
+approach described here to higher levels of language structure..
+higher levels, we must come to grips with the recursive structure of
+sentences, and the unbounded dependencies among elements of sentences. Some ideas about how this might be done are described in
+Chapter 19.
+CONCLUSION
+In this chapter, I have tried to argue that connection information distribution provides a way of overcoming some apparent limitations of
+parallel distributed processing mechanisms. Using connection information distribution, we can create local copies of relevant portions of the
+contents of a central knowledge store. These local copies then serve as
+the basis for interactive processing among the conceptual entities they
+program local hardware units to represent. With this mechanism, PDP
+
+16. PROGRAMMABLE BLACKBOARD MODEL
+169
+models can now be said to be able to create multiple instantiations of
+the same schema, bound appropriately to the correct local variables,
+though subject to just the kinds of binding errors human subjects seem
+to make.
+Perhaps the main lesson is that some of the limitations of PDP
+mechanisms that connection information distribution has been proposed
+to overcome are more apparent than real. For I have not really done
+anything more than show how existing tools in the arsenal of parallel
+distributed processing mechanisms can be used to create local copies of
+networks. This is not to say that all the challenges facing PDP models
+have suddenly vanished. Obviously there is a long way still to go in the
+development of computationally adequate models of reading, speech
+perception, and higher levels of language processing. I hope this
+chapter helps to indicate that PDP mechanisms will help us get there in
+a way that captures the flexibility and interactive character of human
+processing capabilities.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+This work was supported by ONR Contract N00014-82-C-0374, NR
+667-483, by a grant from the System Development Foundation, by a
+grant from the National Science Foundation (BNS-79-24062), and by a
+NIMH Research Scientist Career Development Award. Special thanks
+for useful ideas and suggestions are due to Gary Cottrell, Geoff Hinton, Dave Rumelhart, and David Zipser.
+
+CHAPTER 17
+A Distributed Model of
+Human Learning and Memory
+J. L. McCLELLAND and D. E. RUMELHART
+The view that human memory is distributed has come and gone
+several times over the years. Hughlings-Jackson, the 19th century neurologist; Kurt Goldstein, the Gestalt neurologist of the early 20th century; and Karl Lashley, the physiological psychologist of the same era,
+all held to variants of a distributed model of the physiology of learning
+and memory.
+While Lashley's and Goldstein's more radical views have not been
+borne out, the notion that memory is physiologically distributed within
+circumscribed regions of the brain seems to be quite a reasonable and
+plausible assumption (see Chapters 20 and 21). But given the rather
+loose coupling between a psychological or cognitive theory and a theory
+of physiological implementation, we can ask, does the notion of distributed memory have anything to offer us in terms of an understanding of
+human cognition?
+In Chapter 3, several of the attractive properties of distributed
+models are described, primarily from a computational point of view.
+This chapter addresses the relevance of distributed models from the
+point of view of the psychology of memory and learning. We begin by
+This chapter is a modified version of the article "Distributed Memory and the
+Representation of General and Specific Information" by J. L. McClelland and D. E
+Rumelhart, which appeared in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 1985, 114,
+159-188. Copyright 1985 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. Adapted with
+permission.
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+171
+considering a dilemma that faces cognitive theories of learning and
+memory, concerning the representations of general and specific information.
+Then we show how a simple version of a distributed model
+circumvents the dilemma.
+We go on to show how this model can
+account for a number of recent findings about the learning and
+representation of general and specific information. We end by considering some other phenomena that can be accounted for using a distributed model, and we consider a limitation of the model and ways this
+limitation might be overcome.
+The Dilemma
+One central dilemma for theories of memory has to do with the
+choice to represent general or specific information. On the one hand,
+human memory and human learning seem to rely on the formation of
+summary representations that generalize from the details of the specific
+experiences that gave rise to them. A large number of experiments,
+going back to the seminal findings of Posner and Keele (1968) indicate
+that we appear to extract what is common to a set of experiences. On
+the basis of this sort of evidence, a number of theorists have proposed
+that memory is largely a matter of generalized representations, either
+abstracted representations of concepts discarding irrelevant features, or
+prototypes-representations of typical exemplars (Rosch, 1975). On
+the other hand, specific events and experiences play a prominent role in
+memory. Experimental demonstrations of the importance of specific
+stimulus events even in tasks which have been thought to involve
+abstraction of a concept or rule are now legion. Responses in categorization tasks (Brooks, 1978; Brooks, Jacoby, & Whittlesea, 1985; Medin
+& Schaffer, 1978), perceptual identification tasks (Jacoby, 1983a, 1983b;
+Whittlesea, 1983), and pronunciation tasks (Glushko, 1979) all seem to
+be quite sensitive to the congruity between particular training stimuli
+and particular test stimuli, in ways which most abstraction or prototype
+formation models would not expect.
+One response to this dual situation has been to propose models in
+which apparent rule-based or concept-based behavior is attributed to a
+process that makes use of stored traces of specific events or specific
+exemplars of the concepts or rules. According to this class of models,
+the apparently rule-based or concept-based behavior emerges from what
+might be called a conspiracy of individual memory traces or from a
+sampling of one from the set of such traces. Models of this class
+include the Medin and Schaffer (1978) context model, the Hintzman
+(1983) multiple trace model, and the Whittlesea (1983) episode model.
+
+172
+This trend is also exemplified by our interactive activation model of
+word perception and an extension of the interactive activation model to
+generalization from exemplars (McClelland, 1981). Both of these
+models were described in Chapter 1.
+One feature of some of these exemplar models is very troublesome.
+Many of them are internally inconsistent with respect to the issue of
+abstraction. Thus, though our word perception model assumes that
+linguistic rules emerge from a conspiracy of partial activations of detectors for particular words, thereby eliminating the need for abstraction of
+rules,
+the assumption that there is a single detector for each word
+implicitly assumes that there is an abstraction process that lumps each
+occurrence of the same word into the same single detector unit. Thus,
+the model has its abstraction and creates it too, though at somewhat
+different levels.
+One logically coherent response to this inconsistency is to simply say
+that each word or other representational object is itself the result of a
+conspiracy of the entire ensemble of memory traces of the different
+individual experiences we have had with the object. We will call this
+view the enumeration of specific experiences view. It is exemplified most
+clearly by Jacoby (1983a, 1983b), Hintzman (1983), and Whittlesea
+(1983).
+As the papers just mentioned demonstrate, enumeration models can
+work quite well as an account of quite a number of empirical findings.
+However, there still seems to be a drawback. Enumeration models
+seem to require an unlimited amount of storage capacity, as well as
+mechanisms for searching an almost unlimited mass of data. This is
+especially true when we consider that the primitives out of which we
+normally assume each experience is built are themselves based on generalizations. For example, a word is a sequence of letters, and a sentence is a sequence of words. Are we to believe that all these units are
+mere notational conveniences for the theorist, and that every event is
+stored separately as an extremely rich (obviously structured) representation of the event, with no condensation of details?
+Thus, the dilemma remains. It would appear that enumeration
+models cannot completely eliminate the need for some kind of abstractive representation in memory. Yet the evidence that the characteristics of particular events influence memory performance cannot be
+disposed of completely.
+One response to this dilemma is to propose the explicit storage of
+both general and specific information. For example, Elio and J. R.
+Anderson (1981) have proposed just such a model.
+In this model,
+memory traces are stored in the form of productions, and mechanisms
+of production generalization and differentiation
+form summary
+representations and refine them as necessary during learning.
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+173
+Distributed models suggest another alternative.
+As we shall demonstrate in this chapter, a very simple distributed model, relying on a very
+simple learning rule-the delta rule-is capable of accounting for
+empirical data that has been taken as suggesting that we store summary
+representations (e.g., prototypes) as well as data that has been taken as
+suggesting that memory consists of an enumeration of specific experiences.
+The specific model we consider does have a limitation that it shares
+with enumeration models: It relies on a fixed set of representational
+primitives. However, we shall argue that natural extensions of the
+model which overcome this limitation are now possible. Though we do
+not explore these extensions in detail, we do consider some issues that
+will arise if these extensions are incorporated.
+A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+The model we shall describe is a member of the class of models discussed in Chapter 3. In developing the ideas presented here, we were
+strongly influenced by the work of J. A. Anderson (e.g., 1977, 1983;
+Anderson, Silverstein, Ritz, & Jones, 1977; Knapp & Anderson, 1984)
+and Hinton (198la).
+We have adopted and synthesized what we found
+to be the most useful aspects of their distinct but related models,
+preserving (we hope the basic spirit of both.
+In keeping with the overall enterprise of the book, our distributed
+model is a model of the microstructure of memory.
+It specifies the
+internal workings of some of the components of information processing
+and memory, in particular those concerned with the retrieval and use of
+prior experience. The model does not specify in and of itself how these
+acts of retrieval and use are planned, sequenced, and organized into
+coherent patterns of behavior. Some thoughts about ways this might be
+done may be found in Chapters 8 and 14.
+General Properties
+Our model shares a number of basic assumptions about the nature of
+the processing and memory system with most other distributed models.
+In particular, the processing system is assumed to consist of a highly
+interconnected network of units that take on activation values and communicate with other units by sending signals modulated by weights
+associated with the connections between the units, according to the
+principles laid out in Chapter 2. Sometimes we may think of the units
+
+174 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+as corresponding to particular representational primitives, but they need
+not. For example, even what we might consider to be a primitive
+feature of something, like having a particular color, might be a pattern
+of activation over a collection of units.
+Modular structure. We assume that the units are organized into
+modules. Each module receives inputs from other modules; the units
+within the module are richly interconnected with each other; and they
+send outputs to other modules. Figure 1 illustrates the internal structure of a very simple module, and Figure 2 illustrates some hypothetical interconnections between
+a number of modules.
+Both figures
+grossly under-represent our view of the numbers of units per module
+and the number of modules.
+We would imagine that there would be
+thousands to millions of units per module and many hundred or
+perhaps many thousand partially redundant modules in anything close
+to a complete memory system.
+The state of each module represents a synthesis of the states of all of
+the modules it receives inputs from. Some of the inputs will be from
+relatively more sensory modules, closer to the sensory end-organs of
+FIGURE 1. A simple information processing module, consisting of a small ensemble of
+eight processing units. Each unit receives inputs from other modules (indicated by the
+single input impinging on the input line of the unit from the left; this can stand for a
+number of converging input signals from several units outside the module) and sends
+outputs to other modules (indicated by the rightward output line from each unit). Each
+unit also has a modifiable connection to all the other units in the module, as indicated by
+the branches of the output lines that loop back onto the input lines leading into each unit.
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+175
+FIGURE 2. An illustrative diagram showing several modules and interconnections
+among them. Arrows between modules simply indicate that some of the units in one
+module send inputs to some of the units in the other. The exact number and organization of modules is, of course, unknown; the figure is simply intended to be suggestive.
+one modality or another. Others will come from relatively more
+abstract modules, which themselves receive inputs from and send outputs to other modules placed at the abstract end of several different
+modalities. Thus, each module combines a number of different sources
+of information.
+Units play specific roles within patterns. A pattern of activation only
+counts as the same as another if the same units are involved. The reason for this is that the knowledge built into the system for re-creating
+the patterns is built into the set of interconnections among the units, as
+we will explain below. For a pattern to access the right knowledge, it
+must arise on the appropriate units. In this sense the units play specific
+roles in the patterns.
+Obviously, a system of this sort is useless without sophisticated perceptual processing mechanisms at the interface between memory and
+the outside world, so that input patterns arising at different locations in
+the world can be mapped into the same set of units internally. The
+scheme proposed by Hinton (1981b; see Chapter 4) is one such
+mechanism. Chapter 16 describes mechanisms that allow several different patterns to access the same set of units at the same time; in the
+present chapter, we restrict attention to the processing of one pattern
+at a time.
+
+176
+Relation to Basic Concepts in Memory
+Several standard concepts in the memory literature map easily onto
+corresponding aspects of distributed memory models. Here we consider
+three key concepts in memory and their relation to our distributed
+memory model.
+Mental state as pattern of activation. In a distributed memory system, a mental state is a pattern of activation over the units in some
+subset of the modules. The patterns in the different modules capture
+different aspects of the content of the mental states in a kind of a partially overlapping fashion. Alternative mental states are simply alternative patterns of activation over the modules. Information processing is
+the process of evolution in time of mental states.
+Memory traces as changes in the weights. Patterns of activation
+come and go, leaving traces behind when they have passed. What are
+the traces? They are changes in the strengths or weights of the connections between the units in the modules.' As we already said, each
+memory trace is distributed over many different connections, and each
+connection participates in many different memory traces. The traces of
+different mental states are therefore superimposed in the same set of
+weights.
+Retrieval as reinstatement of prior pattern of activation. Retrieval
+amounts to partial reinstatement of a mental state, using a cue which is
+a fragment of the original state. For any given module, we can see the
+cues as originating from outside of it. Some cues could arise ultimately
+from sensory input. Others would arise from the results of previous
+retrieval operations, fed back to the memory system under the control
+of a search or retrieval plan. It would be premature to speculate on
+how such schemes would be implemented in this kind of a model, but
+it is clear that they must exist.
+Detailed Assumptions
+In the rest of our presentation, we will be focusing on operations that
+take place within a single module. This obviously oversimplifies the
+behavior of a complete memory system since the modules are assumed
+1 These traces are not, of course, to be confused with the continuing pattern of activation stored in the Trace processing structure discussed in Chapter 15.
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+177
+to be in continuous interaction. The simplification is justified, however, in that it allows us to examine some of the basic properties of distributed memory systems which are visible even without these interactions with other modules.
+Let us look, therefore, at the internal structure of one very simple
+module, as shown in Figure 1. Again, our image is that in a system
+sufficient for real memories, there would be much larger numbers of
+units. We have restricted our analysis to small numbers simply to illustrate basic principles as clearly as possible; this also helps to keep the
+running time of simulations in bounds.
+Continuous activation values. The units used in the present model
+are fairly standard units, taking on continuous activation values in the
+range from -1 to +1. Zero is in this case a neutral resting value,
+toward which the activations of the units tend to decay.
+Unlike the models described in some of the previous chapters in this
+section, there is no threshold activation value. This means that both
+positive and negative activations influence other units.
+Inputs, outputs, and internal connections. Each unit receives input
+from other modules and sends output to other modules.
+For simplicity,
+we assume that the inputs from other modules occur at connections
+whose weights are fixed.
+In the simulations, we also treat the input
+from outside the module as a static pattern that comes on suddenly,
+ignoring for simplicity the fact that the input pattern evolves in time
+and might be affected by feedback from the module under study.
+While the input to each unit might arise from a combination of sources
+in other modules, we can lump the external input to each unit into a
+single real valued number representing the combined effects of all components of the external input. In addition to extramodular connections,
+each unit is connected to all other units in the module via a weighted
+connection. The weights on these connections are modifiable, as
+described below. The weights can take on any real values: positive,
+negative, or zero. There is no connection from a unit onto itself.
+An input pattern is presented at some point in time over some or all
+of the input lines to the module and is then left on for several ticks,
+until the pattern of activation it produces settles down and
+stops
+changing.
+The processing cycle. The model is a synchronous model, like all of
+the other models in this section. On each processing cycle, each unit
+determines its net input, based on the external input to the unit and
+the activations of all of the units at the end of the preceding cycle
+modulated by the weight coefficients which determine the strength and
+
+178
+direction of each unit's effect on every other unit. Then the activations
+of all of the units are updated simultaneously.
+The net input to a unit consists of two parts, the external input, arising from outside the module, and the internal input, arising from the
+other units in the module. The internal input to unit i, i, is then just
+the sum of all of these separate inputs, each weighted by the appropriate connection strength:
+i, = Ia, Wij.
+Here, j ranges over all units in the module other than i, a; is the
+activation of unit j at the end of the previous cycle, and wij is the
+weight of the connection to unit i from unit j. This sum is then added
+to the external input to the unit, arising from outside the module, to
+obtain the net input to unit i, net;:
+net; = i, t e;
+where e, is just the lumped external input to unit i.
+Activations are updated according to a simple nonlinear "squashing"
+function like the one we have used in several other chapters. If the net
+input is positive, the activation of the unit is incremented by an amount
+proportional to the distance left to the ceiling activation level of +1.0
+If the net input is negative, the activation is decremented by an amount
+proportional to the distance left to the floor activation level of - 1.0.
+There is also a decay factor which tends to pull the activation of the
+unit back toward the resting level of O. For unit i, if net; > 0,
+Aa; = Enet; (1 - a;) - Da;.
+(1)
+It net; ≤ 0,
+Aa; = Enet; (a; - (-I)) - Da;.
+(2)
+In these equations, E and D are global parameters that apply to all
+units and set the rates of excitation and decay, respectively. The term
+a, is the activation of unit i at the end of the previous cycle, and Aa; is
+the change in a;; that is, it is the amount added to (or, if negative, subtracted from the old value a; to determine its new value for the next
+cycle.
+The details of these assumptions are quite unimportant to the
+behavior of the model. Many of the same results have been obtained
+using other sigmoid squashing functions. The fact that activations
+range from -1 to +1 is, likewise, not very relevant, though if activations ranged from O to 1 instead, it would be necessary to incorporate
+threshold terms in addition to the connection strengths to get the
+model to produce roughly the same results.
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+179
+Given a fixed set of inputs to a particular unit, its activation level
+will be driven up or down in response until the activation reaches the
+point where the incremental effects of the input are balanced by the
+decay. In practice, of course, the situation is complicated by the fact
+that as each unit's activation is changing it alters the input to the
+others. Thus, it is necessary to run the simulation to see how the system will behave for any given set of inputs and any given set of
+weights. In all the simulations reported here, the model is allowed to
+run for 50 cycles, which is considerably more than enough for it to
+achieve a stable pattern of activation over all the units.
+Memory traces. The memory trace of a particular pattern of activation is a set of changes in the entire set of weights in the module. We
+call the whole set of changes an increment to the weights. After a stable
+pattern of activation is achieved, weight adjustment takes place. This is
+thought of as occurring simultaneously for all of the connections in the
+module.
+We use the delta rule to determine the size and direction of the
+change at each connection. This learning rule is explored extensively in
+Chapters 2, 8, and 11. Here, we consider it from the point of view of
+indicating how it implements, in a direct and simple way, the storage of
+the connection information that will allow a module to re-create complete patterns of activation originally produced by external input when
+only a part of the pattern is presented as a "retrieval" cue.
+To achieve pattern completion, we want to set up the internal connections among the units in the module so that when part of the pattern is presented, the internal connections will tend to reproduce the
+rest. Consider, in this light, a particular pattern of activation, and
+assume for the moment that in this pattern the external input to a particular unit j is excitatory. Then we will want the internal input trom
+other units in the module to tend to excite unit / when they lake on
+the activation values appropriate for this particular pattern. In general,
+what we need to do for each unit is to adjust the weights so that the
+internal connections in the module will tend to reproduce the external
+input to that unit, given that the rest of the units have the activation
+values appropriate for this particular pattern.
+The first step in weight adjustment is to see how well we are already
+doing.
+If the network is already doing what it should, the weights do
+not need to be changed. Therefore, for each unit i, we compute the
+ditference 6; between the external input to the unit and the net internal
+input to the unit from other units in the module:
+8; = e; - 1;.
+
+180
+In determining the activation value of the unit, we added the external
+input together with the internal input. Now, in adjusting the weights,
+we are taking the difference between these two terms. This implies
+that the unit must be able to aggregate all inputs for purposes of determining its activation, but it must be able to distinguish between external and internal inputs for purposes of adjusting its weights.
+Let us consider the term &; for a moment. If it is positive, the internal input is not activating the unit enough. If negative, it is activating
+the unit too much. If it is zero, everything is fine and we do not want
+to change anything. Thus, 8; determines the magnitude and direction
+of the overall change that needs to be made in the internal input to unit
+i. To achieve this overall effect, the individual weights are then
+adjusted according to the following formula:
+(3)
+The parameter y is just a global strength parameter which regulates the
+overall magnitude of the adjustments of the weights; Aw, is the change
+in the weight to i from j.
+The delta rule, given by Equation 3, has all the intended consequences. That is, it tends to drive the weights to the right values to
+make the internal inputs to a unit match the external inputs. For
+example, consider the case in which 8; is positive and a; is positive. In
+this case, the value of 8, tells us that unit i is not receiving enough
+excitatory input, and the value of a; tells us that unit i has positive
+activation. In this case, the delta rule will increase the weight from j to
+i. The result will be that the next time unit j has a positive activation,
+its excitatory effect on unit i will be increased, thereby reducing si.
+Similar reasoning applies to cases where 8; is negative, a; is negative,
+or both are negative. Of course, when either 8; or aj is zero, wij is not
+changed. In the first case, there is no error to compensate for; in the
+second case, a change in the weight will have no effect the next time
+unit j has the same activation value.
+What the delta rule can and cannot do. Several important points
+about the delta rule have been discussed in Chapters 2, 8, and 11.
+Here we consider just those that are most relevant to our present purposes. Basically, the most important result is that, for a set of patterns
+that we present repeatedly to a module, if there is a set of weights that
+will allow the system to reduce & to 0 for each unit in each pattern, this
+rule will find it through repeated exposure to all of the members of the
+set of patterns. However, it is important to note that the existence of a
+set of weights that will allow & to be reduced to 0 is not guaranteed, but
+depends on the structure inherent in the set of patterns that the model
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+181
+is given to learn. To be perfectly learnable by our model, the patterns
+must conform to the following linear predictability constraint:
+Over the entire set of patterns, the external input to each unit
+must be predictable from a linear combination of the activations of every other unit.
+While this limitation is severe, it is important to realize that the extent
+to which a set of patterns satisfy the linear predictability constraint
+depends on the way the set of patterns is represented. From this point
+of view, we must distinguish clearly between the theoretical description
+of a set of stimuli presented to a human subject for processing and the
+patterns of activation produced in some module deeply embedded in
+the cognitive system. As a rule of thumb, an encoding which treats
+each dimension or aspect of a stimulus separately is unlikely to be sufficient; what is required is a context sensitive or conjunctive encoding,
+such that the representation of each aspect is colored by other aspects.
+A fuller discussion of this issue is presented in Chapter 3; we also
+return to it below in considering some recent evidence obtained by
+Medin and Schwanenflugel (1981).
+No hidden units. As explained in Chapters 7 and 8, the linear predictability constraint arises from the fact that the present model contains
+no hidden units. If hidden units were incorporated, the generalized
+delta rule described in Chapter 8 could be used to train the connections
+into these units, thereby allowing the model to form new representational primitives to overcome the linear predictability constraint when it
+arises.
+At the end of the chapter, we consider the introduction of hidden units and the effects that this would have on the behavior of the
+model.
+Decay in the increments to the weights. We assume that each trace
+or increment undergoes a decay process, though the rate of decay of
+the increments is assumed to be much slower than the rate of decay of
+patterns of activation. Following a number of theorists (e.g., Wickelgren, 1979), we imagine that traces at first decay rapidly, but then the
+remaining portion becomes more and more resistant to further decay.
+Whether it ever reaches a point where it is no longer decaying at all, we
+do not know. The basic effect of this assumption is that individual
+inputs exert large short-term effects on the weights, but, after they
+decay, the residual effect is considerably smaller. The fact that each
+increment has its own temporal history increases the complexity of
+computer simulations enormously. In many of the simulations, therefore, we will specify simpler assumptions to keep the simulations
+tractable.
+
+182
+Parameters and details. In simulations using the model, it is important to keep the net input to each unit on each processing cycle relatively small, so that activations do not jump too suddenly and go out of
+range. For this purpose we set the parameters E and D equal to .15. It
+is also important to reduce n in proportion to the number of internal
+inputs to each unit. The number of internal inputs to each unit is just 1
+minus the number of units, since each unit receives an input from
+every other unit. Thus, if we define n = S/ (n- 1), where n is the
+number of units, then the rate of learning, in terms of the reduction in
+8, will be about the same for all values of n. Instability can result if S
+is set greater than 1.0. Generally a value of .85 was used in the following simulations.
+Illustrative Examples
+In this section, we describe a number of simulations to illustrate
+several key aspects of the model's behavior. We wish to demonstrate
+several points:
+1. The model can extract what appears to be the prototype or central tendency of a set of patterns, if the patterns are in fact random distortions of the same base or prototype pattern.
+2. The model can do this for several different patterns, using the
+same set of connections to store its knowledge of all the prototypes.
+3. This ability does not depend on the exemplars being presented
+with labels so that the model is given the where-with-all to
+keep them straight.
+4. Representations of specific, repeated exemplars can coexist in
+the same set of connections with knowledge of the prototype.
+Learning a prototype from exemplars. To illustrate the first point,
+we consider the following hypothetical situation. A little boy sees many
+different dogs, each only once and each with a different name. All the
+dogs are a little different from each other, but in general there is a pattern which represents the typical dog-each one is just a different distortion of this prototype. (We are not claiming that the dogs in the
+world have no more structure than this; we make this assumption for
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+183
+purposes of illustration only). For now we will assume that the names
+of the dogs are all completely different. We would expect, given this
+experience, that the boy would learn the prototype of the category,
+even without ever seeing any particular dog that matches the prototype
+directly (Posner & Keele, 1968, 1970; J. A. Anderson, 1977, applies an
+earlier version of a distributed model to this case). That is, the prototype will seem as familiar as any of the exemplars, and the boy will be
+able to complete the pattern corresponding to the prototype from any
+part of it. He will not, however, be very likely to remember the names
+of each of the individual dogs, though he may remember the most
+recent ones.
+We model this situation with a module consisting of 24 units. We
+assume that the presentation of a dog produces a visual pattern of
+activation over 16 of the units in the hypothetical module (the 9th
+through 24th, counting from left to right). The name of the dog produces a pattern of activation over the other 8 units (Units 1 to 8,
+counting from left to right).
+Each visual pattern, by assumption, is a distortion of a single prototype. The prototype used for the simulation simply had a random
+series of + 1 and - 1 values. Each distortion of the prototype was made
+by probabilistically flipping the sign of randomly selected elements of
+the prototype pattern. For each new distorted pattern, each element
+has an independent chance of being flipped, with probability 2. Each
+name pattern was simply a random sequence of +1s and - Is for the
+eight name units. Each encounter with a new dog is modeled as a
+presentation of a new name pattern with a new distortion of the prototype visual pattern. Fifty different trials were run, each with a new
+name-pattern/ visual-pattern pair.
+For each presentation, the pattern of activation is allowed to stabilize,
+and then the weights are adjusted as described above. The increment
+to the weights is then allowed to decay considerably before the next
+input is presented. For simplicity, we assume that before the next pattern is presented, the last increment decays to a fixed small proportion
+(5%) of its initial value and thereafter undergoes no further decay.
+What does the model learn? The module acquires a set of weights
+which is continually buffeted about by the latest dog exemplar, but
+which captures the prototype dog quite well. Waiting for the last increment to decay to the fixed residual yields the weights shown in
+Figure 3.
+These weights capture the correlations among the values in the prototype dog pattern quite well. The lack of exact uniformity is due to
+the more recent distortions presented, whose effects have not been
+corrected by subsequent distortions.
+This is one way in which the
+model gives priority to specific exemplars, especially recent ones. The
+
+184
+Prototype pattern:
++-++-
+Weights acquired after learning:
++
++
+• -
+- +
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
+-
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++
++ +
+. +
++
++
++
++
+i + .
+. +
++
+FIGURE 3. Weights acquired in learning from distorted exemplars of a prototype. (The
+prototype pattern is shown above the weight matrix. Blank entries correspond to weights
+with absolute values less than .Ol; dots correspond to absolute values less than .06;
+plusses or minuses are used for weights with larger absolute values.)
+effects of recent exemplars are particularly strong, of course, before
+they have had a chance to decay. The module can complete the prototype quite well, and it will respond more strongly to the prototype than
+to any distortion of it. It has, however, learned no particular relation
+between this prototype and any name pattern since a totally different
+random association was presented on each trial. If the pattern of activation on the name units had been the same in every case (say, each dog
+was just called "dog"), or even in just a reasonable fraction of the cases,
+then the module would have been able to retrieve this shared name
+pattern from the prototype of the visual pattern and the prototype pattern from the name; we will see cases of this kind of behavior in the
+next section.
+Multiple, nonorthogonal prototypes. In the preceding simulation, we
+have seen how the distributed model acts as a sort of signal averager,
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+185
+finding the central tendency of a set of related patterns. In and of itself
+this is an important property of the model, but the importance of this
+property increases when we realize that the model can average several
+different patterns in the same composite memory trace. Thus, several
+different prototypes can be stored in the same set of weights. This
+property is important because it means that the model does not fall into
+the trap of needing to decide which category to put a pattern into
+before knowing which prototype to average it with. The acquisition of
+the different prototypes proceeds without any sort of explicit categorization. If the patterns are sufficiently dissimilar (i.e., orthogonal), there
+is no interference among them at all. Increasing similarity leads to
+increased confusability during learning, but eventually the delta rule
+finds a set of connection strengths that minimizes the confusability of
+similar patterns. These points are discussed mathematically in Chapter
+11; here we illustrate this through a simulation of the following
+hypothetical situation.
+Let us suppose that our little boy sees different dogs, different cats,
+and different bagels in the course of his day-to-day experience. First,
+let's consider the case in which each experience with a dog, a cat, or a
+bagel is accompanied by someone saying "dog," "cat," or "bagel," as
+appropriate.
+The simulation analog of this situation involved forming three
+"visual"
+prototype patterns of 16 elements: two of them (the one for
+dog and the one for cat) somewhat similar to each other (r= .5) and
+the third (for the bagel) orthogonal to both of the other two. Paired
+with each visual pattern was a name pattern of eight elements. Each
+name pattern was orthogonal to both of the others. Thus, the prototype visual pattern for cat and the prototype visual pattern for dog were
+similar to each other, but their names were not related.
+Stimulus presentations involved presentations of distorted exemplars
+of the name/ visual pattern pairs to a module like the one used in the
+previous simulation. This time, both the name pattern and the visual
+pattern were distorted, with each element having its sign flipped with
+an independent probability of .1 on each presentation. Fifty different
+distortions of each name/ visual pattern pair were presented in groups
+of three, consisting of one distortion of the dog pair, one distortion of
+the cat pair, and one distortion of the bagel pair.
+Weight adjustment
+occurred after each presentation, with decay to a fixed residual before
+each new presentation.
+At the end of training, the module was tested by presenting each
+name pattern and observing the resulting pattern of activation over the
+visual units, and by presenting each visual pattern and observing the
+pattern of activation over the name units. The results are shown in
+Table 1. In each case, the model reproduces the correct completion for
+
+RESULTS OF TESTS AFTER LEARNING THE DOG, CAT, AND BAGEL PATTERNS
+Pattern for
+dog prototype
+Response to
+dog name
+Response to
+dog visual pattern
+Pattern for
+cat prototype
+Response to
+cat name
+Response to
+cat visual pattern
+Pattern for
+bagel prototype
+Response to
+bagel name
+Response to
+bagel visual pattern
+Name Pattern
++-+-+-+-
++5-4
+7+4-5+5-4+4-4
++ + -
+- + +
++5 + 4
+-4-5+4+4-4-4
++ - - + + - - +
++4-4-4+4+4-4-4+4
+Visual Pattern
++ -
++
+-
+-+++++---
++ - +
++
+- - + - +
+-++-+
++4-3+414-4-3-3-4+4-4+4-4+4+4-4+4
+++-+-++-+
++ ++ -
++3+44+4-4+4+4-4+4-4-4+4+3+4+4-4
+Note: Decimal points have been suppressed for clarity; thus, an entry of + 4 represents an activation value of +.4.
+186
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+187
+the probe, and there is no apparent contamination of the "cat" pattern
+by the "dog" pattern, even though the visual patterns are both similar.
+In general, pattern completion is a matter of degree. Below, in simulating particular experimental results,
+we will introduce an explicit
+measure of the degree to which a particular pattern is active in the units
+of a module. For now, it is sufficient simply to note that the sign of all
+of the elements is correct; given this, the average magnitude of the
+elements gives an approximate measure of the "degree" of pattern
+reinstatement.
+In a case like the present one, in which the patterns known to the
+model are not all orthogonal, the values of the connection strengths
+that the model produces do not necessarily have a simple interpretation.
+Though their sign always corresponds to the sign of the correlation
+between the activations of the two patterns, their magnitude is not a
+simple reflection of the magnitude of their correlation, but is influenced by the degree to which the model is relying on this particular
+correlation to predict the activation of one unit from the others. Thus,
+in a case where two units (call them i and j) are perfectly correlated,
+the strength of the connection from i to j will depend on the number
+of other units whose activations are correlated with j. If i is the only
+unit correlated with j, it will have to do all the work of "predicting" j,
+so the weight will be very strong; on the other hand, if many units
+besides i are correlated with j, then the work of exciting j will be
+spread around, and the weight between i and j will be considerably
+smaller. The situation is exactly the same as the one that arises in
+linear regression: if several variables predict another, they share the
+weight. The weight matrix acquired as a result of learning the dog, cat,
+and bagel patterns (Figure 4) reflects these effects. For example,
+across the set of three prototypes, Units 1 and 5 are perfectly correlated, as are Units 2 and 6. Yet the connection from Unit 2 to Unit 6
+is stronger than the connection from Unit 1 to Unit 5 (these connections are *d in the figure). The reason for the difference is that Unit 2
+is one of only three units which correlate perfectly with Unit 6, while
+Unit 1 is one of seven units which correlate perfectly with Unit 5.
+Thus far we have seen that several prototypes, not necessarily
+orthogonal, can be stored in the same module without difficulty. It is
+true, though we do not illustrate it, that the model has more trouble
+with the cat and dog visual patterns earlier on in training, before learning has essentially reached asymptotic levels, as it has by the end of 50
+2 In Figure 4, the weights do not reflect these contrasts perfectly in every case because
+the noise introduced into the learning happens, by chance, to alter some of the correlations present in the prototype patterns. Averaged over time, though, the weights will
+conform to their expected values.
+
+188
+Dog:
++ - +
+Cat:
++ +
+Bagel:
++
++
+- + -
++ +
+-
++ +
+- +
+-1-1
+- 2
++2*-1
+-1+4"
+-1-2 - 1
+-1
++3-1-1
+-1+5-3
+- 1
++3-1-1-2
+-1-1-1+2
+-1
+-1
+- 1+2
+Prototypes
++ - + +
++
++ +
++ - + +
++
++
++
++ +
+- t - +
++
++ + + + -
+Weights
++3
++1-1
++1
+-1+3-3
+-1-1
++5-2-1
+-3+2-1
++2
+-1-1+1-1-1
+-3-1
++1-1-1
+-1+4 +1
+-5
+-3 + 3
+-1
++2+3
+-1-2
+-1+1 +3
++3-3
+-2 + 2
++1+3+1-1-1
+-1-2+1-5-1+2-1+5
++1
+-1+3-2-1
++3+3
+-1-1-3+1-1+3+3
++3-1-1+2-1-1
+-1-1-1+3-1
++1+1+1-3
++3
+-2
++2-1-1-1+3
+- 1
+-2 + 1 + 1
+-2+1+1+1
+-1+2-1
++2
+-1-1-1+2
+-1-1+2
+- 2+1+1+1-3
++1 + 1
++3 -1 +2
++5-1-1-1+4-1
++1
+-2
++1+1-3
++1-5+2+1+1-5+3
++2-1-1
++3-1
++3-4+1+3-4+1
++2-1 - 1
+-1+3-2-1-1+5-3
++3-2
+-3+2
++1
++3+1
+-1
+-3-1
++3+3+1-1-2-2+1-1
++2
++1-3
+-1-3-3
++1+3-1
+-1-2+2
++3-1+1-2-1
+-2+2-1
++2+1-1
+-3
+-3
++1+2-3
+-1-2-1+1
+-1+2-2
++1
++2+1-1
+-3
++2
++2-3
++3
++1
+-3
++3
+-2+1-1-3+3
+-2+1-1-1-3-1+1
++3-3
+- 1 + 1
++3+1-1-1
+-3 +1
+-1-5-1-1
++1-2+2+1-1-3-3-1
+-3+1
+-2+1-1+1
++1+1-2
++1-2+1-3
++2
++1+2-2
+-3 + 2
++ 1
++1
+-1
++1+1
++1-5-1-3
++1+2
+-1+2-3
++2+2
+-1-3
++1
+-1+3 +1-1
+-1
++1-2 +3-1
+FIGURE 4. Weights acquired in learning the three prototype patterns shown. (Blanks in
+the matrix of weights correspond to weights with absolute values less than or equal to
++5 stands for a weight of +.25. The gap in the horizontal and vertical dimensions is
+used to separate the name field from the visual pattern field.)
+cycles through the full set of patterns. And, of course, even at the end
+of learning, if we present as a probe a part of the visual pattern that
+does not differentiate between the dog and the cat, the model will produce a blended response. Both of these aspects of the model seem generally consistent with what we should expect from human subjects.
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY 189
+Category learning without labels. An important further fact about
+the model is that it can learn several different visual patterns, even
+without the benefit of distinct identifying name patterns during learning. To demonstrate this we repeated the previous simulation, simply
+replacing the name patterns with Os. The model still learns about the
+internal structure of the visual patterns so that, after 50 cycles through
+the stimuli, any unique subpart of any one of the patterns is sufficient
+to reinstate the rest of the corresponding pattern correctly. This aspect
+of the model's behavior is illustrated in Table 2. Thus, we have a
+model that can, in effect, acquire a number of distinct categories, simply through a process of incrementing connection strengths in response
+to each new stimulus presentation. Noise, in the form of distortions in
+the patterns, is filtered out. The model does not require a name or
+other guide to distinguish the patterns belonging to different categories.
+Coexistence of the prototype and repeated exemplars. One aspect of
+our discussion up to this point may have been slightly misleading. We
+may have given the impression that the model is simply a prototype
+extraction device. It is more than this, however; it is a device that captures whatever structure is present in a set of patterns (subject, of
+course, to the linear predictability constraint). When the set of patterns
+has a prototype structure, the model will act as though it is extracting
+prototypes; but when it has a different structure, the model will do its
+best to accommodate this as well. For example, the model permits the
+coexistence of representations of prototypes with representations of particular, repeated exemplars
+RESULTS OF TESTS AFTER LEARNING
+THE DOG, CAT, AND BAGEL PATTERNS WITHOUT NAMES
+Dog visual pattern:
+Probe:
+Response:
+Cat visual pattern:
+Probe:
+Response:
+Bagel visual pattern:
+Probe:
+Response:
++
++ + -
++
++t t t
+++++
++3-3+3+3-3-4-3-3 +6+5+6+5+3-2-3-2
++-++-
+- +
++
++ +
++
++- + -
++3-3+3+3-3-3-3-3+6-516-5+3+2-312
+++
++
+++-+--++++
++ - - +
++2+3-413-3 +3+3-3+6-6-616+3+3+3-3
+
+190 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+As an illustration of this point, consider the following situation. Let
+us say that our little boy knows a dog next door named Rover and a
+dog at his grandma's house named Fido. And let's say that the little
+boy goes to the park from time to time and sees dogs, each of which
+his father tells him is a dog.
+The simulation analog of this involved three different eight-element
+name patterns, one for Rover, one for Fido, and one for dog. The
+visual pattern for Rover was a particular randomly generated distortion
+of the dog prototype pattern, as was the visual pattern for Fido. For
+the dogs seen in the park, each one was simply a new random distortion
+of the prototype. The probability of flipping the sign of each element
+was again .2. The learning regime was otherwise the same as in the
+dog-cat-bagel example.
+At the end of 50 learning cycles, the model was able to retrieve the
+visual pattern corresponding to either repeated exemplar (see Table 3)
+given the associated name as input. When given the dog name pattern
+as input, it retrieves the prototype visual pattern for dog. It can also
+retrieve the appropriate name from each of the three visual patterns.
+This is true, even though the visual pattern for Rover differs from the
+visual pattern for dog by only a single element. Because of the special
+importance of this particular element, the weights from this element to
+the units that distinguish Rover's name pattern from the the prototype
+name pattern are quite
+• strong. Given part of a visual pattern, the
+model will complete it; if the part corresponds to the prototype, then
+that is what is completed, but if it corresponds to one of the repeated
+exemplars, then that exemplar is completed. The model, then, knows
+both the prototype and the repeated exemplars quite well.
+Several
+other sets of prototypes and their repeated exemplars could also be
+stored in the same module, as long as its capacity is not exceeded;
+given large numbers of units per module, a lot of different patterns can
+be stored.
+Let us summarize the observations we have made in these several
+illustrative simulations. First, our distributed model is capable of storing not just one but a number of different patterns. It can pull the
+"central tendency" of a number of different patterns out of the noisy
+inputs; it can create the functional equivalent of perceptual categories
+with or without the benefit of labels; and it can allow representations of
+repeated exemplars to coexist with the representation of the prototype
+of the categories they exemplify in the same composite memory trace.
+The model is not simply a categorizer or "prototyping" device; rather, it
+captures the structure inherent in a set of patterns, whether it be
+characterizable by description in terms of prototypes or not, as long as
+the ensemble of patterns adheres to the linear predictability constraint.
+
+TABLE 3
+RESULTS OF TESTS WITH PROTOTYPE AND SPECIFIC EXEMPLAR PATTERNS
+Name Pattern
+Visual Pattern
++ - +
++ + + ++
++4-5+3+3-4-3-3-3 +3 +3+4+3+4-3-4-4
+Pattern for
+dog prototype
+Response 10
+prototype name
+Response 10
+prototype visual pattern
+Pattern for
+Fido exemplar
+Response 1o
+Fido name
+Region visual pattern
+Pattern for
+Rover exemplar
+Response 10
+Rover name
+Response 10
+Rover visual pattern
++5-414-475-4+4-4
++---+-
++ - (-) + - - -
++
+(+) -
++4-4-444-44-4-4+4+4+4+4+4+4-4-4
++5-5-3-574-5-3-5
++--++ + - +
++ (+) + + -
+- - +
++
+14+5+4+4-4-4=1-4+4
++
++
++
++4
++4
++4
+1
+- 4
+-4
++4-4
+-2+4+4+4-2+4
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+191
+
+192
+The ability to retrieve accurate completions of similar patterns is a
+property of the model that depends on the use of the delta learning
+rule. This allows both the storage of different prototypes that are not
+orthogonal and the coexistence of prototype representations and
+repeated exemplars.
+SIMULATIONS OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
+Up to this point, we have discussed our distributed model in general
+terms and have outlined how it can accommodate both generalization
+and representation of specific information in the same network. We
+now consider, in the next two sections, how well the model does in
+accounting for some recent evidence about the details of the influence
+of specific experiences on performance and the conditions under which
+functional equivalents of summary representations such as logogens and
+prototypes emerge.
+Repetition and Familiarity Effects
+When we perceive an item-say a word, for example-this experience has effects on our later performance. If the word is presented
+again within a reasonable interval of time, the prior presentation makes
+it possible for us to recognize the word more quickly or from a briefer
+presentation.
+Traditionally, this effect has been interpreted in terms of units that
+represent the presented items in memory. In the case of word perception, these units are called word detectors or logogens and a model of
+repetition effects for words has been constructed around the logogen
+concept (Morton, 1979). The idea is that the threshold for the logogen
+is reduced every time it "fires" (that is, every time the word is recognized), thereby making it easier to fire the logogen at a later time.
+There is supposed to be a decay of this priming effect, with time, so
+that eventually the effect of the first presentation wears off.
+This traditional interpretation has come under serious question of
+late, for a number of reasons. Perhaps paramount among the reasons is
+the fact that the exact relation between the specific context in which
+the priming event occurs and the context in which the test event occurs
+makes a huge difference (Jacoby, 1983a, 1983b). Generally speaking,
+nearly any change in the stimulus-from spoken to printed, from male
+speaker to female speaker, etc.—tends to reduce the magnitude of the
+priming effect.
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY 193
+These facts might easily be taken to support the enumeration of
+specific experiences view, in which the logogen is replaced by the entire
+ensemble of experiences with the word, with each experience capturing
+aspects of the specific context in which it occurred. Such a view has
+been championed most strongly by Jacoby (1983a, 1983b).
+Our distributed model offers an alternative interpretation. We see
+the traces laid down by the processing of each input as contributing to
+the composite, superimposed memory representation. Each time a
+stimulus is processed, it gives rise to a slightly different memory
+trace-either because the item itself is different or because it occurs in
+a different context that conditions its representation. The logogen is
+replaced by the set of specific traces, but the traces are not kept separate.
+Each trace contributes to the composite, but the characteristics of particular experiences tend nevertheless to be preserved, at least until they
+are overridden by canceling characteristics of other traces. Also, the
+traces of one stimulus pattern can coexist with the traces of other
+stimuli, within the same composite memory trace.
+It should be noted that we are not faulting either the logogen model
+or models based on the enumeration of specific experiences for their
+physiological implausibility here, since these models are generally not
+stated in physiological terms, and their authors might reasonably argue
+that nothing in their models precludes distributed storage at a physiological level.
+What we are suggesting is that a model which proposes
+explicitly distributed, superpositional storage can account for the kinds
+of findings that logogen models have been proposed to account for, as
+well as other findings which strain the utility of the concept of the logogen as a psychological construct.
+To illustrate the distributed model's account of repetition priming
+effects, we carried out the following simulation experiment. We made
+up a set of eight random vectors, each 24 elements long, each one to
+be thought of as the prototype of a different recurring stimulus pattern.
+Through a series of 10 training cycles using the set of eight vectors, we
+constructed a composite memory trace. During training, the model did
+not actually see the prototypes, however. On each training presentation
+it saw a new random distortion of one of the eight prototypes. In each
+of the distortions, each of the 24 elements had its value flipped with a
+probability of .1. Weights were adjusted after every presentation and
+were then allowed to decay to a fixed residual before the presentation
+of the next pattern.
+The composite memory trace formed as a result of this experience
+plays the same role in our model that the set of logogens or detectors
+play in a model like Morton's or, indeed, the interactive activation
+model of word perception. That is, the trace contains information
+which allows the model to enhance perception of familiar patterns,
+
+194
+relative to unfamiliar ones. We demonstrate this by comparing the
+activations resulting from the processing of subsequent presentations of
+new distortions of our eight familiar patterns, compared to other random patterns with which the model is not familiar. The pattern of
+activation that is the model's response to the input is stronger and
+grows to a particular level more quickly if the stimulus is a new distortion of an old pattern than if it is a new pattern. This effect is illustrated in Figure 5.
+Pattern activation and response strength. The measure of activation
+shown in the figure is the dot product of the pattern of activation over
+the units of the module with the stimulus pattern itself, normalized for
+the number n of elements in the pattern: For the pattern p we call this
+expression ap. In mathematical notation it is just
+ap =
+- Ea; epilt)
+ni
+where i indexes the units in the module, and epi indexes the external
+input to unit i in pattern p. Essentially, a represents the degree to
+which the actual pattern of activation on the units captures the input
+pattern. It is an approximate analog of the activation of an individual
+unit in models that allocate a single unit to each whole pattern.
+To relate these pattern activations to response probabilities, we must
+assume that mechanisms exist for translating patterns of activation into
+product
+Activation (dot
+0.5
+0.4
+- familiar
+unfamiliar
+0.2
+0.1
+0.0
+LL
+30
+5
+10
+15
+20
+25
+Processing Cycles
+35
+FIGURE 5. Growth of the pattern of activation for new distortions of familiar and
+unfamiliar patterns. The measure of the strength of the pattern of activation is the dor
+product of the response pattern with the input vector. See text for an explanation.
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+195
+overt responses measurable by an experimenter. We will assume that
+these mechanisms obey the same principles discussed in Chapter 15 for
+relating activations to response probabilities, simply replacing the
+activations of particular units with the a measure of pattern activation. 3
+These assumptions finesse an important issue, namely, the mechanism by which a pattern of activation gives rise to a particular response.
+A specific mechanism for response generation is described in Chapter
+18. For now, we wish only to capture basic properties any actual
+response selection mechanism must have: It must be sensitive to the
+input pattern, and it must approximate other basic aspects of response
+selection behavior captured by the Luce (1963) choice model.
+Effects of experimental variables on time-accuracy curves. Applying the assumptions described above, we can calculate probability of
+correct response as a function of processing cycles for familiar and
+unfamiliar patterns. The result for a particular choice of scaling parameters is shown in Figure 6. If we assume that performance in a perceptual identification task is based on the height of the curve at the point
+where processing is cut off by masking (McClelland & Rumelhart,
+1981), then familiarity would lead to greater accuracy of perceptual
+identification at a given exposure duration. In a reaction time task, if
+the response is emitted when its probability reaches a particular threshold activation value, familiarity would lead to speeded responses. Thus,
+the model is consistent with the ubiquitous influence of familiarity both
+on response accuracy and speed, in spite of the fact that it has no detectors for familiar stimuli.
+But what about priming and the role of congruity between the prime
+event and the test event? To examine this issue, we carried out a
+second experiment. Following learning of eight patterns as in the previous experiment, new distortions of half of the random vectors previously learned by the model were presented as primes. For each of
+these primes, the pattern of activation was allowed to stabilize, and
+changes in the strengths of the connections in the model were then
+made. We then tested the model's response to (a) the same four distortions, (b) four new distortions of the same patterns, and (c) distortions of the four previously learned patterns that
+had not been
+3 One complication arises due to the fact that it is not, in general, possible to specify
+exactly what the set of alternative responses might be for the denominator of the Luce
+choice rule used in the word perception model. For this reason, the strengths of other
+responses are represented by a constant C (which stands for the competition). Thus, the
+expression for probability of choosing the response appropriate to pattern p is just
+ing constant.
+kap) where ap represents the time average of op, and is a scal-
+
+196
+familiar
+unfamiliar
+0.0
+-
+35
+б
+10
+15
+20
+25
+30
+Processing Cycles
+FIGURE 6. Simulated growth of response accuracy over the units in a 24-unit module,
+as a function of processing cycles, for new distortions of previously learned patterns compared to new distortions of patterns not previously learned.
+presented as primes. There was no decay in the weights over the
+course of the priming experiment; if decay had been included, its main
+effect would have been to reduce the magnitude of the priming effects.
+The results of the experiment are shown in Figure 7. The response
+of the model is greatest for the patterns preceded by identical primes,
+intermediate for patterns preceded by similar primes, and weakest for
+patterns not preceded by any related prime.
+Our model, then, appears to provide an account, not only for the
+basic existence of priming effects, but also for the graded nature of
+priming effects as a function of congruity between prime event and test
+event. It avoids the problem of multiplication of context-specific detectors which logogen theories fall prey to, while at the same time avoiding enumeration of specific experiences. Congruity effects are captured
+in the composite memory trace.
+The model also has another advantage over the logogen view. It
+accounts for repetition priming effects for unfamiliar as well as familiar
+stimuli. When a pattern is presented for the first time, a trace is produced just as it would be for stimuli that had previously been
+presented. The result is that, on a second presentation of the same pattern or a new distortion of it, processing is facilitated. The functional
+equivalent of a logogen begins to be established from the very first
+presentation.
+To illustrate the repetition priming of unfamiliar patterns and to
+compare the results with the repetition priming we have already
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+197
+1.0
+0.8
+0.6
+0.4
+0.2
+0.0
+similar prime
+no prime
+5
+10
+15
+•20 25 30
+35
+40
+45
+Processing Cycles
+FIGURE 7. Response probability as a function of exposure time, for patterns preceded
+by identical primes, similar primes, or no related prime.
+observed for familiar patterns, we carried out a third experiment. This
+time, after learning eight patterns as before, a priming session was run,
+in which new distortions of four of the familiar patterns and distortions
+of four new patterns were presented. Then, in the test phase, 16
+stimuli were presented: New distortions of the primed, familiar patterns; new distortions of the unprimed, familiar patterns; new distortions of the primed, previously unfamiliar patterns; and finally, new
+distortions of four patterns that were neither primed nor familiar.
+The
+results are shown in Figure 8. What we find is that long-term familiarity and recent priming have approximately additive effects on the
+asymptotes of the time-accuracy curves. The time to reach any given
+activation level shows a mild interaction, with priming having slightly
+more of an effect for unfamiliar than for familiar stimuli.
+These results are consistent with the bulk of the findings concerning
+the effects of pre-experimental familiarity and repetition in a recent
+series of experiments by Feustel, Shiffrin, and Salasoo (1983) and
+Salasoo,
+Shiffrin,
+and Feustel
+(1985).
+They found that preexperimental familiarity of an item (word vs. nonword) and prior exposure had this very kind of interactive effect on exposure time required
+for accurate identification of all the letters of a string, at least when
+words and nonwords were mixed together in the same lists of materials.
+A further aspect of the results reported by Salasoo, Shiffrin, and
+Feustel is also consistent with our approach. In one of their experiments, they examined the threshold for accurate identification as a
+function of number of prior presentations, for both words and
+
+198
+- familiar
+}unfamiliar
+0.4
+---primed
+- not primed
+0.0
+LILL
+20
+25
+Processing Cycles
+30
+1
+35
+FIGURE 8. Response to new distortions of primed, familiar patterns; unprimed, familiar
+patterns; primed, unfamiliar patterns; and unprimed, unfamiliar patterns.
+pseudowords. While thresholds were initially elevated for pseudowords, relative to words, there was a rather rapid convergence of the
+thresholds over repeated presentations, with the point of convergence
+coming at about the same place on the curve for two different versions
+of their perceptual identification task (Salasoo et al., 1985). Our
+model, likewise, shows this kind of convergence effect, as illustrated in
+Figure 9.
+There is one finding by Salasoo et al. (1985) that appears at first
+glance to support the view that there is some special process of unit
+formation that is distinct from the priming of old units. This is the fact
+that after a year between training and testing, performance with pseudowords used during training is indistinguishable from performance
+with words, but performance with words used during training shows no
+residual benefit compared to words not previously used. The data certainly are consistent with the view that training experience made the
+pseudowords into lasting perceptual units at the same time that it produced transitory priming of existing units. We have not attempted to
+account for this finding in detail, but we doubt that it is inconsistent
+with a distributed model. In support of this, we offer one reason why
+repetition effects might seem to persist longer for pseudowords rather
+than for words in the Salasoo et al. experiment. For pseudowords, a
+strong association would be built up between the item and the learning
+context during initial training. Such associations would be formed for
+words, but because these stimuli have been experienced many times
+before and have already been
+well learned, smaller increments in
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+199
+18
+Cycles to Threshold
+E
+unfamiliar
+15
+14
+=
+12
+11
+familiar
+Prior Presentations
+FIGURE 9. Time to reach a fixed accuracy criterion (60% correct) for previously familiar
+and unfamiliar patterns, as a function of repetitions.
+connection strengths are formed for these stimuli during training, and
+thus the strength of the association between the item and the learning
+context would be less.
+If our interpretation is correct, we would expect to see a disadvantage
+for pseudowords relative to words if the testing were carried out in a
+situation which did not reinstate the mental state associated with the
+original learning experience since for these stimuli much of what was
+learned would be tied to the specific learning contex:. Such a prediction would appear to differentiate our account from any view that postulated the formation of an abstract, context-independent logogen as
+the basis for the absence of a pseudoword decrement effect.
+Representation of General and Specific Information
+In the previous section, we cast our distributed model as an alternative to the view that familiar patterns are represented in memory either
+by separate detectors or by an enumeration of specific experiences. In
+this section, we show that the model provides alternatives to both
+abstraction
+and enumeration models of learning from exemplars of
+prototypes.
+Abstraction models were originally motivated by the finding that subjects occasionally appeared to have learned better how to categorize the
+
+200
+prototype of a set of distorted exemplars than the specific exemplars
+they experienced during learning (Posner & Keele, 1968). However,
+pure abstraction models have never fared very well since there is nearly
+always evidence of some superiority of the particular training stimuli
+over other stimuli equally far removed from the prototype. A favored
+model, then, is one in which there is both abstraction and memory for
+particular training stimuli.
+Recently, proponents of models involving only enumeration of
+specific experiences have noted that such models can account for the
+basic fact that abstraction models are primarily designed to account
+for-enhanced response to the prototype, relative to particular previously seen exemplars, under some conditions-as well as failures to
+obtain such effects under other conditions (Hintzman, 1983; Medin &
+Schaffer, 1978). In evaluating distributed models, then, it is important
+to see if they can do as well. J. A. Anderson (1977) has made important steps in this direction, and Knapp and J. A. Anderson (1984) have
+shown how their distributed model can account for many of the details
+of the Posner-Keele experiments. Recently, however, two sets of findings have been put forward that appear to strongly favor the enumeration of specific experiences view, at least relative to pure abstraction
+models. It is important, therefore, to see how well our distributed
+model can do in accounting for these effects.
+The first set of findings comes from a set of studies by Whittlesea
+(1983). In a large number of studies, Whittlesea demonstrated a role
+for specific exemplars in guiding performance on a perceptual identification task. We wanted to see whether our model would demonstrate a
+similar sensitivity to specific exemplars. We also wanted to see whether
+our model would account for the conditions under which such effects
+are not obtained
+Whittlesea used letter strings as stimuli. The learning experiences
+subjects received involved simply looking at the stimuli one at a time
+on a visual display and writing down the sequence of letters presented.
+Subjects were subsequently tested for the effect of this training on their
+ability to identify letter strings bearing various relationships to the training stimuli and to the prototypes from which
+i the training stimuli were
+derived. The test was a perceptual identification task; the subject was
+simply required to try to identify the letters from a brief flash.
+The stimuli Whittlesea used were all distortions of one of two prototype letter strings. Table 4 illustrates the essential properties of the sets
+of training and test stimuli he used. The stimuli in Set la were each
+one step away from the prototype. The Ib items were also one step
+from the prototype and one step from one of the la distortions. The
+Set Ila stimuli were each two steps from the prototype and one step
+from a particular la distortion. The Set Ilb items were also two steps
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+201
+TABLE 4
+SCHEMATIC DESCRIPTION OF STIMULUS SETS
+USED IN SIMULATIONS OF WHITTLESEA'S EXPERIMENTS
+Prototype
+la
+Ib
+lla
+lIb
+lIc
+III
+V
+PPPPP
+APPPP
+BPPPP
+ABPPP
+ACPPP
+APCPP
+ABCPP
+CCCCC
+PAPPP
+PPAPP
+PBPPP
+PABPP
+PACPP
+PAPCP
+CBOBC
+PPBPP
+PPABP
+PPACP
+PPAPC
+PPABC
+BCACB
+PPPAP
+PPPBP
+PPPAB
+PPPAC
+CPPAP
+CPAB
+ABBA
+PPPPA
+PPPPB
+BPPPA
+CPPPA
+PCPPA
+BCPPA
+CACAC
+Note: The actual stimuli used can be filled in by replacing P with +-+-; A with ++--;
+B with +--t; and C with ++++. The model is not sensitive to the fact the same
+subpattern was used in each of the 5 slots.
+from the prototype, and each was one step from one of the Ila distortions. The Set Ilc distortions were two steps from the prototype also,
+and each was two steps from the closest Ila distortion. Over the set of
+five IIc distortions, the A and B subpatterns each occurred once in each
+position, as they did in the case of the Ila distortions. The distortions
+in Set III were three steps from the prototype and one step from the
+closest member of Set Ila. The distortions in Set V were each five
+steps from the prototype.
+Whittlesea ran seven experiments using different combinations of
+training and test stimuli. We carried out simulation analogs of all of
+these experiments plus one additional experiment that Whittlesea did
+not run. The main difference between the simulation experiments and
+Whittlesea's actual experiments was that he used two different prototypes in each experiment, while we only used one.
+The simulation employed a simple 20-unit module. The set of 20
+units was divided into five submodules, one for each letter in
+Whittlesea's letter strings. The prototype pattern and the different distortions used can be derived from the information provided in Table 4.
+Each simulation experiment began with null connections between the
+units. The training phase involved presenting the set or sets of training
+stimuli analogous to those Whittlesea used, for the same number of
+presentations. To avoid idiosyncratic effects of particular orders of
+training stimuli, each experiment was run six times, each with a different random order of training stimuli. On each trial, activations were
+allowed to settle down through 50 processing cycles, and then connection strengths were adjusted. There was no decay of the increments to
+the weights over the course of an experiment.
+In the test phase, the model was tested with the sets of test items
+analogous to the sets Whittlesea used.
+As a precaution against effects
+
+202
+of prior test items on performance, we simply turned off the adjustment of weights during the test phase.
+A summary of the training and test stimuli used in each of the
+experiments, of Whittlesea's findings, and of the simulation results are
+shown in Table 5. The numbers represent
+relative amounts of
+enhancement in performance as a result of the training experience,
+TABLE 5
+SUMMARY OF PERCEPTUAL IDENTIFICATION EXPERIMENTS
+WITH EXPERIMENTAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
+Whittlesea's
+Experiment
+Number
+Training
+Stimulus
+Set (s)
+Test
+Experimental
+Simulation
+Stimulus
+Results
+Sets
+Results
+1
+la
+la
+Ib
+V
+2
+lIc
+V
+3
+Ha
+Ha
+l1b
+lIc
+4
+lla
+P
+la
+Ha
+.27
+.16
+.03
+.30
+.15
+.03
+.21
+.16
+.10
+.24
+.15
+- 05
+.29
+.12
+- 08
+.29
+.14
+.12
+.24
+.21
+.29
+.15
+4'
+5
+la
+la,b,c
+lla
+15
+-
+-
+-
+6
+7
+III
+HII
+la
+Ha
+la
+HIc
+III
+.16
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+203
+relative to a pretest baseline. For Whittlesea's data, this is the perletter increase in letter identification probability between a pre- and
+posttest. For the simulation, it is the increase in the size of the dot
+product for a pretest with null weights and a posttest after training. For
+combed. this is simply a she do-prodion i faciate cures have borr
+parison of experimental and simulation results.
+A comparison of the experimental and simulation results shows that
+wherever there is a within-experiment difference in Whittlesea's data,
+the simulation produced a difference in the same direction. (Betweenexperiment comparisons are not considered because of subject and
+material differences which render such differences unreliable). The
+next several paragraphs review some of the major findings in detail.
+Some of the comparisons bring out the importance of congruity
+between particular test and training experiences. Experiments 1, 2, and
+3 show that when distance of test stimuli from the prototype is controlled, similarity to particular training exemplars makes a difference
+both for the human subject and in the model. In Experiment 1, the
+relevant contrast was between la and Ib items. In Experiment 2, it was
+between Ila and Ilc items. Experiment 3 shows that the subjects and
+the model both show a gradient in performance with increasing distance
+of the test items from the nearest old exemplar.
+Experiments 4, 4', and 5 explore the status of the prototype and
+other test stimuli closer to the prototype than any stimuli actually
+shown during training.
+In Experiment 4, the training stimuli were
+fairly far away from the prototype, and there were only five different
+training stimuli (the members of the Ila set). In this case, controlling
+for distance from the nearest training stimuli, test stimuli closer to the
+prototype showed more enhancement than those farther away. (la vs.
+III comparison). However, the actual training stimuli nevertheless had
+an advantage over both other sets of test stimuli, including those that
+were closer to the prototype than the training stimuli themselves (la
+vS. la comparison).
+In experiment 4' (not run by Whittlesea), the same number of training stimuli were used as in Experiment 4, but these were closer to the
+prototype. The result is that the simulation shows an advantage for the
+prototype over the old exemplars. The specific training stimuli used,
+even in this experiment, do influence performance, however, as
+Whittlesea's first experiment (which used the same training set) shows
+(la-Ib contrast). This effect holds both for the subjects and for the
+simulation. The pattern of results is similar to the findings of Posner
+and Keele (1968), in the condition where subjects learned six exemplars which were rather close to the prototype. In this condition, their
+subjects'
+categorization performance was most accurate for the
+
+204 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+prototype, but more accurate for old than for new distortions, just as in
+this simulation experiment.
+In Experiment 5, Whittlesea demonstrated that a slight advantage for
+stimuli closer to the prototype than the training stimuli would emerge,
+even with high-level distortions, when a large number of different distortions were used once each in training, instead of a smaller number
+of distortions presented three times each. The effect was rather small
+in Whittlesea's case (falling in the third decimal place in the per-letter
+enhancement effect measure) but other experiments have produced
+similar results, and so does the simulation. In fact, since the prototype
+was tested in the simulation,
+we were able to demonstrate a monotonic drop in performance with distance from the prototype in this
+experiment.
+Experiments 6 and 7, which used small numbers of training exemplars rather far from the prototype, both explore in different ways the
+relative influence of similarity to the prototype and similarity to the set
+of training exemplars. Both in the data and in the model, similarity to
+particular training stimuli is more important than similarity to the prototype, given the sets of training stimuli used in these experiments.
+Taken together with other findings, Whittlesea's results show clearly
+that similarity of test items to particular stored exemplars is of
+paramount importance in predicting perceptual performance. Other
+experiments show the relevance of these same factors in other tasks,
+such as recognition memory, classification learning, etc. It is interesting
+to note, though, that performance does not honor the specific exemplars so strongly when the training items are closer to the prototype.
+Under such conditions, performance is superior on the prototype or
+stimuli closer to the prototype than the training stimuli. Even when
+the training stimuli are rather distant from the prototype, they produce
+a benefit for stimuli closer to the prototype if there are a large number
+of distinct training stimuli each shown only once. Thus, the dominance
+of specific training experiences is honored only when the training
+experiences are few and far between. Otherwise, an apparent advantage
+for the prototype, though with some residual benefit for particular
+training stimuli, is the result.
+The congruity of the results of these simulations with experimental
+findings underscores the applicability of distributed models to the question of the nature of the representation of general and specific information. In fact, we were somewhat surprised by the ability of the model
+to account for Whittlesea's results, given the fact that we did not rely
+on context-sensitive encoding of the letter-string stimuli. That is, the
+distributed representation we assigned to each letter was independent of
+the other letters in the string. A context-sensitive encoding would,
+however, prove necessary to capture a larger ensemble of stimuli.
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+205
+Whether a context-sensitive encoding would produce the same or
+slightly different results depends on the exact encoding. The exact
+degree of overlap of the patterns of activation produced by different
+distortions of the same prototype determines the extent to which the
+model will tend to favor the prototype relative to particular old exemplars. The degree of overlap, in turn, depends upon the specific
+assumptions made about the encoding of the stimuli. However, the
+general form of the results of the simulation would be unchanged:
+When all the distortions are close to the prototype, or when there is a
+very large number of different distortions, the central tendency will
+produce the strongest response; but when the distortions are fewer and
+farther from the prototype, the training exemplars themselves will produce the strongest activations. What the encoding would effect is the
+similarity metric.
+In this regard, it is worth mentioning another finding that may appear
+to challenge our distributed account of what is learned through repeated
+experiences with exemplars. This is the finding of Medin and
+Schwanenflugel (1981). Their experiment compared learning of two
+different sets of stimuli in a categorization task. One set of stimuli
+could be categorized by a linear combination of weights assigned to particular values on each of four dimensions considered independently.
+The other set of stimuli could not be categorized in this way. The
+experiment demonstrated clearly that linear separability was not necessary for categorization learning. Linearly separable stimuli were less
+easily learned than a set of stimuli that were not linearly separable
+but had a higher degree of similarity between exemplars within
+categories.
+At first glance, it may seem that Medin and Schwanenflugel's experiment is devastating to our distributed approach since our distributed
+model can only learn linear combinations of weights. However,
+whether a linear combination of weights can suffice in the Medin and
+Schwanentlugel experiments depends on how patterns of activation are
+assigned to stimuli. If each stimulus dimension is encoded separately in
+the representation of the stimulus, then the Medin and Schwanenflugel
+stimuli cannot be learned by our model. But if each stimulus dimension is encoded in a context sensitive way, then the patterns of activation associated with the different stimuli become linearly separable
+again.
+One way of achieving context sensitivity is via separate enumeration
+of traces.
+But it is well known that there are other ways as well.
+Several different kinds of context-sensitive encodings which do not
+require separate enumeration of traces or the allocation of separate
+units to individual experiences are considered in Chapter 3 and in
+Chapters 18 and 19.
+
+206
+It should be noted that the motivation for context-sensitive encoding
+in the use of distributed representations is captured by, but by no
+means limited to, the kinds of observations reported in the experiment
+by Medin and Schwanenflugel. Context-sensitive encoding is required if
+distributed models are to be able to overcome the linear predictability
+constraint, and this constraint pervades both computational and psychological applications of the idea of distributed representations.
+EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
+There are a number of phenomena in the learning and memory
+literature that lend themselves to accounts in terms of distributed
+models of memory. Here we will give a brief list. In some cases, the
+phenomena are addressed in other chapters, and we merely give
+pointers. In other cases, we have not yet had an opportunity to carry
+out detailed simulations; in these cases we describe briefly how we
+might envision encompassing the phenomena in terms of distributed
+models.
+The Emergence of Semantic Memory From Episodic Traces
+A distributed model leads naturally to the suggestion that semantic
+memory may be just the residue of the superposition of episodic traces.
+Consider, for example, representation of a proposition encountered in
+several different contexts, and assume for the moment that the context
+and content are represented in separate parts of the same module.
+Over repeated experience with the same proposition in different contexts, the proposition will remain in the interconnections of the units in
+the proposition submodule, but the particular associations to particular
+contexts will wash out. However, material that is only encountered in
+one particular context will tend to be somewhat contextually bound. So
+we may not be able to retrieve what we learn in one context when we
+need it in other situations. Other
+authors (e.g., J. R. Anderson &
+Ross, 1980) have recently argued against a separation between episodic
+and semantic memory, pointing out interactions between traditionally
+episodic and semantic memory tasks. Such findings are generally consistent with the view we have taken here.
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+207
+Emergence of Regularities in Behavior and Their Coexistence
+With Exceptions
+Distributed models also influence our thinking about how human
+behavior might come to exhibit the kind of regularity that often leads
+linguists to postulate systems of rules. In Chapter 18 we describe a distributed model of a system that can
+learn the past-tense system of
+English, given as inputs pairs of patterns corresponding to the phonological structure of the present and past tense forms of actual English
+verbs.
+The model accounts for several interesting phenomena which
+have been taken as evidence for the acquisition of "linguistic rules,"
+such as the fact that children at a certain stage overregularize the
+pronunciation of irregular forms. It also accounts for the coexistence of
+irregular pronunciations with productive use of the regular past tense in
+the mature language user.
+In general, then, distributed models appear to provide alternatives to
+a variety of models that postulate abstract, summary representations
+such as
+prototypes, logogens, semantic memory representations, or
+even linguistic rules.
+Spared Learning in Amnesia
+Distributed
+models also provide a natural way of accounting for
+spared learning by amnesics-persons who have diminished ability to
+learn new information after some traumatic event. There are generally
+two types of spared learning effects observed. First, in domains where
+amnesics show deficits, they nevertheless show a residual ability to
+learn gradually from repeated experiences. Indeed, they generally
+appear to be relatively more spared in their ability to extract what is
+common about an ensemble of experiences than in their ability to
+remember the details of individual events. Second, there are some
+domains in which most amnesics show no deficits at all. These
+phenomena are taken up from the point of view of a distributed model
+of learning and memory in Chapter 25. Here, we briefly consider the
+main points of the arguments made in that chapter.
+First, distributed models provide a natural way of explaining why
+there should be residual ability to learn gradually from repeated experience even within those domains where amnesics are grossly deficient in
+their memory for specific episodic experiences. For if we simply imagine that the effective size of the increments to the connections is
+reduced in amnesia, then the general properties of distributed
+
+208 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+models-the fact that they extract the central tendency from a set of
+similar experiences and build up a trace of the prototype from a series
+of repeated exemplars-automatically provide an account of the gradual
+accumulation of repeated information in the face of a profound deficit
+in remembering any specific episode in which the information was
+presented. Indeed, in some cases reduced increments in the sizes of
+connections can actually be an advantage for pulling out the central tendency of a set of experiences since reduction in the size of the increments means that the idiosyncratic properties of recent experiences will
+not unduly dominate the composite memory trace.
+The fact that large changes in connection strengths are not universally beneficial in distributed models may also provide a basis for
+explaining why certain aspects of learning and memory are completely
+unaffected in amnesia. The domains in which learning is almost completely spared are just the ones in which learning is very gradual in normals and is independent of awareness of having learned. These kinds
+of learning, we suggest, are acquired gradually by normals because large
+changes in the strengths of connections do not facilitate learning in
+such cases.
+Memory Blends
+Loftus (1977) has observed that subjects often combine information
+from two episodes when they attempt to describe some aspect of just
+one of these events. Many observations of this kind of effect have
+been observed in the context of legal testimony, but Loftus has now
+begun to explore the same effects in more basic experimental paradigms. The general result is that subjects do not simply report the
+correct property from one or the other memory trace; rather, they
+report a property that results from averaging or blending the properties
+of the individual traces.
+In one study, for example, many subjects
+reported that the color of a vehicle was green. However, no subject
+had actually seen a green truck; instead, they had seen a yellow truck in
+the original scene and a blue one in a distorted version of it. Such
+blend errors, obviously, are the beginnings of the formation of a summary representation and fall naturally out of distributed models.
+Interference and Fan Effects
+One of the oldest phenomena in the memory literature is interference. That similar memories or memories acquired in similar contexts
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+209
+interfere with each other was a central topic in memory research for
+years (see Crowder, 1976, for a review). Recently, this sort of interference effect has been explored by John Anderson, under the name of
+the fan effect (see J. R. Anderson, 1983, for a review). The fan effect
+refers to the fact that reaction times to indicate recognition of propositions goes up with the number of propositions studied that share arguments with the proposition under test. For example, The boy kissed the
+girl is harder to recognize if the subject has studied other sentences
+involving the boy or the girl than if he has not.
+Distributed models like the one we have described here exhibit
+interference of just this kind. Singley (personal communication, 1985)
+has in fact simulated a simple fan-effect experiment. He trained a
+module of 48 units on "propositions" consisting of four parts. The
+parts correspond to a subject, a verb, an object, and a fourth part that
+served as a conjunctive representation of the three other constituents
+(following Hinton, 198la). Some of the propositions shared arguments
+(subpatterns) with others. After several exposures to the set of patterns, Singley tested the module's response to each of the learned patterns and found that the response was generally weaker and took longer
+to reach a strength criterion for those patterns which shared arguments
+with other patterns. Obviously there is a lot more to fan effects than
+this; how well distributed models will be able to do in accounting for
+the details of the fan effect literature and other aspects of interference
+is a matter for further research.
+AUGMENTING THE MODEL WITH HIDDEN UNITS
+For all its successes, it must be said that our model does suffer from
+the fact that it can only learn to respond appropriately to sets of patterns that obey the linear predictability constraint. While this constraint
+can be overcome in specific cases by providing a conjunctive coding
+capable of serving as a basis for learning any prespecified set of patterns, it cannot be overcome, in general, without great cost in terms of
+units to cover the space of possibly necessary conjunctive representations. To overcome this limitation, it is necessary to have a model that
+can create the right conjunctive representation to solve the problems it
+faces in a way that is efficient in terms of units and connections.
+Both the Boltzmann learning rule (Chapter 7) and the generalized
+delta rule (Chapter 8) provide ways of constructing just the required set
+of representations. Here we briefly sketch the application of the generalized delta rule to the case of an auto-associator with hidden units.
+The basic idea is simple. A module consists of a large network of
+units. Some units are designated as input/output or simply input units
+
+210 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+and the remaining are designated as hidden units.
+As in the case
+without hidden units, the goal of the system is to have the net input
+from internal sources impinging on a particular input/output unit equal
+the external input to that unit. In this case, however, input from the
+hidden units is added as part of the total input from internal sources.
+The basic difference between a hidden unit and an input/output unit is
+that hidden units receive no inputs from outside the module, nor do
+they send outputs outside of the module. Rather, they receive inputs
+from other hidden units or from the input/output units. The generalized delta rule allows the system to develop a set of connections to and
+among the hidden units which, in principle, allows the system to
+retrieve the correct input pattern from any unique subportion of the
+input pattern -provided there are enough hidden units.
+The "classical" example of a set of vectors for which hidden units are
+required is due to Hinton (1981a). This is the one-same-one problem.
+Suppose that the input vectors are divided into three portions. The
+first portion represents a number (either one or zero); the second portion represents a relation (either same or different); and the final portion represents a number (again either one or zero). Further, suppose
+that we want to store four vectors in the system representing the four
+propositions, one-same-one, one-different-zero, zero-same-zero, and
+zero-different-one. Now, we probe the system with two of the three
+sections of a stored input vector and hope that the memory system
+reconstructs the missing portion. For example, we present the system
+with one-same-? or zero-?-one and see what values get filled in for the
+unspecified portion of the vector.
+For this example, learning done with the standard delta rule will not
+succeed. These vectors violate the linear predictability constraint. For
+example, suppose we present the system with one-same-?. In this
+case, the pattern associated with one in the first position are as often
+associated with zero in the third position as they are with one in that
+position. Thus, this pattern will try to establish a blend of zero and one
+in the unspecified portion of the input vector. Similarly, the pattern
+representing same in the middle portion are as often associated with the
+zero as with one in both other slots. Each portion will singly try to produce a blend of the two possibilities in the missing portion and both
+together will simply produce the same blend. The same argument can
+be made for each slot. However, with hidden units, the problem can
+be solved. A given hidden unit can relate bits from two or more slots
+together, and in that way it can fill in the appropriate pattern when it is
+missing from the input.
+We have tested a network on a very simple version of this problem,
+using the generalized delta rule (Chapter 8) to learn the appropriate
+weights to and from the hidden units. In this case there were only
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+211
+three input/output units, one for each of the three components of the
+one-same-one propositions. The number one and the predicate same
+were represented by Is in the appropriate positions, and the number
+zero and the predicate different were represented by Os in the appropriate positions. Thus, the proposition one-same-one was represented by
+the input pattern 111 and the proposition zero-different-one was
+represented by pattern 001. The other two propositions were analogously represented as 010 and 100.
+The basic auto-associative memory paradigm was modified slightly
+from the ones presented earlier in this chapter to accommodate the
+requirements of hidden units. Most of the modifications are not substantive, but were made to accommodate the technical requirements of
+the generalized delta rule. In particular, a logistic sigmoid "squashing"
+function was substituted for the one described in Equations 1 and 2.
+This was done because our original squashing function was not differentiable as required by the generalized delta rule (see Chapter 8 for
+details). This is a minor difference and has little effect on the performance of the system. Similarly, output values of units were allowed to
+range between [0,1] rather than I-1,1]. This change again is minor. It
+essentially involves a scale change and the addition of a bias or threshold term (again, see Chapter 8 for details). In this case 0.5 is the resting level rather than 0.0. One other somewhat more significant change
+of paradigm was also required. In the standard auto-associator we did
+not allow units to connect to themselves. The technical reason for this
+is that they can "learn" the input (i.e., they can make the internal input
+equal to the external input) simply by learning to "predict" themselves.
+However, this does not facilitate reconstruction of the whole pattern
+from a part. If the strongest connections are from a unit to itself, when
+that unit is not present in the probe pattern, the missing element will
+not be well predicted. We wished to impose the same restriction to the
+model with hidden units, but in this case the restriction becomes harder
+to enforce. That is, the system can learn to get around a constraint on
+direct connections by using hidden units to "shadow" each of the input
+units.
+When a particular input unit is turned on, it turns on its "shadow" hidden unit which in turn feeds activation back to the input unit.
+Thus we again have a unit predicting itself. Since we are most
+interested in the case of pattern completion, we want to avoid this
+situation. One way to avoid this is to require that the input from all
+units except the unit in question match the external input. To accomplish this, we used the following procedure: For each pattern to be
+learned, for example, 111, we actually trained the module to associate
+all of the patterns 11?, 1?1 and ?11 with the whole 111 pattern.
+There were three input units and three hidden units. A network was
+set up which allowed any input unit to connect to any other input unit
+
+212 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+or to any hidden unit. Hidden units were allowed to connect to any
+input unit and any hidden unit-including themselves. The model was
+repeatedly presented with each of the three training inputs of each of
+the four
+patterns as indicated above, and the network was allowed to
+learn until it became stable and correctly filled in the missing parts of
+the patterns. The system was taught to fill in the missing portion of
+the pattern in three cycles and then to hold this completed pattern.
+Table 6 shows the state achieved by the three hidden units for each of
+the four input patterns. We see a distributed pattern over the hidden
+units in which the first unit signals that the predicate was either different or the proposition was one-same-one. The second hidden unit
+indicates that the predicate was either same or the proposition was onedifferent-zero, and the final hidden unit indicates that the predicate was
+either different or the proposition was one-same-one. This provides a
+unique, linearly independent basis from which to reconstruct the
+required input patterns.
+The final network is shown in Figure 10 and the weight matrix is
+shown in Table 7. A number of interesting features of the network
+should be observed. First, since none of the input units can predict any
+other of the input units, the potential connections among input units
+have all gone to zero. Second, the hidden units all connect positively
+to themselves and negatively to each other. This allows a unit once
+turned on to stay on and shut down any noise feeding into those units
+that were not turned on. Finally, the connections between the input
+units and the hidden units are roughly symmetric. That is, whenever a
+particular hidden unit is turned on by a given input unit, that hidden
+unit tries, in turn, to turn on that input unit. It is interesting that this
+general kind of architecture in which units are connected roughly symmetrically and in which there are pools of mutually inhibitory units
+which evolved following the presentation of these very difficult patterns
+is very much like the architecture we have assumed in a number of our
+TABLE 6
+HIDDEN UNIT REPRESENTATIONS FOR
+THE ONE-SAME-ONE PROBLEM
+Propositions
+Input
+Patterns
+Hidden Unit
+Patterns
+one-same-one
+one-different-zero
+ero-same-zero
+zero-different-on
+111
+100
+010
+001
+-
+-
+-
+111
+011
+110
+101
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+213
+INPUT
+INPUT
+hidden units
+INPUT
+FIGURE 10. The network used in solving the one-same-one problem.
+See text for
+explanation.
+models, including the interactive activation model of word perception
+and the models described in Chapters 15 and 16
+Finally, before leaving this section, it should be noted that the
+hidden-units version of an auto-associator will behave very much like
+the system we have described throughout this chapter if the situation
+does not require hidden units. In this case, the connections among the
+TABLE 7
+WEIGHTS ACQUIRED IN LEARNING THE ONE-SAME-ONE PROBLEM
+FROM
+Input
+Units
+0
+0
+0
+Input Units
+0
+0
+0
+U
+4
+4
+Hidden Units
+4
+4
+- 6
+4
+-6
+4
+TO
+Hidden
+Units
+6
+6
+6
+-5
+6
+-5
+6
+-3
+-3
+-3
+6
+
+214
+input units can capture the structure of the problem, and the connections to and from the hidden units will tend not to play an important
+role. This is because direct connections are learned more quickly than
+those which propagate information through hidden units. These will lag
+behind, and if they are not required, their strength will stay relatively
+small.
+It should also be emphasized that the use of hidden units overcomes
+a problem that our present model shares with enumeration models: the
+problem of having a fixed set of representational primitives. Hidden
+units really are new representational primitives that grow and develop
+to meet the representational needs of the particular set of patterns that
+have been encountered. They allow the model to change its representation and thereby to change the pattern of similarity among the input
+patterns. We have only begun our exploration of the generalized delta
+rule and its application to the case of the auto-associator. We are very
+optimistic that it can serve as a mechanism for building the kinds of
+internal representations required by allowing distributed memories the
+flexibility of adapting to arbitrary sets of stimulus patterns.
+CONCLUSION
+In this chapter, we have argued that a distributed model of memory
+provides a natural way of accounting for the fact that memory appears
+to extract the central tendencies of a set of experiences and for the fact
+that memory is sensitive to the details of specific events and experiences. We have seen how a simple distributed model, using the delta
+rule, provides a fairly direct and homogeneous account for a large body
+of evidence relevant to the representation of general and specific information. The delta rule-and now the generalized delta rule-provide
+very simple mechanisms for extracting regularities from an ensemble of
+inputs
+without the aid of sophisticated generalization or ruleformulating mechanisms that oversee the performance of the processing system. These learning rules are completely local, in the sense that
+they change the connection between one unit and another on the basis
+of information that is locally available to the connection rather than on
+the basis of global information about overall performance. The model
+thus stands as an alternative to the view that learning in cognitive systems involves the explicit formulation of rules and abstractions under
+the guidance of some explicit overseer. We do not wish to suggest that
+explicit rule formation has no place in a cognitive theory of learning
+and memory; we only wish to suggest that such mechanisms need not
+
+17. A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF MEMORY
+215
+be invoked whenever behavior is observed that appears to be describable by some generalization or rule.
+We emphasize that the basic properties of distributed models are
+largely independent of specific detailed assumptions about implementation, such as the dynamic range of the units involved or the exact form
+of the activation update rule. This points are underscored by the
+models considered in Chapters 18 and 19, in which some of the same
+general properties arise from models making use of somewhat different
+detailed assumptions.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+The work reported was supported in part by a grant from the System
+Development Foundation, in part by a contract from the Office of
+Naval Research (N00014-79-C-0323, NR667-437), and in part by a
+NIMH Career Development Award (MH00385) to the first author.
+Many of the ideas described here were developed and elaborated in the
+context of a conference organized by Lee Brooks and Larry Jacoby
+entitled "The Priority of the Specific," June, 1983, Elora, Ontario. The
+chapter owes a great deal to this conference and to stimulating discussions with the organizers and participants.
+
+CHAPTER 18
+On Learning the
+Past Tenses of English Verbs
+D. E. RUMELHART and J. L. McCLELLAND
+THE ISSUE
+Scholars of language and psycholinguistics have been among the first
+to stress the importance of rules in describing human behavior. The
+reason for this is obvious. Many aspects of language can be characterized by rules, and the speakers of natural languages speak the language
+correctly. Therefore, systems of rules are useful in characterizing what
+they will and will not say. Though we all make mistakes when we
+speak, we have a pretty good ear for what is right and what is wrongand our judgments of correctness-or grammaticality-are generally
+even easier to characterize by rules than actual utterances.
+On the evidence that what we will and won't say and what we will
+and won't accept can be characterized by rules, it has been argued that,
+in some sense, we "know" the rules of our language. The sense in
+which we know them is not the same as the sense in which we know
+such "rules" as "i before e except after c," however, since we need not
+necessarily be able to state the rules explicitly. We know them in a way
+that allows us to use them to make judgments of grammaticality, it is
+often said, or to speak and understand, but this knowledge is not in a
+form or location that permits it to be encoded into a communicable verbal statement. Because of this, this knowledge is said to be implicit.
+A slight variant of this chapter will appear in B. MacWhinney (Ed.), Mechanisms of
+language acquisition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum (in press).
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+217
+So far there is considerable agreement. However, the exact characterization of implicit knowledge is a matter of great controversy. One
+view, which is perhaps extreme but is nevertheless quite clear, holds
+that the rules of language are stored in explicit form as propositions,
+and are used by language production, comprehension, and judgment
+mechanisms. These propositions cannot be described verbally only
+because they are sequestered in a specialized subsystem which is used
+in language processing, or because they are written in a special code
+that only the language processing system can understand. This view we
+will call the explicit inaccessible rule view.
+On the explicit inaccessible rule view, language acquisition is thought
+of as the process of inducing rules. The language mechanisms are
+thought to include a subsystem-often called the language acquisition
+device (LAD) -whose business it is to discover the rules. A considerable amount of effort has been expended on the attempt to describe
+how the LAD might operate, and there are a number of different proposals which have been laid out. Generally, though, they share three
+assumptions:
+• The mechanism hypothesizes explicit inaccessible rules.
+• Hypotheses are rejected and replaced as they prove inadequate
+to account for the utterances the learner hears.
+• The LAD is presumed to have innate knowledge of the possible
+range of human languages and, therefore, is presumed to consider only hypotheses within the constraints imposed by a set of
+linguistic universals.
+The recent book by Pinker (1984) contains a state-of-the-art example
+of a model based on this approach.
+We propose an alternative to explicit inaccessible rules. We suggest
+that lawful behavior and judgments may be produced by a mechanism
+in which there is no explicit representation of the rule. Instead, we
+suggest that the mechanisms that process language and make judgments
+of grammaticality are constructed in such a way that their performance
+is characterizable by rules, but that the rules themselves are not written
+in explicit form anywhere in the mechanism. An illustration of this
+view, which we owe to Bates (1979), is provided by the honeycomb.
+The regular structure of the honeycomb arises from the interaction of
+forces that wax balls exert on each other when compressed. The
+honeycomb can be described by a rule, but the mechanism which produces it does not contain any statement of this rule.
+In our earlier work with the interactive activation model of word perception (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland,
+
+218
+1981, 1982), we noted that lawful behavior emerged from the interactions of a set of word and letter units. Each word unit stood for a particular word and had connections to units for the letters of the word.
+There were no separate units for common letter clusters and no explicit
+provision for dealing differently with orthographically regular letter
+sequences-strings that accorded with the rules of English-as opposed
+to irregular sequences. Yet the model did behave differently with
+orthographically regular nonwords than it behaved with words. In fact,
+the model sımulated rather closely a number of results in the word perception literature relating to the tinding that subjects perceive letters in
+orthographically regular letter strings more accurately than they perceive letters in irregular, random letter strings. Thus, the behavior of
+the model was lawful even though it contained no explicit rules.
+It should be said that the pattern of perceptual facilitation shown by
+the model did not correspond exactly to any system of orthographic
+rules that we know of. The model produced as much facilitation, for
+example, for special nonwords like SLNT, which are clearly irregular, as
+it did for matched regular nonwords like SLET. Thus, it is not correct
+to say that the model exactly mimicked the behavior
+we would expect
+to emerge from a system which makes use of explicit orthographic
+rules. However, neither do human subjects. Just like the model, they
+showed equal facilitation for vowelless strings like SLNT as for regular
+nonwords like SLET. Thus, human perceptual performance seems, in
+this case at least, to be characterized only approximately by rules.
+Some people have been tempted to argue that the behavior of the
+model shows that we can do without linguistic rules. We prefer, however, to put the matter in a slightly different light. There is no denying
+that rules still provide a fairly close characterization of the performance
+of our subjects. And we have no doubt that rules are even more useful
+in characterizations of sentence production, comprehension, and grammaticality judgments. We would only suggest that parallel distributed
+processing models may provide a mechanism sufficient to capture lawful behavior, without requiring the postulation of explicit but inaccessible rules. Put succinctly, our claim is that PDP models provide an
+alternative to the explicit but inaccessible rules account of implicit
+knowledge of rules.
+We can anticipate two kinds of arguments against this kind of claim.
+The first kind would claim that although certain types of rule-guided
+behavior might emerge from PDP models, the models simply lack the
+computational power needed to carry out certain types of operations
+which can be easily handled by a system using explicit rules. We
+believe that this argument is simply mistaken. We discuss the issue of
+computational power of PDP models in Chapter 4. Some applications
+of PDP models to sentence processing are described in Chapter 19.
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+219
+The second kind of argument would be that the details of language
+behavior, and, indeed, the details of the language acquisition process,
+would provide unequivocal evidence in favor of a system of explicit
+rules.
+It is this latter kind of argument we wish to address in the present
+chapter. We have selected a phenomenon that is often thought of as
+demonstrating the acquisition of a linguistic rule.
+And we have
+developed a parallel distributed processing model that learns in a
+natural way to behave in accordance with the rule, mimicking the general trends seen in the acquisition data.
+THE PHENOMENON
+The phenomenon we wish to account for is actually a sequence of
+three stages in the acquisition of the use of past tense by children learning English as their native tongue. Descriptions of development of the
+use of the past tense may be found in Brown (1973), Ervin (1964), and
+Kuczaj (1977).
+In Stage 1, children use only a small number of verbs in the past
+tense. Such verbs tend to be very high-frequency words, and the
+majority of these are irregular. At this stage, children tend to get the
+past tenses of these words correct if they use the past tense at all. For
+example, a child's lexicon of past-tense words at this stage might consist of came, got, gave, looked, needed, took, and went. Of these seven
+verbs, only two are regular-the other five are generally idiosyncratic
+examples of irregular verbs. In this stage, there is no evidence of the
+use of the rule-it appears that children simply know a small number of
+separate items.
+In Stage 2, evidence of implicit knowledge of a linguistic rule
+emerges. At this stage, children use a much larger number of verbs in
+the past tense. These verbs include a few more irregular items, but it
+turns out that the majority of the words at this stage are examples of
+the regular past tense in English. Some examples are wiped and pulled.
+The evidence that the Stage 2 child actually has a linguistic rule
+comes not from the mere fact that he or she knows a number of regular forms. There are two additional and crucial facts:
+• The child can now generate a past tense for an invented word.
+For example, Berko (1958) has shown that if children can be
+convinced to use rick to describe an action, they will tend to say
+ricked when the occasion arises to use the word in the past
+tense.
+
+220
+• Children now incorrectly supply regular past-tense endings for
+words which they used correctly in Stage 1. These errors may
+involve either adding ed to the root as in comed /K'md/, or
+adding ed to the irregular past tense form as in camed / kamd/'
+(Ervin, 1964; Kuczaj, 1977).
+Such findings have been taken as fairly strong support for the assertion that the child at this stage has acquired the past-tense "rule." To
+quote Berko (1958):
+If a child knows that the plural of witch is witches, he may simply have memorized the plural form. If, however, he tells us
+that the plural of gutch is gutches, we have evidence that he
+actually knows, albeit unconsciously, one of those rules which
+the descriptive linguist, too, would
+I set forth in his grammar.
+(p. 151)
+In Stage 3, the regular and irregular forms coexist. That is, children
+have regained the use of the correct irregular forms of the past tense,
+while they continue to apply the regular form to new words they learn.
+Regularizations persist into adulthood-in fact, there is a class of words
+for which either a regular or an irregular version are both considered
+acceptable-but for the commonest irregulars such as those the child
+acquired first, they tend to be rather rare. At this stage there are some
+clusters of exceptions to the basic, regular past-tense pattern of English.
+Each cluster includes a number of words that undergo identical changes
+from the present to the past tense. For example, there is a ing/ang
+cluster, an ing/ung cluster, an eet / it cluster, etc. There is also a group
+of words ending in /d/ or /t/ for which the present and past are
+identical.
+Table 1 summarizes the major characteristics of the three stages.
+Variability and Gradualness
+The characterization of past-tense acquisition as a sequence of three
+stages is somewhat misleading.
+It may suggest that the stages are
+clearly demarcated and that performance in each stage is sharply distinguished from performance in other stages.
+1 The notation of phonemes used in this chapter is somewhat nonstandard. Il is
+derived from the computer-readable dictionary containing phonetic transcriptions of the
+verbs used in the simulations. A key is given in Table 5.
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+221
+Verb Type
+Early Verbs
+Regular
+Other Irregular
+Novel
+CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREE STAGES
+OF PAST TENSE ACQUISITION
+Stage 1
+Stage 2
+Correct Regularized
+Correct
+Regularized
+Regularized
+Stage 3
+Correct
+Correct
+Correct or Regularized
+Regularized
+In fact, the acquisition process is quite gradual. Little detailed data
+exists on the transition from Stage 1 to Stage 2, but the transition from
+Stage 2 to Stage 3 is quite protracted and extends over several years
+(Kuczaj, 1977). Further, performance in Stage 2 is extremely variable.
+Correct use of irregular forms is never completely absent, and the same
+child may be observed to use the correct past of an irregular, the
+base ted form, and the past ted form, within the same conversation.
+Other Facts About Past-Tense Acquisition
+Beyond these points, there is now considerable data on the detailed
+types of errors children make throughout the acquisition process, both
+from Kuczaj (1977) and more recently from Bybee and Slobin (1982).
+We will consider aspects of these findings in more detail below. For
+now, we mention one intriguing fact: According to Kuczaj (1977),
+there is an interesting difference in the errors children make to irregular verbs at different points in Stage 2. Early on, regularizations are
+typically of the baseted form, like goed; later on, there is a large
+increase in the frequency of past ted errors, such as wented.
+THE MODEL
+The goal of our simulation of the acquisition of past tense was to
+simulate the three-stage performance summarized in Table 1, and to
+see whether we could capture other aspects of acquisition. In particular, we wanted to show that the kind of gradual change characteristic of
+normal acquisition was also a characteristic of our distributed model,
+and we wanted to see whether the model would capture detailed aspects
+
+222
+of the phenomenon, such as the change in error type in later phases of
+development and the change in differences in error patterns observed
+for different types of words.
+We were not prepared to produce a full-blown language processor
+that would learn the past tense from full sentences heard in everyday
+experience. Rather, we have explored a very simple past-tense learning
+environment designed to capture the essential characteristics necessary
+to produce the three stages of acquisition. In this environment, the
+model is presented, as learning experiences, with pairs of inputs-one
+capturing the phonological structure of the root form of a word and the
+other capturing the phonological structure of the correct past-tense version of that word. The behavior of the model can be tested by giving it
+just the root form of a word and examining what it generates as its
+"current guess" of the corresponding past-tense form.
+Structure of the Model
+The basic structure of the model is illustrated in Figure 1. The
+model consists of two basic parts: (a) a simple pattern associator network similar to those studied by Kohonen (1977; 1984; see Chapter 2)
+which learns the relationships between the base form and the past-tense
+Fixed
+Encoding
+Network
+Pattern Associator
+Modifiable Connections
+Decoding/Binding
+Network
+Phonological
+representation
+of root form
+Phonological
+representation
+of past tense
+Wickelfeature
+representation
+of root form
+Wickelfeature
+representation
+of past tense
+FIGURE I. The basic structure of the model.
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+223
+form, and (b) a decoding network that converts a featural representation of the past-tense form into a phonological
+representation. All
+learning occurs in the pattern associator; the decoding network is simply a mechanism for converting a featural representation which may be
+a near miss to any phonological pattern into a legitimate phonological
+representation. Our primary focus here is on the pattern associator.
+We discuss the details of the decoding network in the Appendix.
+Units.
+The pattern associator contains two pools of units. One pool,
+called the input pool, is used to represent the input pattern corresponding to the root form of the verb to be learned. The other pool, called
+the output pool, is used to represent the output pattern generated by
+the model as its current guess as to the past tense corresponding to the
+root form represented in the inputs.
+Each unit stands for a particular feature of the input or output string.
+The particular features we used are important to the behavior of the
+model, so they are described in a separate section below.
+Connections. The pattern associator contains a modifiable connection linking each input unit to each output unit. Initially, these connections are all set to 0 so that there is no influence of the input units on
+the output units. Learning, as in other PDP models described in this
+book, involves modification of the strengths of these interconnections,
+as described below.
+Operation of the Model
+On test trials, the simulation is given a phoneme string corresponding
+to the root of a word. It then performs the following actions. First, it
+encodes the root string as a pattern of activation over the input units.
+The encoding scheme used is described below. Node activations are
+discrete in this model, so the activation values of all the units that
+should be on to represent this word are set to 1, and all the others are
+set to 0. Then, for each output unit, the model computes the net input
+to it from all of the weighted connections from the input units. The
+net input is simply the sum over all input units of the input unit activation times the corresponding weight. Thus, algebraically, the net input
+to output unit i is
+net, = La; Wij
+where a; represents the activation of input unit j, and wij represents
+the weight from unit j to unit i.
+
+224
+Each unit has a threshold, o, which is adjusted by the learning procedure that we will describe in a moment. The probability that the unit
+is turned on depends on the amount the net input exceeds the threshold. The logistic probability function is used here as in the Boltzmann
+machine (Chapter 7) and in harmony theory (Chapter 6) to determine
+whether the unit should be turned on. The probability is given by
+1
+(1)
+p (a; = 1) =
+It e
+- (nel, - 0,)/ T
+where T represents the temperature of the system. The logistic function is shown in Figure 2. The use of this probabilistic response rule
+allows the system to produce different responses on different occasions
+with the same network. It also causes the system to learn more slowly
+so the effect of regular verbs on the irregulars continues over a much
+longer period of time. As discussed in Chapter 2, the temperature, T,
+can be manipulated so that at very high temperatures the response of
+the units is highly variable; with lower values of T, the units behave
+more like linear threshold units.
+Since the pattern associator built into the model is a one-layer net
+with no feedback connections and no connections from one input unit
+to another or from one output unit to another, iterative computation is
+of no benefit. Therefore, the processing of an input pattern is a simple
+matter of first calculating the net input to each output unit and then
+1.0
+0.5
+0.0
+-5
+-4
+→a1!1!!1
+(ner. - 0,1T}
+5
+FIGURE 2. The logistic function used to calculate probability of activation. The x-axis
+shows values of (nel, - f,/ T), and the y-axis indicales the corresponding probability that
+unit i will be activated
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+225
+setting its activation probabilistically on the basis of the logistic equation given above. The temperature T only enters in setting the variability of the output units; a fixed value of 7 was used throughout the
+simulations.
+To determine how well the model did at producing the correct output, we simply compare the pattern of output Wickelphone activations
+to the pattern that the correct response would have generated. To do
+this, we first translate the correct response into a target pattern of
+activation for the output units, based on the same encoding scheme
+used for the input units. We then compare the obtained pattern with
+the target pattern on a unit-by-unit basis. If the output perfectly reproduces the target, then there should be a 1 in the output pattern wherever there is a 1 in the target. Such cases are called hits, following the
+conventions of signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966). There
+should also be a 0 in the output whenever there is a 0 in the target.
+Such cases are called correct rejections. Cases in which there are Is in
+the output but not in the target are called false alarms, and cases in
+which there are Os in the output that should be present in the input are
+called misses. A variety of measures of performance can be computed.
+We can measure the percentage of output units that match the correct
+past tense, or we can compare the output to the pattern for any other
+response alternative we might care to evaluate. This allows us to look
+at the output of the system independently of the decoding network.
+We can also employ the decoding network and have the system synthesize a phonological string. We can measure the performance of the
+system either at the featural level or at the level of strings of
+phonemes. We shall employ both of these mechanisms in the evaluation of different aspects of the overall model.
+Learning
+On a learning trial, the model is presented with both the root form of
+the verb and the target. As on a test trial, the pattern associator network computes the output it would generate from the input. Then, for
+each output unit, the model compares its answer with the target. Connection strengths are adjusted using the classic perceptron convergence
+procedure (Rosenblatt, 1962). The perceptron convergence procedure is
+simply a discrete variant of the delta rule presented in Chapter 2 and
+discussed in many places in this book. The exact procedure is as follows: We can think of the target as supplying a teaching input to each
+output unit, telling it what value it ought to have. When the actual
+output matches the target output, the model is doing the right thing
+
+226
+and so none of the weights on the lines coming into the unit are
+adjusted. When the computed output is 0 and the target says it should
+be 1, we want to increase the probabillity that the unit will be active the
+next time the same input pattern is presented. To do this, we increase
+the weights from all of the input units that are active by a small amount
+n. At the same time, the threshold is also reduced by n. When the
+computed output is 1 and the target says it should be 0, we want to
+decrease the probability that the unit will be active the next time the
+same input pattern is presented. To do this, the weights from all of the
+input units that are active are reduced by n, and the threshold is
+increased by n. In all of our simulations, the value of n is simply set
+to 1. Thus, each change in a weight is a unit change, either up or
+down. For nonstochastic units, it is well known that the perceptron
+convergence procedure will find a set of weights that will allow the
+model to get each output unit correct, provided that such a set of
+weights exists. For the stochastic case, it is possible for the learning
+procedure to find a set of weights that will make the probability of error
+as low as desired. Such a set of weights exists if a set of weights exists
+that will always get the right answer for nonstochastic units.
+Learning Regular and Exceptional Patterns in a
+Pattern Associator
+In this section, we present an illustration of the behavior of a simple
+pattern associator model. The model is a scaled-down version of the
+main simulation described in the next section. We describe the scaleddown version first because in this model it is possible to actually examine the matrix of connection weights, and from this to see clearly how
+the model works and why it produces the basic three-stage learning
+phenomenon characteristic of acquisition of the past tense. Various
+aspects of pattern associator networks are described in a number of
+places in this book (Chapters 1, 2, 8, 9, 11, and 12, in particular) and
+elsewhere (J. A. Anderson, 1973, 1977; J. A. Anderson, Silverstein,
+Ritz, & Jones, 1977; Kohonen, 1977, 1984). Here we focus our attention on their application to the representation of rules for mapping one
+set of patterns into another.
+For the illustration model, we use a simple network of eight input
+and eight output units and a set of connections from each input unit to
+each output unit. The network is illustrated in Figure 3. The network
+is shown with a set of connections sufficient for associating the pattern
+of activation illustrated on the input units with the pattern of activation
+illustrated on the output units. (Active units are darkened; positive
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+227
++919791919751919
++519+A191551914
+•9.4933532
++913191919+9A1A
+• 39191999914
+
++15
+-15
++15
+-15
+-15
++15
+-15
+-15
++15
+-15
++15
+-15
+-15
++15
+-15
+-15
++15
+-15
++15
+-15
+-15
++15
+-15
+-15
+FIGURE 3. Simple network used in illustrating basic properties of pattern associator networks; excitatory and inhibitory connections needed to allow the active input pattern to
+produce the illustrated output pattern are indicated with + and -. Next to the network,
+the matrix of weights indicating the strengths of the connections from each input unit to
+each output unit. Input units are indexed by the column they appear in; output units are
+indexed by row.
+and negative connections are indicated by numbers written on each
+connection). Next to the network is the matrix of connections
+abstracted from the
+actual network itself, with numerical values
+assigned to the positive and negative connections. Note that each
+weight is located in the matrix at the point where it occurred in the
+actual network diagram. Thus, the entry in the ith row of the jth
+column indicates the connection wij from the jth input unit to the ith
+output unit.
+Using this diagram, it is easy to compute the net inputs that will arise
+on the output units when an input pattern is presented. For each output unit, one simply scans across its rows and adds up all the weights
+found in columns associated with active input units. (This is exactly
+what the simulation program does!) The reader can verify that when
+the input pattern illustrated in the left-hand panel is presented, each
+output unit that should be on in the output pattern receives a net input
+of +45; each output unit that should be off receives a net input of
+-45.2 Plugging these values into Equation 1, using a temperature
+2 In the examples we will be considering in this section, the thresholds of the units are
+fixed at 0. Threshold terms add an extra degree of freedom for each output unit and
+allow the unit to come on in the absence of input, but they are otherwise inessential to
+the operation of the model. Computationally, they are equivalent to an adjustable weight
+to an extra input unit that is always on.
+
+228
+of 15,3 we can compute that each output unit will take on the correct
+value about 95% of the time. The reader can check this in Figure 2;
+when the net input is +45, the exponent in the denominator of the
+logistic function is 3, and when the net input is - 45, the exponent
+is -3. These correspond to activation probabilities of about .95 and
+.OS, respectively.
+One of the basic properties of the pattern associator is that it can
+store the connections appropriate for mapping a number of different
+input patterns to a number of different output patterns. The perceptron
+convergence procedure can accommodate a number of arbitrary associations between input patterns and output patterns, as long as the input
+patterns form a linearly independent set (see Chapters 9 and 11).
+Table 2 illustrates this aspect of the model. The first two cells of the
+table show the connections that the model learns when it is trained on
+each of the two indicated associations separately. The third cell shows
+connections learned by the model when it is trained on both patterns in
+alternation, first seeing one and then seeing the other of the two.
+Again, the reader can verify that if either input pattern is presented to a
+network with this set of connections, the correct corresponding output
+pattern is reconstructed with high probability; each output unit that
+should be on gets a net input of at least +45, and each output unit that
+should be off gets a net input below - 45.
+The restriction of networks such as this to linearly independent sets
+of patterns is a severe one since there are only N linearly independent
+patterns of length N. That means that we could store at most eight
+unrelated associations in the network and maintain accurate performance. However, if the patterns all conform to a general rule, the capacity of the network can be greatly enhanced. For example, the set of
+connections shown in Table 2D is capable of processing all of the patterns defined by what we call the rule of 78. The rule is described in
+Table 3. There are 18 different input/output pattern pairs corresponding to this rule, but they present no difficulty to the network. Through
+repeated presentations of examples of the rule, the perceptron convergence procedure learned the set of weights shown in cell D of Table 2.
+Again, the reader can verify that it works for any legal association fitting the rule of 78. (Note that for this example, the "regular" pairing
+3 For the actual simulations of verb learning, we used a value of T equal to 200. This
+means that for a fixed value of the weight on an input line, the effect of that line being
+active on the unit's probability of firing is much lower than it is in these illustrations.
+This is balanced by the fact that in the verb learning simulations, a much larger number
+of inputs contribute to the activation of each output unit. Responsibility for turning a
+unit on is simply more distributed when larger input patterns are used.
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+WEIGHTS IN THE 8-UNIT NETWORK
+AFTER VARIOUS LEARNING EXPERIENCES
+A.
+Weights acquired in learning
+(247) → (146)
+15
+15
+-16
+-16
+-17
+-17
+16
+16
+-16
+-16
+17
+17
+-16
+- 16
+- 17
+-17
+15
+-16
+-17
+16
+-16
+17
+-16
+-17
+C.
+Weights acquired in learning
+A and B together
+24
+-13
+-23
+24
+-13
+13
+-25
+-12
+-24
+- 13
+24
+-25
+-13
+13
+24
+- 13
+-26
+1
+- 1
+-26
+26
+-1
+-25
+-24
+-13
+24
+-25
+- 13
+13
+24
+-13
+24
+-13
+-23
+24
+- 13
+13
+-25
+-12
+B.
+D.
+61
+-35
+-39
+-6
+-5
+Weights acquired in learning
+(346) - (367)
+-16 - 16
+-17
+17
+-17
+-16
+17
+-16
+-17
+16
+-17
+16
+17
+17
+-17
+-17
+-16
+-17
+17
+-16
+-17
+16
+17
+-17
+Weights acquired in learning
+the rule of 78
+-37
+-37
+60
+-38
+-35
+61
+-4
+-5
+-5
+-4
+-4
+1
+- 1
+-4
+-4
+59
+-36
+-37
+1
+-2
+-37
+60
+-38
+-37
+-38
+60
+1
+-8
+-50
+49
+TABLE 3
+THE RULE OF 78
+Input patterns consist of one
+active unit from each of the
+following sets:
+The output
+pattern paired
+with a given
+input
+pattern
+consists of:
+Examples:
+An exception:
+(123)
+(456)
+(78)
+The same unit from (1 2 3)
+The same unit from (45 6)
+The other unit from (78)
+247-248
+168-167
+357-358
+147-147
+229
+- 7
+-8
+-6
+- 7
+-7
+51
+-50
+
+230
+of (1 47) with (1 4 8) was used rather than the exceptional mapping
+illustrated in Table 3).
+We have, then, observed an important property of the pattern associator: If there is some structure to a set of patterns, the network may be
+able to learn to respond appropriately to all of the members of the set.
+This is true, even though the input vectors most certainly do not form
+a linearly independent set. The model works anyway because the
+response that the model should make to some of the patterns can be
+predicted from the responses that it should make to others of the patterns.
+Now let's consider a case more like the situation a young child faces
+in learning the past tenses of English verbs. Here, there is a regular
+pattern, similar to the rule of 78. In addition, however, there are
+exceptions. Among the first words the child learns are many exceptions, but as the child learns more and more verbs, the proportion that
+are regular increases steadily. For an adult, the vast majority of verbs
+are regular.
+To examine what would happen in a pattern associator in this kind of
+a situation, we first presented the illustrative 8-unit model with two pattern pairs. One of these was a regular example of the 78 rule
+[(258)→ (257)]. The other was
+an exception to the rule
+[(1 4 7) - (147)]. The simulation saw both pairs 20 times, and connection strengths were adjusted after each presentation. The resulting
+set of connections is shown in cell A of Table 4. This number of learning trials is not enough to lead to perfect performance; but after this
+much experience, the model tends to get the right answer for each output unit close to 90 percent of the time. At this point, the fact that one
+of the patterns is an example of a general rule and the other is an
+exception to that rule is irrelevant to the model. It learns a set of connections that can accommodate these two patterns, but it cannot generalize to new instances of the rule.
+This situation, we suggest, characterizes the situation that the
+language learner faces early on in learning the past tense. The child
+knows, at this point, only a few high-frequency verbs, and these tend,
+by and large, to be irregular, as we shall see below. Thus each is
+treated by the network as a separate association, and very little generalization is possible.
+But as the child learns more and more verbs, the proportion of regular verbs increases. This changes the situation for the learning model.
+Now the model is faced with a number of examples, all of which follow
+the rule, as well as a smattering of irregular forms. This new situation
+changes the experience of the network, and thus the pattern of interconnections it contains. Because of the predominance of the regular
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+231
+TABLE 4
+REPRESENTING EXCEPTIONS: WEIGHTS IN THE 8-UNIT NETWORK
+A. After 20 exposures to
+(147)-(147),(258-1257)
+12
+- 12
+12
+-12
+- 11
+13
+-11
+13
+- 11
+- 11
+-11
+-11
+12
+-12
+12
+-12
+-11
+11
+-11
+11
+-11
+-12
+-11
+-12
+12
+11
+12
+11
+-11 -13
+. -11 -13
+12
+-12
+-11
+13
+. -I1
+-11
+12
+-12
+• -11
+11
+• -11
+-12
+12
+11
+. -11
+-13
+C. After 30 more exposures to
+all 18 associations
+61 -38
+-38
+62
+-37
+-38
+-4
+-6
+- 5
+-5
+-6
+-4
+20
+-5
+-19
+-38
+-39
+62
+-6
+-4
+-6
+-6
+- 5
+62
+-38
+-38
+22
+5
+-18
+-5
+-5
+-5
+-40
+62
+-39
+-5
+5
+-4
+-4
+-3
+-38
+-38
+62
+-6
+7
+-6
+-8
+-7
+-8
+-7
+-8
+-50
+54
+- 9
+- 7
+-6
+- 8
+-7
+-7
+61
+-60
+B. After 10 more exposures to
+all 18 associations
+44-34 -26
+-2
+-10
+-32
+46
+-27
+-11
+2
+-30
+-24
+43
+-5
+-5
+-1
+-7
+-7
+45
+-34
+-8
+-3
+-3
+-31
+44
+-6
+-8
+-3
+-31
+-28
+11
+-2
+-6
+11
+-2
+-4
+-4
+-1
+-26
+-27
+42
+-6
+-9 -4 7-13
+1
+-8
+-8
+-9
+-4
+-2
+-9
+-4
+-11
+-7
+- 7
+- 7
+-10
+-35
+38
+636-42
+D. After a total of 500 exposures
+to all 18 associations
+64-39
+-39
+63
+-39
+-40
+- 5
+- 5
+- 5
+-5
+-5
+-5
+71
+-28
+-70
+27
+-39
+-39
+64
+-5
+- 5
+-5
+-29
+28
+-5
+-5
+-5
+64
+-39
+-39
+70
+-70
+-4
+-5
+-5
+-40
+63
+-39
+-28
+27
+-5
+- 5
+-5
+-39
+-39
+63
+-28
+28
+-7
+-7
+-7
+-8
+-7
+-8
+-7
+-7
+-8
+-8
+-7
+-92
+106
+91 - 106
+form in the input, the network learns the regular pattern, temporarily
+"overregularizing" exceptions that it may have previously learned.
+Our illustration takes this situation to an extreme, perhaps, to illustrate the point. For the second stage of learning, we present the model
+with the entire set of eighteen input patterns consisting of one active
+unit from (1 2 3), one from (45 6), and one from (78). All of these
+patterns are regular except the one exception already used in the first
+stage of training.
+At the end of 10 exposures to the full set of 18 patterns, the model
+has learned a set of connection strengths that predominantly captures
+the "regular pattern." At this point, its response to the exceptional pattern is worse than it was before the beginning of Phase 2; rather than
+getting the right output for Units 7 and 8, the network is now regularizing it.
+The reason for this behavior is very simple. All that is happening is
+that the model is continually being bombarded with learning experiences directing it to learn the rule of 78. On only one learning trial out
+of 18 is it exposed to an exception to this rule.
+
+232 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+In this example, the deck has been stacked very strongly against the
+exception. For several learning cycles, it is in fact quite difficult to tell
+from the connections that the model is being exposed to an exception
+mixed in with the regular pattern. At the end of 10 cycles, we can see
+that the model is building up extra excitatory connections from input
+Units 1 and 4 to output Unit 7 and extra inhibitory strength from Units
+1 and 4 to Unit 8, but these are not strong enough to make the model
+get the right answer for output Units 7 and 8 when the (1 47) input
+pattern is shown. Even after 40 trials (panel C of Table 4), the model
+still gets the wrong answer on Units 7 and 8 for the (1 4 7) pattern
+more than half the time. (The reader can still be checking these assertions by computing the net input to each output unit that would result
+from presenting the (1 4 7) pattern.)
+It is only after the model has reached the stage where it is making
+very few mistakes on the 17 regular patterns that it begins to accommodate to the exception. This amounts to making the connection from
+Units 1 and 4 to output Unit 7 strongly excitatory and making the connections from these units to output Unit 8 strongly inhibitory. The
+model must also make several adjustments to other connections so that
+the adjustments just mentioned do not cause errors on regular patterns
+similar to the exceptions, such as (15 7), (24 7), etc. Finally, in
+panel D, after a total of 500 cycles through the full set of 18 patterns,
+the weights are sufficient to get the right answer nearly all of the time.
+Further improvement would be very gradual since the network makes
+errors so infrequently at this stage that there is very little opportunity
+for change.
+It is interesting to consider for a moment how an association is
+represented in a model like this. We might be tempted to think of the
+representation of an association as the difference between the set of
+connection strengths needed to represent a set of associations that
+includes the association and the set of strengths needed to represent the
+same set excluding the association of interest. Using this definition, we
+see that the representation of a particular association is far from invariant. What this means is that learning that occurs in one situation (e.g.,
+in which there is a small set of unrelated associations) does not necessarily transfer to a new situation (e.g., in which there are a number of
+regular associations). This is essentially why the early learning our
+illustrative model exhibits of the (1 4 7) → (1 4 7) association in the
+context of just one other association can no longer support correct performance when the larger ensemble of regular patterns is introduced.
+Obviously, the example we have considered in this section is highly
+simplified. However, it illustrates several basic facts about pattern associators. One is that they tend to exploit regularity that exists in the
+mapping from one set of patterns to another. Indeed, this is one of the
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+233
+main advantages of the use of distributed representations. Second, they
+allow exceptions and regular patterns to coexist in the same network
+Third, if there is a predominant regularity in a set of patterns, this can
+swamp exceptional patterns until the set of connections has been
+acquired that captures the predominant regularity. Then further, gradual tuning can occur that adjusts these connections to accommodate
+both the regular patterns and the exception. These basic properties of
+the pattern associator model lie at the heart of the three-stage acquisition
+process, and account for the gradualness of the transition from
+Stage 2 to Stage 3.
+Featural Representations of Phonological Patterns
+The preceding section describes basic aspects of the behavior of the
+pattern associator model and captures fairly well what happens when a
+pattern associator is applied to the processing of English verbs, following a training schedule similar to the one we have just considered for
+the acquisition of the rule of 78. There is one caveat, however: The
+input and target patterns-the base forms of the verbs and the correct
+past tenses of these verbs-must be represented in the model in such a
+way that the features provide a convenient basis for capturing the regularities embodied in the past-tense forms of English verbs. Basically,
+there were two considerations:
+• We needed a representation that permitted a differentiation of
+all of the root forms of English and their past tenses.
+• We wanted a representation that would provide a natural basis
+for generalizations to emerge about what aspects of a present
+tense correspond to what aspects of the past tense.
+A scheme which meets the first criterion, but not the second, is the
+scheme proposed by Wickelgren (1969). He suggested that
+words
+should be represented as sequences of context-sensitive phoneme units,
+which represent each phone in a word as a triple, consisting of the
+phone itself, its predecessor, and its successor. We call these triples
+Wickelphones. Notationally, we write each Wickelphone as a triple of
+phonemes, consisting of the central phoneme, subscripted on the left
+by its predecessor and on the right by its successor. A phoneme occurring at the beginning of a word is preceded by a special symbol (#)
+standing for the word boundary; likewise, a phoneme occurring at the
+
+234 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+end of a word is followed by #. The word / kat/, for example, would be
+represented as #ka, kay, and
+a*# Though the Wickelphones in a word
+are not strictly position specific, it turns out that (a) few words contain
+more than one occurrence of any given Wickelphone, and (b) there are
+no two words we know of that consist of the same sequence of Wickelphones. For example, / slit/ and / silt/ contain no Wickelphones in
+common.
+One nice property of Wickelphones is that they capture enough of
+the context in which a phoneme occurs to provide a sufficient basis for
+differentiating between the different cases of the past-tense rule and for
+characterizing the contextual variables that determine the subregularities among the irregular past-tense verbs. For example, the word-final
+phoneme that determines whether we should add /d/, / t/ or / ^d/ in
+forming the regular past. And it is the sequence iN# which is
+transformed to aN# in the ing → ang pattern found in words like sing.
+The trouble with the Wickelphone solution is that there are too many
+of them, and they are too specific. Assuming that we distinguish 35
+different phonemes, the number of Wickelphones would be 353
+42,875, not even counting the Wickelphones containing word boundaries. And, if we postulate one input unit and one output unit in our
+model for each Wickelphone, we require rather a large connection
+matrix (4.3 x 10ª squared, or about 2x 109) to represent all their possible connections.
+Obviously, a more compact representation is required. This can be
+obtained by representing each Wickelphone as a distributed pattern of
+activation over a set of feature detectors. The basic idea is that we
+represent each phoneme, not by a single Wickelphone, but by a pattern
+of what we call Wickelfeatures. Each Wickelfeature is a conjunctive, or
+context-sensitive, feature, capturing a feature of the central phoneme, a
+feature of the predecessor, and a feature of the successor.
+Details of the Wickelfeature representation. For concreteness, we
+will now describe the details of the feature coding scheme we used. It
+contains several arbitrary properties, but it also captures the basic principles of coarse, conjunctive coding described in Chapter 3. First, we
+will describe the simple feature representation scheme we used for coding a single phoneme as a pattern of features without regard to its
+predecessor and successor. Then we describe how this scheme can be
+extended to code whole Wickelphones. Finally, we show how we
+"blur" this representation, to promote generalization further.
+To characterize each phoneme, we devised the highly simplified
+feature set illustrated in Table 5. The purpose of the scheme was (a) to
+give as many of the phonemes as possible a distinctive code, (b) to
+allow code similarity to reflect the similarity structure of the phonemes
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+235
+TABLE S
+CATEGORIZATION OF PHONEMES ON FOUR SIMPLE DIMENSIONS
+Interrupted
+Stop
+Nasal
+Cont. Consonant
+Fric.
+Liq/SV
+Vowel
+High
+Low
+Front
+V/L
+U/s
+b
+m
+P
+v/D
+w/l
+f/T
+-
+E
+e
+Place
+Middle
+V/L
+U/S
+d
+n
+I
+a/a
+Back
+V/L
+U/S
+g
+N
+Z/j
+S/C
+h
+U
+W
+*/o
+Key: N = ng in sing; D = th in the; T = th in with; Z = z in azure; S = sh in ship;
+C = ch in chip; E
+= ee in beet; i = i in bit; O = oa in boat; " = u in bur or schwa;
+U = 00 in boot; u = 00 in book; A = ai in bait; e = e in bet; I = i_e in bite;
+a = a in bat; a = a in father: W = ow in cow; * = aw in saw; o = o in hot.
+in a way that seemed sufficient for our present purposes, and (c) to
+keep the number of different features as small as possible.
+The coding scheme can be thought of as categorizing each phoneme
+on each of four dimensions. The first dimension divides the phonemes
+into three major types: interrupted consonants (stops and nasals), continuous consonants (fricatives, liquids, and semivowels), and vowels.
+The second dimension further subdivides these major classes. The
+interrupted consonants are divided into plain stops and nasals; the continuous consonants
+into fricatives and sonorants (liquids and
+semivowels are lumped together; and the vowels into high and low.
+The third dimension classifies the phonemes into three rough places of
+articulation-front, middle, and back. The fourth subcategorizes the
+consonants into voiced vs. voiceless categories and subcategorizes the
+vowels into long and short.
+As it stands, the coding scheme gives
+identical codes to six pairs of phonemes, as indicated by the duplicate
+entries in the cells of the table. A more adequate scheme could easily
+be constructed by increasing the number of dimensions and/or values
+on the dimensions.
+Using the above code, each phoneme can be characterized by one
+value on each dimension. If we assigned a unit for each value on each
+dimension, we would need 10 units to represent the features of a single
+phoneme since two dimensions have three values and two have two
+
+236
+values. We could then indicate the pattern of these features that
+corresponds to a particular phoneme as a pattern of activation over the
+10 units.
+Now, one way to represent each Wickelphone would simply be to use
+three sets of feature patterns: one for the phoneme itself, one for its
+predecessor, and one for its successor. To capture the word-boundary
+marker, we would need to introduce a special eleventh feature. Thus,
+the Wickelphone #*a can be represented by
+1(000) (00) (000) (00) 1]
+| (100) (10) (001) (01) 0]
+[ (001) (01) (010) (01) 0]
+Using this scheme, a Wickelphone could be represented as a pattern of
+activation over a set of 33 units.
+However, there is one drawback with this. The representation is not
+sufficient to capture more than one Wickelphone at a time.
+If we add
+another Wickelphone, the representation gives us no way of knowing
+which features belong together.
+We need a representation, then, that provides us with a way of determining which features go together. This is just the job that can be
+done with detectors for Wickelfeatures-triples of features, one from
+the central phoneme, one from the predecessor phoneme, and one
+from the successor phoneme.
+Using this scheme, each detector would be activated when the word
+contained a Wickelphone containing its particular combination of three
+features. Since each phoneme of a Wickelphone can be characterized
+by 11 features (including the word-boundary feature) and each Wickelphone contains three phonemes, there are 11 × 11 × 11 possible Wickelfeature detectors. Actually, we are not interested in representing
+phonemes that cross word boundaries, so we only need 10 features for
+the center phoneme.
+Though this leaves us
+with a fairly reasonable number of units
+(11 ×10 × 11 or 1,210), it is still large by the standards of what will
+easily fit in available computers. However, it is possible to cut the
+number down still further without much loss of representational capacity since a representation using all 1,210 units would be highly redundant; it would represent each feature of each of the three phonemes 16
+different times, one for each of the conjunctions of that feature with
+one of the four features of one of the other phonemes and one of the
+four features of the other.
+To cut down on this redundancy and on the number of units
+required, we simply eliminated all those Wickelfeatures specifying
+values
+on two different dimensions of the predecessor and the
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE 237
+successor phonemes. We kept all the Wickelfeature detectors for all
+combinations of different values on the same dimension for the predecessor and successor phonemes. It turns out that there are 260 of these
+(ignoring the word-boundary feature), and each feature of each
+member of each phoneme triple is still represented four different times.
+In addition, we kept the 100 possible Wickelfeatures combining a
+preceding word-boundary
+feature with any feature of the main
+phoneme and any feature of the successor; and the 100 Wickelfeatures
+combining a following word boundary feature with any feature of the
+main phoneme and any feature of the successor. All in all then, we
+used only 460 of the 1,210 possible Wickelfeatures.
+Using this representation, a verb is represented by a pattern of
+activation over a set of 460 Wickelfeature units. Each Wickelphone
+activates 16 Wickelfeature units. Table 6 shows the 16 Wickelfeature
+units activated by the Wickelphone Am, the central Wickelphone in
+the word came. The first Wickelfeature is turned on whenever we have
+a Wickelphone in which the preceding contextual phoneme is an interrupted consonant, the central phoneme is a vowel, and the following
+phoneme is an interrupted consonant. This Wickelfeature is turned on
+for the Wickelphone kAm since /k/ and /m/, the context phonemes,
+are both interrupted consonants and / Al, the central phoneme, is a
+vowel. This same Wickelfeature would be turned on in the
+TABLE 6
+THE SIXTEEN WICKELFEATLRES FOR THE WICKELPHONE, Am
+Feature
+Preceding Context Central Phoneme
+Following Context
+1
+2
+Interrupted
+Back
+Stop
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13
+15
+16
+Unvoiced
+Interrunted
+Back
+Stop
+Unvoiced
+Interrupted
+Back
+Stop
+Unvoiced
+Interrupted
+Back
+Stop
+Unvoiced
+Vowel
+Vowel
+Vowel
+Vowel
+Front
+Front
+Front
+Front
+Low
+Low
+Low
+Low
+Long
+Long
+Long
+Long
+Interrupted
+Front
+Nasal
+Voiced
+Vowel
+Front
+Nasal
+Voiced
+Interrupted
+Front
+Nasal
+Voiced
+Vowel
+Front
+Nasal R
+Voiced
+
+238
+representation of b'd pt ma
+'p. and many other Wickelfeatures. Similarly, the sixth Wickelfeature listed in the table will be turned on whenever the preceding phoneme is made in the back, and the central and
+following phonemes are both made in the front. Again, this is turned
+on because / k/ is made in the back and / A/ and /m/ are both made in
+the front. In addition to kAm this feature would be turned on for the
+Wickelphones giv, gAp, kAp, and others. Similarly, each of the sixteen
+Wickelfeatures stands for a conjunction of three phonetic features and
+occurs in the representation of a large number of Wickelphones.
+Now, words are simply lists of Wickelphones. Thus, words can be
+represented by simply turning on all of the Wickelfeatures in any Wickelphone of a word. Thus, a word with three Wickelphones (such as
+came, which has the Wickelphones #ka, kAm, and "m#) will have at
+most 48 Wickelfeatures turned on. Since the various Wickelphones
+may have some Wickelfeatures in common, typically there will be less
+than 16 times the number of Wickelfeatures turned on for most words.
+It is important to note the temporal order is entirely implicit in this
+representation. All words, no matter how many phonemes in the word,
+will be represented by a subset of the 460 Wickelfeatures.
+Blurring the Wickelfeature representation. The representational
+scheme just outlined constitutes what we call the primary representation
+of a Wickelphone. In order to promote faster generalization, we
+further blurred the representation. This is accomplished by turning on,
+in addition to the 16 primary Wickelfeatures, a randomly selected subset of the similar Wickelfeatures, specifically, those having the same
+value for the central feature and one of the two context phonemes.
+That is, whenever the Wickelfeature for the conjunction of phonemic
+features f1, f2, and f3 is turned on, each Wickelfeature of the form
+< ?f2f3 > and <ff? > may be turned on as well. Here "?" stands
+for "any feature." This causes each word to activate a larger set of
+Wickelfeatures, allowing what is learned about one sequence of
+phonemes to generalize more readily to other similar but not identical
+sequences.
+To avoid having too much randomness in the representation of a particular Wickelphone, we turned on the same subset of additional Wickelfeatures each time a particular Wickelphone was to be represented.
+Based on subsequent experience with related models (see Chapter 19),
+we do not believe this makes very much difference.
+There is a kind of trade-off between the discriminability among the
+base forms of verbs that the representation provides and the amount of
+generalization. We need a representation which allows for rapid generalization while at the same time maintains adequate discriminability.
+We can manipulate this factor by manipulating the probability p that
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+239
+any one of these similar Wickelfeatures will be turned on. In our simulations we found that turning on the additional features with fairly high
+probability (9) led to adequate discriminability while also producing
+relatively rapid generalization.
+Although the model is not completely immune to the possibility that
+two different words will be represented by the same pattern, we have
+encountered no difficulty decoding any of the verbs we have studied.
+However, we do not claim that Wickelfeatures necessarily capture all
+the information needed to support the generalizations we might need to
+make for this or other morphological processes. Some morphological
+processes might require the use of units that were further differentiated
+according to vowel stress or other potential distinguishing characteristics. All we claim for the present coding scheme is its sufficiency for
+the task of representing the past tenses of the 500 most frequent verbs
+in English and the importance of the basic principles of distributed,
+coarse (what we are calling blurred), conjunctive coding that it
+embodies (see Chapter 3).
+Summary of the Structure of the Model
+In summary, our model contained two sets of 460 Wickelfeature
+units, one set (the input units) to represent the base form of each verb
+and one set (the output units) to represent the past-tense form of each
+verb.
+The model is tested by typing in an input phoneme string, which is
+translated by the fixed encoding network into a pattern of activation
+over the set of input units. Each active input unit contributes to the
+net input of each output unit, by an amount and direction (positive or
+negative) determined by the weight on the connection between the
+input unit and the output unit. The output units are then turned on or
+off probabilistically, with the probability increasing with the difference
+between the net input and the threshold, according to the logistic
+activation function. The output pattern generated in this way can be
+compared with various alternative possible output patterns, such as the
+correct past-tense form or some other possible response of interest, or
+can be used to drive the decoder network described in the Appendix.
+The model is trained by providing it with pairs of patterns, consisting
+of the base pattern and the target, or correct, output. Thus, in accordance with common assumptions about the nature of the learning situation that faces the young child, the model receives only correct input
+from the outside world. However, it compares what it generates internally to the target output, and when it gets the wrong answer for a
+
+240
+particular output unit, it adjusts the strength of the connection between
+the input and the output units so as to reduce the probability that it will
+make the same mistake the next time the same input pattern is
+presented. The adjustment of connections is an extremely simple and
+local procedure, but it appears to be sufficient to capture what we know
+about the acquisition of the past tense, as we shall see in the next
+section.
+THE SIMULATIONS
+The simulations described in this section are concerned with demonstrating three main points:
+• That the model captures the basic three-stage pattern of acquisition.
+• That the model captures most aspects of differences in performance on different types of regular and irregular verbs.
+• That the model is capable of responding appropriately to verbs
+it has never seen before, as well as to regular and irregular
+verbs actually experienced during training.
+In the sections that follow we will consider these three aspects of the
+model's performance in turn.
+The corpus of verbs used in the simulations consisted of a set of 506
+verbs. All verbs were chosen from the Kucera and Francis (1967)
+word list and were ordered according to frequency of their gerund form.
+We divided the verbs into three classes: 10 high-frequency verbs, 410
+medium-frequency verbs, and 86 low-frequency verbs. The ten highest
+frequency verbs were: come (/k'm/), get (/get/), give (/giv/), look
+(/luk/), take (/tAk/), 80 (/go/), have (/hav/), live (/liv/), and feel
+(/ fEl/). There is a total of 8 irregular and 2 regular verbs among the
+top 10. Of the medium-frequency verbs, 334 were regular and 76 were
+irregular. Of the low-frequency verbs,
+72 were regular and 14 were
+irregular.
+The Three-Stage Learning Curve
+The results described in this and the following sections were obtained
+from a single (long) simulation run. The run was intended to capture
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+241
+approximately the experience with past tenses of a young child picking
+up English from everyday conversation. Our conception of the nature
+of this experience is simply that the child learns first about the present
+and past tenses of the highest frequency verbs; later on, learning occurs
+for a much larger ensemble of verbs, including a much larger proportion of regular forms. Although the child would be hearing present and
+past tenses of all kinds of verbs throughout development, we assume
+that he is only able to learn past tenses for verbs that he has already
+mastered fairly well in the present tense.
+To simulate the earliest phase of past-tense learning, the model was
+first trained on the 10 high-frequency verbs, receiving 10 cycles of
+training presentations through the set of 10 verbs. This was enough to
+produce quite good performance on these verbs. We take the performance of the model at this point to correspond to the performance of a
+child in Phase 1 of acquisition. To simulate later phases of learning,
+the 410 medium-frequency verbs were added to the first 10 verbs, and
+the system was given 190 more learning trials, with each trial consisting
+of one presentation of each of the 420 verbs. The responses of the
+model early on in this phase of training correspond to Phase 2 of the
+acquisition process; its ultimate performance at the end of 190 exposures to each of the 420 verbs corresponds to Phase 3. At this point,
+the model exhibits almost errorless performance on the basic 420 verbs.
+Finally, the set of 86 lower-frequency verbs were presented to the system and the transfer responses to these were recorded. During this
+phase, connection strengths were not adjusted. Performance of the
+model on these transfer verbs is considered in a later section.
+We do not claim, of course, that this training experience exactly captures the learning experience of the young child. It should be perfectly
+clear that this training experience exaggerates the difference between
+early phases of learning and later phases, as well as the abruptness of
+the transition to a larger corpus of verbs.
+However, it is generally
+observed that the early, rather limited vocabulary of young children
+undergoes an explosive growth at some point in development (Brown,
+1973). Thus, the actual transition in a child's vocabulary of verbs
+would appear quite abrupt on a time-scale of years so that our assumptions about abruptness of onset may not be too far off the mark.
+Figure 4 shows the basic results for the high frequency verbs. What
+we see is that during the first 10 trials there is no difference between
+regular and irregular verbs. However, beginning on Trial 11 when the
+410 midfrequency verbs were introduced, the regular verbs show better
+performance. It is important to notice that there is no interfering effect
+on the regular verbs as the midfrequency verbs are being learned.
+There is, however, substantial interference on the irregular verbs. This
+interference leads to a dip in performance on the irregular verbs.
+
+242
+Percent Features Correct
+1.0
+Regular
+Irregular
+0.5
+40
+1
+"Trial"
+120
+Trials
+160
+200
+FIGURE 4. The percentage of correct features for regular and irregular high-frequency
+verbs as a function of trials.
+Equality of performance between regular and irregular verbs is never
+again attained during the training period. This is the so-called U-
+shaped learning curve for the learning of the irregular past tense. Performance is high when only a few high-frequency, largely irregular
+verbs are learned, but then drops as the bulk of lower-frequency regular
+verbs are being learned.
+We have thus far only shown that performance on high-frequency
+irregular verbs drops; we have not said anything about the nature of the
+errors. To examine this question, the response strength of various possible response alternatives must be compared. To do this, we compared
+the strength of response for several different response alternatives. We
+compared strengths for the correct past tense, the present, the base ted
+and the past ted. Thus, for example with the verb give we compared
+the response strength of / gav/, /giv/, / givd/, and / gAvd/. We determined the response strengths by assuming that these response alternatives were competing to account for the features that were actually
+turned on in the output. The details of the competition mechanism,
+called a binding network, are described in the Appendix. For present
+purposes, suffice it to say that each alternative gets a score that
+represents the percentage of the total features that it accounts for. If
+two alternatives both account for a given feature, they divide the score
+for that feature in proportion to the number of features each accounts
+for uniquely. We take these response strengths to correspond roughly
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+243
+to relative response probabilities, though we imagine that the actual
+generation of overt responses is accomplished by a different version of
+the binding network, described below. In any case, the total strength of
+all the alternatives cannot be greater than 1, and if a number of
+features are accounted for by none of the alternatives, the total will be
+less than 1.
+Figure 5 compares the response strengths for the correct alternative
+to the combined strength of the regularized alternatives. * Note in the
+figure that during the first 10 trials the response strength of the correct
+alternative grows rapidly to over .5 while that of the regularized alternative drops from about .2 to 1. After the midfrequency verbs are introduced, the response strength for the correct alternative drops rapidly
+while the strengths of regularized alternatives jump up. From about
+Trials 11 through 30, the regularized alternatives together are stronger
+than the correct response. After about Trial 30, the strength of the
+correct response again exceeds the regularized alternatives and continues to grow throughout the 200-trial learning phase. By the end, the
+correct response is much the strongest with
+all other alternatives
+below 1.
+Response Strength
+1.0
+0.8
+0.6
+0.4
+0.2
+0.0
+Correct
+wown tegularized
+40
+80
+120
+Trials
+160
+200
+FIGURE 5. Response strengths for the high-frequency irregular verbs. The response
+strengths for the correct responses are compared with those for the regularized alternatives as a function of trials.
+4 Unless otherwise indicated, the regularized alternatives are considered the base ted
+and past ted alternatives. In a later section of the paper we shall discuss the pattern of
+differences between these alternatives. In most cases the base ted alternative is much
+stronger than the past + ed alternative.
+
+244
+MPSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+The rapidity of the growth of the regularized alternatives is due to
+the sudden influx of the medium-frequency verbs. In real life we
+would expect the medium-frequency verbs to come in somewhat more
+slowly so that the period of maximal regularization would have a somewhat slower onset.
+Figure 6 shows the same data in a slightly different way. In this
+case, we have plotted the ratio of the correct response to the sum of
+the correct and regularized response strengths. Points on the curve
+below the .S line are in the region where the regularized response is
+greater that the correct response. Here we see clearly the three stages.
+In the first stage, the first 10 trials of learning, performance on these
+high-frequency verbs is quite good. Virtually no regularization takes
+place. During the next 20 trials, the system regularizes and systematically makes errors on the verbs that it previously responded to
+correctly. Finally, during the remaining trials the model slowly eliminates the regularization responses as it approaches adult performance.
+In summary, then, the model captures the three phases of learning
+quite well, as well as the gradual transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3.
+It does so without any explicit learning of rules. The regularization
+is the product of the gradual tuning of connection strengths in response
+Correct/(Regularized+Correct)
+1.0
+0.8
+0.6
+0.4
+0.0
+-
+40
+1
+80
+120
+160
+200
+Trials
+FIGURE 6. The ratio of the correct response 1o the sum of the correct and regularized
+response. Points on the curve below the .5 line are in the region where the regularized
+response is greater than the correct response.
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+245
+to the
+predominantly regular correspondence exhibited by the
+medium-frequency words. It is not quite right to say that individual
+pairs are being stored in the network in any simple sense. The connection strengths the model builds up to handle the irregular forms do not
+represent these items in any separable way; they represent them in the
+way they must be represented to be stored along with the other verbs in
+the same set of connections.
+Before discussing the implications of these kinds of results further, it
+is useful to look more closely at the kinds of errors made and at the
+learning rates of the medium-frequency regular and irregular verbs.
+Learning the medium-frequency verbs. Figure 7A compares the
+learning curves for the regular verbs of high and medium frequency,
+and Figure 7B compares the learning curves for the corresponding
+groups of irregular verbs. Within only two or three trials the mediumfrequency verbs catch up with their high-frequency counterparts.
+Indeed, in the case of the irregular verbs, the medium-frequency verbs
+seem to surpass the high-frequency ones. As we shall see in the following section, this results from the fact that the high-frequency verbs
+include some of the most difficult pairs to learn, including, for example, the go/ went pair which is the most difficult to learn (aside from the
+verb be, this is the only verb in English in which the past and root form
+are completely unrelated). It should also be noted that even at this
+early stage of learning there is substantial generalization. Already, on
+Trial 11, the very first exposure to the medium-frequency verbs,
+between 65 and 75 percent of the features are produced correctly.
+Chance responding is only 50 percent. Moreover, on their first presentation, 10 percent more of the features of regular verbs are correctly
+responded to than irregular ones. Eventually, after 200 trials of learning, nearly all of the features are being correctly generated and the system is near asymptotic performance on this verb set. As we shall see
+below, during most of the learning period the difference between highand medium-frequency verbs is not important. Rather, the differences
+between different classes of verbs is the primary determiner of performance.
+We now turn to a discussion of these different types.
+Types of Regular and Irregular Verbs
+To this point, we have treated regular and irregular verbs as two
+homogeneous classes. In fact, there are a number of distinguishable
+
+246
+High & Medium Regulars
+Percent
+Features Correct
+1.0
+0.9
+0.8
+Medium Frequency
+0.6
+0.5
+-High Frequency
+40
+80
+120
+Trials
+160
+200
+High & Medium Irregulars
+Percent
+Features Correct
+1.0
+0.9
+0.8
+0.7
+Medium Frequency
+0.6
+- High Frequency
+0.5
+40
+80
+120
+Trials
+160
+1
+FIGURE 7. The learning curves for the high- and medium-frequency verbs.
+200
+types of regular and irregular verbs. Bybee and Slobin (1982) have
+studied the different acquisition patterns of the each type of verb. In
+this section we compare their results to the responses produced by our
+simulation model.
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+247
+Bybee and Slobin divided the irregular verbs into nine classes,
+defined as follows:
+I. Verbs that do not change at all to form the past tense, e.g.,
+beat, cut, hit.
+II. Verbs that change a final /d/ to /t/ to form the past tense, e.g.,
+send/sent, build / built.
+III. Verbs that undergo an internal vowel change and also add a
+final / t/ or /d/, e.g., feel| felt, lose/ lost, say/ said, tell/ told.
+IV. Verbs that undergo an internal vowel change, delete a final
+consonant, and add a final /t/ or /d/, e.g., bring/ brought,
+catch/caught.
+V. Verbs that undergo an internal vowel change whose stems end
+in a dental, e.g., bite/ bit, find | found, ride/ rode.
+VIa. Verbs that undergo a vowel change of /i/ to /a/ e.g., sing/ sang,
+drink/drank.
+VIb. Verbs that undergo an internal vowel change of /i/ or /a/ to
+/ e.g., sting/ stung, hang/hung.?
+VII. All other verbs that undergo an internal vowel change, e.g.,
+give/ gave, break/ broke.
+VIII. All verbs that undergo a vowel change and that end in a dipthongal sequence, e.g., blow/ blew, fly/flew.
+A complete listing by type of all of the irregular verbs used in our study
+is given in Table 7.
+In addition to these types of irregular verbs, we distinguished three
+categories of regular verbs: (a) those ending in a vowel or voiced consonant, which take a /d/ to form the past tense; (b) those ending in a
+voiceless consonant, which take a /t/; and (c) those ending in /t/ or
+5 Criteria from Bybee and Slobin (1982, pp. 268-269)
+6 Following Bybee and Slobin, we included buy/bought in this class even though no
+final consonant is deleted
+7 For many purposes we combine Classes Vla and Vib in our analyses.
+
+248
+Type
+High
+II
+feel
+IV
+V
+have
+make
+get
+Vla
+VIb
+VII
+VIII
+give
+take
+come
+go
+TABLE 7
+IRREGULAR VERBS
+Frequency
+Medium
+beat fit set spread
+hit cut put
+build send spend
+deal do flee tell sell
+hear keep leave sleep
+lose mean say sweep
+think buy bring
+seek teach
+meet shoot write lead
+understand sit mislead
+bleed feed stand light
+find fight read meet
+hide hold ride
+drink ring sing swim
+drag hang swing
+shake arise rise run
+become bear wear speak
+brake drive strike
+fall freeze choose
+throw blow grow
+draw fly know see
+Low
+thrust
+bid
+bend lend
+creep
+weep
+catch
+breed
+wind
+grind
+dig cling
+stick
+tear
+/d/, which take a final / ^d/ to form the past tense. The number of
+regular verbs in each category, for each of the three frequency levels, is
+given in Table 8.
+Type I: No-change verbs. A small set of English verbs require no
+change between their present- and past-tense forms. One factor common to all such verbs is that they already end in /t/ or /d/. Thus, they
+superficially have the regular past-tense form-even in the present
+tense. Stemberger (1981) points out that it is common in inflectional
+languages not to add an additional inflection to base forms that already
+appear to have the inflection. Not all verbs ending in / t/ or / d/ show
+no change between present and past (in fact the majority of such verbs
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+249
+Type
+End in dental
+End in voiceless
+consonant
+End in voiced
+consonant or
+vowe!
+TABLE 8
+NUMBER OF REGULAR VERBS OF EACH TYPE
+Frequency
+Suffix Example
+/ d/
+start
+look
+High
+0
+1
+Medium
+Low
+94
+13
+30
+/d/
+move
+176
+29
+in English do show a change between present and past tense), but there
+is a reasonably large group-the Type I verbs of Bybee and Slobin -that
+do show this trend. Bybee and Slobin (1982) suggest that children
+learn relatively early on that past-tense verbs in English tend to end in
+/t/ or /d/ and thus are able to correctly respond to the no-change verbs
+rather early. Early in learning, they suggest, children also incorrectly
+generalize this "no-change rule" to verbs whose present and past tenses
+differ.
+The pattern of performance just described shows up very clearly in
+data Bybee and Slobin (1982) report from an elicitation task with
+preschool children. In this task, preschoolers were given the presenttense form of each of several verbs and were asked to produce the
+corresponding past-tense form. They used the set of 33 verbs shown in
+Table 9.
+The results were very interesting. Bybee and Slobin found that verbs
+not ending in t/d were predominately regularized and verbs ending ir
+t/d were predominately used as no-change verbs. The number of
+occurrences of each kind is shown in Table 10. These preschool
+TABLE 9
+VERBS USED BY BYBEE & SLOBIN
+Type of Verb
+Verb List
+Regular
+walk smoke melt pat smile climb
+Vowel change
+drink break run swim throw meet shoot ride
+Vowel change + t/d
+do buy lose sell sleep help teach catch
+No change
+hit hurt set shut cut put beat
+Other
+go make build lend
+
+250 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+TABLE 10
+REGULAR AND NO CHANGE RESPONSES
+TO t/d AND OTHER VERBS
+(Dala from Bybee & Slobin, 1982)
+Verb Ending
+Regular Suffix
+No Change
+Not 1/d
+203
+34
+i/d
+42
+157
+children have, at this stage, both learned to regularize verbs not ending
+in 1/d and, largely, to leave verbs ending in i/d without an additional
+ending.
+Interestingly, our simulations show the same pattern of results. The
+system learns both to regularize and has a propensity not to add an
+additional ending to verbs already ending in t/d. In order to compare
+the simulation results to the human data we looked at the performance
+of the same verbs used by Bybee and Slobin in our simulations. Of the
+33 verbs, 27 were in the high- and medium-frequency lists and thus
+were included in the training set used in the simulation. The other six
+verbs (smoke, catch, lend, pat, hurt and shut) were either in the lowfrequency sample or did not appear in our sample at all. Therefore, we
+Will report on 27 out of the 33 verbs that Bybee and Slobin tested.
+It is not clear what span of learning trials in our simulation
+corresponds best to the level of the preschoolers in Bybee and Slobin's
+experiment. Presumably the period during which regularization is
+occurring is best. The combined strength of the regularized alternatives
+exceeds correct response strength for irregulars from about Trial 11
+through Trials 20 to 30 depending on which particular irregular verbs
+we look at. We therefore have tabulated our results over three different time ranges-Trials 11 through 15, Trials 16 through 20, and
+Trials 21 through 30. In each case we calculated the average strength
+of the regularized response alternatives and of the no-change response
+alternatives. Table 11 gives these strengths for each of the different
+time periods.
+The simulation results show clearly the same patterns evident in the
+Bybee and Slobin data. Verbs ending in t/d always show a stronger
+no-change response and a weaker regularized response than those not
+ending in t/d. During the very early stages of learning, however, the
+regularized response is stronger than the no-change response-even if
+the verb does end with t/d.
+This suggests that the generalization that
+the past tense of t/d verbs is formed by adding / ^d/ is stronger than
+the generalization that verbs ending in t/d should not have an ending
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE 251
+TABLE 11
+AVERAGE SIMULATED STRENGTHS OF
+REGULARIZED AND NO-CHANGE RESPONSES
+Time Period Verb Ending Regularized No Change
+11-15
+not 1/d
+0.44
+0.10
+i/d
+0.35
+0.27
+16-20
+not 1/d
+i/d
+0.32
+0.12
+0.25
+0.35
+21-30
+not t/d
+t/d
+0.52
+0.11
+0.32
+0.41
+added. However, as learning proceeds, this secondary generalization is
+made (though for only a subset of the t/d verbs, as we shall see), and
+the simulation shows the same interaction that Bybee and Slobin (1982)
+found in their preschoolers.
+The data and the simulations results just described conflate two
+aspects of performance, namely, the tendency to make no-change errors
+with 1/d verbs that are not no-change verbs and the tendency to make
+correct no-change responses to the t/d verbs that are no-change verbs.
+Though Bybee and Slobin did not report their data broken down by this
+factor, we can examine the results of the simulation to see whether in
+fact the model is making more no-change errors with i/d verbs for
+which this response is incorrect. To examine this issue, we return to
+the full corpus of verbs and consider the tendency to make no-change
+errors separately for irregular verbs other than Type I verbs and for regular verbs.
+Erroneous no-change responses are clearly stronger for both regular
+and irregular i/d verbs. Figure 8A compares the strength of the
+erroneous no-change responses for irregular verbs ending in t/d (Types
+Il and V) versus those not ending in t/d (Types III, I, VI, VIl, and
+VIII). The no-change response is erroneous in all of these cases.
+Note, however, that the erroneous no-change responses are stronger for
+the i/d verbs than for the other types of irregular verbs. Figure 8B
+shows the strength of erroneous no-change responses for regular verbs
+ending in t/d versus those not ending in t/d. Again, the response
+strength for the no-change response is clearly greater when the regular
+verb ends in a dental.
+We also compared the regularization responses for irregular verbs
+whose stems end in t/d with irregulars not ending in t/d. The results
+are shown in Figure 8C. In this case, the regularization responses are
+initially stronger for verbs that do not end in t/d than for those that do.
+
+252
+Irreg ending in t/d
+0.2
+Response Strength
+0.1
+0.0
+Irreg not ending in t/d
+40
+80
+120
+Trials
+160
+200
+Response Strength
+0.2
+Reg ending in t/d
+mom
+Reg not ending in t/d
+80
+120
+Trials
+160
+200
+Response
+Strength
+0.5
+0.4
+Irreg not ending in t/d
+.' IN Irreg ending in t/d
+0.0
+40
+80
+120
+Trials
+160
+200
+FIGURE 8. A: The strength of erroneous no-change responses for irregular verbs ending
+in a dental versus those not ending in a dental. B: The strength of erroneous no-change
+responses for regular verbs ending in a dental versus those not ending in a dental. C
+The strength of erroneous regularization responses for irregular verbs ending in a dental
+versus those not ending in a dental.
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+253
+Thus, we see that even when focusing only on erroneous responses, the
+system shows a greater propensity to respond with no change to t/d
+verbs, whether or not the verb is regular, and a somewhat greater tendency to regularize irregulars not ending in t/d.
+There is some evidence in the literature on language acquisition that
+performance on Type I verbs is better sooner than for irregular verbs
+involving vowel changes-Types III through VIII. Kuczaj (1978)
+reports an experiment in which children were to judge the grammaticality of sentences involving past tenses. The children were given sentences involving words like hit or hitted or ate or eated and asked
+whether the sentences sounded "silly." The results, averaged over three
+age groups from 3;4 to 9;0 years, showed that 70 percent of the
+responses to the no-change verbs were correct whereas only 31 percent
+of the responses to vowel-change irregular verbs were correct. Most of
+the errors involved incorrect acceptance of a regularized form. Thus,
+the results show a clear difference between the verb types, with performance on the Type I verbs superior to that on Type III through VIl
+verbs.
+The simulation model too shows better performance on Type 1 verbs
+than on any of the other types. These verbs show fewer errors than
+any of the other irregular verbs. Indeed the error rate on Type I verbs
+is equal to that on the most difficult of the regular verbs. Table 12
+gives the average number of Wickelfeatures incorrectly generated (out
+of 460) at different periods during the learning processes for no-change
+(i.e., Type I) irregular verbs, vowel-change (i.e., Type III-VIII) irregular verbs, regular verbs ending in t/d, regular verbs not ending in t/d,
+and regular verbs ending in i/d whose stem is a CVC (consonantvowel-consonant) monosyllable.
+The table clearly shows that
+throughout learning, tewer incorrect Wickelfeatures are generated for
+no-change verbs than for vowel-change verbs. Interestingly, the table
+TABLE 12
+AVERAGE NUMBER OF WICKELFEATURES INCORRECTLY GENERATED
+Irregular Verbs
+Regular Verbs
+Trial
+Number
+11-15
+16-20
+21-30
+31-50
+51-100
+101-200
+Type I
+Types III-VIII
+Ending in 1/d Not Ending in 1/d
+89.8
+123.9
+74.1
+57.6
+93.7
+45.5
+45.3
+82.8
+51.2
+78.2
+32.9
+34.4
+61.3
+22.9
+37.4
+26.0
+18.8
+39.0
+11.4
+12.9
+11.8
+21.5
+6.4
+7.4
+CVild
+87.3
+60.5
+47.9
+37.3
+21.5
+12.7
+
+254
+also shows that one subset of regulars are no easier than the Type I
+irregulars. These are the regular verbs which look on the surface most
+like Type 1 verbs, namely, the monosyllabic CVC regular verbs ending
+in t/d.
+These include such
+verbs as
+bat, wait, shout, head, etc.
+Although we know of no data indicating that people make more nochange errors on these verbs than on multisyllabic verbs ending in t/d,
+this is a clear prediction of our model. Essentially what is happening is
+that the model is learning that monosyllables ending in t/d sometimes
+take no additional inflection. This leads to quicker learning of the nochange verbs relative to other irregular verbs and slower learning of
+regular verbs which otherwise look like no-change verbs. It should be
+noted that the two regular verbs employed by Bybee and Slobin which
+behaved like no-change verbs were both monosyllables. It would be
+interesting to see if whether no-change errors actually occur with verbs
+like decide or devote.
+Types III-VIII: Vowel-change verbs. To look at error patterns on
+vowel-change verbs (Types III-VIII), Bybee and Slobin (1982) analyzed
+data from the spontaneous speech of preschoolers ranging from 1½ to 5
+years of age. The data came from independent sets of data collected by
+Susan Ervin-Tripp and Wick Miller, by Dan Slobin, and by Zell Greenberg. In all, speech from 31 children involving the use of 69 irregular
+verbs was studied. Bybee and Slobin recorded the percentages of regularizations for each of the various types of vowel-change verbs. Table
+13 gives the percentages of regularization by preschoolers, ranked from
+most to fewest erroneous regularizations. The results show that the
+two verb types which involve adding a t/d plus a vowel change (Types
+IIl and IV) show the least regularizations, whereas the verb type in
+which the present tense ends in a diphthong (Type VIII) shows by far
+the most regularization.
+It is not entirely clear what statistic in our model best corresponds to
+the percentage of regularizations. It will be recalled that we collected
+response strength measures for four different response types for irregular verbs. These were the correct response, the no-change response,
+the base ted regularization response, and the past ted regularization
+response. If we imagine that no-change responses are, in general, difficult to observe in spontaneous speech, perhaps the measure that would
+be most closely related to the percentage of regularizations would be
+the ratio of the sum of the strengths of the regularization responses to
+8 Though the model does not explicitly encode number of syllables, monosyllabic
+words are distinguished from multisyllabic words by the fact that the former contain no
+Wickelphones of the form Cy. There are no no-change verbs in English containing such
+Wickelphones.
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+255
+TABLE 13
+PERCENTAGE OF REGULARIZATION
+BY PRESCHOOLERS
+(Data from Bybee & Slobin, 1982)
+Percentage
+Verb Type
+VIII
+VI
+V
+VII
+III
+IV
+Example
+blew
+sang
+bit
+broke
+fell
+caught
+Regularizations
+80
+55
+34
+32
+10
+the sum of the strengths of regularization responses and the correct
+response-that is,
+(base+ed + pastted)
+(base+ed + pastted + correct)
+As with our previous simulation, it is not entirely clear what portion
+of the learning curve corresponds to the developmental level of the
+children in this group. We therefore calculated this ratio for several
+different time periods around the period of maximal overgeneralization.
+Table 14 shows the results of these simulations.
+The spread between different verb classes is not as great in the simulation as in the children's data, but the simulated rank orders show a
+TABLE 14
+STRENGTH OF REGULARIZATION RESPONSES
+RELATIVE TO CORRECT RESPONSES
+Data
+Trials
+11-15
+Trials
+16-20
+Trials
+21-30
+Average
+Trials
+11-30
+Rank
+Order
+Type Percent
+Type Ratio
+Type Ratio
+VIII
+VI
+V
+VII
+HII
+IV
+80
+55
+34
+32
+13
+10
+VIII
+VII
+VI
+V
+IV
+III
+.86
+.80
+.76
+.72
+.69
+.67
+VIII
+VII
+V
+IV
+VI
+.76
+.74
+.60
+.59
+.57
+.52
+Type Ratio
+VIII
+VII
+IV
+V
+IlI
+VI
+.61
+.61
+.48
+.46
+.44
+.40
+Type Ratio
+VIII
+VII
+V
+IV
+III
+VI
+.71
+.69
+.56
+.56
+.53
+.52
+
+256 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+remarkable similarity to the results from the spontaneous speech of the
+preschoolers, especially in the earliest time period. Type VIII verbs
+show uniformly strong patterns of regularization whereas Type III and
+Type IV verbs, those whose past tense involves adding a t/d at the end,
+show relatively weak regularization responses. Type VI and Type VII
+verbs produce somewhat disparate results.
+For Type VI verbs, the
+simulation conforms fairly closely to the children's speech data in the
+earliest time period, but it shows rather less strength for regularizations
+of these verbs in the later time periods and in the average over Trials
+11-30. For Type VII verbs, the model errs in the opposite direction:
+Here it tends to show rather greater strength for regularizations of these
+verbs than we see in the children's speech. One possible reason for
+these discrepancies may be the model's insensitivity to word frequency.
+Type VI verbs are, in fact, relatively low-frequency verbs, and thus, in
+the children's speech these verbs may actually be at a relatively earlier
+stage in acquisition than some of the more frequent irregular verbs.
+Type VII verbs are, in general, much more frequent-in fact, on the
+average they occur more than twice as often (in the gerund form) in
+the Kucera-Francis count than the Type VI verbs. In our simulations,
+all medium-frequency verbs were presented equally often and the distinction was not made. A higher-fidelity simulation including finer gradations of frequency variations among the verb types might lead to a
+closer correspondence with the empirical results. In any case, these
+verbs aside, the simulation seems to capture the major features of the
+data very nicely.
+Bybee and Slobin attribute the pattern of results they found to factors
+that would not be relevant to our model. They proposed, for example,
+that Type III and IV verbs were more easily learned because the final
+i/d signaled to the child that they were in fact past tenses so the child
+would not have to rely on context as much in order to determine that
+these were past-tense forms. In our simulations, we found these verbs
+to be easy to learn, but it must have been for a different reason since
+the learning system was always informed as to what the correct past
+tense really was. Similarly, Bybee and Slobin argued that Type VIII
+verbs were the most difficult because the past and present tenses were
+so phonologically different that the child could not easily determine
+that the past and present tenses of these verbs actually go together.
+Again, our simulation showed Type VIII verbs to be the most difficult,
+but this had nothing to do with putting the past and present tense
+together since the model was always given the present and past tenses
+together.
+Our model, then, must offer a different interpretation of Bybee and
+Slobin's findings. The main factor appears to be the degree to which
+the relation between the present and past tense of the verb is
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+257
+idiosyncratic. Type VIII verbs are most difficult because the relationship between base form and past tense is most idiosyncratic for these
+verbs. Thus, the natural generalizations implicit in the population of
+verbs must be overcome for these verbs, and they must be overcome
+in a different way for each of them. A very basic aspect of the mapping
+from present to past tense is that most of the word, and in particular
+everything up to the final vowel, is unchanged. For regular verbs, all
+of the phonemes present in the base form are preserved in the past
+tense.
+Thus,
+verbs that make changes to the base form are going
+against the grain more than those that do not; the larger the changes,
+the harder they will be to learn. Another factor is that past tenses of
+verbs generally end in /t/ or /d/.
+Verbs that violate the basic past-tense pattern are all at a disadvantage in the model, of course, but some suffer less than others because
+there are other verbs that deviate from the basic pattern in the same
+way. Thus, these verbs are less idiosyncratic than verbs such as
+80/ went, see/saw, and draw/drew which represent completely idiosyncratic vowel changes. The difficulty with Type VIII verbs, then, is simply that, as a class, they are simply more idiosyncratic than other verbs.
+Type III and IV verbs (e.g., feel/felt, catch/caught), on the other hand,
+share with the vast bulk of the verbs in English the feature that the
+past tense involves the addition of a t/d. The addition of the t/d makes
+these verbs easier than, say, Type VII verbs (e.g., come/ came) because
+in Type VII verbs the system must not only learn that there is a vowel
+change, but it must also learn that there is not an addition of t/d to the
+end of the verb.
+Type VI verbs (sing/sang, drag/drug) are interesting from this point
+of view, because they involve fairly common subregularities not found
+in other classes of verbs such as those in Type V. In the model,
+the Type VI verbs may be learned relatively quickly because of this
+subregularity.
+Types of regularization. We have mentioned that there are two distinct ways in which a child can regularize an irregular verb: The child
+can use the base ted form or the pastted form. Kuczaj (1977) has
+provided evidence that the proportion of past + ed forms increases, relative to the number of baseted forms, as the child gets older. He
+found, for example, that the nine youngest children he studied had
+more base ted regularizations than past ted regularizations whereas
+four out of the five oldest children showed more pastted than
+base ted regularizations. In this section, we consider whether our
+model exhibits this same general pattern.
+Since the base form and the
+past-tense form are identical for Type I verbs, we restrict our analysis
+of this issue to Types II through VIII.
+
+258$ PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+Figure 9 compares the average response strengths for base ted and
+past ted regularizations as a function of amount of training. The results
+of this analysis are more or less consistent with Kuczaj's findings.
+Early in learning, the baseted response alternative is clearly the
+stronger of the two. As the system learns, however, the two come
+together so that by about 100 trials the baseted and the past ted
+response alternatives are roughly equally strong. Clearly, the simulations show that the percentage of regularizations that are past ted
+increases with experience-just as Kuczaj found in children. In addition, the two curves come together rather late, consistent with the fact,
+reported by Kuczaj (1977), that these past ted forms predominate for
+the most part in children who are exhibiting rather few regularization
+errors of either type. Of the four children exhibiting more past ted
+regularizations, three were regularizing less than 12% of the time.
+A closer look at the various types of irregular verbs shows that this
+curve is the average of two quite different patterns. Table 15 shows the
+overall percentage of regularization strength due to the base ted alternative.
+It is clear from the table that the verbs fall into two general
+categories, those of Types III, IV, and VIII which have an overall
+preponderance of base ted strength (the percentages are all above 5)
+and Types II, VII, V, and VI which show an overall preponderance of
+past ted strength (the percentages are all well below 5). The major
+variable which seems to account for the ordering shown in the table is
+the amount the ending is changed in going from the base form to the
+Response Strength
+0.3
+Baseted
+0.2
+0.1
+Pastted
+0.0
+40
+1
+120
+160
+200
+Trials
+FIGURE 9. Average response strength for base ted and past ted responses for verb
+Types Il through VIII.
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+259
+TABLE 15
+PERCENTAGE OF REGULARIZATION
+STRENGTH DUE TO BASE+ ED
+Verb Type Percent base ted
+Examples
+IlI
+IV
+VIII
+Il
+VII
+V
+VI
+0.77
+sleep/slept
+0.69
+catch/caught
+0.68
+see/saw
+0.38
+spend/spent
+0.38
+come/came
+0.37
+bite/ bit
+0.26
+sing/sang
+past-tense form. If the ending is changed little, as in sing/sang or
+come/came, the past ted response is relatively stronger. If the past
+tense involves a greater change of the ending, such as see/saw, or
+sleep/slept, then the past ted form is much weaker. Roughly, the idea
+is this: To form the past ted for these verbs two operations must occur.
+The normal past tense must be created, and the regular ending must be
+appended. When these two operations involve very different parts of
+the verb, they can occur somewhat independently and both can readily
+occur. When, on the other hand, both changes occur to the same portion of the verb, they conflict with one another and a clear past ted
+response is difficult to generate. The Type II verbs, which do show an
+overall preponderance of past ted regularization strength, might seem
+to violate this pattern since it involves some change to the end in its
+past-tense form. Note, however, that the change is only a one feature
+change from /d/ to /t/ and thus is closer to the pattern of the verbs
+involving no change to the final phonemes of the verb. Figure 10A
+shows the pattern of response strengths to base ted and past ted regularizations for verb Types II, VII, V, and VI which involve relatively little change of the final phonemes from base to past form. Figure 10B
+shows the pattern of response strengths to base ted and past ted for
+verb Types III, IV, and VIII. Figure 10A shows very clearly the pattern
+expected from Kuczaj's results. Early in learning, base ted responses
+are by far the strongest. With experience the pastted response
+becomes stronger and stronger relative to the base ted regularizations
+until, at about Trial 40, it begins to exceed it.
+Figure 10B shows a different pattern. For these verbs the past ted form is weak throughout
+learning and never comes close to the base ted regularization response.
+Unfortunately, Kuczaj did not present data on the relative frequency of
+the two types of regularizations separately for different verb types.
+
+260 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+Verb Types II, V, VI and VII
+Response
+Strength
+0.3
+Baseted
+-
+0.2
+Pastted
+0.0
+80
+120
+Trials
+160
+200
+Verb Types III, IV and VIII
+Baseted
+Response Strength
+0.1
+0.0
+Pastted
+40
+80
+120
+160
+200
+FIGURE 10. A: The pattern of response strengths to base ted and past ted regularizations for verb Types II, V. VI, and VII. B: The pattern of response strengths to
+base ted and past ted for verb Types III, IV, and VIII.
+Thus for the present, this difference in type of regularization responses
+remains an untested prediction of the model.
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+261
+Transfer to Novel Verbs
+To this point we have only reported on the behavior of the system
+on verbs that it was actually taught. In this section, we consider the
+response of the model to the set of 86 low-frequency verbs which it
+never saw during training. This test allows us to examine how well the
+behavior of the model generalizes to novel verbs. In this section we
+also consider responses to different types of regular verbs, and we
+examine the
+model's performance in generating
+unconstrained
+responses.
+Overall degree of transfer. Perhaps the first question to ask is how
+accurately the model generates the correct features of the new verbs.
+Table 16 shows the percentage of Wickelfeatures correctly generated,
+averaged over the regular and irregular verbs. Overall, the performance
+is quite good. Over 90 percent of the Wickelfeatures are correctly generated without any experience whatsoever with these verbs. Performance is, of course, poorer on the irregular verbs, in which the actual
+past tense is relatively idiosyncratic. But even there, almost 85 percent
+of the Wickelleatures are correctly generated.
+Unconstrained responses. Up until this point we have always proceeded by giving the model a set of response alternatives and letting it
+assign a response strength to each one. This allows us to get relative
+response strengths among the set of response alternatives we have provided. Of course, we chose as response alternatives those which we
+had reason to believe were among the strongest. There is the possibilother, unvered alt that some ohmodel to actual way one ome
+put of the model is really doing at specifying correct past tenses or
+errors of the kind that children actually make, we must allow the model
+to choose among all possible strings of phonemes
+To do this, we implemented a second version of the binding network.
+This version
+is also described in the Appendix.
+Instead of a
+TABLE 16
+PROPORTION OF WICKELFEATURES
+CORRECTLY GENERATED
+Regular
+Irregular
+Overall
+.92
+.84
+.91
+
+262 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+competition among alternative strings, it involves a competition among
+individual Wickelphone alternatives, coupled with mutual facilitation
+between mutually compatible Wickelphones such as #ka and kAm?
+The results from the free-generation test are quite consistent with
+our expectations from the constrained alternative phase, though they
+did uncover a few interesting aspects of the model's performance that
+we had not anticipated. In our analysis of these results we have considered only responses with a strength of at least .2. Of the 86 test
+verbs, There were 65 cases in which exactly one of the alternatives
+exceeded .2. Of these, 55 were simple regularization responses, four
+were no-change responses, three involved double marking of regular
+verbs, (e.g., type was responded to with /tipt^d/), and there was one
+case of a vowel change (e.g., slip/ slept). There were 14 cases in which
+two alternatives exceeded threshold and one case in which three
+exceeded threshold. Finally, in six cases, no response alternative
+exceeded threshold. This occurred with the regular verbs jump, pump,
+soak, warm, trail, and glare. In this case there were a number of alternatives, including the correct past-tense form of each of these verbs,
+competing with a response strength of about 1.
+Table 17 shows the responses generated for the 14 irregular verbs.
+The responses
+here are very clear. All of the above-threshold
+responses made to an irregular verb were either regularization
+responses, no-change responses (to Type 1 and V verbs as expected) or
+correct vowel-change generalizations. The fact that bid is correctly generated as the past for bid, that wept is correctly generated as the past for
+weep, and that clung is correctly generated as a past tense for cling illustrates that the system is not only sensitive to the major regular pasttense pattern, but is sensitive to the subregularities as well. It should
+also be noted that the no-change responses to the verbs grind and wind
+occurs on monosyllabic Type V verbs ending in t/d, again showing evidence of a role for this subregularity in English past-tense formation.
+Of the 72 regular verbs in our low-frequency sample, the six verbs
+mentioned above did not have any response alternatives above threshold. On 48 of the remaining 66 regular verbs, the only response
+exceeding threshold was the correct one. The threshold responses to
+the remaining 18 verbs are shown in Table 18.
+9 The major problem with this method of generating responses is that it is tremendously computer intensive. Had we used this method to generate responses throughout
+the learning phase, we estimate that it would have taken over three years of computer time
+to complete the learning phase alone! This compares to the 260 hours of computer time
+the learning phase took with the response alternatives supplied. It took about 28 hours to
+complete the response generation process in testing just the 86 low-frequency verbs used
+in this section of the study. Of course, in biological hardware, this would not be a problem since the processing would actually occur in parallel.
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+263
+TABLE 17
+THE MODEL'S RESPONSES TO UNFAMILIAR
+LOW-FREQUENCY IRREGULAR VERBS
+Verb
+Type
+Presented
+Word
+Phonetic
+Input
+Phonetic
+Response
+English
+Rendition
+III
+bid
+thrust
+bend
+lend
+creep
+weep
+/ bid/
+/Tr st/
+/bend/
+/lend/
+/ krEp/
+/WEp/
+IV
+V
+catch
+breed
+grind
+wind
+VI
+cling
+dig
+stick
+VII tear
+/kac/
+/bred/
+/grind/
+/wind/
+/ kliN/
+/ dig/
+/stik/
+/ter/
+/ bid/
+/ Trist d/
+/bend d/
+/lend d/
+/ krept/
+/wEpt/
+/wept/
+/kact/
+/bred'd/
+/grind/
+/wind/
+/ kliNd/
+(bid)
+(thrusted)
+(bended)
+(lended)
+(creeped)
+(weeped)
+(wept)
+(catched)
+(breeded)
+(grind)
+(wind)
+(clinged)
+/ digd/
+/ stikt/
+/terd/
+(clung)
+(digged)
+(sticked)
+(teared)
+Response
+Strength
+0.55
+0.57
+0.28
+0.70
+0.51
+0.34
+0.33
+0.67
+0.48
+0.44
+0.37
+0.28
+0.23
+0.22
+0.53
+0.90
+Note that for 12 of the 18 verbs listed in the table, the correct
+response is above threshold. That means that of the 66 regular verbs to
+which any response at all exceeded threshold, the correct response
+exceeded threshold in 60 cases. It is interesting to note, also, that the
+model never chooses the incorrect variant of the regular past tense. As
+shown in Table 8, verbs ending in a /t/ or /d/ take / ^d/ in the past
+tense; verbs ending in unvoiced consonants take / t/, and verbs ending
+in vowels or voiced consonants take /d/. On no occasion does the
+model assign a strength greater than .2 an incorrect variant of the past
+tense. Thus, the model has clearly learned the substructure of the regular correspondence and adds the correct variant to all different types
+of base forms. These results clearly demonstrate that the model acts in
+accordance with the regular pattern for English verbs and that it can
+apply this pattern with a high level of success to novel as well as familiar verbs
+In addition to the regular responses, five of the responses were nochange responses. In three cases the no-change response was to a verb
+ending in t/d. Four of the responses followed the pattern of Type III
+verbs, modifying the vowel and adding a final /t/. Thus, for example,
+
+264
+TABLE 18
+SYSTEM RESPONSES TO UNFAMILIAR LOW-FREQUENCY REGULAR VERBS
+Verb
+Type
+End in
+i/d
+Presented
+Phonetic
+Phonetic
+Word
+Input
+Response
+guard
+/gard/
+/gard/
+/gard d/
+kid
+/ kid/
+/ kid/
+/ kid'd/
+mate
+/MAl/
+/mAl^ d/
+/mad^d/
+squat
+/skw*t/
+/skw*d/
+/skw*1/
+/skw*kt/
+End in
+unvoiced
+consonant
+carp
+/karp/
+/karpt /
+/karpr d/
+drip
+/drip/
+/dript d/
+/dript/
+map
+/ map/
+/mapt d/
+/ mapt/
+shape
+/SAP/
+/SApt/
+/sipt/
+sip
+/sip/
+/sipt/
+/sept/
+slip
+smoke
+/slip/
+/smOk/
+/slept/
+/smOkt^d/
+English
+Rendition
+(guard)
+(guarded)
+(kid)
+(kidded)
+(mated)
+(maded)
+(squated)
+(squat)
+(squawked)
+(carped)
+(carpted)
+(dripted)
+(dripped)
+(mapted)
+(mapped)
+(shaped)
+(shipped)
+(sipped)
+(paddas)
+(slept)
+(smokted)
+/smOk/
+snap
+step
+type
+brown
+/snap/
+/step/
+/ tip/
+/brwn/
+/snapt d/
+/stept d/
+/trpt d/
+End in
+voiced
+consonant
+or vowel
+/ brwnd/
+/br*nd/
+hug
+mail
+/hi g/
+/ mA I/
+/hig/
+/mA^Id/
+/ memb^ Id/
+tour
+/tur/
+/turd r/
+/turd/
+(snapted)
+(stepted)
+(typted)
+(browned)
+(brawned)
+(hug)
+(mailed)
+(membled)
+(toureder)
+(toured)
+Response
+Rendition
+0.29
+0.26
+0.39
+0.24
+0.43
+0.23
+0.27
+0.22
+0.21
+0.28
+0.21
+0.28
+0.22
+0.24
+0.22
+0.43
+0.27
+0.42
+0.28
+0.40
+0.29
+0.22
+0.40
+0.59
+0.33
+0.46
+0.39
+0.59
+0.38
+0.23
+0.31
+0.25
+we have the past of sip rendered as sept, presumably on the model of
+sleep/slept, keep/kept, sweep/swept, etc. Interestingly, three of the four
+cases involved verbs whose base form ended in /p/ just as in the
+models listed above.
+Even though these last responses are, strictly
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+265
+speaking, incorrect, they all indicate a sensitivity to the regular and
+subregular patterns of the English past tense.
+Perhaps the most surprising result evident from the table is the
+occurrence of a double past marker on the responses to seven of the
+verbs. Although we know of no references to this phenomenon in the
+literature, we expect that children (and adults) do occasionally make
+this kind of error. It is interesting, and possibly significant, that all
+seven of these responses occurred to verbs whose correct past tense is
+the addition of a /t/. It would be interesting to see whether children's
+errors of this type follow a similar pattern.
+Finally, there were just four responses that involved the addition or
+modification of consonants. These were maded as a past tense of mate,
+squawked as a past tense for squat, membled as a past tense for mail, and
+toureder as a past tense for tour. It is unlikely that humans would make
+these errors, especially the last two, but these responses are, for the
+most part, near threshold. Furthermore, it seems likely that many of
+these responses could be filtered out if the model incorporated an
+auto-associative network of connections among the output units. Such
+a network could be used to clean up the output pattern and would probably increase the tendency of the model to avoid bizarre responses.
+Unfortunately, we have not yet had the chance to implement this
+suggestion.
+Summary. The system has clearly learned the essential characteristics of the past tense of English. Not only can it respond correctly to
+the 460 verbs that it was taught, but it is able to generalize and transfer
+rather well to the unfamiliar low-frequency verbs that had never been
+presented during training. The system has learned about the conditions
+in which each of the three regular past-tense endings are to be applied,
+and it has learned not only the dominant, regular form of the past
+tense, but many of the subregularities as well.
+It is true that the model does not act
+as a perfect rule-applying
+machine with novel past-tense forms. However, it must be noted that
+people-or at least children, even in early grade-school years-are not
+perfect rule-applying machines either. For example, in Berko's classic
+(1958) study, though her kindergarten and first-grade subjects did often
+produce the correct past forms of novel verbs like spow, mott, and rick,
+they did not do so invariably. In fact, the rate of regular past-tense
+forms given to Berko's novel verbs was only 51 percent!° Thus, we see
+10 Unfortunately, Berko included only one regular verb to compare to her novel verbs.
+The verb was melt. Children were 73 percent correct on this verb.
+The two novel verbs
+that required the same treatment as melt (molt and bodd) each received only 33 percent
+correct responses.
+
+266
+little reason to believe that our model's "deficiencies" are significantly
+greater than those of native speakers of comparable experience.
+CONCLUSIONS
+We have shown that our simple learning model shows, to a remarkable degree, the characteristics of young children learning the morphology of the past tense in English. We have shown how our model generates the so-called U-shaped learning curve for irregular verbs and that
+it exhibits a tendency to overgeneralize that is quite similar to the pattern exhibited by young children. Both in children and in our model,
+the verb forms showing the most regularization are pairs such as
+know/knew and see/ saw, whereas those showing the least regularization
+are pairs such as feel|felt and catch/caught. Early in learning, our
+model shows the pattern of more no-change responses to verbs ending
+in t/d whether or not they are regular verbs, just as young children do.
+The model, like children, can generate the appropriate regular pasttense form to unfamiliar verbs whose base form ends in various consonants or vowels. Thus, the model generates an / ^d/ suffix for verbs
+ending in t/d, a / t/ suffix for verbs ending in an unvoiced consonant,
+and a /d/ suffix for verbs ending in a voiced consonant or vowel.
+In the model, as in children, different past-tense forms for the same
+word can coexist at the same time. On rule accounts, such transitional
+behavior is puzzling and difficult explain. Our model, like human children, shows an relatively larger proportion of past ted regularizations
+in learning. Our model, like learners of English, will sometimes
+generate past-tense forms to novel verbs which show sensitivities to the
+subregularities of English as well as the major regularities. Thus, the
+past of cring can sometimes be rendered crang or crung. In short, our
+simple learning model accounts for all of the major features of the
+acquisition of the morphology of the English past tense.
+In addition to our ability to account for the major known features of
+the acquisition process, there are also a number of predictions that the
+model makes which have yet to be reported. These include:
+• We expect relatively more past + ed regularizations to irregulars
+whose correct past form does not involve a modification of the
+final phoneme of the base form.
+• We expect that early in learning, a no-change response will
+occur more frequently to a CVC monosyllable ending in t/d
+than to a more complex base verb form.
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+267
+• We expect that the double inflection responses (/dript d/) will
+occasionally be made by native speakers and that they will
+occur more frequently to verbs whose stem is ends in /p/ or
+/k/.
+The model is very rich and there are many other more specific predictions which can be derived from it and evaluated by a careful analysis
+of acquisition data.
+We have, we believe, provided a distinct alternative to the view that
+children learn the rules of English past-tense formation in any explicit
+sense. We have shown that a reasonable account of the acquisition of
+past tense can be provided without recourse to the notion of a "rule" as
+anything more than a description of the language. We have shown that,
+for this case, there is no induction problem. The child need not figure
+out what the rules are, nor even that there are rules. The child need
+not decide whether a verb is regular or irregular. There is no question
+as to whether the inflected form should be stored directly in the lexicon
+or derived from more general principles. There isn't even a question
+(as far as generating the past-tense form is concerned) as to whether a
+verb form is one encountered many times or one that is being generated for the first time. A uniform procedure is applied for producing
+the past-tense form in every case. The base form is supplied as input
+to the past-tense network and the resulting pattern of activation is
+interpreted as a phonological representation of the past form of that
+verb. This is the procedure whether the verb is regular or irregular,
+familiar or novel.
+In one sense, every form must be considered as being derived. In
+this sense, the network can be considered to be one large rule for generating past tenses from base forms. In another sense, it is possible to
+imagine that the system simply stores a set of rote associations between
+base and past-tense forms with novel responses generated by "on-line"
+generalizations from the stored exemplars.
+Neither of these descriptions is quite right, we believe. Associations
+are simply stored in the network, but because we have a superpositional
+memory, similar patterns blend into one another and reinforce each
+other. If there were no similar patterns (i.e., if the featural representations of the base forms of verbs were orthogonal to one another) there
+would be no generalization. The system would be unable to generalize
+and there would be no regularization. It is statistical relationships
+among the base forms themselves that determine the pattern of
+responding. The network merely reflects the statistics of the featural
+representations of the verb forms.
+We chose the study of acquisition of past tense in part because the
+phenomenon of regularization is an example often cited in support of
+
+268 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+the view that children do respond according to general rules of
+language. Why otherwise, it is sometimes asked, should they generate
+forms that they have never heard? The answer we offer is that they do
+so because the past tenses of similar verbs they are learning show such
+a consistent pattern that the generalization from these similar verbs
+outweighs the relatively small amount of learning that has occurred on
+the irregular verb in question. We suspect that essentially similar ideas
+will prove useful in accounting for other aspects of language acquisition. We view this work on past-tense morphology as a step toward a
+revised understanding of language knowledge, language acquisition, and
+linguistic information processing in general.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+This research was supported by ONR Contracts N00014-82-C-0374, NR
+667-483 and N00014-79-C-0323, NR 667-437, by a grant from the System Development Foundation, and by a Research Scientist Career
+Development Award MH00385 to the second author from the National
+Institute of Mental Health.
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+269
+APPENDIX
+One important aspect of the Wickelfeature representation is that it
+completely suppressed the temporal dimension. Temporal information
+is stored implicitly in the feature pattern. This gives us a representational format in which phonological forms of arbitrary length can be
+represented.
+It also avoids an a priori decision as to which part of the
+verb (beginning, end, center, etc.) contains the past-tense inflection.
+This grows out of the learning process. Unfortunately, it has its negative side as well. Since phonological forms do contain temporal information, we need to have a method of converting from the Wickelfeature representation into the time domain-in short, we need a
+decoding network which converts from the Wickelfeature representation to either the Wickelphone or a phonological representational format. Since we have probabilistic units, this decoding process must be
+able to work in the face of substantial noise. To do this we devised a
+special sort of decoding network which we call a binding network.
+Roughly speaking, a binding network is a scheme whereby a number of
+units compete for a set of available features-finally attaining a strength
+that is proportional to the number of features the units account for.
+We proceed by first describing the idea behind the binding network,
+then describing its application to produce the set of Wickelphones
+implicit in the Wickelfeature representation, and finally to produce the
+set of phonological strings implicit in the Wickelfeatures.
+Binding Networks
+The basic idea is simple.
+Imagine that there are a set of input
+features and a set of output features. Each output feature is consistent
+with certain of the input features, inconsistent with certain other of the
+input features, and neutral about still other of the input features. The
+idea is to find a set of output features that accounts for as many as possible of the output features while minimizing the number of input
+features accounted for by more than one output feature. Thus, we
+want each of the output features to compete for input features.
+The
+more input features it captures, the stronger its position in the competition and the more claim it has on the features it accounts for.
+Thus
+consider the case in which the input features are Wickelfeatures and the
+output features are Wickelphones. The Wickelphones compete among
+one another for the available Wickelfeatures. Every time a particular
+Wickelphone "captures" a particular Wickelfeature, that input feature no
+
+270 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+longer provides support for other Wickelphones. In this way, the system comes up with a set of more or less nonoverlapping Wickelphones
+which account for as many as possible of the available Wickelfeatures.
+This means that
+if two Wickelphones have many Wickelfeatures in
+common (e.g., km and «Am) but one of them accounts for more
+features than the other, the one that accounts for the most features will
+remove nearly all of the support for the very similar output feature
+which accounts for few if any input features uniquely. The binding network described below has the property that it two output units are competing for a set of input features, each will attain a strength proportional to the number of input features uniquely accounted for by that
+output feature divided by the total number of input features uniquely
+accounted for by any output feature.
+This is accomplished by a network in which each input unit has a
+fixed amount of activation (in our case we assumed that it had a total
+activation value of 1) to be distributed among the output units consistent with that input feature. It distributes its activation in proportion
+to the strength of the output feature to which it is connected. This is
+thus a network with a dynamic weight. The weight from input unit j to
+output unit i is thus given by
+a;
+Eak,
+where k; ranges over the set of output units consistent with input units
+j. The total strength of output unit k at time t is a linear function of
+its inputs at time t- 1 and is thus given by
+9к (1) =21, Wkia (1) =
+(1 - 1)
+where jk ranges over the set of input features consistent with output
+feature k, lik ranges over the set of output features consistent with
+input feature jk, and i, takes on value 1 if input feature j is present and
+is O otherwise.
+We used the binding network described above to find the set of
+Wickelphones which gave optimal coverage to the Wickelfeatures in the
+input. The procedure was quite effective. We used as the set of output
+all of the Wickelphones that occurred anywhere in any of the 500 or so
+verbs we studied. We found that the actual Wickelphones were always
+the strongest when we had 80 percent or more of the correct Wickelfeatures.
+Performance dropped off as the percentage of correct
+
+18. LEARNING THE PAST TENSE
+271
+Wickelfeatures dropped. Still when as few as 50 percent of the Wickelfeatures were correct, the correct Wickelphones were still the strongest
+most of the time. Sometimes, however, a Wickelphone not actually in
+the input would become strong and push out the "correct" Wickelphones.
+If we added the constraint that the Wickelphones must fit
+together to form an entire string (by having output features activate
+features that are consistent neighbors), we found that more than 60
+percent of correct Wickelfeatures lead to the correct output string more
+than 90 percent of the time.
+The binding network described above is designed for a situation in
+which there is a set of input features that is to be divided up among a
+set of output features. In this case, features that are present, but not
+required for a particular output feature play no role in the evaluation of
+the output feature. Suppose, however, that we have a set of alternative
+output features, one of which is supposed to account for the entire pattern. In this case, input features that are present, but not consistent,
+with a given output feature must count against that output feature.
+One solution to this is to have input units excite consistent output units
+according the the rule given above and to inhibit inconsistent output
+units. In the case in which we tried to construct the entire phonological
+string directly from a set of Wickelfeatures we used the following
+activation rule:
+ак (1) = Ді, "кік 11) - Ек
+where I indexes the input features that are inconsistent with output
+feature k. In this case, we used as output features all of the strings of
+less than 20 phonemes which could be generated from the set of Wickelphones present in the entire corpus of verbs. This is the procedure
+employed to produce responses to the lowest frequency verbs as shown
+in Tables 17 and 18.
+
+CHAPTER 19
+Mechanisms of Sentence Processing:
+Assigning Roles to Constituents of Sentences
+J. L. McCLELLAND and A. H. KAWAMOTO
+MULTIPLE CONSTRAINTS ON ROLE ASSIGNMENT
+Like many natural cognitive processes, the process of sentence
+comprehension involves the simultaneous consideration of a large
+number of different sources of information. In this chapter, we consider one aspect of sentence comprehension: the assignment of the
+constituents of a sentence to the correct thematic case roles. Case role
+assignment is not, of course, all there is to comprehension, but it
+reflects one important aspect of the comprehension process, namely,
+the specification of who did what to whom.
+Case role assignment is not at all a trivial matter either, as we can see
+by considering some sentences and the case roles we assign to their
+constituents. We begin with several sentences using the verb break:
+(1) The boy broke the window.
+(2) The rock broke the window.
+(3) The window broke.
+(4) The boy broke the window with the rock.
+(5) The boy broke the window with the curtain.
+We can see that the assignment of case roles here is quite complex.
+The first noun phrase (NP) of the sentence can be the Agent (Sentences 1, 4, and 5), the Instrument (Sentence 2), or the Patient
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+273
+(Sentence 3). The NP in the prepositional phrase (PP) could be the
+Instrument (Sentence 4), or it could be a Modifier of the second NP,
+as it is in at least one reading of Sentence S. Another example again
+brings out the ambiguity of the role assignment of with-NPs:
+(6) The boy ate the pasta with the sauce.
+(7) The boy ate the pasta with the fork.
+In (6) the with-NP clearly does not specify an Instrument, but in (7) it
+clearly does.
+Before we go much further, it should be said that there is no universally accepted set of case roles, nor universal agreement as to the
+correct assignment of constituents to roles. We have adopted conventions close to those originally introduced by Fillmore (1968) in "The
+Case for Case," but we do not think the details are of crucial importance to the behavior of our model. Later we will suggest ways in
+which an extension of our model might circumvent certain of the difficulties involved in specifying the correct assignment of cases.
+These complications aside, it appears from the examples that the
+meaning of the words in these sentences influences the assignment of
+arguments to roles. However, the placement of NPs within the sentences is also very important. Consider these two cases:
+(8) The vase broke the window.
+(9) The window broke the vase.
+Here we must rely on word-order constraints. That such constraints are
+very strong in English can be seen from sentences like:
+(10) The pencil kicked the cow.
+Even though semantic constraints clearly would indicate that the cow is
+a much more likely Agent and the pencil a much more likely Patient,
+Sentence 10 simply is not given this interpretation by adult readers who
+are native speakers of English.
+Word-order constraints like those illustrated by (10) are very strong
+in English, but it is important to realize that such heavy reliance on
+such constraints is not universal. Bates and MacWhinney (in press;
+MacWhinney, Bates, & Kliegl, 1984) have shown that adult speakers of
+Italian will assign roles to sentences like (10) based predominantly on
+semantic constraints; ' word order plays a very limited role and
+¡ We use the phrase "semantic constraints" to refer to the constraints language users
+impose on the co-occurrence of constituents in particular roles in case-level representations. In the model, as we shall see, these constraints arise from the co-occurrences of
+constituents in the experiences the model is exposed to.
+
+274 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+determines assignment only when semantics and case-marking inflections give no information.
+As the work of Bates and MacWhinney amply demonstrates, case
+role assignment is influenced by at least three different kinds of factors:
+word order, semantic constraints, and (when available) inflectional
+morphology. Reliance on any one of these constraints is a matter of
+degree, and varies from language to language. In addition to these factors, there is one more that cannot be ignored, namely, the more global
+context in which the sentence is presented. Consider, for example,
+Sentence 11:
+(11) The boy saw the girl with the binoculars.
+We get one reading if prior context tells us "A boy was looking out the
+window, trying to see how much he could see with various optical
+instruments." We get quite a different one if it says "Two girls were
+trying to identify some birds when a boy came along. One girl had a
+pair of binoculars and the other did not." Crain and Steedman (1985)
+have experimentally demonstrated contextual influences on parsing
+decisions.
+While the fact that word order and semantic constraints both influence role assignment has often been acknowledged (Bever, 1970;
+Fodor, Bever, & Garrett, 1974), there are few existing models that go
+very far toward proposing a mechanism to account for these effects.
+However, there are some researchers in language processing who have
+tried to find ways of bringing semantic considerations into syntactic processing in one way or another. One recent approach has been to rely
+on the lexicon to influence both syntactic processing and the construction of underlying functional representations (Ford, Bresnan, & Kaplan,
+1982; Kaplan & Bresnan, 1982; MacWhinney & Sokolov, in press).
+Ford et al. (1982) considered cases like the following:
+(12) The woman wanted the dress on the rack.
+(13) The woman positioned the dress on the rack.
+They noted that the preferred reading of the first of these had on the
+rack as a modifier of the dress, while the preferred reading of the
+second had on the rack as a locative argument of positioned. To account
+for this difference in role assignment, they proposed two principles:
+(a) lexical preference and (b) final arguments. Basically, lexical preference establishes an expected argument structure (e.g., Subject-Verb-
+Object in the case of want; Subject-Verb-Object-Prepositional Object in
+the case of positioned) by consulting an ordered list of possible argument structures associated with each verb. If a constituent is
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING l
+275
+encountered that could fill a slot in the expected argument structure,
+the constituent is treated as an argument of the verb. However, if a
+constituent is encountered that appears to satisfy the conditions on the
+final argument of the expected argument structure, its attachment is
+delayed to allow for the incorporation into the constituent of subsequent constituents. Thus, with want, the NP the dress is a candidate for
+final argument and is not attached directly as a constituent of the VP;
+rather, a superordinate NP structure containing the dress on the rack is
+ultimately attached to the VP. With position, however, the dress would
+not be the final argument, and so is attached directly to the VP and
+closed. On the rack is then available for attachment as the final argument to the VP.
+While this scheme certainly does some of the work that needs to be
+done in allowing the constraints imposed by the words in a sentence to
+influence role assignment, we do not think it goes nearly far enough.
+For as we saw in Sentences 4-7, the NPs of a sentence also influence
+syntactic decisions. Oden (1978) has verified that all three NPs in sentences like these influence subjects' role-assignment decisions.
+In the literature on sentence processing, no one disputes that various
+factors influence the final reading that is assigned to a sentence. However, there are various views of the way in which these factors are
+taken into account on-line. Kurtzman (1985) argues that the parsing
+process is directly guided by an ongoing plausibility analysis; Marslen-
+Wilson and Tyler (1981) have pioneered this sort of view, and they
+stress the immediacy with which syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic
+considerations can all be brought to bear on the course of sentence processing. On the other hand, Frazier and her colleagues (e.g., Frazier &
+Rayner, 1982; Rayner, Carlson, & Frazier, 1983) argue that the syntactic parser imposes its preferred structuring on the sentence based only
+on syntactic considerations, passing the results of this processing on
+quickly to a thematic interpreter that can reject the syntactic parse in
+favor of a thematically more appropriate reading.
+Whichever view one holds, it is clear that a mechanism is needed in
+which all the constituents of a sentence can work simultaneously to
+influence the assignment of roles to constituents.
+While we ourselves
+tend to favor a highly interactive view, the model we will describe here
+takes as its input a partial surface parse (though it is one that leaves
+certain attachment decisions unspecified) and generates from it a caselevel representation. Intended extensions of the model, which we will
+describe below, would incorporate feedback to the syntactic structure
+level; but most of the model's behavior is not dependent on this feedback, and so readers committed to a less interactive view of the relation
+between syntactic and thematic analyses may yet find the model to be
+of interest.
+
+276
+GOALS
+The primary goal of our model is to provide a mechanism that can
+begin to account for the joint role of word order and semantic constraints on role assignment. We wanted the model to be able to learn
+to do this based on experience with sentences and their case representations. We wanted the model to be able to generalize what it learned to
+new sentences made up of novel combinations of words.
+In addition, we had several other goals for the model:
+• We wanted the model to be able to select contextually appropriate readings of ambiguous words.
+• We wanted the model to select the appropriate verb frame
+based on the pattern of arguments and their semantic features.
+• We wanted the model to fill in missing arguments in incomplete sentences with plausible default values.
+• We wanted the model to be able to generalize its knowledge of
+correct role assignment to sentences containing a word it has
+never seen before, given only a specification of some of the
+semantic properties of the word.
+The model succeeded in meeting all these goals, as we shall see.
+The model also exhibits an additional property that we had not actually anticipated, even though it is a central characteristic of language
+understanding:
+The model exhibits an uncanny tendency to shade its
+representation of the constituents of a sentence in ways that are contextually appropriate. It does this without any explicit training to do so; in
+fact, it does this in spite of the fact that the training inputs it receives
+are not contextually shaded as they would be in reality. We will examine this aspect of the model's behavior through examples, and observe
+how it emerges naturally from the model's structure.
+The model is, of course, very far from a complete or final model of
+sentence processing or even case role assignment. Perhaps it is best
+seen as a partial instantiation of one view of what some properties of
+the interface between syntactic and more conceptual levels of language
+representation might be like. We offer the model not because it "solves
+the problem of sentence comprehension." Rather, we offer it because it
+suggests new ways of thinking about several aspects of language and
+language representation. The simulation model that embodies these
+ideas will undoubtedly require substantial development and elaboration.
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+277
+It is our belief, though, that the basic principles that it embodies will
+prove extremely valuable as cognitive science continues to try to come
+to grips with the problem of understanding natural language.
+We have limited the model in several ways. Most importantly, we
+have considered only single clause sentences.
+We have also considered
+only a limited set of roles and a limited vocabulary. Since we have
+restricted the analysis to English, case inflectional morphology does not
+arise. Within these bounds, we will see that we have been able to meet
+the goals of the model quite successfully, using a very simple PDP
+architecture.
+Previous, Related Work
+Both Cottrell (1985; Cottrell & Small, 1983) and Waltz and Pollack
+1985) have preceded us in noting the appeal of connectionism as a
+means of exploiting the multiple constraints that appear to influence
+both case role assignment and the contextual disambiguation of ambiguous noun phrases. Their models differ from ours in several ways,
+most notably in that both rely primarily on local representations (oneunit-one-concept as opposed to distributed representations, although
+Waltz and Pollack (1985) do suggest ways that a distributed representation could be used to represent global contextual influences on word
+meaning disambiguation. Within the context of distributed models,
+ours builds on the work of J. A. Anderson
+(1983) and Kawamoto
+(1985): Both models show how context can be used to select the
+appropriate reading of an ambiguous word. Our work incorporates
+mechanisms quite like theirs to accomplish this and other goals.
+Finally, Hinton's (1981a) early discussion of the use of distributed
+representations to represent propositions played an important role in
+the development of the ideas described here.
+ARCHITECTURE OF THE MODEL
+The role-assignment model is a distributed model, and has many
+properties in common with the verb learning model described in
+Chapter 18.
+The model consists of two sets of units: one for
+representing
+the surface structure of the sentence and one for
+representing its case structure. The model learns through presentations
+of correct surface-structure/case-structure pairs; during testing, we simply present the surface-structure input and examine the output the
+model generates at the case-structure level.
+
+278
+Sentences. The sentences processed by the model consist of a verb
+and from one to three NPs. There is always a Subject NP, and optionally there may be an Object NP. If this is present, there may also be a
+with-NP; that is, a NP in a sentence-final prepositional phrase beginning
+with the word with. All of the numbered sentences considered in the
+introduction are examples of sentence types that might be presented to
+the model.
+Input format of sentences. What the model actually sees as input is
+not the raw sentence but a canonical representation of the constituent
+structure of the sentence, in a form that could be produced by a simple
+surface parser and a simple lexicon. Such a parser and lexicon are not,
+in fact, parts of the model in its present form-the sentences are simply
+presented to the model in this canonical format. We discuss ways such
+a parser could be implemented in a PDP model in the discussion
+section.
+Semantic Microfeatures
+In the canonical input format, words are represented as lists of
+semantic microfeatures (Hinton, 198la; see Chapter 3; Waltz & Pollack, 1985, also make some use of a microfeature representation). For
+both
+nouns and verbs, the features are grouped into several dimensions. Each dimension consists of a set of mutually exclusive values,
+and, in general, each word is represented by a vector in which one and
+only one value on each dimension is ON for the word and all of the
+other values are OFF. Values that are set to be ON are represented in
+the feature vectors as 1s. Values that are set to be OFF are represented
+as dots (".").
+We chose the dimensions and the values on each dimension to capture what we felt were important dimensions of semantic variation in
+the meanings of words that had implications for the role assignments of
+the words. We should be very clear about one point, though, which is
+that we do not want to suggest that the full range of the phenomena
+that are described under the rubric of the "meanings" of the words are
+captured by these semantic microfeatures. Indeed, we do not think of
+words as actually having some fixed meaning at all. Exactly how we
+do think of meanings will become clear after we examine the behavior
+of the model, so we postpone a fuller consideration of this issue until
+the discussion.
+The full set of dimensions used in the feature sets are given in
+Table 1. The noun dimensions are largely self-explanatory, but the
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+279
+HUMAN
+SOFTNESS
+GENDER
+FEATURE DIMENSIONS AND VALUES
+Nouns
+human nonhuman
+soft hard
+male female neuter
+small medium large
+VOLUME
+FORM
+POINTINESS
+BREAKABILITY
+OBJ-TYPE
+DOER
+CAUSE
+TOUCH
+NAT_CHNG
+AGT_MYMT
+PT_MVMT
+INTENSITY
+compact I-D 2-D 3-D
+pointed rounded
+fragile unbreakable
+food toy tool utensil furniture
+animate nat-inan
+Verbs
+yes no
+yes no-cause no-change
+agent inst both none AisP
+pieces shreds chemical none
+unused
+trans part none NA
+trans part none NA
+low high
+Note: nat-inan = natural inanimate, AisP = Agent is Patient,
+NA = not applicable.
+different dimensions of the verbs may need some explication. Basically, these dimensions are seen as capturing properties of the scenario
+specified by the verb. Thus, the DOER dimension indicates whether
+there is an Agent instigating the event. The CAUSE dimension specifies whether the verb is causal. If not, it indicates whether this is
+because there is no cause specified (as in the case of the window broke)
+or whether it is because there is no change (as in the case of the boy
+
+280
+touched the girl). The TOUCH dimension indicates whether the Agent,
+the Instrument, both, or neither touches the Patient; the "AisP" value
+simply indicates that the Agent and the Patient are the same (as in the
+cat moved). The NAT_CHNG dimension specifies the nature of the
+change that takes place in the Patient. The AGT_MVMT and
+PI_MVMT specify the movement of the Agent and the Patient, respectively; and INTENSITY simply indicates the forcefulness of the action.
+The labels given to the dimensions are, of course, only for reference;
+they were chosen so that each noun or verb dimension would have a
+unique first letter that could be used to designate the dimension.
+It must be stressed that we are not strongly wedded to this particular
+choice of features, and that other features would need to be included to
+extend the model to larger sets of nouns and verbs. On the other hand,
+the features that we did include were carefully chosen because they
+seemed highly relevant to determining the case role assignments. For
+example, the DOER dimension directly specifies whether there is or is
+not an Agent. Thus, the features of the verb, in particular, often have
+direct case-structural implications. (We would prefer a model that constructed its own semantic microfeatures using back propagation
+[Chapter 8] or a related method for learning, but this extension has not
+yet been implemented.)
+Figures 1 and 2 give the vectors that we assigned to each of the
+words used in the model. It will be immediately noted that some of
+our encoding decisions were arbitrary, and that sometimes we seem to
+be forcing words into molds that they do not perfectly fit. Further,
+each feature has the same weight as all the others, and is as definite as
+all the others. Reality is not nearly so definite or evenhanded, of
+course. Balls are round, but may be soft or hard; paperweights are generally compact in shape but need not be, etc. The definiteness of the
+input used in the simulations is a simplification that we have adopted to
+make the initial coding of the input patterns as straightforward as possi-
+A more realistic coding would allow some features to be more
+definite than others.
+We will see that the model tends to correct this
+deficiency on its own accord.
+One of our goals for the model is to show how it can select the contextually appropriate meaning for an ambiguous word. For ambiguous
+words (bat, flying or baseball, and chicken, living or cooked) the input
+pattern is the average of the feature patterns of each of the two readings of the word. This means that in cases where the two agree on the
+value of a particular input dimension, that dimension has the agreed
+value in the input representation. In cases where the two disagree, the
+feature has a value of .5 (represented by "?") in the input representation. A goal of the simulations is to see if the model can correctly fill
+in these unspecified values, effectively retrieving the contextually
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+281
+HU
+1
+ball
+fl-bat
+bb-bat
+bat
+boy
+paperwi
+cheese
+li-chicken
+co-chicken
+chicken
+SO
+1
+?
+?
+GND
+1
+VOL
+FORM
+1
+PO
+BR
+?
+?.
+?
+1
+OBJ_TYP
+.1
+.... l
+?
+. 1
+.1
+?
+????
+?
+.?
+girl
+hatchet
+hammer
+man
+woman
+plate
+rock
+potato
+pasta
+spoon
+carrot
+vase
+window
+dog
+wolf
+sheep
+lion
+1
+1
+1
+1..
+1..
+. 1
+1
+1
+. 1
+.. 1
+FIGURE 1. The nouns used in the model and their features. For ambiguous noun constiluents, the correct, fully specified reading was used in specifying what the case role
+representation of the constituent should be, but the underspecified, ambiguous forms
+were used in the sentence-level input representation. See text for a full discussion.
+appropriate missing values in the process of assigning the word to the
+appropriate case role. Figure 1 indicates both "full" readings of bat and
+chicken, as well as the ambiguous forms used as inputs.?
+Another goal for the model is to show how it can select the contextually appropriate reading of a verb. This is handled in much the same
+2 For the concept food, which is taken to be the implied Patient in sentences like The
+boy ate, no particular shape seems appropriate. Therefore the intended output representation is assumed to be unspecified (as indicated by the "?") for all values on the shape
+dimension. For all other dimensions, food has what we take to be the typical values for
+foods.
+
+282
+ate
+ateAVP
+ate AVPI
+ateAVF
+broke
+brokeAVPI
+brokeAVP
+broke|VP
+brokePV
+hit
+hitAVPI
+hitAVP
+hitiVP
+moved
+movedAVP
+movedAVS
+movedPV
+DO
+1.
+1
+1.
+•1.
+CAU
+1
+TOUCH N_CHG
+A_MV
+1
+.. 1
+.. 1
+.. 1..
+. 1
+1
+..1... 1
+.. 1.
+1
+P MV
+IN
+1.
+1
+1.
+1..
+1.
+1..
+. 1.
+. 1
+1...
+. 1...
+1
+. 1 ...
+. 1...
+1.
+1.
+7....
+1
+....
+r
+1
+. 1..
+.. 1
+1..
+.. 1
+. 1
+• 1
+1
+1
+. 1
+... 1. ...1
+..1. .1
+1
+. 1
+. 1
+. 1....1.
+11. i
+. 1. 1.
+1
+... 1. ...1
+...
+touched
+1...1.1... ...1. .1......1..1....1.
+touchedAVPI
+1. 1
+. 1...
+1.
+.1..
+..1.
+touchedAVP
+..11..
+touchedIVP. 1
+..1.1...
+.1..
+.1.
+.. T.
+...1.
+. 1.
+FIGURE 2. The verbs used in the model and their microfeature representations. The
+forms followed by strings of uppercase letters (e.g., AVPI) represent the alternative
+feature patterns that the model must choose between as its way of specifying the contextually appropriate reading of the verb. These alternative feature patterns correspond to
+the semantic features of the verb appropriate for particular configurations of case roles, as
+indicated by the uppercase letters: A = Agent, V = Verb, P = Patient, I = Instrument,
+M = Modifier, S = Self, F = implied Food. The position of the letter indicates the
+position of the corresponding constituent in the input sentence. The patterns given with
+the generic verb unadorned by uppercase letters were used in the sentence-level, input
+representations.
+way as noun ambiguity resolution. The different readings are
+represented by (potentially) different sets of semantic microfeatures;
+for example, the Agent/No-Instrument reading of broke (brokeAVP)
+involves
+contact between
+the Agent
+and the Patient, while the
+Instrument/No-Agent version (brokeIVP) and the Agent/ Instrument
+version (brokeAVPI) involve contact between the Instrument and the
+Patient. The input representation of the features of a given verb is the
+same, regardless of context, and the task given to the model is to
+activate the set of features for the sentence-appropriate version. Rather
+than use the average pattern based on all of the different possible readings of the verb, we used a "generic" pattern for each verb, which is
+the pattern for what we took to be the verb's most typical case frame.
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+283
+This is indicated in Figure 2 by the pattern of features next to the plain
+verb. 3
+The feature patterns corresponding to the different case frames the
+model must choose among are indicated on the lines in the table following its generic pattern. (The labels on these lines are used simply to
+designate the feature patterns. They indicate the roles the various arguments in the surface structure of the sentence play. Thus, brokeAVPI
+specifies the case frame in which the surface subject is the Agent, the
+surface object is the Patient, and the with-NP is the Instrument.) Note
+that the microfeatures of two different readings of the same verb may
+or may not differ, depending on whether the features of the scenario do
+or do not change in different case frames.
+The feature vectors for the constituents of the sentence The boy
+broke the window with the hammer are shown just below the corresponding constituents at the top of Figure 3. Note that these are displayed in
+the order: Verb, Subject NP, Object NP, and With-NP. The row of
+letters below the feature vectors indicates the first letter of the name of
+the dimension on which each feature represents a value. For example,
+the first two elements of the verb feature vector are labeled d for the
+DOER dimension; the first two values of each of the three noun
+feature vectors are labeled h for the HUMAN dimension.
+Sentence-structure units. The sentence-structure level representation
+of an input sentence is not actually the set of constituent feature vectors; rather, it is the pattern of activation these vectors produce over
+units that correspond to pairs of features. These units are called
+sentence-structure (SS) units. 4
+3 The different handling of nouns and verbs is not a principled distinction, but an
+exploration of two endpoints on a continuum ranging from underspecification of the
+input for ambiguous words to complete specification of an input representation, regardless of the fact that the features used in the case role representation will differ as a function of context. Perhaps the idea that the features will be altered as a function of context
+is the best way of putting things in this case. We imagine that the true state of affairs is
+intermediate between these two extremes, for both nouns and verbs. In any case, the
+model does not have any prior commitment to the idea that the features in the input
+representation should be preserved in the output representation; the full prespecification
+simply gives the model a fuller description to work from, thereby allowing greater differentiation of the different verbs.
+4 An alternative name for these units would be "surface-structure" units, to indicate
+that they do not capture the notion of underlying subject, object, etc. However, we have
+chosen the term "sentence-structure" because, for present purposes, the information they
+capture is not even a full surface-structure parse of the sentence; in particular, it does not
+specify the attachment of the with-NP.
+
+284
+1?
+3333:
+.?.
+
+.??
+?.?. ?...?....?.?.?
+?.?.?...?....?.?.?
+.?.т
+21?1
+?.?..?
+?.?..?.?.
+.?.?
+?.?.
+?.?
+.?.?
+?1?1
+?1?1??1
+?.?..?
+?.?..?
+
+• ?.?..??
+.. T
+3:3..3:3:3
+3. 3:3
+•Et.1.z
+nhssgggvwuffff000b000c
+1..
+.1.1.1
+brOKenUE: AGENT
+.1.
+boy
+nnssgggwvffffp0bbo00o...oo
+1.1..1.
+1.
+brokenval
+rnss88guuuf114p0bb00000o.
+........
+window
+brokenue INSTRUMENT naane
+h/tss888/WW711100610000000
+MODIFIER
+hammer
+FIGURE 3. The top line of this figure displays the constituents of the sentence The boy
+broke the window with the hammer in the order: Verb, Subject NP, Object NP, and With-
+NP. Below these are the microfeatures of each constituent, and below these are conjunctive sentence-structure units for each constituent. Below the horizontal line are the
+blocks of case-structure units for the Agent, Patient, Instrument, and Modifier roles.
+Below these is an indication of the pattern of noun features the model is activating for
+each siot (represented by the vertical black bars), followed by a representation of the
+microfeatures of the correct filler of each slot. The last line gives the label of the correct
+head (verb frame or modified NP) and tail (slot filler) for each slot. See text for further
+explanation.
+Each SS unit represents the conjunction of two microfeatures of the
+filler of a particular surface role. Since there are four sentencestructure roles, there are four sets of SS units. Within each set there is
+a unit that stands for the conjunction of every microfeature value on
+each dimension with every microfeature value on every other dimension. For example, for nouns there are units for:
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+285
+HUMAN = yes / GENDER = male
+SOLIDITY = hard / BREAKABILITY = fragile
+among many others; for the verb, one of the units corresponds to
+DOER = yes / TOUCH = instrument
+(i.e., there is a doer-the Instrument touches the Patient).
+The sentence-structure units are displayed in Figure 3 in four roughly
+triangular arrays. The verb array is separated from the arrays for the
+three NPs to indicate that different features are conjoined in the verb
+and NP representations.
+Each array contains the conjunctive units for the constituent immediately above it. There is a unit wherever there is a 1, a"?"
+', or a "'"
+Within each array, the units are laid out in such a way that the column
+a unit is in indicates one of the microfeatures that it stands for, and the
+row it is in indicates the other microfeature. Rows and columns are
+both ordered in the same way as the microfeature vectors at the top of
+the figure. The dimensions are indicated by the row of letters across
+the top of each array and along the left (for the verb units) or right (for
+the three sets of NP units). Note that the set of units in each array fills
+less than half of each block for two reasons. First, there are only
+In (n - 1)]/ 2 distinct pairs of n features; second, pairs of values on the
+same dimension are not included.
+We considered various schemes for activating the sentence-structure
+units. One possible scheme would be to use a strict deterministic
+activation rule, so that a particular SS unit would be turned on only if
+both of the features the unit stands for were on in the feature vector.
+This use of the SS units would allow the model to learn to respond in a
+finely tuned way to particular conjunctions of microfeatures. However,
+we wished to see how well the model could function using an
+inherently noisy input representation. Furthermore, as discussed in
+Chapter 18, we knew that generalization is facilitated when units that
+only partially match the input have some chance of being activated. In
+the present case, we considered it important to be able to generalize to
+words with similar meanings. Therefore, the SS units were treated as
+stochastic binary units, like the units used in Chapter 18. Each SS unit
+received excitatory input from each of the two features that it stands
+for, and we set the bias and variance of the units so that when both of
+a SS unit's features were active, the unit came on with probability. 85;
+and when neither was active, it came on with probability .15. These
+cases are represented in the figure by "1" and "."
+, respectively. Units
+receiving one excitatory input came on with probability .S; these units
+are represented in Figure 3 by "?"
+
+286
+The use of the SS units in conjunction with these particular activation
+assumptions means that the input representation the model must use as
+the basis for assigning words to case roles is both noisy and redundant.
+Each feature of the input is represented in the activation of many of
+the SS units, and no one of these is crucial to the representation. A
+drawback of these particular activation assumptions, however, is that
+they do not allow the model to learn to respond to specific conjunctions
+of inputs. While the model does well in our present simulations, we
+presume that simulations using a larger lexicon would require greater
+differentiation of some of the noun and verb representations. To handle such cases, we believe it would be necessary to allow tuning of the
+input connections to the SS units via back propagation (Chapter 8) so
+that greater differentiation can be obtained when necessary. In principle, also, higher-order conjunctions of microfeatures might sometimes
+be required. Our use of broadly tuned, pair-wise conjunctive units
+illustrates the style of representation that we think is appropriate for the
+input, but the present version is only an approximation to what we
+would expect a model with a tunable input representation to build for
+itself.
+Case role representation. The case role representation takes a
+slightly different form than the sentence-structure representation. To
+understand this representation, it is useful to drop back to a more
+abstract viewpoint, and consider more generally how we might
+represent a structural description in a distributed representation. In
+eneral, structure dese i in an be represented bys
+description, and R stands for the relation between the nodes. For
+example, a class-inclusion hierarchy can be represented by triples of the
+form (> IS-A Y), where X and Y are category names. Any other
+structural description, be it a syntactic constituent structure, a semantic
+constituent structure, or anything else, can be represented in just this
+way. Specifically, the case role assignment of the constituents of the
+sentence The boy broke the window with the hammer can be represented
+as:
+Broke Agent Boy
+Broke Patient Window
+Broke Instrument Hammer
+The constituent structure of a sentence such as The boy ate the pasta
+with the sauce would be represented by:
+Ate Agent Boy
+Ate Patient Pasta
+Pasta Modifier Sauce
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+287
+In a localist
+representation, we might represent each of these triples
+by a single unit. Each such unit would then represent the conjunction
+of a particular head or left-hand side of a triple, a particular relation,
+and a particular tail or right-hand side. Our more distributed approach
+is to allocate groups of units to stand for each of the possible relations
+(or roles), namely, Agent, Patient, Instrument, and Modifier, and to
+have units within each group stand for conjunctions of microfeatures of
+the first and third arguments (the head and the tail) of the triple.
+Thus, the triple is represented not by a single active unit, but by a pattern of activation over a set of units.
+In our implementation, there is a group of units for each of the four
+relations allowed in the case structure. In Figure 3, the Agent, Patient,
+Instrument, and Modifier groups are laid out from left to right. Within
+each group, individual units stand for conjunctions of one microfeature
+of the head of each relation with a microfeature of the tail of each relation. Thus, for example, Broke-Agent-Boy is represented by a pattern
+of activation over the left-most square block of units. The unit in the
+ith row and jth column stands for the conjunction of feature i of the
+verb with feature j of the noun. Thus all the units with the same verb
+feature are lined up together on the same row, while all the units with
+the same noun feature are lined up together in the same column. For
+the Modifier group, the unit in the ith row and jth column stands for
+the conjunction of feature i of the modified NP and feature j of the
+modifier NP. Letters indicating the dimension specifications of the
+units are provided along the side and bottom edges.
+The figure indicates the net input to each case role unit produced at
+the end of the training described below, in response to the sentence
+The boy broke the window with the hammer. (We will see very shortly
+how these net inputs are produced.) As before, a 1 indicates that the
+net input would tend to turn the unit on with probability (p) greater
+than or equal to .85, and a"." indicates that the net input would tend to
+turn it on with probability of .15 or less. A "+" indicates that the net
+input has a tendency to turn the unit on (.85 > p > .5), and a "-"
+indicates that the net input has a tendency to turn the unit off
+(.5 > p > 15).
+The correct case-frame interpretation of the sentence is provided to
+the model by a specification that lists, for each of the four possible case
+roles, the label corresponding to the head and tail of the role. These
+are shown below each of the four blocks of case role units. The "#" is
+used to indicate a null slot filler, as in the Modifier role in the present
+example. From this it is possible to compute which units should be on
+in the case role representation. Here we simply assume that all the
+correct conjunctions should be turned on and all other units should
+be off.
+
+288 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+In this example, the pattern of net inputs to the case role units
+corresponds quite closely to the correct case role representation of the
+sentence. The features of boy may be seen in the columns of the block
+of Agent units; the features of window in the columns of the block of
+Patient units; and the features of hammer in the columns of the block
+of Instrument units. The features of the Agent-Verb-Patient reading
+of the verb broke can be seen in the rows of each of these three sets of
+units.
+There are no features active in the fourth set of units, the
+Modifier units, because there is no Modifier in this case. In both the
+Agent and the Patient slots, the model tends to turn on (p > 5) all
+the units that should be on, and tends to turn off (p < .5) all the units
+that should be off. In the Instrument slot, there are some discrepancies; these are indicated by blackening the background for the offending
+units. All of the discrepancies are relatively mild in that the unit has
+either a weak tendency to go on when it should not (t on a black background) or to go off when it should be on (- on a black background).
+Several things should be said about the case-frame representations.
+The first thing is that the slots should not be seen as containing lexical
+items. Rather, they should be seen as containing patterns that specify
+some of the semantic properties assigned by the model to the entities
+designated by the words in the sentences. Thus, the pattern of feature
+values for the verb break specifies that in this instance there is contact
+between the Instrument and the Patient. This would also be the case in
+a sentence like The hammer broke the window. However, in a sentence
+like The boy broke the window, with no Instrument specified, the pattern
+of feature values specifies contact between the Agent and the Patient.
+Thus, the verb features provide a partial description of the scenario
+described by the sentence. The noun features, likewise, provide a partial description of the players (to use Fillmore's analogy) in the
+scenario, and these descriptions, as we will see later on, may actually be
+modulated by the model to take on attributes appropriate for the
+scenario in question.
+Details of Sentence Processing and Learning
+The model is very much like the verb learning model (Chapter 18).
+When a sentence is presented, a conventional computer program frontend determines the net input to each of the sentence-structure units,
+based on the feature vectors of the words. Each of these units is then
+turned on probabilistically, as described above. Each surface-structure
+unit has a modifiable connection to each of the case-structure units. In
+addition, each case-structure unit has a modifiable bias (equivalent to a
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+289
+connection from a special unit that is always on). Based on the
+sentence-structure pattern and the current values of the weights, a net
+input to each case-structure unit is computed; this is just the sum of
+the weights of the active inputs to each unit plus the bias term. Casestructure units take on activation values of 0 and 1, and activation is a
+probabilistic function of the net input, as in the verb learning model
+During learning, the resulting activation of each case-structure unit is
+compared to the value it should have in the correct reading of the sentence. The correct reading is supplied as a "teaching input" specifying
+which of the case role units should be on. The idea is that this teaching input is analogous to the representation a real language learner
+would construct of the situation in which the sentence might have
+occurred. Learning simply amounts to adjusting connection strengths
+to make the output generated by the model correspond more closely to
+the teaching input. As in the verb learning model, if a unit should be
+active and it is not, the weights on all the active input lines are incremented and the threshold is decremented. If a unit should not be
+active but it is, the weights on all the active output lines are decremented and the threshold is incremented. This is, of course, just the
+perceptron convergence procedure (Rosenblatt, 1962), whose strengths
+and weaknesses have been examined and relied upon throughout the
+book.
+SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
+The most important thing about the model is the fact that its
+response to new inputs is strictly dependent upon its experience. In
+evaluating its behavior, then, it is important to have a clear understanding of what it has been exposed to during learning. We have done a
+number of different experiments with the model, but we will focus primarily on one main experiment.
+The main experiment consisted of generating a corpus of sentences
+derived from the sentence frames listed in Table 2. It must be
+emphasized that these sentence frames were simply used to generate a
+set of legal sentences. Each frame specifies a verb, a set of roles, and a
+list of
+possible fillers of each role. Thus, the sentence frame The
+human broke the fragile_object with the breaker is simply a generator for
+all the sentences in which human is replaced with one of the words on
+the list of humans in Table 3, fragile_object is replaced with one of the
+words on the list of fragile objects in Table 3, and breaker is replaced
+with one of the words on the list of breakers in the table. It is clear
+that these generators do not capture all of the subtle distributional
+
+290
+GENERATORS FOR SENTENCES USED IN TRAINING AND TESTS
+Sentence Frame
+Argument Assignment
+The human ate.
+The human ate the food.
+The human ate the food with the food.
+The human ate the food with the utensil.
+The animal ate.
+The predator ate the prey.
+The human broke the fragile_object.
+The human broke the fragile_object with the breaker.
+The breaker broke the fragile_object.
+The animal broke the fragile_object.
+The fragile_object broke.
+The human hit the thing.
+The human hit the human with the possession.
+The human hit the thing with the hitter.
+The hitter hit the thing.
+The human moved.
+The human moved the object.
+The animal moved.
+The object moved.
+AVF
+AVP
+AVPM
+AVPI
+AVF
+AVP
+AVP
+AVPI
+IVP
+AVP
+PV
+AVP
+AVPM
+AVPI
+IVP
+AVS
+AVP
+AVS
+PV
+Note: Argument assignments specify the case role assignment of the constituents of
+a sentence from left to right. A = Agent, V = Verb, P = Patient, 1 = Instrument,
+M = Modifier, F = (implied) Food, S = Self.
+properties of referents in real scenarios (e.g., the model is completely
+sex and age neutral when it comes to hitting and breaking things, contrary to reality), and so we cannot expect the model to capture all these
+subtleties. However, there are certain distributional facts implicit in the
+full ensemble of sentences encompassed by the generators. For example, all the breakers but one are hard, not soft (only ball is coded as soft
+in the feature patterns); only the humans enter as Agents into scenarios
+involving Instrument use; etc.
+The "target" case-frame representations of the sentences were generated along with the sentences themselves. The case role assignments
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING 291
+human
+animal
+object
+thing
+predator
+prey
+food
+utensil
+fragile_object
+hitter
+breaker
+possession
+TABLE 3
+NOUN CATEGORIES
+man woman boy girl
+fl-bat li-chicken dog wolf sheep lion
+ball bb-bat paperwt cheese co-chicken curtain
+desk doll fork hatchet hammer plate rock
+pasta spoon carrot vase window
+human animal object
+wolf lion
+li-chicken sheep
+co-chicken cheese spaghetti carrot
+fork spoon
+plate window vase
+ball bb-bat paperwt hatchet hammer rock vase
+paperwt ball bb-bat hatchet hammer rock
+ball dog bb-bat doll hatchet hammer vase
+are indicated in Table 2 by the sequence of capital letters. These indicate the assignment of arguments from the sentences to the roles of
+Agent, Verb, Patient, Instrument, and Modifier (of the Patient). S Note
+that there are some sentences that could be generated by more than
+one generator. Thus, The boy hit the girl with the ball can be generated
+by the generator The human hit the human with the possession, in which
+case the ball is treated as a Modifier of the Patient. Alternatively, it
+may be generated by the generator The human hit the thing with the
+hitter. In this case, the ball is treated as the Instrument. Similarly, The
+bat broke the vase can be generated by The breaker broke the
+fragile_object, in which case its case-frame representation contains a
+5 Two special cases should be noted: For The human ate, the case frame contains a
+specification (F) that designates an implied Patient that is the generic food with unspecified shape, as indicated in the feature patterns displayed in Figure I. For The human
+moved and
+The animal moved, the case frame contains a specification (S) that indicates
+that there is an implied Patient who is the same as the Agent (note that the sense of the
+verb move used here involves moving oneself and not one's possessions).
+
+292 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+baseball bat serving as Instrument. The same sentence can also be generated by The animal broke the fragile_object, in which case, of course,
+its case-frame representation contains a flying bat serving as Agent.
+For the main experiment, we generated all the sentences covered by
+the generators and then selected eight of each type to use as training
+sentences. Of these we selected two to be familiar test sentences. In
+addition, we selected two additional sentences from each generator to
+be used as novel test sentences. These sentences were never used to
+train the model.
+The model was given 50 cycles of training with the set of training
+sentences. On each cycle, each sentence was
+presented, the model's
+response to it was generated, and connection strengths were adjusted
+according to the perceptron convergence procedure.
+After the 5th, 10th, 20th, 30th, 40th, and 50th training cycles, the
+model was tested on both the familiar and the novel test sentences. No
+learning occurred during the tests, so that the response to the novel test
+sentences always represented generalization from the training materials
+rather than the effects of direct experience.
+Basic Results
+Figure 4 gives a very global indication of the model's performance on
+both the familiar and the novel test sentences at each phase of testing.
+The figure indicates the average number of incorrect microfeatures produced by the model as a function of learning trials, for both the familiar and unfamiliar test sentences. There are a total of 2500 case role
+units, so on the average the model is getting over 95% correct, even
+with unfamiliar sentences, after the first 5 learning cycles, and is down
+to about 1% error at Cycle 50. However, these statistics are somewhat
+misleading, since on the whole, most of the case role units should be
+off. A more realistic indication of the absolute performance level is
+provided by the observation that between 56 and 168 of the units
+should be on in the correct case role representation of each sentence.
+In general, the errors that the model does make are about evenly distributed between sins of commission (false alarms) and sins of
+6 Some of the generators (e.g., The human hit the thing with the hitter) generate rather
+large numbers of different sentences (in this case, 756), but others (e.g., The human ate,
+The predator ate the prey) generate only very small numbers of sentences (four in each of
+these cases). The training materials contained four copies of each of two of these senlences so that even here, there were two familiar test sentences and two unfamiliar test
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+293
+Avg # Incorrect Bits
+80
+60
+novel sentences
+familiar sentences
+1
+10
+20 k
+30
+Learning Cycle
+40
+50
+FIGURE 4. Average number of incorrect microfeatures produced as a function of
+amount of learning experience (in number of cycles through the full list of training sentences).
+omission (incorrect rejections). Thus, on average, at the end of 50
+cycles, the model is turning on about 85 of the approximately 100
+microfeatures that should be on, and is turning on about 15 out of 2400
+microfeatures that should be off. This corresponds to a d'of about 3.5.
+Two things are apparent in the graph. First, there is a smooth and
+continuing improvement in performance for both familiar and unfamiliar sentences. Second, there is an advantage for sentences that the
+model has actually seen betore, but it is not particularly great. As we
+shall see, there is considerable variabılity in the model's ability to deal
+with particular sentences; only a part of it is accounted for by whether a
+particular sentence happens to be old or new.
+Figures 5 and 6 indicate the model's performance on each of the 38
+familiar and unfamiliar test sentences, at each of the six tests.
+In what follows, we will focus attention on the performance of the
+model at the end of 50 learning cycles.
+Use of Semantic and Word-Order Cues
+To assess the model's ability to make use of word-order and semantic
+cues to role assignment, we examined its performance on the verbs hit
+
+294
+FAMILIAR
+SENTENCES
+Number
+of
+Cycles
+of
+30
+Training
+40
+girl
+man
+hit
+hit
+hit
+woman
+hit
+girl
+hit
+hatchet
+hit
+hammer
+man
+woman
+girl
+fi_ bat
+dog
+doll
+desk
+moved
+moved
+moved
+moved
+moved
+moved
+moved
+Frame
+AVF
+AVF
+cheese
+pasta
+AVP
+AVP
+co_chic pasta
+AVPM
+pasta
+co chic AVPA
+pasta
+spoon
+AVPI
+co_chic fork
+AVPI
+AVF
+AVF
+1_ch1
+hee
+AVP
+AVP
+window
+AVP
+plate
+AVP
+window bb_bat
+AVPI
+plate
+hatchet
+AVPI
+vase
+IVP
+plate
+IVP•
+window
+AVP•
+plate
+PV
+PV
+pasta
+boy
+girl
+woman
+hamme r
+fl bat
+hammer
+vase
+bb_bat
+pasta
+vase
+AVP
+AVP
+AVPM*
+AVPM*
+AVPI•
+AVPI
+IVP
+IVP
+AVS
+AVS
+AVP
+plate
+pasta
+AVS•
+AVS
+PV
+PV
+83
+104
+79
+66
+122
+97
+148
+93
+FIGURE 5. Number of microfeature errors for each familiar sentence, after 5, 10, 20,
+30, 40, and 50 cycles through the set of training stimuli. Sentences are written in SVOW
+(W = with-NP) order to facilitate reading; the column labeled "Verb Frame" indicates
+the role assignments of these arguments. The * indicates a sentence that is ambiguous in
+terms of the set of generators used, in that it could have been generated in two different
+ways. Recall that ambiguous words (bat, chicken) are ambiguously specified in the input;
+it is the job of the model to select the contextually appropriate reading.
+and break. In the case of break, constraints are very important; in the
+case of hit, role assignment is sometimes determined by word order
+alone.
+The dog broke the plate, the hammer broke the vase, and the window broke. The verb break can take its Instrument, its Agent, or even
+its Patient as its Subject. In the first two cases (as in The dog broke the
+plate and The hammer broke the vase), it is only the semantic properties
+of the subject that can tell us whether it is Agent or Instrument.
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+295
+UNFAMILIAR SENTENCES
+Number of Cycles of Training
+26
+18
+50
+6
+co
+boy
+carrot
+pasta
+fork
+fork
+45
+34
+boy
+man
+boy
+11 r
+girl
+carrot
+boy
+hammer
+woman
+doll
+rock
+suntain talk
+AVP*
+AVP
+AVP
+hatchet
+AVP
+ball
+AVPI
+AVPI
+IVP
+IVP
+PV
+PV
+AVP
+AVP
+AUPM*
+AVPM
+AVPI
+AVPI
+IVP*
+IVP
+girl
+moved
+boy
+girl
+moved
+moved
+man
+moved
+wolf
+sheep
+moved
+moved
+hatchet moved
+paperat moved
+hammer
+window
+AVP
+AVP
+AVS
+AVS
+PV
+PV
+FIGURE 6. Number of missed features in output for each unfamiliar sentence, after
+10, 20,30, 40, and 50 cycles of training. See previous caption for conventions.
+These two sentences happened to be among the unfamiliar test sentences generated by the generators The animal broke the fragile_object
+and The breaker broke the fragile _object.' The patterns of activity produced by the model in response to each of these two sentences are
+shown in Figures 7 and 8. We can see that in the case of The dog broke
+the plate, there is a strong pattern of activation over the Agent units,
+while in the case of The hammer broke the vase, there is a strong pattern
+of activation over the Instrument units. In fact, the pattern of activation over the Agent units in the first case corresponds closely to the
+co Ar the instrument unis,
+expected target pattern for brokeAVP-agent-dog, and the pattern of
+" The others were The bat broke the vase and The ball broke the vase.
+tences will be discussed later.
+Each of these sen-
+
+296
+311?
+?.?.
+19999
+?.?...?...
+.......
+
+.??.?.
+??.?.
+??.?.
+?
+3?1
+.??
+3...
+?.?...?...?.
+.?.?
+?...?....?.??
+7332
+,.. 3.3.?
+.?.?.?
+.?. ?.?
+...?.?.?
+3:3:72
+:?:"
++.=.
+..+1
+M.I..I.
+.....I.i.....I.
+AGENT
+brokenve
+00g
+plate
+dog
+° 4312
+4312
+e.2277
+в.2277
+1...n
+PATIENT
+brokeriup
+plate
+8,4236
+. 8987
+2524
+9,2524
+brokenue INSTRUMENT
+plate
+MODIFIER
+FIGURE 1. Display of the state of the model after processing the sentence The dog broke
+the plate.
+activation over the Patient units in the second case corresponds closely
+to the expected target pattern for brokeIVP-instrument-hammer.
+Thus, the model has correctly assigned the word dog to be Agent in the
+first case, and the word hammer to be Instrument in the second. A
+summary display that makes the same point is shown below the case
+role representations in Figures 7 and 8, and is repeated, for these and
+other sentences, in Figure 9.
+The summary display indicates in histogram form the features of the
+right-hand side of the triple stored in the corresponding block of units.
+The summary pattern for the Agent role in the sentence The dog broke
+the plate is shown below the block of Agent units in Figure 1. The pattern iust below this indicates the "correct" pattern; in this instance, this
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+297
+??
+71?1771
+?.?..?
+..?
+133
+?1?17?1133
+?..??.
+•.?.,??
+• ??
+133
+?.?.
+?.?.
+..?..
+31?1931
+.?..
+3?
+
+• 3.3.. 7?..
+
+.?..?2.
+.??.
+3233
+3333?3
+..gx.+.
++..=
+-*4.
+.1..g1.1.-
+hns5g9gVVVff1f000000000xx
+1mi.m.imini
+brokerve INSTRUMENT
+hammer
+AGENT
+brokeivr
+brokeIve
+PATIENT
+MODIFIER
+vase
+vase
+nameer
+2867
+FIGURE 8. Display of the state of the model after processing the sentence The hammer
+broke the vase.
+pattern is just the feature pattern for dog. In this case we can see that
+the pattern the model produced is very close to the correct answer.
+8 The summaries are based on average probability of activation, with the average only
+taken over the subset of units associated with a particular noun feature that is also associated with the features of the correct verb frame. Thus, for example, there are 25 units
+second column of units in each slot; the ones that indicate whether this feature holds for
+Seven of these units conjoin this feature with a feature of the verb frame brokeAVP. In
+the case of The dog broke the plate, illustrated in Figure 7, most of these units have a tendency to come on (.5 < p < .85), while two (the last two have a tendency to stay off
+(.15 < p < 5) —a tendency that is considered to be erroneous and results in these units
+lence The dog broke the plate.
+
+298
+The dos broke the plate.
+broKenuT
+dos brokeruP
+plate
+nnss9gg
+• 6:16
+9,4236
+฿.3166
+8.3166
+8.8008
+8.008в
+6.3200
+0.
+•3199
+8.0000
+0.0800
+The hammer broke the vase.
+brokeIve
+vase brokeIve
+, 0891
+3183
+:. 3061
+,3:64
+hamter
+.1..1.1.1..
+8.2828
+в.1520
+6.0218
+฿.282€
+insissin errandso
+8.e00e
+9,3197
+0.3197
+e,e00e
+The plate broke.
+brokeru
+plate
+place
+AGENT
+PATIENT
+INSTRUMENT
+MODIFIER
+FIGURE 9. Summary of the activations produced on the case role units by the sentences
+The dog broke the plate, The hammer broke the vase, and The plate broke.
+Below each feature-pattern summary, we present in quantitative form
+a measure of the similarity of all possible nouns from the sentence with
+the summary pattern for each slot. We also compare the contents of
+each slot to the "#" pattern, corresponding to "all units off."
+The
+numbers (called deviation scores) indicate the mean squared deviation of
+the indicated noun pattern from the summary representation of the
+contents of each slot.
+A small deviation score indicates a close
+correspondence. Thus, if we look at the row of numbers labeled dog,
+we can see again that the pattern over the Agent units (first column) is
+very similar to the pattern for dog. Further, we can see that the pattern
+for dog is not similar to the patterns in any of the other slots (second
+through fourth columns). The pattern on the Patient units is similar to
+the pattern for plate, and the patterns on the Instrument and Modifier
+units are similar to the null pattern. For the sentence The hammer
+broke the vase, the pattern on the Instrument units is similar to the pattern for hammer, the pattern on the Patient units is similar to the pattern for vase, and the patterns on the Agent and Modifier units are
+similar to the blank pattern. Thus, each argument has effectively been
+assigned the correct role, and each role has effectively been assigned
+the correct filler.
+9 With respect to the summary pattern on the Instrument slot for The hammer broke the
+window, we can see that the model is trying to activate both values on the POINTINESS
+dimension. Because hammer and hatcher are identical except for this feature, the
+representation is really describing a somewhat pointy hammer (or perhaps blunt hatchet).
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+299
+This example has been described in some detail, in part to explicate
+our displays of the model's responses to particular
+sentences. In the
+process we have seen clearly that dog and hammer trigger the appropriate bindings of arguments to slots. This is also the case for examples
+of the form The plate broke. There, Figure 9 indicates that the only slot
+in which there is appreciable activity is the Patient slot.
+These examples illustrate that the model has learned quite a bit about
+assigning fillers to slots on the basis of the microfeatures of the slot fillers involved. For the word break, animate surface subjects are treated
+as Agents and inanimate surface subjects are treated as Instruments if
+an Object is specified; if not, the inanimate surface subject is treated as
+Patient. The model seems to capture this fact pretty well in its
+behavior. '°
+The boy hit the girl and the girl hit the boy. For the verb hit, there
+is a possibility that a sentence describing an instance of hitting will have
+two animate arguments, which may be equally plausible candidates to
+serve as Agent. The only way to tell which is the Agent (in the
+absence of other context) is to rely on word-order information. We
+know that boy is the Agent in the The boy hit the girl only because it
+occurs in the preverbal position. The model has no difficulty coping
+with this fact. Figure 10 shows in summary form the features activated
+by the sentences The girl hit the boy (a sentence the model actually
+experienced during learning) and The boy hit the girl (a sentence not
+experienced during learning). In both cases, the model activates the
+feature pattern for the correct argument in the correct slot. This is so,
+even though the feature patterns for boy and girl differ
+by a single
+feature.! As a more formal test of the model's ability to assign slot
+10 One thing that we see illustrated here is that with certain novel sentences, the model
+may have a tendency to misgenerate some of their features when assigning them to
+underlying slots. Thus, for example, in the case of The plate broke, only some of the
+features are produced faithfully. These are, in fact, the features associated with the slot
+fillers that the model actually learned to deal with in this sentence frame (vase, window).
+The ones that are poorly reproduced are the features that the familiar exemplars differ on
+or which differ between the familiar examples and plate. Such errors would be greatly
+reduced if a more disparate range of Patient-intransitive verbs with a more disparate
+range of subjects had been used in the learning. Such errors could aiso be cleaned up
+quite a bit by an auto-associative network of connections among the case role units. The
+virtues of augmenting the model with such a network are considered in more detail later.
+1l Though the model did not actually learn the sentence The boy hit the girl or any other
+sentence containing boy and girl as Subject and Object, it did learn several sentences in
+which boy was the subject of hit and several others in which girl was the object. As it
+happened, several of these involved modifiers of girl, hence the rather diffuse pattern of
+activation over the Modifier units.
+
+300
+The sirs hit the bou.
+nitAve
+girl hitAue
+boy
+0. ABB1
+8.2994
+9. 2970
+8.9821
+9.8021
+The boy nit the girl.
+hitaur
+M.t111
+boy nitAue
+8.8117
+girl
+•.8583
+4. 3189
+8.3189
+8.0999
+9.9990
+hnssgggvvvfftronhb0000000
+8.2785
+8.2745
+9.9153
+8.9153
+AGENT
+PATIENT
+INSTRUMENT
+MODIFIER
+FIGURE 10. Summaries of of the role assignment patterns produced by The girl hit the
+boy and The boy hit the girl.
+fillers to slots based only on sentence-structure information, we tested
+the model on the full set of 12 different human-hit-human sentences.
+In all cases, the preverbal argument more closely matched the pattern
+of activation in the Agent role, and the postverbal argument more
+closely matched the pattern in the Patient role.
+Verb-Frame Selection
+Part of the task of the model is to put slot fillers in the correct
+places, but there is more that it must do than this. It must also determine from the ensemble of
+arguments what reading of the verb is
+intended. By this, we mean which of the possible scenarios the verb
+might describe is actually being described in this particular case. For
+example, the sentences The boy broke the window with the hammer generates quite a different mental scenario than The dog broke the window
+or The window broke. Our model captures the differences between
+these scenarios in two ways: one is simply in terms of the set of underlying roles and the assignment of sentence constituents to these roles.
+We have already seen in our earlier discussion of break that the model
+produced a different set of slots and assigned the preverbal noun phrase
+to a different role in each of the sentences The dog broke the window,
+The hammer broke the vase, and The plate broke. The other way the
+model captures the differences between scenarios is in terms of the pattern of activation of verb features in the Agent, Patient, and Instrument slots. Thus in The boy hit the girl, we visualize physical contact
+between the boy and the girl; in the case of The boy hit the girl with the
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING 301
+rock, we visualize physical contact between the rock and the girl. These
+and other related distinctions are captured (admittedly, imperfectly) in
+the different feature patterns associated with the verb frames. As with
+the feature patterns for nouns, the patterns that we used do not adequately encode the differential flexibility of different aspects of the different scenarios. Nevertheless they capture the essence of the difference, say, between one or the other kind of hitting.
+The features of the scenario are captured in the pattern of activation
+of the case role units. To this point, we have been summing along
+columns of units to determine the features of the object assigned to a
+particular role by the model. To determine the features of the action or
+scenario assigned to the sentence, we need to look along the rows. Figures 3, 7, and 8 indicate that features in somewhat different patterns of
+rows are activated by the sentences The boy broke the window with the
+hammer, The dog broke the plate, and The hammer broke the vase. These
+are, indeed, the correct verb features in each one. Thus, we see that
+the model has learned to successfully assign a different scenario,
+depending on the arguments supplied along with the verb
+In general, the model did quite well selecting the correct scenario.
+For every unambiguous test sentence, familiar or unfamiliar, the value
+on each scenario dimension that was most active was the correct value.
+Filling in Missing Arguments
+The model does a very good job filling in plausible default values for
+missing arguments. To demonstrate this, we tested the model on the
+sentence fragment The boy broke. The results are shown in Figure 11.
+The model fills in, fairly strongly, a plausible but underspecified fragile
+object-something that is nonhuman, neuter, nonpointed, fragile, and
+has object-type furniture (plate, vase, and window are all classified as furniture in the model). Values on the size (VOLUME) and shape
+(FORM) dimensions are very weakly specified.!2
+We see similar kinds of things happening with The girl ate, though in
+this case, the model is actually taught to fill in food of unspecified
+form, so this performance is not surprising. Something slightly
+12 While the model's response to The boy broke clearly illustrates default assignment, it
+differs from the way many people appear to process this input; several people have commented to us that they read this fragment as a complete sentence specifying that it was
+the boy that broke, even though this produces a somewhat anomalous reading.
+The
+model's response to The boy broke is closer to the kind of thing most people get with a
+verb like hit, which does not have an intransitive reading.
+
+302
+The boy broke.
+Doy brokenue:
+11i....1
+6.0204
+hhssgggvuufe7f0pbb0000000
+0.3191
+฿. 3208
+3. 090€
+The girl are.
+ateAuT
+girl stenur
+food
+153
+The man movea.
+mOVedAUS
+man movecaus
+11s....l...1..i.....t
+hnss998vvv4f4fppb60000000
+в.3190
+0. 3192
+8.8868
+man
+.3193
+8.319
+8e00
+0.80g@
+AGENT
+PATIENT
+INSTRUMENT
+MODIFIER
+FIGURE 11. Summaries of the model's response to The boy broke, The girl ate, and The
+man moved.
+different happens with The man moved: The model is taught to treat
+man as both Agent and Patient in such sentences; and indeed, the pattern for man predominates in the Patient slot. (Note that if an object is
+specified, as in The man moved the piano, it is handled correctly.)
+These additional examples make two points: First, that the model
+can be explicitly trained to fill in implied arguments; and second, that
+the filling in of implied arguments is clearly specific to the particular
+verb. What is filled in on the Patient slot is quite different for each of
+these three examples.
+Lexical Ambiguity Resolution
+In general, the model does very well with ambiguous words. That is,
+it has little difficulty determining which reading to assign to an ambiguous word based on its context of occurrence-as long as the context is
+itself sufficient to disambiguate the meaning of the word.
+To demonstrate this point, we carried out a number of analyses of
+the model's responses to sentences containing the ambiguous nouns
+chicken (live or cooked) and bat (flying or baseball). We divided the
+sentences containing these ambiguous words into those that had only
+one case-frame representation derivable from the generators and those
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+303
+that could have been generated in two different ways. An example of
+the former kind of sentence is The chicken ate the carrot, since only a
+live chicken could occur as the preverbal NP with ate. An example of
+the latter kind of sentence is The bat broke the window, which could be
+generated either from The animal broke the fragile_object or from The
+breaker broke the fragile object. Given the set of generators, the context
+specifies which reading is correct for the first kind of sentence but does
+not specify which reading is correct for the latter. Since our present
+interest is to see how well the model can do at using context to resolve
+ambiguity, we focus here on the former type.
+Our first analysis simply compared the model's performance with
+these sentences to its performance with sentences containing no ambiguous words. Since a large number of factors contribute to the
+number-of-bits-incorrect measure, we focused on a set of seven
+matched pairs of sentences that were generated from the same generators and were also either both old or both new, but differed in that one
+contained an ambiguous word (e.g., The woman ate the chicken with the
+carrot) and the other did not (The boy ate the carrot with the pasta). The
+average number of features missed was 28.4 for the items containing
+ambiguous words and 29.1 for the control items, F(1,6) < 1.
+Another way to examine the data is to examine the relative strengths
+of the features of the two readings of an ambiguous word in the output
+summary representation. Figure 12 indicates a typical case and one
+interesting exception to the general pattern. In the typical case (The
+man ate the chicken with the fork), we see that the features of the
+cooked chicken have been strongly activated in the Patient slot, and
+though there are some weak traces of the features of the live chicken,
+they are not stronger than the weak extraneous activation we often see
+The man ate the chicken with the fork.
+AteRUPI
+man Aterupi
+co-chicken atenues
+fork
+0.4988
+6.3121
+9.3160
+The wolf ste the chicken.
+stenve
+fenicken
+wolf atenur
+• 0030
+29-
+0.2963
+li-chicken
+0.3683
+s:2/////4p0000000
+AGENT
+PATIENT
+INSTRUMENT
+MODIFIER
+FIGURE 12. Summaries of the case role activations produced by The man are the chicken
+with the fork and The wolf ate the chicken.
+
+304 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+of incorrect features for unambiguous words. In the atypical case (The
+wolf ate the chicken), the pattern is really much closer to the cooked
+chicken than the live one that the model was "supposed" to have
+retrieved. It is difficult to fault the model too much in this case, however. Though it was never given sentences of the form The animal ate
+the food, it was given sentences of the form The animal ate, where the
+underlying case frame included (implied) food. Thus the model had
+considerable reason to treat the object of The animal ate as food.
+Though it had learned The lion ate chicken referred to a live chicken, it
+appears to prefer to treat chicken in The wolf ate chicken more as cooked
+food than as a living animal. Some of the properties of the live chicken
+are weakly present-e.g., its female sex and its natural, animate objecttype classification -but the predominant pattern is that of food.
+With this exception, the model has shown itself quite capable of handling sentences containing ambiguous words as well as sentences containing only unambiguous words. This is, of course, not really surprising in view of the fact that all the words in the sentence are used to
+help constrain the features assigned to the fillers of every role in the
+case frame. When one word does not provide the information to constrain the output, the model can exploit information contained in other
+words.
+Structural Ambiguity
+In this section, we briefly consider another type of ambiguity that
+sometimes arises even when the words in the sentence are unambiguous. This is the structural ambiguity of sentences such as The man hit
+the woman with the hammer. In such cases, hammer can either be the
+Instrument or simply a Modifier of woman. This case-structure ambiguity parallels an ambiguity in the syntactic structure of the sentence as
+well; if hammer is an Instrument, it is dominated directly by the VP;
+whereas if it is a Modifier, it is dominated by the NP the window.
+Because hammer was included both in the list of possible possessionmodifiers of human objects and in the list of possible instruments of
+hitting (designated as possessions and hitters in the sentence frames in
+Table 2 and in the noun categories in Table 3), either of these readings
+is equally possible. Thus, it is not so surprising that the model has considerable difficulty with such sentences, generating a blend of the two
+readings.
+A particularly interesting case of case-structure ambiguity occurs with
+the sentence The bat broke the window. As already mentioned, the sentence is both lexically ambiguous and ambiguous in case structure, and
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+305
+the structural ambiguity hinges on the lexical ambiguity. If bat is a
+baseball bat then the case frame specifies an Instrument and a Patient,
+but if it is a flying bat then the case frame specifies an Agent and a
+Patient.
+Figure 13 illustrates the pattern of activation generated in this case.
+What the model does, quite sensibly, is activate one kind of bat-the
+flying bat-on the Agent units and the other-the baseball bat-on the
+Instrument units (see the figure caption for a detailed explanation of
+the use of the black background in this figure.
+People generally get only one reading of a sentence at a time, even
+when (as in this case) the sentence is easy to interpret in either of two
+ways. In a later section of this chapter we explain how crossconnections among the case role units and back-connections to
+sentence-level units would tend to cause the model to choose a single
+interpretation, even in these ambiguous cases.
+Shades of Meaning
+Another property of the model, related to its handling of ambiguity,
+is the fact that it can shade the feature patterns it assigns, in ways that
+often seem quite appropriate. One example of this tendency arises in
+the model's response to the sentence The ball broke the vase. A summary of the pattern produced is shown in Figure 14. The feature pattern on the Instrument units matches the features of ball fairly closely.
+The value on each dimension that is most strongly activated is the
+correct value, except on one dimension- the hard/soft dimension. On
+this dimension, we can see that the model has gotten ball completely
+wrong-it has strongly activated hard, instead of soft.
+In one sense, this is clearly an "error" on the model's part; all the
+balls that it learned about were soft, not hard balls. But in another
+sense, it is a perfectly sensible response for the model to make. All of
+the other instruments of breaking (called breakers in Table 3) were, in
+fact, hard. The model picked up on this fact, and shaded its interpretation of the meaning of the word ball as a result. As far as this model is
+concerned, balls that are used for breaking are hard, not soft.
+This kind of shading of meaning is just another manifestation of the
+process that fills in missing arguments, chooses appropriate verb
+frames, and selects contextually appropriate meanings of words.
+It is
+part and parcel of the mechanism that generally results in the activation
+of the nominally correct feature pattern. It is a mechanism that naturally blends together what it learns into a representation that regularizes
+slot fillers, in the same way that the verb learning model discussed in
+Chapter 18 regularizes verbs.
+
+306
+20003
+3:
+1?1???1???
+?.?
+.?.
+22..2..2.
+?.?.
+?.?...?
+?.?.
+3rs**
+?1+++?+
+--.-?.
++??7-?.
+0131?3913
+-...
+_ . :
++333-34---?-???-1
+?--.-?...-.---.?
+,?--.-?..
+---.?
+327-333333
+=........
+....
+0001 007
+422920*
+
+•aaa
+hhs598gvvvfff1p00b00000oo
+AGENT
+hhssgggvwuffff00000000000
+111....
+1..
+PATIENT
+brokeAVFIVP
+brokeAup
+{1-bat
+window
+bo-bat
+fl-bat
+8.1473
+8 • 3220
+2736
+window
+8.3429
+6 646S
+8.2819
+e.1371
+a -7-24.0
+nnssgggwuvf11fp00b0000ox
+1.1..
+1...1.
+.1.1
+brokerve INSTRUMENT
+bo-bat
+9.2782
+,2690
+• 1503
+window
+MODIFIER
+,3198
+8,8688
+FIGURE 13. State of the model after processing the sentence The bat broke the window.
+For this sentence, the black background on the Agent units shows which units would be
+active in the pattern for Alving bat as Agent of the agentive (AVP) reading of broke. The
+black background on the Instrument units indicates the units that would be active in the
+pattern for baseball bat as Instrument of the instrumental (IVP) reading of broke. The
+black background on the Patient units indicates the units that would be active in either the
+pattern appropriate for window as Patient of the agentive reading of broke or in the instrumental reading of broke.
+Other Creative Errors
+The model made a number of other interesting "errors." Its response
+to The doll moved was a particularly striking example. Recall that the
+training stimuli contained sentences from the frames The animal moved,
+The human moved, and The object moved. In the first two cases, the case
+frame contained the subject as both Agent and Patient, as in The animal
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+307
+The ball broke the vase.
+i3599Vr7886000000
+8.6019
+brokeive
+vase brokesve
+฿.2508
+DalI
+mnst89vw7777066000000o
+AGENT
+PATIENT
+INSTRUMENT
+MODIFIER
+FIGURE 14. Summary of the activations on the case role units for the sentence The ball
+broke the vase.
+moved itself. In the third case, the case frame contained the subject
+only as Patient. The model had some difficulty with these constructions, but generally put inanimate subjects into the Patient role only (as
+in The desk moved), and animate subjects into both the Agent and
+Instrument role. With The doll moved, however, the case-frame
+representation shows considerable activation in the Agent slot. The
+pattern of activation there (Figure 15) seems to be pretty much that of
+a small (though fragile and nonhuman) girl-or perhaps it is simply an
+animate doll.
+Generalization to Novel Words
+We have already seen that the model can generalize quite well from
+particular sentences that it has learned about to new ones that it has not
+seen before. It is, obviously, important to be able to generalize in this
+way, since we cannot expect the training set of sentences to cover all
+possible word combinations in the language, even if they contain only a
+single clause. Thus far, however, we have only considered generalization to sentences made up of familiar words. What would happen, we
+wondered, if we tested the model using new words that it had never
+seen before? To examine this issue, we tested the model on the verb
+touch. Touch differs from hit in only one feature, namely, intensity;
+otherwise all of the same verb features are appropriate to it. We
+assumed that the model already knew the meaning of touch-that is, we
+assumed that the correct input microfeatures were activated on presentation of a sentence containing it. We then took all of the test sentences containing the word hit, replaced hit with touched, and tested the
+model on each of these sentences. Overall, performance was somewhat
+worse than with hit, but the model was still able to assign arguments to
+the correct underlying roles. In particular, it had no difficulty assigning
+animate Subject NPs to the role of Agent and the Object NP to the role
+
+308
+•01!.1.1..
+0305
+anac
+??
+?.?..
+3:3::
+...?.
+•...?.?...
+211?
+?11?91?
+, 33..?.
+??..?
+3333:
+??..?.?
+
+
+??..?.?.....?.?
+??
+• ??.
+9?.. ?.?.....?.33.
+??..?.?.....?.??.
+32.23.3:3
+....?.33.
+• ?.??.
+
+..2.
+f00bb00000x
+.i..i.i..
+...T.I...
+AGENT
+movedus
+an-dol1
+a/t-doll
+an-do11
+8.0921
+8757
+hhssggswwwffffpobb00000.00
+BOVE-dAUSAV
+PATIENT art-doll
+฿B17
+998
+198
+hhssgsgwwyff44ppkk
+INSTRUMENT
+MOOIFIER
+0.3194
+8. 3592
+в.веве
+8.3208
+e.egee
+FIGURE 15. State of the model after processing the sentence The doll moved. The units
+with the black background in the Agent slot indicate the units appropriate for the pattern
+corresponding to an "animate doll" as Agent of the Agent-Verb-Self (AVS) reading of
+move. The units with the black background in the Patient slot indicate the units appropriate for either an animate or (normal) toy doll as Patient of either the AVS or Patient-
+Verb (PV) reading of move.
+of Patient, nor did it have any problem assigning inanimate subjects to
+the role of Instrument, as illustrated in Figure 16.
+Two characteristics of the model's performance with this novel verb
+should be noted. The first is that it does not activate all the correct
+verb features: The verb features captured in the case role representalion are appropriate for hit rather than touch. There are two reasons for
+this. One is the redundancy of the representation of the verbs. The
+input representation we are using is an extremely rich and redundant
+representation for capturing the very small number of verbs that we
+have actually used, so the model learns to predict features from other
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+309
+The natcher toucned the pasta.
+insssaa(/urtrto00..o..
+touchedive
+pasta touchedive
+natchet
+3191
+The sirl toucned the boy.
+touchedAve
+sirl toucneanue
+DOy
+nnss88gvm
+hn33999
+• 3185
+3185
+0e8e
+, 3031
+AGENT
+PATIENT
+INSTRUMENT
+MODIFIER
+FIGURE 16. Summary of the pattern of activation produced by the model in response to
+The hatchet touched the pasta and The girl touched the boy.
+features. In a much less redundant set of verbs, the model would be
+forced to learn to rely on just the right features of the sentence-level
+pattern to predict the features of the case role representation correctly.
+The second reason is that the deviant feature on the word touch does
+not fall inside a subspace delineated by a set of related exemplars that
+behave in similar ways. What we are seeing here, essentially, is assimilation to a single familiar verb that is near the novel verb in feature
+space. When a novel word is presented that more nearly falls inside the
+subspace delineated by a set of related exemplars, the model is better
+able to correctly represent all the features of the novel word in the case
+role representation. To show this, we defined a new fragile object, a
+that was nonhuman, hard,
+neuter, medium-sized, onedimensional, not pointed, fragile, and furniture. This set of features
+matches at least one of the breakable objects on every dimension, but
+matches none of them on all of the dimensions. We then tested the
+model by taking all of the familiar test sentences containing any of the
+familiar breakable objects (window, vase, and plate) and then testing the
+model on these sentences with the word lamp in the place of the familiar breakable object. In many cases, as in the first example shown in
+Figure 17, the model activated all the features correctly. That is, the
+correct feature for lamp on each dimension was more strongly activated
+than any other. The model was most vulnerable to error on the
+VOLUME and FORM dimensions, as in the second example shown,
+where it differed from two of the three familiar fragile objects in each
+The example indicates, then, that the desirable tendency of the
+model to shade the meanings of the words it encounters to fit the typical features it expects in certain contexts need not lead to severe distortions of novel words, as long as their feature patterns fall inside the
+
+310
+The woman broke the lamo.
+brokenue
+woman brokenue
+nn$5888Vv/f1ifpabb000d.oo
+womar
+1 amp
+0.0939
+฿.5271
+1.293
+1,293
+The boy broke the lamo.
+brokenue
+Doy brokenve
+'ano
+0,4934
+13400
+0. 3106
+. 3103
+• Фе•2
+0002
+, 3198
+„нgv|
+0.479
+9.840!
+:-303
+3194
+. 0001
+AGENT
+PATIENT
+INSTRUMENT
+MODIFIER
+FIGURE 17. Summary of the response of the model to The woman broke the lamp and
+The boy broke the lamp.
+space spanned by a set of similar words that are treated by the model in
+a consistent way.
+Straightforward Extensions
+The model does many things well, but it is really just the first step
+toward a PDP model of sentence processing. In the general discussion
+we will consider some of the more general issues that confront the
+attempt to extend a model of this type further. Here, we will just mention some straightforward extensions that should be fairly easy to
+implement. We have not yet implemented these changes, so our discussion is somewhat speculative.
+One straightforward set of extensions to the model would involve
+adding
+cross-connections among the case role units. The crossconnections would allow argument co-occurrence constraints that are
+verb-frame specific to be captured more effectively than they can now.
+In the present version of the model, the influence of one argument on
+another can only essentially add together with the influence of the verb
+on that argument. This will ultimately prove insufficient, we believe,
+because different verbs carry with them radically different interdependencies among their arguments. For example, see imposes some
+restrictions between the Instrument and the Object (as in Bill saw the
+man with the telescope and Bill saw the man with the revolver; the first is
+ambiguous, the second is not) that are different from those posed by hit
+(Bill hit the man with the telescope and Bill hit the man with the revolver
+seem equally ambiguous). The present version of the model would not
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+311
+easily capture these kinds of verb-contingent argument constraints
+because each argument is encoded separately from the verb at the sentence level, and it is only connections from units at the sentence level
+that determine the input to the case role units. This means that conjunctions of noun characteristics with verb characteristics are not
+directly at work in determining case role unit activations. The case role
+units, however, do provide just such a conjunctive encoding. It seems
+likely, therefore, that connections among these units would be able to
+capture verb-specific (or, more exactly, verb-feature specific) contingencies between slot fillers and their assignments to roles.
+Cross-connections among the case role units would add a number of
+other advantages, as well. They would allow competition among alternative interpretations of the same word at the case-frame level, so that
+the stronger of two competing interpretations of the same word could
+effectively suppress the weaker.
+A second straightforward extension would be the addition of backconnections from the case role units to the sentence-structure units.
+This, too, could have several beneficial effects on the performance of
+the model. In an extended version of the model with cross-connections
+and back-connections, the computation performed by the present version of the model would be just the first step in an iterative settling
+process. This settling process could be used to fill in the features of one
+reading or another of an ambiguous word at the sentence level, based
+on the emerging pattern at the case role level. Once filled in, these
+features could then add to the support for the "dominant" reading over
+other, initially partially activated readings-the whole network would, in
+effect, drive itself into a stable "corner" that would tend to represent a
+coherent interpretation at both the sentence and the case role level.
+Kawamoto (1985) has observed just such effects in a simulation of
+word disambiguation based on the brain-state-in-a-box model of J. A.
+Anderson, Silverstein, Ritz, and Jones (1977). (Cottrell, 1985, and
+Waltz & Pollack, 1985, have also observed such effects in their more
+localist sentence-processing models.)
+Back connections would also allow case role activations to actually
+specify the semantic features of novel or unfamiliar words occurring in
+constraining contexts. Consider, for example, the sentence, The girl
+broke the shrafe with the feather. The context provides a considerable
+amount of constraint on the properties of shrafe. The existing version
+of the model is able to fill in a plausible interpretation at the case level,
+but with feedback it would be able to pass this information back to the
+sentence level.
+Another way of passing information back to the surface-structure
+level would be to use the back-propagation learning algorithm. The use
+of back propagation to train the sentence-structure units could allow the
+
+312 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+right features to be constructed at the surface level with only a phonological representation of the words as the predefined input.
+Back propagation might also allow us to cut down on the rather excessive numbers
+of units currently used in the surface-structure level. Right now there
+are far more SS units than are strictly necessary to do the work that the
+model is doing. While many units could be eliminated in a straightforward way (e.g., many of the sentence units could be eliminated because
+they stand for unlikely conjunctions of features across dimensions, such
+as human and tool), many more are simply redundant ways of encoding
+the same information and so could be consolidated into fewer units. On
+the other hand, for a larger vocabulary, some conjunctive units will
+turn out to be necessary, and pair-wise conjunctive units ultimately will
+probably not suffice. Indeed, we feel quite sure that no predefined
+coding scheme of the kind we have used could provide a sufficient
+basis for learning all the sentences in any real language without being
+immensely wasteful, so it will become crucial to train the sentence and
+case role units to represent just the needed conjunctions of features.
+Distributed Representation of Roles
+We mention a final "straightforward" extension of the model under a
+separate heading because it is both more speculative and perhaps somewhat more difficult to understand than the previous suggestions. This
+is the idea of using a distributed representation of the roles. The idea
+was first suggested by Hinton (198la), and is currently under exploration by Derthick and Hinton at Carnegie-Mellon University. The
+essence of the idea is to think of roles not as strictly separate, monolithic objects, but as sets of role descriptors. Thus the role of Agent
+has certain properties: It specifies an active participant in the scenario,
+one that may be volitional; it specifies the instigator of the action. The
+role of Patient, on the other hand, specifies a passive participant, one
+whose volitional involvement is (pretty much) irrelevant, but who is
+the one that experiences the effects of the action.
+Various problems arise with treating these roles as unitary objects.
+One is that some but not all of the Patient properties generally hold for
+the role nominally identified as Patient. Similarly, some but not all of
+the Agent properties generally hold for the role nominally identified as
+Agent. In certain cases, as with sentences like The boy moved, enough
+of these properties hold that we were led to assign the boy to both roles
+at once.
+One suggestion that has often been made is to proliferate separate
+roles to deal separately with each of the slight variants of each of the
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+313
+traditional cases. This leads, of course, to a proliferation of roles that is
+ungainly, unwieldy, and inelegant, and that detracts considerably from
+the utility of the idea of roles as useful descriptive constructs.
+Here, distributed representation can provide an elegant solution, just
+as it has in other instances where there appears to be a temptation to
+proliferate individualized, unitary representational constructs (see
+Chapter 17). If each role is represented by a conjunction of role properties, then far more distinct roles can be represented on the same set
+of role units. Furthermore, what the Agent roles of two verbs have in
+common is captured by the overlap of the role features in the representations of their roles, and how they differ is captured by their differences. The notion of a role that represents a combined Agent/Patient
+as in
+The boy moved is no longer a special case, and we get out of
+assigning the same argument to two different slots.
+So far, the vision outstrips the implementation of this idea, but we
+will sketch briefly one very rudimentary instantiation of it, in what
+really amounts to a rather slight modification of the model we have
+described above. Currently, our case role units stand for conjunctions
+of a role, a feature of the verb, and a feature of the filler of the role.
+The suggestion, quite simply, is to replace these units with units that
+stand for a feature of a role, a feature of the verb, and a feature of the
+filler of the role. The first NP in The boy broke the window with the
+hammer will produce a pattern of activation over one set of these triples
+(corresponding pretty much to the canonical features of agenthood),
+while the boy in The boy moved would activate some units from other
+role feature sets, as well as many of the typical agent feature units.
+Again, we stress that we do not yet have much experience using this
+kind of distributed representations of roles. However, Derthick and
+Hinton (personal communication, 1985) are exploring these ideas in
+the context of a PDP implementation of the representation language
+KL-TWO (Brachman & Schmolze, 1985; Moser, 1983). They have
+already shown that at least one version of the idea can be made to work
+and that the coarse coding of roles can be used to allow inheritance of
+constraints on role fillers.
+DISCUSSION
+Now that we have examined the model in some detail and considered
+some possible extensions of it, we turn to more general considerations.
+We consider three issues. First, we examine the basic principles of
+operation of the model and mention briefly why they are important and
+useful principles for a sentence-processing model to embody. Second,
+
+314
+we consider some of the implications of the model for thinking about
+language and the representation of language. Third, we address the
+limitations of the present model. This part of the discussion focuses on
+a key question concerning the feasibility of our approach, namely, the
+requirement that any plausible model of language processing must be
+able to handle sentences containing embedded clauses.
+Basic Features of the Model
+We emphasize before we begin that the basic features of the present
+model are shared with a number of other distributed models, especially
+those of Hinton (198la) and those described in Chapters 3, 14, 17, and
+18 of this book. The two most important properties of the model are
+its ability to exploit the constraints imposed by all the arguments in a
+sentence simultaneously and its ability to represent shades of meaning.
+These aspects are basic, we believe, to any attempt to capture the flexibility and context-sensitivity of comprehension.
+The first of these properties is, perhaps, just as easily capturable
+using local rather than distributed connectionist networks. These local
+connectionist models capture this property much more effectively than
+they have been captured
+in nonconnectionist mechanisms (e.g.,
+Small's, 1980, word expert parser; cf. Cottrell & Small, 1983). Such
+networks have been applied to sentence processing, particularly to the
+problems of ambiguity resolution and role assignment (Cottrell, 1985;
+Waltz & Pollack, 1985). Both models use single units to stand for
+alternative meanings of words or as "binders" to tie words to alternative
+roles, and use mutual activation and inhibition to select between alternative meanings and alternative role assignments.
+The present model exhibits many of these same properties, but uses
+distributed representations rather than local ones. What the distributed
+representations have that local representations lack is the natural ability
+to represent a huge palette of shades of meaning. With distributed
+representations, it is quite natural to represent a blend of familiar concepts or a shaded version of a familiar concept that fits a scenario
+(Waltz & Pollack, 1985, do this with their context microfeatures).
+Perhaps this is the paramount reason why the distributed approach
+appeals to us. To be sure, it is possible to represent different shades of
+meaning in a localist network. One can, for example, have different
+units for each significantly different variation of the meaning of a word.
+A problem arises, though, in specifying the meaning of "significantly
+different." We will probably all agree that there are different readings
+of the word bat in the sentences The bat hit the ball and The bat flew
+round the cave. But what about the word chicken in the sentences The
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+315
+woman ate the chicken and The wolf ate the chicken? Or what about the
+word ball in The baby kicked the ball and The ball broke the window?
+There is no doubt that we think of different balls in these cases; but do
+we really want to have a separate unit in memory for the soft, squishy,
+rubber ball the baby kicks and the small, hard ball that can break a
+window?
+With distributed representations, we do not have to choose. Different readings of the same word are just different patterns of activation; really different readings, ones that are totally unrelated, such as
+the two readings of bat simply have very little in common. Readings
+that are nearly identical with just a shading of a difference are simply
+represented by nearly identical patterns of activation.
+These properties of distributed representations are extremely general,
+of course, and they have come up before, particularly in the chapter on
+schemata (Chapter 14). We also just invoked them in suggesting that
+we might be able to use distributed representations instead of some
+fixed set of case roles. In both of these other cases, as in the case of
+distributed representation of word senses, the use of distributed
+representation allows for all shades and degrees of similarity and difference in two representations to be captured in a totally seamless way.
+A final basic feature of the model is the gradualness of acquisition it
+exhibits. We have not stressed the time course of acquisition, but it
+was, of course, a crucial property of the verb learning model, described
+in Chapter 18, and it is quite evident that acquisition is gradual from
+Figure 4. As with the verb learning model, our model also seems to
+pick up on the strongest regularities first. This is seen most easily in
+Figures 5 and 6 by comparing NVN sentences from the hit and broke
+generators. Those with animate preverbal NPs, which are Agents, are
+learned more quickly than those with inanimate preverbal NPs, which
+are Instruments. This is because a far greater number of constructions
+have animate, Agent subjects than have inanimate, Instrument subjects.
+These three basic properties-exploitation of multiple, simultaneous
+constraints, the ability to represent continuous gradations in meaning,
+and the ability to learn gradually, without formulating explicit rules,
+picking up first on the major regularities, are hallmarks of parallel distributed models, and they are no less applicable to comprehension of
+language than they are to any other aspect of cognitive processes.
+Do Words Have Literal Meanings?
+There is one further aspect of the distributed approach to representation of meaning that should be mentioned briefly. This is the stand our
+model takes on the issue of whether words have literal meanings. It is
+
+316
+normal and natural to think of words as having literal meanings, but it
+is very difficult to say what these meanings really are. For, as we have
+noted throughout this chapter, the apparent meanings of words are
+infinitely malleable and very difficult to pin down. An alternative view
+is that words are clues to scenarios. This view, which has been proposed by Rumelhart (1979) among others, never made very much
+impression on us until we began to study the present model. However,
+in exploring the model, we have found that it embodies Rumelhart's
+idea exactly. A sentence assembles some words in a particular order,
+and each provides a set of clues that constrains the characteristics of the
+scenario, each in its own way. The verb, in and of itself, may specify a
+range of related scenarios and certain constraints on the players. The
+nouns further restrict the scenario and further constrain the players.
+But the words themselves
+are no longer present in the scenario, nor is
+there necessarily anything in the scenario that corresponds to the literal
+meaning of any of the words. Thus in the case of The doll moved, the
+(partially activated) Agent is not a copy of the standard doll pattern,
+but a pattern appropriate for a doll that can move under its own steam.
+The crucial point, here, is that all the words work together to provide
+clues to the case frame representation of the sentence, and none of the
+words uniquely or completely determine the representation that is
+assigned to any of the constituents of the underlying scenario. Certainly, the word hammer most strongly constrains the filler of the
+Instrument role in The boy broke the vase with the hammer, but the other
+words contribute to the specification of the filler of this role, and hammer contributes to the specification of the fillers of the other roles.
+Compare The prisoner struck the rock with the hammer and The boy broke
+the vase with the feather: The former suggests a heavier hammer; the
+latter suggests an extremely fragile vase (if we give an instrumental
+reading to the with-NP).
+Toward a More Complete Model of Sentence Processing
+As we have already made clear, the model that we have described in
+this chapter is far from a complete model of the psychological processes
+involved in sentence processing. It does not deal with the fact that sentence processing is an on-line process, a process that unfolds in real
+time as each word is heard. It does not deal with the integration of
+processed sentences into larger contextual frameworks. It does not
+handle anaphora and other referential phenomena, or tense, aspect, or
+number. No attempt is made to deal with quantification or scoping
+issues. The model even lacks a way of distinguishing different tokens
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+317
+with identical featural descriptions. Thus it does not explicitly designate separate dogs in dog eat dog and only one dog in The dog chased
+himself. Finally, the model completely ignores the complexities of syntax. For the present model, a sentence can come in only one rigidly
+structured form, and no embedded clauses, cleft sentences, or passive
+constructions are allowed.
+Clearly, we have much work to do before we can claim to have a
+model that is in any sense complete or adequate. The question is, can
+it be done at all? Is there any fundamental limitation in the PDP
+approach that will prevent the successful development of a full-scale
+model of language processing that preserves the positive aspects of the
+distributed approach?
+Obviously, the proof is in the pudding. But we think the enterprise
+can succeed. Rather than discuss all of the issues raised above, we will
+discuss one that seems quite central, namely, the application of PDP
+models to the processing of sentences with embedded clauses.
+We consider several different ways that PDP models could be applied to the
+processing of such sentences.
+Interfacing PDP mechanisms with conventional parsers. We start
+with what might be the simplest view, or at any rate the most conventional: the idea that a model such as ours might be interfaced with a
+conventional parser. For example, we might imagine that a parser similar to Marcus's PARSIFAL (1980) might pass off the arguments of
+completed (or possibly even incomplete) clauses to a mechanism such
+as the one we have proposed for case role assignment and PP attachment. In this way, the "role-assignment module" could be used with
+any given sentoid and could be called repeatedly during the processing
+of a sentence containing embedded clauses.
+Interfacing our model with a conventional parser would perhaps provide a way of combining the best of both conventional symbol processing and parallel distributed processing. We are not, however, particularly inclined to follow this route ourselves. For it appears that it will be
+possible to implement the parser itself as a PDP mechanism. As we
+shall see, there are at least three ways this might be done. One
+involves implementing a true recursive automaton in a PDP network.
+We describe this method first, even though we suspect that the human
+parser is not in fact such a machine. After describing the mechanism,
+we will explain our objections to this view of the human sentenceprocessing mechanism. This will lead us to suggest two other mechanisms. One relies on the connection information distribution mechanism
+described in Chapter 16 to program a parallel net to process sentences
+of indefinite length and embeddedness; the other operates iteratively
+rather than recursively. It is more computationally limited in some
+
+318
+respects than the other mechanisms, but the limitations appear to conform to those of the human parser, as we shall see.
+A PDP model that does recursion. It turns out that it is not difficult
+to construct a parallel network that does true recursive processing.
+Hinton (personal communication) worked out the scheme we will
+describe here and implemented a rudimentary version of it in 1973.
+While such a mechanism has not been applied directly to parsing, the
+fact that recursive processing is possible suggests that there is no reason, in principle, why it should not provide a sufficient basis for implementing some kind of parser.
+The mechanism consists of a large network of units. Patterns of
+activation on these units are distributed representations of a particular
+state in a processing sequence. Processing occurs through the succession of states. The units are divided up into subnets that represent particular parts of the state. One important subnet is a set of units that
+provides a distributed pattern corresponding to a stack-level counter.
+The connections in the network are set up so that successive states of
+a routine are associated with their predecessors. Thus, when one state is
+in place, it causes another to follow it. States may also be used to drive
+actions, such as output of a line segment, say, if the automaton is a
+mechanism for recursively drawing figures, as Hinton's was. Processing, then, amounts to carrying out a sequence of states, emitting
+actions (and possibly reading input) along the way.
+Calling subroutines in such a mechanism is not particularly difficult,
+since all that is required is to associate a particular state (the calling
+state) with the start state of some routine. Passing parameters to the
+called routine is likewise not particularly difficult; in the simplest case
+they can be parts of the calling state that are carried along when the
+routine is called.
+To implement recursion in such a network, all that is required is a
+way to reinstate the calling state when a routine is done.
+To do this,
+the mechanism associates the state of the stack-level units with the
+state that is in place over the rest of the units, using an associative
+learning rule to adjust connection strengths while processing is taking
+place. These associations are implemented by rapidly changing a shortterm component of the weights whose long-term values implement the
+associations that allow the model to cycle through a sequence of states.
+The temporary associations stored in these short-term weights are not
+strong enough to overrule the long-term weights, but they are sufficiently strong to determine the next state of the network when the
+long-term weights leave several possibilities. So, at the end of a routine at stack level N, the network associatively reinstates stack level
+N - 1, with the rest of the state cleared. This associative reinstatement
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING 319
+of the previous stack-level state would be based on long-term, relatively
+permanent associations between states corresponding to adjacent depths
+in the stack. This reinstated stack-level state, which was associated in
+the short-term weights with the calling state just before the subroutine
+call occurred, would then simply use this short-term association to reinstate the pattern that existed before the call. (A "done" bit would have
+to be set to keep the process from doing the call again at this point.)
+There is no apparent a priori limit to the number of embedded calls
+that could be carried out by such a network, though for any fixed size
+of the stack-level subnet, there will be a corresponding maximum
+number of associations that can be learned without error. Of course,
+similar limitations also occur with all other stack machines; the stack is
+always of finite depth. There would also likely be interference of previous calling states when returning from any particular level, unless the
+learning were carefully tuned so that earlier associations with a particular stack level were almost completely wiped out or decayed by the time
+a new one must be used. Care would also be necessary to avoid
+crosstalk between stack-level representations. However, these problems
+can be overcome by using enough units so that very different states are
+used to represent each level of the stack.
+Drawbacks of true recursion. The scheme described in the previous
+section has several fairly nice properties and deserves considerably
+more exploration than it or some obvious variants have received to
+date. However, it does have one drawback from our point of viewone that it shares with other, more conventional implementations of
+truly recursive automata. The drawback is that the calling state is not
+present and active during the subroutine call; it is effectively inaccessible until it is reinstated after the return.
+This property of truly recursive schemes limits their ability to simultaneously consider binding a prepositional phrase at each of two levels
+of embedding. Consider the sentences:
+(14) The boy put the cake the woman made in the kitchen.
+(15) The boy saw the cake the woman made in the kitchen.
+Our preferred reading of the first of these two sentences has the boy
+putting the cake in the kitchen, rather than the woman preparing it
+there; while in the second case, the preferred interpretation appears to
+be that the woman made the cake in the kitchen, and the boy saw it at
+some unspecified location. Since the material is the same from the
+beginning of the embedding in both cases, it appears that the demand
+the matrix clause material (The boy put the cake ...) makes for a locative argument influences the decision about whether in the kitchen
+
+320 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+should be bound into the subordinate clause. While it may be possible
+to arrive at these two different readings in a conventional parser by
+backtracking or by passing aspects of the calling state along when the
+subroutine is called, it would seem to be more natural to suppose that
+the matrix clause is actively seeking its missing locative argument as
+the embedded material is being processed, and so is prepared to steal in
+the kitchen from the verb in the embedded clause. Thus, it appears that
+a mechanism capable of processing at different levels of embedding at
+the same time is needed.
+A fixed-length sentence processor. A connectionist parser that can,
+in principle, handle this kind of competition among alternative attachment decisions at different levels of embedding has recently been
+developed and implemented by Fanty (1985). He describes a mechanism that effectively parses a sentence at many levels at the same time.
+The parser consists of a fixed network of units.
+Some of the units
+represent the terminal and nonterminal symbols of the grammar; other
+units, called match units, represent the different possible expansions of
+each nonterminal. The symbol units are easily represented in a table in
+which the columns represent starting positions in the input string and
+the rows represent lengths. There is a unit for each terminal symbol in
+each position of the bottom row, and there is a unit for each nonterminal symbol at every position in the table; that is, there is a copy of each
+nonterminal unit for every possible portion of the input that it could
+cover. For each of these there is a set of binder units, one for each possible expansion of each nonterminal unit.
+A simple version of the table, for the indicated three-rule grammar,
+is shown in Figure 18. Only a subset of the units-the ones that would
+become active in the parse of aabbb-are shown.
+The parser can only process strings up to a predefined maximal
+length. Essentially, it processes the entire sentence in one two-pass
+processing sweep.
+In the first, bottom-up pass, all possible constituents
+are identified, and in the second, top-down pass, the constituents that
+fit together with the top S and the subconstituents of the top S are reinforced. These active units represent the parse tree.
+A very nice feature of Fanty's parse is that it takes into account all
+levels of the parse tree simultaneously. This allows it to find a globally
+satisfactory parse in one
+pair of sweeps,
+eliminating
+possible
+constituents that do not fit together with others to make a globally
+acceptable structure. With some modifications (different degrees of
+strength for different rules; continuous, interactive processing as
+opposed to a single pair of sweeps), it would probably be possible to
+implement a mechanism that could choose the "better" of two alternative acceptable parses, as people seem to do with many ambiguous
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+321
+length
+5 s
+4
+3
+2
+5 → AB
+A → aA a
+B → bB | b
+a
+8
+a A b
+b
+1 2 3 4
+starting position
+b B s
+5
+FIGURE 18. Parsing table used in Fanty's multilevel parser. Only the units active in the
+correct parse of the string aabbb are illustrated. (From Context-Free Parsing in Connectionist Networks ITR-174, p. 31 by M. Fanty, 1985, Rochester, NY: University of Rochester,
+Department of Computer Science. Copyright 1985 by M. Fanty. Reprinted by permission.)
+sentences. The parser of Selman and Hirst (1985; Selman, 1985),
+which is similar to the Fanty parser in structure but uses simulated
+annealing, appears to have just the right characteristics in this regard.
+However, this kind of parser does have some drawbacks. Most
+importantly, it is limited to sentences of a prespecified length. To
+expand it, one needs not only to add more units, one needs to program
+these units with the connections that allow them to do the jobs they are
+needed or potentially needed to do. Second, the size does grow rather
+quickly with the allowable length (see Fanty, 1985, for details).
+Fanty's model is, in fact, somewhat reminiscent of the
+TRACE
+model of speech perception (Chapter 15) in its reduplication of dedicated units and connections. As with TRACE, it may be possible to
+use connection information distribution (Chapter 16) to program the
+necessary connections in the course of processing from a single, central
+network containing the system's long-term knowledge of the rules of
+English. Indeed, Fanty (1985) has explored an off-line variant of the
+connection information distribution scheme; his version learns new
+productions locally, and sends the results to a central network which
+then distributes the results to the rest of the net, off-line. If the programming of the connections could be made to work on-line in the
+course of processing, as with the programmable blackboard model of
+
+322PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+reading, we would have a mechanism that still needs large numbers of
+units and connections, but crucially, these would be uncommitted units
+and programmable connections.
+The computational capability of the
+machine would be expandable, simply by increasing the size of the programmable network.
+Myths about the limitations of PDP models. We hope that these
+last two sections will help to dispel some widely held beliefs about computation and PDP models. We will briefly consider two variants of
+these beliefs. The first, quite simply, is that PDP models cannot do
+recursion.
+Hinton's recursive processor needs considerably more
+development before we will have a working simulation that proves that
+this belief is wrong, but it seems clear enough that a recursive PDP
+processor will be available fairly soon. In fact, it is likely that a slightly
+different approach will be explored more fully first: Touretzky and Hinton (1985) have recently developed a PDP implementation of a production system that can do rudimentary variable binding, and at present
+it appears that they may be able to extend it to perform recursive
+computations.
+The second belief seems to follow from the first: It is that PDP
+models are inherently incapable of processing a full range of sentences.
+We say it only seems to follow because it depends upon accepting the
+assumption that in order to process sentences it is necessary to be able
+to do recursion. Most people who have thought computationally about
+sentence processing are familiar with sentence-processing mechanisms
+that are in fact recursive, such as the ATN (Woods, 1970) or the
+Marcus parser. Since sentences are recursively defined structures, the
+(implicit) argument goes, the mechanisms for parsing them must themselves operate recursively.
+Fanty's (1985) parser, or an extension of it incorporating connection
+information distribution, begins to suggest that this may not be so. In a
+programmable version of Fanty's parser, we would have captured the
+essential property of a recursive automaton-that the same procedural
+knowledge be applicable at any point in a parse tree. But we would
+have captured it in a very exciting new way, a way that would free the
+mechanism from the serial processing constraint that prevents conventional recursive mechanisms from being able to exploit constraints from
+many levels at the same time. Connection information distribution
+may actually permit us to reap the benefits of simultaneous mutual constraints while at the same time enjoying the benefits of being able to
+apply the same bit of knowledge at many points in processing the same
+sentence.
+There are a couple of caveats, however. One is that connection
+information distribution is very expensive computationally; a
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+323
+considerable number of units and connections are required to handle
+the input to and output from the central knowledge structures (see
+Chapter 12 for further discussion), and the resource demands made by
+even a fixed version of Fanty's parser are quite high already.
+There
+may turn out to be ways of reducing the resource demands made by the
+Fanty parser. In the meantime, it is worth asking whether some other
+approach might not succeed nearly as well with fewer resources.
+Context-sensitive coding, iteration, and center embedding. There is
+one more belief about sentences, this one even more deeply ingrained
+than the last, that we have tacitly accepted up to this point. This is the
+belief that sentences are indeed recursively defined structures. Clearly.
+sentences are recursively definable, but there is one proviso: Only one
+level of center embedding is allowed. It may be controversial whether
+the "true" competence grammar of English accepts multiple centerembedded sentences, but people cannot parse such sentences without
+the use of very special strategies, and do not even judge them to be
+acceptable (G. A. Miller, 1962). Consider, for example, the
+"sentence":
+(16) The man who the girl who the dog chased liked laughed.
+The unparsability of sentences such as (16) has usually been explained
+by an appeal to adjunct assumptions about performance limitations
+(e.g., working-memory limitations), but it may be, instead, that they
+are unparsable because the parser, by the general nature of its design, is
+simply incapable of processing such sentences. 13
+It should be noted that parsers like the ATN and the Marcus parser
+are most eradi sy
+are most certainly not intrinsically incapable of processing such sentences. Indeed, such parsers are especially well suited for handling an
+indefinite number of center embeddings. Such mechanisms are clearly
+necessary for processing such things as Lisp expressions, such as this
+one taken from a program (actually, itself a parser) written by Jeff
+Sokolov:
+(land (eq (car (explode arg)) '/)
+(eq (car (reverse (explode arg))) '/))
+implode (reverse (cdr (reverse (cr (explode arg)))))))
+13 This argument has been made previously by a number of other authors, including
+Reich (1969). In fact, Reich proposed an iterative approach to sentence processing that is
+similar, in some respects, to the one we consider here.
+
+324 PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+But sentences in natural language are simply not structured in this way.
+Perhaps, then, the search for a model of natural language processing
+has gone down the garden path, chasing a recursive white rabbit.
+One approach to sentence processing holds that we should ask much
+less of a syntactic parser and leave most of the work of sentence processing to a more conceptual level of processing. This position is most
+strongly associated with Schank (1973), and Charniak (1983) is among
+the recent proponents of this view.
+Let us assume that the job of the parser is to spit out phrases
+encoded in a form that captures their local context, in a way that is
+similar to the way the verb learning model, described in Chapter 18, in
+a form that captures their local context 14 Such a representation mav
+prove sufficient to allow us to reconstruct the correct bindings of noun
+phrases to verbs and prepositional phrases to nearby nouns and verbs.
+In fact, we suspect that this kind of local context-sensitive encoding can
+capture the attachments of NPs to the right verbs in "tail-recursive"
+sentences like
+(17) This is the farmer that kept the cock that waked the priest that
+married the man that milked the cow that tossed the dog that
+worried the cat that killed the rat that ate the malt that lay in
+the house that Jack built. 'S
+Locally context-sensitive coding will begin to break down, however,
+when there is center embedding-specifically, more than one level of
+center embedding. Local context can be used to signal both the beginning and the end of an embedding, but cannot be used to specify which
+beginning of an embedding the material just after the end of an embedding should be bound to. Thus if we read to the last word of
+(18) The man who the girl who the dog chased laughed
+we may not know whether to bind laughed (just after the end of the
+embedding) to the man (NP before an embedding) or to the girl (a different NP before an embedding). If we bind it to the man, we may
+14 For this to work it will be necessary to code units, not in terms of the adjacent
+words, but in terms of neighboring constituents more abstractly defined. Thus, in The girl
+in the hat saw the mouse on the floor, we will want to encode the complex NP the girl in the
+hat as adjacent to the verb saw. Thus, local context will have to be defined, as it is in
+Marcus (1980), in terms of constituents, not merely in terms of words. Getting this to
+work will be one of the major challenges facing this approach.
+IS Adapted from E. Johnson, E. R. Sickels, & F. C. Sayers (Eds.), Anthology of
+Children's Literature (4th ed., p. 16), 1970, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
+
+19. SENTENCE PROCESSING
+325
+experience a false sense of closure-this sentence is ungrammatical
+because it has only two verbs for three clauses.
+These suggestions lead us to the following conjecture: It may be possible to build a PDP language-processing mechanism that works iteratively along a sentence, building constituents represented by distributed
+patterns conjunctively encoded with their local context of occurrence.
+The mechanism would need a way of unifying constituents on two sides
+of an intervening embedding. Exactly how this would be done remains
+to be established, but as long as it is done in terms of a mechanism
+sensitive only to the local context of the constituents before and after
+the embedding, it may succeed where there is a single embedding but
+fail in multiply embedded sentences where there are two suspended,
+incomplete constituents that the mechanism must choose between
+completing.
+We hope it is clear that these ideas are speculative and that they are
+but pointers to directions for further research. Indeed, all three of the
+directions we have described in this section are only just beginning to
+be explored systematically, and it is unclear which of them will prove
+most attractive on closer scrutiny. We mention them because they suggest that ways of overcoming some of the apparent limitations of PDP
+mechanisms may not be very far beyond our present grasp, and that it
+may soon be possible to retain the benefits of parallel distributed processing in mechanisms that can cope with the structural complexity and
+semantic nuance of natural language.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+This work is supported by ONR Contract N00014-82-C-0374, NR
+667-483,
+by a Research
+Scientist Career Development Award
+(MH00385) to the first author, and by grants from the Sloan Foundation and the System Development Foundation. We would like to thank
+Liz Bates, Gene Charniak, Gary Cottrell, Gary Dell, Mark Derthick,
+Mark Fanty, Geoff Hinton, Ron Kaplan, Brian MacWhinney, Dave
+Rumelhart, Bart Selman, and Michael Tanenhaus for useful comments
+and discussions.
+
+PART V
+One of the appeals of parallel distributed processing is the fact that it
+seems closer to the neural basis of cognition
+than most other
+approaches to cognitive processes. The idea that intelligent processing
+can emerge from the interactions of a large number of simple computational units and their interactions is, of course, directly inspired by what
+we know about the way the brain works.
+Further, several of the
+specific assumptions embodied in particular models have been inspired
+by observed characteristics of neural function.
+This part of the book explores the neural mechanisms underlying
+parallel distributed processing in three different, though interrelated
+ways. First, it examines what we know and do not know about relevant
+aspects of the brain. Second, it considers the precise nature of the relation between concepts at a neural level of analysis, and concepts at
+higher, more cognitive levels. Third, it presents three specific attempts
+to bring PDP and neuroscience closer together by capturing aspects of
+neural function in simulation models based on the PDP framework laid
+out in Chapter 2.
+The relevant neurophysiology. There is, of course, a vast body of
+data about the details of human brain function, and it would be hopeless to try to summarize all of this information within the confines of
+our book. However, among these data are some emerging principles
+and observations about the characteristics of the mammalian brain that
+seem particularly relevant to parallel distributed processing.
+
+328
+In Chapter 20, Crick and Asanuma describe the principles and observations they see as most salient, based on their ongoing survey of the
+neurophysiology of the mammalian brain. The focus is on the details
+of neuronal interaction and on the developing state of knoweldge about
+the regional architecture of the visual system, as revealed through physiological and anatomical experiments, primarily in primates.
+The
+material in this chapter is useful background for any PDP modeler, and
+will be of particular interest to anyone interested in modeling
+the
+detailed properties of real neural circuitry.
+In Chapter 21, Sejnowski takes a somewhat different approach, and
+considers several general questions about brain function. By and large,
+neurophysiological data do not answer such questions in a definitive
+way, but they do suggest several principles of brain function that should
+continue to help steer our efforts to capture the essential features of
+the computational processes that take place in the human brain.
+The relation between PDP models and the brain. There are several
+different ways in which PDP models relate to the brain.
+Different
+pieces of work represented in this book have different relationships to
+the details of brain structure. All share in common that they are "neurally inspired" models and are explorations of "brain-style" processing.
+Beyond this, however, there are some important differences. Here, we
+briefly outline some of these different approaches, and say how they
+relate to the chapters in Part V.
+Some PDP models are intended to explore the computational properties of "brain-like"
+networks. The models described in Parts II and III
+are generally of this type. They consider sets of units with specified
+characteristics, and study what can be computed with them, how many
+units are required to do certain computations, etc. These models focus
+on parallel processing mechanisms more or less in their own right, quite
+apart from facts about the details of brain structure or the details of
+human behavior and cognition.
+There are two principle kinds of motivations for this computational
+type of work. One is that the mechanisms under study are sufficiently
+brain-like that they may shed light on the actual way in which computation is done in the brain. The fact that these models generally idealize
+various properties of the brain may in many cases be a virtue for understanding brain function, since idealization, as Sejnowski points out in
+Chapter 21, can often facilitate an analysis that leads to deeper understanding of the emergent properties of complex systems. Indeed, some
+of this work is driven by the goal of exploring the implications of
+specific properties of brain function, such as the stochastic nature of
+neural firing, as explored in harmony theory (Chapter 6) and in
+Boltzmann machines (Chapter 7). The other motivation is to explore
+
+INTRODUCTION TO PART V
+329
+the computational capacities of networks that appear on their surface to
+be well suited to certain kinds of information-processing tasks, such as
+search or representation building.
+Other PDP models-and here we have in mind primarily the models
+in Part IV-attempt more directly to build accounts of human information processing capabilities, at a level of abstraction somewhat higher
+than the level of individual neurons and connections. In such models,
+the relationship between particular brain structures and particular elements of the models is not generally specified, but since the models
+attempt to capture the behavioral products of the activity of human
+brains, it is assumed that there is some relationship to real activity in
+the brain. The basic idea is that there is a mapping between elements
+of the model and the brain, but it is unknown and probably only
+approximate. A single unit may correspond to a neuron, a cluster of
+neurons, or a conceptual entity related in a complex way to actual
+neurons.
+It might be thought that by adopting this more abstract approach,
+these models lose all contact with the underlying neurophysiological
+mechanisms. This is not the case. While models of cognitive processes
+may be developed without detailed regard for the underlying physiology, some of the characteristics of the brain clearly place constraints on
+the cognitive mechanisms. Some examples are the speed and precision
+of the basic computational elements, the general characteristics of their
+patterns of interconnection, the nature of the operations they can perform, the number of elements available in the brain, etc. (Chapter 4
+provides a fuller discussion of these points). It becomes important,
+then, to develop some way of relating the more abstract, cognitive-level
+theory to the underlying neurophysiology. More fundamentally, this
+relation is central to conceptions of the relation between mind an brain.
+It is therefore of considerable importance to have an explicit theoretical
+framework for conceptualizing the exact nature of this relation. This
+point is addressed by Smolensky in Chapter 22.
+In still other cases, the goal is to do neural modeling-to account for
+the facts of neuroscience rather than (or in addition to) the facts of
+cognition. This use of PDP models involves less idealization of the
+neural elements and more attention to the details of brain structure.
+Crick favors these applications for he feels that building up from the
+facts about real neural function is the best way to find out the way
+things really work-as opposed to the way things might work-in the
+brain. The last three chapters of Part V take this approach.
+We hasten to add that we do not think any one of these uses is the
+"right" or "only" way to employ PDP models. Rather, we believe that
+work at each of these levels complements and reinforces work at the
+other levels, and that work at all of these levels will eventually allow us
+
+330
+to converge on an understanding of the nature of the cognitive
+processes that the brain supports and the neural mechanisms underlying
+these processes.
+We believe that the use of the common PDP framework for all of these applications will facilitate this process.
+PDP models of neural mechanisms. Chapters 23 through 25 each
+take their own approach to modeling information-processing activity in
+the brain. Chapters 23 and 24 are explicit attempts to develop models
+that capture aspects of what is known about the behavior of neurons,
+while Chapter 25 focuses on neuropsychological data.
+In Chapter 23, Zipser takes as his goal the development of biologically plausible models of place learning and goal localization in the rat.
+The goal of the models is to account for localization and place learning
+behavior, and at the same time, incorporate knowledge gained from
+single-unit recording experiments. The first model described in the
+chapter accounts for the behavior of so-called "place-field" cells in the
+hippocampus of the rat, and is closely tied to the physiological data.
+Two other, more speculative models work toward an account of goal
+localization, about which less of the physiology is known.
+In Chapter 24, Munro considers the plasticity of neural mechanisms,
+as revealed through studies of single units in visual cortex after various
+schedules of visual deprivation and other forms of intervention. He
+shows how a very simple neural model that focuses on the plasticity of
+individual units can account for much of the data on the critical period.
+The account is based on the simple observation that changes in the
+connections of a neuron will make more difference if its prior connections are weak than if they are strong. The critical period is seen, on
+this account, as a simple manifestation of the natural consequences of
+the strengthening of connections through experience, and not as a manifestation of some sort of preordained maturational process that turns
+off plasticity.
+Chapter 25 is not concerned with modeling data on the behavior of
+individual neurons; rather, it is concerned with reconciling neuropsychological evidence about amnesia with distributed models of
+memory. In distributed models, such as the one described in Chapter
+17, information of different ages is stored in superimposed form, in the
+same set of connections. This fact provides a natural way of accounting
+for one aspect of amnesia: the fact that amnesics exhibit the residual
+ability to learn, gradually, from repeated experiences, even though their
+memory for individual
+episodes is extremely weak. Distributed
+memory, however, seems incompatible with another aspect of amnesia:
+namely, the temporally graded nature of the retrograde amnesia-the
+loss of prior information - that accompanies the reduction in the capacily to learn new material. If all memories are stored in the same set of
+
+INTRODUCTION TO PART V
+331
+connections, why should more recent ones be more susceptible to loss
+or disruption than older ones? Chapter 25 reports simulations of various aspects of anterograde and retrograde amnesia, based on one possible answer to this question.
+
+CHAPTER 20
+Certain Aspects of the
+Anatomy and Physiology of the Cerebral Cortex
+F. CRICK and C. ASANUMA
+Our aim in this chapter is to describe some aspects of our present
+knowledge of the anatomy and physiology of the cerebral cortex of
+higher animals which may be of interest to theorists. We shall assume
+that readers have at least an elementary knowledge of this subject, so
+that they know, for instance, about the structure of neurons and the
+basis of neuronal excitation and synaptic transmission. The text by
+Kandel and Schwartz (1981) could be used to cover this background
+knowledge.
+It is clearly impossible to describe most of what is known, even
+though this represents a tiny fraction of what one would like to know.
+We shall select examples to illustrate the general points we want to
+make. It will soon emerge that while some things are known with reasonable certainty, much is unknown or, even worse, surmised only on
+rather incomplete evidence. For this reason alone, the object of this
+chapter is not to dictate to theorists what "units" they must use in their
+modeling. It might turn out that theory will show that a particular process, or implementation of a process, gives a very advantageous performance, even though the experimentalists can, as yet, see no sign of
+it. The wise thing at that point would be to look for it experimentally,
+since it may have been overlooked for one or another technical reason.
+This aside, theorists should at least try to learn whether the features
+they wish to use for their implementation do actually occur in the
+relevant part of the brain, and they should be duly cautious if the
+
+334 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+experimentalist can see no trace of them. Whether a theorist's unit can
+be a group of neurons is discussed later.
+One other general point should perhaps be stated at the outset. Different parts of the brain are "wired" in radically different ways. It is
+thus not sensible to take one feature from, say, the olfactory bulb,
+another from the thalamus, and a third from the cerebellum, and combine them all together to account for a task that the cortex is expected
+to perform. Wherever possible, therefore, we shall choose examples
+from the mammalian cerebral cortex, both because so much work has
+been done on it and also because the problems theorists choose are
+often taken from aspects of human behavior that are mediated by the
+cerebral cortex. Excursions to other parts of the nervous system, such
+as the retina, cerebellum, and the olfactory bulb, will be made only
+when necessary to clarify certain points. Figure 1 illustrates a human
+brain and demonstrates the general location of some of its internal
+structures in relation to the cerebral cortex. However our aim in this
+chapter is not to describe the cerebral cortex as fully as possible, as one
+would need to do if one were concerned with its detailed workings, but
+CEREBRUM
+CAUDATE NUCLEUS
+THALAMUS
+MIRAIN
+..- AMYGDALA
+HYPOTHALAMUS
+- OPTIC CHIASM
+PUTAMEN
+AND GLOBUS
+PALLIDUS
+HIPPOCAMPUS
+PONS AND
+HINDBRAIN
+OLfACTORY BULB
+CEREBELLUM
+SPINAL CORD
+PITUITARY
+FIGURE 1. The human brain. The cerebral cortex is depicted transparently in this
+drawing so that some of the internal brain structures are visible. (From "The Organization of the Brain" by W. J. H. Nauta and M. Feirtag, 1979, Scientific American, 241, p.
+102. Copyright 1979 by W. H. Freeman & Co. Reprinted by permission.)
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+335
+merely to point out certain features of the cortex which should not be
+overlooked in theoretical modeling.
+Another general point that should be made is that in many cases
+theorists choose problems associated with either language or the human
+visual system without recognizing that there is at least one important
+difference between them. Put briefly, there is no animal model for
+language, nor is it possible to carry out many types of experiments on
+the language centers of the human brain for obvious ethical reasons.
+Most of the really useful new methods used in neuroanatomy, such as
+tritiated amino acid autoradiography.
+, horseradish peroxidase histochemistry, and metabolic mapping with ['4C] deoxyglucose can only be usec
+effectively on animals. We are in the embarrassing position of knowing
+a lot about the neuroanatomy of the macaque monkey while having
+only a very limited amount of similar information about the human
+brain. Similarly, the most powerful neurophysiological technique-the
+use of microelectrodes for isolating the electrical activity of single neurons (or small groups of neurons) — is not suited for extensive use on
+humans. This disadvantage is partly offset by the greater ease with
+which human psychophysical experiments can be done. There are also
+a number of techniques which can be used to study aspects of the
+neural activity from the outside. These include position emission
+tomography (PET scanning), magnetic field detectors, electroencephalography, (EEG) and scalp recordings of evoked potentials.
+Unfortunately either the spatial or the temporal resolution of these
+methods is usually inadequate, and, as a result, the interpretation of the
+results is often not clear cut.
+In the long run, a theoretical model in biology can only be validated
+by a detailed comparison with experiment. All psychophysical tests
+show that the performance of the visual system of the macaque monkey is roughly comparable to our own. From this point of view, therefore, the solutions of visual problems should be easier to bring down to
+earth than linguistic ones.
+This does not mean that linguistic problems
+may not suggest valuable ideas about the working of the brain. It does
+mean that they may be more difficult to test at the level of neuronal
+organization and function.
+The Neuron
+The "classical" neuron has several dendrites, usually branched, which
+receive information from other neurons and a single axon which outputs the processed information usually by the propagation of a "spike"
+or an "action potential." The axon ramifies into various branches that
+make synapses onto the dendrites and cell bodies of other neurons.
+
+336
+This simple picture (Figure 2A) has become complicated in several
+ways:
+(For a more thorough, yet general account, see the book by
+Shepherd, 1979.)
+• A neuron may have no obvious axon but only "processes" that
+seem to both receive and transmit information (Figure 2B).
+An example of such neurons is the various amacrine cells
+found in the retina (Cajal, 1892). Although neurons without
+axons also occur in the olfactory bulb (Cajal, 1911), they have
+not been convincingly demonstrated in other parts of the nervous system.
+• Axons may form synapses on other axons. In the cerebral cortex these synapses have been found only upon the initial segments of the axons of certain cells (Figure 2C) (Peters,
+Proskauer, & Kaiserman-Abramof, 1968; Westrum, 1966).
+• Dendrites may form synapses onto other dendrites (Figure
+2D). Examples of this are known in the retina (Dowling &
+Boycott, 1966), the olfactory bulb (Rall, Shepherd, Reese, &
+Brightman, 1966), the thalamus (Famiglietti, 1970), the superior colliculus (R
+D. Lund, 1972), and the spinal cord (Ralston, 1968), but such contacts appear to be rare or absent in the
+cerebral cortex.
+• An axon may not propagate a spike but instead produce a
+graded potential. Because of attenuation, we should expect this
+form of information signaling not to occur over long distances,
+and indeed it is found largely in such places as the retina,
+where the distances between connected neurons are shorter
+than in many other neural tissues; possibly because the time
+requirements are different (Figure 2E) (Werblin & Dowling,
+1969). It is also conceivable that graded potentials occur at
+more local levels (Figure 2F). For example, an axon terminal
+forming a synapse on a given cell may itself receive a synapse.
+The presynaptic synapse may exert only a local potential change
+which is therefore restricted to that axon terminal. (The
+existence of this sort of a mechanism has been suggested for
+the spinal cord [Kuno, 1964] and the thalamus lAndersen,
+Brooks, Eccles, & Sears, 1964], but to date, no examples of this
+arrangement have been reported in the cerebral cortex.)
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+337
+A.
+Axon
+Synapse
+Cell Body
+Dendrite
+F.
+Axon# 2
+FIGURE 2. Highly schematized diagrams of the "classical" neuronal profile (4) and
+some of its variants (B-F). A: The "classical" neuron receives synapses on its dendrites
+and generates action potentials which travel down the axon. The axon subsequently
+branches and forms synapses on the dendrites and cell bodies of other neurons. B: There
+are neurons with no obvious axons. C: The initial segments of axons of neurons in the
+cerebral cortex may receive synapses. Note the highly strategic position of this kind of
+synapse. D: Dendrites forming synapses directly onto the dendrites of other neurons
+occur in the olfactory bulb and the thalamus. E: Graded potentials (instead of action
+potentials) can be effective if the axon is short. F: Graded potentials can also be effective
+at local levels. Here, Axon #2 can modulate the efficacy of the synapse formed by Axon
+# 1 by producing a local potential change in the terminal of Axon #1.
+
+338 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+Synapses
+The great majority of synapses in the cerebral cortex are chemical,
+not electrical. A small star-shaped neuron (stellate cell) may receive a
+few hundred synapses, a small pyramid-shaped neuron (pyramidal cell)
+some thousands, and a large pyramidal cell some tens of thousands of
+synapses. Despite the large and variable number of synaptic contacts
+present upon neurons in the cerebral cortex, most synaptic contacts can
+be classified morphologically into two basic types (see Figure 3)
+(Peters, Palay, & Webster, 1976):
+• Type 1. These synapses have asymmetrical membrane specializations (the membrane thickening is greater on the postsynaptic
+side), and the presynaptic process contains fairly large (ca. 50
+nm), round synaptic vesicles-believed to contain quanta, or
+packets of neurotransmitter. The synaptic cleft is usually about
+30 nm across.
+• Type II. These have symmetrical membrane specializations.
+The synaptic vesicles are smaller and, with the usual fixatives
+used for electron microscopy, are often ellipsoidal or flattened.
+(The shape of the vesicles depends on the details of the fixation and is not always a completely reliable criterion when comparing results reported by different investigators.) The synaptic
+cleft is usually 20 nm across and the zone of apposition is usually smaller than that of the Type I synapse.
+B
+FIGURE 3. Idealized diagrams of a Type I (A) and a Type II (B) synapse. See text for
+explanation.
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+339
+The importance of the classification into the two morphological types
+(originally recognized by Gray, 1959) is that Type I synapses seem to be
+excitatory, whereas Type II synapses seem to be inhibitory. We should add
+that the foregoing statement, though generally accepted by experimentalists, has not been systematically tested. In systems where the excitatory or inhibitory nature of a given synapse is well established, this
+correlation of morphology with physiology appears to be absolute
+(Uchizono, 1965).
+There is another possible criterion for determining the character of
+synapses: This is the transmitter they use. In general, one is apt to
+assume that a given transmitter (or apparent transmitter) will usually
+do the same thing in different places, though there are well-established
+exceptions (depending on the nature of the postsynaptic receptors).
+Glutamate and aspartate always seem to excite, GABA (gamma-amino
+butyric acid) always seems to inhibit (Krnjevíc & Phillis, 1963). (It
+may come as a surprise to the reader to learn that for most cells in the
+brain we do not yet know what neurotransmitter they use.) The identity of the transmitters is usually determined immunocytochemically.
+Thus, an antibody staining for the enzyme glutamic acid decarboxylase
+(GAD), which is necessary for the production of GABA, can be used
+to identify some of the inhibitory synapses in that tissue.
+Various other methods have been used to identify possible neurotransmitters, for example: injecting the putative transmitters on to neurons while recording from them, microassays to determine their level in
+the tissue, labeling of high affinity uptake systems, etc. Each technique
+has limitations on what it can show. At the moment it is difficult to
+identify the transmitters involved and their postsynaptic effects at most
+synapses in the central nervous system. That said, we can make a tentative list of possible generalizations about synapses, although most of
+them are only supported by our ignorance:
+• No axon makes Type I synapses at some sites while making
+Type Il at others.
+• No axon in the mammalian brain has been shown to release
+two different nonpeptide neurotransmitters. (But it seems likely
+that many neurons, including cortical neurons,
+may release a
+"conventional" transmitter and a neuropeptide, or in some
+cases two or more neuropeptides.)
+• There is no evidence so far in the mammalian brain that the
+same axon can cause excitation and inhibition at different
+synapses, but this is certainly possible since the effect of a
+given transmitter ultimately depends on the kinds of receptors
+present and their associated ion channels.
+
+340
+Peptides
+A remarkable discovery over the last ten years or so has been the
+existence of many distinct peptides, of various sorts and sizes, which
+can act as neurotransmitters (see Iverson, 1984, for review). There
+are, however, reasons to suspect that peptides are different from more
+conventional transmitters such as acetylcholine or norepinephrine:
+• Peptides appear to "modulate" synaptic function rather than to
+activate it by themselves.
+• The action of peptides, in the few cases studied, usually appears
+to come on slowly and to persist for some time. That is, for
+times up to seconds or even minutes rather than for a
+i few
+milliseconds or less as is the case for conventional transmitters.
+• In some cases it has been shown that peptides act not at their
+place of release but at some distance away. This distance may
+be perhaps some tens of micra or further if carried by a vascular system (as in the path from the hypothalamus to the pituitary). Diffusion takes time. The slow time of onset would be
+compatible with the possible time delays produced by diffusion.
+• There are many examples now known of a single neuron producing (and presumably releasing) more than one neuropeptide.
+It has been argued that peptides form a second, slower means of
+communication between neurons that is more economical than using
+extra neurons for this purpose. Different peptides are used in the same
+tissue to enable this communication to have some degree of specificity.
+(We should remark that so far very little is known about either the
+receptors for peptides or the physiological role of most neuropeptides.)
+THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+We shall assume that the reader has some familiarity with the structure of the cerebral cortex and with the behavior of the neurons it contains. For an excellent review of the functional architecture of the primary visual cortex, see Hubel and Wiesel, 1977. This section aims to
+expand that knowledge. We shall not deal here with the non-neuronal
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+341
+cells in the cortex (the glial cells, which may outnumber the neurons
+by 10-50 times) nor with its blood supply, though both these topics are
+of considerable practical and clinical importance.
+The cerebral cortex is conventionally divided into the allocortex
+(comprising olfactory and limbic cortical areas and the phylogenetically
+more recent neocortex, which is all the rest. We shall be concerned
+almost exclusively with the neocortex, the extensive development of
+which
+is characteristic of the mammalian brain,
+especially the
+behaviorally more interesting primates.
+General Organization
+The neocortex consists of two distinct sheets of neurons, one on
+each side of the head. Each sheet is relatively thin (typical thicknesses
+run from 1.5 to about 5 mm) and continuous. This is illustrated in Figure 4. Although it is highly convoluted in most of the larger mammals,
+the neocortex has no slits in it and, as far as we know, no insulating
+barriers within it. Since it is a continuous finite sheet, it must have an
+edge. This edge is surrounded by allocortical areas and by various noncortical structures. The sheets on either side of the head are connected
+by a massive fiber bundle, the corpus callosum. In humans, each sheet
+has an area of roughly 1000 cm (Henneberg, 1910). In the macaque
+monkey the figure is nearer 100 cm?
+Each sheet of the neocortex is highly stratified. An example of the
+stratification in a typical cortical area is shown in Figure SA. Historically and didactically, the neocortex has been subdivided into six layers
+(Lewis, 1878), although a more convenient parcellation can be made
+into four main layers, which can then be divided further. These four
+layers are listed below, along with their most prominent features.
+• A superficial layer (usually referred to as layer I). This layer has
+rather few cell bodies and consists mainly of axons and apical
+dendrites. (The presence of this superficial cell-poor layer
+seems to be characteristic of a "cortical" arrangement of neurons, be it the neocortex, the allocortex, or the cerebellar
+cortex.)
+• An upper layer (layers II and III). This layer contains the
+smaller pyramidal neurons which send their main axons to
+other cortical areas, either in the same hemisphere or on the
+opposite side.
+
+342
+LATERAL VENTRICLE
+SUPERIOR COLLICULUS
+CEREBRAL CORTEX
+CEREBRAL AQUEDUCT
+CENTRAL GRAY SUBSTANCE
+THALAMUS
+THIRD VENTRICLE
+PONS
+HIPPOCAMPUS
+CEREBELLUM
+SUBSTANTIA NIGRA
+AMYGDALA
+SPINAL CORD
+FIGURE 4. A human brain is sliced and opened like a book to demonstrate the continuity of each cortical sheet and its relation to some internal structures. (From "The
+Organization of the Brain" by W. J. H. Nauta and M. Feirtag, 1979, Scientific American,
+241, p. 92. Copyright 1979 by W. H. Freeman & Co. Reprinted by permission.)
+• A middle layer (layer IV). In this layer are found the densely
+packed small stellate neurons whose axons commonly ascend
+vertically to terminate in the upper layers.
+• A deep layer (layers V and VI). This layer contains the larger
+pyramidal neurons whose axons leave the cortex to terminate in
+subcortical structures such as the striatum, the claustrum, the
+thalamus, the brain stem, and the spinal cord. (Occasional
+pyramidal neurons are present in this layer which project to
+other cortical areas rather than projecting subcortically.)
+This broad division covers all parts of the neocortex, but there is
+considerable regional variation in the relative amount of each layer.
+The middle layer in the primary sensory areas is usually rather thick,
+e.g., in the striate cortex of primates the middle layer is so pronounced
+and differentiated that it can be divided into four sublayers (Figure 5B).
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+343
+SUPERFICIAL
+UPPER
+MIDDLE
+SSUPERFICIAL A
+UPPER
+a
+b
+MIDDLE
+y ca
+cB
+#SUPERFICIAL
+UPPER
+DEEP
+DEEP
+DEEP
+FIGURE S. Top: Some examples of variations in
+cortical stratification patterns. The
+stain used is selective for cell bodies. The surface of the brain is at the top in each of
+these photomicrographs. A: Parietal cortex. In most cortical areas, the four main layers
+are easily recognized. B: Striate cortex. A marked differentiation of the middle layer is
+evident in primary sensory areas. C: Motor cortex. The middle layer is virtually absent
+in the primary motor cortex. Bottom: Stains selective for cell bodies are often used to
+differentiate cortical areas and thalamic nuclei. D: Cross-section of the junction between
+the striate cortex and its immediately adjacent area (area 18). The border is clearly evident (indicated by the arrow) due to the marked differentiation of the middle layer in the
+striate cortex (right of arrow), and the lack of such a differentiation in the middle layer
+of area 18 (left of arrow). E: The lateral geniculate nucleus is a laminated nucleus, which
+can easily be identified in cross-sections of the thalamus. Six distinct sheets of neurons
+can be recognized in the macaque and human lateral geniculate nucleus. All photomicrographs are taken from macaque monkey brains. Bars represent ½ millimeter in A-C, and
+1 millimeter in Dand E.
+In contrast, the middle layer is virtually nonexistent in the primary
+motor area (Figure SC).
+In addition to the horizontal stratification of neuronal cell bodies,
+there is a pronounced vertical arrangement of dendritic and axonal
+
+344
+arborizations in the neocortex (Figure 6). Not only do most of the
+incoming and outgoing axons travel vertically across the layers to enter
+or exit from the deep aspect of the cortical sheet, but many of the dendritic and axonal processes of neurons in the neocortex are vertically
+oriented (the ascending dendrites of pyramidal cells are particularly
+good examples of this-see Figure 14A,B).
+The number of neurons per unit volume of the neocortex varies
+somewhat, but the total number of neurons underlying a given unit of
+surface area is remarkably constant from one area of the cortex to
+another and from species to species (Rockel, Hiorns, & Powell, 1980).
+In the unshrunken state, this figure is about 80,000 per mm? (Powell &
+Hendrickson, 1981). An exception is the striate cortex of primates,
+where the figure is about 2½ times as large (Rockel et al., 1980). The
+reasons for this regularity (and the exception) are not known.
+Wa
+FIGURE 6. The pronounced vertical orientation of many of the dendritic and axonal
+processes in the neocortex is evident in this diagram of the parietal cortex of an adult
+mouse. At the left is a diagrammatic representation of all neuronal cell bodies within one
+very thin section; at the center are the cell bodies and dendrites of some pyramidal neurons, and at the right are some different types of cortical input axons. The surface of the
+brain is at the top. (From "Cerebral Cortex: Architecture, Intracortical Connections,
+Motor Projections" by R. Lorente de Nó. In Physiology of the Nervous System, p. 282,
+edited by J. F. Fulton, 1943, New York: Oxford University Press. Copyright 1943 by
+Oxford University Press. Reprinted by permission.)
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+345
+Cortical Areas
+The neocortex, as already implied, appears to consist of several distinct areas, or "fields" (Rose, 1949). These differ somewhat in their
+histological appearance! (the striate cortex, for example, can be easily
+recognized in cross section by the presence of a distinct stripe through
+the middle layer [Figure SD], although most areas are not so easily
+recognized.), anatomical connections, and the functions they perform.
+The hope is that in time it will be possible to parcel out unambiguously
+the entire neocortex into a number of distinct functional areas. Within
+each such area we may expect there to be considerable homogeneity of
+cell types, connections, and functions, all of which are likely to change
+rather abruptly when one crosses the border of each area and passes
+into another area. The number of distinct areas in the neocortex of
+humans (on one side) is likely to be of the order of 100. Presently, the
+most commonly accepted cortical parcellation scheme is the one that
+was established by Brodmann (1909) and is illustrated in Figure 7.
+Although extremely accurate in certain places, this map will undoubtedly be refined in future years.
+It has yet to be shown that this simple concept of cortical area may
+not break down in parts of the neocortex. If it holds up, we should be
+able to count their exact number, so that we could say that in humans
+there are, say, 137 and not 136 distinct cortical areas. Eventually it
+should be possible to distinguish each area and thus construct a fourcolor map of the cortex
+This concept of cortical area appears to hold up fairly well in those
+cortical areas concerned with early visual processing. In primates there
+appear to be at least ten of them, covering the region occupied by
+Brodmann's areas 17, 18, and 19 (Figure 8) It applies very well to the
+striate cortex (area 17), sometimes called the first visual area (or VI),
+and to the area known as MT (or the middle temporal area. In the
+macaque, VI is an exceptionally large area, whereas MT is rather small,
+being less than 10% the size of VI (Van Essen, Maunsell, & Bixby,
+1981; Weller & Kaas, 1983). The size of the other early visual areas
+will probably fall between these limits. It is important to not lose sight
+of the basic definition of a cortical area: ridiculously small subdivisions
+that do not reflect real functional differences can obscure the utility of
+this concept.
+1 The common terms used for these differences are cytoarchitectonics and myeloarchitectonics. The former refers to the differences in neuronal density and to the relative
+development of individual cortical layers; the latter refers to differences in the distributions of axons (especially myelinated axons) within the cortex which varies from area to
+area.
+
+346
+38
+18
+18
+FIGURE 7. Brodmann's areas of the human cerebral cortex. Each of his areas are numbered and indicated by different symbols. A: Medial surface of the cerebral cortex (the
+black areas are occupied by fiber bundles crossing the midline to connect the two hemispheres). B: Lateral surface of the cerebral cortex. (From Vergleichende Localisationslehre der Grosshirnrinde in Ihren Prinzipien Dargestellt auf Grund des Zellenbaues [Principles of comparative localization in the cerebral cortex presented on the basis of cytoarchitecture],
+by K. Brodmann, 1909, Leipzig: Barth. Copyright 1909 by Barth Publishing. Reprinted
+by permission.)
+Cortical Inputs
+An important feature of the neocortex is that almost all the outside
+information it receives (either from the sensory periphery or from
+other subcortical centers), with the exception of some olfactory
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+347
+DM -
+Calcarine
+Sulcus
+VI
+PP
+Frontal Eye
+Fields
+Motor
+Somatic
+Proper
+SI
+Post.
+Cutaneous
+Deep
+Somatic
+DM
+DII
+VI
+Deep
+Sylvian
+Sulcus
+Al
+VI
+VII+
+IT
+5mm
+FIGURE 8. Visual processing areas of the owl monkey cerebral cortex. Each of the dilferent types of shading represent different areas. +'s indicate the regions representing
+the dorsal half of the visual field. -'s indicate the ventral half of the visual field. DI,
+dorsointermediate visual area; DL, dorsolateral crescent visual area; DM, dorsomedial
+visual area; IT, inferotemporal cortex; M, medial visual area; MT, middle temporal
+visual area; PP, posterior parietal cortex; VA, ventral anterior visual area; VP, ventral
+posterior visual area; VI, first visual area; V2, second visual area. (From
+Response Properties of Neurons in Four Extrastriate Visual Areas of the Owl Monkey
+(Aotus trivirgatus): A Quantitative Comparison of the Medial, Dorsomedial, Dorsolateral,
+and Middle Temporal Areas" by J. F. Baker, S. E. Petersen, W. T. Newsome, and J. Allman, 1981, Journal of Neurophysiology, 45, p. 400. Copyright 1981 by The American Physiological Society. Reprinted by permission.)
+
+348
+information, passes through the thalamus. Input systems terminate on
+neurons in the thalamus, and these thalamic neurons, in turn, project
+to the cerebral cortex (Figures 9A and 10). Though the terminations
+of thalamic axons may account for only a small proportion of the total
+synapses in any given cortical area,? the thalamus is clearly the major
+THALAMUS
+FIGURE 9. Some of the inputs to the neocortex. A: Most of the information entering
+the neocortex gets there through the thalamus. B: A diffuse cholinergic input arises in
+the basal forebrain. C: Diffuse noradrenergic and serotonergic inputs arise in the brain
+stem.
+2 Recent synapse counts indicate that in the monkey striate cortex, approximately 35%
+of the total synaptic population comprises middle layer synapses (O'Kusky & Colonnier,
+1982). Reported percentages of thalamocortical synapses within the middle layer of the
+striate cortex range from 5% (Garey & Powell, 1971) to 29% (Tigges & Tigges, 1979).
+These data suggest that thalamocortical synapses account for 2-10% of the total synaptic
+population in the striate cortex, but this calculation does not take into account the
+thalamocortical synapses which terminate outside the middle layer (e.g., in layer 1 and in
+layer VI).
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+349
+MG
+ELPE
+LP
+VPI
+MD:
+ÇM
+MD
+CM
+MG
+NC
+NC
+MD
+GP
+GP
+OT
+FIGURE 10. A schematic diagram demonstrating part of the systematic relationship of
+the thalamus with the cerebral cortex and the thalamic termination of several input systems in macaque monkeys. The cerebral cortex (top center) is viewed from the left side,
+and several frontal cross-sections of the thalamus are illustrated, with the caudalmost section at top left and the rostralmost section at bottom right. Similarly marked parts on the
+left sides of the thalamic sections and the cerebral cortex have thalamocortical connections. The terminations of afferent systems are represented on the right sides of the
+thalamic sections as follows: inputs from the cerebellum by heavy cross-hatching,
+somatic sensory inputs from the leg area by short heavy dashes, somatic sensory inputs
+from the arm area by heavy lines, and somatic sensory inputs from the face by heavy
+dots and dashes. Abbreviations in the thalamic sections indicate histologically identifiable nuclei. (From The Primate Thalamus, p. 189, by A. E. Walker, 1938, Chicago:
+University of Chicago Press. Copyright 1938 by the University of Chicago Press.
+Reprinted by permission.)
+center through which the cerebral cortex has access to outside information. The thalamus is, therefore, often referred to as the "gateway" to
+the cerebral cortex.
+There are a few exceptions to this general rule. The following pathways do not relay through the thalamus:
+
+350
+• Diffuse innervations to the cortex arise in a number of brain
+stem and basal forebrain areas (Figures 9B,C). Among them
+are a noradrenergic system that arises principally in the locus
+coeruleus (Andén et al., 1966), a serotonergic system that
+arises mainly in the dorsal raphé nucleus (Bobillier et al.,
+throughout the cortex both horizontally and vertically and do
+not appear to be organized with any topographic finesse. In
+addition to these, it has been suggested recently that there may
+be a diffuse GABAergic system innervating the neocortex,
+which arises in the hypothalamus (Vincent, Hökfelt, Skirboll, &
+Wu, 1983). The exact function of these diffuse inputs is not
+known, but it is important for theorists to be aware of their
+existence.
+• A structure called the claustrum-situated deep to the insular
+region of the cortex, receives inputs from (Carman, Cowan, &
+Powell, 1964) and projects to (Macchi, Bentivoglio, Minciacchi,
+& Molinari, 1981) almost all areas of the cortex.
+Since, apart
+from its diffuse innervation from the brain stem, it receives no
+other input, it could well be described as a satellite of the cortex.
+Only the visually responsive part of the claustrum has
+been intensively studied, and it has been shown to be systematically connected with the striate cortex and the adjacent visual
+area (LeVay & Sherk, 1981a).
+• Restricted neocortical projections arise in the hippocampus
+(Swanson, 1981) and amygdala (Porrino, Crane, & Goldman-
+Rakic, 1981). These tend to terminate most heavily in cortical
+areas that are removed from the primary sensory and primary
+motor areas.
+The thalamus comprises a number of specific nuclei; these have welldefined inputs and project to restricted portions of the cerebral cortex.
+The thalamic nuclei, like the cortical fields, can be differentiated in
+terms of histological appearance, connections, and function. The lateral
+geniculate nucleus, for example, is the relay center for inputs from the
+retina that pass on to the striate cortex. It is a distinct, laminated
+nucleus which can be easily differentiated histologically from the surrounding structures (Figure SE). Neurons in the lateral geniculate
+nucleus receive visual signals from the axons of ganglion cells in the
+retina and project, in turn, to the striate cortex.
+The inputs to the cortex from the thalamus terminate primarily in
+the middle layer (Cajal, 1911). Where the middle layer is sparse or
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+351
+absent (as in the motor cortex), they usually terminate in the lower
+part of the upper layer (Jones, 197Sa). In the electron microscope, the
+terminal boutons of thalamocortical axons are all Type I (Jones &
+Powell, 1970a) and are known
+to be excitatory.
+The axons of the
+thalamic neurons that project to the cortex rarely have collaterals within
+the main body of the thalamus (Friedlander, Lin, Stanford, & Sherman, 1981).
+In addition to the specific nuclei, there are a number of less specific
+(sometimes called nonspecific) thalamic nuclei. The most prominent
+group of the less-specific nuclei is known as the intralaminar nuclei and
+occupies a thin, vertical, sheet-like zone extending anteroposteriorly
+through the center of the thalamus. While most of these are rather
+small, one-the centromédian
+nucleus-is very prominent in the
+human brain. The neurons of the intralaminar nuclei project both to
+the striatum and to the cerebral cortex (Jones & Leavitt, 1974; Powell
+& Cowan, 1967). Their cortical projection, instead of terminating in
+the middle layer of the cortex, terminates mainly in the supertical layer
+(layer I). Moreover, the cortical projections of the intralaminar nuclei
+are not confined to a single cortical field, but tend to be rather
+widespread. Our present knowledge of the less-specific thalamic nuclei
+and their role in cortical function is quite vague.
+Each of the specific thalamic projections to the cortex is accompanied
+by a reverse projection from the cortex to the thalamus. The spatial
+organization of the reverse projection reciprocates, fairly precisely, the
+forward one. This reverse projection arises from cells at the bottom of
+the deep layer and terminates directly on the peripheral dendrites of
+thalamocortical relay cells. Their terminations are also Type I (Guillery, 1969; Szentágothai, Hámori, & Tömböl, 1966). Although they are
+very numerous, the function of these reverse projections is not known.
+A very remarkable nucleus, called the thalamic reticular nucleus
+forms a thin shell around the main body of the thalamus.
+It is only a
+few cells thick. Its neurons are very large, with protrusions on their
+dendrites called spines (M. E. Scheibel & A. B. Scheibel, 1966). This
+nucleus does not project to the cortex but projects back into the
+thalamus (Jones, 1975b). It appears to receive small collaterals from
+most of the axons that pass between the thalamus and the cortex. It
+also gets some input from the traffic between the thalamus and the striatum. Its axons are inhibitory (Houser, Vaughn, Barber, & Roberts,
+1980; Montero & Scott, 1981), and they have extensive axon collaterals
+within the reticular nucleus (Scheibel & Scheibel, 1966). Obviously this
+nucleus occupies a very strategic place in the brain. It deserves more
+attention, both from experimentalists and theorists (Crick, 1984).
+In addition to their thalamic inputs, most cortical neurons receive
+inputs from other cortical areas either in the same hemisphere (in
+
+352
+which case they are called associational inputs) or in the opposite hemisphere (where they are known as commissural inputs). It is important
+to note that a typical cortical area is not connected directly to all or
+even most other cortical areas. Usually it projects to a handful of other
+areas, although the areas that are removed from the primary sensory or
+motor areas tend to project more widely (Jones & Powell, 1970b; Pandya & Kuypers, 1969). But if a cortical area projects to another cortical
+area, its projections are usually topographically organized, at least on a
+coarse scale. That is, as far as position in the sheet is concerned, connections between areas are not random; neighboring neurons in a field
+tend to project to neighboring regions in other fields in some systematic
+way. Moreover, as a general rule, projections from one field are usually matched by a reciprocal projection from that field which is also
+topographically organized. To a considerable extent the forward and
+backward mappings coincide, at least on a coarse scale, but are not symmetrical in all details. Rockland and Pandya (1979) and Maunsell and
+Van Essen (1983) suggest that for the early visual areas, a forward projection (forward with respect to the retina) is likely to project predominantly into the middle layer, whereas the reverse projection is likely to
+avoid the middle layer and instead terminate largely in the superficial
+and deep layers (Figure 11).
+Topographically organized maps occur in many cortical areas.
+Anatomical and electrophysiological studies show that in most cortical
+areas there is a more or less topographic representation of the periphery
+upon the cortical surface. Detailed maps of cortical representation patterns are available for the areas concerned with sensory input (and
+motor output). As might be expected, such maps vary somewhat from
+individual to individual. Their broad topography is usually not linear;
+the extent of cortex representing a given region of the periphery is
+roughly proportional to the peripheral innervation density. Thus, the
+fovea is heavily over-represented in the striate cortex (Figure 12A),
+and the hand occupies a bigger region than the trunk in the somatic
+sensory (Nelson, Sur, Felleman, & Kass, 1980; C. N. Woolsey,
+Marshall, & Bard, 1942) and motor cortical areas (C. N. Woolsey et al.,
+1952; see Figure 12B).
+All this makes good sense. Because neurons in the cortex cannot act
+directly on more distant neurons in the same area (see later), such
+"maps" bring into proximity neurons which are likely to have related
+inputs. They also allow more space for the more densely innervated
+regions.
+This systematic mapping of the periphery is likely to be a feature of
+many cortical areas, not merely those near the sensory input. In general terms, as one proceeds further from the sensory input, the
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX 353
+IV
+FORWARD
+FEEDBACK
+FIGURE 11. A schematic diagram of the characteristic laminar distributions of cell
+bodies and terminals in forward and feedback cortico-cortical pathways. Forward pathways arise mainly from the upper layer and terminate mainly in the middle layer. Feedback pathways arise from both upper and lower layers and terminate mainly outside the
+middle layer. Triangles represent cell bodies, and axons are represented by thin lines.
+(From "The Connections of the Middle Temporal Visual Area and Their Relation to a
+Cortical Hierarchy in the Macaque Monkey" by J. H. R. Maunsell and D. C. Van Essen,
+1983, Journal of Neuroscience, 3, p. 2579. Copyright 1983 by The Society for Neuroscience. Reprinted by permission.)
+mapping of the periphery becomes more diffuse. At the same time the
+neurons respond to more elaborate "features" of the input.
+There are irregularities within a cortical area. It should not be
+inferred from the above description that cortical areas are relatively uniform. On the contrary, on the scale of 1 mm to 2 mm, patchiness is
+almost always the rule. The patchiness can, in many instances, be
+attributed to disjunctive distributions of inputs. Dense foci of terminations, separated by zones that are relatively free of terminations, have
+been described for the inputs from the thalamus and from other cortical
+areas.
+This is especially clear in cases where the inputs are not continuous
+but discrete. For example, the thalamic input from either of the two
+eyes form nonoverlapping stripe patterns (not unlike fingerprints when
+viewed from the surface) in the middle layer of the striate cortex (Figure 13) (Hubel, Wiesel, & LeVay, 1977; LeVay, Connolly, Houde, &
+Van Essen, 1985). In the somatic sensory system of rodents, inputs
+
+120°
+150°
+210°
+2400
+CYNO
+MONKEY
+AreD
+111
+354
+6/
+10°
+30°
+Eccentricity
+FIGURE 12. Though continuous, the cortical representations of the periphery are often not faithful duplications of the periphery. A: In the primary visual cortex, the fovea occupies a disproportionately large percentage of the total area. The amount of cortical surface area devoted to a
+degree of visual field is plotted as a function of retinal eccentricity. (From "The Representation of the Visual Field on the Cerebral Cortex in
+Monkeys" by P. M. Daniel and D. Whitteridge, 1961, Journal of Physiology, 159, p. 212. Copyright 1961 by Cambridge University Press.
+Reprinted by permission.) B: In the primary somatic sensory cortex of primates, the representation of the hands (in particular, the digits) осси-
+pies a bigger region than the trunk. The areas of the cortex devoted to each body part are depicted on a flattened map of the primary somatic
+sensory cortex. (From "Representations of the Body Surface in Postcentral Parietal Cortex of Macaca fascicularis" by R. J. Nelson, M. Sur, D. J.
+Felleman, and J. H. Kaas, 1981, Journal of Comparative Neurology, 192, p. 614. Copyright 1981 by Alan R. Liss, Inc. Reprinted by permission.)
+The data shown in both A and B are derived from macaque monkeys.
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+355
+FIGURE 13. A surface view of the middle layer of the striate cortex in a macaque monkey in which the input from one of the eyes is labeled autoradiographically with tritium.
+In this figure, the label, in the form of exposed photographic silver grains, appears light
+against a dark background. The disjunctive, stripe-like patterns of input from each eye is
+clearly evident. Due to the curvature of the cortex, this figure is a montage of many
+photomicrographs. (From "The Complete Pattern of Ocular Dominance Stripes in the
+Striate Cortex and Visual Field of the Macaque Monkey" by S. LeVay, M. Connolly, J.
+Houde, and D. C. Van Essen, 1985, Journal of Neuroscience, 5. Copyright 1985 by The
+Society for Neuroscience. Reprinted by permission.)
+from each mystacial vibrissa project, through independent channels in
+the thalamus, to separate foci in the middle layer of the somatic sensory cortex called "barrels" (T. A. Woolsey, 1978). Neural connections
+between barrels appear less strong than those within each barrel. Similar
+focal arrangements have been proposed for the thalamic input to other
+cortical areas.
+Disjunctive, stripe-like patterns have also been demonstrated in certain terminations coming from other cortical areas. For example, the
+projection
+from the striate cortex to other visual areas is usually
+
+356 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+irregular. Stripe-like patterns of terminations have been described for
+their projections to area 18 (Gilbert & Wiesel, 1981; Maunsell, Newsome & Van Essen, 1980). In the primary auditory cortex, there are
+irregular rows of commissural terminations which in cross-section
+appear as multiple column-like clusters. Such clusters contain neurons
+that display certain kinds of binaural interaction (Imig & Brugge, 1978).
+The various kinds of patches outlined above appear to underlie a tendency of neurons aligned vertically to display certain similarities in
+functional properties. Other response properties, not necessarily correlating with input signals, are also aligned vertically. For example, in
+the visual system of monkeys, the cells that project to the cortex have
+center-surround receptive fields, and the neurons in the upper and
+lower layers of the striate cortex respond specifically to lines oriented in
+a particular orientation (Hubel & Wiesel, 1968). Furthermore, neurons
+with similar orientation preferences are often aligned vertically, though
+this may not always be true. However, in a general sense it has been
+found that when recordings are made with a microelectrode inserted
+perpendicular to the surface of the cortex, the response properties of all
+the neurons encountered throughout the depths of the cortex tend to
+be similar.
+These various types of patchinesses have suggested to some authors
+that the cortex is organized on a "modular" basis, either involving
+columns about ½ mm or so in diameter or into minicolumns, some 50
+microns or so across (Mountcastle, 1978). In the cortex there is really
+no evidence for true modules of the type found, for example, in the
+fly's eye and rather little for more irregular modules. The exact basis
+on which the cortex is organized remains to be discovered
+Cortical Outputs
+All the axons that leave a cortical area make Type I (excitatory)
+synapse in their projection fields.
+The subcortical projections of the
+cortex, in contrast to the subcortical inputs, are not subject to the constraint of always relaying through the thalamus. Thus, the cortex can
+project directly to the spinal cord or superior colliculus, but the spinal
+and collicular inputs to the cortex always relay in the thalamus.
+As mentioned earlier, there is a close relationship between populations of cortical output neurons and their laminar positions. This is
+particularly evident for the populations of neurons that project subcortically. For example, the cortical neurons which project to the thalamus
+are situated at the bottom of the deep layer, whereas those that project
+to the striatum and brain stem tend to be concentrated in more
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+357
+superficial portions of the deep layer (Jones & Wise, 1977; J. S. Lund,
+R. D. Lund, Hendrickson, Bunt & Fuchs, 1975).
+As with the input systems, most of the output systems of the neocortex are patchy. Patches of neurons have been demonstrated to project
+to other cortical areas and others to project subcortically (Jones & Wise,
+1977; Murray & Coulter, 1981). Although the groups of cells giving
+rise to the various projections are segregated into layers, physiological
+studies indicate that neurons producing similar outputs
+are vertically
+aligned. This has been most convincingly demonstrated in the motor
+cortex, where microstimulation points producing isolated contractions
+of given muscles have been
+. shown to be organized in cylindrical zones
+which extend throughout the depths of the cortex (Asanuma & Rosén,
+1972).
+THE NATURE OF NEOCORTICAL NEURONS
+Experimental Methods
+The shape of neurons in many areas of the brain has traditionally
+been studied in Golgi-stained material. The Golgi method stains, in
+their entireties, a few cells here and there, apparently "at random." The
+haphazard selectivity of this method allows investigators to visualize
+clearly most of the dendritic processes of individual neurons. Unfortunately, though, the technique is capricious and does not always stain
+the axon and axon collaterals completely. A more recent method,
+using intracellular injections of an appropriate marker such as the
+fluorescent dyes procion yellow or lucifer yellow or the enzyme horseradish peroxidase (HR), is capable of producing a similar picture with
+better reliability and control, but is not suited for sampling large populations of neurons since each neuron must be separately injected.
+Very fine details, such as the morphology of the synapse, cannot be
+seen using the light microscope. The electron microscope is necessary
+for this.
+The extremely high magnifications needed to differentiate
+such details, however, make it difficult to reconstruct (using a very
+large number of serial sections) even a very small neuron in its
+entirety. (This problem can be partially alleviated by combining standard electron microscopic procedures with the Golgi method or a
+variety of labeling methods.)
+It is important to realize that each of the techniques presently available is limited in its sampling capacities. Many of the following conclusions, therefore, are rather general and apply to broad groupings of
+
+358
+cortical neurons. Except in rare cases, there is little quantitative information on specific cell types.
+Cell Types in the Neocortex
+The most common and most characteristic neurons of the cerebral
+cortex are the pyramidal cells (Figure 14A). Such neurons, as their
+name implies, have a pyramid-shaped cell body. A thick apical dendrite
+ascends vertically from the apex of the cell body. It often has tufts of
+branches that arborize in specific laminae. A number of basal dendrites
+also extend out from the bottom of the cell; these branches spread horizontally for some distance.
+All dendrites of pyramidal cells possess
+large numbers of dendritic spines. The axons of pyramidal cells emerge
+either from the bottom of the cell body or from one of the basal dendrites and generally leave the area.
+Though these basic features are common to all pyramidal cells, there
+are a variety of different types of pyramidal cells (Figure 14B). On the
+basis of cell body size alone, they range from about 10 microns up to
+100 microns in diameter (Cajal, 1911; Conel, 1939). The branching
+patterns of the apical and the basal dendrites also differ tremendously,
+as do the target sites of the projection axons and the arborizations of
+axon collaterals which participate in local circuits. These variations do
+not appear to be random, and a number of classes of pyramidal cells
+have been described (Cajal, 1911; Lorente de Nó, 1943; J. S. Lund,
+1973). Unfortunately, the information presently available for differentiating the various types of pyramidal cells is far from complete. It is
+unlikely that there are as few as ten distinct types: There could be as
+many as a thousand
+All axons that leave the cortex belong to pyramidal cells. The converse, however, may not be true. Though all pyramidal cells were once
+considered to be projection neurons (Cajal, 1911), recent data suggest
+otherwise. Using intracellular HRP injections, Gilbert and Wiesel
+(1983) have found a few pyramidal cells with extensive local axonal
+arborizations that do not project out of the striate cortex.
+The remainder of the neurons in the cerebral cortex can be broadly
+categorized as "nonpyramidal cells" (Figure 14C). By definition, they
+comprise all neurons whose cell bodies are not pyramid-shaped. They
+constitute a large number of cell types which can be differentiated on
+the basis of the shape of the cell body, size, dendritic arborizations, and
+axonal ramifications. For example, some have relatively spherical cell
+bodies with dendrites that radiate in all directions and therefore are
+star-shaped, or "stellate." Others are spindle-shaped and have dendritic
+
+FIGURE 14. Drawings of Golgi-stained neurons of the cerebral cortex. A: The most characteristic neurons of the cerebral cortex are the pyramidal cells. They are characterized by a pyramid shaped cell body, a thick apical dendrite, and a number of basal dendrites. There are a variety of
+different types of pyramidal cells. B: The remainder of neurons in the cerebral cortex can be broadly referred to as nonpyramidal cells. There
+variety of different types of nonpyramidal cells. See text for further details. (From Histologie du Susteme Nerveux de L'homme et des
+Vertébrés, T. 2. [Histology of the Nervous System of Man and of Vertebrates, Vol. 21, by S. Ramón y Cajal, 1911, Paris: Maloine. Copyright 1911 by
+Librairie Maloine. Reprinted by permission.)
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+359
+
+360
+arborizations which are aligned vertically. Again, the number of distinct types is not known. It is unlikely to be as few as ten; it could run
+to several hundreds.
+Instead of discussing in detail the varieties of nonpyramidal cells that
+are known, we should like to draw the reader's attention to two characteristics of nonpyramidal cells that are of significance in the context of
+this chapter. One is that the nonpyramidal cells are local circuit neurons, viz., they do not project out of a given cortical area. The other is
+that there are two basic types of nonpyramidal cells according to their
+dendritic morphology. One type has numerous spines on its dendrites,
+and the other has few or no spines.
+A convenient categorization combines the entire population of
+pyramidal cells and also the spiny nonpyramidal cells into a group called
+"neurons with spines," and the remaining nonpyramidal cells into a
+group called "neurons without many spines." The following generalizations are applicable when cortical neurons are categorized in this way
+(see Table 1).
+Neurons With Spines
+The neurons with spines are the pyramidal cells, the star pyramids,
+and the spiny stellate cells. Such cells receive Type I synapses mainly
+on their spines. Usually, each spine has only a single Type I synapse;
+Input to Spines
+Neurons With Spines
+Usually one Type I
+Occasionally one Type I
+plus one Type II
+Neurons Without Spines
+-
+Input to Dendrites
+Input to Soma
+Both types
+Type Il only
+Multiple Type Il on many
+Input to Axon Hillock
+pyramidals in layers II
+and Ill (see text)
+Both types
+Both types
+-
+Output
+Type I
+Working Assumptions: Type | = excitation Type II = inhibition
+Usually Type II
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+361
+a minority of spines has an additional Type II synapse. No spine seems
+to have only a Type II synapse by itself (Colonnier, 1968).
+The Type II synapses on spiny cells tend to be fewer in number than
+Type I synapses. They do, however, occupy sites that are suited for
+effectively influencing impulse generation by the neuron (which generally takes place at the axon initial segment). They usually occur on
+the proximal shafts of the dendrites or on the cell bodies (Gray, 1959).
+A special type of Type II synapse is found on the initial segment of the
+axon of many pyramidal cells (Peters et al., 1968).
+The axon of a spiny cell forms only Type I synapses (LeVay, 1973).
+Pyramidal cells almost always send the main branch of their axon out
+into the white matter below the cortex. Spiny stellates almost always
+have a local axon which does not leave the cortex but ramifies instead
+in close proximity to its cell of origin.
+Neurons Without Many Spines
+Although neurons without spines may have transient spines on their
+dendrites early in development, in the mature state they have relatively
+few, if any, spines.
+Such cells, of which there are several obviously different morphological types, receive both Type I and Type II synapses on their dendritic
+shafts and on their cell bodies (Gray, 1959). The axons of nonspiny
+neurons do not descend to the white matter but ramify locally. Their
+axons are believed, in most cases, to form only Type II synapses
+(LeVay, 1973), but there may well be exceptions
+It remains to say that spiny cells are in the majority (80%). Of these,
+a fair number, perhaps as many 25% can be nonpyramidal in some cortical areas. The nonspiny cells are in a minority (20%). Unfortunately
+these percentages are only very approximate. 3
+3 These approximations are derived from the results of Tömböl (1974), who found 59%
+of the neurons in the visual cortex of monkeys to be pyramidal neurons, 7.4% to be large
+stellate neurons, and 33.6% to be small stellate neurons. Of the population of small stellate neurons, 63% were found to occur in the middle layer. These results did not take
+into account the spiny stellate neurons which also need to be included in the spiny
+category. Since spiny stellate neurons are small (Cajal, 1911), restricted to the middle
+layer (J. S. Lund, 1973), and constitute the major component of the middle layer (J. S
+Lund, 1973), we have added 21% to the overall percentage of pyramidal neurons
+reported by Tömböl, to obtain a very rough figure of 80% for our estimate of spiny neurons.
+
+362
+Excitation Versus Inhibition
+We shall now discuss these generalizations (summarized in Table 1)
+on the assumption that most Type I synapses excite and most Type I!
+synapses inhibit. The main point to grasp is the asymmetry between
+excitation and inhibition.
+Excitatory neurons and excitatory synapses are clearly in the majority.
+Only excitation is sent out of any area of the cortex to other places. On
+the other hand, the inhibitory synapses are more strategically placed on
+the cells, being nearer the impulse initiating site at the axon hillock, at
+least for spiny cells. This is almost a necessity if the system is not to
+get out of hand, since any area of the cortex feeds back excitation to
+itself in large amounts.
+The synapses formed by axons entering the
+cortex are in a minority, sometimes a very small minority. The great
+majority come from the axons of other cortical cells: mostly, but not
+entirely, from those within a few hundred microns.
+Inhibition seems to have priority in two ways.
+Inhibitory neurons
+have excitatory inputs on their cell bodies, so that they can be brought
+into action quickly. Excitatory neurons, on the other hand, receive
+inhibition at strategic sites. This preference for inhibition must be set
+against the fact that (excluding some of the diffuse innervation) the
+inputs entering the cortex are all excitatory. Thus any inhibition
+needed must be generated from this excitation. This requires an extra
+step and therefore will take time. It seems as if the cortex is arranged
+so that this time delay is minimized by the regularities discussed above.
+In special conditions, such as epilepsy and under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs, the cortical system may go into full-scale oscillation,
+presumably because the balance between excitation and inhibition has
+been upset.
+Special Cell Types
+Nonspiny neurons are of various types. Many of them are stellate.
+Here we describe three unusual types of nonspiny neurons whose properties may be of special interest.
+Chandelier cells. So-called because their axons end in a set of vertically oriented beaded terminal segments which make them look somewhat like chandeliers (Szentágothai & Arbib, 1974). An alternative
+name for them is "axo-axonic" cells (Somogyi, 1977).
+These beaded terminal segments turn out to be the sites of multiple
+Type II synapses upon the axon initial segments of nearby pyramidal
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+363
+cells (Somogyi, 1977). Each chandelier cell axon has at least 50 to 200
+such terminal segments (Somogyi, Freund, & Cowey, 1982), each of
+which may form 5 to 10 synapses (Fairen & Valverde, 1980; Somogyi
+et al., 1982). (There does not appear to be any corresponding cell
+which makes Type I synapses on axon hillocks.) Each pyramidal cell
+may receive up to six such terminal segments, presumably from different chandelier cells (Fairén & Valverde, 1980; Somogyi et al., 1982).
+It is difficult to resist the impression that a chandelier cell can veto
+the output of a whole set of neighboring pyramidal cells. Whether this
+is really true is not known, but the fact that chandelier cells are probably GABAergic (Peters, Proskauer, & Ribak, 1982) and form Type II
+synapses strongly implies that they are inhibitory.
+The number of chandelier cells is not known. A not unreasonable
+guess would be that they form about 1% of the total neuronal population. 4 It is not known how many types of chandelier cells exist. So far
+no stain has been found which selectively stains them.
+Basket cells. These cells have vertically oriented stem axons which
+give rise to several horizontally disposed collaterals. The collaterals
+subsequently give off obliquely or vertically directed fine terminal
+branches, which are commonly clustered and resemble baskets (Cajal,
+1911; Marin-Padilla, 1969), though not all terminal branches resemble
+baskets (Jones, 1975c). These terminal branches often form loops of
+boutons around the cell bodies of pyramidal cells (10 to 20 terminal
+branches may converge upon certain pyramidal cells; Martin, Somogyi,
+& Whitteridge, 1983). The characteristic fine axonal sprays of these
+cells are rather difficult to visualize, so it is not certain that basket cells
+occur in all cortical areas. The terminal boutons of basket cells are
+Type Il in morphology and are thought to contain GABA (Martin et al.,
+1983; Somogyi, Kisvárday, Martin, & Whitteridge, 1983).
+Again, one cannot resist the impression that the basket cell is likely
+to exert a veto (or at least a partial veto) upon the output of the cortical projection neurons.
+Bipolar cells. These are cells whose dendrites and axons form a very
+long thin bundle in the vertical direction (M. L. Feldman & Peters,
+1978). Some of them have been shown to contain peptides such as
+somatostatin, cholecystokinin (CCK), and vasoactive polypeptide (VIP)
+4 This guess is based on three arbitrary assumptions: (a) all pyramidal neurons receive
+initial segment synapses from chandelier cells, (b) every chandelier cell innervates about
+200 pyramidal neurons, and (c) every pyramidal neuron is innervated by about five different chandelier cells. Together, these suggest that there are about 40 pyramidal neurons for each chandelier cell. Since pyramidal neurons account for about 60% of the neurons in the visual cortex of monkeys (Tömböl, 1974), the above assumptions would suggest that chandelier cells form about 1.5% of the neuronal population of the monkey
+visual cortex. This is probably an overestimate.
+
+364
+(Emson & Hunt, 1981; Fuxe, Hökfelt, Said, & Mutt, 1977). These
+cells can be stained immunohistochemically. About 1350 VIP cells are
+estimated to occur under 1 mm? of surface in the rat visual cortex (this
+figure is uncorrected for shrinkage) (Morrison, Magistretti, Benoit, &
+Bloom, 1984), thereby making up about 1% of the total neurons.
+Whether bipolar VIP cells also have other nonpeptide transmitters is
+not yet known. The type of synapse made by each type of bipolar cell
+is not clear. Their relationship, if any, to the "columns" reported in the
+cortex is also unclear. Nevertheless, their narrow shape is intriguing.
+The Behavior of Single Neurons in the Cerebral Cortex
+The behavior of single neurons in the cerebral cortex will depend to
+some extent on the exact nature of the neuron concerned. Here we
+will treat only the general problem.
+It is widely believed that the dendrites of most neurons behave in a
+largely passive manner. Their cable constants can be estimated from
+passive membrane transients that can be recorded intracellularly. In the
+cortex the total soma-dendritic input resistance ranges from 6.7 to 78
+megohms with a mean of 24 megohms, while the membrane time constant tends to be relatively constant at around 8.2 milliseconds (Connors, Gutnick, & Prince, 1982). If the specific membrane capacitance
+is assumed to be about 1 uF/cm? (K. S. Cole, 1968), then the mean
+specific membrane resistance is relatively high at about 8,200 ohm-cm?
+This implies a relatively large length constant for most neurons in the
+cerebral cortex.
+However, there are disturbing reports that the dendrites of some
+neurons (for example, the Purkinje cells of the cerebellum and the
+pyramidal cells of the hippocampus) may have spike generating patches
+(Llinas & Nicholson, 1969; Spencer & Kandel, 1961). Unfortunately,
+the experimental techniques to look for this are not easy and the
+interpretation of the results is not straightforward.
+Clearly, it would make a tremendous difference if the dendrites of a
+neuron were not purely passive. To give just one example, if its dendrites are passive it might be argued that the apical dendrites of a
+pyramidal cell may mainly serve to "modulate" the inputs of the basal
+dendrites, because the apical dendritic shaft would attenuate any change
+of potential produced by synapses in the apical tuft so that, by itself, it
+might not be able to fire the cell. If the apical dendrite had spike generating capabilities, this argument would not be valid. It is clearly an
+urgent matter to decide just how potential changes are propagated in
+dendrites of different types of cells.
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+365
+Another important theoretical parameter is the "weight" of individual
+synapses; that is, the size (and time course) of the potential change that
+synapse produces in the postsynaptic cell. Since in many theories these
+weights not only determine the behavior of the neuron but are thought
+to be important for memory, they are obviously of considerable significance. Such weights could be influenced by many factors, both
+presynaptic and postsynaptic. Moreover, the weights could be subject
+to transient changes due to many different biochemical processes.
+Parenthetically we may point out that there is a problem concerning
+long-term memory and the synaptic weights that may be associated with
+it. How do synapses manage to remember anything over a period of
+years in the face of relentless molecular turnover? This makes one
+wonder whether some single structural feature, either at the molecular
+level or at a higher level, might embody the "long-term weight." A
+naive guess might be that it is simply the area of the synapse, since in
+the neocortex this varies, from synapse to synapse, by a factor of 10
+(Peters & Kaiserman-Abramof, 1969).
+Type II synapses tend to be nearer the axon hillock than do Type 1
+synapses.
+Thus, it can be argued that such inhibitory synapses on a
+given dendrite can exercise a partial veto on more distal excitation and
+thus the exact arrangement of the various synapses could be significant.
+On this view, a single neuron, rather than being a single integrating
+device for distributed excitation and inhibition, may be a more complex
+processing unit, with each dendritic branch acting, in a loose sense, as
+an integrating unit for its own inputs (Koch, Poggio, & Torre, 1982).
+It remains to be seen whether this new concept is really valid. Whether
+it is or not, it should be noted that it is a lot easier to implement addition, subtraction, and division than it is to implement multiplication in
+a single neuron. In logical terms, AND-NOT seems easier to implement than AND. However, because of the uncertainties in our
+knowledge, such generalizations are precarious.
+In any single neuron a synapse nearer the cell body is likely to have a
+larger effect than one near the ends of the dendrites, but even this
+rather obvious deduction has been questioned for neurons whose dendrites generate action potentials. It is obvious that a lot needs to be
+learned about dendritic behavior before theorists have a solid body of
+facts to build on.
+The Behavior of Groups of Neurons in the Cerebral Cortex
+If little is known for certain about single neurons, even less is known
+about neuronal groups and their behavior in the cerebral cortex.
+
+366 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+As we have already seen, in the cortex there are extensive axon collaterals. Many of these only extend laterally for relatively small
+distances-less than mm-but a significant fraction spread for several
+millimeters (Gilbert & Wiesel, 1983; Rockland & J. S. Lund, 1983).
+However, they never seem to spread as much as a centimeter, though
+this is not true for the diffuse inputs such as those from the brain stem.
+Thus, in mathematical terms, for one cortical
+area the connections
+seem to be "near-diagonal," assuming that we have a two-dimensional
+arrangement of cells and a four-dimensional connection matrix.
+Whether excitatory axons spread more or less than inhibitory axons is
+not clear.
+The data on this point are confusing.
+A favorite theoretical model is one in which all cells of one type connect directly to all other cells of the same type. It seems very rare for a
+cell to connect to itself (the diagonal term), although occasional axon
+collaterals that terminate upon their parent cell have been described
+(Van der Loos & Glaser, 1972). A more disturbing criticism is that,
+among the sea of axon collaterals, we really have no evidence that cells
+of one type connect to other cells of the same type. A better guess
+would be that the collaterals usually contact cells of other types in that
+area of cortex, often to cells in a different layer. Our ignorance springs
+partly from the fact that we lack convenient experimental methods for
+studying which cell types actually connect to which.
+Are there any general rules about the connection in the neocortex?
+An outline model, based on recent studies of the visual cortex (Gilbert,
+1983; Wiesel & Gilbert, 1983), might be that the main extrinsic input
+to a cortical area (from the thalamus) is to the middle layer. From
+there the excitation spreads largely to the upper layer, and from there
+to the deep layer-first to layer V and then to layer VI. The flow of
+information for other inputs is less clear. Inputs from other cortical
+areas tend to end in the upper layer and presumably spread from there
+to the deep layer. This description is certainly grossly oversimplified in
+almost every respect but it may turn out to have an element of truth
+in it.
+Rates of Firing
+The average discharge rate of neocortical neurons is relatively
+slow-perhaps only 50 to 100 spikes per second, though the rate for a
+brief time can rise as high as several hundred spikes per second (see
+e.g., Lynch, Mountcastle, Talbot & Yin, 1977). This means that the
+time between spikes is often 10 to 20 milliseconds. Bearing in mind
+how much "computation" the brain can do in 100 milliseconds, this
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+367
+seems to suggest that the average rate of firing of an individual neuron
+can only be transmitted rather approximately and that computations
+involving many reiterations are unlikely, at least for the initial processing of an input. The precise nature of this limitation deserves further
+study.
+Most, but not all, cortical neurons have very low resting discharges:
+only a few spikes a second (see, e.g., Abeles, 1982). This is likely to
+cause problems when one needs to signal both positive and negative
+values of a function. One obvious way is for one set of neurons to signal the positive values and another to signal the negative ones. In the
+visual system this appears to be initiated by the retinal ganglion cells
+(which have separate ON-center and OFF-center receptive fields,
+Kuffler, 1953) which signal information from the retina to the lateral
+geniculate body (Cajal, 1892) and from there are relayed to the primary
+visual cortex and elsewhere.
+A large "soma-dendritic" spike generally follows an action potential
+which is initiated at the axon hillock.
+This large spike is believed to
+take place at the cell body and possibly invade the proximal parts of the
+dendrites (Brock, Coombs, & Eccles, 1952a). This might conceivably
+wipe clean the slate each
+time a neuron fires, as well as tell each
+synapse that the cell had fired. There is evidence suggesting that such
+a mechanism might exist in spinal motoneurons. Virtually complete
+destruction of pre-existent postsynaptic potentials have been seen following soma-dendritic spikes in spinal motoneurons (Brock, Coombs,
+& Eccles, 1952b). Further data on this important point would be
+welcome.
+Feature Detection
+In certain parts of the neocortex, especially those near the sensory
+inputs, it has been shown that a particular neuron will respond best to a
+certain set of "features" in the input. Thus a so-called "simple cell" in
+the first visual area responds best to a line or edge of a particular orientation in a particular place in the visual field (Hubel & Wiesel, 1968).
+It may prefer a certain small range of spatial frequencies (Schiller, Finlay, &
+. Volman, 1976). It may respond better to movement in one
+direction rather than that in the opposite direction (Hubel & Wiesel,
+1968). Some cells are sensitive to the horizontal "disparity" between
+the input to the two eyes (Hubel & Wiesel, 1970a). Other cells may
+respond better to some wavelengths of light than to others (Michael,
+1978) and so on.
+
+368
+The description and classification of features are matters of the first
+importance, but
+even for the early parts of the visual system our
+knowledge is still very incomplete. These details are of the greatest
+interest to theorists actively studying a particular system. Here we can
+only mention them in passing.
+As one proceeds further from the sensory input, the mapping of the
+periphery becomes more diffuse. At the same time most of the neurons tend to respond to one or another feature of the stimulusmovement, color, etc.-while still others respond to more elaborate
+features in the input. For example, Zeki has shown that in the visual
+area V4 of the macaque, a cell's response to the wavelength of the light
+depends somewhat on the wavelength coming from fairly distant
+regions in the visual field (Zeki, 1978). In the first visual area, on the
+other hand, a neuron's response to wavelength is much more local
+(Michael, 1978). This makes sense since although the axon collaterals
+spread a similar cortical distance in both areas, V4 is smaller than V1,
+so that in the former the collaterals can reach more distant parts of the
+visual field, especially as the "mapping" in V4 is more diffuse than it is
+in V1 (Van Essen & Zeki, 1978).
+As one proceeds further into the system it becomes increasingly difficult to discover exactly what "feature" a cell likes best. A few neurons
+in the cortex, lining the superior temporal sulcus and in the inferior
+temporal cortex of monkeys, appear to respond to pictures of faces
+(Bruce, Desimone, & Gross, 1981; Desimone, Albright, Gross, &
+Bruce, 1980; Perrett, Rolls, & Caan, 1982). If the eyes are blocked out
+in the pictures, the neurons fire less. If the features of the face are
+jumbled, the neurons do not respond at all. The exact location and the
+orientation of the pictures do not appear to be critical to the response
+of these neurons. It is claimed that other neurons in these complex
+cortical areas respond specifically to hands (Desimone et al., 1980), but
+for most of the neurons in these cortical areas, the best type of
+stimulus has eluded discovery. This is a case where a good theory
+might give useful pointers to an experimentalist. Since a neuron's output is simply the spikes it sends down its axon, the same pattern of
+spikes can conceivably be produced by a whole variety of different but
+related inputs. Thus, in a very real sense the firing of a single neuron
+conveys somewhat ambiguous information. It is widely believed that it
+is the pattern of a set of neurons which is best thought of as conveying
+information.
+It thus becomes important to know whether the input
+from a single cortical neuron can, by itself, fire a particular cell in its
+projection field or whether several neurons are required to do this.
+There is little evidence in the neocortex that a single neuron can, by
+itself, fire a cell, but exactly how many are needed can only be guessed
+at. Even where we know that the axon of one neuron contacts the
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+369
+dendrites of another neuron, we usually do not know how many distinct
+synapses it makes on the second cell. Methods that could answer this
+question would be very valuable.
+Conceptually the problem is not straightforward, since the background "noise" (the occasional random firing of many neurons) is likely
+to bring a neuron closer to threshold and thus reduce the number of
+more active neurons required to fire the cell. Spontaneous, transient
+fluctuations of the membrane potential have been seen in all intracellularly examined cortical neurons (Connors, Gutnick, & Prince, 1982).
+There seems to be rather little correlated firing of neurons in the neocortex. (For details, see the monograph by Abeles, 1982.) That is,
+neighboring neurons seldom fire at precisely the same time. When
+neurons do fire with some degree of synchrony, as they appear to do to
+produce alpha-waves in the EEG, they do so mainly when the mind
+appears to be idle. This apparent lack of synchronized firing suggests
+that the brain is not organized, as a modern digital computer is, on a
+repeating time cycle. However, the thalamus does appear to impose a
+degree of rhythm on its output, so it is possible that more subtle time
+effects exist and have been missed.
+An important unresolved question concerning feature detection is
+whether it is inborn or learned. This is a difficult topic and we can only
+touch on it. At the moment it seems likely that "feature detectors" are
+to a considerable extent inborn but can be tuned up by experience,
+especially during certain "critical periods" in development. The neocortex does not appear in its details to be a general-purpose computing
+machine. Each area (with its connections) seems designed to carry out
+a specific function, even though this can be modified somewhat by
+experience. Natural selection has had every opportunity to develop the
+necessary neuronal machinery to cope with issues which, because of the
+nature of the external world, have changed little in evolution. Theorists almost always assume that they are cleverer than natural selection.
+This is usually a mistake.
+In spite of the above remarks, it is reasonable to assume that the
+neocortex has evolved because it is good at a particular sort of computation and that, with appropriate local variations, it may be broadly the
+same in all parts. We may also expect that these basic processes will be
+complicated by somewhat elaborate neural gadgetry designed to make
+for better performance.
+What these basic computational processes are
+remains to be discovered.
+Other sections of this book concern models constructed out of
+"units." These units often have properties similar in some respects to
+neurons in that they have multiple inputs, some sort of summation
+rule, a threshold rule, and a single output which is usually distributed
+to several other units. However, their inventors are always careful to
+
+370
+point out that they are not intended to represent real neurons. Indeed,
+at this stage in the game, it would be foolish to attempt to do this. Nor
+are most of the units used satisfactory idealizations of real neurons. If
+the properties of real
+neurons present useful gadgets to neural
+modelers, they should not be mixed together in combinations that
+never occur together in the brain.
+Another explanation offered by modelers in defense of their units is
+that a single unit really stands for a group of neurons. This might be
+acceptable to neuroscientists if it were carefully stated how this group
+might be built out of more or less real neurons, but this is seldom if
+ever done. Consequently, it is difficult to know whether a given "unit"
+is plausible or not.
+Another approach to the difficulty is to claim that "units are placeholders for informational states" (J. L. McClelland, personal communication) and that the relationship between the neurons and such states
+may be complex.
+This
+may
+, indeed be plausible, but from the
+neuroscientist's point of view it makes it almost impossible to test the
+models unless the relationship is spelled out in detail.
+Another difficulty is that neural modelers seldom state exactly what
+their models are supposed to demonstrate. This difficult question is
+addressed more fully in the last chapter of this book
+Meanwhile we list here briefly some of the devices loved by theorists
+which, if interpreted literally, are not justified by the available experimental evidence:
+• Neurons that excite some cells and inhibit others.
+• Neurons that merely "change sign." For example, a neuron that
+accepts excitation from one neuron only and whose onput produces inhibition on one neuron only.
+• Neurons that connect to all other cells of the same type.
+• Neurons with distinctive synapses that do elaborate computations. Apart from spines which sometimes have both a Type I
+and a Type II synapse, such complications are rare or absent in
+the neocortex, though they do occur in the thalamus. However, separate dendrites may perform such a role in the cortex.
+• A neuron that, by itself, can fire another cell. This does occur
+in the cerebellum (the climbing fiber on a Purkinje cell)
+(Eccles, Llinás, & Sakaski, 1966). It is not certain that it does
+not occur in the neocortex but the available evidence suggests
+that it is not common. However, chandelier cells and basket
+cells may, by themselves, be able to veto the firing of another
+cell.
+
+20. THE CEREBRAL CORTEX
+371
+The following are features found in the neocortex but often not used
+in theoretical models:
+• Veto cells, which appear to veto many other cells and which
+probably need the summated activity of several distinct inputs
+to fire them.
+• The various diffuse inputs, from the brain stem and elsewhere,
+which may be important, not only for the general level of
+arousal of the cortex (as in sleep) but also for potentiating the
+synaptic modification involved in laying down a memory.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+We thank our colleagues at the Salk Institute for many helpful discussions. We are especially grateful to W. Maxwell Cowan and Jay
+McClelland for their detailed comments on the manuscript. We also
+thank Betty Lang for her careful typing of the various drafts.
+This work was supported by the J. W. Kieckhefer Foundation, the
+Samuel Roberts Noble Foundation, the System Development Foundation, and NIH Fellowship NS-07061.
+
+CHAPTER 21
+Open Questions About
+Computation in Cerebral Cortex
+T. J. SEJNOWSKI
+In Chapter 20, Crick and Asanuma have attempted the difficult task
+of summarizing what is presently known about the physiology and anatomy of cerebral cortex. Here I will attempt to summarize what is not
+known. The goal of this chapter is to provide a framework within
+which to ask computational questions about cerebral cortex.
+QUESTIONS ABOUT CEREBRAL CORTEX
+Different areas of cerebral cortex are specialized for processing information from different sensory modalities, such as visual cortex, auditory cortex, and somatosensory cortex, and other areas are specialized
+for motor functions; however, all of these cortical areas have a similar
+internal anatomical organization and are more similar to each other in
+cytoarchitecture than they are to any other part of the brain. The relatively uniform structure of cerebral cortex suggests that it is capable of
+applying a general-purpose style of computation to many processing
+domains, from sensory processing to the most abstract
+reasoning.
+Whether the similarity between different areas of cortex is merely
+superficial or extends to the computational level is an experimental
+question that depends on theoretical issues.
+Information processing and memory share the same circuitry in cerebral cortex, in contrast with digital computers where the memory and
+central processing unit are physically separated. The style of
+
+21. COMPUTATION IN CEREBRAL CORTEX
+373
+computation and the style of memory must therefore be closely related.
+This requirement is a very powerful one and should help narrow the
+range of possible candidate computational styles because, in addition to
+showing that a class of algorithms has significant processing capabilities,
+it is necessary to also show that the performance of the algorithms can
+be seamlessly improved by experience. This intimate relationship
+between the hardware and the software may make it possible to use
+constraints from both the computational level and the implementational
+level to investigate experimentally the representations and algorithms
+used in each cortical area (Ballard, in press; Sejnowski, in press).
+The key issue about which we know least is the style of computation
+in cerebral cortex: How are signals in neurons used to represent information? How do networks of neurons cooperate in transforming the
+information? How are the results of a computation stored for future
+use? These questions will be the focus of this chapter, which concludes with some remarks on the role of computational models in
+understanding complex systems like cerebral cortex.
+REPRESENTING INFORMATION
+Almost all information that must be transmitted by neurons over distances greater than 1 millimeter is coded into action potentials. These
+all-or-none spike discharges last for about 1 millisecond and carry information by their presence or absence. When the technique for reliably
+recording action potentials from single cortical neurons was introduced,
+it was a surprise to many that the response from some cortical neurons
+in somatosensory cortex and visual cortex could be correlated with simple features of sensory stimuli (Hubel & Wiesel, 1962; Mountcastle,
+1957). This early success put a special emphasis on the cellular level
+rather than either the subcellular or network levels and led to the idea
+that single neurons coded simple sensory features and perhaps simple
+percepts as well (Barlow, 1972).
+It should be emphasized, however, that rarely does a single neuron
+respond solely to a single feature dimension and that the tuning curves
+along feature dimensions are usually broad. Thus, single neurons in
+sensory cortex can be thought to represent volumes in
+a highdimensional space of features: The firing rate of a single cortical neuron no longer represents the analog value of a variable directly, but
+rather the probability of a variable lying within some volume of the
+space of features (Ballard, Hinton, & Sejnowski, 1983).
+The perceptual interpretation of a local feature depends on the context of the visual scene in which the feature is embedded. If the
+
+374
+response of a single neuron were to represent not merely a conjunction
+of local features, but an interpretation of those features in the context
+of the image, then the response should be influenced by parts of the
+image outside the classical receptive field. Recently, evidence has been
+found for strong surround effects in visual cortex which are antagonistie to the response properties of the receptive fields (Allman, Miezin, &
+McGuinness, 1985).
+What makes these new surround effects especially interesting is that
+they are selective. As shown in Figure 1, some neurons with directionally selective receptive fields in extrastriate cortex can have their best
+responses modulated 100% depending on the direction of movement of
+the surrounding visual field (Allman et al., 1985). The surround
+effects in the middle-temporal area (MT), where receptive fields are
+typically S-10°, can extend 40-80°. Significant surround effects related
+to illusory contours have also been reported in area V-Il (von der
+Heydt, Peterhans, & Baumgartner, 1984), as shown in Figure 2. In
+another region of visual cortex, the V4 complex, neurons have been
+found whose surrounds are selectively tuned for orientation, spatial frequency, and color (Desimone, Schein, Moran, & Ungerleider, 1985).
+Some of the neurons in this area appear to be selective for color over a
+wide range of illumination: The wavelength-dependent response in the
+receptive field is influenced by the color balance of the surround
+(Zeki, 1983a, 1983b).
+These surround effects may be important for perceptual phenomena
+like motion parallax and color constancy that require comparison of
+local features within a larger context of the visual field (Allman, et al.,
+1985). The basis of these long-range influences is not known, but
+several sources may contribute: First, stimulus-specific information
+could spread laterally within cortex through intrinsic horizontal axonal
+arborizations that extend 2-4 mm (Gilbert & Wiesel, 1983; Rockland &
+J. S. Lund, 1983); second, reciprocal connections between cortical
+maps, particularly the descending feedback projections, could have
+extensive spread; third, inputs from noncortical structures such as the
+claustrum (LeVay & Sherk, 1981b) could influence the surrounds; and
+fourth, transcollosal connections might carry surround information, particularly between regions across the vertical meridian (Desimone et al.,
+1985).
+The discovery of large nonclassical surrounds provides an important
+opportunity to explore the collective properties of cortical processing
+The response properties within the classical receptive field probably
+represent local, intrinsic processing, but the surround effects represent
+the long-range pathways and the spread of information within cortical
+areas. The spread is stimulus specific and should prove to be as important as the primary response properties of the receptive field itself. For
+
+21. COMPUTATION IN CEREBRAL CORTEX
+375
+330°
+300°
+270°
+- 240°
+-. 210°
+180°
+150°
+120°
+90°
+60°
+30°
+BACKGROUND DOTS STATIONARY
+BACKGROUND DOTS MOVE AT 0
+- 330°
+300°
+270°
+240°
+210°
+180°
+150°
+120°
+90°
+60°
+30°
+0°
+330°
+300°
+270°
+240°
+210°
+180°
+• 150°
+120°
+90°
+60°
+30°
+BACKGROUND DOTS MOVE AT 180°
+FIGURE 1. Responses of a neuron in middle temporal (MT) cortex to a bar moving in
+different directions superimposed on a background of random dots. The bar was oriented
+orthogonally to the direction of movement. The results of each of the 12 directions (0°
+through 330°) are shown in histograms consisting of a before period, an underscored
+stimulus presentation period, and an after period. The largest histogram bin contains 26
+When the background is moving in the same direction as the bar the response is
+entirely abolished, but when its movement is opposed to the direction of the bar the
+response is enhanced. (From "Stimulus Specific Responses From Beyond the Classical
+Receptive Field: Neurophysiological Mechanisms for Local-Global Comparisons in Visual
+Neurons" by J. Allman, J. Miezin, and E. McGuinness, 1985, Annual Review of Neuroscience, 8, p. 416. Copyright 1985 by Annual Reviews, Inc. Reprinted by permission.)
+
+376
+Neuron 1
+m
+Neuron 2
+It°
+G
+H
+8.2
+4.4
+0.5
+0.4
+0.4
+27.7
+4.6
+0.7
+Neuron 3
+J
+Spikes per stimulus
+20
+10
+-80
+-45
+45
+80
+Orientation (deg)
+Number of lines
+FIGURE 2. Top: Illusory contours. Apparent contours are perceived in A, B, and D at
+sites where the stimulus is consistent with an occluding contour. Small alterations in the
+stimulus can have dramatic effects on the appearance of these contours, as in C where
+thin lines have been added to B. Bottom: Responses of neurons in extrastriate visual
+corlex (area 18) of the monkey to edges, bars and stimuli producing illusory contours.
+The stimuli (insets) were moved back and forth across the receptive fields (ellipses). In
+each line of the raster scan a white dot indicates the occurrence of an action potential as a
+function of time. The mean number of spikes per stimulus cycle is indicated to the right.
+Neuron 1, which responded to the lower right edge of the light bar (A), was activated
+also when only the illusory contour passed over its classical receptive field (B). Either
+half of the stimulus alone failed to evoke a response (C and D). Spontaneous activity is
+shown in E. Neuron 2 responded to a narrow bar (F) and, less strongly, to the illusory
+bar stimulus (G). When the ends of the "bar" were intersected by thin lines, however,
+the response was nearly abolished (H). In Neuron 3, the border between two abutting
+gratings elicited a strong response. The orientation tuning curves show corresponding
+peaks for bar and illusory contour (1). When the lines inducing the contour were
+reduced in number to less than three, the response disappeared (J). In contrast, neurons
+in primary visual cortex (area 17) did not respond to any of these stimuli. (From
+"Illusory Contours and Cortical Neuron Responses" by R. von der Heydt, E. Peterhans,
+and G. Baumgartner, 1984, Science, 224, p. 1261. Copyright 1984 by the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Reprinted by permission.)
+
+21. COMPUTATION IN CEREBRAL CORTEX 377
+example, different orientation-sensitive neurons could respond differently to a local edge depending on the meaning of the edge within
+the context of the surrounding image: whether it represents an occluding contour, surface texture, or a shadow boundary (Sejnowski & Hinton, in press).
+The analysis of a single image requires the processing power of the
+entire visual system; in a sense, the interpretation of the image is the
+state of all the neurons in the visual system. In the language of
+features one would say that the object is internally represented by the
+particular combination of features currently activated.
+LA problem arises
+when it is necessary to compare two objects, such as faces, seen at different times. One needs some means for binding together the most
+important combination of features at one moment and storing them for
+future use.
+This binding problem is particularly difficult because most regions of
+cortex are only sparsely interconnected. If two groups of neurons have
+few direct connections then it is difficult to imagine how a conjunction
+of two facts represented in the two regions can somehow be stored.
+Several solutions to this binding problem have been suggested, but no
+one yet knows how it is actually solved in the nervous system. The
+binding problem is a touchstone for testing network models that claim
+to have psychological validity. For a discussion of binding in the context of shape recognition see Hinton (1981c).
+One approach to the binding problem is to represent a complex
+object by the activity of only a few neurons, a so-called local representation similar to the "grandmother cell" hypothesis (J. A. Feldman,
+1981). In this case the binding of two facts can be accomplished by
+dedicating one or more intermediate links between the neurons
+representing the features and the neurons representing the object. One
+problem with this approach is the combinatorial explosion of neurons
+and links that must be dedicated to the representation of even modestly
+complex objects. One consequence of the localist solution to binding is
+that some decisions to take an action may be based on the state of very
+few links between very few units. There is no convincing evidence for
+such "command fibers" anywhere in cerebral cortex. An alternative
+solution to the binding problem, based on a "searchlight of attention" is
+discussed in the section on temporal coincidence.
+In summary, it appears from studies of single neurons in visual cortex that they generally respond to a conjunction of features on a
+number of different dimensions. The sharpness of the tuning for
+values on different dimensions varies, but in general, each neuron is
+rather coarsely tuned, and its receptive field overlaps with the receptive
+fields of other neurons. Coarse coding of features also holds for other
+sensory areas of cortex and motor cortex (Georgopoulos, Caminiti,
+
+378
+Kalaska, & Massey, 1983), although the evidence there is not nearly as
+good as in the visual system. These observations are consistent with
+the ideas about distributed representations described in Chapters 3, 7,
+and 18.
+NEURONAL PROCESSING
+The time available for processing puts strict constraints on the types
+of algorithms that could be implemented in cerebral cortex. Following
+a briefly presented image, the information coded as a pattern of hyperpolarizations in the photoreceptors is processed in the retina and coded
+into trains of action potentials by the retinal ganglion cells. Within
+about half a second following presentation of the image we can recognize an object in the image. Because photoreceptors are slow, a signififant fraction of the response time, about 25-50 milliseconds, is
+required for the information to reach cortex and several hundred milliseconds are required for the motor system to produce a response, which
+leaves about 200-300 milliseconds for visual processing. This is a
+severe restriction on algorithms, such as cooperative ones, that require
+extensive exchange of information between local neurons. David Marr
+(1982) concluded that:
+cooperative methods take too long and demand too much
+neural hardware to be implemented in any direct way. The
+problem with iteration is that it demands the circulation of
+numbers around some kind of loop, which could be carried out
+by some system of recurrent collaterals or closed loops of neuronal connections. However, unless the numbers involved can
+be represented quite accurately as they are circulated, errors
+characteristically tend to build up rather quickly. To use a neuron to represent a quantity with an accuracy of even as low as 1
+in 10, it is necessary to use a time interval that is sufficiently
+long to hold 1 to 10 spikes in comfort. This means at least 50
+ms per iteration for a medium-sized cell, which means 200 ms
+for four iterations-the minimum time ever required for our
+cooperative algorithm to solve a stereogram. And this is too
+slow. (p. 107)
+The timing problem is even more severe than Marr states because
+the responses of single neurons in cortex often vary from trial to trial
+and there are usually only a few spikes in a single response (Figure 3).
+
+21. COMPUTATION IN CEREBRAL CORTEX
+379
+Trials
+hit thit
+4
+5
+6
+TTT
+8
+9
+10 •
+-thrill fa
+12
+50 msec
+POST-STIMULUS TIME HISTOGRAM
+20T
+10-
+-50 0 50
+150 250
+Time in Milliseconds
+FIGURE 3. Extracellular recordings from a single neuron in extrastriate visual cortex of
+the cat. This neuron responded best to a slit of light obliquely oriented in a particular
+part of the visual field. The first 12 successive responses of the neuron to 50 exposures
+of the light are shown above, and the average response for 20 trials is shown below
+(Post-Stimulus Time Histogram). Even before the onset of the stimulus the neuron was
+spontaneously active. Although the pattern of firing varied from trial to trial, the ensemble average of the responses is repeatable. (From "Integrative Properties of Parastriate
+Neurons" by F. Morrell, in Brain and Human Behavior, p. 262, edited by A. G. Karczmar
+and J. Eccles, 1972, Berlin: Springer. Copyright 1972 by Springer-Verlag. Reprinted by
+permission.)
+Therefore, in many experiments the spike train is averaged over a
+number of responses (typically 10) to obtain a post-stimulus time histogram. The histogram represents the probability of a spike occurring
+during a brief interval as a function of time following the stimulus.
+This suggests that for short intervals (5-10 milliseconds) and especially
+during nonstationary conditions, stochastic variables may be more
+appropriate than the average firing rate (Hinton & Sejnowski, 1983;
+Sejnowski, 1981).
+A probabilistic code means that the probability of firing, rather than
+being represented by a number that must be accurately transmitted, can
+be represented directly as the probability for a neuron to fire during a
+
+380 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+short time interval. The use of a probabilistic code rather than one
+based on the average value of spike firing reopens the possibility of
+cooperative algorithms because in 200 milliseconds it is possible to perform 40 or more iterations with 3-5 milliseconds per iteration, the
+minimum interspike interval. This is enough time for some cooperative algorithms to converge to a steady state solution through a process
+of relaxation (Sejnowski & Hinton,
+in press). Interestingly, it was
+found that adding noise to the system during the relaxation often
+improved the convergence by helping the system overcome locally inappropriate configurations and achieve the best overall global state. Some
+of the details and consequences of these probabilistic algorithms are
+discussed in Chapter 7.
+Nonetheless, "single-shot" algorithms that converge in one pass
+through a network, such as a linear transformation followed by thresholding (Duda & Hart, 1973; Kohonen, 1977), remain attractive, especially for the early stages of visual processing that are fairly automatic.
+Even for problems that require the global comparison of features, it
+would be desirable wherever possible to minimize the number of passes
+that information must make through a circuit without new information
+being added. However, contextual influences on processing might still
+require iterative computation, as illustrated in models like the interactive activation model of word perception.
+The single-shot and relaxation strategies have been presented as
+alternatives, but a better way to view them is as extremes in a continuum of strategies, any of which may be adopted by cortex depending
+on the level in cortex and the nature of the problem. For the recognition of common objects, a network that can process the image in a
+single-shot may be learned through experience. For novel or more
+complex objects, a relaxation strategy may be more flexible and have a
+higher capacity. Since the relaxation strategy must start out with a
+guess anyway, it may as well be a good one and get better with practice.
+This is also a graceful way to use the finite resources available in visual
+memory. In Chapter 7, an example is given of a relaxation strategy
+which can improve its performance with practice.
+Several nonlinear parallel models (J. A. Anderson, 1983; McClelland
+& Rumelhart, 1981; see also Chapters 14 through 17) make use of
+units that have continuous activation values. While the membrane
+potential of a neuron does have an approximately continuous value, the
+interaction between neurons with action potentials is clearly not continuous. Several ways have been proposed to relate the variables in
+these models more closely with neural properties. First, the continuous
+value may be considered an average firing rate; however, as explained
+earlier, the time average firing rate is ill-defined over short time intervals.
+Second, a single unit could correspond to a population of
+
+21. COMPUTATION IN CEREBRAL CORTEX
+381
+neurons, and the activation would then represent the fraction of the
+neurons in the ensemble that are firing during a short time interval
+(Wilson & Cowan, 1972). A third possibility is that the units are dendritic branches that interact nonlinearly.
+Until recently, the dendrites of most neurons were thought to be
+governed mainly by the passive linear properties of membranes (Rall,
+1970) and to serve mainly in the integration rather than processing of
+synaptic signals. If, however, there are voltage-dependent channels in
+dendrites, then the signals represented by membrane potentials are
+nonlinearly transformed and the dendrites
+must then be studied in
+smaller units, perhaps as small as patches of membranes (J. P. Miller,
+Rall, & Rinzel, 1985; D. H. Perkel & D. J. Perkel, 1985; Shepherd et
+al., 1985). The membrane patches and dendritic branches still have an
+integrative function, but to analyze that function requires a finer-grain
+analysis (Figure 4).
+At an even finer level individual synapses may themselves interact
+nonlinearly because the conductance change at one synapse may serve
+as a current shunt and alter the driving force for other nearby synapses
+(Koch, Poggio, & Torre, 1982; Rall, 1970). This is particularly true for
+synapses that occur on dendritic
+shafts but is less important for
+synapses that are electrically isolated on spines. With nonlinear interactions between synapses and between patches of dendritic membrane
+many more processing units are available but this advantage is partially
+offset by the limited topological connectivity of dendritic trees. We
+need to explore the range of transformations that can be performed
+inside neurons and build up a vocabulary of elementary computational
+operations (Shepherd, 1978, 1985).
+Whether nonlinear computations are performed at a subneuronal
+level is of fundamental importance to modeling parallel networks. If, at
+one extreme, each neuron acts like a classical linear integrator, then the
+sigma-pi units discussed in Chapters 2, 10, and 16 would have to be
+implemented in the brain using a single neuron for each multiplicative
+connection. If, on the other hand, nonlinear interactions can be implemented at a subneuronal level, our estimate of the computational
+power of a fixed number of neurons would be greatly increased, and it
+would be possible to directly implement several proposals that require
+multiplicative connections, such as Ballard's (1984) implementation of
+Hough transforms; Hinton's (1981c) mapping from a retinocentric to a
+viewer-centered frame of reference; or McClelland's (1985) method for
+"programming" the weights between one set of units using signals set
+up in another set of units. It is worth noting, though, that these
+schemes would generally require very precise anatomical connectivity
+and very accurate timing of signals to get the most out of the nonlinear
+processing capabilities of dendrites.
+
+382
+B
+1, 2-
+04
+106
+| 50 pm
+D8
+S1
+52
+S3
+
+FIGURE 4. Top: A: Pyramidal neuron in the cerebral cortex stained by the Golgi
+method of impregnation. B: Schematic diagram of the terminal segment of an apical
+dendritic branch in the most superficial cortical layer in A. Only three spines out of the
+total array are indicated, spaced 50 um apart. C: Diagrammatic representation of a compartment model of B. Dendritic compartments are symbolized by D, the necks of spines
+by N, and the spine heads by S. In addition to passive membrane resistance and capacilance, active sodium and potassium currents, following the Hodgkin-Huxley model, were
+incorporated into the spine heads. This is a simplified model of only a small portion of
+the apical dendrite. Bottom: Current pulses were injected into spine head S1. The traces
+show the simulated membrane potential in various compartments of the dendrite and
+spines following
+either a subthreshold current pulse or a suprathreshold current pulse.
+Note that when a spike occurs in Sl it propagates by saltatory conduction through the
+dendritic compartments down the chain of spines. Spines may also interact if they simultaneously receive input currents: The combination may reach threshold even though the
+inputs individually produce only subthreshold membrane potentials. (From "Signal
+Enhancement in Distal Cortical Dendrites by Means of Interactions Between Active Dendritic Spines" by G. M. Shepherd, R. K. Brayton, J. P. Miller, I. Segev, J. Rinzel, W.
+Rall, 1985. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 82, p. 2193. Reprinted by
+
+21. COMPUTATION IN CEREBRAL CORTEX
+383
+TEMPORAL COINCIDENCE
+Digital computers have a central clock that synchronizes the processing of signals throughout the central processing unit.
+No such clock
+has been found in the central nervous system on the millisecond time
+scale, but this does not rule out the importance of small time differences in neural processing. For example, the information about visual
+motion in primates at the level of the retina is represented as time
+differences in the firing pattern of axons in the optic nerve. In visual
+cortex, the relative timing information is used to drive cells that
+respond best to edges that are moving in particular directions (Koch &
+Poggio, 1985). In the realm of learning, the timing of sensory stimulation in the 10-50 millisecond range is known to be critically important
+for classical conditioning (Gluck & Thompson, in press; Sutton &
+Barto, 1981). Unfortunately, very little is known about the coding and
+processing of information as spatio-temporal patterns in populations of
+neurons. A few of the possibilities will be mentioned here.
+The arrival time of impulses is extremely important in the auditory
+system where slight temporal differences between spike trains in the
+two cochlear nerves can be used to localize sound sources. It also
+appears that information in the relative timing of impulses in the same
+nerve is essential in carrying information in speech at normal hearing
+levels (Sachs, Voigt, & Young, 1983). Although it is difficult for neurons with millisecond time constants to make accurate absolute timing
+measurements, differences between arrival times down to 10
+microseconds can be detected (Loeb, 1985) and therefore submillisecond timing information could also be important in cortex. This
+raises the possibility that the timing of arriving impulses might also be
+important in the cerebral cortex as well.
+The transformation between the input current and the firing rate of
+the neuron has a range between threshold and saturation over which
+the relationship is fairly linear. However, at any given time only a
+small fraction of all cortical neurons is operating in the linear region.
+Therefore only a subpopulation of neurons is sensitive to the timing of
+synaptic events, namely, those neurons that are near the threshold
+region. This leads to the idea of a skeleton filter-the temporary network of neurons near threshold that can linearly transform correlations
+between spikes on input lines (Sejnowski, 1981). This is a way for
+temporarily changing the effectiveness with
+which some synapses can
+transmit information on the timing of synaptic events without actually
+altering their strength. It is not as flexible as a general modification
+scheme, such as the one suggested by McClelland (1985), because all
+
+384
+the synapses originating from one neuron are modified by the same
+factor.
+Recently, von der Malsburg (in press) has suggested a scheme for
+binding together distributed circuits that represent a set of facts by their
+simultaneous activation. He speculates that this temporal binding is
+implemented by the rapid changes in the strengths of synapses between
+neurons that are co-active within a few milliseconds. Crick (1984) has
+modified this proposal by suggesting that the binding occurs during
+longer intervals of about 50 milliseconds during which bursts of
+impulses, produced by "searchlights" of attention in the thalamus, provide the signal for rapid synaptic changes (Figure 5). The advantage of
+this approach is that the representations are distributed over a population of neurons and that simultaneous co-activation of a group of neurons in one area will impose simultaneous
+co-activation in
+another
+group that receives a projection from the first.
+NEOCORTEX
+RETICULAR
+COMPLEX
+THALAMUS
+FIGURE 5. The main connections of the reticular complex, highly diagrammatic and not
+drawn to scale. Solid lines represent excitatory axons, dashed lines show inhibitory
+axons, and arrows represent synapses. The principal neurons in the thalamus that project
+to the neocortex have two modes of response depending on the membrane potential. If
+the membrane potential is initially depolarized, then ascending input to the thalamus
+(from the retina. for example) causes the principal neuron to fire at a moderate rate
+roughly proportional to the input. If, however, the neuron is initially hyperpolarized, for
+example by inhibitory inputs from the reticular complex, then the output from the principal cell is a rapid burst of spikes. According to the searchlight hypothesis, focal inhibition
+arising from the reticular nucleus produces sequentially occurring bursts in subsets of
+active thalamic neurons. The bursts are thought to last about 50 milliseconds and to produce short-term transient alterations in the synaptic strengths in cerebral cortex. (From
+"Function of the Thalamic Reticular Complex: The Searchlight Hypothesis" by F. H. C.
+Crick, 1984, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 81, p. 4587. Reprinted
+by permission.)
+
+21. COMPUTATION IN CEREBRAL CORTEX
+385
+If a temporal code is used in cortex, then spatio-temporal correlations
+should show up in recordings from groups of neurons. In recordings
+from nearby cortical neurons, spatio-temporal correlations have been
+observed between spike trains, but the significance of these correlations
+is unclear (Abeles, 1982; Abeles, de Ribaupierre, & de Ribaupierre,
+1983; Gerstein, Bloom, Espinosa, Evanczuk, & Turner, 1983; Shaw,
+Silverman, & Pearson, 1985; Ts'o, Gilbert, & Wiesel, 1985). However,
+it is already clear from these pioneering observations that the complexity of spatio-temporal signals from two or more neurons will require
+new techniques for data analysis and presentation. Several groups now
+have the technical ability to record simultaneously from many isolated
+neurons in cerebral cortex (Gerstein et al., 1983; Kuperstein & Eichenbaum, 1985; V. B. Mountcastle, personal communication, 1985; Reitboek, 1983). It will be especially interesting to record from alert
+animals attending to sensory stimuli and to search for correlated bursts
+of spikes and temporal coherence between spike trains.
+NEURONAL PLASTICITY
+Not only does cortex provide the capability of fast processing but it
+can be partially reconfigured with experience. There are experimental
+hints that the functional connectivity within cerebral cortex is far more
+fluid than previously thought. In a series of careful studies, Merzenich,
+Kaas and their colleagues have demonstrated that the spatial map of the
+body surface on the surface of primary somatosensory cortex of monkeys can be significantly altered by changes in activity.
+In one series of experiments the map of the hand in somatosensory
+cortex was determined by multiple electrode penetrations before and
+after one of the three nerves that innervate the hand was sectioned
+(Merzenich et al., 1983), as illustrated in Figure 6. Immediately following nerve section most of the cortical territory which previously
+could be activated by the region of the hand innervated by the afferent
+nerves became unresponsive to somatic stimulation. In most monkeys,
+small islands within the unresponsive cortex immediately became
+responsive to somatic stimulation from neighboring regions. Over
+several weeks following the operation, the previously silent regions
+became responsive and topographically reorganized. In another set of
+experiments a hand region in somatosensory cortex was mapped before
+and after prolonged sensory stimulation of a finger; the area
+represented by the finger on the surface of cortex expanded and the
+average size of the receptive fields within the finger region diminished
+(Jenkins, Merzenich, & Ochs, 1984).
+
+386
+A. Nerve Fields of the Hand
+DA
+Nerve
+Skin
+Median
+Nerve
+Skin
+B. Topographic Pattern of
+Hand Representations
+3b
+DsO
+DaC
+1
+PA
+P3
+Dorsum
+Dy
+C. Normal Hand
+Representation
+3b
+Wrist
+Wrist
+D2-5
+H
+D.Cortex Deprived Dy
+Median Nerve
+3b
+Wrist
+Section
+D2-5
+H
+H
+E. Fully Reorganized
+Cortex
+3b
+Wrist
+Wrist
+D2-5
+H
+D5
+5
+4
+D5
+DA
+)Pa
+PA
+D5
+PA
+Ds
+5
+Da
+D3
+P3
+P2
+Tips
+D4
+D3
+P3
+3
+Tips
+D3
+P1
+Dz
+T
+P,
+0,
+1
+face
+Face
+Di
+Face
+Face
+101
+Face
+1 + 2
+Face
+FIGURE 6. The effect of median-nerve section and ligation on the representations of
+the hand in somatosensory Areas 3b and 1 of the owl monkey. A: The radial side of the
+glaborous hand is innervated by the median nerve, the ulnar side by the ulnar nerve, and
+the dorsal surface by the ulnar and radial nerves. Digits (D) and palmar pads (P) are
+numbered in order. Insular (I), hypothenar (H), and thenar (T) pads, and distal (d),
+middle (m), and proximal (p) phalanges are also indicated. B: Pattern of topographic
+organization of the two hand representations, indicated without accurately reflecting cortical surface areas devoted to the representation of various surfaces of the hand. Cortex
+devoted to representation of dorsal surfaces of the digits is shown in black. C: Typical
+organization of the hand representations in a normal owl monkey. D: The same area of
+cortex following section of the median nerve. The part of cortex indicated by dots is
+deprived of normal activation by sensory stimulation. E: The organization of the two
+hand representations several months after median-nerve section and ligation. Much of
+the deprived cortex is activated by stimulation of the dorsal digit surfaces and the dorsum
+of the hand (black). In addition, palmar pads innervated by the ulnar nerve have an
+increased cortical representation.
+All "new" inputs are topographically ordered. Peripherally, the ulnar and radial nerves do not grow into the anesthetic median-nerve skin
+field. (From "Reorganization of Mammalian Somatosensory Cortex Following Peripheral
+Nerve Injury" by M. M. Merzenich and J. H. Kaas, 1982, Trends in Neuroscience, S, p.
+435. Copyright 1982 by Elsevier Biomedical Press. Reprinted by permission.)
+
+21. COMPUTATION IN CEREBRAL CORTEX
+387
+The uncovering of previously "silent" synapses is the favored explanation for these experiments because the maximum shift observed, a
+few millimeters, is about the size of the largest axonal arborizations
+within cortex.
+The apparently new receptive fields that were
+"uncovered" immediately after nerve section could represent a rapid
+shift in the dynamical balance of inputs from existing synapses, and the
+slower reorganization could be caused by changes in synaptic strengths
+at the cortical and subcortical levels. This raises several crucial questions: First, what fraction of morphologically identified synaptic structures are functionally active in cerebral cortex? It is not known, for
+example, how many quanta of transmitter are released on average at
+any central synapse. Second, how quickly if at all can a synapse be
+transformed from a "silent" state to an active state, and what are the
+conditions for this transformation? Finally, how is this plasticity related
+to the representation and processing of sensory information? Perhaps
+the most serious deficiency in our knowledge of cerebral cortex concerns the physiology of individual central synapses, which are inaccessible by conventional techniques owing in part to the complexity of the
+cortical neuropil.
+New optical techniques for noninvasively recording
+membrane potentials and ionic concentrations may someday make it
+possible to study dynamic changes at central synapses (Grinvald, 1985).
+The evidence for a rearrangement of the body map on the surface of
+cerebral cortex during experimental manipulations raises interesting
+questions about perceptual stability because this reorganization is not
+accompanied by confused or mistaken percepts of the body surface
+(Merzenich & Kaas, 1982). This suggests that as a neuron shifts its
+input preference, other neurons that receive information from it must
+reinterpret the meaning of the signal. If the connectivity of cerebral
+cortex is as dynamic under normal conditions as these experiments suggest, then many of the issues that have been raised in this chapter must
+be re-examined from a new perspective (Changeux, Heidmann, &
+Patte, 1984; Crick, 1984; Edelman, 1981).
+ROLE OF COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
+A complete description of every neuron, every synapse, and every
+molecule in the brain is not synonymous with a complete understanding
+of the brain. At each level of description the components must be
+related to the phenomena which those components produce at the next
+highest level, and models are a succinct way to summarize the relation-
+A classic example of a successful model in neuroscience is the
+Hodgkin-Huxley model of the action potential in the squid axon. Here
+
+388 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+the bridge was between microscopic membrane channels (hypothetical
+at the time) and macroscopic membrane currents. The first step in
+making a model is to identify the important variables at both the lower
+and upper levels; next, a well-defined procedure must be specified for
+how these variables interact (an algorithm); and finally, the conditions
+under which the model is valid must be stated so that it can be compared with experiments.
+The models that have been explored in this book do not attempt to
+reconstruct molecular and cellular detail. Rather, these connectionist
+models are simplified, stripped-down versions of real neural networks
+similar to models in physics such as models of ferromagnetism that
+replace iron with a lattice of spins interacting with their nearest neighbors. This type of model is successful if it falls into the same
+equivalence class as the physical system; that is, if some qualitative
+phenomena (such as phase transitions) are the same for both the real
+system and the model system (Ma, 1976). When they are successful
+these simple models demonstrate the sufficiency of the microscopic
+variables included in the model to account for the macroscopic
+measurements.
+The emergence of simple parallel models exhibiting nontrivial computational capabilities may be of great importance for future research in
+neuroscience because they offer one of the few ways that neuroscientists can test qualitative ideas about the representation and processing
+of information in populations of neurons. Suppose that single neurons
+in an area responded to features of the visual input that could be
+important for computing, say, optical flow. Knowing the goal of the
+computation, one could design a parallel algorithm for implementing
+the computation of optical flow and then test it with a wide range of
+inputs. The process of specifying and testing an algorithm often reveals
+unexamined assumptions and refines the original motivation for the
+model. If one successful algorithm is found then the computational
+feasibility of the original proposal is strengthened; to test whether some
+form of the algorithm is actually implemented in cortex would be much
+more difficult; ultimately, the performance of the algorithm has to be
+compared with psychophysical testing.
+Some neuroscientists may feel uncomfortable because connectionist
+models do not take into account much of the known cellular properties
+of neurons, such as the variety of membrane channels that have been
+found. What if the processing capabilities of cerebral cortex were to
+depend crucially on some of these properties? In this case it may not
+be possible to get networks of oversimplified model neurons to solve
+difficult computational problems, and it may be necessary to add new
+properties to the model neuron. The added capabilities would yield
+better understanding of the roles played by these neural properties in
+
+21. COMPUTATION IN CEREBRAL CORTEX 389
+processing information, and suggestions could emerge for useful properties which have not yet been observed. The present models are
+guideposts for thinking about the computational capabilities of neural
+networks and benchmarks that set the standards for future models.
+One of the key insights that has already emerged from studying one
+class of simple nonlinear networks with recurrent collaterals is that
+amongst the large number of possible states of a network, only relatively few of these states, called attractors, are stable (J. A. Anderson,
+1983; M. A. Cohen & Grossberg, 1983; Hinton & Sejnowski, 1983;
+Hogg & Huberman, 1984; Hopfield, 1982; Hopfield & Tank, 1985;
+Sejnowski, 1976; Wilson & Cowan, 1972). The existence of stable
+attractors is a feature that is likely to generalize to more complex networks. Objects and their relationships can be internally represented by
+these attractors, and the search for the best match between the world
+and the internal representation of the world by the dynamics of the network is much more powerful than previous template-matching procedures. This opens a large number of research problems, such as the
+issue of local vs. distributed representations and the binding problem,
+both of which have been discussed in this chapter. The identification
+and study of these issues in simple network models will greatly help us
+in understanding the principles that went into the design of the cerebral
+cortex.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+I am grateful to Neal Cohen, Francis Crick, Mark Gluck, Geoffrey
+Hinton, Chip Levy, and Gordon Shepherd who provided valuable
+suggestions on earlier versions of this chapter, and I especially wish to
+thank Jay McClelland for helping to shape the chapter in many ways,
+large and small.
+
+CHAPTER 22
+Neural and Conceptual
+Interpretation of PDP Models
+P. SMOLENSKY
+Mind and brain provide two quite different perspectives for viewing
+cognition. Yet both perspectives are informed by the study of parallel
+distributed processing. This duality creates a certain ambiguity about
+the interpretation of a particular PDP model of a cognitive process: Is
+each processing unit to be interpreted as a neuron? Is the model supposed to relate to the neural implementation of the process in some
+less direct way?
+A closely related set of questions arises when it is observed that PDP
+models of cognitive processing divide broadly into two classes. In local
+models, the activity of a single unit represents the degree of participation in the processing of a known conceptual entity-a word, a word
+sense, a phoneme, a motor program. In distributed models, the strength
+of patterns of activity over many units determine the degree of participation of these conceptual entities. In some models, these patterns are
+chosen in a deliberately arbitrary way, so that the activity of a single
+unit has no apparent "meaning" whatever-no discernible relation to
+the conceptual entities involved in the cognitive process. On the surface, at least, these two types of models seem quite different. Are they
+as ditterent as they seem! How are they related!
+This chapter begins with a briet consideration of the neural interpretation of PDP models of cognition. These considerations serve mostly
+to lay out a certain perspective on the PDP modeling world, to make
+some distinctions I have found to be valuable, to introduce some
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+391
+terminology, and to lead into the main question of this chapter: How
+are distributed and local PDP models related? The chapter ends with a
+discussion of how, using the framework of PDP models, we might
+forge a mathematical relationship between the principles of mind and
+brain.
+The following technique will be used to relate distributed to local
+models. We take a distributed model of some cognitive process, and
+mathematically formulate a conceptual description of that model, a
+description in terms of the conceptual entities themselves rather than
+the activity patterns that represent them. From some perspectives, this
+amounts to taking an account of cognition in terms of neural processing
+and transforming it mathematically into an account of cognition in
+terms of conceptual processing. The conceptual account has a direct
+relation to a local model of the cognitive process, so a distributed
+model has been mapped onto a local model.
+The mathematical formulation of the conceptual description of a distributed model is straightforward, and the mathematical results reported
+in this chapter are all quite elementary, once the appropriate mathematical perspective is adopted. The major portion of this chapter is therefore
+devoted to an exposition of this abstract perspective on PDP modeling,
+and to bringing the consequent mathematical observations to bear on
+the cognitive issues under consideration.
+The abstract viewpoint presented in this chapter treats PDP models
+as dynamical systems like those studied in mathematical physics. The
+mathematical concepts and techniques that will be used are those of
+linear algebra, the study of vector spaces; these techniques are discussed in some detail in Chapter y. The formal parts of the discussion
+will be confined to footnotes and italicized passages; these may be
+skipped or skimmed as all results are discussed conceptually in the main
+portion of the text, which is self-contained.
+NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATIONS
+The interpretation of any mathematical model involves the mapping
+of a mathematical world into some observable part of the real world
+The ambiguity in the interpretation of PDP models arises because the
+mathematical world of the model can be mapped into two observable
+worlds: the neural world and the world of cognitive behavior.
+The neural world relevant here is discussed in Chapter 20-a world
+of receptor cells, neurons, synaptic contacts, membrane depolarizations,
+neural firings, and other features of the nervous system viewed at this
+
+392
+level of description. The mathematical world is that described in
+Chapter 2-a world of processing units, weighted connections, threshold and sigmoidal functions, and activation.
+Least precisely prescribed is the world of cognitive behavior. This
+world is mapped by experiments that probe perceptual behavior, reasoning and problem solving behavior, skilled motor behavior, linguistic
+behavior, memory task behavior, and the like. PDP models have been
+interpreted in terms of all these aspects of behavior, and to understand
+the common basis for these interpretations we must adopt a fairly
+general —and rather imprecise-way of speaking about cognition.
+The connection between the formal structure of PDP models and
+cognitive behavior rests on theoretical knowledge constructs
+hypothesized to underlie this behavior. Consider perception first.
+Interpreting sensory input can be thought of as consideration of many
+hypotheses about possible interpretations and assigning degrees of confidence in these hypotheses. Perceptual hypotheses like "a word is being
+displayed the first letter of which is A," "the word ABLE is being
+displayed," and "the word MOVE is being displayed" are tightly interconnected; confidence in the first supports confidence in the second
+and
+undercuts confidence in the third. Thus assignment of
+confidence-inference-is supported by knowledge about the positive
+and negative evidential relations among hypotheses. This same kind of
+knowledge underlies other cognitive abilities; this kind of inference can
+support problem solving, the interpretation of speech and stories, and
+also motor control. The act of typing ABLE can be achieved by letting
+"the word ABLE is to be typed" support "the first letter to be typed is
+A" and inhibit "the first letter to be typed is M."
+This way of thinking about cognition can be summarized by saying
+that behavior rests on a set of internal entities called hypotheses that
+are positively and negatively related in a knowledge base that is used
+for inference, the propagation of confidence. The hypotheses relate
+directly to our way of thinking about the given cognitive process; e.g.,
+for language processing the hypotheses relate to words, syntactic
+categories, phonemes, meanings. To emphasize that these hypotheses
+are defined in terms of our concepts about the cognitive domain, I will
+call them conceptual hypotheses or the conceptual entities, or simply concepts; they are to be distinguished from the mathematical and neural
+entities-units and neurons-of the other two worlds.
+The internal structure of the neural, mathematical, and conceptual
+worlds we have described are quite similar. Table 1 displays mappings
+that directly relate the features of the three worlds. Included are all the
+central defining features of the PDP models-the mathematical
+world-and the corresponding features of the portion of the neural and
+conceptual worlds that are directly idealized in PDP models.
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+THE MAPPINGS FROM THE MATHEMATICAL WORLD TO
+THE NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL WORLDS
+Neural
+Mathematical
+Conceptual
+neurons
+units
+spiking frequency
+spread of
+depolarization
+activation
+spread of
+activation
+synaptic contact
+excitation/inhibition
+approximate additivity
+of depolarizations
+spiking thresholds
+limited
+dynamic range
+connection
+positive/negative
+weight
+summation
+of inputs
+activation spread
+threshold G
+sigmoidal
+function F
+hypotheses
+degree of confidence
+propagation of
+confidence: inference
+conceptual - inferential -
+interrelations
+positive/negative
+inferential relations
+approximate additivity
+of evidence
+independence from
+irrelevant information
+limited range of
+processing strength
+393
+In Table 1, individual units in the mathematical world are mapped on
+the one hand into individual neurons and on the other into individual
+conceptual hypotheses. ' These two mappings will be taken to define the
+local neural interpretation and the local conceptual interpretation of PDP
+models, respectively. These are two separate mappings, and a particular
+PDP model may in fact be intended to be interpreted with only one of
+these mappings. Using both mappings for a single model would imply
+that individual concepts, being identified with individual units, would
+also be identified with individual neurons.
+In addition to the local mappings there are also distributed mappings
+of the mathematical world into each of the neural and conceptual
+worlds. In a distributed conceptual interpretation, the confidence in a
+1 What is relevant to this chapter are the general features, not the details, of Table 1.
+The precision with which the mappings are described is sufficient for present purposes.
+For a more precise
+account of the relation between the mathematics of certain PDP
+models and the mathematics of inference, see Hinton, Sejnowski, and Ackley (1984).
+
+394 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+conceptual hypothesis is represented by the strength of a pattern of
+activation over a set of mathematical
+units. In a distributed neural
+interpretation, the activation of a unit is represented by the strength of
+a pattern of neural activity of a set of neurons.
+It must be emphasized that the choices of neural and conceptual
+interpretations are truly independent. Some neural models (e.g., Hopfield, 1982) may have no direct conceptual interpretation at all; they are
+intended as abstract models of information processing, with no cognitive domain implied and therefore no direct connection with a conceptual world. The reading model of McClelland and Rumelhart (1981;
+Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982; see Chapter 1) has an explicit local
+conceptual interpretation; we can choose to give it no neural interpretation, a local neural interpretation (implying individual neurons for individual words), or a distributed
+neural interpretation. The Hinton
+(1981a) and J. A. Anderson (1983) models of semantic networks have
+explicitly distributed conceptual interpretations; they can be given a
+local neural interpretation, so that the patterns over units used in the
+models are directly interpreted as patterns over neurons. They can also
+be given a distributed neural interpretation, in which the units in the
+model are represented by activity patterns over neurons so that the
+concepts-patterns over units-correspond to new patterns over neurons.
+The nature of the patterns chosen for a distributed interpretation -
+either neural or conceptual-can be important (although it is not
+always; this is one of the results discussed later). A distributed
+interpretation will be called quasi-local if none of the patterns overlap,
+that is, if every pattern is defined over its own set of units. Quasi-local
+distributed interpretation, as the name implies, forms a bridge between
+local and distributed interpretation: a quasi-local neural interpretation
+associates several neurons with a single mathematical unit, but only a
+single unit with each neuron.
+Since quasi-local
+interpretations are special cases of distributed
+representations, the methods applied in this chapter to the general case
+of distributed
+• representations could also be applied to quasi-local
+representations. Certain similarities to local representations can be
+expected to emerge, but the general results to be discussed suggest that
+it is a mistake to assume that the mathematical properties of the local
+and quasi-local cases will be essentially the same.
+The primary reason for displaying Table 1 is to emphasize that the
+neural and conceptual bases for interest in PDP models are completely
+independent. Even if all neural interpretations are eliminated empirically, or if no neural interpretation is given a model at all, a conceptual
+interpretation remains a
+strong independent source of cognitive
+relevance for a PDP model.
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+395
+At the same time, the independence of the neural and conceptual
+mappings makes it quite striking that both contact exactly the same class
+of mathematical models. Why should this be? Is it that we have
+ignored crucial features of the two worlds, features which would lead to
+quite different mathematical abstractions?
+A more encouraging possibility is this: Perhaps we have captured the essence of neural processing
+in PDP models. Perhaps implicit in the processing of neural firing patterns is another mathematical description, a description in terms of the
+concepts represented in those patterns.
+Perhaps when we analyze the
+mathematics of this conceptual description, we will find that it has the
+mathematical structure of a PDP model —that because of special properties of PDP models, at both the neural and conceptual levels of description, the mathematical structure is the same.
+This wildly optimistic scenario (depicted schematically in Figure 1)
+will be called the hypothesis of the isomorphism of the conceptual and
+neural levels-the isomorphism hypothesis for short. We will find that it
+is in fact exactly true of the simplest-one might say the purest - PDP
+models, those without the nonlinear threshold and sigmoidal functions.
+For models with these nonlinearities, we shall see how the isomorphism
+Neural World
+Conceptual World
+final
+state
+final state
+- - -
+initial
+state
+pop model
+#1
+"lower level model"
+initial
+state
+pdp model
+#2
+"higher level model"
+FIGURE 1. The dashed line indicates a mapping from a PDP model representing neural
+states to a PDP model representing conceptual states. The mapping is an isomorphism if,
+when the two models start in corresponding states and run for the same length of time,
+they always end up in corresponding states.
+
+396 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+hypothesis fails, and explore a phenomenon within these models that
+distinguishes between the neural and conceptual levels.2
+It is an open empirical question whether the conceptual entities with
+which we understand most cognitive processes are represented by the
+firing of a single neuron, by the firing of a group of neurons dedicated
+to that concept, by a pattern of firing over a group of neurons involved
+in representing many other concepts, by neural features other than
+firing, or by no neural features at all.
+The purpose of this chapter is to
+show how to use PDP models as a mathematical framework in which to
+compare the implications of assumptions like those of local and distributed models.
+The plan of attack in this chapter is to compare two related
+mathematical models, each of which can be given either neural or conceptual interpretations. They can be thought of as describing a single
+neural net with both a local and a distributed model, or as implementing inference over a single set of conceptual hypotheses using both a
+local and a distributed model. The comparison of these two models will
+thus tell us two things. It will show how a description of a neural net
+in terms of its patterns compares with a description in terms of its individual neurons. It will also provide information about how behavioral
+predictions change when
+a local model of a set of concepts is converted
+to a distributed model.
+The comparison between the two mathematical models will constitute
+an investigation of the isomorphism of levels hypothesis. Model 2 will
+be a description of the dynamics of the patterns of activation of Model 1;
+the hypothesis is that the description at the higher level of patterns
+(Model 2) obeys the same laws as-is isomorphic to-the description at
+the lower level of individual units (Model 1). To permit all the
+relevant interpretations to apply, I shall call Model 1 simply the lowerlevel model and Model 2 the higher-level model.
+2 Strictly speaking, an isomorphism insists not only that there be a mapping between the
+neural and conceptual world that preserves the dynamics, as indicated by Figure 1, but
+also that the map establish a one-to-one correspondence between states in the two
+worlds. Actually, it seems reasonable to assume that the neural world is a larger space
+than the conceptual world: that a conceptual state lumps together many neural states, or
+that the set of possible neural states includes many that have no conceptual counterpart.
+This would render the "conceptual level" a "higher" level of description. These considerations will manifest themselves formally in the section "Pattern Coordinates," but for
+now the relation of isomorphism, despite its symmetry, serves to emphasize the true
+strength of the hypothesis under consideration.
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+397
+FROM NETWORK OF PROCESSORS TO
+DYNAMICAL SYSTEM
+This section introduces the perspective of PDP models as dynamical
+systems. Traditionally, a PDP model is viewed as a network of processors communicating across links;
+I will call this the computational
+viewpoint. To illustrate the difference between the computational and
+dynamical system perspectives, it is useful to consider a prototypical
+dynamical system: a collection of billiard balls bouncing around on a
+table.
+A common exercise in object-oriented computer programming is to
+fill a video screen with billiard balls bouncing off each other. Such a
+program creates a conceptual processor for each billiard ball. Each
+"ball" processor contains variables for its "position" and "velocity,"
+which it updates once for each tick of a conceptual clock. These processors must exchange messages about the current values of their variables to inform each other when "bounces" are necessary.
+Billiard balls can be seen from a computational viewpoint as processors changing their local variables through communication with other
+processors. Physics, however, treats the position and velocity values
+simply as real variables that
+are mutually constrained mathematically
+through the appropriate "laws of physics." This is characteristic of the
+dynamical system viewpoint.
+To view a PDP model as a dynamical system, we separate the data
+and process features of the units. The activation values of the units are
+seen merely as variables that assume various values at various times,
+like the positions and velocities of billiard balls. The changes in these
+variables over time are not conceptualized as the result of prescribed
+computational processes localized in the units. In fact the processes by
+which such changes occur are unanalyzed; instead, mathematical equations that constrain these changes are analyzed
+The equations that determine activation value changes are the analogs of the laws of physics that apply to billiard balls; they are the "laws
+of parallel distributed processing" that have been described in Chapter
+2. A version of these equations can be written as follows. Let u, (t)
+denote the activation of unit v at time t. Then its new value one unit
+of time later is given by
+(1A)
+Here F is a particular nonlinear sigmoid function, an increasing S-
+shaped function that takes a real number as input (the net activation
+flowing into a unit) and gives as output a number in the range I-m, M]
+
+398
+(the new activation of the unit). G is a nonlinear threshold function:
+G(x) = x unless x is less than a threshold, in which case G(x) = 0.
+Wuu is the strength of the connection from unit u to unit v.
+The "knowledge" contained in a PDP model lies in the connection
+strengths Wul or weight matrix, W. The nonlinear functions F and G
+encode no knowledge about the cognitive domain of the model, and
+serve to control the activation spread in non-domain-specific ways.
+Thus the heart of a PDP model is its weight matrix; the rest of the
+machinery can be viewed as bells and whistles added to get the weight
+matrix to be "used properly" during inference. The purest PDP
+models, from this point of view, consist only of the weight matrix;
+from the preceding equation, F and G are removed:
+4, (1+1) = 2W, 4(1).
+The absence of the controlling nonlinearities make these models difficult to use for real modeling, but for our analytic purposes, they are
+extremely convenient. The main point is that even for nonlinear
+models with F and G present, it remains true that at the heart of the
+model is the linear core, W. For this reason, I will call the dynamical
+systems governed by the preceding equation quasi-linear dynamical systems. In this chapter, the analysis of PDP models becomes the analysis
+of quasi-linear dynamical systems. These systems will be viewed as elaborations of linear dynamical systems.
+KINEMATICS AND DYNAMICS
+Investigation of the hypothesis of the isomorphism of levels is a
+purely mathematical enterprise that bears on the questions of interpreting PDP models. This section provides an
+introduction
+to the
+mathematical structure of dynamical systems.
+There are two essential components of any dynamical system. First,
+there is the state space S, the set of all possible states of the system. In
+our case, each states in S is a pattern of activation, i.e., a vector of
+activation values for all of the units. The second component of a
+dynamical system is a set of trajectories s,, the paths through S that
+obey the evolution equations of the system.
+These trajectories can start
+at any point so in S. For activation models, so is the initial activation
+pattern determined by the input given to the model (or its history prior
+to our observation of it), and the corresponding trajectory s, is the
+ensuing sequence of activation values for all later times, viewed as a
+path in the state space S. (This "path" is a discrete set of points
+because the values of t are;
+this fact is not significant in our
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+399
+considerations.) The evolution equations for our quasi-linear dynamical
+systems are Equations 1A of the previous section.
+Corresponding to these two components of dynamical systems are
+two sets of questions. What is the state space S? Is it finite or infinite?
+Bounded or unbounded? Continuous or discrete? How can the points
+in S be uniquely labeled? What structures relate points to one another?
+These properties define the geometry of state space, what I will call the
+kinematics of the dynamical system. In kinematics, the evolution equations and trajectories are ignored; time plays no role. Only the properties of the points in state space themselves are considered.
+The questions in the second set pertain to the trajectories. Are they
+repetitive (periodic)? Do they tend to approach certain special states
+(limit points)? Can we define quantities over S that differ from trajectory to trajectory but are constant along a trajectory (conserved quantities)? These are the questions about the system's dynamics, and their
+answers depend strongly on the details of the evolution equations.
+It may seem that the questions of dynamics are the real ones of
+interest. However, it is useful to consider kinematics separately from
+dynamics for two reasons. First, the link between kinematics and
+dynamics is strong: The kinds of evolutionary equations that can sensibly be assumed to operate in a dynamical system are limited by the
+geometry of its state space. For example, geometrical structures
+expressing the symmetries of spacetime or elementary-particle state
+spaces restrict severely the possible evolutionary equations: This is the
+basis of the theory of relativity and gauge field theories of elementary
+particles. In our case, imposing boundedness on the state space will
+eventually lead to the breakdown of the isomorphism of levels. The
+second reason to emphasize kinematics in its own right is that the questions of interpreting the dynamical system have mostly to do with interpreting the states, i.e., with kinematics alone.
+In this chapter we are concerned primarily with interpretation, and
+the discussion will therefore center on kinematics; only those aspects of
+dynamics that are related to kinematics will be considered. These
+aspects involve mainly the general features of the evolution
+equations-the linearity of one component (W) and the nonlinearity of
+the remaining components (FG). More detailed questions about the
+trajectories (such as those mentioned above) address the behavior of the
+system rather than its interpretation, and will not be considered in this
+chapter 3
+3 J. A. Anderson, Silverstein, Ritz, and Jones (1977) show the power of concepts from
+linear algebra for studying the dynamics of PDP models. Some of their results are
+closely related to the general observations about nonlinear models I will make in the last
+portion of this chapter.
+
+400
+KINEMATICS
+The first question to ask about a state space is: How can the
+points-states-be labeled? That is, we must specity a coordinate system
+for s, an assignment to each activation state s of a unique set of
+numbers.
+Each such s denotes a pattern of activation over the units. Let us
+denote the activation value of the vth unit in state s by u, (s); this was
+formerly just denoted uv. These functions lu,) form the unit coordinates for S. Each function u, takes values in the set of allowed activation values for unit v. In the standard PDP model, this is the interval
+I-m, M]. One could also consider binary units, in which case the functions u, would take values in the set (0,1) (or (-1,1)). In any event,
+if all units are of the same type, or, more specifically, if all have the
+same set of allowed values, then all unit coordinates take values in a
+single set.
+It is sometimes helpful to draw a very simplified example of a state
+space S. Using unit coordinates, we can plot the points of S with
+respect to some Cartesian axes.
+We need one such axis for each up,
+i.e., each unit. Since three axes are all we can easily represent, we
+imagine a very simple network of only three units. The state space for
+such a network is shown in Figure 2. In Figure 2A, the case of activation values in I-m, M] is depicted. In this case, S' is a solid cube (with
+side of length m+M). Figure 2B depicts the case of binary activation
+values (0,1); in this case, S is the eight vertices (corner points) of a
+cube. Except where specified otherwise, in the remainder of this
+chapter the standard
+• case of continuous activation values will be
+assumed.
+Thus if the network contains N units, S is an N-dimensional space
+that can be thought of as a solid hypercube. Any other point of N-
+space outside this hypercube is excluded from S because it corresponds
+to activation for at least one unit outside the allowed range. Thus,
+states with "too much" activation have been excluded from S.
+"Too much" has so far been defined according to each unit individually; it is
+interesting to consider whether states should be excluded if they correspond to "too
+much" activation among the units collectively. This would amount to excluding
+from S even some of the points in the hypercube.
+Here are two ways one might eliminate states with too much activation in total.
+The first way is to require that of the complete set of N units, only Nmax can be
+active (i.e., have nonzero activation) at any one time. As Figure 3 shows, this
+removes much of the hypercube and leaves S with a rather bizarre shape. This S is
+topologically quite different from the original hypercube.
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+401
+-m
+M
+1
+M
+M
+-
+-m
+FIGURE 2. A: The solid cube bounded by -m and M forms the standard state space for
+PDP models containing continuous units. B: The eight corners of the cube bounded by 0
+and 1 forms a modified state space, corresponding to PDP models containing binary
+units.
+A less unusual approach is to define "too much activation in total" by the
+condition
+≥ 4, 1 > amax-
+This results in an S' that is depicted in Figure 4. Unlike the bizarre S of Figure 3,
+this new S is not topologically distinct from the original hypercube.
+Imposing this kind of limitation on total activation would turn out to have much
+less of an effect on the dynamics of the model than would the limitation on the
+number of active units.
+
+402
+FIGURE 3. If only two of three units are allowed to have nonzero activation, the state
+space is formed from three intersecting planes.
+Redefining the "total activation" to be the Euclidean distance of the plotted point
+from the origin would not change the conclusion that y is not topologically distinct
+from the hypercube. In fact, limiting the Euclidean distance or the sum of activations, or using the original hypercube, are all special cases of defining S to be a
+"ball" with respect to some metric in N-space. It is a fact that all such balls are
+topologically equivalent (e.g., Loomis & Sternberg, 1968, p. 132).
+In the remainder of this chapter, S will denote the standard hypercube as depicted in Figure 2A, the state space of the general nonlinear
+activation model. The state space of the simplified, linear, activation
+model will be denoted Si. This space, as we shall see in the next section, is simply all of N-dimensional Euclidean space, where N is again
+the number of units in the network. (For example, there is no need to
+draw S, because, for N = 2, it is the entire plane of the paper!) S is
+clearly a subset of Sp; in S, the unit coordinates of any state fall within
+the restricted range I-m, Ml, while in Si the unit coordinates can be
+any real numbers.
+The unit coordinates provide a convenient description of S for many
+purposes. However, it is important to realize that points of S can also
+be described with an infinitude of other coordinate systems. In a distributed interpretation, new coordinates that give a simple description
+of these patterns will turn out to be better than unit coordinates for
+interpreting states of the system. We shall construct these pattern
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+403
+a max
+amax
+amax
+FIGURE 4. This solid octahedron is the state space obtained by restricting the sum of
+the magnitudes of the units' activations to be less than a maxcoordinates shortly, but this construction uses a property of S we must
+now discuss: its vector space structure.
+VECTOR SPACE STRUCTURE
+A central feature of parallel distributed processing is its exploitation
+of superposition of knowledge during computation. Each unit that
+becomes active exerts its influence in parallel with the others, superimposing its effects on those of the rest with a weight determined by its
+level of activation. As we shall see, in linear models, this is a
+mathematically precise and complete account of the processing. As
+emphasized in the section "From Network of Processors to Dynamical
+System," even nonlinear PDP models are quasi-linear systems, and
+knowledge is used in the same fashion as in linear models. Thus superposition plays a crucial role in all PDP models.
+Superposition is naturally represented mathematically by addition. In
+the simplest case, addition of individual numbers represents superposition of unidimensional quantities. Adding multidimensional quantities (like states of activation models) is mathematically represented by
+
+404
+vector addition. The concepts of vector and vector addition are best
+viewed together, as data and process: "Vector" formalizes the notion of
+"multidimensional quantity" specifically for the purpose of "vector
+addition." 4
+Actually, the notion of superposition corresponds to somewhat more
+than the operation of addition: Superposition entails the capability to
+form weighted sums. This is important for parallel distributed processing, where the complete state of the system typically corresponds to a
+blend of concepts, each partially activated. Such a state is mathematically constructed by summing the states corresponding to the partially
+activated concepts, each one weighted by its particular degree of
+activation.
+Using unit coordinates, the operation of weighted summation is simply described. The activation of a unit in a state that is the weighted
+sum of two other states is simply the weighted sum of the activations of
+that unit in those two states. In other words, the unit coordinates of
+the weighted sum of states are the weighted sum of the unit coordinates of the states. Given two states s1 and s2, and two weights w, and
+W2, the weighted sum s is written
+S =W
+252°
+What I have already said about the unit coordinates is then written
+4(s) = W,4, (sy) + Wzl, (52).
+Using unit coordinates, the evolution equation of quasi-linear systems, Equation IA, can be written
+4, (SI+1) = FIZWurG(U, (s,))].
+(1B)
+The reason all the unit coordinates u, of the state s, +1 are guaranteed
+to lie in the allowed range I-m, M] is that the function F takes all its
+values in that range. This nonlinear function is what ensures that the
+trajectories do not leave the bounded cube S of states. If F were
+absent, then the coordinate u, would just be the weighted sum (with
+weights Wur for all values of u) of the quantities G(Uu (t)); this need
+4 It is common lo use the term "vector" for any multidimensional quantity, that is, a
+quantity requiring more than one real number to characterize completely. This is, however, not faithful to the mathematical concept of vector unless the quantity is subject to
+superposition. The precise meaning of "superposition" is captured in the axioms for the
+operation of "addition" that defines it (see Chapter 9).
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+405
+not lie in the allowed range. ' So in the simplified linear theory in which
+F and G are absent, the evolution equation
+(2A)
+imposes no restriction on the range of values of the coordinates; trajectories may wander anywhere in N-space.
+Thus we see that the kinematical restriction of state space to the
+bounded region S has lead to the insertion of the bounded (and therefore nonlinear) function F into the dynamical equation. If state space
+is extended to all of N-space, i.e. SL, then the linear dynamical equation above is permissible.
+The linear evolution equation can be written more transparently in lerms of state
+vectors rather than unit coordinates. Define N vectors Wu by
+и, (Wl) = Wipe.
+Wil
+is the vector of weights on connections from unit u. It is also the activation
+vector that would exist at time it 1 if at time t, unit u had activation 1 and all
+other units had activation O. Now because the evolution is linear, the state at time
+*+1 produced by a general activation pattern at time t is just the weighted sum of
+the patterns that would be set up by individual unit activations at the units, with the
+weights equal to the actual activation of the units. That is,
+(This vector can be seen to obey the linear evolution equation given above by
+evaluating its uth unit coordinate, using the rule for coordinates of weighted sums,
+and the defining coordinates of the vectors Wu.)
+This equation explicitly shows the blending of knowledge that characterizes parallel distributed processing. The vector Wu is the output of unit u; it is the
+"knowledge" contained in that unit, encoded as a string of numbers. The state of
+the system at time t+ 1, S,+1, is created by forming a weighted superposition of all
+the pieces of knowledge stored in all the units. The weight for unit u in this superposition determines how much influence is exerted by the knowledge encoded by that
+unit. This weisht, according to the previous equation, is Uu (S,). That is just the
+degree to which unit u is active at time t.
+Another useful form for the linear evolution equation uses matrix
+notation:
+u (t+ 1) = Wu(t).
+(2B)
+5 By imposing special restrictions on the weights, it is possible to ensure that the
+weighted sum lies in S, and then the nonlinearity F can be eliminated. But like F, these
+restrictions would also have strong implications for the dynamics
+
+406
+u is the N X1 column matrix of unit coordinates up, and W is the
+N × N matrix of values W,
+yu: This matrix is relative to the unit coordinates; shortly we shall switch to other coordinates, changing the
+numbers in both the square matrix W and the column matrix u.
+PATTERN COORDINATES
+Now we consider activity patterns used in a distributed neural or conceptual
+interpretation.
+For concreteness,
+consider the pattern
+<+1,-1,+1,-1> over the first four units. To denote this pattern, we
+define a vector p the first four unit coordinates of which are
+<+1,-1,+1,-1>; the remaining unit coordinates are zero. Now consider the state s with unit coordinates <.3,-.3,3,- .3,0,0, ...,0>.
+This state can be viewed in two ways. The first is as the superposition
+of four states: u 1 with unit coordinates <1,0,0,...,0>, u2 with unit
+coordinates
+<0,1,0,...,0>, etc., with
+weights
+respectively
++.3, -.3, +.3, and - 3. This is the unit view of s. The second view is
+simpler: s is simply .3 times p:
+s = 3p.
+This is the pattern view of s.
+The general situation is comparable. If there is a whole set of distributed patterns, each can be represented by a vector pi. Any given
+state s can be represented in two ways: as the superposition of the vectors up, with weights given by the unit coordinates of's, or as a superposition of pattern vectors pi. If the patterns comprise a distributed
+conceptual interpretation, the weights in this latter superposition indicate the system's confidence in
+the corresponding conceptual
+hypotheses.
+Let's consider a slightly less simplified example. Let pi be the vector
+p above, and let P2 correspond
+to the
+activation pattern
+<+1,t1,+1,+1> over the first four units. Then the state s with unit
+coordinates <.9,.6,9,6,0,0,..., O> can be viewed either as
+s = 94, + .64, +94, + 64,
+or as
+The first representation shows the activation pattern of units, while the
+second shows s to be a weighted sum of the two patterns with respective strengths.15 and .75.
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+407
+It is useful to consider this example geometrically as well as algebraically. In Figure 5, s is drawn (only the first two unit dimensions are
+depicted). The projections of this vector onto the unit axes (defined by
+the vectors u 1 and u2) are .9 and .6, while the projections onto the vectors P1 and Pz are .15 and .75. These conceptual vectors define the
+axes of the pattern coordinate system for state space.
+In a PDP model with a distributed interpretation, the interpretation
+of the state of a system requires the use of the pattern coordinate system. The mathematics of linear algebra (discussed in Chapter 9) tells
+how to convert state descriptions from unit coordinates to pattern coordinates, and vice versa. All that is required is the specification of the
+patterns.
+Before considering the conversion between unit and pattern coordinates, one
+observation needs to be made. Consider a distributed conceptual interpretation.
+(Exactly the same considerations apply to a distributed neural representation.) If
+confidence in a group of conceptual hypotheses are to be separable, then the pattern
+.75
+P2
+.6-
+8
+"1
+9
+.15
+4P1
+FIGURE 5. The unit basis vectors u y and u2 define the axes for the unit coordinate system. The states has unit coordinates <.9,6>. The pattern vectors p, and p2 define the
+axes for the pattern coordinate system. The state s has pattern coordinates <.15,.75>.
+
+408
+vectors representing them must be linearly independent. Suppose, for example, that
+P3 is not independent of P, and P2i say,
+P3 = 4P, + 3P,
+Then the state s representing confidence. 2 in Hypothesis 1,. 15 in Hypothesis 2,
+and 0 confidence in Hypothesis 3,
+s = 2p, + .15p, + Op,,
+will be identical to the state representing confidence. 5 in Hypothesis 3, and 0 confidence in Hypotheses 1 and 2:
+s = Op, tOp, t.SP,.
+Thus Hypothesis 3 is not separable from Hypotheses 1 and 2; in fact any of the
+three hypotheses can be written as a superposition of the other two, so it is better to
+say that the Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are not independently represented by the
+activation patterns described by the vectors p1, P2, P3.
+Thus we must assume that the distributed representation involves a set of separable hypotheses that are represented by a linearly independent set of vectors i Pil.
+Therefore if there are N units, so that state space is N-dimensional, there may be
+at most N conceptual vectors. If there are exactly N such vectors, then (Pil forms
+a basis for SL: Every state in SL is uniquely expressible as a superposition of the
+patterns, and therefore interpretable in terms of the conceptual hypotheses. If there
+are fewer than N conceptual vectors, then there will be states of the model that are
+not conceptually interpretable, since no superposition of the vectors ( Pi) will equal
+the state. This may be no problem if the dynamics of the model (i.e.,
+W) tends to
+keep trajectories away from such states.
+When a distributed interpretation involves fewer than N patterns, only the vectors
+in a subspace of the state space Sy are interpretable, and the pattern coordinates
+allow description only of this subspace. This reduction in expressivity is to be
+expected in a passage from a lower- to higher-level description. In any event, when
+there are fewer than N patterns, extra pattern vectors can be freely created
+10 expand (Pil to a complete basis.
+To simplify the analysis, we shall assume
+this to be done, noting that states involving these extra vectors are not completely
+interpretable.
+The unit and pattern coordinates of a state s are the components of
+the vector s with respect to the unit basis (u,) and the pattern basis
+{pil, respectively. To translate between these bases, we need the
+change-of-basis matrix P defined by the entries
+"vi =4, (Pi).
+The ith column of this matrix is simply the pattern of activation over
+the units defining the ith pattern. Then the unit coordinates of a state
+s, the components of s with respect to the unit basis (u,i, can be
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+409
+computed from the conceptual components of s, the components of s
+with respect to the pattern basis (Pil, by
+u = Pp.
+(3A)
+In this matrix equation, u and p are the NX 1 column matrices of coordinates of s in the unit and pattern systems, respectively.
+To compute the pattern coordinates from the unit ones, we need the
+inverse matrix of P:
+p =P-'u.
+(3B)
+The existence of an inverse of P is guaranteed by the linear independence of the
+(Pil
+Let's consider a simple case with two units supporting the two patterns < 1,2>
+and <3,1>. Here the pattern matrix is
+P = 21.
+Thus the state sy representing .S of pattern one and .3 of pattern two has pattern
+coordinates <.S,.3> and unit coordinates
+= = 215 =
+The two coordinate systems and S are shown in Figure 6.
+2
+1.3
+1
+P2
+T
+.3
+1
+1.4
+3
+FIGURE 6. The states, in the pattern and unit coordinates.
+
+410
+To go from unit coordinates to pattern coordinates, we use the inverse of the pattern matrix:
+.2
+6.
+P-1
+•=
+.4
+- 2
+Thus the state S 2 with unit coordinates < 4,3> has pattern coordinates
+- 2
+P2=
+4-213
+= i•
+(It is easily verified that < 4,3> is the sum of < 1,2> and <3,1>!) The state s 2
+is shown in Figure 7.
+The evolution Equation 2B for the linear model can now be
+transformed, by multiplication by P-!,
+, from unit to pattern coordinates:
+p (t+ 1) = Ip (t).
+(4A)
+Here the matrix W of interunit connection weights has become the
+matrix
+I = P-' W P.
+(5)
+The meaning of this matrix is clear upon writing the evolution equation
+out in component form:
+pi (t+ 1) = 21p; (1).
+(4B)
+j
+FIGURE 1. The state s2 in the unit and pattern coordinates.
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+411
+Thus, ly is the interconnection strength from pattern j to pattern i. In
+a distributed conceptual interpretation, this number expresses the sign
+and strength of the evidential relation from the jth conceptual
+hypothesis to the ith conceptual hypothesis. Thus I governs the propagation of inferences.
+The important result is that the evolution equation for the linear model
+has exactly the same form in the pattern coordinate system as it had in the
+unit coordinates.
+THE ISOMORPHISM HYPOTHESIS HOLDS IN LINEAR
+SYSTEMS
+The analysis at the end of the preceding section shows that for a
+linear model the evolution equation has exactly the same form in pattern coordinates as in unit coordinates. In other words, there is an exact
+isomorphism between the lower and higher levels of description in linear
+models.
+This isomorphism has been viewed so far as a mapping between two
+descriptions of a given model. It can also be viewed as a mapping
+between the behavior of two different PDP models. One is the original
+model with which we began, a model supporting a distributed interpretation, having N units with interconnection weight matrix W. Let's call
+this the lower-level model, My. The higher-level model My has a unit for
+every pattern of the distributed interpretation and has interconnection
+matrix 1. The law governing its processing (Equation 4) is exactly the
+same as that of the lower-level model (Equation 2).
+The isomorphism maps states of the lower-level model into states of
+the higher-level model. Take any state s, of the lower-level model. To
+find the corresponding state sn of the higher-level model, express s, in
+pattern coordinates. The coordinate for the ith pattern —its strength in
+state s, -gives the activation in state sh of the ith unit of Mn. (In
+other words, the ith pattern coordinate of s, equals the ith unit coordinate of sn.)
+So for example if the states of the lower-level model is a superposition of the first
+two patterns, say,
+s = 6P, + .3P,
+then the corresponding state in the higher-level model would have activation .6 in
+Unit 1,.3 in Unit 2, and O elsewhere.
+The mapping between the lower- and higher-level models is an isomorphism because the evolution equation for one model is mapped into
+
+412 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+the evolution equation of the other, so that the behavior of one model
+is exactly mapped onto that of the other. That is, if the two models
+start off in corresponding states, and are subject to corresponding
+inputs, then for all time they will be in corresponding states.
+The significance of the behavioral equivalence of the two models can
+be brought out in an example. Consider a linear version of the letter
+perception model (that is, remove the nonlinearities from the equations
+of the model, maintaining the original nodes and interconnections). As
+originally proposed, this model, Mh, has a local conceptual interpretation. Suppose we wanted to rebuild the model with a distributed conceptual interpretation, with hypotheses about words and letters
+represented as activation patterns over the units of a model Mi.
+First, each conceptual hypothesis (i.e., unit in the original model)
+would be associated with some specific activation pattern over units in
+My. The inference matrix of Mh, which gives the positive and negative
+strengths of connections between conceptual hypotheses in the original
+model, would be algebraically transformed (following Equation 5),
+using the activation patterns defining the distributed interpretation.
+This new matrix defines the correct weights between units in M,. This
+sets up the lower-level model.
+To run the model, inputs are chosen and also an initial state. Both
+are originally specified in conceptual terms, and must be algebraically
+transformed to M, (following Equation 3A). This defines the inputs
+and initial state of the lower-level model. Then the lower-level model
+is run for a length of time. The model's response to the input is determined by taking the final state, representing it in pattern coordinates,
+and reading off the activations of the corresponding conceptual
+hypotheses.
+What the isomorphism tells us is that after all this effort, the result
+will be exactly the same as if we had simply run the higher-level model.
+The higher-level model can be viewed as a conceptual description of
+the lower-level model in which details of the "implementation patterns"
+have been ignored. The behavioral isomorphism implies that these
+details have no effect at all on the behavior of the model. However,
+the two models do implement the same processing differently, and they
+will differ in how they respond to modifications of the processing
+mechanism itself. Thus the behavioral effect of destroying a unit will
+6 If the lower-level model has external inputs to the units, exactly the same transformation that maps states of M, to stales of Mir
+also maps inputs of M, to inputs of Ma. This
+can be verified by taking the matrix form of the new linear evolution equation,
+u(1+ 1) = Wu(1) +i.
+where i is the N× 1 column matrix of external inputs, and performing the same operations as in the preceding section to transform it from the unit to pattern basis.
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+413
+be different for the two models, and the demands on connection adaptation, i.e., learning will differ.
+• Understanding these phenomena in
+terms of the lower- and higher-level models provides an opportunity
+to exploit more of the power of the techniques of linear algebra.
+They will be discussed in the following two sections, which can be
+skipped without diminishing the comprehensibility of the subsequent
+LOCALIZED DAMAGE AND THE ISOMORPHISM OF
+LEVELS
+Suppose we remove one unit from the lower-level model. What will
+be the corresponding modification
+in
+the isomorphic higher-level
+model? That is, what will be the effect on the model's ability to process the patterns that are meaningful in the distributed interpretation?
+Removing unit v can be viewed as insisting that it have activation
+zero and no incoming connections.
+This amounts to allowing only
+states s that have
+u, (s) = 0.
+This change in the kinematics of the system brings with it a change in
+the dynamics. We need to follow this change through, transforming it
+to the higher-level model.
+The evolution equation must be changed so that only allowed states are reached;
+this amounts to saying that the activation of unit u will never change from zero.
+This can be done as follows.
+The column matrix Wu u(t) has for its uth element
+the inputs coming in to unit v; rather than this for the vth element in u (t + 1) we
+want zero. So we apply a "damage matrix" that " projects out" the component along
+D, = 1 - 4, 4)
+(Here 1 is the unit or identity matrix, and T is the matrix transpose operation.) The
+new evolution equation becomes
+u(I+1) = Du, Wult).
+Introducing D is equivalent to the more obvious step of replacing the uth row of
+W by zeroes, or of simply removing it altogether, along with the uth element of u.
+However, it is difficult to map these surgeries onto the higher-level model to see what
+they correspond to. By instead performing the "damage" by introducing a new linear
+operation (multiplication by D), we can again use simple linear algebra and transparently transform the "damage" to the pattern basis.
+
+414
+We can view D as a projection onto the states orthogonal to U, if we introduce
+the inner product in which the unit basis vectors are orthonormal.
+Then the inner
+product of two states s and s', (s,s'), can be easily computed using the column
+matrices u and u' of the unit coordinates of these states:
+(s,s') = ulú
+While the unit basis is orthonormal, the pattern basis may not be. The relevant
+matrix is M with elements
+i.e.,
+M = PT P.
+If M is the unit matrix 1, then the pattern basis is orthonormal, also, and the inner
+product of two states S and s' can be computed using the column matrices p and p'
+of their pattern coordinates using the same simple formula as in the unit coordinates:
+(s,s') = pT p'
+lorthonormal patterns onlyl
+Otherwise one must use the general formula of which this is a special case:
+(s,s') = p' Mp'.
+(Since u = Pp, this is justu" u'.)
+Now we apply the standard procedure for changing the dynamical equation to the
+pattern basis. This gives
+p(t+1) = Dalp(t).
+Here, the "damage vector" d is the column matrix of pattern coordinates of u,:
+d =P-'u,
+and Da is again the matrix that orthogonally projects out d:
+Da = 1-dd' M.
+(If the pattern basis is not orthonormal, the inner product matrix M must appear in
+the orthogonal projection matrix D; if the pattern basis is orthogonal, then M = 1
+so it has no effect.)
+So the corresponding damage in the higher-level model is removal of the pattern
+represented byd: All allowed states will be orthogonal to this pattern. Introducing D
+here is equivalent to making a change in the inference matrix I that is more complicated than just converting a row to zeroes. All connections coming into the patterns
+that employ the deleted unit will be altered in a rather complicated way; I is replaced
+by Dal.
+Thus corresponding to the damage produced in the lower-level model
+by removing unit y is the removal of all states in the higher-level
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+415
+model that are not orthogonal to a particular state of the higher-level
+units. This state corresponds under the isomorphism to u,; it
+represents exactly the superposition of lower-level patterns in which the
+activations on all lower-level units exactly cancel out to 0, except for
+the removed unit, which ends up with an activation of 1.
+Let's return to the two-unit example from the section " Pattern Coordinates." Suppose the first unit is removed. This eliminates the horizontal axis from the state
+space; that is, now only states that have zero x-coordinate are allowed. This is
+shown in Figure 8. How does this look in pattern coordinates? The damage vector
+d has unit coordinates < 1,0>. Its conceptual coordinates are therefore
+p =1
+(The weighted sum of the two patterns, with weights <-.2,.4>, is seen to be 0 on
+the second unit, I on the first.) Thus in the pattern coordinates, the damage has
+been to remove the state <-.2,.4>, leaving only states orthogonal to it. This of
+course is just a different description of exactly the same change in the state space:
+see Figure 9.
+Thus removing a lower-level unit corresponds to removing a pattern
+of activation over the higher-level units; under a distributed conceptual
+interpretation, this amounts to removing "pieces of concepts"-the
+pieces relying on that unit.
+The same analysis can be run in reverse, to show that "removing a
+higher-level unit" (e.g., a concept) amounts to performing a rather
+complicated change in the weight matrix that has the effect of eliminating from the state space those states not orthogonal to the pattern
+undamaged
+state
+space
+destroy
+unit
+damaged
+state 2=
+space
+= 41
+и,
+FIGURE 8. When Unit 1 is destroyed, the two-dimensional state space shrinks to the
+one-dimensional space with zero activation for the destroyed unit.
+
+416
+undamaged
+state
+space
+remove
+state
+<-.2,4>
+→
+damaged
+state N
+space
+--27
+P,
+FIGURE 9. In pattern coordinates, the destruction of Unit 1 is described as the removal
+of the state < - 2,4>, leaving only the states orthogonal to it.
+corresponding to the deleted higher-level unit. In short, localized damage in one model is distributed damage in the other. Geometrically,
+the picture is similar in the two cases; localized damage removes the
+states orthogonal to a coordinate axis, while distributed damage
+removes the states orthogonal to a vector that is not a coordinate axis
+Since the higher-level coordinates simply employ different axes than
+the lower-level coordinates, the picture makes good sense.
+LEARNING OF CONNECTIONS AND THE
+ISOMORPHISM OF LEVELS
+One major conceptual distinction between local and distributed
+interpretations is that in the former case the individual elements of the
+interconnection matrix can be readily interpreted while in the latter case
+they cannot. In a version of the reading model with a local conceptual
+interpretation, the positive connection from the unit representing "the
+first letter is A" and that representing "the word is ABLE" has a clear
+intuitive meaning. Thus the connection matrix can be set up intuitively, up to a few parameters that can be adjusted but which have clear
+individual interpretations. By contrast, the interconnection matrix of
+the modified reading model defined in the section "The Isomorphism
+Hypothesis Holds in Linear Systems," with a distributed conceptual
+interpretation, had to be obtained by algebraically transforming the
+original interconnection matrix: This matrix cannot be obtained by
+intuition, and its individual elements (the connection strengths
+between individual units in the distributed model) have no conceptual
+interpretation.
+This way of generating the interconnection matrix for the distributed
+model seems to give a primal status to the local model. There is,
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+417
+however, another way to produce the interconnections in the distributed model: through a learning procedure. The two procedures I will
+discuss are the original Hebb learning procedure and its error-correcting
+modification, the delta rule.
+I will only briefly and imprecisely discuss these two learning procedures; a fuller discussion is presented in Chapter 2, Chapter 8, and
+Chapter 11. In the Hebb procedure, the interconnection strength
+between two units is increased whenever those units are simultaneously
+active. This can be implemented by adding to the strength the product
+of the units' activation.
+In the delta rule, this is modified so that what
+is added to the strength is the product of the input unit's activation and
+the difference between the output unit's activation and the value it
+should have according to some outside "teacher."
+The relevant results about these procedures, for present purposes,
+are these: The delta rule will eventually produce the interconnection
+matrix that minimizes the error, measured relative to the teacher. The
+Hebb procedure will give essentially the same result in the special case
+that the activation patterns the model must respond to are mutually
+orthogonal. In this case, the error-correction feature of the delta rule is
+superfluous.
+There is an intuitive explanation of this result. Suppose a new input
+activation pattern must be associated with some output pattern. In general, that input pattern will, by virtue of previously learned associations,
+produce some output pattern. The delta rule adds into the interconnections just what is needed to modify that output pattern, to make it the
+correct one. The Hebb procedure adds connections that will themselves
+produce the output pattern completely from the input pattern, ignoring
+connections that have already been stored. If the new input pattern is
+orthogonal to all the already learned patterns, then a zero output pattern
+will be produced by the previously stored associations. That is why,
+with orthogonal inputs, the simple Hebb procedure works.
+The point is that in general, the delta rule will produce the correct
+interconnection matrix for a distributed model, as it will for a local
+model. This represents a degree of parity in the status of the two
+models. However, this parity has its limits. The Hebb rule will in general not produce the correct matrix for a distributed model, unless the
+patterns have been carefully chosen to be orthogonal. (A simple example of such orthogonality is a strictly local model in which each input is
+uniquely represented by a single unit.)
+Thus the lower- and higher-level models may differ in whether Hebb
+learning works; this is because what is local to the connection between
+7 Orthogonality means that the inputs to each output unit cancel each other out completely.
+
+418 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+two units in one model will in general not be local in the other, and
+some special arrangement-orthogonality of patterns-is needed to
+ensure that nonlocalities do not cause any problems.
+This issue of the orthogonality of the patterns relates back to kinematics.
+To
+analyze what the individual components of the interconnection matrix need to be, it is
+necessary to add to the vector space of states the additional geometric structure of an
+inner product; it is this that tells whether states are orthogonal. The inner product
+is defined so that the unit basis is orthonormal. When the pattern basis is orthonormal as well, the transformation from unit to pattern coordinates is a rotation,
+and it preserves the constraints on the interconnection matrix elements. In particular, the adequacy of the Hebb procedure is invariant under the transformation from
+the lower- to higher-level model. In the general case, when the pattern basis is not
+orthonormal, this invariance is broken.
+NONLINEARITY AND RESTRICTED STATE SPACE
+Having established the validity of the isomorphism of levels
+hypothesis for linear PDP models, it is time to consider quasi-linear
+systems with nonlinearities. To understand the effects of these nonlinearities, it is helpful to go back to kinematics.
+The state space Si of linear PDP models is all of N-space, where N
+is the number of units in the model. By contrast, the standard state
+space S of general PDP models is the solid hypercube in N-space
+described in the section "Kinematics." This represents states in which
+each unit has activation within the limited range I-m, M]. Such a restriction is motivated within the neural interpretation by the limited
+range of activity of individual neurons; it is motivated within the conceptual interpretation by the desirability of limiting the possible influence of a single conceptual hypothesis. (PDP models are feedback systems that tend to be difficult to control unless activation values have a
+ceiling and floor. Nonlinearities also allow multilayer PDP networks to
+possess greater computational power than single-layer networks:
+see
+Chapter 2.)
+Whatever the motivation, the restriction of states to the cube S,
+instead of allowing all states in N-space Si, means that the general
+linear evolution equation (with unrestricted
+weight matrix W) is unacceptable. Introducing the nonlinear sigmoidal function F of Equation
+1 with range I-m, M] solves this problem by brute force.
+Unlike St, the hypercube S looks quite different in different coordinate systems. In unit coordinates, all coordinates are limited to
+I-m, Ml; with a different set of axes, like those of pattern coordinates,
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+419
+the allowed values of a given coordinate vary, depending on the values
+of the other coordinates. (See Figure 10) No longer is it possible for
+the description of the system to be the same in the two coordinate systems. As we shall see explicitly, the exact ismorphism of levels that
+holds for linear models breaks down for nonlinear models.
+Another characterization of the kinematic effect of restricting S to a
+hypercube is that now states can be distinguished according to their
+position relative to edges, faces, corners, and
+so on. Choosing to
+represent a concept, for example, by a point in the corner of S will produce different behavior than choosing a point in the middle of a face.
+These distinctions simply cannot be made in the linear state space St.
+A crucial effect of limiting the state space to S is that now some
+superpositions of states will be in S while others will not; it will depend
+on the position of the states relative to the boundary of the hypercube.
+Because some patterns cannot superimpose, i.e., coexist, they must
+instead compete for the opportunity to exist. Other patterns can coexist,
+so the choice of patterns in an interpretation will matter. In particular,
+42
+P,
+=-m
+- 41
+M
+-m
+P2
+FIGURE 10. In unit coordinates, the allowed values of 42 are I-m,M] regardless of the
+value of pi. as then be the or ate a bars thel bars care orderers
+values of P1, and their length indicates the allowed values of pz.
+
+420
+the choice of nonoverlapping patterns (e.g., over single units) - a local
+or quasi-local interpretation —will produce different behavior than the
+choice of overlapping patterns—a genuinely distributed interpretation.
+Take for concreteness the allowed unit coordinate range I-m, M/ 10 be
+1-1,+1l.
+Consider for example a local conceptual interpretation in which Concepts / and 2
+are represented by Units I and 2, respectively. In unit coordinates, then, the
+representation of the hypotheses
+<0,1,0,0,..,07. Then the superposition of these two states is simply
+< 1,1,0,0, ...,O>. This falls within S, and is therefore kinematically allowed.
+By contrast, consider the simple distributed representation in which the two
+hypotheses
+are
+respectively represented by <1,1.0.0,...0>
+and
+< 1,- 1,0,0, ...,0>.
+Now the superposition of the
+tWo
+states is
+< 2,0,0,0, ...,O> which is kinematically forbidden. The situation is graphically depicted in Figure 11.
+The basic observation is that superimposing states representing maximal confidence in two conceptual hypotheses is kinematically allowed when the corresponding
+patterns do not overlap-always true in a local interpretation -but kinematically
+forbidden when they do overlap-sometimes true in a genuinely distributed
+interpretation.
+The kinematic restriction that states stay inside the hypercube has a dynamical
+consequence in the sigmoidal function F. It will now be verified that F does indeed
+lead to a greater difficulty in superposing <1,1> and <1,-1> than in superposing < 1,0> and < 0,1>. (All coordinates in this note will be unit coordinates.)
+Let F be the function that takes a vector, passes all its unit coordinates through
+F, and uses the resulting numbers as the unit coordinates of the output. I will show
+that F retards the growth in length of a vector along the edge (the <a, 0> direction
+ore) more than along the diagonal (the <B,B> direction ord). These retardation
+factors are
+Re =
+le
+(F(e)|
+=
+F (x)
+and
+Id|
+Rd =-
+Fd)|
+As shown in Figure 12, these retardation factors are the reciprocals of the average
+slope of the F curve between the origin and the x values a and B, respectively.
+Since the F curve is concave downward, as x increases, this average slope diminishes so its reciprocal increases. That is, the retardation will be greater as a and B
+grow; F squashes vectors more and more strongly the closer they get to the edge of
+the state space. A fair comparison between the retardation along e and d requires
+that these vectors be of equal length. In that case, a is greater than B (by a factor
+of V2); this means the retardation is greater fore, i.e., along the edge.
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+421
+4, +42
+-u,
+S
+= P, +Pz
+FIGURE 11. A: In a local interpretation in which Concepts 1 and 2 are represented by
+vectors ", and "2, the superposition u, + u2 lies in S (along the diagonal). B: In a distributed interpretation in which Concepts 1 and 2 are represented by vectors p1 and P2.
+the superposition py + P2 lies outside of S (in the direction of an edge).
+Competition of patterns that are forbidden to superimpose-what I
+will call natural competition-does not exist in linear models. The subsequent discussion of nonlinear models will focus on natural competition and how it distinguishes between local and distributed models.
+Natural competition resembles inhibition, which of course can be
+present in linear models. There is a crucial difference, however. Inhibition is explicitly inserted into the interconnection matrix. Competition
+arises independently of the interconnection matrix; it depends on the
+overlap of patterns and on the nonlinearity. Loosely, we can say that
+whether two states naturally compete depends only on kinematics (their
+position in state space relative to the edges of the space), and not on
+
+422
+FIGURE 12. The slope of the solid line, F(B)/B, exceeds the slope of the dotted line,
+F(a)/a, because ß<a and Fis concave downward (for positive inputs).
+the dynamics (interconnection matrix); whether two states mutually
+inhibit depends on the dynamics but not on the kinematics.
+If natural
+competition is to be exploited computationally, distributed interpretations are needed.
+For expository convenience, for the remainder of this chapter, except
+where otherwise indicated, we take M = 1 and m = 1, so the allowed
+activation range is [-1,1l
+The plan for the remainder of this chapter is first to explicitly show
+the breakdown of the isomorphism hypothesis for nonlinear models,
+next to analyze natural competition and its effects, and finally to summarize the results and discuss the value of a mathematical approach to
+the mind/brain problem.
+THE ISOMORPHISM HYPOTHESIS FAILS IN
+NONLINEAR MODELS
+To investigate the isomorphism hypothesis in nonlinear PDP models,
+as before we take a model with a distributed interpretation and
+transform the description from unit to pattern coordinates. We then
+compare the new form of the evolution equation with the original form;
+if the form has changed, the hypothesis tails. To start with, we restore
+the nonlinear sigmoidal function F to the evolution equation; we will
+discuss the thresholding function G later.
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+423
+Our evolution equation in unit coordinates is Equation 1A with G
+removed: 8
+(6A)
+Using Equations 3 and 5, this can be transformed to the pattern coordinates:
+(6B)
+Now in the linear case, when F is absent, the pattern matrices P-1 and
+P cancel each other out: the patterns don't matter. By definition of
+nonlinearity, here F prevents the cancellation, and the equation in pattern coordinates is more complicated than it is in unit coordinates.
+There is no isomorphism of levels. The choice of patterns can matter
+behaviorally.
+As in the linear case, we can construct a higher-level model, with
+one unit for each pattern. The evolution equation for the higher-level
+model is Equation 6B; it is not the equation for a PDP model, so the
+higher-level model, while behaviorally equivalent to the lower-level
+model, is not a PDP model. Here is how the higher-level model works.
+The units add up the weighted sum of their inputs from other units,
+using the inference matrix I, just as in the linear case. However, what
+happens next is complicated.
+To determine its new value, a unit must
+find out what the weighted sum of inputs is for all the other units, form
+a weighted sum of these (with weights determined by the patterns), and
+then pass the resulting value through the nonlinear function F.
+But
+this is not the end. Now the unit must find out what number all the
+other units have gotten out of F, then form a weighted sum of these
+(again, with weights determined by the patterns). This finally is the
+new value for the unit.
+Thus, what distinguishes the higher- and lower-level models is that
+the nonlinearity in the lower-level model is applied locally in each unit
+to its weight sum of inputs, while in the higher-level model the nonlinearity is applied globally through consultation among all the units. It
+is this nonlocal nonlinearity that makes the higher-level model not a
+PDP model.
+8 Using the vector-valued function F defined in the previous section, the evolution
+equation can be written in a concise, coordinate-free form:
+5(1 + 1) = F[Us (1)]
+where U is the linear transformation on S which is represented by matrix W in unit coordinates and by matrix I in pattern coordinates. This equation is the nonlinear generalization of Equation 2B.
+
+424
+The higher-level model just considered has the same behavior as and
+different processing rules from the lower-level model. We can also
+consider another higher-level model that has the same processing rules
+as and different behavior from the lower-level model. This model also
+has one unit for each pattern of the lower-level model, and also uses
+the interconnection matrix I. However, each unit computes its new
+value simply by passing its weighted sum of inputs through F, without
+the added complications of consulting other units as in the other
+higher-level model. Because these complications are removed, the
+behavior of this model will be different from the lower-level model;
+that is, if the two models were started in corresponding states and given
+corresponding inputs, they would not continue to stay in corresponding
+states. However, the linear core of this higher-level model uses the
+correct matrix I, so its behavior should be related to that of the lowerlevel model in meaningful ways. A more precise comparison has not
+been carried out.?
+NATURAL COMPETITION IN DISTRIBUTED
+NONLINEAR MODELS
+One aspect of the level isomorphism for linear models is that there is
+no competition between patterns that share units; they simply superimpose without conflict. As discussed in the section "Nonlinearity and
+Restricted State Space," however, in nonlinear models, patterns that fall
+on the boundary of the state space space-involving saturated unitsoften cannot superimpose and remain in the state space. This gives rise
+to natural competition between strong patterns that require common
+units.
+In this section I will analyze a simple example of natural competition,
+contrasting the cases of distributed and local models. I will work
+through the effect for a particular nonlinear function F, and then show
+it obtains for all suitable functions F. I will then show explicitly how
+9 A possibility that deserves investigation is that the pattern coordinates determined by
+specific activation patterns should be defined some way other than through superposition,
+i.e., other than as a change of basis in a vector space. If this approach succeeded in saving the isomorphism hypothesis for the nonlinear case, it could destroy it for the linear
+case, for which change of basis is guaranteed to leave the evolution equation invariant.
+To save the isomorphism hypothesis in the nonlinear case, however, the pattern coordinates would probably have lo be determined jointly by the distributed patterns and the
+nonlinearities; a successful procedure might well reduce to change of basis in the limit as
+the nonlinearity disappears.
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION 425
+the effect can simulate inhibitory connections between units representing incompatible hypotheses in the higher-level model.
+Consider a PDP model with a distributed interpretation involving the patterns
+< 1,1> and < 1,- 1>. A superposition of these two states with weights.3 and .2,
+respectively, would produce, in a linear model, the state with unit coordinates
+<.5,.1> (this state has pattern coordinates <.3,.2 > of course). In the nonlinear
+model, the numbers.5 and .1 are each passed through the function F to get the unit
+coordinates of the new state. Consulting the F function of Figure 13, we see that
+F(.5) = .9 and F(.I) = .6, so the new state has unit coordinates <.9.6>. The
+pattern coordinates of this state, as shown in the section called "Pattern Coordinates," are <.75,.15>. Thus the strength of pattern 1 relative to pattern 2 has
+been amplified by the factor
+75/.15
+- = 3.33.
+.3/.2
+The dominance of the stronger pattern has been enhanced by the nonlinearity, just
+as the dominance of stronger nodes is increased by mutual inhibition. This is
+natural competition.
+This competitive effect is not present if the patterns do not overlap. In fact the
+nonlinearity diminishes dominance in this case. If the "patterns" are < 1,0> and
+< 0,1 > -i.e., if the model is local-and we again consider combining. 3 of the first
+with. 2 of the second, then the weighted sum is <.3,.2> and the new state, after
+passing the unit coordinates through F, is <. 78,. 7> The "amplification" factor is
+therefore
+_78/7
+=.74.
+.3/.2
+In other words, the nonlinearity is actually countercompetitive for local models.
+F(x)
+- X
+.2
+.3
+.4
+.5
+.6.7
+FIGURE 13. An example of a sigmoidal function F.
+
+426
+For these patterns, the conclusions that the amplification factor is greater than
+one for the distributed model and less than one for the local model is not dependent
+on the particular F values used above; they hold for any negatively accelerated F
+function. The distributed amplification is (letting .3 be replaced by x and .2 by y):
+½[F(x+y) + F(x-y)|/ ½[F(x+y) - F(x- x)I.
+x / У
+Letting x+y = w and -y = z, this becomes
+½[F(w) + F(z)]/ ½[F(w) - F(z)! = ½[F(w) + F(z)] / ½[w+z]
+½[w +z]/ ½[w- z]
+[F(w) - F(z)] / [w- z]
+As shown in Figure 14, this is the ratio of the slopes of two lines that can be drawn
+on the graph of F, and because F is negatively accelerated, this ratio must be greater
+than one.
+The local amplification is simply
+F(x) / F()
+F(x)/ x
+x/y
+F(y)/ y
+This is the ratio of the average slope of F between the origin and x and between the
+origin and y; as already pointed out in section 10, the negative acceleration of F
+implies that this slope will be less for the greater interval (x), so the local amplification is always less than one.
+FIGURE 14. The slope of the solid line is [F(w) - F(z)]/(w -z). The point marked
+x is the midpoint of this line-the vector average of the endpoints-with coordinates
+<½[w+z|,½[F(w)+F(z)]>. Thus the slope of the dashed line is
+½[F(w) + F(z)]
+½[w + z]
+Since F is concave downward, the slope of the dashed line is greater (slope of dashed line
+> slope of dotted line > slope of solid line).
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+427
+It is useful to explicitly relate natural competition to mutual inhibition; we shall do
+this for the above case.
+The pattern coordinates of the state created in the nonlinear
+model by superposing <1,1> with strength and <1, -1> with strength y are
+p1 = ½[F(x + y) + F(x - y)I
+P2 = ½[F(x + y) - F(x - y)].
+Now let us substitute
+F(x+y) = s+ Ix + yl
+F(x-y) = s_Ix -yl.
+St is the average slope of F between the origin and x + y; this is less than s_, the
+average slope of F between the origin and X - y (see Figure 15). This substitution
+gives, on regrouping,
+PI = ax-YY
+P2=ay - yx
+where
+a = ½(s+ + s_)
+y = /(S_-s+).
+These equations, displayed graphically in Figure 16, show that the effect of the nonlinearity on the <x, y> combination is the same as having an inhibition of strength
+y between units representing the initial and final strengths of the different patterns,
+along with an excitation of strength a between units for the initial and final values
+of the same patterns. The magnitude of the inhibition y depends on the difference in
+average slope of F between the origin and x - y on the one hand and x + y on
+FIGURE 15. Because F is negatively accelerated, the slope of the solid line, s_, is
+greater than the slope of the dotted line, st.
+
+428
+P2
+a
+=y
+FIGURE 16. A network displaying the effective inhibition produced by natural competition between overlapping patterns p1 and p2.
+the other. In the region
+sufficiently close to the origin that the graph of Fis nearly
+linear, y is zero. Thus for sufficiently weak patterns there is no competition; how
+weak is " sufficient" will depend on how large the linear range of Fis.
+The conclusion, then, is that with overlapping patterns like those
+occurring in truly distributed models, F amplifies differences in the
+strengths of patterns; with nonoverlapping patterns like those of local
+or quasi-local models, F has the opposite effect. This is natural competition at work.
+When viewed at the higher level of patterns, natural competition acts
+like inhibition between overlapping patterns. The nonlinearities
+automatically create significant inhibition between strong patterns but
+insignificant inhibition between weak patterns. So for a distributed conceptual interpretation, it is impossible to have a high degree of confidence in more than one conceptual hypothesis represented on a given
+set of units, but the system can simultaneously entertain without difficulty a low degree of confidence in several such hypotheses. If we
+think of the units on which conceptual hypotheses are represented as
+some kind of semantic features, then two hypotheses that call for different values of the same features-two hypotheses represented by
+overlapping patterns-are hypotheses that are semantically incompatible. Thus distributed representation offers an attractive form of
+automatic inhibition between mutually incompatible hypotheses.
+These considerations suggest that we could try to make a higher-level
+PDP model approximately behaviorally equivalent to a distributed nonlinear lower-level PDP model by inserting additional inhibitory weights
+between units representing competing patterns. These extra weights
+might approximately serve the function of the complicated nonlocal
+nonlinearity in the truly isomorphic non-PDP higher-level model. Of
+course, assigning fixed magnitudes to those weights would only approximate the real situation in the lower-level model in which the degree of
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+429
+competition varies with the strength of the patterns. With nonlinear
+models, it does seem that higher-level models must incorporate some
+form of complexity that goes beyond the standard PDP framework in
+order to really capture the subtlety of the interaction of patterns in the
+lower-level model; the degree of failure of the isomorphism hypothesis
+seems to be significant.
+The failure in the isomorphism hypothesis induced by F is compounded by the nonlinear thresholding function, G. In the previous
+section we saw that the nonlinearity introduced by F becomes nonlocal
+in the higher-level model. Exactly the same analysis applies to the nonlinearity introduced by G.
+It is interesting to consider whether a local thresholding of the activation of patterns in the higher-level model, since it can't be created by
+putting a local G in the lower-level model, can be affected some other
+way.
+Natural competition functions like a threshold on inhibition.
+When a concept is weakly present, it creates essentially no inhibition;
+when it is strongly present, it generates considerable inhibition. Thus.
+it is as though there were a threshold of activation below which a concept is incapable of influencing other concepts inhibitively. The threshold is not sharp, however, as there is a gradual transition in the amount
+of inhibition as the concept strengthens.
+CONCLUSION
+If mind is to be viewed as a higher-level description of brain, some
+definite procedure is needed to build the higher-level description from
+the lower. One possibility is that the higher level describes collective
+activity of the lower level, for example, patterns of activation over multiple lower-level units. In the analysis of dynamical systems, it is customary to create such higher-level descriptions, using higher-level units
+that are collective aspects of many lower-level units. The higher-level
+description employs new mathematical variables, each of which is
+defined by combining many variables in the lower-level description.
+This requires that the lower-level description be expressed in terms of
+mathematical variables.
+PDP models constitute an account of cognitive processing that does
+rest on mathematical variables: the activation of units. Thus these
+models can be described at a higher level by using the preceding
+method. The lower-level description of the system amounts to a set of
+variables and an evolution equation; the higher-level description is
+created by defining new variables out of many old ones and substituting
+the new variables for the old in the evolution equation.
+
+430
+Analyzing PDP models in this way leads to several observations.
+The core of the evolution equation, where the knowledge of the system
+is employed, is linear. The dynamical systems corresponding to PDP
+models are quasi-linear. A central kinematic feature of these systems is
+that the state spaces lie in vector spaces, and linear operations play a
+very special role. Superposition is fundamental to the way parallel distributed processing works. Linear algebra gives us both concepts for
+understanding PDP models and techniques for analyzing them. It tells
+us that there are many equally good coordinate systems for describing
+the states, and how to transform descriptions from one coordinate system to another. In particular, it suggests we consider a coordinate system based on the patterns, and use this to frame our higher-level
+description. It tells us how to transform the knowledge (interconnec-
+In the pasterns
+tion matrix) from one level of description to the other. Linear algebra
+tells us that linear operations are invariant under this kind of transformation, and therefore if the evolution equation is linear, its form will
+be the same in the two descriptions. This is the isomorphism of levels
+for linear PDP models.
+Linear algebra also alerts us to the fact that edges to the state space
+interfere with superposition. This leads to an evolution equation that
+modifies pure linear superposition by adding nonlinear operations. The
+breakdown of superposition at the boundaries of state space leads to
+competition between states that cannot superpose. The lack of invariance of the bounded state space under linear operations leads to a
+breakdown of the isomorphism of levels in the corresponding nonlinear
+PDP models.'°
+The concepts of linear algebra add considerably to our understanding
+of PDP models, supplementing the insight that comes from simulating
+PDP models on computers. We can analyze with precision, for example, the effects of localized damage or of synaptic modification upon
+the higher-level description of the processing. We can understand why
+the choice of patterns doesn't matter in linear models and why it does
+in nonlinear models. We can even get some handle on what kind of
+effects these choices have for nonlinear models, although the picture
+needs much more clarification.
+10 Note that the nonlinearity in quasi-linear systems is minor compared to that in highly
+nonlinear systems. In PDP models, the knowledge is contained in the linear part—it is
+this part that is learned, for example, in adaptive models-while the nonlinearity is uniform across the units, and fixed from the outset. In a highly nonlinear model, the activation value of a unit would be a nonlinear function of the other activations, with parameters encoding the unit's knowledge that are used in arbitrary ways, rather than merely as
+coefficients in a weighted sum. In such a model, superposition and linear algebra might
+have no relevance whatever.
+
+22. NEURAL AND CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATION
+431
+The isomorphism of levels hypothesis constitutes a mathematically
+analyzable question about the mind/brain duality, within the framework
+of PDP models of cognition. These models serve well because of
+their independent interpretations as models of neural and conceptual
+processing.
+While the isomorphism of levels hypothesis speaks to a fairly philosophical issue, the analyses of this chapter show that no strong argument about the hypothesis can have validity unless it makes sharp
+enough distinctions among models to differentiate between linear and
+nonlinear PDP models: The matter demands a certain degree of
+mathematical care. From an appropriate formal viewpoint, however,
+we have seen that conceptual accounts of mind and physiological
+accounts of brain can be two descriptions of a single cognitive system.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+While I carry full responsibility for the views expressed in this
+chapter, the critical role played by insights of Jay McClelland and Dave
+Rumelhart is fully and gratefully acknowledged. This chapter is actually
+in major part the result of a joint effort, and I thank Dave and Jay for
+the ideas and understanding they have shared with me. Many thanks,
+too, to Eileen Conway and Mark Wallen for excellent graphics and
+computer support. The work was supported by the Systems Development Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, National Institute
+of Mental Health Grant PHS MH 14268 to the Center for Human
+Information Processing, and Personnel and Training Research Programs
+of the Office of Naval Research Contract N00014-79-C-0323, NR 667-
+437.
+
+CHAPTER 23
+Biologically Plausible Models of
+Place Recognition and Goal Location
+D. ZIPSER
+In this chapter I describe three parallel network models that deal with
+some elementary aspects of spatial cognition-namely, recognizing
+places and locating goals. The performance of these models was examined using computer simulations in which the networks guide the
+movements of a simulated observer. These models are constrained by
+both the requirements of accomplishing the tasks and by a desire to
+achieve some degree of biological plausibility. The requirement of biological plausibility has the advantage of generating models that can have
+immediate relevance to psychology and neurobiology but it has the
+disadvantage of limiting the range of problems that can be approached.
+This limitation is not one of principle, but grows out of our currently
+limited understanding of how computation is organized in the brain.
+More general problems can often be attacked when the constraint of
+biological plausibility is not invoked and unrestricted symbol manipulation is allowed. Before tackling biologically plausible models, it is useful to look at what has been done in this unrestricted computing context because it will give some insight into the major issues in spatial
+cognition.
+From the realm of "pure" artificial intelligence research, for example,
+we have the fuzzy map theory (Davis, 1981; McDermott, 1980). The
+The first third of this chapter is a modification of the article "A Computational Model
+of Hippocampal Place Fields" by D. Zipser, which appeared in Behavioral Neuroscience,
+1985, 99, 1006-1018. Copyright 1985 by the American Psychological Association, Inc
+Adapted with permission.
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+433
+goal here was to develop a system that could deal with the spatial relations between objects so that queries about them could be answered in
+the context of a language understanding system.
+Among the questions
+the fuzzy map system is designed to answer are: "Am I headed towards
+home? How do I get from here to Carnegie Hall? What buildings are
+between Woolsie and Sterling? What is the nearest Chinese restaurant
+to here? What street is the best route from Yale to the hospital?"
+These questions are answered in a linguistic framework and new information is assimilated through language so no attempt was made to
+guide actual navigation behavior or to learn from the environment.
+Clearly, the range of possible facts about the spatial relationships
+between objects necessary to answer questions of this kind is far too
+great to be explicitly stored in memory. What is needed is a representation that stores basic information so that inference can be used to
+determine the required facts when the system is questioned. In the
+fuzzy map system, each landmark or object has its own reference frame
+fixed rigidly to it. The combination of object and associated reference
+frame is called a frob. Frobs are connected to each other to form maps
+by storing quants, each of which contains information about the translation, rotation, or scale factors relating a pair of frobs. Queries about
+spatial relations are answered by searching a data structure consisting of
+mquants. An important feature of the fuzzy map formulation is that it
+separates the components of the transformation relating frobs so that
+rotation, translation, and scale factors are in separate mquants. This
+has a number of advantages, one of the most important of which is that
+partial information about the spatial relations between frobs can be
+used. For example, two frobs connected only by a scale factor can be
+compared with respect to size even if their other spatial relations are
+unknown. Another important feature of the fuzzy map concept is its
+"fuzziness." The components of the transformation between frobs are
+not specified exactly, but are specified as ranges. This allows inexact,
+semiqualitative information to be incorporated
+into the map data
+structure.
+Another approach to spatial processing, in large scale environments,
+is found in the work of Kuipers (1978, 1983) who is concerned with
+developing psychological models. A particularly interesting feature of
+Kuipers' approach is the concept of view, which he defines as "the sensory image received by the observer at a particular point" (Kuipers,
+1983, p. 217). The critical importance of views is that they are used to
+recognize places. Places are important because their representation can
+serve as a node to which related information can be attached. The critical operation on views is comparison to determine equality. For example, by comparing the current view with a data base of stored views, it
+is possible to gain access to all the information associated with the
+
+434 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+current place. The concept of view is very relevant biologically because
+there are neurons in the brain that fire only within the context of a particular view. One of the important things that can be associated with
+. a
+place is information about getting from that place to another place.
+Kuipers represents the paths between places as a sequence of actions
+and views. The idea is that if you are at a particular place, and take a
+certain action, it will generate a new view. This view, in turn, can be
+used to index a new action, which will produce a new view, and so
+forth, tracing out a path to the goal. This strategy almost certainly
+corresponds to one of those used by humans and animals.
+In addition to path information, it is also possible to associate actual
+knowledge about the direction and distance to a goal with a place. The
+existence of absolute knowledge of goal location, relative to external
+landmarks, has been clearly demonstrated in the case of rats that are
+forced to swim in a tank of milky water (Morris, Garrud, Rawlins, &
+O'Keefe, 1982). A small platform is placed below the surface of the
+cloudy water so that it is invisible to the rat. The rat is then put into
+the tank and swims around randomly until it locates the platform. The
+rat climbs up on the platform, rises up, and observes the landmarks in
+its environment. On subsequent immersions, the rat no longer
+searches randomly but swims directly to the remembered position of
+the platform. Since the rat will swim directly to the platform from any
+initial position in the tank, it must be computing the location of the
+platform, using remembered information about the location of external
+landmarks.
+The models described in this paper were designed to emulate the
+kind of goal seeking behavior seen with the rat in cloudy water. Such
+models require that a place, or more generally, an environmental context, can be recognized. In addition, they need a mechanism to bind
+goal location to place representations and a way to use this information
+to guide behavior. Finally, the models need a mechanism to assimilate
+new information so that goals can be located in unfamiliar environments. The first model discussed is concerned with place recognition
+and it can be quite biologically plausible because a lot is known about
+the neurobiology of place recognition. The subsequent models of goal
+location must be more speculative since much less is known about the
+mechanism of this activity.
+Place Recognition
+One of the most remarkable correlations between single neuron
+activity and events in the world is found in the place-field cells of the
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+435
+hippocampus (Becker, Walker, & Olton, 1980; O'Keefe, 1976; O'Keefe
+& Dostrovsky, 1971; Olton, Branch, & Best, 1978). In the rat, for
+example, there are single units that fire at their maximum rate only
+when the animal is at a particular location relative to a set of distal
+landmarks. These locations are called place fields. Removing too many
+landmarks or radically altering their spatial relations abolishes the
+place-field response of these units (O'Keefe, 1979; O'Keefe & Nadel,
+1979). Recently, it has become possible to make accurate measurements of the location, size, and shape of place fields, and to determine
+how they change when the environmental landmark cues are manipulated (Muller, Kubie, & Ranck, 1983). Quantitative experiments of
+this kind show that the response of place-field units is determined in a
+systematic, rule-governed manner by the configuration of the surrounding scene. Muller, Kubie, and Ranck have demonstrated this in a particularly elegant fashion. They showed that when every feature of the
+environment is scaled to a different size, the relative location of place
+fields and their areas scale with the environment. This, as we will see
+later, places a nontrivial constraint on the computational mechanisms
+that can be used to model location in rats.
+To account for these experimental observations, I have developed a
+computational model that relates the configuration of distal landmarks
+to the location, size, and shape of place fields. The input to this model
+is the configuration of landmarks in the environment together with the
+location of the observer.
+The output of the model represents the
+activity of a place-field unit in the observer's brain. The model can be
+used to simulate experiments on a computer, the results of which can
+be compared with real experiments to test the correctness of the model.
+For example, suppose it is known from experiment that an animal can
+use a set of simple objects-such as rectangular cards-as place cues,
+and it is also known that the size of the retinal images of these cards is
+used as an indicator of location. Then the model can use this information to provide quantitative predictions of how the shape and location
+of place fields will change when the size, tilt, or location of these cards
+is changed. Conversely, suppose that the way in which place fields
+change when the environmental cues are manipulated has been determined experimentally. Then the model can help to determine what
+features of the environmental cues are being measured to locate the
+animal
+It might seem strange to try to construct a model to do this since so
+much information processing takes place between the input of sensory
+information and the excitation of place-field units. Obviously, no
+theory currently feasible can account for all this processing in detail,
+and I make no attempt to do so. Rather, my model employs a biologically plausible architecture to compute the activity of place-field units
+
+436
+from the configuration of distal landmarks using only the geometrical
+constraints inherent in the problem itself and as few specific hypotheses
+about brain structure and function as possible. This approach implies
+that even if the model proves to be a valid predictor, it will not directly
+provide new physiological knowledge. What it will do is give a precise
+description of the computations being carried out by the place-field system. Once these computations are understood, the task becomes to
+explain how neural networks in the brain actually implement them. I
+feel that trying to explain how neurons might accomplish a clearly
+defined computation is a more tractable task than trying to relate an
+animal's behavior directly to the functioning of its neurons.
+The Model
+The basic question that the model must address is: How do the
+place-field neurons know that the observer, in whose brain they reside,
+is at the location where they are supposed to fire? I consider this to be
+a pattern-recognition problem in which a stored representation of a
+scene is compared to a representation of the current scene.
+Roughly
+speaking, the better the match between these two representations, the
+closer the viewer is to the viewpoint of the stored scene. The activity
+of place-field units can be thought of as reflecting the closeness of this
+match. A matching task of this kind could be very complicated if
+details from the entire scene had to be considered. However, the
+experiments show that only a few discrete objects need to be used.
+This greatly simplifies the modeling problem and also makes sense
+since location information about only a small set of objects is sufficient
+to locate a viewer in the environment. An example of how several
+measurements combine to specify location is shown in Figure 1 where
+the point P is uniquely located by its distance from the three landmarks
+a, b, and c.
+In order to see how a place-field unit might make use of this kind of
+information, imagine that at some time when an observer was at location P, in Figure 1, representations of the objects a, b, and e were
+recorded in some way in memory. Further assume, that the descriptions of each of these objects contained the value of the distance to P.
+Suppose that at some later time the observer returns to the vicinity of
+P. The observer's sensory system can now generate a set of current
+descriptions representing the objects, together with their current distances.
+If these representations, other than their distance components,
+are not affected too much by the viewing position, then the current
+representation of each object will differ from its stored representation
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+437
+a o..
+FIGURE 1. The location of point Pis uniquely determined by its distance from the three
+landmarks located at a, b, and c. The circles are parametric curves along which the distance of an observer from a landmark remains the same. Other measures of location
+such as the size of the retinal image of a landmark also give parametric curves, but these
+are not generally circles centered at the landmark. (From "A Computational Model of
+Hippocampal Place Fields" by D. Zipser, 1985, Behavioral Neuroscience,
+99, p. 1007.
+Copyright 1985 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.)
+only to the degree that the object's current distance from the observer
+differs from its distance to P. A neuron whose output response is a
+summated measure of the similarity between these current and stored
+representations for each landmark will have the properties of a placefield unit.
+The model deals with the problem of implementing a place-field unit
+that can carry out the required matching by breaking the task into two
+stages, each of which is carried out by a "layer" of simple processors
+roughly analogous to neurons or small neural networks. This arrangement is shown in Figure 2. Each unit in the first layer is specific for
+one landmark and one place field, and each is able to compare the
+current value of a location parameter with a value of the same parameter stored in the unit. The output of these units remains O while their
+landmarks are not in the current scene. When a first-layer unit's
+
+438
+SCENE
+x
+dx
+sensory
+System
+Layer 1
+Layer 2
+FIGURE 2. The model is shown here as implemented in a network of processors. The
+"sensory system" processes input from an environmental scene and produces two outputs.
+These are X, which is a description of a landmark in the current scene, coded so that it
+will be recognizable by units in Layer 1, and dy, which is the value of a location parameter, such as distance, valid for the current position of the observer and landmark X.
+Each unit in Layer 1 is concerned with just one landmark and place field. When a
+description of this landmark appears at the output of the sensory system, the current
+value at the dy output is compared with the value, da, stored in the unit.
+Thus, if the
+value at X= A, then the unit labeled Ap will generate an output by applying its response
+function to dy - da. The procedure used to evaluate the model assumes that the whole
+scene is scanned while the observer remains still, and it also assumes that the outputs of
+Layer 1 units, once computed, remain fixed until the observer moves again. The Layer 2
+unit integrates the outputs of the Layer 1 units to get an overall measure of how closely
+the current scene matches the scene as viewed from the place field centered at P. (From
+"A Computational Model of Hippocampal Place Fields" by D. Zipser, 1985, Behavioral
+Neuroscience, 99, p. 1008. Copyright 1985 by the American Psychological Association.
+Reprinted by permission.)
+landmark is detected by the sensory system, its response increases as
+the current and stored location parameter values become closer. The
+response of these first-layer units reaches its maximum value when the
+current and stored location parameters are equal. The task of the sensory system is to detect the landmarks and generate descriptions of
+them that can be recognized by the processors in the first layer. The
+sensory system must also measure the current value of whatever
+parameters are used to determine location. The model, however, is not
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+439
+concerned with the details of how this is done. It is also not concerned
+with how this information is represented or transmitted to the processors in the first layer.
+The computations involved in the model do not
+require any detailed knowledge of these processes.
+The output of the processors in the first layer serves as input to the
+unit in the second layer, which acts like a place-field neuron. Only one
+of these is shown in Figure 2 because the current model is only concerned with the output of a single place-field unit. The output of the
+second-layer unit must be a monotonically increasing function of the
+sum of its inputs from the first layer in order to represent the similarity
+between the current scene and the scene as recorded at the center of
+the place field.
+The output of this second-layer unit is used to define
+the location and shape of place fields in simulated experiments.
+So far, the response functions for the units in each of the two layers
+have only been specified in general terms. In order to precisely define
+the model for computer simulation, some real functions must be
+chosen for these roles. The properties of the model are not very sensitive to the exact nature of these functions so long as they have the
+required general properties. This insensitivity to detail is illustrated in
+Figure 3 where place fields have been calculated using the two different
+first-layer tuning functions shown below:
+0 iflax-dil > o
+1 otherwise
+R1 = exp- (ax-di)/o?
+(1)
+where R1 is the first-layer unit response function, dx and dx are the
+stored and current values of a location parameter (distance from landmark X to P in the case of Figure 3), and o is the matching criteria
+parameter. The second-layer unit response function is
+0 if [ R1(x) - 0 ≤ 0
+(2)
+R2 =
+R 1(x) - © otherwise
+where R2 is the second-layer unit response function, y is the set of all
+landmarks used for the match, and © is the threshold parameter. The
+outlines of the place fields in Figure 3 indicate the curves along which
+the function R2 = O. While the two place fields are not identical, the
+outlines and locations generated by the two different first-layer matching functions are quite similar. Since the step function and the Gaussian function used are about as different as this kind of monomodal
+
+440
+op
+FIGURE 3. The boundaries of the place fields centered at P have been computed using
+two different Layer 1 response functions. The location parameters used were the distances to landmarks al A, B, and C. The two Layer 1 functions used are plotted in the
+insert and the arrows indicate which function generates which place-field boundary.
+(From "A Computational Model of Hippocampal Place Fields" by D. Zipser, 1985,
+Behavioral Neuroscience, 99, p. 1009. Copyright 1985 by the American Psychological
+Association. Reprinted by permission.)
+tuning function can get, the similarity in place-field shape indicates the
+general insensitivity of the model to the nature of these functions.
+While the outlines of the place fields generated are similar, the internal
+structure of the fields are different. The Gaussian matching function
+(Equation 1) gives the kind of smooth peak observed experimentally in
+place fields.
+It is clear that what has been described is not a single model but a
+class of computational
+schemata related by the way in which they use
+location parameters in a two-layer architecture. The individual models
+in the class differ in
+just what features are measured to serve as
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+441
+location parameters and in which response functions are used in each
+layer.
+Location Parameters
+In Figure 1, distance was used as a measure of landmark location.
+Any other measurable feature whose value is a function of observer
+location can also be used. Somewhat more formally, a location parameter is a function depending on the relative location of landmark and
+observer that has a single value for each point in the environment. The
+inverse is not true. That is, a single value of a location parameter may
+map to many different locations. In the examples used so far, distance
+has been the location parameter, but in fact, distance is probably not
+being used by the rats in the Kubie, Muller, and Ranck (1983) experiments. This is demonstrated in Figure 4 which shows what happens
+when a triangle of landmarks a, b, c, is expanded by dilation to a
+larger triangle a', b', c'. The experimental results on environmental
+dilation predict that the place field should increase in size and still be
+centered at P. However, if the remembered distances are used, there
+is no longer a triple intersection at P. Actually, there is no triple intersection anywhere, which implies that there will be either no place field
+at all or, at best, one with a greatly reduced size, just the opposite of
+what is actually observed. This suggests that remembered values of the
+absolute distance to landmarks are not being used by the rat to activate
+place-field units in the dilation experiments.
+If distance is not being used as a measure of landmark location, what
+is? Something is required that, like distance, defines curves in the
+environment whose intersections can be used to localize the viewer,
+but, unlike distance, scales properly with dilation. Among the measurable features that have these properties are the visual angle subtended
+by two points on a landmark and the retinal area of the landmark
+image. Angle and area differ from distance in several ways. Unlike
+distance, they cannot refer to single points but require landmarks with
+some finite extent. Also, unlike distance, angle and area can be determined by a single measurement. Distance requires either two measurements or knowledge of the absolute size of the landmark. Because the
+notion of "landmark" is somewhat arbitrary, measurements can often
+just as easily be made that reflect the relationship between landmarks.
+For example, the gap between two trees could make just as good a
+landmark as each of the trees themselves. Retinal area, it should be
+noted, is a very simple thing for a visual system to compute since after
+a figure-ground separation, all that is required is that the number of
+
+442
+....
+FIGURE 4. The scene from Figure 1 characterized by landmarks at a, b, and c has been
+dilated by a factor of 1.5 which has relocated the same landmarks at a', b', and c'. The
+circles indicate the curves along which the location parameters (the distances, indicated
+by the dotted lines in this case) have their undilated values. These circles no longer
+intersect at P making it unlikely that a place-field mechanism that dilates with the scene
+could depend on remembered distances. (From "A Computational Model of Hippocampal Place Fields" by D. Zipser, 1985, Behavioral Neuroscience, 99, p. 1010. Copyright
+1985 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.)
+units in the figure be totaled. Of course, other factors must be
+included to explain conscious perception that corrects for apparent retinal size.
+Since location parameters, by definition, have a single value at each
+point in space, the properties of a particular parameter can be visualized
+by plotting the locus of a single value of the parameter. Examples of
+the curves generated in this way for distance, angle, and area are given
+in Figure S. These are the curves that arise assuming the landmark is a
+square card that looks the same from both sides. Actually, most
+natural landmarks look different from the back, so that generally only
+the curves on one side of the landmark will play a role in place-field
+location. The shape of these location parameter curves will depend on
+the shape of the landmark.
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+443
+FIGURE 5. L is a landmark and P is a viewpoint. Curve 1 is a locus of all viewpoints a
+constant distance from the center of L. Curve 2 is a locus of all viewpoints from which a
+square standing vertically on L would have a constant area on a spherical retina. Curve 3
+is a locus of all viewpoints where a line of length L would subtend a constant visual
+angle. The visual angle, A, subtended by a line of length a is given by:
+A = 2 arctan(s-b)(s-c)/s (s-a)
+where b and c are the distances from the endpoints of the line to the focal point and s =
+½ (a t b + c). Note that A is invariant to dilation by a factor d since replacing a, b, and
+e by da, db, and de does not affect the value of the above equation. The area of any
+object can be approximated by the sum of the areas of a set of triangles which cover its
+visible surface. The retinal area of a triangle is:
+Area = 4f2 arctan / tan (S/ 2) tan((S- A)/ 2) tan ( (S- B)/ 2) tan((S- C)/ 2)
+where fis the focal length; A, B, and C, are the visual angles of the three sides of the triangle; and S = ½ (A + B + C). Since A, B, and C are dilation invariant, so is the retinal area of the object. (From " A Computational Model of Hippocampal Place Fields" by
+D. Zipser, 1985, Behavioral Neuroscience, 99, p. 1011. Copyright 1985 by the American
+Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.)
+Simulated Experiments
+In order to see how well the model works, experiments of the kind
+used to study place fields were simulated on a computer. The simulated experimental environment, as detailed above, is shown in the
+computer generated display in Figure 6 (details of the simulations are
+given in the legend to this figure). The outer rectangle, which
+represents the limit of the simulated environment, contains the landmarks (shown as straight lines). The simulation assumes that the
+animal has a place field centered at point P. The location of the simulated observer is systematically moved over a uniform lattice of points
+
+444
+FIGURE 6. This figure shows the output from a typical simulated
+experiment on the
+screen of a Symbolics 3600 LISP machine. The experiment is initialized by first placing
+landmarks, (simulated square cards in this case) in the outer square. The size, position,
+and number of landmarks can be input explicitly as a set of numbers or determined
+interactively by the use of a "mouse." Once the scene is set, an initial viewpoint P, which
+will be the center of the place field, is chosen. Then values for or and © are picked and
+the simulation is started. First, the simulation program calculates the areas of the landmarks from the viewpoint P. These areas are used as the stored values of the location
+parameter. Then the viewpoint is systematically scanned through a raster of 145,000
+points in the inner rectangle. At each of these points the retinal areas of landmarks are
+computed and used as the current value of the location parameters in evaluating the
+response of the Layer 2 unit that represents the place-field unit. A mark is placed in the
+inner rectangle wherever the value of the Layer 2 unit just crosses threshold. The curve
+generated by these marks is the border of the place field. The landmarks in this figure
+are quite symmetrically placed around the scene that leads to a fairly symmetrically
+shaped place-field border.
+Asymmetrically placed landmarks would produce a less symmetrical field (see Figures 7 and 8). The size and, to some degree, the shape of the place
+field are determined by the choice of or and O. See the text and Figure 7 for more about
+or and (). (From "A Computational Model of Hippocampal Place Fields" by D. Zipser,
+1985, Behavioral Neuroscience, 99, p. 1012. Copyright 1985 by the American Psychological
+Association. Reprinted by permission.)
+covering the inner rectangle. The observer is limited to this inner rectangle so as to keep the landmarks distal because the model cannot deal
+with either proximal landmarks or the complexities of having the
+observer wander around in between landmarks. At each viewpoint,
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION 445
+the activity of the place-field unit is computed using the model. In
+this, and all following simulations, the Gaussian matching function
+(Equation 1) and a threshold function (Equation 2) are used for the
+response functions of the first- and second-layer units respectively, and
+retinal area is the location parameter. The shape and location of place
+fields are visualized by plotting their boundaries. At each viewpoint
+scanned in the inner rectangle, information from all landmarks is used.
+That is, no account is taken of viewer orientation. The significance of
+this simplification will be discussed later.
+More About Landmarks
+In the experiments that originally demonstrated the dependence of
+place-field unit activity on distal landmarks, a variety of objects such as
+a fan, a white card, a buzzer, and a light, all arranged at 90° intervals
+around the experimental area, were used (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1979).
+The only manipulation carried out on these cues was either to remove
+them or to interchange their locations. While this served well to
+demonstrate the basic phenomenon in a qualitative fashion, a more precisely defined set of landmarks and closer control over their location is
+required to determine the quantitative relationship between landmark
+configuration and place-field unit activity. At the present time not
+enough information is available to determine what would constitute a
+good, simple set of landmarks. In the computer simulations described
+here, planar, square landmarks of different sizes, that stand vertically at
+any position in the outer rectangle, are used. As viewed from above, in
+the computer-generated display, these square landmarks appear as
+straight lines. Squares were chosen because the computation of their
+projected retinal areas is reasonably tractable. The computation of the
+projected retinal area of an arbitrarily shaped object from a large
+number of different positions is quite complex. In all the rest of the
+simulations described here, the retinal area of these squares will be the
+location parameter used. It seems reasonable that a set of such square
+cards of different sizes, textures, and reflectances might well serve as
+adequate cues in real place-field experiments. Indeed in the Kubie,
+Muller, and Ranck (1983) experiments, a rectangular card played an
+important role as an environmental cue.
+Place-Field Shape and Size
+The two parameters o and ® in Equations 1 and 2 affect the size
+and, to some degree, the shape of the simulated place fields. The way
+
+446
+o and affect place fields is shown in Figure 7, in which o and @ are
+systematically varied while the landmarks and
+place-field center are
+kept fixed. The results shown in Figure 7 indicate that although these
+two parameters do not have identical effects on the shape and size of
+place fields, their effects are quite similar, particularly in the region of
+moderately high O and moderately low o, which give realistic looking
+place fields. Real place-field units are probably subject to a good deal
+of inhibitory interaction with other hippocampal units and many other
+modulating influences. For this reason, the model described here is
+unlikely to give a very accurate picture of the shape variation of place
+fields with landmark manipulation.
+Place-Field Location
+Extensive simulations indicate that both the location, shape, and size
+of place fields is affected by the number, size, and location of the landmarks.
+The effect of landmark manipulation on the shape of place
+fields is relatively small and might be difficult to observe experimentally. However, the much larger effects of changing landmark location,
+size, or orientation on the location and size of place fields can easily be
+detected experimentally and will serve as the main test of the model.
+B
+FIGURE 7. This figure was generated in the same way as Figure 6 except that rather
+than displaying the place-field boundary for just one set of values of or and O, a range of
+values was used to create a contour map of the place fields. A: o has been scanned
+while @ is held at 2.4. The or values for the different curves are: 0 = 0.1, 02= 0.25,
+03=0.4, 04=0.55, 05=0.7, 06=0.85. B: o is fixed at 0.6 and © is scanned: 01=3.9,
+02 = 3.4, 03 = 2.9,04=2.4, 05=1.9, 06= 1.4.
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+447
+For example, the one hard quantitative experimental result that we
+have in this area comes from the dilation experiments (Kubie et al.,
+1983). Experiments similar to this were simulated using the model
+described here. The results of this simulation are shown in Figure 8.
+First, a place field centered at P was generated using landmarks A, B,
+and C. All the coordinates specifying the location of 4, B, and C
+were then multiplied by 2 to give a dilation. The dilated scene was
+then translated back to a convenient location in the outer rectangle to
+FIGURE 8. This figure shows the result of a simulated dilation experiment. First, the
+landmarks A, B, and C of the indicated size were set up and the viewpoint P chosen as
+the place-field center. The field centered at P was generated by the simulation. Then the
+dilation, which increased the size of each landmark and the distance between them by a
+factor of two, was computed using the known coordinates of the landmarks. This
+enlarged scene was then shifted so that it could be put in the outer rectangle. This
+resulted in landmarks A', B', and C. A place-field boundary was then computed by the
+simulation using the same values of the stored location parameters originally determined
+at P. This led to the generation of a new larger place field at a different location. When
+the point P was dilated and translated by the same amount as the landmark A', B', and
+C, it mapped to a location indicated by P'. The fact that P' occupies the same position in
+the new place field as P did in the original, together with the fact that the new place field
+is a lwo-fold magnification of the original, are consequences of the dilation properties of
+retinal area used as a location parameter. (From " A Computational Model of Hippocampal Place Fields" by D. Zipser, 1985, Behavioral Neuroscience, 99, p. 1015. Copyright
+1985 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.)
+
+448 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+give landmarks A', B', and C'. The same dilation and translation were
+applied to the point P itself to give the point P'. The landmarks A',
+B', and C' were used to generate a new place field using the same
+recorded values of the location parameters employed to generate the
+original place field centered at P. The new place field is centered at P'
+and has the same shape but is twice the size of the original. This result
+demonstrates that when retinal area is used as a location parameter, the
+model gives the expected result for a dilation experiment. While the
+actual shape and size of a place field depends on model parameters, the
+way it dilates is the result of the inherent mathematical properties of
+the location parameter used-area in this case. (See the caption of Figure 5 for proof that the area has the expected dilation properties.)
+Other simulations in which the size or location of landmarks was
+changed in ways other than uniform dilation, produced large shifts in
+the location and size of the place fields. The finding of similar placefield position shifts accompanying corresponding landmark manipulations in real experiments serves as strong confirmation that the model
+described here embodies the correct rules relating landmark configuration to place-field properties.
+Scope of the Place-Field Model
+The model
+place-field described here is both oversimplified and
+incomplete, yet within its domain of applicability, it is testable by
+experiment. One way in which the model is incomplete is that it ignores
+the problem of left-right asymmetry. Early experiments that indicated
+that distal landmarks determined place fields also showed that interchanging the landmarks on the right and left side extinguished the
+location-specific activity of place-field units. This indicates that the
+animal has the ability to distinguish right from left, whereas the model
+as described is symmetrical. The ability to distinguish right from left is
+a relatively straightforward feature to incorporate into the model and
+one way of doing this is described later in this chapter in connection
+with goal-finding models.
+Another oversimplification of the place-field model is that it ignores
+the problem of viewer orientation. It is known from experiment that
+many place-field
+• units show sensitivity to the orientation of the
+observer (McNaughton, Barnes, & O'Keefe, 1983). For example, a rat
+running through a maze arm in one direction may excite a place-field
+unit at a particular location that is not excited when the rat runs back
+through the same location in the opposite direction. Orientation is
+important for goal location and a mechanism for incorporating it into a
+place-field system is described in the next section.
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+449
+Goal Location
+Knowing where you are is only worthwhile if this information can be
+used for some useful cognitive purpose.
+For example, to answer the
+question "How do I get home from here?"
+, information about the location of a goal (home in this case) must be available. For the rest of this
+chapter, I will deal with the problem of developing mechanisms that
+can answer this question. The problem is trivial, of course, if the goal
+is perceivable from the current location. The problem becomes
+interesting only when the goal is too far away or too inconspicuous to
+detect. In all of what follows, it will be assumed that the observer must
+find the way home using a set of locally visible landmarks and that the
+observer has no access to absolute direction information such as "Which
+way is north?" and so forth. This does not significantly reduce the generality of the problem, since the determination of an absolute direction
+such as north would, in general, depend on knowledge about the configuration of the local landmarks anyway.
+The unoriented place fields described above are insufficient for goal
+location. The reason for this is that in the absence of absolute direction
+information, the location of a goal must be given relative to both the
+location and orientation of the observer. One way to approach this
+issue is to incorporate orientation into the place field itself. I call an
+oriented place field a view field. Many of the place fields observed in the
+hippocampus are, in fact, oriented as pointed out above. That is, some
+hippocampus neurons fire at a particular place only when the rat is
+pointed in a specific direction. Orientation can be incorporated into
+place fields by adding some weak, topological constraint, such as classifying landmarks as being either on the right, in the center, or on the
+left. Distinguishing right, left, and center is a fairly straightforward
+task for the sensory system of any bilaterally symmetrical animal.
+In the following sections I describe two models of goal-finding. One,
+the distributed view-field model, uses a large number of oriented placefields, each with associated goal location information, scattered around
+the environment.
+The other model is based on a more extensive
+computational analysis and requires fewer units but more elaborate
+calculations.
+The Distributed View-Field Model
+The distributed view-field model for goal location is based on the
+network shown in Figure 9 which is used as the "cognitive map" to
+guide an observer to a goal. The first layer of units, called object units,
+
+450
+left
+VISUAL SYSTEM
+center
+right
+OBJECT
+UNITS
+YIEW -FIELD
+UNITS
+Evi
+•..
+GOAL
+UNITS
+9 = -
+29,4
+Evi
+MOTOR
+SYSTEM
+FIGURE 9. Network used in the distributed view-field model. The visual system outpu
+consists of three sets (ieft, center, and right) of three numbers representing an object's
+type, distance, and orientation relative to the observer. The output of an object unit is o
+unless its recorded type number matches its current input from the visual system. In this
+case, the output is the product of two Gaussian tuning functions (see Equation 1), one
+for distance and one for orientation. The output of the view-field units is the same kind
+of sum given in Equation 2. The output of the goal units is two components of a vector
+pointing to the goal each multiplied by the input from a view unit.
+is analogous in function to the Layer 1 units of the preceding placefield model shown in Figure 2. The primary difference is that the
+object units in Figure 9 are divided into left, center, and right groups.
+Object units are gated on only when the landmarks they recognize
+appear in the appropriate region of the visual field, i.e., left, center, or
+right. The view-field units in Figure 9 are analogous to the Layer 2
+units in Figure 2. Together, the object units and the view-field units
+recognize an oriented place field, i.e., a view field, in the same general
+way as the corresponding units in Figure 2. However, now the output
+of the view-field unit also depends on orientation as well as location.
+Once a view-field unit for a particular place is created, information
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+451
+about the location of a goal can be associated with it. In the network
+shown in Figure 9, goal location is encoded in an additional unit whose
+output is interpreted by the motor system as the direction of the goal.
+To actually head to a goal from any particular location, an observer with
+this kind of network would first examine the landmarks in front of it,
+which would lead to the activation of a set of object units and then to
+the activation of an associated view unit. This in turn would activate a
+goal unit, the output of which could direct the observer to the goal.
+There are several problems to be solved before this general strategy
+can actually be applied to controlling the movements of an observer.
+First, it is impossible to have a unique view-field unit for every place
+and orientation in the environment. At best, one could hope to have a
+rich supply of view-field units whose place fields spanned the environment. Another problem is that even with a large number of view-field
+units, it is unlikely that the observer is ever at the exact center of a
+place field. This means that some form of interpolation is required to
+compute the location of the goal from the current position of the
+observer. Another problem is to specify how information about the
+environment gets assimilated by the network in Figure 9 in the first
+place. Aside from the technical issues of recruiting the appropriate
+units and connecting them together with the desired weights, there is
+the conceptual problem that arises from the need to know the location
+of a goal at the time that its association with a particular view field is
+made. There is no trivial solution to this problem. One approach is to
+remember and constantly update the location of a particular goal as the
+observer moves through the environment. This active memory of goal
+location can then be used to establish the place-field goal relationships
+when new units are recruited. Once enough units have been instantiated, the territory can be thought of as familiar and it will no longer
+be necessary to have an active memory of the location of a goal in
+order to find it. This is the strategy used in the distributed view-map
+model described here. This approach has the drawback that it demands
+both processing resources and memory accuracy. These requirements
+could possibly be met for modest periods of time and over short distances with no distractions, but they could cause problems in more
+extended situations.
+In the distributed view-map model, the viewer has a large set of view
+fields scattered over the environment. Associated with each of these
+view fields is a vector pointed towards the goal. If the observer is in
+the center of one of these view fields and oriented in the optimal direction, the associated goal unit indicates the direction of the goal. However, the observer is seldom at the center of a view field so information
+from a set of nearby view fields must be interpreted. The first step in
+this process is recognition of the currently visible set of left, center,
+
+452 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+and right landmarks that are used to gate the appropriate ensemble of
+view fields. Associated with each of these view fields is a vector pointing home. This is illustrated in Figure 10, which shows a viewer, V,
+oriented towards the central landmark, C, and nine view fields, each
+labeled m. Of course, the oriented view fields are not actually written
+on the ground in the environment but are encoded in the brain of the
+observer. Although the whole ensemble of view fields that have the
+same set of three landmarks will be gated on, the activity of each individual unit will depend on how closely its parameters match the current
+situation. The closer the viewer is to the center and orientation of any
+particular view field, the more active the unit representing it becomes.
+In the distributed view-field model, the observer interpolates the location of the goal by using a weighted average of the direction vectors of
+all of the active goal units. The way this weighted average is formed is
+that each goal unit multiplies its output vector, indicating goal location
+by its input from a view-field unit. The motor system then sums all of
+these weighted vectors and normalizes them to the sum of the activity
+m
+'m
+m
+FIGURE 10. A diagrammatic representation of the view-field model. G is the goal, V is
+the observer, L, C, and R are landmarks. The positions at which view fields have been
+recorded by the observer are indicated by ms. Each view field consists of a line
+representing the orientation of the observer when the view field was recorded and an
+arrow representing the direction of the goal relative to this orientation.
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+453
+of all the view-field units (see Figure 9). Thus, the goal vectors associated with close-matching view fields play a large part in the sum, since
+their associated units are highly active, whereas the vectors from less
+closely fitting view fields play a smaller role. This strategy requires the
+view fields to be reasonably well distributed around the environment.
+In order to test the model, the network of Figure 9 was used to actually control the behavior of a simulated observer moving around in a
+model environment. Before describing this simulation in detail, it's
+necessary to deal with the problem of getting environmental information into view fields. Rather than building in spatial information, a procedure for assimilating it while the viewer moves around was incorporated into the model. The naive viewer was supplied with a network
+similar to that shown in Figure 9, but in which all object units and goal
+units had zero values for all their relevant parameters. At fixed time
+intervals, while the observer explored the environment at random, a
+signal is sent to recruit object and goal units. Upon receipt of this signal, the object units being recruited record the values necessary to
+recognize and locate the currently visible set of landmarks, while the
+goal unit records the location of the goal relative to the current position
+and orientation.
+The object units receive their information from the
+current output of the visual system, whereas the goal unit to be trained
+obtains its values from a working memory. Once all the available units
+are recruited, no more view fields can be learned and all subsequent
+goal-directed travel is dependent on the existing set of view fields.
+To observe the properties of the distributed view-field model, a
+simulated observer was developed with two motivational states, "curiosity" and "guilt." In the curiosity state, the observer explores the
+environment by a random pattern of movement. In the guilt state, the
+observer attempts to return home using the information recorded in its
+network of view-field units. The assimilation of new information takes
+place at all times, independent of the motivational state of the observer.
+Thus, new information can be assimilated either during random
+exploration or during return to home.
+The actual simulation program to carry out all this is quite complex,
+because in addition to simulating the cognitive mapping network of Figure 10, the environment, together with some information about the
+observer's location and visual system, had to be modeled. This project
+was expedited by the availability of a general purpose parallel simulating
+system called P3 (Parallel Process Programmer).
+The P3 system is
+described in more detail in a separate chapter of this book, but brietly,
+P3 is used to simulate networks consisting of an arbitrary number of
+unit processors connected together by signal lines. The complete network of interconnected units is called a P3 plan. Each unit in the plan
+must have a computer program, called a method, associated with it that
+
+454 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+updates its outputs according to some function of its current inputs and
+state variables. The input to units described in a P3 plan can come only
+from other units in the plan. That is, there is no outside world in the
+P3 description of a network. This means that the environment, as well
+as the nervous system network within the model, must be described by
+individual units. The simulated model can interact with the outside
+world in two ways. It can be initialized and observed as it functions,
+using facilities provided by the P3 simulation system. In addition, the
+method programs can communicate with the investigator through the
+keyboard and display using the available features of the method
+language. The methods can also use the file system. However, all
+communication between units must be via connections described in the
+P3 plan.
+A simplified view of the P3 plan used
+to simulate the model
+described here is shown in Figure 11. There is one very complex unit
+called the environ unit which carries out a multitude of tasks. It keeps a
+record of and displays for observation the current position of the
+viewer, the location of the goal (home in this case), and the position of
+all relevant landmarks. The output of the environ unit provides the
+viewer-centered information necessary to activate the object units in the
+model. In this way, the environ unit serves as the sensory system of
+the viewer. Another output of the environ unit is working memory,
+which has the current goal location used by goal units when they are
+assimilating new information. The input to the environ unit comes
+from the mover unit which serves as the motor system for the viewer.
+The environ unit uses this information to update the location and the
+orientation of the observer. Thus, we see that the environ unit serves
+as the entire world outside the particular part of the brain being simulated by the mapping network under test, that is, it constitutes the musculature, the visual system, and the short-term memory of the observer
+together with the physical world outside the viewer. Obviously the
+method program for the environ unit is quite complex. The shaded
+units in Figure 11 represent the major parts of the cognitive map networks under test. These are the elements that are changed significantly
+when different models of the viewer's space representation system are
+studied. The rest of the P3 plan can remain essentially the same, constituting a major saving in effort.
+The model and the associated methods were coded in the P3 system.
+An example of what the screen of the Symbolics 3600 LISP machine
+looks like during the progress of a simulation of the model is shown in
+Figure 12. Information about the state of various units, at one time
+cycle, is displayed in the large panel on the left. The "world display"
+window of the environ unit appears in the panel on the right. The
+behavior of the model is most easily analyzed by examination of the
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+455
+ENVIRON UNIT
+world display window
+yiever
+bame
+landmark
+goal
+location
+memory
+visual
+system
+viewer
+possition
+update
+movel
+unit
+objet
+stote
+unit
+unit
+FIGURE 11. A simplified plan of the P3 simulation of the distributed view-field model
+The shaded boxes represent the part of the model that contains the specific map informa
+tion. The mover is actually comprised of several units that compensate for the delay
+between observation and resulting movement. This compensation is required because
+other motions may occur during this period. The symbols in the world display window of
+the environ unit are those used in the computer display that it drives (see Figure 12).
+world display window. The observer, marked V in the figure, is just
+about to reach the goal at the center, having started towards the goal at
+a point marked S. The path of the observer during the "guilt" state,
+when it is trying to go home, is characterized by evenly spaced dots.
+The path of the observer during the "curiosity" state is seen as a set of
+much more arbitrarily spaced dots. One dot is added to these paths at
+each cycle of the simulation. At the outer extremes of the field, the
+landmarks appear as rectangles. In this particular simulation, eleven
+landmarks were used. Although they all look the same on the screen,
+
+456
+Select Model
+Flush Medel
+Fall
+p3 Interaction Pane
+rose! ELMER: ZIPSER p3-models:2-rew-vml86 pšpian
+Iteration 215
+Stop interval: 2000 Mext scheduled stop: Rfter iteration 2000.
+luge i per-Suspend to make ar unacheduled stop.
+Simulate Inst:alize Instrumertation:
+0
+L
+
+
+0000
+000
+0000
+000
+0000
+3O0
+DOGOOD
+000
+0O000C
+000
+DOODOO
+000
+
+000
+gOO0DOO
+000
+000
+000
+
+R
+CO•COOOOOD
+0OD
+DUDD
+0000
+0000
+00000
+Ew 38
+009
+000
+0C02
+0000
+0DO
+DO00000000
+
+000
+DOO
+000
+0000
+
+0000
+
+layr fication 1
+Lirits in P3 Space
+Modating. Click to reset landmarkst
+soda 67
+FIGURE 12. Symbolies 3600 LISP machine display of the distributed view-field model.
+See the text for explanation.
+they are in fact distinguished by the viewer. The three landmarks that
+constitute the current view are highlighted by making them hollow rectangles slightly larger than the unviewed landmarks.
+Figure 12 represents the state of the system after 216 iterations of
+the simulation. Only 10 out of the pool of 100 view units have been
+recruited, so this is relatively early in the exploration phase. Examining
+the path from S to V in the world display window, shows that the
+viewer is able to go directly home along a moderately straight path. In
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION 457
+general, this is the case early in a simulation, before many view fields
+have been recruited. The panel on the left shows the output activity of
+the object units, the view-field units, and the goal units. No information is being displayed about the teach unit, the environ unit, the state
+unit, or the mover unit. Actually, the mover unit consists of a group
+of several units that work together to provide the appropriate motion
+information based on the output of the array of goal units. Some caution needs to be used in looking at a state display of this type since
+there is a delay of one cycle between each layer of the network. Thus,
+what's seen at the output of the goal units is a consequence of events
+occurring one cycle earlier in the view units, and two cycles earlier in
+the L, C, and R object units. The important point to notice here is
+that only two goal units show any output activity at all, and both of
+these have activity of the same sign. This means that at this point the
+movement of the viewer is being controlled by only a small set of view
+fields. This is consistent with the fact that the simulation is early in the
+assimilation phase.
+After the assimilation phase is over and all units have been recruited,
+the pattern of view fields is as shown in Figure 13. This figure was
+generated from the world display window of the environ unit, which
+has the option of showing the actual positions corresponding to the
+observer's store of view fields. Figure 14 shows the path of the
+observer attempting to get home after simulation cycle 3081 when the
+assimilation phase is long over. The path starts at S, and the observer,
+atter much thrashing about, has reached point V, and not yet gotten
+close enough to home for the home detector to have triggered. Note
+that the path starts at Sand continues in a relatively straight fashion,
+but not directly towards home. Before passing too far beyond the goal,
+the observer has made a sharp turn to the left and moved towards the
+goal on a very uncertain and constantly changing path. Then, after
+approaching quite close to the goal, the observer again turned, this time
+in a path that took it somewhat away from the goal. As we look at Figure 14 at the current cycle, the observer has been thrashing around in
+the general vicinity of the goal but has not been able to actually reach
+it. Eventually the observer will get home, but it will take a great many
+cycles. This behavior is quite typical of what happens when an attempt
+is made to go home after all 100 view-field units have been recruited.
+To the right of the world display window, the current states of the array
+of the view-field units and goal units are shown. These are not both
+from the same cycle, rather the view-field units are shown from one
+cycle before the goal
+units so that the active view-field units are the
+ones that determined the activity of the goal units in the lower array.
+Notice that a large number of view-field units are active and that a
+correspondingly large number of goal field units are active. However,
+
+458
+m
+G
+$500
+
+000 oF
+80.
+850
+FIGURE 13. The distribution of view fields after all 100 available units have been
+recruited. A typical view field, labeled m, has a line indicating the orientation of the
+observer at the time it was recorded. The goal vector is left out for clarity but it would
+point to the dark oval at the center. The current position of the observer is indicated
+by v.
+some goal units have positive output values as indicated by solid rectangles, while others have negative values as indicated by open rectangles.
+The reason for this is that some of the view fields are on opposite sides
+of the goal, which provides the observer with conflicting information
+about the sign of the direction of the goal. This conflicting information
+is the cause of the viewer's inability to get to the goal in a smooth
+fashion. This conflict situation only causes a serious problem when the
+observer is quite close to the goal because when it is further away,
+information from view fields on the opposite side of the goal contribute
+very little to the weighted sum of goal vectors. Although the problem
+is inherent in the model, by adjusting various parameters that control
+the density of view-field placement and the strength of their interaction, it is possible to reduce the size of the region of ambiguity to the
+point where it is small compared to the area in which the goal is directly
+perceivable.
+The distributed view-field model simulated above has the virtue of
+simplicity, since the viewer is not required to carry out any complex
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+459
+
+B000000000
+
+
+
+
+VIGOGOODOO
+
+000000000@
+
+00N0000000
+0000000@
+
+
+00000
+L20OL
+
+FIGURE 14. Behavior of observer, V, in the distributed view-field model with all units
+recruited. The state of the view-field units, V, on the 3080th cycle and of the goal units
+on the next cycle are shown on the left. The reason for the complex path followed by
+the observer is given in the text.
+computations to navigate. Its algorithm for assimilating new information is extremely unsophisticated, operating only on the basis of time.
+Une price paid for this simplicity is the need for a large number of units
+to store assimilated information. One way in which this algorithm might
+be improved is to assimilate new information only when the present
+information is inadequate. This inadequacy is easy to detect since the
+unit that sums the activity of all the view-field units can also be used to
+determine when there is insufficient information available. The way
+this is done is to take advantage of the fact that when the sum of the
+activities of the view-field units is high, the observer is in familiar territory; when this sum is low, the viewer is in unfamiliar territory where it
+would be wise to assimilate some new information. This would do
+away with redundant view fields that are generated by the clock
+method. On balance, the distributed view-field model meets the criterion of biological plausibility since it is based on the concept of
+place-field units that are known to exist. These units may well play a
+role in goal navigation since the hippocampus, where they are located,
+
+460
+is required for navigation to unperceived goals. The magnitude of the
+ambiguity problem that this model has in the vicinity of the goal can
+probably be reduced to a point where it is not any more troublesome
+than the uncertainties about goal location that would arise from other
+sources of error in any model.
+The B-Coefficient Model
+In this section, a navigation scheme called the B-coefficient model
+(B model for short) is described that overcomes some of the drawbacks
+of the distributed view-field model described previously. Rather than
+requiring many separate view fields, the ß model needs to record information about a set of landmarks and a goal only once. This recorded
+information can then be used to locate the goal anywhere the landmarks are visible. The ß model also indicates goal location unambiguously, so the problem of sign that caused confusion near the goal in the
+view-field model is eliminated. Since only one recording is required,
+the actual number of units needed for the B model can be much less
+than for the view-field model. The B model can do away with the need
+for an updated memory of goal location whenever the set of landmarks
+to be used are visible from the goal itself since in these cases the
+recording can be made at the goal. If additional recordings of new sets
+of landmarks are made at locations where both a new and an old set are
+visible, the reed for an updatable memory of goal location can be eliminated because the old set of landmarks can be used to establish the
+goal location for the new set. The price paid for these good features is
+an increase in computational complexity together with a loss of an
+immediately obvious link to current neurobiological data. Both of these
+drawbacks could be more apparent than real. More about this after the
+B model has been examined in detail.
+To understand the B model, it's necessary to delve a little more
+deeply into the computational
+aspects of representing location. The
+problem we wish to solve is illustrated in Figure 15. An observer
+located at position V records the position of the three landmarks L, C,
+and R together with the location of the goal G. At some later time, the
+same observer is imagined to be at point V' at which the locations of
+the landmarks L, C, and R can be determined. The observer's problem is to locate the goal G, which cannot be seen from the position V'
+using the information recorded at point V. It can be shown that there
+exist three constants, BL, Bc, and BR, which depend only on the
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+461
+R
+V
+FIGURE 15. The observers at V and at V'can both locate the landmarks L, C, and R in
+their viewer-centered reference frames but only at V can the goal G be perceived. The
+problem is to solve for T so that the observer at V' can locate G
+relative locations of L, C, R and G, and have the following nice
+properties:
+X'G= BLX'L+BCX'C+BRX'R
+ýG=BLY'L+BCC+ BRY'R
+1=BR + BC+BC
+where x'(
+'G, y'a, x', y'L, x'c, y'c, and x'R, y'r are the coordinates of
+G, L, C, and R in the reference frame of the observer at V'. (For a
+derivation of the ßs see Appendix A.) Since the ßs depend only on the
+relative locations of the landmarks and the goal and not on the location
+of the observer, they can be computed at any place where the location
+of the landmarks and the goal are known, that is, at V in our example.
+Because the ßs are constant, it is only necessary to have a single record
+of their values to locate the goal from anywhere the landmarks can be
+viewed. The significance of this set of B equations relating the location
+of G to the location of the landmarks is that the coordinates of the goal
+can be obtained as a linear combination of the current values of the
+landmark coordinates and the remembered B. This means that neurallike elements can perform the computations if their synaptic weights
+correspond to the values of B.
+A network using the B-coefficient concept and consisting of three
+units is shown in Figure 16. The job of the context gate unit is to
+determine that the current left, center, and right landmarks are the
+same as were used to originally program the B units. When the context
+unit recognizes the appropriate set of landmarks, it gates on the B units.
+
+462
+xc
+({x';B.)™
+(GALACAR)
+CONTEXT GATE
+У,
+Y'c
+Y'R
+(½ 41B,) "
+Ус
+FIGURE 16. A pair of units that compute the x and y components of goal location using
+the method of B-coefficients. In the units, the Bs are implemented as weights or lines
+coming from a sensory system that can measure the current values of the coordinates of
+three landmarks, L, C, and R. Each of the triangular B units is gated by a context gate
+unit (oval shape) which has an output of 0 unless the desired goal is G and the current
+landmarks are L, C, and R in the appropriate configuration, in which case the output of
+the gate unit goes to 1. If the value of w = 1 also, the correct value of the goal coordinates appears at the output of the B units.
+These units perform the appropriate linear summation operations and
+their output represents the coordinates of the goal. One of the sets of
+units in Figure 16 is required for every combination of three landmarks
+with a goal. The output of the appropriately gated B units is an exact
+indication of the location of the goal from any point in the environment. This means that there will be no problem approaching the goal
+from any angle and there will be no confusion from information coming from the opposite side of the goal as there was in the previous
+example. Note that only one set of B units and a context unit is
+required for each goal-landmark combination as opposed to many units
+for each combination in the distributed view-field model described
+above. If information about the configuration of the environment is
+recorded at the goal itself, as may be the case for the rat on the platform in cloudy water, no working memory of goal location is required.
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+463
+An important issue in the B model is how the ßs are initially computed and recorded. Since we can get no hints from neurobiology, a
+wide range of possibilities are available. For example, we might imagine that the ßs are computed locally by each B unit when it is
+recruited. Such a computation could take the form of a learning rule
+that adjusted the value of the ßs in accordance with an error signal generated by comparing the current output of aß unit with the correct output, i.e., the coordinates of the goal that, of course, must be known
+when the ßs are programmed. Another approach is to have a single,
+central B computer that calculates the appropriate values of B and
+transmits them to the newly recruited B units for recording. In the
+absence of hard data, it is a matter of taste which of these one considers to be more biologically plausible.
+There is a completely different way to go about programming the B
+units that does not involve setting the values of B at all. In this
+approach it is assumed that there is a pre-existing pool of B units each
+with a set of fixed B values. It is then the values of the strengths of
+connections between a context unit and the ß units in the pool that are
+set to produce the desired result. The idea is that the output of each B
+unit is weighted by the value of the weight, w, which connects it to a
+context unit. If these ws are chosen correctly, the sum of the weighted
+outputs of all the B units in the pool gives the appropriate goal coordinates. In this system a set of ws rather than a set of B units have to be
+learned. This could have some advantages, for example, the number of
+B units in the pool is fixed and can be much smaller than the number
+of context units. This means that fewer units are required to instantiate a w programming version of the model than a B programming version. Another advantage of the w version is that setting the w values
+is synonymous with recruiting the B units so that recruitment and programming are accomplished as a single operation rather than as two
+separate ones. As with the computation of B, the determination of the
+ws can be local to the ß units or carried out by a central w computer.
+In the simulation used here to test the B model, a version of w programming that had a pool consisting of only four ß units with a central
+w computer was used. The way this system worked to program the B
+units with the correct connection strengths to the context units is
+explained in Appendix B.
+A simulation analogous to that used to test the view-field model was
+employed to evaluate the ß-coefficient scheme. Only those parts of the
+P3 plan that determine the representation of the spatial map were
+changed. The plan of this model is shown in Figure 17. The context
+units are very simple recognizers. Their output is 0 unless the particular set of left, center, and right landmarks to which they are sensitive is
+currently being viewed, in which case their output goes to 1. The teach
+
+464
+ENVIRON UNIT
+world display window
+viever
+home
+landmark
+goal
+locotion
+memory
+visual
+system
+viewer
+position
+update
+novel
+unil
+units
+Sente
+teach
+unit
+Barray
+units
+@comp
+unit
+FIGURE 17. A simplified diagram of the P3 plan used to simulate an observer with a B
+ray map of its environment. The shaded units constitute the map and they are the on
+gnificant difference between this plan and the one shown in Figure 1
+unit supplies a signal to the context units and the B units to recruit
+them when new contexts are assimilated. The teach unit requires
+modification since it no longer makes sense to teach at uniform time
+intervals. The teach unit produces a pulse only when no context units
+are active, that is, when the current view is unfamiliar
+The performance of this model is superb. The viewer always goes
+exactly home at the appropriate time. The results of a typical simulation episode are shown in Figure 18.
+Notice the straight paths heading
+directly towards the center of the goal. The number of context units
+required in this model is roughly equal to the number of landmarks,
+plus a few extra to take care of cases where a landmark can be the central object with different sets of flanking objects. The loops in the
+paths, found near the environment window borders in Figure 18, are
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+465
+...
+....é
+FIGURE 18. The performance of the B array model simulated with P3 and shown on
+the display of a Symbolics 3600 LISP machine.
+• See text for details.
+due to that fact that the state unit can detect when the observer leaves
+the area with landmarks. When this happens, the context unit instructs
+the move unit to turn the observer left until a set of three landmarks
+become visible. This feature is only included to keep the observer on
+the screen and has no significance for the network being tested. Even
+when the number of context units is insufficient to assimilate all possible views of the landmarks, the observer manages to find its way home.
+It simply searches until it finds an appropriate view for which it has
+assimilated information and then proceeds to use it to head home.
+Behavior degrades quite gracefully in this case and the number of landmarks has to exceed the number of context units by a great deal before
+serious difficulties are encountered.
+Aside from being able to accomplish the task in an efficient and
+accurate fashion, the B-coefficient network has some other attractive
+features. It is, for example, able to explain the behavior of rats in the
+cloudy water experiment, since while on the platform, the rat can
+assimilate the appropriate B-related information for groups of room
+cues. The distributed view-field model described earlier has a much
+more difficult time with the cloudy water paradigm. It would require
+that the rat jump off the platform and swim around the tank to pick up
+
+466
+a large set of view-field information. The problems that arose in the
+view-field scheme near the goal would be particularly annoying to the
+rat in this case since there are no visual cues to serve in goal detection,
+which become apparent as the rat approaches the submerged platform.
+Conclusion
+The three models that have been presented here differ from each
+other in the degree to which they encompass known experimental
+observations. The first model of place fields is based so strongly on
+neurophysiological data that its predictions are immediately amenable to
+testing. The second model, which adds a goal vector to place fields, is
+more speculative in the sense that it hypothesizes an explicit output
+role for the place-field neurons. It seems very likely that these neurons
+do play a role in navigation since removal of the hippocampus, which
+contains them, cripples navigational ability (Morris et al., 1982). Both
+of these models clearly meet the criterion of biological plausibility since
+they attempt to explain observable data in terms of neural-like models.
+The B model is of a different sort. It attempts to explain the
+observed data by proposing a novel representational and computational
+scheme. This scheme is biologically plausible in the sense that it is
+implementable with neural-like elements operating in a highly parallel
+fashion. However, the B model can draw neither support or opposition
+from current experimental data. Indeed, this is just what we would
+expect from a theory that proposes a mechanism that is not completely
+intuitive but derives from a formal analysis of the problem domain.
+This is to be expected since it is very unlikely that experimentalists
+would find data relevant to the ß model, even if it is correct, until they
+are specifically looking for it. This, of course, is exactly what theory is
+supposed to do, ask questions which would not be asked in the normal
+course of experimentation.
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+467
+APPENDIX A
+To see where the ßs come from, we solve for the transformation T that
+maps all points in the V system to the V' system and then divide the
+expression for T into a constant part that depends on landmark and
+goal configuration and a variable part that depends on observer location. T must be found using only information about the recorded and
+current location of the landmarks L, C, and R. Once T has been
+obtained, it can be applied to the coordinates of the goal G in the V
+system to map them into the coordinates of G in the V' system. If
+information about three landmarks is used in two dimensions, homogeneous coordinates can be employed and T can be a linear transformation (Foley & VanDam, 1983). Having T linear will greatly simplify
+the nature of the computations necessary to use the transformation and
+will make the networks that carry it out much more biologically plausible. The derivation of T is shown below:
+Let x; = (xi Ji,2;) be the homogeneous coordinates of the ith
+object. (In the case of Figure 15, i = L, C, R, or G.) Then T is
+defined so that x'; = x; T. To solve for T let
+XL
+X =
+X'=
+XR
+R
+Then, T = X-'X' where X-' is the inverse of X that exists as long
+as L, C, and R are distinct and not collinear.
+Now we have T defined in terms of the coordinates of the three landmarks recorded at V and the coordinates of the same landmarks
+observed from V'. Since we are using homogeneous coordinates, the
+third coordinate of all objects can be taken as 1.
+The observer at V' is now able to compute T. Applying T to the
+recorded coordinates of the goal G will give the coordinates of G in the
+observer's current reference frame. That is,
+X'G= XGT
+or substituting for T,
+*'G= xGX-X'.
+(1)
+Equation 1 points out an interesting fact. Namely, the first two terms
+on the right-hand side are independent of viewer location and can be
+computed once-at the initial siting of the landmarks.
+This
+
+468
+computation, in fact, yields three constants. Once determined, these
+three constants are sufficient to locate the goal G in any reference
+frame in which the locations of the landmarks L, C, and R can be
+determined. I call these constants ß-coefficients and their definition is
+given below:
+Define:
+B = (BL, Bc, BR) = xGX,
+then:
+x'G=BL*L+BCX'C+BRX'R
+y'G=BLY'L+BCY'C†BRY'R
+1=BL +BCt BR.
+
+23. PLACE RECOGNITION AND GOAL LOCATION
+469
+APPENDIX B
+Four B units with fixed, predetermined values of B were used in the
+simulation described here. They were arranged in a 2 x 2 array as
+shown in Figure 19. When instructed by the teach unit to establish a
+new weight for connection to a newly instantiated context unit, each
+unit calculated the appropriate weight by multiplying together the
+values of its two inputs from the a-computer. The problem is what
+should the outputs of the a-computer be to assure that each ß unit
+generates the correct weights? Assuming that the contribution of each
+goal and object coordinates
+o-computer
+1-0c
+1-0,
+context
+abject coordinates
+$00
+(B-unit O)
+BLo=-10
+Bco= -10
+"onl
+¡BRO = 21
+object coordinates
+→
+W10
+context
+WIn
+B-unit 1,
+8L1
+1 = - 10
+Bc1
+10
+BRI
+= 1
+context
+object coordinates
+·20
+B-unit 2
+812 = 10
+Bc2=-10
+*zn)
+BR2 = 1
+object coordinates
+context
+4#30
+B-unit 3)
+B13 = 10
+Bc3 = 10
+BR3 = - 19
+FIGURE 19. An array of four predetermined B units and the a-computer unit used to
+by the a-computer and B units when they are determining goal location and when they
+are being trained are given in the text.
+
+470
+of four predetermined B units to the x'o component of the goal vector
+is given by
+*'G¡= W¡(BLİX'1 +BcX'C+BRiX'R)
+where i = 0, 1, 2, 3 are the four predetermined B units, wij is the
+weight for the ith B unit in the jth context, and BLi, Bai, and Bri are
+the predetermined, constant B values for each B unit. The condition
+we want satisfied is 2 x'Gi = X'G. It was found that this is satisfied
+when!
+W2j = acj (l-aLj)
+W3j= (1-aL) (1-ac)
+where
+aLj= (BLj-BLO)/ (BL.O- BL.2)
+acj = (Bc; - Bc.o)/ (Bc.o - Bc.1)
+and BL.0=BL.1BL.2=BL.3,BC.0= BC.2,BC,1=BC,3.
+1 Note that the terms on the right of the equations are the outputs of the a-computer.
+
+CHAPTER 24
+State-Dependent Factors
+Influencing Neural Plasticity:
+A Partial Account of the Critical Period
+P. W. MUNRO
+PLASTICITY AND LEARNING
+In this chapter I discuss the state dependence of learning rate using
+the development of ocular dominance in visual cortex (Area 17) as a
+model system. Several qualities make this system an excellent example
+of neural plasticity. Foremost and most obvious of these qualities is
+the clear and abundant evidence of plasticity in Area 17. Secondly, the
+susceptibility of ocular dominance properties to a very broad range of
+manipulations has been extensively analyzed and the circuitry connecting the retina to visual cortex is better understood than any other
+neural system of comparable complexity. Furthermore, for the purposes of this analysis, the system can be characterized in terms of
+two-dimensional "ocularity states," which serve to illustrate many
+of the mathematical concepts in this book with a relatively simple
+representation.
+An account of early learning is presented in this chapter that can be
+described at several different levels. While the underlying concepts are
+actually quite simple, they are also in their essence mathematical and
+are thus expressed in mathematical language. To help make the
+presentation more understandable to all readers, I have tried to elaborate most of the points in more intuitive terms.
+The aim of this chapter is to suggest that the high plasticity frequently observed in the early stages of a learning process may reflect, at
+least in part, an expected reduction in the modifiability of neuronal
+
+472 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+response characteristics as their synaptic connections are strengthened
+as a result of experience. This contrasts with previously proposed alternative possibilities that this phenomenon is either maturational or that
+it is centrally gated by global modulatory signals.
+The organization of the chapter is as follows: The present section
+introduces the reader to the subject and the approach of the chapter.
+The following section describes a general developmental phenomenon
+called the critical period during which neural networks are observed to
+be relatively plastic, then focuses on how plasticity is manifested during
+the development of ocular dominance in visual cortex, both during and
+after the critical period. In the third section, the reader is introduced to
+the notion of state-dependent plasticity, a concept that is then applied
+to give an account of the time course of ocular dominance plasticity. In
+the fourth section, these ideas are compared with experimental data. In
+the final section, the ramifications of state-dependent plasticity are discussed in relation to experimental data, existing theories, and their
+predictive power.
+Focus on single-unit learning. Unlike most of the chapters in this
+book, which explore the behavior of whole networks, the present
+chapter is focused at the level of the single neuron and its afferent
+synapses.
+This does not reflect a difference in belief about the
+appropriate level of analysis, but rather it is grounded in the simple
+pragmatic observation that at the single-unit level, a fairly good account
+of the relevant phenomena can be given. Put another way, the critical
+period is not seen as an emergent property of an interactive network in
+this approach, but as a phenomenon that night be traceable to the
+effects of prior experience on the behavior of individual units.
+Learning rate as a factor in PDP models. Notions of learning rate
+(in general) and the critical period (in particular) bear on models for
+learning by parallel distributed processing systems and have not been
+extensively studied by theorists apart from specific applications. A
+popular approach to selecting a learning rate is the pragmatic strategy in
+which one chooses a step size that yields a good solution in an acceptable time frame; however, rate properties of adaptive systems deserve
+more attention, as they may provide an important link between theoretical models and empirical data. Several existing theories of plasticity in
+cortex are concerned with the sequence of learning and ignore the rate
+of learning, either ignoring the critical period or making ad hoc assumptions to account for it. Conversely, in and of themselves, the scope of
+the ideas to be presented in this chapter is limited to rate and do not
+include an explicit rule for synaptic modification. Since it lacks such an
+explicit learning rule (that could be used to predict final states), it must
+
+24. NEURAL PLASTICITY 473
+be emphasized that the present partial account is not sufficiently complete to constitute either a theory or a model of cortical plasticity.
+Two cautionary notes regarding terminology. First, it should be
+noted that although the terms plasticity and learning are used interchangeably in this chapter, there is a difference in nuance between
+them. Plasticity carries with it a sense of physical modifiability but not
+necessarily toward adaptation, whereas learning has a flavor of storing
+information from the environment with less emphasis on the neural
+(synaptic) substrate.
+Both, however, refer to adaptation, an
+environment-driven metamorphosis that enables a system to generate
+responses appropriate to that environment. Second, one should be particularly careful in interpreting the term state (especially as in "state of
+the system") here. In many of the network models, the state describes
+the instantaneous activation levels of all the units. Here, the same
+term refers to the connectivity values of the afferents to a unit. In the
+context of a network model, the activation state is generally changing
+very rapidly as the assembly of units settles in response to a particular
+stimulus according to information implicit in the connectivity state,
+which modifies more slowly under the influence of some selforganizing adaptive principle.
+THE CRITICAL PERIOD
+It is well established that plasticity varies over the course of ontogenetic development. During so-called critical or sensitive periods of
+plasticity, certain perceptual' mechanisms have been found to be more
+susceptible to adaptive modification by the stimulus environment,
+whereas the susceptibility is low or nonexistent at other times. Sensitive periods have been demonstrated in many systems, such as song
+learning in birds (Konishi, 1978), socialization in dogs (Scott, 1962,
+1968), and phoneme discrimination in humans (Eimas, 1978; Miyuwaki
+et al., 1975). However, the phenomenon has been
+most extensively
+analyzed with respect to the development of binocular interaction in
+mammalian (particularly cat and monkey) visual cortex.
+It is certainly not expected that all of these examples will necessarily
+have the same physiological substrate, nor would it be correct to
+1 Weak evidence exists for sensitive periods at "higher" (i.e., more cognitive) levels of
+mental function. The most compelling results are based on findings that children recover
+from trauma-induced aphasia more rapidly and completely than adults (who rarely, if
+ever, fully recover). For an overview, see Lenneberg (1967).
+
+474A BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+assume that any behavioral observation of sensitive periods in learning
+should be reflected by sensitive periods in neurophysiological measures
+of single-unit plasticity. However the converse inference, namely, that
+plasticity in single units is sufficient (but not necessary) for macroscopic learning phenomena, seems valid. Therefore the reader should
+keep in mind that the framework to be presented below for neuronal
+plasticity is not restricted to visual cortex, but might be applicable much
+more generally.
+Ocular Dominance and its Susceptibility to the Environment
+Interest in visual system plasticity and the generation of relevant data
+enjoy a symbiotic relationship that has led to the production of a great
+deal of both. A brief overview is given in this section of a part of this
+data that is based on measuring changes in the ocular dominance (OD)
+statistics of a large sample of neurons (from about 50 to over 1,000,
+depending on the experiment). This method, devised by Wiesel and
+Hubel (1963), consists of assigning each unit to one of seven ocular
+dominance classes based on the relative values of its optimal responses
+to monocular inputs from both eyes. Since there is an innate statistical
+bias for a neuron to respond preferentially to the eye on the opposite
+side of the head, the ocular dominance classes are ordered according to
+the influence on the neuron of the ipsilateral eye relative to the contralateral eye. A Class 1 neuron responds exclusively to input from the
+eye contralateral to it, a Class 7 neuron responds only to the ipsilateral
+eye, a Class 4 neuron gives roughly equal responses to each eye, and
+neurons in the other
+classes are responsive to both eyes
+with
+corresponding degrees of preference.
+The stimulus environment can be crudely controlled by suturing shut
+neither, either, or both of the eyelids. The resulting paradigms are
+respectively called normal rearing (NR), monocular deprivation (MD),
+and binocular deprivation (BD). These can be combined into rearing
+schedules such as reverse suture (RS) in which a period of MD is followed by opening the closed eye and suturing shut the previously open
+eye, and alternating monocular occlusion (AM) which consists of
+several such reversals.
+Several results can be interpreted in terms of an age-defined critical
+period, though the boundaries of the critical period seem to vary somewhat with the particular details of the experimental procedure. Hubel
+and Wiesel (1970b) found that MD drives all neurons to strongly prefer
+the open eye, provided the animal is still sufficiently young-neuronal
+sensitivity to MD seems to peak at about 4 weeks and disappears by
+about 3 months (see Figure I). More recently, other researchers
+
+24. NEURAL PLASTICITY
+475
+VU 1 23 4 5 6
+FIGURE 1. The ocular dominance histogram (ODH) shift associated with monocular
+deprivation (MD). The classic result of Hubel and Wiesel is shown in this figure adapted
+from their 1970 paper. The ODH is shown for a kitten deprived of vision in one eye
+from Day 10 to Day 37. Units that cannot be driven through either eye are classified as
+visually unresponsive (VU) and are represented here by an unfilled bar. (The ODH of a
+normally reared [NR) kitten is nearly symmetric.)
+(Cynader, Timney, & Mitchell, 1980) report an ocular dominance shift
+in kittens subjected to monocular deprivation for 3 months after rearing
+under normal conditions from birth to 5 months of age. Because it is
+such a striking effect, requiring only 24 hours or less during the height
+of the critical period (Olson & Freeman, 1975; Peck & Blakemore,
+1975), the ocular dominance shift under monocular deprivation is often
+used as a test for assessing cortical plasticity.
+With the exception of BD, other rearing schedules distort the relatively uniform ocular dominance histogram (ODH) of normal kittens and
+Binocular deprivation generally leads to a histogram with all OD
+classes represented, as in newborn and normally reared cats. However,
+unlike normally reared cats, newborn and BD cats have neuronal
+responses described as "sluggish" and "unpredictable" with ill-defined
+receptive fields (Cynader, Berman, & Hein, 1976; Wiesel & Hubel,
+1965). In another rearing paradigm, artificial strabismus (AS), the eyes
+receive noncorrelated inputs. Both surgical (severing some of the
+extraocular muscles) and optical (attaching eyeglasses with prisms)
+techniques have been used to simulate strabismus. Strabismic kittens
+exhibit U-shaped ocular dominance histograms, i.e., the neurons
+become highly monocular, but do not show an overall preference for
+one eye over the other. While AS yields a sensitivity time course that
+closely matches MD (Hubel & Wiesel, 1965), the same cannot be said
+of all procedures.
+The results reviewed thus far appear consistent with a fairly strict
+maturational hypothesis for cortical sensitivity. However, evidence
+against this view comes from a very interesting result that has been
+obtained by Cynader et al. (1976) who have raised binocularly deprived
+
+476
+kittens throughout and beyond the period associated with plasticity (up
+to 10 months) and then opened just one eye. They observed a strong
+shift in ocular dominance after a 3-month period of monocular experience. Cynader (1983) extended this result by raising the kittens in the
+dark for up to 2 years, followed by 9 to 18 months of monocular
+experience.
+This phenomenon, described at the end of this section,
+provides the most compelling evidence for a link between a neuron's
+connectivity state and the plasticity of the state.
+Plasticity-Modulating Processes
+The hypothesis that plasticity is strictly age-related falls down in the
+face of another kind of evidence as well; it has been found that
+plasticity can be modulated by a variety of chemical and/or physical
+processes (see Table 1). One might suppose that the critical period is
+explicitly controlled by one or more of these processes (i.e., it is part of
+the "design" of the system). However, as will be seen, this is not the
+only alternative hypothesis.
+For now, consider the following evidence
+concerning the roles of a variety of modulators of plasticity, focusing on
+norepinephrine in particular.
+Norepinephrine.
+Catecholamines attracted attention as potential
+modulators of neuronal plasticity during the 1960s (see, for example,
+Crow, 1968). The catecholamine norepinephrine (NE) is pervasively
+distributed throughout the central nervous system from a localized
+region in the brain stem, the locus coeruleus (LC); thus the anatomy of
+the norepinephrine system makes it an attractive candidate for a global
+Natural Site of
+Modulation
+Locus Coeruleus
+Proprioception
+(Extraocular)
+PROCESSES THAT MODULATE CORTICAL PLASTICITY
+Experimental Stimulus
+Modality
+pharmacological
+mechanical
+References
+Kasamatsu & Pettigrew (1979)
+Freeman & Bonds (1979)
+Buisseret et al. (1978)
+Reticular Formation
+electrical
+Medial thalamic nuclei
+electrical
+Singer (1979)
+Singer (1982)
+Singer & Rauschecker (1982)
+
+24. NEURAL PLASTICITY
+477
+modulator of plasticity. The LC/NE system has been implicated in
+maze-learning behavior of rats by Anlezark, Crow, and Greenway
+(1973), who showed that bilateral LC lesions impaired learning and
+resulted in decreased cortical concentrations of NE. Neurophysiological
+evidence that NE modulates neuronal plasticity has been found recently
+in rat hippocampus by Hopkins and Johnston (1984) and earlier in cat
+visual cortex by Kasamatsu, Pettigrew, and Ary (1979).
+In a series of experiments (see Kasamatsu, 1983, for a comprehensive review), Kasamatsu and his colleagues showed that when applied
+to visual cortex, 6-hydroxydopamine (6-OHDA), a neurotoxin that
+locally destroys LC projections, prevents the ocular dominance shift in
+MD kittens. They went on to show that plasticity could be restored
+with direct injections of norepinephrine. Kasamatsu et al. (1979) also
+attempted to induce plasticity in normally reared adult cats via NE
+injections. This experiment yielded an asymmetric U-shaped histogram
+biased toward the open eye. That is, NE was shown to produce observable plasticity in a system that otherwise would not demonstrate
+environmentally driven modification.
+Attempts to replicate and extend these results have had mixed outcomes. Consequently, the role played by NE in modulating plasticity is
+very controversial at the present time. While NE certainly has some
+effect on the susceptibility of neurons to their stimulus environments,
+the situation is not as simple as one might think on the basis of
+Kasamatsu's initial reports. A study by Bear et al. (1983) exemplifies
+the mixed nature of the results and provides a partial explanation.
+They obtained catecholamine depletion using two different techniques
+to administer 6-OHDA. One group of kittens received 6-OHDA using
+the osmotic minipump procedure of Kasamatsu et al. (1979) and the
+other group received injections intraperitoneally (into the abdomen)
+before the third postnatal day. Plasticity was disrupted only in the
+former case; however, subsequent biochemical analysis (HPLC)
+revealed that the depletion was more effective in the latter group. The
+results were quite surprising: While the former group replicated the
+earlier result, the latter group showed no observable disruption of
+plasticity even though pharmacological analysis indicated that the NE
+depletion was more severe.?
+Other examples of induced plasticity. Stimulation of at least three
+different sites has been shown to enhance plasticity in visual cortex of
+adult cats. Mechanical stimulation of the extraocular muscles generates
+2 By way of explanation, Bear et al. suggest that if the LC mechanism is disrupted sufficiently early, a compensatory mechanism may be activated. Such a mechanism, they
+point out, may have been discovered by Harik et al. (1981) in the rat.
+
+478
+a proprioceptive (feedback) signal which has been shown to be sufficient for plasticity with respect to both orientation selectivity (Buisseret,
+Gary-Bobo, & Imbert, 1978) and ocular dominance (Freeman & Bonds,
+1979). Plasticity-gating capabilities as revealed by electrical stimulation
+techniques have also been reported for the reticular formation (Singer,
+1979; Singer & Rauschecker, 1982) and the medial
+nuclei
+of the
+thalamus (Singer, 1982; Singer & Rauschecker, 1982).
+The Effect of the Environment on the Critical Period
+The conjecture that NE is a global modulator of neural plasticity does
+not necessarily imply that it governs the sensitive period.
+In this
+chapter an alternative conjecture is entertained; namely, that the potential for change possessed by a neuronal state is a function of that state.
+(It may perhaps be influenced by global factors as well.) The following
+result, mentioned earlier, of Cynader et al. (1976) provides supporting
+evidence. Kittens were raised in total darkness for periods as long as a
+year, after which rearing continued under the MD paradigm. Complete
+shifts to the open eye were found in each case, suggesting that visual
+input influences not only the response properties of the visual system
+by way of some plasticity mechanism, but the functioning of the
+mechanism itself. Ramachandran and Kupperman (in press) have
+taken these results further to show that the ocular dominance shift
+under MD is not the only plasticity phenomenon to be delayed (or prolonged) by dark rearing.
+They have not only obtained ocular dominance shifts in dark-reared animals, but they have observed dominance
+reversal upon reverse suture in animals at ages up to 6 and 6.5 months.
+The details of how much and what kind of experience are necessary
+and/or sufficient to delay the critical period are far from clear at this
+time. Mower, Christen, and Caplan (1983) report that 6 hours of binocular experience at 6 weeks eliminates the plasticity-preserving effect of
+dark rearing; but Ramachandran and Kupperman (in press) have shown
+that kittens raised normally for a full month and subsequently reared in
+darkness show plasticity in Area 17 for at least 6 months.
+THE OCULARITY STATE AND ITS EFFECT ON
+PLASTICITY
+The theoretical formulation in this chapter is intended to serve primarily as a partial explanation of the sensitive period for the development of ocular dominance in visual cortex. The central concept is that
+
+24. NEURAL PLASTICITY
+479
+retino-cortical connectivities are weaker in the newborn and are hence
+more susceptible to change than the stronger synaptic connectivities
+that develop as a result of experience. Assuming that the ocular dominance class depends on the relative synaptic weights (the direction of
+the synapse vector)
+, this means that the effect on the ODH of a given
+change in connectivity is greater when the absolute values of the
+weights (the magnitude of the synapse vector) are relatively small. This
+notion can be supported by a very diverse variety of learning rules (i.e.,
+synaptic modification rules), and so the specific formulae used here are
+secondary to the major theme. They are included for illustrative
+purposes.
+The Model Neuron
+Let the response r of an ideal neuron be given by a continuous nondecreasing function or of its net depolarization x, and let x in turn be a
+weighted sum of the neuron's stimulus components si; i.e., the units
+have a semilinear (see Chapter 2) activation function:
+r (t) = ox (t)) =
+Em 1025 0)
+(1)
+The weights w; are collectively designated by the weight vector w, and
+the stimulus elements s; are collectively designated by the stimulus vector s. Since the weights are associated with synaptic connectivities, w is
+called the synaptic state. One can clearly see that under this assumption
+the neuron's response characteristics, as measured by a set of test
+stimuli, are determined by w. Adaptive learning (i.e., plasticity) is a
+dynamic process in which the synaptic state is driven by the stimulus
+environment such that the response characteristics with respect to the
+same environment approach some optimizing criterion. Several theoreticians (see Chapter 2) have analyzed the adaptive capabilities of various networks (idealized anatomical configurations) that self-organize
+according to rules (idealized physiological processes, usually at the scale
+of the synapse) that express the time rate of change of synapse weight
+w; as a function v of local variables:
+(2)
+= v (r (1), W; (t), s; (1),...).
+dt
+By hypothesizing an explicitly time-dependent factor into the above
+modification rule, the notion of a fixed critical period could be easily
+
+480
+incorporated. Global modulators such as NE can also be factored into
+the rule by appropriate independent functions.
+However, as will be seen, no such ad hoe description is necessary.
+Rather, for certain initial conditions on w, there exist modification
+rules from which plasticity decreases naturally under the influence of
+patterned input.
+The Ocularity Plane
+Figure 2 is a schematic view of the retino-geniculo-cortical pathway,
+the most direct (just two synapses) from the ganglion cells of the retina
+to the visual cortex. Note that the individual components of the
+stimulus vectors incident to a cortical cell are actually the activities of
+neurons in the lateral geniculate nucleus responding to retinal signals. 3
+Despite findings that some LGN cells respond binocularly (Sanderson,
+Bishop, & Darien-Smith, 1971), 4 the components s; are idealized as
+being strictly monocular. Let C(I) be the set of all afferents to a given
+neuron from LGN neurons responsive to the contralateral (ipsilateral)
+eye. Let each neuron's ocularity state W = (Wc, W,) be given by its
+net input connectivities from each eye, and let the ocularity plane be the
+associated state space:
+(3)
+iEC
+iEl
+3 The retina is not the only neural structure that projects to the LGN. Olher sources of
+LGN input include the reticular complex and feedback from Layer 6 of visual cortex
+(Gilbert & Kelly, 1975).
+4 Sanderson and his colleagues found that only about 9% of geniculate neurons in the
+cat could be excited from the nonpreferred eye, but that only 18% are truly monocular,
+the remaining majority having inhibitory fields in the nondominant eye. In monkey the
+LGN seems to maintain a higher degree of segregation; Marrocco and McClurkin (1979)
+report that 87% of neurons in macaque LGN are strictly monocularly driven.
+5 This is actually a special case of a more general formulation in which the ocularity
+state W is given by the net depolarizations of the neuron by arbitrary (fixed) monocular
+stimuli to each eye. Namely, this is the special case in which the test stimuli are uniform
+activations of all afferents. The typical laboratory procedure is quite different. In a given
+neuron the optimal stimulus is found for each eye. Then the two corresponding
+responses are compared in order to determine the ocular dominance class. Hence, the
+test stimuli are state dependent. A more detailed theory (such as Bienenstock, Cooper,
+& Munro, 1982) would be required to simulate this experimental method. However, the
+simple approach used here is adequate for the topic at hand.
+
+24. NEURAL PLASTICITY
+481
+Optic
+Chiasm
+→
+Left
+LEN
+Sup
+Coll
+Right
+LGN
+CORTEX
+Shading Key
+Right visual field information
+Left visual field information
+Tectocortical pathway
+FIGURE 2. Circuitry of the visual system. Of the information pathways from retina 10
+visual cortex, the retino-geniculo-cortical pathway, shown here in gray and white, is the
+most direct and the most well understood. The optic nerves approach the optic chiasm in
+two bundles, one associated with each eye. Here, they are separated and recombined
+into two groups according to whether they originate from the left or right side of the
+retina-i.e., they are grouped as a function of which "side" of the world they look at,
+such that information from the left side of the visual field is generally directed to the
+right side of the brain and vice versa. Other pathways from retina to cortex exist, for
+example, the tectocortical pathway: retina → superior colliculus → pulvinar nucieus →
+cortex (shown here in black).
+Figure 3 depicts these assumptions with respect to a neuron in visual
+cortex. Macy, Ohzawa, and Freeman (1982) define a continuous measure of neuronal ocular preference, the ocular dominance index (ODI)
+
+482
+apical
+dendrite
+W, F
+W,
+basal
+dend
+axon
+FIGURE 3. Schematic view of a neuron. Cortical neurons actually receive several types
+of inputs from several sources. The highlighted inputs represent monocular signals from
+LGN, though these do not necessarily project only to the apical dendrite as illustrated.
+These are segregated in the figure to illustrate the relationship between W and the synaptic weights w;. In this example of just six synapses, C=1,2,4 and /=3,5,6. (In general
+nese two sets need not have the same number of elements.) These synapses are though
+o be purely excitatory. Other inputs, both excitatory and inhibitory, come from proxi
+mal cortical units, other areas of cortex, and other structures in the brain.
+to be the quotient between the optimal ipsilateral response and the
+sums of the individual monocular optimal responses:
+ODI =
+Tipsi
+ripsi + 'contra
+(4)
+
+24. NEURAL PLASTICITY
+483
+Given fixed monocular test stimuli, the ODI can be roughly mapped
+onto the ipsilateral connectivity fraction z, a function of W:
+z (W)
+0 (WI)
+o (W,)+o (Wc)"
+(5)
+Using this index, the ocular dominance categories can be mapped onto
+regions of the ocularity plane (Figure 4). Two prominent aspects of the
+diagram are determined by the particular function o. These are: (a) a
+threshold connectivity Wa for both components of W below which no
+action potentials are elicited by the corresponding test stimuli and
+(b) the curvature of the iso-ocularity contours. (These are straight
+radial lines if o is a linear function.)
+The power of the ocularity plane as a tool in the theoretical analysis
+of ocular dominance plasticity will become clear presently. Scatterplots
+of experimental data on the ocularity plane may prove more valuable
+for presenting results than the ocular dominance histogram if accurate
+techniques for measuring W become available.
+* lanetmeakes the fart of describi he he rotationship be cera.
+neuron's state and its plasticity much easier than it would be otherwise.
+6
+5
+4
+W
+3
+VU
+2
+1
+FIGURE 4. The ocularity plane. The plane is defined by axes corresponding to the net
+connectivities from both eyes to a cortical neuron. Loci of constant ODI are mapped
+onto contours that radiate from
+the point W= (WoW), where the value Wa
+corresponds to the firing threshold for some test stimulus. These have been chosen here
+to mark arbitrary boundaries that might be used to delimit the seven ocular dominance
+classes defined by Wiesel and Hubel (1963). Running orthogonal to these contours is, by
+definition, the gradient field for ocular dominance.
+
+484
+This description is repeated in the next section using more formal
+mathematical language for those who are interested, but the gist can be
+understood quite well without wading through the mathematics. The
+arguments in this chapter are founded on the following assumptions:
+Al. Initially the synaptic weights are small.
+A2. As it is molded under the influence of a structured stimulus
+environment, the pattern of synaptic weights is refined and
+reinforced with experience, and thus tends to grow.
+A3. The rate of change of synaptic weights may decrease or remain
+invariant, with changes in the magnitude of the weight vector;
+in fact, the rate of change of synaptic weight may even grow as
+the magnitude of the weight vector grows, as long as it grows
+less rapidly than the weight vector itself.
+These assumptions are readily understood in the context of the ocularity plane. Since the initial weights are small (Al), the ocularity state
+is initially near the point where the ocular dominance classes converge
+(Wy). In this region, plasticity is high because it requires only a small
+change in the synaptic weights to move the state from one OD class to
+another. As its weights increase (A2), the neuron's ocularity state is
+driven away from the origin where increasingly larger weight changes
+are required to produce shifts in ocular dominance class. Assuming the
+ability to change weights does not also grow in proportion to the growth
+of the weight vector (A3), this results in an observed loss of plasticity.
+State Dependence of Plasticity
+Given z, a scalar measure of the neuronal state, the plasticity p associated with a particular state W can be defined for any stimulus
+environment E. The plasticity is the time rate of change in z under the
+influence of E:
+p = <
+• az
+>==
+az Vet.
+a Wc
+dz
+(6)
+aw,
+where V = < dW/dt > E is the average "velocity" of the state in the
+W-plane and Vz is a vector pointing in the direction of steepest change
+in z with magnitude equal to that change (the components of Vz are
+simply the partial derivatives of z with respect to Wo and Wi. The
+plasticity can thus be represented as the inner (dot) product between
+two vectors: the velocity of the state and the gradient of the ODI. The
+
+24. NEURAL PLASTICITY 485
+inner product of two vectors can be expressed as the product of their
+magnitudes and the angle between them (see Chapter 9). These are
+considered separately below.
+Dependence on the magnitudes of Vz and V. Whether the loss of
+plasticity associated with the critical period is a function of neuronal
+state ultimately depends on the behavior of the product between the
+magnitudes of these two vectors for large magnitudes of W. Since ! Vz!
+decreases with W| (| Vz) goes as |W|- on average), the issue reduces
+to the relationship between |V| and |W|. This is exactly the issue
+addressed in Assumption A3 above, since |W| is the magnitude of the
+weight vector and |V| is its speed in the ocularity plane. In keeping
+with the conventional Hebb-like approach (i.e., the change in each
+synaptic weight depends only on the activities of the corresponding
+presynaptic and postsynaptic units), consider the indirect effect of W on
+V mediated by the neuronal activity rather than any explicit dependence
+of V on the weights. It now becomes very important to consider the
+form of the function o relating the response r to the quantity x (see
+Equation 1). This function is sometimes called a squashing function
+since it tends to saturate for high values of × (as shown, for example,
+by Chapman, 1966) because of the upper limit on the neuronal firing
+rate (i.e., the absolute refractory period). Hence, if V depends on r
+(not x), it will (like r) level off as x increases.
+It would be sensible for V to decrease with increasing x. The argument supporting this possibility is based teleologically on the assumption
+that each unit optimizes some function of its stimulus environment according
+to a gradient descent process. In Chapter 8, it is shown that optimization
+of least square error in a multilayered system leads to an explicit rule
+for learning in which each synapse modifies according to a function
+separable into three factors: the presynaptic (afferent) activity, an error
+signal propagated from higher levels, and the derivative of the squashing
+function of the postsynaptic unit. More generally, one can show that the
+derivative o'(x) is a factor regardless of the function being optimized,
+whether it be a least square error (as in Chapter 8); selectivity for
+orientation, direction, or spatial frequency (as in many cells in visual
+cortex); or some other quantity. This is demonstrated quite easily. Let
+O be the optimized function, a quantity measured over the set of
+response values r' evoked from a given unit by a set of test stimuli s'
+If r' = o (r) (where x' =w•s'), then the gradient VQ breaks down
+as follows:
+89=[₫dr ¿x'
+OW;
+¡ ari dx' Aw;
+= I28
+-o'(x') sj.
+(7)
+
+486
+With increasing exposure to the world, units may become highly selective so that they come to respond at intermediate levels where o (x) is
+high (see Figure 5) less frequently, and may hence become less plastic
+with respect to that environment.
+The first derivatives of certain squashing functions can be expressed
+as functions of the squashing functions themselves-i.e., they satisfy
+0(x) = Flo (x)). A simple (i.e., easily implemented) function F
+gives a technical advantage that may be exploited at two levels: (a) by
+the biochemical mechanisms that underlie plasticity and (b) by the
+o(x)
+X
+B
+o'(x)
+FIGURE 5. A squashing function and its first derivative. A: An easily computed function that incorporates the salient features (namely, a threshold, A, and monotonic
+approach 10 an asymptote, u) of neuronal response characteristics is given by the funcion that is defined by o(x) =u(x-a)/(x1/2tx-2A) forx> A and vanishes for x < A.
+where xyz is the value of x at which the function attains half its maximum value (ie.
+o (xy/2) =p/ 2). B: The derivative o'(x) of this particular function is shown for x > A.
+The decay in the derivative as x increases can be implicated in a decay in learning rate
+for systems that follow gradient descent. This effect is potentially quite substantial as
+indicated by the very small values of the derivative.
+
+24. NEURAL PLASTICITY
+487
+computer algorithms used to simulate them. A few such pairs of functions and derivatives are given in Table 2 along with the function F
+that expresses the function relating each pair.
+Dependence on the angle between Tz and V. Analysis of the time
+course of the OD shift under MD (Blasdel & Pettigrew, 1978) has
+shown that the binocular OD classes are depleted before those associated with the closed eye, resulting in a U-shaped OD histogram. Since
+the inner product between the vector fields (and hence the observed
+plasticity p) tends to increase as the fields are more parallel, the
+elevated plasticity in the binocular regions suggests that the fields may
+be more parallel in these regions than in the monocular regions of the
+ocularity plane. Since the shape of the Vz curves is known to be somewhat circular_about the origin, or concave inward, _ the approximate
+shape of the V-field can be deduced. It follows the V-field trajectories
+are directed radially near the axes and oriented tangentially in the binocular regions; i.e., they are concave outward (Figure 6A). The resulting elevated plasticity level for the binocular states can be seen in
+Figure 6B which illustrates the plasticity function in the context of a
+stimulus environment restricted by monocular deprivation
+(i.e.,
+E = MD) using a simplified version of the Bienenstock et al. (1982)
+formula for V. Note that the states furthest from equilibrium (those at
+the "beginnings" of the trajectories) are initially driven toward the origin, but are "deflected." A useful analogy (suggested by a remark of
+Paul Smolensky's) is that the origin "repels" states under the influence
+of a patterned environment. It is thus seen that while the states tend to
+grow, sudden changes in the statistics of the visual environment (e.g.,
+SAMPLE SQUASHING FUNCTIONS AND FIRST DERIVATIVES
+or (x)
+o'(x)
+o' in terms of o
+1
+I+ x
+(1+ x)2
+0(x) = (1-0)2
+1
+ite-x
+-ex
+(1+e=x)2
+0(x) = 0(1-0)
+1-ex
+ex
+o'(x)= 1-0
+6 Concaveness can be assigned a direction corresponding to the second derivative
+(acceleration) of a trajectory.
+
+488
+W,
+Wc
+af c
+FIGURE 6. Plasticity in a monocularly deprived environment as a function of the ocular-
+A: The velocity field V (bold) is shown together with the gradient field Vz. B:
+Plasticity is plotted as a function of the state W. Note that the origin is located in the far
+corner of the base plane so that the region obstructed by the large peak is minimal.
+RS) may deliver an "impulse" in the direction of the origin which is
+eventually overcome by the system dynamics to drive the state outward, most likely in a direction different from its approach.
+
+24. NEURAL PLASTICITY
+489
+These last two paragraphs have formally expressed a notion that is
+actually simpler than the mathematical nature of the presentation might
+indicate. The fundamental idea is that the observed plasticity depends
+on the objective change in the neuronal state (i.e., V) relative to the
+plasticity measure (in this case, the ocular dominance index z). Aspects
+of this relative change that have been considered are the absolute magnitude |V| of the change in neuronal state, the sensitivity | Vz| of the
+plasticity measure, and the angle between the change in the state and
+the contours of constant z.
+COMPARISON WITH EXPERIMENTAL DATA
+Developmental models of visual cortex have for the most part
+focused on the final (equilibrium) states inherent in the dynamics of
+hypothetical systems (e.g., Amari & Takeuchi, 1978; Bienenstock et al.,
+1982; Cooper, Lieberman, & Oja, 1979; von der Malsburg, 1973),
+ignoring the variability in the convergence rates of these systems that
+results from abrupt changes in the visual environment such as those
+manipulations used to test plasticity. Ocularity plane analysis is an
+attractive technique in the design of a detailed rate-descriptive model
+for learning.
+The time course of the reverse suture paradigm. Qualitative analysis
+of the shape of the trajectories (as in Figure 6A), however, leads to a
+prediction for the RS paradigm. It appears that early reversal of monocular deprivation should bring the states closer to the origin as they
+migrate from the neighborhood of one axis toward the other axis (see
+Figure 7). Hence they might easily go from one monocular class to the
+other via the VU region —i.e., pass between the origin and the plasticity
+singularity Wa. Consider states which begin further from the origin on
+the axis associated with the newly closed eye. After reversal, their
+paths are more likely to traverse the binocular regions of the ocularity
+plane. Therefore the intermediate (U-shape) stage of RS is expected to
+be less sharp, i.e., there should be more binocular units observed if the
+reversal is performed relatively late (but before plasticity vanishes).
+The time course of the ocular dominance shift under RS has been
+analyzed by Blakemore and Van Sluyters (1974). As in the early stages
+of MD rearing, the OD histogram initially becomes somewhat U-
+shaped. Casual consideration of this in terms of the W-plane leads to
+the conclusion that the trajectories must be strongly concave outward,
+matching the result derived in the previous section for simple MD.
+One explanation for these results rests on the assumption that many
+
+490
+W,
+Wc
+FIGURE 7. Trajectories corresponding to reverse suture. Two examples are shown.
+One path (that closer to the origin) starts from a weaker, and hence presumably less
+mature state. This state travels from Class 1 to 7 without entering the intermediate
+classes.
+units maintain subthreshold synaptic input from the closed eye during
+monocular deprivation for some period of time. The possibility that
+these inputs eventually disappear presents another candidate for the
+loss of plasticity by monocular deprivation. Computer simulation results
+of the Blakemore and Van Sluyters (1974) experiment
+are shown
+together with the experimental data in Figure 8.
+Alternating monocular occlusion. Consider a stimulus distribution
+E corresponding to the experimental paradigm for alternating monocular occlusion. If the alternation is sufficiently frequent, states in the
+neighborhood of the diagonal line Wc= W, should display low plasticity
+since they are driven along that line, if at all; hence they move in a
+direction orthogonal to the ODI gradient (i.e., along a contour of constant ODI). This is illustrated by the plasticity function in Figure 9 and
+accounts for the W-shaped OD histograms (i.e., Columns 1, 4, and 7)
+obtained by Blasdel and Pettigrew (1979) in some of their alternating
+deprivation studies.
+How is connectivity related to responsivity? A scatter-plot of a sample of cortical neurons in the ocularity plane adds a dimension to the
+7 Evidence supporting the existence of such input has been found in cat visual cortex
+by sudden removal of the open eye after a period of monocular deprivation (Blakemore,
+Hawken, & Mark, 1982; Kratz, Spear, & Smith, 1976), but Dräger (1978) reports the
+opposite finding for mice.
+
+VU1234567
+laul
+V1234567
+W1234587
+VU1234567
+KIKLKIKI
+W1234587
+W1234567
+98
+VU1234567
+Lea
+V 1234567
+VU1234567
+W1234587
+FIGURE 8. Simulation of reverse suture experiments run by Blakemore and Van Sluyters (1974). In each case, animals were deprived in one
+eye for some variable period (35 days, 42 days, 56 days, 70 days, 98 days) and then subjected to a suture reversal which was left in place for 63
+davs before recording. Top row: Experimental results. Middle row: Simulation state at time of suture reversal. Scatter plots in the ocularity
+plane are shown with the corresponding ocular dominance histograms. Bottom row: Simulation state at time of recording (compare with top
+roW).
+24. NEURAL PLASTICITY
+491
+
+492
+FIGURE 9. Plasticity under alternating monocular occlusion. Note the lack of plasticity
+along the diagonal. In an AM environment, highly binocular units are not as plastic as
+units with a bias for one eye. They are effectively "torn" between committing themselves
+lo one eye over the other.
+information in the ocular dominance histogram. In their study, Freeman, Sclar, and Ohzawa (1982) produce a similar representation which
+maps units onto a ODI vs. responsivity plot. These can be thought of
+as the basis of another (polar-like) coordinate system in the ocularity
+plane (see Figure 10). The ocularity plane would be much more viable
+as an analytic tool if a precise relationship could be established between
+synaptic connectivity and responsivity.
+A finer measure of response
+strength might be accomplished using intracellular electrodes to count
+individual EPSPs (and perhaps IPSPs as well). Lacking this, an objective and more sensitive measure of the degree of response should be
+adequate to the extent that it ought to correlate well with plasticity.
+Not only should the degree of response be included in such a measure,
+but such an index might incorporate several aspects of the response
+including not only the firing frequency, but also (for example the
+latency of firing.
+The role of norepinephrine: A conjecture. The prolongation of the
+critical period induced by BD observed by Cynader and the norepinephrine effect reported by Kasamatsu and Pettigrew (1979) extend
+
+24. NEURAL PLASTICITY
+493
+W,
+=°
+FIGURE 10. Ocular dominance and responsivity as polar-like coordinates. Accurate
+measures of W may be difficult to come by. One can only calculate rough approximations on the basis of the corresponding responses. Some estimates might be made on the
+basis of existing data by using ocular dominance as an indication of the "angle" and
+responsivity as a rough measure of the "magnitude" of W.
+the concept of critical period far beyond the original work by Hubel and
+Wiesel. Of the many differences between these two approaches, there
+is one which is fundamental to the nature of learning by biological
+systems-namely, that while the rate of learning in biological
+information-processing networks can be made subject to extrinsic factors, it may well be influenced by intrinsic properties of the learning
+mechanism, the information patterns as they are learned, and interactions between them.
+It has been established in this chapter that a theory of plasticity need
+not presuppose the existence of a global modulator to account for the
+critical period. What role, then, does the norepinephrine system play?
+After all, it has been well demonstrated, both experimentally and on
+teleological grounds, that it can modulate plasticity.
+The conjecture that the LC releases NE as part of an attentional
+mechanism & seems to resolve the issue. Rather than acting as a clock
+controlling the developmental sequence of plasticity, the activity of NE
+probably fluctuates on a finer time scale. Under this assumption, nonrecognition of a stimulus might trigger a "novelty alarm" in the form of
+an LC/NE plasticity signal. Thus, another factor in the critical period
+8 The notion that NE is a medium for externally gated plasticity originated in the early
+1960s based on studies of the reward system (Poschel & Ninteman, 1963). Whether and
+how catecholamines are implicated in reward and reinforcement remains controversial.
+(For a review, see Wise, 1978.)
+
+494 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+may be the loss of novelty brought about by experience; this suggests
+an explicit experience-dependent mechanism for plasticity-one that
+would amplify the effect described in this chapter and would therefore
+be difficult to analyze independently.
+Grossberg (1980) offers a comprehensive description of the critical
+period that incorporates all of the mechanisms in Table 1. This is quite
+different from the approach taken in this chapter, in which I have
+attempted to separate the critical period from these other factors.
+Given the broad disparity between these two points of view, an experiment to discriminate between them should not be difficult to design.
+For example, what are the states of these mechanisms in cats reared in
+darkness for several months from birth?
+DISCUSSION
+State Dependence and Existing Modification Rules
+Assumptions Al, A2, and A3 can be incorporated into many dynamical models of plasticity in cortex, as can hypotheses based on global
+modulation (see next subsection). Consider three varieties of
+mathematical formulations, characterized by the factors determining the
+magnitudes of the vectors representing the final equilibrium states (see
+Figure 11):
+• Case 1: Throughout modification, the magnitudes of the neural
+states are explicitly constrained; for example, the sum of the components is held constant (e.g., Perez, Glass, & Shlaer, 1975; von
+der Malsburg, 1973; Chapter 5). Unfortunately, explicit constraints on magnitude are not consistent with the assumption
+that the state vectors grow during learning. Certain models of
+this kind employ such constraints because of a tendency for the
+weights to grow without limit; for these models, only an upper
+bound is really needed and the inherent tendency for growth
+may provide the necessary reinforcement. However, some
+models do require that strict magnitude constraints be imposed
+(e.g., those with even less stable dynamical equations). While
+it may not be impossible to adapt these models to Assumptions
+A1, A2, and A3, the solution is not likely an elegant one; for
+example, a requirement that the magnitude be conserved at a
+fixed value M might be altered such that M increases according to some complex ad hoc rule up to some maximum value
+M max-
+
+24. NEURAL PLASTICITY
+495
+i = 1 - y
+j = 1-*
+= (2x-y)(1 - y)
+j = (2y - x) - x)
+* = y -- x
+M
+Case 1
+Case 2
+Case 3
+FIGURE 11. Three kinds of dynamical systems. These three examples (instances of
+Cases 1, 2, 3 in the text) illustrate certain important characteristics of models relevant to
+the assumptions stated earlier for state-dependent plasticity. The dynamical systems used
+are given above each graph in terms of two generic variables, x and y. Case I: In this
+case, the trajectories are driven to either the origin or to infinity, unless the constraint
+x+y= M is imposed. Case 2: Here, there are two global equilibrium points. Thus,
+under the assumption that the initial states are close to the origin (e.g., within the dotted
+circle x'+ y? < R'), the states will tend to grow. Case 3: All states are driven to the
+nearest point satisfying x = y and hence all trajectories tend to preserve the sum x + y of
+the initial state. Thus, there is no tendency for the states to grow.
+• Case 2: While no explicit constraints are placed on the weights, the
+system dynamics drive all states outside some nonzero radius R
+about the origin (e.g., Amari & Takeuchi, 1978; Bienenstock et
+al., 1982). Models of this class are most readily adapted to
+Assumptions Al-A3 since they have a "natural" tendency to
+drive states with sufficiently small magnitudes away from the
+origin. The value R (like M in Case 1) gives a scale for selection
+of the initial weights-i.e., "small" in Al is interpreted
+here as small relative to R. Three kinds of behavior are possible in the limit t →∞; these are (a) convergence to an equilibrium state with magnitude greater than R, (b) oscillations
+(e.g., limit cycles) that come no closer to the origin than R, or
+(c) divergence. It must be emphasized that such models must
+be carefully tuned if they are to give an accurate account of
+learning rate. This tuning is not necessarily limited to selecting
+parameters for the learning rules; good matching to the data
+may require alterations of the form of the rules themselves
+such as the derivative factor in Equation 7.
+
+496
+• Case 3: There is no minimum radius such as that in the previous
+case; equilibrium states exist arbitrarily close to the origin (e.g.,
+Munro, 1984).
+A dynamical system of this variety presents a
+particularly hostile context for Assumptions A1-A3. There is
+no reason to expect the weights to grow no matter how small
+the initial weights are. This highlights the fundamental dependence of the assumptions on scale.
+Global Modulators as Dynamical Variables
+Global modulation of cortical plasticity, whether it is mediated by the
+locus coeruleus, proprioception, the brain stem, or the thalamus, can be
+integrated into a synaptic modification formula in any of several ways.
+Let us assume a general modification rule that is separable into a
+presynaptically dependent function & and a postsynaptically dependent
+function ф:
+dw;
+(8)
+- = 4 (5;) Ф(r).
+dt
+Some simple conjectures as to the role of a modulatory signal (a) are
+that it may influence plasticity in a direct multiplicative fashion or by
+exerting an effect on the presynaptic or postsynaptic activities:
+dwi
+a 4 (s;)Ф (r)
+=
+4 (s; (a)) $ (r).
+(9)
+The first of these possibilities is consistent with the data from both
+Cynader's and Kasamatsu's labs. That is, a global modulatory signal
+may control the speed (magnitude of the velocity vector) of the neuronal state as it is driven by the environment, but the distance between
+ocular dominance classes depends on the state. Thus the observed
+plasticity is a function of both the synaptic state and global factors-e.g.,
+norepinephrine. Destruction of the catecholamine terminals in some
+region by 6-OHDA might then bring synaptic modification to a complete halt.
+Secondary global modulatory action via influence of the presynaptic
+activity is not a very promising approach since it would distort the pattern of afferent activity. This effect would be disastrous except in the
+trivial case, namely, if it were equivalent to a uniform scale factor. Of
+course. the action
+would then be formally identical to the third
+
+24. NEURAL PLASTICITY
+497
+conjecture for the role of a, in which it influences the postsynaptic
+activity (assuming that r depends monotonically on a variable that is
+linear in si, like x in Equation 1).
+Norepinephrine is known to influence responsivity in neurons of the
+visual cortex. Kasamatsu and Heggelund (1982) found that this influence was not easily characterized; for example, overall responsiveness
+would increase, decrease, or not change with roughly equal probability.
+However, they did notice certain correlations with respect to cell type.
+Videen,
+Daw, and Rader (1984) also found that the relationship
+between NE and neuronal response is quite complicated. Thus the
+third of the above functions may have some support, though the exact
+form of the dependence of a on NE concentration has not been
+specified.
+Predictions
+Theoretical neuroscientists are often criticized (often with good reason) for neglecting their duty to suggest experiments that test their
+theories. They counter with accusations, which also are valid, to the
+effect that the bulk of theoretical work passes through the literature
+unnoticed by the experimental community and that many, if not most,
+predictions remain untested.
+Arguments assigning blame aside, the
+interaction of theory and experiment in neuroscience is not in a healthy
+state. In an effort to improve the situation, this section outlines some
+crude designs that may lead to laboratory verification of the ideas
+covered in this chapter.
+A very informative experiment would be to analyze the time course
+of the loss of plasticity along the path of information flow (Layer 4c vs.
+other layers in the monkey) after a period of dark rearing. By comparing this result with the observation that Layer 4c loses plasticity for
+ocular dominance earlier than other layers in monkey Area 17 (Blakemore, Garey, & Vital-Durand, 1978; LeVay, Wiesel, & Hubel, 1980;
+Vital-Durand, Garey, & Blakemore, 1978), it should be possible to
+separate the maturational from the environmental influences on the
+critical period. A strict interpretation of the analysis in this chapter
+predicts that the entire process should be postponed and hence the
+results after dark rearing should not substantially differ from the established results. The outcome of the experiment could conceivably be
+mixed indicating that both environmental/informational and maturational factors exert influence. It seems reasonable, indeed quite likely,
+that at lower levels (such as the thalamus), maturational effects on the
+critical period outweigh the effect described in this chapter.
+
+498
+Reinstating plasticity after patterned rearing. Cynader's experiments have demonstrated that the visual system is capable of "waiting"
+in a plastic state for patterned input. This result may be indicative of a
+more general relationship between responsivity and plasticity. ' One idea
+that grows out of the present approach is that plasticity may in fact be
+reduced in part because cells in the mature animal rarely respond in the
+intermediate range, where the derivative of the cell's response with
+respect to its net input is relatively large (see Figure SB). If, as suggested earlier, synaptic modification depends on this derivative, then
+cells that are responding vigorously will not modify their connections.
+Thus these ideas predict that if the cells could be made to respond less
+vigorously, they could thereby become more plastic, provided the new
+response level were in the appropriate range. Of course, this is not the
+only factor that determines plasticity; the size of the weight vector plays
+a very important role in the extent to which a change of a fixed size
+will alter the ODI. That is, of the two quantities Vz and o'(x) that are
+candidates for the loss of plasticity, only the latter can be manipulated
+in the adult. Hence, the observed plasticity resulting from a reduction
+of response magnitude in adult animals should be weaker than the
+natural plasticity of younger animals.
+The following outline sketches an experimental paradigm for testing
+the relationship between responsivity and plasticity: One method to
+reduce responsivity without introducing the potential pitfalls of pharmacological techniques would be to apply diffusive contact lenses.
+Degrading the contrast of the stimuli has the further property of reducing orientation selectivity and hence simulates this aspect of kittenhood
+as well. This has the advantage of further simulating properties of the
+young animal and the disadvantage of confounding orientation selectivity and neuronal responsivity as factors in neural plasticity. Once the
+lenses have been calibrated with respect to neuronal responsivity, many
+different rearing paradigms should be tried since various factors may
+induce differential effects across different paradigms. Differences in
+morphological development (at both geniculate and cortical levels) are,
+for example, typically observed for different kinds of rearing; it may
+therefore prove advantageous to study the effects of manipulating the
+environments of normally reared animals since they have not suffered
+9 Cynader plays down the generality of this relationship, citing his observation that neuronal responsivity reaches adult levels before the peak of the critical period for animals
+raised in patterned environments. However, it should be noted that synaptic weights can
+continue to grow even after adult levels of responsivity are observed. This will naturally
+be the case in units whose activation saturates according to the general types of activation
+functions considered here and throughout this book.
+
+24. NEURAL PLASTICITY
+499
+the potentially irreversible and possibly plasticity-limiting damage that is
+associated with deprived rearing.
+Regardless of the experimental technique, a clear demonstration that
+links weak neuronal responsivity to increased plasticity promises to both
+provide evidence that neuronal response characteristics evolve such that
+they follow a gradient descent with respect to some environmentrelated variable and lend strong support to the notion that plasticity is
+state dependent.
+BEYOND VISUAL CORTEX
+The ideas which have been described with respect to oculardominance plasticity in visual cortex are abstracted in this section and
+considered as they might apply to higher (more cognitive) levels of cortex. In general, it seems plausible to assume that the important informational content of a stimulus pattern in cortex depends upon the relafive values of its components, which define radially oriented regions of
+the state space, since nearly every level of neural processing shows evidence of lateral inhibition, a known mechanism for pattern normalization. The absolute magnitude of the stimulus loses its relevance in this
+case and its informational content is reduced by one degree of freedom
+to the direction alone. Gati and Tversky (1982) refer to the magnitude
+and direction of a vector stimulus as its qualitative and quantitative
+aspects, respectively. One can clearly see that in this case the assumptions Al, A2, and A3 may apply under these circumstances. According
+to this distinction, the plasticity of a self-organizing process is expected
+to exhibit state dependence as a function of the quantitative aspect of
+the state across a qualitative measure on the stimulus environment.
+Small assemblies or modules of such units can be made to evolve to
+arbitrary regions of the input space (as in Reilly, Cooper, & Elbaum,
+1982), which can be thought of as categories.
+Stages of Processing
+Environmentally driven sequential development. The state dependence of plasticity has interesting implications for a hierarchically
+organized system. Consider an organizational scheme in which information passes through a sequence of several neural assemblies, each
+
+500
+responsible for some stage of processing!' Assume that synaptic connectivities are initially weak throughout the entire system.
+Each stage
+lies in a state of weak connectivity and high plasticity until it receives
+sufficient exposure to some pattern set. At the onset of exposure to
+patterned input (e.g., eye-opening in kittens), only the input assemblies
+receive strong signals. The earliest stages in the system are therefore
+the first to lose plasticity, and so increasingly longer sensitive periods
+may be expected for the development of higher cognitive functions.
+This consequence of the ocularity plane framework is consistent with
+data from visual cortex of both cat and monkey.
+Daw and Wyatt
+(1976) found evidence that the sensitive period for direction-selective
+cells is earlier, both in its onset and offset, than the sensitive period for
+ocular dominance. While these may not represent different stages of
+processing, the experiment clearly supports the notion of a link
+between plasticity and the nature of the stimulus features.
+In monkey (and in cat as well), the LGN projection to Area 17 terminates most predominantly in Layer 4c (Hubel & Wiesel, 1972); this
+layer therefore receives the earliest, most "raw" input to cortex. Considerable evidence, both physiological (Blakemore et al., 1978) and
+morphological (Vital-Durand et al., 1978) indicates that in monkey
+visual cortex, plasticity is diminished in this layer earlier than in the
+other layers. These findings have been replicated by LeVay et al.
+(1980), who attribute the effect to maturational factors rather than
+implicit aspects of plasticity.
+Based on developmental data from the rat somatosensory system,
+Durham and T. A. Woolsey (1984) have formulated a "sequential
+instruction hypothesis for sensory pathway
+pattern development"
+(p. 445). In spite of their conjecture that "a given station might
+"instruct' the next more central one" (p. 425), they stick to a more
+traditional interpretation of their data: "
+... critical periods are linked to
+developmental periods since they coincide with times during which
+axons are normally innervating their targets and are segregating" (p.
+446). It is not clear therefore whether the instruction to which they
+refer is exogenous (i.e., sensory information) or endogenous (e.g.,
+genetically precoded chemical transmission).
+Another factor in considering the developmental aspects of different
+levels of the system is the structure of the pattern environments
+presented to each stage. As successive levels self-organize, the
+representation of the world becomes more symbolic. During its ascent
+10 The visual system seems to be organized in such a fashion. However, the information flow is not strictly serial, rather it seems to be directed along "functional streams"
+(Van Essen & Maunsell, 1983), which have mixed hierarchical/parallel attributes.
+
+24. NEURAL PLASTICITY
+501
+through the system, information is continually recoded in a manner
+such that the stimulus sets become more discrete. Shepard and
+Podgorny (1975) make this point with the following example:
+Whereas we can continuously shift a color (for example, blue)
+in brightness, hue, and saturation until it becomes as similar as
+we wish to any other color (for example, green), we cannot
+continuously deform a word 'blue' to another
+word 'green'
+without passing through intermediate configurations that are
+not words at all. (pp. 189-190)
+This observation pertains to plasticity in that as stimulus sets become
+more discrete, and perhaps more orthogonal, their constituents are
+better separated; hence learning by feature-detecting units is much
+more rapid. So it is conceivable that for such systems, the equilibrium
+points may not be so far from the origin; thus, these neurons may
+enjoy extended or indefinite sensitive periods! This, of course is consistent with our experience; people learn
+i to recognize patterns quite
+rapidly (relative to the hours or days required for neurons to become
+orientation selective, for example and do not generally lose that
+ability.
+SUMMARY
+In this chapter I have proposed a factor that may account for the high
+rate of learning observed in the early stages of many learning processes.
+This factor of state dependence may in fact be the principal component
+responsible for the critical period; it emerges from three basic assumptions regarding the mathematical relationships between synaptic connectivity values and their time derivatives. The notion of state-dependent
+learning rate has been discussed here in the context of the observed
+susceptibility of ocular dominance characteristics to environmental
+manipulations. This approach suggests an account for several specific
+observations in visual cortex and also suggests further experimental
+tests of the relationship between ocularity state and plasticity.
+On a broader level, it is hoped that this chapter will contribute to
+greater interaction between theory and experiment in this field.
+Toward this end, analytical tools such as the ocularity plane may prove
+useful both for making experimental data more accessible to theoretical
+analysis and for examining and describing aspects of the mathematical
+models.
+
+502
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+Over the past three years, several individuals were very generous
+with their time and energy to apply their knowledge and insight to the
+issues raised in this chapter. These include Leon Cooper, Michael
+Paradiso, and Alan Saul of Brown University; Paul Heggelund of the
+University of Oslo; V. S. Ramachandran of UCSD; and several
+members of the PDP research group at the UCSD Institute for Cognitive Science, in particular, David Rumelhart, Paul Smolensky, and
+especially Jay McClelland. This work has been supported by United
+States Office of Naval Research Contract N00014-81-K-0136, the
+Norwegian Council for Science and the Humanities (NAVF), the System Development Foundation, and grant PHS MH-14268-11 from the
+National Institute of Mental Health to the Center for Human Information Processing at the University of California, San Diego.
+
+CHAPTER 25
+Amnesia and
+Distributed Memory
+J. L. McCLELLAND and D. E. RUMELHART
+In several chapters in this book, we have argued for distributed
+models of learning and memory. In most of these cases, we have considered primarily psychological and computational reasons to prefer distributed motels. In this chapter, we ask, can distributed models shed
+any light on the biological basis of memory? One possible answer
+would be "no" - we could fall back on the claim that distributed models
+are abstract descriptions, not concrete descriptions of the physiology of
+memory. Indeed, many of the specific distributed models we have considered in this book are somewhat "unphysiological" in several of their
+details. But the general idea of distributed memory (at least, within
+localized regions of the brain, as discussed in Chapter 3) does seem
+sufficiently consistent with what we know about the brain that the
+hypothesis that memory is physiologically distributed seems worth
+considering.
+In this
+chapter, we consider this hypothesis in light of the
+phenomenon of bitemporal amnesia-the deficit in memory that is produced by a bilateral insult to the medial temporal lobes of the brain.
+Bitemporal amnesia is interesting from the point of view of distributed
+models because two distinct aspects of the phenomenon seem to suggest very different things about the biological plausibility of distributed
+One prominent aspect of bitemporal amnesia is that it produces a
+retrograde amnesia that is temporally graded. After the precipitating
+insult, the individual is unable to remember recent events, but memory
+
+504 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+for remote information appears to be intact. If there is recovery, as
+there is in many cases of bitemporal amnesia, much of the recent information that had been lost will return.
+These aspects of amnesia seem to contradict the most basic assumptions of a distributed, superpositional model of memory. These models
+hold that all memories, old and new, are stored in the same set of connections. If this is so, why is it that an amnesic insult selectively disturbs the newer memories?
+And why is it that the memories that at
+first seemed to be lost can later be retrieved? The phenomenon seems
+to beg for an interpretation in which what is lost is access to that part of
+the memory store in which recent memories are held, rather than one
+in which all memories are superimposed in the same set of connections.
+On the other hand, another prominent aspect of bitemporal amnesia
+seems to be highly consistent with a distributed model. Bitemporal
+amnesia produces a profound anterograde amnesia, as well as a retrograde deficit. That is, after the amnesic insult there may be a profound
+deficit in the ability to acquire new information. This is particularly
+true when amnesics are tested for their ability to recall or recognize
+specific individual events to which they have been exposed since onset
+of the amnesia. However, the amnesic deficit is not so profound, even
+in the severest cases, that the patient is unable to learn from repeated
+experience. For example, H. M., an extremely profound amnesic, is
+quite aware of his deficit, presumably as a result of repeatedly having
+been confronted with it. Milner (1966) reports that he often greets
+people by apologizing for not recognizing them, giving his memory
+deficit as his excuse. He remembers that he cannot remember, even
+though he cannot remember any particular occasion when he failed to
+remember.
+This aspect of amnesia is quite naturally and directly accounted for
+by distributed models. We need only assume that the amnesic insult
+has resulted in a reduction in the size of the changes that can be made
+to connection strengths in response to any given event. Smaller
+changes will result in very weak traces of each individual episode or
+event, but, over repeated trials, what is common to a number of
+experiences will be gradually learned.
+In summary, we appear to be faced by a paradoxical situation. One
+prominent aspect of bitemporal amnesia appears to argue against distributed models, while another appears to argue in favor of them.
+In this chapter, we confront this paradox. First, we consider in more
+detail many of the basic aspects of retrograde amnesia. Then, we propose a model that appears to be capable of accounting for these facts
+within the context of a distributed model of memory. Several simulations are presented illustrating how the model accounts for various
+aspects of the empirical data on bitemporal amnesia, including the
+
+25. AMNESIA
+505
+temporally graded nature of retrograde amnesia and the ability to
+extract what is common from a set of related experiences. In a final
+section of the chapter, we consider some recent evidence suggesting
+that for certain kinds of tasks, amnesics show absolutely no deficits.
+Basic Aspects of Amnesia
+The term bitemporal amnesia was introduced by Squire (1982) to
+refer to the syndrome that is produced by a number of different kinds
+of insults that affect the medial portions of the temporal lobes in both
+hemispheres of the brain. The syndrome may be produced by bilateral
+electroconvulsive therapy (still widely in use as a treatment for severe
+depression), bilateral removal of the medial portions of the temporal
+lobes (as in patient H. M.), head trauma, or in several other ways. The
+syndrome is marked by the following characteristics (see Squire, 1982,
+for a more detailed discussion):
+• The anterograde and retrograde amnesias produced by the
+insult appear to be correlated in extent. While there are some
+reports of dissociation of these two aspects of amnesia, it is well
+established in cases of amnesia due to electroconvulsive therapy
+that anterograde and retrograde amnesia are correlated in severity; both develop gradually through repeated bouts of electroconvulsive therapy.
+• The anterograde amnesia consists of a deficit in the acquisition
+of new knowledge accessible to verbal report or other explicit
+indications that the subject is aware of any particular prior
+experience; somewhat more controversial, it also consists of a
+more rapid loss of information once it has been acquired to a
+level equal to normal levels of acquisition through repeated
+exposure.
+• The retrograde amnesia consists of an inability to give evidence
+of access to previous experiences within a graded temporal window extending back over an extended period of time prior to
+the amnesic insult. The size of the window varies with the
+severity of the amnesia, and good evidence places it at up to
+three year's duration based on careful experimental tests.
+
+506
+• Most strikingly, memories that appear to be lost after an
+amnesic insult are often later recovered. As the ability to
+acquire new memories returns, so does the ability to remember
+old ones that had previously been lost. The recovery is gradual, and it is as if the temporal window of retrograde amnesia
+shrinks. There is generally a residual, permanent amnesia for
+events surrounding the insult that caused the amnesia, extending variously from minutes to days from the event.
+A Resolution to the Paradox
+As we have already noted, the temporally graded nature of the retrograde aspect of bitemporal
+amnesia appears to suggest that recent
+memories are stored separately from older ones. However, it is possible to account for this aspect of the phenomenon in the context of a
+distributed model if we make the following assumptions. First, we
+assume that each processing experience results in chemical/structural
+change in a large number of connections in which many other traces are
+also stored, but that each new change undergoes a gradual consolidation
+process, as well as a natural decay or return to the prechange state.
+Thus, the changes resulting from a particular experience are widely distributed at one level of analysis, but at a very fine grain, within each
+individual connection, each change in its efficacy has a separate consolidation history. ' Second, we assume that consolidation has two effects
+on the residual part of the change: (a) It makes it less susceptible to
+decay; and (b) it makes it less susceptible to disruption. These assumptions can explain not only the findings on the temporally graded nature
+of retrograde amnesia, but also the fact that memory appears to decay
+more rapidly at first and later decays more slowly.
+So far this explanation simply takes existing consolidation accounts of
+the amnesic syndrome (e.g., Milner, 1966) and stipulates that the
+changes are occurring in synapses that they share with other changes
+occurring at other points in time. However, we need to go beyond this
+account to explain two of the important characteristics of the bitemporal amnesic syndrome. First, the hypothesis as laid out so far does
+1 When we speak of connections between units, even if we think of those units as neurons, we still prefer to use the term connection somewhat abstractly; in particular, we do
+not wish to identify the connection between two units as a single synapse. Two neurons
+may have a number of different physical synapses. The total strength of these synapses
+determines the strength of the connection between them.
+
+25. AMNESIA
+507
+not explain recovery; second, it does not explain the coupling of
+anterograde and retrograde amnesia.
+To capture these two important aspects of the syndrome, we propose
+that there exists a factor we call y (gamma) that is depleted by insult to
+the medial temporal lobes. Gamma serves two functions in our model:
+(a) it is necessary for consolidation; without y, new memory traces do
+not consolidate; and (b) it is necessary for expression; without y,
+recent changes in the connection between two units do not alter the
+efficacy of the connection; they are just ineffectual addenda, rather
+than effective pieces of new machinery. Implicit in these assumptions
+is a third key point that y is only necessary during consolidation. Fully
+consolidated memories no longer need it for expression.
+Some Hypothetical Neurochemistry
+To make these ideas concrete, we have formulated the following
+hypothetical account of the neurochemistry of synaptic change. While
+the account is somewhat oversimplified, it is basically consistent with
+present knowledge of the neurochemistry of synaptic transmission,
+though it should be said that there are a number of other ways in which
+connection strengths could be modulated besides the one we suggest
+here (for an introductory discussion of current understanding of synaptic function and synaptic modification, see Kandel & Schwartz, 1981).
+The account goes as follows. The change to the connection from one
+unit to another involves adding new receptors to the postsynaptic membrane (the one on the input unit) (see Figure 1). We assume that both
+Axon;
+h neurotransmitter
+Dendrite
+R_
+negative
+receptors
+-Rt positive receptors
+FIGURE 1. A connection between two units, as we conceptualize il in the amnesia
+model. Note that both positive and negative changes involve addition of new receptors.
+See text for discussion.
+
+508 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+positive and negative changes involve the addition of receptors; in both
+cases, there must be new structure to consolidate for the model to work
+properly. In the figure, we have drawn the connection between two
+units as though it occurred at a single synapse and was not mediated by
+interneurons, though neither of these assumptions is excluded by the
+quantitative structure of the model.2
+A cartoon of one of the receptors is shown in Figure 2. Receptors
+are, of course, known to be the physical structures whereby neurotransmitters released by the presynaptic neuron influence the potential
+of the postsynaptic neuron. To be functional, though, our hypothetical
+receptors must be clamped in place at each of several y-binding sites by
+molecules of y -this is the aspect of the model that is the most speculative. The probability that a site is bound depends, in turn, on the
+receptor
+transmitter
+gamma
+Post-synaptic
+membrane
+FIGURE 2. A cartoon of a receptor, showing its location in the postsynaptic membrane
+and illustrating the role of the transmitter substance, and of the hypothetical substance y,
+which acts to bind the receptor into the membrane.
+2 As pointed out in Chapter 20, real neurons are generally thought to have either excilatory or inhibitory connections but not both. Our model could be brought into line with
+this idea if we assumed that negative (inhibitory) connections between two units actually
+occurred al excitatory synapses onto inhibitory interneurons, rather than on direct connections between two neurons. Connections onto these inhibitory interneurons would
+have 1o be trained, of course, using something like the generalized delta rule (Chapter
+8). This revision of our assumptions would increase the complexity of the model but
+would not change its basic properties; therefore we have retained the less realistic
+assumption that positive and negative increments can be stored in the same connections.
+
+25. AMNESIA
+509
+concentration of y in the environment of the synapse. In this model,
+consolidation amounts to the "hardening" or fixation of the y-binding
+sites, while they are occupied by a molecule of y. Thus, consolidation
+can only occur at bound sites. Consolidation is a process like the setting
+of glue, but it is thought to be probabilistic and all-or-none at each site
+rather than continuous.
+As we have already seen, y is essential for consolidation. In addition, we assume that it is necessary for the receptor to function. Once
+a site is consolidated, however, y is irrelevant to it, just as a clamp is
+irrelevant once a glue-joint is set. Thus, unconsolidated sites depend
+on y, but consolidated ones do not.
+On this view, bitemporal amnesia simply amounts to taking away the
+clamps. Old, fully consolidated synaptic changes no longer require
+them, and new ones cannot function without them and will decay
+without becoming consolidated. But what of memories in an intermediate stage of consolidation? Here, we assume the consolidation process
+has gone far enough so that the structures will not break up rapidly
+without y, but that it has not gone so far that they actually function
+effectively without it. When y returns, after a period for recovery,
+they may still be there, so they will be able to function again and even
+continue to consolidate.
+A Quantitative Formulation of the Model
+Let us now formalize these assumptions in a quantitative model. We
+assume that time is broken up into a number of discrete ticks. In the
+simulations each tick represents about an hour of real time. On each
+tick, an unconsolidated site is bound by y with a probability p, given by
+the law of mass action (this law governs a large number of chemical and
+biochemical processes):
+p=
+This equation has the property that at high concentrations of y (much
+greater than 1), all unconsolidated sites will be bound, but at low concentrations (less than about .2), the probability of being bound is
+roughly linear with y.
+Now, in each tick, an unconsolidated site may become consolidated
+or "fixed" with some probability f, but only if it is bound. Thus, the
+probability of consolidation of unbound site i per tick is just
+Pc (site;) = fp.
+
+510
+For a receptor to be functional at a particular tick, all its sites must be
+either consolidated or bound with y. Each unconsolidated site is
+assumed to be independent of the others, so the probability that receptor i will be active, Pa (receptor;), is just
+Pa (receptor;) = p"
+where u is simply the number of unconsolidated sites.
+Finally, receptors may be lost from the postsynaptic membrane.
+Each site contributes multiplicatively to the probability that the receptor
+will be lost. That is, the probability that receptor i will be lost is simply
+the product of the susceptibilities for each site. The susceptibility of
+consolidated sites, Ac, is assumed to be small enough so that for completely consolidated receptors the probability of loss is very very small
+per tick; though over the course of years these small probabilities eventually add up. The susceptibility of unconsolidated sites, ®u, is relatively large. For any given receptor, some number c of its sites are
+consolidated at any given time and u sites are not. The probability of
+receptor loss per tick, pi (receptor;) simply becomes
+pi (receptor;) = (Ac)'(Au)".
+Relation to Other Accounts of Amnesia
+Most attempts to account for temporally graded retrograde amnesia
+quite naturally involve some form of consolidation hypothesis, and our
+model is no exception to this. However, other accounts either leave
+the nature of the consolidation process unspecified (e.g., Milner, 1966)
+or give it some special status. For Wickelgren (1979), who has the
+most concretely specified account of retrograde amnesia, memory trace
+formation involves a "chunking" or unitization process whereby each
+memory trace is organized under its own superordinate or "chunk"
+unit.
+A number of other authors have proposed accounts with a similar flavor (e.g., Squire, N. J. Cohen, & Nadel, 1984).
+In keeping with the view that our model can be implemented in a
+distributed memory system, our model of consolidation does not
+involve anything like chunking of a memory trace under a single
+superordinate unit. Instead, it simply involves the fixation of memory
+traces in a time-dependent fashion, dependent only on a single, global
+factor: the concentration of y.
+This difference means that our model gives the hippocampus a rather
+different role than it is taken to have in other theories. Theorists
+
+25. AMNESIA
+511
+generally have not imagined that the hippocampus is the actual site of
+memory storage, for on that view, it would be difficult to explain why
+retrograde amnesia is temporally graded, unless only recent memories
+are thought to be stored there. But the hippocampus is often thought
+to play a very important role in memory trace formation. To Wickelgren, for example, the hippocampus is the organ of unitization-it is
+the units in the hippocampus that bind the pieces of a memory trace
+together into chunks. In our model, we imagine that the primary role
+of the hippocampus in memory formation is to produce and distribute y
+to the actual memory storage sites. This does not mean that we believe
+that this is the only function of the hippocampus. An organ as complex
+as the hippocampus may well play important information processing
+roles. However, as we shall see, this role is sufficient to provide quite
+a close account of a number of aspects of the amnesic syndrome.
+Simulations
+The primary goal of the simulations was to demonstrate that, with
+the simple assumptions given above, we could account for the main
+aspects of the coupled phenomena of anterograde and retrograde
+amnesia, using a single set of values for all of the parameters of the
+model, only allowing y to vary with the assumed amnesic state of the
+subject. Since the phenomena range over a wide range of time scales
+(hours or even minutes to years), this is by no means a trivial matter.
+Rather than embedding the assumptions about amnesia in a full-scale
+distributed model, we have simply computed, from the above assumptions, what the residual fraction (or residual functional fraction) of the
+memory trace would be at various times after the learning event, under
+various conditions.
+The assumption here, basically, is that each
+memory trace is made up of a large number of receptors distributed
+widely over a large number of connections. The fraction of the total
+that remains and is functional at any particular time gives the "strength"
+of the memory trace. To relate the results of these simulations to data,
+it is sufficient to assume that the size of the residual functional fraction
+of a memory trace is monotonically related to accuracy of memory task
+performance.
+Of course, memory task performance, and indeed the effective residual strength of a memory trace, does not depend only on the hypothetical biochemical processes we are discussing here. For one thing, there
+is interference:
+New memory traces acquired between a learning event
+and test can change connection strengths in such as way as to actually
+reverse some or all of the changes that were made at the time of the
+
+512
+original encoding event, producing what were classically known
+as
+retroactive interference effects. There will be proactive interference
+effects as well in a distributed model (see Chapter 3). Additionally, as
+time goes by, there will be changes in the mental context in which
+retrieval takes place; all of these factors will contribute to the apparent
+strength of a memory trace as observed in experiments. The point of
+our model of amnesia is not to deny the importance of such factors; we
+simply assume that performance in a memory task varies with the residual functional fraction of the original trace, all else being equal.
+The values of the parameters are shown in Table 1. The significance
+of the particular values chosen will become clear as we proceed.
+Anterograde amnesia: Smaller functional fractions at all delays.
+As we have said, our model assumes that amnesia amounts to a reduction in the size of y. Reducing the size of y does not reduce the size
+of the memory trace-the number of receptors added-but it does
+greatly reduce their effectiveness: For a receptor to be functional, all
+of its sites must be either bound with gamma or consolidated.
+Initially,
+before any consolidation has occurred, the probability that a receptor
+will be functional, or active, is
+Pa (receptor;) = p"
+where n is the number of sites on the receptor. For normals, we take
+p (that is, y/ (1- y)) to be .5. Since each receptor has three sites, Pa
+will be .53 or 125; if amnesia reduces the concentration of y by a factor
+of 9, the effect will be to reduce p to.1, and Pa to .001. In general,
+with sites equal to 3, reducing p by a particular fraction of the normal
+PARAMETERS USED IN SIMULATIONS
+OF THE AMNESIA MODEL
+Parameter Name
+Value
+Y Normal
+3
+.00007
+.02
+.25
+1.0
+Note: Rate parameters f, Ac, and Au are
+given on a per-hour basis.
+
+25. AMNESIA
+513
+value will reduce the effective strength of the initial memory trace by
+the cube of that fraction.
+Correlation of retrograde and anterograde amnesia. The model
+produces retrograde amnesia, as well as anterograde amnesia, for the
+unconsolidated portion of a memory trace. The reason for this is that
+the expression of unconsolidated memories depends on y; thus, it
+applies both to posttraumatic memories and to memories formed before
+the trauma. Indeed, the severity of anterograde and retrograde amnesia
+are perforce correlated in the model since both depend on y for the
+expression of traces that have not had time to consolidate.
+Retrograde amnesia: Older traces are less dependent on gamma.
+One of the most interesting aspects of retrograde amnesia is the fact
+that it is temporally graded. Indeed, in the data collected by Squire,
+Slater, and Chace (1975), shown in Figure 3, it is not only graded, but
+bitemporal amnesics actually show worse memory for recent events
+than for those about three to five years old. This matches the clinical
+impression for patients such as H.M., of whom it is reported that his
+retrograde amnesia initially extended over a period of one or two years
+Median Facts Recalled
+12
+Before ECT
+8
+..
+•'After ECT
+-
+73-74
+70-72
+67-68
+Year Event Occurred (1967-1974)
+FIGURE 3.
+The striking temporally graded retrograde amnesia observed in patients
+whose amnesia was induced by electroconvulsive therapy. Patients served as their own
+controls, based on an alternate form of the test given prior to the beginning of treatment.
+(From "Retrograde Amnesia: Temporal Gradient in Very Long-Term Memory Following
+Electroconvulsive Therapy" by L. R. Squire, P. C. Slater, and P. Chace, 1975, Science,
+187, Copyright 1975 by the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
+Reprinted by permission.)
+
+514 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+(Milner, 1966), and from victims of head trauma (Russell & Nathan,
+1946). This pattern has been replicated many times, and the tests used
+by Squire et al. rule out artifacts that have plagued clinical assessments
+of the severity of retrograde amnesia. This inverted U-shaped curve
+for the relation between age of memory and memory test performance
+provides quite a challenge to theories of retrograde amnesia. However,
+this effect is a natural consequence of our model since old memories,
+though based on smaller residual traces than newer ones, are less
+dependent on y for their expression. Indeed, when a receptor reaches
+a point where all of its sites are consolidated, it no longer depends on y
+at all.
+A simulation capturing the essential features of temporally graded
+retrograde amnesia as represented in Squire et al. is shown in Figure 4.
+The simulation produces a continual erosion in functional strength for
+normals which is almost linear against the log of time over the range of
+times covered by the simulation. In contrast, for amnesics, the function is decidedly (inverted) U-shaped: Functional trace strength
+reaches a peak at about 2 to 3 years with these parameters and then
+falls of gradually thereafter, following the same trajectory as the
+strength of the trace for normals. The location of the peak in the RA
+function depends on all of the parameters of the model, but the primary ones are the consolidation rate parameter f, which is .00007, and
+the rate of decay from consolidated memory, which is (Ac)", or
+Strength
+Normal
+1.00
+0.80
+0.60
+0.40
+0.20
+Amnesic
+-0.8 -0.4-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
+0.8 1.0 1.2
+1.8
+Time in Log Years
+FIGURE 4. Simulation of temporally graded retrograde amnesia. Effective trace strengtt
+as a function of time is years preceding sudden onset of amnesia. Effective trace strengt
+is normalized so that a value of 1.0 corresponds to the normal value at five months.
+
+25. AMNESIA
+515
+8x10%. It should be noted that these figures are per hour. The consolidation parameter translates into a consolidation rate of about 50% per
+year, per receptor site. The average time it takes for all of the sites on a
+receptor to become consolidated is longer than this, of course, but only
+by about a factor of 2 for the case of nites = 3; this is essentially the
+factor that determines where the curve for amnesics will catch up with
+the curve for the normals. The decay rate from fully consolidated
+memory, which translates into about 7% per year or 50% per decade,
+essentially determines the overall slope of the normal function and the
+tail of the amnesic function.
+Recovery of lost memories: The return of the partially consolidated
+trace. Perhaps even more interesting than the fact that retrograde
+amnesia is temporally graded is the fact that it recovers as the ability to
+acquire new memories recovers. In the case of retrograde amnesia
+induced by electrocon vulsive therapy, Squire, Slater, and Miller (1981)
+showed that the severe retrograde amnesia for pretreatment memories
+recovers over the course of several months, at the end of which test
+performance is back to pretreatment levels. In our model, since retrograde amnesia is due to the fact that loss of y renders traces ineffective, it is not surprising that the return of y will render them effective
+again. However, the phenomenon is somewhat more subtle than this,
+for recovery is not generally thought to be complete. There is usually
+some loss of memory for events in the time period preceding the onset
+of the amnesia, and the precipitating event is almost never recalled; this
+is particularly striking in head trauma patients, who often do not know
+what hit them, even if they had seen it at the time (Russell & Nathan,
+1946).
+To examine how well our model can do at reproducing these aspects
+of amnesia, we ran the model in the following simulated amnesiarecovery experiment. The model was made amnesic at some time la
+and was left in this state until some time t,, at which point we assumed
+recovery occurred. Of course, real recovery is gradual, but for simplicity, we assumed that it was a discrete event. We then asked what fraction of a trace laid down before the onset of amnesia remained, relative
+to the fraction that would have remained had there been no insult. The
+results of the simulation are shown in Figure 5. Each curve shows the
+strength of the recovered trace, relative to the strength it would have
+had with no intervening amnesia, as a function of the duration in
+months of the amnesic episode. Clearly, for memories a year or more
+old, the trace recovers to nearly premorbid levels at the end of the
+amnesic episode, even if it lasts as long as a year. For memories laid
+down within the day of the the amnesic event, however, the bulk of
+the trace is gone by the end of the amnesic episode, even if it lasts only
+
+516
+ercent Normal Strength
+-Decade
+-Year
+-Month
+-0.20
+• 1
+2
+3456
+7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
+Time in Months
+FIGURE 5. Simulated recovery of premorbid memories as a function of time in the
+amnesic state and age of memory at onset of the amnesia. The age ranges from an hour
+to a decade, as indicated by the labels on the curves.
+a month. Memories that are a month old at the onset of the amnesia
+show an intermediate pattern. If the amnesia is relatively brief, they
+survive quite well; but if it lasts several months, they weaken considerably, relative to the strength they would have had in the absence of
+amnesia.
+The loss of memory trace strength during amnesia is a result of the
+great reduction in the opportunity for consolidation during the amnesic
+interval. We now turn to a more direct consideration of this matter.
+Do amnesics forget faster than normals? A number of studies
+(Huppert & Piercy, 1978; Squire, 1981) have reported that bitemporal
+amnesic subjects appear to forget more rapidly than normals, even if
+equated with normals for the amount of initial learning. The effect is
+generally rather small, and it is controversial because the equating of
+groups on initial performance requires giving amnesics considerably
+more training than normals, over a longer period of time. These differences could possibly change the basis of learning and other qualitative
+aspects of the task as experienced by amnesic and normal subjects. It is
+interesting, then, to consider whether our model would predict such a
+difference.
+The model does predict a difference in rate of trace decay between
+amnesic and normal subjects. Though y does not influence the rate of
+trace decay directly, it does influence the rate of consolidation, and
+
+25. AMNESIA
+517
+consolidation drastically influences the rate of decay. Completely
+unconsolidated traces decay at a rate of .253 = 1.5% per hour, or about
+30% per day, and are reduced to 1/100,000 of their initial strength in a
+month. Consolidated traces, on the other hand, decay at a rate of only
+.023 = .0008% per hour, or less than 1% per month. As each site
+becomes fixed, it retards decay by a factor of 12. Thus, to the extent
+that consolidation is occurring, memory traces are being protected
+against rapid loss; without any consolidation, trace strength falls precipitously. An illustration of this effect is shown in Figure 6. At higher
+values of y, the drop of trace strength decelerates much earlier than at
+lower values of y, leaving a much larger residual trace.
+Unfortunately, the effect shown in Figure 6 does not happen in the
+right time scale to account for the differential decay of normal and
+amnesic memory over hours, as reported by Huppert and Piercy (1978)
+and Squire (1981). In fact, the effect does not really begin to show up
+until after about 10 days. The reason is clear: The consolidation rate is
+so slow (.0007/hour, or 5% per month that very little consolidation
+happens in the first month. Thus, it appears that the value of the consolidation rate parameter required to account for temporally graded
+retrograde amnesia and U-shaped memory performance on a time scale
+of years is much too slow to account for differences in trace decay on a
+time scale of hours.
+One possible reaction to this state of affairs would be to search for
+alternative interpretations of the apparent differences between normals
+Log
+Residual Trace
+0.0
+- 1.0
+-3.0
+-4.0
+-5.0
+-
+.1.0
+.10
+--
+101
+60
+10
+20
+30
+40
+50
+Time in Days
+70
+FIGURE 6. Log of the residual strength of a trace acquired at Day 0, as a function of
+the concentration of y. The values of 1.0 and O.1 correspond to the values described as
+normal and amnesic in the text.
+
+518
+and amnesics in day-scale decay rates. However, there are other reasons to believe that there is consolidation on a shorter time scale than
+we get with our model and the parameters in Table 1. For one thing, a
+single bout of electroconvulsive therapy that produces a brief and mild
+amnesia nevertheless appears to produce permanent loss of memory for
+the shock treatment itself. Such an effect seems to suggest that there is
+consolidation going on over a shorter time-scale.
+The model might capture all of the data if we assumed that there are
+two separate phases to consolidation, both of them dependent on y:
+one that occurs on a relatively short time scale and is responsible for
+the differences in day-scale decay rates, and one that occurs on a very
+long time scale and is responsible for extended temporally graded retrograde amnesia. As things stand now, traces decay rather slowly over
+hours, but, over the course of a month, they are reduced to about half
+of one percent of their original strength. Though we do not know
+exactly how to scale trace strength against response probability, it seems
+likely that we forget more quickly over hours but more slowy over
+days and months than in the present version of the model.
+Summary. The model provides, we think, an appealing, unified
+account of most aspects of anterograde and retrograde amnesia, simply
+by assuming that the amnesic insult depletes y and that recovery
+amounts to its gradual return to pretraumatic levels. By adding an additional stage of consolidation, the model could be made to span the very
+wide range of time scales, ranging from hours to years, of the coupled
+phenomena of anterograde and retrograde amnesia as they appear in the
+bitemporal amnesic syndrome.
+Most importantly, the model shows clearly that there is no incompatibility between the phenomenon of temporally graded retrograde
+amnesia and distributed representation. So far, however, our account
+of amnesia has not really depended on the features of our distributed
+model. In the next section we will consider aspects of the amnesic syndrome which do seem to point toward distributed models.
+RESIDUAL LEARNING AND SPARED LEARNING IN
+BITEMPORAL AMNESIA
+As we noted briefly before, there are some domains in which
+amnesics exhibit what are generally described as spared learning effects:
+They show no noticeable deficits when compared to normal subjects.
+There is now a very large literature on these spared learning effects.
+
+25. AMNESIA
+519
+The following summary seems to capture the basic characteristics of
+what is spared and what is not.
+While amnesics seem to be highly deficient in the ability to form
+accessible traces of particular individual episodic experiences, they seem
+to be completely spared in their ability to learn certain types of skills
+that require no explicit access to the previous processing episodes in
+which the skill was acquired (N. J. Cohen, 1981; N. J. Cohen, Eichenbaum, Deacedo, & Corkin, 1985). In addition, they show apparently
+normal repetition priming effects in experiments involving such tasks
+as perceptual identification, in which the subject must simply identify a
+briefly flashed word in a short exposure (see Schacter, 1985, for a
+review). These effects may be strongly and strikingly dissociated from
+the subjects' verbally expressed recollections. Thus, H. M. has
+acquired a skill that allows him to perform perfectly in solving the
+Tower of Hanoi problem, without becoming aware that he has actually
+ever performed the task before and without knowing (in a conscious,
+reportable sense) even what constitutes a legal move in the Tower Puzzle (N.. Cohen et al., 1983). Also, amnesic subjects show normal
+effects of prior exposure to words in perceptual identification and
+related tasks, without necessarily having any awareness of having seen
+the words or even participating in the priming portion of the task.
+Between these two extremes lies a gray zone.
+Within the domains
+where learning is impaired, even the densest amnesics seem to learn,
+however gradually, from repeated experience (Schacter, 1985). First,
+we will consider these residual learning effects from the point of view of
+distributed memory. Then, we will examine the more striking spared
+learning effects.
+Residual Learning in Bitemporal Amnesia
+As we noted early in this chapter, distributed models provide a
+natural way of explaining why there should be residual ability to learn
+gradually from repeated experience within those domains where
+amnesics are grossly deficient in their memory for particular episodic
+experiences.
+For if we imagine that the effective size of the increments
+to the changes in synaptic connections is reduced in amnesics, then the
+basic properties of distributed models-the fact that they automatically
+extract the central tendency from a set of similar experiences and build
+up a trace of the prototype from a series of exemplars-automatically
+provides an account of the gradual accumulation of knowledge from
+repeated experience, even in the face of a profound deficit in
+remembering any specific episode in which that information was
+
+520
+presented. Distributed models are naturally incremental learning
+models, and thus they provide a very nice account of how learning
+could occur through the gradual accumulation of small traces.
+We call the hypothesis that anterograde amnesia amounts to reducing
+the effective size of the increments the limited increment hypothesis. For
+bitemporal amnesics, the effective size of the increments is limited by
+the depletion of y; in other forms of amnesia (which also show similar
+kinds of residual learning) the size of the increment might be limited in
+other ways.
+According to the limited increment hypothesis, residual
+learning is simply a matter of the gradual accumulation of information
+through the superimposition of small increments to the connection
+strengths.
+To illustrate this point, we have carried out a simulation analog of
+the following experiment by N. J. Cohen (1981). Amnesic subjects and
+normal controls were seated in front of an apparatus with a movable
+lever. On each trial of the experiment, the subject was asked to move
+the lever until it reached a stop set by the experimenter. The experimenter then moved the lever back to the start position and removed
+the stop.
+After a variable delay, the subjects were asked to reproduce
+the previous movement. Such trials are referred to as reproduction
+trials.
+At the end of each group of three trials, subjects were asked to
+reproduce their impression of the average distance they had been asked
+to move the lever, based on all of the preceding trials in the experiment. Such trials will be called averaging trials.
+The results of the reproduction task were as expected from the fact
+that amnesics have very poor memory for specific experiences; at very
+short delay intervals, amnesics did as well as normals, but at longer
+intervals, they were grossly impaired, as measured by the deviation of
+the reproduced movement from the training movement (Figure 7).
+However, amnesics did no worse than normals at reproducing the average movement. The experiment was divided into four parts: In the first
+and last parts, the movements were all relatively long; and in the two
+intermediate parts, the movements were all relatively short (some subjects had the long and short trials in the other order). At the end of
+each block of trials, both groups accurately reproduced the average
+movement for that block (For the long blocks, movements averaged
+42.6 degrees for the normals and 41.3 for the amnesics; for the short
+blocks, movements averaged 30.8 for the normals and 30.6 for the
+amnesics).
+We simulated this phenomenon using the distributed memory model
+described in Chapter 17. Briefly, that model consists of a single
+module, or set of units, with each unit having a modifiable connection
+to each other unit. The units in the module receive inputs from other
+
+25. AMNESIA
+521
+Absolute Error (degrees)
+10
+8
+- Korsakoff [N=2]
+Case N. A.
+N.A. Controls
+[N=6]
+4
+2
+==-
+Alcoholic
+Controls
+[N=10]
+Reproduction
+Movement
+Interpolated
+Movement
+FIGURE 7. Accuracy of reproduction movements by amnesics and normal controls in
+the lever placement experiment described in text. (From "Neuropsychological Evidence
+for a Distinction Between Procedural and Declarative Knowledge in Human Memory and
+Amnesia" by N. J. Cohen, 1981, doctoral dissertation, University of California, San
+Diego. Copyright 1981 by N. J. Cohen. Reprinted by permission.)
+units via the modifiable connections, as well as external inputs from
+stimulus patterns. Processing in the module begins with all units at a
+resting activation of 0 and the presentation of an external input pattern.
+In this case, the module consisted of 16 units, and each input pattern
+was a vector of 16 excitatory or inhibitory inputs. When a pattern is
+presented, it begins to drive the activations of the units up or down as a
+result of its direct effects; the units then begin to send excitatory and
+inhibitory signals to the other units via the modifiable connections. For
+patterns that have previously been stored in the connections among the
+units, the internal connections produce an enhancement of the pattern
+of activation over and above what would be produced by the external
+input alone; if, however, the external input is very dissimilar (orthogonal) to the patterns that have been stored in the module on previous
+trials, there will be little or no enhancement of the response.
+On each trial of the experiment, a new distortion of the same 16-
+element prototype pattern was presented to the module, and connection
+strengths were adjusted after each trial according to the delta rule (see
+Chapter 17 for details). We then tested the module in two ways: First,
+to simulate Cohen's reproduction test, we looked at the magnitude of
+the model's response to the pattern it had just been shown. For the
+averaging test, we looked at the magnitude of the model's response to
+
+522 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+the prototype. Note that these test trials were run with connection
+strength modification turned off, so each test was completely uncontaminated by the previous tests.
+In keeping with the limited increment hypothesis, we assumed that
+the difference between amnesics and normals in Cohen's experiment
+could be accounted for simply by assuming that amnesics make smaller
+changes to the strengths of the connections on every learning trial. To
+show that the model shows residual learning of the prototype under
+these conditions, we ran the simulation several times, with three ditferent levels of the increment strength parameter n from the equation
+for the delta rule, which we reproduce here:
+The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 8. As the figure
+indicates, the larger the size of n, the more strongly the model
+responds to the immediately preceding distortion of the prototype. But,
+after a few trials, the response to the central tendency or prototype
+underlying each distortion is as good for small values of n as for larger
+ones.
+In fact, response to the prototype is actually better when the
+model is "amnesic" (low n) than when it is "normal" (high n); in the
+latter state, the connections are continually buffeted about by the latest
+distortion, and the model has trouble seeing, as it were, the forest for
+the trees.
+In the figure, there is a gradual improvement in the response to the
+immediately preceding stimulus for small increment sizes. This occurs
+only because the stimuli are all correlated with each other, being
+derived from the same prototype. For a sequence of unrelated stimuli,
+the response to each new input shows no improvement over trials.
+This pattern of performance is very reminiscent of the pattern seen
+in several of the experiments performed by Olton and his colleagues
+(see Olton, 1984, for a review). They have trained rats to run in two
+different mazes, each having two choice points. At one of the choice
+points, the response was always the same for a given maze (we call this
+the maze-dependent choice); at the other choice point, the response
+that had to be made varied from trial to trial, based on the response the
+rat made on the preceding trial (we call this the trial-dependent choice).
+The principal finding of these experiments is that rats with hippocampal
+lesions show gross impairment in the ability to make the right trialdependent choice, but show no impairment in the ability to make the
+right maze-dependent choice if they were trained up on the task before
+surgically induced amnesia. The acquisition of the maze-dependent
+choice is slowed in rats trained after surgery, but these animals eventually reach a point where they can perform as well as normals. Such
+animals show near chance performance in the trial-dependent choice
+
+25. AMNESIA
+523
+Previous Pattern
+0.20
+Network
+Response
+hi
+0.10
+..'
+med
+low
+0.00
+18
+20
+Learning Trials (Groups of 5)
+Prototype
+0.20
+Network Response
+0.10
+hi/
+med
+0.00
+LULLAI
+12
+14
+16
+18
+20
+Learning Trials (Groups of 5)
+FIGURE 8. Network response for the most recent distortion of the prototype pattern
+and for the prototype pattern itself, as a function of test trials, at three different leveis of
+the increment size parameter n. Network response is the dot product of the external
+input to each unit with the internal input generated by the network
+after surgery, even if they had already acquired the ability to do this
+part of the task before the surgery.
+
+S24 BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+Such a pattern of results is completely consistent with the limited
+increment hypothesis: Performance in the trial-dependent choice
+requires, by the design of the task, that the subject rely on a memory
+trace of the preceding trial of the experiment, whereas performance on
+the maze-dependent choice can be based on a composite memory trace
+acquired gradually over repeated experience in the same maze. No
+separate mechanisms for retaining recent episodes, as opposed to more
+general memories, is required
+In summary, there are a variety of phenomena, both in human and
+animal amnesia, which fit in very well with the kind of gradual, residual
+learning we see in our distributed model. Distributed models naturally
+and automatically pull out what is common to a set of experiences,
+even if, or one might even say especially when, the traces of the individual experiences are weak.
+It is worthwhile to note that this property of distributed models
+would not be shared by all learning models, especially those that rely on
+some mechanism that examines stored representations of specific
+events in order to formulate generalizations, as in the ACT* model
+(J. R. Anderson, 1983), or in Winston's (1975) approach to learning.
+For on such models, if the individual traces are impaired, we would
+expect the generalization process to be impaired as well.
+Of course,
+such models could account for these effects by assuming that each
+episode is stored in two different ways, once for the purpose of learning
+generalizations and once for the purpose of remembering the details of
+particular experiences. Thankfully, our distributed model does not
+require us to duplicate memory stores in this way; residual learning
+based on small increments drops out of the basic superpositional character of the model.
+Spared Learning of Skills
+More striking that these residual learning effects is the phenomenon
+of spared learning: The fact that the acquisition of a variety of general
+skills occurs at roughly the same rate in normal and amnesic subjects.
+This fact has been taken as evidence that the brain maintains a distinction between those structures underlying explicitly accessible episodic
+and semantic information on the one hand and those underlying general cognitive skills on the other (N. J. Cohen et al., 1985).
+While this conclusion is certainly plausible, it is worth noting that
+there are other possibilities. One that we have considered is the possibility that limited increments to connection strengths make a difference
+for some kinds of tasks but not for others. The simulations reported in
+
+25. AMNESIA
+525
+the previous section indicated that this can sometimes be the case; in
+fact, they indicated that, as far as extracting the prototype or central
+tendency of an ensemble of experiences is concerned, it can sometimes
+be better to make smaller changes in connection strengths.
+The preserved skill learning observed in many tasks appears to be the
+kind of learning that may be relatively unaffected by the size of the
+changes made to connections. For we can view skill learning as the
+process of learning to respond to new stimuli in a domain, based on
+experience with previous examples. For example, consider the mirrorreading experiment of N. J. Cohen and Squire (1980). In this experiment, subjects were required to read words displayed reflected in a mirror so that they had to be read from right to left. In this task, both
+amnesic and normal subjects learn gradually. Though normals learn to
+read specific repeated displays much more quickly than amnesics, both
+groups show equal transfer to novel stimuli.
+To assess transfer performance in the simple distributed model
+described in the previous section, we observed the response of the
+model to new input patterns, after each learning trial. The results of
+the simulation are shown, for three levels of n, in Figure 9. Though
+there are initial differences as a function of n, these differences are
+considerably smaller than the ones we observe on reproducing old associations. And, at a fairly early point, performance converges, independently of the level of n. As with learning the prototype, there is a
+slight advantage for smaller values of n, in terms of asymptotic transfer
+performance, though this is difficult to see in the noise of the curves.
+New Pattern
+0.10
+Network Response
+hi
+1
+0.05
+med
+low
+0.00
+20
+Learning Trials (Groups of 5)
+FIGURE 9. Network response to transfer patterns (new distortions of the prototype) for
+three levels of n, as a function of learning
+
+526
+This simulation does not capture spared learning of skills perfectly,
+since our simulated normals approach asymptote more rapidly than our
+simulated amnesics. However, if such skills really consisted of many
+small skills, the differences might not be noticeable. We have not yet
+developed a version of our model in which there are no differences as a
+function of n. We still consider it an open question as to whether we
+will succeed.
+It may turn out that there are other distributed models
+(perhaps involving hidden units) in which rate of learning is quite
+insensitive to large differences in sizes of increments on certain kinds
+of measures for certain kinds of tasks. This is a matter we are continuing to pursue as our explorations of memory and learning continue.
+Setting this possibility aside, let us suppose for the moment that
+episodic and semantic memory are learned in one memory system,
+dependent on medial temporal lobe structures, and general skills are
+learned in a different system. This view raises a question: Why should
+this be? Why should the brain make this distinction? We can actually
+provide one possible answer to this question based on our observations
+of the properties of the simple distributed model presented in the simulations. These observations suggest that large changes in connection
+strengths may be better for storing specific experiences but may do
+more harm than good for gradually homing in on a generalizable set of
+connection strengths. 3
+On the basis of these observations, we might propose that the temporal lobe structures responsible for bitemporal amnesia provide a
+mechanism that allows large changes to connections to be made in parts
+of the system in which memories for specific experiences are stored,
+but other parts of the cognitive system make use of a different mechanism for changing connections that results in the smaller changes that
+are at least as good as larger ones for learning what is common to a set
+of experiences. However, as we have already suggested, we remain
+unconvinced that such a distinction is necessary. It may turn out that
+learning of generalizable skills is simply insensitive to the size of the
+changes made in connection strengths.
+3 As noted previously, spared learning effects also show up in single-trial priming
+experiments. One view of these effects, consistent with the separate systems view, is that
+they reflect the subtle effects of single trials in those parts of the system where skills and
+procedures are learned. Again, an alternative would simply be that the priming task is
+less sensitive to the magnitude of the changes in connection strengths and more sensitive
+to the relative size of changes made by different stimuli.
+
+25. AMNESIA
+527
+CONCLUSION
+In this chapter, we have considered the phenomenon of bitemporal
+amnesia in the light of models of distributed memory. We have
+described a hypothetical mechanism that can account for temporally
+graded retrograde amnesia without assuming that recent memories are
+stored separately from older ones.
+We have demonstrated how the
+ability to learn gradually from repeated experiences is an automatic
+consequence of assuming that amnesia simply amounts to the reduction
+of the effective size of the changes in the connections in a distributed
+memory. And we have indicated how a distributed approach can allow
+us to suggest reasons why large changes to connection strengths might
+make more of a difference in forming explicit representations of facts
+and episodes than in laying down the connections required for cognitive
+skills.
+Obviously, there is considerable room for further work to test and to
+extend our views.
+If our hypotheses are correct, and if y really is a
+chemical, then we might hope that someday someone may discover just
+what the chemical is, and will then go on to show that normal memory
+depends only on y and not on some information processing activity that
+takes
+place in the hippocampus, as has frequently been suggested
+(Squire et al., 1984; Wickelgren, 1979). Considerably more theoretical
+work will be required to build a tight connection between those tasks in
+which spared learning is observed empirically and the situations in
+which large increments to the weights do not result in superior learning.
+In the meantime, we hope this chapter has demonstrated that what we
+know about amnesia is not only consistent with the idea of distributed,
+superpositional memory, but that certain aspects of the amnesic
+syndrome-in particular, residual learning in domains where amnesics
+show deficits-actually support the idea.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+The work reported here was supported in part by a grant from the
+System Development Foundation, in part by contracts from the Office
+of Naval Research (N00014-79-C-0323, NR667-437 and N00014-82-C-
+0374, NK 667-483), and in part by a NIMH Career Development
+Award (MH00385) to the first author. We would like to thank Neal
+Cohen, Morris Moscovitch, Daniel Schacter, and Larry Squire for
+several useful discussions of various aspects of amnesia on several different occasions.
+
+CHAPTER 26
+Reflections on
+Cognition and Parallel Distributed Processing
+D. A. NORMAN
+This book presents a novel
+approach to the study of cognitive
+processes.
+The overall proposal is for a major change that alters the
+fundamental mechanisms of human information processing.
+Still,
+despite the impressive results, it is not always obvious just what impact
+this work should have upon the study of cognitive mechanisms. Yes,
+the underlying components might change, but what is the etfect on
+models of cognition? Why should cognitive scientists care about the
+class of models discussed in this book-parallel distributed processing
+models: PDP. What difference do they make? What really has been
+learned about cognition? Anything? And what has been left out:
+Where are the strengths and the weaknesses? Where do we go from
+here? This chapter addresses these issues.
+I start with the issue of level, for I can already hear my colleagues
+muttering-those who are not part of the enterprise, of course:
+So what? So you have this work on low-level processing structures. Why should it make any difference to our work, or to
+cognitive science in general? After all, the study of cognition is
+a high-level pursuit and this PDP stuff is awfully low level-all
+this talk of weights and synapses and connections between lowlevel units. Oh sure, it is all very nice and even significant, but
+it has nothing to do with cognitive science: It has no effect on
+anything we are doing. We care about language and thought,
+
+532 CONCLUSION
+problem-solving and memory, not about neural mechanisms
+and Hebbian rules for adjusting synaptic weights. '
+Well, in many ways those concerns are correct.
+Most of what is
+presented in this book differs radically from the kind of studies that are
+called "cognitive." Most are what would normally be called "low-level,"
+concerned with "implementation details," with the hardware and the
+neurophysiology. Why should it be of concern to the normal, everyday
+cognitive scientist? And, equally important, how does this work fit
+with the substantive concerns of the cognitive scientist? What is useful, what is questionable, and what has been left out?
+It is still too early to give firm answers to all these questions. But I
+can say where I stand. I am an in-between cognitive scientist. I have
+watched the developments reported in this book with great interest.
+Much of my work in the last ten years has been in the spirit of these
+models, some of it, of course, done with my long-time collaborator,
+Dave Rumelhart. I have long thought this philosophy to be powerful
+and important. But I have also disagreed with some aspects, for I have
+had some problems with the work. It is probably useful to discuss
+these here, at the end of the book. Some of these problems may
+reflect inherent, fundamental difficulties. Some may just be temporary
+problems that
+persist simply because they haven't been worked on.
+And some may be pseudoproblems, resulting either from my own
+misunderstandings or from the current point of view, but that will
+disappear when the "proper" approach is adopted. Let me start off with
+the good things: What does this approach-and this book-deliver?
+Then I will turn to the problems.
+Before discussing "the PDP approach," I must remind you that there
+really isn't a single PDP approach. No simple listing of either strengths
+or weaknesses is really fair, for there are many different contributors,
+each with a somewhat different approach with its own set of virtues and
+vices. Although much of the work has a common thread, the details
+and even the operative philosophies are oftentimes quite different.
+This level of disagreement is healthy for a developing science, although
+it may cause confusion to the unwary onlooker.
+11 wrote this paragraph without realizing that my prophecy had already been conirmed: See the essay by Broadbent (1985) and the partially responsive answer by
+Rumeihart and McClelland (1985), recapped in Chapter 4.
+
+26. REFLECTIONS
+533
+WHAT IS NEW: THE PDP APPROACH TO THE
+STUDY OF COGNITION
+"This is a difficult book, difficult but important." With this sentence,
+Rumelhart and I opened our introduction to the book Parallel Models of
+Associative Memory, the earlier work on the study of parallel, distributed
+models of psychological processing edited by Hinton and J. A. Anderson (1981). The sentence still applies, perhaps with a bit less emphasis
+on the difficult, a bit more on the important.
+This book starts to put it all together, to make significant advances in
+the mathematics and underlying bases of the approaches and to explore
+their implications for the study of cognition. The result is a new form
+of model for understanding the mechanisms of human (and animal)
+information processing, models that have several important aspects:
+• A major rethinking of the levels at which we must think of cognitive processes, involving, among other things, an intimate
+relationship between neuroscience and psychology.
+• A new form of computational model involving large numbers
+of highly interconnected parallel computational units, a form
+that takes into account constraints from studies of the nervous
+system, constraints from psychological data, and a deep understanding of computational requirements.
+• New conceptualizations of cognition that change the emphasis
+from symbolic processing to states that reflect the quality of the
+match between the data to be described and the possible configurations of the underlying processing structures. These lead to
+new modes of thinking of cognition, modes that use metaphors
+such as "stability," " harmony," "local" and "global minima," and
+"temperature."
+• An emphasis on learning-the mechanisms are built around
+continual adjustment and learning.
+Everyone agrees that full understanding of cognition requires a combination of efforts that cut across disciplinary boundaries. Indeed, this is
+the basic premise underlying the establishment of cognitive science.
+Nonetheless, even relatively recently, there has been little combination
+of efforts. Scientists in one field tended to think work in other fields
+interesting, but irrelevant to their own. Thus, cognitive psychologists
+tended to think that studies of the brain were interesting but irrelevant;
+
+534 CONCLUSION
+neuroscientists acted as if models of cognition or psychological data
+were too speculative and unrelated to neural activity (amusing pastimes, but not science); those in artificial intelligence thought the
+emphasis should be on control structures and representation, and paid
+little attention to other disciplines. This has changed. There is now a
+spirit of genuine cooperation. The research reported in this book shows
+the results. Neurological data offer strong constraints and invaluable
+guides to the model building efforts: The work reported here both
+builds upon what is known of the nervous system and asks specific
+questions to be decided by future research. Psychological evidence is
+taken seriously: The models must be able to reproduce this form of
+evidence. And the models must reflect the real demands of computational plausibility, which means that the models must work, must produce answers in appropriate times and with appropriate degrees of accuracy. Each field pushes the other. Each field suggests the data that
+should be provided by the other, suggests questions to be examined,
+and sometimes even suggests in which directions future efforts should
+be directed. The overall effort reflects the appropriate interplay of
+theory and data, with genuine interaction among the disciplines: a good
+model for a cognitive science.
+On the Computer Metaphor
+It has always bothered
+me that models of psychological processing
+were thought to be inspired by our understanding of the computer.
+The statement has always been false. Indeed, the architecture of the
+modern digital computer-the so-called Von Neumann architecture—
+was heavily influenced by people's (naive) view of how the mind
+operated. ' Now that whole debate can finally be put aside: The work
+presented here in no way can be interpreted as growing from our metaphor of the modern computer. Here, we are talking about a new form
+of computation, one clearly based upon principles that have heretofore
+not had any counterpart in computers. These models are highly parallel, with thousands or millions of elements interacting primarily
+2 Perhaps I had better document this. Simply read the work on cybernetics and
+thought in the 1940s and 1950s prior to the development of the digital computer. The
+group of workers included people from all disciplines: See the Macy Conferences on
+Cybernetics, or "Her Majesty's Conference on Thought Processes." Read the preface to
+Wiener's book on cybernetics. Everyone who was working together-engineers, physicists, mathematicians, psychologists, neuroscientists (not yet named) -consciously and
+deliberately claimed to be modeling brain processes.
+
+26. REFLECTIONS 535
+through activation and inhibition of one another's activity. Each element is highly interconnected, with perhaps tens of thousands of interconnections. Although the processing speed of each element is slowmeasured in milliseconds rather than the picoseconds common in
+today's computers-the resulting computations are fast, faster than is
+possible with even the largest and fastest of today's machines. Parallel
+computation means that a sequence that requires millions of cycles in a
+conventional, serial computer can be done in a few cycles when the
+mechanism has hundreds of thousands of highly interconnected processors. These neurologically inspired computational processes pose new
+requirements on our understanding of computation, suggest novel
+theoretical explanations of psychological phenomena, and suggest
+powerful new architectures for the machines of the future.
+Although the models reported here are new, they carry on a tradition
+that has long existed, a tradition of building models of neurological
+processes. Work in neural networks, in cybernetics, and in brain theory
+has preceded the present efforts. The studies of perceptrons, a computational device invented by Frank Rosenblatt in the 1950s clearly anticipated many of the results in use today (see Rosenblatt, 1962). The critique of perceptrons by Minsky and Papert (1969) was widely misinterpreted as destroying their credibility, whereas the work simply (but
+elegantly) showed limitations on the power of the most limited class of
+perceptron-like mechanisms, and said nothing about more powerful,
+multiple layer models. Grossberg developed many of the ideas in
+popularity today with his mathematical models of brain structures,
+starting in the late 1960s through today (see Grossberg, 1982).
+Strengths of the PDP Approach
+For me, the work has been important for several reasons. In my personal opinion, many students of cognition have boxed themselves into
+corners, forcing themselves to develop ever more complex rule structures, and ever more complex algorithms for dealing with the behavior
+of people. Each new experimental finding seems to require a new
+theory. Clearly, some new approach has been needed. But what?
+The PDP approach offers a very distinctive counterapproach. Basically, here we have an adaptive system, continually trying to configure
+itself so as to match the arriving data. It works automatically, prewired
+if you will, to adjust its own parameters so as to accommodate the input
+presented to it. It is a system that is flexible, yet rigid. That is,
+although it is always trying to mirror the arriving data, it does so by
+means of existing knowledge, existing configurations. It never expects
+to make a perfect match, but instead simply tries to get the best match
+
+536 CONCLUSION
+possible at any time: The better the match, the more stable the system.
+The system works by storing particular events, but the results of its
+operations are to form generalizations of these particular instances,
+even though the generalizations are never stored directly. The result,
+as has been illustrated throughout the chapters of the book, is that
+although the system develops neither rules of classification nor generalizations, it acts as if it had these rules. Thus, the system really mirrors
+experience; the regularities of its operation result partially from the
+regularities of the world, partially from the interpretations of
+the
+beholder. It is a system that exhibits intelligence and logic, yet that
+nowhere has explicit rules of intelligence or logic.
+These ideas have particular charm for many of us. The attempt
+always to find a best fit to existing data by maximizing harmony (or
+minimizing energy or discrepancy gives mechanism to a common hope
+among many modern cognitive theorists (e.g., Shepard, 1984). The
+heavy dependence upon particular instances and the lack of explicit
+generalizations fit a reasonable body of evidence about the importance
+of specific experiences (e.g., see Kahneman & D. T. Miller, in press;
+Medin & Schaffer, 1978). The way by which these systems try to
+accommodate themselves to the data by minimizing energy or maximizing harmony results in preferred states or interpretations, where the
+preferences reflect the particular events the system has experienced.
+This leads to categorization and classification of the input signals, but in
+a flexible manner-categorization by distance from prototypes, a mode
+that is consistent with much recent evidence. Here is a system that
+incorporates learning as a fundamental, essential aspect of its behavior,
+that makes no attempt to form categories or rules, yet that acts as if it
+were a prototype-matching, categorization system that has rules and
+strategies.
+The schema. What about the schema, that omnipresent, powerful
+tool of modern cognitive theory? Well, as Rumelhart, Smolensky,
+McClelland, and Hinton show in Chapter 14, the schema still exists,
+but in somewhat different form than that which schema theorists have
+thought of it (schema theorists such as Rumelhart and I, I might add).
+I like this new formulation. More than that, I think this an important
+step in the understanding of thought. Schemas are not fixed structures.
+Schemas are flexible configurations, mirroring the regularities of
+experience, providing automatic completion of missing components,
+automatically generalizing from the past, but also continually in modification, continually adapting to reflect the current state of affairs. Schemas are not fixed, immutable data structures. Schemas are flexible
+interpretive states that reflect the mixture of past experience and
+present circumstances.
+
+26. REFLECTIONS
+537
+Because the schema is in reality the theorist's interpretation of the
+system contiguration,
+and because the system configures itself differently according to the sum of all the numerous influences upon it,
+each new invocation of a schema may differ from the previous invocations. Thus, the system behaves as if there were prototypical schemas,
+but where the prototype is constructed anew for each occasion by combining past experiences with the biases and activation levels resulting
+from the current experience and the context in which it occurs.
+Essential properties of human information processing. Some years
+ago, Bobrow and I listed some properties we felt were essential components of the human cognitive system (Bobrow & Norman, 1975;
+Norman & Bobrow, 1975, 1976, 1979). We constructed our lists
+through observations of human behavior and reflection upon the sort
+of processing structures that would be required to yield that behavior.
+We concluded that the system must be robust, relatively insensitive to
+missing or erroneous data and to damage to its parts. Human cognition
+appears to work well in the face of ambiguity, incompleteness, and false
+information. On the one hand, the system is not only robust, it is also
+flexible and creative. On the other hand, the system continually makes
+errors. Speech is riddled with incomplete sentences, with erroneous
+words and false starts. Actions are riddled with "slips" and mistakes.
+People have learned to deal with these problems, in part by elaborate
+(although mostly subconscious correcting mechanisms in language,
+in part through humor and tolerance for the slips that characterize
+everyday behavior.
+Nonetheless,
+these characteristics of human
+cognition seem to provide important clues about the nature of the
+processing mechanisms. We argued that the system had to work by
+descriptions rather than precise specifications, by partial information
+rather than complete information, and by competition among competing interpretations.
+We argued for a set of essential properties: graceful degradation of
+performance, content-addressable storage, continually available output,
+and an iterative retrieval process that worked by description rather than
+by more traditional search. Although these requirements seemed to us
+to be both necessary and sensible, supported by the evidence, a common complaint was that these were hand-waving speculations, dreams,
+that there was no method for implementing these concepts. And if
+they couldn't be built, then they didn't exist-the ideas were wrong.
+Well, the PDP mechanisms described in this book have exactly the
+properties we required. Hurrah for our side.
+New metaphors for thought. A very useful result of the PDP work
+is to provide us with new metaphors with which to discuss cognitive
+
+538 CONCLUSION
+activity. These metaphors are more important than might be realized.
+They
+accommodate the transfer of knowledge from one application
+domain to another. The metaphors of PDP are of weights and
+goodness-of-fit, of stability, of local and global minima or maxima, and
+of the means to move from one stable state (a local minimum) to
+another (perhaps a global minimum) by "shaking up the system" or
+"raising its temperature." We see why systems have what psychologists
+call set or functional fixity: The systems are stable, even if in only a
+local minimum; it takes much less evidence to get into a stable state
+than it takes to get out of it. To change a state is not necessarily easy.
+You have to shake up the system, heat up the temperature. Don't let
+it freeze into position. New interpretations suddenly arise, with no
+necessary conscious experience of how they came about: a moment of
+nothing, and then clarity, as the system heats up, bounces out of one
+stable configuration and falls into a new configuration. The descriptions flow smoothly from the tongue. Good metaphors and comfortable descriptions are not scientific criteria. But they make a large
+difference in the psychological acceptance of the system and in the general utility of the ideas.
+Levels of description. And what about the most common complaint
+of all: Who cares about this low-level stuff? I think that the answer is
+clear: all of us. Now, be careful about how this is interpreted. I, personally, am not particularly excited by much of the discussions of
+synaptic adjustment rules and the details of the operation of single neurons (and worse, single synapses). But careful attention to these lowlevel details is essential in understanding the appropriate primitive
+structures of cognition.
+The whole point for the cognitive scientist is to understand cognition:
+perception, language, thought, social interaction, action, emotion. ...
+To do so, we insist on explanation of the internal processing structures
+that give rise to cognitive activities. This is why we have spoken of
+representation, of the mechanisms of memory and attention, of the
+rule-structures of language, and of the plans, schemas, and beliefs of
+people. But in developing models of internal activity, we must adopt an
+appropriate set of primitive descriptors. So far, the primitives have
+been based upon symbols: symbol manipulating rules, production systems, control structures, and representational systems. How do we
+know these are the appropriate descriptors? We don't. The choice of
+primitive building blocks depends upon the choice of computational
+device.
+Selection of the PDP computational system changes things
+dramatically: New conceptualizations emerge, new primitive levels of
+description are required, new explanations of cognition are possible.
+
+26. REFLECTIONS
+539
+By attending to the seemingly uninteresting level of the adjustment
+of synaptic weights, we end up with a whole new conceptualization of
+how concepts are encoded. The point is that some low-level stuff
+makes large differences in the way that the entire system operates,
+which in turn makes huge differences in the types of high-level descriptions that are most important for the cognitive scientist. Who would
+have thought that a person interested in problem solving or thinking
+should be interested in energy states or measures of "harmony" among
+units at a "neural-like" level? But guess what? They turn out to be
+important. A focus upon these levels turns out to change the way we
+view cognition. Ihe PDP approach torces a re-evaluation of the importance of what would otherwise have been thought to be low-level
+concepts.
+Weaknesses of the PDP Approach
+The approach has weaknesses. In part, it is hard to see exactly how
+to apply it to many of the difficult issues in the study of cognition. In
+general, the closer to perception or to motor output, the easier it is to
+see how the work applies. Thus, there seems to be no question about
+the significance for pattern recognition, for vision or speech understanding, or even for categorization. There have been a few studies
+that show promise for the control of motor movements (Hinton, 1984;
+categorizol on The
+Rumelhart & Norman, 1982). The question arises whether there are
+fundamental limitations in these models or whether the lack of examples simply represents the early stage of development and the initial
+concentration of effort upon the mathematics, the modeling techniques,
+and examples drawn from more restricted domains. The answers, of
+course, are not known. 3
+The type-token problem. Among the problems that have long
+bothered me about the PDP approach are some technical issues in
+3 Yes, it is possible to make a PDP network balance a pole (Barto, Sutton, & C. W.
+Anderson, 1983), but this is really an exercise in demonstrating learning, and the perceptual input and motor output required are, well, trivial. The study isn't trivial —it is a very
+nice demonstration —but the theme is the adjustment of weights, not perception, not
+motor control, and not decision or thought. In this section I examine several of these
+problems: the type-token problem, the problem with variables, the need for an extra,
+evaluative structure capable of overseeing and passing judgment on others, and then
+some general issues in learning and consciousness.
+
+540 CONCLUSION
+computation. There is a list of them, but the two most significant are
+the type-token distinction and the handling of variables.
+The typetoken problem is to be able to handle different instances of the same
+concept, sometimes at the same time. Thus, if the system has the
+knowledge that "John eats a sandwich" and that "Helene eats a
+sandwich," the system has to treat these as different sandwiches. This
+capability is not easy for PDP systems. PDP networks are very good at
+representing general properties, properties that apply to classes of
+objects. This is where their power to generalize, to generate default
+values automatically, arises.
+But the complementary skill of keeping
+individual instances separate seems much harder.
+The issue is addressed in the book; it is discussed in Chapter 3, "Distributed Representations," by Hinton, McClelland, and Rumelhart; in
+the McClelland and Rumelhart chapters on distributed memory and
+amnesia; and in McClelland's chapter on "The Programmable Blackboard Model of Reading" (and probably elsewhere that I missed). All
+this discussion is somewhat symptomatic of the difficulties: In traditional symbolic representations, for example, semantic network
+and
+frame-based
+approaches
+to representation, the issue
+is
+straightforward-the solution is natural. Here, however, considerable
+complications must be introduced to handle the issues, and even then it
+is not clear that the problem is entirely solved
+One question that should be raised, however, is whether we really
+wish the problem to be solved. It is interesting to note that in our typing model, Rumelhart and I concluded that the kinds of errors people
+make in typing require a system in which there is no type-token distinction at the level
+of control
+for the typing of individual letters
+(Rumelhart & Norman, 1982). The lack of distinction gave rise to
+some difficulties, but we argued that these are exactly the difficulties
+that humans face. McClelland makes a similar argument in his chapter
+on the blackboard model of reading. Thus, it may turn out that the
+problems faced by PDP systems in handling the type-token distinction
+are actually virtues with regard to their ability to model human cognition, especially if people have the same problems.
+Variables. Once upon a time I worried about how the nervous system could have evolved to do all the things computational systems
+seemed required to do. Among them was the ability to call subroutines. The problem with calling subroutines was that it required variables: not only the values of the actions to be performed, but the
+name or symbol of the thing that had requested the subroutine-this is
+how the system would know where to resume operations once the subroutine was completed. Symbol processing systems are fundamentally
+variable-interpretation processes, and I couldn't see how they could
+
+26. REFLECTIONS
+541
+have evolved. 4 Well, now along comes the PDP approach: In one
+sense, my problem is solved-there are no variables, save for activation
+values. All that is represented is particular instances. No need to
+represent variables: The variable is represented by the configuration of
+units that are active. But I still am not satisfied
+Now I worry about how PDP units can get away without representing
+variables. Aren't variables necessary? What about thought? If I solve
+a problem mentally don't I have to postulate hypothetical situations in
+my head, evaluate them, and make decisions? How do I plan my day,
+deciding which activities should be done first, which last, which require
+others to precede them, and which can be postponed? How do I compose music, or do science? Don't 1 need to have mental variables,
+symbols that I manipulate? My answer is "yes." I think this lack is a
+major deficiency in the PDP approach. I believe this problem can be
+solved by having several levels of systems, each specialized for different things. The PDP system is fine for perception and motor control, fine for categorization. It is possibly exactly the sort of system
+required for all of our automatic, subconscious reasoning. But I think
+that more is required-either more levels of PDP structures or other
+kinds of systems-to handle the problems of conscious, deliberate
+thought, planning, and problem solving.
+The need for an extra, evaluative structure. A problem with the
+PDP models presented in this book is that they are too specialized, so
+concerned with solving the problem of the moment that they do not
+ask how the whole might fit together. The various chapters present us
+with different versions of a single, homogeneous structure, perfectly
+well-suited for doing its task, but not sufficient, in my opinion, at doing
+the whole task. One structure can't do the job: There do have to be
+several parts to the system that do different things, sometimes communicating with one another, sometimes not.
+The argument seems especially relevant in considering learning.
+Though many of the learning rules are self-correcting, and therefore
+tend to converge in one way or another on optimal performance, they
+seem to be insufficiently sensitive to the global goals and evaluations
+made by the organism in which they are implemented. While it is now
+well accepted that the intention to learn, per se, is not a major determinant of learning, this intention mobilizes cognitive activities that
+result in better learning.
+Not much is said about these intentions, their
+4 Of course, I can't figure out how the bones and impedance-matching structures of the
+ears could have evolved, or the complex tendons that control the tens of bones in the
+hands could have evolved either: My lack of imagination is not restricted to information
+processing.
+
+542 CONCLUSIoN
+source, or the ways in which they influence the system's learning and
+performance.
+When it comes to learning, it is frequently the case that something
+has to watch over the operations and act as a trainer. But this trainer is
+separate from the learning mechanisms. And it has to be able to evaluate the quality of performance. How does this take place? What is this
+second.
+!, overseeing mechanism? And how did it get started? How did
+the trainer know what task it was to train, and when? And how did it
+acquire the knowledge of what was good performance if it was a task
+that the person had never before performed? Even in the competitive
+learning environment (see Chapter 5 by Rumelhart & Zipser) in which
+learning can take place without an overseeing, evaluatory mechanism, it
+is often advantageous to "train" the system by careful presentation of
+the items that are to be classified.
+Thus, Rumelhart and Zipser
+"trained" their system on various stimulus situations-"teaching" is
+what they called it. But how does this come about? Who does the
+"teaching" or "training"? In some cases, it is another person, but not
+always.
+It is often the case that complex behavior has to be monitored to see
+if things are proceeding well. This requires some sort of evaluation of
+the output of the system. But what mechanism does this evaluation?
+And what mechanism decides what the desired output is to be? I
+believe this requires an "overlooking" system, one that compares
+expectations with outcomes. This second, evaluative, system might
+very well also be a PDP structure, but it must be separate from the
+first, overlooking the first and operating upon it.
+More than one system at a time is required. A second problem is
+that because any single PDP network can only settle into one state at a
+time, it is probably the case that multiple systems are required: modules
+of PDP systems, perhaps. Now, this is not really a criticism of the PDP
+model. In fact, the property that a PDP network reaches a single state
+at any moment is both interesting and important: It gives rise to some
+of the strong points of the model. The point is that although the system is highly parallel and very fast when viewed at the level of computational operations, it is highly serial and relatively slow when viewed at
+the "higher level" of interpreting and analyzing the resulting state
+changes. This dual perspective is a strong virtue for the modeling of
+human cognition, for this duality reflects current understanding. People interpret the world rapidly, effortlessly. But the development of
+new ideas, or evaluation of current thoughts proceeds slowly, serially,
+deliberately. People do seem to have at least two modes of operation,
+one rapid, efficient, subconscious, the other slow, serial, and conscious.
+The problem, however, is that people can do multiple activities at the
+
+26. REFLECTIONS
+543
+same time, some of them quite unrelated to one another. So, in my
+opinion, a PDP model of the entire human information processing system is going to require multiple units. That is, the complete model
+requires that the brain consist of several (tens? hundreds? thousands?)
+of independent PDP-like systems, each of which can only settle into a
+single state at a time.
+Learning and Consciousness
+The two problems discussed in the previous section come together
+into a general statement of the problems of learning and consciousness.
+To be skilled at something requires that the requisite actions be performed smoothly, effortlessly, with minimum conscious thought or
+effort. In many ways, skilled performance consists of the execution of
+automated routines. The PDP structures seem like ideal candidates for
+mechanisms that produce these automated, subconscious behaviors.
+But how do these structures come about? What are the procedures for
+learning? This view suggests that we consider "learning" to be the programming of automated routines.
+Under this view, when we learn some new task or skill, two different
+systems are involved. One involves conscious control and awareness of
+the task and the contingencies. Call this system DCC (for deliberate
+conscious control-after
+Norman & Shallice, in press). The other
+involves a PDP mechanism, a pre-established, preprogrammed set of
+procedures that get followed with minimum need for conscious control
+or even awareness.
+The basic idea is this: Learning involves the setting of weights on
+the associative network structures of a PDP system. However, this
+weight setting requires some evaluative mechanism that determines
+when things are going well and when they are not, and perhaps other
+kinds of judgments that can be used to affect the weight setting and
+establishment of appropriate connections. This is one role for DCC. In
+addition, during the time while the weights are being established,
+before the PDP structure is properly set up, if the activity is to be performed at all, it must be through DCC. Hence, two roles for DCC are
+to control activities when the final "programming" has not yet been
+completed, and also to control the "programming." Norman and Shallice suggested that DCC only controls activities by influencing activation values. Among other things, this means that the control by PDP
+and DCC mechanisms are compatible, so that both may operate at the
+same time. Thus, partially learned activities may be under control of
+both modes. Conscious control of activities acts by activating or
+
+544 CONCLUSION
+inhibiting the PDP networks, attempting to direct them into appropriate
+states, but without full power to cause such a result: Conscious control
+is simply one more source of activation and inhibition that adds and
+subtracts from the other influences on total activation values.
+These views of learning and of direct conscious control are consistent
+with a number of qualitative phenomena:
+• Control by DCC is slow and serial, hence not very effective for
+some kinds of skills. If DCC control is exerted after appropriate PDP mechanisms exist, then conscious control of activity
+will be inferior to subconscious control through the PDP
+mechanisms. Performance improves if done subconsciously,
+blocking conscious control. This is indeed the procedure taught
+by a number of athletic training methods: "Stop thinking about
+your actions and performance will improve."
+• Introspection results from the interpretive attempts of deliberate conscious control-by the requirements of the "evaluator"
+or "trainer" for learning. Introspection is therefore essential for
+learning, but it is based upon observation of the outputs of a
+subconscious (PDP) system. As a result, introspections are
+only capable of accurate descriptions of system states. Because
+there is no information available about how that state was
+reached, introspection cannot give reasons for the resulting
+States.
+People usually do give reasons however, but these reasons are of necessity constructions and self-hypotheses: We
+have no conscious awareness of how PDP mechanisms settle
+into states and no vocabulary for describing the weights and
+synaptic interactions even were we to have that awareness.
+• Consider the role of meaning and understanding in learning
+Much has been made of the need for the learner to understand
+the task and
+activity. Yet, understanding does not seem
+relevant to the way that skilled performers operate. Moreover,
+many things we learn have arbitrary relations: the relation
+between the name of an object and the object, the order of the
+letters of the alphabet, the fingering of musical instruments,
+command sequences of computers. I believe the point is that
+PDP mechanisms can set up almost any arbitrary relationship.
+Hence, to the expert, once a skill has been acquired, meaningfulness of the relationships is irrelevant. However, the conscious, supervisory mechanisms require meaningful and understandable relationships: The DCC mechanisms must watch
+over actions and evaluate them, and for this, understandable
+
+26. REFLECTIONS
+545
+and intelligible relationships are important. Understanding is
+also essential for troubleshooting, but in many ways, this is
+what the learning process is all about: troubleshooting the performance in order to establish the appropriate connections.
+TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF
+HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING
+The work presented in this book provides the framework for new
+directions in our understanding of the human information processing
+system. In the older view, processing was done by separate components that communicated by passing messages-symbols-among
+themselves. The perceptual system communicated with the memory
+system. Memory communicated with perception and problem solving
+Language systems communicated with the others. The communications
+consisted of symbolic messages, interpreted through a representational
+system, that implied a correspondence between the symbol and the
+referent and, therefore, an interpretive mechanism (see Rumelhart &
+Norman, in press). The emphasis was on symbolic representation, and
+hence the emphasis was on the rules of thought, problem solving, and
+memory. This led to the development of frame-based schema systems,
+with slots, fillers, default values, and inference mechanisms as well as
+to production-theory descriptions of human problem solving.
+The new view is quite different. Under this new view, processing is
+done by PDP networks that configure themselves to match the arriving
+data with minimum conflict or discrepancy. The systems are always
+tuning themselves (adjusting their weights). Learning is continuous,
+natural, and fundamental to the operation. New conceptualizations are
+reflected by qualitatively different state configurations. Information is
+passed among the units, not by messages, but by activation values, by
+scalars not symbols. The interpretation of the processing is not in terms
+of the messages being sent but rather by what states are active. Thus,
+it is what units are active that is important, not what messages are sent.
+In the conventional system, learning takes place through changes in the
+representational structures,
+in the information contained in memory.
+In this new approach, learning takes place by changes in the system
+itself. Existing connections are modified, new connections are formed,
+old ones are weakened. In the conventional system, we distinguished
+between the information being processed and the processing structures
+In the PDP system, they are the same: The information is reflected in
+the very shape, form, and operation of the processing structures.
+
+546 CONCLUSION
+A large number of issues are now naturally addressed that were difficult to deal with before. In turn, a large number of things that were
+easy to do before now are difficult. This is a combination of evolution
+and revolution. Many of our old ideas are still applicable. Many of the
+essential, critical problems are still problems. But we have a new set of
+tools, powerful tools that can help make major advances on a number
+of fronts. These new mechanisms are fundamentally subconscious
+ones.
+Learning results from the natural adjustments to states: It
+results naturally from the operation of the system. But in the process
+of examining what extra mechanisms are necessary to guide the learning and the overall behavior of the system, we appear to be led directly
+to consideration of the interacting roles of processing mechanisms
+and evaluative mechanisms, of subconscious and conscious processes.
+A nice fallout.
+I still have concerns. I do not know how to map much of my understanding of cognition onto these new structures. I believe the typetoken distinction is critical, that the cognitive system can and does
+manipulate variables, that there must be levels of processes, some of
+which oversee others.
+None of these problems seem insurmountable to
+me. Some may go away, being problems forced upon us (me) only
+because of old habits of thinking, old views of computation. Some may
+be solved by new developments. Some may get handled by an amalgamation of methods, combining the best of the more conventional
+mechanisms of human information processing with these newer views
+of information processing.
+Some old questions are put to rest. To ask "why" a particular action
+was performed or "why" a particular interpretation was placed on an
+event means to ask "why" a given internal stable state was reached.
+But there is no simple answer to these questions. To force the questions is to risk confabulation: answers made up after the fact with no
+necessary connection to reality. In general, there is no single reason why
+any given cognitive state occurs.
+The system is multiply connected, multiply controlled. The states are a result of many different factors all
+impinging upon one another: The state is simply the best match to all
+the sources of information. This provides a rather nice resolution of
+many of the arguments that have taken place over the years within cognitive psychology.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+I thank Jay McClelland for thoughtful comments on the manuscript.
+
+Future Directions
+Parallel distributed processing has come a long way since we began
+our explorations.
+Four years ago, we had no clear idea how PDP
+models were going to overcome the limitations of the perceptron; how
+they could be related to higher level concepts such as the schema; or
+how they could be applied fruitfully to language processing. We think
+it is fair to say that the chapters in both volumes of this book document
+considerable progress on these and other problems. During this same
+period, work emerging from other research groups has also produced
+major advances. Yet, in spite of the progress, these explorations are
+not complete. The more we have learned, the more questions we have
+uncovered. Thus, we think of these volumes more as a progress report
+than as a final statement.
+Even as the book is going to press, the work is continuing and
+expanding. Our own ideas are evolving, and many other researchers
+are beginning to join in these explorations, bringing new viewpoints and
+new issues with them. In the following few paragraphs we sketch what
+we see as the major emerging themes of the next several years of
+work-the most promising directions and the biggest challenges that lie
+ahead.
+
+548
+CONCLUSION
+From where we stand, three general areas stand out as major foci of
+future work. These are:
+• The application of parallel distributed processing to higher-level
+cognitive processes and sequential symbol processing.
+• Further development of mechanisms of learning and a concommitant analysis of network architectures.
+• The closer binding of PDP models with neuroscience.
+We discuss each of these developments below.
+Higher-Level Processes
+We began our work on PDP models with applications that were more
+perceptual in nature and that focused more on those areas in which
+conventional sequential symbol-processing models have been least successful. We obviously believe this is only a first step. We believe that
+PDP models will provide useful insights into such higher-level cognitive processes as thinking and langauge processing. Chapters 14 and 19
+offer our initial explorations of these areas. We do not mean to suggest
+that we believe these chapters provide all of the answers. Indeed, we
+have already begun to elaborate these ideas.
+More important, many
+other researchers have begun to appreciate the benefits of massively
+parallel processing in these areas, and are beginning to develop models
+that go beyond the first steps we have taken in these two chapters.
+Here we indicate a bit more of what we see as the general form these
+new directions will take.
+Sequential symbol processing. It is becoming obvious to many
+others besides ourselves that parallel processing and sequential symbol
+processing must somehow occur in the same system. There appear to
+be three major schemes for integrating these two processing modalities.
+One of these is our approach to the problem: to develop PDP models
+in which sequential behavior is captured in the successive settlings of a
+parallel network or set of networks. Touretzky and Hinton (1985),
+have been working somewhat along the same lines, developing a PDP
+production system. They hope eventually to do variable binding and
+instantiation and, at the same time, preserve the benefits of parallel distributed processing in their symbol-processing machine.
+Beyond this approach, there appear to be two other approaches to
+what might be called massive parallelism in symbol processing. The first
+
+FUTURE DIRECTIONS
+549
+of these, suggested by Norman in Chapter 26, is the idea of a hybrid
+system-a PDP net or set of nets, coupled with a symbol processing
+controller. A similar approach is taken by Schneider (1985) in his
+recent model of controlled and
+automatic processes in attention. A
+slight variant of this approach is to embed calls to parallel modules
+inside a conventional sequential-processing system.
+We applaud this kind of approach since it strives to preserve the best
+of both worlds. It also captures the fact that the cognitive system is
+complex and consists of many parts—a point that no one would dispute.
+We do not take this road ourselves, in part because we see no reason to
+suppose that the mechanisms that control cognitive processing are not
+themselves constructed of the same underlying parallel hardware as the
+other aspects of the cognitive systems, and in part because we prefer to
+view the system not so much in terms of controlled and controlling
+modules, but in terms of more distributed forms of control
+The final approach is to modify other computational frameworks so
+that they incorporate many of the features of PDP models. This
+approach is exemplified by John R. Anderson's (1983) production system implementation of our interactive activation model, and Thibadeau, Just, and Carpenter's (1982) CAPS production system.
+These developments are signs that other researchers, coming from
+other computational viewpoints, have begun to appreciate many of the
+benefits of interactive parallel processing. By building parallel capabilities directly into production systems, however (that is, by effectively
+allowing large numbers of productions to partially match at the same
+time), these models have some tendency of becoming top-heavy. It
+remains to be seen whether the direct computational benefits these
+models have (e.g., explicit, direct variable binding of many productions
+at the same time will turn out to outweigh the extra computational
+overhead they introduce. Our own hope is that we can succeed in
+achieving models that capture the extent of human capabilities more
+naturally as emergent properties of parallel networks, but in the meantime, these massively parallel production systems provide another way
+to bring parallel distributed processing together with the sequential
+symbol-processing tradition in cognitive science.
+Language processing. We began our work on PDP models with a
+strong interest in linguistic information processing. It was an attempt
+to deal with the problems we saw with more conventional accounts of
+language that contributed to our original attraction to PDP models.
+Some of the basic directions of our account of language are indicated in
+Chapters 18 and 19. We see the fleshing out of these sketches as central to our understanding of language acquisition, syntactic processing,
+and the interaction between syntactic and semantic processing.
+
+550 CONCLUSION
+Although it is not yet represented directly in our work, we believe that
+our approach will offer new insight into the role of metaphor and analogy in language. Chapter 19 begins to indicate that the notion of
+literal meaning, like the notions of grammaticality in syntax and regularity in morphology, will turn out to be a matter of degree and will
+best be explained in terms of coalitions of units interacting to produce
+the observed regularities. The notions of figurative and literal meanings will best be seen as coarse categories describing the nature of the
+meanings synthesized by PDP networks rather than fundamentally different meaning types arising from fundamentally different processes.
+Meanwhile, it is clear to everyone that language processing provides
+many challenges and many opportunities to test and elaborate our
+developing conception of how to build powerful processing machinery
+out of simple computational elements, while at the same time preserving the beneficial aspects of parallel distributed processing.
+Learning and Architecture
+Learning has always been a key issue in the development of network
+models. One of the most appealing features of PDP networks is that
+very simple, homogeneous learning procedures can be used to allow the
+networks to self-modify and adapt to their environments. Until very
+recently, these self-organizing systems have been of limited complexity.
+No multilayer learning algorithm has existed. Two such learning procedures have been developed in this book (Chapters 7 and 8) and
+others are under development elsewhere (cf. Barto & Anandan, 1985).
+These learning schemes are already generating a large amount of
+activity. With the development of the error propagation learning procedure, for example (Chapter 8), we can study the kinds of internal
+representations that evolve to support processing in particular problems
+and, in that way, come to understand better the problems under study
+as well as the nature of the networks required to solve them. Moreover, we can use these powerful learning procedures for genuine artificial intelligence-that is, as a tool for designing systems capable of discovering new ways of solving difficult problems.
+Neuroscience
+In spite of the fact that PDP models exploit brain-style processing,
+our own work has not yet moved far toward making direct contact with
+neuroscience. We believe that the opportunity is there, however, and
+
+FUTURE DIRECTIONS
+551
+that the future will bring more and more models specifically designed
+with data from neuroscience in mind. There are two natural areas of
+application- the application to data from people with brain pathologies
+and the application of PDP models to detailed modeling of neurophysiological and neuroanatomical data.
+Neuropsychology. The study of cognitive deficits that arise from
+brain damage has focused on dissociations of function. If one patient
+shows one deficit, and another shows a different deficit, it is reasonable
+to infer that their different pathologies damaged different, separable
+components of the cognitive system. From this kind of data, one can
+try to characterize the separate components of the cognitive system and
+to identify the role each component plays in the functioning of the system as a whole. This approach has been successful in leading to several
+important insights about the macrostructure of the cognitive system.
+But there has been little work, until now, that focuses on the development of models that attempt to characterize the microstructure of the
+components in such as way as to provide an account of the way in
+which performance degrades with damage. Cognitive dysfunction is a
+matter of degree, so different patients can manifest widely different
+degrees of what appears to be a common deficit. Mild cases often show
+their deficits in subtle ways, and make relatively subtle errorsconfusing similar concepts but not confusing distinct concepts. Some
+pathologies that produce highly diffuse damage (e.g., Alzheimer's
+disease) are progressive and increase gradually in severity as the disease
+process continues.
+PDP models hold out considerable promise of providing detailed
+accounts of the way in which cognitive function degrades with damage.
+This point has been made by J. A. Anderson (1977; Anderson, Silverstein, Ritz, & Jones, 1977) and by Wood (1978), and models of aspects
+of neuropsychological phenomena can be found in two places in this
+book (Chapters 3 and 25). Much more can now be done, we think, to
+further the application of PDP models to neuropsychological
+phenomena. Equally important, neuropsychological data can, in some
+cases, help us make decisions about the macrostructure of the cognitive
+systems we construct out of PDP networks. Thus, there is hope that
+we will soon see real synergistic interactions between neuropsychology
+and parallel modeling.
+Physiology and anatomy. Our primary focus has been on "cognitive" data, but the language of PDP is, by design, well suited as a
+medium for actual neural modeling. We expect that as these theoretical tools become more familiar and better understood, they will prove
+more and more useful for organizing data from neuroscience. One clear
+
+552 CONCLUSION
+example of this lies in the paper by Gluck and Thompson (in press), in
+which PDP modeling techniques are applied to an analysis of conditioning in the simple nervous system of Aplysia, as studied by Kandel and
+his collaborators (Hawkins, Abrams, Carew, & Kandel, 1983; Kandel &
+Schwartz, 1982). Although we are a long way from connecting our
+more abstract networks with particular brain structures, we believe that
+the application of PDP models to cognitive and neural modeling enterprises will serve to both clarify the specifically neuroscience questions
+and lead us to a better understanding of the actual neural substructure
+underlying cognitive processes in the brain.
+In addition to the neurophysiology of the brain, we expect that
+neuroanatomical facts will have an increasing impact on the way we
+build our PDP models. We have learned that the major determiner of
+what a particular system learns is largely a function of the possible connections. It is the anatomy that determines the possible connections.
+It seems likely that in subsystems in which the anatomy is relatively
+well understood, as for example in the visual system, that we can use
+the known anatomical structure in our models to constrain them and
+thereby explain why information is processed in the way that it is.
+The four years we have spent working on these volumes have been
+exciting ones for all of us. We have learned much. It is our hope in
+publishing these volumes that they will communicate some of this
+sense of excitement, and that at least some of our readers will take up
+the problems and issues where we have left them, will help us correct
+some of our errors and misconceptions, and will help advance our
+understanding of the microstructure of cognition.
+David E. Rumelhart
+
+References
+Abeles, M. (1982). Studies of brain function: Vol. 6. Local cortical circuits.
+York: Springer-Verlag.
+Abeles, M., de Riboupierre, F., & de Riboupierre, Y. (1983). Detection of
+single unit reponses which are loosely time-locked to a stimulus. IEEE
+Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 13, 683-691.
+Allman, J., Miezen, J., & McGuinness, E. (1985). Stimulus specific responses
+from beyond the classical receptive field: Neurophysiological mechanisms
+for local-global comparisons in visual neurons. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 8, 407-430.
+Amari, S., & Takeuchi, A. (1978). Mathematical theory on formation of
+category detecting nerve cells. Biological Cybernetics, 29, 127-136.
+Andén, N. E., Dahlström, A., Fuxe, K., Larsson, K., Olson, L., & Ungerstredt, U. (1966). Ascending monoamine neurons to the telencephalon
+ventro-basal nucleus of the thalamus: Potential fields, synaptic transmission
+and excitability of both presynaptic and postsynaptic components. Journal
+of Physiology, 174, 348-369.
+Anderson, J. A. (1973). A theory for the recognition of items from short
+memorized lists. Psychological Review, 80, 417-438
+Anderson, J. A. (1977). Neural models with cognitive implications. In D.
+LaBerge & S. J. Samuels (Eds.), Basic processes in reading: Perception and
+comprehension (pp. 27-90). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Anderson, J. A. (1983). Cognitive and psychological computation with neural
+IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC-13,
+799-815.
+
+554
+Anderson, J. A., & Hinton, G. E. (1981). Models of information processing in
+the brain. In G. E. Hinton & J. A. Anderson (Eds.), Parallel models of associative memory (pp. 9-48). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Anderson, J. A., Silverstein, J. W., Ritz, S. A., & Jones, R. S. (1977). Distinctive features, categorical perception, and probability learning: Some
+applications of a neural model. Psychological Review, 84, 413-451.
+Anderson, J. R. (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
+Anderson, J. R., & Ross, B. H. (1980). Evidence against a semantic-episodic
+distinction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and
+Memory, 6, 441-465.
+Anlezark, G. M., Crow, T. J., & Greenway, A. P. (1973). Impaired learning
+and decreased cortical norepinephrine after bilateral locus coeruleus lesions.
+Science, 181, 682-684.
+Asanuma, H., & Rosén, I. (1972). Topographical organization of cortical
+efferent zones projecting to distal forelimb muscles in the monkey. Experimental Brain Research, 14, 243-256.
+Bagley, W. C. (1900).
+The apperception of the spoken sentence: A study in
+the psychology of language. American Journal of Psychology, 12, 80-130
+Baker, J. F., Petersen, S. E., Newsome, W. T., & Allman, J. (1981). Visual
+response properties of neurons in four extrastriate visual areas of the owl
+monkey (Aotus trivirgatus): A quantitative comparison of the medial (M),
+dorsomedial (DM), dorsolateral (DL), and middle temporal (MT) areas.
+Journal of Neurophysiology, 45, 397-406.
+Ballard, D. H. (1984). Parameter nets. Artificial Intelligence, 22, 235-267.
+Ballard, D. H. (in press). Cortical connections and parallel processing: Structure and function. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
+Ballard, D. H., Hinton, G. E., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1983). Parallel visual computation. Nature, 306, 21-26.
+Barlow, H. B. (1972). Single units and sensation: A neuron doctrine for per-
+Barrow, H. G., & Tenenbaum, J. M. (1978). In A. R. Hanson & E. M. Riseman (Eds.), Computer vision systems (pp. 3-26). New York: Academic Press.
+Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
+Barto, A. G., & Anandan, P. (1985). Pattern recognizing stochastic learning
+automata. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 15, 360-375.
+Barto, A. G., Sutton, R. S., & Anderson, C. W. (1983). Neuronlike adaptive
+elements that can solve difficult learning control problems. JEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 13, 835-846.
+Bates, E. (1979). Emergence of symbols. New York: Academic Press.
+Bates, E., & MacWhinney, B. (in press). Competition, variation, and language
+learning: What is not universal in language acquisition. In B. MacWhinney
+(Ed.), Mechanisms of language acquisition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Bear, M. F., Paradiso, M. A., Schwartz, M., Nelson, S. B., Carnes, K. M., &
+Daniels, J. D. (1983). Two methods of catecholamine depletion in kitten
+visual cortex yield different effects on plasticity. Nature, 302, 243-241. /
+Becker, J. I., Walker, J. A., & Olton, D. S. (1980). Neuroanatomical bases of
+spatial memory. Brain Research, 200, 307-320.
+
+555
+Berko, J. (1958). The child's learning of English morphology. Word, 14,
+150-177
+Bever, T. G. (1970). The cognitive basis for linguistic structures. In J. R.
+Hayes (Ed.), Cognition and the development of language. New York: Wiley.
+Bienenstock, E. L., Cooper, L. N., & Munro, P. W. (1982). Theory for the
+development of neuron selectivity: Orientation specificity and binocular
+interaction in visual cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 2, 32-48.
+Blakemore, C., Garey, L. J., & Vital-Durand, F. (1978). The physiological
+effects of monocular deprivation and their reversal in the monkey's visual
+cortex. Journal of Physiology, 283, 223-262.
+Blakemore, C., Hawken, M. J., & Mark, R. F. (1982). Brief monocular
+deprivation leaves subthreshold synaptic input on neurones of the cat's
+visual cortex. Journal of Physiology, 327, 489-303.
+Blakemore, C., & Van Sluyters, R. C. (1974). Reversal of the physiological
+effects of monocular deprivation in kittens: Further evidence for a sensitive
+period. Journal of Physiology, 237, 195-216.
+Blasdel, G. G., & Pettigrew, J. D. (1978). Effect of prior visual experience on
+cortical recovery from the effects of unilateral eyelid suture in kittens.
+Journal of Physiology, 274, 601-619.
+Blasdel, G. G., & Pettigrew, J. D. (1979). Degree of interocular synchrony
+required for maintenance of binocularity in kitten's visual cortex. Journal of
+Neurophysiology, 42, 1692-1710.
+Bobillier, P., Seguin, S., Petitjean, F., Salvert, D., Touret, M., & Jouvet, M
+(1976). The raphé nuclei of the cat brain stem: A topographical atlas of
+their efferent projections as revealed by autoradiography. Brain Research,
+113, 449-486.
+Bobrow, D. G., & Norman, D. A. (1975). Some principles of memory schemata. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representation and understanding: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 131-149). New York: Academic Press.
+Bond, Z. S., & Garnes, S. (1980). Misperceptions of fluent speech. In R. Cole
+(Ed.), Perception and production of fluent speech. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Brachman, R. J., & Schmolze, J. G. (1985). An overview of the KL-ONE
+knowledge representation system. Cognitive Science, 9, 171-216.
+Broadbent, D. E. (1967). Word frequency effect and response bias. Psychological Review, 74, 1-15.
+Broadbent, D. E. (1985). A question of levels: Comment on McClelland and
+Rumelhart. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 114, 189-192.
+Brock, L. G., Coombs, J. S., & Eccles, J. C. (1952a). The nature of the
+monosynaptic excitatory and inhibitory processes in the spinal cord.
+Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 140, 169-176.
+Brock, L. G., Coombs, J. S., & Eccles, J. C. (1952b). The recording of potentials from motoneurons with an intracellular electrode. Journal of Physiology, 117, 431-460.
+Brodmann, K. (1909). Vergleichende localisationslehre der grosshirnrinde in ihren
+prinzipien dargestellt auf grund des zellenbaues (Principles of comparative localization in the cerebral cortex presented on the basis of cytoarchitecturel. Leipzig:
+Barth.
+
+556
+Brooks, L. R. (1978). Nonanalytic concept formation and memory for
+instances. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization.
+Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Brooks, L. R., Jacoby, L. L., & Whittlesea, B. W. A. (1985). The influence of
+specific familiarity on picture identification. Manuscript submitted for publication.
+Brown,
+R. (1973). A first language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
+Press.
+Bruce, C., Desimone, R., & Gross, C. G. (1981). Visual properties of neurons
+in a polysensory area in superior temporal sulcus of the macaque. Journal
+of Neurophysiology, 46, 369-384.
+Buisseret, P., Gary-Bobo, E., & Imbert, M. (1978). Ocular motility and
+recovery of orientational properties of visual cortical neurones in darkreared kittens. Nature, 272, 816-817.
+Bybee, J. L., & Slobin, D. I. (1982). Rules and schemas in the development
+and use of the English past tense. Language, 58, 265-289
+Cajal, S. Ramon y (1892). Die retina der wirbelthiere (The retina of vertebrates/.
+Wiesbaden: Bergman.
+Cajal, S. Ramon y (1911). Histologie du systeme nerveux de l'homme et des
+vertébrés T. 2. (Histology of the nervous system of man and of vertebrates, Vol.
+21. Paris: Maloine.
+Carman, J. B., Cowan, W. M., & Powell, T. P. S. (1964). The cortical projections upon the claustrum. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, & Psychiatry,
+27, 46-51.
+Changeux, J. -P., Heidmann, T., & Patte, P. (1984). Learning by selection. In
+P. Marler & H. S. Terrace (Eds.), The biology of learning (pp. 115-133).
+Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
+Chapman, R. A. (1966). The repetitive responses of isolated axons from the
+crab, Carcinus maenas. Journal of Experimental Biology, 45, 475-488
+Charniak, E. (1983). Passing markers: A theory of contextual influence in
+language comprehension. Cognitive Science, 7, 171-190.
+Cohen, M. A., & Grossberg, S. (1983). Absolute stability of global pattern
+formation and parallel memory storage by competitive neural networks.
+IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 13, 815-825.
+Cohen, N. J. (1981). Neuropsychological evidence for a distinction berween procedural and declarative knowledge in human memory and amnesia. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, San Diego.
+Cohen, N. J., & Squire, L. R. (1980). Preserved learning and retention of
+pattern-analyzing skill in amnesia: Dissociation of knowing how and knowing that. Science, 210, 207-210
+Cohen, N. J., Eichenbaum, H., Deacedo, B. S., & Corkin, S. (1985). Different
+memory systems underlying acquisition of procedural and declarative
+knowledge. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 444, 54-71.
+Cole, K. S. (1968). Membranes, ions, and impulses. Berkeley: University of
+California Press.
+Cole, R. A. (1973). Listening for mispronunciations: A measure of what we
+hear during speech. Perception & Psychophysics, 13, 153-156.
+
+557
+Cole, R. A., & Jakimik, J. (1978). Understanding speech: How words are
+heard. In G. Underwood (Ed.), Strategies of information processing.
+York: Academic Press.
+Cole. Re Ed.. Percenio and productiom of here spee repiane, N: EN:
+Cole, R. A., & Rudnicky, A. (1983). What's new in speech perception? The
+research and ideas of William Chandler Bagley, 1874-1946. Psychological
+Review, 90, 94-101.
+Colonnier, M. (1968). Synaptic patterns on different cell types in the different
+laminae of the cat visual cortex: An electron microscope study. Brain
+Research, 9, 268-287.
+Conel, J. LeRoy (1939). The postnatal development of the human cerebral cortex:
+Vol. 1. The cortex of the newborn. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
+Connors, B. W., Gutnick, M. J., & Prince, D. A. (1982). Electrophysiological
+properties of neocortical neurons in vitro. Journal of Neurophysiology, 48,
+1302-1320.
+Cooper, L. N., Lieberman, F., & Oja, E. (1979). A theory for the acquisition
+and loss of neuron specificity in visual cortex. Biological Cybernetics, 33,
+Cotton, S., & Grosjean, F. (1984). The gating paradigm: A comparison of successive and individual presentation formats. Perception & Psychophysics, 35,
+COITER: 154). Rochester. N. Liniversity or cho chesterd epe disambi Caine
+puter Science.
+Cottrell, G., & Small, S. (1983). A connectionist scheme for modeling word
+sense disambiguation. Cognition and Brain Theory, 1, 89-120.
+Crain, S., & Steedman, M. (1985). On not being led up the garden-path: The
+use of context by the psychological parser. In D. Dowty, L. Karttunen, &
+A. Zwicky (Eds.), Natural language parsing. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
+Crick, F. H. C. (1984). The function of the thalamic reticular complex: The
+searchlight hypothesis. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
+USA, 81, 4586-4590.
+Crow, T. J. (1968).
+Cortical synapses and reinforcement: A hypothesis.
+Nature, 219, 736-737.
+Crowder, R. G. (1976). Principles of learning and memory. Hillsdale, NJ:
+Erlbaum.
+Crowder, R. G. (1978). Mechanisms of auditory backward masking in the
+stimulus suffix effect. Psychological Review, 85, 502-524.
+Crowder, R. G. (1981). The role of auditory memory in speech perception and
+discrimination. In T. Myers, J. Laver, & J. Anderson (Eds.), The cognitive
+representation of speech (pp. 167-179). New York: North-Holland.
+Cynader, M. (1983). Prolonged sensitivity to monocular deprivation in darkreared cats: Effects of age and visual exposure. Developmental Brain
+Research, 8, 155-164.
+
+558 REFERENCES
+Cynader, M., Berman, N., & Hein, A. (1976). Recovery of function in cat
+visual cortex prolonged deprivation. Experimental Brain Research, 25,
+131-137
+Cynader, M., Timney, B. N., & Mitchell, D. E. (1980). Period of susceptibility
+of kitten visual cortex to the effects of monocular deprivation extends
+beyond six months of age. Brain Research, 191, 545-550.
+Daniel, P. M., & Whitteridge, D. (1961). The representation of the visual
+field on the cerebral cortex in monkeys. Journal of Physiology, 159,
+203-221.
+Davis, E. (1981). Organizing spatial knowledge (Research Rep. No. 193). New
+Haven, CT: Yale University, Department of Computer Science.
+Daw, N. W., & Wyatt, H. J. (1976). Kittens reared in a unidirectional
+environment: Evidence for a critical period. Journal of Physiology, 257,
+155-170
+Denes, P. (1955). Effect of duration on the perception of voicing. Journal of
+the Acoustical Society of America, 27, 761-764.
+for Neuroscience Abstracts, 6, 581.
+tour, color, and shape analysis beyond the striate cortex. Vision Research,
+25,441-452.
+Dowling, J. E., & Boycott, B. B. (1966). Organization of the primate retina:
+Electron
+microscopy. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B,
+166, 80-111.
+Dräger, U. C. (1978). Observations on monocular deprivation in mice. Journal of Neurophysiology, 41, 28-42
+Duda, R. O., & Hart, P. E. (1973). Pattern classification and scene analysis.
+New York: Wiley.
+Durham, D., & Woolsey, T. A. (1984). Effects of neonatal whisker lesions on
+mouse central trigeminal pathways. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 223,
+424-447.
+Eccles, J. C., Llinás, R., & Sakaski, K. (1966). The excitatory synaptic action
+of climbing fibres on the Purkinje cells of the cerebellum. Journal of Physiology, 182, 268-296.
+Edelman, G. M. (1981). Group selection as the basis for higher brain function. In F. O. Schmitt, F. G. Worden, G. Adelman, & S. G. Dennis (Eds.),
+The organization of cerebral cortex. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+Eimas, P. D. (1978). Developmental aspects of speech perception. In R
+Held, H. W. Liebowitz, & H.-L. Teuber (Eds.), Handbook of sensory physiology: Vol. 8. Perception (pp. 357-374). Berlin: Springer.
+Elio, R., & Anderson, J. R. (1981). The effects of category generalizations
+and instance similarity on schema abstraction.
+Journal of Experimental
+Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 7, 397-417.
+Elman, J. L. (1983). [Phonotactic rule effects). Unpublished data.
+Elman, J. L., & McClelland, J. L. (1984). The interactive activation model of
+speech perception. In N. Lass (Ed.), Language and speech (pp. 337-374).
+New York: Academic Presss.
+
+559
+Elman, J. L., & McClelland, J. L. (in press). Exploiting the lawful variability
+in the speech wave. In J. S. Perkell & D. H. Klatt (Eds.), Invariance and
+variability of speech processes. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Emson, P. C., & Hunt, S. P. (1981). Anatomical chemistry of the cerebral cortex. In F. O. Schmitt, F. G. Worden, G. Adelman, & S. G. Dennis (Eds.),
+The organization of the cerebral cortex (pp. 325-345). Cambridge, MA: MIT
+Press.
+Erman, L. D., & Lesser, U. R. (1980). The Hearsay-ll speech understanding
+system: A tutorial. In W. A. Lea (Ed.), Trends in speech recognition (pp.
+361-381). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
+Ervin, S. (1964). Imitation and structural change in children's language. In E.
+Lenneberg (Ed.), New directions in the study of language. Cambridge, MA:
+MIT Press.
+Fairén, A., & Valverde, F. (1980). A specialized type of neuron in the visual
+cortex of cat: A Golgi and electron microscope study of chandelier cells.
+Journal of Comparative Neurology, 194, 761-779.
+Famiglietti, E. V. (1970). Dendro-dendritic synapses in the lateral geniculate
+nucleus of the cat. Brain Research, 20, 181-191.
+Fanty, M. (1985). Context-free parsing in connectionist networks (TR-174).
+Rochester, NY: University of Rochester, Department of Computer Science
+Feldman, J. A. (1981). A connectionist model of visual memory. In G. E.
+Hinton & J. A. Anderson (Eds.), Parallel models of associative memory (pp.
+49-81). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Feldman, J. A., & Ballard, D. H. (1982). Connectionist models and their
+properties. Cognitive Science, 6, 205-254.
+Feldman, M. L., & Peters, A. (1978). The forms of nonpyramidal neuron in
+the visual cortex of the rat. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 179, 761-794.
+Feustel, T. C., Shiffrin, R. M., & Salasoo, A. (1983). Episodic and lexical contributions to the repetition effect in word identification. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 112, 309-346.
+Fillmore, C. J. (1968). The case for case. In E. Bach & R. T. Harms (Eds.),
+Universals in linguistic theory. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.
+Fodor, J. A., Bever, T. G., & Garrett, M. F. (1974). The psychology of
+language. New York: McGraw-Hill.
+Foley, J. D., & Van Dam, A. (1983). Fundamentals of interactive computer
+graphics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
+Ford, M., Bresnan, J., & Kaplan, R. M. (1982). A competence-based theory
+of syntactic closure. In J. Bresnan (Ed.), The mental representation of grammatical relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+Foss, D. J., & Blank, M. A. (1980). Identifying the speech codes.
+Cognitive
+Psychology, 12, 1-31.
+Foss, D. J., & Gernsbacher, M. A. (1983). Cracking the dual code: Toward a
+unitary model of phoneme identification. Journal of Verbal Learning and
+Verbal Behavior, 22, 609-633.
+Fowler, C. A. (1984). Segmentation of coarticulated speech in perception.
+Perception & Psychophysics, 36, 359-368
+Fox, R. A. (1982). Unpublished manuscript, Vanderbilt University.
+
+560 REFERENCES
+Fox, R. A. (1984). Effect of lexical status on phonetic categorization. Journal
+of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 10, 526-540.
+Frazier, L., & Rayner, K. (1982). Making and correcting errors during sentence comprehension: Eye movements in the analysis of structurally ambiguous sentences. Cognitive Psychology, 14, 178-210.
+Freeman, R. D., & Bonds, A. B. (1979). Cortical plasticity in monocularly
+deprived immobilized kittens depends on eye movement. Science, 206,
+1093-1095.
+Freeman, R. D., Sclar, G., & Ohzawa, I. (1982). Cortical binocularity is disrupted by strabismus more slowly than by monocular deprivation. Developmental Brain Research, 3, 311-316.
+Friedlander, M. J., Lin, C.-S., Stanford, L. R., & Sherman, S. M. (1981).
+Morphology of functionally identified neurons in lateral geniculate nucleus
+of the cat. Journal of Neurophysiology, 46, 80-129.
+Fry, D. B., Abramson, A. S., Eimas, P. D., & Liberman, A. M. (1962). The
+identification and discrimination of synthetic vowels. Language & Speech, 5,
+171-189.
+Fujimura, O., & Lovins, J. B. (1982). Syllables as concatenative phonetic
+units. In A. Bell & J. B. Hooper (Eds.), Syllables and segments (pp. 107-
+120). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
+Fujisaki, H., & Kawashima, T. (1968, August). The influence of various factors
+on the identification and discrimination of synthetic vowel sounds.
+Paper
+presented at the Sixth International Congress on Acoustics, Tokyo, Japan.
+Fuxe, K., Hökfelt, T., Said, S., & Mutt, V. (1977). Vasoactive intestinal
+polypeptide and the nervous system: Immunohistochemical evidence for
+localization in central and peripheral neurons particularly intracortical neurons of the cerebral cortex. Neuroscience Letters, 5, 241-246.
+Ganong,
+W. F. (1980). Phonetic categorization in auditory word perception.
+Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 6,
+110-115.
+Garey, L. J., & Powell, T. P. S. (1971). An experimental study of the termination of the lateral geniculo-cortical pathway in the cat and monkey.
+Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 179, 41-63.
+Gati, I., & Tversky, A. (1982). Representations of qualitative and quantitative
+dimensions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 8, 325-340.
+Georgopoulos, A. P., Caminiti, R., Kalaska, J. F., & Massey, T. (1983). Spatial
+coding of movement: A hypothesis concerning the coding of movement
+direction
+by motor cortical populations. Experimental Brain Research,
+Suppl. 1.
+Gerstein, G. L., Bloom, M. J., Espinosa, I. E., Evanczuk, S., & Turner, M. R.
+(1983). Design of a laboratory for multineuron studies. IEEE Transactions
+on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 13, 668-676.
+Gilbert, C. D. (1983). Microcircuitry of the visual cortex. Annual Review of
+Neuroscience, 6, 217-247.
+Gilbert, C. D., & Kelly, J. P. (1975). The projection of cells in different layers
+of the cat's visual cortex. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 163, 81-105.
+
+561
+Gilbert, C. D., & Wiesel, T. N. (1981). Projection bands in visual cortex.
+Society for Neuroscience, Abstract, 7, 356.
+Gilbert, C. D., & Wiesel, T. N. (1983). Clustered intrinsic connections in cat
+visual cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 3, 1116-1133.
+Gluck, M. A., & Thompson, R. F. (in press). Modeling the neural substrates
+of associative learning and memory: A computational approach. Psychological Review.
+Glushko, R. J. (1979). The organization and activation of orthographic
+knowledge in reading aloud. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 5, 674-691.
+Gray, E. G. (1959). Axo-somatic and axo-dendritic synapses of the cerebral
+cortex: An electron microscope study. Journal of Anatomy, 93, 420-433.
+Green, D. M., & Swets, J. A. (1966). Signal detection theory and psychophysics.
+New York: Wiley.
+Grinvald, A. (1985).
+Real-time optical mapping of neuronal activity: From
+single growth cones to the intact mammalian brain. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 8, 263-305.
+Grosjean, F. (1980). Spoken word recognition processes and the gating paradigm. Perception & Psychophysics, 28, 267-283.
+Grosjean, F. (1985). The recognition of a word after its acoustic offset: Evidence
+and implications. Unpublished manuscript, Northeastern University.
+Grosjean, F., & Gee, J. (1984). Another view of spoken word recognition.
+Unpublished manuscript, Northeastern University.
+Grossberg, S. (1976). Adaptive pattern classification and universal recoding:
+Part 1. Parallel development and coding of neural feature detectors. Biological Cybernetics, 23, 121-134.
+Grossberg, S. (1980). How does the brain build a cognitive code? Psychological Review, 87, 1-51.
+Grossberg, S. (1982). Studies of mind and brain. Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel.
+Guillery, R. W. (1969). The organization of synaptic interconnections in the
+laminae of the dorsal lateral geniculate nucleus of the cat. Zeitschrift
+Zellforschung und Mikroskopische Anatomie, 96, 1-38.
+Halle, M., & Stevens, K. N. (1964). Speech recognition: A model and a program for research. In J. A. Fodor & J. J. Katz (Eds.), The structure of
+language: Readings in the psychology of language. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
+Prentice-Hall
+Harik, S. J., Duckrow, R. B., LaManna, J. C., Rosenthal, M., Sharma, V. K.,
+& Banerjee, S. P. (1981). Cerebral compensation for chronic noradrenergic
+denervation induced by locus coerulus lesion: Recovery of receptor binding,
+isoproterenol-induced adenylate cyclase activity, and oxidative metabolism.
+Journal of Neuroscience, 1, 641-649.
+Hawkins, R. D., Abrams, T. W., Carew, T. J., & Kandel, E. R. (1983). A cellular mechanism of classical conditioning in Aplysia: Activity dependent
+amplification of presynaptic facilitation. Science, 219, 400-404.
+Henneberg, R. (1910).
+Messung der Oberflachenausdehnung der
+Grosshirnrinde [Measurement of the surface area of the cerebral cortex].
+Journal für Psychologie und Neurologie, 17, 144-158.
+
+562 REFERENCES
+Hinton, G. E. (198la). Implementing semantic networks in parallel hardware.
+In G. E. Hinton & J. A. Anderson (Eds.), Parallel models of associative
+memory (pp. 161-188). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Hinton, G. E. (1981b). A parallel computation that assigns canonical objectbased frames of reference. Proceedings of the Tth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 683-685.
+Hinton, G. E. (1981c). Shape representation in parallel systems. Proceedings
+of the Ith International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1088-1096
+Hinton, G. E. (1984). Parallel computations for controlling an arm. Journal of
+Motor Behavior, 16, 171-194.
+Hinton, G. E., & Anderson, J. A. (Eds.). (1981). Parallel models of associative
+memory. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Hinton, G. E., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1983). Optimal perceptual inference.
+Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision Pattern Recognition,
+448-453.
+Hinton, G. E., Sejnowski, T. J., & Ackley, D. H. (1984). Boltzmann machines:
+Constraint satisfaction networks that learn (Tech. Rep. CMU-CS-84-119).
+Pittsburgh: Carnegie-Mellon University, Department of Computer Science
+Hintzman, D. (1983). Schema abstraction in a multiple trace memory model.
+Paper presented at conference on "The Priority of the Specific," Elora,
+Ontario, Canada.
+Hofstadter, D. (1979). Gödel, Escher, Bach: An eternal golden braid. New
+York: Basic Books.
+Hogg, T., & Huberman, B. A. (1984). Understanding biological computation:
+Reliable learning and recognition. Proceedings of the National Academy of
+Sciences, USA, 81, 6871-6875.
+Hopfield,
+, J. J. (1982). Neural networks and physical systems with emergent
+collective computational abilities. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 79, 2554-2558.
+Hopfield, J. J., & Tank, D. (1985). "Neural" computation of decisions in
+optimization problems. Biological Cybernetics, 52, 141-152.
+Hopkins, W. F., & Johnston, D. (1984). Frequency-dependent noradrenergic
+modulation of long-term potentiation in the hippocampus. Science, 226,
+350-352.
+Houser, C. R., Vaughn, J. E., Barber, R. P., & Roberts, E. (1980). GABA
+neurons are the major cell type of the nucleus reticularis thalami. Brain
+Research, 200, 341-354.
+Hubel, D. H., & Wiesel, T. N. (1962). Receptive fields, binocular interaction,
+and functional architecture in the cat's visual cortex. Journal of Physiology,
+160, 106-154.
+Hubel, D. H., & Wiesel, T. N. (1965). Binocular interaction in striate cortex
+of kittens reared with artificial squint. Journal of Neurophysiology, 28,
+1041-1059.
+Hubel, D. H., & Wiesel, T. N. (1968). Receptive fields and functional architecture of monkey striate cortex. Journal of Physiology, 195, 215-243.
+Hubel, D. H., & Wiesel, T. N. (1970a). Cells sensitive to binocular depth in
+area 18 of the macaque monkey cortex. Nature, 225, 41-42.
+
+563
+Hubel, D. H., & Wiesel, T. N. (1970b). The period of susceptibility to the
+physiological effects of unilateral eye closure in kittens. Journal of Physiol-
+оду, 206, 419-436.
+Hubel, D. H., & Wiesel, I. N. (1972). Laminar and columnar distribution of
+geniculo-cortical fibers in the macaque monkey. Journal of Comparative
+Neurology, 146, 421-450.
+Hubel, key visual Mies, Proceedings of Fencieh al circh of London, Maries U.
+198, 1-59.
+lubel. D. H.. Wiesel, I. N.
+hance columns in monkey strate corlex. Philos Phical Transactilar do me
+Royal Society of London, Series B, 278, 377-409
+Huppert, F. A., & Piercy, M. (1978). Dissociation between learning and
+remembering in organic amnesia. Nature, 275, 317-318.
+Imig, T. J., & Brugge, J. F. (1978). Sources and terminations of callosal axons
+related to binaural and frequency maps in primary auditory cortex of the
+cat. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 182, 637-660.
+Iverson, L. L. (1984). Amino acids and peptides: Fast and slow chemical signals in the nervous system? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London,
+Series B, 221, 245-260.
+Jacoby, L. L. (1983a).
+Perceptual enhancement: Persistent effects of an
+experience. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9, 21-38.
+Jacoby, L. L. (1983b). Remembering the data: Analyzing interaction processes
+in reading. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 22, 485-508.
+Jenkins, W. M., Merzenich, M. M., & Ochs, M. T. (1984). Behaviorally controlled differential use of restricted hand surfaces induces changes in the
+cortical representation of the hand in area 3b of adult owl monkeys. Society
+for Neuroscience Abstracts, 10, 665.
+Johnson, E., Sickels, E. R., & Sayers, F. C. (Eds.). (1970). Anthology of
+children's literature (4th ed.). Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
+Johnston, J. C., Hale, B. L., & van Santen, J. P. H. (1983). Resolving letter
+position uncertainty in words (TM 83-11221-19). Murray Hill, NJ: Bell Labs.
+Jones, E. G. (197Sa). Lamination and differential distribution of thalamic
+afferents within the sensory-motor cortex of the squirrel monkey. Journal
+of Comparative Neurology, 160, 167-204.
+Jones, E. G. (1975b). Some aspects of the organization of the thalamic reticular complex. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 162, 285-308
+Jones, E. G. (1975c). Varieties and distribution of nonpyramidal cells in the
+somatic sensory cortex of the squirrel monkey. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 160, 205-268.
+Jones, E. G., & Leavitt, R. Y. (1974). Retrograde axonal transport and the
+demonstration of nonspecific projections to the cerebral cortex and striatum
+from thalamic intralaminar nuclei in rat, cat, and monkey. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 154, 349-378.
+Jones, E. G., & Powell, T. P. S. (1970a). An anatomical study of converging
+sensory pathways within the cerebral cortex of the monkey. Brain, 93,
+793-820.
+
+564 REFERENCES
+Jones, E. G., & Powell, T. P. S. (1970b). An electron microscopic study of the
+laminar pattern and mode of termination of afferent fibre pathways in the
+somatic sensory cortex of the cat. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
+Society of London, Series B, 257, 45-62.
+Jones, E. G., & Wise, S. P. (1977). Size, laminar, and columnar distribution
+of efferent cells in the sensory-motor cortex of monkey. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 175, 391-438.
+Just, M. A., & Carpenter, P. A. (1980). A theory of reading: Eye fixations to
+comprehension. Psychological Review, 87, 329-354
+Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (in press). Norm theory: Comparing reality to
+its alternatives. Psychological Review.
+Kandel, E. R., & Schwartz, J. H. (1981). Principles of neural science. New
+York: Elsevier/North Holland.
+Kandel, E. R., & Schwartz, J. H. (1982). Molecular biology of memory:
+Modulation of transmitter release. Science, 218, 433-443.
+Kant, E. (1963). Critique of pure reason (2nd ed., N. Kemp Smith, Trans.).
+London: Macmillan. (Original work published 1787)
+Kaplan, R., & Bresnan, J. (1982). Lexical functional grammar: A formal system for grammatical representation. In J. Bresnan (Ed.), The mental
+representation of grammatical relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+Kasamatsu, T. (1983). Neuronal plasticity by the central norepinephrine system in the cat visual cortex. Progress in Psychobiology & Physiological
+Psychology, 10, 1-112.
+Kasamatsu, T., & Heggelund, P. (1982). Single cell responses in cat visual
+cortex to visual stimulation during iontophoresis of noradrenaline. Experimental Brain Research, 45, 317-327.
+Kasamatsu, T., & Pettigrew, J. (1979). Preservation of binocularity after
+monocular deprivation in the striate cortex of kittens treated with 6-
+hydroxydopamine. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 185, 139-161.
+Kasamatsu, T., Pettigrew, J., & Ary, M. (1979). Restoration of visual cortical
+plasticity by local microperfusion of norepinephrine. Journal of Comparative
+Neurology, 185, 163-182.
+Kawamoto, A. H. (1985). Dynamic processes in the (re)solution of lexical ambiguity. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Brown University.
+Kewley-Port, D. (1982). Measurement of formant transitions in naturally produced stop consonant-vowel syllables. Journal of the Acoustical Society of
+America, 12, 379-389.
+Klatt, D. H. (1980). Speech perception: A model of acoustic-phonetic analysis
+and lexical access. In R. Cole (Ed.), Perception and production of fluent
+speech (pp. 243-288). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Knapp, A., & Anderson, J. A. (1984). A signal averaging model for concept
+formation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 10, 616-637.
+Koch, C., & Poggio, T. (1985). Biophysics of computation: Nerves, synapses,
+and membranes. In G. M. Edelman, W. E. Gall, & W. M. Cowan (Eds.),
+New insights into synaptic function.
+New York: Neuroscience Research
+Foundation/ Wiley.
+
+565
+Koch, C., Poggio, T., & Torre, V. (1982). Retinal ganglion cells: A functional
+interpretation of dendritic morphology. Philosophical Transactions of the
+Royal Society of London, Series B, 298, 227-264.
+Kohonen, T. (1977). Associative memory: A system theoretical approach. New
+York: Springer.
+Kohonen, T. (1984). Self-organization and associative memory.
+Berlin:
+Springer-Verlag.
+Konishi, M. (1978). Ethological aspects of auditory pattern recognition. In R.
+Held, H. W. Liebowitz, & H.-L. Teuber (Eds.), Handbook of sensory physiology: Vol. 8. Perception (pp. 289-309). Berlin: Springer.
+Kratz, K. E., Spear, P. D., & Smith, D. C. (1976). Posteritical-period reversal
+of effects of monocular deprivation on striate cortex cells in the cat. Journal of Neurophysiology, 39, 501-511.
+Krnjevíc, K., & Phillis, J. W. (1963). Iontophoretic studies of neurons in the
+mammalian cerebral cortex. Journal of Physiology, 165, 274-304.
+Kubie, J., Muller, R. U., & Ranck, J. B. Jr. (1983). Manipulations of the
+geometry of environmental enclosures control the spatial firing patterns of
+rat hippocampal neurons. Society for Neuroscience Abstracts, 9, 647.
+Kucera, H., & Francis, W. (1967). Computational analysis of present-day American English. Providence, RI: Brown University Press.
+Kuczaj, S. A. (1977). The acquisition of regular and irregular past tense
+forms. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 16, 589-600.
+Kuczaj, S. A. (1978). Children's judgments of grammatical and ungrammatical
+irregular past tense verbs. Child Development, 49, 319-326.
+Kuffler, S. W. (1953). Discharge patterns and functional organization of mammalian retina. Journal of Neurophysiology, 16, 37-68
+Kuipers, B. (1978). Modeling spatial knowledge. Cognitive Science, 2, 129-153.
+Kuipers, B. (1983). Modeling human knowledge of routes: Partial knowledge
+and individual variation. Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
+Intelligence, 216-219.
+Kuno, M. (1964). Mechanism of facilitation and depression of the excitatory
+synaptic potential in spinal motoneurons. Journal of Physiology, 175,
+100-112.
+Kuperstein, M., & Eichenbaum, H. (1985). Unit activity, evoked potentials,
+and slow waves in the rat hippocampus and olfactory bulb recorded with a
+24-channel microelectrode. Neuroscience, 15, 703-712.
+Kurtzman, H. S. (1985). Studies in syntactic ambiguity resolution. Unpublished
+doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
+Lane, H. L. (1965). The motor theory of speech perception: A critical review.
+Psychological Review, 72, 275-309.
+Lehiste, I. (1960). An acoustic-phonetic study of internal open juncture.
+Phonetica, 5, 1-54.
+Lehiste, I. (1964). Juncture. In Proceedings of the Sth International Congress of
+Phonetic Sciences, Munster (pp. 172-200). New York: Karger.
+Lenneberg, E. H. (1967). Biological foundations of language. New York: Wiley.
+LeVay, S. (1973). Synaptic patterns in the visual cortex of the cat and monkey. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 150, 53-86.
+
+566 REFERENCES
+LeVay, S., Connolly, M., Houde, J., & Van Essen, D. C. (1985). The complete pattern of ocular dominance stripes in the striate cortex and visual
+field of the macaque monkey. Journal of Neuroscience, 5, 486-501.
+LeVay, S., & Sherk, H. (198la). The visual claustrum of the cat: I. Structure
+and connections. Journal of Neuroscience, 1, 956-980.
+LeVay, S., & Sherk, H. (1981b). The visual claustrum of the cat: Il. The
+visual field map. Journal of Neuroscience, 1, 981-992.
+LeVay, S., Wiesel, T. N., & Hubel, D. H. (1980). The development of ocular
+dominance columns in normal and visually deprived monkeys. Journal of
+Comparative Neurology, 191, 1-51.
+Levin, J. A. (1976). Proteus: An activation framework for cognitive process models
+(Tech. Rep. No. ISI/WP-2). Marina del Rey: University of Southern California, Information Sciences Institute.
+Lewis, B. (1878). On the comparative structur of the cortex cerebri. Brain, 1,
+79-96.
+Liberman, A. M. (1970). The grammars of speech and language. Cognitive
+Psychology, 1, 301-323.
+Liberman, A. M., Cooper, F. S., Shankweiler, D., & Studdert-Kennedy, M
+(1967). Perception of the speech code. Psychological Review, 84, 452-471.
+Licklider, J. C. R., & Miller, G. A. (1951). The perception of speech. In S. S.
+Stevens (Ed.), Handbook of Experimental Psychology. New York: Wiley.
+Llinás, R., & Nicholson, C. (1969). Electrophysiological analysis of alligator
+cerebellum: A study of dendritic spikes. In R. Llinás (Ed.), Neurobiology of
+cerebellar evolution and development (pp. 431-465). Chicago: American Medical Association.
+Loeb, G. E. (1985, February). The functional replacement of the ear. Scientific American, pp. 104-111.
+Loftus, E. F. (1977). Shifting human color memory. Memory & Cognition, 6,
+696-699.
+Loomis, L. H., & Sternberg, S. (1968). Advanced calculus.
+Reading, MA:
+Addison-Wesley.
+Lorente de Nó, R. (1943). Cerebral cortex: Architecture, intracortical connections, motor projections. In J. F. Fulton (Ed.), Physiology of the nervous system (2nd ed., pp. 274-301). New York: Oxford University Press.
+Luce, R. D. (1959). Individual choice behavior. New York: Wiley.
+Luce, R. D. (1963). Detection and recognition. In R. D. Luce, R. R. Bush, &
+E. Galanter (Eds.), Handbook of mathematical psychology (Vol. I). New
+York: Wiley.
+Lund, J. S. (1973). Organization of neurons in the visual cortex, area 17, of
+the monkey (Macaca mulatta). Journal of Comparative Neurology, 147,
+455-496.
+Lund, J. S., Lund, R. D., Hendrickson, A. E., Bunt, A. H., & Fuchs, A. F.
+(1975). The origin of efferent pathways from the primary visual cortex,
+area 17, of the macaque monkey as shown by retrograde transport of horseradish peroxidase. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 164, 287-304.
+Lund, R. D. (1972). Synaptic patterns in the superficial layer of the superior
+colliculus of the monkey, Macaca mulatta. Experimental Brain Research, 15,
+194-211.
+
+567
+Lynch, J. C., Mountcastle, V. B., Talbot, W. H., & Yin, T. C. T. (1977).
+Parietal lobe mechanisms for directed
+visual attention. Journal of Neurophysiology, 40, 362-389.
+Ma, S. -K
+. (1976). Modern theory of critical phenomena. Reading, MA:
+Benjamin.
+Macchi, G., Bentivoglio, M., Minciacchi, D., & Molinari, M. (1981). The
+organization of the claustroneocortical projections in the cat studied by
+means of the HRP retrograde axonal transport. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 195, 681-695.
+MacWhinney, B., Bates, E., & Kliegl, R. (1984). Cue validity and sentence
+interpretation in English, German, and Italian. Journal of Verbal Learning
+and Verbal Behavior, 23, 127-150.
+Mac Whinney, B., & Sokolov, J. L. (in press). The competition model of the
+acquisition of syntax. In B. MacWhinney (Ed.), Mechanisms of language
+acquisition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Macy, A., Ohzawa, I., & Freeman, R. D. (1982). A quantitative study of the
+classification and stability of ocular dominance in the cat's visual cortex.
+Experimental Brain Research, 48, 401-408
+Mann, V. A., & Repp, B. H. (1980). Influence of vocalic context on perception of the [s]-[s) distinction. Perception & Psychophysics, 28, 213-228.
+Marcus, M. P. (1980). A theory of syntactic recognition for natural language.
+Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+Marin-Padilla, M. (1969). Origin of the pericellular baskets of the pyramidal
+cells of the human motor cortex: A Golgi study. Brain Research, 14,
+633-646.
+Marr, D. (1982). Vision. San Francisco: Freeman.
+Marrocco, R. T., & McClurkin, J. W. (1979). Binocular interaction in the
+lateral geniculate nucleus of the monkey. Brain Research, 168, 633-637.
+Marslen-Wilson, W. D. (1973). Linguistic structure and speech shadowing at
+very short latencies. Nature, 244, 522-523.
+Marsien-Wilson, W. D. (1980). Speech understanding as a psychological process. In J. C. Simon (Ed.), Spoken language generation and understanding
+(pp. 39-67). New York: Reidel.
+Marslen-Wilson, W. D., & Tyler, L. K. (1975). Processing structure of sentence perception. Nature, London, 257, 784-786.
+Marslen-Wilson, W. D., & Tyler, L. K. (1980). The temporal structure of spoken language understanding. Cognition, 8, 1-71.
+Marslen-Wilson, W. D., & Tyler, L. K. (1981). Central processes in speech
+understanding. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London B,
+295, 317-332.
+Marslen-Wilson, W. D., & Welsh, A. (1978). Processing interactions and lexical access during word recognition in continuous speech. Cognitive Psychol-
+оду, 10, 29-63.
+Martin, K. A. C., Somogyi, P., & Whitteridge, D. (1983). Physiological and
+morphological properties of identified basket cells in the cat's visual cortex.
+Experimental Brain Research, 50, 193-200.
+Massaro, D. W. (1975). Experimental psychology and information processing.
+Chicago: Rand McNally.
+
+568 REFERENCES
+Massaro, D. W. (1981). Sound to representation: An information-processing
+analysis. In T. Myers, J. Laver, & J. Anderson (Eds.), The cognitive
+representation of speech (pp. 181-193). New York: North-Holland.
+Massaro, D. W., & Cohen, M. M. (1977). The contribution of voice-onset
+time and fundamental frequency as cues to the / zi/-/ si/ distinction. Perception & Psychophysics, 22, 373-382.
+Massaro, D. W., & Cohen, M. M. (1983). Phonological constraints in speech
+perception. Perception & Psychophysics, 34, 338-348.
+Massaro, D. W., & Oden, G. C. (1980a). Evaluation and integration of acoustic features in speech perception. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 67,996-1013.
+Massaro, D. W., & Oden, G. C. (1980b). Speech perception: A framework for
+research and theory. In N. Lass (Ed.), Speech and language: Advances in
+basic research and practice (Vol. 3, pp. 129-165). New York: Academic
+Maunsell, J. H. R., Newsome, W. T., & Van Essen, D. C. (1980). The spatial
+organization of connections between V1 and V2 in the macaque: Patchy and
+nonpatchy projections. Society for Neuroscience Abstracts, 6, 580.
+Maunsell, J. H. R., & Van Essen, D. C. (1983). The connections of the middle temporal visual area (MT) and their relation to a cortical hierarchy in
+the macaque monkey. Journal of Neuroscience, 3, 2563-2586.
+McClelland, J. L. (1981). Retrieving general and specific information from
+stored knowledge of specifics. Proceedings of the Third Annual Meeting of the
+Cognitive Science Society, 170-172.
+McClelland, J. L. (1985). Putting knowledge in its place: A scheme for programming parallel processing structures on the fly. Cognitive Science, 9,
+113-146.
+McClelland, J. L., & Elman, J. L. (1986). The TRACE model of speech perception. Cognitive Psychology, 18, 1-86.
+McClelland, J. L., & Rumelhart, D. E. (1981). An interactive activation model
+of context effects in letter perception: Part 1. An account of basic findings.
+Psychological Review, 88, 375-407.
+McClelland, J. L., & Rumelhart, D. E. (1985). Distributed memory and the
+representation of general and specific information. Journal of Experimental
+Psychology: General, 114, 159-188
+McConkie, G. W., Zola, D., Blanchard, H. E., & Wolverton, G. S. (1982).
+Perceiving words during reading. Perception & Psychophysics, 32, 271-281.
+McDermott, D. (1980). Spatial inferences with ground, metric formulas on simple
+objects (Research Rep. No. 173). New Haven, CT: Yale University, Department of Computer Science.
+McNaughton, B. L., Barnes, C. A., & O'Keefe, J. (1983). The contributions
+of position, direction, and velocity to single unit activity in the hippocampus
+of freely moving rats. Experimental Brain Research, 52, 41-49.
+Medin, D. L., & Schwanenflugel, P. J. (1981). Linear separability in classification learning.
+Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and
+Memory, 7, 355-368
+Medin, D. L., & Schaffer, M. M. (1978). Context theory of classification
+learning. Psychological Review, 85, 207-238.
+
+REFERENCES 569
+Merzenich, M. M., & Kaas, J. H. (1982). Reorganization of mammalian
+somatosensory cortex following peripheral nerve injury. Trends in Neuroscience, 5, 434-436.
+Merzenich, M. M., Kaas, J. H., Wall, J. T., Sur, M., Nelson, R. J., & Felleman, D. J. (1983). Progression of change following median nerve section
+in the cortical representation of the hand in areas 3b and I in adult owl and
+squirrel monkeys. Neuroscience, 10, 639-665.
+Mesulam, M.-M., & Van Hoesen, G. W. (1976). Acetylcholinesterase-rich
+projections from the basal forebrain of the rhesus monkey to neocortex.
+Brain Research, 109, 152-157.
+Michael, C. R. (1978). Color vision mechanisms in monkey striate cortex:
+Dual-opponent cells with concentric receptive fields. Journal of Neurophysiology, 41, 572-588.
+Miller, G. A. (1962). Some psychological studies of grammar. American
+Psychologist, 17, 748-762
+Miller, G., Heise, G., & Lichten, W. (1951). The intelligibility of speech as a
+function of the context of the test materials. Journal of Experimental
+Psychology, 41, 329-335
+Miller, J. L. (1981). Effects of speaking rate on segmental distinctions. In
+P. D. Eimas & J. L. Miller (Eds.), Perspectives on the study of speech (pp.
+39-74). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Miller, J. L., Green, K., & Schermer, T. M. (1984). A distinction between the
+effects of sentential speaking rate and semantic congruity on word identification. Perception & Psychophysics, 36, 329-337.
+Miller, J. P., Rall, W., & Rinzel, J. (1985). Synaptic amplification by active
+membrane in dendritic spines. Brain Research, 325, 325-330
+Milner, B. (1966). Amnesia following operation on the temporal lobes. In
+C. M. W. Whitty & O. L. Zangwill (Eds.), Amnesia. London: Butterworth.
+Minsky, M. (1975). A framework for representing knowledge. In P. H. Winston (Ed.), The psychology of computer vision (pp. 211-277). New York:
+McGraw-Hill.
+Minsky, M., & Papert, S. (1969). Perceptrons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+Miyuwaki, K., Strange, W., Verbrugge, R., Liberman, A. M., Jenkins, J. J., &
+Fujimura, O. (1975). An effect of linguistic experience: The discrimination of Irl and lIl by native speakers of Japanese and English. Perception &
+Psychophysics, 18, 331-340.
+Montero, V. M., & Scott, G. L. (1981). Synaptic terminals in the dorsal lateral
+geniculate nucleus from neurons of the thalamic reticular nucleus: A light
+and electron microscope autoradiographic study. Neuroscience, 6,
+2561-2577.
+Morrell, F. (1972). Integrative properties of parastriate neurons. In A. G.
+Karczmar & J. C. Eccles (Eds.), Brain and human behavior. Berlin:
+Springer-Verlag.
+Morris, R. G. M., Garrud, P., Rawlins, J. N. P., & O'Keefe, J. (1982). Place
+navigation impaired in rats with hippocampal lesions. Nature, 297, 681-683.
+Morrison, J. H., Magistretti, P. J., Benoit, R., & Bloom, F. E. (1984). The distribution and morphological characteristics of the intracortical VIP-positive
+cell: An immunohistochemical analysis. Brain Research, 292, 269-282.
+
+570 REFERENCES
+Morton, J. (1969). Interaction of information in word recognition. Psychological Review, 76, 165-178
+Morton, J. (1979). Facilitation in word recognition: Experiments causing
+change in the logogen model. In P. A. Kohlers, M. E. Wrolstal, & H.
+Bouma (Eds.), Processing visible language I. New York: Plenum.
+Moser, M. G. (1983). An overview of NIKL: The new implementation of
+KL-ONE. In C. Sidner, M. Bates, R. Bobrow, B. Goodman, A. Haas, R.
+Ingria, D. Israel, D. McAllester, M. Moser, J. Schmolze, & M. Vilain
+(Eds.), Research in knowledge representation for natural language understanding: Annual report (BBN Report No. 5421). Cambridge, MA: Bolt, Beranek,
+and Newman.
+Mountcastle, V. B. (1957). Modality and topographic properties of single neurons of cat's somatic sensory cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology, 20,
+408-434.
+Mountcastle, V. B. (1978). An organizing principle for cerebral function: The
+unit module and the distributed system. In G. M. Edelman & V. B. Mountcastle (Eds.), The mindful brain (pp. 7-50). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+Mower, G. D., Christen, W. G., & Caplan, C. J. (1983). Very brief visual
+experience eliminates plasticity in the cat visual cortex. Science, 221, 178-
+180.
+Mozer, M. C. (1983). Letter migration in word perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 9, 531-546.
+Muller, R. U., Kubie, J. L., & Ranck, J. B. Jr. (1983).
+High resolution mapping of the spatial fields of hippocampal neurons in the freely moving rat.
+Society for Neuroscience Abstracts, 9, 646.
+Munro, P. W. (1984). A model for generalization and specification by single
+neurons. Biological Cybernetics, 51, 169-179
+Murray, E. A., & Coulter, J. D. (1981). Organization of corticospinal neurons
+in the monkey. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 195, 339-365
+Nakatani, L., & Dukes, K. (1977). Locus of segmental cues for word juncture.
+Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 62, 714-719.
+Nauta, W. J. H., & Feirtag, M. (1979). The organization of the brain. Scientific American, 241, 88-111.
+Nelson, R. J., Sur, M., Felleman, D. J., & Kaas, J. H. (1980). Representations
+of the body surface in postcentral parietal cortex of Macaca fascicularis.
+Journal of Comparative Neurology, 192, 611-644.
+Norman, D. A., & Bobrow, D. G. (1975). On data-limited and resourcelimited processes. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 44-64.
+Norman, D. A., & Bobrow, D. G. (1976). On the role of active memory
+processes in perception and cognition. In C. N. Cofer (Ed.), The structure of
+human memory. San Francisco: Freeman.
+Norman, D. A., & Bobrow, D. G. (1979). Descriptions: An intermediate stage
+in memory retrieval. Cognitive Psychology, 11, 107-123.
+Norman, D. A., & Shallice, T. (in press). Attention to action: Willed and
+automatic control of behavior. In R. J. Davidson, G. E. Schwartz, & D.
+Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self regulation: Advances in research, Vol.
+IV. New York: Plenum Press.
+
+571
+Norris, D. (1982). Autonomous processes in comprehension: A reply to
+Marslen- Wilson and lyler. Cognition, 11, 9/-101.
+Nusbaum, H. C., & Slowiaczek, L. M. (1982). An activation model of auditory
+word recognition (Research on Speech Perception, Progress Report No. 8).
+Bloomington: Indiana University, Department of Psychology.
+O'Keefe, J. (1976). Place units in the hippocampus of the freely moving rat.
+Experimental Neurobiology, 51, 78-109.
+O'Keefe, J. (1979). A review of the hippocampal place cells. Progress in Neurobiology, 13, 429-439.
+O'Keefe, J., & Dostrovsky, J. (1971). The hippocampus as a spatial map: Preliminary evidence from unit activity in the freely
+moving rat. Brain
+Research, 34, 171-175.
+O'Keefe, J., & Nadel, L. (1979). The hippocampus as a cognitive map.
+Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2, 487-533.
+O'Kusky, J., & Colonnier, M. (1982). A laminar analysis of the number of
+neurons, glia, and synapses in the visual cortex (area 17) of adult macaque
+monkeys. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 210, 278-290.
+Oden, G. C. (1978). Semantic constraints and judged preference for interpretations of ambiguous sentences. Memory & Cognition, 6, 26-37.
+Oden, G. C., & Massaro, D. W. (1978). Integration of featural information in
+speech perception. Psychological Review, 85, 172-191.
+Olson, C. R., & Freeman, R. D. (1975). Progressive changes in kitten striate
+cortex during monocular vision. Journal of Neurophysiology, 38, 26-32.
+Olton, D. S. (1984). Animal models of human amnesia. In L. R. Squire & N.
+Butters (Eds.), The neuropsychology of memory. New York: Guilford Press.
+Olton, D. S., Branch, M., & Best, P. (1978). Spatial correlates of hippocampal
+unit activity. Experimental Neurobiology, 58, 387-409.
+Pandya, D. N., & Kuypers, H. G. J. M. (1969). Cortico-cortical connections in
+the rhesus monkey. Brain Research, 13, 13-36.
+Peck, C. K., & Blakemore, C. (1975). Modification of single neurons in the
+kitten's visual cortex after brief periods of monocular visual experience.
+Experimental Brain Research, 22, 57-68.
+Perez, R., Glass, L., & Shlaer, R. (1975). Development of specificity in the
+cat visual cortex. Journal of Mathematical Biology, 1, 275-288.
+Perkel, D. H., & Perkel, D. J. (1985). Dendritic spines: Role of active membrane in modulating synaptic efficacy. Brain Research, 325, 331-335.
+Perrett, D. I., Rolls, E. T., & Caan, W. (1982). Visual neurones responsive to
+faces in the monkey temporal cortex. Experimental Brain Research, 47,
+329-342.
+Peters, A., & Kaiserman-Abramof, I. R. (1969). The small pyramidal neuron
+of the rat cerebral cortex: The synapses upon dendritic spines. Zietschrift
+für Zellforschung und Mikrokopische Anatomie, 100, 487-506.
+Peters, A., Palay, S. L., & Webster, H. deF. (1976). The fine structure of the
+nervous system. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders.
+Peters, A., Proskauer, C. C., & Kaiserman-Abramof, I. R. (1968). The small
+pyramidal neuron of the rat cerebral cortex: The axon hillock and initial
+segment. Journal of Cell Biology, 39, 604-619.
+
+572 REFERENCES
+Peters, A., Proskauer, C. C., & Ribak, C. E. (1982). Chandelier cells in rat
+visual cortex. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 206, 397-416.
+Piaget, J. (1952). The origins of intelligence in children. New York: International University Press.
+Pinker, S. (1984). Language learnability and language development. Cambridge,
+MA: Harvard University Press.
+Pisoni, D. B. (1973). Auditory and phonetic memory codes in the discrimination of consonants and vowels. Perception & Psychophysics, 13, 253-260.
+Pisoni, D. B. (1975). Auditory short-term memory and vowel perception.
+Memory & Cognition, 3, 7-18.
+Pisoni, D. B., & Lazarus, J. H. (1974). Categorical and noncategorical modes
+of speech perception along the voicing continuum. Journal of the Acoustical
+Society of America, 55, 328-333.
+Pisoni, D. B., & Tash, J. (1974). Reaction times to comparisons within and
+across phonetic categories. Perception & Psychophysics, 15, 285-290
+Poggio, T., & Torre, V. (1978). A new approach to synaptic interactions. In
+R. Heim & G. Palm (Eds.), Approaches to complex systems. Berlin:
+Springer-Verlag
+Porrino, L. J., Crane, A. M., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1981). Direct and
+indirect pathways from the amygdala to the frontal lobe in rhesus monkeys.
+Journal of Comparative Neurology, 198, 121-136.
+Poschel, B. P. H., & Ninteman, F. W. (1963). Norepinephrine: A possible
+excitatory neurohormone of the reward system. Life Sciences, 2, 782-788.
+Posner, M. I., & Keele, S. W. (1968). On the genesis of abstract ideas. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 77, 353-363
+Posner, M. I., & Keele, S. W. (1970). Retention of abstract ideas. Journal of
+Experimental Psychology, 83, 304-308.
+Powell, T. P. S., & Cowan, W. M. (1967). The interpretation of the degenerative changes in the intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 30, 140-153.
+Powell, T. P. S., & Hendrickson, A. E. (1981). Similarity in number of neurons through the depth of the cortex in the binocular and monocular parts
+of area 17 of the monkey. Brain Research, 216, 409-413.
+Rall, W. (1970). Cable properties of dendrites and effects of synaptic location.
+In P. Andersen & J. Jansen (Eds.), Excitatory synaptic mechanisms (pp. 175-
+187). Oslo Universitersforlag.
+Rall, W., Shepherd, G. M., Reese, T. S., & Brightman, M. W. (1966). Dendrodendritic synaptic pathway for inhibition in the olfactory bulb. Experimental Neurology, 14, 44-56.
+Ralston, H. J. (1968). The fine structure of neurons in the dorsal horn of the
+cat spinal cord. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 132, 275-302.
+Ramachandran, V. S., & Kupperman, B. (in press). Reversal of the physiological effects of monocular deprivation in adult dark-reared cats. Developmental Brain Research.
+Rayner, K. (1975). The perception span and peripheral cues in reading. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 65-81.
+
+REFERENCES 573
+Rayner, K., Carlson, M., & Frazier, L. (1983). The interaction of syntax and
+semantics during sentence processing: Eye movements in the analysis of
+semantically biased sentences. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal
+Behavior, 22, 358-374.
+Rayner, K., McConkie, G. W., & Ehrlich, S. (1978). Eye movements and
+integrating information across fixations. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
+Human Perception and Performance, 4, 529-544.
+Reddy, D. R. (1976). Speech recognition by machine: A review. Proceedings
+of the IEEE, 64, 501-531.
+Reddy, D. R., Erman, L. D., Fennell, R. D., & Neely, R. B. (1973). The
+Hearsay speech understanding system: An example of the recognition process. Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
+185-194.
+Reich, P. A. (1969). The finiteness of natural language. Language, 45,
+831-843.
+Reilly, D. L., Cooper, L. N, & Elbaum, C. (1982). A neural model for
+category learning. Biological Cybernetics, 45, 35-41.
+Reitboek, H. J. P. (1983). A 19-channel matrix drive with individually controllable fiber microelectrodes for neurophysiological applications. IEEE
+Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 13, 676-683.
+Repp, B. H., & Liberman, A. M. (1984). Phonetic categories are flexible.
+Haskins Laboratories Status Report on Speech Research, SR-77/ 78, 31-53
+Rockel, A. J., Hiorns, R. W., & Powell, T. P. S. (1980). The basic uniformity
+in structure of the neocortex. Brain, 103, 221-244.
+Rockland, K. S., & Lund, J. S. (1983). Intrinsic laminar lattice connections in
+macaque prestriate visual cortex. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 216,
+303-318.
+Rockland, K. S., & Pandya, D. N. (1979). Laminar origins and terminations of
+cortical connections of the occipital lobe in the rhesus monkey.
+Brain
+Research, 179, 3-20
+Rosch, E. (1975). Cognitive representations of semantic categories. Journal of
+Experimental Psychology: General, 104, 192-233.
+Rose, J. E. (1949). The cellular structure of the auditory region of the cat.
+Journal of Comparative Neurology, 91, 409-439.
+Rosenblatt, F. (1962). Principles of neurodynamics. New York: Spartan.
+Rumelhart, D. E. (1975). Notes on a schema for stories. In D. G. Bobrow &
+A. Collins (Eds.), Representation and understanding (pp. 211-236). New
+York: Academic Press.
+Rumelhart, D. E. (1977). Understanding and summarizing brief stories. In D.
+LaBerge & S. J. Samuels (Eds.), Basic processes in reading: Perception and
+comprehension (pp. 265-303). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Rumelhart, D. E. (1979). Some problems with the notion of literal meanings.
+In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and thought. Cambridge, England: Cambridge
+University Press.
+Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. In R.
+Spiro, B. Bruce, & W. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading comprehension (pp. 33-58). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+
+574 REFERENCES
+Rumelhart, D. E., & McClelland, J. L. (1981). Interactive processing through
+spreading activation. In A. M. Lesgold & C. A. Perfetti (Eds.), Interactive
+processes in reading. Hillsdale, NJ: Eribaum.
+Rumelhart, D. E., & McClelland, J. L. (1982). An interactive activation model
+of context effects in letter perception: Part 2. The contextual enhancement
+effect and some tests and extensions of the model. Psychological Review,
+89, 60-94.
+Rumelhart, D. E., & McClelland, J. L. (1985). Levels indeed! A response to
+Broadbent. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 114, 193-197.
+Rumelhart, D. E., & Norman, D. A. (1982). Simulating a skilled typist: A
+study of skilled cognitive-motor performance. Cognitive Science, 6, 1-36.
+Rumelhart, D. E., & Norman, D. A. (in press). Representation in memory.
+In R. C. Atkinson, R. J. Herrnstein, G. Lindzey, & R. D. Luce (Eds.),
+Handbook of experimental psychology. New York: Wiley.
+Rumelhart, D. E., & Ortony, A. (1977). The representation of knowledge in
+memory. In R. C. Anderson, R. J. Spiro, & W. E. Montague (Eds.),
+Schooling and the acquisition of knowledge (pp. 99-135). Hillsdale, NJ:
+Erlbaum.
+Russell, W. R., & Nathan, P. W. (1946). Traumatic amnesia. Brain, 69,
+280-300
+Sachs, M. B., Voigt, H. F., & Young, E. D. (1983). Auditory nerve representation of vowels in background noise. Journal of Neurophysiology, 50, 27-45.
+Salasoo, A., & Pisoni, D. B. (1985). Interaction of knowledge sources in spoken word identification. Journal of Memory and Language, 24, 210-231.
+Salasoo, A., Shiffrin, R. M., & Feustel, I. C. (1985). Building permanent
+memory codes: Codification and repetition effects in word identification.
+Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 114, 50-77.
+Samuel, A. G. (1977). The effect of discrimination training on speech perception: Noncategorical perception. Perception & Psychophysics, 22, 321-330.
+Samuel, A. G., van Santen, J. P. H., & Johnston, J. C. (1982). Length effects
+in word perception: We is better than I but worse than you or them. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 8,
+91-105.
+Sanderson, K. J., Bishop, P. O., & Darien-Smith, I. (1971). The properties of
+the binocular receptive fields of lateral geniculate neurons.
+Experimental
+Brain Research, 13, 178-207.
+Schacter, D. (1985).
+Priming of old and new knowledge in amnesic patients
+and normal subjects. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 444, 41-53.
+Schank, R. C. (1973). Identification of conceptualizations underlying natural
+language. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of
+thought and language. San Francisco: Freeman.
+Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Scheibel, M. E
+., & Scheibel, A. B. (1966). The organization of the nucleus
+reticularis thalami: A Golgi study. Brain Research, 1, 43-62.
+Schiller, P. H., Finlay, B. L., & Volman, S. F. (1976). Quantitative studies of
+single-cell properties in monkey striate cortex: III. Spatial frequency. Journal of Neurophysiology, 39, 1334-1351.
+
+575
+Schneider, W. (1985). Toward a model of attention and the development of
+automatic processing. In M. I. Posner & O. S. M. Marin (Eds.), Attention
+and performance X/ (pp. 474-492). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Scott, J. P. (1962). Critical periods in behavioral development. Science, 138,
+949-958.
+Scott, J. P. (1968). Early experience and the organization of behavior. Belmont,
+CA: Wadsworth
+Sejnowski, T. J. (1976). On global properties of neuronal interaction. Biological Cybernetics, 22, 85-95.
+Sejnowski, T. J. (1981). Skeleton filters in the brain. In G. E. Hinton & J. A.
+Anderson (Eds.), Parallel models of associative memory (pp. 49-82). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Sejnowski, T. J. (in press). Computational neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain
+Sciences.
+Sejnowski, T. J., & Hinton, G. E. (in press). Separating figure from ground
+with a Boltzmann machine. In M. A. Arbib & A. R. Hanson (Eds.), Vision,
+brain, and cooperative computation. Cambridge: MIT Press.
+Selman, B. (1985). Rule-based processing in a connectionist system for natural
+language understanding (TR CSRI-168). Toronto: University of Toronto,
+Computer Systems Research Institute.
+Selman, B., & Hirst, G. (1985). A rule-based connectionist parsing system.
+Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society,
+212-221.
+Shallice, T., & McGill, J. (1978). The origins of mixed errors. In J. Reguin
+(Ed.), Attention and Performance VII. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Shaw, G. L., Silverman, D. J., & Pearson, J. C. (1985). Model of cortical
+organization embodying a basis for a theory of information processing and
+memory recall. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 82,
+2364-2368.
+Shepard, R. N. (1984). Ecological constraints on internal representation:
+Resonant kinematics of perceiving, imagining, thinking, and dreaming.
+Psychological Review, 91, 417-447.
+Shepard, R. N., & Podgorny, P. (1975). Cognitive processes that resemble
+perceptual processes. In W. K. Estes (Ed.), Handbook of learning and cognitive processes (pp. 189-237). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Shepherd, G. M. (1978, February). Microcircuits in the nervous system.
+Scientific American, p. 92.
+Shepherd, G. M. (1979). The synaptic organization of the brain. New York:
+Oxford University Press.
+Shepherd, G. M. (1985). Modifiable logic operations are properties of simulated
+interactions between excitable dendritic spines. Unpublished manuscript.
+Shepherd, G. M., Brayton, R. K., Miller, J. P., Segev, I., Rinzel, J., & Rall, W.
+(1985). Signal enhancement in distal cortical dendrites by means of interactions between active dendritic spines. Proceedings of the National Academy of
+Sciences, USA, 82, 2192-2195.
+Singer, W. (1979). Central-core control of visual cortex functions. In F. O.
+Schmitt & F. G. Worden (Eds.), The neurosciences (pp. 1093-1109). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
+576 REFERENCES
+Singer, W. (1982). Central core control of developmental plasticity in the kitten visual cortex: 1. Diencephalic lesions. Experimental Brain Research, 47,
+209-222
+Singer, W., & Rauschecker, J. P. (1982). Central core control of developmental plasticity in the kitten visual cortex: 2. Electrical activation of mesencephalic and diencephalic projections. Experimental Brain Research, 47,
+223-233.
+Small, S. L. (1980). Word expert parsing: A theory of distributed word-based
+natural language understanding (TR- 954).
+Baltimore: University of Maryland, Department of Computer Science.
+Somogyi, P. (1977). A specific 'axo-axonal' interneuron in the visual cortex of
+the rat. Brain Research, 136, 345-350.
+Somogyi, P., Freund, T. F., & Cowey, A. (1982). The axo-axonic interneuron
+in the cerebral cortex of the rat, cat, and monkey. Neuroscience, 7, 2577-
+2607.
+Somogyi, P., Kisvárday, Z. F., Martin, K. A. C., & Whitteridge, D. (1983).
+Synaptic connections
+of morphologically identified and physiologically
+characterized large basket cells in the striate cortex of cat. Neuroscience, 10,
+261-294.
+Spencer, W. A., & Kandel, E. R. (1961). Electrophysiology of hippocampal
+neurons: IV. Fast prepotentials. Journal of Neurophysiology, 24, 272-285.
+Squire, L. R. (1981). Two forms of amnesia: An analysis of forgetting. Journal of Neuroscience, 1, 635-640
+Squire, L. R. (1982). The neuropsychology of human memory. Annual Review
+of Neuroscience, 5, 241-273.
+Squire, L. R., Cohen, N. J., & Nadel, L. (1984). The medial temporal region
+and memory consolidation: A new hypothesis. In H. Weingartner & E.
+Parker (Eds.), Memory consolidation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Squire, L. R., Slater, P. C., & Chace, P. (1975). Retrograde amnesia: Temporal gradient in
+long-term memory following electroconvulsive
+therapy. Science, 187, 77-79.
+Squire, L. R., Slater, P. C., & Miller, P. (1981). Retrograde amnesia following
+ECT: Long term follow-up studies. Archives of General Psychiatry, 38,
+Stemberger, J. P. (1981). Morphological haplology. Language, 57, 791-817.
+lates of phonetic features. In P. D. Eimas & J. L. Miller (Eds.), Perspectives
+on the study of speech (pp. 1-38). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Studdert-Kennedy, M., Liberman, A. M., Harris, K. S., & Cooper, F. S.
+(1970). Motor theory of speech perception: A reply to Lane's critical
+review. Psychological Review, 77, 234-249.
+Summerfield, Q., & Haggard, M. (1977). On the dissociation of spatial and
+temporal cues to the voicing distinction in initial stop consonants. Journal
+of the Acoustical Society of America, 02, 435-448.
+Sutton, K. S., & Barto, A. G. (198I). Toward a modern theory of adaptive
+networks: Expectation and prediction. Psychological Review, 88, 135-171.
+Swanson, L. W. (1981). A direct projection from Ammon's horn to prefrontal
+cortex in the rat. Brain Research, 217, 150-154.
+
+577
+Swinney, D. A. (1982). The structure and time-course of information interaction during speech comprehension: Lexical segmentation, access, and
+interpretation. In J. Mehler, E. C. T. Walker, & M. Garrett (Eds.), Perspectives on mental representation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Szentágothai, J., & Arbib, M. A. (1974). Conceptual models of neural organization. Neuroscience Research Program Bulletin, 12, 307-510.
+Szentágothai, J., Hámori, J., & Tömböl, T. (1966). Degeneration and electron
+microscope analysis of the synaptic glomeruli in the lateral geniculate body.
+Experimental Brain Research, 2, 283-301.
+Thibadeau, R., Just, M. A., & Carpenter, P. A. (1982). A model of the time
+course and content of reading. Cognitive Science, 6, 157-204.
+Thompson, H. (1984). Word recognition: A paradigm case in computational
+(psycho-)linguistics. Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
+Science Society.
+Tigges, M., & Tigges, J. (1979). Types of degenerating geniculocortical axon
+terminals and their contribution to layer IV of area 17 in the squirrel monkey (Saimiri). Cell and Tissue Research, 196, 471-486.
+Tömböl, T. (1974). An electron microscopic study of the neurons of the visual
+cortex. Journal of Neurocytology, 3, 525-531.
+Touretzky, D., & Hinton, G. E. (1985). Symbols among the neurons: Details
+of a connectionist inference architecture. Proceedings of the Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
+Ts'o, D. Y., Gilbert, C. D., & Wiesel, T. N. (1985). Relationships between
+horizontal connections revealed by cross-correlation analysis. Society for
+Neurosciences Abstracts, 11, 17
+Tyler, L. K., & Wessels, J. (1983). Quantifying contextual contributions to
+word-recognition processes. Perception & Psychophysics, 34, 409-420.
+Uchizono, K. (1965). Characteristics of excitatory and inhibitory synapses in
+the central nervous system of the cat. Nature, 207, 642-643.
+Van der Loos, H., & Glaser, E. M. (1972). Autapses in neocortex cerebri:
+Synapses between a pyramidal cell's axon and
+its own dendrites. Brain
+Research, 48, 355-360.
+Van Essen, D., & Maunsell, J. H. R. (1983). Hierarchical organization and
+functional streams in visual cortex. Trends in Neuroscience, 6, 370-375.
+Van Essen, D. C., Maunsell, J. H. R., & Bixby, J. L. (1981). The middle temporal visual area in the macaque: Myeloarchitecture, connections, functional
+properties, and topographic organization. Journal of Comparative Neurology,
+Van Essen, D. C., & Zeki, S. M. (1978). The topographic organization of
+rhesus monkey prestriate cortex. Journal of Physiology, 277, 193-226.
+Videen, T. O., Daw, N. W., & Rader, R. K. (1984).
+The effect of norepinephrine on visual cortical neurons in kittens and adult cats. Journal of
+Neuroscience, 4, 1607-1617
+Vincent, S. R., Hökfelt, T., Skirboll, L. R., & Wu, T. Y. (1983). Hypothalamic
+y-aminobutyric acid neurons project to the neocortex. Science, 220, 1309-1310.
+Vital-Durand, F., Garey, L. J., & Blakemore, C. (1978). Monocular and binocular deprivation in the monkey: Morphological effects and reversibility.
+Brain Research, 158, 45-64.
+
+578 REFERENCES
+von der Heydt, R., Peterhans, E., & Baumgartner, G. (1984). Illusory contours and cortical neuron responses. Science, 224, 1260-1262.
+von der Malsburg, C. (1973). Self-organization of orientation selective cells
+in the striate cortex. Kybernetik, 14, 85-100.
+von der Malsburg, C. (in press).
+Nervous structures with dynamical links.
+Berichte der Bunsen-Gesellschaft fur Physikalische Chemie.
+Vygotsky, L. S. (1962). Thought and language (E. Hanfmann & G. Vakar, Eds.
+and Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Original work published 1934)
+Walker, A. E. (1938). The primate thalamus. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
+Waltz, D. L., & Pollack, J. B. (1985). Massively parallel parsing. Cognitive Science, 9, 51-74.
+Weller, R. E., & Kaas, J. H. (1983). Retinotopic patterns of connections of
+area 17 with visual areas V-ll and MT in macaque monkeys. Journal of
+Comparative Neurology, 220, 253-279.
+Werblin, F. S., & Dowling, J. E. (1969). Organization of the retina of the
+mudpuppy, Necturus maculosus: II. Intracellular recording. Journal of Neurophysiology, 32, 339-355.
+Westrum, L. E. (1966).
+Synaptic contacts on axons in the cerebral cortex.
+Nature, 210, 1289-1290.
+Whittlesea, B. W. A. (1983). Representation and generalization of concepts: The
+abstractive and episodic perspectives evaluated. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, MacMaster University.
+Wickelgren, W. A. (1969). Context-sensitive coding, associative memory, and
+serial order in (speech) behavior. Psychological Review, 76, 1-15.
+Wickelgren, W. A. (1979). Chunking and consolidation: A theoretical synthesis of semantic networks, configuring in conditioning, S-R versus cognitive learning, normal forgetting, the amnesic syndrome, and the hippocampal arousal system. Psychological Review, 86, 44-60.
+Wiesel, T. N., & Gilbert, C. D. (1983). Morphological basis of visual cortical
+function. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Physiology, 68, 523-543.
+Wiesel, T. N., & Hubel, D. H. (1963). Single-cell responses in striate cortex of
+kittens deprived of vision in one eye. Journal of Neurophysiology, 26,
+1003-1017.
+Wiesel, T. N., & Hubel, D. H. (1965). Extent of recovery from the effects of
+visual deprivation in kittens. Journal of Neurophysiology, 28, 1060-1072.
+Wilson, H. R., & Cowan, J. D. (1972). Excitatory and inhibitory interactions
+in localized populations of model neurons. Biophysics Journal, 12, 1-24.
+Winston, P. H. (1975). Learning structural descriptions from examples. In
+P. H. Winston (Ed.), The psychology of computer vision (pp. 157-209). New
+York: McGraw-Hill.
+Wise, R. A. (1978). Catecholamine theories of reward: A critical review.
+Brain Research, 152, 215-247.
+Wood, C. (1978). Variations on a theme by Lashley: Lesion experiments on
+the neural models of Anderson, Silverstein, Ritz, and Jones. Psychological
+Review, 85, 582-591.
+Woods,
+. W. (1970).
+Transition network grammars for natural language
+analysis. Communications of the ACM, 13, 591-606.
+
+579
+Woolsey, C. N., Marshall, W. H., & Bard, P. (1942). Representation of
+cutaneous tactile sensibility in cerebral cortex of monkey as indicated by
+evoked potentials. Bulletin of Johns Hopkins Hospital, 70, 399-441.
+Woolsey, C. N., Settlage, P. H., Meyer, D. R., Sencer, W., Pinto-Hamuy, T.,
+& Travis, A. M. (1952). Patterns of localization in precentral and 'supplementary' motor areas and their relation to concept of premotor area.
+Research Publications Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Disease,
+30, 238- 264.
+Wolson. Brain, Besai, med Batutica, I5, 925-5 corical somalotopic organi-
+Zeki, S. M. (1978). The cortical projections of foveal striate cortex in the
+rhesus monkey. Journal of Physiology, 277, 227-244.
+Zeki, S. M. (1983a). Colour coding in the cerebral cortex: The reaction of cells
+in monkey visual cortex to wavelengths and colours.
+Neuroscience, 9,
+741-765.
+Zeki, S. M. (1983b). Colour coding in the cerebral cortex: The responses of
+wavelength-selective and colour-coded cells in
+monkey visual cortex to
+changes in wavelength composition. Neuroscience, 9. 767-781.
+Zipser, D. (1985). A computational model of hippocampal place fields.
+Behavioral Neuroscience, 99, 1006-1018.
+
+Index
+Page numbers in roman type refer to Volume 1; page numbers in
+italic type refer to Volume 2
+Abeles, M., 367, 369, 385, 553
+Abelson, R. P., 18, 19, 574
+Abrams, T. W., 552, 561
+Abramson, A. S., 94, 560
+Abstraction models of memory,
+199-206
+comparison of experimental and
+simulation results, 203-205
+other findings on, 205-206
+summary of training and test
+stimuli, 202-203
+Whittlesea's experiments on, 201-
+202
+Ackley, D. H., 264, 306, 313, 317,
+335, 507, 510, 393, 562
+ACT* model, 32, 124, 127
+Activation functions
+examples of
+gating activation function, 426
+semilinear, 52, 324-328
+quasi-linear, 425
+quasi-multilinear, 426
+squashing function, 425
+threshold logic or linear threshold
+unit, 425
+logic of
+conclusions on, 442-443
+escription of, 36
+yamoles of 428-47
+main concepts of, 426-428
+as major aspect of PDP models,
+51-52
+results of, 429, 439-442
+rules, examples of, 425-426
+three-dimensional plots, 429,
+430-438 (Figs.)
+views of, 423-425
+Activation rule. See Activation
+functions
+Activation vector of harmony
+theoretical model, 215-216
+Active representation in PDP
+models. See PDP models, active
+representation in
+Addition problem, simple binary,
+341-346. See also Delta rule,
+generalized
+Albright, T. D., 368, 558
+
+582 INDEX
+Algebra, linear. See Linear algebra
+Algebraic properties of inner
+products, 382-383. See also
+Vectors
+Allman, J., 347, 374, 375, 553, 554
+Alternative activity patterns, 82-83
+AM. See Monocular occlusion
+Amari, S. A., 42, 45, 444, 507, 489,
+495,553
+Ambiguity
+lexical, 302-304
+structural, 304-305
+and shading of feature patterns,
+305-306
+Ambiguous characters, 8, 155-157.
+See also Reading, programmable
+blackboard model of
+Amnesia. See also Memory, a
+distributed model of
+anterograde, 504, 505-506, 512-513
+bitemporal, basic aspects of, 505-
+506
+conclusions on, 527
+description of, 503-505
+neurochemistry of synaptic change,
+hypothetical account of, 507-509
+paradox of, resolution to, 506-507
+quantitative model, formulation of,
+509
+relation to other accounts of, 510-
+511
+residual learning in, 518-524
+simulations, 511-518
+anterograde amnesia, 512-573
+lost memories, recovery of, 515-
+516
+retrograde amnesia, 513-515
+retrograde and anterograde
+amnesia, correlation of, 513
+studies on, 516-518
+summary of, 518
+spared learning in, 207-208, 518,
+524-526
+Anandan, P., 322, 508, 550, 554
+AND function, 429. See also
+Boolean function
+Andén, N. E., 350, 553
+Andersen, P., 336, 553
+Anderson, C. W., 539, 554
+Anderson, J. A., 33, 42, 56, 62, 66,
+68, 80, 82, 101, 406, 409, 410,
+418, 507, 510, 511, 8, 173, 183,
+200,226,277, 311, 380,389,
+394, 399, 432, 551, 553, 554,
+562,564
+Anderson, J. R., 32, 124, 127, 251,
+461,507, 173, 206, 209, 524,
+549,554,558
+Anlezark. G. M.. 477, 554
+Annealing, simulated. See Simulated
+annealing
+Aragon, C. R., 235, 508
+Arbib, M. A., 362, 577
+Arbitrary mapping, implementing,
+96-104
+grapheme strings, 97-99, 102
+sememe units, 97-98, 99, 101-102
+three-layer network, 97-98. See
+also Boltzmann machines
+Arguments, missing, filling in, 301-
+302. See also Case role
+assignment, model of
+Агу, М., 477, 564
+Asanuma, H., 357, 554
+Asynchronous update vs.
+synchronous update, 61
+ATN. See Augmented transition
+network parsers
+Attention
+networks for focusing, 114-118
+shifting focus of, 147-151
+Augmented transition network
+parsers (ATN), 119
+Auto-associative paradigm. See also
+Memory, a distributed model of
+definition of, 55, 161
+modification of, 211-212
+Back-propagation simulator,
+description of, 328-330
+Bagley, W. C., 58, 98, 106, 554
+Bahl, L. R., 293, 508
+Baker, J. F., 347, 554
+Baker, R. G., 24, 515
+Ballard, D. H., 12, 43, 45, 72, 117,
+124, 133, 282, 508, 509, 128,
+
+373,381,554,559
+Banerjee, S. P., 477, 561
+Barber, R. P., 351, 562
+Bard, P., 352, 579
+Barlow, Н. В., 373, 554
+Barnes, C. A., 448, 568
+Barrow, H. G., 63, 554
+Bartlett, F. C., 81, 508, 17, 19, 554
+Barto, A. G., 43, 53, 57, 321-322,
+444, 508, 515, 383, 539, 550,
+554, 576
+Barwise, J., 195, 508
+Basket cells, 363-364
+Bates, E., 217, 273, 274, 554, 567
+Baumgartner, G., 376, 578
+B-coefficient constants, (App.), 467-
+468. See also B-coefficient model
+B-coefficient model, 460-466. See
+also Place recognition and goal
+location, biologically plausible
+models of
+concept, network using, 461-462
+constants (App.), 467-468
+description of, 460-461
+issue in, 463
+performance of, 464
+programming, 463
+simulation of, 469-470
+testing, 463-464
+BD. See Binocular deprivation
+Bear, M. F., 477, 554
+Becker, J. T., 435, 554
+Benoit, R., 364, 569
+Bentivoglio, M., 350, 567
+Berko, J., 40, 508, 219, 220, 265,
+555
+Berman, N., 475, 478, 558
+Bernstein, J., 153, 159, 508
+Best, P., 435, 571
+Bever, T. G., 274, 555, 559
+Bienenstock, E. L.., 42, 180, 508,
+480, 487, 489, 495, 555
+Binder, K., 230, 508
+Binding problem, 88-90
+of neurons, 377-378
+Binocular deprivation (BD), 474, 475
+Bipolar cells, 363
+Bishop, P. O., 480, 574
+583
+Bitemporal amnesia. See Amnesia,
+bitemporal
+Bixby, J. L., 345, 577
+Blake, A., 285, 508
+Blakemore, C., 11, 508, 475, 489,
+490, 491, 497, 500, 555, 571, 577
+Blanchard, H. E., 161, 568
+Blank, M. A., 79, 111, 559
+Blasdel, G. G., 487, 490, 555
+Blends of memory traces, 208. See
+also Memory, a distributed model
+of
+Bloom, F. E., 364, 385, 569
+Bloom, M. J., 385, 560
+Blumstein, S., 62, 576
+Bobillier, P., 350, 555
+Bobrow, D. G., 9, 79, 133, 513, 18,
+19,536,555, 570
+Boltzmann machines
+damage, example of effects of,
+304-313
+description of, 43, 148-149
+hard learning, example of, 299-303
+annealing schedule, 302
+shifter network performance,
+302-303
+training procedure, 300
+learning algorithm, 294-303, 209
+conclusions on, 313-314
+derivation of (App.), 315-317
+failure of algorithm, 298-299
+hardware, unreliable, achieving
+reliable computation with, 303-
+learning, easy and hard, 290-294
+relaxation searches, use of to
+perform, 283-290
+research with, 264
+second-order observables and,
+273-275
+unlearning, 296-298
+Bond, Z. S., 61, 555
+Bonds, A. B., 476, 478, 560
+Boolean function, 428, 429, 439-442
+activation function as extension of,
+428
+AND function, 429
+disjunctive normal form, 439
+
+584
+Boolean function (continued)
+linearly separable functions, 440
+mapping from expressions, 439
+neurons treated as devices, 424-425
+XOR function, 429
+Bottom-up approach to analysis of
+information processing systems,
+123
+Bottom-up presentation of harmony
+theory, 199, 213-261. See also
+Harmony theory
+Bottom-up processing system, 51
+matrix representation of, 57-58
+Boycott, B. В., 336, 558
+Brachman, R. J., 313, 555
+Brain. See Cerebral cortex, anatomy
+and physiology of; Cerebral
+cortex, questions about
+computation in
+Brain damage. See also Amnesia;
+Damage, effects of on a network
+graceful degradation and, 29, 134
+neuropsychological investigation of
+patients with, 134-135
+simulated effects of, 304-313
+Brain state in a box model (BSB),
+66-68
+Branch, M., 435, 571
+Brayton, R. K., 381, 382, 575
+Bresnan, J., 274, 559, 564
+Brightman, M. W., 336, 572
+Broadbent, D. E., 121, 508, 97, 532,
+555
+Brock, L. G., 367, 555
+Brodmann, K., 345, 346, 555
+Brodmann's areas of the neocortex,
+345-346. See also Cerebral
+cortex, anatomy and physiology
+of
+Brooks, C. McC., 336, 553
+Brooks, L. R., 171, 556
+Brown, P., 295
+Brown, R., 219, 241, 556
+Bruce, C. J., 368, 556, 558
+Brugge, J. F., 356, 563
+BSB model. See Brain state in a box
+model
+Buisseret, P., 476, 478, 556
+B units, simulations of (4pp.), 469-
+470. See also B-coefficient model
+Bunt, A. H., 357, 566
+Bybee, J. L., 221, 247, 249, 250,
+251,254,255,256,556
+CA. See Connection activation unit
+Caan, W., 368, 571
+Cajal, S. Ramon y, 336, 350, 358,
+359,361,363,367,556
+Caminiti, R., 377-378, 560
+Canonical feature detectors, 114
+Caplan, C. J., 478, 570
+Carew, T. J., 552, 561
+Carlson, M., 275, 573
+Carman, J. B., 350, 556
+Carnes, K. M., 477, 554
+Carpenter, P. A., 153, 161, 549, 564,
+577
+Carroll, Lewis, 97
+Cascade model, 42
+Case role assignment, model of
+architecture of, 277-289
+case role representation, 286-288
+semantic microfeatures, 278-283
+sentence processing and learning,
+details of, 288-289
+sentence-structure units, 283-286
+descriptions of, 3-4
+discussion of, 313-325
+context-sensitive coding,
+iteration, and center embedding,
+323-325
+fixed-length, 320-322
+limitation myths, 322-323
+meaning, representation of, 315-
+316
+model, basic features of, 314-315
+parsers, conventional interfacing
+with, 317-318
+recursion, 318-320
+goals of, 276-277
+studies on, 277
+multiple constraints on, 272-275
+studies on, 273, 275, 277
+simulation experiments of, 289-292
+basic results of, 292-293
+
+feature patterns, shading of, 305-
+306
+lexical ambiguity resolution, 302-
+304
+missing arguments, filling in,
+301-302
+novel words, generalization to,
+307-310
+other creative errors, 306-307
+roles, distributed representation
+of, 312-313
+semantic and word-order cues,
+use of in, 293-300
+straightforward extensions, 310-
+312
+structural ambiguity of, 304-305
+verb-frame selection, 300-301
+Central module, 130-131
+Cerebral cortex, anatomy and
+physiology of
+cortex inputs, 346-356
+irregularities within, 353-356
+topographic representation of,
+352-353
+cortical areas of, 345
+cortical outputs, 356-357
+feature detection of, 367-371
+firing, rates of, 366-367
+general organization of, 340-345
+main layers, 341-345
+general points on, 333-335
+group neuron behavior in, 365-366
+neocortical neurons, nature of
+cell types in, 358-360
+excitatory vs. inhibitory neurons,
+362
+experimental methods, 357-358
+neurons without many spines,
+361
+neurons with spines, 360-361
+special cell types, 362
+neuron behavior in, 364-365
+neuron, classical, 335-337
+peptides, 339
+synapses, types of, 338-339
+Cerebral cortex, questions about
+computation in
+computational models, role of in,
+585
+387-389
+neuronal plasticity in, 385-387
+neuronal processing in, 378-382
+nonlinear computations, 381
+single-shot algorithms, 380-381
+timing problem, 378-380
+representing information in, 373-
+377
+binding problem, 377
+surround effects, 374-377
+temporal binding, 383-385
+Chace, P., 513, 576
+Chandelier cells, 362-363
+Changeux, J. -P., 387, 556
+Chapman, R. A., 485, 556
+Charniak, E., 324, 556
+Chase, W. G., 241, 508
+Chauvin, Y., 213, 332-334,
+Chomsky, N., 24, 119, 123, 246, 508
+Christen, W. G., 478, 570
+Christensen, R., 227, 508
+CID. See Connection information
+distribution mechanism
+Clark, W. A., 154, 509
+Class C' perceptron (Rosenblatt),
+155-156
+Classification paradigm, 161
+Coarse coding, 91-96. See also
+Conjunctive encoding;
+Distributed representations
+limitations on, 92-94
+principle underlying, 94-96
+Cognition and parallel distributed
+processing. See PDP approach,
+introduction to
+Cognition, microstructure of, 12-13
+Cognitive science. See PDP approach
+and cognitive science
+Cognitive theories, constraints on,
+129-130
+Cohen, M. A., 389, 556
+Cohen, M. M., 81, 86, 568
+Cohen. N. J., 510, 519, 520, 521-
+522,524,525, 527, 556, 576
+COHORT model (Marslen-Wilson),
+77, 97-106
+basic assumptions of, 98-99
+dilemma for, 99-100, 101
+
+586 INDEX
+COHORT model (continued)
+resolution of, 101-106
+Cole, K. S., 364, 556
+Cole, R. A., 58, 61, 98, 99, 100,
+107, 111, 556, 557
+Collins, A. M., 85, 508
+Colonnier, M., 348, 361, 557, 571
+Colón Osorio, F. C., 424, 510
+Coltheart, M., 102, 508
+Competence theorem, 226-229
+Competitive inhibition, 21. See also
+Phoneme identification, factors
+influencing
+effect of at phoneme level, 89-90
+Competitive learning
+architecture of competitive learning
+system, 162-166
+basic components of, 151-152
+characteristics of, 166-167
+conclusions on, 190
+definition of. 147
+dipole experiments, results of,
+170-177
+correlated teaching inputs, 182-
+183
+letter similarity effects, 182
+number of elements, effect of per
+serial position, 181-182
+position-specific letter detectors,
+180-181
+word detection units, 181
+word perception model, 177-180
+formal analysis of, 168-170
+geometric interpretation of, 164-
+166
+history of, 152-159
+horizontal and vertical lines,
+experiments with, 184-190
+mechanism of, 159
+neural-like processing systems,
+160-161
+in P3 simulation system
+methods (App. B), 504-506
+plans for (App. A), 502-503
+Completion task, example of, 206-
+208
+Computational level, 121
+Computational models, role of
+cerebral cortex in, 387-389
+Computational temperature (T), 211
+Computational viewpoint on PDP
+models, 397-398
+Conel, J. LeRoy, 358, 557
+Confabulation, as a stable pattern, 81
+Conjunctive encoding, 90-91, 96.
+See also Coarse coding;
+Distributed representations
+CONNECT statements for P3
+system, 495-496. See also P3
+system
+Connection activation system, 130-
+134
+Connection activation unit (CA).
+See also Connection information
+distribution mechanism
+definition of. 132-134
+multiple pattern processing, 477-
+478
+requirements of, 474-476
+single pattern processing, 475-477
+summary of requirements, 480-481
+Connection information distribution
+(CID) mechanism, 473-486,
+129-134,137, 139-140
+benefits of, 164-166
+central knowledge store in, 130-134
+computer simulation of word
+recognition using, 134-136
+extensions of, 167-168
+resource requirements of, 473-486,
+166-167
+Connectionist models, 72
+Connolly, M., 353, 355, 566
+Connors, B. W., 364, 369, 557
+Constructor, as major component of
+P3 system, 489. See also P3
+system
+Content-addressable memory, 79-80
+Continuity and uniqueness
+constraints in depth perception,
+19-20
+Cooling schedule, 244-245. See also
+Electricity problem-solving;
+Simulated annealing
+Coombs, J. S., 367, 555
+Cooper, F. S., 92, 94, 495, 566, 576
+
+Cooper, L. N., 42, 180, 508, 480,
+487,489,499,555, 557,573
+Corkin, S., 519, 524, 556
+Cortical areas of the neocortex,
+Brodmann's cortical parcellation
+scheme, 345
+input systems, 346
+irregularities within, 353-356
+thalamus, as gateway to cerebral
+cortex, 349-352
+topographic representation, 352-
+353
+output systems, 356-357
+Cortical plasticity, processes that
+modulate, 476-478
+Cotton, S., 99, 105, 557
+Cottrell, G., 165, 277, 311, 314, 557
+Coulter, J. D., 357, 570
+Cowan, J. D., 381, 389, 578
+Cowan, W. M., 350, 351, 556, 572
+Cowey, A., 363, 576
+Crain, S., 274, 557
+Crane, A. M., 350, 572
+Crick, F. H. C., 296, 297, 509, 351,
+384,387,557
+Critical or sensitive period of
+plasticity, 473-484
+cortical plasticity, processes that
+modulate, 476-477
+effect of environment on, 478
+hypothesis for, 483-484
+ocular dominance statistics, 474-
+476
+other examples of, 477-478
+Crosstalk, 139-142. See also
+Reading, programmable
+blackboard model of
+Crow, T. J., 476, 477, 554, 557
+Crowder, R. G., 64, 94, 209, 557
+Cynader, М., 475, 476, 478, 492,
+498, 557, 558
+Dahlström, A., 350, 553
+Damage, effects of on a network, 29,
+134, 472. See also Amnesia;
+Boltzmann machines; Brain
+damage; Graceful degradation
+587
+in Boltzmann machines, 304-313
+Daniel, P. M., 354, 558
+Daniels, J. D., 477, 554
+Darien-Smith, J., 480, 574
+Davis, E., 432, 558
+Daw, N. W., 497, 500, 558, 577
+Deacedo, B. S., 519, 524, 556
+Decay process in increments to
+weights, 181. See also Memory, a
+distributed model of
+Decision-making and freezing in
+harmony theory
+coherent interpretation, robustness
+of, 240
+idealized task, 238-239
+phase transitions, computational
+significance of, 236-237
+symmetry breaking, 237-238
+thermodynamic limit, 239
+Deep dyslexia, 102
+Degradation, effects of and benefits
+of redundancy, 472. See also
+Standard pattern associators
+Deliberate conscious control (DCC),
+543-545. See also PDP approach,
+reflections on
+Delta rule, 43, 53, 62, 63, 363, 417-
+418
+Delta rule, analysis of. See also
+Delta rule, generalized
+and multiple linear regression,
+457-458
+in pattern-based coordinates, 447-
+453
+statistical learning and, 453-457
+summary of, 458-459
+in vector notation, 445-447
+Delta rule, generalized, 149
+application of, 327-328
+conclusions on, 361-362
+general cases, 352-361
+recurrent nets, 354-361
+and gradient descent, 322-324
+problem of, 318-323
+XOR problem, 319-321
+for semilinear activation functions
+in feedforward networks, 324-328
+and sigma-pi units, 353
+
+588
+Delta rule, generalized (continued)
+simulation results, 328-330, 352
+encoding problem, 335-339
+negation problem, 346-347
+parity, 334-335
+simple binary addition problem,
+341-346
+symmetry, 340-341
+T-C problem, 348-352
+XOR problem. 330-334
+use of to determine size and
+direction of changes in
+connections, 179-181
+generalized, 209
+DeMarzo, P. M., 241, 242, 509
+Dempster, A. P., 293, 509
+Dendrites, studies on, 381-382. See
+also Cerebral cortex, questions
+about computation in
+Denes, P., 87, 558
+de Riboupierre, F., 385, 553
+de Riboupierre, Y., 385, 553
+Derthick, M., 298, 299, 509, 313
+Desimone, R., 368, 374, 556, 558
+Dipole experiments for competitive
+learning mechanisms, 170-174
+formal analysis of, 174-177
+homogeneous stimulus patterns,
+191-193
+Distal landmarks for biologically
+plausible models of place
+recognition and goal location, 445
+Distributed representations. See also
+Memory, a distributed model of;
+Schemata, concept of
+features of
+generalization effects, 82-85
+memory, 79-81
+new concepts, 86-87
+status of, 78-79
+structure in representations and
+processes, 104-108
+constituent structure,
+representing, 105-106
+sequential symbol processing,
+106-108
+summary on, 108-109
+technical details of, 87-104
+arbitrary pairing, implementing,
+96-104
+binding problem, 88-90
+coarse coding, 91-96
+conjunctive encoding, 90-91
+Distributed view-field model for goal
+location, 449-460. See also Place
+recognition and goal location,
+biologically plausible models of
+description of, 451-453
+network used in, 450-451
+P3 simulation of, 453-454
+Symbolics 3600 LISP machine,
+use of for, 454-456
+problems of, 451
+properties of, 453
+testing of, 453
+Dobson, V., 97, 100
+Dostrovsky, J., 435, 571
+Dowling, J. E., 336, 558, 578
+Dräger, U. C., 490, 558
+Dretske, F., 195, 509
+Duckrow, R. B., 477, 561
+Duda, R. O., 380, 558
+Dukes, K., 61, 110, 570
+Durham, D., 500, 558
+Dynamic functional system, 41
+Dynamical systems, perspective of
+PDP models as, 397-398
+Eccles, J. C., 336, 367, 370, 553,
+555,558
+Edelman, G. M., 387, 558
+Edmonds, D., 153,
+Ehrlich, S., 163, 573
+Eichenbaum, H., 385, 519, 524, 556,
+565
+Eigenvalues. See Eigenvectors and
+eigen values
+Eigenvectors and eigenvalues, 399-
+403. See also Matrices and linear
+syslems
+Eimas, P. D., 94, 473, 558, 560
+Eisen, M., 456, 509
+Elbaum, C., 499, 573
+Electricity problem-solving, 240-250
+Electroencephalography (EEG), 335
+
+Elio, R., 172, 558
+Elman, J. L., 58, 63, 69, 71, 80, 81,
+119,558,559,568
+EM. See Expectation and
+maximization method
+Empiricism vs. nativism, 139-142
+Emson, P. C., 364, 559
+Encoding problem, 335-339. See also
+Delta rule, generalized
+Equilibrium states of the competitive
+learning system, 168-170
+Erman, L. D., 63, 122, 559, 573
+Error correction rule. See Delta rule
+Error propagation, learning internal
+representations by. See Delta
+rule, generalized
+Ervin, S., 219, 220, 254, 559
+Espinosa, I. E., 385, 560
+Evanczuk, S., 385, 560
+Exclusive or (XOR) problem, 64-65,
+96, 319-321, 330-334. See also
+Delta rule, generalized
+Executive-driven processing, 134
+Expectation and maximization (EM)
+method, 293
+Explicit inaccessible rule, 217. See
+also Verbs, learning past tenses of
+Explicit rule formulation, tradition,
+32
+Fahlman, S. E., 85, 86, 264, 509
+Fairén, A., 363, 559
+Famiglietti, E. V., 336, 559
+Fan-in. See Fan-out
+Fan-out
+definition of, 51
+limited, effects of, 468-472
+method for overcoming limitation,
+470-472
+neural nets, biological limits on
+storage capacity of, 469-470
+Fanty, M., 320, 321, 322, 559
+Farley, B. G., 154, 509
+Feature discovery by competitive
+learning. See Competitive
+learning
+Feedback, effects of display length
+589
+on amount of, 159-161. See also
+Reading, programmable
+blackboard model of
+Feedforward networks, delta rule for
+semilinear activation functions in,
+324-328. See also Delta rule,
+generalized
+Feinstein, D. J., 296, S11
+Feirtag, M., 334, 342, 570
+Feldman, J. A., 12, 43, 45, 72, 75,
+86, 117, 124, 130, 181, 509, 9,
+128, 559
+Feldman, M. L., 363, 377, 559
+Feldman and Ballard units, 72
+conjunctive units, 72
+relation to sigma-pi units, 72
+Felleman, D. J., 352, 354, 385, 569,
+570
+Fennell, R. D., 63, 122, 573
+Feustel, T. C., 197, 198, 559, 574
+Fillmore, C. J., 273, 559
+Finlay, B. L., 367, 574
+Firing, rates of in neocortical
+neurons, 366-367. See also
+Neocortical neurons, nature of
+First formant onset frequency
+(FIOF), 84, 85. See also
+Phoneme identification, factors
+influencing
+Fixations. See also Reading,
+programmable blackboard model
+of
+sequences of, 161-164
+single and multiple, 153-155
+Fodor, J. A., 141, 509, 274, 559
+Foley, J. D., 467, 559
+Ford, M., 274, 559
+Foss, D. J., 79, 111, 559
+Fowler, C. А., 60, 73, 77, 95, 118,
+559
+Fox, R. A., 79, 559, 560
+Frames, use of as knowledge
+structure, 9. See also Schemata,
+concept of
+Francis, W., 74, 240, 565
+Frazier, L., 275, 560, 573
+Freeman, R. D., 475, 476, 478, 481,
+492, 560, 567, 571
+
+590 INDEX
+Freezing and decision-making in
+harmony theory. See Decisionmaking and freezing in harmony
+theory
+Freund, T. F., 363, 576
+Friedlander, M. J., 351, 560
+Fry, D. B., 94, 560
+Fuchs, A. F., 357, 566
+Fujimura, О., 62, 473, 560, 569
+Fujisaki, H., 77, 94, 560
+Fukushima, K., 42, 152, 162, 300,
+313, 350, 509
+Future directions for PDP, 547-552
+Fuxe, K., 350, 364, 553, 560
+Fuzzy map theory, 432-433. See also
+Place recognition and goal
+location, biologically plausible
+models of
+Gallistel, C. R., 141, 509
+Gamma factor in bitemporal
+amnesia, 507
+Ganong, W. F., 60, 78, 560
+Garey, L. J., 348, 497, 500, 555,
+560, 577
+Garnes, S., 61, 555
+Garrett, M. F., 274, 559
+Garrud, P., 434, 466, 569
+Gary-Bobo, E., 476, 478, 556
+Gati, I., 499, 560
+Gating activation function, 426. See
+also Activation functions
+Gee, J., 60, 63, 107, 115, 561
+Gelatt, C. D., Jr., 48, 235, 287, S11
+Geman, D., 148, 264, 271, 278, 289,
+509
+Geman, S., 148, 264, 268, 271, 278,
+289,509
+Generalization, 30, 85. See also
+Memory, a distributed model of
+Georgopoulos, A. P., 377-378, 560
+Gernsbacher, M. A., 79, 559
+Gerstein, G. L., 385, 560
+Gibbs sampler, research with, 264
+Gibson, E. J., 198
+Gilbert, C. D., 356, 358, 366, 385,
+480, 560, 561, 577, 578
+Ginsburg, H. P., 241, 509
+Glaser, E. M., 366, 577
+Glass, L., 494, 571
+Glorioso, R. M., 424, 510
+Gluck, M. A., 383, 552, 561
+Glushko, R. J., 43, 510, 171, 561
+Goal location. See Place recognition
+and goal location, biologically
+plausible models of
+Goldman-Rakic, P. S., 350, 572
+Goodness-of-fit function, 14-16, 31,
+32-33, 35-36. See also Schemata,
+concept of
+Graceful degradation, 29, 134. See
+also Damage, effects of on a
+network
+Gradient descent
+and delta rule, 322-324
+use of to solve hard optimizing
+problems on conventional
+computers, 287-288
+Grapheme strings, 97-99, 102. See
+also Arbitrary mapping,
+implementing
+Gray, E. G., 339, 361, 561
+Green, D. M., 466, S10, 225, 561
+Green, K., 96, 569
+Greenberg, Z., 254
+Greenway, A. P., 477, 554
+Grinvald, A., 385, 561
+Grosjean, F., 60, 63, 99, 100, 105,
+107,114, 115,557,561
+Gross, C. G., 368, 556, 558
+Grossberg, S., 42, 53, 70, 116, 146,
+152, 162, 164, 167, 418, 510, 90,
+389,494,535, 556, 561
+Grossberg's models, 70-71
+Guillery, R. W., 351, 561
+Gutnick, M. J., 364, 369, 557
+Haggard, M., 85, 576
+Hale, B. L., 159, 563
+Halle, M., 24, 508, 168, 561
+Halmos, P. R., 422, S10
+Hamiltonian function (H), 211
+Hámori, J., 351, 577
+Hard learning, example of, 299-303.
+See also Boltzmann machines
+
+Harik, S. J., 477, 561
+Harmonium machine, 212
+Harmony function (H). See also
+Harmony theory
+basic requirements of, 220-223
+cognitive systems and, 267-268
+mathematic formulation of, 208,
+211
+retrieving information from, 269-
+272
+terminology, 268-269
+Harmony theory, 213-220
+conclusions on, 261-262
+decision-making and freezing, 236-
+240
+definition of, 148
+electricity, problem-solving of,
+240-250
+goal of, 198-199
+learning new representations, 258-
+261
+macrodescription, 251-258
+mathematical results, description
+of, 226-236
+competence theorem, 226-229
+learnability theorem, 235-236
+physics analogy, 229-230
+realizability theorem, 230-235
+perceptual processing centrality,
+197-198
+and probability, 220-226
+research with, 264
+schema theory and self-consistency
+of, 199-213
+theorems on, formal presentation
+of, 264-281
+top-down strategy pursued in, 196
+Harris, K. S., 92, 576
+Hart. P. E., 380, 558
+Hash coding, 80
+Hawken, M. J., 490, 555
+Hawkins, R. D., 552, 561
+HEARSAY model of speech
+understanding, 43, 119, 122-123,
+124
+BLACKBOARD, 123
+Hebb, D. O., 36, 41, 53, 152-153,
+510
+591
+Hebbian learning rule, 36, 37, 38,
+53, 69-70,297
+Heggelund, P., 497, 564
+Heidmann, T., 387, 556
+Hein, A., 475, 478, 558
+Heise, G., 63, 569
+Hendrickson, A. E., 344, 357, 566,
+572
+Henneberg, R., 341, 561
+Hewitt, C., 132, 510
+Hidden units, augmenting memory
+with, 209-214. See also Memory,
+a distributed model of
+Hidden units, definition of, 48
+Hierarchy, kinds of, 105-106
+Hinton, G. E., 17, 20, 33, 42, 80, 82,
+83, 84, 96, 107, 114, 115, 127,
+133, 264, 272, 282, 283, 289,
+297, 302, 306, 313, 317, 335,
+350, 507,508, 510, 511, 515, 8,
+23,24,63,68, 128, 129, 151,
+173, 175, 209, 210, 277, 278,
+312, 313, 314, 318, 322, 373,
+377, 381, 389, 393, 394, 533,
+539,548, 554, 562, 575, 577
+Hinton's scheme for mapping
+patterns, 114-115, 117, 118. See
+also Attention, networks for
+focusing
+Hintzman, D., 171, 172, 200, 562
+Hiorns, R. W., 344, 573
+Hirst, G., 321, 575
+Hoff, M. E., 321, 444, 516
+Hofstadter, D. R., 43, 132, 202, 213,
+264,511,20,562
+Hogg, T., 313, 511, 389, 562
+Hökfelt, T., 350, 364, 560, 577
+Homogeneous dipole stimulus
+patterns (App.), 191-193
+Hopfield, J. J., 43, 61, 81, 133, 148,
+285, 286, 296, 297, 418, 511, 13,
+14,389, 394,562
+Hopfield nets, applying simulated
+annealing to, 288-289. See also
+Simulated annealing
+Hopkins, W. F., 477, 562
+Horizontal and vertical lines,
+experiments with, 184-190
+
+592 INDEX
+Horizontally hierarchical networks,
+217
+Houde, J., 353, 355, 566
+Houser, C. R., 351, 562
+Hubel, D. H., 340, 353, 356, 367,
+373, 474, 475, 483, 497, 500,
+562,563,566,578
+Huberman, B. A., 313, 511, 389, 562
+Hughlings-Jackson, J., 41, 141-142
+Human information processing. See
+also PDP approach, reflections on
+essential properties of, $37
+new understanding of, 545-546
+Human memory. See Memory, a
+distributed model of; Memory,
+retrieving information from
+Hummel, R. A., 285, 286, 511, 514
+Hunt, S. P., 364, 559
+Huppert, F. A., 516, 517, 563
+6-hydroxydopamine (6-OHDA),
+477-496
+Identity/ role combinations, 106. See
+also Case role assignment, model
+of; Distributed representations
+Imbert, M., 476, 478, 556
+Imig, T. J., 356, 563
+Implementational (physiological)
+level of distributed memory, 121
+Inner products. See also Vectors
+algebraic properties of, 382-383
+in two-dimensional space, 380-382
+Input units, definition of, 48
+Interactive activation model of word
+perception, 43, 71-72, 177-180,
+216-217, 125-129, 137-138
+Interactive model of reading
+(Rumelhart), 43, 122
+Interactive models, representation of
+in matrix form, 57, 59-61. See
+also Interactive activation model
+of word perception
+layered systems, 60
+one-step system, 60
+single-level, 60
+three-level, 59
+Interference of patterns, 139-142.
+See also Programmable pattern
+associators; Reading,
+programmable blackboard model
+of; Standard pattern associators
+Interference of memories, 208-209.
+See also Memory, a distributed
+model of
+Internal representations. See Delta
+rule, generalized; Representation,
+learning of
+IS-A hierarchy, 105
+Isenberg, D., 7, 511
+Isomorphism hypothesis. See also
+PDP models, neural and
+conceptual interpretation of
+of conceptual and neural levels,
+395-396
+failure of in nonlinear models,
+422-424
+levels and localized damage, 413-
+416
+levels, learning of connections and,
+416-418
+in linear systems, 411-413
+Iverson, L. L., 340, 563
+Jackson, J. H., 41, 141, 511
+Jacoby, L. L., 171, 172, 192, 193,
+556,563
+Jakimik, J., 61, 98, 99, 100, 107,
+111,557
+Jelinek, F., 293, 508
+Jenkins, J. J., 473, 569
+Jenkins, W. M., 385, 563
+Johnson, D. S., 235, 508
+Johnson, E., 324, 563
+Johnston, D., 477, 562
+Johnston, J. C., 159, 160, 563, 574
+Jones, E. G., 351, 352, 357, 363,
+563,564
+Jones, R. S., 56, 406, 409, 410, 418,
+507, 173, 226, 311, 551, 554
+Jouvet, M., 350, 555
+Julesz, B., 18, Sl1
+Just, M. A., 153, 161, 549, 564, 577
+Kaas, J. H., 345, 352, 354, 385, 386,
+387,569, 570, 578
+Kahneman, D., 536, 564
+
+Kaiserman-Abramof, I. R., 336, 361,
+365,571
+Kalaska, J. F., 378, 560
+Kandel, E. R., 333, 364, 507, 552,
+561, 564, 576
+Kanerva, P., 76, 465, S11
+Kant, E., 17, 19, 564
+Kaplan, R. M., 119, 516, 274, 559,
+564
+Kasamatsu, Т., 476, 477, 492, 497,
+564
+Kawamoto, A. H., 101, 511, 277,
+311,564
+Kawashima, T., 77, 94, 560
+Keele, S. W., 171, 183, 200, 203,
+572
+Kelly, J. P., 480, 560
+Kewley-Port, D., 85, 564
+Kienker, P. K., 302, 350, 511, 515
+Kinematics of the dynamical system,
+398-399, 400-403. See also PDP
+models, neural and conceptual
+interpretation of
+Kirkpatrick, S., 148, 235, 287, 511
+Kisvárdy, Z. F., 363, 576
+Klatt, D. H., 59, 60, 62, 564
+Kliegl, R., 273, 567
+Кпарр, А., 173, 200, 564
+Knowledge atoms
+definition of, 202
+and electricity problem-solving, 242
+Koch, C., 365, 381, 383, 564, 565
+Kohonen, T., 42, 45, 62, 63, 152,
+406, 409, 418, 422, 424, 425,
+444, 446, 455, 461, 511, 222,
+226,380, 565
+Konishi, M., 473, 565
+Kratz, K. E., 490, 565
+Krnjevic, K., 339, 565
+Kubie, J. L., 435, 441, 445, 447,
+565,570
+Kucera, H., 74, 240, 565
+Kuczaj, S. A., 219, 220, 221, 253,
+257,258,565
+Kuffler, S. W., 367, 565
+Kuipers, B., 433, 565
+Kullback, S., 294, 511
+Kuno, M., 336, 565
+593
+Kuperstein, M., 385, 565
+Kupperman, B., 478, 572
+Kurtzman, H. S., 275, 565
+Kuypers, H. G. J. M., 352, 571
+Laird, N. M., 293, 509
+Lakoff, G., 97
+LaManna, J. C., 477, 561
+Lamperti, J., 277, 511
+Lane, H. L., 91, 565
+Lang, K., 127, 510
+Lang, M., 511
+Language acquisition device (LAD),
+217. See also Verbs, learning past
+tenses of
+Larkin, J. H., 241, 512
+Larsson, K., 350, 553
+Lashley, K. S., 41, 512
+Law of mass action, 509-510. See
+also Amnesia
+Layered systems in interactive
+models, 60
+Lazarus, J. H., 94, 572
+LC. See Locus coeruleus
+Leaky learning model, 179
+Learnability theorem, 235-236, 260
+Learning. See also Boltzmann
+machines; Delta rule, generalized;
+Memory, a distributed model of;
+Neural plasticity and learning
+in Boltzmann machines
+easy and hard, 290-299
+hard, example of, 299-303
+learning algorithm, derivation of,
+315-318
+establishing features through, 258-
+260
+in symbolic and subsymbolic
+paradigms, 261-262
+Learning machine (Minsky and
+Edmonds), 153-154
+Learning paradigms, 54-57
+Learning rule, general form of, 52-53
+Leavitt, R. Y., 351, 563
+Le Cun, Y., 322, 512
+Lehiste, I., 61, 565
+Lenneberg, E. H., 473, 565
+Lesser, U. R., 63, 559
+
+594
+Letter-perception model. See
+Interactive activation model of
+word perception
+LeVay, S., 350, 353, 355, 361, 374,
+497.500.563.565.566
+Levels of analysis, 121-129. See also
+Isomorphism hypothesis
+Marr's levels, 122-124
+other notions of levels, 124-127
+reductionism and emergent
+properties, 127-129
+Levin, J. A., 43, 85, 512, 90, 566
+Levin's proteus model, 43
+Levine, R. D., 227, 512
+Lewis, B., 341, 566
+Lewis, C. H., 251, 512
+LGN cells, 480
+Liberman, A. M., 61, 62, 73, 92, 94,
+95,473,560, 566, 569, 573,576
+Lichten, W., 63, 569
+Licklider, J. C. R., 106, 566
+Lieberman, F., 489, 557
+Limited fan-out. See Fan-out,
+limited; Standard pattern
+associators
+Limited increment hypothesis, 520.
+See also Amnesia
+Lin, C. S., 351, 560
+Lindsay, P. H., 8, 206, 512
+Linear algebra
+matrices and linear systems
+basis for vector space, change of,
+413
+description of, 385-386
+eigenvectors and eigenvalues,
+399-403
+linearity, 393
+matrices, 386-390
+matrix inverses, 410-413
+matrix multiplication and
+multilayer systems, 395-399
+one-layer PDP system, 390-393
+PDP systems, 2 examples, 406-
+410
+transposes and the outer product,
+403-405
+nonlinear systems, 418-420
+vectors
+basic operations of, 367-370
+concepts, use of in analysis of
+simple PDP model, 383-385
+description of, 365-366
+inner products, 375
+linear combinations and
+independence, 370-373
+vector spaces, 374-375
+Linear models, simple, 61-63. See
+also Linear algebra
+auto-associator version of, 63
+pattern associator, 63
+simple linear associator, 62
+weaknesses of, 63
+Linear threshold units, 63-66, 425,
+224. See also Activation
+functions
+perceptron, 6s
+XOR function, 64-65
+LISP programming language, 124
+use of in P3 system, 492, 496-497
+Llinás, R., 364, 370, 558, 566
+Local representations, 77, 85, 96
+Locus coeruleus (LC), 476-477, 493
+Loeb, G. E., 383, 566
+Loftus, E. F., 85, 508, 208, 566
+Logical computation, notion of. See
+Activation functions
+Logogen model, 43, 192-193
+Loomis, L. H., 402, 566
+Lorente de Nó, R., 344, 358, 566
+Lovins, J. B., 62, 560
+Luce, R. D., 75, 93, 195, 566
+Luce choice rule, application of, 90-
+91,195
+Lund, J. S., 357, 358, 361, 366, 374,
+566,573
+Lund, R. D., 336, 357, 566
+Luria, A. R., 41, 79. 135. 512
+Luria's dynamic functional system,
+41
+Lynch, J. C., 366, 567
+Ma, S. -K., 388, 567
+Macchi, G., 350, 567
+Macrodescription of harmony
+mechanism, 246-258
+
+problem solving for, 246-247
+productions and expertise, 251-253
+schemata, 253
+approximation, 256-258
+for rooms. 255-256
+two-choice model, 253-255
+MacWhinney, B., 273, 274, 554, 567
+Macy, A., 481, 567
+Magistretti, P. J., 364, 569
+Mann, V. A., 95, 118, 567
+Mapping from expressions, 439. See
+also Boolean function
+Marcus, M. P., 317, 324, 567
+Marin, O. S. M., 134, 514
+Marin-Padilla, M., 363, 567
+Mark, R. F., 490, 555
+Marr, D., 18, 19, 20, 42, 113, 116,
+117, 121-122, 123, 196, 283, 512,
+63, 119,378, 567
+Marr's levels of analysis, 122-124.
+See also Levels of analysis
+Marrocco, R. T., 480, 567
+Marshall, J. C., 102, 508
+Marshall, W. H., 352, 579
+Marslen-Wilson, W. D., 43, 512, 63,
+77, 79,80, 97, 98, 99, 275, 567
+Martin, K. A. С., 363, 567, 576
+Massaro, D. W., 77, 81, 86, 94, 567,
+568, 571
+Massey, T., 378, 560
+Matrices and linear systems. See also
+Linear algebra
+basis for vector space, change of,
+413-418
+descriptions of, 385-386
+eigenvectors and eigenvalues, 399-
+403
+examples of PDP systems, 406-410
+linearity, 393-395
+matrices, 386
+addition of, 387-389
+matrix mapping, algebraic
+properties of, 389-390
+scalars, multiplication by, 386
+matrix inverses, 410-413
+multiplication and multilayer
+systems, 395-398
+algebraic properties of, 399
+595
+one-layer PDP system, 390-393
+transposes and outer product, 403-
+405
+Matrix inverses, 410-413. See also
+Matrices and linear systems
+Matrix mapping, algebraic properties
+of, 389-390. See also Matrices
+and linear systems
+Maunsell, J. H. R., 345, 352, 353,
+356,500, 568, 577
+Maximum-likelihood model, 292-294
+McCarthy, J., 157-158, 512
+McClelland, J. L., 20, 22, 24, 27, 28,
+42, 43, 71, 79, 85, 120, 121, 133,
+
+177, 199, 202, 216, 321, 512,
+514, 8, 58, 59, 63, 69, 71, 75, 17,
+80, 90, 119, 123, 126, 121, 130,
+131,135, 138, 140, 141, 142,
+170, 172, 195, 217, 370, 380,
+381, 383, 394, 532, 558, 559,
+568, 574
+McClurkin, J. W., 480, 567
+McConkie, G. W., 161, 163, 568,
+573
+McCulloch, W. S., 152, 424, 512
+McDermott, D., 432, 568
+McGeoch, L. A., 235, 508
+McGill, J., 145, 575
+McGuinness, E., 374, 375, 553
+McNaughton, B. L., 448, 568
+MD. See Monocular deprivation
+Medin, D. L., 171, 181, 200, 205,
+536,568
+Meditch, J. S., 456, 512
+Memory, a distributed model of. See
+also Distributed representations;
+Memory, retrieving information
+from
+conclusions on, 214-215
+detailed assumptions of, 176-182
+experimental results of simulations
+repetition and familiarity effects,
+192-199
+representation of general and
+specific information, 199-206
+extensions of model
+amnesia, spared learning in, 207-
+208
+
+596
+Memory, a distributed model of
+extensions of model (continued)
+interference and fan effects, 208-
+209
+memory blends, 208
+regularities of behavior,
+emergence of, 207
+semantic memory, emergence of
+from episodic traces, 206
+general properties of, 173-175
+modular structure, 174-175
+pattern of activation, 175
+hidden units, augmenting model
+with, 209-214
+model's behavior, key aspects of,
+182-192
+relation to basic concept in, 176
+theories of, 2-3, 170-171
+Memory, retrieving information
+from. See also Distributed
+representations, features of;
+Memory, a distributed model of
+content addressability, 25-29
+default assignment, 29-30
+graceful degradation, 29
+spontaneous generalization, 30-31
+Mercer, R. L., 293, 508
+Merzenich, M. M., 385, 386, 387,
+563,569
+Mesulam, M. M., 350, 569
+Metropolis, N., 230, 277, 513
+Meyer, D. R., 352, 579
+Michael, C. R., 367, 368, 569
+Micro- and macrolevels of harmony
+theory, 203-204, 210
+Microdescription, problem-solving
+of, 246. See also Electricity
+problem-solving
+Microfeature, 80-81
+Microfeatures, semantic. See
+Semantic microfeatures
+Microstructure of cognition, 12-13
+Miezin, J., 374, 375, 553
+Miller, D. T., 536, 564
+Miller, G. A., 63, 106, 323, 566, 569
+Miller, J. L., 62, 96, 569
+Miller, J. P., 381, 382, 569, 575
+Miller, P., 515, 576
+Miller, W., 254
+Milner, B., 504, 506, 510, 514, 569
+Minciacchi, D., 350, 567
+Minsky, M., 65, 76, 96, 111-113,
+153, 154, 157-158, 160, 233, 291,
+319, 321, 334, 348, 354, 361,
+424, 513, 18, 19, 535, 569
+Mitchell, D. E., 475, 558
+Mitchinson, G., 296, 297, 468, 486,
+509
+Mitra, S. K., 455, 513
+Miyuwaki, K., 473, 569
+Models, similarities and differences
+between, 4-5
+Modifications of patterns of
+interconnectivity in PDP models,
+52-53. See also Learning
+Modular structure of memory, 79,
+174-175. See also Memory, a
+distributed model of
+Molinari. M.. 35. 567
+Monocular deprivation (MD), 474,
+475
+OD shift under, 487
+rearing, 489
+Monocular occlusion (AM), 474
+Monotonicity concepts for activation
+functions, 427-428. See also
+Activation functions
+Monotonicity-in-context, 426-428
+Montero, V. M., 351, 569
+Moran, J., 374, 558
+Morrell, F., 379, 569
+Morris, R. G. M., 434, 466, 569
+Morrison, J. H., 364, 569
+Morton, J., 43, 513, 97, 106, 192,
+570
+Moser, M. G., 313, 570
+Motor control
+example of multiple constraints in,
+4-6
+PDP models for, examples of, 13-
+18
+finger movements in skilled
+typing, 14-16
+reaching for objects, 16-18
+Mountcastle, V. B., 356, 366, 373,
+385,567, 570
+
+Moussouris, J., 289, 513
+Mower, G. D., 478, 570
+Mozer, M. C., 68, 127, 507, 513,
+125,139,140,142,570
+Muller, R. U., 435, 441, 445, 447,
+565,570
+Multiple linear regression and the
+delta rule, 457-458. See also
+Delta rule, analysis of
+Multiple simultaneous constraints,
+4-9,58, 124, 272-275
+mutual constraints, 7
+operation of in syntax and
+semantics, 6-7
+duplication of connection
+information, need for to exploit,
+124
+role assignment, use of in, 272-275
+simultaneous mutual constraints in
+word recognition, 7-9
+speech perception, role of in, 124
+Munro, P. W., 42, 180, 508, 480,
+487,489, 495, 496, 555, 570
+Murray, E. A., 357, 570
+Mutt, V., 364, 560
+Nadel, L., 435, 445, 510, 527, 571,
+576
+Nakatani, L., 61, 110, 570
+Nathan, P. W., 514, 515, 574
+Nativism vs. empiricism, 139-142
+Nauta, W. J. H., 334, 342, 570
+NE. See Norepinephrine
+Necker cube, 11, 13, 16, 28. See also
+Schemata, concept of
+Neely, R. B., 63, 122, 573
+Negation problem, 346-348. See also
+Delta rule, generalized
+Neisser, U., 81, 113, 116, 212, 513,
+515
+Nelson, R. J., 352, 354, 385, 477,
+569,570
+Nelson, S. B., 477, 554
+Neocortical neurons, nature of
+cell types in, 358-360
+experimental methods, 357-358
+feature detection, 367-371
+firing, rates of, 366-367
+597
+groups of neurons behavior in
+cerebral cortex, 365-366
+neurons without many spines, 361
+neurons with spines, 360-361
+single-neuron behavior in cerebral
+cortex, 364-365
+special cell types, 362-364
+Network damage. See Damage,
+effects of on a network; Graceful
+degradation
+Neural and conceptual interpretation
+of PDP models. See PDP models,
+neural and conceptual
+interpretation of
+Neural-like processing systems,
+common learning paradigms in,
+160-161
+Neural modeling, 130
+Neural nets, biological limits on
+storage capacity of, 469-470. See
+also Fan-out, limited
+Neural or unit level of
+representation. See Pattern-based
+coordinates, delta rule in
+Neural plasticity in cerebral cortex,
+385-387. See also Cerebral
+cortex, questions about
+computation in
+Neural plasticity and learning
+critical period, effect of
+environment on, 478
+critical period of, 473-478
+ocular dominance, measuring
+changes in, 474-476
+plasticity-modulating processes,
+476-478
+discussion of, 471-473, 494-499
+existing modification rules, state
+dependence and, 494-490
+global modulators as dynamic
+variables, 496-497
+predictions for, 497-499
+experimental data on, comparison
+with, 489-494
+ocularity state and its effect on,
+478-489
+model neuron, 479-480
+ocularity plane, 480-484
+
+598
+Neural plasticity and learning
+(continued)
+state dependencies of plasticity,
+484-489
+PDP models, learning rate as factor
+in, 472
+single-unit learning, focus on, 472
+summary of, 501
+terminology, 473
+visual cortex, ideas described with
+respect to ocular dominance in,
+499-501
+Neural processing in cerebral cortex,
+378-382. See also Cerebral
+cortex, questions about
+computation in
+Neural realism, lack of in PDP
+models, 136-138
+Neurons. See also Cerebral cortex,
+anatomy and physiology of;
+Neocortical neurons, nature of
+behavior in the cerebral cortex
+groups of neurons, 365-366
+single neuron, 364-365
+classical description of, 335-337
+connections between, in brain,
+132-133
+communication among, 132
+continuous output of, 133-134
+graceful degradation of, 134
+neocortical, 358-365
+number of, 131
+speed of, 130-131
+systems, 131-132
+treated as devices, 424-425 (see
+also Boolean function)
+without many spines, 36l
+with spines, 360-361
+Newell, A., 108, 195, 513
+Newsome, W. T., 347, 356, 554, 568
+Newtonian mechanics, 125
+Nicholson, C., 364, 566
+Ninteman, F. W.. 493. 572
+Nonlinear systems. See also PDP
+models, neural and conceptual
+interpretation of
+distributed, natural competition in,
+424-428
+isomorphism, failure of in, 422-424
+quasi-linear systems with, 418-422
+use of, 418-421
+limited dynamic range and, 420-
+421
+subthreshold summation, 420
+Nonpyramidal cells, 358-360. See
+also Neocortical neurons, nature
+of
+Norepinephrine (NE), 476-477, 478,
+480,493
+as potential modulator of neural
+plasticity, 476-477, 492-494, 497
+Normal rearing (NR), 474
+Norman, D. A., 8, 9, 14, 15, 79,
+116, 133, 206, 512, 513, 514, 18,
+19,537,539,540, 543, 545, 555,
+570,574
+Norris, D., 63, 100, 571
+NR. See Normal rearing
+Nusbaum, H. С., 120, 571
+Ochs, M. T., 385, 563
+Ocular dominance (OD)
+class, 484
+histograms, 475, 479, 489, 490
+shift, under MD, 487
+statistics, 474-476
+Ocular dominance index, 481-483,
+484,490
+vs. responsivity plot, 492
+Ocularity plane, power of as tool in
+theoretical analyses of ocular
+dominance plasticity, 483-484
+Ocularity state and its effect on
+plasticity, 478-480. See also
+Neural plasticity and learning
+ideal neuron, 479-480
+ocularity plane, 480-484
+plasticity, state dependence of,
+484-489
+OD. See Ocular dominance
+Oden, G. C., 77, 275, 568, 571
+ODH. See Ocular dominance,
+histogram
+ODI. See Ocular dominance index
+6-OHDA. See 6-hydroxydopamine
+Ohzawa, I., 481, 492, 560, 567
+
+Oja, E., 489, 557
+O'Keefe, J., 434, 435, 445, 448, 466,
+568, 569, 571
+O'Kusky, J., 348, 571
+Olson, C. R., 475, 571
+Olson, L., 350, 553
+Olton, D. S., 435, 522, 554, 571
+One-layer PDP systems, use of
+matrices in analyzing, 390-393.
+See also Matrices and linear
+systems
+One-layer perceptron, 111-113
+limitations of, 112-113
+One-step system in interactive
+models, 60
+Optimization problems, use of linear
+programming for, 284-286
+Organization of Behavior, 53, 152
+Ortony, A., 19, 32, 574
+Output units
+definition of, 48
+as major aspect of PDP models, 46,
+48-49
+P3 system. See Parallel process
+programmer
+PABLO. See Reading, programmable
+blackboard model of
+Palay, S. L., 338, 571
+Palmer, R. G., 296, 511, 513
+Palmer, S. E., 117, 513
+Pandemonium, 42
+Pandya, D. N., 352, 571, 573
+Papert, S., 65, 76, 96, 111-113, 158,
+160, 233, 291, 319, 321, 334,
+348, 354, 361, 424, 513, 535, 569
+Paradigms of learning
+associative, 54-55
+regularity discovery, 55
+Paradiso, M. A., 477, 554
+Parallel distributed processing. See
+PDP.
+Parallel Models of Associative Memory,
+33,533
+Parallel network simulating system.
+See Parallel process programmer
+Parallel process programmer (P3
+599
+system), 453-454
+competitive learning methods (App.
+B), 504-506
+description of, 364, 488-489
+major components of, 489-490
+performance of, 500-501
+plan for competitive learning, (App.
+A), 502-503
+plan language of, 490, 491-497
+simplified diagrams of, 454-455,
+464
+simulation system, 497-500
+typical plan for, 490
+Parity networks, 159, 160
+Parity problem, 334-335 See also
+Delta rule, generalized
+Parker, D. B., 322, 361, 513
+PARSIFAL (Marcus), 317
+Parsing in PDP models, 317-323
+Part/ whole hierarchy, 105
+Past-tense acquisition, three stages
+of, 219-221. See also Verbs,
+learning past tenses of
+Patte, P., 387, 556
+Pattern of activation, in distributed
+model of memory, 175
+memory traces as change in
+weights, 176
+mental state as, 176
+prior, retrieval as reinstatement of,
+176
+and response strength, 194-195
+Pattern association paradigm,
+definition of, 55
+Pattern associators. See also
+Programmable pattern associators;
+Standard pattern associators;
+Verbs, learning past tenses of
+basic properties of, 33-37, 226-228
+definition of, 161
+learning regular and exceptional
+patterns in, 226
+models, attractive properties of, 38
+restrictions of, 228-233
+Pattern-based coordinates, delta rule
+in, 447-453
+in conceptual interpretation of PDP
+models, 406-411
+
+600
+Pattern completion device, use of
+Boltzmann machine as, 289-290.
+See also Boltzmann machines
+Pattern of connectivity as major
+aspect of PDP models, 46, 49-51
+Patterson, K., 102, 508
+PDP approach and cognitive science
+conclusions on, 145-146
+natural applications of, 144
+objections to
+analysis, wrong level of, 121-127
+cognitive approach, lack of, 120-
+121
+cognitive theories, constraints of,
+129-136
+conscious knowledge and explicit
+reasoning, 143-145
+human vs. rat intelligence, 143
+lack of neural realism in, 136-138
+Marr's levels, 122-124
+nativism vs. empiricism, 139-142
+other notions of levels, 124-127
+reductionism and emergent
+properties, 127-129
+weaknesses of, 111-120
+status of various models, 144-145
+PDP approach, introduction to
+active representation in, 31-40
+as alternative to serial models, 12-
+13
+appeal of, 3-4, 10-12
+examples of
+memory retrieval, 25-31
+motor control, 13-17
+perception, 18-24
+history of, 41-44
+local vs. distributed representation,
+32-33
+pattern associator models
+attractive properties of, 38
+ensemble of patterns, extracting
+structure from, 39-40
+learning multiple patterns, 37-38
+learning rules of, 36-37
+workings of, 33-36
+PDP approach, reflections on
+computer metaphor and, 533-535
+learning and consciousness,
+problems of, 543-545
+new directions in, 545-546
+strengths of, 535-539
+description, levels of, 538-539
+human information processing,
+essential properties of, 537
+schema, 536-537
+useful result of, 537-538
+weaknesses of, 539-543
+evaluative structure, need for,
+541-542
+multiple systems, required for,
+542-543
+type-token problem, 539-540
+variables, 540-541
+PDP models, active representation
+in, 31-40, 175-176
+local vs. distributed, 32
+pattern associator models attractive
+properties of, 38
+pattern associators, 33-37
+structure of ensemble of patterns,
+extracting, 39-40
+PDP models and the brain. See also
+Cerebral cortex, anatomy and
+physiology of; Cerebral cortex,
+questions about computation in
+relationship between, 328-330
+models of neural mechanisms,
+330-331
+neurophysiology relevant to, 327-
+328
+PDP models, future directions for,
+547-552
+PDP models, general framework for
+bottom-up processing, 57-59
+conclusions on, 74-76
+hierarchical organizations, 57
+interactive models, 59-60
+learning paradigms, 54-57
+major aspects of, 46-54
+activation rule, 51-52
+learning rule, 52-54
+propagation rule, 51
+sigma-pi units, 73-74
+synchronous vs. asynchronous
+update, 61
+top-down processing, 59
+
+versions, specific
+brain state in a box model (BSB),
+66-68
+Feldman and Ballard's units, 72
+Grossberg's units, 70-71
+interactive activation model, 71
+linear threshold units, 63-66
+simple linear models, 61-63
+thermodynamic models, 68-70
+PDP models, learning rate as factor
+in, 472-473. See also Neural
+plasticity and learning
+PDP models, neural and conceptual
+interpretation of
+conclusions on, 429-431
+consideration of, 390-391
+distributed nonlinear models,
+natural competition in, 424-429
+as dynamical systems, 397-398
+interpretations, 391-396
+isomorphism hypothesis, failure of
+in nonlinear models, 422-424
+kinematics, 400-403
+kinematics and dynamics, 398-399
+learning connections and
+isomorphism of levels, 416-418
+linear systems, isomorphism of
+levels in, 411-413
+localized damage and, 413-416
+nonlinearity, quasi-linear systems
+with, 418-422
+pattern coordinates, 406-411
+vector space, structure of, 403-406
+Pearlmutter, B., 298
+Pearson, J. C., 385, 575
+Peck, C. K., 475, 571
+Peptides in the cerebral cortex, 340
+Perez, R., 494, 571
+Perception, examples of for PDP
+models
+familiar patterns and, 20-23
+novel patterns, completion of, 23-
+25
+stereoscopic vision, 18-20
+Perceptrons (Rosenblatt), 154-158
+convergence procedure, 41-42, 6S,
+225-226
+class C', 157-158
+601
+learning rule, 53, 154-157
+parallel reorganizing elements,
+158-159
+Perceptual processing, centrality of,
+197-198. See also Harmony
+theory
+Perkel, D. H., 381, 571
+Perkel, D. J., 381, 571
+Perrett, D. I., 368, 571
+Perry, J., 195, 508
+Peterhans, E., 376, 578
+Peters, A., 336, 338, 361, 363, 365,
+559,571, 572
+Petersen, S. E., 347, 554
+Petitjean, F., 350, 555
+Pettigrew, J. D., 476, 477, 487, 490,
+492, 555, 564
+Phase transitions, computational
+significance of, 236-237
+Phillis, d. W., 339, 565
+Phoneme identification, factors
+influencing
+categorical perception, 84, 88-95
+detectors, retuning of by context,
+95-97
+lexical effects on, 77-78
+factors influencing, 78-80
+simulations, summary of, 97
+trading relations, 84-88
+use of phonotactic rules in, 81-83
+Phonemic restoration effect, 20
+Piaget, J., 17, 19, 572
+Piercy, M., 516, 517, 563
+Pillsbury, W. B., 20, 513
+Pinker, S., 217, 572
+Pinto-Hamuy, T., 352, 579
+Pisoni, D. B., 60, 77, 92, 94, 100,
+572, 574
+Pitts, W, 152, 424, 512
+Place-field model. See also Place
+recognition and goal location,
+biologically plausible models of
+description of, 436-441
+goal location, 449
+properties of, 439-440
+scope of, 448
+shape and size, 445-446
+
+602
+Place recognition and goal location,
+biologically plausible models of
+B-coefficient constants (App.),
+467-468
+B-coefficient model, 460-466
+B units (App.), 469-470
+conclusions on, 466
+distal landmarks, 445
+distributed view-field model, 449-
+goal location, 449
+location parameters, 441-443
+model, description of, 436-441
+properties of, 439-440
+place-field location, 446-448
+place-field model, scope of, 448
+place-field shape and size, 445-446
+place recognition, 434-436
+simulated experiments, 443-445
+Plan language, as major component
+of P3 system, 489, 490, 491-497
+creating P3 plan for, 493-497
+features of, 490
+functions of, 491-493
+Plasticity, neural. See Neural
+plasticity
+Podgorny, P., 501, 575
+Poggio, T., 18, 19, 20, 42, 117, 512,
+513, 129, 365, 381, 383, 564,
+565,572
+Poincaré, H., 213, 513
+Pollack, J. В., 277, 278, 311, 314,
+578
+Porrino, L. J., 350, 572
+Poschel, B. P. H., 493, 572
+Posner, M. I., 171, 183, 200, 203,
+572
+Powell, T. P. S., 344, 348, 350, 351,
+352,556, 560, 563, 564, 572, 573
+Prince, D. A., 364, 369, 557
+Principles of Neurodynamics, 41-42,
+Probability theory, 209-210
+Processing units, set of for PDP
+model, 46-48
+vs. one-unit-one-concept
+representational system, 47
+Programmable blackboard model of
+reading. See Reading.
+programmable blackboard model
+of
+Programmable pattern associators.
+See also Connection information
+distribution mechanism; Reading,
+programmable blackboard model
+of
+CA units, requirements of, 474-476
+CID networks, requirements of,
+473-474
+conclusions on, 486
+discussion of, 485-486
+distributed representations,
+simultaneous access to, 483-485
+multiple pattern processing, 477-
+478
+overlapping, 478-480
+simultaneous access, cost of, 481-
+482
+single pattern processing, 476-477
+summary of CA requirements,
+480-481
+Proskauer, C. C., 336, 361, 363, 571,
+572
+Prototypes
+coexistence of and repeated
+exemplars, 189-192
+learning from exemplars, 182-184
+multiple, nonorthogonal, 184-188
+Pyramidal cells, 358-360. See also
+Neocortical neurons, nature of
+Quasi-linear activation function, 52,
+425. See also Activation
+functions
+Quasi-linear systems with
+nonlinearity, 418-422. See also
+Nonlinear systems; PDP models,
+neural and conceptual
+interpretation of
+Quasi-local interpretations, 394-395.
+See also PDP models, neural and
+conceptual interpretation of
+Quasi-multilinear activation function,
+426. See also Activation
+functions
+Quillan, M. R., 85, 513
+
+Rader, R. K., 497, 577
+Rall, W., 336, 381, 382, 569, 572,
+575
+Ralston, H. J., 336, 572
+Ramachandran, V. S., 478, 572
+Ranck, J. B., Jr., 435, 441, 445, 447,
+565,570
+Random-dot stereograms, 18
+Rao, C. R., 455, 513
+Rauschecker, J. P., 476, 478, 576
+Rawlins, J. N. P., 434, 466, 569
+Rayner, К., 153, 161, 163, 164, 275,
+560, 572, 573
+Reading, programmable blackboard
+model of (PABLO)
+ambiguous characters, 155-157
+amount of feedback, effect of
+display length on, 159-161
+CID computer simulation, results
+of, 136-141
+conclusions on, 168-169
+connection information
+distribution,
+benefits of, 164-166
+computer simulation of word
+recognition using, 134-136
+cost of, 166-167
+extensions of, 167-168
+mechanism, details of, 129-136
+(see also Programmable pattern
+associators)
+description of, 2, 125
+fixations, sequences of, 161-164
+fixations, single and multiple, 153-
+155
+interactive activation model,
+bottom-up activations of word
+units in CID version of, 137-138
+interference and crosstalk, 139-141
+PABLO simulation model
+coarse coding, 146-147
+details of, 151-153
+teedback, 147
+focus of attention, shifting, 147-
+151
+overlapping slots in, 143-147
+role-specific letter units, 145-146
+words of different lengths,
+INDEX 603
+conspiracies of, 157-159
+Realizability theorem, 230-235
+Receptor, cartoon of, 508-509. See
+also Amnesia
+Recurrent networks, 354-360. See
+also Delta rule, generalized
+performance of, 359-360
+sequence completion, learning of,
+358-359
+shift register problem and, 357-358
+Recursion, 119-120, 318-320
+Reddy, D. R., 63, 107, 122, 573
+Reductionism, PDP models as
+exercise in, 127-129
+Redundancy, benefits of, 472. See
+also Standard pattern associators
+Reese, T. S., 336, 572
+Regularity detector paradigm, 161
+Reich, P. A., 323, 573
+Reilly, D. L., 499, 573
+Reitboek, H. J. P., 385, 573
+Relaxation searches, use of parallel
+networks to perform, 283-290
+learning, difficult and easy, 290-292
+maximum likelihood models, 292-
+294
+optimization problems and, 284-
+286
+pattern completion, 289-290
+probabilistic decisions, use of to
+escape from local minima, 287-
+288
+simulated annealing, application of
+to Hopfield nets, 288-289
+Relaxation system, 135-136
+Relearning, speed of in Boltzmann
+machines, 308-310
+Repetition and familiarity effects,
+192-199
+alternative interpretation of, 193-
+194
+pattern action and response
+strength, 194-195
+time-accuracy curves, effects of
+experimental variables on, 195-
+traditional interpretation of, 192-
+193
+
+604 INDEX
+Repp, B. H., 95, 118, 567, 573
+Representation, distributed. See
+Distributed representation
+Representation of environment as
+major aspect of PDP models, 53-
+54
+Representation vector of harmony
+theory, 213-214
+Representational features of
+harmony theoretical model, 213-
+214
+Representation, learning of. See
+Boltzmann machines;
+Competitive learning; Delta rule,
+generalized
+Representation, learning of new in
+harmony theory
+procedure and abstract features,
+258-260
+in symbolic and subsymbolic
+paradigms, 261
+Reproduction trials, S20. See also
+Amnesia
+Residual learning skills in amnesia,
+518-524.
+Retinocentric feature detectors, 114
+Retrograde amnesia, 505-506, 513-
+SIS
+Reverse learning, occurrence of,
+296-298
+Reverse suture (RS), 474, 487-488,
+489
+Reverse suture paradigm, time
+course of, 489-490. See also
+Visual cortex, developmental
+models of
+Ribak, C. E., 363, 572
+Riley, M. S., 241, 264, 514, 515
+Rinzel, J., 381, 382, 569, 575
+Ritz, S. A., 56, 406, 409, 410, 418,
+507, 173, 226, 311, 399, 551,554
+Roberts, E., 351, 562
+Rock, I., 117, 514
+Rockel, A. J., 344, 573
+Rockland, K. S., 352, 366, 374, 573
+Role-assignment model. See Case
+role assignment, model of
+Role-specific letter units, 145-146.
+See also Reading, programmable
+blackboard model of
+Rolls, E. T., 368, 571
+Rosch, E., 171, 573
+Rose, J. E., 345, 573
+Rosén, I., 357, 554
+Rosenblatt, F., 41, 111, 152, 153-
+154, 155-157, 158, 291, 424, 514,
+226,289,535,573
+Rosenbluth, A. W., 230, 277, 513
+Rosenbluth, M. N., 230, 277, 513
+Rosenfeld, A., 285, 514
+Rosenthal, M., 477, 561
+Ross, B. H., 206, 554
+RS. See Reverse suture
+Rubin, D. S., 293, 509
+Rudnicky, A., 58, 557
+Rule of propagation as major aspect
+of PDP models, 46, 51
+Rumelhart, D. E., 6, 9, 14, 15, 20,
+22, 24, 43, 71, 116, 120, 121,
+130, 133, 177, 199, 202, 216,
+300, 321, 512, 514, 7, 18, 19, 31,
+59.71, 75, 77, 90, 170, 195, 217,
+316, 380, 394, 532, 539, 540,
+545,568,573,574
+Russell, W. R., 514, 515, 574
+Ryder, J. M., 7, 511
+Sachs, M. B., 383, 574
+Saffran, E. M., 134, 514
+Said, S., 364, 560
+Sakaski, K., 370, 558
+Salasoo, А., 60, 100, 197, 198, 559,
+574
+Salvert, D., 350, 555
+Samuel, A. G., 95, 160, 574
+Sanderson, K. J., 480, 574
+Sayers, F. C., 324, 563
+Scalars, multiplication by, 367, 386.
+See also Matrices and linear
+systems; Vectors
+Schacter, D., 519, 574
+Schank. R.C.M.6. 9.201. 2026; 148
+18,19,324, 574
+Scheibel, A. B., 351, 574
+Scheibel, M. E., 351, 574
+
+Schein, S. J., 374, 558
+Schemata, concept of, 9, 78-79,
+199-213.1.7-37.536-537
+account of mental processing, 38-
+53
+consciousness, content of, 39
+control, problem of, 39-40
+conversations and, 42-44
+external representations and
+formal reasoning, 44-48
+mental models and, 40-42
+mental stimulation and practice,
+42
+assumptions made about, 30-31
+conclusions on, 53-57
+constraint satisfaction and, 17
+description of, 1, 7-8
+example of, 22-25
+examples of processing of, 25-31
+goodness-of-fit landscapes of, 15,
+16,28,29,30,31,32-33,35
+in harmony theory, 199-213
+completion task, 206-208
+construction of, 201-203
+formulation of, 209-210
+function of, 208
+knowledge atoms, nature of in,
+205-206
+logical structure of, 199-200
+mathematical properties of
+probability and. 211-213
+micro- and microlevels of, 203-
+modified letter perception model,
+204-205
+history of, 17-19
+important features of, 19-20
+interpretation differences and, 21
+PDP models as constraint
+networks, 8-17
+properties of
+active processes, 36
+additional features, 36-37
+goodness-of-fit evaluation to data,
+36
+knowledge representation, 36
+subschema, 35
+605
+variables, 33-34
+summary of, 31, 48
+thinking, goal direction in, 48
+use of as knowiedge structures, 9
+Schermer, T. M., 96, 569
+Schiller, P. H., 367, 574
+Schmolze, J. G., 313, 555
+Schneider, W., 126, 549, 575
+Schumacher, L. E., 302, 350, 511,
+Schwanenflugel, P. J., 181, 205, 568
+Schwartz, J. H., 333, 507, 552, 564
+Schwartz, M. F., 134, 514
+Schwartz, M., 477, 554
+Schweikert, J., 7, 511
+Sclar, G., 492, 560
+Scott, G. L., 351, 569
+Scott, J. P., 473, 575
+Scripts, use of as knowledge
+structure, 9
+Sears, T. A., 336, 553
+Segev, I., 381, 382, 575
+Seguin, S., 350, 555
+Sejnowski, T. J., 118, 264, 272, 282,
+289, 297, 302, 306, 313, 317,
+335, 348, 350, 507, 508, 509,
+510, 511, 514, 515, 23, 24, 63,
+128, 373,377, 379, 380, 393,
+554, 562, 575
+Selfridge, O. G., 8, 41, 212, 515
+Selman, B., 321, 575
+Semantic cues. See Word-order and
+semantic cues to role assignment
+Semantic memory, emergence of
+from episodic traces, 206. See
+also Memory, a distributed model
+of
+Semantic microfeatures, 278-283.
+See also Case role assignment,
+model of
+Sememe units, 97-98, 99, 101-102,
+305-310. See also Arbitrary
+mapping; Damage, effects of on a
+network
+Semilinear activation functions. See
+Activation functions, semilinear
+Sencer, W., 352, 579
+
+606
+Sentence processing in PDP
+networks. See Case role
+assignment, model of
+Sentence-structure (SS)
+representation, 283-286. See also
+Case role assignment, model of
+Sequential symbol processing, 106-
+108
+Sequential thought processes in PDP
+models. See also Recurrent
+networks; Sequential symbol
+processing; Seriality, emergent
+account of mental processing,
+development of, 38-39
+conclusions on, 53-57
+consciousness, contents of, 39
+control, problem of, 39-40
+conversations, 42-44
+external representations and formal
+reasoning, 44-48
+important aspects of, 47
+role of language in, 47
+mental models and, 40-42
+mental simulations and practice, 42
+summary of, 48
+thinking, goal direction in, 48
+tic-tac-toe example of, 48-53, 54
+Seriality, emergent, 247, 249. See
+also Electricity problem-solving
+Settlage, P. H., 352, 579
+Shallice, T., 145, 543, 570, 575
+Shankweiler, D., 92, 94, 566
+Shannon, C. E., 195, 267, 515
+Sharma, V. K., 477, 56/
+Shaw, G. L., 385, 575
+Shepard, R. N., 198, 515, 501, 536,
+575
+Shepherd, G. M., 336, 381, 382,
+572,575
+Sherk, H., 350, 374, 566
+Sherman, S. M., 351, 560
+Shiffrin, R. M., 197, 198, 559, 574
+Shlaer, R., 494, 571
+Sickels, E. R., 324, 563
+Sigma-pi units, 72, 73-74, 426
+generalized delta rule for, 353
+Silverman, D. J., 385, 575
+Silverstein, J. W., 56, 406, 409, 410,
+418, 507, 173, 226, 311, 399,
+551,554
+Simon, H. A., 241, 508
+Simple binary addition problem,
+341-346. See also Delta rule,
+generalized
+Simulated annealing, 287, 288-289,
+313. See also Cooling schedule;
+Harmony theory
+Simulation system environment, as
+major component of P3 system,
+489, 497-500
+Singer, W., 476, 478, 575, 576
+Single-level interactive model, 60
+Single-shot algorithms, 380. See also
+Cerebral cortex, questions about
+computation in
+Single-unit learning, focus on, 472.
+See also Neural plasticity and
+learning
+Singley, 209
+Skirboll, L. R., 350, 577
+Slater, P. C., 513, 515, 576
+Slobin, D. I., 221, 247, 249, 250,
+251,254, 255, 256, 556
+Slowiaczek, L. M., 120, 571
+Small, S. L., 277, 314, 557, 576
+Smith, D. C., 490, 565
+Smith, E., 24, 515
+Smith, P. T., 24, 515
+Smolensky, P., 125, 241, 259, 264,
+277, 289, 447, 514, 515
+Sokolov, J. L., 274, 567
+Somogyi, P., 362, 363, 567, 576
+Spared learning in amnesia, 518-519,
+521-524. See also Amnesia
+Spear, P. D., 490, 565
+Speech, fundamental aspects for
+development of TRACE model
+architecture for TRACE model,
+importance of, 63-64
+context effects, left and right, 60
+cues, sensitivity of, 62
+lack of boundaries, 60, 6l
+speech signal, noise and
+indeterminacy in, 62-63
+stimulus, temporal nature of, 59-60
+temporal overlap, 00-61
+
+Spencer, W. A., 364, 576
+Spoehr, K., 24, 515
+Spoken word recognition, study of,
+97-98
+Spontaneous learning (Rosenblatt),
+155-156
+Squashing function, 425, 485-489.
+See also Activation functions;
+Ocularity state and its effect on
+plasticity
+Squire, L. R., 505, 510, 513, 515,
+516,517,525, 527, 556, 576
+Standard pattern associators. See also
+Programmable pattern associators
+conclusions on, 486
+degradation, effects of, 472
+limited fan-out, effects of, 468-472
+programmable nets, resource
+requirements, 465-468
+redundancy, benefits of, 472
+resource requirements of, 460,
+461-465
+computations of, 463-465
+Stanford, L. R., 351, 560
+State of activation as major aspect of
+PDP model, 46, 48
+State space (S), 398-399. See also
+Kinematics of the dynamical
+system
+coordinate system for, 400
+of general nonlinear activation
+model, 402
+pattern view of, 406
+unit coordinates for, 400-401
+Statistical learning, analyzing case of,
+453-457. See also Delta rule,
+analysis of
+Steedman, M., 274, 557
+Stemberger, J. P., 248, 576
+Sternberg, S., 133, 515, 402, 566
+Stevens, K. N., 62, 168, 561, 576
+Stimulus equivalence, problem of,
+113-114
+Stochastic generative model, 293-
+294,313
+Stochastic units, 81
+Strang, G., 411, 422, SIS
+Strange, W., 473, 569
+607
+Structure in representations and
+processes, 104-108
+constituent structure, 105-106
+sequential symbol processing, 106-
+108
+Studdert-Kennedy, М., 92, 94, 566,
+576
+Subsymbolic and symbolic
+paradigms, learning in, 261-262
+Subthreshold summation, 420. See
+also Nonlinear systems, use of
+Summerfield, Q., 85, 576
+Sur, M., 352, 354, 385, 569, 570
+Surround effects in visual cortex,
+374-377. See also Cerebral
+cortex, questions about
+computation in
+Sutton, R. S., 43, 53, 57, 444, 508,
+515,383, 539, 554,576
+Swanson, L. W., 350, 576
+Swets, J. A., 466, 510, 225, 561
+Swinney, D. A., 109, 577
+Symbolic and subsymbolic
+paradigms, learning in, 261-262
+Symmetry problem, 340-341. See
+also Delta rule, generalized
+Synapses in the cerebral cortex,
+basic types, 338-339
+Synaptic change, neurochemistry of,
+507-509. See also Amnesia
+Synchronous update VS.
+asynchronous update, 6l
+Syntactic processing in PDP models,
+317-323
+Szentagothai, J., 351, 362, 577
+T-C problem, 348-352. See also
+Delta rule, generalized
+Tabula rasa, 139, 141
+Takeuchi, A., 489, 495, 553
+Talbot, W. H., 366, 567
+Tank, D., 389, 562
+Tash, J., 92, 572
+Teitelbaum, P., 142, 515
+Teller, A. H., 230, 277, 513
+Teller, E., 230, 277, 513
+Tenenbaum, J. M., 63, 554
+
+608 INDEX
+Terminal parameters, 491. See also
+P3 system
+Terrace. H. S., 183, S15
+Theorems, harmony, (App.)
+Boltzmann machines, second-order
+observables and, 273-275
+harmony function H, cognitive
+systems and, 267-268
+rerminology, 268-269
+overview of definitions, 264-267
+proofs of, 275-281
+retrieving information from H,
+269-272
+storing information in H, 272-273
+Thermal equilibrium of network,
+290-291, 313
+Thermodynamic limit, 239
+Thermodynamic models, 68-70
+Boltzmann machines, 68, 69
+harmony theory, 68
+Thibadeau, R., 161, 549, 577
+Thomas, G. B., Jr., 276, 515
+Thompson, H., 60, 63, 84, 107, 577
+Thompson, R. F., 383, 552, 561
+Three-dimensional plots, 429, 430-
+438. See also Activation
+functions
+Three-layer network, 97-98. See also
+Arbitrary mapping, implementing
+Three-level interactive model, 59
+Three-stage learning curve, 240-245.
+See also Verbs, learning past
+tenses of
+Threshold logic unit, 425. See also
+Activation functions
+Tic-tac-toe, as example of sequential
+thought processes in PDP models,
+48-53, 54
+Tigges, J., 348, 577
+Tigges, M., 348, 577
+Timing
+problem of, 378-380
+of sensory stimulation, 383-384
+temporal binding, 383-385
+Timney, B. N., 475, 558
+Tömböl, T., 351, 361, 363, 577
+Top-down approach, 123
+Top-down processing system, S1,
+57-59
+Top-down theoretical strategy
+pursued in harmony theory, 196,
+199-213
+Torre, V., 117, 513, 129, 365, 381,
+565,512
+Touret, M., 350, 555
+Touretzky, D., 322, 548, 577
+TRACE model of speech perception
+compared to Fanty's parser, 321-
+322
+conclusions on, 120-121
+deficiencies of, 119-120
+description of, 2, 58-59, 64-68,
+123-124, 143, 153-154
+phoneme identification, factors
+influencing
+categorical perception, 84, 88-95
+lexical effects of on, 77-81
+phoneme detectors, retuning of
+by context, 95-97
+simulations, summary of, 97
+trading relations, 84-88
+use of phonotactic rules in, 81-83
+phoneme units, context-sensitive
+tuning of, 68-69
+programmable version of, 167-168
+speech, fundamental aspects for,
+59-63
+spoken word recognition, study of,
+COHORT model, 98-101, 102,
+103
+word segmentation, lexical basis
+of, 106-115
+word segmentation simulations,
+summary of, 115-117
+successes, summary of, 117-119
+TRACE 1 model, 69, 70-71, 75, 76
+TRACE Il model, 69, 70, 71-75,
+76,102,110
+Travis, A. M., 352, 579
+Tribus, M., 227, 512
+T'so, D. Y., 389, 971
+Turner, M. R., 385, 560
+Tversky, A., 499, 560
+Two-dimensional space, inner
+products in, 380-382. See also
+Vectors
+
+Two-layer scheme in harmony
+theory, advantages of, 218-219
+Tyler, L. K., 97, 98, 99, 104, 275,
+567,577
+Type-token problem, as weakness of
+PDP approach to cognition, 539-
+540
+Uchizono, K., 339, 577
+Ungerleider, L. G., 374, 558
+Ungerstredt, U., 350, 553
+Uniform monotonicity, 426-428
+Uniformly nondecreasing function,
+as special case of uniformly
+monotonic function, 427
+Uniqueness and continuity
+constraints, 19-20
+Unit parameters, 491. See also P3
+system
+UNIT TYPE statement for pattern
+generator in P3, 493-494
+Unlearning, 296-298. See also
+Boltzmann machines
+Valverde, F., 363, 559
+Van Dam, A., 467, 559
+Van der Loos, H., 366, 577
+Van Essen, D. C., 352, 353, 355,
+356,368, 500, 566, 568, 577
+Van Hoesen, G. W., 350, 569
+van Santen, J. P. H., 159, 160, 563,
+574
+Van Sluyters, R. C., 489, 490, 491,
+Variable translational mappings, 116
+Vaughn, J. E., 351, 562
+Vecchi, M. P., 148, 235, 287, 511
+Vector notation, delta rule in, 445-
+447. See also Delta rule, analysis
+of
+Vectors. See also Linear algebra
+basic operations of
+calculating averages, 369
+scalars, multiplication by, 367
+vectors, addition of 368-369
+concepts, use of to analyze simple
+PDP model, 383-385.
+description of, 365-366
+609
+inner products, 375-376
+algebraic properties of inner
+product, 382-383
+angle, 377-379
+length
+1, 376-377
+projections, 379-380
+two-dimensional space, inner
+products in, 380-382
+linear combinations and
+independence
+combinations of vectors, 370-371
+linear independence, 371-373
+vector spaces, 374-375
+structure of, 403-406
+Venesky, R. L., 24, 515
+Verb-frame selection for roleassignment models, 300-301
+Verbs, irregular, types of, 245-246,
+247-254. See also Verbs, learning
+past tenses of
+Verbs, learning past tenses of
+binding networks for (App.), 269-
+271
+conclusions on, 266-268
+example of model based on LAD
+approach, 217-219
+issue of, 3, 216-217
+model of
+learning and, 225-226
+operation of, 223-225
+phonological patterns, featural
+representations of, 233-239
+simple pattern associator model,
+226-233
+structure of, 221-223
+summary of structure of, 239-240
+novel verbs, transfer to, 261-266
+simulations, main points of
+irregular verbs, types of, 245-246,
+247-254
+regularization, types of, 257-260
+regular verbs, types of, 245-246,
+247
+three-stage learning curve, 240-
+245
+vowel-change verbs, 254-257
+stages, sequence of in acquisition
+of use of, 219-221
+
+610 INDEX
+Verbs, regular, 245-246, 247, 254-
+257, 258-260. See also Verbs,
+learning past tenses of
+Verbrugge, R., 473, 569
+Vertical and horizontal lines,
+experiments with, 184-190
+Vertically hierarchical networks, 217
+Videen, T. O., 497, 577
+View-field model, distributed. See
+Distributed view-field model
+Vincent, S. R., 350, 577
+Visual cortex, developmental models
+of, 489-494
+alternating monocular occlusion,
+490,491
+norepinephrine, role of, 492-494
+responsivity, relation of to
+connectivity, 490, 492
+reverse suture paradigm, time
+course of, 489-490
+Visual system, 282-283. See also
+Boltzmann machines
+Vital-Durand, F., 497, 500, 555, 577
+Voight, H. F., 383, 574
+Volman, S. F., 367, 574
+von der Heydt, R., 376, 578
+von der Malsberg, C., 42, 147, 152,
+162, 164, 516, 384, 489, 494, 578
+Von Neumann architecture, 534-535.
+See also PDP approach,
+reflections on
+Von Neumann computer metaphor,
+195
+Vygotsky, L. S., 43, 47, 578
+Walker, A. E., 349, 578
+Walker, E. C. T., 7, 511
+Walker, J. A., 435, 554
+Wall, J. T., 385, 569
+Waltz, D. L., 277, 278, 311, 314,
+578
+Warren, R. M., 20, 516
+Webster, H. de F., 338, 571
+Weight-decay, use of in Boltzmann
+machine, 298-299
+Weller, R. E., 345, 578
+Welsh, А., 43, 512, 63, 77, 79, 80,
+98,99,567
+Werblin, F. S., 336, 578
+Wessels, J., 99, 104, 577
+Westrum, L. E., 336, 578
+Whitteridge, D., 354, 363, 558, 567,
+576
+Whittlesea, B. W. A., 171, 172, 200,
+201.202.203.204.556.578
+Wickelfeature representation
+(Wickelgren)
+blurring, 238-239
+details of, 234-239
+Wickelgren, W. A., 62, 181, 233,
+510,511,527,578
+Wickelphones, 233-234, 236-238
+Widrow, G., 321, 516
+Widrow-Hoff rule, 53, 291-292. See
+also Delta rule
+Wiener, 534
+Wiesel, T. N., 340, 353, 356, 358,
+366, 367, 373, 374, 385, 474,
+475, 483, 497, 500, 561, 562,
+563,566,577,578
+Williams, R. J., 425, 516
+Willshaw, D. J., 42, 97, 100, 460,
+461, 465-466, 468, 472, 475, 516
+Willshaw nets, 461-465
+comparison of to various kinds of
+local representation, 465
+difficulties with, 465-468
+Wilson, H. R., 381, 389, 578
+Winston, P. H., 32, 516, 524, 578
+Wise, R. A., 493, 578
+Wise, S. P., 357, 564
+Wolverton, G. S., 161, 568
+Wood, C. C., 102, 516, 551, 578
+Woods, W., 119, 516, 322, 578
+Woolsey, C. N., 352, 579
+Woolsey, T. A., 355, 500, 558, 579
+Word identification simulations in
+TRACE, summary of, 115-117
+Word-order and semantic cues to
+role assignment, 293-300. See
+also Case role assignment, model
+of
+Word perception model (McClelland
+& Rumelhart). See Interactive
+activation model of word
+perception
+
+611
+Word segmentation, lexical basis of
+for TRACE. 106-115
+identification, word, 112-115
+nonwords, end of, 111-112
+short sentence example, 115
+word inputs, single and multiple,
+107-111
+Wu, T. Y., 350, 577
+Wyatt, H. J., 500, 558
+XOR problem, 319-321, 330-334.
+See also Delta rule, generalized
+Yin, T. C. T., 366, 567
+Young, E. D., 383, 574
+Zadeh, L. A., 423, 516
+Zeki, S. M., 368, 374, 577, 579
+Zipser, D., 97, 300, 514, 432, 437,
+438, 440, 442, 443, 444, 447, 579
+Zola, D., 161, 568
+Zucker, S. W., 285, 286, S11, 514
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/77381f4ae92411ffc55c33d0c1d4b225500abda93ffa0505877db8e976c6e7e4.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/77381f4ae92411ffc55c33d0c1d4b225500abda93ffa0505877db8e976c6e7e4.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b39cccaf5b73738e3df5be1752f46d2ae65650f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/77381f4ae92411ffc55c33d0c1d4b225500abda93ffa0505877db8e976c6e7e4.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -9465,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "77381f4ae92411ffc55c33d0c1d4b225500abda93ffa0505877db8e976c6e7e4",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 2409,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "21a674f8a55a84e4da224215d5ef132b916e19a1815eaf45113ee9f4920a7f3b",
+  "output_sha256": "5895b887ec7bf5f09be6647fba2e717d115cfd534e159e3bcf119f774782833a",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/8f20b52feb0ab5e0c79311a8b5718018de289a0675240cb7c7084e325480a1e9.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/8f20b52feb0ab5e0c79311a8b5718018de289a0675240cb7c7084e325480a1e9.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b6b9daaa088e88c06ad285429e9f7d617a163e63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/8f20b52feb0ab5e0c79311a8b5718018de289a0675240cb7c7084e325480a1e9.md
@@ -0,0 +1,9545 @@
+Formative Writings
+1929-1941
+SIMONE WEIL
+EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY
+DOROTHY TUCK MCFARLAND AND
+
+• Formative Writings
+1929-1941
+SIMONE WEIL
+EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY
+DOROTHY TUCK MCFARLAND AND
+THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS PRESS
+AMHERST, 1987
+
+Originally published in French.
+Cupyright © Editions Gallimard.
+Sur la science (1966); La Condition ouvrière (195 ł);
+Ecrits historiques et politiques (1960).
+Copyright © Editions rivages
+"La Philosophie" by Emile Novis
+(pseudonym of Simone Weil), in Cahiers du Sud,
+nO. 235 (May I941): 288-94.
+Translations, introductions, and all new matter
+copyright ©1987 by
+The Universiry of Massachusetts Press
+All rights reserved
+Printed in the United States of America
+Designed by Barbara Werden
+Set in Linoterm Sabon at The University of Massachusetts Press
+Printed by Cushing-Malloy and bound by Juhn Dekker & Sons
+Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
+Weil, Simone, 1909-1943.
+Formative writings, 1929-1441.
+Contents: Science and perception in Descartes—
+The situation in Germany-Factory journal—(erc.]
+I. Philosophy. 2. Descartes, René, 1596-1650.
+3. Germany-Politics and Government- 1918-1933.
+4. Weil, Simone. s. Factories-France. 6. Pacifism.
+I. McFarland, Dorothy Tuck, 1938-
+. 11. Van Ness.
+Wilhelmina, 1933- . III. Tirle.
+B2430.W472ESS 1986
+194
+86-6976
+ISBN 0-87023-539-7(alk.paper)
+
+FOR GERRY
+sine qua non
+
+Contents
+Acknowledgments
+ix
+Preface
+XI
+3
+Science and Perception in Descartes
+The Situation in Germany
+89
+Factory Journal
+149
+War and Peace
+227
+Philosophy
+279
+2I
+
+Acknowledgments
+This project could not have been done without the generous assistance of
+Sylvie Weil and the helpful cooperation of Dr. André Weil. We are also indebted to Fr. Richard Downs, C.S.C., Irving Groupp, and Leone Stein for
+having read sections of the manuscript and providing valuable suggestions, to Dr. Eric Weitzner for help in translating passages having to
+do with mathematical questions, and to Gerald W. McFarland for his
+sustained material and moral support. The project was also supported
+in part by a grant from the French Ministry of Culture, for which we would
+like to express our appreciation. Finally, we are grateful to the magazine Cahiers du Sud for generously allowing us to translate the essay
+"La Philosophie."
+DOROTHY TUCK MC FARLAND
+
+Preface
+This volume is intended to help fill a gap in the still unfinished process of
+translating into English what might be called the first generation of published editions of Simone Weil's writings. This generation comprises the
+French editions of her writings, grouped loosely under a diversity of headings and published between 1947 and 1966. Most of this material has been
+translated into English, but a remnant of major formative texts, as well
+as a scattering of essays and fragments that reflect difficult, unfamiliar, and
+neglected aspects of Weil as a thinker and a person, has nor, and it is impossible to validly assess her thought and person without some direct
+knowledge of this part of her oeuvre.
+Formative Writings, 1929-1941 is a collection of texts from this remnant. The equivalent of approximately one more volume of short texts
+remains to be translated. The texts selected for this volume were written
+between 1929 and 1941, a crucial and transitional period, one of an anguishing rite of passage for Weil, Europe, and the world. In chronological
+order, the texts are "Science and Perception in Descartes" (1929-30),
+a formidable dissertation Weil wrote as a twenty-one-year-old philosophy
+student at the Ecole Normale Supérieure; "The Situation in Germany"
+(1932-33), a ten-article extravaganza of dissident Left journalism on
+the subject of Hitler's rise to power and Comintern politics; "Factory
+Journal" (1934-35), Weil's unedited, almost daily record of the "year"
+she spent as an unskilled factory worker; "War and Peace" (1933-40),
+a selection of essays and fragments reflecting aspects ofher pacifist thought
+culled from the "War and Peace" and "Spain" sections of Ecrits historiques et politiques; and "Philosophy" (1941), a light essay that accurately
+reflects some of the breadth of her mature thought on Eastern and Western
+art, mysticism, science, and philosophy.
+The selections are primary sources for a great deal of what has been said
+about Weil's thought and psychology over the years. Most have been summarized or presented in digest form by Weil's biographers. "Science and
+Perception in Descartes," which does not lend itself to any convenient
+
+xii
+form of packaging, has been largely neglected. "The Situation in Germany," when it is read in its entirety, leaves no doubt about the quality and
+extent of Weil's participation in French Leftist and Comintern politics. It
+provides information about Weil that simply cannot be had from any
+other source, information that has not been conveyed by references to, or
+summaries of, its content. Similarly, in writing about her factory experience, both Weil and her commentators used her "Factory Journal" selectively. The elapsed time and detail of her experience and the emphases that
+can be seen in the original are invaluable for evaluating what she and her
+commentators later made of it. The texts in "War and Peace" are primary
+sources of the immensely complicated pacifist position that Weil endeavored to sustain during much of the thirties. They episodically trace its
+development and not incidentally illustrate the Leftist component in it.
+One of the most anguishing and controversial texts Weil ever wrote-"A
+European War over Czechoslovakia?"—is included, a text that must be
+considered in any assessment of Weil and her thought. "Philosophy," published originally in Cahiers du Sud, slipped through the cracks of the translation process at least in part because it never found its way into any of the
+French collections of Weil's works. It is included here as a means of bringing this collection full circle-back to Weil's original love of philosophy
+and concern with science. The essay also illustrates a fact of Weil's life and
+oeuvre that needs to be more widely recognized: that throughout her life
+she consciously chose and followed a dual vocation of philosopher and
+teacher. In "Philosophy" she returns to an academic milieu in which she is
+completely at home, and in which she operates very much in the role of
+a teacher—in this case of her peers.
+Most of the texts in this collection are more obviously tied to the special milieus—the academic world, the dissident Left and trade-unionist
+circles—in which they were written than often seems to be the case with
+Weil's writings. The diversity of "voices" and even "roles" that she to
+some extent assumes in all of them, however, points to another fact about
+Weil that is not widely recognized: she is always in some degree composing
+in a specialized language and/or consciously engaging in an experiment in
+popularisation, by which she meant "teaching" in its purest, broadest
+sense-the art of transposing and transmitting truths intact to whomever
+was being taught. In "Science and Perception in Descartes," "A Reply to
+One of Alain's Questions" (one of the essays in "War and Peace"), and
+"Philosophy" she is using variants of her academic voice. "Science and
+
+• Preface
+xili
+Perception" is written in a florid, baroque prose style that Weil cultivated
+as a student to carry the youthful forms of her highly unorthodox thinking
+into mainstream French philosophy. "Reply" was addressed as much to
+her former teacher Alain as to the academic circles in which she and he
+circulated and in which his "questions" were being discussed. "Philosophy" was written for the edification and education of amateur philosophy
+lovers in Marseilles. In "The Situation in Germany" and many of the pre-
+Munich texts in "War and Peace," Weil translated her concerns directly
+into the language and in some cases the jargon of the Leftist circles she
+was addressing. At the opposite pole, Weil compiled her "Factory Journal"—a casual text, sometimes telegraphic to the point of being incomprehensible-for her own private use, and perhaps wrote a few of the sad,
+general post-Munich texts in "War and Peace" to and for herself.
+Readers should also be warned that Weil's style, generally formal and
+elegant and over a half-century old, adheres to conventions that are now
+regarded as hopelessly sexist. In her writings "mankind," "man," and
+"men" stand, as they cannot legitimately do now, for all humanity. We
+have left most of her usages intact, since it would be untrue to her fundamental style, and sometimes to her content, to use less gender-loaded language. She was, incidentally, and for reasons wholly consistent with the
+general tenor of her thought, not a feminist. Her loyalties were always to
+all humanity. She refused on principle to parse the human race into sexual
+or other divisions, or to extend priorities or privileges to any part except,
+as a compensation for injustice, the oppressed. By them she meant the suffering underclass of any time and place, those who are always most in need
+of having a balance redressed.
+A further note on Weil's terminology that may be initially puzzling to
+readers: In "The Situation in Germany" we have kept her usage of the term
+"Hitlerite," rather than supplying the more customary term "Nazi." Weil
+rarely used "Nazi" in her writings. In this text she refers to Hitler's followers either as National Socialists or as Hitlerites. Here, as in Weil's
+later writings, her usage of "Hitlerite" is a constant reminder that she
+viewed Hitler as the embodiment of a force that exercised a fatal attraction for those in every class who felt themselves powerless. Today the
+term "Nazi" on a page powerfully blocks the kind of knowledge of the
+early mechanism of Hitler's appeal that the term "Hitlerite" usefully
+retains.
+In addition to tying up tag-ends from the first-generation publishing
+
+xio
+process, the publication of Weil's Formative Writings, 1929-1941 also
+belongs to the new era of publishing and studying Weil that began in the
+1970s with the publication in France of the revised and expanded edition
+of her three-volume Cahiers (1970, 1972, 1974) and the appearance of
+Simone Pétrement's probably definitive biography, La Vie de Simone
+Weil, which was published in 1973 and has been widely translated. In
+America and England during the same decade, Conor Cruise O'Brien's
+article "The Anti-Politics of Simone Weil"' and Peter Winch's introduction to Lectures on Philosophy (1978) appreciably raised the level of
+scholarly discussion of Weil and her thought. In the 198os Simone Weil:
+Interpretations of a Life (a selection of essays by Staughton Lynd, J. D.
+Cameron, and others, edited by George Abbot White), three monographs
+on Weil by John Hellman (1982), Dorothy Tuck McFarland (1983), and
+John M. Dunaway (1984), and Jean Bethke Elshtain's article "The Vexation of Weil"2 have continued the generally more accurate and high level
+of discussion of Weil and her works that began in the 1970s.
+Most significant of all for the long run, Weil's entire oeuvre, published
+and unpublished, has finally been brought together; a complete microfilm
+of it was made by the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris in the late 1970s, and
+a team of scholars in France is now preparing a new edition of Weil's complete writings that will include a good deal of unpublished material. Since
+errors, misrepresentations, and severe damage to the nature and integrity
+of her thought have resulted from the scattering and compartmentalization of her writings that occurred during the first-generation publishing
+and translating process, this complete edition will greatly facilitate the
+orderly and intelligent study of her life and work.
+I New York Review of Books, May 12, 1977. pp. 23-28.
+2 Telos, no. 58 (Winter 1983-84): 195-203.
+
+FORMATIVE WRITINGS, 1929-194 I
+
+Simone Weil experienced the uprootedness of the twentieth century early
+and continuously. She was born in Paris in 1909, the second child of assimilated French-Jewish parents. She was five years old when the First
+World War broke out, eight at the time of the Russian Revolution, and an
+adolescent during the immediate postwar years of economic and political
+chaos. An extraordinarily gifted child (although her self-confidence during
+childhood and adolescence was severely undermined by the mathematical
+accomplishments of her brother, André, who was three years her senior
+and who became one of the twentieth century's most eminent mathematicians in the field of number theory), she blossomed into a brilliant student
+and received a spectacular training in philosophy, language, French literature, and mathematics in the lycées she attended during the 192os. She was
+admitted in 1928 to the Ecole Normale Supérieure, the apex of the French
+educational system, and passed her agrégation, the state examination that
+qualified her to teach in the upper lycées and universities, in 1931. She
+began her professional life in the midst of the economic chaos and despair
+of the Depression, at an optimum time to observe Hitler's rise to power
+and the early stages of Europe's inexorable progress toward the Second
+World War. Until 1937 (when her deteriorating health precluded it), she
+taught philosophy in a series of provincial girls' lycées and put all her
+extracurricular time and energy at the service of Leftist, revolutionary, and
+working-class causes. During this period she conscientiously exposed herself to three experiences that eventually led her to despair of finding social
+solutions for the malheur, entropy, and uprootedness that she perceived to
+be proliferating and worsening throughout the decade: she visited Germany in the summer of 1932 and personally witnessed the "situation"
+there, the German Communist party's impotence in preventing Hitler's
+coming to power and in bringing about the long-heralded Communist
+revolution in Germany; she spent most of 1935 working as an unskilled
+laborer in three factories in the Paris region; and she served briefly as
+a combatant in the Spanish civil war in 1936. From 1933 tO 1938 she
+
+4
+wrote extensively for the Left and sporadically but consistently in support
+of a pacifism that strove to hnd ways to oppose Hitler without provoking
+a European war. She also passed through the early critical stages of the
+psychological shift toward a preeminently religious orientation that
+reached its full development after the outbreak of the Second World War.
+She made the shift privately, without any essential break in either her nature or her thought.
+Her lifelong concern with finding equilibriums is reflected during this
+period in the both great and small ways current events influenced her
+psychology and thought. Before Munich she was concerned with balancing one set of priorities and injustices, and the specter of European war
+outweighed every other consideration. After Munich she threw all her
+weight on the obviously lighter side of the scale: the injustice done to the
+Czechs and to those Germans who did not wish to fall under a Hitlerite
+hegemony and suffer an outright form of colonialization on the ancient
+Roman and modern western European models. After Munich, also, she
+placed equal emphasis on the details of mounting a practical resistance to
+Hitler and the transcendent rationale for it.
+When France fell in 1940, she lived as a refugee in the south of France
+with her parents until May 1942, and then traveled with them by way of
+North Africa to New York City. In Marseilles and New York City she
+filled notebooks with the vast collection of annotated metaphor culled
+from Western and non-Western religious, scientific, and folkloric traditions, which is the primary source material of her mature religious thought
+and writings. In November 1942, she made the dangerous wartime At-
+lantic crossing to England to work for the Free French in London. She died
+on August 24, 1943, of exhaustion, tuberculosis, and self-inflicted malnutrition in a sanatorium in Ashford-on-Kent outside London. Her death
+came in the midst of the uprootedness and malheur of the Second World
+War, but at a stage when it had become clear that Hitler and the Axis
+powers would be defeated in the foresecable future. She died before the full
+dimensions of the Nazi genocide of European Jewry became publicly
+known. She also did not live to see the onset of the atomic age and the
+virtually unlimited prospects for uprootedness and malheur that were unleashed with it.
+Weil became known primarily as a religious writer in the period immediately following the war as the result of a publishing process that tended
+
+to popularize the religious writings of her last three years in a partial form
+and in isolation from her prior life and thought as a Leftist political activist. More significant still, the process never made clear Weil's lifelong vocation of philosopher/teacher or connected her to the training that prepared
+her for it. At least in part because of the way she was first published and
+translated, her thought was initially, and often still is, characterized as
+contradictory and fragmentary. Gradually, more complete editions of her
+religious writings were brought out and most of her prior writings were
+published in individual collections under the headings of history, politics,
+science, and working-class concerns. These editions, although sometimes
+unwieldy, presented Weil's thought in a more coherent and orderly way
+than did some of the editions in English that gathered selections from
+a variety of French collections. But the result of the entire process has been
+that the other Weils, the political activist and the philosopher/teacher,
+never caught up in the public mind with the religious Weil, or were satisfactorily integrated into the public perception of either her person or her
+thought. The texts in Formative Writings, 1929-1941 were written by the
+rwo still largely neglected other Weils. They were assembled and translated to introduce these Weils to readers who have not met them and to
+demonstrate some of the continuity that underlies all Weil's thought and
+that makes the thought, as well as the person, of a piece.
+The content of Weil's life and the subject of her thought is the total
+crisis—social and spiritual —that came to a head in the West and on
+a global scale in the modern period, a period of transition, upheaval, and
+convulsion that lasted, loosely speaking, from the late nineteenth century
+through the first fifty years of the twentieth. By birth and training Weil was
+remarkably positioned to hold the long view that she took of this crisis. She
+was an assimilated French Jew of genius, a precarious product of the
+Emancipation in France. At the same time she was the lifelong recipient of
+parental affection and support that may have instilled a long-term confidence in the ultimate possibility that pain can be alleviated and contradictions reconciled. She received an exceptional education in preeminently
+nineteenth-century French academic and cultural traditions which trained
+her always to discern and direct her attention to the long view. She saw the
+rwentieth century as the culmination of the three hundred years of accelerated development that had taken place in the West since the Renaissance,
+and concluded that three centuries of revolutionary change in science and
+
+mathematics, in manufacturing and communications technology, and in
+forms of art and literature had not only brought about an expansion of
+political liberties, economic well-being, and cultural opportunities for
+human beings on a global scale, but had also brought about unprecedented
+forms of social and economic injustice and a broad spectrum of wrenching
+discontinuities of an essentially spiritual nature. One of the most important differences between her and other major figures of her generation is
+that although she, like so many of them, penetrated to the special existentialist perception of discontinuity and void that separates wentiethcentury perceptions from those of preceding centuries, she retained a sense
+of continuity with the past. She never made the modern break in one of its
+most familiar forms, that of cutting loose from the nineteenth century: she
+never broke with the education she received that tied her to pre-twentiethcentury forms of thought. Her training allowed her to perceive the world
+in terms of a handful of beautiful pre-twentieth-century mechanistic and
+mathematical analogies, which enabled her to keep fixed in her mind both
+of the polarities of any contradiction; e.g., she could in the midst of the
+conditions of extreme discontinuity in the twentieth century retain the
+knowledge and remembrance of continuity. Her trained intelligence matured into a mechanism for ordering and ranking her thought as a "simultaneous composition on several planes."'
+Her essential thought worked in her person and writings very much in
+the way the action of water is described in the I Ching trigram "The
+Abysmal." In the text of the trigram, water flows on, merely filling all the
+places to which it flows, shrinking from nothing, from no danger or
+plunge, and with no alteration of its nature. Weil's thought flowed through
+and into all her acts and writings. In its broad outlines, it was—irrespective
+of the use to which she put it, or the philosophical, political, or religious
+language that she used to express it —oriented toward the good. Within
+this broad frame, she incessantly, even obsessively, engaged in a wholesale
+philosophical and metaphysical cleaning up of Western religious, scientifc, and political thinking and metaphor, always with the practical goal of
+alleviating oppression and human suffering. To her analyses and critiques
+of the two great "isms" that bore most comprehensively on her concerns
+and to which she was profoundly attracted at specific periods in her life-
+¡ This is one uf the variants of the expression "composition on several planes," which
+Weil uses repeatedly in her notebooks. It is both a sign of, and an essential criterion four recognizing, anything real or true. Weil arraches it to God, human life, and art.
+
+7
+Marxism and Catholicism— she brought the same high and rigorous standards of philosophical coherence and consistency.
+"Science and Perception in Descartes," the first and most difficult text in
+this collection, is an ingenious and elaborate student effort to effect just
+such an immense cleaning up of modern science and thought about the nature of the world in general in relation to Cartesian doctrine, which Weil
+admired and was attracted to in somewhat the same way she later responded to Marxism and Catholicism. In her thesis she brought all her
+training to bear on an effort to connect the doctrine and person of a
+man she admired—Descartes—with a deep personal conviction that she
+had reached during an adolescent crisis occasioned by her brother's accomplishments: the conviction that no one, regardless of inferior mental
+faculties or lack of visible accomplishments, was precluded from access to
+"the realm of truth reserved for genius." She wrote her thesis both to confirm that conviction and to authenticate a doctrine of her own devising
+founded jointly on it and on Descartes. The coup that she attempted to
+bring off in her thesis was a proof of her conviction that ordinary perception and work are of the same nature and value as scientific and other
+forms of specialized and elitist knowledge.
+The French text of "Science and Perception in Descartes" has lain for
+years in the collection Sur la science and has been regarded primarily as
+a writing on science. A decompartmentalization of the text and a provisional effort to reconnect it to aspects of the philosophical training Weil
+received are, for French and English-language readers alike, probably
+overdue and necessary. American readers of Weil's writings have been
+made increasingly aware that she was trained as a philosopher, but do not,
+for the most part, realize that she can probably be said to have essentially
+remained one, or that much of what has been sometimes regarded as idiosyncratic in her thought has antecedents in and carries forward aspects of
+the exacting training she received in the Alain/Lagneau branch of the nineteenth-century voluntarist, spiritueliste line of French philosophy. This
+line, as Weil's teacher Alain received it from his teacher Jules Lagneau
+(I851-94), stemmed directly from Descartes, but had been extensively
+modified by the philosophical and psychological revision of it made by
+Maine de Biran (1766-1824), who is sometimes regarded as the French
+Kant. (In the late nineteenth century and the mid-wentieth century the line
+branched out into the considerably more familiar forms of Bergsonisme
+and Sartrean existentialism.) Biran's doctrine of effort virtually trans-
+
+formed the Cartesian "I" into a power and the famous cogito into I think,
+therefore I can.? Weil particularly picked up on an activism derived from
+Biran's modifications of Cartesianism that Lagneau emphasized, and she
+carried this aspect of Lagneau's thought over into her own thought on
+work. (She was also probably heavily influenced by the published class
+notes of Lagneau's course on perception.)
+Any future valid assessment of Weil will depend on our knowing much
+more about the relationship of her thought to the philosophical training
+she received and to its antecedents. At present, however, it should be
+recognized that Weil never put this training behind her, that it informed
+her vocation as a teacher of philosophy and everything she wrote and did,
+and that traditional, if now unknown or unfamiliar, antecedents exist for
+much of the key content of her thought.
+In this connection, her references to her training, which she made in the
+notebooks she compiled in the last years of her life in Marseilles and New
+York, should someday also be noted and evaluated. In her notebooks she
+occasionally drew correspondences between aspects of her training and
+Greek cosmology, and also between the Alain/Lagneau line of teaching on
+perception and non-Western (Hindu, Tibetan, and Zen) mystical mechanisms and practices. Entries such as those in which she casually paired
+Maine de Biran and Heraclitus, tentatively identified Biran's "effort" with
+the "breath of the mouth" in the Upanishads, and observed that the "continued creation" of Descartes was exactly the same thing as the "manifestation" of the Hindus? suggest that it may someday be possible for others
+to go further and establish a broad spectrum of correspondences that will
+reintegrate into global thought parts of such seemingly separate and specifically Western doctrines as Cartesianism, without denigrating their
+Western forms or origin.
+A final biographical note that is relevant both to "Science and Perception in Descartes" and to understanding all of Weil and her thought is
+her lifelong affinity for the baroque and the seventeenth century. As children, she and her brother seem to have steeped themselves in seventeenthcentury French culture. Simone Pétrement reports that the pair had a
+period when they spent hours competitively reciting long passages of
+Racine and Corneille to each other.* Weil's early admiration and en-
+2 See René Lacrosc, Maine de Biran (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1970), p. 105.
+3 The Notebonks of Simone Weil, 2 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956),
+1:328,43,307.
++ Simone Pétrement, Simone Weil: A Life (New York: Pantheon, 1976), p. 14.
+
+9
+thusiasm for Descartes and the incredibly colored and complicated prose
+that she wrote during her student years reflect a continuing baroque
+streak in her psychology. Her mature attraction for the environment of
+seventeenth-century Venice and the music of Monteverdi, and ultimately
+her susceptibility to Catholicism, 5 can be better understood in terms of it.
+The precise and difficult lines of thought followed by Weil in "Science
+and Perception in Descartes" will be outlined in a short individual introduction that precedes the text. There are large issues raised by the text that
+have not been resolved in the years since Weil wrote her thesis. Some more
+humane match of human beings, on the one hand, and technology, specialized thought, and systems of pedagogy on the other is as lacking and necessary now as it was then. The Descartes she reinvestigated with the aim of
+discovering an alternative foundation for the modern world is still almost
+exclusively read and regarded as the foundation of everything that is most
+oppressive and limiting in modern science and culture. The young Weil has
+been jeered at and condescended to for having had the impertinence to
+challenge the accepted interpretation of Descartes, but "Science and Perception in Descartes" may be the most significant neglected text in her
+published writings. It argues that Descartes could become a different sort
+of resource for modern culture if more attention were paid to the contradictions in his doctrine. It contains the germ of an important revision of the
+way Cartesianism is widely regarded today, and it perhaps suggests the
+ways by which an exact reading of Descartes might someday show how his
+fundamental doctrine of perception corresponds to non- Western theories
+and practices, if only it were transposed in an appropriate manner.
+"The Situation in Germany," the second text in this collection, was written in 1932-33 during the peak period of Weil's involvement in French
+Left and Comintern politics. Although generally recognized and appreciated today, this involvement is still sometimes thought of as abortive,
+preparatory to her mature person and thought, or as a source of colorful or
+comical anecdotes. Weil's involvement was, of course, true to her form,
+that of a dissident who never joined the Communist party (although she
+may have briefly considered it). She was, however, a fairly major Leftist celebrity; one of her colleagues of the Left at the time, Boris Souvarine, called
+her "the only brain the revolutionary movement has produced in years,"
+and another, Marcel Martinet, compared her to Rosa Luxemburg."
+s Well did not, as is sometimes thought, convert to Catholicism.
+6 Pétrement, Simone Weil: A Life, p. 176.
+
+10
+Her period of Leftist activity was, moreover, as deliberate, consistent,
+and integrated a stage of her evolution as anything she ever did. The First
+World War and the Russian Revolution were formative events in her childhood and she came of age psychologically, philosophically, and politically
+during the postwar period. At the Lycée Fénelon, which she attended beiween 1919 and 1924, she is reported to have said to her classmates, 'I'm
+a Bolshevik. "7 She seems to have loved workers, perhaps from childhood.
+During adolescence, she clearly identified them—and with them—as the
+oppressed, and determined upon a lifelong political and philosophical
+vocation to defend them in every way possible. Her "Science and Perception in Descartes" was a massive opening salvo on their behalf on the
+philosophical front. On her graduation from the Ecole Normale Supérieure in 1931, she also graduated, with no perceptible break in her stride,
+from being a highly visible and colorful student activist to being a professional revolutionary. Her careers as a teacher of philosophy and as a political activist coincided and dovetailed. The published class notes® of one of
+her students show that she taught, in addition to a wonderfully clear basic
+philosophy course, the outline of parts of the massive and remarkable
+theoretical essay she was writing at the time, "Reflections on the Causes of
+Liberty and Social Oppression." The outline of a lecture that she delivered
+to a workers' study group in St. Etienne in 1934 on the history of materialism shows that she gave a remarkably clear summary of the same firstclass material that informed her own thought.
+"The Situation in Germany" is a considerably more specialized "socialist" work than most readers of Weil's writings are probably accustomed
+to. It is a journalistic piece, a review and analysis of the Weimar Republic's final year (1932-33), of the events during that year that led to
+Hitler's appointment as chancellor of Germany, and of the "situation"
+that Trotsky had been discussing since 1930 and that was on the mind
+and lips of everyone Weil knew and sympathized with: the prospects for,
+and fate of, Communist revolution in Germany. The subject by itself is
+fascinating, and a detailed comparison of Trotsky's and Weil's thought on
+it would be well worth doing. The separate introduction that precedes the
+text in this collection offers a preliminary comparison, locates the text in
+the complex evolution of Weil's thought on revolution and society, and
+7 Ibid., p. 18.
+8 Simone Weil, Lectures on Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
+
+11
+suggests its relationship to the psychological revolution that rook place
+within her at this time and that was to lead to her mature religious thought.
+The effect on Weil of the victory of Hitlerism in Germany is not usually
+recognized as a factor that influenced her development. It is, however, the
+last nail that events drove into the coffin of her and her generation's revolutionary hopes. For her, and for some in her generation, Hitler's victory
+compounded with Stalinist statism to deliver the knock-out blow to revolution in general as an option. In her great theoretical essay of 1934,
+"Reflections on the Causes of Liberty and Social Oppression," she formally buried these hopes, and marked the close of the strictly political stage of
+her own development. After 1933, Weil withdrew from revolutionary
+activity and limited herself to efforts to help German Communist refugees
+(she did, however, go to Spain in 1936 and fight briefly in the Spanish civil
+war). After 1934, the term "oppression" recedes from Weil's vocabulary
+and is largely replaced by "suffering," a transformation due in part to the
+fact that her thought had overflowed its revolutionary banks into deeper
+and broader channels, and also to the inescapable residual effect on her of
+her 1934-35 factory experience.
+"The Situation in Germany" is an example of Weil's lifelong habit of
+teaching in the languages of specific milieus, in this case that of the Socialist/Communist Left. It is one of many examples of her adapting what she
+had to say to the variery of milieus—academic, political, and religious—in
+which she functioned and through which she passed during her life. The
+marvelous religious essays that she wrote for Père Perrin (collected in
+Waiting for God) were intended for use in a Catholic school where he
+taught and are similar experiments in popularisation-transposing and
+teaching aspects of the original and broader thought that she was working
+out in her notebooks at the time.
+Weil compiled the "Factory Journal," the third major text in this collection, for her own use. It is the unadorned, unedited record of the "year"
+she spent working as an unskilled laborer in three factories in the Paris
+region. It should be noted that she had described and decried the conditions of modern production in the abstract in her 1934 "Reflections"
+essay prior to her sustained personal experience of them. Her later (194 1)
+essay "Factory Work" (in The Simone Weil Reader) is a concise remembrance and marshaling of her observations and offers some of the conclusions that she drew from the experience. Further observations and conclusions are scattered in letters and essays. A reference to a particularly
+
+12
+frustrating situation involving a shortage of boxes for finished pieces turns
+up in her Notebooks and hints at the indelible, scarring impression it made
+on her."
+The complete text of Weil's "Factory Journal" is a conscientious, realistic, and unromanticized record of the jobs she was given, the machines
+she worked on, and tallies of her hours and wages, interspersed with anecdotes about her foremen and worker-comrades. The account is a far more
+gender-loaded one than Weil's own later commentaries and allusions to
+it-and third-person accounts of it—have tended to convey. Weil and
+most of her comrades were unskilled women workers under the supervision of a variety of male foremen. This journal is the only extended firstperson account in Weil's published writings, and the only place where she
+can be glimpsed (however fleetingly) relating informally to people around
+her. A more detailed account of Weil's rationale for the project and appraisal of some of what has been said about it in the past can be found in
+the separate introduction that precedes the text.
+The electrician/mechanic who reviewed the technical vocabulary of our
+text, and who had himself worked in similar American factories in the
+194os, validated Weil's account of factory conditions and the feasibility of
+some of her recommendations for changes. He had reservations about
+what he termed "her ideal of total review, that all workers must be of equal
+(high) skill levels," on the grounds that shops must retool for every large
+job. He regarded her foremen as generally compassionate and observed
+that "they put up with her errors and tried to teach her, rather than simply
+firing her," that "she taxed their patience, but they cared enough not to
+want her to starve." He noticed that she became a better worker. He
+wholeheartedly confirmed her conclusion that the main fact is not the suffering, but the humiliation, and added: "Humiliation has driven more men
+(and women) to violence than suffering; mere suffering only tests one's
+strength." He thought her closing list of psychological and other observations "true and accurate" and "very sensible."
+A closing note on the subject of humiliation. If Weil's "Factory Journal"
+can be said to have a subject, it is humiliation and the obverse of humiliation: self-respect. The emphasis Weil placed on self-respect in much of her
+writing has sometimes been trivialized and regarded as a sign of undue
+scrupulousness about her own personal dignity. A case can certainly be
+y Notebooks, 1:76.
+
+13
+made, however, that humiliation on an epidemic scale was probably at the
+root of much of the violence of Europe's two twentieth-century wars, and
+that it was the primary vehicle for inflicting suffering during the Holocaust. When Weil, toward the end of her "year" of being a factory worker,
+climbed on a bus one Thursday morning on the way home from the dentist
+and experienced a sudden realization that she, a slave, rode the bus by
+favor and not by right, that it would be completely natural if someone brutally ordered her off and told her that such comfortable forms of transportation were not for her, that she had to go on foot, she can be said to
+have had a premonition of the kind of intermediate forms of humiliation
+Jews in Nazi-occupied countries would be subject to only a few years later,
+and to have penetrated, however momentarily, to the core of the humiliation of segregation suffered at the time by American blacks, and to that of
+apartheid suffered by South African blacks today.
+The section "War and Peace" contains a new translation of "Reflections
+on War," a classic antiwar essay Weil wrote for the Left in 1933; "A
+European War over Czechoslovakia?", the most comprehensive of three
+texts advocating the appeasement of Hitler written by Weil in 1938; and
+a patchwork of thirteen short essays and fragments that furnish sample
+defenses of her pacifist position, document the crucial stages through
+which she passed, and reflect the private transformations she underwent
+between 1933 and 1940. The texts selectively, but accurately, reflect the
+complete evolution that took place quietly within Weil during the period
+and that culminated in an orientation that both contained her social
+thought and transcended it. The short essay that precedes the section includes a narrative summary of this evolution.
+Most American readers who know of "Reflections on War," the first
+selection in the section, have met the essay in the form in which it was published in Dwight Macdonald's magazine, Politics. The Politics text was
+itself a revised version of a 1938 translation that had appeared in the
+International Review. Macdonald and Politics were largely responsible
+for introducing Weil's writings to American readers through this text and
+through the subsequent publication of "The Iliad, or the Poem of Force"
+(probably Weil's best-known work) and "Words on War" (retitled "The
+Power of Words" in Richard Rees's more recent translation in Selected
+Essays).
+"Reflections on War" fits snugly into Weil's pattern of cleaning up a
+doctrine for which she has great sympathy and about which she has many
+
+14
+reservations. In this case the doctrine is Marxist, and she is trying to
+straighten out it and her friends on an important point: the equivocations
+of the Left on the subject of war, which the Left tended to support then, as
+it does now, when the war is being waged for revolutionary purposes.
+Weil's purpose in writing it was to try to insinuate a more consistent and
+comprehensive pacifism into Leftist thought and discourse. Like most of
+the Left in her generation and ours, Weil was antiwar, anticolonialist, and
+antinationalist. She was not, however, as "The Situation in Germany"
+shows, antistruggle, in the Communist use of the term, or, in the context of
+most of the "War and Peace" texts, pacifist in the sense that she would
+never fight. She coupled a moral opposition to war in all its forms with the
+anarchist's instinctive distrust of institutions, while more often than not
+actively seeking alternative ways of resistance.
+In "Reflections on War" she argued that even in the context of supportinga revolution war is not justified, that it strengthens bureaucracy and the
+state, and is therefore the "tomb" of every revolution that decides or is
+forced to resort to it. The argument is made in terms of the French and
+Russian revolutions: in both, any hopes for the development of nonoppressive or democratic systems were dashed in the counterrevolutionary
+wars that both revolutions were forced to fight and that necessarily led to
+a strengthening of their bureaucracies and oppressive state apparatuses.
+The argument could be read today with profit by people of good will on
+both the Left and the Right who genuinely desire that nonoppressive
+change be given a chance in the Third World, in Rightist and Leftist societies alike. In Weil's airtight argument, any (in 1985, read Iranian or
+Nicaraguan) revolution that is forced into war, counterrevolutionary,
+defensive, or offensive, is ipso facto a lost cause. In Leftist circles today (in
+the now obviously unsuccessful aftermaths of so many revolutions) it has
+become something of a truism to say that revolution doesn't work. Weil's
+argument in this essay, and in the variant of a part of it that follows in this
+collection, was a crucial building block in the comprehensive argument
+that she was at the time preparing to expound in "Reflections On the
+Causes of Liberty and Social Oppression," her final theoretical word on
+the whole subject: that the Marxist analysis of oppression was inadequate;
+that revolution didn't work because the forms taken by oppression were
+endemic and fixed conditions of human existence; and that the only hope
+for the future lay in alleviating oppressive conditions in limited ways, but
+to the fullest extent possible.
+
+15
+The essays and fragments that follow in "War and Peace" furnish a generous sampling of the political and psychological threads Weil strove to
+weave together into a consistent and moral pacifism that would also effectively oppose Hitler. "A Few More Words on the Boycott" (1933 or
+1934) shows her concern that working-class support of any anti-Hitler
+measures be tactically and morally consistent with working-class interests.
+It underscores the Leftist component in her pacifist position. "Reply to)
+One of Alain's Questions" (1936) is addressed to her academic peers. It is
+an interlocking puzzle of definitions and arguments in which she alludes
+briefly to the advocacy of peace "by itself," but chiefly dissects the expressions "peace with dignity" and "peace with honor." By carefully defining
+"dignity," "self-respect," and "honor" in terms of their relation to coercion, risk, and humiliation, Weil shows that honor cannot he involved if an
+individual's actions are not freely taken, and that peril alone rids one of
+dishonor. Since combatants in a war are under constraint and noncombatants run no risks, she concludes that war cannot be a means of defending
+honor, and that no peace is dishonorable. She reinforces a brief exposition on the subject of humiliation with a cascade of examples taken from
+her experience as a factory worker and from hearsay accounts of army
+life. The insight into humiliation that Weil gained during her year as
+a worker is not limited to conditions of the working class, but informs her
+pacifism as well (and still later, profoundly influences her mature religious
+thought).
+The two fragments on Spain written in 1936 are indications of what
+she might have published at the time had she had the heart to write a comprehensive piece on the subject. Her health and the internal contradictions
+of Spain totally demoralized and paralyzed her. In "Do We Have to Grease
+Our Combat Boots?" (1936), the only piece on Spain she published at the
+time, the issue is much the same one of self-respect and national honor that
+is the subject of her "Reply to One of Alain's Questions," but in this later
+essay she raises it in the context of the Leftist romanticism of the period
+that saw fighting in Spain as a way of proving one's courage. Against the
+dangers of internationalizing a civil war, neither proof of personal courage
+nor considerations of national prestige and honor à la Poincaré carried any
+weight with her. In "The Policy of Neutrality and Mutual Assistance"
+(1936), her working-class sympathies, anti-Stalinism, and dogged instinct for moral consistency and decency in the aftermath of the French
+Socialist government's policy of nonintervention in the Spanish conflict
+
+16
+combine to make her determined not to go to war for the Ussrorfor "any
+central European state." The shadow of Czechoslovakia has begun to fall
+across her pages. In "Broadening the Policy of Nonintervention" (1936),
+Weil demands that the Blum government be consistent and refuse to risk
+war over Alsace-Lorraine, the French colonies (enter anticolonialism,
+which will become one of the major and most profound concerns of her
+mature thought), or Czechoslovakia, on the ground that it did not run that
+risk for Spain.
+"A European War over Czechoslovakia?" (1938) and a prior letter to
+Gaston Bergery, the editor of the pacifist journal La Flèche, are ro of the
+darkest and most controversial compositions Weil ever wrote. Her pre-
+Munich article envisions and rationalizes a worst-case scenario in which
+German hegemony over Czechoslovakia —with its probable consequences
+of loss of rights for Communists and Jews—is traded for European peace.
+Her indifference to the fate of the disenfranchised is the article's most
+shocking and indigestible feature. That she meant it is shown by her suggesting, in her letter to Bergery, that France make the same hypothetical
+concession:
+No doubt the German superiority of strength would impose certain discriminations in France, especially against the Communists and against the Jews. In
+my eyes, and probably in theeyesof the majority of French people, this would
+hardly marter in itself. One can easily conceive that the essential might remain
+intact, and that those who still care about the public good in our country
+might be enabled, at last, to take a little effective action in housing and
+schools, and the problem of reconciling the demands of industrial production
+with the dignity of the workers, and to undertake a massive popularization of
+the marvels of art and science and thought, and other appropriate rasks of
+peace."
+On the surface, Weil's willingness to sacrifice both groups is incomprehensible; Communists were her comrades and Jews were fleeing Nazi
+persecution in Germany. Conor Cruise O'Brien offered a formulation in
+"The Anti-Politics of Simone Weil" that partially accounts for it; Weil, he
+wrote, characteristically proposed to sacrifice two groups to which she
+belonged—her "little platoon" in life, in Edmund Burke's phrase-and
+she fully intended to be sacrificed with them." The root of her indifference
+10 Simonc Weil, Seventy Letters (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 99.
+11 Neu' York Review of Books. March 3, 1977, p. 26.
+
+17
+goes deeper, however. The two texts display the Jewish antisemitism that
+was an altogether involuntary reflex of her psychology. It absolutely prevented her from recognizing that Jewish culture and life were as valuable
+a milieu as the many other milieus that concerned her so movingly and
+beautifully in her late writing-and that they had value for both French
+and Czech national life. Weil later (in the Vichy era) castigated herself for
+having committed a "criminal error" by not having seen the treasonous
+potential of her pacifism and pacifist associates of the 1930s. At the least
+it must be recognized that she perpetrated something perilously close to
+another "criminal error" by virtually ignoring and apparently distancing
+herself from Jewish suffering during the period. That she was willing to
+avoid a European war at any price does not exonerate her from failing to
+even notice that in the loss of Jewish rights, a price would be paid. Weil's
+lifelong reluctance to belong to or uphold a part of anything, and something like a fastidiousness—an innate scorn for grossness and stupidity —
+also prevented her from paying Hitler's virulence and his antisemitic
+ideology the attention they deserved. This universalism and fastidiousness
+are two constant Weilian instincts that, although they repeatedly turn out
+to be unsuited for and irrelevant to short-term uses by her or anyone else,
+are almost invariably validated in the careful detail of her long-term views.
+One interesting postscript to Weil's Munich thought that bears on this
+lifelong resistance to partisan loyalties of any sort and to any kind of partial thought is a little-noted side effect of the way in which a contributory
+stream of her preoccupation with colonialism flowed into and merged
+with her mainstream thought. From Munich on, Weil perceived that the
+enormity of Hitler's crime in the eyes of Europeans was that he did to white
+European nations what they were accustomed to doing to nonwhite and
+non-European peoples: he treated them like colonies. In a 1943 article on
+the French colonial problem written for the Free French in London, Weil
+pointed out that the Czechs had been the first to notice this when they
+protested the Bohemian protectorate in these terms: "No European people
+has ever been subjected to such a regime."12 There is almost always a sense
+in which the holism and accuracy of Weil's long views cancel out the apparent mistakes she makes in the short term.
+After Munich, the tenor and tone of the texts in this collection seem to
+shift abruptly. In "Reflections on Bouché's Lecture" (1938), Weil is
+12 Simone Weil, Selected Essays 1934-1943 (London: Oxford Universiry Press, 1962),
+p. 199.
+
+18
+evincing a distinctly activist and pragmatic interest in a form of nonstatist
+defense—very like the guerrilla warfare of the later Resistance in Nazioccupied France. A careful reading of her comments will show that she is
+being highly selective about the form of defense that she advocates. She
+begins with a glancing allusion to what is still not a familiar or even
+moderately acceptable idea: that of a nation resisting a threat nonviolently. She developed this idea in The Need for Roots in London in 1943,
+projecting the following picture of how France might have implemented
+a policy of passive resistance during the Second World War:
+If | Gandhi's method] had been applied in France, the French would not have
+used any armed force to resist the invader; but they would never have been
+prepared to do anything of any kind which might assist the army of occuparion; they would have done everything possible to hinder it; and they would
+have persisted indefinitely, inflexibly in that attitude. It is clear that in so
+doing, far greater numbers would have perished, and in far more frightful
+circumstances. This would have been an imitation of Christ's passion, realized
+on a national scale. 13
+"The Distress of Our Time" (1938) is in a world apart from the earlier
+texts in this collection that Weil wrote in highly specific contexts and for
+specialized readers. It is a short literary essay, or perhaps the introductory
+paragraphs to some long general essay that she never wrote, a frozen
+moment and a nonspecific sign that she and events had reached a crucial
+point of no return. The fragments that follow are snapshots of the prewar
+public mind in France. When war comes, Weil's priorities are those of
+"holding out" and of defending "positive" milieus, not simply those in
+which there is an absence of tyranny. France's colonial policy is on her conscience. The anguishing postwar period of France's colonial divestiture
+and the Vietnam War lie ahead.
+Weil wrote "Philosophy" (194ł) while she and her parents were living
+in Marseilles as refugees from the debacle of France's June 1940 defeat and
+the Nazi occupation. Like so many others during the period, she was in
+transit and marking time. Weil, however, was marking time in her own
+private and inimitable way: she was assiduously filling "notebook after
+notebook with thoughts hastily set down, in no order or sequence" —on
+Western science, mathematics, and philosophy, on Christian and non-
+13 Simone Weil, The Need for Roots (New York: Harper Colophon Bonks, 1971),
+p. 160.
+
+19
+Christian religion, on global folklore, and on art and literature. To the
+existentialist philosopher Jean Wahl in late 1942 she wrote the following
+digest of her researches and the conclusion she drew from them:
+I believe that one identical thought is to be found—expressed very precisely
+and with only very slight differences of modality — in the ancient mythologies;
+in the philosophies of Pherekydes, Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Plato, and the Greek stoics; in Greek poctry of the greatage; in universal
+folklore; in the Upanishads and the Bhagavad-Gita; in the Chinese Taoist
+writings and in certain currents of Buddhism; in what remains of the sacred
+writings of Egypt; in the dogmas of the Christian faith and in the writings of
+the greatest Christian mystics, especially St. John of the Cross; and in certain
+heresies, especially the Cathar and Manichaean tradition. I believe that this
+thought is the truth, and that it requires today a modern and Western form of
+expression. That is to say, it requires to be expressed through the only approximately good thing we can call our own, namely science. 14
+"Philosophy" appeared in Cahiers du Sud (which had several months
+earlier published "The Iliad, or the Poem of Force") signed with the
+anagram "Emile Novis" that Weil used to circumvent Vichy's laws pertaining to Jewish authors. "Philosophy" is essentially Weil's "review" of
+three lectures she attended whose subjects touched the surface of her own
+investigations. She offers her observations and comments as helpful and
+friendly addenda, and gives her readers the benefit of some of her research.
+Weil's "voice" in "Philosophy" is her academic one. She is addressing
+friends and colleagues. She is congenial and supportive, being as cheerful
+as it is possible to be in the circumstances—in her little corner of the "sorrow and the pity" of France, Europe, and the world during this period.
+Contemporary readers may be struck by Weil's appreciative exposition of
+Hippocrates' "holistic" approach to medicine in the second lecture. Be-
+cause she is so often regarded as a Western and Christian thinker, the evenhandedness of her consideration of the correspondences between Western
+and Eastern art and mysticism may surprise readers. The East-West balances found in "Philosophy" accurately reflect the religious and cultural
+balances that are found in her mature thought.
+"Philosophy" is an accurate reflection-in-miniature of the ways Weil
+used Western philosophy in her later thinking bow w reach out to non-
+14 Weil, Seventy Letters, p. 159.
+
+20
+Western, nonwhite, and non-Christian cultures and religions and to reconnect the cut-out parts of Western culture and religion to the global traditions and continuities from which she thought (as do many people today)
+they have become separated. The article accurately reflects the flowing,
+spreading nature of her thinking and her habit of never, while broadening
+and deepening her thought, discarding any prior stage of it (in this case her
+philosophical training). "Philosophy" provides a glimpse of Weil's tendency to be always turning and returning on her central self, a little like
+a planet orbiting in a solar system.
+A phenomenal amount of work remains to be done on all Weil's writings, on their content as well as on the linkages and continuities that underlie them. Because both her thought and her psychology were concrete
+responses to concrete conditions, it may be necessary to wait until a view
+of them can be had from a perspective of real elapsed time—perhaps from
+some point in the next century. Penetrating to the full wisdom and beauty
+of her writings may, moreover, always be extremely difficult, because
+something like her own intelligence and genius is needed to understand
+and assess them.
+
+
+Simone Weil received a superlative training in philosophy in the French
+lycées and at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, the grande école from which
+come the teachers of the upper lycées and universities, as well as a high
+percentage of France's cultural, political, and intellectual leaders. In many
+respects, however, her pre-Ecole years as a student of the famous philosophy teacher Alain' at the Lycée Henri IV from 1926 to 1928 were even
+more important to the development of her thinking. Alain's influence is
+strongly evident in "Science and Perception in Descartes," even though
+that work was a dissertation written for the diplome d'études supérieures
+at the Ecole Normale and was (at least nominally) done under the supervision of an Ecole professor, the philosopher Léon Brunschvicg. Weil,
+however, apparently consulted Brunschvicg little if at all, for she produced
+an "independent" piece of work that he did not like and to which he gave
+the lowest possible passing grade.
+According to Weil's biographer Jacques Cabaud, the dissertation contains Alain's "entire teaching on Descartes." Its subject is nothing less than
+a reexamination of the relationship between Descartes and modern science
+in an attempt to find grounds for a view of science very different from the
+kind that has actually developed from Cartesian thought. We know René
+Descartes (1596-1650) best as the dualist and mechanist whose philosophical, mathematical, and mechanical investigations constitute the
+foundation of much of the modern worldview. The Descartes taught by
+Alain, however, is a much more fleshed-out, human, multidimensional
+figure, a Descartes filtered through the revisions and additions of François
+Pierre Maine de Biran (1766-1824), Alain's own teacher Jules Lagneau
+(1851-94), and, of course, Alain's own highly idiosyncratic temperament.
+Alain emphasized aspects of Descartes that are largely unfamiliar to us.
+We do not tend, for instance, to think of Descartes the psychologist, whose
+Traité des passions de l'âme so much impressed Alain, or the Descartes
+I Emile Chartier (1868-195 1).
+
+24
+who took an interest in the work of ordinary people, in tools, and in common trades. Also, most of us lack the kind of exact knowledge of Cartesian
+mathematical thought that enabled Wcil to grandly but accurately make
+the name of Descartes synonymous with "the double revolution through
+which physics became an application of mathematics and geometry became algebra." Most unfamiliar of all is the Descartes who most interested
+Weil. He is a Descartes whose whole thought could perhaps have been
+understood in a different way, a way that might have led to an altogether
+different sort of modern science and modern world. In Descartes's affirmation of the scientific value of ordinary perception —he saw perception as
+a function of the understanding, i.e., as an activity that involves making
+judgments and coming to conclusions— Weil glimpsed both the possibility
+of a radically new understanding of what science should be and the possibility of introducing into the core of Western philosophical and scientific
+thought an understanding of work as a way of knowing the world. In the
+process of working out these possibilities in the dissertation, she builds
+a philosophical foundation for ideas that throughout her life were to have
+a central place in her thinking, e.g., that manual work, properly understood, is a source of moral and intellectual value; that it is of the same value
+as science as a way of knowing the world; that there is no justification in
+the nature of science itself for the development of an abstract, purely
+algebraic science that has no relation to the world of common-sense perception; and that, therefore, there is no justification for the existence of
+a scientific elite that supposedly has access to knowledge an ordinary person cannot attain. All these are formidable and real issues that have lost
+nothing of their urgency over the intervening years.
+Many aspects of Alain's teaching dovetailed with questions that had
+urgently presented themselves to Weil in early adolescence, in particular
+the question of whether only people of genius had "access to the realm of
+truth." In Descartes, especially as he was taught by Alain, she found a
+superb mind—a genius—who affirmed the ability of all human beings to
+discover truth, if only they use their minds correctly. Descartes, then, in his
+way, confirmed her own earlier conviction (arrived at after experiencing
+nearly suicidal despair) that "any human being ... can penetrate to the
+kingdom of truth reserved for genius, if only he longs for truth and perpetually concentrates all his attention upon its attainment."2 This corc
+2 Simonc Weil, Waiting for God (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1973), p. 64.
+
+2.5
+conviction that truth is accessible to all may be the single most unifying
+factor underlying Weil's psychology.
+The dissertation as a whole is divided into an introduction, Part i (a historical examination of the problem raised in the introduction), Part 2 (a
+personal investigation of the problem, analogous to Descartes's Meditations), and a conclusion.
+Weil begins the introduction with a lofty and abbreviated summary of
+humanity's quest for indubitable knowledge. Human beings have always
+sought it, felt that their own "ordinary" thought could not provide it, and
+made priests and kings of those whom they mistakenly believed had access
+to it. Thales' discovery of geometry demonstrated that certain knowledge
+is indeed possible; Weil, however, asks whether that discovery merely replaced the tyranny of priests ruling through the "tricks" of religion with
+the legitimate authority of scientists who "really have access to the intelligible world," or whether, "by teaching us that the realm of pure thought
+is the sensible world itself," Thales' discovery made indubitable know|-
+edge available to everyone. In other words, is science necessarily abstract,
+self-referential, unrelated to the world of common-sense perception, an
+elite realm that only the initiated may enter? Greek science, Weil finds,
+does not give a clear answer to the question, and modern science, when
+looked at in a few particulars, is full of contradictions. Weil suggests that
+these contradictions are a sign that the separation of scientific thinking
+from ordinary thinking has come about as a result of the "prejudices" of
+scientists and does not flow from the nature of science itself. To determine
+whether or not this is the case, she proposes to return to the origin of
+modern science—to Descartes—and seek out the principles on which it
+was founded
+In Part I of the dissertation Weil approaches the problem historically.
+First she cites the ways in which the development of modern science does
+seem to be in accord with certain aspects of Cartesian thought; for instance, Descartes does indeed reject the evidence of the senses as deceptive,
+and can be said to have transferred the knowledge of nature from the
+senses to reason. She presents textual evidence in Descartes that supports
+the argument that "from its very origin modern science has been, albeit in
+a less developed form, what it is now." Then, however, she sets the stage
+for an alternative view, pointing out that a careful reading of Descartes
+would "bring one up against a multitude of passages that are apparently
+hard to reconcile" with the outline of Cartesian thought she has just
+
+26
+sketched. In this second selection of texts, she shows that real science, according to Descartes, consists in using one's reason properly, and that
+therefore any person, with proper application, can know all that is within
+the scope of the mind. Science for Descartes, she argues, does not consist in
+a body of knowledge-"results"—but in the use of a method. She cites
+passages showing that he did not confine himself to abstract questions that
+"are of no use except to exercise the mind"; in fact, he gave up such questions in order to have more time to "pursue another kind of geometry,
+which proposes for questions the explanation of natural phenomena."
+While she acknowledges that Descartes is an extreme idealist in one sense,
+she argues that he is also an extreme realist. His geometry, though abstract, always "grasps something," some real object existing in the world.
+And although he defines the world as "extension" (a purely abstract idea,
+she points out that he does not recognize "extension separated from an extended substance." Similarly, she shows that Cartesian science is considerably more concrete than is generally thought; his physics uses familiar
+comparisons drawn from nature, and in his solutions to problems of
+physics he uses perceptible objects as models, so that, as he says, "I could
+submit my reasoning to the examination of the senses, as I always try to
+do." He finds the human mind—i.e., reason or understanding—at work in
+the most ordinary kinds of thinking, and recognizes that perception is an
+act of the understanding and is of the same nature as science. And although
+he distinguishes imagination from mind and locates it in the body, he does
+not reject it; rather, he recognizes it as a useful and even necessary tool in
+knowing the world.
+Having cited these contradictory views to be found in Descartes, Weil
+finds that the historical approach she has followed does not give her the
+wherewithal to reconcile them, and also leaves unanswered the question of
+how Descartes's research in physics could lead (as he claims it did) to the
+acquisition of self-knowledge. She notes, moreover, the impossibility of
+fully understanding Descartes "from the outside" and "piecemeal," and
+proposes to undertake a personal rather than historical investigation of the
+problem in order to try to reconcile these contradictions (an approach
+called in the Sorbonne philosophie dogmatique); she will "become a
+Cartesian" and pursue a series of reflections on her own in order to discover in herself both the process by which indubitable knowledge is arrived at and what that knowledge can consist of. This meditation forms the
+second part of the thesis.
+
+27
+Weil's meditation is far from a simple imitation of the Cartesian original. Descartes began his Meditations by doubting everything that came to
+him through the senses in order to determine what could be known with
+certainty by the mind alone. Weil begins her reflections in a prolonged
+languor in which consciousness is stripped of everything except its most
+essential elements, the living being's awareness of self and the world. This
+state of inchoate awareness consists of feelings of pleasure and pain that
+are constantly changing and never purely one or the other. These primordial, indefinable feelings are the medium through which the world appears
+to consciousness, and at the same time it is the world that gives rise to these
+feelings. However, Weil finds that they cannot give her any certain knowledge about herself, the nature of the world, or even any proof that the
+world exists independently of her. Even abstract ideas, such as mathematical propositions, which do not in themselves give rise to feelings of pleasure and pain, are mediated through appearances, and although something seems to determine that mathematical ideas can appear to her in
+some ways but not in others (she can conceive of two pairs of oranges making four oranges, but not five), this phenomenon seems to be something
+arbitrary and inexplicable arising from her own unknown nature. What
+happens in the world of mathematics, just as in the sensible world, seems
+to be the result only of chance. Consciousness alone does not give her any
+knowledge of the nature or the real existence of what she is conscious of.
+Continued reflection, however, leads Weil to see that there is a power in
+thought, for her thoughts are capable of deceiving her and creating an illusion of a world that seems formidably real. She herself can take command
+of this power, rather than being simply subject to it, when she doubts
+whatever presents itself to her mind. In doubting she is carrying out truly
+autonomous action; the exercise of this power causes her to exist as an
+active being and moves her from the level of consciousness on which
+knowledge is not possible to a level on which clear and indisputable truths
+emerge: "as soon as I reject an idea, even if it should be the idea that I am,
+at once l am." What she finds to be the cornerstone of the edifice of indubitable knowledge is thus slightly different from the Cartesian formula "I
+think, therefore I am." For Weil what is crucial is the ability to take command of the power inherent in thought: Je puis, donc je suis (I have power,
+therefore l am).
+She then establishes what can be known by means of pure understanding; basically, she concludes, all she can know is herself and the extent of
+
+28
+herpower (the rwo are identical, for she is defined by what she can do). For
+her to know herself is thus to know to what degree she is master of her
+thoughts and to what degree her thoughts are subject to the world. This,
+she affirms, is the only knowledge there is. The world's existence is proved,
+she reflects, by the fact that her power over her own thoughts is extremely
+limited. Since power, as she understands it, is infinite by nature, this limitation demonstrates that something other than she must exist, something
+that causes thoughts to arise in her independently or in spite of her own
+will, something that has power over her through those thoughts. As long as
+she responds to this other existence with feelings of pleasure and pain, she
+can know nothing about it. Knowledge of it is dependent on her being able
+to act on it, to "grasp" it, to have power over it in some way. But the kind
+of thinking by which she proved her own existence does not help her to
+grasp the world.
+To learn about the world she finds she must now consult the imagination, that "ambiguous being that is a composite of myself and the world
+acting on one another," even though earlier she had rurned away from the
+imagination in order to determine what could be known by the understanding alone. She finds, initially, that the imagination seems to have two
+aspects. When it is not controlled by the mind it creates fantastic images
+out of sense impressions and causes her to be passive, impotent, "delivered
+over to the world." It mediates a world that can be a cause of joy or sadness
+to her, but not an object of knowledge. When it is controlled by the mind,
+however, the imagination mediates ideas in which the world plays a part,
+but which "do not represent the encroachment of the world on me, since
+they are made present to me only by an act of my own attention." Such
+ideas—e.g., the idea of number, or the sequence of numbers, or any kind of
+orderly series—create a "passageway" for the mind into the world, a clear
+space in the world in which the mind can be free and act. Moreover, the
+idea of sequence, since it can be added to infinitely, makes infinite action in
+the world-that is, action that nothing limits—theoretically possible to
+her.
+Armed with these ideas, she approaches the world. She starts with
+straight-line motion, the simplest of all the clear ideas. Motion in a straight
+line, she asserts, constitutes the basic grasp the world allows her, the basic
+way the mind can act on the world. By combining straight-line motions she
+arrives at a series of geometrical forms—the oblique line, the circle, the
+ellipse-that corresponds in its increasing complexity to the series of
+numbers. Generalizing from this, she postulates that the world is consti-
+
+29
+tuted by an infinitely complex combination of straight-line movements,
+and that this combination is at least theoretically reducible to a movement
+comparable to the simple straight-line movement she has at her disposal.
+She recognizes, however, that this physics of movement is not, strictly
+speaking, true, because it attributes to the world lines and directions,
+which are properties of the mind. Nevertheless, when she separates from
+movement what belongs to the mind and what belongs to the world, she
+arrives at knowledge of what the world is: "the world, in itself, is only extended substance." This is, however, only hypothetical knowledge as long
+as her uncontrolled imagination persists in transforming her sensations
+into signs of an animistic world. Geometry and physics alone, which
+employ one part of the imagination, still leave the other part free. But
+work, she affirms, unites the two imaginations—work and perception,
+because both of them involve the directed activity of the body and therefore of the whole imagination (Weil, like Descartes, identifies the body
+with the imagination). Work and perception, she argues, are the key elements in knowledge of the world. Perception actively controls the imagination and turns sensations into "signs of distances, sizes, shapes, that is,
+signs of work I may do." Work itself, even more important, enables her to
+grasp the world as it is in itself, as "naked extension, stripped of all admixture of mind, all trappings of imagination." Work is thus the most
+direct possible contact of the mind with the world.
+In the final pages of Part 2 Weil returns, at long last, to the question
+raised in the introduction concerning the true nature of science. The basic
+components of science, she contends, are work and perception; science is
+nothing more than a collective effort of perception enabling mankind to
+"grasp" (i.e., determine the actual magnitude and movements of) objects
+like the sun and the stars whose size and distance cannot be accurately perceived by one person alone. The real purpose of science is virtually indistinguishable from the purpose of work; it is "to render the human mind
+master... of the part of the imagination that perception leaves free, and
+then to give it possession of the world." Science, she concludes, can add
+only one thing to what is already known by the person who knows the
+world through what she calls self-conscious work: it can add the knowledge that such work contains "everything there is to know," and that
+"there is nothing else."
+3 In her analysis of the important role of bodily movement in perception Weil is drawing
+on the teaching of Jules Lagneau.
+
+'Ació Oros yEwueTpEi.'
+Humanity began, as every man begins, with no knowledge except consciousness of self and perception of the world. That was all man needed (as
+it is all that primitive peoples, or, in our civilized world, uneducated laborers, still need) to find his way in nature and human society to the extent
+that was necessary for survival. Why desire more? It seems that humanity
+should never have left that state of blissful ignorance, or, to cite Rousseau,
+have become so corrupted as to begin to meditate.2 But the fact is that, as
+far as we can know, humanity never, strictly speaking, had to leave that
+state, for it never confined itself to it. The reason that the search for truth
+has been and still can be of some interest is that man's original state is not
+ignorance, but error. That is why men have never been content to be limited to the immediate interpretation of sensations, and have always intuited that there was a higher, more certain knowledge that is the privilege
+of a few initiates. Men believed that errant thought, given over to sense
+impressions and passions, was not real thought. They believed that they
+would find the higher kind of thought in certain men who seemed godlike
+to them, and they made them their priests and kings. But as they had no
+idea what this higher way of thinking might be (since, indeed, they could
+not have conceived it unless they had possessed it), they deified in their
+priests, under the name of religion, the most fantastic beliefs. Thus the accurate intuition that there was a more certain and higher kind of knowedge than that depending on the senses led them to humble themselves,
+submit to authority, and acknowledge as their superiors men whose only
+r "God geometrizes eternally" (attribured to Plato in Plutarch's Symposiacs bk. 8, question 2).
+2 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), Swiss-born French philosopher. In the Discourse on
+the Origin and Frundation of Inequality among Mankind (17S5) Rousseau wrote: "I dare
+almost affirm that a state of reflection is a state against nature, and that the man who meditates is a degenerate animal." See The Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin and
+Foundation of Inequality among Mankind (New York: Pocket Books, 1971), р. 183.
+
+32
+advantage over them was to have replaced thought that was uncertain in
+its direction with thought that had no direction at all.
+The advent of the geometer Thales was history's greatest moment, a
+moment that is repeated in an individual's life, for Thales is reborn for each
+new generation of students. Until the time of Thales, humaniry had proceeded only by trial and error and guesswork; from the moment that
+Thales discovered geometry —after, according to Hugo,* he had remained
+immobile for four years-humanity knew. This revolution, the first and
+only revolution, overthrew the authority of the priests. But how did it do
+so? What did it bring us in its place? Did it give us that other world, that
+realm of authentic thought which men have always glimpsed through the
+veil of so many crazy superstitions? Did it replace tyrannical priests who
+ruled by means of the tricks of religion with true priests who exercise a
+legitimate authority because they really have access to the intelligible
+world? Must we submit blindly to these thinkers who see for us, as we used
+to submit blindly to priests who were themselves blind, if lack of talent or
+leisure prevents us from entering their ranks? Or, on the contrary, did this
+revolution replace inequality with equality by teaching us that the realm of
+pure thought is the sensible world itself, that this quasi-divine knowledge
+that religions sensed is only a chimera, or rather, that it is nothing but
+ordinary thought? Nothing is harder to know, and at the same time nothing is more important for every man to know. For it is a matter of nothing
+less than knowing whether I ought to make the conduct of my life subject
+to the authority of scientific thinkers, or solely to the light of my own
+reason; or rather, since I alone can decide that, it is a matter of knowing
+whether science will bring me liberty or legitimate chains.
+If we look at the miracle of geometry in its origins, it provides no easy
+answer to this question. Legend has it that Thales discovered the fundamental theorem of mathematics when, in order to measure the pyramids,
+he compared the ratio of their height to their shadow with the ratio of
+a man's height to his shadow. Science here would seem to be merely a more
+careful kind of perception. But that is not how the Greeks thought of it.
+3 Thales of Miletus (c. 624-547 R.r.), Greek mathematician and astronomer. Several
+theorems in elementary geometry are attributed to him.
+4 Victor Hugo (1802-85), French poet, novelist, and dramatist. Alain used this legend of
+Thales' protracted immobility as an illustration of the important part played by arrentic,
+noninterfering observation in the genesis of great discoverics. See Flements de philosophie
+(Paris: Editions Gallimard, 194 1), p. 99.
+
+33
+Plato pur it well when he said that, although the geometer makes use of
+figures, these figures are not the object of geometry, but only the occasion
+for reasoning about the ideal straight line, the ideal triangle, the ideal
+circle. As if drunk on geometry, the philosophers of the Platonic school
+reduced — which that universe of ideas to which they had been miraculously granted access did not—the whole of what is perceived to a fabric of appearances, and forbade the search for wisdom to anyone who was not
+a geometer. Greek science, therefore, leaves us uncertain. In any case, it is
+better to consult modern science, for if we leave aside a fairly rudimentary
+astronomy, it is modern science that, by means of physics, was destined to
+bring Thales' discovery into the area where it vies with perception-in
+other words, into contact with the sensible world
+Here there is no uncertainty at all; it is truly another realm of thought
+that modern science brings us. Thales himself, if he were to return to life to
+see how far men have carried his reflections, would feel like a son of the soil
+compared to our scientists. If he were to look at an astronomy book, he
+would find almost no mention of stars in it. The last things to be discussed
+in a book on capillarity or heat would be capillaries and fluids, a definition
+of heat, or the means of its propagation. Those who want to provide a
+mechanical model of physical phenomena, as the first astronomers did, by
+representing the course of the stars by machines, are now scorned. In the
+absence of things or mechanical models that imitate them, Thales would
+expect to find geometrical figures in our books on nature; again he would
+be disappointed. He would think his discovery forgotten; he would not see
+that it still dominates, in the form of algebra. Science, which in the time of
+the Greeks was the science of numbers, geometrical figures, and machines,
+now seems to be solely the science of pure relationships. Ordinary thinking, which it seems Thales at least utilized, even if he did not confine himself to it, is now clearly scorned. Common-sense notions such as threedimensional space and the postulates of Euclidean geometry have been
+discarded. Certain theories do not hesitate to speak about curved space, or
+to put a measurable speed next to an infinite one. Speculative theories
+about the nature of matter are given free rein, in the attempt to interpret
+this or that result of our physics without the slightest concern for what
+matter may mean to ordinary men who touch it with their hands. In short,
+as much as possible, scientists exclude everything having to do with intuition; they no longer admit anything into science except the most abstract
+form of reasoning, expressed in a suitable language by means of algebraic
+
+34
+signs. But since reasoning in common people is closely tied to intuition, an
+abyss separates the scientist from the uneducated person. Scientists have
+thus indeed become the successors of the priests of the old theocracies,
+with this difference, that a dominion gained by usurpation has been replaced by a legitimate authority.
+Without rebelling against this authority, one may still examine it. Some
+astonishing contradictions are immediately evident. For example, let us
+look at the consequences of the absolute dominion that is exercised over
+science by the most abstract forms of mathematics. As we observed, science has been so purged of everything having to do with intuition that it is
+no longer concerned with anything except combinations of pure relationships. But these relationships must have a content, and where is that to be
+found except in experience? Indeed, physics does nothing but express, by
+means of suitable signs, the relationships that exist between the givens of
+experience. In other words, physics may be thought of as consisting essentially of a mathematical expression of facts. Instead of being the queen of
+science, mathematics is now no more than a language; the result of its
+absolute sovereignty is that it has been reduced to a servile role. That is
+why Poincaré could say, for example, that Euclidean and non-Euclidean
+geometries are only different systems of measurement. In Science and
+Hypothesis he says, "What, then, are we to think of the question: Is
+Euclidean geometry true? It has no meaning. We might as well ask if the
+metric system is true, and if the old weights and measures are false; if
+Cartesian coordinates are true and polar coordinates are false. One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient."6
+Thus, according to the testimony of the greatest mathematician of our
+century, mathematics is only a convenient language. In one form or
+another, it always plays the same role that we see it play in the elementary
+laws of physics, which are represented by curves. Experiments supply the
+points that, on paper, represent actual measurements. The mathematician
+only furnishes the simplest curve that includes all these points, so that the
+various experiments can be grouped under a single law. This was also
+5 Henri Poincaré (1854-1912), French mathematician. At the turn of the century Poincaré was widely regarded as the greatest living mathematician. A prolific writer and lecturer,
+he wrote a number of books for the general reader on the meaning and implications of science
+and mathematics. His conception of the role of convenience in science is considered his greatest contribution to the philosophy of science.
+6 See Henri Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1907),
+p. so. Emphasis added by Simone Weil.
+
+35
+recognized by Poincaré. In The Value of Science he says, "All laws are
+deduced from experiment; but to enunciate them, a special language is
+needed.... Mathematics furnishes the physicist with the only language he
+can speak.
+" According to Poincaré, the role of mathematical analysis is
+limited to this function, and to that of indicating to the physicist analogies
+between phenomena through the similarity of the formulas that express
+them. If one believes those who are competent in the field, scientists have
+reached the point where they translate the results of experiments into differential equations that they are incapable of relating to energy, force,
+space, or any other strictly physical notion. And so this science that arrogantly scorned intuition is reduced to expressing the results of experience in the most general language possible.
+Another contradiction has to do with the relation between science and
+its applications. Modern scientists, considering (as seems proper for them
+to do) knowledge to be the noblest goal they can set for themselves, refuse
+to do research with a view to industrial applications, and loudly declare,
+with Poincaré, that if there can be no Science for its own sake, there can be
+no Science.® But this does not seem to square with the previous idea that
+the question of whether such and such a scientific theory is true is meaningless, since a theory is only more or less convenient. Furthermore, the distance that seemed to exist between the scientist and the uneducated person
+is thus reduced to a difference in degree, since science is found to be not
+more true, but only more convenient, than perception.
+Are these contradictions only apparently insoluble? Or are they a sign
+that scientists, in separating scientific thinking from ordinary thinking as
+they have done, are governed by their own prejudices rather than by the
+nature of science? The best way to decide this question is to consider
+science at its origin and seek out the principles according to which it was
+established; but for the reasons given above, we must go back, not to
+Thales, but to the double revolution through which physics became an application of mathematics and geometry became algebra: in other words, to
+Descartes.
+7 See Poincaré, The Value of Science (New York: Science Press, 1907), p. =6.
+8 Ibid.
+
+Part One
+If we are unsure whether or not science, at its very beginning, substituted
+an intelligible world for the sensible world, this uncertainry should not
+take long to dispel. For if we open the Meditations, we read at once: "All
+that I have accepted until now as being the most true and the most certain,
+I have learned from the senses, or by means of the senses; but I have sometimes found that the senses were deceptive, and it is prudent never to
+entirely trust those who have once deceived us." Accordingly, when
+Descartes wants to seek the truth, he shuts his eyes and plugs his ears; he
+even expunges all images of corporeal things from his mind, or, since that
+is hardly possible, he at least refutes them as vain and false. It is true that
+this concerns metaphysical, not mathematical, research, but we know that
+Descartes considered his metaphysical doctrine to be the foundation of all
+his thought. Thus the first step taken by Descartes as he thinks is to set
+aside sensations. True, that procedure is only a form of his hyperbolic
+doubt, and one could think that this distrust of the senses is only provisional, in accord with the comparison that Descartes uses to explain
+what he means by doubt in his Response to the Seventh Set of Objections:
+"If by chance he [the Jesuit Père Bourdin, whose criticisms of the Meditations Descartes was answering] had a basket of fruit, and he feared that
+some pieces of the fruit might be spoiled, and he wanted to remove the bad
+ones lest they spoil the rest, how would he go about it? Would he not first
+completely remove all the fruit from the basket? And then, examining the
+pieces carefully one by one, would he not take back only those that he saw
+were not spoiled, and replace them in the basket, leaving the others behind?" (7:481). 2 Actually, belief in the evidence of the senses is not among
+the ideas that Descartes, after having thrown them out, takes up again as
+sound. On the contrary, the aim of Cartesian physics is to replace the
+1 All quotations trom Descartes in rhe rexr have been translated by the editors from the
+original French and Latin. Simone Weil quores from Deuvres de Descartes, publiées par
+Ch. Adam et P. Tannery, 12 vols. (Paris, 189?-1910). The above passage is found in 9:14.
+Page references to subsequent citations will be given in parenthesis in the text. For the reader
+who wishes to find the place where the passage occurs in an English rranslation, a footnote
+will give page references wherever such a translation is available. The above passage is found
+in Discourse on Method and the Meditations (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 96.
+2 See The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T.
+Ross (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955), 2:282.
+
+37
+things that we sense with things that we can understand only, to the extent
+of supposing that a simple vortex is the source of solar rays. The sun itself
+is deprived of its light by the mind. And in fact here is the way The World,
+also entitled Treatise on Light, begins: "Since I intend to discuss Light in
+these pages, the first thing I want to tell you is that there can be a difference
+between the impression we have of it —that is, the idea of it that is formed
+in our imagination with the help of our eyes-and what is in the objects
+that gives rise to this impression in us, that is, what is in a flame or in the
+sun that is called by the name of light" (11:3).3 He demonstrates this with
+an example drawn directly from experience:
+Of all our senses, touch is the one that we consider to be the least deceptive
+and the most certain; so that if I prove to you that even touch makes us conceive quire a few ideas that do nor at all resemble the objects that give rise to
+them, I do not think you should find it strange if I say that sight can do the
+same.... A cavalryman returns from a battle; during the heat of the fray he
+could have been wounded without noticing it; hut now that he begins to rclax,
+he fecls some pain, and he thinks he is wounded. A surgeon is sent for; the
+cavalryman is examined, and at length it appears that what he felt was nothing
+but a buckle or a strap which, having become wisted under his armor, was
+pressing against him and causing him discomfort. If his sense of touch, in
+making him feel the strap, had imprinted its image on his mind, he would not
+have needed a surgeon to rell him what he was feeling. (11:5-6)*
+Refusing, accordingly, to trust the senses, Descartes puts his trust in
+reason alone, and we know that his system of the world is the triumph of
+what is called the a priori method. He applied this method with a boldness
+that was, according to a famous saying, both unprecedented and inimitable, for he goes as far as to deduce the existence of the heavens, the earth,
+and the elements. "The order that I adhered to in this," he writes in the
+Discourse on Method, "has been as follows":
+First, I tried to find in general the Principles or First Causes of everything that
+exists or can exist in the world, without considering to this end anything
+except God alone who created it, or deriving them from anything other than
+certain seeds of truth that are naturally in our souls. After that I examined
+3 See Descartes: Selections, ed. Ralph M1. Eaton (New Yurk: Charles Siribner's Sons.
+1927), p. 312.
+4 See ibid., Pp. 317-14.
+
+38
+what were the first and most ordinary effects that could be deduced from these
+causes; and it seems to me that in that way I found Heavens, Stars, an Earth
+and even, on the earth, water, air, fire, minerals, and other such things that are
+the commonest and simplest of all. (6:63-64)5
+He carries out this plan in the Principles with this almost insolent remark,
+which is also found in the Correspondence: "The proofs of all this are so
+certain that, even if experience might seem to show us the contrary, we
+would nevertheless be obliged to put more faith in our reason than in our
+senses" (9:93). To which one may compare this passage from a letter to
+Mersenne: 6 "'I set no store by the Sieur Petit and his words, and it seems to
+me that there is no more reason to listen to him when he promises to refute
+my theory of refractions by experiment than if he were trying, with some
+faulty square, to show that the sum of the three angles of a triangle are not
+equal to the sum of two right angles" (2:497).
+So Cartesian physics is geometrical. But Cartesian geometry, in its turn,
+is far removed from that classical geometry that Comte so appropriately
+called "special" because it is connected to particular forms.® Since we are
+considering Descartes historically, it may be useful at this point to consider
+what form his ideas took among the philosophers who are more or less his
+disciples. Now, with reference to the Geometry of 1637, Malebranche'
+and Spinoza1° both distinguished (albeit differently) intelligible extension
+from the kind of extension that is thrown over things like a cloak and that
+speaks only to the imagination. Although Descartes did not explicitly go
+¡ See Discourse on Method and the Meditations, p. 80.
+6 Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), priest, philosopher, theologian. He maintained a large
+correspondence with the major thinkers of his time, introducing them and their ideas to
+one another. Descartes was his great friend and his principal correspondent, and it was
+through Mersenne that the Discourse on Method, the Fssays, and the Meditations were first
+published
+7 Pierre Petit (1598-1677). A provincial commissioner of the artillery, Petit conducted
+various experiments in physics in his spare time. He was especially interested in the refraction
+of light. He wrote objections to Part 4 of the Discourse and to the Optics and the Meteors.
+8 Auguste Comte (1798-1857), French philosopher and founder of positivism. In the
+System of Positive Polity Comte refers to "the development of general Geometry out of the
+special Geometry which alone was known to the ancients." See System of Positive Polity.
+4 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, and C.o., 1875), 1:389.
+y Nicholas Malebranche (I638-1715), French philosopher and theologian. He spent
+many years studying Cartesian philosophy and is regarded as the connecting link between
+Descartes and Spinoza.
+1o Benedict Spinoza (1632-77), Dutch philosopher.
+
+• Science and Perception in Descarles
+39
+that far, it is he whom we must credit with this forceful idea. Not that he
+didn't seem to imply it in places, as in the famous passage about the piece
+of wax in which he strips extension of its trappings of colors, odors, and
+sounds, and even more in the following lines addressed to Morus, " where
+extension already seems to be conceived in the way Spinoza will later conceive it; true, it is not yet conceived as indivisible, but it is conceived independently of its parts:
+Tangibility and impenetrability in a material body are like the capacity for
+laughter in man, a property of the fourth kind according to the common laws
+oflogic; but this is not a true and essential specific difference, which I contend
+consists in extension; therefore, as man is not defined as an animal capable of
+laughter, but as a rational animal, so a material body is not defined by its
+impenetrability, but by its extension. And this is confirmed by the fact that,
+while tangibility and impenetrability have reference to parts and presuppose
+the concept of division or limit, we can conceive a continuous body of indeterminate or indefinite size, in which nothing except extension need be
+considered. (5:269)
+Nevertheless, it was in the Geometry of 1637—which constituted a
+real revolution for mathematics—that this idea of pure extension, of extension in itself, to use Platonic language, especially burst forth. True, the
+ancient geometers were not reasoning about the triangle or the circle that
+they had before their eyes, but about the triangle or the circle in general;
+still, they remained as though glued to the triangle or the circle. Since their
+demonstrations depended on intuition, they always preserved something
+that was specific to the kind of figure that they were studying. Although
+Archimedes had measured the area enclosed by a segment of a parabola,
+this wonderful discovery was still of no help at all in similar investigations
+concerning, for example, the ellipse, for it was the particular properties of
+the parabola that made this measurement possible, through a construction
+impracticable or useless for any other figure. Descartes was the first to
+understand that the sole object of science is the quantities to be measured,
+or rather the ratios that determine this measurement-ratios that, in
+geometry, are found only as it were hidden in figures, in the same way that,
+for example, ratios can be hidden in movements. After this brilliant in-
+I Henry More (1614-87), English philosopher and theologian, one of the leaders of the
+Cambridge Platonists. He disagreed wirh Descartes's conceprion of extension.
+
+40
+sight, geometers from Descartes onward ceased to condemn themselves, as
+the Greek geometers had done, to making a mathematical expression of
+whatever degree correspond only to a form of extension having a corresponding number of dimensions—lines for simple quantities, surfaces
+for the products of two factors, and volumes for the products of three. As
+a matter of fact,
+all these are used in the same way, if they are considered only with regard to
+dimension, as must be done here and in the mathematical disciplines. ...
+Consideration of this matter throws a great light on geometry, because almost
+all men mistakenly think that there are three kinds of quantity in geometry:
+the line, the surface, and the body. For it has already been said thatthe line and
+the surface are not conceived as truly distinct from the body, or from one
+another; in fact, if they are considered simply as abstractions of the understanding, they are no more different kinds of quantity than "animal" and
+"living being" are different kinds of substance in man. (10:448-49)12
+In this way mathematics was set free from the superstition whereby each
+figure has, as it were, its own quantity. From that time onward, figures
+were no more than givens that posited ratios of quantity; all that was left
+was to apply arithmetical signs to ratios of this new sort. But Vieta, ' when
+he invented algebra, had already applied signs to all possible ratios. Even
+curves were defined by the law—that is, by the formula-that brought
+them, as they were traced out, nearer to or further from an arbitrarily
+chosen straight line. In short, from 1637 on, the essence of the circle, as
+Spinoza would later say, was no longer circular. It was as if all figures were
+dissolved; only the straight line still existed, and geometers, following
+Descartes's example, stopped considering "any other theorems than those
+that state that the sides of similar triangles are proportional, and that in
+right triangles, the square of the base is equal to the sum of the squares of
+the sides.... For ... if one draws other lines and uses other theorems ...
+one does not see so clearly what one is doing unless one has the proof of the
+theorem vividly in mind, and in that case one almost always finds that the
+theorem rests on the consideration of a few triangles that are either right
+12 See Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur (Indianapolis:
+Bobbs-Merrill, 1978), p. 219.
+13 François Vietn (1540-1603), French marhematician. He is said to be the founder of
+modern algebra.
+
+41
+triangles or similar triangles, and thus one comes back again to what I was
+saying" (4:38-39).14
+Furthermore, it is clear that the daring and later almost universally imitated steptaken by Fourier" in his famous studies on heat —he left out the
+intermediary of mechanics in order to apply analysis directly to physics—
+only repeated the Geometry of 1637 on another subject. Or rather, the
+Geometry was only one of the applications of the general principle, applied today in all studies that allow it, that ratios between quantities are the
+sole object of the scientist. One can even think that Descartes would have
+anticipated modern science by using analysis in physics as well as in geometry, if he had possessed a sufficiently elaborate instrument. One need not
+be surprised that the inventor of this bold view had, as we observed, only
+scorn for what Spinoza would call "knowledge of the first kind."" No
+more than Spinoza does he believe that one can be wise without being
+a philosopher, and on this subject no one has expressed himself in stronger
+terms. In the preface to the Principles he says, "To live without philosophizing is exactly like keeping one's eyes shut without ever trying to open
+them.... And, in sum, this study is more necessary for regulating our
+morals and guiding us in this life than the use of our eyes is for directing our
+steps" (9:3-4). 1' Ultimately, one will not be surprised that the Descartes
+who resolutely discards ideas "that are formed in the imagination with the
+help of our eyes" and who sets mathematics free from the yoke of intuition
+has, like Spinoza, reduced the imagination to something consisting only of
+the movements of the human body. This is shown in a text from the Rules
+for the Direction of the Mind: "One must conceive ... the imagination to
+be a real part of the body." And further on: "from this one can understand
+how all the movements of the lower animals can come about, although
+they are not considered to have any knowledge of objects, but only a purely corporeal kind of imagination" (10:414-15).18
+Thus science has been cleansed of the mud of its origin, so to speak,
+14 Descartes to Princess Elizaberh, November 1643.
+15 Jean Baptiste Fourier (1768-1830), French marhematician. His Analytical Thenry of
+Heat (1822) is his most famous work.
+16 According to Spinoza, knowledge of the first kind is "opinion or imagination." that is,
+"all ideas that are inadequate and confused." See The Ethics prop. 40, n. z, and prop. 41
+(New York: Dover Publications, 1955), pp. 113-14.
+17 See Discourse on Method and the Meditations, pp. 174-75.
+18 See Philosophical Essays, pp. 190-91.
+
+42
+which Thales and his successors had not entirely washed away. It is what
+Plato had had a presentiment of: an assemblage of ideas. And this provides
+the opportunity to look at another aspect of Cartesian thought with the
+help of another of Descartes's disciples: Leibnitz. 1 For even though Leibnitz wanted to construct the whole edifice not only of human knowledge,
+but even of divine knowledge (which in his system is the same thing as the
+world), out of ideas, once again it is Descartes who must be regarded as the
+inspiration of this doctrine. True, in the Meditations all Descartes did was
+observe the existence in his mind of ideas that, he said, cannot be considered to be pure nothing, and were not invented by him, but have true
+and immutable natures of their own. But in the Rules—of which Leibnitz
+possessed a copy—Descartes goes much further in his doctrine of simple
+ideas, defining them thus: "I call 'absolute' whatever contains in itself the
+pure and simple essence with which we are concerned; as, for example,
+everything that is considered as independent, as a cause, as simple, universal, one, equal, similar, straight, or other things of this sort; and I call it
+the simplest and the easiest, so that we may use it for the solution of problems" (10:38 1). 20 And how should we use it? This we see further on: "It
+must be noted [second] that there are only a few pure and simple essences
+that we can behold at first sight and in themselves, independently of any
+others, either in experience itself or by means of the light innate in us; and
+we say that careful attention must be paid to them, for they are the ones
+that we call the simplest in each series. All the others, moreover, cannot be
+perceived unless they are deduced from them, either immediately and
+proximately or through two, three, or several different stages" (IO:
+383).21 And further on there is this even more significant passage: "We
+conclude, third, that all human knowledge consists in this: that we see
+clearly how these simple essences come together in the composition of
+other things" (10:427) 22 Simply by pushing thisidea to its furthest consequences we again encounter Leibnitz. For if, in being built, these transparent edifices of simple ideas increasingly approach the complication of
+existing things, must we not think that the gulf that nonetheless separates
+our reasoning from the world is due to our limited mind, rather than to the
+nature of ideas? Hence one can imagine that, for an infinite understanding,
+19 Confried Wilhelm Leibnitz. (I646-1716), German philosopher.
+20 See Philosophical Essays, p. T64.
+21 Seeibid., p. 166.
+22 See ibid., p. 200.
+
+43
+it is necessarily true that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, 23 exactly as it is true
+for us that two and two are four. If this is not necessarily true for us, it is
+because infinite analysis is needed to know an event, properly speaking.
+"Although it is easy," Leibnitz says, "to determine that the number of feet
+in the diameter is not contained in the notion of the sphere in general, it is
+not so easy to determine whether the journey that I plan to make is contained in my notion, otherwise it would be as easy for us to be prophets as
+to be geometers." 24
+The idea that we can form of Descartes as the founder of modern science
+thus seems complete. Classical geometry was still as it were glued to the
+earth; he set it loose, and was like a second Thales in relation to Thales. He
+transferred the knowledge of nature from the realm of the senses to the
+realm of reason. He thus rid our thought of imagination, and modern
+scientists, who have applied mathematical analysis directly to all the objects that can be studied in that way, are his true successors. Poincaré, in
+substituting analytic proofs for intuitive proofs concerning addition and
+multiplication, showed the true Cartesian spirit. Those who, following
+Leibnitz, hope to build, so to speak, the universe out of ideas, or who at
+least think that the universe in God (or, to put it another way, in itself) is
+built in precisely that way, also proceed from Descartes. Even the abovenoted contradiction between making convenience the rule of science and
+having contempt for its applications is found in Descartes. For if on the onc
+hand in his youth, when he thought that the sciences were useful only for
+the mechanical arts, he was of the opinion that such solid foundations had
+not been used for very lofty purposes, on the other hand he does not seem
+to require any more than Poincaré that scientific theories be true, but only
+that they be convenient. For example, he often compares his theories to the
+astronomers' ideas about the equator and the ecliptic, ideas that, although
+false, became the foundation of astronomy. Indeed, he wants order, the essence of Cartesian science, not to conform slavishly to the nature of things,
+but to apply "even to things that do not follow one another naturally."
+In short, from its very origin modern science has been, albeit in a lessdeveloped form, what it is now. The question we were asking earlier has
+been answered; one must accept science as it is, or give it up. There would
+be nothing to do but let the matter rest here, and there would be no further
+23 See I.cibnitz, Discourse on Metaphysics, in Philosophical Writings, ed. G. H. R.
+Parkinson (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1973), p. 2.4.
+24 See Leibnitz, Correspondence with Arnauld, in ibid., p. 59.
+
+44
+questions to ask, if a somewhat careful reading of Descartes were not
+enough to bring one up against a multitude of passages that are apparently
+hard to reconcile with the outline of Cartesian philosophy sketched above.
+Let us therefore review some of these passages, which we will arrange in as
+much order as possible, saving our comments for later.
+First of all, it is not true that Descartes, while devoting himself to the
+sciences, disdains their applications. Not only were the last years of his life
+completely dedicated to medical science (which he regarded as the only
+suitable means of making the majority of men wiser, as well as healthier),
+but, much more, it was only with a view to their applications that he took
+the trouble to communicate his speculations to the public. For, he says, as
+long as the only satisfactory results he had obtained had to do with the
+speculative sciences or morality, he did not feel obliged to publish them.
+"But," he continues,
+as soon as I had acquired some general notions about physics, and when,
+beginning to test them on various particular problems, I observed how far
+they can lead and how they differ from the principles that have been utilized
+until now, 1 believed that I could not keep them hidden without sinning
+greatly against the law that obliges us to procure, insofar as we can, the
+common good of all men. For these general notions about physics showed me
+that it is possible to arrive at knowledge that is very useful in life, and that in
+place of the speculative philosophy that is taught in the schools, we can find
+a practical philosophy, by means of which, knowing the power and the
+actions of fre, water, air, the stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies that
+surround us as clearly as we know the various trades of our craftsmen, we
+could, in the same way, put these things to all the uses to which they are
+appropriate, and thus render ourselves as it were masters and possessors of
+nature. (6:61) 25
+In these lines —which have just about the same ring as those equally forceful ones later written by Proudhon,26 in which he will go as far as to say
+that it is through applications alone that scientific speculations "deserve
+the noble name of works" —science seems to be regarded not as the means
+of satisfying our curiosity about nature, but as a method for taking possession of it. This does not mean that Cartesian science does not also serve
+a purpose that may be regarded as more exalted, but this purpose would be
+25 See Discourse on Method and the Meditations, p. 78.
+26 Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1 809-65), French philosophical anarchist.
+
+45
+the last one to cross our minds today, for it consists in laying the foundation of morality. Descartes explicitly writes this to Chanut27 on the subject
+of the Principles: "It may be said that these are only unimportant truths
+about some matters of Physics that seem to have nothing in common with
+what a Queen should know. But ... these truths of Physics are part of the
+foundations of the highest and most perfect morality" (5:290-91). And
+Descartes cannot be suspected of understanding this connection in the way
+Comte did later, for there is no trace of sociology in Descartes's work.
+What did Descartes mean by this? It's hard to be sure. But, having
+been thus forewarned, we will be less surprised when we observe that, if
+Descartes, like Poincaré, expects science to conform to the mind rather
+than to things, for Descartes it is not at all a matter of thinking conveniently but of thinking well, that is, by directing one's thought properly. That is
+why, and not because it is not general or fruitful enough, he cannot content
+himself with classical geometry, where he had first hoped to find the means
+to satisfy his desire for knowledge. "But in neither (arithmetic or geometry] did I then happen to come upon writers who fully satisfied me. Indeed,
+Tread in them many things about numbers that I proved by my own calculations to be true; there were even many things about figures that in some
+way they showed right to my eyes, and they drew conclusions from certain
+consequences. But they did not seem to make it sufficiently clear to the
+mind why these things are so, and how they were discovered" (10:375). 28
+And if he tries to rediscover the Greek geometers' method of analysis, he
+makes it clear in his Responses to the Second Set of Objections wherein lies
+the advantage of such analysis. "Analysis shows the real way a thing was
+methodically discovered, and shows how effects depend on causes; so that,
+if the reader is willing to follow it, and to cast his eyes carefully over everything contained in it, he will understand the thing demonstrated as perfectly, and will make it as much his own, as if he himself had discovered it"
+(9:121). 29 This is the opposite of the way science is taught: "Synthesis, on
+the contrary, works in a completely different way, as it were by investigating causes through their effects (although the proof that it contains is often
+also a proof of effects through causes). Indeed, synthesis clearly demon-
+27 Hector-Pierre Chanut (1601-62), French diplomat and ambassador to Sweden, and
+a great friend of Descartes. While at the Swedish court he spoke of Descarres's philosophy to
+Queen Christina and subsequently transmitted her invitation to Descarres to visir Stockholm
+and explain his Meditations and Principles to her.
+28 See Philosophical Fssays. p. 159.
+29 See Philosophical Workso/ Descartes, 1:48.
+
+46
+strates what is contained in its conclusions, and makes use of a long series
+of definitions, questions, axioms, theorems, and problems, so that if any
+conclusions are denied, it shows how they are contained in what has gone
+before, and it extracts the consent of the reader, however obstinate and
+opinionated he may be. But it does not, as analysis does, give entire satisfaction to the minds of those who want to learn, because it does not teach
+the method by which the thing was discovered" (9:122).30 Thus Descartes
+does not consider results to be of the slightest importance for the person
+who wants to learn. One can solve a problem without that being science:
+"We, who seek a clear and distinct knowledge of things, make all these
+distinctions, but not the practitioners of arithmetic, who are satisfied if
+they find the sought-for sum, without even noticing how it is derived from
+what is given, although it is in that alone that science properly consists"
+(10:458).31 To know that one cannot know is, in fact, science: "He will
+demonstrate that what he seeks exceeds the comprehension of the human
+mind, and therefore he will not on that account judge himself to be more
+ignorant, because this is no less knowledge than the knowledge of anything else" (10:400).32 Science is nothing but order, and Cartesian
+method—the Rules repeats it constantly—concerns nothing but order.
+There are problems only because often we are given the most compound
+elements of a series, while the simplest remain unknown; the mind must
+then proceed in its own way by going over these elements, known or unknown, according to their order in the series. "Thus, when we want to
+solve some problem, we must first consider it as already solved, and give
+names to all the lines, the unknown ones as well as the others, that seem
+necessary to construct it. Then, without considering that there is any difference between the known lines and the unknown ones, we must go
+through the problem in the order that shows most naturally how the lines
+mutually depend on one another" (6:372).33 Thus interpreted, mathematics becomes truly interesting, whereas, in Descartes's eyes, if one kept
+to the classical method of explanation it held no interest whatever. And he
+was not surprised, he says in the Rules, if indeed clever people scorned
+mathematics as childish and useless, or as too complicated. "For, in truth,
+30 See ibid., 1:49.
+31 See Philosophical Essays, p. 227.
+32 See ibid., p. 179.
+33 See Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, rrans. Paul J.
+Olscamp (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), p. 179.
+
+47
+nothing is more useless than to be so occupied with empty numbers and
+imaginary figures that we seem to be willing to find pleasure in knowledge
+of such trifles...
+" (10:375).34 Thus this new mathematics is worth the
+trouble it takes to pursue it, not because it provides us with knowledge
+about numbers or imaginary figures that Descartes calls trifling and is, he
+says, only the pastime of practitioners of arithmetic or idle geometers, but
+because it is as it were the outer covering of real science, which alone is
+worth pursuing. This idea also stands out in the Rules:
+Nevertheless, whoever will have considered my thought carefully will easily
+understand that I am not thinking here of ordinary Mathematics, but am
+expounding another science, of which (these illustrations] are the outer covering rather than the parts. This science ought to contain the first rudiments of
+human reason and have only to be developed to bring forth truths from any
+subject whatever. And to speak freely, I am convinced that it is preferable to
+all other knowledge handed down to us in the human tradition, since it is the
+source of that knowledge. (IO: 374) 35
+Since real science consists only in directing one's reason well, there is no
+inequality either among the sciences or among minds. One science or part
+of a science cannot be more difficult than any other. "Indeed, it must be
+noted that those who truly know recognize the truth with equal ease
+whether they have derived it from a simple matter or from an obscure one;
+for they grasp each truth by a similar, unified, and distinct act, as soon as
+they come to it. The whole difference is in the route taken, which certainly
+is bound to be longer if it leadsto a truth further removed from the first and
+most absolute principles" (10:401).36 Therefore no man must give up
+approaching any part of human knowledge because he thinks it is beyond
+his reach, or because he thinks he could not make serious progress in a
+science unless he specialized in it:
+For, since all the sciences are nothing other than human wisdom, which
+always remains one and the same, however different the objects to which it is
+applied, and is no more changed by these objects than the light of the sun by
+the variety of things it illuminates, it is not necessary for minds to be confined
+by any limits; for the knowledge of one truth does not keep us from the
+34 See Philosophical Essays, p. I59.
+35 See ibid., pp. 158-59.
+36 Seeibid., p. 180.
+
+48
+discovery uf another, as the practice of one skill docs, but rather helps
+us. (1O:360)5
+What is more, where the sciences are concerned one must take into consideration that "they are all so mutually connected that it is by far easier to learn all of them together than one in isolation from the others"
+(10:361).38 Thus any man, however mediocre his intelligence and his
+talents may he, can, if he applies himself, know everything that is within
+man's reach; every man, "as soon as he has distinguished, concerning each
+object, the kinds of knowledge that only stock or embellish the memory
+from thosc that make someone truly said to be more learned, a distinction
+it is easy to make, ... will certainly perceive that his ignorance about
+anything is not due to lack of intelligence or skill, and that there is absolutely nothing that another man can know that he is not capable of
+knowing also, provided only that he apply his mind to it in the appropriate
+way" (10:396).39
+Viewed in this way, mathematics rules Cartesian physics, but not as it
+rules ours; it does not play the role of language, but rather constitutes
+knowledge of the world. To say that Cartesian physics is purely geometrical, although Descartes says that himself, is putting it weakly; the truth is
+that in Descartes, geometry is itself a physics; which is almost word for
+word what he actually writes to Mersenne: "I have decided to give up only
+abstract geometry, that is, the pursuit of questions that are of no use except
+to exercise the mind. I am doing this in order to have more leisure to pursue
+another kind of geometry, which proposes for questions the explanation
+of natural phenomena." Descartes's explanations of reflection and refraction, among others, carry out this plan with an audacity that is unparalleled even today, and that scandalized Fermat. 4º The demonstration in The
+World of the law by which every movement conserves its direction is no
+less astonishing:
+God conserves each thing by one continuous activity, and, consequently, he
+does not conserve it as it may have been some time previously, but precisely as
+it is at thevery instant that he conserves it. Now, of all movements, the straight
+3- See ibid.. p. Iq7.
+38 See ibid.. p. 148.
+39 Sec Philosophical Essays, p. 176.
+to Pierre de Fermat (1601-65), French marhematician. He dispured the law of refraction
+Descartes arrived at in the Optics.
+
+49
+line is the only one that is entirely simple and whose whole nature can be comprehended in an instant. For, to conceive the straight line, it suffices to think
+that a body is in motion in orderto move in a certain direction, which is found
+to be the case in every one of the instants that can he determined during the
+time that it is in motion. Whereas, to conceive circular movement, or any
+other possible movement, it is necessary to consider at least woofits instants,
+or rather two of its parts, and the relation herween rhem. (11:44-45)*
+There is no exemplar, to use a Scholastic term, for such daring idealism.42 Yet a hundred other passages from Descartes would show that no
+one has taken realism so far. Descartes wants to know the world as it is in
+itself, and he writes as much to Morus: "But I hardly need tell you, if it is
+called a perceptible substance, then it is defined by its relation to our
+senses, which explains only a certain property of ir, not its entire essence,
+which, since it could exist even if no men existed, certainly does not depend
+on our senses" (5:268). 43 That, after having said this, Descartes chose to
+define the world by the concept of extension, that is, by an idea, has always
+been a cause for astonishment. But for him this idealism and this realism,
+both pushed to their extreme limits, are not only reconcilable but correlative; though he does not explain this, at least he states it quite explicitly in
+the following passage from the Letter Concerning Gassendi:
+Several excellent minds, they say, think they clearly see that mathematical
+extension, which I posit as the principle of my physics, is nothing other than
+my thought, and that mathematical extension does not have, and cannot
+have, any existence outside of my mind, since it is only an abstraction I make
+from a material body; and hence, that the whole of my physics can be only
+imaginary and make-believe, like all pure mathematics; and that, in the real
+physics of the things that God has created, there must be real matter, solid and
+not imaginary. Here is the major objection, and the summary of the whole
+doctrine of the excellent minds referred to herc. All the things that we can
+understand and conceive arc, by their account, mere chimeras and fictions of
+our mind, which can have no existence at all; from this it follows that there is
+nothing that one must acknowledge as true, except that which one can in no
+41 See Descartes: Selections, p. 328.
+42 An exemplar, in Scholastic philosophy, is the Divine Idea or model according to which
+a thing is created.
+43 See Philosophical Letters, trans. Anthony Kenny (Oxtord: (larendon Prcss. 1970).
+P.237.
+
+50
+way understand, conceive, or imagine; that is, one must entirely close the door
+to reason, and be satisfied with being a monkey or a parrot, and no longer
+a man, in order to deserve to be pur on a level with these excellent minds. For,
+if the things that one can conceive must be deemed false for the sole reason
+that one can conceive them, what remains except that one must accept as truc
+only those things that one does not conceive, and must compose one's
+doctrine of them, imitating others without knowing why one imitates them,
+as monkeys do, and uttering only statements whose meaning one does not
+understand, as parrots do? (9:212)
+We meet with this opposition everywhere. If this geometry, so ethereal
+that it seems to disdain figures, proves to be substantial enough to constitute a physics, it is because it is never isolated from the imagination. "The
+study of mathematics," writes Descartes to Princess Elizabeth, "chiefly
+exercises the imagination" (3:692). Similarly, he writes in a passage from
+the Rules: "Henceforth we will do nothing without the aid of the imagination" (IO:443).44 It is in the imagination, he says again in the Rules (10:
+416)45 that the idea of everything that can be related to the body must be
+found. Since the mind engaged in geometry makes use of the imagination,
+it does not handle empry ideas. It grasps something. Consequently, in the
+name of the imagination Descartes rejects such propositions as: extension,
+or a figure, is not a body; a number is not the thing numbered; the surface is
+the boundary of a solid, the line the boundary of a surface, the point the
+limit of a line; unity is not a quantity, etc. All these propositions, he says,
+have absolutely nothing to do with the imagination, even if they should be
+true (10:445).46 When it is a question of number, he wants us to imagine
+an object that can be measured by means of several units; he wants us to
+imagine that the point that the geometers use to form a line is only something possessing extension, exclusive of every other determining factor.
+For Descartes is not satisfied with forcefully admonishing those learned
+men who employ distinctions so subtle that they dissipate the light of nature and find something obscure even in things that peasants know; he is
+not satisfied to warn them that as far as he is concerned he does not recognize extension separated from an extended substance, or any philosophic
+entities of this sort, "which really do not fall within the scope of the
+44 See Philosophical Essays, p. 215.
+45 Sce ibid., p. 192.
+46 See ihid., p. 216.
+
+51
+imagination" (1O:442).47 He finds the same idea even in classical geometry, which is thus convicted of contradictions. "What geometer does not
+obscure the clariry of his subject with contradictory principles, as long as
+he thinks that lines have no width and surfaces no depth, and then forms
+some of these from the others, without noticing that the line, from whose
+flowing movement he conceives that a surface is generated, is a real body;
+and that, moreover, the line that lacks width is nothing but a mode of
+a body" (1O:446).48
+Thus Cartesian science is far more packed with matter than is ordinarily
+thought. It does not disdain geometrical figures, since Descartes explicitly
+says that "the ideas of all things can be fashioned" from them alone
+(10:450).49 It is so bound to the imagination, so joined to the human body,
+so close to the most common labors, that one may be initiated into it by
+studying the easiest and simplest crafts; especially those that are the most
+subject to order, like that of weavers, embroiderers, or lacemakers. In
+regard to the part of Cartesian science that is properly called physical, we
+know quite well (through the countless examples found in The World, the
+Principles, and the Meteors) that it avails itself of the most familiar comparisons, drawn sometimes from aspects of nature closest to us, such
+as eddies in rivers, but especially from trades and tools, the slingshot,
+the pressing of grapes. We might think that these comparisons are only
+methods of popularization; on the contrary, they are the very substance of
+Cartesian physics, as Descartes makes a point of explaining to Morin: 50
+"And in order to explain their rotation I was obliged to use these perceptible balls, rather than some imperceptible bits of subtle matter, so that
+I could submit my reasoning to the examination of the senses, as I always
+try to do" (2:366). And, more significant still:
+It is true that the comparisons customarily used in the School, whereby intellectual things are explained by corporeal things, substances by accidents, or at
+any rate one quality by a quality of another kind, reach very little; but in the
+comparisons that I use I compare only movements to other movements, or
+figures to other figures, etc. In other words, I compare only things rhat are not
+perceptible to our senses because of their small size to other things that are
+47 See ibid., p. 214.
+48 See ibid., pp. 217-18.
+49 See ibid., p. 220
+50 Jean-Baptiste Murin (1583-1656), French mathematician and astronomer.
+
+52
+perceptible and that in other respects do not differ from them more than
+a large circle differs from a small circle. And I maintain that, used in this way,
+comparisons are the most appropriate means of setting forth the truth about
+physical questions that the human mind can possess; so much so that, when
+something is asserted about nature that cannot be explained by any such
+comparison, I think I know demonstratively that it is false. (2:367-68)
+The same opposition is found where simple ideas are concerned. The
+doctrine of simple ideas is possibly connected to the foregoing ideas,
+although Leibnitz developed it quite differently. The fact remains that in
+Descartes simple ideas are far from constituting the world as they do
+in Leibnitz. One cannot explain the simple ideas, which are understood
+from the start and in themselves, without obscuring them, for if one wants
+to explain them, either one explains something else under their name, or
+the explanation makes no sense. True, Descartes says all that. He even
+adds that these simple essences "never contain anything false" (10:420).51
+But far from their making up the fabric of the world, they do not even
+belong to the world per se; they exist in relation to our minds. Thus often
+"some things, from a certain point of view, are more absolute than others;
+but considered in another way, they are more relative"; and Descartes
+adds, "we are examining here the series of things to be known, and not the
+nature of each one of them" (10:382-83).52 Therefore the totality of the
+clear ideas is very far from constituting divine understanding. On the
+contrary, according to a doctrine that has always seemed obscure, but to
+which Descartes attached great importance, the eternal verities derive their
+being solely from the decree of God, just as the essences in Plato are created
+and nourished by the Sun of the Good. For, writes Descartes to Mersenne,
+"In God will and knowledge are one" (I: 149). And in a letter written some
+days earlier: "Indeed, to say that these Verities are independent of God is
+the same as to speak of him as a Jupiter or a Saturn and make him subject
+to the Styx and the Fates. Do not fear, I beg you, to affirm and publish
+everywhere that it is God who has established these laws in nature, just as
+a king establishes laws in his kingdom." Far from reality being idealized to
+the point that it is made up only of ideas, it is ideas that here seem to be
+restored to reality. This is made all the more clear as Descartes continues:
+"They are all innate in our minds, just as a king would imprint his laws in
+șr See Philosophical Essays, p. r95.
+52 See ibid., p. 165.
+
+53
+the hearts of all his subjects, ifhe actually had the power to do so" (I: 145).
+Thus, that two quantities equal to a third are equal to each other would not
+be a law of the mind but a law of the world. Here again it appears that
+geometry is a physics; and, related to that idea, although it is difficult to
+understand how, it appears that there is no infinite understanding, since
+God is only will, and understanding is thus limited by its very nature.
+In short, not only does Descartes regard every mind, as soon as it makes
+a serious effort to think properly, as equal to the greatest genius, but he
+finds the human mind even in the most ordinary thinking. There is, in his
+eyes, a common wisdom—a wisdom that is to the mind what the eyes are
+to the body—much closer to authentic philosophy than is the kind of
+thinking that study produces, "since we see very often that those who have
+never worked hard at the study of letters judge things close at hand much
+more soundly and clearly than those who have been in constant attendance
+at the schools" (10:371).53 Thus Descartes's great precept for attaining
+wisdom is not to study excessively. Perception itself, which has been considered by so many philosophers, beginning with Spinoza, as the lowest
+form of knowledge, is of the same nature as science, as we see in the famous
+passage about the piece of wax. "What is this piece of wax that cannot be
+understood except by the understanding or the mind? It is certainly the
+same that I sec, touch, imagine.... Although it might have seemed so
+earlier, my perception is not, and never has been, an act of vision, or touch,
+or imagination, but is solely an inspection of the mind.... and thus I
+understand, selely by the power of judgment that resides in my mind, what
+I believed I saw with my eyes" (9:24-25).54 Descartes explains this in the
+Optics by the comparison with the blind man who directly perceives the
+objects at the end of his stick, not the sensations that the pressure of the
+stick makes on his hand. This leads Descartes to construct a theory of
+sensations as signs, using the example of drawings in which we see not
+marks on paper but men and towns (6:1 13). And it is noteworthy that he
+uses almost the same terms he will later use, in the Responses to the Fifth
+Set of Objections, to explain that the lines drawn on the paper, far from
+giving us the idea of the triangle, are only signs of the real triangle (7:382).
+And so Descartes finds in perception a "natural geometry" and "an operation of thought that, although it is only a simple act of imagination,
+nevertheless contains a form of reasoning similar in that used by sur-
+53 See ibid., p. 157.
+54 See Discourse on Method and the Meditations, pp. 109-10.
+
+54
+veyors when, by standing in two different spots, they measure inaccessible
+places" (6:138).
+Thus, although from a distance Descartes seemed to offer a coherent
+system befitting the founder of modern science, on looking into it more
+closely we no longer find anything but contradictions. And, what is more
+serious, these contradictions all seem to proceed from one initial contradiction. For it is not apparent what interest science could have for this
+founder of modern science, this man who had taken for his motto the
+maxim from the temple at Delphi rhus put into verse by Seneca:
+Illi mors gravis incubat
+Qui notus nimis omnibus
+Ignotus moritur sibi.55
+How could the man who had thus adopted the Socratic motto "know
+thyself" devote his life to the kind of research into physics that Socrates
+scoffed at? The obscurity is only deepened by the passage in which
+Descartes asserts that he mainly used his God-given reason to know God
+and know himself, adding that he "would not have been able to discover
+the foundations of his Physics if he had not sought them in this way"
+(I: 144). Yet is it any wonder that we find in Descartes nothing but obscurities, difficulties, and contradictions? He himself warned his readers that
+they would find nothing else if they tried only to learn his view on such and
+such a subject, looking at it from the outside and in a piecemeal fashion.
+Cartesian thought is not something that one can comment on from the
+outside; every commentator must become, at least for a time, a Cartesian.
+But how does one become a Cartesian? To be a Cartesian is to doubt everything, and then to examine everything in order, without believing in anything except one's own thought insofar as it is clear and distinct, and
+without trusting the authority of anyone, even Descartes, in the least.
+Let us therefore have no hesitation about imitating the Cartesian stratagem in commenting on Descartes. Just as Descartes, in order to form
+accurate ideas about the world in which we live, imagined another world
+that would begin with a sort of chaos and in which everything would be
+ruled by figure and movement, so let us imagine another Descartes, a
+Descartes brought back to life. This new Descartes would have at first
+neither genius, nor wowledge of mathematics and physics, nor force of
+55 Death lies heavily on that man who, too well known by everyone, dies unknown to
+himself.
+
+55
+style; he would have in common with him only the fact of being a human
+being and of having resolved to believe only in himself. According to
+Cartesian doctrine, that is enough. If Descartes was not mistaken, such
+contemplation of one's own thought, starting from absolute doubt, ought,
+if it is freely conducted, to basically coincide with Cartesian doctrine,
+despite all differences and even all apparent contradictions. So let us listen
+to this fictitious thinker.
+Part Two
+We are living beings; our thinking is accompanied by pleasure or pain.
+I am in the world; that is, I feel that I am subject to some external thing that
+I feel is more or less subject to me in return. Depending on whether I feel
+this external thing submitting to me, or myself being subject to it, I feel
+pleasure or pain. All the things that I call objects—the sky, the clouds, the
+wind, stones, the sun—are primarily sources of pleasure insofar as they
+make my own existence manifest to me; they are sources of pain insofar as
+my existence finds its limit in them. Thus pleasure and pain are mixed with
+one another, as the poers have said; my pleasure cannot be so great that it
+may not be spoiled by the desire for an even greater pleasure:
+medio de fonte leporum
+Surgit amari aliquid quod in ipsis floribus angar. '
+Conversely, pain is never tasted without some pleasurable sensation; for
+to breathe, run, see, hear, even to hurt myself is more than anything else to
+taste the pleasure that is, as it were, the tang of my very existence. For me
+the presence of the world is above all this mixed feeling. What the swimmer calls water is for him above all a feeling made up of the pleasure that
+comes from swimming and the pain induced by fatigue. Depending on
+whether, as he swims, he wants to go on swimming or to rest, the water
+Will be more pleasurable or more painful, more friendly or more unfriendly, but, because the feeling is mixed, always treacherous. And, as in a mixture of indistinct noises I suddenly hear a few words pronounced by a
+1 "Amid the fountain of delights something birter springs up that torments us even among
+the flowers" (Lucretius De Rerum Naturae 4. 1133-34).
+
+56
+familiar voice, or on awakening perceive strange animal or human shapes
+in a rumpled piece of clothing, so in this indeterminate feeling does the
+swimmer perceive the water under his body and in front of his arms, or the
+runner perceive the ground under his feet, the air in front of his knees, on
+his face, and in his lungs. In my dreams, when I move toward joy or toward
+sadness, I summon up landscapes that are either luminous or dim; when
+I walk or run, my strength manifests itself to me in the form of clean and
+bracing air and springy ground, or my weariness makes itself known to me
+in the form of air that is oppressive and ground that is slippery. This feeling
+with its shadings of pleasure and pain, which is the only thing I can experience, is thus the fabric of the world. It is all that I can say about the world
+If the swimmer thinks that the ambiguous feeling that makes the water
+present to him is the effect, or mark, or image of a coolness, a transparency, a resistance that is not constituted by that very feeling, he is saying more than he knows. So I can say nothing about the world. I cannot
+say, "This thorn hurts my finger," or even, "I have hurt my finger," or
+even, "I feel pain." As soon as I give a name to what I feel, I am saying, as
+Protagoras observed, more than I can know.
+These things that are so intimately present to me are so only through the
+presence of this feeling that is inseparable from my very existence, which is
+revealed to me solely through them. But I would betoo hasty if concluded
+that outside of this feeling I can affrm nothing; for it seems that abstract
+truths, which are independent of it, are not undermined by my uncertainty
+about things. Arithmetical propositions are devoid of pleasure and pain;
+they are easily forgotten; but, if only I examine them, I find the prohibitions they contain irresistible. My thirst, which I feel just now through the
+medium of the oranges in front of me, cannot, even if I am dreaming, manifest itself in two pairs of oranges that add up to five oranges. My existence
+manifests itself to me through the medium of appearances, but it can appear to me only in certain ways; there are ways of appearing that do not
+define anything that can appear to me. Why will I not go out of my way if
+someone wants to show me a square that is twice the size of another square
+in regard to both the surface and the side? Because if, as I draw, I double
+the side of a square, I cannot prevent a quadruple square from appearing to
+me. A square that is twice the size of another in regard to both the surface
+and the side would be a square that I could neither reproduce, sketch, nor
+describe. It would not be a square with an unintelligible form, it would not
+even be a form.
+
+57
+The world is not transparent to me. Appearances are impenetrable
+insofar as they make present to me the feeling that creates out of them the
+density, the bittersweet savor of my own existence. For this savor is mine,
+but it is not something I have created. If nothing in me were alien to me, my
+thinking would be uncontaminated by pleasure and pain. But, insofar as
+this impenetrable thing is clear and defined for me, insofar as it manifests
+itself to me, it takes its form from me. Say that, half dreaming, I feel myself
+bathing in water "softer than sleep," as the poet says, and then, awakening, I feel that I am in my bed; the water and the bed are only particular
+forms of the indeterminate softness that makes them present to me. Why is
+it that I can grasp that two pairs of oranges make four oranges, and not
+that two pairs of oranges make five oranges? That's the way I am. I see no
+way of learning why I am like this, since I recognize that my thinking cannot give me information about anything except myself. No improvement
+in my thinking can teach me. (Not that improvement is forbidden to me.)
+Certain properties of a figure or of a combination of quantities cannot
+become evident to me without forms or additional quantities; the sum of
+the three angles of a triangle can be present in my mind solely by means of
+parallel lines and their accompanying properties, like the genie that appeared to Aladdin only by means of the marvelous lamp. But on the other
+hand, to make me see that a space cannot be enclosed by less than three
+straight lines, nothing is needed but the corresponding forms. Why? It is
+chance. What I call the world of ideas is no less chaos than the world of
+sensations. Ideas impose their ways of being on me, take hold of me, escape
+me. If, moreover, instead of utilizing forms so as to elicit their properties,
+1 approach them in another way, e.g., by measuring them, nothing assures
+me that I will find the same properties; thus the renowned geometer Gauss?
+did not think it was pointless to measure the sum of the three angles of
+a triangle. If geometry, measurement, and action are in agreement, it is by
+chance. Everything is given over to Descartes's "evil genius," which is
+nothing but chance. Chance, not necessity. In other words, nothing that
+transpires in my consciousness has any reality other than the consciousness that I have of it; the only knowledge I can have is to be conscious of
+what I am conscious of. To know a dream is to dream it; to know a pain is
+to suffer it; to know a pleasure is to enjoy it. Everything is on the same
+level. It is useless for me to go from what is called the sensible plane to what
+2 Karl Friedrich Gauss (1777-1855), German mathematician, one of the greatest mathematical geniuses of all time.
+
+58
+is called the intelligible plane; I know a property of a triangle when that
+property leaps to my eyes—or, more exactly, to my imagination-after
+I have made the appropriate constructions. If mathematical ideas give me
+a feeling of clarity and obviousness that sensations do not provide, it does
+not follow that this feeling exists independently of my consciousness of it.
+No thought, no action has more value for me than any other. Nothing
+makes any difference as long as I am bound by chance. Not that perhaps
+a scale of values, about which I know nothing, might not be applied to my
+thoughts; but even that is chance. Chance is clothed, disguised, in blue, in
+gray, in light, in hardness and softness, cold and heat, in the straight line
+and in the curve, in triangles, in circles, in numbers; chance is anything and
+everything. I am never conscious of anything except the trappings of
+chance; and this very thought, insofar as I am conscious of it, is chance.
+There is nothing else.
+Is there nothing else? No, if nothing reveals itself to me as existing except insofar as I am conscious of it. Insofar as I am conscious of myself,
+I am anything whatever; what my consciousness reveals to me is not me
+but my consciousness of myself, just as it does not reveal things to me, but
+the consciousness that I have of things. I never know what it is that I am
+conscious of; I know only that I am conscious of it. But here is something
+that I do know: I am conscious; I think. And how do I know this? It is not
+an idea, a feeling among the ideas and feelings that occur in my mind. I feel
+that the sky is blue, that I am sad, that I am enjoying myself, that I move;
+I experience the feeling, but I know nothing about it. I think what I think;
+there is nothing else to know.
+Nothing? Yes, there is something. What, then? Everything that I feel
+is illusion, for everything that presents itself to me without my receiving
+from it contact with real existence is trifling with me. And not only pleasure, pain, sensation, but consequently this being that I call me as well,
+which enjoys itself, suffers, and feels. All that is illusion. What does this
+mean? That all these things seem illusory? No; on the contrary, it means
+that these things create illusion, and consequently seem certain. I can
+hardly admit that this table, this paper, this pen, this feeling of well-being,
+and I myself are only things that I think—things that I think and that make
+a show of existing. I think them; they need me in order to be thoughts. But
+how? For I do not think what I want. And the things that I think delude me
+by their own power. So what do they borrow from me? Belief. It is I who
+think these things that produce illusion, and whether I think of them as cer-
+
+59
+tainties or as illusions, the spell that they cast over me remains intact. The
+power that I exercise over my own belief is not an illusion; it is through this
+power that I know that I think. Might what I take for my thought not be
+the thought of an Evil Genius? That could be so in regard to the things that
+I think, but not for the fact that I think them. And through this power of
+thinking —which so far is revealed to me only by the power of doubting-l
+know that I am. I have power, therefore I am (Je puis, donc je suis]. And in
+this flash of thought several things whose nature I did not previously know
+are revealed to me: doubt, thought, power, existence, and knowledge itself. Nevertheless, that is not a reasoned argument; I can resist this knowledge. Or rather, I can disregard it; I cannot reject it. For as soon as I reject
+any thought as illusory, in so doing I am thinking something that I do not
+derive from the thing that presents itself to my thought; for the only thing
+I can derive from my illusory thoughts is the illusion —that is, the belief—
+that they are true. To the extent that I receive an idea, I do not know if
+I accept it or if it merely presents itself; as soon as I reject an idea, even if it
+should be the idea that I am, at once l am. Myownexistence as I feel it is an
+illusion; but my existence as I know it is not a feeling but my creation. To
+exist, to think, to know are only aspects of a single reality: to be able to do
+something. I know what I do, and what I do is think and exist; for from the
+moment that I do something, I cause myself to exist. I am a thing that
+thinks. Will it be said that, without knowing it, I exist and perhaps do
+something else, apart from thinking? What does that mean? What would
+a power that I do not exercise consist of? Certainly an unknown god could
+make use of me without my knowing it with the intention of producing
+results about which I know nothing; but I do not produce those results.
+And as for knowing my own being, what I am is defined by what I can do.
+So there is one thing I can know: myself. And I cannot know anything else.
+To know is to know what I can do; and I know to the degree that I substitute "to act" and "to be acted upon" for "to enjoy," "to suffer," "to feel,"
+and "to imagine." In this way I transform illusion into certainty and
+chance into necessity.
+But this opposition between "to act" and "to be acted upon" is premature; for I know only one power, that of doubting—a power whose exercise nothing can obstruct. It is not that most (or, more accurately, all) of
+the objects and ideas I have decided to doubt have not seemed to grant me
+some power over them. At this very moment, it is I who move my pen over
+the paper. I make everything that I see disappear, reappear, or move by
+
+60
+closing or reopening my eyes or turning my head. I can move most of the
+objects I touch from one place to another. I can walk, jump, run. But do
+I know that these eyes, this body, these objects exist? A power exercised
+over illusions can only be illusory. The belief these illusions inspire in me is
+something real, and therefore the power I exert over my belief is real; once
+again, I exist only through doubt. If later I come to be aware of having
+another power, it will certainly belong to me; but only the power of doubting defines me, for it alone is immediately known. However, don't I have
+the same power over some of the things I think as I have over my belief?
+Can't I create or destroy at least some of my own thoughts? Often I make
+up what I am thinking about, and I call this daydreaming; it would seem
+then that I have complete power over myself, that I play the role of Evil
+Genius in regard to myself. But this is not so. First of all, I never deceive
+myself. Even though I would like to, I can never arouse in myself the same
+belief in the existence of things in my daydreams as that inspired in me by
+what I call real things. Thus I recognize that my power over my belief is
+only a negative one; I can doubt, but I cannot believe. Then who produces
+these daydreams? Nothing assures me that it is I. If I have the feeling that
+I produce them, it is because even when they are painful they do not present themselves to me except to the extent that I accept them; but I can
+always say, of the fantastic series they form, what the events of his life inspired Figaro to say: "Why these things and not others?"3 I can reject
+them, but if I do create them, it is by a power (quite different from the
+power of doubting) that does not give me certain proof that it exists.
+Perhaps the things that I dream are as external to me as the things that I
+think I hear, see, or touch. Perhaps also what in the highest sense of the
+word I call "things" come from me as much as daydreams. Although it
+may be strange to say so, this supposition, if it were true, would make the
+power I think I have over things an illusory power; unexpected sensations
+or intentional ones, falling or running, all would be mine in the same way.
+It is true that events take me by surprise, even when they are desired; in
+what I perceive, even when it is pleasant, there is always something I have
+not desired, something that takes hold of me and imposes itself on me like
+an alien thing. This is what makes me almost invincibly convinced that, if
+my daydreams exist only for me, on the other hand this paper, this table,
+3 Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais, The Marriage of Figaro, Act s: "Oh! Fantastic series of events! Why should they happen to me? Why these things and not orhers?"
+
+61
+the heavens, the earth, Paris, all exist independently of me. But this conviction is not a proof. I have never believed that my anger exists independently of me, and yet don't I get angry suddenly, often even when I want to
+remain calm? Do I have any reason to think that the blue of the sky, the
+white or gray clouds, the touch of the paper on my hand, or the warmth of
+the sun are more distinct from me than my anger, my worry, or my joy?
+And just as a feeling of anger is followed by a calm that I can think I have
+achieved, so light and colors are followed by a sensation of darkness that I
+think I produce, at the same time that my eyelids make contact, when
+I close my eyes. But it is easy to see that my irritation comesfrom me in the
+same way as the subsequent cooling of my anger, my fear in the same way
+as my boldness, my sadness in the same way as my joy. Similarly the darkness that I thought I produced and the feeling of my eyelids making contact
+are related to me in the same way that earlier the light and my open eyes
+were. Certainly, if the light tires me, darkness comes at once when I want
+it; and likewise legs, even aching ones, move immediately at the least desire
+to run. But the running that I want is one thing, the running that I feel is
+another. Nor did I want the darkness that accompanies the closing of my
+eyesto be strewn with spots. In a word, to want to feel is one thing, to feel is
+another. On the other hand, to want to refrain from making reckless
+judgments about all these things is to refrain from making reckless judgments. As long as it is a matter only of my thinking, and not of the things
+I think, the will is effective in itself, and its effect is simply what has been
+willed. Here willing and acting are one. And so, if joy and sadness, darkness and light belong to me in the same way, my thinking of these things
+belongs to me much more; it is me. What causes me to exist is not that
+I move but that I think of moving. What I call my power to move is only
+a relation between my desires and the sensations that seem after a fashion
+to be the response to my desires; thus my desire for a piece of fruit may
+have as its response the sensation of a piece of fruit in my mouth, or only
+the sensation of my outstretched arm. But I exercise no power in desiring,
+even if the response to my every desire were to be pleasure. And so the
+desire for darkness that makes me close my eyes in the presence of a blinding light is no more me than is the sensation of pain in my eyes. Neither
+alien to me nor an essential part of my being, desires, passions, sensations,
+and daydreams cannot be used as proof of any existence at all, not even —
+except insofar as I think them—of my own.
+I can say the same about arithmetic, reasoning, or ideas. Thoughts such
+
+62
+as these present themselves to me neither as daydreams, desires, nor perceived things; I find them only if I search for them, and then, since I have no
+power to change them, they are like an incorruptible treasure hidden in
+me. It is equally true that I learn nothing from thoughts of this sort except
+that I, who think them, exist. Thus what is true of the knowledge that I
+exist is true of all knowledge. I must give up the idea of learning by examining my thoughts. The things that I think cannot prove anything to me.
+I who think—I am the only proof. I am the only proof of my own existence,
+but also, if I can ever know anything other than myself, the only proof of
+the existence of that other thing. The only proof necessary. It was enough
+for me to set aside the supposition that anything exists to know at once
+that I exist; now I set aside the supposition that other things exist. I suppose that I alone exist. But who am I? A thing that exercises this power that
+I call thinking. Except through the free—in other words, real—exercise of
+this power, the being that I call me is nothing. So, in order to know myself,
+I must know the extent of this power. But what does that mean? This
+power no more allows of degrees than existence itself, which I have recognized is identical to it. I have power (je puis], as I exist, absolutely. A power
+such as I would attribute to a king, which is a relation between one thing
+and another (for example, between the king's words and the actions of his
+subjects) can be measured. But my power is not this shadow of power; it
+resides entirely in me, since it is that property of myself, which is me,
+whereby, for me, to decide and to act are the same thing.
+All real power is infinite. If nothing but me exists, nothing exists except
+this absolute power. I depend on nothing but my will, I do not exist except
+insofar as I create myself, 1 am God. I am God, so, in regard to the things
+I make judgments about, I must exercise positively the same sovereign
+power that I exercised over myself negatively when I forbade myself to
+judge; that is, dreams, desires, emotions, sensations, arguments, ideas, or
+calculations must be only acts of my will. Have I ever attributed a greater
+power to God? But it's not so. I am not God. Although this power that
+I possess is by nature infinite, it has some limitations that I must recognize.
+My sovereignty over myself, which is absolute as long as I want only to
+suspend my thought, disappears as soon as it is a matter of giving myself
+something to think about. Freedom is the only power that 1 possess absolutely. Therefore, something other than myself exists. Since no power is
+limited by itself, it is enough for me to know that my power is not absolute
+to know that my existence is not the only existence. What is this other
+
+• Science and Perception in Descarles
+63
+existence? It is defined by this imprint stamped on me, which deprives me
+of sovereignty although it leaves me freedom. But this freedom must be
+won. It would he absurd to imagine, on the one hand, my freedom as being
+inviolate, and on the other hand the things that I think as being similar (as
+a famous saying has it) to silent tableaus; for as soon as my thoughts are
+something other than acts of my will, I am bound by them. My belief is
+indeed bound, as the difficulty of doubting makes me only too aware, but
+more simply I—that is, my will—am bound by the things that I think.
+Everything that appears in one way or another to my imagination—
+dreams, objects, or forms—is made present to me, as I have acknowledged, by a feeling in which pleasure and pain are mixed, that is, by the fact
+that I accept and reject this feeling at the same time. It is through this combined repulsion and acceptance, which seem to me to constitute the imagination, that my thoughts bind me; I am free only to the extent that I can
+disengage myself. To put it another way, however much the other existence has power over me through the intermediary of my thoughts, so
+much, through the same intermediary, do I have power over it. Consequently, although I cannot create a single one of my thoughts, all of
+them-from dreams, desires, and passions to reasoned arguments—are,
+to the extent that they are subject to me, signs of myself; to the extent that
+they are not subject to me, signs of the other existence. To know is to read
+this double meaning in any thought; it is to make the obstacle appear in
+a thought, while recognizing in that thought my own power. Not a phantom of power like the supernatural power that I sometimes believe I possess in my dreams, but the same power that causes me to exist, which I
+know is mine since I know that as soon as I think, I exist. Moreover I can
+say that all the thoughts that I call "clear" and "distinct" are true; that is,
+all the thoughts whose model is "I think, therefore I am." To the extent
+that I affirm thoughts of this kind, I am infallible; God himself guarantees
+me this infallibility. All my other thoughts were nothing but shadows; only
+the idea of God was able to prove an existence. So only the idea of God was
+the idea of a true, and consequently real, power; true power could not be
+imaginary. If the All Powerful could be a fiction of my mind, I myself
+could be a fiction, for I exist only to the degree that I participate in the
+All Powerful. Thus God himself guarantees me that, as soon as I think
+properly, I think the truth. I have no ground for supposing that this
+guarantee is false, that this other existence to which I believe I am subject is
+only an illusion imposed by God. True, if I come up against the limit of my
+
+64
+power, all I will know, strictly speaking, is how God prevents me from
+being God; but that is all there is to know, since that knowledge is know!-
+edge of the world.
+And now I am able to know, and by the very means I had dimly foreseen,
+that is, by reading in the feeling of my own existence, in its coloring of pleasure and pain, its clothing of appearances and illusions, only the obstacle
+submitted to and overcome. To know in this way is to know myself, to
+know under what condition I am master of myself; this is the only knowledge that matters to me, and, furthermore, it is the only knowledge there is.
+It is my responsibility to acquire this knowledge, for I cannot receive it
+except from myself, and I am capable of giving it to myself. The authority
+of others can persuade me, the reasons of others convince me, the example
+of others guide me; but I can learn only from myself. Even God teaches me
+nothing; he only gives me a guarantee. So I have no one at all to help me,
+and have as working materials only some confused daydreams, some very
+clear ideas, some sensations as obscure as they are imperious—and none of
+these things, as I have experienced only too acutely, constitutes knowledge. I will no longer make the mistake of wanting to consider these things
+in themselves, for I never believed 1 grasped them without immediately
+realizing that I had hold of nothing. I now want only to try to find out what
+power I have over myself. Perhaps this is a never-ending undertaking,
+especially as it does not consist in my becoming aware little by little of
+a power that I might be exercising unbeknownst to myself —an idea that,
+only a short time ago, seemed plausible to me, but now seems just as
+absurd as the idea of any uncertainty about my own existence. I now know
+that to learn to know my own power is simply to learn to exercise it. Thus
+I recognize that becoming learned and attaining self-mastery are the same
+thing, although these two undertakings used to seem entirely distinct to
+me, and the first, moreover, seemed very much less important than the
+second. So it is possible that this twofold process of learning may never
+come to an end, that there will always be some power for me to acquire;
+perhaps too I will immediately come up against the limit of my power. But
+from now on I know that knowing depends only on myself; I will come to
+know nothing by chance.
+But then what must I do to learn more than I know at present? For, upto
+now, lexpected to learn only through studying what others had discovered
+before me; I regarded myself as an empty book in which nothing but a few
+axioms were written, but a book in which a page was filled by each day
+
+• Science and Perceplion in Descartes
+65
+spent in study. It did not occur to me that one could receive fresh knowledge except from the outside, either by being taught it or by coming upon it
+by chance. Thus, although I did not give up hope of perhaps one day being
+able to make some new contribution to the wealth of acquired knowledge,
+I did not plan in advance how I would go about it; I simply intended to
+bring together, compare, and combine in every way I could think of the
+various kinds of knowledge acquired through study, and then, in the mass
+of probabilities, problems, and uncertainties generated by mixing them all
+together, I expected to have enough good luck to pick up some true ideas.
+How, indeed, could one embark on the search for truths as yet unsuspected
+except in a random fashion?
+I knew, however, of one sure method of using the knowledge I possessed
+to prove the legitimacy of an assertion: it is what is called logic. But I observed that this method was only a simple form of analysis, absolutely sure
+because it was absolutely fruitless; I could use it to extract from the totality
+of my knowledge the knowledge that I might need, but it was powerless to
+make me acquire anything new. I was aware of only two ways of coming to
+know something new: the first is merely the chance encounters that are
+part of experience. Most of the scientific knowledge that study had
+brought me consisted of the answers that a few stubborn men who had
+asked all sorts of questions about the stars, the seas, the movements of
+bodies, light, heat, and all the transformations of inert or living bodies had
+had the good luck to obtain. I found the other means of learning in the
+almost miraculous power of geometers; they draw a triangle, recall some
+of its properties, draw as if at random or by inspiration other lines whose
+properties they also state, and that is enough for a hitherto unknown
+property of the triangle to be suddenly called forth, as if by magic. But,
+though the proofs forced me to accept this new property, strictly speaking
+I understood nothing about it. If perhaps I thought I might one day be able
+to add something to the totality of mathematical knowledge, I did not expect to invent proofs instead of being subject to them. I merely supposed
+that when I combined figures, properties, and formulas—with a little help
+from a certain instinctive skill—a new property would sometimes miraculously appear by itself, chance playing the role of an instruction manual for
+me. If I had been convinced then that neither study, nor experience, nor the
+elements of chance in mathematics can provide anything else but the illusion of knowing, I would have given up the idea of knowing anything once
+and for all.
+
+66
+But is it permissible to resign myself like this, now that I have put know!-
+edge in my possession by defining it as knowledge of myself, of my power
+over myself, of the conditions of this power? It would be cowardice at this
+point to give up trying to satisfy myself about everything. This is not to say
+that I have my heart set on answering every question that could be put to
+me; I used to believe, with regard to any problem whatever, that to know
+was to solve the problem; now I realize that it means to know how the
+problem concerns me. To actually answer a question, or to know under
+what condition it is in my power to answer it, or to know that it is insoluble
+for me-these are three ways of knowing, and for the same reason they
+constitute knowledge. I will not derive this knowledge, which is without
+gaps, from any source other than myself. I will neither try to find some
+method nor depend on chance with an eye to bringing forth some entirely
+new truth; a truth of that sort is only a chimera, in my view, and the only
+method available to me is analysis. That is, what I know now-that I
+think, that I exist, that I depend on God, that I am subject to the world
+(knowledge that I have had to carefully develop even though it is intuitive
+and one with the act of knowing)-contains everything that I have to
+know; I must find in it the means to satisfy myself on any subject whatever.
+Does it follow that, thanks to this knowledge, I can either solve every
+problem or recognize it as insoluble? For instance, I shall ask myself what
+this piece of paper is on which I am writing. Is it something other than the
+impressions of color or touch that I think I receive from it? Or is this question beyond my scope? But I find that I am ignorant on both counts. Before
+I try to resolve this contradiction, I want to examine more carefully what I
+already know about the nature of the world with regard to me. The knowledge of myself that is given me by the sole fact that I think, would, if I were
+God, be the totality of knowledge; but I remain impenetrable to myself
+insofar as I do not create myself by the act of thinking, that is, to the extent
+that I am subject to the imprint of a world. As I have recognized, the world
+presses on me with all the weight of aversion, desire, and belief, leaving me
+no other power than that of refusal. And what can I refuse? For instance,
+just now I am enjoying a breath of purer and fresher air, 4 I desire to be in
+the countryside, take a walk, and feel the spring breeze; at the same time an
+4 Weil is composing the dissertation in her seventh-floor room in her family's apartment
+overlooking a vista of Paris that includes the Pantheon, to which she will refer later. Ap-
+parently a fresh breeze has just blown through the open window, causing her torespond with
+a wish to take a walk in the countryside.
+
+67
+overriding conviction makes me believe in the existence of this overcast
+sky and this noisy city; and, in the midst of all this, I feel a vague anxicty in
+regard to some absent friends. Does my will have any power over my enjoyment, my desire, my belief, or my anxiery if I want to get rid of them or
+change them? Not the slightest. All I can do is refuse my assent to what
+I believe or desire. The only thing I have that is really mine is my judgment.
+I do not have sovercign power over my thoughts; I am only their arbiter.
+Does this mean that I possess only the ineffectual freedom of approving or
+disapproving of myself? If this is so, I can hope for no other virtue than the
+one that, according to the poet. allowed Medea to "sec the best course
+and approve it," while pursuing the worst; nor can I hope for any other
+knowledge than the intuitive knowledge of my existence and my dependence on some unknown thing, and the consciousness of my passions. But
+this phantom of freedom could not even be called freedom; I know thar
+I am free only to the extent that I am actually master of myself. And in truth
+even if, when I feel overwhelmed by desire for vengeance, I am free only
+not to consent to what the poet calls this anger "sweet as honey,
+"" still the
+exercise of my freedom is not something unimportant. However narrow
+its scope, my power is effective, my refusal is an act. The only thing I
+possess is my judgment, but the exercise of my judgment changes something. It is not possible to shape the desires and beliefs by which the world
+takes hold of me; so at least my judgment encroaches on the world itself.
+The almost insurmountable difficulty that a free judgment costs me proves
+this. The world weighs on my free will in such a way as to make me, if I do
+not resist, the plaything of my impulses; in return, the exercise of my free
+judgment cannot leave the world untouched. As a result, however much
+the contents of my passions have a hold on me, to that extent they also
+allow me a grasp; and thus the world, although it does not depend on me,
+ceases to be something that exercises an inexplicable mastery over me.
+Rather, as I had foreseen, it is the obstacle. The world is the obstacle; this
+means that the act of doubting (which causes me to exist, and to experience
+the weight of the other existence at the same time that I exert all my power
+to resist it) does indeed imply all knowledge for me, but it does not give me
+the means to solve the most insignificant problem having to do with anything outside my power.
+ș Ovid Metamorphoses 7.20.
+6 Homer liad 18. 109.
+
+6&
+Farlier I imagined there were only two ways of learning: selecting from
+acquired knowledge, and unexpectedly encountering knowledge unconnected with my thought; but the world, which does not depend on me in
+any way and which at the same time I can change, must allow knowledge
+the same kind of grasp as it allows action. To the extent that I can change
+the world (and to the extent that, consequently, knowing the world is only
+il way of knowing myself), I know by means of analysis; to the extent that
+the world does not depend on me, I have no way of satisfying myself about
+questions concerning the world, such as what this piece of paper is. Therefore I must invent a kind of analysis unknown to logicians, an analysis that
+is the source of an orderly progression. But isn't that absurd? What could
+such a progression be based on? It must be based on the world. (Indeed, as
+far as I am concerned, the necessity of learning only little by little is evidence that a world exists.) Or, more exactly, this progression must be
+based on the charter that binds the world and me, namely that, since the
+only thing I possess is my freedom, I exercise only an indirect power.
+What is the nature of this power? How is it that, without its having any
+effect except on myself (and that only a negative one), I act on the world at
+the same time? That is difficult to know, for I can neither deduce, explain,
+nor verify the grasp that I have on the world; I can only make use of it. But
+what constitutes using it? Must I make up my mind to act blindly? But to
+act blindly is not to act, it is to suffer. And to possess a power that I do not
+control would be to exercise no power at all. So I need a way of taking control of my own action. Where shall | look for it? In my thought; in any case
+there is nothing, at least with regard to me, that is not thought. Or at least
+I can learn about what is not my thought from my thinking alone. My
+thinking proved my own existence; my thinking proved the existence of
+the world. My thinking must also prove that I act on the world. As sense
+impressions are instrumental in my being subject to the world, 1 must find
+another kind of thought to serve as a tool for changing it. It is by means of
+thoughts of this sort that I will define the passageway that the world allows
+me. What are these thoughts? The "I think, therefore I am" is of no use to
+me here; I find myself in a new realm, confronting a new kind of knowledge. Up to this point, to know meant to make a thought clear. When I said
+"I think, therefore I am," I knew that I existed; I knew it immediately, in
+a perfect and complete way that satisfied me so entirely that I do not conceive divine thought to be any different; for, by one and the same act,
+I thought, existed, and knew, so that in me, as in God, knowing and willing
+
+6 9
+were one. At the very moment that I conceived my existence, it made itself
+clear to me in such a way that I cannot even think that there might be
+reason to know more; for l exist because I think, I think because I will to do
+so, and the will is its own reason for being. But the knowledge by which
+I grasp something other than myself is entirely different; there is no longer
+any question of asking for something to be made clear. The grasp that the
+world offers me does not depend on me, and whatever that grasp might be,
+there is no reason for me to think that it must be what it is. To a high degree
+it gives me—or will give me, when I know what it is—the occasion to ask
+Figaro's cternal question, "Why these things and not others?" and to give
+myself the only answer that this question allows: "That's the way it is."
+I must accept the relationship that exists between my action and things,
+and likewise I must accept as knowledge the thoughts that determine this
+relationship; from now on, knowing is far from being the same as willing.
+Thus, when it is a matter of the world, it is useless to ask myself questions.
+What, then, ought I to question? The world? My actions must be guided
+by it, but, although the world holds fast to my thought and never lets it go,
+it would be difficult for the world to guide or enlighten me, for guiding and
+enlightening are acts of the mind.
+Since the world cannot teach me and I have to instruct myself, I will go
+and ask oracles about things; I will not consult mute things, nor myself
+who am ignorant, but I will go to this third, ambiguous being that is
+a composite of myself and the world acting on each other. This seems to
+have been what the Greeks did at Delphi; they questioned this point of
+intersection between matter and a mind in the person of a woman whom
+they probably thought they had reduced to being nothing more than that.
+Since I wish to believe only in myself, I will consult this bond of action and
+reaction between the world and my thought in myself alone. I will name
+this bond the imagination, as opposed to the understanding, the name of
+the "l" who thinks, and the sensibility, my name insofar as I am acted
+upon. Henceforth the imagination alone will be my teacher —the imagination that is the sole causc of all my uncertainties and errors. For the understanding cannot deceive me, inasmuch as by itself it teaches me nothing
+except I think, therefore I am; and sense impressions cannot deceive me
+since it is always true that I feel what I feel. If I were only understanding
+and sensibility, I would know that I see a flash of lightning or hear thunder
+almost in the same way I know that the words I see in silent film titles are
+uttered by the voice of a man or a woman. My impressions and my
+
+70
+thoughts would not be all blended together, and, outside of the certainty
+that I exist, I would have neither opinions, beliefs, prejudices, nor passions; my wisdom would be negative, but perfect. I would be always like
+a spectator at a badly staged play in which the storm, riot, or battle is
+represented in a ludicrous way. But this supposition is absurd, so contrary
+is it to reality, for the only way sense impressions reach my mind is by
+causing a disturbance in it, and, far from being an understanding to which
+senses have been added like telephone operators to a staff headquarters, I
+am first and foremost nothing but imagination. From the fact that thunder
+crashes it follows, not that I become aware of a sound, but that my thinking is disturbed ar its source; my will is no longer my own, since in grasping
+the world it is delivered over to it and, losing in effectiveness everything
+that it loses in autonomy, it becomes fear, anxiety, aversion, desire, hope.
+In default of a thunderclap, a faint whisper is enough to establish this
+mutual hold of the world and myself on one another—a hold that is indissoluble except by my death. The world and my mind are so thoroughly
+intermingled that, if I think that I conceive one of the two separately, 1 attribute to it what belongs to the other; thus, confused thoughts fill my
+whole soul. The slightest disturbance of the senses hurls me into the world,
+but, as l am not given the direct grasp on the world that I am groping for,
+my will, far from being active, lapses into passion. I then attribute more or
+less influence to this will of mine depending on whether it is more or less
+thwarted; I regard my existence as constituted by this imaginary power
+that comes only from the world and, in return, I endow the world with
+passions. In this hand-to-hand struggle the world is always the winner, but
+then the world always deceives me. I must leave the world if I want to get
+a foothold in it. I must not make a frontal attack and try to throw my arms
+around it, but use cunning, search for a hold and grasp it obliquely.
+Earlier 1 was able to disengage myself from the chaos that results from
+the intermingling of the world and myself. By doubting I momentarily rendered my mind blind and deaf to assaults from the outside, and I silenced
+the tumult of the imagination that prevented me from recognizing in myself not a being who eats, walks, stops, loves, and hates but a being who
+thinks, and I finally came to know that I exist. At this point I know everything that I can know by means of pure understanding. Now I no longer
+have to suspend the imagination; rather, I must give it free rein so that
+I may learn from it. It is in this knot of action and reaction that attaches me
+to the world that I must discover what is my portion and what it is that
+
+71
+resists me. In this regard the impulse that, at the slightest creaking sound,
+sends me forth to re-create the world misleads me every time; for the
+impressions that follow it and through which it is satisfied or thwartedor rather satisfied and thwarted at the same time—are fortuitous. Therefore 1 must not study the imagination as action, that is, in relation to its
+effects, but only as thought. The world is not outside my thought; it is
+above all what is not me in me. I must not try to go out of myself in order to
+define the obstacle.
+Thus I am going to put questions to the imagination. Not in order to
+make it speak, for it speaks enough by itself; I hear nothing else in me;
+I was able to silence it only momentarily in order to listen to pure mind.
+But I must learn to listen to it, to distinguish when it is speaking the truth.
+This I can do, for it is only a matter of distinguishing, in thoughts in which
+the imagination plays a role, those in which it is uncontrolled (or rather, in
+which it leads me) from those in which the mind holds the reins. For the
+imagination by its nature has two aspects. It shows me either the presence
+of an external world that I cannot comprehend, or my grasp on that world.
+But the imagination cannot give me information about the world; if I rely
+on the imagination, the world will never be anything except a cause of sadness or joy, that is (since I always think of a cause as being of the same
+nature as its effect), a will foreign to mine, formidable, well or ill disposed;
+it will never be the obstacle. For there is no obstacle except for someone
+who acts, and there is no possibility of action for the mind dominated by
+the imagination. The imagination represents, or rather constitutes, the
+grasp that I have on the world, the correspondence that exists, through the
+union of the soul and the world, between a thought of mine and a change
+outside me. But this correspondence does not amount to an act; 1 am
+merely able to utilize it in order to act.
+It is according to this dual nature of the imagination that I am going to
+examine everything in me that has to do with imagination. So I am summoning back the multitude of thoughts whose presence I forced myself to
+forget: the city, clouds, noises, trees, forms, colors, odors, emotions, passions, desires. All of these thoughts have a meaning for me again; the question is to know what that meaning is. The imagination seems uncontrolled
+in all thoughts that bear the mark of passion, that sometimes impose
+themselves on me as forcibly as sense impressions, that then change, as
+I change, and escape me. Thus at times something at a bend in the road
+frightens me; what is it? Not a sense impression; impressions have no more
+
+72
+access to my thought than do the strange designs formed by the letters
+when I am reading. What frightens me is the idea, formed by the imagination out of what I see, of a hostile and powerful will that threatens me.
+A few moments later my imagination forms another idea: that of some
+harmless being, a tree. Sometimes, afterward, I can play with my fear,
+evoke it again if I want, but then it either escapes me altogether or it seizes
+me in spite of myself. In all the things that surround me and that I would
+like to believe are independent of me I observe similar games of the imagination. In every way the ideas that I have of these things clearly show the
+presence of the world in me and not my grasp on the world, for they are
+formed in me at least partly in spite of myself. I am subject to them, so they
+bring me nothing but ignorance.
+But let us continue. Are there no other thoughts in which the imagination plays a part? Yes, there are many others. When I count these same
+things that allow the imagination to dominate me, I come across an idea of
+another kind, one that does not impose itself on me, that exists only
+through an act of my attention, and that I cannot change; it is, like the "I
+think, therefore I am," transparent and invincible. This idea of number
+and ideas like it replace the random changes to which other ideas are subject with an orderly progression that originates in themselves. They are
+primarily useful for kinds of reasoning that, although clear and immutable
+like them, seem to force me to accept what they present almost in the same
+way the senses do, and as it were throw truths at me. But sometimes I also
+find an order among these ideas that lets me form one idea after another in
+such a way that each is marked by the same clarity that the initial idea had
+by itself. It is in this way that I think of the number two after the number
+one, the number three after the number two.
+If I try to discover how much trust should be put in the thoughts harbored by the imagination, I find that the clear ideas alone do not represent
+the encroachment of the world on me, since they are made present to me
+only by an act of my own attention. Nevertheless, the imagination plays
+a considerable part in them, for they are not, like the idea of "I think, therefore I am," entirely transparent. Why is seven a prime number? Why not
+nine? I don't know. That's how it is. These ideas are not self-explanatory.
+I must take them as they are. Consequently, they proceed from something
+external to me, in other words, from the world; and since the imagination
+is the only intermediary between the world and me, they proceed from the
+imagination. But the imagination does not form clear ideas insofar as it
+
+73
+makes thought subject to the world; on the contrary, it forms them insofar
+as, guided by the mind, it opens a passageway into the world for the mind.
+So this is the way the mind arms itself against chance. There would be no
+room for chance if my thoughts left everything outside of me untouched,
+or (what in this connection comes to the same thing) if they left an exact
+imprint of themselves in things. But the clear ideas leave on the world
+a mark that bears no resemblance to them. I, however, constantly try to
+find such a resemblance, and to a greater or lesser degree think I have
+found it. This is the origin of superstitions, passions, and every kind of
+folly, in all of which thought is handed over to chance. But the nature of the
+mind is to eliminate chance. That is its task; it is the only thing left for it
+to do. It is a negative task, for in posing the "I think, therefore I am," the
+mind gave all it could of a positive nature. But here the mind finds what it
+can use against chance; for its passions will give way to a will that, despite
+the condition to which the world reduces it, will imprint itself directly in
+things, provided that what it wills is only the kind of change that it is
+capable of bringing about, and that constitutes its mastery over the world.
+So from now on clear ideas, offspring of the docile imagination, will be my
+only support.
+It is true that this support seems very fragile, for these ideas are obviously insufficient. It cannot be otherwise; if the grasp on the world to
+which they correspond were not insufficient, it would constitute direct
+domination; I would not be subject to the world, and my mind would
+remain pure, without conflict. On the contrary, the world limits this sovereign power over itself that is the mark of the mind. It reduces the mind to
+being capable of only partially changing the external existence by which it
+feels held. But the action of the mind is the very essence of the mind; and if
+the world can thus reduce the mind to being merely a finite thing, the world
+is the stronger, and the mind perishes. But in itself this partial action is not
+action, it does not define me, it is at the disposal of infinite thought.
+Although the mind is reduced to exercising a wretchedly ineffective grasp,
+it becomes itself again by its power of infinitely compounding this finite
+action. Through this power the mind escapes the domination of the world
+and becomes the equal of the world. In this way the very insufficiency of
+the clear ideas is evidence of their value for me. A clear idea does not
+constitute knowledge; I demonstrate that I know only when I add a clear
+idea to itself and conceive that such addition is endless. Thus I add one to
+one. What I know in this way is not the world; a series is only a model or
+
+74
+a plan of action for me. But this model is the model of real action, that is,
+action that nothing limits, that is infinite by right and makes me in a way
+equal to God. Thus, at least to the extent that the world is subject to my
+action, order gives me the power to hold the world as a whole before my
+eyes, to examine it, and to be assured that it in no way surpasses my
+thought.
+If I now examine what constitutes the grasp that the world allows me
+and that the clear ideas will help me to define, I find that it consists simply
+of what I call straight motion. I will not try to explain what motion is,
+since, except for my own thought (from which it does not proceed), nothing is more clearly self-evident. Thus the world, this unknown source of
+the thoughts produced in me by the senses and the imagination together, is
+defined as something on which I act through the intermediary of straight
+motion. This idea of straight motion, understood in a way consistent with
+the infinite power whereby I add one action to another, is simply the idea
+of the straight line. Hence the world is once again defined as that which
+receives the straight line. And now (since in my hand-to-hand struggle with
+the world I decided to conceive of it as a wrestler, so to speak, like me, but
+one with countless heads) I am going to combine one straight motion with
+another, one straight line with another. For instance, I will imagine that
+I am pulling an object by a string and that this object is at the same time
+drawn in another direction or held back by an edge; it will only be able to
+move at an angle in relation to the direction in which I am pulling it. This
+gives us the definition of the oblique line, which is to geometry what the
+number two is to the series of numbers. If I now suppose that the object
+I am moving is no longer pulled in some direction or other but is connected
+to a fixed point, I define the circle; if I suppose it is connected to two fixed
+points, I define the ellipse. This is a rough outline, and for the present I cannot take the series further. But at least I understand from the very outset
+that, if I consider the series from a slightly different point of view, the relationship of one straight line to another that is parallel to it plays the role of
+the number one. The relationship between two straight lines that intersect
+is next in the order of complexity; the distance between the straight lines is
+no longer constant, but changes like the series of numbers; now is the time
+to state Thales' famous theorem on which analytic geometry is based.? All
+other lines are defined in the same way, in relation to the straight line, by
+> Parallel lines cur proportionate segments on other lines.
+
+75
+their distance at each point from the straight line. This is how the sequence
+of numbers—in other words, arithmetic—is applied to geometry. Actually, it is not appropriate to apply arithmetic itself to geometry; rather, we
+must use an arithmetic carried to the second power that has the same relation to the second type of series (which is said to be appropriate for gaining
+knowledge of the world) that simple arithmetic has to the first type of
+series, which defines my action. This other kind of arithmetic, which is
+called algebra, is formed by substituting multiplication for addition as the
+generative principle of the series.
+This is the sort of structure of ideas that I must build before I turn my
+mind toward the world. I have thus the means to replace the ideas that the
+deceptive imagination makes me read in sensations. I will now suppose
+that this house, which seems to me to be a mysterious and treacherous
+being, is merely the object of my action, the resistance my action meets
+with. I can conceive of such resistance only as being similar to the action
+that I apply to it, that is, not as thought, will, or passion, but as movement.
+And in order to represent what I am in relation to the world, I will suppose
+that, in opposition to the single movement that I control, the world offers
+an infinitely complex movement that is to motion in a straight line what
+the number the mathematicians call infinity is to the number one, the
+movements that correspond to the oblique line, the circle, and the ellipse
+being like the numbers two, three, and four. But the only way I can clearly
+conceive of this infinitely compounded movement is to conceive of an indefinite number of impulses in a straight line that are combined, and to
+conceive of each of them separately, on the model of the motion that I have
+at my disposal. I will suppose there is an indefinite quantity of simple
+motions in the world, and I will define each of them, like my own, by
+a straight line. That is, insofar as the direction of the straight line is
+changed in the world, I will suppose that it is distorted, wisted out of
+shape by its countless sisters. I will also define this motion as uniform; in
+short, I will suppose that the initial impulse is reproduced endlessly,
+always in the same form. In this way the part played by the world is reduced to that which distorts, halts, accelerates, or retards a straight and
+uniform motion. I can then reduce this part again by considering it afresh
+as a straight and uniform motion. In this way I can analyze the world endlessly. It is not that I hope to achieve a result; it is the nature of my condition that I can never exhaust the world. I will never succeed in bringing the
+world back to straight motion. But at least I have learned that there is no
+
+76
+limit to my analysis, that it is always valid, that I can always find that the
+world is made up of one movement, then another, then another. In this
+way I enter into a relation with the world—not, it is true, as one man does
+with another, but as a man does with a multitude. In the same way that
+a movement in the world is the response to one kind of thought in me
+(which I call will), so 1 assume that the thoughts that I call sense impressions are my response to this multitude of movements. But this multitude
+no longer frightens me, now that I create it by adding one unit to another.
+I see clearly that the direction my thought gives it must immediately become unrecognizable because of all the movements that are combined in it;
+but I also see that that direction is combined in its turn with movements
+that I am subject to, and in this way I conceive that it may be possible for
+me to direct them. I begin to envisage how one can learn to tack about on
+this sea.
+Is this physics accurate? I can't swear that it is. For its basic assumption
+is that all the changes in my impressions are the result of movements in the
+world, straight-line movements. But the very idea of motion proceeds from
+the imagination, and although it is clearer than all the other ideas the
+imagination plays a part in, it is no less ambiguous; for the idea of motion,
+like the imagination itself, has some of the characteristics of both me and
+the world. Thus a straight line is both one and divisible; uniry is the sign of
+me in it. When I connect the idea of a movement with an act of will, I can
+say in two senses that the movement is continuous. In the act of will—in
+the project that is intended—the movement is one from start to finish. On
+the other hand, no sooner is the movement accomplished than I think of it
+as dissolved and, far from beingone, it constantly begins over again. Thus,
+through movement, my will is as it were dispersed in time. But that is
+what constitutes the part of the world in me. It is this dual nature of my
+action that is found as it were mirrored in every kind of order, for instance in the sequence of numbers. Therefore I can say that the world as a
+whole is potentially contained between the numbers one and two. "One"
+and "wo"-these may be regarded as forming a pair of pincers with
+which to grasp the world. But if my thought, insofar as it is joined to the
+world, is thereby as it were cut up into pieces, constantly outside of itself,
+it is because the world is that which is endlessly exterior to itself.® What
+& Thar is, matter is characterized by divisibility, the mind by unity. Weil's way of expressing this comes from Alain, according to whom material chings are "always separated and
+formed of parts exterior to one another." See Alain, Elements de philosophie, p. 48.
+
+77
+gives unity to movement—direction—comes from the mind; if I try to discover what remains of movement apart from direction, I find it is juxtaposition, and juxtaposition belongs to the world. In the world everything
+is set apart from everything, everything is unrelated to everything, everything is neutral with respect to everything. If there is a reason why in my
+thought, insofar as it is joined to the world, nothing is immediate, it is because in the world everything is immediate.? In short, what comes from me
+in movement is the fact that it is directed; what does not come from me is
+that it is extended; and what constitutes the world is extension. And one
+cannot say that the world is defined in this way only insofar as it is an obstacle for me, and consequently only in relation to me. If the world is an
+obstacle for me, it is so to the degree that it is joined to my thought; to that
+degree thought must conform itself to the world, must follow the proper
+nature of the world, which has no relation to the mind. What acts as an obstacle to me in the world is the world itself. The world is what it is, and it
+does not make thought its model when it unites with it; this is why it is an
+obstacle to thought. Thus I can say that the world, in itself, is simply
+extended substance. In attributing lines and directed movements to the
+world, the ideas of geometry and physics not only go beyond what I can
+know; they are not even true. Does this mean that they do not teach me
+anything? Strictly speaking, they cannot be said to teach me anything,
+since I know everything there is to know when I know that the world is
+extension. Still, they do teach me—not insofar as I am understanding, but
+insofar as I am also imagination. They help me to suppose that, in those
+impressions in which I originally read thoughts that are alien to me, hidden
+thoughts, the true text is extension.
+Is this the ultimate form of wisdom? Can I never do morethan suppose
+extension? That would be a very partial, barren kind of wisdom, lacking
+any positive content, stemming purely from mistrust. For as long as the
+wild imagination makes me think that I see the most fantastic things in
+sensations and makes me conjure up a god in every thought, it is useless for
+me to try to counter this eloquent madness with the simple supposition
+that what is actually signified by sensations is extension. The faculty of
+9 Weil is punning on rwo possible philosophical meanings of the word "immediatc."
+Sometimes things are called "immediate" because they are so connected that they need no
+mediation. Sometimes, less frequently, they are called "immediare" because they are so separate that no mediation is possible. The word is used in the first sense in the first clause, and in
+the second sense in the second.
+
+78
+reason would then be set aside and, being separated from the imagination,
+could not prevent it from being given free rein. I am always a dual being, on
+the one hand a passive being who is subject to the world, and on the other
+an active being who has a grasp on it; geometry and physics help me to
+conceive how these two beings can be united, but they do not unite them.
+Can I not attain perfect wisdom, wisdom in action, that would reunite the
+two parts of myself? I certainly cannot unite them directly, since the
+presence of the world in my thoughts is precisely what this powerlessness
+consists of. But I can unite them indirectly, since this and nothing else is
+what action consists of. Not the appearance of action through which the
+uncontrolled imagination makes me blindly turn the world upside down
+by means of my anarchic desires, but real action, indirect action, action
+conforming to geometry, or, to give it its true name, work.
+It is through work that reason grasps the world itself and masters the
+uncontrolled imagination. This would not be possible if I knew the world
+by pure understanding. But the uncontrolled imagination that I want to
+shape in accordance with reason is none other than the docile imagination,
+which teaches me geometry, or rather is the instrument I use in doing
+geometry; there is only one kind of imagination. The simple imagination
+and the one with complex heads are the same thing, the mutual grasp of the
+world and myself; it is seen as one or the other depending on whether it
+submits chiefly to the world or chiefly to me. Only through the intermediary of the world, through the intermediary of work, do I reunite
+them; for if through work I do not unite the two parts of myself, the
+one that undergoes and the one that acts, I at least can cause the changes I
+undergo to be produced by me, so that what I am subject to is my own action. This was impossible as long as I could only desire, since the response
+to the desire for any kind of happiness is only a movement in the world,
+a movement that is entirely unrelated to happiness. But if I bring my will to
+bear only on the idea of a direction, a motion conforming to that act of will
+immediately follows it; my will leaves its living imprint in the world. But
+that is not enough; it is necessary to find intermediaries that connect the
+straight-line motion I alone can produce to this complex change that
+I want to be conveyed to my senses. I must use cunning, I must impede
+myself by using obstacles that steer me where I want to go. The first of
+these obstacles is the imagination itself, this tie, this knot between the
+world and me, this point of intersection between the simple movement that
+I have at my command and the infinitely complex movement that repre-
+
+• Science and Perceplion in Descartes
+79
+sents the world for my understanding. The point of intersection of these
+two kinds of movement is a thing that receives the movement; it is an extended thing, a body. I call it my body, and, in the highest sense of the
+word, the body. In it, and in the world to the extent that I take hold of it by
+work, the two kinds of imagination are reunited
+They are completely joined in my thought; in fact (as I now recognize)
+they have been joined ever since the first thoughts I can remember having
+formulated. For when I reviewed my thoughts I was wrong to sec in some
+of them only imagination guided by the understanding—the kind of imagination that determines geometry —and in others only passive sensibility
+and the kind of imagination that is deceptive. In this latter class I ranked,
+with passions and dreams, the thoughts of all the things present around
+me: this room, this table, these trees, my body itself. Now I recognize that
+the two kinds of imagination, which are found separately in the emotions
+and in geometry, are united in the things I perceive. Perception is geometry
+taking as it were possession of the passions themselves, by means of work.
+It is impossible for me to directly experience my own action, since this is
+the condition that the world imposes on me. But, at least, instead of taking
+impressions as signs of fantastic beings, I can take them merely as intermediaries for grasping my own work, or rather the object of my work: the
+obstacle, extension. This is what perception consists of, as can be seen by
+the famous example of the blind man's stick. The blind man does not feel
+the different pressures of the stick on his hand; he touches things directly
+with his stick, as if it were sensible and formed part of his body. Right now
+I feel the paper at the end of my pen—even more so if I close my eyes. The
+pressure of the penholder on my hand-the only thing, it seems, I should
+feel —1 must pay attention to in order to notice, just as I need to pay attention to see glazes of red or yellow pigment on the canvas that portrays the
+Gioconda, instead of seeing the skin of a woman. What sensations present
+to the mind is never themselves but an idea that corresponds to the disturbance they cause in it. When I respond with work, rather than with feelings
+of joy or sadness, to the assaults of the world that I call sensations, they
+provide the mind with nothing but an object for work. Thus the blind man,
+far from purely and simply being subject to sensations of contact, as we are
+apt to think, uses his stick as a hand and touches, not perceptible matter,
+but the obstacle. And conversely, for each of us the blind man's stick is
+simply his own body. The human body is like a pincer for the mind to grasp
+and handle the world. But—to take things in their proper order—I am not
+
+80
+naturally the master of my body. I must take possession of it. To each of
+my thoughts are joined various movements of my body; thus, when I am
+afraid, my body runs. But I determine only a few of these movements; all
+that I can do is impart a straight-line motion to certain parts of my body.
+But although I do not determine more complicated movements, my body
+does. It deflects, according to its own structure, the direction that I give it.
+I must learn to use this deflection, to turn the obstacle to account in order
+to make up for my lack of power. Thus I do not know how to impart a
+circular movement, but I have the remedy for that, since I am hindered in
+the very act of moving my arm in a straight line by the attachment of my
+arm to my shoulder. In addition, since the body's extension puts several
+straight movements at my command, I can combine them; but first I separate them and, just as I do in a problem, I break the difficulty down into
+several parts in order to consider each element of it separately; in the same
+way I learn to move only the limb that I want to move, and not the whole
+body, by a thought. Then, by a kind of geometry in action, I combine these
+movements according to an order leading from the simple to the complex.
+It is not the number three that teaches me about the number three, nor the
+circle that teaches me about the circle, but the number one and the straight
+line. In the same way, if I am afraid, my body knows how to run; but if
+I want to know how to run, I learn not by running but by training myself in
+the separate motions of raising my knees and lengthening my stride, exercises that no more resemble running than the straight line resembles the
+circle. This intermediary between geometry and work is gymnastics. I
+learn to use my senses in a similar way, for all my senses are kinds of touch.
+More accurately, I see only by acting and touching; thus, as Descartes's
+famous analysis shows, I seize each object with my two eyes, as if with two
+sticks. As soon as I have taken possession of my body in this way I no
+longer only conceive, as geometry allowed me to do, that one can tack
+about in this sea of the world; I do tack about in it. Not only do I have
+a grasp on the world, but my thought is, as it were, a component part of the
+world, just as the world, in another way, is part of my thought. From now
+on I have a share in the universe; I am in the world
+That, however, does not satisfy me. The body is not what is needed for
+work. For work consists, as has been said, of this: if I am to feel what
+I want, I must employ movements that are in themselves indifferent to
+what I want. But if these movements are in themselves unrelated to what I
+want to feel, they are not unrelated to what I do feel; pleasure or pain is
+
+81
+attached to each of them, and I must take this into consideration. Thus
+I cannot put my hand under a heavy stone in order to lift it. In addition, it is
+true that the structure of my body sometimes helps me, as in running or
+throwing, but at other times it hinders me; it is an obstacle that sometimes
+leads me whither I want, sometimes not, and I cannot throw it away and
+replace it by another. Thus I need other human bodies, so to speak, human
+bodies that have no feeling, that I can use anywhere, that are at my disposal, that I can take up, put aside, and take up again, bodies in short that
+perfectly correspond to the indirect nature of work. I am in possession of
+these simpler human bodies that, out of the blend of sensibility and work,
+retain only the characteristics that make them suitable for work; they are
+tools. Thus the movement conceived by the mind is not only cast in the unchangeable mold of this first tool that is attached to me (my body); it is also
+cast in the form of tools properly so called, whose structure I can change as
+I like. Moreover, although they extend my reach, these tools play the same
+role in regard to me as the body itself. They are obstacles fashioned in such
+a way as to transform the impetus I give into more complex movements.
+The attachment of my arm to my body lets me make a circle; this transformation of straight motion is perfect for the peasan when he has put
+a scythe at the end of his arm. The wheel and the winch let me make circles
+wherever 1 want, while those that I make with my arm always have my
+shoulder as a center. The knife grinder gets the circular movement of his
+wheel by raising and lowering his foot perpendicularly to the ground, that
+is, through a straight motion. The lever, on the other hand, transforms one
+vertical movement into another. One could try in this way to rank tools in
+a series according to a geometrical order. Moreover, these tools themselves, like the body, allow me only the simplest movements; the power
+they provide me with differs only in degree from the power furnished by
+the body. Therefore, if I want to further extend my domain, I have only one
+means of doing so, which is to combine simple tools. In this way human
+action increasingly approaches the infinite complexity of the world, without ever attaining it. Man creates machines with the wheel and the lever,
+just as he constructs any given point of a conic section with compass and
+ruler. It is in this way that industry is an extension of work.
+It is in this way that I can distinguish several ways of knowing the world.
+I grasp it through work. The pen that I am moving over the paper serves as
+an intermediary between me and the world. Since the sensations it gives me
+are of no interest to me in themselves, I relate them only to my action and
+
+82
+to the paper that receives it. In the same way, I hide the Pantheon by my
+shutter with a movement of my head, then, with a reverse movement, uncover it, and in this way grasp that the shutter is between my eyes and the
+Pantheon. Again, it is in this way that I relate the sensations that I get from
+my two eyes to one Pantheon, whose relief, distance, or size I determine by
+changing this double contact of my eyes through my own movement. For,
+although this kind of exploration is made at a distance, puts in motion only
+my own body, and is not intended to change anything, it is, if not work, at
+least preparation for work. It turns sensations into signs of distances, sizes,
+shapes; in other words, signs of work I may do. Conversely, actual work is
+related to knowledge insofar as it explores the world, not insofar as it
+changes something in it. I sense, or rather I perceive, the stone at the end of
+the lever, as I perceive the Pantheon at the end, so to speak, of my gazc, at
+the point where my two lines of sight meet. Likewise, to the degree that
+I can act upon the world through my body and the simplest tools, to that
+degree I grasp extension itself in my sensations. I am no longer content
+with drawing geometrical figures; I am practicing geometry. The ambiguity that exists in theoretical geometry, which is related to both the mind
+and the world, now disappears; in the actual practice of geometric action,
+in work, the direction that I impart and the obstacle that I encounter are
+clearly separated; the mind's object is no longer order, it is that element
+in order that belongs to the world alone; I grasp unmediated order. Un-
+mediated order is naked extension. This extension, which I perceive as it
+were directly, stripped of all admixture of mind, all trappings of imagination —this extension grasped intuitively is space.
+Extension, however, is more than space, for space escapes my perception to the extent that it escapes the grasp of my body and the tools I have
+at my disposal. I make the Pantheon glide across the sky with only a movement of my head; I cover the parts of it that I want with my hand, change
+its relief by my movements, determine at what distance from me my two
+lines of sight, fixed on it like iwo sticks that grasp it, converge, and in this
+way I perceive space; but I do not touch it. All I do is imagine its consistency. For insofar as I have no grasp on an object I imagine one; but here
+the imagination, insofar as it is not controlled by the memory of earlier
+work and exploration, is free and consequently deceptive. For example,
+the Pantheon is indeed at the vertex of a triangle determined by the distance between my eyes, which I know, and the direction of each of my two
+lines of sight, which I also know; but no such triangle exists for the sun. If
+
+83
+I wanted to grasp objects with two sticks that I could make longer or
+shorter at will, I would separate the sticks to take hold of distant objects;
+but since I cannot separate my eyes, this pair of pincers that constitutes my
+sight is unable to get a hold on the sun. And so I do not perceive the distance of the sun from me; all I ever do is imagine the distance-for
+example, two hundred paces. The sun can be grasped, not by two eyes of
+the same man, but by two men; if they stand far enough apart from one
+another, and if they know the distance between them and the direction in
+which they are looking, they can determine the distance of the sun just as
+I perceive that of the Pantheon. But if I were to participate in this measurement, my way of perceiving would be unchanged, for this act that grasps
+the sun is collective; it is not something I can do by myself. I know that the
+sun is 93 million miles away, but I no more perceive it as being 93 million
+miles away than one of my eyes, if it could think, could perceive how far
+away the Pantheon is. One can say that two observers who measure the
+distance of the sun are like two eyes of humanity, that humanity alone perceives the space separating the earth from the sun; just as one can say that
+in industry it is humanity that works. To take another example: if, at
+night, a wheel is set spinning in front of me, illuminated only by a light
+that flashes intermittently, I will see only successive positions of the wheel,
+but I will still perceive its movement; in the same way, one can say that
+through observations, records, and archives humanity perceives the return
+of comets.
+That is what science is. The connection that I, as a perceiving being, have
+to establish between my sensations and my actions science must first undo,
+for in the realm of science such a connection can only be imaginary, and
+consequently deceptive. In perception, however, I cannot separate the connection made by the imagination from the real connections that constitute
+space. Science does not regard the observer as a perceiving being but, as far
+as possible, it reduces him to something similar to a simple sense organ.
+Every possible deception on the part of the imagination is done away with,
+owing to the fact that the observer is strictly reduced to the grasp that he
+actually has on the observed phenomena; this grasp, however small it may
+be, always exists, for insofar as the world allows us no grasp it escapes our
+senses entirely. Thus the grasp that we have on the sky consists precisely in
+hiding certain parts of it by interposed objects; and so for the astronomer
+the starry sky is merely some bright spots in the quadrants determined by
+the cross hairs on his telescope. That is what observation is. As tools form
+
+84
+parts of machines, so each observer (insofar as, by his extremely simple
+grasp, he seizes complicated phenomena that are beyond him) is as it were
+a part of science. On the other hand, as the simplest geometry is as it were
+contained in my body, there are other manufactured bodies, such as telescopes, that are completely free of sensibility and at the same time contain
+a higher form of geometry; these are instruments. In this way, in situations
+in which men do not grasp space, science helps them to infer extension. For
+science uses geometrical figures to imitate the perfect connection between
+what is observed and extension that work establishes. To this end science
+imagines, so to speak, that beneath observed phenomena there are combinations of simple tools, such as those from which machines are made.
+Science does not claim that these mechanical models of things duplicate
+the world; that would be meaningless. But at least they let us place phenomena that we do not understand in a series with those that we do, ranking them in a geometrical order that proceeds from the simple to the
+complex. Thus all the mechanical models of a phenomenon, provided that
+they put it in the same place in the series, are equivalent. Or rather they are
+more than equivalent, they are one, just as the ellipse a gardener draws by
+means of a cord tied to two stakes is the same as the section of a cone; and
+the uniformity of all these mechanical models is determined by what expresses the degree of complexity they have in common, that is, by an algebraic formula. Perhaps Maxwell's'° famous statement that, when one has
+obtained one mechanical model of a phenomenon, one can find an infinite
+number of them, can be interpreted in this way. Also one can understand in
+this way how analysis can be directly applied to physics. But in applying
+analysis to physics there is a risk that what legitimates it may be forgotten;
+it is only in geometry and mechanics that algebra has significance. If the
+purpose of science were to add real knowledge to the understanding, perhaps a purely algebraic science would be worth more than, or at least as
+much as, the sciences of geometry and mechanics. But this is not the case;
+the understanding cannor gain anything from science; we know all there is
+to know when we know that the world is extended. The purpose of science
+is entirely different; it is first of all to render the human mind master, as far
+as possible, of the part of the imagination that perception leaves free, and
+to James Clerk Maxwell (r831-79), Scottish physicist. In The Treatise on Electricity and
+Magnetism (1873) Maxwell wrote, "The problem of determining the mechanism required
+to establish a given species of connection between the motions of the parts of a system always
+admits of an infinite number of solutions."
+
+8 5
+then to give it possession of the world; and perhaps, when these two purposes are considered closely, they amount to the same thing. That is true
+even for astronomy, provided that one understands what is meant by possession. Those industrial discoveries that have come about by chance or as
+a result of blind technique and that allow us to turn the world upside down
+through changes we do not understand do indeed give us the illusion of
+having a sort of tyrannical power. But that power is something external to
+us; these innovations do not make the world any more ours than it was
+before. On the other hand, just as I grasp the Pantheon by my gaze, so
+astronomy, although it does not give us any real power over the sky, nevertheless brings it into our domain; so much so that the pilot dares to use the
+stars-which the power of all humanity together could not divert from
+their courses by a hairbreadth—as his instruments.
+In the end, the only wisdom consists in knowing that there is a world,
+that is, matter that work alone can change, and that, with the exception of
+the mind, there is nothing else. But to take one step is enough to make the
+universe appear. Between one step and another I touch the world directly.
+Between the numbers one and two I have only a presentiment of the world;
+for that matter, to count is merely to understand that one can walk,
+walk in a way that leaves one where one is. The wisdom that I have laboriously sought is contained in the simplest perception. Then is the order
+I thought I had to follow meaningless, since I, since everyone, even the least
+meditative person, without having doubted everything, without having
+concluded from his thinking that his own existence is the only certain
+thing, without having thought about God, or searched for reasons to believe i, the existence of external reality, or reflected on the nature of
+movement, geometry, or extension, possesses the wisdom that I thought I
+attained only after all these preliminaries? Not so. In a flash, the mind that
+tears itself away from what it feels retrenches itself in itself and acts; the
+pilot who holds the tiller in a storm, the peasant who swings his scythe,
+knows himself and knows the world in the way meant by the statement "I
+think, therefore I am" and the ideas that follow from it. Workers know
+everything; however, when their work is done, they do not know that they
+had all wisdom in their possession. And so outside of effective action,
+when the body, in which past perceptions are inscribed, is relieved from
+the necessity of exploration, human thought is given over to the passions,
+to the kind of imagination that conjures up gods, to more or less reasonable-sounding arguments received from others. That is why mankind
+
+86
+needs science, provided that instead of imposing its proofs it is taught in
+the way that Descartes called analytic, that is, in such a way that each student, following the same order he would follow if he were methodically
+making discoveries himself, may be said less to receive instruction than to
+teach himself. Science so conceived, by reducing the heavens, the earth, all
+things, and even the imagination (under the name "human body") to a system of machines, will add only one thing to the knowledge that is implicit
+in self-conscious work, namely, it will add the knowledge that that knowledge contains all there is to know, and that there is nothing else.
+Conclusion
+Now that we have come to the end of this somewhat daring series of reflections, it appears that it departs from Cartesian doctrine to the point of
+sometimes seeming to contradict it. Still, it would be surprising if a sketch
+of this sort, however tentative and inadequate it might be, did not, by the
+mere fact that it imitates the development of Cartesian thought without
+actually following it, illuminate it to some extent. Perhaps, in fact, it will
+allow us to envisage how the apparent contradictions and other difficulties
+pointed out earlier in Descartes can be resolved. We can understand why in
+Descartes's The World motion is said to be a simpler notion than figure,
+how this idea is connected with the idea of analytic geometry, how consequently it is through becoming as concrete as possible that geometry apparently became extremely abstract, and how by the same act of the mind
+Descartes identified geometry with algebra on the one hand and physics on
+the other. Unfortunately, Descartes purposely made the explanation of his
+geometrical discovery obscure, but at least his Geometry shows that his
+principal intention was to set up a series of geometrical lines comparable to
+a series of equations. Descartes, however, could do nothing more than
+sketch this series in two different ways; Lagrange' constructed it later in
+his immortal works. On the other hand, we can see how it is the same innovation that reduced physics to geometry and based physics on comparisons with phenomena familiar to us from everyday experience and the
+commonest kinds of work. We can also see-and this is something that
+i Joseph Louis Lagrange (1736-1813), Italian-born French mathematician.
+
+87
+astonished his contemporaries—how, although he continued to imagine
+various kinds of movements, Descartes thought that as far as possible he
+ought to admit only simple motions in order to restrict to the utmost the
+part of the mind that physics was forced to seem to attribute to the world.
+And finally, we can see why, after having based his entire physics on
+movement, he seemingly ruined it by positing movement as purely relative.
+It also appears that there is no contradiction involved in reducing the
+imagination to the human body, and in making it the only instrument of
+knowledge for everything concerning the world. We see that simple ideas
+can be ascribed to the mind and at the same time considered as laws of the
+world, if it is true that simple ideas are expressions of neither the world nor
+the mind but of the passageway that the world allows the mind; we also see
+why it can be said that simple ideas are created by God, since the role of
+God in relation to me is to warrant, in some manner, the union of the soul
+and the body.
+The great correlations that form the core of the doctrine become apparent; there is no longer any contradiction between freedom and necessity, idealism and realism. To no longer be brought up short by this last
+opposition it is enough to observe that the whole mind acts when thought
+is applied to an object. That is why Descartes goes as far as to say, in direct
+contradiction to the way deduction is defined by philosophy as currently
+taught, that "it is the nature of our mind to form general propositions from
+the knowledge of particulars" (9:111). Thus in the Rules Descartes is satisfied with those intuitive proofs of the four arithmetical operations that
+Poincaré later thought must be replaced by analytical reasoning. When the
+mind is viewed in this way, clear and distinct ideas seem infallible, and
+science seems uniformly simple, clear, and easy, however far it extends.
+For science does nothing but establish series in which each idea is as easy to
+grasp after the preceding one as the first was by itself; in other words, the
+only order is the one that rules the sequence of numbers and makes it as
+easy to conceive of a thousand as to conceive of two.
+In short, we understand that, according to this same view, when the
+mind applies itself to the world it may take geometrical figures, algebraic
+signs, or even sensations as intermediaries, but it is always the same mind,
+the same world, and the same knowledge; and it is this that Descartes, in
+all his writings, makes very clear.
+It is not that the ideas that have taken form in the course of this rash
+attempt at reconstruction can claim to be the very ideas of Descartes, or
+
+88
+even to resemble them. A rough outline of this sort does not even need to
+comment on the texts themselves; it is enough if it simply allows us to approach them afresh and more fruitfully. And so it can best be concluded by
+citing (as Descartes did to justify his Optics) the example of the astronomers "who, although their assumptions are almost all false or uncertain,
+nevertheless ... do not cease to derive from them a great deal of knowledge that is very true and certain" (6:83).2
+2 See Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, pp. 66-67.
+
+
+From the very beginning of Simone Weil's professional life, the interest in
+the worker she had shown in "Science and Perception in Descartes" was
+translated into action on behalf of the working class. When she was appointed a professor of philosophy at a girls' lycée in the provincial city of
+Le Puy in 1931, she also became both a political activist and an indefatigable supporter of the revolutionary working-class movement. She was
+a vocal member of two teachers' unions, one affiliated with the reformist
+CGT (Confédération générale du Travail) and the other with the Communist-dominated CGTU (Confédération générale du Travail unitaire).
+She traveled weekly to the industrial city of St. Etienne, about fifty miles
+from Le Puy, in order to work with a revolutionary syndicalist group and
+with the Labor Exchange (the regional trade-union organization) there.
+She wrote for L'Ecole émancipée, the publication of the teachers' trade
+union affiliated with the CGTU, the revolutionary syndicalist journal
+La Révolution prolétarienne, and L'Effort, the newspaper of the construction-workers' trade union of Lyon. In less than a year her tireless activity,
+her dedication, and her penetrating and critical intelligence had made her
+something of a minor celebrity within the French Left.
+Weil was a revolutionary, and she passionately hoped that, out of the
+profound economic crisis afflicting Europe that seemed to signal the decay
+of the capitalist system and the imminence of proletarian revolution,
+a truly egalitarian worker democracy would emerge. Though not an ideologue in the sense of being a doctrinaire adherent of any system of political
+belief, she was probably ideologically closest to the revolutionary syndicalists, trade unionists committed to the necessity of revolutionary change
+who believed that society could be transformed through economic pressure exerted by the trade unions directly. Nevertheless, for Weil it was the
+revolution that was of primary importance, not the group that one belonged to, and she repeatedly supported efforts to get the different (and
+often warring) factions of the Left to set aside their ideological differences
+and work together; without unity, she wrote late in 1931, "the working
+class will be condemned to disappear as a revolutionary force."
+
+92
+Weil found that Trotsky's January 1932 article "What Next?"
+brought the critical nature of the situation in Europe in general and Germany in particular into sharp focus, and specifically said so in her July
+1932 article "Conditions d'une révolution allemande." In Germany,
+where the economic crisis was most acute, Trotsky saw bourgeois democracy on the verge of collapse and about to give way to one of two possible
+alternatives: fascism or proletarian revolution. In other words, because
+both Trotsky and Weil understood fascism to have as one of its principal
+aims the destruction of the working-class organizations and the reduction
+of the proletariat to an amorphous and hence helpless mass, what was
+imminent was either the complete triumph or the complete destruction of
+the proletariat. Moreover, as Weil wrote in her response to Trotsky's article, a fascist Germany, "forming a bloc with Italian Fascism and the
+countries of white terror around the Danube, and giving strength to the
+fascist currents that are already apparent in various parts of Europe and
+the United States, would threaten the entire world and even the USSR."
+Yet despite the seriousness and extremity of the situation, both of the two
+major parties, the Social Democratic party and the Communist party,
+remained, she wrote, "criminally inactive." She blamed this inactivity
+largely on the bureaucracies of both parties, and on the willingness of
+the members, for different reasons, to blindly follow the bureaucrats. A
+bureaucracy, she wrote, can do many things (she cited the industrial
+progress accomplished by the bureaucratic dictatorship in Russia), but
+"what it cannot do is make a revolution." And it was the Russian state
+bureaucracy, she contended, that, through its domination of the Comintern, was determining the do-nothing policies of the German Communist
+party.
+Shortly after this essay was published Weil spent a month in Germany to
+see for herself what the situation there was like. She found it very quiet,
+disappointingly so; she wrote her parents that she had come at a bad time,
+that there was no chance of "observing very much." She was deeply moved
+by the plight of the ordinary members of the German working class, especially the young people. She saw what was happening in Germany not only
+as an occasion for political analysis or political criticism but as a human
+tragedy, one that would, in all likelihood, grow worse. Perhaps most
+significant, what she observed in Germany altered her thinking about the
+real prospects of international proletarian revolution. The revolutionary
+syndicalist movement, she concluded, had "no international significance";
+
+93
+the German trade unions, she found, far from being a "force capable of
+making the revolution," were "organically reformist," basically "associations for mutual welfare." Moreover, what she saw destroyed whatever
+faith she still had in the Communist party as a party capable of leading
+a successful proletarian revolution. "In Germany," she wrote, "I lost all
+the respect that in spite of myself I still felt for the Communist party. The
+contrast berween its revolutionary phrases and its total passivity is much
+too scandalous. Actually it seems to me as culpable as the Social Democracy. I think that at the present moment all compromise with the party or
+any reticence in criticizing it is criminal. Trotsky himself seems to me to
+still retain a kind of timidity toward it that gives him some share of the
+responsibility for the Third International's crimes in Germany."1
+After Weil returned to France she wrote, first, a quite compact description and analysis of the German situation entitled "L'Allemagne en
+attente" that was published in La Révolution prolétarienne in October
+I932; she then wrote the considerably expanded version that is translated
+here and that was published in ten installments in L'Ecole émancipée between December 4, 1932, and March 5, 1933.
+Her first article paints a picture of depression Germany, and implicitly
+poses the question of why, in this objectively revolutionary situation, in
+which the economic crisis is affecting every area of the workers' lives, there
+are "no precursory signs of the revolution in peoples' actions"? Weil's initial answer is that the working class lacks unity. What, she asks with
+apparent ingenuousness, can unify it? A truly revolutionary organization.
+She then asks, does such an organization exist? She proceeds to examine
+the three main working-class organizations—the trade unions, the Social
+Democratic party, and the Communist party —in the light of this question.
+The German trade unions, four million strong and very wealthy, have
+done too well within the capitalist system and have too much to lose to
+support revolution, and the Social Democratic party is compromised by its
+reformist principles and its ties to the Weimar Republic; neither, therefore,
+can provide organization and leadership for a revolutionary working
+class. However, there should be nothing, presumably, to prevent the Communist party from carrying our that task. But 84 percent of the Communist
+party's membership is unemployed; the Party reflects, rather than reme-
+1 Quoted in Simone Pétrement, Simone Weil: A Life (New York: Pantheon, 1976),
+pp. 133, 136, 137.
+
+94
+dies, the split berween the unemployed and the workers in the factories,
+and thus only replicates in itself the enfeebling lack of unity in the working
+class as a whole. To be the strong revolutionary organization the working
+class desperately needs, Weil argues, the Party must win the confidence of
+the workers in the factories who are either reformist or uncommitted. She
+sketches the strategy necessary to do this, a strategy based on the formation of a united front "from above," that is, one organized and led by the
+Communist party and the Social Democratic parry working together for
+specific objectives.
+The last four articles of "The Situation in Germany" are a step-by-step
+indictment of the failure of the Communist party to take any of the actions
+necessary to unite the working class against either the threat posed by the
+Hitlerites or the danger that, with or without the Hitlerites, the government will become fascistic. Weil details situation after situation in which
+the reformist masses were ready to act either against the government or
+against the Hitlerites, and the Communist party contented itself with appeals to spontaneous action and did nothing to actually organize and
+direct that action.
+But the responsibility for this state of affairs does not lie with the rank
+and file of the Communist party, Weil contends, despite the myth to that
+effect within the Party, and despite the fact that the "docile mass" of newcomers that constitutes 8o percent of the Parry membership supports the
+decisions handed down by the bureaucracy. In an attack that gathers increasing momentum in articles 9 and 1o, Weil charges both the German
+party apparatus and the apparatuses of the Comintern and the Russian
+state with betraying the proletariat. A working-class party's mistakes are
+treasonous, she argues, when they are the result of organic connections
+with interests opposed to those of the proletariat, and the German Party
+apparatus is "organically subordinated to the apparatus of the Russian
+state," whose interests are "distinct from those of the world proletariat."
+In a masterful summation that is both reasoned and impassioned Weil lists
+the ways in which what she calls the Party's "mistakes" were imposed on it
+by the Moscow-dominated Comintern, and charges that a genuine correction of things within the Party would be "directly opposed to the interests
+of the Russian state apparatus."
+Her last look at the situation, at the end of February 1933, is both
+clear-sighted and immeasurably sad. She sees the German working class
+facing an imminent and deadly battle unarmed, the weapons it had forged
+
+95
+(i.c., all the working-class organizations) being actually in the hands of
+those whose interests are not its own. And she reports that the Party, as
+a party, continues its policy of inaction, despite the increase in anti-Left
+activities and Hitlerite terror after Hitler became chancellor.
+Within a day or two of the writing of Weil's last article on Germany, the
+Reichstag was set afire. The Communists were blamed and immediately
+afterward more than four thousand Communist officials and numerous
+Social Democrats were arrested and sent to concentration camps. The
+destruction of the working-class movement against which Weil had been
+so passionately warning had begun.
+With the exception of Trotsky's articles,2 there has been virtually nothing in English on the role played by the German Communist party in the
+critical months just before Hitler's accession to power, despite the fact that
+the Communist party was the largest party in Berlin at the end of 1932,
+and the third largest parry in Germany as a whole (after the National
+Socialists and the Social Democrats). The standard histories see the period
+almost exclusively in terms of the struggle between the National Socialists
+and the bourgeois democratic parties, berween the democratic ideology of
+the Weimar Republic and the totalitarian ideology of the Nazis. The fate of
+the Communist party —and even the fate of the German working class —
+has not aroused much interest. Weil's articles, however—articles written
+within the Left and for the Left—provide an account of the destruction of
+the hopes of the working-class movement in Germany (a destruction aided
+and abetted by a Russia posing as the leader and champion of the proletariat) that not only fills in a blank space in our knowledge of the political
+struggle in Germany but is filtered through a mind that was sensitive to the
+tragic and almost epic quality of the events taking place.
+Weil's concern for the actual detail of human suffering in depression
+Germany, her romantic admiration and empathy for German workingclass youth, and the moral idealism of her concept of worker democracy all
+separate her analysis of the situation in Germany from Trotsky's. Nevertheless, Weil's analysis is based on a knowledge of what Trotsky had to say
+on the subject, and both she and Trotsky put great stress on the necessity
+for the German Communist party to immediately form a united front with
+the Social Democrats. Trotsky's proposal for a united front, however, is
+a baldly tactical one that looks forward to a quite treacherous future
+2 Collected in The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany, ed. Ernest Mandel (New York:
+Pathfnder Press, 1971).
+
+reckoning with Social Democracy after fascism has been defeated. Weil's
+concern is an immediate one—to save lives, to prevent the massacre that
+otherwise is imminent —and she takes Social Democracy's understandable
+distrust of Bolshevik tactics into account in her analysis of the difficulties
+of bringing a united front into being. In her view, these treacherous tactics
+must be set aside, and the Party must persuade the Social Democratic
+workers to come over to it by being both a genuinely revolutionary and
+a genuinely democratic party. Though Trotsky, too, placed a high priority
+on open discussion and party democracy, he did so chiefly with the aim of
+having the views of the Left Opposition aired and adopted
+Weil's analysis was not well received within the Leftist circles for which
+she was writing, for those circles were committed to the belief that, if
+revolutionary conditions existed, revolution would necessarily follow.
+Weil's articles, however, analyze why revolution was not happening, and
+why, moreover, it would not happen; like Ajax, she was counseling her
+friends not to let empty hopes lead them astray. This, understandably
+enough, was not a popular attitude. Her articles—one imagines each installment being eagerly awaited, hastily read, and heatedly discussed—
+generated a small storm of letters in response, including three lengthy
+formal replies castigating Weil as a defeatist. But it was typical of Weil's
+psychology to be hardest on her friends and on what she was most attracted to, to be unwilling to have her friends remain in ignorance of the
+truth of their situation. Whether or not she was listened to, she went on
+in the direction in which these articles show that she was beginning to
+move-to question whether, in general, there were any real prospects of
+the revolution predicted by Marx (in "Prospects: Are We Heading toward
+a Proletarian Revolution," published in November 1933), and finally to
+subject Marxism itself to a trenchant criticism in her masterful essay "Re-
+flections on the Causes of Liberty and Social Oppression" in 1934.
+
+One
+Everyone who has pinned all his hopes on the victory of the working class,
+even everyone who cares about preserving the past gains of the liberal
+bourgeoisie, ought right now to have his eyes on Germany. Germany is the
+country where the problem of the social system is being posed in a concrete
+way. For us in France, even for militants, the problem of the social system
+is a topic of speeches at meetings, newspaper articles, and café discussions.
+At most, it is a subject of theoretical study. All day long it is forgotten in
+favor of current business, trivial events, passions, interests. But for the
+majority of the German people there is no problem in their everyday lives
+that is more urgent or more acute.
+In Germany you see former engineers who manage to eat one cold meal
+a day by renting chairs in the public gardens; you see elderly men in stiff
+collars and bowler hats begging at subway exits or singing in cracked
+voices in the strects. Students are dropping out of school and selling peanuts, matches, or shoclaces on the street; their comrades, luckier thus far,
+but who for the most part have no chance whatever of finding a job when
+they finish school, know that any day they can come to that. Peasants are
+being ruined by low prices and taxes. Factory workers' earnings are both
+precarious and miserably reduced; every worker expects some time or
+other to be thrown into the compulsory idleness that is the lot of nearly
+half the German working class; or, rather, into the exhausting and degrading hectic state that consists in running from one office to another to get
+one's card stamped and receive relief (stempeln). Once a worker is unemployed, the relief payments (which are proportional to the wages he
+drew before he was dismissed) are reduced again and again until they
+become almost nothing, as the day on which he stopped having a part in
+the production process recedes into the past. An unemployed man or
+woman living with a father or mother, husband or wife who is working
+receives nothing. An unemployed worker under twenty receives nothing.
+Published in L'Ecole émancipée. December 4, 1932.
+
+98
+The impossibility of living except at the expense of his family reduces the
+unemployed worker to a state of total dependence that sours all family
+relationships. Often this dependence, when it is made intolerable by the
+reproaches of parents who poorly understand the situation and whom
+poverty has driven to distraction, forces the young unemployed workers
+out of the paternal home and drives them to vagabondage, begging, and
+sometimes to suicide. As for starting one's own family, marrying, having children, most young Germans cannor even contemplate it. Is there
+anything left that a young unemployed worker can call his own? A litile freedom. But even this freedom is threatened by the institution of
+the Arbeitsdienst [labor service], work done under military discipline for
+soldiers' pay in kinds of concentration camps for young unemployed
+workers. Although so far this form of labor is still optional, any day now
+Hitlerite pressure may make it compulsory. There is no area of a worker's
+or a German petty bourgeois's private life, especially if he is young, where
+he is not touched or threatened by the economic and political consequences of the crisis. The young, for whom the crisis is the normal state of
+affairs, the only one they have known, cannot escape it even in their
+dreams. They are deprived of everything in the present, and they have no
+future.
+In that lies the decisive aspect of the situation, and not in the poverty
+itself. The decisive aspect lies in this, that on the one hand, rightly or
+wrongly, in Germany there is less and less belief, especially among the
+young, in the transitory nature of the crisis; and on the other hand no man,
+no matter how intelligent or energetic, can have the slightest hope of escaping, through his own resourcefulness, from the general misery created by
+the crisis. A mild crisis, which forces only the least efficient workmen,
+clerks, or engineers out of the factories, lets one go on feeling that the fate
+of each individual largely depends on his own efforts to get himself personally out of trouble. A severe crisis is essentially different. Here, too,
+"quantity changes into quality." In Germany today almost no one in any
+profession can depend on his professional worth to find or keep a job. So
+everyone constantly feels entirely in the power of the regime and its fluctuations; conversely, no one can even imagine what kind of effort he could
+make to take his own fate in hand again, unless it is one that acts upon the
+very structure of society. For almost every German, at least in the petty
+bourgeoisie and the working class, prospects, good or bad, that concern
+even the most intimate aspects of one's own life are immediately formu-
+
+99
+lated, especially if one is young, as prospects that concern the future of the
+regime. Thus the amount of a people's energy that ordinarily is almost
+entirely absorbed by various passions and the defense of private interests
+is, in present-day Germany, brought to bear on the economic and political
+relationships that constitute the very framework of society.
+The situation in Germany can therefore be called revolutionary. The
+most conspicuous sign of this is that everyone's thoughts and conversations, including those of eleven-year-old children, rurn constantly and
+naturally, with the carnestness and sincerity characteristic of Germans, to
+the problem of the social order. But one sees no precursory sign of the
+revolution in peoples' actions. The wave of strikes that just swept across
+Germany, instead of inflaming the country, died out one after the other,
+including that transport workers' strike that had seemed certain to stir up
+Berlin. Yet the situation that exists now has gone on for a long time. We
+have to understand that the crisis is posing the problem of a new system of
+production, not hidden behind other apparently easier problems, as it was
+for the Russians in 1917, but brutally and directly, and to a nonhomogeneous working class. By depriving the unemployed of every future
+prospect, the crisis has led almost all of them, especially the young, to feel
+at one time or another that the transformation of the system of production is the only way out. But too often, as the period of unemployment
+lengthens, the effect of this same crisis is to deprive them of the strength to
+try to find a way out. This life of idleness and poverty, which robs skilled
+workers of their skill and the young of any possibility of learning a trade,
+which deprives the workers of their dignity as producers, which after two,
+three, or four years finally leads—and this is what is worse-to a sort of
+sad tolerance—this life is no preparation for assuming responsibilities in
+the whole system of production. Thus the crisis constantly brings new
+ranks of workers to class consciousness, but it also constantly pulls them
+back again, as the sea brings in and pulls back its waves.
+The German proletariat is also weakened by the number of office
+workers in it, a number that German capitalism increased during the
+period of prosperity with the same foolish extravagance it displayed in
+building its factories and modernizing its machinery. For the office workers, who thus make up a considerable part of both the German wage
+earners and the unemployed, are not much inclined to join ranks with the
+factory workers and are incapable, by the very nature of their profession,
+of wanting to take their fate into their own hands. Finally, there is a split
+
+100
+between the factory workers and the unemployed. The factory workers
+can manage, in spite of everything, to live within the system; they have
+something to lose and they are clinging to it; they too arc at the mercy of
+the eddies of the crisis bur, unlike the unemployed, they are not conscious
+of it all the time. This lack of solidarity deprives the unemployed of any
+influence over the economy and at the same time it in some measure deprives the factory workers of the confidence needed for any struggle. Thus,
+even though the crisis forces almost every German worker or petty bourgeois to feel, at one time or another, that all his hopes are being dashed
+against the very structure of the social system, it does not by itself group
+the German people around the workers determined to transform that system. Only an organization can remedy such weakness. Is there, among the
+organizations that group German workers together in such large numbers,
+one that can in fact remedy it ?
+This is literally a lifc-and-death question for a great many German
+workers. In October 1917 Lenin observed that it is during revolutionary
+periods that the unconscious masses, as long as they are not being dragged
+along by the action in the wake of the conscious workers, most avidly consume counterrevolutionary poisons. The Hitlerite movement is another
+example of this. And despite the electoral defeats, as long as the crisis continues and a revolutionary movement does not triumph, the Hitlerite
+storm troops (which may have the apparatus of the state behind them any
+diy) constitute a permanent threat of extermination for the best elements
+uf the working class. Even excluding the possibility of a systematic extermination, the crisis itself (assuming that it lasts for some time yet) will
+destroy generations of German workers, especially the younger generations. Already, among those who have been able to survive three or four
+years of unemployment, the less resistant ones have been weakened moral-
+Iy and physically by poverty and idleness. They are going to have to get
+through a winter, which may be severe, without heat or hot meals; and
+after this winter, possibly still another one. Those who do not die of it will
+lose their health and strength to it. And the life of the German workers is of
+vital importance to us as well. For, in the breakdown of the capitalist
+economy that is threatening to wipe our the gains of the workers in the
+democratic countries and even in the Ussk by a wave of reaction, our
+greatest hope lies in the German working class, the most mature, the most
+disciplined, the most educated in the world; and especially in the workingclass youth of Germany.
+Nothing is more crushing than the life of dependence, idleness, and
+
+101
+deprivation that is the lot of the young German workers; at the same time
+one cannot imagine anyone more couragcous, more lucid, or more fraternal than the best of them, despite this life. On the whole, in spite of the
+poverty, theft and crime have little hold over these young people, and
+fascist agitation, for its part, has relatively little influence on them. They
+are not trying to forget; they are not complaining; in this hopeless situation
+they are resisting every form of despair. In general they are trying-some
+with more energy than others, and the best wholly achieve it—to build
+a fully human life within the inhuman situation in which they have been
+placed. They don't have the money to satisfy their hunger, but many
+deprive themselves of the necessities of life to obtain what makes life worth
+living. They find a few pennies in order to remain in the sports organizations that send them, boys and girls alike, cheerful in spite of everything,
+off in bands to the forests and lakes to enjoy the wholesome, free pleasures
+of water, air, and sun. They cur down on food to buy books; some form
+study circles where they read the classics of the revolutionary movement,
+write, or debate. It is not unusual to find among them minds more cultured
+than are some of the supposedly educated bourgeois among us. But more
+striking yet is the degree to which this yourh is conscious of itself. In France
+there are only the young and the old; over there, there is a youth. In these
+working-class girls with their sunburnt complexions, in these young working men with their feverish eyes and hollow cheeks whom one sees walking
+the streets of Berlin, one senses atevery turn that, underlying the sadness as
+well as the apparent insouciance, there is a seriousness that is the reverse of
+despair, a full and unremitting consciousness of the tragic lot that they
+have been dealt; an unremitting consciousness of the weight with which
+the regime-this old regime that they have not accepted-is pressing
+down on them, crushing all their aspirations. The fact that in this period of
+crisis the regime is depriving them completely of those future prospects
+that are the natural prerogative of youth makes more acute, by contrast,
+their awareness that they have a future locked up inside thein. And they do
+have a future locked inside them. If in our disintegrating system there are
+any men capable of giving us something new, it is this generation of young
+German workers. Provided, that is, that the fascist gangs, or simply cold
+and hunger, do not deprive them either of their lives or, at any rate, of their
+vital energy.
+We can scarcely be anything in this drama but spectators. I et us, at least,
+give it the attention it deserves. To start with, ler us take stock of the situation; let us establish the relation of forces.
+
+Two
+On the sixth of November, while the big bourgeoisie' was massing all its
+forces behind the von Papen government, 70 percent of the electorate
+voted for the slogans "Down with the Government of the Barons!"
+"Down with the Exploiters!" "For Socialism!" But the hig bourgeoisie
+continues to rule Germany. Yet seven-tenths of the population-what
+a force for socialism! But this seven-tenths is divided among three parties.
+THE HITLERITE MOVEMENT
+Of these three parties, the National Socialist party is by far the strongest.
+Even though it lost votes between the thirty-first of July and the sixth
+of November, on the latter date it still grouped a third of the voters behind it. The fundamental characteristic of the National Socialist movement—one that makes it almost incomprehensible for a Frenchman— is its
+incoherence; an incredible incoherence, which is only a reflection of the
+essential incoherence of the German nation in its present situation. First of
+all, the movement is socially incoherent. Every serious crisis rouses the
+masses to rebellion at every level of the population except the highest.
+Among these masses there are some men who are capable of becoming the
+conscious and responsible architects of a new regime. But there is a far
+greater number of unconscious and irresponsible men who can only blindly desire the end of the regime that is crushing them. Grouped behind the
+first, they constitute a revolutionary force; but if one man manages, as
+Hitler did, to form a separate group of the larger numher, they necessarily
+fall under the control of big capital, in whose service they form armed
+gangs to support the worst kind of reaction and dictatorship and carry out
+pogroms. Since the Hitlerite movement is of this nature, it groups those
+who feel the weight of the regime without heing able to look to themselves
+to transform it: the majority of the intellectuals, the broad masses of the
+petty bourgeoisie of town and country, almost all the agricultural workers,
+and finally a good many urban workers, almost all of them unemployed.
+l'ublished in L'Ecole émancipée, December 18, 1932.
+¡ Grande bourgeoisie. Weil uses the term in the Marxist sense meaning "big capitalists."
+2 Of the ten members of von Papen's cabinet (known as the "Cabinet of the Barons"),
+seven helonged to the nobility.
+
+• The Situation in Gennany
+103
+Among the latter, who are in the storm troops at least in some degree as
+simple mercenaries, there are many fifteen- to eighteen-year-old adolescents who have scarcely any relationship to the working class, for they met
+with the economic crisis on leaving school and there has never even been
+any question of working as far as they are concerned. If one adds some
+members of the big bourgeoisie (the majority of whom are behind the
+scenes, although a few belong to the party) and a prince or two, one will
+have a complete picture of the composition of the Hitlerite movement.
+The propaganda is no less incoherent. It attracts romantic young boys
+with the prospect of heroic struggles and self-sacrifice, and brutes with the
+implicit promise that some day they will be able to heat people up and kill
+them right and left. It promises high sales prices to the countryside and
+a low cost of living to the cities. But the lack of any coherence in Hitlerite
+policy is most obvious in the National Socialist party's relations with the
+other parties. The party to which the Hitlerites are essentially related is the
+German National party, the party of the big bourgeoisie, the party that
+supports the "barons"; like the "barons," the Hitlerites' basic goal is
+a struggle to the death with the Communist movement and the crushing of
+all opposition from the working classes; they claim that they are supporters of private property, the family, and religion, and that they will
+relentlessly fight against the class struggle. But they are estranged from the
+parties of the big bourgeoisie by the social composition of the movement,
+the resultant demagogy, and the personal ambitions of the leaders. On the
+other hand, surprising as it may seem, there are such striking similarities
+between the Hitlerite movement and the Communist movement that, atter
+the elections, the Hitlerite press had to devote a long article to denying
+rumors of negotiations between Hitlerites and Communists with an eye to
+forming a coalition government. The fact is that from August to November 6, the slogans of both parties were almost identical. The Hitlerites, too,
+inveigh against exploitation, low salaries, and the poverty of the unemployed. Their main rallying cry is "Down with the System"; they, too, call
+the transformation of the system revolution; they, too, call the system to
+come socialism. Although the Hitlerite party refuses to acknowledge the
+class struggle and often uses storm troops to break strikes, it can just as
+well (as was quite evident during the Berlin transport strike) publish extremely violent articles supporting a strike, fire off slogans implying the
+existence of a bitter class struggle, and call all the reformists traitors. And
+although the Hitlerites accuse the Social Democrats of betraying both
+
+104
+Germany by being internationalists and the proletariat by being reformists, the Hitlerites have one thing in common with them that is of paramount importance, namely, the economic program. For both the National
+Socialist party and Social Democracy, socialism is nothing but the control
+of a more or less considerable part of the economy by the state, without
+i preliminary transformation of the state apparatus and without the reorganization of any effective workers' control; it is, therefore, nothing but
+state capitalism. This likemindedness is the basis of a tendency in favor
+of a government that would in some as yet undetermined way be turned
+into a main wheel of the economy, a government that would be supported both by the Social Democratic trade unions and the National
+Socialist movement. Leipart,3 in the trade-union burcaucracy, and Gregor
+Strasser, 4 in the Hitlerite camp, support this tendency. It also has the support of some young and brilliant economists associated with the review
+Die Tat, who defend it in the interests of finance capital, and its principal
+representative is said to be von Schleicher himself.s
+This highly disparate movement seems at first glance to find unity of
+a sort in nationalist fanaticism, which reaches the level of hysteria in some
+petty-bourgeois women and which the Hitlerites are trying to use to revive
+the Union Sacréeó of the old days, under the new name "Socialism of the
+Front." But they are not really succeeding. Nationalist propaganda by itself is not enough. The Hitlerites are bound to profit from the feeling
+shared by all Germans that their nation is being crushed not only by the
+oppression of German capitalism, but also by the added weight of the
+oppression of the victorious nations that is burdening the whole German
+economy. The Hitlerites try to give out, on the one hand, that the latter
+burden is by far the more crushing, and on the other that the oppressive
+nature of German capitalism is due solely to the Jews. The result of this is
+3 Thendore Leipart (1867-1947) was the chairman of the workers' division of the General Federation of German Trade Unions.
++ Gregor Strasser (1892-1934) was a National Socialist parry organizer and leader of the
+socialist left wing of the party.
+5 General Kurt von Schleicher (1882-1934) became chancellor on December 2, 1932,
+a few days before Weil's firstarticle on Germany appeared. Von Schleicher was attempting to
+solve the more than wo-year-long governmental crisis resulting from the inability of any one
+party to gain a majority in Parliament by creating a broad-front government based on support from the National Socialists and the trade unions.
+6 National uniry resulting from all political groups putting aside their differences and joining together against an external enemy. The term was first used by President of the Republic
+Raymond l'oincaré at the nurbreak of the First World War, when he appealed to all the
+French, Right, I eft, and Center, to unite "in the same patriotic fairh."
+
+105
+a patriotism quite different from the idiotic adulation of the army that we
+know as nationalism in France; it is a patriotism based on the feeling that
+the victorious nations, France in particular, represent the current system,
+and that Germany stands for all the human values crushed by the regime;
+in short, it is a patriotism based on the feeling that there is a radical opposition between the terms "German" and "capitalist." One can only admire
+the powerful influence that the proletariat possesses in Germany at present
+when one sees that the Hitlerite party, which is controlled by the big
+bourgeoisie and primarily draws recruits from among the petry bourgeoisic, has to present even patriotism as nothing but a form of the struggle
+against capital. What is still more wonderful is that, in a situation like this,
+Hitlerite propaganda has on the whole little hold over the workers, including the Hitlerite workers. The latter, in their frequent and sometimes
+almost amicable discussions with the Communists, rightly scoff at them
+for their illusions about a supposed international solidarity that does not
+exist; but they do not accuse them of betraying the fatherland. Even when
+they argue with the Communists, the Hitlerite workers generally leave the
+national question in the background and stay in the area of working-class
+interests. They accuse the Russian government of making the Russian
+workers miserable, whereas Hitler would make the German workers
+happy by giving them each a plot of land and protecting them in a paternalistic way against the excessive demands of the bosses; and they bitterly reproach the German Communists for betraying the revolution when
+they side with the Social Democrats, those upholders of the regime, against
+them, the Hitlerite workers, who sincerely believe themselves to be good
+revolutionaries.
+In short, Hitlerite propaganda, although it gives the workers it reaches
+the most confused ideas and prevents them from attaining true class consciousness, allows them their working-class spirit. A German worker, even
+a Hitlerite, remains a worker before everything else. And in the Hitlerite
+movement the young workers, especially, keep intact the feeling that lies at
+the heart of all German working-class youth, the urgent feeling that there
+is a future that belongs to them, to which they have a right, from which the
+social system is mercilessly cutting them off, and for the sake of which they
+must destroy the system. The petty-bourgeois Hitlerites, for their part,
+remain petty bourgeois, swinging back and forth between the influence of
+the big bourgeoisie and the influence (clearly stronger at the moment) of
+the proletariat. The big bourgeois in the Hitlerite movement remain big
+bourgeois; the aristocrats remain aristocrats; as for the common brutes
+
+106
+who, whatever their social class, are readily attracted to the Hitlerite
+movement, they remain common brutes. Although Hitler has succeeded in
+bringing together all classes in his movement, he has by no means succeeded in dissolving class barriers. But the more disparate the composition
+of Hitler's party becomes, and the more its policies entail essential contradictions, the greater is the need for something to hold these diverse elements together in a single bloc. But what?
+What unites the members of the Hitlerite movement is, first of all, the
+future that it promises them. What future? It is not described, or it is
+described in several contradictory ways, and therefore it can take on the
+color of each man's dreams. But what is certain is that it will be a new system, a "third reich," something that will resemble neither the past nor,
+above all, the present. And what attracts intellectuals, petty bourgeois,
+office workers, and the unemployed to this undefined future is that they
+sense a force in the party that is promising it to them. This force is glaringly
+apparent everywhere—in the parades of uniformed men, in the acts of
+violence, in the use of airplanes for propaganda. All these weak elements
+fly roward it like moths to a flame. What they do not know is that if it
+appears to be so powerful, it is because it is the force not of those who are
+preparing the way for the future, but of those who rule over the present.
+The prospect of an unknown future and the feeling uf a mysterious force
+are more than enough to lead disciplined gangs of these desperate men
+thirsting for a transformation of the social system to massacre those who
+are preparing for that transformation.
+But hasn't this danger been averted? Isn't the Hitlerite movement in
+rapid decline? And haven't the Hitlerite workers been converted to the
+practice of the class struggle?
+There is no doubt that the Hitlerite movement has lost strength. But this
+weakening is due less to working-class opposition than to the fighting
+among the bourgeois factions. In July the Junkers set von l'apen's authoritarian government before Hitler instead of Brüning's weak one.? In August
+- This is nor quite right. Brüning resigned as chancellor on May 30, 1932. President
+Hindenburg then appointed von Papen to rule with a temporary presidential cabinet until
+new Reichstag elections could be held July 3 1. When the July elections gave no party a majority, and Hitler refused (on August 13) to accept the position uf vice-chancellor, Hindenburg insisted on retaining von Papen and his presidential cabinet. Moreover, although
+von Papen's government was more authoritarian than Brüning's, Brüning was more consistently opposed to the National Socialists; von Papen favored bringing them into the government where, he thought, he could both control them and benefit from their mass support.
+
+• The Siluation in Germany
+107
+heavy industry, without completely abandoning Hitler, also aligned itself
+behind von Papen. As soon as Hitler ceased to appear to be the stronger
+force he lost a good deal of his prestig, which is what explains his setback
+on the sixth of November. But vis-à-vis the big bourgeoisie, this rapid loss
+of strength is a means of blackmail, and that is a strength. The big bourgeoisie would like to make use of Hitler without handing the government
+over to him. But if it were to continue to leave him out of the picture, as it
+did from August to December, the Hitlerite movement would break up
+and the big bourgeoisie would find itself isolated, cut off from the masses,
+facing a growing wave of working-class discontent. Despite its machine
+guns it would then doubtless be lost, barring a swift return of industrial
+prosperiry, which in Germany is highly improbable. There is little reason
+to hope for such foolish tactics on the part of the big bourgeoisie, especially since the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, the mouthpiece of heavy
+industry, has constantly warned against this danger since the beginning of
+November, and called for a consolidation of all the nationalist parties.
+Von Schleicher is going to try to obtain either the more or less openly
+declared support of the Hitlerites alone, with a view to a nationalist bloc,
+or the support of the Hitlerites and the trade unions together, with a view
+to a "trade-union government." If the Hitlerites, under the influence of
+the revolutionary feelings of the base and the personal ambitions of the
+leaders, completely refuse to negotiate, one sees no way out for the big
+bourgeoisie other than a Hitlerite government; that is, the suppression of
+the working-class organizations and organized massacre.
+As far as the Hitlerites' revolutionary actions are concerned, it would be
+dangerous to have any illusions about them. They also are a means of
+blackmailing the big bourgeoisie. Along with the Communists, the Hitlerite party supported the wave of strikes that came in response to
+von Papen's emergency decrees; it particularly supported the strike of the
+transport workers that turned Berlin upside down at the beginning of
+November, a strike in which the whole population took part and that
+wrung cries of alarm from the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. For the
+National Socialist party the strike was a means both to win working-class
+votes and to remind the big bourgeoisie that the National Socialist party
+was indispensable to it, and, to judge by the commentaries in the Deutsche
+Allgemeine Zeitung, it succeeded perfectly. The day after the elections, the
+strike, against which the trade-union bureaucracy had been fighting for
+several days, became embarrassing and dangerous for Hitler as well; it was
+
+108
+brought to an end immediately, and it ended in defeat. On the very eve of
+the elections, the Hitlerite press was issuing slogans identical to those
+of the Communists; the day after, it began a series of sensational articles
+designed to prove that Hitler alone could wipe out communism in Germany. As for the strikers themselves, as long as the strike is not an infraction of party discipline, the fact that some Hitlerite workers are striking is
+no guarantee at all that these same workers will not use the same violence
+a few months hence to put down strikes; all it would take would be for the
+Hitlerite party, in the meantime, to have had a share in power. And these
+workers would think that they were continuing to serve their class, just as,
+with better reason, the Bolshevik workers who put down the anarchist
+movements after the October Revolution thought they were serving their
+class. Thus the fact that they have drawn the Hitlerite workers over to
+their side in a struggle does not constitute a success for the Communists as
+long as they have not separated the Hitlerite workers from their party.
+It can even be said that as long as the united front between Communists
+and Hitlerite workers is not extended to include the Social Democratic
+workers, it increases Hitler's prestige in the eyes of the working-class
+masses, as the elections of November 6 showed in Berlin.
+There is only one way the conscious workers can defeat the Hitlerite
+movement; it is, on the one hand, to make the masses understand that
+a nationalist movement, founded on the union of classes, cannot bring
+about a new system, and, on the other hand, to make them feel the existence of another force confronting the force of Hitler's movement, that of
+the proletariat grouped in its own organizations.
+But no sooner does one set forth this program than one is astonished
+that it has not already been carried out and the Hitlerite movement broken
+up. No nation is more accessible to effective propaganda than the Germans, who read and reflect so extensively. As for the question of strength,
+four million workers are organized in the German trade unions, and on
+November 6 there were six million Communist votes.
+What does the German working-class movement lack? To understand
+this, it is necessary to examine both its reformist and revolutionary
+aspects.
+
+Three • German Reformism
+"In a revolution," Marx wrote in 1848, "the proletarians have nothing to
+lose but their chains. And they have a world to win." Reformism is based
+on the denial of the truth of this formula. German reformism's strength is
+based on the German working-class movement's being a movement of
+a proletariat whose experience has long failed to bear out the truth of this
+formula, a proletariat that for a long time has had something to hold onto
+inside the regime.
+The working-class movement, which from 1792 to 1871 had developed
+primarily in France, where it took an adventurous, violent, almost always
+illegal, and moreover anarchistic form, found a sort of homeland in Germany after 1871, but there it took a prudent, methodical, carefully organized, and almost always legal form. The German workers were organized
+at the beginning of the imperialist period; they took advantage of the new
+expansion of the capitalist economy to win themselves a more human existence within the framework of the regime. Interrupted by the misery of the
+war and the postwar period and by the revolutionary impetus that resulted
+from it, the working-class movement took up where it left off after October 1923, as soon as that revolutionary impetus had been smashed; and
+from 1924 to 1929 it found excellent soil for growth in a Germany somewhat giddy from economic prosperity. It can be said that the working-class
+organization in Germany has given its full measure within the limits of
+capitalist legality. The results should not be disregarded. At present, in
+spite of more than four years of economic crisis, the General Federation of
+Labor there has more than four million members; factories that employ
+only trade-union members are not uncommon; and the key industries, the
+railroads, and the state enterprises are, because of the proportion of union
+workers in them, in the hands of the Federation. This formidable organization secured quite high wages for the German workers during the boom.
+But organizing the workers in the factories is only a part of the German
+trade unions' efforts to increase the workers' health, happiness, and prosperity. Subscriptions serve to maintain numerous and very substantial
+relief funds. In addition there are trade-union libraries, trade-union
+schools where workers selected by the unions can stay at union expense,
+Published in I. 'Ecole émancipée, January 8, 1933.
+
+110
+and freethinkers' associations and sports organizations that are organically tied to the unions, all of which allow the workers to devote their leisure
+time to the cultivation of mind and body. All this is wonderfully organized,
+and housed in magnificent buildings where one again meets with the same
+almost mad extravagance as that displayed by the capitalists during the
+boom. One must recognize that German reformism has done a marvelous
+job of ordering the lives of the workers as humanely as it is possible to do
+within the capitalist regime. It has not freed the German workers from
+their chains, but it has obtained some valuable benefits for them: a little
+comfort, a little leisure, some cultural opportunities.
+But the German trade-union organizations not only have to adapt themselves to the conditions created by the regime; through the force of circumstance, they are bound to the regime by bonds they cannot break. They
+grew with the regime, and they have assumed, so to speak, its exact shape;
+they can exist only within the capitalist system and in the shadow of the
+power that is the protector of the present order, the power of the state. It
+goes without saying that, for the offices, schools, and libraries that are laid
+out in such beautiful buildings, an illegal existence is not even conceivable.
+As for the trade-union funds, their very wealth makes them dependent on
+the state, the protector of capital.
+"The assets of the trade unions," writes the trade-union mouthpiece Die
+Arbeit, "are, for the most part, invested in mortgage bonds. To obtain
+liquid funds, the unions have to mortgage these bonds to the Reichsbank
+or sell them on the Stock Exchange. The government can block off these
+two channels if the unions spend this money not for social welfare but to
+finance major struggles."
+In this way the trade unions are bound to the state apparatus by golden
+chains; and by these same golden chains, which they themselves have
+forged, the workers in their turn are bound to the trade-union apparatus
+and, through it, to the apparatus of the state. For expulsion, a weapon the
+trade-union apparatus frequently uses against workers who would like to
+orient it toward the struggle against the state, is a genuine hardship; the
+expelled worker loses his rights to aid from the relief funds to which he
+made such heavy contributions. And the organizations that are tied to the
+trade-union federation necessarily adopt a similar attitude toward the
+state. The Social Democratic party is a case in point. The pure trade unionists sometimes try to shift responsibility for the political line followed by
+the German trade unions onto the Social Democratic party, to which all
+
+111
+the militants of the trade-union movement belong. Bur even before the war
+the German trade unions had a far less combative attitude toward the
+regime than Social Democracy, and the same is still true today. Far from
+the Social Democratic party's controlling the trade-union movement, it
+can be said that the party is more the parliamentary expression of the rclations between the trade-union apparatus and the state apparatus; the
+events of the twentieth and twenty-first of July 1932 furnish an example
+of this. ' The very way the German trade unions are structured prohibits
+them from cutting their ties to the present social system for fear of being
+crushed. Even should there come a stage of the capitalist economy in which
+Marx's formula is proved to be true, in which the regime deprives the
+workers of everything except their chains, it would not be possible for the
+German trade unions to change the purpose for which they were originally
+intended and become instruments suitable for overthrowing the regime;
+any more than a file, in case of need, could change itself into a hammer.
+Well, that time seems to have come. Or at any rate it is incontestable that
+the formula cited above has proved true for the duration of the crisis, and
+has proved true generally insofar as the capitalist economy is doomed to
+remain, as most people think it will, in a state of latent crisis. And as the
+capitalist regime was shaken more severely by the crisis, the German trade
+unions, far from disengaging themselves from the regime, in fact clung
+more and more fearfully to the power of the state as the only element of
+stability.
+Several years have already passed since the German trade-union federation openly subordinated its action to the state by agreeing to what the
+Germans call the "rule of wage rates." According to this rule, every labor
+contract has the force of law, andevery dispute has to be brought before an
+arbitration board whose decision also has the force of law. If the workers
+want to strike without the employers' having violated the conditions of
+the labor contract or the decision by arbitration, the trade unions, bound
+by the Friedenspflicht (literally "duty of peace"), must oppose it, under
+penalty of losing their legal status. Of course, the trade-union apparatus
+scrupulously respects the Friedenspflicht, not only by cutting off aid to all
+so-called wildcat strikes —that is, strikes not approved by the union-but
+even by occasionally expelling union members who participate in them.
+• On July 20 Chancellor von Papen deposed the Social Democratic government of P'russia.
+The Social Democrars and trade-union leaders considered calling for a general strike, hut
+decided against it our of fear that it might lead to civil war.
+
+112
+This law of wage rates—which, it was said, was to protect the workers
+against arbitrary actions on the part of the employers—has in fact served
+to shield the factory owners in their attacks on wages. As for the Social
+Democratic party, one knows how it constantly capitulated under the
+Brüning government;? at the time labor contracts were renewed it allowed
+Brüning to reduce all wages by emergency decree. The result of this policy
+was that by the time Brüning lost power the factory workers had slipped,
+almost without resistance, from a fairly high standard of living to an
+impoverished state.
+Then came von Papen's government and the coup d'etat of July 20
+which, by abruptly expelling Social Democracy from the government of
+Prussia, stripped it of what remained of its political power. Everyone expected vigorous resistance. At the time of the Kapp putsch in 1920' German Social Democracy had shown how vigorous it could be. In July 1932
+it remained inert. Why? In private conversations, trade-union militants
+gave the following explanations, thus revealing the real relations between
+Social Democracy, the trade-union organizations, and the state: "To us,
+the safety of our organizations is the primary consideration. Political reaction, in itself, does not endanger them in any way. In its present stage of
+development the capitalist economy needs the trade unions. And we're not
+afraid of Hitler; if he attempted a putsch, he would be faced with us on one
+side and the government apparatus on the other."
+The conclusion was that the only thing the trade-union organizations
+have to fear is a struggle between them and the state, a struggle in which
+they would certainly be crushed.
+= Heinrich Brüning, i member of the Catholic Center parry, was chancellor from
+March 28, 1930, until May 30. 1932. Unable to form a government supported by a majority in Parliament, Brüning was obliged to resort to article 48 of the constirurion, which
+allowcd him to govern by decree. In July 1930 the Social Democrats, the Communists, and
+the National Socialists vored to overrule Brüning's energency decrees relating in the budget;
+the Reichsrag was dissolved and new clections set for September. The Seprember elections
+showed an overwhelming increase in National Socialist votes—more than six million, up
+from 81o.ooo in the election two years previously, an increase of 700 percent. The National
+Socialist party had become the second largest parry in Germany. Alarmed by this growth, the
+Social Democratic party decided to "tolerate" the Brüning government as a "lesserevil," and
+it remained in power nearly two more years.
+3 The Kapp putsch was led by General Walther von Lurewitz and Woltgang Kapp. Its
+major cause was the Weimar Republic's arrempt to reduce the German armed forces, as required by the Versailles Treaty, by disbanding some of the Freikorps formations. Two
+Freikorps brigades occupied Berlin; the regular army refused to intervene, the government
+fled to Sruttgart, and Kapp proclaimed himself chancellor. The trade unions, however, called
+for a general strike, and the putsch collapsed.
+
+113
+The unions were forced out of their passivity, however, when the emergency decrees of the fourth and fifth of October authorized the factory
+owners, in certain cases, to lower wages below the rate fixed by the labor
+contract. One after another the factories affected by the decree went
+on strike. The unions approved these strikes insofar as they were based
+on the law of wage rates and, consequently, were not contrary to the
+Friedenspflicht, but, again out of respect for the Friedenspflicht, the unions
+openly did all they could to prevent each strike cither from being extended
+to other objectives than the fight against the emergency decree or trom
+going beyond the confines of the factory by joining up with similar movements. They succeeded in this all the more easily as the employers, artracted by the production bonuses that von Papen had just instituted,
+generally gave in immediately. Some factory owners appealed to the arbitration board, which of course decided in their favor; the union, conforming as always to the Friedenspflicht, then broke the strike. Only one strike
+was difficult to break: the famous movement of the Berlin transport
+workers, when Communists and Hitlerites together succeeded in bringing
+streetcars, busses, and subways to a complete halt for a period of several
+days; but on November 8 the striking transport workers went back to their
+jobs, having gained nothing.
+The ministerial crisis* caused by the elections of November 6 marks the
+beginning of a new stage in the history of the relations between German
+reformism and the state. Social Democracy announced that it would fight
+von Papen by every possible means if he returned to power; it let it be
+understood that its opposition to von Schleicher would be more moderate.
+When von Schleicher became chancellor, Leipart, a leader of the tradeunion bureaucracy, said to the special correspondent from Excelsior: "We
+have nothing to reproach the Chancellor with as regards his political past;
+the social problem is very much in the forefront of his concerns. "S In order
+to appreciate this statement, one needs to know that it was von Schleicher
+4 The November 6 election gave no party a majority. Von Papen resigned on Novernber
+1?, expecting to be reappointed by President Hindenburg and to govern be decree until the
+constitution and the electoral laws could be changed. Von Schleicher. however. charged thar
+the reappointment of von Papen would run the risk of civil war, and Hindenburg asked
+von Papen to step aside. On December 2 von Schleicher, who expected to he able to form
+either a national-front government that included the National Socialists or a broad front
+including the National Socialists and the trade-union leaders, was appointed chancellor.
+• Leipart later flarly denied having said this, bur the journalist stands by what he wrote. All
+that one can affirm on this subject is that the statements reported by Excelsior are wholly consistent with Leipart's repuration in Germany. (Nore of su)
+
+11¢
+who gave the Hitlerite storm troops the right to wear uniforms again and
+who organized the coup d'etat of July 20. Leipart announced that the
+unions were ready to grant von Schleicher a truce if he organized work for
+the unemployed, abolished the emergency decrees by which von Papen had
+reduced wages and unemployment relief, and gave up the idea of changing
+the electoral law and the constitution. However, so far neither Social
+Democracy nor von Schleicher has done anything to bring about a rapprochement; each is standing his ground, the one with its social demands,
+the other with his declarations of attachment to the traditional economy
+and the economic measures of von Papen. Perhaps some underground
+deals are being made. In any case, for both sides it's a waiting game.
+In what direction will German reformism move? To a great extent the
+crisis is making it lose its effectiveness, not only from the point of view of
+the proletariat but also from that of the capitalists. When the bourgeoisie is
+in a position to allow the workers some comforts, it can count on the benefits they possess inside the regime to tie them to the regime; when nothing is
+left to them but their chains, the bourgeoisie cannot count on the memory
+of the benefits that the workers once enjoyed to keep them pacified. In the
+first instance, the bourgeoisie is satisfied with corporative organizations
+under the indirect control of the state; in the second, it may need organizations from the inside of which it can exercise direct constraint over the
+workers-that is, fascist organizations. For, notwithstanding the oratory
+of the Communist parties, the German trade unions are not yet fascist. In
+a fascist union, the factory owners and the workers are organized together,
+membership is compulsory for the workers, and the government intervenes directly; none of these characteristics is found in the German trade
+unions. Will the secret compliciry of the trade-union apparatus be cnough
+for the German bourgeoisie, or will it have to establish a fascist regime? All
+that can be said for certain on this subject is that the present equilibrium
+is unstable. The most unstable equilibrium may last a long time but the
+slightest shock is enough to destroy it, and in Germany manifestations of
+despair on the part of the unemployed may produce that shock. But if the
+German bourgeoisie resorts to fascism, another question arises: will it unleash the Hitlerite gangs, under the command of von Schleicher or of Hitler
+himself, against the working-class organizations, regardless of whether
+they are revolutionary or reformist? Or will it turn to the trade-union
+apparatus itself in order to painlessly transform the unions into fascist
+organizations?
+
+115
+Would the union workers allow their own organizations to cynically
+betray their cause in this way? Before asking this question, one must ask
+how it happens that they have accepted everything they have accepted
+so far.
+Four
+The cadres of German Social Democracy are creatures who are as naturally found lodged in the magnificent offices of the reformist organizations as
+is the nautilus in its chambered shell: they are contented, self-satisfied
+creatures, brothers of those chambered in the most luxurious offices of
+government or industry, and they are wholly estranged from the proletariat. Our German comrades call them "bonzes."' But the hase, despite the
+presence of some members of the petty bourgeoisic, is essentially working
+class; and, moreover, it is composed of workers who are fully conscious of
+belonging, above and beyond all else, to the proletariat.
+Some may deny this. Certainly the German workers, finding within the
+regime a little comfort and the occasional possibility of enjoying the only
+pleasures that mean anything to them—music, intellectual culture, physical exercise, outdoor life-have become attached to the organizations that
+provide these benefits and have been diverted from dangerous attempts to
+destroy the system of production in order to construct another. But one
+cannot reproach them for that. It is natural that a worker who neither
+looks to the revolution for adventure nor views it simply as a myth does
+not embark on the revolutionary path unless he sees no other way out and
+that course seems feasible to him. The most fully conscious worker is the
+one who has the clearest idea not only of the main defects of the regime but
+also of the immense tasks and the crushing responsibilities that a revolution entails. True, for the generation that has now reached maturity, the
+war made the essentially inhuman character of the regime clear enough,
+especially in starving and defeated Germany. But the revolutionary movement that followed the war was twice crushed, first through the bloody
+Published in L'Ecole emancipée, January 15, 1933.
+r "Bonze" is a Japanese word meaning "priess." As used by the European Ief it was
+a derogarory term for members of a parasitic and powerful burcaucracy:
+
+116
+defeat of the Spartacists? and then without a fight in the defeat of October
+1923. What is surprising in the fact that afterward the German workers
+again took it easy in this capitalist world that prosperity was once more
+making habitable? And if some of them succumbed to giddiness during
+that wave of prosperity that made Ford himself reel, it must be remembered that everyone around them was predicting, with the eloquence that
+comes from conviction, a period of continuous progress for the capitalist
+economy and a continuous increase in comfort, cultural opportunities,
+and newly won political liberties for the workers.
+Now the crisis is upon us. Because it is a purely economic phenomenon,
+the crisis shows the inhuman character of the regime even more clearly
+than the war did. It is more effective than any propaganda in making the
+workers (all of whom have been more or less brutally hit by it) understand
+that they have no place in the system as human beings, but are mere tools,
+tools that are left to rust when there is nothing to be gained from using
+them for work. At the same time the regime is losing its trappings of
+democracy. And now the crisis is in its fourth year and the German proletariat seems powerless and bewildered by the catastrophe, as it was during
+the early years of the war —powerless, as then, to cut its ties with organizations that served it in happier times but now can only hand it over to the
+mechanical cruelty of the system.
+However, there is no doubt at all that Social Democracy has lost quite a
+lot of its influence since the beginning of the crisis. In the July 3 r elections,
+it lost 700,000 votes; in the November 6 elections, another 600,000. But
+the main thing is that even inside the reformist organizations there are
+signs of disagreements, sometimes of an extraordinarily violent nature,
+2 The Spartacist League, founded by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, was originally a Lett, antiwar, revolutionary opposition group within the Social Democratic party.
+During the soldiers' and workers' revolt of November 1918 that ousted the kaiser, the
+Spartacists tried to utilize the workers' and soldiers' councils that grew out of the revolt tu
+establish a revolutionary government in Berlin in competition with the new Social Democratic government. This failed, and at the end of December the Spartacists separated from the
+Independent Socialists and formed the German Communist party. Early in January they
+called for an end to the Social Democratic government and occupied the Social Democratic
+party's newspaper building and the Berlin police headquarters. The government responded
+with military force, and, with the help of the newly created Freikorps, the Spartacist uprising
+was put down within a few days. Thousands were killed in Berlin alone, including Liebknecht
+and Luxemburg.
+3 Weil has the figures turned around. In July the Social Democratic party lust 618.000
+votes; in November, 711,700.
+
+• The Siluation in Gennany
+117
+between those who represent the organizations (and, like them, are indissolubly tied to the regime) and the workers who make up the organizations
+and whom the regime itself repulses. As it is, the Social Democrats only
+reluctantly agreed to vote for Hindenburg.4 Social Democracy's passivity
+on July 2o caused indignation in the entire rank and file, and even in the
+part of the trade-union apparatus that is in contact with the rank and file.
+After July 20 debate began in the Social Democratic sections, something
+hitherto unheard of. The older members supported the leaders; the young
+demanded action, a united front with the Communists, and a struggle
+against all the terroristic measures the bureaucracy is trying to impose by
+raising the specter of civil war. But the young are not changing the attitude
+of the organizations. And even though the organizations are not keeping
+up their full numerical strength, they are at least-and this is more important-maintaining their strategic positions. The trade unions continue
+to rule in the factories, and so far they have succeeded in crushing every
+movement of any scope to which they are opposed. The reformist bureaucracy continues to control the wheels of the production process. The
+workers are balking, but the bureaucracy does what it wants.
+What does it want? To save its offices. To save the organizations,
+without asking what purpose they serve. The bonzes are assisted in this
+task by honest militants who, out of long habit of devotion to the organizations, consider them ends in themselves. But what danger threatens these
+organizations that capitalism, as one trade-union functionary used to say,
+doesn't need! Only one: civil war. A working-class insurrection would
+begin by sweeping them away, and an armed attack by the Hitlerite gangs
+would crush them. So it is a matter of avoiding acute forms of the class
+struggle, of preserving peace at any price, that is, at the price of any
+capitulation whatever. It would probably not frighten the bonzes to accept
+a fascist regime, especially since the measures of state capitalism that
+fascism entails could easily secm like "a little bit of socialism" to people for
+whom socialism is nothing more than state capitalism. On the other hand,
+the united front does frighten them; like everyone else, they know that
+Kerenskys would have done better to ally himself with Kornilov rather
+4 In che presidential elections of 1932 the Social Democratic parry urged its members to
+vote for Hindenburg as a "lesser evil" than Hitler, although it had opposed the monarchist
+and conservative Hindenburg in the previous presidential election in 1925.
+5 Aleksandr Kerensky (1881-1970) became head of the provisional Russian government
+in July 19r7. In September Lavr Kornilov, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, at-
+
+118
+than Lenin. There is nothing to equal the rone of harred with which they
+speak of the Communist party. Moreover, although they repeat their fine
+words of the old days, they do so without conviction; at times their contradictions prove they are lying and have no illusions. "Onc cannor arrive at
+socialism except by passing through democracy," they say. But in August
+they asserted that the only favorable times for proposing socialist mcasures are times of acute crisis. Because such times are always periods when
+democracy is suspended and when Social Democracy has no share in
+power, this is a confession of impotence. They also say, "The issue is not
+whether there will be a fascist Germany or a soviet Germany, but a fascist
+Germany or a Weimar Republic." It is not by such hollow formulas that
+the bonzes are able to win over the workers. How, then, do they do it?
+When the German workers, whom we used to count on to ensure world
+peace, found themselves face to face with war, they were thrown into
+disarray not only by nationalist lies but also by the fact that they had only
+one organization, and that organization was sending them to war. German
+workers find it infinitely difficult to make up their minds to take any action
+that is not organized. And so, if they were in the same situation now, one
+would understand their allowing themselves to be led by the reformist
+bureaucracy. For reformist tactics are the only sensible tactics to use inside
+the regime and, consequently, the only sensible ones for anyone who
+doesn't want or doesn't dare to overthrow the regime. These tactics are, by
+definition, tactics of choosing the lesser evil. The regime is evil; if it is not
+overthrown, it must be made as comfortable as possible. When the bourgeoisie is forced by the crisis to tighten its grip, tactics of choosing the lesser
+evil are necessarily tactics of capitulation. The older workers, who during
+a crisis continue to think as they did before the crisis, submit to these
+tactics quite naturally. The young workers cry out that they want to fight;
+but as they don't dare to initiate the struggle to overthrow the whole system of production, and as they are all aware (though they are careful not to
+say so) that the struggle has no other objective, they, too, finally agree to
+capitulate. Once again, all that would be entirely understandable in an
+unarmed proletariar whose organizations were in the hands of its enemies.
+The Hitlerite party is indeed in the hands of big capital, and Social
+Democracy is in the hands of the German state. But the German proletariat
+rempred a coup to establish a conservative military government. The coup was crushed
+largely by the workers' soviets of the radical left. In October the I.cfr. led by Lenin, overthrew
+the Kerensky governinent.
+
+• The Situation in Gennany
+119
+now has what it didn't have in 1914, a Communist party. Certainly, since
+the beginning of the crisis, the Communist party has attracted broad
+masses of the unemployed and some members of the petty bourgeoisie;
+similarly, the Hitlerite party has attracted broad masses of the ruined petty
+bourgeoisie and a quite significant number of the unemployed. Having lost
+everything due to the crisis, these people are naturally ready to try anything, and are flinging themselves at the two parties that promise something new; those who feel solidarity with the working class are moving to
+the party that proclaims the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the factory workers are not being swept along by this current. Those workers—
+that is, the ones who play a responsible role in the production process and
+who, through their daily work, maintain society and can transform iteither remain indifferent or else follow the reformists. There are, of course,
+exceptions, but they are relatively few in number. And so Social Democracy is little concerned about losing the unemployed and the perry bourgeoisie —which, by the way, ir is far from losing completely. Its strategic
+strength is in the factories, and, whatever the future may bring, up to now
+this strength has remained almost intact. Social Democracy will be defeated only when the employed workers embark on an action coherent and
+extensive enough to jeopardize the social system.
+That the workers in the factories are resisting Hitlerite demagogy proves
+that, in spite of the miserable situation to which they have been reduced—
+their low wages, the lack of job security, the factory shutdowns that
+shorten their working hours and affect their whole family —they are not
+giving way to despair. One cannot admire them enough. But how are we to
+understand their allowing themselves to be crushed by the regime when
+a Communist party exists that is completely suited, it seems, to be a powerful tool in their hands to destroy and rebuild the system of production?
+What is it that prevents the working masses who still have jobs in the factories, and particularly those among them who are still young, from having confidence in the Communist party?
+
+Five • The Communist Movement
+In times of prosperity, the revolutionary movement generally depends
+mainly on the strongest part of the proletariat, on those highly skilled
+workers who feel that they are the essential element in production, know
+that they are indispensable, and are afraid of nothing. A crisis radicalizes
+the unemployed, but it also allows the bosses to drive the revolutionary
+workers out of the system of production, and forces those who are still in
+the factories (who are all, even the most skilled, afraid of losing their jobs)
+into a submissive attitude. Thereafter, the revolutionary movement relies
+on the weakest part of the working class. This displacement of the revolutionary movement's axis is the only thing that enables the bourgeoisie to
+get through a crisis without foundering; and conversely, an uprising of the
+masses left in the factories is the only thing that can really endanger the
+bourgcoisie. The existence of a strong revolutionary organization, therefore, is a nearly decisive factor. But for a revolutionary organization to
+be said to be strong, the phenomenon that reduces the proletariat to
+impotence in times of crisis must not be reflected in the organization, or
+reflected in it only to a very slight degree.
+The apparent strength of the German Communist party is considerable.
+The still-living memories of 1919 and 1920, and even those of 1923, give
+it a radiance and a prestige that we French, whose revolutionary tradition
+broke off in May 1871, can hardly imagine. In November the Communist
+party attracted six million voters; its own membership then stood at
+3.30,000. Groups such as the worker relief section, the Red relief section,
+the association of proletarian freethinkers, and especially the Red sports
+associations are also numerically strong, influential, and vigorous. However, the most important of these organizations, a military organization
+intended for street fighting (Rote Front Kämpferhund) was banned rwo
+years ago and has been unable to carry on an illegal existence. Since then
+part of its membership has even gone over to the Hitlerite storm troops. As
+for the Party itself, although it is numerically strong, newcomers are in the
+majority. Some people say that only one-fifth of its members have been in
+the Party more than three years. This phenomenon, which is also found
+in several other sections of the International, and which is evidently due, at
+Published in L'Ecule émancipée, January 29, 1933.
+
+121
+least in part, to the Party's recruiting methods and its internal regime, is
+particularly dangerous in a revolutionary period. Finally, and most important, the German Communist party is for all practical purposes a party
+of the unemployed; by last May, the proportion of the unemployed had
+already reached 84 percent (cf. Internationale Syndicale Rouge no. 19-20,
+p. 916). As for the trade-union organizations under the control of the
+Party, their total membership is less than that of the Party itself, and they
+are about half composed of the unemployed. Thus the German Communist movement offers no remedy for the split that the economic crisis
+itself produces between the unemployed and the workers in the factories; it
+reflects that split, and reflects it in an intensified way.
+The fact is that the Communist party had failed to become solidly rooted
+in the factories. The main cause is probably the Party's unionization tactics. Faced with the exclusionary measures that time and time again struck
+down the revolutionary members of the reformist unions, one could
+choose between two methods: invite all the politically conscious workers
+into the Red unions, as our CGTU! does, or establish, with the expelled
+workers alone, Red unions that do not recruit and that try to increase their
+influence, not their numerical strength. The Belgian "Knights of Labor"
+chose the latter method; the Borinage? strike demonstrated its value,
+and it seems the most appropriate when only individual expulsions occur.
+But in Germany no choice was made; Red unions were organized that
+paralleled the opposition organizations, and the two contradictory slogans "Strengthen the Red Unions" and "Work in the Reformist Unions"
+were always maintained side by side. As a result, the Red unions have
+remained skeletal in the face of the four-million-strong reformist unions;
+but their existence has been enough, on the one hand, to allow the reformists to portray the Communists as enemies of the trade-union organizations in the same way as the Hitlerites are, and on the other hand, to make
+the Red militants neglect propaganda in the Social Democratic unions.
+What is more, at one time the slogan "Destroy the Unions" was openly
+proclaimed. Although this slogan was abandoned, the fear of being ac-
+I Confédération générale du Travail unitaire, the Communist-dominated French tradeunion association.
+2 There had been a miners' strike in the Borinage region of Belgium from July 6 to September 7, 1932. Weil visited the area on September 6, un her way back from Germany, and
+discussed the strike with a Trotskyite who was one of the leaders of a nonrecruiting Red trade
+union called the Belgian Knights of Labor.
+
+122
+cused of returning to a slogan denounced by the Brandlerites? ("Make the
+Bonzes Fight") kept the militants paralyzed for a long time. This unprecedented negligence in regard to propaganda in the reformist unions came to
+an end only quite recently. Then again, both the Red unions and the opposition groups suffer from a stifling regime of bureaucratic dictatorship.
+As for the task of organizing in the factories, an inconceivable indifference
+in that regard has been the rule for a long time.
+In contrast to Social Democracy and the Hitlerite movement—the one
+so powerfully entrenched in the factories through its influence over the
+workers, and the other having, in addition to its working-class followers,
+the advantage of the secret or overt support of the bosses—the German
+Communist party has no ties to the production process. It's not surprising
+that the existence of such a party is not enough, by itself, to turn the
+oppressed masses toward revolutionary action. Consequently everything
+depends on the influence that the German Communist party can manage
+to acquire inside the two other parties; in other words, at the present time
+the German Communist party must be judged in terms of its relations with
+the Hitlerite movement on the one hand and with Social Democracy on the
+other.
+How can the German Communist party gain influence within the Hitlerite movement? Every attempt in this direction must keep in mind that, even
+if the Party were to bring over to its side everything in the Hitlerite movement that is connected to the proletariat, it would not thereby become
+capable of fulfilling its revolutionary tasks. For one thing, the membership
+of workers who could allow themselves to be deceived by fascist demagogy
+would not exactly be of a nature to raise the political level of the Party; for
+another, apart from members of the big bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, some office workers and some unemployed workers, the Hitlerite
+movement contains only a few factory workers, the majority of whom, it is
+true, are situated at key points of the economy, but they are too few to constitute a significant force by themselves. On the other hand, if the Communist party could win the confidence of the reformist masses in the factories, it would thereby acquire almost invincible strength. And so a partial
+agreement between Hitlerites and Communists, even if it may facilitate the
+spread of Communist propaganda among Hitlerite workers, is highly
+3 A right-wing opposition group that unconditionally supported the policies of Stalin
+and the USsa. Its leader, Heinrich Brandler, was expelled from the German Communist
+party in 1929.
+
+123
+dangerous if it is likely to arouse the mistrust of the Social Democratic
+workers. Besides, the tactics of partial agreement are not effective tactics in
+the struggle against Hitler's influence. For the Hitlerite leaders are first of
+all demagogues and adventurers, and they do not shrink from illegal action
+when the need arises; thus, in certain determined circumstances, they can,
+unlike the reformist leaders, not only issue the same slogans as the Communist party but also go at least as far as it in implementing them. Furthermorc, it goes without saying that in a strike, for instance, one cannot refuse
+the support of Hitlerite strikers; but in such a case great care must be taken
+not to do anything that could give this unity of action a suspect character in
+the eyes of the Social Democratic workers; and every possible means must
+be used to try to draw them into the struggle. In short, the only way the
+Communist party can win over the Hitlerite workers without alienating
+the Social Democratic workers is to unsparingly denounce both the petty
+treacheries that the Hitlerite leaders commit every day and the essentially
+reactionary character of their entire policy. Or rather, there is another still
+more effective way, which is for the Communist party to become truly
+strong. But that is what it cannot do without winning the confidence of the
+reformist workers.
+In regard to the reformist workers, propaganda by itself is not of much
+use. They certainly feel, the young especially, that their leaders are capitulating, but they are not convinced that there might be another alternative.
+Obviously on this point words alone are not effective. One can convince
+them only by making them feel through experience, in action, the strength
+that the organized working class possesses. And to do this, it is they who
+must be brought to act, for the Communist party is too weak, by itself, to
+successfully lead an action of any scope. What the Communist party must
+do, therefore, is organize a united front with limited objectives, and lead
+the struggle effectively enough to inspire in the workers more confidence
+than they now have in themselves and in it. True, the reformist leaders are
+constantly maneuvering to prevent such a united front, and their maneuverings are facilitated by the Communist party's isolation. The latter has
+only one way of outmaneuvering these schemes, and that is to make concessions. There is one concession it can never make, namely, to relinquish
+its right of criticism. But it can moderate the tone of its criticisms, and give
+up a violence that is perhaps legitimate but is really harmful. In order to
+show that it is not the enemy of the trade-union organizations, despite its
+disastrous slogans, the Party can suspend recruiting for the tiny Red
+
+124
+unions or even ask for the reinstatement of the expelled workers. Above
+all, it can address all proposals for a united front not only to the base but to
+every level of the reformist hierarchy. Under certain circumstances such
+tactics could probably force the reformist leaders to accept a united front;
+in any case, it would make it much more difficult for them to reject it without discrediting themselves in the minds of the workers who follow them.
+Six
+The German Communist party's policy has actually been, up to now, exactly the opposite. The only means being used to win over the reformist
+workers is purely verbal propaganda; revolution is being preached to
+people who are wondering not if it is desirable but if it is possible. The
+Party accuses the reformist leaders of treason, but it has no business
+judging the Social Democrats' policy of capitulation in this way unless it
+demonstrates that it is itself capable of victoriously leading the proletariat
+on the opposite path, that of struggle. This can't be demonstrated by
+words alone, and so far the Party hasn't demonstrated it in any other way.
+Also, the oft-repeated formulas that refer to Social Democracy as the
+"main enemy," as "social fascism," etc., only have the effect of cutting
+the Communist party off from the Social Democratic workers; especially
+when it goes as far as to apply the term "social fascist" to the tiny Socialist
+Workers' party, which is made up partly of revolutionary workers and
+partly of reformist elements, but which is revolted by the Social Democrats' capitulations. In the area of trade unions, the German Communist
+party stubbornly maintains two contradictory slogans. As for a united
+front with the trade unions, it refuses to address proposals elsewhere than
+to the base, and the maneuvers of the reformist leaders are thereby made so
+much the easier.
+With the Hitlerites, on the other hand, the German Communist party
+has several times formed a sort of united front. In particular, during the
+Berlin transport strike, it even went as far as to suspend for the National
+Socialists the famous "right of criticism" that it correctly refused to sacrifice for a united front with the Social Democrats. What is most serious of
+Published in L'F.cole émancipée, February 5, 1933.
+
+• The Siluation in Germany
+125
+all is that the united front berween Hitlerites and Communists sometimes
+seemed to be directed against Social Democracy, and in some instances
+actually was. Furthermore, it is understandable that, as a result of Hitlerite
+demagogy, the National Socialist party and the Communist party might
+sometimes appear to take nearly identical courses of action in the social
+struggle, but the Gerinan Communist party has gone as far as to follow
+the Hitlerite movement's lead in the area of nationalist propaganda. It
+placed great emphasis—and sometimes, especially during elections, primary emphasis—on nationalist demands, on the struggle against the
+Versailles system, and on the slogan "National Liberation." At the time of
+the July 31 elections it accused the Social Democrats of treason not only
+against the working class but against the country (Landesverräter). What's
+more, it published as a propaganda pamphlet, without any commentary,
+the collection of letters in which the Army officer Scheringer' made it clear
+that he had abandoned National Socialism for communism because communism, which involves prospects of military alliance with Russia, is better suited to serve Germany's national interests; this same Scheringer
+formed a group based on this idea, which people of the best society have
+joined and which is officially under the control of the Party. It should be
+noted that this nationalist orientation bears no relation at all to the feelings
+of the German Communist workers, for their internationalism is sincere
+and deep. The only arguments given in favor of this policy are that it gets
+votes in the elections and that it makes it easier for workers seduced by
+Hitler's demagogy to cross over to communism. However, it makes the
+reverse crossover just as easy. And among the Social Democratic workers
+it provokes only indignation and derision. What is one to think of a revolutionary party whose Central Committee said, in an appeal issued with an
+eye on the November 6 elections, "The chains of Versailles are getting
+heavier and heavier on the German workers"? So it's the chains of Versailles that the German proletariat has to break, and not the chains of
+capitalism? Even if the Central Committee adds that only a socialist
+Germany can break the chains of Versailles, its formula is nevertheless
+a valuable aid to the Hitlerite demagogues, who are trying above all to
+convince the workers that their misery is due to the treaty of Versailles and
+i Lieutenant Richard Scheringer, a Reichswehr officer and an avid nationalist, had been
+arrested in 1930 and sentenced ro eighreen months in prison for trying to win over other
+officers to National Socialism. While in prison he abandoned National Socialism and went
+over to communism.
+
+126
+not to the fact that the whole system of production is subordinated to the
+pursuit of capitalist profit. Gencrally speaking, in times of crisis the bourgeoisie of every country always does its best to turn the discontent of the
+masses of workers and peasants against foreign countries, thereby avoiding being called into account itself. In Germany the Communist party
+publicly associated itself with this maneuver, despite Liebknecht's great
+saying, "The main enemy is in our own country."
+In the end, the German Communist party remains isolated and left to its
+own strength, that is, to its own weakness. Although it continues to recruit, the rate of its progress in that area does not correspond at all to the
+real conditions of action; there is a monstrous discrepancy between the
+forces at its disposal and the tasks that it cannot abandon without losing its
+reason for existing. This discrepancy is all the more striking if one takes
+into account the appearance of strength given the Party by its electoral successes. The vanguard of the German proletariat is on the whole composed
+of men who are truly dedicated and courageous, but for the most part they
+are devoid of experience and political education, and almost all of them
+have been thrown out of the production process, out of the economic system, condemned to a parasitic existence. Such a party can spread feelings
+of revolt, not put forward revolution as a task.
+The German Communist party does what it can to conceal this state of
+things from members and nonmembers alike. In regard to its members, it
+uses dictatorial methods that, by preventing free discussion, also suppress
+every possibility of real education within the Party. In regard to nonmembers, the Party tries to hide its inaction with endless talk. It is not that
+the Party remains completely inactive; in spite of everything, it's trying to
+do something in the factories; it has made some attempts to organize the
+unemployed; it leads tenants' strikes (which it has not, however, managed
+to carry beyond the limits of a street or part of a district); it fights Hitlerite
+terrorists. All of which doesn't amount to very much. The Party makes up
+for this with verbiage, boasting, and ineffectual slugans. When the Hitlerites want to give the appearance of being a workers' party, their propaganda and that of the Communist party sound almost the same. However,
+this demagogic attitude on the part of the Communist party only heightens
+the factory workers' distrust of it. On the other hand, in the organization
+of meetings, in the ritual words and gestures, Communist propaganda
+increasingly resembles religious propaganda; it's as if the revolution were
+on its way to becoming a myth whose purpose, like that of other myths,
+were simply to make an intolerable situation bearable.
+
+• The Situalion in Germany
+127
+Many comrades will be tempted to believe that this description has been
+deliberately exaggerated. Nevertheless, they will find at least partial confirmation of it in the Communist press, especially in no. 19-20 of the
+Internationale Syndicale Rouge and in Piatnitsky's' speech to the Twelfth
+Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. In
+truth, several facts could be cited that would seem to contradict this description, and in recent wecks, in particular, there seems to have been at
+least some slight progress. In order that our comrades can judge if, on the
+whole, this description is accurate, they must have before them as objective
+an account as possible of the recent history of the German Communist
+movement.
+2 Josct Piatnitsky (1882-1938), an Old Bolshevik, became a member of the Executive
+Committee of the Communist International in 1921, and was one of the leading figures of the
+Comintern after 1930.
+Seven
+At the Twelfth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist
+International, Piatnitsky said,
+The German Communist party showed that it is capable of shifting and
+reorganizing its work when necessary. You know, for instance, that the
+German Communist party leadership decided against participating in the
+refcrendum on the dissolution of the Prussian Landrag. Lead articles against
+participating in the referendum were published in several Party newspapers.
+But when the Central Committee, together with the Communist International, decided that the Party should take an active part in the referendum,
+the German comrades mobilized the whole Party in a few days. Except for the
+Communist party of the UsSR, no parry could have done as much.
+What Piatnitsky is congratulating the German Communist party for in
+these terms is something analogous to the sudden reversals that we sometimes see at federal congresses. Remember the most typical of these sudden
+turnabouts, and imagine the effect it would have produced if it had concerned a question of primary importance for the whole country, and of
+burning immediacy. That'sexactly what happened in Germany a year and
+Published in L Ecole émancipée, February 12, 1933.
+
+128
+a half ago, when the Hitlerites organized a referendum against the Social
+Democratic Landrag of Prussia. The Social Democratic workers laugh
+even today when they relate how their Communist comrades suddenly
+began to make propaganda for the referendum, although only the day
+before they were swearing that their taking part in it was out of the question. The consequences of their participation are still being felt. The Hitlerites initiated the referendum with the avowed purpose of taking over the
+government of Prussia; thus it was a question of a struggle between the
+Social Democratic party (which, by its very nature, always tries to establish a certain equilibrium berween the proletariat and the bourgeoisie) and
+the Hitlerite party, whose objective is the complete crushing of the proletariat and the extermination of its vanguard. The German Communist
+party sided with the Hitlerite party in this struggle, by formal order of the
+Comintern. That is what is officially known as the "Red referendum."
+According to Die Rote Fahne, ' this abrupt turnabout was accepted in the
+Party "without discussion." It was at this time that "national liberation"
+began to be spoken of, and Scheringer's statements about "war for liberation" and "the dead of the world war who gave their lives for a free
+Germany" were published in the Party press (Fanfare? of August 1,
+193I). The impression that all this produced on the reformist masses is
+easy to imagine.
+The logical consequences of this orientation unfolded during the remainder of 1931 and the first months of 1932. During this period of the
+vertical, vertiginous rise of National Socialism the German Communist
+party directed all its efforts against Social Democracy. Piat nitsky acknowledges this. "After the Eleventh Plenum," he says (that is, beginning in June
+1931), "Social Democracy is correctly characterized in the documents of
+the German Communist party as the main social bulwark of the bourgeoisie, but then they forgot about the fascists. " Even at that time a strange
+strategy had begun to develop in the Party, that of setting "the trap of
+power" for Hitler. The consequences of this entire policy became apparent
+in the course of the presidential elections in which Social Democracy succeeded in marshaling all its troops for Hindenburg and practically not
+a single Social Democratic worker voted for Thaelmann.3
+In the months that followed, this course was very clearly corrected; but
+the credit for that goes not to the German Communist party but to the
+¡ Daily newspaper of the German Communist party.
+2 German Communist party journal.
+3 Ernst Thaelinann (1 886-1944), leader of the German Communist party.
+
+• The Situalion in Germany
+129
+Hitlerite storm troops. The Hitlerites actually began to murder Communists in their homes or in the streets; there was a whole series of bloody
+skirmishes between Hitlerites and Communists. From that time on the
+Communist party was forced, despite the resolutions of the Eleventh
+Plenum, to reverse its position and direct its efforts mainly against fascism.
+But the Hitlerites rendered an even greater service to the German proletariat when they began to attack Communists and Social Democrats indiscriminately; they thus provoked the spontaneous formation of a united
+front, and ncarly brought into being that "Marxist bloc" which unfortunately existed only in the declarations of their leaders. The Communist
+party could have organized this spontaneous united front, broadened it,
+and carried it into the factories. It did nothing of the sort. This is verified by
+Piatnitsky:
+How was the united front brought abour? In the streets. Thanks to the fact
+that the Nazis did not distinguish berween Social Democrats and Communists, but struck down Social Democratic workers, reformists, and those
+without any party affiliation as well as Communists; thanks to that the united
+front was formed. It's a perfectly good united front and I have nothing to say
+against it. It's the united front of the class struggle. Bur we came to it
+indirectly, not in the factories, not in the Labor Exchanges, not in the trade
+unions. And when it was carried into the factories, then, in the majority of
+cases, it was not thanks to our own work, but because the workers were
+shocked by the murders and organized strikes on the day of the victims' burial.
+In July, however, the united front began to take an organized form. In
+many places committees of antifascist struggle were created; contrary to
+the doctrine of a united front "only from below," proposals for a united
+front were made from organization to organization. What's more, the
+united front was even carried into the parliaments; in the Landtags of
+Prussia and Hesse, the Communists gave their votes to a Social Democrat
+to avoid the election of a Hitlerite. Nevertheless, the Party continued to use
+the phrase "social fascism," and nationalist demands headed the electoral
+program. The incoherence of this policy, the mistakes of the preceding
+months, and the paucity of contact with the masses had as their natural
+outcome the disaster of the twentieth and twenty-first of July 1932.
+The wentieth of July is the day on which von Papen's coup d'état
+expelled the Social Democrats from the Prussian government. The German Communist party decided to take up the defense of the Prussian
+government against von Papen—the same Prussian government that it
+
+130
+had, a year earlier, attacked in alliance with Hitler. This decision could
+have rapidly increased the Party's influence on the reformist masses, for
+the split between the cadres and the base of Social Democracy (a split that
+made it impossible to muster even the support that the Social Democrats
+had given Hindenburg's candidacy) became, thanks to Social Democracy's
+passivity, an accomplished fact on that historic day. If the Communist
+party had been able to contrast this passivity with its own capacity for
+action, it would thereby have gained considerable authority.
+What did it do? It did absolutely nothing, except, with no preparation,
+issue a hasty call for a general strike. This call met with no response whatever, even in the very bosom of the Party. "The Party organizations did not
+respond to the call for the strike," says Piatnitsky, and he adds that this
+was not at all unexpected. Not one Social Democratic worker —what's
+more, not one Communist worker—took seriously a call that, issued
+under such conditions, could only end up discrediting the slogan "general
+strike." The German Communist party gave the impression on July 20 that
+it was trifling with such an important slogan, that it was practically using it
+as an alibi to conceal its inaction. Among the Social Democratic workers,
+the memory of July 20 arouses both indignation and laughter; indignation
+when they think of Social Democracy, laughter when they think of the
+Communist party. As for the Communist militants, the events of that day
+brought on a very profound depression in their ranks. For the first time
+they clearly perceived to what degree their party was isolated from the
+masses, and how completely incapable it was of any kind of effective
+action.
+The electoral success of July 31 gave them the impression that at last
+they had a breathing space. But this success also prevented the salutary
+consequences that might have resulted from their depression; namely,
+a serious examination of the Party's mistakes. What's more, the Central
+Committee of the Party decided to censure the parliamentary fractions
+of the Prussian and Hessian Landtags, and to return to the practice of
+forming the united front "only from below." Or at any rate that's what
+the Trotskyites said; at the base of the Party nobody knew anything
+about these decisions. But what is certain is that after July 31 there
+were no longer any proposals for a united front made from organization to
+organization; moreover, as the Hitlerite acts of violence became more infrequent and soon stopped, the committees for a united front that had
+sprung up spontaneously in July rapidly disappeared.
+
+Eight
+All during August 1932, the Communist party was practically reduced to
+illegality. Its press was muzzled; its meetings, sometimes even private ones.
+were prohibited; its militants were hit with incredibly harsh penalties
+when there were clashes between them and the Hitlerites, even if no blood
+was shed; and, of course, its partisans were hounded out of the factories.
+Isolated as it was, and lacking any experience of illegal action, it could
+offer no resistance. It feared being reduced to a completely illegal status if it
+acted. In Berlin, during that whole month of August, one had the painful
+impression most of the time that the German Communist party did not
+exist. However, the Party was frantically trying to regain a foothold in the
+factories, and it was directing its efforts in accordance with the theory that
+had been in favor in the International for some time: "Fight for everyday
+demands, even the smallest."" Thus the same Communist International
+that so often wanted to artificially politicize wage disputes was now wanting to drag into the area of wage claims a proletariat quite convinced that
+the situation left room only for a political struggle. Fortunately for the
+Party, the emergency decrees of September 5 and 62 gave every wage
+dispute the character of a direct struggle against the power of the state.
+These emergency decrees finally precipitated a spontaneous wave of
+strikes. In many factories the workers—thanks to the three-party united
+front and especially to the recently instituted production bonuses that
+made the employers want to avoid conflict—were victorious after one or
+two days of struggle, or even on the strength of mere threats. The Communist party took credit for everything, strikes and victories, with no
+further explanation, so that anyone reading its press was tempted to suppose that a miracle had transformed the extreme weakness of the proletariat and the Party into overwhelming strength within the space of a few
+days. The Party thus failed in its most elementary duty, which is to inform
+the workers and give them a clear idea of the relation of forces. In addition,
+the influence of the Red trade-union organizations probably increased
+Published in L'F.cole emancipée, February 19, 1933.
+¡ "P'arrial" or "everyday" demands were ordinary economic demands rhat were nor
+revolutionary in narure.
+= Evidently a misprint for Derober y and s. Sec p. 113.
+
+132
+during this period, but they were unable either to coordinate or to extend
+the strike movement.
+Two weeks after this movement had apparently ended, one week before
+the elections, a dispute broke out in the Berlin transport system. 3 Fourteen
+thousand reformist union members out of 21,000 called for a strike, but it
+fell short of the statutory majority. The Red union led the workers out on
+strike, despite the reformist burcaucracy and with the support of the Hitlerites. Social Democracy portrayed the Reds and the Hitlerites as being
+in agreement in wanting to destroy the organizations. It accused them
+of having purely electoral aims and denounced the strike as a Hitlerite
+maneuver imprudently supported by the Communists and perhaps intended to pave the way for a putsch. It wanted to make it appear that in
+trying to break the strike it was not betraying the workers but was struggling against fascism. The Communist party's attitude was the one best
+suited to give these formulas the appearance of truth. Die Rote Fahne
+enthusiastically recounted how Communists and Hitlerites together demolished a truck belonging to Vorwaerts, the Social Democratic newspaper; and it celebrated as a proletarian victory this action in which
+fascists had taken part. The Communist party did nothing to guard against
+the danger of an increase of Hitlerite influence on the workers under cover
+of the strike; during the week the strike lasted, up to and including the day
+of the elections, it directed all its attacks against Social Democracy and
+virtually suspended its struggle against fascist ideas. And it certainly scems
+that the National Socialist party gained worker votes in Berlin at that time,
+although it was losing them everywhere else. Now, the political aspect of
+the strike was all the more important in that, since the strikers were
+transport workers, everything happened in the streets. The Hitlerites
+throw their storm troops against the strikebreakers and thus got possession of the streets in certain districts. The workers also, it is true, and
+especially the unemployed, went spontaneously into the streets en masse to
+aid the pickets; judging by the panic of the bourgeois newspapers and their
+calls for repression, at that time the proletariat must have shown its
+strength. The Communist party did nothing to organize this spontaneous
+solidarity, even though it had enough militants in Berlin to be able to do so;
+but these militants were almost entirely absorbed with election propaganda. On Sunday, election day, the bureaucracy of the reformist trade
+3 The Berlin municipal transport organization had announced that, due to the financial
+emergency, wages would be reduced.
+
+133
+union redoubled its efforts, and the Hitlerites began to sow disorder
+among the strikers by spreading false rumors. But the Communist militants had spent all their strength on electoral propaganda and kept nothing
+in reserve, not dreaming that another more important task awaited them.
+Berlioz, in L'Humanité,* recounted how they slept that night, totally exhausted, with clear consciences. The next day Die Rote Fahne announced
+in giant headlines that the strike would continue until victory was won;
+but layoff notices arrived, demoralizing the strikers who were no longer
+supported by the masses in the street. The Party indignantly rejected the
+proposal made by a few oppositionists not to struggle any longer except to
+get the layoffs rescinded. Nevertheless, that very evening traffic started to
+move again. And the strikers returned to work the next day, accepting not
+only the wage cut that had been the reason for the dispute but even the
+layoff of 2,500 of their comrades, who thus found themselves thrown out
+of work without even the paltry resource of unemployment relief. And Die
+Rote Fahne dared to report this under the headline "Betrayed, But Not
+Beaten.
+So, in the city that is the citadel of communism in Germany, at the very
+moment when, having gained nearly 140,000 votes, it was far ahead of any
+other party in Berlin, the German Communist parry had to terminatc, by
+a complete capitulation, a strike unleashed under its sponsorship, a strike
+of considerable political significance, and one in which the action of the
+masses was as important a factor as that of the strikers themselves. The
+very next day after the electoral victory that had given the Communist
+party the appearance of such great strength the real powerlessness of the
+Party became as clearly and tragically evident as on the twentieth of July.
+Furthermore, it goes without saying that the entire official press of the
+Communist International celebrated the strike as a victory.
+But if the strike did nor increase the strength of the proletariat, it indirectly, and decisively, increased that of the bourgeoisie. For the Hitlerites, the strike was a means of blackmailing the big bourgeoisie; it was
+intended to make the big bourgeoisie understand that, for its own safety, ir
+had to prevent, at all costs, the Hitlerite party from losing strength or from
+even temporarily turning against it. Besides, the only relations that exist
+between the Hitlerites and the big bourgeoisie consist of permanent and
+reciprocal blackmail; each would like the other to be subordinate, and
++ Daily newspaper of the French Communist party.
+
+134
+each would be lost without the other's help. But a party can run risks
+that a class cannot; that's why the mancuver the Hitlerites attempted with
+the transport strike ultimately led, after von Schleicher's unsuccessful
+attempr to domesticate the Hirlerite movement, to Hirer's being appointed chancellor.
+During the three months that have elapsed in the meantime, the German
+Communist party did almost nothing. A few days before the strike, a
+special Party conference expelled Neumann,S charging him particularly
+with having too vigorously criticized the mistakes of the rwentieth of July,
+mistakes the conference admitted. It also reaffirmed the Party's confidence
+in Thaelmann, who will certainly not criticize those mistakes too vigorously, in that it is he who commits them. It also gave up, it is true, certain
+nationalist deviations (the substitution of the slogan "People's Revolucion" for "Proletarian Revolution") by wrongly casting all the responsibility for them on Neumann; but in rcality the nationalist policy continued, scarcely toned down at all. Much greater emphasis was placed on
+the solidariry of the French and German proletariats in the struggle against
+Versailles, which seems all to the good, but that was only dust thrown in
+the eyes of the German proletariar, since the French Communist party is
+not doing much in this regard apart from giving it flashy headlines in
+L'Humanité." It is also true that the conference decided to orient tradeunion propaganda mainly toward gaining a solid position inside the reformist unions; but one cannot say how far this very belated resolution has
+¡ Heinz Neumann (1902-193-9), one of the leaders of the German Communist parry:
+was responsible (with the support of Moscow) for the nationalist emphasis in Parry propaganda. He was censured (nor expelled) by the Twelith Plenum of the Execurive Commurce of
+the Communist Internarional for a variety of errors, and wasrelieved of his position as candidare member of the politburo of the German Communist party. At the Parry conference of
+October 15, 1932, Thaelmann made i savage attack on Veumann and the conference
+endorsed the ICCIscensurc.
+« We should not hide nur responsibility in the German situation from ourselves. The
+favorite argument of the Hirlerites against she Communists is "a French worker is first of all
+French, and only after that a worker." It would be our right to immediately urganize an
+extensive campaign, with articles, traces, pamphlets, or meetings, or all these means, to
+demonstrate to the German prolerariar our active solidarity, to make the French people
+understand that France, through her aggressive imperialism and her ties to the Versailles
+syston, is direcrly responsible for the Hirlerite movement, and finally to prepare a fraternal
+welcone to the German comrades whom tascist terror will soon, perhaps, force in cross the
+frontier. To remain inactive in chis area would be a serious mistake, and should the Communist parry not undertake anything serious in this direction, it would only make this obligarion more urgent for independent organizations like our federation. (Note of su)
+
+135
+been carried out. As for the united front, the tactics have stayed the same;
+even though a renewal of Hitlerite terror in December and January created
+a strong current of opinion in the masses in favor of a united front, nothing
+has been tried that would make these fleeting impulses effective by bringing them into the realm of the organization.
+Like July 20 and November 7, January 22 was a day that again demonstrated, this time even more tragically, the powerlessness of the Communist party. A week earlier the Hitlerites had announced that they would
+organize a demonstration on that day in the center of the northern part of
+Berlin, that is, in the Red section of the city, and in front of the very headquarters of the Communist party (the Karl Liebknecht House). The
+counterdemonstration announced by the Communist party was prohibited. The Party saw that as nothing but a provocation leading to a ban
+against it, and it remained inactive before, during, and after the Hitlerite
+demonstration, apart from making a few appeals in its press and organizing one peaceful counterdemonstration on January 24 at the same
+place, that is, in the district that it controls. Péri, whose special job in
+L.'Humanité is to transform the defeats of the German Communist party
+into successes, crowed victory, both over a few spontaneous demonstrations that took place on January 22 while the Hitlerite parade was passing
+by and over the state of passivity from which the Party did not budge,
+a passivity that was presented as a triumph of "Communist discipline."
+Actually, the assessment made by the Party was entirely false. It was not
+a question of a curtain raiser to the banning of the Communist party; it
+would have been pointless to stage such a show for that purpose. What
+was involved was a sort of dress rehearsal for the fascists, intended to test
+the strength of the Berlin proletariat's resistance, and, when put to the rest,
+that strength was shown to be nil. Certainly the Party was right not to send
+its militants to a massacre; but the proletariat can fight in other ways. Its
+strongholds are the factories. Now, there were protests from the factories,
+but no revolt. And yet, according to the Communist press, which must
+have told the truth on this point, the reformist masses were stirred by feclings of intense indignation. Despite this indignation, and although it was
+warned several days in advance, the Party made no proposal whatever for
+a united front from organization to organization; it confined itself to vague
+and ineffective appeals for spontaneous action on the part of the workers.
+> Gabriel Péri (1902-4T), French Communist polirician and journalise.
+
+136
+As such appeals don't constitute action, or even an attempt a taction, one is
+forced to say that on that decisive day the German Communist party
+purely and simply capitulated. A few days later the long-foreseen and longdreaded event took place: Hitler was appointed chancellor.
+Hitler's appointment, however, has not yet decided the outcome of the
+struggle. It is an extremely serious matter that the gangs of fascist murderers now have behind them the power of the state, with its coffers and its
+police and court system. But the bourgeoisie has not yet handed Germany
+over to fascism; it has kept the Hitlerites out of all the important ministries, notably the Ministry of Defense." Hitler is forced to continue,
+inside the government, the struggle that he has been waging against the
+parties of the big bourgeoisie for eight months. But let us not forget that he
+holds the same trump card thanks to which, despite Hindenburg's reluctance, he obtained the position of chancellor; namely, the fact that the
+Hitlerite movement is indispensable, and it would run the risk of disintegrating if the purely bourgeois parties kept it out of power or domesticated
+it.
+So it all comes down to a matter of knowing which—the proletariat or
+the bourgeoisie-will be the first to achieve unity of action within its
+own ranks. The bourgeoisie is very much further ahead in this area. Certainly, as soon as Hitler came to power, the Communist party and Social
+Democracy jointly issued appeals for united action, but they were careful
+to formulate them in the vaguest possible way. On the other hand, there
+has been, in recent days, a fairly large number of mass demonstrations and
+even strikes in which the united front was formed spontaneously. But, even
+now, nothing is being done to organize this united front. One can obviously expect no initiative whatever from Social Democracy in this regard;
+however, it would be quite difficult for it to refuse clearly defined proposals for a united front made by the Communist party. But the Communist party has not made up its mind to give up the tactic of forming
+a united front "only from below." If it attends mass demonstrations
+against fascism organized by Social Democracy, it does not take advantage
+of this fact to force the Social Democratic leaders to side with it; it does
+nothing but issue vague appeals addressed only to the workers, as it did
+recently at the Lustgarten—appeals that leave reformist bonzes and Hitlerite terrorists completely undisturbed.
+8 Of the eleven-member cabiner, only two were National Socialists.
+
+137
+As for the Party's future, it is first of all necessary to warn the militants
+not to have any illusions. No doubt there will be spontaneous movements,
+strikes, and street fights led by Communists, because those who rally under
+the Communist flag are usually also those who are the most ardent and
+resolute. But the Party as such will be entitled to take credit only for those
+actions that are due to the strength it has as an organization, not to those
+due to the individual heroism of its members. The heroism of the best
+elements of the German working class, whether or not they carry Party
+cards, does not lessen the responsibilities of the Communist party; rather,
+it increases them.
+On the other hand, if the Party does change its political line, one must
+ask not only if the change is for the better, but also if it is complete and
+rapid enough. This is no mere matter of a difference of degree; it is one of
+those situations in which "quantity changes into qualiry." There is a difference only in degree between Rigoulot' and a ninety-pound weakling if
+one sets a wenty-pound weight in front of them; if they are faced with a
+200-pound weight, the difference berween them is a difference in kind. If
+the Party corrects its errors too slowly or too half-heartedly, it would be
+the same as if it made no corrections at all.
+And one can doubt the effectiveness of even a radical change if that
+change is only a bureaucratic about-face and is not preceded by an honest
+and free examination of the situation at all levels of the Party. For a
+bureaucratic about-face would guarantee nothing, and would run the risk
+of confusing the militants and discrediting the Party still a little more in the
+eyes of the masses. The decisive question is thus one of internal Party
+democracy; but democracy is not restored overnight, especially in the
+semi-illegal state to which the Party is now reduced, and which threatens
+to become worse from day to day.
+Meanwhile, in order to completely settle the question of whether one
+can retain some faith in the leadership of the German Communist party, it
+is necessary to examine the Party's internal structure.
+y Charles Rigoulor (1903-62), a French weight lifter, ser Olympic records in 1924 and
+was long considered the strongest man in the world.
+
+Nine
+The Communist party—especially in Germany, where organization is held
+in such high esteem and other revolutionary tendencies are nearly nonexistent—attracts the most conscious and determined part of the proletariat. What hidden flaw in the organization prevents the dedicated and
+heroic proletarians grouped in the German Communist party from effectively serving their class? Ordinary Party members sometimes ask
+themselves this question, and, with touching good faith, answer it themselves using the established formula, "The base is responsible."
+The base, it is true, is rather mixed. Besides young workers who give the
+impression, because of their maturity, resolve, and courage, of being equal
+to the task of building a new society, it contains others, driven to communism by desperation or a taste for adventure, who could just as well have
+gone over to fascism, and who sometimes come from it. Above all, it contains a great many newcomers, who are full of good will, but are also very
+ignorant. By and large, their capacity for making decisions and taking initiative is certainly not very great. On the other hand, there is no doubt that
+the base strongly supports the Party's political errors. In particular, many
+Communists let themselves be blinded by the legitimate loathing that
+Social Democracy inspires in them, especially the older militants who have
+not forgotten the tragic days when the Social Democratic minister Noske
+styled himself a bloodhound.' Since their bluntness makes all their conversations with the Social Democratic workers degenerate into arguments,
+thcy are not aware that the latter feel a similar loathing for Noske, and say
+so loudly in their own party. However, one cannot deny that there exists
+among the Communists a certain current of sympathy for the Hitlerites,
+whose obvious energy sometimes contrasts favorably with Social Democratic capitulations, especially during strikes. One often has the impression that Communist and Hitlerite workers are vainly trying to find the
+point of disagreement in their disputes, and that their fights are a sham. At
+the height of the Hitlerite terror Hitlerites and Communists could be heard
+Published in L'Ecole émancipée, February 26, 1933.
+¡ Gustave Noske was the Social Democratic minister of the interior at the time of the
+Spartacist uprising of January 1у1у. The government felt char the task of suppressing rhe uprising should not be given to a general. Noske was suggested for the job, and he accepted.
+saying, "All right, someone has to be the hloodhound."
+
+139
+nostalgically recalling the time when they struggled, as they put it, "side by
+side"-that is, the time of the Red referendum; and one could hear a Communist exclaim, "Better to be a Nazi than a Social Democrat." However,
+statements of this sort did arouse some protests, for there is also a strong
+current in the Communist party in favor of a united front with Social
+Democracy. Many Communists clearly realize that they can do nothing
+without the support of the reformist workers. They liked the policy followed in July; they did not see its inadequacies, and they have not realized
+that it was given up at the beginning of August. Broadly speaking, especially since July 20, there has been a feeling of uneasiness that has found expression in a renewal of life in the cells; but it is an undefined uneasiness. It
+took a long time for the young Communists to become aware that the situation is acute and that every moment is of inestimable importance; they
+did make some progress in this regard in October, if one believes Berlioz's
+account. Nevertheless, as far as one can tell, their anxiery is still not taking
+an articulate form.
+It is the Party apparatus that prevents it from taking an articulate form
+by keeping the threat of expulsion for "Trotskyite" or "Brandlerite"
+deviations hanging over every Communist's head. It is the apparatus that,
+by suppressing all freedom of expression within the Party and weighing
+down the militants with insignificant and exhausting tasks, kills off all
+decisiveness and initiative and prevents any real education of the newcomers by the experienced militants. Moreover, this mass of newcomers,
+who are as ignorant as they are enthusiastic, is the real support of the
+internal Party apparatus; without this docile mass how could those complete shifts of orientation, accomplished with no discussion and within
+a few days—shifts for which Piatnitsky naively congratulates the Party—
+be brought about? In addition, the policy imposed on the Party by the
+apparatus has on many occasions encouraged those entirely understandable but highly dangerous feelings of hatred for the Social Democrats and
+lenient or even sympathetic feelings for the Hitlerites. Generally speaking,
+it is the apparatus that, by adorning its own policy with all the prestige
+of the October Revolution, has sowed confusion in the mind of every
+German Communist, in exactly the same way as priests rob the enthusiastic faithful of their critical faculties by covering up the most flagrant
+absurdities with the authority of the church.
+If the responsibility for the weakness of the German Communist parry
+lies with its leadership, what is the nature of that responsibility? The
+
+140
+Trotskyites have repeatedly said, with reference to this subject, that "the
+mistakes of the Social Democratic party are acts of treason; those of the
+Communist party arc merely errors." Certainly the Communist International hasn't yet done anything comparable to voting for war credits on
+August 4, 1914, or to the Social Democrats' massacre of the Spartacists in
+1y19. But if one sticks to the present period it is difficult to understand
+what the Trotskyites' formula means. Does it mean that Social Democracy
+steers the workers away from all revolutionary action, and that even if the
+Communist party is getting off to a bad start in paving the way for the
+revolution, it at least involves the workers in looking for a way out on that
+path? But revolution is not a religion with respect to which a lukewarm
+believer is worth more than an unbeliever; it is a practical task. One can no
+more be a revolutionary through words alone than one can be a mason or
+a blacksmith. Only action that paves the way for a transformation of the
+regime is revolutionary (though analyses and slogans that prepare for such
+action, and do not merely preach, can also be considered revolutionary). It
+would not be safe to assert that the German Communist party as an
+organization, and independently of the feelings of the base, is more revolutionary in this sense than the Social Democratic party; moreover, in the
+area of reforms the latter can boast of having rendered services of much
+greater importance than the Communist party in the past. Or does the
+Trotskyites' formula mean that the intentions of the Communist bureaucrats are purer than those of the Social Democratic bureaucrats? The
+question is insoluble, and of no interest besides. In practice, a workingclass party's mistakes can be called errors when they are due to an incorrect assessment of the proletariat's interests, and acts of treason when they
+are due to an organic connection, whether conscious or unconscious, with
+interests opposed to those of the proletariat.
+P.S. What about the united front?
+On February s it was rumored that, according to Trotsky, Moscow had
+given an order to form it.
+Nevertheless, toward the middle of the month, the German Communist
+party responded by bluntly rejecting the Social Democratic party's proposal for a "nonaggression pact." The Social Democrats made it clear that
+each party would keep its point of view and its independence, but heinous
+attacks would be brought to an end. This proposal was a very acceptable
+base for negotiations, and in these negotiations the Communist party
+
+141
+(which would naturally have proposed actual unity of action with complete freedom of criticism on both sides) would have found valuable support right at the very base of Social Democracy. The Party deprived itself
+of that support by refusing even to negotiate.
+Ten
+The German Communist party, like all the sections of the International, is
+organically subordinated to the apparatus of the Russian state. Forced by
+necessity, the Bolsheviks did what Marx saw that all previous revolutionaries except the Communards had done, namely, they perfected the
+machinery of the state instead of destroying it. As Marx wrote in April
+1871, "The destruction of the bureaucratic and military machine is the
+precondition of every popular revolution on the Continent." After Marx,
+Lenin pointed out (in The State and Revolution) that a state apparatus
+distinct from the population, made up of a bureaucracy, police force, and
+permanent army, has interests distinct from the interests of the population,
+especially from those of the proletariat. We do not have to go into Russian
+domestic policy here. But, although it was born of a revolution, insofar as
+it is a permanent apparatus, the state apparatus of the Russian nation has
+interests distinct from those of the world proletariat; distinct-that is, in
+part identical, in part opposed. One could, perhaps, consider the famous
+doctrine of "socialism in one country"' as constituting the theoretical
+expression of this divergence.
+How far does this divergence go? To what degree does it explain the
+political orientation of the Communist International? We don't know.
+What we do know is that the chief mistakes of the German Communist
+party, namely, the sectarian struggle against Social Democracy as the
+"main enemy," the sabotage of the united front, the participation in the socalled Red referendum, and the shameful nationalist demagogy, were all
+imposed on the Party by the International (cf. esp. no. 21-22 of the Communist International). And, speaking of the Communist International, we
+Published in L'Ecole émancipée. March 5. 1933.
++ In 1924 Stalin announced that the Communist parry in Russia would set aside efforts to
+actively further international proletarian revolution in order to first build socialism in Russia.
+
+142
+must not forget that we are talking about an apparatus with no mandate,
+since the congress hasn't been convened for five years; an irresponsible
+apparatus, which is entirely in the hands of the Russian Central Committee. This was quite apparent when the Russian parry forced out Zinoviev, 2
+who was the head of the International, without consulting the other sections or even giving them any of the particulars. And, as for the nationalist
+orientation of the German party, we know that it was in perfect agreement
+with the foreign policy of the ussR, which was at that time especially concerned with preventing France from drawing Germany into an anti-Soviet
+bloc. In addition, if the conversations between Leipart and von Schleicher
+make our blood boil, we are also entitled to wonder what Litvinov, during
+his recent visit to Berlin, could have said to von Schleicher in the course
+of their private conversation.3 Finally, in a general way, one observes
+a continuity and perseverance in the mistakes of the German party which
+would be quite unlikely if the error were accidental; and the methods the
+Comintern employs against those who criticize its mistakes are quite similar to the methods a state apparatus uses against those who threaten its
+interests. Thorez and Semard" demonstrated this when, during a discussion concerning Germany, they had the Trotskyites beaten up in the middle of a public meeting.
+Possibly all that would not be enough to justify an accusation of treason.
+Bur this much is certain: a change in the Party's internal regime-which
+would be the first condition for a genuine reform—is directly opposed to
+the interests of the Russian state apparatus. The Russian state apparatus,
+like every state apparatus in the world, deports, exiles, and directly or
+indirectly kills those who try to diminish its power; but, as a state born of
+a revolution, it needs to be able to say it has the approval of the vanguard
+of the world proletariat. That is why driving our the oppositionists comes
+= Grigori Zinnvier (1883-1936) was the head of the Communist International until
+1925, when he was removed by Stalin. The following year he formed a joint opposition with
+Irorsky, and he and Trorsky were borh expelled in 1927.
+2 Maxim Livinor (1876-1951), rhe Russian commissar of foreign affairs, met with
+ron Schleicher on December 19. 19.32. According to F.. H. Carr, von Schleicher "complained
+of the subversive activities of [the German Comunist parry), and hinred at the possibility of
+a legal ban.... Litvinov... responded by declaring thar measures raken by the German
+government against German communists were no concern of the Soviet government, and
+would not affect Soviet-German relations." See Carr, Twilight of the Comintern, 1930-1935
+(New York: l'antheon, 1982), pp. 80-8т.
+1 Maurice Thorez (1900-1964) and Pierre Semard (1887-1942) were leaders of the
+French Communist party.
+
+• The Situation m Gennany
+113
+betore every other consideration, nor only in the Russian party bur in the
+International. Given the seriousness of the situation in Germany, it can be
+said that every time the German party apparatus expels a Communist for
+disagreeing wirh the Party line, it is betraying the German workers in order
+to save the bureaucracy of the Russian state.
+Only a few tiny opposition groups are fighting against the triple apparatus of the Party, the Comintern, and the Russian state. In addition,
+the unconditionality of their opposition varies from group to group.
+Urbahns's "Leninbund"s goes as far as to entirely refuse to call the USSR
+a workers' state; on the other hand the Trotskyites, who are otherwise
+energetic and courageous, show a perpetual desire to be loyal to the
+"workers' state" and the "Party of the working class" that often impairs
+the clarity of their judgment.® Brandler, whose partisans are the only oppositionists with any influence in the reformist unions, goes much further
+still, since he approves of everything that is done in the USsR, including the
+deportations. A few Brandlerites, grouped around courageous militants
+like Frölich,? finally decided that this attitude was a capitulation, and
+because they also despaired of getting the Communist party to correct its
+mistakes, they went over to the little "Socialist Workers' party," to which
+they were attracted by a genuinely revolutionary youthfulness of spirit.
+But they found themselves caught in an organization that combines the
+numerical weakness of a sect with the lack of cohesion of a mass movement—a paralyzing situation for a militant. Furthermore, the struggle that
+these groups are carrying on is nearly hopeless. How does one, within the
+Communist party, discredit a leadership that has so many ways of preserving its authority? As for trying to discredit the Parry itself in the eyes of the
+proletariar, no oppositionist group would dare do that for fear of thereby
+encouraging reformism or fascism. And, at the base, among some voung
+ș Hugo Urbahns was a leaderof the German Conmunist party in the mid-razos. Expelled
+in 1427, he became one of the founders of the Leninbund, a Left opposition group. He
+became the leader of the Leninbund in 1930.
+& The German Trotskyire group has not been "liquidared." contrary to whar /. 'Humanite
+lowly declared: in simply lost a considerable fraction of its members in quarter, some sil!%
+who not only disowned Trotsky bur condemned all the oppositionist groups. A month
+earlier, the same ones were boasting that they were the hest Trotskyires. The departure of
+elements of this sorr is a good rhing for the group, but the way in which it was brought abour
+seems to indicate an internal regime that differs little from chat of the Party. Nore of su!
+- Paul Frölich (1884-1953) was one of the founders of the German Communist parts.
+He later became a member of the Brandlerite opposition, and then became a leader ul the
+Socialist Workers' party.
+
+1 ÷ 7
+Communist and Social Democratic workers, a movement in favor of a new
+party is just beginning to take shape.
+SO THAT Is the situation of the seven-tenths of the German population
+who yearn for socialism. Thanks to Hitlerite demagogy, the politically
+unconscious, the desperate, and those who are ready for any adventure
+have been recruited as soldiers to fight a civil war in the service of finance
+capital; the prudent and level-headed workers have been handed over by
+Social Democracy, tied hand and foot, to the German state apparatus; and
+the most fervent and resolute proletarians have been kept powerless by the
+representatives of the Russian state apparatus.
+Is it necessary to try to formulate future prospects? The various combinations which the play of conflicts and alliances berween classes and
+fractions of classes can result in, produce a multitude of prospects that cannot be altogether dismissed-even the prospect of a spontaneous proletarian uprising and the emergence of a new commune on the scale of
+Germany. Weighing the probabilities would be pointless. Besides, the significance of the various elements of the German situation depends entirely
+on what may happen in the world, especially on the arrival of that "turning
+point" about which people in Berlin have been talking for more than six
+months; on the rate at which prosperity will be restored; and on the order
+in which the different countries will be affected by it. We cannot say anything with real precision about this subject. The weakness of the revolutionary movement is doubtless largely due to our ignorance of economic
+phenomena—an ignorance, moreover, that is disgraceful for materialists
+who consider themselves to be in the line of Marx.
+At least we clearly perceive the decadence of the regime, a decadence
+that goes beyond the present crisis. Increasingly, expenditures devoted to
+economic warfare (of which military warfare can be considered a particular case) outweigh productive expenditures; and in a parallel way, the
+system is more and morc caught up in the machinery of the state—machinery that, in the course of history, has been always perfected and never
+destroyed. The ideal limit of this process could be defined as absolute
+fascism, that is, a suffocating grip on all forms of social life by the power of
+a state that itself serves as an instrument of finance capital. A return to
+prosperity can seemingly interrupt this process, but the danger will remain
+the same as long as the capitalist regime continues to break down. Already
+the general state of crisis of the regime seems to be spreading not only to
+
+145
+what remains of genuine bourgeois culture but also to the little that we
+possess in the way of rough outlines of a new culture; the working-class
+movement and the proletariat are being affected materially and morally,
+especially at the present time, by the decadence of the capitalist economy.
+And it would be wrong to be sure that this decadence may not also manage
+to stifle what survives of the spirit of the October Revolution in the UsSR,
+perhaps even without military aggression. The attack by the dominant
+class, forced by the crisis to constantly make its oppressive power more
+burdensome, is taking place in Germany now; and we cannot measure the
+importance of the battle that will possibly break out there tomorrow.
+On the eve of such a battle, facing the formidable economic and political
+organizations of capital, the gangs of Hitlerite terrorists, and the machine
+guns of the Reichswehr, the German working class is alone and barc
+handed. Or rather, one is tempted to wonder if it would not be even better
+for it to be bare handed. The instruments that it forged, and that it thinks it
+holds, are in reality in the hands of others, in the defense of interests that
+are not its own.
+P.S. Right now signs of dissension are becoming evident in the capitalist
+camp. Von Papen has just called for a "black-white-red" front including
+the "bourgeois parties," that is, the parties of the Right, with the exception
+of the National Socialists. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung is turning out
+propaganda against state intervention in the economy. Social Democracy
+sees in these internal battles of the bourgeoisic a sign of Hitler's weakness,
+but nothing is less certain. The tone of the articles in the Deutsche Allgemeine Z.eitung seems to reflect a sort of panic, as if the big bourgeoisie felt
+overwhelmed by the Hitlerite movement. And under present conditions it
+would be unreasonable to count on the idea that the big bourgeoisie will
+ever categorically turn against Hitler; that would be to clear the way for
+a proletarian uprising, and the bourgeoisie knows it.
+Actually, Hitler's position keeps on getting stronger and Hitlerite terror
+is on the increase; the police have been given formal orders to systematically attack the parties of the Left, and have been assured that the murders
+committed by them will always be covered up;® the entire Communist
+8 When Hitler became chancellor, Hermann Göring was appointed Prussian minister of
+the interior. He immediarely purged the Prussian state service, especially the higher levels
+of the police force, which he then filled with his own appointments. In mid-February he
+instructed the police to show no mercy to "organizations hostile to the Stare" and assured
+
+146
+press has been suppressed; the Party headquarters (the Karl Liebknecht
+House) has been closed, as has the Karl Marx School, a famous Berlin
+school offering primary and secondary courses, including special secondary courses for young workers; all the secular schools are expected to be
+closed by Easter; an auxiliary police force, composed of members of the
+Hitlerite storm troops and the Steel Helmets,' has been created; etc., etc.
+Resistance is taking the form of one-day local strikes and mass demonstrations, in the course of which the local organizations usually form a
+united front. This resistance remains disorganized and widely scattered, as
+spontaneous movements tend to be, and on the whole it has been, up to
+now, ineffective. Similarly, the united front has been achieved only locally,
+partially, and in an equally disorganized way, which shows that the cadres
+are letting theinselves be borne along by a spontaneous mass current in
+favor of unity of action instead of organizing it. This current is stronger
+every day; one sign of it is the resolutions regarding joint action (which, it
+must be added, are as vague as they are passionate) adopted by all the
+reformist unions' general assemblies that are now taking place.
+The Red federations of the metal and building trades and the Berlin Red
+trade-union organization have made precise proposals for a united frontto
+the corresponding reformist organizations, but of course to no effect. The
+Red trade-union organizations of Germany, which only "reproduce the
+party" in their organization and activity (Internationale Syndicale Rouge,
+no. 19-10, p. y 14), and which remain inferior to the Party in both numerical strength and influence, are too weak to have any serious chance of
+bringing about joint action with the corresponding reformist organizations except by going to the extreme limit of concessions, that is, asking to
+be admitted into the reformist Central. It is difficult to say from a distance
+whether these tactics, recommended by the Trotskyites, would be the best
+or not.
+In any case, one will not be able to believe that the Communist party
+genuinely wants to do everything in its power to achieve proletarian unity
+chum that "police officers who make use of fire arms in the execurion of their duties will, with.
+our regard to the consequences of such usc. bencfir by my protection; chose who, our of
+a misplaced regard torsuch consequences, fail in their dury will be punished in accordance
+with the regulations... Every official must bear in mind that failure to act will be regarded
+more seriously than an error due to taking action." See Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in
+Tyranny (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 261.
+y The Steel Helmers wils al First World War vererans' organizarion char began accepting
+nonvererans in 1924 and became a right-wing paramilitary group.
+
+14 7
+of action until the Party itself, as a party, makes proposals that are specific
+and conciliatory enough to leave the reformist leaders no way out.
+But despite the state of mind of the masses and the urgent danger, the
+Party's Central Committee has heen silent ever since the vague appeal it
+issued the day after Hitler was appointed chancellor. One might think it
+doesn't exist.
+
+
+In 1933-34 Simone Weil became increasingly convinced that there was
+little likelihood of revolutionary change through political activity; moreover, she began to perceive that the real enemy was not the capitalist
+economic system per se but the bureaucratic, centralized apparatus of the
+modern state, whose power was consolidated through war. She clearly
+foresaw that the European states were on a trajectory toward war—very
+likely, she thought, toward "another conflagration" involving "the whole
+of Europe and beyond"—and she feared that the efforts of the Left on
+behalf of "liberty, the proletariat, etc.," would, in reality, only serve the
+interests of the Russian state and the Franco-Prussian military alliance
+and consequently spur war preparations. For this reason, she decided in
+mid-1934 to "take no further part in any political or social activities, with
+two exceptions: anticolonialism and the campaign against civil defense
+exercises." Still, her consuming desire to liberate the oppressed remained.
+She had been coming more and more to believe "that the liberation (relative) of the workers must be brought about before all else in the workshop."' She turned, then, to the workplace itself, the factory.
+Having applied for a leave of absence from teaching for the 1934-35
+school year, Weil made arrangements with Auguste Detoeuf, the managing director of the company that owned the Alsthom factory (a plant
+that made electrical equipment for subway cars and streetcars), to be hired
+as an unskilled worker. She used connections in order to get only this first
+of the three jobs she held berween December 1934 and August 1935, and
+once employed, she lived as fully as possible the life of an ordinary, anonymous unskilled worker. She rented a room in the neighborhood of the
+factory and lived on her skimpy earnings, going as far as to insist on paying
+her parents the price she would have had to pay for a meal when she dined
+with them, and going hungry when she ran low on money during a monthlong period of unemployment. She became a member of what was perhaps
+1 Simone Pétrement, Simone Weil: A Life (New York: Pantheon, 1976), pp. 211, 212,
+227.
+
+152
+the most despised class in the French factory system—the class of unskilled
+women workers. The jobs that she and the other women did, under the
+supervision of male foremen of varying degrees of technical ability and
+human decency, were tedious, extremely repetitive, often dangerous, and
+physically exhausting. Maladroit and not physically strong, subject to
+frequent migraine headaches that the noise of the factory made excruciating, Weil found the experience almost unbearable; "I came near to being
+broken," she wrote of it. Her "Factory Journal," the notebook in which
+she entered an almost daily record of her eight and a half months as a factory worker, is larded with the actual pointless, mindless detail of this life;
+it is full of computations of pieces made, rates of speed achieved, attempts
+(sometimes incorrect) to calculate her hours and meager earnings; it boils
+over with her frustration with the timekeeping system, with her anxiety at
+failing to make the rate, and with her impotent rage at the way she was
+treated. It also conveys a sense of the intense psychological reality of factory life that is largely missing from her later letters and essays on the
+subject.
+Weil had long felt, she wrote early in 1935, that in a factory one should
+make a hard but joyous contact with "real life."2 Ideally, a factory would
+be an environment in which one did the sort of work she described in
+"Science and Perception in Descartes" — work through which the workers
+exercised their minds correctly and came to know both the world and their
+own true natures as thinking and active beings. Though obviously she did
+not expect to find this ideal when she entered the factory, what she found
+was far worse than anything she had imagined. In order to make the minimum rate and not be fired she had to turn herself into an automaton who
+neither thought nor felt, who mindlessly and rapidly produced so-and-so
+many hundreds of pieces per hour. She found the experience not only
+morally and physically painful but also completely dehumanizing. Everything conspired to turn the worker into nothing more than a beast of
+burden. To remain conscious—a thinking being—in those circumstances
+was unbearably painful.
+Weil had been aware before she entered the factory that the organization of production was by its very structure oppressive. In her 1934 essay
+"Reflections on the Causes of Liberty and Social Oppression" she had
+argued that if the proletarian revolution is to have any meaning, it is the
+2 Sintone Weil, Seventy Letters (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 20.
+
+153
+system of relations in production that must be changed—the system in
+which one group gives orders and another carries them out-and not
+simply the capitalist ownership of the means of production. But what had
+been an intellectual awareness was given a more profound dimension by
+her actual experience in the factory; what she had not known before-and
+what marked her, she said, for life—was the experience of being treated as
+a slave, of being submerged in an environment in which she did not count,
+was given no respect, was regarded as having no rights at all, and as a result
+of which she came, finally, to feel that she was not entitled to be treated
+otherwise. Intellectually, she concluded from this experience that working
+conditions that constantly humiliate and degrade workers and destroy
+their sense of having any value will never produce a working class capable
+of revolution. There were, she observed in the factory, no revolutionary
+feelings at all among the workers; the idea of resistance, she wrote, "never
+occurs to anyone." She also saw that economic inequality alone was an
+inadequate explanation of the problem of oppression; the factory gave
+her the first glimpse of the fact that, however much economic inequality
+was a contributing factor, oppression was essentially maintained by the
+systematic humiliation and the instilling of a sense of inferiority in the
+oppressed. What she learned in the factory contributed to her later understanding that, as she would write in her 1943 essay "Human Personality," a truly nonoppressive political system would have to start from
+a real recognition of the respect due every human soul.
+Perhaps even more important than the intellectual conclusions she drew
+from her factory experience were its psychological effects on her. When
+she attempted to describe it in letters to friends, she found it inexpressible;
+she became almost inarticulate and could only sum it up in such generalities as "it's inhuman." She obviously tried very hard—in her letters
+the following year to the manager of the Rosières foundry at Bourges and
+in her 1942 essay "Factory Work"—to convey the profound and important psychological effects of working conditions upon the worker. To
+judge from the general response to these writings, she did not succeed;
+most of those who have commented on her experience have tended to explain her response as completely atypical, due to her temperament, her
+awkwardness, her oversensitivity, and so on, and to see her description of
+herself as a slave, as someone permanently marked with the brand of
+slavery, as a romantic and perhaps slightly hysterical exaggeration. In
+short, the truth of her experience has tended to be dismissed.
+
+154
+Although what she is trying to say comes across more clearly in her
+"Factory Journal" than elsewhere, it is, indeed, very hard to hear, because
+it describes an experience of deep psychological wounding against which
+one habitually and instinctively protects oneself, an experience that it is
+impossible to fully appreciate on an intellectual level alone. The psychological suffering Weil underwent in the factory—a suffering that she made
+every effort to remain conscious of and not to flee from —unquestionably
+affected her very soul and brought about her real entry into the community
+of human suffering. From being a dedicated worker on behalf of the oppressed she became one of them and one with them.
+The factory experience was a watershed in Weil's life. It was her first
+profound contact with affliction (a central concept in her later religious
+writing), especially with the aspect of social degradation that she considered such an important part of the totality of affliction. It led directly to
+her understanding, later expressed in her moving essay on the Iliad, that
+"the sense of human misery is a pre-condition of justice and love." It was,
+finally, of major importance in her receptivity to Christianity. Having been
+brought to a condition in which she considered herself a slave, while
+traveling in Portugal a month or so after leaving the factory she came upon
+a group of Portuguese fishermen's wives carrying candles in a religious
+procession and singing "ancient hymns of a heart-rending sadness."
+Describing this incident later, she wrote, "the conviction was suddenly
+borne in upon me that Christianity is pre-eminently the religion of slaves,
+that slaves cannot help belonging to it, and I among others."4
+3 The Iliad, or The Poem of Force (Wallingford, Penn.: Pendle Hill, 1956), p. 34.
+4 Waiting for God (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1973), p. 67.
+
+TÚNA dEKațOnÉun, кратері б етикетет ¿vayn'
+Not only should man know what he is making, but if possible he should
+sec how it is used— see how nature is changed by him.
+Every man's work should be an object of contemplation for him.
+FIRST WEEK
+Started work Tuesday December 4, 1934.
+Tuesday. 3 hrs. of work in the course of the day. Beginning of the morning, 1 hr. of drilling (Catsous).
+End of the morning, i hr. at the stamping press with Jacquot (that's
+where I met the warchouse keeper). End of the afternoon: 3¾ hr. turning
+a crank to help make cardboards (with Dubois).
+Wednesday morning. Fly-press the whole morning, with some periods of
+no work. Done without hurrying, consequently without fatigue. Didn't
+make the rate!?
+From 3 to 4, easy work at the stamping press; 70 per hundred. Still
+didn't make the rate.
+To 4:45: machine with buttons.
+Thursday morning. Machine with buttons; •56 per hundred (should be
+•72). I, 160 in the whole morning—very difficult.
+Afternoon. Power failure. Waited from 1:15 to 3 o'clock. Left at 3.
+Friday. Right-angle pieces, at the stamping press (tool only supposed to
+accentuate the right angle). 100 pieces botched (crushed, because the
+screw came loose).
+From II A.M. on, handwork: removing cardboards from an assembly
+that they want done over (fixed magnetic circuits—replace cardboard with
+small copper plates). Tools: mallet, compressed-air hose, saw blade, flashlight; very tiring for the eyes.
+1 Much against your will, under pressure of a harsh necessity. Iliad 6. 458.
+2 Weil uses coulé ("didn't cur it" or "blew ir"), a variant of couler le bon or bon coulé—
+working-class slang meaning that one failed to reach a minimum speed on a given urder.
+
+156
+Tour of the tool shop, but no time to see much ofit. Bawled out for having gone there.
+Saturday. Cardboards.
+Didn't make the rate on a single voucher.
+Women workers:
+Mme Forestier
+Mimi
+Tolstoy fan (Eugénie)
+My co-worker on the iron bars (Louisette)
+Mimi's sister
+Cat
+Blonde from the munitions factory
+Redhead (Joséphine)
+Divorced woman
+Mother of the burned kid
+Woman who gave me a roll
+Italian woman
+Dubois
+Big shots:
+Mouquet
+Chastel
+Warehouse keeper (Pommera)
+Set-up men:
+Ilion
+Léon
+Catsous (Michel)
+"Jacquot" (has become a worker again)
+Robert
+"Biol" (at the back)
+(OrV...?)
+"...." (furnace)
+Male workers:
+violinist
+conceited blond
+old man with glasses (the one who reads l' Auto)
+singer at the furnace
+
+157
+worker in drilling goggles ("we'll see"
+... very nice)
+boy with the mallet (drinks—the only one)
+his co-worker
+my "fiancé"
+his brother (?)
+young blond Italian
+welder
+coppersmith
+SECOND WEEK
+Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday. Personnel manager sent for me at 10 A.M.
+to say they are setting my hourly base wage at 2 F (actually, it will be
+1.80 F). Removing cardboards. Violent headache Tuesday, work goes very
+slowly and badly (Wednesday I managed to do it quickly and well, tapping
+very vigorously and accurately with the mallet-but terrible cyestrain).
+Thursday. From Io A.M. (or even earlier?) until about 2 P.M., metal
+polishing on the big fly-press. Work had to be done over again, after it was
+completely done, by order of the foreman, and in a way that was uncomfortable and dangerous.
+Order to do it over again justified, or bullying? In any case, Mouquet
+had me do it over in a way that was exhausting and dangerous (I had to
+duck every time in order to avoid being struck full on the head by the heavy
+counterweight). Pity and mute indignation of neighbors. Furious with
+myself (for no reason, since no one had told me I was not hitting hard
+enough), I had the idiotic feeling that it wasn't worth the effort to pay
+attention to protecting myself. Still, no accident. Set-up man (Léon) very
+annoyed, probably with Mouquet, but not explicitly so.
+At 11:45, observe....
+Afternoon: no work until 4 P.M.
+From 4 t0 5:45....
+Friday. Stamping press—washers. The tool formed them and made a
+hole (). Worked all day. Made the rate, in spite of having to replace
+a spring—the spring was broken. First time that I worked all day on the
+same machine; great fatigue, although I did not go at top speed. Error in
+the count, corrected at my request by the woman who came after me (very
+nice!).
+
+158
+Saturday. I hr. drilling holes in brass ferrules placed against a very low
+stop that I didn't see, which made me botch 6 or 7 (a new woman who had
+never worked before did the job successfully yesterday, according to Léon,
+who bawls you out every chance he gets). Didn't make the rate-but no
+reprimand for the botched pieces, because the count is right.
+¾ hr. for cutting small brass bars with Léon.
+Easy—no blunders.
+Break for cleaning machines.
+Made the rate on i voucher (for 25.50 F).
+A woman who was fired—tubercular —had several times botched hundreds of pieces (but how many times?). Once it was just before she fell very
+ill, so she was forgiven. This time, soo pieces. But on the evening shift
+(2:30 tO 10:30 P.M.) when all the lights are out except the portable lamps
+(which give no light at all). The drama is complicated by the fact that the
+set-up man (Jacquot) is automatically considered partly responsible. The
+women I'm with (Cat and others who have stopped working—one of them
+the Tolstoy fan?) are on Jacquot's side. One of them: "You've got to be
+more conscientious when you have to make a living."
+It seems that the woman had refused to do the order in question (probably for painstaking and badly paid work) — "work that was too hard,"
+someone says. The foreman had said to her, "If this isn't done by tomorrow morning...." It was probably thought she had botched the work on
+purpose. Not one word of sympathy from the women, even though they
+know the disgust you feel facing an exhausting job, knowing you will earn
+2 For less and be bawled out for not having made the rate—a disgust that
+illness must increase tenfold. This lack of sympathy is explained by the fact
+that if one woman is spared a "bad" job, it is done by another... One
+woman's comment (Mme Forestier ?): "She shouldn't have talked back
+... when you have to make a living, you have no choice... (repeated
+several times).... Then she could have gone and told the assistant manager, 'Yes, I was wrong, but even so it's not completely my fault; it's hard
+to see very well, etc. I won't do it any more, etc.' "
+"When you have to make a living": this expression originates partly
+in the fact that some of the married women aren't working for a living,
+but to be a little better off. (That woman had a husband, but he was unemployed.) A great deal of inequality among the women workers....
+Wage system. Below 3 F per hour you don't make the rate. Vouchers on
+
+159
+which you didn't make the rate are adjusted every two weeks in a little
+committee made up of Mouquet and the timekeeper.... (The timekeeper
+is pitiless. Mouquet probably defends the women a little.) They set arbitrary values on these vouchers—sometimes 4 francs, sometimes 3, sometimes the amount of the hourly base wage (2.40 F for the others). Sometimes they pay only the amount actually made by deducting anything over
+and above the hourly wage from the bonus. When a woman thinks she is
+the victim of an injustice, she goes to complain. But it's humiliating, since
+she has no rights at all and is at the mercy of the good will of the foremen,
+who decide according to her worth as a worker, and in large measure
+capriciously.
+The time lost between jobs either must be marked on the vouchers (but
+then you risk not making the rate, especially on small orders) or is deducted from your pay. So you end up with fewer than 96 hours for the
+two-week period.
+It's a form of control; without it you would always be marking down
+shorter periods of time than you actually spent.
+System for estimating hours beforehand.
+Story about Mouquet: Mimi's sister goes to find him to complain about
+the pricing of a voucher; he abruptly orders her back to her work. She goes
+away grumbling. Ten minutes later he goes to find her, asks "What's the
+matter?" and takes care of it.
+"Not very many dare to fall below the minimum rate."
+THIRD WEEK
+Jobs:
+Monday, 17th, morning. At the small fly-press.
+Polishing all morning-tiring-didn't make the rate.
+The memory of my adventure at the big fly-press makes me afraid of not
+hitting hard enough. On the other hand it seems you mustn't hit too hard.
+And the voucher calls for a speed that seems fantastic to me....
+End of the morning: washers from metal bars, with Robert's heavy
+press.
+Afternoon-stamping press; pieces very difficult to position, at .56 per
+hundred (600 from 2:30 to 5:15); ½ hr. to reset the machine, which was
+out of adjustment because I had left a piece in the tool. Tired and fed up.
+
+160
+Feeling of having been a free being for 24 hours (on Sunday), and of having
+to readapt to slavery. Disgust at being forced to strain and exhaust myself,
+with the certainty of being bawled out either for being slow or for botching, for the sake of these 56 centimes. ... Augmented by the fact that I am
+having dinner with my parents—Feeling of slavery—
+The speed is dizzying. (Especially when in order to throw yourself into it
+you have to overcome fatigue, headaches, and the feeling of being fed up.)
+Mimi beside me—
+Mouquet: don't use your fingers. "You don't eat with your fingers...."
+Tuesday, 18th. Same pieces— 500 from 7 A.M. to 8:45, all botched.
+From 9 to s, work in pairs, paid by the hour; iron bars 3 meters long,
+weighing 30 to so kilograms. Very hard, but not nerve-racking. A certain
+joy in the muscular effort... but in the evening, exhaustion. The others
+look at me with pity, especially Robert.
+Wednesday, 19th. No work from 7 A.M. TO II.
+It to 5, heavy press cutting washers out of a bar of sheet metal with
+Robert. Didn't make the rate (2 F per hour; 2.28 F for a thousand
+washers). Very violent headache, finished the work while weeping almost
+uninterruptedly. (When I got home, interminable fit of sobbing.) No
+blunders, however, aside from 3 or 4 botched pieces.
+Advice from the warehouse keeper —illuminating. Pedal only with your
+leg, not with your whole body; push the strip with one hand and hold it in
+position with the other, instead of pulling and holding with the same hand.
+Relation of work to athletics.
+Robert quite severe when he sees that I botched two pieces.
+Thursday, 20th, and Friday, 21st. Stamping rivets at the light press-.62
+per hundred—made 2.40 F per hour (more).
+(Pleasant warning from the foreman: if you botch them, you'll be fired.)
+3,000—earned 18.60 F. Even so, didn't make the rate: 3 F minimum.
+No blunders, but slowed down by irrational scruples.
+Riveting: assembly work. Only difficulty is doing the operations in
+order. Example: I absentmindedly botched two because I did the riveting
+before I had assembled everything.
+Thursday, payday; 241.60 F.
+Saturday, 22nd. Riveting with Ilion. Work pleasant enough-.028 per
+
+161
+piece. Made the rate, but did it by going at top speed. Constant effort —not
+without a certain pleasure, because I am succeeding.
+Probable wages: 48 hrs. at 1.80 F = 86.25 F. Bonus: for Tuesday, if
+I worked at 4 F per hr., 17.60 F; for Wednesday 1.20 F; for Thursday and
+Friday .60 × 15 (approx) = 9 F; for Saturday, 1.20 X 3.5 = 4.20 F.
+Therefore:
+17.60 F + 1.60 F + 9F + 4.20 F = 32.40 F. That would make 86.25 F
++ 32.40 F = 118.65 F. Perhaps out of that a deduction corresponding to
+the job on which I botched soo pieces.
+Actually I had a bonus of 36.75 F (but % hr. was deducted, that's
+1.20 F). So 4.35 F more than I had thought. Undoubtedly an adjusted
+voucher—probably Monday morning's polishing.
+Made the rate on one voucher (for 12 F).
+FOURTH WEEK
+Laid off (week between Christmas and New Year's Day). I caught cold—
+had some fever (very slight) during the week and some terrible headaches;
+when the end of the holidays and the time to go back to work came, I still
+had a cold and was, above all, worn out with fatigue.
+Young unemployed workman encountered on Christmas Day....
+FIFTH WEEK
+Wednesday, 2nd. 7:15 to 8:45 A.M.: cutting pieces out of a long metal
+strip, at the large press with Robert. 677 pieces at 3 19 per hundred. Put
+down i hr. Io min. Held up at the beginning by lack of oil. Difficulty
+cutting the strip. Pulling it. Took out pieces toooften. Earned 1.85 F; at the
+hourly wage they ought to pay me 2. 1o F. Difference of .25 F.
+8:50 to 11:45 A.M.: holes for connectors with the little fly-press
+(name?). Slow in the beginning because I drove the tool in too deeply. Kept
+the piece in place too long-and looked from the wrong angle. 830 pieces
+at .84 per hundred. Earned 7 F; didn't make the rate, but by only a little.
+Actually 2.30 F, put down for 2.8o F.
+For the morning: 1 hr. to make up.
+I:IS tO 2:30: had no work, put down only 1 hr.
+2:30 to 4: stamping press. Cambered pieces cut out in the morning;
+
+162
+600 at. 54 per hundred, so carned 3.24 F. Put down 1 hr. 20 min. (Is min.
+less and I would have made the rate).
+4:30 tO S:I5: furnace. Very hard work; not only intolerable heat, but
+the flames come up to lick your hands and arms. You have to control your
+reflexes or botch... (one botched!). There are soo pieces (the remainder
+to be done Thursday morning), paid at 4.8o F per hundred. So 24 F for the
+lot.
+I have 8 hours.
+In addition to that, in the course of the day I have 3 hrs. 40 min. +
+I hr. 15 min. + i hr. 20 min. = 6% hrs. 2¼ hrs. to make up. Must keep
+track of this. Tomorrow I will probably not do more than 3%½ or 4 hrs.
+Furnace. The first evening, about s o'clock, the pain from the extreme
+heat, exhaustion, and headaches make me completely lose control of my
+movements. I can't lower the furnace damper. A coppersmith jumps up
+and lowers it for me. What gratitude you fcel at such moments! Also when
+the kid who lit the furnace for me showed me how to lower the damper
+with a hook, which made it much easier. On the other hand, when
+Mouquet suggests 1 put the pieces on the right so as to pass less often in
+front of the furnace, my chief reaction is to be annoyed for not having
+thought of it myself. Every time I burned myself, the welder threw me
+a sympathetic smile.
+Made the rate on 3 vouchers (z furnace, I riveting) for 24.60 F + 9.20 F
++ 29.40F=63.20 F.
+Thursday, 3rd. 7 A.M. tO 9:15: furnace. Clearly less hard than the day
+before, in spite of a violent headache from the moment I woke up. Have
+learned not to expose myself so much to the flames, and to run fewer risks
+of botching. Still, very hard. Terrible racket of mallet blows a few meters
+away.
+Earned 24.60 at the furnace. Put down 6 hrs. Took 3 hrs. (therefore
+8.20 F per hr.).
+9:15 tO |IS (Or 11:30?): spent the day drilling. Riveting fun: putting
+rivets in stacks of thin metal plates in which holes had been drilled. But
+inevitably didn't make the rate on the voucher. Put down how much time?
+Probably 1¼ hrs.—or ½, or %4? In any case, below my hourly base wage
+(probably a difference of more than 1 hr.).
+11:30-3 o'clock: ate lunch at the Russian restaurant. Riveting fun
+and easy. 400 pieces at .023 = 9.20 F. Put down 2½½ hrs. (at 3.70 F
+
+163
+per hr.). On resuming work at I: Is, suffering from a crushing headache,
+I botched s pieces by putting them wrong side up before doing the riveting.
+Fortunately the young drilling foreman came to take a look....
+Done at more than 3 F per hr.
+3:15-5:15: furnace. Much less arduous than yesterday evening and
+this morning—made 300 pieces (tempo of 7.3s F per hr.).
+Friday, 4th. =-8:30 A.M.: cutting pieces out of brass strips it the large
+press. Took my time, learning how before I started. Meditated on an
+exasperating mystery: the last piece cut out of the strip was notched; now,
+the one that came out notched was the seventh. Simple explanation given
+by the set-up man (Robert): 6 of them were still left in the die. Put down
+1¼ hrs. 578 for .224 per hundred. Earned 1.30 F! Difference between
+that and the hourly base wage =.95 F.
+8:45-1:30 (standing): polishing. A small order, marked 1o min., then
+300 pieces at .02?. Earned 6.90 F. Put down 2% hrs. (or 2/½?). 2.40 F.
+or 2.70 per hour. Work with the polishing belt, tricky. Did it slowly and,
+apparently, badly (didn't catch on to the knack); nevertheless, pieces not
+botched. But M—t made me stop, and turn over the remaining 200
+pieces to another woman.
+Furnace. Totally different place, although right next to our shop. The
+foremen never go there. Relaxed and brotherly atmosphere, no more servility or pettiness. The smart young man who serves as set-up man....
+The welder.... The young Italian worker with the blond hair... my
+"hancé"
+... his brother... the Italian woman ... the husky fellow with
+the mallet. ...
+At last, a happy workshop. Teamwork. Coppersmiths' shop, tools:
+mainly the mallet. They bend pipe elbows with a little hind machine, then
+make fine adjustments with the mallet; so knack is indispensable. Numerous calculations, needed for measurements-they assemble boxes, etc.
+Work by twos or more, most of the time.
+Wednesday, went to
+a meeting of the isth
+Socialist and Communist
+section about
+Citroën. Confidential.
+No workers
+from
+Hours min.
+Sous
+1%
+212
+1
+•..
+6
+1½
+1.85 F
+7.
+1.80
+.3.2.5
+24.60
+(3) 1.
+
+164
+Citroën, apparently.
+Not much reaction
+about it at the factory.
+2 women: "Sometimes
+you're upset, but with
+good
+reason."
+That
+was all. Warehouse
+keeper:
+"That's the
+way it is...."
+In the coppersmiths'
+shop, one worker had
+on his table the pamphlet distributed the
+night before.
+6½
+9.20
+1.30
+6.90
+5 min.
+5 min.
+2%
+('a] 100 min.
+25 min.
+73/
+31(½) 20 min.
+(1hr. ahead, perhaps 1 hr. 25 min.?).
+2.45
+1.30
+29.40
+2.10
+92.15
+Hrly. wage
+1.80 Fin
+30½ hrs. =
+54.60 F;
+bonus: 37.55 F:
+that makes a
+litele more than
+3F por hr.
+(.6.5 more).
+1:30-3:05 (standing): with the set-up man from the back (Biol?).
+Large pieces. Position the piece while pushing down; tighten with a movable bar; pedal; loosen the bar; tap a lever to free the piece; pull it out
+forcibly.... i F per hundred! Put down 1 hr. 25 min.—244 pieces.
+Earned 2.44 F. Set-up man rugged and very likable. I had already helped
+him cut some sheet metal, with great enjoyment. Didn't make the rate, but
+it was because the timekeeper made a mistake.
+Difference hetween what I earned and the hourly base wage: 25 F.
+3:15-4:50 (approximately): sheet-metal boxes. Apply oil, place
+around a shaft, stamp; the tool forms them. Put the solder on the correct
+side. Exhausted from having spent all day and the day before standing up;
+movements slow. Great pleasure in thinking that this box had been made
+by my teammates in the coppersmiths' shop, soldered.... During this job,
+a collection was taken up for a woman who is sick. Gave I F. Put down
+1¼ hrs. Earned? Made 137 pieces, 92 per hundred—earned approximately 1.30 F. However, the foreman said nothing. Difference between
+what I earned and the hourly base wage: 90 F.
+Saturday, Sth. 7-10 A.M.: furnace. Hardly difficult at all. No headaches,
+made 300 pieces at a leisurely pace. Earned 29.40 F for the lot of 6o0. Put
+down 7% hrs. Worked at a tempo of 4.90 F per hr.
+10-11 A.M.: cardboards (continuing). Easy. Only one stupid mistake
+you can make: cram. I did it! Bawling out from Léon. So centimes per
+
+165
+hundred. Did 425. Earned 2.12 F. Put down ¾ hr. Paid at 1o o'clock;
+II5 F; amount over the hourly base wage: 36.75 F.
+Total of differences berween what I made and the hourly wage: .25 F +
+IF + .95#+.25 F+.90 F = 2.50 F (it won't bankrupt the factory...).
+SIXTH WEEK
+Monday, 7th. 7-9:30 A.M.: continued the cardboards. Did 86s of them
+from 7 to 8:45 A.M. (1¾ hrs. at so centimes per hundred); I ought to have
+done I,05o of them. Then went to clip the ones that were too large, which
+is why Bret put me down for ½ hr. (actual time).
+From 9:15 to 9:30 worked on clipping them. Put down ½½ hr. on the ist
+voucher (so 1¼ hrs. for 680 pieces), that is, for 3•40 F; therefore 2.72 F
+per hr.; didn't make the rate. Put down 1 hr. ro min. on the second voucher
+for a few more than 700 pieces; MADE THE RATE. Total time: 1 hr.
+10 min. + ½ hr. + ¼½ hr. = 2 hrs. 10 min.
+9:30-10:20: 1 hr. of work paid by the hour (sheared off ends of long
+precut strips for Bret).
+10:20-2:40: polishing at the press (with the nice set-up man from the
+back) the large pieces out of which I had cut little tongues on Friday from
+1:30 to 3 (another woman had cambered them in the meantime)..8o per
+hundred! Did 5 16 in 2 hrs. 5o min. Put down 2 1/2 hrs. Earned 4.15 F, that
+is, officially I.6s F per hr. Difference between what I made and the hourly
+base wage for 2½ hrs.: 37 F.
+2:45 tO 5: IS: press to shape into ovals small pieces that are going to be
+soldered. .90 per hundred. Very easy. (The timekeeper must be crazy!)
+Made 1,400 of them; so earned 1,400 X .90 = 14 X 90 = 12.60 F. Actual
+tempo: 5.05 F! Put down ½ hr. + ¾ hr. + 2¼ hrs. [3 orders] = 3½ hrs.;
+tempo there is 3.60 F (more to do).
+Total hours: 2 hrs. 1o min. + 1 hr. + 2½ hrs. + 3½ hrs. = 9 hrs.
+10 min.; that is, 25 minutes ahead (that is, 1 hr. 25 min. or 1 hr. 5o min.).
+Total earnings: 3•40 F + 4.15 F + 12.60 F = 20.15 F; add to that
+1½ hrs. paid by the hour (between 4.50 F and 6 F). (The whole day at 3 F
+per hr. would be 26.25 F; but for the polishing voucher on which I didn't
+make the rate they owe me more than on 1.80 F.) Say 25 F in 8% hrs.
+Exactly 2.88 F per hr.
+Tuesday, 8th, morning. 7:30-II:IS: 1,181 pieces planished at the
+stamping press. Accident at 7:15: a piece stuck in the tool jams it. Set-up
+
+166
+man (Ilion) composed and patient. Only 25 botched pieces. Not my fault;
+but from now on I'll be careful with this machine. 2.314 hrs. 5.30 F
+(•45 per hundred). Didn't make the rate. (While it was being repaired,
+spent 1¼ hrs. turning a crank to cut our cardboards. The woman working
+with me was raising the crank too soon and accused me of turning too
+quickly....515.645. Work paid by the hour.)
+11:15-3:40: large press with Robert; removing rough edges-easy.
+C 280-804 —put in 2 1/2 hrs. (just made the rate; didn't have the voucher
+except at the end). Robert, a bit curt earlier, became very nice, patient, and
+concerned about helping me understand my work. The warehouse kceper
+must have spoken to him. Robert is decidedly likable. Importance of a
+set-up man having human qualities.
+3:45-5:15 and [incomplete in the original text|
+Wednesday, 9th. 7 A.M.-1:30 cambering on the machine operated by
+buttons. The tool was jamming—oil every piece —(by the way, the foreman spoke to me in a nice tone of voice that he rarely uses)—long job—62
+per hundred; but the rate probably doesn't mean anything. Did 833—
+put down 6 hrs. total. Work not too boring, thanks to the feeling of
+responsibility (I was studying how to avoid the jamming).
+1:30-3:30, drilled holes at the stamping press (pieces like the ones
+I planished the time the foreman made me start over). At first the stop was
+set wrong. Ilion doesn't worry about it much-takes his time correcting
+it—sings snatches of songs. I worked slowly because I was being careful to
+check everything (1 was afraid of not placing the pieces correctly against
+the stop). Hrs.? Put down 1¼ hrs. —didn't make the rate.
+3:45-5:15 riveting with Léon; steel caps wrapped in paper. Easy; just
+pay attention to positioning the washers correctly (countersunk hole on
+top). Worked at the required tempo, i.e., uninterruptedly. But worked very
+slowly in the beginning (curb that tendency in the future).
+6 vouchers, made the rate on 4 of them. Worked on average at a tempo
+of 2.88 F.
+Uneventful day. Not particularly hard. Feeling of silent fraternity with
+the rugged set-up man from the back (the only one). Spoke to no one.
+Nothing very instructive.
+I feel much better about the factory after being in the workshop at the
+back, even though I am no longer there.
+A woman drill operator had a clump of hair completely torn out by her
+machine, despite her hairnet; a large bald patch is visible on her head. It
+
+167
+happened at the end of a morning. She came to work in the afternoon just
+the same, although she was in a lot of pain and was even more afraid.
+Very cold this week. Temperature varies greatly according to where you
+are in the factory; there are some places where I am so chilled at my
+machine that my work is clearly slowed down. You go from a machine
+located in front of a hot-air vent, or even a furnace, to a machine exposed
+to drafts. The cloakrooms aren't heated at all; you freeze for the five
+minutes it takes you to wash your hands and ger dressed. One of us has
+chronic bronchitis, serious enough that she has to apply cupping-glasses
+every other day....
+Thursday, 10th. (Awakened at 3:30 A.M. by intense earache, had chills,
+felt feverish....)
+7-10:40 A.M.: continued—fast tempo, in spite of feeling ill. An effort,
+but after a while a mechanical, rather degrading sort of happiness—
+botched one piece (no bawling out). Toward the end, bureaucratic incident: 10 washers short.
+The bureaucratic incident is very funny. I report the shortage of 1o
+washers to Léon who, displeased (just as if it were my fault), sends me back
+to the foreman. The latter curtly sends me to Mme Blay, in the glass
+cubicle. She takes me to the storeroom managed by Bretonnet (who isn't
+there), doesn't find any washers, concludes from that that there aren't any,
+returns to the cubicle, telephones the office from which she thinks the
+order comes; they refer her to Mr. X. She telephones his office, where they
+tell her that he has gone to Mr. Y.'s office, and they won't go and get him.
+She hangs up, laughs and fumes (but still good humoredly) for a few
+minutes, and telephones Mr. Y.'s office, where they give her Mr. X., who
+says he has nothing to do with that order. Laughing, she tells her tribulations to Mouquet, and concludes that there is nothing for it but to work
+with the quantity they have. Mouquet calmly approves, adding that they
+are not equipped to make washers. I go to tell this to the foreman, then to
+Léon (who bawls me out!). While I am doing my voucher, someone apparently made a fresh search of Bretonnet's storeroom; Léon brings me
+about fifteen washers (still bawling me out!) and I proceed to do the to
+remaining pieces. Of course, all this bureaucratic rigamarole represents so
+much time for which I am not paid. ...
+In the meantime-the foreman and Léon have a slight row about finding
+a machine for me.
+10:45 tO II:25, annealing at Léon's furnace-25 pieces—had to
+
+168
+remain continuously in front of the furnace (small, however) in order to
+watch. Discomfort from heat tolerable. Put down 35 min.-.036 the
+piece; worked for .90 F.
+II:30 to 5 P.M., boles in large and heavy baffle plate (-56 per hundred;
+price capriciously set). C. I2190, Bss — 213 pieces—put down 4 hrs.
+Drama —a little cowardice on Léon's part ("I don't intend to be responsible for somebody else's mistakes"). He goes with my worst piece to the
+foreman (his rage—) —The foreman—who contrary to his usual habit is
+rather kind-comes to look and discovers that the stops are inadequate.
+He orders them changed. Léon installs a continuous stop at the back.
+I turn out another defective piece, fooled by the old stop. Léon storms and
+goes to the foreman. Fortunately, I then make a good one. I continue,
+trembling. As a last resort, I get the warehouse keeper, who explains it all
+to me gently and in a luminous fashion (instead of gripping the piece, support it from underneath, and push steadily forward with my thumbs; slide
+it along the stop to make sure it is there). Mimi, who had come to my
+assistance earlier, hadn't been able to help me, except to advise me not to
+worry so much.
+Tremendous distance between the warehouse keeper and the set-up
+men-especially Léon, who is the least competent.
+I tell Mimi, showing her the price: "It can't be helped, I just won't make
+the rate." She answers, "Yes, since they don't want to pay us for badly
+made pieces, there's nothing else to do" (!).
+Friday, 11th. 7-8:05 A.M.: same job, made 6o1 pieces, that's 5.04 F. Put
+down 1½ hrs. Made the rate. Worked at almost 4 F per hr., officially for
+3.40 F.
+8:IS-10: I5: contacts: drilling small copper bars while you set them
+against the stop; no difficulty. I ask llion what they are for; he answers me
+with a joke. Robert, on the other hand, always gives me an explanation
+when I ask him a question, and shows me the plan; but the warehouse
+keeper had to speak to him. As for Léon, when I look at his orders, he
+bawls me out. Why? Hierarchy? No. He thinks that I am trying to fix it so
+that I have the best jobs. In any case, it's not comradeship.
+9C 412087, B 2, 600 at. 64 per hundred = 3.84 F. Put down 1¾ hrs.
+Didn't make the rate. At the end, slight tiff with the shearer (I refuse to do
+some pieces over, which turns out to be unnecessary anyway).
+10:45-11:30— Robert's large press.
+
+169
+11:45-5:45 —shearing and drilling copper strips (with Léon). Second
+drama. —After 250 pieces have been done, Léon notices that the holes
+aren't centered (1 had noticed nothing). Fresh shouting. Mouquet turns up,
+sees my disconsolate expression and is very kind. As soon as Mouquet
+shows up, Léon—who doesn't give a damn since he is released from
+responsibility—will say nothing further. As for me, instead of realizing
+that the exact placement of the holes apparently doesn't much matter,
+I stop at every piece to see if it is against the stop and constantly compare it
+to the model. Léon bawls me out again, but this time with good intentions,
+evidently not being able to understand that it is possible to be conscientious at the expense of one's pocketbook. I speed up a little, but at 5:45
+have done only 1,845 pieces. Paid .45 per hundred; so earned 4.50 F +
+3.60 F + 20 centimes = 8.30 F, which is barely 2 F per hr. Would have to
+make up more than 1½ hrs. There are 10,000 pieces.
+Léon is doing me a great favor by giving me this job. It really is a large
+order. Still, even on the last day, when I was used to the job, and going at
+top speed because I was anxious to make up for my lost time, I barely made
+the prescribed 3 F. True, I was slightly ill. But the work is still very badly
+paid.
+Saturday, 12th. —Same job. Go as fast as I can. Find some ways of
+working: first, put the strips in straight (Léon had adjusted the supports
+badly). Then slide the strip along the stop with a continuous movement. At
+first 1 made 800 pieces in a little more than an hour, then slowed down
+because of fatigue. Very hard. Back-breaking work that reminds me of
+digging potatoes-right arm constantly extended—pedal slightly stiff.
+Thank heaven, it's Saturday!
+Couldn't catch up. Made 2,600, that's 9 F + 2.70 F = 11.70 F in 4 hrs.
+Far from catching up, I'm still about 30 centimes (that's 6o pieces) under
+the prescribed speed. And I gave it all my strength. ... True, went to sleep
+too late.
+Did in all: 4,400.
+Afternoon and Sunday painful: headaches—slept poorly, my one night
+[worrying...).
+SEVENTH WEEK
+Monday, 14th. — Same job. Go even faster —developed greater continuity
+
+170
+in pedaling. Ended up making To,150, that is, 5,05o in the course of the
+day, or
+22.50F +3.75 F = 26.25 Fin 8% hrs.
+Barely 3 F per hr. (to hell with the 6o centimes).
+I'm exhausted. After all that I'm still not caught up, for I ought to have
+done the 10,000 pieces (45 F) in 15 hrs., and it took me 16%.
+Ats: 45, shut shut offmy machine in the dejected and hopeless state of mind
+that accompanies total exhaustion. However, it was enough just bumping
+into the singing boy from the furnace who has a nice smile-running into
+the warehouse keeper —overhearing a more cheerful than usual exchange
+of jokes in the cloakroom —these little displays of brotherly feeling put me
+in such a joyful frame of mind that for a while I no longer feel the fatigue.
+But at home, headaches.
+Tuesday, 15th. 7-7:30 A.M.: same job-finished (about 200 were left).
+Put down a total of 17½ hrs. Didn't make the rate, but the last 200 were
+above 2.50 F.
+Wandered about a little, to no purpose.
+8 A.M.: collars with Biol. Very large press (stamping press) —very heavy
+pieces (1 kg.?). There are 250 of them to do. Paid 3.50 per hundred. Have
+to oil each piece and the tool every time. Very hard work; I have to stand,
+and the pieces are heavy. Not feeling well; earache, headache....
+Incident with the belt, Mouquet-Biol.
+First incident, in the morning; Biol and Mouquet. The machine's belt was
+adjusted before I worked on it, but incorrectly, it seems, for it rides over the
+edge. Mouquet orders it shut off (Biol was at fault to a certain extent; he
+should have shut it off before), and says to Biol, "The pulley has shifted,
+that's why the belt rides off." Biol, eyeing the belt thoughtfully, starts
+a sentence: "No..." and Mouquet interrupts him: "What do you mean,
+No! I say Yes!..." Biol, without a word of reply, goes to find the guy in
+charge of repairs. As for me, fierce desire to slap Mouquet for his peremptory manner and his humiliatingly authoritarian tone of voice. (Later
+Hearn that Biol is universally regarded as a sort of half-wit.)
+Second incident. In the afternoon, all of a sudden the tool stamps a piece
+and I can't remove it. A little rod preventing the bar on top of the tool from
+coming down had slipped out of its hole, and I hadn't noticed it. So the tool
+had gone too deeply into the piece. Biol speaks to me as if it were my fault.
+
+171
+Tuesday at I P.M., leaflets from the unitary syndicate? were passed out.
+Accepted with visible pleasure (which I share) by almost all the men and
+not a few of the women. The Italian woman smiles. The singing boy. ...
+People hold the leaflets in their hands ostentatiously, several reading them
+as they enter the factory. Idiotic content.
+Story overheard: a workman made some bobbins with the hooks a
+centimeter too short. The foreman (Mouquet) told him, "If they're fucked
+up, you've had it." But luckily another order called for exactly these bobbins, and the worker was kept on....
+The effect of exhaustion is to make me forget my real reasons for spending time in the factory, and to make it almost impossible for me to overcome the strongest temptation that this life entails: that of nor thinking
+anymore, which is the one and only way of not suffering from it. It's only
+on Saturday afternoon and Sunday that a few memories and shreds of
+ideas return to me, and I remember that 1 am also a thinking being. The
+terror that takes hold of me when I realize how dependent I am on external
+circumstances: all that would be needed is for circumstances someday to
+force me to work at a jøb without a weekly rest—which after all is always
+possible-and I would become a beast of burden, docile and resigned (at
+least for me). Only the feeling of brotherhood, and outrage in the face of
+injustices inflicted on others, remain intact —but how long would all that
+last ? I am almost ready to conclude that the salvation of a worker's soul
+depends primarily on his physical constitution. I don't sce how those who
+are not physically strong can avoid falling into some form of despair—
+drunkenness, or vagabondage, or crime, or debauchery, or simply (and far
+more often) brutishness-(and religion ?).
+Revolt is impossible, except for momentary flashes (I mean even as a
+feeling). First of all, against what? You are alone with your work, you
+could not revolt except against it —but to work in an irritated state of mind
+would be to work badly, and therefore tostarve. Cf. the tubercular woman
+fred for having botched an order. We are like horses who hurt themselves as soon as they pull on their bits—and we bow our heads. We even
+lose consciousness of the situation; we just submit. Any reawakening of
+thought is then painful.
+3 Confédération générale du Travail unitaire, the Communist-dominared trade-union
+federation.
+
+172
+Jealousy between workers. The conversation between the tall conceited
+blond workman and Mimi, who was accused of having hurried so as to be
+there at the right time for a "good order." Mimi to me: "You aren't
+jealous. You're wrong not to be." However, she says she isn't—but she
+may be anyway.
+Cf. incident with the redhead Tuesday evening. She claimed a job that
+Ilion was in the process of giving me, arguing that she had stopped before
+me (but she had an order started, only it was interrupted; she didn't tell
+Ilion that until after I had gone away...). The job was bad (.56 per
+hundred, setting pieces against a stop so flat it's almost impossible to see if
+it's really there). However, I hadto force myself to give it to her, since I was
+between one and three hours behind. But I'm sure that when she saw that
+the job was no good, she thought that was the reason I gave it up to her.
+The same redhead, at the time of the layoffs, didn't much like the idea
+that single women with kids should be exempted from being laid off.
+I don't find anything else to do. Robert refuses me one job because, he
+says, I would botch half of it. So I just go and chat with the warehouse
+keeper, quite content in one sense, for I am exhausted
+Tuesday evening of the 7th week (January 15) Baldenweck diagnoses
+me as having otitis. I go to rue Auguste-Comte on Thursday and remain
+there the 8th and 9th weeks. The Ioth, rith, and I2th weeks (until Friday)
+I am at Montana in Switzerland, where I see A.L.'s brother and Fehling.
+I go back to rue Lecourbes Saturday night (February 23). Return to the
+factory the 2 5th. Absent a month and ten days. Had asked for a leave of Is
+days beginning the eveningo fFebruary I. Took ro days more: 2 5 days. As
+of February 24th, have worked a total of s weeks (counting only days
+actually worked).
+Was off 6 weeks.
+THIRTEENTH WEEK
+(40 hr. week; quitting time 4:30, Saturday off)
+Monday, 25th. 7-8:15 A.M. (approx.): time without work, spent with
+Mimi and Eugénie-Louisette's friend, etc.
+After 8: 15: stamping rivets at the light press. Same work as Thursday
++ The street on which Weil's parents' apartment was locared.
+5 The street in the factory district where Weil was renting a room.
+
+173
+and Friday of the 3rd week, except that only one side can go against the
+stop, which makes it necessary to look at each piece, and slow down. I
+can't go fast. I do a total of 2,625 pieces, that is, almost 400 per hour
+(allowance made for the fact that I lost 1o min. drawing my pay at
+11 A.M.). The first hour I can't work; my hand trembles with nervousness.
+After that I'm all right, except for the slowness. But I work without tiring.
+Besides, I don't have the voucher.
+If I were no more debilitated and fatigued than this every day, I would
+not be unhappy at the factory.
+Tuesday. Rivets again. I have the voucher: .62 per hundred, like the other
+time (when, however, either side could go against the stop). I do the remainder at about soo per hour, that is, 3 F, but don't make up the time
+lost the day before. At noon, return home gripped by extreme exhaustion;
+hardly eat anything, can barely drag myself back to the factory. But once
+I start work again, the fatigue disappears, replaced by a sort of gaiety, and I
+leave without feeling tired. Finish the screwthreads between 3:30 and 4
+(ord. 406367, b.3). There are 6,011 of them. So I did 3,375 in more
+than 7 hrs. (even so, that's less than 5oo per hr.), that is, 21 F. Total
+37.20 F. Put down 13¾ hrs.
+From 4 to 4:30: washers, as usual with Jacquot, at a hand press. Necessary to support them with my hand to feed them into the die. Mouquet
+wants to do a set-up that is easier to use; Jacquot can't do it because there
+aren't any blocks of exactly the right height, and only makes me lose time.
+I lo washers.
+Wednesday. Finished 8:1o. 560 washers in all, at .468 per hundred;
+carned 2.6o F! Mimi follows me (I hold her up a little), complaining bitterly about the voucher in a rather tired voice (c. 406246, b. I].
+Put down 1½½ hrs.
+Foil. At first I think I won't be able to do it, but I manage very well.
+Jacquot, very gentle, had told me to tell him if I couldn't do it. Mistake on
+the price: 2.80 per hundred, but it means for 1oo packets of 6, that is, for
+the whole order! At least that's what Mimi says. I had never hurried
+before. Finished at 10 A.M., earned exactly 2.80 F! Put down 2 hrs.—
+ord. 425512, b. z.
+Conversations when there is no work. Louisette's friend had an abcess
+in her throat—was out s days—came back: "Kids don't ask you if you're
+sick"; worked two days, out again; came back after the abcess burst. She's
+
+174
+always cheerful. She's becoming irritable, she says, can no longer stand her
+kids tearing around when they play, etc.
+Mouquet said to her, "Your hair is as long as your body." She was
+reallv mortified. Would have liked to tell him off. "You can't answer
+back." Mimi's sister does. Once she went to find him to complain about
+a voucher; he abruptly ordered her back to her job; she went back, but
+didn't stop complaining. Fifteen minutes later he went to find her and
+straightened out the voucher.... "When the job isn't going right, it's
+better to speak to him than to a set-up man or to Chastel; and at times like
+that he's very nice." But angry sometimes; and he's tactless. They quote
+one of his mortifying remarks (to Mimi's sister): "You've never been hunting?" —Eugénie interrupted her work and comes to tell me excitedly that
+she saw circus animals at the Porte de Versailles (2 F admission); that she
+petted the leopard....
+Woes of the young unskilled worker: he had 2 years of Latin, I year of
+Greek, i of English (he naively brags about it), is an office worker by
+profession (he is very proud of that), and has been demoted to being an unskilled laborer! "You have to obey these assholes who can't even sign their
+names!" And you even get bawled out by them. "If that's working-class
+comradeship!..." After that smiles are exchanged when he passes by. He
+is perhaps 17. Rather pretentious.
+Léon isn't there (hurt his arm). Indescribable relief. Jacquot replaces
+him, relaxed and altogether charming.
+Riveting at the large fly-press. Difficult—the pieces don't all go right.
+One botched piece, which makes Jacquor look solemn. The count is
+wrong; work with the quantity given! (108 pieces, I think, instead of 125.)
+Paid .034 per piece, that is, 3.65 F total (1 hr. lost). And I finished at
+2:45! Put down 3 hrs. Then spent ¾ hr. when there was no work at
+Bretonnet's (cutting scrap); finally some cardboards that I finished at
+exactly 4:30, with Jacquor, at a press that can be hand-or foot-operated,
+as you like. Jacquot nice, as usual (got a packing case for me, etc.). The
+young unskilled worker comes and bothers me. Price not marked, but
+didn't make the rate.
+Farned these 3 days: 37.20 F + 3.60 F + 2.60 F + 2.80 F + 3.65 F +
+(admit it!) 2.50 F = 52.35 F!!! That is, 17.43 F per 8-hr. day, that is, an
+average of 2.20 F per hour! Below the official hourly base wage!
+In the late afternoon, working on my cardboards, headaches. But at the
+same time a feeling of having physical resources. The factory noises, some
+of them now meaningful (the mallet blows of the coppersmiths, the sledge
+
+175
+hammer...), simultaneously give me profound moral joy and cause me
+physical pain. Very curious sensation.
+Back at my place, headaches worse, vomiting, don't eat, scarcely sleep;
+at 4:30 decide to stay home; at 5 A.M., get up.... Hot compresses, headache powder. Thursday morning, okay.
+Thursday. "Terminal strips with airgaps." Ord. ¿ 421346, b. 1,.56 per
+hundred. I,068 pieces, that is, 6 F. Finished at 9:05 (?), put down z hrs.,
+made the rate (the only one).
+"Baffle with the movable finger" with Robert—pieces that I think at
+first will be difficult to position; but then I realize thetool positions them as
+it comes down, and it goes faster. SIo pieces, 71 per hundred, that's
+3.50 F. Finish at 10:45, put down 1½½ hrs. (that's 2.30 F per hr.].
+Ord. 421329, b. 1.
+No work (scrap). Bretonnet puts down ½ hr.
+Rail clips at the shearing machine (with Jacquot), (standing, one foot on
+the pedal, at the press where I made the large 40-kg. bars with louisette).
+Ord. 421322, b. I..43 per hundred, it says 350 (I learn the next day
+there were more; I hadn't counted). 1. 50 F. Put down 35 min. Finished at
+11:45; this morning earned 6 F + 3.50 F + .90 F + 1.50 F = 11.90 F in
+4% hrs.; that's exactly 2.50 F per hour.
+Afternoon: cut out cardboards by the hour with Mimi's sister; I turned
+the crank. Very pleasant, no jerks like the time before. Put down 1¼ hrs.
+At 2:30 put on Terminal Connectors by Jacquot (parts for electrical
+motors, says the warehouse keeper). C. 421337, h. 1-.616 per hundred, piece work.
+The difficulty was to put the pieces against the stop so that the and right
+angle is made. If they weren't flush against the stop, the piece was botched.
+Jacquot explains it to me in a nice way. I set to work condently. I succeed several times. One piece, too wide, doesn't fit into the hollow of the
+die, and since it isn't held in place, backs up. Chatel, ° right behind me, tells
+me (not too roughly) to put them against the stop more carefully. I succeed
+with a few more, then botch another one. Not only are some pieces too
+wide, but others are too narrow, and they slip because the stop is roundedoff through use. I show Jacquor; he says to put the wide ones in sideways.
+I call him over again; he speaks to Chatel, tells me to continue and, if it
+doesn't work, to tell Chatel. I try again, then go to Chatel, holding
+a botched piece. He says, "That one's had it. You have to put them against
+E sit dropshe"s" from Chastel's name for the rest of the journal.
+
+176
+the stop." I try to explain. He says, not getting up, "Get on with it, and try
+not to keep on doing things like that." I immediately call the warehouse
+keeper over, who says, "It doesn't work right, obviously, although I could
+make them all turn out." He tries putting them in with his finger and holding them when the tool comes down... and also botches quite a lot of
+them! He thinks about that for a long time, calls for a guy from the tool
+shop who tells him that the stop is worn (I had seen that right away!),
+removes the die, proceeds to file the stop, and resets the machine. I continue the finger method (dangerous!). It works better, but still not well.
+I go to find him again; he's with Mouquet, who comes to look, gives an
+order to widen the die a little and set the tool lower so there's no chance of
+my hand passing under it. It works until 4:30.... A little over Too pieces
+done, and about 40 botched
+I was paid 66.55 F for these 4 days (4 F withheld for Social Insurance).
+But the last 2 were paid at the hourly base wage: for me, 14.40 F per day
+(1.80 F per hour). I made 12.95 F over the base wage for the first 2 days.
+28.80 F + 12.95 F = 4I.75 F. Where the devil did they get that? There
+was the period when there was no work (1¼ hrs., that is, 3.25 F?). And
+what else?
+Friday, March Ist. Do my terminal connectors. Finish at 10:30; made
+2,131 in all, that is, about 2,030 this morning in 3½ hrs. (that's 580 per
+hour, at 616 per hundred!). Earned in all 13 F. Explain to Chatel that
+I lost 2 hrs. the afternoon before; he mutters, "z hours!" and puts "time
+lost" on the voucher... but not how much! I put down 2 hrs. and
+3% hrs.
+No work until 11:45.
+Argument between Dubois, Eugénie, and the redhead during the period
+of no work.
+Annealing at the small furnace after lunch; it goes all right; that is,
+I don't lose my presence of mind when I take out the pieces. Hard, because
+I am continuously in front of the furnace (not like at the big one). Interrupted at z o'clock because ... the pieces are supposed to be laminated
+cold !!! I put down only my time on the voucher. Put down ¾ hr.
+Wait for Robert a good twenty minutes. Another woman, roo....
+On the advice of the warehouse keeper, went to ask Delouche for permission to stay until 5:1S. Granted. The same afternoon went to the tool
+shop. The foreman didn't see me.
+"Handles" at the shearing machine, c. 918452, b. 3I. With Robert.
+
+177
+300 to do, at .616 per hundred, that is, 1.85 F for the lot. I didn't think
+about the price, the required speed, and I took my time doing them, being
+very careful each time to place the rounded end of the piece right against
+the stop. Some bars were twisted and were difficult to hold against the
+stop. Took much too long; finished at 3:25 (but had begun late). Put
+down I hr.
+Terminal Connectors. The same kind. Still .616 per hundred—final
+operation is making them V-shaped. With the button-operated machine
+with plierlike jaws. Often slowed down by the difficulty of disengaging the
+piece from the tool; otherwise, easy to put in.
+The piece bends slightly while the tool is making it V-shaped. I show it to
+Jacquot (who had told me, however, that I needn't look at the pieces); he
+shows it to Chatel; both discuss it solemnly, then Chatel says that it will
+be planed (but how?) and orders me to continue. I continue at a very
+comfortable pace, much too slowly. Did only 281 pieces! 1,8 5o remain to
+be done in at most 3¼ hrs., which means, allowing for losses of time, at
+a tempo of 600 per hour. Essential!
+If I put down I hr. Friday for the terminal connectors, I've lost ½ hr. But
+better, if possible, to lose i hour than not make the rate on my voucher.
+¼ hour lost (if cleaning counts as ¼ hr.).
+But no; actually the rate is. (buttons), (buttons), and in hrs. hrs. I made 15.30 F.
+4 hrs. left, and to catch up I would have to do 460 an hour. I should have to
+do only 425 in 1 hr. If on Monday I do only 425 per hour, in order not to
+fall below the rate I still lose 20 min. Friday.
+But no, again; there's 4¼ hr. for machine cleaning. So have to count only
+/ hr. Friday, and have to make up only s min., negligible. So still have
+4¼ hrs. Have to finish by 1I:I5.
+Much less tired than I feared. Even moments of euphoria at my machines, such as I had not had even at Montana (delayed effect!). But still
+have trouble eating.
+FOURTEENTH WEEK
+Monday, 4th. Acute headaches Monday when I got up. As ill luck would
+have it, the turning thing that makes the infernal racket is going all day
+long right next to me. At noon, can hardly eat. Still, I work fast, and without headache powders.
+Terminal Connectors. Don't finish until 11:45, but not my fault; over
+½ hr., I'm sure, was lost in the morning (even much more) due to the
+
+178
+machine. "With the buttons," says Jacquot, "it never works right." I persuaded him to set up the pedal, though that's more dangerous. It doesn't
+work any better; I have to call him again. On Mouquet's order, he resets
+the buttons. Still doesn't work. Little Jacquot loses his patience.... At
+11: 10, starts to disassemble the machine—broken spring. But when he reassembles it, it doesn't work at all. He gets very rattled.... The shift
+foreman, when I hand him my voucher (tor I gave up finishing the pieces,
+since what had been donc was more than the count) is sarcastic about J.
+Afternoon: no work for ½ hr. Then 2 orders for terminal strips, $20
+each, at .71 per hundred (c. 421275, b. 4). I lost some time at the beginning extracting the pieces, counting them—also positioning them, for
+took some unnecessary precautions—and pedaled inefficiently (not all the
+way down; stiff pedal). Ist order finished at 3:15. and begun at 3:25 (l
+lost s min. waiting, not having noticed Jacquot had the machine ready),
+done at a hellish rate, my maximum, hnished at exactly 4:30. I made
+3.60 F per hour on it. Put down 1 hr. 20 min. for each order. 4½ hrs. +
+1½ + = hrs. 40 min. = 7.40 F. Earned Friday and Monday: 12.30 F +
+1. 35 F + 1.85 F + 14.40 F + .90 F + 7.80 F = 39.60 F. Of that, 21.20 F
+for Monday. Put 1 hr. for Friday and 4½ hrs. for Monday.
+Friday, I saw Biol's heavy machine being set up (not ready). The warehouse keeper told me, "Don't take that, it's too hard." I found something
+else. On Monday I see Eugénie doing that job all day long. Am conscience
+stricken. If I had wanted to be available for it, I probably could have. And
+I know how hard it is; I did it—or something like it—the last afternoon I
+had otitis. At 4:30 she is visibly exhausted
+Jacquot and the machine.
+What did happen with the ma-
+The warehouse keeper, the chine? (idiot, not to have observed
+draftsman,
+and the "universal
+more attentively).— When I pressed
+tool."
+the buttons, the tool sometimes
+came down twice; the shift foreman, seeing that, said, "It shouldn't
+do that" (that was all!). Later, it did
+the same thing again, only the and
+The tool shop and its foreman.
+time it stayed down! Jacquot raised
+it and I continued
+...until the
+problem began again. He finally
+had me stop. Ilion, who passed by,
+told him that the "finger" (the
+
+179
+spring) of the large wheel is broken.
+It's true. But it seems there was still
+somethingelse wrong. It'sclear that
+for little Jacquor the machine is a
+strange beast. ...
+Tuesday morning. 3 orders similar to those of Monday afternoon.
+1) 600 at. 56 per hundred, small pieces difficult to take out, put down
+14 hrs.
+2) 550 at. 71 per hundred, put down 1 hr. 2o min.
+3) 550 at. 71 per hundred, put down 1 hr. 20 min.
+Very tiring over an extended period of time, for the pedal is very stiff
+(cramps). Jacquot charming as usual.
+Afterward, came across Biol (which made me long for the heavy pieces
+that had made me conscience stricken); he set me up at the "piano," where
+I then spent the whole afternoon, except for the period from 2:45 tO 3:45
+when there was no work. The 2 orders paid. .5o per hundred; one was for
+630, the other for 3 I5.
+For time, put down 2 hrs., then 3 ¼ hrs.
+Total: 1¼ hrs., I hr. 20 min., 1 hr. 20 min., 2% hrs. = 6 hrs. 40 min.;
+I would need 1 hr. 20 min. of time when there was no work; I think I have
+i hr., which would make 20 min. lost.
+At 4:30, very tired, so tired that I leave right away. In the evening, acute
+headaches.
+At the "piano" at first had a great deal of difficulty due to my fear of not
+putting the pieces properly against the stop. By the end of the afternoon, it
+went a little better. But my fingertips were bleeding.
+Wednesday morning. Still piano (630 pieces). Went even better, except
+for sore fingers—still, took over 1½ hrs. Put down 1 hr. 20 min. Immediately afterward, Robert had me do a 5o-piece order (C. 421146 27)
+(Paid?). Nice enough to give me another voucher for an order of so of the
+same, which he had already done because it was urgent. Difficulties: some
+of the pieces don't fir against the stop. He makes me put them aside so he
+can do them himself. Slowed down by severe fatigue and headaches, I
+spent ½ hr. on the two orders. Afterward, the "piano" again; the same
+630, to do again in another way. I try to go quickly and narrowly miss
+botching some; for all that, I no longer let my fear of botching hold me
+back too much (although Biol told me that I mustn't lose a single piece,
+
+180
+because the count may be short, or exact). I count the pieces again while
+I'm redoing them. The first time, had found 6ro. Now come up with 620,
+give or take a few. The woman who had done them before said she had
+found 630. The and time I say that the count is right, to have done with it.
+How do they expect you to keep a decent count at a rate of .5o per
+hundred? Put down 1 hr. 20 min. Afterward, Robert reprimands me. 2
+orders marked 25 minutes each (what?).
+Finished all that (including filling out the vouchers) at rI: IS. I tell the
+foreman I finished at 11:o5; he fills in a voucher saying I stopped at
+It o'clock, in return for which I didn't claim any time lost this morning.
+He reprimands me for having filled in all my vouchers at the same time.
+Afternoon, no work until 2 o'clock. Then covers: 200 at 1.45 per hundred! So I should do the job in less than an hour. But they are heavy, they
+have to be taken out of a packing case, and you work the pedal 4 times for
+each one, and there are 2 operations.
+First you position them
+like this:
+then you turn them over. The and operation
+is like this:
+then you turn them over. So, you do them all set up the ist way, pedaling
+twice for each one, then set up the and way, the same thing—so you have
+to pedal 800 times. But they are not that easy to position. The screws have
+to go through the holes, etc. I got the voucher only after the ist operation
+was finished. I often had the feeling that I wasn't going as fast as I could.
+Still, I was exhausted. In the late afternoon I felt for the first time really
+crushed by fatigue, just like before leaving for Montana; the feeling of
+sliding back into the condition of beast of burden. Stuck it out, however;
+had a conversation with the warehouse keeper, visited the tool shop.
+Thursday. Continued with the same pieces until 8 A.M. Put down 3½
+hrs.; the truth (forgot to note down the order). Afterward, c. 421360,
+b. 230, rail clips at 1.28 F per hundred. Finished at 9:45. Put down 1 hr.
+10 min. (was there a ½-hr. interval when there was no work? I no longer
+know). Worked with Jacquot, at the small hand press. Jacquot's smiles as
+usual charming.
+Afterward, no work until rI A.M. During the interval, felt the full brunt
+of fatigue, waited for the job to be given me with a sickish feeling. During
+
+181
+the periods of no work the women get angry a t frequently losing their turn
+to get a job for orders of roo pieces (especially Mimi's sister). Jacquot
+came, bringing an order for 5,000 pieces; it was my turn. It was for cutting
+washers out of metal strips, with uninterrupted pedaling. Price. 224 per
+hundred (more or less). I very much wanted not to fall below the rate. I set
+to work singlemindedly. Jacquot gave me only one bit of advice: don't let it
+jam, for fear of breaking the tool. Fatigue and the wish to go fast made me
+a little nervous. When I began I didn't insert one strip far enough, which
+forced me to start the ist pedal downstroke over again, and I botched one
+piece (one botched piece out of 5,000 isn't much, but if it happened with
+every strip, it would be a lot). It happened several times. Finally, on edge,
+I inserted the strip again, this time too far; it slid over the stop and instead
+of a washer out comes a cone. Instead of calling Jacquot right away, I turn
+the strip over but, unaware of the mistake that I've made, I again overshoot
+the stop (at least it's very likely that's what happened), and another cone
+falls out and, immediately after it, the "grenadier" of the tool (?). The tool
+is broken. What upset me most was the curt and harsh tone in which dear
+little Jacquot talked to me. It was a rush order; the set-up, which was perhaps difficult, had to be done over, and everyone was on edge because of
+similar accidents that had happened on preceding days (and perhaps the
+same day?). The shift foreman, of course, bawled me out like the sergeantmajor that he is, but as it were collectively ("it's unfortunate having
+women workers who ..."). Mimi, who sees me looking desolate, comforts me gently. It's 1 1:45.
+Afternoon (acute headaches). No work until 3:30. 500 pieces, cutting
+rings out of metal strips again (what rotten luck !), but at the small hand
+press. Fear of beginning again makes me horribly nervous. Actually, I
+more than once slide the strip a little over the stop on the ist pedal stroke,
+but nothing happens; each time I tremble.... Jacquot found his smiles
+again (I have to send for him because the machine behaves capriciouslyrefuses to start, or works n times in succession for one pedal stroke), but
+I haven't the heart to respond to them.
+Incident berween Joséphine (the redhead) and Chatel. It seems she was
+given a very poorly paid job (at the press beside mine, the one with the buttons opposite the foreman's office). She complained. Chatel gave her a
+first-class bawling out, saying very vulgar things, it seemed to me (but
+I couldn't make out the words very well). She made no reply, bit her lips,
+swallowed her humiliation, visibly repressed a desire to cry, and, proba-
+
+182
+bly, an even stronger desire to answer back furiously. 3 or 4 women
+witnessed the scene in silence, only half keeping back their smiles (Eugénie
+among them). For if Joséphine hadn't gotten this bad job, one of them
+would have had it; so they were quite pleased that Joséphine got the
+bawling out, and say so openly, later, during a period when there is no
+work-but not in her presence. Conversely, Joséphine would not have
+minded the bad job being palmed off on someone else.
+Conversations during the period without work (1 ought to take them all
+down). On houses in the suburbs (Mimi's sister and Joséphine). When
+Nénette is there most often there is nothing but jokes and confidences that
+would make a regiment of Hussars blush. (Cf. the woman whose "friend"
+is a painter [but she lives alone) and who boasts of sleeping with him 3
+times a day, morning, noon, and night; who explains the difference between his "rechnique" and another's—who gives out she is aided financially by him, and "deprives herself of nothing"; as far as I understood, the
+time she doesn't spend making love, she spends cooking and eating.)
+But there's more to Nénette than that —when she speaks of her kids (the
+boy is 13, the girl 6) — of their studies —of her son's liking for reading (she
+speaks of it with respect). The last few days of this week, in which she had
+no work a lot of the time, she has been serious in a way that is unlike her;
+she is obviously wondering what she will do to pay for the kids' schooling.?
+Argument revolving around Mme Forestier. There is talk of taking up
+a collection for her. Eugénie declares that she will contribute nothing.
+Joséphine also (but she probably doesn't give too often), and adds that
+Mme Forestier went through the factory to say hello to everyone (the same
+day I came back) because of the collection. Nénere and the Italian women,
+who used to be great friends of hers, won't give anything either. Apparently she has done some injury, not to them, but to several others (?).
+The Italian woman is ill. My and week, she had asked for leave and
+Mouquet refused; but there were only 2 of them, and there was no work.
+She has 2 kids; her husband is a brickmaker (unskilled work) and earns
+2.75 F per hour. So she can't take care of herself. She has a bad liver, and
+headaches that the din of the factory makes unendurable (I know about
+that!).
+7 Mer her in the metro when I was at Ronault. She cold how a week earlier she had been ill,
+hadn't been able to inform then and no longer dared to reiurn to Alsthom — (what does she
+have to lose? Bur ...). Certainly an impulsive act.... A look of pained compassion when
+I told her I was at Renault. (Nute of s v)
+
+183
+Friday. Period of no work. I don't spend the time, as I would have a few
+weeks earlier under such circumstances, trembling at the idea of blunders
+I will perhaps make. Proof that I am a little more sure of myself than
+before.
+Ilion calls me (what time?) to notch covers for use on metros. They have
+a right side and a wrong side. I have a lively fear of absentmindedly doing
+the wrong one. 149 covers (voucher for 150) at I.35 F per hundred.
+I don't really try to go fast, too afraid of botching, for here even one
+"messed up" piece would matter a lot. One thing to watch out for: the tool
+failing to penetrate and the notch not coming out. A great deal of time lost
+in manipulation; there are 3 tool carriages. My count came to 147 covers;
+the foreman was in a state and made me spend 4¼ hr. doing the count again
+(but this ¼ hr. won't be on the voucher, but considered a part of the period
+when there was no work), ord. 42I21I, b. 3. Finished at 9 A.M. No work
+until 1o; tired, apprehensive, I would have liked the time without work to
+have lasted all day. At 1o A.M. I was called to remove cardboards from
+magnetic circuits (work that I had done at the end of the Ist week). I saw
+that there were enough to last until evening. Considerable relief. I used the
+technique discovered the last day I had done it (many little taps of the
+mallet) and worked well and quite quickly (more than 3o pieces per hour;
+on the first days I had done 15, and Mouquet had estimated the value of my
+work at 1.80 F per hr., since he had told me that in s hrs. I had done barely
+y F worth of work). No fear of making blunders, so I was relaxed. Nevertheless (and although I had eaten at noon at a restaurant), toward the
+middle of the afternoon I felt myself overcome by very great weariness, and
+welcomed the notice that I was laid off.
+FIFTEENTH WEEK
+Laid off (from March 8 to March 18). —Headaches Saturday and Sunday—state of almost total prostration until noon Wednesday; in the afternoon, in magnificent spring weather, went to Gibert's bookstore from 3
+to 7 P.M. The next day went to Martinet's, bought a textbook on industrial
+design. Friday afternoon, prostration. Didn't sleep that night (headache);
+slept until noon. Saturday saw Guihéneuf (ar the place where he works)
+from 2 to 10:30. Sunday uneventful.
+
+184
+SIXTEENTH WEK
+Monday, 18th. Washers out of a strip until 7:50 (?). With Léon, who has
+returned (my dear little Jacquot is back being a worker again). .336 per
+hundred. 336 pieces. Still fearful. Made the same blunder twice, which
+fortunately passed unnoticed; I became aware of it only after it had happened the and time. I turned the strip over after the ist pedal stroke; the
+hole that it drilled wasn't in the middle of the strip, because you support it
+from behind. This resulted in some bent pieces, which I hid, and the tool
+was probably none the better for it. Very slow work, no concern at all for
+speed. Put down 40 min.
+Planishing the same washers on the small fly-press, which allowed me to
+dispose of a botched piece that had slipped by me. Ord. 907405, b. 34,
+•28 per hundred. Finished at 8:30, put down ½ hr. (so lost 2o min. in all),
+earned 95 F! My hourly base wage.... I hadn't really tried for speed.
+Planishing shunts at the small fly-press c. 420500. Had done 796 pieces
+by 2: IŞ. Put down 4¼ hrs. Paid r.12 F per hundred; earned 8.90 F (barely
+over 2 F per hr.). Chatel had me hit 4 or 5 times per piece (z on one end, z
+or 3 on the other). I told him, when I handed him the voucher, that under
+these conditions I hadn't been able to make the rate. He answered in the
+rudest manner, "Not make it at 1.12 F!" That didn't bother me, considering his lack of competence. I don't know if he put something on the
+voucher; surely not. I should have hit it fewer times.... I tried to go fast,
+but I constantly found myself lapsing into daydreaming. Difficult to control the speed, since I wasn't counting. Tired, especially when leaving for
+lunch at I1:45 (ate at "Prisunic"; relaxation; moments before going back
+inside delightful; the Fortifications, the workers. ... Am a slave again in
+front of my machine).
+In the entranceway I saw shunts like mine, connected in series to contact
+fingers on one side and to metal coils on the other.
+No work from 2 to 3 P.M.—theoretically.
+Stamping sockets out of bezels with Robert. C. 406426. 580 pieces
+at. 5o per hundred; so 2.90 F. Put down 1 hr. 1o min., tempo 2.45 F per hr.
+Actually done from 2:30 to 4:I0, that is, 1 hr. 40 min. But lost some time
+trying to use pliers on the first 1oo and, at the end, gathering up the pieces.
+There again I attained an uninterrupted tempo only momentarily, and
+then fell back into daydreaming. Counter as a means of control; after
+having made 40 or 45 pieces in 5 min., I made 2o the next s minutes, when
+I started daydreaming.
+
+• Factory Joural
+185
+No work from 4:I5 tO 4:30.
+Total: 40 min. + ½ hr. + 4¼ hrs. + 1hr. + 1hr. 1o min. + ¼ hr. = exactly 8 hrs.
+Back at my place (at s: 30) feeling great. Head full of ideas all evening—
+however, I suffered—especially at the fly-press—much more than the
+Monday after Montana.
+Does the meal at "Prisunic" have something to do with my feeling so
+good in the evening?
+Tuesday. No work until 8: IS.
+Riveting contact fingers with Léon, until late afternoon. 500 at 4.12 F
+per hundred, c. 414754, b. I. For switches. Equipment for streetcars. At
+first very slow; Chatel had frightened me, and I dreaded making some
+mistake. There must not be any botched pieces, and I botched the ist one.
+There were 4 parts to assemble: the contact, 2 terminal strips, and a packet
+of io pieces of foil (but some packets had only y). You had to pay attention
+to the two holes of unequal size in the large terminal strip-position the
+smaller hole seam side up, and in the direction of the cutting. Did the first
+70 in 2 hrs., I think. ... Afterward, never stopped daydreaming. Reached
+an uninterrupted tempo only in the afternoon (fortified by lunch and
+loafing), and only by continually repeating to myself the list of operations
+(iron wire—large hole—seam—direction—iron wire...), not so much to
+keep myself from making a blunder as to prevent myself from thinking,
+which is the condition for going fast.
+I profoundly feel the humiliation of this void imposed on my thought. I
+finally manage to go a little faster (at the end I'm making more than 3 F
+per hr.), but with bitterness in my heart.
+Wednesday. Same until 8:30, put down 7¾ hrs., earned 20.60 F (in
+84 hrs., that is, 2.50 F per hr.).
+I don't achieve the "uninterrupted tempo" again; I ought to have finished in 8 hrs.
+Polishing the same pieces until 3:45, put down 5¼ hrs., earned
+13.50 F. C. 414754, h. 4..027 per piece. It's what I did the week I was at
+the furnace; Mouquet took that job away from me as badly done, and in
+fact I was handling it badly. So I begin in a state of apprehension. I go very,
+very slowly at first. Catsous leaves me to myself. The ist discovery I make
+has to do with the direction in which the piece must be turned: in the one in
+which the belt would carry it, but while pulling it in the reverse direction.
+In this way the piece and the belt stay in contact (at least I imagine that's
+
+186
+the reason). The znd (made a long time ago, but I apply it here) is that
+a hand should do only one operation at a time. So I push with my left hand
+and pull with my right; as for turning the piece, I don't have to do it, the
+belt does it. As for the tempo, I start out at a comfortable pace; then, realizing I'm going extremely slowly, I strive for the "uninterrupted tempo," but
+reluctantly and with a feeling of annoyance; also I feel no pleasure at all at
+having mastered a trick of the trade. At noon, I eat a quick lunch at
+"Prisunic," then go sit in the sun across the street from the aircraft plant.
+I remain there in such a state of inertia that I arrive at the factory in a sort of
+half-dream, not in the slightest hurry, at 1: 13 or I: I4.... They were
+locking the gate!
+4-4:30 riveting, see next day.
+Paid I25 F (4 F of which in advance). The week before, 70 F. That's
+192 F for 32 + 48 = 80 hours ... so exactly 2.40 F per hour....
+Conversation with Pommier —knows all the tools.
+Evening: headaches and very bitter weariness in my heart. I don't cat,
+except for a little bread and honey. I take a bath to help me sleep, but the
+headache keeps me awake almost all night. At 4:30 in the morning a great
+need for sleep comes over me. But I have to get up. I resist the temptation to
+take a half-day off.
+Thursday. All day: riveting armatures-had done 700 by 4:30 (in
+8¾ hrs.) —in high spirits going out at noon-exhausted after the meal.
+Evening: too tired to eat, lie stretched out on the bed; little by little a very
+sweet lassitude-delicious sleep.
+C. 421121, b. 3—.056 per piece—800 pieces. Put down 14¼ hrs.
+Mind empty all day, without resorting to tricks as I did in the riveting, by
+an effort of will kept up without too much difficulty. And yet I had gotten
+up with a bad headache that nearly made me stay home. I'm encouraged by
+the fact that this is a "good job," although it's hard. And also—especially-by a sort of sporting spirit. Work really uninterrupted.
+Tool shop (Mouquet comes here ...).
+Italian woman and Mouquet.
+"4 sous... an hour-that's not enough for you in this time of
+unemployment?"
+llion's reflections: "The boss will always be rich.... You always have
+to go too fast, that's why there isn't any work..."
+About a "J.P." who passes by: "and to think how highly these guys are
+regarded"—
+
+187
+Friday. Finish riveting. But some rivets are missing (to tell the truth, there
+were some in the grooves of the machine). 8:15 to 8:45, 50 extension
+pieces at per per hundred, c.? (I'm sure it's 413910), put down ¼ hr.
+Cardboard washers, not timed, job-voucher no. 1747, ord. I4I5, put
+down 2 hrs. (took 2¼¼) —covers. C. 4I2105, b. I,. 72 per hundred (buttons), 400 pieces. Put down 3½ hrs. (I didn't finish them by quitting time,
+but Chatel is finishing them). Lost 1 hr.; the day before I had picked up 3
+(made up for slowness), 2 left.
+Machine wrecked by Ilion (in the process of setting it up, he broke
+something).
+The warehouse keeper: "The set-up men don't know how to use the
+brakes." "They don't know how to set the buttons. It's always too short,
+so that the valve ...(?)."
+Monday. Until 8 A.M. fnished magnetic circuits, order 20154—only 25
+left. I work with ease, without hurrying, without being slow for all that.
+Put down 1 hr. I have 6 hrs. in all (the voucher wasn't passed).
+"Extension pieces" (4-sided boxes to put in a forming block). Ridiculous price (-923 per hundred), 5o pieces! C. 413910, b. I. I put down
+½ hr. Finish at 9:45. You mustn't put them in two at a time, Mimi tells me.
+You have to oil all of them.-Then?
+Until 10:45, foil with Léon, next to Eugénie who is putting in rivets.
+C. 425537, 6. 2-200 packets of 6—2.80 F per hundred. I go fast (the
+Wednesday after Montana, it took me 2 hrs. to do 100 packets!). So
+earned 5.60 F. I put down 1 hr. 5o min. (made the rate). Again I almost
+achieved the uninterrupted tempo.
+Cutting pieces out of metal bars at the press where I spent one Wednesday with Louisette. Put the piece right at the stop, hold it exactly parallel
+... I don't go fast. That lasts until 1:50 P.M. Apparently I put down too
+much time by mistake: 1 hr. 40 min. C. 4009194, b. 97-346 pieces at
+.88 per hundred! (I think I did 360, but Friday Catsous will tell me that
+there were only 330!). I work without making any attempt at speed;
+tired and discouraged by the price, also having an excuse in the fact that
+the pieces are hard to get out.
+Scrap from 1:45 tO 3:30 (so 1% hrs.).
+Same pieces —making them triangular, on the same voucher. Profound
+disgust, which slows me down.
+Finished at 4:30 — put down 3¼ hrs. in all.
+
+188
+Tuesday. ¼ hr. scrap.
+Conversation while doing scrap; Souchal vulgar. One day Joséphine
+summoned him to come...® her, got Mouquet to force him to do it.
+Mouquet is fair, but capricious. Adjusts the vouchers you haven't made
+the rate on sometimes one way, sometimes another —not according to
+how hard the work is!
+"Bimetallic strips" (pieces tricky to place against the stop: die almost
+flat) with Léon; C. 421227, 2,100 pieces with the buttons, so at. 72. Pur
+down 64¼ hrs. Same machine on which I made the terminal connectors the
+znd time, and that Jacquot hadn't been able to fix.
+1½ hr. scrap (lost 40 min. yesterday and today).
+Pommera (Jacquot and the machine for the terminal connectors). Set-up
+men and machines.
+Wednesday. ½ hr. scrap.
+Piano from 7:30 to 8:I5. C. 15682, b. I1, then c. 15682, b. 8, both
+at .495 per hundred. 180 pieces for the ist, 460 for the znd. Put down 25
+min., then 1¼ hrs. Lamentably slow. The woman whose friend is a painter
+came to ... me'
+Riveting, "lower support assembly." C. 24280, b. 45 — 200 pieces at. 10
+F (used to be .028!) (temporary price for the Souchal order) from 9:45
+until Thursday morning. Put down 6¼ hrs. in all. Did 75 pieces in the
+morning, that's another 7.50 F. VERY violent headache that day, otherwise I would have gone faster. I went to bed feeling all right the night
+before, but woke up at 2 A.M. In the morning, wanted to stay home. At the
+factory, every movement hurts. Louisette, at her machine, sees that I'm not
+well.
+A woman drill operator: her 9-year-old is in the cloakroom. Is he
+coming to work? "I wish he were old enough," says the mother. She tells
+how her husband has just been sent home from the hospital where they
+could do almost nothing for him (pleurisy and serious heart disease). There
+is also a 1o-month-old girl. ...
+Thursday. ¾ hr. scrap.
+C. 428195, b. I, put down 2 hrs. C. 23273, b. 21-198 pieces (all
+counted) at 1.008 F per hundred (time? 2 hrs. I think). Washers: 10,000 at
+7.50 F, put down 1½ hrs. for that day; lost 1¾ hrs.
+8 Word unreadable in text.
+9 Sentence unfinished in text.
+
+189
+Machine with arms. Two levers, one of which is for safety and prevents
+the other from coming down; I didn't understand its purpose; the warehouse keeper explains it to me [cf. Descartes and Tantalus!].
+Friday. Finish washers in a hurry. Sifting through them, I notice many are
+botched. I pitch out as many as possible; nevertheless am very afraid. I put
+down 10,000, although there were already some missing in addition to the
+ones I pitched out, and 2½ hrs., which makes the rate on the voucher.
+8-9, scrap.
+9 to 10:30, pieces that are easy to do. C. 421324, voucher for soo;
+there are only 464; Robert makes me pass the voucher. Paid .61 per
+hundred. Put down 1 hr. (didn't make the rate), forl think I lost over ½ hr.
+watching Robert struggling with a machine. The valve no longer opened
+(Pommera came later; a part was missing, a locking wedge). He was there
+when I came; didn't stop for me. The problem happened again several
+times. The woman worker (for once) seemed a bit interested (I don't know
+her); a slightly disheveled brunette, seems nice.
+10:30 to 4:30, scrap (lucky, for it's indescribably restful; in the afternoon, I even end up sitting down) —annealing, with only 200 pieces to do,
+at Léon's furnace until 2 P.M. Put down so min., .o2 r per piece; so earned
+4.20 F (but was the annealing done correctly?). I don't dare put down
+more than so min., and don't take the time to work it out. It comes, alas, to
+s F per hour. Will they lower the price on the voucher because of me?
+I would have done better to have waited and put down at least 1 hr. In any
+case, lost in all 25 min.
+Chatel charming—1 am left in total freedom —I am treated like someone
+condemned to death. ...
+Nénette is suddenly serious. "You're going to look for a job? Poor
+Simone." She herself is laid off the following week. "You can't make it."
+I tell Louisette what I think of that; she replies that Mouquet refused
+to exempt Nénette from the lay-off. Mme Forestier had been exempted
+2 years ago, but on orders from above.
+Monday. Annealing plates (bobbin stops) until 9:10. 200 at .OI
+(421263, 6.21).
+Spindles: 180at.022 [928494, b.48), put down 1¼ hrs. and I hr.
+Fly-press, calibrating (like the and day?) [22616, b. 17, 2 vouchers], 116
+pieces at .o22 per hundred—2 operations, one difficult, the other easy! Put
+down so min. (finished at 11:30).
+
+190
+Scrap
+I hr.
+Vouchers on which I made the rate
+Numbers
+
+(armatures R)
+24280
+(support R)
+(washers I)
+
+(furnace L)
+1hr.
+1hr.
+15 min.
+15 min.
+45 min.
+15 min.
+30 min.
+30 min.
+45 min.
+1 hr.
+1hr.
+2 hrs.
+15 min.
+30 min.
+240 min.
+7hrs. (60 x 4)
+7 hrs. + 4 hrs. = 11 hrs.
+Price
+44.80 F
+20 F
+7.50 F
+4.20 F
+76.50 F
+Time
+14 hrs. 15 min.
+6 hrs. 15 min.
+2hrs. 30 min.
+50 min.
+22 hrs. 110 min.
+forgur:
+23 hrs.
+50 min.
+4255.37
+5.60 F
+82.10 F
+1hr.
+25 hrs.
+50 min.
+40 min
+12 hrs.
+What vouchers should I have made the rate on? The ones
+for planishing (bur ...)—the suckers; the hingers (it I had
+adopted a good system right away ...); the polishing, if it had
+not bcen only the and rime; the piano — (therc it was because
+of headaches). The A pieces (demuralized by the dismissal
+notice).
+In the future: find the system for sately obtaining the highest speed right away. Afterward, aim for the uninterrupted
+tempo.
+short: 20 min.
+But if 3 Fare added for the circuits (?) and 5.50 F for the covers, and
+perhaps 1. 5o F somewhere else, that's 1o F, I'll get 167 F for 65 hrs., that is,
+about 2.55 F per hour....
+If I get 1.70 F for these 65 hrs. and 32.50 F for the 11 hrs. of scrap and
+the 2 hrs. of cardboards, and 15 F for the 5 hrs. of phasing circuits, that will
+make 217.50 F in all, minus the deduction for Social Insurance!
+Add 6 F for the foil to the 167 F; that's 173 F. Perhaps 223 F in all, of
+which 209 F would be for this two-week period.
+On the whole, I haven't made any appreciable progress in the area of
+wages.
+
+191
+Number
+907405 washers L
+Same planishing L
+420,500 pl. shunts L
+406426 sockets R
+414754 fingers 1.
+Same
+-(pol.) Q
+
+
+
+******
+4009194 drilling L
+
+bimetallic strips |
+15682
+piano B
+Same
+B
+
+machine with arms L
+23173
+421.342
+-R
+Vouchers on which i didn't make the rate
+Price
+1F12
+didn't make it
+for reason f!
+.95 F
+8.90 F
+2.90 F
+20.50 F
+13.50 F
+.2?F
+2.88 F
+.46F
+2.90 F
+15.12 F
+.89 F
+2.30 F
+2.80 F (?)
+2.14 F
+2.83 F
+80.55 F
+Time
+40 min.
+.30 min.
+4hrs. 15 min.
+1hr. 10 min.
+7hrs. 45 min.
+Shrs. 15 min.
+15 min.
+3hrs. 30 min.
+30 min.
+3hrs. 15 min.
+6 hrs.
+15 min.
+25 min.
+1hr. 15 min.
+2 hrs.
+2 hrs.
+(?)
+1hr.
+35 hrs. 300 min.
+5 hrs.
+40 hrs.
+robeadded:
+141.5
+2 hrs.
+(work voucher 1747)
+80.50 F
+82.10 F
+162.60 F for 6.5% hrs. of work
+157 | 64
+290
+---
+340
+20
+2.45
+163
+310
+460
+440
+241
+66
+2.4766
+
+192
+Small pieces: 421446, 150 pieces out of 400 at .62 per hundred, i.e.,
+•90 F in all— put down ¼ hr.—severe cramps—infirmary.
+Leave at 2:30 after having tried in vain to stick it out. Prostration until
+about 6 P.M, later not tired.
+Tuesday. Terminals, 240 at. 53 per hundred |409134, 409332|.
+Profound satisfaction that the work is going badly.... Mouquet.
+Washers: 421437, b. 1-.56 per hundred, 86s per piece, put down
+1¼ hrs., terminal-connector press 2.
+Gear guides [12270, b. 68): 1.42 F per hundred, 1so pieces, Robert's
+press (but he's on leave, it's with Biol) —they are bars that you cut by
+pedaling twice in succession, because the cutter isn't the proper length.
+They're not flat. If you put them in this way they go in easily, but
+they're almost impossible to get out. This way, A very hard to put in but
+they can be gotten out. Biol recommends the ist way, Pommera (very
+scornfully, for him) the and—Mouquet comes-orders me to do it the
+Ist way, but gives me a wrench for getting them out (Pommera brought it;
+Mouquet said, "I'm going to show her"). At first I handle it clumsily. He
+has to remind me of the principle of the lever. ...
+Perhaps for the first time, I come back at I:is with a feeling of pleasure—also due to the way Mouquet spoke to me.
+I enjoy doing a hard job, one that "doesn't go well." At Is I tell
+Pommera that work that doesn't go well is much less boring. He says,
+"That's true." I skin my hands (one had cut). Tempo not a problem, since
+the voucher doesn't matter. I notice that I effortlessly assume the "uninterrupted tempo" in front of Mouquet. But once he has left, no... It's not
+because he's the foreman; it's because someone is watching me and waiting for me.
+SCRAP: 2:30tO3:15.
+Piano: 344 sheet-metal pieces at . 56 per hundred |508907, b. 10|, put
+down so min.
+Guides (?): 40009195, I hr.
+Late afternoon, not tired. Go to Puteaux in beautiful sunshine, a cool
+breeze-(metro, collective taxi). Come by bus as far as rue d'Orléans.
+Delightful—go up to B.'s. But get to bed late.
+
+193
+THE MYSTERY OF THE FACTORY
+1. The Mystery of the Machine
+Guihéneuf: the machine is a mystery for the worker who hasn't studied
+mathematics. He doesn't see a balance of forces in it. So he has no confidence in regard to it. For instance: the turner who, by trial and error,
+discovered a tool for rolling both steel and nickel, instead of changing the
+tool to shift from one metal to another. For Guihéneuf, it's simply a cut; he
+just does it. The other goes about it with superstitious respect. It's the same
+thing with a machine that doesn't work. The worker will see that this or
+that needs to be done ... but often makes a repair that, while enablingitto
+work, dooms it to wear out more rapidly, or to develop a new hitch. The
+engineer, never. Even if he never uses differential calculus, differential
+formulas applied to the study of the resistance of materials allow him to
+form a precise idea of a machine as a fixed play of forces.
+The press that wasn't working and Jacquor. Clearly the press was a
+mystery for Jacquot, and so was the reason it stopped working. Not just as
+an unknown factor, but in itself in some way. It doesn't work.... Like the
+machine refuses.
+What I don't understand about presses: Jacquot and the press that
+stamped 1o times in succession.
+2. The Mystery of Manufacture
+Of course, the worker does not know how each piece is used: (1) how it is
+combined with other pieces; (2) the successive operations carried out on it;
+(3) the ultimate use of the whole.
+But there is more: the relationship between causes and effects in the
+work itself isn't understood.
+Nothing is less instructive than a machine.
+3. The Mystery of "Knack"
+Circuits from which I had to remove the cardboards. In the beginning
+I didn't know how to separate them by tapping with the mallet. Then I did
+some reasoning about the principle of the lever, which was quite useless.
+... After which, I knew how to do it very well, without my ever realizing
+either how I learned or how I go about it.
+Essential principle of manual skill in machine work (and elsewhere?)
+badly expressed. Each hand should do only one simple operation. For
+
+194
+instance, work on metallic strips: one hand pushes, the other presses
+toward the stop. Sheet-metal plates: don't hold with the hand; let them
+rest on the hand, apply pressure in the direction of the stop with the thumb.
+Polishing belt: apply pressure with one hand, pull with the other, let the
+belt turn the piece, etc.
+Changes to be Desired
+Different kinds of machine-tools side by side in the same shop. The set-ups
+nearby. The lay-out of the factory aimed at giving every worker a view of
+the entire process (that obviously assumes the abolition of the system of
+set-up men).
+Specializations that degrade:
+Of the worker —of the machine—of parts of factories (of engineers?]
+Organization of the Factory
+Shortage of stools, packing cases, oil cans.
+Whimsical timekeeping. And it's the worst-paid jobs that are the most
+fatiguing, because you exert all your strength to the extreme limit so as not
+to fall below the rate. (Cf. the conversation with Mimi, Tuesday, 7th
+week.) You exhaust yourself, you kill yourself for 2 F per hour. And not
+because you are doing a jøb that demands that you kill yourself; no, only
+because of the capriciousness and carelessness of the timekeeper. You kill
+yourself with nothing at all to show forit, either a subjective result (wages)
+or an objective one (work accomplished), that corresponds to the effort
+you've put out. In that situation you really feel you are a slave, humiliated
+to the very depths of your being.
+Pommera respects the timekeeper (Souchal); excuses him by saying that
+his job is impossible, caught as he is between the management and the
+women. He says that when Souchal is pushing the women, they buckle
+down right away. There is also the issue of false timing; a voucher that
+makes the rate can never be corrected afterward.
+For each job there is a limited—a small—number of possible mistakes,
+some of which can break the tool, and others botch the piece. As far as the
+tool is concerned, only a few possible mistakes exist for each type of job. It
+would be easy for the set-up men to point out these possible mistakes to the
+women, so that they would have a little confidence.
+Notice whether or not the presses are specialized. Try to establish a
+nomenclature—planishing press—Biol's stamping press.
+
+• Faclory Journal
+195
+Foremen and bureaucrats:
+%. Comes from the corps i Marime Fingineers.
+"A manager is a machine for taking responsibility," "no profession
+more stupid than that of manager." "A good manager must above all not
+be a good technician. Just know enough that he can't be made to swallow
+a lot of nonsense."
+D...
+X. Department of Civil Engineering.
+At first manager and managing director. Has now trained a manager to
+spare himself work.
+Became the head of the company totally ignorant of manufacturing
+technique. Felt lost for i year.
+Mouquet (foreman).
+Timekeeper
+(Souchal
+glass
+cubicle
+short, dark).
+Mme Biay (?).
+The most interesting one is clearly Mouquet. Timekeeper an obnoxious type, vulgar,
+they say, with the women-always tends
+toward what is most base—he sets times
+almost at random-I never spoke to him.
+Pommera doesn't think badly of him.
+M. Chanes.
+... press foreman.
+Catsous
+drilling machines.
+Mouquet and the pieces I spent s days on at the beginning taking out
+cardboards.
+Mouquet-sculptural, tormented head-something monastic-always
+tense-"I'I] think about it tonight." Saw him cheerful only once.
+Set-up men:
+llion (foreman)—Léon-Catsous—Jacquot (back being a worker)—
+Robert-Biol.
+Female workers:
+Mme Forestier—Mimi—Mimi's sister—Tolstoy fan—Eugénie-Louisette, her friend (young widow with 2 kids)-Nénette-redhead (Jo-
+séphine)—Cat-blonde with 2 kids-separated from her husbandmother of the burned boy—the one who gave me a roll —the one who has
+chronic bronchitis—the woman who lost a child and is happy not to have
+any at all, and "fortunately" lost her ist husband who had tuberculosis for
+
+196
+8 years (that's what Eugénie says!) —Italian woman (by far the nicest) —
+Alice (by far the least likable) —Dubois (Oh, Mother! if you could see
+me !) —the one who is ill, lives alone (who gave me the Puteaux address) —
+the screw-cutting machine operator who sings-screw-cutting machine
+operator with 2 kids and the sick husband.
+Mimi-26 years old—married for 8 years to a young construction
+worker (knew him from Angers), who put in 2 years at Citroën and is now
+unemployed, although he's a good worker. At Angers she worked in a textile mill (11 F per day!). At Alsth. for 6 years. Took 6 months to acquire
+a fast enough tempo "to earn her living" —in the course of which she very
+frequently wept, thinking she would never make it. Worked another year
+and a half in a state of constant nervousness (fear of doing badly), although
+she was working quickly and well. Only at the end of 2 years did she
+become sure enough of herself "not to worry."
+One of her early reflections: (1 was telling her I was exasperated by my
+ignorance of what I was making); "They take us for machines... others
+are here to think for us..." (Exactly what Taylor1° says, but she says it
+with hitterness.)
+No professional self-esteem. Cf. her response Thursday of the 6th week.
+Incomparably less common than the average.
+Nénette (Mme A., about 35 years old [?|). Has a 13-year-old son and
+a 6½-year-old daughter. Widow. Almost all her conversation consists of
+jokes and confidences that would make a barracksroom blush. Extraordinarily vivacious and full of vitality. Good worker; almost always makes
+over 1 F. In the shop for two years.
+But-enormous respect for education (talks about her son "always
+reading").
+Her rather vulgar cheerfulness disappears the week she is almost constantly without work. "You have to count every penny."
+Talks about her son: "The idea of sending him to the shop—I can't tell
+you what that does to me" (however, a superficial observer could think she
+is happy at the shop).
+Joséphine.
+Eugénie.
+1o Frederick Winskon Taylor (1856-1915) was an American engineer who developed a
+system of "scientife management" to increase efficiency and production in factory work.
+
+197
+Male workers:
+The w'arebouse keeper (Pommera).
+History: born in the country-family of 12 children-herded cows
+when he was 9 years old-got his certificate of studies when he was 12.
+Before the war never worked in a factory; worked in a few garages—never
+served an apprenticeship, or had any other technical or general education
+than what he got for himself in night courses. Served in the war (already
+married) as a platoon leader in the mountain light infantry (?). At the time
+lost the little money he had scraped together, and as a result had to work in
+a factory when he returned from the war. I don't know what he did the first
+4 years. But afterward he was a set-up man on the presses for 6 years in
+another factory. And for the last 6 years, he's been keeper of the rool warehouse at Alsthom. Everywhere, he says, he's had an easy time. Nevertheless, he hopes I won't stay with the machines as long as he did.
+Work:
+He hands out the tools listed on the order (anybody could do that).
+Sometimes he changes the order, noting down other tools that allow, for
+instance, 3 operations to be replaced by 2, which saves the firm money.
+He has done that several times. (You have to be awfully sure of yourself!)
+A sa consequence, he has the confidence that comes from knowing that he
+is indispensable, and that no one would darc bother him.
+Education:
+Technical: knows the lathe-the milling machine-machine-serting.
+Explains marvelously well how something has to be done (unlike the
+set-up men).
+General ? Expresses himself extremely well. But what else?
+Violinist-tall blond-boy at the furnace-one who reads l'Auto—nice
+guy at the drilling machine-little fellow who set me up at the furnace—
+young Italian—my "fiancé" —guy in gray at the shearing machineyoung metal shearer. Bretonner-new unskilled worker-boy from air
+transport—2-man team for repairing machines (...) [Biol's machine,
+Ilion's machine].
+
+198
+AET
+Worker solidarity? No mass solidarity (except Louisette
+...).
+Give them the feeling that they have something of their own to give.
+Worker delegates,
+protection against
+threat of being fired.
+Duties?
+Safety.
+Worker control over the
+bookkeeping?
+Account book? Technical and organizational
+innovations?
+Lectures?
+Bonuses to combat
+waste?
+Organization of part-time work.
+Demands.
+Commendations
+How to deal with these additional concerns? ...
+2 suggestion boxes
+1 for the benefit of
+the firm.
+Popularization,
+i for the benefit of
+Technical
+innovations.
+Waste.
+prepare ...
+the workers
+Recount the bur eaucratic incident. '
+... Liaison.
+"Capitalists' trap": modernization of machinery. One owner updates
+machinery that has been amortized; others have to do the same, even
+though theirs isn't amortized (because they calculate using a particular
+cost, not a general one). The next time, it's the first one's turn to suffer....
+Naiveté of a man who has never suffered
+..
+LOOKING FOR WORK
+Monday. Alone. To Issy—Malakoff. Tedious—nothing to report.
+Tuesday (in the rain) —with a woman (who tells me about her 13-yearold boy whom she is keeping in school. "Without it, what can he become?
+A martyr like the rest of us").
+Wednesday-(glorious weather) with 2 metal fitters. One is 18 years old.
+The other, 58. Very interesting man, but extremely rescrved. To all appearances, a real man. Living alone (his wife walked out on him). A hobby,
+photography. "They killed the cinema when they made it talk, instead of
+letting it remain what it really is, the most beautiful application of photog-
+11 Set above, p. 16-.
+
+199
+raphy." Reminisced about the war in a peculiar tone of voice, as if it were
+a life like any other, just a harder and more dangerous job (artilleryman,
+it's true). "The man who says he has never been afraid is lying." But he
+doesn't seem to have felt fear to the point of having been inwardly humiliated by it. On work: "They have been asking more and more of the trained
+workers for some time; you almost have to know engineering." Tells me
+about the "developable surfaces." You have to find the dimensions of a flat
+piece of sheet metal out of which you will then make a piece full of curves
+and broken lines.
+[Try to find out exactly what a "developable surface" is.]
+He failed a test once, as far as I understood, because he failed to multiply
+the diameter by r.
+A this age, he says, you are disgusted by work (work used to interest him
+passionately when he was young). But the problem isn't the work itself, the
+problem is taking orders. The jail. ... "You would have to be able to work
+for yourself." "I would like to do something else." He was working (in the
+"Mureaux"), 12 but half-expects to be kicked out for not having made the
+rate (he is timed). Complains about the committees that set the times.
+"They can't understand." Argument with the foreman over some pieces to
+be made in y min.; he took 14; the foreman, to show him, made one in 7,
+but he says it was a bad piece (so it's mass-production metal-fitting?).
+Speaks of his past jobs. Some cushy ones. Was a machinist in a textile
+mill. "That was a dream." Spent his time "doing work on the side." Ob-
+viously didn't even notice the miserable lot of the slaves. Affects a certain
+cynicism. However, obviously a man of feeling.
+All morning, extraordinarily free and easy conversation among the
+three of us, on a plane above the miseries of existence that are the dominant preoccupation of slaves, especially the women. After Alsthom, what
+a relief!
+The young one is also interesting. While we were passing Saint-Cloud,
+he says, "If I were up to it (he is not, alas, because he is hungry...) I would
+like to draw." "Everyone is interested in something." "For me," says the
+other one, "it's photography." The young one asks me, "And you, what do
+you like to do?" Embarrassed, 1 answer, "Read." And he: "Yes, I can see
+that. Not novels. You would rather read philosophy, wouldn't you?"
+Then we talked about Zola and Jack London.
+12 Industrial district on the left bank of the Seine.
+
+200
+Both, obviously, have revolutionary tendencies ("revolutionary" very
+inaccurate word—rather, they are class-conscious and have the spirit of
+free men). But when it comes to national defense, we no longer agree.
+However, I don't insist.
+Total comradeship. For the first time in my life, really. No barrier at all,
+cither in the difference of class (since that has been removed) or in the difference of sex. Miraculous.
+EASTER SUNDAY
+On my way home from the church where I had (foolishly) hoped to hear
+some Gregorian chant, 1 come upon a small exhibition where you can see
+a Jacquard loom in operation. I—who had so passionately and vainly
+contemplated one at the Institute of Arts and Crafts-hasten to step in.
+The operator, who sees that I'm interested, explains it to me (as he finishes,
+he does 2 Claquesin picks ... I intrigue him very much). He does everything: punches the card (according to the card pattern, not from the design
+of the fabric—he says he could work out the pattern of the card himself (?)
+and also read the pattern of the fabric from the card (?); however, when
+I ask him if he could read on the card letters to be woven into the fabric, he
+says—and more hesitantly—yes, but not easily). Set-up of the machine
+(which means arranging all the threads without making mistakes-extremely meticulous work) —and the weaving, done by throwing the shuttle
+and treadling; the treadle is heavy because of all the needles and raised
+threads, but he says he's never tired. I finally understood—more or less—
+the relationship of the card, the needles, and the thread. He says there is
+a Jacquard loom in every textile mill, for the patterns; but he thinks that
+practice is going to disappear. Extremely proud of his knowledge. ...
+SECOND SHOP, FROM THURSDAY APRIL IT TO TUESDAY MAY 7,
+CARNAUD, BASSE-INDRE WORKS, RUL DU VIEUX-PONT DE
+SÈVRES, BOULOGNE-BILLANCOURT
+IST DAY. Gautier's shop. Oil cans [afterward, gas masks] (shops highly
+specialized). Some conveyer belts and a few presses. They put me at a press.
+Stamping pieces to turn them into. The dot determines the
+position-small press, light pedal; it's the dot that gives me trouble. You
+have to count (not knowing how the count is supposed to be checked,
+
+201
+I count conscientiously; I'm wrong). I arrange them in order and count
+them by sos, then do them fast. I go faster, although not as fast as I can,
+and do 400 per hour. In general I work harder than at Alsthom. In the
+afternoon, fatigue, made worse by the suffocating atmosphere, saturated
+with odors of paints, varnishes, etc. I wonder if I will be able to keep up the
+pace. But at 4 o'clock Martin, the foreman (a handsome young man with
+an affable manner and voice), comes to tell me quite politely, "If you don't
+do 800, I won't keep you. If you do 8oo in the 2 hrs. that are left, I will perhaps consent to keep you. There are some who do 1,200." I go faster,
+seething with rage, and get up to 6o0 per hour (by cheating a little on the
+count and the position of the pieces). At 5:30 Martin comes to get the
+count and says, "That's not enough." Then he puts me to work setting out
+another woman's pieces; she doesn't give a welcoming word or smile. At
+6 P.M., in the grip of a cold and concentrated fury, I go to the foreman's
+office and ask outright, "Should I come back tomorrow morning?" Quite
+surprised, he says, "Come in, just in case; we'll see. But you have to work
+faster." I answer, "I'll try," and leave. In the cloakroom, I'm surprised to
+hear the others gossiping, chattering, without seeming to feel the same
+suppressed rage that I do. However, they get out of the factory fast. Until
+the bell rings, they work as if they had hours to go; the bell no sooner
+begins to ring than they all rise up as if they were activated by a spring, run
+to punch out, run to the cloakroom, exchange a few words while they slip
+on their wraps, and run home. In spite of my fatigue, I am so in need of
+fresh air that I go on foot as far as the Seine; there I sit on the bank, on
+a stone, gloomy, exhausted, my heart gripped by impotent rage, feeling
+drained of all my vital substance; I wonder if, in the event that I were
+condemned to live this life, I would be able to cross the Seine every day
+without someday throwing myself in.
+The next morning, at my machine again. 630 per hr., desperately
+straining for all I'm worth. Suddenly Martin, who comes over with
+Gautier behind him, says, "Stop." I stop, but remain seated in front of my
+machine, not understanding what is wanted of me. This gets me a bawling
+out, for when a foreman says "Stop" it seems you have to be immediately
+standing at attention, ready to pounce on the new job he is going to give
+you. "Nobody sleeps here." (Indeed, in this shop, not one second in a 9-hr.
+day is not spent in work. I have not once seen a woman raise her eyes from
+her work, or two women exchange a few words. No need to add that in
+this place the seconds of the women's lives are the only things that are
+
+202
+economized on so carefully; in other respects, waste, waste to spare. No
+foreman that l've seen analogous to Mouquet. In Gautier's shop, their
+work seems to consist primarily in pushing the women.) They put me at
+a machine where all I have to do is thread in some thin, flexible metallic
+strips, gilded on the bottom, silvered on top, taking care not to pur in 2 at
+once, and going "at full speed." But often they are stuck together. The Ist
+time I put in 2 (which stops the machine), the set-up man came to fix it. The
+znd time I tell Martin, who puts me back at my ist machine while the and
+one is being fixed. Nearly 62o per hour.... At ir o'clock, a woman with
+a nice smile comes to take me to another shop; I am put in a large light
+room next to the shop, where one workman is showing another how to
+varnish with a spray gun....
+|I forgot to note down my impression the ist day, at 8 A.M., when I arrived at the hiring office. In spite of my fears, 1 am—as an unemployed
+worker who has finally found a job-happy and grateful to the shop.
+I find s or 6 women whose dejected looks astonish me. I ask questions,
+but no one says much; finally I understand that this shop is a convict
+prison13 (frantic pace, cut fingers in profusion, no scruples about laying off
+workers) and that most of the women have worked in it—they had either
+been thrown out of work last fall or had wanted to escape-and are returning with suppressed rage, chafing at their bits.]
+The door opens 10 min. before the hour. But that's a manner of speaking. A small door in the gate is opened ahead of time. At the ist bell (there
+are 3 at 5 min. intervals), the small door is closed and half the gate is
+opened. On days of pouring rain, it's quite a sight to see the herd of women
+who have arrived before the gate "opens" keep standing in the rain next to)
+that small open door waiting for the bell to ring (reason: thefts; cf. diningroom). No protest, no reaction at all.
+A lovely girl, strong, radiant, and healthy, says one day in the cloakroom, after a Io-hr. day: I'm fed up with working all day long. How I wish
+it were Bastille Day so I could dance. Me: You can think of dancing after
+Io hrs. on the job? Her reply: Of course! I could dance all night, etc.
+(laughing). Then, seriously: it's been s years since l've danced. You feel
+like dancing, and then you dance over the washing.
+Two or three melancholy women with sad smiles are not of the same
+common type as the others. One asks me how it's going. I tell her that I'm
+13 Bagne, i.e., a place of confinement at forced labor.
+
+203
+in a quiet corner. She, with a gentle and melancholy smile: I'm glad! Let's
+hope it will last. And she repeats it once or twice.
+In this kind of life those who suffer aren't able to complain. They would
+be misunderstood by others, perhaps laughed at by those who are not suffering, thought of as tiresome by those who, suffering themselves, have
+quite enough suffering of their own. Everywhere the same callousness, like
+the foremen's, with a few rare exceptions.
+In the varnishing shop. Observed s workmen. The carpenter-my
+truck-driver pal—the "guy from downstairs" (tin-plating), who is coforeman. The electrician, former seaman in the reserves (whose brief stay
+was like a breath of sea air for me and my pal). The mechanic (alas, barely
+saw him).
+[Note: separation of the sexes, contempt of the men for the women,
+and reserve on the part of the women toward the men (in spite of the
+exchanges of dirty jokes) is much more pronounced in workers' circles
+than elsewhere.]
+Women: the former metal shearer who had salpingitis 7 years ago (in
+'28, at the height of the boom) and couldn't get herself taken off the presses
+for several years—ever since then her reproductive organs completely and
+irrevocably destroyed. Speaks with much bitterness. But it didn't occur to
+her to change her job—although she could have done it easily!
+LOOKING FOR A JOB FOR THE ZND TIME
+Fired Tuesday May 7. Spent Wednesday, Thursday, Friday in the dismal
+state of prostration caused by headaches. Friday morning, it was all I could
+do to get up in time to telephone Det. 14 Saturday, Sunday, rest.
+Monday, 13th. In front of Renault. Overheard 3 men conversing whom
+I at once took to be trained workers. One, who listens with a knowing air
+(fine face) was hired, so not seen again. — Old workman, skilled worker
+on presses, tanned working-man's face-but intelligence degraded by
+slavery. Old-style Communist. The bosses run the confederated trade
+unions. They choose the leaders. In bad times, the leaders go and tell the
+boss, "I won't be able to hold them back unless. ... One of them told me
+so himself!" And then they tell the workers, "Strikes don't succeed when
+14 Auguste Deroeuf, a friend and managing director of the Alsthom Company.
+
+204
+there is unemployment, you're going to suffer," etc. In short, he harps on
+all the stupidities invented by well-protected bonzes.
+The 3rd, young construction worker, trade-unionist tendencies
+(worked at Lyon), a good sort.
+Tuesday, 14th. Morning: inertia. Afternoon, Saint-Ouen (Luchaire). The
+job was taken....
+Wednesday, 1Sth. Go to Porte de Saint-Cloud, but by the time I telephone
+Det., it's too late to go to Renault or Salmson. Go to Caudron. In front of
+the gate, a half-dozen trained workers, all with references in aviation:
+aviation carpenters, metal-fitters. ... Again the same old story: "They
+won't find any trained workers like the ones they're asking for. They don't
+make them any more...•
+" It's still about the same thing: the developable
+surfaces. As far as I can understand there are two types of test: the "dovetail" Tas
+52 (more or less), which has to fit exactly into a piece
+of sheet metal you are not allowed to file; and the devclopable surfaces. It
+seems the metal-fitters have something of the artist in them.
+The one I got to know well. On the surface, all brawn and no brains.
+Marvelous references. A letter of recommendation from the Institute of
+Arts and Crafts (where he was apprenticed until age 19): "Machinist who
+is a credit to his trade." Lives in Bagnolet (his own little shack??), which
+complicates his finding a job; gives this as his reason for refusing to work
+more than 8 hrs., but I don't think that it's the only one. You work To
+hoursat Renault. Too much for him. With the train, etc. "On Sunday you
+can stay in bed and rest" (so the money doesn't matter). Adds: "s hrs.,
+that's enough for me." Was a foreman more than once (references to prove
+it). "But," he says, "I'm too much of a revolutionary. I could never give the
+workers a bad time." The error of interpretation that he makes in regard to
+me, his attitude afterward. On parting: "You don't hold it against me?" Is
+going to come to see me at my place. But was not in front of Renault the
+next morning. ... The day after, a knock. I'm in bed, don't open the door.
+Was it he? I'll never hear of him again....
+Another day, in front of Gévelot—the guy with white hair, who intended to go in for music before the war. Says he's an accountant (but
+makes mistakes in simple arithmetic) —looking for a job as an unskilled
+worker. Pitiful failure.... We wait from 7: 15 to 7:45 in a light rain, after
+which "no hiring." At Renault, the hiring is over. An hour's wait in front
+of Salmson.
+
+• Faclory Journal
+205
+Another time at Gévelot. The women are let in. The guy doing the hiring
+(head of personnel?) is vulgar and callous; in another connection he also
+bawls out a foreman, who answers very humbly (pleasure to see that).
+Looks us over like horses. "That one's the strongest." His way of questioning the 2o-year-old who 3 years earlier had left because she was pregnant.
+... With me, polite. Takes my address.
+The one who, mother of 2 children, said she wanted to work because she
+was "bored at home" and whose husband worked 15 hrs. a day and didn't
+want her to work! Indignation of another, also mother of 2 children, very
+unhappy at having to work (outside Salmson).
+Another time (?) met the young girl who said, "The fall of the franc will
+mean hard times, they say so on the radio," etc.
+Another time, trip to Ivry. "No women." Headaches. ...
+Another time, outside Langlois (small shop), in Ménilmontant, at 7 A.M.
+(advertisement) — Wait until 8: 30. Then to Saint-Denis, but it's too late.
+Return to Saint-Denis. Hard to walk like this when you're not eating....
+Again at Luchaire in Saint-Ouen before 7:30 (it's the same day on
+which, in the afternoon, I will be hired at Renault).
+During the final week I decide to spend only 3.50 F per day, transportation included. Hunger becomes a permanent feeling. Is this feeling more
+painful than working and eating, or less so? Unresolved question. ... Yes,
+more painful, on the whole.
+RENAULT
+Milling machine operator.
+Wednesday, Sth. Day I was hired, from 1:30 to 5 P.M. The faces around
+me; handsome young worker; the young construction worker; his wife.
+Terrible emotional state, the day I was hired, and the next day setting
+out to confront the unknown; in the metro early in the morning (I arrive at
+6:45), extremely apprehensive, to the point of being physically ill. I see
+people are looking at me; I must be very pale. If ever I have known fear, it is
+today. I imagine a shop with presses, a 1o-hr. day, brutal foremen, cut
+fingers, heat, headaches.... The woman who used to work on presses
+whom I talked with in the hiring office didn't help to raise my spirits. When
+I arrive at shop 21, I feel my will grow weak. But at least there are no
+presses-what luck!
+
+206
+When, 3 months earlier, I had heard the story of the milling machine
+cutter that had gone through a woman's hand, I told myself that with such
+an image in my memory it would never be easy for me to work on a milling
+machine. However, at no time did I ever have any fear to overcome on that
+score.
+Thursday, 6th. From 8 A.M. to noon, observed15—from 2:30 to 10 P.M.,
+worked. 400 the first 2 hrs. 2,050 in all; lost 1½ hrs. or more because the
+set-up man made a mistake. Exhausted when I left.
+The disadvantage of being in the position of a slave is that you are
+tempted to think that human beings who are pale shadows in the cave
+really exist. For instance: my set-up man, that young bastard. I need to
+resist that. [I got over it after a few weeks.]
+Dickmann's idea. But if the workers develop other resources for themselves, and through work that is free, will they submit to these speeds for
+slaves? (If not, so much the better!)
+Those who tell me not to work myself to death. One is (I learn later) the
+foreman of another gang, way at the back of the shop. He's very nice, has
+a real goodness, whereas Leclerc's (my foreman) comes more from never
+giving a damn. Later, on the rare occasions that I have to speak with him,
+he's always particularly nice to me. One day, he throws me a look while
+I am miserably decanting some heavy bolts into an empty packing case
+with my hands.... Never forget this man.
+The foreman and the crank. He says, "Try like this," though it'sobvious
+that it's going to come off.
+Friday, 7th. Exactly 2,500, exhausted even more than the day before
+(especially after 7:30!). Philippe has some fun watching me.... By
+7 o'clock have done only 1,600.
+The young girl in the metro—"no heart for it." Me, either....
+Saturday, 8th. 2,400, cleaning. Tired, but less so than the day before
+(2,400 in 8 hrs., that's only 300 per hr.).
+Tuesday, 11th. 2,250, yoo of them after 7 o'clock-didn't have to push
+myself too hard—only a bit tired when I left. Finished at 1o: I0.
+Wednesday, 12th. Power failure (how wonderful!).
+Thursday, 13th. 2,240, finished at 9:30 (more pieces) - 1,400 of the
+15 sw was then part of the shift thar worked from 2:30 10 10 P.M.
+
+207
+above before 7 o'clock, 840 after (only 330 of them had been done
+by 4 P.M.). Violent headaches. Exhausted when I left. But not aching
+anymore....
+Friday, 14th. 1,350 and 300 others. Not tired.
+Saturday, 15th. 2,000, finished at 8:40, cleaning; barely time to finish. Not
+too tired [this ist week, packing-case problem not too great a source of
+anxiety thanks to the others being nice about it ].
+[Sunday. Headaches, didn't sleep Sunday night to Monday.)
+Monday, 17th. 2,450 (1,950 by 8:35)—tired when I left, but not
+exhausted.
+Tuesday, 18th. 2,300 (1,000 by 8:45) —didn't speed up—not tired when
+Ileft-headache all day.
+Wednesday, 19th. 2,400 (2,000 by 8:35), very tired. The little bastard of
+a set-up man tells me that Ihave to do more than 3,000.
+Thursday, 20th. Going to the shop is extremely painful; each step an effort
+(morally; returning, it's a physical effort). Am in that half-dazed state in
+which 1 am the victim designated for any harsh blow.... From 2:30 to
+3:35,400 pieces. From 3:35 to 4:15, time lost because of the set-up
+man in the cap—(he made me do my botched pieces over) —Large
+pieces—slow and very hard because of the new way the handle of the vise
+is set up. I turn to the foreman for help— Discussion —Go back to work—
+Mill the end of my thumb (there's the harsh blow) —Infirmary —Finish the
+5oo at 6:15 —No more pieces for me (I am so tired I am relieved!). But they
+promise me some. In the end, I don't get them until 7:30 and then only
+500 (to complete the 1,000). [The blond guy is afraid that I'm going to
+complain to the foreman.] 245 by 8 o'clock. Do the soo large ones, in
+a great deal of pain, in 1½ hrs.
+Io min. to set up the machine. This
+set-up uses another part of the cutting tool; it works! I do 240 small pieces
+in exactly ½ hr. Free at 9:40. But earned 16.45 F!!! (no, large pieces a little
+better paid). By the time I leave, I'm tired....
+Ist meal with the women (snack).
+The set-up man in the cap: "If he lays a hand on your machine, send him
+packing. ... He destroys everything he touches...
+He orders me to move a packing case with 2,000 pieces in it. I tell him, "l
+can't budge it by myself." "That's your problem. It's not my job."
+Apropos of the pieces they made me—the beginner—wait for: "The
+
+208
+foreman said that if you had to wait. you should be compensated for it out
+of the wages of the woman who made you wair."
+Friday, 21st. Got up very late—just barely ready in time. Painful going to
+the shop—but, unlike the previous times, pain much more physical than
+moral. Still, I'm afraid of not being able to do enough. Again the feeling of
+"let's stick it out today anyway...," as at Alsth. As of last evening, I've
+been at Renault 2 weeks; and I tell myself that I probably can't last mure
+than z weeks. ...
+Once I'm at the shop, I have 450 pieces to finish, then 2,000; it goes all
+right, no counting. I begin at 2:35, do the 450 by 3:40. Then continue at
+the uninterrupted tempo by fixing my attention on each piece and obsessively repeating in my head, "I have to...." I don't think there is
+enough water; lose a lor of rime looking for the bucket (which was where it
+was supposed to be!). Then I pour in too much water; it overflows. Have
+to get it up, find sawdust, sweep.... The guy from the automatic lathes
+kindly helps me. At 7:20, lose a lot of time (15 to 20 min.) looking for
+a box. I finally find one, full of metal shavings; I go and empty it; the set-up
+man orders me to put it back. I obey. (The next day, one of the women drill
+operators tells me that it belonged to his wife, and says, "I certainly
+wouldn't have pur it back." The drill operators are likable; a group apart.]
+Way at the back of the shop (21 B) I find one; a woman objects to my
+taking it. I give in again (wrongly!). I give up. I continue, and when I have
+no more than about soo pieces to go, empty them partly onto the machine,
+partly into a sort of basket stuck into the machine behind me, and put the
+1, 500 finished pieces into the box thus emptied; time consuming and very
+difficult operation without help. Finally finished at 9:35. Rush to find 75
+more, just to beat my record by a little. Thus: 2,525. Return to rue
+Auguste-Comte. Sleep on the metro. Separate act of will for each step.
+Once home, very cheerful. Went to bed, read until 2 A.M. Woke at 7:15
+(teeth).
+Saturday, 22nd. Magnificent weather. Beautiful morning. Don't think
+about the job except on the way there; then, painful feeling (but feeling less
+like a slave). The other woman hadn't come. I take the box of 2,000 (minus
+the 75) [heavy !]. Begin at 2:45. By 3:45, have done perhaps 425 (which
+would make 500). A change of machine. Easy and well-paid job (3.20 F
+per hundred), but more dangerous cutter. Do 350 (that's 4.20 F). Finished about ș:05. Lose 10 min. Come back to my machine; begin again at
+
+209
+5: 15. Speed that comes automatically, without artificial obsession, effortlessly, and merely by maintaining the "uninterrupted tempo"; did 1,850
+by 8:30 (i.e., 1,350 in 3 hrs., or 450 per hr.!). I every 8 sec. Cheerful
+meal (however, the "fat woman" not there). Feeling of relaxation; Saturday evening, no foremen, free and easy.... Everyone (except me) dawdles
+until 10:25.
+On the way home—| dawdle listening to a band play. Fresh air delightful. Wide awake in the metro, even some energy for walking. Tired,
+however. But on the whole, happy. . . .
+Monday, 24th. Slept badly (itching). Morning, no appetite, violent headaches. Feeling of pain and anxiety on leaving for work
+On arrival, catastrophe: since my co-worker hadn't come in, the box the
+pieces drop into was stolen. I lose 1 hr. finding another (it has to have
+holes). I start on the job; worn cutter. A new set-up man (in gray), in the
+shop I week, replaces it for me (of his own accord!). At the time, he notices
+that there is a little play everywhere. In particular, the ring that holds the
+cutter "has been shot for at least ten years." He is surprised that "the rwo
+pals" (!) hadn't replaced it. My machine is "an old crock," he says. He
+seems to know something about what he is doing. But as a result, I start the
+job at 4:30. Discouraged, exhausted (headaches). Do 1,85o pieces in all
+(in s hrs., that's less than 400 per hr.). In the evening, I again lose time
+looking for a box, and then, not finding one, decanting pieces into a basket
+taken from the next machine. And the box into which almost 16,000
+pieces have dropped is so heavy to handle that I have to empty it into
+another. Back home (A.-C.), tired, but not overly so. Mainly disgusted at
+having done so little. And dying of thirst.
+Tuesday, 2.5th. Awoke at 7 A.M. Lengthy and tiring session at the dentist's—toothache all morning. Almost late. Hot. Have difficulty climbing
+the stairs when I arrive. ... Find my new co-worker (Alsatian woman).
+Again have to look for a box.... Take one near a machine. Its owner
+arrives, furious. Take instead the one that contained the pieces to be done,
+emptying it (200 were left). So I'm back where I started! Find another one.
+Go and fill it, by shovelfuls, at the lathe. Bring it back (heavy!). Then (at
+2:55) go to the infirmary (I have a beginning abcess caused by a metal
+shaving). When I'm back, I find my 2,000 pieces emptied out near my
+machine (the box taken back by its ist owner in my absence). I go looking
+again. Appeal to the foreman opposite the elevator. He tells me, "I'll see
+
+210
+that you're given one." I wait... Bawls me out because I'm waiting. Go
+back to my machine. My neighbor gives me a box. At that moment, my
+foreman (Leclerc) turns up. Starts bawling me out. I tell him my pieces
+were emptied out in my absence. He goes and has it out with my neighbor.
+I gather up the picces. Cutter change. Result: start the job at 4:05! With
+a disgust that I suppress in order to go fast. In spite of everything, I would
+like to do 2,500. But I have trouble keeping up the speed. The 200 left over
+from the other carton go quickly (in 20 or 25 min.). Afterward, it slows
+down.
+Results of this system of multiple set-up men: about 6:30 the cutter
+cuts badly; the set-up man in gray changes the position of the cutter—
+manipulates it—changes the position again—and, I think, puts it back in
+its original position.... By 7 o'clock, I must have made 1,300 pieces, no
+more. After the break, another search for a box, juggling pieces for lack of
+a box. At 9:35 or 40, finished carton (therefore 2,200). Do so more. ... I
+had had the cutter's position changed at y:15 by the young set-up man
+(Philippe); he had made me wait a good 4¼ hr. And as it was I had called
+him too late. 2,250, consequently. Mediocre.... Going home, have to
+force myself to walk, but not, however, step by step.
+Didn't maintain the "uninterrupted tempo." Hampered by my finger.
+Also over confident.
+Absolutely have to find a permanent solution to the box problem. And
+first of all, propose to the woman who operates the lathe to give us 1 out of
+every 2 ? She's never given any, she says. But we're never given any either.
+When we were looking for boxes for 5o0, it was different. Now it's for
+2,000....
+Wednesday, 26th. Tired in the morning—not much more courage than
+what is needed for the day's work ... low-grade feeling of despondency—
+headaches—discouragement—fear, or rather anxicty (in the face of work,
+my box, speed, etc.) —muggy thunderstorm weather.
+Go to the infirmary. "They'll open it for you when it needs to be opened,
+and without asking your opinion." Work. Suffer from my arm, from exhaustion, from headaches. (A slight fever? Not in the evening, in any case.)
+But by going fast I manage not to suffer for a few successive intervals of
+time lasting from 10 min. to ¼ hr. l'ay at 5 o'clock. Afterward, I've had it.
+I count my pieces, wipe my machine, and ask to leave. Go and find Leclerc
+(foreman) in the office of the shop foreman, who puts me down for
+insurance.
+
+211
+Wait ½ hr. outside this office, because no one checks. See how complicated the deliveries are. The camaraderie of the foremen.
+Leaving the dentist's (Tuesday morning, I think—or rather Thursday
+morning), and getting on the W bus, strange reaction. How is it that I,
+a slave, can get on this bus and ride on it for my 1z sous just like anyone
+else? What an extraordinary favor! If someone brutally ordered me to get
+off, telling me that such comfortable forms of transportation are not for
+me, that I have to go on foot, I think that would seem completely natural to
+me. Slavery has made me entirely lose the feeling of having any rights. It
+appcars to me to be a favor when I have a few moments in which I have
+nothing to bear in the way of human brutality. These moments are like
+smiles from heaven, a gift of chance. Let's hope that I will stay in this state
+of mind, which is so reasonable.
+My comrades, I think, do not have this state of mind in the same degree.
+They haven't fully understood that they are slaves. The words "just" and
+"unjust" have probably retained a meaning for them, up to a certain
+point—in this situation in which everything is injustice.
+Thursday, July 4th. Don't return to my milling machine, thank heaven!
+(Occupied by another woman who seems to be working very hard....)
+Small machine for smoothing holes drilled in screw-threads. 2 kinds of
+pieces (the and: nails). 1,300 of the first kind (I.50 F per hundred),
+950 (?) of the and (.6o F per hundred). Then 260 pieces polished on the
+polishing-belt (1 F per hundred).
+Friday, July Sth. Tomorrow a day off; how wonderful! Slept badly (teeth).
+Morning, session at the dentist's. Headaches, exhaustion [also worry,
+which doesn't help matters... J. Only 3 more weeks! Yes, but 3 weeks
+means n times i day! But I have courage for no more than 1 day, just 1.
+And that's by gritting my teeth with the courage of despair. Last night the
+young Italian said to me, "You're losing weight (he had told me that 1o
+days ago); you go to the john too often (!)." That's how I feel before going
+to the job.
+At the end of my strength, seeing the women nearby (machine noise
+ear-splitting ...) preparing to wash their machines, and at their instigation, I go and ask Leclerc if I can leave at 7 o'clork. He answers curtly,
+"You're not going to come in to do 2 hrs., dammit!" In the evening
+Philippe orders me to wait I don't know how long, to annoy me. But I,
+seized by disgust. ...
+
+212
+One could say that by virtue of some convention fatigue doesn't exist.
+... Like danger in war, no doubt.
+Following week: Monday 8th to Friday r2th.
+Monday, Tuesday. Began carton of 3,500 pieces (brass?) at 7 o'clock.
+Wednesday. 8,000 pieces, or almost, in the course of the day. Finished the
+carton from the evening before (at 10:45). Do carton of 5,000 (began
+again at 11:45). Finish at 6 o'clock [dinner with A]. Exhausted. They were
+easy pieces (I don't know exactly what they were; brass, then steel, I think).
+"Uninterrupted tempo."
+Thursday. Exhausted, dead tired from yesterday's effort, go very slowly.
+Friday. Hairnet. Wife of the Italian.
+Evening: R.P.16 meeting—Louzon doesn't recognize me. Says my face
+has changed. "You look tougher."
+NOTEWORTHY INCIDENTS
+The set-up man in gray (Michel) and his scorn for the other two, especially
+the "nitwit."
+The bad set-up that breaks the cutter; incidents. The nitwit setter had
+done a set-up that only half worked. Several times the machine stops while
+I am bearing down on the cutter. That had happened to me once before,
+and I was told, "It isn't tight enough." So I go find the setter and ask him to
+tighten it. At first he doesn't want to come. He says that I'm bearing down
+too hard. Finally he comes. Says, "It isn't there (pointing to the tightening
+blocks of the cutter) but there (pointing to the pulley and the belt of the
+milling-spindle shaft) that it's working too hard (???). Goes away. I continue. It doesn't go well. Finally a piece gets jammed in the mounting,
+breaks 3 teeth. ... He goes to find Leclerc to get me bawled out. Leclerc
+bawls him out for the choice of the mounting, and says the cutter will still
+work. ½ (or ¼) hr. later L. comes back. I tell him, "The cutter stops sometimes." He explains (in a disagreeable tone of voice) that the machine is
+delicate, and that I am probably applying too much pressure. He shows me
+how to work-failing to notice that, at most, he is going at a tempo of
+600 per hr., if that! [i.e., 2.70 F] (I have no way of timing him ...). But
+16 The journal La Révolution prolétarienne.
+
+213
+even this way, the cutter slows down the moment you apply pressure.
+I point this out to him. He says it doesn't matter. A time comes when the
+cutter stops completely, and doesn't start again. I call the set-up man, who
+is ready to bawl somebody out. My neighbor says, "It's too tight." It happens once more; the machine, in the process of turning, automatically
+tightens the shaft if a certain bolt that is supposed to keep it from tightening isn't tight enough.
+You loosen by turning in the direction opposite that of the cutter.
+Difficulty (for me) of conceiving how the machine works, whether I have
+it in front of me or nor....
+What are the possible reasons for the cutter stopping? (Did the shaft also
+stop? Forgot to notice.) Some play, either in the cutter or in the piece. (That
+was what happened in this instance.) Too much resistance is set up if you
+ask the machine for more work than it can put out (was that what the
+nitwit meant?) [but what determines how much it can put out ?].
+Tobestudied: notion of the power of a machine.
+Chartier's letter. Saw and plane. Perhaps it's different for the machine....
+Find out how the machines are driven by one motor. If they are arranged
+in order of heavy and light power needs.
+Wednesday, 17th. Returned to work-weather cool-less suffering
+(moral) than I might have feared. I find myself again compliant under the
+yoke....
+No job. Pay a visit to the automatic lathes (Cuttat), which I had studied
+during the 4 days of vacation.
+Until 8:30, wait for oil.
+4 X TO Steel screws 7010105 | 041916 | cutter I.
+5,000 at 4.50 F, that's 23.50 F.
+? little series given by Leclerc, which Michel in ¾ hr. couldn't even set up.
+He comes after Michel has been laboring over the set-up for ¾ hr. "Who
+gave you these pieces to do?" I retort, "You!" He is nice. Orders me to
+change pieces; ¼ hr. lost, not paid for it! Michel says it could have been
+done.... He will set them up on another machine (that of the young girl
+whom I tease about him). Apropos of this, conversation with him about
+Leclerc. Does he know all about machines?—some yes, others no. Michel
+tells me he was shift foreman for 2 months, lost the job because he was too
+
+214
+much of a nice guy!— "But Leclerc isn't mean" (I say). Michel thinks he
+won't stay. But he was already there when the young Spanish woman
+came, a year and a half ago.
+C4X8 steel screws (7010103) 043408 | cutter r.
+5,000 at 4.50 F, set-up I F, that's 23.50 F.|
+I don't finish them.
+Thursday, 18th. Finish the C 4 × 8s.
+Brass screws (740657 twice || T417 (!), large special saw: 127 | 2).
+TOO (!!!) at. 0045, i.c., 1.45 F.
+Brass fittings | 6005346 | 027947, one r.s cutter (?).
+600 at.045, i.e., 2.25 F + .45 F = 2.70 F (cutter in backward!).
+New set-up man (skilled worker? check this). He asks "what that's
+for," has me get the drawing, which takes a long time and doesn't help
+much....
+Earned yesterday and today (18 hrs.) 23.50 F + 23.50 F + 1.45 F +
+2.70 F=51.15 F.
+Not 3 F! 2.85 F! P'll be paid that, for both the week before the ryth, and
+the Thursday and Friday before that in all 7+7+9+10+9+10 + 9+
+18 = 79 hrs.).
+The C 4 × 8 steel screws: to begin with, I do a package of 1,000. Go to
+Goncher's shop for the rest: not ready. He comes within an ace of bawling
+me our (although I'm the one who would be justified in complaining). I go
+back there in the afternoon for the remaining 4,000, but take them in 4 or
+5 lots and have a long wait each time. That gives me the opportunity to admire the Cuttats.... the young set-up man, I think, finally noticed that I
+have no objection to this sort of waiting.
+INCIDENTS
+Set-up man changed. The fat incompetent guy left Tuesday afternoon.
+(Find out what became of him.) Replaced by one who, it seems, comes
+from another part of the shop. Not the don't-give-a-damn type. Nervous,
+with feverish, jerky gestures. His hands tremble. I feel sorry for him. He
+spends 1 hr. doing a set-up for me (for 600 pieces!), and still gets the cutter
+in backward. (It works anyway; copper, fortunately.)
+Try to do the set-up myself—don't know which side of the rings. (They
+are made up of 2 hollow cylinders with different diameters.) I could easily
+
+215
+observe which side the next time the set-up is disassembled. ... The real
+difficulty is muscular weakness; I can't loosen it.
+Conversation with Michel. Leclere's technical competence? "For some
+machines, not for others." Not a worker. Not mean —"will be thrown
+out"—
+He had given me some pieces that don't work well on this machine.
+Friday, July 19th. Steel locking set screws, 7051634 | 054641 | cutter
+I.S.
+1,000 at s F, that's 6 F (difficult to get the set-up, and still less than satisfactory).
+7 plugs (small | 7050846 | 041784 | cutter I.5
+3,000 at s F, i.e., 16 F | I try to change 3 set-ups, but ... ).
+5 X 22 screws (.) | 705ISSI! 039660 | cutter I.2.
+550(!) at.0045, i.e., 2.25 Ft.235 F + 1F = 3.50 F (nearly).
+Ring set-screws | 7050253 | 45759 | cutter I.
+500(!) at.oos, set-up 1.75 F, i.e., 3-75 F.
+6F+ I6F +3.50F+3.755=29.257
+In g hrs., i.e., 3.25 per hr. (27 F + 2.25 F: exactly!). But in reality 8 hrs.
+(an hour for cleaning), which makes more than 3.50 F! exactly 3.65 F.
+But it's true that I had done a good portion of the steel screws the night
+before....
+Saturday. Violent headaches, distressed state, afternoon better (but weep
+at B's...).
+Sunday. Italian art.
+Monday, 22nd. Finished pieces from Friday (10 to 15 min.). Set up the
+machine myself for the ist time (except for the centering, which I couldn't
+completely do, had to call and wait for set-up man [beret]). Then I change
+the mounting, not the cutter; but call the set-up man—the one in glasses—
+for the centering (which he doesn't do), but spends an infinite amount of
+time adjusting the depth of the cut. He finished at 1o:30; | then did a carton of 1,000 pieces (earned 5.70 F in 3 hrs...). New carton of 1,000.
+The small ones with the "convex side" in red copper. Some get stuck in the
+mounting; I break 2 teeth. ... By noon, have hardly made a start on a new
+carton of 2,000 (brass). Earned I F + 3.70 F + I F + 5 F + 1 F = 11.70 F.
+When I finish the carton, will have 20.70 F. Must still do an additional
+2,000....
+
+216
+Circular pipe-plugs—red copper, 6002400.
+1,000 at 3.70 F + IF, i.e., 4.70 F.
+Same, smaller, 1,000 at 5 F + I F, that's 6 F.
+Afternoon.
+Brass screws, 705700 | 0 | 079658 (cutter o.8).
+2,000 at 4F + 1 F, i.e., 9 F.
+Plugs (large) 6002400 | 071844.
+1,000 at 3.70 F, i.e., 4.70 F.
+Same, 071848.
+1,000 at 3.70 F, that's 4.70 F.
+Brass screws 70500 | 379652 | cutter o.8.
+Just started.
+Earned 4 70 5 1 6 5 + 4705 + 4705+18+9=310
+Leclerc sends for me after I finished 071841 and was just starting 848.
+Begins by bawling me out because I'm doing these pieces without speaking
+to him about them. Asks for the number. I bring him my notebook! Looks
+at it and becomes very kind.
+Tuesday. Do the screws, 2,000 at 4 F.
+C4 X 8 steel screws | 7010103 | 043409 | cutter I.
+5,000 at4.50 F = setting I F, i.e., 23.50.
+23.50 F + 8 F = 31.50 F (in 2 days 61.60 F, i.e., 2 X 30.80 F,
+i.e., 3.08 F per hr.).
+Earned in 3 days 29.25 F + 30.10 F + 31.50 F, i.e., 90.85 F, that in:
+28 |29] hours
+28 × 3
+= 84
+(29)
+[87]
+28x.50
+= 14
+28х.25
+=7
+84 + 7
+=91.
+So l made on the average 3.25 F....
+C. 4. 8. Began them at 11 o'clock—until 5. Cutter bad after % hr.
+(smokes). Nevertheless, it's after 2:30 before Michel changes it. [It's my
+fault; why not have it changed sooner? Fear of getting bawled out....
+Michel says that it worked backward (?). The and cutter, although installed by him, doesn't hold up (it's the new saws—too big, says my neighbor, for the number 1 cutters (r]).
+—Bawled out for the broken cutter (tales of the Span. woman about
+how a beginner feels). Changed at 4 P.M. Afterward, I last until 6 г.M.
+
+217
+(broke 2 teeth). Hard, working with a bad saw. But then, gives me an excuse for not transforming myself into an automaton. ...
+Wednesday. Woes of the young Spanish woman (her pieces —her cutter—
+the new set-up man—Leclerc).
+Last night the saw—put in at 6 P.M. by the set-up man in the beret-had
+worked loose by 7:15. I had told him about it in passing. I find it loose
+again. I call him. He keeps me waiting—bawls me out. I was applying too
+much pressure, it seems. I'm almost sure I wasn't (for the broken saw had
+given me the jitters). I tell him so. Keeps on bawling me out (figuratively
+speaking, since he doesn't raise his voice). This incident sends a chill into
+my heart for some time, since I asked only to think of him as a comrade.
+•..At Io o'clock, a new saw, also installed by him. That takes him about
+20 min. Suddenly, the motor at the back stops. We wait until almost 1 I. [I
+had finished the 5,000 from the day before (and found a box for them) by
+8:30. I learn that today is payday, not tomorrow as I thought, which fills
+my heart with joy, for I won't have to go without eating. ... So at noon,
+I don't hold back at all (pack of cigarettes—compote...).
+At 3 o'clock, disastrous incident: I break a tooth on my saw. I know
+how it happened.... Exhausted, I'm thinking about my weariness at the
+M-. About Adrien-his wife-what Jeannine told me, that Michel is
+forcing her to work herself to death-about what Pierre ought to feel
+about it—about Trotsky's youth ("What a shame"
+...) and, from there,
+about his choice between populism and Marxism-Exactly at that moment I insert a piece that doesn't fit into the mounting (shaving or burr), I
+bear down on the cutter anyway... Ooroi !!? I don't dare change it,
+naturally-The Spanish woman advises me to ask Michel for help; I speak
+to him, but he won't come in the late afternoon. I keep the same cutter until
+7 o'clock. Luckily it holds up—but needless to say I treat it with extreme
+caution! About s o'clock it comes loose again. I don't dare call anyone, of
+course! I tighten it, and do 200 or 300 pieces (or a few more?) that are not
+centered at all. Then I finally make up my mind and succeed in centering it
+myself! (but with the help of a previously made piece).
+Pay: 255 F (I was afraid I would hardly get 200) for 81 hrs.
+Night: didn't sleep.
+Thursday. Again ½ to ¾ hr. with the saw. Then Michel changes it for me,
+17 "Alas" in ancient Greek.
+
+218
+a t the same time as the one on the machine he is setting up. I do the mounting myself, but can't do the centering. In desperation, end up by asking the
+set-up man with the glasses for help. It's done by y o'clock. —Morning
+painful—My legs ache-I'm totally fed up.... (These C 4 x 8 pieces are
+exasperating, with the constant danger of breaking the cutter, the necessity
+of preserving a totally vacuous state of mind....) 3 false alarms, and at
+Ir o'clock—a gesture, a word had attracted my attention—
+catastrophe: broken tooth. Fortunately, what I have to do next calls for
+a I.2 cutter. If only, afterward. ...
+At noon, a piece that jumps loosens the cutter.
+I again realize that I have a moral obligation to get hold of myself, if
+I don't want to end up with a bad conscience. And I pull myself together.
+At 1:30 l tighten the cutter and center it myself [which I hadn't been
+able to do the day before] thanks to the decision, made at lunch, to go
+about it carefully |I use a previously made piece]. The set-up man in the
+beret watches good-naturedly and, when it's done, completes the tightening. Finished at 2 o'clock. The same one sets up the new pieces for me.
+Done at 2:30.
+2:30-4:30, it doesn't work-Michel-his explanation, conversation
+with him. Set-up man in beret fixes it.
+4:30-6:30, 1 do the rest of the 2,000 (1 had done perhaps 200 of
+them).
+Go look for a job. Leclerc as nice as can be.... Am especially worried
+about my cutter, as this job is to be done with cutter I-some steel
+C 4 X Ios. At 7:30 proceed to change .8, I.s, and the no. I with the
+broken tooth. It works. So here I am with a beautiful new cutter. ... But
+I still have 5,000 of these filthy pieces to do (not completely identical,
+however). Beware!
+Direction in which the bolts have to be
+turned in order to make them go toward the
+pulley; also direction in which the pulley and
+everything else turn.
+bolt
+ring
+axle
+pulley
+ring
+in two
+parts
+threaded bolt
+
+219
+The cutter's deviation is in the direction indicated by the arrow; the
+result of the cutter's being mounted on a cone is that the groove not only
+stops being in the center, but becomes progressively less and less deep, or
+even stops being made at all.
+Reason: not tight enough at the end—or worn curter—or the worker is
+applying too much force.
+Too much force: since the cutter is moving more slowly than the pulley
+and the shaft, everything happens as if the cutter were turning in the
+reverse direction (?).
+Other phenomena when it's out of adjustment:
+The cutter stops because the rings around it have loosened (or because
+they haven't been tightened enough, or because you're applying too much
+pressure).
+The cutter stops (along with the shaft and the pulley) because the shaft is
+too tight at theend (b tightens automatically because a isn't tight enough)
+[always because the adjustment is faulty].
+Today, I think one of the causes was that the mounting was not tight
+enough, so that the cutter had to drive down and work at the same time;
+hence too much force has to be applied.
+At noon a joy. The No vote, by which the workers duly and officially,
+etc.... have Saturday off.
+Night: the eczema that had left me in peace for two weeks recurred with
+a vengeance.
+Earned yesterday and today 45 F + 2 F + 12 F (?) = 59 F... (or 58 F).
+Less than 3 F per hr....
+Friday. I have the pieces brought up to me that "Beret" was looking for last
+night. During this time I estimate—250 extra. Leclerc says to do them—l
+begin at 8:15. Did 200 by about 1o:30. Have the cutter changed. Must
+wait... begin again at II:IS. Did less than 3,000 in the course of the
+morning (i.e., I4 F, or less-not more than 3 F per hr.!). Very hard work.
+But doesn't leave me morally crushed as on the day before. Physically,
+however, I'm not feeling as well. After lunch (ate for 5.50 F in the hope of
+fortifying myself) it's much worse. My head swims—I work mechanically.
+Fortunately these pieces don't jump like the C 4 × 8s. ... Ireally think, for
+2 or 2½ hrs., that I'm going to faint. Finally, I decide to slow down, and
+feel better. Finished after 4 o'clock (4:I5 Or 4:30). Leclerc tells me not to
+mark down the extra 250 anywhere, that I wouldn't be paid (they must be
+missing from another lot, he says ...). Gives me a "cushy job" (the long
+
+220
+brass screws at 4 F). Time to set them up, s o'clock. At 5:30, stop working
+to wash the machine (quitting time at 6:30). The hour, on the whole, relatively pleasant, except for early moments of rushing and anxiety.
+Conversations with the set-up man in the beret who, it seems, is beginning to take an interest in me.
+C4X10 steelscrews 7010105 | 041918| cutter 1 | 5,000 at 4.50 F.
+End of pay period is Monday.
+Total hrs.: 8 hrs. + 10 + 10 + 10 + 10 + 9 + 10 = 67 hrs.
+Earned to date 90.75 F + 47 F + 12 F + 23.50 F = 173.25 F, nevertheless, to make 3 F per hr....
+It would mean earning 4.50 F per hr. Monday.... The 4,000 at 4 F
+will come to 18 F (2 cartons). 27 F to go.... Would have to do the
+4,000 in 3 hrs. at most. And afterward do another 5,500... practically
+impossible!
+Sunday night. Back at my place at 11:40. Go to bed. Not being able to
+sleep, realize about 12:30 that I forgot my apron! After that sleep even
+less. Get up at 5:15; at 5:45 telephone home; 18 go by metro as far as
+Trocadero and back (40 min. in all, in the rush hour). Also, tired and
+headaches.
+Monday. I must get out of here this evening or tomorrow. I have a headache. Don't finish the 4,000 until noon... (and I even spend another
+¼ hr. on them from 1:30 to 1:45).
+The machine is out of adjustment again, as on Thursday. The cutter,
+however, is brand new. Lucien (red beret) tells me again (more gently) that
+I'm applying too much pressure. But I'm sure it's really because he didn't
+tighten it enough. Anyway, since, without my having noticed it, the cutter
+was already out of adjustment Friday afternoon, so much so that a number
+of pieces weren't even touched by it, I have to lose time sorting and doing
+pieces over. I also lost a good quarter hour (at least) by going with the
+Spanish woman to get a bucket full of lubricating soap for her new machine; it was too heavy for her to carry by herself, and the worker whose
+job it was to give it to her made her wait. And afterward, on top of all that,
+Lucien's reproaches lowered my morale and speed. I know that if it happens again things will go badly. And as always when I don't singlemindedly strain every fiber to reach the rapid cadence, I slow up. Anyway, for all
+that it came to 4 X 4 = 16 F + 2 F (?) for doing the set-up (2 cartons).
+18 I.e., herparents' home on rue Auguste-Comte. Since she went only as far as Trocadero,
+her mother may have met her half way.
+
+221
+Brass screws (7050010 | 4,000 at 4 F |. Then 400 pieces (out of 1,000;
+Span. woman does the other 600). I won't get the carton for them until
+Wednesday.
+Steel locking screws | 774815 | 000987 | 400 at .so F per hundred |
+set-up 1.25 F | cutter I.2. I do them on the Spanish woman's small
+machine; she has been put somewhere else. The machine setter in glasses
+did the set-up while I was finishing my brass screws. A little before noon,
+although I didn't know at the time that he was preparing that machine for
+me, he ordered me to change the cutter and get the pieces-this in an
+authoritarian tone of voice that brooked no reply, which I obeyed in
+silence, but which, by quitting time, was enough to have made rise in me
+that flood tide of rage and bitterness that when you live a life like this is
+constantly there deep within you, always ready to overwhelm you completely. I pulled myself together, however. He's incompetent (unskilled
+worker, says the Spanish woman?), that's why he needs to lord it over
+people.
+I begin the screws at 1:45. The machine is new to me. I spend, I think,
+almost 1 hr. at it (the Spanish woman will do the 600 in 20 min. !). Afterward, I go ask for a box. A waste of time. (There aren't any.) A young man
+comes for the 400 pieces. I go tell Leclerc that there's no box. Someone
+I don't know (gray smock) is talking informally to him, as far as I can make
+out, about a bawling out that he, Leclerc, is risking. He seems displeased to
+see me there (that's understandable), and his displeasure makes me forget
+to ask him for some pieces. Later, he's strolling about in the shop; I don't
+want to risk getting myself snapped at, as happened the other time, so
+I don't approach him; and I lose more than ¾ hr. (also by going to look for
+the lathe set-up man who gave me the 400 pieces, to find out if there are
+any more, but I don't find him).
+Leclerc finally gives me some C 4 X 16s.
+C 4 X 16 Steel screws | 7010111|013259 | 5,000 at 4.50 F| put
+down I hr. | cutter I.
+On the other hand I do finally have Michel set up my machine. It's
+3:30, past the time for handing in the card. (There's a deadline; you can
+hand them in only until 3 o'clock.) So instead of catching up on my lost
+time (and that's the main reason I was anxious to come today) I add to it.
+The thought of this lowers my morale and speed. For what I make from
+now on counts in a two-week period that I won't complete; so what difference does my hourly average make? I'm depressed by my headaches and
+I'm going—without noticing it—very, very slowly. I won't get these pieces
+
+222
+finished until noon tomorrow (and even then not completely), which
+comes to Is hrs. of work (or even more). 18 F + 3.25 F + 23.50 F =
+44.75 F. But in order to make 3 F per hr., I would have to have earned 45 F
+in these 15 hrs.
+3 o'clock deadline.
+Tuesday. Finished the C 4 X 16s.
+M.P.R. screws, in Gorger's area (automatic lathes).
+M.P.R. screws with large hexagonal heads (•). You have to place
+them so that the groove is perpendicular to the two parallel sides: (D).
+Otherwise the piece is ruined. Very hard steel. While you're placing them,
+you risk turning them. All afternoon (and ¾ hr. the next day) I do only one
+carton of 1,400 (5 F per 1,000 + I F for set-up, i.e., 8 F), with one interruption for 1,000 large brass screws on the machine beside me, for which
+I don't have the box, but which I'm sure didn't pay more than 4.50 F
+maximum. That is, in 6% hrs. (or longer?) earned 8F + 4.50 F = 12.50 F.
+That's disgraceful! 2 F per hour! It's a good thing I'm telling them I'm sick
+Wednesday morning.
+Collection taken up for a pregnant worker. 19 People give I F, r.50 F
+(me 2 F). Discussion in the cloakroom (it had been done a year ago, for the
+same worker). "Well, every year! It's a great misfortune, and that's all
+there is to it. It can happen to anyone. —When you don't know, you
+shouldn't...." Spanish woman: "I don't feel that this is a good reason to
+take up a collection, do you?" I say "Yes" with conviction, and she doesn't
+pursue it.
+When I left Monday night intending to report sick the following morning, I was careful not to eat more than a sandwich bought at 7 o'clock, and
+a glass of cider. Woke up at 5:30 (on purpose). I ate a roll Tuesday
+morning. The same at noon. 3 rolls in the evening, and went on foot to the
+Porte de Saint-Cloud, plus an espresso coffee to make me sleep. But the
+result of this diet was to put me into a state of euphoria!... Only I was
+extremely slow on the job.
+Wednesday morning. Finish the carton of 1,400 M.P.R.s. I do 200 out of
+the new carton—s For 5.80 F? I go very, very slowly, but feel, through
+a damned spirit of contradiction, singularly joyful and in top form.
+Leclerc and Gorger [foreman of the automatic lathes), the cartons of
+1,000 brass pieces. Leclerc: "If you want to stop, stop."
+19 Probably to pay for an abortion.
+
+223
+Eanned 2750 [ 0 1 f 0 0 1 (0 0 = 38
+40.60 F| theoretically in 11½ hrs. |34.50 F
+....
+Monday-Tuesday. C 4 × 16 screws | steel | 5,000 at 4.50 F + set-up
+I F | cutter 1, 7010 III | 013252, anchoring flanges.
+M.P.R. screws, steel, 4,000 at 5.80 F + set-up 2 F 1.5 | 747327|
+046-543.
+Steel stop pins, 2,000 at 4.50 F+ 2F (:) 7050129 099937|
+cutter 1.
+23.50F + 23.20 F+ F+ gF+ 2F= 59.70F.
+37 F + 59.70 # = 96.70 F in 112 hrs. + 20%½ hrs. = 32 hrs.
+32×3 = 96.
+So in terms of the 3 F minimum, I'm up to date, but barely...
+and there would be 12 f to make up from the other 2-week period!
+Episodes: Gorger
+• •
+Michel...
+Any child can see through Juliette's little tricks ...
+Monday, in a bad way. Going back to work infinitely more painful than
+I would have thought. The days seem an eternity to me. Heat.... Headaches. ... These C 4 × 16 screws disgust me. It's one of the "cushy jobs";
+I would have to do it quickly, and I can't. Barely finished, I think, by
+3:30. Prostration, bitterness at stupifying work, disgust. Fear also, all
+the time, of the cutter coming loose. Nevertheless, it happens. The wait to
+have the cutters changed. For the ist time I succeed in changing a cutter
+myself, with no help at all, and Philippe says that it's right in the middle.
+A victory, better than speed. I also learn, after another bad experience, to
+adjust the tightness of the screw and handle at the end myself. Lucien
+sometimes completely forgets to tighten it. ... The M.P.R. screws. Michel
+warns me. He doesn't set them up, but "spectacles" does it. I do the
+M. P.R.s a little faster than before, but still very, very slowly.
+Wednesday. Steel stops, cutter I.5.
+C 001268
+
+
+
+1,000
+at 4.50 F (2 set-ups)
+
+224
+Round pipe plugs in red copper 10 C.V. cutter I.5.
+
+1,000
+C 002400
+50
+3.70 F
+47
+4.50FX3+3.70FX3+3F...
+13.50Ft 11.1OF + 3F = 27.60 F, worked 10½ hrs. So am short 4 F.
+Thursday. Steel lock bolts & C.V., cutter I.
+737887 | 084097, 3,000 at 4.50F, set-up 1 F.
+Round pipe plugs in red copper, cutter I.5.
+13.50F +3.70F+5F+3.80F+4F=30F. Am short 1.50 F. So
+am short 5.50 F in all. Maybe it's been compensated for by the week
+before.
+Episode of the "stops." Michel, Thursday morning.
+Humid Wednesday and Thursday. Delightfully cool Thursday evening.
+Good....
+The stops had been begun the day before at s o'clock. On that Tuesday
+when I thought I was going to faint, when the weather was so humid, when
+my whole body felt on fire, when I had such a headache.... Juliette says to
+me, "I.S cutter." I remove my number i cutter, proceed to change the 2
+cutters and hand one to Philippe, saying simply, "That's a number I."
+At Renault.
+Lange: foreman-former set-up man —stickler for order and neatness,
+apart from that. ... Scowls, etc.; foremen treat him with respect. With
+me, nice enough.
+Roger: (replc. Leclerc); drilling machine set-up man.
+Philippe: boor; lathe set-up man.
+Protruding Eyes...: tall blond, another lathe set-up man.
+Spectacles...
+Male workers: Armenian, milling machine operator next to ist machine,
+mild-mannered worker who jokes about "women going to war." Italian
+who replaces him (likable).
+Women: Bertrand-another neighbor (Juliette)-beginner-woman
+who flirts with Michel—the tall brunette with 2 kids—old woman who
+works on the lathes-Italian's wife-drilling machine operator.
+Shift foremen:
+Fortin: such a nice guy ...
+Gorcher: automatic lathes, comedian, likable.
+
+225
+Leclerc.
+tolerable.
+Michel.
+Lucien.
+Foreman across from elevator-tone of superiority in his voice in-
+Gained from this experience? The feeling that I do not possess any right
+whatever, of any kind (take care not to lose this feeling). The ability to be
+morally self-sufficient, to live in this state of constant latent humiliation
+without feeling humiliated in my own eyes; to savor intensely every
+moment of freedom or camaraderie, as if it would last forever. A direct
+contact with life....
+I came near to being broken. I almost was—my courage, the feeling that
+I had value as a person were nearly broken during a period I would be
+humiliated to remember, were it not that strictly speaking I have retained
+no memory of it. I got up in the mornings with anguish. I went to the factory with dread; I worked like a slave; the noon break was a wrenching
+experience; I got back to my place at 5:45, preoccupied immediately with
+getting enough sleep (which I didn't) and with waking up early enough.
+Time was an intolerable burden. Dread—outright fear—of what was
+going to happen next only relaxed its grip on me on Saturday afternoon
+and Sunday morning. And what I dreaded was the orders.
+The fceling of self-respect, such as it has been built up by sociery, is
+destroyed. It is necessary to forge another one for oneself (although exhaustion wipes out consciousness of one's ability to think!). Try to hold on
+to this other kind.
+One finally gets a clearidea of one's own importance.
+The class of those who do not count—in any situation—in anyone's
+eyes—and who will not count, ever, no matter what happens (notwithstanding the last line of the ist verse of the Internationale). 20
+Det.'s question (working-class solidarity).
+Problem: objective conditions that allow men to be 1) nice guys and
+2) productive.
+One always needs to have some external signs of one's worth for oneself.
+The main fact isn't the suffering, but the humiliation.
+20 "Wc have been naughr, we shall be all."
+
+226
+Hitler's strength is perhaps founded on that (whereas stupid "materialism"
+...).
+If trade unionism brought about a sense of responsibility in everyday
+life....]
+Never forget this observation: in these rough beings I always found that
+generosity of heart and aptitude for general ideas were directly proportional to one another.
+An obviously inexorable and invincible form of oppression does not
+engender revolt as an immediate reaction, but submission.
+At Alsthom, Irebelled only on Sundays. ..
+At Renault, I had arrived at a more stoical attitude. Substitute acceptance for submission.
+
+
+The articles collected in the following section present the different positions on war Weil took in response to the European political situation
+from 1933 to 1940. She had begun the decade of the 1930s as a revolutionary, and a cursory glance at both these texts and her life during
+1933-40 reveals that she went through several changes of position, first
+advocating pacifism, then, while still apparently holding pacifist opinions,
+becoming a revolutionary again and fighting briefly in the Spanish civil
+war, then vigorously defending a noninterventionist policy in Europe in
+hopes of avoiding European war, and finally advocating an armed resistance against Hitler that would be infused by actively practiced humane
+virtues opposing the violence, brutality, and inhumanity of the Nazis. The
+apparent inconsistencies in these positions and in Weil's activities in this
+period are not, however, signs of vacillation or inconsistency in Weil herself; she always viewed war in the larger context of oppression and was
+always asking the implicit question: Is war in these circumstances likely to
+alleviate the oppression of the masses of the people, or will it reinforce that
+oppression and make it even more murderous?
+The first article, "Reflections on War," comes at the end of what might
+be described as the first period of her political life, the period of revolutionary confidence, which was being gradually eroded by what she saw happening in Germany, by her observations of what had happened to the revolution in Russia, and by her experience within the French Left. For her it
+was a time of increasing disillusionment with Marxist revolutionary hopes
+and a time of serious critical reevaluation of the Marxist belief in the inevitability of revolution; for the French Left it was a time of widespread expectation of war and confused hopes that the war might further revolution. In the midst of this atmosphere of tense expectation and confusion
+she set about to clarify the situation, to do what she charged that no one
+else on the Left had yet done, which was to apply Marxist analysis to war
+in order to determine what, indeed, had been the effect of war on revolu-
+
+230
+tions in history and what one could logically expect that effect to be in the
+future.
+Contrary to the Socialists' belief that revolutionary war was "one of the
+most glorious forms of the struggle of the working masses against their
+oppressors," Weil's analysis in "Reflections on War" showed that both the
+French and Russian revolutionary wars had actually taken political power
+from the people and entrenched it in the state and military apparatus, that
+the exigencies of war had in fact made democracy impossible, had led to
+the Terror and then to the military dictatorship of Napoleon in France and
+had given Russia "the heaviest bureaucratic, military, and police machine
+that has ever burdened an unfortunate people." Revolutionary war, she
+concluded, "is the tomb of the revolution and will remain so as long as the
+soldiers themselves, or rather the armed citizenry, are not given the means
+of making war without a controlling apparatus, without police pressure,
+without a special court, without punishment for desertion."
+Weil extended her analysis to show that, in the modern era, war "only
+reproduces the social relations that constitute the structure of the regime,"
+i.e., the structure in which managers or officers command and workers or
+soldiers have no choice but to obey. Because in modern war (she was thinking of course of World War I) the "controlling apparatus has no other
+means of defeating the enemy except to force its own soldiers to go to their
+deaths, the war of one state against another is immediately transformed
+into a war of the state and military apparatus against its own army." War,
+she argued, is thus the most radical form of oppression, since "soldiers do
+not expose themselves to death [but | are sent to the slaughter." The main
+enemy, she contended, borrowing Karl Liebknecht's phrase, is in our own
+country; she was not thinking of imperialism, as Liebknecht had, but of
+the structure of command and obedience in industrial production and the
+organization of the military; it was this structure of command, and the
+powerful bureaucratic apparatus that was inseparable from it, that reduced the proletariat to slavery, in peace as well as in war, but especially in
+war. What was crucial, she argued, was to recognize this apparatus as the
+enemy no matter what its name-"fascism, democracy, or dictatorship of
+the proletariat" —and to refuse to subordinate oneself to it and "trample
+underfoot, in order to serve it, all human values in oneself and others."
+Thus, although Weil continued to write vigorously against war in the arricles that follow, she was arguing against the type of war berween nationstates that would strengthen the state apparatus and further humiliate and
+
+231
+destroy predominantly working-class conscripts. But the civil warin Spain
+that broke out in July 1936 was another matter; not only was it a civil war
+and not an international war, but it was a civil war in which, initially at
+least, the Spanish workers and peasants were fighting in their own democratically organized militias, a civil war in which, in the arcas controlled by
+the Left, a genuine social revolution scemed already to have happened.
+Weil had great hopes that this represented the beginning of a complete social transformation, and she wanted above all else to participate in it; less
+than a month after the war broke out she went to Barcelona, made her way
+to the Aragon front, and joined a militia unit. Within a week she was badly
+burned in a camp accident and forced to return to Barcelona, but during
+the month she spent recuperating in Spain she saw enough to destroy her
+earlier hope that a war made "by the armed citizenry, without a controlling apparatus" could serve revolutionary ends. "The atmosphere and necessities of civil war are sweeping away the aspirations that we are seeking
+to defend by means of civil war," she wrote shortly after her return to
+France in late September. In October she learned of the increasingly oppressive regulations imposed on both industrial workers and militiamen
+by the regional government of Catalonia and saw her earlier predictions
+about the tendency of war to generate oppressive apparatuses being
+proved true. She saw her friends on the Left urging French intervention, a
+widening of the war; some even spoke of deliberately escalating the Spanish civil war into international war. Heartsick and more than ever convinced that European war would be a "disaster of incomparable magnitude," she wrote in support of French premier and Popular Front leader
+Léon Blum's policy of nonintervention in Spain, and then took Blum to
+task for the inconsistency between his position on nonintervention in regard to Spain and his willingness to accept the notion of collective security
+in regard to countries with which France had mutual defense pacts. If the
+Popular Front policy of mutual assistance was unreasonable with regard
+to Spain, Weil argued, it could not be reasonable to risk European war to
+defend Czechoslovakia. She was willing to take Hitler at his word that he
+wanted the German-speaking sections of Czechoslovakia united with the
+Reich and would respect the independence of the remainder of the Czech
+state; she was willing to accept German hegemony in Europe for as long as
+it might naturally last, pointing out that "in the long run, hegemony always weakens the country that has achieved it"; she was willing to accept
+the evil consequences of Czechoslovakia's becoming a German satellite
+
+232
+state-"the exclusion of Jews and Communists from all relatively important positions" —because she believed that the country as a whole
+would not have to sacrifice "its culture, its language, or its national characteristics." Her final argument on the Czechoslovakia issue was that few
+Frenchmen of military age, or their wives or mothers or fathers, would find
+it "reasonable and just that French blood should be shed for Czechoslovakia"; if war were declared, she argued, it would be in the interests of
+governments, not of the people.
+The essay on Czechoslovakia also touches on two issues that are easy
+to overlook: one, the injustice of French colonialism and the moral inconsistency of France's going to war to defend the right of Czechs to selfdetermination when France was refusing to grant that right to its own
+colonies; and two, the importance of the preservation of national life and
+traditions. The importance of moral consistency to the success of any action and the need of the soul to be rooted in a milieu rich in historical and
+spiritual traditions were to become major themes in Weil's later writings.
+Early formulations of these ideas are found in the next essay, "Reflections
+on Bouché's Lecture."
+Henri Bouché, a former student of Alain's, gave a lecture on national defense in which he suggested decentralization as a means of making France
+less vulnerable to enemy air attack; this idea greatly appealed to Weil, who
+had long conceived of social organization in terms of a loose federation of
+democratically organized collectives or small population centers. Her description of the kind of national defense that would result from this sort of
+organization bears a startling resemblance to the guerrilla defense of Indochina and Central America in the 1970s and 198os. What both necessitated and made possible this kind of guerrilla defense for France, Weil argued, was France's relative loss of power in Europe—a loss that in her eyes
+was actually a gain, for it transformed France from a powerful modern
+bourgeois state regarded essentially as an oppressor and an enemy into a
+locus of national life, tradition, and spiritual values. Once France was no
+longer the strongest power in Europe Weil could begin to see in the concept
+of "the nation" something more than a cover for chauvinism and the will
+to extend the power of the state; she began to see it as associated both with
+a people and with a place, with "a certain spirit attached to a particular
+human milieu." It is this spirit infusing a country, she argued, that gives
+national defense its point. This kind of national defense and this concept
+of nation are centered in the people, not in the state; this kind of national
+
+233
+defense can be undertaken without the danger of consolidating military
+and state power, can indeed, if successful, strengthen the spirit of the people. Conversely, Weil argues, when this spirit is lacking, enslavement is
+inevitable.
+Despite this tentative awareness of a new understanding of the importance of national life expressed in "Reflections on Bouché's Lecture," in
+the same period Weil was also sensitive to the dangers of nationalism
+aroused in a country threatened with war. The real threat of war that
+France had experienced during the Munich Crisis in September 1938 had,
+quite naturally, aroused a powerful latent nationalism throughout the entire country, even among the internationalist Left. But in this case Weil
+feared the identification of the nation with the totalitarian state, the equation of national defense with the buildup of that state, and the indefinite
+setting aside, in the interests of national defense, of all other concerns. In a
+France transformed into an armed camp, she feared, respect for human life
+and liberty and concern for justice and humanity were in danger either of
+being forgotten or of being regarded as fairy tales.! Weil not only warned
+against this tendency but argued that, if it should happen, the democratic
+countries could not win the war; "in order to fight well," she wrote, "it is
+not enough to defend an absence of tyranny. We must be rooted in a milieu
+in which every activity is really oriented in the opposite direction from
+tyranny."
+In the metaphors Weil used to describe these positive and negative concepts of "the nation" it is possible to see a parallel with an important aspect of modern feminist thought. Weil's description of the oppressive,
+power-oriented, centralized nation-state and the chauvinist nationalism it
+fosters calls to mind the oppressive structures of patriarchal society as described in the 1970s by the feminist philosopher Mary Daly. Although in
+the essays collected in "War and Peace" Weil did not use specifically female imagery to describe the positive aspects of the nation (in "Reflections
+on Bouché's Lecture" she merely argues that the nation that believes in
+freedom and justice must mediate those values for all of its inhabitants),
+in a letter written during this same period she uses clearly maternal images
+to describe the ideal social and political human community; she speaks of
+• In another country —Chile under the military dictatorship of General Pinochet— Weil's
+fear seems to have been more than realized: a political cartoon in the Chile Neu'sletter in the
+mid- 198os depicted a mother, dressed in rags, reading a bedtime story to her three children.
+"Once upon a time," she reads, "there was tea, sugar, flour, rice, potatoes, mear, coffce...."
+
+234
+the fragility and the inestimable value of "the living warmth of a human
+environment, that medium which bathes and fosters the thoughts and the
+virtues" and praises what Mary Daly would call "biophilic societies"-
+forms of social life that do not kill the fragile thing that "is the medium that
+favours the development of the soul. "2 Like Daly, Weil identifies the patriarchal structures with slavery and death? and the maternal milieus with life
+and with the mediation of humane and transcendent values.
+By 1940 Weil had come to see the war as an arena of moral as well as
+physical battle, success in which demanded the actual and everyday practice and strengthening of virtue; the suffering it entailed she saw as a means
+of purification and painful revalorization of "the precious things we allowed to be lost because we did not know how to appreciate them." In
+short, she thought it could and should lead not only to a social transformation of French life after the war but to a profound deepening of spiritual
+and moral awareness in all who participated in it or were affected by it.
+That she saw the war, at least metaphorically, in terms of a battle berween
+the necrophilic values of the patriarchy and female-mediated values is suggested by her insistence on the necessity of opposing "humane" values to
+the inhumanity and death-oriented fanaticism of the German forces. Her
+much-scorned plan for a corps of front-line nurses offers a concrete image
+of the female as the bearer of "humane" values in the very heart of the inevitable brutality of war.
+Starting as a revolutionary in 1931, Weil would have, given the chance,
+become a guerrilla in 1940. When the Germans brutally suppressed an
+uprising of students in Prague soon after the outbreak of the war, she devised a plan for parachuting arms and volunteers (including herself) into
+Czechoslovakia to help support popular resistance. The plan was turned
+down by the French political leaders to whom she presented it, and Weil
+then conceived of a corps of nurses who would go into battle with the soldiers to give emergency first aid to the wounded; she of course intended to
+be one of the nurses, and went to great lengths to try to get the project
+adopted by the French and later by the American government. That, too,
+was turned down and she tried to persuade the Free French in London to
+parachute her into France as a saboteur, or at least as a liaison person who
+= "Three Letters on Histury" in Selected Essays (London: Oxford University Press, 1962),
+pp. 79,80.
+3 Weil's often-criticized condemnation of ancient Israel and ancient Rome may be read
+as a condemnation of patriarchal values manifested in an almost pure form.
+
+235
+could communicate the feelings and the state of mind of the French under
+the Occupation back to Free French headquarters in London. Again, she
+was refused. All of these efforts, so often seen as impractical if not fatuously idealistic, purely and simply exemplify the spirit that she felt was absolutely necessary if the war was going to be a means of liberation and not
+simply a means of reinforcing oppressive structures of power.
+
+Reflections on War
+The present situation and the state of mind it creates once more make the
+problem of war the order of the day. We live now in constant expectation
+of war. The danger is perhaps imaginary, but the feeling of danger is real,
+and that in itself constitutes a not negligible factor. One cannot call the response anything but panic, less the kind of panic that undermines peoples'
+courage when they are threatened with massacre than one that afflicts
+minds faced with the problems posed by war. And in no quarter is the disarray more evident than in the working-class movement. If we do not undertake a serious effort of analysis, one day sooner or later we may well
+find ourselves at war and powerless not only to act but even to make judgments. And the first thing we must do is assess the traditions from which,
+until now, we have more or less consciously drawn sustenance.
+Until the period following the last war, the revolutionary movement, in
+its various forms, had nothing to do with pacifism. Revolutionary ideas on
+war and peace have always drawn their inspiration from memories of the
+years 1792, 1793, and 1794, which were the cradle of all the revolutionary movements of the nineteenth century. In absolute contradiction with
+historical fact, the war of 1792 was seen as a triumphant outburst which,
+by rousing the French people against foreign tyrants, would at the same
+time break the domination of the court and the upper bourgeoisie and
+bring the representatives of the toiling masses to power. This legendary
+memory, perpetuated by the "Marseillaise," gave rise to the idea that revolutionary war, whether defensive or offensive, is not only a legitimate form
+but also one of the most glorious forms of the struggle of the working
+masses against their oppressors. That idea was held by all Marxists and
+almost all revolutionaries until fifteen years ago. However, when it comes
+to assessing the value of other kinds of war, the socialist tradition furnishes
+This essay was published in La Critique sociale, no. 10, November 1933.
+
+238
+us with not just one but several contradictory ideas, which have never been
+clearly set forth and compared.
+In the first half of the nineteenth century, war itself seems to have had a
+certain prestige in the eyes of revolutionaries; in France, for example, they
+sharply criticized Louis Philippe's policy of peace. Proudhon wrote an eloquent tribute in praise of war, and revolutionaries dreamed just as much of
+wars of liberation on behalf of oppressed nations as of insurrections. The
+war of 1870 forced the proletarian organizations (meaning, at that time,
+the International) to take a concrete position on the question of war for the
+first time. Through Marx's pen, the International called on the workers of
+the two warring countries to oppose any attempt at conquest but to resolutely join in defending their country against enemy attack.
+When Engels, in 1892, eloquently evoking memories of the war that had
+broken out a hundred years earlier, urged the German Social Democratsto
+fight for all they were worth if Germany were attacked by France allied
+with Russia, he was speaking in behalf of another idca. Defense or attack
+no longer mattered; what mattered was to preserve, by offensive or defensive tactics, the country where the working-class movement was the
+strongest, and to crush the more reactionary country. In other words, according to this idea (which was also held by Plekanov, Mehring, and others),' to judge a conflict one must try to ascertain the outcome that would
+be most advantageous for the proletariat, and take sides accordingly.
+This idea is diametrically opposed to another idea, which was held by
+the Bolsheviks and the Spartacists, and according to which, in every war,
+with the exception of wars of national defense or revolutionary wars according to Lenin, and with the exception of revolutionary wars alone
+according to Rosa Luxemburg, the proletariat must wish for the defeat of
+its own country and sabotage the war effort in it. But this idea-which is
+based on the notion that all wars, with the exceptions mentioned above,
+are imperialist in nature and thereby comparable to a quarrel of brigands
+wrangling over spoils-entails some serious difficulties. It seems to destroy
+the international proletariat's unity of action, obliging the workers in each
+country, who must work for their country's defeat, to thereby favor the
+victory of the enemy imperialism, a victory that other workers must try to
+prevent. Liebknecht's famous saying, "Our main enemy is in our own
+1 Georgi Valentinovich Plekanov (1856-1918) introduced Marxism into Russian revolu-
+Tionary thought in the 188os. Franz Mehring (1846-1919) was a German Socialist.
+
+239
+country, "2 clearly reveals this difficulty by assigning a different enemy to
+the various national fractions of the proletariat, and thus, in appearance at
+least, setting them in opposition to one another.
+It is obvious that, as far as war is concerned, the Marxist tradition offers
+neither unity nor clarity. But all the theories agree on at least one point:
+the absolute refusal to condemn war as such. The Marxists, especially
+Kautsky3 and Lenin, were fond of paraphrasing Clauswitz's formula* to
+the effect that war is only the continuation of the politics of peacetime by
+other means, which leads to the conclusion that a war must be judged not
+by the violent nature of the methods employed, but by the ends pursued
+through those methods.
+What the postwar period introduced into the working-class movement
+was not another idea —for it would be impossible to accuse the workingclass (or so-called working-class) organizations of our time of having ideas
+on any subject whatever-but another moral atmosphere. As early as
+1918 the Bolshevik party, which passionately desired revolutionary war,
+had to resign itself to peace, not for doctrinal reasons bur because of the
+direct pressure of the Russian soldiers, who were no more inspired to emulate the example of 1793 when the Bolsheviks invoked it than when Ke-
+rensky did. The same thing happened in other countries on the level of ordinary propaganda; the masses battered by the war forced the parties that
+claimed to represent the proletariat to use purely pacifist language—which
+did not, it must be added, prevent some of them from glorifying the Red
+Army, and others from voting war credits in their respective countries.
+Never, of course, were theoretical analyses made to justify this new way of
+speaking; no one even seemed to notice that it was new. But the fact is that
+instead of war being branded as imperialist, imperialism began to be
+branded as a cause of wars. The so-called Amsterdam movement, whose
+theoretical basis was against imperialist war, in order to make itself heard,
+2 "The Main Enemy Is in Our Own Country" is the ritle of an important underground
+pamphlet written by Karl Lichknecht in 1915 while he was in prison for his antiwar politics.
+In it he says that the main enemy is German imperialism and urges the German people ro
+"wage a political fight against this enemy... in cooperation with the proletariat of other
+countries whose fight must be directed against their own imperialists."
+3 Karl Kautsky (1854-1938) was an important figure in the German Social Democratic
+movement.
+4 The Prussian general Karl von Clauswitz (1780-183 1) is considered to have been the
+foremost modern theorist on land warfare. He is best known for the idea Weil refers ro above,
+that war is not an end in itself but a means to political ends.
+
+240
+had to present itself as being against war in general. Russian propaganda
+emphasized the pacifist inclination of the USSR even more than its proletarian (or so-called proletarian) character. The formulations of the great
+theoreticians of socialism on the impossibility of condemning war as such
+were completely forgotten.
+Ir is as if Hitler's triumph in Germany made all the old ideas, inextricably mixed together, float to the surface. Peace appeared less precious as
+soon as it allowed the unspeakable horrors borne by thousands of suffering workers in the German concentration camps. The idea that Engels
+voiced in his article of 1892 is reappearing. Isn't the main enemy of
+the international proletariat German fascism, as in 1892 it was Russian
+czarism? This fascism, which is spreading in all directions, can only be
+crushed by force; and, since the German proletariat is unarmed, only the
+nations that have remained democratic, it seems, can do it.
+It scarcely matters, moreover, whether this would involve a war of
+national defense or a "preventive war"; preventive war might even be
+better. Didn't Marx and Engels at one time urge England to attack Russia?
+Such a war, it is thought, would not appear to be a struggle berween two
+rival imperialist powers but between two political regimes. And, just as the
+aging Engels said in 1892 when he recalled what had happened a hundred
+years before, it is being said that a war would force the state to make
+serious concessions to the proletariat; all the more so as the war that is
+brewing would necessarily involve conflict between the state and the capitalist class, and socialist measures would probably be pushed quite far.
+Who knows if the war would not thus automatically bring the representatives of the proletariat to power?
+In the political circles that claim to speak for the proletariat, all these
+considerations have begun to create a current of opinion more or less explicitly in favor of active participation in a war against Germany. This current is still fairly weak, but it can easily grow stronger. Some stick to the
+distinction between aggression and national defense; others to Lenin's
+ideas; others, lastly—and there are still a good many of them-remain
+pacifist, but for the most part more out of force of habit than for any other
+reason. One could not imagine worse confusion.
+So much uncertainty and obscurity may surprise and ought to embarrass us, if one bears in mind that it concerns a phenomenon that, given its
+attendant preparations, reparations, and renewed preparations, and considering all the moral and material consequences that follow from it, seems
+
+241
+to dominate our era and be its most characteristic feature. The real surprise, however, would be if we had arrived at anything better by starting
+from the absolutely legendary and illusory tradition of 1793 and by using
+the most defective method possible, one that claims to evaluate every war
+in terms of the ends pursued and not by the nature of the means employed.
+It is not that it would be betterto condemn the use of violence in general, as
+pure pacifists do; in each era war consists of a quite specific kind of violence, and we must study its mechanism before passing any judgment. The
+very essence of the materialist method is that, in its examination of any
+human event whatever, it attaches much less importance to the ends pursued than to the consequences necessarily implied by the working out of
+the means employed. One can neither solve nor even state a problem relating to war without having hrst of all taken apart the mechanism of the
+military struggle, that is, without having analyzed the social relations it
+implies under given technical, economic, and social conditions.
+One can speak of war in general only in abstract terms. Modern war is
+absolutely different from everything designated by that name under earlier
+regimes. On the one hand, modern war is only an extension of that other
+war known as competition, which makes production itself into a simple
+form of the struggle for power; on the other hand, every aspect of economic life is presently oriented toward a coming war. In this inextricable
+mixture of the military and the economic, where arms are put at the service
+of competition and production at the service of war, war only reproduces
+the social relations that constitute the structure of the regime, although to
+a considerably higher degree. Marx forcefully showed that what defines
+the modern mode of production is the subordination of the workers to the
+instruments of production, which are at the disposal of those who do not
+work; and he showed how, since the only recognized weapon is the exploitation of the workers, competition is transformed into a struggle of
+cach owner against his own workers and, in the last analysis, of the aggregate of the owners against the aggregate of the workers. In the same
+way, war in our time is defined by the subordination of the combatants to
+the instruments of combat, and the armaments, the real heroes of modern
+wars, are, just like the men dedicated to their service, controlled by those
+who do not fight. Since this controlling apparatus has no other means of
+defeating the enemy except by forcingits own soldiers togoto their deaths,
+the war of one state against another is immediately transformed into a war
+of the state and military apparatus against its own army. Ultimately, war
+
+242
+in our time appears to be a war conducted by the aggregate of the state
+apparatuses and their general staffs against the aggregate of men old
+enough to bear arms. But, whereas machines take away from the workers
+only their labor power, and owners have no other means of constraint
+except dismissal (which is blunted by the fact that the worker can choose
+among different employers), every soldier is constrained to sacrifice his
+very life to the demands of the military machine, and he is forced to do so
+by the threat of execution without trial that the power of the state constantly holds over his head. Consequently it matters very little whether
+a war is defensive or offensive, imperialist or nationalist; every state at war
+is forced to use this method, since the cnemy uses it. The great error of
+almost every study on war—an error into which all the socialists, especially, have fallen—is to consider war as an episode in foreign policy, when
+above all it constitutes a fact of domestic policy, and the most atrocious
+one of all. What is at issue here is not a matter of sentimental considerations or superstitious respect for human life; it is a matter of a very simple
+observation, namely, that massacres the most radical form of oppression,
+and soldiers do not expose themselves to death, they are sent to the
+slaughter. And since an oppressive apparatus, once established, goes on
+functioning until something destroys it, every war that causes an apparatus responsible for directing strategic maneuvers to be a burden on the
+masses forced to do the fighting must be considered, even if it is led by
+revolutionaries, to be a reactionary factor. And the effect on foreign
+countries of such a war is determined by the political relationships established domestically. Weapons wielded by a sovereign state apparatus can
+bring no one liberty.
+That is what Robespierres had realized and what the war of 1792—the
+same war that gave birth to the idea of revolutionary war-confirmed
+beyond the shadow of a doubt. At that time military technique was still far
+from having reached the degree of centralization it has attained in our
+time; nevertheless, the subordination of the soldiers charged with carrying
+out military operations to the high command charged with coordinating
+those operations had been very strict since the time of Frederick II.° Just as
+5 In late 1791 and early 1792 Maximilien Rubespierre (1758-94), the guiding spirit of the
+group that dominated the radical phase of the French Revolution, had opposed the more
+modcrate Girondin group who, in hopes both of consulidating their own political power and
+of bringing the revolution to France's neighbors by means of "armed missionaries," had
+argued in favor of war with Austria and Prussia.
+6 Frederick the Great (17 12-86) was king uf Prussia from 1740 tO 1786. A military and
+
+243
+the revolution was getting under way, a war was about to transform all
+France, as Barère' wouldlatersay, into a vast camp, and consequently give
+the state apparatus that power without appeal that is characteristic of military authority. That was the calculation made in 1792 by the court and the
+Girondins. A legend much too easily accepted by the socialists has made
+the war appear to be a spontaneous outburst of the people rising up against
+both their oppressors and the foreign tyrants who threatened them; actually, it was a provocation of the court and the upper bourgeoisie ploring
+together against the liberty of the people. On the surface, it would seem
+that they miscalculated, since, instead of bringing about national unity as
+they expected, the war aggravated all clashes of interests, brought the king
+and then the Girondins to the scaffold, and gave the Mountain" dictatorial
+power. But that does not alter the fact that on April 20, 1792, the day war
+was declared, every hope of democracy sank without a trace; and the
+second of June? was followed only too closely by the ninth Thermidor, 1°
+the consequences of which, in their turn, soon led to the eighteenth
+Brumaire.'' In addition, of what use to Robespierre and his friends was the
+power they exercised before the ninth Thermidor? Their goal was not to
+seize power but to establish a real democracy, both political and social. But
+by a bloody irony of history, the war forced them toleave the Constitution
+of 1793 on paper, forge a centralized apparatus, carry on a bloody terror
+that they could not even turn against the rich, abolish all liberty, and
+become, finally, the precursors of the military, bureaucratic, and bourgeois despotism of Napoleon. At least they kept their lucidity to the end.
+Two days before his death, Saint-Just12 wrote these profound words:
+political genius, he made Prussia into a power second unly to Austria among the Germin
+states.
+7 Bertrand Barère de Vieuzac (1755-1841) was a member of the National Convention
+and a supporter of Robespicrre.
+8 The Mountain was the name given a group of Jacobins led by Robespierre who sat in the
+highest seats in the National Convention. They supplanted the Girondins as the dominant
+faction.
+9 On the second of June 1793, in response to a three-day-lung demonstration by rens of
+thousands of armed Parisian workers and shopkeepers, the Girondins were expelled from the
+National Convention and arrested. Most of them were executed a few months larer.
+10 On the ninth Thermidor (July 27, 1794) Robespierre was refused a hearing in the
+National Convention and was arrested; he was exccuted the next day.
+I I On the eighteenth Brumaire (November 9, 1799) Napoleon carried our a coup d'état
+against the first French Republic (the Directory) and established a military despotism known
+as the Consulate.
+12 Antoine Louis de Saint-Just (1767-94), a member of the National Convention, was
+a close associate of Robespierre. They were executed on the same day.
+
+21ł
+"Only those who are in the battles win them, and only those who are in
+power profit from them." As for Robespierre, as soon as the question
+arose, he understood that a war could not free any foreign people ("liberty
+is not brought at the point of bayonets"), and that it would hand the
+French people over to the chains of state power—a power that one could
+no longer try to weaken since it was needed in the struggle against the
+foreign enemy. "War is good for military officers, for ambitious men, for
+speculators... for the executive arm.... This course relieves one of
+all other responsibilities. One no longer has any obligations toward the
+people when one gives them war." From that time onward he foresaw the
+coming military despotism, and continued to predict it despite the apparent successes of the revolution; he was still predicting it two days before
+his death, in his last speech, and left this prediction behind as a testament,
+but those who have since claimed him as their own have unfortunately not
+attached much importance to it.
+The history of the Russian Revolution provides exactly the same lessons, along with a striking analogy. The Soviet Constitution suffered
+exactly the same fate as the Constitution of 1793; Lenin forsook its
+democratic doctrines in order to establish the despotism of a centralized
+state apparatus, just as Robespierre did, and Lenin was the precursor of
+Stalin, as Robespierre was the precursor of Bonaparte. The difference is
+that Lenin—who had, moreover, long ago paved the way for the domination of the state apparatus by forging a highly centralized party—later
+distorted his own doctrines in order to adapt them to the necessities of the
+hour; thus he was not guillotined, but has become the idol of a new state
+religion.
+The history of the Russian Revolution is all the more striking as war was
+constantly its central problem. The revolution was a movement against the
+war started by soldiers who, feeling the governmental and military apparatus falling apart over their heads, hastened to throw off an intolerable
+yoke. Kerensky, invoking the memories of 1792 with an involuntary sincerity due to ignorance, called for a continuation of the war for exactly the
+same rcasons as the Girondins had earlier. Trotsky admirably showed how
+the bourgeoisic, counting on the war to postpone domestic political problems and bring the people back under the yoke of state power, wanted to
+transform "the war of attrition against the enemy into a war of attrition
+against the revolution." At that time the Bolsheviks were calling for a
+struggle against imperialism. But it was the war itself, not imperialism,
+
+245
+that mattered, and they saw this quite clearly when, once in power, they
+were forced to sign the peace of Brest-Litovsk. 13 By that time the old army
+had been broken up and Lenin had reiterated what Marx had said, that
+there was no place in a dictatorship of the proletariat for a permanent
+army, police force, or bureaucracy. But, almost immediately, the white
+armies and fear of foreign intervention put all Russia into a state of siege.
+The army was then reconstituted, the election of officers abolished, thirty
+thousand officers of the old regime reinstated in the officer corps, and the
+death penalty, the old disciplinary code, and military centralization reestablished; the bureaucracy and the police were reconstituted along
+parallel lines. What this military, bureaucratic, and police apparatus did
+to the Russian people later on is quite well known.
+Revolutionary war is the tomb of the revolution and will remain so as
+long as the soldiers themselves, or rather the armed citizenry, are not given
+the means of making war without a controlling apparatus, without police
+pressure, without a special court, without punishment for desertion. Only
+once in modern history was war conducted in this way, namely, under the
+Commune; 14 and everyone knows how that ended. It seems that a revolution involved in a war has only the choice of succumbing to the deadly
+blows of the counterrevolution or of transforming itself into a counterrevolution through the very mechanism of the military struggle. The
+prospects of revolution seem therefore very limited, for can a revolution
+avoid war? Nevertheless, we must stake everything on the slight chance
+that it can, or abandon all hope. The Russian example is there to instruct
+us. An advanced country would not encounter, in the event of a revolution,
+the difficulties that served as the foundation of the barbarous regime of
+Stalin in backward Russia; but a war of any scope would give rise to other
+difficulties at least as great.
+All the more so, a war undertaken by a bourgeois state can only trans-
+13 The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (signed March 3, 1918) ended the war berween Russia
+and Germany, at the cost of Russia's surrendering Poland, the Ukraine, and the Baltic
+provinces to German control.
+14 The Paris Commune of 1871 was an insurrection of Paris Republicans who refused to
+accept the harsh peace terms dictated by Bismarck following the Franco-P'russian War, terms
+that the recently clected National Assembly was prepared to accept. Civil war broke out
+between the Communards in Paris and the national government seated at Versailles. The
+Commune lasted for two months of bloody fighting before it was finally put down by the
+national government. Thirty-eight thousand Communards were arrested and 20,000 were
+pur to death.
+
+246
+form power into despotism and enslavement into calculated murder. If
+war sometimes appears to be a revolutionary factor, it is only in the sense
+that it is an incomparable test of the functioning of the state apparatus. At
+its touch a badly organized apparatus falls apart, but if the war does not
+end immediately and permanently, or if the breakdown of the state has not
+gone far enough, the result will be merely one of those revolutions that, in
+Marx's words, perfect the state apparatus instead of destroying it. That's
+what has always happened until now. In our time the difficulty that war
+greatly exacerbates is the one resulting from the ever-increasing opposition between the state apparatus and the capitalist system; what happened
+in Briey during the last war is a striking example. 15 The last war gave the
+various state apparatuses some authority over the economy, and this gave
+rise to the completely erroneous term "war socialism"; afterward the
+capitalist system began to function again almost normally, despite customs barriers, import quotas, and national currencies. In the next war
+things will probably go very much further, and it is known that quantity is
+capable of being changed into quality. In this sense, war in our time can be
+a revolutionary factor, but only if one wants to give the term "revolution"
+the meaning the National Socialists give it; like the economic crisis, war
+would arouse strong hostility to the capitalists, and this hostility would be
+turned, by means of the Union Sacrée, ' to the advantage of the state apparatus and not of the workers. Furthermore, to recognize the kinship
+between war and fascism, all one has to do is turn to the fascist texts that
+conjure up "the martial spirit" and "socialism of the front." Both war and
+fascism essentially involve a kind ofaggravated fanaticism that leads to the
+total effacement of the individual before the state bureaucracy. If the capitalist system is more or less damaged in the process, it can only be at the
+expense of human values and the proletariat, and not to their benefit, no
+matter what the demagogues may sometimes say.
+The absurdity of adopting war as a means of antifascist struggle is thus
+quite apparent. Not only would it mean fighting against a barbarous oppression by crushing the peoples under the weight of an even more barbarous massacre; it would even mean extending under another form the
+regime we want to abolish. It is childish to suppose that a state apparatus
+Is The de Wendel family, French owners of metallurgical factories in Briey (in the Lorraine, which at that rime belonged to Germany), prevented the factories from being bombed
+by the French Air Force.
+16 See no. 6, P. 104.
+
+247
+made powerful by a victorious war would alleviate the oppression to
+which the enemy state apparatus had subjected its own people; it is more
+childish still to believe that a victorious state would let a proletarian revolution break out in the defeated nation without immediately drowning it in
+blood. As for the bourgeois democracy? that has been destroyed by fascism, a war would not do away with, but rather reinforce and broaden, the
+causes that make it impossible at present.
+It seems, generally speaking, that history is increasingly forcing everyone engaged in political action to choose between aggravating the intolerable oppression exercised by the state apparatuses and conducting a direct
+and ruthless struggle against those apparatuses in order to destroy them.
+To be sure, the perhaps insoluble difficulties that loom up in our time may
+justify abandoning the struggle purely and simply. But if we don't want to
+renounce action, we must understand that we can fight against a state
+apparatus only from the inside. And, particularly in the event of war, we
+must choose between impeding the functioning of the military machine in
+which we ourselves constitute the wheels, or helping that machine to
+blindly crush human lives. Liebknecht's famous words, "The main enemy
+is in our own country," thus take on their full meaning, and are applicable
+to every war in which soldiers are reduced to the state of passive matter
+manipulated by a military and bureaucratic apparatus, which means they
+are applicable to every war, absolutely speaking, as long as the existing
+technology lasts. And one cannot foresee the advent of another form of
+technology in our time. In production, as in war, the increasingly collective
+way in which the expenditure of forces takes place has not changed the
+essentially individual nature of the functions of decision making and management; it has only caused the hands and lives of the masses to be put
+increasingly at the disposal of the controlling apparatuses.
+As long as we do not perceive how, in the very act of producing or fighting, it is possible to avoid this hold of the apparatuses on the masses, any
+attempt at revolution will have something desperate about it; for, even
+if we know what system of production and combat we wholeheartedly
+aspire to destroy, we do not know what system would be acceptable in
+place of it. And on the other hand, every attempt at reform appears childish in comparison with the blind necessities involved in the working of this
+monstrous machinery. Present-day society is like an immense machine that
+17 l.c., the Weimar Republic.
+
+248
+continually snatches up and devours men and that no one knows how to
+control. Those who sacrifice themselves for social progress are like people
+who would hang on to the wheels and the transmission belts in an attempt
+to stop the machine, and who will be ground to bits in their turn. But the
+helplessness one feels at a given moment—a helplessness that must never
+be regarded as final—cannot exempt one from remaining faithful to oneself, nor excuse capitulation to the enemy, whatever mask he might
+assume. And, no matter what name it bears-fascism, democracy, or
+dictatorship of the proletariat—the principal enemy remains the administrative, police, and military apparatus; not the apparatus across the border
+from us, which is our enemy only to the degree that it is the enemy of our
+brothers, but the one that calls itself our defender and makes us its slaves.
+Whatever the circumstances, the worst possible treason is always to consent to subordinate oneself to this apparatus and trample underfoot, in
+order to serve it, all human values in oneself and others.
+Fragment on Revolutionary War
+[These questions] all come down to this: of what value to a revolution is
+war? On this point the legend of 1793 is the source of a dangerous misunderstanding that continues to this day in the entire working-class
+movement.
+The war of 1792 was not a revolutionary war. It was not an armed
+defense of the French republic against the kings but, at least at the outset, it
+was a maneuver of the court and the Girondins intended to crush the
+revolution, a maneuver that Robespierre, in his magnificent speech against
+the declaration of war, tried in vain to head off. True, the war itself,
+through its own exigencies, then drove the Girondins from the government
+and brought in the members of the radical group known as the Mountain;
+nevertheless, the Girondins' maneuver, in the main, was a success. For
+even though Robespierre and his friends held responsible positions in the
+state, they could bring about neither the political democracy nor the social
+This fragment, a variant of a part of the preceding essay, was written late in 1933.
+
+249
+changes that it had been their sole purpose to give to the French people.
+They could not even stand in the way of the corruption that finally brought
+about their deaths. In fact, through the ruthless centralization and senseless terror that the war made absolutely necessary, they only opened the
+way for the military dictatorship. Robespierre, with the astonishing lucidity that made him great, was aware of this, and said so, not without bitterness, in the famous speech just before his death. As for the effect of this
+war on other countries, it obviously contributed to the destruction of the
+old feudal order in some countries, but on the other hand, as soon as,
+through an inevitable development, it turned toward conquest, it singularly weakened the propagandistic force of France's revolutionary ideals,
+thus bearing out Robespierre's famous saying: "Armed missionaries are
+not loved." It is not without reason that Robespierre was accused of taking
+no pleasure in the French victories. This was the war that, to borrow
+Marx's words, replaced Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity with Infantry,
+Cavalry, and Artillery.
+Furthermore, even the war against foreign intervention in Russia, a genuinely defensive war, whose participants deserve our admiration, was an
+insurmountable obstacle to the development of the Russian Revolution.
+This war imposed on a revolution that had a program calling for the abolition of the army, the police, and the permanent bureaucracy, a Red army
+whose officer corps was made up of czarist officers, a police force that lost
+no time coming down on Communists more harshly than counterrevolutionaries, and a bureaucratic apparatus unequaled in the rest of the world.
+These apparatuses were all a response to the necessities of the moment; but
+they were fated to outlast those necessities. Generally speaking, war
+always reinforces the central power at the expense of the people. As
+Saint-Just wrote, "Only those who are in the battles win them, and only
+those who are in power profit from them." The Paris Commune was an
+exception; however, it was defeated. War is inconceivable without an
+oppressive organization, without those in positions of command forming
+a separate apparatus that exercises absolute power over those who carry
+out orders. War in this sense—if one assumes, as Marx and Lenin did, that
+revolution in our time consists above all in immediately and permanently
+smashing the state apparatus—constitutes a counterrevolutionary factor,
+even when it is waged by revolutionaries in defense of the revolution they
+have made. All the more so, when war is carried on by an oppressive class,
+
+250
+the consent of the oppressed to the war constitutes a complete surrender to
+the state apparatus that is crushing them. That is what happened in 1914;
+and we must recognize that Engels shares the responsibility for that shameful betrayal.
+A Few More Words on the Boycott
+The question of an economic boycott of Hitler's Germany has aroused
+considerable controversy among comrades who are all equally sincere.
+Some have a compelling desire to fight against the abominable Hitlerite
+terror; others are held back by fear of arousing nationalist passions. Both
+the socialist and the trade-union Internationals have passed resolutions
+(not yet implemented) in favor of the boycott; some of the leaders of the
+confederated trade-union organizations have taken a stand against those
+decisions. The one certain thing is that soon a year will have elapsed without the slightest gesture of international solidarity having been made
+against the unspeakable tortures being inflicted on the flower of the German working-class movement. This fact wrings the heart. It seems to me
+that, on both sides, the problem of antifascist action has been badly stated.
+We must undertake, on behalf of our German comrades, some action
+that will come to the attention of the common masses of Germany. For one
+of the psychological bases of National Socialism is the bitter isolation felt
+by the German working masses, who are weighed down by the double
+burden of the economic crisis and the "Diktat" of Versailles. The full
+responsibility for this isolation lies with all of us in France who call ourselves internationalists and are so in words only. The only effective way we
+can fight against Hitler is to show the German workers that their French
+comrades are ready to make efforts and sacrifices for them. On the other
+hand, we must at all costs avoid stirring up nationalist passions, because if
+that were to happen antifascist action would not only become dangerous
+for France, it would also be useless as far as Germany is concerned; the
+German people would think the French workers were making a stand not
+against despotism but against the German nation, and were acting in con-
+This fragment was written at the end of 1933 0r the beginning of 1934.
+
+251
+cert with the French bourgeoisie and French imperialist interests. Perhaps
+this risk would be negligible had all of us who are active in the French
+working-class movement shown, before the coming of Hitler, that we were
+in solidarity with neither French imperialism nor the system of Versailles.
+Alas, we did not, and we will never be able to forgive ourselves. But the fact
+remains that now we must take into account the difficulties created by our
+own recent cowardice.
+The solution lies in an action undertaken by the working class alone.
+There are some kinds of action in which the proletariat can benefit from
+joining with the liberal petty bourgeoisie; that was the case, for example,
+during the Dreyfus affair. But it is never the case when nationalism can
+come into play; for the petty bourgeois always show themselves to be rabid
+chauvinists, and there can be nothing more dangerous for the proletariat
+than nationalist passions, which always lead to some kind of Union Sacrée
+and play into the hands of the bourgeois state. The German workers must
+be helped by the French workers, and by them alone. The German workers
+can have nothing in common with the French petty bourgeoisie, which has
+always been the strongest pillar of the Versailles system and consequently
+bears a heavy share of the responsibility for the victory of National Socialism. Some will say that that is a matter of a purely sentimental order; but in
+exactly the same way the repercussions on the German working class of an
+anti-Hitler action coming from France would be mainly of a sentimental
+order, and would not be any less important because of that.
+To tell the truth, a union of classes in an anti-Hitler action would be very
+much less risky today than a few months ago....
+Reply to One of Alain's Questions
+I am going to respond only to the last of Alain's questions. ' It seems to me
+to be extremely important, but I think it needs to be stated more broadly.
+Today "dignity" and "honor" are possibly the most deadly words in our
+Alain had published "A List of Questions on Recent International Events" in Vigilance,
+no. 34, March 20, 1936, pp. 10-11. This essay, which was obviously intended for Vigilance, was never published.
+I Alain's last question was "Are the men who speak of honor and digniry as being more
+
+252
+vocabulary. It is quite difficult to know exactly how the French people
+really reacted to the recent events.2 But I have too often observed that in
+every sort of milieu the appeal to dignity and honor in international affairs
+continues to move people. The words "peace with dignity" or "peace with
+honor" —those phrases of sinister memory which, when written by Poincaré, ' were the immediate prelude to a slaughter—are still in current use. It
+is not certain that orators advocating peace by itself, without honor,
+would be favorably received anywhere. That is very serious.
+The word "dignity" is ambiguous. It can mean the feeling of respect for
+oneself; no one will venture to deny that dignity in that sense should be put
+before life, for to prefer life would be "to live at the price of losing every
+reason for living." But self-respect depends exclusively on actions that one
+carries out oneself after having freely decided on them. A man who has
+been grossly insulted may need to fight in order to regain his sense of selfrespect; this will be the case only if it is impossible for him to submit passively to the insult without being convicted of cowardice in his own eyes. It
+is clear that in such matters the individual concerned is the one and only
+judge. It is impossible to imagine that any man could delegate to someone
+else the task of judging whether or not he needs to risk his life in order to
+preserve his sense of self-respect. It is even more obvious that the defense of
+dignity, understood in this way, cannot be imposed by force; as soon as
+force comes into play, the question of self-respect is no longer involved. On
+the other hand, what rids one of dishonor is not vengeance but peril. For
+example, to kill someone who has injured you by cunning and without risk
+is never a means of preserving one's respect for oneself.
+One must conclude that war is never a means to avoid holding oneself in
+contempt. It cannot be a means for noncombatants, because they have
+relatively little, if any, share in the danger; war can do nothing to change
+their own view of their personal courage. Nor can it be a means for the
+combatants, because they are under constraint. Most of them go into the
+army because they are forced to, and those who enlist voluntarily are
+precious than life disposed ro he the first to risk their lives? And if not, what should we think
+of them?"
+2 Weil is referring to the German reoccuparion of the demilitarized Rhineland that took
+place on March 7, 1936. France offered no resistance to this violation of the Versailles
+Treaty and the Locarno Pact, fearing that war would break out if French troops were sent into
+the zone.
+3 Raymond Poincaré (1860-1934), president of the French Republic from 1913 in
+1920.
+
+2.53
+forced to remain. The power of initiating and bringing an end to hostilities
+is exclusively in the hands of those who do not fight. The free decision to
+risk one's life is the very soul of honor; honor is not involved where some
+men make decisions without taking any risks, and others die in order to
+carry out their decisions. And if war cannot be a means of safeguarding
+anyone's honor, we must also conclude from that fact that no peace is dishonorable, whatever its terms may be.
+In reality, the term "dignity," applied to international relations, does
+not refer to a feeling of respect for oneself, which cannot be involved; its
+opposite is humiliation, not self-contempt. These are two different things;
+there is a great deal of difference between losing respect for oneself and
+being treated with no respect by others. Epictetus treated like a plaything
+by his master and Jesus slapped and crowned with thorns were in no way
+diminished in their own eyes. To prefer to die rather than lose one's selfrespect is the basis of any moral philosophy; to prefer to die rather than be
+humiliated is something altogether different; it is merely the feudal code of
+honor. One may admire the feudal code of honor; one may also, and with
+good reason, refuse to make it a rule of life. But that is not the issue. We
+must realize whom we are sending to die to defend this code of honor in
+international conflicts.
+We send the common masses, those who, since they possess nothing at
+all, have as a general rule no right to any respect, or very nearly none. It is
+true that we are a republic; but that does not prevent humiliation from
+being in fact the daily bread of all the weak. And yet they live and let live.
+A man in a subordinate position submits to a contemptuous reprimand,
+with no power to argue back; a worker is given the gate with no explanation, and if he asks his boss for one, is told, "I don't owe you any explanation"; some unemployed workers gathered in front of a hiring office learn
+after waiting an hour that there is no work for them; the lady of the manor
+in a village orders a poor peasant about and condescends to pay him five
+sous for two hours' worth of trouble; a prison guard strikes and insults
+a prisoner; a judge in open court makes jokes at the expense of the accused
+or even of the victim; all these things happen, and yet blood does not flow.
+But all these people are in constant danger of having to kill and die some
+day because a foreign country fails to treat their country or its representatives with all desired respect. If they decided to begin washing away humiliation in blood on their own behalf as they are asked to do on behalf of
+their country, wholesale slaughter would take place every day in peace-
+
+254
+time. Very few of those w ho possess power in any degree would be likely to
+survive; many military leaders would most certainly perish.
+Now, the greatest paradox of modern life is not only that the personal
+dignity of those who one day will be sent to die for the dignity of the nation
+is trampled under foot in civilian life, but that also, at the very moment
+their lives are being sacrificed to safeguard the common honor, they are
+exposed to far more severe humiliations than they were subject to before.
+What are the insults regarded as grounds for war between countries compared to those that an officer can inflict on a soldier with impunity? He can
+insult him, and no response at all is permitted; he can kick him—hasn't
+a certain author of war reminiscences boasted of having done that ? He can
+give him any order whatever at gunpoint, including the order to shoot
+a comrade. He can subject him to the meanest types of hazing as punishment. He can do almost anything, and any disobedience is punished by
+death, or can be. Those whom we in the rear hypocritically honor as heroes
+are actually treated as slaves. And of the soldiers who survive, those who
+are poor are freed from military slavery only to sink back into civilian
+slavery, where more than one is forced to submit to the insolence of men
+who have grown rich without running any risks.
+Constant and almost methodical humiliation is an essential element in
+our social organization, in peacetime as well as in war, but in war to
+a higher degree. If the principle that obligates one to resist being humiliated even at the cost of one's life were applied inside the country, it would
+be subversive of all social order, especially of the discipline indispensable
+to the conduct of war. This being the case, that one dares to make that
+principle into a rule of international policy is really the height of unconsciousness. A famous saying has it that one may, if necessary, have slaves,
+but it is intolerable to treat them as citizens. It is even more intolerable to
+make soldiers of them. Certainly there have always been wars; but it is
+a characteristic of our era that the wars are fought by slaves. And what is
+more, these wars in which slaves are asked to die for a dignity that has
+never been granted them—these wars constitute the main wheel in the
+mechanism of oppression. Every time we closely and in a concrete manner
+examine ways of actually alleviating oppression and inequality, we always
+come up against war, the aftereffects of war, and the necessities imposed
+by preparation for war. We will never untangle this knot; we must cut
+it-that is, if we can.
+
+Untitled Fragment on Spain
+What's going on in Spain? Everyone has something to say about it, has
+stories to tell, is ready to pass judgment. Nowadays it's the fashion to take
+a little trip down there, see a bit of revolution and civil war, and come back
+with articles dripping from one's pen. You can't open a newspaper or
+a journal without finding accounts of the events in Spain. How could all
+that not be superficial? First of all, a social transformation cannot be correctly evaluated except in terms of what it brings to the everyday life of all
+those who make up the people. It'snot easy to enter into that everyday life.
+Besides, each day brings something new. And then constraint and spontaneity, what is necessary and what is ideal, are so mixed together as to
+produce a hopeless confusion not only on the level of facts but even in the
+very consciousness of the actors and spectators of the drama. That very
+confusion is the essential characteristic and perhaps the greatest evil of
+civil war. It is also the first conclusion to be drawn from a rapid survey of
+the events in Spain, and what we know of the Russian Revolution confirms
+it only too well. It is not true that revolution automatically corresponds to
+a higher, more intense, and clearer consciousness of the social problem.
+The opposite is true, at least when revolution takes the formof civil war. In
+the agony of civil war, every common measure between principles and
+realities is lost, every sort of criterion by which one could judge acts and
+institutions disappears, and the transformation of society is given over to
+chance. How can one communicate something coherent, after a brief
+sojourn and a few fragmentary observations? At best, one can convey
+a few impressions, point out a few lessons.
+Weil returned from Spain on September 25, I936. This fragment was probably written
+shortly afterward.
+
+Reflections That No One Is Going to Like
+I know that what I am going to say will shock and scandalize many good
+comrades. But when one claims to believe in freedom, one must have the
+courage to say what one thinks, even if it's bound to give offense.
+Day by day we all follow anxiously, with anguish, the struggle taking
+place on the other side of the Pyrenees. We try to help our friends. But that
+neither prevents nor excuses us from drawing lessons from an experience
+that so many workers and peasants in Spain are paying for in blood.
+Europe has already undergone one experience of this sort, also paid for
+with a great deal of blood: the Russian experience. In Russia, Lenin publically demanded a state in which there would be neither army, nor police,
+nor a bureaucracy distinct from the population. Once in power, he and his
+associates set about constructing, through a long and grievous civil war,
+the heaviest bureaucratic, military, and police machine that has ever
+burdened an unfortunate people.
+Lenin was the leader of a political party, a machine for taking and exercising power. One may question his and his associates' good faith; one
+may at least think that there is a contradiction between the goals Lenin
+defined and the nature of a political party. But one cannot question the
+good faith of our anarchist comrades in Catalonia. Yet what do we see
+over there? Alas, there also we see forms of compulsion and instances of
+inhumanity that are directly contrary to the libertarian and humanitarian
+ideal of the anarchists. The necessities and the atmosphere of civil war are
+sweeping away the aspirations that we are seeking to defend by means of
+civil war.
+Here we loathe military constraint, police constraint, compulsory labor,
+and the spreading of lies by the press, the radio, and all the means of communication. We loathe social differentiations, arbitrariness, cruelty.
+Well, in Spain there is military constraint. In spite of the influx of
+volunteers, mobilization has been ordered. The defense council of the
+Generalitar, ' in which our FAr comrades hold some of the leading posts,
+has just decreed that the old military code is to be applied in the militias.
+There is compulsory labor. The council of the Generalitar, where our
+This fragment was probably written in October 1936.
++ The Generalitar was the autonomous regional government of Catalonia.
+2 Federacion Anarquista Iberica, the revolutionary anarchosyndicalist organization.
+
+257
+comrades hold the economic ministries, has just decreed that workers
+must put in as much extra unpaid time as might be judged necessary.
+Another decree stipulates that workers whose rate of production is too
+slow will be considered seditious and treated as such. This quite clearly
+means the introduction of the death penalty in industrial production.
+As for police constraint: the police had lost almost all its power before
+the nineteenth of July." But to make up for that, during the first three
+months of civil war, committees of investigation, responsible militants,
+and, too often, irresponsible individuals carried out executions without
+the slightest semblance of a trial, and consequently without any possibility
+of syndical or other control. The popular tribunals established to try the
+seditious or those presumed seditious have been in existence for only a few
+days. It is too soon yet to know what effect this reform will have.
+Nor did organized lying disappear after the nineteenth of July. ...
+3 The day the civil war broke nur.
+Do We Have to Grease Our Combat Boots?
+We were beginning to get used to hearing some of our comrades sing the
+"Marseillaise," but since the outbreak of the war in Spain one hears on
+every side things being said that, alas, take us back twenty-two years. It
+would seem that this time we will be shouldering our packs for justice,
+liberty, and civilization, not to mention that this will be, of course, the last
+of all wars. It's also a matter of destroying German militarism, and defending democracy while allied with a Russia that is not a democratic
+state, to say the least. One might think that someone had invented a time
+machine....
+Only this time there is Spain, and there is a civil war. For some comrades, it is no longer a matter of turning international war into civil war,
+but civil war into international war. One even hears talk of "international
+civil war." It seems that by trying to avoid this widening of the war one
+displays shameful cowardice. A journal that claims to be Marxist has gone
+so far as to speak of the "policy of grovelling."'
+Published in Vigilance, no. 44/45, October 27, 1936.
+I "La politique de la fesse tendue," litcrally, "the policy of extending one's burock,"
+
+258
+What is at stake here? Proving to yourself that you're not a coward?
+Comrades, they're recruiting for Spain. You're free to go. They'll certainly
+find you some rifles there.... Or are you defending an ideal? Then, comrades, ask yourselves this question: Can any war bring more justice, more
+liberty, or more well-being into the world? Has the experiment been tried,
+or not? Is every generation going to repeat it? How many times?
+But, some will say, it's not a matter of going to war. If we speak firmly,
+the fascist powers will retreat.
+Singular lack of logic! It's said that fascism is war. What does that mean,
+if not that the fascist states will not shrink from the unspeakable disasters
+a war would bring about? Whereas we—we do shrink from them. Yes, we
+do and we will shrink from the prospect of war. But not because we are
+cowards. I repeat, all those who are afraid of looking like cowards in their
+own eyes are free to go and get themselves killed in Spain. If they went to,
+say, the Aragon front, they might meet some French pacifists, rifles in
+hand, who are still pacifists. It is not a matter of courage or cowardice; it is
+a matter of weighing one's responsibilities and not taking on responsibility
+for a disaster of incomparable magnitude.
+We must make up our minds. Between a government that does not retreat in the face of war and one that does, the latter will ordinarily be at
+a disadvantage in international negotiations. One must choose between
+prestige and peace. And whether one claims to believe in the fatherland,
+democracy, or revolution, the policy of prestige means war. That being the
+case, it's about time we made up our minds either to deck Poincaré's tomb
+with flowers, or stop the swashbuckling. And if the misfortune of the time
+decrees that civil war today must become a war like any other, and must
+almost inevitably be tied to international war, we can draw only one conclusion: we must also avoid civil war.
+Some of us, in any case, will never deck Poincaré's tomb with flowers.?
+a vulgar pun on "la politique de la main tendue." usually translared as "the policy of making
+friendly overtures."
+2 Former French Prime Minister and President Raymond Poincaré (who died in 1934)
+was largely responsible forthe policies thatled to French involvement in World War I.
+
+The Policy of Neutrality and Mutual Assistance
+The policy of neutrality with regard to Spain is generating such passionate
+controversy that no one notices what a tremendous precedent it is serting
+in matters of international policy.
+On the whole, the French working class seems to have backed Léon
+Blum's efforts to safeguard peace.' But the least we can ask is that it back
+them only conditionally. We need to know if Blum's efforts will have the
+logical result that can be expected from them. And, frankly speaking, that
+logical result would be diametrically opposed to the Popular Front's program. The problem is: Neutrality or mutual assistance? In order to state it
+clearly, one must make a choice.
+"Mutual Assistance" is the slogan that was so dinned into our ears by
+the Popular Front before, during, and after the election that it almost
+became an obsession. We were familiar with the slogan; we were used to
+hearing it from the politicians of the Right. At present it constitutes the
+entire doctrine of the parties of the Left. Blum's great speech at Geneva did
+nothing but develop it and set forth all its aspects. And yet Blum himself,
+not by his words but by his acts, is now proclaiming that it is unreasonable.
+What happened on the other side of the Pyrenees in July? It was a clearcut act of aggression, beyond the shadow of a doubt. Of course, it was not
+one nation that attacked another; it was a military caste that attacked
+a great people. But we are all the more interested in the outcome of the
+conflict. The liberties of the French people are closely tied to the liberties of
+the Spanish people. If the doctrine of mutual assistance were reasonable, if
+there was ever an occasion to intervene by armed force, to rush tothe aid of
+the victims of aggression, it would have been then.
+We did not do so, for fear of setting all Europe ablaze. We proclaimed
+neutrality. We put an embargo on weapons. We are allowing our beloved
+comrades to risk their lives unaided for a cause that is ours as well as theirs.
+We are allowing them to fall, armed only with rifles or grenades, because
+This essay, unpublished during Weil's lifetime, was written after October 1936.
+• Léon Blum (1872-1950) was the leader of France's Popular Front government, a coalition of parties of the Left that was elected in May 1936. Spain deny had a Popular Front
+government, and the policy of the Popular Front was mutual assistance. After the ourbreak of
+the Spanish civil war, however, Blum reluctandly proclaimed a policy of neutraliry toward
+Spain, fearing that french assistance might lead to European war.
+
+260
+they must use their living flesh as a substitute for the big guns they lack. We
+are doing all that to avoid a European war.
+But if we have, with anguished hearts, agreed to such a situation, let no
+one later dare send us to war when it is a matter of a conflict between
+nations. What we have not done for our beloved comrades in Spain we will
+not do for Czechoslovakia, for Russia, or for any state. Faced with the
+conflict that is the most sharply painful for us, we let the government proclaim neutrality. So it should not dare speak to us about mutual assistance
+later on. Faced with any conflict, of whatever nature, that might erupt on
+the surface of the globe, it will be our tum to cry out with all our strength:
+Neutrality! Neutrality! We will not be able to forgive ourselves for having
+accepted neutrality in regard to the Spanish slaughter unless we make
+every effort to transform this position into a precedent that will govern all
+French foreign policy in the future.
+Could we do otherwise? We are almost passively watching the finest
+blood of the Spanish people being shed, and yet we would go to war over
+any central European state! We are exposing a brand new revolution in the
+flush of youth, brimming over with vitality and possessing an unlimited
+future, to defeat and extermination, and we would go to war for that
+corpse of revolution called the USSR!
+The present policy of neutrality would constitute the worst sort of
+treason on the part of the French working-class organizations if it werenot
+aimed at the prevention of war in general. And it cannot effectively prevent
+war unless it is broadened, unless the principle of neutrality wholly replaces the murderous policy of mutual assistance. We have no business
+backing Léon Blum except under this condition.
+Broadening the Policy of Nonintervention
+Ever since the policy of nonintervention was first put into practice, one
+concern has weighed heavily on my heart. A great many other people must
+also share it.
+I do not intend to join in the violent attacks, some of which are honestly
+This essay, unpublished during Weil's lifetime, was written after October 1936.
+
+261
+meant, though the majority are treacherous, that have rained down upon
+our comrade Léon Blum. I recognize the necessities that make him act as he
+has. I admire the moral courage that enabled him to submit to them, harsh
+and bitter as they are, despite all the harangues. Even when I was in Aragon
+or Catalonia, in the middle of an atmosphere of combat and among militants who had no term harsh enough for Blum's policy, I supported that
+policy. As far as 1 personally am concerned, 1 refuseto deliberately sacrifice
+peace, even when it is a question of saving a revolutionary people threatened with destruction.
+But in almost every speech our comrade Léon Blum has made since the
+Spanish war began, I have found, side by side with profoundly moving
+formulations about war and peace, other formulations that have a disquieting ring. I waited anxiously for responsible militants to react, to
+debate, to ask certain questions. I find that the atmosphere of confusion
+inside the Popular Front is reducing many comrades to silence, or to expressing their thoughts in a veiled way.
+Léon Blum misses no opportunity, right in the middle of the most
+moving formulations, to say in substance this: We want peace; we will
+preserve it at any cost, unless an attack on our territory or the territories
+protected by us forces us to go to war.
+In other words, we will not wage war to prevent Spanish workers and
+peasants from being wiped out by a clique of savages more or less decked
+out in gold braid. But if the occasion arises, we will wage war for Alsace-
+Lorraine, for Morocco, for Russia, for Czechoslovakia, and, if some
+Tardieu had signed a treaty with Honolulu, we would wage war for
+Honolulu.
+Because of my sympathy for Léon Blum, and especially in the light of the
+threats that hang over our whole future, I would give a great deal to be able
+to interpret the formulations I have in mind differently. But no other interpretation is possible. Blum's words are only too clear.
+Do the militants of the CGT' and the organizations on the Left accept
+this position? Do our country's workers and peasants accept it? I don't
+know. Every individual must answer for himself. As far as l am concerned,
+I do not accept it.
+The workers and peasants on the other side of the Pyrenees who are
+fighting to defend their lives and their liberty, fighting to lift the weight of
+1 Confédération générale du Travail, the reformist-dominated trade-union organization.
+
+262
+the social oppression that has crushed them for so long, fighting to take
+their destiny in hand, are not tied to France by any written treaty. But all of
+us—the CGT, the Socialist party, the working class —feel tied to them by
+an unwritten pact of brotherhood, by ties of flesh and blood stronger than
+any treaty. Compared to this unanimously felt brotherhood, of what importance are the signatures of the Poincarés, the Tardieus, the Lavals on
+papers that have never been submitted for our approval? If ever it were
+possible to justify the sum of suffering, blood, and tears that war represents, it would be when a people is struggling and dying for a cause that it
+wants to defend, not on account of a scrap of paper that it never had anything to do with.
+No doubt Léon Blum shares the feelings of the working masses on the
+Spanish question. It is said that when he spoke of Spain before the leaders
+of the socialist federations he wept. Quite probably, if he were in the opposition he would support the slogan "Guns for Spain." What checked his
+natural inclination toward solidarity is a feeling tied to the possession of
+power: the feeling of responsibility a man has when he holds the fate of a
+nation in his hands, and sees himself on the verge of plunging it into a war.
+But if a Czechoslovakia were at stake, instead of some Spanish workers
+and peasants, would he be gripped by the same feeling of responsibility?
+Or would a certain legalistic mentality make him think that in such a case
+a piece of paper bears all the responsibility? This question is a matter of life
+and death for every one of us.
+Collective security is part of the Popular Front's program. In my opinion, the Communists are right when they accuse Léon Blum of abandoning
+the Popular Front's program in the matter of Spain. It's true that the treaties and other documents relating to collective security do not provide for
+anything resembling the Spanish conflict, but that's because no one ever
+anticipated anything like it. But the facts are plain enough. There was an
+act of aggression, a clear-cut act of military aggression, although in the
+form of civil war. Foreign countries have supported this aggression. It
+would seem normal to extend the principle of collective security to such
+a case, to intervene militarily in order to crush the forces guilty of aggression. Instead of taking this course, Léon Blum tried to limit the conflict.
+Why? Because intervention, instead of restoring order in Spain, would
+have set all Europe ablaze. But this is how it always has been and always
+will be every time a local war raises the question of collective security. I
+defy anyone, including Léon Blum, to explain why the reasons that deter
+
+263
+us from intervening in Spain would be less compelling if it was a question
+of Czechoslovakia's being invaded by the Germans.
+Many people have asked Léon Blum to "reconsider" his policy in regard
+to Spain. There is much to be said for their position. But if one does accept
+nonintervention, then, in order to be consistent, one must ask both Blum
+and the working masses to "reconsider" the principle of collective security. If nonintervention in Spain is a reasonable policy, collective security is
+unreasonable, and vice versa.
+The day Léon Blum decided not to intervene in Spain, he took on a heavy
+responsibility. On that day he decided, if it became necessary, to go as far
+as to abandon our Spanish comrades to mass destruction. All of us who
+have supported him share this responsibility. Very well then, if we are willing to sacrifice the miners of Asturias,? the starving peasants of Aragon and
+Castile, and the anarchist workers of Barcelona rather than ignite a world
+war, nothing else in the world should lead us to ignite the war. Nothing,
+neither Alsace-Lorraine, nor the colonies, nor treaties. It must not be said
+that anything in the world is more precious to us than the life of the Spanish people. Otherwise, if we abandon them, if we allow them to be massacred, and if afterward we waged war anyway for another cause, how could
+we justify ourselves?
+Are we going to decide to look these problems squarely in the face, or
+not? Are we going to pose the problem of war and peace in its entirety? If
+we continue to evade the problem, deliberately shut our eyes, and repeat
+slogans that solve nothing, then let the global catastrophe come. We will
+all have deserved it for our spiritual cowardice.
+2 A province in northern Spain in which the labor movement was particularly strong. As-
+turias was famous for a working-class revolt that took place berween October 5-18, 1934.
+The revolt, which began in the heart of the mining district, involved 30,000 anned workers.
+The rehels occupied most of the towns of the province until the government brought in troops
+from Morocco to put down the insurrection.
+
+A European War over Czechoslovakia?
+Many people make the mistake of not squarely facing what they will be
+confronted with if the problem of Czechoslovakia takes the most acute
+form. In order not to succumb to panic, we need to draw up, as lucidly as
+we can, a course of action for the worst as well as for the best cases. What
+follows relates to the worst case: that is, if Hitler, for reasons of domestic
+and foreign policy, should determine to gain a striking and decisive success
+in central Europe.
+Every international question can be considered from four points of
+view, which are, moreover, often related: the question of rights as such;
+the balance of power; France's treaty commitments; and the chances of
+war and peace. From none of these points of view does the preservation of
+the Czechoslovakian state as it presently exists seem to have the importance that is attributed to it.
+FROM THE POINT of view of rights, Czechoslovakia certainly has received some pieces of German territory, and it seems incontestable that the
+German population in them is being persecuted to some extent. To what
+extent is debatable. It is difficult to make these scattered territories into a
+separate province enjoying full autonomy within the framework of the
+Czechoslovakian state; on the other hand, since they form a fringe along
+the edges of the German border and what used to be the Austrian border, it
+seems easy for a newly expanded Germany to purely and simply annex
+them through a process of border rectification.
+One may wonder if Germany intends to seize Czech territories as well.
+In all likelihood, a rectification of borders would satisfy Germany, especially if France and England simultaneously approached Berlin and
+Prague, agreeing to such a rectification and prohibiting any more ambitious undertaking. For, in the first place, Hitler has always declared that,
+in Europe, he wants the German territories and nothing else. What's more,
+the territories with German populations contain a good part of the industrial resources of Czechoslovakia on the one hand, and the mountain
+ranges that protect the country on the other. The annexation of these territories by Germany would put Czechoslovakia at its mercy; Germany
+would have no need to attack Czechoslovakian independence in order to
+Published in Feuilles libres de la quinzaine, no. 58, May 25, 1938.
+
+265
+achieve all its diplomatic, economic, and military objectives. A kind of
+protectorate would suit Hitler's general policy much better than annexation of the Czech territory. Further, it is probable that a simple change of
+diplomatic orientation on Czechoslovakia's part would suffice to eliminate the whole minority problem. To Hitler the main thing is that Czechoslovakia, regardless of whether or not it is dismembered, become a satellite
+state of Germany.
+What disadvantages would there be in this situation? It is possible to
+think that making Czechoslovakia so dependent on Germany would be
+something of an injustice. Probably it is. But on the other hand the status
+quo is unjust to the Sudeten Germans, which simply proves that the right
+of peoples to self-determination comes up against an obstacle in the nature
+of things, from the fact that the three maps of Europe-geographic, economic, and ethnographic—do not coincide.
+Czechoslovakia may very well become-either as a result of being
+weakened by the excision of its German territories, or in order to avoid
+such an excision—a satellite of Germany without having to sacrifice its
+culture, its language, or its national characteristics, and that limits the
+injustice. National Socialist ideology is simply racist; its only universal
+content is its anticommunism and antisemitism. The Czechs can ban the
+Communist party and exclude Jews from all relatively important positions
+without losing anything of their national life. In short, injustice for injustice—since there must be some form of injustice in any case—let us choose
+the one that has the least risk of leading to war.
+Besides, even if the injustice were greater, isn't there a bitter irony in
+France's buckling on her armor as a redresser of wrongs! By preventing
+the Anschluss for twenty years, France herself, in the most flagrant manner, interfered with the famous right of peoples to self-determination. And
+God knows that in Africa and Asia there is no shortage of peoples for
+France to emancipate without running the risk of war, if it is the rights of
+peoples that interest her.
+It is true that satisfying Germany's demands in Czechoslovakia would
+cause all central Europe to fall under German influence. This brings us to
+another point of view, that of the balance of power. Rights no longer have
+anything to do with it.
+IT IS POSSIBLE that Hitler's efforts are directed toward one goal: the establishment of German hegemony in Europe, by war if necessary, without
+war if possible. Traditionally, France allows no hegemony in Europe ex-
+
+266
+cept, when she can establish it, her own. Today a kind of unstable balance
+exists between the victorious France of twenty years ago and a Germany,
+if one may say so, in the bloom of convalescence. Is it necessary to try to
+maintain this balance? To reestablish French hegemony?
+It is obvious, if one thinks about it, that the great principle of "the balance of power in Europe" is a principle that leads to war. Because of this
+principle, a country feels deprived of security and placed in an intolerable
+situation as soon as it is the weaker in relation to a possible adversary.
+Now, since no scale exists for measuring the strength of states, a country or
+bloc of countries has only one means of not being the weaker; it is to be the
+stronger. When two countries or two blocs both feel an imperative need to
+be the stronger, one can confidently predict war.
+If one country must dominate the center of Europe, it is in the nature of
+things that it will be Germany. Force is on Germany's side. In 1918 Germany was just barely defeated, and by a powerful coalition. Besides, why is
+the possibility of German hegemony worse than French hegemony? True,
+Germany is "totalitarian." But political regimes are unstable; of France
+and Germany thirty years hence who can say which will be a dictatorship
+and which a democracy? Right now German hegemony would be stifling.
+But could it be more stifling, I'm not saying than a war, but more than the
+present peace, with the maddening nervous tension, the siege mentality,
+and the material and moral impoverishment to which we are increasingly
+subjected? Assuming that France still possesses a culture, traditions, a
+spirit that is uniquely hers, and a liberal ideal, her spiritual radiance might
+be much greater if she were to hand central Europe over to German influence than if she were to persist in struggling against an almost inevitable
+development. Besides, in the long run hegemony always weakens the
+country that has achieved it. But until now, both the acquisition of hegemony and the weakening that follows from it have always, if I am not
+mistaken, been brought about by wars. If this time the same process could
+take place without war, wouldn't that be real progress?
+FRANCE'S TREATY OBLIGATIONS in regard to Czechoslovakia are the
+subject of a great deal of debate. But even a formal promise does not constitute, in international matters, sufficient grounds for action. Statesmen of
+all countries know this, although they don't let on that they do. Even if
+they didn't know it, can we allow a whole young generation to die for a
+treary it did not ratify? The League of Nations treaty constitutes a formal
+
+267
+obligation, yet virtually no action was ever taken on the basis of it, and it
+was tacitly recognized as nul every time special clauses were added. A little
+over a quarter of a century ago France violated a signed treaty when she
+seized Morocco, thereby risking a European war; she could certainly
+do just as much today in order to avoid a war. True, her prestige would
+then be destroyed in the eyes of the small countries, and, since the time of
+Talleyrand, France has traditionally depended on them for support. This
+policy is an application of the theory of the balance of power in Europe;
+France tries to use the small nations to compensate for her own inferiority.
+At the same time she gives herself a sort of halo of idealism—entirely undeserved, for what atrocious woes did the carving up of central Europe
+twenty years ago not create! In any event, no policy ever met with more
+bitter failure, since it was "little Serbia" that precipitated the European
+slaughter whose consequences are still weighing on us. When one thinks
+about it, that seems to have been a necessary result, not an accident. The
+small countries are irresistibly tempting to the will to power, whether it
+takes the form of conquest or, what is preferable from all points of view,
+the creation of zones of influence. It is natural for small countries caught
+between two great nations to fall under the more or less veiled domination
+of the more powerful one, and if the other tries to stand in the way of this,
+recourse to arms is almost inevitable.
+THAT IS THE central issue. Will the chances for peace be improved if
+France and England—assuming they agree—once more solemnly guarantee the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia, or if they resign themselves,
+with suitable formalities, to hand it over to its fate? It is said that in the first
+instance, Hitler would retreat. Perhaps. But it is a terrible chance to take.
+He is swept along, in what he does, by a double dynamism —his own, and
+the dynamism he has been able to communicate to his people, which he
+must keep at the temperature of incandescent iron in order to preserve his
+power. It is true that until now he never exposed himself to the risk of war;
+but until now he never needed to. One can by no means conclude that he is
+determined to always avoid that risk. It is said that it would be madness on
+his part to risk a general war to attack Czechoslovakia; yes, but it would be
+just as much madness on the part of France and England to run the same
+risk to defend it. If they decide to take that risk, why shouldn't he? It seems
+more and more clear-cut that a firm position on the Czechoslovakian question, even if it were joined to proposals for general negotiation, would not
+
+268
+ease present tensions in Europe. On the material level, negotiations, compromises, and economic arrangements would be highly advantageous for
+Germany, even necessary; but from the point of view of public opinion—
+and nonmaterial considerations are by far the most important for a dictatorship like Hitler's —he doesn't need any of those things. What he needs is
+to make periodic and brutal assertions of the existence and strength of his
+country. It is not very likely that he can be kept from doing this other than
+by force of arms.
+If it were only a matter of using a bluff to make him retreat, who would
+not be for it? But if, as at least is possible, actual military action is going
+to be involved, I wonder how many mobilizable young men, how many
+fathers, mothers, and wives of mobilizable men one would find who consider it reasonable and just that French blood should be shed for Czechoslovakia. Few, I believe, if any at all. A war caused by events in central
+Europe would be a new confirmation of the sarcastic but powerful words
+Mussolini wrote in his preface to Machiavelli:
+Even in countries where the mechanisms (of democracy) date from a centuryold tradition, there comes a solemn hour when one no longer asks the people
+anything, because one knows the response would be disastrous. One lifts from
+their head the cardboard crown of sovereignty, fit for normal times, and simply and solely orders them to accept revolution, or peace, or to march toward
+the unknown of war. The people are left with nothing but a monosyllable with
+which to consent and obey. We see that the sovereignty generously accorded
+the people is withdrawn from them precisely at the times that they might feel
+the need of it... Can one imagine a war being declared by referendum?
+A referendum is a very good thing if it is a matter of choosing the most suitable
+site for the village fountain, but when the most important interests of a people
+are at stake, even ultrademocratic governments take great care not to entrust
+those interests to the judgment of the people themselves....
+To return to Czechoslovakia, there are only two clear and defensible
+choices: either France and England declare that they will go to war to
+maintain Czechoslovakia's integrity, or they openly agree to a transformation of the Czechoslovakian state that would satisfy the main German
+aims. Apart from these two choices, there can be only terrible humiliations, or war, or probably both. It's obvious to me that the second choice is
+infinitely preferable. One whole sector of English public opinion —and not
+only the Right—is ready to welcome such a solution.
+
+Reflections on Bouches Lecture
+In order to make my own comments on Bouché's lecture, I am adopting the
+same position he chose, that is, taking the idea of a strengthened national
+defense as a hypothetical point of departure. At the present time nonviolence is perfectly defensible as an individual position, but as the policy of
+a government it is unthinkable.
+The present system of national defense, as Bouché admirably showed,
+leaves room for appalling disasters in the near future, almost limitless
+risks, and scarcely any hope. So any less oppressive system involving less
+risk and more hope must be preferable. No plan for a new system can be
+asked to eliminate the possibility of France losing her independence; indeed, the present system, no matter how far one extends it, does not eliminate that, since a crushing defeat is always possible, and perhaps even
+probable.
+France is a long way from being the most powerful country in Europe.
+So she must give up trying to shape Europe's future, even the near future,
+according to her views or traditions. For her, national defense must be the
+defense of her territory against invasion, not the defense of a system of
+treaties and pacts drawn up by her at a time when she could believe herself
+the most powerful country.
+Defense against invasion seems, on reflection, to be more a matter of diplomacy than military force. Except for colonial campaigns, the wars of
+the past few centuries, if I am not mistaken, never had the annexation of a
+foreign territory as an aim or immediate pretext, although they sometimes
+had that result. They were always caused by disagreements over the preservation or conquest of some particular diplomatic position. France can
+avoid being caught in this sort of dispute by a reasonable and moderate
+diplomatic policy.
+Such a policy must, however, be defended by a military system that
+would prevent an invasion of France from looking to both Frenchmen and
+foreigners like a colonial campaign. But since this military system would
+Henri Bouché, one of Alain's former students, gave a lecture un March 28, 19.38, on "The
+French Problem of National Defense." Weil's response remained unpublished during her
+lifetime.
+
+270
+be merely an auxiliary arm of a diplomatic policy designed to safeguard
+peace for France, the problem is not how to assure the defeat of the enemy
+in case of invasion; rather, it is how to make a potential invasion difficult
+enough that the idea of such an invasion does not constitute a temptation
+to neighboring states.
+Solving this problem would not give us absolute security, but we would
+be more secure than under our present system, even if we were to have
+twice as many airplanes and tanks.
+This new formulation of the problem of security would involve a complete transformation of military procedure, which henceforth, from the
+technical point of view, would have to constitute a sort of compromise between the methods of war and those of insurrection. As a method of civil
+defense against air attack, Bouché recommends decentralization; it seems
+to me that one could enlarge this idea and extend it to the whole conception of national defense. Political, economic, and social life in France could
+be decentralized, dense centers of population dispersed, and city and country life joined together. Possible armed resistance could be decentralized as
+well, always keeping in mind that in the natural course of things there
+might be no need for it. Assuming some degree of decentralization to have
+been achieved, it seems to me that modern technique, especially because of
+the speed of communications, makes a particular form of resistance possible that would more closely resemble guerrilla warfare than regular war.
+Don't establish fronts or besiege cities; harass the enemy, block his communications, always attack him where he least expects it, demoralize him,
+and stimulate resistance by a series of small but victorious actions. If, especially at the beginning, the Spanish Republicans had used such a method—
+they never tried it—they might not be in the deplorable state we see them
+in now. But, once more, the real purpose of such a system is not to force
+an enemy who has entered our territory to leave it; it is to give food for
+thought to those who could be tempted by the idea of armed invasion.
+Such a conception of defense presupposes real public spiritedness and a
+keen awareness of the benefits of liberty in all the French people. We are
+not at that point yet. At present the Russian, Italian, or German dictatorships exercise an enormous amount of prestige over a considerable part of
+the population, beginning with workers and intellectuals, the traditional
+mainstays of democracy. The peasants have still not found a way of making their opinion heard in the country. The urban big and petty bourgeoisie
+
+271
+is absorbed by narrow interests or given over to fanaticism and can scarcely be counted on for any form of civic enthusiasm. Can the idealistic and
+liberal spirit that is traditionally attributed to France come to life again?
+There is room for doubt. But if it does not, if freedom is to perish slowly
+in men's souls even before it is destroyed in its political form, national defense loses any real point. For it is not the defense of a word or a patch of
+color on the map that can be worth sacrifices, but a certain spirit attached
+to a particular human milieu. In the absence of such a spirit France is in
+danger-and we are already seeing signs of it—of falling victim to a foreign power without an invasion.
+All that is in reference only to France. But as soon as the French empire
+is taken into consideration, the problem becomes altogether different.
+Bouché barely touched on this aspect of the question, probably for lack of
+time. It seems obvious that the French empire in its present form requires
+that France preserve and develop offensive armaments, and that the present military system be maintained; there are far too few French settlers for
+a defensive system, and the indigenous populations would rightly have little inclination for it. It seems no less obvious, given the balance of power,
+that if the present form of the French empire is maintained, France is almost certain to lose all or part of her colonies some day, with or without
+a world war. It would be infinitely preferable if it were without a war, but
+even without a war such a thing is not desirable from any point of view.
+For the defensive method advocated by Bouché to be applied, the French
+empire would, as a first and essential condition, have to evolve very rapidly
+in the direction taken by the British empire; that is, the majority of our colonies would very quickly have to be given considerable independence,
+enough to satisfy them. For such a change to be carried out smoothly,
+preparations for it would have to be made well in advance; inasmuch as
+France, in her blindness, has not made preparations for it, it will not happen smoothly. But it is urgent that it be done. The French colonies are
+tempting spoils and a constant cause of immediate danger in the world as
+long as the indigenous populations have no form of national defense, and
+national defense presupposes a nation.
+In short, the conception of national defense put forward by Bouché presupposes liberty; it is suitable only for citizens. Not only does it demand
+that French citizens have civic feeling and actually possess the rights of citizens, but, above all, it can be only an idle dream as long as all the territories
+
+272
+under the authority of the French state contain more slaves than citizens.
+Therefore the choice now before us is to make citizens of these slaves, or to
+become slaves ourselves.
+The Distress of Our Time
+Our era is not the first in history in which the dominant feeling is distress,
+anxiety, a sense of waiting for one knows not what, nor the first in which
+men feel they have the painful privilege of being a generation destined for
+an exceptional fate. Since history is past and exists only on paper, it is easy
+to entertain the illusion that all previous periods were peaceful compared
+to the one in which we are now living, just as twenty-year-old adolescents
+always feel they are the first to have ever experienced the anxieties of
+youth. Nevertheless, one can say with no fear of exaggeration that the part
+of humanity in our little corner of Europe that has ruled the world for so
+long is going through a profound and serious crisis. The great hopes inherited fromthe three preceding centuries, especially from the last—hopes
+of a progressive spread of enlightenment, of general well-being, of democracy, of peace-are rapidly crumbling. That would not be so serious if it
+were simply a matter of a disillusionment affecting certain intellectual
+circles, or certain spheres particularly taken up with political and social
+problems. But the conditions under which we live are such that the distress
+touches and taints every aspect of men's lives, every source of action, hope,
+and happiness. Private life, in its daily course, is less and less separated
+from public life, and this is the case in every sphere. There have previously
+been times in history when great collective outbursts temporarily reduced
+private life to insignificance; today, however, it is the enduring conditions
+of our existence that prevent us from finding in daily life any moral resources that are independent of the political and social situation.
+Our feeling of security is profoundly affected. That, however, is not
+something absolutely bad; there can be no security for man on this earth,
+This shortrext, probably written during 1938, was not puhlished until after Weil's death.
+
+273
+and the feeling of security, beyond a certain degree, is a dangerous illusion
+that falsifies everything, that makes minds narrow, limited, superficial,
+and stupidly satisfied; we saw quite a lot of that during the so-called period
+of prosperity, and we still see it in a few-increasingly rare-sectors of
+society in which people feel protected. But the total absence of security,
+especially when the catastrophes to be feared are incommensurable with
+the resources that intelligence, action, and courage might be able to provide, is no more favorable to the health of the soul. We saw an economic
+crisis in several large countries deprive a whole young generation of any
+hope of ever being able to enter into the social structure, earn a living, and
+maintain a family. We have a good chance of shortly seeing a new generation in the same impasse. We saw and we continue to see conditions of
+production that bring on old age-and an old age with no means of support—at forty for people in some social categories. The fear of war —a war
+in which nothing would be left intact —has stopped being a subject of lectures or pamphlets and has become a general preoccupation; it is increasingly becoming a daily preoccupation as civilian life is everywhere
+subordinated to military preparation. Modern means of communication—the press, the radio, the cinema—are powerful enough today to rattle the nerves of an entire nation. Of course, life always defends itself,
+protected by instinct and a certain layer of unconsciousness; nevertheless,
+the fear of great collective catastrophes, awaited as passively as tidal waves
+or earthquakes, increasingly colors the way each man sees his personal
+future.
+Fragment Written after September 1938
+These last few months in France have seen signs of a profound change in
+the way people are thinking. Its consequences cannot as yet be foreseen,
+but the process itself is well worth our attention. Men who only a short
+while ago were democrats, socialists, syndicalists—some well known and
+in positions of authority, othersobscure and powerless—are fairly clearly
+showing that they are not far from wishing that France had a totalitarian
+dictatorship like the one that is enabling Germany to triumph in Europe.
+Perhaps some of them do more than wish it; perhaps they are already
+
+274
+thinking of paving the way for it. And if Russia were a stronger ally, we
+would probably see everyone that we call bourgeois make a corresponding
+shift from horror to love of Russia, as we know some of them have already
+done. Italy suddenly lost the esteem of those who not so very long ago were
+praising the regime almost to the point of adoration. It seems incredible
+that barely two years ago it was hard to imagine a war in which France
+would not be split into two camps, both of which would put doctrine
+ahead of country. So intense were the passions that some people harbored
+for Russia and Republican Spain, and others for Italy and even Germany,
+that one could think, in a mobilized country, they would blot out the concern for defending the country. In two years what changes have taken
+place! Today almost the only thought in anyone's mind is "the Nation."
+Those who are still attached to other ideas are forcing themselves to hold
+on to them, and even so, their attachment to them is less firm than they
+think.
+Thus, among those who don't resist, all other ideas—whether of preserving and increasing the leisure, well-being, and liberty of the people at
+the expense of privilege, or of preserving privileges and the pride that goes
+with them-vanish in the face of the desire to aggrandize the nation.
+Which is not to say that the slightest degree of public spiritedness enters
+into it. It goes without saying that people are still making money in the aircraft industries, to the detriment of the state, just as they did before; some
+make millions; others, modestly, hundreds or tens of thousands of francs.
+But that's not a way of thinking; it's a practice. Likewise, the aircraft
+workers, on their necessarily much lower level, do not, however much they
+hate the Munich policy, want to work sixty hours a week or be paid
+meager wages. It is not interests that one sacrifices to the nation; it israreto
+sacrifice any interests unless some kind of force helps one to do so. What
+one sacrifices are the ideas in the name of which one defended one's interests and which ennobled them by giving them a universal significance.
+However, the sacrifice of ideas after a while leads to the sacrifice of
+interests, for it involves submission to the force that will wipe them out.
+Those who approve of the Munich policy' usually scoff when their opponents speak of humiliation. They are wrong to do this. There really was,
+1 The Munich agreement, signed by France, England, Germany, and Iraly on Seprember
+30, 1938, ceded the Suderenland (the western areas of Czechoslovakia in which the majority of the population was German-speaking) to Germany.
+
+275
+in September, a widespread feeling of humiliation in France; what can be
+better proof of it than the kind of stupor—the normal response to a recent
+humiliation—into which we have all been plunged since then? Bur it is
+quite correct to say that it is not a matter of national humiliation. We were
+humiliated much more deeply than in our attachment to national prestige:
+we all suffered in our innermost selves what is, in truth, the essence of any
+kind of humiliation: the abasement of thought before the power of a fact.
+To try to find the person that one still was yesterday and not be able to, not
+because one has been renewed through some mental or physical effort, but
+because between yesterday and today, without one's having willed it, some
+external event happened—that is what it means to be humiliated. When
+the event in question is due solely to the action of inert matter—a flood, an
+carthquake, an illness—one finds in oneself the means to pull oneself
+together. When what happens is due to a human action, one cannot get
+over it. One realizes that men have the power, if they so desire, to tear our
+thoughts away from the objects to which we used to apply them, and force
+on us, totally and unremittingly, some obsession that is not of our own
+choosing. Such and nothing less is the power of a fact. It dominates all
+our thoughts, and when it does not change their content, it changes their
+coloration.
+So what happened to us in September ?? It's very simple; we saw the war
+as a fact, although it has not yet happened. And at the same time, though
+we still had peace, it no longer seemed to be a fact. During those few weeks
+sume people expected one outcome, others another, and within the same
+person expectations changed several times a day. But I do not believe there
+2 The Munich crisis began on September 15, when Hitler demanded self-determinarion
+for the Suderen Germans and threatened ro attack Czechoslovakia if Britain. France. and
+Czechoslovakia did nor accept his demand. Under pressure trom Britain and France, Who
+feared that a Czech refusal would result in war, the Czechs agreed. Informed of this on
+September 22, Hitler then demanded that the Czechs evacuare the Sudeten areas so thar
+a German military occupation could begin on October 1, and threarened ro arrack Czechoslovakia if his ultimatum were not accepted by 2 r.M. Seprember 28. Czechoslovakia mohilized
+on the twenty-third, and France began a partial mobilization on the wenty-fourth. On
+September 25 Czechoslovakia refused the ultimatum, and both Britain and France said they
+would support their treary obligations if Crechoslovakia were artacked. War scemed inevitable. On the morning of Seprember 28, only a few hours before the ultimatum was due to
+expire, Hitler accepted Mussolini's proposal to invite the Four Powers to meet at Munich the
+next day to try to resolve the Czechoslovakian problem. Britain and France accepted Hirler's
+derands and forced Czechoslovakia, which was not represented ar the meeting, mn accepr by
+saying that if she persisted in her refusal she would have to face Hitler's attack alone.
+
+276
+is anyone who did not at some time feel the presence of war. And now,
+although peace still exists, and perhaps, if fate wills, may still last for a long
+time, we scarcely feel the presence of peace. So, even though we still talk
+about war and peace as we did before, and some people endeavor to say
+the same things about them as they said before, it is no longer the same war
+or the same peace. The idea of war that we once had, which seemed preposterous even when we said it was inevitable, more closely resembles
+peace than whar we think of when we speak of peace today, now that we
+have had a real brush with war. Is it any wonder that the word "nation," so
+long relegated to the cold and indifferent terminology of official vocabulary, today contains an inexhaustible wealth of unanswerable arguments,
+and that the name of France constantly recurs beneath one's pen and on
+one's lips? A country becomes a nation when it takes up arms against
+another or prepares to do so. Is it any wonder that we tend to imagine our
+country's future as an entrenched camp, with no leisure or liberty, and
+with death or torture as punishment for deserters? All of us, either before
+or after 1914, have read in history books or old chronicles frightful accounts that we knew were true, but that even so we could not take for anything but stories. We were wrong, of course, because those atrocities had
+in fact occurred. Without having yet reached it, today we are moving
+toward a condition in which respect for human life and liberty, concern for
+justice and humanity, and the desire to increase leisure, well-being, enlightenment, and every kind of enjoyment among the mass of the people
+will, in their turn, seem like fairy tales to us. We will be just as wrong, and
+we will be wrong in the same way.
+Is it any wonder that a syndicalist, for example, does not give up calling
+himself one, but abandons the ideal that syndicalism stood for and that he
+once professed, in order to apply his thoughts exclusively to defending the
+nation and building up the totalitarian state? It's as if one were amazed to
+find that a man, after having suffered an injury, hates the person who
+injured him, although he did not hate him before; or becomes frightened in
+the face of a danger that he defied when he was only anticipating it. Certainly, virtue consists in feeling no more hatred after an injury than before,
+and no more anxiety prior to a danger than when facing it. But virtue is
+difficult and rare. Today, in regard to affairs of state, virtue requires not
+that one think about the same things as before, but that one keep in mind
+everything that one thought about before. Reason, which is the same thing
+
+• Warand Peace
+277
+as virtue, consists in keeping alive in one's mind, in addition to the present,
+a past and a future that bear no resemblance to it.
+Fragment Written after September 1939
+In order to hold out through all the forms that time may give to this struggle in which the only two major European countries that have remained
+democratic are matched against a totalitarian regime, we need first of all to
+have a clear conscience. Let us not think that because we are less brutal.
+less violent, less inhuman than our opponents we will carry the day. Brutality, violence, and inhumanity have an immense prestige that schoolbooks hide from children, that grown men do not admir, but that everyone bows before. For the opposite virtues to have as much prestige,
+they must be actively and constantly put into practice. Anyone who is
+merely incapable of being as brutal, as violent, and as inhuman as somcone
+else, but who does not practice the opposite virtues, is inferior to that
+person in both inner strength and prestige, and he will not hold out in
+a confrontation.
+Certainly, from a national standpoint, almost all Frenchmen have clear
+consciences. Butthere are several ways of having a clear conscience. A contented bourgeois who is ignorant of the realities of life has a very clear
+conscience; a just man has a clear conscience in a quite different way. Generally, his conscience is less clear, but he has a radiance and a power of
+attraction that the former lacks. Almost all Frenchmen are convinced that,
+in a general way, what France has done, is doing, and will do, apart from
+a few rare and unimportant exceptions, is just and good. But this conviction is theoretical, for it is almost always accompanied by a great deal of
+ignorance; it does not constitute an inner source of energy. Likewise,
+foreigners associate France's name with the great humanitarian idcals and
+the principle of justice so often invoked by her, bur this association is
+hardly more than a habit, a commonplace, and it does not generate an irresistible power of attraction, as we need it to. Anyone who in recent years
+stepped from the territory of a totalitarian country onto French soil found
+himself suddenly able to breathe, whereas before he had been suffocating.
+
+278
+But one could still not say that the atmosphere in our country is really
+impregnated and charged with the ideal in whose name we are fighting. In
+order to fight well it is not enough to defend an absence of tyranny. We
+must be rooted in a milieu in which every activity is really oriented in the
+opposite direction from tyranny. Our domestic propaganda cannot be
+made of words: to be effective, it must consist of dazzling realities.
+Fragment Written after June 1940
+You don't need a tank or an airplane to kill a man. A kitchen knife is
+enough. If those who have had their fill of the Nazi executioners all rise up
+together, at the same time that the armed forces strike the decisive blow,
+deliverance will be swift. But in the meantime we must both refrain from
+squandering human lives needlessly and keep from falling into inertia, believing that the liberation will be carried out by others. Each of us must
+know that one day it will be his duty to take part in it, and hold himself
+in readiness.
+This period of painful waiting is of the utmost importance for the destiny of France. France's future will have been forged by these years of
+apparent passivity.
+We must focus our thoughts, beyond each day's personal sorrows, on
+the immense drama that is being played out in the world; we must prevent
+suffering from causing disunity among Frenchmen through ill humor,
+jealousy, or shabby efforts to have a little more than one's neighbor. On
+the contrary, we must turn suffering into an indissoluble bond through
+generosity and mutual aid. We must think of the precious things we allowed to be lost hecause we did not know how to appreciate them, things
+that we have to regain and that we will have to preserve, things whose
+value we nou know....
+
+• Philosopby
+
+Following the German occupation of Paris in June 1940, Weil and her
+parents fled to the south of France, finally settling in Marseilles, where they
+remained until May 1942. As is reflected in the notebooks she kept during
+the approximately wenty months of her sojourn in Marseilles, she spent
+this time musing deeply on a wide variety of subjects, among them science,
+art, folklore, and religion. In the spring of 1941 she devoted considerable
+thought to science, returning to terrain she had worked in "Science and
+Perception in Descartes," but seeing it from a considerably different perspective. In 1929-30 she had criticized modern science for its elitism, its
+devaluation of ordinary perception and ordinary thinking, its tendency to
+separate itself from the world and to pursue purely abstract systems of
+relationships; she had proposed a conception of science that would make
+it an instrument by means of which all human beings could discover
+for themselves indubitable knowledge of the world and thereby come to
+"possess" —master, be able to act on—the material world. By 1941, however, she was no longer satisfied with the conception of the world as
+mechanical necessity that underlay both the view of science she had criticized and the one she had proposed. "It is true," she wrote in "Classical
+Science and After," a long essay composed in the spring of 194I, "that the
+matter which constitutes the world is a tissue of blind necessities ... ; it is
+true, too, in a sense, that they are absolutely indifferent to spiritual aspirations, indifferent to the good; but also, in another sense, it is not true....
+We are ruled by a double law: an obvious indifference and a mysterious
+complicity, as regards the good, on the part of the matter which composes
+the world; it is because it reminds us of this double law that the spectacle of
+beauty pierces the heart."1
+Weil found in the science of ancient Greece the combination of mathematical rigor and metaphor that corresponded to this "double law." In the
+i On Science, Necessity, and the Love of God (London: Oxford University Press, 1968),
+p. 12.
+
+282
+large place given to the study of proportion in Greek geometry she saw
+both the desire to arrive at an exact mathematical expression of the relationships that constitute the fabric of necessity and the desire to contemplate those relationships as metaphors revealing the nature and the activity
+of the mind of God. The blind necessity revealed in geometry, she wrote,
+"appears to us as a thing to be overcome; for the Greeks it was a thing to
+love, because it is God himself who is the perpetual geometer."2 She turned
+to Greek science, then, as a corrective model for modern science's partial
+and even inhuman representation of the universe-inhuman in that it
+deliberately excluded the aspiration of the human heart toward the good,
+an aspiration that Weil considered to be as real and as factual as "the
+trajectory of a planet."3
+Weil's mature critique of the problems of modern science can be found
+both in "Classical Science and After" and in the last section of The Need
+for Roots, written in London only a few months before her death. The
+informal essay that is translated here—a review of two lectures and the defense of a philosophy dissertation she attended in the spring of 194I—contains a brief summary of her thought on the relationship between modern
+and Greek science and points out the latter's usefulness as a model. The
+other two sections of the essay—on the art and philosophy of China and
+on the philosophy dissertation defense respectively-offer a glimpse of
+Weil's aesthetic thought and a confirmation of the direction of her late
+philosophical movement: back toward Plato, and outward toward "what
+is called the transcendent."
+2 Ibid., p. 21.
+3 The Need for Roots (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1971), p. 243.
+
+In the last few weeks philosophy lovers in Marseilles have had three agreeable occasions on which to meet. The Sociery for Philosophical Studies
+brought its lecture series to a close by evoking the Orient and Greece, two
+wellsprings of wisdom and serenity toward which, fortunately, many
+minds are now being driven because of the distress of the present time. And
+the society's president, M. Gaston Berger, defended his philosophy thesis
+at Aix.
+M. Marcel Brion, who is well known for his studies of aesthetics, among
+other works, took as his subject an extremely interesting parallel between
+the painting and philosophy of China. It has to do, of course, with Taoism.
+Quite appropriately, he mentioned Confucius only in passing; the marvelous passages he cited were all taken from Taoist writings or Buddhist
+writings closely related to Taoism. One immediately felt, on hearing them,
+that the parallel between philosophy and painting was not at all forced, for
+these texts have an obvious relation to artistic thought. Unfortunately, one
+lecture is too short a time to draw such a parallel with sufficient precision,
+and M. Brion stopped at a point at which his audience would have very
+much liked him to continue, for he was just getting to the heart of the
+matter. At least, he left his hearers with the desire to spend a few hours in
+contemplation of Chinese paintings; if that is not possible, they may meditate on Taoist sayings.
+M. Brion spoke in such a way as to arouse in the audience feelings of
+interest in and attraction for the Orient, which he constantly contrasted to
+the West to the latter's disadvantage. Certainly, when one's subject is the
+Orient, there is nothing wrong with contrasting it to the West only in order
+to show its superiority, but this contrast is perhaps emphasized too much.
+Is there really anything that is foreign to us in Oriental thought? If we
+could but realize it, we would recognize that there is in Oriental thought
+Published in Cahiers du Sud, no. 235, May 1941, under the pseudonym "Emile Novis," an
+anagram for "Simone Weil."
+
+284
+that which is most intimate to every one of us. Every Taoist saying awakens a resonance in us, and the Taoist texts evoke by turns Heraclitus,
+Protagoras, Plato, the Cynics, the Stoics, Christianity, and Jean-Jacques
+Rousseau. Not that Taoist thought is not original, profound, and new for
+a European, but like everything truly great, it is both new and familiar; we
+remember, as Plato used to say, having known it on the other side of the
+sky. Isn't this country beyond the sky that Plato remembered the same as
+the one where, according to the texts cited by M. Brion, the wise man
+frolics, beyond the Four Seas, beyond space?
+The same can be said of art. The idea of painting having a connection
+with philosophy is not a new idea for us if we have read Leonardo da Vinci.
+Leonardo may have been the only one in our tradition to say that painting
+is a philosophy that uses lines and colors, but possibly he was not the only
+one to think so. Can real art be anything but a method of establishing a cer-
+:tain relationship between the world and the self, between oneself and the
+self, that is, the equivalent of a philosophy? To be sure, many Western
+artists have thought otherwise, but they are undoubtedly not the greatest.
+Undoubtedly the greatest artists conceived of art as did the painter in the
+marvelous anecdote quoted by M. Brion; having vainly asked the emperor
+to go with him into a painted grotto at the bottom of his picture, he went
+into it alone and never reappeared. One might very well imagine Giotto
+entering into one of his Paduan frescoes in that way. When M. Brion
+speaks of the importance of the void in Chinese painting-"Thirty spokes
+unite in the hub, but it is the empty space at the center that enables the
+wheel to be used," says Lao-Tsu-one also thinks of Giotto, in whose
+work a void in the middle of a fresco often has such a powerful effect. The
+Chinese reject symmetry, whereas we take delight in it, because, according
+to M. Brion, they chose the tree as the model of equilibrium and we, following the Greeks, chose the human body; but the quest for equilibrium is
+common to both kinds of art, and that makes them more related than they
+are different. Chinese painters, according to M. Brion, have such a need for
+the infinite that it compels them to handle perspective in a peculiar way
+and to almost dissolve forms; the Greeks, on the other hand, looked for the
+definite, the limited, everywhere; nevertheless, the same human need is involved. Man cannot get over regretting that he has not been given the
+infinite, and he has more than one way of fabricating, with the finite, an
+equivalent of the infinite for himself-which is perhaps the definition of
+
+285
+art. But the highest praise that can be given M. Brion's talk is that, while
+presenting Chinese art as foreign, he makes it seem so closely akin to us.
+M. CORNIl, Dean of the Faculty of Medicine, carried us back to the
+Golden Age of Greece when he spoke to us about Hippocrates. He is well
+qualified to do so, being a doctor who reflects on his art and on matters
+beyond his art; and a doctor of today deserves more credit for acquiring
+a broad culture than a Greek doctor, now that theage itself locks everyone,
+almost by force, into a specialty. M. Cornil made Hippocrates seem not remote from us, but close at hand, an easy thing to do when one knows and
+understands him, for what is closer to us than Greece? It is closer to us than
+we ourselves. It is doubtful that we have a single important idea that the
+Greeks did not have a clear conception of; M. Cornil reminded us, for
+example, that they had a clear conception of evolution.
+Hippocrates had the idea of the experimental method as clearly as any
+man in the succeeding centuries, if not more so, as is shown by the splendid
+quotation judiciously chosen by M. Cornil.
+I commend reasoning when it is based on experience and methodically orders
+the sequence of phenomena. If it starts with the facts as they have obviously
+taken place, it discovers the truth through the power of the meditation that
+lays stress on each particular object and then classifieseach of them according
+to the way they naturally follow one another.... I believe that every art is
+based on the method of observing all the facts individually and then grouping
+them according to their similarities.
+M. Cornil made it quite evident that Hippocrates' greatness consists not
+in his fondness for experiment, for there were a number of excellent empiricists in his time, nor in his liking for philosophy, for a number of
+philosophers talked at length about medicine, but in his methodical use of
+philosophical thought, and especially Pythagorean thought, for an ongoing investigation of experience.
+The Pythagorean method, as set forth in the Philebus, ' requires that in
+every instance one try to find definite objects, if possible defined by ratios,
+countable, if need be merely theoretical, in order to classify the innumer-
+¡ For Socrares' description of the Pythagorean merhod, see Plaro's Philebus 16c-c, 18h d.
+23C-25C.
+
+286
+able varieties of particular cases. This method still dominates science
+today. The Hippocratic theory of the four humors and the theory of the
+critical days in illnesses are among its applications. Also supremely
+Pythagorean is Hippocrates' principal idea, namely, that health and illness
+are defined by relationships—relationships between the soul and the body,
+berween the parts of the body, humors, organs, and functions, and between man and his environment—and that, when these relationships are
+in balance, in harmony, there is health. That is an insight that we are far
+from having exhausted. We are able to understand it better now than we
+could fifty years ago, for today the idea of totality is reappearing everywhere in science: in biology and medicine, where Hippocrates has been
+restored to a place of honor; in physics, where they are beginning to conceive of studying a phenomenon as a whole, including the instruments
+used in measuring it; and in mathematics, where they are starting to base
+everything on the theory of aggregates and the theory of groups. But so far
+this development in science is producing mostly trouble and confusion. We
+lack the virtue and the intelligence needed to raise us to the level of Greece,
+where all forms of thought were united.
+In one sense, Greek science is much closer to our own than we think, and
+it is anything but a rough outline. The Epinomis? defines geometry as the
+science of generalized number; some Greek astronomers hypothesized
+that the earth was a sphere and that the earth and the planets moved
+around the sun; Eudoxus, the inventor of the integral calculus, had conceived of combining several movements in a single trajectory; Archimedes
+founded mechanics with the theory of the lever and physics by searching
+for something analogous to the lever in natural phenomena. But in another
+sense we are a long way from Greek science, which is far above us; for its
+branches are interrelated, and in its entirety it is related to every form of
+thought.
+Among the Greeks, epic poetry, drama, architecture, sculpture, the conception of the universe and the laws of nature, astronomy, mechanics,
+physics, politics, medicine, and the idea of virtue all have at their center the
+idea of balance that goes with proportion, the soul of geometry. With this
+idea of balance, which we have lost, the Greeks created science, our
+science. Imbalance was inconceivable to them except as something that
+2 Geometry is defined as an "assimilation to one another of numbers which are naturally
+dissimilar, effected by reference to areas" (Epinomis 990d).
+
+287
+comes after equilibrium, in relation to it, as a breaking of the equilibrium;
+illness, for example, as a disturbance of health. We, on the contrary, tend
+to consider health as a special case of illness, a borderline case that marks
+the limits of illness. This way of looking at things, extended to psychology,
+accounts for a great deal of the baseness of soul that is so widespread in our
+era. In Greece, the idea of balance gave every type of scientific research an
+orientation toward the good, and medicine, of course, more than any
+other. M. Cornil showed by numerous quotations that for Hippocrates,
+virtue and something approaching sanctity were part of the definition of
+the real doctor.
+There can be no question of our returning to Greece, for France has
+never been in contact with Greek civilization, except perhaps at the time of
+Vercingetorix. Vercingetorix was conquered, and the Druids, who may
+have taught doctrines similar to those of Pythagoras, were massacred by
+the Emperor Claudius. Bur if we were worthy of it, it might be possible for
+us to go toward Greece. A lecture like the one given by M. Cornil may help
+to plant a desire to do so.
+M. BERGER'S defense of his thesis also carried us back to Greece. Not that
+the subject particularly had to do with Greece; the minor thesis was on the
+great contemporary German philosopher Husserl, and the main thesis was
+an original work by M. Berger on the conditions of knowledge. But in following the discussion—which M. Berger's exceptional clariry of mind
+made easy to do, despite one's not having read the book under discussion —one could not help thinking of Plato. M. Berger's method is not to
+ask himself whether an idea or an assertion he has encountered is true, but
+to ask what it means; this is the same method that Socrates used. "If we
+were clever ..., we would contend like the sophists do, opposing assertions with assertions; but we, simple people that we are, first want to
+consider what these things that we think, in themselves and by themselves,
+can really be." This is also the method of all the philosophers descended
+from Platonism, such as Descartes or Kant, but they did not state it formally, and did not realize it clearly enough, and that worked against them.
+3 Weil seems to be referring to the Platonic-Pythagorean teaching that "any compound,
+whatever it be, that does not by some means or orher exhibit measure and proportion" has no
+value at all, and is not even a real mixrurc, bur "a miserable mass of unmixed messiness." The
+presence of measure and proportion are chus characteristics of che good. See Philebus
+6411-65b.
+
+288
+To tell the truth, there can be only two kinds of philosophers, those
+who use this method and those who construct a representation of the universe to their liking; the latter alone can be said, strictly speaking, to have
+systems, whose value consists only in a certain poetic beauty, and especially in the marvelously penetrating formulas scattered through some of
+them, as is the case with Aristotle and Hegel. But the former are the true
+masters of thought, and one does well to follow in their footsteps, as
+M. Berger does. His method enables him to eliminate meaningless problems; he refuses to pose the problem of whether or not knowledge has any
+valuc because knowledge is given, is intermingled with thought, and the
+thinking being cannot escape from it; he refuses to pose the problem of the
+existence of objective reality, because a reality outside ourselves is given at
+the same time as our own; it is just as impossible to reject, and we continually experience it. That is an excellent starting point.
+The extraordinary thing is that the philosophies that follow this method
+are all oriented toward salvation; M. Berger is no exception to this rule.
+Thinking it was original, someone drew attention to M. Berger's view that
+philosophic reflection depends on an effort of detachment that goes beyond the intelligence and involves the whole man; but this is pure Plato.
+"One must turn toward the truth with one's whole soul." Besides, to be
+original on that point is not to think differently from Plato; it is to do on
+one's own account what Plato did twenty-five centuries ago, and indeed
+turn toward the truth with one's whole soul.
+Of course, without having read and examined M. Berger's book closely,
+one cannot ascertain whether or not the ideas it contains are really presented, each in its turn, in such a way as to reveal their meaning, or whether
+it carries the imprint of a soul entirely turned toward truth. In any case,
+M. Berger defended himself quite well, without being afraid to say what he
+thought about objections that did not always seem very pertinent. For
+example, someone thought he detected a tendency to mysticism and an
+attraction to Hindu thought in M. Berger's book; this was pointed out
+with a shade of reproach, as if there were heresies in philosophy. No
+doubt, with us mysticism and the Orient are often a cover for shoddy
+merchandise, but that is through no fault of their own. If one wanted to
+rule out attempts to conceive of what is called the transcendental, one
+would have to admit only those whom Plato called the uninitiated. Fortunately, things haven't come to that at the university, since M. Berger was
+
+289
+granted the title of doctor cum laude. And, what is heartening, the discussion was attentively followed by a large number of students in this city of
+Aix where the yellow stones, the lovely little squares, and the young people
+who fill the streets make one think of some Italian university of the
+Renaissance.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/8f20b52feb0ab5e0c79311a8b5718018de289a0675240cb7c7084e325480a1e9.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/8f20b52feb0ab5e0c79311a8b5718018de289a0675240cb7c7084e325480a1e9.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..875e6191218be8e378786788e421e411f772e75c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/8f20b52feb0ab5e0c79311a8b5718018de289a0675240cb7c7084e325480a1e9.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -5753,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "8f20b52feb0ab5e0c79311a8b5718018de289a0675240cb7c7084e325480a1e9",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1255,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "0f56c0f9f3e82fb49cda18ef30d3b0246393c87999fd7dda45043c0b22190722",
+  "output_sha256": "199a5c83d4a8dbda5bcc210e0ef648810acafcc8fbd43f926e71e3fde8c85c01",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/a74d05ce49a30b1f6a7db815314eb33a89db895ca02fbd36207dea5155e38243.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/a74d05ce49a30b1f6a7db815314eb33a89db895ca02fbd36207dea5155e38243.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..644d03975c25ad32f662e05d861f4866ef849e7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/a74d05ce49a30b1f6a7db815314eb33a89db895ca02fbd36207dea5155e38243.md
@@ -0,0 +1,9077 @@
+Understanding
+Computers and
+Cognition
+A
+New
+Foundation
+forDesign
+TERRY WINOGRAD
+FERNANDO FLORES
+Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.
+Reading, Massachusetts Menlo Park, California New York
+Don Mills, Ontario Wokingharn, England Amsterdam
+Bonn
+Sydney Singapore Tokyo Madrid San Juan
+
+Contents
+Preface
+Acknowledgments
+XI
+xiii
+PART I - Theoretical Background
+1
+Introduction
+1.1
+The question of design
+1.2 The role of tradition
+1.3
+Our path
+2
+2.2
+2,3
+2.4
+The rationalistic tradition
+2. 1 The rationalistic orientation.
+Language, truth, and the world
+Decision making and problem solving
+Cognitive science
+3
+Understanding and Being
+3.1 Hermeneutics
+3.2 Understanding and ontology.
+3.3 An illustration of thrownness
+3.4 Breaking down and readiness-to-hand
+4 Cognition as a biological phenomenon
+4.1 The closure of the nervous system
+4.2 Autopoiesis, evolution, and learning
+4.3 The cognitive domain
+4.4 Consensual domains
+4.5 The observer and description
+4.6 Domains of explanation
+"
+3
+4
+7
+8
+14
+14
+" 17
+20
+23
+27
+27
+30
+33
+36
+38
+41
+44
+46
+48
+50
+52
+V
+
+vi
+CONTENTS
+5 Language, listening, and commitment
+5..1 Listening in a background
+5.2 Meaning, commitment, and speech acts
+5.3 Objectivity and tradition
+5.4 Recurrence and formalization
+5.5 Breakdown, language, and existence
+6 Towards a new orientation
+6.1 Cognition and being in the world.
+6.2 Knowledge and representation.
+6..3 Pre-understanding and background.
+6.4 Language and action
+6.5
+Breakdown and the ontology of design
+54
+54
+58
+60
+64
+68
+70
+70
+72
+74
+76
+77
+PART II - Computation, Thought, and Language
+7 Computers and representation
+7.1
+7.2
+7.3
+Programming as representation
+Levels of representation
+Can computers do more than you tell them to do?
+8
+Computation and intelligence
+8.1 Why do we ask?
+8,2
+Intelligence as rational problem solving
+8.3
+The phenomenon of blindness
+8.4
+What about learning and evolution?
+8.5
+Can pigs have wings?
+9 Understanding language
+9..1 Artificial intelligence and language understanding.
+9.2
+The problem of background..
+9.3
+Understanding as pattern recognition
+9.4
+What does it mean to understand?.
+10 Current directions in artificial intelligence
+10.1 The forking of the paths.
+10.2 Expert systems
+10.3 The fifth generation computer system
+83
+84
+86
+90
+93
+93
+95
+97
+100
+104
+107
+107
+111
+115
+119
+125
+126
+131
+133
+
+CONTENTS
+PART III - Design
+11 Management and conversation
+11.1 Management and decision making
+11.2 Decision making and resolution.
+11,3
+Organizations as networks of commitments
+11.4 Decision support systems
+11,5 Tools for conversation
+12 Using computers: A direction for design
+12.1 A background for computer design
+12.2 A design example.
+12,3 Systematic domains
+12,4 Technology and transformation
+Bibliography
+Name Index
+Subject Index
+Vii
+143
+144
+147
+150
+152
+157
+163
+164
+167
+174
+177
+181
+191
+194
+
+For the people of Chile
+
+Preface
+This is a book about the design of computer technology. In it, we look
+closely at computers as they exist today and we set out new directions
+for future development.. The discourse presented here, however, is not
+what one would expect to find in a book of science and engineering. It
+moves among topics and purposes that appear to be worlds apart: it is
+both theoretical and practical; it is concerned with computer technology
+and with the nature of human existence; with the philosophy of language
+and with office automation. But it is more than a study in contrasts.
+Our intention in bringing together these diverse elements is to generate
+understanding-to let the apparent chasms become spaces in which new
+possibilities are revealed.
+All new technologies develop within the background of a tacit
+under standing of human nature and human work. The use of technology in
+turn leads to fundamental changes in what we do, and ultimately in what it
+is to be human. We encounter the deep questions of design when we
+recognize that in designing tools we are designing ways of being. By
+confronting these questions directly, we can develop a new background for
+understanding computer technology-one that can lead to important
+advances in the design and use of computer systems.
+When we began the collaboration that led to this book, we had no idea
+where our discussions would lead. We had lived through very different experiences; we spoke different languages (both literally and metaphorically);
+and we had studied in disparate fields, Terry Winograd has been actively
+engaged for many years in computer science and artificial intelligence research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University,
+and the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center.. His work has consisted primarily of designing systems (both formal languages and computer programs)
+for the representation and analysis of language and knowledge. Fernando
+Flores has had experience with social and political organization at the
+highest level of government, in his posts as director of the state-owned
+corporations, Minister of Economics, and Minister of Finance in the government of Salvador Allende in Chile between 1970 and 1973. He was
+xi
+
+xii
+instrumental in a large-scale project to apply cybernetic theory to practical management problems (see Beer,
+Platform for Change,
+1975) and is
+primarily interested in the understanding of social reality that we can gain
+through combining theory and practice. In spite of these differences, we
+had a sense that we shared much in our understanding of the world, and we
+entered into a dialog to explore this common ground. The dialog evolved
+into a paper, the paper in turn expanded and became a book, and the
+book evolved through a series of drafts whose focus shifted dramatically..
+In our reading and discussions, we came to the realization that although
+our formal training was in the technical fields of mathematics and computer science, many of our guiding intuitions about language and thought
+were not compatible with the traditions in those disciplines, We found
+ourselves in much closer accord with writers who were far removed from
+the mathematico-logical paradigm, who identified their interests as
+biology, hermeneutics, and phenomenology. One of the initial attractions
+this work was the understanding it provided of the larger human context
+in which the study of cognition has meaning. What surprised us was that
+the ideas were so relevant to the practical work in which we are engaged:
+the design of computer systems and the management of complex organizations. The philosophical ideas of thinkers such as Heidegger, Gadamer,
+Maturana, and Austin provided a framework to integrate what we had
+previously learned through our practical experience.
+As we studied further, we began to formulate new theoretical founda
+for the design of computer technologies. In working to clarify the
+and role of computers we were forced to reject many assumptions
+tions
+nature
+that we had
+long accepted implicitly and that go unquestioned in most discussions of
+computing. We had to address new questions, and these in turn
+led to looking
+more carefully at what people actually
+do with computers, and what might
+be done better.
+Readers with a background in science and technology may find it implausible that philosophical considerations have practical relevance for
+their work. Philosophy may be an amusing diversion, but it seems that
+the theories relevant to technological development are those of the hard
+sciences and engineering. We have found quite the opposite,. Theories
+about the nature of biological existence, about language, and about the
+nature of human action have a profound influence on the shape of what
+we build and how we use it. We have accordingly devoted a considerable
+amount of space, especially in the first part of the book, to discussing
+matters that appear unrelated to computers but that are nonetheless indispensable in the process of opening up for the reader new possibilities
+and new directions for what we can do with them.
+In the course of developing a new understanding we came across questions that have long been the subject of debate, such as "Can computers
+
+xiii
+think?", "Can computers understand language?", and "What is rational
+decision-making?" We address these questions not so much to solve them
+to dissolve
+hem They arise in a background of understanding abou
+human
+thought and language, a background that itself needs to be re
+examined and revised.
+In the end, we are not concerned with providing
+new answers to questions about
+technology as they have traditionally been
+posed. We look towards new questions that
+can lead to the design and use of machines that are suited to human purposes.
+Our book is intended for a wide audience-not just those who are
+professionally involved in computer research, design, and production, or
+working in related fields such as cognitive psychology, linguistics,
+science. We address everyone (expert and layperson
+scholars
+and management
+alike) who has a serious interest
+in understanding what computers are and how they fit into our lives.
+Although we devote a good deal of attention to philosophical background, we have not attempted to make this a scholarly book. Our intention is to lead the reader through some of the intellectual pathways
+that shaped our own understanding, and this process is by necessity selective. We do not attempt to trace historical antecedents, to assign proper
+credit for originality, or to point out the many other thinkers 'who have
+dealt with the same topics in related ways. In fact, much of what we cite is
+from books intended to provide popularized accounts and from articles appearing in the popular press. The concern about what computers can do is
+not an abstract conundrum to be puzzled over for intellectual amusement,
+but a practical question at the center of a significant discourse in society
+as a whole. The answer as understood by the public (including those who
+make political and business decisions) is ultimately more significant than
+the twists and tums of academic debate. By dealing with the understanding that appears in the public discourse about computing, we can better
+achieve what we have set out to do-to reveal the pre-understanding we
+and others bring to computer technology and by doing so to open a new
+clearing in which to glimpse future paths for design.
+Acknowledgments
+In developing this book over a number of years, we have benefited from
+discussions with many people, including Jean Bamberger, Chauncey Bell,
+Daniel Bobrow, Aaron Cicourel, Werner Erhard, Michael Graves, Heinz
+von Foerster, Anatol Holt, Rob Kling, George Lakoff, Juan Ludlow, Donald Norman, Donald Schon, John Searle, Francisco Varela, and students
+in a series of seminars at Stanford University. We are especially grate
+ful to Ralph Cherubini, Hubert Dreyfus, Anne Gardner, Elihu Gerson,
+
+XiV
+Humberto Maturana, Brian Smith, Peter Stokoe, and Paul Trachtman
+for extended and insightful commentaries on earlier drafts. Our dialogs
+with them have been the source of much of our understanding, and we
+appreciate their efforts and concern. Richard Ogle's probing discussion
+and editorial assistance were vital to the completion of the manuscript.
+This work was made possible by support to Terry Winograd from the
+System Development Foundation and from Stanford University's Center
+for the Study of Language and Information. We owe profound gratitude
+those people at Stanford and in Amnesty International whose efforts
+freedom possible for Fernando Flores. These include George Dantzig, Richard
+Fagen, Robert Floyd, and Charles Meyer.
+Finally, we want to acknowledge the people of Chile for their courage to
+open new conversations for possibility and for their strength in times of
+From them we have learned much about language, about meaning,
+about living.
+made
+trial.
+Terry Winograd
+Fernando Flores
+Palo Alto, California
+July, 1985
+
+PART I
+Theoretical Background
+
+Chapter 1
+Introduction
+Computers are everywhere. The versatile silicon chip has found a place
+our homes, our schools, our work, and our leisure. We must cope with
+flood of new devices, bringing with them both benefits and dangers.
+Popular books and magazines proclaim that we are witnessing a
+'com puter revolution,' entering a 'micro-millennium' in which computers
+will completely transform our lives.
+We search for images that can help us anticipate computer impacts and
+direct further development. Are computers merely giant adding machines
+or are they electronic brains? Can they only do 'programmed' rote tasks
+or can we expect them to learn and create? The popular discourse about
+these questions draws heavily on the analogy between computation and
+human thought:
+While many areas of human endeavor have currently seemed
+to flounder-such as understanding and dealing with economic
+systems or correcting social injustices-research and technical
+developments in the scientific field of artificial intelligence have
+exploded... Asa result, artificial-intelligence researchers are
+developing computers that can listen to spoken sentences and
+grasp their meaning; that can read news stories and write succinct, accurate, grammatical summaries; that employ robots,
+who never get bored, to work on assembly lines; that assemble
+data about a sick person-and suggest a diagnosis,- Stockton,
+"Creating computers to think like humans" (1980), p. 41.
+In five or six years-by 1988 or thereabouts-portable, quasihuman brains, made of silicon or gallium arsenide, will be commonplace. They will be an intelligent electronic race, working
+3
+
+4
+as partners with the human race. We will carry these small
+creatures around with us everywhere. Just pick them up, tuck
+them under your arm, and go off to attend to your business.
+They will be Artoo-Detoos without wheels: brilliant, but
+nice personalities, never sarcastic, always giving you a straight
+answer-little electronic friends that can solve all your problems. - Jastrow, "The thinking computer" (1982), p. 107..
+We are about to embark on a massive programme to develop
+highly intelligent machines, a process by which we will lead
+computers by the hand until they reach our own intellectual
+level, after which they will proceed to surpass us... But
+what will we do with the Ultra-Intelligent Machines when they
+arrive? Clearly, the first thing would be to put them to work on
+some of the numerous problems facing society. These could be
+economic, medical or educational matters, and also, perhaps,
+strategic modelling to forecast trends and produce early warnings of difficulties or crises...
+It is unlikely that there will be
+any serious objections to this apart from those of an emotional
+or doctrinaire nature.
+- Evans, The Micro Millennium
+(1979),
+pp. 195-196,229.
+But focussing on the image of 'computer as brain' can lead us away
+from the important questions. The concern with giving computers humanlike
+(or god-like) intelligence rests on a more fundamental discourse about the
+nature of technology and of human thinking, language, and being. This
+discourse has unfolded within a tradition-a way of understanding-that
+deeply rooted in modern technological society.
+In examining this tradition, we came to realize that although it provides
+a fertile background for developing new technology, it does not support
+an adequate understanding of what computer devices
+do in a context of
+human practice. We were led to a broad critique of what has been said
+about computers, and what has been done in disciplines such as linguistics,
+psychology, and management science. We developed a new orientation that
+provides an alternative basis for understanding computer technology.
+1.1 The question of design
+In order to understand the phenomena surrounding a new technology, we
+must open the question of
+design-the interaction between understanding
+and creation.. In speaking here of design, we are not restricting our concern
+to the methodology of conscious design. We address the broader question
+of how a society engenders inventions whose existence in turn alters that
+
+1.1. THE QUESTION OF DESIGN
+society. We need to establish a theoretical basis for looking at what the
+devices do, not just how they operate
+In order to develop such a theoretical basis we must step back and
+examine the implicit understanding of design that guides technological
+development within our existing tradition of thought. Only by
+unconcealing that tradition and making explicit its assumptions can we
+open ourselves to alternatives and to the new design possibilities that flow
+from them. The remainder of this introduction provides a guide to how we
+have undertaken that task in this book.
+We can illustrate the kind of questioning we have in mind by seriously
+asking "What is a word processor?" The first thing to recognize is that
+different answers grow from the concerns of different individuals For the
+manager of a factory that builds word processors, they are assemblies of
+electronic and mechanical devices, to be constructed, tested, and shipped
+the person who programs the word processor, it is a particular collection of
+software, dealing with the input, storage, and output of bytes
+information. It operates through some kind of interface to a user who
+generates and modifies that information.
+These are both perfectly valid answers, arising in particular domains
+to which the theories of computation and electronics are relevant. If we
+want to understand a breakdown of the hardware or software, we operate
+in their terms and turn to them for predictions. But these answers do not
+deal with what a word processor does-with the fact that it is a medium
+for the creation and modification of linguistic structures that play a role in
+human communication. For the purchaser of a word processor, this is the
+relevant domain, The word processor exists as a collection of hardware or
+programs only when it breaks down.' In its use, one is concerned with
+the actions of creating and modifying documents and producing physical
+presentations of them on a screen or printed page. The relevant domain
+is not a computational one, but one that emerged long ago with the first
+writing instruments It brings with it concerns of visual presentationissues of layout, type fonts, and integration of text with illustrations. Many
+current computer products are designed with a primary concern for this
+domain. They deal at length with formats and typography, focussing on
+the document as the thing being produced
+But still with this, we have not reached a full understanding of the word
+processor. We cannot take the activity of writing as an independent phenomenon. Writing is an instrument-a tool we use in our interactions with
+other people. The computer, like any other medium, must be understood
+in the context of communication and the larger network of equipment and
+'As we will see in later chapters, this includes the initial breakdown implicit in the
+condition of unreadzness
+that calls for buying and assembling a new system
+For
+
+6
+CHAPTER 1
+INTRODUCTION
+practices in which it is situated A person who sits down at a word
+processor is not just creating a document, but is writing a letter or a memo or
+a book. There is a complex social network in which these activities make
+sense, It includes institutions (such as post offices and publishing
+companies), equipment (including word processors and computer networks,
+but also all of the older technologies with which they coexist), practices
+(such as buying books and reading the daily mail), and conventions (such as
+the legal status of written documents).
+The significance of a new invention lies in how it fits into and changes
+this network, Many innovations are minor-they simply improve some
+aspect of the network without altering its structure. The automatic transmission made automobiles easier to use, but did not change their role.
+Other inventions, such as the computer, are radical innovations that cannot be understood in terms of the previously existing network. The printing press, the automobile, and television are all examples of radical innovations that opened up whole new domains of possibilities for the network of
+human interactions. Just as the automobile had impacts on our society far
+beyond speeding up what had been done with horses, the use of computers
+will lead to changes far beyond those of a fancy typewriter. The nature of
+publishing, the structure of communication within organizations, and the
+social organization of knowledge will all be altered, as they were with the
+emergence of other technologies for language, such as the printing press.
+One might think that the questioning can stop at this point. It is clear
+(and has been widely recognized) that one cannot understand a technology without having a functional understanding of how it is used. Furthermore, that understanding must incorporate a
+holistic view of the network
+of technologies and activities into which it fits, rather than treating the
+technological devices in isolation, But this is still not enough. We can
+say that the word processor must be understood by virtue of the role it
+plays in communication, the distribution of information, and the accumulation of knowledge. But in doing so we take for granted the use of
+words like 'communication, 'information,' and 'knowledge,' which themselves require closer examination. In this examination, we find ourselves
+being drawn into inquiries about basic human phenomena that have been
+called things like 'intelligence, "language,' and 'rationality.'
+As the use of a new technology changes human practices, our ways of
+speaking about that technology change our language and our understanding, This new way of speaking in turn creates changes in the world we
+construct,, As an example of how new language creates new possibilities
+for action, consider Freud's introduction of terms such as 'ego,' 'subconscious,' and 'repression.' At one level we might say that he recognized and
+labelled phenomena that had always existed. But the innovation in his
+language had a major impact on human society, in everything from the
+
+1.2. THE ROLE OF TRADITION
+7
+way we treat deviants (such as prisoners and the mentally ill) to the way we
+teach our children.
+Looking at computers we find the same process at work. The development of the technology has led to new uses of terms such as "information,'
+'input, "output,' 'language,' and 'communication,' while work in areas
+such as artificial intelligence is bringing new meanings to words like 'intelligence,' "decision,' and 'knowledge.! The technical jargon gives shape to
+our commonsense understanding in a way that changes our lives.
+In order to become aware of the effects that computers have on society
+we must reveal the implicit understanding of human language, thought,
+and work that serves as a background for developments in computer technology. In this endeavor we are doubly concerned with language. First,
+we are studying a technology that operates in a domain of language. The
+computer is a device for creating, manipulating, and transmitting symbolic (hence linguistic) objects. Second, in looking at the impact of the
+computer, we find ourselves thrown back into questions of language-how
+practice shapes our language and language in turn generates the space of
+possibilities for action.
+This book, then, is permeated by a concern for language. Much of our
+theory is a theory of language, and our understanding of the computer
+centers on the role it will play in mediating and facilitating linguistic action
+as the essential human activity. In asking what computers can do, we
+are drawn into asking what people do with them, and in the end into
+addressing the fundamental question of what it means to be human.
+1.2 The role of tradition
+One cannot approach questions like those raised in the previous section
+from a neutral or objective standpoint. Every questioning grows out of a
+tradition-a pre-understanding that opens the space of possible answers.
+We use the word tradition' here in a broad sense, without the connotation
+that it belongs to a cohesive social or cultural group, or that it consists of
+particular customs or practices. It is a more pervasive, fundamental phenomenon that might be called a 'way of being.' In trying to understand a
+tradition, the first thing we must become aware of is how it is concealed
+by its obviousness. It is not a set of rules or sayings, or something we
+will find catalogued in an encyclopedia. It is a way of understanding, a
+background, within which we interpret and act We use the word "tradition' because it emphasizes the historicity of our ways of thinking the
+fact that we always exist within a pre-understanding determined by the
+history of our interactions with others who share the tradition.
+
+When we encounter people who live in a substantially different tradition, we are struck by the impression that they have a strange and apparently arbitrary 'world view.' It takes a careful self-awareness to turn the
+same gaze on our own lives and 'unconceal' our own tradition-to bring
+into conscious observation that which invisibly gives shape to our thought.
+In examining how people have thought about and talked about computers, we become aware of the pervasive effect of a powerful tradition that
+emphasizes "information,'
+'representation,' and
+'decision making.' This
+tradition has been the basis for a great deal of technological progress and
+has also led to many of the problems created by the use of computers.
+in discussions of what computers can and cannot do, the questions
+posed reflect a particular blindness about the nature of human
+and language-a blindness that can lead to a broad misunder
+the role that will be played by computers.
+We have labelled this tradition the 'rationalistic tradition' because of
+its emphasis on particular styles of consciously rationalized thought and
+action. In calling it 'rationalistic' we are not equating it with 'rational!'
+We are not interested in a defense of irrationality or a mystic appeal to nonrational intuition. The rationalistic tradition is distinguished by its narrow
+focus on certain aspects of rationality, which (as we will show throughout
+the book) often leads to attitudes and activities that are not rational when
+viewed in a broader perspective, Our commitment is to developing a new
+ground for rationality-one that is as rigorous as the rationalistic tradition
+in its aspirations but that does not share the presuppositions behind it.
+The task we have undertaken in this book is to challenge the ratio
+nalistic tradition, introducing an alternative orientation that can lead to
+asking new questions. In developing this new orientation, we were led to
+a critique of the current mythology of artificial intelligence and its related
+cognitive theories, drawing conclusions that contradict the naive optimism
+apparent in the quotations at the beginning of the chapter., Our ultimate
+goal, however, is not a debunking but a redirection. The alternative we
+pose is not a position in a debate about whether or not computers will be
+intelligent, but an attempt to create a new understanding of how to design
+computer tools suited to human use and human purposes.
+1.3 Our path
+Our intention is to provide an opportunity for the reader to develop a new
+orientation. No book can embody the result of such a process, but through
+entering a dialog with the reader we can help make it possible. We have
+attempted to do this in three steps. First we present some previous work
+that challenges the theoretical assumptions of the rationalistic tradition,
+calling into question much of what is normally taken for granted in our
+it
+Even
+that are
+thought
+standing of
+
+9
+tradition. Next we carefully examine, from the orientation developed in the
+rst part, the phenomena that have emerged in the practice of computer
+technology, Finally, we suggest some alternative directions for the design of
+computer-based tools.
+Part I of the book (Chapters 1-6) describes the rationalistic tradition
+and presents three distinct bodies of work, each of which stands in contrast
+to that tradition and each of which has deeply influenced our own understanding. We do not attempt to provide a philosophical exposition and
+critique in which arguments for and against each position are enumerated
+and weighed. We find it more fruitful to present the central points, listening for their relevance to our own concerns. Our discourse is theoretical
+in that it deals with fundamental questions, but it is not directed towards
+postulating formal theories that can be systematically used to make predictions. As will become clear, one of the most prominent illusions of
+the rationalistic tradition is the belief that knowledge consists of explicit
+theories of that sort.
+Chapter 2 describes the rationalistic tradition in some detail, showing
+how it serves as a basis for our culture's commonsense understanding of
+language, thought, and rationality. Our goal is to reveal biases and assumptions that are concealed by their embodiment in the background of
+our language..
+Chapter 3 deals with a tradition that includes
+hermeneutics (the study
+of interpretation) and phenomenology (the philosophical examination of
+the foundations of experience and action). This tradition has emerged
+from humanistic studies, and is concerned with the relation of the individual to the context-especially the social context-in which he or, she lives.
+It emphasizes those areas of human experience where individual interpretation and intuitive understanding (as opposed to logical deduction and
+conscious reflection) play a central role. Its exponents challenge the belief
+that a formal analytical understanding of these phenomena is possible at
+all.
+We concentrate on the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Martin Heidegger Many other philosophers have explored related ideas, including
+phenomenologists such as Husserl, Ricoeur, and Merleau-Ponty, existentialists such as Sartre, pragmatists such as Mead and Dewey, current political philosophers such as Habermas and Apel, and even some with a more
+analytic background, such as Wittgenstein,. We have selected Heidegger
+and Gadamer, partly because of the role their writings played in our own
+learning, and partly because of their intrinsic importance within the tradition they represent. Heidegger stands out as the modern philosopher who
+has done the most thorough, penetrating, and radical analysis of everyday
+experience. His ideas lie at the root of much of what other philosophers
+have said, and at the root of our own orientation. Gadamer has been
+fi
+
+10
+most articulate in applying this orientation to the problem of language, a
+problem that we see as central.. Since it was not our intention to produce
+a work of philosophical scholarship, we do not attempt to draw connec
+tions between the discourse developed by these two philosophers and the
+many others that preceded and followed them Our aim is to bring out
+the relevant distinctions in the clearest possible way, by focussing on their
+central insights.
+Chapter 4 presents the work of Humberto R. Maturana, a Chilean
+neurobiologist most widely known for his work on the neurophysiology
+vision. His background is that of a biologist, not a philosopher, and he
+deals first and foremost with the nature of biological organisms as
+mechanistic structure-determined systems.
+His work was critical in
+the development of our understanding of cognition and of our perspective
+on the rationalistic tradition.
+Writers like Heidegger challenge the dominant view of mind, declaring
+that cognition is not based on the systematic manipulation of representations, This perspective has been the basis for several critiques of artificial
+intelligence that initially have a kind of mystical feel to those within
+the scientific community. In questioning the common understanding of
+the relationship among perception, representation, and thought, these accounts seem at first sight to deny the physical basis of human action.
+Maturana provides two useful insights that let us escape from this limited pre-understanding: the role of the observer in creating
+phenomenal
+domains; and the concept of
+structural coupling,
+which allows us to
+understand behavior that is mechanically generated but not programmed.
+As a biologist, Maturana sets out a conceptual framework in which
+phe nomena of interpretation arise as a necessary consequence of the
+structure of biological beings. At the same time, he compels us to acquire
+a new understanding of the way we talk about physical nature and to apply
+this understanding to ourselves.
+As we pointed out earlier, questions concerning cognition are intertwined with questions about the nature of language. Chapter 5 begins by
+showing how the insights of hermeneutics are relevant to the issues that
+have traditionally been addressed by linguists and analytic philosophers
+of language. It emphasizes the role of the listener in the active generation
+of meaning, showing how the idealization of 'literal meaning' breaks down
+in looking at ordinary language. We then introduce speech act theory, as
+developed by Austin and Searle and later adapted by social philosophers
+such as Habermas. Although this work grew out of the analytic school of
+philosophy, its view of language as speech acts challenges the rationalistic
+2For example, see Dreyfus,
+What Computers Can't Do
+(1979) and Haugeland,
+"The nature and plausibility of cognitivism' (1978).
+
+11
+tradition by suggesting that language, and therefore thought, is ultimately
+based on social interaction Speech act theory is a starting point for an
+understanding of language as an act of social creation, In the last part
+of the chapter we present our own synthesis of speach act theory and
+the hermeneutic understanding of language developed in Chapter 3. This
+synthesis is central to our interpretation of computer technology in the
+second part of the book It leads us to the conclusion that we create our
+world through language, an observation that has important consequences
+for design.
+Chapter 6, which acts as a transition to the remainder of the book,
+draws out and summarizes some common points from the preceding three
+chapters. The rejection of cognition as the manipulation of knowledge of an
+objective world, the primacy of action and its central role in language, and
+the impossibility of completely articulating background assumptions all
+play a major role in the critique of current computer technology presented
+in Part II and in the new design orientation elaborated in Part III..
+Part II (Chapters 7-10) addresses concrete questions about what
+computers do. Our goal is to understand and reinterpret what is
+currently being done and to anticipate future developments.
+Chapter 7 describes what people do when they program computers. It
+focusses on the relationship between the intentions of programmers and
+the behavior of devices that run the programs they create. Programming is
+a process of creating symbolic representations that are to be interpreted at
+some level within a hierarchy of constructs of varying degrees of abstractness. The interactions between levels of representation can be complex,
+since each is implemented in terms of the lower ones. This description lays
+the groundwork for the discussion of computer intelligence in the following
+chapters..
+Chapter 8 examines the computational techniques that have been proposed as a basis for artificial intelligence. Drawing on the ideas outlined
+in Part I, we argue contrary to widespread current belief-that one cannot construct machines that either exhibit or successfully model intelligent
+behavior. We begin by asking why mind like properties are attributed to
+computers but not to other types of machines that can equally be said to
+provide or process information. We continue with a more thorough exposition of work in artificial intelligence and an analysis of its limitations..
+Many of the difficulties with current research derive from a fundamental orientation that equates intelligence with rationalistic problem solving
+based on heuristic procedures.
+Chapter 9 takes up the theme of the preceding chapter within the context of computer programs that process natural language. We look at
+why the many programs developed during the 1970s do not approach the
+human ability to interpret meaning.. In spite of a wide variety of inge-
+
+12
+nious techniques for making analysis and recognition more flexible, the
+scope of comprehension remains severely limited.. There may be practical
+applications for computer processing of natural-language-like formalisms
+and for limited processing of natural language, but computers will remain
+incapable of using language in the way human beings do, both in interpretation and in the generation of commitment that is central to language.
+Chapter 10 takes a critical look at some major current research directions in areas such as knowledge engineering, expert systems, and the
+so-called 'fifth generation' computers, It describes the overall shift from
+the general goal of creating programs that can understand language and
+thought to that of designing software for specialized task domains, and
+evaluates the projections being made for the coming years.
+Part III (Chapters 11 and 12) presents an alternative orientation to
+design, based on the theoretical background we have developed. The relevant questions are not those comparing computers to people, but those
+opening up a potential for computers that play a meaningful role in human
+life and work, Once we move away from the blindness generated by the
+old questions, we can take a broader perspective on what computers
+do
+can
+Chapter 11 addresses the task of designing computer tools for use in organizational contexts. We focus on the activity of people called 'managers,'
+but the same concerns arise in all situations involving social interaction
+and collaborative effort. Drawing on Heidegger's discussion of "thrownness'
+and 'breakdown,' we conclude that models of rationalistic problem solving
+do not reflect how actions are really determined, and that programs based
+on such models are unlikely to prove successful. Nevertheless, there is a
+role for computer technology in support of managers and as aids in coping
+with the complex conversational structures generated within an organization. Much of the work that managers do is concerned with initiating,
+monitoring, and above all coordinating the networks of speech acts that
+constitute social action.
+Chapter 12 retums to the fundamental questions of design and looks
+at possibilities for computer technology opened up by the understanding
+developed in the preceding chapters. After briefly reviewing the relevant
+theoretical ideas outlined earlier, we examine some of the phenomena to
+which design must address itself, illustrating our approach with a concrete
+example. We also consider design in relation to systematic domains of
+human activity, where the objects of concern are formal structures and
+the rules for manipulating them The challenge posed here for design is
+not simply to create tools that accurately reflect existing domains, but to
+provide for the creation of new domains. Design serves simultaneously to
+bring forth and to transform the objects, relations, and regularities of the
+world of our concerns.
+
+13
+In one sense, then, this is a book about computers. But it reaches
+beyond the specific issues of what computers can do, Our larger goal is to
+clarify the background of understanding in which the discourse about computers and technology takes place, and to grasp its broader implications.
+Ultimately we are seeking a better understanding of what it means to be
+human. In this quest, progress is not made by finding the 'right answers,'
+but by asking meaningful questions-ones that evoke an openness to new
+ways of being. We invite the readers to create with us an openness that
+can alter our collective vision of how computer technology will develop in
+the coming decades.
+
+Chapter 2
+The rationalistic
+tradition
+Current thinking about computers and their impact on society has been
+shaped by a rationalistic tradition that needs to be re-examined and challenged as a source of understanding. As a first step we will characterize
+the tradition of rationalism and logical empiricism that can be traced back
+at least to Plato. This tradition has been the mainspring of Western science and technology, and has demonstrated its effectiveness most clearly
+in the 'hard sciences'-those that explain the operation of deterministic
+mechanisms whose principles can be captured in formal systems. The
+tradition finds its highest expression in mathematics and logic, and has
+greatly influenced the development of linguistics and cognitive psychology.
+We will make no attempt to provide a full historical account of this
+tradition, or to situate it on some kind of intellectual map,. Instead, we
+have chosen to concentrate on understanding its effects on current discourse and practice, especially in relation to the development and impact
+of computers. The purpose of this chapter is to outline its major points
+and illustrate their embodiment in current theories of language, mind, and
+action.
+2.1
+The rationalistic orientation
+We can begin to reveal the rationalistic tradition by considering the question "What do you do when faced with some problem whose solution you
+care about?" The rationalistic orientation can be depicted in a series of
+steps:
+
+2.1. THE RATIONALISTIC ORIENTATION
+1. Characterize the situation in terms of identifiable objects with welldefined properties.
+2. Find general rules that apply to situations in terms of those objects
+and properties.
+3. Apply the rules logically to the situation of concern, drawing conclusions about what should be done.
+There are obvious questions about how we set situations into correspondence with systematic 'representations' of objects and properties, and
+with how we can come to know general rules. In much of the rationalistic
+tradition, however, these are deferred in favor of emphasizing the formulation of systematic rules that can be used to draw logical conclusions.
+Much of Western philosophy-from classical rhetoric to modern symbolic
+logic-can be seen as a drive to come up with more systematic and precise
+formulations of just what constitutes valid reasoning.
+Questions of correspondence and knowledge still exercise philosophers,
+but in the everyday discourse about thinking and reasoning they are taken
+as unproblematic. In fact when they are raised, the discussion is often
+characterized as being too philosophical. Even within philosophy, there
+are schools (such as analytic philosophy) in which the problems raised by
+the first two items are pushed aside, not because they are uninteresting,
+but because they are too difficult and open-ended. By concentrating on
+formalisms and logical rules, the philosopher can develop clear technical
+results whose validity can be judged in terms of internal coherence and
+consistency.
+There is a close correlation between the rationalistic tradition and the
+approach of organized science. In a broad sense, we can view any orga
+form of inquiry as a science, but in ordinary usage more is implied.
+must be some degree of adherence to the scientific method. This
+consists of a series of basic steps (that can be repeated in successive
+refinements of the science):
+[The scientific method] can be described as involving the following operations: (a) observation of a phenomenon that, henceforth, is taken as a problem to be explained;
+(b) proposition
+of an explanatory hypothesis in the form of a deterministic
+system that can generate a phenomenon isomorphic with the
+one observed; (c) proposition of a computed state or process
+in the system specified by the hypothesis as a predicted phenomenon to be observed; and (d) observation of the predicted
+phenomenon, Maturana, "Biology of language: The epistemology of reality" (1978), p 28.
+nized
+There
+method
+IA
+15
+
+16
+The scientist first notes some regularity in the phenomena of interestsome recurring pattern of observations. He or she proposes a conceptual
+or concrete system that can be set into correspondence with the observations and that can be manipulated to make predictions about other
+potential observations, Conditions are created in which these observa
+can be expected and the results used to modify the theory,, Scientific
+consists of setting up situations in which observable activity will
+tions
+research
+be
+determined in a clear way by a small number of variables that can be
+systematically manipulated. This simplicity is necessary if the modelling
+system is to make predictions that can be checked,,
+The rationalistic orientation not only underlies both pure and applied
+science but is also regarded, perhaps because of the prestige and success
+that modern science enjoys, as the very paradigm of what it means to
+think and be intelligent. In studies of thought, emphasis is placed on
+the form of the rules and on the nature of the processes by which they
+are logically applied. Areas of mathematics, such as symbolic logic and
+automata theory, are taken as the basis for formalizing what goes on when
+a person perceives, thinks, and acts. For someone trained in science and
+technology it may seem self-evident that this is the right
+(or even the
+only) approach to serious thinking. Indeed, this is why man
+y workers in
+artificial intelligence find critiques like that of Dreyfus
+(What Computers
+Can't Do, 1979) obviously wrong, since they challenge this deep
+-seated preunderstanding,. In defense, they argue that the only conceivable
+alternative
+is some kind of mysticism, religion, or fuzzy thinking that is a
+to throwback
+earlier stages of civilization,
+It is scarcely surprising, then, that the rationalistic orientation
+per vades not only artificial intelligence and the rest of computer science, but
+also much of linguistics, management theory, and cognitive science-three
+areas with which artificial intelligence has been closely associated. In the
+next
+three sections we will examine each of these areas in turn, seeing how
+rationalistic styles of discourse and thinking have determined the questions
+have been asked and the theories, methodologies, and assumptions
+that
+that
+have been adopted.
+First, however, a caveat is in order, In presenting these elements as
+part of an overall rationalistic tradition, we are aware that they are not
+uniformly accepted in carefully reasoned work of analytic philosophers,'
+However it would be a mistake to therefore not take this tradition seriously.
+It pervades the work of those same philosophers and of researchers in
+'In some ways, the rationalistic tradition mightbetter be termed the 'analytic tradition 'We have adopted a more neutral lab
+takethE sadheW e also are not concerned here with the debate between 'rationalists'and 'empiricists,' The rationalistic tradition
+
+2
+LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND THE WORLD
+computer science and psychology as well. In moments of careful reflection
+they acknowledge the importance of phenomena that are not subject to the
+rationalistic style of analysis, but in their day-to-day work they proceed as
+though everything were. In generating theories and in building programs,
+they operate in a style that is fully consistent with the naive tradition and
+avoid areas in which it breaks down. In the end, we are really concerned
+not with the philosophical arguments, but with a broader phenomenonthe role of a tradition in giving orientation to people who do not consider
+themselves philosophers, but whose ways of thinking nevertheless embody
+a philosophical orientation,
+2.2
+Language, truth, and the world
+Much of our book is an attempt to show the non-obviousness of the rationalistic orientation and to reveal the blindness that it generates. In
+pursuing this, we found ourselves deeply concerned with the question of
+language. The rationalistic tradition regards language as a system of symbols that are composed into patterns that stand for things in the world.
+Sentences can represent the world truly or falsely, coherent pondenceently, but their ultimate grounding is in their
+of affairs they represent.
+This concept of correspondence can be
+summarized as:
+1. Sentences say things about the world, and can be either true or false.
+2.. What a sentence says about the world is a function of the words it
+contains and the structures into which these are combined.
+3. The content words of a sentence (such as its nouns, verbs, and adjectives) can be taken as denoting (in the world) objects, properties,
+relationships, or sets of these.
+Of course most people will not be able to formulate these assumptions
+directly. For example, they may not be aware of the distinction between
+'content words' (like "dog" and "disappear") and 'function words' (like
+of" and "the"). But they would find none of these statements surprising
+or unintuitive.
+The relation of these assumptions to more formal studies of semantics is more complex. During this century a large body of work has been
+produced that systematically examines meaning from a formal analytical
+perspective. 2 Its goal is to explain the regularities in the correspondence
+2Analysis of this style was developed by such prominent philosophers and logicians
+as Frege (1949), Russell (1920), and Tarski (1944) More recent work is presented in
+17
+with the
+
+18
+between what we say and what we mean. There are two levels at which
+to define the problem First, there is the problem of "semantic correspondence..! Just what is the relationship between a sentence (or a word)
+and the objects, properties, and relations we observe in the world? Few
+philosophers adhere to the naive view that one can assume the presence of
+an objective reality in which objects and their properties are 'simply there.!'
+They recognize deep ontological problems in deciding just what constitutes
+a distinct object or in what sense a relation or event 'exists.' Some limited
+aspects (such as the reference of proper names) have been studied within
+the philosophy of language, but it is typically assumed that no formal
+answers can be given to the general problem of semantic correspondence.
+The second, more tractable level at which to study meaning is to take
+for granted that some kind of correspondence exists, without making a
+commitment to its ontological grounding. Having done this, one can look
+at the relations among the meanings of different words, phrases, and sentences, without having to answer the difficult question of just what those
+meanings are. 3
+There are many different styles in which this study can be carried out.
+The approach called 'structural semantics' or 'linguistic semantics'4 deals
+only with the linguistic objects (words, phrases, and sentences) themselves.
+The fact that "Sincerity admires John" is anomalous or that "male parent"
+and "father" are synonymous can be encompassed within a theory relating
+words (and posited features of words) to their occurrences in certain kinds
+of phrases and sentences. Within such a theory there need be no reference
+either to the act of uttering the words or to the states of affairs they
+describe.
+This approach is limited, however, because of its dependence on specific words and structures as the basis for stating general rules. Most
+theories of semantics make use of a formalized language in which deeper
+regularities can be expressed. It is assumed that each sentence in a natural language (such as English) can be set into correspondence with one
+or more possible interpretations in a formal language (such as the firstorder predicate calculus) for which the rules of reasoning are well defined.
+The study of meaning then includes both the translation of sentences into
+the corresponding formal structures and the logical rules associated with
+these structures. Thus the sentences "Every dog has a tail," "All dogs
+several collections, such as Linsky (1952), Davidson and Harman (1972), Hintikka,
+Mbiavesik, and Suppes (1973), and some of the papers in Keenan (1975),
+3For a critique of recent attempts to extend this methodology, see Winograd, "Moving
+the semantic fulcrum" (1985).
+4In this category, we include work such as that of Leech (1969), Lyons (1963), Katz
+and Fodor (1964), and Jackendoff (1976)
+
+2.2. LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND THE WORLD
+19
+have tails," and "A dog has a tail" are all translated into the same form,
+while "I walked to the bank" will have two possible translations (corresponding to the two meanings of "bank"), as will "Visiting relatives can
+be boring" (corresponding to different interpretations of who is doing the
+visiting).
+Most current work in this direction adopts some form of truth
+theoretic' characterization of meaning. We can summarize its underlying
+assumptions as follows:
+1. There is a system of rules (which may include 'pragmatic' and contextual considerations) by which sentences of a natural language
+can be translated into formulas of a formal language, such that the
+essence of their meaning is preserved.
+2. There is another system of rules by which the meanings of formulas
+in this formal language are determined in a systematic way by the
+meanings of their parts and the structures by which those parts are
+combined..
+3.. There are systematic rules of logic that account for the interrelation
+of the truth conditions for different formulas.
+4.. The fundamental kind of sentence is the indicative, which can be
+taken as stating that a certain proposition is true.. Its meaning can
+be characterized in terms of the conditions in the world under which
+it would be true.
+In addition to these assumptions, there is a general understanding that
+in order for the compositional rules to be of interest, the meanings of the
+items being composed should be fixed
+without reference to the context
+which they appear. If the meaning of each item could vary arbitrarily
+with each use, the rules for composing meanings would be vacuous. There
+would be no systematic notion of a meaning of the item which applied
+to all of its uses. Of course, this context-independence cannot be taken
+as an absolute; there are obvious recognized exceptions.' But the central
+theory of meaning (semantics) deals with words and sentences in terms of
+their literal meaning,
+which is treated as not context-dependent. We will
+discuss the consequences of this assumption in Chapter 5..
+The correspondence theory of language is one cornerstone on which
+other aspects of the rationalistic tradition rest. Rationalistic theories of
+"These include indexical pronouns
+('I'"you"), place and time adverts
+"now"), and the use of tenses (as in "He will go."). It is also clearly understood
+that there are dependencies on the linguistic context
+(as with the anaphoric pronouns "he," "she," "it") and that there are metaphorical and poetic uses of language
+which depend on complex personal contexts.
+('here,"
+
+20
+CHAPTER 2, THE RATIONALISTIC TRADITION
+mind all adopt some form of a 'representation hypothesis,' in which it is
+as sumed that thought is the manipulation of representation structures in the
+mind, Although these representations are not specifically linguistic (that is,
+not the sentences of an ordinary human language), they are treated as
+sentences in an "internal language,' whose connection to the world of the
+thinker follows the principles outlined above.
+2.3 Decision making and problem solving
+Another modern embodiment of the rationalistic tradition is in the disci
+of management science, a field concerned with mathematical analyses
+decision making and with behavioral analyses of human conduct. In this
+discipline, decision making is regarded as the central task of management and
+is characterized as a process of information gathering and processing
+behavior is seen as a consequence of choosing among alternatives
+an evaluation of outcomes. Simon characterizes the basic
+decision-making theory as follows:
+At each moment the behaving subject, or the organization composed of numbers of such individuals, is confronted with a large
+number of alternative behaviors, some of which are present in
+consciousness and some of which are not. Decision, or choice,
+as the term is used here, is the process by which one of these alternatives for each moment's behavior is selected to be carried
+out, The series of such decisions which determines behavior
+over some stretch of time may be called a
+strategy... Ifany
+one of the possible strategies is chosen and followed out, certain consequences will result. The task of rational decision is
+to select that one of the strategies which is followed by the
+preferred set of consequences. - Simon,
+Administrative Behavior
+pline
+Rational
+according to
+assumption of
+(1976), p. 67,
+Simon asserts that
+rational decision making is a process of choosing
+among alternatives, and that it involves a series of steps:
+1. Listing all the alternative strategies.
+2. Determining all the consequences that follow upon each of these
+strategies.
+3. Comparatively evaluating these sets of consequences..
+In the literature on computers and decision making, a wide range of
+human activities and concerns are subjected to this kind of analysis. Re-
+searchers in simulation, operations research, and game theory (all within
+
+2.3. DECISION MAKING AND PROBLEM SOLVING
+21
+The New Utopians
+(1965), calls the
+what Boguslaw, In
+proach) apply sophisticated mathematical methods to decisions as varied
+'formalist apas the routing
+of telephone calls, the choice of advertising media for a new product, and the selection of
+targets for bombing.
+These techniques are based on the development of a formal model for
+the system that
+will be affected, a set of rules that describe the behavior
+of the modelled system, and an
+objective means of assigning valuations
+to the resulting effects When calculations
+based on the model, rules,
+and valuations are performed, alternatives can be compared
+and the most highly valued (optimal) one selected.
+There have been critiques of this idealization, often from people within
+management
+science who object to the narrow assumptions of the formalist
+approach. Simon, for
+example, continues his description of the assump
+tions given above, noting that:
+The word 'all' is used advisedly.. It is obviously impossible
+for the individual to know
+'all' his alternatives or 'all' their consequences, and this impossibility is a very important departure
+of actual behavior from the model of objective rationality -
+Simon, Administrative Behavzor, p. 67
+This caveat is the major contribution of Simon.. He treats objective
+rationality as an idealization, rarely (if ever) achieved in a real situation..
+Practical decision making only roughly approximates this ideal:
+It is impossible for the behavior of a single, isolated individual
+to reach any high degree of rationality. The number of alternatives he must explore is so great, the information he would
+need to evaluate them so vast that even an approximation of
+objective rationality is hard to conceive,....
+Actual behavior
+falls short, in at least three ways, of objective rationality as
+defined in the last chapter:
+1. Rationality requires a complete knowledge and anticipation of the consequences that will follow on each choice..
+In fact, knowledge of consequences is always fragmentary,
+2. Since these consequences lie in the future, imagination
+must supply the lack of experienced feeling in attaching
+value to them. But values can be only imperfectly anticipated,
+3. Rationality requires a choice among all possible alternative behaviors.. In actual behavior, only a very few of all
+these possible alternatives ever come to mind.
+- Simon,
+Admznzstrative Behavior, pp 79ff.
+
+22
+It is important to note, however, that this critique is not an objection
+to the rationalistic approach, but to the assumption of
+and rationality in applying optimization techniques. Simon argues that
+systematic reasoning rules can be applied for effective decision making,
+and can be programmed into computers. Rather than computing all of
+the consequences, the computer must operate with 'bounded rationality.'
+Simon's decision-making theories developed into more general theories
+of problem solving' as he and others made the first attempts to build
+intelligent computer programs. Rather than concentrating on the kinds
+of decisions that managers make, researchers studied tasks (such as proving logic theorems and solving simple puzzles) that could be viewed as
+problems of search in a space of alternatives. The task is characterized in
+terms of a 'problem space! Each 'node' of the space is reached by some
+sequence of actions, and has some consequences relevant to structure of
+the task. The computer program searches for a solution in this potentially
+huge space of possibilities, using
+'heuristics' to guide the search and to
+provide valuations. In this search it will explore only some of the possible
+alternatives, and will apply its valuation heuristics in the absence of full
+knowledge.
+Programs of this sort are described more fully in Chapter 8, and are
+the textbook examples of artificial intelligence. There is a widely accepted
+definition of what constitutes 'general problem-solving behavior:'
+full knowledge
+A person is confronted with a
+problem
+when he wants something and does not know immediately what series of actions
+he can perform to get it...
+To have a problem implies (at
+least) that certain information is given to the problem solver:
+information about what is desired, under what conditions, by
+means of what tools and operations, starting with what initial
+information, and with access to what resources. The problem
+solver has an interpretation of this information-exactly that
+interpretation which lets us label some part of it as
+goal, another part as side conditions,
+and so on. Consequently, if we
+provide a representation for this information (in symbol structures), and assume that the interpretation of these structures
+is implicit in the program of the problem solving IPS [Information Processing System], then we have defined a problem.
+- Newell and Simon, Human Problem Solving
+(1972), pP, 72-73..
+There are several key elements to this view of problem solving, which
+generally taken for granted in artificial intelligence research:
+1. Task environment. First, we characterize the problem in terms of
+a 'task environment' in which there are different potential 'states'
+
+2.4. COGNITIVE SCIENCE
+affairs, 'actions' available to the problem solver to change the state,
+and 'goals' from which rational actions can be derived.
+2. Internal representation. Second, the problem solver has some
+kind of "representation' of the task environment This representation
+is a collection of "symbol structures' that are part of the constitution
+of the problem solver. They correspond in a systematic way to the
+task environment.
+3. Search. The problem solver goes through an information process
+that can be analyzed as a search among alterative courses of action,
+in order to find those that will lead to a desired goal..
+4. Choice. Finally, a rational agent will select the course of action
+among those found that best achieves the desired goals.. Newell,
+in "The knowledge level" (1982, p. 102), calls this the 'principle of
+rationality: "If an agent has knowledge that one of its actions will
+lead to one of its goals, then the agent will select that action," Of
+course we must allow for the case in which more than one action may
+to one of the goals, so we cannot predict the specific action, but
+"The action that occurs at any instant is a member of the
+of actions."
+More formally, we can describe the operation of the problem solver in
+terms of a search in a problem space determined by the task environment
+and internal representation. Although there is much to be said about just
+how this can be applied to different cases (for example, the role played by
+having multiple representations, as discussed by Bobrow in "Dimensions
+of representation,"
+1975), the differences are not germane to answering
+our larger questions about what computers can do. There is a shared
+background that cuts across the detailed schools of artificial intelligence
+and that is in general accord with the rationalistic tradition. We will
+explore some of these topics more fully in Chapter 11.
+23
+lead
+just that
+selected set
+2.4
+Cognitive science
+In recent years there have been efforts to unify theories of human thought
+and language from within the rationalistic tradition under a new discipline known as 'cognitive science.!' Initially, several books were put forth
+as volumes in cognitive science.6
+The journal Cognitive Science
+began
+(1975), Schank and Abelson's
+6Bobiow and Collins's
+Representation and Understanding
+(1977), and Norman and Rumelhart's
+Explorations in
+Scripts Plans Goals and Understanding
+Cognition (1975) were among the first
+
+24
+CHAPTER 2 THE RATIONALISTIC TRADITION
+publication in 1977, and the Cognitive Science Society held its first annual
+meeting in 19797
+A number of other conferences, journals, and research
+funding programs have followed.
+Of course cognitive science is not really new. It deals with phenomena
+of thought and language that have occupied philosophers and scientists for
+thousands of years Its boundaries are vague, but it is clear that much of
+linguistics, psychology, artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of mind
+fall within its scope. In declaring that it exists as a science, people are
+marking the emergence of what Lakatos calls a 'research programme. 8
+Lakatos chooses this term in preference to Kuhn's 'paradigm'
+(The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
+1962) to emphasize the active role that a
+research programme plays in guiding the activity of scientists He sees the
+history of science not as a cyclic pattern of revolution and normal science,
+but as a history of competing research programmes. He distinguishes between 'mature science,' consisting of research programmes, and 'immature
+science,' consisting of "a mere patched up pattern of trial and error."
+A research programme is more than a set of specific plans for carrying
+out scientific activities. The observable details of the programme reflect
+a dooper coherence which is not routinely examined. In the day-to-day
+business of research, writing, and teaching, scientists operate within a
+background of belief about how things are, This background invisibly
+shapes what they choose to do and how they choose to do it. A research
+programme grows up within a tradition of thought, It is the result of
+many influences, some recognized explicitly and others concealed in the
+social structure and language of the community. Efforts to understand
+and modify the research programme are made within that same context,
+and can never escape it to produce an 'objective' or correct' approach,.
+The research programme of cognitive science encompasses work that
+has been done under different disciplinary labels, but is all closely related
+through its roots in the rationalistic tradition. Cognitive science needs
+to be distinguished from 'cognitive psychology,' which is the branch of
+traditional (experimental) psychology dealing with cognition. Although
+cognitive psychology constitutes a substantial part of what is seen as cognitive science, it follows specific methodological principles that limit its
+scope.. In particular, it is based on an experimental approach in which
+progress is made by performing experiments that can directly judge between competing scientific hypotheses about the nature of cognitive mech-
+7 Norman, Perspectives on Cognitive Science
+(1981), is a collection of presentations
+from
+that conference,, They were intended to define the science and explain its significance
+8Soe Lakatos, "Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes"
+(1970), In order to avoid confusion in our discussion of computers and computer programs, we will consistently follow Lakatos's use of the British spelling, 'programme,'
+when using the word in this sense
+
+2 COGNITIVE SCIENCE
+25
+anisms. In most experiments, situations are created in which the variety of
+action is strictly controlled and only a very limited aspect of the situation
+considered relevant to the patterns of recurrence (typical examples are
+experiments with rats in mazes, nonsense-syllable memorization, and the
+matching of geometrical figures to simple descriptions).
+The assumption underlying this empirical research is that general laws
+can be found in these restricted cases that will apply (albeit in a more
+complex way) to a much broader spectrum of cognitive activity. It is also
+implicitly assumed that these laws will have the same general form as those
+of sciences like physics, and can be subjected to rigid experimental test.
+In the last few decades, simple forms of cognitive psychology have been
+challenged by advocates of 'information-processing psychology,' who assert
+that cognitive systems can be best understood by analogy to programmed
+computers. The assumptions behind this approach can be summarized as
+follows:
+1. All cognitive systems are symbol systems. They achieve their intelligence by symbolizing external and internal situations and events,
+and by manipulating those symbols,
+2. All cognitive systems share a basic underlying set of symbol manipulating processes.
+3. A theory of cognition can be couched as a program in an appropriate symbolic formalism such that the program when run in the
+appropriate environment will produce the observed behavior.
+This approach is not incompatible with the earlier non-computational
+models.. In general the rules postulated as governing recurrences could be
+embedded in appropriate programs, In this sense, a program is a formal
+system that has some number of variables and that can be manipulated
+(run) to generate predictions about the behavior (outputs) of some naturally occurring system that it is intended to model.. To the extent that the
+predicted behavior corresponds to that observed, the theory is supported.
+The role of the computer is to enable the scientist to deal with more
+complex theories than those whose consequences could be determined by
+examination or by manual computation. This makes it feasible for cognitive theories to be more intricate and complicated than their predecessors
+and still remain under empirical control.
+In trying to deal with phenomena that do not have the obvious limitations of the sparse experimental situations of cognitive psychology, researchers have turned to artificial intelligence-the design and testing
+of computer programs that carry out activities patterned after human
+thought and language. These programs are then taken as theories of the
+
+26
+corresponding human behavior As Simon says in "Cognitive science: The
+newest science of the artificial"
+(1981, p. 24): "Most of our knowledge
+[of intelligence] will have to come from, .. observation of the vast variety
+of intelligent systems,. and from formal theories-mainly in the form of
+computer programs-induced from that body of observation."
+Many difficult issues are raised by the attempt to relate programs to
+theory and to cognitive mechanisms Within the cognitive science community, there is much debate about, just what role computer programs have
+in developing and testing theories, We will not present the details of that
+debate, however. It is more important to understand how the discourse
+determined by a taken-for-granted background shaped by the underly
+assumptions of the rationalistic tradition, as we have outlined in this
+chapter. In the rest of this book we pose challenges to those assumptions,
+and in the end argue that we need to replace the rationalistic orientation if
+we want to understand human thought, language, and action, or to design
+effective computer tools Implicit in our critique is a statement about the
+cognitive science research programme-not that it is vacuous or useless,
+but that it will have important limitations in its scope and in its power to
+explain what we are and what we do 9
+ing
+For an excellent overview of both the history and current direction of cognitive
+science, see Gardner,
+The Mind's New Science
+(1985)
+
+Chapter 3
+Understanding and Being
+In this chapter we introduce Heidegger's analysis of understanding and
+Being. Heidegger's writings are both important and difficult, and we will
+make no attempt to give a thorough or authoritative exposition. Our
+intention is to bring out those aspects relevant to our examination of language and thought and to our understanding of technology. Before turning
+to Heidegger, however, it will be useful to look briefly at issues that arise
+in interpreting texts. In addition to the obvious relevance of this material
+to our discussion of language, we have found that it is easier to grasp the
+more radical phenomenological statements about interpretation if we first
+consider interpretive activity in a more obvious setting.
+When someone speaks of 'interpretation,' the most likely association
+with artistic or literary works. The musician, the literary critic, and
+ordinary reader of a poem or novel are all in some immediate sense
+"interpreting' a collection of marks on a page. One of the fundamental
+insights of phenomenology is that this activity of interpretation is not
+limited to such situations, but pervades our everyday life. In coming to an
+understanding of what it means to think, understand, and act, we need to
+recognize the role of interpretation.
+3.1 Hermeneutics
+Hermeneutics' began as the theory of the interpretation of texts, particularly mythical and sacred texts. Its practitioners struggled with the
+problem of characterizing how people find meaning in a text that exists
+over many centuries and is understood differently in different epochs. A
+'Palmei's
+Hermeneutics
+(1969) is an excellent first introduction to hermeneutics.
+including both its historical roots and its current meaning for literary criticism
+
+28
+CHAPTER 3.. UNDERSTANDING AND BEING
+mythical or religious text continues to be spoken or read and to serve as a
+source of deep meaning, in spite of changes in the underlying culture and
+even in the language. There are obvious questions to be raised. Is the
+meaning definable in some absolute sense, independent of the context in
+which the text was written? Is it definable only in terms of that original
+context? If so, is it possible or desirable for a reader to transcend his or
+her own culture and the intervening history in order to recover the correct
+interpretation?
+If we reject the notion that the meaning is in the text, are we reduced
+saying only that a particular person at a particular moment had a
+particular interpretation? If so, have we given up a naive but solid-seeming
+view of the reality of the meaning of the text in favor of a relativistic appeal to
+individual subjective reaction?
+Within hermeneutics there has been an ongoing debate between those
+who place the meaning within the text and those who see meaning as
+grounded in a process of understanding in which the text, its production,
+and its interpretation all play a vital part.. As we will show in Chapter 5,
+this debate has close parallels with current issues in linguistic and semantic
+theory.
+For the objectivist school of hermeneutics,2 the text must have a meaning that exists independently of the act of interpretation.. The goal of a
+hermeneutic theory (a theory of interpretation) is to develop methods by
+which we rid ourselves of all prejudices and produce an objective analysis
+of what is really there. The ideal is to completely 'decontextualize the
+text.
+The opposing approach, most clearly formulated by Gadamer, 3 takes
+the act of interpretation as primary, understanding it as an interaction
+between the horizon4 provided by the text and the horizon that the interpreter brings to it. Gadamer insists that every reading or hearing of a
+text constitutes an act of giving meaning to it through interpretation.
+Gadamer devotes extensive discussion to the relation of the individual
+to tradition, clarifying how tradition and interpretation interact. Any
+individual, in understanding his or her world, is continually involved in
+activities of interpretation. That interpretation is based on prejudice (or
+pre understanding),
+which includes assumptions implicit in the
+language
+2Emilio Betti (Teona Generale della Interpretazione,
+1955) has been the most
+influential supporter of this approach. Hirsch's
+Validity in Interpretation
+applies Betti's view to problems of literary criticism
+(1967)
+3Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975) and Philosophical Hermeneutics
+(1976)
+4 In his discussions of hermeneutics, Gadamer makes frequent reference to a person's
+"horizon' As with many of the words we will introduce in this chapter, there is no
+simple translation into previously understood terms The rest of the chapter will
+serve to elucidate its meaning through its use.
+27
+
+3
+HERMENEUTICS
+29
+that the person uses, 5
+That language in turn is learned through activities
+of interpretation The individual is changed through the use of language,
+and the language changes through its use by individuals. This process is
+of the first importance, since it constitutes the background of the beliefs
+and assumptions that determine the nature of our being. 6
+We are social
+creatures:
+In fact history does not belong to us, but we belong to it.
+Long before we understand ourselves through the process of
+self-examination, we under stand ourselves in a self-evident way
+in the family, society and state in which we live. The focus of
+subjectivity is a distorting mirror, The self-awareness of the
+individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical
+life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than
+his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being
+-
+Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975), p
+Gadamer sees in this essential historicity of our being the cause of our
+inability to
+achieve full explicit understanding of ourselves, The nature of
+our being is determined by
+our cultural background, and since it is formed
+in our very way of experiencing and living
+in language, it cannot be made fully explicit in that language:
+To acquire an awareness of a situation is, however, always a
+task of particular difficulty. The very idea of a situation means
+that we are not standing outside it and hence are unable to
+have any objective knowledge of it. We are always within the
+situation, and to throw light on it is a task that is never entirely completed. This is true also of the hermeneutic situation,
+i.e., the situation in which we find ourselves with regard to the
+tradition that we are trying to understand The illumination
+of this situation-effective-historical reflection-can never be
+completely achieved, but this is not due to a lack in the re-
+f 1 ection, but lies in the essence of the historical being which is
+ours. To exist historically means that knowledge of oneself can
+never be complete. - Gadamer,
+Truth and Method
+(1975), pP
+268-269.
+5The attempt to elucidate our own pre-understanding is the central focus of the
+• Garfinkel, "What
+branch of sociology called ethnomethodolo he Presentation of Self in Ever day Life
+is eth Comethodology" (1967), Goffman,
+Cognitive Sociology (1974)
+6The widely mentioned 'Sapir-Whorf hypothesis' is a related but somewhat simplex
+account, in that it emphasizes the importance of a language determined warld view
+without relating it to tradition and interpretation
+(1959),
+
+30
+We can become aware of some of our prejudices, and in that way
+eman cipate ourselves from some of the limits they place on our thinking. But
+we commit a fallacy in believing we can ever be free of all prejudice. Instead
+of striving for a means of getting away from our own pre-understanding,
+theory of interpretation should aim at revealing the ways in which that preunderstanding interacts with the text.
+Gadamer's approach accepts the inevitability of the
+hermeneutic
+circle.
+The meaning of an individual text is contextual, depending on the moment
+of interpretation and the horizon brought to it by the interpreter. But
+that horizon is itself the product of a history of interactions in language,
+interactions which themselves represent texts that had to be understood
+in the light of pre-understanding. What we understand is based on what
+we already know, and what we already know comes from being able to
+understand.
+Cadamer's discourse on language and tradition is based on a rather
+broad analysis of interpretation and understanding. If we observe the
+hermeneutic circle only at the coarse-grained level offered by texts and
+societies, we remain blind to its operation at the much finer-grained level
+daily life. If we look only at language, we fail to relate it to the
+inter pretation that constitutes non-linguistic experience as well. It is
+therefore necessary to adopt a dooper approach in which interpretation is
+taken as relevant to ontology-to our understanding of what it means for
+something or someone to exist.
+3.2 Understanding and ontology
+Gadamer, and before him Heidegger, took the hermeneutic idea of
+inter pretation beyond the domain of textual analysis, placing it at the
+very foundation of human cognition. Just as we can ask how
+interpretation
+plays a part in a person's interaction with a text, we can
+examine its role in our understanding of the world as a whole.
+Heidegger and Gadamer reject the commonsense philosophy of our culture in a deep and fundamental way. The prevalent understanding is based
+on the metaphysical revolution of Galileo and Descartes, which grew out of
+a tradition going back to Plato and Aristotle. This understanding, which
+goes hand in hand with what we have called the 'rationalistic orientation,'
+includes a kind of mind-body dualism that accepts the existence of two
+separate domains of phenomena, the
+objective world of physical reality,
+and the subjective mental world of an individual's thoughts and feelings.
+Simply put, it rests on several taken-for-granted assumptions:
+1.. We are inhabitants of a 'real world' made up of objects bearing properties. Our actions take place in that world.
+
+3
+UNDERSTANDING AND ONTOLOGY
+31
+2. There are 'objective facts' about that world that do not depend on
+the interpretation (or even the presence) of any person.
+3. Perception is a process by which facts about the world are (sometimes inaccurately) registered in our thoughts and feelings.
+4. Thoughts and intentions about action can somehow cause physical
+(hence real-world) motion of our bodies..
+Much of philosophy has been an attempt to understand how the mental and physical domains are related-how our perceptions and thoughts
+relate to the world toward which they are directed, Some schools have
+denied the existence of one or the other. Some argue that we cannot coherently talk about the mental domain, but must understand all behavior
+in terms of the physical world, which includes the physical structure of our
+bodies. Others espouse solipsism, denying that we can establish the existence of an objective world at all, since our own mental world is the only
+thing of which we have immediate knowledge. Kant called it "a scandal
+of philosophy and of human reason in general" that over the thousands
+of years of Western culture, no philosopher had been able to provide a
+sound argument refuting psychological idealism-to answer the question
+"How can I know whether anything outside of my subjective consciousness
+exists?"
+Heidegger argues that "the 'scandal of philosophy is not that this
+proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and
+attempted
+again and again,"7 He says of Kant's "Refutation of Idealism" that it
+shows".... how intricate these questions are and how what one wants to
+prove gets muddled with what one does prove and with the means whereby
+the proof is carried out,"s Heidegger's work grew out of the questions of
+phenomenology posed by his teacher Husserl, and developed into a quest for
+an understanding of Being. He argues that the separation of subject and
+object denies the more fundamental unity of
+being-in-the-world (Dasein).
+By drawing a distinction that I (the subject) am perceiving something
+(the object), I have stepped back from the primacy of experience and
+understanding that operates without reflection.
+Heidegger rejects both the simple objective stance (the objective physical world is the primary reality) and the simple subjective stance
+(my
+thoughts and feelings are the primary reality, arguing instead that it is
+impossible for one to exist without the other. The interpreted and the
+interpreter do not exist independently: existence is interpretation, and interpretation is existence. Prejudice is not a condition in which the subject
+else
+Heidegger, Being and Time (1962), p 249, emphasis in original
+8Ibid., p 247
+
+32
+is led to interpret the world falsely, but is the necessary condition of having
+background for interpretation (hence Being) This is clearly expressed in
+the later writings of Gadamer:
+It is not so much our judgments as it is our prejudices that constitute our being... • the historicity of our existence entails
+that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the
+initial directedness of our whole ability to experience Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world, They are simply
+conditions whereby we experience something-whereby what
+we encounter says something to us.
+- Gadamer, Philosophical
+Hermeneutics (1976), p 9.
+We cannot present here a thorough discussion of Heidegger's philosophy, but will outline some points that are relevant to our later discussion:9
+Our implicit beliefs and assumptions cannot all be made explicit.
+Heidegger argues that the practices in terms of which we render the world
+and our own lives intelligible cannot be made exhaustively explicit.. There
+is no neutral viewpoint from which we can see our beliefs as things, since
+we always operate within the framework they provide, This is the essential
+insight of the hermeneutic circle, applied to understanding as a whole.
+The inevitability of this circularity does not negate the importance of
+trying to gain greater understanding of our own assumptions so that we
+can expand our horizon. But it does preclude the possibility that such
+understanding will ever be objective or complete. As Heidegger says in
+Being and Time (1962, po. 194), "But if we see this circle as a vicious one
+and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just sense it as an inevitable
+imperfection, then the art of understanding has been misunderstood from
+the ground up."
+Practical understanding is more fundamental than detached theoretical understanding. The Western philosophical tradition is based
+on the assumption that the detached theoretical point of view is superior
+to the involved practical viewpoint. The scientist or philosopher who devises theories is discovering how things really are, while in everyday life we
+have only a clouded idea,. Heidegger reverses this, insisting that we have
+primary access to the world through practical involvement with the
+to-hand-the world in which we are always acting unreflectively. Detached
+contemplation can be illuminating, but it also obscures the phenomena
+ready-
+9This overview is based on Dreyfus's
+Being-in-the-World A Commentary on Divcsion I
+ofHeid
+egger's Being and Time (in press), It uses some of his discussion directly, but also
+includes our own interpretations for which he cannot be held responsible.
+
+AN ILLUSTRATION OF THROWNNESS
+33
+themselves by isolating and categorizing them. Much of the current study
+of logic, language, and thought gives primacy to activities of detached
+contemplation. Heidegger does not disregard this is a thinkie, l acting in the
+pots He is concerned co nit cond
+He is
+concerned
+with
+condition of
+thrownness-the
+condition
+of understanding in which our actions find some resonance or effectiveness
+in the world.
+We do not relate to things primarily through having representa
+tions of
+them Connected to both of the preceding points is Heidegger's
+rejection of mental representations.
+The common sense of our tradition is
+that in order to perceive and relate to things, we must have some content
+in our minds that corresponds to our knowledge of them If we focus on
+concernful activity instead of on detached contemplation, the status of this
+representation is called into question. In driving a nail with a hammer (as
+opposed to thinking about a hammer), I need not make use of any explicit
+representation of the hammer. My ability to act comes from my familiarity with
+hammering,
+not my knowledge of a hammer,. This skepticism
+concerning mental representations is in strong opposition to current approaches in cognitive psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and the
+foundation of cognitive science, as described in Chapter 2. Representation
+is so taken for granted that it is hard to imagine what would be left if
+it were abandoned. One of the major issues discussed in later chapters
+is the connection between representation and mechanism; this discussion
+will aid our understanding of what it means to take seriously Heidegger's
+questioning of mental representation,
+Meaning is fundamentally social and cannot be reduced to the
+meaning giving activity of individual subjects. The rationalistic
+view of cognition is individual-centered.. We look at language by studying
+characteristics of an individual language learner or language user, and
+reasoning by describing the activity of an individual's deduction process.
+Heidegger argues that this is an inappropriate starting point-that we
+must take social activity as the ultimate foundation of intelligibility, and
+even of existence A person is not an individual subject or ego, but a
+manifestation of Dasein within a space of possibilities, situated within a
+world and within a tradition.
+at
+3.3 An illustration of thrownness
+Many people encountering the work of Heidegger for the first time find it
+very difficult to comprehend. Abstract terms like 'Dasein' and 'thrownness,' for instance, are hard to relate to reality. This is the opposite of
+
+34
+what Heidegger intends. His philosophy is based on a deep awareness of
+everyday life, He argues that the issues he discusses are difficult not
+be cause they are abstruse, but because they are concealed by their 'ordinary
+everydayness.'
+In order to give more of a sense of the importance of thrownness (which
+will play a large role in the second half of the book), it may be useful to
+consider a simple example that evokes experiences of thrownness for many
+readers,
+Imagine that you are chairing a meeting of fifteen or so people, at
+which some important and controversial issue is to be decided: say, the
+decision to bring a new computer system into the organization, As the
+meeting goes on you must keep things going in a productive direction,
+deciding whom to call on, when to cut a speaker off, when to call for an
+end of discussion or a vote, and so forth. There are forcefully expressed
+differences of opinion, and if you don't take a strong role the discussion will
+quickly deteriorate into a shouting match dominated by the loudest, who
+will keep repeating their own fixed positions in hopes of wearing everyone
+else down.
+We can make a number of observations about your situation:
+You cannot avoid acting. At every moment, you are in a position of
+authority, and your actions affect the situation, If you just sit there for
+time, letting things go on in the direction they are going, that in itself
+constitutes an action, with effects that you may or may not want. You are
+'thrown' into action independent of your will.
+You cannot step back and reflect on your actions. Anyone who has
+been in this kind of situation has afterwards felt "I should have said... "
+or "I shouldn't have let Joe get away with... " In the need to respond
+immediately to what people say and do, it is impossible to take time to
+analyze things explicitly and choose the best course of action. In fact, if
+you stop to do so you will miss some of what is going on, and implicitly
+choose to let it go on without interruption. You are thrown on what people
+loosely call your 'instincts,' dealing with whatever comes up.
+The effects of actions cannot be predicted. Even if you had time to
+reflect, it is impossible to know how your actions will affect other people.
+If you decide to cut someone off in order to get to another topic, the group
+may object to your heavy-handedness, that in itself becoming a topic of
+discussion, If you avoid calling on someone whose opinion you don't like,
+you may find that he shouts it out, or that a friend feels compelled to take
+up his point of view. Of course this doesn't imply that things are total
+chaos, but simply that you cannot count on careful rational planning to
+
+AN ILLUSTRATION OF THROWNNESS
+35
+find steps that will achieve your goals. You must, as the idiom goes, 'flow
+with the situation.'
+You do not have a stable representation of the situation In the
+post-mortem analysis, you will observe that there were significant patterns.
+"There were two factions, with the Smith group trying to oppose the
+computer via the strategy of keeping the discussion on costs and away
+from an analysis of what we are doing now, and the Wilson group trying
+to be sure that whether or not we got the computer, they would remain
+in control of the scheduling policies. Evans was the key, since he could
+go either way, and they brought up the training issue because that is his
+bailiwick and they knew he wouldn't want the extra headaches." In a
+sense you have a representation of the situation, with objects
+(e.g, the
+two factions) and properties
+(their goals, Evans's lack of prior loyalty,
+etc.), but this was not the understanding you had to work with as it was
+developing. Pieces of it may have emerged as the meeting went on, but
+they were fragmentary, possibly contradictory, and may have been rejected
+for others as things continued.
+Every representation is an interpretation. Even in the post-mortem,
+your description of what was going on is hardly an objective analysis of the
+kind that could be subjected to proof. Two people at the same meeting
+could well come away with very different interpretations Evans might
+say "Smith is competing with me for that promotion, and he wanted to
+bring up the training issue to point out that we've been having difficulty
+in our group lately." There is no ultimate way to determine that any one
+interpretation is really right or wrong, and even the people whose behavior
+is in question may well not be in touch with their own deep motivations.
+Language is action. Each time you speak you are doing something
+quite different from simply 'stating a fact.' If you say "First we have to
+address the issue of system development" or "Let's have somebody on
+the other side talk," you are not describing the situation but creating it.
+The existence of "the issue of system development" or "the other side"
+is an interpretation, and in mentioning it you bring your interpretation
+into the group discourse. Of course others can object "That isn't really an
+issue-you're confusing two things" or "We aren't taking sides, everyone
+has his own opinion" But whether or not your characterization is taken
+for granted or taken as the basis for argument, you have created the objects
+and properties it describes by virtue of making the utterance.
+Heidegger recognized that ordinary everyday life is like the situation we
+have been describing. Our interactions with other people and with the
+
+36
+CHAPTER 3 UNDERSTANDING AND BEING
+inanimate world we inhabit put us into a situation of thrownness, for which
+the metaphor of the meeting is much more apt than the metaphor of the
+objective detached scientist who makes observations, forms hypotheses,
+and consciously chooses a rational course of action,
+3.4
+Breaking down and readiness-to-hand
+Another aspect of Heidegger's thought that is difficult for many people
+assimilate to their previous understanding is his insistence that objec
+id properties are not inherent in the world, but arise only in an event c
+breaking down in which they become present-at-hand.
+One simple
+example he gives is that of a hammer being used by someone engaged in
+driving a nail. To the person doing the hammering, the hammer as such
+does not exist. It is a part of the background of
+readiness-to-hand
+that is
+taken for granted without explicit recognition or identification as an
+object. It is part of the hammerer's world, but is not present any more
+than are the
+tendons of the hammerer's arm
+The hammer presents itself as a hammer only when there is some kind
+of breaking down or
+unreadzness-to-hand
+Its 'hammerness' emerges if
+it breaks or slips from grasp or mars the wood, or if there is a nail to
+be driven and the hammer cannot be found. The point is a subtle one,
+closely related to the distinction between thrownness and reflection on
+one's actions, as discussed above. As observers, we may talk about the
+hammer and reflect on its properties, but for the person engaged in the
+thrownness of unhampered hammering, it does not exist as an entity.
+Some other examples may help convey the importance of this distinction. As I watch my year-old baby learn to walk and pick up objects, I
+may be tempted to say that she is 'learning about gravity' But if I really
+want to deal with her ontology-with the world as it exists for her-there
+is no such thing as gravity. It would be inappropriate to view her learning
+as having anything to do with a concept or representation of gravity and
+its effects, even though she is clearly learning the skills that are necessary
+for acting in a physical world that we (as adult observers) characterize in
+terms of abstractions like 'gravity.' For the designer of space vehicles, on
+the other hand, it is clear that gravity exists. In anticipating the forms
+breaking down that will occur when the normal background of gravity
+altered, the designer must deal with gravity as a phenomenon to be
+considered, represented, and manipulated,.
+If we turn to computer systems, we see that for different people, engaged in different activities, the existence of objects and properties emerges
+in different kinds of breaking down. As I sit here typing a draft on a word
+processor, I am in the same situation as the hammerer. I think of words
+
+BREAKING DOWN AND READINESS-TO-HAND
+37
+and they appear on my screen. There is a network of equipment that
+includes my arms and hands, a keyboard, and many complex devices that
+mediate between it and a screen. None of this equipment is present for
+me except when there is a breaking down. If a letter fails to appear on
+the screen, the keyboard may emerge with properties such as 'stuck keys.'
+Or I may discover that the program was in fact constructed from sepa
+components such as a 'screen manager' and a 'keyboard handler,' and
+certain kinds of 'bugs' can be attributed to the keyboard handler.
+problem is serious, I may be called upon to bring forth a complex
+network of properties reflecting the design of the system and the details of
+computer software and hardware
+For me, the writer, this network of objects and properties did not exist
+previously. The typing was part of my world, but not the structure that
+emerges as I try to cope with the breakdown. But of course it did exist
+for someone else-for the people who created the device by a process of
+conscious design. They too, though, took for granted a background of
+equipment which, in the face of breaking down, they could have further
+brought to light.
+In sum, Heidegger insists that it is meaningless to talk about the existence of objects and their properties in the absence of concernfuls is not defined by
+with its potential for breaking down What really
+an objective omniscient observer, nor is it defined by an individual-the
+writer or computer designer-but rather by a space of potential for human
+concern and action. In the second part of the book we will show how shifting from a rationalistic to a Heideggerian perspective can radically alter
+our conception of computers and our approach to computer design
+rate
+that
+if the
+
+Chapter 4
+Cognition as a biological
+phenomenon
+The previous chapter presented the primary basis for our theoretical orientation, but our own understanding initially developed through a different
+path. The rationalistic orientation of our prior training in science and technology made the foundations of hermeneutics and phenomenology nearly
+inaccessible to us, Before we could become open to their relevance and
+importance we needed to take a preliminary step towards unconcealing the
+tradition in which we lived, recognizing that it was in fact open to serious
+question,
+For us, this first step came through the work of Humberto Maturana,
+biologist who has been concerned with understanding how biological
+processes can give rise to the phenomena of cognition and language..
+Be ginning with a study of the neurophysiology of vision, which led to the
+classic work on the functional organization of the frog's retina,' he went
+to develop a theory of the organization of living systems2 and of language
+and cognition,3
+'Maturana et al, "Anatomy and physiology of vision in the frog" (1960)
+2Maturana, "The organization of the living; A theory of the living organization"
+(1975); Maturana and Varela,
+Autopodests and Cognition
+(1980).
+3See, for example, Maturana, "Neurophysiology of cognition"
+(1970), "'Cognitive
+strategies"
+(1974), "Biology of language: The epistemology of reality" (1978) Much
+of Maturana's theory was developed in conjunction with Francisco Varela, whose own
+work is further developed in Varela,
+Principles of Biological Autonomy
+(1979), "Living
+ways of sense making: A middle way approach to neurosciences" (1984), and
+El
+Arbol de Conoczmzento
+(forthcoming) Maturana was deeply influenced by work in
+cybernetics by von Foerster and others in the Biological Computer Laboratory at
+the University of Illinois The book
+Cybernetics of Cybernetics
+(von Foerster,
+1974),
+on
+
+CHAPTER 4. COGNITION AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON
+39
+In comparing Maturana's orientation to Heidegger's, it is important to
+recognize that they began in very different traditions. As we mentioned in
+the previous chapter, there is a long history within philosophy of viewing
+mental and physical descriptions as applying in incommensurate domains.
+In approaches based on this 'dualism' it is taken for granted that mental
+predications (such as "'X knows that Y" or "X perceives a Y") are not
+expressible in terms of physical descriptions of a nervous system. Having
+made this assumption, it becomes a confusion of levels to ask whether
+a particular physical activity of the nervous system is a 'perception' or
+whether a certain state is one in which the organism 'knows' some 'fact.'
+Among the scientists who work in areas such as neurophysiology and
+artificial intelligence, however, it is a strongly held working hypothesis that
+there is a systematic and recurrent relationship between the two domains..
+It is assumed that "X sees a red spot" can be correlated with a particular
+pattern of activity in the retina and visual cortex, or that "John believes
+that Brutus killed Caesar" can be associated with a particular pattern
+of data in John's brain, viewed as a computer with appropriate software
+and storage devices. Few researchers adopt the naive approach of looking
+for immediate correlations between the mental and the physical except in
+peripheral functions like the image manipulation done by the retina. Usually the argument is based on an analogy to computer programs, in which
+the organization of the software provides a level of 'functional description'
+that is abstracted away from the specifics of the physical implementation.
+An entity counts as being explained when its behavior can be described in
+terms of a compositional analysis that postulates parts that are functionally identified-that play functionally defined roles in its operation.
+It is possible to adopt the position, as Chomsky at times does, 4 that
+theories of cognition can deal purely with 'competence,' characterizing the
+behavior of the cognitive system while making no hypothesis concerning
+the generation of that behavior by mechanisms. Most cognitive scientists,
+however, find this stance too restrictive, As scientists, they take it for
+granted that all observable phenomena are ultimately explainable in terms
+of mechanistic systems operating according to regular laws. A cognitive
+theory noods to deal with the causal principles by which these systems
+operate, not just with abstract characterizations of the behavior they generate, The appropriate level of description for the causal regularities may
+be an abstract level of software, rather than the physical descriptions of
+individual components, but nevertheless it has the goal of explaining
+produced in that laboratory, provides a broad insight into its work Since we have
+been most directly influenced by Maturana's writings we will refer primarily to them
+and to him
+'See, for example, Chomsky,
+Reflections on Language
+(1975)
+why
+
+40 CHAPTER 4. COGNITION AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON
+things happen, not just characterizing what happens.
+In creating such an explanation, it has generally been taken for granted
+that the distinctions and relations that are applied in describing the mental domain will form a basis for examining the structures in the domain of
+causal mechanism.. Maturana, beginning as an experimental neurophysiologist, came to realize that this naive formulation was inadequate and that
+it obscured the phenomena he wanted to study... However, he also wanted
+to adhere to the scientific tradition of explanation in terms of deterministic physical systems, asking how such systems might give rise to cognitive
+phenomena.s Much of his writing, therefore, is directed toward revealing
+the pervasiveness of the pre-understanding that biologists and cognitive
+scientists bring to bear, and toward opening possibilities for a different
+understanding
+In his writings, Maturana introduces a good deal of new terminology
+which seems puzzling and difficult on first reading. He does this quite
+consciously, because he recognizes that the old terminology carries within
+it a pre-understanding that is a trap for new understanding. For example,
+in describing their use of the word 'autopoiesis' Maturana and Varela say:
+Curiously, but not surprisingly, the introduction of this word
+proved of great value. It simplified enormously the task of
+talking about the organization of the living without falling into
+the always gaping trap of not saying anything new because
+the language does not permit it. We could not escape being
+immersed in a tradition, but with an adequate language we
+could orient ourselves differently and, perhaps, from the new
+perspective generate a new tradition. - Maturana and Varela,
+Autopozesis and Cognztzon (1980), p xvii.
+We introduce much of Maturana's terminology, without attempting to
+give definitions (indeed our own theory of language denies the possibility of
+giving precise definitions). The network of meanings will gradually evolve
+as the different ideas are developed and the links of their interdependence
+laid out.. We cannot in these few pages give a complete or balanced account of Maturana's work We have chosen instead to emphasize those
+aspects that were most critical in the development of our own understanding, trusting that for many readers this introduction will motivate the
+challenging but rewarding task of reading the original sources.
+As will become obvious in this chapter and throughout the book, the words 'cognitive
+and 'cognition' are used in quite different ways by different writers We will not
+attempt to give a simple definition of Maturana's use, but will clarify it through the
+discussion in the chapter
+
+THE CLOSURE OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM
+4.1 The closure of the nervous system
+In neurophysiological studies of vision, the traditional assumption (based
+on a rationalistic philosophy of cognition) was that the activity in the optic
+nerve was a direct representation of the pattern of light on the retina.
+The work of Maturana, Lettvin, MoCulloch, and Pitts on "Anatomy and
+physiology of vision in the frog" (1960) challenged this, demonstrating
+that
+over large areas of the retina to which single fibers of the optic nerve were
+connected, it was not the light intensity itself but rather the pattern of
+local variation of intensity that excited the fiber There was, for example,
+one type of fiber that responded best to a small dark spot surrounded by
+light. When triggered, it led to activity appropriate for catching a fly in
+the location corresponding to the spot It became apparent that at least
+some of the cognitive processes that we would interpret as relevant to the
+survival of the frog actually take place within its visual system, not deeper
+in its neuroanatomy.
+In trying to extend this research to color vision, Maturana, Uribe,
+and Frenk ("A biological theory of relativistic color coding in the primate
+retina," 1968) made observations that led to further questioning the relation between perception and the world being perceived Making use of a
+simple observation that had been noted for many years, they argued that
+theories associating colors directly with wavelengths on the spectrum were
+inadequate.. When a stick is illuminated by a white light from one side
+and a red light from the other, it casts two shadows, one of which appears
+red (against a generally pink background) and the other of which appears
+green. If we ask about the objective 'thing' being observed, there is no
+light with a spectrum of wavelengths normally called green; only various
+shades of red, white, and pink However, Maturana and other researchers
+have postulated that the patterns of neural activity produced are the same
+as those produced by light of a single wavelength normally called green.6
+The presence of "green' for the nervous system is not a simple correlate of
+the presence of certain wavelengths of light, but the result of a complex
+pattern of relative activity among different neurons
+This example was one of many that led Maturana to question the
+validity of our commonsense understanding of perception. On the naive
+view, there is some objectively recognizable property of a thing in the
+environment, and our perception of it is a capturing of that property in
+our mind. This idea is contained in the very words used in description:
+When Jerry Y. Lettvin and I wrote our several articles on frog
+vision... , we did it with the implicit assumption that we were
+6The original work in this area is described in Land, "The retinex theory of color
+vision" (1977)
+
+42 CHAPTER 4. COGNITION AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON
+handling a clearly defined cognitive situation: there was an
+objective (absolute) reality, external to the animal, and independent of it (not determined by it), which it could perceive
+(cognize), and the animal could use the information obtained in
+its perception to compute a behavior adeq rat to the perceived
+situation. This assumption of ours appeared clearly in our language, We described the various kinds of retinal ganglion cells
+as feature detectors, and we spoke about the detection of prey
+and enemy. - Maturana,
+"Biology of cognition"
+(1970), p xii
+Further examination of visual phenomena, however, suggested a different orientation. In order to deal with the seemingly fundamental perceptu al category of color it was necessary to give explanations in terms of
+relativ e patterns of activity within the nervous system.
+I soon realized in my research that my central purpose in the
+study of color vision could not be the study of a mapping of
+a colorful world on the nervous system, but rather that it had
+to be the understanding of the participation of the retina (or
+nervous system) in the generation of the color space of the
+observer. - Maturana, 'Biology of cognition" (1970), p xii.
+Perception, in other words, must be studied from the inside rather
+than the outside-looking at the properties of the nervous system as a
+genera tor of phenomena, rather than as a filter on the mapping of reality.
+Ma turana describes the nervous system as a closed network of interacting n eurons such that any change in the state of relative activity of a
+collection of neurons leads to a change in the state of relative activity of
+other or th e same collection of neurons. From this standpoint, the nervous system does not have "inputs' and 'outputs,' It can be
+perturbed by
+structural changes in the network itself, and this will affect its activity, but
+the sequence o f states of the system is generated by relations of neuronal
+activity, as determined by its structure.
+When light strikes the retina, it alters the structure of the nervous system by triggering chemical changes in the neurons This changed structure
+will 1 ead to patterns of activity different from those that would have been
+generated without the change, but it is a misleading simplification to view
+this c hange as a perception of the light. If we inject an irritant into a
+would h it triggers a change in the patterns of activity, but one which we
+esitate to call a perception' of the irritant, Maturana argues that
+all activity of the nervous system is best understood in this way. The
+focus sho uld be on the interactions within the system as a whole, not on
+the struct ure of perturbations. The perturbations do not determine what
+happens in the nervous system, but merely trigger changes of state. It is
+
+THE CLOSURE OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM
+43
+specifies
+the structure of the perturbed system that determines, or better,
+what structural configurations of the medium can perturb it.
+From this perspective, there is no difference between perception and
+hallucination. If the injected irritant creates a pattern of neural activity
+identical to that which would be produced by heat applied to the area
+served by the nerve, then there is no neurophysiological sense to the question of whether the heat was really 'perceived' or was a 'hallucination.'
+At first, this refusal to distinguish reality from hallucination may seem
+far-fetched, but if we think back to color vision it is more plausible. The
+question of whether the shadow in the stick experiment was 'really green'
+is meaningless once we give up the notion that the perception of green
+corresponds in a simple way to a pattern of physical stimuli. In giving a
+scientific explanation of the operation of the nervous system at the physical
+level, we need to explain how the structure of the system at any moment
+generates the pattern of activity. The physical means by which that structure is changed by interaction within the physical medium lie outside the
+domain of the nervous system itself.
+Of course an observer of the nervous system within its medium can
+make statements about the nature of the perturbation and its effect on
+patterns of activity. For this observer it makes sense to distinguish the
+situation of an injected irritant from one of heat. But
+from the standpoint
+of the nervous system
+it is not a relevant, or even possible, distinction,.
+Along with this new understanding of perception, Maturana argues
+against what he calls the 'fallacy of instructive interaction.'
+'Instructive
+interaction' is his term for the commonsense belief that in our interactions
+with our environment we acquire a direct representation of it-that
+properties of the medium are mapped onto (specify the states of)
+structures in the nervous system. He argues that because our interaction is
+always through the activity of the entire nervous system, the changes are
+not in the nature of a mapping. They are the results of patterns of activity
+which, although triggered by changes in the physical medium, are not
+representations of it. The correspondences between the structural changes
+and the pattern of events that caused them are historical, not structural..
+They cannot be explained as a kind of reference relation between neural
+structures and an external world,,
+domain of
+The structure of the organism at any moment determines a
+perturbations-a
+space of possible effects the medium could have on the
+sequence of structural states that it could follow. The medium selects
+among these patterns, but does not generate the set of possibilities. In
+7 Here and throughout this chapter we use the term 'medium rather than 'environment' to refer to the space in which an organism exists This is to avoid the connotation that there is a separation between an entity and its 'environment' An entity
+exists as part of a medium, not as a separate object inside it
+
+44 CHAPTER 4 COGNITION AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON
+understanding an organism as a structure-determined system we view it in
+terms of its components and the interactions among them The appropriate
+domain of description is not the behavior of the organism as a unity, but
+the interlocking behaviors of its physical components.
+4.2 Autopoiesis, evolution, and learning
+Maturana's understanding of an organism's relation to its environment
+leads to an epistemological problem, In our culture's commonsense theo
+of knowledge, what we know is a representation of the external world.
+on information gathered through perception, our brain somehow
+facts, uses them to draw conclusions, and updates them on the
+experience.
+If we look at the nervous system as closed, we must ask how an organism comes to have any knowledge of the world,. How can a history
+of independent perturbations lead to the phenomena of cognition that
+our introspective intuitions will not let us deny? Maturana seeks to explain the origins of all phenomena of cognition in terms of the phylogeny
+(species history) and ontogeny (individual history) of living systems. To
+do this, he must first give an adequate account of the organization of the
+living. Maturana and Varela characterize the organization of the living as
+'autopoietic,'s An autopoietic system is defined as:
+a network of processes of production (transformation and
+destruction) of components that produces the components that:
+(i) through their interactions and transformations continuously
+regenerate the network of processes (relations) that produced
+them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity
+in the space in which they (the components) exist by specifying
+the topological domain of its realization as such a network. -
+Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition
+(1980), p. 79.
+The terms used in this definition, such as 'unity,'
+component,' and
+'space,' have technical meanings in Maturana's work. We will not attempt
+define them here, but will explicate their meaning in the course of
+describing the relevance of this definition
+The phenomenon of autopoiesis is quite general. It can apply to systems existing in any domain in which we can identify unities and components. An autopoietic system holds constant its organization and defines
+its boundaries through the continuous production of its components. If
+8For a collection of papers by Maturana, Varela, and others on autopoiesis, see Zeleny,
+Autopoiesrs, a Theory of the Living
+Or ganization
+(1978).
+ries
+Based
+stores
+basis of
+
+4.2. AUTOPOIESIS, EVOLUTION, AND LEARNING
+the autopoiesis is interrupted, the systems organization-its identity as a
+particular kind of unity-is lost, and the system disintegrates (dies). An
+autopoietic system that exists in physical space is a living system 9
+At first sight, this definition may seem irrelevant or trivial. But it is in
+fact a carefully crafted statement expanding on a simple idea: the essential
+characteristic of a living system is that it is a collection of components
+constituting a unity that can live or die. Maturana's central observation
+is that exactly this simple property leads to the complex phenomena of
+life. The functioning of an organism as a structure-determined system
+with the potential of disintegration leads to adaptation and evolution.
+The mechanism by which an organism comes to function adequately
+in its medium is one of selection, which includes both the selection of
+structural changes within an individual and the selection of individuals
+by the possibilities of survival and disintegration,, A plastic, structuredetermined system (i.e., one whose structure can change over time while
+its identity remains) that is autopoietic will by necessity evolve in such a
+way that its activities are properly coupled to its medium Its structure
+must change so that it generates appropriate changes of state triggered by
+specific perturbing changes in its medium; otherwise it will disintegrate.
+Learning is not a process of accumulation of representations of
+the environment; it is a continuous process of transformation
+of behavior through continuous change in the capacity of the
+nervous system to synthesize it. Recall does not depend on the
+indefinite retention of a structural invariant that represents an
+entity (an idea, image, or symbol), but on the functional ability
+of the system to create, when certain recurrent conditions are
+given, a behavior that satisfies the recurrent demands or that
+the observer would class as a reenacting of a previous one.
+Maturana, "Biology of cognition"
+(1970), p.. 45.
+Structural coupling is the basis not only for changes in an individual
+during its lifetime (learning) but also for changes carried through reproduction (evolution). In fact, all structural change can be viewed as ontogenetic (occurring in the life of an individual). A genetic mutation is a
+structural change to the parent which has no direct effect on its state of
+autopoiesis until it plays a role in the development of an offspring.
+It... the observer wants to discriminate between learned and
+instinctive behavior, he or she will discover that in their actual
+91n later work, Maturana and Varela distinguish autopoiesis, as a property of cellular
+systems, from a more general property of
+operational closure
+class of systems We will not pursue the distinction here, but it is explicated in
+Varela's El Arbol de Conocimiento
+(forthcoming).
+that applies to a broader
+45
+
+46 CHAPTER 4. COGNITION AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON
+realization, both modes of behavior are equally determined in
+the present by the structures of the nervous system and organism, and that, in this respect, they are indeed indistinguishable. The distinction between learned and instinctive behaviors lies exclusively in the history of establishment of the structures responsible for them
+- Maturana, "Biology of language"
+(1978), p 45
+The structural coupling generated by the demands of autopoiesis plays
+the role that we naively attribute to having a representation of the world..
+The frog with optic fibers responding to small moving dark spots does
+not have a representation
+of flies. As a result of structural coupling, the
+structure of the nervous system generates patterns of activity that are
+triggered by specific perturbations and that contribute to the continued
+autopoiesis of the frog. Of course, the changes of structure that led to
+the frog's nervous system would not have been supportive of autopoiesis
+if the frog had to compete for food in a flyless environment. But it is an
+error to assume that the structure reflects a knowledge of the existence of
+fl ies. An explanation of why a frog catches a fly can be in two different
+domains. In the domain of the frog as a physical system we can explain how
+the structure determines the action. In the cognitive domain (discussed
+below), we can explain how the history of perturbations of the frog (and
+its ancestors) led to the structure that determines it.
+4.3
+The cognitive domain
+Maturana's primary concern is to understand what 'cognition' can mean
+when we relate it to the fundamental nature of living systems. Rejecting the metaphor of information processing as the basis for cognition,
+he
+replaces the question "How does the organism obtain information about
+its environment?" with "How does it happen that the organism has the
+structure that permits it to operate adequately in the medium in which it
+exists?" An answer to this question cannot be generated by comprehending how a nervous system operates, but must be grounded in a deeper
+understanding of how cognitive activity is common to all life, and is determined by the underlying phenomenon of autopoiesis. As Maturana ob
+serves ("Neurophysiology of cognition,"
+1970, p. 8), "Living systems are
+cognitive systems, and living, as a process, is a process of cognition., This
+statement is valid for all organisms, with and without a nervous system."
+What does it mean, then, to understand an organism as a cognitive
+system?
+
+4.
+THE COGNITIVE DOMAIN
+47
+A cognitive system is a system whose organization defines a
+domain of interactions in which it can act with relevance to the
+maintenance of itself, and the process of cognition is the actual
+(inductive) acting or behaving in this domain,
+- Maturana,
+"Biology of cognition"
+(1970), p.. 13,
+relevance of action to
+A cognitive explanation is one that deals with the
+the maintenance of autopoiesis,. It operates in a
+phenomenal domain
+(domain of
+phenomena) that is distinct from the domain of mechanistic
+structuredetermined behavior:
+• as a result of the structural coupling that takes place along
+such a history, history becomes embodied both in the struc
+ture of the living system and the structure of the medium even
+though both systems necessarily, as structure determined systems, always operate in the present through locally determined
+processes... History is necessary to explain how a given system or phenomenon came to be, but it does not participate in
+the explanation of the operation of the system or phenomenon
+in the present. - Maturana, "Biology of language" (1978), P
+39.
+As observers we can generate descriptions of the activity of living
+systems in either of two non-intersecting domains. One description deals
+with the structure of the system and how that structure determines
+behavior. Such a description is essentially ahistorical. It does not matter
+how the system came to be that way, only that it is. We can at the
+same time
+describe (as observers of a history of changes within the
+structure and the
+medium the pattern of interactions by which the
+structure came to be,
+and the relationship of those changes to effective
+action. It is this second domain of explanation that Maturana calls
+cognitive! The cognitive do
+main deals with the relevance of the changing
+structure of the system to behavior that is effective for its survival.
+It is therefore in this cognitive domain that we can make distinctions
+based on words such as "intention,' "knowledge,' and 'learning.' As mentioned above, philosophers have been careful to distinguish 'mental predicates' such as these from the physical predicates that apply to the organisms or machines embodying the phenomena they describe. For Maturana
+the cognitive domain is not simply a different (mental) level for providing
+a mechanistic description of the functioning of an organism. It is a domain
+for characterizing effective action through time. It is essentially temporal
+and historical. A statement like "The animal knows X" is not a statement
+about its state, but a statement about a pattern of actions (past and projected). One of Maturana's main objectives is to overcome the tendency
+
+48 CHAPTER 4. COGNITION ASA BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON
+(imposed on us by our language) to treat mental terms as though they
+could meaningfully be taken as descriptions of state or structure.
+In making a distinction between the domain of cognition and the domain of the nervous system as a structure-determined system, Maturana
+clarifies an issue that has been at the heart of behaviorist approaches to
+cognition. The behaviorist describes the behavior of the organism (its responses) as a function of the sequence of states of the environment-the
+relevant stimuli, reinforcements, and punishments.. In the most extreme
+form of behaviorism, it is assumed that stimuli and responses can be described externally without reference to the structure of the organism, and
+that all of the interesting recurrences of behavior can be explained by the
+pattering of the events.. There are many who would call themselves behaviorists (or 'neobehaviorists'10) who postulate an internal state of an
+organism as well as the record of inputs and outputs. What is common to
+behaviorist approaches is the focus on the organism as a behaving entity
+(a unity, in Maturana's terms) subject to external stimuli, rather than as
+a composite to be understood through the interactions of its components.
+Although he recognizes the significance of a domain that is independent
+of the structure of the cognitive system, Maturana rejects the behaviorist
+view, arguing that we cannot deal with 'organism' and, 'environment' as
+two interacting independent things.. We cannot identify stimuli that exist
+independently of the unity and talk about its history of responses to them.
+The unity itself specifies the space in which it exists, and in observing it
+we must use distinctions within that space.
+I
+4.4 Consensual domains
+The sources of perturbation for an organism include other organisms of the
+same and different kinds. In the interaction between them, each organism
+undergoes a process of structural coupling due to the perturbations gener
+by the others. This mutual process can lead to interlocked patterns of
+behavior that forma consensual domain.
+When two or more organisms interact recursively as structurally plastic systems, ... „ the result is mutual ontogenic structural coupling._. For an observer, the domain of interactions
+specified through such ontogenic structural coupling appears
+as a network of sequences of mutually triggering interlocked
+conducts. ,.. The various conducts or behaviors involved are
+both arbitrary and contextual. The behaviors are arbitrary
+because they can have any form as long as they operate as
+r° For example, see Suppes, "From behaviorism to neobehaviorism" (1975).
+ated
+
+4.4. CONSENSUAL DOMAINS
+triggering perturbations in the interactions; they are contextual because their participation in the interlocked interactions
+of the domain is defined only with respect to the interactions
+that constitute the domain...
+I shall call the domain of interlocked conducts_ a consensual domain..-
+Maturana, "Biology
+of language"
+(1978), p 47
+For example, when the male and female of a species develop a sequence
+of mutual actions of approach and recognition in a mating ritual, we as ob
+servers can understand it as a coherent pattern that includes both animals.
+Our description is not a description of what the male and female (viewed
+as mechanisms made up of physical components) do, but a description of
+the mating dance as a pattern of mutual interactions. The generation of
+a consensual domain is determined by the history of states and interactions among the participants (and their progenitors) within the physical
+domain. However, as observers of this behavior we can distinguish a new
+domain in which the system of behaviors exists, The consensual domain is
+reducible neither to the physical domain (the structures of the organisms
+that participate in it) nor to the domain of interactions (the history by
+which it came to be), but is generated in their interplay through structural
+coupling as determined by the demands of autopoiesis for each participant.
+Maturana refers to behavior in a consensual domain as 'linguistic
+be havior.' Indeed, human language is a clear example of a consensual
+do main, and the properties of being arbitrary and contextual have at times
+been taken as its defining features. But Maturana extends the term
+'lin guistic' to include
+any mutually generated domain of interactions.
+Lan guage acts, like any other acts of an organism, can be described in
+the domain of structure and in the domain of cognition as well, But
+their existence as language is in the consensual domain generated by
+mutual interaction. A language exists among a community of individuals,
+and is continually regenerated through their linguistic activity and the
+structural coupling generated by that activity.
+Language, as a consensual domain, is a patterning of mutual orienting
+behavior,' not a collection of mechanisms in a 'language user' or a 'seman
+coupling between linguistic behavior and non-linguistic perturbations
+experienced by the organisms.
+Maturana points out that language is connotative and not denotative,
+and that its function is to orient the orientee within his or her cognitive
+domain, and not to point to independent entities. An observer will at
+times see a correspondence between the language observed and the entities
+observed, just as there is a correspondence between the frog's visual system
+and the existence of flies. But if we try to understand language purely
+within the cognitive domain, we blind ourselves to its role as orienting
+49
+tic
+
+50 CHAPTER 4.. COGNITION AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON
+behavior, and make inappropriate assumptions about the necessity and
+nature of reference.
+The basic function of language as a system of orienting behavior is not the transmission of information or, the description of
+an independent universe about which we can talk, but the creation of a consensual domain of behavior between linguistically
+interacting systems through the development of a cooperative
+domain of interactions.- Maturana, "Biology of language," p. 50
+The role of 'listening' in generating the meaning of an utterance is
+closely related to Maturana's explanation of consensual domains, and will be
+discussed at length in Chapter 5.
+4.5 The observer and description
+At this point, it is useful to take a step back and apply Maturana's orientation to what we ourselves are doing. In the act of writing down these
+words on paper we are engaged in linguistic activity. In using language,
+we are not transmitting information or describing an external universe,
+but are creating a cooperative domain of interactions. Our own use of
+language carries a possibly misleading pre-understanding.
+There is a naive view (as discussed in Chapters 2 and 5) that takes
+language as conveying information about an objective reality. Words and
+sentences refer to things whose existence is independent of the act of speaking. But we ourselves are biological beings, and the thrust of Maturana's
+argument is that we therefore can never have knowledge about external
+reality. We can have a structure that reflects our history of interactions in
+a medium, but that medium is not composed of 'things' that are knowable.
+We can talk about a world, but in doing so we act as 'observers':
+An observer is a human being, a person, a living system who
+can make distinctions and specify that which he or she
+distin guishes as a unity..,. and is able to operate as if he or she
+were external to (distinct from the circumstances in which the
+ob server finds himself or herself. Everything said is said by an
+observer to another observer, who can be himself or
+herself. Maturana, "Biology of language," p. 31.
+As observers, we generate
+distinctions in a consensual domain. A description in any domain (whether it be the domain of goals and intention,
+or that of physical systems) is inevitably a statement made by an observer
+to another observer, and is grounded not in an external reality but in
+
+4.5. THE OBSERVER AND DESCRIPTION
+the consensual domain shared by those observers, Properties of things
+fact the recognition of distinct things at all) exist only as operational
+distinctions in a domain of distinctions specified by an observer, When we
+about systems and their medium, components, and structural change,
+speak as if there were extemal things and properties. This is an
+in escapable result of using language, but it is always a speaking 'as if,' not
+an ontological claim
+This idea that all cognitive distinctions are generated by an observer
+(and are relative to the nature of that observer) is not talt Psychology
+cod if phenome, in the classical bord presents itself to the naive
+nat phenomena-1.e.,
+observer in everyday situations-are not objective or subjective by virtue
+of whether they arise from internal or external events, since all knowable events are in one sense internal (resulting from internal experiences
+and neurophysiological events). More recent work in systems theory and
+cybernetics also challenges the naive acceptance of modes of interpretation that assume the objectivity of observation, What is different and
+crucial in Maturana's discourse is the recognition that distinctions lie in a
+consensual domain-that they presuppose some kind of social interaction
+in which the observer is engaged:
+(in
+talk
+we
+(1929), ar-
+The linguistic domain as a domain of orienting behavior requires at least two interacting organisms with comparable domains of interactions, so that a cooperative system of consensual interactions may be developed in which the emerging
+conduct of the two organisms is relevant for both... The
+central feature of human existence is its occurrence in a lin
+cognitive domain, This domain is constitutively social.
+"Biology of cognition" (1970), pp. 41, xxiv,
+guistic
+- Matur ana,
+In denying the possibility of subject-independent objective knowledge,
+Maturana does not adopt the solipsistic position that our discourse can
+deal ultimately only with our subjective thoughts and feelings. By virtue
+of being a discourse it lies in a consensual domain-a domain that exists for
+a social community. Reality is not objective, but neither is it individual:
+cultural differences do not represent different modes of treating the same objective reality, but legitimately different cognitive domains. Culturally different men live in different cognitive realities that are recursively specified through their living in them. The question of solipsism arises only as a
+"See, for example, Pask,
+Conversation Theory
+(1976) and Conversation, Cognition and
+Learnzng
+(1975), and von Foeister,
+Cybernetics of Cybernetics
+(1974)
+
+52
+CHAPTER 4. COGNITION AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON
+c pseudo-problem, or does not arise at all, because the necessary
+ondition for our possibility of talking about
+language that is a consensual system of interac
+gallon or solpsism - Maturana
+it is our having a
+tions in a subject
+constitutes the
+ependent coğnitive domain, and this conditio
+p. 464,
+"Cognitive strategies" (1974),
+its C In going on to deal with consciousness, Maturana again emphasizes
+ontinuity with other phenomena of cognition,
+as a fundamentally different capacity. He sees consci
+through the operation of the consensual domain in wh
+erated. Language (shared, not private) is prior to cons
+4.6
+rather than seeing
+ousness as generated
+ich language is gencious thought.
+Domains of explanation
+"The relevance of Maturana's work to the design of computers lies in his
+ti ccount of how biological organisms function. It was a critical perturba-
+CO on to our understanding of computers because it provided a domain of'
+To ncrete examples of systems that were mechanistic but not programmed.
+understand the importance of this, it is useful to look at an example.
+colle
+the Examining a newbor baby's ability to get food, we see a remarkable
+ction of extremely successful behaviors. A cry gets mother's attention
+to th rooting' reflex (a light pressure on one cheek produces a head turn
+action at side) positions the baby's mouth over a nipple, and the sucking
+he or s s express milk. If an Al scientist set out to build such a program,
+such as he might propose that the baby be provided with a set of goals,'
+as 'cry, :
+'drink milk' and 'get nipple in mouth,' a set of 'operators' such
+turn
+head,' and 'suck,' and a model
+of the world that sets them
+into appropriate correspondence. A more soph
+isticated model might even
+include a model of mother's goals and plans,
+so that the cry could be
+part. analyzed as an attempt to evoke an appropria
+te plan of action on her
+The But of course all of this is irrelevant to the actual mechanisms at work.
+can b baby, like every organism, has a complex set of reflexes whose purposes
+depen e explained in terms like those above, but whose functioning does not
+that is d on representations, planning, or analysis. The result is behavior
+in its ra
+successful for a particular coupling with the medium, but is limited
+ability t
+nge. If the particular actions don't work, there is no generalized
+can desc o come up with 'other ways to eat.! In Maturana's terms, we
+and coup
+ribe behavior in either the cognitive domain (in which purposes
+determine ling are central) or the domain of the mechanism as a structure-
+d system (in which the actual reflex paths are the key).
+
+4.6.
+OMAINS OF EXPLANATION
+In trying to build computer systems, it has often been argued that we
+must move beyond 'baby' systems, which simply do what is appropriate
+because their structure is properly coupled. If the computer can manipu
+an explicit model of the goals and potential actions, then it can infer
+action sequences that were not initially programmed but that lead
+desired goals. Greater flexibility should come from specifying the goals and
+operators instead of the course of action.
+To some extent this approach is valid, but in another way it is shortsighted. It assumes that the programmer (or
+"knowledge engineer) can
+articulate an explicit account of the system's coupling with the worldwhat it is intended to do, and what the consequences of its activities
+will be. This can be done for idealized toy' systems and for those with
+clearly circumscribed formal purposes (for example programs that calculate mathematical formulas) But the enterprise breaks down when we
+turn to something like a word processor, a time-sharing system, or for
+that matter any system with which people interact directly. No simple set
+of goals and operators can delimit what can and will be done.. We might,
+for example, note that 'goals' of the word processor include allowing a
+person to compare two pieces of text, to rapidly skim through a document, to copy fragments from one document to another, to move quickly
+to some part of a document, etc These might be satisfied by 'window
+and 'scrolling' mechanisms, but they will not operate by explicit analysis
+of the user's goals. The person selects among basic mechanisms that the
+machine provides, to get the work done. If the mechanisms don't do what
+is needed, others may have to be added. They will often be used in ways
+that were not anticipated in their design.
+Similarly, the effects of different 'operators' cannot be fully described
+or anticipated when they elicit responses by people
+(or even by other
+computer systems) We can define the domain of perturbations (the space
+of possible effects the interaction can have on the system), but we cannot
+model how the system's activity will engender them.
+The most successful designs are not those that try to fully model the
+domain in which they operate, but those that are "in alignment' with the
+fundamental structure of that domain, and that allow for modification
+and evolution to generate new structural coupling. As observers
+programmers), we want to understand to the best of our ability just what
+relevant domain of action is This understanding guides our design
+selection of structural changes, but need not (and in fact cannot) be
+embodied in the form of the mechanism
+In Chapters 8 and 12 we will explore more fully the consequences of
+Maturana's approach for the design of computer programs, and for the
+discourse about machines and intelligence
+53
+late
+possible
+to the
+(and
+
+Chapter 5
+Language, listening,
+and commitment
+The third foundation on which we will build our understanding of computers is a theory of language that combines the hermeneutic orientation
+of Chapter 3 with the theory of
+speech acts-the analysis of language
+as meaningful acts by speakers in situations of shared activity. In this
+chapter we show how 'language as action' and 'language as interpretation'
+can be reconciled. In doing this we will move back and forth between
+two fundamental questions: "How does an utterance have meaning?" and
+"What kinds of actions do we perform in language?" The juxtaposition
+of these questions leads us to a new grounding for our understanding of
+language and the nature of human existence as language.
+5.1 Listening in a background
+Chapter 2 introduced the concept of 'literal meaning' and its importance
+rationalistic semantic theories. Searle characterizes what he sees as the
+'received opinion:'
+Sentences have literal meanings. The literal meaning of a sentence is entirely determined by the meanings of its component
+words (or morphemes) and the syntactical rules according to
+which these elements are combined... For sentences in the
+indicative, the meaning of a sentence determines a set of truth
+conditions; that is, it determines a set of conditions such that
+the literal utterance of the sentence to make a statement will be
+the making of a true statement if and only if those
+conditions
+
+5.1. LISTENING IN A BACKGROUND
+55
+are satisfied...
+The literal meaning of the sentence is the
+meaning it has independently of any context whatever, and,
+diachronic changes [changes in the language over time] apart,
+it keeps that meaning in any context in which it is uttered. -
+Searle, "Literal meaning"
+(1979), p. 117..
+Formal analytic approaches based on literal meaning often take as their
+model the language of mathematics, in which the truth of a statement can
+be determined without reference to outside context or situation' But
+real language, one rarely if ever makes a statement that could not be
+construed as having an unintended literal meaning. Speaker A says "Snow
+white" and B can point to the murky grey polluted stuff at their feet.
+replies "I meant pure snow," and B responds "You didn't say so, and
+anyway no snow is absolutely pure." It is an edifying exercise to look at
+the statements made both in writing and in everyday conversation, to see
+how few of them can even apparently be judged true or false without an
+appeal to an unstated background.
+It is impossible to establish a context-independent basis for
+circum scribing the literal use of a term even as seemingly simple as
+"water," as shown by the following dialog:
+A: Is there any water in the refrigerator?
+B: Yes.
+A: Where? I don't see it.
+B: In the cells of the eggplant.
+A claims that B's first response was a lie (or at best "misleading),
+while B contends that it was literally true. Most semantic theories in the
+rationalistic tradition provide formal grounds to support B, but a theory
+of language as a human phenomenon needs to deal with the grounds for
+A's complaint as well-i.e., with the "infelicity of B's reply.
+At first, it seems that it might be possible simply to expand the definition of "water." Perhaps there is a 'sense' of the word that means "water
+in its liquid phase in sufficient quantity to act as a fluid," so that a sentence containing the word "water" is ambiguous as to whether it refers
+to this sense or to a sense dealing purely with chemical composition. But
+this doesn't help us in dealing with some other possible responses of B:
+1. B: Yes, condensed on the bottom of the cooling coils.
+2, B: There's no water in the refrigerator, but there's some lemonade.
+'In fact, as pointed out by Lakatos in
+case even in mathematics
+Proofs and Refutations
+(1976), this is not really the
+A
+54
+
+56 CHAPTER 5. LANGUAGE, LISTENING, AND COMMITMENT
+3
+yB: Yes, there's a bottle of water in the refrigerator, with a little
+emon in it to cover up the taste of the rust from the pipes
+Response 1
+only because of
+checking for sour
+is facetious, like the one about eggplants. But that is
+ces rhumidity that ruined some to it
+some photoperson A
+weregraphic plates
+cbeing stored in the retrigerator. Similarly, in responses 2 and 3, s
+ultural issues are at stake in deciding whether a certain amount of le
+should disqualify a substance as being "water." We cann
+a situation-independent detinition of what qualities as v
+ny amount of fiddling with the definition, one can alway
+new context in which it is inadequate. In making the stat
+some water in the refrigerator, " a person is not stating ar
+Every speech act occurs in a context, with a background shar
+and hearer. The 'felicity conditions' depend on mutual kn
+intentions,
+Some other simple examples illustrate a variety of ways in which the
+back ground can be relevant.
+1. Joan has never failed a student in Linguistics 265.
+ubtle
+mon
+ot come up with
+ater, since after
+come up with a
+ment "There's
+objective fact.
+ed by speaker
+owledge and
+2. I'm sorry I missed the meeting yesterday. My car had a flat tire,,
+3. There's an animal over, there in the bushes
+in w
+Sentence 1 is formally true in many circumstances, including the one
+hich Joan has never taught Linguistics 265. However, in ordinary conversa
+tion, the hearer makes the additional inference that Joan has taught
+the co
+use, and is justified in accusing the speaker of bad faith if the
+inferen is not true. Similarly in sentence 2, the hearer assumes that there
+a cohe
+rence to the events being described. If the second sentence were
+"There ar
+e fifteen million people in Mexico City," the hearer would be
+puzzled, and i
+f the flat tire had nothing to do with missing the meeting (even
+though it a
+ctually was flat), the speaker is practicing deception.. Sentence
+is a more
+subtle case. If the hearer looks over and sees a dog in the
+bushes, and fi
+nds out that the speaker knew it was a dog, he or she will
+feel that the st
+atement was inappropriate, and might say "If you knew it
+was a dog, why
+didn't you say so?" On the
+other hand, the statement
+"There's a dog over there in the bushes" is pe
+rfectly appropriate even if
+both speaker and hearer know that it is a beagle
+, and sentence 3 would be
+fine for a dog if it were a response to something li
+ke "There are no animals
+anywhere around here."
+Austin (whose work on speech acts is described below) summed matters
+3
+
+up as follows:
+
+LISTENING IN A BACKGROUND
+57
+It is essential to realize that
+"true' and 'false,' like
+'unfree,' do not stand for anything simple at all; but only for
+a general dimension of being a right or proper thing to say
+sa opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this
+audience, for to Do phings ves andrasth these intentions.4s.
+'free' and
+There have been attempts to give theoretical accounts of these phenomena. Some, such as Grice's conversational principles ("Logic and conversation," 1975), are in the form of pragmatic' rules followed by speakers
+of a language. Others, such as Rosch's analysis of human categorization
+systems,2 look toward psychological explanations. Moravesik ("'How do
+words get their meanings," 1981) has proposed 'aitiational schemes,' which
+include functional and causal factors in defining meaning. Although such
+analyses point to important phenomena, they cannot provide a full account of background and the listening that lives within it. To do so they
+would have to make explicit the conditions that distinguish those situations in which the use of a particular word or phrase is appropriate. For
+example, in Searle's paper on literal meaning, truth conditions still play a
+central role, although they are seen as relative to a background:
+For a large class of unambiguous sentences such as "The cat is
+on the mat," the notion of the literal meaning of the sentence
+only has application relative to a set of background assumptions. The truth conditions of the sentence will vary with variations in these background assumptions; and given the absence
+or presence of some background assumptions the sentence does
+not have determinate truth conditions. These variations have
+nothing to do with indexicality, change of meaning, ambiguity, conversational implication, vagueness or presupposition as
+these notions are stanclardly discussed in the philosophical and
+linguistic literature. - Searle, "Liter
+al meaning" (1979), p.
+125..
+We must be cautious with this statement. In speaking of 'a set of background assumptions,' Searle suggests that background can be accounted
+for by adding the appropriate set of further propositions to a formal semantic account. As we argued in Chapter 3, however, background is a
+pervasive and fundamental phenomenon. Background is the space of possibilities that allows us to listen to both what is spoken and what is un
+spoken. Meaning is created by an active listening, in which the linguistic
+form triggers interpretation, rather than conveying information. The background is not a set of propositions, but is our basic orientation of "care'
+2The example of Sentence 3 above is like those studied in Rosch, "Cognitive repre
+sentations of semantic categories"
+(1975)
+
+58 CHAPTER 5. LANGUAGE, LISTENING, AND COMMITMENT
+for the world, This world is always already organized around fundamen
+human projects, and depends upon these projects for its being and
+organization.
+To recapitulate in more explicitly Heideggerian language, the world is
+encountered as something always already lived in, worked in, and acted
+upon. World as the background of obviousness is manifest in our everyday
+dealings as the familiarity that pervades our situation, and every possible
+utterance presupposes this. Listening for our possibilities in a world in
+which we already dwell allows us to speak and to elicit the cooperation
+of others. That which is not obvious is made manifest through language.
+What is unspoken is as much a part of the meaning as what is spoken.
+5.2 Meaning, commitment, and speech acts
+Having posed the problem of meaning, we tur for a moment to the structure of language acts. In doing so, we draw on speach act theory, as orig
+inated by the philosopher J. L. Austin
+(How to Do Things with
+Words,
+1962), Austin studied a class of utterances (which he termed 'performatives') that do not refer to states of the world, but that in themselves
+constitute acts such as promising, threatening, and naming. He
+argued
+that the generally accepted view of the truth and falsity of propositions
+was not applicable to many of these speech acts. It does not make sense to
+ask whether a particular utterance of "I pronounce you man and wife" or
+"Get me a hamburger" is true or false, but rather whether it is
+felicitouswhether it is appropriate to the context in which it is uttered.
+Austin's student Searle (Speech Acts, 1969) formalized the structure
+of the felicity conditions associated with a variety of speech acts, such as
+promising and requesting, In "A taxonomy of illocutionary acts" (1975) he
+classified all speech acts as embodying one of five fundamental
+illocutionary points. These categories cover all utterances, not just sentences with
+explicit performative verbs such as "I promise... " and "I declare., .. " For
+example, we can talk about a speech act as being a promise even though
+its form may be a simple statement, as in "T'll be there,,"
+The five categories of illocutionary point are:
+Assertives: commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something's being
+the case-to the truth of the expressed proposition.
+Directives: attempt (in varying degrees) to get the hearer to do something.. These include both questions (which can direct the hearer to
+make an assertive speech act in response) and commands (which attempt to get the hearer, to carry out some linguistic or non-linguistic
+act).
+tal
+
+5.2. MEANING, COMMITMENT, AND SPEECH ACTS
+59
+Commissives: commit the speaker (again in varying degrees) to some
+future course of action.
+Expressives: express a psychological state about a state of affairs. This
+class includes acts such as apologizing and praising.
+Declarations: bring about the correspondence between the propositional
+content of the speech act and reality, as illustrated by the example
+of pronouncing a couple married.
+illocutionary point
+Searle distinguishes amand its propositional content.
+of an utterance, its
+The illocutionary point
+locutionary torce,
+is one of the five categories above Two speech acts (such as a polite
+question and a demand for information) may differ in their illocutionary force
+(manner and degree) while having the same illocutionary point (in
+directive). The fact that an utterance involves a proposition
+this case a
+about some topic, such
+as the speaker's attendance at a particular meeting at a particular time, is its
+propositional content.
+The essential importance of illocutionary point is the specification of
+meaning in
+terms of patterns of commitment entered into by speaker and
+hearer by virtue of taking
+part in the conversation The taxonomy classifies
+the possibilities for what a speaker can
+do with an utterance. It is not a
+set of cultural conventions like those governing polite
+behavior It is based on the underlying set of possibilities for how words can be related
+to the world, Each culture or language may have its unique ways of expressing
+different speech acts, but the space of possibilities is the universal basis of our existence in
+language.
+The centrality of commitment in speech act theory has been brought out
+particularly clearly by Habermas in discussing what he calls the 'validity claims' of an
+utterance:
+The essential presupposition for the success of an illocutionary
+act consists in the speaker's entering into a specific
+ment,
+so that the hearer can rely on him An utterance can
+count as a promise, assertion, request, question, or avowal, if
+and only if the speaker makes an offer that he is ready to make
+good insofar as it is accepted by the hearer, The speaker must
+engage himself, that is, indicate that in certain situations he
+will draw certain consequences for action.
+- Habermas, "What
+is universal pragmatics?"
+(1979), p. 61
+engage
+Habermas argues that every language act has consequences for the
+participants, leading to other immediate actions and to commitments for
+future action. In making a statement, a speaker is doing something like
+
+60 CHAPTER 5. LANGUAGE, LISTENING, AND COMMITMENT
+making a promise-making a commitment to act in appropriate ways in
+the future.. Of course, a statement has a different kind of satisfaction condition from a promise. No specific action is anticipated, but there is a
+structure of potential dialog in the face of a breakdown. If the speaker
+says "Yes, there is water in the refrigerator" and the hearer can't find any,
+the speaker is committed to give an account. Either they reach agreement
+that the statement was inappropriate, or they articulate part of the
+as sumed background ("I thought you were looking for something to drink,"
+"I assumed we were talking about chemical composition.")
+Speech act theory, then, recognizes the importance of commitment
+and is a first step towards dealing more adequately with meaning. But
+as we have described it so far, it does not go outside of the rationalistic
+tradition. Our emphasis on interpretation and background was not part of
+that theory as originally developed and is not shared by all those currently
+working on it. Much of the work on speech acts attempts to extend rather
+than reject the notion that the meaning of an utterance can be described
+in terms of conditions stated independently of context. For example, in
+precisely specifying the 'sincerity conditions' that are necessary for an act
+of promising, one must refer to the intentional states of the speaker (e.g.,
+the speaker believes that it is possible to do the promised act and intends
+to do it), In extending simple truth-conditional accounts to include mental
+states, one is still treating the conditions of appropriate meaning as though
+it were an objective state of affairs.. In order to understand how meaning
+is shared, we must look at the social rather than the mental dimension.
+5.3 Objectivity and tradition
+Readers with a background in the rationalistic tradition may well be getting impatient at this point. Surely there must be some way of talking
+about meaning that isn't tied up with the fuzziness of background and
+social commitment. If the meaning of an utterance can be described only
+terms of its interpretation by a particular speaker or listener in a partic
+situation with a particular history, how do we talk about regularities
+meaning at all? Since no two situations are identical and no two people
+identical histories, we are in danger of being left with no grounds
+generalization. If every aspect of the situation or of the individual
+backgrounds can potentially bear on a meaning, how can we talk about
+regularities that go across situations and speakers?
+As a simple example, consider the appropriateness of using a common
+noun, such as "dog," in referring to a particular object of interest or using
+the preposition "on" to describe a relationship between two objects. The
+naive view of language is that it simply reflects reality. Nature (or at least
+ular
+have
+
+5.3, OBJECTIVITY AND TRADITION
+nature as perceived by the human organism) comes carved up into objects
+various kinds, and the role of language is to give them labels and to state
+facts about the thing can be audit so in in the de.
+and "on" or
+group a certain set of objects or properties together under whichever names it uses.
+As long as we stick to the rather idealized isolated sentences used as
+examples in philosophy books, it may seem plausible to ground the meaning of words in a language-prior categorization. Whether a given object
+is a "bachelor' or a "lemon" is taken to be a matter of definition or of
+science, not one of utterance context. But as soon as we look at real situated language, the foundation crumbles. Examples like the ones in the
+previous sections usually convince people that the naive view of language
+as description cannot account for the way they actually use language (although some will continue to maintain that it accounts for the way people
+should use language),
+But even many sophisticated linguists and philosophers are genuinely
+puzzled when one proposes that the basis for the meaning of words and sentences is not ultimately definable in terms of an objective external world,,
+There may be some difficult cases, but most of the time for most purposes,
+the correspondence seems pretty close to what you would naively expect.
+How can we reconcile this with our emphasis on interpretation and the
+generation of meaning through listening within a situation?
+Consider an analogy: the study of roads and their relation to the terrain. Looking at a roadmap superimposed on a topographic map, one sees
+tremendous regularities. Roads follow along riverbeds, they go through
+passes, and they wind their way up and down mountainsides in a regular
+fashion. Surely this regularity must mean that road placement is determined by the lay of the land. But of course it isn't. The road network is
+conditioned by the lay of the land, and it would be strange (though certainly not impossible, given modern technology) to cut from here to there
+in total disregard of the terrain. But the actual placement depends on
+who wants to get vehicles of what kind from where to where, for reasons
+that transcend geography.
+Words correspond to our intuition about 'reality' because our purposes
+using them are closely aligned with our physical existence in a world
+our actions within it. But the coincidence is the result of our use
+language within a tradition (or, as Maturana might say, our structural
+coupling within a consensual domain)..
+Language and cognition are fundamentally social. Maturana, Gadamer, and Heidegger all argue that our ability to think and to give meaning
+to language is rooted in our participation in a society and a tradition.
+Heidegger emphasizes that the meaning and organization of a culture must
+61
+of the wo"d te"
+
+62 CHAPTER 5. LANGUAGE, LISTENING, AND COMMITMENT
+be taken as the basic given and cannot be traced back to the
+meaning giving activity of individual subjects. Habermas is explicit in
+relating meaning to an extended kind of cultural agreement.
+I may ascribe a predicate to an object if and only if every other
+person who could enter into a dialogue with me would ascribe
+the same predicate to the same object.. In order to distinguish
+true from false statements, I make reference to the judgment of
+others-in fact to the judgment of all others with whom I could
+ever hold a dialogue (among whom I counterfactually include
+all the dialogue partners I could find if my life history were
+coextensive with the history of mankind). The condition of the
+truth of statements is the potential agreements of all others. -
+Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien" [Theories of truth] (1973), p.
+220,
+Habermas's imagined infinite dialog is a valuable metaphor, but does
+not provide us with useful structure. We can never have this infinity of hypothetical dialogs, and even among those we could have, we would not find
+absolute agreement. It would be ontologically vacuous to modify Habermas's idealization in some kind of statistical or probabilistic direction,
+attributing meaning to a sort of "popularity poll'3
+Maturana's theory of
+structural coupling furnishes a more revealing analogy.
+Through structural coupling, an organism comes to have a structure
+that allows it to function successfully within its medium. The demands
+of continued autopoiesis shape this structure in a way that can be viewed
+as a reflection of an external world. But the correspondence is not one in
+which the form of the world is somehow mapped onto the structure of the
+organism. It is indirect (and partial), as created by the results of actions
+produced by the structure, and their potential to lead to breakdown-to
+the disintegration of the organism,
+In language, the correspondence of words to our non-linguistic medium
+is equally indirect. We use language in human activities, and our use of
+linguistic forms is shaped by the need for effective coordination of action
+with others. If one person's utterance is not intelligible to others, or if
+its interpretation by the listener is not consistent with the actions the
+speaker anticipates, there will be a breakdown. This breakdown may not
+be as drastic as those in the biological domain (although at times it will
+be), but in any case it results in the loss of mutual trust in commitment. If
+I say there is water in the refrigerator and this assertion is not consistent
+3lt is also not adequate to do as Putnam suggests in "Is semantics possible?"
+locating 'real' meaning in the usage of the 'experts' who deal with scientific terms..
+Our, "water" examples demonstrate that this deals with meaning only in a specialized
+and limited sense
+(1970),
+
+5.3. OBJECTIVITY AND TRADITION
+63
+with the domain of relevant actions, you may decide that you can't "take
+me seriously" or "believe what I say." A fundamental condition of
+successful communication is lost, The need for continued mutual
+recognition of commitment plays the role analogous to the demands of
+autopoiesis in selecting among possible sequences of behaviors.
+From this analogy we can see how language can work without any 'objective' criteria of meaning. We need not base our use of a particular word
+on any externally determined truth conditions, and need not even be in full
+agreement with our language partners on the situations in which it would
+be appropriate. All that is required is that there be a sufficient coupling
+so that breakdowns are infrequent, and a standing commitment by both
+speaker and listener to enter into dialog in the face of a breakdown 4
+The conditions of appropriateness for commitment naturally take into
+account the role of a shared unarticulated background. When a person
+promises to do something, it goes without saying that the commitment is
+relative to unstated assumptions. If someone asks me to come to a meeting
+tomorrow and I respond "T'll be there," I am performing a commissive
+speech act.. By virtue of the utterance, I create a commitment. If I find
+out tomorrow that the meeting has been moved to Timbuktu and don't
+show up, I can justifiably argue that I haven't broken my promise. What I
+really meant was "Assuming it is held as scheduled... " On the other hand,
+if the meeting is moved to an adjacent room, and I know it but don't show
+up, you are justified in arguing that I have broken my promise, and that
+the "Timbuktu excuse' doesn't apply. The same properties carry over to
+all language acts: meaning is relative to what is understood through the
+tradition.
+It may appear that there is a conflict between our emphasis on meaning as commitment and on the active interpretive role of the listener. If
+the meaning of a speach act is created by listening within a background,
+how can the speaker be responsible for a commitment to its consequences?
+But of course, there is no contradiction, just as there is no contradiction
+in the preceding example of a promise. As participants in a shared tradition, we are each responsible for the consequences of how our acts will
+be understood within that tradition. The fact that there are no objective
+rules and that there may at times be disagreements does not free us of
+that responsibility.
+4A similar insight was put forth in discussions of meaning (semiotics) by the pragmatists, such as Peirce, Dewey and Mead. As John-Steiner and Tatter ("An interactionist model of language development,"
+1983) describe the pragmatist orientation:
+"The semiotic process is purposive, having a directed flow. It functions to
+choreograph and to harmonize the mutual adjustments necessary for the carrying
+out of human social activities, It has its sign function only within the intentional
+context of social cooperation and direction, in which past and future phases of
+activity are brought to bear upon the present."
+
+64 CHAPTER 5. LANGUAGE, LISTENING, AND COMMITMENT
+5.4 Recurrence and formalization
+In a complete rationalistic analysis of meaning, we would be able to
+explicate the meaning of each utterance by showing how it is built up
+systemat ically from smaller elements, each with its own determinate
+meaning. At the bottom, tie smallest elements would denote objects,
+properties, and relations of interest in the external world. Although there is a
+deep fallacy in this orientation, there is also a power in its emphasis on
+regular, formal structures. To the extent that they are adequate for a
+particular purpose (such as the implementation of language-like facilities on
+computers) they
+provide a systematic approach for generating rules and
+operations dealing with symbolic representations.
+Having observed that the regularities in the use of language grow out
+of mutual coupling among language users (not the coupling of the individual to some external reality, we are faced with the question of how to
+apply rigorous methods in our accounts of meaning. We will not expect to
+f i nd networks of definitions, either stipulated or empirically determined,
+by which we can determine the truth conditions associated with utterances and their constituent parts. But this does not mean there are no
+regularities, or that formal accounts are useless. In our introduction we
+observed that computers can play a major role as devices for facilitating
+human communication in language. As we will see in Part II, computer
+programming is based on the ability to observe and describe regular recurrences.
+The issue here is one of finding the appropriate
+domain of recurrence.
+Linguistic behavior can be described in several distinct domains. The rele
+regularities are not in individual speech acts (embodied in sentences)
+some kind of explicit agreement about meanings. They appear in
+domain of conversation, in which successive speech acts are related to
+another. This domain is like Maturana's cognitive domain, in being
+relational and historical. The regularities do not appear in the correlation
+between an act and the structure of the actor, but in the relevance of a
+pattern of acts through time.
+As an example of conversational analysis we will consider in some detail
+the network of speech acts that constitute straightforward
+conversations
+for action-those in which an interplay of requests and commissives are
+directed towards explicit cooperative action. This is a useful example
+both because of its clarity and because it is the basis for computer tools
+for conducting conversations, as described in Chapter 11,
+We can plot the basic course of a conversation in a simple diagram like
+that of Figure 5, 1, in which each circle represents a possible state of the
+conversation and the lines represent speech acts. This is not a model of the
+mental state of a speaker or hearer, but shows the conversation as a 'dance.'
+vant
+or in
+one
+
+5.4. RECURRENCE AND FORMALIZATION
+65
+A: Declare
+B. Assert
+Ai Accept
+1 BRenege
+B: Counter
+A: Counter
+Figure 5.1: The basic conversation for action
+The lines indicate actions that can be taken by the initial speaker (A) and
+hearer (B) The initial action is a request from A to B, which specifies some
+conditions of satisfaction.
+Following such a request, there are precisely five
+alteratives: the hearer can accept the conditions (promising to satisfy
+them), can reject them, or can ask to negotiate a change in the conditions
+of satisfaction (counteroffer). The original speaker can also withdraw the
+request before a response, or can modify its conditions.5
+Each action in turn leads to a different state, with its own space of
+possibilities. In the 'normal' course of events, B at some point asserts
+to A that the conditions of satisfaction have been met
+state labelled 4 in the figure). If A declares that he or she is satisfied,
+the conversation reaches a successful completion (state 5). On the other
+hand, A may not interpret the situation in the same way and may declare
+that the conditions have not been met, returning the conversation to state
+3. In this state, either party may propose a change to the conditions of
+satisfaction, and in any state one or the other party may back out on the
+deal, moving to a state of completion in which one or the other can be
+moving to the
+5 These are the acts directly relevant to the structure of completion of the conversation
+for action. There are of course other possibilities in which the conversational acts
+themselves are taken as a topic, for example in questioning the intelligibility ("What,
+I didn't hear you"') or legitimacy ("'You can't order me to do that!") of the acts.
+
+66 CHAPTER 5. LANGUAGE, LISTENING, AND COMMITMENT
+held 'liable' (states 7 and 9).
+Several points about this conversation structure deserve note:
+1.. At each point in the conversation, there is a small set of possible
+actions determined by the previous history. We are concerned here
+with the basic structure, not the details of content. For example,
+the action 'counteroffer' includes any number of possibilities for just
+what the new conditions of satisfaction are to be.
+2. All of the relevant acts are linguistic-they represent utterances by
+the parties to the conversation or silences that are listened to as
+standing for an act. The act that follows a commitment is an assertion (an assertive speech act) from the original hearer to the requestor that the request has been satisfied, and must be followed
+by a declaration by the requestor that it is satisfactory. The actual
+doing of whatever is needed to meet the conditions of satisfaction
+lies outside of the conversation,
+3. There are many cases where acts are 'listened to' without being
+explicit. If the requestor can recognize satisfaction of the request
+directly, there may be no explicit assertion of completion. Other
+acts, such as declaring satisfaction, may be taken for granted if some
+amount of time goes by without a declaration to the contrary. What
+is not said is listened to as much as what is said..
+4. Conditions of satisfaction are not objective realities, free of the interpretations of speaker and hearer. They exist in the listening, and
+there is always the potential for a difference among the parties. This
+can lead to breakdown (for example, when the promiser declares
+that the commitment is satisfied, and the requestor does not agree)
+and to a subsequent conversation about the understanding of the
+conditions.
+5. There are a few states of "completion' from which no further actions
+can be taken (these are the heavy circles in the figure).. All other
+states represent an incomplete conversation. Completion does not
+guarantee satisfaction. For example, if the promiser takes the action
+of reneging,' the conversation moves to a completed state, in which
+the original request was not satisfied.
+6. The network does not say what people
+should do, or deal with consequences of the acts (such as backing out of a commitment). These are
+important phenomena in human situations, but are not generated in
+the domain of conversation formalized in this network.
+
+5.4. RECURRENCE AND FORMALIZATION
+67
+The analysis illustrated by this network can then be used as a basis for
+further dimensions of recurrent structure in conversations,. These include
+temporal relations among the speech acts, and the linking of conversations
+with each other (for example, a request is issued in order to help in the
+satisfaction of some promise previously made by the requestor). These
+will be discussed further in Chapter 11.
+Other kinds of conversations can be analyzed in a similar vein, For
+example, in order to account for the truthfulness of assertives in the do
+main of recurrent structures of conversation, we need a 'logic of argument,'
+where 'argument' stands for the sequence of speech acts relevant to the articulation of background assumptions,, When one utters a statement, one
+is committed to provide some kind of grounding' in case of a breakdown.
+This grounding is in the form of another speech act (also in a situational
+context) to satisfy the hearer that the objection is met., There are three
+basic kinds of grounding: experiential, formal, and social.
+Experiential. If asked to justify the statement "Snow is white," one can
+give a set of instructions ("'Go outside and look!") such that any
+person who follows them will be led to concur on the basis of experience. The methodology of science is designed to provide this kind
+of grounding for all empirical statements. Maturana points out that
+the so-called 'objectivity' of science derives from the assumption that
+for any observation, one can provide instructions that if followed by a
+'standard observer' will lead him or her to the same conclusion. This
+does not necessarily mean that the result is observer-free, simply that
+it is anticipated to be uniform for all potential human observers.
+Formal. Deductive logic and mathematics are based on the playing of a
+kind of language game's in which a set of formal rules is taken for
+granted and argument proceeds as a series of moves constrained by
+those rules. For example, if I expect you to believe that all Swedes
+are blonde and that Sven is a redhead, then I can use a particular
+series of moves to provide grounding for the statement that Sven is
+not Swedish. Of course, one can recursively demand grounding for
+each of the statements used in the process until some non-formal
+grounding is reached. Formal grounding is the subject matter of
+formal compositional semantics, but with a different emphasis. Our
+focus here 'is not on the coherence of a mathematical abstraction but
+on how the formal structures play a role in patterns of conversation.
+6 In a series of papers such as "Quantifiers in logic and quantifiers in natural languages"
+(1976), Hintikka uses games as a basis for a form of deductive logic, including modal
+logic. Wittgenstein's
+Philosophical Investigations
+(1963) introduced the term
+'language
+game' in a somewhat different but related sense.
+
+68 CHAPTER 5. LANGUAGE, LISTENING, AND COMMITMENT
+Social. Much of what we say in conversation is based neither on experience nor on logic, but on other conversations We believe that water
+is H2O and that Napoleon was the Emperor of France not because
+we have relevant experience but because someone told us. One possible form of grounding is to 'pass the buck'-to argue that whoever
+made the statement could have provided grounding,.
+Just as one can develop taxonomies and structural analyses of illocutionary points, it is important to develop a precise analysis of these
+structures of argumentation. There are many ways in which such a logic
+will parallel standard formal logic, and others in which it will not.. For
+example, the role of analogy and metaphor will be more central when
+the focus is on patterns of discourse between individuals with a shared
+background rather than on deductive inference from axioms,'
+In our examination of these recurrent patterns of conversation we must
+keep in mind that they exist in the domain of the observed conversation,
+not in some mental domain of the participants. A speaker and hearer do
+apply 'conversation pattern rules' any more than they apply 'percep
+rules' or 'deduction rules ' As emphasized in Chapter 3, the essential
+of language activity (the processes of saying and listening) is the
+thrownness of a person within language. When we are engaged in success
+language activity, the conversation is not present-at-hand, as something
+observed. We are immersed in its unfolding,. Its structure becomes visible
+only when there is some kind of breakdown..
+5.5 Breakdown, language, and existence
+So far in this chapter we have emphasized two main points:
+1, Meaning arises in listening to the commitment expressed in speech
+acts.
+2,. The articulation of content-how we talk about the world emerges
+in recurrent patterns of breakdown and the potential for discourse
+about grounding.
+From these points, we are led to a more radical recognition about
+language and existence: Nothing exists except through language..
+We must be careful in our understanding. We are not advocating a
+linguistic solipsism that denies our embedding in a world outside of our
+speaking,. What is crucial is the nature of "existing.' In saying that some
+7For a discussion of the central role that metaphor plays in language use, see Lakoff
+and Johnson,
+Metaphors We Live By
+(1980).
+not
+tion
+feature
+ful
+
+5.5. BREAKDOWN, LANGUAGE, AND EXISTENCE
+"thing' exists or that it has some property), we have brought it into a
+domain of articulated objects and qualities that exists in language and
+through the structure of language, constrained by our potential for action in
+the world.
+As an example, let us look once again at the meaning of individual
+words, and the problem of how a particular choice of words is appropriate
+in a situation. We have shown how "water" can have different interpretations in different situations, but how does it come to have the same
+interpretation in more than one? The distinctions made by language are
+not determined by some objective classification of situations' in the world,
+but neither are they totally arbitrary. 8 Distinctions arise from recurrent
+patterns of breakdown in concernful activity. There are a variety of human
+activities, including drinking, putting out fires, and washing, for which the
+absence or presence of "water" determines a space of potential breakdowns.
+Words arise to help anticipate and cope with these breakdowns. It is often
+remarked that the Eskimos have a large number of distinctions for forms of
+snow. This is not just because they see a lot of snow (we see many things
+we don't bother talking about), but precisely because there are recurrent
+activities with spaces of potential breakdown for which the distinctions
+are relevant.
+It is easy to obscure this insight by considering only examples that fall
+close to simple recurrences of physical activity and sensory experience. It
+naively seems that somehow "snow" must exist as a specific kind of entity
+regardless of any language (or even human experience) about it. On the
+other hand, it is easy to find examples that cannot be conceived of as
+existing outside the domain of human commitment and interaction, such
+as "friendship," "crisis," and "semantics." In this chapter we have chosen
+to focus on words like "water" instead of more explicitly socially-grounded
+words, precisely because the apparent simplicity of physically-interpreted
+terms is misleading.
+We will see in Part II that this apparently paradoxical view (that nothing exists except through language) gives us a practical orientation for
+understanding and designing computer systems. The domain in which
+people need to understand the operation of computers goes beyond the
+physical composition of their parts, into areas of structure and behavior
+for which naive views of objects and properties are clearly inadequate.
+The 'things' that make up 'software,' "interfaces,' and 'user interactions'
+are clear examples of entities whose existence and properties are generated
+in the language and commitment of those who build and discuss them.
+8 W inograd, in "Moving the semantic fulcrum" (1985), criticizes the assumptions made
+by Barwise and Perry in basing their theory of "situation semantics'
+(Situations and
+Attitudes, 1983) on a naive realism that takes for granted the existence of specific
+objects and properties independent of language..
+69
+
+Chapter 6
+Towards a new
+orientation
+The previous chapters have dealt with fundamental questions of what it
+means to exist as a human being, capable of thought and language. Our
+discourse concerning these questions grew out of seeing their direct relevance to our understanding of computers and the possibilities for the
+design of new computer technology. We do not have the pretension of
+creating a grand philosophical synthesis in which Maturana, Heidegger,
+Gadamer, Austin, Searle, and others all find a niche. The importance of
+their work lies in its potential for unconcealing the rationalistic tradition
+in which we are already immersed. Their unity lies in the elements of the
+tradition that they challenge, and thereby reveal.
+As background to our study of computers and programming in Part II,
+this section summarizes the concems raised in previous chapters, pointing
+out their areas of overlap and the role they play in our detailed examination of
+computer technology and design.
+6.1 Cognition and being in the world
+This book has the word 'cognition' in its title, and in the previous chap
+we have given accounts of cognitive activity. But in using the term
+'cognition' we fall into the danger of implicitly following the tradition that
+we are challenging. In labelling it as a distinct function like 'respiration'
+'locomotion,' we evoke an understanding that an activity of 'cognizing'
+be separated from the rest of the activity of the organism We need
+to examine this understanding more carefully and to recognize its
+consequences for design,
+ters
+can
+first
+
+6.1. COGNITION AND BEING IN THE WORLD
+In speaking of thinking as a kind of activity, we adopt a common preunderstanding that seems so obvious as to be unarguable. When you sit
+at your desk deciding where to go for lunch, it seems clear that you are
+engaged in 'thinking,' as opposed to other things you might be doing at
+the time, This activity can be characterized in terms of mental states and
+mental operations An explanation of how it is carried out will be couched
+in terms of sentences and representations, concepts, and ideas. This kind
+detached reflection is obviously a part of what people do The blindness
+the rationalistic tradition lies in assuming that it can serve as a basis
+understanding the full range of what we might call 'cognition.' Each of the
+previous three chapters challenges this assumption
+One of the most fundamental aspects of Heidegger's discourse is his
+emphasis on the state of thrownness as a condition of being-in-the-world.
+We do at times engage in conscious reflection and systematic thought, but
+these are secondary to the pre-reflective experience of being thrown in a
+situation in which we are always already acting. We are always engaged
+in acting within a situation, without the opportunity to fully disengage
+ourselves and function as detached observers. Even what we call 'disengagement' occurs within thrownness: we do not escape our thrownness,
+but shift our domain of concern,. Our acts always happen within thrownness and cannot be understood as the results of a process (conscious or
+non-conscious) of representing, planning, and reasoning.
+Heidegger argues that our being-in-the-world is not a detached reflection on the external world as present-at-hand, but exists in the readinessto-hand of the world as it is unconcealed in our actions. Maturana, through
+his examination of biological systems, arrived in a different way at a remarkably similar understanding, He states that our ability to function
+as observers is generated from our functioning as structure determined
+systems, shaped by structural coupling, Every organism is engaged in a
+pattern of activity that is triggered by changes in its medium, and that
+has the potential to change the structure of the organism (and hence to
+change its future behavior).
+Both authors recognize and analyze the phenomena that have generated
+our naive view of the connection between thinking and acting, and
+argue that we must go beyond this view if we want to understand
+nature of cognition cognition viewed not as activity in some mental
+but as a pattern of behavior that is relevant to the functioning of the
+person or organism in its world.
+When we look at computer technology, this basic point guides our
+understanding in several ways First, it is critical in our anticipation of the
+kinds of computer tools that will be useful. In a tradition that emphasizes
+thought as an independent activity, we will tend to design systems to work
+within that domain. In fact much of the current advertising rhetoric about
+70
+71
+both
+realm,
+
+72
+CHAPTER 6.. TOWARDS A NEW ORIENTATION
+computers stresses the role they will play in 'applying knowledge' and
+'making decisions,' If, on the other hand, we take action as primary, we
+will ask how computers can play a role in the kinds of actions that make
+up our lives-particularly the communicative acts that create requests
+and commitments and that serve to link us to others, The discussion of
+word processors in Chapter 1 (which pointed out the computer's role in a
+network of equipment and social interactions) illustrates how we can gain
+a new perspective on already existing systems and shape the direction of
+future ones..
+We also want to better understand how people use computers, The rationalistic tradition emphasizes the role played by analytical understanding and reasoning in the process of interacting with our world, including
+our tools.. Heidegger and Maturana, in their own ways, point to the importance of readiness-to-hand (structural coupling) and the ways in which
+objects and properties come into existence when there is an unreadiness or
+breakdown in that coupling, From this standpoint, the designer of a computer tool must work in the domain generated by the space of potential
+breakdowns,. The current emphasis on creating 'user-friendly' computers
+is an expression of the implicit recognition that earlier systems were not
+designed with this domain sufficiently in mind, A good deal of wisdom
+has been gained through experience in the practical design of systems, and
+one of our goals is to provide a clearer theoretical foundation on which to
+base system design. We will come back to this issue in our discussion of
+design in Chapter 12.
+Finally, our orientation to cognition and action has a substantial impact
+on the way we understand computer programs that are characterized by
+their designers as 'thinking and 'making decisions.' The fact that such
+labels can be applied seriously at all is a reflection of the rationalistic
+tradition, In Chapters 8 through 10, we will examine work in artificial
+intelligence, arguing that the current popular discourse on questions like
+"Can computers think?" needs to be reoriented.
+6.2Knowledge and represantation
+Our understanding of being is closely linked to our understanding of
+knowl edge. The question of what it means to know is one of the oldest and
+most central issues of philosophy, and one that is at the heart of
+Heidegger's challenge. Chapter 2 described a 'naive realism that is
+prominent within the rationalistic tradition. As we pointed out there, this
+is not a logical consequence of the tradition (and is not accepted by all
+philosophers within it), but it is part of the pervasive background that
+follows the tradition in our everyday understanding.
+
+6 2. KNOWLEDGE AND REPRESENTATION
+73
+At its simplest, the rationalistic view accepts the existence of an
+objective reality, made up of things bearing properties and entering into
+relations. A cognitive being 'gathers information' about those things and
+builds up a 'mental model' which will be in some respects correct (a faith
+representation of reality) and in other respects incorrect, Knowledge
+storehouse of representations, which can be called upon for use in rea
+and which can be translated into language. Thinking is a process of
+manipulating representations.
+This naive ontology and epistemology is one of the central issues for
+both Maturana and Heidegger Neither of them accepts the existence of
+'things' that are the bearers of properties independently of interpretation.
+They argue that we can not talk coherently of an 'external' world, but are
+always concerned with interpretation.. Maturana describes the nervous
+system as closed, and argues against the appropriateness of terms like
+'perception' and 'information,' Heidegger begins with being-in-the-world,
+observing that present-at-hand objects emerge from a more fundamental
+state of being in which readiness-to-hand does not distinguish objects or
+properties.
+For Heidegger,
+"things' emerge in breakdown, when unreadiness-tohand unconceals them as a matter of concern. Maturana sees the presence
+of objects and properties as relevant only in a domain of distinctions made
+by an observer, In the domain of biological mechanism they do not exist.
+Both authors recognize that we are situated in a world that is not of our
+own making. Their central insight is that this world, constituted as a
+world of objects and properties, arises only in the concernful activities of
+the person.
+Maturana and Heidegger both oppose the assumption that cognition
+is based on the manipulation of mental models or representations of the
+world, although they do so on very different grounds, Maturana begins as
+a biologist, examining the workings of the nervous system He argues that
+while there is a domain of description (the cognitive domain) in which it is
+appropriate to talk about the correspondence between effective behavior
+and the structure of the medium in which it takes place, we must not confuse this domain of description with the domain of structural (biological)
+mechanisms that operate to produce behavior, In saying that a representation is present in the nervous system, we are indulging in misplaced
+concreteness, and can easily be led into fruitless quests for the corresponding mechanisms. While the point is obvious in cases of reflex behavior like
+the frog and fly of his early research, Maturana sees it as central to our
+understanding of all behavior, including complex cognitive and linguistic
+activities.
+Heidegger makes a more radical critique, questioning the distinction
+between a conscious, reflective, knowing 'subject' and a separable
+'object.'
+ful
+is a
+soning
+
+74
+CHAPTER 6 TOWARDS A NEW ORIENTATION
+He sees representation as a derivative phenomenon, which occurs only
+when there is a breaking down of our concernful action. Knowledge lies in
+the being that situates us in the world, not in a reflective representation..
+Chapter 2 described efforts being made to create a unified 'cognitive
+science,' concerned with cognition in people, animals, and machines. To
+the extent that there is intellectual unity in this quest, it centers around
+some form of the
+representation hypothesis:
+the assumption that
+cognition rests on the manipulation of symbolic representations that can be
+understood as referring to objects and properties in the world'
+When we turn to a careful examination of computer systems in Chap
+7, we will see that the corresponding representation hypothesis is not
+true but is the key to understanding how such systems operate. The
+essence of computation lies in the correspondence between the
+manipu lation of formal tokens and the attribution of a meaning to those
+tokens as representing elements in worlds of some kind.. Explicit concern
+with representation is one of the criteria often used in distinguishing
+artificial intelligence from other areas of computer science.
+The question of knowledge and representation is central to the design
+of computer-based devices intended as tools for 'knowledge amplification.'
+We may seck to devise means of manipulating knowledge, in the sense
+that a word processor allows us to manipulate text. We might attempt to
+build systems that 'apply knowledge' towards some desired end. In this
+effort, our choice of problems and solutions will be strongly affected by
+our overall understanding of what knowledge is and how it is used. Many
+of the expert systems being developed in "knowledge engineering' research
+are based on a straightforward acceptance of the representation hypothesis. In Chapter 10 we will describe these efforts and their limitations,
+and characterize the kinds of systematic domains
+that can be successfully
+ter
+only
+treated in representational terms.
+6.3 Pre-understanding and background
+Chapter 3 emphasized that our openness to experience is grounded in a
+pre-understanding without which understanding itself would not be possible. An individual's pre-understanding is a result of experience within a
+tradition, Everything we say is said against the background of that expe
+rience and tradition, and makes sense only with respect to it.. Language
+(as well as other meaningful actions) need express only what is not obvious, and can occur only between individuals who share to a large degree
+the same background. Knowledge is
+always
+the result of interpretation,
+'This assumption, which has also been called the physical symbol system hypothesis,
+
+is discussed at length in Chapter 8
+
+6.3. PRE- UNDERSTANDING AND BACKGROUND
+75
+which depends on the entire previous experience of the interpreter and
+on situatedness in a tradition. It is neither 'subjective'
+(particular to the
+individual) nor 'objective' (independent of the individual).
+Maturana describes a closely related phenomenon in explaining how
+the previous structure of the system defines its domain of perturbations.
+The organism does not exist in an externally defined space Its history
+structural coupling generates a continually changing space of possible
+perturbations that will select among its states. Interacting systems engage
+mutual structural coupling, in which the structure of each one plays
+role in selecting among the perturbations (and hence the sequence of
+structures) of the others.
+Our presentation of speech act theory has also emphasized the role
+background and interpretation, while retaining a central focus on the
+commitment engendered by language acts.. In this we move away from the
+individual-centered approach of looking at the mental state (intentions) of
+speaker and hearer, describing instead the patterns of interaction that
+occur within a shared background. As we will show in detail in Chapter
+12, the pervasive importance of shared background has major consequences for
+the design of computer systems.
+Artificial intelligence is an attempt to build a full account of human
+cognition into a formal system (a computer program). The computer operates with a background only to the extent that the background is articulated and embodied in its programs. But the articulation of the unspoken
+is a never-ending process. In order to describe our pre-understanding,
+we must do it in a language and a background that itself reflects a preunderstanding, The effort of articulation is important and useful, but it
+can never be complete.
+This limitation on the possibility of articulation also affects more
+con crete issues in designing computer tools, If we begin with the implicit
+or explicit goal of producing an objective, background-free language for
+interacting with a computer system, then we must limit our domain to those
+areas in which the articulation can be complete (for the given purposes).
+This is possible, but not for the wide range of purposes to which comput
+are applied. Many of the problems that are popularly attributed to
+'computerization' are the result of forcing our interactions into the narrow
+mold provided by a limited formalized domain,
+At the other extreme lies the attempt to build systems that allow us
+to interact as though we were conversing with another person who shares
+our background. The result can easily be confusion and frustration, when
+breakdowns reveal the complex ways in which the computer fails to meet
+our unspoken assumptions about how we will be understood. The goal
+of creating computers that understand natural language must be reinterpreted (as we will argue in Chapter 9) in light of this. We must be
+ers
+
+76
+CHAPTER 6. TOWARDS A NEW ORIENTATION
+especially careful in dealing with so-called 'expert systems.' The ideal of
+an objectively knowledgeable expert must be replaced with a recognition
+of the importance of background, This can lead to the design of tools
+that facilitate a dialog of evolving understanding among a knowledgeable
+community.
+6.4
+•Language and action
+Popular accounts of language often portray it as a means of communication
+by which information is passed from one person (or machine) to another.
+An important consequence of the critique presented in the first part of
+this book is that language cannot be understood as the transmission of
+information.
+Language is a form of human social action, directed towards the creation of what Maturana calls "mutual orientation.' This orientation is not
+grounded in a correspondence between language and the world, but exists
+as a consensual domain-as interlinked patterns of activity. The shift from
+language as description to language as action is the basis of speech act theory, which emphasizes the
+act of language rather than its representational
+role.
+In our discussion of language we have particularly stressed that speech
+acts create commitment. In revealing commitment as the basis for language, we situate it in a social structure rather than in the mental activity
+of individuals. Our reason for this emphasis is to counteract the forgetfulness of commitment that pervades much of the discussion (both theoretical and commonplace) about language,. The rationalistic tradition takes
+language as a representation-a carrier of information-and conceals its
+central social role. To be human is to be the kind of being that generates
+commitments, through speaking and listening. Without our ability to create and accept (or decline) commitments we are acting in a less than fully
+human way, and we are not fully using language.
+This dimension is not explicitly developed in work on hermeneutics
+(including Heidegger) or in Maturana's account of linguistic domains. It
+is developed in speech act theory (especially in later work like that of
+Habermas) and is a crucial element in our analysis of the uses of computer
+technology. This key role develops from the recognition that computers
+are fundamentally tools for human action. Their power as tools for linguistic action derives from their ability to manipulate formal tokens of
+the kinds that constitute the structural elements of languages. But they
+are incapable of making commitments and cannot themselves enter into
+language.
+The following chapters introduce discussions of the possibilities for "intelligent computers, " 'computer language understanding,' 'expert systems,'
+
+6.5. BREAKDOWN AND THE ONTOLOGY OF DESIGN
+77
+and 'computer decision making.' In each case there is a pervasive misunderstanding based on the failure to recognize the role of commitment in
+language. For example, a computer program is not an expert, although it
+can be a highly sophisticated medium for communication among experts,
+or between an expert and someone needing help in a specialized domain.
+This understanding leads us to re-evaluate current research directions and
+suggest alternatives.
+One possibility we will describe at some length in Chapter 11 is the
+design of tools that facilitate human communication through explicit
+application of speech act theory. As we pointed out in the introduction,
+computers are linguistic tools. On the basis of our understanding of
+commitment, we can create devices whose form of readiness-to-hand leads
+to more effective communication. We discuss a particular family of devices
+called 'coordination systems' that help us to recognize and create the
+commitment structures in our linguistic acts. In using such tools, people
+will be directed into a greater awareness of the social dimensions of their
+language and of its role in effective action.
+6.5 Breakdown and the ontology of design
+The preceding sections have discussed background and commitment. The
+third major discussion in the preceding chapters was about 'breakdown,'
+which is especially relevant to the question of design.
+In designing new artifacts, tools, organizational structures, managerial
+practices, and so forth, a standard approach is to talk about problems'
+and 'problem solving.' A great deal of literature has been devoted to this
+topic, in a variety of disciplines. The difficulty with such an approach,
+which has been deeply influenced by the rationalistic tradition, is that it
+tends to grant problems some kind of objective existence, failing to take
+account of the blindness inherent in the way problems are formulated.
+A 'problem' always arises for human beings in situations where they
+live-in other words, it arises in relation to a background. Different
+inter preters will see and talk about different problems requiring different
+tools, potential actions, and design solutions.. In some cases, what is a
+problem for one person won't be a problem at all for someone else.
+Here, as elsewhere, we want to break with the rationalistic tradition,
+proposing a different language for situations in which 'problems' arise. Following Heidegger, we prefer to talk about "breakdowns.' By this we mean
+the interrupted moment of our habitual, standard, comfortable 'being-inthe-world! Breakdowns serve an extremely important cognitive function,
+revealing to us the nature of our practices and equipment, making them
+
+78
+CHAPTER 6. TOWARDS A NEW ORIENTATION
+"present-to-hand' to us, perhaps for the first time. In this sense they
+function in a positive rather than a negative way.
+New design can be created and implemented only in the space that
+emerges in the recurrent structure of breakdown. A design constitutes an
+interpretation of breakdown and a committed attempt to anticipate future
+breakdowns. In Chapter 10 we will discuss breakdowns in relation to the
+design of expert systems, and in Chapter 11 their role in management and
+decision making.
+Most important, though, is the fundamental role of breakdown in creating the space of what can be said, and the role of language in creating
+our world. The key to much of what we have been saying in the preceding
+chapters lies in recognizing the fundamental importance of the shift from
+an individual-centered conception of understanding to one that is socially
+based. Knowledge and understanding (in both the cognitive and linguistic senses) do not result from formal operations on mental representations
+of an objectively existing world. Rather, they arise from the individual's
+committed participation in mutually oriented patterns of behavior that
+are embedded in a socially shared background of concerns, actions, and
+beliefs. This shift from an individual to a social perspective-from mental
+representation to patterned interaction-permits language and cognition
+to merge. Because of what Heidegger calls our 'thrownness,' we are largely,
+forgetful of the social dimension of understanding and the commitment it
+entails. It is only when a breakdown occurs that we become aware of the
+fact that 'things' in our world exist not as the result of individual acts of
+cognition but through our active participation in a domain of discourse
+and mutual concern.
+In this view, language-the public manifestation in speech and writing
+this mutual orientation-is no longer merely a reflective but rather a
+constitutive medium We create and give meaning to the world we live
+and share with others. To put the point in a more radical form, we
+design ourselves (and the social and technological networks in which our
+lives have meaning) in language.
+Computers do not exist, in the sense of things possessing objective
+features and functions, outside of language. They are created in the conversations human beings engage in when they cope with and anticipate
+breakdown. Our cntral claim in this book is that the current theoretical
+discourse about computers is based on a misinterpretation of the nature
+of human cognition and language. Computers designed on the basis of
+this misconception provide only impoverished possibilities for modelling
+and enlarging the scope of human understanding. They are restricted to
+representing knowledge as the acquisition and manipulation of facts, and
+communication as the transferring of information. As a result, we are now
+witnessing a major breakdown in the design of computer technology-a
+
+6.5, BREAKDOWN AND THE ONTOLOGY OF DESIGN
+breakdown that reveals the rationalistically oriented background of discourse in which our current understanding is embedded,
+The question we now have to deal with is how to design computers on
+the basis of the new discourse about language and thought that we have
+been elaborating. Computers are not only designed in language but are
+themselves equipment for language They will not just reflect our understanding of language, but will at the same time create new possibilities for
+the speaking and listening that we do-for creating ourselves in language.
+79
+
+PART П
+Computation, Thought, and Language
+
+Chapter 7
+Computers and
+representation
+This book is directed towards understanding what can be done with computers. In Part I we developed a theoretical orientation towards human
+thought and language, which serves as the background for our analysis of
+the technological potential, In Part II we turn towards the technology itself, with particular attention to revealing the assumptions underlying its
+development. In this chapter we first establish a context for talking about
+computers and programming in general, laying out some basic issues that
+apply to all programs, including the artificial intelligence work that we will
+describe in subsequent chapters. We go into some detail here so that readers not familiar with the design of computer systems will have a clearer
+perspective both on the wealth of detail and on the broad relevance of a
+few general principles.
+Many books on computers and their implications begin with a description of the formal aspects of computing, such as binary numbers, Boolean
+logic, and Turing machines. This sort of material is necessary for technical
+mastery and can be useful in dispelling the mysteries of how a machine
+can do computation at all, But it turns attention away from the more
+significant aspects of computer systems that arise from their larger-scale
+organization as collections of interacting components (both physical and
+computational) based on a formalization of some aspect of the world. In
+this chapter we concentrate on the fundamental issues of language and
+rationality that are the background for designing and programming computers
+We must keep in mind that our description is based on an idealization in which we take for granted the functioning of computer systems
+83
+
+84
+according to their intended design, In the actual use of computers there
+is a critical larger domain, in which new issues arise from the breakdowns
+('bugs' and 'malfunctions') of both hardware and software, Furthermore,
+behind these technical aspects are the concerns of the people who design,
+build, and use the devices. An understanding of what a computer really
+does is an understanding of the social and political situation in which it
+is designed, built, purchased, installed, and used, Most unsuccessful computing systems have been relatively successful at the raw technical level
+but failed because of not dealing with breakdowns and not being designed
+appropriately for the context in which they were to be operated.'
+It is beyond the scope of our book to deal thoroughly with all of these
+matters,. Our task is to provide a theoretical orientation within which we
+can identify significant concerns and ask appropriate questions, In showing
+how programming depends on representation we are laying one cornerstone
+for the understanding of programs, and in particular of programs that are
+claimed to be intelligent.
+7.1 Programming as representation
+The first and most obvious point is that whenever someone writes a
+pro gram, it is a program about something,' Whether it be the orbits of
+a satellite, the bills and payroll of a corporation, or the movement of
+spaceships on a video screen, there is some subject domain to which the
+programmer addresses the program.
+For the moment (until we refine this view in section 7.2) we can re
+the underlying machine as providing a set of storage cells, each of
+can hold a symbol structure, either a number or a sequence of char
+gard
+which
+acters
+(letters, numerals, and punctuation marks). The steps of a program specify
+operations on the contents of those cells-copying them into other cells,
+comparing them, and modifying them (for example by adding two
+numbers
+or removing a character from a sequence),
+In setting up a program, the programmer has in mind a systematic correspondence by which the contents of certain storage cells
+represent objects
+and relationships within the subject domain. For example, the contents of
+three of the cells may represent the location of some physical object with
+respect to a Cartesian coordinate system and unit of measurement,. The
+operations by which these contents are modified as the program runs are
+designed to correspond to some desired calculation about the location of
+"The nature and importance of this social embedding of computers is described by
+Klingand Scaochi in "The web of computing" (1982)
+2 We will ignore special cases like the construction of a sequence of instructions whose
+purpose is simply to exercise the machine to test it for flaws
+
+7.1. PROGRAMMING AS REPRESENTATION
+that object, for example in tracking a satellite Similarly, the sequence
+characters in a cell may represent the name or address of a person for
+whom a paycheck is being prepared,
+Success in programming depends on designing a representation and set
+of operations that are both
+veridical and efective. They are veridical to the
+extent that they produce results that are correct relative to the domain:
+they give the actual location of the satellite or the legal deductions from
+the paycheck. They are effective to varying degrees, depending on how
+efficiently the computational operations can be carried out. Much of the
+detailed content of computer science lies in the design of representations
+that make it possible to carry out some class of operations efficiently.
+Research on artificial intelligence has emphasized the problem of representation. In typical artificial intelligence programs, there is a more
+complex correspondence between what is to be represented and the corresponding form in the machine For example, to represent the fact that
+the location of a particular object is "between 3 and 5 miles away" or
+"somewhere near the orbiter," we cannot use a simple number. There
+must be conventions by which some structures (e g, sequences of characters) correspond to such facts, Straightforward mappings (such as simply
+storing English sentences) raise insuperable problems of effectiveness. The
+operations for coming to a conclusion are no longer the well-understood
+operations of arithmetic, but call for some kind of higher-level reasoning.
+In general, artificial intelligence researchers make use of formal logical
+systems (such as predicate calculus) for which the available operations
+and their consequences are well understood.. They set up correspondences
+between formulas in such a system and the things being represented in
+such a way that the operations achieve the desired veridicality. There is
+a great deal of argument as to the most important properties of such
+formal system, but the assumptions that underlie all of the standard
+approaches can be summarized as follows:
+1 There is a structure of formal symbols that can be manipulated
+according to a precisely defined and well-understood system of rules..
+2. There is a mapping through which the relevant properties of the
+domain can be represented by symbol structures This mapping is
+systematic in that a community of programmers can agree as to what
+a given structure represents,
+3. There are operations that manipulate the symbols in such a way as
+to produce veridical results-to derive new structures that represent
+the domain in such a way that the programmers would find them
+accurate representations. Programs can be written that combine
+these operations to produce desired results..
+85
+
+86
+The problem is that representation is in the mind of the beholder.
+There is nothing in the design of the machine or the operation of the
+program that depends in any way on the fact that the symbol structures
+are viewed as representing anything at all,3
+There are two cases in which it is not immediately obvious that the
+significance of what is stored in the machine is externally attributed: the
+case of robot-like machines with sensors and effectors operating in the
+physical world, and the case of symbols with internal referents, such as
+those representing locations and instructions within the machine. We will
+discuss the significance of robots in Chapter 8, and for the moment will
+simply state that, for the kinds of robots that are constructed in artificial
+intelligence, none of the significant issues differ from those discussed
+here.
+The problem of 'meta-reference' is more complex. Newell and Simon,
+in their discussion of physical symbol systems (Computer science as an
+empirical inquiry," 1976), argue that one essential feature of intelligent
+systems is that some of the symbols can be taken as referring to operations
+and other symbols within the machine: not just for an outside observer,
+but as part of the causal mechanism.
+Even in this case there is a doop and important sense in which the
+referential relationship is still not intrinsic. However, the arguments are
+complex and not central to our discussion. We are primarily concerned
+with how computers are used in a practical context, where the central
+issue is the representation of the external world. The ability of computers
+to coherently represent their own instructions and internal structure is an
+interesting and important technical consideration, but not one that affects
+our perspective.
+7.2 Levels of representation
+In the previous section, computers were described rather loosely as be
+ing able to carry out operations on symbol structures of various kinds.
+However this is not a direct description of their physical structure and
+functioning. Theoretically, one could describe the operation of a digital
+computer purely in terms of electrical impulses travelling through a complex network of electronic elements, without treating these impulses as
+symbols for anything. Just as a particular number in the computer might
+represent some relevant domain object (such as the location of a satellite), a dooper analysis shows that the number itself is not an object in
+3This point has been raised by a number of philosophers, such as Fodor in "Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology"
+and Searle in "Minds, brains, and programs"
+(1980),
+(1980) We will discuss its relevance
+to language understanding in Chapter 9
+
+T2 LEVELS OF REPRESENTATION
+87
+the computer, but that some pattern of impulses or electrical states in
+turn represents the number, One of the properties unique to the digital
+computer is the possibility of constructing systems that cascade levels of
+representation one on top of another to great depth.
+The computer programmer or theorist does not begin with a view of the
+computer as a physical machine with which he or she interacts, but as an
+abstraction-a formalism for describing patterns of behavior. In programming, we begin with a language whose individual components describe
+simple acts and objects. Using this language, we build up descriptions of
+algorithms for carrying out a desired task. As a programmer, one views
+the behavior of the system as being totally determined by the program
+The language implementation is opaque in that the detailed structure of
+computer systems that actually carry out the task are not relevant in the
+domain of behavior considered by the programmer.
+If we observe a computer running a typical artificial intelligence
+program, we can analyze its behavior at any of the following levels:
+The physical machine. The machine is a complex network of compo
+nents such as wires, integrated circuits, and magnetic disks, These components operate according to the laws of physics, generating patterns of
+electrical and magnetic activity. Of course, any understandable description
+will be based on finding a modular decomposition of the whole machine
+into components, each of which can be described in terms of its internal
+structure and its interaction with other components. This decomposition
+is recursive-a single component of one structure is in turn a composite
+made up of smaller structures. At the bottom of this decomposition one
+finds the basic physical elements, such as strands of copper and areas of
+semiconductor metal laid down on a wafer of silicon crystal. It is important
+to distinguish this kind of hierarchical decomposition into components at
+a single level) from the analysis of levels of representation.
+The logical machine. The computer designer does not generally begin
+with a concept of the machine as a collection of physical components, but
+as a collection of logical elements, The components at this level are logical
+abstractions such as or-gates, inverters, and flip-flops (or, on a higher level
+of the decomposition, multiplexers, arithmetic-logical units, and address
+decoders). These abstractions are represented by activity in the physical
+components. For example, certain ranges of voltages are interpreted as
+representing a logical true' and other ranges a logical 'false.' The course
+of changes over time is interpreted as a sequence of discrete cycles, with
+the activity considered stable at the end of each cycle, If the machine is
+properly designed, the representation at this level is veridical-patterns
+of activity interpreted as logic will lead to other patterns according to
+
+88
+the rules of logic. In any real machine, at early stages of debugging,
+this representation will be incomplete. There will be behavior caused
+phenomena such as irregular voltages and faulty synchronization that does
+not accurately represent the logical machine. In a properly working
+machine, all of the relevant physical behavior can be characterized in terms
+of the logic it represents.
+The abstract machine. The logical machine is still a network of components, with activity distributed throughout. Most of today's computers are
+described in terms of an abstract single sequential processor, which steps
+through a series of instructions. It is at this level of representation that a
+logical pattern (a pattern of trues and falses) is interpreted as representing
+a higher-level symbol such as a number or a character Each instruction is
+a simple operation of fetching or storing a symbol or performing a logical
+or arithmetic operation, such as a comparison, an addition, or a multiplication. The activity of the logical machine cannot be segmented into
+disjoint time slices that represent the steps of the abstract machine In
+a modern machine, at any one moment the logical circuits will be simultaneously completing one step (storing away its results), carrying out the
+following one (e.g, doing an arithmetic operation), and beginning the next
+(analyzing it to see where its data are to be fetched from. Other parts
+of the circuitry may be performing tasks needed for the ongoing function
+of the machine (e.g., sending signals that prevent items from fading from
+memory cells), which are independent of the abstract machine steps. Most
+descriptions of computers are at the level of the abstract machine, since
+this is usually the lowest level at which the programmer has control over
+the details of activity. 4
+A high-level language. Most programs today are written in languages
+such as FORTRAN, BASIC, COBOL, and LISP, which provide elementary operations at a level more suitable for representing real-world do
+mains.. For example, a single step can convey a complex mathematical
+operation such as "x = (ytz)*3/z." A compiler or interpreter5 converts
+a formula like this into a sequence of operations for the abstract machine.
+A higher-level language can be based on more complex symbol structures,
+such as lists, trees, and character strings. In LISP, for example, the contents of a number of storage cells in the underlying abstract machine can
+4Even this stary is too simple It was true of computers ten years ago, but mast
+present-day computers have an additional level called 'micro-code' which implements
+the abstract machine instructions in terms of instructions for a simpler abstract
+machine which in turn is defined in terms of the logical machine
+5The difference between compiling and interpretation is subtle and is not critical for our
+discussion
+by
+
+7.2. LEVELS OF REPRESENTATION
+be interpreted together as representing a list of items, To the LISP programmer, the list "(APPLES ORANGES PUDDING PIE)" is a single
+symbol structure to which operations such as "REVERSE" can be
+ap plied. Once again, there need be no simple correspondence between an
+operation at the higher level and those at the lower level that represent it.
+several formulas all contain the term "(ytz)" the compiler may produce
+sequence of machine steps which does the addition only once, then saves
+result for use in all of the steps containing those formulas. If asked
+question "Which formula is it computing right now?" the answer may
+a single high-level step.
+A representation scheme for 'facts'. Programs for artificial intelligence use the symbol structures of a higher-level language to represent
+facts about the world. As mentioned above, there are a number of different
+conventions for doing this, but for any one program there must be a uniform organization. For example, an operation that a programmer would
+describe as "Store the fact that the person named 'Eric' lives in Chicago"
+may be encoded in the high-level language as a series of manipulations on a
+data base, or as the addition of a new proposition to a collection of axioms.
+There will be specific numbers or sequences of characters associated with
+"Fric" and "Chicago" and with the relationship "lives in." There will be
+a convention for organizing these to systematically represent the fact that
+it is Eric who lives in Chicago, not vice versa.. At this level, the objects being manipulated lie once again in the domain of logic (as they did several
+levels below), but here instead of simple Boolean (two-valued) variables,
+they are formulas that stand for propositions. The relevant operators are
+those of logical inference, such as instantiating a general proposition for a
+particular individual, or using an inference rule to derive a new proposition
+from existing ones..
+In designing a program to carry out some task, the programmer thinks
+in terms of the subject domain and the highest of these levels that exists
+for the programming system, dealing with the objects and operations it
+makes available. The fact that these are in tur represented at a lower
+level (and that in turn at a still lower one) is only of secondary relevance,
+as discussed in the following section. For someone designing a program
+or piece of hardware at one of the lower levels, the subject domain is the
+next higher level itself.
+The exact form of this tower of levels is not critical, and may well
+change as new kinds of hardware are designed and as new programming
+concepts evolve. This detail has been presented to give some sense of the
+complexity that lies between an operation that a programmer would mention in describing what a program does and the operation of the physical
+89
+If
+not be
+
+90
+computing device. People who have not programmed computers have not
+generally had experiences that provide similar intuitions about systems.
+One obvious fact is that for a typical complex computer program, there is
+no intelligible correspondence between operations at distant levels. If you
+ask someone to characterize the activity in the physical circuits when the
+program is deciding where the satellite is, there is no answer that can be
+given except by building up the description level by level.. Furthermore, in
+going from level to level there is no preservation of modularity. A single
+high-level language step (which is chosen from many different types available may compile into code using all of the different machine instructions,
+and furthermore the determination of what it compiles into will depend
+on global properties of the higher-level code.
+7.3
+Can computers do mare than you tell
+themto do?
+Readers who have had experience with computers will have noted that
+the story told in the previous section is too simple. It emphasizes the
+opacity of implementation, which is one of the key intellectual contributions of computer science. In the construction of physical systems, it is a
+rare exception for there to be a complete coherent level of design at which
+considerations of physical implementation at a lower level are irrelevant,.
+Computer systems on the other hand can exhibit many levels of representation, each of which is understood independently of those below it. One
+designs an algorithm as a collection of commands for manipulating logical
+formulas, and can understand its behavior without any notion of how this
+description will be written in a higher-level language, how that program
+will be converted into a sequence of instructions for the abstract machine,
+how those will be interpreted as sequences of instructions in micro-code,
+how those in turn cause the switching of logic circuits, or how those are
+implemented using physical properties of electronic components. Theoretically, the machine as structured at any one of these levels could be
+replaced by a totally different one without affecting the behavior as seen
+at any higher level.
+We have oversimplified matters, however, by saying that all of the
+relevant aspects of what is happening at one level can be characterized in
+terms of what they represent at the next higher level. This does not take
+into account several issues:
+Breakdowns. First of all, the purely layered account above is based on
+the assumption that each level operates as a representation exactly as anticipated. This is rarely the case.. In describing the step from electronic
+
+7.3 CAN COMPUTERS DO MORE?
+91
+circuits to logic circuits, we pointed out that it took careful debugging to
+guarantee that the behavior of the machine could be accurately described
+in terms of the logic. There is a similar problem at each juncture, and a
+person writing a program at any one level often needs to understand (and
+potentially modify) how it is represented at the one below. The domain
+of breakdowns generated by the lower levels must be reflected in the do
+main for understanding the higher ones.. This kind of interdependence is
+universally viewed as a defect in the system, and great pains are taken to
+avoid it, but it can never be avoided completely.
+Resource use. Even assuming that a description at a higher level is
+adequate (the representation is veridical), there may be properties of the
+machine that can be described only at a lower level but which are relevant
+to the efficiency with which the higher-level operations are carried out.
+For example, two operations that are both primitive in a higher-level language may take very different amounts of time or physical storage to run
+on a given machine with a given
+implementatzon (representation of the
+higher-level language on the abstract machine). Although this may not
+be relevant in specifying what the result will be, it will be relevant to the
+process of getting it. In real-time systems, where the computer activates
+physical devices at times that have relevance in the subject domain (e.g.,
+a controller for an industrial process, or a collision avoidance system for
+aircraft, the speed of execution may be critical, In the use of storage,
+there are often limits on how much can be stored, and the details of when
+these limits will be reached can be described only on the lower levels.
+Differing attitudes are taken to cross-level dependencies that deal with
+resources. Some programmers argue that whenever resources are significant, the program should be written at the level where they can be directly described, rather than a higher level. For example they argue that
+real-time control processes should be written in assembly language
+(a language that corresponds closely to the abstract machine) rather than in a
+higher-level language, since the resources connected with the objects and
+operations of the abstract machine can be directly specified. Others argue
+the program should be designed at the higher level only, and that
+lower-level systems should provide higher-level operations that are so
+efficient that there never need be a concern, In practice, programs are
+often initially designed without taking into account the lower level, and
+then modified to improve performance.
+Accidental representation. There are some cases in which there are
+useful higher-level descriptions of a program's behavior that do not correspond to an intentional representation by a programmer. As a simple
+example, there have been a number of "display hack' programs that prothat
+
+92
+duce geometrical designs on a computer screen. Many of these grew out
+programs that were originally created to perform operations on sym
+that had nothing to do with visual figures When the contents of
+their internal storage cells were interpreted as numbers represent
+bols
+some of
+ing points
+on a video display screen, strikingly regular patterns emerged, which the
+programmer had not anticipated. One such program produces
+containing circular forms and might be appropriately described as
+f i gures
+"drawing
+a circle," even though the concept of circle did not play a role in the design of
+its mechanisms at any level. In these cases, the description of
+the program as
+representing something is a description by some observer after the fact,
+rather than by its designer.
+If it were not for this last possibility we could argue that any properly
+con structed computer program is related to a subject domain only through
+the relationships of representation intended by its programmers. However
+there remains the logical possibility that a computer could end up
+oper ating successfully within a domain totally unintended by its designers
+or the programmers who constructed its programs.
+This possibility is related to the issues of structural coupling and instructional interaction raised by Maturana.. He argues that structures in
+the nervous system do not represent the world in which the organism lives.
+Similarly one could say of the display hack program that its structures do
+not represent the geometrical objects that it draws. It is possible that we
+might (either accidentally or intentionally) endow a machine with essential
+qualities we do not anticipate. In Section 8.4 we will discuss the relevance
+of this observation to the question of whether computers can think,
+
+Chapter 8
+Computation and
+intelligence
+Questions concerning the future uses of computers are often intertwined
+with questions about whether they will be intelligent. The existence of
+a field called 'artificial intelligence' implies that possibility and, as we
+pointed out in our introduction, there have been many speculations on the
+social impact of such developments. The theoretical principles developed
+in the earlier chapters lead us to the conclusion that one cannot program
+computers to be intelligent and that we need to look in different directions
+for the design of powerful computer technology Our goal in this chapter
+is to ground that conclusion in an analysis and critique of claims about
+artificial intelligence. We begin by examining the background in which the
+question of machine intelligence has been raised,
+8.1 Why do we ask?
+The first question one might ask is why anyone would consider that computers could be intelligent. A computer, like a clock or an adding machine,
+is a complex physical device exhibiting patterns of activity that represent
+some external world. But it hardly seems worthwhile asking whether a
+clock or an adding machine is intelligent. What then is different about
+computers!
+There is no simple answer to this question-no sharp distinction that
+clearly separates clocks from computers and puts the latter into a class
+potential thinkers. The differences are all differences of degree (albeit
+large ones), along a number of dimensions:
+
+94
+Apparent autonomy. It has been argued that the clock played a major
+role in the development of our understanding of physical systems because it
+exhibited a kind of autonomy that is not shared by most mechanical tools
+Although it is built for a purpose, once it is running it can go on for a long
+time (even indefinitely) without any need for human intervention. This
+feature of autonomous operation made it possible for the clock to provide a
+model for aspects of the physical world, such as the motions of the planets,
+and of biological organisms as well. The computer exhibits this kind of
+autonomy to a much larger degree Once it has been programmed it can
+carry out complex sequences of operations without human intervention.
+Complexity of purpose. A clock may be complex in the details of its
+construction, but its overall structure is determined by a clear, understandable purpose. All of the parts and their activities can be explained
+in terms of their contribution to the regular rotation of the hands. The
+complexity can be broken down in a modular way. A computer system, on
+the other hand, need not have a single purpose The activities of a large
+modern time-sharing system can be understood only by looking at the entire range of services provided for users. There is no way to assign a single
+global purpose to any one detail of its construction or operation. Each detail may be the result of an evolved compromise between many conflicting
+demands. At times, the only explanation for the system's current form
+may be an appeal to this history of modification.
+Structural plasticity. Most physical mechanisms (including clocks) do
+not undergo structural change over time. Their dynamic changes (the motion of the parts) leave the basic structure constant. Computer systems,
+on the other hand, can undergo continual structural change Every time
+a program is run, a file written, or a new program added, the system
+(viewed at the appropriate level) undergoes a change that may cause it
+to act differently in the future, In Maturana's terms, machines such as
+clocks only undergo structural changes of first order: changes in relations
+between components with properties that remain invariant.. Computers
+and other such systems also undergo structural changes of second order:
+changes in the properties of components that are themselves composite
+unities. As discussed in Chapter 7, an account of the system as having
+changed will generally be at one of the higher (software) levels. From
+the point of view of the hardware, the structural relationships (as opposed to the state) of the computer don't change any more than a radio
+changes depending on the station it is tuned to. One of the powers of
+the layering described in Chapter 7 is the potential for building mutable
+higher-level structure (which determines behavior) on a relatively fixed
+underlying physical structure.
+93
+
+8.2. INTELLIGENCE AS RATIONAL PROBLEM SOLVING
+95
+Unpredictability. As a consequence of complexity and plasticity, the
+activity of a computer (even when running without errors) is often unpredictable in an important sense. Of course, it is predictable at the physical
+level-a complete simulation of the machine executing the program would
+lead to predictions of the same results. But this is like saying that the
+activity of an organism is predictable by carrying out a simulation of its
+physical cells.. The simulation is of an order of complexity that makes it
+uninteresting as a predictive mechanism.. Similarly, in a complex computer
+system designed and functioning properly at a higher level there is often
+no way to predict how a program will act, short of running it (or simulating it step by step, which is of the same complexity. In interacting with
+such a system we tend to treat it in the same way we treat organisms-we
+operate by perturbing it and observing the results, gradually building up
+an understanding of its behavior.
+The net effect of these quantitative differences is to create an apparent
+qualitative leap, from the 'ordinary' properties of adding machines and
+clocks to the 'mind-like' qualities of the computer. It is important to note
+that the differences do not result from the fact that computers use symbols
+(so do adding machines, to the same extent) or that they contain general
+purpose processors (so do many current microwave ovens). The differences
+result from global properties of the overall systems within which computers
+function.
+8.2 Intelligence as rational problemsolving
+Chapter 2 described how artificial intelligence developed out of attempts
+to formalize problem-solving behavior, under the influence of Simon's work
+on rational decision making, A problem or task is analyzed in terms of a
+"problem space,' generated by a finite set of properties and operations. A
+'solution' is a particular point in that space that has the desired properties.
+Problem solving is a process of search for a sequence of operations that
+will lead to a solution point. Although this model was initially applied in
+a very direct sense in the design of programs such as GPS (the General
+Problem Solver), it can be applied in a more general sense to most work
+in artificial intelligence.
+We can begin to grasp the limitations of this approach to intelligence
+by looking carefully at what must go on when someone constructs a computer program Several distinct tasks need to be carried out (although
+not necessarily in isolation of one another, or in the particular order given
+here). They may at times be assigned to different people, with job titles
+1See Newell and Simon, Human Problem Solving (1972).
+
+96
+such as 'system analyst,'
+'knowledge engineer,' and 'programmer.' For
+simplicity we will refer, to a single 'programmer,'
+1. Characterizing the task environment. First, the programmer
+must have a clear analysis of just what constitutes the task and the
+potential set of actions for the program The task cannot be described with some vague generality like "diagnose illnesses" or "understand newspaper stories" but must be precisely stated in terms of
+the relevant objects of the environment and the particular
+that are to be considered. As we will discuss at length later, this
+task is the most critical, It results in the generation of a
+atic domain, which embodies the programmer's interpretation of the
+situation in which the program will function.
+2. Designing a formal representation. A major constraint on the
+characterization of the task environment is the need for a formal
+symbolic representation in which everything relevant can be stated
+explicitly. This formal representation may not look like mathematical logic, but it does need to be formal in that fully explicit rules can
+be set down for just what constitutes a well-formed representation,
+and in that it must be manipulable in ways that correspond to the
+task environment. One of the major activities in theoretical artificial
+intelligence has been the attempt to design formal systems that can
+adequately and consistently represent facts about the world.
+3. Embodying the representation in the computer system A
+formal representation is an abstraction. In order to use it in building
+a computer system, we need to set its structures in correspondence
+with the structures available on the computer at some level, A particular formal representation may be embodied in many different ways,
+each having different properties with regard to the computations that
+can be carried out. The critical thing is that the embodiment remain
+faithful to the formal system-that the operations carried out by the
+computer system are consistent with the rules of the formal system'
+4. Implementing a search procedure. Finally, the programmer
+designs a procedure that operates on the embodied representation
+Practitioners of artificial intelligence will be aware that in many cases the programmer deals directly with the correspondence between the subject domain and the
+symbol structures provided by a higher-level programming language, with no systeratic level of logical representation It is coming to be widely accepted (see, for
+example, Hayes, "In defence of logic," 1977; Nilsson,
+Prinexples of Artificial
+Intelligence, 1980; Newell, "The knowledge level," 1982) that this kind of haphazard formal
+system cannot be used to build comprehensible programs, and that the distinction
+between the logical formalism and its embodiment in a computation is critical,
+properties
+system-
+
+8.3. THE PHENOMENON OF BLINDNESS
+97
+structures in order to carry out the desired task. As mentioned
+above, the procedure may or may not be directly characterized as
+search. Its critical property is its faithfulness to the formal system,
+whether that system is mathematical logic, procedural reasoning,
+fuzzy logic, pattern matching, or other such systems. For each of
+these there are underlying formal rules that, though they may differ
+from standard deductive logic, nevertheless determine what constitutes a valid representation and what can be done with it. Without
+a precise understanding of these rules, there would be no way to
+design a computer program.
+8.3
+The phenomenon of blindness
+The summary in the previous section prepares us to look at the question
+of machine intelligence in relation to Heidegger's account of "blindness.'
+As we discussed in Chapter 3, Heidegger argues that the basis for an
+understanding of cognition is
+being-in-the-world.
+Our ability to treat our
+experience as involving
+present-at-hand objects and properties is derived
+from a pre-conscious experience of them as
+ready-to-hand.
+The essence of
+our Being is the pre-reflective experience of being
+thrown
+in a situation
+of acting, without the opportunity or need to disengage and function as
+detached observers, Reflection and abstraction are important phenomena,
+but are not the basis for our everyday action..
+Whenever we treat a situation as present-at-hand, analyzing it in terms
+objects and their properties, we thereby create a blindness. Our view is
+limited to what can be expressed in the terms we have adopted. This
+not a flaw to be avoided in thinking-on the contrary, it is necessary
+inescapable Reflective thought is impossible without the kind of
+abstraction that produces blindness. Nevertheless we must be aware of
+the limitations that are imposed.
+In writing a computer program, the programmer is responsible for
+char acterizing the task domain as a collection of objects, properties, and
+operations, and for formulating the task as a structure of goals in terms of
+these. Obviously, this is not a matter of totally free choice The programmer
+acts within a context of language, culture, and previous understanding,
+both shared and personal. The program is forever limited to working
+within the world determined by the programmer's explicit articulation of
+possi ble objects, properties, and relations among them It therefore
+embodies the blindness that goes with this articulation.
+There are restricted task domains in which this blindness does not preclude behavior that appears intelligent. For example, many games are
+amenable to a direct application of the techniques described in the
+previof
+
+98
+ous section to produce a program that outplays human opponents. There
+is no a priori reason to doubt that this will be true even for highly complex games such as chess, There are also domains where so-called 'expert
+systems' can be built successfully, such as the manipulation of algebraic
+expressions, the analysis of chemical spectrograms, and the recognition of
+anomalies in electrocardiograms As with games, these are areas in which
+the identification of the relevant features is straightforward and the nature
+of solutions is clear-cut
+If we look at intelligence in a broader context, however, the inadequacies of a program with built-in permanent blindness begin to emerge.
+The essence of intelligence is to act appropriately when there is no simple
+pre-definition of the problem or the space of states in which to search for
+a solution. Rational search within a problem space is not possible until
+the space itself has been created, and is useful only to the extent that the
+formal structure corresponds effectively to the situation,.
+It should be no surprise, then, that the area in which artificial intelligence has had the greatest difficulty is in the programming of common
+sense. It has long been recognized that it is much easier to write a pro
+gram to carry out abstruse formal operations than to capture the common
+sense of a dog. This is an obvious consequence of Heidegger's realization
+that it is precisely in our, 'ordinary everydayness' that we are immersed in
+readiness-to-hand A methodology by which formally defined tasks can be
+performed with carefully designed representations (making things presentat-hand) does not touch on the problem of blindness. We accuse people of
+lacking common sense precisely when some representation of the situation
+has blinded them to a space of potentially relevant actions.
+There has been a certain amount of discussion in the artificial intelligence literature about the possibility of a program switching between
+different representations, or creating new representations. If this were
+possible, the blindness inherent in any one representation could be overcome. But if we look carefully at what is actually proposed, it does not
+really confront the issues,, In some cases the programmer builds in a small
+number of different characterizations (instead of just one), and the program is able to switch among these. In others, the so-called creation of
+representations does not deal at all with the characterization of the environment (which is where the problem arises), but simply with the details
+of the formal structures by which it is represented,. In either case, the
+problem of blindness as created by the initial programming is untouched.
+In current artificial intelligence research it is often stated that the key
+problem is 'knowledge acquisition,' Researchers seek to build tools that
+enable experts in a task domain (such as medical diagnosis) to pass their
+expert knowledge to a computer system. It should be apparent from the
+preceding discussion that this is an unreachable goal. It has generally been
+
+8 3. THE PHENOMENON OF BLINDNESS
+99
+assumed that the difficulty of getting experts to make their knowledge
+explicit is one of communication that the appropriate representation is
+somehow there in the expert's mind, but not accessible to introspection or
+verbalization. If we take the work of Heidegger and Maturana seriously, we
+see that experts do not need to have formalized representations in order
+to act.3 They may at times manipulate representations as one part of
+successful activity, but it is fruitless to search for a full formalization of
+the pre-understanding that underlies all thought and action. As Gadamer
+points out, we can never have a full explicit awareness of our prejudices.
+This is an essential condition of human thought and language, not a failure
+of communication tools.
+But, one might be tempted to argue, aren't we being too hasty in
+pre cluding machines from being intelligent because of their blindness? Might
+we not be committing the 'superhuman-human fallacy,' denying
+intelligence to ordinary human thought as well?
+The answer to this objection was laid out in the earlier chapters. Heidegger demonstrates that the essence of our intelligence is in our thrownness, not our reflection. Similarly, Maturana shows that biological cognitive systems do not operate by manipulating representations of an external
+world. It is the observer who describes an activity as representing something else. Human cognition includes the use of representations, but is not
+based on representation. When we accept (knowingly or unknowingly) the
+limitations imposed by a particular characterization of the world in terms
+of objects and properties, we do so only provisionally,. There always remains the possibility of rejecting, restructuring, and transcending that
+particular blindness This possibility is not under our control-the breakdown of a representation and jump to a new one happens independently
+of our will, as part of our coupling to the world we inhabit.
+In debates concerning the possibility of artificial intelligence, a recurrent theme has been the deriding of the common objection that machines
+can do only what they are told to do, Evans
+(The Micro Millennium,
+1979, p. 157) gives a typical response,. When asked "Surely it can only do
+what you have previously programmed it to do?" he suggests the answer
+is unexpectedly simple: "The same is true of animals and humans." It
+should be clear that in this response (as in all similar responses) there
+is a failure to distinguish between two very different things: structuredetermined systems (which include people, computers, and anything else
+operating according to physical laws), and systems programmed explicitly
+with a chosen representation. Stating matters carefully: "An animal or
+human can do only what its structure as previously established will allow
+3Dxeyfus and Dreyfus, in
+Mznd Over Machine
+ours that expertise cannot be captured in any collection of formal rules
+(1985), argue along lines very similar to
+
+100
+it to do." But this is not at all the same as "what you have previously
+programmed it to do" for any "you" and any notion of "programmed"
+that corresponds to the way computers are actually programmed.
+8.4 What about learning and evolution?
+Having followed the argument this far, the reader might be tempted to
+object to the way we have linked the questions "Can computers be
+intelligent?" and "Can we construct an intelligent machine?" We have
+focussed on the problems of construction, showing that the requirements
+on the programmer lead to inevitable limitations. But what if the
+programmer didn't have to explicitly determine the representation and its
+embodiment? What if somehow these could develop on their own?
+Ever since the beginning of artificial intelligence, there have been critics who have felt that the essence of intelligence lay in the ability of an
+organism to learn from experience, dooming any efforts to create intelligent machines by programming them. There have been many attempts to
+build learning programs, which begin with a minimum of structure and
+develop further structure either through a process of reinforcement modelled on behaviorist theories of reward and punishment or through a kind
+of selection modelled after theories of evolution, Recently there has been
+a resurgence of interest in learning programs, even among writers such as
+Minsky, who were sharply critical of earlier efforts.4
+If we examine the artificial intelligence literature on learning, we find
+three somewhat different approaches:
+Parameter adjustment. The simplest approach and the one that has
+led to the most publicized results) is to limit the programs learning capacities to the adjustment of parameters that operate within a fixed representation. For example, Samuel's checker-playing program
+collection of evaluation functions, which computed the benefits of a proposed position. These functions (such as adding up the number of pieces,
+or seeing how many jumps were possible) gave different results for different situations. The obvious problem was deciding how much weight to
+give each one in the overall choice of a move. Samuel's program gradually
+shifted the weights and then adopted the modified weighting if the moves
+thereby chosen were successful.
+More sophisticated applications of this technique have been developed,
+but the general idea remains the same: a fixed structure is in place, and
+4See Minsky, "K-lines: A theory of memory" (1981).
+5Samuel, "Some studies in machine learning using the game of checkers" (1963).
+contained a
+
+84 WHAT ABOUT LEARNING AND EVOLUTION?
+101
+the learning consists of adjusting some kind of weights to achieve a higher
+measure of performance. Although there may be some kinds of
+program ming tasks for which this technique is useful, it clearly does not
+avoid the problem of blindness, since it provides only a slight adjustment
+on a preprogrammed representation.
+Combinatorial concept formation. The second kind of learning program does what has been called "concept formation' or 'concept learning!'
+This approach (which has also been the source of many experiments in cognitive psychology) is motivated by the observation that people can learn to
+group related objects into categories. It appears that people have a 'concept' of "horse" that enables them to distinguish horses from non-horses..
+The question is how such concepts arise, since in most cases they are not
+taught explicitly but are learned through experiences in which specific
+objects are labelled as members or non-members of the class.
+In the computer programs (and in most of the psychological experiments as well) the problem is initially characterized in terms of a set of
+objects and properties, just as in the standard programming methodology
+described above. For example, in Winston's program dealing with the
+"blocks world,'6 the initial formulation includes undecomposable objects
+(the individual blocks) and properties
+(such as their color, shape, and
+orientation, and whether or not they are touching). The program then
+tries to find structural combinations of objects and properties that correspond to the assignment (by the programmer) of examples to categories.
+Winston's program, for instance, produces the combination that we could
+describe as "two vertical blocks, not abutting, with a third horizontal object supported by both of them" for the concept of "Arch" as embodied
+in a specific sequence of examples.. Other programs have more elaborate
+mechanisms, but there is a common basis: the programmer begins by creating a representation, and the 'learning' consists of finding (and storing
+for later use) combinations of its elements that satisfy some criterion.
+The limitations of this approach are not as immediately obvious as
+those of simple parameter adjustment, but follow directly from the discussion in the previous section. No amount of rearrangement and recombination of existing elements will ever transcend the assumptions made in
+representing those elements. In general, programs of this sort have dealt
+with only the simplest kinds of examples, and with 'concepts' lacking in
+naturalness and generality. In order for the search for combinations to
+have any chance of success at all, the initial representation must be pared
+down to a small number of carefully chosen properties that will turn out._
+Winston, "Learning structural descriptions from examples" (1975)
+
+102
+to be relevant. As Winston cautiously observes: 7
+"The small number of
+properties associated with each object may be a cause for some uneasiness, Is it possible that the examples work only because of the careful
+arrangements of the slots and their small number? Maybe. Indeed one
+important question to be addressed as the work goes on is that of how
+much complexity can be coped with before the system breaks down."
+Evolution of structure. The third and most ambitious kind of learning
+is that in which the initial system does not have a structure directly related
+to the task as seen by its designer. The learning machines of the early
+1960s8 and attempts at 'artificial evolution'
+(such as Fogel, Owens, and
+Walsh, Artificial Intelligence Through Simulated Evolution,
+1966) fall
+this group. In these programs the techniques of the previous two classes
+are applied at a microscopic level,. Parameter adjustment or combinatorial
+search is applied, but at the level of individual elements connected in an
+overall web whose structure was not designed as a representation, It was
+hoped that a device designed on general principles (often by analogy with
+simple models of the nervous system) could learn a wide range of behaviors
+as a result of its structural coupling in a series of learning trials.
+This approach is compatible with Maturana's view of structural coupling. We get a very different perspective on computers if, instead of
+looking at the problem of programming them, we look at them as plastic
+structure determined systems. A computer system need not have a fixed
+structure built by a programmer but can be an evolving structure shaped
+by interactions,. Many of the characteristics of autopoietic systems will
+hold for any system whose internal structure can change as a result of
+perturbations, and computer programs share this quality,.
+The evolutionary approach to artificial intelligence is theoretically possible but there has been essentially no success in getting it to work, The
+techniques devised for structural change at the microscopic level and the
+organizational structures for the connectivity of elements have been inadequate to get even the most rudimentary interesting behavior.9 After a
+brief heyday in the 1950s and early 1960s, work of this sort was almost
+completely
+abandoned, to be replaced with the style of artificial intelligence research we have
+been describing.
+This failure is not surprising if we look at the assumptions made by
+those who tried it. They assumed that the underlying system had a relatively simple structure, and that its complexity came from large numbers
+TWinston, "Learning by creating and justifying transfer frames" (1978), p
+166
+8See Nilsson, Learning Machines
+(1965), for a good general introduction
+s "The Chaostron," by Cadwallader-Cohen, Zysiczk, and Donnelly (1961), is a satirical
+critique of the naivete that was evident in some of the early attempts.
+
+8.4. WHAT ABOUT LEARNING AND EVOLUTION?
+of learned interconnections. The guiding image was that of a large num
+of essentially uniform neurons with widespread and essentially uniform
+potential for interconnections. Work over the years in neuroanatomy and
+neurophysiology has demonstrated that living organisms do not fit this
+image. Even an organism as small as a worm with a few hundred neu
+is highly structured, and much of its behavior is the result of built-in
+structure, not learning,.
+Of course, the structure of nervous systems came into being through
+evolution. But if we try to duplicate evolution rather than the structural change that takes place in the lifetime of an individual, we are faced
+with even less knowledge of the mechanisms of change. This remains true
+despite recent advances in molecular genetics, which further reveal the
+complexity of layer upon layer of mechanisms involved at even the most
+microscopic level There is also the obvious fact that the time scale of
+biological evolution is epochal; changes occur as a result of coupling over
+millions of years
+In discussions of artificial evolution it is sometimes argued that there
+is no need for an artificial system to evolve at this slow pace, since its
+internal operations are so much faster than those of organic nervous systems, Millions upon millions of "generations' could be produced in a single
+day,, But this is wrong for two reasons. First, nature does not do things
+sequentially.. Although each generation for a higher organism takes days
+or years, there are millions of individual organisms all undergoing the process simultaneously. This high degree of parallelism more than cancels out
+the additional speed of computing. Second, and more important, the view
+that evolution can go at the speed of the machine ignores the fundamental
+process of structural coupling.. In order for changes to be relevant to survival in the medium the organism inhabits, there must be sufficient time
+for those changes to have an effect on how the organism functions. The
+evolutionary cycle must go at the speed of the coupling, not the speed at
+which internal changes occur. Unless we reduce our notion of the medium
+to those things that can be rapidly computed (in which case we fall into
+all of the problems discussed above for small simplistic representations,
+an artificial system can evolve no faster than any other, system that must
+undergo the same coupling.
+It is highly unlikely that any system we can build will be able to undergo the kind of evolutionary change (or learning) that would enable it
+to come close to the intelligence of even a small worm, much less that of
+a person.
+The issue of structural change is also closely tied to the problem of the
+physical embodiment of computers as robots. It has been argued that the
+representation relation between a computer and the world its structures
+describe will be different when we can build robots with visual, tactile,
+103
+ber
+rons
+
+104
+and other sensors and motor effectors operating in the physical domain.
+As a number of philosophers have pointed out, 10 a computer attached
+to a television camera is no different in principle from one attached to a
+teletype. The relevant properties and their representation are fixed by the
+design of the equipment. A scanned-in video scene that has been processed
+into an array of numerical 'pixels' (picture elements) is exactly equivalent
+to a long list of sentences, each of the form "The amount of light hitting
+the retina at point [x, A is z."
+In designing a fixed correspondence between parameters of the recep
+(or effectors) and elements of the representation, the programmer is
+embodying exactly the sort of blindness about which we have been speak
+Once again, this does not apply to systems that, rather than being
+designed to implement a particular representation, evolve through
+structural coupling, However, the possibilities for computers whose
+physical structure evolves in this way are even more remote than those of
+programming by evolutionary change.
+tors
+ing,
+8.5 Can pigs have wings?
+Readers well trained in the analytic tradition will by this point have
+con cluded that our argument that computers cannot be intelligent has
+several "logical holes' in it:
+1. First of all, we have not given a precise definition of intelligence..
+The discussion of Heidegger has suggested various qualities of human
+intelligence but does not give the kind of clear criteria that would
+be needed to design objective experiments to determine whether a
+given system was intelligent.
+2, We have explicitly said that computers can perform some tasks (such
+as playing complex games) as well as people: Some researchers would
+take this as constituting intelligent behavior. How, then, do we
+exclude this behavior from the domain of intelligence?
+3. Finally, we have left open the possibility that some suitably designed
+machine or sequence of machines might be able to undergo adequate
+structural coupling, and hence have the same claims to intelligence
+as any organism, including a person. Since we accept the view that a
+person is a physical structure-determined system, we cannot be sure
+that a similar system made out of silicon and metals might not be
+equivalent to one composed of protoplasm
+loSe, for example, Searle, "Minds, brains, and programs,"
+1980.
+
+8.5. CAN PIGS HAVE WINGS?
+In light of these points, aren't we being illogical or inconsistent in our
+assertion that computers cannot be intelligent?
+In order to respond to this challenge, we need to recall the theory of
+language developed in Chapter 5. Sentences in a human language cannot
+treated as statements of fact about an objective world, but are actions
+space of commitments, If this applies to the question "Is there any
+in the refrigerator?" it must apply at least as strongly to "Can
+computers be intelligent?"
+If we assume that the person asking the question is serious, there is
+an underlying background of purposes and understanding (the "horizon'
+as Gadamer calls it) into which the question fits. If a questioner were to
+ask "Can pigs have wings?" a respondent within the analytic tradition
+might have difficulty answering, because although the idea is outrageously
+farfetched, current work in genetic engineering does leave open the logical
+possibility of creating a beast with the desired characteristics Admittedly,
+there might be some refuge in challenging the asker as to whether such
+a monstrosity would still properly be called a pigrl thereby invalidating
+the question. But if the question were asked seriously, neither the logical
+possibility nor the precise meaning of "pig" would be the issue at hand.
+The questioner would be asking for some reason in some background of
+understanding and purpose, and the approprate answer just like the appropriate answer to "Is there water in the refrigerator?") would have to
+be relevant to that background.
+The background for serious questions about computer intelligence is
+the development of computer systems and their use in human contexts.
+What then is the basis for deciding whether it is appropriate to describe
+computers as potentially intelligent? In applying a predicate to an entity,
+one is implicitly committed to the belief that the entity is the kind of thing
+to which the predicate properly applies.. In uttering a sentence containing
+mental terms (intelligent,'
+"perceive,' 'learn'), we are adopting an orientation towards the thing referred to by the subject of the sentence as an
+autonomous agent The issue is not whether it really is autonomous-the
+question of free will has been debated for centuries and work in artificial
+intelligence has provided no new solutions.. Rather, in using mental terms
+we commit ourselves to an orientation towards it as an autonomous agent.
+There are many reasons why one can feel uncomfortable with the
+ten dency to adopt the same orientation towards people (whom we take as
+autonomous beings) and towards machines.. It is not a matter of being
+right or wrong, accurate or inaccurate, but rather of a pre-understanding
+that guides our discourse and our actions.
+"See, for example Putnamis discussion of natural kinds in "Is semantics possible?"
+(1970)
+105
+be
+in a
+water
+
+106
+In attributing intelligence to machines, one is doing more than just taking what Dennett, in "Mechanism and responsibility" (1973, p. 246), calls
+the "intentional stance' He argues that in taking an intentional stance towards computers, all one is claiming is that "on occasion, a purely physical
+system can be so complex, and yet so organized, that we find it convenient,
+explanatory, pragmatically necessary for prediction, to treat it as if it has
+beliefs and desires and was rational " But treating a system as though it
+were rational (in the formalized sense of rationality) is very different from
+treating it as though it had beliefs and desires, and this is a significant
+confusion.
+We treat other people not as merely 'rational beings' but as 'responsible
+beings! An essential part of being human is the ability to enter into
+commitments and to be responsible for the courses of action that they
+anticipate. A computer can never enter into a commitment (although it
+can be a medium in which the commitments of its designers are conveyed),
+and can never enter as a participant into the domain of human discourse
+Our earlier chapters point out the centrality of commitment for those
+aspects of intelligent behavior that initially seem based on more objective
+ideals of rationality. Even the ability to utter a true statement' emerges
+from the potential for commitment, and the absence of this potential gives
+computers a wholly different kind of being.
+We do not treat the question of whether computers can be intelligent
+a pure stance, with one or another choice to be taken for the sake
+argument. We exist within a discourse, which both prefigures and is
+constituted by our utterances. The meaning of any question or
+state ment lies in its role within this discourse. Our answer to the question
+of whether machines can be intelligent must be understood in the context
+of the questions raised by the other chapters, and in the orientation that
+these questions provide for action
+
+Chapter 9
+Understanding language
+There is an intimate connection between intelligence and language. Many
+of the representation techniques described in the previous chapters were
+f i rst developed in trying to process natural language' with computers. Our
+position, in accord with the preceding chapters, is that computers cannot
+understand language. Some important observations can be made along
+the route to that conclusion, and in this chapter we review the existing
+research work in some detail, We are concerned with the technical details
+here because natural language research has been the context for many of
+the efforts within artificial intelligence to deal with the theoretical issues
+we raise. Mechanisms such as 'frames," scripts,' and 'resource-limited
+reasoning' have been proposed as ways to build machines that in some
+sense deal with 'understanding' and "interpretation.' We need to examine
+them carefully to evaluate these claims..
+9.1
+Artificial intelligence and
+language understanding
+In the mid 1960s, natural language research with computers proceeded
+in the wake of widespread disillusionment caused by the failure of the
+highly touted and heavily funded machine translation projects. There was
+a feeling that researchers had failed to make good on their early confident
+claims and that computers might not be able to deal with the complexities of human language at all. Artificial intelligence researchers took a
+new approach, going beyond the syntactic word-shuffling that dominated
+'In discussions of computers and formal systems, the term 'natural language' is used
+for ordinary human languages, to distinguish them from constructed formal
+languages, such as the predicate calculus and FORTRAN
+
+108
+machine translation. It was clear that for effective machine processing of
+language-whether for translation, question answering, or sophisticated
+information retrieval-an analysis of the syntactic structures and
+identification of the lexical items was not sufficient, Programs had to
+deal somehow with what the words and sentences
+meant.
+A number of programs in this new vein were described in the early collections of papers on artificial intelligence.2
+Each program worked in some
+very limited domain (such as baseball scores, family trees, or algebra word
+problems) within which it was possible to set up formal representation
+structures corresponding to the meanings of sentences. These structures
+could be used in a systematic reasoning process as a partial simulation of
+language comprehension. The model of language understanding implicit
+in those programs (and most such programs since) rests on some basic
+assumptions about language and representation that we have elaborated
+in our earlier accounts of the rationalistic tradition:
+1. Sentences in a natural language correspond to facts about the world.
+2, It is possible to create a formal representation system such that:
+(a) For any relevant fact about the world there can be a corresponding structure in the representation system
+(b) There is a systematic way of correlating sentences in natural
+language with structures in the representation system, so that
+the corresponding structure states the same fact as the sentence.
+(c) Systematic formal operations on representation structures can
+be devised to carry out valid reasoning,
+This somewhat simplistic formulation needs elaboration to be
+comprehensive. It is clear, for example, that a question or command
+does not correspond to facts in the same manner as a statement, and that a
+reason ing system based on pure logic is unlikely to be sufficient. We will
+discuss some of these elaborations later, but for a preliminary understanding
+they do not play a major role.
+The critical element in this approach is the systematic manipulation
+of a formal representation. Operations carried out on the representation
+structures are justified not by facts about language, but by the correspondence between the representation and the world being described.. It is in
+this sense that such programs are said to 'understand' the words and sentences they deal with, while the earlier machine translation programs (or
+2Feigenbaum
+and Feldman,
+Information Processing (1967).
+Computers and Thought
+(1963); Minsky,
+Semantic
+If)7
+
+9,1 AI AND LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING
+other programs that deal with text using key-word recognition or statistical methods) only 'manipulate without understanding.'
+Many claims have been made that the 'artificial intelligence paradigm'
+is new and superior to older philosophical approaches to language. But
+with a few notable exceptions (discussed later), these claims have proved
+rather empty. Fodor, in "Methodological solipsism considered as a research
+strategy in cognitive psychology" (1980), has pointed out that to the extent
+that they are clearly defined, artificial intelligence models are generally
+equivalent to older philosophical ones in the analytic tradition, drawing on
+ideas that go back to Aristotle and beyond.. Before pursuing the limitations
+of this tradition, let us look at what has been achieved.
+One of the most widely known programs of the kind described here
+was Winograd's SHRDLU (Understanding Natural Language,
+The
+program carried on a dialog with a person (via teletype) concerning the
+activity of a simulated robot arm in a tabletop world of toy objects (often
+referred to as the 'blocks world). The program could answer questions,
+carry out commands, and incorporate new facts about its world. It displayed the simulated world on a video screen, showing the activities it
+carried out as it moved the objects around.. The following dialog3 illustrates some of its abilities (lines in lower case are typed by the person,
+those in upper case by the computer):
+• pick up a big red block.
+OK.
+• grasp the pyramid
+I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHICH PYRAMID YOU MEAN..
+• find a block which is taller than the one you are holding and put it
+into the box,
+OK
+109
+1972).
+• what does the box contain?
+THE BLUE PYRAMID AND THE BLUE BLOCK.
+• what is the pyramid supported by?
+THE BOX.
+• how many blocks are not in the box?
+FOUR OF THEM.
+3Reprinted from Winograd,
+Understanding Natural Language
+(1972), pP
+8-15.
+
+110
+• is at least one of them narrower than the one which I told you to
+pick up?
+YES, THE RED CUBE.
+• is it supported?
+YES, BY THE TABLE.
+• can the table pick up blocks?
+NO.
+• had you touched any pyramid before you put the green one on the
+little cube?
+YES, THE GREEN ONE.
+• when did you pick it up?
+WHILE I WAS STACKING UP THE RED CUBE, A LARGE RED
+BLOCK AND A LARGE GREEN CUBE.
+• why?
+TO GET RID OF IT.
+In addition to giving responses that call for reasoning about the domain (the world of toy blocks), the system draws conclusions about the
+structure of the conversation and about the hypothesized knowledge of
+the other participant. In order to analyze a phrase like "the pyramid"
+context must be considered. The command "Grasp the pyramid" near the
+beginning of the dialog is underspecified since there are several pyramids
+in the robot's world, But the later question "What is the pyramid supported by?" is understood as referring to the specific pyramid mentioned
+in a previous response. By keeping a record of the conversation, SHRDLU
+could often determine the referent of a phrase. It also kept track of part
+of the knowledge implicit in the person's utterances, for example the fact
+that a particular block was referred to using its color. It could then use
+this to help in choosing among alternative interpretations. For example, if
+a block had been referred to by the person as "the green block," it would
+not be considered as a likely referent for "it" in a subsequent question
+"What color is it?"
+In SHRDLU, this reasoning about the conversation did not make use
+of the same representation formalism as for the blocks world itself, but
+was done in an ad hoc style. Nevertheless, in essence it was no different
+
+9.2. THE PROBLEM OF BACKGROUND
+111
+from any other reasoning process carried out on representation structures..
+Later programs have refined and extended the approach, within the same
+theoretical background.
+9.2
+The problem of background
+The rationalistic approach to meaning that underlies systems like SHRDLU
+is founded on the assumption that the meanings of words and of the sentences and phrases made up of them can be characterized independently of
+the interpretation given by individuals in a situation,. There are, of course,
+aspects of meaning that call for qualifying this assumption. A sentence
+may include indexicals (words like "I," "you," and "now") whose referents
+are elements of the conversation situation, or may have connotative effects
+(as in the impact of a poetic metaphor) that depend on the full understanding and empathy of the hearer, But these are seen as add-ons to a
+central core of meaning that is context-independent. Even those who are
+critical of artificial intelligence are prone to accept this separation of the
+'literal meaning' from other linguistic effects. Weizenbaum, for instance,
+argues against the possibility of computer understanding in this way:
+It may be possible... to construct a conceptual structure that
+corresponds to the meaning of the sentence, "Will you come
+to dinner with me this evening?" But it is hard to see... how
+[such] schemes could possibly understand that same sentence
+to mean a shy young man's desperate longing for love. -
+Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason
+(1976), p. 200.
+In his review of Weizenbaum's book, MoCarthy responds by pointing
+out that there are different kinds of understanding and by suggesting that
+we might expect a computer to understand literal meaning even if it were
+not open to the connotations and emotional subtleties of full meaning:
+This good example raises interesting issues and seems to call for
+some distinctions. Full understanding of the sentence indeed
+results in knowing about the young man's desire for love, but it
+would seem that there is a useful lesser level of understanding
+in which the machine would know only that he would like her
+to come to dinner,. - MoCarthy, "An unreasonable book" (1976),
+p. 86.
+But as we saw in Chapters 3 and 5, the concept of literal meaning
+is inadequate even in dealing with the most mundane examples. The
+phenomena of background and interpretation pervade our everyday life.
+Meaning always derives from an interpretation that is rooted in a situation:
+
+112
+relativity to situation and opportunity constitutes the very
+essence of speaking. For no statement simply has an unambiguous meaning based on its linguistic and logical construction, as
+such, but on the contrary, each is motivated. A question is behind each statement that first gives it its meaning
+- Gadamer,
+Philosophical Hermeneutics
+(1976), pp 88-89
+Gadamer, Heidegger, Habermas, and others argue that the goal of reducing even 'literal' meanings to truth conditions is ultimately impossible,
+and inevitably misleading, It focusses attention on those aspects of language (such as the statement of mathematical truths) that are secondary
+and derivative, while ignoring the central problems of meaning and com
+munication,. When we squeeze out the role of interpretation, we are left
+not with the essence of meaning, but with the shell, Chapter 5 showed
+how the meaning of a concrete term like "water" could be understood only
+relative to purpose and background. Looking at computer programs, we
+see this kind of problem lurking at every turn.. In order for a computer system to draw conclusions from the use of a word or combination of words,
+meaning must be identified with a finite collection of logical predicates (its
+truth conditions) or procedures to be applied. Complications arise even
+in apparently simple cases..
+In classical discussions of semantics, the word "bachelor"" has been put
+forth as a word that can be clearly defined in more elementary terms:
+"adult human male who has never been married."4
+But when someone
+refers to a person as a "bachelor" in an ordinary conversational situation,
+much more (and less) is conveyed. "Bachelor" is inappropriate if used in
+describing the Pope or a member of a monogamous homosexual couple,
+and might well be used in describing an independent career woman. The
+problem is not that the definition of bachelor is complex and involves more
+terms than accounted for in the classical definition. There is no coherent
+'checklist' of any length such that objects meeting all of its conditions will
+consistently be called "bachelors" and those failing one or more of them
+will not.' The question "Is X a bachelor?" cannot be answered without
+considering the potential answers to "Why do you want to know?" This
+is what Gadamer means by "A question is behind each statement that
+first gives it its meaning." It is possible to create artificial stipulative
+definitions,' as in a mathematics text or in establishing the use of terms in
+4This is, of course, anly ane of its definitions. Others, as pointed out in Katz and
+Fodar's account of semantics ("The structure of a semantic theory," 1964), relate to fur
+seals and chivalry.
+5Far a discussion of examples like this, see Fillmore, "An alternative to checklist
+theories of meaning" (1975) and Winograd, "Toward a procedural understanding of
+semantics" (1976)
+
+9.2. THE PROBLEM OF BACKGROUND
+113
+legal documents, but these do not account for the normal use of language.
+When we leave philosophical examples and look at the words appearing
+in everyday language, the problem becomes even more obvious. Each of
+nouns in the sentence "The regime's corruption provoked a crisis of
+confidence in government" raises a significant problem for definition. It is
+clear that purpose and context play a major role in determining what will be
+called a "crisis," "corruption," or a "regime."
+Other problems arise in trying to deal with words such as "the" and
+"and," which seem the closest to logical operators. In SHRDLU, as described above, the program for determining the referent of a definite noun
+phrase such as "the block" made use of a list of previously mentioned
+objects. The most recently mentioned thing fitting the description was
+assumed to be the referent. But this is only a rough approximation
+Sometimes it gives a wrong answer, and other times it gives no clue at
+all.. Consider the text: "Tommy had just been given a new set of blocks.
+He was opening the box when he saw Jimmy coming in."
+There is no mention of what is in the box-no clue as to what
+box it is at all. But a person reading the text makes the immediate assumption that it is the box which contains the set
+of blocks. We can do this because we know that new items
+often come in boxes, and that opening the box is a usual thing
+to do. Most important, we assume that we are receiving a
+connected message. There is no reason why the box has to
+be connected with the blocks, but if it weren't, it couldn't be
+mentioned without further introduction.
+- Winograd, 'When
+will computers understand people?"
+(1974), P 75.
+The problem, then, is to account for how the background of knowledge
+and expectations leads to interpretation,. In building artiticial intelligence
+systems, this has led to the addition of 'internal' aspects to the representation. In addition to reasoning about the subject matter, the program
+attempts to model those aspects of the speaker's and hearer's internal
+thought processes that are relevant to interpretation. There has been a
+good deal of work along these lines' which rests on an extended version of
+the basic model and a corresponding extension of the assumptions given
+above:
+1. There is a systematic way of correlating sentences in natural language with structures in the representation system
+'See, for example, Schank and Abelson,
+Scripts Plans Goals and Understanding
+(1977); Hobbs, "Coherence and coreference" (1979); Grosz, "Utterance and objective:
+Issues in natural language communication" (1980),
+
+114
+2. The correlation can be analyzed in terms of:
+(a) Fixed basic meanings of the smallest elements (words or morphemes).
+(b) Rules for the composition of these into the meanings of phrases
+and sentences, where these rules can take into account specific
+properties of the current state of speaker and hearer (including
+memory of the preceding text)..
+3. There is a fixed set of relevant properties that constitute the psychological state of a language user, and there is a well-defined set of
+rules that describe how this state is modified by any utterance..
+The extension allows considerations such as recency, focus, and hearer's
+knowledge to contribute to the analysis of the meaning of an utterance,.
+The third assumption is necessary or the second becomes vacuous, If we
+cannot specify the relevant properties and the laws that govern them, then
+we cannot have a rigorous account of meaning.
+Philosophers have generally avoided making this kind of extension because of the difficulty of producing a clear account of psychological state
+as it relates to language. 7 Workers in artificial intelligence, on the other
+hand, adopt a pragmatic approach with casual introspection as a guide
+to devising models that seem potentially useful,. Objects and properties
+get added to the representation of the state of the speaker/hearer because
+the programmer feels they will be relevant. They are kept because with
+them the system is perceived as in some way performing better than it did
+without them.
+There have been many clever ideas for what should be included in the
+model of the speaker/hearer and how some of it might be organized, but
+the overall feeling is of undirected and untested speculation. Experimental psychology provides some suggestive concepts, but little else of direct
+use. A language comprehension system depends on models of memory,
+attention, and inference, all dealing with meaningful material, not the
+well-controlled stimuli of the typical laboratory experiment. Research in
+cognitive psychology has focussed on tasks that do not generalize to these
+more complex activities. In fact, much current psychological investigation
+of how people deal with meaningful material has been guided by research
+on artificial intelligence rather than the other way around.
+7A partial exception is Barwise and Perry,
+(Sztuatzons and Attitudes,
+attempt
+to situate these complexities in the tradition of analytic philosophy of language.
+Winograd, in "Moving the semantic fulcrum" (1985), discusses the relevance of their
+work for artificial intelligence.
+1983), who
+
+9.3. UNDERSTANDING AS PATTERN RECOGNITION
+115
+9.3 Understanding as pattern recognition
+The artificial intelligence literature of the
+1970s heralded a move away
+from the traditional problem-solving orientation towards a new one centered around 'frames' or 'expectations.' Programs based on "beta structures' (Moore and Newell, 1973), 'frames' (Minsky, 1975), 'scripts' (Schank
+and Abelson, 1977), 'schemas'
+(Bobrow and Norman, 1975), and 'prototypes' and "perspectives' (Bobrow and Winograd, 1977) all deal with how a
+previously existing structure guides the interpretation of new inputs. The
+emphasis is on recognition rather than problem solving. It has been
+claimed that these systems avoid the limitations of earlier approaches to
+represen tation and that they support 'non-logical' kinds of reasoning that
+more closely approximate human intelligence. We will examine these
+claims in light of our discussion of background..
+The overall idea is summarized by Minsky:
+Here is the essence of the theory: When one encounters a
+new situation (or makes a substantial change in one's view
+of the present problem) one selects from memory a substantial
+structure called a frame. This is a remembered framework to
+be adapted to fit reality by changing details as necessary...
+Once a frame is proposed to represent a situation, a matching process tries to assign values to the terminals [the detailed
+features] of each frame, consistent with the markers at each
+place. Most of the phenomenological power of the theory
+hinges on the inclusion of expectations and other kinds of presumptions. A frame's terminals are normally already filled
+with default assignments. Thus, a frame may contain a great
+many details whose supposition is not specifically warranted
+by the situation. These have many uses in representing general information, most-likely cases, techniques for 'bypassing
+logic' and ways to make useful generalizations
+- Minsky, "A
+framework for representing knowledge" (1975), pP
+212-213,
+Minsky's standard example is a frame for the visual appearance of a
+room. Once we have decided (perhaps on the basis of seeing a doorway)
+that we are looking at a room, our interpretation of the rest of the scene
+is biased by assumptions that certain other elements (such as windows)
+are present.. Similar assumptions also apply to the understanding of a
+sentence, in which previous expectations are matched against the contents..
+In applying the frame idea to the meaning of words in a natural language,
+we associate a frame-like 'prototype' with each word. This prototype,
+like a definition, includes a description of the objects to which the word
+applies. Unlike a definition, however, this further description is not taken
+
+116
+to be sufficient or necessary for determining the applicability of the word.
+It can include things that are typical (but not always the case) or that
+are relevant only in some contexts, In deciding whether a word applies
+a representation of an object, the reasoning system compares these
+further descriptions to what is known about the object, In doing so it can
+preferentially deal with only some of the description, choosing what to do on
+the basis of context,
+It would seem that a process of this type has the potential to treat word
+meanings in the open-ended way discussed for the "bachelor" example
+above Although the "bachelor" prototype includes further descriptions
+(typical life style, age, etc.), the process of checking is context-dependent.
+One can devise strategies for deciding which of these to examine, depending on some characterization of context and current purposes.
+In addition to using expectations about typical properties, frame systems have also been portrayed as a way to reason and understand by
+analogy.
+One thing that people remember is a particular experience, often in some detail, So, we postulate a level of memory that contains specific remembrances of particular situations,... Un-
+derstanding is finding the closest higher-level structure available to explain an input and creating a new memory node for
+that input that is in terms of the old node's closely related
+higher-level structure, Understanding is a process that has its
+basis in memory, particularly memory for closely related experiences accessible through reminding and expressible through
+analogy. - Schank, "Language and memory" (1981), pp 121, 129.
+In a way, frame-based computational systems approach meaning from
+a hermeneutic direction. They concentrate not on the question "How does
+the program come to accurately reflect the situation?" but rather "How
+does the system's preknowledge (collection of frames) affect its interpretation of the situation?" The meaning of a sentence or scene lies in the
+interaction between its structure and the pre-existing structures in the
+machine.
+The widespread enthusiasm about frames was a response to a shared
+but unarticulated awareness of the inadequacies of the problem-solving
+approach. But the solution did not solve the problems. Let us once again
+consider the task of a programmer trying to create an intelligent program,
+this time using frames. First there is the characterization of the task environment. This is essentially the same. It is still necessary to distinguish
+the relevant objects and properties before doing any representation.
+The difference comes in the second step-in designing the formal system used to represent the situation. In more traditional programs, whether
+
+9.3. UNDERSTANDING AS PATTERN RECOGNITION
+117
+las
+such
+or not they explicitly use formal logic, there is an assumption that formu
+represent propositions of the kind traditionally assigned truth values,
+as "Every dog is an animal." A major goal of frame formalisms was to
+represent "defaults': the ways things are typically, but not always. For
+example we might want to include the fact "Dogs bark" without precluding
+the possibility of a mute dog..
+The frame intuition can be implemented only in a system that does
+in formal reasoning-one that comes to conclusions based on partial evidence,
+makes assumptions about what is relevant and what is to be expected in
+typical cases, and leaves open the possibility of mistake and contradiction.
+can be 'non-monotonic'-it can draw some conclusion, then reverse it
+the basis of further information,.8
+The problem, of course, is to know when something is to be treated as
+"typical' and when the various parts of the frame are to be taken as relevant. Here, if we look at the literature on frame systems, we find a mixture of hand waving and silence. Simple rules don't work. If, for example,
+defaults are used precisely when there is no explicit (previously derived)
+information to the contrary, then we will assume that one holds even when
+a straightforward simple deduction might contradict it, If analogies are
+treated too simply, we attempt to carry over the detailed properties of one
+object to another for which they are not appropriate.
+It should be clear that the answer cannot lie in extending the details
+of the rules within the subject domain, If the default that rooms have
+windows is to be applied precisely in the cases of "those rooms that... and
+not those that.. " then it is no longer a default. We have simply refined
+our description of the world to distinguish among more properties that
+rooms can have
+Another approach has been to postulate 'resource-limited processing'
+as a basis for reasoning 9 In any act of interpretation or reasoning, a system (biological or computer) has a finite quantity of processing resources
+to expend. The nature of these resources will be affected by the details
+of the processor, its environment, and its previous history.. The outcome
+of the process is determined by the interaction between the structure of
+the task and the allocation of processing. The ability to deal with partial
+or imprecise information comes from the ability to do a finite amount of
+processing, then jump to a conclusion on the basis of what has happened
+so far, even though that conclusion may not be deducible or even true,
+8 For a variety of approaches to non-monotonic reasoning, see the papers in Bobiow
+(ed), "Special issue on non-monotonic logic"
+(1980).
+9For a general discussion of resource-limited processing as applied to experimental
+psychology, soe Norman and Bobrow, "On data-limited and resource-limited
+pro cesses" (1975)
+It
+on
+
+118
+This is what Minsky refers to when he talks of the need to "bypass logic."
+From one point of view, a resource-limited system is a purely logical
+formal system-it operates with precise rules on well-defined structures,
+as does any computer program From another viewpoint the system is
+carrying out informal reasoning. The key to this paradox lies in the use of
+formal rules that are relative to the structure of the computer system that
+embodies the formalism 10
+In reasoning about some task environment,
+a frame-based system can come to conclusions on the basis not only of
+statements about the world, but also on the basis of the form of the representation and the processes that manipulate it (for example, concluding
+something is false because it is represented as typically false, and with
+some bounded amount of deduction in this case it cannot be proved true).
+Once again, the intuition is related to the work we have been presenting. Maturana's account of structure-determined systems deals directly
+with how the system's structure (rather than an externally observed structure of the environment) determines its space of operation. However, there
+is a significant difference in that the frame approach assumes a mechanism
+operating on representations, albeit in a resource-limited way.
+Although the general idea of frames with resource-limited reasoning
+has some plausibility, it has not produced computer systems with any de
+gree of generality. The problem lies in accounting for how the detailed
+structure of the system leads to the desired results. Only very simplistic
+examples have been given of what this structure might look like, and those
+examples cannot be extended in any obvious way. Programs actually written using frame systems tend to fall into two classes. Either the structures
+are written with a few specific examples in mind and work well only for
+those examples and minor variations on them," or they do not make any
+essential use of the frame ideas (adopting only a frame-like notation) and
+are equivalent to more traditional programs. 12
+Furthermore, even if a system containing frames with an appropriate structure could be constructed, it still does not escape the problems
+of blindness described in Chapter 8. The programmer is responsible for
+a characterization of the objects and properties to be dealt with using
+frames, to exactly the same degree as the programmer of any representation system. The program begins with a characterization of the possible
+objects and properties. Detailed consideration of its internal structure
+(both of representations and of processes on them) cannot move
+beyond
+roHofstadter, in Godel, Escher, Bach (1979) elaborates this point clearly and at great
+length.
+"Soc, for example, the programs described in Schank, "Language and memory" (1981).
+12This
+was the experience with KRL, as described in Bobrow et al, "Experience with
+KRL-0" (1977).
+
+9.4. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO UNDERSTAND?
+119
+this initial articulation. No amount of non-monotonic resource-limited
+processing in this domain can lead to giving the program a background in
+the sense of pre-understanding emphasized by Heidegger or the structural
+coupling described by Maturana.
+9.4 What does it mean to understand?
+In light of this critique, we may be puzzled when
+Newsweek reports that
+"Computers can..,. draw analogies among Shakespearean plays and understand tales involving friendship and adultery" 13 and Schank and Riesbeck
+state that their program SAM "was a major advance... because its use of
+scripts allowed it to understand real stories." 14
+Are these claims true or
+false?
+To answer this last question in its own terms would violate our theory
+of language. If objective truth conditions cannot be defined for "water,"
+how could they possibly be found for "understand"? We need instead
+to analyze the web of commitments into which we have entered when we
+seriously utter a sentence of the form "X understands Y." We will begin
+by illustrating some simple 'language understanding' programs as a basis
+for comparison.,
+Program 1 prints out the time of day whenever the precise sequence
+"What time is it?"' is typed in, Any other sequence is simply ig
+nored. Such a program might well operate to the satisfaction of
+those who use it, and they might want to claim that it "understands
+the question," since it responds appropriately.
+Program 2 accepts sequences of the form "What... is it?" where the
+gap is filled by "time, 'day," ''month," or '"year." It types out the
+appropriate answer to each of these and ignores any sequence not
+matching this pattern.
+Program 3 has a collection of patterns that are matched against the
+input. For each of these there is a corresponding form to be printed
+out, where that printout may include fragments of the pattern that
+was entered. The program finds a pattern that matches the input and
+prints out the associated response. For example if it is provided with
+the pattern "My name is... " and corresponding response "Hello,
+, how are you today?" it would respond to the input "My name
+is Joseph" with "Hello, Joseph, how are you today?"
+13 Begley et al, "How smart can computers get?"
+(1980), p. 52
+141nszde Computer Understandzng
+(1981), р. б.
+
+120
+Those familiar with artificial intelligence will recognize program 3 as
+ELIZA 15 This program was run (under the name DOCTOR) with a collection of patterns that simulated a non-directive psychiatrist interviewing
+a patient. For example, it responded to "I am. ,.. " with "How long have
+you been ... ?"' Given "I hope..." it responded "What would it mean
+to you if...
+?" and given"...
+everybody
+it responded "Are you
+thinking of somebody in particular?"
+The behavior of the DOCTOR program was strikingly human-like,.
+Weizenbaum reported:
+I was startled to see how quickly and how very deeply people
+conversing with DOCTOR became emotionally involved with
+the computer and how unequivocally they anthropomorphized
+it. Another widespread, and to me surprising, reaction to
+the ELIZA program was the spread of a belief that it demonstrated a general solution to the problem of computer understanding of natural language, - Weizenbaum,
+Computer Power
+and Human Reason (1976), p 6
+Program 4 has a collection of scripts,' each corresponding to a particular kind of event sequence. For example, it might have a script for
+what happens when a person goes to a restaurant: "The person enters, is seated by a host, is brought a menu by a waiter, orders some
+food, is brought the food by the waiter, eats the food, is brought a
+check by the waiter, pays the check, and leaves, " When an input is
+entered that matches the 'title' of the script (te., it mentions going
+to a restaurant), the program then compares each subsequent input
+with one of the event patterns in the script and fills in values based
+on the input (as ELIZA filled in the "... " in the examples above),.
+If the input does not match the next event in line, it skips over that
+event and compares it to the next. Once the input is complete, the
+program can use the values filled in from the inputs to answer simple
+questions. For example, given the sequence of inputs "John went to
+a restaurant. John ate a hamburger," it can use the script to answer
+the question "What did John order?" with "a hamburger."
+Again, this is a description (slightly simplified but not in any essential
+way) of an existing program-the SAM program that Schank and Riesbock
+described as "understanding real stories." It has served as a model for
+a series of more elaborate programs done by Schank and his group, as
+described in Schank and Riesbeck,
+Inside Computer Understanding
+(1981).
+15W eizenbaum, "ELIZA" (1966)
+
+9.4.. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO UNDERSTAND?
+121
+With these examples in mind, let us return to the question of what it
+would mean for a computer to understand language, We might say that
+the computer understands when it responds appropriately. The obvious
+problem lies in determining what constitutes an appropriate response. In
+one sense, the simple clock program always responds appropriately. Asked
+"What time is it?" it types out the time. But of course we could equally
+well have designed it to respond with the time when we type in "Why
+is the sky blue?" or simply "?" The appropriateness of the response is
+relative to a background of other things that might be said. In the case
+of the timekeeper
+(or the more elaborate program 2 that allows some
+variability in the patterns) this range is too limited to warrant being called
+understanding
+But as we move up in complexity to ELIZA and SAM, the essential
+issue doesn't change. The range of patterns grows larger and, as Weizenbaum reports, it may be difficult for a person to recognize the programs
+limitations. Nonetheless, the program responds on the basis of a fixed
+set of patterns provided by a programmer who anticipated certain inputs.
+This anticipation may be clever (as in the DOCTOR's response to sentences mentioning "everybody"), but it still represents a permanent structure of blindness.. This limitation is not one of insufficient deductive power.
+It applies equally to programs like SHRDLU that include routines for reasoning with representations, and holds as well for systems with 'frame-like'
+reasoning.. It lies in the nature of the process by which representations are
+fi xed in a computer program.
+It is important to recognize that this limitation is not dependent on
+the apparent breadth of subject. SHRDLU operates in a microworld in
+which the set of objects, properties, and relations are fixed and limited in
+an obvious way. The DOCTOR apparently deals with all aspects of
+human life, but it is really working with an even more limited set of objects
+and properties, as specified in its patterns. Given the sentence "I am
+swallowing poison," it will respond "How long have you been swallowing
+poison?" rather than responding as a person would to implications that
+were not anticipated in creating the pattern.
+The claim that computers "understand tales involving friendship and
+adultery" was based on a program called BORIS,' a more elaborate version of SAM. Instead of dealing with "John went to a restaurant. He ate
+a hamburger," BORIS works on stories containing sentences like "When
+Paul walked into the bedroom and found Sarah with another man, he
+nearly had a heart attack, Then he realized what a blessing it was," It
+responds to questions like "What happened to Paul at home?" and "How
+16 Lohnert et al., "BORIS: An experiment in in depth understanding of narratives"
+(1983).
+
+122
+did Paul feel?" with "Paul caught Sarah committing adultery" and "Paul
+was surprised."
+If we examine the workings of BORIS we find a menagerie of scriptlike representations (called MOPS, TOPS, TAUS, and META-MOPS) that
+were used in preparing the system for the one specific story it could answer
+questions about, For example, TAU-RED-HANDED is activated "when a
+goal to violate a norm, which requires secrecy for its success, fails during
+plan execution due to a witnessing." It characterizes the feeling of the
+witness as "surprised." In order to apply this to the specific story, there
+are MOPS such as M-SEX (which is applied whenever two people are
+in a bedroom together) and M-ADULTERY (which includes the structure
+needed to match the requirements of TAU-RED-HANDED). The apparent
+human breadth of the program is like that of ELIZA,. A rule that "If
+two people are in a bedroom together, infer they are having sex" is as
+much a micro-world inference as "If one block is directly above another,
+infer that the the lower one supports the upper." The illusions described
+by Weizenbaum are fueled by subject matter that makes it appear that
+complex and subtle understanding is taking place.
+In a similar vein, the program that can "draw analogies among
+Shake spearean plays" operates in a micro-world that the programmer
+fashioned after his reading of Shakespeare. 17 The actual input is not a
+Shakespeare play, or even a formal representation of the lines spoken by
+the characters, but a structure containing a few objects and relations
+based on the
+plot, The complete representation of
+Macbeth
+drawing analogies consisted of the following:
+{Macbeth is a noble} before {Macbeth is a king),
+Macbeth marry Lady-Macbeth.
+Lady-Macbeth is a woman-has-property greedy ambitious.
+Duncan is a king.
+Macduff is a noble-has-property loyal angry.
+Weird-sisters is a hag group-has-property old ugly weirdnumber 3.
+Weird-sisters predict {Macbeth murder Duncan}.
+Macbeth desire {Macbeth kind-of king}
+[cause {Macbeth murder Duncan} ].
+Lady-Macbeth persuade {Macbeth murder Duncan}.
+Macbeth murder Duncan {coagent Lady-Macbethinstrument knife?.
+Lady-Macbeth kill Lady-Macbeth.
+Macbeth murder Duncan [cause {Macduff kill Macbeth} L-
+17Winston, "Learning and reasoning by analogy" (1980).
+used for
+
+9.4 WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO UNDERSTAND?
+123
+The program includes simple rules like "whenever a person persuades
+another to do an action, the action is caused by the persuasion and the
+persuaded person has 'control' of the action." As with all of the examples
+so far, the programs claim to understanding is based on the fact that
+the linguistic and experiential domains the-programmer is trying to represent are complex and call for a broad range of human understanding. As
+with the other examples, however, the program actually operates within
+a narrowed micro-world that reflects the blindness of that representation.
+But, one might argue, aren't people subject to this blindness too? If we
+don't want to describe these programs as "understanding language,' how
+can we coherently ascribe understanding to anyone? To answer this we
+must return to the theory of language presented in Chapter 5. We argued
+there that the essence of language as a human activity lies not in its abil
+to reflect the world, but in its characteristic of creating commitment..
+When we say that a person understands something, we imply that he or
+she has entered into the commitment implied by that understanding. But
+how can a computer enter into a commitment?
+As we pointed out in Chapter 8, the use of mental terms like "understand" presupposes an orientation towards an autonomous agent, In spite
+of this, it is often convenient to use mental terms for animals and machines.
+It seems natural to say "This program only understands commands asking
+for the time and date" and to find this way of talking effective in explaining
+behavior. In this case, "understand a command" means to perform those
+operations that someone intends to invoke in giving the command. But
+the computer is not committed to behaving in this way-it is committed
+to nothing. I do not attribute to it the kind of responsibility that I would
+to a person who obeyed (or failed to obey) the same words..
+Of course there is a commitment, but it is that of the programmer, not
+the program. If I write something and mail it to you, you are not tempted
+to see the paper as exhibiting language behavior,. It is a medium through
+which you and I interact.. If I write a complex computer program that
+responds to things you type, the situation is still the same-the program
+is still a medium through which my commitments to you are conveyed.
+This intermediation is not trivial, and in Chapter 12 we will describe the
+roles that computers can play as an 'active structured communication
+medium' Nonetheless, it must be stressed that we are engaging in a
+particularly dangerous form of blindness if we see the computer-rather
+than the people who program it-as doing the understanding.
+This applies equally to systems like TEIRESIAS18 that can respond
+to queries about the details of the representation itself and the way it has
+been used in a particular calculation. The 'meta-knowledge' programmed
+18 Davis, "Interactive transfer of expertise"
+(1979)
+ity
+
+124
+into such a system is a representation of exactly the kind we have been
+talking about throughout this book, It may play a useful role in the
+operation of the program, but it reflects a pie-determined choice of objects,
+properties, and relations and is limited in its description of the program
+in the same way the program is limited in its description of a domain.
+Hofstadter argues in
+Godel, Escher, Bach
+(1979) that these limitations
+might not apply to a system that allows multiple levels of such knowledge,
+including 'strange loops' in which a level of description applies to itself.
+However, he admits that this is an unsupported intuition, and is not able
+to offer explanations of just why we should expect such systems to be
+really different,
+As we have pointed out in earlier chapters, a person is not permanently
+trapped in the same kind of blindness,. We have the potential to respond
+breakdown with a shift of domains in which we enter into new commit
+Understanding is not a fixed relationship between a representation
+things represented, but is a commitment to carry out a dialog
+ments.
+and the
+within the
+full horizons of both speaker and hearer in a way that permits new
+distinctions to emerge.
+What does all this mean about practical applications of language processing on computers? Our critique is not a condemnation of the technical
+work that has been done or even of the specific techniques (representations,
+deductive logic, frames, meta-description, etc.) that have been developed.
+It challenges the common understanding of how these techniques are related to the human use of language. Chapter 10 describes some practical
+applications of computer programs in which linguistic structures (e.g., En-
+glish words and syntax) provide a useful medium for building or accessing
+formal representations. The deductive techniques developed in artificial
+intelligence (including the frame-like reasoning discussed in this chapter)
+may serve well in producing useful responses by such programs.
+What is important is that people using the system recognize (as those
+duped by ELIZA did not) two critical things,, First, they are using the
+structures of their natural language to interact with a system that does
+not
+understand the language but is able to manipulate some of those struc
+Second, the responses reflect a particular representation that was
+some person or group of people, and embodies a blindness of
+tures.
+created by
+which even the
+builders cannot be fülly aware.
+
+Chapter 10
+Current directions in
+artificial intelligence
+There is an apparent contradiction between our critical view of the potential
+for artificial intelligence and the current mood of optimistic expansion
+dominates research and development in the area. During the past
+years, AI has moved from being a laboratory curiosity to seeking a
+role in technology policy and investment. In his 1981 presidential
+to the American Association for Artificial Intelligence, Feigenbaum described
+the first surge of enthusiasm:
+No one who attended the First National AAAI conference
+last August at Stanford could fail to be impressed by the
+site and quality of the scientific meeting and the power of
+the ideas presented... Eleven hundred scientists, engineers,
+R&D managers, students, venture capitalists and journalists
+gathered... Mingled with the usual scientific papers were
+discussions of impending industrial applications and the motives of the companies (mighty and midget) who are now entering the field because of its potential for application. - Feigenbaum, "AAAI President's message" (1980/81), p.
+Even within the traditionally conservative business community there has
+been a campaign to foster optimism and to promote financial interest in
+artificial intelligence ventures:
+The world stands on the threshold of a second computer age.
+New technology now moving out of the laboratory is starting to
+change the computer from a fantastically fast calculating machine to a device that mimics human thought processes-giving
+that
+few
+major
+address
+
+126
+CHAPTER 10. CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN Al
+machines the capability to reason, make judgments, and even
+learn.. Experts are convinced that it is now only a matter
+of time before these 'thinking' computers open up awesome new
+applications in offices, factories, and homes.
+- Business Week,
+"Artificial Intelligence: The second computer age begins"
+(1982),
+p. 66.
+Computers... . emerged decades ago to mechanize the process
+of converting raw data into information that humans could
+comprehend and use in decision-making. Now we are entering
+the era in which they will convert information into knowledgeshowing us how to design computers, find valuable ore deposits,
+and otherwise accomplish our purposes. Perhaps a day will
+come when they will begin converting knowledge to wisdomadvising us as to what purposes are truly worth accomplishing.
+- Alexander, "Computers on the road to self-improvement" (1982),
+p. 160.
+These statements might well be dismissed as pure fantasy. Advice on
+what purposes are truly worth accomplishing' is so obviously outside the
+scope of computation that it indicates a deep misunderstanding of what
+computers do. However, this kind of discussion has a significant effect on
+our shared background of understanding about computers, and we need
+to be able to distinguish fantasy from genuine potential for development.
+This chapter examines more closely the current state of research in artificial intelligence and the burgeoning interest in commercial applications.
+10.1
+The forking of the paths
+Until the mid-1970s artificial intelligence researchers generally believed
+they could work simultaneously towards two goals: extending the capabilities of computers, and moving towards an understanding of human
+intelligence. They might emphasize one aspect or the other, choosing to
+call their work 'artificial intelligence' or 'cognitive simulation,' but that
+was a short-term strategic decision, aimed towards an ultimate synthesis.
+In the last few years, this view has been questioned. There is a tacit
+acceptance of the point we have made in this book-that the techniques of
+current Al are not adequate for an understanding of human thought
+language,. As a result, there is a clear split between the 'knowledge
+engineers,' who apply the well-developed technologies of Al to practical
+problems, and the 'mind-modelers,' who speculate about the more complex
+structures that might underlie human thought.
+
+10.1. THE FORKING OF THE PATHS
+Commercial interest lies in the first direction-in finding profitable
+applications of a rather limited set of techniques. The greatest interest
+in 'expert systems'-programs for problem solving in some scientific
+technical domain. We will discuss these more fully in the following
+section. First we will look at the less extensive current developments in
+robotics and natural language processing and at the work aimed more in
+the direction of cognitive modelling.
+Robotics
+In the early years of artificial intelligence, work on robotics emphasized the
+quest for general principles of intelligence underlying human perception
+and action. Abstract work on symbolic problem solving was motivated by
+plans for a robot operating with a 'hand' or maneuvering its way around an
+environment. Current work in robotics applies some techniques developed
+this earlier work, but is better understood as extending a process of
+automation that began decades ago.
+Computers already play a major role in the physical work of industry,
+for example in controlling the complex processes of oil refineries and in
+guiding numerically controlled milling machines. As computer hardware
+becomes cheaper, it becomes practical to automate more activities:
+Several of the largest U. S. corporations are making major commitments to the use of industrial robots.,.. Three top computer companies.. » are seriously considering jumping into the
+robot market...
+New technology is making it possible to replace increasingly skilled workers. The latest computer-controlled robots are considerably more versatile than their sim
+ple
+minded predecessors of just two years ago. And a new
+generation of robots that 'see' and 'feel' and even "think' is
+emerging from the laboratories.
+- Business Week,
+"Robots join
+the labor force" (1980), p. 62.
+Once again we need to be cautious about words like 'think' (even when
+set off in quotation marks).. Nevertheless it is quite likely that automation
+will continue to develop, including general-purpose programmable manipulators and visual-manual coordination. It is not within the scope of this
+book to analyze the economic potential for such systems or to discuss the
+social effects of their widespread use. However, it is important to separate
+out the real potential for such devices from the implications that come
+from calling them applications of artificial
+'intelligence,' and even from
+the use of the word robot,,
+This book has not focussed on aspects of intelligence directly concerned
+with perception and action in a physical world. As we discussed in Chapter
+127
+
+128
+CHAPTER 10.. CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN Al
+8, this is not because the issues are different, but because the central
+focus of the argument is clearer in 'disembodied' areas, The limitations
+of representation and programming based on a formal characterization of
+properties and actions are just as strong (if not stronger) in dealing with
+physical robots.. Perception is much more than the encoding of an external
+world into a representation, and action is more than the execution of
+'motor routines.' Nevertheless, robotic devices that operate in artificially
+limited domains may be quite useful, in spite of (or at times because of)
+not reflecting the nature of human perception and action.
+Natural language interaction
+Another area of active commercial development is the creation of 'natural
+language front ends.' As in other areas, the advertising often far outstrips
+the content of the research. One company, for example, advertises
+"pro grams that understand you so that you don't have to understand
+them."1 Their brochure goes on to say:
+Cognitive Systems, Inc. creates and markets computer software that is revolutionizing data processing, resulting in immense benefits in terms of employee productivity and information accessibility. Our programs understand English-not
+an English-like programming language but
+everyday conversational English [emphasis in the original] (or French or German
+or any language you want)...
+Cognitive Systems natural language programs are unique in that they are intelligent, ...
+We
+give our computer programs the same kind of knowledge that
+people use, so our programs understand a sentence just the
+way a person does, and respond in conversational English.
+Even those who believe in the success of artificial intelligence view such
+claims as a gross exaggeration of the capabilities of any existing system.
+They are all the more notable since the company is directed by one of the
+leading figures in artificial intelligence research, who is also chairman of
+the computer science department at a major university. 2
+'Advertising brochure for Cognitive Systems, Inc., distributed at the AAAI National
+Conference, August 1982
+2From the brochure: "Cognitive Systems, Inc. is an outgrowth of research at the Ar-
+tificial Intelligence (AI) Lab of the Computer Science Department at Yale University.
+The Yale Al Lab is one of the foremost research centers in the country in the field
+of natural language processing. Cognitive Systems was founded by Professor Roger
+Schank, Chairman of the Computer Science Department and Director of Research
+at the Al Lab at Yale."
+
+10.1, THE FORKING OF THE PATHS
+129
+More responsible proponents of natural language interaction acknowledge that programs cannot understand language in a significant sense, and
+argue that many practical applications may not demand real understanding. In some applications the structures of natural language provide a
+useful way to interact with a computer system carrying out a limited task.
+The interaction can be for control (as in giving instructions to a manipulator) or for information retrieval (as in getting statistics from a data
+base). A number of companies and research laboratories are designing
+natural language 'front ends' to data base systems, for both mainframes
+and personal computers. Such a program transforms input sentences into
+well-formed queries that the data base system can process. The limitation
+of scope and domain comes naturally from the limitations of the data base
+itself.
+The practicality of limited natural language systems is still an open
+question. Since the nature of the queries is limited by the formal structure
+of the data base, it may well be more efficient for a person to learn a specialized formal language designed for that purpose, rather than learning
+through experience just which English sentences will and will not be handed. When interacting in natural language it is easy to fall into assuming
+that the range of sentences that can be appropriately processed will approximate what would be understood by a human being with a similar
+collection of data. Since this is not true, the user ends up adapting to a
+collection of idioms-fixed patterns that experience has shown will work.
+Once the advantage of flexibility has been removed, it is not clear that
+the additional costs of natural language (verbosity, redundancy, ambiguity, etc.) are worth paying in place of a more streamlined formal system.
+On the other hand, there are cases in which the appearance of natural
+language can make a computer system seem less formidable, encouraging
+use by people who would resist a more visibly formal approach.
+Some of the specific technologies developed in conjunction with arti-
+f i cial intelligence language research will lead to practical system developments, For example, speech recognition systems provide a form of communication that is more ready-to-hand than pressing keys on a keyboard..
+Customers will be disappointed if they expect the computer to understand
+spoken language as a person does. But it can identify sequences of sounds
+and trigger actions on the basis of them, within a limited domain. Ma-
+chines can currently recognize a vocabulary of a few hundred items (words
+or short phrases). They will soon be extended to larger vocabularies and
+will be able to analyze more elaborate artificial syntactic structures that
+parallel some of the structures of natural language. The fact that computers cannot understand human language does not preclude the utility
+of interacting with them by voice.. In fact, our theoretical understanding
+of tools leads us to believe that it will have many advantages.
+
+130
+CHAPTER 10. CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN AI
+Cognitive modelling
+The widely publicized application developments stand in contrast to research aimed at the theoretical issues underlying human cognition. As
+mentioned above, current work is less ambitious in scope than were the
+earlier attempts. At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Artificial
+Intelligence Laboratory, for example, work on detailed visual processes in
+the retina has displaced earlier vision work that dealt with higher-level
+object perception and 'frames,'3
+This is not to say that at MIT (or elsewhere there is no longer any research in the classical Al style of applying
+representational techniques to general human abilities. But such work is
+taking a back seat to more specific analysis of "peripheral' capabilities, and
+among some workers is being displaced by highly speculative attempts to
+characterize higher-level mental architecture.
+This last direction is interesting because it has led to a rekindling of
+interest in issues that were prominent in earlier cybernetic research but
+had been previously rejected in Al. For example, there is new interest in
+phenomena of learning, and in the metaphorical use of 'stored experience
+as a basis for understanding. Both of these were de emphasized in the
+Al of the '60s and early '70s, since they were not amenable to the formal
+analysis and programming techniques that were then being developed.
+Their return to favor goes along with the acceptance that the available
+techniques are too limited to form the basis for a broad theory. The
+alternative has been the development of sketchy and loosely formulated
+descriptions of mental structures in 'connectionist' approaches, such as
+the 'society of minds'
+(Minsky, "The society theory of thinking,"
+'K-lines,' (Minsky, "K-Lines: A theory of memory,"
+1979),
+1981), and 'Memory
+Organizing Packets' (Schank, "Language and memory," 1981). The desire
+computational rigor has been abandoned in an attempt to touch on
+more subtle aspects of thought and language.
+As with the research on frames described in Chapter 9, the problem
+with these efforts lies in the huge gap between the subtlety of the
+intuitions that motivate them and the paucity of computational
+mechanisms that can produce behavior compatible with those intuitions.
+At times, justification for the theory seems to be little more than the
+hope that if the computational system is complex enough and its behavior
+sufficiently unpredictable, something intelligent will emerge.
+Other researchers are looking towards the design of systems that 'learn'
+through training sequences, rather than being programmed. Programs like
+Lenat's EURISKO ("'Computer software for intelligent systems," 1984) are
+started with a basic set of objects and properties, and with heuristics for
+3For an overview of the newer approaches to vision, see Marr,
+VIst On (1982)
+
+10.2. EXPERT SYSTEMS
+131
+combining them in various ways and testing the effectiveness of those combinations.. As we discussed in the section on learning in Chapter 8, this
+does not enable them to move beyond the limitations of their initial domain. Similarly, detailed theories may be developed that in some way
+model the functioning of nervous systems and the modification of their
+structure over time. There is much to be discovered about how our nervous systems really work, but Al theories and neurophysiological theories
+are in different domains. Detailed theories of neurological mechanisms will
+not be the basis for answering the general questions about intelligence and
+understanding that have been raised in this book any more than detailed
+theories of transistor electronics would aid in understanding the complexities of computer software.
+10.2
+Expert systems
+The area of artificial intelligence arousing the greatest commercial interest
+is the creation of systems that perform some detailed technical task, such
+as analyzing chemical spectrograms (Lindsay et al.,
+DENDRAL, 1980),
+identifying a particular kind of bacterial infection (Shortliffe,
+Computer
+Based Medical Consultations: MYCIN,
+1976), or checking a proposed conf
+i guration of computer equipment (McDermott, "Ri: A rule-based config
+urer
+of computer systems," 1982).
+These programs are based on rather straight forward techniques that
+were developed in the carly work in artificial intelligence. They do not try
+to deal with the difficult questions of relevance, context, and background
+raised in earlier chapters of this book. They are built on the assumption
+that the programmer can determine a small clear classification of relevant
+objects and properties together with a set of rules relating them They are
+applicable only to carefully limited domains. Buchanan, ("New research on
+expert systems," 1982, p. 283) lists some characteristics of problems that
+are suitable, including: "Narrow domain of expertise; limited language for
+expressing facts and relations; limiting assumptions about problem and
+solution methods; little knowledge of own scope and limitations." He is
+careful to label these limitations as being relative to the current state of
+the art,' but his observations are really more general. As we discussed
+at length in Chapter 8, these are exactly the characteristics that make it
+possible to create a program to do 'problem solving' within a systematic
+domain, and there is no reason to believe that any future state of the art
+will transcend them.
+There are many areas of technology that are served by carrying out
+complex computations, of which Al techniques are one specialized kind.
+We expect such uses to continue proliferating, as they have ever since the
+
+132
+CHAPTER 10, CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN Al
+earliest computers were used for code breaking and ballistic calculations.
+To the extent that areas can be well-defined and the rules for them set
+down precisely, 'expert systems' can be created and will operate
+successfully, However, there are two important caveats.
+First, there is a danger inherent in the label 'expert system' When we
+talk of a human 'expert' we connote someone whose depth of understanding serves not only to solve specific well-formulated problems, but also to
+put them into a larger context. We distinguish between experts and idiot
+savants.' Calling a program an 'expert' is misleading in exactly the same
+way as calling it 'intelligent' or saying it 'understands.' The misrepresentation may be useful for those who are trying to get research funding or
+sell such programs, but it can lead to inappropriate expectations by those
+who attempt to use them Dreyfus and Dreyfus
+(Mind Over Machine,
+1985) describe four stages of progressively greater expertise, of which only
+the first, 'novice' stage, can be accounted for with the kind of rules that
+have been used by programs attempting to duplicate expert performance.
+The second problem with creating 'expert systems' is the difficulty in
+understanding and conveying a sense of the limitations of a particular program and of the approach in general. A good example of the problem can
+be found in the application of computers to medicine. Nobody would question that there are relevant computations (such as the determination of
+electrolyte balances) that are too complex for practical hand calculations.
+There are other areas (such as the recognition of specific infections and the
+analysis of electrocardiograms) in which the domain can be circumscribed
+carefully enough so that programs can be effective even though there is no
+simple 'closed form algorithm for getting the 'right answer.' But in the
+popular press (and much of the professional literature as well), computers
+are described as 'diagnosing diseases' and 'choosing treatments.'
+An editorial in the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine
+evaluated the potential for computer diagnosis:
+The optimistic expectation of 20 years ago that computer technology would also come to play an important part in clinical
+decisions has not been realized, and there are few if any situations in which computers are being routinely used to assist in
+either medical diagnosis or the choice of therapy, , .. In the
+real world it is necessary that the doctor not only understand
+the statistical relations of signs and symptoms to the various
+possible diseases but also have the wisdom and common sense
+that derive from the understanding and experience of everyday
+human existence It is this last requirement that represents
+the greatest weakness
+(and perhaps the ultimate limitation)
+of computer technology in dealing in any comprehensive fash-
+
+133
+ion with the problem of clinical diagnosis.
+computer and clinical judgment" (1982), pp. 493-494.
+- Barnett, "The
+In order to produce a set of rules for a medical 'expert' system, it is first
+necessary to pre-select the relevant factors and thereby cut out the role of
+the background, But as we have been arguing throughout this book, this
+process by its very nature creates blindness. There is always a limit set
+by what has been made explicit, and always the potential of breakdowns
+that call for moving beyond this limit.
+The problem is not just that the designers of such programs can get
+people to belleve the computer does more than it actually does, but that
+the designers themselves are blind to the limitations, Much of the current
+enthusiasm for applied artificial intelligence comes from the belief that the
+rather limited domains of applicability of current programs are just initial
+steps towards programs that really can do diagnosis and select treatments.
+As the work develops, serious researchers will gain a better understanding
+of the problems they are attacking, and we will eventually see a separation
+between those who persist in looking for intelligence in their programs and
+those who build programs that successfully carry out computations within
+carefully delimited domains.
+10.3
+The fifth generation computer system
+Until recently, artificial intelligence research was pursued almost exclusively in the United States and Britain, with a small scattering of work
+in Europe and elsewhere. Japanese scientists followed with interest, but
+produced little new research. They are now trying to change that with the
+widely publicized 'fifth generation' computer project, initiated in 1981.4
+Their intent is to produce computer systems for the 1990s, making use
+of the latest developments in artificial intelligence and extending them
+to new uses and capabilities After a two-year study involving dozens
+4The name 'fifth generation' is based on a frequently used classification of earlier
+computer technologies The first generation, developed in the 1940s, used vacuum
+tubes as computing elements The seoond generation, in the mid'50s, replaced
+these with transistors, greatly increasing reliability and reducing costs The third
+generation, in the '60s and early "70s, used integrated circuits' which combined
+the equivalent of many transistors and connections an a single chip The fourth
+goneration, of the '70s and '8Os, uses 'very large scale integration' (VLSI) in which
+tens of thousands of circuit elements occupy a single silicon chip, making possible
+the 'micro-computer' that has revolutionized the use of computers
+For a thorough and careful discussion of the fifth generation project and its political context, see Uttal, "Here comes Computer Inc"
+(1982). Feigenbaumand
+MoCorduck's
+The Fifth Generation
+(1983) was an attempt to stir up enthusiasm for
+a similar, program in the United States.
+
+134
+CHAPTER 10. CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN Al
+of researchers, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) decided to sponsor an ambitious ten-year project at a newly
+formed research center in Tokyo, called the Institute for New Generation
+Computer Technology. It was anticipated that the overall ten-year project
+would involve an investment of at least $500 million, and perhaps several
+times that.5
+The announcement of this commitment to push computer technology
+in a new direction came when the United States and Europe are in a
+period of crisis and self-doubt about productivity and the effective development of technology. Japan's success in world markets (especially in
+high-technology products) has been extolled, denounced, and scrutinized
+in agonizing detail.. As might be expected, the fifth generation project
+has created a great deal of interest.. There have been responses from several nations, eager not to be left behind. In Britain, a committee chaired
+by Lord Alvey (1982) successfully advocated a major new spending plan
+in computing research. On the continent, the Common Market (FEC)
+created a program called Esprit, to sponsor multinational research efforts
+within the Common Market. A French report (CNSRS, 1983) on the need
+for a "Programme de Development de 'Intelligence Artificielle" was summarized: "This report insists on prompt action: there is no further time
+to be lost." In the United States, the major response has been from the
+Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which has long
+been the primary sponsor of artificial intelligence research. It initiated the
+Strategic Computing Initiative with the intent to invest $500 million over
+the next ten years to develop artificial intelligence technology oriented to
+specific military goals.6
+The fifth generation project and its followers raise many important
+issues concerning the development of technology and the roles of govern
+and industry in research. In this book, however, we will concentrate
+theoretical issues: What are these projects really trying to do, and what
+would it mean to achieve it?
+The goals are anything but modest. In his introduction to the study
+initiating the fifth generation project, the project leader stated:
+Fifth generation computers are expected to function extremely
+effectively in all fields of society... Totally new applied fields
+will be developed, social productivity will be increased, and
+distortions in values will be eliminated, .., Everyone will be
+able to converse with computers even without a professional
+5By late 1984, the projection had been reduced by about half, due to serious deficits and
+budget cuts by the Japanese government.
+6For an analysis and critique of this program see Davis, "Assessing the Strategic
+Computing Initiative" (1985),
+ment
+on the
+
+knowledge of them, even if everyday natural language is used,
+the computers will be able to understand our thoughts and
+give us suitable answers...
+By promoting the study of arti-
+f i cial intelligence and realizing intelligent robots, a better understanding of the mechanisms of life will become possible.
+The approaching realization of automatic interpretation and
+translation will serve to help people of different tongues understand each other, to reduce troubles due to misunderstanding
+and ignorance, and to lead to further growth based on mutual
+understanding of cultures. With the construction of a knowledge base made possible, the knowledge which mankind has
+accumulated can be stored and effectively utilized, so that the
+development of culture as a whole can be rapidly promoted. -
+Moto-oka, "Keynote speech: Challenge for knowledge information
+processing systems" (1982), pp. 23-24..
+The first page of the study lists four major social areas in which fifth
+generation computers will "play active roles in the resolving of anticipated
+social bottlenecks":
+1. Increasing productivity in low productivity areas such as agriculture,
+i shing, goods distribution, and public services.
+2. Meeting international competition and contributing toward international cooperation through the development of information-intensive
+industries.
+3. Assisting in saving energy and resources by improving efficiency of resource use and developing knowledge-intensive (rather than resourceintensive) industry.
+4. Coping with an aging society through such advances as streamlined
+medical and related information systems, health management systems, and lifetime education systems.
+All of this will take major advances in the technology, characterized in
+terms such as "increase the level of computer intelligence as well as their
+affinity for cooperation with man, " "use their vast ability to store informa
+to achieve new judgment facilities of their own," and "[increase] the
+intelligence level of computers... to the extent where they can comprehend
+the environment."
+It should be obvious how our critique of artificial intelligence applies to
+this plan. It is naive to say that computers of any generation will be able
+to "understand our thoughts" or "comprehend the environment," and it
+135
+tion
+
+136
+CHAPTER 10, CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN Al
+is unrealistic to expect that they will have a major positive impact on the
+wide variety of problems identified by Moto-oka.
+However, the more detailed plans appearing in the same study give
+a somewhat different perspective. The project is not a monolithic push
+towards a single goal, but an attempt to promote and coordinate research
+on advanced computer technology in a quite general way Although the
+artificial intelligence aspect gets the most attention in public descriptions,
+it is only one component of a full spectrum of computer science research,
+To the extent that there is a common theme tying the project together,
+we can summarize it as a loosely linked series of research commitments:
+1, Computer technology can play a major role in solving social problems.
+2. The major technical problem is to increase the effectiveness of human
+use of computers,
+3. This will be achieved through the development of "intelligent' systems along the lines of current expert systems and artificial intelligence research
+4. Expert systems will become much more advanced when built using
+specialized machines and programming languages especially suited
+to them.
+5. These new machines will make use of parallel processing (the ability
+to carry on many computations simultaneously) much more than
+current computers,
+6,, The construction of such machines will require the development of
+advanced VLSI techniques.
+Many of the steps in this chain can stand on their own., It is no novelty
+to say that the human-computer interface is a prime area for research or
+that new advances will come from parallel machine architectures. Many of
+the specific research themes deal with one or another of the steps above,
+and their success or failure will stand independently of the chain of reasoning,. The project will produce useful results even if it does not increase
+productivity in agriculture or significantly improve the quality of life for
+the aged, Let us consider each of these steps more carefully,
+1. Can computer technology play a major role in solving social
+problems? As with any technology, there are potential benefits and
+dangers. There is no question that computers will have major effects
+on society, as they already have. While this provides an important
+
+motivation for technical development, we must not fall into the trap
+assuming that the technology will fix the problems. In the case of
+computers there is a double temptation, since if the direct application
+computer technology to the problems is not the answer, one might
+for "intelligent' programs that can tell us what to do, As we
+emphasized in Chapter 8, this is an idle dream.
+2. Is the major technical problemto increase the effectiveness with which people use computers? Here, we are quite
+in agreement with the basic idea, but not with its expression. In-
+deed, the way that people use machines is of key importance,, The
+most significant advances in computer science in the coming decade
+will be those facilitating this interaction. However, in their public
+discussions of the project, the researchers often equate improved interaction with the development of human-like systems. Moto-oka
+says (1982, p. 27): "Its greatest feature will be that interface between man and computer will greatly approach the human level...
+Man will be able to communicate with computers by using speech,
+natural languages, pictures or images... " The report predicts that
+f i fth generation machines will be able to understand normal speech,
+with a vocabulary of over 10,000 words by 1990.
+There is an error in assuming that success will follow the path of
+artificial intelligence. The key to design lies in understanding the
+readiness-to-hand of the tools being built, and in anticipating the
+breakdowns that will occur in their use. A system that provides
+a limited imitation of human facilities will intrude with apparently
+irregular and incomprehensible breakdowns, On the other hand, we
+can create tools that are designed to make the maximal use of human
+perception and understanding without projecting human capacities
+onto the computer.
+3. Is the key the development of 'intelligent' systems? Here is
+the weakest link in the chain. There will be many specialized uses
+for 'expert' systems, but they are not the basis for dealing with the
+human-machine interface. To a large extent, the fifth generation report uses "intelligent' in the loose manner of phrases like 'intelligent
+terminals,' We find mention of "intelligent interface functions, 'intelligent systematization support, ' "intelligent programming, 'intelligent VLSI designing, "intelligent utility system,' 'intelligent software
+tools,' and 'intelligent communication system.' Often this is simply
+an advertising slogan for a more advanced and comprehensive version
+of what is available now. As the project proceeds, current artificial
+intelligence techniques will find their way into a variety of niches
+137
+hope
+
+138
+-CHAPTER 10. CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN Al
+within the project, but will not be central to its overall goal of mak
+the machine more accessible. More ambitious Al goals such as
+general-purpose machine translation and real natural-language
+understanding will be dropped.
+4. Can expert systems make effective use of specialized machines? Much of the academic interest in the project has been
+generated by the attempt to make use of higher-level programming
+languages based on formal logic, 7 and to integrate them with mechanisms for logical inference and for efficient access to large data bases.
+Such languages and mechanisms are notoriously inefficient on current computers, and one of the major technical claims of the project
+is that new computer designs will get rid of this bottleneck.
+This book is not the place for detailed technical arguments at this
+level. It seems likely researchers will develop more efficient devices
+for doing certain kinds of symbolic manipulation, particularly when
+dealing with large bodies of stored data, These devices will be useful
+for the development of specialized Al systems, and more generally in
+building programs operating in systematic domains, as discussed in
+Chapter 12. However, they will not be the panacea that ties together
+the rest of the goals in the chain, and it is not even obvious that the
+particular choices anticipated at this point will be the right ones for
+the more limited goals..
+5. Is parallel processing critical to new machines? This is again a
+technical issue, and one on which there is broad agreement within the
+computer science community. It is not obvious that the particular
+approach currently envisioned by the project is the best one, but it
+will not be surprising if an effort of the anticipated magnitude leads
+to important new advances in this area.
+6. Is it crucial to develop advanced VLSI techniques? Like the
+previous item, this is hardly a debatable point.. Every major computer company and computer science laboratory is working in this
+area, and it is reasonable to believe that the fifth generation project
+can participate effectively in this line of research. The important
+point is that these last two areas are likely to lead to successful results that bear only a minimal relationship to the higher-level goals.
+The grandiose goals, then, will not be met, but there will be useful
+spinoffs. In the long run, the ambitions for truly intelligent computer
+Initially the Japanese researchers plan to use PROLOG (which stands for
+PROgramming in LOGic), a language developed in Europe. This is considered a
+starting point from which new languages and systems will develop.
+ing
+
+systems, as reflected in this project and others like it around the world,
+will not be a major factor in technological development. They are too
+rooted in the rationalistic tradition and too dependent on its assumptions
+about intelligence, language, and formalization.
+139
+
+PART I
+Design
+
+Chapter 11
+Management and
+conversation
+The preceding chapters have examined the current understanding of
+computers and the predictions for "intelligent' machines and their uses.
+We have argued that artificial intelligence is founded on assumptions that
+limit its potential to generate new designs. The basic question we come back
+to in our concluding chapters is "What can people do with computers?" and
+to begin with, "What do people do?"
+There is no one answer to this question..
+'Doing' is an interpretation
+within a background and a set of concerns. People talk and walk and
+breathe and move their hands. They live and love and look for approval.
+Without a more specific orientation, the question "What do people do?"
+is meaningless. We are concerned with the design of new computer-based
+tools, and this leads us to asking what people do in a domain of linguistic
+action. As our primary example we consider what people do in their work,
+taking the office as the prototypical workplace. The issues of commitment
+and coordinated action that are highlighted in that setting are vital to all
+kinds of work situations and to 'home life' as well.
+Within the office we will focus our attention more specifically on what
+goes on under the general category of 'management.' In referring to management, we are not limiting our concern to the running of businesses.
+Anyone in a position to direct actions that affect the economic, political,
+or physical conditions of others is in some sense a manager. In all but the
+most routinized jobs, a worker functions in some ways as a manager, requesting and initiating actions that affect the work of others. We will show
+later how an essential part of all work in organizations is the dimension of
+'coordination' that is highlighted in the manager's job. We therefore begin
+143
+
+144
+CHAPTER 11 MANAGEMENT AND CONVERSATION
+our examination of what people do by looking at a particular person: a
+manager in an office,
+The question "What is this person doing now?" can be answered in
+many domains:
+• sitting at a desk sipping coffee and moving a pencil over a piece of
+paper.
+• writing English text
+• looking for the right word to finish a sentence..
+• drafting an inter-office memo
+• reminding an administrative assistant about next week's meeting
+concerning the software contract.
+• deciding whether the marketing manager should attend the meeting.
+• working on preparations for the new contract
+• trying to increase the efficiency of how this office handles contracts.
+These are all appropriate descriptions, each generated in a particular
+domain of actions and breakdowns As we showed in our discussion of word
+processing in Chapter 1, current designs for 'office automation' are based
+on domains dealing with the preparation of text and the manipulation of
+'electronic paper,' such as memos New tools can be designed to operate
+in the domain of speech acts and conversation-the one in which terms
+like 'reminding,' "'requesting,' and 'agreeing' are relevant, We will argue
+that this is the most fruitful domain for understanding and facilitating
+management. Every manager is primarily concerned with generating and
+maintaining a network of conversations for action-conversations in which
+requests and commitments lead to successful completion of work.
+11.1
+Management and decision making
+In talking about managers, we are deliberately avoiding the commonly
+label 'decision makers,' The managers (and by extension, other work
+describe might be called decision makers, but that term carries a
+pre-understanding of what such a person does. We want to
+pre-understanding. We will first lay out the tradition of
+and show how it can be a restrictive and misleading
+what managers do.
+used
+ers) we
+particular
+challenge that
+decision making,'
+way of understanding
+
+11.1. MANAGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING
+145
+Chapter 2 briefly reviewed the approach to decision making developed
+by Simon and others, which was a key starting point for the field of artificial intelligence. Simon characterizes making a decision as a heuristic
+search among alternatives in a problem space of possible courses of action,
+with the aim of achieving a preferred set of consequences. It is a process of bounded rationality, in which choices are made by applying formal
+rules to partial information in ways that are precise but not based on a
+simple model of deduction and proof., Such processes have been taken by
+researchers in artificial intelligence as the basis for a wide variety of human
+mental activity, as we saw in Chapter 8.. It is not surprising, then, that
+the theoretical understanding developed in the earlier chapters should be
+applicable to the problems of management and decision making as well.
+A variety of crucial questions need to be asked about the decision mak
+model: Is this really the only way to be rational? What about other
+of coping with hesitations, such as learning and behaving according
+authority, rules, or intuition? A number of secondary questions also
+come to mind: Where do alternatives come from? Where do preferences
+come from? Who is considering them? Is it not possible that a wrong
+way of looking at problems may drive us to find solutions to overly narrow
+understandings of situations?
+The taken-for-granted assumption that identifies rational decision mak
+with choosing is highly restrictive. It does not lead us to see
+irrationality in a situation as manifested in wrong alternatives and
+wrong preferences. Although it is often helpful to use methods for
+evaluating and choosing among alternatives, these methods are harmful
+when they blind us to a larger realm of concern for human behavior. Two
+issues are immediately apparent: thrownness in a situation, and the
+importance of background. We will look at these in turn.
+First, the description of decision making as a heuristic search in a space
+of possibilities does not fit observations of what goes on in management
+situations,. Keen and Scott-Morton
+(Decision Support Systems,
+15) argue, "A serious weakness of the whole study of management has
+been ignorance of, and lack of interest in, how decisions are really made."
+They draw an analogy:
+Suppose on a clear day, driving a car down a suburban street
+at 20 mph, we see a small child running across the road in front
+of the car,, The problem is clear-some action must be taken
+or the child will be hit., There are perhaps four alternatives:
+(1) cut off the engine,
+(2) put the car in reverse,
+(3) swerve,
+or (4) hit the brakes. The choice among these alternatives has
+been 'programmed' into us and under normal conditions we
+would automatically use the brakes, Change the conditions
+ing
+ways
+ing
+1978, p.
+
+146
+to driving on the turnpike in pouring rain at 55 mph with
+traffic on all sides, and a large dog suddenly dashing across
+the road in front of us-to hit the dog might result in the car
+turning over, to swerve might result in hitting the cars on either
+side of us, to hit the brakes too hard might result in skidding,
+and so on. The careful evaluation of these alternatives by,
+for example, looking around to see how close the nearest car
+is, is a theoretical possibility only if there is sufficient time,
+but the high speed of the car precludes all these informationgathering activities. Thus we have a situation in which all
+of the variables are known but where there is is not enough
+time to do the evaluation. In such a case we argue that the
+context makes this an unstructured problem Managers are
+often irritated by the tendency of management scientists to
+focus on the inherent structure of a decision, as in our example
+of driving, ignoring the context that makes that irrelevant. -
+Keen and Scott-Morton,
+Decision Support Systems
+94.
+(1978), p.
+This driver is an example par excellence of the thrownness that Heidegger points out in our everyday life. We do not act as a result of consideration, but as a way of being. The driver's reaction in this situation
+cannot be adequately described in terms of rationality, even bounded rationality. His habits or his experience of a prior accident may be much
+more important than any of his concepts or evaluations of risk. Managers
+are "irritated' because the decision-making approach is based on the assumption that these "performance limitations' are somehow peripheral or
+avoidable, and that a manager should be able to act without them The
+theorists may succeed in convincing them of the benefits of systematic
+evaluation of choices, but their experience confirms Heidegger.
+The problem is not just one of limitations. The view of management as
+rational problem solving and decision making fails to deal with the question of background. Saying that a manager is optimizing some value by
+choosing among alternatives for action is like regarding language understanding as a process of choosing among formal definitions. The hard part
+is understanding how the alternatives relevant to a given context come
+into being.. The critical part of problem solving lies in formulating the
+problem
+The bounded rationality approach does not assume that a decision
+maker can evaluate all alternatives, but it takes for granted a well-defined
+problem space in which they are located.. It is not clear for what observer
+this space of alternatives exists. In describing the behavior of a manager
+we (as observers) can formalize the situation by describing it as a set of
+altematives with associated properties. In doing so we impose our own
+
+11.2. DECISION MAKING AND RESOLUTION
+147
+pre-understanding to create distinct alternatives out of the full situation.
+order to write a computer program we are forced to do this kind of
+analysis a prion.
+Keen and Scott-Morton (1978, p. 58) point out: "Most, if not all, of the
+managers' key decisions tend to be fuzzy problems, not well understood
+by them or the organization, and their personal judgment is essential."
+A problem is created by the linguistic acts in which it is identified and
+categorized.. Of course, some situation is previous to the formulation, but
+its existence as a particular problem (which constrains the space of possible
+solutions) is generated by the commitment in language of those who talk
+about it. This conversation in turn exists within their shared background
+in a tradition,.
+As with language in general, we cannot look to simple notions of truth
+and deduction. The 'energy crisis' was not created by commercial acts
+of the oil companies, the Arabs, or the American consumer, but by those
+with the power to create consensus who looked at a long-term situation
+and declared it to be a crisis. The relevant question is not whether it
+is "true or 'false' that there is a problem, but what commitments are
+generated (for speaker and hearer) by the speech acts that created it, and
+how those commitments generate the space of possible actions.
+In
+11.2 Decision making and resolution
+Instead of talking about 'decisions' or 'problems' we can talk of "situations
+of irresolution,' in which we sense conflict about an answer to the question
+"What needs to be done?" If someone hires a new employee or signs a
+new contract, there may or may not be a 'decision,' but one can certainly
+say "A resolution has been reached" The process of reaching resolution
+is characteristically initiated by some claim that generates a mood of irresolution. Claims may be of many different kinds and origins: a routine
+internal evaluation, some external fact or contingency, or a new proposal,
+which presents us with the issue of our possibilities. The ensuing irresolution is not a process in which purely logical alternatives come to be
+considered. In general, there is a dissatisfaction about "where things are
+going," more or less articulately expressed. It is concerned with the past
+as a pattern of actions, and the future as potential for further actions.
+The question "What needs to be done?" arises in a breakdown, in which
+the course of activity is interrupted by some kind of "unreadiness.' It is
+often manifested in hesitation and confusion, and is
+always already oriented
+to a certain direction of possibilities. This pre-orientation of possibilities
+appears as an exclusionary bias, revealing a space of possible actions and
+simultaneously concealing others
+
+148
+Let us illustrate with a simple example:
+You have been commuting to work in your old Chevrolet. Re-
+cently you have had to jump-start it three times, and there
+has been an ominous scraping sound every time you apply the
+brakes.. One morning as you are driving to work you cannot
+get it into first gear. You take it to a mechanic who says there
+is a major problem with the transmission. Clearly you are in a
+situation of irresolution. You talk to your husband and decide
+that there are several alternatives-you can have the old car
+repaired, or you can buy a used or a new car. If you want a
+used car you can try to get it through friends or newspaper ads,
+or you can go to a dealer. If you get a new one you may want a
+van you can use for camping trips, but you're not sure you can
+afford it and still go on the vacation you had planned. In fact
+you're not sure you can afford a new car at all, since you have
+to keep up the payments and insurance on your husband's car
+as well.
+From the point of view of classical decision theory, the task is to lay out
+the space of alternatives and to assign valuations to each. This includes
+dealing with the uncertainties, such as not knowing how much the repair
+will cost, how much trouble it will be to find a good used car, and what your
+f i nancial situation will be in the future. In addition it requires comparing
+factors that are not directly comparable. How important is it to be able
+to go camping in comfort? How bad is it to be stuck with car payments
+that make the budget a hassle every month? What would it mean to give
+up the vacation? How valuable is it to avoid the increased worry about
+breakdowns that comes with a used car? How do you feel about being
+seen driving an old clunker?
+the problem is not just that it is impossible to apply systematic decision techniques, but that there is a bias inherent in formulating the
+situation as one of choosing between these alternatives. Imagine that on
+the next day (since you can't drive to work) you call and check the city
+buses and find one you can take. After a few days of taking the bus you
+realize you didn't really need the car. The problem of "How can I get a
+working car?" has not been solved, it has been dissolved.
+You realize that
+the problem you really wanted to solve was "How can I get to work?"
+Of course one might argue that you failed to identify the real space
+of alternatives, but that it existed nevertheless., But imagine a slightly
+different scenario., The bus ride takes too long, and you are complaining
+about the situation to your friend at work. He commiserates with you,
+since his bicycling to work is unpleasant when it rains. The two of you
+come up with the idea of having the company buy a van for an employee
+
+112 DECISION MAKING AND RESOLUTION
+149
+car pool. In this case, resolution comes in the creation of a new alternative.
+The issue is not one of choosing but of generating.. Or, on the other hand,
+you might steal a car, or set up housekeeping in a tent in your office,
+commit suicide.. Each in its own way would 'solve the problem' We
+seriously misled if we consider the relevant space of alternatives to
+the space of all logical possibilities, Relevance always comes from a preorientation within a background.
+You talk to another friend who has just gotten his car back from the
+shop, He hears your story and expresses surprise at the whole thing. It
+never occurred to him to do anything except have it fixed, just as he always
+did, For him the resolution of having it repaired was not a decision. A
+breakdown of irresolution never occurred. This exclusionary feature is the
+principal element of resolution. It is sometimes articulated as reasons or
+arguments, in which some of the excluded paths can be pointed out ('I
+can't afford to buy a new car"), But there is always more that is not
+articulated, falling back into the fathomless background of obviousness.
+This kind of exclusionary commitment is present even in situations
+where we do not experience irresolution; we simply act, order, promise,
+declare, or decline to commit ourselves to some acts. It is naive to
+be lieve that these are not rational actions, on the grounds that the process
+of deliberation (in the sense of choosing among alternatives) is missing.
+Commitment to an action, with exclusion of other possibilities, is the
+common feature of the processes that precede action,
+We call the process of going from irresolution to resolution 'deliberation.' The principal characteristic of deliberation is that it is a kind of
+conversation (in which one or many actors may participate) guided by
+questions concerning how actions should be directed. Sometimes we can
+specify conditions of further inquiry to attain a resolution. On other occasions the resolution will come from a more prolonged hesitation and/or
+debate, Only in some of these cases will the phenomenon of choosing
+between alternatives occur, and a process of ranking according to some
+metric or other criterion may occur even less frequently.
+We can describe the conversation that constitutes deliberation in the
+following terms:
+1. At some moment in the process of articulating the claims, some
+incipient partial proposals can be discerned, as different people give
+opinions, suggestions, disparagements, counter-offers, etc. In this
+conversation, distinctions between means and goals, parts and wholes
+are discarded in favor of interpretations about possible causal links,
+potential results, and inconveniences.
+2, At some moment, a sedimented opinion about possible courses of
+action to be evaluated and considered may begin to appear; this is
+are
+be
+
+150
+when the process called 'choosing' could be considered. However,
+the name 'choosing' is inadequate, because it suggests algorithmic
+procedures for selecting the course of action.
+It is worth noting that much of what is called problem solving does not
+deal with situations of irresolution, but takes place within the normal state
+resolution, For example, when a linear programming model is used to
+schedule operations in a refinery, the 'problem' to be solved does not call
+for a resolution, Resolution concerns the exploration of a situation, not
+the application of habitual means.
+11.3
+Organizations as networks of
+commitments
+In asking "What do managers do?" we must look at what goes on in an organization as a whole, In Part I we saw that a certain kind of recurrence,'
+or repetitive pattern of actions, pervades our life as patterns of breakdown
+repeat themselves. An organization attempts to exploit this by division of
+labor, in order to be ready to deal with a breakdown as something already
+known.
+Varying our simple car example, imagine that it is a delivery truck,
+not a personal car. In this case the company has a standard procedure for
+repair, so that the resolution of the situation is predetermined: take it into
+the company garage and get a temporary replacement. Other patterns of
+action in the organization are designed to anticipate rather than cope with
+breakdown-in this case, obviously, the preventive maintenance done to
+the trucks on a regular basis.
+The concepts of breakdown and recurrence apply equally when we look
+beyond those areas like vehicle maintenance where they are superficially
+obvious, Breakdowns are not just situations of trouble, but are how
+con cers appear to each member of the organization. Many of them
+are already anticipated in the form of work specialization: standard forms
+to be filled out, rules for credit, policies about the levels of inventories, and
+so forth. To be in business is to know how to deal with breakdowns, and to
+be pre-oriented in anticipation of them,,
+The taken-for-granted recurrence in an organization includes, for example, the definitions of what products and services are to be offered and
+to whom, as well as what kinds of requests will be considered. The rigidity implied by this recurrence is necessary, but it also brings a danger, an
+inertia or bias, with a field of possibilities that tends to be narrow and
+closed. This rigidity is often apparent in support activities, such as maintenance and data processing. The development of means to achieve them
+
+11.3. ORGANIZATIONS AS NETWORKS OF COMMITMENTS
+151
+may come to hide the purposes they were intended to serve.. The blindness can take on immense proportions when the survival of an organization
+is assured by some external declaration, as with public bureaucracies or
+armies in peacetime. It becomes attached to programs and projects, attending to recurrent requests, with little sensitivity to the consequences
+and implications of its activity or to the declared commitments of the
+organization.
+Decision making, as described in the first section of this chapter, is
+part of the recurrent activity. The professional discipline of 'systems
+analysis' has focussed on routine structured processes,
+frequently
+attacking
+problems of volume and routine rather than problems of
+communication. If we look carefully at the process of resolution described
+above, we see that the key elements are the conversation among the
+affected parties and the commitment to action that results from reaching
+resolution. Success cannot be attributed to a decision made by a particular
+actor, but only to the collective performance.
+Careful observers of what successful managers do (such as Mintzberg,
+in The Nature of Managerial Work,
+1973) have remarked that their
+activities are not well represented by the stereotype of a reflecting solitary mind
+studying complex alternatives. Instead, managers appear to be absorbed
+in many short interactions, most of them lasting between two and twenty
+minutes. They manifest a great preference for oral communication-by
+telephone or face to face. We may say that managers engage in conversations in which they create, take care of, and initiate new commitments
+within an organization. The word 'management' conveys the sense of
+active concern with action, and especially with the securing of effective
+cooperative action. At a higher level, management is also concerned with
+the generation of contexts in which effective action can consistently be
+realized.
+In understanding management as taking care of the articulation and
+activation of a network of commitments, produced primarily through
+promises and requests, we cover many managerial activities, Nevertheless,
+we also noed to incorporate the most essential responsibilities of managers:
+to be open, to listen, and to be the authority regarding what activities and
+commitments the network will deal with. These can be characterized as
+participation in "conversations for possibilities' that open new backgrounds
+for the conversations for action.
+The key aspect of conversations for possibilities is the asking of the
+questions "What is it possible to do?" and "What will be the domain of
+actions in which we will engage?" This requires a continuing reinterpretation of past activity, seen not as a collection of past requests, promises,
+and doeds in action conversations, but as interpretations of the whole
+situation-interpretations that carry a pre-orientation to new possibilities
+
+152
+for the future. Like the car owner in our example, the manager needs to
+be continually open to opportunities that go beyond the previous horizon.
+11.4
+Decision support systems
+Those who predict the development of intelligent computers propose that
+they be used to enhance human decision making by suggesting alternatives,
+predicting consequences, and pulling together the information that goes
+into making decisions:
+-in the future, artificial intelligence could produce powerful assistants who manage information for us, reading books,
+newspapers, magazines, reports; preparing summaries, avoiding those things the computer knows won't interest us, keeping
+abreast of everything that happens in the world, seeing that
+nothing we really should know about escapes us. These in
+telligent computers could analyze the decisions that face us,
+searching libraries of knowledge for facts that will help with a
+decision and then presenting us with suggested courses of action and the probable consequences. They could understand
+specialized knowledge and know how to put it to work in some
+of the highly skilled areas in which we humans function-law
+and medicine, for example. - Stockton, "Creating computers to
+think like humans" (1980), p. 41,
+It should be clear by this point that a computer cannot "see that
+nothing we really should know about escapes us." However, the more
+modest claim that a computer can help explore pre-constrained sets of
+alternatives has been the basis for the development of a family of tools
+known as 'decision support systems.' As with so-called 'expert systems,'
+there is both an appropriate domain of activities for such tools, and a
+danger in seeing them as doing too much. We will describe them here as
+a potential and will then contrast them to the additional kinds of tools we
+envision for supporting work in the domain of conversation.
+Decision Support Systems (DSS) represent a point of view on
+the role of the computer in the management decision making
+process. Decision support implies the use of computers to:
+1. Help managers in their decision processes in semi-structured tasks.
+2. Support, rather than replace, managerial judgment.
+
+11.4,. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
+153
+3.. Improve the effectiveness of decision making rather than
+its efficiency.
+- Keen and Scott-Morton,
+Decision Support
+Systems (1978), p. 1.
+In their careful definition of such systems, Keen and Scott-Morton
+introduce terms that deserve more explanation. They refer to
+semistructured tasks' and distinguish 'effectiveness' from 'efficiency.'
+Nearly every writer on management and decision making draws a dichotomy between two kinds of managerial situations:
+"programmed vs.
+nonprogrammed decision' (Simon,
+The Shape of Automation for Men
+Management, 1965), 'structured vs., unstructured problems' (Keen and
+Scott-Morton, 1978), 'established vs. emergent situations' (Boguslaw,
+New Utopians,
+1965) On the one hand there are obviously recurrent tasks,
+such as the scheduling of jobs on the machines in a shop. On the other,
+there are the open-ended innovative actions introduced in conversations
+for possibilities,
+For structured tasks it is often possible to create a set of rules and
+have computers apply them to the situation. For unstructured tasks such
+rules cannot be formulated.. However, there is an in-between area of 'semistructured' tasks with some degree of recurrence but not so much that
+one can fully specify the relevant rules. Keen and Scott-Morton see this
+as the relevant area for computer aid to human decision making. They
+state their goal not as 'efficiency' but 'effectiveness'-measured in terms
+of global outcomes rather than of the speed of making decisions or their
+immediate payoffs. A system is effective if an organization using it finds itself in a better position. A system can be ineffective but be highly efficient
+at making decisions that are in fact (because of the particular blindness
+inherent in their formulation) irrelevant or harmful to the enterprise.
+We will not try to examine decision support systems in detail here. It
+is clear that in day-to-day management there are areas where such tools
+can be of use, and there have been many ideas for their design. However
+it is important to point out some of the dangers that potentially attend
+their use.
+Orientation to choosing. The phrase 'decision support' carries with it
+a particular orientation to what the manager does-one that we have been
+criticizing.. The emphasis implicit in this approach serves to reinforce the
+decisionist perspective and to support a rigid status quo in organizations,
+denying the validity of more social, emotive, intuitive, and personalized
+approaches to the complex process of reaching resolution,.
+Assumption of relevance. Once a computer system has been installed,
+it is difficult to avoid the assumption that the things it can deal with are
+The
+
+154
+the most relevant things for the manager's concern. An information system
+dedicated to collecting data and answering predetermined questions, even
+one as well-designed as possible, will be harmful if it is not complemented
+by heterodox practices and a permanent attitude of openness to listening.
+Unintended transfer of power. In the design of a system that will be
+used in an organization, many choices are made that will have significant
+consequences for life within that organization. As Boguslaw points out:
+A designer of systems, who has the de facto prerogative to specify the range of phenomena that his system will distinguish,
+clearly is in possession of enormous degrees of power...
+It is
+by no means necessary that this power be formalized through
+the allocation of specific authority,. .. It is in this sense that
+computer programmers, the designer's of computer equipment,
+and the developers of computer languages possess power. To
+the extent that decisions made by each of these participants in
+the design process serve to reduce, limit, or totally eliminate
+action alternatives, they are applying force and wielding power
+in the precise sociological meaning of these terms.
+- Boguslaw,
+The New Utopians (1965), p.. 190.
+Often those who are invisibly empowered have an overall orientation
+not shared by others within the organization. Trained professionals in computer technology tend to place high values on efficiency and predictability,
+and to devalue the need for human discretion and innovation. The resulting design can erode the effectiveness of the organization while concentrating on its efficiency. In one case, the scheduling of jobs within a machine
+shop (previously done by a manager who walked around from worker to
+worker) was automated with a computer communication system. Only
+after many breakdowns was it realized that the manager in his perambulations was doing much more than simply assigning tasks.. His openness to
+new concerns (both from talking to the workers and from his observations
+of the workplace) played a critical role in anticipating breakdowns, which
+had not been recognized in the design of the computer system.
+Unanticipated effects. Every technological advance brings with it unanticipated effects, some desirable and some undesirable. In this era of ecological consciousness it is hardly necessary to give examples of dangerous
+unintended effects of such apparently beneficial devices as automobiles
+and nuclear power plants. Computer technology brings its own kinds of
+problems. For example, in the attempt to provide better information to
+managers about what was going on in one grocery warehouse, a system
+was installed that made it possible to monitor the activity of individual
+
+11.4, DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
+155
+workers on a minute-by-minute basis, The workers went on strike,
+demanding removal of the system because of the stress it placed on them
+and the resulting deterioration of working conditions,
+Effects of this kind can be difficult to formulate or test precisely. For
+example, in evaluating the dangers of large data bank systems, Wessel
+notes:
+Indoed, the damage resulting from the potential misuses of
+facts is far less serious than that which stems from the
+individual's simple knowledge that the data bank exists, an
+awareness which has a subtle but inevitable effect on how he
+conducts himself. - Wessel, Freedom's Edge (1974), p 30,
+Obscuring responsibility. Once a computer system is designed and
+in place, it tends to be treated as an independent entity. The understanding we have been developing leads us to recognize the computer's
+role not as a surrogate expert, but as an intermediary-a sophisticated
+medium of communication, A group of people (normally including both
+computer specialists and experts in the subject domain) build a program
+incorporating a formal representation of some of their discourse,. The computer transmits consequences of their statements to users of the system,
+typically combining these statements. The fact that these combinations
+involve complex deductive logic, heuristic rule application, or statistical
+analysis does not alter the basic structure of communicative acts.
+Once we recognize the machine as an intermediary, it becomes clear
+that the commitment inherent in the use of language is made by those
+who produce the system, In the absence of this perspective it becomes
+all too easy to make the dangerous mistake of interpreting the machine
+as making commitments, thereby concealing the source of responsibility
+for what it does,. Medical diagnosis programs (which can be thought of as
+decision support systems for physicians) provide a good example. Imagine
+a program written by a team of computer specialists working with a group
+of medical experts, installed by the administration of a hospital, and used
+by a member of the medical house staff in choosing a treatment. If the
+diagnosis was wrong and the patient is harmed, who is responsible?
+The problem may not be one of wrong medical knowledge, but rather
+one of background assumptions. An answer that is correct in one context
+may be inappropriate in another. For example, if the program was written
+with ambulatory patients in mind, it might not be appropriate for a chronic
+bedridden invalid. A person writing a program (or contributing to its
+'knowledge base') does so within a background of assumptions about how
+the program will be used, and how its responses will be interpreted. Part
+
+156
+CHAPTER 11 MANAGEMENT AND CONVERSATION
+of this can be made explicit in documentation, but part is an implicit
+background of what can be normally understood, Except for systems
+operating within strongly constrained domains, there inevitably comes a
+breakdown because the system is being used in a way that does not fit
+the assumptions. In a computer-mediated system (as opposed to direct
+personal interaction), it is difficult to maintain the implicit commitments
+and the potential for a dialog in the face of breakdown.
+False belief in objectivity. One immediate consequence of concealing
+commitment is an illusion of objectivity. Since the 'facts' stored by a computer cannot be readily associated with a commitment by an individual
+who asserted them, it is easy to be blind to the nature of their origin,
+Evans, for example, argues in describing the computer projections of the
+future world economy done for the Club of Rome
+(The Limits to Growth,
+1972):
+Like it or not, even the most ardent anti-computerist would
+admit that the computer, lacking emotions, hunches and
+prejudices, would consider and generate only the stark facts of
+the matter.. - Evans,
+The Micro Millennium
+(1979), p, 92
+But this is nonsense. Computers neither consider nor generate facts.
+They manipulate symbolic representations that some person generated
+on the belief that they corresponded to facts, There was a good deal of
+hindsight analysis of the disastrous results for the U,S, military in Vietnam
+produced by the faith placed by commanders in computer analyses that
+were based on highly distorted and even fabricated 'facts.' The issue,
+though, is not just one of mistake or of conscious fabrication. It is in the
+nature of any 'fact' that it is an assertion by an individual in a context,
+based on a background of pre-understanding. DAmato illustrates the
+fallacy of ignoring this in his discussion of computer aids in law.
+Another possible benefit is that law might seem more impartial
+to the man on the street if computers were to take over large
+areas now assigned to judges. There is certainly some degree of
+belief on the part of the public that judges cannot escape their
+own biases and prejudices and cannot free themselves from
+their relatively privileged class position in society. But computers, unless programmed to be biased, will have no bias.
+-
+D'Amato, "Can/should computers replace judges?"
+(1977), p.. 1300.
+Once again this is utter nonsense. In order for a program to be biased,
+it is not necessary for the programmer to consciously set out to insert
+prejudices, nor is he or she likely to do this. In order even to begin the task
+
+11.5, TOOLS FOR CONVERSATION
+157
+of preparing a program, a programmer (or legal expert working with the
+programmer) must operate within his or her own background of prejudice.
+This is not a mistake that can be avoided, but an essential condition for
+knowledge of any kind. To repeat a central quotation from Gadamer:
+It is not so much our judgments as it is our prejudices that constitute our being... the historicity of our existence entails
+that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the
+initial directedness of our whole ability to experience, Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply
+conditions whereby we experience something-whereby what
+we encounter says something to us.
+- Gadamer,
+Philosophical
+Hermeneutics (1976), p. 9.
+To conclude, we see decision support systems, like all computer-based
+systems, as offering a potential for new kinds of human action. With this
+potential come particular blindnesses and dangers. The question is not
+whether such systems are good or bad, but how our understanding and
+use of them determines what we do and what we are.
+11.5 Tools for conversation
+We have been arguing that the domain of "decision support'-dealing with
+alternatives, valuations, and choice-is not the most promising domain in
+which to build computer tools for managing. In this section, we will outline
+another kind of computer tool, based on the theory of management and
+conversation we have been developing. We begin by reviewing the basic
+points of the theory, as developed in this chapter and in Chapter 5:
+1. Organizations exist as networks of directives and commissives,. Di-
+rectives include orders, requests, consultations, and offers; commissives include promises, acceptances, and rejections..
+2.. Breakdowns will inevitably occur, and the organization needs to be
+prepared. In coping with breakdowns, further networks of directives
+and commissives are generated.
+3. People in an organization (including, but not limited to managers)
+issue utterances, by speaking or writing, to develop the conversations required in the organizational network. They participate in
+the creation and maintenance of a process of communication. At the
+core of this process is the performance of linguistic acts that bring
+forth different kinds of commitments.
+
+158
+In fulfilling an organization's external commitments, its personnel are
+involved in a network of conversations. This network includes requests and
+promises to fulfill commitments, reports on the conditions of fulfillment of
+commitments, reports on external circumstances, declarations of new policies, and so on. The organization encounters requests and other external
+contingencies that it can deal with by making commitments that can be
+fulfilled by the activation of certain special
+networks of recurrent
+conversations, where only certain details of the content of the conversations differ,
+not their general structure. These networks of recurrent conversations
+are the core of organization. They are embodied as intercommunicating
+offices, each specialized in fulfilling certain kinds of commitments.
+A person working within an organization is always concerned with
+questions such as "What is missing?", "What needs to be done?", and
+"Where do I stand in terms of my obligations and opportunities?" In situations where many people must act together, the problem of coordination
+becomes a crucial one. For many organizations it is a matter of survival.
+The networks of commitments and the conversations in which people participate are becoming larger and more complex, and the complexity of
+organizations has gone beyond the point where it can be controlled without appropriate tools.
+New computer-based communication technology can help anticipate
+and avoid breakdowns. It is impossible to completely avoid breakdowns
+by design, since it is in the nature of any design process that it must
+select a finite set of anticipations from the situation. But we can partially
+anticipate situations where breakdowns are likely to occur (by noting their
+recurrence) and we can provide people with the tools and procedures they
+need to cope with them Moreover, new conversational networks can be
+designed that give the organization the ability to recognize and realize new
+possibilities.
+Many systems designed by computer professionals are intended to facilitate the activity of an individual working alone. Although such tools
+(including word processors, filing systems, program creation aids, etc.) are
+useful, they leave out the essential dimension of collective work. In most
+work environments the coordination of action is of central importance. The
+conversational dimension permeates every realm of coordinated activity,
+whether it be computer programming, medical care, or selling shoes. The
+details differ from setting to setting, but there is a common theoretical
+basis and a common regular structure. Computer-based tools can be used
+in requesting, creating, and monitoring commitments. They can provide
+relevant answers to the question "What do I need to do?", or as we prefer
+to put it, "What is the status of my active commitments?"
+The rules of conversation are not arbitrary conventions like the rules of
+chess, but reflect the basic nature of human language and action. The tax-
+
+11.5. TOOLS FOR CONVERSATION
+159
+onomy of speech acts and the diagram of conversation structure presented
+in Chapter 5 deal with the fundamental ontology of linguistic acts. They
+provide a basis for the design of tools to operate in a linguistic domain.
+We are not proposing that a computer can 'understand' speech acts
+by analyzing natural language utterances. It is impossible to formulate a
+precise correspondence between combinations of words and the structure
+of the commitments listened to in a conversation. What we propose is
+to make the user aware of this structure and to provide tools for working
+with it explicitly. Substantial experience is being amassed with a computer
+program that we have developed called "The CoordinatorTM Workgroup
+Productivity System"" It is the first example of a new class of products
+that we are calling "coordination systems" or "workgroup systems," for
+use on computer communication networks (which might be based on local
+networks, time-sharing, or advanced telephone exchanges) to which all
+of the participants have access through some kind of workstations. Its
+objective is to make the interactions transparent-to provide a ready-tohand tool that operates in the domain of conversations for action.
+There are a surprisingly few basic conversational building-blocks (such
+as request/promise, offer/acceptance, and report/acknowledgement) that
+frequently recur in conversations for action. The development of a conversation requires selection among a certain finite set of possibilities that is
+defined by the opening directive and the subsequent responses. It is like a
+dance, giving some initiative to each partner in a specific sequence.
+A coordination system supports a number of operations:
+Speech act origination. An individual performs a speech act using a
+system such as The Coordinator by: selecting the illocutionary force
+from a small set of alternatives (the basic building blocks mentioned
+above); indicating the propositional content in text; and explicitly
+entering temporal relationships to other (past and anticipated) acts.
+By specifying directly, for example, that a particular utterance is a
+'request' with a specific date for satisfaction, the listening is constrained to a much greater degree than it is for an English sentence
+such as "Would you be able to..." The force of a speech act comes
+from concerned listening, and by making an explicit declaration of
+this force we can avoid confusion and breakdown due to differences
+(intended or unintended) in the listening of the concerned parties.
+In addition to having a direct specification of its force, a speech act
+is related to others, for example as the response to a request, or
+'For a more developed description of coordination systems, see Flores and Ludlow,
+"Doing and speaking in the office" (1981), Flores, "Management and communication
+the office of the future" (1982), and Winograd, "A language/action perspective on the
+design of cooperative work" (1987), "The Coordinator" is a registered trademark
+Action Technologies, Inc
+
+160
+as a request being made in order to satisfy some previous
+commit ment. These relationships are made explicit in the way a
+speech act is entered into the workstation. The need to select among
+pre structured alternatives for possible illocutionary forces serves as a
+kind of 'coaching' that reveals the space of possibilities and the structure
+of different acts within it.
+Monitoring completion. Much of the moment-by-moment concern of
+language is directed towards the completion of conversations for action. The questions "What do I have to do now?" and "What do I
+need to check up on?" are really questions about the movement of
+conversations towards states of completion (which may or may not
+include satisfaction of the initial request), as described in Chapter
+5. A coordination system can keep track of where things stand and
+when they will change. This can be used to generate reminders and
+alerts and to provide a clear picture of what is happening and where
+potential breakdowns lie ahead.
+Keeping temporal relations. A coordination system can keep track of
+time relationships within the network and use them to help anticipate and cope with breakdowns. Time is not an incidental condition,
+but a critical aspect of every speech act.. A promise is not really a
+promise unless there is a mutually understood (explicitly or implicitly) time for satisfaction. More subtly, a request is not fully formed
+unless there is a time specified for reply and for completion. In unstructured social settings, these time conditions are understood by
+the participants through their shared background and may never be
+made explicit. In structured organizations they are stated directly,
+and in situations like contract negotiations they are dealt with in the
+law. As speech acts are made using the system, the user is coached
+to explicitly represent the temporal relations that are central to the
+network of commitment. These relations can be used to monitor
+what needs to be done and to warn of potential breakdowns.
+Examination of the network. An individual can display part of the
+conversation network, showing the conversations and their status,
+the individual commitments and requests, and their relationships
+to others. It is possible, for example, to find out what requests
+were generated in anticipation of breakdown in satisfying a particular
+commitment, or what requests are still awaiting a response from a
+particular individual. The details of the interaction (for example
+using a graphic display) are important for making the tool ready-tohand, but are not theoretically central. The key is that the network
+is observed in the space generated by the structure of conversation.
+
+11.5. TOOLS FOR CONVERSATION
+161
+Automated application of recurrence. Every organization deals with
+situations that recur and are handled in a standard way. For example, if a certain request (e.g., for payment) has not been met within
+a certain time, other requests are made (to the same party or others). A coordination system can be given this pattern and trigger
+the corresponding acts without direct intervention. It is important
+to remember that it is never the computer that makes a request or
+commitment. A person can specify a recurrent request or commitment, instances of which are generated automatically.
+Recurrence of propositional content. So far we have not described
+the propositional content of the speech acts. This is an intentional
+strategy, in that the crucial dimension of conversation for coordination is the illocutionary content and its attendant temporal relations.
+But of course there are recurrences of propositional content as well.
+A 'purchase order' or 'travel advance request' or any other such form
+is designed to facilitate the generation of a request or commitment
+dealing with a particular content, The creation and use of "forms' of
+this kind can be integrated into a coordination system, within the
+framework provided by the basic conversation.
+Another system that illustrates some of the opportunities, possible
+constructions, and applications of coordination systems was described by
+Cashman and Holt (A communication oriented approach to structuring
+the software maintenance environment," 1980). It was one part of a distributed programming environment for maintaining large software collections. As the software being maintained by the system was distributed
+and used, people needed to fix bugs, make improvements, and produce
+updated versions. This process was extremely difficult to manage, leading to long delays and failure to meet the needs of software users. By
+providing a computer tool to maintain the structure of the requests and
+commitments, they were able to greatly improve productivity. Other such
+systems are in development at a number of institutions.2
+In using a coordination system, the individual is faced with a restricted
+set of possibilities. It is not the same as a face-to-face conversation, a, telephone call, or even an electronic message.. Because the illocutionary forces
+and temporality are specified explicitly, it is necessary to be conscious of
+them and to have a mutually visible manifestatior of them. This is valuable in a wide variety of everyday communications within organizations,
+but it is not a universal communicating device, equally applicable to all
+2See, for example, Holt, Ramsey, and Grimes, "Coordination system technology as
+the basis for a programming environment" (1983), and Sluzier and Cashman, "XCP:
+An experimental tool for supporting office procedures" (1984),
+
+162
+situations. In many contexts this kind of explicitness is not called for, and
+may even be detrimental. Language cannot be reduced to a representation
+of speech acts. A coordination system deals with one dimension of language structure-one that is systematic and crucial for the coordination
+of action, but that is part of the larger and ultimately open-ended domain
+of interpretation.
+We conclude here by pointing out that computer tools themselves are
+only one part of the picture. The gain from applying conversation theory
+in organizations has to do with developing the communicative competence,
+norms, and rules for the organization, including the training to develop the
+appropriate understanding. This includes the proper terminology, skills,
+and procedures to recognize what is missing, deteriorated, or obtruding
+(i.e., what is broken-down), and the ability to cope with the situation.
+People have experience in everyday dealing with others and with situations. Nevertheless, there are different levels of competence. Competence
+here does not mean correct grammatical usage or diction, but successful
+dealing with the world, good managerial abilities, and responsibility and
+care for others. Communicative competence means the capacity to express
+one's intentions and take responsibilities in the networks of commitments
+that utterances and their interpretations bring to the world. In their dayto-day being, people are generally not aware of what they are doing. They
+are simply working, speaking, etc., more or less blind to the pervasiveness
+of the essential dimensions of commitment. Consequently, there exists
+a domain for education in communicative competence: the fundamental
+relationships between language and successful action. People's conscious
+knowledge of their participation in the network of commitment can be reinforced and developed, improving their capacity to act in the domain of
+language.
+
+Chapter 12
+Using computers:
+A direction for design
+This book is concerned with the design of computer-based systems to
+facilitate human work and interaction. In this final chapter we suggest
+directions for the future, drawing on the discourse developed in Part I to
+re-examine some basic questions about what designing means.
+The most important designing is
+ontological. It constitutes an intervention in the background of our heritage, growing out of our alreadyexistent ways of being in the world, and deeply affecting the kinds of
+beings that we are. In creating new artifacts, equipment, buildings, and
+organizational structures, it attempts to specify in advance how and where
+breakdowns will show up in our everyday practices and in the tools we use,
+opening up new spaces in which we can work and play Ontologically oriented design is therefore necessarily both reflective and political, looking
+backwards to the tradition that has formed us but also forwards to as-yetuncreated transformations of our lives together. Through the emergence of
+new tools, we come to a changing awareness of human nature and human
+action, which in turn leads to new technological development. The designing process is part of this 'dance' in which our structure of possibilities is
+generated.
+The concluding sections of this chapter will discuss the optical-ontological significance of design-how our tools are part of the background in
+which we can ask what it is to be human., First we consider the direct relevance of our theoretical orientation to the design of computer systems. We
+'We do not use 'design' here in the narrow sense of a specific methodology for creating
+artifacts, but are concerned with a broad theory of design like that sought in the
+work of reflective architects such as Alexander
+(Notes on the Synthesis of Form,
+1964)..
+
+164
+will use coordination systems, such as The Coordinator TM described in
+Chapter 11, as our primary example. But our intended scope is larger,
+encompassing other computer systems and ultimately all technology.
+12.1
+A background for computer design
+In the popular literature on computers, one frequently encounters terms
+such as
+'user-friendly,' 'easy-to-learn,' and
+"self-explaining.' They are
+ague and perhaps overused, but they reflect real concerns-concerns tha
+re not adequately understood within the rationalistic tradition, and t
+which phenomenological insights about readiness-to-hand, breakdown, and
+blindness are relevant.
+Readiness-to-hand
+One popular vision of the future is that computers will become easier
+use as they become more like people. In working with people, we
+establish domains of conversation in which our common pre-understanding
+lets us communicate with a minimum of words and conscious effort. We
+become explicitly aware of the structure of conversation only when there
+some kind of breakdown calling for corrective action. If machines could
+understand in the same way people do, interactions with computers would be
+equally transparent.
+This transparency of interaction is of utmost importance in the
+de sign of tools, including computer systems, but it is not best achieved by
+attempting to mimic human faculties. In driving a car, the control
+interaction is normally transparent. You do not think "How far should I
+turn the steering wheel to go around that curve?" In fact, you are not
+even aware (unless something intrudes) of using a steering wheel.
+Phenomeno logically, you are driving down the road, not operating controls.
+The long evolution of the design of automobiles has led to this readinessto-hand. It is not achieved by having a car communicate like a person, but
+by providing the right coupling between the driver and action in the
+relevant domain (motion down the road).
+In designing computer tools, the task is harder but the issues are the
+same. A successful word processing device lets a person operate on the
+words and paragraphs displayed on the screen, without being aware of
+formulating and giving commands. At the superficial level of "interface
+design' there are many different ways to aid transparency, such as special
+function keys (which perform a meaningful action with a single keystroke),
+pointing devices (which make it possible to select an object on the screen),
+and menus (which offer a choice among a small set of relevant actions).
+
+12 1. A BACKGROUND FOR COMPUTER DESIGN
+165
+More important is the design of the domains in which the actions are
+generated and interpreted.. A bad design forces the user to deal with complexities that belong to the wrong domain. For example, consider the user
+of an electronic mail system who tries to send a message and is confronted
+with an 'error message' saying "Mailbox server is reloading," The user operates in a domain constituted of people and messages sent among them.
+This domain includes actions (such as sending a message and examining
+mail) that in turn generate possible breakdowns (such as the inability to
+send a message). Mailbox servers, although they may be a critical part
+of the implementation, are an intrusion from another domain-one that
+is the province of the system designers and engineers, In this simple example, we could produce a different error message, such as "Cannot send
+message to that user, Please try again after five minutes," Successfil
+system builders learn to consider the user's domain of understanding after
+seeing the frustrations of people who use their programs,,
+But there is a more systematic principle at stake here. The programmer designs the language that creates the world in which the user operates,
+This language can be 'ontologically clean' or it can be a jumble of related
+domains, A clearly and consciously organized ontology is the basis for the
+kind of simplicity that makes systems usable. When we try to understand
+the appeal of computers like the Apple MacIntosh (and its predecessor the
+Xerox Star), we see exactly the kind of readiness-to-hand and ontological
+simplicity we have described. Within the domains they encompass-text
+and graphic manipulation-the user is 'driving,' not 'commanding.' The
+challenge for the next generation of design is to move this same effectiveness beyond the superficial structures of words and pictures into the
+domains generated by what people are doing when they manipulate those
+structures.
+Anticipation of breakdown
+Our study of Heidegger revealed the central role of breakdown in human
+understanding, A breakdown is not a negative situation to be avoided, but
+a situation of non-obviousness, in which the recognition that something is
+missing leads to unconcealing (generating through our declarations) some
+aspect of the network of tools that we are engaged in using. A breakdown
+reveals the nexus of relations necessary for us to accomplish our task,. This
+creates a clear objective for design-to anticipate the forms of breakdown
+and provide a space of possibilities for action when they occur. It is impossible to completely avoid breakdowns by means of design. What can be
+designed are aids for those who live in a particular domain of breakdowns.
+These aids include training, to develop the appropriate understanding of
+the domain in which the breakdowns occur and also to develop the skills
+
+166
+and procedures needed to recognize what has broken down and how to
+cope with the situation.
+Computer tools can aid in the anticipation and correction of
+break downs that are not themselves computer breakdowns but are in the
+appli cation domain. The commitment monitoring facilities in a
+coordination system are an example, applied to the domain of conversations
+for action. In the design of decision support systems, a primary
+consideration is the anticipation of potential breakdowns. An early example
+of such a system was Cybersyn, 2 which was used for monitoring production
+in a sector of the economy of Chile. This system enabled local groups to
+describe the range of normal behavior of economic variables (such as the
+output of a particular factory, and to be informed of significant patterns of
+variation that could signal potential breakdown.
+But more importantly, breakdowns play a fundamental role in design.
+As the last section pointed out, the objects and properties that constitute
+the domain of action for a person are those that emerge in breakdown.
+Retuming to our simple example of an electronic mail system, our 'fix'
+left a person with certain courses of action in face of the breakdown. He
+or she can simply forget about sending the message or can wait until later
+to try sending it again. But it may be possible to send it to a different
+'mail server' for delayed forwarding and delivery. If so, it is necessary
+to create a domain that includes the existence of mail servers and their
+properties as part of the relevant space in which the user exists.
+In designing computer systems and the domains they generate, we must
+anticipate the range of occurrences that go outside the normal functioning
+and provide means both to understand them and to act. This is the basis
+for a heuristic methodology that is often followed by good programmers
+("In writing the program try to think of everything that could go wrong"),
+but again it is more than a vague aphorism The analysis of a human
+context of activity can begin with an analysis of the domains of breakdown,
+and that can in tum be used to generate the objects, properties, and
+actions that make up the domain.
+The blindness created by design
+Any opening of new possibilities closes others, and this is especially true
+of the introduction of technology. As an example, consider the possibility
+of an 'electronic library' in which one can search for items using sophisticated cataloging techniques based on publication information (such as
+author, publisher, and title) and topic classifications (such as the Library
+of Congress categories and the key word systems used in many journals).
+2Cybeisyn is described in Beer,
+Platform for Change
+(1975).
+
+167
+If we accept the domain generated by those classifications as the relevant
+one for finding books, the system is appropriate and useful. However,
+this may not be the right choice. The facility may make it easier for a
+reader to find a book on a specific narrow topic, while reducing the ease
+of 'browsing' through shelves of loosely related material. Recognizing the
+importance of background and thrownness, it becomes clear that the unexpected and unintended encounters one has in browsing can at times be
+of much greater importance than efficient precise recall. If the problem is
+narrowly construed as "Find a book, given specific information" then the
+system may be good. If we put it into its larger context of "Find writings
+relevant to what you want to do" it may well not be, since relevance cannot be formalized so easily. In providing a tool, we will change the nature
+of how people use the library and the materials within it.
+As with breakdown, blindness is not something that can be avoided,
+but it is something of which we can be aware. The designer is engaged
+a conversation for possibilities. Attention to the possibilities being
+eliminated must be in a constant interplay with expectations for the new
+possibilities being created.
+12.2
+A design example
+We turn now to a concrete example of how our theoretical background
+might guide the design of a computer-based system in a practical setting.
+It is not a complete analysis of the specific case, but is a vehicle for suggesting possibilities and clarifying the points in these two concluding chapters.
+We have chosen a mundane business example, but the same principles hold
+for applications of computers in all kinds of organizations.
+The setting. You have been operating a successful dress shop
+for several years and expanded last year to a chain of three
+stores. You have not made any use of computers, but have recently come to feel they might be of some help. Profits aren't
+what they should be, you are losing some customers who seem
+dissatisfied with the service they get, and the staff feels overworked.
+there are no clear problems to be solved: Action needs to be
+taken in a situation of irresolution.
+This is the typical case in which questions about what to do arise, as
+described in Chapter 11. There is no clear "problem to be solved, but a
+sense of irresolution that opens opportunities for action. Computers are
+not the 'solution,' but may be useful in taking actions that improve the
+
+168
+CHAPTER 12.. A DIRECTION FOR DESIGN
+situation. Once the manager senses this, the typical next step would be
+go to computer service vendors to find out what kinds of 'systems' are
+available and to see if they are worth getting The space of possibilities
+determined by the particular offerings and the 'features' they exhibit.
+we can begin with a more radical analysis of what goes on in the store and
+what kinds of tools are possible..
+A business (like any organization) is constituted as a network of
+recurrent conversations.
+As a first step we look for the basic networks of conversation that constitute the business. We ask "Who makes requests and promises to whom,
+and how are those conversations carried to completion?" At a first level
+we treat the company as a unity, examining its conversations with the
+outside world-customers, suppliers, and providers of services. There are
+some obvious central conversations with customers and suppliers, opened
+by a request for (or offer of) dresses in exchange for money. Secondary
+conversations deal with conditions of satisfaction for the initial ones: conversations about alteration of dresses, conversations concerning payment
+(billing, prepayment, credit, etc.), and conversations for preventing breakdown in the physical setting (janitorial services, display preparation, etc.).
+Taking the business as a composite, we can further examine the conversational networks among its constituents: departments and individual
+workers. There are conversations between clerk and stockroom, clerk and
+accounting, stockroom and purchasing, and so forth. Each of these conversation types has its own recurrent structure, and plays some role in
+maintaining the basic conversations of the company. As one simple example, consider the conversation in which the stock clerk requests that
+purchase orders be sent to suppliers.. Instances of this conversation are either triggered by a conversation in which a salesperson requested an item
+that was unavailable, or when the stock clerk anticipates the possibility of
+such a breakdown.. Other conversations are part of the underlying structure that makes possible the participation of individuals in the network
+(payroll, work scheduling, performance evaluations, etc.). Each conversation has its own structure of completion and states of incompletion with
+associated time constraints.
+Conversations are linked in regular patters of triggering and
+breakdown
+The goal in analyzing these conversations is a description in which the
+linkages between the recurrent conversations are made explicit. These
+links include normal triggering (e.g., a customer request triggers a stock
+But
+
+169
+request), and others that deal with breakdown (e.g., if a request for alteration is not met on time it may trigger a request by the customer to
+see the manager). Having compiled this description, we can see possibilities for restructuring the network on the basis of where conversations fail
+to be completed satisfactorily. We may, for example, note that customer
+dissatisfaction has come from alterations not being done on time (perhaps because alterations are now being combined for the three stores and
+therefore the tailors aren't immediately available). Actions might include
+imposing a rigid schedule for alterations (e.g., never promise anything for
+less than a week) so that commitments will be met on time, even if the
+times that can be promised are less flexible. Or it might mean introducing
+better tools for coordination, such as a computer-based system for keeping
+track of alteration requests and giving more urgent ones higher priority.
+In creating tools we are designing new conversations and
+can nectians.
+When a change is made, the most significant innovation is the modification of the conversation structure, not the mechanical means by which
+the conversation is carried out (e.g., a computer system versus a manual
+one based on forms).. In making such changes we alter the overall pattern
+of conversation, introducing new possibilities or better anticipating breakdowns in the previously existing ones.. This is often not noticed because the
+changes of devices and of conversation structure go hand in hand.. At times
+the changes can be beneficial, and at times detrimental. There are many
+cases of systems for activities like job scheduling that were introduced to
+make things more efficient, but as a result of modifying the conversation
+structure they in fact hindered the work. Often this is the result of taking one part of the conversation network (the 'official' or standard' part)
+and embodying it in the structure of the computer system, thereby making impossible other less frequent types of requests and promises that are
+crucial for anticipating and coping with breakdowns. When we are aware
+of the real impact of design we can more consciously design conversation
+structures that work.
+As an example, there is a potential for coordination systems to reduce
+the need for rigid work schedules. Much of the temporal structure of what
+goes on in organizations is driven by the need to be able to anticipate
+completion. If the manager knows that a certain task will be done every
+Friday, then he or she can make a commitment to do something that uses
+its results on the following Monday. For many routine tasks, this is the
+best way to guarantee effective coordination. But it can also be an inflexible straitjacket that reduces the space of possibilities open to workers in
+organizing their activities. If effective coordination on a conversation-by-
+
+170
+conversation basis could be regularized, then the rigidity could be relaxed,
+altering the conversation structure to make the workers more productive.
+Design includes the generation of new possibilities.
+No analysis of existing recurrent structures is a full account of the possibilities. The existing networks represent a particular point of structural
+coupling of the organization to the world in which it exists. Actions may
+radically alter the structure. In our example, the store might simply stop
+doing alterations, Or it might hire more tailors, or contract out the alterations, or hire many more tailors and go into the contract alteration
+business as well. In some cases, the business as a whole may have a new
+interpretation. The owner of a small candy store notes the success of the
+video games in the back, and may ultimately decide that the business is
+a video game parlor with a candy counter. No methodology can guarantee that all such possibilities will be found, but a careful analysis of the
+conversation structure can help reveal conversations with a potential for
+expansion.
+In designing computer-based devices, we are not in the position of
+creating a formal 'system' that covers the functioning of the organization
+and the people within it. When this is attempted, the resulting system
+(and the space of potential action for the people within it) is inflexible
+and unable to cope with new breakdowns or potentials. Instead we design
+additions and changes to the network of equipment (some of it computerbased) within which people work. The computer is like a tool, in that
+it is brought up for use by people engaged in some domain of action.
+The use of the tool shapes the potential for what those actions are and
+how they are conducted. The computer is unlike common tools in its
+connectivity to a larger network of equipment. Its power does not lie in
+having a single purpose, like a carpenter's plane, but in its connection to
+the larger network of communication (electronic, telephone, and paperbased) in which organizations operate.
+Domains are generated by the space of potential breakdown of
+actian
+If our dress shop owner chooses to install a computer-based system dealing
+with some of the conversations, the analysis proceeds by examining (and
+generating) the appropriate domains. Much computer automation deals
+with standard derived domains, such as payroll accounting, billing and
+employee scheduling. A domain of relevant objects, properties, and actions
+has already been generated through standard practice, and is enforced by
+the need to satisfy external conversations based on it (such as those with
+
+the Internal Revenue Service).. But even in these sedimented cases, it
+important to recognize that ultimately the present-at-hand world of
+objects is always based on the breakdown of action.
+As an obvious example, we can ask what a customer's address' is.
+The immediate response is "For what?"
+(or, "What is the conversation
+in which it determines a condition of satisfaction?"). There are two distinct answers., Some conversations with customers involve requests for
+the physical transfer of goods while others involve correspondence. Different conditions of satisfaction require different kinds of address. This is
+a standard case, and most business forms and computer data bases will
+distinguish "shipping address" and "billing address." But we may also
+need an address where the person can be found during the day to perform
+further measurements. In every case, the relevant "property' to be associated with the person is determined by the role it plays in an action. This
+grounding of description in action pervades all attempts to formalize the
+world into a linguistic structure of objects, properties, and events.
+This also leads us to the recognition that the development of any
+computer-based system will have to proced in a cycle from design to
+experience and back again. It is impossible to anticipate all of the relevant breakdowns and their domains.. They emerge gradually in practice.
+System development methodologies need to take this as a fundamental
+condition of generating the relevant domains, and to facilitate it through
+techniques such as building prototypes early in the design process and applying them in situations as close as possible to those in which they will
+eventually be used.
+Breakdown is an interpretation everything exists
+interpre tation withina background
+As a somewhat more interesting example of how the world is generated by
+language, consider the conditions of satisfaction associated with 'fit.' The
+customer is only satisfied by a dress that fits, and a complex linguistic
+domain (the domain of clothing sizes) has been generated to provide a
+means of anticipating and preventing breakdown. But fitting cannot be
+objectively defined. One person may be happy with an article that
+someone else of the same overall shape and size would reject. The history
+fashion and the differences between cultures make it clear that 'fitting'
+interpretation within a particular horizon. But at the same time it
+purely individual.. The background shared by a community is what makes
+individual tastes' possible.
+Ultimately, then, satisfaction is determined not by the world but by
+a declaration on the part of the requestor that a condition is satisfied.
+The case of "fit' may seem extreme, but every condition of satisfaction
+171
+is an
+is not
+
+172
+ultimately rests on a declaration by an individual, within the background
+of a community.. The cases that seem 'objective' are those in which there
+is great regularity and for which possible conversations about satisfaction
+have been regularized (perhaps formally in the legal system). One kind of
+innovation lies in generating new interpretations and corresponding new
+domains for conditions of satisfaction. In fact, one might view this as the
+primary enterprise of the 'fashion' industry (and of every entrepreneur).
+Domains of anticipation are incomplete.
+The domain of clothing sizes was generated to anticipate breakdown in the
+satisfaction of conversations in which clothing is sold. It is a useful but
+incomplete attempt. Given the interpretive nature of 'fit,' no system of
+sizes can guarantee success.. Once again, this is a clearly visible example
+a more universal phenomenon. Every attempt to anticipate breakdown
+reflects a particular domain of anticipation. This does not make it useless,
+but means that we must design with the flexibility to encounter other
+(always unanticipated) breakdowns.
+As another case, consider inventory control. The stock clerk tries to
+maintain a supply on hand that will decrease the possibility of running
+out, while keeping the overall investment in inventory as low as feasible
+(thereby anticipating breakdowns in cash flow). Orders are sent far enough
+ahead of time to anticipate delivery lags, and counts of what has been
+sold are used to keep track of what is on hand.. But of course there are
+breakdowns in all of this.. A supplier can simply fail to deliver as promised.
+An inventory count based on previous inventory and on what has been
+sold fails to account for the items lost through shoplifting. This does not
+mean that anticipation is impossible or that systems should not be built
+to do it. The critical part is to recognize clearly what the real domains
+are. An inventory count is not a statement of fact, but a declaration of
+an interpretation. For many purposes this can be treated as though it
+were the 'actual number of items,' but conversations that depend on this
+assumption will fail to deal with the unexpected cases.
+Computers are a tool for conducting the netwark of
+conversa tians.
+Most of what has been said in this section is independent of computers.
+It applies to businesses and organizations, whether they operate with the
+most modern equipment or with ledger pads and uuills. It is also not
+a prescription for what they should do, but an analysis of what they are
+already doing. If we examine what computers are doing now in settings like
+our example, we find them embodying possibilitic- for action within a set of
+
+recurrent conversations. Whether it be a payroll system, a billing system,
+or an inventory control system, the hardware and software are a medium
+in which requests and promises are made and monitored. There is a wide
+range of possibilities, including the standard packages now prominent in
+commercial applications, the decision support and coordination systems
+described in Chapter 11, and the 'expert' systems being widely promoted
+today. In each case, the question to be asked is not an abstract one of
+"What kind of system is needed?" but a concrete one of how different
+tools will lead to new conversations and in the end to new ways of working
+and Being.
+'Computerization' in its pejorative sense occurs with devices
+that were designed without appropriate consideration of the conversational
+structures they engender (and those that they consequently preclude).
+Innovations have their own domains of breakdown
+We have not tried to deal in our dress shop example with concrete questions of computer devices. In practice one needs to make many choices
+based on the availability, utility, and cost of different kinds of equipmentcomputers, software packages, networks, printers, and so on. In doing so,
+all of the same theoretical considerations apply. As computer users know
+all too well, breakdown is a fundamental concern. It is important to recognize in this area that breakdowns must be understood within a larger
+network of conversation as well. The issue is not just whether the machine
+will stop working, but whether there is a sufficient network of auxiliary
+conversations about system availability, support, training, modification,
+and so on. Most of the well-publicized failures of large computer systems
+have not been caused by simple breakdowns in their functioning, but by
+breakdowns in this larger "web of computing" in which the equipment
+resides.
+Design is always already happening.
+Imagine yourself in the situation depicted at the beginning of the section.
+You resolve to take actions that will lead to acquiring and installing a
+new computer system What does our analysis have to offer? Aren't
+available computer systems good enough? What guidance is there in
+determining what to do or buy?
+Our first response is that we are not proposing some new answer to
+the 'data processing problem' Much of our theoretical analysis applies
+to existing systems, and many of these operate in ways that achieve what
+3 This termis from Kling and Scacchi, "The web of computing" (1982), which is
+based on empirical studies of experience with large scale computer systems in a social
+context.
+173
+
+174
+CHAPTER 12, A DIRECTION FOR DESIGN
+we propose. This is not surprising, since a situation of natural selection
+applies-those systems that work ultimately survive.
+But this is not the whole picture. It is not necessary to belabor what
+everyone knows from experience-computer systems are frustrating, don't
+really work right, and can be as much of a hindrance as a help in many
+situations. We don't offer a magic solution, but an orientation that leads
+to asking significant questions. The result of an analysis like the above
+might well be to lead the shop owner to make changes to the conversations
+as they now occur (by voice and writing) without buying a computer at
+all. Or it might serve as a background from which to generate criteria for
+deciding among competing vendors and creating new interpretations for
+the available systems within the particular situation. Or it might be the
+basis for coming up with entirely new tools that open new possibilities for
+action. Design always proceeds, with or without an articulated theory,
+but we can work to improve its course and its results.
+12.3
+Systematic donmains
+The previous sections point out the central role played by the creation
+through language of the domains in which we act. Language is the creation
+of distinctions: nouns distinguish objects into groups, verbs distinguish
+kinds of actions, etc. This is not something we choose to do, but is a
+fundamental condition of using language. Furthermore, the words are
+constitutive of the objects among which they distinguish. As we showed
+at length in Chapter 5, language does not describe a pre existing world,
+but creates the world about which it speaks. There are whole domains,
+such as those in financial markets involving 'shares, 'options,' and 'futures,
+whose existence is purely linguistic-based on expressions of commitment
+from one individual to another.
+The use of a distinction is very different from its explicit formal
+articulation. The fact that we commonly use a word does not mean that
+there is an unambiguous formal way to identify the things it denotes or to
+determine their properties. But whenever there is a recurrent pattern of
+breakdown, we can choose to explicitly specify a
+systematic domain,
+which definitions and rules are articulated.
+The preceding chapters have repeatedly contrasted the computational
+manipulation of formal representations with the being-in-the-world of human thought and understanding.. In each case we have shown how the
+projection of human capacities onto computational devices was mislead
+ing. But there is a positive side to this difference.. Computers are wonderful
+devices for the rule-governed manipulation of formal representations, and
+there are many areas of human endeavor in which such manipulations are
+
+12.3. SYSTEMATIC DOMAINS
+175
+crucial.. In applying computers appropriately to systematic domains, we
+develop effective tools.
+The development of systematic domains is of course not new. Mathematics is a prototypical example of such a domain, and the development of
+a calculus of logical form, as begun by philosophers such as Frege and Russell, made it possible to apply mathematical techniques to more general
+representations of objects and their properties. Work in computer science
+has added a new dimension-the design of mechanisms that can carry out
+complex sequences of symbolic manipulations automatically, according to
+a fixed set of rules.
+There are many domains in which such manipulations
+are
+common place. One of the most obvious is the numbers representing
+financial entities and transactions. Every accounting program, payroll
+program,
+and billing program operates within a systematic domain of
+bookkeeping that has evolved over centuries of commercial experience. The
+advent of computers has not yet had a major impact on the structure of
+that do main, but it has made it possible to do quickly and efficiently what
+was previously tedious and costly...
+Nobody would argue that an accounting program like Visicalc4 'thinks'
+about business, but it is a vital tool because of the clear and appropriate
+correspondence between its domain and the activities that generate the
+commercial world. Another widespread example is 'word processing,' as
+illustrated in our introductory chapter.. Its domain is the superficial stuff
+of language-letters and punctuation marks, words, sentences, and paragraphs. A word processor does not 'understand' language, but can be used
+to manipulate text structures that have meaning to those who create and
+read them The impact comes not because the programs are 'smart' but
+because they let people operate effectively in a systematic domain that is
+relevant to human work.
+We can best understand the creation of expert systems as the creation
+of systematic domains that are relevant and useful to a particular profession. In developing such a system, there is an initial period of 'knowledge
+acquisition,' during which professionals in the domain work together with
+'knowledge engineers' to articulate the structure of the relevant concepts
+and rules. This is often described as a process of "capturing' the knowledge that the experts already have and use. In fact, it is a creative design
+activity in which a systematic domain is created, covering certain aspects
+of the professionals' work. The successful examples of expert systems have
+almost all been the result of long and intensive effort by a particularly qual-
+4Visicalc is a microcomputer program that lets a parson manipulate an electronic
+spreadsheet' with rows and columns of related figures It is one of the most commercially successful pieces of sofiware ever created, and is credited with motivating the
+purchase of more small home and business computers than any other single program
+
+176
+ified practitioner, and it can well be argued that the domains generated in
+developing the system are themselves significant research contributions.
+Such profession-oriented domains
+can be the basis for
+computational
+tools that do some tasks previously done by professionals. They can also
+be the basis for tools that aid in communication and the cooperative accumulation of knowledge. A profession-oriented domain makes explicit
+aspects of the work that are relevant to computer-aided tools and can be
+general enough to handle a wide range of what is done within a profession,
+in contrast to the very specialized domains generated in the design of a
+particular computer system. A systematic domain is a structured formal
+representation that deals with things the professional already knows how
+to work with, providing for precise and unambiguous description and manipulation. The critical issue is its correspondence to a domain that is
+ready-to-hand for those who will use it.
+Examples of profession-oriented systematic domains already exist. One
+of the reasons for Visicald's great success is that it gives accountants transparent access to a systematic domain with which they already have a great
+deal of experience the spreadsheet. They do not need to translate their
+actions into an unfamiliar domain such as the data structures and algorithms of a programming language. In the future we will see the development of many domains, each suited to the experience and skills of workers
+in a particular area, such as typography, insurance, or civil engineering.
+To some extent, the content of each profession-oriented domain will be
+unique. But there are common elements that cross the boundaries. One
+of these-the role of language in coordinated action-has already been
+discussed at length. The computer is ultimately a
+structured dynamic
+communication medium
+that is qualitatively different from earlier
+media
+such as print and telephones. Communication is not a process of transmitting information or symbols, but one of commitment and interpretation.
+A human society operates through the expression of requests and promises
+among its members. There is a systematic domain relevant to the struc
+ture of this network of commitments, a domain of "conversation for action'
+that can be represented and manipulated in the computer.
+Another widely applicable domain is the specification of mechanisms
+like those in computer hardware and programs. These involve physically
+embodied systems that can be understood as carrying out discrete processes (processes that proceed in identifiable individual steps). There are
+kinds of objects, properties, and relations that are suited to describing
+them and that can be embodied in a systematic domain Programming
+languages are one approach to formalizing this domain, but in general
+they are not well suited to the communication of intent and conceptual
+structure.. They are too oriented to the structure of the machine, rather
+
+than to the structure of its behavior. We are beginning to see the devel-
+
+12.4. TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSFORMATION
+opment of 'system specification languages" that deal with the domain of
+computational devices in a more general way.
+In all situations where systematic domains are applicable, a central
+(and often difficult) task is to characterize the precise form and relevance
+of the domain within a broader orientation. In our example of coordination systems, we find the embedding of a systematic domain (conversation
+structure within the larger domain of language. The meaning of an utterance is not captured by a formal structure, but lies in the active listening
+of a hearer in a context. At the same time, its role within a particular
+network of requests and promises can be identified and represented in a
+systematic way. In a similar vein, the rows and columns of a bookkeeping
+program do not reflect the meaning of the economic system, but isolate
+one aspect that is amenable to systematic treatment. The limitations of
+this domain become obvious in attempts to apply accounting techniques to
+non-systematic areas, such as measuring overall 'productivity or providing a cost-benefit analysis of activities (such as research) whose 'products'
+are not easily measured
+Every within areas such as law-where there is a primary concern with
+the social and ethical fabric-we find an interaction between the contex
+and the systematic. The statutes and decisions provide a systematic
+framework that is the basis for argumentation in court. There are clear
+formal statements, such as "In order to be guilty of first-degree murder,
+there must be premeditation." But of course these rest on understand
+of terms like "premeditation,' which call for contextual interpretation.
+Computer programs can help a lawyer manipulate formal structures and
+deductions that can be made from them, while leaving the 'hard questions'
+open to human interpretation. 6
+12.4 Technology and transformation
+Our book has focussed on the designing of computer-based tools as part
+of a larger perspective of ontological design. We are concerned with what
+happens when new devices are created, and with how possibilities for inno
+vation arise. There is a circularity here: the world determines what we can
+do and what we do determines our world. The creation of a new device or
+systematic domain can have far-reaching significance-it can create new
+ways of being that previously did not exist and a framework for actions
+that would not have previously made sense. As an example, systematic
+bookkeeping techniques did not just make it easier to keep track of the
+5Sce Winograd, "Beyond programming languages" (1979).
+6See Gardner,
+An Artificial Intelligence Approach to Legal Reasoning
+press), for an example and a general discussion of the issues,
+177
+tual
+ings
+(in
+
+178
+f i nancial details of business as it existed. New ways of doing business
+(in fact, whole new businesses dealing with financial transactions) became
+possible, and the entire financial activity of society evolved in accord with
+the structure of the new domain.
+The hermeneutic orientation of Chapter 3 and the biological theories of
+Chapter 4 give us insight into this process. In the act of design we bring
+forth the objects and regularities in the world of our concern. We are
+engaged in an activity of interpretation that creates both possibilities and
+blindness.. As we work within the domain we have defined, we are blind to
+the context from which it was carved and open to the new possibilities it
+generates.. These new possibilities create a new openness for design, and
+the process repeats in an endless circle.
+In Maturana's terms, the key to cognition is the plasticity of the
+cognitive system, giving it the power of structural coupling. As the
+domain of interactions is modified, the structure of the interacting system
+changes in accord with it. We cannot directly impose a new structure on
+any in dividual, but whenever we design changes to the space of interactions,
+we trigger changes in individual structure-changes to the horizon that is
+the precondition for understanding.
+Computers have a particularly powerful impact, because they are machines for acting in language. In using them we engage in a discourse
+generated within the distinctions set down by their programmers. The
+objects, properties, and acts we can distinguish and perform are organized according to a particular background and pre-understanding In
+most cases this pre-understanding reflects the rationalistic tradition we
+have criticized throughout this book.. It includes biases about objectivity,
+about the nature of "facts' (or 'data' or "information) and their origin,
+and about the role of the individual interacting with the computer.
+We have argued that tools based on this pre-understanding will lead to
+important kinds of breakdown in their use. But there is a larger problem
+as well. As we work with devices whose domains of action are based on
+an interpretation of "data,'
+'goals,' "operators,' and so forth, we develop
+patterns of language and action that reflect these assumptions. These
+carry over into our understanding of ourselves and the way we conduct our
+lives. Our criticism of descriptions of human thought as 'decision making'
+and language understanding as the manipulation of representations is not
+just a prediction that certain kinds of computer programs will fail. It
+reflects a deeper concern with the discourse and actions that are generated
+a rationalistic interpretation of human action. Computer systems can
+easily reinforce this interpretation, and working with them can reinforce
+patterns of acting that are consistent with it.7
+7This effect is described in Turkle, The Second Self (1984).
+by
+
+12.4. TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSFORMATION
+179
+On the other hand, where there is a danger there is an opportunity.
+We can create computer systems whose use leads to better domains of
+interpretation. The machine can convey a kind of coaching' in which new
+possibilities for interpretation and action emerge. For example, coordination systems grew out of research on how to train people to improve their
+effectiveness in working with others. This training in communication for
+action's reveals for people how their language acts participate in a network of human commitments. The training does not involve computers,
+but rests on the development of a new linguistic domain-new distinctions
+and descriptions that serve as a basis for action. The use of a coordination
+system can help develop and reinforce this new understanding. Even at
+the simple level of providing the initial possibilities of make request' and
+'make promise' instead of 'send message,' it continually reminds one of the
+commitment that is the basis for language. As one works successfully in
+this domain, the world begins to be understood in these terms, in settings
+far away from the computer devices.
+This is just one example of a phenomenon that is only beginning to
+emerge in designing computers-the domain created by a design is a do
+main in which people live. Computers, like every technology, are a vehicle
+for the transformation of tradition. We cannot choose whether to effect
+a transformation: as designers and users of technology we are always already engaged in that transformation, independent of our will. We cannot
+choose what the transformation will be: individuals cannot determine the
+course of a tradition. Our actions are the perturbations that trigger the
+changes, but the nature of those changes is not open to our prediction
+or control. We cannot even be fully aware of the transformation that is
+taking place: as carriers of a tradition we cannot be objective observers of
+it. Our continuing work toward revealing it is at the same time a source
+of concealment.
+However, we can work towards unconcealment, and we can let our
+awareness of the potentials for transformation guide our actions in creating and applying technology. In ontological designing, we are doing
+more than asking what can be built. We are engaging in a philosophical discourse about the self-about what we can do and what we can be.
+Tools are fundamental to action, and through our actions we generate the
+world. The transformation we are concerned with is not a technical one,
+but a continuing evolution of how we understand our surroundings and
+ourselves-of how we continue becoming the beings that we are.
+8 The training was developed by F., Flores through Hermenet, Inc., in San Francisco,
+and Logonet, Inc.., in Berkeley.
+
+Bibliography
+Alexander, Christopher,
+MA:
+Notes on the Synthesis of Form,
+Cambridge,
+Harvard University Press, 1964,
+Alexander, Tom, Computers on the road to self-improvement,
+Week, June 14, 1982, 148-160.
+Alvey, Lord, A Programme for Advanced Information Technology
+The
+Business
+Report of the Alvey Committee,
+London: Her Majesty's
+Stationery
+Office, 1982.
+Austin, J.L., How to Do Things with Words,
+Harvard
+Cambridge, MA:
+University Press, 1962
+Barnett, G.. Octo, The computer and clinical judgment,
+Journal of Medicine, 307:8 (August 19, 1982), 494-495.
+Barwise, Jon and John Perry, Situations and Attitudes,
+The New England
+Cambridge, MA:
+Bradford/M.I.T. Press, 1983.
+Beer, Stafford, Platform for Change, New York: Wiley, 1975.
+Begley, Sharon, John Carey and Michael Reese, How smart can computers
+get?, Newsweek 95:26 (June 30, 1980), 52-53.
+Betti, Emilio, Teoria Generale della Interpretazione,
+A.
+Milan: Dott.
+Giuffre, 1955.
+Bobrow, Daniel, Dimensions of representation, in Bobrow and Collins
+(1975), 1-34.
+Bobrow, Daniel (Ed.), Special issue on non-monotonic logic,
+Artificial In-
+telligence,
+13:1 (January 1980), 1-174,
+Bobrow, Daniel and Allen M. Collins (Eds..),
+standing.-,- Studies in Cognitive Science,
+Representation and Under-
+New York: Academic
+Press,
+1975.
+Bobrow, Daniel and Donald Norman, Some principles of memory schemata, in Bobrow and Collins, (1975), 131-150.
+Bobrow, Daniel and Terry Winograd, An overview of KRL, a knowledge
+representation language, Cognitive Science,
+1:1 (January 1977), 3-46.
+
+Bobrow, Daniel and Terry Winograd, KRL: Another perspective,
+tive Science, 3:1 (January-March 1979), 29-42.
+181
+Cogni-
+
+182
+Bobrow, Daniel, Terry Winograd, and the KRL Research Group, Experience with KRL-0: One cycle of a knowledge representation language,
+Proceedings of the Fifth International Joint Conference on
+Artificial
+Intelligence, Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon Computer Science Department, 1977, 213-222.
+Boguslaw, Robert, The New Utopians: A Study of System Design
+Social Change, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965.
+Buchanan, Bruce, New research on expert systems, in J.E. Hayes, D
+Michie, and Y-H. Pao (Eds.),
+Machine Intelligence 10,
+Chichester:
+Ellis Horwood Ltd., 1982, 269-299.
+Business Week, Artificial Intelligence; The second computer age begins,
+March 8, 1982, 66-72.
+Business Week, Robots join the labor force, June 9, 1980, 62-76.
+Cadwallader-Cohen, J.B., W.S. Zysiczk, and R.R. Donnelly, The chaostron, Datamation, 7:10 (October 1961). Reprinted in R. Baker (Ed.),
+A Stress Analysis of a Strapless Evening Gown,
+New York:
+Anchor,
+1969.
+Cashman, Paul M and Anatol W. Holt, A communication-oriented approach to structuring the software maintenance environment,
+ACM
+SIGSOFT, Software Engineering Notes,
+5:1 (January 1980), 4-17.
+Chomsky, Noam, Reflections on Language,
+New York: Pantheon, 1975.
+Cicourel, Aaron V., Cognitive Sociology: Language and Meaning in
+Social
+Interaction, New York: Free Press, 1974.
+Club of Rome, The Limits to Growth, New York: Universe Books, 1972.
+CNSRS, Report on artificial intelligence, prepared by the Inria Sico club
+and the CNSRS working party on Artificial Intelligence, in
+Technology
+and Science of Informatics, 2:5 (1983), 347-362.
+D Amato, Anthony, Can/should, computers replace judges?,
+Georgia Law
+Review, 11 (1977), 1277-1301..
+Davidson, Donald and G. Harman (Eds.),
+Semantics of Natural
+Language,
+Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972.
+Davis, Dwight B., Assessing the Strategic Computing Initiative,
+High
+Technology, 5:4 (April 1985), 41-49..
+Davis, Randall, Interactive transfer of expertise: Acquisition of new inference rules, Artificial Intelligence,
+12:2 (August 1979), 121-157.
+Dennett, Daniel, Intentional systems,
+The Journal of Philosophy,
+68 (1971),
+87-106. Reprinted in Haugeland (1981), 220-242.
+Dennett, Daniel, Mechanism and responsibility, in Ted Honderich (Ed.),
+
+Essays on the Freedom of Action, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
+1973. Reprinted in D. Dennett,
+Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on
+Mind and Psychology, Montgomery, VT: Bradford, 1978, 233-255.
+Dreyfus, Hubert L.., What Computers Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial
+
+183
+Reason, New York: Harper & Row, 1972 (2nd Edition with new
+Preface, 1979)..
+Dreyfus, Hubert L.,
+Being-in-the- World: A Commentary on Division
+Heidegger's Being and Time,
+Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Stuart E. Dreyfus,
+York: Macmillan/The Free Press, 1985.
+Evans, Christopher,
+The Micro Millennium,
+Feigenbaum, Edward, AAAI President's message,
+ter 1980/81), 1, 15..
+Feigenbaum, Edward and Julian Feldman (Eds.),
+Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. ,Press, in press.
+Mind Over Machine,
+New
+New York: Viking, 1979.
+Al Magazine, 2:1
+(Win-
+Computers and Thought,
+New York: McGraw Hill, 1963.
+Feigenbaum, Edward and Pamela McCorduck,
+The Fifth Generation: Ar-
+tificial Intelligence and Japan's Computer Challenge to the
+World,
+Reading, MA: Addison- Wesley, 1983.
+Fillmore, Charles, An alternative to checklist theories of meaning, in A.
+Cogen et al. (Eds.), Proceedings of the First Annual Meeting of
+Berkeley Linguistics Society, University of California, Berkeley,
+1975.
+Flores, C. Fernando, Management and communication in the office of the
+future, Report printed by Hermenet Inc., San Francisco, 1982.
+Flores, C. Fernando and Juan Ludlow, Doing and speaking in the office, in
+G. Fick and R. Sprague (Eds.),
+DSS: Issues and Challenges, London:
+Pergamon Press, 1981.
+Fodor, Jerry, Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy
+in cognitive psychology, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3
+(1980),
+63-73. Reprinted in Haugeland (1981), 307-338.
+Fogel, Lawrence J., Alvin J. Owens, and Michael J. Walsh,
+telligence Through Simulated Evolution,
+Artificial In-
+New York: John Wiley,
+1966..
+Frege, Gottlob, On sense and nominatum, in H.. Feigl and W. Sellars
+(Eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis,
+New York: Appleton
+Century Crofts, 1949, 85-102 (published originally in German, 1892).
+Gadamer, Hans-Georg,
+Truth and Method
+(translated and edited by Garrett Barden and John Cumming), New York: Seabury Press, 1975.
+Gadamer, Hans-Georg,
+Philosophical Hermeneutics
+(translated by
+David
+E. Linge), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976..
+Gardner, Anne, An Artificial Intelligence Approach to Legal
+
+Reasoning,
+Cambridge, MA: Bradford/M.I. T. Press, in press.
+Gardner, Howard, The Mind's New Science. A History of the
+Cognitive
+Revolution, New York: Basic Books, 1985.
+Garfinkel, Harold, What is ethnomethodology, in H. Garfinkel (Ed.),
+ies in Ethnomethodology, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967.
+Goffman, Erving, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life,
+York:
+Doubleday, 1959. Penguin Edition, 1971.
+Stud-
+New
+
+184
+Grice, H. Paul, Logic and conversation, in P. Cole and J.L. Morgan (Eds.),
+Studies in Syntax, Volume III, New York: Academic Press, 1975.
+Grosz, Barbara, Utterance and objective: Issues in natural language communication, Al Magazine, 1:1 (Spring 1980), 11-20.
+Habermas, Jurgen, What is universal pragmatics?, in J. Habermas,
+munication and the Evolution of Society
+Com
+(translated by Thomas
+Mc-
+Carthy), Boston: Beacon Press, 1979, 1-68.
+Habermas, Jurgen, Wahrheitstheorien, in H. Fahrenbach
+(Ed.), Wirk-
+Izchkezt and Refiexion, Neske: Pfullingen, 1973, 211-265. Quotations
+based on anonymous translation (manuscript 40 pp,), "Theories of
+truth," undated..
+Haugeland, John, The nature and plausibility of cognitivism,
+The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2 (1978), 215-260. Reprinted in
+Haugeland
+(1981), 243-281.
+Haugeland, John, Mind Design, Montgomery, VT: Bradford/M.I.T. Press,
+1981.
+Haugeland, John, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea,
+Cambridge,
+MA:
+Bradford/M. I. T. Press, 1985.
+Hayes, Pat, In defence of logic,
+Joint
+Proceedings of the Fifth International
+Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
+Pittsburgh: Carnegie
+Mellon
+Computer Science Dept., 1977, 559-565.
+Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time
+(translated by John Macquarrie and
+Edward Robinson), New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
+Heidegger, Martin,
+What Is Called Thinking?
+(translated by Fred D.
+Wieck and J. Glenn Gray), New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
+Heidegger, Martin, On the Way to Language
+(translated by Peter Hertz),
+New York: Harper & Row, 1971
+Heidegger, Martin, The Question Concerning Technology
+translated
+by
+William Lovitt), New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
+Hintikka, Jaako, Quantifiers in logic and quantifiers in natural languages,
+in S.. Koener (Ed.), Philosophy of Logic, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, 208-232.
+Hintikka, Jaako, Julius Moiavosik, and Patrick Suppes (Eds ),
+Approaches
+to Natural Language,
+Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973
+Hirsch, E.D.. Jr., Validity in Interpretation,
+New Haven, CT: Yale
+University Press, 1967.
+Hobbs, Jerry, Coherence and coreference,
+Cognitive Science,
+3:1 (January-
+
+March 1979), 67-90.
+Hotstadter, Douglas,
+Godel, Escher, Bach.. An Eternal Golden Braid,
+New
+York: Basic Books, 1979,
+Holt, Anatol W., HR. Ramsey and J.D.. Grimes, Coordination system
+technology as the basis for a programming environment,
+Communication, 57:4
+(1983), 307-314.
+Electrical
+
+185
+Jackendoff, Ray, Toward an explanatory semantic representation,
+Linguistic Inquiry, 7:1 (Winter 1976) 89-150.
+Jastrow, Robert, The thinking computer,
+Science Digest,
+90:6 (June 1982),
+54-55, 106-107.
+John-Steiner, Vera, and Paul Tatter, An interactionist model of language
+development, in B. Bain (Ed.),
+The Sociogenesis of Language
+Human Conduct, New York: Plenum, 1983.
+Katz, J.J. and J. A Fodor, The structure of a semantic theory, in J. Fodor
+and J, Katz (Eds.), The Structure of Language,
+Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
+Prentice Hall, 1964, 479-518.
+Keen, Peter G. W. and Michael S. Scott-Morton,
+tems: An Organizational Perspective,
+Decision Support Sys-
+Reading, MA: Addison-
+Wesley,
+1978.
+Keenan, Edward L. (Ed.),
+Formal Semantics of Natural Language,
+Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975..
+Kling, Rob and Walt Scacchi, The web of computing: Computing technology as social organization, in M. Yovits (Ed.),
+Advances in Computers,
+Vol.. 21, 1982, 1-90.
+Kohler, Wolfgang,
+Gestalt Psychology, New York: Liveright, 1929.
+Kuhn, Thomas,
+The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
+Chicago:
+University of Chicago Press, 1962.
+Lakatos, Imre, Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (Eds.),
+Criticism and the
+Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
+Lakatos, Imre, Proofs and Refutations, Cambridge: Cambridge University
+Press, 1976.
+Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson,
+Metaphors We Live By,
+Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
+Land, Edwin, The retinex theory of color vision,
+Scientific American,
+237:6
+(December 1977), 108-128.
+Leech, Geoffrey, Towards a Semantic Description of English,
+Longman, 1969.
+Lehnert, Wendy, Michael Dyer, Peter Johnson, and C.J,. Yang, BORIS:
+An experiment in in-depth understanding of narratives,
+Artificial In-
+telligence,
+20:1 (1983), 15-62.
+Lenat, Douglas, The ubiquity of discovery,
+Artificial Intelligence, 9
+(1977),
+257-286.
+Lenat, Douglas, Computer software for intelligent systems,
+Scientific Am-
+London:
+
+erican, 251:3 (September 1984), 204-211.
+Lindsay, Robert, Bruce Buchanan, Edward Feigenbaum, and Joshua Lederberg, DENDRAL, New York: MoGraw Hill, 1980.
+Linsky, Leonard (Ed.),
+Semantics and the Philosophy of Language,
+Ur-
+bana: University of Illinois Press, 1952.
+
+186
+Lyons, John, Structural Semantics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1963.
+Marr, David, Vision, New York: Freeman, 1982..
+Maturana, Humberto R., Biology of cognition (1970). Reprinted in Maturana and Varela (1980), 2-62.
+Maturana, Humberto R., Neurophysiology of cognition, in P. Garvin (Ed.),
+Cognition: A Multiple View,
+New York: Spartan Books, 1970, 3-23.
+Maturana, Humberto R.., Cognitive strategies, in von Foerster (1974), 457-
+469,
+Maturana, Humberto R.., The organization of the living: a theory of the
+living organization, International Journal Man-Machine Studies,
+7
+(1975), 313-332.
+Maturana, Humberto R., Biology of language: The epistemology of reality,
+in GA. Miller and E,. Lenneberg (Eds.),
+Psychology and Biology of
+Language and Thought. Essays in Honor of Eric Lenneberg,
+New
+York:
+Academic Press, 1978, 27-64.
+Maturana, H.R., J, Y, Lettvin, W.S. MoCulloch, and W.H.. Pitts, Anatomy
+and physiology of vision in the frog,
+Journal of General Physiology,
+43 (1960), 129-175..
+Maturana, Humberto R., Gabriela Uribe, and Samy Frenk, A biological
+theory of relativistic color coding in the primate retina,
+Arch. Biologia
+y Mea. Exp., Suplemento No, 1, Santiago: University of Chile, 1968.
+Maturana, Humberto R. and Francisco Varela,
+Autopoiesis and
+Cognition:
+The Realization of the Living,
+Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980.
+McCarthy, John, An unreasonable book (review of Joseph Weizenbaum's
+Computer Power and Human Reason), Creative Computing,
+2:9
+(September-October 1976), 84-89,.
+McDermott, John, RI: A rule-based configurer of computer systems, Ar-
+tificial Intelligence,
+19:1 (September 1982), 39-88.
+Minsky, Marvin (Ed.), Semantic Information Processing,
+Cambridge, MA:
+M.I.T. Press, 1967..
+Minsky, Marvin, A framework for representing knowledge, in Winston
+(1975), 211-277.
+Minsky, Marvin, The society theory of thinking, in P. Winston and R.
+Brown (Eds.), Artificial Intelligence: An MIT Perspective,
+Cambridge,
+MA: M.I.T. Press, 1979, 421-452.
+Minsky, Marvin, K-Lines: a theory of memory, in Norman (1981), 87-104.
+Mintzberg, Henry, The Nature of Managerial Work,
+New York: Harper
+&
+Row, 1973.
+
+Moore, J. and A. Newell, How can MERLIN understand?, in L. Gregg
+(Ed.), Knowledge and Cognition, Baltimore, MD: Lawrence Eribaum
+Associates, 1973.
+Moravcsik, Julius, How do words get their meanings?,
+Philosophy,
+78:1 (January 1981), 5-24.
+The Journal of
+
+187
+Moto-oka, T., Keynote speech: Challenge for knowledge information processing systems, in Moto-oka (1982), 1-89
+Moto-oka, T, (Ed), Fifth Generation Computer Systems
+Proceedings of
+International Conference on Fifth Generation Computer Systems,
+Am-
+sterdam: North Holland, 1982
+Newell, Allen, The knowledge level,
+1982), 87-127.
+Newell, Allen and Herbert A Simon,
+Artificial Intelligence,
+18:1 (January
+Human Problem Solving,
+New York:
+Prentice Hall, 1972
+Newell, Allen and Herbert A Simon, Computer science as an empirical inquiry: Symbols and search, Communications of the ACM,
+19:3 (March
+1976), 113-26 Reprinted in Haugeland (1981), 35-66.
+Nilsson, Nils, Learning Machines,
+New York: McGraw Hill, 1965,
+Nilsson, Nils,
+Principles of Artificial Intelligence,
+Palo Alto, CA:
+Tioga,
+1980.
+Norman, Donald A
+(Ed,), Perspectives on Cognitive Science,
+Norwood,
+NJ: Ablex, 1981
+Norman, Donald and Daniel Bobrow, On data-limited and resource-limited
+processes, Cognitive Psychology, 7(1975), 44-64
+Norman, Donald, David Rumelhart, and the LN Group,
+Explorations in
+Cognition, San Francisco: Freeman, 1975.
+Palmer, Richard E., Hermeneutics; Interpretation theory in
+Schleiermacher, Dzlthey, Hezdegger and Gadamer,
+Evanston, IL:
+Northwestern
+University Press, 1969,
+Pask, Gordon, Conversation, Cognition and Learning. A Cybernetic
+Theory and Methodology, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1975.
+Pask, Gordon, Conversation Theory. Applications in Education and
+Epzstemology, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1976.
+Putnam, Hilary, Is semantics possible?, in HE. Kiefer and MK. Munitz
+(Eds,), Language, Belief and Metaphysics,
+Albany: SUNY Press,
+1970,
+50-63.
+Rosch, Eleanor, Cognitive representations of semantic categories,
+of Experimental Psychology General,
+104 (1975), 192-233.
+Russell, Bertrand, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy,
+Journal
+London:
+
+Al-
+len and Unwin, 1920.
+Samuel, Arthur, Some studies in machine learning using the game of checkers, in Feigenbaum and Feldman (1963), 71-108.
+Schank, Roger, Language and memory, in Norman (1981), 105-146.
+Schank, Roger C. and R.P, Abelson,
+Scripts
+Plans Goals and
+Understanding, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1977.
+Schank, Roger and Christopher Riesbeck,
+Inside
+Computer
+Understanding,
+Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1981.
+
+188
+Searle, John R.,
+Speech Acts,
+Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
+1969.
+Searle, John R., A taxonomy of illocutionary acts, in K. Gunderson (Ed.),
+Language, Mind and Knowledge,
+Minneapolis: University of
+Minnesota, 1975, 344-369. Reprinted in Searle (1979), 1-29.
+Searle, John R., Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of
+Speech
+Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1979.
+Searle, John R., Literal meaning,
+Erkenntnis,
+13:1 (July 1978), 207-224.
+Reprinted in Searle (1979), 117-136.
+Searle, John R.., Minds, brains, and programs,
+The Behavioral and Brain
+Sciences, 3 (1980), 417-424, Reprinted in Haugeland (1981), 282-306.
+Shortliffe, Edward, Computer Based Medical Consultations.: MYCIN,
+New
+York: American Elsevier, 1976..
+Simon, Herbert A.,
+The Shape of Automation
+• for Men and
+Management,
+New York: Harper and Row, 1965.
+Simon, Herbert A., Administrative Behavior
+(3rd Edition), New York:
+The
+Free Press, 1976.
+Simon, Herbert A., Cognitive science: The newest science of the artificial,
+in Norman (1981), 13-26...
+Sluzier, Suzanne and Paul M. Cashman, XCP: An experimental tool for
+supporting office procedures,
+IEEE 1984 Proceedings of the First In-
+ternational Conference on Office Automation, Silver Spring, MD:
+LEEE
+Computer Society, 1984, 73-80.
+Stockton, William, Creating computers to think like humans (first of a
+two part series), New York Times Magazine,
+December 7, 1980, 40-
+43, 182-187..
+Suppes, Patrick, From behaviorism to neobehaviorism,
+Theory and Decision, 6 (1975), 269-285.
+Tarski, Alfred, The semantic conception of truth,
+Philosophy and Phe
+nomenological Research, 4 (1944). Reprinted in Linsky (1952), 13-47.
+Turkle, Sherry, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit,
+New
+York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.
+Uttal, Bro, Here comes Computer Inc.,
+Fortune, October 4, 1982, 82-90.
+Varela, Francisco J., Principles of Biological Autonomy,
+New York:
+Elsevier-North Holland, 1979.
+Varela, Francisco J., Living ways of sense making: A middle way ap-
+
+proach to neurosciences, in P. Livingston et al.
+(Eds..),
+Disorder-
+Order:
+Proceedings of the Stanford International Symposium,
+CA: Anma Libri, 1984.
+Varela, Francisco J.,
+El Arbol de Conocimiento
+translated as The Tree of Knowledge.
+von Forster, Heinz (organizer),
+Cybernetics of Cybernetics,
+Saratoga,
+(forthcoming). To be
+Urbana:
+Biological Computer Laboratory, University of Illinois, 1974..
+
+189
+Weizenbaum, Joseph, ELIZA,
+Communications of the ACM,
+9:1
+(January,
+1966), 36-45.
+Weizenbaum Joseph,
+Computer Power and Human Reason,
+San
+Francisco:
+Freeman, 1976.
+Wessel, Milton R.,
+Freedom's Edge: The Computer Threat to
+Society,
+Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1974.
+Winograd, Terry,
+Understanding Natural Language,
+New York:
+Academic
+Press, 1972.
+Winograd, Terry, When will computers understand people?,
+Psychology
+Today, 7:12 (May 1974), 73-79.
+Winograd, Terry, Toward a procedural understanding of semantics,
+Revue
+Internationale de Philosophie, 3:117-118 (1976), 260-303.
+Winograd, Terry, Beyond programming languages,
+Communications of the
+ACM, 22:7 (July 1979), 391-401.
+Winograd, Terry, What does it mean to understand language?, in Norman
+(1981), 231-264.
+Winograd, Terry, Moving the semantic fulcrum,
+Linguistics and Philosophy, 8:1 (1985), 91-104.
+Winograd, Terry, A language/action perspective on the design of cooperative work, Human-Computer Interaction,
+3(1987).
+Winston, Patrick, Learning structural descriptions from examples, in Winston (1975), 157-210.
+Winston, Patrick (Ed.), The Psychology of Computer Vision,
+New
+York:
+McGraw Hill, 1975.
+Winston, Patrick, Learning by creating and justifying transfer frames,
+Artificial Intelligence,
+10:2 (April 1978), 147-172.
+Winston, Patrick, Learning and reasoning by analogy,
+Communications of
+the ACM, 23:12 (December 1980), 689-703.
+Wittgenstein, Ludwig,
+Philosophical Investigations
+(translated by
+G.E.
+Anscombe), Oxford: Blackwell, 1963.
+Zeleny, M. (Ed.), Autopoiesis, a Theory of the Living Organization,
+New
+York: Elsevier-North Holland, 1978.
+
+Name Index
+Abelson, Robert, 23n, 113n, 115
+Alexander, Christopher, 163
+Alexander, Tom, 126
+Allende, Salvador, xi
+Ape], Karl, 9
+Aristotle, 30, 109
+Austin, J.L., xii, 10,56, 58, 70
+Bamberger, Jean, xili
+Barnett, Octo, 133
+Barwise, Jon, 69n, 114n
+Beer, Stafford, xii, 166n
+Bell, Chauncey, Xili
+Betti, Emilio, 28n
+Bobrow, Daniel, xiii, 23, 115, 117n,
+118n
+Boguslaw, Robert, 21, 153-154
+Buchanan, Bruce, 131
+Cadwallader-Cohen, J,B., 102n
+Cashman, Paul, 161
+Cherubini, Ralph, xiv
+Chomsky, Noam, 39
+Cicourel, Aaron, xiii, 29n
+Collins, Allen, 23n
+D'Amato, Anthony, 156
+Dantzig, George, xiv
+Davidson, Donald, 18n
+Davis, Randall, 123n
+Dennett, Dan, 106
+Descartes, Rene, 30
+Dewey, John, 9, 63n
+Donnelly, R.R., 102n
+Dreyfus, Hubert, xiv, 10n, 16, 32n,
+99n, 132
+Dreyfus, Stuart, 99n, 132
+Erhard, Werner, xii
+Evans, Christopher, 4, 99, 156
+Fagen, Richard, xiv
+Feigenbaum, Edward, 108n, 125,
+133n
+Feldman, Julian, 108n
+Fillmore, Charles, 112n
+Flores, Fernando, xi, xiv,
+159n,
+179n
+Floyd, Robert, xiv
+Fodor, Jerry, 18n, 86n, 109, 112n
+Fogel, Lawrence, 102
+Frege, Gottlob, 17n, 175
+Frenk, Samy, 41
+Freud, Sigmund, 6
+Gadamer, Hans-Georg, xii, 9, 28-
+32,61, 70,99, 105, 112.
+Galileo, 30
+Gardner, Anne, xiv, 177n
+Garfinkel, Harold, 29n
+Gerson, Elihu, xiv
+Goffman, Erving, 29n
+Graves, Michael, xili
+Grice, H.P.., 57
+Grimes, J.D., 161n
+Grosz, Barbara, 113n
+157
+Habermas, Jurgen, 9, 10, 59, 62,
+76, 112
+191
+
+192
+Harman, Gilbert, 18n
+Haugeland, John, 10n
+Hayes, Pat, 96n
+Heidegger, Martin, xii, 9, 10, 12,
+27, 30-39, 58, 61, 70-73, 76-
+78,97-99,104,112,119,146,
+165
+Hintikka, Jaako, 18n, 67n
+Hirsch, E.D,., 28n
+Hobbs, Jerry, 113n
+Hofstadter, Douglas, 118n, 124
+Holt, Anatol, xiii, 161
+Husserl, Edmund, 9, 31
+Jackendoff, Ray, 18n
+Jastrow, Robert, 4
+John-Steiner, Vera, 63n
+Johnson, Mark, 68n
+Katz, J.J.,
+18n, 112n
+Keen, Peter, 145-147, 153
+Keenan, Edward, 18n
+Kling, Rob, xiii, 84n,
+Kohler, Wolfgang, 51
+Kuhn, Thomas, 24
+173n
+Lakatos, Imre, 24, 55n
+Lakoff, George, xili, 68n
+Land, Edwin, 41n
+Leech, Geoffrey, 18n
+Lehnert, Wendy, 121n
+Lenat, Douglas, 130
+Lettvin, Jerry, 41
+Lindsay, Robert, 131
+Linsky, Leonard, 18n
+Ludlow, Juan, xiii, 159n
+Lyons, Johnn, 18n
+Marr, David, 130n
+Maturana, Humberto, xii, xiv, 10,
+15, 38, 40-53, 61, 64, 67, 70-
+76, 92, 94, 99, 102, 118, 119,
+178
+McCarthy, John, 111
+NAME INDEX
+McCorduck, Pamela, 133n
+McCulloch, Warren, 41
+McDermott, John, 131
+Mead, George Herbert, 9, 63
+Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 9
+Meyer, Charles, xiv
+Minsky, Marvin, 100, 108n, 115,
+118, 130
+Mintzberg, Henry, 151
+Moore, James, 115
+Moravcsik, Julius, 18n, 57
+Moto-oka, Tohru, 135-137
+Newell, Allen, 22,
+96n, 115
+Nilsson, Nils, 96n, 102n
+Norman, Donald, xili, 23n, 24n,
+115, 117n
+23, 86, 95n,
+Ogle, Richard, xiv
+Owens, Alvin, 102
+Palmer, Richard, 27n
+Pask, Gordon, 51n
+Peirce, Charles, 63n
+Perry, John, 69n, 114n
+Pitts, Walter, 41
+Plato, 14, 30
+Putnam, Hilary, 62n, 105n
+Ramsey, H.R, 161n
+Ricoeur, Paul, 9
+Riesbeck, Chris, 119, 120
+Rosch, Eleanor, 57
+Rumelhart, David, 23n
+Russell, Bertrand, 17n, 175
+Samuel, Arthur, 100
+Sartre, Jean Paul, 9
+Scacchi, Walt, 84n, 173n
+Schank, Roger,
+23n, 113n,
+115,
+116, 118n,
+119, 120,
+128n,
+130
+Schon, Donald, xiii
+
+NAME INDEX
+Scott Morton, Michael, 145-147,
+153
+Searle, John, xiii,
+86n, 104n
+10, 54-59, 70,
+Shakespeare, William, 119, 122
+Shortliffe, Edward, 131
+Simon, Herbert,
+20-22, 26,
+86,
+95, 145, 153
+Sluzier, Suzanne, 161n
+Smith, Brian, xiv
+Stockton, William, 3, 152
+Stokoe, Peter, xiv
+Suppes, Patrick, 18n, 48n
+Tarski, Alfred, 17n
+Tatter, Paul, 63n
+Trachtman, Paul, xiv
+Turkle, Sherry, 178n
+193
+Via), Bro, is3a, 41
+Varela, Francisco, xiii,
+38n,
+44,45n
+von Foerster, Heinz, xiii, 38n, 51n
+Walsh, Michael, 102
+Weizenbaum, Joseph,
+111,
+122
+Wessel, Milton, 155
+Winograd, Terry, xi, 18, 69, 109,
+112n, 113, 114n, 115, 177n
+Wingenten, Lic, 121 , 60n
+102, 1221
+Zeleny, M., 44n
+Zysiczk, W.S,, 102n
+40,
+120-
+
+Subject Index
+AAAI (See American Association
+for Artificial Intelligence)
+Abstract machine, 88
+Accidental representation, 91-92
+Accounting, as profession oriented
+systematic domain, 176
+Acquisition (See Knowledge acquisition)
+Act (See Linguistic act, Speech
+act)
+Action, 71-72
+and autopoiesis, 47
+breakdown of, 170-171
+conversation for (See Conversation for action)
+and existence, 69
+as interpretation, 144
+and language (See Language) in
+problem solving, 23
+and thrownness, 34, 71
+Address, as example of distinc
+tion, 171
+Agreement, as basis for meaning,
+62-64
+Al (See Artificial intelligence)
+Aitiational scheme, 57
+Algorithm, 87,90
+Alternatives, 146-149
+choice among, 20-23, 144-150,
+153
+generation of, 149
+(See also Decision making)
+Alvey committee, 134
+American Association for Artificial Intelligence,
+125, 128n
+Amnesty International, xiv
+Analogy, 68, 116-117
+Analytic philosophy
+(See Philosophy)
+Anticipation (See Breakdown)
+Apple (See MacIntosh)
+Appropriateness
+of computer response, 121
+of utterance, 57-58
+Arch, as example of concept, 101
+Argument, structure of, 67-68
+Artificial intelligence, 3-4, 93-139
+applications, 125-131
+and background, 113
+claims for, 3-4, 152
+and cognition, 8, 25, 75, 130
+and common sense, 98
+critiques of, 16
+current developments, 125-139
+and formal logic, 85
+as paradigm, 109
+as problem solving, 22-23, 95-
+programming for, 87-89
+and representation, 84-86, 96n,
+98
+(See also Expert system, Fifth
+generation, Heuristic, Learning, Thinking, Understanding)
+Assembly language, 91
+194
+
+195
+Assertive, speech act, 58, 66
+Automation, 127
+Autonomous agent, 105
+Autonomy, of device, 94
+Autopoiesis, 40, 44-46
+and consensual domain, 49
+Autopoietic system (See Autopoiesis)
+Awareness, 29
+Baby, as example of cognitive system, 52
+Bachelor, as example of word detinition, 112
+Background, 54-58, 74-76, 111-
+ariation o, 61-68s, 73, 148-
+of commitment, 63
+in expert system, 131-133
+and frames, 119
+and interpretation,
+113, 171-
+172
+and listening, 5458
+and meaning, 54-58, 60, 112
+in programming, 155,
+178
+(See also Interpretation, Preunderstanding, Tradition)
+Behavior
+learned vs. instinctive, 45
+rational, 20-23
+Behaviorism, 48
+Being, 29,
+30-33 (See also Exis-.
+tence, Ontology)
+Belief Being-in-the-world, 31, 70-73, 97
+attributed to computer, 106
+explicit formalization of, 32
+Beta structure, 115
+Bias, of computer, 156
+Biological Computer Laboratory,
+Biology, 38-53, 73
+Blindness, 97-100
+awareness of, 167
+created by design, 166-167 to
+commitment, 162
+in decision support system,
+153,
+157
+in human understanding, 123
+inevitability of, 167
+of programs,
+97-98,
+, 101,
+121,
+123, 133
+a of rationalistic tradition, 17, 71
+n recurrence, 151
+in representation, 98, 124
+Blocks world, 101, 109-110
+Bookkeeping, as systematic
+main, 170-171, 175, 177
+do-
+BORIS, 121
+Bounded rationality, 22, 145-146
+Breakdown, 36-37, 66-69, 77-79,
+165-173
+anticipation of,
+78,
+150, 154,
+158, 165, 168, 171-172
+in computer, 5, 36, 75, 78,84,
+90-91, 165-166, 173
+in conversation,
+60,
+66, 168-
+169
+and decision making, 147
+and design, 77-79, 165-166
+as interpretation, 171-172
+and language, 60, 68-69, 78
+in organization, 150, 157
+and readiness-to-hand, 36-37
+recurrence of, 68-69, 150, 158
+Browsing, 166-167
+Car buying, as example of deci-
+148-149
+Center for the Study of Language
+and Information, xiv
+Chaostron, 102n
+Checkers, 100
+Checklist, for definition, 112
+Chile, xi, xiv, 166n
+Choice (See Alternative)
+sion,
+d
+
+196
+Circularity (See Hermeneutic circle, Strange loop)
+Classification, objective, 69
+Clock, 94
+Closure (See Nervous system)
+Clothing size, as example of domain, 171-172
+CNSRS, 134
+Coachin, 15,318.53, 70-22
+in rationalistic tradition, 16, 33,
+and representation, 73, 99
+(See also Cognitive science)
+Cognitive domain, 46-48, 51, 52,
+73
+Cognitive modelling, 25, 130-131
+Cognitive psychology, 24-25, 114
+Cognitive science, 23-26, 74
+Cognitive Science, journal, 23
+Cognitive Science Society, 24
+Cognitive system, 25, 46,
+Cognitive Systems, Inc.., 128
+Color, perception of, 41-43
+Combinatorial concept formation
+(See Concept formation)
+Commissive, type of speech act,
+59, 63, 157
+Commitment, 76-77, 150-160
+as basis for language,
+58-60,
+76-77,179
+concealment of, 156
+in conversation, 66, 157
+forgetfulness of, 76, 156
+and humanness, 76, 106
+in organization, 150-152, 158
+and temporality, 160
+(See also Speech act)
+Common sense
+difficulty of programming, 98
+shaping by technical language,
+7, 178
+Communication, 76-77, 176
+Communicative competence,
+162
+Competence, 39
+Compiler, 88,90
+Completion
+(See
+Conversation)
+Complexity, 94-95
+Component
+of autopoietic unity, 44
+of machine, 87
+Computer 3-7, 83-106
+as abstract machine, 88
+and breakdown (See Breakdown)
+and commitment, 106, 123, 155
+and decision-making, 20-22, 152-
+157
+design of, xi-xili, 53, 75, 77-79,
+163-179
+as evolving structure, 102
+and intelligence
+(See Artificial
+intelligence)
+interaction with, 136-138, 165
+logic device, 87-88
+as medium of communication,
+76, 155, 159
+as physical machine, 87
+as plastic structure-determined
+system, 94, 102
+and representation, 83-92, 174
+177
+and social context, 84, 135-137
+as tool, 71-72, 77, 169-170 (See
+also Coordinator)
+unanticipated effects of, 154
+understanding by See Understanding)
+(See also Artificial intelligence,
+Robot )
+Computer language (See Programming language)
+Computer program, 83-90
+and bias, 156-157
+and blindness, 97-100
+evolution of, 102
+and representation, 84-86, 96n,
+
+98
+and structural change, 94
+for systematic domain, 174-177
+and task domain, 97
+as theory of behavior, 26
+Computerization,
+75,
+173, 154
+155
+Concealment (See Tradition)
+Concept formation, 101-102
+Concernful activity, 33, 37, 69, 73
+Condition of satisfaction, 60, 65-
+66, 171-172
+Connectionist approach, 130
+Consciousness, 52
+Consensual domain, 48-52, 76
+Content word, 17
+Context
+analysis in SHRDLU, 110
+of answer, 155
+in decision making, 146
+in expert system, 131-133
+and frames, 116
+and interpretation, 28
+and literal meaning, 19
+in semantics, 19, 55, 113
+of speech act, 56
+of systematic domain, 177
+and textual meaning, 30
+Conversation, 64-68, 157-162, 168- 173
+completion of, 66, 160
+comter tools for, 157-162, 172-
+as dance, 159
+recurrent, 168, 172-173
+Conversation for action, 64, 151,
+159-161
+Conversation for possibilities, 151
+Conversational principle, 57
+Cooperative domain, 50
+Coordination
+in organization, 143, 158
+197
+Coordination system, 157-162, 177,
+179
+for programming
+161
+to reduce work rigidity, 169
+The Coordinator, 159
+Correspondence theory of mean-
+Counteroffer, 65
+Coupling (See Structural coupling)
+Cybernetics, 38n, 51, 130
+Cybersyn, 166
+Dasein, 31
+Data bank, 155
+Data base, 89, 129
+Decision, programmed vs. nonprogrammed, 153
+Decision maker, 144
+Decision making, 20-23, 144-150
+and pre-orientation, 147
+and rationality, 145
+vs. resolution, 147-150, 151
+(See also Management, Problem solving)
+Decision support system, 152-157,
+Declaration, type of speech act,
+59
+Decomposition, 87
+Decontextualization, 28
+Default, in frame, 115, 117
+Deliberation, as conversation, 149
+DENDRAL, 131
+Denotation, 17
+Description, 50-52
+Design, 4-7, 77-79, 163-179
+and anticipation
+(See Breakdown)
+of computer systems
+puter)
+(See Comof conversation structures, 158,
+169-170
+of domain, 165
+of formal representation, 96, 97
+
+198
+Design (continued)
+as generation of new possibilities, 170
+ontological,
+163, 177-179
+as problem-solving, 77
+and structural coupling, 53, 164,
+178
+Designer', power of, 154
+Desire, attributed to computer,
+106
+Detached observation and reflection, 34, 71
+Diagnosis, by computer, 131-133
+Directive, type of speech act, 58,
+157
+Disintegration, of autopoietic system, 45
+Display hack, 91-92
+Dissolving, of problem, 148
+Distinction
+in language, 69, 174
+by observer, 50-51, 73
+DOCTOR, 120-121
+Doing, as interpretation, 143-144
+Domain, 46-53, 170-179
+of action, 53, 166
+of anticipation, 172
+of breakdown, 166, 170-171, 173
+created by design, 179
+created by language, 174
+design of, 165
+of distinctions, 73
+of explanation, 52-53
+linguistic, 51
+of perturbations, 43, 53, 75
+of recurrence, 64
+of structure-determined behavior, 47, 73
+(See also Cognitive domain, Consensual domain, Cooperative
+domain, Systematic domain)
+Dress shop, as example of design,
+167-174
+Driving, as example of decision
+making, 145
+DSS (See Decision support system)
+Dualism, 30-31, 39, 47
+Effectiveness
+vs. efficiency, 153
+of representation, 85
+Efficiency
+of computer operations, 91
+vs. effectiveness,
+153
+Electronic mail, 165-166
+ELIZA, 120-124
+Emergent situation, 153
+Empiricism, 16n
+Energy crisis,
+147
+Engagement, in speech act, 59
+Environment,
+43n,
+44-46, 48
+Epistemology, 44, 73
+Equipment (See Network of equipment)
+Eskimo, 69
+Established situation, 153
+Ethnomethodology, 29n
+EURISKO, 130
+Everydayness, 34, 98
+Evolution
+artificial, 100-104
+biological, 44-46
+and learning programs, 100-107
+structural coupling, 45
+time scale of, 103
+Exclusionary commitment, 149
+Existence, 68-69 (See also Being,
+Ontology)
+Expectation (See Frame)
+Experiential, grounding of meaning, 67
+Expert, 132
+and meaning, 62n
+representation of knowledge, 99
+Expert system, 131-139
+
+199
+limitations, 132-133
+as systematic domain, 175
+(See also Fifth generation)
+Explanation (See Domain)
+Expressive, type of speech act, 59
+Felicity condition, of speech act,
+56.58
+Fifth generation computer system,
+133-139
+First order structural change, 94
+Fit, as example of condition of
+satisfaction, 171-172
+Formal grounding of meaning, 67
+Formal representation
+(See Representation)
+Formalist approach to management, 21
+Formalization, and recurrence, 64-
+Frame, 115-119, 130
+Frog, visual system, 41, 46
+Front end, natural language, 128
+Functional description, 39
+Game
+as model for logic, 67
+program for playing, 97
+Game theory, 20
+General Problem Solver, 95
+Gestalt psychology, 51
+Goal, in problem solving, 22, 53
+GPS (See General Problem Solver)
+Gravity, as example of presentat-hand, 36
+Grounding, of speech act, 67-69
+Hallucination, 43
+Hammer, as readiness-to-hand, 33,
+36
+Hardware (See Computer)
+Hearer's knowledge, computer analysis of, 114
+Hermenet, Inc., 179n
+Hermeneutic circle, 30, 32
+Hermeneutics, 27-30
+and commitment, 76
+and frames, 116
+objectivist,
+28
+(See also Interpretation)
+Heuristic (See Search)
+Hierarchical decomposition, 87
+Hierarchy of levels, 94
+High-level programming language,
+88-91, 96n
+Historicity
+of domains, 64
+of individual, 29
+and tradition, 7
+History, embodied in structure,
+Horizon, 28, 30 (See also Hermeneutics, Interpretation, Preunderstanding)
+Hypothesis, in science, 15
+Idealism, 31
+Illocutionary force, 59
+in coordinator, 159-161
+Illocutionary point, 58-59
+Implementation
+of computer program, 91
+of functional mechanism, 39
+of programming language, 87
+Indexical, 19n, 111
+Indicative, 19
+Individual, 29, 33
+Infelicity, 55
+Inference (See Reasoning)
+Information, 50, 73, 76
+Information-processing psycholo
+25
+Information-processing system,
+22
+Input, to nervous system, 42
+
+200
+Institute for New Generation Computer Technology, 134
+Instruction, of computer, 88
+Instructive interaction, 43
+Integrated circuit,
+133n
+Intelligence, 93-106
+artificial (See Artificial intelligence)
+and blindness, 97-100
+of computers, 104-106 (See also
+Artificial intelligence)
+and learning, 100
+as rational problem solving, 95-
+97,98
+theories of, 23-26,
+131
+(See also Cognition, Rationality, Thinking, Understanding)
+Intentional stance, 106
+Intentional state, of speaker, 60
+Interface, human-computer, 136-
+137, 164
+Interpretation, 27-33, 35, 111-114
+and breakdown, 171-172
+in conversation, 66
+and design, 178
+and existence, 30-33
+and frames, 115-116
+in law, 177
+of texts, 27-28
+(See also Background, Hermeneutics, Language, Pre-understanding, Understanding)
+Interpreter, for programming language, 88
+Inventory control, as example of
+anticipating breakdown, 172
+Irrationality, 8,
+145
+Irresolution, 147,
+167
+Japan (See Fifth generation)
+Job scheduling, by computer, 169
+K-lines, 130
+Key-word recognition, 109
+Knowledge, 46-48, 72-76
+computer manipulation of, 74
+of expert, 132
+and interpretation, 74-76
+and shared background, 78
+(See also Cognition, Epistemology, Representation)
+Knowledge acquisition, 98-99, 175
+Knowledge engineering, 74, 96, 126,
+175 (See also Expert system)
+KRL (Knowledge Representation
+Language), 118n
+Language, 17-20, 29-30, 49-50,
+54-69, 76-77, 107-124
+as action, 35,
+76-77, 179 (See
+also Speech act)
+arbitrariness of, 49
+and being, 29
+and cognition, 49-50
+as commitment, 58-60, 105, 123
+as consensual domain, 49-50
+and existence, 68-69, 78, 174
+high-level (See High-level programming language)
+internal, 20
+machine (See Machine language)
+natural (See Natural language)
+programming (See Programming
+language)
+as orienting behavior, 50
+and shared background, 74-76
+social, 61
+as tradition, 29
+and truth, 17-20
+understanding by computer
+(See
+Understanding)
+(See also Distinction, Information, Interpretation, Listening, Meaning, Pre-understanding, Understanding)
+Language game, 67
+
+Law, 156, 1777
+Learning, 44-47
+by computer, 100-104, 130-131
+Level of representation
+(See Representation)
+Library, electronic, 166-167
+Linguistic act,
+66,
+Language)
+147 (See also
+Linguistic semantics, 18
+Listening, 54-58, 63, 66
+(See also
+Interpretation)
+Literal meaning, 19, 54 57, 111-
+112
+Living system, 44-48
+Logic
+of argument, 67-68
+bypassing, 115, 118
+in computer, 87-91, 96n
+as game, 67n
+non-monotonic, 117
+Macbeth, 122
+Machine intelligence
+(See Artificial intelligence)
+Machine language, 91
+Machine translation, 107-108, 135,
+MacIntosh, 165
+Management, 143-162
+as concern with action, 151
+and conversation, 157-162
+and decision making, 144-147,
+as generation of contexts, 151
+and network of commitments,
+150-152
+as problem solving, 146
+Mapping, in representation, 85
+Massachusetts Institute of Technology, xi, 130
+Matching, of frame, 115
+Meaning, 17-20, 54-63, 111-114
+201
+and commitment, 58-60, 63, 67-
+computer analysis of, 107-124
+distinction, 69
+formalization of, 19, 108
+full vs. literal,
+111
+literal
+(See Literal meaning)
+objective (See Objectivity)
+social basis for, 33
+subjective (See Subjectivity)
+(See also Hermeneutics, Interpretation, Listening, Speech
+act, Understanding)
+Medicine, artificial intelligence in,
+132-133, 155
+Medium, 43-47
+Memory, 114, 115
+Mental predicate, 47, 105-106, 123
+Mental representation
+(See Representation)
+Meta-knowledge, 123
+META-MOP, 122
+Metaphor, 68 (See also Analogy)
+Meta-reference, 86
+Microcode, 88n, 90
+Microcomputer, 133n
+Microworld, 121-123
+Mind-body dualism (See Dualism)
+Mind-modeler, in artificial intelligence,
+126
+M.I.T.
+(See Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
+MITI, 134
+Model
+cognitive, 130
+mental, 73 (See also Representation)
+for simulation, 21
+Modular decomposition, 87, 90
+Monitor, of commitment,
+160
+Mutual orientation, 76
+MYCIN, 131
+
+202
+Naive realism, 69n, 72
+Natural kind, 105n
+Natural language, 107n
+in computer applications, 128-
+129
+computer understanding of
+(See
+Understanding)
+in fifth generation, 135, 138
+front end, 129
+Neobehaviorism, 48
+Nervous system, 41-48, 73, 102-
+103
+as closed system, 41-44, 73
+as generating phenomena, 42
+models of, 131
+Network
+of commitment, 150-152, 162
+of conversation, 64-68, 157-162,
+168-170, 172-173
+of equipment, 37, 72, 170
+neuronal (See Nervous system)
+Nonlogical reasoning, 115
+Nonmonotonic reasoning, 117
+Nonprogrammed decision, 153
+Objective rationality, 21
+Objectivity
+illusion of in computer, 156
+of meaning, 28, 60-63
+of reality, 30-32, 42, 50-52, 72-
+74,78
+of science, 67
+Observation, in science, 15, 67
+Observer, 50-52
+detached, 71
+standard, 67
+Office, 143-144, 158
+Ontogeny, 44 45
+Ontological design
+(See Design)
+Ontology, 18, 30-33, 36, 72-74
+and design, 77-79,163-167
+(See also Being, Existence, In-
+terpretation)
+Opacity of implementation, 87, 90-
+92
+Operational closure, 45n
+Operations research, 20-21
+Optimal decision, 21-22
+Ordinary everydayness, 34, 98
+Organization, as network of conversations, 150-152, 157-158,
+168-170
+Orienting behavior, 49-52
+Output, of nervous system, 42
+Paradigm, 24
+Parallel processing, 136, 138
+Parallelism, in evolution, 103
+Parameter adjustment,
+100-101
+(See also Learning)
+Pattern, in natural language program, 119-124
+Pattern recognition, as paradigm
+for understanding, 115-119
+Perception, 41-44
+by robot, 127-128
+Performance limitation,
+146
+Performative, 58
+Perspective, 115
+Perturbation, 42-50
+space of, 75
+Phenomenal domain, 47
+Phenomenology, 9, 27, 31
+Philosophy
+analytic, 15-16
+and artificial intelligence, 109 of
+language, 17-18, 114
+in rationalistic tradition,
+14
+17
+(See also Dualism, Epistemology, Ontology, Phenomenology)
+Phylogeny, 44
+Physical embodiment of computer,
+87,103
+Physical symbol system, 74n, 86
+
+Plastic system, 45, 48
+Plasticity, of computer, 94
+Possibilities (See Conversation for
+Possibilities)
+Power, unintended transfer of, 154
+Practical understanding, 32-33
+Pragmatics, 19, 57
+Pragmatist, 63n
+Praxis, 33
+Pre-orientation, in decision making, 147-149
+Pre-understanding, 7, 28-30,
+71
+and background, 74-76
+and frames, 119
+in programming, 97
+(See also Background, Hermeneutics, Prejudice)
+Predicate calculus, 18
+Prediction, 15-16, 34, 95
+Prejudice, 28-30
+and being, 32, 157
+in computer program, 156-157
+(See also Pre-understanding)
+Present-at-hand, 36,
+71, 73, 97-
+98 (See also Breakdown, Readyto-hand)
+Primitive operation, of computer
+language, 91
+Principle of rationality, 23
+Problem
+generation of, 147
+interpretation of, 77
+structured vs. unstructured, 153
+(See also Decision)
+Problem solving, 20-23, 95-97, 131-
+132, 146-150
+Problem space,
+22-23,95,
+146-
+147
+Profession-oriented domain, 133,
+Program (See Computer program)
+Programme (See Research programme)
+Programmed decision, 153
+203
+Programming (See Computer program)
+Programming language, 87-88, 165,
+176
+PROLOG, 138n
+Promise, as metaphor for statement, 60
+Property, 72-74
+Proposition, 89
+Propositional content, 59, 159, 161
+Prototype, 115, 171
+Psychiatrist, simulation of, 120
+Psychological state, 114
+Psychology, cognitive, 242
+6, 114
+Question, behind each statement,
+RI (expert system), 131
+Rational behavior, 20
+Rational decision making, 20, 95
+Rationalist, 16n
+Rationalistic orientation, 1417
+Rationalistic tradition, 7-11, 14
+and cognitive science, 24-26
+and computer design, 178
+decision-making, 22
+and ontology, 72-73
+and science, 15
+Rationality, 8, 21-23
+attributed to computer, 106
+bounded, 22, 146
+objective, 21
+principle of, 23
+Ready-to-hand, 32, 36-37, 71-73,
+164-165 (See also Present-athand, Unready-to-hand)
+Reality (See Existence, Naive realism, Objectivity, Ontology)
+Reasoning, 15, 18, 85
+in computer analysis of meaning, 108,
+114
+26
+112
+
+204
+Reasoning (continued)
+and frames, 116-118
+informal, 117-118
+resource limited, 118
+in SHRDLU, 110
+(See also Logic, Representation,
+Thinking)
+Recognition as understanding, 115-
+119
+Recurrence
+in conversation, 67-68, 161, 168-
+170
+and distinction, 69
+and meaning, 60-68
+in organization, 150, 158, 161
+of propositional content, 161
+in science, 16
+of tasks, 153
+Recursive decomposition, 87
+Reference
+in SHRDLU, 110, 113
+of symbol in computer, 86
+Relevance
+of alternative, 149
+of computer system, 153
+Representation, 33, 72-74, 84-92
+accidental, 91-92
+and blindness, 97-100
+and cognition, 73
+in computer, 84-92, 96-100
+of facts, 89
+formality of, 85, 96n
+as interpretation, 35
+and knowledge, 72-74
+and language, 108
+in learning, 36, 101-104
+levels in computer, 86-92
+in nervous system, 41-48, 73
+in problem solving, 22-23
+(See also Frame, Script)
+Representation hypothesis, 74
+Research programme, 24
+Resolution, 147-150, 151
+Resource, in computer system, 91
+Resource-limited processing, 117-
+119
+Responsibility
+for being understood, 63
+and communicative competence,
+162
+in computer systems, 123, 155
+essential to human, 106
+(See
+also Commitment)
+Restaurant, example of script, 120
+Roadmap, as analogy for meaning, 61
+Robot, 86, 103-104, 127-128
+simulated in SHRDLU, 109-110
+SAM, 119-121
+Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, 29n
+Satisfaction (See Condition of satisfaction)
+Scandal of philosophy, 31
+Scheduling, of work, 169
+Schema, 115
+Science, 14-16, 24, 67
+cognitive (See Cognitive science)
+Scientific method, 15-16
+Script, 120, 122
+Search
+in problem solving, 22-23
+procedure for, 96-97
+Second order structural change,
+94
+Selection, 45, 100
+Semantic correspondence, 18
+Semantics, 18 (See also Meaning,
+Situation semantics)
+Semiotics, 63n
+Semi-structured task,
+• 152-153
+Sense, of word, 55
+Sequential processor, 88
+Sex, 122
+Shakespeare, computer understanding of, 119, 122-123
+
+205
+SHRDLU, 109-111, 113, 121
+Simulation, 20-21, 95
+(See also
+Model) b
+Sincerity condition, 60
+Situation
+stablished vs, emergent, 15.
+hermeneutic, 29
+of irresolution,
+147-150
+as set of alteratives,
+146
+Situation semantics, 69n
+Social basis of meaning, 33,
+63, 67-68, 76
+60
+Software, (See Computer program)
+Solipsism, 31, 51
+Speaker/hearer, computer model
+of,
+Structural change, 4448
+evolutionary, 103
+first order, 94
+second order, 94
+Structural coupling,
+45-49, 71-
+72, 75
+and design, 53
+in evolution, 103
+and learning, 102-104
+Structural plasticity (See Plasticity)
+Initiative, 134
+Specification, of state, 43
+Specification language, 176
+Speech, recognition by computer,
+Speech act, 56, 58-60,
+76-77
+application in computer design,
+in background, 63
+in coordinator, 159-162
+and rationalistic tradition, 60
+taxonomy of, 159
+and time, 67, 160
+(See also Commitment, Conversation)
+Spreadsheet, 175n, 176
+Stance, for explanation, 106
+Standard observer, 67
+State Stanford University, xi, xii, xiv
+in problem solving, 22
+of speaker/hearer, 114
+Steering wheel,
+164
+Stipulative definition, 112
+Storage, in computer, 84, 88, 9.
+Strange loop, 124
+Strategy, 20 Strategic Computing
+129
+77
+
+Structural semantics, 18
+Structure-determined system, 41-
+46,52,
+99,
+118
+Structured dynamic medium, 176
+Structured problem, 153
+Subject-object distinction, 30-31
+(See also Objectivity)
+Subjectivity of meaning, 28-30
+Superhuman-human fallacy, 99
+Symbol structure, 22-23, 84-86
+Symbol system, 25 (See also physical symbol system)
+System Development Foundation,
+System development methodology,
+System specification language, 177
+XiV
+Systematic domain, 96, 131, 174-
+177
+Task, structured vs. semi-structured,
+153
+Task domain, and blindness, 97
+Task environment, 22, 96
+TAU, 122
+Taxonomy of speech acts, 58-59
+Technolngy, 17-179 (See also De
+TEIRESIAS, 123
+Temporality
+in coordinator, 159-161
+in organization, 169
+
+206
+Temporality (continued)
+in speech act, 160
+Terminal, of frame, 115
+Text (See Interpretation, Understanding)
+Theoretical understanding, 32
+Theory
+as computer program, 26
+relevance to design, xii
+Thing, 72-73
+Thinking 16, 71, 73 (See also Cognition, Intelligence, Rationality, Reasoning, Understanding)
+Thought (See Thinking)
+Thrownness,
+33-36, 71,
+78, 97,
+145-147
+within language, 68
+Time (See Temporality)
+Tool, (See Computer, Design, Network of equipment, Technology)
+TOP, 122
+Tradition, 7-9, 60-63
+concealment of, 7, 179
+and language, 40, 61
+and objectivity, 60-63
+and pre-under standing, 74
+rationalistic (See Rationalistic
+tradition)
+unconcealment of, 5, 179
+Transformation, and design, 177-
+179
+Translation
+(See Machine translation)
+Transparency of interaction, 164
+Triggering
+in conversation, 168
+by perturbation, 48-49
+Truth, 17-20, 55-58
+as agreement (Habermas), 62
+appropriateness (Austin), 57
+VS.
+grounding, 67
+Truth condition, 19, 54, 57, 112
+Truth theoretic semantics, 17-19
+Ultra-intelligent machine, 4
+Unanticipated effect, of technology, 154
+Unconcealment
+(See Tradition)
+Understanding, 27-33, 115-124
+and autonomy, 123
+and Being, 27-37,
+as commitment, 123-124
+by computer, 75, 107-124, 128-
+129, 135, 159
+and memory, 116
+and ontology, 30-33
+practical vs, theoretical, 32
+recognition, 115-119
+(See also Interpretation, Preunderstanding)
+Unity, 44
+Unpredictability, of deterministic
+device, 95
+Unreadiness, 5n, 147
+Unready-to-hand, 36, 72, 73 (See
+also Ready-to-hand)
+Unstructured problem, 153
+User-friendly, 72, 164
+Validity claim, 59
+Value, in decision-making, 21-22
+Veridicality, of representation, 85
+Visicalc, 175, 176
+Vision
+color, 41-43
+by computer, 104, 130
+in frog, 38,41
+VLSI (Very large scale integration), 133n, 136-138
+Voice (See Speech)
+Water, as example of word meaning, 55-56, 60, 62n, 69
+Web of computing, 173
+
+Word processing
+as example of equipment, 5-7,
+36-37, 53, 164
+as systematic domain, 175
+Workgroup system (See Coordination system)
+World view, 8, 29n
+Xerox Palo Alto Research
+Center, xi
+Xerox Star, 165
+Yale University, 128n
+207
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/a74d05ce49a30b1f6a7db815314eb33a89db895ca02fbd36207dea5155e38243.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/a74d05ce49a30b1f6a7db815314eb33a89db895ca02fbd36207dea5155e38243.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..784a060211bc4c0ba93cb370e2d839d570a2f63c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/a74d05ce49a30b1f6a7db815314eb33a89db895ca02fbd36207dea5155e38243.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -4251,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "a74d05ce49a30b1f6a7db815314eb33a89db895ca02fbd36207dea5155e38243",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 819,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "14031988bac3bad20b579d13effc0d41565a992b64457ff775ba05c8dc9c44db",
+  "output_sha256": "ba1a72fdfab85d6070652b69ddd5f760a6b06129c430499dc392c689dc050a91",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/a7f183b6ca9f26a0e977a93921cba36e713fc2ed16138bf6e12e2ce468efd0b9.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/a7f183b6ca9f26a0e977a93921cba36e713fc2ed16138bf6e12e2ce468efd0b9.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1f6085946c6db3b0682c1ff4e6172d3bda95d42f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/a7f183b6ca9f26a0e977a93921cba36e713fc2ed16138bf6e12e2ce468efd0b9.md
@@ -0,0 +1,13134 @@
+Philosophy and the
+Mirror of Nature
+RICHARD RORTY
+Princeton University Press
+Princeton, New Jersey
+
+Copyright © 1979 by Princeton University Press
+Published by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey
+All Rights Reserved
+Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
+Rorty, Richard.
+Philosophy and the mirror of nature.
+Includes index.
+1. Philosophy. 2. Philosophy, Modern. 3. Mind
+and body. 4. Representation (Philosophy)
+5. Analysis
+(Philosophy) 6. Civilization-Philosophy.
+I. Title.
+B53.R68
+19°
+79-84013
+ISBN 0-691-07236-1
+ISBN 0-691-02016-7 pbk.
+Publication of this book has been aided by a grant from
+The National Endowment for the Humanities
+This book has been composed in Linotype Baskerville
+Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper and
+meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on
+Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library
+Resources
+Printed in the United States of America
+Second printing, with corrections, 1980
+First Princeton Paperback printing,
+,1980
+20
+19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11
+10
+
+TO
+M. V. R.
+
+When we think about the future of the world, we always
+have in mind its being at the place where it would be if it
+continued to move as we see it moving now. We do not
+realize that it moves not in a straight line, but in a curve,
+and that its direction constantly changes.
+Philosophy has made no progress? If somebody scratches
+where it itches, does that count as progress? If not, does that
+mean it wasn't an authentic scratch? Not an authentic
+itch? Couldn't this response to the stimulus go on for quite
+a long time until a remedy for itching is found?
+Wenn wir an die Zukunft der Welt denken, so meinen wir
+immer den Ort, wo sie sein wird, wenn sie so weiter läuft,
+wie wir sie jetzt laufen sehen, und denken nicht, dass sie nicht
+gerade läuft, sondern in einer Kurve, und ihre Richtung sich
+konstant ändert. (Ludwig Wittgenstein,
+Vermischte Bemer.
+kungen, Frankfurt, 1977, p. 14.)
+Die Philosophie hat keinen Fortschritt gemacht? Wenn Einer
+kratzt, wo es ihn juckt, muss ein Fortschritt zu sehen sein? Ist es
+sonst kein echtes Kratzen, oder kein echtes Jucken? Und kann
+nicht diese Reaktion auf die Reizung lange Zeit so weitergehen,
+ehe ein Mittel gegen das Jucken gefunden wird (Ibid., pp.
+163-164)
+
+Contents
+Preface
+Introduction
+PART ONE: Our Glassy Essence
+CHAPTER I: The Invention of the Mind
+1. CRITERIA OF THE MENTAL
+2. THE FUNCTIONAL, THE PHENOMENAL,
+AND THE IMMATERIAL
+3. THE DIVERSITY OF MIND-BODY
+PROBLEMS
+4. MIND AS THE GRASP OF UNIVERSALS
+5. ABILITY TO EXIST SEPARATELY FROM
+THE BODY
+6. DUALISM AND "MIND-STUFF"
+CHAPTER II: Persons Without Minds
+1. THE ANTIPODEANS
+2. PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES
+3. INCORRIGIBILITY AND RAW FEELS
+4. BEHAVIORISM
+5. SKEPTICISM ABOUT OTHER MINDS
+6. MATERIALISM WITHOUT MIND-BODY
+IDENTITY
+7. EPISTEMOLOGY AND "THE PHILOSOPHY
+OF MIND"
+PART TWO: Mirroring
+3
+17
+17
+22
+32
+45
+61
+70
+70
+78
+88
+98
+107
+114
+125
+129
+CHAPTER III: The Idea of a "Theory of Knowledge" 131
+ix
+
+CONTENTS
+1. EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY'S
+SELF-IMAGE
+2. LOCKE'S CONFUSION OF EXPLANATION
+131
+WITH JUSTIFICATION
+139
+3. KANT'S CONFUSION OF PREDICATION
+WITH SYNTHESIS
+148
+4. KNOWLEDGE AS NEEDING "FOUNDATIONS" 155
+CHAPTER IV: Privileged Representations
+1. APODICTIC TRUTH, PRIVILEGED REPRE-
+SENTATIONS, AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
+2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM
+3. PRE-LINGUISTIC AWARENESS
+4. THE " 'IDEA' IDEA"
+5. EPISTEMOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM,
+PSYCHOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM, AND
+LANGUAGE
+CHAPTER V: Epistemology and Empirical
+Psychology
+1. SUSPICIONS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY
+2. THE UNNATURALNESS OF EPISTEMOLOGY
+3. PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES AS GENUINE
+EXPLANATIONS
+4. PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES AS
+REPRESENTATIONS
+CHAPTER VI: Epistemology and Philosophy of
+Language
+1. PURE AND IMPURE PHILOSOPHY OF
+LANGUAGE
+2. WHAT WERE OUR ANCESTORS
+TALKING ABOUT?
+3. IDEALISM
+4. REFERENCE
+5. TRUTH WITHOUT MIRRORS
+6. TRUTH, GOODNESS, AND RELATIVISM
+165
+165
+173
+182
+192
+20g
+213
+213
+221
+230
+244
+257
+257
+266
+273
+284
+295
+306
+x
+
+CONTENTS
+PART THREE: Philosophy
+CHAPTER VII: From Epistemology to Hermeneutics
+1. COMMENSURATION AND CONVERSATION
+2. KUHN AND INCOMMENSURABILITY
+3. OBJECTIVITY AS CORRESPONDENCE
+AND AS AGREEMENT
+4. SPIRIT AND NATURE
+CHAPTER VIII: Philosophy Without Mirrors
+1. HERMENEUTICS AND EDIFICATION
+2. SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY AND
+EDIFYING PHILOSOPHY
+3. EDIFICATION, RELATIVISM, AND
+OBJECTIVE TRUTH
+4. EDIFICATION AND NATURALISM
+5. PHILOSOPHY IN THE CONVERSATION
+OF MANKIND
+Index
+315
+315
+322
+333
+343
+357
+357
+365
+373
+379
+389
+395
+
+Preface
+ALMost as soon as I began to study philosophy, 1 was impressed by the way in which philosophical problems appeared, disappeared, or changed shape, as a result of new
+assumptions or vocabularies. From Richard McKeon and
+Robert Brumbaugh I learned to view the history of philosophy as a series, not of alternative solutions to the same
+problems, but of quite different sets of problems. From
+Rudolph Carnap and Carl Hempel I learned how pseudoproblems could be revealed as such by restating them in the
+formal mode of speech. From Charles Hartshorne and Paul
+Weiss I learned how they could be so revealed by being
+translated into Whiteheadian or Hegelian terms. I was
+very fortunate in having these men as my teachers, but, for
+better or worse, I treated them all as saying the same
+thing: that a "philosophical problem" was a product of the
+unconscious adoption of assumptions built into the vocabulary in which the problem was stated-assumptions which
+were to be questioned before the problem itself was taken
+seriously.
+Somewhat later on, I began to read the work of Wilfrid
+Sellars. Sellars's attack on the Myth of the Given seemed to
+me to render doubtful the assumptions behind most of
+modern philosophy. Still later, I began to take Quine's
+skeptical approach to the language-fact distinction seriously,
+and to try to combine Quine's point of view with Sellars's.
+Since then, 1 have been trying to isolate more of the assumptions behind the problematic of modern philosophy,
+in the hope of generalizing and extending Sellars's and
+Quine's criticisms of traditional empiricism. Getting back
+to these assumptions, and making clear that they are optional, I believed, would be "therapeutic" in the way in
+xiii
+
+PREFACE
+which Carnap's original dissolution of standard textbook
+problems was "therapeutic." This book is the result of that
+attempt.
+The book has been long in the making. Princeton University is remarkably generous with research time and sabbaticals, so it is embarrassing to confess that without the
+further assistance of the American Council of Learned
+Societies and the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation I should probably never have written it. I began
+thinking out its plot while holding an ACLS Fellowship in
+1969-1970, and wrote the bulk of the first draft while holding a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1973-1974. I am most grate.
+ful to all three institutions for their assistance.
+Many people-students at Princeton and elsewhere, audiences at papers given at various conferences, colleagues and
+friends-have read or listened to various drafts of various
+sections of this book. I made many changes of both substance and style in response to their objections, and am very
+grateful. I regret that my memory is too poor to list even the
+most important instances of such help, but I hope that here
+and there readers may recognize the beneficial results of
+their own comments. I do wish, however, to thank two people-Michael Williams and Richard Bernstein—who made
+very helpful comments on the penultimate version of the
+entire book, as did an anonymous reader for the Princeton
+University Press. I am also grateful to Raymond Geuss,
+David Hoy, and Jeffrey Stout, who took time out to help me
+resolve last-minute doubts about the final chapter.
+Finally, I should like to thank Laura Bell, Pearl Cavanaugh, Lee Ritins, Carol Roan, Sanford Thatcher, Jean
+Toll, and David Velleman for patient help in transforming
+what I wrote from rough copy into a printed volume.
+****»
+Portions of Chapter IV appeared in Neue Hefte für
+Philosophie 14 (1978). Portions of Chapter V appeared in
+Body, Mind and Method: Essays in Honor of Virgil C.
+xiv
+
+PREFACE
+Aldrich, ed. Donald F. Gustafson and Bangs L. Tapscott
+(Dordrecht, 1979). Other portions of that chapter appeared
+in Philosophical Studies 31 (1977). Portions of Chapter VII
+appeared in Acta Philosophica Fennica, 1979. I am grateful
+to the editors and publishers concerned for permission to
+reprint this material.
+
+Philosophy and the
+Mirror of Nature
+
+Introduction
+PHILOSOPHers usually think of their discipline as one which
+discusses perennial, eternal problems—problems which
+arise as soon as one reflects. Some of these concern the difference between human beings and other beings, and are
+crystallized in questions concerning the relation between the
+mind and the body. Other problems concern the legitimation
+of claims to know, and are crystallized in questions concerning the "foundations" of knowledge. To discover these foundations is to discover something about the mind, and conversely. Philosophy as a discipline thus sees itself as the
+attempt to underwrite or debunk claims to knowledge made
+by science, morality, art, or religion. It purports to do this
+on the basis of its special understanding of the nature of
+knowledge and of mind. Philosophy can be foundational
+in respect to the rest of culture because culture is the assemblage of claims to knowledge, and philosophy adjudicates such claims. It can do so because it understands the
+foundations of knowledge, and it finds these foundations in
+a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the
+"activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the
+mind; so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to
+construct such representations. Philosophy's central concern
+is to be a general theory of representation, a theory which
+will divide culture up into the areas which represent reality
+well, those which represent it less well, and those which do
+not represent it at all (despite their pretense of doing so).
+We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on
+an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth
+century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of
+3
+
+"the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur
+to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the
+notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the
+eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian
+notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of
+mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance.
+In the nineteenth century, the notion of philosophy as a
+foundational discipline which "grounds" knowledge-claims
+was consolidated in the writings of the neo-Kantians. Oc-
+casional protests against this conception of culture as in
+need of "grounding" and against the pretensions of a theory
+of knowledge to perform this task (in, for example, Nietzsche and William James) went largely unheard. "Philosophy" became, for the intellectuals, a substitute for religion. It was the area of culture where one touched bottom,
+where one found the vocabulary and the convictions which
+permitted one to explain and justify one's activity as an
+intellectual, and thus to discover the significance of one's
+life.
+At the beginning of our century, this claim was reaffirmed
+by philosophers (notably Russell and Husser!) who were
+concerned to keep philosophy "rigorous" and "scientific."
+But there was a note of desperation in their voices, for by
+this time the triumph of the secular over the claims of religion was almost complete. Thus the philosopher could no
+longer see himself as in the intellectual avant-garde, or as
+protecting men against the forces of superstition.' Further,
+in the course of the nineteenth century, a new form of
+culture had arisen-the culture of the man of letters, the
+intellectual who wrote poems and novels and political
+treatises, and criticisms of other people's poems and novels
+and treatises. Descartes, Locke, and Kant had written in a
+1 Terms such as "himself" and "men" should, throughout this book,
+be taken as abbreviations for "himself or herself," "men and women,"
+and so on.
+4
+
+period in which the secularization of culture was being
+made possible by the success of natural science. But by the
+early twentieth century the scientists had become as remote
+from most intellectuals as had the theologians. Poets and
+novelists had taken the place of both preachers and philosophers as the moral teachers of the youth. The result was
+that the more "scientific" and "rigorous" philosophy became, the less it had to do with the rest of culture and the
+more absurd its traditional pretensions seemed. The attempts of both analytic philosophers and phenomenologists
+to "ground" this and "criticize" that were shrugged off by
+those whose activities were purportedly being grounded or
+criticized. Philosophy as a whole was shrugged off by those
+who wanted an ideology or a self-image.
+It is against this background that we should see the work
+of the three most important philosophers of our century—
+Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey. Each tried, in his
+early years, to find a new way of making philosophy "foundational"—a new way of formulating an ultimate context
+for thought. Wittgenstein tried to construct a new theory of
+representation which would have nothing to do with mentalism, Heidegger to construct a new set of philosophical
+categories which would have nothing to do with science,
+epistemology, or the Cartesian quest for certainty, and
+Dewey to construct a naturalized version of Hegel's vision
+of history. Each of the three came to see his earlier effort
+as self-deceptive, as an attempt to retain a certain conception of philosophy after the notions needed to flesh out that
+conception (the seventeenth-century notions of knowledge
+and mind) had been discarded. Each of the three, in his
+later work, broke free of the Kantian conception of philosophy as foundational, and spent his time warning us against
+those very temptations to which he himself had once succumbed. Thus their later work is therapeutic rather than
+constructive, edifying rather than systematic, designed to
+make the reader question his own motives for philosophiz-
+5
+
+ing rather than to supply him with a new philosophical
+program.
+Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey are in agreement
+that the notion of knowledge as accurate representation,
+made possible by special mental processes, and intelligible
+through a general theory of representation, needs to be
+abandoned. For all three, the notions of "foundations of
+knowledge" and of philosophy as revolving around the
+Cartesian attempt to answer the epistemological skeptic
+are set aside. Further, they set aside the notion of "the
+mind" common to Descartes, Locke, and Kant-as a special
+subject of study, located in inner space, containing elements
+or processes which make knowledge possible. This is not to
+say that they have alternative "theories of knowledge" or
+"philosophies of mind." They set aside epistemology and
+metaphysics as possible disciplines. I say "set aside" rather
+than "argue against" because their attitude toward the
+traditional problematic is like the attitude of seventeenthcentury philosophers toward the scholastic problematic.
+They do not devote themselves to discovering false propositions or bad arguments in the works of their predecessors
+(though they occasionally do that too). Rather, they
+glimpse the possibility of a form of intellectual life in
+which the vocabulary of philosophical reflection inherited
+from the seventeenth century would seem as pointless as the
+thirteenth-century philosophical vocabulary had seemed to
+the Enlightenment. To assert the possibility of a post-
+Kantian culture, one in which there is no all-encompassing
+discipline which legitimizes or grounds the others, is not
+necessarily to argue against any particular Kantian doctrine,
+any more than to glimpse the possibility of a culture in
+which religion either did not exist, or had no connection
+with science or politics, was necessarily to argue against
+Aquinas
+s claim that God's existence can be proved by
+natural reason. Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey have
+brought us into a period of "revolutionary" philosophy (in
+the sense of Kuhn's "revolutionary" science) by introducing
+6
+
+new maps of the terrain (viz., of the whole panorama of
+human activities) which simply do not include those features which previously seemed to dominate.
+This book is a survey of some recent developments in philosophy, especially analytic philosophy, from the point of
+view of the anti-Cartesian and anti-Kantian revolution which
+I have just described. The aim of the book is to undermine
+the reader's confidence in "the mind" as something about
+which one should have a "philosophical" view, in "knowledge" as something about which there ought to be a "theory" and which has "foundations," and in "philosophy" as
+it has been conceived since Kant. Thus the reader in search
+of a new theory on any of the subjects discussed will be disappointed. Although I discuss "solutions to the mind-body
+problem" this is not in order to propose one but to illustrate why I do not think there is a problem. Again, although
+I discuss "theories of reference" I do not offer one, but
+offer only suggestions about why the search for such a theory is misguided. The book, like the writings of the philosophers I most admire, is therapeutic rather than constructive. The therapy offered is, nevertheless, parasitic upon the
+constructive efforts of the very analytic philosophers whose
+frame of reference I am trying to put in question. Thus
+most of the particular criticisms of the tradition which I
+offer are borrowed from such systematic philosophers as
+Sellars, Quine, Davidson, Ryle, Malcolm, Kuhn, and
+Putnam.
+I am as much indebted to these philosophers for the
+means I employ as I am to Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and
+Dewey for the ends to which these means are put. I hope
+to convince the reader that the dialectic within analytic
+philosophy, which has carried philosophy of mind from
+Broad to Smart, philosophy of language from Frege to
+Davidson, epistemology from Russell to Sellars, and philosophy of science from Carnap to Kuhn, needs to be carried a few steps further. These additional steps will, I think,
+7
+
+put us in a position to criticize the very notion of "analytic
+philosophy," and indeed of "philosophy" itself as it has
+been understood since the time of Kant.
+From the standpoint I am adopting, indeed, the difference between "analytic" and other sorts of philosophy is
+relatively unimportant—a matter of style and tradition
+rather than a difference of "method" or of first principles.
+The reason why the book is largely written in the vocabulary of contemporary analytic philosophers, and with reference to problems discussed in the analytic literature, is
+merely autobiographical. They are the vocabulary and the
+literature with which I am most familiar, and to which I
+owe what grasp I have of philosophical issues. Had I been
+equally familiar with other contemporary modes of writing
+philosophy, this would have been a better and more useful
+book, although an even longer one. As I see it, the kind of
+philosophy which stems from Russeli and Frege is, like classical Husserlian phenomenology, simply one more attempt
+to put philosophy in the position which Kant wished it to
+have-that of judging other areas of culture on the basis of
+its special knowledge of the "foundations" of these areas.
+"Analytic" philosophy is one more variant of Kantian philosophy, a variant marked principally by thinking of representation as linguistic rather than mental, and of philosophy of language rather than "transcendental critique," or
+psychology, as the discipline which exhibits the "foundations of knowledge." This emphasis on language, I shall be
+arguing in chapters four and six, does not essentially change
+the Cartesian-Kantian problematic, and thus does not really
+give philosophy a new self-image. For analytic philosophy is
+still committed to the construction of a permanent, neutral
+framework for inquiry, and thus for all of culture.
+It is the notion that human activity (and inquiry, the
+search for knowledge, in particular) takes place within a
+framework which can be isolated prior to the conclusion
+of inquiry—a set of presuppositions discoverable a prioriwhich links contemporary philosophy to the Descartes-
+8
+
+Locke-Kant tradition. For the notion that there is such a
+framework only makes sense if we think of this framework
+as imposed by the nature of the knowing subject, by the
+nature of his faculties or by the nature of the medium within which he works. The very idea of "philosophy" as something distinct from "science" would make little sense without the Cartesian claim that by turning inward we could
+find ineluctable truth, and the Kantian claim that this
+truth imposes limits on the possible results of empirical inquiry. The notion that there could be such a thing as "foundations of knowledge" (all knowledge-in every field, past,
+present, and future) or a "theory of representation" (all
+representation, in familiar vocabularies and those not yet
+dreamed of) depends on the assumption that there is some
+such a priori constraint. If we have a Deweyan conception
+of knowledge, as what we are justified in believing, then we
+will not imagine that there are enduring constraints on
+what can count as knowledge, since we will see "justification" as a social phenomenon rather than a transaction between "the knowing subject" and "reality." If we have a
+Wittgensteinian notion of language as tool rather than
+mirror, we will not look for necessary conditions of the
+possibility of linguistic representation. If we have a Heideggerian conception of philosophy, we will see the attempt
+to make the nature of the knowing subject a source of neces.
+sary truths as one more self-deceptive attempt to substitute
+a "technical" and determinate question for that openness to
+strangeness which initially tempted us to begin thinking.
+One way to see how analytic philosophy fits within the traditional Cartesian-Kantian pattern is to see traditional philosophy as an attempt to escape from history-an attempt to
+find nonhistorical conditions of any possible historical development. From this perspective, the common message of
+Wittgenstein, Dewey, and Heidegger is a historicist one.
+Each of the three reminds us that investigations of the
+foundations of knowledge or morality or language or society
+9
+
+may be simply apologetics, attempts to eternalize a certain
+contemporary language-game, social practice, or self-image.
+The moral of this book is also historicist, and the three parts
+into which it is divided are intended to put the notions of
+"mind," of "knowledge," and of "philosophy," respectively,
+in historical perspective. Part I is concerned with philosophy of mind, and in chapter one I try to show that the socalled intuitions which lie behind Cartesian dualism are
+ones which have a historical origin. In chapter two, I try to
+show how these intuitions would be changed if physiological
+methods of prediction and control took the place of psychological methods.
+Part Il is concerned with epistemology and with recent
+attempts to find "successor subjects" to epistemology. Chapter three describes the genesis of the notion of "epistemology" in the seventeenth century, and its connection with
+the Cartesian notions of "mind" discussed in chapter one.
+It presents "theory of knowledge" as a notion based upon
+a confusion between the justification of knowledge-claims
+and their causal explanation-between, roughly, social
+practices and postulated psychological processes. Chapter
+four is the central chapter of the book-the one in which
+the ideas which led to its being written are presented. These
+ideas are those of Sellars and of Quine, and in that chapter
+I interpret Sellars's attack on "givenness" and Quine's attack on "necessity" as the crucial steps in undermining the
+possibility of a "theory of knowledge." The holism and
+pragmatism common to both philosophers, and which they
+share with the later Wittgenstein, are the lines of thought
+within analytic philosophy which I wish to extend. I argue
+that when extended in a certain way they let us see truth as,
+in James's phrase, "what it is better for us to believe," rather
+than as "the accurate representation of reality." Or, to put
+the point less provocatively, they show us that the notion
+of "accurate representation" is simply an automatic and
+empty compliment which we pay to those beliefs which are
+successful in helping us do what we want to do. In chapters
+10
+
+five and six I discuss and criticize what I regard as reactionary attempts to treat empirical psychology or philosophy of
+language as "successor subjects" to epistemology. I argue
+that only the notion of knowledge as "accuracy of representation" persuades us that the study of psychological processes or of language-qua media of representation-can do
+what epistemology failed to do. The moral of part Il as a
+whole is that the notion of knowledge as the assemblage of
+accurate representations is optional-that it may be replaced by a pragmatist conception of knowledge which
+eliminates the Greek contrast between contemplation and
+action, between representing the world and coping with it.
+A historical epoch dominated by Greek ocular metaphors
+may, I suggest, yield to one in which the philosophical
+vocabulary incorporating these metaphors seems as quaint
+as the animistic vocabulary of pre-classical times.
+In part Ill I take up the idea of "philosophy" more explicitly. Chapter seven interprets the traditional distinction
+between the search for "objective knowledge" and other,
+less privileged, areas of human activity as merely the distinction between "normal discourse" and "abnormal discourse." Normal discourse (a generalization of Kuhn's
+notion of "normal science") is any discourse (scientific, political, theological, or whatever) which embodies agreed-upon
+criteria for reaching agreement; abnormal discourse is any
+which lacks such criteria. I argue that the attempt (which
+has defined traditional philosophy) to explicate "rationality" and "objectivity" in terms of conditions of accurate
+representation is a self-deceptive effort to eternalize the
+normal discourse of the day, and that, since the Greeks, philosophy's self-image has been dominated by this attempt. In
+chapter eight I use some ideas drawn from Gadamer and
+Sartre to develop a contrast between "systematic" and "edifying" philosophy, and to show how "abnormal" philos
+ophy which does not conform to the traditional Cartesian-
+Kantian matrix is related to "normal" philosophy. I present
+Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey as philosophers whose
+11
+
+aim is to edify-to help their readers, or society as a whole,
+break free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes, rather
+than to provide "grounding" for the intuitions and customs
+of the present.
+I hope that what I have been saying has made clear why I
+chose "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" as a title.
+It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather
+than statements, which determine most of our philosophical
+convictions. The picture which holds traditional philosophy
+captive is that of the mind as a great mirror, containing
+various representations-some accurate, some not-and
+capable of being studied by pure, nonempirical methods.
+Without the notion of the mind as mirror, the notion of
+knowledge as accuracy of representation would rot have
+suggested itself. Without this latter notion, the strategy
+common to Descartes and Kant-getting more accurate
+representations by inspecting, repairing, and polishing
+the mirror, so to speak-would not have made sense.
+Without this strategy in mind, recent claims that philosophy could consist of "conceptual analysis" or "phenomenological analysis" or "explication of meanings" or
+examination of "the logic of our language" or of "the structure of the constituting activity of consciousness" would not
+have made sense. It was such claims as these which Wittgenstein mocked in the Philosophical Investigations, and it is
+by following Wittgenstein's lead that analytic philosophy
+has progressed toward the "post-positivistic" stance it presently occupies. But Wittgenstein's flair for deconstructing
+captivating pictures needs to be supplemented by historical
+awareness—awareness of the source of all this mirrorimagery-and that seems to me Heidegger's greatest contribution. Heidegger's way of recounting history of philosophy lets us see the beginnings of the Cartesian imagery in
+the Greeks and the metamorphoses of this imagery during
+the last three centuries. He thus lets us "distance" ourselves
+from the tradition. Yet neither Heidegger nor Wittgen-
+12
+
+stein lets us see the historical phenomenon of mirrorimagery, the story of the domination of the mind of the
+West by ocular metaphors, within a social perspective. Both
+men are concerned with the rarely favored individual rather
+than with society—with the chances of keeping oneself
+apart from the banal self-deception typical of the latter days
+of a decaying tradition. Dewey, on the other hand, though
+he had neither Wittgenstein's dialectical acuity nor Heidegger's historical learning, wrote his polemics against traditional mirror-imagery out of a vision of a new kind of
+society. In his ideal society, culture is no longer dominated
+by the ideal of objective cognition but by that of aesthetic
+enhancement. In that culture, as he said, the arts and the
+sciences would be "the unforced flowers of life." I would
+hope that we are now in a position to see the charges of
+"relativism" and "irrationalism" once leveled against Dewey
+as merely the mindless defensive reflexes of the philosophical tradition which he attacked. Such charges have no
+weight if one takes seriously the criticisms of mirrorimagery which he, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger make. This
+book has little to add to these criticisms, but I hope that it
+presents some of them in a way which will help pierce
+through that crust of philosophical convention which
+Dewey vainly hoped to shatter.
+13
+
+PART ONE
+Our Glassy Essence
+
+CHAPTER I
+The Invention of the Mind
+1. CRITERIA OF THE MENTAL
+Discussions in the philosophy of mind usually start off by
+assuming that everybody has always known how to divide
+the world into the mental and the physical-that this distinction is common-sensical and intuitive, even if that between two sorts of "stuff," material and immaterial, is philosophical and baffling. So when Ryle suggests that to talk of
+mental entities is to talk of dispositions to behave, or when
+Smart suggests that it is to talk of neural states, they have
+two strikes against them. For why, if anything like behaviorism or materialism is true, should there be anything like
+this intuitive distinction?
+We seem to have no doubt that pains, moods, images, and
+sentences which "flash before the mind," dreams, hallucinations, beliefs, attitudes, desires, and intentions all count as
+"mental" whereas the contractions of the stomach which
+cause the pain, the neural processes which accompany it,
+and everything else which can be given a firm location
+within the body count as nonmental. Our unhesitating
+classification suggests that not only have we a clear intuition
+of what "mentality" is, but that it has something to do with
+non-spatiality and with the notion that even if the body
+were destroyed the mental entities or states might somehow
+linger on. Even if we discard the notion of "mind-stuff,"
+even if we drop the notion of res cogitans as subject of predication, we seem able to distinguish mind from body nonetheless, and to do so in a more or less Cartesian way.
+These purported intuitions serve to keep something like
+Cartesian dualism alive. Post-Wittgensteinian philosophers
+who oppose behaviorism and materialism tend to grant to
+17
+
+Wittgenstein and Strawson that in some sense there is
+nothing there but the human organism, and that we must
+give up the notion of this organism as made out of a bit of
+res cogitans nonspatially associated with a bit of res extensa.
+But, they say, the Cartesian intuition that the mental.
+physical distinction is unbridgeable by empirical means, that
+a mental state is no more like a disposition than it is like a
+neuron, and that no scientific discovery can reveal an identity remains. This intuition seems to them enough to establish an unbridgeable gap. But such neo dualist philosophers
+are embarrassed by their own conclusions, since although
+their metaphysical intuitions seem to be Cartesian, they are
+not clear whether they are entitled to have such things as
+"metaphysical intuitions." They tend to be unhappy with
+the notion of a method of knowing about the world prior to
+and untouchable by empirical science.
+In this situation, it is tempting for the dualist to go
+linguistic and begin talking about "different vocabularies"
+or "alternative descriptions." This jargon suggests that the
+dualistic intuition in question is merely one of the difierences between ways of talking about the same phenomenon,
+and thus seems to lead one from something like dualism to
+something like Spinoza's double-aspect theory. But the
+question "two descriptions of what?" makes this a difficult
+position to hold onto. To reply "two descriptions of organisms" seems all right until we ask, "Are organisms physical?" or "Is there more to organisms, even human organisms,
+than the actual and possible dispositions of their parts?"
+Neo-dualists are usually happy to concede a whole raft of
+mental states to Ryle, and to say that beliefs, desires, attitudes, and intentions (not to mention skills, virtues, and
+moods) are all merely ways of talking about organisms, their
+parts, and the actual and possible movements of those parts.
+(But they may insist, following Brentano and Chisholm,
+that no Rylean necessary and sufficient conditions can be
+provided). But when they come to pains, mental images, and
+occurrent thoughts-short-term mental states which look,
+18
+
+so to speak, event-like rather than disposition-like-they
+hesitate. And well they should. For the difference between
+dualism and materialism would vanish if once they said that
+to describe an organism as in pain is simply one way of
+talking about a state of its parts. These parts, remember,
+must be physical parts, since once we have Kantized and
+Strawsonized Descartes the notion of "mental part" will no
+longer even seem to make sense. What more could a defender of mind-body identity ask for than the admission
+that talk of how one feels is just an alternative way of reporting on how suitable portions of one's anatomy (presumably neurons) are?
+We thus have the following dilemma: either neo-dualists
+must construct an epistemological account of how we know
+a priori that entities fall under two irreducibly distinct ontological species, or else they must find some way of expressing
+their dualism which relies on neither the notion of "ontological gap" nor that of "alternative description." But
+before casting about for ways of resolving this dilemma,
+we should look more closely at the notion of "ontological
+species" or "ontological gap." What sort of notion is this?
+Do we have any other examples of ontological gaps? Any
+other case in which we know a priori that no empirica!
+inquiry can identify two entities? We know, perhaps, that
+no empirical inquiry can identify two spatio-temporal entities which have different locations, but that knowledge
+seems too trivial to be relevant. Is there any other case in
+which we know a priori about natural ontological kinds?
+The only examples which I can think of are the distinctions
+between finite and infinite, between human and divine, and
+between particular and universal. Nothing, we intuit, could
+cross those divides. But these examples do not seem very
+helpful. We are inclined to say that we do not know what it
+would be for something infinite to exist. If we try to clarify
+the orthodox notion of "the divine" we seem to have either
+a merely negative conception, or else one explicated in
+terms of the notions of "infinity" and "immateriality."
+19
+
+Since reference to infinity explains the obscure by the more
+obscure, we are left with immateriality. We feel vaguely
+confident that if the infinite could exist, it, like the universal, could only be exemplified by the immaterial. If it makes
+any sense to speak of the existence of universals, it would
+seem that they must exist immaterially, and that is why they
+can never be identified with spatio-temporal particulars.
+But what does "immaterial" mean? Is it the same thing as
+"mental"? Even though it is hard to see more in the notion
+of being "physical" than being "material" or "spatiotemporal," it is not clear that "mental" and "immaterial"
+are synonyms. If they were, then such disputes as that about
+the status of universals between conceptualists and realists
+would look even sillier than they do. Nevertheless, the opposite of "mental" is "physical" and the opposite of "immaterial" is "material." "Physical" and "material" seem
+synonymous. How can two distinct concepts have synonymous opposites?
+At this point we may be tempted to recur to Kant and
+explain that the mental is temporal but not spatial, whereas
+the immaterial-the mystery beyond the bounds of sense
+is neither spatial nor temporal. This seems to give us a nice
+neat threefold distinction: the physical is spatio-temporal;
+the psychological is nonspatial but temporal; the metaphysical is neither spatial nor temporal. We can thus explain away the apparent synonymy of "physical" and "material" as a confusion between "nonpsychological" and
+"nonmetaphysical." The only trouble is that Kant and
+Strawson have given convincing arguments for the claim
+that we can only identify mental states as states of spatially
+located persons.! Since we have given up "mind-stuff," we
+are bound to take these arguments seriously. This brings us
+almost full circle, for now we want to know what sense it
+1 See Kant's "Refutation of Idealism" at K.d.r.V. B274ff. and P. F.
+Strawson, Individuals (London, 1959), chap. 2, and The Bounds of
+Sense (London, 1966), pp. 162fl.
+20
+
+makes to say that some states of a spatial entity are spatial
+and some are not. It is no help to be told that these are its
+functional states—for a person's beauty and his build and
+his fame and his health are functional states, yet intuition
+tells us that they are not mental states either. To clarify our
+intuition, we have to identify a feature shared by our pains
+and beliefs but not by our beauty or our health. It will not
+help to identify the mental as that which can survive death
+or the destruction of the body, since one's beauty can survive
+death and one's fame can survive the destruction of one's
+body. If we say that one's beauty or one's fame exists only
+relationally, in the eyes or the opinion of others, rather than
+as states of oneself, then we get sticky problems about how to
+distinguish merely relational properties of persons from
+their intrinsic states. We get equally sticky problems about
+a person's unconscious beliefs, which may be discovered
+only after his death by psycho-biographers, but which are
+presumably as much his mental states as those beliefs which
+he was aware of having during his lifetime. There may be a
+way of explaining why a person's beauty is a nonintrinsic
+relational property whereas his unconscious paranoia is a
+nonrelational intrinsic state; but that would seem to be
+explaining the obscure by the more obscure.
+I conclude that we cannot make non-spatiality the criterion of mental states, if only because the notion of "state"
+is sufficiently obscure that neither the term spatial state nor
+the term nonspatial state seems useful. The notion of mental
+entities as nonspatial and of physical entities as spatial, if
+it makes any sense at all, makes sense for particulars, for
+subjects of predication, rather than for the possession of
+properties by such subjects. We can make some dim sort of
+pre-Kantian sense out of bits of matter and bits of mindstuff, but we cannot make any post-Kantian sense out of
+spatial and nonspatial states of spatial particulars. We get a
+vague sense of explanatory power when we are told that
+human bodies move as they do because they are inhabited
+21
+
+by ghosts, but none at all when we are told that persons
+have nonspatial states.
+I hope that I have said enough to show that we are not
+entitled to begin talking about the mind-body problem, or
+about the possible identity or necessary non-identity of
+mental and physical states, without first asking what we
+mean by "mental." I would hope further to have incited the
+suspicion that our so-called intuition about what is mental
+may be merely our readiness to fall in with a specifically
+philosophical language-game. This is, in fact, the view that
+I want to defend. I think that this so-called intuition is no
+more than the ability to command a certain technical vocabulary—one which has no use outside of philosophy books
+and which links up with no issues in daily life, empirical
+science, morals, or religion. In later sections of this chapter
+I shall sketch a historical account of how this technical
+vocabulary emerged, but before doing so, I shall beat some
+neighboring bushes. These are the possibilities of defining
+"mental" in terms of the notion of "intentionality" and in
+terms of the notion of being "phenomenal"-of having a
+characteristic appearance, an appearance somehow exhaus
+tive of reality.
+2. THE FUNCTIONAL, THE PHENOMENAL, AND THE IMMATERIAL
+The obvious objection to defining the mental as the intentional is that pains are not intentional-they do not
+represent, they are not about anything. The obvious objection to defining the mental as "the phenomenal" is that
+beliefs don't feel like anything-they don't have phenomenal properties, and a person's real beliefs are not always
+what they appear to be. The attempt to hitch pains and
+beliefs together seems ad hoc-they don't seem to have
+anything in common except our refusal to call them "physical." We.can gerrymander, of course, so as to make pain the
+acquisition of a belief that one of one's tissues is damaged,
+construing pain reports as Pitcher and Armstrong construe
+22
+
+perceptual reports.? But such a tactic still leaves us with
+something like a dualistic intuition on our hands-the in.
+tuition that there is "something more" to being conscious of
+a pain or a sensation of redness than being tempted to
+acquire a belief that there is tissue-damage or a red object
+in the vicinity. Alternatively, we can gerrymander the other
+way and simply confine the term mental to what does have
+phenomenal properties, abandoning beliefs and desires to
+Armstrong to identify with the physical. But that tactic
+runs up against the intuition that whatever the mind-body
+problem is, it is not the feeling-neuron problem. If we expel
+representations, intentional states, from the mind we are left
+with something like a problem of the relation between life
+and nonlife, rather than a mind-body problem.
+Still another tactic would be simply to define "mental"
+disjunctively as "either phenomenal or intentional." This
+suggestion leaves it entirely obscure how an abbreviation for
+this disjunction got entrenched in the language, or at least
+in philosophical jargon. Still, it does direct our attention to
+the possibility that the various "mental" items are held
+together by family resemblances. If we consider thoughts—
+occurrent thoughts, flashing before the mind in particular
+words—or mental images, then we seem to have something
+which is a little like a pain in being phenomenal and a little
+like a belief in being intentional. The words make the
+thoughts phenomenal and the colors and shapes make the
+images phenomenal, yet both of them are of something in
+the required intentional sense. If I suddenly and silently say
+to myseif, "Good Lord, I left my wallet on that cafe-table in
+Vienna," or if I have an image of the wallet on the table,
+then I am representing Vienna, the wallet, the table, etc.—I
+have all these as intentional objects. So perhaps we should
+think of thoughts and mental images as the paradigmatic
+3 See George Pitcher, A Theory of Perception (Princeton, 1971);
+D. M. Armstrong, Perception and the Physical World (London and
+New York, 1961) and A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London and
+New York, 1968).
+23
+
+mental entities. Then we can say that pains and beliefs get
+classified as mental through their resemblance to these paradigms, even though the resemblance is in two quite different
+respects. The relationship between the various candidates
+for mentality could then be illustrated by the following
+diagram:
+intentional,
+representational
+with phenomenal
+properties
+occurrent thoughts,
+mental images
+without phenomenal
+properties
+beliefs, desires,
+intentions
+nonintentional,
+nonrepresentational
+raw feels e.g.,
+pains and what babies
+have when they see
+colored objects
+"the merely
+physical"
+Suppose for the moment that we settle for this "family
+resemblance" answer to the question "what makes the mental mental?"—viz., that it is one or another family resemblance to the paradigmatically mental. Now let us turn
+back to our original question, and ask what makes us fill in
+the fourth box with "the merely physical?" Does "physical"
+mean merely "what doesn't fit in the other three boxes?" Is
+it a notion which is entirely parasitic on that of "mental?"
+Or does it somehow tie in with "material" and "spatial,"
+and how does it do sor
+To answer this, we have to ask two subquestions: "Why
+is the intentional nonmaterial?" and "Why is the phenomenal nonmaterial?" The first question may seem to have a
+fairly straightforward answer. If we take "the material" to
+be "the neural," for example, we can say that no amount of
+inspection of the brain will reveal the intentional character
+of the pictures and inscriptions found there. Suppose that
+all persons struck by the thought "I left my wallet on a
+cafe-table in Vienna," in those very English words, have an
+identical series of neural events concomitant with the
+24
+
+thought. This seems a plausible (though probably false)
+hypothesis. But it is not plausible that all those who acquire
+the belief that they have left their wallet on a cafe-table in
+Vienna have this series of events, for they may formulate
+their belief in quite other words or in quite other language.
+It would be odd if a Japanese and an English thought
+should have the same neural correlate. It is equally plausible
+that all those who suddenly see the same missing wallet on
+the same distant table in their mind's eye should share a
+second series of neural events, though one quite difterent
+from that correlated with the thinking of the English sentence. Even such neat concomitance would not tempt us to
+"identify" the intentional and the neurological properties
+of the thought or the image, any more than we identify the
+typographical and the intentional properties of the sentence
+"I left my wallet on a cafe-table in Vienna" when we meet
+it on the printed page. Again, the concomitance of pictures
+of wallets on cafe-tables against a Viennese background with
+certain properties of the surfaces of paper and canvas does
+not identify the intentional property "being about Vienna"
+with the arrangement of pigments in space. So we can see
+why one might say that intentional properties are not physical properties. But, on the other hand, this comparison
+between neurological and typographical properties suggests
+that there is no interesting problem about intentionality.
+Nobody wants to make philosophical heavy weather out of
+the fact that you can't tell merely from the way it looks
+what a sentence means, or that you can't recognize a picture
+of X as a picture of X without being familiar with the relevant pictorial conventions. It seems perfectly clear, at least
+since Wittgenstein and Sellars, that the "meaning" of typo
+graphical inscriptions is not an extra "immaterial" property
+they have, but just their place in a context of surrounding
+events in a language-game, in a form of life. This goes for
+brain-inscriptions as well. To say that we cannot observe
+intentional properties by looking at the brain is like saying
+that we cannot see a proposition when we look at a Mayan
+25
+
+codex—we simply do not know what to look for, because
+we do not yet know how to relate what we see to a symbolsystem. The relation between an inscription-on paper or,
+given the hypothesized concomitance, in the brain-and
+what it means is no more mysterious than the relation
+between a functional state of a person, such as his beauty
+or his health, and the parts of his body. It is just those parts
+seen in a given context.
+So the answer to the question "Why is the intentional
+nonmaterial?" is "because any functional state-any state
+which can only be grasped by relating what is observed to a
+larger context-is, in a trivial sense, nonmaterial." The
+problem is in trying to relate this trivial notion of being
+"nonmaterial"—which means merely something like "not
+immediately evident to all who look"—with the philosophically pregnant sense of "immateriality." To put it another
+way, why should we be troubled by Leibniz's point that if
+the brain were blown up to the size of a factory, so that we
+could stroll through it, we should not see thoughts? If we
+know enough neural correlations, we shall indeed see
+thoughts—in the sense that our vision will reveal to us what
+thoughts the possessor of the brain is having. If we do not,
+we shall not, but then if we stroll through any factory
+without having first learned about its parts and their relations to one another, we shall not see what is going on.
+Further, even if we could find no such neural correlations,
+even if cerebral localization of thoughts was a complete
+failure, why would we want to say that a person's thoughts
+or mental images were nonphysical simply because we cannot give an account of them in terms of his parts? To use
+an example from Hilary Putnam, one cannot give an account of why square pegs do not fit into round holes in
+terms of the elementary particles which constitute the peg
+and the hole, but nobody finds a perplexing ontological gap
+between macrostructure and microstructure.
+I think that we can link the trivial sense of "nonmaterial"
+(which applies to any functional, as opposed to observable,
+26
+
+state) with the pregnant sense of "immaterial" only by
+resurrecting Locke's view of how meaning attaches to in.
+scriptions—the view which Wittgenstein and Sellars attack.
+For Locke the meaningfulness-the intentional character—
+of an inscription was the result of its production by, or encoding of, an idea. An idea, in turn, was "what is before a
+man's mind when he thinks." So the way to see the intentional as the immaterial is to say that neither a sequence of
+processes in the brain nor some ink on paper can represent
+anything unless an idea, something of which we are aware
+in that "immediate" way in which we are aware of pains,
+has impregnated it. In a Lockean view, when we walk
+through Leibniz's factory we do not see thoughts not because, as for Wittgenstein, we cannot yet translate brainwriting, but because we cannot see those invisible (because
+nonspatial) entities which infuse the visible with intentionality. For Wittgenstein, what makes things representational or intentional is the part they play in a larger context
+—in interaction with large numbers of other visible things.
+For Locke, what makes things representational is a special
+causal thrust—what Chisholm describes as the phenomenon
+of sentences deriving intentionality from thoughts as the
+moon derives its light from the sun.s
+So our answer to the question "How can we convince
+ourselves that the intentional must be immaterial?" is "First
+we must convince ourselves, following Locke and Chisholm
+and pace Wittgenstein and Sellars, that intentionality is
+intrinsic only in phenomenal items-items directly before
+the mind." If we accept that answer, however, we are still
+only part of the way to resolving the issue. For since the
+problem with which we have been wrestling has been
+caused precisely by the fact that beliefs do not have phenomenal properties, we now have to ask how Locke, following Descartes, can conflate pains and beliefs under the
+common term idea-how he can convince himself that a
+3 Roderick Chisholm, "Intentionality and the Mental" in Minnesota
+Studies in the Philosophy of Science & (1958), 533.
+27
+
+belief is something which is "before the mind" in the way
+in which a mental image is, how he can use the same ocular
+imagery for mental images and for judgments. I shall discuss the origin of this Cartesian-Lockean use of the term
+idea below. But for the moment I shall pass over the issue
+and come to the second subdivision of the question "Why
+should the mental be thought of as immaterial?"—namely,
+why should the phenomenal be thought of as immaterial?
+Why do some neo-dualist philosophers say that how something feels, what it is like to be something, cannot be identical with any physical property, or at least any physical
+property which we know anything about?
+A trivial answer to this question would be that we can
+know all about something's physical properties and not
+know how it feels--especially if we can't talk to it. Consider
+the claim that babies and bats and Martians and God and
+panpsychistically viewed rocks all may inhabit different
+phenomenal "quality spaces" from those we inhabit.* So
+they may. But what does this have to do with non-physicality? Presumably those who say that the phenomenal is
+* This claim has been presented very forcefully in Thomas Nagel's
+"What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-
+450. I have learned a great deal from Nagel's work in philosophy of
+mind, although I disagree heartily with him on almost every point.
+I think that the difference between our views goes back to the question
+(raised most sharply by Wittgenstein) of whether "philosophical intui.
+tions" are more than residua of linguistic practices, but I am not sure
+how this issue is to be debated. Nagel's intuition is that "facts about
+what it is like to be an X are very peculiar" (p. 437), whereas I think
+that they look peculiar only if, following Nagel and the Cartesian tradition, we hold that "if physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must themselves be given a physical account"
+(p. 437). In later sections of this chapter, I try to trace the history of
+the philosophical language-game in which this claim is at home. For
+the Davidsonian reasons offered in chapter four, section 4, below, I do
+not think physicalism subject to such a constraint. Physicalism, I argue
+there, is probably true (but uninteresting) if construed as predicting
+every event in every space-time region under some description or other,
+but obviously false if construed as the claim to say everything true.
+28
+
+nonphysical are not complaining that being told how the
+atoms of the bat's brain are laid out will not help one feel
+like a bat. Understanding about the physiology of pain does
+not help us feel pain either, but why should we expect it to,
+any more than understanding aerodynamics will help us
+fly? How can we get from the undoubted fact that knowing
+how to use a physiological term (e.g., "stimulation of C-
+fibers") will not necessarily help us use a phenomenological
+term (e.g., "pain") to an ontological gap between the referents of the two terms? How can we get from the fact that
+knowing Martian physiology does not help us translate
+what the Martian says when we damage his tissues to the
+claim that he has got something immaterial we haven't got?
+How, to come to the point, do we know when we have two
+ways of talking about the same thing (a person, or his
+brain) rather than descriptions of two different things? And
+why are neo-dualists so certain that feelings and neurons
+are an instance of the latter?
+I think that the only reply such philosophers have to
+offer is to point out that in the case of phenomenal properties there is no appearance-reality distinction. This amounts
+to defining a physical property as one which anybody could
+be mistaken in attributing to something, and a phenomenal
+property as one which a certain person cannot be mistaken
+about. (E.g., the person who has the pain cannot be mistaken about how the pain feels.) Given this definition, of
+course, it is trivially the case that no phenomenal property
+can be a physical one. But why should this epistemic distinction reflect an ontological distinction? Why should the epistemic privilege we all have of being incorrigible about how
+things seem to us reflect a distinction between two realms
+of being?
+The answer presumably has to go something like this:
+Feelings just are appearances. Their reality is exhausted in
+how they seem. They are pure seemings. Anything that is
+not a seeming (putting the intentional to one side for the
+moment) is merely physical—that is, it is something which
+29
+
+can appear other than it is. The world comes divided into
+things whose nature is exhausted by how they appear and
+things whose nature is not. But if a philosopher gives this
+answer he is in danger of changing from a neo-dualist into a
+plain old-fashioned Cartesian dualist, "mind-stuff" and all.
+For now he has stopped talking about pains as states of
+people or properties predicated of people and started talking about pains as particulars, a special sort of particular
+whose nature is exhausted by a single property. Of what
+could such a particular be made, save mind-stuff? Or, to put
+it another way, what could mind-stuff be save something
+out of which such thin, wispy, and translucent things can
+be made? As long as feeling painful is a property of a person
+or of brain-fibers, there seems no reason for the epistemic
+difference between reports of how things feel and reports
+of anything else to produce an ontological gap. But as soon
+as there is an ontological gap, we are no longer talking
+about states or properties but about distinct particulars,
+distinct subjects of predication. The neo-dualist who identifies a pain with how it feels to be in pain is hypostatizing a
+property-painfulness—into a special sort of particular, a
+particular of that special sort whose esse is percipi and
+whose reality is exhausted in our initial acquaintance with
+it. The neo-dualist is no longer talking about how people
+feel but about feelings as little self-subsistent entities, floating free of people in the way in which universals float free of
+the instantiations. He has, in fact, modeled pains on universals. It is no wonder, then, that he can "intuit" that pains
+can exist separately from the body, for this intuition is
+simply the intuition that universals can exist independently
+of particulars. That special sort of subject of predication
+whose appearance is its reality—phenomenal pain-turns
+out to be simply the painfulness of the pain abstracted from
+the person having the pain. It is, in short, the universal
+painfulness itself. To put it oxymoronically, mental particulars, unlike mental states of people, turn out to be
+universals.
+30
+
+This then is the answer I want to give to the question:
+Why do we think of the phenomenal as immaterial? We
+do so because, as Ryle put it, we insist on thinking of having
+a pain in ocular metaphors—as having a funny sort of par-
+, ticular before the eye of the mind. That particular turns
+out to be a universal, a quality hypostatized into a subject
+of predication. Thus when neo-dualists say that how pains
+feel are essential to what pains are, and then criticize Smart
+for thinking of the causal role of certain neurons as what is
+essential to pain, they are changing the subject. Smart is
+talking about what is essential to people being in pain,
+whereas neo-dualists like Kripke are talking about what is
+essential for something's being a pain. Neo-dualists feel unafraid of the question "What is the epistemological basis for
+your claim to know what is an essential property of pain?"
+for they have arranged things so that pains have only one
+intrinsic property-namely, feeling painful-and so the
+choice of which properties are to count as essential to them
+is obvious.
+Let me now summarize the results of this section. I have
+said that the only way to associate the intentional with the
+immaterial is to identify it with the phenomenal, and that
+the only way to identify the phenomenal with the immaterial is to hypostatize universals and think of them as
+particulars rather than abstractions trom particulars-thus
+giving them a non-spatio-temporal habitation. It turns out,
+in other words, that the universal particular distinction is
+the only metaphysical distinction we have got, the only one
+which moves anything at all outside of space, much less
+outside of space-time. The mental-physical distinction then
+is parasitic on the universal-particular distinction, rather
+than conversely. Further, the notion of mind-stuff as that
+out of which pains and beliefs are made makes exactly as
+much or as little sense as the notion of "that of which universals are made." The battle between realists and conceptualists over the status of universals is thus empty because
+we have no idea of what a mind is save that it is made of
+31
+
+whatever universals are made of. In constructing both a
+Lockean idea and a Platonic Form we go through exactly
+the same process—we simply lift off a single property from
+something (the property of being red, or painful, or good)
+and then treat it as if it itself were a subject of predication,
+and perhaps also a locus of causal efficacy. A Platonic Form
+is merely a property considered in isolation and considered
+as capable of sustaining causal relations. A phenomenal
+entity is precisely that as well.
+3. THE DIVERSITY OF MIND-BODY PROBLEMS
+At this point we might want to say that we have dissolved
+the mind-body problem. For, roughly speaking, all that is
+needed to find this problem unintelligible is for us to be
+nominalists, to refuse firmly to hypostatize individual properties. Then we shall not be fooled by the notion that there
+are entities called pains which, because phenomenal, cannot
+be physical. Following Wittgenstein, we shall treat the fact
+that there is no such thing as "a misleading appearance of
+pain" not as a strange fact about a special ontological genus
+called the mental, but just as a remark about a languagegame-the remark that we have the convention of taking
+people's word for what they are feeling. From this "language game" point of view, the fact that a man is feeling
+whatever he thinks he's feeling has no more ontological
+significance than the fact that the Constitution is what the
+Supreme Court thinks it is, or that the ball is foul if the
+umpire thinks it is. Again following Wittgenstein, we shall
+treat the intentional as merely a subspecies of the functional, and the functional as merely the sort of property
+whose attribution depends upon a knowledge of context
+rather than being observable right off the bat. We shall see
+the intentional as having no connection with the phenomenal, and the phenomenal as a matter of how we talk. The
+mind-body problem, we can now say, was merely a result of
+Locke's unfortunate mistake about how words get meaning,
+32
+
+combined with his and Plato's muddled attempt to talk
+about adjectives as if they were nouns.
+As fast dissolutions of philosophical problems go, this one
+has its points. But it would be silly to think that we had
+resolved anything by arriving at this diagnosis. It is as if a
+psychiatrist were to explain to a patient that his unhappi.
+ness is a result of his mistaken belief that his mother wanted
+to castrate him, together with his muddled attempt to think
+of himself as identical with his father. What the patient
+needs is not a list of his mistakes and confusions but rather
+an understanding of how he came to make these mistakes and
+become involved in these confusions. If we are going to get
+rid of the mind-body problem we need to be able to answer
+such questions as the following:
+How did these rather dusty little questions about the
+possible identity of pains and neurons ever get mixed up
+with the question of whether man "differed in kind" from
+the brutes—whether he had dignity rather than merely
+valuer
+Given that people thought that they survived the destruction of their bodies long before Locke and Plato began to
+make specifically philosophical confusions, haven't we
+left something out when we treat the mind as simply an
+assemblage of phenomenal and intentional states?
+Isn't there some connection between our ability to have
+knowledge and our having minds, and is this accounted
+for by referring simply to the fact that persons, like in.
+scriptions, have intentional properties?
+All these are good questions, and nothing that I have said
+so far helps answer them. To answer them, I think, nothing
+will serve save the history of ideas. Just as the patient needs
+to relive his past to answer his questions, so philosophy
+needs to relive its past in order to answer its questions. So
+far I have, in the customary manner of contemporary
+philosophers of mind, been flinging around terms like
+"phenomenal," "functional," "intentional," "spatial" and
+33
+
+the like as if these formed the obvious vocabulary in which
+to discuss the topic. But of course the philosophers who
+created the language which gave us the mind-body problem
+did not use this vocabulary, or anything close to it. If we
+are to understand how we got the intuitions which make us
+think that there must be a real, indissoluble, philosophical
+problem somewhere in the neighborhood, we have to set
+aside our up-to-date jargon and think in the vocabulary of
+the philosophers whose books gave us those intuitions. In
+my Wittgensteinian view, an intuition is never anything
+more or less than familiarity with a language-game, so to
+discover the source of our intuitions is to relive the history
+of the philosophical language-game we find ourselves
+playing.
+The "mind-body problem" which I have just "dissolved"
+concerns only a few of the notions which, emerging at
+different points in the history of thought, have intertwined
+to produce a tangle of interrelated problems. Questions like
+"How are intentional states of consciousness related to
+neural states?" and "How are phenomenal properties such
+as painfulness related to neurological properties?" are parts
+of what I shall call the "problem of consciousness." This
+problem is distinct from such pre-philosophical problems
+about personhood as "Am I really only this mass of flesh
+and bone?" and from such Greek philosophical problems
+about knowledge as "How can we have certainty about the
+changing?" "How can knowledge be of the unchanging?"
+and "How can the unchanging become internal to us by
+being known?" Let us call the "problem of personhood"
+that of what more a human being is than flesh. This problem has one form in the pre-philosophical craving for immortality, and another in the Kantian and romantic assertion of human dignity—but both cravings are quite distinct
+from problems about consciousness and about knowledge.
+Both are ways of expressing our claim to be something quite
+different from the beasts that perish. Let us call the "problem of reason" that of how to spell out the Greek claim that
+34
+
+the crucial difference between men and beasts is that we
+can know-that we can know not merely singular facts but
+universal truths, numbers, essences, the eternal. This problem takes different forms in Aristotle's hylomorphic account
+of knowing, Spinoza's rationalist account, and Kant's transcendental account. But these issues are distinct both from
+those about the interrelations between two sorts of things
+(one spatial and the other nonspatial) and from issues concerning immortality and moral dignity. The problem of
+consciousness centers around the brain, raw feels, and bodily
+motions. The problem of reason centers around the topics of
+knowledge, language, and intelligence-all our "higher
+powers." The problem of personhood centers around attributions of freedom and of moral responsibility.
+In order to sort out some of the relations among these
+three problems, I shall offer a list of ways of isolating beings
+which have minds in contrast to the "merely physical"-
+"the body," "matter," the central nervous system, "nature"
+or "the subject matter of the positive sciences." Here are
+some, though hardly all, of the features which philosophers
+have, at one time or another, taken as marks of the mental:
+1. ability to know itself incorrigibly ("privileged access")
+2. ability to exist separately from the body
+3. non-spatiality (having a nonspatial part or "element")
+4. ability to grasp universals
+5. ability to sustain relations to the inexistent ('intentionality")
+6. ability to use language
+7. ability to act freely
+8. ability to form part of our social group, to be "one
+of us"
+9. inability to be identified with any object "in the
+world"
+This is a long list, and it could easily be lengthened. But
+5 See Herbert Feigl, The "Mental" and the "Physical" (Minneapolis,
+1967) for a similar list, and for illuminating comments on the relationships between the various items.
+35
+
+it is important to go through these various suggestions
+about what it is to have a mind, for each of them has helped
+philosophers to insist on an unbridgeable dualism between
+mind and body. Philosophers have constantly seized upon
+some distinctive feature of human life in order to give our
+intuition of our uniqueness a "firm philosophical basis."
+Because these firm bases are so varied, naturalisms and mate.
+rialisms, when not shrugged off as hopeless attempts to
+jump a vast ontological (or epistemological, or linguistic)
+gulf, are often treated as trivially true but pointless. They
+are pointless, it is explained, because our uniqueness has
+nothing whatever to do with whichever abyss the naturalist
+has laboriously filled in, but everything to do with some
+other abyss which has all the while been gaping just behind
+his back. In particular, the point is often made that even
+if we settled all questions about the relation between pains
+and neurons, and similar questions arising out of incorrigi.
+bility-(1) above—we should still have dealt, at best, only
+with (2) and (3) among the other marks of the mental. We
+should still have left everything relevant to reason (notably
+[4], [5] and [6]) and everything relevant to personhood
+(notably [7], [8] and [9]) as obscure as ever.
+I think that this point is quite right, and further, that if
+it had been appreciated earlier the problem of consciousness would not have loomed so large as it has in recent
+philosophy. In the sense of having pains as well as neurons,
+we are on a par with many if not all of the brutes, whereas
+we presumably share neither reason nor personhood with
+them. It is only if we assume that possession of any nonphysical inner state is somehow, via (3), connected with
+(4) or (5) that we will think that light shed upon raw
+feels would reflect off onto representational mental states,
+and thereby illuminate our capacity to mirror the world
+around us. Again, only the assumption that life itself (even
+that of the fetus, the brain damaged human, the bat, or the
+caterpillar) has a special sanctity akin to personhood would
+make us think that understanding raw feels might help us to
+36
+
+understand our moral responsibilities. Both assumptions
+are, however, often made. Understanding why they are
+made requires an understanding of intellectual history
+rather than an understanding of the meanings of the relevant terms, or an analysis of the concepts they signify. By
+sketching a little of the history of discussions of the mind,
+I hope to show that the problem of reason cannot be stated
+without a return to epistemological views which no one
+really wishes to resurrect. Further, I want to supply some
+ground for a suggestion which I shall develop later: that
+the problem of personhood is not a "problem" but a description of the human condition, that it is not a matter for
+philosophical "solution" but a misleading way of expostulating on the irrelevance of traditional philosophy to the
+rest of culture.
+I shall not, however, discuss all the items on the list
+above in this chapter, but only (2), (3), and (4)—separation
+from the body, non-spatiality, and the grasp of universals.
+What I want to say about the other items will come in other
+chapters. I shall discuss (1)—privileged access—in the following chapter, and I shall be discussing (5) and (6)-
+intentionality and the ability to use language-in chapters
+four and six. While the items bearing on personhood-(7),
+(8), and (9)—will not be discussed separately, I shall be
+sketching the way in which I think the notion of personhood should be treated in chapter four, section 4, again in
+chapter seven, section 4, and in chapter eight, section 3. In
+the present chapter, I want to stick as closely as possible
+to the question: Why should consciousness seem to have
+anything to do with reason or with personhood? By sticking
+to the three topics of grasping universals, separation from
+the body, and non-spatiality, I shall move toward my conclusion that if we hold these last three historically distinct
+notions apart, then we shall no longer be tempted by the
+notion that knowledge is made possible by a special Glassy
+Essence which enables human beings to mirror nature.
+Thus we shall not be tempted to think that the possession of
+37
+
+an inner life, a stream of consciousness, is relevant to reason.
+Once consciousness and reason are separated out in this
+way, then personhood can be seen for what I claim it is—a
+matter of decision rather than knowledge, an acceptance
+of another being into fellowship rather than a recognition
+of a common essence.
+4. MIND AS THE GRASP OF UNIVERSALS
+There would not have been thought to be a problem
+about the nature of reason had our race confined itself to
+pointing out particular states of affairs-warning of cliffs
+and rain, celebrating individual births and deaths. But
+poetry speaks of man, birth, and death as such, and mathematics prides itself on overlooking individual details. When
+poetry and mathematics had come to self-consciousness—
+when men like lon and Theatetus could identify themselves with their subjects—the time had come for something
+general to be said about knowledge of universals. Philosophy undertook to examine the difference between knowing that there were parallel mountain ranges to the west
+and knowing that infinitely extended parallel lines never
+meet, the difference between knowing that Socrates was
+good and knowing what goodness was. So the question
+arose: What are the analogies between knowing about
+mountains and knowing about lines, between knowing
+Socrates and knowing the Good? When this question was
+answered in terms of the distinction between the eye of the
+body and the Eye of the Mind, voûsthought, intellect,
+insight—was identified as what separates men from beasts.
+There was, we moderns may say with the ingratitude of
+hindsight, no particular reason why this ocular metaphor
+seized the imagination of the founders of Western thought.
+But it dia, and contemporary philosophers are still working
+out its consequences, analyzing the problems it created,
+and asking whether there may not be something to it after
+all. The notion of "contemplation," of knowledge of uni-
+38
+
+versal concepts or truths as Dewpia, makes the Eye of the
+Mind the inescapable model for the better sort of knowl
+edge. But it is fruitless to ask whether the Greek language,
+or Greek economic conditions, or the idle fancy of some
+nameless pre-Socratic, is responsible for viewing this sort of
+knowledge as looking at something (rather than, say, rubbing up against it, or crushing it underfoot, or having
+sexual intercourse with it).®
+Given this model, and with it the Mind's Eye, what must
+the mind be? Presumably something as different from the
+body as invisible parallelness is from visible mountain
+ridges. Something like that was ready to hand, for poetry
+and religion suggested that something humanoid leaves
+the body at death and goes off on its own.? Parallelness
+6 Dewey sees the metaphor of the Eye of the Mind as the result of
+the prior notion that knowledge must be of the unchangeable:
+The theory of knowing is modeled after what was supposed to take
+place in the act of vision. The object refracts light and is seen; it
+makes a difference to the eye and to the person having an optical apparatus, but none to the thing seen. The real object is the object so
+fixed in its regal aloofness that it is a king to any beholding mind
+that may gaze upon it. A spectator theory of knowledge is the in.
+evitable outcome. (The Quest for Certainty [New York, 1960], p. 23)
+It is hard to know whether the optical metaphor determined the notion
+that the object of true knowledge must be eternal and immutable or
+conversely, but the two notions do seem made for one another. Compare A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, Mass.,
+1936), chap. 2. The quest for certainty and the optical metaphor persist, however, once the notion of immutability and eternality is given
+up-for example, C. D. Broad's argument to sense-data on the ground
+that "if nothing elliptical is before my mind, it is very hard to understand why the penny should seem elliptical rather than of any other
+shape" (Scientific Thought [London, 1923), p. 240).
+" On the connection of fuxn, shadow, and breath, see C. A. van
+Peursen, Body, Soul, Spirit (Oxford, 1966), p. 88 and chap. 7 passim,
+together with the passages in Bruno Snell's Discovery of the Mind
+(Cambridge, Mass., 1953) and R. B. Onians's The Origins of European
+Thought (Cambridge, Mass., 1951) to which van Peursen refers. Onians's discussion of the relation between bukós and fuxi (PP. 93fi.) makes
+clear how little connection either notion had with knowing, and how
+39
+
+can be thought of as the very breath of parallels—the shadow remaining when the mountains are no more. The more
+wispy the mind, the more fit to catch sight of such invisible
+entities as parallelness. So even Aristotle, who spent his life
+pouring cold water on the metaphysical extravagances of his
+predecessors, suggests that there probably is something to
+the notion that the intellect is "separable," even though
+nothing else about the soul is. Aristotle has been praised by
+Ryleans and Deweyans for having resisted dualism by thinking of "soul" as no more ontologically distinct from the
+human body than were the frog's abilities to catch flies
+and flee snakes ontologically distinct from the frog's body.
+But this "naturalistic" view of soul did not prevent Aristotle from arguing that since the intellect had the power of
+receiving the form of, for example, froghood (skimming
+off the universal from the clearly known particular frog, so
+to speak) and taking it on itself without thereby becoming
+a frog, the intellect (voûs) must be something very special
+indeed. It must be something immaterial-even though no
+such strange quasi-substance need be postulated to explain
+most human activity, any more than it need be postulated
+to explain the frog's.
+much with fighting, sex, and movement generally. On the relation of
+these two notions to voûs in the pre-philosophical period, see Snell,
+chap. I, where Plato's description of voûs as "the eye of the soul" is
+cited and explained by reference to the archaic use of voiv as the grasp
+of images. For our purposes, the important thing is that it is only when
+the notion of an immaterial and invisible object of knowledge (as in
+the knowing of the geometer) comes along that a clear distinction between, as van Peursen says, "inner and outer worlds" gets developed.
+Cf. van Peursen, pp. 87, go.
+I do not think Aristotle ever explicitly gives this argument for
+claiming that the intellect is separable (and the difficulty about the relations between the active and the passive intellect in De Anima III, 4
+make it almost impossible to see whether he intended to). But his
+followers have assumed that this was the argument which led him to
+write De Anima 408b 19-20 and 413b 25ff., and I have no better suggestion. See Mortimer Adler, The Difference of Man and the Difference
+40
+
+Philosophers have often wished that Aristotle had never
+fallen in with Plato's talk of universals and his spectator
+theory of knowledge, or that his Entwicklung had lasted
+long enough for such passages as De Anima III, 5 and Metaphysics xII to be expunged as juvenalia. But once again,
+there is no point in trying to pin the blame on Aristotle
+or his interpreters. The metaphor of knowing general truths
+by internalizing universals, just as the eye of the body
+knows particulars by internalizing their individual colors
+and shapes, was, once suggested, sufficiently powerful to become the intellectual's substitute for the peasant's belief in
+life among the shades. In varied forms, running the gamut
+between neo-Platonic notions of knowledge as a direct connection with (emanation from, reflection of) the Godhead
+on the one hand, and down-to-earth neo-Aristotelian hylom orphic accounts of abstraction on the other, the soul as
+immaterial-because-capable-of-contemplating-universals remained the Western philosopher's answer to the question
+"Why is man unique?" for some two thousand years.
+The tension thus established between the two sides of our
+being found conventionalized expression in passages like
+Isabella's "ape and essence" speech:
+It Makes (New York, 1967), p. 220, citing 42ga 18-b23 as adumbrating the standard Thomistic argument from the hylomorphic explanation of abstraction. For a Deweyan account of "separability" as
+a "Platonic wild oat," cf. J. H. Randall, Aristotle (New York, 1960),
+and the treatment by Werner Jaeger to which Randall refers. See also
+Marjorie Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle (London, 1963), PP. 243ff. I
+share Grene's bafflement on the point.
+• For an interesting contrary view, see T. H. Green, "The Philosophy
+of Aristotle" (in Collected Works [London, 1885], III, PP. 52-91). Green
+takes De Anima III, 5 as an advance on both Plato and the Posterior
+Analytics toward the discovery of holism and of the concrete universal.
+Green also, incidentally, compliments Aristotle (at p. 81) on appreciating the difference between "sensation and the intelligent consciousness of sensation" which Locke fatally ignored. I suggest below, following Kenny, that Locke's mistake was a consequence of Descartes's transformation of the notion of the mind.
+41
+
+But man, proud man
+Dressed in a little brief authority
+Most ignorant of what he's most assured—
+His glassy essence-like an angry ape,
+Plays such fantastic tricks before high Heaven
+As make the angels weep—who, with our spleens,
+Would all laugh themselves mortal.1°
+Our Glassy Essence—the "intellectual soul" of the scholastics—is also Bacon's "mind of man" which "far from the
+nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of
+things should reflect according to their true incidence...
+is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and
+imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced."11 These
+early seventeenth-century conceits express a division within
+ourselves which was felt long before the New Science,
+Descartes's division between thinking and extended substance, the veil of ideas, and "modern philosophy." Our
+Glassy Essence was not a philosophical doctrine, but a pic-
+10 William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, II, ill, 11. 117-123.
+See J. V. Cunningham, " 'Essence' and The Phoenix and the Turtle,"
+English Literary History 19 (1952), p. 266 for the claim that the "glassy
+essence" here is the "intellectual soul," which is "glassy, for it mirrors
+God." The O.E.D. does not give this sense of "glassy," but Cunningham
+is persuasive and is followed by the editors of the Arden Shakespeare
+(to which I owe the reference to Cunningham). Shakespeare here seems
+to be simply original, rather than using a stock trope. There is apparently no allusion to the "speculum obscurem" passage in St. Paul or
+any other standard notion. For the history of analogies between the
+soul and a mirror, see Herbert Grabes, Speculum, Mirror und Looking-
+Glass (Tübingen, 1973), pp. gaff. ('Geistig-Seelisches als Spiegel"). The
+phrase man's glassy essence was first invoked in philosophy by C. S.
+Peirce in an 18gz essay of that title on the "molecular theory of protoplasm," which Peirce strangely thought important in confirming the
+view that "a person is nothing but a symbol involving a general idea"
+and in establishing the existence of "group minds" (cf. Collected
+Works, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.,
+1935), 6.270-271).
+11 Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning, bk. II in Works, ed
+James Spedding and Robert Ellis (Boston, 1861), VI, 276.
+42
+
+ture which literate men found presupposed by every page
+they read. It is glassy-mirror-likefor two reasons. First,
+it takes on new forms without being changed-but intellectual forms, rather than sensible ones as material mirrors
+do. Second, mirrors are made of a substance which is purer,
+finer grained, more subtle, and more delicate than most.!?
+Unlike our spleen, which, in combination with other equal.
+ly gross and visible organs, accounted for the bulk of our
+behavior, our Glassy Essence is something we share with the
+angels, even though they weep for our ignorance of its
+nature. The supernatural world, for sixteenth-century intellectuals, was modeled upon Plato's world of Ideas, just
+as our contact with it was modeled upon his metaphor of
+vision.
+There are few believers in Platonic Ideas today, nor even
+many who make a distinction between the sensitive and the
+intellectual soul. But the image of our Glassy Essence remains with us, as does Isabella's lament that we cannot
+grasp it. A sense of moral failure mixes with a sense of
+grievance that philosophy—the discipline supremely concerned with "the higher" —has not made us more aware of
+our own nature. That nature, it is still felt, makes its distinctive character most clearly felt in a certain sort of
+knowledge-knowledge of the highest and purest things:
+mathematics, philosophy itself, theoretical physics, anything which contemplates universals. To suggest that there
+are no universals—that they are flatus vocis—is to endanger
+our uniqueness. To suggest that the mind is the brain is to
+12 Cf. ibid., p. 242 for Bacon's claim that "the soul is the simplest of
+substances." He quotes a Lucretian passage from Vergil in support:
+purumque reliquit | aethereum sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem
+(Aeneid, VI, 747). The notion that the soul must be made of some very
+special fine-grained material in order to be capable of knowledge goes
+back to Anaxagoras. Antiquity wavered between voûs as utterly incorporeal and as made of some very special, very pure matter. Such wavering was inevitable, given the unimaginability of the non-spatio-tem.
+poral and the notion that reason must resemble the non-spatio-temporal
+forms or truths which it grasps.
+43
+
+suggest that we secrete theorems and symphonies as our
+spleen secretes dark humors. Professional philosophers shy
+away from these "crude pictures" because they have other
+pictures—thought to be less crude-which were painted in
+the later seventeenth century. But the sense that the nature
+of reason is a "permanent problem" and that anyone who
+doubts our uniqueness should study mathematics persists.
+The vuós which quickened the Homeric heroes, St. Paul's
+aveûua, and Aquinas's active intellect, are all quite different
+notions. But for present purposes we can coalesce them, as
+Isabella does, in the phrase Glassy Essence. They are all
+things which corpses do not have and which are distinctively human. The powers manifested by Achilles were not
+those of Theatetus or the Apostles or St. Thomas, but the
+"intellectual essence" of the scholastics inherited the dualistic notions which gathered force between Homer and An-
+axagoras, were given canonical form by Plato, were toned
+down by Aristotle, and then became entangled (in St. Paul)
+with a new and determinedly other-worldly religious cult. 13
+13 The vague common-sense dualism of body and soul which lay ready
+to hand for Descartes was a product of the vocabulary of vernacular
+translations of the Bible as much as of anything else. So, in order to
+see how recent and parochial the Cartesian distinction is, it is worth
+noting that the authors of the Bible did not have anything much like
+the Cartesian contrast between "consciousness" and "insensate matter"
+in mind. On Jewish conceptions and their influence on St. Paul, see
+Onians, Origins of European Thought, pp. 48off. On St. Paul himself,
+it is useful to note that, unlike modern writers on philosophy of mind,
+he does not identify body (oûua) with what is buried after death. The
+latter is oápt (flesh) whereas, according to J.A.T. Robinson, "oûua is
+the nearest equivalent of our word 'personality'" (The Body: A Study
+in Pauline Theology [London, 1952], p. 28; contrast Keith Campbell,
+Body and Mind [New York, 1970], p. 2: "Provided you know who you
+are, it is easy to say what your body is: it is what the undertakers bury
+when they bury you.") As Robinson says (p. 3In.), it is not that oua
+and oápt are distinct parts of man but rather "the whole man differently regarded." The notion of man divided into parts does not come
+naturally to non-philosophers even after Plato; see van Peursen, Body,
+Soul, Spirit, chap. 6. For examples of the un-Cartesian ways in which
+oûna, oápt, fuxi, and Treûua are used by Paul, see 1 Corinthians
+15:35-54
+44
+
+In the "mirror" images of the Renaissance humanists, the
+differences between Homer and Augustine, Plotinus and
+Thomas, were flattened out to produce a vague but emphatic dualism—ape and essence-which everyone knew
+philosophers were supposed to know about, even though
+few could guess what they might hope to say about it. Re-
+cent philosophy of mind has tended to lump this vague
+conglomerate—man's Glassy Essence-together with the
+post-Cartesian notions of "consciousness" or "awareness."
+In the next section I shall try to show how different they
+are.
+5. ABILITY TO EXIST SEPARATELY FROM THE BODY
+The only point in the previous section at which argument intruded was in the mention of the Thomistic (and
+possibly Aristotelian) inference to the "separable," immaterial character of voûs from a hylomorphic conception of
+knowledge—a conception according to which knowledge is
+not the possession of accurate representations of an object
+but rather the subject's becoming identical with the object.
+To see the difference between this argument and the various
+Cartesian and contemporary arguments for dualism, we
+need to see how very different these two epistemologies are.
+Both lend themselves to the imagery of the Mirror of
+Nature. But in Aristotle's conception intellect is not a mirror inspected by an inner eye. It is both mirror and eye in
+one. The retinal image is itself the model for the "intellect
+which becomes all things," whereas in the Cartesian model,
+the intellect inspects entities modeled on retinal images.
+The substantial forms of frogness and starness get right into
+the Aristotelian intellect, and are there in just the same
+way they are in the frogs and the stars—not in the way in
+which frogs and stars are reflected in mirrors. In Descartes's
+conception-the one which became the basis for "modern"
+epistemology-it is representations which are in the
+"mind.
+!" The Inner Eye surveys these representations hoping to find some mark which will testify to their fidelity.
+45
+
+Whereas skepticism in the ancient world had been a matter
+of a moral attitude, a style of life, a reaction to the pretensions of the intellectual fashions of the day, 4* skepticism
+in the manner of Descartes's First Meditations was a perfectly definite, precise, "professional" question: How do
+we know that anything which is mental represents anything which is not mental? How do we know whether what
+the Eye of the Mind sees is a mirror (even a distorted
+mirror-an enchanted glass) or a veil? The notion of
+knowledge as inner representation is so natural to us that
+Aristotle's model may seem merely quaint, and Cartesian
+(as opposed to Pyrrhonian "practical"') skepticism seems to
+us so much a part of what it is to "think philosophically"
+that we are amazed that Plato and Aristotle never confronted it directly. But if we see that the two models-the
+hylomorphic and the representative-are equally optional,
+perhaps we can see the inferences to mind-body dualism
+which stem from each as just as optional.
+In an article called "Why Isn't the Mind-Body Problem
+14 See Philip P. Hallie on Greek skepticism as "eudaemonistic practical-wisdom philosophy" whose "doubt, rather than being an instrument for rolling back the veil of sense-experience, is a means of wiping
+off the excrescences that befoul man's life and lead him into endless,
+bitter conflicts with his fellow men" (Scepticism, Man and God [Middletown, Conn., 1964], p. 7). It is not clear what role the notion of the
+veil of ideas played in ancient skepticism, but it seems to have been
+incidental, rather than central in the way in which the Locke-Berkeley.
+Kant tradition made it central. Charlotte Stough (Greek Scepticism
+[Berkeley, 1969], p. 24) describes Pyrrho as viewing ò фалбреко» as "а
+curtain between subject and object, screening the real world from his
+view." However it is not clear that tò dawbuevor is much like a Lockean
+idea, which is incorrigibly before the mind, purely mental simply because incorrigibly known. The closest ancient thought seems to come
+to a notion of a class of incorrigibly knowable mental entities is the
+Stoic doctrine of каталуттий фаталіа (cf. Stough, pp. 38-40), but this is
+defined as a representation exactly corresponding to its object and
+therefore compelling assent, which is hardly Locke's notion. See also
+Josiah B. Gould, "Being, the World and Appearance in Early Stoicism
+and Some Other Greek Philosophers," Review of Metaphysics 27
+(1974), 261-288, especially pp. 277ft.
+46
+
+Ancient?"15 Wallace Matson has noted the principal point
+which divides Greek from seventeenth-century ways of looking at the separation of mind from body:
+The Greeks did not lack a concept of mind, even of a
+mind separable from the body. But from Homer to Aristotle, the line between mind and body, when drawn at
+all, was drawn so as to put the processes of sense perception on the body side. That is one reason why the Greeks
+had no mind-body problem. Another is that it is difficult,
+almost impossible, to translate such a sentence as "What
+is the relation of sensation to mind (or soul)?" into
+Greek. The difficulty is in finding a Greek equivalent for
+"sensation" in the sense philosophers make it bear. ...
+"Sensation" was introduced into philosophy precisely to
+make it possible to speak of a conscious state without
+committing oneself as to the nature or even existence of
+external stimuli.16
+One can sum up both of Matson's points by saying that in
+Greek there is no way to divide "conscious states" or "states
+of consciousness"-events in an inner life—from events in
+an "external world." Descartes, on the other hand, used
+"thought" to cover doubting, understanding, affirming,
+denying, willing, refusing, imagining, and feeling, and said
+15 Wallace Matson, "Why Isn't the Mind-Body Problem Ancient?"
+in Mind, Matter and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in
+Honor of Herbert Feigl, ed. Paul Feyerabend and Grover Maxwell
+(Minneapolis, 1966), pp. 92-102.
+16 Matson, "Mind-Body Problem," p. 101. He goes on to argue that
+neither añolnos nor aioonua will do as an equivalent of "sensation."
+Фртатна is a tempting possibility, but even to translate Aristotle's use
+of it as "mental image" is not above suspicion, and one could not call
+a pain a pávragua. On the difficulty of interpreting Aquinas's notion of
+phantasma, see Anthony Kenny, "Intellect and Imagination in St.
+Thomas" in Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Kenny (Garden City, N.Y., 196g), pp. 293-294. The point Matson makes in the final
+sentence of this quotation is backed up by Thomas Reid's account of
+the term "sensation." See his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man
+(Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 249 (and essay II, passim).
+47
+
+that even if I dream that I see light "properly speaking this
+in me is called feeling, and used in this precise sense that is
+no other thing than thinking. "1 Once Descartes had entrenched this way of speaking it was possible for Locke to
+use "idea" in a way which has no Greek equivalent at all,
+as meaning "whatsoever is the object of the understanding
+when a man thinks" or "every immediate object of the mind
+in thinking."18 As Kenny puts it, the modern use of the
+17 In Meditation II Descartes starts by defining a "thing which
+thinks" as "a mind or soul, or an understanding, or a reason" (res
+cogitans, id est, mens, sive animus, sive intellectus, sive ratio) and
+quickly goes on to "What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which
+doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and also imagines
+and feels" (italics added; "Nempe dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens, imaginans quoque, et sentiens"). Then he contin
+ues with the second passage cited above (hoc est proprie quod in me
+sentire appelatur; atque hoc praecise sic sumptum nihil aliud est quam
+cogitare). All three texts are at pp. 184-186 in Oeuvres Philosophiques,
+ed. Alquié (Paris, 1967), vol. II (PP. 152-153 in vol. I of the Haldane
+and Ross translation). See also Principles I, sec. g: "By the word
+thought I understand all that of which we are conscious of operating
+in us (tout ce qui se fait en nous de telle sorte que nous l'apercevons
+immédiatement par nous-mêmes). And that is why not only understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling (sentir) are here the same
+thing as thought" (Oeuvres Philosophiques III, p. 95; Haldane and
+Ross, I, P. 222). On translating res cogitans as
+"consciousness" see
+Robert McRae, "Descartes' Definition of Thought" in Cartesian Studies,
+ed. R. J. Butler (Oxford, 1972), PP. 55-70.
+18 The first quotation is from the Essay (1, i, 8) and the second from
+the "Second Letter to the Bishop of Worcester." Immediacy as the mark
+of the mental (with the criterion of immediacy being incorrigibility)
+became an unquestioned presupposition in philosophy because of such
+passages as these. As so often in philosophy, neologistic usage became
+the mark of an understanding of "distinctively philosophical" topics and
+issues. Thus we find Hume saying, "... all the conclusions, which the
+vulgar form under this head, are directly contrary to those which are
+confirmed by philosophy. For philosophy informs us, that everything,
+which appears to the mind, is nothing but a perception, and is interrupted, and dependent on the mind; whereas the vulgar confound perceptions and objects, and attribute a distinct continued existence to
+the very things we feel and see" (Treatise, I, iv, ii). Jonathan Bennett
+notes that "Locke's thought is dominated by his attempt to use 'idea'
+48
+
+word idea derives through Locke from Descartes, "and
+Descartes was consciously giving it a new sense... it was a
+new departure to use it systematically for the contents of
+a human mind."18 More important, there had been no term,
+univocally as a key term in his accounts of perception and of meaning
+—or, in shorthand, his use of idea' to cover both sense-data and concepts" and says that this "embodies his substantive mistake, shared with
+Berkeley and Hume and others in the empiricist tradition, of assimilating the sensory far too closely to the intellectual" (Bennett, Locke,
+Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes [Oxford, 1971], p. 25). This mistake,
+however, goes back to Descartes and was embodied equally in the rationalist tradition. It is part of what Wilfrid Sellars calls the "framework of givenness" common to both traditions, and has always been
+the target of those influenced by Hegel. Cf. Sellars's Science, Perception
+and Reality (London and New York, 1963), pp. 127 and 155-156. Sellars's and Bennett's complaints are presaged by H. L. Prichard, and before him by T. H. Green, whom I discuss briefly below in chapter three,
+section 2.
+18 Anthony Kenny, "Descartes on Ideas" in Descartes: A Collection of
+Critical Essays, ed. Willis Doney (Garden City, N.Y., 1967), p. '226. See
+Descartes's definitions of "pensée" as "tout ce qui est tellement en nous,
+que nous en sommes immédiatement connaissants" and of "idée" as
+"cette forme de chacune de nos pensées, par la perception immédiate
+de laquelle nous avons connaissance de ses mêmes pensées" (Replies to
+Second Objections, Alquié edition, II, 586). John Yolton, however, takes
+issue with Kenny (and with Alquié and other commentators who take
+the traditional line—which I am taking here-that Descartes's doctrine
+of representative perception was a sharp, and perhaps disastrous, break
+with the scholastic tradition of direct realism. In his "Ideas and
+Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy" (Journal of the History of Philosophy 13 (1975), 145-165) he cites Descartes's characterization of "idée" as "une manière ou façon de penser" in the Third Med-
+¡tation (Alquié, II, 439) as evidence that Descartes held an "act" theory
+of ideas which was compatible with scholastic direct realism. Here and
+in other works Yolton has suggested that the usual story (common to,
+eg., Étienne Gilson and J. H. Randall) about the emergence of
+epistemological skepticism out of a theory of representative perception
+created by Descartes and Locke may be too simple-minded. A similar
+line is taken by Brian O'Neil in Epistemological Direct Realism in
+Descartes' Philosophy (Albuquerque, N.M., 1974), pp. 96-97: "Descartes'
+long struggle was an effort to retain and relate the theory of esse objectivum and the doctrine of simple natures." O'Neil agrees with Jean
+49
+
+even of philosophical art, in the Greek and medieval traditions coextensive with the Descartes-Locke use of "idea."
+Nor had there been the conception of the human mind as
+an inner space in which both pains and clear and distinct
+ideas passed in review before a single Inner Eye. There
+were, to be sure, the notions of taking tacit thought, forming resolutions in foro interno, and the like.? The novelty
+was the notion of a single inner space in which bodily and
+perceptual sensations ("confused ideas of sense and imagination" in Descartes's phrase), mathematical truths, moral
+rules, the idea of God, moods of depression, and all the rest
+of what we now call "mental" were objects of quasi-observation. Such an inner arena with its inner observer had
+been suggested at various points in ancient and medieval
+thought but it had never been taken seriously long enough
+to form the basis for a problematic. But the seventeenth
+Wahl that Descartes "ait exprimé les deux conceptions fondamentales
+et antinomiques du réalisme," the one based on something like Thomism and the other based on something like a veil of ideas, some of
+which guarantee their own accuracy as representations. If Yolton's revisionist readings of Locke and Descartes are correct, then one will
+have to look further along in history for the emergence of what is now
+thought of as the epistemological problematic created by Descartes.
+Here, however, I am going along with Kenny's more familiar account.
+20 See, for example, Plato, Sophist 263E.
+21 Adler (Difference of Man, pp. 217-218) agrees with Matson that
+"within the framework of Aristotelian metaphysics and psychology
+there can be no mind-body problem" but claims that "Plato, for example, would have understood Descartes much better than Aristotle could
+have, especially the Cartesian separation of mind and body into existentially distinct substances and the Cartesian view of the mind's independence of the body." I would doubt, however, that there is a real
+difference between Plato and Aristotle on this point; Matson's point
+applies equally well to both. On the other hand, I have to admit that
+there is something to Gilson's view that Descartes brings back just those
+elements in the Augustinian tradition which Thomas had used Aristotle to criticize. So the Coleridgean choice between Plato and Aristotle
+does seem relevant. Further, there are passages in Augustine which are
+remarkably close to passages usually cited from Descartes to show the
+50
+
+century took it seriously enough to permit it to pose the
+problem of the veil of ideas, the problem which made
+epistemology central to philosophy.
+Once Descartes had invented that "precise sense" of "feeling" in which it was "no other than thinking," we began
+to lose touch with the Aristotelian distinction between
+reason-as-grasp-of-universals and the living body which
+takes care of sensation and motion. A new mind-body distinction was required-the one which we call that "between consciousness and what is not consciousness." This
+was not a distinction between human faculties but a distinction between two series of events, such that many events in
+one series shared many characteristics with many events in
+originality of his notion of "thinking" to cover both sense and intellect.
+Gareth Matthews (in "Consciousness and Life," Philosophy 52 [1977],
+13-26) cites a striking example from Contra Academicos, bk. 3, sec. 11,
+chap. 26 and comments:
+The picture of human beings as having ... both an "inside" and an
+"outside" is so commonplace, so (as it may seem to us) commonsensical, that we find it hard to realize how strikingly modern it is.
+But to appreciate its modernity one need only cast about for statements of it earlier than Descartes. One does find interesting anticipations of it in Augustine, but not much earlier, and not much between the time of Augustine and that of Descartes. (p. 25)
+Matthews's point (like Matson's) seems to me a useful corrective to the
+claim that Ryle was attacking a basic human intuition when he attacked the notion of the ghost in the machine, rather than merely a
+Cartesian idiosyncrasy. Such a claim is made, for example, by Stuart
+Hampshire ("Critical Study" of The Concept of Mind, Mind 59
+[1950], 237-255, esp. sec. 2). On the other hand, Hampshire's criticism
+is strengthened by the suggestion (made to me in conversation by
+Michael Frede) that the apparent novelty of Cartesian doctrines of
+representative perception and of human beings' "inner space" is mitigated if one reads Hellenistic philosophy and appreciates the role of
+the Stoics in Renaissance thought. If Frede is right, and especially if
+Yolton is also right on the issues discussed above in note 1g, then there
+are many more continuities in the history of philosophic discussion of
+these topics than the story I am telling (which is borrowed from the
+Gilson-Randall historiographical tradition) would allow.
+51
+
+the other, while nonetheless differing toto caelo because
+one was an event in extended, and the other in nonextended, substance. It was more like a distinction between two
+worlds than like a distinction between two sides, or even
+parts, of a human being. The "Ideal World" of philosophers
+like Royce inherits the prestige and the mystery of the
+Glassy Essence of the Renaissance, but it is self-contained
+in a way in which a part of a man could never be. To
+show that mind was imaginable apart from body was thus
+an entirely different project from that found in the tradition which stemmed from Aristotle. In Aristotle, the faculty which received universals without embodying them in
+matter was "separable" and it was hard (without some
+help from extra-philosophical concerns, such as Christianity)
+to say whether one should view it as a special power which
+the body had, a separate substance attached to each mature
+human body, or perhaps a single substance which was
+somehow shared among as many men and angels as there
+happened to be. Aristotle vacillated between the first and
+second options, with the second having the usual attrac-
+22 See Royce's description of Cartesian subjectivism as "The Rediscovery of the Inner Life" (the title of chapter Ill of his The Spirit of
+Modern Philosophy [New York, 18gz]) and as opening the way to an
+understanding that the real world must be "mental" (the conclusion he
+draws triumphantly in chapter XI). See also chapter I of Lovejoy's The
+Revolt Against Dualism (La Salle, III., 1930), in which Lovejoy insists,
+against those who would dethrone Descartes, that the veil of ideas is
+a problem which arises for all who hold
+the primary and most universal faith of man, his inexpugnable real.
+ism, his two-fold belief that he is on the one hand in the midst of
+realities which are not himself nor mere obsequious shadows of him.
+self, a world which transcends the narrow confines of his own transient being; and, on the other hand, that he can himself somehow
+reach beyond those confines and bring these external existences with.
+in the compass of his own life, yet without annulment of their transcendence. (p. 14)
+To Aristotle, Aquinas, Dewey, or Austin this "realism" would seem as
+artificial and farfetched as Royce's idealism.
+52
+
+tions offered by the possibility of surviving death. Medieval
+philosophy vacillated between the second and third. But
+in all these disputes the controversy was not about the survival of "consciousness" but about the indestructibility of
+reason. 2 Once mind is no longer synonymous with reason,
+23 Thus Augustine leads off his treatise "On the Immortality of the
+Soul" with what he regards as the simplest and most decisive argument of all: the soul is immortal because it is the subject (i.e., the
+seat) of science, which is eternal. In chapter I, for example, he says:
+"The human body is mutable and reason is immutable. For all which
+does not exist always in the same mode is mutable, but that two and
+two are four exists always in the same mode. ... This sort of reasoning, then, is immutable. Therefore, reason is immutable" (Concerning
+the Teacher and On the Immortality of the Soul, trans. George Leckie
+[New York, 1938], p. 61). Between Plato's Phaedo and the seventeenth
+century, the standard philosophical argument for immortality had always revolved around our ability to do what beasts cannot-know unchanging truths rather than just particular facts. Even Descartes, although he opened the floodgates to an entirely new conception of the
+difference between mind and body, was inclined to backtrack to the
+standard position and say that the body was responsible for all the
+actions which we share with brutes for example, flight from danger.
+Thus in the Fourth Responses he says that reflex action occurs "without the aid of mind," and that this is no more a marvel than that
+"light reflected from the body of a wolf in the eyes of a sheep should
+be capable of exciting a motion of flight" (Oeuures Philosophiques,
+ed. Alquié, II, 671; Haldane and Ross, II, 104). But his treatment of
+feeling as a sort of thinking would seem to force him into the paradoxi
+cal claim (which neither Aristotle nor Augustine would have any reason to make) that the feeling of terror which accompanies our flight
+has no parallel within the sheep. See the argument in a letter to Henry
+More (February 5, 1649) at p. 885 of vol. Ill of the Alquié edition. In
+such passages as this, the ambiguity of "thought" between "reasoning"
+and "consciousness" comes to a head. Descartes needs the former sense
+to avoid paradox and to maintain a link with the tradition, and the
+latter sense to establish a dualism of extended and nonextended sub.
+stance. For a review of relevant Cartesian texts and a good account of
+the impact of Descartes's view on later philosophy, see Norman Malcolm, "Thoughtless Brutes," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 46 (1973), 5-20. Malcolm, however, thinks
+that my question of why Descartes repackaged pains and thoughts so as
+53
+
+then something other than our grasp of universal truths
+must serve as the mark of mind.
+If we look in Descartes for a common factor which pains,
+dreams, memory-images, and veridical and hallucinatory perceptions share with concepts of (and judgments about) God,
+number, and the ultimate constituents of matter, we find
+no explicit doctrine. Descartes tells us that we have a clear
+grasp of the distinction between the extended and the nonextended, and so we do (in the same trivial sense in which
+we might claim a clear grasp of the distinction between the
+finite and the infinite), but this does not help with the
+borderline cases (sensory grasp of particulars) which are,
+as it happens, the heart of the matter. For it is just the
+status of the "confused ideas of sense and imagination"
+which makes the difference between mind-as-reason and
+mind-as-consciousness.
+The answer I should like to give to the question "What
+common factor did Descartes find?" is "indubitability," that
+is, the fact that pains, like thoughts and most beliefs, are
+such that the subject cannot doubt that he has them, whereas doubt is possible about everything physical. If we give
+this answer, then we can see what Royce called "Descartes's
+rediscovery of the inner life" as the discovery of the true
+to include them within the same substance is answered by saying that
+what is common to imagining, willing, sensing, feeling, etc. is that in
+all of them "there is an object of awareness." (Malcolm, "Descartes's
+Proof That His Essence Is Thinking" in Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Willis Doney, p. 317n.) In other words, Malcolm thinks
+that intentionality is sufficient to unite all the things which Descartes
+wants to unite under cogitatio and pensée. I do not think that this will
+work for pains. In any case it runs together the genuine intentionality
+of linguistic representations and the pseudo-intentionality (as Sellars
+calls it) of sensations which Aquinas kept separate. It is just this coalescence by Descartes which needs explanation. Or, to put it another way, what needs explanation is just the origin of the notion of
+"awareness" in the phrase "object of awareness." On the distinction
+between genuine and pseudo-intentionality, see Sellars, "Being and Be-
+ing Known" in Science, Perception and Reality.
+54
+
+essence of consciousness-that there is no distinction between appearance and reality, whereas everywhere else
+there is. The trouble with offering this answer, however,
+is that it is never explicitly given by Descartes himself. So
+the best I can do to justify it is to say that something is
+needed to explain Descartes's repackaging of the various
+items which Aristotle and Aquinas had separated, that
+nothing else seems to do, and that indubitability was so
+close to the heart of the author of the First Meditation that
+it seems a natural motive for his conceptual revolution.
+Margaret Wilson has noted that we can find in Descartes
+an argument for mind-body dualism (a dualism drawn
+along the revisionist lines I have been describing) which is
+a simple "argument from doubt." This argument says that
+what we can doubt exists cannot, by Leibniz's law, be
+identical with what we cannot doubt exists. As Wilson
+says, this argument is "universally recognized to be fallacious."2 It is fallacious, if for no other reason, because
+Leibniz's law does not apply to intentional properties. But,
+Wilson continues, the argument for dualism in the Sixth
+Meditation is not a version of this fallacious argument. It
+turns instead on the notion of "a complete thing" (which
+seems the same as the notion of "substance" in the sense of
+the term in which Descartes will admit only three substances—thought, extension, and God). The crucial premise
+is "I can clearly and distinctly understand that something
+can be a complete thing if it has x (a psychological property) even if it lacks ø (a physical property)" (p. 14).
+I think that Wilson's analysis is right, and that she is
+also right when she says that this argument as a whole "is
+no better than the distinction between clear and distinct
+perception and 'mere' perception," concerning which she
+doubts whether "recent essentialists' appeals to intuition"
+are on better ground (p. 14). In my view, however, the prin-
+24 See Margaret Wilson, "Descartes: the Epistemological Argument
+for Mind-Body Distinctness," Nous 10 (1976), 7-8. I am much indebted
+to Wilson for careful and helpful comments on a draft of this chapter.
+55
+
+cipal question raised by her analysis is how Descartes managed to convince himself that something which included
+both pains and mathematical knowledge was "a complete
+thing" rather than two things. This in turn reduces to the
+question of how he was able to give "penser" the extended
+sense of "consciousness" while still seeing it as the name of
+a separate substance, in the way in which vois and intellectus had been made familiar as the names of separate
+substances. In my view, as I have said, "essentialist intuitions" and "clear and distinct perceptions" are always appeals to linguistic habits entrenched in the language by our
+predecessors. So what needs explanation is how Descartes
+was able to convince himself that his repackaging was
+"intuitive."
+Granted that the "argument from doubt" has no merit,
+I think that nevertheless it is one of those cases of "finding
+bad reasons for what we believe on instinct" which serves as
+a clue to the instincts which actually do the convincing.
+The hunch in question here was, I think, that the indubitably known mathematical truths (once their proofs had
+been worked through so as to make them clearly and distinctly perceived with a sort of "phenomenal" vividness
+and non-discursiveness) and the indubitable momentary
+states of consciousness had something in common—something permitting them to be packaged inside of one substance. Thus Descartes says:
+Now as to what concerns ideas, if we consider them only
+in themselves and do not relate them to anything else
+beyond themselves, they cannot properly speaking be
+false; for whether I imagine a goat or a chimera, it is not
+the less true that I imagine the one rather than the
+other.25
+Speaking of the imaginary beings created by painters, he
+says that even if
+25 Meditation III, Alquié edition, II, 193.
+56
+
+their work represents a thing purely fictitious and absolutely false, it is certain all the same that the colors
+of which this is composed are necessarily real. And for
+the same reason, although these general things (generalia)
+such as eyes, a head, hands, and so on, may be imaginary,
+it is nevertheless necessary that there be some more simple
+and universal (quaedam aduc magis simplicia et universalia) things out of which all these are made-just as
+out of colors all the images of things (rerum imagines),
+whether true or false, which are in our thought (quae in
+cogitatione nostra sunt) are made.26
+In these passages, I think Descartes is dimly envisaging a
+similarity between the "simple natures" which we know in
+mathematical physics (which may be the quaedam simplicia
+et universalia in question) and the colors themselves. Colors,
+in his official, Galilean, metaphysical view, are secondary
+qualities waiting upon analysis into simples, but epistemo.
+logically they seem, like pain, to have the same sort of primitive inescapability as the simple natures themselves. He
+could not make the analogy explicit without setting his
+foot on the road toward Lockean empiricism. But neither
+could he give it up without falling back into the old Aristotelian distinctions between the sensitive and the intellectual souls. This would have brought back all the pre-
+Galilean metaphysics which he wanted to avoid, not to
+mention a hylomorphic epistemology impossibly difficult
+to reconcile with the explanatory power of Galilean mechanics.? In this difficult situation, he allowed, I think,
+26 Meditation I, Alquié edition, II, 179.
+27 Thus the following remark of A.G.A. Balz:
+I think Descartes would have liked to assert that the intellect alone
+is the thinking thing, the unextended immaterial soul substance, attributing to the body imagination, sense, and feeling. But if the pain,
+caused by the knife, is not a property of the knife as a constellation
+of modes of matter, it cannot be a property of that constellation of
+modes of matter that is the human body. So perforce pain and all the
+remainder of our immediate experience must be dumped into the
+57
+
+Uk GLAsSY LOSENCE
+most of the work of changing the notion of "mind" to be
+done under the table, not by any explicit argument but
+simply by verbal maneuvers which reshuffled the deck
+slightly, and slightly differently, at each passage in which
+the mind-body distinction came to the fore.?
+If I am right in thinking that Descartes's badly argued
+hunch, the one which made him able to see pains and
+thoughts as modes of a single substance, was that indubitability was the common factor they shared with nothing
+physical, then we can see him as working his way around
+toward a view in which indubitability is no longer the mark
+of eternality, but rather of something for which the Greeks
+had no name-consciousness. Whereas previous philosophers had more or less followed Plato in thinking that only
+the eternal was known with certainty, Descartes was substituting "clear and distinct perception"-that is, the sort
+of unconfused knowledge gained by going through a process of analysis—for "indubitability" as a mark of eternal
+truths. This left indubitability free to serve as a criterion
+of the mental. For although the thought that I am in pain
+does not count as a clear and distinct perception, it can no
+more be successfully doubted than the thought that I exist.
+Whereas Plato and the tradition had made the lines between confusion and clarity, dubitability and indubitability, and the mind and the body coincide, Descartes was
+soul substance. ("Concerning the Thomistic and Cartesian Dualisms:
+A Rejoinder to Professor Mourant," Journal of Philosophy 54 (1957),
+387.)
+28 Such unconscious sleight-of-hand, when practiced by men of
+Descartes's boldness of imagination, is an occasion for gratitude rather
+than censure. No great philosopher has avoided it, and no intellectual
+revolution could succeed without it. In "Kuhnian" terminology, no
+revolution can succeed which employs a vocabulary commensurable
+with the old, and thus none can succeed by employing arguments which
+make unequivocal use of terms shared with the traditional wisdom. So
+bad arguments for brilliant hunches must necessarily precede the
+normalization of a new vocabulary which incorporates the hunch.
+Given that new vocabulary, better arguments become possible, although
+these will always be found question-begging by the revolution's victims.
+58
+
+now rearranging them. The result was that from Descartes
+on we have to distinguish between the special metaphysical
+ground for our certainty about our inner states ("nothing
+is closer to the mind than itself") and the various epistemological reasons which ground our certainties about anything
+else. This is why, once this distinction was drawn clearly,
+and once Descartes's own confusion between certainty that
+something exists and certainty about its nature was dissipated, empiricism began to edge out rationalism. For our
+certainty that our concept of "painful" or "blue" signifies
+something real edges out our certainty that we have a clear
+and distinct perception of such simple natures as "substance," "thought," and "motion." With Lockean empiricism, foundationalist epistemology emerged as the paradigm
+of philosophy. 28
+Descartes himself was forever trying to hold on to standard
+Platonic and scholastic distinctions with one hand while
+deconstructing them with the other. Thus we find him,
+when challenged by Hobbes,3° using the pineal gland to
+28 The discovery of the possibility of an empiricist foundationalism
+is connected with what Ian Hacking has described in The Emergence
+of Probability (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975) as the
+invention of the notion of "evidence" in the modern sense—a notion
+which was a prerequisite for foundationalist projects, and a fortiori
+for empiricism. This invention, as well as the eventual triumph of
+empiricism, was connected with the distinction between the high and
+low sciences (cf. Hacking, p. 35, and I. S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension
+(Chicago, 1978], chap. 3). A fuller account of these Cartesian shifts
+would bring these themes together.
+30 See his claim that Hobbes confuses ideas properly so-called with
+"les images des choses matérielles depeinte en la fantasie corporelle,"
+the latter being the pineal gland, in Replies to Third Objections,
+Alquié edition, II, 611. Margaret Wilson, in "Cartesian Dualism" (in
+Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays, ed. Michael Hooker, (Baltimore, 1978]) suggests, on the basis of such passages, that we should be
+cautious about attributing to him the view that "we clearly and distinctly perceive our sensations apart from any physical state or occurrence." Caution is indeed called for, but this is not to say that there is
+a way of making Descartes's denial of this claim consistent with the
+more "mainline" dualistic passages in the Meditations. (This essay of
+Wilson's also makes the useful point that Descartes himself, unlike
+59
+
+reintroduce the distinction between the sensitive and intellective souls, and using it again to recreate the standard
+Pauline association between the passions and the flesh in
+The Passions of the Soul. But this dissimulation was laughed
+out of court by, for example, Spinoza, who saw clearly that
+a confused, but purely mental, idea could do everything
+which animal spirits or "la fantasie corporelle" could do.31
+Once such second-generation Cartesians, who viewed Descartes himself as having one foot still implanted in the
+scholastic mud, had purified and "normalized" Cartesian
+doctrine, we got the full-fledged version of the " idea' idea,"
+the one which made it possible for Berkeley to think of extended substance as a hypothesis of which we had no need.
+This thought could never have occurred to a pre-Cartesian
+bishop, struggling with the flesh rather than with intellectual confusion. With this full-fledged " 'idea' idea" there
+came the possibility of philosophy as a discipline which centered around, of all things, epistemology, rather than
+around God and morality.32 Even for Descartes himself, the
+Gassendi, Hobbes, and Spinoza, did not believe in psychophysical
+parallelism and thus did adopt the view that nonphysical forces operated in the mind which made it impossible to predict thoughts physio.
+logically.)
+31 See Spinoza, Ethics, the first and last paragraphs of part Ill and
+the discussion of animal spirits in the preface to part v.
+32 This full-fledged " idea' idea" (blandly presupposed by Hume in
+the passage cited in note 18 above) is the one Reid despairingly protested against; in this protest he was preceded by Arnauld and succeeded in later centuries by I. H. Green and by John Austin. John
+Yolton has pointed out to me a passage in Arnauld's Des uraies et des
+fausses idées (Oeuures, Paris and Lausanne, 1780, vol. 39, p. 190) which
+brings in the mirror-imagery (going back to Plato, Republic 510a) that
+I have been treating as the original sin of epistemology:
+Since all men were at first infants, and since they then were occupied
+only with their bodies and with the things which their senses encountered, they spent a long time without knowing of any other
+sight (vue) than the corporeal, which they attribute to their eyes.
+They could not avoid noticing two facts. The first is that it is necessary that the object be before our eyes if we are to see it. This is
+60
+
+matter of the relation between body and soul was not something for philosophy; philosophy had, so to speak, risen
+above the practical wisdom sought by the ancients and had
+become professional, almost as professional as mathematics,
+whose subject symbolized the indubitability characteristic of
+the mind. "It is only in daily life and ordinary discourse,
+abstaining from meditating and studying matters which
+excite the imagination, that one learns to grasp (concevoir)
+the union of body and soul... that union which everyone
+experiences without philosophizing."33 The Cartesian
+change from mind-as-reason to mind-as-inner-arena was not
+the triumph of the prideful individual subject freed from
+scholastic shackles so much as the triumph of the quest for
+certainty over the quest for wisdom. From that time forward, the way was open for philosophers either to attain
+the rigor of the mathematician or the mathematical physicist, or to explain the appearance of rigor in these fields,
+rather than to help people attain peace of mind. Science,
+rather than living, became philosophy's subject, and epistemology its center.
+6. DUALISM AND "MIND-STUFF"
+I can summarize the result of the previous section by
+saying the notion of the "separation between mind and
+what they call presence (presence) and this makes them regard the
+presence of the object as a necessity for sight. The second fact is that
+we sometimes see visible things in mirrors, or in water, or in other
+things which represent them. Thus they believe, wrongly, that they
+do not then see the things themselves, but only their images.
+Compare Austin on "the philosophers' use of 'directly perceive'" (Sense
+and Sensibilia [Oxford, 1962], p. 19) and on mirror-images (ibid., PP.
+31, 50). For a valuable survey of post-Cartesian accounts of what Descartes should have meant by "idea" (including Arnauld's last-ditch
+attempt to treat ideas as acts, in the manner of Brentano, Husserl, and
+G. E. Moore), see Robert McRae, " Idea' as a Philosophical term in the
+17th Century," Journal of the History of Ideas 26 (1965), 175-190.
+33 Letter to Princess Elizabeth, June 28, 1643 (Alquié edition, III, 45),
+cited in van Peursen, Body, Soul, Spirit, p. 25.
+61
+
+body" means different things, and is proved by different
+philosophical arguments, before and after Descartes. The
+hylomorphic epistemology which thought of grasping universals as instancing in one's intellect what the frog instanced in its flesh was, thanks to the rise of mathematical
+physics, being replaced by a law-event framework which
+explained froghood as possibly a merely "nominal" essence. So the notion of reason as a faculty of grasping uni.
+versals was not available for use in a premise proving the
+distinctness of the mind from the body. The notion which
+would define what could "have a distinct existence from
+the body" was one which would draw a line between the
+cramps in one's stomach and the associated feeling in one's
+mind.
+I have suggested that the only criterion which will draw
+this line is indubitability-that closeness to the Inner Eye
+which permits Descartes to say (in a sentence which would
+have astonished Isabella and antiquity) that "nothing is
+easier for the mind to know than itself."34 But this may
+seem strange, since the obvious Cartesian candidate for
+such a mark would seem to be non-spatiality. Descartes insists over and over again that we can separate mind from
+"extended substance," thereby viewing it as nonextended
+substance. Further, the first and most common-sensical rebuttal offered to contemporary philosophers who suggest
+that pains might be identical with brain processes is drawn
+straight from Descartes: viz., pains "in" amputated limbs
+are nonspatial-the argument being that if they had any
+spatial location they would be in an arm, but since there
+is no arm, they must be of a quite different ontological sort.
+34 This passage occurs in a splendid non sequitur following the example of the piece of wax in Meditation II: since even bodies are not
+known "proprie" by sense or imagination but only by intellect, it is clear
+that nihil facilius aut evidentius mea mente posse a me percipi (Alquié,
+II, 1g2; Haldane and Ross, I, 157). The argument depends upon confusion between the cogito as proof of my existence and as isolation of
+my essence.
+62
+
+Philosophers still insist that "it makes no sense at all to
+locate the occurrence of a thought at some place within
+your body,"35 and they tend to attribute this insight to
+Descartes. But, as I have argued in section 2 above, we
+would hardly think of a thought or a pain as a thing (a
+particular distinct from a person, rather than a state of a
+person) which was not locatable unless we already had the
+notion of a nonextended substance of which it might be a
+portion. No intuition that pains and thoughts are nonspatial antedates, or can ground an argument for, the Cartesian notion of the mind as a distinct substance (a nonspatial one). There is, however, more to be said about how
+the notion of "nonspatial substance," and thus of "mindstuff," entered philosophy, and thus about why contemporary philosophy of mind finds itself talking about pains and
+beliefs rather than people having pains or beliefs. Going
+over this further material will, I hope, make clearer how
+very different Cartesian dualism is from the "dualism" of
+contemporary discussions.
+We need to bear in mind that the nonspatial substance
+which Kant and Strawson reject as an incoherent notion
+was a seventeenth-century notion, and that it is a commonplace of intellectual history that strange things happened to the notion of "substance" in that century. For
+Aristotle, and still for St. Thomas, the paradigm of a substance was an individual man or frog. Detached parts of
+men or frogs were, like clumps of turf or pailsful of water,
+dubious borderline cases—they were "capable of existing
+separately" in one sense (spatial separation), but they did
+not have the functional unity or "nature" which proper
+substances should have. Aristotle, when worried about such
+cases, was wont to dismiss them as "mere potencies"-as
+neither accidents, like the frog's color, nor proper actuali-
+35 Jerome Shaffer, Philosophy of Mind (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968),
+p. 48; cf. Norman Malcolm, "Scientific Materialism and the Identity
+Theory," Dialogue 3 (1964), 115-125.
+63
+
+ties, like the living, leaping frog itself. 36 Descartes pretends
+that he is using "distinct substance" in the standard sense
+of "capable of separate existence," but he does not mean
+either spatial separation or functional unity.3 He means
+something like "capable of having everything else disappear
+[or be "thought away"] and still being around."38 This
+definition of "capacity for separate existence" fits the One,
+the Platonic Ideas, and Aristotle's Unmoved Movers, but
+almost nothing else. Given such a definition, it is hardly
+surprising that there should turn out to be, at most, only
+three substances-God, mind, and matter. Nor is it surprising that Malebranche and Berkeley should begin to have
+doubts about the third candidate, and Spinoza about both
+third and second. It would not have occurred to Aristotle
+to think that frogs, stars, and men were simply so many accidents of one big substance merely on the ground that if
+38 Cf. Metaphysics 1040b, 5-10 on "heaps." I discuss the tension between Aristotle's criteria for being a substance-"separate existence"
+and "unity"-in "Genus as Matter," in Exegesis and Argument: Studies
+in Greek Philosophy in Honor of Gregory Vlastos, ed. Edward N. Lee
+et al. (Dordrecht, 1973).
+37 Descartes thinks that a human hand, whether or not detached, is
+a perfectly good example of substance. Cf. Fourth Responses (Alquié,
+II, 663; Haldane and Ross, II, 99), where he says that the sense in which
+a hand is an "incomplete substance" is unimportant and is merely a
+matter of "not forming a whole distinct from every other thing" (en un
+autre sens on les peut appeler incomplètes, non qu'elles aient rien
+d'incomplet en tant qu'elles sont des substances, mais seulement en tant
+qu'elles se rapportent à quelqu'autre substance avec laquelle elles composent un tout par soi et distinct de tout autre). There is, however, a
+tension in Descartes between the view that any material thing (a hand,
+a dust mote) is a substance and the notion (clear in Spinoza) that these
+things are only modes of a larger substance (e.g., matter-as-a-whole).
+38 This definition gives Descartes trouble since it suggests the Spinozaistic view that God, on whom everything else must be thought to
+depend, is the only substance. The point is discussed by L. J. Beck,
+The Metaphysics of Descartes (Oxford, 1965), p. 110, who says: "The
+apparent inconsistency in using the word substantia, or even res, to
+connote the self of the Cogito is due, in no small measure, to trying to
+put new wine into old bottles, to express the Cartesian doctrine in the
+technical language of the schools."
+64
+
+we imagine all the other bodies in the world (eg., earth
+and air) annihilated, the frog and the human could hardly
+be imagined to survive. But precisely this notion of one big
+substance was what was needed to provide a "philosophical
+foundation" of Galilean mechanics while heaping scorn on
+traditional hylomorphic explanations.39 When matter-asall-the-atoms- (or vortices) -put-together replaced matter-aspotentiality, it was promoted to the rank of substance
+(absorbing all the old nonhuman Aristotelian substances
+into itself) and left only Aristotle's "pure actuality" (the
+voûs which is the Unmoved Movers and may not be distinct
+from the "separable" voûs in individual men) as a possible
+rival in that rank. 4o
+We contemporary inheritors of the Cartesian distinction
+between mind and matter have lost touch with the notion of
+"substance" in its seventeenth-century definition. The notion of existence a se was never intelligible to the vulgar,
+and Kant succeeded in making it unintelligible even to
+professional philosophers. So when we assent to the claim
+that there is an obvious distinction between a category of
+things which can exist in space and another category of
+things which cannot, we are not assenting to Descartes's
+claim that mind and matter are distinct entities "which
+depend on nothing else for their existence." Many contemporary philosophers who agree that it is nonsense to
+39 Cf. E. A. Burtt, Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical
+Science (Garden City, N.Y., 1955), chap. IV. At p. 117 Burtt says, "The
+fact is, and this is of central importance for our whole study, Descartes
+real criterion is not permanence but the possibility of mathematical
+handling; in his case, as with Galileo, the whole course of his thought
+from his adolescent studies on had inured him to the notion that we
+know objects only in mathematical terms." The resulting distinction
+between primary and secondary qualities supplies the motive to regard
+paradigmatic Aristotelian substances as merely modes of res extensa.
+40 Cf. Fourth Responses (Alquié, II, 602; Haldane and Ross, II, 98)
+where Descartes says that "concevoir pleinement" and "concevoir que
+c'est une chose complète" are synonymous, a point which he thinks
+helps explain how we grasp that soul and body are two substances.
+65
+
+speak of the location of a pain or a thought nevertheless
+insist, pace Descartes, that a stream of consciousness without
+a body is unimaginable. Such philosophers are content to
+think of mental entities as states of persons rather than "bits
+of ghostly stuff," and to let nonlocatability be a sign of the
+adjectival status of states rather than of the peculiar makeup
+of certain particulars. Since a man's build, personality,
+weight, hilarity, or charm is not capable of being pinpointed
+in space, why should his beliefs and desires be? So it seems
+plausible to say that Descartes's insight was merely a recognition of the difference between parts of persons or states
+of those parts (e.g., cramps of their stomachs) on the one
+hand and certain states of the whole person on the other,
+misleadingly stated in a corrupted scholastic vocabulary as
+a distinction of "substance."
+This account of what it means to say that the mind is nonspatial provides a convenient way of simultaneously stating
+and dissolving one mind-body problem. For few people are
+worried by an ontological gap between what is signified by
+names and what is signified by adjectives. However, like
+most behaviorist-style solutions to the mind-body problem,
+this one has difficulties with thoughts and raw feels-events
+as opposed to dispositions. It is easy to view beliefs and desires and moods as (in Ryle's phrase) "traits of intellect and
+character" which require no nonmaterial medium as substrate but only the man himself. It is harder to think of raw
+feels, mental images, and thoughts this way. They suggest
+an immaterial stream of consciousness rushing invisibly and
+intangibly through the interstices of the brain, perhaps-
+41 The point is made in various ways by Hampshire, Austin, and
+Ayer in their respective reviews of The Concept of Mind reprinted in
+Ryle: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. O. P. Wood and George
+Pitcher (Garden City, N.Y., 1970). For ways of extending Ryle's methods
+to perceptions and the associated raw feels, see Pitcher, A Theory of
+Perception. On perceptions as dispositions to belief, and the discussion
+of "adverbial materialism," see James Cornman, Materialism and Sensations (New Haven, 1971). See also Richard Rorty, "Incorrigibility as
+the Mark of the Mental," Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 406-409.
+66
+
+because it seems so natural to regard them as things rather
+than states of things. So contemporary philosophers, returning to an Aristotelian and vulgar notion of "thing" instead
+of Descartes's sophisticated and extravagant notion of "substance," are inclined to split the difference between Aristotle
+and Descartes. That is, they think that Aristotle neglected
+certain particulars-for example, pains and raw feels—
+whereas Descartes pointlessly took them to be accidents of
+one big nonextended substance, just as he took frogs and
+atoms to be accidental configurations of one big extended
+substance called Matter. This permits contemporary philosophers to have mental entities without the soul, and thus
+without appearing to be haunted by the Invisible and
+Intangible Man of religious belief (a notion which they
+read into Descartes —not without some encouragement from
+Descartes himself).
+This dualism based on "separate existence from the body"
+—a fourth sort—is quite different from the dualism between
+a person and his ghost, or between a person and his Aristotelian passive intellect, or between res cogitans and res
+extensa. But it is also a partial dualism—as partial, in equal
+and opposite ways, as that of the ancients. Whereas the
+ancients took only the universal grasping part of Descartes's
+nonextended substance as "separately existing" contemporary dualists (conceding beliefs, desires, and the like to
+Ryle as ways of speaking of dispositions) take only event-like
+candidates for mentality as "separately existing." Whereas
+Thomists, for example, accuse Descartes of having pointlessly endowed sense with the immateriality which is the
+prerogative of reason, contemporary dualists accuse him of
+having pointlessly endowed mathematical knowledge and
+decisions on conduct with the immaterial thinghood which
+belongs to pains, after-images, and occurrent thoughts. For
+the ancients, the mind was most obviously capable of separate existence when it contemplated the unchanging and
+was itself unchanging. For the moderns, it is most obviously
+so capable when it is a blooming, buzzing collection of raw
+67
+
+feels. 42 Whoever is right, it is clear that neither ancients nor
+moderns share Descartes's "clear and distinct perception" of
+the separability of all the items he lumped together under
+"thinking."
+Descartes's only improvement on the Homeric notion of
+an Invisible and Intangible Man was to strip the intruder
+of humanoid form. By thus making the possible intruders
+among bodies less easily identifiable, he made them more
+philosophical. They were more philosophical in that, like
+the voûs of Aristotle and the Glassy Essence of Isabella, they
+were not shady homunculi, but rather essentially unpicturable entities. Since to be concerned with philosophical
+matters was to be concerned with that which the eye cannot
+see nor the ear hear, both seventeenth-century nonextended
+substance and contemporary nonlocatable thoughts and
+feels were thought to be more philosophically respectable
+than the ghosts for whose peace religious believers pray. But
+contemporary philosophers, having updated Descartes, can
+be dualists without their dualism making the slightest difference to any human interest or concern, without interfering
+with science or lending any support to religion. For insofar
+as dualism reduces to the bare insistence that pains and
+thoughts have-no places, nothing whatever hangs on the distinction between mind and body.
+Let me now remind the reader of the course I have followed in this chapter. In sections 1-2 I argued that we could
+make no sense of the notion of "mental entities" as a distinct
+ontological genus without invoking the notion of "phenomenal entities" such as pains, entities whose being was exhausted by the single property of, for example, painfulness.
+I claimed that the real problem was not to abjure such
+42 "Whereas, for Plato, rational thoughts were the paradigmatic
+activities of the soul, such lowly events as itches, toothaches, and twinges
+are now among those typically mentioned in philosophical discussion
+as mental events" Jaegwon Kim, "Materialism and the Criteria of the
+Mental," Synthese 22 [1971], 336).
+68
+
+hypostatized universals but to explain why anyone had
+taken them seriously, and how they came to seem relevant to
+discussions of the nature of personhood and of reason. I
+hope that sections 3-6 have given an idea of how I think
+these historical questions can be answered (although I am
+painfully aware of the lacunae in the story I have told). My
+answer to the question "Why do we tend to lump the intentional and the phenomenal together as 'the mental'?" is that
+Descartes used the notion of the "incorrigibly known" to
+bridge the gap between them. So I now need to spell out
+more fully my own anti-Cartesian, Wittgensteinian, view
+of the nature of "our privileged access to the mental."
+In the following chapter, therefore, I put aside personhood and reason, and discuss consciousness almost
+exclusively. I shall try to show that the purportedly metaphysical "problem of consciousness" is no more and no less
+than the epistemological "problem of privileged access," and
+that once this is seen questions about dualism versus ma.
+terialism lose their interest.
+69
+
+CHAPTER II
+Persons Without Minds
+1. THE ANTIPODEANS
+Far away, on the other side of our galaxy, there was a
+planet on which lived beings like ourselves-featherless
+bipeds who built houses and bombs, and wrote poems and
+computer programs. These beings did not know that they
+had minds. They had notions like "wanting to" and "intending to" and "believing that" and "feeling terrible" and
+"feeling marvelous." But they had no notion that these
+signified mental states-states of a peculiar and distinct
+sort-quite different from "sitting down," "having a cold,"
+and "being sexually aroused." Although they used the notions of believing and knowing and wanting and being
+moody of their pets and their robots as well as of themselves,
+they did not regard pets or robots as included in what was
+meant when they said, "We all believe ..." or "We never
+do such things as. ..." That is to say, they treated only
+members of their own species as persons. But they did not
+explain the difterence between persons and non-persons by
+such notions as "mind," "consciousness," "spirit," or anything of the sort. They did not explain it at all; they just
+treated it as the difference between "us" and everything
+else. They believed in immortality for themselves, and a few
+believed that this would be shared by the pets or the robots,
+or both. But this immortality did not involve the notion of a
+"soul" which separated from the body. It was a straightforward matter of bodily resurrection followed by mysterious
+and instantaneous motion to what they referred to as "a
+place above the heavens" for good people, and to a sort of
+cave, beneath the planet's surface, for the wicked. Their
+philosophers were concerned primarily with four topics: the
+nature of Being, proofs of the existence of a Benevolent and
+70
+
+Omnipotent Being who would carry out arrangements for
+the resurrection, problems arising out of discourse about
+nonexistent objects, and the reconciliation of conflicting
+moral intuitions. But these philosophers had not formulated
+the problem of subject and object, nor that of mind and
+matter. There was a tradition of Pyrrhonian skepticism, but
+Locke's "veil of ideas" was unknown, since the notion of an
+"¡dea" or "perception" or "mental representation" was also
+unknown. Some of their philosophers predicted that the
+beliefs about immortality which had been central in earlier
+periods of history, and which were still held by all but the
+intelligentsia, would someday be replaced by a "positivistic"
+culture purged of all superstitions (but these philosophers made no mention of an intervening "metaphysical"
+stage).
+In most respects, then, the language, life, technology, and
+philosophy of this race were much like ours. But there was
+one important difference. Neurology and biochemistry had
+been the first disciplines in which technological breakthroughs had been achieved, and a large part of the conversation of these people concerned the state of their nerves.
+When their infants veered toward hot stoves, mothers cried
+out, "He'll stimulate his C-fibers." When people were given
+clever visual illusions to look at, they said, "How oddl It
+makes neuronic bundle G-14 quiver, but when I look at it
+from the side I can see that it's not a red rectangle at all."
+Their knowledge of physiology was such that each wellformed sentence in the language which anybody bothered
+to form could easily be correlated with a readily identifiable
+neural state. This state occurred whenever someone uttered,
+or was tempted to utter, or heard, the sentence. This state
+also sometimes occurred in solitude and people reported
+such occasions with remarks like "I was suddenly in state
+S-296, so I put out the milk bottles." Sometimes they
+would say things like "It looked like an elephant, but then
+it struck me that elephants don't occur on this continent, so
+I realized that it must be a mastodon." But they would also
+71
+
+sometimes say, in just the same circumstances, things like
+"I had G-412 together with F-11, but then I had S-147, so I
+realized that it must be a mastodon." They thought of
+mastodons and milk bottles as objects of beliefs and desires,
+and as causing certain neural processes. They viewed these
+neural processes as interacting causally with beliefs and
+desires-in just the same way as the mastodons and milk
+bottles did. Certain neural processes could be deliberately
+self-induced, and some people were more skillful than others
+in inducing certain neural states in themselves. Others were
+skilled at detecting certain special states which most people
+could not recognize in themselves.
+In the middle of the twenty-first century, an expedition
+from Earth landed on this planet. The expedition included
+philosophers, as well as representatives of every other
+learned discipline. The philosophers thought that the most
+interesting thing about the natives was their lack of the
+concept of mind. They joked among themselves that they
+had landed among a bunch of materialists, and suggested
+the name Antipodea for the planet-in reference to an
+almost forgotten school of philosophers, centering in Australia and New Zealand, who in the previous century had
+attempted one of the many futile revolts against Cartesian
+dualism in the history of Terran philosophy. The name
+stuck, and so the new race of intelligent beings came to be
+known as Antipodeans. The Terran neurologists and biochemists were fascinated by the wealth of knowledge in
+their field which the Antipodeans exhibited. Since technical
+conversation on these subjects was conducted almost entirely in offhand references to neural states, the Terran
+experts eventually picked up the ability to report their own
+neural states (without conscious inference) instead of reporting their thoughts, perceptions, and raw feels. (The
+physiologies of the two species were, fortunately, almost
+identical.) Everything went swimmingly, except for the
+difficulties met by the philosophers.
+The philosophers who had come on the expedition were,
+72
+
+as usual, divided into two warring camps: the tenderminded ones who thought philosophy should aim at Significance, and the tough-minded philosophers who thought
+that it should aim at Truth. The philosophers of the first
+sort felt that there was no real problem about whether the
+Antipodeans had minds. They held that what was important in understanding other beings was a grasp of their
+mode of being-in-the-world. It became evident that, whatever Existentiale the Antipodeans were using, they certainly
+did not include any of those which, a century earlier, Heidegger had criticized as "subjectivist." The whole notion of
+"the epistemological subject," or the person as spirit, had
+no place in their self-descriptions, nor in their philosophies.
+Some of the tender-minded philosophers felt that this
+showed that the Antipodeans had not yet broken out of
+Nature into Spirit, or, more charitably, had not yet progressed from Consciousness to Self-Consciousness. These
+philosophers became town-criers of inwardness, attempting
+to bully the Antipodeans across an invisible line and into
+the Realm of Spirit. Others, however, felt that the Antipodeans exhibited the praiseworthy grasp of the union of
+órcuos and lóyos which was lost to Western Terran consciousness through Plato's assimilation of ovaía to iéa. The
+Antipodean failure to grasp the notion of mind, in the view
+of this set of philosophers, showed their closeness to Being
+and their freedom from the temptations to which Terran
+thought had long since succumbed. In the contest between
+these two views, equally tender-minded as both were, discussion tended to be inconclusive. The Antipodeans themselves were not much help, because they had so much
+trouble translating the background reading necessary to appreciate the problem-Plato's Theatetus, Descartes's Meditations, Hume's Treatise, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,
+Hegel's Phenomenology, Strawson's Individuals, etc.
+The tough-minded philosophers, as usual, found a much
+more straightforward and clean-cut question to discuss.
+They did not care what the Antipodeans thought about
+73
+
+themselves, but rather focused on the question: Do they in
+fact have minds? In their precise way, they narrowed this
+question down to: Do they in fact have sensations? It was
+thought that if it became clear whether they had, say, sensations of pain, as well as stimulated C-fibers, when touching
+hot stoves, everything else would be plain sailing. It was
+clear that the Antipodeans had the same behavioral dispositions toward hot stoves, muscle cramps, torture, and the like
+as humans. They loathed having their C-fibers stimulated.
+But the tough-minded philosophers asked themselves: Does
+their experience contain the same phenomenal properties as
+ours? Does the stimulation of C-fibers feel painful? Or does it
+feel some other, equally awful, way? Or does feeling not come
+into it at all? These philosophers were not surprised that the
+Antipodeans could offer noninferential reports of their own
+neural states, since it had been learned long since that
+psychophysiologists could train human subjects to report
+alpha-rhythms, as well as various other physiologically describable cortical states. But they felt baffled by the question:
+Are some phenomenal properties being detected by an Antipodean who says, "It's my C-fibers again—you know, the
+ones that go off every time you get burned or hit or have a
+tooth pulled. It's just awful."?
+It was suggested that the question could only be answered
+experimentally, and so they arranged with the neurologists
+that one of their number should be wired up to an Antipodean volunteer so as to switch currents back and forth
+between various regions of the two brains. This, it was
+thought, would also enable the philosophers to insure that
+the Antipodeans did not have an inverted spectrum, or
+anything else which might confuse the issue. As it turned
+out, however, the experiment produced no interesting results. The difficulty was that when the Antipodean speech
+center got an input from the C-fibers of the Earthling brain
+it always talked only about its C-fibers, whereas when the
+Earthling speech center was in control it always talked only
+about pain. When the Antipodean speech center was asked
+74
+
+what the C-fibers felt like it said that it didn't quite get the
+notion of "feeling," but that stimulated C-fibers were, of
+course, terrible things to have. The same sort of thing happened for the questions about inverted spectra and other
+perceptual qualities. When asked to call off the colors on a
+chart, both speech centers called off the usual color-names in
+the same order. But the Antipodean speech center could also
+call off the various neuronic bundles activated by each patch
+on the chart (no matter which visual cortex it happened to
+be hooked up to). When the Earthling speech center was
+asked what the colors were like when transmitted to the
+Antipodean visual cortex, it said that they seemed just as
+usual.
+This experiment seemed not to have helped. For it was
+still obscure whether the Antipodeans had pains. It was
+equally obscure whether they had one or two raw feels when
+indigo light streamed onto their retinas (one of indigo, and
+one of neural state C-692)—or whether they had no raw feels
+at all. The Antipodeans were repeatedly questioned about
+how they knew it was indigo. They replied that they could
+see that it was. When asked how they knew they were in
+C-6gz, they said they "just knew" it. When it was suggested
+to them that they might have unconsciously inferred that it
+was indigo on the basis of the C-6g2 feel, they seemed unable
+to understand what unconscious inference was, or what
+"feels" were. When it was suggested to them that they might
+have made the same inference to the fact that they were in
+state C-6gz on the basis of the raw feel of indigo, they were,
+of course, equally baffled. When they were asked whether
+the neural state appeared indigo, they replied that it did
+not—the light was indigo-and that the questioner must be
+making some sort of category mistake. When they were
+asked whether they could imagine having C-6g2 and not
+seeing indigo, they said they could not. When asked whether
+it was a conceptual truth or an empirical generalization that
+these two experiences went together, they replied that they
+were not sure how to tell the difference. When asked
+75
+
+whether they could be wrong about whether they were
+seeing indigo, they replied that they of course could, but
+could not be wrong about whether they seemed to be seeing
+indigo. When asked whether they could be wrong about
+whether they were in state C-6g2, they replied in exactly
+the same way. Finally, skillful philosophical dialectic
+brought them to realize that what they could not imagine
+was seeming to see indigo and failing to seem to be in state
+C-692. But this result did not seem to help with the questions: "Raw feels?" "Two raw feels or one?" "Two referents
+or one referent under two descriptions?" Nor did any of this
+help with the question about the way in which stimulated
+C-fibers appeared to them. When they were asked whether
+they could be mistaken in thinking that their C-fibers were
+stimulated, they replied that of course they could —but that
+they could not imagine being mistaken about whether their
+C-fibers seemed to be stimulated.
+At this point, it occurred to someone to ask whether they
+could detect the neural state which was the concomitant of
+"seeming to have their C-fibers stimulated." Antipodeans
+replied that there was, of course, the state T-435 which was
+the constant neural concomitant of the utterance of the
+sentence "My C-fibers seem to be stimulated," state T-497
+which went with "It's just as if my C-fibers were being stimulated," state T-293 which went with "Stimulated C-fibers!"
+and various other neural states which were concomitants of
+various other roughly synonymous sentences-but that there
+was no further neural state which they were aware of in
+addition to these. Cases in which Antipodeans had T-435
+but no stimulation of C-fibers included those in which, for
+example, they were strapped to what they were falsely informed was a torture machine, a switch was theatrically
+turned on, but nothing else was done.
+Discussion among the philosophers now switched to the
+topic: Could the Antipodeans be mistaken about the T-
+series of neural states (the ones which were concomitants of
+understanding or uttering sentences)? Could they seem to
+76
+
+be having T-435 but not really be? Yes, tile Antipodeans
+said, cerebroscopes indicated that sort of thing occasionally
+happened. Was there any explanation of the cases in which
+it happened-any pattern to them? No, there did not seem
+to be. It was just one of those odd things that turned up
+occasionally. Neurophysiology had not yet been able to find
+another sort of neural state, outside the T-series, which was
+a concomitant of such weird illusions, any more than for
+certain perceptual illusions, but perhaps it would someday.
+This answer left the philosophers still in difficulties on the
+question of whether the Antipodeans had sensations of pain,
+or anything else. For there now seemed to be nothing which
+the Antipodeans were incorrigible about except how things
+seemed to them. But it was not clear that "how things
+seemed to them" was a matter of what raw feels they had,
+as opposed to what they were inclined to say. If they had the
+raw feel of painfulness, then they had minds. But a raw feel
+is (or has) a phenomenal property—one which you cannot
+have the illusion of having (because, so to speak, having the
+illusion of it is itself to have it). The difference between
+stimulated C-fibers and pains was that you could have the
+illusion of stimulated C-fibers (could have, e.g., T-435)
+without having stimulated C-fibers, but could not have the
+illusion of pain without having pain. There was nothing
+which the Antipodeans could not be wrong about except
+how things seemed to them. But the fact that they could not
+"merely seem to have it seem to them that ..." was of no
+interest in determining whether they had minds. The fact
+that "seems to seem ...
+" is an expression without a use is a
+fact about the notion of "appearance," not a tip-off to the
+presence of "phenomenal properties." For the appearancereality distinction is not based on a distinction between
+subjective representations and objective states of affairs; it is
+merely a matter of getting something wrong, having a false
+belief. So the Antipodeans' firm grasp of the former distinction did not help philosophers tell whether to ascribe the
+latter to them.
+77
+
+2. PHENOMENAL PrOPErTIES
+Coming back now to the present, what should we say
+about the Antipodeans? The first thing to do, presumably, is
+to look more closely at the notion of "phenomenal property," and in particular at the disanalogy between apprehending a physical phenomenon in a misleading way and
+apprehending a mental phenomenon in a misleading way.
+Kripke's account of the distinction sums up the intuition
+on which defenders of dualism have usually relied, so we
+may begin a closer look by trying to apply his terminology:
+Someone can be in the same epistemic situation as he
+would be if there were heat, even in the absence of heat,
+simply by feeling the sensation of heat; and even in the
+presence of heat, he can have the same evidence as he
+would have in the absence of heat simply by lacking the
+sensation S. No such possibility exists in the case of pain
+or in other mental phenomena. To be in the same epistemic situation that would obtain if one had a pain is to
+have a pain; to be in the same epistemic situation that
+would obtain in the absence of a pain is not to have a
+pain.... The trouble is that the notion of an epistemic
+situation qualitatively identical to one in which the observer had a sensation S simply is one in which the observer had that sensation. The same point can be made in
+terms of the notion of what picks out the reference of a
+rigid designator [an expression which designates the same
+object in all the possible worlds in which it designates at
+all]. In the case of identity of heat with molecular motion
+the important consideration was that although "heat" is
+a rigid designator, the reference of that designator was
+determined by an accidental property of the referent,
+namely the property of producing in us the sensation S.
+... Pain, on the other hand, is not picked out by one of
+its accidental properties; rather it is picked out by the
+property of being pain itself, by its immediate phenomenological quality. Thus pain, unlike heat, is not only rigidly
+78
+
+designated by "pain" but the reference of the designator is
+determined by an essential property of the referent. Thus
+it is not possible to say that although pain is necessarily
+identical with a certain physical state, a certain phenomenon can be picked out in the same way we pick out pain
+without being correlated with that physical state. If any
+phenomenon is picked out in exactly the same way that
+we pick out pain, then that phenomenon is pain.!
+These considerations suggest that the real question is: Do
+the Antipodeans pick out mental phenomena by accidental
+properties? If we assume for the moment that they do have
+pains, could they perhaps miss the "immediate phenomeno.
+logical quality" and note only the accidental feature of
+being constantly accompanied by stimulated C-fibers? Or, if
+they cannot exactly miss an immediate phenomenological
+quality, might they perhaps fail to have a name for it, and
+thus fail to pick out the entity that has the quality by an
+essential property? To put it another way, since the Antipodeans do not pick out pain "in exactly the same way that
+we pick out pain," can we conclude that whatever they have
+it is not pain? Is one's epistemic relation to one's raw feels
+necessary as well as sufficient to establish the existence of the
+raw feel in question? Or should we say that actually they do
+pick out pain in exactly the way that we do-because when
+they say, "Ooh! Stimulated C-fibers!" they feel exactly what
+we feel when we say, "Pain!"? Actually, perhaps, they were
+feeling pain and calling that feeling "the state of seeming to
+have one's C-fibers stimulated," and they are in the same
+epistemic situation relative to seeming to have their C-fibers
+stimulated as we are in seeming to see something red, and to
+all other such incorrigible states.
+1 Saul Kripke, "Naming and Necessity" in Semantics of Natural
+Language, ed. Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (Dordrecht, 1972),
+PP. 339-340. For criticism of Kripke's discussion of dualism and materialism, see Fred Feldman, "Kripke on the Identity Theory," and Wil.
+liam Lycan, "Kripke and the Materialists," both in Journal of
+Philosophy 71 (1974), 665-68g.
+79
+
+It now looks as if what we need is some quite general
+criterion for deciding when two things are "really" the same
+thing described in two different ways. For there seems
+nothing distinctive about the present conundrum which
+makes it depend upon the peculiarities of the mental. If
+we agree that what counts in deciding whether the Antipodeans have raw feels is incorrigibility—the inability to
+have an illusion of ...—the general problem about alternative descriptions will still prevent us from applying this
+criterion and thus resolving the issue. This problem is not
+one which is going to receive a neat, clear-cut, readily applicable solution. For nothing general will resolve every
+tension between saying,
+You're talking about X's all right, but practically everything you say about them is false
+and saying instead,
+Since practically nothing you say is true of X's, you can't
+be talking about X's.
+But let us put aside this difficulty for the moment (returning to it in chapter six) and consider the still more depressing point that anyone who even tried to state general
+criteria for assimilating or distinguishing referents of expressions would need some general ontological categories—
+some firm, if coarse, way of blocking things out—just to get
+started. It would help, in particular, to have a distinction
+between mental entities and physical entities. But the problem about the Antipodeans puts this whole distinction in
+doubt. To see why it does so, suppose that there are no
+criteria for "mental phenomenon" save Kripke's epistemic
+one? This supposition identifies "the mental" with raw
+feels, passing thoughts, and mental images. It excludes such
+2 I defended a qualified form of this supposition in "Incorrigibility
+as the Mark of the Mental," Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424.
+See also Jaegwon Kim, "Materialism and the Criteria of the Mental,"
+Synthese 22 (1972), 323-345, esp. 336-341.
+80
+
+things as beliefs, moods, and the like (which, though indubitably "higher," are nonetheless not parts of our incorrigibly reportable inner life, and hence not such as to
+encourage the Cartesian kind of distinction between two
+ontological realms). The supposal amounts, in other words,
+to the claim that (1) it is sufficient for being a mental state
+that the thing in question be incorrigibly knowable by its
+possessor, and (2) we do not literally attribute any nonphysical states (e.g., beliefs) to beings which fail to have
+some such incorrigibly knowable states. (This conforms to
+Antipodean practice, as well as to our intuition that dogs
+have nonphysical states simply by virtue of having pains,
+whereas computers do not, even by virtue of offering us
+novel and exciting truths.) On this supposition, then, there
+will be nothing to answer to the question "When they
+report that their C-fibers seem to be firing, are they reporting a feeling (perhaps the same feeling that we report by
+"pain!") or are they just making the noises which are triggered by their neurons being in certain states?" And if this
+is so, since the role played in our lives by reports of feelings
+is the same as the role played in Antipodean lives by reports
+of neurons, we face the further question: Are we reporting
+feelings or neurons when we use "pain"?
+To see that this is a real issue, consider the implications
+of the identity of functional role. If it is the case that the
+Antipodeans have the entire range of culture that we do, if
+they are as intentional in their discourse and as self-consciously aesthetic in their choice of objects and persons as
+we, if their yearning for moral excellence and immortality
+is as great, they are likely to think our philosophers' interest
+in whether they have minds is a bit parochial. Why, they
+wonder, does it make such a difference? Why, they may ask
+us, do we think that we have these odd things called "feels"
+and "minds"? Now that they have taught us micro-neurology, cannot we see that talk of mental states was merely a
+place-holder for talk of neurons? Or, if we really do have
+some funny extra states besides the neurological ones, are
+81
+
+they really all that important? Is the possession of such
+states really the basis for a distinction between ontological
+categories?
+These last sets of questions illustrate how lightly the
+Antipodeans take the controversy which, among Terran
+philosophers, is the hard-fought issue between materialists
+and epiphenomenalists. Further, the success of Antipodean
+neurology, not only in the explanation and control of be.
+havior but in supplying the vocabulary for the Antipodean
+self-image, shows that none of the other Terran theories
+about "the relation between mind and body" can even get a
+look-in. For parallelism and epiphenomenalism can only be
+differentiated on some non-Humean view of causation—
+some view according to which there is a causal mechanism
+to be discovered which will show which way causal lines run.
+But nobody, not even the most diehard Cartesian, imagines
+that when a molecule-by-molecule account of the neurons is
+before us (as, ex hypothesi, it is before the Antipodeans) there
+will still be a place to look for further causal mechanisms.
+(What would "looking" amount to?) So even if we abandon
+Hume, we are still in no position to be parallelist, except on
+some a priori ground according to which we "just know"
+that the mental is a self-contained causal realm. As for
+interactionism, the Antipodeans would not dream of
+denying that beliefs and desires, for example, interact
+causally with irradiations of the retina, movements of the
+arm, and so on. But they view talk of such an interaction not
+as yoking different ontological realms but as a handy (because brief) reference to function rather than to structure.
+(It is as philosophically unproblematic as a transaction
+between a government and an individual. No set of
+necessary and sufficient conditions stated in terms of
+just who did what to whom can be given for a remark
+about such a transaction, any more than for remarks about
+beliefs caused by radiations and movements caused by beliefs—but who would have thought they could?) Interaction
+would only be of interest if a neural discharge were swerved
+82
+
+from its course by a raw feel, or drained of some of its power
+by a raw feel, or something of the sort. But the Antipodean
+neurologists have no need of such hypotheses.
+If there is no way of explaining to the Antipodeans our
+problems and theories about mind and body—no way of
+making them see that this is the paradigm case of an ontological divide—we ought to be prepared to face up to the
+possibility that the "materialist" Antipodeans (as opposed
+to the more charitable "epiphenomenalist" ones) are right:
+we have just been reporting neurons when we thought we
+were reporting raw feels. It was just a happenstance of our
+cultural development that we got stuck so long with placeholders. It is as if, while perfecting many sublunary disciplines, we had never developed astronomy and had remained pre-Ptolemaic in our notions of what was above the
+moon. We would doubtless have many complicated things
+to say about holes in the black dome, movements of the
+dome as a whole, and the like-but once we were clued in
+we could redescribe what we had been reporting easily
+enough.
+At this point, however, there is a familiar objection to be
+dealt with. It is expressed in such remarks as the following:
+... in the case of stabbing pains, it is not possible to hold
+that the micro-picture is the real picture, that perceptual
+appearances are only a coarse duplication, for in this case
+we are dealing with the perceptual appearances themselves, which cannot very well be a coarse duplicate of
+themselves.®
+It is all very well to claim that hurtfulness is how activity
+of the C-fibers in the cortex appears, that the smell of
+onion is how the shape of onion molecules appears to a
+human with a normal nasal system. ... This deals with
+the pain, smell or color apprehended and, relegating it to
+the category of appearance, renders it ontically neutral.
+3 Richard Brandt, "Doubts about the Identity Theory," in Dimen.
+sions of Mind, ed. Sidney Hook (New York, 1961), p. 70.
+83
+
+But it leaves us with a set of seemings, acts of imperfect
+apprehension, in which the phenomenal properties are
+grasped. So we must ask the new question: Is it possible
+that things can seem to be in a certain way to a merely
+material system? Is there a way in which acts of imperfect
+apprehension can be seen to be ontically neutral?
+... The materialist account of real men can find no
+place for the fact that our imperfect apprehension is by
+phenomenal property and not by, for example, beliefs just
+spontaneously arising.*
+This objection common to Brandt and Campbell seems at
+first blush to be that one can only misdescribe things if one
+is not a "merely material system"—for such systems cannot
+have things appear to them differently from what they are.
+But this will not do as it stands, for, as I suggested earlier,
+the distinction between reality and appearance seems merely
+the distinction between getting things right and getting
+things wrong-a distinction which we have no trouble
+making for simple robots, servo-mechanisms, etc. To make
+the objection plausible we must say that "appearance" in
+the present context is a richer notion—one which has to be
+explicated by the notion of "phenomenal property." We
+must hold some principle like:
+(P) Whenever we make an incorrigible report on a state
+of ourselves, there must be a property we are presented with which induces us to make the report.
+But this principle, of course, enshrines the Cartesian notion
+that "nothing is closer to the mind than itself," and involves an entire epistemology and metaphysics, a specifically
+dualistic one." So it is not surprising, once we have encapsu-
+4 Keith Campbell, Body and Mind (New York, 1960), PP. 106-107,
+10g.
+5 George Pitcher has worked out an account of the linguistic behavior we display in reporting pains without using such a premise.
+Pitcher takes pains to be reports of damaged peripheral tissue, whereas
+the Antipodeans take them to be reports of states of the central nervous
+84
+
+lated this view in the notion of "phenomenal property,"
+that "the materialist account ... can find no place for the
+fact that our imperfect apprehension is by phenomenal
+property."
+Still, we must ask whether there is some pre-philosophical
+intuition which is preserved in (P) and which can be separated from the Cartesian picture. What exactly is the difterence between misdescribing something like a star and misdescribing something like a pain? Why does the former seem
+obviously possible and the latter unimaginable? Perhaps the
+answer goes something like this. We expect the star to look
+the same even after we realize that it is a faraway ball of
+flame rather than a nearby hole, but the pain ought to feel
+different once we realize that it is a stimulated C-fiber, for
+the pain is a feeling, as the star is not a visual appearance.
+If we give this answer, however, we are still stuck with the
+notion of "feeling" and with the puzzle about whether the
+Antipodeans have any feelings. What, we must ask, is the
+difference between feeling a pain and simply reacting to a
+stimulated C-fiber with the vocable "pain," avoidancebehavior, and the like? And here we are inclined to say: no
+difference at all from the outside, but all the difference in
+the world from the inside. The difficulty is that there will
+system. In his view, it is a mistake to think of the common-sense concept of pain as the concept of a mental particular. I would want to
+say that it is the concept of a mental particular, but claim that his
+analysis of the epistemological status of pains applies, mutatis mutandis,
+equally well wherever one stands on this question. See Pitcher, "Pain
+Perception," Philosophical Review 79 (1970), 368-393. Pitcher's general
+strategy is a defense of direct realism and is also found in his A Theory
+of Perception (Princeton, 1971) and in D. M. Armstrong, Perception
+and the Physical World (London and New York, 1961) and A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London and New York, 1968). This strategy
+seems to me essentially right, and enough to show that the mentalparticular view is optional. But I am dubious about Pitcher's and
+Armstrong's metaphilosophical stance, which would make this view a
+philosopher's misconstrual of what we believe, rather than a correct
+account of what we believe (but need not continue to believe).
+85
+
+never be any way in which we can explain this difference to
+the Antipodeans. The materialist Antipodeans think that
+we don't have any feelings, because they do not think there
+is such a thing as "feeling." The epiphenomenalist Antipodeans think that there may be such things, but cannot imagine why we make such a fuss about having them. The
+Terran philosophers who think that Antipodeans do have
+feelings but don't know it have reached the terminal stage
+of philosophizing mentioned by Wittgenstein: they just feel
+like uttering an inarticulate sound. They cannot even say
+to the Antipodeans that "it's different for us on the inside"
+because the Antipodeans do not understand the notion of
+"inner space"; they think "inside" means "inside the skull."
+There, they rightly remark, it isn't different. The Terran
+philosophers who think that the Antipodeans don't have
+feelings are in a better position only because they feel it
+beneath their dignity to argue with mindless beings about
+whether they have minds.
+We seem to be getting nowhere with pursuing the objection offered by Brandt and Campbell. Let us try another
+tack. In the materialist view, every appearance of anything
+is going to be, in reality, a brain-state. So, it would seem,
+the materialist is going to have to say that the "coarse"
+duplicate of a brain-state (the way stimulated C-fibers feel)
+is going to be another brain-state. But, we may then say, let
+that other brain-state be the referent of "pain" rather than
+the stimulated C-fibers. Every time the materialist says "but
+that's just our description of a brain-state," his opponent
+will reply, "Okay, let's talk about the brain-state which is
+the 'act of imperfect apprehension' of the first brain-state."®
+And so the materialist seems to be pressed ever backward—
+with the mental cropping up again wherever error does. It
+is as if man's Glassy Essence, the Mirror of Nature, only
+became visible to itself when slightly clouded. A neural
+® I owe this way of putting the Brandt-Campbell point to Thomas
+Nagel.
+86
+
+system can't have clouds but a mind can. So minds, we
+conclude, cannot be neural systems.
+Consider now how the Antipodeans would view "acts of
+imperfect apprehension." They would see them not as
+cloudy portions of the Mirror of Nature but as a result of
+learning a second-rate language. The whole notion of incorrigibly knowable entities, as opposed to being incorrigible
+about how entities seem to be—the notion of "seemings" as
+themselves a kind of entity-strikes them as a deplorable
+way of speaking. The whole Terran vocabulary of "acts of
+apprehension," "cognitive states," "feelings," etc. strikes
+them as an unfortunate turn for a language to have taken.
+They see no way of getting us out of it except by proposing
+that we raise some of our children to speak Antipodean and
+see whether they don't do as well as a control group. The
+Antipodean materialists, in other words, see our notion of
+"mind and matter" as a reflection of an unfortunate linguistic development. The Antipodean epiphenomenalists
+are baffled by the question "What is the neural input to the
+Terrestrial speech center which produces pain reports as
+well as C-fiber reports?" Those Terrestrial philosophers who
+think that Antipodeans do have feelings think that the
+Antipodean language is "inadequate to reality." Those Terrestrial philosophers who think that the Antipodeans don't
+have feelings rest their case on a theory of language-development according to which the first things named are the
+things "better known to us"—raw feels—so that the absence
+of a name for feeling entails the absence of feeling.
+To sharpen the issue a bit further, perhaps we may drop
+from consideration the Antipodean epiphenomenalists and
+the Terrestrial skeptics. The former's problem about the
+neurology of pain reports seems insoluble; if they are to
+continue charitably to ascribe states to Earthmen which are
+unknown to Antipodeans they will have to swallow a whole
+dualistic system, irrefutable by further empirical inquiry,
+in order to explain our linguistic behavior. As for the
+Terran skeptic's claim that the Antipodeans have no raw
+87
+
+feels, this is based entirely on the a priori dictum that one
+cannot have a raw feel and lack a word for it. Neither intellectual position-the extreme charity of the Antipodean
+epiphenomenalist and the parochial distrust of the Terrestrial skeptic—is attractive. We are left with the Antipodean materialist saying "They think they have feelings but
+they don't" on the one hand and Terrestrial philosophers
+saying "They have feelings but don't know it" on the other
+hand. Is there a way out of this impasse, given that every
+empirical result (brain-switching, etc.) seems to weigh
+equally on both sides? Are there powerful philosophical
+methods which will cut through the problem and either
+settle it or offer some happy compromise?
+3. INCORRIGIBILITY AND RAW FEELS
+One philosophical method which will do no good at all is
+"analysis of meanings." Everybody understands everybody
+else's meanings very well indeed. The problem is that one
+side thinks there are too many meanings around and the
+other side too few. In this respect the closest analogy one
+can find is the conflict between inspired theists and uninspired atheists. An inspired theist, let us say, is one who
+"just knows" that there are supernatural beings which play
+certain explanatory roles in accounting for natural phenomena. (They are not to be confused with natural theologians—who offer the supernatural as the best explanation
+of these phenomena.) Inspired theists have inherited their
+picture of the universe as divided into two great ontological
+realms—the supernatural and the natural—along with their
+language. The way they talk about things is inextricably
+tied up with—or at least strikes them as inextricably tied
+up with—references to the divine. The notion of the supernatural does not strike them as a "theory" any more than
+the notion of the mental strikes us as a "theory." When they
+encounter atheists they view them as people who don't
+know what's going on, although they admit that atheists
+88
+
+seem able to predict and control natural phenomena very
+nicely indeed. ("Thank heaven," they say, "that we are not
+as those natural theologians are, or we too might lose touch
+with the real.") The atheists view these theists as having too
+many words in their language and too many meanings to
+bother about. Enthusiastic atheists explain to inspired
+theists that " all there really is is...," and the theists reply
+that one should realize that there are more things in heaven
+and earth. ... And so it goes. The philosophers on both
+sides may analyze meanings until they are blue in the face,
+but all such analyses are either "directional" and "reductive" (e.g., "noncognitive" analyses of religious discourse,
+which are the analogue of "expressive" theories of pain
+reports) or else simply describe alternative "forms of life,"
+culminating in nothing more helpful than the announcement: "This language-game is played." The theists' game is
+essential to their self-image, just as the image of man's
+Glassy Essence is essential to the Western intellectual's,
+but neither has a larger context available in which to evaluate this image. Where, after all, would such a context come
+from?
+Well, perhaps from philosophy. When experiment and
+"meaning analysis" fail, philosophers have traditionally
+turned to system-building-inventing a new context on the
+spot, so to speak. The usual strategy is to find a compromise
+which will enable both those who favor Occam's Razor
+(e.g., materialists, atheists) and those who cling to what
+they "just know" to be viewed indulgently as having
+achieved "alternate perspectives" on some larger reality
+which philosophy has just adumbrated. Thus some tenderminded philosophers have risen above the "warfare between
+science and theology" and seen Bonaventure and Bohr as
+possessing different, noncompetitive "forms of consciousness." The question "consciousness of what?" is answered
+by something like "the world" or "the thing-in-itself" or
+"the sensible manifold" or "stimulations." It does not matter which of these is offered, since all are terms of art de-
+89
+
+signed to name entities with no interesting features save
+placid neutrality. The analogue of this tactic among toughminded philosophers of mind is neutral monism, in which
+the mental and the physical are seen as two "aspects" of
+some underlying reality which need not be described further. Sometimes we are told that this reality is intuited
+(Bergson) or is identical with the raw material of sensation
+(Russell, Ayer), but sometimes it is simply postulated as the
+only means of avoiding epistemological skepticism (James,
+Dewey). In no case are we told anything about it save that
+"we just know what it's like" or that reason (i.e., the need
+to avoid philosophical dilemmas) requires it. Neutral monists like to suggest that philosophy has discovered, or should
+look for, an underlying substrate, in the same way in
+which the scientist has discovered molecules beneath elements, atoms beneath molecules, and so on. But in fact
+the "neutral stuff" which is neither mental nor physical is
+not found to have powers or properties of its own, but
+simply postulated and then forgotten about (or, what
+comes to the same thing, assigned the role of ineffable
+datum).? This tactic cannot help in coping with the question which the tough-minded Terrestrial philosophers raised
+7 Urging that philosophers need to do more than this, Cornelius
+Kampe has suggested that the mind-body identity theory will make
+sense only if we provide "a theoretical framework (or an ontology for
+the common idiom) of such a type as to provide a link for the two
+diverse phenomena whose identity is asserted." His motive for this
+revival of neutral monism is his belief that making sense of an identity
+theory requires that "the subjective-objective distinction must be
+abandoned, as must the privileged status of first-person introspective
+reports." Such a change, he says, would "drastically affect the logic of
+our language." I think Kampe is right that giving up the subjective.
+objective distinction would have such a drastic effect, but wrong in
+thinking that giving up privileged access would. As I think Sellars
+has shown, and as I have been arguing here, the subjective-objective
+distinction (the notion of "seems") can get along quite well without
+the notions of "mind," "phenomenal property," etc. (Cf. Kampe,
+"Mind-Body Identity: A Question of Intelligibility," Philosophical
+Studies 25 [1974), 63-67.)
+90
+
+about the Antipodeans: Do they have raw feels or don't
+they?
+The problem about the Antipodeans can be summarized
+as follows:
+1. It is essential to raw feels that they be incorrigibly
+knowable
+together with
+2. There is nothing which the Antipodeans think themselves incorrigible about
+seems to leave us either with
+3. The Antipodeans do not have raw feels
+or with
+4. The Antipodeans do not know about their own incorrigible knowledge.
+The trouble with (3) is that the Antipodeans have pretty
+much the behavior, physiology, and culture that we do.
+Further, we can train Antipodean infants to report raw
+feels, and take themselves to be incorrigible about them.
+These considerations seem to drive us toward (4). But (4)
+sounds silly, and needs at least to be softened to
+4'. The Antipodeans do not know about their own capacity for incorrigible knowledge
+which is a little odd but at least has a few parallels. (Compare "John XXIII had to be convinced by argument of his
+own infallibility upon succeeding to the papacy.") However, if we press (4), the teachability of Antipodean infants
+seems to leave us up in the air between
+5. The Antipodeans can be taught to recognize their own
+raw feels
+and
+91
+
+5'. The Antipodeans can be taught, thanks to the presence
+of neural concomitants of raw feels, to simulate reports of raw feels without actually having any.
+One might hope to resolve this new dilemma by finding a
+bilingual Antipodean. But the bilingual does not have "inside" knowledge about the meanings of the foreign expres
+sions; he just has the same sort of theory which the lexiconmaker has. Consider an adult Antipodean who has come
+to speak English. He says, "I am in pain" or the Antipodean
+for "My C-fibers are firing," depending on which he's speaking. If a Terran interlocutor tells him that he really isn't
+in pain he points out that the remark is a deviant utterance,
+and claims privileged access. When Antipodean interlocutors show him that his C-fibers aren't in fact firing he says
+something like "That's funny; they certainly seem to be.
+That's why I told the Terrans I was in pain," or perhaps
+something like "That's funny; I'm certainly in what the
+Terrans call 'pain,' and that never happens except when
+my C-fibers are firing." It is hard to see that he would have
+any strong preference for either locution, and harder to see
+that philosophers could make anything out of a preference
+if he had one. Once again, we seem driven to the rhetorical
+question "But what does it feel like?"—to which the bilingual Antipodean replies, "It feels like pain." When asked,
+"Doesn't it also feel like C-fibers?" he explains that there is
+no concept of "feeling" in Antipodean, and so it would
+not occur to him to say that he felt his C-fibers firing, although of course he is aware of it whenever they do.
+If this seems paradoxical, it is presumably because we
+think that "noninferential awareness" and "feeling" are
+pretty well synonymous. But pointing this out is no help.
+If we treat them as synonymous, then of course Antipodean
+does have the concept of a state called "feeling," but it still
+doesn't have the concept of "feelings" as intentional objects
+of knowledge. Antipodean has the verb but not the noun, so
+to speak. An accommodating Antipodean can note that his
+92
+
+language can express the notion of "state such that one
+cannot be mistaken in thinking one is in it"—namely, the
+state of it seeming to one that ...—but still be puzzled
+about whether these states are the same things as the pains
+and other raw feels in which the Terrans are so interested.
+On the one hand, it seems all they could be talking about,
+for he remembers having learned to say "pain" when and
+only when his C-fibers seem to be firing. On the other hand,
+the Terrans insist that there is a difference between being
+in a state such that it seems to one that one is ... and having
+a raw feel. The former state is an epistemic position toward
+something about which doubt is possible. The latter state
+automatically puts one in an epistemic position toward
+something about which doubt is impossible.
+So the dilemma seems to boil down to this: We must
+affirm or deny
+6. any report of how something seems to one is a report
+of a raw feel.
+The only ground for affirming it seems to be that it is a
+corollary of the converse of (1), that is:
+7. It is essential to whatever is incorrigibly knowable that
+it be a raw feel.
+But (7) is just a form of the principle invoked by the
+Brandt-Campbell objection above, viz.:
+(P) Whenever we make an incorrigible report on a state
+of ourselves, there must be a property which we are
+presented with which induces us to make the report
+and in this principle everything turns on the notion "presented with"—a notion which harks straight back to the
+metaphors of the "Eye of the Mind," "presence to consciousness," and the like, which are in turn derived from the
+initial image of the Mirror of Nature-of knowledge as a
+set of immaterial representations. If we adopt this prin-
+93
+
+ciple, then, oddly enough, we can no longer be skeptics:
+the Antipodeans automatically have raw feels. We must
+choose (5) over (5). Since we do not contest that it seems
+to some Antipodean that his stomach is cramped or his
+C-fibers firing, and since we grant incorrigibility to such reports, we must grant that he has some raw feels which
+are the "basis" for his seems-statements and which he
+could be trained to report by learning an appropriate vocabulary. But this means, paradoxically enough, that a species
+of behaviorism is entailed by the very principle that incarnates the Cartesian image of the Eye of the Mind-the
+very image which has often been accused of leading to the
+"veil of ideas" and to solipsism. We should only be able to
+be skeptics and assert (5')—that simulation might be all
+the Antipodeans could do-by holding that when the Antipodeans made seems-statements they were not really meaning what we meant by them, and that the deviance, in An-
+tipodean, of the expression "You may be mistaken in saying
+that it seems to you that your C-fibers are firing" does not
+suffice to show that the Antipodeans have any incorrigible
+knowledge. That is, we should have to reconstrue the behavior which we initially took to be exhibited, and base
+our skepticism about their raw feels on a more general
+skepticism about their possession of knowledge (or of some
+kinds of knowledge). But it is difficult to see how we could
+make skepticism about this plausible except on some antecedent conviction that they were mindless—a conviction
+which would a fortiori rule out raw feels. So skepticism here
+will have to be groundless and Pyrrhonian.® On the other
+8 I want to distinguish between "mere," or Pyrrhonian, skepticism
+and the specifically "Cartesian" form of skepticism which invokes the
+"veil of ideas" as a justification for a skeptical attitude. "Pyrrhonian"
+skepticism, as I shall use the term, merely says, "We can never be certain; so how can we ever know?" "Veil of ideas" skepticism, on the
+other hand, has something more specific to say, viz., "Given that we
+shall never have certainty about anything except the contents of our
+own minds, how can we ever justify an inference to a belief about anything else?" For a discussion of the intertwining of these two forms of
+94
+
+hand, if we deny (6)—if we disengage seeming from the
+having of mental states and abandon the Cartesian pictures
+-then we have to face up to the possibility that we ourselves never had any feelings, any mental states, any minds,
+any Glassy Essence. This paradox seems so overwhelming as
+to drive us right back to (P) and the Mirror of Nature.
+So the problem comes down to a choice among three
+troubling possibilities. We have to either share our Glassy
+Essence with any being which seems to speak a language
+containing seems-statements, or become Pyrrhonian skeptics, or else face up to the possibility that this essence was
+never ours. If we grant (7) above-the premise which makes
+being a raw feel essential to being an object of incorrigible
+knowledge—then we must admit either (a) that the Antipodean language, just by virtue of containing some incorrigible reports, is about raw feels, or (b) that we shall never
+know whether the Antipodeans speak a language just because we shall never know whether they have raw feels,
+or (c) that the whole issue about raw feels is a fake because
+the example of the Antipodeans shows that we never had
+any raw feels ourselves.
+These three possibilities correspond roughly to three
+standard positions in the philosophy of mind-behaviorism,
+skepticism about other minds, and materialism. Rather than
+adopt any of these three, however, I suggest that we deny
+(7), and with it (P). That is, I suggest that we abandon
+the notion that we possess incorrigible knowledge by virtue
+of a special relation to a special kind of object called "mental objects." This suggestion is a corollary of Sellars's attack on the Myth of the Given. I shall present that attack
+in more detail in chapter four, but here I merely note that
+this myth is the notion that such epistemic relations as
+"direct knowledge" or "incorrigible knowledge" or "certain
+knowledge" are to be understood on a causal, para-mechanskepticism, see Richard Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (New York, 1964).
+95
+
+ical model, as a special relation between certain objects
+and the human mind which enables knowledge to take
+place more easily or naturally or quickly. If we think of
+incorrigible knowledge simply as a matter of social practice
+—of the absence of a normal rejoinder in normal conversation to a certain knowledge-claim-then no principle like
+(7) or (P) will seem plausible.
+In the last two sections I have been treating "mental
+object" as if it were synonymous with "incorrigibly knowable object," and thus as if to have a mind were the same
+thing as having incorrigible knowledge. I have disregarded
+immateriality and the ability to abstract, which were discussed in chapter one, and intentionality, which will be
+discussed in chapter four. My excuse for pretending that the
+mind is nothing but a set of incorrigibly introspectible raw
+feels, and that its essence is this special epistemic status, is
+that the same pretense is current throughout the area called
+"philosophy of mind." This area of philosophy has come
+into existence in the thirty years since Ryle's The Concept
+of Mind. The effect of that book was to make issues about
+minds and bodies turn almost entirely on the cases which
+resisted Ryle's own logical behaviorist attempt to dissolve
+Cartesian dualism—namely, raw feels. Wittgenstein's discussion of sensations in Philosophical Investigations seemed
+to offer the same sort of attempt at dissolution. Thus many
+philosophers have taken it for granted that "the mindbody problem" was the question of whether raw feels could
+be viewed as dispositions to behave. Thus the only possi
+bilities have seemed to be the ones I have just cited: (a)
+granting that Ryle and Wittgenstein were right, and that
+there are no mental objects, (b) saying that they were
+wrong, and that therefore Cartesian dualism stands intact,
+with skepticism about other minds a natural consequence,
+and (c) some form of mind-brain identity theory, according
+to which Ryle and Wittgenstein were wrong, but Descartes
+is not thereby vindicated.
+The effect of setting up the issues in this way is to focus
+96
+
+on pains, while paying less attention to the side of the
+mind which is, or should be, of more concern to epistemology-beliefs and intentions. (The balance has been somewhat redressed in recent years thanks to philosophers of
+mind who try to build bridges with empirical psychology.
+Their work will be discussed in chapter five.) But it is still
+the case that "the mind-body problem" is thought of primarily as a problem about pains, and the distinctive point
+about pains is just the one mentioned by Kripke-that
+there seems no such thing as an appearance-reality distinction in regard to our knowledge of them. In fact, as I have
+tried to show in chapter one, this is only one of several
+"mind-body problems," each of which has contributed to
+the fuzzy notion that there is something especially mysteri.
+ous about man which makes him capable of knowing, or of
+certain special sorts of knowing.
+For the remainder of this chapter, however, I shall try to
+support my claim that we should drop (P) and thus be
+neither dualists, skeptics, behaviorists, nor "identity-theorists." I do not know how to argue against (P) directly,
+since the claim that incorrigible knowledge is a matter of
+being presented with a phenomenal property is not so much
+a claim as an abbreviation for an entire theory—a whole set
+of terms and assumptions which center around the image
+of mind as mirroring nature, and which conspire to give
+sense to the Cartesian claim that the mind is naturally
+"given" to itself. It is this image itself which has to be set
+aside if we are to see through the seventeenth-century notion that we can understand and improve our knowing by
+understanding the workings of our mind. I hope to show
+the difference between setting it aside and adopting any of
+the positions which presuppose this image. So the remainder
+of this chapter is devoted to behaviorism, skepticism, and
+the mind-body identity theory, in an attempt to differentiate
+my position from each of these. In the concluding section
+of the chapter-"Materialism without Identity"-I attempt
+to say something more positive, but this attempt needs to
+97
+
+be linked up with the discussion of other "mind-body
+problems" in chapter one in order to appear plausible.
+4. BEHAVIORISM
+Behaviorism is the doctrine that talk of "inner states" is
+simply an abbreviated, and perhaps misleading, way of talking of dispositions to behave in certain ways. In its Rylean
+or "logical" form—with which I shall be concerned in what
+follows—its central doctrine is that there is a necessary connection between the truth of a report of a certain raw feel
+and a disposition to such-and-such behavior. One motive for
+holding this view is a distrust of what Ryle called "ghosts in
+machines," the Cartesian picture of people, and another is
+the desire to prevent the skeptic about other minds from
+raising the question of whether the person writhing on the
+floor has feels of the sort which the skeptic himself would
+have when he writhes. In the logical behaviorist view, reports of such feels are to be taken not to refer to nonphysical
+entities, and perhaps not to any entities at all save to the
+writhing or the disposition to writhe.
+This doctrine has been attacked on the ground that there
+seems no way to fill in a description of the requisite disposition to behave without giving infinitely long lists of possible
+movements and noises. It has also been attacked on the
+ground that whatever "necessity" there is in the area is not
+a matter of "meaning" but simply an expression of the fact
+that we customarily explain certain behavior by reference
+to certain inner states-so that the necessity is no more
+"linguistic" or "conceptual" than that which connects the
+redness of the stove to the fire within. Finally, it has been
+attacked as the sort of philosophical paradox which would
+only occur to a mind obsessed with instrumentalist or verificationist dogma-eager to reduce all unobservables to
+observables in order to avoid any risk of believing in
+something unreal.
+All these criticisms are, I think, quite justified. The classic
+98
+
+statements of logical behaviorism do indeed presuppose just
+the distinctions between observation and theory and between language and fact which philosophers would, as I
+shall argue in chapter four, do well to give up. But the feeling that the behaviorist is on to something remains. One
+point which he has going for him is that it seems absurd to
+suggest that we might someday, after years of fruitful conversation with the Antipodeans, have ground for saying,
+"Ah, no raw feels; so no minds; so no language, and not
+persons after all." The suggestion that we might find ourselves compelled to say that they had no raw feels makes
+us ask whether we can even imagine what such a compulsion
+could be like. It also makes us realize that even if we somehow were so compelled, we should almost certainly not
+draw the suggested inferences. On the contrary, we might
+begin to share the Antipodeans' bewilderment about why
+we had cared so much about this question. We should begin
+to appreciate the quizzical attitude which the Antipodeans
+adopt toward the whole topic-the same attitude with
+which the Polynesians viewed missionaries' preoccupation
+with the question "Are these descendants of Shem or of
+Ham?" The behaviorist's strong point is that the more one
+tries to answer them the more pointless the tough-minded
+philosopher's questions "Minds or no minds?" "Raw feels
+or no raw feels?" seem to become.
+But this good point begins to go bad as soon as it is put
+as a thesis about "necessary connections" established by
+"analysis of meanings." Ryle's insight was frustrated by the
+positivistic epistemology he inherited. Instead of saying that
+incorrigible knowledge was just a matter of what practices
+of justification were adopted by one's peers (the position
+which I shall call "epistemological behaviorism" in chapter
+four), he was led to say that a certain type of behavior
+formed a necessary and sufficient condition for the ascription of raw feels, and that this was a fact about "our language." He then was confronted by a stubborn problem.
+The fact that our language licensed the inference to the
+99
+
+presence of such feels made it difficult, without falling back
+on materialism, to deny that there really were ghostly entities to report. Thus the two motives behind logical be.
+haviorism came into conflict, since the desire to find a "logical" barrier to skepticism about other minds seems to lead
+back toward dualism. For if we take the notion that a given
+linguistic practice, a given piece of behavior, is enough
+(pace the skeptic) to show the necessity of raw feels within,
+in whatever sense raw feels exist, then it seems necessary to
+say that our conversational experience with the Antipodeans entails that they have raw feels in whatever sense we
+have raw feels. That is, it seems necessary to adopt the
+following view:
+(P) The ability to speak a language which includes incorrigible seems-statements entails the presence of
+raw feels in speakers of that language, in whatever
+sense raw feels are present in us.
+It is easy to heap ridicule on the notion that we can discover the truth of such a claim by doing something called
+"analyzing meanings."* It seems easy to say (with the skeptic) that we might have the ability without the feels. But
+it is hard, as Wittgenstein and Bouwsma have made clear,
+actually to tell a coherent story about what we have imagined. Despite this, (P°) has a certain plausibility. The reason it is plausible is that it is, once again, a corollary of:
+(P) Whenever we make an incorrigible report on a state
+of ourselves, there must be a property with which
+we are presented which induces us to make this
+report-
+a principle vital to the image of the Mirror of Nature. It is
+the picture according to which "appearance" is not just
+mistaken belief but mistaken belief generated by a particu-
+• For a sample of such ridicule, see Hilary Putnam, "Brains and
+Behavior" in Mind, Language and Reality, vol. II (Cambridge, 1975).
+100
+
+lar mechanism (a misleading thing getting before the Eye
+of the Mind) which makes the connection between behavior
+and raw feel seem so necessary. It is the picture according
+to which three things are involved when a person gets something wrong (or, by extension, right): the person, the object
+he is talking about, and the inner representation of that
+object.
+Ryle thought that he had eschewed this picture, but that
+he was unable to do so is shown by his attempt to show,
+paradoxically and fruitlessly, that there were no such things
+as incorrigible reports. Ryle was afraid that if there were
+any such reports, then something like (P) would have to be
+true in order to explain their existence. For he thought that
+if there were such a thing as an ability to make incorrigible
+noninferential reports on inner states, this would show that
+someone who knew nothing of behavior could know everything about inner states, and thus that Descartes was right
+after all. He rightly criticized the usual Cartesian account of
+introspection as a piece of "para-optics," but he did not
+have another account available and thus was forced into
+the impossible position of having to deny the phenomenon
+of privileged access altogether. He devoted the least convincing chapter of The Concept of Mind ("Self-Knowledge") to the paradoxical claim that "the sorts of things
+that I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of
+things that I can find out about other people, and the
+methods of finding them out are much the same."o The
+result was that many philosophers who agreed that Ryle
+had shown that beliefs and desires were not inner states
+agreed also that he had left raw feels untouched, and thus
+that a choice still had to be made between dualism and
+materialism. 11
+10 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York, 1965), p. 155. The
+reference to "para-optics" is at p. 159.
+11 Sellars's "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (in Science,
+Perception and Reality (London and New York, 1963]) took the first
+step beyond Ryle. Sellars showed that even though the fact that be-
+101
+
+To put Ryle's mistake in other words, he believed that
+if one could show a "necessary connection" between ascriptions of behavioral dispositions and ascriptions of inner
+states, then one would have shown that there were really
+no inner states. But this instrumentalist non sequitur can
+be avoided, as can (P), while preserving the antiskeptical
+point that the behavior of the Antipodeans is quite enough
+evidence to warrant the attribution to them of as much or
+as little of an inner life as we ourselves possess. The metaphysical inference which the behaviorist is tempted to
+make-the inference that there is no Glassy Essence within
+—is, in isolation, as implausible as any other instrumentalist
+claim. (Compare: "There are no positrons; there are just
+dispositions on the part of electrons to...." "There are no
+electrons; there are just dispositions on the part of macroscopic objects to..." "There are no physical objects; there
+are just dispositions on the part of sense-contents to. ...")
+Stripped of its pretensions to rigor, the behaviorist position
+simply comes down to reminding us that the notion of raw
+havior is evidence for raw feels is "built into the very logic" of concepts
+of raw feels, this does not mean that there can be no raw feels, any
+more than the parallel point about macro-phenomena and microentities dictates the operationalist claims that there can be no microentities. Sellars there said what Ryle should have said in his chapter
+on "Self-Knowledge" but did not—viz., that introspective reporting
+was no more mysterious than any other noninferential report, and did
+not require the Myth of the Given (and thus did not require paraoptics) for its explanation. Unfortunately, however, Sellars did not
+draw the conclusion that, as Armstrong was later to say, there was no
+such thing as "logically privileged access" but only "empirically privi.
+leged access" (Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind [London,
+1968], p. 108). This point, which is vital to the vięw I am presenting in
+this book, is suggested by everything Sellars says, but Quine's attack on
+the logical-empirical distinction was required to make it possible to get
+around the shibboleth of "logically necessary connections" which Ryle
+had built into the philosophy of mind. As I suggest in chapter four,
+Sellars has never quite been able to swallow Quineanism full strength,
+and his talk of "the very logic of these concepts" was unfortunately in
+the Rylean tradition.
+102
+
+feel only has a role in the context of a picture which connects certain sorts of behavior (introspective reports) with
+others (reports of physical objects) in terms of a certain
+image of what human beings (not just their minds) are
+like. The behaviorist is looking at the social role of the
+notion of "pain" and not attempting to burrow behind it
+to the ineffable phenomenological quality which pains have.
+The skeptic has to insist that it is this quality—which you
+only know of from your own experience-which counts.
+The reason why the behaviorist keeps edging himself into
+the paradoxical metaphysical position of denying that there
+are nondispositional mental causes for behavioral dispositions is put by Wittgenstein as follows:
+How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviorism arise?—The first
+step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of
+processes and states and leave their nature undecided.
+Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them—we
+think. But that is just what commits us to a particular
+way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better.
+(The decisive movement in the conjuring-trick has been
+made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.) 2
+Alan Donagan provides an admirable gloss on this passage,
+saying that
+the Cartesians ... transformed the grammatical facts
+which we summed up in the proposition that sensation
+is non-dispositional and private into the grammatical fiction that sensations are states or processes in a private,
+and hence non-material, medium.
+The behaviorists, on the other hand,
+12 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (London and
+New York, 1953), pt. I, sec. 308.
+103
+
+whether moved by the barrenness of much introspectionist psychology, by the philosophical difficulties of
+Cartesianism, or by other considerations, began by denying that the private Cartesian processes in their nonmaterial medium exist at all.
+Wittgenstein cleared up the matter, Donagan thinks, by
+allowing "that sensations are private non-dispositional accompaniments of the behavior by which they are naturally
+expressed," but refusing "to recognize those accompaniments as processes that can be named and investigated independently of the circumstances that produce them, and
+the behavior by which they are naturally expressed."13
+I think that Donagan's pithy account of the common difficulty of behaviorists and dualistic skeptics about other
+minds is right, but that it can be clarified and carried one
+step further. The notion of a "private, ... non-material
+medium" is obscure because it suggests that we have a notion of what it is like to have a Glassy Essence—a metaphysical grasp of what nonextended substance is like-which is
+independent of the epistemic criterion of the mental. If we
+neglect this notion and press Wittgenstein's phrase "a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process
+better" we can get a diagnosis of what Donagan calls the
+"opposite and complementary errors"14 of behaviorism and
+Cartesianism which avoids reference to the metaphysical
+(''non-material," ghostly) nature of raw feels.
+The basic epistemological premise which both schools
+share, and which forms their notion of "knowing better," is
+the doctrine of the Naturally Given, that is:
+Knowledge is either of the sort of entity naturally suited
+to be immediately present to consciousness, or of entities
+whose existence and properties are entailed by entities of
+13 All four quotations are from Alan Donagan, "Wittgenstein on
+Sensation," Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. George Pitcher (New York, 1966), p. 350.
+14 Ibid., p. 349.
+104
+
+the first sort (and which are thus "reducible" to those
+of the first sort).
+The Cartesians thought that the only sorts of entities which
+were naturally suited to be directly present to consciousness were mental states. The behaviorists, at their epistemological best, thought that the only sort of entities directly
+present to consciousness were states of physical objects. The
+behaviorists prided themselves on escaping the notions of
+our Glassy Essence and the Inner Eye but they remained
+true to Cartesian epistemology in retaining the notion of
+an Eye of the Mind which got some things firsthand. Science, in this view, infers to other things entailed by
+"ground-floor" entities, and philosophy then reduces these
+other things back down again. The behaviorists gave up
+the notion that "nothing is better known to the mind than
+itself" but they kept the notion that some things were naturally knowable directly and others not, and the metaphysical corollary that only the first were "really real." This doctrine-that the most knowable was the most real-which
+George Pitcher has dubbed the "Platonic Principle,"15
+added to the principle of the Naturally Given, produced
+either an idealistic or panpsychist reduction of the physical
+to the mental, or a behaviorist or materialist reduction in
+the other direction. The choice between the two sorts of
+reduction depends, I think, not so much on difficulties in
+psychology or philosophy but on one's general notion of
+what wisdom is like, and thus of what philosophy is good
+for. Is it to emphasize the aspects of man reached by public
+methods of common conversation and scientific inquiry? Or
+rather a personal and inarticulate sense of "something far
+more deeply interfused"" This choice has little to do with
+philosophical argument or with the image of the Mirror
+of Nature. But the image-and particularly the metaphor
+15 Cf. Pitcher, Theory of Perception, p. 23 and Plato, Republic
+478B: "So if the real is the object of knowledge, then the object of
+belief must be something other than the real."
+105
+
+of the Inner Eye-serves the purposes of both disputants
+equally well, which is why debate between them has been
+so lengthy and so inconclusive. Both have a clear sense of
+what is best known, and knowing a process means either
+knowing it that way, or else showing that it "really is nothing but" something else which is known that way.
+If we look at the controversy between the behaviorist and
+the skeptic about other minds from the Antipodean point of
+view, the first thing we realize is there is no place for the
+"Naturally Given." There is, to be sure, a place for the
+notion of "direct knowledge." This is simply knowledge
+which is had without its possessor having gone through any
+conscious inference. But there is no suggestion that some
+entities are especially well suited to be known in this way.
+What we know noninferentially is a matter of what we
+happen to be familiar with. Some people (those who sit in
+front of cloud-chambers) are familiar with, and make noninferential reports of, elementary particles. Others are familiar with diseases of trees, and can report "another case
+of Dutch elm disease" without performing any inferences.
+All Antipodeans are familiar with the states of their nerves,
+and all Terrans with their raw feels. The Antipodeans do
+not suggest that there is something suspiciously metaphysical or ghostly about raw feels—they just do not see the point
+of talking about such things instead of talking about one's
+nerves. Nor, of course, does it help if the Terrans explain
+that though (putting aside the possibility of unconscious
+inference) perhaps anything can be known noninferentially
+it does not follow that anything except certain naturally
+suitable entities can be known incorrigibly. For the Antipodeans do not have the notion of entities known incorrigibly
+but only of reports (seems-statements) which are incorrigible
+and which may be about any sort of entity. They understand that the Terrans do have the former notion, but they
+are baffled why they think they need it, although they can
+see how, in ignorance of neurology, a lot of strange notions
+might have become current.
+106
+
+5. SKEPTICISM ABOUT OTHER MINDS
+When we turn to the skeptic about other minds-the person who emphasizes that there can be inner states without
+behaviorial accompaniments—we again have a perfectly
+sound intuition blown up into a paradox. The sound intuition is just that raw feels are as good particulars as tables
+or archangels or electrons—as good inhabitants of the
+world, as good candidates for ontological status. The question "Do the Antipodeans have raw feels?" is no fishier
+or more "metaphysical" than the question "Do they have
+red blood?" or "Do they have the moral sense?" Further,
+we do indeed have a special, superior way of knowing about
+our own raw feels—we have privileged access to private
+entities.
+This good point begins to turn bad, however, when the
+principle of the Naturally Given suggests that since raw
+feels are so very well known indeed, they must be entities
+of a very special sort—processes in a private "non-material
+medium," perhaps. It turns bad, so to speak, when more is
+made of man's Glassy Essence than the fact that man's
+knowledge is a Mirror of Nature, and when the question
+arises "What kind of special and marvelous material, or
+non-material, could do that mirroring?" There is nothing
+wrong, so to speak, with saying that people have to be pretty
+special to know so much more than the beasts of the field;
+even the Antipodeans say the same. But when we try to go
+from
+1. We know our minds better than we know anything else
+to
+2. We could know all about our minds even if we knew
+nothing else
+to
+3. Knowing whether something has a mind is a matter
+of knowing it as it knows itself
+107
+
+then we can never say why we should not be solipsists. The
+transition from (1) to (2) is made natural, though not
+necessitated, by the principle of the Naturally Given and
+the metaphor of the Inner Eye. For if we think of the Eye
+simply turning inward and spotting a raw feel, the whole
+complex of social institutions and behavioral manifestations
+which surround reports of such raw feels seems irrelevant.
+Just because it is irrelevant, we are impelled to move from
+(2) to (3)—all we shall ever know about our fellows (if we
+have any), we now say wistfully, is their behavior and their
+social position. We shall never know how it is with them
+within, if indeed there is any "within" there. The effect of
+this is that we stop thinking of our friends and neighbors as
+people and start thinking of them as husks surrounding a
+mysterious thing (the Glassy Essence, the private nonmaterial medium) which only professional philosophers, perhaps, can describe but which we know (or hope) is there.
+The notion that introspection is a glimpse into another
+ontological realm is not (and here the Wittgensteinians are
+quite right) something which becomes obvious when we
+actually do some introspecting. No haunting sense of spying
+on the uncanny comes over us when we turn the Eye of the
+Mind inward. The notion that we are doing so is a product
+of the epistemological notions which let us slide from (1)
+to (2) to (3). Here, as elsewhere, epistemology precedes, and
+tempts us into, metaphysics.
+But the artificial uncanniness produced by too much
+epistemology should not lead us (and here some Wittgensteinians are quite wrong) to think that there can be nothing inside at all. Nor should we think our privileged access
+to our own mental states is a mystery requiring either metaphysical defense or skeptical destruction. The force of the
+skeptic's original sound intuition can be brought out by
+emphasizing this last point. I shall do so by taking a critical
+look at Wittgensteinian arguments that mental entities
+have a sort of diminished ontological responsibility, and
+that the whole notion of "private" entities and of privileged
+108
+
+access to them is somehow misguided. It has been emphasized by Strawson that Wittgenstein had two distinct sorts
+of "hostility"-one to privacy and one to immediacy. The
+latter, I think, was crucially important, but the former was
+entirely misguided.1e
+Consider the famous passage in which Wittgenstein says
+that a sensation "is not a something, but not a nothing
+either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would
+serve just as well as a something about which nothing could
+be said."1r This directs attention to the paradoxical thing
+about the skeptic's claim—the insistence that it is the "special incommunicable felt qualities" of inner states which
+matter. But if we distinguish between the claim that
+We have privileged access to our own pains
+and the claim that
+We know which mental states we are in purely by virtue
+of their special felt qualities
+we can avoid the paradox and let a sensation be as much a
+something as a table. The former claim merely says that
+there is no better way of finding out whether somebody is in
+pain than by asking him, and that nothing can overrule his
+16 Cf. P. F. Strawson, "Review of Wittgenstein's Philosophical In-
+vestigations" in the anthology cited in note 13, p. 6z. I have argued
+elsewhere that we can save Wittgenstein's epistemological insights,
+which center around the impossibility of learning the meaning of
+words without antecedent "stage-setting," without getting caught up
+in a hostility to privacy which led Wittgenstein to the edge of behaviorism and which led some of his followers over the edge. In the view I
+would recommend, Wittgenstein's critique of "pure ostensive definition"
+can be generalized into Sellars's doctrine that we cannot know the
+meaning of one word without knowing the meaning of a lot of others,
+and thus can be used to show what is wrong with the notion of the
+Eye of the Mind, without drawing any metaphysical corollaries. See my
+"Wittgenstein, Privileged Access, and Incommunicability," American
+Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1970), 192-205 and "Verificationism and
+Transcendental Arguments," Nous 5 (1971), 3-14.
+17 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, pt. I, sec. 304.
+109
+
+own sincere report. The latter says that the mechanism
+which makes this privilege possible is his inspection of the
+"phenomenological properties" of his own mental states. To
+get from the first claim to the second we need the Cartesian
+model of self-knowledge as analogous to observation-the
+image of the Inner Eye-and the notion that stomach
+cramps, for example, are not Naturally Given in the way
+in which the feelings produced by stomach cramps are.
+This is the notion which, brought to bear on the Antipodeans, produces the notion that they can't be directly
+acquainted with their C-fibers but must be making an
+"unconscious" inference from "special, felt qualities."
+If we drop the notion that the only way in which we can
+have "direct knowledge" of an entity is by being acquainted
+with its "special, felt, incommunicable qualities," then we
+can have privileged access without paradox. We can drop
+this notion if, with Wittgenstein, we note that unless there
+were such a thing as typical pain behavior we would never
+be able to teach a child the meaning of, for example, "tooth.
+ache." More generally, we can note that the way in which
+the pre-linguistic infant knows that it has a pain is the way
+in which the record-changer knows the spindle is empty,
+the plant the direction of the sun, and the amoeba the
+temperature of the water. But this way has no connection
+with what a language-user knows when he knows what pain
+is-that it is mental rather than physical, typically produced
+by injured tissues, etc. The mistake which Wittgenstein exposed was to assume that we learn what a pain is in the second sense by casting linguistic garb over our knowledge of
+what pain is in the first sense—by clothing our direct
+acquaintance with special felt, incommunicable qualities
+in words (thus rendering ourselves forever skeptical about
+whether the same incommunicable quality is being named
+when our friends use the same word). The notion that
+knowledge in the first sense-the sort manifested by behavioral discrimination—is the "foundation" (rather than
+simply one possible causal antecedent) of knowledge in the
+110
+
+second sense is itself one more product of the Cartesian
+model. For as long as it is thought that the Naturally Given
+is known through and through simply by being seen by the
+Inner Eye, it will seem odd to suggest that the behavior and
+environment which we must know about in order to use
+the word "pain" in ordinary conversation should have anything to do with what "pain" means. The image of the
+Mental Eye, combined with the notion that language consists of names of the Naturally Given plus abbreviations for
+instrumentalistic criteria for detecting the presence of all
+entities not Naturally Given, produces skepticism. For these
+assumptions guarantee that the facts about behavior and
+environment of which behaviorists and Wittgensteinians
+make much should seem irrelevant to the "essence" of pain.
+For that essence is determined simply by what is named.18
+From the Antipodean point of view, the notion of "private
+entities"—entities about which only one person has incorrigible knowledge—is strange but not incomprehensible. It
+strikes the Antipodeans as clear but pointless. What would
+strike them as unintelligible is the notion of entities so
+private, so to speak, that knowledge of them is not only
+privileged but incommunicable. These indeed, they might
+say, are not entities at all. Contrariwise, the Wittgensteinian
+temptation to suggest that sensations have some sort of
+halfway existence between nothings and somethings-that
+they "drop out" of the world like the beetles-in-boxes of
+Wittgenstein's famous analogy-comes from running to-
+18 One might argue about whether Wittgenstein's views on sensations
+were a corollary of his views about meaning, or whether the epistemological views reflected in the former entail his philosophy of language.
+I do not think that such an argument would be fruitful. As I shall
+suggest in chapter six, there is no particular reason to view philosophy
+of language as "prior" to other parts of philosophy. In particular, I
+do not think that disputes about the "theory of reference" (which I
+discuss in section 4 of chapter six) help to illuminate the issue which
+Kripke raises about the essence of pain in the passage cited in section
+≥ of this chapter. Questions about rigid designation leave questions
+about essence wide open.
+111
+
+gether the notions of incorrigibility and incommunicability.
+If we assimilate the two, and realize the skeptical implications of incommunicability, then we will indeed be skeptical about privileged access to private entities. But this
+skepticism will not be the sort the Antipodeans have.
+They are skeptical because they think such entities and such
+access are de trop, not because they think that the notions
+of them are "conceptual confusions."
+Traditional Cartesian skeptics about other minds are of
+still a third sort. They just doubt whether other people have,
+for example, pains. This skepticism is no more refutable and
+no more interesting than skepticism about whether the
+table exists when there is no one about to perceive it. It is,
+after all, quite possible that tables vanish when nobody
+is around. It is quite possible that our companions always
+simulate pain-behavior without ever having any pains. It
+is quite possible that the world is a very different sort of
+place than we imagine. But this kind of skepticism would
+never have occupied philosophers' attention if it were not
+for the notion of the Naturally Given, and the consequent
+suggestion that everything (our friend's mind, as well as his
+table and his body) which is not a fragment of our own
+Inner Mirror-a part of our own Glassy Essence-is just a
+"posit," "an inference," "a construction," or something
+equally dubious which requires metaphysical system-building (Descartes, Kant) or discoveries about "our language"
+(Russell, Ayer) for its defense. Such redescriptions of reality
+or language are supposed to show that it is impossible for
+the skeptic to doubt what he doubts without making some
+wholesale intellectual mistake-"misunderstanding the nature of matter" (Kant) or "misunderstanding the logic of
+our language" (Ayer). But it is not impossible, it is just
+pointless, unless some further reason for doubt is given
+other than that certainty cannot be had.
+We should not think that philosophers of the seventeenth
+century misunderstood the nature of the mind by, so to
+speak, systematically distorting ordinary language (Ryle).
+112
+
+Nor should we think that since the naive metaphysics of
+common sense generates skeptical problems we need to replace it by, say, a neutral monism (Spinoza), or a panpsychism (Whitehead, Hartshorne), or a materialism (Smart).
+The seventeenth century did not "misunderstand" the Mirror of Nature or the Inner Eye any more than Aristotle misunderstood natural motion or Newton gravity. They hardly
+could misunderstand it, since they invented it. The charge
+that this set of images inaugurated an era of philosophy
+which centered around epistemological skepticism is sound
+enough, but it is important to see that this was not because
+other minds were somehow especially susceptible to skepticism. They are no more susceptible than anything else
+that is outside one's own mind. The seventeenth century
+gave skepticism a new lease on life because of its epistemology, not its philosophy of mind. Any theory which views
+knowledge as accuracy of representation, and which holds
+that certainty can only be rationally had about representations, will make skepticism inevitable.
+The veil-of-ideas epistemology which took over philosophy in the seventeenth century transformed skepticism from
+an academic curiosity (Pyrrhonian skepticism) and a concrete and local theological issue (the authority of the
+church versus that of the individual reader of Scripture
+into a cultural tradition. 1° It did so by giving rise to a new
+philosophical genre—the system which brings subject and
+object together again. This reconciliation has been the goal
+of philosophical thought ever since. Ryle and Wittgenstein
+are misleading when they say that there must be something
+wrong with the seventeenth-century picture which has held
+us captive, on the ground that in ordinary life we have no
+difficulty telling what has a mind and what doesn't, nor
+19 See Popkin, Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes and Maurice
+Mandelbaum, Philosophy, Science, and Sense-Perception (Baltimore,
+1964) for discussions of various factors which contributed to the formation of this tradition. For a more radical interpretation, see Jacques
+Maritain, The Dream of Descartes (New York, 1944).
+113
+
+whether tables persist out of sight. It is as if we said that the
+imitation of Christ cannot be a suitable ideal because in
+ordinary life we have no trouble recognizing the bounds
+placed on love by prudence and self-interest. The images
+which generate philosophical (and poetic) traditions are not
+likely to be attended to outside the study, just as the counsels of perfection which religion proffers are not likely to
+be noticed on weekdays. If philosophy is an attempt to see
+how "things, in the largest sense of the term, hang together,
+in the largest sense of the term," then it will always involve
+the construction of images which will have characteristic
+problems and will beget characteristic genres of writing.
+One may wish to say, as I do, that the seventeenth-century
+image is outworn-that the tradition which it inspired has
+lost its vitality. But that is quite a different criticism from
+saying that this tradition misunderstood something or failed
+to solve a problem. Skepticism and the principal genre of
+modern philosophy have a sym biotic relationship. They live
+one another's death, and die one another's life. One should
+see philosophy neither as achieving success by "answering
+the skeptic," nor as rendered nugatory by realizing that
+there is no skeptical case to be answered. The story is more
+complicated than that.
+6. MATERIALISM WITHOUT MIND-BODY IDENTITY
+Like the behaviorist and the skeptic about other minds,
+the materialist has a sound intuition which becomes paradoxical when stated in the vocabulary of the tradition to
+which it is a reaction. Encouraged by reflection on the
+Antipodeans, the materialist thinks it likely that reference
+to neurological microstructures and processes may replace
+reference to short-term mental states (sensations, thoughts,
+mental images) in the explanation of human behavior. (If
+he is wise, he does not think the same for beliefs, desires,
+and other long-term-and not incorrigibly knowablemental states, but is content to view them as properties of
+114
+
+persons rather than of minds, in the manner of Ryle.) Not
+content with this plausible prediction, however, he wishes
+to say something metaphysical. The only thing to be said
+seems to be that "mental states are nothing but neural
+states." But this sounds paradoxical. So he tries various
+tactics to mitigate the paradox. One such tactic is to say that
+the nature of the mind has so far been misunderstood, and
+that once we understand it correctly we shall see that it is
+not paradoxical to say that it may turn out to be the
+nervous system. Behaviorism is one form of this tactic, and
+it is compatible with materialism in the sense that the claim:
+When we talk about mental events we are really talking
+about behavioral dispositions
+though not compatible with:
+When we talk about mental events we are really talking
+about neural events
+is compatible with:
+There are, however, other things relevant to prediction
+and explanation of behavior than the systematic interrelationships of dispositions with events in the external
+world, and among these are the neural events which
+sometimes cause the onset of such dispositions.
+It has been customary in recent discussions, however, to
+take behaviorism and materialism as two quite different
+ways—mild and violent, respectively-of modifying the
+seventeenth-century picture of the mind. In this spirit, materialists have fastened on those mental entities most recalcitrant to Ryle's dispositional analyses-the raw feels, the
+passing thoughts, the mental images-and tried to show
+that these are to be construed, roughly, as "whatever it is
+which causes the onset of certain behavior or behavioral
+dispositions." This so-called topic-neutral analysis of the
+mind (by, especially, J.J.C. Smart and David Armstrong)
+runs into trouble, however, over the intuitive distinction
+115
+
+between "whatever mental state it is which causes the onset ...
+" and "whatever physical state it is which causes the
+onset...." To put it another way, the intuition that there
+is some difference between materialism and parallelism
+makes us feel that there is something misleading, or at least
+incomplete, in topic-neutral accounts of what makes the
+mental mental. Or, to put it still another way, if our notion
+of "mind" is what topic-neutral analyses say it is, it is very
+hard to explain the existence of a mind-body problem. 2°
+We may say that the lack of a fine-grained neurological account promoted the notion that there is something distinctive about the mind-that it must be something ghostlybut this tactic simply splits the traditional notion of the
+mental into two parts: the causal role and the Glassy Es-
+sence believed to play this causal role. Topic-neutral analyses obviously cannot capture, and do not want to capture,
+the latter. But it seems mere gerrymandering to split our
+concept of a "mental state" into the portion which is compatible with materialism and the portion which is not, and
+then say that only the former is "essential" to the concept."1
+We can put the attempt at "topic-neutral" analyses in
+perspective by seeing it as one way to get around the following argument for dualism:
+1. Some statements of the form "I just had a sensation of
+pain" are true
+2. Sensations of pain are mental events
+3. Neural processes are physical events
+4. "Mental" and "physical" are incompatible predicates
+5. No sensation of pain is a neural event
+6. There are some nonphysical events
+20 See M. C. Bradley's "Critical Notice" of J.J.C. Smart's Philosophy
+and Scientific Realism, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1964),
+262-283, on this point. My own "Incorrigibility as the Mark of the
+Mental," Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424, begins with a discussion of this point, and was inspired by Bradley's review of Smart.
+21 Doing so is the inverse of Kripke's Cartesian claim that the "im.
+mediate phenomenological quality" of pain is essential to it.
+116
+
+Ryleans, and some Wittgensteinians, taking mentality to
+consist in accessibility to privileged access, and indulging
+what Strawson calls "a hostility to privacy," deny (2).
+Panpsychists have denied (3),22 "Reductive" materialists
+such as Smart and Armstrong, who offer "topic-neutral"
+analyses of mentalistic terms, challenge (4). "Eliminative"
+materialists like Feyerabend and Quine deny (1). This last
+position claims the advantage over the "reductive" version
+of not having to offer revisionary "analyses" of terms, and
+thus not having to get involved with dubious notions such
+as "meaning" and "analysis." It does not say that we have
+been misleadingly calling neural processes "sensations,"
+but merely that there are no sensations. Nor does it say that
+the meaning of the term sensation can be analyzed in such
+a way as to produce such unexpected results as the denial
+of (4). It is fully "Quinean" and wholly anti-Rylean in the
+sense that it happily accepts all the things which the dualist
+would like to construe the man in the street as saying, and
+merely adds, "So much the worse for the man in the street."
+This position seems to hold out hope of a sense in which
+the materialists' metaphysical claim "Mental states are nothing but neural states" can be cheaply bought. For now it
+can be defended without the need to do anything as laborious or as shady as "philosophical analysis." We can say that
+although in one sense there just are no sensations, in another sense what people called "sensations," viz., neural
+states, do indeed exist. The distinction of senses is no more
+sophisticated than when we say that the sky does not exist,
+22 Hartshorne and Whitehead are perhaps the clearest examples in
+recent philosophy. I have argued against Whitehead's version of this
+doctrine in "The Subjectivist Principle and the Linguistic Turn" in
+Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy, ed. George Kline
+(Englewood Clifis, N.J., 1963). A panpsychist view is also suggested by
+Thomas Nagel's proposal for an "objective phenomenology" which
+would "permit questions about the physical basis of experience to
+assume a more intelligible form" ("What Is It Like to Be a Bat?"
+Philosophical Review 83 (1974], 449). However, in both Hartshorne and
+Nagel, panpsychism tends to merge with neutral monism.
+117
+
+but that there is something which people call the sky (the
+appearance of a blue dome as a result of refracted sunlight) which does exist (although, as the prevalence of the
+Brandt-Campbell objection discussed in section 2 shows, the
+analogy cannot be pressed so as to make a mental state the
+"appearance"' of a neural state). So it looks as if the argument for dualism above can be handled by saying that all
+the dualist is entitled to is the following premise:
+1'. Some statements of the form "I just had a sensation
+of pain" are as properly taken as true as "The sky is
+overcast" and "The sun is rising," but none of them
+is true.
+If we substitute (1') for (1) in the argument, then we will
+substitute the following for (2):
+2'. If there were any sensations of pain, they would be
+mental events
+and then draw the conclusion:
+6'. The things which people have been calling "sensations" are physical (and, specifically, neural) events.
+We can then conclude that although there are no mental
+events, the things which people have called mental events
+are physical events, even though "mental" and "physical"
+are as incompatible as "rising above the horizon" and
+"standing still."
+This attempt at a cheap version of the identity of minds
+and brains will work well enough if we refrain from pressing questions about criteria of identity of reference, just
+as topic-neutral analyses will work well enough if we refrain
+from pressing questions about identity of meaning. I do not,
+however, think that there are criteria for the identity of
+either which are useful in philosophically controversial
+cases. So I do not think that "eliminative materialism" is a
+more plausible version of the thesis of mind-brain identity
+than "reductive materialism." When we try to make sense
+118
+
+of any claim of the form "There aren't really any X's; what
+you have been talking about are nothing but Y's," it is always possible to object that (a) "X" refers to X's, and (b)
+we cannot refer to what does not exist. So to get around
+this standard criticism the eliminative materialist would
+have to say either that "sensation" does not refer to sensations, but to nothing at all, or that "refer" in the sense of
+"talk about" is not subject to (b). Either line is defensible,
+and I defend the second in discussing the notion of reference in connection with the so-called problem of conceptual
+change in chapter six below. But since I think that the reductive and eliminative versions of the identity theory are
+both merely awkward attempts to throw into current philosophical jargon our natural reaction to an encounter
+with the Antipodeans, I do not think that the difference between the two should be pressed. Rather, they should both
+be abandoned, and with them the notion of "mind-body
+identity." The proper reaction to the Antipodean story is to
+adopt a materialism which is not an identity theory in any
+sense, and which thus avoids the artificial notion that we
+must wait upon "an adequate theory of meaning (or reference)" before deciding issues in the philosophy of mind.23
+23 This is not to say that the controversies surrounding the reductive
+and eliminative forms of the identity theory have been pointless. On
+the contrary, I think that they have been very useful, and particularly
+so because of their interplay with questions in the philosophy of
+language. But I think that the upshot of this interplay has been, first,
+to bolster Quine's view that the notion of "sameness of meaning" cannot be invoked to solve philosophical problems where the notion of
+"coextensive" has failed, and, second, to show that the sense of "really
+talking about" used in such discussions as that about materialism is
+not interestingly connected with the Fregean notion of reference (in
+which one cannot refer to what does not exist). (The latter point is
+argued in chapter six.) Having adopted an eliminative materialist
+position some years ago ("Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and Categories,"
+Review of Metaphysics 19 [1965], 25-54), I am very grateful to the
+people whose criticisms of this article eventually led me to what I hope
+is a clearer understanding of the issues. I am especially indebted to
+publications by, or conversations with, Richard Bernstein, Eric Bush,
+119
+
+This amounts to saying, once again, that the materialist
+should stop reacting to stories such as that about the Antipodeans by saying metaphysical things, and confine himself to
+such claims as "No predictive or explanatory or descriptive
+power would be lost if we had spoken Antipodean all our
+lives." It is pointless to ask whether the fact that cerebroscopes correct Antipodean reports of inner states shows that
+they are not mental states, or shows rather that mental
+states are really neural states. It is pointless not just because nobody has any idea how to resolve the issue, but
+because nothing turns on it. The suggestion that it has a
+clear-cut answer depends upon the pre-Quinean notion of
+"necessary and sufficient conditions built into our language"
+for the application of the terms "sensation," "mental,"
+and the like, or upon some similar essentialism.2* Only a
+philosopher with a lot invested in the notion of "ontological
+status" would need to worry about whether a corrigibly re-
+David Coder, James Cornman, David Hiley, William Lycan, George
+Pappas, David Rosenthal, Steven Savitt, and Richard Sikora. The
+reader interested in following up the similarities and differences between reductive and eliminative materialism might consult Cornman,
+Materialism and Sensations (New Haven, 1971), Lycan and Pappas,
+"What Is Eliminative Materialism?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy
+50 (1972), 149-159, Bush, "Rorty Revisited," Philosophical Studies 25
+(1974), 33-42, and Hiley, "Is 'Eliminative Materialism' Materialism?"
+Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (1978), 325-337.
+21 I injudiciously invoked such a notion in "Incorrigibility as the
+Mark of the Mental," cited in note 20 above. I there concluded that
+the development of due respect for cerebroscopes would mean the discovery that there had never been any mental events. But this is overdramatized, and tries to establish more of a difference between eliminative and reductive materialism than (as Lycan and Pappas have shown)
+there really is. I have been greatly helped to see the flaws in my earlier
+view by correspondence with David Coder concerning his "The Funda.
+mental Error of Central State Materialism," American Philosophical
+Quarterly 10 (1973), 289-298, and with David Rosenthal concerning
+his "Mentality and Neutrality," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), 386-
+415.
+120
+
+portable pain was "really" a pain or rather a stimulated C-
+fiber.25
+If we stop asking questions about what counts as "mental"
+and what does not, and instead recall that incorrigibility is
+all that is at issue in puzzles about the Antipodeans, then we
+can see the argument for dualism offered above as an overdramatized version of the following argument:
+1. Some statements of the form "I just had a sensation
+of pain" are true
+2'. Sensations of pain are incorrigibly reportable
+3'. Neural events are not incorrigibly reportable
+4'. Nothing can be both corrigibly and incorrigibly reportable
+5. No sensation of pain is a neural event
+Here the temptation to avoid (5) by denying (1) is much
+less great, for (4') is more easily criticized than (4). It is hard
+to say that "mental" really means "something that might
+turn out to be physical," just as it is hard to say that "criminal behavior" really means "behavior which might turn
+out to be innocent." That is why detailed attempts at topicneutral analysis in hopes of denying (4) seem foredoomed.
+But it is relatively easy to deny (4) and say that something
+can be corrigibly reportable (by those who know neurology)
+25 But this is not to say that the Antipodeans would have no impact
+on philosophy. The disappearance of psychology as a discipline distinct
+from neurology, and similar cultural developments, might eventually
+free us from the image of the Mirror of Nature much more effectively
+than philosophers' identity theories. Outside of philosophy, there would
+be a bit of "blurring" in ordinary speech (a bit of "not knowing what
+to say" when the sincere introspector defied the cerebroscope), but
+common sense, language, and culture have survived worse muddles
+than this. Compare, for example, conversations between moralistic
+judges and psychiatrists who produce a case history to show that
+"criminal" is inappositely applied to the accused's behavior. Nobody
+but an overzealous philosopher would think that there was an essence
+of "crime" determined by looking at, for example, "our language" and
+capable of resolving judges' dilemmas.
+121
+
+and incorrigibly reportable (by those who don't), as easy
+as to say, "Something can be treated rather than punished
+(by those who understand psychology) and punished rather
+than treated (by those who don't)." For in both these latter
+examples we are talking about social practices rather than
+"intrinsic properties of the entities in question" or "the
+logic of our language." It is easy to imagine different social
+practices in regard to the same objects, actions, or events,
+depending upon the degree of intellectual and spiritual
+development of the culture in question ("higher" stages
+of development being, pace Hegel, those in which Spirit is
+less self-conscious). So by denying (4) we seem to open the
+way for denying (5), and saying that "sensation" and
+"brain process" are just two ways of talking about the same
+thing.
+Having earlier heaped scorn on both neutral monists
+and identity theorists, I may now seem to be edging into
+their camp. For the question now arises: Two ways of talking about what? Something mental or something physical?
+But here, I think, we have to resist our natural metaphysical urge, and not reply, "A third thing, of which both mentality and physicality are aspects." It would be better at this
+point to abandon argument and fall back on sarcasm, asking
+rhetorical questions like "What is this mental-physical contrast anyway? Whoever said that anything one mentioned
+had to fall into one or other of two (or half-a-dozen) ontological realms?" But this tactic seems disingenuous, since
+it seems obvious (once the psychology departments stop
+doing experiments with questionnaires and slide shows,
+and just do it all with cerebroscopes) that "the physical"
+has somehow triumphed.
+But what did it triumph over? The mental? What was
+that? The practice of making incorrigible reports about
+certain of one's states? That seems too small a thing to count
+as an intellectual revolution. Perhaps, then, it triumphed
+over the sentimental intellectual's conviction that there was
+a private inner realm into which publicity, "scientific meth-
+122
+
+od," and society could not penetrate. But this is not right
+either. The secret in the poet's heart remains unknown to
+the secret police, despite their ability to predict his every
+thought, utterance, and movement by monitoring the cerebroscope which he must wear day and night. We can know
+which thoughts pass through a man's mind without understanding them. Our inviolable uniqueness lies in our poetic
+ability to say unique and obscure things, not in our ability
+to say obvious things to ourselves alone.
+The real difficulty we encounter here is, once again, that
+we are trying to set aside the image of man as possessor of a
+Glassy Essence, suitable for mirroring nature with one hand,
+while holding on to it with the other. If we could ever drop
+the whole cluster of images which Antipodeans do not share
+with us, we would not be able to infer that matter had
+triumphed over spirit, science over privacy, or anything
+over anything else. These warring opposites are notions
+which do not make sense outside of a cluster of images
+inherited from the Terran seventeenth century. No one
+except philosophers, who are professionally obligated to
+take these images seriously, will be scandalized if people
+start saying, "The machine told me that it didn't really
+hurt—it only, very horribly, seemed to." Philosophers are
+too involved with notions like "ontological status" to take
+such developments lightly, but no other part of culture is.
+(Consider the fact that only philosophers remain perplexed
+about how one can have unconscious motives and desires.)
+Only the notion that philosophy should provide a permanent matrix of categories into which every possible empirical discovery and cultural development can be fitted without strain impels us to ask unanswerable questions like
+"Would this mean that there were no minds?" 'Were we
+wrong about the nature of the mind?" "Were the Antipodeans right in saying, 'There never were any of those things
+you called "raw feels" "3"
+Finally, the same overambitious conception of philosophy, stemming from the same set of seventeenth-century
+123
+
+images, is responsible for materialists' fears that unless
+cerebral localization and "philosophical analysis" cooperate to "identify" the mind and the body, then "the unity of
+science" is endangered. If we follow Sellars in saying that
+science is the measure of all things, then we shall not worry
+about cerebral localization turning out to be a flop, much
+less about materialist "analyses" of our everyday mentalistic
+vocabulary succumbing to counter-examples. We shall not
+interpret either failure as showing that science has all the
+while been riding on two horses—one solid and one ghostly
+—which may start galloping off in opposite directions at any
+moment. Science's failure to figure out how the brain works
+will cause no more danger to science's "unity" than its
+failure to explain mononucleosis, or the migration of butterflies, or stockmarket cycles. Even if neurons turn out to
+"swerve"—to be buffeted by forces as yet unknown to science—Descartes would not be vindicated. To think otherwise is to commit the fallacy of omne ignotum pro spectro
+—taking everything one cannot understand to be a ghost,
+something known in advance to be beyond the reach of science, and which must therefore be despairingly handed over
+to philosophy.26 If we do not think of philosophy as supply-
+26 This point can be made a bit more precisely by using Meehl and
+Sellars's distinction between "physical," ("an event or entity is physical,
+if it belongs in the space-time network") and "physical," ("an event or
+entity is physical, if it is definable in terms of theoretical primitives adequate to describe completely the actual states though not necessarily
+the potentialities of the universe before the appearance of life"). This
+distinction (drawn in "The Concept of Emergence," Minnesota Studies
+in the Philosophy of Science, I [1956], 252) can be multiplied to distinguish "physical," from appropriate senses of "physical," defined in
+terms of "the universe before the appearance of linguistic behavior"
+("•.. of intentional action," "of beliefs and desires," etc.). For any
+such distinction, the point to be emphasized is that science's failure to
+explain something in terms of physical, (for n greater than r) entities
+does nothing to show that the explanation must be in terms of nonphysical, entities. The point is put to good use by Geoffrey Hellman
+and Frank Thompson in "Physicalism: Ontology, Determination and
+Reduction," Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975), 551-564 and "Physicalist
+124
+
+ing a permanent ontological frame for any possible scientific
+result (consisting, eg., of categories like "mental" and
+"physical") we shall not think of science's failure as a vindication of Descartes, any more than we regard science's
+failure to explain the origin of the first living cell as a
+vindication of Aquinas. If the neurons do swerve, or if the
+brain works holistically rather than atomistically, this does
+not help show that we do, after all, have clear and distinct
+ideas of "the mental" and "the physical." These so-called
+ontological categories are simply the ways of packaging
+rather heterogenous notions, from rather diverse historical
+sources, which were convenient for Descartes's own purposes. But his purposes are not ours. Philosophers should
+not think of his artificial conglomerate as if it were a discovery of something preexistent—a discovery which because
+"intuitive" or "conceptual" or "categorical" sets permanent
+parameters for science and philosophy.
+7. EPISTEMOLOGY AND "THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND"
+I hope that the two chapters on the "mind-body problem"
+which the reader has just finished have persuaded him of at
+least the following points:
+Unless we are willing to revive Platonic and Aristotelian notions about grasping universals, we shall not think
+that knowledge of general truths is made possible by
+some special, metaphysically distinctive, ingredient in
+human beings.
+Unless we wish to revive the seventeenth century's
+somewhat awkward and inconsistent use of the Aristotelian notion of "substance" we shall not make sense of the
+notion of two ontological realms-the mental and the
+physical.
+Materialism," Nous 11 (1977), 309-346. Their version of "materialism
+without identity" should be compared with Davidson's in his "Mental
+Events" (discussed in chapter four below).
+125
+
+Unless we wish to affirm what I have called Principle
+(P)-roughly, the claim that a distinctive metaphysical
+property of "presence to consciousness"
+grounds some of
+our noninferential reports of our states—we shall not be
+able to use the notion of "entities whose appearance exhausts their reality" to bolster the mental-physical distinction.
+The notion that there is a problem about mind and body
+originated in the seventeenth century's attempt to make "the
+mind" a self-contained sphere of inquiry. The idea was to
+offer a para-mechanical account of mental processes which,
+somehow, would underwrite some claims to knowledge
+and disallow other claims. The paradigm of the "epistemological turn" taken by philosophy in the seventeenth century was what Kant called "the physiology of the human
+understanding of the celebrated Mr. Locke"—a causal account of mental processes which is supposed to criticize and
+justify knowledge-claims. To get this notion off the ground
+required the Cartesian replacement of the ancient and
+medieval problem of reason by the modern problem of
+consciousness. If what I have been saying in the past two
+chapters is right, the persistence of notions like the "mindbody problem" and "the philosophy of mind" is due to the
+persistence of the notion that there is some link between
+the older notions of reason or personhood and the Cartesian notion of consciousness. Part II of this book attempts
+to dissolve the modern version of the problem of reason—
+the notion that there is a problem about the possibility or
+extent of accurate representation which is the concern of a
+discipline called "epistemology." Insofar as it succeeds, this
+attempt frees us from the notion of human knowledge as an
+assemblage of representations in a Mirror of Nature, and
+thus reinforces the claim of part I that we can do without
+the notion of our Glassy Essence. If knowledge is not a matter of accuracy of representations, in any but the most trivial and unproblematic sense, then we need no inner mir-
+126
+
+ror, and there is thus no mystery concerning the relation of
+that mirror to our grosser parts.
+Even if the problems of consciousness and reason are both
+dissolved, however, that of personhood might seem to remain intact, since this notion draws on our moral intuitions, intuitions which seem unlikely to be merely the results of misguided Greek or seventeenth-century attempts to
+construct models of knowing or of the mind. Insofar as
+personhood is discussed in this book, it is in part ill, in connection with the notion of "philosophy." There I try to
+show how the peculiarly philosophical project of picking
+out which entities are persons, and therefore possess moral
+dignity, on the basis of some "objective criterion"-for example, their possession of a Glassy Essence-is a confusion
+between, roughly, science and ethics. Part Ill tries to suggest
+a way of viewing our moral consciousness which avoids this
+idea.
+Parts Il and III thus pick up the notions which I listed
+in chapter one, section 3, above as "marks of the mental"
+but have not discussed in part 1. They suggest ways of
+handling these notions—for example, intentionality, moral
+dignity—once the notion of a special mental ingredient—
+our Glassy Essence—is dropped. So I hope that some of the
+doubts which have emerged in the reader's mind in the
+course of part I, and some of the questions which may have
+been left dangling, will be resolved in the remainder of the
+book.
+127
+
+PART TWO
+Mirroring
+
+CHAPTER III
+The Idea of a "Theory of Knowledge"
+1. EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY'S SELF-IMAGE
+The notion that there is an autonomous discipline called
+"philosophy," distinct from and sitting in judgment upon
+both religion and science, is of quite recent origin. When
+Descartes and Hobbes denounced "the philosophy of the
+schools" they did not think of themselves as substituting a
+new and better kind of philosophy—a better theory of
+knowledge, or a better metaphysics, or a better ethics. Such
+distinctions among "fields of philosophy" were not yet
+drawn. The idea of "philosophy" itself, in the sense in
+which it has been understood since the subject became
+standardized as an academic subject in the nineteenth century, was not yet at hand. Looking backward we see Descartes and Hobbes as "beginning modern philosophy," but
+they thought of their own cultural role in terms of what
+Lecky was to call "the warfare between science and theology." They were fighting (albeit discreetly) to make the
+intellectual world safe for Copernicus and Galileo. They
+did not think of themselves as offering "philosophical systems," but as contributing to the efflorescence of research
+in mathematics and mechanics, as well as liberating intellectual life from ecclesiastical institutions. Hobbes defined
+"philosophy" as "such knowledge of effects of appearances,
+as we acquire by true ratiocination from the knowledge we
+have first of their causes of generation." He had no wish
+to distinguish what he was doing from something else called
+"science." It was not until after Kant that our modern philosophy-science distinction took hold. Until the power of the
+1 Thomas Hobbes, De Corpore, chap. I, sec. 2.
+131
+
+churches over science and scholarship was broken, the energies of the men we now think of as "philosophers" were
+directed toward demarcating their activities from religion.
+It was only after that battle had been won that the question
+of separation from the sciences could arise.
+The eventual demarcation of philosophy from science
+was made possible by the notion that philosophy's core was
+"theory of knowledge," a theory distinct from the sciences
+because it was their foundation. We now trace that notion
+back at least to Descartes's Meditations and Spinoza's De
+Emendatione Intellectus, but it did not achieve self-consciousness until Kant. It did not become built into the
+structure of academic institutions, and into the pat, unreflective self-descriptions of philosophy professors, until
+far into the nineteenth century. Without this idea of a
+"theory of knowledge," it is hard to imagine what "philosophy" could have been in the age of modern science.
+Metaphysicsconsidered as the description of how the
+heavens and the earth are put together—had been displaced
+by physics. Thè secularization of moral thought, which was
+the dominating concern of European intellectuals in the
+seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was not then viewed
+as a search for a new metaphysical foundation to take the
+place of theistic metaphysics. Kant, however, managed to
+transform the old notion of philosophy—metaphysics as
+"queen of the sciences" because of its concern with what
+was most universal and least material-into the notion of a
+"most basic" discipline—a foundational discipline. Philosophy became "primary" no longer in the sense of "highest"
+but in the sense of "underlying." Once Kant had written,
+historians of philosophy were able to make the thinkers of
+the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries fall into place as
+attempting to answer the question "How is our knowledge
+possible?" and even to project this question back upon the
+ancients.?
+2 On the difference between histories of philosophy written before
+and after Kant, see Maurice Mandelbaum, "On the Historiography of
+132
+
+This Kantian picture of philosophy as centered in epistemology, however, won general acceptance only after
+Hegel and speculative idealism had ceased to dominate the
+intellectual scene in Germany. It was only after people
+like Zeller began saying that it was time to stop throwing
+up systems and to get down to the patient labor of sorting
+out the "given" from the "subjective additions" made by
+Philosophy," Philosophy Research Archives, vol. II (1976); John Passmore's article on "Historiography of Philosophy" in The Encyclopedia
+of Philosophy (New York, 1967); Lucien Braun, Histoire de l'Histoire
+de la Philosophie (Paris, 1973), esp. chap. 5; Victor Cousin, Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie (Paris, 1868), douzième leçon, "Des
+Historiens de la Philosophie." Mandelbaum (p. 713) says of the frequency with which the concept of the history of philosophy was discussed in the last decade of the eighteenth century in Germany that
+"I believe it to be the case-although my documentation is insufficient
+to make this more than a conjecture-that this discussion must have
+been instigated through the impact of Kant's work in that period: by
+the sense that his system was at one and the same time an end and a
+new beginning." All these writers emphasize the contrast between
+Brucker's Historia Critica Philosophiae of 1742-1767 and the histories
+of Tiedemann (Geist der spekulativen Philosophie, 1791-1797) and
+Tennemann (Geschichte der Philosophie, 1789-1819). Brucker devotes
+about one-tenth of his space to the modern "syncretic philosophers"
+(i.e., those who do not fit into one of the ancient schools) and includes
+(besides the now standard sequence consisting of Bacon, Descartes,
+Hobbes, Spinoza, etc.) some twenty-odd other figures (e.g., Machiavelli,
+Kepler, Boyle). These are dropped from consideration by Tiedemann,
+who originates the canonical short list of "great modern philosophers."
+Tennemann tells us that "the history of philosophy is the exhibition
+of the successive stages in the development of philosophy, the exhibition of the strivings of Reason to realize the idea of a science of the
+ultimate bases and laws of Nature and of Freedom," having previously
+told us that reason begins with the faculty of "unifying the manifold
+of representations," and continues from there to the ultimate unification of scientific thought. (Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. I, Leipzig, 1798, pp. xxix, xxvi.) His history of philosophy already has the
+"dramatic" quality which we associate with Hegel's. He gives us both
+a canon of those who are to count as philosophers, based on how closely
+their work can be thought to resemble Kant's, and the notion of
+progress in philosophy from the ancients to the moderns.
+133
+
+the mind that philosophy could be thoroughly professionalized." The "back to Kant" movement of the 186os in Germany was also a "let's get down to work" movement—a way
+of separating the autonomous nonempirical discipline of
+philosophy from ideology on the one hand and from the
+rising science of empirical psychology on the other. The
+picture of "epistemology-and-metaphysics" as the "center of
+philosophy" (and of "metaphysics" as something which
+emerges out of epistemology rather than vice versa), which
+was established by the neo-Kantians, is the one built into
+philosophy curricula today.* The expression theory of
+knowledge itself attained currency and respectability only
+after Hegel had gone stale. The first generation of Kant's
+admirers used Vernunftkritik as a handy label for "what
+3 Cf. Edouard Zeller, "Über Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie" in Vorträge und Abhandlungen, Zweite Sammlung (Leipzig,
+1877), p. 495. Zeller's essay is one of a long sequence since Kant which
+announces that the day of the philosophical amateur is over and that
+the professionals are now in charge. For a later version, see G. J. Warnock, English Philosophy Since 1900 (London, 1958), p. 171: "...
+philosophy has only rather recently achieved professional status" and
+p. 172: "... it is only quite recently that the subject matter, or rather
+the tasks, of philosophy have come to be clearly distinguished from
+those of other disciplines." (Warnock is speaking of the period 1900
+1958.) I do not know the earliest appearance of such claims, but note
+Ernst Reinhold's use of the term Philosophen von Profession to contrast with the alle wissenschaftlich Gebildete for whom his Handbuch
+der allgemeinen Geschichte der Philosophie is intended. (Handbuch
+•... Erster Theil, Gotha, 1828, p. v) The Einleitung to Reinhold's
+history is useful for confirming Mandelbaum's claim (cf. note 2 above)
+about the relation of Kantian thought to the replacement of "chronicles
+of the opinions of the philosophers" by "history of philosophy" in the
+modern sense.
+4 As I shall be arguing in more detail below, especially in chapter
+six, the contemporary notion of philosophy of language as "first philosophy" is not so much a change from the older claim that epistemology
+was "first" as a minor variant upon it. The central claim of philosophy
+since Kant has been that the "possibility of representing reality" was
+what needed explanation, and for this project the difference between
+mental and linguistic representations is relatively unimportant.
+134
+
+Kant did," and the words Erkenntnislehre and Erkenntnistheorie were invented a bit later (in 1808 and 1832 respectively). But Hegel and idealistic system-building had by
+then intervened to obscure the question "What is the
+relation of philosophy to other disciplines?" Hegelianism
+produced an image of philosophy as a discipline which somehow both completed and swallowed up the other disciplines, rather than grounding them. It also made philosophy
+too popular, too interesting, too important, to be properly professional; it challenged philosophy professors to
+embody the World-Spirit, rather than simply getting on
+with their Fach. The essay of Zeller's which (according to
+Mauthner) "first raised the term Erkenntnistheorie' to its
+present academic dignity,"® ends by saying that those who
+believe that we can spin all the sciences out of our own
+spirit may continue on with Hegel, but anyone saner should
+recognize that the proper task of philosophy (once the
+notion of the thing-in-itself, and thus the temptations of
+idealism, are rejected) is to establish the objectivity of the
+knowledge-claims made in the various empirical disciplines.
+5 Cf. Hans Vaihinger, "Über den Ursprung des Wortes Erkenntnistheorie,'" Philosophische Monatshefte, vol. XII (Leipzig, 1876), pp. 84-
+90 for the history of the term. Vaihinger presents the view, which most
+neo-Kantians seemed to share, and which I am adopting here, that
+Locke was the first to "have a clear consciousness that all metaphysical
+and ethical discussion must be preceded by epistemological investigations," and that what Descartes and Spinoza said along these lines was
+merely occasional and unsystematic (P. 84). I am indebted for the reference to Vaihinger (as well as for other references and for many
+enlightening ideas) to an unpublished paper by Ian Hacking on the
+rise of epistemology as a discipline.
+6 Fritz Mauthner, Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Munich and Leipzig,
+1910), s.v. "Erkenntnistheorie," vol. 1, p. 2g6: "ein ausschliesslich
+deutscher Ausdruck, von Reinhold der Sohne (nach Eisler) geprägt,
+aber erst durch Zeller zu seiner jetzigen akademischen Würde promoviert." The same claim for Zeller is made by Vaihinger, "Wortes
+'Erkenntnistheorie,'" p. 8g. Vaihinger's article is both a report on, and
+an example of, the new "professionalized" self-image which neo.
+Kantian philosophers were in the course of creating.
+135
+
+This will be done by the appropriateness of the a priori contributions brought to bear in perception.? Erkenntnistheorie
+thus appears in 1862 as a way out from both "idealism"
+and "speculation." Fifteen years later, Zeller notes there is no
+longer any need to point out the proper role of Erkenntnistheorie, since this is now commonly accepted, especially
+by "our younger colleagues.": Thirty years further on, William James would bemoan "the gray-plaster temperament of
+our bald-headed young Ph.D.'s, boring each other at seminaries, writing those direful reports of literature in the
+Philosophical Review and elsewhere, fed on 'books of reference' and never confounding 'Aesthetik' with 'Erkenntnistheorie.' "9
+In this chapter I want to trace some of the crucial stages in
+the transition from the campaigns of Descartes and Hobbes
+against "the philosophy of the schools" to the nineteenth
+century's reestablishment of philosophy as an autonomous,
+self-contained, "scholastic," discipline. I shall try to back up
+the claim (common to Wittgenstein and Dewey) that to
+think of knowledge which presents a "problem," and about
+which we ought to have a "theory," is a product of viewing
+knowledge as an assemblage of representations—a view of
+knowledge which, I have been arguing, was a product of
+the seventeenth century. The moral to be drawn is that if
+this way of thinking of knowledge is optional, then so is
+epistemology, and so is philosophy as it has understood itself since the middle of the last century. The story I shall
+be telling about how philosophy-as-epistemology attained
+self-certainty in the modern period will go like this:
+Descartes's invention of the mind—his coalescence of
+beliefs and sensations into Lockean ideas-gave philosophers new ground to stand on. It provided a field of inquiry
+which seemed "prior" to the subjects on which the ancient
+" Zeller, "Erkenntnistheorie" pp. 494-495.
+8 Ibid., p. 496.
+9 William James, Letters, ed. Henry James (Boston, 1920), p. 228
+(letter to George Santayana of May 2, 1905).
+136
+
+philosophers had had opinions. Further, it provided a field
+within which certainty, as opposed to mere opinion, was
+possible.
+Locke made Descartes's newly contrived "mind" into the
+subject matter of a "science of man"—moral philosophy
+as opposed to natural philosophy. He did this by confusedly thinking that an analogue of Newton's particle
+mechanics for "inner space" would somehow be "of great
+advantage in directing our Thoughts in the search of other
+Things"10 and would somehow let us "see, what Objects
+our Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with."11
+This project of learning more about what we could know
+and how we might know it better by studying how our mind
+worked was eventually to be christened "epistemology." But
+before the project could come to full self-consciousness, a
+way had to be found of making it a nonempirical project.
+It had to be a matter of armchair reflection, independent
+of physiological discoveries and capable of producing necessary truths. Whereas Locke had retained the new inner
+space of research—the workings of the newly invented Cartesian mind—he had not been able to hold onto Cartesian
+certainty. Locke's "sensualism" was not yet a suitable candidate for the vacant position of "queen of the sciences."
+Kant put philosophy "on the secure path of a science"
+by putting outer space inside inner space (the space of the
+constituting activity of the transcendental ego) and then
+claiming Cartesian certainty about the inner for the laws
+of what had previously been thought to be outer. He thus
+reconciled the Cartesian claim that we can have certainty
+only about our ideas with the fact that we already had certainty—a priori knowledge-about what seemed not to be
+ideas. The Copernican revolution was based on the notion
+that we can only know about objects a priori if we "constitute" them, and Kant was never troubled by the question of
+how we could have apodictic knowledge of these "constitut-
+10 John Locke, Essay I, 1, i.
+11 Ibia., "Epistle to the Reader."
+137
+
+ing activities," for Cartesian privileged access was supposed
+to take care of that. Once Kant replaced the "physiology
+of the human understanding of the celebrated Mr. Locke"
+with (in Strawson's words) "the mythical subject of transcendental psychology," "epistemology" as a discipline came
+ot age.
+Besides raising "the science of man" from an empirical to
+an a priori level, Kant did three other things which helped
+philosophy-as-epistemology to become self-conscious and
+self-confident. First, by identifying the central issue of epistemology as the relations between two equally real but irreducibly distinct sorts of representations-"formal" ones
+(concepts) and "material" ones (intuitions) he made it
+possible to see important continuities between the new
+epistemological problematic and problems (the problems
+of reason and of universals) which had bothered the ancients
+and the medievals. He thereby made it possible to write
+"histories of philosophy" of the modern sort. Second, by
+linking epistemology to morality in the project of "destroying reason to make room for faith" (that is, destroying Newtonian determinism to make room for the common moral
+consciousness), he revived the notion of a "complete philosophical system," one in which morality was "grounded"
+on something less controversial and more scientific. Whereas the ancient schools had each had a view of human virtue
+designed to match their view of what the world was like,
+Newton had preempted views on the latter subject. With
+Kant, epistemology was able to step into metaphysics' role
+of guarantor of the presuppositions of morality. Third, by
+taking everything we say to be about something we have
+12 See K.d.r.V., Bxvi-xvii: The supposition that "objects must conform
+to our knowledge," Kant says, "agrees better with the supposition that
+it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining
+something in regard to them prior to their being given." The question
+of how we know what conditions they must conform to-how to validate knowledge-claims made from the transcendental standpoint—is
+discussed neither here nor elsewhere in the first Critique.
+138
+
+"constituted," he made it possible for epistemology to be
+thought of as a foundational science, an armchair discipline
+capable of discovering the "formal" (or, in later versions,
+"structural," "phenomenological," "grammatical," "logical," or "conceptual") characteristics of any area of human
+life. He thus enabled philosophy professors to see themselves as presiding over a tribunal of pure reason, able to determine whether other disciplines were staying within the
+legal limits set by the "structure" of their subject matters, 13
+2. LOCKE's CONFUSION OF EXPLANATION WITH
+JUSTIFICATION
+The "epistemological turn" taken by Descartes might not
+have captured Europe's imagination had it not been for a
+crisis of confidence in established institutions, a crisis expressed paradigmatically in Montaigne. But we should
+distinguish traditional Pyrrhonian skepticism about our
+ability to attain certainty from the new veil-of-ideas skep.
+ticism which Descartes made possible by carving out inner
+space. Traditional skepticism had been troubled principally
+by the "problem of the criterion"'—the problem of validating procedures of inquiry while avoiding either circularity
+or dogmatism. This problem, which Descartes thought he
+had solved by "the method of clear and distinct ideas," had
+little to do with the problem of getting from inner space
+to outer space—the "problem of the external world" which
+13 Kant's fondness for jurisprudential metaphors has often been remarked. It is also found in the neo-Kantians. See, for example, Zeller's
+"Uber die Aufgabe der Philosophie und ihre Stellung zu den übrigen
+Wissenschaften" (Vorträge und Abhandlungen, Zweite Sammlung, PP.
+445-466). In the course of sketching the philosopher's pretensions as
+overseer of culture, he speaks of the Rechtstitel which each discipline
+should secure from philosophy and says that "there is no branch of
+human knowledge of which the roots do not reach down into philosophical terrain, for all science springs from the knowing spirit and
+borrows its laws from that spirit's procedures" (p. 465).
+139
+
+became paradigmatic for modern philosophy.44 The idea of
+a "theory of knowledge" grew up around this latter problem—the problem of knowing whether our inner representa.
+tions were accurate. The idea of a discipline devoted to "the
+nature, origin, and limits of human knowledge"-the textbook definition of "epistemology"—required a field of study
+called "the human mind," and that field of study was what
+Descartes had created. The Cartesian mind simultaneously
+made possible veil-of-ideas skepticism and a discipline devoted to circumventing such skepticism.
+This is not to say, however, that the invention of the Cartesian mind is a suffcient condition for the development of
+epistemology. That invention gave us the notion of inner
+representations, but this notion would not have given rise
+to epistemology without the confusion I attributed to Locke
+—the confusion, of which Descartes was largely innocent,
+between a mechanistic account of the operations of our
+mind and the "grounding" of our claims to knowledge.
+This is what T. H. Green was to call
+the fundamental confusion, on which all empirical psychology rests, between two essentially distinct questions—
+14 The uneasy relations between these two forms of skepticism are
+illustrated by section XII of Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Un-
+derstanding, "Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy." Hume
+wants to distinguish the skepticism of Descartes's First Meditation
+(which he thought hyperbolical and impossible) both from his own
+veil-of-ideas skepticism based on the view that "nothing can ever
+be present to the mind but an image or perception" (David Hume,
+Philosophical Works [Boston and Edinburgh, 1854], vol. 4, p. 173)
+and from Pyrrhonism, or excessive skepticism (p. 183). He was anxious
+to separate the second from the third and to insist that one not take
+the merely "professional" and "technical" skepticism of the "new way
+of ideas" seriously. Hume did not think of himself as finding new
+arguments to support Sextus; rather he was anxious to show that the
+skeptical outcome of Locke's project showed not (as Kant and Russell
+were to believe) the need for a new and better sort of epistemology
+but the need to appreciate the unimportance of epistemology and the
+importance of sentiment. On Pyrrhonism in the period before Descartes, see Richard Popkin, History of Scepticism from Erasmus to
+Descartes (New York, 1964).
+140
+
+one metaphysical, What is the simplest element of knowledge? the other physiological, What are the conditions in
+the individual human organism in virtue of which it
+becomes a vehicle of knowledge?1s
+Green's distinction between an "element of knowledge"
+and "the conditions of the organism" reminds us that a
+claim to knowledge is a claim to have justified belief, and
+that it is rarely the case that we appeal to the proper functioning of our organism as a justification. Granted that we
+sometimes justify a belief by saying, for example, "I have
+good eyes," why should we think that chronological or compositional "relations between ideas," conceived of as events
+in inner space, could tell us about the logical relations between propositions? After all, as Sellars says:
+In characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing,
+we are not giving an empirical description of that episode
+or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons,
+of justifying and being able to justify what one says. 16
+How was it that Locke should have committed what Sellars
+calls "a mistake of a piece with the so-called 'naturalistic
+fallacy' in ethics," the attempt to "analyze epistemic facts
+without remainder into non-epistemic facts"?? Why should
+he have thought that a causal account of how one comes to
+have a belief should be an indication of the justification one
+has for that belief?
+The answer, I think, is that Locke, and seventeenth-century writers generally, simply did not think of knowledge
+as justified true belief. This was because they did not think
+of knowledge as a relation between a person and a proposi-
+15 T. H. Green, Hume and Locke [Green's "Introductions" to Hume's
+Treatise], ed. Ramon Lemos (New York, 1968), p. 19.
+16 Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality (London and New
+York, 1963), p. 16g.
+17 Ibid., p. 131. For a development of Sellars's point, with application
+to recent phenomenalisms, see Michael Williams, Groundless Belief
+(Oxford, 1977), esp. chap. 2.
+141
+
+tion. We find it natural to think of "what S knows" as the
+collection of propositions completing true statements by S
+which begin "I know that. ..." When we realize that the
+blank may be filled by such various material as "this is red,"
+"e = mc?" "my Redeemer liveth," and "I shall marry
+Jane," we are rightly skeptical of the notion of "the nature,
+origin, and limits of human knowledge," and of a "department of thought" devoted to this topic. But Locke did not
+think of "knowledge that" as the primary form of knowledge. He thought, as had Aristotle, of "knowledge of" as
+prior to "knowledge that," and thus of knowledge as a relation between persons and objects rather than persons and
+propositions. Given that picture, the notion of an examination of our "faculty of understanding" makes sense, as does
+the notion that it is fitted to deal with some sorts of objects
+and not with others. It makes even more sense if one is convinced that this faculty is something like a wax tablet upon
+which objects make impressions, and if one thinks of "having an impression" as in itself a knowing rather than a
+causal antecedent of knowing.
+It was just the notion of an "impression" upon which
+Reid-the great eighteenth-century enemy of the "'idea'
+idea"—fastened, to be followed by Green in the following
+century, and by a host of others (H. A. Prichard, Wilfrid
+Sellars, J. L. Austin, Jonathan Bennett) in our own. Reid
+says:
+There is no prejudice more natural to man, than to
+conceive of the mind as having some similitude to body
+in its operations. Hence, men have been prone to imagine,
+that as bodies are put in motion by some impulse or impression made upon them by contiguous bodies; so the
+mind is made to think and to perceive by some impression
+made upon it, or some impulse given to it by contiguous
+bodies.18
+18 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, reprinted
+with an introduction by Baruch Brody (Cambridge, Mass., 196g),
+p. 100.
+142
+
+Green, in a passage following the one quoted from him
+above, says that only through the confusion between elements of knowledge (propositions) and physiological conditions can "any idea be described as an 'impression' at
+all. ... A metaphor, interpreted as a fact, becomes the basis
+of (Locke's) philosophical system."1a Sellars (speaking of
+Hume rather than Locke) diagnoses a confusion between:
+1. An impression of a red triangle as a red and triangular
+item which is immediately and noninferentially known
+to exist and to be red and triangular.
+[and]
+2. An impression of a red triangle as a knowing that a red
+and triangular item exists.20
+All three criticisms are protests against the notion that a
+quasi-mechanical account of the way in which our immaterial tablets are dented by the material world will help us
+know what we are entitled to believe.
+Locke presumably thought himself justified in running
+together the two senses of "impression" distinguished by
+Sellars because he thought the dents in our quasi-tablet to
+be (as Ryle puts it) self-intimating. Thus he says: "
+•.. imprinting, if it signify any thing, being nothing else, but the
+making certain Truths to be perceived. For to imprint
+anything on the Mind without the Mind's perceiving it,
+seems to me hardly intelligible."21 It is as if the tabula rasa
+were perpetually under the gaze of the unblinking Eye of
+the Mind—nothing, as Descartes said, being nearer to the
+mind than itself. If the metaphor is unpacked in this way,
+however, it becomes obvious that the imprinting is of less
+interest than the observation of the imprint—all the knowing gets done, so to speak, by the Eye which observes the
+19 Green, Hume and Locke, P. 11.
+20 Wilfrid Sellars, Philosophical Perspectives (Springfield, IlI., 1967),
+p. 211.
+21 Locke, Essay, I, 2, V.
+143
+
+imprinted tablet, rather than by the tablet itself. Locke's
+success, accordingly, depended upon not unpacking the
+metaphor, on leaving intact the ambiguity between the
+quasi-red-and-triangular quasi-object in inner space and
+knowledge that such an object was there. Whereas Aristotle
+had not had to worry about an Eye of the Mind, believing
+knowledge to be the identity of the mind with the object known, Locke did not have this alternative available.
+Since for him impressions were representations, he needed a
+faculty which was aware of the representations, a faculty
+which judged the representations rather than merely had
+them-judged that they existed, or that they were reliable,
+or that they had such-and-such relations to other representations. But he had no room for one, for to postulate such a
+faculty would have intruded a ghost into the quasi-machine
+whose operation he hoped to describe. He kept just enough
+of Aristotle to retain the idea of knowledge as consisting of
+something object-like entering the soul, but not enough to
+avoid either skeptical problems about the accuracy of representations or Kantian questions about the difference be.
+tween intuitions with and without the "I think." To put it
+another way, the Cartesian conglomerate mind which
+Locke took for granted resembled Aristotelian vous just
+enough to give a traditional flavor to the notion of "impression" and departed from it just enough to make Humean skepticism and Kantian transcendentalism possible.
+Locke was balancing awkwardly between knowledge-asidentity-with-object and knowledge-as-true-judgment-aboutobject, and the confused idea of "moral philosophy" as an
+empirical "science of man" was possible only because of this
+transitional stance.23
+22 Reid thought that Aristotle, in his doctrine of phantasms, had
+begun the descent down the slippery slope which led to Hume. Cf.
+Essays, p. 133.
+23 In
+his groundbreaking The Emergence of Probability (Cambridge, 1975), Ian Hacking suggests that the idea of evidence, as a
+relation of confirmation holding between propositions, was just begin-
+144
+
+Still another way of describing the tension in Locke's
+thought is to see it as pulled on one side toward physiology
+and on another side toward Aristotle. Reid and Green,
+once again, agree in this diagnosis. Reid says of Descartes
+that
+he sometimes places the ideas of material objects in the
+brain ... yet he sometimes says, that we are not to conceive the images or traces in the brain to be perceived as if
+there were eyes in the brain; these traces are only occasions on which, by the laws of the union of soul and body,
+ideas are excited in the mind. ... Descartes seems to have
+hesitated between the two opinions, or to have passed
+from the one to the other. Mr. Locke seems, in like
+manner, to have wavered between the two; sometimes
+representing the ideas of material things as being in the
+brain, but more frequently as in the mind itself.24
+Green, discussing Locke's "ideas of reflection," speaks of his
+"confusion of thought and matter in the imaginary cerebral
+tablet" and says that
+Locke disguises the difficulty from himself and his reader
+by constantly shifting both the receptive subject and the
+impressive matter. We find the "tablet" perpetually receding. First it is the "outward part" or bodily organ.
+Then it is the brain.... Then it is the perceptive mind,
+which takes an impression of the sensation or has an idea
+of it. Finally, it is the reflective mind....25
+The reason for the shuffling which Reid and Green criticize
+is that if (like Aristotle and Locke) one tries to model all
+ning to emerge in the seventeenth century. If Hacking is right, then
+this fact sheds considerable light on the various awkward blendings of
+propositional and (purported) nonpropositional knowledge in the work
+of the British empiricists. See especially Hacking's remarks on Locke,
+Berkeley, and Hume in chapter 19.
+24 Reid, Essays, PP. 147-148.
+25 Green, Hume and Locke, p. Il; cf. also p. 163.
+145
+
+knowledge on sense-perception, then one will be torn between the literal way in which part of the body (e.g., the
+retina) can have the same quality as an external object and
+the metaphorical way in which the person as a whole has,
+for example, froghood "in mind" if he has views about
+frogs. The notion of an "immaterial tablet" splits the difference between simple physiological fact and speculative
+metaphor, and any philosophy which uses it will be torn
+both ways. It is precisely the choice of sense-perception as
+a model, and in particular of ocular imagery, which makes
+both Aristotle and Locke attempt to reduce "knowledge
+that"—justified true belief in propositions—to "knowledge of" construed as "having in mind." Since Locke views
+himself as an up-to-date scientist he would love to cash
+the "tablet" metaphor in physiological terms. Since he cannot, shuffling is his only option. When he shuffles back
+toward Aristotle, he begins to talk about a "reflective mind"
+which is very un-tablet-like indeed.
+However, the most important shuffle in Locke's treatment
+of knowledge is not between brain and voûs but, as I have
+said, between knowledge as something which, being the
+simple having of an idea, can take place without judgment,
+and knowledge as that which results from forming justified
+judgments. This is the shuffle which Kant detected as the
+basic error of empiricism-the error most vigorously expressed in his criticism of the confusion of "a succession of
+apprehensions with an apprehension of succession," but
+which bears equally upon the confusion between merely
+having two "juxtaposed" ideas-froghood and greenness—
+and "synthesizing" these into the judgment "Frogs are usually green." Just as Aristotle has no clear way to relate grasping
+universals to making judgments, no way to relate the receptivity of forms into the mind to the construction of propositions, neither has Locke. This is the principal defect of any
+attempt to reduce "knowledge that" to "knowledge of," to
+model knowing on seeing.
+This defect in Locke was thought by Green, and by most
+146
+
+writers in epistemology in the nineteenth century, to have
+been made good by Kant. Green sums up his own basic
+criticism of British empiricism in the following passage:
+Locke's empiricism becomes invincible as soon as it is
+admitted that qualified things are "found in nature"
+without any constitutive action of the mind. As the only
+effective way of dealing with Locke is to ask-After abstraction of all that he himself admitted to be the creation
+of thought, what remains to be merely found'—so Hume
+must be met in limine by the question whether, apart
+from such ideas of relation as according to his own showing are not simple impressions, so much as the singular
+proposition is possible. If not, then the singularity of such
+proposition does not consist in any singleness of presentation to sense.2®
+The phrase "constitutive action of the mind" is the tip-oft
+to Green's own view of the matter, which is summed up in
+the slogan of the British Idealists: Only Thought Relates.
+They viewed this doctrine as an abbreviation of Kant's
+slogan that "intuitions without concepts are blind." Kant's
+discovery was supposed to have been that there are no
+"qualified things"—no objects—prior to "the constitutive
+action of the mind." An object-something of which
+several predicates are true-is thus always a result of
+synthesis.
+With Kant, the attempt to formulate a "theory of knowledge" advanced half of the way toward a conception of
+knowledge as fundamentally "knowing that" rather than
+"knowing of"-halfway toward a conception of knowing
+which was not modeled on perception. Unfortunately, however, Kant's way of performing the shift still remained
+within the Cartesian frame of reference; it was still phrased
+as an answer to the question of how we could get from
+inner space to outer space. His paradoxical answer was that
+outer space was constructed out of the Vorstellungen which
+28 Ibid., pp. 185-186.
+147
+
+inhabited inner space. Nineteenth-century attempts to preserve the insight that knowledge is a relation to propositions
+rather than to objects while avoiding Kantian paradox also
+remained within the Cartesian frame, and thus were "idealisms." The only object of which they could conceive was
+one constituted by the synthesis of Lockean ideas, and thus
+they devoted themselves to identifying the ensemble of such
+objects with the thing-in-itself. So in order to understand
+the idea of "epistemology" as the twentieth century inherited it, we need to turn from Locke's confusion between
+explanation and justification to Kant's confusion between
+predication (saying something about an object) and synthesis (putting representations together in inner space).
+3. KANT'S CONFUSION OF PREDICATION WITH SYNTHESIS
+For a person to form a predicative judgment is for him
+to come to believe a sentence to be true. For a Kantian transcendental ego to come to believe a sentence to be true is for
+it to relate representations (Vorstellungen) to one another:
+two radically distinct sorts of representations, concepts on
+the one hand and intuitions on the other. Kant provided a
+framework for understanding the confusing seventeenthcentury intellectual scene when he said that "Leibniz intellectualized appearances, just as Locke ... sensualized all
+concepts of the understanding."2 He thereby created the
+standard version of "the history of modern philosophy"
+according to which pre-Kantian philosophy was a struggle
+between "rationalism," which wanted to reduce sensations
+to concepts, and "empiricism," which wanted the inverse
+reduction. Had Kant instead said that the rationalists
+wanted to find a way of replacing propositions about
+secondary qualities with propositions which somehow did
+the same job but were known with certainty, and that the
+empiricists opposed this project, the next two centuries of
+philosophical thought might have been very different. For
+27 K.d.r.V. A271, B387.
+148
+
+if the "problem of knowledge" had been stated in terms of
+the relations between propositions and the degree of certainty attaching to them, rather than in terms of putative
+components of propositions, we might not have inherited
+our present notion of "the history of philosophy. "According
+to standard neo-Kantian historiography, from the time of the
+Phaedo and Metaphysics Z through Abelard and Anselm,
+Locke and Leibniz, and right down to Quine and Strawson
+reflection which was distinctively philosophical has concerned the relation between universals and particulars.
+Without this unifying theme, we might not have been able
+to see a continuous problematic, discovered by the Greeks
+and worried at continuously down to our own day, and thus
+might never have had the notion of "philosophy" as something with a twenty-five-hundred-year history. Greek
+thought and seventeenth-century thought might have
+seemed as distinct both from each other and from our
+present concerns as, say, Hindu theology and Mayan numerology.
+For better or worse, however, Kant did not take this
+pragmatic turn. He talked about inner representations
+rather than sentences. He simultaneously gave us a history
+of our subject, fixed its problematic, and professionalized it
+(if only by making it impossible to be taken seriously as a
+"philosopher" without having mastered the first Critique).
+He did so by building into our conception of a "theory of
+knowledge" (and thus our conception of what distinguished
+philosophers from scientists) what C. I. Lewis called "one of
+the oldest and most universal philosophical insights," viz.:
+There are, in our cognitive experience, two elements; the
+immediate data, such as those of sense, which are presented or given to the mind, and a form, construction, or
+interpretation, which represents the activity of thought.28
+The "insight," however, is neither old nor universal. It is
+no older than the notion that we possess something called
+28 Lewis, Mind and the World-Order (New York, 1956), p. 38.
+149
+
+"cognitive experience." The term experience has come to be
+the epistemologists' name for their subject matter, a name
+for the ensemble of Cartesian cogitationes, Lockean ideas.
+In this sense, "experience" is a term of philosophical art
+(quite distinct from the everyday use, as in "experience on
+the job," in which it is equivalent to éurepía). Lewis's claim
+that when we look at this ensemble we find it falling into
+two kinds makes it sound as if the man in the street, untutored in philosophy, could simply be asked to turn his
+mental eye inward and notice the distinction. But a man
+who does not know that Locke used "experience" to include
+only "ideas of sensation and reflection" and to exclude judgments, and that Kant used it to cover "both the object and
+the method of knowledge, the combination, in accordance
+with the laws of thought, of all functions of knowledge,"2s
+may be baffled about what he is supposed to look at, much
+less what distinction he is to notice.
+Strawson repeats Lewis's claim when he says "the duality
+of general concepts ... and particular instances of general
+concepts encountered in experience" is a "fundamental duality, inescapable in any philosophical thinking about experience or empirical knowledge."30 This version is less
+misleading than Lewis's, simply because it includes the word
+philosophical. For the reason this duality is inescapable in
+philosophical thinking about experience is just that those
+who do not find it do not call themselves "philosophers."
+We can only explain what "philosophical thinking about
+experience" is by reference to the sort of thing which Kant
+dia. Psychologists can go on about stimuli and responses, but
+29 Heinrich Ratke, Systematisches Handlexikon zu Kants Kritik der
+Reinen Vernunft (Hamburg, 1929), p. 6z: "Erfahrung bezeichnet sowohl den Gegenstand als die Methode der Erkenntnis, den denkgesetzlichen Zusammenhang aller Funktionen der Erkenntnis." Kant's
+usage is, indeed, such that no definition less fuzzy and less richly ambiguous than Ratke's could do it justice. On the philosophic sense of
+"experience," see John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York,
+1958), p. 11.
+30 P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London, 1966), p. 20.
+150
+
+this is blosse Naturalismus, and does not count as "philosophical." Common sense can talk about experience in its
+banal way—pondering whether we have had enough experience with something to make a judgment about it, for
+example, but this too is not philosophical. Thought is only
+philosophical if, like Kant's, it looks for causes of, rather
+than merely reasons for, claims to empirical knowledge, and
+if the resulting causal account is compatible with anything
+which psychological inquiry might come up with.31 Philosophical thinking of the sort which finds this duality inescapable is supposed to do more than just tell us that normally we have knowledge when we have justified true belief,
+referring us to common sense and common practice for
+details about what counts as justification. It is supposed to
+explain how knowledge is possible, and to do that in some
+a priori way which both goes beyond common sense and yet
+avoids any need to mess about with neurons, or rats, or
+questionnaires.
+Given these somewhat exiguous requirements and no
+knowledge of the history of philosophy we might well be
+puzzled about just what was wanted and about where to
+begin. Such puzzlement can only be alleviated by getting the
+hang of terms like "Being versus Becoming," "sense versus
+intellect," "clear versus confused perceptions," "simple versus complex ideas," "ideas and impressions," "concepts and
+intuitions." We will thereby get into the epistemological
+language-game, and the professional form of life called
+31 It may seem shocking to call Kant's account "causal," but the no.
+tion of "transcendental constitution" is entirely parasitical on the
+Descartes-Locke notion of the mechanics of inner space, and Kant's
+self-deceptive use of "ground" rather than "cause" should not be permitted to obscure this point. If we eliminate from Kant what Strawson
+calls "the mythical subject of transcendental psychology" we can make
+no sense of the Copernican revolution. I have discussed Strawson's version of what remains of Kant once one forgets the Copernican revolution in "Strawson's Objectivity Argument," Review of Metaphysics 24
+(1970), 207-244.
+151
+
+"philosophy." When we begin our philosophical meditations we do not, as Lewis and Strawson suggest, inevitably
+stumble across the intuition concept distinction. Rather, we
+would not know what counted as "experience," much less
+as being philosophical about it, unless we had mastered that
+distinction. For, once again, the notion of a "theory of
+knowledge" will not make sense unless we have confused
+causation and justification in the manner of Locke, and
+even then it will seem fuzzy until we have isolated some
+entities in inner space whose causal relations seem puzzling.
+"Concepts" and "intuitions" are exactly the entities required. If Kant had gone straight from the insight that "the
+singular proposition" is not to be identified with "the
+singularity of a presentation to sense" (nor, for that matter,
+to intellect) to a view of knowledge as a relation between
+persons and propositions, he would not have needed the
+notion of "synthesis." He might have viewed a person as a
+black box emitting sentences, the justification for these
+emissions being found in his relation to his environment
+(including the emissions of his fellow black boxes). The
+question "How is knowledge possible?" would then have
+resembled the question "How are telephones possible?"
+meaning something like "How can one build something
+which does that?" Physiological psychology, rather than
+"epistemology," would then have seemed the only legitimate
+follow-up to the De Anima and the Essay Concerning
+Human Understanding.
+It is important, however, before leaving Kant behind, to
+ask how he contrived to make the concept-intuition distinction look both plausible and intriguingly problematic. To
+understand this, we must notice that the Kantian "synthesis" required for a judgment differs from the Humean "association of ideas" in being a relation which can hold
+only between ideas of two different sorts—general ideas and
+particular ideas. The notions of "synthesis" and the concept-intuition distinction are thus tailor-made for one
+another, both being invented to make sense of the para-
+152
+
+doxical but unquestioned assumption which runs through
+the first Critique-the assumption that manifoldness is
+"given" and that unity is made. That assumption is spelled
+out in the claim that inner space does contain something
+like what Hume found there, a collection of "singular presentations to sense," but that these "intuitions" cannot be
+"brought to consciousness" unless "synthesized" by a second
+set of representations (unnoticed by Hume)-the concepts—
+which enter into one-many relations with batches of intuitions. Unofficially, to be sure, the reason for this assumption
+is that it is required by the strategy of the Copernican revolution, to insure that objects will conform to our knowledge
+rather than be able to demand conformity from us.32 But officially, it is used as a premise in the "Transcendental De-
+duction" to argue that the "Copernican" strategy works.
+The "Deduction" is supposed to show that we can only be
+conscious of objects constituted by our own synthesizing
+activity. Officially, then, we are supposed just to see that
+of all representations, combination is the only one which
+cannot be given through objects. ... For where the understanding has not previously combined, it cannot dissolve,
+since only as having been combined by the understanding
+can anything that allows of analysis be given to the
+faculty of representation. 33
+But how, if we have not read Locke and Hume, do we
+know that the mind is presented with a diversity? Why
+should we think that sensibility "in its original receptivity" 34
+presents us with a manifold, a manifold which, however,
+"cannot be represented as a manifold"35 until the under-
+32 K.d.r.V., Bavii.
+33 Ibid., Bigo.
+34 Ibid., Aroo.
+35 Ibid., Agg. According to the Transcendental Aesthetic, of course,
+the manifold is spatio-temporal from the outset. But the Analytic contradicts this (cf., e.g., A102, B16on), and the argument of the Analogies
+would not go through unless the doctrine of the Aesthetic were aban.
+doned. Cf. Robert Paul Wolff, Rant's Theory of Mental Activity (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 15iff. on this point.
+153
+
+standing has used concepts to synthesize it? We cannot introspect and see that it does, because we are never conscious of
+unsynthesized intuitions, nor of concepts apart from their
+application to intuitions. The doctrine that we are not so
+conscious is precisely Kant's advance in the direction of
+taking knowledge to be of propositions rather than of
+objects—his step away from the attempts of Aristotle and
+Locke to model knowing on perceiving. But if it is not an
+evident pre-analytic fact that such a manifold exists, how
+can we use the claim that sensibility presents us with a
+manifold as a premise? How, in other words, do we know
+that a manifold which cannot be represented as a manifold
+is a manifold? More generally, if we are going to argue that
+we can only be conscious of synthesized intuitions, how do
+we get our information about intuitions prior to synthesis?
+How, for instance, do we know that there is more than one
+of them?86
+This last question can be answered by saying that if
+there were only one then synthesis would be unnecessary.
+But this just leads us around a rather small circle. What we
+want to know is whether concepts are synthesizers, and it is
+no help to be told that they couldn't be unless there were a
+lot of intuitions awaiting synthesis. At this point, I think,
+we must confess that "intuition" and "concept," in their
+Kantian senses, are susceptible only of contextual definitions; like "electron" and "proton," they have sense only
+as elements in a theory which hopes to explain something.
+But with that admission, of course, we snap the last links to
+Locke's and Descartes's appeals to that special certainty
+with which we are aware of "what is closest to our minds"
+and "easiest for us to know." The assumption that diversity
+36 Suppose a mystic tells us that intuition presents us with unitythe white radiance of eternity—whereas conceptual thinking (like a
+dome of many-colored glass) breaks this up into a multiplicity. How
+could we decide whether he or Kant was right about whether unity
+was correlated with receptivity or with spontaneity? How could it
+matter?
+154
+
+is found and unity made turns out to have its sole justification in the claim that only such a "Copernican" theory will
+explain our ability to have synthetic a priori knowledge.3?
+But if we view the whole Kantian story about synthesis as
+only postulated to explain the possibility of synthetic a
+priori knowledge, if we accept the claim that the quasipsychological goings-on described in the "Deduction" have
+no introspective ground, we shall no longer be tempted by
+the "Copernican" strategy. For the claim that knowledge of
+necessary truths about made ("constituted") objects is more
+intelligible than about found objects depends upon the
+Cartesian assumption that we have privileged access to the
+activity of making. But on the interpretation of Kant just
+given, there is no such access to our constituting activities.
+Any mystery which attaches to our knowledge of necessary
+truths will remain. For postulated theoretical entities in
+inner space are not, by being inner, any more useful than
+such entities in outer space for explaining how such knowledge can occur.
+4. KNOWLEDGE AS NEEDING "FOUNDATIONS"
+It may be objected to my treatment of Kant that there is,
+in fact, a pre-analytic distinction between intuitions and
+concepts, one as old as Plato. Sensory intuitions, one could
+argue, are identified first of all as the source of knowledge
+of contingent truths, and concepts as the source of knowledge of necessary truths. The conflict between rationalism
+and empiricism, in this view, is not, as I have been claiming,
+Kant's invidious way of describing his predecessors in terms
+37 To put the point another way, Kant's own transcendental ideal.
+ism cuts the ground out from under the "Transcendental Deduction"
+—for either the machinery (synthesis) and the raw material (concepts,
+intuitions) described in the "Deduction" are noumenal, or they are
+phenomenal. If phenomenal, then, contrary to the premises of the
+"Deduction," we can be aware of them. If noumenal, then nothing
+(including what the "Deduction" says) can be known of them.
+155
+
+of his own new distinction, but is as old as the discovery of
+the dramatic difference between mathematical truth and
+more humdrum truths. I have been speaking as if the familiar oppositions between sense and intellect, confused and
+clear ideas, etc., were all parts of a modern artifact called
+"theory of knowledge." But, even if one grants that the
+"philosophical" sense of "experience" is a modern artifact,
+surely the Greek distinction between sense and intellect was
+a genuine discovery, as much a discovery as that of the
+rigorous provability of geometrical truth? And surely Kant
+was asking a good question when he asked how necessary
+(e.g., mathematical) truth was possible?
+This objection gives me a chance to introduce a final
+point to round out my account of the origin and nature of
+the idea of a "department of thought concerned with the
+origin and nature of human knowledge." Plato, in my view,
+did not discover the distinction between two kinds of entities, either inner or outer. Rather, as I have remarked
+earlier, he was the first to articulate what George Pitcher
+has called the "Platonic Principle"'—that differences in
+certainty must correspond to differences in the objects
+known.38 This principle is a natural consequence of the
+attempt to model knowledge on perception and to treat
+'knowledge of" as grounding "knowledge that." If it is
+assumed that we need distinct faculties to "grasp" such
+different objects as bricks and numbers (as we have distinct
+sense-organs for colors and for smells) then the discovery of
+geometry will seem to be the discovery of a new faculty
+called voûs. This in turn will generate the problem of reason
+discussed in chapter one.
+It is so much a part of "thinking philosophically" to be
+impressed with the special character of mathematical truth
+that it is hard to shake off the grip of the Platonic Principle.
+If, however, we think of "rational certainty" as a matter of
+victory in argument rather than of relation to an object
+38 Cf. chapter two, note 15.
+156
+
+known, we shall look toward our interlocutors rather than
+to our faculties for the explanation of the phenomenon. If
+we think of our certainty about the Pythagorean Theorem
+as our confidence, based on experience with arguments on
+such matters, that nobody will find an objection to the
+premises from which we infer it, then we shall not seek to
+explain it by the relation of reason to triangularity. Our
+certainty will be a matter of conversation between persons,
+rather than a matter of interaction with nonhuman reality.
+So we shall not see a difference in kind between "necessary"
+and "contingent" truths. At most, we shall see differences
+in degree of ease in objecting to our beliefs. We shall, in
+short, be where the Sophists were before Plato brought his
+principle to bear and invented "philosophical thinking": we
+shall be looking for an airtight case rather than an unshakable foundation. We shall be in what Sellars calls "the
+logical space of reasons" rather than that of causal relations to objects.38
+The major point I wish to make about the necessarycontingent distinction is just that the notion of "foundations
+of knowledge"—truths which are certain because of their
+causes rather than because of the arguments given for them
+—is the fruit of the Greek (and specifically Platonic) analogy between perceiving and knowing. The essential feature
+of the analogy is that knowing a proposition to be true is to
+be identified with being caused to do something by an
+object. The object which the proposition is about imposes
+the proposition's truth. The idea of "necessary truth" is
+just the idea of a proposition which is believed because the
+"grip" of the object upon us is ineluctable. Such a truth is
+necessary in the sense in which it is sometimes necessary to
+believe that what is before our eyes looks red-there is a
+38 For a sympathetic account of the Sophists, and pre-Platonic
+thought generally, which accords with this view, see Laszlo Versényi,
+Socratic Humanism (New Haven, 1963). See also Heidegger's discussion
+of Protagoras in The Question Concerning Technology and Other
+Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York, 1977), pp. 143-147.
+157
+
+power, not ourselves, which compels us. The objects of
+mathematical truths will not let themselves be misjudged
+or misreported. Such paradigmatically necessary truths as
+the axioms of geometry are supposed to have no need of
+justification, of argument, of discussion—they are as undiscussable as the command of Zeus shaking the lightning, or of
+Helen beckoning to her bed. (Putatively rational dváyrn is,
+so to speak, just a sublimated form of brute ßía.)
+The notion of "concept" can, if one likes, be thought of as
+"the source of knowledge of necessary truths," but this does
+not mean that Lewis and Strawson are right in thinking
+that the concept-intuition distinction is pre-analytically
+given. It is merely the modern version of a set of optional
+metaphors—the ones chosen by Plato, the ones which have
+become definatory of "philosophical thinking." Plato's primary distinction was not between two kinds of entities in
+inner space, two sorts of inner representations. Although he
+toyed with "inner space" metaphors (as in the aviary image
+of the Theatetus and in his use of "in the soul" [êv Tô Yuxi]),
+and at times approximated Descartes's imagery of the Eye of
+the Mind inspecting various—more or less compellinginner pictures, his thought was essentially "realistic." The
+Platonic distinction to which mathematical truth gave rise
+was metaphysical rather than epistemological—a distinction between the worlds of Being and of Becoming. What
+corresponds to the metaphysical distinctions on the "divided
+line" of Republic vi are distinctions not between kinds of
+nonpropositional inner representations, but between grades
+of certainty attaching to propositions. Plato did not focus on
+the idea of nonpropositional inner entities, but rather on
+that of the various parts of the soul and of the body being
+compelled in their respective ways by their respective objects. Plato, like Descartes, based a model of man on the
+distinction between two sorts of truth, but these were two
+quite different models. More important, however, the idea
+that the existence of mathematical truth requires some such
+explanatory model is not something pre-analytic, given at
+158
+
+the beginning of philosophical reflection. It is a product of
+the choice of a certain set of metaphors for talking about
+knowledge, the perceptual metaphors which underlie both
+Platonic and modern discussions. 4o
+So much, then, for the objection with which I began this
+section. I want now to enlarge on the point that the idea of
+"foundations of knowledge" is a product of the choice of
+perceptual metaphors. To recapitulate, we can think of
+knowledge as a relation to propositions, and thus of justification as a relation between the propositions in question
+and other propositions from which the former may be
+inferred. Or we may think of both knowledge and justification as privileged relations to the objects those propositions
+are about. If we think in the first way, we will see no need
+to end the potentially infinite regress of propositionsbrought-forward-in-defense-of-other-propositions. It would
+be foolish to keep conversation on the subject going once
+everyone, or the majority, or the wise, are satisfied, but of
+course we can. If we think of knowledge in the second way,
+we will want to get behind reasons to causes, beyond argument to compulsion from the object known, to a situation in
+which argument would be not just silly but impossible, for
+anyone gripped by the object in the required way will be
+unable to doubt or to see an alternative. To reach that point
+is to reach the foundations of knowledge. For Plato, that
+point was reached by escaping from the senses and opening
+up the faculty of reason-the Eye of the Soul-to the World
+of Being. For Descartes, it was a matter of turning the Eye
+of the Mind from the confused inner representations to the
+clear and distinct ones. With Locke, it was a matter of
+reversing Descartes's directions and seeing "singular presentations to sense" as what should "grip" us—what we
+cannot and should not wish to escape from. Before Locke,
+it would not have occurred to anyone to look for foundations for knowledge in the realm of the senses. Aristotle, to
+40 It is perhaps obvious that my discussion of Platonic ocular meta.
+phors is indebted to both Dewey and Heidegger.
+159
+
+be sure, had remarked that we cannot be in error about how
+things appear to us, but the idea of basing knowledge on
+appearances would have struck both him and Plato as
+absurd. What we want to have as an object of knowledge is
+precisely what is not an appearance, and the idea of propositions about one sort of object (the appearances) being
+evidence for propositions about another sort of object (what
+is really there) would not have made sense to either of
+them.
+After Descartes, however, the appearance-reality distinction began to slip out of focus, and was replaced by the
+inner-outer distinction. The question "How can I escape
+from the realm of appearance?" was replaced by the question "How can I escape from behind the veil of ideas?" To
+this question, Locke had an answer: Make the same use of
+your certainty about how things appear to your senses as
+Plato made of the axioms of geometry—use them as premises to infer everything else (only inductively, rather than,
+as in Plato, deductively). This answer looked good only
+until Hume got to work on it, but it had a certain innocent
+charm. It satisfied the same need to be gripped, grasped,
+and compelled which Plato had felt, yet "simple ideas of
+sensation" seemed less pretentious and more up-to-date than
+Platonic Forms. By the time of Kant, therefore, it looked
+as if there were two alternative foundations for knowledge
+—one had to choose between the interiorized version of the
+Forms, Cartesian clear and distinct ideas, on the one hand,
+and Humean "impressions" on the other. In both cases,
+one was choosing objects to be compelled by. Kant, in rejecting both these putative objects as essentially incomplete
+and powerless to compel unless combined with one another
+in "synthesis," was the first to think of the foundations of
+knowledge as propositions rather than objects. Before Kant,
+an inquiry into "the nature and origin of knowledge" had
+been a search for privileged inner representations. With
+Kant, it became a search for the rules which the mind had
+set up for itself (the "Principles of the Pure Understand-
+160
+
+ing"). This is one of the reasons why Kant was thought to
+have led us from nature to freedom. Instead of seeing ourselves as quasi-Newtonian machines, hoping to be compelled
+by the right inner entities and thus to function according
+to nature's design for us, Kant let us see ourselves as deciding (noumenally, and hence unconsciously) what nature
+was to be allowed to be like.
+Kant did not, however, free us from Locke's confusion
+between justification and causal explanation, the basic confusion contained in the idea of a "theory of knowledge."
+For the notion that our freedom depends on an idealistic
+epistemology—that to see ourselves as "rising above mechanism" we have to go transcendental and claim to have "constituted" atoms and the void ourselves—is just Locke's
+mistake all over again. It is to assume that the logical space
+of giving reasons—of justifying our utterances and our other
+actions—needs to stand in some special relationship to the
+logical space of causal explanation so as to insure either an
+accord between the two (Locke) or the inability of the one
+to interfere with the other (Kant). Kant was right in thinking accord was senseless and interference impossible, but
+wrong in thinking that establishing the latter point required
+the notion of the "constitution" of nature by the knowing
+subject. Kant's advance in the direction of a propositional
+rather than a perceptual view of knowledge went only halfway because it was contained within the framework of
+causal metaphors-"constitution," "making," "shaping,"
+"synthesizing," and the like.
+The difference between the "mainstream" Anglo-Saxon
+tradition and the "mainstream" German tradition in twentieth-century philosophy is the expression of two opposed
+stances toward Kant. The tradition which goes back to
+Russell dismissed Kant's problem about synthetic a priori
+truths as a misunderstanding of the nature of mathematics,
+and thus viewed epistemology as essentially a matter of
+updating Locke. In the course of this updating, epistemology was separated off from psychology by being viewed as a
+161
+
+study of the evidential relations between basic and nonbasic
+propositions, and these relations were viewed as a matter of
+"logic" rather than of empirical fact. In the German tradition, on the other hand, the defense of freedom and spirituality through the notion of "constitution" was retained
+as the distinctive mission of the philosopher. Logical empiricism and, later, analytic philosophy were dismissed by most
+German (and many French) philosophers as not "transcendental," and therefore neither methodologically sound nor
+properly edifying. Even those with the gravest doubts about
+most Kantian doctrines never doubted that something like
+his "transcendental turn" was essential. On the Anglo-Saxon
+side, the so-called linguistic turn was thought to do the job
+of demarcating philosophy from science, while freeing one
+of any vestiges of, or temptation to, "idealism" (which was
+thought the besetting sin of philosophy on the Continent).
+On both sides of the Channel, however, most philosophers
+have remained Kantian. Even when they claim to have
+"gone beyond" epistemology, they have agreed that philos
+ophy is a discipline which takes as its study the "formal" or
+"structural" aspects of our beliefs, and that by examining
+these the philosopher serves the cultural function of keeping
+the other disciplines honest, limiting their claims to what
+can be properly "grounded." The great exceptions to this
+neo-Kantian consensus are, once again, Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger. In connection with the topic of this
+section-the notion of "foundations" of knowledge as based
+on an analogy with the compulsion to believe when staring
+at an object—it is Heidegger who is especially important.
+For Heidegger has tried to show how the epistemological
+notion of "objectivity" derives from, as he puts it, the
+Platonic "identification of púrs with iséa"—of the reality
+of a thing with its presence before us.* He is concerned
+to explore the way in which the West became obsessed with
+the notion of our primary relation to objects as analogous
+41 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph
+Manheim (New Haven, 1959), p. 185.
+162
+
+to visual perception, and thus to suggest that there could
+be other conceptions of our relations to things. The historical roots of the Aristotle-Locke analogy of knowledge
+to perception are beyond the scope of this book, but we
+can at least take from Heidegger the idea that the desire
+for an "epistemology" is simply the most recent product
+of the dialectical development of an originally chosen set
+of metaphors.42
+To describe this development as a linear sequence is of
+course simplistic, but perhaps it helps to think of the original dominating metaphor as being that of having our beliefs determined by being brought face-to-face with the object of the belief (the geometrical figure which proves the
+theorem, for example). The next stage is to think that to understand how to know better is to understand how to improve the activity of a quasi-visual faculty, the Mirror of
+Nature, and thus to think of knowledge as an assemblage
+of accurate representations. Then comes the idea that the
+way to have accurate representations is to find, within the
+Mirror, a special privileged class of representations so compelling that their accuracy cannot be doubted. These privileged foundations will be the foundations of knowledge,
+and the discipline which directs us toward them-the theory of knowledge—will be the foundation of culture. The
+theory of knowledge will be the search for that which compels the mind to belief as soon as it is unveiled. Philosophy.
+as-epistemology will be the search for the immutable structures within which knowledge, life, and culture must be
+contained-structures set by the privileged representations
+which it studies. The neo-Kantian consensus thus appears
+as the end-product of an original wish to substitute confrontation for conversation as the determinant of our belief.
+In part il I try to show how things look if conversation
+is thought sufficient and the search for confrontation abandoned, and thus if knowledge is not conceived of as rep-
+42 Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, ed. and trans. Joan
+Stambaugh (New York, 1973), p. 88.
+163
+
+resentations in the Mirror of Nature. In the next three
+chapters, however, I shall try first (in chapter four) to sketch
+the shape the neo-Kantian consensus took in twentieth-century philosophy, and the confusion into which one form of
+this consensus-"analytic philosophy" —has recently fallen.
+This will involve describing, and defending, Quine's and
+Sellars's attacks on the notion of privileged representation.
+In chapters five and six I take up two putative "successor
+subjects" to philosophy-as-epistemology—empirical psychology and philosophy of language, respectively-which remain within the neo-Kantian consensus by taking philosophy to be, paradigmatically, the study of representing.
+164
+
+CHAPTER IV
+Privileged Representations
+1. APODICTIC TRUTH, PRIVILEGED REPRESENTATIONS, AND
+ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
+At the end of the nineteenth century, philosophers were
+justifiably worried about the future of their discipline. On
+the one hand, the rise of empirical psychology had raised
+the question "What do we need to know about knowledge
+which psychology cannot tell us?" Ever since Descartes's
+attempt to make the world safe for clear and distinct ideas
+and Kant's to make it safe for synthetic a priori truths,
+ontology had been dominated by epistemology. So the
+"naturalization" of epistemology by psychology suggested
+that a simple and relaxed physicalism might be the only
+sort of ontological view needed. On the other hand, the
+tradition of German idealism had declined—in England
+and America—into what has been well described as "a
+continuation of Protestantism by other means." The idealists purported to save the "spiritual values" which physicalism seemed to neglect by invoking Berkeleian arguments to
+get rid of material substance and Hegelian arguments to
+get rid of the individual ego (while resolutely ignoring
+Hegel's historicism). But few took these high-minded efforts seriously. The earnest reductionism of Bain and Mill
+and the equally earnest romanticism of Royce drove
+aesthetical ironists like James and Bradley, as well as social
+1 This question has echoed through our own century, in ways described in the following chapter. Psychology was born out of philosophy in the confused hope that we might get back behind Kant and
+recapture Lockean innocence. Ever since, psychologists have vainly protested their neglect by neo-Kantian philosophers (of both the analytic
+and the phenomenological sorts).
+165
+
+reformers like the young Dewey, to proclaim the unreality
+of traditional epistemological problems and solutions.
+They were provoked to radical criticisms of "truth as correspondence" and "knowledge as accuracy of representations," thus threatening the entire Kantian notion of
+philosophy as metacriticism of the special disciplines.
+Simultaneously, philosophers as various as Nietzsche, Bergson, and Dilthey were undermining some of the same
+Kantian presuppositions. For a time, it seemed
+as if
+philosophy might turn away once and for all from
+epistemology, from the quest for certainty, structure, and
+rigor, and from the attempt to constitute itself a tribunal
+of reason.
+The spirit of playfulness which seemed about to enter
+philosophy around 1900 was, however, nipped in the bud.
+Just as mathematics had inspired Plato to invent "philosophical thinking," so serious-minded philosophers turned
+to mathematical logic for rescue from the exuberant satire
+of their critics. The paradigmatic figures in this attempt to
+recapture the mathematical spirit were Husserl and Russell. Husserl saw philosophy as trapped between "naturalism" and "historicism," neither of which offered the sort
+of "apodictic truths" which Kant had assured philosophers
+were their birthright.? Russell joined Husserl in denouncing the psychologism which had infected the philosophy of
+mathematics, and announced that logic was the essence of
+philosophy. Driven by the need to find something to be
+2 Cf. Edmund Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, ed. and trans. Quentin Lauer
+(New York, 1965), p. 120. In this essay (published in 1910), Husserl
+analyzed both naturalism and historicism as forms of skepticism and
+relativism. See, for example, pp. 76-79, 122. He began his criticism of
+naturalism by repeating the attack on psychological conceptions of
+logic made in his Logical Investigations. (Cf. Pp. Soff. on naturalism's
+self-refutation through its reduction of norms to fact.)
+3 Bertrand Russell ended the chapter called "Logic as the Essence of
+Philosophy" in his Our Knowledge of the External World (London,
+1914) with the following claims:
+The old logic put thought in fetters, while the new logic gives it
+166
+
+apodictic about, Russell discovered "logical form" and Husserl discovered "essences," the "purely formal" aspects of
+the world which remained when the nonformal had been
+"bracketed." The discovery of these privileged representations began once again a quest for seriousness, purity, and
+rigor,* a quest which lasted for some forty years. But, in
+the end, heretical followers of Husserl (Sartre and Heidegger) and heretical followers of Russell (Sellars and Quine)
+raised the same sorts of questions about the possibility of
+apodictic truth which Hegel had raised about Kant. Phenomenology gradually became transformed into what Husserl despairingly called "mere anthropology,"s and "anawings. It has, in my opinion, introduced the same kind of advance
+into philosophy as Galileo introduced into physics, making it possible at last to see what kinds of problems may be capable of solution,
+and what kinds must be abandoned as beyond human powers. And
+where a solution appears possible, the new logic provides a method
+which enables us to obtain results that do not merely embody personal idiosyncrasies, but must command the assent of all who are
+competent to form an opinion.
+For my present purposes, the standard charge (made, e.g., by Dummett
+and by Anscombe) that Russell confused the specifically semantical doctrines of Frege and Wittgenstein, which did spring from the new logic,
+with epistemological doctrines which did not, is irrelevant. The charge
+is fair enough, but without this very confusion the analytic movement
+either would not have got off the ground, or would have been quite a
+different thing. Only in the last two decades has a clear distinction between "linguistic philosophy" and "philosophy of language" begun to
+be made. See chapter six, section 1, for more on this distinction.
+4 See Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 61 (in the
+American edition [New York, 1924]), and Husserl, Phenomenology,
+PP. 110-111.
+5 See Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, zd ed.
+(The Hague, 1965), I, 275-283, and David Carr's "Translator's Introduction" to Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and
+Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston, 1970), pp. xxv-xxxviii. See
+also Ryle's reaction to Sein und Zeit, exemplifying the kinship between Anglo-Saxon projects influenced by Russell and Husserl's original project: "It is my personal opinion that qua First Philosophy
+Phenomenology is at present heading for bankruptcy and disaster and
+will end either in self-ruinous Subjectivism or in a windy Mysticism"
+167
+
+lytic" epistemology (i.e., "philosophy of science") became increasingly historicist and decreasingly "logical" (as in
+Hanson, Kuhn, Harré, and Hesse). So, seventy years after
+Husserl's "Philosophy as Rigorous Science"
+and Russell's
+"Logic as the Essence of Philosophy," we are back with the
+same putative dangers which faced the authors of these manifestoes: if philosophy becomes too naturalistic, hard-nosed
+positive disciplines will nudge it aside; if it becomes too
+historicist, then intellectual history, literary criticism, and
+similar soft spots in "the humanities" will swallow it up.®
+The full story of the splendors and the miseries of phenomenology and analytic philosophy is, obviously, far
+beyond the scope of this book. The story I want to tell in
+this chapter is merely how the notion of two sorts of representations-intuitions and concepts-fell into disrepute in
+the latter days of the analytic movement. I have been
+claiming that the Kantian picture of concepts and intuitions getting together to produce knowledge is needed to
+givesense to the idea of "theory of knowledge" as a specifically philosophical discipline, distinct from psychology. This is
+(Mind, 1929; cited by Spiegelberg, I, 347). Ryle's prescient point was
+that the coming of "existential phenomenology" meant the end of
+phenomenology as "rigorous science."
+6 I think that in England and America philosophy has already been
+displaced by literary criticism in its principal cultural function—as a
+source for youth's self-description of its own difference from the past.
+Cf. Harold Bloom, A Map of Misreading (New York, 1975), p. 39:
+The teacher of literature now in America, far more than the teacher
+withdrawn as agents from the Scene of Instruction, leaving the bewildered teacher of literature at the altar, terrifiedly wondering
+whether he is to be sacrifice or priest.
+This is roughly because of the Kantian and antihistoricist tenor of
+Anglo-Saxon philosophy. The cultural function of teachers of philosophy in countries where Hegel was not forgotten is quite different, and
+closer to the position of literary critics in America. See my "Professionalized Philosophy and Transcendentalist Culture," Georgia Review
+30 (1976), 757-769.
+168
+
+equivalent to saying that if we do not have the distinction between what is "given" and what is "added by the mind," or
+that between the "contingent" (because influenced by what
+is given) and the "necessary" (because entirely "within" the
+mind and under its control), then we will not know what
+would count as a "rational reconstruction" of our knowledge. We will not know what epistemology's goal or method
+could be. These two distinctions were attacked at intervals
+throughout the history of the analytic movement. Neurath
+had questioned Carnap's appeal to the given, for example,
+and doubts had often been expressed about Russell's notion of "knowledge by acquaintance" and Lewis's "expressive language." These doubts only came to a head,
+however, in the early 195os, with the appearance of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Austin's mockery
+of "the ontology of the sensible manifold," and Sellars's
+"Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind." The distinction between the necessary and the contingent-revitalized
+by Russell and the Vienna Circle as the distinction between "true by virtue of meaning" and "true by virtue of
+experience"—had usually gone unchallenged, and had
+formed the least common denominator of "ideal language"
+and "ordinary language" analysis. However, also in the
+early fifties, Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" challenged this distinction, and with it the standard notion
+(common to Kant, Husserl, and Russell) that philosophy
+stood to empirical science as the study of structure to the
+study of content. Given Quine's doubts (buttressed by
+similar doubts in Wittgenstein's Investigations) about how
+to tell when we are responding to the compulsion of
+"language" rather than that of "experience," it became difficult to explain in what sense philosophy had a separate
+"formal" field of inquiry, and thus how its results might
+have the desired apodictic character. For these two challenges were challenges to the very idea of a "theory of
+knowledge," and thus to philosophy itself, conceived of as a
+discipline which centers around such a theory.
+169
+
+In what follows, I shall confine myself to discussing two
+radical ways of criticizing the Kantian foundations of analytic philosophy—Sellars's behavioristic critique of "the
+whole framework of givenness" and Quine's behavioristic
+approach to the necessary-contingent distinction. I shall
+present both as forms of holism. As long as knowledge is
+conceived of as accurate representing-as the Mirror of
+Nature-Quine's and Sellars's holistic doctrines sound
+pointlessly paradoxical, because such accuracy requires a
+theory of privileged representations, ones which are automatically and intrinsically accurate. So the response to
+Sellars on givenness and Quine on analyticity is often that
+they have "gone too far"-that they have allowed holism to
+sweep them off their feet and away from common sense. In
+order to defend Sellars and Quine, I shall be arguing that
+their holism is a product of their commitment to the thesis
+that justification is not a matter of a special relation between ideas (or words) and objects, but of conversation, of
+social practice. Conversational justification, so to speak, is
+naturally holistic, whereas the notion of justification embedded in the epistemological tradition is reductive and
+atomistic. I shall try to show that Sellars and Quine invoke
+the same argument, one which bears equally against the
+given-versus-nongiven and the necessary-versus-contingent
+distinctions. The crucial premise of this argument is that
+we understand knowledge when we understand the social
+justification of belief, and thus have no need to view it
+as accuracy of representation.
+Once conversation replaces confrontation, the notion of
+the mind as Mirror of Nature can be discarded. Then the
+notion of philosophy as the discipline which looks for
+privileged representations among those constituting the
+Mirror becomes unintelligible. A thoroughgoing holism has
+no place for the notion of philosophy as "conceptual," as
+"apodictic," as picking out the "foundations" of the rest of
+knowledge, as explaining which representations are "purely
+given" or "purely conceptual," as presenting a "canonical
+170
+
+notation" rather than an empirical discovery, or as isolating
+"trans-framework heuristic categories." If we see knowledge
+as a matter of conversation and of social practice, rather
+than as an attempt to mirror nature, we will not be likely
+to envisage a metapractice which will be the critique of all
+possible forms of social practice. So holism produces, as
+Quine has argued in detail and Sellars has said in passing,
+a conception of philosophy which has nothing to do with
+the quest for certainty.
+Neither Quine nor Sellars, however, has developed a new
+conception of philosophy in any detail. Quine, after arguing that there is no line between science and philosophy,
+tends to assume that he has thereby shown that science can
+replace philosophy. But it is not clear what task he is asking
+science to perform. Nor is it clear why natural science,
+rather than the arts, or politics, or religion, should take over
+the area left vacant. Further, Quine's conception of science
+is still curiously instrumentalist. It is based on a distinction between "stimuli" and "posits" which seems to lend
+aid and comfort to the old intuition-concept distinction.
+Yet Quine transcends both distinctions by granting that
+stimulations of sense-organs are as much "posits" as anything else. It is as if Quine, having renounced the conceptual-empirical, analytic-synthetic, and language-fact distinctions, were still not quite able to renounce that between the given and the postulated. Conversely, Sellars,
+having triumphed over the latter distinction, cannot
+quite renounce the former cluster. Despite courteous
+acknowledgment of Quine's triumph over analyticity,
+Sellars's writing is still permeated with the notion of "giving the analysis" of various terms or sentences, and with a
+tacit use of the distinction between the necessary and the
+contingent, the structural and the empirical, the philosophical and the scientific. Each of the two men tends to
+make continual, unofficial, tacit, heuristic use of the distinction which the other has transcended. It is as if analytic
+philosophy could not be written without at least one of the
+171
+
+two great Kantian distinctions, and as if neither Quine
+nor Sellars were willing to cut the last links which bind
+them to Russell, Carnap, and "logic as the essence of philosophy."
+Analytic philosophy cannot, I suspect, be written without
+one or the other of these distinctions. If there are no intuitions into which to resolve concepts (in the manner of the
+Aufbau) nor any internal relations among concepts to make
+possible "grammatical discoveries" (in the manner of "Ox-
+ford philosophy"), then indeed it is hard to imagine what
+an "analysis" might be. Wisely, few analytic philosophers
+any longer try to explain what it is to offer an analysis.
+Although there was a great deal of metaphilosophical
+literature in the 1g3os and 1940s under the aegis of Russell
+and Carnap, and another spate of such literature in the
+1950s which took the Philosophical Investigations and The
+Concept of Mind as paradigms,? there is now little attempt
+to bring "analytic philosophy" to self-consciousness by explaining how to tell a successful from an unsuccessful
+analysis. The present lack of metaphilosophical reflection
+within the analytic movement is, I think, symptomatic of
+the sociological fact that analytic philosophy is now, in
+several countries, the entrenched school of thought. Thus
+in these countries anything done by philosophers who employ a certain style, or mention certain topics, counts (ex
+oficiis suis, so to speak) as continuing the work begun by
+Russell and Carnap. Once a radical movement takes over
+the establishment against which it revolted, there is less
+need for methodological self-consciousness, self-criticism,
+or a sense of location in dialectical space or historical time.
+I do not think that there any longer exists anything
+identifiable as "analytic philosophy" except in some such
+stylistic or sociological way. But this is not a disparaging
+remark, as if some legitimate expectation had been disap-
+"I attempted to summarize this literature, up through 1965, in the
+introduction to The Linguistic Turn, ed. Richard Rotty (Chicago,
+1967).
+172
+
+pointed. The analytic movement in philosophy (like any
+movement in any discipline) worked out the dialectical
+consequences of a set of assumptions, and now has little
+more to do. The sort of optimistic faith which Russell and
+Carnap shared with Kant-that philosophy, its essence and
+right method discovered at last, had finally been placed
+upon the secure path of a science—is not something to be
+mocked or deplored. Such optimism is possible only for
+men of high imagination and daring, the heroes of their
+times.
+2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM
+The simplest way to describe the common features of
+Quine's and Sellars's attacks on logical empiricism is to say
+that both raise behaviorist questions about the epistemic
+privilege which logical empiricism claims for certain assertions, qua reports of privileged representations. Quine asks
+how an anthropologist is to discriminate the sentences to
+which natives invariably and wholeheartedly assent into
+contingent empirical platitudes on the one hand and necessary conceptual truths on the other. Sellars asks how the
+authority of first-person reports of, for example, how things
+appear to us, the pains from which we suffer, and the
+thoughts that drift before our minds differs from the authority of expert reports on, for example, metal stress, the mating behavior of birds, or the colors of physical objects. We
+can lump both questions together and simply ask, "How do
+our peers know which of our assertions to take our word for
+and which to look for further confirmation of?" It would
+seem enough for the natives to know which sentences are
+unquestionably true, without knowing which are true "by
+virtue of language." It would seem enough for our peers
+to believe there to be no better way of finding out our inner
+states than from our reports, without their knowing what
+"lies behind" our making them. It would also seem enough
+for us to know that our peers have this acquiescent attitude.
+173
+
+That alone seems sufficient for that inner certainty about
+our inner states which the tradition has explained by "immediate presence to consciousness," "sense of evidence,"
+and other expressions of the assumption that reflections in
+the Mirror of Nature are intrinsically better known than
+nature itself. For Sellars, the certainty of "I have a pain"
+is a reflection of the fact that nobody cares to question it,
+not conversely. Just so, for Quine, the certainty of "All
+men are animals" and of "There have been some black dogs."
+Quine thinks that "meanings" drop out as wheels that are
+not part of the mechanism, & and Sellars thinks the same of
+"self-authenticating non-verbal episodes." More broadly, if
+assertions are justified by society rather than by the character of the inner representations they express, then there is
+no point in attempting to isolate privileged representations.
+Explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by
+the former, is the essence of what I shall call "epistemological behaviorism," an attitude common to Dewey and
+Wittgenstein. This sort of behaviorism can best be seen as
+a species of holism-but one which requires no idealist
+metaphysical underpinnings. It claims that if we understand the rules of a language-game, we understand all that
+there is to understand about why moves in that languagegame are made (all, that is, save for the extra understanding obtained from inquiries nobody would call epistemological—into, for example, the history of the language, the
+structure of the brain, the evolution of the species, and
+the political or cultural ambiance of the players). If we
+are behaviorist in this sense, then it will not occur to us to
+invoke either of the traditional Kantian distinctions. But
+8 For an interpretation of Quine as attacking the explanatory utility
+of the "philosophical notion of meaning," see Gilbert Harman, "Quine
+on Meaning and Existence, I," Review of Metaphysics 21 (1967), 124-
+151, esp. 125, 135-141.
+• Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality (London and New
+York, 1963), p. 167.
+174
+
+can we just go ahead and be behaviorist? Or, as Quine's
+and Sellars's critics suggest, doesn't behaviorism simply beg
+the question?io Is there any reason to think that fundamental epistemic notions should be explicated in behavioral terms?
+This last question comes down to: Can we treat the study
+of "the nature of human knowledge" just as the study of
+certain ways in which human beings interact, or does it
+require an ontological foundation (involving some specifically philosophical way of describing human beings)? Shall
+we take "S knows that p" (or "S knows noninferentially
+that p," or "S believes incorrigibly that p," or "S's knowledge that p is certain") as a remark about the status of S's
+reports among his peers, or shall we take it as a remark
+about the relation between subject and object, between
+nature and its mirror? The first alternative leads to a pragmatic view of truth and a therapeutic approach to ontology
+(in which philosophy can straighten out pointless quarrels
+between common sense and science, but not contribute any
+arguments of its own for the existence or inexistence of
+something). Thus for Quine, a necessary truth is just a statement such that nobody has given us any interesting alternatives which would lead us to question it. For Sellars, to
+say that a report of a passing thought is incorrigible is to
+say that nobody has yet suggested a good way of predicting
+and controlling human behavior which does not take sincere first-person contemporary reports of thoughts at facevalue. The second alternative leads to "ontological" explanations of the relations between minds and meanings,
+minds and immediate data of awareness, universals and
+particulars, thought and language, consciousness and
+brains, and so on. For philosophers like Chisholm and Berg-
+10 For this sort of criticism of Quine's behaviorism, see H. P. Grice
+and P. F. Strawson, "In Defense of a Dogma," Philosophical Review 65
+(1956), pp. 141-156. For such criticisms of Sellars, see Roderick Chisholm's criticisms of his claims about intentionality, in their correspondence printed in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2
+(1958), pp. 521ft.
+175
+
+mann, such explanations must be attempted if the realism of
+common sense is to be preserved. The aim of all such explanations is to make truth something more than what
+Dewey called "warranted assertability": more than what
+our peers will, ceteris paribus, let us get away with saying. Such explanations, when ontological, usually take the
+form of a redescription of the object of knowledge so as
+to "bridge the gap" between it and the knowing subject. To
+choose between these approaches is to choose between truth
+as "what it is good for us to believe" and truth as "contact
+with reality."
+Thus the question of whether we can be behaviorist in
+our attitude toward knowledge is not a matter of the
+"adequacy" of behaviorist "analyses" of knowledge-claims or
+of mental states. Epistemological behaviorism (which
+might be called simply "pragmatism," were this term not a
+bit overladen) has nothing to do with Watson or with Ryle.
+Rather, it is the claim that philosophy will have no more
+to offer than common sense (supplemented by biology, history, etc.) about knowledge and truth. The question is not
+whether necessary and sufficient behavioral conditions for
+"S knows that p" can be offered; no one any longer dreams
+they can. Nor is the question whether such conditions can
+be offered for "S sees that p," or "It looks to S as if p,"
+or "S is having the thought that p." To be behaviorist in
+the large sense in which Sellars and Quine are behaviorist
+is not to offer reductionist analyses, but to refuse to attempt a certain sort of explanation: the sort of explanation
+which not only interposes such a notion as "acquaintance
+with meanings" or "acquaintance with sensory appearances" between the impact of the environment on human
+beings and their reports about it, but uses such notions to
+explain the reliability of such reports.
+But, once again, how are we to decide whether such notions are needed? It is tempting to answer on the basis of an
+antecedent decision about the nature of human beings—a
+decision on whether we need such notions as "mind,"
+176
+
+"stream of consciousness," and the like to describe them.
+But this would be the wrong answer. We can take the
+Sellars-Quine attitude toward knowledge while cheerfully
+"countenancing" raw feels, a priori concepts, innate ideas,
+sense-data, propositions, and anything else which a causal
+explanation of human behavior might find it helpful to
+postulate.1 What we cannot do is to take knowledge of
+these "inner" or "abstract" entities as premises from which
+our knowledge of other entities is normally inferred, and
+without which the latter knowledge would be "ungrounded." The difference is between saying that to know a
+language is to be acquainted with the meanings of its terms,
+or that to see a table is to have a rectangular sense-impression, and explaining the authority of tokens of "All men
+are animals" or "That looks like a table" by virtue of the
+prior (internal, private, nonsocial) authority of a knowledge of meanings or of sense-impressions. Behaviorism in
+epistemology is a matter not of metaphysical parsimony,
+but of whether authority can attach to assertions by virtue
+of relations of "acquaintance" between persons and, for
+example, thoughts, impressions, universals, and propositions. The difference between the Quine-Sellars and the
+Chisholm-Bergmann outlooks on these matters is not the
+difference between lush and spare landscapes, but more like
+the difference between moral philosophers who think that
+rights and responsibilities are a matter of what society
+bestows and those who think that there is something inside a man which society "recognizes" when it makes its
+bestowal. The two schools of moral philosophy do not differ on the point that human beings have rights worth dying for. They differ rather about whether, once we have
+11 I defend this claim when I discuss empirical psychology in chapter
+five. Sellars and Quine themselves, unfortunately, do not see the matter
+in this carefree way. For criticism of Quine's flight from intentions, see
+section 4 below. This criticism can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to
+Sellars's insistence on the claim that "the scientific image" excludes intentions; but Sellars's point is more subtle, and is involved with his
+Tractarian notion of picturing, criticized below in chapter six, section 5.
+177
+
+understood when and why these rights have been granted
+or denied, in the way in which social and intellectual historians understand this, there is more to understand. They
+differ, in short, about whether there are "ontological
+foundations for human rights," just as the Sellars-Quine
+approach differs from the empiricist and rationalist traditions about whether, once we understand (as historians of
+knowledge do) when and why various beliefs have been
+adopted or discarded, there is something called "the relation of knowledge to reality" left over to be understood.
+This analogy with moral philosophy lets us focus the
+issue about behaviorism in epistemology yet again: the
+issue is not adequacy of explanation of fact, but rather
+whether a practice of justification can be given a "grounding" in fact. The question is not whether human knowledge in fact has "foundations," but whether it makes sense
+to suggest that it does—whether the idea of epistemic or
+moral authority having a "ground" in nature is a coherent
+one. For the pragmatist in morals, the claim that the customs of a given society are "grounded in human nature" is
+not one which he knows how to argue about. He is a
+pragmatist because he cannot see what it would be like for
+a custom to be so grounded. For the Quine-Sellars approach
+to epistemology, to say that truth and knowledge can only
+be judged by the standards of the inquirers of our own
+day is not to say that human knowledge is less noble or
+important, or more "cut off from the world," than we had
+thought. It is merely to say that nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what we already accept, and that
+there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our language
+so as to find some test other than coherence.
+To say that the True and the Right are matters of social
+practice may seem to condemn us to a relativism which, all
+by itself, is a reductio of a behaviorist approach to either
+knowledge or morals. I shall take up this charge in discussing historicism, in chapters seven and eight. Here I shall
+simply remark that only the image of a discipline—philos-
+178
+
+ophy—which will pick out a given set of scientific or moral
+views as more "rational" than the alternatives by appeal to
+something which forms a permanent neutral matrix for all
+inquiry and all history, makes it possible to think that such
+relativism must automatically rule out coherence theories
+of intellectual and practical justification. One reason why
+professional philosophers recoil from the claim that knowledge may not have foundations, or rights and duties an
+ontological ground, is that the kind of behaviorism which
+dispenses with foundations is in a fair way toward dispensing with philosophy. For the view that there is no permanent neutral matrix within which the dramas of inquiry
+and history are enacted has as a corollary that criticism of
+one's culture can only be piecemeal and partial—never "by
+reference to eternal standards." It threatens the neo-
+Kantian image of philosophy's relation to science and to
+culture. The urge to say that assertions and actions must
+not only cohere with other assertions and actions but "correspond" to something apart from what people are saying
+and doing has some claim to be called the philosophical
+urge. It is the urge which drove Plato to say that Socrates'
+words and deeds, failing as they did to cohere with current
+theory and practice, nonetheless corresponded to something which the Athenians could barely glimpse. The
+residual Platonism which Quine and Sellars are opposing
+is not the hypostatization of nonphysical entities, but the
+notion of "correspondence" with such entities as the touchstone by which to measure the worth of present practice.12
+12 Unfortunately, both men tend to substitute correspondence to
+physical entities, and specifically to the "basic entities" of physical science (elementary particles, or their successors). Sellars's Tand Jay
+Rosenberg's) attempt to salvage something from the Platonic notion
+of knowledge as accuracy of picturing is criticized below (chapter six,
+section 5). My own attitude is Strawson's (and Heidegger's): "The correspondence theory requires, not purification, but elimination." (P. F.
+Strawson, "Truth," reprinted in Truth, ed. George Pitcher [Englewood
+Cliffs, N.J., 1964], p. 32)-or, more mildly, it requires separation from
+epistemology and relegation to semantics. (See Robert Brandom,
+179
+
+I am claiming, in short, that the Quine-Sellars attack on
+the Kantian notion of two sorts of representations—intuitions "given" to one faculty, and concepts (or meanings)
+"given" to another-is not the attempt to substitute one
+sort of account of human knowledge for another, but an
+attempt to get away from the notion of "an account of
+human knowledge." It amounts to a protest against an
+archetypal philosophical problem: the problem of how to
+reduce norms, rules, and justifications to facts, generalizations, and explanations.1 For this reason, we will not find
+neutral metaphilosophical ground on which to argue the
+issues Quine and Sellars raise. For they are not offering an
+"account" to be tested for "adequacy" but pointing to the
+futility of offering an "account." To refuse, as both do, to
+justify assertions by appeal to behavioristically unverifiable
+episodes (in which the mind recognizes its own direct
+acquaintance with an instantiation of blueness or with the
+meaning of "blue") is just to say that justification must be
+holistic. If we are not to have a doctrine of "knowledge by
+acquaintance" which will give us a foundation, and if we
+do not simply deny that there is such a thing as justification, then we will claim with Sellars that "science is rational
+not because it has a foundation, but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy,
+"Truth and Assertability," Journal of Philosophy 73(1976], pp. 137-
+13 Cf. Sellars's claim that "the idea that epistemic facts can be analyzed without remainder-even 'in principle'—into nonepistemic facts,
+whether phenomenal or behavioural, public or private, with no matter
+how lavish a sprinkling of subjunctives and hypotheticals is, I believe,
+a radical mistake—a mistake of a piece with the so-called 'naturalistic
+fallacy' in ethics" (Science, Perception and Reality, p. 131). I would
+argue that the importance of Sellars's approach to epistemology is that
+he sees the true and interesting irreducibility in the area not as between one sort of particular (mental, intentional) and another (physical) but as between descriptions on the one hand and norms, practices,
+and values on the other. (See note 17 below.)
+180
+
+though not all at once."14 We will say with Quine that
+knowledge is not like an architectonic structure but like a
+field of force,15 and that there are no assertions which are
+immune from revision. We will be holistic not because we
+have a taste for wholes, any more than we are behaviorist
+because of a distaste for "ghostly entities," but simply because justification has always been behavioristic and holistic. Only the professional philosopher has dreamed that it
+might be something else, for only he is frightened by the
+epistemological skeptic. A holistic approach to knowledge
+is not a matter of antifoundationalist polemic, but a distrust of the whole epistemological enterprise. A behavioristic approach to episodes of "direct awareness" is not a
+matter of antimentalistic polemic, but a distrust of the
+Platonic quest for that special sort of certainty associated
+with visual perception. The image of the Mirror of Na-
+ture—a mirror more easily and certainly seen than that
+which it mirrors—suggests, and is suggested by, the image
+of philosophy as such a quest.
+If what I have been saying so far is sound, there is no way
+to argue for the views of Sellars and Quine except by replying to their critics. There is no neutral ground on which
+to stand and show that they have overcome, respectively,
+"the given" and "the analytic" in a fair fight. The best we can
+do is to disentangle the pure form of their criticisms of the
+tradition from various extraneous issues which their critics
+(and, to some extent, Quine and Sellars themselves) have
+introduced, and thereby perhaps to mitigate the paradoxical air of their doctrines. In the next section, I shall
+take up Sellars's attack on the Myth of the Given, and try
+to disentangle it from the "unfair to babies" implications
+of the claim that there is no such thing as pre-linguistic
+awareness. Next, I shall take up Quine's attack on the distinction between language and fact and try to disentangle
+14 Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, p. 170.
+15 W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Mass.,
+1953), p. 42.
+181
+
+it from Quine's unhappy reductionist claims about the
+"indeterminacy" of translation and of the Geisteswissenschaften. When Sellars's and Quine's doctrines are purified,
+they appear as complementary expressions of a single claim:
+that no "account of the nature of knowledge" can rely on a
+theory of representations which stand in privileged relations
+to reality. The work of these two philosophers enables us to
+unravel, at long last, Locke's confusion between explanation and justification, and to make clear why an "account
+of the nature of knowledge" can be, at most, a description of
+human behavior.
+3. PRE-LINGUISTIC AWARENESS
+In "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," Sellars
+formulates "psychological nominalism" as the view that
+all awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short
+all awareness of abstract entities-indeed, all awareness
+even of particulars—is a linguistic affair. According to it,
+not even the awareness of such sorts, resemblances, and
+facts as pertain to so-called immediate experience is presupposed by the process of acquiring the use of language.16
+The existence of raw feels—pains, whatever feelings babies
+have when looking at colored objects, etc.—is the obvious
+objection to this doctrine. To counter this objection, Sellars
+invokes the distinction between awareness-as-discriminativebehavior and awareness as what Sellars calls being 'in the
+logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to
+justify what one says" (p. 16g). Awareness in the first
+sense is manifested by rats and amoebas and computers; it
+is simply reliable signaling. Awareness in the second sense
+is manifested only by beings whose behavior we construe as
+the utterance of sentences with the intention of justifying
+the utterance of other sentences. In this latter sense awareness is justified true belief-knowledge-but in the former
+16 Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, p. 160.
+182
+
+sense it is ability to respond to stimuli. The bulk of "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" is an argument that
+such ability is a causal condition for knowledge but not a
+ground for knowledge. This view has as a corollary that
+knowledge of particulars or of concepts is not temporally
+prior to knowledge of propositions (but always an abstraction from the latter), and thus that empiricist accounts of
+language-learning and of the nonpropositional basis for
+propositional knowledge are inevitably misguided. The
+crucial premise of this argument is that there is no such
+thing as a justified belief which is nonpropositional, and no
+such thing as justification which is not a relation between
+propositions. So to speak of our acquaintance with redness
+or with an instantiation of redness as "grounding" (as opposed to being a causal condition of) our knowledge that
+"this is a red object" or that "redness is a color" is always a
+mistake.
+Children and photoelectric cells both discriminate red
+objects, but pre-linguistic children are thought to "know
+what red is" in some sense in which photoelectric cells do
+not. But how can the child know what pain is if all awareness of anything "is a linguistic affair?" Here Sellars needs
+another distinction. This time it is between "knowing what
+X is like" and "knowing what sort of thing an X is." The
+latter involves being able to link the concept of Xness up
+with other concepts in such a way as to be able to justify
+claims about X's. On Sellars's Wittgensteinian view, in
+which to have a concept is to use a word, these two abilities
+are the same ability. It follows that we cannot have one concept without having many, nor can we come "to have a concept of something because we have noticed that sort of
+thing"; for "to have the ability to notice a sort of thing is
+already to have the concept of that sort of thing" (p. 176).
+But to "notice a sort of thing" is to notice under a description, not just to respond discriminatively to it. What, then,
+is it to know what pain is like without knowing or noticing
+what sort of thing it is?
+183
+
+It is just to have pain. The snare to avoid here is the
+notion that there is some inner illumination which takes
+place only when the child's mind is lighted up by language, concepts, descriptions, and propositions, and does
+not take place when the child inarticulately wails and
+writhes. The child feels the same thing, and it feels just the
+same to him before and after language-learning. Before language, he is said to know the thing he feels just in case it
+is the sort of thing which in later life he will be able to
+make noninferential reports about. That latent ability is
+what sets him apart from the photoelectric cell, not his
+greater sensitivity. Thus he may respond directly to a lack
+of oxygen in the air, the overly rapid motion of molecules,
+kinky alpha-rhythms in his brain, and so on, but he is not
+said to "know what they are" unless and until he comes to
+grasp the relevant vocabulary. But suffocation, heat, ecstasy,
+pain, fire, redness, parental hostility, mother love, hunger,
+loudness, and the like, are "known" pre-linguistically, or so
+ordinary speech would have it. They are known just by
+being had or felt. They are known without being able to
+be placed in classes, or related in any other way to anything
+else.
+There is no reason for Sellars to object to the notion of
+"knowing what pain (or redness) is like," for this would
+only support the Myth of the Given, and contradict psychological nominalism, if there were some connection between knowing what pain feels like and knowing what sort
+of thing pain is. But the only connection is that the former
+is an insufficient and unnecessary causal condition for the
+latter. It is insufficient for the obvious reason that we can
+know what redness is like without knowing that it is different from blue, that it is a color, and so on. It is unnecessary because we can know all that, and a great deal more,
+about redness while having been blind from birth, and thus
+not knowing what redness is like. It is just false that we cannot talk and know about what we do not have raw feels of,
+and equally false that if we cannot talk about them we may
+184
+
+nevertheless have justified true beliefs about them. What is
+special about language is not that it "changes the quality of
+our experience" or "opens up new vistas of consciousness"
+or "synthesizes a previously unconscious manifold" or
+produces any other sort of "inner" change. All that its
+acquisition does is to let us enter a community whose members exchange justifications of assertions, and other actions,
+with one another.'
+So Sellars may be taken as saying to traditional empiricism: knowing what things are like is not a matter of
+being justified in asserting propositions. To this, the empiricist is likely to reply, as have Roderick Firth and others,
+that such a view confuses concepts with words.18 Sellars,
+17 Cf. ibid., p. 16g: "The essential point is that in characterizing an
+episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical
+description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical
+space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says."
+18 See Roderick Firth, "Coherence, Certainty, and Epistemic Priority," reprinted in Empirical Knowledge, ed. Roderick Chisholm and
+Robert Swartz (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1973). Firth attempts to resolve
+a problem created by the "coherence theory of concepts": viz., since
+"we cannot fully understand 'looks red' unless we possess the contrasting concept 'is red,' then it would seem that it is not logically
+possible to have the concept looks red' [as C. I. Lewis's doctrine of
+"sense meaning" would require] before we have the concept 'is red'"
+(p. 461). Firth says that
+the underlying paradox is easily dissolved if we do not confuse concepts with the words used to express them. It is a genetic fact, but
+a fact with philosophical implications, that when a child first begins
+to use the word "red" with any consistency he applies it to things
+that look red to him.... To call this a "primitive form" of the concept "looks red" is to acknowledge that in some sense the child cannot fully understand adult usage until he is able to distinguish
+things that merely look red from things that really are red; but we
+must not suppose that the child somehow loses his primitive concept
+when he acquires a more sophisticated one. (PP. 461-462)
+For a more detailed polemic against the Ryle-Wittgenstein-Sellars identification of having concepts with using words, see Brand Blanshard's
+Reason and Analysis (La Salle, III., 1962), chap. Ix. Something like
+Firth's notion of a "primitive concept" recurs in a criticism of Sellars
+185
+
+Wittgenstein, and others who "exaggerate" the importance
+of language are said to beg the question in favor of psychological nominalism by assuming that to have a concept
+is to have the use of a word. Sellars can rejoin with the following dilemma: either grant concepts to anything (e.g.,
+record-changers) which can respond discriminatively to
+classes of objects, or else explain why you draw the line
+between conceptual thought and its primitive predecessors
+in a different place from that between having acquired a
+language and being still in training. This dilemma highlights the fact that traditional notions of givenness have run
+together raw feels and ability to discriminate, using the lack
+of the first to eliminate machines and include babies, and
+then using the presence of the second to make what babies
+have resemble propositional knowledge. The argument between Sellars and his critics on this point boils down to:
+Shall we take conceptualization as a matter of classification
+or of justification? Sellars can say that he will give up the
+term concept to those who wish to endow record changers
+or their protoplasmic counterparts with concepts, as long
+as he can have some other term to indicate what we have
+when we can place classifications in relation to other
+classifications in the way language-users do when they argue
+about what class a given item should fall in. Once again,
+Sellars falls back on saying that justification is a matter of
+social practice, and that everything which is not a matter
+of social practice is no help in understanding the justification of human knowledge, no matter how helpful it may be
+in understanding its acquisition. The naturalistic and the
+genetic fallacies have, Sellars thinks, combined in traditional empiricism to produce the view that we would be in
+a better position to congratulate ourselves on accurately
+mirroring nature (or to lament our failure) if we could only
+bring to consciousness the stages of our childhood developby William S. Robinson, "The Legend of the Given," in Action,
+Knowledge and Reality, ed. H.-N. Castañeda (Indianapolis, 1975), pp.
+83-108.
+186
+
+ment. Confused by Descartes's conflation of thought and
+feeling, bemused by the virgin innocence of Locke's wax
+tablet, and frightened by the fact that if truth is in the
+whole then certainty is nowhere, empiricists have fastened
+on "what red feels like" as the key to our knowledge of the
+natural world. For Sellars, this is like fastening on what the
+baby feels like when its feeding is delayed as the key to the
+common moral consciousness.
+To sum up, Sellars's psychological nominalism is not a
+theory of how the mind works, nor of how knowledge is
+born in the infant breast, nor of the "nature of concepts,"
+nor of any other matter of fact. It is a remark about the difference between facts and rules, a remark to the effect that
+we can only come under epistemic rules when we have
+entered the community where the game governed by these
+rules is played. We may balk at the claim that knowledge,
+awareness, concepts, language, inference, justification, and
+the logical space of reasons all descend on the shoulders of
+the bright child somewhere around the age of four, without
+having existed in even the most primitive form hitherto.
+But we do not balk at the thought that a cluster of rights
+and responsibilities will descend on him on his eighteenth
+birthday, without having been present in even the most
+primitive form hitherto. The latter situation is, to be sure,
+more clear-cut than the former, since there is no mark of the
+former occasion save some adult's casual remark (eg., "the
+kid knows what he's talking about"). But in both cases what
+has happened is a shift in a person's relations with others,
+not a shift inside the person which now suits him to enter
+such new relationships. It is not as if we might be mistaken
+in thinking that a four-year-old has knowledge but that no
+one-year-old does, any more than we might be mistaken in
+taking the statute's word for the fact that eighteen-year-olds
+can marry freely whereas seventeen-year-olds cannot. It may
+be injudicious to take the prattle of certain four-yearolds seriously, just as it may have been injudicious to have
+set the age of legal responsibility so low, but no greater
+187
+
+understanding of how knowledge
+(or responsibility)
+"works" will decide such matters.
+Thus Sellars should not be expected to offer arguments
+for a "theory of the relation between language and
+thought," for thoughts are inner episodes which may or may
+not (depending on the needs of empirical psychology) be
+thought of as necessarily linked to language, to brain-states,
+or to various other things. As an epistemologist, Sellars is
+not offering a theory about inner episodes. Rather, he is
+noting that the traditional, nonbehaviorist notion of "epistemology" is the confusion of an account of such episodes
+with an account of the right to make certain assertions.
+This is to adopt the view that philosophy (and, specifically, "philosophy of mind") cannot, by supplying a loftier
+critical point of view, reinforce or diminish the confidence
+in our own assertions which the approval of our peers
+gives us. Sellars's psychological nominalism does not stem
+from behaviorism as a thesis about what the mind is or is
+not. It stems only from epistemological behaviorism in the
+sense defined above, a sense indistinguishable from epistemological holism. To be behaviorist in this sense is simply to
+"divide through" by any and all mental events and faculties and to view our practices of justifying assertions as not
+needing empirical or "ontological" ground.1
+Having reverted yet again to the community as source
+of epistemic authority, I shall end this section by reemphasizing that even the nonconceptual, nonlinguistic
+knowledge of what a raw feel is like is attributed to beings
+on the basis of their potential membership in this com-
+19 I shall be claiming in chapter eight that this attitude toward the
+relation between philosophy of mind and epistemology (or, more
+largely, between any scientific or metaphysical description of man on
+the one hand and any remark about the justification for his actions
+linguistic or otherwise on the other) is central to Wittgenstein's efforts
+in the Investigations. I think that, like Sellars's own application of the
+distinction between describing men and judging them, it is a natural
+corollary of the Tractatus's rigorous separation of fact-stating from all
+other (e.g., ethical) uses of language.
+188
+
+munity. Babies and the more attractive sorts of animal are
+credited with "having feelings" rather than (like photoelectric cells and animals which no one feels sentimental about
+-e.g., flounders and spiders) "merely responding to
+stimuli." This is to be explained on the basis of that sort
+of community feeling which unites us with anything
+humanoid. To be humanoid is to have a human face, and
+the most important part of that face is a mouth which
+we can imagine uttering sentences in synchrony with appropriate expressions of the face as a whole.2o To say, with
+common sense, that babies and bats know what pain and
+red are like, but not what the motion of molecules or the
+change of seasons is like, is just to say that we can fairly
+readily imagine them opening their mouths and remarking
+on the former, but not on the latter. To say that a gadget
+(consisting of a photoelectric cell hitched up to a tape
+recorder) which says "red!" when and only when we shine
+red light on it doesn't know what red is like is to say that
+we cannot readily imagine continuing a conversation with
+the gadget. To say that we just don't know whether
+androids who have been manufactured out of protoplasm
+(and are all ready to go except for the speech center, which
+is about to be installed) know what red is like is not to confess scientific or philosophical bafflement concerning the
+nature of subjectivity." It is merely to say that things with
+roughly human faces which look as if they might someday
+be conversational partners are usually credited with "feelings," but that if we know too much about how these things
+20 For a good explication of the force and ramifications of Wittgenstein's view that the human body is the best picture of the human soul,
+see Virgil Aldrich, "On What It Is Like to Be a Man," Inquiry 16
+(1973), 355-366. See also Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (London, 1959), chap. 1.
+21 See Hilary Putnam, "Robots: Machines or Artificially Created
+Life?" reprinted in Modern Materialism, ed. J. O'Connor (New York,
+1969), esp. p. 262: "... the question: Are robots conscious? calls for
+a decision, on our part, to treat robots as fellow members of our linguistic community, or not to so treat them."
+189
+
+have been put together we may be loath to think of them as
+even potential partners.22
+This view of the attribution of pre-linguistic awareness—
+as a courtesy extended potential or imagined fellow-speakers
+of our language—has as a corollary that moral prohibitions
+against hurting babies and the better looking sorts of
+animals are not "ontologically grounded" in their possession of feeling. It is, if anything, the other way around. The
+moral prohibitions are expressions of a sense of community
+based on the imagined possibility of conversation, and the
+attribution of feelings is little more than a reminder of
+these prohibitions. This can be seen by noticing that nobody except philosophers of mind cares whether the raw
+feel of pain or redness is different for koalas than for us, but
+that we all care quite a bit about a koala when we see it
+writhing about. This fact does not mean that our or the
+koala's pain "is nothing but its behavior"; it just means that
+writhing is more important to our ability to imagine the
+koala asking us for help than what is going on inside the
+koala. Pigs rate much higher than koalas on intelligence
+tests, but pigs don't writhe in quite the right humanoid
+way, and the pig's face is the wrong shape for the facial
+expressions which go with ordinary conversation. So we
+send pigs to slaughter with equanimity, but form societies
+for 'the protection of koalas. This is not "irrational," any
+more than it is irrational to extend or deny civil rights to
+the moronic (or fetuses, or aboriginal tribes, or Martians).
+Rationality, when viewed as the formation of syllogisms
+based on discovery of "the facts" and the application of
+22 This does not mean that we are right to be loath, nor that we
+are wrong. I merely want to call attention to the traditional fear that
+biologists or psychologists, in their attitude toward their fellow men,
+may "murder to dissect." We are tempted, when we are particularly
+good at predicting something's behavior on the basis of its internal
+structure, to be "objective" about it—that is, to treat it as an en-soi
+rather than a pour-soi and "one of us." Philosophers have, I think,
+nothing much to say about when this temptation is justified or unjustified. Novelists and poets, however, do.
+190
+
+such principles as "Pain should be minimized" or "In-
+telligent life is always more valuable than beautiful unintelligent beings," is a myth. Only the Platonic urge to say
+that every moral sentiment, and indeed every emotion of
+any sort, should be based on the recognition of an objective
+quality in the recipient makes us think that our treatment
+of koalas or whites or Martians is a "matter of moral principle." For the "facts" which must be discovered to apply
+the principle are, in the case of the koala's or the white's
+"feelings," not discoverable independently of sentiment,23
+The emotions we have toward borderline cases depend on
+the liveliness of our imagination, and conversely. Only the
+notion that in philosophy we have a discipline able to give
+good reasons for what we believe on instinct lets us think
+that "more careful philosophical analysis" will help us draw
+a line between coldness of heart and foolish sentimentality.
+This claim that animals' knowledge of what some things
+are like has little to do with justified true belief, but a lot
+to do with morals, follows naturally from the Sellarsian
+notion that the inside of people and quasi-people is to be
+explained by what goes on outside (and, in particular, by
+their place in our community) rather than conversely. Ever
+since Descartes made methodological solipsism the mark of
+rigorous and professional philosophical thinking, philos.
+ophers have wanted to find the "ground" of cognition,
+23 It is notorious that moral philosophers are of little help in deciding what is to count as a moral agent, as having dignity rather than
+value, as among the beings whose happiness is to be maximized, as
+one of those one must take one's chance on turning out to be while
+still behind the veil of ignorance, etc. Sellars discusses the topic briefly
+and inconclusively in terms of the question of whether all members of
+an epistemic community are members of an ethical communitywhether "the intersubjective intention to promote epistemic welfare
+implies the intersubjective intention to promote welfare sans phrase"
+(Science and Metaphysics [London and New York, 1968], p. 225). For
+the effect of holism on meta-ethics and on the Platonic urge just mentioned, see J. B. Schneewind, "Moral Knowledge and Moral Principles" in Knowledge and Necessity, ed. G. A. Vesey (London and New
+York, 1970).
+191
+
+morality, aesthetic taste, and anything else that matters
+within the individual. For how could there be anything in
+societies which individuals had not put there? Only since
+Hegel have philosophers begun toying with the notion that
+the individual apart from his society is just one more
+animal. The antidemocratic implications of this view, not
+to mention its historicist and relativist implications, have
+made it difficult for Hegelian modes of thought to have
+any impact on the hard core of analytic philosophy-epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind.
+But Sellars's "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind"—
+self-described as "incipient Meditations Hegeliènnes'24_
+succeeds in prying raw feels and justified true belief apart
+and depriving raw feels of their status as privileged representations. It thereby shows how behaviorism in epistemology can avoid the confusion between explanation and justification which made empiricist epistemology seem possible
+and necessary. In chapters seven and eight I shall try to
+show how the emphasis on the priority of the public to the
+private which results from repudiating empiricism paves
+the way for further Hegelian and Heideggerian projects of
+deconstruction.
+4. THE "'IDEA' IDEA"
+Having argued that Sellars's attack on the Myth of the
+Given is compatible with kindness to babies and animals
+and thus with the common moral consciousness, I now want
+to argue that Quine's attack on the "'idea' idea" and the
+distinction between language and fact is compatible with
+the intellectual respectability of the Geisteswissenschaften.
+Quine's doctrines of the "indeterminacy of translation" and
+the "inscrutability of reference" have led him to claim
+that there is no "matter of fact" involved in attributions of
+meaning to utterances, beliefs to people, and aspirations to
+cultures. I think that here again some distinctions will take
+24 Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, p. 148.
+192
+
+care of putative counter-intuitive consequences of epistemological behaviorism, letting us see it as clearing the ground
+for morality and high culture rather than depriving them
+of "objective truth."
+What Quine calls the "'idea' idea" is the view that language is the expression of something "inner" which must
+be discovered before we can tell what an utterance means,
+or interpret the linguistic behavior of utterers (e.g., attribute beliefs, desires, and cultures to them). To abandon
+this idea is at once to abandon the logical-empiricist notion
+of "truth in virtue of meaning" and the sometime Oxonian
+notion of "conceptual truth," since there are no meanings
+or concepts from which truths might be read off. This attitude toward the concept of "concept" makes it possible to
+dismiss Kant's distinction between necessary truths (which
+can be determined by looking at concepts alone [analytic
+truth] or pure concepts and pure forms of intuition alone
+[synthetic a priori truth]) and contingent truths (which require reference to empirical intuitions). But Quine regards
+concepts and meanings as merely one species of intentions, and he wishes to obliterate all intentions. Thus, admitting that "means," "believes," and "desires," for example, have no behavioristic equivalents (as Brentano and
+Chisholm, in an effort to preserve some kernel of truth in
+traditional mind-body dualism, had also attempted to
+show), Quine concludes that this shows that the notions of
+"belief" and "desire" are (for "scientific" purposes) as
+dispensable as those of "concept" and "intuition":
+One may accept the Brentano thesis either as showing the
+indispensability of intentional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of intention, or as
+showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the
+emptiness of a science of intention. My attitude, unlike
+Brentano's, is the second. To accept intentional usage
+at face value is, we saw, to postulate translation relations as somehow objectively valid though indeterminate
+193
+
+in principle relative to the totality of speech dispositions. Such postulation promises little gain in scientific
+insight if there is no better ground for it than that the
+supposed translation relations are presupposed by the
+vernacular of semantics and intention.25
+Quine thinks this anti-intentionalism of a piece with his
+polemic against analyticity. But it is not. The author of
+"Two Dogmas of Empiricism" should have said that concepts and meanings are harmless if posited to give explanations of our behavior, and become harmful only when
+treated as the source of a special kind of truth and of a
+special sort of authority for certain assertions. In particular,
+we would expect him to say that the reasons normally given
+for translating languages one way rather than another (or
+for ascribing one set of beliefs and desires rather than an
+odd alternative which would predict the same linguistic
+behavior) are justified simply by their internal coherence,
+and that such practices as translation and ascription of
+intentional states are justified by their social utility. Quine
+grants the utility, but he thinks it philosophically important to insist that the sort of truth proffered in such
+remarks as "'Hund' is German for 'dog,'" and "Robinson
+believes in God" is not the sort of truth which expresses
+"matter of fact."2 He thus offers us a distinction between
+truth by convenience and truth by correspondence, so to
+speak, rather than the old positivist distinction between
+25 W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 221.
+26 See Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine,
+ed. Donald Davidson and Jaakko Hintikka (Dordrecht, 196g), p. 303,
+where Quine says:
+Consider ... the totality of truths of nature, known and unknown,
+observable and unobservable, past and future. The point about indeterminacy of translation is that it withstands even all this truth,
+the whole truth about nature. This is what I mean by saying that,
+where indeterminacy of translation applies, there is no real question of right choice; there is no fact of the matter even to within
+the acknowledged under-determination of a theory of nature.
+194
+
+truth by convention and truth confirmed by sensory experience. Truths about meanings and beliefs and propositions are, somehow, not really truths in the full sense of the
+term —just as the positivists used to say that necessary truths
+were not really "about the world."
+The holism and pragmatism of "Two Dogmas" would
+seem to make this distinction between two sorts of truth
+as difficult to maintain as the older distinctions which
+Quine is concerned to attack. Many critics of Quine have
+noted this point, and have diagnosed his insistence on this
+distinction as a hangover of traditional empiricism." I
+agree with most of these criticisms, and shall not attempt to
+summarize or synthesize them (beyond noting that such
+critics unite in remarking that any sort of "indeterminacy"
+which we can find in translation will show up, equally
+harmlessly, in the Naturwissenschaften). But by examining
+the notion of "inscrutability of reference" we may get some
+understanding of the "empiricist" intuitions which make
+Quine persist in talk of "correspondence," and which hold
+him back from the Hegelian implications of his own
+behaviorism and holism.
+Quine summarizes the argument of his "Ontological
+Relativity" by saying:
+27 The best-known criticism of this sort is Noam Chomsky's "Quine's
+Empirical Assumptions" in Words and Objections. The point is most
+convincingly made, however, by Hilary Putnam in "The Refutation
+of Conventionalism," Nous 8 (1974), 38: "If the adoption of one system
+of analytical hypotheses rather than another permits a great simplification of such sciences as neurophysiology, psychology, anthropology,
+etc., then why should we not say that what we mean by "translation'
+is translation according to the manuals that have this property?" Putnam rightly diagnoses Quine's doctrine of the special indeterminacy
+of translation as following from a kind of essentialism. It is, roughly,
+one in which we know in advance that what cannot be put in the
+vocabulary of the physics of the day is so inessential as to be merely
+"in the eye of the beholder," a matter of subjective convenience. See
+also Christopher Boorse, "The Origins of the Indeterminacy Thesis,"
+Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975), 369-387, and Richard Rorty, 'Inde.
+terminacy of Translation and of Truth," Synthese 23 (1972), 443-462.
+195
+
+What makes sense is to say not what the objects of a
+theory are, absolutely speaking, but how one theory of
+objects is interpretable or reinterpretable in another. ...
+What our present reflections are leading us to appreciate
+is that the riddle about seeing things upside down, or
+in complementary colors, should be taken seriously and
+its moral applied widely. The relativistic thesis to which
+we have come is this, to repeat: it makes no sense to say
+what the objects of a theory are, beyond saying how to
+interpret or reinterpret that theory in another.... Talk
+of subordinate theories and their ontologies is meaningful but only relative to the background theory with its
+own primitively adopted and ultimately inscrutable
+ontology. 28
+One would think this relativistic thesis the natural and
+happy result of the approach to knowledge and science
+which Quine shares with Sellars, were it not for the disturbing phrase "primitively adopted and ultimately inscrutable
+ontology." On a full-blooded holistic view, the question
+"Are we really referring to rabbits or rabbit-stages? formulae or Gödel numbers?" would be regarded neither as
+senseless, nor as sensible only when relativized to a background language, 2 but as like "Are we really talking about
+nations or about groups of individual persons?" or "Are we
+really talking about witches or about hallucinatory psychotics?" The latter questions have a sense if we give them
+a sense-that is, if something further depends upon the
+answer. It is easy to imagine situations in which sense
+would be given to them; it is harder, but not impossible,
+for the rabbit-versus-rabbit-stage case. But Quine is not
+28 W.V.O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New
+York, 196g), pp. 50-51.
+29 See ibid., pp. 47ff. Hartry Field has shown that Quine's notion of
+"relativization to a background language" and "taking reference at
+face value" are incompatible with his general line of argument. See his
+"Quine and the Correspondence Theory," Philosophical Review 83
+(1974), 207ff. But this difficulty is not relevant to my present purposes.
+196
+
+interested in the question of that way of giving sense. His
+claims about indeterminacy and inscrutability are not supposed to tie in with the needs of science or practice. Admitting that linguists never dream of taking advantage of
+indeterminacy to translate the short expressions normally
+uttered when rabbits break cover as "another rabbit-stagel"
+Quine says:
+The implicit maxim guiding his [the linguist's] choice of
+"rabbit"
+... is that an enduring and relatively homogenous object, moving as a whole against a contrasting
+background, is a likely reference for a short expression.
+... The maxim is his own imposition, toward settling
+what is objectively indeterminate. It is a very sensible
+imposition, and I would recommend no other. But I am
+making a philosophical point. 3o
+A "philosophical point" in this sense is, at a minimum,
+one that has no relevance to deciding how the world is.
+Quine teeters between the older positivist view that such
+points are disreputably "metaphysical" and the more
+Oxonian philosophy-as-therapy view that such peculiarly
+philosophical points serve as antidotes to a mpürov feudos such
+as the ""idea' idea." We might, however, take this particular philosophical point as offering an antidote against, if
+anything, the notions of "ontology" and of "reference."
+That is, we might fall back on the more old-fashioned view
+that just as the behaviorist approach to "truth by virtue
+of meaning" in "Two Dogmas" left us with no notion of
+"sameness of meaning" save (as Harman says) the commonsensical and philosophically uninteresting one in which
+"The president went to Vietnam" and "Johnson went to
+Vietnam" mean the same thing, so the behaviorist approach
+to "ontology" of "Ontological Relativity" leaves us with no
+notion of "sameness of reference" save the common-sensical
+and philosophically uninteresting one in which talk about
+rabbit-stages and talk about rabbits are talk about the same
+30 Quine, Ontological Relativity, p. 34.
+197
+
+things (in different ways).31 The philosophical notion of
+"reference" seems to Quine to contrast with that of meaning because:
+Reference, extension, has been the firm thing; meaning,
+intension, the infirm. The indeterminacy of translation
+now confronting us, however, cuts across extension and
+intension alike. The terms "rabbit," "undetached rabbit
+part," and "rabbit stage" differ not only in meaning; they
+are true of different things. Reference itself proves
+behaviorally inscrutable.32
+But this relative firmness was itself merely the product of
+Quine's claim that intensions, for which there were no
+criteria of identity, were flabbier entities than extensions,
+for which there were. The problem about identity-conditions for intensions boils down, Quine thinks, to that of
+how "two eternal sentences should be related in order that,
+where 'p' and 'q' stand for them, we be entitled to say that
+[P] is the same proposition as [9] rather than another."33
+But to think that this question can be answered is to think,
+Quine says, that there is some synonymy relation which
+makes a sentence of one language the right translation of
+a sentence of another, 34
+We have now, however, come full circle. The firmness of
+reference is what it is because of a putative contrast with
+an infirmness about meaning. But this infirmness is only
+present if translation is indeterminate in some way in which
+physics is not. So if we accept the standard criticisms of
+Quine's "double" indeterminacy of translation (an indeterminacy which differs from that of physical theory in
+31 The example of common-sensical sameness of meaning comes from
+Harman, "Quine," p. 142. For more on the distinction between the
+common-sensical and the philosophical senses of "talking about" or
+referring, see my "Realism and Reference," Monist 59 (1976), 321-340,
+and chapter six, section 4.
+32 Quine, Ontological Relativity, p. 35.
+33 Quine, Word and Object, p. 200.
+34 Ibid., p. 206.
+198
+
+that there is no "matter of fact" in the former case), then
+we have no reason for being startled at reference's faring no
+better, and no reason for thinking that the behavioral inscrutability of reference leads to any conclusions save "so
+much the worse for reference" or "rabbit-stages and rabbits
+are just the same things." Since "reference" here means a
+specifically philosophical notion, whose inscrutability is a
+specifically philosophical point which depends upon holding rabbits and rabbit-stages further apart than any scientific or practical need would hold them, we might feel
+entitled to adopt the same insouciant attitude toward this
+inscrutability which Quine adopts toward the specifically
+philosophical notion of synonymy and toward Brentano's
+thesis of the irreducibility of the intentional.
+We should indeed adopt this attitude,35 but not before
+looking more closely at Quine's vacillation on the subject
+of ontology. To say that the philosophical notion of reference is one we can well do without is, as Quine would agree,
+to say that ontology is also. Since it is because of a concern
+for ontology that Quine takes reference seriously, it will
+help to see how hard it is for him to reconcile this concern
+with his holistic claim that there is no "first philosophy"
+higher than and prior to ordinary scientific inquiry,se This
+latter view would seem to incline him toward Sellars's view
+that "science is the measure of all things, of what is that it
+is, and of what is not that it is not."3 Nevertheless, Quine
+claims that the practical indispensability of intentional
+idioms should not blind us to the fact that:
+If we are limning the true and ultimate structure of
+reality, the canonical scheme for us is the austere scheme
+that knows no quotation but direct quotation and no
+35 I argue again for doing so in chapter seven.
+36 See "On Carnap's Views on Ontology" in Quine, Ways of Paradox
+(New York, 1968) and "Epistemology Naturalized" in Ontological Relativity.
+37 The phrase is from Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, p. 173.
+199
+
+propositional attitudes but only the physical constitutions
+and behavior of organisms,38
+This project, he claims, is continuous with that of science
+because:
+Each elimination of obscure constructions or notions that
+we manage to achieve, by paraphrase into more lucid
+elements, is a clarification of the conceptual scheme of
+science. The same motives that impel scientists to seek
+ever simpler and clearer theories adequate to the subject
+matter of their special sciences are motives for simplification and clarification of the broader framework shared by
+all the sciences.... The quest of a simplest, clearest overall
+pattern of canonical notation is not to be distinguished
+from a quest of ultimate categories, a limning of the most
+general traits of reality. Nor let it be retorted that such
+constructions are conventional affairs not dictated by
+reality; for may not the same be said of a physical theory?
+True, such is the nature of reality that one physical
+theory will get us around better than another; but
+similarly for canonical notations. (p. 161)
+The catch, of course, comes in knowing what "obscurity"
+and "clarity" are. The Geisteswissenschaften, Quine thinks,
+employ notions which are so unclear that we must simply
+rub them out when limning the structure of reality. All is
+clear, however, in the physical sciences save when these
+invoke numbers, functions, properties, etc., in which case
+we interpret these as sets, an interpretation which the
+physical scientist can regard with sublime indifference. But
+the unclarity of "belief," "meaning," "translates as ...," etc.
+are irredeemable; there is nothing on hand in set theory
+to replace them with; they can survive only on grounds of
+practical convenience. 39
+38 Quine, Word and Object, p. 221.
+39 Harman ("Quine," p. 126) puts a more charitable interpretation
+upon Quine's views on these matters. According to Harman,
+It is not that he thinks intensional objects, propositions or meanings,
+are a queer kind of entity (as one might believe that electrons must
+200
+
+Why, however, do "believes in ..." and "translates as ..."
+owe more to the necessities of practice than "is the same
+electron as ..." and "is the same set as ..." Why do the
+Naturwissenschaften limn reality while the Geisteswissenschaften merely enable us to cope with it? What is it that
+sets them apart, given that we no longer think of any sort
+of statement having a privileged epistemological status, but
+of all statements as working together for the good of the
+race in that process of gradual holistic adjustment made
+famous by "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"? Why should not
+the unit of empirical inquiry be the whole of culture (including both the Natur- and the Geisteswissenschaften)
+rather than just the whole of physical science?
+Trying to answer these rhetorical questions leads us to a
+genuine contradiction in Quine's view. It comes out most
+clearly in a passage in which he is trying to argue that the
+practical dictates of translation have no epistemological implications:
+"Save logical truth" is conventional in character because
+of the indeterminacy of translation.... The very want of
+determinacy puts a premium on adhering to this strong
+and simple rule as a partial determinant. ... "Save logical
+truth" is both a convention and a wise one. And we see
+also that it gives logical truth no epistemological status
+distinct from that of any obvious truths of a so-called factual kind. *o
+be a queer kind of entity). His complaint is not that intensional
+objects, as something abstract, offend his sensibilities in the way that
+they no doubt offend the sensibilities of Nelson Goodman. ...
+Quine's argument... is that the various views in that cluster [which
+invoke such entities]
+are theories that don't explain what they purport to explain. So his attitude toward intensional objects is similar
+to his attitude toward phlogiston or the ether (or witches).
+Quine seems blandly to endorse Harman's interpretation at Words and
+Objections, p. 296. But I do not think that this interpretation can be
+reconciled with many of the arguments in Word and Object and elsewhere, although I agree that it represents the attitude which Quine
+should have adopted.
+40 Words and Objections, p. 318.
+201
+
+But if conventionality depends upon a special indeterminacy
+of translation, then we may not say, as Quine does in a
+passage quoted previously, that physical theory is a "conventional affair not dictated by reality." If the permanence
+of logical truth is merely a practical rule, rather than an
+insight into the nature of reality, then if physical theory
+is such an insight, it cannot also be a practical rule.
+To sum up his vacillations, we may note that Quine
+wants to assert all the following:
+1. There is such a thing as ontology, governed by
+"scruples about what objects one may assume" and
+based on a distinction between "irresponsible reification and its opposite."41
+2. There is no special epistemological status which any
+sentence has apart from its role in the maintaining
+that "field of force" which is human knowledge and
+whose aim is coping with sensory irradiations.
+3. So there is no such thing as direct acquaintance with
+sense-data or meanings which would give inviolability to reports by virtue of their correspondence to
+reality, apart from their role in the general scheme of
+belief.
+4. So epistemology and ontology never meet, since our
+scruples about what objects to assume are not dictated
+by our acquaintance with either universals or particulars.
+5. But there is nevertheless a distinction to be made between those parts of the web of belief which express
+matters of fact and those which do not, and ontology
+insures that we can detect this difference.
+If he is to assert (5) as well as (1)-(4), Quine must give a
+sense to the distinction between "matter of fact" and "convention" which has no links with the usual instrumentalistphenomenalist distinction —that between what we are really
+acquainted with and what we "posit" to cope with stimuli.
+41 Quine, Word and Object, pp. 119-120.
+202
+
+The only way he can do so, as far as 1 can see, is simply to
+pick out the elementary particles of contemporary physics
+as paradigmatically matter-of-factual and explain that the
+sense in which there is no matter of fact about meanings
+or beliefs is that different things can be said about what a
+sentence means or a man believes without any implications
+for the movements of these particles. This tactic makes his
+preference for physics over psychology, and thus his concern
+about "irresponsible reification," purely aesthetic. Further,
+it will not work. For alternative biochemical (e.g.) as well
+as alternative psychological theories will be compatible
+with all and only the same movements of the same particles.
+Unless and until there is a genuine deduction of all true
+nomological statements from the laws of physics (which
+no one seriously expects), there will be no complaint to be
+made about intentions which cannot be made about
+mitochondria.tz
+42 Dagfinn Føllesdal ("Meaning and Experience" in Mind and Language, ed. S. Guttenplan (Oxford, 1975]) suggests a way of construing
+Quine's indeterminacy thesis designed to show that "Quine's position
+is more interesting if his ontological bias towards physicalism is regarded as a consequence of a more fundamental epistemological bias
+towards empiricism." (p. 33) The suggestion is that
+•.. all the truths there are, are included in the theory of nature.
+As we noted earlier, in our theory of nature we try to account for
+all our experiences. And the only entities we are justified in assuming
+are those that are appealed to in the simplest theory that accounts
+for all this evidence. These entities and their properties and interrelations are all there is to the world, and all there is to be right or
+wrong about. All truths about these are included in our theory of
+nature. In translation we are not describing a further realm of reality, we are just correlating two comprehensive theories concerning
+all there is. (p. 32)
+However, I do not see how we can tell when we have stopped describing and started correlating descriptions. Or, to put it in another way,
+I do not see how we can mark off "nature" from something else save
+by finding some sense of "account for all our experiences" in which
+something less than the whole of culture can account for all our experiences.
+An alternative way of tracing the indeterminacy thesis to empiri-
+203
+
+Quine is led into these difficulties, I think, by an attempt
+to preserve the view which he, like Sellars, inherits from
+Carnap and ultimately from Wittgenstein's Tractatus: the
+view that the world can be "completely described" in an
+extensional language. It is intensionality rather than intentionality which is the real bugbear, for only the non-truthfunctional character of intentional discourse makes its presumed subject more disreputable than, say, irreducibly biochemical talk of mitochondria. Reducibility to talk of
+particles is only a cover for reducibility to truth-functional
+discourse. The particles do not matter, but logical form
+does. The lack of clear identity-conditions for intentions is
+a disaster not because of some ghostliness which ensues, but
+simply because this lack leaves certain sentences nonextensional. But if this is so, then we can achieve Quine's
+ends without employing his means. We can do so by granting that the world can be completely described in a truthfunctional language, while simultaneously granting that
+pieces of it can also be described in an intensional one, and
+simply refraining from invidious comparisons between
+cism is offered by John McDowell ('Truth Conditions, Bivalence, and
+Verificationism" in Truth and Meaning, ed. G. Evans and J. McDowell
+[Oxford, 1976]). McDowell thinks that Quine may be asserting "a version, not quite happily formulated, of the strong verificationist objection to realism in a theory of meaning." (p. 65) This objection is that
+to construe an assertion's truth as "underdetermined by what is observable" would, if we construed the statement "realistically," require us to
+attribute to the speaker "a conception of truth as being independent
+of what is observable." (p. 64) Since the latter is, for the verificationist,
+absurd, it shows that we must not construe the statement "realistically."
+This strategy, however, seems to involve finding a sense for "determination by what is observable" which would keep biology and exclude
+translation, and, once again, I do not see how this is to be done. So I
+conclude that the tension between (4) and (5) remains, despite the
+attempts of friendly critics of Quine to reformulate his point in a way
+that renders it safe from Chomsky's criticism that the only indeterminacy in the area is the familiar underdetermination of theory by observation (a criticism which both Føllesdal and McDowell refer to, and
+wish to circumvent).
+204
+
+these modes of description. To say that it can be completely
+described is to use a notion of completeness defined in terms
+of spatio-temporal extent, not in terms of either explanatory
+power or practical convenience. If we could not refer to
+intentions, we might be hard put to it to cope with the
+world, but we should-for whatever this is worth-still be
+able to describe every bit of it, and even make an accurate
+prediction about the content of any space-time region of
+any desired minuteness.
+The way to apply this point to the vocabulary of beliefs
+and desires has been shown by Davidson, who puts the matter in terms of a distinction between homonomic and
+heteronomic generalizations:
+On the one hand, there are generalizations whose positive
+instances give us reason to believe the generalization itself could be improved by adding further provisos and
+conditions stated in the same general vocabulary as the
+original generalization. Such a generalization points to
+the form and vocabulary of the finished law; we may say
+that it is a homonomic generalization. On the other hand
+there are generalizations which when instantiated may
+give us reason to believe there is a precise law at work,
+but one that can be stated only by shifting to a different
+vocabulary. We may call such generalizations heteronomic.
+I suppose most of our practical lore (and science) is
+heteronomic. This is because a law can hope to be
+precise, explicit, and as exceptionless as possible only if
+it draws its concepts from a comprehensive closed theory.
+•.. Confidence that a statement is homonomic, correctible within its own conceptual domain, demands that
+it draw its concepts from a theory with strong constitutive elements. ...
+Just as we cannot intelligibly assign a length to any
+object unless a comprehensive theory holds of objects of
+that sort, we cannot intelligibly attribute any proposi-
+205
+
+tional attitude to an agent except within the framework
+of a viable theory of his beliefs, desires, intentions, and
+decisions. 43
+Davidson goes on to say that purported psychophysical
+laws are like "All emeralds are grue." They combine terms
+taken from disparate vocabularies. We may talk about
+emeroses and grueness, or about emeralds and greenness,
+but not about both at once (at least not if we want a useful comprehensive theory). Even so, we may talk about
+actions and beliefs, or about movements and neurons, but
+not (comprehensively) both at once. But there is an obvious
+sense, in the former example, in which we are talking about
+the same things, whichever set of predicates we choose. Even
+so, Davidson says, in the latter case. The difference in
+choice of vocabularies is not a mark of the difference between the real and the ontologically disreputable, nor of
+that between the factual and the mythical, but is on all
+fours with the difference between talking of the activities
+of nations-as-such and talking of the activities of ministers
+and generals, or between talking of mitochondria as such
+and talking of the elementary particles they contain. We
+may usefully and truly say things like "If Asquith had remained prime minister, England would have lost," or "If
+there had been a few more neutrons in there, the mitochondrion would not have survived," or "If we had just
+stuck in an electrode in the right place in the cortex, he
+would never have decided he was Napoleon," or "If we
+could get hold of an emerose, we should have just the right
+shade of green," but we cannot (so far as we know now, at
+least) develop such heteronomic remarks into laws which
+are parts of comprehensive theories. Nor, on the other
+hand, need we see such heteronomic remarks as crossing the
+line between ontological realms—in particular, the realm
+of the factual and the realm of the nonfactual. In Davidson's view of the relation between different explanatory
+13 Donald Davidson, "Mental Events" in Experience and Theory, ed.
+L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (Amherst, Mass., 1970), pp. 94-96.
+206
+
+vocabularies, there is no reason whatever for thinking that
+those vocabularies which lend themselves to truth-functional formulations "limn the true and ultimate structure
+of reality" in a way in which intensional vocabularies do
+not. The extensional intensional distinction turns out to
+have no more and no less philosophical interest than the
+distinction between nations and people: it is capable of
+inciting reductionist emotion, but not capable of providing
+a special reason for embarking on reductionist projects.
+Davidson's distinction gives us a way of seeing that an
+intentional vocabulary is just one more vocabulary for talking about portions of a world which can, indeed, be completely described without this vocabulary. We can share
+Carnap's intuition that the movement of anything can be
+predicted on the basis of the movement of elementary
+particles, and that if we simply kept track of all those
+particles we would be keeping track of (though not explaining) all that there is, without speaking, with Quine, of
+"the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness
+of a science of intention." One vocabulary-that of particle
+physics—may work for every portion of the universe,
+whereas talk of mitochondria, emeroses, cabinet ministers,
+and intentions is called for only here and there. But the
+distinction between the universal and the specific is not the
+distinction between the factual and the "empty," still less
+that between the real and the apparent, or the theoretic and
+the practical, or nature and convention.
+Davidson, however, links his own project to Quine's in a
+misleading way when he says that "the heteronomic character of general statements linking the mental and the
+physical traces back to this central role of translation in
+the description of all propositional attitudes, and to the indeterminacy of translation, "44 and also when he cites with
+approval Quine's remark that "Brentano's thesis of the irreducibility of intentional idioms is of a piece with the
+thesis of indeterminacy of translation."45 Both remarks sug-
+14 Ibid., p. 97.
+45 Ibid., p. 97n., quoting Quine, Word and Object, p. 221.
+207
+
+gest that the relation between statements which offer
+translations and behaviorese is special in some way that the
+relation between statements about mitochondria and those
+about elementary particles is not. Both suggest Quine's
+odd doctrine of the "double" indeterminacy of translation.
+But if what I have been saying is right, irreducibility is
+always just irreducibility, and never a clue to "ontological"
+differences. There are lots of vocabularies in the language
+within which one might expect to get a comprehensive
+theory phrased in homonomic generalizations, and science,
+political theory, literary criticism, and the rest will, God
+willing, continue to create more and more such vocabularies. To abandon the notion that in philosophy we have a
+discipline which guards against "irresponsible reification"
+and systematizes our "scruples about what objects one may
+assume" would be to take irreducibility in our stride and
+thus to judge each such vocabulary on pragmatic or aesthetic grounds alone. Quine's strictures against Carnap's attempt to divide philosophy from science are just what is
+needed to help us realize that there is no such discipline,
+and thus just what is needed to see that the Geisteswissenschaften would have not become more wissenschaftlich, or
+more ontologically respectable, if Brentano and Dilthey had
+turned out to be wrong about their irreducibility. Un-
+fortunately, however, Quine's enduring conviction that
+symbolic logic must somehow have "ontological implications" leads him to make more of translation, intentionality, and the "'idea' idea" than needs to be made.
+I have devoted this long section to arguing that Quine's
+attack on "truth by virtue of meaning" as an explanation
+of putatively necessary truths should not be confused with
+his attack on "meanings" as ideas in the mind, ideas which
+determine the accuracy of translations in a way that linguistic behavior cannot. The former is indeed a pseudo-explanation; there are, for the holistic reasons given in "Two
+Dogmas," no privileged representations. But Quine's distrust of privileged representations leads him to distrust all
+208
+
+representations, to distrust the " 'idea' idea" itself. Yet ideas
+in the mind are no more or less disreputable than neurons
+in the brain, mitochondria in the cells, passions in the soul,
+or moral progress in history. The damage done by the
+"'idea' idea" in modern philosophy was done by the
+pseudo-explanation of epistemic authority through the notion of "direct acquaintance"' by the "Eye of the Mind"
+with mental entities such as sense-data and meanings. But
+this is epistemological damage, not ontological damage. If
+I am right in the criticisms of Quine I have been making
+(and in the general line I am taking in this book) the only
+way in which one can do ontological damage is to block
+the road of inquiry by insisting on a bad old theory at the
+expense of a good new theory. It may be claimed that nineteenth-century introspectionist psychology did briefly block
+the road of inquiry, but even if that were so it would be
+quite a different thing from saying that the Geisteswissenschaften are preventing us from seeing reality plain, or that
+their shady ontology must be tolerated for the sake of practical ends. The lesson of epistemological behaviorism is just
+that there is no "philosophical point" to be made about
+translation or intentionality, nor about any other "ontological" subject. Rather, it helps us see that explanatory
+power is where we find it, and that the philosophical attempt to distinguish between "scientific" and "unscientific"
+explanations is needless.
+5. EPISTEMOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM, PSYCHOLOGICAL
+BEHAVIORISM, AND LANGUAGE
+In the previous chapter I said that the epistemological
+tradition confused the causal process of acquiring knowedge with questions concerning its justification. In this
+chapter I have presented Sellars's criticism of the Myth of
+the Given and Quine's criticism of the notion of truth by
+virtue of meaning as two detailed developments of this
+more general criticism. If we accept these criticisms, and
+209
+
+therefore drop the notion of epistemology as the quest,
+initiated by Descartes, for those privileged items in the field
+of consciousness which are the touchstones of truth, we are
+in a position to ask whether there still remains something
+for epistemology to be. I want to urge that there does not.
+To understand the matters which Descartes wanted to understand-the superiority of the New Science to Aristotle,
+the relations between this science and mathematics, common sense, theology, and morality—we need to turn outward rather than inward, toward the social context of
+justification rather than to the relations between inner
+representations. This attitude has been encouraged in
+recent decades by many philosophical developments, particularly those stemming from Wittgenstein's Philosophical
+Investigations and from Kuhn's Structure of Scientific
+Revolutions. Some of these developments will be canvassed
+in chapters seven and eight. Before doing so, however, I
+shall discuss two attempts to preserve something from the
+Cartesian tradition, attempts which may seem to shed some
+doubt on our ability simply to drop the image of the Mirror
+of Nature altogether.
+The first of these attempts is the revolt against logical
+behaviorism in the philosophy of psychology, leading to the
+development of explanations of behavior in terms of inner
+representations without, necessarily, any linkup with the
+justification of beliefs and actions. I have already said that
+once explanation and justification are held apart there is no
+reason to object to explanation of the acquisition of knowledge in terms of representations, and that such explanations can be offered without resuscitating the traditional
+"mind-body problem." But I think that the defense of such
+explanations against Ryle and Skinner can easily be distorted into a rehabilitation of the traditional seventeenthcentury philosophical problematic, and thus I shall devote
+chapter five to a discussion of such defenses. My aim will be
+to disassociate empirical psychology from the remnants of
+210
+
+epistemology by defending it against both Wittgensteinian
+criticisms and Chomskyan compliments.
+The second attempt to preserve something from the
+Cartesian tradition which I shall discuss is the effort, within
+recent philosophy of language, to specify "how language
+hooks onto the world," thus creating an analogue of the
+Cartesian problem of how thought hooks onto the world.
+An attempt to use the notions of the reference of terms and
+the truth of sentences to aid in understanding the matters
+which troubled Descartes seems to me doomed to failure,
+but such a program is very tempting. Because language is
+a "public" Mirror of Nature, as thought is a "private" one,
+it seems that we should be able to reformulate a great many
+Cartesian and Kantian questions and answers in linguistic
+terms, and thereby rehabilitate a lot of standard philosophical issues (e.g., the choice between idealism and realism). I devote chapter six to various efforts at such rehabilitation, and argue that semantics should be kept as pure
+of epistemology as should psychology.
+Once both the inner representations needed in psychological explanation and the word-world relations needed by
+semantics to produce a theory of meaning for natural languages are seen as irrelevant to issues of justification, we
+can see the abandonment of the search for privileged representations as the abandonment of the goal of a "theory of
+knowledge." The urge toward such a theory in the seventeenth century was a product of the change from one
+paradigm of understanding nature to another, as well as
+of the change from a religious to a secular culture. Philosophy as a discipline capable of giving us a "right method of
+seeking truth" depends upon finding some permanent
+neutral framework of all possible inquiry, an understanding of which will enable us to see, for example, why neither
+Aristotle nor Bellarmine was justified in believing what
+he believed. The mind as Mirror of Nature was the Cartesian tradition's response to the need for such a frame-
+211
+
+work. If there are no privileged representations in this mirror, then it will no longer answer to the need for a touchstone for choice between justified and unjustified claims
+upon our belief. Unless some other such framework can be
+found, the abandonment of the image of the Mirror leads
+us to abandon the notion of philosophy as a discipline
+which adjudicates the claims of science and religion, mathematics and poetry, reason and sentiment, allocating an appropriate place to each. In chapters seven and eight I develop this point further.
+212
+
+CHAPTER V
+Epistemology and Empirical Psychology
+1. SUSPICIONS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY
+The line of thought I have called "epistemological behaviorism" has produced a prejudice against the notion of
+"mental entities" and "psychological processes." A certain
+picture of man's higher faculties, common to Descartes
+and Locke, has been gradually erased by the work of such
+writers as Dewey, Ryle, Austin, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and
+Quine. However, this picture-the one which gave rise to
+the seventeenth-century notion of a "veil of ideas," and thus
+to epistemological skepticism—has not been replaced by
+a new and clearer picture. On the contrary, there is widespread fratricidal disagreement among anti-Cartesians
+about what, if anything, to say about the mind. Ryle's
+magic word "disposition" is no longer in favor, but more
+up-to-date notions such as "functional state" are offered as
+substitutes. Anything smacking of either Skinnerian methodological behaviorism or Rylean "logical" behaviorism
+is looked at askance, but it is agreed that there must be some
+way of avoiding such reductive efforts without falling back
+into the sort of dualism which engendered the traditional
+"problems of modern philosophy." The counter-intuitive
+consequences of behaviorism, reductively interpreted, are
+illustrated by Malcolm's polemic against much recent work
+by psychologists:
+Thus, it is the facts, the circumstances surrounding the
+behavior, that give it the property of expressing recognition. This property is not due to something that goes on
+inside.
+It seems to me that if this point were understood by
+213
+
+philosophers and psychologists, they would no longer
+have a motive for constructing theories and models for
+recognition, memory, thinking, problem solving, understanding, and other "cognitive processes."1
+If we follow out this line of thought, we can decide that
+the whole empirical science of psychology is based on a mistake, and that there is no middle ground for research between common-sensical explanations of behavior on the one
+hand and neurophysiology on the other. The notion that
+there is a middle ground for psychology to investigate will,
+in this view, be a product of Malcolm's "myth of cognitive
+processes and structures" —what Ryle called "Descartes'
+Myth." Malcolm seems inclined to take the matter to this
+point, for example, in his description of the Chomskyan
+notion of an "internalized system of rules" as typical of the
+root mistake of the "traditional theory of Ideas," viz.:
+The assumption ... that in speaking a person must be
+guided. There must be something at hand that shows him
+how to speak, how to put words together grammatically
+and with coherent sense. ... What is being explained is
+knowledge-both knowing that and knowing how. The
+presence in him of the structure of the language or of its
+system of rules is supposed to account for this knowledge
+—to explain how he knows. (P. 389)
+If we once see that "our understanding of human cognitive
+powers is not advanced by replacing the stimulus-response
+mythology with a mythology of inner guidance systems"
+(p. 392), Malcolm thinks, we shall not think that there are
+any explanations to be looked for in this area.
+It is certainly true that the model of the mind which
+led Descartes and Locke to construct the "traditional philosophical problems" was built into the terminology of the
+1 Norman Malcolm, "The Myth of Cognitive Processes and Structures," in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, ed. Theodore
+Mischel (New York and London, 1971), p. 387.
+214
+
+young science of psychology.? It would be surprising if the
+overthrow of this model did not have some eftect upon
+work in that science. Yet it would be equally surprising if
+a discipline now several generations away from its philosophical origins should be unable to stand on its own feet.
+There must, we suspect, be psychological research programs
+which cannot be endangered by a philosophical criticism of
+the vocabularies used by their designers.
+Wittgensteinian criticisms (like Malcolm's) of such programs often seem based on a fallacious move from
+1. The meaning of terms referring to the mental is to be
+explained in terms of behavior (where "behavior" is
+short-hand for "functions relating circumstances and
+stimuli to behavior") rather than by interior ostension
+to
+2. Psychology can concern itself only with empirical correlations between bits of behavior and external circumstances.
+The inference, as successive critics of Ryle have pointed
+out, has no greater force than the parallel inference made
+by operationalist philosophers of science about physics.
+Fodor, for example, remarks that the psychologist is quite
+prepared to admit that certain features in behavior and in
+the social matrix are necessary conditions for the occurrence
+of thoughts, recognitions, emotions, etc., but he urges that
+there may be lots of equally necessary "inner" conditions
+as well. So if the psychological investigator has sense
+enough to avoid defining, for example, "act of recognition"
+in terms of purely inner events, presumably he can take
+¿ See, for example, J. C. Flugel and Donald J. West, A Hundred
+Years of Psychology (London, 1964), chapters one and two.
+3 The point was first made, I believe, by Albert Hofstader in "Professor Ryle's Category-Mistakes," Journal of Philosophy 47 (1951), 257-
+* Jerry Fodor, "Could There Be a Theory of Perception?" Journal of
+Philosophy 63 (1966), 371.
+215
+
+advantage of behavior and surroundings to identity his
+data. What more than this can be required to avoid the
+charge of mythologizing? It might, of course, turn out that
+there were no "intervening variables" worth postulating,
+but this could presumably only be discovered a posteriori,
+by trying and failing. As P. C. Dodwell says, replying to
+Malcolm:
+On Malcolm's view, psychologists would have to restrict
+themselves to investigations of simple empirical relationships such as that which might obtain between memory
+and sleep deprivation. But it is extremely difficult to see
+how this restriction could be justified. The factors which
+psychologists investigate in human memory are empirical
+relationships, although usually of a more complicated
+sort than the one just mentioned. Who, then, should make
+the decision on which empirical relationships are to be
+cleared for investigation? Not philosophers, surely."
+This reply seems to me entirely convincing, but we can
+nevertheless profit from considering the reasons why a reductive operationalism has seemed so much more palatable
+for psychology than for physics. Why have philosophers begrudged psychologists the right to dream up whatever theoretical entities and processes might help them to explain
+our behavior? One such reason has already been given: the
+confusion between the claims labeled (1) and (2) above.
+This confusion rested upon the fear, found in Husserl and
+Dilthey as well as in Wittgensteinians like Winch and Kenny, that subjecting human behavior to mechanistic explanation in terms of "psychological processes" would obscure
+the distinction between persons and things, between the
+human reality studied by the Geisteswissenschaften and the
+rest of reality studied by the Naturwissenschaften. More
+will be said in later chapters about that distinction, but for
+3 P. C. Dodwell, 'Is a Theory of Conceptual Development Necessary!"
+in Cognitive Development and Epistemology (cited in note 1 above),
+p. 382.
+216
+
+now we may be content with Dodwell's reply. Fear of
+mechanism and loss of personhood is a ground for suspicion of all the behavioral sciences, and does not catch what
+philosophers have found especially dubious about psychology. The more directly relevant reasons for suspicion
+are those which suggest that psychologists should be more
+mechanistic rather than less, that they should cut straight
+through the mental to the neurophysiological.
+The first reason is simply the urge toward unified science,
+which is not so much the urge to reduce the Many to the
+One as the conviction that seventeenth-century science discovered that everything could be explained by atoms and
+the void, and that philosophy has a moral duty to preserve
+this insight. This conviction, however, has been softened
+by a dim awareness of quantum mechanics, so that an ontological respect for insensate matter has been replaced by a
+sociological respect for professors of physics. Philosophers'
+references to "the physical" are now standardly accompanied by a note explaining that any entity will count as
+"physical" which is invoked by the "physical sciences." Be-
+fore Quine, when "reduction" was still the heart of the
+logical-empiricist program, philosophers thought themselves able to make actual contributions to the unification
+of science by "analyzing the meanings" of terms used in
+sociology, psychology, etc. Since Quine's attack on meaning,
+however, the need to reduce everything to whatever-physicists-will-countenance has been replaced by a still vaguer
+feeling that the sciences other than physics become "more
+scientific" when they can replace functional descriptions of
+theoretical entities (e.g., "gene") with structural descriptions (e.g., "DNA molecule"). This feeling is evanescent in
+cases like sociology and economics, where nobody wants to
+press for the physical realization of postulated theoretical
+entities, but it persists in psychology, whose theoretical
+entities have roughly the sort of concreteness which invites
+replacement by neurophysiology. But why, given Quinean
+reasons for thinking that no interesting necessary and suf-
+217
+
+ficient conditions for the application of the terms of one discipline can be given in the terms of another, should we be
+so impatient for such replacement? No one thought that
+genetics involved appeal to dubious entities because DNA
+was a long time coming. So what accounts for the instinctive feeling that psychologists are blocking the road of
+inquiry?
+To answer this, we must turn to a second reason for suspicion of postulated mental entities and processes. We may
+call this, following Ryle, the fear of ghosts. The thought
+that by countenancing the mental, even temporarily, we
+are losing the scientific spirit, comes from two sources. The
+first, which I discussed in chapter one, is the confusion of
+the post-Cartesian conception of "consciousness" with the
+pre-philosophical notion of the soul as what leaves the body
+at death. The second is the epistemological argument that
+introspectibility carries with it privileged access, and that
+since such epistemic privilege must be based on an ontological difference (mental entities being intrinsically better
+known to their possessors than anything physical could be
+known to anyone), we must deny the existence of the
+mental-qua-introspectable on pain of making part of our
+knowledge of reality depend upon unverifiable reports.
+Such an argument is rarely offered so boldly, but something
+like it underlies a great deal of both positivistic and Wittgensteinian hostility to the mental.® However, just as the notion of the "unity of science" as a program for philosophical research cannot survive Quine's attack on "meaning."
+so this epistemological argument cannot survive Sellars's
+treatment of "givenness." In Sellars's account of immediate
+knowledge, introspection is a learned ability, and the dark
+suspicion that subjects will turn out to introspect whatever
+the experimenter tells them they ought to be able to introspect is largely justified. For our immediate knowledge
+• See, for example, Malcolm's "expression theory" of first-person mentalistic reports, based on a passage in the Philosophical Investigations.
+218
+
+of mental events is not, according to Sellars, a mark of
+distinct ontological status, and the incorrigibility of firstperson reports, like all matters concerning epistemic status,
+is a sociological rather than a metaphysical concern. But
+giving up the special ghostly status which had been supposed to make privileged access possible redeems the methodological respectability of appeals to introspection. For
+we can now see that teaching people to introspect thoughts,
+or nostalgia, or blood-pressure, or kinky alpha-rhythms, is
+simply a matter of utilizing connections within the organism—presumably the connections between the speech
+center and the rest of the nervous system—as scientific instruments. The fact that such training must take its point of
+departure from intersubjectively available circumstances is
+enough to insure that nothing sneaky is going on. The
+"subjectivity" and "unscientific" character of introspective
+reports are thus no more philosophically significant than
+the defects of spectroscopes. Once "subjective reports" are
+seen as a matter of heuristic convenience, rather than of
+permitting someone's unsupported word to refute a promising scientific hypothesis, we can clear away the unfortunate associations of introspectionist psychology with ration.
+alism's appeal to clear and distinct ideas and Protestantism's
+appeal to the individual conscience.
+I conclude that the Quinean and Sellarsian arguments
+I have outlined in the preceding chapter also serve to clear
+psychology of the standard suspicions which empiricistic
+and physicalistic philosophers have brought against it. The
+suspicions which come from the other direction-from the
+need to preserve human uniqueness, free will, and the integrity of the Geisteswissenschaften-will be discussed in
+chapters seven and eight. In the present chapter, I shall
+stick to the question: Can we find any relevance to traditional philosophical problems concerning knowledge in
+actual or expected results of empirical psychological research? Since I wish to say that these "philosophical prob-
+219
+
+lems" should be dissolved rather than solved, it is predictable that I should give a negative answer. But this negative
+answer needs considerable defense, since many philosophers
+who have been impressed by the arguments against privileged representations marshaled by Quine and Sellars
+nevertheless want to replace traditional "foundationalist"
+epistemology by the use of psychological results to produce
+a general theory of inner representations. I shall be arguing that such a "new epistemology" can offer nothing
+relevant to issues of justification, and that consequently it
+has no relevance to the cultural demands which lea to the
+emergence of epistemology in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nor, consequently, can it aid in maintaining the image of philosophy as a discipline which stands
+apart from empirical inquiry and explains the relevance of
+the results of such inquiry to the rest of culture.
+To make this point 1 shall discuss two suggestions current in the recent philosophical literature, all of which
+attribute to psychology a greater degree of philosophical
+importance than I think it deserves. The first is Quine's
+suggestion that psychology can investigate the "relations
+between theory and evidence" which used to be the subject matter of epistemology. In section 2 I shall argue that
+these relations cannot be restated in psychological terms.
+The second is the claim that the analogies between pro.
+gram states of computers and psychological states of persons and between "hardware" states of computers and
+neurophysiological states of bodies give a new and interesting sense to the notion that our knowledge consists of
+an "inner representation" of the world. This claim has been
+developed in greatest detail by Fodor; in sections 3 and 4
+I shall be arguing that Fodor runs together a sense of "representation" in which representations may be judged accurate or inaccurate, and another in which they may not.
+These two senses, I hold, mark out the respective domains
+of epistemology and psychology.
+220
+
+2. THE UNNATURALNESS OF EPISTEMOLOGY
+In an essay called "Epistemology Naturalized," Quine
+reviews the various embarrassments confronting efforts to
+provide a "foundation for science" and finally considers
+Wittgenstein's sardonic attitude toward this enterprise:
+Carnap and the other logical positivists of the Vienna
+Circle had already pressed the term "metaphysics" into
+pejorative use, as connoting meaninglessness; and the
+term "epistemology" was next. Wittgenstein and his followers, mainly at Oxford, found a residual philosophical
+vocation in therapy: in curing philosophers of the delusion that there were epistemological problems.
+But I think that at this point it may be more useful
+to say rather that epistemology still goes on, though in a
+new setting and a clarified status. Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural
+phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject. This human
+subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled
+input—certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance-and in the fullness of time the
+subject delivers as output a description of the three-dimensional external world and its history. The relation
+between the meager input and the torrential output is a
+relation that we are prompted to study for somewhat the
+same reason that always prompted epistemology; namely,
+in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in
+what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available
+evidence.
+Consider first Quine's claim that the motive behind epistemology has always been "to see how evidence relates to
+theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends
+any available evidence." Most intellectual historians have
+7 W. V. O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New
+York, 1969), pp. 82-83.
+221
+
+found it striking that what we now call the "theory of
+knowledge" plays so little part in the thought of writers
+before the seventeenth century. In Quine's account of epistemology, it is hard to see why this should be so. We might
+suggest that the need for a choice between radically distinct theories about planets and ballistic missiles became
+intense in the time of Galileo and Descartes, and that consequently the mind of the West was newly struck with the
+way in which "one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence." But this suggestion is rather thin. There
+were plenty of competing theories about the heavens in ancient and medieval times, but we have to rummage about
+quite a bit to find anything called "epistemology" in Plato
+and Aristotle, if epistemology means noting the gaps between theory and evidence and comparing ways of crossing
+those gaps. We can fasten with glad cries upon some passages in the Theaetetus and the De Anima; neo-Kantian
+historians of Greek philosophy like Zeller often have. But
+little to the purpose will turn up elsewhere in the fourth
+century, and practically nothing in the Posterior Analytics
+(where Aristotle, who knew all about controversy between
+competing scientific theories, and competed with the best of
+them, discusses the status and methodology of science).
+When Cartesianism burst upon a startled world in the
+seventeenth century, it was not because a new view was
+being offered about long-debated questions concerning the
+relations between theory and evidence. It was rather because questions were being taken seriously which, as Gilson
+remarked with some indignation, the scholastics had been
+too sensible to ask.®
+8 "From the point of view of medieval philosophy, Descartes plays the
+role of the indisciplinatus-someone who takes pride in insisting, no
+matter what discipline is in question, on the same degree of certainty,
+no matter how inappropriate. In a word, Descartes no longer recognizes an intermediary between the true and the false; his philosophy is
+the radical elimination of the notion of 'the probable'" (Étienne Gilson, Études sur le Role de la Pensée Médiévale dans la Formation du
+Système Cartésien [Paris, 1930], p. 235.)
+222
+
+To understand why the seventeenth century became intrigued with the relation between theory and evidence, we
+need to ask why Descartes's fantasies captured Europe's
+imagination. As Quine says: "Epistemologists dreamed of a
+first philosophy, firmer than science and serving to justify
+our knowledge of the external world."• But why did everybody suddenly start dreaming the same dream? Why did
+the theory of knowledge become something more than the
+languid academic exercise of composing a reply to Sextus
+Empiricus? The dream of a first philosophy firmer than
+science is as old as the Republic, and we may agree with
+Dewey and Freud that the same primordial urges lie behind both religion and Platonism. But that does not tell
+us why anyone should think that first philosophy consists
+in, of all things, epistemology.
+It may seem heavy-handed to press Quine's phrases in
+this way. I am doing so nevertheless because I think that
+understanding modern philosophy requires a more radical
+break with the tradition than Quine wants to make, or than
+is needed for his purposes. His genial "Don't let's throw out
+epistemology—let's let it be psychology" line is entirely reasonable if our aim is to show what in empiricism can be
+saved once we throw out the dogmas. But if we want to
+know why anybody thought it worthwhile, much less exciting or morally obligatory, to be an empiricist, we have
+to step back from the whole subject and press questions
+which Quine can safely neglect. To help achieve this distance, I turn now to some of the things Quine says about
+psychology. I want to show how very remote any psychological discovery of the sort he envisages will be from any concern with the foundations of science or with the relation between theory and evidence.
+The link between empirical psychology of perception and
+empiricist epistemology is, I think, provided largely by the
+loose use of such words as "evidence," "information," and
+• W. V. O. Quine, "Grades of Theoreticity," in Experience and Theory, ed. L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (Amherst, Mass., 1970), p. 2.
+223
+
+"testimony." This use permits Quine to say things like
+"The nerve endings ... are the place of input of unprocessed information about the world"10 and "It is simply the
+stimulations of our sensory receptors that are best looked
+upon as the input to our cognitive mechanism."" Suppose
+we ask: Could psychology discover that it is not at the
+retina (the first nerve cells to be troubled by light rays) that
+information begins to be processed? Could it discover that
+it is actually in the lens, or perhaps only just where the
+optic nerve merges into the visual cortex? Could it discover
+that everything up to the latter point was not information
+but just electricity? Presumably not, since it is hard to see
+what would count as an experimental criterion of "information" or "processing." Quine, however, writes as if there
+could be such criteria. He notes that epistemology has always been torn between two criteria for being "datal":
+"causal proximity to the physical stimulus" and "the focus
+of awareness." But, he says:
+The dilemma is dissolved, and the strain relieved, when
+we give up the dream of a first philosophy firmer than science. If we are seeking only the causal mechanism of our
+knowledge of the external world, and not a justification
+of that knowledge in terms prior to science, we can settle
+after all for a theory of vision in Berkeley's style based
+on color patches in a two-dimensional field. ... We can
+look upon man as a black box in the physical world,
+exposed to externally determinable stimulatory forces as
+input and spouting externally determinable testimony
+about the external world as output. Just which of the
+inner workings of the black box may be tinged with
+awareness is as may be.12
+10 Ibia., p. 3.
+11 Quine,
+"Epistemology Naturalized," in Ontological Relativity,
+p. 84.
+12 Quine, "Grades of Theoreticity," in Experience and Theory, pp.
+2-3.
+224
+
+But if we forget justification and look for causal mechanisms, we are certainly not going to be talking about color
+patches in a two-dimensional visual field. We shall have no
+use for the distinction between what is given and what is
+inferred, and no need for the notion of a "visual field" to
+hold the former. We may talk about irradiated patches on
+a two-dimensional retina or pulses in the optic nerve, but
+this will be a matter of choosing a black box, not of discovering touchstones for inquiry. Quine dissolves a dilemma only by changing the motive of inquiry. If one were only
+interested in causal mechanisms, one would never have worried one's head about awareness. But the epistemologists
+who dreamed the dream Quine describes were not only interested in causal mechanisms. They were interested in making, for example, an invidious distinction between Galileo
+and the professors who refused to look through his telescope.
+If there are indeed no experimental criteria for where
+the real data come, then Quine's suggestion that we give up
+the notion of "sense data" and speak causally of nerve endings and epistemologically of observation sentences! does
+not resolve a dilemma which has plagued epistemology.
+Rather it lets epistemology wither away. For if we have
+psychophysiology to cover causal mechanisms, and the sociology and history of science to note the occasions on
+which observation sentences are invoked or dodged in constructing and dismantling theories, then epistemology has
+nothing to do. We would think that this result would be
+congenial to Quine, but in fact he resists it. The resistance
+is clearest when he rebukes such writers as Polanyi, Kuhn,
+and Hanson for wanting to drop the notion of observation
+altogether. Quine thinks this a perfectly good notion, and
+wants to reconstruct it in terms of intersubjectivity. He defines an "observation sentence" as "one on which all speakers of the language give the same verdict when given the
+13 Ibid., p. 3.
+11 Ibid., p. 5; cf. "Epistemology Naturalized," p. 87.
+225
+
+same concurrent stimulation. To put the point negatively,
+an observation sentence is one that is not sensitive to differences in past experience within the speech community."15
+Quine thinks that by excluding the blind, the insane, and a
+few more "occasional deviants" (p. 88n.) we can tell which
+are the sentences which "depend on present sensory stimulation and on no stored information beyond what goes into
+understanding the sentence" (p. 86). This amounts to defining "present sensory stimulation" in terms of the uncontroversiality of certain sentences. Quine thinks that this
+preserves the force of the empiricist insight while abandoning the notions about meaning which are associated with the
+"'idea' idea."
+I think Quine is right in taking this line in order to preserve what was true in empiricism, for doing so makes it
+quite clear that if anything "replaces" epistemology it is
+the history and sociology of science, and is certainly not psychology. But this is not Quine's reason. Consider another
+passage about "data":
+What to count as observation now can be settled in terms
+of the stimulation of sensory receptors, let consciousness
+fall where it may.
+In the old anti-psychologistic days the question of epistemological priority was moot. What is epistemologically
+prior to what? Are Gestalten prior to sensory atoms ... ?
+Now that we are permitted to appeal to physical stimulation, the problem dissolves; A is epistemologically prior
+to B if A is causally nearer than B to the sensory receptors. Or, what is in some ways better, just talk explicitly
+in terms of causal proximity to sensory receptors and
+drop the talk of epistemological priority. (pp. 84-85)
+What is puzzling is that we have defined "observation
+sentence" in terms of the consensus gentium; we can divide
+observation from theory without knowing or caring which
+bits of our body are the sensory receptors, much less how
+far down the nerves the "processing" begins. We do not
+15 Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," pp. 86-87.
+226
+
+need any psychophysiological account of causal mechanisms
+to isolate what is intersubjectively agreeable—we just do
+this in ordinary conversation. So presumably psychology has
+nothing to tell us about causal proximity which is worth
+knowing by those who wish to continue "epistemology in a
+psychological setting." To put it another way, once we have
+picked out the observation sentences conversationally rather
+than neurologically, further inquiry into "how evidence
+relates to theory" would seem to be a matter for Polanyi,
+Kuhn, and Hanson. For what could psychology add to their
+accounts of how scientists form and discard theories? Quine
+says of them that
+•..some iconoclastic philosophers of science have taken
+to questioning the notion of observation only now that it
+ceases to present a problem. Theirs is, I think, a delayed
+reaction against the dubiety of the old notion of datum.
+Now that we have thrown off the old dream of a first
+philosophy, let us exult rather in our new access to unproblematical concepts. Neural input is one, and observation sentence as just now defined is another, 16
+But these concepts, where unproblematic, are not new.
+As electricity, neural input is not new; as "information" it
+is problematic. The notion of "observation sentence" as
+Quine has defined it is as old as the first lawyer who asked a
+witness, "But what did you actually see?" If we are to exult
+over anything, it is that we are no longer asking certain questions-not that we have found something new to do or some
+new terms in which to think. Quine has told us that we
+gave up bothering about consciousness when we gave up
+rational reconstruction. But he seems to be bringing it right
+back again by explicating observationality in terms of intersubjectivity. So he should either let Polanyi, Kuhn, and
+Hanson say that "observation" is just a matter of what we
+can agree on these days, or he should show how psychological discoveries can make something more of this notion. If
+16 Quine, "Grades of Theoreticity," PP. 4-5.
+227
+
+they cannot, then defining "dependence on present sensory
+stimulation" in terms of intersubjectivity will just be invoking an old epistemological honorific to no psychological
+purpose.
+My discussion of Quine has pressed his words with tiresome literalness. Quine probably does not care about the
+fate of the word "epistemology." What he does care about,
+perhaps, is his Deweyan position that science and philosophy are continuous—not to be viewed as having difterent
+methods or subjects. He is opposed to loose Oxonian talk
+about "philosophy as the analysis of concepts," and he associates Wittgenstein and "therapeutic positivism" with
+this sort of talk. I have been suggesting that we emphasize
+rather what Dewey and Wittgenstein have in commontheir view that a natural quest for understanding has been
+run together, by modern philosophers, with an unnatural
+quest for certainty. In this view, the hopes and fears which
+psychology at various times inspired among philosophers
+are equally misguided." To say with Wisdom and Bouwsma
+that "epistemology" is a collection of obsessive concerns
+with certainty to be dissolved by therapy, and to say with
+Quine that epistemological impulses should be satisfied by
+psychological results, may both be viewed as ways of saying:
+We can have psychology or nothing.
+17 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (London,
+1953), p. 232, on "the confusion and barrenness of psychology": "The
+existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means
+of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method
+pass each other by." See also Dewey's warnings about the movement
+which was eventually to become the "behavioristic psychology" which
+Quine admires: "The older dualism between sensation and idea is repeated in the current dualism of peripheral and central structures and
+functions; the older dualism of body and soul finds a distinct echo in
+the current dualism of stimulus and response ..."; again, "... sensation as stimulus does not mean any particular psychical existence. It
+means simply a function, and will have its value shift according to the
+special work requiring to be done." (The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," in The Early Works of John Dewey, vol. 5 [Carbondale,
+1972], pp. 96, 107.)
+228
+
+If it were not that one of my concerns in this book is to
+ask why we have such a phenomenon as "philosophy" in
+our culture, the matter could be left at that. But for this
+historical question the difference between nothing and psychology is important. Dewey emphasized the religious and
+social motives behind the non"scientific" aspects of philosophy, and joined his insistence on the continuity between philosophy and science with an invidious distinction
+between what philosophy had been and what it should become. Quine is reluctant to flirt with a genetic fallacy, and
+genially disposed to see himself and Locke as fellow-inquirers
+into "the relation between theory and evidence": Locke, he
+thinks, was misled by a bad theory of meaning, but we moderns may now be led aright (toward psychology) by a good
+one. But this geniality hides precisely what is important
+for historical understanding: Locke's concern about the
+skeptic's suggestion that our subjective modes of apprehension might hide reality from us, and Quine's refusal to be
+troubled by skepticism at all.
+Quine's remoteness from skeptical concerns is shown by
+his assimilation of elements of experience to elements of
+knowledge, and of explanation to justification. Psychology,
+by finding the elements of experience, explains knowledge.
+Epistemology, by (putatively) finding elements of knowledge, justifies nonelementary knowledge. Nobody would
+want "human knowledge" (as opposed to some particular
+theory or report) justified unless he had been frightened
+by skepticism. Nobody would assimilate epistemology to
+psychology unless he were so little frightened by skepticism
+as to regard "grounding human knowledge" as a bit of a
+joke. So, though we may heartily agree with Quine that if
+there are discoveries to be made about human knowledge
+they are likely to come from psychology, we can also sympathize with the view which Quine attributes to Wittgenstein: The thing to do with epistemology is to "cure philosophers of the delusion that there were epistemological
+problems." Such therapy does not separate philosophy from
+229
+
+science: it takes philosophy to be just common sense or science mobilized to provide "reminders for a particular purpose. "18
+3. PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES AS GENUINE EXPLANATIONS
+To get a psychological theory which would say something
+about the relation between theory and evidence we need,
+at a minimum, one which will reproduce "internally" the
+ordinary "public" justification of assertions by circumstances
+and other assertions. We need, in other words, mental entities which can bear the same relations to public assertions
+and to one another as do premises and conclusions in
+speeches, as the testimonies of witnesses to the charges in
+law courts, and so on. But whenever a psychological theory
+is proposed which answers to this need, the cry of "infinite
+regress" is likely to be raised. Thus we find Malcolm saying:
+If we say that the way in which a person knows that something in front of him is a dog is by seeing that the
+creature "fits" his Idea of a dog, then we need to ask
+"How does he know that this is an example of fitting?"
+What guides his judgment here? Does he not need a second-order Idea which shows him what it is like for something to fit an Idea? That is, will he not need a model of
+fitting? ... An infinite regress has been generated and
+nothing has been explained.1
+The difficulty, made familiar by Ryle, is that if we are not
+content to take "He sees it" as a sufficient justification for
+18 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 50.
+18 Malcolm, "Myth of Cognitive Processes,"
+p. 391. Compare Ryle,
+The Concept of Mind (New York, 1949), chap. 7, and Wittgenstein,
+Philosophical Investigations, PP. 213-215. See also John Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning (London, 1961), chap. & ("The Infinite Regress
+Argument"'), where he discusses Ryle's use of the argument. I have compared Wittgenstein's and Peirce's anti-Cartesian employment of this
+argument in "Pragmatism, Categories, and Language," Philosophical
+Review 49 (1961), 197-223.
+230
+
+the man's knowing that there is a dog before him, then we
+shall not be able to take anything else as a justification either.
+For insofar as a mentalistic account provides merely a
+causal explanation of recognition by sight, it does not seem
+to answer the question "How does he know?" It does not
+tell us anything about the man's evidence for his view, but
+only about his coming to hold it. On the other hand, insofar as it does offer a justification of the original public
+knowledge-claim, it provides an occasion to press for further justification.
+Fodor criticizes Ryle's claim that nothing "para-mechanical" could improve our understanding of perceptual recognition, and remarks that "the appealing simplicity of Ryle's
+position is purchased by begging precisely the sorts of question theories of perception and learning have traditionally
+attempted to answer"zo He proceeds to argue that "some
+simple story about learned associations" will not do to answer these questions:
+But if what the various ways of performing "Lillibulero"
+have in common is something abstract, it would appear to
+follow that the system of expectations that constitutes
+one's recipe for hearing the song must be abstract in the
+same sense. ...
+... The relevant expectations must be complicated and
+abstract, since perceptual identities are surprisingly independent of physical uniformities among stimuli. Since
+it is precisely this perceptual "constancy" that psychologists and epistemologists have traditionally supposed unconscious inferences and other para-mechanical transactions will be needed to explain, it seems relevant to
+remark that Ryle's treatment has begged all the issues
+that constancy raises. (pp. 377-378)
+We may agree with Fodor that if there are "issues that
+constancy raises" then Ryle has begged them. But Ryle
+20 Fodor, "Could There Be a Theory of Perception?" Journal of
+Philosophy 63 (1966), 375.
+231
+
+could easily reply that the notion of "complicated and abstract expectations" (e.g., a set of unconscious inferences
+involving reference to some rules, or some abstract paradigms) is what makes it appear that there are issues here.
+Perhaps only the picture of a little man in the mind, applying rules drawn up in nonverbal but still "abstract" terms,
+makes us ask "How is it done?" Had we not had this picture imposed on us, Ryle can say, we would respond with
+something like "It's only possible because of having a complicated nervous system-doubtless some physiologist will
+someday tell us just how it works." The notion of nonphysiological "models" would not occur, in other words, if we
+did not already have the whole Cartesian bag of tricks in
+hand.
+This reply can be restated a bit more precisely. Suppose
+we agree with Fodor that recognition of similarity among
+potentially infinite differences is recognition of something
+"abstract" —Lillibulerohood, say. What does it mean to say
+that "one's recipe for hearing the song must be abstract in the
+same sense"? Presumably that it must be able to distinguish
+similarity among potentially infinite differences. But then
+there is no use for the notion of "non-abstract recipe,"
+since any recipe must be able to do this. The possible
+qualitative variations among the ingredients for a batch of
+chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite. So if
+we are to talk about "complicated sets of expectations" (or
+"programs" or "systems of rules") at all, we shall always be
+talking about something "abstract"—precisely as abstract,
+in fact, as the characteristic whose recognition (or the task
+whose accomplishment) we wish to explain. But then we are
+in a dilemma: either the acquisition of these sets of expectations or rules requires the postulation of new sets of
+expectations or rules, or they are unacquired. If the former
+horn is grasped, Malcolm's infinite regress really will be
+generated by Fodor's principle that recognition of the abstract requires use of the abstract, for what holds of recognition should hold of acquisition. If we grasp the latter
+232
+
+horn, then we seem to be back with Ryle: to say that people
+have an unacquired ability to recognize similarity among
+infinite differences is hardly to say anything explanatory
+about "the issues that constancy raises."
+So, Ryle can conclude, these issues are either "conceptual"
+issues about the sufficient conditions for the ordinary application of terms like "recognize," or else issues about
+physiological mechanisms. The latter sort of issue involves
+no problems about regresses, since nobody thinks that "constancy" requires postulating "abstract" mechanisms in photoelectric cells or tuning forks. Yet is there any difference
+between middle C and "Lillibulerohood," save that we have
+dubbed the former a "concrete acoustic quality" and the
+latter an "abstract similarity?" We could specify a thousand accidental features (timbre, volume, presence of light,
+color of the object emitting the sound) which the tuning
+fork ignores, just as the Lillibulero-recognizer does. Since
+the abstract-concrete distinction is as relative to a given
+data-base as the complex-simple distinction, it looks as if,
+in saying that psychological explanation requires reference
+to abstract entities, we are simply claiming that explaining
+the sort of thing mammals can do requires reference to different—categorically different—sorts of things from explaining what amoebas, tuning forks, cesium atoms, and stars
+can do. But how do we know that? And what does "categorically" mean here? Once again, Ryle can say that if we
+did not already have the Cartesian picture (of an Inner
+Eye looking at the rules posted on the walls of the mental
+arena), we should not know what to make of the claim.
+So much for the strength of the infinite-regress argument. Now consider the sort of rejoinder to it which would
+be made by someone like Dodwell, who argues that nonphysiological model-building is, a priori, neither good nor
+bad, but is to be justified by its fruits. Dodwell is impressed
+by the analogy between brains and computers: "The single
+most powerful influence on psychologists' ideas about cognitive processes at present is the nexus of concepts which
+233
+
+has been developed for computer programming."21 Nevertheless, he admits:
+It might be argued that the computer analogy is trivial,
+because a program merely codifies a set of operations
+which are like cognitive operations, but no more explains
+thinking than does writing down a set of rules for solving
+arithmetic problems. ... To say that a computer program can "explain" thinking, then, would have about
+the same force as to say that a set of logical formulas
+"explain" the laws of correct deductive argument. (Pp.
+371-372)
+To this argument he replies that the computer analogy only
+has force once one distinguishes levels:
+•.. explanations of what goes on in problem solving by
+a computer can be given at different levels. ... The implementation of a program has to be explained in terms of
+computer hardware, just as, presumably, the implementation of thinking has in some sense to be explained by
+processes which actually occur in the central nervous system. The subroutines by which particular computations
+are made can be explained by reference to the "machine
+language" and the step-by-step algorithms by which solutions are found. ... The principle of the subroutine
+operation is not itself to be understood and explained
+just by examining the hardware, in just the same way
+that the point of multiplication tables could not be
+grasped by examining the brain. Similarly, an understanding of how the subroutines themselves work does
+not explain the principle of solving problems in terms of
+a sequence of steps. ... For that, one must look at the
+executive process, which in the machine embodies the
+overall organization and goal of the program, and in the
+human being a less clearly understood "goal directedness." (p. 372)
+21 Dodwell, "Is a Theory of Conceptual Development Necessary?"
+p. 370.
+234
+
+The importance of levels is illustrated, for example, by the
+fact that experimentation may give us reason to say that
+we recognize visual patterns by a template-matching process
+rather than a feature-extraction process (P. 379). To say
+this is neither a "conceptual" remark (about "the executive
+process") nor a "physiological" one (about "hardware"),
+but it may be genuinely explanatory nonetheless. The notion of "subroutine" seems to give us just what psychology
+needs—an explanation of what the middle ground between
+common sense and physiology might be good for.
+But how does this notion help us avoid an infinite-regress
+argument? Presumably Malcolm and Ryle would urge that
+either "templates" or abstract ideas of the features extracted
+(depending upon which model one picks) themselves produce the same problems as the "constancy" they are supposed to explain. But Dodwell can reply that they would
+only do this if they were supposed to be answers to such
+general questions as "How is abstraction (recognition, constancy) possible?" To such questions, he can say, there is
+no answer, except the pointless remark that nature has
+evolved suitable hardware to get the job done. For any of
+Dodwell's models will indeed be anthropomorphic, in the
+sense of envisaging a little inferrer in the brain checking
+his (or its) templates or ticking off features. This inferrer's
+powers of abstraction or recognition will be as problematic
+as those of his host, and it does not make them less so to say
+that he (or it) is a little machine rather than a little man.2
+22 This would be doubted by some psychologists. Gregory, citing
+with approval Helmholtz's notion of "unconscious inferences" involved
+in perception, says that
+we must be clear that there is no "little man inside" doing the arguing, for this leads to intolerable philosophical difficulties. Helmholtz
+certainly did not think this, but his phrase "unconscious inferences"
+and his description of perceptions as "unconscious conclusions" did
+perhaps suggest, at the time, to people unfamiliar with computers,
+some such unacceptable idea. But our familiarity with computers
+should remove temptation towards confusion of this kind. For we no
+235
+
+Anthropomorphic models here are no more misleading than
+the programmer's anthropomorphic remark that "the machine won't understand the problem if you use Polish notation, because it only knows about. ..." To complain that
+"templates"-like Locke's "ideas"-are a reduplication of
+the explanandum is like claiming that the particles which
+make up the Bohr atom are a reduplication of the billiard
+balls whose behavior they help explain. It turns out to be
+fruitful to postulate little billiard balls inside big ones, so
+why not postulate little people inside big ones (or little rats
+inside big rats)? Every such "model" is, in Sellars's phrase,
+accompanied by a "commentary" which lists the features
+of the modeled entity "abstracted from" in the model.23 It
+seems reasonable to suggest that the implicit commentary on
+all anthropomorphic models in psychology goes something
+like this:
+As long as we stay on the level of subroutines we shall
+feel free to talk anthropomorphically about inferences
+and other operations "unconsciously"
+performed by the
+person, or performed (neither "consciously" nor "unconsciously") by brain centers or other organs spoken of
+as if they themselves were persons. The use of such phrases
+longer think of inference as a uniquely human activity involving
+consciousness. (The Intelligent Eye [New York, 1970], p. 30.)
+I think it misleading to say that the little man leads to "intolerable
+philosophical difficulties," because I do not see that little machines
+are less "conscious" than little men. To adopt what Dennett calls the
+"intentional stance" toward batches of transistors or neurons is to
+speak of them as we speak of conscious beings, and to add "but of
+course they are not really conscious" seems merely to say that we have
+no moral responsibilities to them. We can neither inquire which such
+batches are, in Quine's phrase, "tinged with awareness" nor discover
+that inferences can be performed by beings not so tinged. Familiarity
+with computers does not bring about such a discovery; it only makes
+attribution of the intentional stance more common and casual.
+23 See Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality (London and
+New York, 1963), p. 182 on "commentaries" and pp. Igaff. on red senseimpressions.
+236
+
+does not commit us to attributing intellect and character
+to brain centers any more than speaking of a "red sense.
+impression" as the common factor in various illusions
+commits us to the existence of something both "inner"
+and red. But once we get off the "subroutine" level and
+onto the hardware level, anthropomorphism is no longer
+in place.
+To see the force of this commentary, suppose that some
+special sort of neural current came down the optic nerve
+when and only when psychological theory predicted the
+occurrence of a red sense-impression (and so for all other
+perceptual situations). If we knew this fact, we should
+simply skip the "subroutine" explanation and go straight to
+hardware. The notion of "sense-impression" would no
+longer have a role (unless there were other theoretical entities postulated by psychological theory which required
+this notion for their explication). If things did turn out to
+be as simple as this, then the "computer" analogy would
+no longer seem particularly relevant—any more than it does
+for one-celled animals, where the step from behavior to
+physiology is too short to make the notion of "levels" seem
+in point.
+This is to say that if physiology were simpler and more
+obvious than it is, nobody would have felt the need for
+psychology. This conclusion may seem odd, particularly in
+the light of Dodwell's remark (quoted above) that "the
+principle of the subroutine operation is not itself to be
+understood and explained just by examining the hardware,
+in just the same way that the point of multiplication tables
+could not be grasped by examining the brain."24 But this
+24 Fodor also has suggested that the distinction between "functional"
+(or "program") analysis and "mechanical" (or "hardware") analysis in
+psychology is irreducible and not just a matter of convenience. See his
+"Explanations in Psychology," in Philosophy in America, ed. M. Black
+(Ithaca, 1965), p. 177. I have argued against this suggestion in "Functionalism, Machines, and Incorrigibility," Journal of Philosophy 6g
+(1972), 203-220.
+237
+
+remark is seriously misleading. It embodies a confusion between the evident:
+If we did not know what multiplication was, looking into
+the brain would never tell us
+and the dubious:
+If we did know what multiplication was, we could not
+tell that someone was doing a certain bit of multiplication
+by looking at his brain.
+The latter is dubious because we just do not know whether
+or not there are quite simple neurophysiological parameters
+associated with certain mental operations. It is immensely
+unlikely that there are, but there is no a priori reason why
+some suitable brain-probe-cum-microscope might not show
+something which the trained observer would report as "Ah,
+you're multiplying forty-seven by twenty-five" (and be right
+every time). More generally, the question of what is best
+explained in hardware terms and what in program terms
+depends entirely on how ad hoc the hardware happens to be,
+and on how perspicuously it is laid out. Ad honess and
+perspicuousness are, obviously, relative to choice of vocabulary and level of abstraction—but then so is the hardwaresoftware distinction itself. Given the right sort of hardware and the right parameters, it certainly is possible to
+"understand and explain the principle of the subroutine
+just by examining the hardware." Indeed, we can imagine
+machines in which it would be easier to find out what the
+machine was up to by opening it up and looking than by
+reading the program.
+Since the brain is almost certainly not such a machine,
+the point here is one of principle, but the principle has
+25 On this sort of relativity, see William Kalke, "What Is Wrong
+with Fodor and Putnam's Functionalism," Nous 3 (1969), 83-94. For
+criticism of Kalke's paper and of my own parallel paper (cited in note
+24), see B. J. Nelson, "Functionalism and the Identity Theory," Journal
+of Philosophy 73 (1976), 379ff.
+238
+
+philosophical importance. For it shows that the distinction
+between psychology and physiology is not a distinction between two distinct subject matters in any stronger a sense
+than is, say, the distinction between chemistry and physics.
+It might have turned out that chemical phenomena such as
+the formation of compounds never had anything to do with
+the submicroscopic makeup of the elements in question.
+But in fact they do, and so now whether we use physicists'
+or chemists' terms to explain a reaction is a matter of convenience or pedagogy. If it turns out that physiology has as
+much to do with multiplying as electrons have to do with
+explosions, then the psychology-physiology distinction will
+be equally pragmatic. So the paradoxical conclusion offered
+earlier-that had physiology been more obvious psychology
+would never have arisen—-can be reaffirmed. Indeed, we can
+strengthen it and say that if the body had been easier to
+understand, nobody would have thought that we had a
+mind.z®
+It is time now to sum up this way of dealing with the
+infinite-regress argument. The central point is just that explanatory entities postulated by psychologists reduplicate
+problems in the explananda only when these problems
+are bad problems anyway-for example, "How is recognition possible?" Philosophers like Malcolm and Ryle are
+accustomed to bad philosophical answers to bad philosophical questions: "How is motion possible?-as the actualization of the potential qua potential"; "Why does nature
+follow laws?—because of God's benevolence and omnipotence." Consequently they tend to see such questions lurking
+behind even quite specific and limited research programs.
+They are not always wrong, since psychologists still some-
+26 As I trust chapter two has made clear, I do not mean by this that
+we should not have thought of ourselves as having beliefs and desires,
+and as seeing, inferring, and so on. But we would not have saddled ourselves with the notions of a "separable active intellect," a Cartesian
+"immaterial substance," or Lockean ideas. Our concept of mind would
+have been much closer to Ryle's or Aristotle's than to the Cartesian
+concept we presently have.
+239
+
+times offer their latest "model" as resolving ancient philosophical problems." But suppose such models as those
+Dodwell has in mind-proposals about subroutines which
+are neither introspectable (like the "executive process")
+nor physiologically decipherable (like the "hardware") —are
+viewed neither as contributions to resolving Cartesian
+pseudo-problems nor as discoveries about some nonphysical
+sort of entity. Then the infinite-regress argument has no
+force. For whether or not hardware-correlates for these
+subroutines ever turn up, the success in prediction and control of behavior made possible by the experimental discovery of such subroutines would be enough to show the
+reality of the objects of psychological inquiry 2 Dodwell's
+27 See, for example, Seymour Papert's "Introduction" to Warren S.
+McCulloch, Embodiments of Mind (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). Papert,
+in explaining the importance of McCulloch's work, tells us that "we
+need no longer be trapped by the dilemma" of
+a split... between psychology, which was based on mechanism but
+which was unable to reach the complex properties of thought, and
+philosophy, which took the properties of thought seriously but could
+be satisfied with no conceivable mechanism. (p. xiv)
+The insight which is to resolve this dilemma has as its "principal conceptual step"
+the recognition that a host of physically different situations involving
+the teleonomic regulation of behavior in mechanical, electrical, and
+even social systems should be understood as manifestations of one
+basic phenomenon: the return of information to form a closed central loop. (p. xvi)
+Papert here supposes that the "properties of thought" which bothered
+philosophers were those relevant to purposiveness. But neither the distinction between justification and causal explanation nor that between
+consciousness and its lack—which are the two great ways of dividing
+epistemology from psychology-is clarified by clarifying purposiveness.
+Nor would Bergsonians, who are worried by purposiveness, feel soothed
+by contemplating automatic record-changers
+28 It is tempting to think of "intervening variables" postulated by
+psychologists (with "subroutines" written in terms of them) as mere
+place-holders for undiscovered neurological processes. We usually do,
+indeed, assume that when neurophysiology reaches a certain point it
+will serve as a touchstone for choice among competing psychological
+240
+
+suggestion is that nothing succeeds like such success when it
+is a matter of establishing the nonmythical and "scientific"
+character of one's subject, and this may pretty well be the
+last word on the matter.
+Applying this point to the Rylean dilemma about acquired and unacquired abilities I sketched, we can cheerfully admit that any such model-building must grant that
+nature has wired in some unacquired abilities to perform
+higher-order mental operations. At least some of those little
+men performing subroutines in various brain-centers will
+have to have been there since birth. But why not? If one
+gives up the notion that empirical psychology is going to
+do what the British Empiricists failed to do-show how a
+tabula rasa gets changed into a complicated informationprocessing device by impacts upon peripheral sense-organs
+-then one will not be surprised that half of the adult's
+subroutines were wired into the infant's brain on instructions from the chromosomes. Further, it will not strike one
+as important to our understanding of the nature of man or
+his mind to discover just which were wired in then and
+which came along later.2 Finally, it will not seem odd that
+"models of the mind." But it is important to see that even if we
+somehow discovered that neurophysiology will never reach the stage
+we had hoped for, this disappointment would not make the psychologists' work any more dubious, either "methodologically" or "metaphysically."
+29 The notion that it is important to discover what is "innate" comes
+out in such questions as "Does all knowledge (information is the con.
+temporary term) come through the sense organs or is some knowledge
+contributed by the mind itself?" (J. J. and E. J. Gibson, "Perceptual
+Learning: Differentiation or Enrichment?" Psychological Review 62
+[1955], 32) Gibson and Gibson take this Kantian question with entire
+seriousness, and urge that, pace Hume and Helmholtz, perceptual
+learning is not unconscious inference from memory-traces, but simply
+"increased sensitivity to the variables of the stimulus array" (p. 40).
+Yet it is very difficult to imagine how experiment could help decide
+between this view and, say, Gregory's neo-Helmholtzian interpretation
+of standard experiments in perceptual learning. Cf. R. L. Gregory,
+Eye and Brain (New York and Toronto, 1966), especially such passages
+241
+
+something "abstract" (like a capacity for recognizing simi.
+larity in difference) is as unacquired as such "concrete"
+capacities as making a differential response to G-sharp. For
+we can simply remind ourselves that the latter is itself as
+"abstract" as an ability could well be, and no more abstract
+than any ability must be. The whole notion of concreteversus-abstract abilities, which is accepted as uncritically by
+Fodor as by Kant, is of a piece with the notion of the "irreducibly physical" versus the "irreducibly psychical." No-
+body can say how to draw these lines except in relation to
+the temporary purposes of inquiry. But the Cartesian attempt to draw them once and for all and the "empiricist"
+and "behaviorist" attempts to "reduce" the one to the other
+have created the view that certain deep mysteries which had
+confounded the philosophers may yet be penetrated by psychological research. The incautious use of the infinite-regress argument by Malcolm and Ryle should be seen, I
+believe, as an understandable reaction against this notion
+that psychology can succeed in solving problems which philosophers have posed.
+I can now tie together the result of examining the "infinite regress" argument with that of the last section by saying
+that the notion of psychological states as inner representations is unobjectionable but fairly uninteresting. To say
+that psychological states are states postulated to explain
+behavior, ones which we do not yet know how to identify
+with physiological states, is not to discover the true nature
+of the mind; it is only to reemphasize that there is no "nature" to be known. The analogy between minds and computers drawn by Dodwell and Fodor is better than Plato's
+analogy between minds and aviaries simply because the
+as at p. 11: "The senses do not give us a picture of the world directly;
+rather they provide evidence for checking hypotheses about what lies
+before us." See Fodor's discussion of Gibson, which I cite and briefly
+discuss in section 4.
+242
+
+former avoids the epistemologically (not metaphysically)
+misleading picture of introspection as observation of our interior. Illumination from such analogies is a matter of responding to what philosophers are worried about, and they
+are worried about unified science on the one hand and
+"subjectivity" on the other. If we agree that mentalistic explanations would not have arisen if our hardware had been
+more perspicuous, that will ke enough to make the mindbody distinction pragmatic rather than ontological. That,
+in turn, is enough to reconcile us to the fact that we may
+never get a neurophysiological account of what is going on
+inside us which is as perspicuously related to psychological
+states as the engineer's account of how the hardware "realizes" the computer's program. Once, for Quinean reasons,
+we stop thinking that the possibility or impossibility of
+such an account can be determined by "philosophical analysis," we can see that the unity of science is only endangered by ghosts, not by the unknown or the irreducible.
+Just as the suggestion that the atoms of Democritus and
+Newton's shining lights are merely geometrodynamical
+bumps does not bother anybody's "physicalistic" instincts,
+neither does Putnam's point that we shall never have a
+micro-particulate explanation of why square pegs will not
+fit in round holes. The permanent need for mentalistic talk
+only seems dangerous to philosophers who think of "the
+mental" as involving reference to ghosts, and Sellars's treatment of the givenness of the mental takes care of them.
+Sellars shows that when we introspect, no nonphysical item
+is present to a nonphysical observer. He thus wards off the
+threatened loss of "scientific objectivity." Once again, the
+seeds of metaphysical problems are found in epistemological
+difficulties, and specifically in the notion that to understand
+how we have a right to be so sure that we are nostalgic we
+must erect an ontological divide between nostalgia and
+neurons.
+243
+
+4. PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES AS REPRESENTATIONS
+We must, however, beware of attempts to erect a new sort
+of mental-physical barrier on the line which divides the abstract from the concrete, representations from non-representations, rather than along lines of greater and less certainty. To see what such an attempt looks like, consider
+Fodor's rehabilitation of traditional empiricist accounts of
+perception:
+It is, I take it, an empirical question whether psychological processes are computational processes. But if they
+are, then what must go on in perception is that a description of the environment that is not couched in a vocabulary whose terms designate values of physical variables is
+somehow computed on the basis of a description that is
+couched in such a vocabulary.so
+Fodor rightly says that if we are to have anything like a
+"psychological problem of perception" we must have some
+such model in mind. He criticizes Gibson's suggestion that
+we could avoid "the problem of how the (presumed) stimulus invariants are detected" by "distinguishing between the
+stimulus for the sensory transducers (viz., physical energies)
+and the stimulus for the perceptual organs (viz., abstract invariants)" by saying:
+... this way trivialization lies. If one is allowed to use
+the notion of a stimulus so as to distinguish the input to
+the retina (light energy) from the input to the optic system (patterns of light energy which exhibit invariances
+relevant, e.g., to the explanation of perceptual constancies), why not also talk about the stimulus for the whole
+organism (viz., perceptibles)? Thus, the answer to "How
+do we perceive bottles?" would go: "It is necessary and
+sufficient for the perception of a bottle that one detect the
+presence of the stimulus invariant bottle."
+30 Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought (New York, 1975), p. 47.
+244
+
+•.. What this shows, I think, is not that the psychological problem of perception is a muddle, but that stating
+the problem requires choosing (and motivating) a proprietary vocabulary for the representation of inputs. I
+have argued that the vocabulary of values of physical
+parameters is appropriate on the plausible assumption
+that sensory transducers detect values of physical parameters and that all perceptual knowledge is mediated by
+the activity of sensory transducers. (p. 4gn.)
+Here Fodor confronts the question I raised in discussing
+Quine's attempt to view psychology as naturalized epistemology: If the choice of what is datal is a matter of some.
+thing deeper than consensus among observers, expressible
+in ordinary language, then what criterion can the psychologist use in isolating the "input to our cognitive mechanism"?
+Quine wobbles on the point, but Fodor firmly and sensibly
+tells us that, unless we take something which our subject
+need not know about as his input, we shall trivialize the
+notion of "processing in the cognitive mechanism." To my
+earlier rhetorical question "Could psychology discover that
+the input to the cognitive mechanism is not at the retina,
+but rather halfway down the optic nerve?" Fodor would
+presumably answer: Yes, for doing it one way rather than
+another depends upon which way of drawing lines around
+black boxes best splits the organism into the sort of transducers and processors whose descriptions make up a general
+and fruitful theory of cognitive processing.
+Notice that this answer takes away any connection between the question "How do we recognize bottles" and the
+question "What is indubitably given to the mind, such as
+to serve as an infallible touchstone for inference?" For the
+question "What does the subject have a right to believe
+without conscious inference?" or, more precisely, "What
+sort of thing can he justify merely by such remarks as I
+saw it clear as I see you now' or 'I know English'" has
+nothing whatever to do with the question "What bit of the
+245
+
+organism shall we pick as interface with the world?" or
+more precisely, "What choice shall we make of 'a propri.
+etary vocabulary for the representation of inputs'?" Fodor
+is admirably explicit on this point:
+But whatever relevance the distinction between states of
+the organism and states of its nervous system may have for
+some purposes, there is no particular reason to suppose
+that it is relevant to the purposes of cognitive psychology.
+(p. 52)
+... the states of the organism postulated in theories of
+cognition would not count as states of the organism for
+purposes of, say, a theory of legal or moral responsibility.
+But so what? What matters is that they should count as
+states of the organism for some useful purpose. In particular, what matters is that they should count as states of the
+organism for purposes of constructing psychological theories that are true. (p. 53)
+We need only add that what goes for moral or legal responsibility goes also for epistemic responsibility-the organism's being justified in believing this or that. No roads
+lead from the discovery of the organism's various interfaces
+with the world to criticisms of the organism's views about
+the world, or, more generally, from psychology to epistemology. What the empiricists got right about perception was
+that the sense-organs must be thought of as having a vocabulary that is impoverished compared to the "vocabulary in
+which the hypotheses are couched"—couched by either the
+processing units) or the subject itself. They were doubtless
+also right in commending Galileo for preferring his eyes to
+his Aristotle, but this epistemological judgment has no particular connection with their theory of perception.
+We can now see that fodor's picture of the mind as a
+system of inner representations has nothing to do with the
+image of the Mirror of Nature I have been criticizing. The
+crucial point is that there is no way to raise the skeptical
+question "How well do the subject's internal representations
+246
+
+represent reality?" about Fodor's "language of thought."
+In particular there is no way to ask where, or how well, the
+products of spontaneity's theories represent the source of
+receptivity's evidence, and thus no way to be skeptical about
+the relation between appearance and reality. Nor is there
+anything general to say about the gap between the evidence
+contributed by receptivity and the theories contrived by
+spontaneity. A different sort of gap is crossed by the requirement that the vocabulary of a sensory mechanism be
+composed of "natural kind terms in some (ideally completed) physical science" (p. 45). This vocabulary will be
+"more impoverished" than that of the "processors" in the
+sense that there will be a many-one relation between sets of
+values of physical parameters and the terms which the
+processors use in their hypotheses. The relation will thus
+be like that between science and common sense. The
+Quinean "underdetermination of theory by evidence" is
+thus built into the model, in that many common-sensical
+ways of speaking will be compatible with the one true
+(ideally completed) description of the world by physical
+science, and many possible "processor" languages can mediate between these. To find out something epistemological
+by learning features of "the language of thought" would only
+be possible if, in between the scientific vocabulary used by
+sensory mechanisms and the various vocabularies consciously used by the subject, there were a vocabulary used by the
+processors, knowledge of which would help the subject discover the truth about things in general. Only this sort of
+"psychological reality" could take the place of "what is
+given to the mind without interpretation" as an epistemo.
+logical touchstone of justification. But it is hard to see why
+the psychological reality of certain colors, grammars, or
+moral principles will correspond to their use in explaining
+or judging nonpsychological realities. We should expect
+such correspondence only if we view the processing units
+which psychological theory isolates as in some way "our
+better part," the successor of reason as the natural ruler over
+247
+
+the rest of the soul, or as our true self. Fodor and cognitive
+psychology have no interest in any such honorific status
+for the internal code; that code, like FoRTRAN, or the binary
+representation of numbers, is just a code, not an aid in telling the true from the false.
+To see this point against the background of the previous
+chapters, recall the claim that the epistemological tradition
+confused causal explanations of the acquisition of belief
+with justifications of belief. When causal explanations are
+given in the internal code, the assumption that this code
+can be used to detect the acquisition of true belief would
+amount to the assumption that "truth-generating mental
+processes" were natural kinds within psychological theory.
+But Fodor would presumably agree that there is no reason
+whatever to think that such evaluative terms mark out such
+natural kinds. As he says about creativity:
+It may be that the processes we think of as creative don't
+form a natural kind for purposes of psychological explanation, but that, nevertheless, every instance of such
+a process is an instance of rule-guided, computational activity of one sort or another.... The categories creative /
+boring may simply cross-classify the taxonomy that psychology employs.
+My main point, however, is that the mere fact that
+creative mental processes are mental processes does not
+ensure that they have explanations in the language of
+psychology under any of their descriptions. It may be that
+good ideas... are species of mental states which don't
+have mental causes. (Pp. 201-202)
+The rise of the notion of knowledge as a matter of rightly
+ordered inner representations—an unclouded and undistorting Mirror of Nature-was due to the notion that the
+difference between the man whose beliefs were true and the
+man whose beliefs were false was a matter of "how their
+minds worked." If this phrase is taken in the sense of "what
+they would say in a conversation," it is true but shallow
+248
+
+and unphilosophical. To make it deep and philosophical,
+one must believe, with Descartes and Locke, that a taxonomy of mental entities and processes will lead to discoveries which will provide one with a method of discovering truth, and not just truth about the mind.". But Fodor's
+envisaged psychological taxonomy is not an epistemological
+taxonomy. It leaves both the method and the substance of
+the various other disciplines which make up culture to sink
+or swim on their own. Only the assumption that one day
+the various taxonomies put together by, for example, Chomsky, Piaget, Lévi-Strauss, Marx, and Freud will all flow together and spell out one great Universal Language of Na-
+ture-an assumption sometimes attributed to structuralism
+—would suggest that cognitive psychology had epistemological import. But that suggestion would still be as misguided as the suggestion that, since we may predict everything by knowing enough about matter in motion, a completed neurophysiology will help us demonstrate Galileo's
+superiority to his contemporaries. The gap between explaining ourselves and justifying ourselves is just as great whether a programming language or a hardware language is used
+in the explanations.
+It might be thought, however, that if we construe epistemology not as certifying success in discovering truth but
+rather as developing canons of rationality, then a know!-
+edge of the internal code will give us something to go on.
+Fodor, perhaps unintentionally, suggests such a view when
+31 Cf. Hiram Caton, The Origins of Subjectivity: An Essay on Descartes (New Haven, 1973), p. 53: "The great difference between the
+Aristotelian and Cartesian methodology is that, for Descartes, mind is
+a principle of science." Contrast the lack of connection between the
+De Anima and the Posterior Analytics with Locke's assumption that an
+inquiry into "the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion and assent"
+can be carried out by a "historical, plain method" which begins with
+"the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call
+them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his
+mind, and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished
+with them" (Essay I, 1, ii-iii).
+249
+
+he speaks of the discovery of this code as showing "how
+rationality is structured." But the only content he gives to
+this notion of "rationality" is provided by the following
+passage:
+If the main line of this book is right, then the language of
+thought provides the medium for internally representing
+the psychologically salient aspects of the organism's environment; to the extent that it is specifiable in this language-and only to this extent-does such information
+fall under the computational routines that constitute the
+organism's cognitive repertoire. ... But now I want to
+add that some organisms, at least, appear to have considerable freedom in determining how this representational system shall be employed and that that freedom is
+typically rationally exploited. ... If subjects really do
+calculate how internal representations are to be deployed,
+then these calculations, too, must be defined over representations; i.e., over representations of representations.
+Some properties of the language of thought must, in
+short, be represented in the language of thought since
+the ability to represent representations is, presumably,
+a precondition of the ability to manipulate representations rationally, 32
+Here "rationality" means the adjustment of means to ends,
+and the ability of organisms to do this with their representations differs from their ability to do it with their hormones
+only in that a metalinguistic vocabulary is required to describe the former ability. But to grasp the metalinguistic
+vocabulary which the organism uses for this purpose is not
+to grasp anything as general as the phrase "the structure of
+rationality" might suggest, but rather something as particular as the tricks the programmer employs to insure that the
+computer will switch from one subroutine to another as
+needed to optimize efficiency. We do not understand more
+32 Fodor, The Language of Thought, p. 172.
+250
+
+about what it is to be a rational inquirer or agent from
+understanding such tricks than we do from understanding
+what makes the pituitary gland release this hormone rather
+than that. Nor would it make sense to criticize the subject's
+conscious representation of his environment-that is, the
+vocabulary in which he states his views—on the ground that
+it did not represent these aspects as well as do "the com.
+putational routines that constitute the organism's cognitive
+repertoire." "Rational" is no better than "true" (or "honest"
+or "chaste" or "good") as a candidate for an evaluative notion which we might understand better by knowing how
+our mind works. For our judgment as to how rationally
+evolution has designed us, or how rational evolution has
+managed to make us, must be made by reference to our
+views on the ends we are to serve. Knowledge of how our
+mind works is not more relevant than knowledge of how
+our glands or our molecules work to the development or
+correction of such views.
+If we are to find epistemological relevance in the doctrine of internal representations, then, it will have to be in
+the rationalist overtones of the "innatist" views common to
+Chomsky and Fodor rather than their explicit antireductionist intent. An inference from the Chomsky-Fodor notion
+of a wired-in language (and metalanguage) of thought to a
+rationalist epistemology is offered by Vendler. Consider the
+following provocatively anti-Wittgensteinian passage:
+... the most reasonable explanation is that a child must
+learn his native tongue in a way similar to the way one
+learns a second language. He must have, in other words, a
+native equipment that codes the fundamental illocutionary, syntactic, and semantic features of any possible human language. ... Such a system of native "ideas" provides the framework which is then filled up progressively
+through the influence of a more specific code representing
+the features of the mother tongue.... As for the content
+of this native stock of concepts, we can at the present time
+251
+
+do no more than make educated guesses. Yet, I think,
+the task of spelling it out in detail is not an impossible
+one: Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and recently Chomsky
+have succeeded in marking out domains that must belong
+to this framework. ... These are, then, the "clear and
+distinct" ideas which lend intelligibility to the rest. They
+are "a priori" in origin and self-contained in their development: experience cannot change their content. No experience is relevant to one's idea of what it is to assert or
+to request something; what it is to believe or to decide;
+what is truth or necessity; what is a person, an object, a
+process, or a state; what are change, purpose, causation,
+time, extension, and number. If these ideas need clarification, the way to obtain it is to reflect on what we all
+implicitly know and show forth in the correct use of
+language....'
+This inference from a wired-in vocabulary to a set of beliefs
+which can only be "clarified" and not changed runs up
+against Quine's criticism of the distinctions between fact
+and language, science and philosophy, clarifying meanings
+and changing beliefs. But a more fundamental objection is
+that Vendler requires not just the premise that there is a
+fixed language of thought but the premise that our knowledge of the nature of that language is itself immune to correction on the basis of experience. This is the same premise
+which Kant used when explaining that we could understand our possession of synthetic a priori truths if and only
+if our mind contributed those truths34 But Fodor's claim
+that the discovery of the language of thought will be a longdrawn-out empirical process has as a corollary that we may
+always be quite wrong about what this language is, and
+thus wrong about what is a priori. Kant's claim that if we
+know what goes on inside we can legitimize our certainties
+before the tribunal of pure reason harks back to Descartes's
+33 Zeno Vendler, Res Cogitans (Ithaca, N.Y., 1972), pp. 140-141.
+34 K.d.r. V., Bxvii.
+252
+
+claim that "nothing is easier for the mind to know than itself." But though epistemology is an armchair discipline,
+psychology is not; this is one reason why psychology cannot
+serve epistemological ends.35
+I can sum up this discussion of inner representations by
+recurring once more to the confusion between explanation
+and justification. The notion of "representation," as it is employed by psychologists, is ambiguous as between, roughly,
+pictures and propositions-between, for example, retinal
+images (or their counterparts somewhere deep in the visual
+cortex) and beliefs such as "That's red and rectangular."
+Only the latter serve as premises, but only the former are
+"unmediated," and the tradition of British empiricism ran
+them together, with familiar results. Fodor's representationsin-the-processors are propositions rather than pictures, so
+they are not subject to Green's and Sellars's criticisms of the
+empiricist notion of "givenness." On the other hand, they
+are not necessarily propositions toward which the subject
+has attitudes. Indeed, the subject's attitudes toward those
+propositions of which he is cognizant float free of the views
+of the processors. As Dennett remarks in criticism of Fodor,
+35 An interesting non-Chomskyan attempt to link up epistemology
+with psychology is offered by Gilbert Harman in Thought (Princeton,
+1973). He finds the connection between the two in the topic of "Gettier
+examples"-examples in which true justified belief is not knowledge
+because, roughly, a person is assumed to have used a false premise in
+the inference which led him to the belief in question. Harman needs
+a theory of "real reasons" for believing, and this leads him to what he
+describes as "psychologism" (pp. 15ff.). However, it is not clear whether
+Harman can find a link between empirical psychological inquiry and
+the armchair postulation of specific unconscious inferences (involving
+"real reasons") as demanded by our intuitions about Gettier examples.
+See Michael Williams, "Inference, Justification and the Analysis of
+Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978), 249-263, and Harman's
+"Using Intuitions about Reasoning to Study Reasoning: A Reply to
+Williams," ibid., 433-438. If Harman is able to establish such a link
+he will have isolated something right in Locke's attempt to treat knowledge in terms of the mechanics of inner space. But a link between
+justification and psychological processes would still be missing.
+253
+
+two subjects can hold the same belief even if their respective
+processors don't even speak the same language.3® So there
+need be no inference from the propositions held by the processors to those held by the subject, even though attributing
+various propositional attitudes to processors may be the best
+possible way of explaining how the subject came to hold
+the belief that he did. Unlike the empiricist's "ideas," the
+causal process which runs from the retinal images through
+various propositional attitudes held by various processors to
+the output of the subject's speech center need not correspond to any train of inference which justifies the subject's
+views. Explanation may be private, in the sense that, for all
+we know or care, physiological quirks might make yellow
+men or red-haired men process information in quite different languages and by quite different methods than do white
+men, web-footed men, or whatever. But justification is public, in the sense that dispute between these various people
+about what to believe will probably make no reference to
+how their quirky minds work, nor should it. So the claim
+that we possess a system of internal representations embodies, at worst, not only the confusion between pictures
+and propositions but a more general confusion between
+causation and inference.
+In fact, however, this confusion is present only in philosophical interpretations of cognitive psychology, not in
+actual psychological explanation. When Wittgensteinians
+criticize psychology it is not really psychology but the confusion of epistemology with psychology which is their target.
+Psychologists, out of a misguided urge to be "philosophical,"
+sometimes make this confusion. Contemporary psychologists, in revolt against behaviorism, sometimes like to think
+36 Daniel Dennett, "Critical Notice" of The Language of Thought,
+Mind 86 (1977), 278: "If one agrees with Fodor that it is the job of
+cognitive psychology to map the psychologically real processes in people, then since the ascription of belief and desire is only indirectly tied
+to such processes, one might well say that beliefs and desires are not
+the proper objects of study of cognitive psychology."
+254
+
+of themselves as doing "scientifically" what Locke and Kant
+did in their armchairs. But there is all the difference in the
+world between saying:
+We must isolate those nonpropositional items of awareness which are the foundation for belief in propositions
+and saying:
+We can treat items such as patterns of neural excitation as
+if they were beliefs in order to use the metaphor of "inference from data" in constructing models of mental processes.37
+Psychologists need say only the latter. If they confine themselves to this, they can follow Putnam in treating the distinc.
+tion between "brain process" and "mental process" as of no
+greater philosophical interest than that between "hardware
+description" and "description of the program."38 The
+temptation to say the former-the epistemologically motivated temptation to "discover the link between the mind
+and the body"-can be treated on a par with the temptation
+to raise the question "How can the computer tell that the
+pattern of electrical charges coming down the wire is the
+total of the day's cash receipts?" The whole seventeenthcentury notion that we learn more about what we should
+believe by understanding better how we work can be seen
+to be as misguided as the notion that we shall learn whether
+to grant civil rights to robots by understanding better how
+they work. The man-machine analogy will be seen as helping us not only as a source for useful models of organisms,
+31 On this difference, see the strictures of J. O. Urmson, "Recognition," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1955-56), 259-280.
+38 See Putnam's 1g60 article "Minds and Machines," reprinted in
+Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge, 1975), PP. 362-385 (especially the concluding paragraphs). Putnam was the first philosopher to
+point out clearly that the moral of the analogies between computers
+and people was not "Computers help us understand the relation between mind and body" but rather "There cannot be any problem about
+the relation between mind and body."
+255
+
+but as helping us bear in mind the difference between men
+as objects of explanation and men as moral agents, concerned to justify their beliefs and their actions. It may also
+help us, as I shall be claiming in chapters seven and eight,
+to give up the notion that these two ways of viewing ourselves need to be "synthesized."
+256
+
+CHAPTER VI
+Epistemology and Philosophy of Language
+1. PURE AND IMPURE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
+There are two sources for the discipline presently called
+"philosophy of language." One is the cluster of problems
+pointed out by Frege and discussed, for example, by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus and by Carnap in Meaning and
+Necessity. These are problems about how to systematize our
+notions of meaning and reference in such a way as to take
+advantage of quantificational logic, preserve our intuitions
+about modality, and generally produce a clear and intuitively satisfying picture of the way in which notions like
+"truth," "meaning." "necessity," and "name" fit together. I
+shall call this set of problems the subject matter of "pure"
+philosophy of language—a discipline which has no epistemological parti pris, nor, indeed, any relevance to most of
+the traditional concerns of modern philosophy. An ancestry
+can be traced for some of Frege's problems in Parmenides,
+Plato's Sophist, and some other ancient and medieval writings, but they are issues which rarely intersect with other
+textbook "problems of philosophy."
+The second source for contemporary philosophy of language is explicitly epistemological. The source of this "impure" philosophy of language is the attempt to retain Kant's
+picture of philosophy as providing a permanent ahistorical
+framework for inquiry in the form of a theory of knowledge.
+The "linguistic turn," as I have said in chapter four, started
+as the attempt to produce a nonpsychologistic empiricism by
+rephrasing philosophical questions as questions of "logic."
+1 Consider the difficulty of tying in the Sophist with the Republic,
+or Meaning and Necessity with the Logical Structure of the World.
+257
+
+Empiricist and phenomenalist doctrines could now, it was
+thought, be put as the results of "the logical analysis of language" rather than as empirical psychological generalizations. More generally, philosophical points about the nature
+and extent of human knowledge (e.g., those which Kant
+made about knowledge-claims concerning God, freedom,
+and immortality) could be stated as remarks about language.
+Treating philosophy as the analysis of language seemed to
+unite the merits of Hume with those of Kant. Hume's empiricism seemed substantively true, but methodologically
+shaky because it reposed on nothing more than an empirical
+theory of the acquisition of knowledge. Kant's criticisms of
+"bad" philosophy (e.g., natural theology) seemed both more
+systematic and more forceful than Hume's, but seemed to
+presuppose the possibility of a nonempirical methodology.
+Language, unlike transcendental synthesis, seemed a suitably
+"natural" field of inquiry-but, unlike introspective psychology, linguistic analysis seemed to offer the promise of a
+priori truth. To say that a material substance was constituted by the synthesis of a manifold of intuition under an
+a priori concept seemed "metaphysical" whereas to say that
+any meaningful remark about such a substance could be put
+in terms of phenomenalistic hypothetical statements seemed
+both necessarily true and methodologically unmysterious.?
+Kant had taught that the only way in which a priori knowledge could be possible was if it were knowledge of our
+contribution-the contribution of our faculty of spontaneity-to the constitution of the object of knowledge.
+Rephrased by Bertrand Russell and C. I. Lewis, this became
+the view that every true statement contained our contribution (in the form of the meanings of the component terms)
+2 Cf. Hilary Putnam's discussion of idealism and phenomenalism in
+Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 14-19. Putnam
+there presents the traditional view, which I have been denying, that
+the "linguistic turn" enabled philosophers to provide substantive solutions to traditional problems.
+258
+
+as well as the world's (in the form of the facts of senseperception).
+The attack on this latter notion which I described in
+chapter four has produced two strikingly different movements in recent philosophy of language. One of these is best
+represented by Davidson, and the other by Putnam. The first
+reaction is in the direction of a purified and de-epistemol.
+ogized conception of the philosophy of language. One outcome of so recasting the subject is to discard what Davidson
+calls "the third dogma" of empiricism, namely, the "dualism
+of scheme and content, of organizing system and something
+waiting to be organized"—a dogma which I have argued in
+chapter four is central to epistemology generally as well as
+to empiricism in particular. Davidson distinguishes between philosophical projects which form part of "the theory
+of meaning properly so-called" and those motivated by
+"some adventitious philosophical puritanism."* Roughly,
+Frege and Tarski pursued the first sort of project, whereas
+Russell and Carnap and Quine mingled pure theory of
+meaning with impure epistemological considerations—those
+which led them, at various times and in various ways, to
+various forms of operationalism, verificationism, behaviorism, conventionalism, and reductionism. Each of these was
+an expression of an underlying "philosophical puritanism"
+which held that anything incapable of being "logically constructed" out of certainties (the data of sense, or the rules
+of language) was suspicious.
+In Davidson's view, the question of "how language works"
+has no special connection with the question of "how
+knowledge works." The fact that truth is discussed in con-
+3 See Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,"
+Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 47(1973-74), 11.
+* Donald Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," Synthese 7 (1967), 316.
+5 Putnam trenchantly criticizes Quine on this point. Cf. Putnam,
+Mind, Language and Reality, pp. 153-191 ("The Refutation of Conventionalism"). However, as I shall be arguing, Putnam himself becomes involved in the same confusion.
+259
+
+nection with both questions should not mislead us into
+thinking that we can infer
+A theory of meaning will analyze the meaning of all
+referring expressions other than those for sensory qualia
+in terms of those which do refer to sensory qualia
+from
+Our only evidence for empirical truths is the patterns of
+qualia in our sensory fields.
+A theory of meaning, for Davidson, is not an assemblage of
+"analyses" of the meanings of individual terms, but rather
+an understanding of the inferential relations between sentences.® To understand these relations is to understand the
+truth-conditions for the sentences of English, but for lots of
+simple sentences ("An oak is a tree," "Russia is our fatherland," "Death is inevitable") there are no more enlightening
+truth-conditions to be given than for "Snow is white."
+The case is different with sentences ascribing beliefs or
+actions, however, or those containing adverbial modifiers—
+or any other sentence such that the inferential relationships
+obtaining between it and neighboring sentences are not
+revealed by the ordinary apparatus of quantificational logic
+without reparsing. In these cases, we get truth-conditions
+which are not trivial, are hard to construct, and are testable
+only by their susceptibility to integration within a theory of
+truth-conditions for other sentences. "The desired effect,"
+Davidson says, "is standard in theory building: to extract a
+rich concept (here something reasonably close to translation) from thin little bits of evidence (here the truth values
+of sentences) by imposing a formal structure on enough
+bits."" Not only has this program nothing to do with epis-
+B See Davidson, "Truth and Meaning." pp. 316-318.
+" Donald Davidson, "In Defense of Convention T" in Truth, Syntax
+and Modality, ed. H. Leblanc (Amsterdam, 1973), p. 84. For the bland
+metaphysical upshot of the theory, see Davidson's "The Method of
+260
+
+temology, but its "ontological" results are bound to be bland.
+It does not, for example, serve any of the usual sentimental
+purposes of metaphysical system-building to learn from
+Davidson that we probably just have to go ahead and quantify over persons, rather than "reducing" them to things, in
+order to have a truth-theory for action-sentences. The philosophical interest of the program is, indeed, largely negative:
+by showing what philosophy of language comes to when
+purified of attempts to imitate either Kant or Hume, it
+throws the "adventitious puritanisms" of earlier programs
+into bold relief. The actual results of the hard work on
+adverbial modification and the like which would result from
+concerted efforts to carry out Davidson's suggestions would
+do little to help or hinder any solution of any of the textbook problems of philosophy.
+Davidson's work can best be seen as carrying through
+Quine's dissolution of the distinction between questions of
+meaning and questions of fact—his attack on the linguistic
+reinterpretation of Kant's distinction between the receptivity of sense and the a priori concepts given by spontaneity.
+Davidson is saying that if we are serious in renouncing an
+a priori knowledge of meaning, then the theory of meaning
+is going to be an empirical theory. Thus there can be no
+special province for such a theory save, roughly, the traditional province of the grammarian-the attempt to find
+ways of describing sentences which help to explain how
+those sentences are used. From this perspective, Quine's
+"canonical notation" should not be conceived of as an
+attempt "to limn the true and ultimate structure of reality,'*
+but rather as an attempt to find the most perspicuous ways
+of describing a fairly small portion of reality-the use of
+language. The point of constructing a "truth theory of
+English" is not to enable philosophical problems to be put
+Truth in Metaphysics," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977), PP.
+244-254, especially the concluding paragraphs.
+8 W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 221.
+261
+
+in a formal mode of speech, nor to explain the relationship
+between words and the world, but simply to lay out perspicuously the relation between parts of a social practice
+(the use of certain sentences) and other parts (the use of
+other sentences).
+The opposite approach to Davidson's in recent philosophy of language is found in Dummett and in Putnam.
+Dummett still holds to the slogan common to Vienna and
+Oxford-the claim that "philosophy has, as its first if not its
+only task, the analysis of meanings." Davidson, as far as I can
+see, has no such attachment to the notion of "analyzing
+meanings." Dummett goes on to say something which
+Davidson does not, and which he would, as far as I can see,
+have no reason to say: "the theory of meaning, which is the
+search for such a model, is the foundation of all philosophy,
+and not epistemology, as Descartes misled us into believing."*
+In the view which I am urging in this book, this claim is
+multiply misleading. For it is misleading to say that Descartes misled us into believing that epistemology was the
+foundation of all philosophy. Rather, what he did was to
+make it possible for Locke and Kant to develop an epistemological problematic which replaced the scholastic problematic. He made possible a discipline in which metaphysics
+was a matter of making the world safe for clear and distinct
+ideas and for moral obligation, and in which the problems
+of moral philosophy became problems of meta-ethics, problems of the justification of moral judgment. This is not to
+make epistemology the foundation of philosophy so much
+as to invent something new-epistemology-to bear the
+9 Michael Dummett, Frege's Philosophy of Language (London, 1973),
+p. 559. In his polemics against Davidson's holism, Dummett insists that
+one cannot have an adequate philosophy of language without the
+two Kantian distinctions (given-versus-interpreted and necessary-versus-contingent) attacked by Quine and Sellars. See especially "What Is
+a Theory of Meaning? (I)" in Samuel Guttenplan, ed., Mind and Language (Oxford, 1975), pp. 97-138. The defense of the former distinction
+is most explicit at p. 137 and of the latter at pp. 117ff.
+262
+
+name "philosophy." The picture of ancient and medieval
+philosophy as concerned with things, the philosophy of the
+seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries with ideas, and
+the enlightened contemporary philosophical scene with
+words has considerable plausibility. But this sequence
+should not be thought of as offering three contrasting views
+about what is primary, or what is foundational. It is not
+that Aristotle thought that one could best explain ideas and
+words in terms of things, whereas Descartes and Russell
+rearranged the order of explanation. It would be more correct to say that Aristotle did not have-did not feel the need
+of—a theory of knowledge, and that Descartes and Locke did
+not have a theory of meaning.!° Aristotle's remarks about
+knowing do not offer answers, good or bad, to Lockes questions, any more than Locke's remarks about language offer
+answers to Frege's.
+Dummett sees philosophy of language as foundational
+because he sees epistemological issues now, at last, being
+formulated correctly as issues within the theory of meaning.
+He agrees with Descartes about the importance of the issues
+which emerged out of the "way of ideas," but he thinks that
+we have only recently been able to state them properly. Just
+as Spinoza and Leibniz thought that they were doing well
+what the scholastic metaphysicians had done awkwardly
+(e.g., investigating the nature of substance), so Dummett
+and Putnam think that they are doing well what epistemologists have done awkwardly (investigating the issue between
+realism and idealism). But Descartes, we can see by hindsight, was self-deceived; by the time of Kant it became clear
+that if we start from Cartesian concerns we are not going to
+be able to raise the good old metaphysical questions. Davidson stands to Russell, Putnam, and Dummett, in this respect, as Kant stood to Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz.
+Davidson's distinction between giving a theory of meaning
+10 See Ian Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?
+(Cambridge, 1975), p. 43.
+263
+
+and "adventitious philosophical puritanism" is a contemporary parallel to Kant's distinction between the legitimate
+and the illegitimate uses of reason.
+If we adopt this view of new philosophical paradigms
+nudging old problems aside, rather than providing new
+ways of stating or solving them, then we will see the second
+("impure") type of philosophy of language as a last nostalgic attempt to hook up a new kind of philosophical activity
+with an old problematic. We will see Dummett's notion of
+philosophy of language as "first philosophy" as mistaken not
+because some other area is "first" but because the notion of
+philosophy as having foundations is as mistaken as that of
+knowledge having foundations. In this conception, "philos
+ophy" is not a name for a discipline which confronts permanent issues, and unfortunately keeps misstating them, or
+attacking them with clumsy dialectical instruments. Rather,
+it is a cultural genre, a "voice in the conversation of mankind" (to use Michael Oakeshott's phrase), which centers on
+one topic rather than another at some given time not by
+dialectical necessity but as a result of various things happening elsewhere in the conversation (the New Science, the
+French Revolution, the modern novel) or of individual men
+of genius who think of something new (Hegel, Marx, Frege,
+Freud, Wittgenstein, Heidegger), or perhaps of the resultant
+of several such forces. Interesting philosophical change (we
+might say "philosophical progress," but this would be question-begging) occurs not when a new way is found to deal
+with an old problem but when a new set of problems
+emerges and the old ones begin to fade away. The temptation (both in Descartes's time and in ours) is to think that
+the new problematic is the old one rightly seen. But, for all
+the reasons Kuhn and Feyerabend have offered in their
+criticism of the "textbook" approach to the history of inquiry, this temptation should be resisted.
+In this chapter, I shall be largely engaged in urging this
+"Kuhnian" conception of the relation between philosophy
+of language and traditional philosophical problems, in op-
+264
+
+position to Dummett's more familiar (and, I think, generally accepted) view of their relation. I shall do so by
+criticizing "impure" philosophy of language and its illicit
+transfers of problems from epistemology into philosophy of
+language. Evidently, I cannot survey the whole field, so I
+shall stick to a topic that provides the greatest temptation
+to think that explanations of how language works will also
+help us see how "language hooks onto the world" and thus
+how truth and knowledge are possible. This is the so-called
+issue of conceptual change, around which most recent polemics about "realism," "pragmatism," "verificationism,"
+"idealism," and "conventionalism" have centered. I think
+that Davidson is right in saying that the notion of "conceptual change" is itself incoherent, and that we need to
+see through it in order to recognize why debates about it
+seem both so important and so unlikely to be resolved.
+So I shall, in the next section, discuss the issues purportedly raised by theory-change for epistemology on the
+one hand and for philosophy of language on the other.
+Then, in succeeding sections, I shall discuss Putnam's "realistic" response to these issues in some detail, since Putnam's
+work seems to me the clearest statement of an "impure"
+program. I shall be contrasting it with a "pure" or "pragmatist" or "language-game" approach to language, which I
+think is illustrated by Sellars and by Wittgenstein as well as
+by Davidson (despite the differences which may seem to set
+these three in opposition to one another). I hope thereby to
+show that the issue between the two approaches is not a
+replay of the issues which separated realists from idealists
+and pragmatists in the days of philosophy-as-epistemology,
+and indeed is not really an issue about language at all. I
+shall be claiming that if we press Quine's and Davidson's
+criticisms of the language-fact and scheme-content distinctions far enough, we no longer have dialectical room to state
+an issue concerning "how language hooks onto the world"
+between the "realist" and the "idealist" (or the "pragmatist"). The need to construct such an issue seems to me
+265
+
+one more manifestation of the Kantian need for an overarching permanent neutral matrix within which to "place"
+and criticize past and future inquiry. This nostalgia for
+philosophy as an architectonic and encompassing discipline
+survives in contemporary philosophy of language only because of the vague association of "language" with "the a
+priori" and of the latter with "philosophy." Insofar as there
+is a real issue between "realists" and "pragmatists" in contemporary philosophy of language it seems to me a metaphilosophical one—the issue about whether philosophy can
+retain its Kantian self-image once the notion of language as
+the source of a priori knowledge is dropped. On this point,
+to be sure, I shall be siding with the "pragmatists." But I
+hope that my discussion may help to frame this metaphilosophical issue in less Aesopian language than that in which
+it is usually stated.
+2. WHAT WERE OUR ANCESTORS TALKING ABOUT?
+Was Aristotle wrong about motion being divided into
+natural and forced? Or was he talking about something
+different from what we talk about when we talk about
+motion? Did Newton give right answers to questions to
+which Aristotle had given wrong answers? Or were they
+asking different questions? This sort of conundrum has
+inspired a great deal of the best work in philosophy of
+science and philosophy of language in recent years. Yet,
+like most philosophical puzzles, its motives and presuppositions are of more interest than the various solutions which
+have been offered. Why, after all, should we think that there
+is a more interesting answer to these questions than to the
+question of whether the ship of Theseus endured the change
+of each of its planks? Why should we think that the question
+"What did they mean?" or "What were they referring to?"
+is going to have a determinate answer? Why should it not be
+answerable in either way, depending on what heuristic con-
+266
+
+siderations are relevant to some particular historiographical
+purpose?
+The reason we think that there should be determinate
+answers here is, at a first approximation, that we think that
+the history of the pursuit of truth should be different from
+the history of poetry or politics or clothes. We may well feel
+that questions like "Did the Greeks mean 'temperance' by
+owøpooúvn?" and "Do the Nuer refer to the soul as koth?"
+can be dismissed by saying that there is no special reason to
+think that any given one-word expression in one culture can
+be matched with a one-word expression in a very different
+culture. Indeed, we may feel that even lengthy paraphrases
+will be of little help, and that we must just get into the
+swing of the exotic language-game." But in the case of
+science, such an attitude seems perverse. Here, we are inclined to say, there jolly well is something out there—motion
+and its laws, for example-which people either meant to
+refer to, or at least were referring to without realizing it.
+Scientific inquiry is supposed to discover what sorts of
+objects there are in the world and what properties they
+have. Anybody who conducted serious inquiry could only
+have been asking which predicates were to be pinned on
+which things. When we find it hard to say which thing
+Aristotle was talking about, we feel that there must be a
+right answer somewhere, because he must have been talking
+about some of the things we talk about. Even if he imagined
+unreal objects and uninstantiated properties, he must have
+given sense to his talk about them by some intertwined talk
+about, or other interaction with, what was really there. This
+feeling is the root of instrumentalist remarks like "All this
+talk about kinds and laws of motion is just a complicated
+way of classifying sensory experiences." This need to say
+that talk about something we don't recognize is "really"
+11 See Clifford Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive
+Theory of Culture" in his The Interpretation of Cultures (New York,
+1973).
+267
+
+talk about something we do recognize used to be gratified by
+simply assuming (in "Whiggish" fashion) that our misguided ancestors had "really" been talking about whatever
+our best-approved contemporary inquirers claimed that they
+were talking about. Thus we were told that Aristotle had
+really been talking about gravitation when he spoke of
+natural downward motion, that ignorant sailors really referred to the horns of narwhals when they talked of those
+of unicorns, that "caloric fluid" was a misleading way of
+describing the transmission of energy between bouncing
+molecules, and that Kierkegaard was describing our relations to our fathers in the flesh when he talked of Abraham's
+relation to God.
+Two developments have made philosophers nervous in
+recent years about this "what they were really talking
+about" strategy. These developments are, roughly, breakdowns of each of the two "dogmas of empiricism" identified
+by Quine. The first dogma enshrined what Quine called
+"essentialism" —the notion that one could distinguish between what people were talking about and what they were
+saying about it by discovering the essence of the object being
+discussed. In its linguistic form, this was the doctrine that
+one could discover which term in our language translated a
+term in that of the ancient scientists, and then discover the
+essence of the referent of both terms by distinguishing between the analytic statements which told one the terms'
+meaning and the synthetic statements which expressed possibly false beliefs about this referent. The second dogma
+held that such a translation could always be found, and that
+such analytic statements could always be formulated, because to determine the meaning of any referring expression
+one need only discover which reports in a "neutral observation language" would confirm, and which would disconfirm,
+a statement asserting the existence of the referent in question.
+The conviction that science differed from softer discourse
+in having "objective reference" to things "out there" was
+268
+
+bolstered in pre-Quinean days by the thought that even if
+there were no such things as Aristotelian essences that could
+become immaterially present in the intellect, there certainly
+were points of contact with the world in the presentations
+of sense. This contact, plus the ability of an operationalist
+"meaning-analysis" to characterize the essence of the referent in terms of the presentations to be expected from it,
+seemed to give science what was lacking in religion and
+politics-the ability to use contact with the real as the
+touchstone of truth. The horror which greeted Quine's overthrow of the dogmas, and Kuhn's and Feyerabend's examples of the "theory-ladenness" of observation, was a result
+of the fear that there might be no such touchstone. For if we
+once admitted that Newton was better than Aristotle not
+because his words better corresponded to reality but simply
+because Newton made us better able to cope, there would be
+nothing to distinguish science from religion or politics. It
+was as if the ability to tell the analytic from the synthetic,
+and the observational from the theoretical, was all that
+stood between us and "irrationalism."
+I have suggested in previous chapters that this identification of rationality with the philosophical dogmas of the day
+reflects the fact that, since Kant, philosophy has made it its
+business to present a permanent neutral framework for
+culture. This framework is built around a distinction between inquiry into the real—the disciplines which are on
+"the secure path of a science"—and the rest of culture. This
+is the sort of distinction which we find in the last paragraph
+of Hume's Enquiry, in the first paragraph of the preface to
+the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, and in
+the manifestoes by Russell and Husserl cited in chapter
+four. If philosophy is essentially the formulation of the
+distinction between science and nonscience, then endangering current formulations seems to endanger philosophy
+itself, and with it rationality (of which philosophy is seen
+as the vigilant guardian, constantly fending off the forces
+of darkness). Given this conception of the dogmas which
+269
+
+Quine overthrew, the response of many philosophers was to
+find some way of formulating the desired distinction which
+would (a) keep the philosophy of language as much in the
+center of the picture as it had been since the days of the
+Vienna Circle, (b) not involve any recourse to the notion
+of language as the realm of the a priori, (c) provide an
+answer to questions about whether Newton and Aristotle
+had a common referent (and if so, what it was). This desire
+was the root of what has come to be called "the theory of
+reference," a term now roughly coextensive with what I
+have been calling "impure philosophy of language."
+Before this desire became explicit, however, there was a
+preliminary stage of disarray which found philosophers
+asking for a theory of "meaning-change." This demand arose
+primarily from a reaction to Feyerabend's claim that the
+traditional empiricist view had presupposed a "condition of
+meaning invariance"—presupposed, that is, that "all future
+theories will have to be phrased in such a manner that their
+use in explanations does not affect what is said by the
+[other] theories, or factual reports to be explained."12 Feyerabend, like Kuhn, was concerned to show that the meaning of lots of statements in the language, including lots of
+"observation" statements, got changed when a new theory
+came along; or, at least, that granting that such change took
+place made more sense of the facts of the history of science
+than the standard textbook view which kept meanings constant and let only beliefs change. The response of many
+philosophers to such historical examples was to grant that
+meanings could shift as a result of new discoveries-that the
+permanent neutral framework of meanings within which
+rational inquiry could be conducted was not so permanent
+as had been thought. But, they said, there must be such a
+thing as a "rational" and principled change of meaning,
+and it is now our task, as the guardians and explicators of
+12 Paul Feyerabend, "How To Be a Good Empiricist" in Challenges
+to Empiricism, ed. Harold Morick (Belmont, Calif., 1972), p. 16g.
+270
+
+the rationality natural to natural scientists, to explain what
+principles are involved. Feyerabend himself had been content to suggest that meanings changed every time any feature
+of use changed, but cooler heads thought there must be some
+middle view between "meanings remain and beliefs change"
+and "meanings change whenever beliefs do." This led to the
+feeling that there ought to be a way to mark off a change
+of beliefs within Kuhn's "normal science" from the shift in
+norms which occurred in a "scientific revolution." Granted,
+philosophers said, that the textbook account of theorychange is misleading, still, anything the historiographer of
+science needs philosophy can provide. We shall set about
+to discover those conditions in which successive changes in
+belief produce something that is not merely a change in
+belief but a change in "conceptual scheme."13
+The notion that it would be all right to relativize sameness of meaning, objectivity, and truth to a conceptual
+scheme, as long as there were some criteria for knowing
+when and why it was rational to adopt a new conceptual
+scheme, was briefly tempting. For now the philosopher, the
+13 Fred Suppe, in his "The Search for Philosophic Understanding of
+Scientific Theories" (in The Structure of Scientific Theories, ed. Suppe
+(Urbana, 1974), pp. 3-241) classifies this project as the attempt to construct a "Weltanschauungen analysis" of scientific theory-change (cf
+esp. pp. 127ff.). Many of the authors whom Suppe discusses would, I
+think, quarrel with the implications of the term, and with some of
+the details of Suppe's presentation. But the general lines of Suppe's
+treatment of this period in the development of recent philosophy of
+science seem to me accurate and illuminating. Another document useful for understanding this period is Conceptual Change, ed. Glenn
+Pearce and Patrick Maynard (Dordrecht, 1973), which has some very
+useful papers on the question of "meaning-change," especially those by
+Binkley, Sellars, Putnam, Barrett, and Wilson. The line I am taking in
+this chapter is in harmony with Binkley's and Sellar's papers, but I
+think that both men take too seriously the question which Binkley formulates as "How is our system of epistemic appraisal to be applied in
+contexts of changing meanings?" (p. 71). In my view, there is no such
+system—no overarching structure of rationality. Barrett's criticisms of
+Putnam chime with those offered by Fine and by me in the articles
+cited below in note 26.
+271
+
+guardian of rationality, became the man who told you when
+you could start meaning something different, rather than
+just the man who told you what you meant. But this attempt
+to retain the philosopher's traditional role was doomed. All
+the Quinean reasons why he could not do the one were also
+reasons why he could not do the other. The philosopher
+had been portrayed, since the beginnings of "the linguistic
+turn," as a man who knew about concepts by knowing about
+the meanings of words, and whose work therefore transcended the empirical. But as soon as it was admitted that
+"empirical considerations" (e.g., the discovery that there
+were spots on the moon, the discovery that the États-Géné-
+raux would not go home) incited but did not require "conceptual change" (e.g., a different concept of the heavens
+or of the state), the division of labor between the philosopher and the historian no longer made sense. Once one
+said that it was rational to abandon the Aristotelian conceptual scheme as a result of this or that discovery, then
+"change of meaning" or "shift in conceptual scheme" meant
+nothing more than "shift in especially central beliefs." The
+historian can make the shift from the old scheme to the new
+intelligible, and make one see why one would have been
+led from the one to the other if one had been an intellectual
+of that day. There is nothing the philosopher can add to
+what the historian has already done to show that this intelligible and plausible course is a "rational" one. Without
+what Feyerabend called "meaning invariance," there is no
+special method (meaning-analysis) which the philosopher
+can apply. For "meaning invariance" was simply the "linguistic" way of stating the Kantian claim that inquiry, to
+be rational, had to be conducted within a permanent framework knowable a priori, a scheme which both restricted
+possible empirical content and explained what it was rational to do with any empirical content which came along.
+Once schemes became temporary, the scheme-content distinction itself was in danger, and with it the Kantian notion
+of philosophy as made possible by our a priori knowledge
+272
+
+of our own contribution to inquiry (the schematic, formal
+element--e.g., "language").
+3. IDEALISM
+Philosophers came to realize fairly quickly that the search
+for a criterion of meaning-change was as disastrous to the
+notion of philosophy qua analysis of meanings as the notion
+of the right to revolt had been to political philosophy qua
+study of sovereignty. So they realized that Feyerabend had
+misstated his own point when he spoke of "meaning-change."
+This criticism was most effectively made by Putnam:
+Feyerabend cannot escape the same difficulties that have
+bedeviled the Positivists. ... To see that this is the case,
+it suffices to recall that for Feyerabend the meaning of a
+term depends upon a whole theory containing the term.
+•..One might, of course, take the radical line that any
+change in theory is a change in the meaning of terms....
+But I expect Feyerabend would not take this line. For to
+say that any change in our empirical beliefs about Xs is a
+change in the meaning of the term X would be to abandon the distinction between questions of meaning and
+questions of fact. To say that the semantical rules of English cannot at all be distinguished from the empirical
+beliefs of English speakers would just be to throw the
+notion of a semantical rule of English overboard. ... All
+appearance of sensation would have vanished if Feyerabend had taken this course. For the "sensation" here
+depends on sliding back and forth between a noncustomary conception of meaning and the customary conception. 14
+Appreciation of this point led philosophers into a second
+stage of the debate over our relation to ancestral theories
+and exotic cultures. It was recognized that if one was whole-
+14 Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality, PP. 124-125.
+273
+
+heartedly Quinean in one's attitude toward the notion of
+"meaning" one would not even want to ask "Did they mean
+the same thing by '—"" What, then, had all the fuss
+been about? Presumably about how we could assign truthvalues to various statements. We want to know whether to
+say, "Aristotle said mostly false things about motion" or
+rather to say, "Aristotle said mostly true things about what
+he called 'motion,' but we don't believe there is any such
+thing." Further, we want to say in some cases, "Here Aristotle goofed, even in his own terms" and in other cases,
+"Here we have a statement which would be true if anything
+in Aristotelian physics were, but which, alas, refers to something which does not exist and thus is false." Or, to put it
+still another way, we want to distinguish between Aristotelian falsehoods which are a result of the nonexistence of what
+he was talking about, and those which result from his misuse
+of his own theoretical apparatus—just as we want to distinguish between the falsehood of "Holmes lived on Baker
+Street" and that of "Holmes was married." To make the
+distinction between internal questions (where the answers
+are given within the culture, the theory, the story, the
+game) and external ones (answered by whether it is a culture we are members of, a theory we accept, a story we
+believe, a game we play), we can get along with the notion
+of "reference" and skip that of "meaning." "Meaning" only
+seemed important because it provided a way to pick out an
+object in the world, which we could then determine to be
+the same or not the same as some object countenanced by
+our own culture, theory, story, or game. Once we give up
+the notion of meaning, we also give up the notion of reference as determined by meaning of the "defining attributes" of a term picking out the referent of the term.
+The need to pick out objects without the help of definitions, essences, and meanings of terms produced, philosophers thought, a need for a "theory of reference" which
+would not employ the Fregean machinery which Quine had
+rendered dubious. This call for a theory of reference be-
+274
+
+came assimilated to the demand for a "realistic" philosophy
+of science which would reinstate the pre-Kuhnian and pre-
+Feyerabendian notion that scientific inquiry made progress
+by finding out more and more about the same objects.15 It
+was not that either Kuhn or Feyerabend had denied this,
+but rather that their views about the incommensurability of
+alternative theories suggested that the only notions of
+"truth" and "reference" we really understood were those
+which were relativized to a "conceptual scheme." If there
+was no necessity that there be a single observation language
+common to all alternative theories, as Feyerabend and Kuhn
+had suggested (and Quine and Sellars had given further
+reasons for believing), then the empiricist notion that one
+could always give operational definitions of theoretical
+terms had to be dropped. Quine's attack on the first dogma
+had made the notion of "definition" dubious, and his holistic attack on the second, combined with Sellars's claim that
+"givenness to sense" was a matter of acculturation, made
+the notion of "operational definition" doubly dubious. The
+antireductionist implications of all this anti-empiricist polemic were such that something which seemed much like
+idealism began to become intellectually respectable. It
+seemed possible to say that the question of what was real
+or true was not to be settled independently of a given conceptual framework, and this in turn seemed to suggest that
+perhaps nothing really existed apart from such frameworks.16 So the notion that we could find a common matrix
+15 Cf. ibid., pp. 1g6ff.
+16 Actually, this suggestion only occurred to critics of Quine and
+Kuhn, who then pounced upon it as a reductio. Cf. Suppe, "Search for
+Philosophical Understanding'" p. 151: "... if science always views the
+world through a disciplinary matrix... then isn't Kuhn committed to
+some form of antiempirical idealism?" Israel Scheffler makes the charge
+of idealism in chapter 1 of his Science and Subjectivity (Indianapolis,
+1976) but in later chapters he seems to me to show how, even after we
+have given up C. I. Lewis's notion of the "given" and most of the
+empiricist mythology discussed in chapter four, we can nevertheless
+have control of theory by observation (in the form of control by less
+275
+
+of inquiry-something which overspanned all actual and
+possible "conceptual frameworks" —was very attractive to
+those who felt that there must be something true about the
+old-fashioned pre-Quinean and pre-Kuhnian notion of increasingly accurate representations of nature being found in
+its mirror.
+Actually, however, this clamor about "idealism" is a red
+herring. It is one thing to say (absurdly) that we make objects by using words and something quite different to say
+that we do not know how to find a way of describing an
+enduring matrix of past and future inquiry into nature except in our own terms-thereby begging the question against
+"alternative conceptual schemes." Almost no one wishes to
+say the former. To say the latter is, when disjoined from
+scary rhetoric about "losing touch with the world," just a
+way of saying that our present views about nature are our
+only guide in talking about the relation between nature and
+our words. To say that we have to assign referents to terms
+and truth-values to sentences in the light of our best notions
+of what there is in the world is a platitude. To say that
+truth and reference are "relative to a conceptual scheme"
+sounds as if it were saying something more than this, but
+it is not, as long as "our conceptual scheme" is taken as
+simply a reference to what we believe now—the collection
+of views which make up our present-day culture. This is all
+that any argument offered by Quine, Sellars, Kuhn, or
+Feyerabend would license one to mean by "conceptual
+scheme." However, Putnam, having cleared up part of the
+controversial beliefs over more controversial beliefs). Scheffler's claim
+(P. 39) that "we simply have a false dichotomy in the notion that
+observation must be either a pure confrontation with an undifferentiated given, or else so conceptually contaminated that it must render
+circular any observational test of a hypothesis" seems just what Kuhn
+himself would want to say about the issue. As Michael Williams has
+pointed out to me, Kuhn is simply not concerned with skepticism,
+either pro or con, but is almost always read by philosophers as if he
+were advancing skeptical arguments.
+276
+
+confusion created by Feyerabend's talk of meaning-change,
+unfortunately proceeded to treat the difference between
+Feyerabend and himself not as a difference between taking
+the notion of "meaning" seriously and abandoning it, but
+rather as the difference between an "idealistic" and a "realistic" theory of meaning.
+To see how this pseudo-issue developed is to understand
+the final stage in the development of "the theory of reference" out of the so-called problem of conceptual change.
+Putnam says, for example:
+What is wrong with positivist theory of science is that it is
+based on an idealist or idealist-tending world view, and
+that that view does not correspond to reality. However,
+the idealist element in contemporary positivism enters
+precisely through the theory of meaning; thus part of any
+realist critique of positivism has to include at least a
+sketch of a rival theory.1?
+By an "idealist-tending world view," Putnam means roughly a view which "regards or tends to regard the 'hard facts'
+as just facts about actual and potential experiences, and
+all other talk as somehow just highly derived talk about
+actual and potential experiences" (p. 20g). He thereby treats
+positivism's desire for operational definitions as motivated
+not by a need to guarantee an analytic-synthetic distinction and thus a fixed framework for inquiry (in the way I
+have treated it above), but by a Berkeleian desire to avoid
+questions about the relation between experience and an
+independent reality. This is, I think, wrong-headed as
+history, but it is not particularly important. What is important is Putnam's insistence that "the positivist today is
+no more entitled than Berkeley was to accept scientific
+theory and practice-that is, his own story leads to no reason to think that scientific theory is true or that scientific
+practice tends to discover truth" (p. 209). Putnam thinks
+17 Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality, p. 207.
+277
+
+of philosophers as typically having either strongly "antirealistic or strongly realistic intuitions":
+... the antirealist does not see our theory and Archimedes' theory as two approximately correct descriptions
+of some fixed realm of theory-independent entities, and he
+tends to be sceptical about the idea of "convergence" in
+science—he does not think our theory is a better description of the same entities that Archimedes was describing.
+But if our theory is just our theory, then to use it in
+deciding whether or not X lies in the extension of xpuaós
+is just as arbitrary as using Neanderthal theory to decide
+whether or not X lies in the extension of xpuaós. The only
+theory that it is not arbitrary to use is the one the speaker
+himself subscribes to.
+The trouble is that for a strong antirealist truth makes
+no sense except as an intra-theoretic notion.... The antirealist can use truth intra-theoretically in the sense of a
+"redundancy theory"; but he does not have the notions of
+truth and reference available extra-theoretically. But extension is tied to the notion of truth. The extension of a
+term is just what the term is true of. Rather than try to
+retain the notion of extension via an awkward operationalism, the antirealist should reject the notion of extension as he does the notion of truth (in any extratheoretic sense). Like Dewey, for example, he can fall
+back on a notion of "warranted assertibility" instead of
+truth... Then he can say that "X is gold (xpurós)" was
+warrantedly assertible in Archimedes' time and is not
+warrantedly assertible today ... but the assertion that X
+was in the extension of xpurós will be rejected as meaningless, like the assertion that "X is gold (xpuaós) was true.
+(p. 236)
+It is difficult to find a philosopher who meets Putnam's
+criteria for being an "antirealist." Kuhn occasionally hints
+that he finds the notion of "a better description of the same
+entities" objectionable, but most philosophers who have
+278
+
+been influenced by his criticisms of positivistic philosophy
+of science have seen no need to go this far. Again, philosophers who are dubious about the notion of a theory of
+connections between words and the world, and who, like
+Sellars, are inclined to relativize "true" to conceptual frameworks, nevertheless would never call meaningless either of
+the assertions which Putnam thinks they ought to call
+meaningless. Sellars would interpret "warranted assertible
+in our conceptual framework but not true" as an implicit
+reference to another, perhaps not yet invented, conceptual
+framework in which the statement in question would not
+be warranted assertible. Philosophers who, like James and
+Dewey and Strawson, are dubious about the "correspondence theory of truth," nevertheless have no sympathy with
+the notion of nature as malleable to thought, or with the
+inference from "one cannot give a theory-independent description of a thing" to "there are no theory-independent
+things." As usual in debates between "idealists" and "realists," both sides wish the other to assume the burden of
+proof. The so-called idealist claims to be able to give a satisfactory sense to everything which common sense, and
+even the philosophy of language, wants to say, and asks
+what the realist can possibly add. The realist insists that
+the idealist view has counter-intuitive consequences which
+only a theory of a relation called "correspondence between
+thought (or words) and the world" can safeguard us against.
+Putnam has three lines of argument, each designed to
+show that there is a significant issue between the realist
+and his opponent and that the realist is right. The first is
+an argument against construing "true" as meaning "warrantedly assertible" or any other "soft" notion having to do
+with relations of justification. This is supposed to show
+that only a theory about relations between words and the
+world can offer a satisfactory construal. The second is an
+argument to the effect that a certain kind of sociological
+fact which needs explanation-the reliability of standard
+methods of scientific inquiry, or the utility of our language
+279
+
+as an instrument for coping with the world-can only be
+explained on realist grounds. The third is an argument
+that only the realist can avoid inferring from "many terms
+used in the sciences of the past did not refer" to "it is overwhelmingly likely that no term used by our scientists refers," a conclusion he finds objectionable.18 I think that only
+the third of these arguments really joins issue with a reallife opponent. My examination of this argument will consist of the discussions of reference, truth, and relativism in
+the next three sections. In the remainder of this section,
+however, I shall try to say enough in criticism of Putnam's
+first two arguments to show why only the third need be
+taken seriously.
+Putnam's claim that no notion like "warranted assertible"
+will have the same syntactic features as "true" is perfectly
+justified. But it is not clear that it is relevant to any philosopher's claim. Philosophers who suggest that "true"
+means "warranted assertible" usually either (a) relativize the
+notion of truth to a language, theory, stage of inquiry, or
+conceptual scheme, or (b) explain that we do not need a
+notion of "true" once we have the notion of "warranted
+assertible." In other words, they either suggest a revision
+in our normal use of "true," or suggest abandoning the
+term altogether. As Putnam himself notes, arguments
+against such notions as analyses of "true" are as easy as
+Moore's arguments against attempts to define "good," and
+for pretty much the same reason. "True but not warranted
+assertible" makes as good sense as, for example, "good but
+not conducive to the greatest happiness" or "good but disapproved of by all cultures so far." Philosophers who are
+concerned (as Tarski and Davidson are not) to tell us something about truth which will explain or underwrite the
+success of our search for truth are like philosophers who
+18 Putnam, "What Is 'Realism'" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1976, p. 194. (Reprinted with changes as Lectures II-III in his
+Meaning and the Moral Sciences [London, 1978], a book which appeared after this chapter was written.)
+280
+
+want to tell us more about "good" than that it is used to
+commend, something which will explain or underwrite
+moral progress. But there may be little of this sort to be
+said. To use the analogy with moral philosophy once again,
+it is no help in understanding either why "good" is indefinable, or how it is used, to explain that a good action is
+one which corresponds to the Form of the Good, or to the
+Moral Law. It is equally pointless to be told that true statements correspond to the way the world is.19
+The appropriate position for the "antirealist" is just to
+admit that nothing will explicate "theory-independent
+truth," just as nothing will explicate "noninstrumental
+goodness" or "nonfunctional beauty," and to move the burden of proof back to Putnam. The way in which it should be
+shoved back is, roughly, to ask, "What would we lose if
+we had no ahistorical theory-independent notion of truth?"
+This question seems as reasonable as the question "What
+did we gain when Socrates taught us to use 'good' in such a
+way that 'bad for me, but nevertheless good,' 'bad for
+Athens, but nevertheless good' and even 'abhorrent to the
+gods, but nevertheless good' made sense?" That we have
+such notions of truth and of goodness—notions which float
+free of all questions of justification—is unquestionable. It is
+equally unquestionable that this notion of truth has certain properties which no notion of assertibility or justification is going to have (e.g., to cite some of those which
+Putnam notes: if a statement is true, so are its logical consequences; if two statements are true, so is their conjunction; if a statement is true now it always is). This notion
+may not be much older than the time of Socrates and Aris-
+19 See Nelson Goodman, "The Way the World Is" in his Problems
+and Projects (Indianapolis, 1972), PP. 24-32, esp. p. 31: "There are
+many ways the world is, and every true description captures one of
+them." Goodman's point seems to me to have been developed best by
+Davidson, in "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (discussed
+below) and in "Mental Events" (discussed in chapter four, section 5
+above).
+281
+
+totle, before which "logical consequence" would not have
+been intelligible. But, whatever the provenance, the fact
+that we possess such a notion is in itself no guarantee that
+there will be an interesting philosophical theory about it.
+Most of what passes for discussion of "truth" in philosophy
+books is, in fact, about justification, just as most of what
+passes for discussion of "goodness" is about pleasure and
+pain. The price of sharply distinguishing the transcendentalia from their common-sense counterparts may be to leave
+one without material for theory construction, and without
+problems to resolve.
+Putnam, however, is very explicit that there are problems
+to be resolved which have nothing to do with justification,
+and the second of the arguments to which I have referred is
+a direct reply to the question "What do we need the notion
+of truth, as opposed to justification, for?" Putnam's answer
+is that we need it to explain the reliability of our procedures
+of inquiry. More specifically, we need it to explain the fact
+of "convergence" in science-the fact that the old bad theories nonetheless present, as they approach our own time,
+better and better approximations of our present theories.20
+The obvious objection to this starting point is that this "convergence" is an inevitable artifact of historiography. It
+seems clear that there will always be a natural way of telling
+the story of theory-succession (or of the succession of religions or forms of government) which shows our predecessors
+gradually, if jerkily, progressing to where we are now. There
+is no reason to think that the antirealist will lack a story to
+tell about the causal effects upon our ancestors of the objects spoken of by our present theory. He too can describe
+how these objects helped to bring about justified but false
+descriptions of themselves, followed by equally justified, incompatible, and slightly better descriptions, and so on down
+to our own day. If, however, "convergence" is seen not as a
+20 See Putnam, "Reference and Understanding." in Meaning and the
+Moral Sciences, PP. 97-119. I owe my knowledge of this paper to a
+preprint kindly supplied by Professor Putnam.
+282
+
+fact about the history of the various disciplines but as a
+fact about the results of tests of new theories, then the
+realist may seem in a better position to make use of this
+fact. Boyd, who has collaborated with Putnam in developing this line of argument, interprets "convergence" as the
+"reliability" of such a principle as
+it should be inquired, in the light of available theoretical
+knowledge, under what circumstances the causal claims
+made by the theory might plausibly go wrong, either because alternative causal mechanisms plausible in the light
+of existing knowledge might be operating instead of those
+indicated by the theory, or because causal mechanisms
+of sorts already known might plausibly be expected to
+interfere with those required by the theory in ways which
+the theory does not anticipate.?
+It is hard to imagine anyone taking exception to such a
+principle, so the issue is not joined until Boyd claims that
+we can only account for this principle's leading to useful results "on a realistic understanding of the relevant collateral
+theories":
+Suppose you always "guess" where theories are most likely
+to go wrong experimentally by asking where they are
+most likely to be false as accounts of causal relations,
+given the assumption that currently accepted laws represent probable causal knowledge. And suppose your guessing procedure works—that theories really are most likely
+to go wrong-to yield false experimental predictions
+just where a realist would expect them to.... What explanation beside scientific realism is possible? Certainly
+not the mere effect of conventionally or arbitrarily adopted scientific traditions. ... Unless, as no empiricist would
+suggest, the world is molded by our conventions, there
+is no way that the reliability of this principle could merely be a matter of convention. (p. 12)
+21 Richard N. Boyd, "Realism, Underdetermination and a Causal
+Theory of Evidence," Nous 7 (1973), 11.
+283
+
+Boyd here confuses the sense in which a procedure is reliable
+in respect of an independent test (as thermometers are reliable indicators of how uncomfortable it is outside with
+the sense in which a procedure is reliable because we cannot imagine an alternative. To check new theories by old
+ones is not an optional procedure. How else would we
+check them? The fact that new theories often go wrong
+just where old ones say they might is not something which
+requires explanation. It would require explanation if they
+went wrong somewhere else. We could only make it appear
+that the "nonrealist" is at a loss to explain the relevance of
+old theories to testing new ones if we took this straw man
+to be claiming that new theories arrive completely equipped
+with equally new observational languages, testing pro.
+cedures, and regulative principles of their own. But a "new
+theory" is simply a rather minor change in a vast network
+of beliefs. Its truth, as James said, is largely a matter of
+its ability to perform "a marriage function" between the
+deposit of old truth and the "anomaly" which suggested it
+in the first place. Only some of Feyerabend's more strained
+conceits suggest that we should grant a new theory immunity from any test based on the results of an old one. Such
+suggestions have nothing to do with the question of whether
+we need a notion of "truth" in addition to one of "warranted assertibility."
+4. REFERENCE
+To show that we do need such a notion we must turn
+to Putnam's third argument, which has the virtue of presenting us with a more plausible "antirealist" than those
+who have been discussed so far. This argument centers
+around what Putnam calls the need to block "the disastrous
+meta-induction that concludes 'no theoretical term
+ever
+refers. 'zz
+22 Putnam, "What Is Realism?" p. 194.
+284
+
+What if we accept a theory from the standpoint of which
+electrons are like phlogiston?
+Then we will have to say electrons don't really exist.
+What if this keeps happening? What if all the theoretical
+entities postulated by one generation (molecules, genes,
+etc., as well as electrons) invariably "don't exist" from
+the standpoint of later science?-this is, of course, one
+form of the old skeptical "argument from error"-how do
+you know you aren't in error now? But it is the form in
+which the argument from error is a serious worry for
+many people today, and not just a "philosophical doubt."
+One reason this is a serious worry is that eventually
+the following meta-induction becomes overwhelmingly
+compelling: just as no term used in the science of more
+than 50 (or whatever) years ago referred, so it will turn
+out that no term used now (except maybe observation
+terms, if there are such) refers. (pp. 183-184)
+Putnam says that blocking this meta-induction is "obviously a desideratum for the Theory of Reference." This
+is puzzling, for two reasons. First, it is not clear what philosophical standpoint could show that revolutionary change
+in science had come to an end-that we will not stand to
+our descendants as our primitive animist ancestors stand
+to us. How are we supposed to step outside our own culture and evaluate its place relative to the end of inquiry?
+Second, even if there were such a philosophical standpoint,
+it is not clear how the theory of reference could possibly
+supply it. Suppose we have decisive intuitions about the answer to such questions as "If Jones did not do the mighty
+deeds attributed to him, but Smith (previously unknown to
+history) did most of them, does 'Jones' refer to Jones or to
+Smith?" Suppose, less plausibly, that our intuitions about
+such puzzle cases as this are firm enough to lead us to a general theory which informs us, without appeal to intuition,
+that we and Dalton refer to the same things by "molecule"
+whereas "caloric fluid" was never used to refer to the mo-
+285
+
+tion of molecules. 23 Such a theory might push the premises
+of the suggested meta-induction farther into the past-since
+now we might have to look back five thousand years rather
+than fifty years for a science none of whose theoretical terms
+referred. But this could hardly satisfy a skeptic who had
+developed a serious worry about the status of our science
+relative to that of, say, the Galactic civilization of the future. Such a skeptic would presumably only be satisfied by
+a theory of reference which showed that at all ages and
+places scientists had mostly been referring to the same
+things, thus depriving the meta-induction in question of
+any interesting premises.
+Now in one obvious sense we know perfectly well—prior
+to any theory—that they have been referring to the same
+things. They were all trying to cope with the same universe,
+and they referred to it, although doubtless often under unfruitful and foolish descriptions. To discover, as a result of
+the next scientific revolution, that there are no genes, molecules, electrons, etc., but only space-time bumps, or hypnotic
+suggestions from the Galactic hypnotists who have manipulated our scientists since the time of Galileo, or whatever,
+would still not put us out of touch with either the world or
+our ancestors. For we would proceed to tell the same sort
+of story of the emergence of better descriptions of the
+world out of false, confused, unfruitful, descriptions of the
+world which we tell about, say, the rise of Milesian science
+—in both cases, it would be the story of a triumph of reason, and in both cases it would be the application of reason
+to the same world. In general, there is no intelligible suggestion one can make about what the world might really
+turn out to be like which seems a basis for "serious worry."
+(The suggestion that there might be some unintelligible
+description of the world—one which was expounded within
+an untranslatable conceptual scheme—is another worry al-
+23 I owe the example to Rom Harré's The Principles of Scientific
+Thinking (Chicago, 1970), p. 55.
+286
+
+together, which has no need for, and no possibility of getting, inductive support. I discuss this other worry in connection with Davidson's attack on the notion of "conceptual
+scheme" in the following section.)
+Still, this notion of "bad description of the same thing"
+may seem to fudge an issue. "Reference" seems an all-ornothing affair. It may seem better to say that "caloric fluid"
+either does or does not refer to the motion of molecules
+than to say that "caloric fluid" and "motion of molecules"
+are two abbreviations for (better and worse) descriptions of
+the same phenomenon, whatever it may eventually turn out
+to be. We may feel that referring to the motion of molecules should be like referring to individual people or middle-sized physical objects—we either pick out them or we
+don't. This feeling is enhanced if we have recently been
+reading Tarski, and further enhanced if we are disinclined
+to view theoretical statements in the quasi-instrumentalist
+way Sellars does—as material principles of inference licensing the utterance of other statements. We will then want
+sentences like "Heat is the motion of molecules" to be true
+in the straightforward "corresponding" way that "White is
+the typical color of snow" is true. So it may seem important,
+for purposes of understanding "how language works," to
+think in terms of expressions' "picking out entities" rather
+than simply being used "to describe reality." Let it be so.
+Still, it is hard to see why we need do more to assuage the
+skeptic than to be "Whiggish" in our historiography. We
+can just write things up so as to make even the most primitive of animists talk about, for example, the motion of
+molecules, radium, genes, or whatever. We do not thereby
+assuage his fear that molecules may not exist, but then
+no discovery about how words relate to the world will do
+that. For "the world," as known by that theory, is just the
+world as known to the science of the day.
+So far, then, we have the following dilemma: either the
+theory of reference is called upon to underwrite the success
+of contemporary science, or else it is simply a decision about
+287
+
+how to write the history of science (rather than the provision of a "philosophical foundation" for such historiography). The one task seems too much to ask, and the other
+too slight to merit the title of "theory." At this point it
+would be well to ask where the notion of "theory of reference" came from in the first place. What sort of thing is it
+that it should be burdened with the task of blocking skep.
+ticism, thus doing the job we had always hoped epistemology would do? In my view, the notion that there is such a
+theory results from running together two quite different
+considerations, namely:
+the fact, noted by Kripke, Donnellan, and others, that
+there are counter-examples to the Searle-Strawson cri.
+terion for reference-that is, that S refers, in his use of
+"X," to whatever entity would make most of his central
+beliefs about X true24
+the fact that the usual (Frege, Searle, Strawson) assumption that meaning, in the sense of beliefs or intentions (or,
+more generally, entities in the heads of users of words),
+determines reference suggests that the more false beliefs
+we have the less "in touch with the world" we are.
+The two considerations taken together suggest that the
+usual "intentionalist" notion of how words hook onto the
+world is both wrong in particular cases and philosophically
+disastrous. So in recent "impure" philosophy of language, it
+has become almost a dogma that the "idealist" sounding
+doctrines of Quine, Wittgenstein, Sellars, Kuhn, Feyerabend (and other heroes of this book) are to be refuted by
+24 Most recent discussion of these counter-examples stems from Keith
+Donnellan, "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions" and Saul
+Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," both of which appear in Semantics
+of Natural Language, ed. Davidson and Harman (Dordrecht, 1972). See
+Stephen P. Schwartz, ed., Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds (Ithaca,
+1976) for further articles attempting to construct a general theory to
+deal with such counter-examples, and a useful review of the literature
+in the editor's "Introduction."
+288
+
+going back to the first principles of semantics, overturning
+Frege's "intentionalist" theory of reference, and substituting
+something better.25 The idea is that if the world reaches up
+and hooks language in factual (e.g., causal) relationships,
+then we shall always be "in touch with the world," whereas
+in the old Fregean view we are in danger of losing the
+world, or may never have hooked onto it in the first place.
+We should, however, be suspicious of the notion of a
+clash between an old—intentionalist-and a new, "causal"
+(or, more generally, nonintentionalist and therefore "realist") theory of reference. The clash is produced by the
+equivocity of "refer." The term can mean either (a) a factual relation which holds between an expression and some
+other portion of reality whether anybody knows it holds or
+not, or (b) a purely "intentional" relation which can hold
+between an expression and a nonexistent object. Call the
+one "reference" and the other "talking about." We cannot
+refer to Sherlock Holmes but we can talk about him, and
+similarly for phlogiston. "Talking about" is a commonsensical notion; "reference" is a term of philosophical art.
+"Talking about" ranges over fictions as well as realities,
+and is useles for realist purposes. The assumption that people's beliefs determine what they are talking about works
+as well or as badly for things which exist as for things
+which do not, as long as questions about what exists do not
+arise. In a community where there are no conflicting theories
+(physical, historical, "ontological," or whatever), but in
+which it is well known that some of the people and things
+truly spoken of do exist while others are fictions, we could
+indeed use the Searle-Strawson criteria. We are talking
+about whatever most of our beliefs are true of. The puzzle
+cases (the cases in which intuition tells us that people are
+not talking about whatever entity makes most of their beliefs true) arise only when we know something they don't.
+25 Putnam's "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" and his "The Refutation
+of Conventionalism" (both included in his Mind, Language and Reality) are the fullest expressions of this attitude.
+289
+
+Thus if we discover that there was a hitherto unknown man
+named Smith who did 99 percent of the deeds attributed to
+a mythical Jones, but that the tales about Jones actually
+accreted around a man named Robinson, we may want to
+say that when we speak of Jones we are really talking about
+Robinson and not about Smith.
+If this notion of "really talking about" is confused with
+reference, it becomes easy to think (as do Putnam and
+Kripke) that we have "intuitions" about reference, intuitions which might be the basis for a nonintentional and
+"theory independent" "theory of reference." But this is to
+think that the question
+a. What is the best way to express the falsehood of the
+usual beliefs about Jones by saying that they were
+about nothing at all, truths about a fiction, or falsehoods about a reality?
+should be answered on the basis of an answer to
+b. Is there an entity in the world connected to our use of
+"Jones" by the relation of "reference"?
+In the view Putnam and Kripke adopt, (b) is a sensible question, and is antecedent to (a). Answering (a) is not a matter
+of expository or historiographical convenience, in this view,
+but a matter of hard fact—a fact determined by the answer
+to (b). In the view I am recommending, (b) does not
+arise. The only factual issue in the neighborhood concerns
+the existence or nonexistence of various entities which are
+talked about. Once we have decided on the latter factual
+question, we can adopt one of four attitudes toward beliefs
+in which (by the common-sensical Searle-Strawson criterion)
+the person in question is talking about nonexistent entities:
+We can
+1. declare all of them false (Russell) or truth-valueless
+(Strawson)
+or
+290
+
+2. divide them into the ones which are false or truthvalueless because they are about nothing and those
+which are "really about" some real thing and which
+thus may be true
+or
+3. divide them into the ones which are false or truthvalueless because they are about nothing and those
+which are "really about" fictional entities, and which
+thus may perhaps be true
+or
+4. combine strategies (2) and (3).
+The "really" in "really about" marks our departure from
+the Searle-Strawson criterion for aboutness, but it does not
+mark an invocation of our intuitions concerning a matter of
+fact. It is like the notion of "really a good thing to have
+done" used when, although somebody has acted in a prima
+facie shameful way, a more extended and informed view of
+the matter suggests that common-sensical criteria of moral
+worth should be set aside. In the moral case, we are not having an intuition about the factual connection between the
+deed and the Form of the Good; we are simply recasting our
+description of the situation in a way which avoids paradox
+and maximizes coherence. Similarly in the case of decisions
+about who was really talking about what.
+It may seem that the issue between the view I am suggesting and the Putnam-Kripke view turns on the question of
+"Meinongianism"-of whether one can refer to fictions.
+But it does not. In the sense in which the use of the term
+refer is governed by the inference from
+"N" refers and N is Ø
+to
+N exists (is not a fiction),
+291
+
+then of course one cannot refer to fictions. This is the usual
+way in which the term refer is used, and I have no wish to
+use it differently. But the moral I draw from the fact that
+this condition defines the notion of "reference" is that
+"reference" has nothing in particular to do with either
+"talking about" or "really talking about." "Reference" only
+arises when one has made one's decision about the various
+strategies used to express the error that one finds in the
+world-the decision among (1) (4) above-and then wishes
+to cast the result of one's decision into "canonical" form,
+that is, into a language which uses standard quantificational
+logic as a matrix. This is what I meant by saying that "reference" is a term of art. It is also the reason it is not some.
+thing we have intuitions about. So I conclude that the
+"intuition" with which the Searle-Strawson criterion conflicts is merely the intuition that when there is dispute about
+what exists there may be dispute as to what is "really being
+talked about," and that the criterion for "really about" is
+not the Searle-Strawson one.
+What, then, is it? There is no answer to this question, no
+such "criterion." The considerations which dictate choice
+between strategies (1) (4) above are so diverse that the request for a criterion is out of place. We might be tempted
+to say that "really talking about" is a relation that can hold
+between an expression and what we think exists, as opposed
+to "talking about," which holds between an expression and
+what its user thinks exists, and to "refers," which can hold
+only between an expression and what really and truly does
+exist. But this would be wrong, since, once again, not only
+can we talk about nonexistent entities, but we can be discovered to have really been talking about nonexistent entities. Really talking about X is not the same as talking
+about a real X. "Really" here is just a matter of "placing"
+the relative ignorance of the person being discussed in the
+context of the relatively greater knowledge claimed by the
+speaker. There are as many ways of doing that as there are
+292
+
+contexts of discourse. Consider, for example, "You think
+you are talking about Thales, but you are really talking
+about a tale told by Herodotus"; "You think you are talking
+about your analyst, but you are really talking about yourself"; "You think you are talking about a fictional deity
+named Artemis, but you are actually talking about a fleshand-blood woman who lived in Thebes in the ninth century
+в.с."; "You think you are talking about lithium, but you are
+really talking about kryptonite." 28
+I think, then, that the quest for a theory of reference
+represents a confusion between the hopeless "semantic"
+quest for a general theory of what people are "really talking
+about," and the equally hopeless "epistemological" quest for
+a way of refuting the skeptic and underwriting our claim
+to be talking about nonfictions. Neither the one nor the
+other demand need be satisfied for the purposes of a Davidsonian "pure" philosophy of language. The first demand is,
+roughly, a demand for a decision-procedure for solving difficult cases in historiography, anthropological description,
+and the like-cases where nothing save tact and imagination
+will serve. The latter demand is for some transcendental
+standpoint outside our present set of representations from
+which we can inspect the relations between those representations and their object. (This is the demand which Berkeley told us we could not meet, which Kant met only by
+calling the world "appearance," and which the image of the
+Mirror of Nature makes us think we ought to be able to
+meet.) The question "What determines reference?" is ambiguous between a question about the best procedure for
+comparing large coherent sets of false beliefs (other epochs,
+cultures, etc.) with ours and a question about how to refute
+the skeptic. Debates about theories of reference get their
+26 I have developed this view about reference at greater length in
+"Realism and Reference," The Monist 59 (1976), 321-340. For a parallel criticism of Putnam on this topic, see Arthur Fine, "How to Compare Theories: Reference and Change," Nous 9 (1975), 17-32.
+293
+
+concreteness from attempts to answer the first part of the
+question, and their philosophical interest from hints that
+they might somehow answer the second. But nothing can
+refute the skeptic-nothing can do what epistemology
+hoped to do. For we discover how language works only with.
+in the present theory of the rest of the world, and one cannot
+use a part of one's present theory to underwrite the rest of
+it. Theory of reference is as hopeless as a "theory of transcendental constitution of the object" for this purpose.
+Putnam (in an address delivered after the bulk of this
+chapter was written) has largely recanted his "metaphysical
+realism"—the project of explaining successful reference
+by some means which does not presuppose that success. In
+this address, he makes the point I have just been making
+about "causal theories." He says that what the metaphysical
+realist wanted, but could not have, is a view of "truth as
+radically nonepistemic"—that is, one in which "the theory
+that is 'ideal' from the point of view of operational utility,
+inner beauty and elegance, 'plausibility,' simplicity, 'conservatism,' etc., might be false."a The metaphysical realist
+thought he needed to say this because it seemed the only way
+of clearly separating "true" from "warranted assertible."
+But, as Putnam says, even if one defines "true" à la Tarski in
+terms of the relation of satisfaction, we shall be able to map
+any set of beliefs onto the world in terms of this relation.
+Further, there will be lots of different ways in which this
+can be done, and there are no constraints on ways of doing it
+other than constraints on theories generally. Our best theory
+about what we are referring to is merely noncontroversial
+fallout from our best theory about things in general. As
+Putnam says: "... a 'causal' theory of reference is not
+(would not be) of any help here: for how 'causes' can
+uniquely refer is as much of a puzzle as how 'cat' can, on the
+27 Putnam, "Realism and Reason," Proceedings of the American
+Philosophical Association, vol. 50 (1977), p. 485. (This paper has now
+been reprinted in Meaning and the Moral Sciences. The passage appears there at p. 125).
+294
+
+metaphysical realist picture."z Similarly, no matter what
+nonintentional relation is substituted for "cause" in our
+account of how the things in the content reach up and
+determine the reference of the representations making up
+the scheme, our theory about what the world is made of
+will produce, trivially, a self-justifying theory about that
+relation.
+5. TRUTH WITHOUT MIRRORS
+Putnam's recantation comes down to saying that there is
+no way to make some empirical discipline do what transcendental philosophy could not do-that is, say something
+about the scheme of representations we are employing which
+will make clear its tie to the content we wish to represent.
+But if there is no such way, then we can fall in with Davidson's claim that we need to drop the scheme-content distinction altogether. We can admit that there is no way to
+make the notion of "scheme" do what philosophers traditionally wanted to do with it-that is, make clear certain
+special constraints which "rationality" exerts and which
+explain why our ideal theories must "correspond to reality."
+Putnam now agrees with Goodman and Wittgenstein: to
+think of language as a picture of the world—a set of representations which philosophy needs to exhibit as standing in
+some sort of nonintentional relation to what they represent—is not useful in explaining how language is learned or
+understood. But, at least in his writings prior to his recantation, he thought that we could still make use of this picture
+of language for purposes of a naturalized epistemology;
+language-as-picture was not a useful image for understanding how one used language, but it was useful for explaining
+the success of inquiry, just as "a map is successful if it corresponds in an appropriate way to a particular part of the
+earth." Putnam is here making the same move as that made
+28 Putnam, "Realism and Reason," p. 486 (p. 126 in Meaning and
+295
+
+by Sellars and Rosenberg. These men do identify "true"
+with "warranted assertible by us" (thereby allowing truth
+about nonexistent objects) but they then proceed to describe
+"picturing" as a nonintentional relation which supplies an
+Archimedean point by reference to which we may say that
+our present theory of the world, though to be sure true, may
+not picture the world as adequately as some successor theory.
+The difference in terminology is unimportant, since what
+all three philosophers want is simply to make it possible to
+answer the question "What guarantees that our changing
+theories of the world are getting better rather than worse?"
+All three want a Wittgensteinian meaning-as-use theory to
+handle what I have called the problems of "pure" philosophy of language, and a Tractarian picturing relation to
+handle epistemological problems.
+Putnam's criticism of his own previous attempts to make
+sense of such a transcendental guarantee applies equally to
+Sellars and Rosenberg. He says:
+Metaphysical realism collapses just at the point at which
+it claims to be distinguishable from Peircean realism—
+i.e., from the claim that there is an ideal theory. ... Since
+Peirce himself (and the verificationists) always said metaphysical realism collapses into incoherence at just that
+point, and realists like myself thought they were wrong,
+there is no avoiding the unpleasant admission that "they
+were right and we were wrong" on at least one substantive
+issue.29
+Compare this passage with Sellars's discussion of Peirce:
+•.. although the concepts of "ideal truth" and "what
+really exists" are defined in terms of a Peircian conceptual
+structure they do not require that there ever be a Peirceish
+community. Peirce himself fell into difficulty because, by
+not taking into account the dimension of "picturing" he
+20 Putnam, "Realism and Reason," p. 48g (p. 130 in Meaning and
+296
+
+had no Archimedean point outside the series of actual and
+possible beliefs in terms of which to define the ideal or
+limit to which members of this series might approximate.3°
+Sellars's point here is that Peirce's identification of "the
+truth" with "the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed to
+by all" makes it seem that the very existence of truth and
+reality depends upon such hazardous matters as the continuation of the race and of the Enlightenment's notions of
+rational inquiry. So Sellars wants to substitute a way of
+looking at human inquiry which views "fated to be agreed
+upon" as a description of a causal process which leads to
+the creation of self-representings by the universe. Thus we
+find Rosenberg echoing the later Peirce's idealistic metaphysics of evolutionary love:
+We can understand our representational activities ...
+only by redescribing them in terms of the concepts of a
+total theory of the universe as a physical system which, of
+natural necessity, evolves subsystems which in turn necessarily project increasingly adequate representations of the
+whole. To put it crudely, we must come to see the physical
+universe as an integrated physical system which necessarily "grows knowers" and which thereby comes to mirror
+itself within itself. 31
+Both Sellars and Rosenberg rightly view the coming-intobeing of the Mirror of Nature as made possible by the existence of minds, but they urge (as does Putnam) that mentality and intentionality are irrelevant to understanding
+how the Mirror mirrors. The crucial sort of representing—
+the one which helps us say how and why we are superior to
+our ancestors—is one which takes place not relative to a
+scheme of conventions, not relative to intentions: "Picturing
+30 Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics (London and New York,
+1968), p. 142.
+31 Jay Rosenberg, Linguistic Representation (Dordrecht, 1974), p. 144.
+297
+
+is a complex matter-of-factual relation and, as such, belongs
+in quite a different box from the concepts of denotation and
+of truth."32
+So if Putnam's recantation is right, it bears directly on the
+point that Sellars and Rosenberg thought crucial. Putnam is
+saying that the attempt to get a set of nonintentional relationships (such as those offered by a causal theory of reference or by a Sellarsian notion of "more adequate picturing")
+is always vitiated by the fact that those relationships are
+simply further parts of the theory of the world of the present
+day. This criticism of any possible naturalization of episte.
+mology leaves us, Putnam thinks, with what he calls "internal realism"—the view that we can explain the "mundane fact that language-using contributes to getting our
+goals, achieving satisfaction, or what have you" by saying
+"not that language mirrors the world but that speakers
+mirror the world—i.e., their environment-in the sense
+of constructing a symbolic representation of that environment."33 Internal realism, in this sense, is just the view that,
+according to our own representational conventions, we are
+representing the universe better than ever. But that, in turn,
+is just complimenting ourselves for, say, having invented the
+term lithium to represent lithium, which hasn't been represented for all these years. The difference between the recanted "metaphysical" realism and the uncontroversial
+internal realism is the difference between saying that we are
+successfully representing according to Nature's own conventions of representation and saying that we are successfully representing according to our own. It is the difference between, roughly, science as a Mirror of Nature, and
+as a set of working diagrams for coping with nature. To say
+that we are coping, by our lights, pretty well is true but
+trivial. To say that we are mirroring correctly is "only a
+picture," and one which we have never been able to make
+82 Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, p. 136.
+33 Putnam, "Realism and Reason," p. 483 (p. 123 in Meaning and
+298
+
+sense of. Nature may, for all we know, necessarily grow
+knowers which represent her, but we do not know what it
+would mean for Nature to feel that our conventions of
+representations are becoming more like her own, and thus
+that she is nowadays being represented more adequately than
+in the past. Or, rather, we can make sense of this only if we
+go all the way with the Absolute Idealists, and grant that
+epistemological realism must be based on personalistic
+pantheism.
+I have been trying in this section to present Putnam's
+simple but devastating point that nonintentional relations
+are as theory-relative as intentional relations as a general
+criticism of the whole attempt to naturalize epistemology
+by first transforming it into the philosophy of language and
+then getting a naturalistic account of meaning and reference. The common motive of Quine's "Epistemology Naturalized," Daniel Dennett's hints at an "evolutionary
+epistemology," the revivification by Kripke and Fisk of the
+Aristotelian notions of essence and natural necessity, various
+causal theories of reference, and Sellarsian theories of
+picturing has been to de-transcendentalize epistemology
+while nevertheless making it do what we had always hoped
+it might: tell us why our criteria of successful inquiry are
+not just our criteria but also the right criteria, nature's criteria, the criteria which will lead us to the truth. If this
+motive is finally given up, then philosophy of language is
+simply "pure" Davidsonian semantics, a semantics which
+does not depend upon mirror-imagery, but which, on the
+contrary, makes it as difficult as possible to raise philosophically interesting questions about meaning and reference.
+Let me now proceed, therefore, to describe how Davidson
+ties in his discussion of truth with his attack on the "schemecontent" distinction and mirror-imagery generally. In the
+first place, he wants to say that the notion of statements'
+being true because they correspond to ("picture," "adequately represent") reality is just fine for all the cases in
+299
+
+which it is philosophically uncontroversial-cases like
+"Snow is white." It is even fine for such cases as "Perseverence keeps honor bright," "Our theory of the world corresponds to physical reality," and for "Our moral philosophy conforms to the Idea of the Good." These too are true
+if and only if the world contains the right sorts of things,
+and is laid out in the way the statements suggest. There is
+no occasion, in Davidson's view, for "philosophical puritanism" which would depopulate the world of honor, or physi.
+cal reality, or the Idea of the Good. If one wants to say that
+there are no such things, then one can give an alternative
+theory of the world which does not contain them, but this
+will not be a semantical theory. Discussions of the way in
+which truth is correspondence to reality float free of discussions of what there is in heaven and earth. No roads lead
+from the project of giving truth-conditions for the sentences
+of English (English as it is spoken, containing all sorts of
+theories about all sorts of things) to criteria for theory-choice
+or to the construction of a canonical notation which "limns
+the true and ultimate structure of reality." Correspondence,
+for Davidson, is a relation which has no ontological preferences—it can tie any sort of word to any sort of thing. This
+neutrality is an expression of the fact that, in a Davidsonian
+view, nature has no preferred way of being represented, and
+thus no interest in a canonical notation. Nor can nature be
+corresponded to better or worse, save in the simple sense
+that we can have more or fewer true beliefs. 34
+341 am not sure where Davidson stands on the question of truth
+about fictions, and whether he would allow that a relation of "satisfaction" can hold between "Sherlock Holmes" and Sherlock Holmes. I
+would hope that he would, since this would underline the separation
+between Tarskian semantics and "realistic" epistemology which I am
+emphasizing. In the view I am putting forward, "Sherlock Holmes
+roomed with Dr. Watson" is as true, and as little in need of "philosophical analysis" as "Snow is white." This means that there can be true
+statements which do not contain referring expressions. This consequence will not be disturbing if one remembers the distinction between
+"referring" and "talking about," and thus the distinction between "not
+300
+
+In the second place, Davidson thinks that the notion of
+"representational scheme" or "conceptual framework" or
+"intended correspondence" attempts to disjoin the notion
+of "truth" from that of "meaning," and thus must fail. His
+most effective way of putting this comes in his claim that the
+notion of an "alternative conceptual scheme"—for example,
+one which would contain none of the referring expressions
+used in ours—is the notion of a language which is "true but
+not translatable." After a sustained criticism of several
+referring" and "talking about nothing." But I do not feel clear enough
+about the issues surrounding the interpretation of Tarski's notion of
+"satisfaction" to feel confident about the relation between this notion
+and either of the two others. The general line I want to take is that
+there are true statements about fictions, values, and numbers, as well
+as about cats on mats, and that the attempt to find something like
+"correspondence" in terms of which to "analyze" the former truths on
+the model of the latter is pointless. Sellars puts this point by saying
+that not all true statements "picture" the world—only the "basic empirical" ones. I would prefer to say that no true statements picture the
+world-that picturing is "only a picture," one which has served only
+to produce ever more convoluted Sprachstreit.
+On the interpretation of Tarski, see Sellars's claim that "semantical
+statements of the Tarski-Carnap variety do not assert relations between linguistic and extra-linguistic items" (Science and Metaphysics,
+p. 82) and the contrast between "the 'picture' sense of 'correspond' and
+the Tarski-Carnap sense of 'correspond'" (p. 143). Sellars's view is that
+all semantic statements are about intensions, and that "picturing" has
+nothing to do with semantics. For contrasting views, see John Wallace,
+"On the Frame of Reference," in Semantics of Natural Language, ed
+Davidson and Harman, and Hartry Field, "Tarski's Theory of Truth,"
+Journal of Philosophy 6g (1972).
+For an attempt to work out a view of "true" which distinguishes it
+from "assertible" without attempting to construe it as "standing in a
+correspondence relation to the extra-linguistic," see Robert Brandom,
+"Truth and Assertibility," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), 137-149.
+Brandom gives an account of why we need "true" in addition to "assertible" for the purpose of what I am calling "pure" philosophy of
+language-understanding how language works, as opposed to how it
+hooks onto the world. He thereby diagnoses, I believe, the fundamental
+confusion between the need for this concept in semantics and the need
+for it in epistemology, a confusion which motivates "impure" philosophy of language.
+301
+
+variations on the traditional mirror-imagery (conceptual
+schemes as "fitting" reality better or worse, or "classifying"
+reality differently from one another), Davidson concludes:
+The trouble is that the notion of fitting the totality of
+experience, like the notions of fitting the facts, or being
+true to the facts, adds nothing intelligible to the simple
+concept of being true. To speak of sensory experience
+rather than the evidence, or just the facts, expresses a
+view about the source or nature of evidence, but it does
+not add a new entity to the universe against which to test
+conceptual schemes.
+So, he says:
+Our attempt to characterize languages or conceptual
+schemes in terms of the notion of fitting some entity has
+come down, then, to the simple thought that something is
+an acceptable conceptual scheme or theory if it is true.
+Perhaps we better say largely true in order to allow sharers
+of a scheme to differ on details. And the criterion of a
+conceptual scheme different from our own now becomes:
+largely true but not translatable. The question whether
+this is a useful criterion is just the question how well we
+understand the notion of truth, as applied to language,
+independent of the notion of translation. The answer is,
+I think, that we do not understand it independently at
+all.35
+Davidson's reason for saying that we do not understand
+this derives from what he calls a "certain holistic view of
+meaning":
+If sentences depend for their meaning on their structure,
+and we understand the meaning of each item in the struc-
+35 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," p. 16. Un-
+fortunately Davidson in that paper misinterprets Kuhn as meaning
+"untranslatable" by "incommensurable" (p. 12). It is important for
+my argument in this book to separate sharply these two notions. See
+chapter seven, section 1.
+302
+
+ture only as an abstraction from the totality of sentences
+in which it features, then we can give the meaning of any
+sentence (or word) only by giving the meaning of every
+sentence (and word) in the language.3
+This holistic view of meaning amounts to the view that a
+theory of meaning for a language must do no more than
+"give an account of how the meanings of sentences depend
+upon the meanings of words" (p. 304). The crucial move is
+to say that we need not think that "individual words must
+have meanings at all, in any sense that transcends the fact
+that they have a systematic effect on the meanings of the
+sentences in which they occur" (p. 305). The traditional view
+is that we anchor language to the world by giving meaning
+by ostension (or some other nonintentional mechanism—
+one which presupposes no "stage-setting in the language")
+to certain individual words, and then going on holistically
+from there. Davidson's neo-Wittgensteinian point is that
+even "red" and "mama" have uses—can help make possible
+the statement of truths—only in the context of sentences
+and thus of a whole language (ct. p. 308). Whatever role
+ostension (or neural pathways, or any other nonintentional
+setup) plays in learning a language, one need not know
+anything about these mechanisms to know the language, nor
+to know how to translate that language. The same goes,
+Davidson points out, for Tarskian truth-conditions for the
+sentences of English, and this is why it turns out that "a
+theory of meaning for the language L shows 'how the meanings of sentences depend upon the meanings of words' if it
+contains a (recursive) definition of truth-in-L"; for
+what we require for a theory of meaning for a language I
+is that without appeal to any (further) semantical notions
+it place enough restrictions on the predicate is T' [in the
+schema: s is T if and only if p] to entail all sentences
+got from schema T when 's' is replaced by a structural
+36 Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," p. 308.
+303
+
+description of a sentence of L and 'p' by that sentence,
+... [and so] the condition we have placed on satisfactory
+theories of meaning is in essence Tarski's Convention T.
+(P. 309)
+So, Davidson invites us to conclude:
+Since Convention T embodies our best intuition as to how
+the concept of truth is used, there does not seem to be
+much hope for a test that a conceptual scheme is radically
+different from ours if that test depends on the assumption
+that we can divorce the notion of truth from that of translation.37
+Let me try to restate the gist of this argument by pointing
+out the connection between Davidson's holism about meaning and his disdain for the notion of "scheme." Someone
+who is not a holist in this sense will think that understanding a language is a matter of two distinct processes—tying
+some individual words on the world via ostension, and then
+letting other words build up meanings around this central
+core in the course of being used. He will also think that
+understanding what "truth" means involves "analyzing"
+every true sentence until ostensions which would make it
+true become apparent. This picture of holism ceasing to
+apply at the point at which reference is least problematic—
+at the interface between language and the world where
+demonstratives do their work—is one way to get the schemecontent distinction going. If we think of language in this
+way, we will be struck by the thought that somebody else
+(the Galactics, say) will have "cut up" the world differently
+in their original acts of ostension and thus given different
+meanings to the individual words in the "core" of their language. The rest of their language will thus be infected by
+this divergence from our way of giving meaning to the
+"core" of English, and so there will be no way for us to com-
+37 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," p. 17.
+304
+
+municate—no common points of reference, no possibility of
+translation. Davidson's attack on these metaphors parallels
+Max Black's Wittgensteinian criticism of the so-called inverted-spectrum problem-the possibility that some people
+may (for colors and presumably all other perceptual "quality spaces") start off on the wrong foot. Black points out that
+we can "divide through" by the difference for all purposes
+of communication-language will, of course, go through
+equally well no matter what we were ostending. 38 Similarly,
+Davidson can say that if a difference in the original ostension does not show up at the holistic level—in the use of the
+sentences that contain the word-then the theory of meaning for the language can divide through by that difference.
+Still, we might want to insist that Davidson's argument
+concerns only what it is to give a theory of meaning and a
+theory of truth. We might claim that all he could possibly
+do is show that we cannot verify the existence of a language
+which gives a true description of the world unless it is translatable into our own, and that this would not show that
+there cannot be one. This line of argument would be analogous to the criticism of Black's way of dealing with the
+"inverted spectrum" problem, and similar Wittgensteinian
+antiskeptical strategies, as "verificationist."3s I shall close
+this chapter by replying to this objection.
+38 See Max Black, "Linguistic Method in Philosophy" in Language
+and Philosophy (Ithaca, 1949), esp. PP. 3-8. Black treats the "inverted
+spectrum" as a paradigm of the sort of skeptical argument which the
+approach to language he is recommending helps debunk. He is, I think,
+right in this. Indeed, there is a perspective from which all of what I
+called "epistemological behaviorism" in chapter four can be derived
+from the sort of argument which Black offers here.
+39 For this sort of objection, see Barry Stroud, "Transcendental Ar-
+guments," Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 241-256. I have attempted
+to deal with this objection in "Verificationism and Transcendental Ar-
+guments," Nous 5 (1971), 3-14, and with some related objections in
+"Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference and Pragmatism" in Transcendental Arguments and Science, ed. Peter Bieri, Rolf Horstmann
+and Lorenz Krüger (Dordrecht, 1979), 77-103.
+305
+
+6. TRUTH, GOODNESS, AND RELATIVISM
+In order to get a somewhat broader view of the issue
+about verificationism, consider the following suggestions:
+None of our terms refer
+None of our beliefs are true
+No translation is possible between English and the language which represents the way the world is
+None of our moral intuitions are right (participate in the
+Idea of the Good, reflect the Moral Law, or whatever)
+I take the least plausible of these to be the last. The reason
+is that what we take to be moral—to be even a candidate for
+participation in the Idea of the Good—is something which
+roughly satisfies, or is at least not too repugnant to, our
+present moral intuitions. Are we being rash in thinking of
+"morally right" as meaning "rather like our own ideal of
+behavior, only more so"? Is this to neglect a real possibility
+simply because of the verificationist intuition that we cannot
+recognize anybody who does not appeal to our intuitions as
+having anything to say about morality?
+I think that we can answer these questions best by distinguishing between a philosophical sense of "good" in respect
+to which "the naturalistic fallacy" arises and an ordinary
+sense in respect to which it does not. If we ask, "What are
+the necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being
+good?" we may say, with G. E. Moore, that it is always an
+open question whether good has anything to do with any
+conditions which might be mentioned. Words like "good,"
+once they have been handled in the way that the philosophical tradition has handled them, acquire a sense in respect to
+which this is so. They become the name of a focus imaginarius, an Idea of Pure Reason whose whole point is not to be
+identifiable with the fulfillment of any set of conditions.
+This is not to say that åyalós served pre-Platonic Greeks as
+306
+
+the name of such an unconditioned, nor that any word
+served this purpose before the Pythagoreans and the Or-
+phics and Plato invented idealism (in both its senses). But
+now there is a specifically philosophical use of "good," a
+use which would not be what it is unless Plato, Plotinus,
+Augustine, and others had helped construct a specifically
+Platonic theory of the absolute difference between the eternal and the spatio-temporal. When Moore appealed to our
+sense for the meaning of "good" he was appealing to nothing less than this sense, a sense which it is rather hard to
+get hold of without the knowledge of the history of Western
+thought commoner in Bloomsbury than in Birmingham.
+Principia Ethica should be read, as should the Euthyphro,
+as a work of edifying pedagogy and quiet moral revolution,
+rather than as an effort to describe current linguistic or
+intellectual practice.
+There is also, however, an ordinary sense of "good," the
+sense the word has when used to commend—to remark that
+something answers to some interest. In this sense, too, one
+is not going to find a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for goodness which will enable one to find the Good
+Life, resolve moral dilemmas, grade apples, or whatever.
+There are too many different sorts of interests to answer
+to, too many kinds of things to commend and too many
+different reasons for commending them, for such a set of
+necessary and sufficient conditions to be found. But this is
+a quite different reason for the indefinability of "good" than
+the one I just gave for the indefinability of the philosophical
+sense of "good." In its homely and shopworn sense, the
+reason why "good" is indefinable is not that we might be
+altogether wrong about what good men or good apples are,
+but simply that no interesting descriptive term has any
+interesting necessary and sufficient conditions. In the first,
+philosophical sense of "good," the term is indefinable because anything we say about what is good may "logically" be
+quite irrelevant to what goodness is. The only way to get a
+homely and shopworn mind to grasp this first sense is to
+307
+
+start it off with Plato or Moore and hope that it gets the
+Idea.
+My point in suggesting that there are two senses of "good"
+is, of course, to make plausible the suggestion that there are
+also two senses apiece of "true" and "real" and "correct representation of reality," and that most of the perplexities of
+epistemology come from vacillation between them (just as
+most of the perplexities of meta-ethics come from vacillating
+between senses of "good"). To begin by pursuing the analogy between goodness and truth, consider the homely use
+of "true" to mean roughly "what you can defend against all
+comers." Here the line between a belief's being justified and
+its being true is very thin. That is why Socrates had trouble
+explaining the difference between these two notions to his
+interlocutors, the same trouble we philosophy professors
+still have in explaining it to our freshmen. When the pragmatists identified truth with "what we will believe if we
+keep inquiring by our present lights" or "what it is better
+for us to believe" or with "warranted assertibility," they
+thought of themselves as following in the footsteps of Mill,
+and doing for science what the utilitarians had done for
+morality-making it something you could use instead of
+something you could merely respect, something continuous
+with common sense instead of something which might be
+as remote from common sense as the Mind of God.
+It is the homely and shopworn sense of "true" which
+Tarski and Davidson are attending to, and the special philosophical sense to which Putnam applies his "naturalistic
+fallacy" argument.4o The two concerns pass each other by.
+Davidson's is the "pure" project of finding a way of diagramming the relations among the sentences of English so as to
+make perspicuous why people call some longer sentences
+"true" by seeing this as a function of their calling shorter
+sentences "true." Putnam's is the "impure" project of show-
+10 See "Reference and Understanding" (Meaning and the Moral Sciences, p. 108), where Putnam makes explicit the analogy between his
+strategy with "true" and Moore's with "good."
+308
+
+ing you that the most complete possible understanding of
+this matter will leave you as open as ever to the possibility
+that you have no true beliefs at all. So it will, but, once
+again, there is an ambiguity at hand which makes the irrelevance look like an opposition. Davidson can say, without any attempt at anticipating the end of inquiry and
+blocking Putnam's skeptical "meta-induction," that most
+of our beliefs are true. This claim follows from his claim
+that we cannot understand the suggestion that most of
+them are false—a suggestion which has sense only when
+backed up with the phony notion of an "alternative, untranslatable, conceptual scheme." But it is of no force
+against the skeptic except insofar as it challenges him to
+make concrete his suggestion that we have got it all wrong
+—a project as difficult as it would be to make concrete the
+more limited claim that all our sentences which end "
+is morally right" are false. Davidson, like Kant, is saying
+that we cannot project from the fact that this or that
+central belief turns out to be false, or this or that moral
+intuition to be perverse and prejudiced, to the possibility
+that all of them will turn out so. Only in the context of
+general agreement does doubt about either truth or goodness have sense. The skeptic and Putnam avoid this point
+by switching to the specifically "philosophical" sense of
+"good" and "true" which, like the Ideas of Pure Reason,
+are designed precisely to stand for the Unconditioned-that
+which escapes the context within which discourse is conducted and inquiry pursued, and purports to establish a
+new context.
+Davidson seems verificationist and conventionalist and
+relativist if one interprets his claim that "most beliefs are
+true" as the claim that we are getting close to the end of
+inquiry, to a grasp of the way the world is, to an utterly unclouded Mirror of Nature. But this is like interpreting him
+as claiming that we are close to the top of Plato's divided
+line, to a clear vision of the Idea of the Good. Such an interpretation takes both "true" and "good" as names for the
+309
+
+accurate fitting of a scheme of representations to something
+which supplies a content for that scheme. But as Davidson
+says:
+It would be wrong to summarize by saying we have shown
+how communication is possible between people who have
+different schemes, a way that works without need of what
+there cannot be, namely a neutral ground, or a common
+coordinate system. For we have found no intelligible
+basis on which it can be said that schemes are different.
+It would be equally wrong to announce the glorious news
+that all mankind-all speakers of language, at least—
+share a common scheme and ontology. For if we cannot
+intelligibly say that schemes are different, neither can we
+intelligibly say that they are one.
+In giving up dependence on the concept of an uninterpreted reality, something outside all schemes and science, we do not relinquish the notion of objective truth—
+quite the contrary. Given the dogma of a dualism of
+scheme and reality, we get conceptual relativity, and
+truth relative to a scheme. Without the dogma, this kind
+of relativity goes by the board. Of course truth of sentences remains relative to language, but that is as objective as can be. In giving up the dualism of scheme and
+world, we do not give up the world, but reestablish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics
+make our sentences and opinions true or false.4
+To suggest that Davidson is verificationist and relativist
+in saying that most of our beliefs are true or that any language can be translated into English is just to say that he
+is not using the "Platonic" notions of Truth and Goodness
+and Reality which "realists"
+need to make their realism
+41 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," p. 20. I
+have tried to develop the contrast between giving up the world (as
+common sense takes it to be) and giving up the World (as the Thingin-Itself, the World which we might never get right) in "The World
+Well Lost," Journal of Philosophy 6g (1972), 649-666, esp. 662-66g.
+310
+
+dramatic and controversial ("metaphysical" rather than
+"internal," in Putnam's sense). But neither is Davidson
+"refuting" these Platonic notions by exhibiting their "inconsistency." All he can do with them is do what Kant did
+with the Ideas of Pure Reason-show how they function,
+what they can and cannot do.. The trouble with Platonic
+notions is not that they are "wrong" but that there is not a
+great deal to be said about them-specifically, there is no
+way to "naturalize" them or otherwise connect them to the
+rest of inquiry, or culture, or life. If you ask Dewey why he
+thinks Western culture has the slightest notion of what
+goodness is, or Davidson why he thinks that we ever talk
+about what really exists or say anything true about it, they
+are likely to ask you what makes you have doubts on the
+subject. If you reply that the burden is on them, and that
+they are forbidden to argue from the fact that we would
+never know it if the skeptic were right to the impossibility
+of his being right, Dewey and Davidson might both reply
+that they will not argue in that way. They need not invoke
+verificationist arguments; they need simply ask why they
+should worry about the skeptical alternative until they are
+given some concrete ground of doubt. To call this attempt
+to shift the burden back to the skeptic "verificationism," or
+a confusion of the order of knowledge with the order of
+being, is like calling "verificationist" the man who says
+that he will not worry about whether the things he has
+called "red" are really red until some concrete alternative is
+provided. The decision about whether to have higher than
+usual standards for the application of words like "true" or
+"good" or "red" is, as far as I can see, not a debatable issue.
+But I suspect it is the only remaining issue between realists
+and pragmatists, and I am fairly sure that the philosophy
+of language has not given us any interesting new debating
+points.
+311
+
+PART THREE
+Philosophy
+
+CHAPTER VII
+From Epistemology to Hermeneutics
+1. COMMENSURATION AND CONVERSATION
+I have argued (in chapter three) that the desire for a
+theory of knowledge is a desire for constraint—a desire to
+find "foundations" to which one might cling, frameworks
+beyond which one must not stray, objects which impose
+themselves, representations which cannot be gainsaid. When
+I described the recent reaction against the quest for foundations as "epistemological behaviorism" (in chapter four)
+I was not suggesting that Quine and Sellars enable us to
+have a new, better, "behavioristic" sort of epistemology.
+Rather, they show us how things look when we give up
+the desire for confrontation and constraint. The demise of
+foundational epistemology, however, is often felt to leave a
+vacuum which needs to be filled. In chapters five and six I
+criticized various attempts to fill it. In this chapter I shall
+be talking about hermeneutics, so I want to make clear at
+the outset that I am not putting hermeneutics forward as
+a "successor subject" to epistemology, as an activity which
+fills the cultural vacancy once filled by epistemologically
+centered philosophy. In the interpretation I shall be offering, "hermeneutics" is not the name for a discipline, nor
+for a method of achieving the sort of results which epistemology failed to achieve, nor for a program of research.
+On the contrary, hermeneutics is an expression of hope that
+the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will
+not be filled—that our culture should become one in which
+the demand for constraint and confrontation is no longer
+felt. The notion that there is a permanent neutral framework whose "structure" philosophy can display is the notion
+that the objects to be confronted by the mind, or the rules
+315
+
+which constrain inquiry, are common to all discourse, or at
+least to every discourse on a given topic. Thus epistemology
+proceeds on the assumption that all contributions to a given
+discourse are commensurable. Hermeneutics is largely a
+struggle against this assumption.
+By "commensurable" I mean able to be brought under
+a set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement can
+be reached on what would settle the issue on every point
+where statements seem to conflict. These rules tell us how
+to construct an ideal situation, in which all residual disagreements will be seen to be "noncognitive" or merely
+verbal, or else merely temporary—capable of being resolved
+by doing something further. What matters is that there
+should be agreement about what would have to be done if a
+resolution were to be achieved. In the meantime, the interlocutors can agree to differ-being satisfied of each other's rationality the while. The dominating notion of epistemology
+is that to be rational, to be fully human, to do what we
+ought, we need to be able to find agreement with other human beings. To construct an epistemology is to find the
+maximum amount of common ground with others. The
+assumption that an epistemology can be constructed is the
+assumption that such common ground exists. Sometimes
+this common ground has been imagined to lie outside us—
+for example, in the realm of Being as opposed to that of
+Becoming, in the Forms which both guide inquiry and are
+its goal. Sometimes it has been imagined to lie within us, as
+in the seventeenth century's notion that by understanding
+our own minds we should be able to understand the right
+method for finding truth. Within analytic philosophy, it
+1 Note that this sense of "commensurable" is not the same as "assigning the same meaning to terms." This sense—which is the one often
+used in discussing Kuhn-does not seem to me a useful one, given the
+fragility of the notion of "sameness of meaning." To say that parties
+to a controversy "use terms in different ways" seems to me an unenlightening way of describing the fact that they cannot find a way of
+agreeing on what would settle the issue. See chapter six, section 3, on
+this point.
+316
+
+has often been imagined to lie in language, which was supposed to supply the universal scheme for all possible content. To suggest that there is no such common ground seems
+to endanger rationality. To question the need for commensuration seems the first step toward a return to a war
+of all against all. Thus, for example, a common reaction to
+Kuhn or Feyerabend is that they are advocating the use of
+force rather than persuasion.
+The holistic, antifoundationalist, pragmatist treatments
+of knowledge and meaning which we find in Dewey, Wittgenstein, Quine, Sellars, and Davidson are almost equally
+offensive to many philosophers, precisely because they abandon the quest for commensuration and thus are "relativist."
+If we deny that there are foundations to serve as common
+ground for adjudicating knowledge-claims, the notion of
+the philosopher as guardian of rationality seems endangered.
+More generally, if we say that there is no such thing as epistemology and that no surrogate can be found for it in, for
+example, empirical psychology or the philosophy of language, we may be seen as saying that there is no such thing
+as rational agreement and disagreement. Holistic theories
+seem to license everyone to construct his own little whole—
+his own little paradigm, his own little practice, his own
+little language-game-and then crawl into it.
+I think that the view that epistemology, or some suitable
+successor-discipline, is necessary to culture confuses two roles
+which the philosopher might play. The first is that of the
+informed dilettante, the polypragmatic, Socratic intermediary between various discourses. In his salon, so to speak,
+hermetic thinkers are charmed out of their self-enclosed
+practices. Disagreements between disciplines and discourses
+are compromised or transcended in the course of the conversation. The second role is that of the cultural overseer
+who knows everyone's common ground-the Platonic philosopher-king who knows what everybody else is really
+doing whether they know it or not, because he knows about
+the ultimate context (the Forms, the Mind, Language)
+317
+
+within which they are doing it. The first role is appropriate
+to hermeneutics, the second to epistemology. Hermeneutics
+sees the relations between various discourses as those of
+strands in a possible conversation, a conversation which presupposes no disciplinary matrix which unites the speakers,
+but where the hope of agreement is never lost so long as
+the conversation lasts. This hope is not a hope for the discovery of antecedently existing common ground, but simply
+hope for agreement, or, at least, exciting and fruitful disagreement. Epistemology sees the hope of agreement as a
+token of the existence of common ground which, perhaps
+unbeknown to the speakers, unites them in a common rationality. For hermeneutics, to be rational is to be willing
+to refrain from epistemology-from thinking that there is
+a special set of terms in which all contributions to the conversation should be put-and to be willing to pick up the
+jargon of the interlocutor rather than translating it into
+one's own. For epistemology, to be rational is to find the
+proper set of terms into which all the contributions should
+be translated if agreement is to become possible. For epistemology, conversation is implicit inquiry. For hermeneutics, inquiry is routine conversation. Epistemology views the
+participants as united in what Oakeshott calls an universitas
+—a group united by mutual interests in achieving a common end. Hermeneutics views them as united in what he
+calls a societas—persons whose paths through life have
+fallen together, united by civility rather than by a common
+goal, much less by a common ground.?
+My use of the terms epistemology and hermeneutics to
+stand for these ideal opposites may seem forced. I shall try
+to justify it by noting some of the connections between
+holism and the "hereneutic circle." The notion of knowledge as accurate representation lends itself naturally to the
+notion that certain sorts of representations, certain expressions, certain processes are "basic," "privileged," and "foun-
+2 Cf. "On the Character of a Modern European State" in Michael
+Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford, 1975).
+318
+
+dational." The criticisms of this notion which I have canvassed in previous chapters are backed up with holistic
+arguments of the form: We will not be able to isolate basic
+elements except on the basis of a prior knowledge of the
+whole fabric within which these elements occur. Thus we
+will not be able to substitute the notion of "accurate representation" (element-by-element) for that of successful accomplishment of a practice. Our choice of elements will
+be dictated by our understanding of the practice, rather
+than the practice's being "legitimated" by a "rational reconstruction" out of elements. This holist line of argument says
+that we shall never be able to avoid the "hermeneutic circle"-the fact that we cannot understand the parts of a
+strange culture, practice, theory, language, or whatever, unless we know something about how the whole thing works,
+whereas we cannot get a grasp on how the whole works until
+we have some understanding of its parts. This notion of
+interpretation suggests that coming to understand is more
+like getting acquainted with a person than like following a
+demonstration. In both cases we play back and forth between
+guesses about how to characterize particular statements or
+other events, and guesses about the point of the whole situation, until gradually we feel at ease with what was hitherto
+strange. The notion of culture as a conversation rather than
+as a structure erected upon foundations fits well with this
+hermeneutical notion of knowledge, since getting into a
+conversation with strangers is, like acquiring a new virtue
+or skill by imitating models, a matter of póvyous rather than
+The usual way of treating the relation between hermeneutics and epistemology is to suggest that they should
+divide up culture between them—with epistemology taking
+care of the serious and important "cognitive" part (the
+part in which we meet our obligations to rationality) and
+hermeneutics charged with everything else. The idea behind
+such a division is that knowledge in the strict sense-emar/pen
+—must have a lóyos, and that a dóyos can only be given by
+319
+
+the discovery of a method of commensuration. The idea of
+commensurability is built into the notion of "genuine cognition," so that what is "only a matter of taste" or "of
+opinion" need not fall within epistemology's charge, and
+conversely, what epistemology cannot render commensurable is stigmatized as merely "subjective."
+The pragmatic approach to knowledge suggested by epistemological behaviorism will construe the line between discourses which can be rendered commensurable and those
+which cannot as merely that between "normal" and "abnormal" discourse—a distinction which generalizes Kuhn's
+distinction between "normal" and "revolutionary" science.
+"Normal" science is the practice of solving problems against
+the background of a consensus about what counts as a good
+explanation of the pheromena and about what it would
+take for a problem to be solved. "Revolutionary" science is
+the introduction of a new "paradigm" of explanation, and
+thus of a new set of problems. Normal science is as close as
+real life comes to the epistemologist's notion of what it is
+to be rational. Everybody agrees on how to evaluate everything everybody else says. More generally, normal discourse
+is that which is conducted within an agreed-upon set of
+conventions about what counts as a relevant contribution,
+what counts as answering a question, what counts as having
+a good argument for that answer or a good criticism of it.
+Abnormal discourse is what happens when someone joins
+in the discourse who is ignorant of these conventions or who
+sets them aside. 'Emorýun is the product of normal discourse
+-the sort of statement which can be agreed to be true by all
+participants whom the other participants count as "rational." The product of abnormal discourse can be anything from nonsense to intellectual revolution, and there is
+no discipline which describes it, any more than there is a
+discipline devoted to the study of the unpredictable, or of
+"creativity." But hermeneutics is the study of an abnormal
+discourse from the point of view of some normal discourse
+—the attempt to make some sense of what is going on at a
+320
+
+stage where we are still too unsure about it to describe it,
+and thereby to begin an epistemological account of it. The
+fact that hermeneutics inevitably takes some norm for
+granted makes it, so far forth, "Whiggish." But insofar
+as it proceeds nonreductively and in the hope of picking up
+a new angle on things, it can transcend its own Whiggishness.
+From this point of view, then, the line between the respective domains of epistemology and hermeneutics is not
+a matter of the difference between the "sciences of nature"
+and the "sciences of man," nor between fact and value, nor
+the theoretical and the practical, nor "objective knowledge"
+and something squishier and more dubious. The difference
+is purely one of familiarity. We will be epistemological
+where we understand perfectly well what is happening but
+want to codify it in order to extend, or strengthen, or teach,
+or "ground" it. We must be hermeneutical where we do not
+understand what is happening but are honest enough to
+admit it, rather than being blatantly "Whiggish" about it.
+This means that we can get epistemological commensuration only where we already have agreed-upon practices of
+inquiry (or, more generally, of discourse)-as easily in
+"academic" art, "scholastic" philosophy, or "parliamentary"
+politics as in "normal" science. We can get it not because
+we have discovered something about "the nature of human
+knowledge" but simply because when a practice has continued long enough the conventions which make it possible
+—and which permit a consensus on how to divide it into
+parts—are relatively easy to isolate. Nelson Goodman has
+said of inductive and deductive inference that we discover
+its rules by discovering what inferences we habitually accept; so it is with epistemology generally. There is no
+3 Nelson Goodman's pragmatist attitude toward logic is nicely
+summed up in a passage which, once again, calls the "hermeneutic
+circle" to mind: "This looks flagrantly circular. ... But this circle is
+a virtuous one. ... A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are
+unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are
+321
+
+difficulty getting commensuration in theology or morals or
+literary criticism when these areas of culture are "normal."
+At certain periods, it has been as easy to determine which
+critics have a "just perception" of the value of a poem as
+it is to determine which experimenters are capable of making accurate observations and precise measurements. At
+other periods-for example, the transitions between the
+"archaeological strata" which Foucault discerns in the recent intellectual history of Europe-it may be as difficult
+to know which scientists are actually offering reasonable
+explanations as it is to know which painters are destined for
+immortality.
+2. KUHN AND INCOMMENSURABILITY
+In recent years, debates about the possibility of epistemology as opposed to hermeneutics have gained a new
+concreteness as a result of the work of T. S. Kuhn. His
+Structure of Scientific Revolutions owed something to Wittgenstein's criticisms of standard epistemology, but it
+brought those criticisms to bear on received opinion in a
+fresh way. Since the Enlightenment, and in particular since
+Kant, the physical sciences had been viewed as a paradigm
+of knowledge, to which the rest of culture had to measure
+up. Kuhn's lessons from the history of science suggested that
+controversy within the physical sciences was rather more
+like ordinary conversation (on the blameworthiness of an
+action, the qualifications of an officeseeker, the value of a
+poem, the desirability of legislation) than the Enlightenment had suggested. In particular, Kuhn questioned whether philosophy of science could construct an algorithm for
+choice among scientific theories. Doubt on this point made
+his readers doubly doubtful on the question of whether epistemology could, starting from science, work its way outunwilling to amend" (Fact, Fiction and Forecast [Cambridge, Mass.,
+1955), p. 67.)
+322
+
+ward to the rest of culture by discovering the common
+ground of as much of human discourse as could be thought
+of as "cognitive" or "rational."
+Kuhn's examples of "revolutionary" change in science
+were, as he himself has remarked, cases of the sort which
+hermeneutics has always taken as its special assignment—
+cases in which a scientist has said things which sound so silly
+that it is hard to believe that we have understood him properly. Kuhn says that he offers students the maxim:
+When reading the works of an important thinker, look
+first for the apparent absurdities in the text and ask yourself how a sensible person could have written them. When
+you find an answer,... when these passages make sense,
+then you may find that more central passages, ones you
+previously thought you understood, have changed their
+meaning.*
+Kuhn goes on to say that this maxim does not need to be
+told to historians, who, "consciously or not, are all practitioners of the hermeneutic method." But Kuhn's invocation of such a maxim was disturbing to philosophers of
+science who, working within the epistemological tradition,
+were bound to think in terms of a neutral scheme ("observation language," "bridge laws," etc.) which would make
+Aristotle and Newton, for example, commensurable. Such a
+scheme could, they thought, be used to render hermeneutical
+guesswork unnecessary. Kuhn's claim that there is no commensurability between groups of scientists who have different paradigms of a successful explanation, or who do not
+share the same disciplinary matrix, or both, seemed to
+many such philosophers to endanger the notion of theorychoice in science. For the "philosophy of science" —the name
+4 T. S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension (Chicago, 1977), p. xii.
+5 See "Second Thoughts on Paradigms" (in ibid.) for Kuhn's distinction between two "central" senses of "paradigm," blended in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions but now distinguished-"paradigm" as
+achieved result and paradigm as "disciplinary matrix."
+323
+
+under which "epistemology" went when it hid itself among
+the logical empiricists—had envisaged itself as providing an
+algorithm for theory-choice.
+Kuhn's claim that no algorithm was possible save a post
+factum and Whiggish one (one which constructed an epistemology on the basis of the vocabulary or assumptions of the
+winning side in a scientific dispute) was, however, obscured
+by Kuhn's own "idealistic"-sounding addenda. It is one
+thing to say that the "neutral observation language" in
+which proponents of different theories can offer their evidence is of little help in deciding between the theories. It is
+another thing to say that there can be no such language
+because the proponents "see different things" or "live in
+different worlds." Kuhn, unfortunately, made incidental
+remarks of the latter sort, and philosophers pounced upon
+them. Kuhn wished to oppose the traditional claim that
+"what changes with a paradigm is only the scientist's interpretation of observations that themselves are fixed once and
+for all by the nature of the environment and of the perceptual apparatus."® But this claim is innocuous if it means
+merely that the results of looking can always be phrased in
+terms acceptable to both sides ("the fluid looked darker,"
+"the needle veered to the right," or, in a pinch, "red here
+now!"). Kuhn should have been content to show that the
+availability of such an innocuous language is of no help
+whatever in bringing decision between theories under an
+algorithm, any more than in bringing decisions about guilt
+or innocence in jury trials under an algorithm, and for the
+same reasons. The problem is that the gap between the neutral language and the only languages useful in deciding the
+issue at hand is too great to be bridged by "meaning postulates" or any of the other mythological entities that traditional empiricist epistemology invoked
+Kuhn should have simply discarded the epistemological
+project altogether. But instead he called for "a viable al-
+в T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, zd ed. (Chicago, 1970), p. 120.
+324
+
+ternate to the traditional epistemological paradigm"' and
+said that "we must learn to make sense of statements that
+at least resemble 'the scientist afterward [after the revolution] works in a different world.' " He thought we must also
+make sense of the claims that "when Aristotle and Galileo
+looked at swinging stones, the first saw constrained fall, the
+second a pendulum" and that "pendulums were brought
+into existence by something very like a paradigm-induced
+gestalt switch." The unfortunate result of these remarks was
+to set the pendulum swinging between realism and idealism
+once again. In order to guard against the confusions of traditional empiricism, we need make no more of the gestaltswitch in question than the fact that people became able to
+respond to sensory stimulations by remarks about pendulums, without having to make an intervening inference.
+Kuhn was right in saying that "a philosophical paradigm
+initiated by Descartes and developed at the same time as
+Newtonian dynamics" needed to be overthrown, but he let
+his notion of what counted as a "philosophical paradigm"
+be set by the Kantian notion that the only substitute for a
+realistic account of successful mirroring was an idealistic
+account of the malleability of the mirrored world. We do
+indeed need to give up the notion of "data and interpretation" with its suggestion that if we could get to the real
+data, unpolluted by our choice of language, we should be
+"grounding" rational choice. But we can get rid of this
+notion by being behaviorist in epistemology rather than by
+being idealist. Hermeneutics does not need a new epistemological paradigm, any more than liberal political thought
+requires a new paradigm of sovereignty. Hermeneutics,
+rather, is what we get when we are no longer epistemological.
+Putting aside Kuhn's incidental "idealism," then, we may
+focus simply on Kuhn's claim that no algorithm for theorychoice is available. This led his critics to claim that he was
+- This and all other quotations from Kuhn in this paragraph are
+from ibid., pp. 120-121.
+325
+
+licensing every scientist to set up his own paradigm and
+then define objectivity and rationality in terms of that paradigm—the criticism which, as I said above, has been customarily made of any holistic, nonfoundational theory of
+knowledge. Thus Kuhn wrote:
+In learning a paradigm the scientist acquires theory,
+methods and standards together, usually in an inextricable mixture. ...
+That observation .. • provides our first explicit indication of why the choice between competing paradigms
+regularly raises questions that cannot be resolved by the
+criteria of normal science. ... Like the issue of competing
+standards, [it] can be answered only in terms of criteria
+that lie outside of normal science altogether, and it is that
+recourse to external criteria that most obviously makes
+paradigm debates revolutionary.8
+And critics such as Scheffler often glossed him as follows:
+... the comparative evaluation of rival paradigms is quite
+plausibly conceived of as a deliberative process occurring
+at a second level of discourse... regulated, to some degree
+at least, by shared standards appropriate to second-order
+discussion. The passage just quoted suggests, however,
+that such sharing of second-order standards is impossible.
+For to accept a paradigm is to accept not only theory and
+methods, but also governing standards of criteria which
+serve to justify the paradigm as against its rivals.... Paradigm differences are thus inevitably reflected upward, in
+criterial differences at the second level. It follows that each
+paradigm is, in effect, inevitably self-justifying, and that
+paradigm debates must fail of objectivity: again we appear driven back to non-rational conversions as the final
+characterization of paradigm shifts within the community
+of science.'
+8 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Ist ed. (Chicago,
+1961), pp. 108-10g.
+9 Israel Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity (Indianapolis, 1967), p. 84.
+326
+
+It is certainly possible to argue that "paradigm differences
+are thus inevitably reflected upward," but Kuhn did not in
+fact argue in this way. He merely said that such reflection
+into meta-discourse makes it harder to resolve controversies
+about paradigm shifts than it is to resolve controversies
+within normal science. So far, critics like Scheffler would
+not disagree; indeed, as Kuhn has noted, "most philosophers
+of science would ... now regard the sort of algorithm which
+has traditionally been sought as a not quite attainable
+ideal."10 The only real question which separates Kuhn from
+his critics is whether the sort of "deliberative process" which
+occurs concerning paradigm shifts in the sciences (the sort
+of process which, as Kuhn shows in The Copernican Revolution, can stretch out over a century) is different in kind
+from the deliberative process which occurs concerning, for
+example, the shift from the ancien régime to bourgeois
+democracy, or from the Augustans to the Romantics.
+Kuhn says that the criteria of choice between theories
+(even within normal science, where hermeneutic problems
+may not yet arise) "function not as rules, which determine
+choice, but as values, which influence it" (p. 331). Most of
+his critics would agree even to this, but they would insist
+that the crucial question is whether we can find a range of
+specifically scientific values which should affect such choice,
+as opposed to "extraneous considerations" (the impact of
+science on theology, the future of life on earth, and the like)
+which should not be allowed to enter the "deliberative process." The criteria themselves Kuhn identifies as "accuracy,
+consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness" (p. 322)—a
+more or less standard list-and we might be tempted to say
+that it would be "unscientific" to permit any values save
+these to influence our choice. But the trade-offs between
+satisfaction of these various criteria provide room for endless rational debate. As Kuhn says:
+Though the historian can always find men-Priestly, for
+instance—who were unreasonable to resist [a new theory]
+10 Kuhn, Essential Tension, p. 326.
+327
+
+for as long as they did, he will not find a point at which
+resistance becomes illogical or unscientific."
+But can we then find a way of saying that the considerations
+advanced against the Copernican theory by Cardinal Bellarmine-the scriptural descriptions of the fabric of the
+heavens—were "illogical or unscientific?"12 This, perhaps,
+is the point at which the battle lines between Kuhn and his
+critics can be drawn most sharply. Much of the seventeenth
+century's notion of what it was to be a "philosopher," and
+much of the Enlightenment's notion of what it was to be
+"rational," turns on Galileo's being absolutely right and the
+church absolutely wrong. To suggest that there is room for
+rational disagreement here-not simply for a black-andwhite struggle between reason and superstition-is to endanger the very notion of "philosophy." For it endangers the
+notion of finding "a method for finding truth" which takes
+Galilean and Newtonian mechanics as paradigmatic.13 A
+whole complex of mutually reinforcing ideas—philosophy as
+a methodological discipline distinct from the sciences, epistemology as the provision of commensuration, rationality as
+possible only on the common ground which makes possible
+commensuration-seems endangered if the question about
+Bellarmine is answered in the negative.
+Kuhn does not give an explicit answer to the question,
+but his writings provide an arsenal of argument in favor of
+a negative answer. In any case, a negative answer is implied
+11 Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed., P. 159.
+12 The historical role of Bellarmine's sophisticated objections to Co-
+pernican theories is described by Giorgio de Santillana in The Crime
+of Galileo (Chicago, 1955). The significance of Bellarmine's position is
+discussed by Michael Polanyi in Personal Knowledge (Chicago, 1958).
+13 Mechanics was taken as paradigmatic in a double sense by the
+founders of "modern philosophy." On the one hand, "the method of
+finding truth" had to be the one which Newton followed, or at least
+one which would come up with Newtonian results. On the other hand,
+in such writers as Locke, Newtonian mechanics was a model for the
+mechanics of "inner space" (the "para-mechanical" mental operations
+satirized by Reid and Ryle).
+328
+
+by the argument of the present book. The crucial consideration is whether we know how to draw a line between science
+and theology such that getting the heavens right is a "scientific" value, and preserving the church, and the general
+cultural structure of Europe, is an "unscientific" value.'
+The argument that we do not centers around the claim that
+the lines between disciplines, subject matters, parts of culture, are themselves endangered by novel substantive suggestions. This argument can be put in terms of the scope of
+the criterion of "scope"—one of the standard desiderata for
+theories listed above. Bellarinine thought the scope of
+Copernicus's theory was smaller than might be thought.
+When he suggested that perhaps Copernican theory was
+really just an ingenious heuristic device for, say, navigational purposes and other sorts of practically oriented celestial reckoning, he was admitting that the theory was,
+within its proper limits, accurate, consistent, simple, and
+perhaps even fruitful. When he said that it should not be
+thought of as having wider scope than this he defended his
+view by saying that we had excellent independent (scriptural) evidence for believing that the heavens were roughly
+Ptolemaic. Was his evidence brought in from another
+sphere, and was his proposed restriction of scope thus "unscientific"? What determines that Scripture is not an excel
+lent source of evidence for the way the heavens are set up?
+Lots of things, notably the Enlightenment's decision that
+Christianity was mostly just priestcraft. But what were
+14 Another example of the same sort is the question raised about
+"objectivity" by Marxist critics of the traditional distinctions between
+areas of culture. See, for example, Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional
+Man (Boston, 1964), chaps. 6-7. More concretely, we can ask whether
+there is a clear way of separating out the "scientific" value of getting
+the heritability of intelligence right from the "political" value of discouraging racism. I think that Marcuse is right in saying that most of
+the ("bourgeois") intellectual apparatus of the Enlightenment is required to make this distinction. Unlike Marcuse, however, I would
+hope that we might retain the distinction even after discarding one
+piece of the apparatus—epistemologically centered "foundational"
+philosophy.
+329
+
+Bellarmine's contemporaries—who mostly thought Scripture to be indeed the word of God-supposed to say to
+Bellarmine? What they did say, among other things, was
+that adherence to Scripture could be disjoined from adherence to various adventitious (e.g., Aristotelian and Ptolemaic) notions which had been used to interpret Scripture.
+(This was the sort of thing nineteenth-century liberal divines were later to say in connection with Genesis and
+Darwin.) Were all these arguments about how liberal one's
+scriptural hermeneutics might legitimately be beside the
+point? They were attempts to limit, so to speak, the scope
+of Scripture (and thus of the church)-the opposite reaction to Bellarmine's own attempt to limit the scope of
+Copernicus. So the question about whether Bellarmine
+(and, perforce, Galileo's defenders) was bringing in extraneous "unscientific" considerations seems to be a question about whether there is some antecedent way of determining the relevance of one statement to another, some
+"grid" (to use Foucault's term) which determines what
+sorts of evidence there could be for statements about the
+movements of planets.
+Obviously, the conclusion I wish to draw is that the
+"grid" which emerged in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not there to be appealed to in the early
+seventeenth century, at the time that Galileo was on trial.
+No conceivable epistemology, no study of the nature of
+human knowledge, could have "discovered" it before it was
+hammered out. The notion of what it was to be "scientific"
+was in the process of being formed. If one endorses the
+values—or, perhaps, the ranking of competing values
+common to Galileo and Kant, then indeed Bellarmine was
+being "unscientific." But, of course, almost all of us (including Kuhn, though perhaps not including Feyerabend)
+are happy to endorse them. We are the heirs of three hundred years of rhetoric about the importance of distinguish.
+ing sharply between science and religion, science and politics, science and art, science and philosophy, and so on. This
+330
+
+rhetoric has formed the culture of Europe. It made us what
+we are today. We are fortunate that no little perplexity
+within epistemology, or within the historiography of science, is enough to defeat it. But to proclaim our loyalty to
+these distinctions is not to say that there are "objective"
+and "rational" standards for adopting them. Galileo, so to
+speak, won the argument, and we all stand on the common
+ground of the "grid" of relevance and irrelevance which
+"modern philosophy" developed as a consequence of that
+victory. But what could show that the Bellarmine-Galileo
+issue "differs in kind" from the issue between, say, Kerensky
+and Lenin, or that between the Royal Academy (circa
+1910) and Bloomsbury?
+I can explain the notion of "difference in kind" which is
+in question here by reverting to the notion of commensurability. The desired difference is one which would permit us
+to say that any reasonable disinterested observer of the
+Bellarmine-Galileo controversy, taking all the relevant considerations into account, would come down on Galileo's
+side, whereas reasonable men still differ about the other
+issues I just mentioned. But this, of course, just brings us
+back around to the question of whether the values Bellarmine invoked were properly "scientific," whether his attitude counts as "disinterested," and his evidence as "relevant." At this point, it seems to me, we would do well to
+abandon the notion of certain values ("rationality," "disinterestedness") floating free of the educational and institutional patterns of the day. We can just say that Galileo
+was creating the notion of "scientific values" as he went
+along, that it was a splendid thing that he did so, and that
+the question of whether he was "rational" in doing so is out
+of place.
+As Kuhn says in connection with a smaller, though obviously related issue, we cannot differentiate scientific communities by "subject matter," but rather by "examining
+patterns of education and communication."15 To know
+15 Kuhn, Essential Tension, p. xvi.
+331
+
+what counts as relevant to choice between theories about a
+certain subject is, in periods of normal inquiry, to belong
+to what Kuhn calls a "disciplinary matrix." In periods
+when the relevant community of inquirers is in question, in
+which the lines between "learned men," "mere empirics,"
+and kooks (or, to alter the example, between "serious political thinkers" and "revolutionary pamphleteers") are getting fuzzy, the question of relevance is up for grabs. We
+cannot determine relevance by focusing on subject matter
+and saying, for example, "Don't bother with what Scripture
+said God did, just look at the planets and see what they do."
+Mere looking at the planets will be of no help in choosing
+our model of the heavens, any more than mere reading of
+Scripture. In 1550 a certain set of considerations was relevant to "rational" views on astronomy, and by 1750 a largely
+different set of considerations was relevant. This change in
+what was thought relevant can be seen, by hindsight, as
+drawing proper distinctions among what was really there in
+the world ("discovering" that astronomy was an autonomous sphere of scientific inquiry), or it can be seen as a shift
+in cultural climate. It does not greatly matter which way
+we see it, as long as we are clear that the change was not
+brought about by "rational argument" in some sense of
+"rational" in which, for example, the changes lately brought
+about in regard to society's attitude toward slavery, abstract
+art, homosexuals, or endangered species, would not count
+as "rational."
+To sum up the line I am taking about Kuhn and his
+critics: the controversy between them is about whether
+science, as the discovery of what is really out there in the
+world, differs in its patterns of argumentation from discourses for which the notion of "correspondence to reality"
+seems less apposite (e.g., politics and literary criticism).
+Logical-empiricist philosophy of science, and the whole
+epistemological tradition since Descartes, has wanted to say
+that the procedure for attaining accurate representations in
+the Mirror of Nature differs in certain deep ways from the
+332
+
+procedure for attaining agreement about "practical" or
+"aesthetic" matters. Kuhn gives us reason to say that there
+is no deeper difference than that between what happens in
+"normal" and in "abnormal" discourse. That distinction
+cuts across the distinction between science and nonscience.
+The fierce indignation with which Kuhn's work was
+greeted16 was natural, for the ideals of the Enlightenment
+not only are our most precious cultural heritage but are in
+danger of disappearance as totalitarian states swallow up
+more and more of humanity. But the fact that the Enlightenment ran together the ideal of the autonomy of science
+from theology and politics with the image of scientific
+theory as Mirror of Nature is not a reason for preserving
+this confusion. The grid of relevance and irrelevance which
+we inherit almost intact from the eighteenth century will
+be more attractive when it is no longer tied to this image.
+Shopworn mirror-metaphors are of no help in keeping
+intact the inheritance-both moral and scientific-of
+Galileo.
+3. OBJECTIVITY AS CORRESPONDENCE AND AS AGREEMENT
+Kuhn's critics have helped perpetuate the dogma that
+only where there is correspondence to reality is there the
+possibility of rational agreement, in a special sense of
+"rational" of which science is the paradigm. This confusion
+is aided by our use of "objective" to mean both "characterizing the view which would be agreed upon as a result of
+16 The ferocity was found, however, mainly among professional philosophers. Kuhn's description of how science works was no shock to the
+scientists whose rationality the philosophers were concerned to protect.
+But the philosophers combined a professional attachment to mirrormetaphors with an understanding of the central role these metaphors
+had played in the Enlightenment, and thus in making possible the
+institutional basis for modern science. They were right in seeing that
+Kuhn's criticism of the tradition went deep, and that the ideology
+which had protected the rise of modern science was in danger. They
+were wrong in thinking that the institutions still needed the ideology.
+333
+
+argument undeflected by irrelevant considerations" and
+"representing things as they really are." The two are largely
+coextensive, and for non philosophical purposes no trouble
+arises from running them together. But if we begin to take
+seriously questions like "In just what sense is Goodness out
+there waiting to be represented accurately as a result of
+rational argument on moral questions?" or "In just what
+sense were there physical features of reality capable of being
+represented accurately only by differential equations, or
+tensors, before people thought of so representing them?"
+then tension between these two notions begins to arise. We
+have Plato to thank for the first sort of question and idealism and pragmatism to thank for the second sort. Neither
+question is answerable. Our natural inclination to return a
+robust "In no sense" to the first and an equally robust "In
+the fullest possible and most straightforward sense" to the
+second will be of no help in getting rid of these questions if
+we still feel the need to justify answers to such questions by
+constructing epistemological and metaphysical theories.
+Since Kant, the principal employment of such theories has
+been to support intuitions concerning the subjective-objective distinction-either attempts to show that nothing outside of natural science counts as "objective" or attempts to
+apply this honorific term to morals, or politics, or poems.
+Metaphysics, as the attempt to find out what one can be
+objective about, is forced to ask about the similarities and
+differences among, for example, the discovery (as a result
+of finally resolving a long-standing moral dilemma) of a new
+article of the Moral Law, the discovery (by mathematicians)
+of a new sort of number or of a new set of spaces, the discovery of quantum indeterminacy, and the discovery that
+the cat is on the mat. The latter discovery—a homely point
+d'appui for the notions of "contact with reality," "truth as
+correspondence" and "accuracy of representation"-is the
+standard against which the others are compared in point of
+objectivity. The metaphysician must thus worry about the
+334
+
+respects in which values, numbers, and wave packages
+resemble cats. The epistemologist must worry about the
+respects in which more interesting statements share the
+objectivity possessed by that triumph of mirroring-the appropriate utterance of "The cat is on the mat." In the view
+which follows from epistemological behaviorism, there is
+no interesting way to discover whether, for example, there
+is a Moral Law to be corresponded to. The fact that, for
+example, "the moral standards entailed by the nature of
+man" are more at home in Aristotle's hylomorphic universe
+than in Newton's mechanistic one is not a reason for thinking that there is or is not an "objeotive" Moral Law. Nor
+could anything else be. The trouble with metaphysics, just
+as the positivists said, is that nobody feels clear about what
+would count as a satisfactory argument within it, although,
+of course, the same goes for the "impure" philosophy of
+language which the positivists practiced (e.g., Quine's thesis
+of the "non-factuality" of the intentional). In the view that
+I am recommending, we might, in an imaginary age in
+which consensus in these areas was almost complete, view
+morality, physics, and psychology as equally "objective."
+We might then relegate the more debatable areas of literary
+criticism, chemistry, and sociology to the realm of the "noncognitive," or "interpret them operationalistically," or "reduce" them to one or another "objective" discipline. The
+application of such honorifics as "objective" and "cognitive"
+is never anything more than an expression of the presence
+of, or the hope for, agreement among inquirers.
+Although it will involve some repetition of what has been
+said above, I think that the debate between Kuhn and his
+critics is worth taking up yet again in the context of a
+discussion of the "objective-subjective" distinction, simply
+because the grip of this distinction is so very powerful, and
+so charged with moral feeling. Once again, this moral feeling is a consequence of the (entirely justified) notion that
+the preservation of the values of the Enlightenment is our
+335
+
+best hope. So in this section I shall try once again to cut the
+links which connect these values with the image of the
+Mirror of Nature.
+It is convenient to begin with Kuhn's own way of dealing
+with the claim that his view opens the floodgates to "subjectivity." He says:
+"Subjective" is a term with several established uses: in
+one of these it is opposed to "objective," in another to
+"judgmental." When my critics describe the idiosyncratic
+features to which I appeal as subjective, they resort, erroneously I think, to the second of these senses. When
+they complain that I deprive science of objectivity, they
+conflate that second sense of subjective with the first.!?
+In the sense in which "subjective features" are nonjudgmental, they are, Kuhn continues, "matters of taste"-the
+sort of thing nobody bothers to discuss, simple reports of
+one's state of mind. But, of course, the worth of a poem or a
+person is not, in this sense, a matter of taste. So, Kuhn can
+say, the worth of a scientific theory is a matter of "judgment,
+not taste" in the same sense.
+This reply to the charge of "subjectivity" is useful as far
+as it goes, but it does not reach the deeper fear behind the
+charge. This is the fear that there really is no middle ground
+between matters of taste and matters capable of being settled by a previously statable algorithm. The philosopher
+who sees no such middle ground is, I think, reasoning
+roughly as follows:
+1. All statements describe either internal states of human
+beings (their Glassy Essence, the possibly clouded Mirror)
+or states of external reality (nature).
+2. We can tell which statements are which by seeing which
+we know how to get universal agreement on.
+3. So the possibility of perpetual disagreement is an indication that, no matter how rational debate may seem to
+17 Kuhn, Essential Tension, p. 336.
+336
+
+be, there is really nothing to debate about-since the
+subject can only be internal states.
+This course of reasoning, shared by Platonists and positivists, produced in the latter the notion that by "analyzing"
+sentences we can discover whether they are indeed about the
+"subjective" or the "objective"—where "analysis" means
+finding out whether there is general agreement among sane
+and rational men on what would count as confirming their
+truth. Within traditional epistemology, this latter notion
+has only rarely been seen for what it is: an admission that
+our only usable notion of "objectivity" is "agreement"
+rather than mirroring. Even, for example, in Ayer's refreshingly frank remark that "we define a rational belief as
+one which is arrived at by the methods which we now
+consider reliable,"18 the notion of "reliability" still functions as a hint that we can only be rational by corresponding to the real. Not even his equally frank admission that all
+the privileged representations in the world will nevertheless
+permit a man to "sustain his convictions in the face of
+apparently hostile evidence if he is prepared to make the
+necessary ad hoc assumptions" (p. 95) is enough to defeat
+Ayer's conviction that in separating the "empirical" from
+the "emotive" and the "analytic" he is separating "truth
+about the world" from something else. This is because
+Ayer, like Plato, adds to the above chain of reasoning the
+further, foundationalist premise:
+4. We are able to eliminate the possibility of perpetual,
+undecidable rational disagreement only in those areas
+where unquestioned links to external reality provide a
+common ground for the disputants.
+The claim that where we can find no unquestioned links
+with (eg., privileged representations of) the objects to be
+mirrored there is no possibility of an algorithm, conjoined
+with the claim that where there is no possibility of an algo-
+18 A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York, 1970), p. 100.
+337
+
+rithm there can be only the appearance of rational agreement, leads to the conclusion that the absence of relevant
+privileged representations shows that we have only "a matter
+of taste." Kuhn is right in saying that this is a long way
+from the ordinary notion of "taste," but, like the equally
+unordinary notion of truth as something which need have
+nothing to do with agreement, it has a long history within
+philosophy.1° That history has to be understood if one is to
+see why such bland historiographical suggestions as Kuhn's
+should trouble the deeper unconscious levels of the trained
+philosophical mind.
+Perhaps the best way to deal with the charge of "subjectivism" brought against Kuhn is to make a distinction
+between senses of "subjective" other than the one he himself made in the passage I quoted. We can distinguish two
+senses of "subjective" which will stand roughly opposite
+each of the two senses of "objective" distinguished earlier.
+"Objectivity" in the first sense was a property of theories
+which, having been thoroughly discussed, are chosen by a
+consensus of rational discussants. By contrast, a "subjective"
+consideration is one which has been, or would be, or should
+be, set aside by rational discussants—one which is seen to be,
+or should be seen to be, irrelevant to the subject matter of
+the theory. To say that someone is bringing in "subjective"
+considerations to a discussion where objectivity is wanted
+is, roughly, to say that he is bringing in considerations
+18 Kant built this notion of truth about reality into German philos.
+ophy (and, a fortiori, into philosophy as a professionalized discipline
+which looked to the German universities for its model). He did so by
+distinguishing mere coping with phenomena from intellectually intuiting noumena. He also built the distinction between cognitive and aesthetic judgment, and the distinction between the latter and mere taste,
+into European culture. For purposes of the present dispute, however,
+his distinction between "aesthetic judgment" which can be right or
+wrong and "taste" which cannot drops out. Kuhn's critics could more
+cautiously (but, by their own lights, equally devastatingly) criticize
+him for making theory-choice in science a matter of aesthetic rather
+than cognitive judgment.
+338
+
+which the others think beside the point. If he presses these
+outré considerations, he is turning normal inquiry into
+abnormal discourse—he is being either "kooky" (if he loses
+his point) or "revolutionary" (if he gains it). For a consideration to be subjective, in this sense, is simply for it to be
+unfamiliar. So judging subjectivity is as hazardous as judging relevance.
+In a more traditional sense of "subjective," on the other
+hand, "subjective" contrasts with "corresponding to what
+is out there," and thus means something like "a product
+only of what is in here" (in the heart, or in the "confused"
+portion of the mind which does not contain privileged representations and thus does not accurately reflect what is
+out there). In this sense "subjective" is associated with "emotional" or "fantastical," for our hearts and our imaginations
+are idiosyncratic, while our intellects are, at their best,
+identical mirrors of the self-same external objects. Here
+we get a linkup with "matters of taste," since the state
+of our emotions at a given moment (of which our unconsidered momentary reaction to a work of art is an example
+is indeed undebatable. We have privileged access to what
+goes on inside us. In this way, the tradition since Plato
+has run together the "algorithm versus no algorithm" distinction with the "reason versus passion" distinction. The
+various ambiguities of "objective" and "subjective" illustrate the way in which the confusion can develop. If it were
+not for the traditional linkage of these distinctions, a historian of inquiry who emphasized similarities between the
+controversies of scientists and those of literary critics would
+not have been construed as endangering our minds by upgrading our hearts.
+Kuhn himself, however, occasionally makes too large
+concessions to the tradition, particularly when he suggests
+that there is a serious and unresolved problem about why
+the scientific enterprise has been doing so nicely lately. Thus
+he says:
+339
+
+Even those who have followed me this far will want to
+know how a value-based enterprise of the sort I have described can develop as a science does, repeatedly producing
+powerful new techniques for prediction and control. To
+that question, unfortunately, I have no answer at all, but
+that is only another way of saying that I make no claim to
+have solved the problem of induction. If science dia
+progress by virtue of some shared and binding algorithm
+of choice, I would be equally at a loss to explain its success. The lacuna is one I feel acutely, but its presence
+does not differentiate my position from the tradition. 20
+As I have argued in connection with Putnam's "metaphysical realism" in the previous chapter, the lacuna should not
+be felt acutely. We should not regret our inability to perform a feat which no one has any idea of how to perform.
+The notion that we are faced by a challenge to fill this
+lacuna is one more result of hypostatizing the Platonic
+focus imaginarius—truth as disjoined from agreement—
+and allowing the gap between oneself and that unconditional ideal to make one feel that one does not yet understand the conditions of one's existence.
+In the view I am advocating, the question "Why, if science is merely ..., does it produce powerful new techniques for prediction and control?" is like the question
+20 Kuhn, Essential Tension, pp. 332-333. There are other passages in
+that book in which, I should argue, Kuhn grants too much to the epistemological tradition. One is at p. xxiii, where he expresses the hope
+that philosophers' understanding of "reference determination and
+translation" will help clarify the issues. Another is p. 14, where he
+suggests that the philosophy of science has a quite distinct mission
+from the hermeneutic activities of the historian of science: "Philosophy's business is with rational reconstruction, and it need preserve
+only those elements of its subject essential to science as sound knowledge." This passage seems to me to preserve intact the myth that there
+is something called "the nature of sound knowledge" for philosophers
+to describe, an activity quite distinct from description of what counts
+as justification within the various disciplinary matrices constituting the
+culture of the day.
+340
+
+"Why, if the change in moral consciousness in the West
+since 1750 is merely ..., has it been able to accomplish so
+much for human freedom?" We can fill the first blank with
+"adherence to the following binding algorithm ..'" or
+with "a succession of Kuhnian institutionalized disciplinary matrices." We can fill the second with "the application of secular thought to moral issues" or "the guilty conscience of the bourgeoisie" or "changes in the emotional
+constitution of those who control the levers of power," or
+with a lot of other phrases. In no case does anyone know
+what might count as a good answer. Retrospectively, "Whiggishly," and "realistically" we will always be able to see the
+achievement desired (prediction and control of nature,
+emancipation of the oppressed) as the result of getting a
+clearer view of what is there (the electrons, the galaxies, the
+Moral Law, human rights). But these are never the sorts
+of explanations philosophers want. They are, in Putnam's
+phrase, "internal" explanations—explanations which satisfy
+our need to tell a coherent causal story about our interactions with the world, but not our transcendental need to
+underwrite our mirroring by showing how it approximates
+to truth. To "solve the problem of induction," in the sense
+Kuhn intends, would be like "solving the problem of fact
+and value"; both problems survive only as names for a certain inarticulate dissatisfaction. They are the sort of problems which cannot be formulated within "normal philosophy"; all that happens is that this or that technical gimmick
+is occasionally labeled a "solution" to such a problem, in
+the vague hope of establishing contact with the past, or with
+eternity.
+What we need, rather than a solution to "the problem of
+induction," is the ability to think about science in such a
+way that its being a "value-based enterprise" occasions no
+surprise. All that hinders us from doing so is the ingrained
+notion that "values" are "inner" whereas "facts" are "outer"
+and that it is as much a mystery how, beginning with values,
+we could produce bombs as how, beginning with private
+341
+
+inner episodes, we could avoid bumping into things. Here
+we come round once again to the bugbear of "idealism" and
+the notion that the search for an algorithm goes hand in
+hand with a "realistic" approach to science whereas a relaxation into the merely hermeneutic method of the historian
+sells the pass to the idealist. Whenever it is suggested that
+the distinctions between theory and practice, fact and value,
+method and conversation be relaxed, an attempt to make
+the world "malleable to human will" is suspected. This
+produces, yet again, the positivist claim that we must either
+make a clear distinction between the "noncognitive" and
+the "cognitive," or else "reduce" the former to the latter.
+For the third possibility—reducing the latter to the former
+—seems to "spiritualize" nature by making it like history
+or literature, something which men have made rather than
+something they find. It is the third option that Kuhn
+seems, to some of his critics, to be suggesting.
+This renewed attempt to see Kuhn as verging upon
+"idealism" is, however, a muddled way of reiterating the
+claim that something like (4) above is true-that we must
+see scientists as "in touch with external reality" and therefore able to reach rational agreement by means not available
+to politicians and poets. The muddle consists in suggesting
+that Kuhn, by "reducing" the methods of scientists to those
+of politicians, has "reduced" the "found" world of neutrons
+to the "made" world of social relationships. Here again we
+find the notion that whatever cannot be discovered by a
+machine programmed with the appropriate algorithm cannot exist "objectively," and thus must be somehow a "human creation." In the following section, I shall try to bring
+together what I have been saying about objectivity with
+some themes from earlier portions of this book in the hope
+of showing that the distinction between epistemology and
+hermeneutics should not be thought of as paralleling a distinction between what is "out there" and what we "make
+up."
+342
+
+4. SPIRIT AND NATURE
+It must be confessed that the notion that there is a special
+set of methods appropriate for the "soft" disciplines-the
+Geisteswissenschaften—does have historical links with idealism. As Apel says, the present opposition between analytic
+philosophy and "hermeneutics" as philosophical strategies
+seems natural since
+the metaphysics of the spirit and of the subject in igthcentury Idealism, which should be considered the foundations of the Geisteswissenschaften (although the latter
+certainly put more emphasis upon material research) are
+taken by the later Wittgenstein as a "disease" of language together with all other concepts of metaphysics in
+Western philosophy.21
+The notion that the empirical self could be turned over to
+the sciences of nature, but that the transcendental self,
+which constitutes the phenomenal world and (perhaps)
+functions as a moral agent, could not, has indeed done as
+much as anything else to make the spirit-nature distinction
+meaningful. So this metaphysical distinction lurks in the
+background of every discussion of the relations between the
+Geistes- and the Naturwissenschaften. The picture is further
+complicated by the vague notion that those who like to talk
+about "hermeneutics" are proposing to substitute a new
+kind of method (a suspiciously "soft" kind) for some other
+method (the "scientific method," say, or perhaps "philosophical analysis"). In this section I hope to show that
+hermeneutics, as discourse about as-yet-incommensurable
+discourses, has no particular connection with either (a) the
+"mind" side of Cartesian dualism, or (b) the "constituting"
+side of the Kantian distinction between the constituting and
+structuring faculty of spontaneity and the passive faculty of
+receptivity, or (c) the notion of a method for discovering
+21 Karl-Otto Apel, Analytic Philosophy of Language and the Geistes.
+wissenschaften (Dordrecht, 1967), p. 35. Cf. also p. 53.
+343
+
+the truth of sentences which competes with the normal
+methods pursued in extra-philosophical disciplines. (Nonetheless, I think that this limited and purified sense of "hermeneutics" I am employing does link up with the use of the
+term by such writers as Gadamer, Apel, and Habermas. I
+shall try to bring out the connections in the following
+chapter.)
+The dread of "falling into idealism" which afflicts those
+tempted by Kuhn to reject standard notions of philosophy
+of science (and more generally of epistemology) is enhanced
+by the thought that if the study of science's search for truth
+about the physical universe is viewed hermeneutically it
+will be viewed as the activity of spirit—the faculty which
+makes—rather than as the application of the mirroring
+faculties, those which find what nature has already made.
+This latent romantic-classic opposition which lurks in the
+background of discussion of Kuhn is brought into the open
+by Kuhn's unhappy use (deprecated in section 2 above) of
+romantic phrases like "being presented with a new world,"
+instead of the classic "using a new description for the
+world." In the view I want to recommend, nothing deep
+turns on the choice between these two phrases—between the
+imagery of making and of finding. They thus resemble the
+opposition between "objective" and "nonobjective," or "cognitive" and "noncognitive," which I discussed in the previous section. It is less paradoxical, however, to stick to the
+classic notion of "better describing what was already there"
+for physics. This is not because of deep epistemological or
+metaphysical considerations, but simply because, when we
+tell our Whiggish stories about how our ancestors gradually
+crawled up the mountain on whose (possibly false) summit we stand, we need to keep some things constant throughout the story. The forces of nature and the small bits of
+matter, as conceived by current physical theory, are good
+choices for this role. Physics is the paradigm of "finding"
+simply because it is hard (at least in the West) to tell a story
+of changing physical universes against the background of
+344
+
+an unchanging Moral Law or poetic canon, but very easy
+to tell the reverse sort of story. Our tough-minded "naturalistic" sense that spirit is, if not reducible to nature, at least
+parasitic upon it, is no more than the insight that physics
+gives us a good background against which to tell our stories
+of historical change. It is not as if we had some deep insight
+into the nature of reality which told us that everything save
+atoms and the void was "by convention" (or "spiritual" or
+"made up"). Democritus's insight was that a story about the
+smallest bits of things forms a good background for stories
+about changes among things made of these bits. The acceptance of this genre of world-story (fleshed out successive.
+ly by Lucretius, Newton, and Bohr) may be definatory of
+the West, but it is not a choice which could obtain, or which
+requires, epistemological or metaphysical guarantees.
+Kuhnians should, I conclude, resist the temptation to
+dish the Whigs by talking of "different worlds." By giving
+up such phrases, they would not be conceding anything to
+the epistemological tradition. To say that the study of the
+history of science, like the study of the rest of history, must
+be hermeneutical, and to deny (as I, but not Kuhn, would)
+that there is something extra called "rational reconstruction" which can legitimize current scientific practice, is
+still not to say that the atoms, wave packages, etc., discovered by the physical scientists are creations of the human
+spirit. To buy in on the normal science of one's day in
+constructing the largest possible story to tell about the history of the race is not, unless one also buys the various
+Platonic dogmas mentioned in the previous section, to say
+that physics is "objective" in some way in which politics or
+poetry may not be. For the line between making and finding
+has nothing to do with the line between incommensurability
+and commensurability. Or, to put it another way, the sense
+in which man is a spiritual and not merely a natural being—
+the sense to which antireductionists like Alasdair MacIntyre,
+Charles Taylor, and Marjorie Grene have devoted attention
+— is not a sense in which he is a being who makes worlds. To
+345
+
+say, with Sartre, that man makes himself, and that he differs
+thereby from atoms and inkwells, is quite compatible with
+repudiating any suggestion that part of his self-creation
+consists in "constituting" atoms and inkwells. But the confusions among the romantic notion of man as self-creative,
+the Kantian notion of man as constituting a phenomenal
+world, and the Cartesian notion of man as containing a
+special immaterial ingredient need to be examined in some
+detail. This set of confusions is embodied in much discussion concerning the "nature of spirit," "the irreducibility
+of the person," the distinction between action and motion,
+and the distinction between the Geistes-and the Naturwissenschaften. Since the last distinction is supposedly coextensive with the distinotion between hermeneutical and
+other methods, it is especially important to take it up in
+order to clarify the notion of hermeneutics which I am
+offering.
+I shall begin unraveling this threefold confusion by taking up the claim that hermeneutics is peculiarly suited to
+"spirit" or to "the sciences of man," whereas some other
+method (that of the "objectivizing" and "positive" sciences) is appropriate to "nature." If we draw the line between epistemology and hermeneutics as I have been drawing it—as a contrast between discourse about normal and
+about abnormal discourse-then it seems clear that the
+two do not compete, but rather help each other out. Nothing is so valuable for the hermeneutical inquirer into an
+exotic culture as the discovery of an epistemology written
+within that culture. Nothing is so valuable for the determination of whether the possessors of that culture uttered
+any interesting truths (by—what else?—the standards of
+the normal discourse of our own time and place than the
+hermeneutical discovery of how to translate them without
+making them sound like fools. So I suspect that this notion
+of competing methods derives from the view that the world
+comes divided into the areas which can, and those which
+cannot, be best described in the normal discourse (the
+346
+
+"conceptual scheme," to use a pre-Davidsonian phrase) of
+our own culture. Specifically, this view suggests that people
+are somehow always going to be so slimy and slippery
+(Sartre's "viscousness") that they will escape "objective"
+explanation. But, once again, if one draws the hermeneuticsepistemology distinction as I want to draw it, there is no
+requirement that people should be more difficult to understand than things; it is merely that hermeneutics is only
+needed in the case of incommensurable discourses, and that
+people discourse whereas things do not. What makes the
+difference is not discourse versus silence, but incommensurable discourses versus commensurable discourses. As physicalists correctly point out, once we can figure out how to
+translate what is being said, there is no reason to think
+that the explanation of why it is being said should differ
+in kind (or proceed by different methods) from an explanation of locomotion or digestion. There is no metaphysical
+reason why human beings should be capable of saying incommensurable things, nor any guarantee that they will
+continue to do so. It is just our good fortune (from a hermeneutical point of view) or bad fortune (from an epistemological point of view) that they have done so in the
+past.
+The traditional quarrel about the "philosophy of the
+social sciences" has proceeded generally as follows. One side
+has said that "explanation" (subsumption under predictive laws, roughly) presupposes, and cannot replace, "understanding." The other side has said that understanding
+simply is the ability to explain, that what their opponents
+call "understanding" is merely the primitive stage of groping around for some explanatory hypotheses. Both sides are
+quite right. Apel rightly notes that
+the protagonists of "understanding" (ie., of the Geisteswissenschaften) always attack the supporters of the theory of explanation (i.e., of the objective social or behavioral sciences) from behind-and vice versa. The
+347
+
+"objective scientists" point out that the results of "understanding" are only of pre-scientific, subjectively heuristic validity, and that they at least must be tested and
+supplemented by objective analytic methods. The protagonists of understanding, on the other hand, insist that
+the obtaining of any data in the social sciences-and
+therefore any objective testing of hypotheses—presupposes "actual understanding"
+•..of meaning."
+Those who are suspicious of hermeneutics want to say that
+the fact that some beings talk is no reason to think they
+escape the great unified web of predictively powerful laws,
+for these laws can predict what they will say as well as what
+they will eat. Those who defend hermeneutics say that the
+question of what they will say has two parts—what sounds
+or inscriptions they make (which might become predictable
+enough, perhaps through neurophysiology), and what these
+mean, which is something quite different. At this point, the
+natural move for the defenders of "unified science" is to say
+that it is not different, since there are procedures for translating any significant utterance into a single language-the
+language of unified science itself. Given a single language
+which contains everything that everybody could ever say (in
+the way in which Carnap attempted to put together such a
+language in the Aufbau), the question of which sentence
+of that language is being proffered by the language-user
+under investigation is no more "special" than the question
+of what he will have for dinner. Translation into the language of unified science is difficult, but the attempt to
+translate does not involve different techniques of theoryconstruction or theory-testing from the attempt to explain
+dietary habits.
+In reply to this, defenders of hermeneutics should just say
+that, as a matter of brute fact rather than of metaphysical
+necessity, there is no such thing as the "language of unified
+science." We have not got a language which will serve as a
+22 Ibid., p. 3o.
+348
+
+permanent neutral matrix for formulating all good explanatory hypotheses, and we have not the foggiest notion of
+how to get one. (This is compatible with saying that we do
+have a neutral, if unhelpful, observation language.) So
+epistemology—as the attempt to render all discourses commensurable by translating them into a preferred set of terms
+—is unlikely to be a useful strategy. The reason is not that
+"unified science" works only for one metaphysical realm
+and not for another, but that the Whiggish assumption that
+we have got such a language blocks the road of inquiry. We
+might always want to change the language in which we do
+our explaining. In particular, we might do this because we
+have found out how to translate a language spoken by the
+subjects of our explanation. But this would be just a special
+case of the permanent possibility of someone's having a better idea. Understanding the language spoken by the subjects,
+grasping the explanations they give of why they are doing
+this and that, may be helpful or may not. In the case of
+people who are particularly stupid, or psychotic, we rightly
+wave aside their explanations. We attribute intentions and
+actions to them in terms they do not accept and may not
+even understand. The familiar claim that a speaker's description of himself usually needs to be taken into account
+in determining what action he is performing is sound
+enough. But that description may perfectly well be set
+aside. The privilege attached to it is moral, rather than
+epistemic. The difference between his description and ours
+may mean, for example, that he should not be tried under
+our laws. It does not mean that he cannot be explained by
+our science.
+To say that we cannot understand a foreign culture if
+we insist on Whiggishly interpreting it as holding "too
+many" of our own beliefs and desires is just a generalization
+of the Kuhnian point that we cannot understand past scientists if we insist on doing the same thing to them. This
+can itself be generalized to the claim that we should not
+assume that the vocabulary used so far will work on every.
+349
+
+thing else that turns up. The problem is not that spirits are
+inherently resistant to being predicted, but simply that
+there is no reason to think (and much reason not to think)
+that our own spirit has now got hold of the best vocabulary
+for formulating hypotheses which will explain and predict
+all the other spirits (or, perhaps, the other bodies). This
+point is made by Charles Taylor, who puts the question as
+follows:
+... we might be so scandalized by the prospect of such a
+hermeneutical science that we will want to go back to
+the verification model. Why can we not take our understanding of meaning as part of the logic of discovery, as
+the logical empiricists suggest for our unformalizable
+insights, and still found our science on the exactness of
+our predictions? 23
+and answers it by listing three reasons why "such exact
+prediction is radically impossible." He says that
+the third and most fundamental reason for the impossibility of hard prediction is that man is a self-defining
+animal. With changes in his self-definition go changes in
+what man is, such that he has to be understood in different terms. But the conceptual mutations in human history can and frequently do produce conceptual webs
+which are incommensurable, that is, where the terms
+can't be defined in relation to a common stratum of expressions. (p. 49)
+The point that what interferes with predicting the behavior
+of inhabitants of the unfamiliar culture is simply the incommensurability of their language seems to me exactly
+right, but I think Taylor proceeds to obscure his own point
+when he goes on to say:
+The success of prediction in the natural sciences is bound
+up with the fact that all states of the system, past and
+23 Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review
+of Metaphysics 25 (1971), p. 48.
+350
+
+future, can be described in the same range of concepts,
+as values, say, of the same variables. Hence all future
+states of the solar system can be charaoterized, as past
+ones are, in the language of Newtonian mechanics. ...
+Only if past and future are brought under the same conceptual net can one understand the states of the latter as
+some function of the states of the former, and hence
+predict.
+This conceptual unity is vitiated in the sciences of man
+by the fact of conceptual innovation which in turn alters
+human reality. (p. 49)
+Here Taylor reinstates the notion of man as a being who
+changes from the inside by finding better (or, at least,
+novel) ways of describing, predicting, and explaining himself. Nonhuman beings, as mere étres-en-soi, do not get
+changed from inside but are simply described, predicted,
+and explained in a better vocabulary. This way of putting
+it leads us back into the bad old metaphysical notion that
+the universe is made up of two kinds of things. The sense
+in which human beings alter themselves by redescribing
+themselves is no more metaphysically exciting or mysterious
+than the sense in which they alter themselves by changing
+their diet, their sexual partners, or their habitation. It is
+just the same sense: viz., new and more interesting sentences
+become true of them. Taylor goes on to say that "the very
+terms in which the future will have to be characterized if
+we are to understand it properly are not all available to us
+at present" (p. 50), and he means this to hold only for human beings. But, for all we know, it may be that human
+creativity has dried up, and that in the future it will be-the
+nonhuman world which squirms out of our conceptual net.
+It might be the case that all future human societies will
+be (as a result, perhaps, of ubiquitous technocratic totalitarianism) humdrum variations on our own. But contemporary science (which already seems so hopeless for explaining
+acupuncture, the migration of butterflies, and so on) may
+soon come to seem as badly off as Aristotle's hylomorphism.
+351
+
+The line that Taylor is describing is not the line between
+the human and the nonhuman but between that portion
+of the field of inquiry where we feel rather uncertain
+that we have the right vocabulary at hand and that
+portion where we feel rather certain that we do. This does,
+at the moment, roughly coincide with the distinction between the fields of the Geistes- and the Naturwissenschaften.
+But this coincidence may be mere coincidence. In a sufficiently long perspective, man may turn out to be less devós
+than Sophocles thought him, and the elementary forces of
+nature more so than modern physicalists dream.
+To see this point, it helps to bear in mind that there are
+plenty of occasions on which we do well simply to ignore
+the pour-soi of human beings. We do this in the case of
+panticularly dull and conventional people, for example,
+whose every act and word are so predictable that we "objectivize" them without hesitation. Conversely, when we
+come up against something nonhuman which wriggles out
+of the conceptual net presently used, it is natural to start
+talking about an unknown language-to imagine, for example, the migrating butterflies having a language in which
+they describe features of the world for which Newtonian
+mechanics has no name. Or, if we do not go this far, we at
+least fall naturally into the notion that the Book of Nature
+has not yet been deciphered-that it no more contains
+"gravitation," say, than it contains "natural motion." The
+temptation is to anthropomorphize the nonhuman world,
+or some part of it, just as soon as it becomes clear that, as with
+the native of an exotic culture, or the genius whose talk is
+over our heads, we do not "speak the same language." Na-
+ture is whatever is so routine and familiar and manageable
+that we trust our own language implicitly. Spirit is whatever is so unfamiliar and unmanageable that we begin to
+wonder whether our "language" is "adequate" to it. Our
+wonder, stripped of mirror-imagery, is simply about whether
+somebody or something may not be dealing with the world
+in terms for which our language contains no ready equiva-
+352
+
+lents. More simply still, it is just wonder about whether we
+do not need to change our vocabulary, and not just our
+assertions.
+I said at the beginning of this chapter that hermeneutics is, roughly, a description of our study of the unfamiliar
+and epistemology is, roughly, a description of our study of
+the familiar. Given the somewhat strained interpretation
+I have just put upon "spirit" and "nature," I could now
+agree with the traditional view that hermeneutics describes
+our inquiry into spirit, whereas epistemology is a description
+of our inquiry into nature. But it would be better, I think,
+to drop the spirit-nature distinction altogether. As I have
+already said, this distinction runs together (a) the distinction between that which does not and that which does fit
+nicely under our present way of explaining and predicting
+things with (b) the distinction between something which
+unites all the various characteristics (enumerated in chapter one, section 3) which have, at one time or another, been
+taken to be distinctively human, and the rest of the world.
+It also runs both of these distinctions together with (c) the
+distinction (criticized in chapter three, section 3) between
+the faculty of spontaneity (the transcendental activity of
+constitution) and that of receptivity. (It does this by a conflation of our transcendental receptive faculty of sense with
+the field of sensory presentations which make up the "empirical self"—a conflation Kant himself was unable to
+avoid.) The result of running together spirit as romantic
+self-transcending creativity (always liable to begin talking
+in a way incommensurable with our present language) with
+spirit as identical with man's Glassy Essence (with all
+its metaphysical freedom from physical explanation), and
+with spirit as the "constitutor" of phenomenal reality, was
+the metaphysics of nineteenth century German idealism. It
+was a fruitful set of assimilations, but one of its less fortunate results was the notion that philosophy had a special
+sphere of its own, quite apart from science. This assimilation helped keep alive the notion of "philosophy" as a dis-
+353
+
+cipline centered in epistemology. As long as the notion of
+spirit as transcendental constitutor (in the Kantian sense)
+was reinforced by the appeal of Cartesian dualism on the
+one hand and by that of romanticism on the other, the no.
+tion of a presiding discipline called "epistemology" or
+"transcendental philosophy"—reducible neither to Naturwissenschaft (psychophysiology) nor to Geisteswissenschaft
+(the sociology of knowledge)-could survive unquestioned.
+A further unfortunate legacy was the confusion of the need
+for nonmechanical translation (and more generally for
+imaginative concept-formation) with the "irreducibility of
+the constituting transcendental ego." This confusion kept
+the idealism-realism issue alive long after it should have
+been closed down, since the friends of hermeneutics thought
+(as the quotation from Apel at the beginning of this section
+illustrates) that something like idealism was the charter of
+their activity, whereas its enemies assumed that anyone who
+overtly practiced hermeneutics must be "antinaturalist,"
+and must lack a proper sense of the brute exteriority of the
+physical universe.
+To sum up what I want to say about the "irreducibility
+of the Geisteswissenschaften," then, let me offer the following theses:
+Physicalism is probably right in saying that we shall
+someday be able, "in principle," to predict every movement
+of a person's body (including those of his larynx and his
+writing hand) by reference to microstructures within his
+body.
+The danger to human freedom of such success is minimal,
+since the "in principle" clause allows for the probability
+that the determination of the initial conditions (the antecedent states of microstructures) will be too difficult to carry
+out except as an occasional pedagogical exercise. The torturers and the brainwashers are, in any case, already in as
+good a position to interfere with human freedom as they
+could wish; further scientific progress cannot improve their
+position.
+354
+
+The intuition behind the traditional distinction between
+nature and spirit, and behind romanticism, is that we can
+predict what noises will come from someone's mouth without knowing what they mean. Thus even if we could predict
+the sounds made by the community of scientific inquirers of
+the year 4000, we should not yet be in a position to join in
+their conversation. This intuition is quite correct.24
+The fact that we can predict a noise without knowing
+what it means is just the fact that the necessary and sufficient
+microstructural conditions for the production of a noise
+will rarely be paralleled by a material equivalence between
+a statement in the language used for describing the microstructure and the statement expressed by the noise. This is
+not because anything is in principle unpredictable, much
+less because of an ontological divide between nature and
+spirit, but simply because of the difference between a lan.
+guage suitable for coping with neurons and one suitable for
+coping with people.
+We can know how to reply to a cryptic remark from a
+different language-game without knowing or caring what
+sentence in our ordinary language-game is materially equivalent to that remark. Producing commensurability by
+24 This is the kernel of truth disguised in the Quinean claim that the
+Geisteswissenschaften contain no "matters of fact." It is well expressed
+in a discussion of Quine by Raymond Geuss: "Even when we have a
+theory of nature which allows us to predict someone's verbal dispositions for all eternity, we still will not thereby understand what he
+means." ("Quine und die Unbestimmtheit der Ontologie," Neue Hefte
+für Philosophie, Heft 8 (1973], p. 44n.).
+35 That all languages are translatable into one another (for the
+Davidsonian reasons mentioned in chapter six) does not mean that
+such equivalences can be found (even "in principle"). It just means
+that we cannot make sense of the claim that there are more than temporary impediments to our know-how—the claim that something called
+a "different conceptual scheme" prevents us from learning how to converse with another language-user. Nor does it take away the intuition
+behind the false romantic claim that great poems are untranslatable
+They are, of course, translatable; the problem is that the translations
+are not themselves great poems.
+355
+
+finding material equivalences between sentences drawn from
+different language-games is only one technique among
+others for coping with our fellow humans. When it does not
+work, we fall back on whatever does work—for example,
+getting the hang of a new language-game, and possibly forgetting our old one. This is the same technique we use when
+nonhuman nature shows itself recalcitrant to being predicted in the vocabulary of traditional science.
+Hermeneutics is not "another way of knowing"-"understanding" as opposed to (predictive) "explanation." It is
+better seen as another way of coping. It would make for hilosophical clarity if we just gave the notion of "cognition"
+to predictive science, and stopped worrying about "alternative cognitive methods." The word knowledge would not
+seem worth fighting over were it not for the Kantian tradition that to be a philosopher is to have a "theory of knowledge," and the Platonic tradition that action not based on
+knowledge of the truth of propositions is "irrational."
+356
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+Philosophy Without Mirrors
+1. HERMENEUTICS AND EDIFICATION
+Our present notions of what it is to be a philosopher are
+so tied up with the Kantian attempt to render all knowl
+edge-claims commensurable that it is difficult to imagine
+what philosophy without epistemology could be. More
+generally, it is difficult to imagine that any activity would
+be entitled to bear the name "philosophy" if it had nothing
+to do with knowledge-if it were not in some sense a theory
+of knowledge, or a method for getting knowledge, or at
+least a hint as to where some supremely important kind of
+knowledge might be found. The difficulty stems from a
+notion shared by Platonists, Kantians, and positivists: that
+man has an essence-namely, to discover essences. The notion that our chief task is to mirror accurately, in our own
+Glassy Essence, the universe around us is the complement
+of the notion, common to Democritus and Descartes, that
+the universe is made up of very simple, clearly and distinctly
+knowable things, knowledge of whose essences provides the
+master-vocabulary which permits commensuration of all
+discourses.
+This classic picture of human beings must be set aside
+before epistemologically centered philosophy can be set
+aside. "Hermeneutics," as a polemical term in contemporary
+philosophy, is a name for the attempt to do so. The use of
+the term for this purpose is largely due to one book-
+Gadamer's Truth and Method. Gadamer there makes clear
+that hermeneutics is not a "method for attaining truth"
+which fits into the classic picture of man: "The hermeneutic phenomenon is basically not a problem of method at
+357
+
+all." Rather, Gadamer is asking, roughly, what conclusions
+might be drawn from the fact that we have to practice hermeneutics-from the "hermeneutic phenomenon" as a fact
+about people which the epistemological tradition has tried
+to shunt aside. "The hermeneutics developed here," he says,
+"is not ... a methodology of the human sciences, but an
+attempt to understand what the human sciences truly are,
+beyond their methodological self-consciousness, and what
+connects them with the totality of our experience of the
+world."" His book is a redescription of man which tries to
+place the classic picture within a larger one, and thus to
+"distance" the standard philosophical problematic rather
+than offer a set of solutions to it.
+For my present purposes, the importance of Gadamer's
+book is that he manages to separate off one of the three
+strands—the romantic notion of man as self creative-in the
+philosophical notion of "spirit" from the other two strands
+with which it became entangled. Gadamer (like Heidegger,
+to whom some of his work is indebted) makes no concessions either to Cartesian dualism or to the notion of "transcendental constitution" (in any sense which could be given
+an idealistic interpretation). He thus helps reconcile the
+"naturalistic" point I tried to make in the previous chapter
+—that the "irreducibility of the Geisteswissenschaften" is
+not a matter of a metaphysical dualism—with our "existentialist" intuition that redescribing ourselves is the most
+1 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York, 1975), p. xi.
+Indeed, it would be reasonable to call Gadamer's book a tract against
+the very idea of method, where this is conceived of as an attempt at
+commensuration. It is instructive to note the parallels between this
+book and Paul Feyerabend's Against Method. My treatment of Gadamer is indebted to Alasdair Macintyre; see his "Contexts of Interpretation," Boston University Journal 24 (1976), 41-46.
+& Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. xiii.
+3 Cf. ibid., p. 15. "But we may recognize that Bildung is an element
+of spirit without being tied to Hegel's philosophy of absolute spirit,
+just as the insight into the historicity of consciousness is not tied to
+his philosophy of world history."
+358
+
+important thing we can do. He does this by substituting the
+notion of Bildung (education, self-formation) for that of
+"knowledge" as the goal of thinking. To say that we become different people, that we "remake" ourselves as we
+read more, talk more, and write more, is simply a dramatic
+way of saying that the sentences which become true of us
+by virtue of such activities are often more important to us
+than the sentences which become true of us when we drink
+more, earn more, and so on. The events which make us
+able to say new and interesting things about ourselves are,
+in this nonmetaphysical sense, more "essential" to us (at
+least to us relatively leisured intellectuals, inhabiting a
+stable and prosperous part of the world) than the events
+which change our shapes or our standards of living ("remaking" us in less "spiritual" ways). Gadamer develops his
+notion of wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein (the sort of
+consciousness of the past which changes us) to characterize
+an attitude interested not so much in what is out there in
+the world, or in what happened in history, as in what we
+can get out of nature and history for our own uses. In this
+attitude, getting the facts right (about atoms and the void,
+or about the history of Europe) is merely propaedeutic to
+finding a new and more interesting way of expressing ourselves, and thus of coping with the world. From the educational, as opposed to the epistemological or the technological, point of view, the way things are said is more
+important than the possession of truths.*
+4 The contrast here is the same as that involved in the traditional
+quarrel between "classical" education and "scientific" education, mentioned by Gadamer in his opening section on "The Significance of the
+Humanist Tradition." More generally, it can be seen as an aspect of
+the quarrel between poetry (which cannot be omitted from the former
+sort of education) and philosophy (which, when conceiving of itself as
+super-science, would like to become foundational to the latter sort of
+education). Yeats asked the spirits (whom, he believed, were dictating
+A Vision to him through his wife's mediumship) why they had come.
+The spirits replied, "To bring you metaphors for poetry." A philosopher might have expected some hard facts about what it was like on
+the other side, but Yeats was not disappointed.
+359
+
+Since "education" sounds a bit too flat, and Bildung a
+bit too foreign, I shall use "edification" to stand for this
+project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking. The attempt to edity (ourselves or
+others) may consist in the hermeneutic activity of making
+connections between our own culture and some exotic culture or historical period, or between our own discipline and
+another discipline which seems to pursue incommensurable
+aims in an incommensurable vocabulary. But it may instead
+consist in the "poetic" activity of thinking up such new
+aims, new words, or new disciplines, followed by, so to
+speak, the inverse of hermeneutios: the attempt to reinterpret our familiar surroundings in the unfamiliar terms of
+our new inventions. In either case, the activity is (despite
+the etymological relation between the two words) edifying
+without being constructive—at least if "constructive" means
+the sort of cooperation in the accomplishment of research
+programs which takes place in normal discourse. For edifying discourse is supposed to be abnormal, to take us out
+of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in
+becoming new beings.
+The contrast between the desire for edification and the
+desire for truth is, for Gadamer, not an expression of a
+tension which needs to be resolved or compromised. If there
+is a conflict, it is between the Platonic-Aristotelian view that
+the only way to be edified is to know what is out there (to
+reflect the facts accurately—to realize our essence by knowing essences) and the view that the quest for truth is just one
+among many ways in which we might be edified. Gadamer
+rightly gives Heidegger the credit for working out a way
+of seeing the search for objective knowledge (first developed
+by the Greeks, using mathematics as a model) as one human
+project among others. The point is, however, more vivid
+5 See the section called "The Overcoming of the Epistemological
+Problem ..." in Truth and Method, pp. 21qff., and compare Martin
+Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, 1962), sec. 32.
+360
+
+in Sartre, who sees the attempt to gain an objective knowedge of the world, and thus of oneself, as an attempt to
+avoid the responsibility for choosing one's project.® For
+Sartre, to say this is not to say that the desire for objective
+knowledge of nature, history, or anything else is bound to
+be unsuccessful, or even bound to be self-deceptive. It is
+merely to say that it presents a temptation to self-deception
+insofar as we think that, by knowing which descriptions
+within a given set of normal discourses apply to us, we
+thereby know ourselves. For Heidegger, Sartre, and Gadamer, objective inquiry is perfectly possible and frequently
+actual-the only thing to be said against it is that it provides
+only some, among many, ways of describing ourselves, and
+that some of these can hinder the process of edification.
+To sum up this "existentialist" view of objectivity, then:
+objectivity should be seen as conformity to the norms of
+justification (for assertions and for actions) we find about
+us. Such conformity becomes dubious and self-deceptive
+only when seen as something more than this—namely, as a
+way of obtaining access to something which "grounds" current practices of justification in something else. Such a
+"ground" is thought to need no justification, because it has
+become so clearly and distinctly perceived as to count as
+a "philosophical foundation." This is self-deceptive not
+simply because of the general absurdity of ultimate justification's reposing upon the unjustifiable, but because of the
+more concrete absurdity of thinking that the vocabulary used
+by present science, morality, or whatever has some privileged
+attachment to reality which makes it more than just a further set of descriptions. Agreeing with the naturalists that
+redescription is not "change of essence" needs to be followed up by abandoning the notion of "essence" altogether.?
+® See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes
+(New York, 1956), pt. two, chap. 3, sec. 5, and the "Conclusion" of the
+book.
+7 It would have been fortunate if Sartre had followed up his remark
+that man is the being whose essence is to have no essence by saying
+361
+
+But the standard philosophical strategy of most naturalisms
+is to find some way of showing that our own culture has
+indeed got hold of the essence of man-thus making all
+new and incommensurable vocabularies merely "noncognitive" ornamentation.& The utility of the "existentialist"
+view is that, by proclaiming that we have no essence, it permits us to see the descriptions of ourselves we find in one of
+(or in the unity of) the Naturwissenschaften as on a par
+with the various alternative descriptions offered by poets,
+novelists, depth psychologists, sculptors, anthropologists,
+and mystics. The former are not privileged representations
+in virtue of the fact that (at the moment) there is more
+consensus in the sciences than in the arts. They are simply
+among the repertoire of self-descriptions at our disposal.
+This point can also be put as an extrapolation from the
+commonplace that one cannot be counted as educated—
+gebildet—if one knows only the results of the normal Naturwissenschaften of the day. Gadamer begins Truth and Method with a discussion of the role of the humanist tradition in
+giving sense to the notion of Bildung as something having
+"no goals outside itself." To give sense to such a notion
+we need a sense of the relativity of descriptive vocabularies
+to periods, traditions, and historical accidents. This is what
+the humanist tradition in education does, and what training
+in the results of the natural sciences cannot do. Given that
+sense of relativity, we cannot take the notion of "essence"
+that this went for all other beings also. Unless this addition is made,
+Sartre will appear to be insisting on the good old metaphysical distinction between spirit and nature in other terms, rather than simply
+making the point that man is always free to choose new descriptions
+(for, among other things, himself).
+& Dewey, it seems to me, is the one author usually classified as a
+"naturalist" who did not have this reductive attitude, despite his incessant talk about "scientific method." Dewey's peculiar achievement was
+to have remained sufficiently Hegelian not to think of natural science
+as having an inside track on the essences of things, while becoming
+sufficiently naturalistic to think of human beings in Darwinian terms.
+& Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 12.
+362
+
+seriously, nor the notion of man's task as the accurate representation of essences. The natural sciences, by themselves,
+leave us convinced that we know both what we are and
+what we can be—not just how to predict and control our
+behavior, but the limits of that behavior (and, in particular, the limits of our significant speech). Gadamer's attempt
+to fend off the demand (common to Mill and Carnap) for
+"objectivity" in the Geisteswissenschaften is the attempt to
+prevent education from being reduced to instruction in the
+results of normal inquiry. More broadly, it is the attempt to
+prevent abnormal inquiry from being viewed as suspicious
+solely because of its abnormality.
+This "existentialist" attempt to place objectivity, rationality, and normal inquiry within the larger picture of our
+need to be educated and edified is often countered by the
+"positivist" attempt to distinguish learning facts from
+acquiring values. From the positivist point of view, Ga-
+damer's exposition of wirkungsgeschichtliche Bewusstsein
+may seem little more than reiteration of the commonplace
+that even when we know all the objectively true descriptions of ourselves, we still may not know what to do with
+ourselves. From this point of view, Truth and Method
+(and chapters six and seven above) are just overblown
+dramatizations of the fact that entire complaince with all
+the demands for justification offered by normal inquiry
+would still leave us free to draw our own morals from the
+assertions so justified. But from the viewpoints of Gadamer, Heidegger, and Sartre, the trouble with the fact-value
+distinction is that it is contrived precisely to blur the fact
+that alternative descriptions are possible in addition to
+those offered by the results of normal inquiries.o It suggests that once "all the facts are in" nothing remains except
+"noncognitive" adoption of an attitude—a choice which is
+not rationally discussable. It disguises the fact that to use
+10 See Heidegger's discussion of "values" in Being and Time, p. 133,
+and Sartre's in Being and Nothingness, pt. two, chap. 1, sec. 4. Compare Gadamer's remarks on Weber (Truth and Method, pp. 461ft.).
+363
+
+one set of true sentences to describe ourselves is already
+to choose an attitude toward ourselves, whereas to use
+another set of true sentences is to adopt a contrary atti.
+tude. Only if we assume that there is a value-free vocabulary
+which renders these sets of "factual" statements commensurable can the positivist distinction between facts and
+values, beliefs and attitudes, look plausible. But the philosophical fiction that such a vocabulary is on the tips of our
+tongues is, from an educational point of view, disastrous. It
+forces us to pretend that we can split ourselves up into
+knowers of true sentences on the one hand and choosers of
+lives or actions or works of art on the other. These artificial
+diremptions make it impossible to get the notion of edification into focus. Or, more exactly, they tempt us to think of
+edification as having nothing to do with the rational faculties which are employed in normal discourse.
+So Gadamer's effort to get rid of the classic picture of
+man-as-essentially-knower-of-essences is, among other things,
+an effort to get rid of the distinction between fact and value,
+and thus to let us think of "discovering the facts" as one
+project of edification among others. This is why Gadamer devotes so much time to breaking down the distinctions which
+Kant made among cognition, morality, and aesthetic judg.
+ment." There is no way, as far as I can see, in which to argue
+the issue of whether to keep the Kantian "grid" in place or
+set it aside. There is no "normal" philosophical discourse
+which provides common commensurating ground for those
+who see science and edification as, respectively, "rational"
+and "irrational," and those who see the quest for objectivity
+as one possibility among others to be taken account of in
+wirkungsgeschichtliche Bewusstsein. If there is no such common ground, all we can do is to show how the other side
+11 See Gadamer's polemic against "the subjectivization of the aesthetic" in Kant's Third Critique (Truth and Method, p. 87) and compare Heidegger's remarks in "Letter on Humanism" on Aristotle's distinctions among physics, logic, and ethics (Heidegger, Basic Writings,
+ed. Krell [New York, 1976], p. 232).
+364
+
+looks from our own point of view. That is, all we can do is
+be hermeneutic about the opposition-trying to show how
+the odd or paradoxical or offensive things they say hang
+together with the rest of what they want to say, and how
+what they say looks when put in our own alternative idiom.
+This sort of hermeneutics with polemical intent is common
+to Heidegger's and Derrida's attempts to deconstruct the
+tradition.
+2. SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY AND EDIFYING PHILOSOPHY
+The hermeneutic point of view, from which the acquisition of truth dwindles in importance, and is seen as a component of education, is possible only if we once stood at
+another point of view. Education has to start from acculturation. So the search for objectivity and the self-conscious
+awareness of the social practices in which objectivity
+consists are necessary first steps in becoming gebildet. We
+must first see ourselves as en-sor—as described by those statements which are objectively true in the judgment of our
+peers—before there is any point in seeing ourselves as poursoi. Similarly, we cannot be educated without finding out a
+lot about the descriptions of the world offered by our
+culture (e.g., by learning the results of the natural sciences).
+Later perhaps, we may put less value on "being in touch
+with reality" but we can afford that only after having passed
+through stages of implicit, and then explicit and self-conscious, conformity to the norms of the discourses going on
+around us.
+I raise this banal point that education-even the education of the revolutionary or the prophet—needs to begin
+with acculturation and conformity merely to provide a
+cautionary complement to the "existentialist" claim that
+normal participation in normal discourse is merely one
+project, one way of being in the world. The caution
+amounts to saying that abnormal and "existential" discourse is always parasitic upon normal discourse, that the
+365
+
+possibility of hermeneutics is always parasitic upon the
+possibility (and perhaps upon the actuality) of epistemology, and that edification always employs materials provided
+by the culture of the day. To attempt abnormal discourse
+de novo, without being able to recognize our own abnormality, is madness in the most literal and terrible sense. To
+insist on being hermeneutic where epistemology would do
+-to make ourselves unable to view normal discourse in
+terms of its own motives, and able to view it only from
+within our own abnormal discourse-is not mad, but it
+does show a lack of education. To adopt the "existentialist"
+attitude toward objectivity and rationality common to
+Sartre, Heidegger, and Gadamer makes sense only if we do
+so in a conscious departure from a well-understood norm.
+"Existentialism" is an intrinsically reactive movement of
+thought, one which has point only in opposition to the
+tradition. I want now to generalize this contrast between
+philosophers whose work is essentially constructive and
+those whose work is essentially reative. I shall thereby
+develop a contrast between philosophy which centers in epistemology and the sort of philosophy which takes its point of
+departure from suspicion about the pretensions of epistemology. This is the contrast between "systematic" and
+"edifying" philosophies.
+In every sufficiently reflective culture, there are those who
+single out one area, one set of practices, and see it as the
+paradigm human activity. They then try to show how the
+rest of culture can profit from this example. In the mainstream of the Western philosophical tradition, this paradigm has been knowing—possessing justified true beliefs, or,
+better yet, beliefs so intrinsically persuasive as to make
+justification unnecessary. Successive philosophical revolutions within this mainstream have been produced by philosophers excited by new cognitive feats-e.g., the rediscovery of Aristotle, Galilean mechanics, the development of
+self-conscious historiography in the nineteenth century,
+Darwinian biology, mathematical logic. Thomas's use of
+366
+
+Aristotle to conciliate the Fathers, Descartes's and Hobbes's
+criticisms of scholasticism, the Enlightenment's notion that
+reading Newton leads naturally to the downtall of tyrants,
+Spencer's evolutionism, Carnap's attempt to overcome metaphysics through logic, are so many attempts to refashion the
+rest of culture on the model of the latest cognitive achieve.
+ments. A "mainstream" Western philosopher typically says:
+Now that such-and-such a line of inquiry has had such a
+stunning success, let us reshape all inquiry, and all of culture, on its model, thereby permitting objectivity and
+rationality to prevail in areas previously obscured by convention, superstition, and the lack of a proper epistemological understanding of man's ability accurately to represent
+nature.
+On the periphery of the history of modern philosophy,
+one finds figures who, without forming a "tradition," resemble each other in their distrust of the notion that man's
+essence is to be a knower of essences. Goethe, Kierkegaard,
+Santayana, William James, Dewey, the later Wittgenstein,
+the later Heidegger, are figures of this sort. They are often
+accused of relativism or cynicism. They are often dubious
+about progress, and especially about the latest claim that
+such-and-such a discipline has at last made the nature of
+human knowledge so clear that reason will now spread
+throughout the rest of human activity. These writers have
+kept alive the suggestion that, even when we have justified
+true belief about everything we want to know, we may have
+no more than conformity to the norms of the day. They
+have kept alive the historicist sense that this century's
+"superstition" was the last century's triumph of reason, as
+well as the relativist sense that the latest vocabulary, borrowed from the latest scientific achievement, may not express privileged representations of essences, but be just
+another of the potential infinity of vocabularies in which
+the world can be described.
+The mainstream philosophers are the philosophers I
+shall call "systematic," and the peripheral ones are those I
+367
+
+shall call "edifying." These peripheral, pragmatic philosophers are skeptical primarily about systematic philosophy,
+about the whole project of universal commensuration.12 In
+our time, Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger are the great
+edifying, peripheral, thinkers. All three make it as difficult
+as possible to take their thought as expressing views on
+traditional philosophical problems, or as making constructive proposals for philosophy as a cooperative and
+progressive discipline.18 They make fun of the classic picture of man, the picture which contains systematic philosophy, the search for universal commensuration in a final
+vocabulary. They hammer away at the holistic point that
+words take their meanings from other words rather than by
+virtue of their representative character, and the corollary
+that vocabularies acquire their privileges from the men who
+use them rather than from their transparency to the real, 14
+12 Consider the passage from Anatole France's "Garden of Epicurus"
+which Jacques Derrida cites at the beginning of his "La Mythologie
+Blanche" (in Marges de la Philosophie [Paris, 1972], p. 250):
+•.. the metaphysicians, when they make up a new language, are like
+knife-grinders who grind coins and medals against their stone instead of knives and scissors. They rub out the relief, the inscriptions,
+the portraits, and when one can no longer see on the coins Victoria,
+or Wilhelm, or the French Republic, they explain: these coins now
+have nothing specifically English or German or French about them,
+for we have taken them out of time and space; they now are no
+longer worth, say, five francs, but rather have an inestimable value,
+and the area in which they are a medium of exchange has been infinitely extended.
+13 See Karl-Otto Apel's comparison of Wittgenstein and Heidegger as
+having both "called into question Western metaphysics as a theoretical
+discipline" (Transformation der Philosophie [Frankfurt, 1973], vol. 1,
+p. 228). I have not offered interpretations of Dewey, Wittgenstein,
+and Heidegger in support of what I have been saying about them, but
+I have tried to do so in a piece on Wittgenstein called "Keeping Philosophy Pure" (Yale Review [Spring 1976], pp. 336-356), in "Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey" (Review of Metaphysics 3o
+[1976], 280-305), and in "Dewey's Metaphysics" in New Studies in the
+Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Steven M. Cahn (Hanover, N.H., 1977).
+14 This Heideggerean point about language is spelled out at length
+368
+
+The distinction between systematic and edifying philosophers is not the same as the distinction between normal
+philosophers and revolutionary philosophers. The latter
+distinction puts Husserl, Russell, the later Wittgenstein,
+and the later Heidegger all on the same ("revolutionary")
+side of a line. For my purposes, what matters is a distinction between two kinds of revolutionary philosophers. On
+the one hand, there are revolutionary philosophers—those
+who found new schools within which normal, professionalized philosophy can be practiced—who see the incommensurability of their new vocabulary with the old as a tempo.
+rary inconvenience, to be blamed on the shortcomings of
+their predecessors and to be overcome by the institutionalization of their own vocabulary. On the other hand, there are
+great philosophers who dread the thought that their vocab.
+ulary should ever be institutionalized, or that their writing
+might be seen as commensurable with the tradition. Husserl
+and Russell (like Descartes and Kant) are of the former sort.
+The later Wittgenstein and the later Heidegger (like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche) are of the latter sort.15 Great systematic
+philosophers are constructive and offer arguments. Great
+edifying philosophers are reactive and offer satires, parodies,
+aphorisms. They know their work loses its point when the
+period they were reacting against is over. They are intentionally peripheral. Great systematic philosophers, like
+great scientists, build for eternity. Great edifying philosophers destroy for the sake of their own generation.
+Systematic philosophers want to put their subject on the
+and didactically by Derrida in La Voix et le Phénomène, translated as
+Speech and Phenomenon by David Allison (Evanston, 1973). See Newton Garver's comparison of Derrida and Wittgenstein in his "Introduction" to this translation.
+15 The permanent fascination of the man who dreamed up the whole
+idea of Western philosophy—Plato—is that we still do not know which
+sort of philosopher he was. Even if the Seventh Letter is set aside as
+spurious, the fact that after millenniums of commentary nobody knows
+which passages in the dialogues are jokes keeps the puzzle fresh.
+369
+
+secure path of a science. Edifying philosophers want to keep
+space open for the sense of wonder which poets can sometimes cause—wonder that there is something new under the
+sun, something which is not an accurate representation of
+what was already there, something which (at least for the
+moment) cannot be explained and can barely be described.
+The notion of an edifying philosopher is, however, a
+paradox. For Plato defined the philosopher by opposition to
+the poet. The philosopher could give reasons, argue for
+his views, justify himself. So argumentative systematic
+philosophers say of Nietzsche and Heidegger that, whatever
+else they may be, they are not philosophers. This "not
+really a philosopher" ploy is also used, of course, by normal
+philosophers against revolutionary philosophers. It was
+used by pragmatists against logical positivists, by positivists
+against "ordinary language philosophers," and will be used
+whenever cozy professionalism is in danger. But in that
+usage it is just a rhetorical gambit which tells one nothing
+more than that an incommensurable discourse is being
+proposed. When it is used against edifying philosophers, on
+the other hand, the accusation has a real bite. The problem
+for an edifying philosopher is that qua philosopher he is in
+the business of offering arguments, whereas he would like
+simply to offer another set of terms, without saying that
+these terms are the new-found accurate representations of
+essences (e.g., of the essence of "philosophy" itself). He is,
+so to speak, violating not just the rules of normal philosophy
+(the philosophy of the schools of his day) but a sort of metarule: the rule that one may suggest changing the rules only
+because one has noticed that the old ones do not fit the
+subject matter, that they are not adequate to reality, that
+they impede the solution of the eternal problems. Edifying
+philosophers, unlike revolutionary systematic philosophers,
+are those who are abnormal at this meta level. They refuse
+to present themselves as having found out any objective
+truth (about, say, what philosophy is). They present themselves as doing something different from, and more important than, offering accurate representations of how things
+370
+
+are. It is more important because, they say, the notion of
+"accurate representation" itself is not the proper way to
+think about what philosophy does. But, they then go on to
+say, this is not because "a search for accurate representations
+of ... (eg., 'the most general traits of reality' or the
+nature of man')" is an inaccurate representation of philosophy.
+Whereas less pretentious revolutionaries can afford to
+have views on lots of things which their predecessors had
+views on, edifying philosophers have to decry the very
+notion of having a view, while avoiding having a view about
+having views.16 This is an awkward, but not impossible,
+position. Wittgenstein and Heidegger manage it fairly well.
+One reason they manage it as well as they do is that they
+do not think that when we say something we must necessarily be expressing a view about a subject. We might just
+be saying something participating in a conversation rather
+than contributing to an inquiry. Perhaps saying things is
+not always saying how things are. Perhaps saying that is
+itself not a case of saying how things are. Both men suggest
+we see people as saying things, better or worse things,
+without seeing them as externalizing inner representations
+of reality. But this is only their entering wedge, for then we
+must cease to see ourselves as seeing this, without beginning
+to see ourselves as seeing something else. We must get the
+visual, and in particular the mirroring, metaphors out of
+our speech altogether."? To do that we have to understand
+speech not only as not the externalizing of inner representations, but as not a representation at all. We have to drop
+the notion of correspondence for sentences as well as for
+16 Heidegger's "Die Zeit des Weltbildes" (translated as "The Age
+of the World-View" by Marjorie Grene in Boundary II [1976]) is the
+best discussion of this difficulty I have come across.
+17 Derrida's recent writings are meditations on how to avoid these
+metaphors. Like Heidegger in "Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache
+zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden" (in Unterwegs zur
+Sprache (Pfullingen, 1959]), Derrida occasionally toys with the notion
+of the superiority of Oriental languages and of ideographic writing.
+371
+
+thoughts, and see sentences as connected with other sentences rather than with the world. We have to see the term
+"corresponds to how things are" as an automatic compliment paid to successful normal discourse rather than as a
+relation to be studied and aspired to throughout the rest of
+discourse. To attempt to extend this compliment to feats of
+abnormal discourse is like complimenting a judge on his
+wise decision by leaving him a fat tip: it shows a lack of
+tact. To think of Wittgenstein and Heidegger as having
+views about how things are is not to be wrong about how
+things are, exactly; it is just poor taste. It puts them in a
+position which they do not want to be in, and in which
+they look ridiculous.
+But perhaps they should look ridiculous. How, then, do
+we know when to adopt a tactful attitude and when to insist
+on someone's moral obligation to hold a view? This is like
+asking how we know when someone's refusal to adopt our
+norms (of, for example, social organization, sexual practices, or conversational manners) is morally outrageous and
+when it is something which we must (at least provisionally)
+respect. We do not know such things by reference to general
+principles. We do not, for instance, know in advance that
+if a given sentence is uttered, or a given act performed, we
+shall break off a conversation or a personal relationship, for
+everything depends on what leads up to it. To see edifying
+philosophers as conversational partners is an alternative to
+seeing them as holding views on subjeots of common concern. One way of thinking of wisdom as something of which
+the love is not the same as that of argument, and of which
+the achievement does not consist in finding the correct vocabulary for representing essence, is to think of it as the
+practical wisdom necessary to participate in a conversation.
+One way to see edifying philosophy as the love of wisdom is
+to see it as the attempt to prevent conversation from degenerating into inquiry, into a research program. Edif ying
+philosophers can never end philosophy, but they can help
+prevent it from attaining the secure path of a science.
+372
+
+3. EDIFICATION, RELATIVISM, AND OBJECTIVE TRUTH
+I want now to enlarge this suggestion that editying
+philosophy aims at continuing a conversation rather than
+at discovering truth, by making out of it a reply to the
+familiar charge of "relativism" leveled at the subordination
+of truth to edification. I shall be claiming that the difference between conversation and inquiry parallels Sartre's
+distinction between thinking of oneself as pour-soi and as
+en-soi, and thus that the cultural role of the edifying
+philosopher is to help us avoid the self-deception which
+comes from believing that we know ourselves by knowing a
+set of objective facts. In the following section, I shall try to
+make the converse point. There I shall be saying that the
+wholehearted behaviorism, naturalism, and physicalism I
+have been commending in earlier chapters help us avoid
+the self-deception of thinking that we possess a deep, hidden, metaphysically significant nature which makes us "irreducibly" different from inkwells or atoms.
+Philosophers who have doubts about traditional epistemology are often thought to be questioning the notion
+that at most one of incompatible competing theories can
+be true. However, it is hard to find anyone who actually
+does question this. When it is said, for example, that coherentist or pragmatic "theories of truth" allow for the possibility that many incompatible theories would satisfy the
+conditions set for "the truth," the coherentist or pragmatist
+usually replies that this merely shows that we should
+have no grounds for choice among these candidates for "the
+truth." The moral to draw, they say, is not that they have
+offered inadequate analyses of "true," but that there are
+some terms—for example, "the true theory," "the right
+thing to do"—which are, intuitively and grammatically,
+singular, but for which no set of necessary and sufficient
+conditions can be given which will pick out a unique reterent. This fact, they say, should not be surprising. No-
+body thinks that there are necessary and sufficient conditions
+373
+
+which will pick out, for example, the unique referent of
+"the best thing for her to have done on finding herself in
+that rather embarrassing situation," though plausible conditions can be given which will shorten a list of competing
+incompatible candidates. Why should it be different for the
+referents of "what she should have done in that ghastly
+moral dilemma" or "the Good Life for man" or "what the
+world is really made of"?
+To see relativism lurking in every attempt to formulate
+conditions for truth or reality or goodness which does not
+attempt to provide uniquely individuating conditions we
+must adopt the "Platonic" notion of the transcendental
+terms which I discussed above (chapter six, section 6). We
+must think of the true referents of these terms (the Truth,
+the Real, Goodness) as conceivably having no connection
+whatever with the practices of justification which obtain
+among us. The dilemma created by this Platonic hypostatization is that, on the one hand, the philosopher must
+attempt to find criteria for picking out these unique referents, whereas, on the other hand, the only hints he has
+about what these criteria could be are provided by current
+practice (by, e.g., the best moral and scientific thought of
+the day). Philosophers thus condemn themselves to a Sisyphean task, for no sooner has an account of a transcendental
+term been perfected than it is labeled a "naturalistic
+fallacy," a confusion between essence and accident.18 I think
+we get a clue to the cause of this self-defeating obsession
+from the fact that even philosophers who take the intuitive
+impossibility of finding conditions for "the one right thing
+to do" as a reason for repudiating "objeotive values" are
+loath to take the impossibility of finding individuating conditions for the one true theory of the world as a reason for
+denying "objective physical reality." Yet they should, for
+formally the two notions are on a par. The reasons for and
+against adopting a "correspondence" approach to moral
+18 On this point, see William Frankena's classic "The Naturalistic
+Fallacy," Mind 68 (1939).
+374
+
+truth are the same as those regarding truth about the physical world. The giveaway comes, I think, when we find that
+the usual excuse for invidious treatment is that we are
+shoved around by physical reality but not by values. Yet
+what does being shoved around have to do with objectivity,
+accurate representation, or correspondence? Nothing, I
+think, unless we confuse contact with reality (a causal, nonintentional, non-description-relative relation) with dealing
+with reality (describing, explaining, predicting, and modi.
+fying it—all of which are things we do under descriptions).
+The sense in which physical reality is Peircean "Secondness"
+—unmediated pressure-has nothing to do with the sense
+in which one among all our ways of describing, or of coping
+with, physical reality is "the one right" way. Lack of mediation is here being confused with accuracy of mediation. The
+absence of description is confused with a privilege attaching
+to a certain description. Only by such a confusion can the
+inability to offer individuating conditions for the one true
+description of material things be confused with insensitivity to the things' obduracy.
+Sartre helps us explain why this confusion is so frequent
+and why its results are purveyed with so much moral earnestness. The notion of "one right way of describing and
+explaining reality" supposedly contained in our "intuition"
+about the meaning of "true" is, for Sartre, just the notion of
+having a way of describing and explaining imposed on us
+in that brute way in which stones impinge on our feet. Or,
+to shift to visual metaphors, it is the notion of having reality
+unveiled to us, not as in a glass darkly, but with some unimaginable sort of immediacy which would make discourse
+and description superfluous. If we could convert knowledge
+from something discursive, something attained by continual adjustments of ideas or words, into something as
+18 What seems to be a sense of being shoved around by values,
+they reductively say, is just physical reality in disguise (e.g., neural
+arrangements or glandular secretions programmed by parental conditioning).
+375
+
+ineluctable as being shoved about, or being transfixed by a
+sight which leaves us speechless, then we should no longer
+have the responsibility for choice among competing ideas
+and words, theories and vocabularies. This attempt to slough
+off responsibility is what Sartre describes as the attempt to
+turn oneself into a thing-into an être-en-soi. In the visions
+of the epistemologist, this incoherent notion takes the form
+of seeing the attainment of truth as a matter of necessity,
+either the "logical" necessity of the transcendentalist or the
+"physical" necessity of the evolutionary "naturalizing" epistemologist. From Sartre's point of view, the urge to find
+such necessities is the urge to be rid of one's freedom to
+erect yet another alternative theory or vocabulary. Thus
+the edifying philosopher who points out the incoherence of
+the urge is treated as a "relativist," one who lacks moral
+seriousness, because he does not join in the common human
+hope that the burden of choice will pass away. Just as
+the moral philosopher who sees virtue as Aristotelian selfdevelopment is thought to lack concern for his fellow man,
+so the epistemologist who is merely behaviorist is treated as
+one who does not share the universal human aspiration
+toward objective truth.
+Sartre adds to our understanding of the visual imagery
+which has set the problems of Western philosophy by
+helping us see why this imagery is always trying to transcend itself. The notion of an unclouded Mirror of Nature
+is the notion of a mirror which would be indistinguishable
+from what was mirrored, and thus would not be a mirror at
+all. The notion of a human being whose mind is such an
+unclouded mirror, and who knows this, is the image, as
+Sartre says, of God. Such a being does not confront something alien which makes it necessary for him to choose an
+attitude toward, or a description of, it. He would have no
+need and no ability to choose actions or descriptions. He
+can be called "God" if we think of the advantages of this
+situation, or a "mere machine" if we think of the disadvantages. From this point of view, to look for commensura
+376
+
+tion rather than simply continued conversation-to look
+for a way of making further redescription unnecessary by
+finding a way of reducing all possible descriptions to one—
+is to attempt escape from humanity. To abandon the notion
+that philosophy must show all possible discourse naturally
+converging to a consensus, just as normal inquiry does,
+would be to abandon the hope of being anything more than
+merely human. It would thus be to abandon the Platonic
+notions of Truth and Reality and Goodness as entities
+which may not be even dimly mirrored by present practices
+and beliefs, and to settle back into the "relativism" which
+assumes that our only useful notions of "true" and "real"
+and "good" are extrapolations from those practices and
+beliefs.
+Here, finally, I comearound to the suggestion with which
+I ended the last section—that the point of edifying philosophy is to keep the conversation going rather than to find
+objective truth. Such truth, in the view I am advocating, is
+the normal result of normal discourse. Edifying philosophy
+is not only abnormal but reactive, having sense only as a
+protest against attempts to close off conversation by proposals for universal commensuration through the hypostatization of some privileged set of descriptions. The danger
+which edifying discourse tries to avert is that some given
+vocabulary, some way in which people might come to think
+of themselves, will deceive them into thinking that from
+now on all discourse could be, or should be, normal discourse. The resulting freezing-over of culture would be, in
+the eyes of edifying philosophers, the dehumanization of
+human beings. The edifying philosophers are thus agreeing
+with Lessing's choice of the infinite striving for truth over
+"all of Truth."o For the edifying philosopher the very idea
+of being presented with "all of Truth" is absurd, because
+the Platonic notion of Truth itself is absurd. It is absurd
+20 Kierkegaard made this choice the prototype of his own choice of
+"subjectivity" over "system." Cf. Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
+trans. David Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton, 1941), p. 97
+377
+
+either as the notion of truth about reality which is not
+about reality-under-a-certain-description, or as the notion
+of truth about reality under some privileged description
+which makes all other descriptions unnecessary because
+it is commensurable with each of them.
+To see keeping a conversation going as a sufficient aim of
+philosophy, to see wisdom as consisting in the ability to sustain a conversation, is to see human beings as generators of
+new descriptions rather than beings one hopes to be able to
+describe accurately. To see the aim of philosophy as truth—
+namely, the truth about the terms which provide ultimate
+commensuration for all human inquiries and activities—is
+to see human beings as objects rather than subjects, as
+existing en-soi rather than as both pour-soi and en-soi, as
+both described objects and describing subjects. To think
+that philosophy will permit us to see the describing subject
+as itself one sort of described object is to think that all
+possible descriptions can be rendered commensurable with
+the aid of a single descriptive vocabulary—that of philosophy itself. For only if we had such a notion of a universal
+description could we identify human-beings-under-a-givendescription with man's "essence." Only with such a notion
+would that of a man's having an essence make sense, whether
+or not that essence is conceived of as the knowing of essences.
+So not even by saying that man is subject as well as object,
+pour-sor as well as en-sor, are we grasping our essence. We
+do not escape from Platonism by saying that "our essence is
+to have no essence" if we then try to use this insight as the
+basis for a constructive and systematic attempt to find out
+further truths about human beings.
+That is why "existentialism"-and, more generally, edifying philosophy—cam be only reactive, why it falls into selfdeception whenever it tries to do more than send the
+conversation off in new directions. Such new directions may,
+perhaps, engender new normal discourses, new sciences, new
+philosophical research programs, and thus new objective
+378
+
+truths. But they are not the point of edifying philosophy,
+only accidental byproducts. The point is always the same
+to perform the social function which Dewey called "breaking the crust of convention," preventing man from deluding
+himself with the notion that he knows himself, or anything
+else, except under optional descriptions.
+4. EDIFICATION AND NATURALISM
+I argued in chapter seven that it would be a good idea to
+get rid of the spirit-nature distinction, conceived as a division between human beings and other things, or between
+two parts of human beings, corresponding to the distinction
+between hermeneutics and epistemology. I want now to take
+up this topic again, in order to underline the point that the
+"existentialist" doctrines I have been discussing are compatible with the behaviorism and materialism I advocated
+in earlier chapters. Philosophers who would like to be simultaneously systematic and edifying have often seen them
+as incompatible, and have therefore suggested how our sense
+of ourselves as pour-soi, as capable of reflection, as choosers
+of alternative vocabularies, might itself be turned into a
+philosophical subject matter.
+Much recent philosophy—under the aegis of "phenomenology" or of "hermeneutics," or both—has toyed with
+this unfortunate idea. For example, Habermas and Apel
+have suggested ways in which we might create a new sort of
+transcendental standpoint, enabling us to do something like
+what Kant tried to do, but without falling into either scientism or historicism. Again, most philosophers who see Marx,
+Freud, or both as figures who need to be drawn into "mainstream" philosophy have tried to develop quasi-epistemological systems which center around the phenomenon which
+both Marx and Freud throw into relief-the change in
+behavior which results from change in self-description. Such
+philosophers see traditional epistemology as committed to
+379
+
+"objectivizing" human beings, and they hope for a successor subject to epistemology which will do for "reflection"
+what the tradition did for "objectivizing knowledge."
+I have been insisting that we should not try to have a successor subject to epistemology, but rather try to free ourselves from the notion that philosophy must center around
+the discovery of a permanent framework for inquiry. In particular, we should free ourselves from the notion that philosophy can explain what science leaves unexplained. From
+my point of view, the attempt to develop a "universal
+pragmatics" or a "transcendental hermeneutics" is very
+suspicious. For it seems to promise just what Sartre tells us
+we are not going to have—a way of seeing freedom as nature
+(or, less cryptically, a way of seeing our creation of, and
+choice between, vocabularies in the same "normal" way as
+we see ourselves within one of those vocabularies). Such
+attempts start out by viewing the search for objective knowledge through normal discourse in the way I have suggested
+it should be viewed —as one element in edification. But they
+then often go on to more ambitious claims. The following
+passage from Habermas is an example:
+... the functions knowledge has in universal contexts of
+practical life can only be successfully analyzed in the
+framework of a reformulated transcendental philosophy.
+This, incidentally, does not entail an empiricist critique
+of the claim to absolute truth. As long as cognitive interests can be identified and analyzed through reflection
+upon the logic of inquiry in the natural and cultural
+sciences, they can legitimately claim a "transcendental"
+status. They assume an "empirical" status as soon as they
+are analyzed as the result of natural history—analyzed, as
+it were, in terms of cultural anthropology.2
+21 Jürgen Habermas, "Nachwort" to the second edition of Erkenntnis
+und Interesse (Frankfurt: Surkamp, 1973), p. 410; translated as "A
+Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests," by Christian Lenhardt
+in Philosophy of the Social Sciences 3 (1973), 181. For a criticism of
+the line Habermas takes here—a criticism paralleling my own—see
+380
+
+I want to claim, on the contrary, that there is no point in
+trying to find a general synoptic way of "analyzing" the
+"functions knowledge has in universal contexts of practical
+life," and that cultural anthropology (in a large sense which
+includes intellectual history) is all we need.
+Habermas and other authors who are impelled by the
+same motives see the suggestion that empirical inquiry suffices as incorporating an "objectivistic illusion." They tend
+to see Deweyan pragmatism, and the "scientific realism" of
+Sellars and Feyerabend, as the products of an inadequate
+epistemology. In my view, the great virtue of Dewey,
+Sellars, and Feyerabend is that they point the way toward,
+and partially exemplify, a nonepistemological sort of philosophy, and thus one which gives up any hope of the
+"transcendental." Habermas says that for a theory to
+"ground itself transcendentally" is for it to
+become familiar with the range of inevitable subjective
+conditions which both make the theory possible and
+place limits on it, for this kind of transcendental corroboration tends always to criticize an overly self-confident self-understanding of itself.22
+Specifically, this overconfidence consists in thinking that
+there can be such a thing as truthfulness to reality in the
+sense postulated by philosophical realism. Correspondence-theories of truth tend to hypostatize facts as entities
+in the world. It is the intention and inner logic of an
+epistemology reflecting upon the conditions of possible
+experience as such to uncover the objectivistic illusions of
+such a view. Every form of transcendental philosophy
+olaims to identify the conditions of the objectivity of ex-
+Michael Theunissen, Gesellschaft und Geschichte: Zur Kritik der Kritischen Theorie (Berlin, 1969), pp. zoff. (I owe the reference to Theunissen to Raymond Geuss.)
+22 Habermas, "Nachwort," p. 411; English translation, p. 182.
+381
+
+perience by analyzing the categorical structure of objects
+of possible experience.23
+But Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars, Kuhn, and the other
+heroes of this book all have their own ways of debunking
+"truthfulness to reality in the sense postulated by philosophical realism," and none of them think that this is to be
+done by "analyzing the categorical structure of objects of
+possible experience."
+The notion that we can get around overconfident philosophical realism and positivistic reductions only by adopting something like Kant's transcendental standpoint seems
+to me the basic mistake in programs like that of Habermas
+(as well as in Husserl's notion of a "phenomenology of the
+life-world" which will describe people in some way "prior"
+to that offered by science). What is required to accomplish
+these laudable purposes is not Kant's "epistemological"
+distinction between the transcendental and the empirical
+standpoints, but rather his "existentialist" distinction between people as empirical selves and as moral agents.24
+Normal scientific discourse can always be seen in two dif
+ferent ways—as the successful search for objective truth, or
+as one discourse among others, one among many projects
+we engage in. The former point of view falls in with the
+normal practice of normal science. There questions of
+moral choice or of edification do not arise, since they have
+already been preempted by the tacit and "self-confident"
+commitment to the search for objective truth on the subject
+in question. The latter point of view is one from which we
+23 Ibid., PP. 408-409; English translation, p. 180.
+24 Wilfrid Sellars uses this latter Kantian distinction to good eftect in
+his insistence that personhood is a matter of "being one of us," of falling within the scope of practical imperatives of the form "Would that
+we all ..., rather than a feature of certain organisms to be isolated
+by empirical means. I have invoked this claim several times in this
+book, particularly in chapter four, section 4. For Sellars's own use of
+it, see Science and Metaphysics (London and New York, 1968), chap. 7,
+and the essay "Science and Ethics" in his Philosophical Perspectives
+(Springfield, Ill., 1967).
+382
+
+ask such questions as "What is the point?" "What moral is
+to be drawn from our knowledge of how we, and the rest of
+nature, work?" or "What are we to do with ourselves now
+that we know the laws of our own behavior?"
+The primal error of systematic philosophy has always
+been the notion that such questions are to be answered by
+some new ("metaphysical" or "transcendental") descriptive
+or explanatory discourse (dealing with, e.g., "man," "spirit,"
+or "language"). This attempt to answer questions of justification by discovering new objective truths, to answer the
+moral agent's request for justifications with descriptions of a
+privileged domain, is the philosopher's special form of bad
+faith—his special way of substituting pseudo-cognition for
+moral choice. Kant's greatness was to have seen through the
+"metaphysical" form of this attempt, and to have destroyed
+the traditional conception of reason to make room for moral
+faith. Kant gave us a way of seeing scientific truth as something which could never supply an answer to our demand
+for a point, a justification, a way of claiming that our moral
+decision about what to do is based on knowledge of the
+nature of the world. Unfortunately, Kant put his diagnosis
+of science in terms of the discovery of "inevitable subjective
+conditions," to be revealed by reflection upon scientific
+inquiry. Equally unfortunately, he thought that there really
+was a decision procedure for moral dilemmas (though not
+based on knowledge, since our grasp of the categorical Im-
+perative is not a cognition)." So he created new forms of
+philosophical bad faith—substituting "transcendental" attempts to find one's true self for "metaphysical" attempts to
+find a world elsewhere. By tacitly identifying the moral agent
+with the constituting transcendental self, he left the road
+25 See Kant's distinction between knowledge and necessary belief at
+K.d.r.V., A824-B852ff., and especially his use of Unternehmung as a
+synonym for the latter. This section of the First Critique seems to me
+the one which gives most sense to the famous passage about denying
+reason to make room for faith at Bxxx. At many other points, however,
+Kant inconsistently speaks of practical reason as supplying an enlargement of our knowledge.
+383
+
+open to ever more complicated post-Kantian attempts to
+reduce freedom to nature, choice to knowledge, the pour-soi
+to the en-soi. This is the road I have been trying to block by
+recasting ahistorical and permanent distinctions between
+nature and spirit, "objectivizing science" and reflection,
+epistemology and hermeneutics, in terms of historical and
+temporary distinctions between the familiar and the unfamiliar, the normal and the abnormal. For this way of
+treating these distinctions lets us see them not as dividing
+two areas of inquiry but as the distinction between inquiry
+and something which is not inquiry, but is rather the inchoate questioning out of which inquiries—new normal discourses-may (or may not) emerge.
+To put this claim in another way, which may help bring
+out its connections with naturalism, I am saying that the
+positivists were absolutely right in thinking it imperative to
+extirpate metaphysics, when "metaphysics" means the attempt to give knowledge of what science cannot know. For
+this is the attempt to find a discourse which combines the
+advantages of normality with those of abnormality-the intersubjective security of objective truth combined with the
+edifying character of an unjustifiable but unconditional
+moral claim. The urge to set philosophy on the secure path
+of a science is the urge to combine Plato's project of moral
+choice as ticking oft the objective truths about a special sort
+of object (the Idea of the Good) with the sort of intersubjective and democratic agreement about objects found in
+normal science. 2 Philosophy which was utterly unedifying,
+utterly irrelevant to such moral choices as whether or not
+to believe in God would count not as philosophy, but only
+as some special sort of science. So as soon as a program to put
+philosophy on the secure path of science succeeds, it simply
+26 The positivists themselves quickly succumbed to this urge. Even
+while insisting that moral questions were noncognitive they thought to
+give quasi-scientific status to their moralistic attacks on traditional philosophy—thus making themselves subject to self-referential criticisms
+concerning their "emotive" use of "noncognitive."
+384
+
+converts philosophy into a boring academic specialty. Systematic philosophy exists by perpetually straddling the gap
+between description and justification, cognition and choice,
+getting the facts right and telling us how to live.
+Once this point is seen, we can see more clearly why
+epistemology emerged as the essence of systematic philosophy. For epistemology is the attempt to see the patterns of
+justification within normal discourse as more than just such
+patterns. It is the attempt to see them as hooked on to
+something which demands moral commitment-Reality,
+Truth, Objectivity, Reason. To be behaviorist in epistemology, on the contrary, is to look at the normal scientific discourse of our day bifocally, both as patterns adopted for
+various historical reasons and as the achievement of objective truth, where "objective truth" is no more and no less
+than the best idea we currently have about how to explain
+what is going on. From the point of view of epistemological
+behaviorism, the only truth in Habermas's claim that scientific inquiry is made possible, and limited, by "inevitable
+subjective conditions" is that such inquiry is made possible
+by the adoption of practices of justification, and that such
+practices have possible alternatives. But these "subjective
+conditions" are in no sense "inevitable" ones discoverable
+by "reflection upon the logic of inquiry." They are just
+the facts about what a given society, or profession, or other
+group, takes to be good ground for assertions of a certain
+sort. Such disciplinary matrices are studied by the usual
+empirical-cum-hermeneutic methods of "cultural anthropology." From the point of view of the group in question
+these subjective conditions are a combination of commonsensical practical imperatives (e.g., tribal taboos, Mill's
+Methods) with the standard current theory about the subject. From the point of view of the historian of ideas or the
+anthropologist they are the empirical facts about the beliefs,
+desires, and practices of a certain group of human beings.
+These are incompatible points of view, in the sense that we
+cannot be at both viewpoints simultaneously. But there is
+385
+
+no reason and no need to subsume the two in a higher
+synthesis. The group in question may itself shift from the
+one point of view to the other (thus "objectivizing" their
+past selves through a process of "reflection" and making
+new sentences true of their present selves). But this is not a
+mysterious process which demands a new understanding
+of human knowledge. It is the commonplace fact that people may develop doubts about what they are doing, and
+thereupon begin to discourse in ways incommensurable with
+those they used previously.
+This goes also for the most spectacular and disturbing
+new discourses. When such edifying philosophers as Marx,
+Freud, and Sartre offer new explanations of our usual patterns of justifying our actions and assertions, and when
+these explanations are taken up and integrated into our
+lives, we have striking examples of the phenomenon of
+reflection's changing vocabulary and behavior. But as I
+argued in chapter seven, this phenomenon does not require
+any new understanding of theory-construction or theoryconfirmation. To say that we have changed ourselves by
+internalizing a new self-description (using terms like "bourgeois intelleotual" or "self-destructive" or "self-deceiving")
+is true enough. But this is no more startling than the fact
+that men changed the data of botany by hybridization,
+which was in turn made possible by botanical theory, or
+that they changed their own lives by inventing bombs and
+vaccines. Meditation on the possibility of such changes, like
+reading science fiction, does help us overcome the self-confidence of "philosophical realism." But such meditation
+does not need to be supplemented by a transcendental account of the nature of reflection. All that is necessary is the
+edifying invocation of the fact or possibility of abnormal
+discourses, undermining our reliance upon the knowledge
+we have gained through normal discourses. The objectionable self-confidence in question is simply the tendency of
+normal discourse to block the flow of conversation by presenting itself as offering the canonical vocabulary for dis-
+386
+
+cussion of a given topic-and, more particularly, the tendency of normal epistemologically centered philosophy to
+block the road by putting itself forward as the final commensurating vocabulary for all possible rational discourse.
+Self-confidence of the former, limited sort is overthrown
+by edifying philosophers who put the very idea of universal commensuration, and of systematic philosophy, in
+doubt.
+Risking intolerable repetitiveness, I want to insist again
+that the distinction between normal and abnormal discourse does not coincide with any distinction of subject
+matter (e.g., nature versus history, or facts versus values),
+method (e.g., objectivation versus reflection), faculty (e.g.,
+reason versus imagination), or any of the other distinctions
+which systematic philosophy has used to make the sense of
+the world consist in the objective truth about some previously unnoticed portion or feature of the world. Anything
+can be discoursed of abnormally, just as anything can become edifying and anything can be systematized. I have been
+discussing the relation between natural science and other
+disciplines simply because, since the period of Descartes
+and Hobbes, the assumption that scientific discourse was
+normal discourse and that all other discourse needed to be
+modeled upon it has been the standard motive for philosophizing. Once we set this assumption aside, however, we
+can also set aside the various anti-naturalisms about which
+I have been complaining. More specifically, we can assert
+all of the following:
+Every speech, thought, theory, poem, composition, and
+philosophy will turn out to be completely predictable in
+purely naturalistic terms. Some atoms-and-the-void account
+of micro-processes within individual human beings will permit the prediction of every sound or inscription which will
+ever be uttered. There are no ghosts.
+Nobody will be able to predict his own actions, thoughts,
+theories, poems, etc., before deciding upon them or inventing them. (This is not an interesting remark about the
+387
+
+odd nature of human beings, but rather a trivial consequence of what it means to "decide" or "invent.") So no
+hope (or danger) exists that cognition of oneself as en-soi
+will cause one to cease to exist pour-sor.
+The complete set of laws which enable these predictions
+to be made, plus complete descriptions (in atoms-and-thevoid terms) of all human beings, would not yet be the
+whole "objective truth" about human beings, nor the
+whole set of true predictions about them. There would remain as many other distinct sets of such objective truths
+(some useful for prediction, some not) as there were incommensurable vocabularies within which normal inquiry
+about human beings could be conducted (e.g., all those vocabularies within which we attribute beliefs and desires,
+virtues and beauty).
+Incommensurability entails irreducibility but not incompatibility, so the failure to "reduce" these various vocabularies to that of "bottom-level" atoms-and-the-void science
+casts no doubt upon their cognitive status or upon the
+metaphysical status of their objects. (This goes as much
+for the aesthetic worth of poems as for the beliefs of persons, as much for virtues as for volitions.)
+The assemblage, per impossible, of all these objective
+truths would still not necessarily be edifying. It might be
+the picture of a world without a sense, without a moral.
+Whether it seemed to point a moral to an individual would
+depend upon that individual. It would be true or false that
+it so seemed, or did not seem, to him. But it would not be
+objectively true or false that it "really did," or did not, have
+a sense or a moral. Whether his knowledge of the world
+leaves 'him with a sense of what to do with or in the world
+is itself predictable, but whether it should is not.
+The fear of science, of "scientism," of "naturalism," of
+self-objectivation, of being turned by too much knowledge
+into a thing rather than a person, is the fear that all discourse
+will become normal discourse. That is, it is the fear that
+there will be objectively true or false answers to every ques-
+388
+
+tion we ask, so that human worth will consist in knowing
+truths, and human virtue will be merely justified true belief.
+This is frightening because it cuts off the possibility of something new under the sun, of human life as poetic rather
+than merely contemplative.
+But the dangers to abnormal discourse do not come from
+science or naturalistic philosophy. They come from the
+scarcity of food and from the secret police. Given leisure
+and libraries, the conversation which Plato began will not
+end in self-objectivation—not because aspects of the world,
+or of human beings, escape being objects of scientific inquiry, but simply because free and leisured conversation
+generates abnormal discourse as the sparks fly upward.
+5. PHILOSOPHY IN THE CONVERSATION OF MANKIND
+I end this book with an allusion to Oakeshott's famous
+title," because it catches the tone in which, I think, philosophy should be discussed. Much of what I have said about
+epistemology and its possible successors is an attempt to
+draw some corollaries from Sellars's doctrine that
+in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing,
+we are not giving an empirical description of that episode
+or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons,
+of justifying and being able to justify what one says. 28
+If we see knowing not as having an essence, to be described
+by scientists or philosophers, but rather as a right, by current standards, to believe, then we are well on the way to
+seeing conversation as the ultimate context within which
+knowledge is to be understood. Our focus shifts from the
+relation between human beings and the objects of their
+inquiry to the relation between alternative standards of
+27 Cf. Michael Oakeshott, "The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation
+of Mankind," in his Rationalism and Politics (New York, 1975).
+28 Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality (London and New
+York, 1963), p. 16g.
+389
+
+justification, and from there to the actual changes in those
+standards which make up intellectual history. This brings
+us to appreciate Sellars's own description of his mythical
+hero Jones, the man who invented the Mirror of Nature and
+thereby made modern philosophy possible:
+Does the reader not recognize Jones as Man himself in
+the middle of his journey from the grunts and groans of
+the cave to the subtle and polydimensional discourse of
+the drawing room, the laboratory, and the study, the
+language of Henry and William James, of Einstein and of
+the philosophers who, in their efforts to break out of
+discourse to an åpxý beyond discourse, have provided the
+most curious dimension of all? (p. 196)
+In this book I have offered a sort of prolegomenon to
+a history of epistemology-centered philosophy as an episode
+in the history of European culture. Such philosophy goes
+back to the Greeks, and goes sideways into all sorts of nonphilosophical disciplines which have, at one time or another, proposed themselves as substitutes for epistemology,
+and thus for philosophy. So the episode in question cannot
+simply be identified with "modern philosophy," in the
+sense of the standard textbook sequence of great philosophers from Descartes to Russell and Husserl. But that
+sequence is, nevertheless, where the search for foundations
+for knowledge is most explicit. So most of my attempts to
+deconstruct the image of the Mirror of Nature have concerned these philosophers. I have tried to show how their
+urge to break out into an pxý beyond discourse is rooted
+in the urge to see social practices of justification as more
+than just such practices. I have, however, focused mainly on the expressions of this urge in the recent literature of analytical philosophy. The result is thus no more
+than a prolegomenon. A proper historical treatment would
+require both learning and skills which I do not possess. But
+I would hope that the prolegomenon has been sufficient to
+let one see contemporary issues in philosophy as events in a
+390
+
+certain stage of a conversation—a conversation which once
+knew nothing of these issues and may know nothing of them
+again.
+The fact that we can continue the conversation Plato
+began without discussing the topics Plato wanted discussed,
+illustrates the difference between treating philosophy as a
+voice in a conversation and treating it as a subject, a Fach, a
+field of professional inquiry. The conversation Plato began
+has been enlarged by more voices than Plato would have
+dreamed possible, and thus by topics he knew nothing of.
+A "subject"—astrology, physics, classical philosophy, furniture design—may undergo revolutions, but it gets its selfimage from its present state, and its history is necessarily
+written "Whiggishly" as an account of its gradual maturation. This is the most frequent way of writing the history
+of philosophy, and I cannot claim to have avoided such
+Whiggery entirely in sketching the sort of history which
+needs to be written. But I hope that I have shown how we
+can see the issues with which philosophers are presently
+concerned, and with which they Whiggishly see philosophy
+as having always (perhaps unwittingly) been concerned, as
+results of historical accident, as turns the conversation has
+taken.2° It has taken this turn for a long time, but it might
+29 Two recent writers—Michel Foucault and Harold Bloom-make
+this sense of the brute factuality of historical origins central to their
+work. Cf. Bloom, A Map of Misreading (New York, 1975), p. 33: "All
+continuities possess the paradox of being absolutely arbitrary in their
+origins and absolutely inescapable in their teleologies. We know this so
+vividly from what we all of us oxymoronically call our love lives that
+its literary counterparts need little demonstration." Foucault says that
+his way of looking at the history of ideas "permits the introduction,
+into the very roots of thought, of notions of chance, discontinuity and
+materiality." ('The Discourse on Language," included in the Archaeology of Knowledge [New York, 1972], p. 231) It is hardest of all to see
+brute contingency in the history of philosophy, if only because since
+Hegel the historiography of philosophy has been "progressive," or (as
+in Heidegger's inversion of Hegel's account of progress) "retrogressive,"
+but rever without a sense of inevitability. If we could once see the de.
+sire for a permanent, neutral, ahistorical, commensurating vocabulary as
+391
+
+turn in another direction without human beings thereby
+losing their reason, or losing touch with "the real problems."
+The conversational interest of philosophy as a subject, or
+of some individual philosopher of genius, has varied and
+will continue to vary in unpredictable ways depending upon
+contingencies. These contingencies will range from what
+happens in physics to what happens in politics. The lines
+between disciplines will blur and shift, and new disciplines
+will arise, in the ways illustrated by Galileo's successful
+attempt to create "purely scientific questions" in the seventeenth century. The notions of "philosophical significance"
+and of "purely philosophical question," as they are currently used, gained sense only around the time of Kant.
+Our post-Kantian sense that epistemology or some successor
+subject is at the center of philosophy (and that moral philosophy, aesthetics, and social philosophy, for example, are
+somehow derivative) is a reflection of the fact that the professional philosopher's self-image depends upon his professional preoccupation with the image of the Mirror of Na-
+ture. Without the Kantian assumption that the philosopher
+can decide quaestiones juris concerning the claims of the rest
+of culture, this self-image collapses. That assumption depends on the notion that there is such a thing as understanding the essence of knowledge doing what Sellars tells
+us we cannot do.
+To drop the notion of the philosopher as knowing something about knowing which nobody else knows so well
+would be to drop the notion that his voice always has an
+overriding claim on the attention of the other participants
+in the conversation. It would also be to drop the notion that
+there is something called "philosophical method" or "philosophical technique" or "the philosophical point of view"
+itself a historical phenomenon, then perhaps we could write the history
+of philosophy less dialectically and less sentimentally than has been
+possible hitherto.
+392
+
+which enables the professional philosopher, ex oficio, to
+have interesting views about, say, the respectability of psychoanalysis, the legitimacy of certain dubious laws, the
+resolution of moral dilemmas, the "soundness" of schools
+of historiography or literary criticism, and the like. Philosophers often do have interesting views upon such questions, and their professional training as philosophers is often
+a necessary condition for their having the views they do. But
+this is not to say that philosophers have a special kind of
+knowledge about knowledge (or anything else) from which
+they draw relevant corollaries. The useful kibitzing they
+can provide on the various topics I just mentioned is made
+possible by their familiarity with the historical background
+of arguments on similar topics, and, most importantly, by the
+fact that arguments on such topics are punctuated by stale
+philosophical clichés which the other participants have
+stumbled across in their reading, but about which professional philosophers know the pros and cons by heart.
+The neo-Kantian image of philosophy as a profession,
+then, is involved with the image of the "mind" or "language" as mirroring nature. So it might seem that epistemological behaviorism and the consequent rejection of mirror-imagery entail the claim that there can or should be no
+such profession. But this does not follow. Professions can
+survive the paradigms which gave them birth. In any case,
+the need for teachers who have read the great dead philosophers is quite enough to insure that there will be philosophy departments as long as there are universities. The
+actual result of a widespread loss of faith in mirror-imagery
+would be merely an "encapsulation" of the problems
+created by this imagery within a historical period. I do not
+know whether we are in fact at the end of an era. This will
+depend, I suspect, on whether Dewey, Wittgenstein, and
+Heidegger are taken to heart. It may be that mirror-imagery
+and "mainstream," systematic philosophy will be revitalized
+once again by some revolutionary of genius. Or it may be
+that the image of the philosopher which Kant offered is
+393
+
+about to go the way of the medieval image of the priest. If
+that happens, even the philosophers themselves will no
+longer take seriously the notion of philosophy as providing
+"foundations" or "justifications" for the rest of culture, or
+as adjudicating quaestiones juris about the proper domains
+of other disciplines.
+Whichever happens, however, there is no danger of philosophy's "coming to an end." Religion did not come to an
+end in the Enlightenment, nor painting in Impressionism.
+Even if the period from Plato to Nietzsche is encapsulated
+and "distanced" in the way Heidegger suggests, and even
+if twentieth-century philosophy comes to seem a stage of
+awkward transitional backing and filling (as sixteenth-century philosophy now seems to us), there will be something
+called "philosophy" on the other side of the transition.
+For even if problems about representation look as obsolete
+to our descendants as problems about hylomorphism look to
+us, people will still read Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant,
+Hegel, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger. What roles these men
+will play in our descendants' conversation, no one knows.
+Whether the distinction between systematic and edifying
+philosophy will carry over, no one knows either. Perhaps
+philosophy will become purely edifying, so that one's selfidentification as a philosopher will be purely in terms of
+the books one reads and discusses, rather than in terms
+of the problems one wishes to solve. Perhaps a new form of
+systematic philosophy will be found which has nothing
+whatever to do with epistemology but which nevertheless
+makes normal philosophical inquiry possible. These speculations are idle, and nothing I have been saying makes one
+more plausible than another. The only point on which I
+would insist is that philosophers' moral concern should be
+with continuing the conversation of the West, rather than
+with insisting upon a place for the traditional problems of
+modern philosophy within that conversation.
+394
+
+Index
+Abelard, Peter, 149
+abnormal and normal discourse,
+11, 320-322, 333, 339, 346, 360,
+363, 365-366, 372, 377,382,
+384,386-389
+Adler, Mortimer, 40 n.8, 50 n.21
+Aldrich, Virgil, 189 n.zo
+analytic philosophy, 7-8, 12, 168,
+170-173,192, 316-317, 343, 390
+Anaxagoras, 43 n.12, 44
+Anscombe, G.E.M., 167 n.3
+Anselm, Saint, 149
+Apel, Karl-Otto, 343-344, 347-348,
+354, 368 n.13, 379
+Aquinas, St. Thomas, 6, 44-45,
+50 n.21, 52л, 54л, 55, 63, 125,
+366-367
+Aristotle, 35, 40-41, 44-47, 52, 53n,
+55, 63-64,67,142, 144-146,149,
+158, 154, 159-160, 163, 210-211,
+222, 239n, 249п, 252, 263, 26g,
+351, 360, 364, 366-367, 394
+Armstrong, David, 22-28, 85n,
+1021, 115, 117
+Arnauld, Antoine, 60 n.32
+Augustine, Saint, 45, 50 n.21, 53n,
+307
+Austin, J. L., 52n, 60 n.3z, 6zn,
+142,169, 213
+awareness, prelinguistic, 181-192
+Ayer, A. J., 66n, 112, 337
+Bacon, Francis, 42, 43 1.12, 133n
+Bain, Alexander, 165
+Balz, A.G.A., 57 n.27
+Barrett, Robert, 271n
+Beck, L. J., 64 n.38
+behaviorism, epistemological, 99,
+170, 173-182, 193, 209-213, 305
+п.38, 315, 320, 325, 373, 376,
+379,385, 393; psychological,
+17-18, 66, 94-96, 98-107, 109л,
+115,176, 190, 209-212, 228n, 259
+Bellarmine, Cardinal, 211, 328-
+331
+Bennett, Jonathan, 48 n.18, 142
+Bergmann, Gustav, 175-177
+Bergson, Henri, 166, 240 n.27
+Berkeley, George, 49 1.18, 64, 277,
+293
+Bernstein, Richard, xiv, 11gn
+Binkley, Robert, 27In
+Black, Max, 305
+Blanshard, Brand, 185 n.18
+Bloom, Harold, 168 n.6, 391
+Boorse, Christopher, 195n
+Bouwsma, O. K., 100, 228
+Boyd, Richard, 283-284
+Boyle, Robert, 133n
+Bradley, M. C., 116 n.20, 165
+Brandom, Robert, 179n, goin
+Brandt, Richard, 83-84, 86, 93, 118
+Braun, Lucien, 133n
+Brentano, Franz, 18, 61 n.32, 193,
+199, 207-208
+Broad, C. D., 7, 39 n.6
+Brucker, Jakob, 133n
+Brumbaugh, Robert, xiii
+Burtt, E. A., 65 n.39
+Busch, Eric, 119
+Campbell, Keith, 44 n.13, 83-84,
+86, 93, 118
+Carnap, Rudolph, xili-xiv, 7, 16g,
+395
+
+Carnap, Rudolph (cont.)
+172-173,204, 207-208, 221, 257,
+259, 3011, 348, 363.367
+Carr, David, 167 1.5
+Caton, Hiram, 249n
+Chisholm, Roderick, 18, 27, 175-
+177,193
+Chomsky, Noam, 195n, 204n, 214,
+249,251-253
+Coder, David, 12onn
+conceptual change, 265-273, 277
+consciousness, see mind as consciousness
+conversation, 156-157, 159, 163,
+170-171, 318, 322, 371-373, 377-
+378,386,389-394
+Copernicus, 131, 328-330
+Cornman, James, 66n, 120 n.23
+Cousin, Victor, 133n
+culture, philosophy as foundation
+of, 3-6, 8, 131, 138-139, 163, 166,
+179, 193, 220, 257, 266, 269, 315,
+317-318, 354, 359n, 394
+Cunningham, J. V., 42 n.10
+Darwin, Charles, 330, 362 n.8, 366
+Davidson, Donald, 7, 125n, 205-
+207, 259-265, 280, 281п, 287, 293,
+295, 299-305, 308-311, 347,355
+Democritus, 345, 357
+Dennett, Daniel, 236 n.22, 253-254,
+299
+Derrida, Jacques, 365, 368 n.12,
+зод 1.14, 371 1.17
+Descartes, René, 4, 6, 8-12, 19, 27,
+42, 44n, 45-51, 52П, 53п, 54-69,
+73,112, 124-125, 131-132, 13311,
+136-137,139-140, 843, 145, 1511,
+154,158-160, 165,187, 191, 210,
+219-214, 222n, 223, 239л, 249,
+252-253, 262-264, 325, 357, 367,
+з69, 387, 390, 394
+Dewey, John, 5-7, 9, 11, 13, 39 n.6,
+520, 136, 150, 1597, 162, 165,
+396
+174, 176, 213, 223, 228-229, 279,
+311, 362 п.8, 367-368, 379, 381-
+Dilthey, Wilhelm, 166, 208, 216
+Dodwell, P. C., 216-217, 233-235,
+237, 240-242
+Donagan, Alan, 109-104
+Donnellan, Keith, 288
+Dummett, Michael, 167 n.3, 262-
+265
+edification, 5, 11-12, 357-372, 376.
+389,394
+epistemology: as commensuration,
+316,357,364, 376-378, 387; as
+desire for constraint, 9, 157-163,
+315,375; as first philosophy, 10,
+132-138, 163, 16g, 223,257, 262.
+263, 354,385,392; as quest for
+privileged representations, 160,
+163,167,337,361. See also representations, philosophy as a
+general theory of
+essentialism, 120, 195n, 268, 361-
+364,367,370,372, 374,378
+existentialism, 361-363, 365-366,
+378-379,382
+extensionalism, 204, 207
+fact-value distinction, 363-365,
+375,387
+Feigl, Herbert, 85 1.5
+Feldman, Fred, 79n
+Feyerabend, Paul, 117, 264, 26g-
+273, 275-277, 284, 317, 330,
+358 n.1, 381
+Field, Hartry, 196 n.29, 301n
+Fine, Arthur, 271n, 293n
+Firth, Roderick, 185 n.18
+Fisk, Milton, 299
+Flugel, J. C., 215 n.2
+Fodor, Jerry, 215, 220, 231-232,
+2371,242, 244-256
+Føllesdal, Dagrinn, 203n
+
+Foucault, Michel, 322, 330, 39111
+Frankena, William, 374n
+Frede, Michael, 5111
+Frege, Gottlob, 7-8, 167 n.3, 257,
+259, 263-264,288
+Freud, Sigmund, 223, 249, 264,
+379,386
+functionalism, see mind as the
+functional
+Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 11, 344,
+357-364, 366
+Galileo, 65 n.39, 131, 225, 246, 249,
+328, 330-331, 333, 366, 392
+Garver, Newton, 36g n.14
+Gassendi, Pierre, 60 n.30
+Geertz, Clifford, 267n
+Geisteswissenchaften, 182, 192,
+200-201, 208-209, 216, 219, 321,
+343-356, 362-363,387
+Gettier, E. L., 253n
+Geuss, Raymond, xiv, 355 n.24,
+381 n.21
+Gibson, J. J., and E. J. Gibson,
+241 n.29, 244
+Gilson, Étienne, 49 n.19, 50 n.21,
+510,222
+givenness, see myth of the given;
+phenomenal properties
+Glassy Essence, 37, 42-45, 52, 68,
+86, 89, 102, 104-105, 107-108,
+112, 116, 123, 126-127, 336, 353,
+356-357
+Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von,
+367
+Goodman, Nelson, 201 n.39, 281n,
+295,321
+Gould, Josiah B., 46 n.14
+Grabes, Herbert, 42 n.10
+Green, Thomas Hill, 41 n.9, 49
+n.18, 60 n.32, 140-143, 145-147,
+253
+Gregory, R. L.., 235n, 241 n. 29
+Grene, Marjorie, 41 n.8, 345
+Grice, H. P., 1750
+Hacking, Ian, 59 n.2g, 135 1.5,
+144 1.23,263n
+Hallie, Philip P., 46 n.14
+Hampshire, Stuart, 51, 66n, 189
+n.20
+Hanson, Norwood, 168, 225, 227
+Harman, Gilbert, 174 n.8, 197,
+198 n.31, 200 n.39,253n
+Harré, Rom, 168, 286n
+Hartshorne, Charles, xili, 113,
+1177
+Hegel, G.W.F., 5, 49 n.18, 73, 122,
+133-135,165,167,168 п.б, 192,
+264, 358 п.3, 362 n.8, 39111, 394
+Heidegger, Martin, 5-7, 9, 11-13,
+73, 157n, 159n, 162-163, 167,
+179n, 264, 358, 360-361, 363,
+364n, 365-372, 391n, 393-394
+Hellman, Geoffrey, 124n
+Helmholtz, Hermann von, 235n,
+241 n.29
+Hempel, C. G., xili
+hermeneutics, 315-323, 325, 330,
+342-348, 350, 353-354, 357-366,
+379-380
+Hesse, Mary, 168
+Hiley, David, 120 n.23
+historicism, 9-10, 33-34, 166, 168,
+178, 192, 264-265, 272, 281, 342,
+367
+Hobbes, Thomas, 59, 60 n.30, 131,
+133n, 136, 367,387
+Hofstader, Albert, 215 n.3
+holism, 170-171, 174, 180-181, 188,
+191n, 195-196, 201, 208, 262n,
+302-304,317-319,368
+Homer, 44-45, 47
+Hoy, David, xiv
+Hume, David, 48 n.18, 60 n.32, 73,
+140n, 143, 147, 153, 160, 241
+n.29, 258, 261, 26g
+397
+
+Husserl, Edmund, 4, 61 n.32, 166-
+16g, 216, 26g, 369, 38г, 390
+"idea idea, 48-51, 60, 136-137,
+139-140, 142, 144, 146-148, 150,
+152,192-209, 226, 263
+idealism, 105, 135-136, 148, 151n,
+155, 161-162, 165, 174, 258n, 263,
+265-266, 273-284, 288, 299, 307,
+324-325.334.342-344, 353-354
+incommensurability, 275, 302n,
+316,320-333,343,345,347,350,
+369,386,388
+incorrigibility, 29, 35, 46n, 48 n.18,
+54,77.80,84, 87-98, 100, 106,
+111-112, 120-121, 154, 175, 218.
+See also mind as the indubitably knowable
+intentionality, see mind as the
+intentional
+Jaeger, Werner, 41 n.8
+James, William, 4, 10, 136, 165,
+279,284,367
+Kalke, William, 238n
+Kampe, Cornelius, gon
+Kant, Immanuel, 4, 6-9, 12, 20, 35,
+63,65,73,112,131-132,1331,
+134-135, 137-139,146-156, 160-
+161, 165-167, 16g, 173,193.241
+п.29, 242, 852, 255, 857-258, 261-
+264, 269, 293, 309, 311, 322, 325,
+330, 334, 338n, 353, 364, 369, 379,
+382-384, 392-394
+Kenny, Anthony, 41 n.9, 47 n.16,
+48-49, 216
+Kepler, Johannes, 133n
+Kierkegaard, Søren, 4, 367, 369,
+3770
+Kim, Jaegwon, 68n, 8on
+Kripke, Saul, 31, 78-79, 97, 111n,
+116 п. 21, 288, 290-291, 299
+Kuhn, T. S., 6-7, 11, 59 n.2g, 168,
+398
+210, 225, 227, 264, 269, 271, 275-
+276,278, 3021, 316-317,320, 322-
+333, 335-342, 344-345, 382
+Lecky, W.E.H., 131
+Leibniz, G. W., 26-27, 148-149, 263
+Lessing, Gotthold, 377
+Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 249
+Lewis, C. I., 149-150, 152, 158, 16g,
+185 п.18, 258, 275 п.16
+Locke, John, 3-4, 6, 9, 27, 32-33,
+48-50,71, 137-154, 159-161, 163,
+165П, 187, 213-214, 229, 236, 249,
+253П, 255, 262-263, 328 1.13
+Lovejoy, A. O., 39 n.6, 52n
+Lycan, William, 79n, 120nn
+McCulloch, Warren S., 240 1.27
+McDowell, John, 204n
+McKeon, Richard, xii
+McRae, Robert, 48 n.17, 61 n.32
+Machiavelli, Niccolò, 133n
+Macintyre, Alasdair, 345, 358 n.1
+Malcolm, Norman, 7, 53n, 63n,
+213-216,230,232, 235, 239,242
+Malebranche, Nicolas, 64
+Mandelbaum, Maurice, 113n, 132n
+Marcuse, Herbert, 329n
+Maritain, Jacques, 113n
+Marx, Karl, 249, 264, 329n, 379,
+386
+materialism, 17-19, 36, 82-84, 86,
+95, 105, 113-125,379
+Matson, Wallace, 47, 50 n.21
+Matthews, Gareth, 5In
+Mauthner, Fritz, 135
+meaning-change, 270-274, 316n
+Meehl, Paul, 124n
+Mill, J. S., 165, 308, 363
+mind: as consciousness, 34-38, 48
+п.17, 51-56, 58, 61, 69, 126, 218;
+as modeled on universals, 30-32;
+as personhood, 34-38, 123, 127,
+218; as reason, 34-38, 43-44, 53-
+
+54, 61-62, 67, 125-125, 247-248;
+as separate substance, 4, 17, 50
+п.21, 52, 53л, 56, 62-64, 66-68,
+125-126; as the functional, 21,
+26-27,32; as the immaterial, 20,
+24, 26-28, 31-32, 40-41, 45, 67,
+239,346; as the indubitably
+knowable, 29, 48 n.18, 54-56,
+58-59, 62, 69, 77, 80-81, дб, 218;
+as the intentional, 22-27, 35-36,
+54n, 6g; as the nonspatial, 17-21,
+27. 35.52-54, 62-63, 65-66, 68; as
+the phenomenal, 22-24, 28-32,
+55, 6g
+mind-stuff, 17-18, 20-21, 30-31, 63,
+66. See also mind as separate
+substance
+mirror-imagery, 12-13, 42n, 45,
+60 п. 32, 97, 100, 105-106, 121n,
+126-127, 163, 181, 210-211, 246,
+248, 276, 293, 295, 297-299, 302,
+309, 332-333, 336, 352, 357, 371,
+376,390, 392-393
+Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de,
+139
+Moore, G. E.., 61 n.32, 280, 306-
+308
+moral philosophy, 138, 177-178,
+190-191, 262, 269, 280-282, 291,
+300, 306-309, 332, 334-335, 341,
+364.374,376,383
+myth of the given, 95, 102n, 104-
+105, 107-108, 111-112, 169-171,
+174,180, 184, 275 п.16
+Nagel, Thomas, 28 n.4, 86n, 117n
+naturalism, 36, 166, 168, 299, 345,
+362,373,379-389
+necessary truth, 155-158, 166, 16g-
+171, 173, 175, 193, 208, 257, 376
+Nelson, B. J., 238n
+neo-dualism, 18-19, 28-31, 45, 55,
+63, 67-68,78
+neo-Kantianism, 4, 134-135, 139n,
+149, 162-165, 179, 222, 393
+Neurath, Otto, 16g
+neutral monism, 89-90, 113, 117n,
+122
+Newton, Isaac, 137-138, 325, 328,
+345,367
+Nietzsche, Friedrich, 4, 166, 36g-
+370,394
+noninferential knowledge, 92,
+102n, 106, 175
+Nous, 38-40, 43n, 45, 56-57, 6z, 65,
+68, 142, 144, 146, 156
+Oakeshott, Michael, 264, 318, 3ög
+objective-subjective distinction,
+77, дол, 333-342, 344-345, 361,
+373-379
+ocular imagery, see visual metaphors
+O'Neil, Brian, 49 n.19
+Onians, R. B., 39 n.7, 44 n.13
+Papert, Seymour, 240 n.27
+Pappas, George, 120nn
+Passmore, John, 133n, 230 n.19
+Paul, Saint, 42 n.10, 44, 60
+Peirce, C. S., 42 n.10, 230 n.19,
+296-297
+phenomenal properties, 22-23, 27,
+29, 34, 68, 77-88, доп, 97, 103,
+110, 116n. See also mind as the
+phenomenal
+phenomenology, 5, 8, 12, 167 1.5,
+168, 379,382
+philosophy: as general theory of
+presentation; see representa
+ion; historiography of, 191-132
+1 331, 134 П.3, 138, 148-149, 390-
+391
+philosophy of language: as first
+philosophy, 8, 134 n.4, 262-264;
+mpure, 257-258, 264-265, 270,
+288, 293, 301л, 308-30g, 335;
+399
+
+philosophy of language (cont.)
+pure, 257, 259, 261, 265, 293, 299,
+3oIn, 308
+Piaget, Jean, 249
+Pitcher, George, 22-23, 66n, 84 n.5,
+105,156
+Plato, 32-33, 41, 43-44, 46, 53n, 58,
+73, 1050, 149, 155-150, 179, 222,
+242,257, 307-308, 310, 334, 337,
+339, 360, 369 п.15, 370, 374, 377-
+378,384, 389,391,394
+Plotinus, 45, 307
+Polanyi, Michael, 225, 227, 328
+n.12
+Popkin, Richard, 95n, 113n, I40n
+pragmatism, 11, 176, 178, 195, 265-
+266, 308, 311, 317, 334, 381
+Prichard, H. L., 49 n.18, 142
+psychology, 165, 203, 210, 213-256
+Putnam, Hilary, 7, 26, 100n, 18g
+п. 21, 1957, 243, 255, 258л, 259,
+262-26g, 265, 271n, 273, 276-285,
+289-291, 294-299, 308-309, 311,
+340-341
+Quine, W.V.O., xiii, 7, 11, 102n,
+117, 1190, 149, 167, 169-175, 177
+182, 192-204, 207-209, 213, 217-
+230, 236 п. 22, 245, 252, 259, 261,
+265, 268-270, 275-276, 299, 315,
+335, 355 n.24
+Randall, J. H., 41 n.8, 49 n.19, 51n
+Ratke, Heinrich, 150 n.29
+raw feels, 24, 35-36, 66-68, 77-103,
+107-108, 182, 184, 186, 190, 192
+realism, 265-266, 273-296, 298-299,
+310-311, 325, 340,342, 354, 382,
+386
+reference, 7, 118-119, 192, 195-199,
+211,257, 265-295; versus
+"talking about," 28g-293, 300n
+Reid, Thomas, 47 n.15, 6о n.32,
+142, 144 1.22, 145, 3-8 1.13
+400
+Reinhold, Ernst, 134n
+relativism, 13, 166 n.2, 178-179,
+196,276,279, 306-311, 317,326,
+367,373-379
+representation, philosophy as a
+general theory of, 3, 6, 9, 11,
+371, 381-382, 392
+Robinson, J.A.T., 44 n.13
+Robinson, William S., 186n
+Rosenberg, Jay, 179n, 296-298
+Rosenthal, David, 120nn
+Royce, Josiah, 52, 54, 165
+Russell, Bertrand, 4, 7-8, 112, 161,
+166-16g, 172-173, 258-259, 263,
+269, 369, 390
+Ryle, Gilbert, 7, 18, 31, 5ın, 66-67,
+99, 101-102, 112-113, 143, 167
+n5, 185 п.18, 210, 213-215, 218,
+230-233. 235,239, 242, 328 n. 13
+Santayana, George, 367
+de Santillana, Giorgio, 328 n.12
+Sartre, Jean-Paul, 11, 167, 346-347,
+361, 363, 366, 373, 375-376, 380,
+386
+Savitt, Steven, 120 n.23
+Scheffler, Israel, 275 n.16, 326-327
+scheme-content distinction, 259,
+265,272,295,299, 301-302, 304,
+309,325
+Schneewind, J. B., 191n
+Searle, John R., 288-292
+self-deception, 5, 9, 11, 13, 373,
+377,378,383
+Sellars, Wilfrid, xili, 7, 10, 25, 27,
+49 n. 18, 54n, gon, 101 n.11,
+10g 1.16, 124n, 141-143, 157,
+167-188, 191n, 192, 196, 204, 209,
+213, 218-220, 236, 243, 253, 265,
+2711, 275-276, 279, 287, 296-299,
+3011, 315, 381-302, 389-390, 392
+Sextus Empiricus, 223
+Shaffer, Jerome, 63n
+Shakespeare, William, 42
+
+Sikora, Richard, 120 n.23
+skepticism, 6, 46, 49 n.19, 94-95,
+113-114, 139-140, 144, 166 n.2,
+181, 213, 229, 246-247, 294,309,
+311; about other minds, 94-96,
+98, 100, 104, 106-114, 276л
+Skinner, B. F., 210, 213
+Smart, J.J.C., 7, 31, 113, 115, 117
+Snell, Bruno, 39 n.7
+social practice, 9-10, 96, 99, 103,
+122, 170-171, 174-175, 177-178,
+186-188, 192, 262, 365, 372, 374,
+377,385,390
+Socrates, 179, 281
+solipsism, 94, 107-108, 191
+Sophists, The, 157
+Spencer, Herbert, 367
+Spiegelberg, Herbert, 167 n.5
+Spinoza, Benedictus de, 18, 35, 60,
+64,113,132,1331, 263
+Stough, Charlotte, 46 n.14
+Stout, Jeffrey, xiv
+Strawson, P. F., 18, 20, 63, 73, 109,
+117,138,149-152, 158, 175n,
+179n, 279, 288-292
+Stroud, Barry, 305 n.39
+subjectivity, see objectivesubjective distinction
+Suppe, Fred, 271n
+systematic philosophy, 5, 11, 367-
+370,383,385,387.394
+Tarski, Alfred, 259, 280, 287, 294,
+30In, 303-304, 308
+Taylor, Charles, 345, 350-352
+Tennemann, Gottlieb, 133n
+Theunissen, Michael, 381 n.21
+Thompson, Frank, 124n
+Tiedemann, Dietrich, 133n
+topic-neutrality, 115-118, 121, 276
+translation, indeterminacy of, 182,
+192, 194-209
+Urmson, J. O., 225 n.37
+Vaihinger, Hans, 135nn
+values, see fact-value distinction
+van Peursen, C. A., 39 n.7,
+44 1.13
+Vendler, Zeno, 251-252
+verificationism, 259, 265, 305,
+309-311
+Versényi, Laszlo, 157n
+visual metaphors, 11, 13, 28, 38-39,
+41, 50, 60 п.32, 93, 101, 105,
+143-144, 146, 157-159,162-163,
+181,371, 375-376
+Wahl, Jean, 49 n.18
+Wallace, John, goin
+Warnock, G. J., 134 n.3
+Weber, Max, 36gn
+Weiss, Paul, xiii
+West, Donald J., 215 n.z
+Whitehead, Alfred North, 113,
+1177
+Williams, Michael, xiv, 141 n.17,
+253n, 276n
+Wilson, Margaret, 55-56, 59 n.30
+Wilson, N. L., 27In
+Winch, Peter, 216
+Wisdom, John, 228
+Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 5-7, 9-13,
+25,27,32,34, 69, 100, 103-104,
+109-111, 113, 136, 162, 167 п.3,
+16g, 174, 185 п.18, 186, 188л,
+204, 210, 213, 215, 221, 228-230,
+257, 264-265, 295, 303, 305, 322,
+343. 367-369, 371-372, 382, 393-
+394
+Wolff, Robert Paul, 153 1.35
+Yeats, W. B., 359n
+Yolton, John, 49 n.1g, 51n, 60
+n.32, 10g
+Zeller, Edouard, 133-136, 139n, 222
+401
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/a7f183b6ca9f26a0e977a93921cba36e713fc2ed16138bf6e12e2ce468efd0b9.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/a7f183b6ca9f26a0e977a93921cba36e713fc2ed16138bf6e12e2ce468efd0b9.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3974948eefddb328d1d7f9dfe7a5011395977c87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/a7f183b6ca9f26a0e977a93921cba36e713fc2ed16138bf6e12e2ce468efd0b9.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -11952,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "a7f183b6ca9f26a0e977a93921cba36e713fc2ed16138bf6e12e2ce468efd0b9",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 2444,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "100af1abc4acd1ebf1294e2655afb9a0d7027d68f2b990414e1d00fa42cb6a41",
+  "output_sha256": "f01deb57d1248c84d8569d5b1e10947e0353ba9b0269cd2ab0368facf6895e03",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/b5f2660d81cf65f4e541de6b68dc0702120e5702a8c8b5a462d12fab847207c4.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/b5f2660d81cf65f4e541de6b68dc0702120e5702a8c8b5a462d12fab847207c4.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e2c9d9d164e09ae3bed2d4a0fa05ce20881d199e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/b5f2660d81cf65f4e541de6b68dc0702120e5702a8c8b5a462d12fab847207c4.md
@@ -0,0 +1,7384 @@
+Marlin Heidegger
+The
+Question
+Concerning
+Technology
+and Other Essays
+Translated and with
+an Introduction by
+William Lovitt
+HARPER TORCHBOOKS < 78.1982.
+
+The Question
+Concerning Technology
+& and Other Essays 35
+MARTIN HEIDEGGER
+Translated and with an Introduction by
+WILLIAM LOVITT
+GARLAND PUBLISHING, INC.
+New York & London
+1977
+
+THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS. English translation
+copyright © 1977 by Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved.
+Printed in the United States of America. No part of this book may be used
+or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except
+in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For
+information address Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 10 East 53rd Street,
+New York, N.Y. 10022. Published simultaneously in Canada by Fitzhenry &
+Whiteside Limited, Toronto.
+Designed by Eve Callahan
+This edition published by arrangement with Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
+LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA
+Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976.
+The question concerning technology, and other essays.
+Translations of essays which originally appeared in
+Die Technik und die Kehre, Holzwege, and Vorträge und
+Aufsätze.
+CONTENTS: The question concerning technology.—The
+turning.—The word of Nietzsche: "God is dead". [etc.]
+1. Ontology-Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Technology-Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Title.
+B3279.H48Q47 1977
+193 77-87181
+ISBN 0-8240-2427-3
+
+Contents
+PART I
+PART II
+The Word of Nietzsche: "God Is Dead"
+PART III
+vii
+ix
+xiii
+3
+36
+53
+115
+155
+
+I am greatly indebted to Professor J. Glenn Gray for initiating
+me into the demanding art of translating Heidegger and for our
+close association over the past two years, in the course of which
+his meticulous reviewing of my translations for this volume has
+rescued me from many dangers but left me largely free to build
+my own way.
+To Professor Gray, as well as to Professor Heidegger himself,
+I owe thanks for access to the unpublished transcripts of two
+seminars conducted by Heidegger in France: "Séminaire tenu par
+le Professeur Heidegger sur le Differenzschrift de Hegel" and
+"Séminaire tenu au Thor en septembre 1969 par le Professeur
+Martin Heidegger." The latter has helped provide the perspective
+for my Introduction, and both have enhanced my understanding
+of the five essays included here.
+Those on the faculty and staff at California State University,
+Sacramento, who have helped and supported me in my work on
+this volume are too numerous to be acknowledged each individually, but I am particularly grateful to my colleague in German,
+Professor Olaf K. Perfler, for hours of intense conversation in
+which many secrets of the German idiom were revealed to me.
+To Moira Neuterman, who was my typist from the beginning
+of this project almost to the last, and to Mary Ellyn McGeary,
+
+vili
+her successor, are due my special thanks for exceptional skill and
+Every page of this book owes its final shaping in very large
+measure to the imaginative and rigorous scrutiny of my wife,
+Dr. Harriet Brundage Lovitt, who, though trained in another
+discipline, has now become indisputably a scholar and interpreter
+of Heidegger in her own right.
+WILLIAM LovItT
+
+The essays in this book were taken with Heidegger's permission
+from three different volumes of his works: Die Technik und die
+Kehre (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1962); Holzwege (Frankfurt:
+Vittorio Klostermann, 1952); and Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1954). "The Question Concerning Technology" is contained in both Die Technik und die Kehre and
+Vorträge und Aufsätze.
+In Die Technik und die Kehre the following prefatory note
+appears regarding the two essays, "The Question Concerning
+Technology" ("Die Frage nach der Technik") and "The Turning"
+("'Die Kehre"):
+Under the title "Insight into That Which Is," the author gave, on
+December 1, 1949, in the Club at Bremen, four lectures, which were
+repeated without alterations in the spring of 1950 (March 25 and
+26) at Bühlerhöhe. The titles were "The Thing ["Das Ding"], "En-
+framing" ["Das Gestell"], "The Danger" ["Die Gefahr"], "The
+Turning" ["Die Kehre"].*
+The first lecture was given in an expanded version on June 6,
+1950, before the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts. (See Vorträge und
+Aufsätze, 1954, pp. 163 ff.)†
+* Throughout the translations in this volume parenthetical elements
+interpolated by me are shown in brackets, while those present in the
+author's original text are given in parentheses.
++ "The Thing" has been published in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans.
+Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 165-186.
+
+The second lecture was given on November 18, 1955, also in an
+expanded version, under the title "The Question Concerning Technology," in the series entitled "The Arts in the Technological Age."
+(See Vorträge und Aufsätze, 1954, pp. 13 ff.). The present volume
+repeats this text unaltered.
+The third lecture remains still unpublished.
+The fourth lecture, "The Turning," is published here for the first
+time according to the first unaltered version.
+At the end of Holzwege Heidegger makes the following observations concerning "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God Is Dead' "
+(''Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot' ") and "The Age of the World
+Picture ("Die Zeit des Weltbildes"):
+"The Word of Nietzsche: 'God Is Dead' ": The major portions were
+delivered repeatedly in 1943 for small groups. The content is based
+upon the Nietzsche lectures that were given between 1936 and 1940
+during five semesters at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau.
+These set themselves the task of understanding Nietzsche's thinking
+as the consummation of Western metaphysics from out of Being.
+"The Age of the World Picture": The lecture was given on June
+9, 1938, under the title "The Establishing by Metaphysics of the
+Modern World Picture," as the last of a series that was arranged by
+the Society for Aesthetics, Natural Philosophy, and Medicine at
+Freiburg im Breisgau, and which had as its theme the establishing
+of the modern world picture. The appendixes were written at the
+same time but were not delivered.
+Of all the essays in Holzwege Heidegger remarks:
+In the intervening time these pieces have been repeatedly revised
+and, in some places, clarified. In each case the level of reflection and
+the structure have remained, and so also, together with these, has
+the changing use of language.
+And at the end of Vorträge und Aufsätze Heidegger gives the
+following notes:
+"The Question Concerning Technology" ["Die Frage nach der
+Technik"]: Lecture held on November 18, 1955, in the main auditorium of the Technische Hochschule, Munich, in the series "The
+Arts in the Technological Age," arranged by the Bavarian Academy
+of Fine Arts under the leadership of President Emil Preetorius;
+published in volume III of the Yearbook of the Academy (ed. Clemens Graf Podewils), R. Oldenbourg, Munich, 1954, pp. 70 ff.
+
+xi
+"Science and Reflection" ["Wissenschaft und Besinnung"]: Lecture,
+in its present version given in August, 1954, before a small group,
+in preparation for the above-mentioned conference in Munich.
+WILLIAM LOVITT
+Sacramento, California
+
+To read Heidegger is to set out on an adventure. The essays in
+this volume-intriguing, challenging, and often baffling the
+reader—call him always to abandon all superficial scanning and
+to enter wholeheartedly into the serious pursuit of thinking.
+Every philosopher demands to be read in his own terms. This
+is especially true of Heidegger. One must not come to him with
+ready-made labels, although these are very often given. Thus
+Heidegger is not an "existentialist." He is not concerned centrally
+or exclusively with man. Rather he is centrally concerned with
+the relation between man and Being, with man as the openness
+to which and in which Being presences and is known. Heidegger
+is not a "determinist." He does not believe that man's actions
+are completely controlled by forces outside him or that man has
+no effective freedom. To Heidegger man's life does indeed lie
+under a destining sent from out of Being. But to him that destining can itself call forth a self-orienting response of man that is
+real and is a true expression of human freedom. Again, Heidegger
+is not a "mystic." He does not describe or advocate the experiencing of any sort of oneness with an absolute or infinite. For
+him both man and Being are finite, and their relationship never
+dissolves in sheer oneness. Hence absolute, infinite, or the One
+can appear to him only as abstractions of man's thinking, and
+not as realities of essential power.
+
+xiv
+Heidegger is not a "primitive" or a "romantic." He is not one
+who seeks escape from the burdens and responsibilities of contemporary life into serenity, either through the re-creating of
+some idyllic past or through the exalting of some simple experience. Finally, Heidegger is not a foe of technology and
+science. He neither disdains nor rejects them as though they
+were only destructive of human life.
+The roots of Heidegger's thinking lie deep in the Western
+philosophical tradition. Yet that thinking is unique in many of
+its aspects, in its language and in its literary expression. In the
+development of his thought Heidegger has been taught chiefly
+by the Greeks, by German idealism, by phenomenology, and by
+the scholastic theological tradition. These and other elements
+have been fused by his genius of sensitivity and intellect into
+very individual philosophical expression.
+In approaching Heidegger's work the reader must ask not only
+what he says, but how he says it. For here form and content are
+inextricably united. The perceptive reader will find at hand in
+the literary form of each one of these essays many keys to unlock its meaning. He will also find the content of each continually
+shaping for itself forms admirably suited to its particular expression.
+For Heidegger true thinking is never an activity performed in
+abstraction from reality. It is never man's ordering of abstractions simply in terms of logical connections. Genuine thinking is,
+rather, man's most essential manner of being man. Rigorously
+demanding and but rarely attained, it manifests the relation between man and Being. In true thinking man is used by Being,
+which needs man as the openness that provides the measure and
+the bounds for Being's manifesting of itself in whatever is. Man
+in thinking is called upon to lend a helping hand to Being. In-
+deed, Heidegger can refer to thinking as handcraft. As such,
+thinking is man's fundamental responding to whatever offers
+itself to him. Informed by recollection, it brings forth into awareness and efficacy whatever is presented to it to know. It is the
+caretaking hand that receives and holds and shapes everything
+that truly comes to be and to be known. Through that receiving
+and shaping of whatever is present, thinking, as belonging to
+
+XV
+and needed by Being, cooperates in the handing out of limits
+and the setting of bounds.
+Here Being is in no sense to be thought of as an entity of some
+sort. Nor is it to be simply identified with any element or aspect
+or totality of the reality that we ordinarily know. Rather Being
+is the Being of whatever is. Ruling in whatever is, yet transcending and governing the latter in the particularity of its presencing,
+Being may perhaps best be said to be the ongoing manner in
+which everything that is, presences; i.e., it is the manner in which,
+in the lastingness of time, everything encounters man and comes
+to appearance through the openness that man provides. Hence
+for Heidegger Being is the very opposite of an abstraction
+fashioned by human thought. Rather it is "what is given to
+thinking to think." True thinking should not concern itself with
+some arcane and hidden meaning, but with "something lying
+near, that which lies nearest," which, in virtue of that very
+nearness, man's thinking can readily fail to notice at all (WN
+111).* Being rules in whatever is—in the particular and in the
+far-ranging complexity of the whole-thereby constantly approaching and concerning man. "In the 'is,' " spoken of anything
+real whatever, "'Being' is uttered" (T 46).
+Being manifests itself continually anew. In keeping with this,
+thinking can never be for Heidegger a closed system. Rather it
+is the traveling of a road. Each thinker goes along a way that is
+peculiarly his own. In a fundamental sense it is the way and not
+the individual that assembles what is thought, that provides
+bounds and lets everything stand in relation to everything else.
+Heidegger's writings exemplify this centrality of the way for
+* The five essays in this volume are referred to in the Introduction and
+in the footnotes with the following symbols:
+QT: "The Question Concerning Technology"
+T: "The Turning"
+WN: "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God Is Dead'"
+AWP: "The Age of the World Picture"
+SR: "Science and Reflection"
+The abbreviation
+"Pr. Iden." refers to the essay "The Principle of Identity,"
+in Heidegger's Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York:
+Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 23 ff. In all quotations from this work slight
+modifications of the translation have been made. "Sem" refers to the unpublished transcript of the "Séminaire tenu au Thor en septembre 1969 par
+le Professeur Martin Heidegger."
+
+×vi
+him. Characteristically he writes essays, excursions of thought.
+Each of the five essays in the present volume is of this nature.
+The five center around the theme of technology and the modern
+age, yet in reading each of them we travel a particular path. Each
+is distinctive and self-contained, and must be read in and for
+itself. In each, innumerable details of word and phrase and structure at once both arise from and reveal what Heidegger is saying.
+Heidegger is primarily a teacher. He does not wish to travel
+alone and then report what he has seen, nor does he wish to go
+as a guide merely pointing out objects along the road. He wishes
+the reader to accompany him on the way, to participate with him,
+and even to begin to build his own way through thinking, and
+not merely to hear about what it is or should be.
+Being approaches and concerns us in whatever is, yet Being
+characteristically conceals itself even in so doing. Hence thinking
+cannot readily find it out. The way through thinking to that place
+where man can open himself to the ruling of Being is difficult. It leads often through unfamiliar and even perilous country.
+We modern men are far from that open clearing. We are trapped
+and blinded by a mode of thought that insists on grasping reality
+through imposed conceptual structures. We cannot and will not
+come to that place where we can let what is, be. We do not perceive that the way by which true thinking proceeds can itself
+prove to be the source of that unity which we, often frenziedly,
+strive after in our philosophy, in our science, and in every aspect
+of our activity.
+In order to prepare us truly to think, Heidegger, in keeping
+with the best speculative tradition, often carries us beyond our
+facile conceiving to seek the ground of our thinking. But he does
+more. He confronts us repeatedly with an abyss. For he strives
+to induce us to leap to new ground, to think in fresh ways.
+Hence, again and again, as we travel with him through these
+essays some precipice will confront us. One must often clamber
+through dark sayings and scale absurdities if one would follow
+on these paths. This is a daunting prospect. Yet Heidegger has
+hope for those who go with him. For the ground he seeks to
+achieve belongs fundamentally to man as man. Hence he calls
+each of us who reads to come and find it out.
+
+×vii
+Heidegger's writing is intrinsically sequential, always moving in
+some particular direction. Therefore one must discover meaning
+as one moves forward. One must experience the turnings of these
+paths just where they happen. No element can properly be excerpted and considered in isolation, and none can properly be
+left out of account; for each element plays its part in the forward
+movement. Words and sentences must always be read in context
+if one hopes to apprehend the meaning that they bear.
+In this building forward of thinking there is always a pattern.
+Sometimes it is closely and intricately woven, as in "The Turning." Sometimes, as in "The Question Concerning Technology"
+or "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God Is Dead,' " it is far-ranging,
+involving long, complex discussions whose interconnections can
+be hard to discern. At times bewilderment may seize even the
+thoughtful reader. Yet he must remember that, on each particular
+path, Heidegger himself never loses his way and never forgets
+in what direction he is going. He never abandons the sequence
+of his themes, never forgets what he has previously said, and
+never forsakes the pattern of his work. Everything fits, often
+with great precision, into that pattern. For Heidegger is always
+working out of the wholeness provided by the delimiting way
+pursued.
+Heidegger must build and is content to build finitely. However intricate the relationships to be expressed, however manifold the given meaning, he must set forth one facet at a time.
+There is tremendous rigor in his work. Therefore he makes great
+demands on those who follow him. Yet the reader who perseveres
+may hope to experience the excitement of discovery as he finds
+himself intimately engaged in the pursuit of thinking
+Because Heidegger is eager that the reader should follow him
+and sensible that the way is hard, again and again he speaks so
+as to evoke a response that will carry his companion forward.
+Often at some key point he will ask a question, seeking to force
+the reader to come to grips with what is being said, to think, to
+reply, and then to listen for an answer that will send the discussion forward: "Does this mean that man, for better or worse, is
+helplessly delivered over to technology?" (T 37). "In what does
+the essence of modern science lie?" (AWP 117). "What is hap-
+
+xvill
+pening to Being?" (WN 104). When we come upon such questions we must listen alertly. A question may be answered in an
+immediately ensuing sentence, or its answer may emerge only
+after an involved exposition. But an answer will come. And it
+will be important to the whole discussion.
+Sometimes Heidegger speaks with sharp emphasis, to indicate
+that a point must be heard: "never can it be sufficiently
+stressed
+..." (SR 160), "a confrontation with Christendom is
+absolutely not in any way ...
+" (WN 64), "never does the Being
+of that which is consist...
+" (AWP 130). Such words demand
+our closest attention.
+Again, Heidegger has many devices for catching the reader up
+and jolting him from his habitual frame of mind. "But where
+have we strayed to?" he will ask, after a sequence of thought has
+drawn to an expected conclusion (QT 12). Or he will interject
+some sharp assertion: "for centuries we have acted as though
+the doctrine of the four causes had fallen from heaven as a truth
+as clear as daylight" (QT 6)—and he thereby calls in question
+our unconsidered assumptions. At one point he will echo what
+we are thinking, only to amplify it with a word that moves it
+into another dimension: Yes, the instrumental definition of technology is "correct"; it is "indeed so uncannily correct"-and the
+word "uncanny," even if forgotten, hangs over the portrayal of
+the skeletal power into whose domain we look in words that
+eventually follow (QT 5, 19 ff.). At another point he will thrust
+at the foundations of our thinking with a quick reversal of
+thought, hoping to dislodge us and bring us to new ground:
+"Modern physics is called mathematical because, in a remarkable way, it makes use of a quite specific mathematics. But it
+can proceed mathematically in this way only because, in a deeper
+sense, it is already itself mathematical" (AWP 118) —and we are
+compelled to ask, What is he saying with this puzzling assertion?
+Sometimes such thrusts are all but beyond our comprehension:
+"The essence of technology is by no means anything technological" (QT 4); "Physics as physics can make no assertions
+about physics" (SR 176). Such words may even, when heard
+superficially, sound like mere cleverness or arrogant nonsense.
+More seriously confronted, such statements may fairly halt the
+reader in dismay and exasperation. "I know this man must be
+
+xix
+wrong," he may protest, "if he says that the essence of technology has nothing to do with technology. He can't be saying
+that. But what is he saying? I am willing to do as I was asked, to
+follow, to question, to build a way. But what can I do with an
+opaque statement like that? "The essence of technology is by no
+means anything technological'!" Yet in such opaque statements
+the meaning of the way is often most deeply lodged. Again the
+reader has been forced to ask, to look for the ranges of meaning
+within seemingly familiar words. Never should it be thought
+that at such junctures Heidegger is merely playing with words.
+For him, rather, language plays with us. The swiftly turned
+phrase is not a roadblock. It is another, if enigmatic, signpost.
+It is a statement opaque only by reason of fullness, intended to
+guide the reader forward in search of the meaning that it bodies
+forth.
+Access to the way to which Heidegger wishes to introduce us,
+the way to thinking and to a free relationship with Being, lies
+through language. For thinking is man's according with and
+responding to Being, and "language is the primal dimension" in
+which that responsive corresponding takes place (T 41).
+Heidegger has a poet's ear for language and often writes in
+a poetic way. For him the proper function of words is not to
+stand for, to signify. Rather, words point to something beyond
+themselves. They are translucent bearers of meaning. To name a
+thing is to summon it, to call it toward one. Heidegger's words
+are rich in connotation. Once inclined to invent words to carry
+needed meanings, he has more recently become concerned with
+the rehabilitation of language, with the restoring of its original,
+now obliterated force.
+Repeatedly he tells us of the ancient and fundamental meanings of words, carefully setting forth nuances or tracing historical
+changes that took place as thought passed from one language to
+another. Our word "technology," we learn, rests back upon the
+Greek techne. Our "cause," from the Latin causa, translates the
+Greek aition, which has a very different meaning. "Essence,"
+"theory," "reflection," the "real" —word after word is searched
+out to its roots and defined and used according to its latent
+meanings. In all this Heidegger is of course no mere antiquarian.
+
+XX
+He has said that language is the house of Being. The reciprocal
+relation between Being and man is fulfilled through language.
+Hence to seek out what language is, through discovering what
+was spoken in it when it first arose and what has been and can
+be heard in it thereafter, is in fact to seek out that relationship.
+It is to endeavor to place oneself where the utterance of Being
+may be heard and expressed.
+Heidegger chooses—he himself might say "discovers" —words
+that are as expressive as possible. Often he defines them with
+great precision. Sometimes he points out facets of meaning that
+are clearly present in a German word, as in verschulden (to be
+responsible or indebted), wirken (to work or bring about), or
+besinnen (to reflect; from sinnen, to scent out or sense) QT 7;
+SR 159, 180). Sometimes he presses a word forward to encompass new meanings that he hears within it, as with Bestand (stock,
+now become standing-reserve), or Gestell (frame, now become
+Enframing), or Geschick (fate, now become the self-adaptive
+destining of Being) (QT 17, 19, 24; T 37-38).
+Heidegger's use of words is very often peculiar to himself. It
+is characteristically demanding and often strange to our thought.
+The words that meet us in his essays are not intended to mystify
+his readers or to attract devotees who will facilely repeat esoteric
+speech. Yet Heidegger is acutely aware that his words may well
+be seized upon and used in just such ways: we must, he says,
+keep from "hastily recasting the language of the thinker in the
+coin of a terminology," immediately repeating some new and
+impressive word "instead of devoting all our efforts to thinking
+through what has been said."]
+Since words are in no sense abstractions, but rather show the
+Being of that of which they speak, Heidegger can and does
+employ them variously so as to bring out particular aspects of
+their meaning at particular points. But he uses them consistently
+according to his understanding of the meaning that they carry;
+and nuances that fall away at any given time nevertheless always
+remain alive and must be continually heard. We must read
+Heidegger's definitions and study his ways of using words with
+care. For these alone, and not our own preconceptions and ingrained notions of meaning, will tell us what words like "truth"
+1. "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics," in Identity and
+Difference, pp. 73-74.
+
+xXI
+or "essence" or "technology" or "metaphysics" are conveying
+here.
+In this situation the non-German reader is of course at a
+peculiar disadvantage. A translator is inexorably forced to choose
+among many aspects of connotation for word upon word and to
+recast sentence after sentence into a very different mold. Parallel
+words and even rather lengthy phrases have sometimes been
+used here to render single German words in order to display
+adequately their breadth of meaning. Every attempt has been
+made to maintain consistency in the translation of given words
+and to mirror as faithfully as possible the inner emphases of
+construction resident in the German text. Yet despite all such
+efforts, the evocative power of the original word, as often of the
+original stress and turn of phrase, can scarcely be preserved for
+the English-speaking reader. In these essays, footnotes and citations of the original German have been provided to help the
+reader at crucial points. The essays have been translated with
+care, and it is hoped that much of Heidegger's meaning lies within
+these pages, even though the fullness of the original German
+must be lacking. It goes without saying that anyone who wishes
+to know Heidegger's work well must read and study the German
+text.
+When all this has been said, it must be added that the first
+problem of the reader of this English volume is apt to lie, not in
+the fact that he is reading Heidegger in translation, but in the
+fact that in reading Heidegger he is encountering words that he
+must learn to let come to him with fresh meaning. Definition
+and context remain to give considerable aid. Moreover, even in
+the language of translation the expressiveness of many of Heidegger's words can reach us with genuine power. If we can learn,
+with whatever difficulty, to think truth as unconcealment or
+essence as the manner in which something endures in coming to
+presence; if we can let words like "technology" or "destining"
+or "danger" sound with the meaning Heidegger intends, then
+something of that power will be present for us.
+Very often Heidegger uses words that point to realities or relations beyond those of which they immediately speak. On occassion a pair of words will be found, each of which, if we are
+truly listening, more or less clearly suggests and reenforces the
+other. Words like "unconcealing" and "concealing" "pres-
+
+XXiI
+encing" and "withdrawing," are intended variously to act in this
+way. More importantly, such words, like many others, also have
+a two-wayness that permits them to point at once to Being and to
+man. Thus "presencing" and "revealing" speak simultaneously
+of a moving into presence or unconcealment and of one toward
+whom that movement takes place, while "concealing" and "withdrawing" tell of a movement away and remind of one who is
+being deprived of that which might be present or revealed.
+Often this breadth of expressiveness possessed by Heidegger's
+language can help the attentive reader to make his way through
+difficult passages. In "The Turning," for example, throughout
+the especially difficult sequence in which we are told of what
+comes to pass in the turning of the danger that is the essence of
+technology, almost no overt allusion is made to the role of man
+(T 41-47). That role is set forth in the opening pages of the
+essay (pp. 36-41), but it could easily be let slip from view as the
+reader follows the intricate discussion. Throughout that very
+discussion, however, a whole series of words-"light," "inflashing," "glance," "insight"—appears. And these can serve to
+remind one of a lighting up that both shines forth and is seen.
+These words speak specifically of what happens in the turning
+within Being itself. But they also sustain for us, if but hiddenly,
+the memory of man's necessary involvement in what is coming
+to pass, until the human role is again taken up and brought
+forward (T 47).
+Heidegger makes particular use of prepositions and adverbs,
+standing either alone or as components of verbs, to speak thus
+of fundamental relations, even when those relations themselves
+are not under discussion. Such words as "into," "from out of,"
+"toward," "forth," "out," and "hither" will be met with frequently in these pages. They should be carefully noted, for they
+can embody with peculiar force the apprehension of reality out
+of which Heidegger is speaking.
+Poet that he is, Heidegger often speaks the same words again
+and again and again. Repetition gives emphasis. A word introduced at one point and then taken up only later into full discussion gains in richness through that early introduction, for its
+presence threads all but unnoticed through the pattern of intervening thought. The same phrases are used now, then used again;
+
+xxiii
+yet they are not really the same. The later phrase is always fuller
+in meaning by reason of all that has been said since its words
+were first spoken. This cumulative power of repetition can be
+seen strikingly when Heidegger returns at the close of an essay
+to words and themes that sound toward its beginning (cf. T,
+WN). Such words speak with new eloquence when we find them
+thus at the conclusion of an arduous path.
+Above all, the reader must not grow deaf to Heidegger's words;
+he must not let their continual repetition or their appearance in
+all but identical phrases lull him into gliding effortlessly on,
+oblivious to the subtle shifts and gatherings of meaning that are
+constantly taking place.
+A number of terms that we have used thus far point to fundamental characteristics in Heidegger's thinking that must become
+integral to one's own outlook if one would enter into and gain
+some understanding of his work. We have spoken of the "way"
+that "assembles" and relates things to one another. We have
+alluded to "wholeness," to "pattern," to the expressing of facets
+of thought in finite "sequence." We have discussed the "twowayness" of particular words, and the "richness of connotation"
+inherent in Heidegger's language generally. All these are but
+particular manifestations of a thinking that is essentially inclusive and essentially rooted in the discerning of relations. On the
+ground where Heidegger moves, reality does not appear as composed of discrete elements or aspects that are linked by cause
+and effect connections. For Heidegger thinking is not primarily
+deductive, although he often shows himself to be a master at
+elucidating the implications of a statement or thought. For him
+the primary question to be asked is always how and never why.
+His is descriptive and evocative thinking, in the sense that it tells
+us of what is and of what is taking place, and seeks to bring it
+before us. The reality described is manifold. Aspects impinge
+upon one another. Movements and interactions are what must
+fundamentally be recounted.
+But these interrelations always involve some intricate unity.
+The inherence of something in something else or the manifestation in the present of what has long been present, the sameness
+of various and even opposite manifestations or the oneness of
+
+XXIV
+subtly diverse occurrences-such things are here to be met with
+at every turn.
+Once more the reader may be tempted to say, "What nonsense!" One should be wary, however, of leaping hastily to any
+such conclusion. So pervasively does unitive, relational thinking
+inform every aspect of Heidegger's work that one who dismissed
+such thinking out of hand would risk extinguishing for himself
+any hope of understanding what Heidegger is saying. The reader
+must in fact become so alert to inclusive complexities of thought
+that he will be sensitive to their presence even when they do not
+manifestly appear.
+Heidegger, as is typical of him, is concerned in the essays
+before us with the understanding of Western history and Western thought. We ordinarily think of the modern age, "the age of
+science and technology," as one that began a few centuries ago
+and that is unquestionably new. Heidegger too can speak of a
+new departure in the modern age; yet for him to say this is to
+point at the same time to the coming into overt expression of a
+tendency whose true origin lies decisively if hiddenly in Greek
+antiquity.
+The fundamental Greek experience of reality was, Heidegger
+believes, one in which men were immediately responsive to whatever was presencing to them. They openly received whatever
+spontaneously met them (AWP 131).
+For the Greeks the coming into the "present" out of the "notpresent" was poisesis (QT 10). This "bringing forth" was manifest first of all in physis, that presencing wherein the burstingforth arose from within the thing itself. Techne was also a form
+of this bringing forth, but one in which the bursting-forth lay
+not in the thing itself but in another. In techne, through art and
+handcraft, man participated in conjunction with other contributing elements—with "matter," "aspect," and "circumscribing
+bounds"—in the bringing forth of a thing into being (QT 7-8).
+Moreover the arts of the mind were called techne also (QT 13).
+Greek man openly received and made known that which
+offered itself to him. Yet nevertheless he tended in the face of
+the onrush of the revealing of Being in all that met him to seek
+to master it. It is just this tendency toward mastery that shows
+itself in Greek philosophy. Philosophy sprang from the funda-
+
+XXV
+mental Greek experience of reality. The philosopher wondered at
+the presencing of things and, wondering, fixed upon them. (That,
+Heidegger remarks, is why Thales tumbled into a well! [Sem
+11]). The philosopher sought to grasp and consider reality, to
+discover whatever might be permanent within it, so as to know
+what it truly was. But precisely in so doing he distanced himself
+from Being, which was manifesting itself in the presencing of all
+particular beings. For in his seeking, he reached out not simply
+to receive with openness, but also to control. Here, to Heidegger's thinking, lies the real origin of the modern technological
+age. Technē was a skilled and thorough knowing that disclosed,
+that was, as such, a mode of bringing forth into presencing, a
+mode of revealing. Philosophy, as a thinking that considered
+reality and therewith made it manifest in its Being, was techne
+also in its own way. In the Western tradition, the metaphysical
+thinking born of that philosophy carried forward the expression
+of technē into modern times.
+Heidegger finds Christian theology to be wholly dominated by
+metaphysics during the centuries after the beginning of the
+Christian era. In the medieval period men were preoccupied with
+the question of how they might be in right relationship with God,
+how they might be assured of salvation, ie., how they might find
+enduring security. At the close of that period the overt theological
+undergirding of these questions fell away, but the quest for
+security remained. Man needed a new basis for his self-assurance,
+his assurance of rightness. The work of Descartes, itself an expression of the shift in men's outlook that had already taken
+place, set forth that basis in philosophical terms (WN 88-90).
+In the ego cogito [ergo] sum of Descartes, man found his selfcertainty within himself. Man's thinking (cogitare), which Heidegger says was also a "driving together" (co-agitare), was found
+to contain within itself the needed sureness. Man could represent
+reality to himself, that is, he could set it up over against himself,
+as it appeared to him, as an object of thought. In so doing, he
+felt assured at once of his own existence and of the existence of
+the reality thus conceived (AWP 131).
+It is in this that Heidegger sees the focal point for the beginning of the modern age. The tendency present in metaphysics
+from its inception here begins to come to fulfillment. Man, once
+
+xXVI
+concerned to discover and decisively to behold the truly real, now
+finds himself certain of himself; and he takes himself, in that
+self-certainty, to be more and more the determining center of
+reality.
+This stance of man in the midst of all that is bespeaks the fact
+that man has become "subject." The phenomenon of the "sub-.
+ject" is itself not new. It was present among the Greeks. But
+there subject, hypokeimenon, that-which-lies-before (for the
+Greeks, that which looms up, e.g., an island or mountain), meant
+the reality that confronted man in the power of its presence (cf:
+Sem. 7). With Descartes at the beginning of the modern period,
+this meaning of hypokeimenon, subject, was decisively transformed
+Descartes fixed his attention not on a reality beyond himself,
+but precisely on that which was present as and within his own
+consciousness. At this point human self-consciousness became
+subject par excellence, and everything that had the character of
+subject—of that-which-lies-before—came to find the locus and
+manner of its being precisely in that self-consciousness, i.e., in
+the unity of thinking and being that was established by Descartes
+in his ego cogito [ergo] sum, through which man was continually
+seeking to make himself secure. Here man became what he has
+been increasingly throughout our period. He became subject, the
+self-conscious shaper and guarantor of all that comes to him
+from beyond himself (AWP 147 ff.).
+Modern science is for Heidegger a work of man as subject in
+this sense. Modern man as scientist, through the prescribed procedures of experiment, inquires of nature to learn more and more
+about it. But in so doing he does not relate himself to nature as
+the Greek related himself to the multitudinous presencing of
+everything that met him spontaneously at every turn. He does
+not relate to nature in the openness of immediate response. For
+the scientist's "nature" is in fact, Heidegger says, a human
+construction. Science strikingly manifests the way in which
+modern man as subject represents reality. The modern scientist
+does not let things presence as they are in themselves. He arrests
+them, objectifies them, sets them over against himself, precisely
+by representing them to himself in a particular way. Modern
+theory, Heidegger says, is an "entrapping and securing refining
+
+xxvii
+of the real" (SR 167). Reality as "nature" is represented as a
+manifold of cause and effect coherences. So represented, nature
+becomes amenable to experiment. But this does not happen
+simply because nature intrinsically is of this character; rather it
+happens, Heidegger avers, specifically because man himself
+represents nature as of this character and then grasps and investigates it according to methods that, not surprisingly, fit
+perfectly the reality so conceived.
+Here, science (Wissenschaft) means any discipline or branch
+of knowledge. In speaking of science, Heidegger can refer as
+often to the discipline of history, with its representing of historical events as causal sequences, as he does to physics and its
+related disciplines with their respective ways of representing
+nature.
+The intricate system of techniques and apparatus that we call
+modern technology belongs essentially to this same realm. In
+it contemporary man's inveterate drive to master whatever confronts him is plain for all to see. Technology treats everything
+with "objectivity." The modern technologist is regularly expected, and expects himself, to be able to impose order on all
+data, to "process" every sort of entity, nonhuman and human
+alike, and to devise solutions for every kind of problem. He is
+forever getting things under control.
+Heidegger's portrayal of the beginnings of the modern age
+and of its characteristic phenomena often so sharply stresses the
+self-exalting and restrictive role of man that his thinking can
+seem not unlike that of those who unconditionally condemn
+"Cartesian abstraction" and decry the pernicious tendency of
+science and technology to cut man off from vital awareness of
+the real (AWP 118 ff., SR 169 ff.). But for Heidegger that simple
+stress never stands alone. Its seeming simplicity in fact masks
+a concomitant hidden truth that actually belies any such simplicity. Always for Heidegger-even when he most vividly describes how man as subject has brought the modern age into
+being and how he now shapes and dominates its phenomena—
+the primal relationship between man and Being lies as near at
+hand and demands as much to be taken into account as it does
+when he speaks of the ancient Greeks and of their immediate
+responsiveness to the ruling of Being in whatever was presencing
+
+xxvili
+to them. However extensively Heidegger may speak about man,
+his thinking and his doing, he never loses sight of the truth that
+"in the 'is' " of everything that is, "'Being' is uttered."
+Modern technology, like ancient technē, from which it springs
+—and like science and metaphysics, which are essentially one
+with it—is a mode of revealing. Being, through its manner of
+ruling in all that is, is manifesting itself within it.
+That which has come to fruition in Descartes and in all of us,
+his modern successors, not only took its rise long before in a
+temporal sense. It also took its rise long in advance from beyond
+man (QT 14). For in its fulfillment Heidegger sees the holdingsway of a "destining" or "sending forth" of Being, that has come
+upon man and molded him and his world (QT 24).
+In the time of the Greeks the philosophers did not simply impose categories like idea upon reality so as to make it accessible
+to themselves in the way they wished. Rather, that which everywhere met them in its Being so offered itself as to call forth their
+thought in just those ways. In the same manner, in the modern
+"Cartesian" scientific age man does not merely impose his own
+construction upon reality. He does indeed represent reality to
+himself, refusing to let things emerge as they are. He does forever catch reality up in a conceptual system and find that he
+must fix it thus before he can see it at all. But man does this both
+as his own work and because the revealing now holding sway at
+once in all that is and in himself brings it about that he should
+do so. This simultaneous juxtaposing of the destining of Being
+and the doing of man is absolutely fundamental for Heidegger's
+thinking.
+We ordinarily understand modern technology as having arisen
+subsequently to science and as subordinate to it. We consider it
+to be a phenomenon brought about through scientific advance.
+Heidegger points out that, on the contrary, modern science and
+machine technology are mutually dependent upon one another.
+More importantly, technology, in its essence, precedes and is
+more fundamental than science. This is no mere statement concerning chronological priority, for the "essence of technology"
+is the very mode of Being's revealing of itself that is holding
+sway in all phenomena of the modern age. Man's arrogation to
+himself of the role of subject in philosophy; his objectifying of
+
+xxiX
+nature, life, and history in dealing with them in the sciences;
+and his calculating and cataloguing and disposing of all manner
+of things through machine technology—all these alike are expressions of that essence and of that revealing. Technology, so
+understood, is in no sense an instrument of man's making or in
+his control. It is rather that phenomenon, ruled from out of
+Being itself, that is centrally determining all of Western history.
+Modern technology in its essence is a "challenging revealing."
+It involves a contending with everything that is. For it "sets
+upon" everything, imposing upon it a demand that seizes and
+requisitions it for use. Under the dominion of this challenging
+revealing, nothing is allowed to appear as it is in itself.
+The rule of such a way of revealing is seen when man becomes subject, when from out of his consciousness he assumes
+dominion over everything outside himself, when he represents
+and objectifies and, in objectifying, begins to take control over
+everything. It comes to its fulfillment when, as is increasingly the
+case in our time, things are not even regarded as objects, because
+their only important quality has become their readiness for use.
+Today all things are being swept together into a vast network
+in which their only meaning lies in their being available to serve
+some end that will itself also be directed toward getting everything under control. Heidegger calls this fundamentally undifferentiated supply of the available the "standing-reserve"
+(QT 17).
+The ordering of everything as standing-reserve, like objectifying itself, is once more a manifestation of a destining. It is first
+of all the bringing to fruition of a way of appearing that is given
+to everything that is, from out of Being itself. But as such, it does
+not, of course, take place simply outside of or apart from man.
+The same destining that gives this mode of appearing to whatever is also rules in him, provoking him to order everything in
+just this way, as standing-reserve. The challenging claim that
+now summons man forth, that "gathers man thither to order the
+self-revealing as standing-reserve," Heidegger calls das Ge-stell
+(Enframing) (QT 15). As "Enframing," that claim ceaselessly
+brings both men and things to take their places in the stark
+configuration that is being wrought out through ordering for use.
+This challenging summons, ruling in modern technology, is
+
+XXX
+a mode of Being's revealing of itself. Yet in it, also, Being withdraws, so that the summons that thus "enframes" is all but devoid of Being as empowering to be. Compelled by its claim,
+ordered and orderer alike are denuded. All that is and man
+himself are gripped in a structuring that exhibits a mere skeleton
+of their Being, of the way in which they intrinsically are. In all
+this the essence of technology rules.
+The dominion of Enframing as the essence of modern technology and the concomitant presence of the standing-reserve are
+most clearly seen in the realm of machine technology, where no
+object has significance in itself and where the "orderability" of
+everything, from energy and statistics to machines and persons,
+is all-important. It can be found also, Heidegger says, in the
+sphere of science, namely, in modern physics. There again, the
+object, otherwise the hallmark of the sciences, has disappeared.
+In its stead the relation between subject and object comes to the
+fore and "becomes a standing-reserve" to be controlled (SR 173).
+In metaphysics too the rule of the essence of technology appears. Perhaps rather surprisingly, Heidegger finds in Nietzsche
+the culmination of the movement of modern metaphysics begun
+in Descartes and carried forward by subsequent thinkers. Standing within the modern metaphysical outlook, Nietzsche, in asking
+concerning the reality of the real, found the will to be fundamentally determinative. The self-consciousness of the subject,
+which Descartes established as normative, is raised in Nietzsche
+to full metaphysical expression. Self-consciousness is here the
+self-consciousness of the will willing itself. The will to power,
+fundamental for Nietzsche, is no mere human willing. It is the
+mode of Being now ruling in everything that is, which must find
+accomplishment through man (WN 96-97).
+In striving ever forward in and to greater power, the will to
+power must-indeed in the most extreme manner—act in the
+very way that Heidegger finds characteristic of metaphysical
+thinking as such. In positing for itself the preservation-enhancement conditions of life that attend its own necessary advance,
+the will to power cannot and does not receive what comes to it
+and leave it to its spontaneously flowing presencing. Rather it
+must arrest it, delimit it, make it into a constant reserve, into
+that on the basis of which it itself moves forward (WN 83 ff.).
+
+xxXi
+The establishing of the conditions necessary for the will to
+power's willing of itself is thought of by Nietzsche as valuepositing
+Nietzsche designates as "nihilism" the devaluing of the transcendent values imposed on man by traditional metaphysical
+thinking; and he calls "completed nihilism" the "revaluing,"
+accomplished in his own thinking, that at once guards against a
+slipping back into those former values and provides an affirmative basis for the positing of new values. For Heidegger, Nietzsche
+actually displays in his "completed nihilism" a yet more extreme
+form of nihilism whose character he does not himself suspect.
+Despite his desire to overcome metaphysics, Nietzsche stands
+squarely in the metaphysical tradition, for he continues to think
+in terms of valuing. He can indeed take Being to be a value, a
+condition posited in the will to power for its own preservation
+and enhancement. The Being of everything, far from being a
+revealing presencing to be freely received, becomes a determinative aim in view that must lead always to some further end.
+Here self-consciousness—which as subject sets itself and everything present to it before itself, that it may make itself securecomes, in the mode of the will to power, to take disposal, in its
+value-positing, even over Being.
+It is just this thinking that is for Heidegger in the highest
+degree "nihilistic." In it Being has been degraded into a value
+(cf. WN 102-104); Being cannot be Being; i.e., the power of
+everything whatever to presence directly in its Being has been
+destroyed by a thinking that would find every aspect and characteristic of reality to be at the disposal and service of the final
+expression of the subjectness of the subject as self-securing selfconsciousness—the will to power. Nietzsche's anticipated "overman," embodying in himself the determining power once supposed to lie in the realm of transcendent values, would actualize
+this subjectness.
+In this way Heidegger sees in Nietzsche's philosophy the completion and consummation of metaphysics, and that must mean
+also the consummation of the essence of technology. Nietzsche's
+overman might be said to be technological man par excellence.
+The name "overman" does not designate an individual. Rather
+it names that humanity which, as modern humanity, is now be-
+
+xXXiI
+ginning to enter upon the consummation of the modern age (cf.
+WN 96). Overman would consciously will and would have
+dominion and disposal over all things as the one fully manifesting
+the will to power.
+Once again the thinking that degrades Being and in effect
+destroys it as Being is not a merely human doing. Indeed, Heidegger sees in the fact that Nietzsche's work, for all its bold
+newness, only brings to culmination tendencies present in metaphysics from its beginning, striking evidence that the obstructing,
+yes, the very absence, of Being in its manifestation in Western
+thinking derives from Being itself. Precisely as with the challenging revealing of Enframing, the power that, even in his highest
+metaphysical thinking, thrusts man forward as value-positing
+and hence fundamentally as "ordering for use"—and that simultaneously brings it about that nothing that is can appear as it
+is in itself, and that man must conceive and determine everything
+in this controlling way—is the very destining of Being itself
+that is holding sway more and more pervasively in the modern
+Heidegger sees every aspect of contemporary life, not only
+machine technology and science but also art, religion, and culture
+understood as the pursuit of the highest goods, as exhibiting
+clear marks of the ruling essence of technology that holds sway
+in the dominion of man as self-conscious, representing subject.
+Everywhere is to be found the juxtaposing of subject and object
+and the reliance on the experience and the evaluating judgment
+of the subject as decisive. The presencing of everything that is
+has been cut at its roots. Men speak, significantly enough, of a
+"world picture" or "world view." Only in the modern age could
+they speak so. For the phrase "world picture" means just this:
+that what is, in its entirety—i.e., the real in its every aspect and
+element—now is "taken in such a way that it first is in being and
+only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who
+represents and sets forth" (AWP 129-130, italics mine). Were
+contemporary man seriously to become aware of this character of
+his life and of his thinking, he might, with the modern physicist,
+well say, "It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself" (QT 27).
+
+xxx1İl
+Such a judgment would, however, be a delusion. Man in fact
+"can never encounter only himself" (QT 27). For man is summoned, claimed, in the challenging revealing of Enframing even
+when he knows it not, even when he thinks himself most alone
+or most dreams of mastering his world. Man's obliviousness to
+that claim is itself a manifestation of the rule of Enframing. So
+completely has he been drawn into that dominion that he is
+actually cut off from awareness of his own essence. For he is
+estranged from Being even while Being, in the self-withdrawnness of its challenging self-revealing, is so encountering him that
+he is in fact being constrained to bring about the dominion of
+that revealing—i.e., is being claimed by it. For this reason, man
+does not know himself as the one who is being brought into
+relation to Being; that is, he does not know himself as man.
+Ruled in this way, man today, despite what seems true to him,
+never encounters himself, i.e., his essence.
+Man needs above all in our age to know himself as the one
+who is so claimed. The challenging summons of Enframing
+"sends into a way of revealing" (QT 24). So long as man does
+not know this, he cannot know himself; nor can he know himself
+in relation to his world. As a consequence he becomes trapped in
+one of two attitudes, both equally vain: either he fancies that he
+can in fact master technology and can by technological means—
+by analyzing and calculating and ordering-control all aspects of
+his life; or he recoils at the inexorable and dehumanizing control
+that technology is gaining over him, rejects it as the work of the
+devil, and strives to discover for himself some other way of life
+apart from it. What man truly needs is to know the destining
+to which he belongs and to know it as a destining, as the disposing power that governs all phenomena in this technoiogical
+age.
+A destining of Being is never a blind fate that simply compels
+man from beyond himself. It is, rather, an opening way in which
+man is called upon to move to bring about that which is taking
+place. For man to know himself as the one so called upon is for
+him to be free. For Heidegger freedom is not a matter of man's
+willing or not willing particular things. Freedom is man's opening
+himself-his submitting himself in attentive awareness—to the
+
+XXXIV
+summons addressed to him and to the way on which he is already
+being sent. It is to apprehend and accept the dominion of Being
+already holding sway, and so to be "taken into a freeing claim"
+(QT 26).
+The truth of modern man's situation must become known to
+him. This does not mean at all that man can be presented with
+some "truth" that, if it were once brought to his attention, he
+might then grasp, assent to, and act upon. For Heidegger such
+"truth," the corresponding of a statement with a situation, would
+be mere correctness. Truth is unconcealment. That is not to say
+that it is something immediately accessible. Unconcealment is
+simultaneously concealment. Unconcealment, truth, is never
+nakedly present to be immediately known. The truth of modern
+man's situation is a revealing that comes upon him, but it comes
+upon him veiled.
+Enframing is a mode of revealing, a destining of Being. Yet
+precisely under its dominion nothing whatever, including man
+himself, appears as it intrinsically is; the truth of its Being remains concealed. Everything exists and appears as though it
+were of man's making.
+Because Enframing, as a revealing of Being, rules in this way,
+it is a danger beyond any danger that man otherwise knows. The
+essence of Enframing, its manner of coming to presence, "is that
+setting-upon gathered into itself which entraps the truth of its
+own coming to presence with oblivion. This entrapping disguises
+itself, in that it develops into the setting in order of everything
+that presences as standing-reserve, establishes itself in the
+standing-reserve, and rules as the standing-reserve" (T 37-38).
+In this "oblivion" that blocks the self-manifesting of Being, man's
+danger lies. The danger is real that every other way of revealing
+will be driven out and that man will lose his true relation to
+himself and to all else. Language, the primal mode through which
+man may experience and think and know whatever is, in its
+Being, may be bereft of its power, to become only a mere instrument of information. And man may be divested of his true
+essence and become one who "manufactures himself" (Sem. 34;
+cf. QT 26 ff.). Man himself, through whom the ordering characteristic of Enframing takes place, may even be wholly sucked
+up into the standing-reserve and may come to exist not as the
+
+XXXV
+"openness-for-Being" ('Da-sein"), but as a merely self-conscious
+being knowing himself only as an instrument ready for use.?
+Yet this stark eventuality need not befall man. For Enframing
+necessarily and intrinsically rules not merely as danger but also
+as that which saves. These are not two discrete aspects of its
+holding sway. The danger "is the saving power" (T 42). En-
+framing is a revealing. It manifests first of all the withdrawnness
+of Being. It estranges man from Being. Yet it remains a revealing.
+In it Being is still confronting man. Therefore Enframing bears
+within itself simultaneously with its endangering of man that
+other possibility, that man will be delivered from his estrangement and that it will be granted to him to come into an essential
+relationship with Being, recollectingly to receive what is present
+to him in all that is and thoughtfully to guard it (QT 32 ff.).
+In this twofoldness of Enframing as danger and saving power,
+and not in any merely human effort, lies the possibility that
+technology may be overcome. This does not mean that technology
+will be done away with. It means, rather, that technology will be
+surmounted from within itself, in such a way as to be restored
+to and fulfilled in its own essence. The unconcealment, the truth,
+concealed in the rule of technology will flash forth in that very
+concealing. Being will reveal itself in the very ongoing of technology, precisely in that flashing. But not without man. For man
+is needed for this as for every revealing of Being. Man must come
+to that place where, through language, through thinking, this
+revealing may come to pass. Yet man cannot bring it about, and
+he cannot know when it will take place (T 39, 41-42).
+What comes to pass happens suddenly. Heidegger speaks of
+it as a "turning." It is a turning within Enframing, within the
+essence of technology as the danger. It is the entrapping of the
+truth of Being in oblivion, i.e., in concealment. The truth, the
+unconcealment, of Being, is, in the very instant of its revealing,
+2. In a letter to Professor J. Glenn Gray (October 10, 1972) concerning
+this work, Heidegger states: "Everything that I have attempted is misunderstood without the turning from 'consciousness' into the 'openness-for-Being'
+that was being prepared in Being and Time." ('Ohne die in Sein und Zeit
+sich anbahnende Wendung vom 'Bewusstsein' in das 'Da-sein' wird alles,
+was ich versuchte, missverstanden.") Heidegger has emphatically expressed
+his preference for "openness" and his disapprobation of "there" as a translation of da in Dasein.
+
+xXxvi
+caught up in concealing. Yet the revealing of the truth of Being
+is concealed as revealing. Hence, "when this entrapping-withoblivion does come expressly to pass, then oblivion as such turns
+in and abides"; that is, concealment is revealed as concealment
+(T 43) —for it conceals that which is itself simultaneously shown
+as being concealed.
+Here Enframing, a destining of Being that denies to everything
+its Being, becomes simultaneously that which saves, that which
+bestows Being. For in it the truth of Being, Being's own unconcealment, turns about and enters into whatever is (cf. T 41).
+In this "turning," Being reveals itself solely from out of itself;
+yet it necessarily does so in such a way as to reach man. For
+without man, Being cannot come freely into the open, as the
+Being of what is. This turning about of concealing and unconcealing, which so closely involves Being and man, is a granted gift.
+The sudden flashing of the truth of Being into once truthless
+Being, which comes to pass in the essence of technology, in En-
+framing, is an "entering flashing look," is "insight into that
+which is"—i.e., into Being itself (T 46). This is no human
+looking, no human seeing. Quite to the contrary, it is Being's
+disclosing of itself. In it men are the ones beheld in their essence,
+so that they behold (cf. T 47). Heidegger uses for that in-flashing
+which is the self-revealing turning within Being itself the word
+Ereignis. It is a disclosing bringing to pass, a "bringing to sight
+that brings into its own" (T 45, 38 n. 4). Taking place within
+Being, it returns Being to itself-here, restoring the essence of
+technology to itself as a revealing-and it simultaneously brings
+man, glimpsed in his essence, to glimpse the revealing given
+appropriately to him.
+This disclosing brings itself to pass always uniquely. Being
+and man belong together. The disclosing here named is the fulfilling of that relation. It brings man and Being into their own in
+entrusting them to one another. It is a "letting belong together"
+of man and Being (Pr. Iden. 39).
+Enframing and the "disclosing that brings into its own" are in
+truth one. Heidegger can speak of Enframing as the "photographic negative" of that disclosing (Sem. 42). In enframing,
+Being and man confront each other, but they meet in estrangement.
+. In the unique disclosing that brings them into their own,
+
+xxxvii
+they meet in the very same relationship; but now, instead of and
+yet within the skeletal darkness of Enframing, there flashes also
+the light of that disclosing which brings them to belong together,
+which grants them what is truly their own.
+Here there can be disclosed to modern man something beyond
+what was known to the Greeks. The Greeks knew the togetherness of man and Being. But now, in our age, it can be possible to
+"glimpse a first oppressing flash" of the disclosing bringing-topass that brings man and Being into a constellation that is new
+and newly known (Pr. Iden. 38). In Enframing, precisely in its
+character as "the mutual challenge of man and Being to enter
+upon the calculating of the calculable," that newness of relationship appears (Pr. Iden. 40). When we catch sight of the turning
+in the essence of Enframing, we do not simply catch sight of the
+belonging together of man and Being. We do more: "We witness
+a belonging together of man and Being in which the letting belong first determines the manner of the 'together' and its unity"
+(Pr. Iden. 38, second italics mine). Within and beyond the looming presence of modern technology there dawns the possibility
+of a fuller relationship between man and Being-and hence
+between man and all that is—than there has ever been.
+In looking upon the present, our thinking can hope to see,
+over and beyond the immediate, evident situation of man, the
+relation of Being and man "from out of that which gives them
+to belong to one another, from out of the disclosing bringing-topass that brings them into their own" (Pr. Iden. 40). Such
+thinking is completely different from the sort of instantaneous
+calculating on which we more and more rely. It is a thinking
+within the sphere of tradition, a learning through what has been
+thought. As such, it is freed by tradition from being a mere
+thinking back, to become a thinking forward that is totally removed from planning, ordering, and setting up for use.
+It has sometimes been said that Heidegger exhibits in his philosophical work extreme arrogance. True, he does not, like Descartes, put forth his thinking as possessed of the compelling
+certainty of self-evident truth; nor does he, like Hegel, believe
+himself capable of surveying and expressing the truth about all
+human history and all reality. But does he not consider himself
+
+xxxvili
+to have insight into reality such as none before him has ever had?
+It is a fact that his thinking is confined to Western history and
+Western thought. But within that scope does he not, as in his
+treatment of Nietzsche, believe himself able on the basis of that
+insight to think that which is "unthought" in the thought of
+others, to discover the true meaning that those before him could
+not themselves see? He does. Yet is this arrogance, or is there
+insight here?
+Surely Heidegger himself would say that whatever insight he
+has is not of his own discovering but comes to him from out of
+reality itself. Clearly he continually feels himself summoned to
+respond to the revealing that comes to him and to call others to
+the same path. Deeply conscious as he is of his place within a
+tradition, Heidegger doubtless regards what seems to some like
+the proud reinterpreting of others' work as being, rather, the
+discovery in that work of far more meaning than those before
+him who accomplished it were given to see. Certainly, although
+Heidegger speaks with assurance of his insight, and though it
+ranges far, he also holds it to be but a glimpse, a beginning, an
+entering of modern man upon a thinking that, in its own time,
+may be granted to see far more clearly and to see anew (cf. WN
+55-56). In his philosophical work he has moved forward and ever
+forward, not bound by any given formulation of his thought. To
+Heidegger true thinking always remains a revealing, and he must
+follow where that revealing leads. The openness of his thinking
+shows itself fittingly enough in the fact that each of the essays
+in this volume ends, not with a declarative statement of what is
+incontrovertibly true, but with actual questions or with a pointing
+to some way or reality needed beyond what is now known. Each
+essay, whole though it be in itself, remains a part of an unfinished way. Where Descartes built glass palaces inviolable and
+Hegel a mansion finished for all time, Heidegger builds, as it
+were, sandcastles, ready to be reshaped or swept away in the
+next responsive on-working of thought.
+Heidegger has written:
+At the close of a lecture called "The Question Concerning Technology," given some time ago, I said: "Questioning is the piety of
+thinking." "Piety" is meant here in the ancient sense: obedient, or
+
+XXXiX
+submissive, and in this case submitting to what thinking has to
+think about. One of the exciting experiences of thinking is that at
+times it does not fully comprehend the new insights it has just
+gained, and does not properly see them through. Such, too, is the
+case with the sentence just cited that questioning is the piety of
+thinking. The lecture ending with that sentence was already in the
+ambience of the realization that the true stance of thinking cannot
+be to put questions, but must be to listen to that which our questioning vouchsafes—and all questioning begins to be a questioning
+only in virtue of pursuing its quest for essential Being.
+This is Heidegger's own way and his quest. This is the intrigung adventure to which he summons us in the essays that follow
+Has he glimpsed truth that might lighten our stricken age? To
+judge of that we must pursue with him the paths of his own
+thinking.
+3. "The Nature of Language," in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter
+D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 72.
+
+Part I
+
+The Question
+Concerning Technology
+In what follows we shall be questioning concerning technology.
+Questioning builds a way. We would be advised, therefore, above
+all to pay heed to the way, and not to fix our attention on isolated sentences and topics. The way is a way of thinking. All
+ways of thinking, more or less perceptibly, lead through language
+in a manner that is extraordinary. We shall be questioning concerning technology, and in so doing we should like to prepare
+a free relationship to it. The relationship will be free if it opens
+our human existence to the essence of technology.! When we
+1. "Essence" is the traditional translation of the German noun Wesen.
+One of Heidegger's principal aims in this essay is to seek the true meaning
+of essence through or by way of the "correct" meaning. He will later show
+that Wesen does not simply mean what something is, but that it means,
+further, the way in which something pursues its course, the way in which
+it remains through time as what it is. Heidegger writes elsewhere that the
+noun Wesen does not mean quidditas originally, but rather "enduring as
+presence" (das Währen als Gegenwart). (See
+An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim [New York: Doubleday, 1961], p. 59.) Wesen
+as a noun derives from the verb wesen, which is seldom used as such in
+modern German. The verb survives primarily in inflected forms of the verb
+sein (to be) and in such words as the adjective anwesend (present). The
+old verbal forms from which wesen stems meant to tarry or dwell. Heidegger repeatedly identifies wesen as "the same as währen [to last or endure]."
+(See p. 30 below and SR 161.) As a verb, wesen will usually be translated
+
+4
+can respond to this essence, we shall be able to experience the
+technological within its own bounds.
+Technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology.
+When we are seeking the essence of "tree," we have to become
+aware that That which pervades every tree, as tree, is not itself
+a tree that can be encountered among all the other trees.
+Likewise, the essence of technology is by no means anything technological. Thus we shall never experience our relationship to the essence of technology so long as we merely conceive
+and push forward the technological, put up with it, or evade it.
+Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology,
+whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered
+over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it,' to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence
+of technology.
+According to ancient doctrine, the essence of a thing is considered to be what the thing is. We ask the question concerning
+technology when we ask what it is. Everyone knows the two
+statements that answer our question. One says: Technology is a
+means to an end. The other says: Technology is a human activity.
+The two definitions of technology belong together. For to posit
+ends and procure and utilize the means to them is a human
+activity. The manufacture and utilization of equipment, tools,
+and machines, the manufactured and used things themselves,
+and the needs and ends that they serve, all belong to what techhere with "to come to presence," a rendering wherein the meaning "endure"
+should be strongly heard. Occasionally it will be translated "to essence,"
+and its gerund will be rendered with "essencing." The noun Wesen will
+regularly be translated "essence" until Heidegger's explanatory discussion
+is reached. Thereafter, in this and the succeeding essays, it will often be
+translated with "coming to presence." In relation to all these renderings, the
+reader should bear in mind a point that is of fundamental importance to
+Heidegger, namely, that the root of wesen, with its meaning "to dwell,"
+provides one integral component in the meaning of the verb sein (to be).
+(Cf. An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 59.)
+2. "Conception" here translates the noun Vorstellung. Elsewhere in this
+volume, Vorstellung will usually be translated by "representation," and its
+related verb vorstellen by "to represent." Both "conception" and "representation" should suggest a placing or setting-up-before. Cf. the discussion
+of Vorstellung in AWP 131-132.
+
+5
+nology is. The whole complex of these contrivances is technology. Technology itself is a contrivance, or, in Latin, an
+instrumentum.3
+The current conception of technology, according to which it is
+a means and a human activity, can therefore be called the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology.
+Who would ever deny that it is correct? It is in obvious conformity with what we are envisioning when we talk about technology. The instrumental definition of technology is indeed so
+uncannily correct that it even holds for modern technology, of
+which, in other respects, we maintain with some justification
+that it is, in contrast to the older handwork technology, something completely different and therefore new. Even the power
+plant with its turbines and generators is a man-made means to
+an end established by man. Even the jet aircraft and the highfrequency apparatus are means to ends. A radar station is of
+course less simple than a weather vane. To be sure, the construction of a high-frequency apparatus requires the interlocking of
+various processes of technical-industrial production. And certainly a sawmill in a secluded valley of the Black Forest is a
+primitive means compared with the hydroelectric plant in the
+Rhine River.
+But this much remains correct: modern technology too is a
+means to an end. That is why the instrumental conception of
+technology conditions every attempt to bring man into the right
+relation to technology. Everything depends on our manipulating
+technology in the proper manner as a means. We will, as we say,
+"get" technology "spiritually in hand." We will master it. The
+will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology
+threatens to slip from human control.
+But suppose now that technology were no mere means, how
+would it stand with the will to master it? Yet we said, did we
+3. Instrumentum signifies that which functions to heap or build up or to
+arrange. Heidegger here equates it with the noun Einrichtung, translated
+"contrivance," which can also mean arrangement, adjustment, furnishing, or
+equipment. In accordance with his dictum that the true must be sought by
+way of the correct, Heidegger here anticipates with his identification of
+technology as an instrumentum and an Einrichtung his later "true" characterization of technology in terms of setting-in-place, ordering, Enframing,
+and standing-reserve.
+
+6
+not, that the instrumental definition of technology is correct?
+To be sure. The correct always fixes upon something pertinent
+in whatever is under consideration. However, in order to be correct, this fixing by no means needs to uncover the thing in
+question in its essence. Only at the point where such an uncovering happens does the true come to pass.* For that reason the
+merely correct is not yet the true. Only the true brings us into
+a free relationship with that which concerns us from out of its
+essence. Accordingly, the correct instrumental definition of technology still does not show us technology's essence. In order that
+we may arrive at this, or at least come close to it, we must seek
+the true by way of the correct. We must ask: What is the instrumental itself? Within what do such things as means and end
+belong? A means is that whereby something is effected and thus
+attained. Whatever has an effect as its consequence is called a
+cause. But not only that by means of which something else is
+effected is a cause. The end in keeping with which the kind of
+means to be used is determined is also considered a cause.
+Wherever ends are pursued and means are employed, wherever
+instrumentality reigns, there reigns causality.
+For centuries philosophy has taught that there are four causes:
+(1) the causa materialis, the material, the matter out of which,
+for example, a silver chalice is made; (2) the causa formalis, the
+form, the shape into which the material enters; (3) the causa
+finalis, the end, for example, the sacrificial rite in relation to
+which the chalice required is determined as to its form and matter; (4) the causa efficiens, which brings about the effect that is
+the finished, actual chalice, in this instance, the silversmith. What
+technology is, when represented as a means, discloses itself when
+we trace instrumentality back to fourfold causality.
+But suppose that causality, for its part, is veiled in darkness
+with respect to what it is? Certainly for centuries we have acted
+as though the doctrine of the four causes had fallen from heaven
+as a truth as clear as daylight. But it might be that the time has
+come to ask, Why are there just four causes? In relation to the
+aforementioned four, what does "cause" really mean? From
+4. "Come to pass" translates sich ereignet. For a discussion of the fuller
+meaning of the verb ereignen, see T 38 n. 4, 45.
+
+7
+whence does it come that the causal character of the four causes
+is so unifiedly determined that they belong together?
+So long as we do not allow ourselves to go into these questions, causality, and with it instrumentality, and with the latter
+the accepted definition of technology, remain obscure and
+groundless.
+Fora long time we have been accustomed to representing cause
+as that which brings something about. In this connection, to
+bring about means to obtain results, effects. The causa efficiens,
+but one among the four causes, sets the standard for all causality.
+This goes so far that we no longer even count the causa finalis,
+telic finality, as causality. Causa, casus, belongs to the verb
+cadere, "to fall," and means that which brings it about that something falls out as a result in such and such a way. The doctrine
+of the four causes goes back to Aristotle. But everything that
+later ages seek in Greek thought under the conception and rubric
+"causality," in the realm of Greek thought and for Greek thought
+per se has simply nothing at all to do with bringing about and
+effecting. What we call cause [Ursache] and the Romans call
+causa is called aition by the Greeks, that to which something
+else is indebted [das, was ein anderes verschuldet]." The four
+causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being
+responsible for something else. An example can clarify this.
+Silver is that out of which the silver chalice is made. As this
+matter (hyle), it is co-responsible for the chalice. The chalice is
+indebted to, i.e., owes thanks to, the silver for that out of which
+it consists. But the sacrificial vessel is indebted not only to the
+silver. As a chalice, that which is indebted to the silver appears
+in the aspect of a chalice and not in that of a brooch or a ring.
+Thus the sacrificial vessel is at the same time indebted to the
+aspect (eidos) of chaliceness. Both the silver into which the
+aspect is admitted as chalice and the aspect in which the silver
+appears are in their respective ways co-responsible for the
+sacrificial vessel.
+5. Das, was ein anderes verschuldet is a quite idomatic expression that
+here would mean to many German readers "that which is the cause of
+something else." The verb verschulden actually has a wide range of meanings—to be indebted, to owe, to be guilty, to be responsible for or to, to
+cause. Heidegger intends to awaken all these meanings and to have connotations of mutual interdependence sound throughout this passage.
+
+8
+But there remains yet a third that is above all responsible for
+the sacrificial vessel. It is that which in advance confines the
+chalice within the realm of consecration and bestowal.® Through
+this the chalice is circumscribed as sacrificial vessel. Circumscribing gives bounds to the thing. With the bounds the thing
+does not stop; rather from out of them it begins to be what,
+after production, it will be. That which gives bounds, that which
+completes, in this sense is called in Greek telos, which is all too
+often translated as "aim" or "purpose," and so misinterpreted.
+The telos is responsible for what as matter and for what as aspect
+are together co-responsible for the sacrificial vessel.
+Finally there is a fourth participant in the responsibility for
+the finished sacrificial vessel's lying before us ready for use, i.e.,
+the silversmith-but not at all because he, in working, brings
+about the finished sacrificial chalice as if it were the effect of a
+making; the silversmith is not a causa efficiens.
+The Aristotelian doctrine neither knows the cause that is
+named by this term nor uses a Greek word that would correspond to it.
+The silversmith considers carefully and gathers together the
+three aforementioned ways of being responsible and indebted.
+To consider carefully [überlegen] is in Greek legein, logos.
+Legein is rooted in apophainesthai, to bring forward into appearance. The silversmith is co-responsible as that from whence
+the sacrificial vessel's bringing forth and resting-in-self take and
+retain their first departure. The three previously mentioned ways
+of being responsible owe thanks to the pondering of the silversmith for the "that" and the "how" of their coming into appearance and into play for the production of the sacrificial vessel.
+Thus four ways of being responsible hold sway in the sacrificial
+vessel that lies ready before us. They differ from one another,
+yet they belong together. What unites them from the beginning?
+In what does this playing in unison of the four ways of being
+6. Literally, "confines into"—the German preposition in with the accusative. Heidegger often uses this construction
+in ways that are unusual in
+German, as they would be in English. It will ordinarily be translated here
+by "within" so as to distinguish it from "in" used to translate in with the
+dative.
+
+9
+responsible play? What is the source of the unity of the four
+causes? What, after all, does this owing and being responsible
+mean, thought as the Greeks thought it?
+Today we are too easily inclined either to understand being
+responsible and being indebted moralistically as a lapse, or else
+to construe them in terms of effecting. In either case we bar to
+ourselves the way to the primal meaning of that which is later
+called causality. So long as this way is not opened up to us we
+shall also fail to see what instrumentality, which is based on
+causality, actually is.
+In order to guard against such misinterpretations of being
+responsible and being indebted, let us clarify the four ways of
+being responsible in terms of that for which they are responsible. According to our example, they are responsible for the
+silver chalice's lying ready before us as a sacrificial vessel. Lying
+before and lying ready (hypokeisthai) characterize the presencing
+of something that presences. The four ways of being responsible
+bring something into appearance. They let it come forth into
+presencing [An-wesen]." They set it free to that place and so
+start it on its way, namely, into its complete arrival. The principal characteristic of being responsible is this starting something
+on its way into arrival. It is in the sense of such a starting something on its way into arrival that being responsible is an occasioning or an inducing to go forward [Ver-an-lassen].® On the
+7. By writing An-wesen, Heidegger stresses the composition of the verb
+anwesen, translated as "to presence." The verb consists of wesen (literally,
+son of toe decenty
+to continue or endure) with the prepositional prefix an- (at, to, toward).
+It is man who must receive presencing, man to whom it comes as enduring.
+Cf. On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row,
+1972), p. 12.
+8. Ver-an-lassen is Heidegger's writing of the verb veranlassen in noun
+form, now hyphenated to bring out its meaning. Veranlassen ordinarily
+means to occasion, to cause, to bring about, to call forth. Its use here relates back to the use of anlassen (to leave [something] on, to let loose, to
+set going), here translated "to start something on its way." Anlassen has
+just been similarly written as an-lassen so as to emphasize its composition
+the German prefix ver- is to intensify the force of a verb. Andre Préau
+quotes Heidegger as saying: "Ver-an-lassen is more active than an-lassen.
+The ver-, as it were, pushes the latter toward a doing [vers un faire]." Cf.
+Martin Heidegger, Essais et Conférences (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), p. 16 n.
+
+10
+basis of a look at what the Greeks experienced in being responsible, in aitia, we now give this verb "to occasion" a more
+inclusive meaning, so that it now is the name for the essence of
+causality thought as the Greeks thought it. The common and
+narrower meaning of "occasion" in contrast is nothing more
+than striking against and releasing, and means a kind of secondary cause within the whole of causality.
+But in what, then, does the playing in unison of the four ways
+of occasioning play? They let what is not yet present arrive into
+presencing. Accordingly, they are unifiedly ruled over by a
+bringing that brings what presences into appearance. Plato tells
+us what this bringing is in a sentence from the Symposium
+(205b): he gar toi ek tou mè onton eis to on ionti hotoioun aitia
+pasa esti poiesis. "Every occasion for whatever passes over and
+goes forward into presencing from that which is not presencing
+is poiēsis, is bringing-forth [Her-vor-bringen]."'
+It is of utmost importance that we think bringing-forth in its
+full scope and at the same time in the sense in which the Greeks
+thought it. Not only handcraft manufacture, not only artistic
+and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery, is
+a bringing-forth, poiesis. Physis also, the arising of something
+from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, poiesis. Physis is indeed
+poiesis in the highest sense. For what presences by means of
+physis has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g.,
+the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself (en heautõi). In
+contrast, what is brought forth by the artisan or the artist, e.g.,
+9. The full gamut of meaning for the verb hervorbringen, here functioning as a noun, includes to bring forth or produce, to generate or beget, to
+utter, to elicit. Heidegger intends that all of these nuances be heard. He
+hyphenates the word in order to emphasize its adverbial prefixes, her-
+(here or hither) and vor- (forward or forth). Heidegger elsewhere makes
+specific the meaning resident in Her-vor-bringen for him by utilizing those
+prefixes independently. Thus he says (translating literally), "Bringing-forthhither brings hither out of concealment, forth into unconcealment" (cf. below, p. 11); and—after identifying working (wirken) and her-vor-bringen—
+he says that working must be understood as "bringing hither—into unconcealment, forth—into presencing" (SR 161). Because of the awkwardness
+of the English phrase "to bring forth hither," it has not been possible to
+include in the translation of her-vor-bringen the nuance of meaning that
+her-provides.
+
+11
+the silver chalice, has the bursting open belonging to bringingforth not in itself, but in another (en allõi), in the craftsman or
+artist.
+The modes of occasioning, the four causes, are at play, then,
+within bringing-forth. Through bringing-forth, the growing
+things of nature as well as whatever is completed through the
+crafts and the arts come at any given time to their appearance.
+But how does bringing-forth happen, be it in nature or in
+handwork and art? What is the bringing-forth in which the
+fourfold way of occasioning plays? Occasioning has to do with
+the presencing [Anwesen] of that which at any given time comes
+to appearance in bringing-forth. Bringing-forth brings hither out
+of concealment forth into unconcealment. Bringing-forth comes
+to pass only insofar as something concealed comes into unconcealment. This coming rests and moves freely within what we
+call revealing [das Entbergen].1° The Greeks have the word
+10. The verb entbergen (to reveal) and the allied noun Entbergung (revealing) are unique to Heidegger. Because of the exigencies of translation,
+entbergen must usually be translated with "revealing," and the presence of
+Entbergung, which is rather infrequently used, has therefore regrettably
+been obscured for want of an appropriate English noun as alternative that
+would be sufficiently active in meaning. Entbergen and Entbergung are
+formed from the verb bergen and the verbal prefix ent-. Bergen means to
+rescue, to recover, to secure, to harbor, to conceal. Ent- is used in German
+verbs to connote in one way or another a change trom an existing situation. It can mean "forth" or "out" or can connote a change that is the
+negating of a former condition. Entbergen connotes an opening out from
+protective concealing, a harboring forth. For a presentation of Heidegger's
+central tenet that it is only as protected and preserved-and that means as
+enclosed and secure-that anything is set free to endure, to continue
+that which it is, i.e., to be, see "Building Dwelling Thinking" in Poetry,
+Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row,
+1971), p. 149, and cf. p. 25 below.
+Entbergen and Entbergung join a family of words all formed from bergen
+—verbergen (to conceal), Verborgenheit (concealment), das Verborgenc (the
+concealed), Unverborgenheit (unconcealment), das Unverborgene (the unconcealed)-of which Heidegger makes frequent use. The lack of viable
+English words sufficiently numerous to permit a similar use of but one
+fundamental stem has made it necessary to obscure, through the use of
+"reveal," the close relationship among all the words just mentioned. None
+of the English words used-"reveal," "conceal," "unconceal"-evinces with
+any adequacy the meaning resident in bergen itself; yet the reader should
+be constantly aware that the full range of connotation present in bergen
+sounds for Heidegger within all these, its derivatives.
+
+12
+alētheia for revealing. The Romans translate this with veritas.
+We say "truth" and usually understand it as the correctness of
+an idea.
+But where have we strayed to? We are questioning concerning
+technology, and we have arrived now at alētheia, at revealing.
+What has the essence of technology to do with revealing? The
+answer: everything. For every bringing-forth is grounded in
+revealing. Bringing-forth, indeed, gathers within itself the four
+modes of occasioning—causality-and rules them throughout.
+Within its domain belong end and means, belongs instrumentality.' Instrumentality is considered to be the fundamental
+characteristic of technology. If we inquire, step by step, into
+what technology, represented as means, actually is, then we shall
+arrive at revealing. The possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing.
+Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way
+of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm
+for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the
+realm of revealing, ie., of truth.!'
+This prospect strikes us as strange. Indeed, it should do so,
+should do so as persistently as possible and with so much urgency
+that we will finally take seriously the simple question of what the
+name "technology" means. The word stems from the Greek.
+Technikon means that which belongs to techne. We must observe
+11. Here and elsewhere "belongs within" translates the German gehört in
+with the accusative (literally, belongs into), an unusual usage that Heidegger
+often employs. The regular German construction is gehört zu (belongs to).
+With the use of "belongs into," Heidegger intends to suggest a relationship
+involving origin.
+12. Heidegger here hyphenates the word Wahrheit (truth) so as to expose
+its stem, wahr. He points out elsewhere that words with this stem have a
+common derivation and underlying meaning (SR 165). Such words often
+show the connotations of attentive watchfulness and guarding that he there
+finds in their Greek cognates, horao, ora, e.g., wahren (to watch over and
+keep safe) and bewahren (to preserve). Hyphenating Wahrheit draws it
+overtly into this circle of meaning. It points to the fact that in truth, which
+is unconcealment (Unverborgenheit), a safekeeping carries itself out.
+Wahrheit thus offers here a very close parallel to its companion noun
+Entbergung (revealing; literally, harboring forth), built on bergen (to
+rescue, to harbor, to conceal). See n. 10, above. For a further discussion of
+words built around wahr, see T 42, n. 9.
+
+13
+two things with respect to the meaning of this word. One is that
+techne is the name not only for the activities and skills of the
+craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts.
+Techne belongs to bringing-forth, to poiesis; it is something
+poietic.
+The other point that we should observe with regard to techne
+is even more important. From earliest times until Plato the word
+techne is linked with the word episteme. Both words are names
+for knowing in the widest sense. They mean to be entirely at
+home in something, to understand and be expert in it. Such
+knowing provides an opening up. As an opening up it is a revealing. Aristotle, in a discussion of special importance (Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VI, chaps. 3 and 4), distinguishes between
+epistème and techne and indeed with respect to what and how
+they reveal. Techne is a mode of alētheuein. It reveals whatever
+does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us,
+whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another.
+Whoever builds a house or a ship or forges a sacrificial chalice
+reveals what is to be brought forth, according to the perspectives
+of the four modes of occasioning. This revealing gathers together
+in advance the aspect and the matter of ship or house, with a
+view to the finished thing envisioned as completed, and from
+this gathering determines the manner of its construction. Thus
+what is decisive in techne does not lie at all in making and
+manipulating nor in the using of means, but rather in the aforementioned revealing. It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that techne is a bringing-forth.
+Thus the clue to what the word techne means and to how the
+Greeks defined it leads us into the same context that opened
+itself to us when we pursued the question of what instrumentality as such in truth might be.
+Technology is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to
+presence [West] in the realm where revealing and unconcealment
+take place, where alētheia, truth, happens.
+In opposition to this definition of the essential domain of
+technology, one can object that it indeed holds for Greek
+thought and that at best it might apply to the techniques of
+the handcraftsman, but that it simply does not fit modern
+machine-powered technology. And it is precisely the latter and
+
+14
+it alone that is the disturbing thing, that moves us to ask the
+question concerning technology per se. It is said that modern
+technology is something incomparably different from all earlier
+technologies because it is based on modern physics as an exact
+science. Meanwhile we have come to understand more clearly
+that the reverse holds true as well: Modern physics, as experimental, is dependent upon technical apparatus and upon progress in the building of apparatus. The establishing of this
+mutual relationship between technology and physics is correct.
+But it remains a merely historiographical establishing of facts
+and says nothing about that in which this mutual relationship
+is grounded. The decisive question still remains: Of what essence is modern technology that it happens to think of putting
+exact science to use?
+What is modern technology? It too is a revealing. Only when
+we allow our attention to rest on this fundamental characteristic
+does that which is new in modern technology show itself to us.
+And yet the revealing that holds sway throughout modern
+technology does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of
+poiesis. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], 13 which puts to nature the unreasonable
+demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored
+as such. But does this not hold true for the old windmill as well?
+No. Its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to
+the wind's blowing. But the windmill does not unlock energy
+from the air currents in order to store it.
+In contrast, a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of
+coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant
+formerly cultivated and set in order [bestellte] appears differently
+than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and
+13. Herausfordern means to challenge, to call forth or summon to action,
+to demand positively, to provoke. It is composed of the verb fordern (to
+demand, to summon, to challenge) and the adverbial prefixes her- (hither)
+and aus- (out). The verb might be rendered very literally as "to demand
+out hither." The structural similarity between herausfordern and her-vorbringen (to bring forth hither) is readily apparent. It serves of itself to
+point up the relation subsisting between the two modes of revealing of
+which the verbs speak—modes that, in the very distinctive ways peculiar to
+them, occasion a coming forth into unconcealment and presencing. See
+below, 29-30.
+
+15
+to maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the
+soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in
+the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase.
+But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under
+the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon
+[stellt] nature.'* It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it.
+Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set
+upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield
+uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic
+energy, which can be released either for destruction or for peaceful use.
+This setting-upon that challenges forth the energies of nature
+is an expediting [Fördern], and in two ways. It expedites in that
+it unlocks and exposes. Yet that expediting is always itself
+directed from the beginning toward furthering something else,
+i.e., toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum
+expense. The coal that has been hauled out in some mining
+district has not been supplied in order that it may simply be
+present somewhere or other. It is stockpiled; that is, it is on call,
+ready to deliver the sun's warmth that is stored in it. The sun's
+warmth is challenged forth for heat, which in turn is ordered to
+deliver steam whose pressure turns the wheels that keep a
+factory running.
+14. The verb stellen (to place or set) has a wide variety of uses. It can
+mean to put in place, to order, to arrange, to furnish or supply, and, in a
+military context, to challenge or engage. Here Heidegger sees the connotations of herausfordern (to challenge, to call forth, to demand out hither) as
+fundamentally determinative of the meaning of
+stellen, and this remains
+true throughout his ensuing discussion. The translation of stellen with "to
+set upon" is intended to carry this meaning. The connotations of setting in
+place and of supplying that lie within the word stellen remain strongly
+present in Heidegger's repeated use of the verb hereafter, however, since
+the "setting-upon" of which it speaks is inherently a setting in place so as
+to supply. Where these latter meanings come decisively to the fore, stellen
+has been translated with "to set" or "to set up," or, rarely, with "to supply."
+Stellen embraces the meanings of a whole family of verbs: bestellen (to
+order, command; to set in order), vorstellen (to represent), sicherstellen (to
+secure), nachstellen (to entrap), verstellen (to block or disguise), herstellen
+(to produce, to set here), darstellen (to present or exhibit), and so on. In
+these verbs the various nuances within stellen are reinforced and made
+specific. All these meanings are gathered together in Heidegger's unique
+use of the word that is pivotal for him, Ge-stell (Enframing). Cf. pp. 19 ff.
+See also the opening paragraph of "The Turning," pp. 36-37.
+
+16
+The hydroelectric plant is set into the current of the Rhine. It
+sets the Rhine to supplying its hydraulic pressure, which then
+sets the turbines turning. This turning sets those machines in
+motion whose thrust sets going the electric current for which
+the long-distance power station and its network of cables are
+set up to dispatch electricity.l5 In the context of the interlocking
+processes pertaining to the orderly disposition of electrical
+energy, even the Rhine itself appears as something at our command. The hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine River
+as was the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for
+hundreds of years. Rather the river is dammed up into the power
+plant. What the river is now, namely, a water power supplier,
+derives from out of the essence of the power station. In order
+that we may even remotely consider the monstrousness that
+reigns here, let us ponder for a moment the contrast that speaks
+out of the two titles, "The Rhine" as dammed up into the
+power works, and "The Rhine" as uttered out of the art work,
+in Hölderlin's hymn by that name. But, it will be replied, the
+Rhine is still a river in the landscape, is it not? Perhaps. But how?
+In no other way than as an object on call for inspection by a tour
+group ordered there by the vacation industry.
+The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has
+the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challengingforth. That challenging happens in that the energy concealed in
+nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is
+transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed,
+and what is distributed is switched about ever anew. Unlocking,
+transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways
+of revealing. But the revealing never simply comes to an end.
+Neither does it run off into the indeterminate. The revealing
+reveals to itself its own manifoldly interlocking paths, through
+regulating their course. This regulating itself is, for its part,
+everywhere secured. Regulating and securing even become the
+chief characteristics of the challenging revealing.
+15. In these two sentences, in order to show something of the manner in
+which Heidegger gathers together a family of meanings, a series of stellen
+verbs-stellen (three times), herstellen, bestellen-have been translated with
+verbal expressions formed around "set." For the usual meanings of these
+verbs, see n. 14.
+
+17
+What kind of unconcealment is it, then, that is peculiar to that
+which comes to stand forth through this setting-upon that challenges? Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be
+immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may
+be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in
+this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve
+[Bestand]. The word expresses here something more, and something more essential, than mere "stock." The name "standingreserve" assumes the rank of an inclusive rubric. It designates
+nothing less than the way in which everything presences that is
+wrought upon by the challenging revealing. Whatever stands by
+in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against
+us as object.
+Yet an airliner that stands on the runway is surely an object.
+Certainly. We can represent the machine so. But then it conceals
+itself as to what and how it is. Revealed, it stands on the taxi
+strip only as standing-reserve, inasmuch as it is ordered to ensure the possibility of transportation. For this it must be in its
+whole structure and in every one of its constituent parts, on call
+for duty, i.e., ready for takeoff. (Here it would be appropriate
+to discuss Hegel's definition of the machine as an autonomous
+tool. When applied to the tools of the craftsman, his characterization is correct. Characterized in this way, however, the machine
+is not thought at all from out of the essence of technology within
+which it belongs. Seen in terms of the standing-reserve, the
+machine is completely unautonomous, for it has its standing
+only from the ordering of the orderable.)
+The fact that now, wherever we try to point to modern technology as the challenging revealing, the words "setting-upon,"
+"ordering," "standing-reserve," obtrude and accumulate in a dry,
+monotonous, and therefore oppressive way, has its basis in what
+is now coming to utterance.
+16. Bestand ordinarily denotes a store or supply as "standing by." It
+carries the connotation of the verb bestehen with its dual meaning of to last
+and to undergo. Heidegger uses the word to characterize the manner in
+which everything commanded into place and ordered according to the
+tutability of objects. Bestand contrasts with Gegenstand (object; that which
+stands over against). Objects indeed lose their character as objects when
+they are caught up in the "standing-reserve." Cf. Introduction, p. xxix.
+
+18
+Who accomplishes the challenging setting-upon through which
+what we call the real is revealed as standing-reserve? Obviously,
+man. To what extent is man capable of such a revealing? Man
+can indeed conceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in
+one way or another. But man does not have control over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the real shows
+itself or withdraws. The fact that the real has been showing
+itself in the light of Ideas ever since the time of Plato, Plato did
+not bring about. The thinker only responded to what addressed
+itself to him.
+Only to the extent that man for his part is already challenged
+to exploit the energies of nature can this ordering revealing
+happen. If man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does
+not man himself belong even more originally than nature within
+the standing-reserve? The current talk about human resources,
+about the supply of patients for a clinic, gives evidence of this.
+The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and
+to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way
+as did his grandfather is today commanded by profit-making in
+the lumber industry, whether he knows it or not. He is made
+subordinate to the orderability of cellulose, which for its part
+is challenged forth by the need for paper, which is then delivered
+to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, in their
+turn, set public opinion to swallowing what is printed, so that a
+set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand. Yet
+precisely because man is challenged more originally than are the
+energies of nature, i.e., into the process of ordering, he never is
+transformed into mere standing-reserve. Since man drives technology forward, he takes part in ordering as a way of revealing.
+But the unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is
+never a human handiwork, any more than is the realm through
+which man is already passing every time he as a subject relates
+to an object.
+Where and how does this revealing happen if it is no mere
+handiwork of man? We need not look far. We need only apprehend in an unbiased way That which has already claimed man
+and has done so, so decisively that he can only be man at any
+given time as the one so claimed. Wherever man opens his eyes
+and ears, unlocks his heart, and gives himself over to meditating
+
+19
+and striving, shaping and working, entreating and thanking, he
+finds himself everywhere already brought into the unconcealed.
+The unconcealment of the unconcealed has already come to pass
+whenever it calls man forth into the modes of revealing allotted
+to him. When man, in his way, from within unconcealment
+reveals that which presences, he merely responds to the call of
+unconcealment even when he contradicts it. Thus when man,
+investigating, observing, ensnares nature as an area of his own
+conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of revealing
+that challenges him to approach nature as an object of research,
+until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of
+standing-reserve.
+Modern technology as an ordering revealing is, then, no merely
+human doing. Therefore we must take that challenging that sets
+upon man to order the real as standing-reserve in accordance
+with the way in which it shows itself. That challenging gathers
+man into ordering. This gathering concentrates man upon ordering the real as standing-reserve.
+That which primordially unfolds the mountains into mountain
+ranges and courses through them in their folded togetherness is
+the gathering that we call "Gebirg" [mountain chain].
+That original gathering from which unfold the ways in which
+we have feelings of one kind or another we name "Gemüt" [disposition).
+We now name that challenging claim which gathers man
+thither to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve: "Ge-stell"
+[Enframing] *
+We dare to use this word in a sense that has been thoroughly
+unfamiliar up to now.
+17. The translation "Enframing" for Ge-stell is intended to suggest,
+through the use of the prefix "en-," something of the active meaning that
+Heidegger here gives to the German word. While following the discussion
+that now ensues, in which Enframing assumes a central role, the reader
+should be careful not to interpret the word as though it simply meant a
+framework of some sort. Instead he should constantly remember that En-
+framing is fundamentally a calling-forth. It is a "challenging claim," a
+demanding summons, that "gathers" so as to reveal. This claim enframes
+in that it assembles and orders. It puts into a framework or configuration
+everything that it summons forth, through an ordering for use that it is
+forever restructuring anew. Cf. Introduction, pp. xxix ff.
+
+20
+According to ordinary usage, the word Gestell [frame] means
+some kind of apparatus, e.g., a bookrack. Gestell is also the name
+for a skeleton. And the employment of the word Ge-stell [En-
+framing] that is now required of us seems equally eerie, not to
+speak of the arbitrariness with which words of a mature language
+are thus misused. Can anything be more strange? Surely not.
+Yet this strangeness is an old usage of thinking. And indeed
+thinkers accord with this usage precisely at the point where it is a
+matter of thinking that which is highest. We, late born, are no
+longer in a position to appreciate the significance of Plato's daring to use the word eidos for that which in everything and in
+each particular thing endures as present. For eidos, in the common speech, meant the outward aspect [Ansicht] that a visible
+thing offers to the physical eye. Plato exacts of this word, however, something utterly extraordinary: that it name what precisely
+is not and never will be perceivable with physical eyes. But even
+this is by no means the full extent of what is extraordinary here.
+For idea names not only the nonsensuous aspect of what is
+physically visible. Aspect (idea) names and is, also, that which
+constitutes the essence in the audible, the tasteable, the tactile,
+in everything that is in any way accessible. Compared with the
+demands that Plato makes on language and thought in this and
+other instances, the use of the word Gestell as the name for the
+essence of modern technology, which we now venture here, is
+almost harmless. Even so, the usage now required remains something exacting and is open to misinterpretation.
+Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon
+which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the
+real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. Enframing
+means that way of revealing which holds sway in the essence of
+modern technology and which is itself nothing technological.
+On the other hand, all those things that are so familiar to us and
+are standard parts of an assembly, such as rods, pistons, and
+chassis, belong to the technological. The assembly itself, however, together with the aforementioned stockparts, falls within
+18. Where idea is italicized it is not the English word but a transliteration
+of the Greek.
+
+21
+the sphere of technological activity; and this activity always
+merely responds to the challenge of Enframing, but it never
+comprises Enframing itself or brings it about.
+The word stellen [to set upon] in the name Ge-stell [Enframing] not only means challenging. At the same time it should
+preserve the suggestion of another Stellen from which it stems,
+namely, that producing and presenting [Her- und Dar-stellen]
+which, in the sense of poisis, lets what presences come forth
+into unconcealment. This producing that brings forth—e.g., the
+erecting of a statue in the temple precinct-and the challenging
+ordering now under consideration are indeed fundamentally different, and yet they remain related in their essence. Both are
+ways of revealing, of alētheia. In Enframing, that unconcealment
+comes to pass in conformity with which the work of modern
+technology reveals the real as standing-reserve. This work is
+therefore neither only a human activity nor a mere means within
+such activity. The merely instrumental, merely anthropological
+definition of technology is therefore in principle untenable. And
+it cannot be rounded out by being referred back to some metaphysical or religious explanation that undergirds it.
+It remains true, nonetheless, that man in the technological age
+is, in a particularly striking way, challenged forth into revealing.
+That revealing concerns nature, above all, as the chief storehouse
+of the standing energy reserve. Accordingly, man's ordering
+attitude and behavior display themselves first in the rise of
+modern physics as an exact science. Modern science's way of
+representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces. Modern physics is not experimental physics because it applies apparatus to the questioning of nature. Rather
+the reverse is true. Because physics, indeed already as pure
+theory, sets nature up to exhibit itself as a coherence of forces
+calculable in advance, it therefore orders its experiments precisely
+for the purpose of asking whether and how nature reports itself
+when set up in this way.
+But after all, mathematical physics arose almost two centuries
+before technology. How, then, could it have already been set
+upon by modern technology and placed in its service? The facts
+testify to the contrary. Surely technology got under way only
+
+22
+when it could be supported by exact physical science. Reckoned
+chronologically, this is correct. Thought historically, it does not
+hit upon the truth.
+The modern physical theory of nature prepares the way first
+not simply for technology but for the essence of modern technology. For already in physics the challenging gathering-together
+into ordering revealing holds sway. But in it that gathering does
+not yet come expressly to appearance. Modern physics is the
+herald of Enframing, a herald whose origin is still unknown. The
+essence of modern technology has for a long time been concealing itself, even where power machinery has been invented, where
+electrical technology is in full swing, and where atomic technology is well under way.
+All coming to presence, not only modern technology, keeps
+itself everywhere concealed to the last." Nevertheless, it remains, with respect to its holding sway, that which precedes all:
+the earliest. The Greek thinkers already knew of this when they
+said: That which is earlier with regard to the arising that holds
+sway becomes manifest to us men only later. That which is
+primally early shows itself only ultimately to men.? Therefore,
+in the realm of thinking, a painstaking effort to think through
+still more primally what was primally thought is not the absurd
+wish to revive what is past, but rather the sober readiness to be
+astounded before the coming of what is early.
+Chronologically speaking, modern physical science begins in
+the seventeenth century. In contrast, machine-power technology
+develops only in the second half of the eighteenth century. But
+modern technology, which for chronological reckoning is the
+later, is, from the point of view of the essence holding sway
+within it, the historically earlier.
+19. "Coming to presence" here translates the gerund Wesende, a verbal
+form that appears, in this volume, only in this essay. With the introduction
+into the discussion of "coming to presence" as an alternate translation of
+the noun Wesen (essence), subsequent to Heidegger's consideration of the
+meaning of essence below (pp. 30 ff.), occasionally the presence of das
+Wesende is regrettably but unavoidably obscured
+20. "That which is primally early" translates die anfängliche Frühe. For
+a discussion of that which "is to all present and absent beings . . . the
+earliest and most ancient at once"—i.e., Ereignen, das Ereignis-see
+"The
+Way to Language" in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New
+York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 127.
+
+23
+If modern physics must resign itself ever increasingly to the
+fact that its realm of representation remains inscrutable and
+incapable of being visualized, this resignation is not dictated by
+any committee of researchers. It is challenged forth by the rule
+of Enframing, which demands that nature be orderable as
+standing-reserve. Hence physics, in all its retreating from the
+representation turned only toward objects that has alone been
+standard till recently, will never be able to renounce this one
+thing: that nature reports itself in some way or other that is
+identifiable through calculation and that it remains orderable
+as a system of information. This system is determined, then, out
+of a causality that has changed once again. Causality now displays neither the character of the occasioning that brings forth
+nor the nature of the causa efficiens, let alone that of the causa
+formalis. It seems as though causality is shrinking into a reporting—a reporting challenged forth—of standing-reserves that
+must be guaranteed either simultaneously or in sequence. To this
+shrinking would correspond the process of growing resignation
+that Heisenberg's lecture depicts in so impressive a manner.*
+Because the essence of modern technology lies in Enframing,
+modern technology must employ exact physical science. Through
+its so doing, the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology
+is applied physical science. This illusion can maintain itself only
+so long as neither the essential origin of modern science nor
+indeed the essence of modern technology is adequately found
+out through questioning.
+We are questioning concerning technology in order to bring to
+light our relationship to its essence. The essence of modern technology shows itself in what we call Enframing. But simply to
+point to this is still in no way to answer the question concerning
+technology, if to answer means to respond, in the sense of
+correspond, to the essence of what is being asked about.
+Where do we find ourselves brought to, if now we think one
+step further regarding what Enframing itself actually is? It is
+nothing technological, nothing on the order of a machine. It is
+the way in which the real reveals itself as standing-reserve.
+* W. Heisenberg, "Das Naturbild in der heutigen Physik," in Die Künste
+im technischen Zeitalter (Munich, 1954), pP. 43 ff.
+
+24
+Again we ask: Does this revealing happen somewhere beyond
+all human doing? No. But neither does it happen exclusively in
+man, or decisively through man.
+Enframing is the gathering together that belongs to that
+setting-upon which sets upon man and puts him in position to
+reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. As
+the one who is challenged forth in this way, man stands within
+the essential realm of Enframing. He can never take up a relationship to it only subsequently. Thus the question as to how
+we are to arrive at a relationship to the essence of technology,
+asked in this way, always comes too late. But never too late
+comes the question as to whether we actually experience ourselves as the ones whose activities everywhere, public and private, are challenged forth by Enframing. Above all, never too
+late comes the question as to whether and how we actually
+admit ourselves into that wherein Enframing itself comes to
+presence.
+The essence of modern technology starts man upon the way
+of that revealing through which the real everywhere, more or
+less distinctly, becomes standing-reserve. "To start upon a way"
+means "to send" in our ordinary language. We shall call that
+sending-that-gathers [versammelde Schicken] which first starts
+man upon a way of revealing, destining [Geschick]." It is from
+out of this destining that the essence of all history [Geschichte]
+is determined. History is neither simply the object of written
+chronicle nor simply the fulfillment of human activity. That
+activity first becomes history as something destined.* And it is
+only the destining into objectifying representation that makes the
+historical accessible as an object for historiography, i.e., for a
+science, and on this basis makes possible the current equating
+of the historical with that which is chronicled.
+Enframing, as a challenging-forth into ordering, sends into a
+way of revealing. Enframing is an ordaining of destining, as is
+21. For a further presentation of the meaning resident in Geschick and
+the related verb schicken, cf. T 38 ff., and Introduction, pp. xxvili ff
+* See Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, 1930; Ist ed., 1943, PP. 16 ff. [English
+translation, "On the Essence of Truth," in Existence and Being, ed. Werner
+Brock (Chicago: Regnery, 1949), pp. 308 ff.]
+
+25
+every way of revealing. Bringing-forth, poiesis, is also a destining
+in this sense.
+Always the unconcealment of that which is" goes upon a way
+of revealing. Always the destining of revealing holds complete
+sway over man. But that destining is never a fate that compels.
+For man becomes truly free only insofar as he belongs to the
+realm of destining and so becomes one who listens and hears
+[Hörender], and not one who is simply constrained to obey
+[Höriger].
+The essence of freedom is originally not connected with the
+will or even with the causality of human willing.
+Freedom governs the open in the sense of the cleared and
+lighted up, i.e., of the revealed.23 It is to the happening of revealing, ie., of truth, that freedom stands in the closest and most
+intimate kinship. All revealing belongs within a harboring and a
+concealing. But that which frees—the mystery-is concealed and
+always concealing itself. All revealing comes out of the open,
+goes into the open, and brings into the open. The freedom of
+the open consists neither in unfettered arbitrariness nor in the
+constraint of mere laws. Freedom is that which conceals in a way
+that opens to light, in whose clearing there shimmers that veil
+that covers what comes to presence of all truth and lets the veil
+appear as what veils. Freedom is the realm of the destining that
+at any given time starts a revealing upon its way.
+The essence of modern technology lies in Enframing. Enframing belongs within the destining of revealing. These sentences
+express something different from the talk that we hear more
+frequently, to the effect that technology is the fate of our age,
+where "fate" means the inevitableness of an unalterable course.
+But when we consider the essence of technology, then we experience Enframing as a destining of revealing. In this way we
+are already sojourning within the open space of destining, a
+destining that in no way confines us to a stultified compulsion to
+push on blindly with technology or, what comes to the same
+22. dessen was ist. On the peculiar significance of das was ist (that
+which is), see T 44 n. 12.
+23. "The open" here translates das Freie, cognate with Freiheit, freedom.
+Unfortunately the repetitive stress of the German phrasing cannot be reproduced in English, since the basic meaning of Freie-open air, open space
+—is scarcely heard in the English "free."
+
+26
+thing, to rebel helplessly against it and curse it as the work of
+the devil. Quite to the contrary, when we once open ourselves
+expressly to the essence of technology, we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim.
+The essence of technology lies in Enframing. Its holding sway
+belongs within destining. Since destining at any given time starts
+man on a way of revealing, man, thus under way, is continually
+approaching the brink of the possibility of pursuing and pushing
+forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering, and of deriving all his standards on this basis. Through this the other possi
+bility is blocked, that man might be admitted more and sooner
+and ever more primally to the essence of that which is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order that he might experience as his essence his needed belonging to revealing
+Placed between these possibilities, man is endangered from out
+of destining. The destining of revealing is as such, in every one
+of its modes, and therefore necessarily, danger.
+In whatever way the destining of revealing may hold sway,
+the unconcealment in which everything that is shows itself at
+any given time harbors the danger that man may quail at the unconcealed and may misinterpret it. Thus where everything that
+presences exhibits itself in the light of a cause-effect coherence,
+even God can, for representational thinking, lose all that is
+exalted and holy, the mysteriousness of his distance. In the
+light of causality, God can sink to the level of a cause, of causa
+efficiens. He then becomes, even in theology, the god of the
+philosophers, namely, of those who define the unconcealed and
+the concealed in terms of the causality of making, without ever
+considering the essential origin of this causality.
+In a similar way the unconcealment in accordance with which
+nature presents itself as a calculable complex of the effects of
+forces can indeed permit correct determinations; but precisely
+through these successes the danger can remain that in the midst
+of all that is correct the true will withdraw.
+The destining of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but
+danger as such.
+Yet when destining reigns in the mode of Enframing, it is the
+supreme danger. This danger attests itself to us in two ways. As
+soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as
+
+27
+object, but does so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and
+man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of
+the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a
+precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself
+will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of
+lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail that
+everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: It
+seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only
+himself. Heisenberg has with complete correctness pointed out
+that the real must present itself to contemporary man in this
+way.* In truth, however, precisely nowhere does man today any
+longer encounter himself, i.e., his essence. Man stands so decisively in attendance on the challenging-forth of Enframing that
+he does not apprehend Enframing as a claim, that he fails to see
+himself as the one spoken to, and hence also fails in every way
+to hear in what respect he ek-sists, from out of his essence, in the
+realm of an exhortation or address, and thus can never encounter
+only himself.
+But Enframing does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is. As a destining, it
+banishes man into that kind of revealing which is an ordering.
+Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing. Above all, Enframing conceals that revealing
+which, in the sense of poiesis, lets what presences come forth
+into appearance. As compared with that other revealing, the
+setting-upon that challenges forth thrusts man into a relation to
+that which is, that is at once antithetical and rigorously ordered
+Where Enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the
+standing-reserve mark all revealing. They no longer even let
+their own fundamental characteristic appear, namely, this revealing as such.
+Thus the challenging Enframing not only conceals a former
+way of revealing, bringing-forth, but it conceals revealing itself
+and with it That wherein unconcealment, i.e., truth, comes to
+pass.
+* "Das Naturbild," Pp. 60 ff.
+
+28
+Enframing blocks the shining-forth and holding-sway of truth.
+The destining that sends into ordering is consequently the extreme danger. What is dangerous is not technology. There is no
+demonry of technology, but rather there is the mystery of its
+, essence. The essence of technology, as a destining of revealing, is
+the danger. The transformed meaning of the word "Enframing"
+will perhaps become somewhat more familiar to us now if we
+think Enframing in the sense of destining and danger.
+The threat to man does not come in the first instance from
+the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The
+actual threat has already affected man in his essence. The rule
+of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could
+be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and
+hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.
+Thus, where Enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest
+sense.
+But where danger is, grows
+The saving power also.
+Let us think carefully about these words of Hölderlin. What
+does it mean "to save"? Usually we think that it means only to
+seize hold of a thing threatened by ruin, in order to secure it in
+its former continuance. But the verb "to save" says more. "To
+save" is to fetch something home into its essence, in order to
+bring the essence for the first time into its genuine appearing.
+If the essence of technology, Enframing, is the extreme danger,
+and if there is truth in Hölderlin's words, then the rule of
+Enframing cannot exhaust itself solely in blocking all lighting-up
+of every revealing, all appearing of truth. Rather, precisely the
+essence of technology must harbor in itself the growth of the
+saving power. But in that case, might not an adequate look into
+what Enframing is as a destining of revealing bring into appearance the saving power in its arising?
+In what respect does the saving power grow there also where
+the danger is? Where something grows, there it takes root, from
+thence it thrives. Both happen concealedly and quietly and in
+their own time. But according to the words of the poet we have
+no right whatsoever to expect that there where the danger is we
+
+29
+should be able to lay hold of the saving power immediately and
+without preparation. Therefore we must consider now, in advance, in what respect the saving power does most profoundly
+take root and thence thrive even in that wherein the extreme
+danger lies, in the holding sway of Enframing. In order to consider this, it is necessary, as a last step upon our way, to look
+with yet clearer eyes into the danger. Accordingly, we must once
+more question concerning technology. For we have said that in
+technology's essence roots and thrives the saving power.
+But how shall we behold the saving power in the essence of
+technology so long as we do not consider in what sense of
+"essence" it is that Enframing is actually the essence of technology?
+Thus far we have understood "essence" in its current meaning.
+In the academic language of philosophy, "essence" means what
+something is; in Latin, quid. Quidditas, whatness, provides the
+answer to the question concerning essence. For example, what
+pertains to all kinds of trees—oaks, beeches, birches, firs—is the
+same "treeness." Under this inclusive genus—the "universal"—
+fall all real and possible trees. Is then the essence of technology,
+Enframing, the common genus for everything technological? If
+that were the case then the steam turbine, the radio transmitter,
+and the cyclotron would each be an Enframing. But the word
+"Enframing" does not mean here a tool or any kind of apparatus.
+Still less does it mean the general concept of such resources. The
+machines and apparatus are no more cases and kinds of Enframing than are the man at the switchboard and the engineer in
+the drafting room. Each of these in its own way indeed belongs
+as stockpart, available resource, or executer, within Enframing;
+but Enframing is never the essence of technology in the sense of
+a genus. Enframing is a way of revealing having the character of
+destining, namely, the way that challenges forth. The revealing
+that brings forth (poiesis) is also a way that has the character of
+destining. But these ways are not kinds that, arrayed beside one
+another, fall under the concept of revealing. Revealing is that
+destining which, ever suddenly and inexplicably to all thinking,
+apportions itself into the revealing that brings forth and that also
+challenges, and which allots itself to man. The challenging reveal-
+
+30
+ing has its origin as a destining in bringing-forth. But at the
+same time Enframing, in a way characteristic of a destining,
+blocks poiesis.
+Thus Enframing, as a destining of revealing, is indeed the
+essence of technology, but never in the sense of genus and
+essentia. If we pay heed to this, something astounding strikes us:
+It is technology itself that makes the demand on us to think in
+another way what is usually understood by "essence." But in
+what way?
+If we speak of the "essence of a house" and the "essence of a
+state," we do not mean a generic type; rather we mean the ways
+in which house and state hold sway, administer themselves,
+develop and decay—the way in which they "essence" [Wesen].
+Johann Peter Hebel in a poem, "Ghost on Kanderer Street," for
+which Goethe had a special fondness, uses the old word die
+Weserei. It means the city hall inasmuch as there the life of the
+community gathers and village existence is constantly in play, i.e.,
+comes to presence. It is from the verb wesen that the noun
+is derived. Wesen understood as a verb is the same as währen
+[to last or endure], not only in terms of meaning, but also in
+terms of the phonetic formation of the word. Socrates and Plato
+already think the essence of something as what essences, what
+comes to presence, in the sense of what endures. But they think
+what endures as what remains permanently [das Fortwährende]
+(aei on). And they find what endures permanently in what, as
+that which remains, tenaciously persists throughout all that happens. That which remains they discover, in turn, in the aspect
+[Aussehen] (eidos, idea), for example, the Idea "house."
+The Idea "house" displays what anything is that is fashioned
+as a house. Particular, real, and possible houses, in contrast, are
+changing and transitory derivatives of the Idea and thus belong
+to what does not endure.
+But it can never in any way be established that enduring is
+based solely on what Plato thinks as idea and Aristotle thinks
+as to ti en einai (that which any particular thing has always been),
+or what metaphysics in its most varied interpretations thinks as
+essentia.
+All essencing endures. But is enduring only permanent enduring? Does the essence of technology endure in the sense of
+
+31
+the permanent enduring of an Idea that hovers over everything
+technological, thus making it seem that by technology we mean
+some mythological abstraction? The way in which technology
+essences lets itself be seen only from out of that permanent
+enduring in which Enframing comes to pass as a destining of
+revealing. Goethe once uses the mysterious word fortgewähren
+[to grant permanently] in place of fortwähren [to endure permanently].* He hears währen [to endure] and gewähren [to grant]
+here in one unarticulated accord." And if we now ponder more
+carefully than we did before what it is that actually endures and
+perhaps alone endures, we may venture to say: Only what is
+granted endures. That which endures primally out of the earliest
+beginning is what grants.?5
+As the essencing of technology, Enframing is that which endures. Does Enframing hold sway at all in the sense of granting?
+No doubt the question seems a horrendous blunder. For according
+to everything that has been said, Enframing is, rather, a destining
+that gathers together into the revealing that challenges forth.
+Challenging is anything but a granting. So it seems, so long as
+we do not notice that the challenging-forth into the ordering
+of the real as standing-reserve still remains a destining that starts
+man upon a way of revealing. As this destining, the coming to
+presence of technology gives man entry into That which, of
+himself, he can neither invent nor in any way make. For there
+is no such thing as a man who, solely of himself, is only man.
+But if this destining, Enframing, is the extreme danger, not
+only for man's coming to presence, but for all revealing as such,
+should this destining still be called a granting? Yes, most emphat-
+*"Die Wahlverwandtschaften" [Congeniality], pt. II, chap. 10, in the
+novelette Die wunderlichen Nachbarskinder [The strange neighbor's chil-
+24. The verb gewähren is closely allied to the verbs währen (to endure)
+and wahren (to watch over, to keep safe, to preserve). Gewähren ordinarily
+means to be surety for, to warrant, to vouchsafe, to grant. In the discussion
+that follows, the verb will be translated simply with "to grant." But the
+reader should keep in mind also the connotations of safeguarding and
+guaranteeing that are present in it as well.
+25. Nur das Gewährte währt. Das anfänglich aus der Frühe Währende ist
+das Gewährende. A literal translation of the second sentence would be,
+of "the early," see n. 20 above.
+
+32
+ically, if in this destining the saving power is said to grow.
+Every destining of revealing comes to pass from out of a granting
+and as such a granting. For it is granting that first conveys to man
+that share in revealing which the coming-to-pass of revealing
+needs." As the one so needed and used, man is given to belong
+to the coming-to-pass of truth. The granting that sends in one
+way or another into revealing is as such the saving power. For the
+saving power lets man see and enter into the highest dignity of
+his essence. This dignity lies in keeping watch over the unconcealment-and with it, from the first, the concealment-of all
+coming to presence on this earth. It is precisely in Enframing,
+which threatens to sweep man away into ordering as the supposed single way of revealing, and so thrusts man into the
+danger of the surrender of his free essence-it is precisely in
+this extreme danger that the innermost indestructible belongingness of man within granting may come to light, provided that
+we, for our part, begin to pay heed to the coming to presence of
+technology.
+Thus the coming to presence of technology harbors in itself
+what we least suspect, the possible arising of the saving power.
+Everything, then, depends upon this: that we ponder this
+arising and that, recollecting, we watch over it. How can this
+happen? Above all through our catching sight of what comes
+to presence in technology, instead of merely staring at the technological So long as we represent technology as an instrument,
+we remain held fast in the will to master it. We press on past
+the essence of technology.
+When, however, we ask how the instrumental comes to presence as a kind of causality, then we experience this coming to
+presence as the destining of a revealing.
+When we consider, finally, that the coming to presence of the
+essence of technology comes to pass in the granting that needs
+and uses man so that he may share in revealing, then the following becomes clear:
+26. Here and subsequently in this essay, "coming-to-pass" translates the
+noun Ereignis. Elsewhere, in "The Turning," this word, in accordance with
+the deeper meaning that Heidegger there finds for it, will be translated with
+"disclosing that brings into its own." See I 45; see also Introduction, pp.
+xxxvi-xxxvii.
+
+33
+The essence of technology is in a lofty sense ambiguous. Such
+ambiguity points to the mystery of all revealing, i.e., of truth.
+On the one hand, Enframing challenges forth into the frenziedness of ordering that blocks every view into the coming-to-pass
+of revealing and so radically endangers the relation to the essence
+of truth.
+On the other hand, Enframing comes to pass for its part in the
+granting that lets man endure-as yet unexperienced, but perhaps more experienced in the future-that he may be the one
+who is needed and used for the safekeeping of the coming to
+presence of truth."" Thus does the arising of the saving power
+appear.
+The irresistibility of ordering and the restraint of the saving
+power draw past each other like the paths of two stars in the
+course of the heavens. But precisely this, their passing by, is the
+hidden side of their nearness.
+When we look into the ambiguous essence of technology, we
+behold the constellation, the stellar course of the mystery.
+The question concerning technology is the question concerning the constellation in which revealing and concealing, in which
+the coming to presence of truth, comes to pass.
+But what help is it to us to look into the constellation of truth?
+We look into the danger and see the growth of the saving power.
+Through this we are not yet saved. But we are thereupon summoned to hope in the growing light of the saving power. How
+can this happen? Here and now and in little things, that we may
+foster the saving power in its increase. This includes holding
+always before our eyes the extreme danger.
+The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing,
+threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only
+in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. Human activity can
+never directly counter this danger. Human achievement alone
+can never banish it. But human reflection can ponder the fact that
+27. 'Safekeeping" translates the noun Wahrnis, which is unique to Heidegger. Wahrnis is closely related to the verb wahren (to watch over, to
+keep safe, to preserve), integrally related to Wahrheit (truth), and closely
+akin to währen (to endure) and gewähren (to be surety for, to grant). On
+the meaning of Wahrnis, see T 42, n. 9 and n. 12 above.
+
+34
+all saving power must be of a higher essence than what is endangered, though at the same time kindred to it.
+But might there not perhaps be a more primally granted revealing that could bring the saving power into its first shining
+forth in the midst of the danger, a revealing that in the technological age rather conceals than shows itself?
+There was a time when it was not technology alone that bore
+the name techne. Once that revealing that brings forth truth into
+the splendor of radiant appearing also was called techne.
+Once there was a time when the bringing-forth of the true into
+the beautiful was called techne. And the poiesis of the fine arts
+also was called technē.
+In Greece, at the outset of the destining of the West, the arts
+soared to the supreme height of the revealing granted them.
+They brought the presence [Gegenwart] of the gods, brought the
+dialogue of divine and human destinings, to radiance. And art
+was simply called techne. It was a single, manifold revealing. It
+was pious, promos, i.e., yielding to the holding-sway and the
+safekeeping of truth.
+The arts were not derived from the artistic. Art works were
+not enjoyed aesthetically. Art was not a sector of cultural activity.
+What, then, was art—perhaps only for that brief but magnificent time? Why did art bear the modest name techne? Be-
+cause it was a revealing that brought forth and hither, and
+therefore belonged within poiesis. It was finally that revealing
+which holds complete sway in all the fine arts, in poetry, and in
+everything poetical that obtained poiesis as its proper name.
+The same poet from whom we heard the words
+But where danger is, grows
+The saving power also.
+says to us:
+...poetically dwells man upon this earth.
+The poetical brings the true into the splendor of what Plato
+in the Phaedrus calls to ekphanestaton, that which shines forth
+most purely. The poetical thoroughly pervades every art, every
+revealing of coming to presence into the beautiful.
+
+35
+Could it be that the fine arts are called to poetic revealing?
+Could it be that revealing lays claim to the arts most primally,
+so that they for their part may expressly foster the growth of
+the saving power, may awaken and found anew our look into that
+which grants and our trust in it?
+Whether art may be granted this highest possibility of its
+essence in the midst of the extreme danger, no one can tell. Yet
+we can be astounded. Before what? Before this other possibility:
+that the frenziedness of technology may entrench itself everywhere to such an extent that someday, throughout everything
+technological, the essence of technology may come to presence
+in the coming-to-pass of truth.
+Because the essence of technology is nothing technological,
+essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation
+with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to
+the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally
+different from it.
+Such a realm is art. But certainly only if reflection on art,
+for its part, does not shut its eyes to the constellation of truth
+after which we are questioning.
+Thus questioning, we bear witness to the crisis that in our sheer
+preoccupation with technology we do not yet experience the
+coming to presence of technology, that in our sheer aestheticmindedness we no longer guard and preserve the coming to
+presence of art. Yet the more questioningly we ponder the essence of technology, the more mysterious the essence of art
+becomes.
+The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the
+ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. For questioning is the piety of thought.
+
+The essence' of Enframing is that setting-upon gathered into
+itself which entraps the truth of its own coming to presence with
+oblivion.? This entrapping disguises itself, in that it develops
+1. Throughout this essay the noun Wesen will sometimes be given its
+traditional translation "essence," but more often it will be translated with
+"coming to presence." For Heidegger the essence of anything is its "enduring as presence." As such, it is the manner in which anything in its enduring comports itself effectually as what it is, i.e., the manner in which it
+"holds sway" through time (see QT 30; 3, n. 1). Thus in this essay the Wesen
+of that enframing summons-"Enframing," das Ge-stell-which governs the
+modern age is the "challenging setting-upon" (Stellen) that sets everything
+in place as supply, ruling in modern technology (cf. OT 15, n. 14; 19, n. 17);
+the Wesen of modern technology is Enframing itself; the Wesen of Being is
+the manner in which Being endures, at any given time, as the Being of
+whatever is (cf. p. 38); the Wesen of man is that dwelling in openness, accomplished through language and thinking, wherein Being can be and is
+preserved and set free into presence (cf. PP. 39-42 and "Time and Being" in
+On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh [New York: Harper & Row,
+1972], p. 12).
+2. Vergessenheit (oblivion) is not to be confused with the propensity to
+forget things or with a lapse of memory. In this essay, as for Heidegger
+generally, Vergessenheit is to be understood in the positive sense of the
+Greek lethē. It is that concealedness which is the source and foundation of
+all unconcealedness or truth (alētheia). There can be no unveiling unless
+there is concealment from whence it comes. The words of Heraclitus, physis
+kryptesthai philei-ordinarily translated "nature loves to hide"-would be
+rendered by Heidegger approximately as "concealedness is the very heart of
+coming into appearance" (from the transcript of the "Séminaire tenu au
+Thor en septembre 1969 par le Professeur Martin Heidegger, " p. 21).
+
+37
+into the setting in order of everything that presences as standingreserve, establishes itself in the standing-reserve, and rules as
+the standing-reserve.
+Enframing comes to presence as the danger. But does the danger therewith announce itself as the danger? No. To be sure,
+men are at all times and in all places exceedingly oppressed by
+dangers and exigencies. But the danger, namely, Being itself
+endangering itself in the truth of its coming to presence, remains
+veiled and disguised. This disguising is what is most dangerous
+in the danger. In keeping with this disguising of the danger
+through the ordering belonging to Enframing, it seems time and
+time again as though technology were a means in the hands of
+man. But, in truth, it is the coming to presence of man that is
+now being ordered forth to lend a hand to the coming to presence of technology.
+Does this mean that man, for better or worse, is helplessly
+delivered over to technology? No, it means the direct opposite;
+and not only that, but essentially it means something more than
+the opposite, because it means something different.
+If Enframing is a destining of the coming to presence of Being
+itself, then we may venture to suppose that Enframing, as one
+among Being's modes of coming to presence, changes. For what
+gives destining its character as destining is that it takes place so
+as suitably to adapt itself to the ordaining that is ever one. To
+take place so as to adapt means to set out in order to adjust
+fittingly to the directing already made apparent-for which another destining, yet veiled, is waiting. That which has the character of destining moves, in itself, at any given time, toward a
+special moment that sends it into another destining, in which,
+however, it is not simply submerged and lost. We are still too
+3. "Destining" translates Geschick, which ordinarily means skill, aptitude,
+fitness, as well as fate or destiny, and is here regularly rendered by "destining." The expressions "ordaining" and "takes place so as suitably to adapt
+itself" render words closely allied to Geschick. "Ordaining" translates
+Schickung, meaning providential decree, dispensation. "To take place so as
+suitably to adapt" translates the verb sich schicken, which means to come
+to pass or happen, to suit or be fit, to accommodate oneself, to agree with,
+to match or blend. In this essay, where Heidegger's central concern is with
+turning about, a changing of direction, the connotations of aptness, fitness,
+and self-adapting brought forward for Geschick in this passage should
+always be kept in mind for the word "destining." Cf. QT 24.
+
+38
+inexperienced and thoughtless to think the essence of the historical from out of destining and ordaining and taking place so
+as to adapt. We are still too easily inclined, out of habit, to
+conceive that which has the character of destining in terms of
+happening, and to represent the latter as an expiration, a passing
+away, of events that have been established historiographically.
+We locate history in the realm of happening, instead of thinking
+history in accordance with its essential origin from out of destining. But destining is essentially destining of Being, indeed
+in such a way that Being itself takes place so as to adapt itself,
+and ever comes to presence as a destining and, accordingly,
+changes in the manner of a destining. If a change in Being-
+i.e., now, in the coming to presence of Enframing-comes to
+pass, then this in no way means that technology, whose essence
+lies in Enframing, will be done away with.* Technology will not
+be struck down; and it most certainly will not be destroyed
+If the essence, the coming to presence, of technology, Enframing as the danger within Being, is Being itself, then technology
+will never allow itself to be mastered, either positively or negatively, by a human doing founded merely on itself. Technology,
+whose essence is Being itself, will never allow itself to be overcome by men. That would mean, after all, that man was the
+master of Being.
+Nevertheless, because Being, as the essence of technology, has
+adapted itself into Enframing, and because man's coming to
+presence belongs to the coming to presence of Being-inasmuch
+as Being's coming to presence needs the coming to presence of
+man, in order to remain kept safe as Being in keeping with its
+own coming to presence in the midst of whatever is, and thus
+4. The phrase "comes to pass" renders the German verb sich ereignet
+(from sich ereignen, to happen or take place). The noun treignis usually
+means, correspondingly, event. Later in this essay (p. 45), Heidegger points
+to the fact that Ereignis, and with it necessarily sich ereignen, embodies the
+meanings of the two verbs eignen (to be one's own, to suit, to belong to),
+and the archaic eräugnen (to bring before the eyes, to bring to sight). He
+says: Ereignis ist eignende Eräugnis ("Disclosing coming-to-pass is bringing-to-sight that brings into its own"') (p. 45). Although the introduction of
+this fullness of meaning for sich ereignen and Ereignis has been reserved
+in the translation for the point at which Heidegger's definitive statement is
+made, that meaning clearly informs the argument of the essay throughout
+and should therefore be borne in mind.
+
+39
+as Being to endure as present-for this reason the coming to
+presence of technology cannot be led into the change of its
+destining without the cooperation of the coming to presence of
+man. Through this cooperation, however, technology will not
+be overcome [überwunden] by men. On the contrary, the coming
+to presence of technology will be surmounted [verwunden] in a
+way that restores it into its yet concealed truth. This restoring
+surmounting is similar to what happens when, in the human
+realm, one gets over grief or pain. But the surmounting of a
+destining of Being—here and now, the surmounting of Enframing-each time comes to pass out of the arrival of another
+destining, a destining that does not allow itself either to be logically and historiographically predicted or to be metaphysically
+construed as a sequence belonging to a process of history. For
+never does the historical-let alone happening itself as represented historiographically-determine destining; but rather
+happening, together with the representation of the constancy
+assigned to it, is already in each instance that which, belonging
+to a destining of Being, has the character of destining.
+Man is indeed needed and used for the restorative surmounting of the essence of technology. But man is used here in his
+essence that corresponds to that surmounting. In keeping with
+this, man's essence must first open itself to the essence of technology. This opening is, in terms of that coming-to-pass which
+discloses, something quite different from the event of man's
+affirming technology and its means and promoting them. However, in order that man in his essence may become attentive to
+the essence of technology, and in order that there may be
+founded an essential relationship between technology and man
+in respect to their essence, modern man must first and above all
+find his way back into the full breadth of the space proper to
+his essence. That essential space of man's essential being receives the dimension that unites it to something beyond itself
+solely from out of the conjoining relation [Ver-hältnis] that is
+the way in which the safekeeping of Being itself is given to
+belong to the essence of man as the one who is needed and used
+by Being. Unless man first establishes himself beforehand in
+the space proper to his essence and there takes up his dwelling,
+he will not be capable of anything essential within the destining
+
+40
+now holding sway. In pondering this let us pay heed to a word
+of Meister Eckhart, as we think it in keeping with what is most
+fundamental to it. It reads: "Those who are not of a great
+essence, whatever work they perform, nothing comes of it"5
+(Reden der Unterscheidung, No. 4).
+It is toward the great essence of man that we are thinking,
+inasmuch as man's essence belongs to the essence of Being and
+is needed by Being to keep safe the coming to presence of Being
+into its truth.
+Therefore, what is necessary above all is this: that beforehand
+we ponder the essence of Being as that which is worthy of
+thinking; that beforehand, in thinking this, we experience to
+what extent we are called upon first to trace a path for such
+experiencing and to prepare that path as a way into that which
+till now has been impassable.
+All this we can do only if, before considering the question that
+is seemingly always the most immediate one and the only urgent
+one, What shall we do? we ponder this: How must we think?
+For thinking is genuine activity, genuine taking a hand, if to
+take a hand means to lend a hand to the essence, the coming to
+presence, of Being. This means: to prepare (build) for the coming to presence of Being that abode in the midst of whatever is
+into which Being brings itself and its essence to utterance in
+language. Language first gives to every purposeful deliberation
+its ways and its byways. Without language, there would be
+lacking to every doing every dimension in which it could bestir
+5. Die nitt von grossem wesen sind, was werk die wirken, da wirt nit us.
+6. inmitten des Seienden. "Whatever is" here translates Seienden, the
+present participle of the German verb sein (to be) used as a noun. The
+necessity in English of translating Sein, when it appears as a noun, with
+"Being" precludes the possibility of the use of the most obvious translation,
+"being." for Seiendes. A phrase such as the "Being of being" or "Being in
+the midst of being" would clearly present unacceptable difficulties. Heidegger does not intend das Seiende to refer primarily to any mere aggregate of
+entities or beings, let alone to a particular being. The word connotes for
+him, first of all, the intricately interrelated entirety of all that is, in whose
+"is" Being is made manifest. The verbal force of the participle is always
+significantly present. In these essays, the translation of das Seiende will
+vary according to the demands of particular contexts. The translations
+"what is," "whatever is," "that which is," "what is in being," "whatever is
+in being," and "that which is in being" will ordinarily be used.
+
+41
+itself and be effective. In view of this, language is never primarily the expression of thinking, feeling, and willing. Language
+is the primal dimension within which man's essence is first able
+to correspond at all to Being and its claim, and, in corresponding, to belong to Being. This primal corresponding, expressly
+carried out, is thinking. Through thinking, we first learn to dwell
+in the realm in which there comes to pass the restorative surmounting of the destining of Being, the surmounting of En-
+framing.
+The coming to presence of Enframing is the danger. As the
+danger, Being turns about into the oblivion of its coming to
+presence, turns away from this coming to presence, and in that
+way simultaneously turns counter to the truth of its coming to
+presence. In the danger there holds sway this turning about not
+yet thought on. In the coming to presence of the danger there
+conceals itself, therefore, the possibility of a turning in which
+the oblivion belonging to the coming to presence of Being will
+so turn itself that, with this turning, the truth of the coming to
+presence of Being will expressly turn in-turn homeward—into
+whatever is?
+Yet probably this turning-the turning of the oblivion of
+Being into the safekeeping belonging to the coming to presence
+of Being-will finally come to pass only when the danger, which
+is in its concealed essence ever susceptible of turning, first comes
+expressly to light as the danger that it is. Perhaps we stand
+already in the shadow cast ahead by the advent of this turning.
+When and how it will come to pass after the manner of a destining no one knows. Nor is it necessary that we know. A knowl-
+7. "Will turn in—turn homeward—" translates einkehrt. The verb
+einkehren means to turn in, to enter, to put up at an inn, to alight, to stay.
+The related noun Einkehr, translated in this essay as "in-turning," means
+putting up at an inn; an inn or lodging. Einkehren and Einkehr speak of a
+thorough being at home that yet partakes of the transiency belonging to
+the ongoing. Both words suggest the Heimkehr (homecoming) important
+in Heidegger's earlier Hölderlin essays. The allusion to a transient abiding
+made here in these words leads toward Heidegger's culminating portrayal
+of the turning within Being as a self-clearing, i.e., a self-opening-up, as
+which and into which Being's own self-lighting that is a self-manifesting
+entering brings itself to pass. Cf. pp. 44-45, where we find, in immediate
+conjunction with Einkehr, the introduction of the nouns Einblick (entering,
+flashing glance, insight) and Einblitz (in-flashing).
+
+42
+edge of this kind would even be most ruinous for man, because
+his essence is to be the one who waits, the one who attends upon
+the coming to presence of Being in that in thinking he guards it.
+Only when man, as the shepherd of Being, attends upon the
+truth of Being can he expect an arrival of a destining of Being
+and not sink to the level of a mere wanting to know.
+But what happens there where the danger comes to pass as
+the danger and is thus for the first time unconcealedly danger?
+That we may hear the answer to this question, let us give heed
+to the beckoning sign that is preserved in some words of Hölderlin. At the beginning of the later version of his Hymn "Patmos,"
+the poet says:
+But where danger is, grows
+The saving power also.*
+If now we think these words still more essentially than the
+poet sang them, if we follow them in thought as far as they go,
+they say: Where the danger is as the danger, there the saving
+power is already thriving also. The latter does not appear incidentally. The saving power is not secondary to the danger. The
+selfsame danger is, when it is as the danger, the saving power.
+The danger is the saving power, inasmuch as it brings the saving
+power out of its—the danger's—concealed essence that is ever
+susceptible of turning. What does "to save" mean? It means to
+loose, to emancipate, to free, to spare and husband, to harbor
+protectingly, to take under one's care, to keep safe. Lessing still
+uses the word "saving" emphatically, in the sense of vindication, i.e., to put something back into what is proper and right,
+into the essential, and to keep it safe therein. That which genuinely saves is that which keeps safe, safekeeping.?
+* Von Hellingrath, ed., IV, 227.
+8. in das Rechte, wesenhafte zurückstellen.
+9. The preceding three sentences make plain with peculiar force the meaning that Heidegger intends for the verb wahren (to keep safe) and the
+noun Wahrnis (safekeeping). His equating here of these two words with
+das Rettende (the saving-power) draws into them all the connotations of
+freeing and safeguarding that he has just established for the latter. Wahren,
+ordinarily understood as to watch over, to keep safe, to preserve—and with
+it Wahrnis-clearly carries, simultaneously, connotations of freeing, i.e., of
+allowing to be manifest. The same connotations are resident in all the
+
+43
+But where is the danger? What is the place for it? Inasmuch
+as the danger is Being itself, it is both nowhere and everywhere.
+It has no place as something other than itself. It is itself the
+placeless dwelling place of all presencing. The danger is the
+epoch of Being coming to presence as Enframing. 1°
+When the danger is as the danger, then its coming to presence
+expressly comes to pass. But the danger is the entrapping that
+is the way in which Being itself, in the mode of Enframing, pursues with oblivion the safekeeping belonging to Being. In the
+entrapping, what comes to presence is this, that Being dismisses
+and puts away its truth into oblivion in such a way that Being
+denies its own coming to presence. When, accordingly, the danger is as the danger, then the entrapping that is the way Being
+itself entraps its truth with oblivion comes expressly to pass.
+When this entrapping-with-oblivion does come expressly to pass,
+then oblivion as such turns in and abides. Thus rescued through
+this abiding from falling away out of remembrance, it is no longer
+oblivion. With such in-turning, the oblivion relating to Being's
+safekeeping is no longer the oblivion of Being; but rather, turning
+in thus, it turns about into the safekeeping of Being. When the
+danger is as the danger, with the turning about of oblivion, the
+safekeeping of Being comes to pass; world comes to pass.* That
+world comes to pass as world, that the thing things, this is the
+distant advent of the coming to presence of Being itself.
+The self-denying of the truth of Being, which entraps itself
+with oblivion, harbors the favor as yet ungranted, that this selfentrapping will turn about; that, in such turning, oblivion will
+turn and become the safekeeping belonging to the coming to
+words built on wahr. They should be heard in Wahrheit (truth), which, in the
+discussion now in progress, is often used—sometimes all but interchangeably-with Wahrnis. For the common derivation of wahren and Wahrheit,
+and hence of other words built on the stem wahr, and for the fundamental
+meaning therein, cf. SR 164-165.
+10. Heidegger never intends "epoch" simply in the sense of "era" or
+"age." "Epoch" always carries for him the meaning of the Greek epoche, i.e.,
+withholding-to-self (Ansichhalten). Cf. "Time and Being," On Time and
+Being, p. 9. Here, then, the meaning is that the danger is the self-withholding of Being enduring as present in the mode of Enframing.
+* Cf. "The Thing," in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 165 ff.
+
+44
+presence of Being, instead of allowing that coming to presence
+to fall into disguise. In the coming to presence of the danger there
+comes to presence and dwells a favor, namely, the favor of the
+turning about of the oblivion of Being into the truth of Being.
+In the coming to presence of the danger, where it is as the danger, is the turning about into the safekeeping, is this safekeeping
+itself, is the saving power of Being.
+When the turning comes to pass in the danger, this can happen only without mediation. For Being has no equal whatever.
+It is not brought about by anything else nor does it itself bring
+anything about. Being never at any time runs its course within
+a cause-effect coherence. Nothing that effects, as Being, precedes
+the mode in which it—Being itself-takes place so as to adapt
+itself; and no effect, as Being, follows after. Sheerly, out of its
+own essence of concealedness, Being brings itself to pass into
+its epoch. Therefore we must pay heed:
+The turning of the danger comes to pass suddenly. In this
+turning, the clearing belonging to the essence of Being suddenly
+clears itself and lights up. This sudden self-lighting is the
+lightning-flash. It brings itself into its own brightness, which
+it itself both brings along and brings in. When, in the turning
+of the danger, the truth of Being flashes, the essence of Being
+clears and lights itself up. Then the truth of the essence, the
+coming to presence, of Being turns and enters in.
+Toward where does in-turning bring itself to pass? Toward
+nowhere except into Being itself, which is as yet coming to
+presence out of the oblivion of its truth. But this same Being
+comes to presence as the coming to presence of technology. The
+coming to presence of technology is Enframing. In-turning, as
+the bringing to pass of the turning about of oblivion, turns in
+into that which now is the epoch of Being. That which genuinely
+" is in no way this or that particular being. What genuinely
+is, i.e., what expressly dwells and endures as present in the "is,"
+is uniquely Being. Only Being "is," only in Being and as Being
+does that which the "is" names bring itself to pass; that which
+is, is Being from out of its essence.!?
+11. Das was eigentlich ist.
+12. 'That which is" here translates das was ist. In the discussion that begins at this point, Heidegger is clearly employing a usage that must force
+
+45
+"To flash [blitzen], in terms both of its derivation and of what
+it designates, is "to glance" [blicken]. In the flashing glance and
+as that glance, the essence, the coming to presence, of Being
+enters into its own emitting of light. Moving through the element
+of its own shining, the flashing glance retrieves that which it
+catches sight of and brings it back into the brightness of its
+own looking. And yet that glancing, in its giving of light, simultaneously keeps safe the concealed darkness of its origin as
+the unlighted. The in-turning [Einkehr] that is the lightningflash of the truth of Being is the entering, flashing glanceinsight [Einblick]. We have thought the truth of Being in the
+worlding of world as the mirror play of the fourfold of sky and
+earth, mortals and divinities.* When oblivion turns about, when
+world as the safekeeping of the coming to presence of Being
+turns in, then there comes to pass the in-flashing [Einblitz] of
+world into the injurious neglect of the thing." That neglect
+comes to pass in the mode of the rule of Enframing. In-flashing
+of world into Enframing is in-flashing of the truth of Being into
+truthless Being. In-flashing is the disclosing coming-to-pass
+within Being itself. Disclosing coming-to-pass [Ereignis] is bringing to sight that brings into its own [eignende Eräugnis].
+any German reader to think afresh; by specifically distinguishing das was
+ist from any use of the present participle Seiendes for "this or that particular being." he can set forth a distinction apparent in the words themselves.
+For the English-speaking reader of this volume, however, a different and
+more difficult problem remains. Since das Seiende is very often translated
+in these essays with "what is," "whatever is," and "that which is," confusion could easily result in the present context. Only in the discussion
+now underway, in two related passages in QT (Pp. 25, 27), and in one other
+instance (WN 97) will "that which is" translate forms of das was ist; das
+Seiende will be translated variously as "what is," "what is in being," and
+"that which is in being."
+* Cf. Poetry, Language, Thought, 165ff.
+13. "Injurious neglect" translates Verwahrlosung. Doubtless we should
+hear in Verwahrlosung-a noun built on the verb verwahren (to keep,
+guard, secure, protect) with the negating prefix los-—connotations that go
+beyond its ordinary meaning of neglect and injury caused by neglect, and
+that accord with those of manifesting that Heidegger finds resident in the
+stem wahr (cf. p. 42, n. 9). In this and in the following sentence in the text,
+the reader should be reminded of the character of Enframing as that "setting-upon that challenges forth" which sets everything in place as supply,
+which orders everything as standing-reserve and hence keeps nothing safe,
+i.e., leaves nothing free to be as it genuinely is.
+
+46
+Insight into that which is—this designation now names the
+disclosing that brings into its own that is the coming-to-pass
+of the turning within Being, of the turning of the denial of
+Being's coming to presence into the disclosing coming-to-pass of
+Being's safekeeping. Insight into that which is, is itself the disclosing that brings into its own, as which the truth of Being
+relates itself and stands in relation to truthless Being. Insight
+into that which is—this names the constellation in the essence
+of Being. This constellation is the dimension in which Being
+comes to presence as the danger.
+From the first and almost to the last it has seemed as though
+"insight into that which is" means only a glance such as we
+men throw out from ourselves into what is. We ordinarily take
+"that which is" to be whatever is in being. For the "is" is asserted of what is in being. But now everything has turned about.
+Insight does not name any discerning examination [Einsicht]
+into what is in being that we conduct for ourselves; insight
+[Einblick] as in-flashing [Einblitz] is the disclosing coming-topass of the constellation of the turning within the coming to
+presence of Being itself, and that within the epoch of Enframing. That which is, is in no way that which is in being. For the
+"it is" and the "is" are accorded to what is in being only inasmuch as what is in being is appealed to in respect to its Being
+In the "is," "Being" is uttered: that which "is," in the sense that
+it constitutes the Being of what is in being, is Being.14
+The ordering belonging to Enframing sets itself above the
+thing, leaves it, as thing, unsafeguarded, truthless.'5 In this way
+Enframing disguises the nearness of world that nears in the thing.
+Enframing disguises even this, its disguising, just as the forgetting of something forgets itself and is drawn away in the
+wake of forgetful oblivion. The coming-to-pass of oblivion not
+only lets fall from remembrance into concealment; but that
+falling itself falls simultaneously from remembrance into concealment, which itself also falls away in that falling.
+14. On the relation between das Sein (Being) and das Seiende (what is)
+see "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics," in Identity and
+Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 64,
+132.
+15. ungewahrt, wahrlos.
+
+47
+And yet—in all the disguising belonging to Enframing, the
+bright open-space of world lights up, the truth of Being flashes.
+At the instant, that is, when Enframing lights up, in its coming
+to presence, as the danger, i.e., as the saving-power. In Enframing, moreover, as a destining of the coming to presence of Being,
+there comes to presence a light from the flashing of Being. En-
+framing is, though veiled, still glance, and no blind destiny in
+the sense of a completely ordained fate.
+Insight into that, which is—thus do we name the sudden flash
+of the truth of Being into truthless Being.
+When insight comes disclosingly to pass, then men are the
+ones who are struck in their essence by the flashing of Being.
+In insight, men are the ones who are caught sight of.
+Only when man, in the disclosing coming-to-pass of the insight by which he himself is beheld, renounces human self-will
+and projects himself toward that insight, away from himself,
+does he correspond in his essence to the claim of that insight.
+In thus corresponding man is gathered into his own [ge-eignet],16
+that he, within the safeguarded element of world, may, as the
+mortal, look out toward the divine.
+Otherwise not; for the god also is—when he is—a being and
+stands as a being within Being and its coming to presence, which
+brings itself disclosingly to pass out of the worlding of world."
+16. The translation "gathered into his own" for ge-eignet takes cognizance of the prefix ge-, which Heidegger has separated from the verb eignen
+(to be one's own). Heidegger repeatedly stresses the force of ge- as meaning
+"gathering." Cf. e.g., QT 19. Here the suggestion of gathering points to
+man's belonging within the wholly mutual interrelating of the fourfold of
+sky and earth, divinities and mortals. The ensuing allusions to "the divine"
+and "the god" bespeak the same context of thought (cf. "The Thing,"
+Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. 178 ff.). Ge-eignet speaks specifically of
+that bringing into its own which is the disclosing coming-to-pass (Ereignis)
+of the "insight into that which is" that is the in-flashing of Being into its
+own enduring as presence-the in-flashing that brings to pass, in Being's
+manifesting of itself to itself, the worlding of world and the thinging of the
+thing.
+17. "The god" of whom Heidegger speaks is not the god of the metaphysical-theological tradition of Christendom. Heidegger characteristically
+thinks of a dimension of the divine that the divinities make manifest—as
+among the Greeks, or for the Hebrew prophets, or in the preaching of
+Jesus-and toward which they beckon man. He can speak of the modern
+age as "the time of the gods that have fled and of the god that is coming"
+("Remembrance of the Poet," Tr. Douglas Scott, in Existence and Being,
+
+48
+Only when insight brings itself disclosingly to pass, only when
+the coming to presence of technology lights up as Enframing, do
+we discern how, in the ordering of the standing-reserve, the truth
+of Being remains denied as world. Only then do we notice that
+all mere willing and doing in the mode of ordering steadfastly
+persists in injurious neglect. In this same way all mere organizing of the world conceived and represented historiographically
+in terms of universality remains truthless and without foundation. All mere chasing after the future so as to work out a picture of it through calculation in order to extend what is present
+and half-thought into what, now veiled, is yet to come, itself
+still moves within the prevailing attitude belonging to technological, calculating representation. All attempts to reckon existing
+reality morphologically, psychologically, in terms of decline and
+loss, in terms of fate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merely
+technological behavior. That behavior operates through the device of the enumerating of symptoms whose standing-reserve
+can be increased to infinity and always varied anew. Such
+analyses of the "situation" do not notice that they are working
+only according to the meaning and manner of technological
+dissecting, and that they thus furnish to the technological consciousness the historiographical-technological presentation of
+happening commensurate with that consciousness. But no historiographical representation of history as happening ever brings
+us into the proper relation to destining, let alone into the essential
+origin of destining in the disclosing coming-to-pass of the truth
+of Being that brings everything into its own.
+All that is merely technological never arrives at the essence
+of technology. It cannot even once recognize its outer precincts.
+Therefore, as we seek to give utterance to insight into that
+which is, we do not describe the situation of our time. It is the
+constellation of Being that is uttering itself to us.
+But we do not yet hear, we whose hearing and seeing are perishing through radio and film under the rule of technology. The
+introd. and analysis by Werner Brock [Chicago: Regnery, 1949], p. 288),
+and can anticipate a time when, through the fulfillment of the essence of
+that age, Being will make itself accessible to genuine questioning, and
+"ample space" will therewith be opened "for the decision as to whether
+Being will once again become capable of a god" (AWP 153).
+
+49
+constellation of Being is the denial of world, in the form of injurious neglect of the thing. Denial is not nothing; it is the
+highest mystery of Being within the rule of Enframing.
+Whether the god lives or remains dead is not decided by the
+religiosity of men and even less by the theological aspirations
+of philosophy and natural science. Whether or not God is God
+comes disclosingly to pass from out of and within the constellation of Being.
+So long as we do not, through thinking, experience what is,
+we can never belong to what will be.
+Will insight into that which is bring itself disclosingly to pass?
+Will we, as the ones caught sight of, be so brought home into
+the essential glance of Being that we will no longer elude it?
+Will we arrive thereby within the essence of the nearness that,
+in thinging the thing, brings world near? Will we dwell as those
+at home in nearness, so that we will belong primally within the
+fourfold of sky and earth, mortals and divinities?
+Will insight into that which is bring itself disclosingly to pass?
+Will we correspond to that insight, through a looking that looks
+into the essence of technology and becomes aware of Being itself
+within it?
+Will we see the lightning-flash of Being in the essence of technology? The flash that comes out of stillness, as stillness itself?
+Stillness stills. What does it still? It stills Being into the coming
+to presence of world.
+May world in its worlding be the nearest of all nearing that
+nears, as it brings the truth of Being near to man's essence, and
+so gives man to belong to the disclosing bringing-to-pass that
+is a bringing into its own.
+
+Part I1
+
+The Word of Nietzsche:
+"God Is Dead"
+The following exposition attempts to point the way toward the
+place from which it may be possible someday to ask the question
+concerning the essence of nihilism.' The exposition stems from
+a thinking that is for once just beginning to gain some clarity
+concerning Nietzsche's fundamental position within the history
+of Western metaphysics. This pointing of the way will clarify
+a stage in Western metaphysics that is probably its final stage;
+for inasmuch as through Nietzsche metaphysics has in a certain
+sense divested itself of its own essential possibility, other possibilities of metaphysics can no longer appear. Through the overturning of metaphysics accomplished by Nietzsche,? there remains for metaphysics nothing but a turning aside into its own
+inessentiality and disarray. The suprasensory is transformed
+1. 'Essence" will be the translation of the noun Wesen throughout this
+essay. The reader should continually keep in mind that the "essence" of
+metaphysics or of nihilism, of the will to power or of value or of truth,
+always means fundamentally for Heidegger the manner in which each, in
+its ongoing presence, "holds sway" and prevails as whatever it is. See QT 3,
+n. 1, 30.
+2. Throughout this essay the word "overturning" (Umkehrung) is used in
+the sense of an upsetting or a turning upside down, never in the sense of
+an overcoming or conquest (Überwindung).
+
+54
+into an unstable product of the sensory. And with such a debasement of its antithesis, the sensory denies its own essence. The
+deposing of the suprasensory does away with the merely sensory
+and thus with the difference between the two. The deposing of
+the suprasensory culminates in a "neither-nor" in relation to
+the distinction between the sensory (aestheton) and the nonsensory (noẽton). It culminates in meaninglessness. It remains,
+nevertheless, the unthought and invincible presupposition of its
+own blind attempts to extricate itself from meaninglessness
+through a mere assigning of sense and meaning.
+In what follows, metaphysics is thought as the truth of what
+is as such in its entirety, and not as the doctrine of any particular
+thinker. Each thinker has at any given time his fundamental
+philosophical position within metaphysics. Therefore a particular metaphysics can be called by his name. However, according to what is here thought as the essence of metaphysics, that
+does not mean in any way that metaphysics at any given time is
+the accomplishment and possession of the thinker as a personality within the public framework of creative cultural activity. In
+every phase of metaphysics there has been visible at any particular time a portion of a way that the destining of Being
+prepares as a path for itself over and beyond whatever is, in
+sudden epochs of truth.3 Nietzsche himself interprets the course
+of Western history metaphysically, and indeed as the rise and
+development of nihilism. The thinking through of Nietzsche's
+metaphysics becomes a reflection on the situation and place of
+contemporary man, whose destiny is still but little experienced
+with respect to its truth. Every reflection of such a kind, however, if it is not simply an empty, repetitious reporting, remains
+out beyond what usually passes for reflection.* Its going beyond
+is not merely a surmounting and is not at all a surpassing; moreover, it is not an immediate overcoming. The fact that we are
+reflecting on Nietzsche's metaphysics does not mean that, in
+addition to considering his ethics and his epistemology and his
+aesthetics, we are also and above all taking note of his metaphysics; rather it means simply that we are trying to take
+3. On the meaning of "epoch," see T 43, n. 10.
+4. Besinnung. On the meaning of this word, see SR 155 n. 1.
+
+55
+Nietzsche seriously as a thinker. But also, to think means this
+for Nietzsche: to represent what is as what is. Any metaphysical
+thinking is onto-logy or it is nothing at all."
+For the reflection we are attempting here, it is a question of
+preparing for a simple and inconspicuous step in thought. What
+matters to preparatory thinking is to light up that space within
+which Being itself might again be able to take man, with respect
+to his essence, into a primal relationship. To be preparatory is
+the essence of such thinking.
+That thinking, which is essential and which is therefore everywhere and in every respect preparatory, proceeds in an unpretentious way. Here all sharing in thinking, clumsy and groping
+though it may be, is an essential help. Sharing in thinking proves
+to be an unobtrusive sowing—a sowing that cannot be authenticated through the prestige or utility attaching to it—by sowers
+who may perhaps never see blade and fruit and may never know
+a harvest. They serve the sowing, and even before that they
+serve its preparation.
+Before the sowing comes the plowing. It is a matter of making
+the field capable of cultivation, the field that through the unavoidable predominance of the land of metaphysics has had to
+remain in the unknown. It is a matter first of having a presentiment of, then of finding, and then of cultivating, that field. It
+is a matter of taking a first walk to that field. Many are the ways,
+still unknown, that lead there. Yet always to each thinker there
+is assigned but one way, his own, upon whose traces he must
+again and again go back and forth that finally he may hold
+to it as the one that is his own—although it never belongs to
+him-and may tell what can be experienced on that one way.
+Perhaps the title Being and Time is a road marker belonging
+5. The word "onto-logy" is built from the Greek present participle ontos
+(being). Ontos is paralleled by Heidegger's use of the German present
+participle das Seiende employed as a noun, literally, being, i.e., what is,
+what has or is in being. The meaning of "what is"
+can extend from "a
+being" to the most inclusive encompassing of whatever is as such, in its
+entirety. For Heidegger connotations of inclusiveness regularly predominate.
+Das Seiende stands always in reciprocal and mutually determinative relation to das Sein, the German infinitive translated "Being." On this relation,
+see "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics," in Identity and
+Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pP.
+64, 132.
+
+56
+to such a way. In accordance with the essential interwovenness
+of metaphysics with the sciences, which are counted among
+metaphysics' own offspring-an interwovenness demanded by
+metaphysics itself and forever sought anew—preparatory thinking must move from time to time in the sphere of the sciences;
+for the sciences, in manifold ways, always claim to give the
+fundamental form of knowing and of the knowable, in advance,
+whether deliberately or through the kind of currency and effectiveness that they themselves possess. The more unequivocally
+the sciences press on toward their predetermined technological
+essence and its distinctive character, the more decisively does
+the question concerning the possibility of knowledge laid claim
+to in technology clarify itself-the question concerning the kind
+and limits of that possibility and concerning its title to rightness.
+An education in thinking in the midst of the sciences is part
+of preparatory thinking and its fulfillment. To find the suitable
+form for this, so that such education in thinking does not fall
+victim to a confusion with research and erudition, is the hard
+thing. This objective is in danger, then, above all when thinking
+is simultaneously and continually under the obligation of first
+finding its own abode. To think in the midst of the sciences
+means to pass near them without disdaining them.
+We do not know what possibilities the destining of Western
+history holds in store for our people and the West. Moreover,
+the external shaping and ordering of those possibilities is not
+primarily what is needed. It is important only that learners in
+thinking should share in learning and, at the same time, sharing
+in teaching after their manner, should remain on the way and
+be there at the right moment.
+The following exposition confines itself in its aim and scope to
+the sphere of the one experience from out of which Being and
+Time is thought. That thinking is concerned unceasingly with
+one single happening: In the history of Western thinking, indeed
+continually from the beginning, what is, is thought in reference
+to Being; yet the truth of Being remains unthought, and not only
+is that truth denied to thinking as a possible experience, but
+Western thinking itself, and indeed in the form of metaphysics,
+expressly, but nevertheless unknowingly, veils the happening of
+that denial.
+
+57
+Preparatory thinking therefore maintains itself necessarily
+within the realm of historical reflection. For this thinking, history
+is not the succession of eras, but a unique nearness of the Same®
+that, in incalculable modes of destining and out of changing
+immediacy, approaches and concerns thinking.
+What is important to us now is the reflection pertaining to
+Nietzsche's metaphysics. Nietzsche's thinking sees itself as belonging under the heading "nihilism." That is the name for a
+historical movement, recognized by Nietzsche, already ruling
+throughout preceding centuries, and now determining this century. Nietzsche sums up his interpretation of it in the brief
+statement: "God is dead."
+One could suppose that the pronouncement "God is dead"
+expresses an opinion of Nietzsche the atheist and is accordingly
+only a personal attitude, and therefore one-sided, and for that
+reason also easily refutable through the observation that today
+everywhere many men seek out the houses of God and endure
+hardships out of a trust in God as defined by Christianity. But
+the question remains whether the aforesaid word of Nietzsche
+is merely an extravagant view of a thinker about whom the
+correct assertion is readily at hand: he finally went mad. And
+it remains to ask whether Nietzsche does not rather pronounce
+here the word that always, within the metaphysically determined
+history of the West, is already being spoken by implication.
+Before taking any position too hastily, we must first try to think
+this pronouncement, "God is dead," in the way in which it is
+6. For Heidegger the "Same" is a unity that—far from being abstract and
+simple-is rather a together that involves a reciprocal relation of belonging
+That unity of belonging together springs out of the disclosing bringinginto-its-own (Ereignis) that is the unique bringing-to-pass that takes place
+within Being itself (cf. T 45 ff.). It holds sway in the primal relatings of
+Being and what is, and of Being and man. Thus the Same is that very difference, that separating-between (Unter-Schied), out of which Being and
+what is endure as present in their differentiating, which is an indissoluble
+relating. And again, "thinking and Being belong together into the Same
+and from out of the Same." (See "The Principle of Identity," in Identity and
+Difference, pp. 27 ff., 90 ff.) Thus the Same of which Heidegger here speaks
+is the Same in the sense of the belonging together that rules in the modes
+of the destining of the Being of what is, and that concerns a thinking that
+apprehends that Being as determined out of that unity which gives distinctiveness while uniting. (See "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics," in Identity and Difference, pp. 64 ff., 133 ff.)
+
+58
+intended. To that end, therefore, we would do well to put aside
+all premature opinions that immediately obtrude for us at this
+dreadful word.
+The following reflections attempt to elucidate Nietzsche's pronouncement in a few essential respects. Once again let it be
+emphasized: The word of Nietzsche speaks of the destining of
+two millennia of Western history. We ourselves, unprepared as
+we are, all of us together, must not suppose that through a lecture on the word of Nietzsche we can alter this destining or even
+simply learn to know it adequately. Even so, this one thing is
+now necessary: that out of reflection we receive instruction, and
+that on the way of instruction we learn to reflect.
+Every exposition must of course not only draw upon the substance of the text; it must also, without presuming, imperceptibly
+give to the text something out of its own substance. This part
+that is added is what the layman, judging on the basis of what
+he holds to be the content of the text, constantly perceives as
+a meaning read in, and with the right that he claims for himself
+criticizes as an arbitrary imposition. Still, while a right elucidation never understands the text better than the author understood it, it does surely understand it differently. Yet this difference must be of such a kind as to touch upon the Same toward
+which the elucidated text is thinking.
+Nietzsche spoke the word "God is dead" for the first time in
+the third book of his work The Gay Science, which appeared
+in the year 1882. With that work begins Nietzsche's way toward
+the development of his fundamental metaphysical position. Be-
+tween it and his vain efforts at shaping his proposed masterpiece
+lies the publication of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The proposed
+masterpiece was never completed. Tentatively it was to bear the
+title "The Will to Power" and to receive the subtitle "Attempt
+at a Revaluation of All Values."
+The strange notion of the death of a god and the dying of the
+gods was already familiar to the younger Nietzsche. In a note
+from the time of the completion of his first work, The Birth of
+Tragedy, Nietzsche writes (1870): "I believe in the ancient German saying: 'All gods must die.' " The young Hegel, at the end
+of his treatise Faith and Knowledge (1802), names the "feeling
+on which rests the religion of the modern period-the feeling
+
+59
+God himself is dead. ... " Hegel's pronouncement carries a
+thought different from that contained in the word of Nietzsche.
+Still, there exists between the two an essential connection that
+conceals itself in the essence of all metaphysics. The word of
+Pascal, taken from Plutarch, "Le grand Pan est mort" ["Great
+Pan is dead"] (Pensées, 694), belongs within the same realm,
+even if for contrary reasons.
+Let us listen, to begin with, to the full text of section no. 125,
+from the work The Gay Science. The piece is entitled "The Madman" and runs:
+The Madman. Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern
+in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly, "I seek God! I seek God!" As many of those who do
+not believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked
+much laughter. Why, did he get lost? said one. Did he lose his way
+like a child? said another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has
+he gone on a voyage? or emigrated? Thus they yelled and laughed
+The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his
+glances.
+"Whither is God" he cried. "I shall tell you. We have killed him—
+you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how have we done this?
+How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to
+wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained
+this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we
+moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually?
+Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or
+down left? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do
+we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder?
+Is not night and more night coming on all the while? Must not
+lanterns be lit in the morning? Do we not hear anything yet of the
+noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell
+anything yet of God's decomposition? Gods too decompose. God is
+dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we,
+the murderers of all murderers, comfort ourselves? What was holiest
+and most powerful of all that the world has yet owned has bled to
+death under our knives. Who will wipe this blood off us? What
+water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must not we ourselves become
+gods simply to seem worthy of it? There has never been a greater
+
+60
+deed; and whoever will be born after us-for the sake of this deed
+he will be part of a higher history than all history hitherto."
+Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners;
+and they too were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last
+he threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke and went out.
+"I come too early," he said then; "my time has not come yet. This
+tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering—it has not yet
+reached the ears of man. Lightning and thunder require time, the
+light of the stars requires time, deeds require time even after they
+are done, before they can be seen and heard. This deed is still more
+distant from them than the most distant stars-and yet they have
+done it themselves."
+It has been related further that on that same day the madman
+entered divers churches and there sang his requiem aeternam deo.
+Led out and called to account, he is said to have replied each time,
+"What are these churches now if they are not the tombs and
+sepulchers of God?'™
+Four years later (1886) Nietzsche added to the four books of
+The Gay Science a fifth, which is entitled "We Fearless Ones."
+Over the first section in that book (Aphorism 343) is inscribed
+"The Meaning of Our Cheerfulness." The piece begins, "The
+greatest recent event—that 'God is dead,' that the belief in the
+Christian god has become unbelievable—is already beginning to
+cast its first shadows over Europe."
+From this sentence it is clear that Nietzsche's pronouncement
+7. The translation of this passage is from Walter Kaufmann's The
+Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking, 1968), pp. 95-96. The quotations
+from Nietzsche in this essay are regularly taken from Kaufmann or Kaufmann-Hollingdale translations when these are available. In some instances
+quotations have been revised, usually only slightly, where the context of
+Heidegger's thinking makes changes necessary so as to bring out the meaning that Heidegger sees in Nietzsche's words. The following is a list of
+passages where alterations in translation have been made; page numbers in
+parentheses refer to pages in this volume. From The Will to Power, trans.
+Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1968) :
+Aph 2 (p. 66), Aph. 1021 (p. 69), Aph. 28 (p. 69), Aph. 14 (p. 70), Aph. 715
+(p. 71), Aph. 556 (p. 73), Aph. 715 (p. 74), Aph. 14 (p. 74), Aph. 675 (p. 77-
+78), Aph. 853 (p. 85). From On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter
+Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967): Third Essay, Section I (p.
+79). From Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York:
+Random House, 1967): Aph. 23 (p. 79). From Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in
+The Portable Nietzsche; Close, Part I (p. 111). In all quotations, italics
+Nietzsche's unless otherwise indicated.
+
+61
+concerning the death of God means the Christian god. But it is
+no less certain, and it is to be considered in advance, that the
+terms "God" and "Christian god" in Nietzsche's thinking are
+used to designate the suprasensory world in general. God is
+the name for the realm of Ideas and ideals. This realm of the
+suprasensory has been considered since Plato, or more strictly
+speaking, since the late Greek and Christian interpretation of
+Platonic philosophy, to be the true and genuinely real world.
+In contrast to it the sensory world is only the world down here,
+the changeable, and therefore the merely apparent, unreal world
+The world down here is the vale of tears in contrast to the mountain of everlasting bliss in the beyond. If, as still happens in
+Kant, we name the sensory world the physical in the broader
+sense, then the suprasensory world is the metaphysical world.
+The pronouncement "God is dead" means: The suprasensory
+world is without effective power. It bestows no life. Metaphysics,
+i.e., for Nietzsche Western philosophy understood as Platonism,
+is at an end. Nietzsche understands his own philosophy as the
+countermovement to metaphysics, and that means for him a
+movement in opposition to Platonism.
+Nevertheless, as a mere countermovement it necessarily remains, as does everything "anti," held fast in the essence of that
+over against which it moves. Nietzsche's countermovement
+against metaphysics is, as the mere turning upside down of
+metaphysics, an inextricable entanglement in metaphysics, in
+such a way, indeed, that metaphysics is cut off from its essence
+and, as metaphysics, is never able to think its own essence.
+Therefore, what actually happens in metaphysics and as metaphysics itself remains hidden by metaphysics and for metaphysics.
+If God as the suprasensory ground and goal of all reality is
+dead, if the suprasensory world of the Ideas has suffered the
+loss of its obligatory and above all its vitalizing and upbuilding
+power, then nothing more remains to which man can cling and
+by which he can orient himself. That is why in the passage just
+cited there stands this question: "Are we not straying as through
+an infinite nothing?' The pronouncement "God is dead" contains the confirmation that this Nothing is spreading out.
+"Nothing" means here: absence of a suprasensory, obligatory
+
+62
+world. Nihilism, "the most uncanny of all guests," is standing
+at the door.
+The attempt to elucidate Nietzsche's word "God is dead" has
+the same significance as does the task of setting forth what
+Nietzsche understands by "nihilism" and of thus showing how
+Nietzsche himself stands in relation to nihilism. Yet, because
+this name is often used only as a catchword and slogan and
+frequently also as an invective intended to prejudice, it is necessary to know what it means. Not everyone who appeals to his
+Christian faith or to some metaphysical conviction or other stands
+on that account definitely outside nihilism. Conversely also,
+however, not everyone who troubles himself with thoughts about
+Nothing and its essence is a nihilist.
+This name is readily used in such a tone as would indicate
+that the mere designation "nihilist," without one's even thinking
+to oneself anything specific in the word, already suffices to provide proof that a reflection on Nothing inevitably leads to a
+plunge into Nothing and means the establishment of the dictatorship of Nothing.
+Actually, we should be asking whether the name "nihilism,"
+thought strictly in the sense of Nietzsche's philosophy, has only
+a nihilistic, i.e., a negative, meaning, one that floats off into the
+void of nothingness. Given the vague and arbitrary use of the
+word "nihilism," it is surely necessary, before a thorough discussion of what Nietzsche himself says about nihilism, to gain
+the right perspective from which we may first begin to question
+concerning nihilism.
+Nihilism is a historical movement, and not just any view or
+doctrine advocated by someone or other. Nihilism moves history
+after the manner of a fundamental ongoing event that is scarcely
+recognized in the destining of the Western peoples. Hence nihilism is also not simply one historical phenomenon among others—
+not simply one intellectual current that, along with others, with
+Christendom, with humanism, and with the Enlightenment—
+also comes to the fore within Western history.
+Nihilism, thought in its essence, is, rather, the fundamental
+movement of the history of the West. It shows such great profundity that its unfolding can have nothing but world catastrophes as its consequence. Nihilism is the world-historical move-
+
+63
+ment of the peoples of the earth who have been drawn into the
+power realm of the modern age. Hence it is not only a phenomenon of the present age, nor is it primarily the product of
+the nineteenth century, in which to be sure a perspicacious eye
+for nihilism awoke and the name also became current. No more
+is nihilism the exclusive product of particular nations whose
+thinkers and writers speak expressly of it. Those who fancy
+themselves free of nihilism perhaps push forward its development most fundamentally. It belongs to the uncanniness of this
+uncanny guest that it cannot name its own origin.
+Nihilism also does not rule primarily where the Christian god
+is disavowed or where Christianity is combated; nor does it rule
+exclusively where common atheism is preached in a secular setting. So long as we confine ourselves to looking only at this
+unbelief turned aside from Christianity, and at the forms in
+which it appears, our gaze remains fixed merely on the external
+and paltry façades of nihilism. The speech of the madman says
+specifically that the word "God is dead" has nothing in common
+with the opinions of those who are merely standing about and
+talking confusedly, who "do not believe in God." For those who
+are merely believers in that way, nihilism has not yet asserted
+itself at all as the destining of their own history.
+So long as we understand the word "God is dead" only as a
+formula of unbelief, we are thinking it theologically in the manner of apologetics, and we are renouncing all claims to what
+matters to Nietzsche, i.e., to the reflection that ponders what has
+already happened regarding the truth of the suprasensory world
+and regarding its relation to man's essence.
+Hence, also, nihilism in Nietzsche's sense in no way coincides
+with the situation conceived merely negatively, that the Christian god of biblical revelation can no longer be believed in, just
+as Nietzsche does not consider the Christian life that existed
+once for a short time before the writing down of the Gospels
+and before the missionary propaganda of Paul to belong to
+Christendom. Christendom for Nietzsche is the historical, worldpolitical phenomenon of the Church and its claim to power
+within the shaping of Western humanity and its modern culture.
+Christendom in this sense and the Christianity of New Testament faith are not the same. Even a non-Christian life can affirm
+
+64
+Christendom and use it as a means of power, just as, conversely,
+a Christian life does not necessarily require Christendom. Therefore, a confrontation with Christendom is absolutely not in any
+way an attack against what is Christian, any more than a critique
+of theology is necessarily a critique of faith, whose interpretation theology is said to be. We move in the flatlands of the
+conflicts between world views so long as we disregard these
+essential distinctions.
+In the word "God is dead" the name "God," thought essentially, stands for the suprasensory world of those ideals which
+contain the goal that exists beyond earthly life for that life
+and that, accordingly, determines life from above, and also in
+a certain way, from without. But now when unalloyed faith in
+God, as determined through the Church, dwindles away, when
+in particular the doctrine of faith, theology, in its role of serving
+as the normative explanation of that which is as a whole, is
+curtailed and thrust aside, then the fundamental structuring,
+in keeping with which the fixing of goals, extending into the
+suprasensory, rules sensory, earthly life, is in no way thereby
+shattered as well.
+Into the position of the vanished authority of God and of the
+teaching office of the Church steps the authority of conscience,
+obtrudes the authority of reason. Against these the social instinct
+rises up. The flight from the world into the suprasensory is
+replaced by historical progress. The otherworldly goal of everlasting bliss is transformed into the earthly happiness of the
+greatest number. The careful maintenance of the cult of religion
+is relaxed through enthusiasm for the creating of a culture or
+the spreading of civilization. Creativity, previously the unique
+property of the biblical god, becomes the distinctive mark of
+human activity. Human creativity finally passes over into business enterprise.
+Accordingly, that which must take the place of the suprasensory world will be variations on the Christian-ecclesiastical and
+theological interpretation of the world, which took over its
+schema of the ordo of the hierarchy of beings from the Jewish-
+Hellenistic world, and whose fundamental structure was established and given its ground through Plato at the beginning of
+Western metaphysics.
+
+65
+The realm for the essence and the coming-to-pass of nihilism
+is metaphysics itself—provided always that we do not mean by
+this name a doctrine, let alone only one particular discipline of
+philosophy, but that we think rather on the fundamental structuring of that which is, as a whole, insofar as that whole is
+differentiated into a sensory and a suprasensory world and the
+former is supported and determined by the latter. Metaphysics
+is history's open space wherein it becomes a destining that the
+suprasensory world, the Ideas, God, the moral law, the authority
+of reason, progress, the happiness of the greatest number, culture, civilization, suffer the loss of their constructive force and
+become void. We name this decay in the essence of the suprasensory its disessentializing [Verwesung].® Unbelief in the sense
+of a falling away from the Christian doctrine of faith is, therefore, never the essence and the ground, but always only a consequence, of nihilism; for it could be that Christendom itself
+represents one consequence and bodying-forth of nihilism.
+From here we are able also to recognize the last aberration to
+which we remain exposed in comprehending and supposedly
+combating nihilism. Because we do not experience nihilism as a
+historical movement that has already long endured, the ground
+of whose essence lies in metaphysics, we succumb to the ruinous
+passion for holding phenomena that are already and simply
+consequences of nihilism for the latter itself, or we set forth the
+consequences and effects as the causes of nihilism. In our
+thoughtless accommodation to this way of representing matters,
+we have for decades now accustomed ourselves to cite the
+dominance of technology or the revolt of the masses as the
+cause of the historical condition of the age, and we tirelessly
+dissect the intellectual situation of the time in keeping with such
+views. But every analysis of man and his position in the midst
+of what is, however enlightened and ingenious it may be, remains
+8. The noun Verwesung in ordinary usage means decomposition, and the
+corresponding verb verwesen means to perish or decay. Heidegger here uses
+Verwesung in a quite literal sense, to refer to that ongoing event of the
+deposing of the suprasensory world in which the suprasensory loses its
+essence. As this event takes place, culminating in Nietzsche's decisive work
+of the overturning of metaphysics, metaphysics, as the truth of what is as
+such, becomes the very reverse of itself and enters into its own nonenduring.
+
+66
+thoughtless, and engenders only the semblance of reflection so
+long as it fails to think on the place of habitation proper to man's
+essence and to experience that place in the truth of Being.
+So long as we merely take the appearances of nihilism for nihilism itself, our taking of a position in relation to nihilism
+remains superficial. It is not one whit less futile when, out of
+dissatisfaction with the world situation, or out of half-avowed
+despair or moral indignation, or a believer's self-righteous superiority, it assumes a certain defensive vehemence.
+In contrast to this, it is important above all that we reflect.
+Therefore, let us now ask Nietzsche himself what he understands
+by nihilism, and let us leave it open at first whether with this
+understanding Nietzsche after all touches on or can touch nihilism's essence.
+In a note from the year 1887 Nietzsche poses the question,
+"What does nihilism mean?" (Will to Power, Aph. 2). He answers: "That the highest values are devaluing themselves."
+This answer is underlined and is furnished with the explanatory amplification: "The aim is lacking; 'Why?' finds no answer."
+According to this note Nietzsche understands nihilism as an
+ongoing historical event. He interprets that event as the devaluing of the highest values up to now. God, the suprasensory world
+as the world that truly is and determines all, ideals and Ideas,
+the purposes and grounds that determine and support everything
+that is and human life in particular-all this is here represented
+as meaning the highest values. In conformity with the opinion
+that is even now still current, we understand by this the true,
+the good, and the beautiful; the true, i.e., that which really is;
+the good, i.e., that upon which everything everywhere depends;
+the beautiful, i.e., the order and unity of that which is in its
+entirety. And yet the highest values are already devaluing themselves through the emerging of the insight that the ideal world
+is not and is never to be realized within the real world. The
+obligatory character of the highest values begins to totter. The
+question arises: Of what avail are these highest values if they
+do not simultaneously render secure the warrant and the ways
+and means for a realization of the goals posited in them?
+If, however, we were to insist on understanding Nietzsche's
+definition of the essence of nihilism in so many words as the
+
+67
+becoming valueless of the highest values, then we would have
+that conception of the essence of nihilism that has meanwhile become current and whose currency is undoubtedly strengthened
+through its being labeled "nihilism": to wit, that the devaluing
+of the highest values obviously means decay and ruin. Yet for
+Nietzsche nihilism is not in any way simply a phenomenon of
+decay; rather nihilism is, as the fundamental event of Western
+history, simultaneously and above all the intrinsic law of that
+history. For that reason, in his observations about nihilism
+Nietzsche gives scant attention to depicting historiographically
+the ongoing movement of the event of the devaluing of the highest values and to discovering definitively from this, through
+calculation, the downfall of the West; rather Nietzsche thinks
+nihilism as the "inner logic" of Western history.
+With this, Nietzsche recognizes that despite the devaluing for
+the world of the highest values hitherto, the world itself remains;
+and he recognizes that, above all, the world, become value-less,
+presses inevitably on toward a new positing of values. After the
+former values have become untenable, the new positing of values
+changes, in respect to those former values, into a "revaluing of
+all values." The no to the values hitherto comes out of a yes to
+the new positing of values. Because in this yes, according to
+Nietzsche's view, there is no accommodation to or compromise
+with the former values, the absolute no belongs within this yes
+to the new value-positing. In order to secure the unconditionality
+of the new yes against falling back toward the previous values,
+i.e., in order to provide a foundation for the new positing of
+values as a countermovement, Nietzsche even designates the
+new positing of values as "nihilism," namely, as that nihilism
+through which the devaluing to a new positing of values that is
+alone definitive completes and consummates itself. This definitive phase of nihilism Nietzsche calls "completed," i.e., classical,
+nihilism. Nietzsche understands by nihilism the devaluing of
+the highest values up to now. But at the same time he takes an
+affirmative stand toward nihilism in the sense of a "revaluing
+of all previous values." Hence the name "nihilism" remains
+ambiguous, and seen in terms of its two extremes, always has
+first of all a double meaning, inasmuch as, on the one hand, it
+designates the mere devaluing of the highest values up to now,
+
+68
+but on the other hand it also means at the same time the unconditional countermovement to devaluing. Pessimism, which
+Nietzsche sees as the prefiguration of nihilism, is already twofold also, in the same sense. According to Schopenhauer, pessimism is the belief that in this worst of worlds life is not worth
+being lived and affirmed. According to this doctrine, life, and
+that means at the same time all existence as such, is to be denied
+This pessimism is, according to Nietzsche, the "pessimism of
+weakness." It sees everywhere only gloom, finds in everything
+a ground for failure, and claims to know how everything will
+turn out, in the sense of a thoroughgoing disaster. Over against
+this, the pessimism of strength as strength is under no illusion,
+perceives what is dangerous, wants no covering up and glossing
+over. It sees to the heart of the ominousness of mere impatient
+waiting for the return of what has been heretofore. It penetrates
+analytically into phenomena and demands consciousness of the
+conditions and forces that, despite everything, guarantee mastery
+over the historical situation.
+A more essential reflection could show how in what Nietzsche
+calls the pessimism of strength there is accomplished the rising
+up of modern humanity into the unconditional dominion of subjectivity within the subjectness of what is." Through pessimism
+9. "Subjectness" translates Subjektität, a word formed by Heidegger to
+lies before). As such, subjectness has ruled from ancient times, while yet
+it has changed with the change in the destining of Being that took place at
+the beginning of the modern age and has reached consummation, through
+Nietzsche's metaphysics, in the subjectriess of the will to power. In like
+manner, throughout Western history what is has been appearing as subject,
+though with a transformation corresponding to that change in the destining
+of Being. What is appeared as the hypokeimenon for the Greeks. Subsequently, the character of the hypokeimenon was transformed into the selfconscious, self-assertive subject, which, in its subjectivity, holds sway in our
+age. Heidegger writes elsewhere that the name "subjectness" "should emphasize the fact that Being is determined in terms of the subiectum, but
+not necessarily by an ego." Subjectness "names the unified history of Being,
+beginning with the essential character of Being as idea up to the completion
+of the modern essence of Being as the will to power." (The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh [New York: Harper & Row, 1973], pp. 46, 48.
+Professor Stambaugh translates Subjektität as "subiectity.") Later in this
+essay (pp. 79 ff.), Heidegger will take up the discussion adumbrated in this
+sentence and this word.
+
+69
+in its twofold form, extremes become manifest. Those extremes
+as such maintain the ascendancy. There thus arises a situation
+in which everything is brought to a head in the absoluteness of
+an "either-or." An "in-between situation" comes to prevail in
+which it becomes evident that, on the one hand, the realization
+of the highest values hitherto is not being accomplished. The
+world appears value-less. On the other hand, through this making conscious, the inquiring gaze is directed toward the source
+of the new positing of values, but without the world's regaining
+its value at all in the process.
+To be sure, something else can still be attempted in face of
+the tottering of the dominion of prior values. That is, if God in
+the sense of the Christian god has disappeared from his authoritative position in the suprasensory world, then this authoritative place itself is still always preserved, even though as that
+which has become empty. The now-empty authoritative realm
+of the suprasensory and the ideal world can still be adhered to.
+What is more, the empty place demands to be occupied anew
+and to have the god now vanished from it replaced by something else. New ideals are set up. That happens, according to
+Nietzsche's conception (Will to Power, Aph. 1021, 1887), through
+doctrines regarding world happiness, through socialism, and
+equally through Wagnerian music, i.e., everywhere where "dogmatic Christendom" has "become bankrupt." Thus does "incomplete nihilism" come to prevail. Nietzsche says about the latter:
+"Incomplete nihilism: its forms: we live in the midst of it.
+Attempts to escape nihilism without revaluing our values so far:
+they produce the opposite, make the problem more acute" (Will
+to Power, Aph. 28, 1887).
+We can grasp Nietzsche's thoughts on incomplete nihilism
+more explicitly and exactly by saying: Incomplete nihilism does
+indeed replace the former values with others, but it still posits
+the latter always in the old position of authority that is, as it
+were, gratuitously maintained as the ideal realm of the suprasensory. Completed nihilism, however, must in addition do away
+even with the place of value itself, with the suprasensory as a
+realm, and accordingly must posit and revalue values differently.
+From this it becomes clear that the "revaluing of all previous
+values" does indeed belong to complete, consummated, and
+
+70
+therefore classical nihilism, but the revaluing does not merely
+replace the old values with new. Revaluing becomes the overturning of the nature and manner of valuing. The positing of
+values requires a new principle, i.e., a new principle from which
+it may proceed and within which it may maintain itself. The
+positing of values requires another realm. The principle can no
+longer be the world of the suprasensory become lifeless. Therefore nihilism, aiming at a revaluing understood in this way, will
+seek out what is most alive. Nihilism itself is thus transformed
+into "the ideal of superabundant life" (Will to Power, Aph. 14,
+1887). In this new highest value there is concealed another appraisal of life, i.e., of that wherein lies the determining essence
+of everything living. Therefore it remains to ask what Nietzsche
+understands by life.
+The allusion to the various levels and forms of nihilism shows
+that nihilism according to Nietzsche's interpretation is, throughout, a history in which it is a question of values—the establishing
+of values, the devaluing of values, the revaluing of values; it is a
+question of the positing of values anew and, ultimately and
+intrinsically, a question of the positing of the principle of all
+value-positing—a positing that values differently. The highest
+purposes, the grounds and principles of whatever is, ideals and
+the suprasensory, God and the gods-all this is conceived in
+advance as value. Hence we grasp Nietzsche's concept of nihilism
+adequately only when we know what Nietzsche understands by
+value. It is from here that we understand the pronouncement
+"God is dead" for the first time in the way in which it is thought.
+A sufficiently clear exposition of what Nietzsche thinks in the
+word "value" is the key to an understanding of his metaphysics.
+It was in the nineteenth century that talk of values became
+current and thinking in terms of values became customary. But
+only after the dissemination of the writings of Nietzsche did
+talk of values become popular. We speak of the values of life,
+of cultural values, of eternal values, of the hierarchy of values,
+of spiritual values, which we believe we find in the ancients,
+for example. Through scholarly preoccupation with philosophy
+and through the reconstructions of Neo-Kantianism, we arrive
+at value-philosophy. We build systems of values and pursue in
+ethics classifications of values. Even in Christian theology we
+
+71
+define God, the summum ens qua summum bonum, as the highest value. We hold science to be value-free and relegate the
+making of value judgments to the sphere of world views. Value
+and the valuable become the positivistic substitute for the metaphysical. The frequency of talk about values is matched by a
+corresponding vagueness of the concept. This vagueness, for its
+part, corresponds to the obscurity of the essential origin of value
+from out of Being. For allowing that value, so often invoked in
+such a way, is not nothing, it must surely have its essence in
+Being.
+What does Nietzsche understand by value? Wherein is the
+essence of value grounded? Why is Nietzsche's metaphysics the
+metaphysics of values?
+Nietzsche says in a note (1887-88) what he understands by
+value: "The point-of-view of 'value' is the point-of-view constituting the preservation-enhancement conditions with respect
+to complex forms of relative duration of life within becoming"
+(Will to Power, Aph. 715).1°
+The essence of value lies in its being a point-of-view. Value
+means that upon which the eye is fixed. Value means that which
+is in view for a seeing that aims at something or that, as we say,
+reckons upon something and therewith must reckon with something else. Value stands in intimate relation to a so-much, to
+quantity and number. Hence values are related to a "numerical
+and mensural scale" (Will to Power, Aph. 710, 1888). The question still remains: Upon what is the scale of increase and decrease, in its turn, grounded?
+Through the characterization of value as a point-of-view there
+results the one consideration that is for Nietzsche's concept of
+value essential: as a point-of-view, value is posited at any given
+time by a seeing and for a seeing. This seeing is of such a kind
+that it sees inasmuch as it has seen, and that it has seen inasmuch
+as it has set before itself and thus posited what is sighted, as a
+10. Italics Heidegger's. "Point-of-view" (Gesichtspunkt) is hyphenated in
+order to differentiate it from its usual meaning, point of view as a subjective opinion or standpoint. The latter meaning is present in Gesichtspunkt
+as it is used here; but Heidegger stresses immediately that what is mainly
+involved in valuing for Nietzsche is, rather, a focusing on the point that is
+in view.
+
+72
+particular something. It is only through this positing which is a
+representing that the point that is necessary for directing the
+gaze toward something, and that in this way guides the path of
+sight, becomes the aim in view—i.e., becomes that which matters
+in all seeing and in all action guided by sight. Values, therefore,
+are not antecedently something in themselves so that they can on
+occasion be taken as points-of-view.
+Value is value inasmuch as it counts." It counts inasmuch as
+it is posited as that which matters. It is so posited through an
+aiming at and a looking toward that which has to be reckoned
+upon. Aim, view, field of vision, mean here both the sight beheld
+and seeing, in a sense that is determined from out of Greek
+thought, but that has undergone the change of idea from eidos
+to perceptio. Seeing is that representing which since Leibniz has
+been grasped more explicitly in terms of its fundamental characteristic of striving (appetitus). All being whatever is a putting
+forward or setting forth, inasmuch as there belongs to the Being
+of whatever is in being the nisus—the impetus to come forward
+—that enjoins anything to arise (to appear) and thus determines
+its coming forth. The essence of everything that is—an essence
+thus possessed of nisus-lays hold of itself in this way and
+posits for itself an aim in view. That aim provides the perspective
+that is to be conformed to. The aim in view is value.
+According to Nietzsche, with values as points-of-view, "preservation-enhancement conditions" are posited. Precisely through
+this way of writing, in which the "and" is omitted between
+"preservation" and "enhancement" and replaced with a hyphen,
+Nietzsche wants to make clear that values as points-of-view are
+essentially and therefore constantly and simultaneously conditions of preservation and enhancement. Where values are posited, both ways of serving as conditions must be constantly kept
+in view in such a way that they remain unitively related to one
+another. Why? Obviously, simply because any being which, as
+such, represents and strives, itself so is in its essence that it
+requires these twofold aims in view. For what do values as
+points-of-view serve as conditions, if they must function simul-
+11. gilt. The verb gelten has a range of meaning extending from to be of
+worth or force; through to have influence, to pass current, and to be real or
+true; to, to rest upon or have at stake.
+
+73
+taneously as conditions of preservation as well as of enhancement?
+Preservation and enhancement mark the fundamental tendencies of life, tendencies that belong intrinsically together. To the
+essence of life belongs the will to grow, enhancement. Every
+instance of life-preservation stands at the service of lifeenhancement. Every life that restricts itself to mere preservation
+is already in decline. The guaranteeing of space in which to live,
+for example, is never the goal for whatever is alive, but is only
+a means to life-enhancement. Conversely, life that is enhanced
+heightens in turn its prior need to expand its space. But nowhere
+is enhancement possible where a stable reserve is not already
+being preserved as secure, and in this way as capable of enhancement. Anything that is alive is therefore something that is
+bound together by the two fundamental tendencies of enhancement and preservation, i.e., a "complex form of life." Values,
+as points-of-view, guide seeing "with respect to complex forms."
+This seeing is at any given time a seeing on behalf of a viewto-life that rules completely in everything that lives. In that it
+posits the aims that are in view for whatever is alive, life, in its
+essence, proves to be value-positing (cf. Will to Power, Aph.
+556, 1885-86).
+"Complex forms of life" are oriented with reference to conditions of preserving and stabilizing, and indeed in such a way
+that what is stable stands fast only in order to become, in enhancement, what is unstable. The duration of these complex
+forms of life depends on the reciprocal relationship of enhancement and preservation. Hence duration is something comparative. It is always the "relative duration" of what is alive, i.e.,
+of life.
+Value is, according to Nietzsche's words, the "point-of-view
+constituting the preservation-enhancement conditions with respect to complex forms of relative duration of life within becoming." Here and in the conceptual language of Nietzsche's
+metaphysics generally, the stark and indefinite word "becoming" does not mean some flowing together of all things or a
+mere change of circumstances; nor does it mean just any development or unspecified unfolding. "Becoming" means the passing
+over from something to something, that moving and being moved
+
+74
+which Leibniz calls in the Monadology (chap. 11) the changements naturels, which rule completely the ens qua ens, i.e., the
+ens percipiens et appetens [perceptive and appetitive being].
+Nietzsche considers that which thus rules to be the fundamental
+characteristic of everything real, i.e., of everything that is, in
+the widest sense. He conceives as the "will to power" that which
+thus determines in its essentia whatever is.
+When Nietzsche concludes his characterization of the essence
+of value with the word "becoming," then this closing word gives
+the clue to the fundamental realm within which alone values
+and value-positing properly belong. "Becoming" is, for Nietzsche,
+the "will to power." The "will to power" is thus the fundamental
+characteristic of "life," which word Nietzsche often uses also in
+the broad sense according to which, within metaphysics (cf.
+Hegel), it has been equated with "becoming." "Will to power,"
+"becoming." "life," and "Being" in the broadest sense—these
+mean, in Nietzsche's language, the Same (Will to Power, Aph.
+582, 1885-86, and Aph. 689, 1888). Within becoming, life—i.e.,
+aliveness—shapes itself into centers of the will to power particularized in time. These centers are, accordingly, ruling configurations. Such Nietzsche understands art, the state, religion,
+science, society, to be. Therefore Nietzsche can also say: "Value
+is essentially the point-of-view for the increasing or decreasing
+of these dominating centers" (that is, with regard to their ruling
+character) (Will to Power, Aph. 715, 1887-88).
+Inasmuch as Nietzsche, in the above-mentioned defining of
+the essence of value, understands value as the condition—having
+the character of point-of-view—of the preservation and enhancement of life, and also sees life grounded in becoming as the will
+to power, the will to power is revealed as that which posits
+that point-of-view. The will to power is that which, out of its
+"internal principle" (Leibniz) as the nisus esse of the ens, judges
+and esteems in terms of values. The will to power is the ground
+of the necessity of value-positing and of the origin of the possibility of value judgment. Thus Nietzsche says: "Values and
+their changes are related to the increase in power of that which
+posits them" (Will to Power, Aph. 14, 1887)."
+12. Italics Heidegger's.
+
+75
+Here it is clear: values are the conditions of itself posited by
+the will to power. Only where the will to power, as the fundamental characteristic of everything real, comes to appearance,
+i.e., becomes true, and accordingly is grasped as the reality of
+everything real, does it become evident from whence values
+originate and through what all assessing of value is supported
+and directed. The principle of value-positing has now been recognized. Henceforth value-positing becomes achievable "in principle," i.e., from out of Being as the ground of whatever is.
+Hence the will to power is, as this recognized, i.e., willed,
+principle, simultaneously the principle of a value-positing that
+is new. It is new because for the first time it takes place consciously out of the knowledge of its principle. This value-positing
+is new because it itself makes secure to itself its principle and
+simultaneously adheres to this securing as a value posited out
+of its own principle. As the principle of the new value-positing,
+however, the will to power is, in relation to previous values, at
+the same time the principle of the revaluing of all such values.
+Yet, because the highest values hitherto ruled over the sensory
+from the height of the suprasensory, and because the structuring of this dominance was metaphysics, with the positing of the
+new principle of the revaluing of all values there takes place the
+overturning of all metaphysics. Nietzsche holds this overturning
+of metaphysics to be the overcoming of metaphysics. But every
+overturning of this kind remains only a self-deluding entanglement in the Same that has become unknowable.
+Inasmuch as Nietzsche understands nihilism as the intrinsic
+law of the history of the devaluing of the highest values hitherto,
+but explains that devaluing as a revaluing of all values, nihilism
+lies, according to Nietzsche's interpretation, in the dominance
+and in the decay of values, and hence in the possibility of valuepositing generally. Value-positing itself is grounded in the will
+to power. Therefore Nietzsche's concept of nihilism and the
+pronouncement "God is dead" can be thought adequately only
+from out of the essence of the will to power. Thus we will complete the last step in the clarifying of that pronouncement when
+we explain what Nietzsche thinks in the name coined by him,
+"the will to power."
+The name "will to power" is considered to be so obvious
+
+76
+in meaning that it is beyond comprehension why anyone would
+be at pains specifically to comment on this combination of words.
+For anyone can experience for himself at any time what "will"
+means. To will is to strive after something. Everyone today
+knows, from everyday experience, what power means as the
+exercise of rule and authority. Will "to" power is, then, clearly
+the striving to come into power.
+According to this opinion the appellation "will to power" presupposes two disparate factors and puts them together into a
+subsequent relation, with "willing" on one side and "power" on
+the other. If we ask, finally, concerning the ground of the will
+to power, not in order merely to express it in other words but
+also simultaneously to explain it, then what we are shown is that
+it obviously originates out of a feeling of lack, as a striving
+after that which is not yet a possession. Striving, the exercise
+of authority, feeling of lack, are ways of conceiving and are
+states (psychic capacities) that we comprehend through psychological knowledge. Therefore the elucidation of the essence of
+the will to power belongs within psychology.
+The view that has just been presented concerning the will
+to power and its comprehensibility is indeed enlightening, but
+it is a thinking that in every respect misses both what Nietzsche
+thinks in the word "will to power" and the manner in which he
+thinks it. The name "will to power" is a fundamental term in
+the fully developed philosophy of Nietzsche. Hence this philosophy can be called the metaphysics of the will to power. We will
+never understand what "will to power" in Nietzsche's sense
+means with the aid of just any popular conception regarding
+willing and power; rather we will understand only on the way
+that is a reflection beyond metaphysical thinking, and that means
+at the same time beyond the whole of the history of Western
+metaphysics.
+The following elucidation of the essence of the will to power
+thinks out of these contexts. But it must at the same time, even
+while adhering to Nietzsche's own statements, also grasp these
+more clearly than Nietzsche himself could immediately utter
+them. However, it is always only what already has become more
+meaningful for us that becomes clearer to us. What is meaningful is that which draws closer to us in its essence. Everywhere
+
+77
+here, in what has preceded and in what follows, everything is
+thought from out of the essence of metaphysics and not merely
+from out of one of its phases.
+In the second part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which appeared
+the year after the work The Gay Science (1883), Nietzsche for
+the first time names the "will to power" in the context out of
+which it must be understood: "Where I found the living, there
+I found will to power; and even in the will of those who serve I
+found the will to be master."
+To will is to will-to-be-master. Will so understood is also even
+in the will of him who serves. Not, to be sure, in the sense that
+the servant could aspire to leave his role of subordinate to become himself a master. Rather the subordinate as subordinate,
+the servant as servant, always wills to have something else under
+him, which he commands in the midst of his own serving and of
+which he makes use. Thus is he as subordinate yet a master.
+Even to be a slave is to will-to-be-master.
+The will is not a desiring, and not a mere striving after something, but rather, willing is in itself a commanding (cf. Thus
+Spoke Zarathustra, parts I and II; see also Will to Power, Aph.
+668, 1888). Commanding has its essence in the fact that the
+master who commands has conscious disposal over the possibilities for effective action. What is commanded in the command
+is the accomplishing of that disposal. In the command, the one
+who commands (not only the one who executes) is obedient to
+that disposing and to that being able to dispose, and in that
+way obeys himself. Accordingly, the one who commands proves
+superior to himself in that he ventures even his own self. Commanding, which is to be sharply distinguished from the mere
+ordering about of others, is self-conquest and is more difficult
+than obeying. Will is gathering oneself together for the given
+task. Only he who cannot obey himself must still be expressly
+commanded. What the will wills it does not merely strive after
+as something it does not yet have. What the will wills it has
+already. For the will wills its will. Its will is what it has willed.
+The will wills itself. It mounts beyond itself. Accordingly, the
+will as will wills out beyond itself and must at the same time
+in that way bring itself behind itself and beneath itself. Therefore Nietzsche can say: "To will at all is the same thing as to
+
+78
+will to become stronger, to will to grow ... " (Will to Power,
+Aph. 675, 1887-88).13 "Stronger" means here "more power,"
+and that means: only power. For the essence of power lies in
+being master over the level of power attained at any time. Power
+is power only when and only so long as it remains powerenhancement and commands for itself "more power." Even a
+mere pause in power-enhancement, even a mere remaining at a
+standstill at a level of power, is already the beginning of the
+decline of power. To the essence of power belongs the overpowering of itself. Such overpowering belongs to and springs
+from power itself, in that power is command and as command
+empowers itself for the overpowering of its particular level of
+power at any given time. Thus power is indeed constantly on
+the way to itself, but not as a will, ready at hand somewhere for
+itself, which, in the sense of a striving, seeks to come to power.
+Moreover; power does not merely empower itself for the overpowering of its level of power at any given time, for the sake of
+reaching the next level; but rather it empowers itself for this
+reason alone: to attain power over itself in the unconditionality
+belonging to its essence. Willing is, according to this defining of
+its essence, so little a striving that, rather, all striving is only
+a vestigial or an embryonic form of willing.
+In the name "will to power" the word "power" connotes
+nothing less than the essence of the way in which the will wills
+itself inasmuch as it is a commanding. As a commanding the
+will unites itself to itself, i.e., it unites itself to what it wills. This
+gathering itself together is itself power's assertion of power. Will
+for itself does not exist any more than does power for itself.
+Hence, also, will and power are, in the will to power, not merely
+linked together; but rather the will, as the will to will, ' is itself
+the will to power in the sense of the empowering to power. But
+power has its essence in the fact that it stands to the will as the
+will standing within that will. The will to power is the essence
+13. Here Nietzsche italicizes "to will." Heidegger italicizes "stronger."
+14. Here and subsequently the second word "will" in the phrase
+"will to
+will" (Wille zum Willen) is a noun, not a verb, a distinction impossible to
+show in English. "Will to will" immediately parallels "will to power"
+(Wille zur Macht).
+
+79
+of power. It manifests the unconditional essence of the will,
+which as pure will wills itself.
+Hence the will to power also cannot be cast aside in exchange
+for the will to something else, e.g., for the "will to Nothing";
+for this latter will also is still the will to will, so that Nietzsche
+can say, 'It (the will) will rather will Nothing, than not will"
+(Genealogy of Morals, 3, Section I, 1887).15
+"Willing Nothing" does not in the least mean willing the mere
+absence of everything real; rather it means precisely willing the
+real, yet willing the latter always and everywhere as a nullity
+and, through this, willing only annihilation. In such willing,
+power always further secures to itself the possibility of command
+and the ability-to-be-master.
+The essence of the will to power is, as the essence of will, the
+fundamental trait of everything real. Nietzsche says: The will
+to power is "the innermost essence of Being" (Will to Power,
+Aph. 693, 1888). "Being" means here, in keeping with the language of metaphysics, that which is as a whole. The essence of
+the will to power and the will to power itself, as the fundamental
+character of whatever is, therefore cannot be identified through
+psychological observations; but on the contrary psychology itself
+first receives its essence, i.e., the positability and knowability
+of its object, through the will to power. Hence Nietzsche does
+not understand the will to power psychologically, but rather,
+conversely, he defines psychology anew as the "morphology and
+the doctrine of the development of the will to power" (Beyond
+Good and Evil, Aph. 23).1" Morphology is the ontology of on
+whose morphe, transformed through the change of eidos to
+perceptio, appears, in the appetitus of perceptio, as the will to
+power. The fact that metaphysics-which from ancient times
+thinks that which is, in respect to its Being, as the hypokeimenon,
+sub-iectum-is transformed into the psychology thus defined
+only testifies, as a consequent phenomenon, to the essential event,
+which consists in a change in the beingness of what is. The
+ousia (beingness) of the subiectum changes into the subjectness
+15. Parenthesis Heidegger's.
+16. Heidegger omits Nietzsche's italicization of "the development of the
+will to power."
+
+80
+of self-assertive self-consciousness, which now manifests its essence as the will to will." The will is, as the will to power, the
+command to more power. In order that the will in its overpowering of itself may surpass its particular level at any given time,
+that level, once reached, must be made secure and held fast.
+The making secure of a particular level of power is the necessary
+condition for the heightening of power. But this necessary condition is not sufficient for the fact that the will is able to will
+itself, for the fact, that is, that a willing-to-be-stronger, an enhancement of power, is. The will must cast its gaze into a field
+of vision and first open it up so that, from out of this, possibilities may first of all become apparent that will point the way
+to an enhancement of power. The will must in this way posit a
+condition for a willing-out-beyond-itself. The will to power
+must, above all, posit conditions for power-preservation and
+power-enhancement. To the will belongs the positing of these
+conditions that belong intrinsically together.
+"To will at all is the same thing as to will to become stronger,
+to will to grow-and, in addition, to will the means thereto"
+(Will to Power, Aph. 675, 1887-88).18
+The essential means are the conditions of itself posited by the
+will to power itself. These conditions Nietzsche calls values. He
+says, "In all will there is valuing..." (XIII, Aph. 395, 1884).1'
+To value means to constitute and establish worth. The will to
+power values inasmuch as it constitutes the conditions of enhancement and fixes the conditions of preservation. The will to
+17. The German noun Selbstbewusstsein means both self-assertion and
+self-consciousness. In all other instances of its occurrence, it will be translated simply as "self-consciousness." As the discussion
+. here in progress
+shows, connotations of self-assertion should always be heard in Heidegger's
+references to self-consciousness.
+19. When, as here, Heidegger cites a work by Roman numeral, he is
+referring to the collection of Nietzsche's works called the Grossoktavausgabe, which was edited under the general supervision of Elizabeth Förster
+Nietzsche and published by Kröner in Leipzig. Heidegger's references are
+always to those volumes included in the second section (Volumes IX-XVI)
+entitled Nachlass. First published between 1901 and 1911, they contain
+"notes, fragments, and other materials not published by Nietzsche himself."
+See Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist
+(New York: Random House, 1968), p. 481. A Kaufmann translation of these
+volumes of the Nachlass is not available.
+
+81
+power is, in its essence, the value-positing will. Values are the
+preservation-enhancement conditions within the Being of whatever is. The will to power is, as soon as it comes expressly to
+appearance in its pure essence, itself the foundation and the
+realm of value-positing. The will to power does not have its
+ground in a feeling of lack; rather it itself is the ground of
+superabundant life. Here life means the will to will. "Living:
+that already means 'to ascribe worth' " (loc. cit.).
+Inasmuch as the will wills the overpowering of itself, it is not
+satisfied with any abundance of life. It asserts power in overreaching-i.e., in the overreaching of its own will. In this way
+it continually comes as the selfsame back upon itself as the
+same." The way in which that which is, in its entirety—whose
+essentia is the will to power-exists, i.e., its existentia, is "the
+eternal returning of the same."21 The two fundamental terms of
+20. In this sentence both "selfsame" and "same" translate gleich (equal,
+equivalent, even, like). Subsequently in this discussion gleich will be translated simply with "same." "Same" and "selfsame" must here be taken to
+carry the meaning of "equivalence." They should not be understood to
+connote sameness in the sense of simple identity, for they allude to an
+equivalence resident in the self-relating movement of what is intrinsically
+one. This latter meaning should be clearly distinguished from that of the
+"Same," namely, the identity of belonging together, which is fundamental
+for Heidegger's own thinking. See p. 57 n. 6 above. Because of possible
+confusion, "selfsame" and "same" have been used here only with reluctance, but none of the usual translations of gleich prove suitable for the
+phrasing of the translation.
+21. Nietzsche's phrase die ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen, here translated as "the eternal returning of the same," is usually translated as "the
+eternal recurrence (or return) of the same." The translation "returning" has
+been chosen in accordance with the burden of Heidegger's present discussion of the will to power as turning back upon itself. The phrase might well
+be rendered here the "perpetual returning of the selfsame."
+The turning back of the will to power upon itself, that it may move forward as the will to power, has its correlate for Heidegger in the reflexive
+movement characteristic of what is as such. "The eternal returning of the
+same," as the existentia of the essentia, the will to power, is taken by Heidegger to speak of that mode of Being of all that is which he elsewhere calls
+"subjectness" (Subjektität). Just as the will to power, as the Being of what
+is, simultaneously and necessarily turns back upon itself in going beyond
+itself; so, correspondingly, whatever is, in its Being, simultaneously and
+necessarily goes out beyond itself while yet underlying itself, thereby
+perpetuating and securing itself. Thus, "Everywhere the Being of whatever
+setting-itself-before-itself and thus in setting-itself-up" (p. 100).
+This is that self-objectifying, self-establishing character of what is which
+
+82
+Nietzsche's metaphysics, "will to power" and "eternal returning
+of the same," define whatever is, in its Being-ens qua ens in
+the sense of essentia and existentia—in accordance with the views
+that have continually guided metaphysics from ancient times.
+The essential relationship that is to be thought in this way,
+between the "will to power" and the "eternal returning of the
+same," cannot as yet be directly presented here, because metaphysics has neither thought upon nor even merely inquired after
+the origin of the distinction between essentia and existentia.
+When metaphysics thinks whatever is, in its Being, as the
+will to power, then it necessarily thinks it as value-positing. It
+thinks everything within the sphere of values, of the authoritative force of value, of devaluing and revaluing. The metaphysics of the modern age begins with and has its essence in
+the fact that it seeks the unconditionally indubitable, the certain
+and assured [das Gewisse], certainty.** It is a matter, according
+to the words of Descartes, of firmum et mansurum quid stabilire,
+of bringing to a stand something that is firmly fixed and that
+remains. This standing established as object is adequate to the
+is its character as "representing" and which corresponds to the will to
+power's simultaneously advancing to greater power and establishing a
+reserve on the basis of which it can so advance.
+22. Gewiss (certain) and Gewissheit (certainty) are allied to the verb
+wissen (to know). Both words carry a strong connotation of sureness, firmness—the sureness of that which is known. During the discussion that here
+ensues, the connotations of sureness should always be felt in the words
+"certain" and "certainty." In particular, "certainty" must never be taken to
+refer to some sort of merely intellectual certainty. For, as the discussion
+itself makes clear, the sure certainty here in question partakes of a being
+secure (n. 28 below). This note of "secureness" will here dominate Heidegger's presentation at length, culminating in the discussion of "justice"
+(pp. 89 ff.), which, as here under consideration, involves "making secure."
+The words "knowing" (wissen), "self-knowing-itself" (Sich-selbstwissen),
+"gathering-of-knowing" (Ge-wissen [normally Gewissen, consciousness,
+conscience]), "conscious" (bewusst), and "consciousness" (Bewusstsein),
+which Heidegger will subsequently introduce here, all originate from the
+same root wiss that is found in gewiss and Gewissheit, and must be seen
+to lie closely within the sphere of meaning just pointed out for those words.
+The most fundamental root meaning resident in wissen and its cognates
+is that of seeing, and this meaning should here also be kept in view, for it
+doubtless has a part in the meaning that Heidegger intends for truth
+—which is for him unconcealment-when he speaks of truth as certainty
+(Gewissheit) and of the true as the certain (das Gewisse) that is represented, i.e., set before.
+
+83
+essence, ruling from of old, of what is as the constantly presencing, which everywhere already lies before (hypokeimenon, subiectum). Descartes also asks, as does Aristotle, concerning the
+hypokeimenon. Inasmuch as Descartes seeks
+this subiectum
+along the path previously marked out by metaphysics, he, thinking truth as certainty, finds the ego cogito to be that which presences as fixed and constant. In this way, the ego sum is
+transformed into the subiectum, i.e., the subject becomes selfconsciousness. The subjectness of the subject is determined out
+of the sureness, the certainty, of that consciousness.
+The will to power, in that it posits the preservation, i.e., the
+securing, of its own constancy and stability as a necessary value,
+at the same time justifies the necessity of such securing in everything that is which, as something that by virtue of its very
+essence represents—sets in place before-is something that
+also always holds-to-be-true. The making secure that constitutes
+this holding-to-be-true is called certainty. Thus, according to
+Nietzsche's judgment, certainty as the principle of modern metaphysics is grounded, as regards its truth, solely in the will to
+power, provided of course that truth is a necessary value and
+certainty is the modern form of truth. This makes clear in what
+respect the modern metaphysics of subjectness is consummated
+in Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power as the "essence" of
+everything real.
+Therefore Nietzsche can say: "The question of value is more
+fundamental than the question of certainty: the latter becomes
+serious only by presupposing that the value question has already
+been answered" (Will to Power, Aph. 588, 1887-88).
+However, when once the will to power is recognized as the
+principle of value-positing, the inquiry into value must immediately ponder what the highest value is that necessarily follows
+from this principle and that is in conformity with it. Inasmuch
+as the essence of value proves itself to be the preservationenhancement condition posited in the will to power, the perspective for a characterization of the normative structuring of value
+has been opened up.
+The preservation of the level of power belonging to the will
+reached at any given time consists in the will's surrounding
+itself with an encircling sphere of that which it can reliably
+
+84
+grasp at, each time, as something behind itself, in order on the
+basis of it to contend for its own security. That encircling sphere
+bounds off the constant reserve of what presences (ousia, in the
+everyday meaning of this term for the Greeks) that is immediately at the disposal of the will.23 This that is steadily constant,
+however, is transformed into the fixedly constant, i.e., becomes
+that which stands steadily at something's disposal, only in being
+brought to a stand through a setting in place. That setting in
+place has the character of a producing that sets before.?* That
+which is steadily constant in this way is that which remains.
+True to the essence of Being (Being = enduring presence) holding sway in the history of metaphysics, Nietzsche calls this that
+is steadily constant "that which is in being." Often he calls that
+which is steadily constant-again remaining true to the manner
+of speaking of metaphysical thinking—"Being." Since the beginning of Western thinking, that which is has been considered to
+be the true and truth, while yet, in connection with this, the
+meaning of "being" and "true" has changed in manifold ways.
+Despite all his overturnings and revaluings of metaphysics,
+Nietzsche remains in the unbroken line of the metaphysical tradition when he calls that which is established and made fast in the
+will to power for its own preservation purely and simply Being,
+or what is in being, or truth. Accordingly, truth is a condition
+posited in the essence of the will to power, namely, the condition
+of the preservation of power. Truth is, as this condition, a value.
+23. "Constant reserve" renders Bestand. Cf. QT 17. Bestand does not
+here have the fully developed meaning of the "standing-reserve" present in
+that chronologically later essay, but does already approach it. "The constant
+reserve of what presences," i.e., of what is as such, that the will to power
+needs for its own preservation and enhancement, becomes, when viewed
+with regard to man as accepting and accomplishing the dominion of the will
+to power, that which must be made secure as available for man. Heidegger
+speaks later in this essay of a making secure of "the stably constant reserve
+of what is for a willing of the greatest possible uniformity and equality"
+(p. 102); and the constant reserve is secured that it may be used as a secure
+resource for every aspect of man's life (p. 107). Here must lie close at hand
+for us the thought of the standing-reserve as the undifferentiated reserve
+of the available that is ready for use. In keeping with this, Heidegger's
+discussion of man under the dominion of the will to power |
+has a close
+parallel in his discussion of the rule of Enframing in the modern age. Cf.
+also p. 100 below, QT 19 ff.
+24. Dieses Stellen hat die Art des vor-stellenden Herstellens.
+
+85
+But because the will can will only from out of its disposal over
+something steadily constant, truth is a necessary value precisely
+from out of the essence of the will to power, for that will. The
+word "truth" means now neither the unconcealment of what is
+in being, nor the agreement of a judgment with its object, nor
+certainty as the intuitive isolating and guaranteeing of what is
+represented. Truth is now, and indeed through an essentially
+historical origin out of the modes of its essence just mentioned,
+that which-making stably constant-makes secure the constant
+reserve, belonging to the sphere from out of which the will to
+power wills itself.
+With respect to the making secure of the level of power that
+has been reached at any given time, truth is the necessary value.
+But it does not suffice for the reaching of a level of power; for
+that which is stably constant, taken alone, is never able to provide what the will requires before everything else in order to
+move out beyond itself, and that means to enter for the first
+time into the possibilities of command. These possibilities are
+given only through a penetrating forward look that belongs to
+the essence of the will to power; for, as the will to more power,
+it is, in itself, perspectively directed toward possibilities. The
+opening up and supplementing of such possibilities is that condition for the essence of the will to power which—as that which
+in the literal sense goes before-overtops and extends beyond
+the condition just mentioned. Therefore Nietzsche says: "But
+truth does not count as the supreme standard of value, even less
+as the supreme power" (Will to Power, Aph. 853, 1887-88).
+The creating of possibilities for the will on the basis of which
+the will to power first frees itself to itself is for Nietzsche the
+essence of art. In keeping with this metaphysical concept,
+Nietzsche does not think under the heading "art" solely or even
+primarily of the aesthetic realm of the artist. Art is the essence
+of all willing that opens up perspectives and takes possession of
+them: "The work of art, where it appears without an artist,
+e.g., as body, as organization (Prussian officer corps, Jesuit
+Order). To what extent the artist is only a preliminary stage.
+The world as a work of art that gives birth to itself" (Will to
+Power, Aph. 796, 1885-86).25
+25. Italics Heidegger's.
+
+86
+The essence of art, understood from out of the will to power,
+consists in the fact that art excites the will to power first of all
+toward itself [i.e., toward the will] and goads it on to willing
+out beyond itself. Because Nietzsche, in fading reminiscence of
+the zoe and physis of early Greek thinkers, often also calls the
+will to power, as the reality of the real, life, he can say that art
+is "the great stimulant of life" (Will to Power, Aph. 851, 1888).
+Art is the condition posited in the essence of the will to power
+for the will's being able, as the will that it is, to ascend to power
+and to enhance that power. Because it conditions in this way,
+art is a value. As that condition which—in the hierarchy of the
+conditioning pertaining to the making secure of a constant reserve-takes the lead and in that way precedes all conditioning,
+it is the value that first opens all heights of ascent. Art is the
+highest value. In relation to the value truth, it is the higher
+value. The one, ever in a fresh way, calls forth the other. Both
+values determine in their value-relation the unitive essence of
+the intrinsically value-positing will to power. The will to power
+is the reality of the real or, taking the word more broadly than
+Nietzsche usually is accustomed to using it: the Being of that
+which is. If metaphysics must in its utterance exhibit that which
+is, in respect to Being, and if therewith after its manner it names
+the ground of that which is, then the grounding principle of the
+metaphysics of the will to power must state this ground. The
+principle declares what values are posited essentially and in
+what value hierarchy they are posited within the essence of the
+value-positing will to power as the "essence" [Essenz] of that
+which is. The principle runs: "Art is worth more than truth"
+(Will to Power, Aph. 853, 1887-88).
+The grounding principle of the metaphysics of the will to
+power is a value-principle.
+It becomes clear from the highest value-principle that valuepositing as such is essentially twofold. In it, whether expressly
+articulated or not, a necessary and a sufficient value are always
+posited, although both are posited from out of the prevailing
+relationship of the two to one another. This twofoldness of
+value-positing corresponds to its principle. That from out of
+which value-positing as such is supported and guided is the
+will to power. From out of the unity of its essence it both craves
+
+87
+and is sufficient for the conditions of the enhancement and
+preservation of itself. The reference to the twofold essence of
+value-positing brings thinking expressly before the question concerning the essential unity of the will to power. Inasmuch as the
+will to power is the "essence" of that which is as such, which
+means moreover that it is the true of metaphysics, we are asking
+concerning the truth of this true when we ponder the essential
+unity of the will to power. With that, we attain to the highest
+point of this and every metaphysics. But what does "highest
+point" mean here? We shall explain what we mean with reference to the essence of the will to power, and shall thus remain
+within the bounds that have been drawn for this discussion.
+The essential unity of the will to power can be nothing other
+than the will itself. This unity is the way in which the will to
+power, as will, brings itself before itself. It orders the will
+forth into the will's own testing and sets it before the latter
+in such a way that in such testing the will first represents [reprä-
+sentiert] itself purely and therewith in its highest form. Here,
+representation [Repräsentation] is, however, in no way a presenting [Darstellung] that is supplementary; but rather the presence [Präsenz] determined from out of that presenting is the
+mode in which and as which the will to power is.
+Yet this mode in which the will is, is at the same time the
+manner in which the will sets itself forth into the unconcealment26 of itself. And therein lies the will's truth. The question
+concerning the essential unity of the will to power is the question
+concerning the type of that truth in which the will to power is
+as the Being of whatever is. This truth, moreover, is at the same
+time the truth of that which is as such, and it is as that truth
+that metaphysics is. The truth concerning which we are now
+asking is accordingly not that truth which the will to power itself
+posits as the necessary condition of that which is, as something
+in being; but rather it is the truth in which the condition-positing
+will to power as such already comes to presence [west]. This One
+in which the will to power comes to presence, its essential unity,
+concerns the will to power itself.
+26. das Unverborgene. In this passage, Heidegger's central characterization of truth as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) must be kept in mind.
+
+88
+But now of what type is this truth of the Being of whatever
+is? It can be defined only from out of that whose truth it is.
+However, inasmuch as within modern metaphysics the Being
+of whatever is has determined itself as will and therewith as
+self-willing, and, moreover, self-willing is already inherently selfknowing-itself, therefore that which is, the hypokeimenon, the
+subiectum, comes to presence in the mode of self-knowing-itself.
+That which is (subiectum) presents itself [präsentiert sich], and
+indeed presents itself to itself, in the mode of the ego cogito.
+This self-presenting, this re-presentation [Re-präsentation] (setting-before [Vor-stellung]), is the Being of that which is in being
+qua subiectum. Self-knowing-itself is transformed into subject
+purely and simply. In self-knowing-itself, all knowing and what
+is knowable for it gathers itself together. It is a gathering together of knowing, as a mountain range is a gathering together
+of mountains. The subjectivity of the subject is, as such a
+gathering together, co-agitatio (cogitatio), conscientia, a gathering of knowing [Ge-wissen], consciousness (conscience)." But
+the co-agitatio is already, in itself, velle, willing. In the subjectness of the subject, will comes to appearance as the essence
+of subjectness. Modern metaphysics, as the metaphysics of
+subjectness, thinks the Being of that which is in the sense
+of will.
+It belongs to subjectness, as the primary determination of its
+essence, that the representing subject makes itself sure of itself—
+and that means makes itself sure continually also of what it
+represents—as a particular something. In accordance with such
+a making sure, the truth of that which is, as certainty [Gewissheit], has its character of secureness [Sicherheit] (certitudo).28
+The self-knowing-itself, wherein is certainty as such, remains
+27. The French word conscience. On the meaning of the prefix ge- as
+"gathering," see QT 19.
+28. Sicherheit (certainty, security, trustworthiness, safeguard) very closely
+parallels Gewissheit (certainty, sureness, certitude, firmness), although in it
+the connotation of making secure is present in a way not found in Gewissheit. This nuance, resident heretofore in Heidegger's discussion in the verb
+sichern (to make secure, to guarantee, to make safe), is now, with this use
+of Sicherheit-in conjunction with sich versichern (to assure oneself, to
+attain certainty, to insure one's life, to arrest [someone]) and Versicherung
+(insurance, assurance, guarantee)-brought forward into the pivotal position
+it maintains in the discussion immediately following.
+
+89
+for its part a derivative of the former essence of truth, namely,
+of the correctness (rectitudo) of a representing. However, now
+the correct no longer consists in an assimilation to something
+presencing that is unthought in its presence. Correctness consists
+now in the arranging of everything that is to be represented,
+according to the standard that is posited in the claim to knowledge of the representing res cogitans sive mens [thinking thing
+or mind]. This claim moves toward the secureness that consists
+in this, that everything to be represented and representing itself
+are driven together into the clarity and lucidity of the mathematical idea and there assembled. The ens is the ens coagitatum
+perceptionis [the being that is driven together and consists in perceiving]. The representing is now correct when it is right in relation to this claim to secureness. Proved correct [richtig] in
+this way, it is, as "rightly dealt with" [recht gefertigt] and as
+at our disposal, made right, justified [gerecht-fertigt]." The
+truth of anything that is in being, in the sense of the selfcertainty of subjectness, is, as secureness (certitudo), fundamentally the making-right, the justifying, of representing and
+of what it represents before representing's own clarity. Justification (iustificatio) is the accomplishing of iustitia [justice or rightness] and is thus justice [Gerechtigkeit] itself.30 Since the subject
+29. Note that Heidegger here brings together three words, all of which
+are derived from the stem recht (right). By so doing, he is able implicitly to
+show that much of the truth of his statement lies in the words themselves.
+The discussion that now ensues includes a variety of recht words that can
+be translated accurately in English only by introducing the stem "just."
+The full significance of this discussion can be appreciated only if we bear
+constantly in mind the intimate relationship that these recht words have
+to one another. Thus: richtig (correct), rechtfertigen and Rechtfertigung (to
+justify; justification), Gerechtigkeit_ (justice, rightness, or righteousness),
+Gerecht (right, just, righteous), das Rechte (the morally right).
+30. The English word "justice"' carries strong connotations of an apportioning in an ethical or legal sense. Iustitia (justice), as used in medieval
+and Reformation theology, has a more ample meaning. It alludes to the
+entire rightness of man's life and the rightness of his relationship to God,
+i.e., his righteousness. Heidegger here points to the roots of the modern
+philosophical understanding of justice in this theological tradition. The
+German word Gerechtigkeit (justice or righteousness), because of the centrally formative influence exerted by Luther's translation of the Bible on
+the modern German language, inevitably carries something of this theological connotation, and the range of its meaning colors Heidegger's present
+discussion.
+
+90
+is forever subject, it makes itself certain of its own secureness.
+It justifies itself before the claim to justice that it itself has
+posited.
+At the beginning of the modern age the question was freshly
+raised as to how man, within the totality of what is, i.e., before
+that ground of everything in being which is itself most in being
+(God), 31 can become certain and remain certain of his own sure
+continuance, i.e., his salvation. This question of the certainty of
+salvation is the question of justification, i.e., of justice (iustitia).
+Within modern metaphysics it is Leibniz who first thinks the
+subiectum as ens percipiens et appetens [the perceptive and
+appetitive being]. He is the first to think clearly-in the vischaracter [force-character] of the ens—the volitional essence of
+the Being of whatever is. In a modern manner he thinks the
+truth of whatever is in being as sureness and certainty [Gewissheit]. In his Twenty-four Theses on Metaphysics, Leibniz says
+(Thesis 20): lustitia nihil aliud est quam ordo seu perfectio circa
+mentes.2 The mentes, ie., the res cogitantes [thinking things],
+are, according to Thesis 22, the primariae mundi unitates [primary units of the world]. Truth as certainty is the making secure
+of secureness; it is order (ordo) and thoroughgoing establishment, i.e., full and utter completion (per-fectio). The making
+secure that characterizes that which primarily and genuinely is,
+in its Being, is iustitia (justice).
+Kant, in his laying of the critical foundations of metaphysics,
+thinks the ultimate self-securing of transcendental subjectivity as
+the quaestio iuris of the transcendental deduction. This is the
+legal question of the making right, the justification, of the representing subject, which has itself firmly fixed its essence in the
+self-justifiedness of its "I think."33
+In the essence of truth as certainty-certainty thought as the
+31. vor dem seiendsten Grund aller Seienden (Gott).
+"Justice is nothing but the order and perfection that obtains in respect
+to minds."
+33. "Self-justifiedness" is the translation of Selbst-Gerechtigkeit. Selbstgerechtigkeit, without a hyphen, is always translated "self-righteousness."
+By hyphenating it here, Heidegger lets it show what in the context of this
+discussion might be called its more fundamental meaning of self-justifiedness.
+
+91
+truth of subjectness, and subjectness thought as the Being of
+whatever is—is concealed justice, experienced in terms of the
+justification having to do with secureness. Indeed, justice holds
+sway as the essence of the truth of subjectness, although in the
+metaphysics of subjectness justice is not thought as the truth
+of that which is. Yet, on the other hand, justice must in fact
+confront modern metaphysical thinking as the self-knowing
+Being of everything in being as soon as the Being of whatever
+is appears as the will to power. The latter knows itself as that
+which is essentially value-positing, as that which, in its positing
+of values as the conditions of the constant reserve belonging to
+its own essence, makes itself secure, and in that way perpetually
+becomes just and right to itself and in such becoming is justice.
+It is in justice and as justice that the unique essence of the will
+to power must represent [repräsentieren], and that means, when
+thought according to modern metaphysics: be. Just as in Nietzsche's metaphysics the idea of value is more fundamental than
+the grounding idea of certainty in the metaphysics of Descartes,
+inasmuch as certainty can count as the right only if it counts as
+the highest value, so, in the age of the consummation of Western
+metaphysics in Nietzsche, the intuitive self-certainty of subjectness proves to be the justification belonging to the will to power,
+in keeping with the justice holding sway in the Being of whatever is.
+Already in an earlier and more generally known work, the
+second Untimely Meditation, "Of the Use and Disadvantage of
+History" (1874), Nietzsche substitutes "justice" for the objectivity of the historical sciences (fragment 6). But otherwise
+Nietzsche is silent on the subject of justice. Only in the decisive
+years 1884-85, when the "will to power" stands before his mind's
+eye as the fundamental characteristic of whatever is in being,
+does he write down two ideas on justice without publishing them.
+The first note (1884) bears the title: "The Ways of Freedom."
+It reads: "Justice, as building, separating, annihilating mode of
+thinking, out of value-judgments; highest representative of life
+itself" (XIII, Aph. 98).
+The second note (1885) says: "Justice, as function of a power
+having a wide range of vision, which sees out beyond the narrow
+
+92
+perspectives of good and evil, thus has a wider horizon of interest
+—the aim, to preserve Something that is more than this or that
+particular person" (XIV, Aph. 158).34
+A thorough exposition of these thoughts would extend beyond
+the limits of the reflection being attempted here. An indication
+of the essential sphere within which the justice that is thought
+by Nietzsche belongs will have to suffice. To prepare ourselves
+for an understanding of the justice that Nietzsche has in view,
+we must rid ourselves of those conceptions of justice that stem
+from Christian, humanistic, Enlightenment, bourgeois, and socialist morality. For Nietzsche does not at all understand justice
+primarily as it is defined in the ethical and juridical realms.
+Rather, he thinks it from out of the Being of what is as a whole,
+i.e., from out of the will to power. The just is that which is in
+conformity with the right. But what is right is determined from
+out of that which, as whatever is, is in being. Thus Nietzsche
+says: "Right = the will to eternalize a momentary power relation. Satisfaction with that relation is its presupposition. Everything sacred is drawn toward it to let the right appear as eternal"
+(XIII, Aph. 462, 1883).
+With this belongs the note from the following year: "The
+problem of justice. What is first and most powerful, of course, is
+precisely the will to and the strength for suprapower. The ruler
+establishes 'justice' only afterward, i.e., he measures things according to his standard; if he is very powerful, he can go very
+far toward giving free rein to and recognizing the individual who
+tries" (XIV, Aph. 181). Nietzsche's metaphysical concept of
+justice may well seem strange when compared with our familiar
+conception, and this is to be expected; yet for all that, it touches
+squarely the essence of the justice that at the beginning of the
+consummation of the modern age, amidst the struggle for mastery
+of the earth, is already historically true, and that therefore determines all human activity in this period, whether explicitly
+or not, whether secretly or openly.
+The justice thought by Nietzsche is the truth of what is—
+which now is in the mode of the will to power. And yet Nietzsche
+neither thought justice explicitly as the essence of the truth of
+34. Heidegger italicizes "interest" and "more."
+
+93
+what is nor brought to utterance from out of such thought the
+metaphysics of completed subjectness. Justice is, however, the
+truth of whatever is, the truth determined by Being itself. As
+this truth it is metaphysics itself in its modern completion. In
+metaphysics as such is concealed the reason why Nietzsche can
+indeed experience nihilism metaphysically as the history of valuepositing, yet nevertheless cannot think the essence of nihilism.
+We do not know what concealed form, ordained from out of
+the essence of justice as its truth, was reserved for the metaphysics of the will to power. Scarcely has its first fundamental
+principle been articulated; and when it has, it has not once been
+experienced in the form of a principle. To be sure, within this
+metaphysics the principle-character of that principle is of a
+peculiar kind. Certainly the first value-principle is not the major
+premise for a deductive system of propositions. If we take care
+to understand the designation "fundamental principle of metaphysics" as naming the essential ground of whatever is as such,
+i.e., as naming the latter in the unity of its essence, then this
+principle remains sufficiently broad and intricate to determine at
+any given time, according to the particular type of metaphysics,
+the way in which the latter declares that ground.
+Nietzsche articulated the first value-principle of the metaphysics of the will to power in still another form: "We possess
+art lest we perish of the truth" (Will to Power, Aph. 822).
+We must not, of course, understand in terms of our everyday
+conceptions of truth and art this principle that concerns the
+metaphysical relation pertaining to essence—i.e., the metaphysical value-relation-that subsists between art and truth.
+If that happens, everything becomes banal and, what is all the
+more ominous, takes from us the possibility of attempting an
+essential discussion with the concealed position of the metaphysics of our world age—a metaphysics now coming to completion-in order that we may free our own historical essence
+from being clouded by historiography and world views.
+In the formulation of the fundamental principle of the metaphysics of the will to power just cited, art and truth are thought
+as the primary forms of the holding-sway of the will to power in
+relation to man. How the essential relation of the truth of what
+is as such to man's essence is to be thought at all within meta-
+
+94
+physics in keeping with the latter's essence remains veiled to
+our thinking. The question is scarcely asked, and because of
+the predominance of philosophical anthropology it is hopelessly
+confused. In any case, however, it would be erroneous were we
+to take the formulation of the value-principle as testimony that
+Nietzsche philosophizes existentially. That he never did. But he
+did think metaphysically. We are not yet mature enough for
+the rigor of a thought of the kind found in the following note
+that Nietzsche wrote down at about the time when he was doing
+the thinking for his projected masterpiece, The Will to Power:
+"Around the hero everything turns into tragedy; around the
+demi-god, into a satyr-play; and around God—what?—perhaps
+into 'world'?" (Beyond Good and Evil, Aph. 150, 1886).
+But the time has come for us to learn to perceive that Nietzsche's thinking, although it must display another mien when
+judged historiographically and on the basis of the label assigned
+it, is no less possessed of matter and substance and is no less
+rigorous than is the thinking of Aristotle, who in the fourth book
+of his Metaphysics thinks the principle of contradiction as the
+primary truth regarding the Being of whatever is. The comparison
+between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard that has become customary,
+but is no less questionable for that reason, fails to recognize, and
+indeed out of a misunderstanding of the essence of thinking,
+that Nietzsche as a metaphysical thinker preserves a closeness to
+Aristotle. Kierkegaard remains essentially remote from Aristotle,
+although he mentions him more often. For Kierkegaard is not a
+thinker but a religious writer, and indeed not just one among
+others, but the only one in accord with the destining belonging
+to his age. Therein lies his greatness, if to speak in this way is
+not already a misunderstanding.
+In the fundamental principle of Nietzsche's metaphysics the
+unity of the essence of the will to power is named with the
+naming of the essential relation between art and truth. Out of
+this unity of essence belonging to what is as such, the metaphysical essence of value is determined. Value is the twofold
+condition of the will to power itself, posited in the will to power
+for the will to power.
+Because Nietzsche experiences the Being of everything that is
+as the will to power, his thinking must think out toward value.
+
+95
+Thus it is valid, everywhere and before everything else, to pose
+the question of value. This questioning comes to experience itself
+as historical.
+How does it stand with the highest values up to now? What
+does the devaluing of those values mean in relation to the revaluing of all values? Because thinking in terms of values is
+grounded in the metaphysics of the will to power, Nietzsche's
+interpretation of nihilism as the event of the devaluing of the
+highest values and the revaluing of all values is a metaphysical
+interpretation, and that in the sense of the metaphysics of the
+will to power. However, inasmuch as Nietzsche understands his
+own thinking—the doctrine of the will to power as the "principle
+of the new value-positing" —in the sense of the actual consummation of nihilism, he no longer understands nihilism merely
+negatively as the devaluing of the highest values, but at the
+same time he understands it positively, that is, as the overcoming
+of nihilism; for the reality of the real, now explicitly experienced,
+i.e., the will to power, becomes the origin and norm of a new
+value-positing. Its values directly determine human representing
+and in like manner inspire human activity. Being human is lifted
+into another dimension of happening.
+In the passage quoted from The Gay Science (Aph. 125), the
+madman says this of the act of men whereby God was killed, i.e.,
+whereby the suprasensory world was devalued: "There has never
+been a greater deed; and whoever will be born after us-for the
+sake of this deed he will be part of a higher history than all
+history hitherto."
+With the consciousness that "God is dead," there begins the
+consciousness of a radical revaluing of the highest values hitherto.
+Man himself, according to this consciousness, passes over into
+another history that is higher, because in it the principle of all
+value-positing, the will to power, is experienced and accepted
+expressly as the reality of the real, as the Being of everything
+that is. With this, the self-consciousness in which modern humanity has its essence completes its last step. It wills itself as
+the executer of the unconditional will to power. The decline of
+the normative values is at an end. Nihilism, "that the highest
+values are devaluing themselves," has been overcome. The
+humanity which wills its own being human as the will to power,
+
+96
+and experiences that being human as belonging within the reality
+determined in its entirety by the will to power, is determined by
+a form of man's essence that goes beyond and surpasses man
+hitherto.
+The name for this form of man's essence that surpasses the
+race of men up to now is "overman."35 By this name Nietzsche
+does not mean any isolated exemplar of man in whom the
+abilities and purposes of man as ordinarily known are magnified
+and enhanced to gigantic proportions. "Overman" is also not
+that form of man that first originates upon the path of the
+practical application of Nietzsche's philosophy to life. The name
+"overman" designates the essence of humanity, which, as modern
+humanity, is begining to enter into the consummation belonging
+to the essence of its age. "Overman" is man who is man from
+out of the reality determined through the will to power, and for
+that reality.
+Man whose essence is that essence which is willing, i.e., ready,
+from out of the will to power is overman. The willing that characterizes the essence of man that is willing in this way must
+correspond to the will to power as to the Being of whatever is.
+Therefore, simultaneously with the thinking that thinks the will
+to power, there necessarily arises the question: In what form
+must the essence of man that becomes willing from out of the
+Being of what is, present itself and unfold, in order that it may
+be adequate to the will to power and may thus be capable of
+receiving dominion over all that is? Unexpectedly, and above all
+in a way unforeseen, man finds himself, from out of the Being
+of what is, set before the task of taking over dominion of the
+35. 'Overman" is the translation of der Ubermensch, which ordinarily
+means superhuman being, demigod, superman. The term "overman," introduced into Nietzsche translation by Walter Kaufmann, has the advantage
+of avoiding the misinterpretations that lie ready to hand in the usual translation as "superman." In keeping with Nietzsche's presentation of der
+Übermensch in the figure of Zarathustra, Kaufmann regularly uses "the
+overman." Here the article has been dropped in the translation of the noun
+in accordance with the fact that, as Heidegger's ensuing discussion itself
+makes clear, Ubermensch is not intended in that discussion to refer at all
+to an individual man. Rather, the noun has a generic meaning-it refers to
+man, to humanity. Übermensch might almost be translated "man-beyond,"
+for overman stands in contrast with man hitherto and goes beyond (hinausgeht... iber) the latter in his surpassing of him.
+
+97
+earth. Has man hitherto sufficiently considered in what mode
+the Being of what is has meanwhile appeared? Has man hitherto
+assured himself as to whether his essence has the maturity and
+strength to correspond to the claim of that Being? Or does man
+hitherto simply get along with the help of expedients and detours
+that drive him away ever anew from experiencing that which is?3
+Man hitherto would like to remain man hitherto; and yet he is
+at the same time already the one who, of all that is, is willingwhose Being is beginning to appear as the will to power. Man
+hitherto is, in his essence, not yet at all prepared for Being,
+which all the while has been holding complete sway over what
+is. In the latter there rules the necessity that man go beyond man
+hitherto, not out of mere desire or mere arbitrariness, but solely
+for the sake of Being
+Nietzsche's thought that thinks overman arises from the thinking that thinks whatever is ontologically as what is in being, and
+it thus accommodates itself to the essence of metaphysics, yet
+without being able to experience that essence from within metaphysics. For this reason the respect in which the essence of man
+is determined from out of the essence of Being remains concealed
+for Nietzsche, just as it does in all metaphysics before him. Therefore, the ground of the essential connection between the will to
+power and the essence of overman necessarily veils itself in
+Nietzsche's metaphysics. Yet in every veiling there already rules
+simultaneously an appearing. The existentia that belongs to the
+essentia of whatever is, i.e., to the will to power, is the eternal
+returning of the same. The Being that is thought in that returning contains the relation to the essence of overman. But this
+relation necessarily remains unthought in its essence as that
+essence relates to Being. It thus remains obscure even to Nietzsche
+himself what connection the thinking that thinks overman in the
+figure of Zarathustra has with the essence of metaphysics. Hence
+the character of the work Thus Spoke Zarathustra as a work
+remains concealed. Only when some future thought is brought
+into the situation of thinking this "Book for All and None"
+36. Here, "that which is" exceptionally translates das ... was ist, rather
+than das Seiende. This allusion will return below (p. 102) in the question,
+"What is?" where the reference in question is Being itself and not any
+particular being. Cf. T 46.
+
+98
+together with Schelling's Investigations on the Essence of Human
+Freedom (1809)—and that means at the same time also with
+Hegel's work The Phenomenology of Mind (1807), and also with
+the Monadology (1714) of Leibniz-and only when it is brought
+into the situation of thinking these works not only metaphysically
+but from out of the essence of metaphysics will there be established the right and duty as well as the foundation and horizon
+for an explication.
+It is easy but irresponsible to be indignant at the idea and
+figure of overman, which has clothed itself in the very misunderstanding that attaches to it, and to make this indignation pass
+for a refutation. It is difficult, but for future thinking it will be
+inescapable, to attain to the high responsibility out of which
+Nietzsche pondered the essence of that humanity which, in the
+destining of Being as the will to power, is being determined
+toward the assuming of dominion over the earth. The essence of
+overman is no license for the frenzy of self-will. It is the law
+grounded in Being itself of a long chain of the highest of selfconquests that are first making man mature for that which is,
+which, as that which is, belongs to Being-to Being that, as the
+will to power, is bringing to appearance its essence as will, and
+through that appearing is making an epoch, namely, the ultimate
+epoch of metaphysics.
+Man hitherto is called this, according to Nietzsche's metaphysics, because, although his essence is indeed determined by
+the will to power as the fundamental characteristic of all that
+is, he has still not experienced and accepted the will to power
+as that principal characteristic. Man who surpasses man up to
+now takes the will to power, as the principal characteristic of all
+that is, up into his own willing and in that way wills himself in
+the manner of the will to power. All that is, is as that which is
+posited within this will. That which formerly conditioned and
+determined the essence of man in the manner of purpose and
+norm has lost its unconditional and immediate, above all its
+ubiquitously and infallibly operative power of effective action.
+That suprasensory world of purposes and norms no longer
+quickens and supports life. That world has itself become lifeless, dead. There will be Christian faith here and there. But
+the love holding sway in that world is not the effectively work-
+
+99
+ing and operative principle of what is happening now. The suprasensory ground consisting of the suprasensory world, thought
+as the operative, working reality of everything real, has become
+unreal.3" That is the metaphysical meaning of the word "God is
+dead," thought metaphysically.
+Will we persist in closing our eyes in face of the truth of this
+word, to be thought in this way? If we do so, the word will
+certainly not become untrue through this curious blindness. God
+is still not a living God when we persist in trying to master the
+real without taking God's reality seriously and calling it in question beforehand, and when we persist in this without pondering
+whether man has so matured for the essence into which, from
+out of Being, he is being drawn, that he may withstand and
+surmount that destining genuinely from out of his essence and
+not do so with the sham help of mere expedients.
+The attempt to experience the truth of that word concerning
+the death of God without illusions is something different from
+an espousing of Nietzsche's philosophy. Were the latter our intention, thinking would not be served through such assent. We
+show respect for a thinker only when we think. This demands
+that we think everything essential that is thought in his thought.
+When God and the gods are dead in the sense of the metaphysical experience just elucidated, and when the will to power
+is deliberately willed as the principle of all positing of the conditions governing whatever is, i.e., as the principle of valuepositing, then dominion over that which is as such, in the form
+of dominion over the earth, passes to the new willing of man
+determined by the will to power. Nietzsche closes the first part
+of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which appeared one year after The
+Gay Science, in 1883, with the statement: "Dead are all gods:
+now we will that overman live!"
+We could believe, were we thinking crassly, that this pronouncement says that dominion over all that is, is passing from
+God to man or, even more crassly, that Nietzsche puts man in
+the place of God. Those who believe thus do not, of course, think
+37. Der übersinnliche Grund der übersinnlichen Welt ist, als die wirksame Wirklichkeit alles Wirklichen gedacht, unwirklich geworden. On the
+meaning of the "real" (das Wirkliche), as shown through the meaning of
+wirken (to work), see SR 159 ff.
+
+100
+in a very godly way about the divine essence. Never can man
+put himself in the place of God, because the essence of man
+never reaches the essential realm belonging to God. On the contrary, compared with this impossibility something far more uncanny can happen, something whose essence we have scarcely
+begun to consider. Thought metaphysically, the place that is
+peculiar to God is the place of the causative bringing about and
+preserving of whatever is, as something created. That place of
+God can remain empty. Instead of it, another, i.e., a place corresponding metaphysically, can loom on the horizon—a place that
+is identical neither with the essential realm belonging to God nor
+with that of man, but with which man comes once more into a
+distinctive relationship. Overman never enters at all into the place
+of God; rather the place into which his willing enters is another
+realm belonging to another grounding of what is, in its other
+Being. This other Being of what is, meanwhile-and this marks
+the beginning of modern metaphysics-has become subjectness.
+All that is, is now either what is real [das Wirkliche] as the
+object or what works the real [das Wirkende], as the objectifying within which the objectivity of the object takes shape. Ob-
+jectifying, in representing, in setting before, delivers up the
+object to the ego cogito. In that delivering up, the ego proves
+to be that which underlies its own activity (the delivering up
+that sets before), i.e., proves to be the subiectum. The subject
+is subject for itself. The essence of consciousness is self-consciousness. Everything that is, is therefore either the object of
+the subject or the subject of the subject. Everywhere the Being
+of whatever is lies in setting-itself-before-itself and thus in
+setting-itself-up. Man, within the subjectness belonging to whatever is, rises up into the subjectivity of his essence. Man enters
+into insurrection. The world changes into object. In this revolutionary objectifying of everything that is, the earth, that which
+first of all must be put at the disposal of representing and setting
+forth, moves into the midst of human positing and analyzing
+The earth itself can show itself only as the object of assault, an
+assault that, in human willing, establishes itself as unconditional
+objectification. Nature appears everywhere—because willed from
+out of the essence of Being-as the object of technology.
+From the same period, 1881-82, in which the passage "The
+
+101
+Madman" originated comes this note of Nietzsche's: "The time
+is coming when the struggle for dominion over the earth will be
+carried on. It will be carried on in the name of fundamental
+philosophical doctrines" (XII, 441).38
+This does not mean that the struggle for unlimited exploitation of the earth as the sphere of raw materials and for the
+realistic utilization of "human material," in the service of the
+unconditional empowering of the will to power in its essence,
+would specifically have recourse to an appeal to a philosophy.
+On the contrary, it is to be conjectured that philosophy as the
+doctrine and image of culture will disappear, and that also in
+its present form it can disappear; for insofar as it has been
+genuine it has already brought the reality of the real to utterance
+and in that way has brought that which is as such into the
+history of its Being. "Fundamental philosophical doctrines" does
+not mean the doctrines of scholars but the language of the truth
+of what is as such, which truth metaphysics itself is in the form
+of the metaphysics of the unconditional subjectness of the will
+to power.
+The struggle for dominion over the earth is in its historical
+essence already the result of the fact that whatever is as such is
+appearing in the mode of the will to power without yet being
+recognized or without being understood at all as that will. At
+any rate, the doctrines of action and the conceptual ideologies
+that are commonly subscribed to never utter that which is, and
+which therefore is happening. With the beginning of the struggle
+for dominion over the earth, the age of subjectness is driving
+toward its consummation. To this completion belongs the fact
+that whatever is—which is in the manner of the will to power—
+is, after its fashion and in every respect, becoming certain and
+therefore also conscious of its own truth about itself. Making
+conscious is a necessary instrument of the willing that wills from
+out of the will to power. It happens, in respect to objectification,
+in the form of planning. It happens, in the sphere of the uprising of man into self-willing, through the ceaseless dissecting of
+the historical situation. Thought metaphysically, the "situation"
+is constantly the stage for the action of a subject. Every analysis
+38. Italics Heidegger's.
+
+102
+of the situation is grounded, whether it knows it or not, in the
+metaphysics of subjectness.
+"The great noon" is the time of the brightest brightness,
+namely, of the consciousness that unconditionally and in every
+respect has become conscious of itself as that knowing which
+consists in deliberately willing the will to power as the Being
+of whatever is; and, as such willing, in rebelliously withstanding
+and subjugating to itself every necessary phase of the objectifying of the world, thus making secure the stably constant reserve
+of what is for a willing of the greatest possible uniformity and
+equality. In the willing of this will, however, there comes upon
+man the necessity that he concomitantly will the conditions, the
+requirements, of such a willing. That means: to posit values and
+to ascribe worth to everything in keeping with values. In such
+a manner does value determine all that is in its Being. This brings
+us to the question:
+What is now, in the age when the unconditional dominion of
+the will to power is openly dawning, and this openness and its
+public character are themselves becoming a function of this will?
+What is? We are not asking about events and facts, for every
+one of which at any time, in the realm of the will to power,
+testimonies may always be brought forward and laid aside on
+demand
+What is? We do not ask concerning this or that particular
+being, but rather we ask concerning the Being of whatever is.
+More especially, we are asking what is happening to Being
+itself. Furthermore, we do not ask at random, but with a view to
+the truth of what is as such, which is coming to utterance in
+the form of the metaphysics of the will to power. What is happening to Being in the age of the dominion, now beginning, of
+the unconditional will to power?
+Being has been transformed into a value." The making con-
+39. Within the highly elliptical connection between this and the following sentence in the text lies Heidegger's understanding of the complex
+interrelation of Being, what is, and man. That meaning might, in the context of the present discussion of the will to power, be suggested as follows.
+The "Being" to which Heidegger here refers is, first of all, the Being
+possessed by what is. The metaphysics of the will to power, which thinks
+Being in thinking the truth, the unconcealedness of what is, takes the
+Being of what is—a Being linked indissolubly with the security and certainty
+
+103
+stant of the stability of the constant reserve*° is a necessary condition of its own securing of itself, which the will to power
+itself posits. Can Being possibly be more highly esteemed than
+through being expressly raised to a value? Yet, in that Being is
+accorded worth as a value, it is already degraded to a condition
+posited by the will to power itself. Already from of old, insofar
+as Being itself has been esteemed at all and thus given worth,
+it has been despoiled of the dignity of its essence. When the
+Being of whatever is, is stamped as a value and its essence is
+thereby sealed off, then within this metaphysics-and that means
+continually within the truth of what is as such during this age—
+every way to the experiencing of Being itself is obliterated. Here,
+in speaking in such a way, we presuppose what we should perhaps not presuppose at all, that such a way to Being has at some
+of the objectively represented—as a value, a determining condition directing
+power-actualizing willing. Hence the metaphysics of the will to power can,
+with Nietzsche, take Being to be a value (cf. p. 84); or it might say that
+to be is to have value. And it is Being itself, ruling in the modern age in
+the mode of the will to power, that gives itself to the thinking of metaphysics in this way. Yet, at the same time, metaphysics is not here thinking
+Being itself. It is not thinking Being as Being, "presencing specifically as
+presencing,
+from out of its truth" (p. 109). Being, in manifesting itself
+precisely as value through the thinking belonging to the metaphysics of
+the will to power, is, at the same time, concealing itself as regards that
+which it is as Being.
+Metaphysics, for Heidegger, "grounds an age" (AWP 115). In interpreting or in laying out (auslegen), ie., in thinking forth, the Being of what is
+precisely as a value, that is, in making Being manifest-insofar as it is
+given to metaphysics to apprehend and manifest Being at all in the latter's
+holding-sway in the mode of the will to power-the metaphysics of the will
+to power, as the consummation of the modern metaphysics begun with
+Descartes, provides the thought-out basis for the activity of modern man.
+And Being needs that activity, undergirded by that thinking, in order to
+endure as present and to rule in the manner that is now proper to it.
+Precisely when Being has become a value, when to be is to have value, the
+metaphysical basis has been consummately given for that human activity
+through which whatever is—offering itself in the manner governed by the
+will to power-is fixed as a stable reserve that has value and can be of use
+just in virtue of its being and of its being available for future "willing to
+will" and "empowering to power." And precisely through just that metaphysically grounded activity and through it alone, the holding-sway of
+Being-of Being now manifesting itself in the mode of the will to power-is
+accomplishing itself through the only open center through which it can
+ever find accomplishment, namely, through man.
+40. Beständigung der Beständigkeit des Bestandes.
+
+104
+time existed and that a thinking on Being has already thought
+Being as Being.
+Unmindful of Being and its own truth, Western thinking has
+since its beginning continually been thinking what is in being
+as such. All the while, this thinking has been thinking Being
+only in such truth, so that it brings the name "Being" to utterance only with considerable awkwardness and in a manifoldness
+of meaning that remains confused because it is not experienced.
+This thinking that has remained unmindful of Being itself is the
+simple and all-sustaining, thus enigmatic and unexperienced,
+coming-to-pass [Ereignis] of that Western history which meanwhile is on the point of broadening out into world history.
+Finally, in metaphysics, Being has debased itself to a value.
+Herein lies the testimony that Being has not been accepted and
+acknowledged as Being. What does this mean?
+What is happening to Being? Nothing is happening to Being."1
+But what if, precisely in that, the essence of nihilism, which has
+been veiled up to now, were first to proclaim itself? Would
+thinking in terms of values then itself be pure nihilism? But
+surely Nietzsche understands the metaphysics of the will to
+power specifically as the overcoming of nihilism. And in fact, so
+long as nihilism is understood only as the devaluing of the highest
+values, and the will to power, as the principle of the revaluing of
+all values, is thought from out of a re-positing of the highest
+values, the metaphysics of the will to power is indeed an overcoming of nihilism. But in this overcoming of nihilism valuethinking is elevated to a principle.
+If, however, value does not let Being be Being, does not let it
+be what it is as Being itself, then this supposed overcoming is
+above all the consummation of nihilism. For now metaphysics
+not only does not think Being itself, but this not-thinking of
+Being clothes itself in the illusion that it does think Being in the
+most exalted manner, in that it esteems Being as a value, so that
+41. Wie ist es mit dem Sein? Mit dem Sein ist es nichts. Here and in the
+two preceding instances of this question, the verb "happening"—usually
+r'eserved for the translation of the German verb geschehen-has been used
+so as to preserve the colloquial force of Heidegger's words. Subsequently
+this construction will be translated using the verb "befall" instead of
+"happen."
+
+105
+all questions concerning Being become and remain superfluous.
+But if the thinking that thinks everything in terms of values is
+nihilism when thought in relation to Being itself, then even
+Nietzsche's own experience of nihilism, i.e., that it is the devaluing of the highest values, is after all a nihilistic one. The interpretation of the suprasensory world, the interpretation of God as
+the highest value, is not thought from out of Being itself. The
+ultimate blow against God and against the suprasensory world
+consists in the fact that God, the first of beings,* is degraded
+to the highest value. The heaviest blow against God is not that
+God is held to be unknowable, not that God's existence is
+demonstrated to be unprovable, but rather that the god held
+to be real is elevated to the highest value. For this blow comes
+precisely not from those who are standing about, who do not
+believe in God, but from the believers and their theologians who
+discourse in the being that is of all beings most in being,*
+without ever letting it occur to them to think on Being itself, in
+order thereby to become aware that, seen from out of faith,
+their thinking and their talking is sheer blasphemy if it meddles
+in the theology of faith.
+Now, for the first time a faint light begins to penetrate the
+darkness enveloping the question that earlier we wanted to
+direct to Nietzsche while we were hearing the passage about the
+madman. How can it happen at all that men are ever capable of
+killing God? But obviously it is precisely this that Nietzsche is
+thinking. For in the entire passage there are only two sentences
+expressly placed in italics. The one reads: "We have killed him,"
+namely, God. The other reads: " And yet they have done it themselves," which is to say men have performed the deed of killing
+God, even though today they have still heard nothing about it.
+The two italicized sentences give the interpretation for the
+word "God is dead." The pronouncement does not mean-as
+though it were spoken out of denial and common hatred-there
+is no god. The pronouncement means something worse: God has
+been killed. In this way the decisive thought first comes to
+appearance. Yet, nevertheless, the understanding of it becomes
+more difficult. For the word "God is dead" would be much more
+42. das Seiende des Seienden.
+43. vom Seiendsten alles Seienden.
+
+106
+readily grasped if it declared: God himself, of his own accord,
+has distanced himself from his living presence. But that God
+should be killed by others and indeed by men is unthinkable.
+Nietzsche himself is astounded at this thought. It is only for
+that reason that immediately after the decisive words, "We have
+killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers," he allows
+the madman to ask: "But how have we done this?' Nietzsche
+elucidates the question as he repeats it, spelling out what is
+asked in three images: "How were we able to drink up the sea?
+Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What
+did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun?'
+To the last question we could answer: What men did when
+they unchained the earth from its sun is told in the last three
+and a half centuries of European history. What, then, has happened at the foundation of this history to that which is? When
+Nietzsche names the relationship between the sun and the earth
+he is not thinking merely of the Copernican revolution in the
+modern understanding of nature. The word "sun" at once recalls
+Plato's allegory. According to the latter, the sun and the realm
+of its light are the sphere in which that which is appears according to its visible aspect, or according to its many countenances
+(Ideas). The sun forms and circumscribes the field of vision
+wherein that which is as such shows itself.44 "Horizon" refers
+44. Here "forms" translates bildet. The German bilden means to form,
+to shape, to constitute. In this passage the meaning of "constitute" should
+be heard within the translation "forms" virtually with the force of "is."
+The word "sun" speaks, as does the word "horizon" that follows, of the
+self-manifesting that characterizes what is as such. It speaks of what is as
+being, in itself, unconcealed. In thinking in his own way Nietzsche's and
+Plato's-image of the sun, Heidegger speaks here of what is, the real, as
+that which is looked at because it lets itself be seen. It is just this character
+of what is-as what gives itself to sight-that, in what here immediately
+follows, he sees as transformed in the modern period, so that it appears
+differently when, under the dominion of the will to power, everything real
+is transformed into value, i.e., into "point-of-view," that both is seen and
+permits seeing. When possessed of this new character, what is, is no longer
+free to show itself directly in itself. It is, rather, either as subject or as
+object, always at the disposal of assertive self-consciousness, and hence of
+that mode of Being, the will to power, ruling in the latter.
+Accordingly, in
+his discussion of the meaning of value for Nietzsche as "point-of-view,"
+Heidegger has said above (p. 72): "Aim, view, field of vision, mean here
+both the sight beheld and seeing, in a sense that is determined from out of
+Greek thought. . . :
+
+107
+to the suprasensory world as the world that truly is. This is at
+the same time that whole which envelops all and in itself includes all, as does the sea. The earth, as the abode of man, is
+unchained from its sun. The realm that constitutes the suprasensory, which as such, is in itself45 no longer stands over man
+as the authoritative light. The whole field of vision has been
+wiped away. The whole of that which is as such, the sea, has been
+drunk up by man. For man has risen up into the I-ness of the
+ego cogito. Through this uprising, all that is, is transformed into
+object. That which is, as the objective, is swallowed up into the
+immanence of subjectivity. The horizon no longer emits light of
+itself. It is now nothing but the point-of-view posited in the
+value-positing of the will to power.
+By means of the three key images (sun, horizon, and sea),
+which are for thinking presumably something quite other than
+images, the three questions elucidate what is meant by the event
+of the killing of God. The killing means the act of doing away
+with the suprasensory world that is in itself—an act accomplished
+through man. It speaks of the event wherein that which is as
+such does not simply come to nothing, but does indeed become
+different in its Being. But above all, in this event man also becomes different. He becomes the one who does away with that
+which is, in the sense of that which is in itself. The uprising of
+man into subjectivity transforms that which is into object. But
+that which is objective is that which is brought to a stand through
+representing. The doing away with that which is in itself, i.e.,
+the killing of God, is accomplished in the making secure of the
+constant reserve by means of which man makes secure for himself
+material, bodily, psychic, and spiritual resources, and this for
+the sake of his own security, which wills dominion over whatever is—as the potentially objective-in order to correspond to
+the Being of whatever is, to the will to power.
+Making secure, as the creating of secureness, is grounded in
+value-positing. Value-positing has brought down and slain beneath itself—and has therefore killed as that which is for itself—
+all that is in itself. This ultimate blow in the killing of God is
+perpetrated by metaphysics, which, as the metaphysics of the
+45. des an sich seienden Übersinnlichen.
+
+108
+will to power, accomplishes thinking in the sense of valuethinking. However, Nietzsche himself no longer recognizes this
+ultimate blow, through which Being is struck down to a mere
+value, for what the blow is when thought with respect to Being
+itself. And yet, does not Nietzsche himself say: "All of us are his
+murderers!—you and I"? Certainly. And according to this,
+Nietzsche also continues to understand the metaphysics of the
+will to power as nihilism. To be sure. But this means for Nietzsche only that that metaphysics, as the countermovement in the
+sense of the revaluing of all former values, brings to completion
+the previous "devaluing of the highest values hitherto" most
+radically, because definitively.
+And yet Nietzsche can no longer think as killing and nihilism
+precisely that new positing of value on the basis of the principle of all value-positing. Within the field of vision of the selfwilling will to power, i.e., within the perspective of value and
+value-positing, that new positing of value is no longer a devaluing.
+But what happens to value-positing itself when value-positing
+is thought in respect to that which is as such, and that means at
+the same time from out of a view toward Being? Then, thinking
+in terms of values is radical killing. It not only strikes down
+that which is as such, in its being-in-itself, but it does away
+utterly with Being. The latter can, where it is still needed, pass
+only for a value. The value-thinking of the metaphysics of the
+will to power is murderous in a most extreme sense, because it
+absolutely does not let Being itself take its rise, i.e., come into
+the vitality of its essence. Thinking in terms of values precludes
+in advance that Being itself will attain to a coming to presence
+in its truth.
+But is this murdering that kills at the roots first and exclusively the way of the metaphysics of the will to power? Is it
+only the interpretation of Being as value that does not let Being
+itself be the Being that it is? If this were the case, then metaphysics before Nietzsche would have to have experienced and
+thought Being itself in its truth, or at least to have questioned
+concerning it. But nowhere do we find such experiencing of
+Being itself. Nowhere are we confronted by a thinking that thinks
+the truth of Being itself and therewith thinks truth itself as Being.
+
+109
+This is not thought even where pre-Platonic thinking, as the
+beginning of Western thinking, prepares for the unfolding of
+metaphysics in Plato and Aristotle. The estin (eon) gar einai does
+indeed name Being itself. But it does not think presencing specifically as presencing, from out of its truth. The history of Being
+begins, and indeed necessarily, with the forgetting of Being. It is
+not due then to metaphysics as the metaphysics of the will to
+power that Being itself in its truth remains unthought. This
+strange remaining-away of Being is due only to metaphysics as
+metaphysics. But what is metaphysics? Do we know its essence?
+Can it itself know that essence? If it conceives it, it grasps it
+metaphysically. But the metaphysical concept of metaphysics
+constantly falls short of its essence. This holds also for every
+logic, assuming that logic is still at all capable of thinking what
+logos is. Every metaphysics of metaphysics, and every logic of
+philosophy, that in any way whatever attempts to climb beyond
+metaphysics falls back most surely beneath metaphysics, without
+knowing where, precisely in so doing, it has fallen.
+Meanwhile, at least one feature of the essence of nihilism has
+become clearer to our thinking. The essence of nihilism lies in
+history; accordingly, in the appearing of whatever is as such, in
+its entirety, Nothing is befalling Being itself and its truth, and
+indeed in such a way that the truth of what is as such passes for
+Being, because the truth of Being remains wanting. In the age
+of that completion and consummation of nihilism which is beginning, Nietzsche indeed experienced some characteristics of
+nihilism, and at the same time he explained them nihilistically,
+thus completely eclipsing their essence. And yet Nietzsche never
+recognized the essence of nihilism, just as no metaphysics before
+him ever did
+But if the essence of nihilism lies in history, so that the truth
+of Being remains wanting in the appearing of whatever is as
+such, in its entirety, and if, accordingly, Nothing is befalling
+Being and its truth, then metaphysics as the history of the truth
+of what is as such, is, in its essence, nihilism. If, finally, metaphysics is the historical ground of the world history that is
+being determined by Europe and the West, then that world
+history is, in an entirely different sense, nihilistic.
+Thought from out of the destining of Being, the nihil in
+
+110
+"nihilism" means that Nothing is befalling Being. Being is not
+coming into the light of its own essence. In the appearing of
+whatever is as such, Being itself remains wanting. The truth of
+Being falls from memory. It remains forgotten.
+Thus nihilism would be in its essence a history that runs its
+course along with Being itself. It would lie in Being's own essence, then, that Being remain unthought because it withdraws.
+Being itself withdraws into its truth. It harbors itself safely
+within its truth and conceals itself in such harboring.
+In looking toward this self-concealing harboring of its own
+essence, perhaps we glimpse the essence of that mystery in the
+guise of which the truth of Being is coming to presence.
+According to this, metaphysics itself would not be merely a
+neglect of a question still to be pondered concerning Being.
+Surely it would not be an error. Metaphysics, as the history of
+the truth of what is as such, would have come to pass from out of
+the destining of Being itself. Metaphysics would be, in its essence,
+the mystery of Being itself, a mystery that is unthought because
+withheld. Were it otherwise, a thinking that takes pains to hold
+to Being in what is to be thought could not unceasingly ask,
+"What is metaphysics?"
+Metaphysics is an epoch*® of the history of Being itself. But
+in its essence metaphysics is nihilism. The essence of nihilism
+belongs to that history as which Being itself comes to presence.
+However, provided that Nothing in whatever manner also points
+toward Being, the determination and defining of nihilism from
+out of the history of Being might well at least indicate antecedently the realm within which the essence of nihilism can be
+experienced in order to become something thought that concerns our thinking. We are accustomed above all to hearing a
+false note in the name "nihilism." However, when we ponder
+the essence of nihilism as belonging to the history of Being,
+there is at once something dubious in simply hearing a false
+note. The word "nihilism" indicates that nihil (Nothing) is, and
+is essentially, in that which it names. Nihilism means: Nothing
+is befalling everything and in every respect. "Everything" means
+whatever is, in its entirety. And whatever is stands there in
+46. A self-withholding.
+
+111
+every respect proper to it when it is experienced as that which
+is. Hence nihilism means that Nothing is befalling whatever is
+as such, in its entirety. But whatever is, is what it is and how it
+is from out of Being. Assuming that every "is" lies in Being,
+the essence of nihilism consists in the fact that Nothing is befalling Being itself. Being itself is Being in its truth, which truth
+belongs to Being.
+When we hear in the name "nihilism" that other note wherein
+sounds the essence of that which it names, then we are also
+hearing differently the language of that metaphysical thinking
+which has experienced something of nihilism without being able
+to think its essence. Perhaps with that other note in our ears, we
+will someday ponder the age of that consummation of nihilism
+which is now beginning in another way than we have hitherto.
+Perhaps then we will recognize that neither the political nor the
+economic nor the sociological, nor the technological and scientific,
+nor even the metaphysical and the religious perspectives are
+adequate to think what is happening in that age. What is given
+to thinking to think is not some deeply hidden underlying meaning, but rather something lying near, that which lies nearest,
+which, because it is only this, we have therefore constantly already passed over. Through this passing over we are, without
+noticing it, constantly accomplishing the killing in relation to
+the Being of whatever is in being
+In order to pay heed to it and to learn to pay heed, it can be
+enough for us simply to ponder for once what the madman says
+about the death of God and how he says it. Perhaps we will no
+longer pass by so quickly without hearing what is said at the
+beginning of the passage that has been elucidated: that the
+madman "cried incessantly: 'I seek God! I seek God!' "
+In what respect is this man mad? He is "de-ranged."41 For he
+is dis-lodged from the level of man hitherto, where the ideals of
+the suprasensory world, which have become unreal, are passed
+off for real while yet their opposite is realizing itself. This de-
+47. "De-ranged" translates ver-rückt, which, unhyphenated, means mad
+or insane. Other adjectival translations of related past participles built on
+rucken (to jerk, to pull, to change the place of) follow here: "dislodged"
+(ausgerückt), "carried
+(eingerückt).
+
+112
+ranged man is carried out beyond man hitherto. Nevertheless,
+in this way he has only been drawn utterly into being the predetermined essence of man hitherto, the animal rationale. The
+man who is deranged in this way has nothing in common with
+the kind of men standing about in the market place "who do not
+believe in God." For these men are not unbelievers because God
+as God has to them become unworthy of belief, but rather because they themselves have given up the possibility of belief,
+inasmuch as they are no longer able to seek God. They can no
+longer seek because they no longer think. Those standing about
+in the market place have abolished thinking and replaced it
+with idle babble that scents nihilism in every place in which it
+supposes its own opinion to be endangered. This self-deception,
+forever gaining the upper hand in relation to genuine nihilism,
+attempts in this way to talk itself out of its anguished dread in
+the face of thinking. But that dread is dread in the face of dread.
+The madman, on the contrary, is clearly, according to the first,
+and more clearly still according to the last, sentences of the
+passage, for him who can hear, the one who seeks God, since
+he cries out after God. Has a thinking man perhaps here really
+cried out de profundis? And the ear of our thinking, does it
+still not hear the cry? It will refuse to hear it so long as it does
+not begin to think. Thinking begins only when we have come
+to know that reason, glorified for centuries, is the most stiffnecked adversary of thought.
+
+Part III
+
+The Age of the
+World Picture
+In metaphysics reflection is accomplished concerning the essence
+of what is and a decision takes place regarding the essence of
+truth.* Metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific
+interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension
+of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is essentially
+formed." This basis holds complete dominion over all the phenomena that distinguish the age. Conversely, in order that there
+may be an adequate reflection upon these phenomena themselves,
+the metaphysical basis for them must let itself be apprehended
+1. "Reflection" translates Besinnung. On the meaning of the latter, see
+SR 155 n. 1. "Essence" will be the translation of the noun Wesen in most
+instances of its occurrence in this essay. Occasionally the translation
+"coming to presence" will be used. Wesen must always be understood to
+allude, for Heidegger, not to any mere "whatness," but to the manner in
+which anything, as what it is, takes its course and "holds sway" is its
+ongoing presence, ie., the manner in which it endures in its presencing.
+See QT 30, 3 n. 1. "What is" renders the present participle seiend
+as a noun, das Seiende. On the translation of the latter, see T 40 n. 6.
+2. der Grund seines Wesensgestalt. Heidegger exemplifies the statement
+that he makes here in his discussion of the metaphysics of Descartes as
+providing the necessary interpretive ground for the manner in which, in
+the subjectness of man as self-conscious subject, Being and all that is and
+man-in their immediate and indissoluble relation--come to presence in the
+modern age. See Appendix 9, pp. 150 ff.
+
+116
+in them. Reflection is the courage to make the truth of our own
+presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things
+that most deserve to be called in question (see Appendix 1) 3
+One of the essential phenomena of the modern age is its science. A phenomenon of no less importance is machine technology. We must not, however, misinterpret that technology as
+the mere application of modern mathematical physical science
+to praxis. Machine technology is itself an autonomous transformation of praxis, a type of transformation wherein praxis
+first demands the employment of mathematical physical science.
+Machine technology remains up to now the most visible outgrowth of the essence of modern technology, which is identical
+with the essence of modern metaphysics.
+A third equally essential phenomenon of the modern period
+lies in the event of art's moving into the purview of aesthetics.
+That means that the art work becomes the object of mere subjective experience, and that consequently art is considered to be
+an expression of human life.*
+A fourth modern phenomenon manifests itself in the fact that
+human activity is conceived and consummated as culture. Thus
+culture is the realization of the highest values, through the nurture and cultivation of the highest goods of man. It lies in the
+essence of culture, as such nurturing, to nurture itself in its turn
+and thus to become the politics of culture.
+A fifth phenomenon of the modern age is the loss of the gods."
+This expression does not mean the mere doing away with the
+gods, gross atheism. The loss of the gods is a twofold process.
+On the one hand, the world picture is Christianized inasmuch
+as the cause of the world is posited as infinite, unconditional,
+3. Heidegger's explanatory appendixes begin on p. 137.
+4. Erlebris, translated here as "subjective experience"
+and later as lifeexperience," is a term much used by life philosophers such as Dilthey and
+generally connotes adventure and event. It is employed somewhat pejoratively here. The ferm Erfahrung, which is regularly translated in this volume
+as "experience," connotes discovery and learning, and also suffering and
+undergoing. Here and subsequently (ie.,
+"mere religious experience"),
+"Mere'
+is inserted to maintain the distinction between Erlebnis and
+Erfahrung.
+5. Entgötterung, here inadequately rendered as "loss of the gods," attually means something nore like "degodization."
+
+117
+absolute. On the other hand, Christendom transforns Christian
+doctrine into a world view (the Christian world view), and in
+that way makes itself modern and up to date. The loss of the
+gods is the situation of indecision regarding God and the gods.
+Christendom has the greatest share in bringing it about. But the
+loss of the gods is so far from excluding religiosity that rather
+only through that loss is the relation to the gods changed into
+mere "religious experience." When this occurs, then the gods
+have fled. The resultant void is compensated for by means of
+historiographical and psychological investigation of myth.
+What understanding of what is, what interpretation of truth,
+lies at the foundation of these phenomena?
+We shall limit the question to the phenomenon mentioned
+first, to science [Wissenschaft].
+In what does the essence of modern science lie?
+What understanding of what is and of truth provides the basis
+for that essence? If we succeed in reaching the metaphysical
+ground that provides the foundation for science as a modern
+phenomenon, then the entire essence of the modern age will have
+to let itself be apprehended from out of that ground.
+When we use the word "science" today, it means something
+essentially different from the doctrina and scientia of the Middle
+Ages, and also from the Greek enistime. Greek science was
+never exact, precisely because, in keeping with its essence, it
+could not be exact and did not need to be exact. Hence it makes
+no sense whatever to suppose that modern science is more exact
+than that of antiquity. Neither can we say that the Galilean
+doctrine of freely falling bodies is true and that Aristotle's
+teaching, that light bodies strive upward, is false; for the Greek
+understanding of the essence of body and place and of the relation between the two rests upon a different interpretation of
+beings and hence conditions a correspondingly different kind
+of seeing and questioning of natural events. No one would presume to maintain that Shakespeare's poetry is more advanced
+than that of Aeschylus. It is still more impossible to say that
+the modern understanding of whatever is, is more correct than
+that of the Greeks. Therefore, if we want to grasp the essence of
+modern science, we must first free ourselves from the habit of
+
+118
+comparing the new science with the old solely in terms of degree,
+from the point of view of progress.
+The essence of what we today call science is research. In what
+does the essence of research consist?
+In the fact that knowing [aas Erkennen] establishes itself as
+a procedure within some realm of what is, in nature or in history.
+Procedure does not mean here merely method or methodology.
+For every procedure already requires an open sphere in which
+it moves. And it is precisely the opening up of such a sphere that
+is the fundamental event in research. This is accomplished
+through the projection within some realm of what is—in nature,
+for example-of a fixed ground plan® of natural events. The
+projection sketches out in advance the manner in which the
+knowing procedure must bind itself and adhere to the sphere
+opened up. This binding adherence is the rigor of research.?
+Through the projecting of the ground plan and the prescribing of
+rigor, procedure makes secure for itself its sphere of objects
+within the realm of Being. A look at that earliest science, which
+is at the same time the normative one in the modern age, namely,
+mathematical physics, will make clear what we mean. Inasmuch
+as modern atomic physics still remains physics, what is essential
+-and only the essential is aimed at here-will hold for it also.
+Modern physics is called mathematical because, in a remarkable way, it makes use of a quite specific mathematics. But it
+can proceed mathematically in this way only because, in a deeper
+sense, it is already itself mathematical. Ta mathêmata means for
+the Greeks that which man knows in advance in his observation
+of whatever is and in his intercourse with things: the corporeality of bodies, the vegetable character of plants, the animality
+of animals, the humanness of man. Alongside these, belonging
+also to that which is already-known, i.e., to the mathematical,
+are numbers. If we come upon three apples on the table, we
+6. Grundriss. The verb reissen means to tear, to rend, to sketch, to design,
+and the noun Riss means tear, gap, outline. Hence the noun Grundriss, first
+sketch, ground plan, design, connotes a fundamental sketching out that is
+an opening up as well.
+"Binding adherence" here translates the noun Bindung. The noun could
+also be rendered "obligation." It could thus be said that rigor is the obligation to remain within the realm opened up.
+
+I19
+recognize that there are three of them. But the number three,
+threeness, we already know. This means that number is something mathematical. Only because numbers represent, as it were,
+the most striking of always-already-knowns, and thus offer the
+most familiar instance of the mathematical, is "mathematical"
+promptly reserved as a name for the numerical. In no way, however, is the essence of the mathematical defined by numberness.
+Physics is, in general, the knowledge of nature, and, in particular, the knowledge of material corporeality in its motion; for
+that corporeality manifests itself immediately and universally in
+everything natural, even if in a variety of ways. If physics takes
+shape explicitly, then, as something mathematical, this means
+that, in an especially pronounced way, through it and for it
+something is stipulated in advance as what is already-known.
+That stipulating has to do with nothing less than the plan or
+projection of that which must henceforth, for the knowing of
+nature that is sought after, be nature: the self-contained system
+of motion of units of mass related spatiotemporally. Into this
+ground plan of nature, as supplied in keeping with its prior
+stipulation, the following definitions among others have been
+incorporated: Motion means change of place. No motion or
+direction of motion is superior to any other. Every place is equal
+to every other. No point in time has preference over any other.
+Every force is defined according to--i,e., is only-its consequences in motion, and that means in magnitude of change of
+place in the unity of time. Every event must be seen so as to be
+fitted into this ground plan of nature. Only within the perspective of this ground plan does an event in nature become visible
+as such an event. This projected plan of nature finds its guarantee in the fact that physical research, in every one of its
+questioning steps, is bound in advance to adhere to it. This
+binding adherence, the rigor of research, has its own character
+at any given time in keeping with the projected plan. The rigor
+of mathematical physical science is exactitude. Here all events,
+if they are to enter at all into representation as events of nature,
+must be defined beforehand as spatiotemporal magnitudes of
+motion. Such defining is accomplished through measuring, with
+the help of number and calculation. But mathematical research
+
+120
+into nature is not exact because it calculates with precision;
+rather it must calculate in this way because its adherence to its
+object-sphere has the character of exactitude. The humanistic
+sciences, in contrast, indeed all the sciences concerned with life,
+must necessarily be inexact just in order to remain rigorous.
+A living thing can indeed also be grasped as a spatiotemporal
+magnitude of motion, but then it is no longer apprehended as
+living. The inexactitude of the historical humanistic sciences is
+not a deficiency, but is oniy the fulfillment of a demand essential
+to this type of research. It is true, also, that the projecting and
+securing of the object-sphere of the historical sciences is not
+only of another kind, but is much more difficult of execution
+than is the achieving of rigor in the exact sciences.
+Science becomes research through the projected plan and
+through the securing of that plan in the rigor of procedure. Projection and rigor, however, first develop into what they are in
+methodology. The latter constitutes the second essential characteristic of research. If the sphere that is projected is to become
+objective, then it is a matter of bringing it to encounter us in
+the complete diversity of its levels and interweavings. Therefore
+procedure must be free to view the changeableness in whatever
+encounters it. Only within the horizon of the incessant-otherness
+of change does the plenitude of particularity-of facts—show
+itself. But the facts must become objective [gegenständlich].
+Hence procedure must represent [vorstellen] the changeable in
+its changing," must bring it to a stand and let the motion be a
+motion nevertheless, The fixedness of facts and the constantness
+of their change as such is "rule." The constancy of change in
+the necessity of its course is "law." It is only within the purview
+of rule and law that facts become clear as the facts that they
+are. Research into facts in the realm of nature is intrinsically
+the establishing and verifying of rule and law. Methodology,
+through which a sphere of objects comes into lepresentation,
+8. Throughout this essay the literal meaning of vorstellen, which is
+usually translated with "to represent," is constantly in the foreground, so
+that the verb suggests specifically a setting-in-place-before that is an objectifying, ie., a bringing to a stand as object. See pp. 127, 129-30, 132; cf.
+Appendix 9, pp. 148 f. Heidegger frequently hyphenates vorstellen in this
+essay and its appendixes so as to stress the meaning that he intends.
+
+121
+has the character of clarifying on the basis of what is clear—of
+explanation. Explanation is always twofold. It accounts for an
+unknown by means of a known, and at the same time it verifies
+that known by means of that unknown. Explanation takes place
+in investigation. In the physical sciences investigation takes
+place by means of experiment, always according to the kind of
+field of investigation and according to the type of explanation
+aimed at. But physical science does not first become research
+through experiment; rather, on the contrary, experiment first
+becomes possible where and only where the knowledge of nature
+has been transformed into research. Only because modern physics is a physics that is essentially mathematical can it be experimental. Because neither medieval doctrina nor Greek epistème
+is science in the sense of research, for these it is never a question
+of experiment. To be sure, it was Aristotle who first understood
+what emperia (experientia) means: the observation of things
+themselves, their qualities and modifications under changing
+conditions, and consequently the knowledge of the way in which
+things as a rule behave. But an observation that aims at such
+knowledge, the experimentum, remains essentially different from
+the observation that belongs to science as research, from the
+research experiment; it remains essentially different even when
+ancient and medieval observation also works with number and
+measure, and even when that observation makes use of specific
+apparatus and instruments. For in all this, that which is decisive
+about the experiment is completely missing. Experiment begins
+with the laying down of a law as a basis. To set up an experiment
+means to represent or conceive (vorstellen] the conditions under
+which a specific series of motions can be made susceptible of
+being followed in its necessary progression, i.e., of being controlled in advance by calculation. But the establishing of a law
+is accomplished with reference to the ground plan of the objectsphere. That ground plan furnishes a criterion and constrains
+the anticipatory representing of the conditions. Such representing in and through which the experiment begins is no random
+imagining. That is why Newton said, hypothesis non fingo, "the
+bases that are laid down are not arbitrarily invented." They are
+developed out of the ground plan of nature and are sketched
+into it. Experiment is that methodology which, in its planning
+
+122
+and execution, is supported and guided on the basis of the
+fundamental law laid down, in order to adduce the facts that
+either verify and confirm the law or deny it confirmation. The
+more exactly the ground plan of nature is projected, the more
+exact becomes the possibility of experiment. Hence the muchcited medieval Schoolman Roger Bacon can never be the forerunner of the modern experimental research scientist; rather he
+remains merely a successor of Aristotle. For in the meantime,
+the real locus of truth has been transferred by Christendom to
+faith—to the infallibility of the written word and to the doctrine
+of the Church. The highest knowledge and teaching is theology
+as the interpretation of the divine word of revelation, which is
+set down in Scripture and proclaimed by the Church. Here, to
+know is not to search out; rather it is to understand rightly the
+authoritative Word and the authorities proclaiming it. Therefore, the discussion of the words and doctrinal opinions of the
+various authorities takes precedence in the acquiring of knowledge in the Middle Ages. The componere scripta et sermones, the
+argumentum ex verbo," is decisive and at the same time is the
+reason why the accepted Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy
+that had been taken over had to be transformed into scholastic
+dialectic. If, now, Roger Bacon demands the experimentum-and
+he does demand it-he does not mean the experiment of science
+as research; rather he wants the argumentum ex re instead of the
+argumentum ex verbo, the careful observing of things themselves,
+i.e., Aristotelian emperia, instead of the discussion of doctrines.
+The modern research experiment, however, is not only an
+observation more precise in degree and scope, but is a methodology essentially different in kind, related to the verification of
+law in the framework, and at the service, of an exact plan of
+nature. Source criticism in the historical humanistic sciences corresponds to experiment in physical research. Here the name
+"source criticism" designates the whole gamut of the discovery,
+examination, verification, evaluation, preservation, and interpretation of sources. Historiographical explanation, which is
+9. "The comparing of the writings with the sayings, the argument from
+the word." Argumentum et re, which follows shortly, means "argument
+from the thing."
+
+123
+based on source criticism, does not, it is true, trace facts back
+to laws and rules. But neither does it confine itself to the mere
+reporting of facts. In the historical sciences, just as in the natural sciences, the methodology aims at representing what is fixed
+and stable and at making history an object. History can become
+objective only when it is past. What is stable in what is past,
+that on the basis of which historiographical explanation reckons
+up the solitary and the diverse in history, is the always-hasbeen-once-already, the comparable. Through the constant comparing of everything with everything, what is intelligible is
+found by calculation and is certified and established as the
+ground plan of history. The sphere of historiographical research
+extends only so far as historiographical explanation reaches. The
+unique, the rare, the simple-in short, the great—in history is
+never self-evident and hence remains inexplicable. It is not that
+historical research denies what is great in history; rather it
+explains it as the exception. In this explaining, the great is measured against the ordinary and the average. And there is no other
+historiographical explanation so long as explaining means reduction to what is intelligible and so long as historiography remains
+research, i.e., an explaining. Because historiography as research
+projects and objectifies the past in the sense of an explicable and
+surveyable nexus of actions and consequences, it requires source
+criticism as its instrument of objectification. The standards of
+this criticism alter to the degree that historiography approaches
+journalisti,
+Every science is, as research, grounded upon the projection
+of a circumscribed object-sphere and is therefore necessarily
+a science of individualized character. Every individualized science
+must, moreover, in the development of its projected plan by
+means of its methodology, particularize itself into specific fields
+of investigation, This particularizing (specialization) is, however, by no means simply an irksome concomitant of the increasing unsurveyability of the results of research. It is not a necessary evil, but is rather an essential necessity of science as
+research. Specialization is not the consequence but the founda.
+tion of the progress of all research. Research does not, through
+its methodology, become dispersed into random investigations,
+
+124
+so as to lose itself in them; for modern science is determined by
+a third fundamental event: ongoing activity (Appendix 2).10
+By this is to be understood first of all the phenomenon that a
+science today, whether physical or humanistic, attains to the
+respect due a science only when it has become capable of being
+institutionalized. However, research is not ongoing activity because its work is accomplished in institutions, but rather institutions are necessary because science, intrinsically as research,
+has the character of ongoing activity. The methodology through
+which individual object-spheres are conquered does not simply
+amass results. Rather, with the help of its results it adapts
+[richtet sich... ein] itself for a new procedure. Within the complex of machinery that is necessary to physics in order to carry
+out the smashing of the atom lies hidden the whole of physics
+up to now. Correspondingly, in historiographical research, funds
+of source materials become usable for explanation only if those
+sources are themselves guaranteed on the basis of historiographical explanation. In the course of these processes, the
+methodology of the science becomes circumscribed by means
+of its results. More and more the methodology adapts itself to
+the possibilities of procedure opened up through itself. This
+having-to-adapt-itself to its own results as the ways and means
+of an advancing methodology is the essence of research's character as ongoing activity. And it is that character that is the
+intrinsic basis for the necessity of the institutional nature of
+research.
+In ongoing activity the plan of an object-sphere is, for the
+first time, built into whatever is. All adjustments that facilitate
+a plannable conjoining of types of methodology, that further the
+reciprocal checking and communication of results, and that regulate the exchange of talents are measures that are by no means
+only the external consequences of the fact that research work
+is expanding and proliferating. Rather, research work becomes
+the distant sign, still far from being understood, that modern
+science is beginning to enter upon the decisive phase of its his-
+10. "Ongoing
+activity" is the rendering of Betrieb, which is difficult to
+translate adequately. It means the act of driving on, or industry, activity,
+as well as undertaking, pursuit, business. It can also mean management, or
+workshop of factory.
+
+125
+tory. Only now is it beginning to take possession of its own
+complete essence.
+What is taking place in this extending and consolidating of
+the institutional character of the sciences? Nothing less than the
+making secure of the precedence of methodology over whatever
+is (nature and history), which at any given time becomes objective in research. On the foundation of their character as ongoing
+activity, the sciences are creating for themselves the solidarity
+and unity appropriate to them. Therefore historiographical or
+archeological research that is carried forward in an institutionalized way is essentially closer to research in physics that is
+similarly organized than it is to a discipline belonging to its
+own faculty in the humanistic sciences that still remains mired
+in mere erudition. Hence the decisive development of the modern
+character of science as ongoing activity also forms men of a
+different stamp. The scholar disappears. He is succeeded by the
+research man who is engaged in research projects. These, rather
+than the cultivating of erudition, lend to his work its atmosphere
+of incisiveness. The research man no longer needs a library at
+home. Moreover, he is constantly on the move. He negotiates
+at meetings and collects information at congresses. He contracts
+for commissions with publishers. The latter now determine along
+with him which books must be written (Appendix 3).
+The research worker necessarily presses forward of himself
+into the sphere characteristic of the technologist in the essential
+sense. Only in this way is he capable of acting effectively, and
+only thus, after the manner of his age, is he real. Alongside him,
+the increasingly thin and empty Romanticism of scholarship
+and the university will still be able to persist for some time in
+a few places. However, the effective unity characteristic of the
+university, and hence the latter's reality, does not lie in some
+intellectual power belonging to an original unification of the
+sciences and emanating from the university because nourished
+by it and preserved in it. The university is real as an orderly
+establishment that, in a form still unique because it is administratively self-contained, makes possible and visible the striving
+apart of the sciences into the particularization and peculiar unity
+that belong to ongoing activity. Because the forces intrinsic to
+the essence of modern science come immediately and unequiv-
+
+126
+ocally to effective working in ongoing activity, therefore, also,
+it is only the spontaneous ongoing activities of research that
+can sketch out and establish the internal unity with other like
+activities that is commensurate with themselves.
+The real system of science consists in a solidarity of procedure
+and attitude with respect to the objectification of whatever is—
+a solidarity that is brought about appropriately at any given time
+on the basis of planning. The excellence demanded of this system
+is not some contrived and rigid unity of the relationships among
+object-spheres, having to do with content, but is rather the
+greatest possible free, though regulated, flexibility in the shifting
+about and introducing of research apropos of the leading tasks
+at any given time. The more exclusively science individualizes
+itself with a view to the total carrying on and mastering of its
+work process, and the more realistically these ongoing activities
+are shifted into separate research institutes and professional
+schools, the more irresistibly do the sciences achieve the consummation of their modern essence. But the more unconditionally science and the man of research take seriously the modern
+form of their essence, the more unequivocally and the more
+immediately will they be able to offer themselves for the common
+good, and the more unreservedly too will they have to return
+to the public anonymity of all work useful to society.
+Modern science simultaneously establishes itself and differentiates itself in its projections of specific object-spheres. These
+projection-plans are developed by means of a corresponding
+methodology, which is made secure through rigor. Methodology
+adapts and establishes itself at any given time in ongoing activity. Projection and rigor, methodology and ongoing activity,
+mutually requiring one another, constitute the essence of modern
+science, transform science into research.
+We are reflecting on the essence of modern science in order
+that we may apprehend in it its metaphysical ground. What
+understanding of what is and what concept of truth provide the
+basis for the fact that science is being transformed into research?
+Knowing, as research, calls whatever is to account with regard
+to the way in which and the extent to which it lets itself be put
+at the disposal of representation. Research has disposal over
+
+1,27
+anything that is when it can either calculate it in its future
+course in advance or verify a calculation about it as past. Nature,
+in being calculated in advance, and history, in being historiographically verified as past, become, as it were, "set in place"
+[gestellt]." Nature and history become the objects of a representing that explains. Such representing counts on nature and
+takes account of history. Only that which becomes object in this
+way is—is considered to be in being. We first arrive at science as
+research when the Being of whatever is, is sought in such objectiveness.
+This objectifying of whatever is, is accomplished in a settingbefore, a representing, that aims at bringing each particular
+being before it in such a way that man who calculates can be
+sure, and that means be certain, of that being. We first arrive at
+science as research when and only when truth has been transformed into the certainty of representation. What it is to be is
+for the first time defined as the objectiveness of representing,
+and truth is first defined as the certainty of representing, in the
+metaphysics of Descartes. The title of Descartes's principal work
+reads: Meditationes de prima philosophia [Meditations on First
+Philosophy]. Prote philosophia is the designation coined by Aristotle for what is later called metaphysics. The whole of modern
+metaphysics taken together, Nietzsche included, maintains itself
+within the interpretation of what it is to be and of truth that
+was prepared by Descartes (Appendix 4).
+Now if science as research is an essential phenomenon of the
+modern age, it must be that that which constitutes the metaphysical ground of research determines first and long beforehand the essence of that age generally. The essence of the modern age can be seen in the fact that man frees himself from the
+bonds of the Middle Ages in freeing himself to himself. But
+11. The verb steller, with the meanings to set in place, to set upon (i.e.,
+to challenge forth), and to supply, is invariably fundamental in Heidegger's
+understanding of the modern age. See in this essay the discussion of the
+setting in place of the world as picture, p. 129. For the use of steller to
+characterize the manner in which science deals with the real, see SR 167-168
+for a discussion in which stellen and the related noun Ge-stell serve centrally to characterize and name the essence of technology in this age, see
+QT IA If
+
+128
+this correct characterization remains, nevertheless, superficial. It
+leads to those errors that prevent us from comprehending the
+essential foundation of the modern age and, from there, judging
+the scope of the age's essence. Certainly the modern age has, as
+a consequence of the liberation of man, introduced subjectivism
+and individualism. But it remains just as certait that no age
+before this one has produced a comparable objectivism and that
+in no age before this has the non-individual, in the form of the
+collective, come to acceptance as having worth. Essential here
+is the necessary interplay between subjectivism and objectivism.
+It is precisely this reciprocal conditioning of one by the other
+that points back to events more profound.
+What is decisive is not that man frees himself to himself from
+previous obligations, but that the very essence of man itself
+changes, in that man becomes subject. We must understand this
+word subiectum, however, as the translation of the Greek
+hypokeimenon. The word names that-which-lies-before, which,
+as ground, gathers everything onto itself. This metaphysical
+meaning of the concept of subject has first of all no special relationship to man and none at all to the I.
+However, when man becomes the primary and only real subiectum, that means: Man becomes that being upon which all
+that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its
+truth. Man becomes the relational center of that which is as such.
+But this is possible only when the comprehension of what is as
+a whole changes. In what does this change manifest itself? What,
+in keeping with it, is the essence of the modern age?
+When we reflect on the modern age, we are questioning concerning the modern world picture [Weltbild]."' We characterize
+the latter by throwing it into relief over against the medieval
+and the ancient world pictures. But why do we ask concerning
+a world picture in our interpreting of a historical age? Does every
+period of history have its world picture, and indeed in such a
+way as to concern itself from time to time about that world
+I2. The conventional translation of Welthild would be "conception of
+the world" or "philosophy of life." The more literal translation, "world
+picture," is needed for the following of Heidegger's discussion; but it is
+worth noting that "conception of the world" bears a close relation to
+ing that onception of the
+Heidegger's theme of man's representing of the world as picture.
+
+129
+picture? Or is this, after all, only a modern kind of representing,
+this asking concerning a world picture?
+What is a world picture? Obviously a picture of the world.
+But what does "world" mean here? What does "picture" mean?
+"World" serves here as a name for what is, in its entirety. The
+name is not limited to the cosmos, to nature. History also belongs
+to the world. Yet even nature and history, and both interpenetrating in their underlying and transcending of one another, do
+not exhaust the world. In this designation the ground of the
+world is meant also, no matter how its relation to the world is
+thought (Appendix 5).
+With the word "picture" we think first of all of a copy of
+something. Accordingly, the world picture would be a painting,
+so to speak, of what is as a whole. But "world picture" means
+more than this. We mean by it the world itself, the world as
+such, what is, in its entirety, just as it is normative and binding
+for us. "Picture" here does not mean some imitation, but rather
+what sounds forth in the colloquial expression, "We get the
+picture" [literally, we are in the picture] concerning something.
+This means the matter stands before us exactly as it stands with
+it for us. "To get into the picture" [literally, to put oneself into
+the picture] with respect to something means to set whatever is,
+itself, in place before oneself just in the way that it stands with
+it, and to have it fixedly before oneself as set up in this way.
+But a decisive determinant in the essence of the picture is still
+missing. 'We get the picture" concerning something does not
+mean only that what is, is set before us, is represented to us, in
+general, but that what is stands before us—in all that belongs
+to it and all that stands together in it—as a system. "To get the
+picture" throbs with being acquainted with something, with
+being equipped and prepared for it. Where the world becomes
+picture, what is, in its entirety, is juxtaposed as that for which
+man is prepared and which, correspondingly, he therefore intends to bring before himself and have before himself, and
+consequently intends in a decisive sense to set in place before
+himseif (Appendix 6). Hence world picture, when understood
+essentially, does not mean a picture of the world but the world
+conceived and grasped as picture. What is, in its entirety, is now
+taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being
+
+230
+to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets
+forth.1? Wherever we have the world picture, an essential decision takes place regarding what is, in its entirety. The Being
+of whatever is, is sought and found in the representedness of
+the latter.
+However, everywhere that whatever is, is not interpreted in
+this way, the world also cannot enter into a picture; there can
+be no world picture. The fact that whatever is comes into being
+in and through representedness transforms the age in which this
+occurs into a new age in contrast with the preceding one. The
+expressions "world picture of the modern age" and "modern
+world picture" both mean the same thing and both assume
+something that never could have been before, namely, a medieval
+and an ancient world picture. The world picture does not change
+from an earlier medieval one into a modern one, but rather the
+fact that the world becomes picture at all is what distinguishes
+the essence of the modern age [der Neuzeit].' For the Middle
+Ages, in contrast, that which is, is the ens creatum, that which
+is created by the personal Creator-God as the highest cause.
+Here, to be in being means to belong within a specific rank of
+the order of what has been created-a rank appointed from the
+beginning—and as thus caused, to correspond to the cause of
+creation (analogia entis) (Appendix 7). But never does the Being
+of that which is consist here in the fact that it is brought before
+man as the objective, in the fact that it is placed in the realm of
+man's knowing and of his having disposal, and that it is in being
+only in this way.
+The modern interpretation of that which is, is even further
+from the interpretation characteristic of the Greeks. One of the
+oldest pronouncements of Greek thinking regarding the Being
+of that which is runs: To gar auto noein estin te kai einai.?° This
+sentence of Parmenides means: The apprehending of whatever
+is belongs to Being because it is demanded and determined by
+13. durch den vorstellenden-herstellenden Menschen gestellt ist.
+14. Die Neuzeit is more literally "the new age." Having repeatedly used
+this word in this discussion, Heidegger will soon elucidate the meaning of
+the "newness" of which it speaks (pp. 130 f.).
+I5. The accepted English translation of this fragment is, "For thought and
+being are the same thing' (Nahm).
+
+131
+Being. That which is, is that which arises and opens itself, which,
+as what presences, comes upon man as the one who presences,
+i.e., comes upon the one who himself opens himself to what
+presences in that he apprehends it. That which is does not come
+into being at all through the fact that man first looks upon it,
+in the sense of a representing that has the character of subjective
+perception. Rather, man is the one who is looked upon by that
+which is; he is the one who is—in company with itselfgathered toward presencing, by that which opens itself. To be
+beheld by what is, to be included and maintained within its
+openness and in that way to be borne along by it, to be driven
+about by its oppositions and marked by its discord-that is the
+essence of man in the great age of the Greeks. Therefore, in order
+to fulfill his essence, Greek man must gather (legein) and save
+(sozein), catch up and preserve," what opens itself in its openness, and he must remain exposed (aletheuein) to all its sundering confusions. Greek man is as the one who apprehends [der
+Vernehmer] that which is," and this is why in the age of the
+Greeks the world cannot become picture. Yet, on the other hand,
+that the beingness of whatever is, is defined for Plato as eidos
+[aspect, view] is the presupposition, destined far in advance and
+long ruling indirectly in concealment, for the world's having to
+become picture (Appendix 8).
+In distinction from Greek apprehending, modern representing,
+whose meaning the word representatio first brings to its earliest
+expression, intends something quite different. Here to represent
+[vor-stellen] means to bring what is present at hand [das Vorhandene] before oneself as something standing over against, to
+relate it to oneself, to the one representing it, and to force it
+back into this relationship to oneself as the normative realm.
+Wherever this happens, man "gets into the picture" in precedence
+over whatever is. But in that man puts himself into the picture
+in this way, he puts himself into the scene, i.e, into the open
+16. "Preserve" translates bewahren. The verb speaks of a preserving that
+as such frees and allows to be manifest. On the connotations resident in
+walren and related words formed from waht, see T 42 n. 9.
+17. The noun Vernehmer is related to the verb vernehmen (to hear, to
+perceive, to understand). Vernehmen speaks of an immediate receiving. in
+contrast to the setting-before (vor-stellen) that arrests and objectifies.
+
+132
+sphere of that which is generally and publicly represented.
+Therewith man sets himself up as the setting in which whatever
+is must henceforth set itself forth, must present itself [sich...
+präsentieren), i.e., be picture. Man becomes the representative
+[der Repräsentant] of that which is, in the sense of that which
+has the character of object.
+But the newness in this event by no means consists in the
+fact that now the position of man in the midst of what is, is an
+entirely different one in contrast to that of medieval and ancient
+man. What is decisive is that man himself expressly takes up
+this position as one constituted by himself, that he intentionally
+maintains it as that taken up by himself, and that he makes it
+secure as the solid footing for a possible development of humanity. Now for the first time is there any such thing as a
+"position" of man. Man makes depend upon himself the way
+in which he must take his stand in relation to whatever is as the
+objective. There begins that way of being human which mans
+the realm of human capability as a domain given over to measuring and executing, for the purpose of gaining inastery over
+that which is as a whole. The age that is determined from out
+of this event is, when viewed in retrospect, not only a new one
+in contrast with the one that is past, but it settles itself firnly in
+place expressly as the new. To be new is peculiar to the world
+that has become picture.
+When, accordingly, the picture character of the world is made
+clear as the representedness of that which is, then in order fully
+to grasp the modern essence of representedness we must track
+out and expose the original naming power of the worn-out word
+and concept "to represent" [vorstellen]: to set out before oneself
+and to set forth in relation to oneself. Through this, whatever
+is comes to a stand as object and in that way alone receives the
+seal of Being. That the world becomes picture is one and the
+same event with the event of man's becoming subiectum in the
+midst of that which is (Appendix 9).
+Only because and insofar as man actually and essentially has
+become subject is it necessary for him, as a consequence, to
+confront the explicit question: Is it as an "I" confined to its own
+preferences and freed into its own arbitrary choosing or as the
+"we" of society; is it as an individual or as a community; is it
+
+133
+as a personality within the community or as a mere group
+member in the corporate body; is it as a state and nation and
+as a people or as the common humanity of modern man, that
+man will and ought to be the subject that in his modern essence
+he already is? Only where man is essentially already subject
+does there exist the possibility of his slipping into the aberration
+of subjectivism in the sense of individualism. But also, only
+where man remains subject does the positive struggle against
+individualism and for the community as the sphere of those goals
+that govern all achievement and usefulness have any meaning.
+The interweaving of these two events, which for the modern
+age is decisive-that the world is transformed into picture and
+man into subiectum-throws light at the same time on the
+grounding event of modern history, an event that at first glance
+seems almost absurd. Namely, the more extensively and the more
+effectually the world stands at man's disposal as conquered, and
+the more objectively the object appears, all the more subjectively,
+i.e., the more importunately, does the subiectum rise up, and all
+the more impetuously, too, do observation of and teaching about
+the world change into a doctrine of man, into anthropology. It
+is no wonder that humanism first arises where the world becomes
+picture. It would have been just as impossible for a humanism
+to have gained currency in the great age of the Greeks as it
+would have been impossible to have had anything like a world
+picture in that age. Humanism, therefore, in the more strict
+historiographical sense, is nothing but a moral-aesthetic anthropology. The name "anthropology" as used here does not mean
+just some investigation of man by a natural science. Nor does it
+mean the doctrine established within Christian theology of man
+created, fallen, and redeemed. It designates that philosophical
+interpretation of man which explains and evaluates whatever is,
+in its entirety, from the standpoint of man and in relation to
+man (Appendix 10).
+The increasingly exclusive rooting of the interpretation of the
+world in anthropology, which has set in since the end of the
+eighteenth century, finds its expression in the fact that the
+fundamental stance of man in relation to what is, in its entirety,
+is defined as a world view (Weltanschauung). Since that time
+this word has been admitted into common usage. As soon as
+
+134
+the world becomes picture, the position of man is conceived as
+a world view. To be sure, the phrase "world view" is open to
+misunderstanding, as though it were merely a matter here of a
+passive contemplation of the world. For this reason, already in
+the nineteenth century it was emphasized with justification that
+"world view" also meant and even meant primarily "view of
+life." The fact that, despite this, the phrase "world view" asserts
+itself as the name for the position of man in the midst of all
+that is, is proof of how decisively the world became picture as
+soon as man brought his life as subiectum into precedence over
+other centers of relationship. This means: whatever is, is considered to be in being only to the degree and to the extent that
+it is taken into and referred back to this life, ie., is lived out,
+and becomes life-experience. Just as unsuited to the Greek spirit
+as every humanism had to be, just so impossible was a medieval
+world view, and just as absurd is a Catholic world view. Just as
+necessarily and legitimately as everything must change into lifeexperience for modern man the more unlimitedly he takes charge
+of the shaping of his essence, just so certainly could the Greeks
+at the Olympian festivals never have had life-experiences.
+The fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of
+the world as picture. The word "picture" [Bild] now means the
+structured image [Gebild] that is the creature of man's producing
+which represents and sets before." In such producing, man contends for the position in which he can be that particular being
+who gives the measure and draws up the guidelines for everything that is. Because this position secures, organizes, and articulates itself as a world view, the modern relationship to that
+which is, is one that becomes, in its decisive unfolding, a confrontation of world views; and indeed not of random world
+views, but only of those that have already taken up the fundamental position of man that is most extreme, and have done
+18. Gebild is Heidegger's own word. The noun Gebilde means thing
+forned, creation, structure, image. Gebild is here taken to be close to it in
+meaning. and it is assumed-with the use of "structured"-that Heidegger
+intends the force of the prefix ge-, which connotes a gathering, to be found
+in the word (cf. QT 19 ff.). "Man's producing which represents and sets be
+fore* translates des vorstellenden Herstellens.
+
+• ..
+135
+so with the utmost resoluteness. For the sake of this struggle
+of world views and in keeping with its meaning, man brings into
+play his unlimited power for the calculating, planning, and
+molding of all things. Science as research is an absolutely necessary form of this establishing of self in the world; it is one of
+the pathways upon which the modern age rages toward fulfillment of its essence, with a velocity unknown to the participants. With this struggle of world views the modern age first
+enters into the part of its history that is the most decisive and
+probably the most capable of enduring (Appendix 11).
+A sign of this event is that everywhere and in the most varied
+forms and disguises the gigantic is making its appearance. In so
+doing, it evidences itself simultaneously in the tendency toward
+the increasingly small. We have only to think of numbers in
+atomic physics. The gigantic presses forward in a form that
+actually seems to make it disappear-in the annihilation of great
+distances by the airplane, in the setting before us of foreign and
+remote worlds in their everydayness, which is produced at random through radio by a flick of the hand. Yet we think too
+superficially if we suppose that the gigantic is only the endlessly
+extended emptiness of the purely quantitative. We think too
+little if we find that the gigantic, in the form of continual notever-having-been-here-yet, originates only in a blind mania for
+exaggerating and excelling. We do not think at all if we believe
+we have explained this phenomenon of the gigantic with the
+catchword "Americanism" (Appendix 12).
+The gigantic is rather that through which the quantitative becomes a special quality and thus a remarkable kind of greatness.
+Each historical age is not only great in a distinctive way in contrast to others; it also has, in each instance, its own concept of
+greatness. But as soon as the gigantic in planning and calculating
+and adjusting and making secure shifts over out of the quantitative and becomes a special quality, then what is gigantic, and
+what can seemingly always be calculated completely, becomes,
+precisely through this, incalculable. This becoming incalculable remains the invisible shadow that is cast around all things
+everywhere when man has been transformed into subiectum and
+the world into picture (Appendix 13).
+
+136
+By means of this shadow the modern world extends itself out
+into a space withdrawn from representation, and so lends to the
+incalculable the determinateness peculiar to it, as well as a historical uniqueness. This shadow, however, points to something
+else, which it is denied to us of today to know (Appendix 14).
+But man will never be able to experience and ponder this that is
+denied so long as he dawdles about in the mere negating of the
+age. The fight into tradition, out of a combination of humility
+and presumption, can bring about nothing in itself other than
+self-deception and blindness in relation to the historical moment.
+Man will know, ie., carefully safeguard into its truth," that
+which is incalculable, only in creative questioning and shaping
+out of the power of genuine reflection. Reflection transports the
+man of the future into that "between" in which he belongs to
+Being and yet remains a stranger amid that which is (Appendix
+15). Hölderlin knew of this. His poem, which bears the superscription "To the Germans," closes:
+How narrowly bounded is our lifetime,
+We see and count the number of our years.
+But have the years of nations
+Been seen by mortal eye?
+If your soul throbs in longing
+Over its own time, mourning, ther
+You linger on the cold shore
+Among your own and never know them,?
+19. Wissen, d.h., in seine Wahrheit verwahren, wird der Mersch, . ..
+Her shened is surely to ended stremind of hasize by sensatet u in
+ine sentence,
+whose characterization this essay began. On such knowing-an attentive
+beholding that watches over and makes manifest-as essential to the characterizing of science as such, see SR 180 ff.
+Wohl ist enge begrenzt unsere Lebenzeit,
+Unserer Jahre Zahl sehen und zählen wir,
+Doch die Jahre der Völker,
+Sah ein sterbliches Auge sie?
+Wenn die Seele dir auch iiber die eigene Zeit
+Sich die sehnende schwingt, trauernd verweilest du
+Dann am kalten Gestade
+Bei den Deinen und kennst sie nie.
+
+1.37
+APPENDIXES
+1. Such reflection is not necessary fox all, nor is it to be accomplished or even found bearable by everyone. On the other
+hand, absence of reflection belongs to a very great extent to
+certain definite stages of achieving and moving forward. And
+yet the questioning belonging to reflection never becomes either
+groundless or beyond all question, because, in anticipation, it
+questions concerning Being. Being is for it that which is most
+worthy of questioning. Reflection finds in Being its most extreme
+resistance, which constrains it to deal seriously with whatever is
+as the latter is brought into the light of its Being. Reflection on
+the essence of the modern age puts thinking and decision into
+the sphere of effective working that belongs to the genuinely
+essential forces of this age. These forces work as they will, beyond the reach of all everyday valuation. In the face of these
+forces, there is only a readiness for their decisive issue or, instead,
+an evasive turning away into the ahistorical. In this connection,
+however, it is not sufficient to affirm technology, for example, or,
+out of an attitude incomparably more essential, to set up "total
+mobilization" as an absolute once it is recognized as being at
+hand." It is a matter of constantly grasping in advance the
+essence of the age from out of the truth of Being holding sway
+wh. Heidegger refers here to the central theme of Errust Jünger's "Die
+Totale Mobilmachung," first published in 1931 as the preliminary sketch fos
+his monumental book Der Arbeiter (The worker) (Hamburg: Hanseatisch€
+Verlaganstalt, 1932). Originally, on the basis of his experience of World
+War I, Jinger sees "total mobilization" as the fundamental characteristic of
+modern warfare. Primarily a confrontation between man and technology,
+war shows itself to be a "gigantic labor process" (gigantischer Arbeitspro.
+zeer). {See "Die Totale Mobilmachung" in Blätter und Steine (Hamburg:
+Flanseatische Verlaganstalt, 1934), p. 130.) In the evolution of Jinger's
+thinking, the meaning of the term
+mobilization" extends itself to
+denote the phenomenon which for him is the essence of modern times:
+man's dominating of the earth by means of his technological will. "The war
+and the labor front are identical" (Der Arbeiter, p. 109). Viewing
+Jünger's thinking in the light of Nietzsche's, Heidegger understands "total
+mobilization" as the final realization of the metaphysies of the will to
+power, or as the final phase of "active nihilism." See The Question of
+Being [Zur Seinsfrage], trans. William Klubach and Jean T. Wilde (New
+York: Twayne, 1958), pp. 41 ff.
+
+138
+within it; for only thus, simultaneously, is that which is most
+worthy of questioning experienced, ie., that which radically
+carries forward and constrains a creating into the future, out
+beyond what is at hand, and lets the transformation of man become a necessity springing forth from Being itself. No age lets
+itself be done away with by a negating decree. Negation only
+throws the negator off the path. The modern age requires, however, in order to be withstood in the future, in its essence and on
+the very strength of its essence, an originality and range of reflection for which we of today are perhaps preparing somewhat,
+but over which we certainly can never gain mastery.
+z. The phrase "ongoing activity" [Betrieb] is not intended
+here in a pejorative sense. But because research is, in essence,
+ongoing activity, the industrious activity of mere "busyness" [des
+blossen Betriebs), which is always possible, gives the impression
+of a higher reality behind which the burrowing activity proper to
+research work is accomplished. Ongoing activity becomes mere
+busyness whenever, in the pursuing of its methodology, it no
+longer keeps itself open on the basis of an ever-new accomplishing of its projection-plan, but only leaves that plan behind itself
+as a given; never again confirms and verifies its own self accumulating results and the calculation of them, but simply chases after
+such results and calculations. Mere busyness must at all times
+be combated precisely because research is, in its essence, ongoing activity. If we seek what is scientific in science solely in
+serene erudition, then of course it seems as though the disowning
+of practical activity also means the denying of the fact that research has the essential character of ongoing activity, It is true
+that the more completely research becomes ongoing activity, and
+in that way mounts to its proper level of performance, the more
+constantly does the danger of mere industriousness grow within
+it. Finally a situation arises in which the distinction between ongoing activity and busyness not only has become unrecognizable,
+but has become unreal as well. Precisely this balancing out of the
+essential and the aberrant into the average that is the self-evident
+makes research as the embodiment of science, and thus makes
+the modern age itself, capable of enduring. But whence does re-
+
+139
+search receive the counterpoise to the mere busyness within its
+ongoing activity?
+3. The growing importance of the publishing business is not
+based merely on the fact that publishers (perhaps through the
+process of marketing their books) come to have the best ear for
+the needs of the public or that they are better businessmen than
+are authors. Rather their peculiar work takes the form of a
+procedure that plans and that establishes itself with a view to
+the way in which, through the prearranged and limited publication of books and periodicals, they are to bring the worid into
+the picture for the public and confirm it publicly. The preponderance of collections, of sets of books, of series and pocket editions,
+is already a consequence of this work on the part of publishers,
+which in turn coincides with the aims of researchers, since the
+latter not only are acknowledged and given consideration more
+easily and more rapidly through collections and sets, but, reaching a wider public, they immediately achieve their intended effect.
+4, The fundamental metaphysical position of Descartes is
+taken over historically from the Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics and moves, despite its new beginning, within the same
+question: What is it to be?* That this question, formulated in
+this way, does not come to the fore in Descartes's Meditations
+only proves how essentially the change in the answer to it already
+determines the fundamental position. Descartes's interpretation
+of what it is to be and of truth first creates the presupposition
+underlying the possibility of a theory of knowledge or a metaphysics of knowledge. Through Descartes, realism is first put
+in the position of having to prove the reality of the outer world,
+ofhaving to save that which is as such.
+The essential modifications of the fundamental position of
+Descartes that have been attained in German thinking since
+Leibniz do not in any way overcome that fundamental position
+itself. They simply expand its metaphysical scope and create the
+presuppositions of the nineteenth century, still the most obscure
+* Was ist das Seiende? Literally, "What is being?"
+
+140
+of all the centuries of the modern age up to now. Indirectly those
+modifications confirm the fundamental position of Descartes in
+a form in which they themselves are almost unrecognizable,
+though they are not for that reason the less ieal. In contrast,
+mere Cartesian Scholasticism, with its rationalism, has lost all
+power further to shape modern times. With Descartes begins the
+completion and consummation of Western metaphysics. And yet,
+because such a consummation is only possible once again as
+metaphysics, modern thinking has its own greatness.
+With the interpretation of man as subiectum, Descartes
+creates the metaphysical presupposition for future anthropology
+of every kind and tendency. In the rise of the anthropologies,
+Descartes celebrates his greatest triumph. Through anthropology
+the transition of metaphysics into the event of the simple stopping and setting aside of all philosophy is introduced. The fact
+that Dilthey disavowed metaphysics, that fundamentally he no
+longer even understood its question and stood helpless before
+metaphysical logic, is the inner consequence of his fundamental
+anthropological position. His "philosophy of philosophy" is
+an outstanding form of the anthropological abrogation- not the
+overcoming-of philosophy. This is why every anthropology in
+which previous philosophy is employed at will but is explained
+as superfluous qua philosophy has the advantage of seeing
+clearly what is required along with the affirmation of anthropology. Through this, the intellectual situation finds some clarification, while the laborious fabrications of such absurd offshoots as the national-socialist philosophies produce nothing
+but confusion. The world view does indeed need and use philosophical erudition, but it requires no philosophy, since, as world
+view, it has already taken over a particular interpretation and
+structuring of whatever is. But one thing, surely, anthropology
+cannot do. It cannot overcome Descartes, nor even rise up against
+him, for how shall the consequence ever attack the ground on
+which it stands?
+Descartes can be overcome only through the overcoming of
+that which he himself founded, only through the overcoming of
+modern, and that means at the same time Western, metaphysics.
+Overcoming means here, however, the primal asking of the
+question concerning the meaning, i.e., concerning the realm of
+
+141
+the projection or delineation, and thus concerning the truth, of
+Being-which question simultaneously unveils itself as the
+question concerning the Being of truth.
+5. The concept of world as it is developed in Being and Time
+is to be understood only from within the horizon of the question
+concerning "openness for Being" [Da-sein], a question that, for
+its part, remains closely conjoined with the fundamental question
+concerning the meaning of Being (not with the meaning of that
+which is).
+E. What belongs properly to the essence of the picture is
+standing-together, system. By this is not meant the artificial and
+external simplifying and putting together of what is given, but
+the unity of structure in that which is represented [im Vorgestellten] as such, a unity that develops out of the projection
+of the objectivity of whatever is. In the Middle Ages a system
+is impossible, for there a ranked order of correspondences is
+alone essential, and indeed as an ordering of whatever is in the
+sense of what has been created by God and is watched over as his
+creature. The system is still more foreign to the Greeks, even
+if in modern times we speak, though quite wrongly, of the
+Platonic and Aristotelian "systems." Ongoing activity in research
+is a specific bodying-forth and ordering of the systematic, in
+which, at the same time, the latter reciprocally determines the
+ordering. Where the world becomes picture, the systern, and not
+only in thinking, comes to dominance. However, where the
+system is in the ascendancy, the possibility always exists also
+of its degenerating into the superficiality of a system that has
+merely been fabricated and pieced together, This takes place
+when the original power of the projecting is lacking. The unique
+ness of the systematic in Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and
+Schelling-a uniqueness that is inherently diverse-is still not
+grasped. The greatness of the systematic in these thinkers lies
+in the fact that it unfolds not as in Descartes out of the subject
+as ego and substantia finita, but either as in Leibniz out of the
+monad, or as in Kant out of the transcendental essence of finite
+understanding rooted in the imagination, or as in Fichte out of
+the infinite I, or as in Hegel out of Spirit as absolute knowledge,
+
+142
+or as in Schelling out of freedom as the necessity of every patticular being which, as such a being, remains determined through
+the distinction between ground and existence.
+The representation of value is just as essential to the modern
+interpretation of that which is, as is the system. Where anything
+that is has become the object of representing, it first incurs in a
+certain manner a loss of Being, This loss is adequately perceived,
+if but vaguely and unclearly, and is compensated for with corresponding swiftness through the fact that we impart value to the
+object and to that which is, interpreted as object, and that we take
+the measure of whatever is, solely in keeping with the criterion
+of value, and make of values themselves the goal of all activity.
+Since the latter is understood as culture, values become cultural
+values, and these, in turn, become the very expression of the
+highest purposes of creativity, in the service of man's making
+himself secure as subiectum. From here it is only a step to making
+values into objects in themselves. Value is the objectification of
+needs as goals, wrought by a representing self-establishing
+within the world as picture. Value appears to be the expression
+of the fact that we, in our position of relationship to it, act
+to advance just that which is itself most valuable; and yet that
+very value is the impotent and threadbare disguise of the objectivity of whatever is, an objectivity that has become flat and
+devoid of background. No one dies for mere values. We should
+note, for the sake of shedding light on the nineteenth century,
+the peculiar in-between position of Hermann Lotze, who at the
+same time that he was reinterpreting Plato's Ideas as values
+undertook, under the title Microcasmos, that Attempt at an An-
+thropology (1856) which still drew sustenance for the nobility
+and straightforwardness of its mode of thinking from the spirit
+of German idealism, yet also opened that thinking to positivism.
+Because Nietzsche's thinking remains imprisoned in value representation, he has to articulate what is essential for him in the
+form of a reversal, as the revaluation of all values. Only when
+we succeed in grasping Nietzsche's thinking independently of
+value representation do we come to a standing-ground from
+which the work of the last thinker of metaphysics becomes a task
+
+143
+assigned to questioning, and Nietzsche's antagonism to Wagner
+becomes comprehensible as the necessity of our history.
+7. Correspondence [Die Entsprechung], thought as the fundamental characteristic of the Being of whatever is, furnishes the
+pattern for very specific possibilities and modes of setting the
+truth of this Being, in whatever has being, into the work. The
+art work of the Middle Ages and the absence of a world picture
+in that age belong together.
+8. But did not a sophist at about the time of Socrates dare
+to say, "Man is the measure of all things, of those that are [der
+seienden], that they are, of those that are not, that they are not?"
+Does this statement of Protagoras not sound as though Descartes
+were speaking? Most importantly, is it not true that the Being
+of whatever is, is grasped by Plato as that which is beheld, as
+¿dea? Is the relation to what is as such not for Aristotle theoria,
+pure beholding? And yet it is no more the case that this sophistic
+statement of Protagoras is subjectivism than it is that Descartes
+could carry into execution nothing but the overturning of Greek
+thought. Certainly, through Plato's thinking and through Aristotle's questioning a decisive change takes place in the interpretation of what is and of men, but it is a change that always remains on the foundation of the Greek fundamental experience
+of what is. Precisely as a struggle against sophism and therefore
+in dependency upon it, this changed interpretation is so decisive
+that it proves to be the end of Greek thought, an end that at the
+same time indirectly prepares the possibility of the modern age."
+This is why Platonic and Aristotelian thinking has been able to
+pass for Greek thinking per se, not only in the Middle Ages but
+throughout the modern age up to now, and why all pre-Platonic
+thinking could be considered merely a preparation for Plato. It
+is because from long habituation we see Greek thinking through
+a modern humanistic interpretation that it remains denied to us
+22. The word "end" (Ende) should here be taken in its full sense of conclusion, issue, aim, purpose.
+
+144
+to ponder the Being that opened itself to Greek antiquity in
+such a way as to leave to it its uniqueness and its strangeness.
+Protagoras statement runs: Pantön chrèmaton metron estin
+anthröpos, tön men ontön hös estin, tön de me ontön hos ouk
+estin (cf. Plato, Theatetus, 152).2
+"Of all things (those, namely, that man has about him in
+customary use, and therefore constantly, chremata chresthai) the
+(particular) man is the measure, of those that presence, that they
+presence as they presence, but also of those to which it remains
+denied to presence, that they do not presence." That which is
+whose Being stands ready for decision is here understood as
+that which presences of itself within this sphere, within the
+horizon of man. But who is man? Plato gives details concerning
+this in the same place, when he has Socrates say: Oukoun houtos
+pos legei, hös hoia men hekasta emoi phainetai, toiauta men
+estin emoi, hoia de soi toiauta de au soï' anthropos de su te kai
+egõ:24 "Does he (Protagoras) not understand this somewhat as
+follows? Whatever at a given time anything shows itself to me
+as, of such aspect is it (also) for me: but whatever it shows itself
+to you as, such is it in turn for you. You are a man as much as
+I.*25
+Man is here, accordingly, a particular man (1 and you and he
+and she). And this ego is not supposed to coincide with the ego
+cogito of Descartes? Never. For everything essential, i.e., that
+which determines with equal necessity the two fundamental metaphysical positions in Protagoras and Descartes, is different in the
+23. Cornford translates: "Man is the measure of all things-alike of the
+being of things that are and of the not-being of things that are not." Having
+given his own translation of the quotation at the beginning of this paragraph, Heidegger now proceeds to give, at the beginning of the next, a
+rendering of it that presents his thinking out of the thought of the Greek
+passage in his own way.
+24. Comford translates: "He puts it in this sort of way, doesn't he?-that
+appeiveto hiu, you and being it appears to me, and is to you such as it
+25. This is a literal translation of the German, as the latter is of the
+Greek. However, it is impossible in English so bring out one emphasis that
+Heidegger himself gives. Following the Greek word order, he places nis (as;
+Greek hos) at the beginning of the main clause in the sentence, in an
+atypical German construction. He is thus able to stress by a means not
+available in English the importance here of the appearance to the particular
+observer.
+
+145
+two. What is essential in a fundamental metaphysical position
+embraces:
+1. The manner and mode in which man is man, ie., is
+himself; the manner of the coming to presence [Wesensart]
+of selfhood, which is not at all synonymous with I-ness, but
+rather is determined out of the relation to Being as such
+2 The interpretation of the coming to presence [Wesens
+auslegung] of the Being of whatever is
+3. The delineation of the coming to presence [Wesensentwurf] of truth
+The sense in which, in any given instance, man is
+measure
+None of these essential moments in a fundamental metaphysical position may be understood apart from the others. Each one
+always betokens, from the outset, the whole of a fundamental
+metaphysical position. Precisely why and in what respect these
+four moments sustain and structure in advance a fundamental
+metaphysical position as such is a question that can no longer be
+asked or answered from out of metaphysics and by means of
+metaphysics. It is a question that is already being uttered from
+out of the overcoming of metaphysics.
+To be sure, for Protagoras, that which is does remain related
+to man as ega. What kind of relation to the I is this? The ego
+tarries within the horizon of the unconcealment that is meted out
+to it always as this particular unconcealment. Accordingly, it
+apprehends everything that presences within this horizon as
+something that is. The apprehending of what presences is
+grounded in this tarrying within the horizon of unconcealment.
+Through its tarrying [das Verweilen] in company with what
+presences, the belongingness of the I into the midst of what
+presences is. This belonging to what presences in the open fixes
+the boundaries between that which presences and that which
+absents itself. From out of these boundaries man receives and
+keeps safe the measure of that which presences and that which
+absents. Through man's being limited to that which, at any particular time, is unconcealed, there is given to him the measure
+that always confines a self to this or that. Man does not, from
+out of some detached I-ness, set forth the measure to which
+
+146
+everything that is, in its Being, must accommodate itself. Man
+who possesses the Greeks' fundamental relationship to that
+which is and to its unconcealment is metron (measure [Mass])
+in that he accepts restriction [Mässigung] to the horizon of unconcealment that is limited after the manner of the I; and
+he consequently acknowledges the concealedness of what is and
+the insusceptibility of the latter's presencing or absenting to any
+decision, and to a like degree acknowledges the insusceptibility
+to decision of the visible aspect of that which endures as present.2° Hence Protagoras says (Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: Protagoras B, 4): Peri men theön ouk echö eidenai, outh hos
+eisin, outh hös ouk eisin, outh hopoioi tines idean? "I am surely
+not in a position to know anything (for the Greek, to have anything in 'sight') regarding the gods, neither that they are not
+that they are not, nor how they are in their visible aspect
+(idea)."
+Polla gar ta koluonta eidenai, he l'adelotes kai brachus on ho
+bios tou anthropou.2R "For manifold is that which prevents the
+apprehending of whatever is as what it is, ie., both the nondisclosedness (concealment) of what is and the brevity of man's
+historical course."
+Need we wonder that Socrates, considering Protagoras' circumspection, says of him, Eikos mentoi sophon andra me lěrein:
+"We may suppose that he (Protagoras), a sensible man, (in his
+statement about man as metron) is not simply babbling on."2
+The fundamental metaphysical position of Protagoras is only
+a narrowing down, but that means nonetheless a preserving, of
+the fundamental position of Heraclitus and Parmenides. Sophism
+is possible only on the foundation of sophia, i.e., on the foundation of the Greek interpretation of Being as presencing and of
+truth as unconcealment-an unconcealment that itself remains ar
+essential determination of Being, so that what presences is de-
+26. die Unentscheidbarkeit
+... über das Aussehen des Wesenden.
+27. "As to the gods, I have no means of knowing either that they exist
+or that they do not exist" (Nahm).
+28. "For many are the obstacles that impede knowledge, both the obscurity of the question and the shortness of human life" (Nahm),
+29. Cornford translates: "Well, what a wise man says is not likely to be
+nonsense."
+
+147
+termined from out of unconcealment and presencing is determined from out of unconcealedness in its particularity. 3 But just
+how far removed is Descartes from the beginning of Greek
+thinking, just how different is the interpretation of man that
+represents him as subject? Precisely because in the concept of the
+subiectum the coming to presence of Being as experienced by
+the Greeks-the hypokeisthai of the hypokeimenon-still resounds in the form of a presencing that has become unrecognizable and unquestioned (namely, the presencing of that which
+lies fixedly before), therefore the essence of the change in fundamental metaphysical position is to be seen from out of that
+coming to presence of Being.
+It is one thing to preserve the horizon of unconcealment that
+is limited at any given time through the apprehending of what
+presences (man as metron). It is another to proceed into the unlimited sphere of possible objectification, through the reckoning
+up of the representable that is accessible to every man and
+binding for all.
+All subjectivism is impossible in Greek sophism, for here man
+can never be subiectum; he cannot become subiectum because
+here Being is presencing and truth is unconcealment.
+In unconcealment fantasia comes to pass: the coming-intoappearance, as a particular something, of that which presences—
+for man, who himself presences toward what appears. Man as
+representing subject, however, "fantasizes," ie., he moves in
+imaginatio, in that his representing imagines, pictures forth,
+whatever is, as the objective, into the world as picture.
+9. How does it happen at all that that which is displays itself
+in a pronounced manner as subiectum,? and that as a conse-
+30. In this sentence Heidegger shows the wholly mutual relation that he
+envisions between Being (Sein) and what is (Seiendes), i.e., between presencing and what presences, that each is forever determining and determined
+by the other. Ct. "The Onto-theological Constitution of Metaphysies." in
+Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row,
+1969), pp. 61 ff., 128 ff.
+31.
+Here "displays itself" translates sich
+ausiegt. Anslegen is usually
+translated in these essays with "to interpret." For Heidegger the interpreting accomplished in metaphysics is the correlate of the displaying of itself
+in its Being vouchsafed by that which is.
+
+148
+quence the subjective achieves dominance? For up to Descartes,
+and also still within his metaphysics, that which is, insofar as
+it is a particular being, a particular sub-iectum (hypo-keimenon),
+is something lying before from out of itself, which, as such,
+simultaneously lies at the foundation of its own fixed qualities
+and changing circumstances. The superiority of a sub-iectum
+(as a ground lying at the foundation) that is preeminent because
+it is in an essential respect unconditional arises out of the claim
+of man to a fundamentum absolutum inconcussum veritatis (selfsupported, unshakable foundation of truth, in the sense of certainty). Why and how does this claim acquire its decisive
+authority? The claim originates in that emancipation of man
+in which he frees himself from obligation to Christian revelational truth and Church doctrine to a legislating for himself that
+takes its stand upon itself. Through this liberation, the essence
+of freedom, i.e., being bound by something obligatory, is posited
+anew. But because, in keeping with this freedom, self-liberating
+man himself posits what is obligatory, the latter can henceforth
+be variously defined. The obligatory can be human reason and
+its law; or whatever is, arranged and objectively ordered from
+out of such reason; or that chaos, not yet ordered and still to be
+mastered through objectification, which demands mastery in a
+particular age.
+But this liberation, although without knowing it, is always still
+freeing itself from being bound by the revelational truth in which
+the salvation of man's soul is made certain and is guaranteed for
+him. Hence liberation from the revelational certainty of salvation
+had to be intrinsically a freeing to a certainty [Gewissheit] in
+which man makes secure for himself the true as the known of
+his own knowing [Wissens). That was possible only through
+self-liberating man's guaranteeing for himself the certainty of
+the knowable. Such a thing could happen, however, only insofar
+as man decided, by himself and for himself, what, for him, should
+be "knowable" and what knowing and the making secure of the
+known, i.e., certainty, should mean. Descartes's metaphysical
+task became the following: to create the metaphysical foundation for the freeing of man to freedom as the self-determination
+that is certain of itself. That foundation, however, had not only
+to be itself one that was certain, but since every standard of
+
+149
+measure from any other sphere was forbidden, it had at the
+same time to be of such a kind that through it the essence of the
+freedom claimed would be posited as self-certainty. And yet
+everything that is certain from out of itself must at the same
+time concomitantly make secure as certain that being for which
+such certain knowing must be certain and through which everything knowable must be made secure. The fundamentum, the
+ground of that freedom, that which lies at its foundation, the
+subiectum, must be something certain that satisfies the essential
+demands just mentioned. A subiectum distinguished in all these
+respects becomes necessary. What is this something certain that
+fashions and gives the foundation? The ego cogito (ergo) sum.
+The something certain is a principle that declares that, simultaneously (conjointly and lasting an equal length of time) with
+man's thinking, man himself is indubitably co-present, which
+means now is given to himself. Thinking is representing, settingbefore, is a representing relation to what is represented (idea as
+perceptio).32
+To represent means here: of oneself to set something before
+oneself and to make secure what has been set in place, as something set in place. This making secure must be a calculating, for
+calculability alone guarantees being certain in advance, and firmly
+and constantly, of that which is to be represented. Representing
+is no longer the apprehending of that which presences, within
+whose unconcealment apprehending itself belongs, belongs indeed as a unique kind of presencing toward that which presences
+that is unconcealed. Representing is no longer a self-unconcealing
+for ... 33 but is a laying hold and grasping of. ... What
+presences does not hold sway, but rather assault rules. Representing is now, in keeping with the new freedom, a going forth—
+from out of itself-into the sphere, first to be made secure, of
+32. Perceptio is from the Latin percipere (per † capere), thoroughly to
+lay hold of. The idea, that which presents itself and is viewed directly, has
+become the perceptio, that which is laid hold of and set in place and is
+thus known.
+33. das Sich-entbergen für. .
+. Sich-entbergen (self-unconcealing) might
+be very literally translated "self-harboring forth." The verb speaks of that
+accepting of bounds from out of which Greek man opened himself toward
+that which presenced to him. See Appendix 8, pp. 143 ff. For a discussion
+of entbergen and other words formed on bergen, see QT 11 n. 10.
+
+150
+what is made secure. That which is, is no longer that which
+presences; it is rather that which, in representing, is first set over
+against, that which stands fixedly over against, which has the
+character of object [das Gegen-ständige]. Representing is makingstand-over-against, an objectifying that goes forward and masters.** In this way representing drives everything together into
+the unity of that which is thus given the character of object.
+Representing is coagitatio.
+Every relation to something-willing, taking a point of view,
+being sensible of [something]-is already representing; it is
+cogitans, which we translate as "thinking." Therefore Descartes
+can cover all the modes of voluntas and of affectus, all actiones
+and passiones, with a designation that is at first surprising:
+cogitatio. In the ego cogito sum, the cogitare is understood in
+this essential and new sense. The subiectum, the fundamental
+certainty, is the being-represented-together-with-made secure
+at any time-of representing man together with the entity represented, whether something human or non-human, i.e., together
+with the objective. The fundamental certainty is the me cogitare
+= me esse that is at any time indubitably representable and
+represented. This is the fundamental equation of all reckoning
+belonging to the representing that is itself making itself secure.
+In this fundamental certainty man is sure that, as the representer
+of all representing 35 and therewith as the realm of all repre
+sentedness, and hence of all certainty and truth, he is made safe
+and secure, i.e., is. Only because in the fundamental certainty (in
+the fundamentum absolutum inconcussum of the me cogitare =
+me esse), man is, in this way, necessarily represented-togetherwith; only because man who frees himself to himself belongs
+necessarily within the subiectum of this freedom—only for this
+reason can and must this man himself be transformed into an
+exceptional being, into a subject which, with regard to that which
+truly (le, certainly) is, which is primary," has preeminence
+among all subiecta. That in the fundamental equation of certainty, and then again in the actual subiectum, the ego is named
+does not mean that man is now being defined in terms of the I
+34. Das Vor-stellen ist vor-gehende, meisternde Ver-geger-ständlichung.
+35. Literally, "as the one who sets-before all setting-before."
+36. das erste walirtaft (dil, geroiss) Seiende.
+
+151
+and egoistically. It means simply this: To be subject now becomes the distinction of man as the thinking-representing being
+[Wesen]. The I of man is placed in the service of this subiectum.
+The certainty lying at the foundation of this subiectum is indeed
+subjective, ie,, is holding sway in the essence of the subiectum;
+but it is not egoistic. Certainty is binding for every I as such, i.e.,
+for every I as subiectum. In the same way, everything that intends to be established, through representing objectification, as
+secured and hence as in being, is binding for every man. But
+nothing can elude this objectification that remains at the same
+time the decision concerning what must be aliowed to count as
+an object. To the essence of the subjectivity of the subiectum and
+to the essence of man as subject belongs the unconditional delimiting forth [Entschränkung] of the realm of possible objectification and the right to decide regarding objectification.
+87
+Now it has also been clarified in what sense man as subject
+intends to be and must be the measure and center of that which
+is, which means of objects, of whatever stands-over-against. Man
+is now no longer metron in the sense of the restricting of his
+apprehending to the encircling sphere, particularized at any given
+time, of the unconcealment belonging to whatever presences
+toward which each man presences at any given time. As subiectum, man is the co-agitatio of the ego. Man founds and confirms
+himself as the authoritative measure for all standards of measure
+with which whatever can be accounted as certain -i.e., as true,
+ie., as în being- is measured off and measured out (reckoned
+up). Freedom is new as the freedom of the subiectum. In the
+Meditationes de prima philosophia the freeing of man to the new
+freedom is brought onto its foundation, the subiectum. The freeing of modern inan does not first begin with the ego cogito ergo
+37. 'The noun Entschränkung is peculiar to Heidegger. Related nouns
+mean bounds or that which is enclosed. On the prefix ent-, as meaning
+forth or out, see QT 11 n. I0. Entschränkung expresses Heidegger's viesy
+that to set bounds is to free what is enclosed to be what it is (cf. QT 8).
+Heidegger is using the word in this context to point up the contrast between
+the position of modern man and that of breek man, who, far trom setting
+limits, "accepts restriction to the horizon of uncuncealment that is limited
+[beschränkten] after the manner of the I," and who, far from deciding
+about what shall have being, "acknowledges the concealedness of what is
+and the insusceptibility of the latter's presencing or absenting to any decision." See p. 146.
+
+152
+sumi, nor is the metaphysics of Descartes merely a metaphysics
+subsequently supplied and therefore externally built onto this
+freedom, in the sense of an ideology, In the co-agitatio, representing gathers all that is objective into the "all together" of
+representedness. The ego of the cogitare now finds in the selfsecuring "together" of representedness, in con-scientia, its
+essence. Conscientia is the representing setting together of Whatever has the character of object, along with representing man,
+within the sphere of representedness safeguarded by man. Everything that presences receives from out of this representedness
+the meaning and manner of its presence [Anwesenheit]-namely,
+the meaning and manner of presence (Praesenz) —in repraesentatio. The con-scientia of the ego as the subiectum of the coagitalio determines, as the subjectivity of the subiectum that is
+distinctive in this way, the Being of whatever is.
+The Meditationes de prima philosophia provide the pattern
+for an ontology of the subiectum with respect to subjectivity defined as conscientia. Man has become subiectum. Therefore he
+can determine and realize the essence of subjectivity, always in
+keeping with the way in which he himself conceives and wills
+himself. Man as a rational being of the age of the Enlightenment
+is no less subject than is man who grasps himself as a nation,
+wills himself as a people, fosters himself as a race, and, finally,
+empowers himself as lord of the earth. Still, in all these fundamental positions of subjectivity, a different kind of 1-ress and
+egoism is also possible; for man constantly remains determined
+as 1 and thou, we and you. Subjective egoism, for which mostly
+without its knowing it the l is determined beforehand as subject,
+can be canceled out through the insertion of the 1 into the we.
+Through this, subjectivity only gains in power. In the planetary
+imperialism of technologically organized man, the subjectivism
+of man attains its acme, from which point it will descend to the
+level of organized uniformity and there firmly establish itself.
+This uniformity becomes the surest instrument of total, i.e.,
+technological, rule over the earth.* The modern freedom of sub-
+38. The reader will recognize in this passage a close foreshadowing of
+Heidegger's later characterization of the modern age as that wherein-under
+the rule of Enframing as the essence of technology-everything that is, is,
+through man, being transformed into and set in order as nothing
+standing-reserve. CE. QT 14 ff.
+
+153
+jectivity vanishes totally in the objectivity commensurate with it.
+Man cannot, of himself, abandon this destining of his modern
+essence or abolish it by fiat. But man can, as he thinks ahead,
+ponder this: Being subject as humanity has not always been the
+sole possibility belonging to the essence of historical man, which
+is always beginning in a primal way, nor will it always be. A
+fleeting cloud shadow over a concealed land, such is the darkening which that truth as the certainty of subjectivity-once prepared by Christendom's certainty of salvation-lays over a
+disclosing event [Ereignis] that it remains denied to subjectivity
+itself to experience.
+I0. Anthropology is that interpretation of man that already
+knows fundamentally what man is and hence can never ask who
+he may be. For with this question it would have to confess itself
+shaken and overcome. But how can this be expected of anthropology when the latter has expressiy to achieve nothing less
+than the securing consequent upon the self-secureness of the
+subiectum?
+1l. For now the melting down of the self-consummating
+essence of the modern age into the self-evident is being accomplished. Only when this is assured through world views
+will the possibility arise of there being a fertile soil for Being
+to be in question in an original way-a questionableness of
+Being that will open ample space for the decision as to whether
+Being will once again become capable of a god, as to whether
+the essence of the truth of Being will lay claim more primally to
+the essence of man. Only there where the consummation of the
+modern age attains the heedlessness that is its peculiar greatness
+is future history being prepared.
+12. "Americanism" is something European. It is an as-yetuncomprehended species of the gigantic, the gigantic that is itself
+still inchoate and does not as yet originate at all out of the complete and gathered metaphysical essence of the modern age. The
+American interpretation [Interpretation] of Americanism by
+means of pragmatism still remains outside the metaphysical
+realm.
+
+154
+13. Everyday opinion sees in the shadow only the lack of
+light, if not light's complete denial. In truth, however, the shadow
+is a manifest, though impenetrable, testimony to the concealed
+emitting of light. In keeping with this concept of shadow, we
+experience the incalculable as that which, withdrawn from representation, is nevertheless manifest in whatever is, pointing to
+Being, which remains concealed.
+and most astere eveating of Being? What then? Understest
+from out of metaphysics (i.e., out of the question of Being, in
+the form What is it to be?), the concealed essence of Being, denial,
+unveils itself first of all as absolutely not-having-being, as Nothing. But Nothing as that Nothing which pertains to the having-ofbeing is the keenest opponent of mere negating. Nothing is never
+nothing; it is just as little a something, in the sense of an object
+[Gegenstand]; it is Being itself, whose truth will be given over
+to man when he has overcome himself as subject, and that means
+when he no longer represents that which is as object [Objekt].
+15. This open between is the openness-for-Being [Da-sein],
+the word understood in the sense of the ecstatic realm of the
+revealing and concealing of Being.
+
+Science and
+Reflection'
+In keeping with a view now prevalent, let us designate the realm
+in which the spiritual and creative activity of man is carried out
+with the name "culture." As part of culture, we count science,
+together with its cultivation and organization. Thus science is
+ranked among the values which man prizes and toward which,
+out of a variety of motives, he directs his attention.
+But so long as we take science only in this cultural sense, we
+"Reflection" is the translation of the noun Besinnung, which means
+recollection, reflection, consideration, deliberation. The corresponding reflexive verb, sich besinnen, means to recollect, to remember, to call to mind,
+to think on, to hit upon. Although "reflection" serves the needs of translation best in this and other essays in this volume, the word has serious
+inadequacies. Most importantly, reflection-from Latin reflectere, to bend
+back-intrinsically carries connotations uncomfortably close to those in
+Heidegger's use of vorstellen, to represent or set before, and could suggest
+the mind's observing of itself. Moreover, reflection, like the other nouns
+available as translations of Besinnung, lacks any marked connotation of
+directionality, of following after. The reader should therefore endeavor to
+hear in "reflection" fresh meaning. For Heidegger Besinnung is a recollecting thinking-on that, as though scenting it out, follows after what
+thought. It involves itself with sense (Sinn) and meaning, and is at the
+same time a "calm, self-possessed surrender to that which is worthy of
+questioning." See below, pp. 180 ff; cf. What Is Called Thinking?, trans.
+Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp.
+207 ff.
+
+156
+will never be able to gauge the scope of its essence.? This is
+equally the case for art. Even today we readily name these two
+together: "art and science." Art also is represented as one sphere
+of cultural enterprise. But then we experience nothing of its
+essence. Regarded in terms of its essence, art is a consecration
+and a refuge in which the real bestows its long-hidden splendor
+upon man ever anew, that in such light he may see more purely
+and hear more clearly what addresses itself to his essence.
+Science is no more a cultural activity of man than is art. Science
+is one way, and indeed one decisive way, in which all that is
+presents itself to us.
+Therefore we must say: The reality within which man of today
+moves and attempts to maintain himself is, with regard to its
+fundamental characteristics, determined on an increasing scale
+by and in conjunction with that which we call Western European
+science.
+When we ponder this ongoing event, it becomes evident that,
+in the Western world and during the eras of its history, science
+has developed such a power as could never have been met with
+on the earth before, and that consequently this power is ultimately to be spread over the entire globe.
+Is science, then, nothing but a fabrication of man that has been
+elevated to this dominance in such a way as to allow us to
+assume that one day it can also be demolished again by the will
+of man through the resolutions of commissions? Or does a
+greater destiny rule here? Is there, ruling in science, still something other than a mere wanting to know on the part of man?
+Thus it is, in fact. Something other reigns. But this other conceals itself from us so long as we give ourselves up to ordinary
+notions about science.
+This other is a state of affairs that holds sway throughout all
+the sciences, but that remains hidden to the sciences themselves.
+2. "Essence" will be the usual translation in this essay for the noun
+Wesen. Occasionally Wesen will be translated with "coming to presence."
+The main argument of the essay is centrally concerned with the "essence"
+of science. In following the discussion, the reader should keep firmly in
+mind that for Heidegger the Wesen of science-as of anything whatever—is
+not simply what science is, but rather the manner in which it pursues its
+course through time, the manner in which it comports itself in its enduring
+as present. See QT 3 n. 1.
+
+157
+In order that this state of affairs may come into view for us,
+however, there must be adequate clarity about what science is.
+But how shall we come to know that? Most surely, it seems,
+simply by describing the scientific enterprise of our day. Such
+a presentation could show how, for a long time, ever more
+decisively and at the same time ever more unobtrusively, the
+sciences have been intersecting in all organizational forms of
+modern life: in industry, in commerce, in education, in politics,
+in warfare, in journalism of all kinds. To be acquainted with
+this intersecting is important. In order to be able to give an
+exposition of it, however, we must first have experienced that
+in which the essence of science lies. This may be expressed in
+one concise statement. It runs: Science is the theory of the real.
+This statement intends to provide neither a ready definition
+nor an easy formula. It contains nothing but questions. They
+emerge only when the statement is clarified. We must observe
+first of all that the name "science" [Wissenschaft] in the statement "Science is the theory of the real" always refers exclusively
+to the new science of modern times. The statement "Science is
+the theory of the real" holds neither for the science of the Middle
+Ages nor for that of antiquity. Medieval doctrina is as essentially
+different from a theory of the real as it is different when contrasted with the epistèmé of the ancients. Nevertheless, the
+essence of modern science, which has become world-wide meanwhile as European science, is grounded in the thinking of the
+Greeks, which since Plato has been called philosophy.
+With these considerations, the revolutionary character of the
+modern kind of knowing is in no way being weakened. Quite to
+the contrary, the distinctive character of modern knowing [Wissens] consists in the decisive working out of a tendency that still
+remains concealed in the essence of knowing as the Greeks experienced it, and that precisely needs the Greek knowing in order
+to become, over against it, another kind of knowing.
+Whoever today dares, questioningly, reflectingly, and, in this
+way already as actively involved, to respond to the profundity of
+the world shock that we experience every hour, must not only
+pay heed to the fact that our present-day world is completely
+dominated by the desire to know of modern science; he must
+consider also, and above all else, that every reflection upon that
+
+158
+which now is can take its rise and thrive only if, through a
+dialogue with the Greek thinkers and their language, it strikes
+root into the ground of our historical existence. That dialogue
+still awaits its beginning. It is scarcely prepared for at all, and
+yet it itself remains for us the precondition of the inevitable
+dialogue with the East Asian world.
+But a dialogue with the Greek thinkers-and that means at
+the same time with the Greek poets-does not imply a modern
+renaissance of the ancients. Just as little does it imply a historiographical curiosity about that which meanwhile has indeed
+passed, but which still could serve to explain some trends in
+the modern world chronologically as regards their origins.
+That which was thought and in poetry was sung at the dawn
+of Greek antiquity is still present today, present in such a way
+that its essence, which is still hidden from itself, everywhere
+comes to encounter us and approaches us most of all where
+we least suspect it, namely, in the rule of modern technology,
+which is thoroughly foreign to the ancient world, yet nevertheless
+has in the latter its essential origin.
+In order to experience this presence [Gegenwart] of history,3
+we must free ourselves from the historiographical representation
+of history that still continues to dominate. Historiographical
+representation grasps history as an object wherein a happening
+transpires that is, in its changeability, simultaneously passing
+away.
+In the statement "Science is the theory of the real" there remains present what was primally thought, primally destined.*
+We will now elucidate the statement from two points of view.
+Let us first ask, What does "the real" mean? And next, What
+does "theory" mean? At the same time our elucidation will show
+how the two, the real and the theoretical, join one another
+essentially.
+3. The German noun Gegenwart means both "presence" and "the present." It thus speaks of presence expressly in the present. In Was Heisst
+Denken? (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1974), Heidegger writes: An-
+wesen und Anwesenheit heisst: Gegenwart. Diese meint das Entgegenweilen
+(very literally, "Presencing and presence mean: present-time-presence. The
+latter means tarrying over against and toward") (p. 141). Cf. What Is Called
+Thinking?, p. 234.
+4. Literally, "that which was early thought, early destined." Cf. QT 31.
+
+159
+In order to make clear what the name "real" means in the
+statement "Science is the theory of the real," let us simply
+consider the word itself. The real [das Wirkliche] brings to fulfillment the realm of working [des Wirkenden], of that which
+works [wirkt]." What does it mean "to work"? The answer to
+this question must depend on etymology. But what is decisive is
+the way in which this happens. The mere identifying of old and
+often obsolete meanings of terms, the snatching up of these
+meanings with the aim of using them in some new way, leads
+to nothing if not to arbitrariness. What counts, rather, is for us,
+in reliance on the early meaning of a word and its changes, to
+catch sight of the realm pertaining to the matter in question
+into which the word speaks. What counts is to ponder that
+essential realm as the one in which the matter named through
+the word moves. Only in this way does the word speak, and
+speak in the complex of meanings into which the matter that is
+named by it unfolds throughout the history of poetry and
+thought.
+"To work" means "to do" [tun]. What does "to do" mean?
+The word belongs to the Indo-Germanic stem dhé; from this also
+stems the Greek thesis: setting, place, position. This doing, however, does not mean human activity only; above all it does not
+mean activity in the sense of action and agency. Growth also,
+the holding-sway of nature (physis), is a doing, and that in the
+strict sense of thesis. Only at a later time do the words physis
+and thesis come into opposition, something which in turn only
+becomes possible because a sameness determines them. Physis
+is thesis: from out of itself to lay something before, to place it
+here, to bring it hither and forth [her- und vor-bringen], that is,
+into presencing. That which "does" in such a sense is that which
+works; it is that which presences,® in its presencing. The verb
+5. Unfortunately it is impossible to show in translation that the word
+rendered with "real" (Wirkliche) belongs immediately to the family of
+words built on the stem of the verb wirken (to work).
+6. das An-wesende. Most literally, "that which endures unto." Heidegger
+writes elsewhere: Die deutsche Präposition "an" bedeutet ursprünglich
+zugleich: "auf" und "in" ("The German preposition an [unto] originally
+means simultaneously 'toward' [auf] and 'intó' [in]"). (Was Heisst Denken?,
+p. 143). There, in a discussion of presencing, he says: Wesen ist her-bei-,
+ist an-wesen im Streit mit dem ab-wesen (literally, "Wesen [enduring as
+
+160
+"to work" understood in this way—namely, as to bring hither
+and forth—names, then, one way in which that which presences,
+presences. To work is to bring hither and forth, whether something brings itself forth hither into presencing of itself or whether
+the bringing hither and forth of something is accomplished by
+man. In the language of the Middle Ages our German word
+wirken still means the producing [Hervorbringen] of houses,
+tools, pictures; later, the meaning of wirken is narrowed down
+to producing in the sense of sewing, embroidering, weaving.
+The real [Wirkliche] is the working, the worked [Wirkende,
+Gewirkte]; that which brings hither and brings forth into presencing, and that which has been brought hither and brought
+forth. Reality [Wirklichkeit] means, then, when thought sufficiently broadly: that which, brought forth hither into presencing,
+lies before; it means the presencing, consummated in itself, of
+self-bringing-forth. Wirken belongs to the Indo-Germanic stem
+uerg, whence our word Werk [work] and the Greek ergon. But
+never can it be sufficiently stressed: the fundamental characteristic of working and work does not lie in efficere and effectus,
+but lies rather in this: that something comes to stand and to lie
+in unconcealment. Even when the Greeks—that is to say, Aristotle-speak of that which the Romans call causa efficiens, they
+never mean the bringing about of an effect. That which consummates itself in ergon is a self-bringing-forth into full presencing;
+ergon is that which in the genuine and highest sense presences
+[an-west). For this reason and only for this reason does Aristotle
+name the presence of that which actually presences energeia
+and also entelecheia: a self-holding in consummation (i.e., consummation of presencing). These names, coined by Aristotle for
+the actual presencing of what presences, are, in respect to what
+they express, separated by an abyss from the later modern
+meanings of energeia in the sense of "energy" and of entelecheia
+in the sense of "entelechy"-talent and capacity for work.
+Aristotle's fundamental word for presencing, energeia, is
+properly translated by our word Wirklichkeit [reality] only if we,
+presence] is enduring hither, enduring unto, in strife with enduring away
+from [absenting]"). Cf. What Is Called Thinking?, p. 236.
+7. des eigentlich Anwesenden.
+
+161
+for our part, think the verb wirken [to work] as the Greeks
+thought it, in the sense of bringing hither-into unconcealment,
+forth—into presencing. Wesen [to come to presence] is the
+same word as währen, to last or endure. We think presencing
+[Anwesen] as the enduring of that which, having arrived in unconcealment, remains there. Ever since the period following
+Aristotle, however, this meaning of energeia, enduring-in-work,
+has been suppressed in favor of another. The Romans translate,
+i.e., think, ergon in terms of operatio as actio, and they say,
+instead of energeia, actus, a totally different word, with a totally
+different realm of meaning. That which is brought hither and
+brought forth now appears as that which results from an operatio.
+A result is that which follows out of and follows upon an actio:
+the consequence, the out-come [Er-folg]. The real is now that
+which has followed as consequence. The consequence is brought
+about by the circumstance [Sache] that precedes it, i.e., by the
+cause [Ursache] (causa). The real appears now in the light of
+the causality of the causa efficiens. Even God is represented in
+theology—not in faith—as causa prima, as first cause. Finally,
+in the course of the relating of cause and effect, following-afterone-another is thrust into the foreground, and with it the elapsing
+of time. Kant recognized causality as a principle of temporal
+succession. In the latest works of Werner Heisenberg, the problem of the causal is the purely mathematical problem of the
+measuring of time. With this change in the reality of the real,
+however, is bound up something else no less essential. That
+which has been brought about [das Erwirkte], in the sense of the
+consequent [des Erfolgten], shows itself as a circumstance that
+has been set forth in a doing1°—i.e., now, in a performing and
+8. her—ins Unverborgene, vor—ins Anwesen.
+9. der Ursache-Wirkungsbeziehung.
+10. sich
+...herausgestellt hat. The verb herausstellen means to put out
+in place or to expose. Sich herausstellen, in addition to serving simply as a
+reflexive form with the meaning to put oneself out in place, means to become manifest, to turn out, to prove. The main component of the verb
+stellen (to set or place) is fundamental to all Heidegger's characterizing of
+that which is taking place in the modern age (cf. QT 15, AWP 129-130),
+while the prefix her- (hither) is regularly one of his primary vehicles for
+speaking of a bringing into presencing. The use of herausstellen here
+parallels that of her-vor-bringen above (p. 159); see also n. 21 below. Sirl
+herausstellen will be translated hereafter with either "to set itself forth" u
+
+162
+executing. That which follows in fact and indeed from such a
+doing is the factual [Tatsächliche]." The word "factual" today
+connotes assurance, and means the same thing as "certain" and
+"sure." Instead of "It is certainly so," we say "It is in fact so,"
+and "It is really so." Nevertheless, it is neither an accident nor
+a harmless caprice in the change in meaning of mere terms that,
+since the beginning of the modern period in the seventeenth
+century, the word "real" has meant the same thing as "certain."
+The "real," in the sense of what is factual, now constitutes the
+opposite of that which does not stand firm as guaranteed and
+which is represented as mere appearance or as something that
+is only believed to be so. Yet throughout these various changes
+in meaning the real still retains the more primordially fundamental characteristic, which comes less often and differently to
+the fore, of something that presences which sets itself forth from
+out of itself.
+But now the real presents itself in the taking place of consequences. The consequence demonstrates that that which presences has, through it, come to a secured stand, and that it
+encounters as such a stand [Stand]. The real now shows itself
+as object, that which stands over against [Gegen-Stand].
+The word Gegenstand first originates in the eighteenth century, and indeed as a German translation of the Latin obiectum.
+There are profound reasons why the words "object" and "objectivity" [Gegenständlichkeit] took on special importance for
+"to exhibit itself," depending on the exigencies of the particular context in
+which it appears. The reader should keep in mind that the self-exhibiting
+of which the verb speaks is a self-setting-forth that involves a setting in
+place. The importance of the latter nuance of meaning in sich herausstellen
+is shown by the fact that the verb's introduction here leads directly into a
+discussion of the appearing of the real as object, as that which stands over
+against-a connection for the verb that will be found repeatedly in the
+succeeding pages (see especially p. 163 below). Regrettably, none of the
+translations here employed can overtly suggest either the evocative force
+or the wide-ranging kinship that sich herausstellen possesses in the German
+11. Das in der Tat solchen Tuns Erfolgten ist das Tatsächliche. Tatsächlich (actual, factual), based on the word Tat (deed), from tun (to do), here
+makes the connection Heidegger intends in a way that cannot be duplicated
+in English.
+
+163
+Goethe. But neither medieval nor Greek thinking represents that
+which presences as object. We shall now name the kind of
+presence belonging to that which presences that appears in the
+modern age as object: objectness [Gegenständigkeit].12
+This is first of all a character belonging to that which presences
+itself. But how the objectness of what presences is brought to
+appearance and how what presences becomes an object for a
+setting-before, a representing [Vor-stellen], can show itself to
+us only if we ask: What is the real in relation to theory, and thus
+in a certain respect also in and through theory? We now ask, in
+other words: In the statement "Science is the theory of the real,"
+what does the word "theory" mean? The word "theory" stems
+from the Greek verb theörein. The noun belonging to it is theoria.
+Peculiar to these words is a lofty and mysterious meaning. The
+verb theorein grew out of the coalescing of two root words,
+thea and horao. Thea (cf. theater) is the outward look, the aspect,
+in which something shows itself, the outward appearance in
+which it offers itself. Plato names this aspect in which what
+presences shows what it is, eidos. To have seen this aspect,
+eidenai, is to know [wissen]. 13 The second root word in therein,
+horao, means: to look at something attentively, to look it over,
+to view it closely. Thus it follows that theorein is thean horan,
+to look attentively on the outward appearance wherein what
+presences becomes visible and, through such sight—seeing-to
+linger with it.**
+That particular way of life (bios) that receives its determina-
+12. Gegenständigkeit (objectness) is a word formed by Heidegger to
+characterize the peculiar mode of presencing that rules in the modern age.
+It is not to be confused with the familiar German word Gegenständlichkeit
+(objectivity). In accordance with what Heidegger says elsewhere about the
+word Subjektität, translated in this volume as "subjectness" (cf. WN 68
+n. 9), we may perhaps say that "objectness" speaks of the mode in which
+Being endures as present as determined by what is, as the latter presences
+as object.
+13. The verb wissen comes ultimately from the same Indo-European root
+weid as does the Greek eidenai. See The American Heritage Dictionary, s.v.
+"Indo-European Roots," p. 1548.
+14. Den Anblick, worin das Anwesende erscheint, ansehen und durchi
+solche Sicht bei ihm sehend verweilen. On the force of the prefix an-, centrol
+here, see p. 159 n. 6.
+
+164
+tion from theorein and devotes itself to it the Greeks call bios
+theoretikos, the way of life of the beholder, the one who looks
+upon the pure shining-forth of that which presences. In contrast
+to this, bios praktikos is the way of life that is dedicated to
+action and productivity. In adhering to this distinction, however,
+we must constantly keep one thing in mind: for the Greeks, bios
+theoretikos, the life of beholding, is, especially in its purest form
+as thinking, the highest doing. Theoria in itself, and not only
+through the utility attaching to it, is the consummate form of
+human existence. For theoria is pure relationship to the outward
+appearances belonging to whatever presences, to those appearances that, in their radiance, concern man in that they bring the
+presence [Gegenwart] of the gods to shine forth. The further
+characterization of theorein, i.e., that it brings the archai and
+aitiai of what presences before man's apprehension and powers
+of demonstration, cannot be given here; for this would require a
+reflection on what Greek experience understood in that which
+we for so long have represented as principium and causa, ground
+and cause (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VI, chap. 2,
+1139 ff).
+Bound up with the supremacy accorded theoria within Greek
+bios is the fact that the Greeks, who in a unique way thought
+out of their language, i.e., received from it their human existence,
+15 were also able to hear something else in the word theoria.
+When differently stressed, the two root words thea and orao can
+read theá and ora. Theá is goddess. It is as a goddess that
+Aletheia, the unconcealment from out of which and in which that
+which presences, presences, appears to the early thinker Parmenides. We translate alētheia by the Latin word veritas and by
+our German word Wahrheit [truth].
+The Greek word ora signifies the respect we have, the honor
+and esteem we bestow. If now we think the word theoria in the
+context of the meanings of the words just cited, then theoria is
+the reverent paying heed to the unconcealment of what presences.
+Theory in the old, and that means the early but by no means the
+15. "Existence" translates Dasein. Written as Da-sein, it is translated as
+"openness-for-Being." See Introduction, p. xxxv n. 2. Cf. AWP Appendix 5,
+p. 141. The latter meaning should be found also in the translation of Dasein
+as "existence"; cf. the discussion of Being's coming to presence in language
+through the cooperation of man given in T 40-41.
+
+165
+obsolete, sense is the beholding that watches over truth. Our
+old high German word wara (whence wahr, wahren, and Wahr-.
+heit)'? goes back to the same stem as the Greek horaõ, ora, wora.
+The essence of theory as thought by the Greeks, which is
+ambiguous and from every perspective high and lofty, remains
+buried when today we speak of the theory of relativity in physics,
+of the theory of evolution in biology, of the cyclical theory in
+history, of the natural rights theory in jurisprudence. Nonetheless, within "theory," understood in the modern way, there yet
+steals the shadow of the early theoria. The former lives out of
+the latter, and indeed not only in the outwardly identifiable sense
+of historical dependency. What is taking place here will become
+clearer when now we ask this question: In distinction from the
+early theoria, what is "the theory" that is named in the statement
+"Modern science is the theory of the real"?
+We shall answer with the necessary brevity, since we shall
+choose an ostensibly superficial way. Let us take careful note
+how the Greek words theorein and theoria are translated into the
+Latin and the German languages. Deliberately we say "words"
+[die Worte] and not "terms" [die Wörter], in order to emphasize
+that, each time, in the coming to presence and holding-sway of
+language, it is a destining that decides.
+The Romans translate theörein by contemplari, thēoria by
+contemplatio. This translation, which issues from the spirit of
+the Roman language, that is, from Roman existence, makes that
+which is essential in what the Greek words say vanish at a stroke.
+For contemplari means: to partition something off into a separale
+sector and enclose it therein. Templum is the Greek temeno:,
+which has its origin in an entirely different experience from Ih.l
+out of which theörein originates. Temnein means: to cul, lo
+divide. The uncuttable is the atméton, a-tomon, atom.
+The Latin templum means originally a sector carved oul in
+the heavens and on the earth, the cardinal point, the region ol
+the heavens marked out by the path of the sun. It is within thr
+16. das hütende Schauen der Wahrheit.
+17. This passage makes clear how these words wahr (trud), walnen 11.
+keep safe, preserve), Wahrheit (truth) all bear, in Heidegger's mind, tunal.,
+mental connotations of manifesting and watchful safeguarding: 11 1 r•
+n. 9.
+
+166
+region that diviners make their observations in order to determine
+the future from the flight, cries, and eating habits of birds. (See
+Ernout-Meillet, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine (3),
+1951, p. 1202: contemplari dictum est a templo, i.e., loco qui ab
+omni parte aspici, vel ex quo omnis pars videri potest, quem
+antiqui templum nominabant). 18
+In theoria transformed into contemplatio there comes to the
+fore the impulse, already prepared in Greek thinking, of a
+looking-at that sunders and compartmentalizes. A type of encroaching advance by successive interrelated steps toward that
+which is to be grasped by the eye makes itself normative in
+knowing. But even now the vita contemplativa still remains distinct from the vita activa.
+In the language of medieval Christian piety and theology, the
+above-mentioned distinction gains still another sense. It contrasts
+the meditative-monastic life with the worldly-active one.
+The German translation for contemplatio is Betrachtung [view
+or observation]. The Greek theörein, to look attentively upon
+the aspect of what presences, appears now as to observe or
+consider [Betrachten]. Theory is the viewing, the observation,
+of the real. But what does observation mean? We speak of a
+contemplative viewing in the sense of religious meditation and
+introspection. This kind of viewing belongs in the realm of the
+vita contemplativa just mentioned. We speak also of the viewing
+of a picture, in looking at which we find release. In such usage,
+the word Betrachtung [view] is close to beholding, and it still
+seems to be of like meaning with the early theoria of the Greeks.
+And yet the "theory" that modern science shows itself to be is
+something essentially different from the Greek theoria. Thus,
+when we translate "theory" by "observation" we are giving the
+word "observation" a different meaning, not an arbitrarily invented one, but rather the one from which it is originally descended. If we take seriously what the German Betrachtung
+means, we shall recognize what is new in the essence of modern
+science as the theory of the real
+What does Betrachtung mean? Trachten [to strive] is the Latin
+18. "Contemplari is derived from templum, i.e., from [the name of] the
+place which can be seen from any point, and from which any point can be
+seen. The ancients called this place a templum."
+
+167
+tractare, to manipulate, to work over or refine [bearbeiten].!"
+To strive after something means: to work one's way toward
+something, to pursue it, to entrap it in order to secure it. Ac-
+cordingly, theory as observation [Betrachtung] would be an
+entrapping and securing refining of the real. But this characterization of science would obviously have to run counter to science's
+essence. For after all, science as theory is surely "theoretical."
+It spurns any refining of the real. It stakes everything on grasping the real purely. It does not encroach upon the real in order
+to change it. Pure science, we proclaim, is "disinterested."
+And yet modern science as theory in the sense of an observing
+that strives after is a refining of the real that does encroach uncannily upon it. Precisely through this refining it corresponds
+to a fundamental characteristic of the real itself. The real is
+what presences as self-exhibiting.2 But what presences shows
+itself in the modern age in such a way as to bring its presencing
+to a stand in objectness. Science corresponds to this holding-sway
+of presencing in terms of objects, inasmuch as it for its part, as
+theory, challenges forth the real specifically through aiming its
+objectness." Science sets upon the real.2 It orders it into place
+19. From this point Heidegger continues to use das Wirkliche (the real),
+out he begins to use forms of the verb arbeiten (to execute, to work, to
+fashion; [intrans.] to labor) to set forth the way in which modern science,
+in corresponding to the manner in which the real now presents itself as
+object in a causal sequence, performs the doing that brings the real forth
+into its presencing in the modern age. Thus arbeiten and its compoundsbearbeiten (to work over or refine), zuarbeiten (to work toward), umarbeiten (to work around or recast),
+herausarbeiten
+(to work out)-are
+juxtaposed to wirken (to work), discussed above. It has not been possible to
+show this juxtaposition in the translation. Indeed, the necessity of sometimes translating the verbs formed around arbeiten with uses of the English
+verb "work" actually functions to obscure it altogether. Heidegger's use
+here of verbs formed from arbeiten recalls his previous statement: "That
+which has been brought about, in the sense of the consequent, shows itself
+as a circumstance that has been set forth in a doing,i.e., now, in a per
+forming and executing" (Das Erwirkte im Sinne des Erfolgten zeigt sich il:
+Sache, die sich in einem Tun, d.h. jetzt Leisten und Arbeiten herausgestell!
+hat) (p. 161).
+20. das sich herausstellende Anwesende.
+21. "Challenges forth" translates herausfordern (literally, dem.nl. *
+hither). The structural parallel between the verbs herausfordern …d li
+ausstellen bespeaks the correspondence between the refining of th ral
+wrought by science as an executing and the real's "working" • it•ll
+22. "Sets upon" translates stellen. On the meaning of this verd, err 1ul
+
+168
+to the end that at any given time the real will exhibit itself as
+an interacting network,23 i.e., in surveyable series of related
+causes. The real thus becomes surveyable and capable of being
+followed out in its sequences. The real becomes secured in its
+objectness. From this there result spheres or areas of objects
+that scientific observation can entrap after its fashion.2 En-
+trapping representation, which secures everything in that objectness which is thus capable of being followed out, is the fundamental characteristic of the representing through which modern
+science corresponds to the real. But then the all-decisive work
+[Arbeit] that such representing performs in every science is that
+refining of the real which first in any way at all expressly works
+the real out into an objectness through which everything real
+is recast in advance into a diversity of objects for the entrapping
+securing.
+The fact that what presences—e.g., nature, man, history,
+language-sets itself forth as the real in its objectness, the fact
+that as a complement to this science is transformed into theory
+that entraps the real and secures it in objectness, would have
+been as strange to medieval man as it would have been dismaying to Greek thought.
+Thus modern science, as the theory of the real, is not anything
+self-evident. It is neither a mere construct of man nor something
+extorted from the real. Quite to the contrary, the essence of
+science is rendered necessary by the presencing of what pres-
+15 n. 14. The use of herausstellen to characterize the manner in which the
+real exhibits and sets itself forth in the modern age has already been noted
+(p. 161, n. 10). A variety of stellen verbs follow here in this discussion of
+the conduct of modern science as theory: nachstellen (to entrap), sicherstellen (to make secure), bestellen (to order or command), feststellen (to
+fix or establish), vorstellen (to represent), umstellen (to encompass), erstellen (to set forth), beistellen (to place in association with).
+23. 'Interacting network" translates Ge-wirk. In isolating the prefix gein the ordinary noun Gewirk (web, texture, weaving), Heidegger would have
+us hear, in accordance with his foregoing discussion, the more fundamental
+meaning of a gathering of that which works and is worked. Cf. the discussion of ge-, QT 19.
+24. "Spheres or areas of objects" translates Gebiete von Gegenständen, a
+phrase that Heidegger employs only at this one point in the essay. His
+"obie-ares ebiet, used frequently in the following pages, is translated as
+to distinguish it from the nearly synonymous Gegenstandsbezirk, translated as "object-sphere" in AWP.
+
+169
+ences at the moment when presencing sets itself forth into the
+objectness of the real. This moment remains mysterious, as does
+every moment of its kind. It is not only the greatest thoughts
+that come as upon doves' feet; but at any given time it is the
+change in the presencing of everything that presences that comes
+thus-and before all else.
+Theory makes secure at any given time a region of the real as
+its object-area. The area-character of objectness is shown in the
+fact that it specifically maps out in advance the possibilities for
+the posing of questions. Every new phenomenon emerging within
+an area of science is refined to such a point that it fits into the
+normative objective coherence of the theory. That normative
+coherence itself is thereby changed from time to time. But objectness as such remains unchanged in its fundamental characteristics. That which is represented in advance as the determining
+basis for a strategy and procedure is, in the strict sense of the
+word, the essence of what is called "end" or "purpose." When
+something is in itself determined by an end, then it is pure theory.
+It is determined by the objectness of what presences. Were objectness to be surrendered, the essence of science would be
+denied. This is the meaning, for example, of the assertion that
+modern atomic physics by no means invalidates the classical
+physics of Galileo and Newton but only narrows its realm of
+validity. But this narrowing is simultaneously a confirmation of
+the objectness normative for the theory of nature, in accordance
+with which nature presents itself for representation as a spatiotemporal coherence of motion calculable in some way or other in
+advance.
+Because modern science is theory in the sense described, therefore in all its observing [Be-trachten] the manner of its strivingafter [Trachtens], i.e., the manner of its entrapping-securing procedure, i.e., its method, has decisive superiority. An oft-cited
+statement of Max Planck reads: "That is real which can be
+measured." This means that the decision about what may pass
+in science, in this case in physics, for assured knowledge rests
+with the measurability supplied in the objectness of nature and,
+in keeping with that measurability, in the possibilities inherent
+in the measuring procedure. The statement of Max Planck is true,
+however, only because it articulates something that belongs to
+
+170
+the essence of modern science, not merely to physical science.
+The methodology, characterized by entrapping securing, that
+belongs to all theory of the real is a reckoning-up. We should
+not, of course, understand this term in the narrow sense of performing an operation with numbers. To reckon, in the broad,
+essential sense, means: to reckon with something, i.e., to take it
+into account; to reckon on something, i.e., to set it up as an
+object of expectation. In this way, all objectification of the real
+is a reckoning, whether through causal explanation it pursues
+the consequences of causes, whether through morphology it
+puts itself into the picture in precedence over objects, or whether
+in its fundamental elements it secures and guarantees some
+coherence of sequence and order. Mathematics also is not a
+reckoning in the sense of performing operations with numbers
+for the purpose of establishing quantitative results; but, on the
+contrary, mathematics is the reckoning that, everywhere by
+means of equations, has set up as the goal of its expectation
+the harmonizing of all relations of order, and that therefore
+"reckons" in advance with one fundamental equation for all
+merely possible ordering.
+Because modern science as the theory of the real depends on
+the precedence that attaches to its method, therefore it must, as
+a securing of object-areas, delimit these areas over against one
+another and localize them, as thus delimited, within compartments, i.e., compartmentalize them. The theory of the real is
+necessarily departmentalized science.
+Investigation of an object-area must, in the course of its work,
+agree with the particular form and modification possessed at any
+given time by the objects belonging to that area. Such agreement
+with the particular transforms the procedure of a branch of
+science into specialized research. Specialization, therefore, is in
+no way either a deterioration due to some blindness or a manifestation of the decline of modern science. Specialization is also
+not merely an unavoidable evil. It is a necessary consequence, and
+indeed the positive consequence, of the coming to presence
+[Wesen] of modern science.
+The delimiting of object-areas, the compartmentalizing of these
+into special provinces, does not split the sciences off from one
+another, but rather it first yields a border traffic between them
+
+171
+by means of which boundary areas are marked out. Those areas
+are the source of a special impetus that produces new formulations of questions that are often decisive. We know this fact.
+The reason for it remains enigmatic, as enigmatic as the entire
+essence of modern science.
+We have, indeed, already characterized this essence by elucidating the statement "Science is the theory of the real" according to its two principal words. This happened in preparation
+for our second step, which is to ask: What inconspicuous state
+of affairs conceals itself in the essence of science?25
+We shall notice this state of affairs the moment that, taking
+particular sciences as examples, we attend specifically to whatever is the case regarding the ordering—in any given instanceof the objectness belonging to the object-area of those sciences.
+Physics, which, roughly speaking, now includes macrophysics
+and atomic physics, astrophysics and chemistry, observes nature
+(physis) insofar as nature exhibits itself as inanimate. In such
+objectness nature manifests itself as a coherence of motion of
+material bodies. The fundamental trait of the corporeal is impenetrability, which, for its part, presents itself as a kind of
+coherence of motion of elementary objects. The elementary objects themselves and their coherence are represented in classical
+25. "State of affairs" translates the noun Sachverhalt. Sachverhalt might
+be rendered very literally "relating or conjoining of matters." Heidegger is
+doubtless here using this word as he does elsewhere, at the outset of the
+intricate discussion in "Time and Being" (see On Time and Being, trans.
+Joan Stambaugh [New York: Harper & Row, 1972], p. 4, where the word is
+translated "matter at stake") to point to the wholly singular and selfinitiating bringing-to-pass (Ereignis)-not brought about by anything from
+beyond itself and not bringing about anything as its consequence-that
+takes place as and within Being itself, the bringing-to-pass that, precisely
+as a disclosing, brings Being and man into their own at any given time in
+giving them into their needed belonging to one another. Cf. T 45 ff; cf. also
+"Time and Being," Pp. 23 ff. Although "Being" is scarcely mentioned as such
+in this essay and the word Ereignis is never used, the relating of Being-as
+the Being of whatever is—to man, whose science works over the real, clearly
+underlies Heidegger's entire discussion and comes tellingly if hiddenly into
+end of the essay. The same allusion as that in Sachverhalt lies in Heidegger's later discussion of that which is not to be gotten around that is
+intractable and inaccessible (das unzugängliche Unumgängliche); and it
+sounds somewhat more evidently in his mention of that which is worthy of
+questioning (das Fragwürdige). Cf. AWP, Appendix 1, Pp. 137-138.
+
+172
+physics as geometrical point mechanics, in the physics of today
+under the headings "nucleus" and "field." Accordingly, for
+classical physics every state of motion of bodies that occupy
+space is at any time simultaneously determinable-i.e., is precisely calculable in advance, predictable-both as to position and
+as to velocity. In contrast to this, in atomic physics a state of
+motion may on principle only be determined either as to position
+or as to velocity. Correspondingly, classical physics maintains
+that nature may be unequivocally and completely calculated in
+advance, whereas atomic physics admits only of the guaranteeing of an objective coherence that has a statistical character.
+The objectness of material nature shows in modern atomic
+physics fundamental characteristics completely different from
+those that it shows in classical physics. The latter, classical
+physics, can indeed be incorporated within the former, atomic
+physics, but not vice versa. Nuclear physics does not permit itself to be traced back to classical physics and reduced to it.
+And yet—modern nuclear and field physics also still remains
+physics, i.e., science, i.e., theory, which entraps objects belonging
+to the real, in their objectness, in order to secure them in the
+unity of objectness. For modern physics too it is a question of
+making secure those elementary objects of which all other objects in its entire area consist. The representing belonging to
+modern physics is also bent on "being able to write one single
+fundamental equation from which the properties of all elementary particles, and therewith the behavior of all matter whatever,
+follow."*
+This rough indication of a distinction between epochs within
+modern physics makes plain where the change from the one to
+the other takes place:2® in the experience and determination of
+the objectness wherein nature sets itself forth. Nevertheless,
+what does not change with this change from geometrizing-classical physics to nuclear and field physics is this: the fact that nature
+has in advance to set itself in place for the entrapping securing
+* Heisenberg, "Die gegenwärtigen Grundprobleme der Atomphysik." See
+Wandlungen in den Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaft (1948 ed.), 8 : 98.
+26. For the meaning of "epoch," see T 43 n. 10.
+
+173
+that science, as theory, accomplishes. However, the way in
+which in the most recent phase of atomic physics even the object
+vanishes also, and the way in which, above all, the subject-object
+relation as pure relation thus takes precedence over the object
+and the subject, to become secured as standing-reserve, cannot
+be more precisely discussed in this place.
+(Objectness changes into the constancy of the standing-reserve,
+a constancy determined from out of Enframing. [See "The Question Concerning Technology."] The subject-object relation thus
+reaches, for the first time, its pure "relational," i.e., ordering,
+character in which both the subject and the object are sucked
+up as standing-reserves. That does not mean that the subjectobject relation vanishes, but rather the opposite: it now attains
+to its most extreme dominance, which is predetermined from out
+of Enframing. It becomes a standing-reserve to be commanded
+and set in order.)27
+We are now considering the inconspicuous state of affairs that
+lies in the holding-sway of objectness.
+Theory identifies the real—in the case of physics, inanimate
+nature-and fixes it into one object-area. However, nature is
+always presencing of itself. Objectification, for its part, is directed
+toward nature as thus presencing. Even where, as in modern
+atomic physics, theory-for essential reasons—necessarily becomes the opposite of direct viewing, its aim is to make atoms
+exhibit themselves for sensory perception, even if this selfexhibiting of elementary particles happens only very indirectly
+and in a way that technically involves a multiplicity of intermediaries. (Compare the Wilson cloud chamber, the Geiger
+counter, the free balloon flights to confirm and identify mesons.)
+Theory never outstrips nature—nature that is already presencing-and in this sense theory never makes its way around nature.
+Physics may well represent the most general and pervasive lawfulness of nature in terms of the identity of matter and energy;
+and what is represented by physics is indeed nature itself, but
+undeniably it is only nature as the object-area, whose objectness
+is first defined and determined through the refining that is char-
+27. For this paragraph Heidegger uses brackets. The reference to QT
+is his.
+
+174
+acteristic of physics and is expressly set forth in that refining.
+Nature, in its objectness for modern physical science, is only one
+way in which what presences—which from of old has been
+named physis-reveals itself and sets itself in position for the
+refining characteristic of science. Even if physics as an object-area
+is unitary and self-contained, this objectness can never embrace
+the fullness of the coming to presence of nature. Scientific representation is never able to encompass the coming to presence of
+nature; for the objectness of nature is, antecedently, only one
+way in which nature exhibits itself. Nature thus remains for the
+science of physics that which cannot be gotten around. This
+phrase means two things here. First, nature is not to be "gotten
+around" inasmuch as theory never passes that which presences
+by, but rather remains directed toward it. Further, nature is
+not to be gotten around inasmuch as objectness as such prevents
+the representing and securing that correspond to it from ever
+being able to encompass the essential fullness of nature. It is
+this, at bottom, that haunted Goethe in his abortive struggle with
+Newtonian physics. Goethe could not yet see that his intuitive
+representing of nature also moves within the medium of objectness, within the subject-object relation, and therefore in principle
+is not different from physics and remains the same metaphysically
+as physics. Scientific representation, for its part, can never decide whether nature, through its objectness, does not rather
+withdraw itself than bring to appearance the hidden fullness of
+its coming to presence. Science cannot even ask this question,
+for, as theory, it has already undertaken to deal with the area
+circumscribed by objectness.
+In the objectness of nature to which physics as objectification
+corresponds, that which—in a twofold sense—is not to be gotten
+around holds sway. As soon as we have once caught sight in one
+science of that which is not to be gotten around and have also
+considered it somewhat, we see it easily in every other.
+Psychiatry strives to observe the life of the human soul in its
+sick-and that means always simultaneously in its healthy—
+manifestations. It represents these in terms of the objectness of
+the bodily-psychical-spiritual unity of the whole man. At any
+given time human existence, which is already presencing, displays itself in the objectness belonging to psychiatry. The open-
+
+175
+ness-for-Being [Da-sein] in which man as man ek-sists, remains
+that which for psychiatry is not to be gotten around.
+Historiography, which ever more urgently is developing into
+the writing of universal history, accomplishes its entrapping
+securing in the area that offers itself to its theory as history. The
+word Historie (historein) [historiography] means to explore and
+make visible, and therefore names a kind of representing. In
+contrast, the word Geschichte [history] means that which takes
+its course inasmuch as it is prepared and disposed in such and
+such a way, i.e., set in order and sent forth, destined. Historiography is the exploration of history. But historiographical observation does not first create history itself. Everything "historiographical," everything represented and established after
+the manner of historiography, is historical [geschichtlich], i.e.,
+grounded upon the destining resident in happening. But history
+is never necessarily historiographical.
+Whether history reveals itself in its essence only through and
+for historiography or whether it is not rather concealed through
+historiographical objectification remains for the science of history something it cannot itself decide. This, however, is decided:
+In the theory of historiography, history holds sway as that which
+is not to be gotten around.
+Philology makes the literature of nations and peoples into the
+object of its explanation and interpretation. The written word of
+literature is at any given time the spoken word of a language.
+When philology deals with language, it treats it in accordance
+with the objective ways of looking at language that are established through grammar, etymology, and comparative linguistics,
+through the art of composition and poetics.
+Yet language speaks without becoming literature and entirely
+independently of whether literature for its part attains to the
+objectness with which the determinations of a literary science
+correspond. In the theory of philology language holds sway as
+that which is not to be gotten around.
+Nature, man, history, language, all remain for the aforementioned sciences that which is not to be gotten around, already
+holding sway from within the objectness belonging to them....
+remain that toward which at any given time those sciences
+are directed, but that which, in the fullness of its coming, lo
+
+176
+presence, they can never encompass by means of their representing.2 This impotence of the sciences is not grounded in the
+fact that their entrapping securing never comes to an end; it is
+grounded rather in the fact that in principle the objectness in
+which at any given time nature, man, history, language, exhibit
+themselves always itself remains only one kind of presencing, in
+which indeed that which presences can appear, but never
+absolutely must appear.
+That which is not to be gotten around, as characterized above,
+holds sway in the essence of every science. Is this, then, the
+inconspicuous state of affairs that we should like to bring into
+view? Yes and no. Yes, inasmuch as that which is not to be gotten
+around belongs to the state of affairs referred to; no, insofar as
+what is not to be gotten around, as mentioned above, of itself
+alone still does not constitute that state of affairs. This is already
+evident in the fact that what is not to be gotten around still
+itself occasions a further essential question.
+That which is not to be gotten around holds sway in the
+essence of science. Accordingly, it would have to be expected
+that science itself could find present within itself that which is
+not to be gotten around, and could define it as such. But it is
+precisely this that does not come about, and indeed because
+anything like it is essentially impossible. What is the basis for
+our knowing this? If the sciences themselves should at any time
+be able to find at hand within themselves what is not to be
+gotten around of which we are speaking, they would have before all else to be in a position to conceive and represent their
+own essence. But they are never in a position to do this.
+Physics as physics can make no assertions about physics. All
+the assertions of physics speak after the manner of physics.
+Physics itself is not a possible object of a physical experiment.
+The same holds for philology. As the theory of language and
+literature, philology is never a possible object of philological
+observation. This is equally the case for every science.
+Nevertheless, an objection could arise. Historiography, as a
+science, has a history as do all the rest of the sciences. Thus the
+science of history is able to observe itself in the sense of apply-
+28. durch ihr Vorstellen nie um-stellen können.
+
+177
+ing its own method and thematic procedure to itself. To be sure.
+Through such observation, historiography grasps the history of
+the science that it itself is. But through doing this historiography
+never grasps its essence as historiography, i.e., as a science. If
+we want to assert something about mathematics as theory, then
+we must leave behind the object-area of mathematics, together
+with mathematics' own way of representing. We can never
+discover through mathematical reckoning what mathematics
+itself is.
+It remains the case, then, that the sciences are not in a position
+at any time to represent themselves to themselves, to set themselves before themselves, by means of their theory and through
+the modes of procedure belonging to theory.
+If it is entirely denied to science scientifically to arrive at its
+own essence, then the sciences are utterly incapable of gaining
+access to that which is not to be gotten around holding sway in
+their essence.
+Here something disturbing manifests itself. That which in the
+sciences is not at any time to be gotten around-nature, man,
+history, language—is, as that which is not to be gotten around
+[numgängliche], intractable and inaccessible [unzugänglich]
+for the sciences and through the sciences."
+Only when we also pay heed to this inaccessibility of that
+which is not to be gotten around does that state of affairs come
+into view which holds complete sway throughout the essence
+of science.
+But why do we call that which is inaccessible and not to be
+gotten around the inconspicuous [unscheinbare] state of affairs?30
+29. Unumgängliche and unzugänglich are built on the stem of the verb
+gehen (to go). In this passage Heidegger uses several forms of gehen itself:
+eingehen (to arrive at), zugehen (to gain access to), gehen (to move), ibergehen (to pass over). And subsequently das Ubergangene, translated with
+"that which is passed over " will also be used. In most cases it has been
+impossible to translate these words so as to show the close connection
+existing among them. Hence this passage carries in the German a force
+arising out of repetition, which the translation cannot reproduce. And il
+evinces, in that repetition, the interrelated unitariness of that about which
+Heidegger is speaking.
+30. Unscheinbar means literally, "not shining," "not bright." The varl in
+the sentence that follows here, auff allen, means not only to strike as army,
+but first of all, to fall upon, to fall open. Heidegger clearly intern:: I.l Ir-
+
+178
+The inconspicuous does not strike us as strange. It may be seen,
+yet without being particularly heeded. Does the state of affairs
+shown us in the essence of science remain unnoticed only because we think too little and too seldom on the essence of science?
+That scarcely anyone could justifiably maintain. On the contrary,
+many evidences speak for the fact that, not only through physics
+but through all the sciences, there moves a strange restiveness.
+Before this, however, in past centuries of intellectual and scientific history in the West, attempts to delimit and define the
+essence of science have made themselves felt again and again.
+The passionate and incessant troubling over this is therefore
+above all a fundamental characteristic of modern times. How,
+then, could that state of affairs remain unheeded? Today we
+speak of "the crisis at the foundations" of the sciences. That
+crisis, in fact, touches only the fundamental concepts of the
+individual sciences. It is in no way a crisis of science as such.
+Today science goes its way more securely than ever before.
+That which is inaccessible and not to be gotten around, which
+holds sway throughout the sciences and in that way renders their
+essence enigmatic, is, however, something far more, i.e., something essentially other, than a mere unsureness in the providing
+of fundamental concepts by means of which at any given time
+an area is placed in association with the sciences. Thus the restiveness in the sciences extends far beyond the mere precariousness of their fundamental concepts. We are restive in the sciences
+and yet cannot say for what reason or to what end, despite multifarious discussions about the sciences. Today we philosophize
+about the sciences from the most diverse standpoints. Through
+such philosophical efforts, we fall in with the self-exhibiting that
+is everywhere being attempted by the sciences themselves in
+the form of synthetic résumés and through the recounting of the
+history of science.
+But for all that, what is inaccessible and not to be gotten
+around remains in inconspicuousness. Therefore the inconspicuousness of the state of affairs cannot lie only in the fact that it
+meanings that the translation here displays should be heard as primary in
+these two words at this point. But at the same time both also contain
+connotations of self-manifestation, which he will bring out as the discus..
+sion proceeds.
+
+179
+does not astound us and that we do not notice it. The inconspicuousness of the state of affairs, its failure to shine forth, is
+grounded rather in the fact that it, of itself, does not come to
+appearance. The fact that that which is inaccessible and not to be
+gotten around is continually passed over depends on it itself as
+such. Inasmuch as such inconspicuousness is a fundamental
+characteristic of the aforementioned state of affairs itself, the
+latter is defined adequately only when we say:
+The state of affairs that holds sway throughout the essence
+of science, i.e., throughout the theory of the real, is that which is
+inaccessible and not to be gotten around, which is constantly
+passed over. 31
+The inconspicuous state of affairs conceals itself in the sciences.
+But it does not lie in them as an apple lies in a basket. Rather
+we must say: The sciences, for their part, lie in the inconspicuous state of affairs as the river lies in its source.
+Our aim was to point to that state of affairs, in order that it
+itself might beckon us into the region from out of which stems
+the essence of science.
+What have we achieved? We have become attentive to that
+which is inaccessible and not to be gotten around, which is constantly passed over. It shows itself to us in [an] the objectness
+into which the real sets itself forth and through whose whole extent theory entraps objects in order, for the sake of representation, to secure those objects and their coherence in the object-area
+of a particular science at a particular time. The inconspicuous
+state of affairs holds sway throughout the objectness in which the
+reality of the real as well as the theory of the real moves freely,
+and in which consequently the entire essence, the coming to presence, of the modern science of this new era moves freely also.
+We shall be satisfied with having pointed to the inconspicuous
+state of affairs. To bring out what it is in itself would require
+that we pose further questions. Through this pointing to the inconspicuous state of affairs we are, however, directed onto a
+way that brings us before that which is worthy of questioning.
+In contradistinction to all that is merely questionable, as well as
+to everything that is "without question," that which is worthy
+31. das stets übergangene unzugängliche Unumgängliche.
+
+180
+of questioning alone affords, from out of itself, the clear impetus
+and untrammeled pause through which we are able to call toward
+us and call near that which addresses itself to our essence.32
+Traveling in the direction that is a way toward that which is
+worthy of questioning is not adventure but homecoming.
+To follow a direction that is the way that something has, of
+itself, already taken is called, in our language, sinnan, sinnen [to
+sense]. To venture after sense or meaning [Sinn] is the essence
+of reflecting [Besinnen]. This means more than a mere making
+conscious of something. We do not yet have reflection when we
+have only consciousness. Reflection is more. It is calm, selfpossessed surrender to that which is worthy of questioning.
+Through reflection so understood we actually arrive at the
+place where, without having experienced it and without having
+seen penetratingly into it, we have long been sojourning. In
+reflection we gain access to a place from out of which there first
+opens the space traversed at any given time by all our doing and
+leaving undone.
+Reflection is of a different essence from the making conscious
+and the knowing that belong to science; it is of a different
+essence also from intellectual cultivation [Bildung]. The word
+bilden [to form or cultivate] means first: to set up a preformed
+model [Vor-bild] and to set forth a preestablished rule [Vorschrift]. It means, further, to give form to inherent tendencies.
+Intellectual cultivation brings before man a model in the light
+of which he shapes and improves all that he does. Cultivating
+the intellect requires a guiding image rendered secure in advance,
+as well as a standing-ground fortified on all sides. The putting
+forward of a common ideal of culture and the rule of that ideal
+presuppose a situation and bearing of man that is not in question
+and that is secured in every direction. This presupposition, for
+its part, must be based on a belief in the invincible power of an
+immutable reason and its principles.
+As over against this, reflection first brings us onto the way
+32. In this sentence the reader will recognize, although in a very different
+guise, a portrayal much like that which Heidegger gives in "The Turning,"
+of the manifesting, freeing, restoring, that may take place from within and
+for Being-as the Being of
+whatever is-and for man in the coming lo
+presence of modern technology.
+
+181
+toward the place of our sojourning. This sojourning is constantly
+a historical sojourning—i.e., one allotted to us-—no matter
+whether we represent, analyze, and classify it historiographically
+or whether we believe that we can artificially detach ourselves
+from history by means of a merely voluntary turning away from
+historiography.
+How and by what means our historical sojourn adds to and
+enlarges the dwelling proper to it —about this, reflection can
+decide nothing directly.
+The age of intellectual cultivation is coming to an end, not
+because the uncultured are gaining the ascendancy, but berausse
+the signs are appearing of a world-age in which that which is
+worthy of questioning will someday again open the door Ihl
+leads to what is essential in all things and in all destining:.
+We will respond to the claim from afar, to the bim of the
+prevailing demeanor [des Verhaltens] of that workd ase. when
+we begin to reflect by venturing onto the wary arealy lal en loy
+that state of affairs [Sachverhalt] which show; islf lo ur: in Ihne
+essence of science-though not only there.
+Nevertheless, reflection remains more provisonal, more for
+bearing and poorer in relation to its age Ihn e. the intellectual
+cultivation that was fostered earlier. Still, Ihe poverty of reflection is the promise of a wealth whose Treasures glow in the
+resplendence of that uselessness which con never be included in
+any reckoning.
+The ways of reflection constantly change, ever according to
+the place on the way at which a path begins, ever according
+to the portion of the way that it traverses, ever according to the
+distant view that opens along the way into that which is worthy
+of questioning.
+Even if the sciences, precisely in following their ways and
+using their means, can never press forward to the essence of
+science, still every researcher and teacher of the sciences, every
+33. sein wohnen an- und ausbaut. Like the verb bilden (to form) used
+above, bauen (to build) has as one of its meanings to cultivate. In using
+bauen in these compounds (anbaut, "adds to"; ausbaut, "enlarges") in the
+midst of his juxtaposing of intellectual cultivation and reflection, Heidegger
+undoubtedly intends that bauen point up that contrast-an intention thal
+has been impossible to preserve in the translation.
+
+182
+man pursuing a way through a science, can move, as a thinking
+being,34 on various levels of reflection and can keep reflection
+vigilant.
+Yet even there where once, through a special favor, the highest
+level of reflection might be attained, reflection would have to be
+content only with preparing a readiness for the exhortation and
+consolation that our human race today needs.
+Reflection is not needed, however, in order that it may remove
+some chance perplexity or break down an antipathy to thinking.
+Reflection is needed as a responding that forgets itself in the
+clarity of ceaseless questioning away at the inexhaustibleness of
+That which is worthy of questioning—of That from out of which,
+in the moment properly its own, responding loses the character
+of questioning and becomes simply saying.
+34. als denkenden Wesen.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/b5f2660d81cf65f4e541de6b68dc0702120e5702a8c8b5a462d12fab847207c4.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/b5f2660d81cf65f4e541de6b68dc0702120e5702a8c8b5a462d12fab847207c4.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a468f76de2c1bdeffa6792688ade29296befa51f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/b5f2660d81cf65f4e541de6b68dc0702120e5702a8c8b5a462d12fab847207c4.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -7645,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "b5f2660d81cf65f4e541de6b68dc0702120e5702a8c8b5a462d12fab847207c4",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 975,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "57b80939eafc79a1c4fa3b8097cfa0d10a46658b55bf7ebc8de436884b881892",
+  "output_sha256": "a14a4bbe4bce4bd26b8acc38eda9a8ef3d7262182e91a23f727741172656dd26",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/b6abbfcf95255fa2e845b1f8fc25142e9b43870b5decd668bbb658fedd7084e7.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/b6abbfcf95255fa2e845b1f8fc25142e9b43870b5decd668bbb658fedd7084e7.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b456d0d1d1b253ce335179e2efafb4f210e7cddc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/b6abbfcf95255fa2e845b1f8fc25142e9b43870b5decd668bbb658fedd7084e7.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5384 @@
+WILFRID
+SELLAR
+With an Introduction by RICHARD RORTY
+and a Study Guide ly ROBERT BRANDOM
+Harvard University Press
+Cambridge, Massachusetts
+London, England
+1997
+
+Introduction and Study Guide © 1997 by the President and Fellows of
+Harvard College
+All rights reserved
+Printed in the United States of America
+Empiricism and the Philosopby of Mind was originally published in Minnesota
+Studies in the Philosopby of Science, vol. I., ed. Herbert Feigl and Michael
+Scriven (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956).
+Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
+Sellars, Wilfrid.
+Empiricism and the philosophy of mind / Wilfrid Sellars; with an
+introduction by Richard Rorty, and a study guide by Robert Brandom.
+p. cm.
+Taken from Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, v. 1,
+The Foundations of science and the concepts of psychology and
+psychoanalysis.
+Includes bibliographical references.
+ISBN 0-674-25154-7 (cloth : alk. paper)
+ISBN 0-674-25155-5 (pbk. : alk. paper)
+1. Philosophy of mind. 2. Empiricism - Controversial literature.
+3. Analysis (Philosophy). 4. Sellars, Wilfrid. Empiricism and the
+philosophy of mind. I. Rorty, Richard. II. Brandom, Robert.
+II. Title.
+BD418.3.S45
+1997
+128.2- .2-dc21
+96-51811
+
+=
+111
+IV
+VI
+VII
+VIlI
+1X
+XI
+X 1I
+XIII
+X IV
+X V
+XVI
+CONTENTS
+Introduction by Richard Rorty
+An Ambiguity in Sense-Datum Theories
+Another Language?
+The Logic of 'Looks'
+Explaining Looks
+Impressions and Ideas: A Logical Point
+Impressions and Ideas: A Historical Point
+The Logic of 'Means'
+Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?
+Science and Ordinary Usage
+Private Episodes: The Problem
+Thoughts: The Classical View
+Our Rylean Ancestors
+Theories and Models
+Methodological versus Philosophical Behaviorism
+The Logic of Private Episodes: Thoughts
+The Logic of Private Episodes: Impressions
+References
+Study Guide by Robert Brandom
+25
+32
+53
+57
+68
+79
+85
+88
+90
+24
+98
+102
+107
+117
+119
+
+
+RORTY
+THE KIND OF PHILOSOPHY We now call "analytic" started out as a form of empiricism. It developed out of the work of Bertrand Russell, Rudolf
+Carnap, and others-the work summarized and put
+in canonical, easily teachable, form by A. J. Ayer
+in his Language, Truth, and Logic (1936). In that book,
+Ayer put forward the ideas which make up what we
+now call "logical positivism" or "logical empiricism" -
+ideas which restated the foundationalist epistemology of British empiricism in linguistic, as opposed to
+psychological, terms. These ideas are very different
+from those which underlie what is sometimes called
+"post-positivistic" analytic philosophy-a brand of
+philosophy which is sometimes said to be "beyond"
+empiricism and rationalism.
+The shift from the earlier to the later form of analytic philosophy, a shift which began around 1950 and
+was complete by around 1970, was a result of many
+complexly interacting forces, the pattern of which
+is hard to trace. Nevertheless, any historian of this
+shift would do well to focus on three seminal works:
+Willard van Orman Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiri-
+
+2
+cism" (1951), Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation
+(1954), and Wilfrid Sellars's "Empiricism and the Philosophy
+of Mind" (1956).
+Of these three, Sellars's long, complicated, and very rich
+essay is the least known and discussed. Historians of recent Anglo-American philosophy have emphasized the importance of Quine's essay in raising doubts about the notion
+of "analytic truth" and thus about the Carnapian-Russellian
+notion that philosophy should be "the logical analysis of
+language." They have also emphasized the importance of the
+work of the later Wittgenstein -especially what Strawson
+called his "hostility to immediacy," his distrust of traditional
+empiricist explanations of the acquisition of knowledge. They
+have not, for the most part, given much weight to Sellars's
+role in bringing about the collapse of sense-data empiricism.
+This is a pity, since Sellars's attack on "the Myth of the
+Given" was, in America (though not in Britain), very influential in persuading philosophers that there was something
+deeply wrong with the sort of phenomenalism Ayer had
+advocated.'
+Wilfrid Sellars was born in 1912 and died in 1989. He
+taught philosophy at Minnesota, Yale, and finally at Pittsburgh. He published a great many essays, as well as one
+monograph, Science and Metaphysiar (his Locke Lectures at
+Oxford in 1967).2 His work was often criticized for its
+1. Austin's criticism of Ayer in his posthumous Sense and Sensibilin played the
+role in Britain which Sellars's article played in America. Though they greatly
+admired Austin, American philosophers had already pretty much given up on
+sense-data by the time Sense and Sensibilla appeared.
+2. Science and Metaphysics (London: Routledge, 1967). The most important collections of Sellars's essays are his Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge,
+1963) — which contains "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind"-and his Easay!
+in Philrophy and Its History (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974). Commentary on Sellars's work
+may be found in C. F. Delaney et al., The Syroptic Vision: Faways on the Philosophy of
+
+3
+obscurity. This obscurity was partially a result of Sellars's
+idiosyncratic style, but some of it was in the eye of the
+beholder. For Sellars was unusual among prominent American philosophers of the post-World War Il period, and quite
+different from Quine and Wittgenstein, in having a wide
+and deep acquaintance with the history of philosophy.3 This
+knowledge of previous philosophers kept intruding into his
+work (as in the two rather cryptic chapters on Kant which
+open Science and Metaphysic), and helped to make his writings
+seem difficult for analytic philosophers whose education had
+been less historically oriented than Sellars's. Sellars believed
+that "philosophy without the history of philosophy is, if not
+blind, at least dumb," but this view seemed merely perverse
+to much of his audience.
+OF ALL SELLARS'S WRITINGS, "Empiricism and the Philosophy
+of Mind" is the most widely read and the most accessible.
+Indeed, this essay is all that most analytic philosophers know
+of Sellars. But it is almost enough, since it is the epitome of
+an entire philosophical system. It covers most of the aspects
+of Sellars s overall project-the project he described as an
+attempt to usher analytic philosophy out of its Humean and
+into its Kantian stage.
+The fundamental thought which runs through this essay
+is Kant's: "intuitions without concepts are blind." Having
+Wilfrid Sellars (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1977), and in Hector-
+Neri Casteneda, ed., Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars
+(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975).
+3. For Quine's dismissive attitude toward the history of philosophy, see his
+robioraphy is sport y ty life (Cambrid and modern piss .5, art
+or Wittgensteins spotty readir
+Hallett, S.J., A Companion to Wittgenatein's Philosophical Investigations' (Ithaca: Cornell
+University Press, 1977), pp. 759-775.
+
+4
+a sense-impression is, by itself, an example neither of knowledge nor of conscious experience. Sellars, like the later
+Wittgenstein but unlike Kant, identified the possession of a
+concept with the mastery of the use of a word. So for him,
+mastery of a language is prerequisite of conscious experience.
+As he says in sect. 29: "
+all awareness of sorta, resemblances,
+facta, etc., in short all awareness of abstract entities -indeed,
+all awareness even of particulars — is a linguistic affair." This
+doctrine, which he called "psychological nominalism," entails
+that Locke, Berkeley, and Hume were wrong in thinking that
+we are "aware of certain determinate sorts ... simply by
+virtue of having sensations and images" (sect. 28).
+Sellars's argument for psychological nominalism is based
+on a claim which spells out the moral of many of the aphorisms of Philosophical Investigations: "The essential point is that
+in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we
+are not giving an empirical description of that episode or
+state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of
+justifying and being able to justify what one says" (sect. 36).
+In other words, knowledge is inseparable from a social practice - the practice of justifying ones assertions to ones fellow-humans. It is not presupposed by this practice, but
+comes into being along with it.
+So we cannot do what some logical positivists hoped to
+do: analyze epistemic facts without remainder "into nonepistemic facts, whether phenomenal or behavioral, public or
+private, with no matter how lavish a sprinkling of subjunctives and hypotheticals" (sect. 5).4 In particular, we can-
+4. This reterence to various attempted reductive analyses presupposes, as do
+many other passages in the essay, some familiarity with the literature of analytic
+philosophy in the 1940s and early 1950s —e.g., with Ayer's defenses of phenomenal-
+
+5
+not perform such an analysis by discovering the "foundation"
+of empirical knowledge in the objects of "direct acquaintance," objects which are "immediately before the mind."
+We cannot privilege reports that, for example, there is something red in the neighborhood as "reports of the immediately given." For such reports are no less mediated by language, and thus by social practice, than reports that there
+are cows or electrons in the neighborhood. The whole idea
+of "foundations" of knowledge, basic to both empiricism and
+rationalism, disappears once we become psychological nominalists.
+Whereas Quine's "Two Dogmas" had helped destroy the
+rationalist form of foundationalism by attacking the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths, "Empiricism and
+the Philosophy of Mind" helped destroy the empiricist form
+of foundationalism by attacking the distinction between what
+is "given to the mind" and what is "added by the mind."
+Sellars's attack on the Myth of the Given was a decisive move
+in turning analytic philosophy away from the foundationalist
+motives of the logical empiricists. It raised doubts about the
+very idea of "epistemology,"
+about the reality of the problems which philosophers had discussed under that heading.
+One of the most quoted sentences in the essay occurs in sect.
+38: "
+... empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extenism, Ryle's criticisms of Descartes, and so on. Certain sections of Sellars's essay-
+e.g., sections 8-9 and 21-23—may seem pointless excursus to those who lack such
+familiarity. But the overall argument of the essay is intelligible without reference to
+the particular figures whom Sellars discusses.
+5. Sellars's work along these lines links up with that of the American pragmatists —notably Peirce's polemics against givenness in his essay "Consequences of
+Four Incapacities" (1868) and Dewey's in "An Empirical Survey of Empiricisms"
+(1935). For a good account of the development of American pragmatism-an
+account from which Sellars is largely absent, but into which he fits nicely-see
+
+6
+sion, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but
+because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any
+claim in jeopardy, though not all at once."6 This sentence
+suggests that rationality is a matter not of obedience to
+standards (which epistemologists might hope to codify), but
+rather of give-and-take participation in
+a cooperative social
+project.
+AN ELABORATION AND DEFENSE of the presuppositions and
+implications of psychological nominalism, however, is not all
+there is to "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind." Sections 48-63 contain Sellars's "Myth of Jones" — a story which
+explains why we can be naturalists without being behaviorists, why we can accept Wittgenstein's doubts about what
+Sellars calls "self-authenticating non-verbal episodes" without sharing Ryle's doubts about the existence of such mental
+entities as thoughts and sense-impressions.
+At the time at which Sellars was writing, this was a vexed
+issue. For the appearance of Ryle's The Concept of Mind (1949)
+shortly before that of the Philosophical Investigations (1954) had
+made Wittgensteinian opposition to the idea of "a private
+language," and to that of "entities capable of being known
+by only one person,"
+seem inseparable from Ryles polemic
+against "the ghost in the machine." Sellars's account of inner
+episodes as having originally been postulated, rather than
+John P. Murphy, Pragmatium: From Peirce to Davideon (Boulder, Colo: Westview
+Press, 1990).
+philosopher offereda brief a tount of the roles do wine of ls li and lading
+in sect. 2 of Chapter IV of my Philoropby and the Mirror of Nature (1979).
+abandon the idea that we needed a
+
+7
+observed, entities, together with his account of how speakers
+might then come to make introspective reports (sect. 59) of
+such episodes, made clear how one could be Wittgensteinian
+without being Rylean. Sellars showed how one could give a
+non-reductive account of "mental event" while nevertheless
+eschewing, with Wittgenstein, the picture of the eye of the
+mind witnessing these events in a sort of immaterial inner
+theater.
+Sellars's treatment of the distinction between mind and
+body has been followed up by many philosophers of mind in
+subsequent decades. He may have been the first philosopher
+to insist that we see "mind" as a sort of hypostatization of
+language. He argued that the intentionality of beliefs is a
+reflection of the intentionality of sentences, rather than conversely? This reversal makes it possible to understand mind
+as gradually entering the universe by and through the gradual development of language, as part of a naturalistically
+explicable evolutionary process, rather than seeing language
+as the outward manifestation of something inward and mysterious which humans have and animals lack. As Sellars sees
+it, if you can explain how the social practices we call "using
+language" came into existence, you have already explained
+Williams-in his Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realim and the Basis of Scepticism
+(Cambridge, Mass., and Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) — has developed this theme much
+more thoroughly and carefully. He argues that it is the unfortunate idea that there
+is a natural kind called "human knowledge" which gives rise to both foundationalism
+and Cartesian skepticism. Williams's earlier book-Groundleds Belief (Blackwell,
+1977) —an anti-foundationalist treatise which laid the foundations for Unnatural
+Doubte, was heavily influenced by Sellars.
+7. This insistence is most explicit in Sellars's very instructive debate with
+Roderick Chisholm, reprinted as "Intentionality and the Mental" in Minnesta Studies
+in the Philosoply of Science, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958).
+
+8
+all that needs to be explained about the relation between
+mind and world.®
+A RECENT BOok by Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit,'
+offers the first systematic and comprehensive attempt to
+follow up on Sellars's thought.'° More specifically, it offers a
+"semantic explanatory strategy which takes inference as its
+basic concept,"
+as opposed to the alternative strategy "dominant since the Enlightenment, which takes representation as
+its basic concept."' Brandom's work can usefully be seen as
+an attempt to usher analytic philosophy from its Kantian to
+8. This is only true, however, if, like Daniel Dennett and unlike Thomas Nagel,
+one does not think of "what it is like to see something red" as referring to something
+quite different than does "having the disposition to call something red." To agree
+that Sellars dissolved the mind-body problem, one has to deny the existence of
+qualia. It is not clear that Sellars would be on Dennett's side of this issue, however,
+since he was tempted to think that what he called "the scientific image of man"
+would be incomplete until we discover special new microstructural properties
+capable of accounting for "the ultimate homogeneity" of phenomenological presentations. Be that as it may, Dennett has made clear his own indebtedness to Sellars.
+See his The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books, 1986). At p. 341
+Dennett gives Sellars credit for originating functionalism, the school of thought in
+contemporary philosophy of mind to which Dennett himself belongs. In a footnote
+on that page, Dennett remarks that "Sellars's influence has been ubiquitous but
+almost subliminal," and at p. 349 he says, "Almost no one cites Sellars, while
+reinventing his wheels with gratifying regularity." This latter remark seems to me
+an accurate account of Sellars's role in recent analytic philosophy.
+9. Making It Explicit: Reaming, Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Cambridge,
+Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
+ellarss attempt to revive the "picturing
+which Wittgenstein formulated in the Tractatus and later repudiated, as well as his
+speculations about the need for science to develop microphysical concepts adequate
+to explain the phenomenology of perception. In this respect, Brandom stands to
+"Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" as Davidson (who slufts off what he calls
+Quine's "adventitious philosophical puritanism") stands to "Two Dogmas." Both
+men cultivate their respective teacher's central insight by stripping it of accidental
+accretions.
+11. Brandom, Making It Explicit, p. xvi.
+
+9
+its Hegelian stage - an attempt foreshadowed in Sellars's wry
+description of "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" as
+"incipient Meditatians Hegeliènnes"12 (sect. 20) and his reference to Hegel as "that great foe of "immediacy'" (sect. 1).
+From Hegel's point of view, taking Kant's point that intuitions without concepts are blind is the first step toward
+abandoning a bad philosophical habit which the British empiricists took over from Descartes-the habit of asking
+whether mind ever succeeds in making unmediated contact
+with world, and remaining skeptical about the status of
+knowledge-claims until such contact can be shown to exist.
+That habit is characteristic of philosophers who, in Brandom's terms, are "representationalist" (like Descartes and
+Locke) rather than "inferentialist" (like Leibniz, Kant, Frege,
+the later Wittgenstein, and Sellars). The former take concepts to be representations (or putative representations) of
+reality rather than, as Kant did, rules which specify how
+something is to be done. Kant's fundamental insight, Brandom says, "is that judgements and actions are to be understood to begin with in terms of the special way in which we
+are responsible for them."13
+Following out this side of Kant's thought, rather than the
+side which led him to the skeptical conclusion that we could
+have no knowledge of things as they are in themselves, means
+emphasizing the passages in Kant which anticipate Hegel,
+Marx, Dewey, and Habermas, as opposed to those which
+connect Kant with his predecessors. This is the side of the
+Critique of Pure Reason which links up with Kant's "Project for
+12. Sellars is alluding
+to Husserl's Paris lectures, published
+as Meditation.
+Carteviennes.
+13. Brandom, Making It Earplicit, p. 8.
+
+10
+a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent,"
+rather than
+with Leibniz and Hume.
+I once took the liberty of asking Sellars, "If a man chooses
+to bind the spirit of Hegel in the fetters of Carnap, how
+shall he find readers?"4 My question was prompted by the
+final section of "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,"
+one of the few places where Sellars let himself go. In that
+section he offers a brief, but synoptic, vision of world
+history:
+I have used a myth [of Jones] to kill a myth-the Myth of
+the Given. But is my myth really a myth? Or does the
+reader not recognize Jones as Man himself in the middle of
+his journey from the grunts and groans of the cave to the
+subtle and polydimensional discourse of the drawing room,
+the laboratory, and the study, the language of Henry and
+William James, of Einstein and of the philosophers who, in
+their efforts to break out of discourse to an arché beyond
+discourse, have provided the most curious dimension of all?
+(sect. 63)
+This question serves to link the Myth of Jones to Hegel's
+account, in the Phenomenology, of the transition from senseperception to consciousness to self-consciousness-and,
+more generally, from Nature to Spirit -and also to Darwin's
+amendments to that account. Sellars's inclusion of Henry
+James as well as of Einstein reminds us of his justified
+suspicion of the science-worship which afflicted the early
+stages of analytic philosophy. The final clause serves as a
+rebuke to all those philosophers, from Plato to Ayer, who
+4. I was attempting a pastiche of W. G. Pogson-Smith's
+if a man choose to bind the spirir of Christ in the fetters of Eudlid, hor Shall he
+find readers?" Sellars was not amused.
+
+11
+hoped to "break out of discourse,"15 and as a reminder that
+the moral of the essay as a whole is that, though there is no
+such arché, we are none the worse for that.
+Brandom begins, so to speak, where Sellars's essay leaves
+off. His book makes good on a lot of what Sellars called
+his "promissory notes," and it ends with a description of
+"the complete and explicit interpretive equilibrium exhibited by a community whose members adopt the explicit discursive stance toward each other" — an equilibrium Brandom
+identifies with "social self-consciousness."16 Brandom offers
+a vision of all language-users forming "one great Community comprising members of all particular communities - the
+Community of those who say 'we' with and to someone,
+whether the members of those different particular communities recognize each other or not."'?
+This sort of free and easy transition between philosophy
+of language and mind on the one hand, and world-historical
+vision on the other, is reminiscent not only of Mead and
+Dewey but also of Gadamer and Habermas. Such transitions,
+as well as Sellars's and Brandom's prope-Hegelianism, suggest that the Sellars-Brandom "social practice" approach to
+the traditional topics of analytic philosophy might help reconnect that philosophical tradition with the so-called "Continental" tradition.
+Philosophers in non-anglophone countries typically think
+quite hard about Hegel, whereas the rather skimpy training
+in the history of philosophy which most analytic philosophers
+15. And perhaps also as a rebuke to Hegel's occasional suggestions that, at the
+end of inquiry and of History, we too might manage to break out of it.
+16. Brandom, Making It Explicit, p. 643.
+17. Brandom, Making It Esplicit, p. 4.
+
+12
+receive often tempts them to skip straight from Kant to
+Frege. It is agreeable to imagine a future in which the
+tiresome "analytic-Continental split" is looked back upon as
+an unfortunate, temporary breakdown of communication —a
+future in which Sellars and Habermas, Davidson and Gadamer, Putnam and Derrida, Rawls and Foucault, are seen as
+fellow-travelers on the same journey, fellow-citizens of what
+Michael Oakeshott called a civitas pelegrina.
+
+SELLARS
+I. An Ambiguity in Sense-Datum Theories
+1 PRESUME that no philosopher who has attacked
+the philosophical idea of givenness or, to use the
+Hegelian term, immediacy, has intended to deny that
+there is a difference between inferring that something
+is the case and, for example, seeing it to be the case.
+If the term "given" referred merely to what is observed as being observed, or, perhaps, to a proper
+subset of the things we are said to determine by
+observation, the existence of "data" would be as noncontroversial as the existence of philosophical perplexities. But, of course, this just isn't so. The phrase
+"the given"
+as a piece of professional-epistemological — shoptalk carries a substantial theoretical commitment, and one can deny that there are "data" or that
+anything is, in this sense, "given" without flying in the
+face of reason.
+Vote: This paper was first presented as the University of Londor
+Special Lectures on Philosophy for 1955-56, delivered on March 1, 8, anc
+15, 1956, under the title The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on
+Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind."
+
+14
+Many things have been said to be "given": sense contents,
+material objects, universals, propositions, real connections,
+first principles, even givenness itself. And there is, indeed, a
+certain way of construing the situations which philosophers
+analyze in these terms which can be said to be the framework
+of givenness. This framework has been a common feature of
+most of the major systems of philosophy, including, to usę a
+Kantian turn of phrase, both "dogmatic rationalism"
+and
+"skeptical empiricism." It has, indeed, been so pervasive that
+few, if any, philosophers have been altogether free of it;
+certainly not Kant, and, I would argue, not even Hegel, that
+great foe of "immediacy." Often what is attacked under its
+name are only specific varieties of "given." Intuited first
+principles and synthetic necessary connections were the first
+to come under attack. And many who today attack "the
+whole idea of givenness" - and they are an increasing number -are really only attacking sense data. For they transfer
+to other items, say physical objects or relations of appearing,
+the characteristic features of the "given." If, however, I begin
+my argument with an attack on sense datum theories, it is
+only as a first step in a general critique of the entire framework of givenness.
+2. Sense-datum theories characteristically distinguish between an act of awareness and, for example, the color patch
+which is its object. The act is usually called sending. Classical
+exponents of the theory have often characterized these acts
+as "phenomenologically simple" and "not further analyzable."
+But other sense-datum theorists-some of them with an
+equal claim to be considered "classical exponents" - have
+held that sensing is analyzable. And if some philosophers
+seem to have thought that if sensing is analyzable, then it
+can't be an act, this has by no means been the general opinion.
+
+15
+There are, indeed, deeper roots for the doubt that sensing (if
+there is such a thing) is an act, roots which can be traced to
+one of two lines of thought tangled together in classical
+sense-datum theory. For the moment, however, I shall simply
+assume that however complex (or simple) the fact that x is
+sensed may be, it has the form, whatever exactly it may be,
+by virtue of which for x to be sensed is for it to be the object
+of an act.
+Being a sense datum, or sensum, is a relational property
+of the item that is sensed. To refer to an item which is sensed
+in a way which does not entail that it is sensed, it is necessary
+to use some other locution. Sensible has the disadvantage that
+it implies that sensed items could exist without being sensed,
+and this is a matter of controversy among sense-datum theorists. Sense content is, perhaps, as neutral a term as any.
+There appear to be varieties of sensing, referred to by
+some as visual sending, tactual sending, etc., and by others as
+directly seeing, directly bearing, etc. But it is not clear whether
+these are species of sensing in any full-blooded sense, or
+whether "x is visually sensed" amounts to no more than "x
+is a color patch which is sensed," "x is directly heard" than
+"x is a sound which is sensed" and so on. In the latter case,
+being a visual sending or a direct bearing would be a relational
+property of an act of sensing, just as being a sense datum is
+a relational property of a sense content.
+3. Now if we bear in mind that the point of the epistemological category of the given is, presumably, to explicate the
+idea that empirical knowledge rests on a "foundation' of
+non-inferential knowledge of matter of fact, we may well
+experience a feeling of surprise on noting that according to
+sense-datum theorists, it is particulars that are sensed. For
+what is known, even in non-inferential knowledge, is facts
+
+16
+rather than particulars, items of the form something's being
+thees-and-so or sometbing's standing in a certain relation to something else. It would seem, then, that the sensing of sense
+contents cannot constitute knowledge, inferential or noninferential; and if so, we may well ask, what light does the
+concept of a sense datum throw on the 'foundations of empirical knowledge?' The sense-datum theorist, it would seem,
+must choose between saying:
+(a) It is particulars which are sensed. Sensing is not
+knowing. The existence of sense-data does not logically imply the existence of knowledge.
+or
+(b) Sensing it a form of knowing. It is fact rather than
+particulars which are sensed.
+On alternative (a) the fact that a sense content was sensed
+would be a non-epistemic fact about the sense content. Yet it
+would be hasty to conclude that this alternative precludes
+any logical connection between the sensing of sense contents
+and the possession of non-inferential knowledge. For even if
+the sensing of sense contents did not logically imply the
+existence of non-inferential knowledge, the converse might
+well be true. Thus, the non-inferential knowledge of particular matter of fact might logically imply the existence of sense
+data (for example, seeing that a certain physical object i red might
+logically imply sending a red sende content) even though the
+sensing of a red sense content were not itself a cognitive fact
+and did not imply the possession of non-inferential knowedge.
+On the second alternative, (b), the sensing of sense contents would logically imply the existence of non-inferential
+knowledge for the simple reason that it would be this know!-
+
+17
+edge. But, once again, it would be facts rather than particulars which are sensed
+4. Now it might seem that when confronted by this choice,
+the sense-datum theorist seeks to have his cake and eat it.
+For he characteristically insists both that sensing is a knowing
+and that it is particulars which are sensed. Yet his position is
+by no means as hopeless as this formulation suggests. For
+the 'having' and the 'eating' can be combined without logical
+nonsense provided that he uses the word know and, correspondingly, the word given in two senses. He must say something like the following:
+The non-inferential knowing on which our world picture rests
+is the knowing that certain items, e.g. red sense contents, are
+of a certain character, e.g. red. When such a fact is noninferentially known about a sense content, I will say that the
+sense content is sensed as being, e.g., red. I will then say that
+a sense content is rended (full stop) if it is sensed as being of a
+certain character, e.g. red. Finally, I will say of a sense content
+that it is known if it is sensed (full stop), to emphasize that
+sensing is a cognitive or epistemic fact.
+Notice that, given these stipulations, it is logically necessary that if a sense content be sensed, it be sended de being of a
+certain character, and that if it be sensed ad being of a certain
+character; the fact that it is of this character be non-inferentially
+known. Notice also that the being sensed of a sense content
+would be knowledge only in a stipulated sense of know. To say
+of a sense content—a color patch, for example-that it was
+'known' would be to say that some fact about it was noninferentially known, e.g. that it was red. This stipulated use
+of know would, however, receive aid and comfort from the
+fact that there is, in ordinary usage, a sense of know in which
+
+18
+it is followed by a noun or descriptive phrase which refers
+to a particular, thus
+Do you know John?
+Do you know the President?
+Because these questions are equivalent to "Are you acquainted with John?" and "Are you acquainted with the
+President?" the phrase "knowledge by acquaintance" recommends itself as a useful metaphor for this stipulated sense of
+know and, like other useful metaphors, has congealed into a
+technical term.
+5. We have seen that the fact that a sense content is a
+datum (if, indeed, there are such facts) will logically imply
+that someone has non-inferential knowledge only if to say that
+a sense content is given is contextually defined in terms of
+non-inferential knowledge of a fact about this sense content.
+If this is not clearly realized or held in mind, sense-datum
+theorists may come to think of the givenness of sense contents as the basi or primitive concept of the sense-datum
+framework, and thus sever the logical connection between
+sense data and non-inferential knowledge to which the classical form of the theory is committed. This brings us face
+to face with the fact that in spite of the above considerations, many if not most sense-datum theorists have thought
+of the givenness of sense contents as the basic notion of
+the sense-datum framework. What, then, of the logical connection in the direction sensing , ende contents → having noninferential knowledge? Clearly it is severed by those who think
+of sensing as a unique and unanalyzable act. Those, on the
+other hand, who conceive of sensing as an analyzable fact,
+while they have prima facie severed this connection (by
+taking the sensing of sense contents to be the basic concept
+
+19
+of the sense-datum framework) will nevertheless, in a sense,
+have maintained it, if the result they get by analyzing t it a
+red denue datum turns out to be the same as the result they get
+when they analyze i is non-inferentially known to be red. The
+entailment which was thrown out the front door would have
+sneaked in by the back.
+It is interesting to note, in this connection, that those who,
+in the classical period of sense-datum theories, say from
+Moore's "Refutation of Idealism" until about 1938, analyzed
+or sketched an analysis of sensing, did so in non-epistemic
+terms. Typically it was held that for a sense content to be
+sensed is for it to be an element in a certain kind of relational
+array of sense contents, where the relations which constitute
+the array are such relations as spatiotemporal juxtaposition
+(or overlapping), constant conjunction, mnemic causation -
+even real connection and belonging to a self. There is, however, one class of terms which is conspicuous by its absence,
+namely cognitive terms. For these, like the 'sensing' which was
+under analysis, were taken to belong to a higher level of
+complexity.
+Now the idea that epistemic facts can be analyzed without
+remainder-even "in principle"- into non-epistemic facts,
+whether phenomenal or behavioral, public or private, with
+no matter how lavish a sprinkling of subjunctives and hypotheticals is, I believe, a radical mistake —a mistake of a
+piece with the so-called "naturalistic fallacy" in ethics. I shall
+not, however, press this point for the moment, though it will
+be a central theme in a later stage of my argument. What I
+do want to stress is that whether classical sense-datum philosophers have conceived of the givenness of sense contents
+as analyzable in non-epistemic terms, or as constituted by
+acts which are somehow both irreducible and knowings, they
+
+20
+have without exception taken them to be fundamental in
+another sense.
+6. For they have taken givenness to be a fact which
+presupposes no learning, no forming of associations, no setting up of stimulus-response connections. In short, they have
+tended to equate densing sende contente with being conscinus, as
+a person who has been hit on the head is not conscious
+whereas a new born babe, alive and kicking, is conscious.
+They would admit, of course, that the ability to know that a
+person, namely oneself, is now, at a certain time, feeling a pain,
+is acquired and does presuppose a (complicated) process of
+concept formation. But, they would insist, to suppose that
+the simple ability to feel a pain or dee a color, in short, to sense
+sense contents, is acquired and involves a process of concept
+formation, would be very odd indeed.
+But if a sense-datum philosopher takes the ability to sense
+sense contents to be unacquired, he is clearly precluded from
+offering an analysis of it sensed a sende content which presupposes acquired abilities. It follows that he could analyze .t
+sensed red senue content « as « non-inferentially knowe that « let red
+only if he is prepared to admit that the ability to have such
+non-inferential knowledge as that, for example, a red sense
+content is red, is itself unacquired. And this brings us face
+to face with the fact that most empirically minded philosophers are strongly inclined to think that all classificatory
+consciousness, all knowledge that something is thus-and-do, or,
+in logicians' jargon, all subsumption of particulars under
+universals, involves learning, concept formation, even the use
+of symbols. It is clear from the above analysis, therefore, that
+classical sense-datum theories - I emphasize the adjective, for
+there are other, 'heterodox,' sense-datum theories to be taken
+into account-are confronted by an inconsistent triad made
+up of the following three propositions:
+
+21
+A. Xuenses red denue content « entails i non-inferentially knows
+that i is red.
+B. The ability to sense sense contents is unacquired.
+C. The ability to know facts of the form. is $ is acquired.
+A and B together entail not-C; B and C entail not-A; A and
+C entail not-B.
+Once the classical sense-datum theorist faces up to the fact
+that A, B, and C do form an inconsistent triad, which of them
+will he choose to abandon?
+1) He can abandon A, in which case the sensing of
+sense contents becomes a noncognitive fact—a noncognitive fact, to be sure which may be a necessary
+condition, even a logually necessary condition, of noninferential knowledge, but a fact, nevertheless, which
+cannot constitute this knowledge.
+2) He can abandon B, in which case he must pay the
+price of cutting off the concept of a sense datum
+from its connection with our ordinary talk about sensations, feelings, afterimages, tickles and itches, etc.,
+which are usually thought by sense-datum theorists
+to be its common sense counterparts.
+3) But to abandon C is to do violence to the predominantly nominalistic proclivities of the empiricist tradition.
+7. It certainly begins to look as though the classical concept of a sense datum were a mongrel resulting from a
+crossbreeding of two ideas:
+(1) The idea that there are certain inner episodes-e.g.
+sensations of red or of C# which can occur to human
+beings (and brutes) without any prior process of
+learning or concept formation; and without which it
+
+22
+would in some sende be impossible to dee, for example,
+that the facing surface of a physical object is red and
+triangular, or hear that a certain physical sound is C#.
+(2) The idea that there are certain inner episodes which
+are the non-inferential knowings that certain items
+are, for example, red or C#; and that these episodes
+are the necessary conditions of empirical knowledge
+as providing the evidence for all other empirical
+propositions.
+And I think that once we are on the lookout for them, it is
+quite easy to see how these two ideas came to be blended
+together in traditional epistemology. The firat idea clearly
+arises in the attempt to explain the facts of sense perception
+in scientific style. How does it happen that people can have
+the experience which they describe by saying "It is as though
+I were seeing a red and triangular physical object" when
+either there is no physical object there at all, or, if there is,
+it is neither red nor triangular? The explanation, roughly,
+posits that in every case in which a person has an experience
+of this kind, whether veridical or not, he has what is called
+a 'sensation' or "impression'"' of a red triangle.' The core idea
+is that the proximate cause of such a sensation is only for the
+mout part brought about by the presence in the neighborhood
+of the perceiver of a red and triangular physical object; and
+that while a baby, say, can have the 'sensation of a red
+triangle' without either seeing or deeming to see that the facing
+side of a physical object is red and triangular, there usually looke,
+to adults, to be a physical object with a red and triangular
+facing surface, when they are caused to have a 'sensation of
+a red triangle'; while without such a sensation, no such experience can be had.
+
+23
+I shall have a great deal more to say about this kind of
+'explanation' of perceptual situations in the course of my
+argument. What I want to emphasize for the moment, however, is that, as far as the above formulation goes, there is no
+reason to suppose that having the sensation of a red triangle
+is a cognitive or epistemic fact. There is, of course, a temptation
+to assimilate "having a sensation of a red triangle" to "thinking of a celestial city" and to attribute to the former the
+epistemic character, the "intentionality' of the latter. But this
+temptation could be resisted, and it could be held that having
+a sensation of a red triangle is a fact sui generi, neither
+epistemic nor physical, having its own logical grammar. Un-
+fortunately, the idea that there are such things as sensations
+of red triangles-in itself, as we shall see, quite legitimate,
+though not without its puzzles - seems to fit the requirements
+of another, and less fortunate, line of thought so well that it
+has almost invariably been distorted to give the latter a
+reinforcement without which it would long ago have collapsed. This unfortunate, but familiar, line of thought runs
+as follows:
+The seeing that the facing surface of a physical object is red
+and triangular is a veridical member of a class of experiences -
+let us call them 'ostensible seeings' - some of the members of
+which are non-veridical; and there is no inspectible hallmark
+which guarantees that any such experience is veridical. To
+suppose that the non-inferential knowledge on which our
+world picture rests consists of such ostensible seeings, hearings, etc., as happen to be veridical is to place empirical knowledge on too precarious a footing-indeed, to open the door
+to skepticism by making a mockery of the word knowledge in
+the phrase "empirical knowledge."
+Now it is, of course, possible to delimit subclasses of os-
+
+24
+tensible seeings, hearings, etc., which are progressively less
+precarious, i.e. more reliable, by specifying the circumstances
+in which they occur, and the vigilance of the perceiver. But
+the possibility that any given ostensible seeing, hearing, etc.,
+is non-veridical can never be entirely eliminated. Therefore,
+given that the foundation of empirical knowledge cannot consist
+of the veridical members of a class not all the members of
+which are veridical, and from which the non-veridical members cannot be weeded out by "inspection,' this foundation
+cannot consist of such items as reeing that the facing surface of
+a physical object is red and triangular:
+Thus baldly put, scarcely anyone would accept this conclusion. Rather they would take the contrapositive of the
+argument, and reason that since the foundation of empirical
+knowledge is the non-inferential knowledge of such facts,
+it doed consist of members of a class which contains nonveridical members. But before it is thus baldly put, it gets
+tangled up with the first line of thought. The idea springs to
+mind that sensations of red triangles have exactly the virtues
+which ostensible seeings of red truangular physical surfaced lack.
+To begin with, the grammatical similarity of 'sensation of a
+red triangle' to "thought of a celestial city" is interpreted to
+mean, or, better, gives rise to the presupposition, that sensafinn belong in the same general pigeonhole as thoughts-in
+short, are cognitive facts. Then, it is noticed that sensations
+are ex hypothesi far more intimately related to mental processes than external physical objects. It would seem easier
+to "get at" a red triangle of which we are having a sensation, than to "get at" a red and triangular physical surface.
+But, above all, it is the fact that it doesn't make sense to speak
+of unveridical sensations which strikes these philosophers,
+though for it to strike them as it does, they must overlook
+
+25
+the fact that if it makes sense to speak of an experience as
+veridical it must correspondingly make sense to speak of it
+as unveridical. Let me emphasize that not all sense-datum
+theorists -even of the classical type-have been guilty of
+all these confusions; nor are these all the confusions of
+which sense-datum theorists have been guilty. I shall have
+more to say on this topic later. But the confusions I have
+mentioned are central to the tradition, and will serve my
+present purpose. For the upshot of blending all these ingredients together is the idea that a sensation of a red triangle
+is the very paradigm of empirical knowledge. And I think
+that it can readily be seen that this idea leads straight to
+the orthodox type of sense-datum theory and accounts
+for the perplexities which arise when one tries to think it
+through.
+Il. Another Language?
+8. I shall now examine briefly a heterodox suggestion by, for
+example, Ayer (1)(2) to the effect that discourse about sense
+data is, so to speak, another language, a language contrived
+by the epistemologist, for situations which the plain man
+describes by means of such locutions as "Now the book looks
+green to me" and "There seems to be a red and triangular
+object over there." The core of this suggestion is the idea that
+the vocabulary of sense data embodies no increase in the
+content of descriptive discourse, as over and against the plain
+man's language of physical objects in Space and Time, and
+the properties they have and appear to have. For it holds
+that sentences of the form
+X presents S with a Ф sense datum
+
+26
+are simply stipulated to have the same force as sentences of
+the form
+X looks $ to S.
+Thus "The tomato presents S with a bulgy red sense-datum"
+would be the contrived counterpart of "The tomato looks
+red and bulgy to S" and would mean exactly what the latter means for the simple reason that it was stipulated to
+do so.
+As an aid to explicating this suggestion, I am going to
+make use of a certain picture. I am going to start with the
+idea of a code, and I am going to enrich this notion until the
+codes I am talking about are no longer mere codes. Whether
+one wants to call these "enriched codes" codes at all is a
+matter which I shall not attempt to decide.
+Now a code, in the sense in which I shall use the term, is
+a system of symbols each of which represents a complete
+sentence. Thus, as we initially view the situation, there are
+two characteristic features of a code: (1) Each code symbol
+is a unit; the parts of a code symbol are not themselves code
+symbols. (2) Such logical relations as obtain among code
+symbols are completely parasitical; they derive entirely from
+logical relations among the sentences they represent. Indeed,
+to speak about logical relations among code symbols is a way
+of talking which is introduced in terms of the logical relations
+among the sentences they represent. Thus, if "O" stands for
+"Everybody on board is sick" and "A" for "Somebody on
+board is sick," then "A" would follow from "O" in the sense
+that the sentence represented by "A" follows from the sentence represented by "O."
+Let me begin to modify this austere conception of a code.
+There is no reason why a code symbol might not have parts
+
+EMPIRICISM AND THE PIILOSOPHY OF MIND
+27
+which, without becoming full-fledged symbols on their own,
+do play a role in the system. Thus they might play the role
+of mnemonic desiced serving to put us in mind of features of
+the sentences represented by the symbols of which they are
+parts. For example, the code symbol for "Someone on board
+is sick" might contain the letter S to remind us of the word
+"sick," and, perhaps, the reversed letter E to remind those of
+us who have a background in logic of the word "someone."
+Thus, the flag for "Someone on board is sick" might be 'S.'
+Now the suggestion at which I am obviously driving is that
+someone might introduce so-called sense-datum sentences as
+code symbols or "flags," and introduce the vocables and
+printables they contain to serve the role of reminding us of
+certain features of the sentences in ordinary perceptual discourse which the flags as wholes represent. In particular, the
+role of the vocable or printable "sense datum" would be that
+of indicating that the symbolized sentence contains the context"... looks...," the vocable or printable "red" that the
+correlated sentence contains the context "... looks red ..."
+and so on.
+9. Now to take this conception of sense datum 'sentences'
+seriously is, of course, to take seriously the idea that there
+are no independent logical relations between sense-datum
+'sentences.' It looks as though there were such independent
+logical relations, for these "sentences' look like sentenced, and
+they have as proper parts vocables or printables which function in ordinary usage as logical word. Certainly if sense-datum
+talk is a code, it is a code which is easily mistaken for a
+language proper. Let me illustrate. At first sight it certainly
+seems that
+A. The tomato presents S with a red sense datum
+entails both
+
+28
+B. There are red sense data
+and
+C. The tomato presents S with a sense datum which has
+some specific shade of red.
+This, however, on the kind of view I am considering, would
+be a mistake. (B) would follow -even in the inverted commas sense of 'follows' appropriate to code symbols-from
+(A) only because (B) is the flag for (B), "Something looks
+red to somebody," which does follow from (a), "The tomato
+looks red to Jones" which is represented in the code by (A).
+And (C) would 'follow' from (A), in spite of appearances,
+only if (C) were the flag for a sentence which followd from (a).
+I shall have more to say about this example in a moment.
+The point to be stressed now is that to carry out this view
+consistently one must deny to such vocables and printables
+as "quality," "is,
+" "red," "color," "crimson," "determinable,"
+"determinate," "all," "some," "exists," etc., etc., as they occur
+in sense-datum talk, the full-blooded status of their counterparts in ordinary usage. They are rather clues which serve to
+remind us which sense-datum 'flag' it would be proper to fly
+along with which other sense-datum 'flags' Thus, the vocables which make up the two 'flags'
+(D) All sense-data are red
+and
+(E) Some sense data are not red
+remind us of the genuine logical incompatibility between, for
+example,
+(F) All elephants are grey
+and
+(G) Some elephants are not grey,
+and serve, therefore, as a clue to the impropriety of flying
+
+29
+these two 'flags' together. For the sentences they symbolize
+are, presumably,
+(ô) Everything looks red to everybody
+and
+(e) There is a color other than red which something looks
+to somebody to have,
+and these are incompatible.
+But one would have to be cautious in using these clues.
+Thus, from the fact that it is proper to infer
+(H) Some elephants have a determinate shade of pink
+from
+(1) Some elephants are pink
+it would clearly be a mistake to infer that the right to fly
+(K) Some sense data are pink
+carries with it the right to fly
+(L) Some sense data have a determinate shade of pink.
+9. But if sense-datum sentences are really sense-datum
+'sentences'-i.e. code flags-it follows, of course, that sensedatum talk neither clarified nor explains facts of the form t
+looks & to Sor air $. That it would appear to do so would
+be because it would take an almost superhuman effort to
+keep from taking the vocables and printables which occur in
+the code (and let me now add to our earlier list the vocable
+"directly known") to be words which, if homonyms of words
+in ordinary usage, have their ordinary sense, and which, if
+invented, have a meaning specified by their relation to the
+others. One would be constantly tempted, that is, to treat
+sense-datum flags as though they were sentences in a theory,
+and sense-datum talk as a language which gets its use by
+coordinating sense-datum sentences with sentences in ordinary perception talk, de molecule talk gele its use by coordinating
+
+30
+sentences about populations of molecules with talk about the presure
+of gases on the walls of their containers. After all,
+x looks red to S •=• there is a class of red sense data
+which belong to x, and are sensed by S
+has at least a superficial resemblance to
+g exerts pressure on w •=. there is a class of molecules
+which make up g, and which are bouncing off w,
+a resemblance which becomes even more striking once it is
+granted that the former is not an analysis of it looke red to S
+in terms of sense data.
+There is, therefore, reason to believe that it is the fact that
+both codes and theories are contrived systems which are
+under the control of the language with which they are coordinated, which has given aid and comfort to the idea that
+sense-datum talk is "another language" for ordinary discourse about perception. Yet although the logical relations
+between sentences in a theoretical language are, in an important sense, under the control of logical relations between
+sentences in the observation language, nevertheless, within
+the framework of this control, the theoretical language has
+an autonomy which contradicts the very idea of a code. If
+this essential difference between theories and codes is overlooked, one may be tempted to try to eat his cake and have
+it. By thinking of sense-datum talk as merely another language,
+one draws on the fact that codes have no surplus value.
+By thinking of sense-datum talk as illuminating the "language
+of appearing,"
+one draws on the fact that theoretical languages, though contrived, and depending for their meaningfulness on a coordination with the language of observation, have
+an explanatory function. Unfortunately, these two charac-
+
+EMPIRICISM AND THE PHILOSOPIY OF MIND
+31
+teristics are incompatible; for it is just because theories have
+"surplus value" that they can provide explanations.
+No one, of course, who thinks-as, for example, does
+Ayer-of the existence of sense data as entailing the existence of "direct knowledge," would wish to say that sense data
+are theoretical entities. It could scarcely be a theoretical fact
+that I am directly knowing that a certain sense content is red.
+On the other hand, the idea that sense contents are theoretical
+entities is not abrinusly absurd-so absurd as to preclude
+the above interpretation of the plausibility of the "anotherlanguage" approach. For even those who introduce the expression "sense content" by means of the context "... is
+directly known to be..." may fail to keep this fact in mind
+when putting this expression to use — for example, by developing the idea that physical objects and persons alike are
+patterns of sense contents. In such a specific context, it is
+possible to forget that sense contents, thus introduced, are
+essentially sense data and not merely items which exemplify
+sense qualities. Indeed, one may even lapse into thinking of
+the densing of sense contents, the givenness of sense data, as
+non-epistemic facts.
+I think it fair to say that those who offer the "anotherlanguage" interpretation of sense data find the illumination
+it provides to consist primarily in the fact that in the language
+of sense data, physical objects are patterns of sense contents,
+so that, viewed in this framework, there is no "iron curtain"
+between the knowing mind and the physical world. It is to
+elaborating plausible (if schematic) translations of physicalobject statements into statements about sense contents,
+rather than to spelling out the force of such sentences as
+"Sense content ‹ is directly known to be red," that the greater
+part of their philosophical ingenuity has been directed.
+
+32
+However this may be, one thing can be said with confidence. If the language of sense data were merely a code, a
+notational device, then the cash value of any philosophical
+clarification it might provide must lie in its ability to illuminate logical relations within ordinary discourse about physical
+objects and our perception of them. Thus, the fact (if it were
+a fact) that a code can be constructed for ordinary perception
+talk which 'speaks' of a "relation of identity" between the
+components ("sense data") of "minds" and of "things," would
+presumably have as its cash value the insight that ordinary
+discourse about physical objects and perceivers could (in
+principle) be constructed from sentences of the form "There
+looks to be a physical object with a red and triangular facing
+surface over there" (the counterpart in ordinary language of
+the basic expressions of the code). In more traditional terms,
+the clarification would consist in making manifest the fact
+that persons and things are alike logical constructions out
+of lookings or appearings (not appearances!). But any claim
+to this effect soon runs into insuperable difficulties which
+become apparent once the role of "looks"
+or "appears" is
+understood. And it is to an examination of this role that I
+now turn.
+Ill. The Logic of 'looks'
+10. Before turning aside to examine the suggestion that the
+language of sense data is "another language" for the situations described by the so-called "language of appearing."
+I had concluded that classical sense-datum theories, when
+pressed, reveal themselves to be the result of a mismating of
+two ideas: (1) The idea that there are certain "inner episodes," e.g. the sensation of a red triangle or of a C# sound,
+
+33
+which occur to human beings and brutes without any prior
+process of learning or concept formation, and without which
+it would - in some sense -be impossible to dee, for example,
+that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular, or bear that a certain physical sound is C#; (2) The
+idea that there are certain "inner episodes" which are the
+noninferential knowings that, for example, a certain item is
+red and triangular, or, in the case of sounds, C#, which inner
+episodes are the necessary conditions of empirical knowledge
+as providing the evidence for all other empirical propositions.
+If this diagnosis is correct, a reasonable next step would be
+to examine these two ideas and determine how that which
+survives criticism in each is properly to be combined with
+the other. Clearly we would have to come to grips with the
+idea of inner episodes, for this is common to both.
+Many who attack the idea of the given seem to have
+thought that the central mistake embedded in this idea is
+exactly the idea that there are inner episodes, whether
+thoughts or so-called "immediate experiences," to which each
+of us has privileged access. I shall argue that this is just not
+so, and that the Myth of the Given can be dispelled without
+resorting to the crude verificationisms or operationalisms
+characteristic of the more dogmatic forms of recent empiricism. Then there are those who, while they do not reject the
+idea of inner episodes, find the Myth of the Given to consist
+in the idea that knowledge of these episodes furnishes premided on which empirical knowledge rests as on a foundation.
+But while this idea has, indeed, been the most widespread
+form of the Myth, it is far from constituting its essence.
+Everything hinges on why these philosophers reject it. If, for
+example, it is on the ground that the learning of a language
+is a public process which proceeds in a domain of public
+
+34
+EMPIRICISM AND THE PIILOSOPILY OF MIND
+objects and is governed by public sanctions, so that private
+episodes - with the exception of a mysterious nod in their
+direction —must needs escape the net of rational discourse,
+then, while these philosophers are immune to the form of the
+myth which has flowered in sense-datum theories, they have
+no defense against the myth in the form of the givenness of
+such facts as that physical object r looks red to person S at tune t,
+or that there looks to person S at time t to be a red physical object
+over there. It will be useful to pursue the Myth in this direction
+for a while before more general issues are raised
+11. Philosophers have found it easy to suppose that such
+a sentence as "The tomato looks red to Jones" says that a
+certain triadic relation, looking or appearing, obtains among a
+physical object, a person, and a quality.* "A looks $ to S"
+is assimilated to "x gives y to z"—or, better, since giving is,
+strictly speaking, an action rather than a relation-to "x
+is between y and z,"
+and taken to be a case of the general
+form "R(x,y,z)." Having supposed this, they turn without
+further ado to the question, "Is this relation analyzable?"
+Sense-datum theorists have, on the whole, answered "Yes,"
+and claimed that facts of the form. i looks red to X are to be
+analyzed in terms of sense data. Some of them, without
+necessarily rejecting this claim, have argued that facts of this
+kind are, at the very least, to be explained in terms of sense
+data. Thus, when Broad (4) writes "If, in fact, nothing elliptical is before my mind, it is very hard to understand why
+the penny should seem elliptical rather than of any other
+shape (p. 240)," he is appealing to sense-data as a means of
+explaining facts of this form. The difference, of course, is that
+• A useful discussion of views of this type is to be found in (9) and (13).
+
+35
+whereas if i looke $ to S is correctly analyzed in terms of sense
+data, then no one could believe that x looks $ to S without
+believing that S has sense data, the same need not be true if
+•i looke Ø to S is explained in terms of sense data, for, in the
+case of some types of explanation, at least, one can believe a
+fact without believing its explanation.
+On the other hand, those philosophers who reject sensedatum theories in favor of so-called theories of appearing
+have characteristically held that facts of the form i looks $ to
+Sare ultimate and irreducible, and that sense data are needed
+neither for their analysis nor for their explanation. If asked,
+"Doesn't the statement 'x looks red to S' have as part of its
+meaning the idea that s stands in some relation to something
+that is red?" their answer is in the negative, and, I believe,
+rightly so.
+12. I shall begin my examination of "X looks red to S at
+t" with the simple but fundamental point that the sense of
+"red" in which things look red is, on the face of it, the same
+as that in which things are red. When one glimpses an object
+and decides that it looks red (to me, now, from here) and
+wonders whether it really is red, one is surely wondering
+whether the color — red - which it looks to have is the one it
+really does have. This point can be obscured by such verbal
+manipulations as hyphenating the words "looks" and "red"
+and claiming that it is the insoluble unity "looks-red" and not
+just "looks"
+which is the relation. Insofar as this dodge is
+based on insight, it is insight into the fact that looks is not a
+relation between a person, a thing, and a quality. Unfortunately, as we shall see, the reason for this fact is one which
+gives no comfort at all to the idea that it is looks-red rather
+than looke which is the relation.
+
+36
+I have, in effect, been claiming that being red is logically
+prior, is a logically simpler notion, than looking red; the function "x is red" to "x looks red to y." In short, that it just won't
+do to say that. i is red is analyzable in terms of t looke red to
+y. But what, then, are we to make of the necessary truthand it is, of course, a necessary truth -that
+x is red •=. x would look red to standard observers
+in standard conditions?
+There is certainly some sense to the idea that this is at least
+the schema for a definition of physical rednesd in terms of
+looking red. One begins to see the plausibility of the gambit
+that looking-red is an insoluble unity, for the minute one gives
+"red" (on the right-hand side) an independent status, it becomes what it obviously is, namely "red" as a predicate of
+physical objects, and the supposed definition becomes an
+obvious circle.
+13. The way out of this troubling situation has two parts.
+The second is to show how "x it red" can be necessarily
+equivalent to "x would look red to standard observers in
+standard situations" without this being a definition of "x is
+red" in terms of "x looks red." But the first, and logically
+prior, step is to show that "x looks red to S" does not assert
+either an unanalyzable triadic relation to obtain between x,
+red, and S, or an unanalyzable dyadic relation to obtain
+between x and S. Not, however, because it asserts an analyzable relation to obtain, but because looke is not a relation at
+all. Or, to put the matter in a familiar way, one can say that
+looke is a relation if he likes, for the sentences in which this
+word appears show some grammatical analogies to sentences
+built around words which we should not hesitate to classify
+as relation words; but once one has become aware of certain
+
+37
+other features which make them very unlike ordinary relation sentences, he will be less inclined to view his task as that
+of finding the ander to the question "Is looks a relation?"
+14. To bring out the essential features of the use of "looks,"
+I shall engage in a little historical fiction. A young man,
+whom I shall call John, works in a necktie shop. He has
+learned the use of color words in the usual way, with this
+exception. I shall suppose that he has never looked at an
+object in other than standard conditions. As he examines his
+stock every evening before closing up shop, he says, "This is
+red," "That is green," "This is purple," etc., and such of his
+linguistic peers as happen to be present nod their heads
+approvingly.
+Let us suppose, now, that at this point in the story, electric
+lighting is invented. His friends and neighbors rapidly adopt
+this new means of illumination, and wrestle with the problems it presents. John, however, is the last to succumb. Just
+after it has been installed in his shop, one of his neighbors,
+Jim, comes in to buy a necktie.
+"Here is a handsome green one," says John.
+"But it in't green," says Jim, and takes John outside.
+"Well," says John, 'it was green in there, but now it is
+blue."
+"No," says Jim, "you know that neckties don't change
+their color merely as a result of being taken from place to
+place."
+"But perhaps electricity changes their color and they
+change back again in daylight?"
+"That would be a queer kind of change, wouldn't it?" says
+Jim.
+"I suppose so," says bewildered John. "But we saw that it
+was green in there."
+
+38
+"No, we didn't see that it was green in there, because it
+wasn't green, and you can't see what isn't so!"
+"Well, this is a pretty pickle," says John. "I just don't know
+wbat to say."
+The next time John picks up this tie in his shop and
+someone asks what color it is, his first impulse is to say "It
+is green." He suppresses this impulse, and, remembering
+what happened before, comes out with "It is blue." He
+doesn't dee that it is blue, nor would he say that he sees it to
+be blue. What does he see? Let us ask him.
+"I don't know what to say. If I didn't know that the tie is
+blue -and the alternative to granting this is odd indeed -1
+would swear that I was seeing a green tie and seeing that it
+is green. It is de though I were seeing the necktie to be green."
+If we bear in mind that such sentences as "This is green"
+have both a fact-stating and a reporting use, we can put the
+point I have just been making by saying that once John
+learns to stifle the report "This necktie is green" when looking
+at it in the shop, there is no other report about color and the
+necktie which he knows how to make. To be sure, he now
+says, "This necktie is blue." But he is not making a reporting
+use of this sentence. He uses it as the conclusion of an
+inference.
+15. We return to the shop after an interval, and we find
+that when John is asked "What is the color of this necktie?"
+he makes such statements as "It looks green, but take it
+outside and see." It occurs to us that perhaps in learning to
+say "This tie looks green" when in the shop, he has learned
+to make a new kind of report. Thus, it might seem as though
+his linguistic peers have helped him to notice a new kind of
+objective fact, one which, though a relational fact involving a
+perceiver, is as logically independent of the beliefs, the con-
+
+39
+ceptual framework of the perceiver, as the fact that the
+necktie is blue; but a minimal fact, one which it is safer to
+report because one is less likely to be mistaken. Such a
+minimal fact would be the fact that the necktie looks green
+to John on a certain occasion, and it would be properly
+reported by using the sentence "This necktie looks green." It
+is this type of account, of course, which I have already
+rejected.
+But what is the alternative? If, that is, we are not going
+to adopt the sense-datum analysis. Let me begin by noting
+that there certainly seems to be something to the idea that
+the sentence "This looks green to me now" has a reporting
+role. Indeed, it would seem to be essentially a report. But if
+so, what does it report, if not a minimal objective fact, and if
+what it reports is not to be analyzed in terms of sense data?
+16. Let me next call attention to the fact that the experience of having something look green to one at a certain time
+is, insofar as it is an experience, obviously very much like
+that of seeing something to be green, insofar as the latter is
+an experience. But the latter, of course, is not jut an experience. And this is the heart of the matter. For to say that a
+certain experience is a seeing that something is the case, is to
+do more than describe the experience. It is to characterize it
+as, so to speak, making an assertion or claim, and -which is
+the point I wish to stress —to endorse that claim. As a matter
+of fact, as we shall see, it is much more easy to see that the
+statement "Jones sees that the tree is green" ascribes a
+propositional claim to Jones'
+experience and endorses it,
+than to specify how the statement describes Jones' experience.
+I realize that by speaking of experiences as containing
+propositional claims, I may seem to be knocking at closed
+doors. I ask the reader to bear with me, however, as the
+
+40
+justification of this way of talking is one of my major aims.
+If I am permitted to issue this verbal currency now, I hope
+to put it on the gold standard before concluding the argument.
+16. It is clear that the experience of seeing that something
+is green is not merely the occurrence of the propositional
+claim 'this is green' — not even if we add, as we must, that
+this claim is, so to speak, evoked or wrung from the perceiver
+by the object perceived. Here Nature-to turn Kant's simile
+(which he uses in another context) on its head -puts us to
+the question. The something more is clearly what philosophers have in mind when they speak of "visual impressions"
+or "immediate visual experiences." What exactly is the logical
+status of these "impressions" or "immediate experiences" is a
+problem which will be with us for the remainder of this
+argument. For the moment it is the propositional claim which
+concerns us.
+I pointed out above that when we use the word "see" as
+in "S sees that the tree is green" we are not only ascribing a
+claim to the experience, but endorsing it. It is this endorsement which Ryle has in mind when he refers to seeing that
+something is thus and so as an achievement, and to "sees" as an
+achievement word. I prefer to call it a "so it is" or "just so" word,
+for the root idea is that of truth. To characterize S's experience as a seeing is, in a suitably broad sense - which I shall
+be concerned to explicate-to apply the semantical concept
+of truth to that experience.
+Now the suggestion I wish to make is, in its simplest terms,
+that the statement "X looks green to Jones" differs from
+"Jones sees that x is green" in that whereas the latter both
+ascribes a propositional claim to Jones experience and endorses it, the former ascribes the claim but does not endorse
+
+41
+it. This is the essential difference between the two, for it is
+clear that two experiences may be identical ‹ experienced, and
+yet one be properly referred to as a seeing that something is
+green, and the other merely as a case of something's looking
+green. Of course, if I say "X merely looks green to S" I am
+not only failing to endorse the claim, I am rejecting it.
+Thus, when I say "X looks green to me now" I am reporting
+the fact that my experience is, so to speak, intrinsically, de
+an experience, indistinguishable from a veridical one of seeing
+that x is green. Involved in the report is the ascription to my
+experience of the claim 'x is green'; and the fact that I make
+this report rather than the simple report "X is green" indicates that certain considerations have operated to raise, so to
+speak in a higher court, the question 'to endorse or not to
+endorse.' I may have reason to think that x may not after all
+be green.
+If I make at one time the report "X looks to be green" -
+which is not only a report, but the withholding of an endorsement- 1 may later, when the original reasons for withholding
+endorsement have been rebutted, endorse the original claim
+by saying "I saw that it was green, though at the time I was
+only sure that it looked green." Notice that I will only say "I
+see that x is green" (as opposed to "X is green") when the
+question "to endorse or not to endorse" has come up. "I see
+that x is green" belongs, so to speak, on the same level as "X
+looks green" and "X merely looks green."
+17. There are many interesting and subtle questions about
+the dialectics of "looks talk," into which I do not have the
+space to enter. Fortunately, the above distinctions suffice for
+our present purposes. Let us suppose, then, that to say that
+"X looks green to S at t" is, in effect, to say that S has that
+kind of experience which, if one were prepared to endorse
+
+42
+the propositional claim it involves, one would characterize as
+seeing i to be green at t. Thus, when our friend John learns to
+use the sentence "This necktie looks green to me" he learns
+a way of reporting an experience of the kind which, as far
+as any categories I have yet permitted him to have are
+concerned, he can only characterize by saying that as an
+experience it does not differ from seeing something to be
+green, and that evidence for the proposition "This necktie is
+green' is ipso facto evidence for the proposition that the experience in question is seeing that the necktie is green.
+Now one of the chief merits of this account is that it
+permits a parallel treatment of 'qualitative' and '
+'existential'
+seeming or looking. Thus, when I say "The tree looks bent"
+I am endorsing that part of the claim involved in my experience which concerns the existence of the tree, but withholding endorsement from the rest. On the other hand, when
+I say "There looks to be a bent tree over there" I am refusing
+to endorse any but the most general aspect of the claim,
+namely, that there is an 'over there' as opposed to a 'here.'
+Another merit of the account is that it explains how a necktie,
+for example, can look red to S at t, without looking scarlet
+or crimson or any other determinate shade of red. In short
+it explains how things can have a merely generic look, a fact
+which would be puzzling indeed if looking red were a natural
+as opposed to epistemic fact about objects. The core of the
+explanation, of course, is that the propositional claim involved in such an experience may be, for example, either the
+more determinable claim 'This is red' or the more determinate claim 'This is crimson.' The complete story is more
+complicated, and requires some account of the role in these
+experiences of the "impressions' or "immediate experiences'
+the logical status of which remains to be determined. But
+
+43
+even in the absence of these additional details, we can note
+the resemblance between the fact that x can look red to S,
+without it being true of some specific shade of red that x
+looks to S to be of that shade, and the fact that S can believe
+that Cleopatra's Needle is tall, without its being true of some
+determinate number of feet that S believes it to be that
+number of feet tall.
+18. The point I wish to stress at this time, however, is that
+the concept of looking green, the ability to recognize that
+something looks green, presupposes the concept of being green,
+and that the latter concept involves the ability to tell what
+colors objects have by looking at them-which, in turn,
+involves knowing in what circumstances to place an object
+if one wishes to ascertain its color by looking at it. Let me
+develop this latter point. As our friend John becomes more
+and more sophisticated about his own and other people's
+visual experiences, he learns under what conditions it is as
+though one were seeing a necktie to be of one color when in
+fact it is of another. Suppose someone asks him "Why does
+this tie look green to me?" John may very well reply "Be-
+cause it is blue, and blue objects look green in this kind of
+light." And if someone asks this question when looking at the
+necktie in plain daylight, John may very well reply "Because
+the tie i green" -to which he may add "We are in plain
+daylight, and in daylight things look what they are." We thus
+see that
+x is red •=. x looks red to standard observers in
+standard conditions
+is a necessary truth not because the right-hand side is the
+definition of "x is red," but because "standard conditions"
+means conditions in which things look what they are. And,
+
+of course, which conditions are standard for a given mode of
+perception is, at the common-sense level, specified by a list
+of conditions which exhibit the vagueness and open texture
+characteristic of ordinary discourse.
+19. I have arrived at a stage in my argument which is, at
+least prima facie, out of step with the basic presuppositions
+of logical atomism. Thus, as long as looking green is taken to
+be the notion to which being green is reducible, it could be
+claimed with considerable plausibility that fundamental concepts pertaining to observable fact have that logical independence of one another which is characteristic of the empiricist tradition. Indeed, at first sight the situation is quite
+disquieting, for if the ability to recognize that x looks green
+presupposes the concept of heing green, and if this in turn
+involves knowing in what circumstances to view an object to
+ascertain its color, then, since one can scarcely determine
+what the circumstances are without noticing that certain
+objects have certain perceptible characteristics-including
+colors - it would seem that one couldn't form the concept of
+being green, and, by parity of reasoning, of the other colors,
+unless he already had them.
+Now, it just won't do to reply that to have the concept of
+green, to know what it is for something to be green, it is
+sufficient to respond, when one is in point of fact in standard
+conditions, to green objects with the vocable "This is green."
+Not only must the conditions be of a sort that is appropriate
+for determining the color of an object by looking, the subject
+must know that conditions of this sort are appropriate. And
+while this does not imply that one must have concepts before
+one has them, it does imply that one can have the concept
+of green only by having a whole battery of concepts of which
+it is one element. It implies that while the process of acquiring the concept green may -indeed does-involve a long
+
+45
+history of acquiring piecemeal habits of response to various
+objects in various circumstances, there is an important sense
+in which one has no concept pertaining to the observable
+properties of physical objects in Space and Time unless one
+has them all —and, indeed, as we shall see, a great deal more
+besides.
+20. Now, I think it is clear what a logical atomist, supposing that he found any merit at all in the above argument,
+would say. He would say that I am overlooking the fact that
+the logical space of physical objects in Space and Time rests
+on the logical space of sense contents, and he would argue
+that it is concepts pertaining to sense contents which have
+the logical independence of one another which is characteristic of traditional empiricism. "After all," he would point
+out, "concepts pertaining to theoretical entities— molecules,
+for example-have the mutual dependence you have, perhaps rightly, ascribed to concepts pertaining to physical fact.
+But," he would continue, "theoretical concepts have empirical content because they rest on —are coordinated with -a
+more fundamental logical space. Until you have disposed,
+therefore, of the idea that there is a more fundamental logical
+space than that of physical objects in Space and Time, or
+shown that it too is fraught with coherence, your incipient
+Meditations Hegeliènned are premature."
+And we can imagine a sense-datum theorist to interject the
+following complaint: "You have begun to write as though you
+had shown not only that physical redned is not to be analyzed
+in terms of looking red-which I will grant-but also that
+physical redness is not to be analyzed at all, and, in particular, not to be analyzed in terms of the redness of red sense
+contents. Again, you have begun to write as though you had
+shown not only that observing that x looks red is not more
+basic than observing that x it red, but also that there is no
+
+46
+form of visual noticing more basic than seeing that x is red,
+such as the sensing of a red sense content. I grant," he
+continues, "that the tendency of sense-datum theorists has
+been to claim that the redned of physical objects is to be
+analyzed in terms of looking red, and then to claim that looking
+red is itself to be analyzed in terms of red sense contenta, and
+that you may have undercut this line of analysis. But what
+is to prevent the sense-datum theorist from taking the line
+that the properties of physical objects are directly analyzable
+into the qualities and phenomenal relations of sense contents?"
+Very well. But once again we must ask, How does the
+sense-datum theorist come by the framework of sense contents? and How is he going to convince us that there are
+such things? For even if looking red doesn't enter into the
+analysis of physical redness, it is by asking us to reflect on
+the experience of having something look red to us that he
+hopes to make this framework convincing. And it therefore
+becomes relevant to note that my analysis of a looks red to S
+at t has not, at least as far as I have pushed it to date, revealed
+any such items as sense-contents. And it may be relevant to
+suggest that once we see clearly that physical redness is not
+to be given a dispositional analysis in terms of looking red, the
+idea that it is to be given any kind of dispositional analysis
+loses a large measure of its plausibility. In any event, the next
+move must be to press further the above account of qualitative and existential looking.
+I. Explaining Looks
+21. I have already noted that sense-datum theorists are impressed by the question "How can a physical object look red
+
+47
+to S, unless something in that situation is red and S is taking
+account of it? If S isn't experiencing something red, how does
+it happen that the physical object looks red, rather than green
+or streaky?" There is, I propose to show, something to this
+line of thought, though the story turns out to be a complicated one. And if, in the course of telling the story, I shall
+be led to make statements which resemble some of the things
+sense-datum theorists have said, this story will amount to a
+sense-datum theory only in a sense which robs this phrase
+of an entire dimension of its traditional epistemological force,
+a dimension which is characteristic of even such heterodox
+forms of sense-datum theory as the "another language" approach.
+Let me begin by formulating the question: "Is the fact that
+an object looks to S to be red and triangular, or that there
+looks to S to be a red and triangular object over there, to be
+explained in terms of the idea that Jones has a sensation —or
+impression, or immediate experience —of a red triangle? One
+point can be made right away, namely that if these expressions are so understood that, say, the immediate experience
+of a red triangle implies the existence of something-not a
+physical object-which i red and triangular, and if the redness which this item has is the same as the redness which
+the physical object looke to have, then the suggestion runs up
+against the objection that the redness physical objects look to
+have is the same as the redness physical objects actually do
+have, so that items which ex hypotheri are not physical objects,
+and which radically, even categorically, differ from physical
+objects, would have the same redness as physical objects.
+And while this is, perhaps, not entirely out of the question,
+it certainly provides food for thought. Yet when it is claimed
+that "obviously" physical objects can't look red to one unless
+
+48
+one is experiencing something that i red, is it not presumed
+that the redness which the dometbing has is the redness which
+the physical object looks to have?
+Now there are those who would say that the question
+"Is the fact that an object looks red and triangular to S to
+be explained —as opposed to notationally reformulated -in
+terms of the idea that S has an impression of a red triangle?"
+simply doesn't arise, on the ground that there are perfectly
+sound explanations of qualitative and existential lookings
+which make no reference to 'immediate experiences' or other
+dubious entities. Thus, it is pointed out, it is perfectly proper
+to answer the question "Why does this object look red?" by
+saying "Because it is an orange object looked at in such and
+such circumstances." The explanation is, in principle, a good
+one, and is typical of the answers we make to such questions
+in everyday life. But because these explanations are good, it
+by no means follows that explanations of other kinds might
+not be equally good, and, perhaps, more searching.
+22. On the face of it there are at least two ways in which
+additional, but equally legitimate explanations might be forthcoming for such a fact as that t looks red. The first of these
+is suggested by a simple analogy. Might it not be the case
+that just as there are two kinds of good explanation of the
+fact that this balloon has expanded, (a) in terms of the
+Boyle-Charles laws which relate the empirical concepts of
+volume, pressure, and temperature pertaining to gases, and
+(b) in terms of the kinetic theory of gases; so there are two
+ways of explaining the fact that this object looks red to S:
+(a) in terms of empirical generalizations relating the colors
+of objects, the circumstances in which they are seen, and
+the colors they look to have, and (b) in terms of a theory
+of perception in which 'immediate experiences' play a role
+analogous to that of the molecules of the kinetic theory.
+
+49
+Now there is such an air of paradox to the idea that
+'immediate experiences' are mere theoretical entities -entities, that is, which are postulated, along with certain fundamental principles concerning them, to explain uniformities
+pertaining to sense perception, as molecules, along with the
+principles of molecular motion, are postulated to explain the
+experimentally determined regularities pertaining to gases —
+that I am going to lay it aside until a more propitious context
+of thought may make it seem relevant. Certainly, those who
+have thought that qualitative and existential lookings are to
+be explained in terms of 'immediate experiences' thought of
+the latter as the most untheoretical of entities, indeed, as the
+observables par excellence.
+Let us therefore turn to a second way in which, at least
+prima facie, there might be an additional, but equally legitimate explanation of existential and qualitative lookings. Ac-
+cording to this second account, when we consider items of
+this kind, we find that they contain as components items
+which are properly referred to as, for example, 'the immediate experience of a red triangle.' Let us begin our exploration
+of this suggestion by taking another look at our account of
+existential and qualitative lookings. It will be remembered
+that our account of qualitative looking ran, in rough and
+ready terms, as follows:
+'× looks red to S' has the sense of 'S has an experience which
+involves in a unique way the idea that i is red and involves it
+in such a way that if this idea were true, the experience would
+correctly be characterized as a seeing that x is red.'
+Thus, our account implies that the three situations
+(a) Seeing that x, over there, is red
+(b) Its looking to one that x, over there, is red
+
+50
+(c) Its looking to one as though there were a red object
+over there
+differ primarily in that (a) is so formulated as to involve an
+endorsement of the idea that x, over there, is red, whereas
+in (b) this idea is only partially endorsed, and in (c) not at
+all. Let us refer to the idea that.i, over there, in red as the
+common propositional content of these three situations. (This is,
+of course, not strictly correct, since the propositional content
+of (c) is existential, rather than about a presupposedly designated object x, but it will serve my purpose. Furthermore,
+the common propositional content of these three experiences
+is much more complex and determinate than is indicated by
+the sentence we use to describe our experience to others, and
+which I am using to represent it. Nevertheless it is clear that,
+subject to the first of these qualifications, the propositional
+content of these three experiences could be identical.)
+The propositional content of these three experiences is, of
+course, but a part of that to which we are logically committed
+by characterizing them as situations of these three kinds. Of
+the remainder, as we have seen, part is a matter of the extent
+to which this propositional content is endorsed. It is the
+residue with which we are now concerned. Let us call this
+residue the descriptive content. I can then point out that it is
+implied by my account that not only the propositional content,
+but also the descriptive content of these three experiences may
+be identical. I shall suppose this to be the case, though that
+there must be some factual difference in the total situations
+is obvious.
+Now, and this is the decisive point, in characterizing these
+three experiences as, respectively, a seeing that i, over there, is
+red, its looking to one ad though it, over there, were red, and its looking
+
+51
+to one as though there were a red object over there, we do not specify
+this common descriptive content save indirectly, by implying
+that if the common propositional content were true, then all these
+three situations would be cases of seeing that x, over there, is
+red. Both existential and qualitative lookings are experiences
+that would be seeings if their propositional contents were true.
+Thus, the very nature of "looks talk" is such as to raise
+questions to which it gives no answer: What is the intrindic
+character of the common descriptive content of these three
+experiences? and How are they able to have it in spite of the
+fact that whereas in the case of (a) the perceiver must be in
+the presence of a red object over there, in (b) the object over
+there need not be red, while in (c) there need be no object
+over there at all?
+23. Now it is clear that if we were required to give a more
+direct characterization of the common descriptive content of
+these experiences, we would begin by trying to do so in terms
+of the quality red. Yet, as I have already pointed out, we can
+scarcely say that this descriptive content is itself something
+red unless we can pry the term "red" loose from its primafacie tie with the category of physical objects. And there is
+a line of thought which has been one of the standard gambits
+of perceptual epistemology and which seems to promise exactly this. If successful, it would convince us that redned! - in
+the most basic sense of this term - is a characteristic of items
+of the sort we have been calling sense contents. It runs as
+follows:
+While it would, indeed, be a howler to say that we don't see
+chairs, tables, etc., but only their facing surfaces, nevertheless,
+although we see a table, say, and although the table has a
+back as well as a front, we do not see the back of the table
+
+52
+as we see its front. Again, although we see the table, and
+although the table has an 'inside,' we do not see the inside of
+the table as we see its facing outside. Seeing an object entails
+seeing its facing surface. If we are seeing that an object is red,
+this entails seeing that its facing surface is red. A red surface
+is a two-dimensional red expanse-two-dimensional in that
+though it may be bulgy, and in this sense three-dimensional, it
+has no thickned. As far as the analysis of perceptual consciousness is concerned, a red physical object is one that has a red
+expanse as its surface.
+Now a red expanse is not a physical object, nor does the
+existence of a red expanse entail the existence of a physical
+object to which it belongs. (Indeed, there are "wild" expanses
+which do not belong to any physical object.) The "descriptive
+content" — as you put it-which is common to the three experiences (a), (b) and (c) above, is exactly this sort of thing,
+a bulgy red expanse.
+Spelled out thus baldly, the fallacy is, or should be, obvious; it is a simple equivocation on the phrase "having a red
+surface." We start out by thinking of the familiar fact that a
+physical object may be of one color "on the surface" and of
+another color "inside." We may express this by saying that,
+for example, the 'surface' of the object is red, but its 'inside'
+green. But in saying this we are not saying that there is a
+'surface' in the sense of a bulgy two-dimensional particular,
+a red 'expanse' which is a component particular in a complex
+particular which also includes green particulars. The notion
+of two-dimensional bulgy (or flat) particulars is a product of
+philosophical (and mathematical) sophistication which can
+be related to our ordinary conceptual framework, but does not
+belong in an analysis of it. I think that in its place it has an
+important contribution to make. (See below, Section 61, (5),
+
+53
+pp. 113-115.) But this place is in the logical space of an ideal
+scientific picture of the world and not in the logical space of
+ordinary discourse. It has nothing to do with the logical
+grammar of our ordinary color words. It is just a mistake to
+suppose that as the word "red" is actually used, it is ever
+surfaces in the sense of two-dimensional particulars which
+are red. The only particular involved when a physical object
+is "red on the outside, but green inside" is the physical object
+itself, located in a certain region of Space and enduring
+over a stretch of Time. The fundamental grammar of the
+attribute red is physical object or is red at place pand at time t.
+Certainly, when we say of an object that it is red, we commit ourselves to no more than that it is red "at the surface."
+And sometimes it is red at the surface by having what we
+would not hesitate to call a "part" which is red through and
+through -thus, a red table which is red by virtue of a layer
+of red paint. But the red paint is not itself red by virtue of
+a component —a 'surface' or 'expanse'; a particular with no
+thickness — which is red. There may, let me repeat, turn out
+to be some place in the total philosophical picture for the
+statement that there "really are" such particulars, and that
+they are elements in perceptual experience. But this place is
+not to be found by an analysis of ordinary perceptual discourse, any more than Minkowski four-dimensional Space-
+Time worms are an analysis of what we mean when we speak
+of physical objects in Space and Time.
+V. Impressions and Ideas: A Logical Point
+24. Let me return to beating the neighboring bushes. Notice
+that the common descriptive component of the three experiences 1 am considering is itself often referred to (by philoso-
+
+54
+phers, at least) as an experience —as, for example, an immediate
+experience. Here caution is necessary. The notorious "ing-ed"
+ambiguity of "experience" must be kept in mind. For although seeing that x, over there, it red is an experiencing - indeed,
+a paradigm case of experiencing - it does not follow that the
+descriptive content of this experiencing is itself an experiencing. Furthermore, because the fact that ox, over there, looks to
+Jones to be red would be a seeing, on Jones' part, that is, over
+there, is red, if its propositional content were true, and because
+if it were a seeing, it would be an experiencing, we must beware
+of concluding that the fact that ix, over there, looks red to Jones
+is itself an experiencing. Certainly, the fact that something
+looks red to me can itself be experienced. But it is not itself an
+experiencing.
+All this is not to say that the common descriptive core may
+not turn out to be an experiencing, though the chances that
+this is so appear less with each step in my argument. On the
+other hand, I can say that it is a component in states of affairs
+which are experienced, and it does not seem unreasonable to
+say that it is itself experienced. But what kind of experience
+(in the sense of experienced) is it? If my argument to date is
+sound, I cannot say that it is a red experience, that is, a red
+experienced item. I could, of course, introduce a new use of
+"red" according to which to say of an "immediate experience'
+that it was red, would be the stipulated equivalent of characterizing it as that which could be the common descriptive
+component of a seeing that something is red, and the corresponding qualitative and existential lookings. This would give
+us a predicate by which to describe and report the experience,
+but we should, of course, be only verbally better off than if
+we could only refer to this kind of experience as the kind which
+could be the common descriptive component of a seeing and
+a qualitative or existential looking. And this makes it clear
+
+55
+that one way of putting what we are after is by saying that
+we want to have a name for this kind of experience which is
+truly a name, and not just shorthand for a definite description.
+Does ordinary usage have a name for this kind of experience?
+I shall return to this quest in a moment. In the meantime
+it is important to clear the way of a traditional obstacle to
+understanding the status of such things as sensations of red
+triangles. Thus, suppose I were to say that while the experience I am examining is not a red experience, it is an experience of red. I could expect the immediate challenge: "Is 'sensation of a red triangle' any better off than 'red and triangular
+experience"? Does not the existence of a sensation of a red
+triangle entail the existence of a red and triangular item, and
+hence, always on the assumption that red is a property of physical
+objecto, of a red and triangular physical object? Must you not,
+therefore abandon this assumption, and return to the framework of sense contents which you have so far refused to do?"
+One way out of dilemma would be to assimilate "Jones
+has a sensation of a red triangle" to "Jones believes in a
+divine Huntress." For the truth of the latter does not, of
+course, entail the existence of a divine Huntress. Now, I
+think that most contemporary philosophers are clear that it
+is possible to attribute to the context
+.. sensation of ...
+the logical property of being such that "There is a sensation
+of a red triangle" does not entail "There is a red triangle"
+without assimilating the context "
+... sensation of..." to the
+context "... believes in ..." in any closer way. For while
+mentalistic verbs characteristically provide nonextensional
+contexts (when they are not "achievement" or "endorsing"
+words), not all nonextensional contexts are mentalistic. Thus,
+as far as the purely logical point is concerned, there is no
+
+56
+reason why "Jones has a sensation of a red triangle" should
+be assimilated to "Jones believes in a divine Huntress"
+rather
+than to "It is possible that the moon is made of green cheese"
+or to any of the other nonextensional contexts familiar to
+logicians. Indeed there is no reason why it should be assimilated to any of these. "
+... sensation of ..." or "... impression of...
+" could be a context which, though sharing with
+these others the logical property of nonextensionality, was
+otherwise in a class by itself.
+25. Yet there is no doubt but that bistorically the contexts
+"... sensation of ..." and "... impression of ..." were
+assimilated to such mentalistic contexts as "... believes ...,"
+"... desires...,""... chooses ...,"
+in short to contexts
+which are either themselves 'propositional attitudes' or involve propositional attitudes in their analysis. This assimilation took the form of classifying sensations with ideas or
+thoughts. Thus Descartes uses the word "thought" to cover
+not only judgments, inferences, desires, volitions, and (occurrent)
+ideas of abstract qualities, but also sensationa, feelings, and imaged.
+Locke, in the same spirit, uses the term "idea" with similar
+scope. The apparatus of Conceptualism, which had its genesis in the controversy over universals, was given a correspondingly wide application. Just as objects and situations
+were said to have 'objective being' in our thoughts, when we
+think of them, or judge them to obtain —as contrasted with
+the "subjective' or 'formal being' which they have in the
+world-so, when we have a sensation of a red triangle, the
+red triangle was supposed to have 'objective being' in our
+sensation.
+In elaborating, for a moment, this conceptualistic interpretation of sensation, let me refer to that which has 'objective
+being' in a thought or idea as its content or inmanent object. Then
+I can say that the fundamental difference between occurrent
+
+57
+abstract ideas and sensations, for both Locke and Descartes,
+lay in the specificity and, above all, the complevity of the
+content of the latter. (Indeed, both Descartes and Locke
+assimilated the contrast between the simple and the complex
+in ideas to that between the generic and the specific.) Descartes thinks of sensations as confused thoughts of their
+external cause; Spinoza of sensations and images as confused
+thoughts of bodily states, and still more confused thoughts
+of the external causes of these bodily states. And it is interesting to note that the conceptualistic thesis that abstract
+entities have only eude intentionale (their ede is concipi) is
+extended by Descartes and, with less awareness of what he
+is doing, Locke, to include the thesis that colors, sounds, etc.,
+exist "only in the mind" (their ease is percipi) and by Berkeley
+to cover all perceptible qualities.
+Now, I think we would all agree, today, that this assimilation of sensations to thoughts is a mistake. It is sufficient
+to note that if "sensation of a red triangle" had the sense of
+"episode of the kind which is the common descriptive component of those experiences which would be cases of seeing
+that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular if an object were presenting a red and triangular facing
+surface" then it would have the nonextensionality the noticing of which led to this mistaken assimilation. But while we
+have indeed escaped from this blind alley, it is small consolation. For we are no further along in the search for a 'direct'
+or 'intrinsic' characterization of 'immediate experience.'
+VI. Impressions and Ideas: A Historical Point
+26. There are those who will say that although I have spoken
+of exploring blind alleys, it is really I who am blind. For, they
+will say, if that which we wish to characterize intrinsically is
+
+58
+an experience, then there can be no puzzle about knowing what
+kind of experience it is, though there may be a problem about
+how this knowledge is to be communicated to others. And,
+indeed, it is tempting to suppose that if we should happen, at
+a certain stage of our intellectual development, to be able to
+classify an experience only as of the kind which could be common to a seeing and corresponding qualitative and existential
+lookings, all we would have to do to acquire a 'direct designation' for this kind of experience would be to pitch in,
+'examine' it, locate the kind which it exemplifies and which
+satisfies the above description, name it — say "$" —and, in full
+possession of the concept of $, classify such experiences,
+from now on, as $ experiences.
+At this point, it is clear, the concept—or, as I have put it,
+the myth—of the given is being invoked to explain the possibility of a direct account of immediate experience. The
+myth insists that what I have been treating as one problem
+really subdivides into two, one of which is really no problem
+at all, while the other may have no solution. These problems
+are, respectively
+(1) How do we become aware of an immediate experience as of one sort, and of a simultaneous immediate experience as of another sort?
+(2) How can I know that the labels I attach to the sorts
+to which my immediate experiences belong, are attached by you to the same sorts? May not the sort I
+call "red" be the sort you call "green" - and so on
+systematically throughout the spectrum?
+We shall find that the second question, to be a philosophical perplexity, presupposes a certain answer to the first question - indeed the answer given by the myth. And it is to this
+
+EMPIRICISM AND THE PIILOSOPIIY OF MIND
+59
+first question that I now turn. Actually there are various
+forms taken by the myth of the given in this connection,
+depending on other philosophical commitments. but they
+all have in common the idea that the awareness of certain sorts-and by "sorts" I have in mind, in the first instance, determinate sense repeatables — is a primordial, nonproblematic feature of 'immediate experience.' In the context
+of conceptualism, as we have seen, this idea took the form
+of treating sensations as though they were absolutely specific,
+and infinitely complicated, thougbt. And it is essential to
+an understanding of the empiricist tradition to realize that
+whereas the contemporary problem of universals primarily
+concerns the status of repeatable determinate features of particular situations, and the contemporary problem of abstract
+ideas is at least as much the problem of what it is to be aware
+of determinate repeatables as of what it is to be aware of
+determinable repeatables, Locke, Berkeley and, for that matter, Hume saw the problem of abstract ideas as the problem
+of what it is to be aware of determinable repeatables. * Thus,
+an examination of Locke's Esday makes it clear that he is
+thinking of a sensation of white as the sort of thing that can
+become an abstract idea (occurrent) of White-a thought
+of White "in the Understanding" - merely by virtue of being
+separated from the context of other sensations (and images)
+which accompany it on a particular occasion. In other words,
+for Locke an abstract (occurrent) idea of the determinate
+repeatable Whiteness is nothing more than an isolated image
+of white, which, in turn, differs from a sensation of white only
+(to use a modern turn of phrase) by being
+"centrally
+aroused."
+›ocke, Berkeley, and Hume, '
+• For a systematic laboratoreader should contut lollowing interpretation of
+
+60
+In short, for Locke, the problem of how we come to be
+aware of determinate sense repeatables is no problem at all.
+Merely by virtue of having sensations and images we have
+this awareness. His problem of abstract ideas is the problem
+of how we come to be able to think of generic properties.
+And, as is clear from the Essay, he approaches the problem
+in terms of what might be called an "adjunctive theory of
+specification," that is, the view that (if we represent the idea
+of a determinable as the idea of being A) the idea of a determinate form of A can be represented as the idea of being A and B.
+It is, of course, notorious that this won't account for the
+relation of the idea of being red to the idea of being crimson. By
+thinking of conjunction as the fundamental logical relation
+involved in building up complex ideas from simple ones, and
+as the principle of the difference between determinable and
+determinate ideas, Locke precluded himself from giving even
+a plausible account of the relation between ideas of determinables and ideas of determinates. It is interesting to speculate what turn his thought might have taken had he admitted
+disjunctive as well as conjunctive complex ideas, the idea of being
+A or B alongside the idea of being A and B.
+27. But my purpose here is not to develop a commentary
+on the shortcomings of Locke's treatment of abstract ideas,
+but to emphasize that something which is a problem for us
+was not a problem for him. And it is therefore important to
+note that the same is true of Berkeley. His problem was not,
+as it is often construed, "How do we go from the awareness
+of particulars to ideas of repeatables?" but rather "Granted that
+in immediate experience we are aware of absolutely specifi
+sense qualities, how do we come to be conscious of genera
+pertaining to them, and in what does this consciousness
+consist?" (This is not the only dimension of "abstraction" that
+
+61
+concerned him, but it is the one that is central to our purpose.) And, contrary to the usual interpretation, the essential
+difference between his account and Locke's consists in the
+fact that whereas Locke was on the whole* committed to the
+view that there can be an idea which is of the genus without
+being of any of its species, Berkeley insists that we can have
+an idea of a genus only by having an idea of the genus ar, to
+borrow a useful Scotist term, 'contracted' into one of its species.
+Roughly, Berkeley's contention is that if being A entails
+being B, then there can be no such thing as an idea which is
+of A without being of B. He infers that since being triangular
+entails baving some determinately triangular sbape, there cannot
+be an idea which is of triangle without being of some determinately triangular shape. We can be aware of generic triangularity only by having an idea which is of triangularity as
+contracted' into one of the specific forms of triangularity.
+Any of the latter will do; they are all "of the same sort."
+" I say that Locke was "on the whole" committed to the view that there can be
+an idea which is of the genus without being of any of its species, because while he
+saw that it couldn't be of any one of the species to the exclusion of the others, and
+saw no way of avoiding this except by making it of none of the species, he was
+greatly puzzled by this, for he saw that in some sense the idea of the genus must be
+of all the species. We have already noted that if he had admitted disjunction as a
+principle of compounding ideas, he could have said that the idea of the genus is the
+idea of the disjunction of all its species, that the idea of being triangular is the idea of
+being scalene or inceled. As it was, he thought that to be of all the species it would
+have to be the idea of being scalene and insceles, which is, of course, the idea of an
+impossibility.
+It is interesting to note that if Berkeley had faced up to the implications of the
+criterion we shall find him to have adopted, this disjunctive conception of' the generic
+idea is the one he would have been led to adopt. For since heing G-where 'G'
+stands for a generic character-entails being Si or S2 or S3..... or So. -where
+'Si' stands for a specific character falling under G- Berkeley should have taken as
+the unit of ideas concerning triangles, the idea of the genus Triangle as differentiated
+into the set of specific forms of triangularity. But, needless to say, if Berkeley bad
+taken this step, he could not have thought of a sensation of crimson as a determinate
+thought.
+
+62
+28. Now, a careful study of the Treatise makes it clear that
+Hume is in the same boat as Berkeley and Locke, sharing
+with them the presupposition that we have an unacquired
+ability to be aware of determinate repeatables. It is often
+said that whereas he begins the Treatise by characterizing
+'ideas' in terms which do not distinguish between imaged and
+thoughts, he corrects this deficiency in Book I, Part I, Section
+vii. What these students of Hume tend to overlook is that
+what Hume does in this later section is give an account not
+of what it is to think of repeatabled whether determinable or
+determinate, but of what it is to think of determinables, thus
+of color as contrasted with particular shades of color. And
+his account of the consciousness of determinables takes for
+granted that we have a primordial ability to take account of
+determinate repeatables. Thus, his later account is simply built
+on, and in no sense a revision of, the account of ideas with
+which he opens the Treatise.
+How, then, does he differ from Berkeley and Locke? The
+latter two had supposed that there must be such a thing as an
+occurrent thought of a determinable, however much they differed in their account of such thoughts. Hume, on the other
+hand, assuming that there are occurrent thoughts of determinate repeatables, denies that there are occurrent thoughts of
+determinables. I shall spare the reader the familiar details of
+Hume's attempt to give a constructive account of our consciousness of determinables, nor shall I criticize it. For my
+point is that however much Locke, Berkeley, and Hume
+differ on the problem of abstract ideas, they all take for
+granted that the human mind has an innate ability to be
+aware of certain determinate sorts —indeed, that we are aware
+of them simply by virtue of baving servations and images.
+29. Now, it takes but a small twist of Hume's position to
+get a radically different view. For suppose that instead of
+
+63
+characterizing the initial elements of experience as impressions of, e.g. red, Hume had characterized them as red particulara (and I would be the last to deny that not only Hume,
+but perhaps Berkeley and Locke as well, often treat impressions or ideas of red as though they were red particulars) then
+Hume's view, expanded to take into account determinates as
+well as determinables, would become the view that all consciousness of sorts or repeatables rests on an association of
+words (e.g. "red") with classes of resembling particulars.
+It clearly makes all the difference in the world how this
+association is conceived. For if the formation of the association involves not only the occurrence of resembling particulars, but also the occurrence of the awareness that they are
+resembling particulars, then the givenness of determinate kinds
+or repeatables, say crimson, is merely being replaced by the
+givenness of facts of the form t resembles y, and we are back
+with an unacquired ability to be aware of repeatables, in this
+case the repeatable resemblance. Even more obviously, if the
+formation of the association involves not only the occurrence
+of red particulars, but the awareness that they are red, then the
+conceptualistic form of the myth has merely been replaced
+by a realistic version, as in the classical sense-datum theory.
+If, however, the association is not mediated by the awareness of facts either of the form i resembles y, or of the form
+it is $, then we have a view of the general type which I will
+call paychological nominali, according to which all awareness
+of sorte, resemblanced, facto, etc., in short, all awareness of
+abstract entities —indeed, all awareness even of particulars -
+is a linguistic affair. According to it, not even the awareness
+of such sorts, resemblances, and facts as pertain to so-called
+immediate experience is presupposed by the process of acquiring the use of a language.
+Two remarks are immediately relevant: (1) Although the
+
+64
+form of psychological nominalism which one gets by modifying Humes view along the above lines has the essential
+merit that it avoids the mistake of supposing that there are
+pure episodes of being aware of sensory repeatables or sensory facts, and is committed to the view that any event which
+can be referred to in these terms must be, to use Ryle's
+expression, a mongrel categorical-hypothetical, in particular,
+a verbal episode as being the manifestation of associative connections of the word-object and word word types, it nevertheless is
+impossibly crude and inadequate as an account of the simplest concept. (2) Once sensations and images have been
+purged of epistemic aboutness, the primary reason for supposing that the fundamental associative tie between language
+and the world must be between words and 'immediate experiences' has disappeared, and the way is clear to recognizing
+that basic word-world associations hold, for example, between "red" and red physical dejects, rather than between "red"
+and a supposed class of private red particulars.
+The second remark, it should be emphasized, does not
+imply that private sensations or impressions may not be
+essential to the formation of these associative connections.
+For one can certainly admit that the tie between "red" and
+red physical objects — which tie makes it possible for "red"
+to mean the quality red - is caually mediated by sensations
+of red without being committed to the mistaken idea that it
+is "really" sensations of red, rather than red physical objects,
+which are the primary denotation of the word "red."
+Vil. The Logic of 'Means'
+30. There is a source of the Myth of the Given to which even
+philosophers who are suspicious of the whole idea of inner
+episodes can fall prey. This is the fact that when we picture a
+
+65
+child-or a carrier of slabs-learning his first language, we,
+of course, locate the language learner in a structured logical
+space in which we are at home. Thus, we conceive of him
+as a person (or, at least, a potential person) in a world
+of physical objects, colored, producing sounds, existing in
+Space and Time. But though it is we who are familiar with
+this logical space, we run the danger, if we are not careful,
+of picturing the language learner as having al initio some
+degree of awareness - "pre-analytic," limited and fragmentary though it may be —of this same logical space. We picture
+his state as though it were rather like our own when placed
+in a strange forest on a dark night. In other words, unless
+we are careful, we can easily take for granted that the process
+of teaching a child to use a language is that of teaching it to
+discriminate elements within a logical space of particulars,
+universals, facts, etc., of which it is already undiscriminatingly aware, and to associate these discriminated elements
+with verbal symbols. And this mistake is in principle the
+same whether the logical space of which the child is supposed
+to have this undiscriminating awareness is conceived by ult
+to be that of physical objects or of private sense contents.
+The real test of a theory of language lies not in its account
+of what has been called (by H. H. Price) "thinking in absence," but in its account of "thinking in presence" — that is
+to say, its account of those occasions on which the fundamental connection of language with nonlinguistic fact is exhibited. And many theories which look like psychological
+nominalism when one views their account of thinking in
+absence, turn out to be quite "Augustinian" when the scalpel
+is turned to their account of thinking in presence.
+31. Now, the friendly use I have been making of the phrase
+"psychological nominalism" may suggest that I am about to
+equate concepts with words, and thinking, in so far as it is
+
+66
+episodic, with verbal episodes. I must now hasten to say that
+I shall do nothing of the sort, or, at least, that if I do do
+something of the sort, the view I shall shortly be developing
+is only in a relatively Pickwickian sense an equation of
+thinking with the use of language. I wish to emphasize,
+therefore, that as I am using the term, the primary connotation of "psychological nominalism" is the denial that there is
+any awareness of logical space prior to, or independent of,
+the acquisition of a language.
+However, although I shall later be distinguishing between
+thoughts and their verbal expression, there is a point of fundamental importance which is best made before more subtle
+distinctions are drawn. To begin with, it is perfectly clear
+that the word "red" would not be a predicate if it didn't have
+the logical syntax characteristic of predicates. Nor would it
+be the predicate it is, unless, in certain frames of mind, at
+least, we tended to respond to red objects in standard circumstances with something having the force of "This is red."
+And once we have abandoned the idea that learning to use
+the word "red" involves antecedent episodes of the awareness
+of redness-not to be confused, of course, with sensations of
+red —there is a temptation to suppose that the word "red"
+means the quality red by virtue of these two facts: briefly, the
+fact that it has the syntar of a predicate, and the fact that it
+is a response (in certain circumstances) to red objects.
+But this account of the meaningfulness of "red," which
+Price has correctly stigmatized as the "thermometer view,"
+would have little plausibility if it were not reinforced by
+another line of thought which takes its point of departure
+from the superficial resemblance of
+(In German) "rot" means red
+
+67
+to such relational statements as
+Cowley adjoins Oxford.
+For once one assimilates the form
+"..." means - - -
+to the form
+× Ry
+and thus takes it for granted that meaning is a relation
+between a word and a nonverbal entity, it is tempting to
+suppose that the relation in question is that of association.
+The truth of the matter, of course, is that statements of the
+form "'
+: means - - -"
+are not relational statements, and that
+while it is indeed the case that the word "rot" could not mean
+the quality red unless it were associated with red things, it
+would be misleading to say that the semantical statement
+"Rot' means red" says of "rot" that it associated with red
+things. For this would suggest that the semantical statement
+is, so to speak, definitional shorthand for a longer statement
+about the associative connections of "rat," which is not the
+case. The rubric "'
+..! means - .." is a linguistic device for
+conveying the information that a mentioned word, in this case
+"rot," plays the same role in a certain linguistic economy, in
+this case the linguistic economy of German-speaking peoples,
+as does the word "red," which is not mentioned but wed - used
+in a unique way; exhibited, so to speak -and which occurs
+"on the right-hand side" of the semantical statement.
+We see, therefore, how the two statements
+"Und" means and
+and
+"Rot" means red
+
+68
+can tell us quite different things about "und" and "rat," for
+the first conveys the information that "und" plays the purely
+formal role of a certain logical connective, the second that
+"rat" plays in German the role of the observation word
+"red"-in spite of the fact that means has the same sense in
+each statement, and without having to say that the first says
+of "und" that it stands in "the meaning relation" to Conjunction, or the second that "rot" stands in "the meaning relation"
+to Redness. *
+These considerations make it clear that nothing whatever
+can be inferred about the complexity of the role played by
+the word "red" or about the exact way in which the word
+"red" is related to red things, from the truth of the semantical
+statement "'red' means the quality red." And no consideration arising from the 'Fido'-Fido aspect of the grammar of
+"means"
+precludes one from claiming that the role of the
+word "red" by virtue of which it can correctly be said to have
+the meaning it does is a complicated one indeed, and that
+one cannot understand the meaning of the word "red" -
+"know what redness is" - unless one has a great deal of
+knowledge which classical empiricism would have held to
+have a purely contingent relationship with the possession of
+fundamental empirical concepts.
+VIll. Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?
+32. One of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given is the
+idea that there is, indeed must be, a structure of particular
+matter of fact such that (a) each fact can not only be noninferentially known to be the case, but presupposes no other
+• For an analysis of'the problem of abstract entities built on this interpretation
+of semantical statements, see (20).
+
+69
+knowledge either of particular matter of fact, or of general
+truths; and (b) such that the noninferential knowledge of
+facts belonging to this structure constitutes the ultimate court
+of appeals for all factual claims - particular and generalabout the world. It is important to note that I characterized
+the knowledge of fact belonging to this stratum as not only
+noninferential, but as pre-supposing no knowledge of other
+matter of fact, whether particular or general. It might be
+thought that this is a redundancy, that knowledge (not belief
+or conviction, but knowledge) which logically presupposes
+knowledge of other facts must be inferential. This, however,
+as I hope to show, is itself an episode in the Myth.
+Now, the idea of such a privileged stratum of fact is a
+familiar one, though not without its difficulties. Knowledge
+pertaining to this level is noninferential, yet it is, after all,
+knowledge. It is ultimate, yet it has authority. The attempt to
+make a consistent picture of these two requirements has
+traditionally taken the following form:
+Statements pertaining to this level, in order to 'express knowledge' must not only be made, but, so to speak, must be worthy
+of being made, credible, that is, in the sense of worthy of
+credence. Furthermore, and this is a crucial point, they must
+be made in a way which involved this credibility. For where
+there is no connection between the making of a statement and
+its authority, the assertion may express conviction, but it can
+scarcely be said to express knowledge.
+The authority - the credibility — of statements pertaining to
+this level cannot exhaustively consist in the fact that they are
+supported by other statements, for in that case all knowledge
+pertaining to this level would have to be inferential, which
+not only contradicts the hypothesis, but flies in the face of
+good sense. The conclusion seems inevitable that if some
+
+70
+statements pertaining to this level are to express noninferential
+knowledge, they must have a credibility which is not a matter
+of being supported by other statements. Now there does seem
+to be a class of statements which fill at least part of this bill,
+namely such statements as would be said to report observation,
+thus, "This is red." These statements, candidly made, have
+authority. Yet they are not expressions of inference. How,
+then, is this authority to be understood?
+Clearly, the argument continues, it springs from the fact
+that they are made in just the circumstances in which they
+are made, as is indicated by the fact that they characteristically, though not necessarily or without exception, involve those so-called token-reflexive expressions which, in
+addition to the tenses of verbs, serve to connect the circumstances in which a statement is made with its sense. (At this
+point it will be helpful to begin putting the line of thought I
+am developing in terms of the fact-stating and observationreporting roles of certain sentences.) Roughly, two verbal performances which are tokens of a non-token-reflexive sentence
+can occur in widely different circumstances and yet make the
+same statement; whereas two tokens of a token-reflexive sentence can make the same statement only if they are uttered
+in the same circumstances (according to a relevant criterion
+of sameness). And two tokens of a sentence, whether it contains a token-reflexive expression —over and above a tensed
+verb-or not, can make the same report only if, made in all
+candor, they express the presence-in some sense of "presence" - of the state of affairs that is being reported; if, that is,
+they stand in that relation to the state of affairs, whatever the
+relation may be, by virtue of which they can be said to
+formulate observations of it.
+It would appear, then, that there are two ways in which a
+sentence token can have credibility: (1) The authority may
+accrue to it, so to speak, from above, that is, as being a token
+
+71
+of a sentence type all the tokens of which, in a certain use,
+have credibility, e.g. "2 + 2 = 4." In this case, let us say that
+token credibility is inherited from type authority. (2) The
+credibility may accrue to it from the fact that it came to exist
+in a certain way in a certain set of circumstances, e.g. "This
+is red." Here token credibility is not derived from type credibility.
+Now, the credibility of some sentence types appears to be
+intrinic—at least in the limited sense that it is not derived from
+other sentences, type or token. This is, or seems to be, the
+case with certain sentences used to make analytic statements.
+The credibility of some sentence types accrues to them by
+virtue of their logical relations to other sentence types, thus
+by virtue of the fact that they are logical consequences of
+more basic sentences. It would seem obvious, however, that
+the credibility of empirical sentence types cannot be traced
+without remainder to the credibility of other sentence types.
+And since no empirical sentence type appears to have intrinsic
+credibility, this means that credibility must accrue to some
+empirical sentence types by virtue of their logical relations to
+certain sentence tokens, and, indeed, to sentence tokens the
+authority of which is not derived, in its turn, from the authority of sentence types.
+The picture we get is that of their being two ultimate modes
+of credibility: (I) The intrinsic credibility of analytic sentences, which accrues to tokens as being tokens of such a
+type; (2) the credibility of such tokens as "express observations," a credibility which flows from tokens to types.
+33. Let us explore this picture, which is common to all
+traditional empiricisms, a bit further. How is the authority of
+such sentence tokens as "express observational knowledge"
+to be understood? It has been tempting to suppose that in
+spite of the obvious differences which exist between "obser-
+
+72
+vation reports" and "analytic statements," there is an essential
+similarity between the ways in which they come by their
+authority. Thus, it has been claimed, not without plausibility,
+that whereas ordinary empirical statements can be correctly
+made without being true, observation reports resemble analytic statements in that being correctly made is a sufficient
+as well as necessary condition of their truth. And it has been
+inferred from this —somewhat hastily, I believe —that "correctly making" the report "This is green" is a matter of
+"following the rules for the use of 'this,' "is' and 'green."
+Three comments are immediately necessary:
+(1) First a brief remark about the term "report." In ordinary usage a report is a report made by someone to someone.
+To make a report is to do something. In the literature of
+epistemology, however, the word "report" or "Konstatierung"
+has acquired a technical use in which a sentence token can
+play a reporting role (a) without being an overt verbal performance, and (b) without having the character of being "by
+someone to someone" -even oneself. There is, of course,
+such a thing as "talking to oneself" — in fora interna-but, as
+I shall be emphasizing in the closing stages of my argument,
+it is important not to suppose that all "covert" verbal episodes
+are of this kind.
+(2) My second comment is that while we shall not assume that because 'reports' in the ordinary sense are actions,
+'reports' in the sense of Konstatierungen are also actions, the
+line of thought we are considering treats them as such. In
+other words, it interprets the correctness of Konstatierungen
+as analogous to the rightness of actions. Let me emphasize,
+however, that not all ought is ought to do, nor all correctness
+the correctness of action..
+(3) My third comment is that if the expression "following
+
+73
+a rule" is taken seriously, and is not weakened beyond all
+recognition into the bare notion of exhibiting a uniformity -
+in which case the lightning, thunder sequence would "follow
+a rule"-then it is the knowledge or belief that the circumstances are of a certain kind, and not the mere fact that they
+are of this kind, which contributes to bringing about the
+action.
+34. In the light of these remarks it is clear that if observation reports are construed as actions, if their correctness is
+interpreted as the correctness of an action, and if the authority
+of an observation report is construed as the fact that making
+it is "following a rule" in the proper sense of this phrase, then
+we are face to face with givenness in its most straightforward
+form. For these stipulations commit one to the idea that
+the authority of Konstatierungen rests on nonverbal episodes
+of awareness —awareness that something is the case, eg.
+that this is green — which nonverbal episodes have an intrinsic
+authority (they are, so to speak 'self-authenticating) which
+the verbal performances (the Konstatierungen) properly performed "express." One is committed to a stratum of authoritative nonverbal episodes ("awareness") the authority of
+which accrues to a superstructure of verbal actiond, provided
+that the expressions occurring in these actions are properly
+uded. These self-authenticating episodes would constitute the
+tortoise on which stands the elephant on which rests the
+edifice of empirical knowledge. The essence of the view is
+the same whether these intrinsically authoritative episodes
+are such items as the awareness that a certain sense content
+is green or such items as the awareness that a certain physical
+object looks to someone to be green.
+35. But what is the alternative? We might begin by trying
+something like the following: An overt or covert token of
+
+74
+"This is green" in the presence of a green item is a Konstatierung and expresses observational knowledge if and only if
+it is a manifestation of a tendency to produce overt or covert
+tokens of "This is green" —given a certain set - if and only if
+a green object is being looked at in standard conditions.
+Clearly on this interpretation the occurrence of such tokens
+of "This is green" would be "following a rule" only in the
+sense that they are instances of a uniformity, a uniformity
+differing from the lightning-thunder case in that it is an
+acquired causal characteristic of the language user. Clearly
+the above suggestion, which corresponds to the "thermometer view" criticized by Professor Price, and which we have
+already rejected, won't do as it stands. Let us see, however,
+if it can't be revised to fit the criteria I have been using for
+"expressing observational knowledge."
+The first hurdle to be jumped concerns the authority which,
+as I have emphasized, a sentence token must have in order
+that it may be said to express knowledge. Clearly, on this
+account the only thing that can remotely be supposed to
+constitute such authority is the fact that one can infer the
+presence of a green object from the fact that someone makes
+this report. As we have already noticed, the correctness of a
+report does not have to be construed as the rightness of an
+action. A report can be correct as being an instance of a
+general mode of behavior which, in a given linguistic community, it is reasonable to sanction and support.
+The second hurdle is, however, the decisive one. For we
+have seen that to be the expression of knowledge, a report
+must not only have authority, this authority must in some sense
+be recognized by the person whose report it is. And this is
+a steep hurdle indeed. For if the authority of the report "This
+is green" lies in the fact that the existence of green items
+
+75
+appropriately related to the perceiver can be inferred from
+the occurrence of such reports, it follows that only a person
+who is able to draw this inference, and therefore who has
+not only the concept green, but also the concept of uttering
+"This is green" - indeed, the concept of certain conditions of
+perception, those which would correctly be called 'standard
+conditions'-could be in a position to token "This is green"
+in recognition of its authority. In other words, for a Konstatierung "This is green" to "express observational knowledge,"
+not only must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a
+green object in standard conditions, but the perceiver must
+know that tokens of "This is green" are symptoms of the
+presence of green objects in conditions which are standard
+for visual perception.
+36. Now it might be thought that there is something
+obviously absurd in the idea that before a token uttered by,
+say, Jones could be the expression of observational knowledge, Jones would have to know that overt verbal episodes
+of this kind are reliable indicators of the existence, suitably
+related to the speaker, of green objects. I do not think that
+it is. Indeed, I think that something very like it is true. The
+point I wish to make now, however, is that if it is true, then
+it follows, as a matter of simple logic, that one couldn't have
+observational knowledge of any fact unless one knew many
+other things as well. And let me emphasize that the point is
+not taken care of by distinguishing between knowing bow and
+knowing that, and admitting that observational knowledge
+requires a lot of "know how." For the point is specifically
+that observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that
+this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the
+form X is a relialle symptom of Y. And to admit this requires
+an abandonment of the traditional empiricist idea that obser-
+
+76
+vational knowledge "stands on its own feet." Indeed, the
+suggestion would be anathema to traditional empiricists for
+the obvious reason that by making observational knowledge
+presuppose knowledge of general facts of the form Xis a reliable
+symptom of Y, it runs counter to the idea that we come to
+know general facts of this form only after we have come to
+know by observation a number of particular facts which
+support the hypothesis that X is a symptom of Y.
+And it might be thought that there is an obvious regress
+in the view we are examining. Does it not tell us that observational knowledge at time t presupposes knowledge of the
+form X is a reliable symptom of Y, which presupposes priar
+observational knowledge, which presupposes other knowledge of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y, which presupposes still other, and prior, observational knowledge, and so
+on? This charge, however, rests on too simple, indeed a
+radically mistaken, conception of what one is saying of Jones
+when one says that he knows that p. It is not just that the
+objection supposes that knowing is an episode; for clearly
+there are episodes which we can correctly characterize as
+knowings, in particular, observing. The essential point is that
+in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we
+are not giving an empirical description of that episode or
+state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of
+justifying and being able to justify what one says.
+37. Thus, all that the view I am defending requires is that
+no tokening by S now of "This is green" is to count as
+"expressing observational knowledge" unless it is also correct
+to say of S that he now knows the appropriate fact of the
+form X is a reliable symptom of Y, namely that (and again I
+oversimplify) utterances of "This is green"
+are reliable indicators of the presence of green objects in standard conditions
+
+77
+of perception. And while the correctness of this statement
+about Jones requires that Jones could now cite prior particular facts as evidence for the idea that these utterances are
+reliable indicators, it requires only that it is correct to say
+that Jones now knows, thus remembers, that these particular
+facts did obtain. It does not require that it be correct to say
+that at the time these facts did obtain he then knew them to
+obtain. And the regress disappears.
+Thus, while Jones' ability to give inductive reasons today
+is built on a long history of acquiring and manifesting verbal
+habits in perceptual situations, and, in particular, the occurrence of verbal episodes, e.g. "This is green," which is superficially like those which are later properly said to express
+observational knowledge, it does not require that any episode
+in this prior time be characterizeable as expressing knowledge. (At this point, the reader should reread Section 19
+above.)
+38. The idea that observation "strictly and properly socalled" is constituted by certain self-authenticating nonverbal episodes, the authority of which is transmitted to verbal
+and quasi-verbal performances when these performances are
+made "in conformity with the semantical rules of the language," is, of course, the heart of the Myth of the Given. For
+the given, in epistemological tradition, is what is taken by these
+self-authenticating episodes. These 'takings' are, so to speak,
+the unmoved movers of empirical knowledge, the 'knowings
+in presence' which are presupposed by all other knowledge,
+both the knowledge of general truths and the knowledge 'in
+absence' of other particular matters of fact. Such is the
+framework in which traditional empiricism makes its characteristic claim that the perceptually given is the foundation
+of empirical knowledge.
+
+78
+Let me make it clear, however, that if I reject this framework, it is not because I should deny that observings are
+inner episodes, nor that strictly speaking they are nonverbal
+episodes. It will be my contention, however, that the sense
+in which they are nonverbal-which is also the sense in
+which thought episodes are nonverbal —is one which gives
+no aid or comfort to epistemological givenness. In the concluding sections of this paper, I shall attempt to explicate the
+logic of inner episodes, and show that we can distinguish
+between observations and thoughts, on the one hand, and
+their verbal expression on the other, without making the
+mistakes of traditional dualism. I shall also attempt to explicate the logical status of impressions or immediate experiences,
+and thus bring to a successful conclusion the quest with
+which my argument began.
+One final remark before 1 begin this task. If I reject the
+framework of traditional empiricism, it is not because I want
+to say that empirical knowledge has no foundation. For to
+put it this way is to suggest that it is really "empirical
+knowledge so-called," and to put it in a box with rumors and
+hoaxes. There is clearly some point to the picture of human
+knowledge as resting on a level of propositions —observation
+reports —which do not rest on other propositions in the same
+way as other propositions rest on them. On the other hand,
+I do wish to insist that the metaphor of "foundation" is
+misleading in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is a
+logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest
+on observation reports, there is another logical dimension in
+which the latter rest on the former.
+Above all, the picture is misleading because of its static
+character. One seems forced to choose between the picture
+of an elephant which rests on a tortoise (What supports the
+
+79
+tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian serpent of
+knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where does it begin?).
+Neither will do. For empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a
+foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which
+can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once.
+IX. Science and Ordinary Usage
+39. There are many strange and exotic specimens in the
+gardens of philosophy: Epistemology, Ontology, Cosmology,
+to name but a few. And clearly there is much good sense -
+not only rhyme but reason -to these labels. It is not my
+purpose, however, to animadvert on the botanizing of philosophies and things philosophical, other than to call attention to a recent addition to the list of philosophical flora and
+fauna, the Philosophy of Science. Nor shall I attempt to
+locate this new specialty in a classificatory system. The point
+I wish to make, however, can be introduced by calling to
+mind the fact that classificatory schemes, however theoretical
+their purpose, have practical consequences: nominal causes,
+so to speak, have real effects. As long as there was no such
+subject as 'philosophy of science,' all students of philosophy
+felt obligated to keep at least one eye part of the time on both
+the methodological and the substantive aspects of the scientific enterprise. And if the result was often a confusion of the
+task of philosophy with the task of science, and almost
+equally often a projection of the framework of the latest
+scientific speculations into the common-sense picture of the
+world (witness the almost unquestioned assumption, today,
+that the common-sense world of physical objects in Space
+and Time must be analyzable into spatially and temporally, or
+
+80
+even spatiotemporally, related eventi), at least it had the merit
+of ensuring that reflection on the nature and implications of
+scientific discourse was an integral and vital part of philosophical thinking generally. But now that philosophy of science has nominal as well as real existence, there has arisen
+the temptation to leave it to the specialists, and to confuse
+the sound idea that philosophy is not science with the mistaken idea that philosophy is independent of science.
+40. As long as discourse was viewed as a map, subdivided
+into a side-by-side of sub-maps, each representing a subregion in a side-by-side of regions making up the total subject
+matter of discourse, and as long as the task of the philosopher
+was conceived to be the piecemeal one of analysis in the sense
+of defunition - the task, so to speak, of "making little ones out
+of big ones"— one could view with equanimity the existence
+of philosophical specialists —specialists in formal and mathematical logic, in perception, in moral philosophy, etc. For if
+discourse were as represented above, where would be the
+harm of each man fencing himself off in his own garden? In
+spite, however, of the persistence of the slogan "
+philosophy
+is analysis," we now realize that the atomistic conception of
+philosophy is a snare and a delusion. For "analysis" no longer
+connotes the definition of terms, but rather the clarification
+of the logical structure — in the broadest sense — of discourse,
+and discourse no longer appears as one plane parallel to
+another, but as a tangle of intersecting dimensions whose
+relations with one another and with extra-linguistic fact conform to no single or simple pattern. No longer can the
+philosopher interested in perception say "let him who is
+interested in prescriptive discourse analyze its concepts and
+leave me in peace." Most if not all philosophically interesting
+concepts are caught up in more than one dimension of dis-
+
+81
+course, and while the atomism of early analysis has a healthy
+successor in the contemporary stress on journeyman tactics,
+the grand strategy of the philosophical enterprise is once
+again directed toward that articulated and integrated vision
+of man-in-the-universe —or, shall I say discourse-about-manin-all-discourse -which has traditionally been its goal.
+But the moral I wish specifically to draw is that no longer
+can one smugly say "Let the person who is interested in
+scientific discourse analyze scientific discourse and let the
+person who is interested in ordinary discourse analyze ordinary discourse." Let me not be misunderstood. I am not
+saying that in order to discern the logic-the polydimensional logic-of ordinary discourse, it is necessary to make
+use of the results or the methods of the sciences. Nor even
+that, within limits, such a division of labor is not a sound
+corollary of the journeyman's approach. My point is rather
+that what we call the scientific enterprise is the flowering of
+a dimension of discourse which already exists in what historians call the "prescientific stage," and that failure to understand this type of discourse "writ large" - in science — may
+lead, indeed, has often led to a failure to appreciate its role
+in "ordinary usage," and, as a result, to a failure to understand the full logic of even the most fundamental, the "simplest" empirical terms.
+41. Another point of equal importance. The procedures of
+philosophical analysis as such may make no use of the methods or results of the sciences. But familiarity with the trend
+of scientific thought is essential to the apprairal of the framework categories of the common-sense picture of the world.
+For if the line of thought embodied in the preceding paragraphs is sound, if, that is to say, scientific discourse is but
+a continuation of a dimension of discourse which has been
+
+82
+present in human discourse from the very beginning, then
+one would expect there to be a sense in which the scientific
+picture of the world replaces the common-sense picture; a
+sense in which the scientific account of "what there is" superseder the descriptive ontology of everyday life.
+Here one must be cautious. For there is a right way and
+a wrong way to make this point. Many years ago it used to
+be confidently said that science has shown, for example, that
+physical objects aren't really colored. Later it was pointed
+out that if this is interpreted as the claim that the sentence
+"Physical objects have colors" expresses an empirical proposition which, though widely believed by common sense, has
+been shown by science to be false, then, of course, this claim
+is absurd. The idea that physical objects aren't colored can
+make sense only as the (misleading) expression of one aspect
+of a philosophical critique of the very framework of physical
+objects located in Space and enduring through Time. In
+short, "Physical objects aren't really colored" makes sense
+only as a clumsy expression of the idea that there are no such
+things as the colored physical objects of the common-sense
+world, where this is interpreted, not as an empirical proposition - like "There are no nonhuman featherless bipeds" -
+within the common-sense frame, but as the expression of a
+rejection (in some sense) of this very framework itself, in
+favor of another built around different, if not unrelated,
+categories. This rejection need not, of course, be a practical
+rejection. It need not, that is, carry with it a proposal to
+brain-wash existing populations and train them to speak
+differently. And, of course, as long as the existing framework
+is used, it will be incorrect to say - otherwise than to make a
+philosophical point about the framework-that no object is
+really colored, or is located in Space, or endures through
+
+83
+Time. But, speaking as a philoropher, 1 am quite prepared to say
+that the common-sense world of physical objects in Space
+and Time is unreal -that is, that there are no such things.
+Or, to put it less paradoxically, that in the dimension of
+describing and explaining the world, science is the measure
+of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it
+is not.
+43. There is a widespread impression that reflection on
+how we learn the language in which, in everyday life, we
+describe the world, leads to the conclusion that the categories
+of the common-sense picture of the world have, so to speak,
+an unchallengeable authenticity. There are, of course, different conceptions of just what this fundamental categorial
+framework is. For some it is sense contents and phenomenal
+relations between them; for others physical objects, persons,
+and processes in Space and Time. But whatever their points
+of difference, the philosophers I have in mind are united in
+the conviction that what is called the "ostensive tie" between
+our fundamental descriptive vocabulary and the world rules
+out of court as utterly absurd any notion that there are no
+such things as this framework talks about.
+An integral part of this conviction is what I shall call (in
+an extended sense) the positivestic conception of science, the idea
+that the framework of theoretical objects (molecules, electromagnetic fields, etc.) and their relationships is, so to speak,
+an auviliary framework. In its most explicit form, it is the
+idea that theoretical objects and propositions concerning
+them are "calculational devices," the value and status of
+which consist in their systematizing and heuristic role with
+respect to confirmable generalizations formulated in the
+framework of terms which enjoy a direct ostensive link with
+the world. One is tempted to put this by saying that accord-
+
+84
+ing to these philosophers, the objects of ostensively linked
+discourse behave as if and only as if they were bound up with
+or consisted of scientific entities. But, of course, these philosophers would hasten to point out (and rightly so) that
+X behaves as if it consisted of Y's
+makes sense only by contrast with
+X behaves as it does because it does consist of Y's
+whereas their contention is exactly that where the Y's are
+scientifi objects, no such contrast makes sense.
+The point I am making is that as long as one thinks that
+there is a framework, whether of physical objects or of sense
+contents, the absolute authenticity of which is guaranteed by
+the fact that the learning of this framework involves an
+"ostensive step," so long one will be tempted to think of the
+authority of theoretical discourse as entirely derivative, that
+of a calculational auxiliary, an effective heuristic device. It is
+one of my prime purposes, in the following sections, to
+convince the reader that this interpretation of the status of
+the scientific picture of the world rests on two mistakes: (1)
+a misunderstanding (which I have already exposed) of the
+ostensive element in the learning and use of a language- the
+Myth of the Given; (2) a reification of the metbodological
+distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical discourse
+into a substantive distinction between theoretical and nontheoretical existence.
+44. One way of summing up what I have been saying
+above is by saying that there is a widespread impression
+abroad, aided and abetted by a naive interpretation of concept formation, that philosophers of science deal with a mode
+of discourse which is, so to speak, a peninsular off shoot from
+
+85
+the mainland of ordinary discourse. The study of scientific
+discourse is conceived to be a worthy employment for those
+who have the background and motivation to keep track of
+it, but an employment which is fundamentally a hobby divorced from the perplexities of the mainland. But, of course,
+this summing up won't quite do. For all philosophers would
+agree that no philosophy would be complete unless it resolved the perplexities which arise when one attempts to
+think through the relationship of the framework of modern
+science to ordinary discourse. My point, however, is not that
+any one would reject the idea that this is a proper task for
+philosophy, but that, by approaching the language in which
+the plain man describes and explains empirical fact with the
+presuppositions of givenned, they are led to a "resolution" of
+these perplexities along the lines of what I have called the
+positivistic or peninsular conception of scientific discourse -
+a "resolution" which, I believe, is not only superficial, but
+positively mistaken.
+X. Private Episodes: The Problem
+45. Let us now return, after a long absence, to the problem
+of how the similarity among the experiences of seeing that an
+deject over there is red, its looking to one that an object over there is
+red (when in point of fact it is not red) and its looking to one
+au though there were a red object over there (when in fact there is
+notbing over there at all) is to be understood. Part of this
+similarity, we saw, consists in the fact that they all involve
+the idea —the proposition, if you please — that the object over
+there is red. But over and above this there is, of course, the
+aspect which many philosophers have attempted to clarify by
+the notion of impresions or immediate experience.
+
+86
+It was pointed out in Sections 21 ff. above that there are
+prima facie two ways in which facts of the form a merely looks
+red might be explained, in addition to the kind of explanation
+which is based on empirical generalizations relating the color
+of objects, the circumstances in which they are seen, and
+the colors they look to have. These two ways are (a) the
+introduction of impressions or immediate experiences as
+theoretical entities; and (b) the discovery, on scrutinizing these
+situations, that they contain impressions or immediate experiences as components. I called attention to the paradoxical
+character of the first of these alternatives, and refused, at that
+time, to take it seriously. But in the meantime the second
+alternative, involving as it does the Myth of the Given, has
+turned out to be no more satisfactory.
+For, in the first place, how are these impressions to be
+described, if not by using such words as "red" and "triangular." Yet, if my argument, to date, is sound, physical objects
+alone can be literally red and triangular. Thus, in the cases
+I am considering, there is nothing to be red and triangular.
+It would seem to follow that "impression of a red triangle"
+could mean nothing more than "impression of the sort which
+is common to those experiences in which we either see that
+something is red and triangular, or something merely looks
+red and triangular or there merely looks to be a red and
+triangular object over there." And if we can never characterize "impressions" intrinsically, but only by what is logically
+a definite description, i.e., du the kind of entity which is common
+to such situations, then we would scarcely seem to be any
+better off than if we maintained that talk about "impressions"
+is a notational convenience, a code, for the language in which
+we speak of how things look and what there looks to be.
+And this line of thought is reinforced by the consideration
+
+87
+that once we give up the idea that we begin our sojourn in
+this world with any -even a vague, fragmentary, and undiscriminating —awareness of the logical space of particulars,
+kinds, facts, and resemblances, and recognize that even such
+"simple" concepts as those of colors are the fruit of a long
+process of publicly reinforced responses to public objects
+(including verbal performances) in public situations, we may
+well be puzzled as to how, even if there are such things as
+impressions or sensations, we could come to know that there
+are, and to know what sort of thing they are. For we now
+recognize that instead of coming to have a concept of something
+because we have noticed that sort of thing, to have the ability to notice
+a vart of thing is already to have the concept of that sort of thing, and
+cannot account for it.
+Indeed, once we think this line of reasoning through, we
+are struck by the fact that if it is sound, we are faced not
+only with the question "How could we come to have the idea
+of an "impression' or "sensation?'" but by the question "How
+could we come to have the idea of something's looking red
+to us, or," to get to the crux of the matter, "of seeing that
+something is red?" In short, we are brought face to face with
+the general problem of understanding how there can be inner
+episodes-episodes, that is, which somehow combine privacy,
+in that each of us has privileged access to his own, with
+intersubjectivity, in that each of us can, in principle, know
+about the other's. We might try to put this more linguistically
+as the problem of how there can be a sentence (e.g. "S has
+a toothache") of which it is logically true that whereas anyhody
+can use it to state a fact, only one person, namely S himself,
+can use it to make a report. But while this is a useful
+formulation, it does not do justice to the supposedly episodic
+character of the items in question. And that this is the heart
+
+88
+of the puzzle is shown by the fact that many philosophers
+who would not deny that there are short-term hypothetical
+and mongrel hypothetical-categorical facts about behavior
+which others can ascribe to us on behavioral evidence, but
+which only we can report, have found it to be logical nonsense
+to speak of non-behavioral episode of which this is true. Thus,
+it has been claimed by Ryle (17) that the very idea that there
+are such episodes is a category mistake, while others have
+argued that though there are such episodes, they cannot be
+characterized in intersubjective discourse, learned as it is in
+a context of public objects and in the 'academy' of one's
+linguistic peers. It is my purpose to argue that both these
+contentions are quite mistaken, and that not only are inner
+episodes not category mistakes, they are quite "effable" in
+intersubjective discourse. And it is my purpose to show,
+positively, bow this can be the case. I am particularly concerned to make this point in connection with such inner
+episodes as sensations and feelings, in short, with what has —
+unfortunately, I think -been called "immediate experience."
+For such an account is necessary to round off this examination of the Myth of the Given. But before I can come to grips
+with these topics, the way must be prepared by a discussion
+of inner episodes of quite another kind, namely tboughts.
+XI. Thoughts: The Classical View
+46. Recent empiricism has been of two minds about the status
+of thought. On the one hand, it has resonated to the idea that
+insofar as there are episoder which are thoughts, they are verbal
+or linguistic episodes. Clearly, however, even if candid overt
+verbal behaviors by people who had learned a language were
+thoughts, there are not nearly enough of them to account for
+
+EMPIRICISM AND THE PIILOSOPIIY OF MIND
+89
+all the cases in which it would be argued that a person was
+thinking. Nor can we plausibly suppose that the remainder
+is accounted for by those inner episodes which are often very
+clumsily lumped together under the heading "verbal imagery."
+On the other hand, they have been tempted to suppose
+that the episodes which are referred to by verbs pertaining to
+thinking include all forms of "intelligent behavior," verbal as
+well as nonverbal, and that the "thought episodes" which are
+supposed to be manifested by these behaviors are not really
+episodes at all, but rather hypothetical and mongrel hypothetical-categorical facts about these and still other behaviors. This, however, runs into the difficulty that whenever we
+try to explain what we mean by calling a piece of nonbalitual
+behavior intelligent, we seem to find it necessary to do so
+in terms of thinking. The uncomfortable feeling will not be
+downed that the dispositional account of thoughts in terms
+of intelligent behavior is covertly circular.
+47. Now the classical tradition claimed that there is a
+family of episodes, neither overt verbal behavior nor verbal
+imagery, which are thoughta, and that both overt verbal behavior and verbal imagery owe their meaningfulness to the
+fact that they stand to these thoughts in the unique relation
+of "expressing" them. These episodes are introspectable. In-
+deed, it was usually believed that they could not occur without being known to occur. But this can be traced to a number
+of confusions, perhaps the most important of which was the
+idea that thoughts belong in the same general category as
+sensations, images, tickles, itches, etc. This mis-assimilation
+of thoughts to sensations and feelings was equally, as we saw
+in Sections 26 ff. above, a mis-assimilation of sensations and
+feelings to thoughts, and a falsification of both. The assump-
+
+90
+tion that if there are thought episodes, they must be immediate experiences is common both to those who propounded
+the classical view and to those who reject it, saying that they
+"find no such experiences." If we purge the classical tradition of these confusions, it becomes the idea that to each of
+us belongs a stream of episodes, not themselves immediate experiences, to which we have privileged, but by no
+means either invariable or infallible, access. These episodes
+can occur without being "expressed" by overt verbal behavior, though verbal behavior is—in an important sense — their
+natural fruition. Again, we can "hear ourselves think," but
+the verbal imagery which enables us to do this is no more
+the thinking itself than is the overt verbal behavior by which
+it is expressed and communicated to others. It is a mistake
+to suppose that we must be having verbal imagery -indeed,
+any imagery -when we "know what we are thinking" -in
+short, to suppose that "privileged access" must be construed
+on a perceptual or quasi-perceptual model.
+Now, it is my purpose to defend such a revised classical
+analysis of our common-sense conception of thoughts, and
+in the course of doing so I shall develop distinctions which
+will later contribute to a resolution, in principle, of the puzzle
+of immediate experience. But before I continue, let me hasten
+to add that it will turn out that the view I am about to
+expound could, with equal appropriateness, be represented
+as a modified form of the view that thoughts are linguistic
+episodes.
+XII. Our Rylean Ancestors
+48. But, the reader may well ask, in what sense can these
+episodes be "inner" if they are not immediate experiences?
+
+91
+and in what sense can they be "linguistic" if they are neither
+overt linguistic performances, nor verbal imagery "in foro
+interno"? I am going to answer these and the other questions
+I have been raising by making a myth of my own, or, to give
+it an air of up-to-date respectability, by writing a piece of
+science fiction - anthropological science fiction. Imagine a
+stage in pre-history in which humans are limited to what I
+shall call a Rylean language, a language of which the fundamental descriptive vocabulary speaks of public properties
+of public objects located in Space and enduring through
+Time. Let me hasten to add that it is also Rylean in that
+although its basic resources are limited (how limited I shall
+be discussing in a moment), its total expressive power is very
+great. For it makes subtle use not only of the elementary
+logical operations of conjunction, disjunction, negation, and
+quantification, but especially of the subjunctive conditional.
+Furthermore, 1 shall suppose it to be characterized by the
+presence of the looser logical relations typical of ordinary
+discourse which are referred to by philosophers under the
+headings "vagueness" and "open texture."
+I am beginning my myth in medias red with humans who
+have already mastered a Rylean language, because the philosophical situation it is designed to clarify is one in which we
+are not puzzled by how people acquire a language for referring to public properties of public objects, but are very
+puzzled indeed about how we learn to speak of inner episodes and immediate experiences.
+There are, I suppose, still some philosophers who are
+inclined to think that by allowing these mythical ancestors
+of ours the use ad libitum of subjunctive conditionals, we
+have, in effect, enabled them to say anything that we can say
+when we speak of thoughts, experienced (seeing, hearing, etc.),
+
+92
+and immediate experiences. I doubt that there are many. In any
+case, the story I am telling is designed to show exactly how
+the idea that an intersubjective language must be Rylean rests
+on too simple a picture of the relation of intersubjective
+discourse to public objects.
+49. The questions I am, in effect, raising are "What resources would have to be added to the Rylean language of
+these talking animals in order that they might come to recognize each other and themselves as animals that think, olserve, and have feelings and sendations, as we use these terms?"
+and "How could the addition of these resources be construed
+as reasonable?" In the first place, the language would have
+to be enriched with the fundamental resources of semantical
+discourse - that is to say, the resources necessary for making
+such characteristically semantical statements as "Rot' means
+red," and "Der Mond ist rund' is true if and only if the moon
+is round." It is sometimes said, e.g., by Carnap (6), that these
+resources can be constructed out of the vocabulary of formal
+logic, and that they would therefore already be contained, in
+principle, in our Rylean language. I have criticized this idea
+in another place (20) and shall not discuss it here. In any
+event, a decision on this point is not essential to the argument.
+Let it be granted, then, that these mythical ancestors of
+ours are able to characterize each other's verbal behavior in
+semantical terms; that, in other words, they not only can talk
+about each other's predictions as causes and effects, and as
+indicators (with greater or less reliability) of other verbal and
+nonverbal states of affairs, but can also say of these verbal
+productions that they mean thus and so, that they say that
+such and such, that they are true, false, etc. And let me
+emphasize, as was pointed out in Section 31 above, that to
+
+93
+make a semantical statement about a verbal event is not a
+shorthand way of talking about its causes and effects, although there is a sense of "imply" in which semantical statements about verbal productions do imply information about
+the causes and effects of these productions. Thus, when I say
+"Es regnet' means it is raining," my statement "implies" that
+the causes and effects of utterances of "Es regnet" beyond
+the Rhine parallel the causes and effects of utterances of
+"It is raining" by myself and other members of the Englishspeaking community. And if it didn't imply this, it couldn't
+perform its role. But this is not to say that semantical statements are definitional shorthand for statements about the
+causes and effects of verbal performances.
+50. With the resources of semantical discourse, the language of our fictional ancestors has acquired a dimension
+which gives considerably more plausibility to the claim that
+they are in a position to talk about thought just as we are.
+For characteristic of thoughts is their intentionality, reference,
+or aboutned, and it is clear that semantical talk about the
+meaning or reference of verbal expressions has the same
+structure as mentalistic discourse concerning what thoughts
+are about. It is therefore all the more tempting to suppose
+that the intentionality of thoughts can be traced to the application of semantical categories to overt verbal performances,
+and to suggest a modified Rylean account according to which
+talk about so-called "thoughts" is shorthand for hypothetical
+and mongrel categorical-hypothetical statements about overt
+verbal and nonverbal behavior, and that talk about the intentionality of these "episodes" is correspondingly reducible to
+semantical talk about the verbal components.
+What is the alternative? Classically it has been the idea
+that not only are there overt verbal episodes which can be
+
+94
+characterized in semantical terms, but, over and above these,
+there are certain inner episodes which are properly characterized by the traditional vocabulary of intentionality. And, of
+course, the classical scheme includes the idea that semantical
+discourse about overt verbal performances is to be analyzed
+in terms of talk about the intentionality of the mental episodes which are "expressed" by these overt performances.
+My immediate problem is to see if I can reconcile the classical
+idea of thoughts as inner episodes which are neither overt
+behavior nor verbal imagery and which are properly referred
+to in terms of the vocabulary of intentionality, with the idea
+that the categories of intentionality are, at bottom, semantical
+categories pertaining to overt verbal performances.*
+XIlI. Theories and Models
+51. But what might these episodes be? And, in terms of our
+science fiction, how might our ancestors have come to recognize their existence? The answer to these questions is
+surprisingly straightforward, once the logical space of our
+discussion is enlarged to include a distinction, central to the
+philosophy of science, between the language of theory and the
+language of observation. Although this distinction is a familiar
+one, I shall take a few paragraphs to highlight those aspects
+of the distinction which are of greatest relevance to our
+problem.
+Informally, to construct a theory is, in its most developed or sophisticated form, to postulate a domain of entities
+which behave in certain ways set down by the fundamental
+• An earlier attempt along these lines is to be found in (18) and (19).
+
+95
+principles of the theory, and to correlate-perhaps,
+in a
+certain sense to identify-complexes of these theoretical entities with certain non-theoretical objects or situations; that
+is to say, with objects or situations which are either matters
+of observable fact or, in principle at least, describable in
+observational terms. This "correlation" or "identification" of
+theoretical with observational states of affairs is a tentative
+one "until further notice," and amounts, so to speak, to
+erecting temporary bridges which permit the passage from
+sentences in observational discourse to sentences in the theory, and vice versa. Thus, for example, in the kinetic theory
+of gases, empirical statements of the form "Gas g at such and
+such a place and time has such and such a volume, pressure,
+and temperature" are correlated with theoretical statements
+specifying certain statistical measures of populations of molecules. These temporary bridges are so set up that inductively
+established laws pertaining to gases, formulated in the language of observable fact, are correlated with derived propositions or theorems in the language of the theory, and that
+no proposition in the theory is correlated with a falsified
+empirical generalization. Thus, a good theory (at least of the
+type we are considering) "explains" established empirical
+laws by deriving theoretical counterparts of these laws from
+a small set of postulates relating to unobserved entities.
+These remarks, of course, barely scratch the surface of the
+problem of the status of theories in scientific discourse. And
+no sooner have I made them, than I must hasten to qualify
+them -almost beyond recognition. For while this by now
+classical account of the nature of theories (one of the earlier
+formulations of which is due to Norman Campbell (5), and
+which is to be found more recently in the writings of Carnap
+
+96
+(8), Reichenbach (15, 16), Hempel (10), and Braithwaite
+(3)) does throw light on the logical status of theories, it
+emphasizes certain features at the expense of others. By
+speaking of the construction of a theory as the elaboration
+of a postulate system which is tentatively correlated with
+observational discourse, it gives a highly artificial and unrealistic picture of what scientists have actually done in the
+process of constructing theories. I don't wish to deny that
+logically sophisticated scientists today might and perhaps, on
+occasion, do proceed in true logistical style. I do, however,
+wish to emphasize two points:
+(1) The first is that the fundamental assumptions of a
+theory are usually developed not by constructing uninterpreted calculi which might correlate in the desired manner
+with observational discourse, but rather by attempting to find
+a model, i.e. to describe a domain of familiar objects behaving
+in familiar ways such that we can see how the phenomena
+to be explained would arise if they consisted of this sort of
+thing. The essential thing about a model is that it is accompanied, so to speak, by a commentary which qualifies or
+limite —but not precisely nor in all respects -the analogy
+between the familiar objects and the entities which are being
+introduced by the theory. It is the descriptions of the fundamental ways in which the objects in the model domain, thus
+qualified, behave, which, transferred to the theoretical entities, correspond to the postulates of the logistical picture of
+theory construction.
+(2) But even more important for our purposes is the fact
+that the logistical picture of theory construction obscures the
+most important thing of all, namely that the process of devising "theoretical" explanations of observable phenomena
+did not spring full-blown from the head of modern science.
+
+97
+In particular, it obscures the fact that not all common-sense
+inductive inferences are of the form
+All observed A's have been B, therefore (probably)
+all A's are B.
+or its statistical counterparts, and leads one mistakenly to
+suppose that so-called "hypothetic-deductive" explanation is
+limited to the sophisticated stages of science. The truth of the
+matter, as I shall shortly be illustrating, is that science is
+continuous with common sense, and the ways in which the
+scientist seeks to explain empirical phenomena are refinements of the ways in which plain men, however crudely and
+schematically, have attempted to understand their environment and their fellow men since the dawn of intelligence. It
+is this point which I wish to stress at the present time, for I
+am going to argue that the distinction between theoretical
+and observational discourse is involved in the logic of concepts pertaining to inner episodes. I say "involved in" for it
+would be paradoxical and, indeed, incorrect, to say that these
+concepts are theoretical concepts.
+52. Now I think it fair to say that some light has already
+been thrown on the expression "inner episodes"; for while it
+would indeed be a category mistake to suppose that the
+inflammability of a piece of wood is, so to speak, a hidden
+burning which becomes overt or manifest when the wood is
+placed on the fire, not all the unobservable episodes we
+suppose to go on in the world are the offspring of category
+mistakes. Clearly it is by no means an illegitimate use of
+"in" — though it is a use which has its own logical grammar -
+to say, for example, that "in" the air around us there are
+innumerable molecules which, in spite of the observable
+stodginess of the air, are participating in a veritable turmoil
+
+98
+of episodes. Clearly, the sense in which these episodes are
+"in" the air is to be explicated in terms of the sense in which
+the air "is" a population of molecules, and this, in turn, in
+terms of the logic of the relation between theoretical and
+observational discourse.
+I shall have more to say on this topic in a moment. In the
+meantime, let us return to our mythical ancestors. It will not
+surprise my readers to learn that the second stage in the
+enrichment of their Rylean language is the addition of theoretical discourse. Thus we may suppose these language-using
+animals to elaborate, without methodological sophistication,
+crude, sketchy, and vague theories to explain why things
+which are similar in their observable properties differ in their
+causal properties, and things which are similar in their causal
+properties differ in their observable properties.
+XIV. Methodological versus Philosophical Behaviorism
+53. But we are approaching the time for the central episode
+in our myth. I want you to suppose that in this Neo-Rylean
+culture there now appears a genius — let us call him Joneswho is an unsung fore-runner of the movement in psychology, once revolutionary, now commonplace, known as Be-
+haviorism. Let me emphasize that what I have in mind is
+Behaviorism as a methodological thesis, which I shall be
+concerned to formulate. For the central and guiding theme
+in the historical complex known by this term has been a
+certain conception, or family of conceptions, of how to go
+about building a science of psychology.
+Philosophers have sometimes supposed that Behaviorists
+are, as such, committed to the idea that our ordinary mentalistic concepts are analyzable in terms of overt behavior. But
+
+EMPIRICISM AND THE PHILOSOPNY OF MIND
+99
+although behaviorism has often been characterized by a certain metaphysical bias, it is not a thesis about the analys of
+evisting psychological concepts, but one which concerns the
+construction of new concepts. As a methodological thesis, it
+involves no commitment whatever concerning the logical
+analysis of common-sense mentalistic discourse, nor does it
+involve a denial that each of us has a privileged access to our
+state of mind, nor that these states of mind can properly be
+described in terms of such common-sense concepts as believing, wondering, doubting, intending, wishing, inferring, etc.
+If we permit ourselves to speak of this privileged access to
+our states of mind as "introspection," avoiding the implication
+that there is a "means" whereby we "see" what is going on
+"inside," as we see external circumstances by the eye, then
+we can say that Behaviorism, as I shall use the term, does
+not deny that there is such a thing as introspection, nor that
+it is, on some topics, at least, quite reliable. The essential
+point about 'introspection' from the standpoint of Behaviorism is that we introspect in terma of common sense mentalisti
+concepti. And while the Behaviorist admits, as anyone must,
+that much knowledge is embodied in common-sense mentalistic discourse, and that still more can be gained in the future
+by formulating and testing hypotheses in terms of them, and
+while he admits that it is perfectly legitimate to call such a
+psychology "scientific," he proposes, for his own part, to
+make no more than a heuristic use of mentalistic discourse,
+and to construct his concepts "from scratch" in the course of
+developing his own scientific account of the observable behavior of human organisms.
+54. But while it is quite clear that scientific Behaviorism
+is not the thesis that common-sense psychological concepts
+are analyzable into concepts pertaining to overt behavior —a
+
+100
+thesis which has been maintained by some philosophers and
+which may be called'
+'analytical' or 'philosophical' Behaviorism — it is often thought that Behaviorism is committed to the
+idea that the concepts of a behavioristic psychology must be
+so analyzable, or, to put things right side up, that properly
+introduced behavioristic concepts must be built by explicit
+definition -in the broadest sense —from a basic vocabulary
+pertaining to overt behavior. The Behaviorist would thus be
+saying "Whether or not the mentalistic concepts of everyday
+life are definable in terms of overt behavior, I shall ensure
+that this is true of the concepts that I shall employ." And it
+must be confessed that many behavioristically oriented psychologists have believed themselves committed to this austere
+program of concept formation.
+Now I think it reasonable to say that, thus conceived, the
+behavioristic program would be unduly restrictive. Certainly,
+nothing in the nature of sound scientific procedure requires
+this self-denial. Physics, the methodological sophistication
+of which has so impressed —indeed, overly impressed - the
+other sciences, does not lay down a corresponding restriction
+on its concepts, nor has chemistry been built in terms of
+concepts explicitly definable in terms of the observable properties and behavior of chemical substances. The point I am
+making should now be clear. The behavioristic requirement
+that all concepts should be introduced in terms of a basic
+vocabulary pertaining to overt behavior is compatible with
+the idea that some behavioristic concepts are to be introduced as theoretical concepts.
+55. It is essential to note that the theoretical terms of a
+behavioristic psychology are not only not defined in terms of
+overt behavior, they are also not defined in terms of nerves,
+synapses, neural impulses, etc., etc. A behavioristic theory of
+
+101
+behavior is not, as such, a physiological explanation of behavior. The ability of a framework of theoretical concepts
+and propositions successfully to explain behavioral phenomena is logically independent of the identification of these
+theoretical concepts with concepts of neurophysiology. What
+i true-and this is a logical point-is that each special
+science dealing with some aspect of the human organism
+operates within the frame of a certain regulative ideal, the
+ideal of a coherent system in which the achievements of each
+have an intelligible place. Thus, it is part of the Behaviorist's
+business to keep an eye on the total picture of the human
+organism which is beginning to emerge. And if the tendency
+to premature identification is held in check, there may be
+considerable heuristic value in speculative attempts at integration; though, until recently, at least, neurophysiological
+speculations in behavior theory have not been particularly
+fruitful. And while it is, I suppose, noncontroversial that
+when the total scientific picture of man and his behavior is
+in, it will involve some identification of concepts in behavior
+theory with concepts pertaining to the functioning of anatomical structures, it should not be assumed that behavior
+theory is committed al initio to a physiological identification
+of all its concepts, — that its concepts are, so to speak, physiological from the start.
+We have, in effect, been distinguishing between two dimensions of the logic (or 'methodologic') of theoretical terms:
+(a) their role in explaining the selected phenomena of which
+the theory is the theory; (b) their role as candidates for
+integration in what we have called the "total picture." These
+roles are equally part of the logic, and hence the "meaning."
+of theoretical terms. Thus, at any one time the terms in a
+theory will carry with them as part of their logical force that
+
+102
+which it is reasonable to envisage - whether schematically or
+determinately —as the manner of their integration. However,
+for the purposes of my argument, it will be useful to refer to
+these two roles as though it were a matter of a distinction
+between what I shall call pure theoretical concept, and hypotheses concerning the relation of these concepts to concepts in
+other specialties. What we can say is that the less a scientist
+is in a position to conjecture about the way in which a certain
+theory can be expected to integrate with other specialities,
+the more the concepts of his theory approximate to the
+status of pure theoretical concepts. To illustrate: We can
+imagine that Chemistry developed a sophisticated and successful theory to explain chemical phenomena before either
+electrical or magnetic phenomena were noticed; and that
+chemists developed as pure theoretical concepts, certain concepts which it later became reasonable to identify with concepts belonging to the framework of electromagnetic theory.
+XV. The Logic of Private Episodes: Thoughts
+56. With these all too sketchy remarks on Methodological
+Behaviorism under our belts, let us return once again to our
+fictional ancestors. We are now in a position to characterize
+the original Rylean language in which they described themselves and their fellows as not only a behavioristic language,
+but a behavioristic language which is restricted to the nontbeoretical vocabulary of a behavioristic psychology. Suppose,
+now, that in the attempt to account for the fact that his
+fellow men behave intelligently not only when their conduct
+is threaded on a string of overt verbal episodes-that is
+to say, as we would put it, when they "think out loud" - but
+also when no detectable verbal output is present, Jones
+
+EMPIRICISM AND THE PILOSOPHY OF MIND
+103
+develops a theory according to which overt utterances are but
+the culmination of a process which begins with certain inner
+episodes. And let ud suppose that his model for these episodes which
+initiate the events which culminate in overt verbal behavior
+is that of overt verbal bebavior itself. In other words, wing the
+language of the model, the theory is to the effect that overt verbal
+behavior is the culmination of a procede which begins with "inner
+specib."
+It is essential to bear in mind that what Jones means by
+"inner speech" is not to be confused with verbal imagery. As
+a matter of fact, Jones, like his fellows, does not as yet even
+have the concept of an image.
+It is easy to see the general lines a Jonesean theory will
+take. According to it the true cause of intelligent nonhabitual
+behavior is "inner speech." Thus, even when a hungry person
+overtly says "Here is an edible object" and proceeds to eat
+it, the true —theoretical —cause of his eating, given his hunger, is not the overt utterance, but the "inner utterance of
+this sentence."
+57. The first thing to note about the Jonesean theory is
+that, as built on the model of speech episodes, it carries over
+to these inner episodes the applicability of semantical categories.
+Thus, just as Jones has, like his fellows, been speaking of
+overt utterances as meaning this or that, or being about this
+or that, so he now speaks of these inner episodes as meaning
+this or that, or being about this or that.
+The second point to remember is that although Jones'
+theory involves a model, it is not identical with it. Like all
+theories formulated in terms of a model, it also includes a
+commentary on the model; a commentary which places more
+or less sharply drawn restrictions on the analogy between
+the theoretical entities and the entities of the model. Thus,
+
+104
+while his theory talks of "inner speech," the commentary
+hastens to add that, of course, the episodes in question are
+not the wagging of a hidden tongue, nor are any sounds
+produced by this "inner speech."
+58. The general drift of my story should now be clear. I
+shall therefore proceed to make the essential points quite
+briefly:
+(1) What we must suppose Jones to have developed is the
+germ of a theory which permits many different developments. We must not pin it down to any of the more sophisticated forms it takes in the hands of classical philosophers.
+Thus, the theory need not be given a Socratic or Cartesian
+form, according to which this "inner speech" is a function of
+a separate substance; though primitive peoples may have had
+good reason to suppose that humans consist of two separate
+things.
+(2) Let us suppose Jones to have called these discursive
+entities thoughts. We can admit at once that the framework
+of thoughts he has introduced is a framework of "unobserved," "nonempirical" "inner" episodes. For we can point
+out immediately that in these respects they are no worse off
+than the particles and episodes of physical theory. For these
+episodes are "in" language-using animals as molecular impacts are "in" gases, not as "ghosts"
+are in "machines." They
+are "nonempirical" in the simple sense that they are theoretical —not definable in observational terms. Nor does the fact
+that they are, a introduced, unobserved entities imply that
+Jones could not have good reason for supposing them to
+exist. Their "
+'purity" is not a metaphysical purity, but, so to
+speak, a metbodological purity. As we have seen, the fact that
+they are not introduced as physiological entities does not
+preclude the possibility that at a later methodological stage,
+
+105
+they may, so to speak, "turn out" to be such. Thus, there are
+many who would say that it is already reasonable to suppose
+that these tboughts are to be "identified" with complex events
+in the cerebral cortex functioning along the lines of a calculating machine. Jones, of course, has no such idea.
+(3) Although the theory postulates that overt discourse is
+the culmination of a process which begins with "inner discourse," this should not be taken to mean that overt discourse
+stands to "inner discourse" de voluntary movements stand to
+intentions and motives. True, overt linguistic events can be
+produced as means to ends. But serious errors creep into the
+interpretation of both language and thought if one interprets
+the idea that overt linguistic episodes epress thoughts, on the
+model of the use of an instrument. Thus, it should be noted
+that Jones' theory, as I have sketched it, is perfectly compatible with the idea that the ability to have thoughts is
+acquired in the process of acquiring overt speech and that
+only after overt speech is well established, can "inner speech"
+occur without its overt culmination.
+(4) Although the occurrence of overt speech episodes
+which are characterizable in semantical terms is explained
+by the theory in terms of thought which are aldo characterized
+in semantical terms, this does not mean that the idea that
+overt speech "has meaning" is being analyzed in terms of the
+intentionality of thoughts. It must not be forgotten that the
+semantical characterization of overt verbal epiunded is the primary use
+of semantical terma, and that overt linguistic evente ad semantically
+characterized are the model for the inner epiunded introduced by the
+theary,
+(5) One final point before we come to the dénouement of
+the first episode in the saga of Jones. It cannot be emphasized too much that although these theoretical discursive
+
+106
+episodes or thoughts are introduced as inner episodes — which
+is merely to repeat that they are introduced as tbeoretical
+episodes - they are not introduced as immediate experienced. Let
+me remind the reader that Jones, like his Neo-Rylean contemporaries, does not as yet have this concept. And even
+when he, and they, acquire it, by a process which will be the
+second episode in my myth, it will only be the philosophers
+among them who will suppose that the inner episodes introduced for one theoretical purpose -thoughts -must be a
+subset of immediate experiences, inner episodes introduced
+for another theoretical purpose.
+59. Here, then, is the dénouement. I have suggested a number of times that although it would be most misleading to say
+that concepts pertaining to thinking are theoretical concepts,
+yet their status might be illuminated by means of the contrast
+between theoretical and non-theoretical discourse. We are
+now in a position to see exactly why this is so. For once our
+fictitious ancestor, Jones, has developed the theory that overt
+verbal behavior is the expression of thoughts, and taught
+his compatriots to make use of the theory in interpreting
+each other's behavior, it is but a short step to the use of
+this language in self-description. Thus, when Tom, watching
+Dick, has behavioral evidence which warrants the use of the
+sentence (in the language of the theory) "Dick is thinking
+'p'" (or "Dick is thinking that p"), Dick, using the same
+behavioral evidence, can say, in the language of the theory,
+"I am thinking 'p'" (or "I am thinking that p"). And it now
+turns out — need it have? - that Dick can be trained to give
+reasonably reliable self-descriptions, using the language of
+the theory, without having to observe his overt behavior.
+Jones brings this about, roughly, by applauding utterances
+by Dick of "I am thinking that p" when the behavioral
+evidence strongly supports the theoretical statement "Dick is
+
+107
+thinking that p"; and by frowning on utterances of "I am
+thinking that p." when the evidence does not support this
+theoretical statement. Our ancestors begin to speak of the
+privileged access each of us has to his own thoughts. What
+began as a language with a purely theoretical ude bad gained a
+reporting role.
+As I see it, this story helps us understand that concepts
+pertaining to such inner episodes as thoughts are primarily
+and essentially intersubjective, as intersubjective as the concept of a positron, and that the reporting role of these concepts - the fact that each of us has a privileged access to his
+thoughts -constitutes a dimension of the use of these concepts which is built on and presupposed this intersubjective
+status. My myth has shown that the fact that language is
+essentially an intersubjective achievement, and is learned in
+intersubjective contexts —a fact rightly stressed in modern
+psychologies of language, thus by B. F. Skinner (21), and by
+certain philosophers, e.g. Carnap (7), Wittgenstein (22) - is
+compatible with the "privacy" of "inner episodes." It also
+makes clear that this privacy is not an "absolute privacy."
+For if it recognizes that these concepts have a reporting use
+in which one is not drawing inferences from behavioral
+evidence, it nevertheless insists that the fact that overt behavior is evidence for these episodes is built into the very logic
+of these concepti, just as the fact that the observable behavior
+of gases is evidence for molecular episodes is built into the
+very logic of molecule talk.
+XVI. The Logic of Private Episodes: Impressions
+60. We are now ready for the problem of the status of
+concepts pertaining to immediate experience. The first step
+is to remind ourselves that among the inner episodes which
+
+108
+belong to the framework of thoughts will be perceptions, that
+is to say, seeing that the table is brown, bearing that the piano is
+out of tune, etc. Until Jones introduced this framework, the
+only concepts our fictitious ancestors had of perceptual episoder were those of overt verbal reports, made, for example,
+in the context of looking at an object in standard conditions.
+Seeing that something is the cade is an inner episode in the
+Jonesean theory which has as its model reporting on looking
+that something is the case. It will be remembered from an earlier
+section that just as when I say that Dick reported that the table
+is green, I commit myself to the truth of what he reported,
+so to say of Dick that he daw that the table is green is, in
+part, to ascribe to Dick the idea 'this table is green' and to
+endorse this idea. The reader might refer back to Sections
+16 ff. for an elaboration of this point.
+With the enrichment of the originally Rylean framework
+to include inner perceptual episodes, I have established contact with my original formulation of the problem of inner
+experience (Sections 22 ff.). For I can readily reconstruct in
+this framework my earlier account of the language of appearing,
+both qualitative and existential. Let us turn, therefore to the
+final chapter of our historical novel. By now our ancestors
+speak a quite un-Rylean language. But it still contains no
+reference to such things as impressions, sensations, or feelings- in short, to the items which philosophers lump together under the heading "immediate experiences.'
+" It will be
+remembered that we had reached a point at which, as far as
+we could see, the phrase "impression of a red triangle" could
+only mean something like "that state of a perceiver —over
+and above the idea that there is a red and triangular physical
+object over there -which is common to those situations in
+which
+
+109
+(a) he sees that the object over there is red and triangular;
+(b) the object over there looks to him to be red and triangular;
+(c) there looks to him to be a red and triangular physical object over there."
+Our problem was that, on the one hand, it seemed absurd to
+say that impressions, for example, are theoretical entities,
+while, on the other, the interpretation of impressions as
+theoretical entities seemed to provide the only hope of accounting for the positive content and explanatory power that
+the idea that there are such entities appears to have, and of
+enabling us to understand how we could have arrived at this
+idea. The account I have just been giving of thought suggests
+how this apparent dilemma can be resolved.
+For we continue the myth by supposing that Jones develops, in crude and sketchy form, of course, a theory of sense
+perception. Jones' theory does not have to be either wellarticulated or precise in order to be the first effective step in
+the development of a mode of discourse which today, in the
+case of some sense-modalities at least, is extraordinarily subtle and complex. We need, therefore, attribute to this mythical theory only those minimal features which enable it to
+throw light on the logic of our ordinary language about
+immediate experiences. From this standpoint it is sufficient
+to suppose that the hero of my myth postulates a class of
+inner-theoretical —episodes which he calls, say, impressions,
+and which are the end results of the impingement of physical
+objects and processes on various parts of the body, and, in
+particular, to follow up the specific form in which I have
+posed our problem, the eye.
+
+110
+61. A number of points can be made right away:
+(1) The entities introduced by the theory are states of the
+perceiving subject, not a clade of particulars. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the particulars of the commonsense world are such things as books, pages, turnips, dogs,
+persons, noises, flashes, etc., and the Space and Time-
+Kant's Undinge-in which they come to be. What is likely to
+make us suppose that impresdion are introduced as particulars is that, as in the case of thoughts, this ur-theory is
+formulated in terms of a model. This time the model is the
+idea of a domain of "inner replicas" which, when brought
+about in standard conditions, share the perceptible characteristics of their physical source. It is important to see that
+the model is the occurrence "in" perceivers of replicas, not of
+perceivings of replicas. Thus, the model for an impression of a
+red triangle is a red and triangular replica, not a seeing of a red
+and triangular replica. The latter alternative would have the
+merit of recognizing that impressions are not particulars. But,
+by misunderstanding the role of models in the formulation
+of a theory, it mistakenly assumes that if the entities of the
+model are particulars, the theoretical entities which are introduced by means of the model must themselves be particulars-thus overlooking the role of the commentary. And by
+taking the model to be seeing a red and triangular replica, it
+smuggles into the language of impressions the logic of the
+language of thoughts. For seeing is a engritive episode which
+involves the framework of thoughts, and to take it as the
+model is to give aid and comfort to the assimilation of impressions to thoughts, and thoughts to impressions which, as
+I have already pointed out, is responsible for many of the
+confusions of the classical account of both thoughts and
+impressions.
+(2) The fact that impressiond are theoretical entities en-
+
+ables us to understand how they can be intrinsically characterized - that is to say, characterized by something more than
+a definite description, such as "entity of the kind which has as its
+standard cause looking at a red and triangular physical object
+in such and such circumstances" or "entity of the kind which
+is common to the situations in which there looks to be a red
+and triangular physical object." For although the predicates
+of a theory owe their meaningfulness to the fact that they are
+logically related to predicates which apply to the observable
+phenomena which the theory explains, the predicates of a
+theory are not shorthand for definite descriptions of properties in terms of these observation predicates. When the kinetic theory of gases speaks of molecules as having mad, the
+term "mass" is not the abbreviation of a definite description
+of the form "the property which ..." Thus, "impression of a
+red triangle" does not simply mean "impression such as is
+caused by red and triangular physical objects in standard
+conditions," though it is true-Logically true -of impressions
+of red triangles that they are of that sort which is caused by
+red and triangular objects in standard conditions.
+(3) If the theory of impressions were developed in true
+logistical style, we could say that the intrinsic properties of
+impressions are "implicitly defined" by the postulates of the
+theory, as we can say that the intrinsic properties of subatomic particles are "implicitly defined" by the fundamental
+principles of subatomic theory. For this would be just another way of saying that one knows the meaning of a theoretical term when one knows (a) how it is related to other
+theoretical terms, and (b) how the theoretical system as a
+whole is tied to the observation language. But, as I have
+pointed out, our ur-behaviorist does not formulate his theory
+in textbook style. He formulates it in terms of a model.
+Now the model entities are entities which do have intrinsic
+
+112
+properties. They are, for example, red and triangular wafers.
+It might therefore seem that the theory specifies the intrinsic
+characteristics of impressions to be the familiar perceptible
+qualities of physical objects and processes. If this were so, of
+course, the theory would be ultimately incoherent, for it
+would attribute to impressions — which are clearly not physical objects-characteristics which, if our argument to date
+is sound, only physical objects can have. Fortunately, this
+line of thought overlooks what we have called the commentary on the model, which qualifies, restricts and interprets
+the analogy between the familiar entities of the model and
+the theoretical entities which are being introduced. Thus, it
+would be a mistake to suppose that since the model for the
+impression of a red triangle is a red and triangular wafer, the
+impression itself is a red and triangular wafer. What can be
+said is that the impression of a red triangle is analogous, to
+an extent which is by no means neatly and tidily specified,
+to a red and triangular wafer. The essential feature of the
+analogy is that visual impressions stand to one another in a
+system of ways of resembling and differing which is structurally similar to the ways in which the colors and shapes of
+visible objects resemble and differ.
+(4) It might be concluded from this last point that the
+concept of the impression of a red triangle is a "
+purely
+formal" concept, the concept of a "logical form" which can
+acquire a "content" only by means of "ostensive definition."
+One can see why a philosopher might want to say this, and
+why he might conclude that in so far as concepts pertaining
+to immediate experiences are intersubjective, they are "purely
+structural," the "content" of immediate experience being incommunicable. Yet this line of thought is but another expression of the Myth of the Given. For the theoretical concept
+
+113
+of the impression of a red triangle would be no more and no
+less "without content" than any theoretical concept. And
+while, like these, it must belong to a framework which is
+logically connected with the language of observable fact, the
+logical relation between a theoretical language and the language of observable fact has nothing to do with the epistemological fiction of an "ostensive definition."
+(5) The impressions of Jones' theory are, as was pointed
+out above, states of the perceiver, rather than particulars. If
+we remind ourselves that these states are not introduced as
+physiological states (see Section 55), a number of interesting
+questions arise which tie in with the reflections on the status
+of the scientific picture of the world (Sections 39-44 above)
+but which, unfortunately, there is space only to adumbrate.
+Thus, some philosophers have thought it obvious that we can
+expect that in the development of science it will become
+reasonable to identify all the concepts of behavior theory
+with definable terms in neurophysiological theory, and these,
+in turn, with definable terms in theoretical physics. It is
+important to realize that the second step of this prediction,
+at least, is either a truum or a mistake. It is a truism if it
+involves a tacit redefinition of "physical theory" to mean
+"theory adequate to account for the observable behavior of
+any object (including animals and persons which has physical properties." While if "physical theory" is taken in its
+ordinary sense of "theory adequate to explain the observable
+behavior of physical objects," it is, I believe, mistaken.
+To ask how impremion fit together with electromagnetic fielde,
+for example, is to ask a mistaken question. It is to mix the
+framework of molar behavior theory with the framework of
+the micro-theory of physical objects. The proper question is,
+rather, "What would correspond in a micro-theory of sentient
+
+114
+organisms to molar concepts pertaining to impressions?" And
+it is, I believe, in answer to this question that one would come
+upon the particulars which sense-datum theorists profess to
+find (by analysis) in the common-sense universe of discourse
+(cf. Section 23). Furthermore, I believe that in characterizing
+these particulars, the micro-behaviorist would be led to say
+something like the following: "It is such particulars which
+(from the standpoint of the theory) are being responded to
+by the organism when it looks to a person as though there
+were a red and triangular physical object over there." It
+would, of course, be incorrect to say that, in the ordinary
+sense, such a particular is red or triangular. What could be
+said, * however, is that whereas in the common-sense picture
+physical objects are red and triangular but the impression
+"of" a red triangle is neither red nor triangular, in the framework of this micro-theory, the theoretical counterparts of
+sentient organisms are Space-Time worms characterized by
+two kinds of variables: (a) variables which also characterize
+the theoretical counterparts of merely material objects; (b)
+variables peculiar to sentient things; and that these latter
+variables are the counterparts in this new framework of the
+perceptible qualities of the physical objects of the commonsense framework. It is statements such as these which would
+be the cash value of the idea that ".
+'physical objects aren't
+really colored; colors exist only in the perceiver,"
+and that
+"to see that the facing surface of a physical object is red
+and triangular is to mistake a red and triangular sense content
+for a physical object with a red and triangular facing side."
+* For a discussion of some logical points pertaining to this framework, the reader
+should consult the essay, "The Concept of Emergence." by Paul E. Meehl and
+Wilfrid Sellars, Minnesota Studies in the Philosopby of Science, vol. I (Minneapolis:
+University of Minnesota Press, 1956), pp. 239-252.
+
+115
+Both these ideas clearly treat what is really a speculative
+philosophical critique (see Section 41) of the common-sense
+framework of physical objects and the perception of physical
+objects in the light of an envisaged ideal scientific framework,
+as though it were a matter of distinctions which can be drawn
+within the common-sense framework itself.
+62. This brings me to the final chapter of my story. Let us
+suppose that as his final service to mankind before he vanishes without a trace, Jones teaches his theory of perception
+to his fellows. As before in the case of thoughta, they begin
+by using the language of impressions to draw theoretical
+conclusions from appropriate premises. (Notice that the evidence for theoretical statements in the language of impressions will include such introspectible inner episodes as its
+looking to one at though there were a red and triangular physical
+object over there, as well as overt behavior.) Finally he succeeds
+in training them to make a reporting use of this language. He
+trains them, that is, to say "I have the impression of a red
+triangle" when, and only when, according to the theory, they
+are indeed having the impression of a red triangle.
+Once again the myth helps us to understand that concepts
+pertaining to certain inner episodes-in this case impredsonu-can be primarily and essentially intersubjective, without
+being resolvable into overt behavioral symptoms, and that
+the reporting role of these concepts, their role in introspection, the fact that each of us has a privileged access to his
+impressions, constitutes a dimension of these concepts which
+is built on and prepposed their role in intersubjective discourse. It also makes clear why the "privacy" of these episodes is not the "absolute privacy" of the traditional puzzles.
+For, as in the case of thoughts, the fact that overt behavior
+is evidence for these episodes is built into the very logic of
+
+116
+these concepts as the fact that the observable behavior of
+gases is evidence for molecular episodes is built into the very
+logic of molecule talk.
+Notice that what our "ancestors" have acquired under the
+guidance of Jones is not "just another language" — a "notational convenience" or "code" - which merely enables them
+to say what they can already say in the language of qualitative and existential looking. They have acquired another
+language, indeed, but it is one which, though it rests on a
+framework of discourse about public objects in Space and
+Time, has an autonomous logical structure, and contains an
+explanation of, not just a code for, such facts as that there looks
+to me to be a red and triangular physical object wer there. And notice
+that while our "ancestors" came to notice impressions, and
+the language of impressions embodies a "discovery" that
+there are such things, the language of impressions was no
+more tailored to fit antecedent noticings of these entities than
+the language of molecules was tailored to fit antecedent
+noticings of molecules.
+And the spirit of Jones is not yet dead. For it is the
+particulars of the micro-theory discussed in Section 61(5)
+which are the solid core of the sense contents and sense fields
+of the sense-datum theorist. Envisaging the general lines
+of that framework, even sketching some of its regions, he
+has taught himself to play with it (in his study) as a report
+language. Unfortunately, he mislocates the truth of these
+conceptions, and, with a modesty forgivable in any but a philosopher, confuses his own creative enrichment of the framework of empirical knowledge, with an analysis of knowledge
+as it was. He construes as data the particulars and arrays
+of particulars which he has come to be able to observe,
+
+117
+and believes them to be antecedent objects of knowledge
+which have somehow been in the framework from the beginning. It is in the very act of taking that he speaks of the given.
+63. I have used a myth to kill a myth-the Myth of the
+Given. But is my myth really a myth? Or does the reader
+not recognize Jones as Man himself in the middle of his
+journey from the grunts and groans of the cave to the subtle
+and polydimensional discourse of the drawing room, the
+laboratory, and the study, the language of Henry and William
+James, of Einstein and of the philosophers who, in their
+efforts to break out of discourse to an arché beyond discourse,
+have provided the most curious dimension of all.
+References
+1. Ayer, A. J. Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. London: Macmillan,
+1940.
+2. Ayer, A. J. "The Terminology of Sense Data," in Philosophical Ex-
+saye, pp. 66-104. London: Macmillan, 1954. Also in Mind, 54, 1945,
+pp. 298-312.
+3. Braithwaite, R. B. Scientific Explanation. Cambridge: Cambridge
+Univ. Pr., 1953.
+4. Broad, C. D. Scientific Thought. London: Kegan Paul, 1923.
+5. Campbell, Norman. Plyrics: The Elements. Cambridge: Cambridge
+Univ. Pr., 1920.
+6. Carnap, Rudolf. Introduction to Semantica. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago
+Pr., 1942.
+7. Carnap, Rudolf: "Psychologie in Plyvikalischer Sprache," Erkenntnis,
+3:|07-42 (1933).
+8. Carnap, Rudolf. "The Interpretation of Physics," in H. Feigl and
+M. Brodbeck (eds.), Readinge in the Philovapby of Science, pp. 309-18.
+New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953. This selection consists
+of pp. 59-69 of his Foundations of Logic and Mathematica. Chicago:
+Univ. of Chicago Pr., 1939.
+9. Chisholm, Roderick. "The Theory of Appearing," in Max Black
+
+118
+(ed.), Philosophical Analydis, pp. 102-18. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Pr.,
+1950.
+10. Hempel, C. G. Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science.
+Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Pr., 1952.
+I1. Linnell, John. "Berkeley's Critique of Abstract Ideas." A Ph.D. thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Minnesota, June 1954.
+12. Paul, G. A. 'Is there a Problem about Sense Data?" in Supplementary Volume XV of the Aristotelian Society Proceedling.. Also in A. C
+V. Flew (ed.), Lagic and Language. New York: Philosophical Lib
+1951.
+13. Price, H. H. Perception. London: Methuen, 1932.
+14. Price, H. H. Thinking and Experience. London: Hutchinson's Univ.
+Lib., 1953.
+15. Reichenbach, H. Philosopbie der Raum-Zeit-Lebre. Berlin: de Gruyter,
+16. Reichenbach, H. Experienie and Prediction. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago
+Pr., 1938.
+17. Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson's Univ. Lib.,
+1949
+18. Sellars, Wilfrid. "Mind, Meaning and Behavior," Philosophical Studied,
+3:83-94 (1952).
+19. Sellars, Wilfrid. "A Semantical Solution of the Mind-Body Problem," Methodor, 5:45-84 (1953).
+20. Sellars, Wilfrid. "Empiricism and Abstract Entities," in Paul A.
+Schlipp (ed.), The Philampby of Rudolf Carnap. Evanston (IIl.): Li-
+brary of Living Philosophers (forthcoming). (Available in mimeograph form from the author.)
+21. Skinner, B. F. "The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms,"
+Prychological Review, 52:270-77 (1945). Reprinted in H. Feigl and M.
+Brodbeck (eds.), Readings in the Philosoply of Science, pp. 585-94.
+New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953.
+22. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. London: Macmillan, 1953.
+
+ROBERT BRANDOM
+THE NOTES THAT FOLLOW were developed over
+the years to help my graduate and advanced undergraduate students at the University of Pittsburgh to
+see their way through the textual trees to the Sellarsian forest. They are meant to provide only a first take
+on the material, to indicate the most general outlines
+of the structure of the essay and of the thought behind
+it. To that end, many philosophically interesting issues
+and discussions have been brushed past. In particular, I have sedulously avoided discussing genuinely
+esoteric issues — such as the philosophical significance
+some have professed to find in the distinction between
+'red' paragraphs and 'green' paragraphs. The formulations and characterizations that are provided are
+not intended to be definitive or authoritative. They
+aim to provide a place to start reading this rich and
+difficult text.
+The idea for such a document, and the notes to the
+concluding sections, had their origins in a handout
+Richard Rorty circulated for similar purposes when I
+was a graduate student at Princeton in the 1970s. I
+
+120
+am grateful to my colleague John McDowell, and to our
+former student Danielle Macbeth, for many suggestions and
+improvements. It should be noted, though, that where their
+comments evidenced substantive disagreements about what
+Sellars is (and ought to be) saying -concerning in particular
+the intricacies of 'looks' talk in relation to reports of the
+presence of secondary qualities, and the various theses and
+commitments involved in scientific realism - I have stuck to
+my own readings. The errors that remain, both those of
+omission and of commission, should be charged to my account alone.
+Note: Section numbers of "Empiricism and the Philosophy
+of Mind" are indicated in square brackets: [36]. On the rare
+occasions where sections of this guide must be referenced, I
+use double brackets: [[36]].
+Part | [I]-[7]
+An Ambiguity in Sense-Datum Theories
+Section I: Sellars announces that his project is to attack "the
+whole framework of givenness." By this he does not mean to
+be undercutting the distinction between judgments we arrive
+at noninferentially, paradigmatically through perception, and
+those that are arrived at as the conclusions of inferences.
+Indeed, one of the positive tasks of the essay is precisely to
+tell us how to understand noninferential reports without
+insensibly sliding into the constellation of philosophical commitments that Sellars calls "the Myth of the Given." Sensedatum theories, his immediate target, are important only as
+prominent and influential instances of the appeal to givenness. We will have to learn to recognize such appeals in many
+less obvious guises.
+
+121
+In these opening sections, the Myth of the Given shows
+up in the guise of the idea that some kind of non-epistemic
+facts about knowers could entail epistemic facts about
+them.! Epistemic facts about knowers are in the first instance
+facts about what someone knowd (though we will come to see
+that facts about what one merely believed are equally
+'epistemic' facts in Sellars's sense). One of Descartes's signal
+innovations was to define the mind in epistemic terms: for a
+state to be a mental state is for being in that state to entail
+knowing that one is in that state (transparency, ruling out
+ignorance) and for beliering that one is in that state to entail
+being in that state (incorrigibility, ruling out error). The mind
+is the realm of what is known immediately, not just in the
+sense of noninferentially, but in the stronger sense that its
+goings-on are given to us in a way that banishes the possibility
+both of ignorance and of error. (Descartes's thought was
+that if anything is known to us mediately, that is, by means
+of representations of it, then something-some kind of representations — must be known to us immediately, on pain of
+an infinite regress.) Sellars will try to show us that the
+Cartesian way of talking about the mind is the result of
+confusion about the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic items, and the roles they can play in various sorts
+of explanation.
+In its most familiar form, the Myth of the Given blurs
+the distinction between sentience and sapience. This is the
+distinction between being aware in the sense of being merely
+awake (which we share with nondiscursive animals-those
+I. The discussion of foundationalism in [32] shows that one can still be committed to the Myth of the Given even if'one's foundations are conceived as epistemic
+facts-if the capacity to know those facts is thought of as independent of inferential
+capacities and hence the acquisition of ordinary empirical concepts.
+
+122
+that do not grasp concepts), on the one hand, and, on the
+other hand, being aware in a sense that involves knowledge
+either by being a kind of knowledge, or as potentially serving to justify judgments that so qualify. The "idea that a
+sensation of a red triangle is the very paradigm of empirical knowledge" [7] is a paradigm of the sort of conflation in
+question. The Myth of the Given is the idea that there can
+be a kind of awareneds that has two properties. First, it is
+or entails having a certain sort of knowledge-perhaps not of
+other things, but at least that one is in that state, or a state
+of that kind -knowledge that the one whose state it is possesses simply in virtue of being in that state. Second, it
+entails that the capacity to have that sort of awareness, to be
+in that sort of state, does not presuppose the acquisition of
+any concepti-that one can be aware in that sense independently of and antecedently to grasping or mastering the use
+of any concepts (paradigmatically through language learning).? The conclusion of Sellars's critical argument is that
+these two features are incompatible: only what is propositionally contentful, and so conceptually articulated, can
+serve as (or, for that matter, stand in need of) a justification, and so ground or constitute knowledge. Davidson expresses a version of this thought with the slogan, "Nothing
+can count as a reason for holding a belief except another
+belief." Sellars's thought is better captured by changing this
+to "Nothing can count as a reason for endorsing a believable
+except another believable," where believables are the con-
+2. As McDowell puts the point: "The idea of the Given is the idea that the space
+of reasons, the space of justifications or warrants, extends more widely than the
+conceptual sphere" (Mind and World [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
+1994], p. 7); that is, that what is Given can serve as a justification, without its being
+given requiring the exercise of conceptual capacities.
+
+STuDY GuIdE
+123
+tents of possible beliefs, that is, what is propositionally contentful.3
+Sellars understands propositional contentfulness, what is
+epistemic in the sense of being a candidate for knowledge,
+in terms of role in what he calls "the game of giving and
+asking for reasons." "In characterizing an episode or state as
+that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of
+that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of
+reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says"
+[36]. To treat something as even a candidate for knowledge
+is at once to talk about its potential role in inference, as
+premise and conclusion. Because a crucial distinguishing
+feature of epistemic facts for Sellars is that their expression
+requires the use of normative vocabulary, to treat something
+as a candidate for knowledge is also to raise the issue of
+its normative status. The Myth of the Given eventually appears as "of a piece with the naturalistic fallacy in ethics" -
+the attempt to derive ought from id.4 This is because talk
+of knowledge is inevitably talk of what (conceptually articulated propositional contents) someone is committed to,
+and whether he is in various senses entitled to those commitments.
+Section 2: Here Sellars distinguishes between the act or episode of sensing, on the one hand, and the content of that
+3. The emendation allows that propositionally contentful items that are not
+believings might serve as epistemic justifiers-for instance, that facts could play this
+4. "The idea that epistemic facts can be analyzed without remainder-even in
+principle'-into non-epistemic facts ... is ... a radical mistake—a mistake of a
+piece with the so-called 'naturalistic fallacy' in ethics" [5]. This theme arises very
+early in Sellars's writing. See, for instance, "A Semantical Solution to the Mind-
+Body Problem, " reprinted in J. Sicha, ed., Pure Pragmatics and Pawible Worlds: The
+Early Easays of Wilfrid Sellars (Reseda, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing, 1980).
+
+124
+act, what is sensed, which is called a sense content, on the
+other. When one hallucinates a pink elephant, doing so is
+sensing, and the sense-content is what makes it an of-a-pinkelephant hallucination, rather than, for instance, an of-a-
+green-Norway-rat hallucination. In ordinary perception, the
+contents sensed must be carefully distinguished from the
+external objects sensed (which are entirely absent in the case
+of hallucinations).
+Section 3: Now consider the suitability of sensings of sense
+contents as foundations of knowledge and justification on the
+Cartesian model.
+The general idea of a foundation for knowledge can be
+sketched as follows. Our beliefs constitute knowledge only
+insofar as they are not only true, but jitified- lucky guesses
+don't qualify. One claim or belief can justify another to which
+it is inferentially related. If one is justified in a commitment to
+the claim that p, and q may be inferred from p. then one may
+for that reason be justified in a commitment to the claim that
+%. To say this is to offer a mechanism whereby justification
+can be inherited. But, the thought is, not all commitments
+that are justified can have inherited that status inferentially
+from others. There must be some other mechanism for acquiring positive justification status, to give the inheritance
+mechanism something to pass along. If pi inherits its status
+from pz, and pa inherits it from p3, and so on, then either
+at some point a claim is repeated (some p, is identical
+with a pm for m < n), in which case the "justification'
+is circular,
+or
+there never is a repetition, in which case an infinite regress arises, in which each po has the anomalous
+
+125
+status of an unjustified 'justifier,' which is not itself
+justified until an infinite number of other claims have
+been justified.5
+The conclusion is that there must be some way of being
+justified without having to he justified. We ought to distinguish two senses of 'justification,' one indicating a status
+(being justified), and the other making reference to a process
+(justifying) that can result in possession of the status.6 Then
+the conclusion is that there must be some other way of
+acquiring positive justificatory status besides justifying it in
+the sense of offering a justification. Besides inferential inheritance, there must also be some noninferential acquisition
+mechanism for this epistemic status.
+So far, so good. Descartes concluded from this line of
+thought that there is a kind of claim or belief, call it a basi
+belief, that forms the foundation of all other beliefs in the
+sense that these beliefs are the font from which the justificatory status of all the rest flows inferentially. This does not
+follow, but Sellars will not contest it? Descartes believed
+5. This argument is obviously oversimplified in many ways. Of course justifications need not be single statements —but a corresponding dilemma occurs if sets of
+premises are allowed. The argument also ignores the fact that there is a regress on
+inferences in many ways analogous to this regress on premises, and that the two
+sorts of regress can interact in complex and significant ways.
+6. This is an instance of what Sellars calls "the notorious "ing'led' ambiguity"
+[24]. (See also [[35]].)
+7. See [32]. As it stands, the argument turns on an invalid quantifier inversion.
+What immediately follows from the foundationalist regress argument is at most that
+forench chain of justifications there i a belief that ir justified (has positive justificatory
+status) without having to he justified (by appeal to another belief). It does not follow
+that there i' a kind of belief such that for each chain of justification its terminus is a
+belief of that kind. A belief that stands in need of' justification in one context might
+serve as an unjustified justifier in another. Compare: For each minute there is a woman
+somewhere having a baby at that time. This is true. It does not follow that there in
+a woman such that foreach minute, she is having a baby at that time. If it did follow,
+then we could solve the problem of overpopulation by finding that woman and
+making her stop!
+
+126
+further that unless those beliefs were certain (the ultimate
+positive justificatory status), none of those inferentially based
+upon them could even be probable (as C. I. Lewis put it in
+Murd and the World Order). Descartes gave philosophy a decisive epistemic turn which was, at least until Kant, confused
+with a subjective turn. The latter is a consequence only of
+Descartes's peculiar and optional way of working out the
+former. For he defined the mind by its epistemic status, as
+what is best known to itself by falling within the reach of the
+subject's incorrigibility and local omniscience. This epistemic
+definition is what motivates the assimilation of events whose
+contents are structured like sentences, such as thinking that
+Vienna is a city in Austria, and events whose contents are
+structured like pictures, such as imagining or seeming to see
+a red triangle inside a green circle.
+To return to the idea of using sensings of sense contents
+as a foundation of knowledge, then, a process is pictured
+something like this:
+Physical Objects
+Sensings of Sense Contents
+2
+Noninferential Beliefs
+3
+Inferential Beliefs
+
+STuDy GuIDE
+127
+In the standard perceptual case, it is becale there is a red
+object with an octagonal facing surface in front of me that I
+find myself with a sensing of a red and octagonal sense
+content. It is because I have such a sense content that I acquire
+the noninferential belief that there is a red and octagonal
+object in front of me. And it is hecaue I have this belief,
+together, perhaps, with other beliefs, that I am justified in
+the further inferential belief that there is a stop sign in front
+of me.
+The point to focus on is the nature of the 'because's. The
+first (arrow 1) can be understood as a causal notion, perhaps the sort studied by students of the neurophysiology of
+perception. As such, it relates particulars describable in a
+nonnormative vocabulary. This is a matter-of-factual, nonepistemic relation. The final 'because' (arrow 3), on the other
+hand, indicates the sort of relation Sellars calls 'epistemic.' It
+is an inferential notion, relating sententially structured beliefs
+(or believables) which are repeatable abstracta—a matter of
+reasons rather than causes. This justificatory relation is not
+a natural one, but a normative one; it is not the empirical
+scientist, but the logician or epistemologist who has the final
+say about it.
+The question is, what sort of relation is the middle one
+(arrow 2)? Does it belong in a box with the first, causal
+relation, or in a box with the third, inferential relation? How
+are the sensings of sense contents to be conceived as related
+to (potentially foundational) noninferential beliefs? Here is
+where the distinction between the epistemic and the nonepistemic, between particulars specified in the language of
+causes and believables specified in the language of reasons,
+comes into play.
+Suppose that one understands the sensing of a sense con-
+
+128
+tent to be the existence of a nonepistemic relation between
+one particular, the sense content, and another, the person
+doing the sensing. (This is the position Sellars himself eventually endorses.) If so, then it is hard to see how the sensing
+of a sense content could entail or justify a claim, for instance, a noninferential belief. For only things with sentential
+structure can be premises of inference, not nonepistemically
+specified particulars. For this reason sensings, understood in
+terms of nonepistemic relations between sense contents and
+perceivers, are not well suited to serve as the ultimate ground
+to which inferentially inherited justification traces back.
+Since the occurrence of such a sensing does not entail commitment to any claim, it would be possible to have one
+without coming to believe anything, and certainly without
+coming to know anything (for this latter requires positive
+justificatory status). So it seems the foundationalist who
+wants to appeal to sensings as foundational must take the
+sensing of a sense content to be an epistemic fact about the
+sensing agent. But if so, what becomes of the particular?
+Sectione 4 and 5: The sense-datum theorist can treat sensings
+as epistemic noninferential beliefs, from which inferences
+may be made and justification status inherited, so that
+sensings can perform their foundational function. To retain
+a role for the mental particulars that are sensed (sense data,
+sense contents conceived as a kind of sensed object), that
+theorist must be willing to say the following: "The primitive
+notion is believing that sense content i has property F To
+sense the sense content . is to believe that it has some (no
+matter what) characteristic F. The sense content, which is
+a particular, is the intentional object of the epistemic sensing." The important thing to notice about this analysis is
+that epistemic notions are presupposed, not accounted for in
+
+129
+terms of a supposedly antecedently understood nonepistemic
+notion of sensing a sense content (thought of as a relation
+between a subject and a sense content, both of them particulars). In fact Sellars believes that no such reduction of the
+epistemic to the nonepistemic is possible, even in principlethough his arguments will not depend on this claim.
+Section 6: At this point a further consideration is introduced:
+the ability to stand in the passive causal relations to the
+physical world envisaged by the fans of givenness is not
+something that must be acquired through experience or training. Organisms of the right sort get it just by being awake.
+But the capacity to have beliefs of the form 't is F' involves
+classifying unrepeatables or particulars under repeatables or
+universals. It is natural to think that the capacity to classify
+is acquired, since one must learn by experience and training
+what the boundaries of the classes are. This line of thought
+results in the inconsistent triad of claims that the sense-datum
+theorist is committed to, and would like to be entitled to
+A. 'S senses red sense content .r, ' entails 'S noninferentially believes (knows) that . is red.'
+B. The ability to sense sense contents is unacquired.
+C. The capacity to have classificatory beliefs of the form
+it is F' is acquired.
+If A is given up, the sensing of sense contents becomes a
+nonepistemic event, which can at best be a logically necessary condition of knowledge or noninferential beliefs, not a
+logically sufficient condition of it. To take this way out would
+be to discard the line pursued in [4] and [5]. If B is given
+up, the sense-datum theorist must either claim that we need
+practice to feel pain, hunger, itches, and so on when we are
+infants, or claim that feeling these things is not sensing. But
+
+130
+then what is sensing? If C is given up, a story must be told
+about what universal concepts are innate (unacquired, inborn, wired-in) and which are not. This would require much
+more than even latter-day innatists such as Chomsky have
+claimed, since substantive concepts like red and tall, not
+merely grammatical forms, would have to be innate. A is the
+Myth of the Given, in one of its forms, and Sellars will give
+it up. He'll then owe (and provide) us a new account of both
+thoughts and sensations, and of the origins (both in the order
+of causation and in the order of justification) of knowledge.
+Section 7: Sellars's diagnosis, which is not yet a treatment for
+the conceptual illness of givenness, is that it results from
+confusing two trains of thought, the first derived from an
+attempt to give a scientific account of perception and the
+acquisition of empirical information, and the second from an
+attempt to give a foundational epistemological account on the
+Cartesian model canvassed above in the discussion of [3]:
+I. The idea that there are certain inner episodes -e.g.,
+sensations of red or of C# which can occur to human
+beings (and brutes) without any prior process of
+learning or concept formation; and without which it
+would in some sense be impossible to see, for example, that the facing surface of a physical object is red
+and triangular, or hear that a certain physical sound
+is C#.
+2. The idea that there are certain inner episodes which
+are the noninferential knowings that certain items
+are, for example, red or C#; and that these episodes
+are the necessary conditions of empirical knowledge
+as providing evidence for all other empirical propositions.
+
+131
+The first class consists of particulars, picked out by their
+causal role. The second consists of claimings structured like
+sentences, picked out by their inferential or justificatory
+role. Sellars will offer an account (starting in [45]) of the
+genus, inner episode, to which these two species belong. He
+will call the first kind 'sense impressions,' and the second
+kind 'thoughts,' and will describe the roles they play. Finally,
+he will explain how they are related in human knowledge. (I
+have talked about belief so far, where Sellars talks about
+knowledge, in order to emphasize that the question of the
+justification of or warrant for noninferential beliefs has yet to
+be discussed.)
+The result of running together these two lines of thought
+is "the idea that a sensation of a red triangle is the very
+paradigm of empirical knowledge." That idea is subject to
+precisely those related 'perplexities' that Sellars has pointed
+out:
+• Should we think of the sensation in question as a kind
+of particular (structured like a triangle), or as a kind of
+belief (structured like a sentence)?
+• Is the capacity to have empirical knowledge like this
+acquired by experience, or prior to experience?
+• Is it prior to the rest of our knowledge in the order of
+causation, or in the order of justification and evidence?
+Part || [8]-[9]
+Another Language?
+Section 8: This and the next two sections (both marked in
+the original as Section 9!) are in one way an aside. The
+main thread is picked up again in [10]. The excursus is
+used to introduce some important ideas that will be dis-
+
+132
+cussed further along. The topic here is one possible form
+a sense-datum theory might take to avoid the nonepistemically-specifiable-particular vs. only-epistemically-specifiablesententially-structured-premise dilemma Sellars is constructing for it. One might give up entirely on the nonepistemic
+side of things and embrace the foundational noninferential belief side. Thus Ayer sees sensing-of-sense-data talk
+as equivalent to and derivative from talk about how things
+look or seem to a subject. The suggestion comes in three
+parts:
+a) There is a class of noninterential beliefs that form a
+justificatory basis for the rest of our empirical beliefs.
+[Note that this would be sufficient to respond to the
+regress argument sketched above in [[3]], though, as
+suggested there, it is not a necessary condition for a
+response.]
+b) Three nested descriptions of a phenomenon. First, a
+platitude: I may be mistaken that there is a red triangle in front of me. It is not possible for me to be mistaken about there seeming to be one. Next, a reifying
+move: an application of the Cartesian principle that
+although appearance must be distinguished from reality since subjects can be in error about the latter, on
+pain of an infinite regress it cannot be that one might
+be mistaken about the former also. Finally, a foundational claim: the class mentioned in (a) consists of beliefs that would be expressed by sentences used to
+make perceptual reports, prefixed by a special operator "It looks to me now that ...,
+" 'It seems to me
+now that...,
+" or "It now appears to me just as
+though...
+
+133
+c) Sentences of the form "S is having (or is aware of) a
+sense datum that is F" (say, red and triangular) are
+by definition equivalent to sentences of the form "It
+seems to S that he senses something F." On this understanding, there are no particulars that are sense
+data - the apparently referential singular terms that
+give the contrary impression must be understood contextually, like the 'it' in 'it is raining.'
+Section 9: Here Sellars offers an observation about this approach and then formulates a dilemma for it. The observation
+regards merely generic lookings. Something can look polygonal without there being any determinate number of sides that
+it looks to have. But nothing can le polygonal without there
+being a determinate number of sides that it has. (This contrast will be explored in [17].) So the inferences one is
+permitted to make in sense-datum talk as introduced by the
+equivalence asserted by (c) are not the same as those licensed
+by the sense-datum theorist's talk of sense data as particulars
+(for which the above 'inference to further determination'
+goes through). Thus the code is misleading.
+Section 9 lis: The dilemma presents a more serious objection.
+If sense-datum talk is just a code, it is redundant (insofar as
+it is not misleading). So what good is it? It can't explain
+anything about seemings or appearance. To do that it would
+have to be a theory of appearings, explaining them by relation
+to a certain kind of particular, namely, sense data. (Sellars
+begins to explain how he thinks about theoretical explanation
+in [21] and [22]. We then hear a lot more about this topic
+in the second half of the essay, beginning at [391-[44]) But
+this would reintroduce the strand of thought (1) above (in
+
+134
+[7] and [[7]]), which the code theory is formulated precisely
+to avoid. The lesson is that that strand of thought is not
+altogether mistaken. The account Sellars will offer provides
+a theory of appearings, and will embrace and reconcile (1)
+and (2), properly understood. So (c) is not a way to avoid
+the problem. It allows us to look, however, at the assumptions
+(a) and (b) to which it was conjoined. Sellars's conclusion is
+that this line of thought is committed already at step (b) to
+the possibility of inferring from claims exclusively about how
+things seem to claims about how things actually are. But if,
+as (a) and (b) assert, all empirical evidence ultimately derives
+from how things seem, it is clear that such an inference
+cannot be warranted empirically, by inductive correlation of
+appearances and realities. The alternative seems to be to
+find a definitional reduction according to which "ordinary
+discourse about physical objects and perceivers could (in
+principle) be constructed from sentences of the form 'There
+looks to be a physical object with a red and triangular facing
+surface over there."" Since commitment to (a) and (b) is
+much more widespread than commitment to (c), it is important to see what is wrong with the view the former expresswhy the reduction they presuppose is impossible. To that end
+Sellars turns to the logic of 'looks' or 'seems' talk.
+Part I|| [1O]-[Z0]
+The Logic of "Looks'
+Section 10: To get out of the trilemma of [6], it is necessary
+to "examine these two ideas [(1) and (2) in [7] and [[7]]]
+and determine how that which survives criticism in each
+is properly to be combined with the other." To begin with,
+consider the genus inner episode to which each subject
+
+135
+has privileged access, which is common to sensations and
+thoughts.
+a) Logical positivists have denied that there could be
+such episodes, because their existence is not intersubjectively verifiable or falsifiable. This is the source of
+the traditional problem of other minds, and of the inverted spectrum. To avoid entertaining such unverifiable hypotheses, one can reject idea (1).
+b) Wittgenstein and some of his followers have attacked
+(2), the idea that inner episodes can be premises for
+inferentially based knowledge, because as private
+they escape the net of public discourse and language
+learning (the beetle in the box, and the private language argument).
+Sellars disagrees with both of these. We'll return to the first
+later under the heading "behaviorism' ([54]-[55]). What one
+should reject in order to avoid the problem of other minds
+and the possibility of inverted spectra is the Myth of the
+Given, not the notion of inner episodes. Sellars will argue (in
+[45]-[47]) that (b) is both too strong and too weak. It is too
+strong in that inner episodes need not escape the net of public
+discourse. The second half of EPM has the task of showing
+us how to think of inner episodes — as theoretical entities that
+became observable. It is too weak in that this repudiation of
+inner episodes is not (as we see in the following sections)
+sufficient to avoid Sellars's foe, the Myth of the Given.
+Section 11: The problem is that noninferential beliefs of the
+form "X looks F to S" can be held to be given in the bad
+sense even if, for inverted spectrum and beetle-in-a-box reasons, one refuses to talk about intrinsic properties of these
+
+136
+lookings. That is, even if one does not assume (as one ought
+not, see [21]) that if anything looks F to S, something is F
+(the "sense-datum inference"), one can still fall prey to the
+Myth. In order to attack this more insidious form of the
+Myth, then, Sellars considers the notion of 'looks' talk independent of any relation it might be taken to have to inner
+episodes as particulars.
+Section 12: The question is, Does looka-red come before it-red
+conceptually (and so in the order of explanation)? That is,
+could the latter be defined in terms of the former in such a
+way that one could learn how to use the defining concept
+(looking-F) first, and only afterwards, by means of the definition, learn how to use the defined concept (i-F)? Descartes
+and his tradition claimed that looke-F talk, with which it is
+possible to form a class of statements about which subjects
+are incorrigible, is a foundation of knowledge, and so must
+be prior in this sense to it-F talk, with which it is possible to
+express only corrigible, inferred beliefs. This view is the
+essence of Descartes's foundationalism.
+Descartes was struck by the fact that the appearance/reality distinction seems not to apply to appearances. While I
+may be mistaken about whether something is red (or whether
+the tower, in the distance, is square), I cannot in the same
+way be mistaken about whether it looks red to me now.
+While I may legitimately be challenged by a doubter- "Perhaps the item is not really red; perhaps it only seem red"-
+8. I might be mistaken about whether red is what it looks, that is, whether the
+property expressed by the word 'red' is the one it looks to have. But that, the
+thought goes, is another matter. I cannot be mistaken that it looks that way, like
+that, where this latter phrase is understood as having a noncomparative use. It
+looke-red, i.e., it has a distinctive phenomenal property, which we may inconveniently
+only happen to be able to pick out by its association with a word for a real-world
+property.
+
+137
+there is no room for the further doubt, "Perhaps the item
+does not even seem red; perhaps it only deems to seem red."
+If it seems to seem red, then it really does seem red. The
+looko, seemo, or appears operators collapse if we try to iterate
+them. A contrast between appearance and reality is marked
+by the distinction between looke-F and F for ordinary (realityindicating) predicates 'F. But no corresponding contrast is
+marked by the distinction between looked-to-look-F and looks-F.
+Appearances are reified by Descartes as things that really
+are just however they appear. He inferred that we do not
+know them mediately, by means of representings that introduce the possibility of mid-representing (a distinction between how they really are and how they merely appear, i.e.,
+are represented as being). Rather, we know them immediately-simply by having them. Thus appearings-thought
+of as a realm of entities reported on by noninferentially elicited claims about how things look (for the visual case), or
+more generally seem, or appear - show up as having the ideal
+qualifications for epistemologically secure foundations of
+knowledge: we cannot make mistakes about them. Just baving an appearance ("being appeared-to F-ly," in one of the
+variations Sellars discusses) counts as knowing something: not
+that something is F, to be sure, but at least that something
+looke, deena-, or appears-F. The possibility accordingly arises
+of reconstructing our knowledge by starting out only with
+knowledge of this sort-knowledge of how things look, seem,
+or appear —and building up in some way to our knowledge
+(if any) of how things really are (outside the realm of appearance).
+This project requires that concepts of the form looks-F be
+intelligible in principle in advance of grasping the corresponding concepts F (or i-F). Sellars is a linguistic pragmatist about the conceptual order; that is, for him, grasp of a
+
+138
+concept just is mastery of the use of a word.? So he systematically pursues the methodology of translating questions of
+conceptual priority into questions about the relative autonomy of various language games. He will argue that in this
+case, Descartes got things backwards. 'Looks' talk does not
+form an autonomous stratum of the language-it is not a
+language-game one could play though one played no other.
+One must already be able to use "is-F' talk in order to master
+'looks-F' talk, which turns out to be parasitic on it. In this
+precise practical sense, i-F is conceptually (Sellars often says
+'logically') prior to looke-F.
+Section 13: The definition being considered for exploitation
+in a Cartesian order of explanation (and so, ultimately, of
+justification) is
+• lit red = de. t would look red under standard conditions.
+Sellars will show how to acknowledge that this claim is
+definitionally true without countenancing the conceptual priority of'looks' talk, and hence without giving aid and comfort
+to givenness and the sort of foundationalism it supports.
+Section 14: Sentences can have reporting (noninferential) uses
+as well as (merely) fact stating (inferential) uses.!° For reliable reporters, one may infer from the fact that one is dis-
+9. For it to be a concept one grasps thereby, the word must have an inferential
+role; it must be usable in formulating premises and conclusions of inferences
+assessable as correct or incorrect. Thus acquiring the differential responsive dispositions required to use the word 'ouch' does not qualify as grasping a concept. See
+[[1] below
+10. Sellars's terminology is strained here. There is no reason to deny that
+noninferential reports are in the fact-stating line of work, and so, when true, state
+facts. The preferred usage is to see the distinction between claims that are noninferentially elicited and those that arise as the conclusions of inferences as a distinction within fact-stating discourse.
+
+STUDY GuIdE
+139
+posed to say that . is F and that the conditions are as far as
+one knows standard and that when under those conditions
+one is so disposed it is usually the case that a is F, to the
+conclusion that t' is in fact F. (The reporter's having to believe
+all of this, and so to understand it, is crucial to Sellars's later
+argument). Understanding the possibility of systematic error
+in the responsive dispositions of reporters introduces a new
+dimension in the relation between practices of reporting and
+those of inferring. Here Sellars introduces the illustrative
+parable of young John in the tie shop.
+Section 15: Where collateral beliefs indicate that systematic
+error is likely, the subject learns not to make the report it is
+F, to which his previously inculcated responsive dispositions
+incline him, but to make a new kind of claim: it looke (or
+seems) F.' Of course it is tempting to take this as a new kind
+of report, indeed, a report of a special kind of particular, a
+sense datum. This report, then, is naturally thought of as
+reporting a minimal, noninferentially ascertainable, foundationally basic fact, about which each subject is incorrigible.
+There are two points here which might be distinguished.
+First, it is a mistake in any case to treat what is reported as
+foundationally basic facts, for the concepts needed to formulate them turn out to depend on other concepts, which are
+not formed using any analogue of a 'looks'-operator. (See
+[32].) Second, it is a mistake to treat these as reports at
+all -since they evince a disposition to call something F, but
+may not happily be thought of as saying that one has such a
+disposition. Sellars wavers on the second point, but he is firm
+on the first.
+Section (1) 16: Sellarss alternative analysis depends on distinguishing two different dimensions of the use of a noninfer-
+
+140
+ential report. First, each report is the manifestation of some
+reliable differential responsive disposition. That is, it is the result
+of one's being trained to behave in a certain way when in
+certain environmental situations (like a pigeon trained to
+peck at the red square when the red light comes on). What
+is the difference between a parrot trained to utter "That's
+red!" when and only when confronted by the visible presence
+of something red, and a genuine noninferential reporter of
+the same circumstance? Having the differential responsive
+dispositions is not enough to have the concept, else a chunk
+of iron that rusts in wet environments and not in dry ones
+would have to be counted as having the concepts of wet and
+dry environments. What more, besides the parrot's sentience,
+is required for the sapience that consists in responding differentially by applying a concept? Sellars's answer, invoking the
+second dimension of reporting, is that the response must be
+taking up a position in the space of reasons - making a move
+in the game of giving and asking for reasons. The genuine
+noninferential reporter of red things has, and the parrot has
+not, mastered the inferential role played by reports of that
+type -where inferential role is a matter of what conclusions
+one is entitled to draw from such a statement when it is
+overheard, what would count as a reason for it, and what is
+incompatible with it and so a reason against it. This is a
+matter of the inferentially articulated content of the assertional commitment undertaken by the reporter in virtue of
+the performance that is the reporting: what the reporter is
+responsible for. Sellars's term for this second dimension is
+endorsement, a matter of what one is linguistically committed to
+(the inferential consequences of ones claims) or responsible
+for (how it could be justified) in virtue of one's assertional
+performance. This notion of responsibility, or of what conclu-
+
+STuDy GuIDE
+141
+sions one has given others the right to draw, or has obliged
+oneself to draw, and what other commitments would count
+as entitling one to the commitment one has undertaken is the
+normative element in linguistic conduct, whose irreducibility
+to descriptive aspects (such as responsive dispositions) lies
+at the base of the epistemic/nonepistemic distinction, and is
+the source of Sellars's remark about the naturalistic fallacy
+at the end of [5].
+On Sellars's understanding, the ability to use t looks
+green' correctly appeals to the same responsive dispositions
+acquired in learning to use it is green' correctly. But these
+two sorts of remarks elicited in accordance with those dispositions support quite different inferences. In particular, the
+parable of the tie shop shows that in saying that something
+merely look green, one can be understood to be doing two
+things: expressing one's noninferential differential responsive
+disposition to call it green (to commit oneself to the claim
+that it is green, with all of its inferential consequences and
+justificatory obligations), and at the same time explicitly
+withholding one's endorsement of that claim. For collateral
+beliefs concerning the possibility of systematic error under
+the prevailing circumstances of observation have undermined
+the reporter's confidence in his reliability-that is, in the
+correctness of the inference from "X is disposed noninferentially to report the presence of something green (seen by
+electric lighting)," to "There is (probably) something green
+there."
+This analysis of what one is doing in using 'looks' explains
+the incorrigibility of 'looks' talk. One can be wrong about
+whether something i green because the claim one endorses,
+the commitment one undertakes, may turn out to be incorrect. For instance, its inferential consequences may be incom-
+
+142
+patible with other facts one is or comes to be in a position
+to know independently. But in saying that something looks
+green, one is not endorsing a claim, but withholding endorsement from one. Such a reporter is merely evincing a disposition to do something that for other reasons (e.g., suspicion
+that the circumstances of observation lead to systematic error) he is unwilling to do-namely, endorse a claim. Such a
+reporter cannot be wrong, because he has held back from
+making a commitment. This is why the looks, seema, and
+appears operators do not iterate. Their function is to express
+the withholding of endorsement from the sentence that appears within the scope of the operator. There is no sensible
+contrast between 'looks-to-look F' and 'looks-F' of the sort
+there is between 'looks-F'
+and '(is-)F' because the first 'looks'
+has already withheld endorsement from the only content in
+the vicinity to which one might be committed (to something's
+being F). There is no further withholding work for the
+second 'looks' to do. There is nothing left to take back. Since
+asserting 'X looks F' is not undertaking a propositionally
+contentful commitment-but only expressing an overrideable disposition to do so-there is no issue as to whether or
+not that commitment (which one?) is correct.
+Sellars accordingly explains the incorrigibility of appearance-claims, which had so impressed Descartes. He does so
+in terms of the practices of using words, which are what
+grasp of the relevant appearance concepts must amount to,
+according to his methodological linguistic pragmatism. But
+once we have seen the source and nature of this incorrigibility - in down-to-earth, practical, resolutely nonmetaphysical
+terms —we see also why it is precisely unsuited to use as an
+epistemological foundation for the rest of our (risky, corrigible) empirical knowledge. For, first, the incorrigibility of
+
+143
+claims about how things merely look simply reflects their
+emptiness: the fact that they are not really claims at all.
+And second, the same story shows us that looks' talk is not
+an autonomous language game-one that could be played
+though one played no other. It is entirely parasitic on the
+practice of making risky empirical reports of how things
+actually are. Thus Descartes seized on a genuine phenomenon -the incorrigibility of claims about appearances, reflecting the non-iterability of operators like looke, seema, and
+appear -but misunderstood its nature, and so mistakenly
+thought it available to play an epistemologically foundational
+role for which it is in no way suited.
+This analysis of "the logic of 'looks' talk," along with the
+consequent diagnosis of the errors of a foundationalism based
+on the incorrigibility of our epistemic access to appearances,
+is the constructive core of Sellars's critique of Cartesianism.
+It does not purport to be a knock-down argument; for it can
+only be as persuasive as its account of how 'looks' talk works,
+and alternatives are always possible.' What it is meant to do
+I1. "There are many interesting and subtle questions about the dialectics of
+'looks'-talk, into which I do not have space to enter" [17]. Sellars focuses on one
+sort of use that 'looks' has: first-person, noninferential uses. But as he points out in
+this section, 'looks' also has third-person, (merely) fact-stating uses, as when S' says:
+"X looks I to S." The account generalizes to these cases straightforwardly. In
+making this claim, S' is doing two things: attributing to S a disposition noninferentially to report that X is F, and herself withholding endorsement from the claim that
+X is F. The words used to make this report do not settle whether S' would attribute
+to S the endorsement, or the withholding of endorsement, from the claim that X is
+F (that is, whether S' takes it that the disposition being she attributes to S issues
+in an endorsement, or is overridden and withheld by S). More expressively powerful
+and discriminating regimented uses that do mark such distinctions are easily contrived. (This same idea will account for the nontrivial iterated or embedded uses of'
+'looks' or 'seems' made possible by shifts of perspective: "It seems to S' that X looks
+F to S, and so on.)
+Further uses of 'looks' that are more challenging to the Sellarsian account have
+been pointed out by Joe Camp. These are cases where we use looks F without a
+
+144
+is to remove the temptation to go the Cartesian foundationalist route, by explaining, without explaining away, the exact
+nature of that temptation.
+Section 17: (This line of thought is completed in [22]). We
+begin to look for some confirmation of the two-pronged
+account of 'looks' talk as expressing a differential responsive
+disposition to make a specified noninferential report, while
+withholding endorsement of that claim. The confirmation
+takes the form of explanations of otherwise puzzling features
+of appearance-talk. Consider the three sentences:
+(i) The apple over there is red.
+(ii) The apple over there looks red.
+(iii) It looks as though there were a red apple over there.
+Utterances of these sentences can express the same responsive disposition to report the presence of a red apple, but
+they endorse (take responsibility for the inferential consequences of) different parts of that claim. (i) endorses both
+the existence of the apple and its quality of redness. (ii)
+endorses only the existence of the apple. The 'looks' locution
+explicitly cancels the qualitative commitment or endorsement. (iii) explicitly cancels both the existential and the
+corresponding practice of' using the unmodified '(is) F:' Thus after the optometrist
+puts pupil-dilating drops in my eyes, I may say, "Things look blurry." 'Blurry' does
+not express a way things could be. It is essentially an expression pertaining to images
+or representations. Taking this sort of use of 'looks' as central and paradigmatic
+could encourage the reintroduction of the idea that noninferential uses of looks'
+are genuine reports, reports of intrinsic features of appearances as such. Sellarsians
+ing possibilities, derivative from the central uses, and to be explained in terms of'
+them. Sellars himself never discusses this issue.
+In a note to the 1963 edition, Sellars suggests that one might distinguish between
+looks P and looks to be f, in a way that corresponds to Chisholms distinction
+between noncomparative and comparative 'appears' statements.
+
+145
+qualitative endorsements. Thus, if someone claims that there
+is in fact no apple over there, he is asserting something
+incompatible with (i) and (ii), but not with (iii). If he denies
+that there is anything red over there, he asserts something incompatible with (i), but not with (ii) or (iii). Sellars's account
+of the practice of using 'looks,' in terms of the withholding
+of endorsement when one suspects systematic error in one's
+responsive dispositions, can account for the difference in
+scope of endorsement that (i)-(iii) exhibit. But how could
+that difference be accounted for on a sense-datum approach?
+In this section Sellars points out another virtue of his
+account, as opposed to sense-datum theories, namely, the
+possibility of reporting a merely generic (more accurately,
+merely determinable) look. (Recall that Sellars introduced
+this phenomenon already in [9].) Thus it is possible for an
+apple to look red, without its looking any specific shade of
+red (crimson, scarlet, etc.). It is possible for a plane figure
+to look many-sided without there being some particular number of sides (say 119) which it looks to have. But if 'looks'
+statements are to be understood as reports of the presence
+before the eye of the mind of a particular which is F, how
+can this possibility be understood? Particulars are completely
+determinate. A horse has a particular number of hairs,
+though as Sellars points out, it can look to have merely 'a lot'
+of them. It is a particular shade of brown (or several shades),
+even though it may look only darkly colored. So how are
+such generic, merely determinable, looks possible? Sellars's
+account is in terms of scope of endorsement. One says that
+the plane figure looks 'many-sided' instead of ' 119-sided' just
+in case one is willing only to endorse (be held responsible
+for justifying) the more general claim. This is a matter of how
+far one is willing to trust one's responsive dispositions, a
+
+146
+STuDY GuIDe
+matter of the epistemic credence one feels they deserve or
+are able to sustain. Particulars, even if they are sense contents, cannot be colored without being some determinate
+color and shade. How then can the sense-datum theorist -
+who wants to say that when something looks F to S, something in S it F-account for the fact that something can look
+colored without looking to be any particular color, or look
+red without looking to be any particular shade of red? So
+Sellars's account of 'looks' talk in terms of endorsement can
+account for two aspects of that kind of discourse that no
+theory that invokes a given can explain: the scope distinctions between qualitative and existential lookings, and the
+possibility of merely generic or determinable lookings.
+Section 18: On this account, then, one must first acquire the
+practice of reporting red objects (getting both the appropriate responsive dispositions and an understanding of what one
+is endorsing by making such a claim), and only then can one
+learn to make reports expressing those same dispositions, but
+which are more guarded in their endorsement. As the argument of the previous section has shown, the mastery of
+different endorsements required can be quite sophisticated.
+One may, for instance, discriminate existential and qualitative lookings, and various grades of determinability. Thus to
+know when something looks red, one must understand what
+it is to be red, and a good deal besides.! We can see at this
+point that the sentence we worried about in [13] is true
+12. In a footnote added to the 1963 reprinting of' the essay, Sellars points out
+that his story is compatible with distinguishing a rudimentary concept corresponding
+to the use of 'green,' which one can have without having mastered the use of looks
+green, and a richer concept (corresponding more closely to ours) which is achieved
+only once one has also mastered 'looks' talk. This observation opens the door to
+distinguishing (as McDowell does) concepts corresponding to secondary qualities as
+those mastery of which requires mastery of the associated looks' vocabulary-as,
+arguably, green does, while massive, and perhaps square, do not.
+
+147
+because it is a definition, not of is-red, but of standard conditions. For standard conditions are just those in which one's
+responsive dispositions can be trusted, and ought to be fully
+endorsed. Given such a definition, one can investigate empirically what those conditions are.
+Section 19 and 20: These sections return to the question of the
+acquisition of various capacities involved in mastering an
+observation concept, the question that set up the trilemma of
+[6]. We now know that these capacities involve both regular
+responsive dispositions and a capacity to manipulate endorsements inferentially, a nonepistemic and an epistemic
+skill respectively. The specifically inferential articulation required for endorsements to qualify as conceptually contentful
+introduces at least a limited bolium into Sellars's picture: one
+could not have one concept unless one had many others to
+which it is inferentially related: "The essential point is that
+even to have the more rudimentary concept [of green, say]
+presupposes having a battery of other concepts." This entails
+rejecting the idea that "fundamental concepts pertaining to
+observable fact have that logical independence of one another which is characteristic of the empiricist tradition."
+These sections do not present Sellars's argument in a perspicuous, or even linear, fashion, and the argument is repeated in more satisfactory form at [33]-[37], where we will
+discuss it.
+Part IV [Z1]-[23]
+Explaining Looks
+Sections 21 and 22: [17] discussed the issue of the scope of
+endorsement, which is treated in the third paragraph of [21].
+Sellars reformulates that account in terms of the events that
+
+148
+are lookings and seeings, where earlier we discussed the
+reports causally occasioned by those events. The first two
+paragraphs of [22] and the third paragraph of [21] then
+present a preliminary account of a distinction between two
+ways in which some phenomenon can be explained:
+(i) By deducing it from some empirical generalization
+formulated entirely in terms of observables (things
+that can be noninferentially reported). Explaining a
+change in pressure of a gas sample by appealing to
+the law PV = kT, together with suitable background conditions, is an example.
+(il) By postulating unobservable entities, and subsuming
+the phenomenon under laws involving those theoretical entities. Explaining the change in pressure of a
+gas by appealing to the kinetic theory of gases and
+its postulated molecules and their interactions is an
+example.
+Once again, this discussion is really out of place here, serving
+merely as a dark foreshadowing of a line of argument that
+will be pursued in more detail later (beginning at [39]-[44]).
+Sellars does here raise the important question that remains
+even after we have understood existential, qualitative, and
+unqualified 'looks' statements in terms of scope of endorsement (as in [17]), namely, what is it that is common to the
+three cases? The answer, we will see, is "sense impressions
+of red." But that is an answer we will not be able to understand until the very end of the essay ([62]).
+Section 23: This section discusses the question of what things
+can literally be red. Sellars's claim is that only physical
+objects can, and that it is a mistake to think that even facing
+surfaces can, except in a derivative sense. The discussion as it
+
+149
+stands is unsatisfactory, since criteria of primacy of sense and
+literalness of attribution are not forthcoming. Once again, a
+later discussion is being prefigured, in this case concerning
+the 'of-red'ness of sensations in [60]-[61].
+Parts V and VI (Sections [24]-[29]) offer a discussion of
+the British Empiricists' treatment of impressions. They fill in
+some of the historical background of Sellars's discussion, but
+are not central or essential to the development of his argument.
+Part V [24]-[25]
+Impressions and Ideas: A Logical Point
+Sections 24 and 25: A discussion of the intentionality of 'sensation of ..! Sellars's view is that Descartes mistakenly
+assimilated sensations and thoughts because of the way in
+which each is 'of' or 'about or directed at something. There
+need be no red triangle for me to have a sensation 'of' one,
+and there need be no golden mountain for me to have a
+thought 'of' one. But this is a superficial similarity, for the
+kind of aboutness is in fact quite different in the two cases.
+An equally important motivation for the assimilation, which
+Sellars does not mention here, is the incorrigibility and transparency, the epistemic privilege accorded to reports of sensations and of thoughts. Here Sellars points out "the notorious
+'ing'l'ed' ambiguity" as it applies to the concept of experience.
+Part VI [26]-[29]
+Impressions and Ideas: A Historical Point
+Section 26: The inverted spectrum problem cannot be stated
+without recourse to some version of the Myth of the Given.
+*
+*
+
+150
+Section 27: A central epistemological problem of the empiricists Locke, Berkeley, and Hume is taken to be the question
+how, given that we can be aware of completely determinate
+sense repeatables, we can come to be aware also of determinable sense repeatables. Determinate/determinable is like species/genus, except that there is no separately specifiable differentiating factor. Colors are the prime example: scarlet is a
+more determinate shade of the determinable color red, as red
+is a determination of the determinable colored.
+Section 28: The British Empiricists "... all take for granted
+that the human mind has an innate ability to be aware of
+certain determinate sorts — indeed, that we are aware of them
+simply by virtue of having sensations and images." That is,
+they did not ask a corresponding question about how, given
+that we can be aware of particular unrepeatable token sense
+contents, we can come to be aware also of their repeatable
+types, even maximally determinate ones.
+Section 29: Against this Sellars will argue for what he calls
+'psychological nominalism' (not the best imaginable name),
+according to which all awareness of repeatables (whether
+determinate or determinable) is a linguistic affair, and hence
+may not be presupposed in one's account of the acquisition
+and functioning of language. Sellars is proposing a linguistic,
+social theory of awareness. He has in mind more by this term
+than simply being awake (not being asleep): he is after
+awareness in the sense of sapience, not of sentience. It is classificatory awareness, awareness of something as something.
+But not all acts of classification are acts of awareness. As
+pointed out above in [[16]], anything with stable dispositions
+to respond differentially to stimuli can be thought of as
+
+151
+classifying the stimuli according to the repeatable responses
+those stimuli elicit. A parrot trained to respond differentially
+to red things in its environment does not display the sort of
+awareness that Sellars is explaining. Such awareness, specifically conceptual awareness, requires something beyond being awake and classifying by differential response.
+Part VII [OJ-BI]
+The Logic of 'Means'
+Section 30: Anyone whose account of the prelinguistic awareness that makes language acquisition possible assigns it an
+inferential structure (Sellars says 'logical,' but that is just
+1950s talk for 'conceptual,' which for Sellars can be parsed
+as 'inferential") and is committed to the Myth of the Given.
+Such conceptual awareness involves not only classification,
+but making the classifications significant in inferences. It is
+at this point that statements of fact are made, particulars
+referred to and classified under universals. On the sort of
+account Sellars opposes to the Myth, conceptual content is
+inferentially articulated. But inference is a process arising
+only within the "game of giving and asking for reasons,"
+which essentially involves beliefs. This is a normative realm,
+of commitment and entitlement to claims, of endorsement
+and justification. It is what Sellars has been calling the
+'epistemic.' The Myth is to think that anything could intrinsically, naturally, or necessarily possess a particular significance for this realm, independent of the acquisition or
+deployment of concepts by the one for whom it has that
+significance. Acts of awareness as traditionally conceived, as
+entailing the existence of something sufficiently belief-like to
+serve as the ultimate inferential ground of empirical knowl-
+
+152
+edge (never mind as themselves constituting knowledge),
+would have to have just such a property.
+Section 3l: So learning a meaning ought not to be understood
+as associating something one is already aware of with a
+verbal symbol. But isn't this the natural way to understand
+statements like "'Rot' (in German) means red"? How else
+can Sellars understand this sentence except as expressing an
+association between ones awareness of the determinable repeatable quality and the word 'rot"? His answer is that
+meaning claims like this really assert that the mentioned
+expression ('rot') plays the same conceptual functional role
+as the used expression ('red"'). 'These considerations make it
+clear that nothing whatever can be inferred ... about the
+exact way in which the word red' is related to red things,
+from the truth of the semantical statement "red" means the
+quality red.'"
+Part VIII [32]-[38]
+Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?
+Section 32: Another incorrect, foundationalist account is described here. Sellars disagrees with only one bit of this
+story, though it turns out to be an important bit. Foundationalism is the claim that there is a structure of particular beliefs
+such that
+(1) Each one is noninferentially arrived at.
+(2) The beliefs in (1) presuppose no other belief, either
+particular or general.
+(3) These noninferentially acquired beliefs constitute the
+ultimate court of appeal for all factual claims.
+
+153
+Sellars accepts (1) and (3), but denies (2). His project at this
+point is to show how a bit of knowledge (beliet) can, and
+indeed how all of it does, presuppose other knowledge (belief), even though it is not inferred from that other knowledge
+or belief. This possibility was not seriously examined by the
+classical epistemological tradition. It is a certain hierarchical
+picture of understanding (at this level a necessary condition of
+believing) that Sellars rejects. He does not object to a hierarchical picture of justification, once that has been suitably
+disentangled from bad foundationalism concerning the nature and acquisition of belief.
+For Sellars, there is no such thing as a noninferential
+belief, if by that one means a belief one could have without
+grasping its inferential connection to at least some other
+beliefs. For to understand a sentence, to grasp a propositional
+content (a necessary condition of having a belief) is to place
+it in the space of reasons, to assign it an inferential role in
+the game of giving and asking for reasons, as entailing some
+other contents and being incompatible with others. A noninferential report or belief can properly be called 'noninferential' only in the sense that the reporter's commitment to an
+essentially inferentially articulated content is elicited noninferentially on this occasion - that is, that it is elicited as a
+response to some nonlinguistic, nonepistemic environing circumstance, rather than as a response to another belief or
+assertion. Noninferential beliefs do not form an autonomous
+discursive stratum: there could be no language game consisting entirely of noninferential reports. (Notice that this is a
+stronger claim than that made above in connection with
+'looks'-talk. For this claim concerns any kind of noninferential report, whether what they report is inner or outer, appearances or empirical realities.) For any sentence to have
+
+154
+STuDy GuIdE
+noninferential uses, some sentences must have inferential
+ones. For the conceptual content expressed by a sentence
+(what is believed) essentially involves its potential as a premise and as a conclusion of inferences. Unless one can employ
+noninferentially acquired beliefs as the premises of inferences
+leading to further beliefs, their acquisition does not qualify
+as acquiring belief: (something propositionally contentful) at
+all. On this inferentialist picture of conceptual content, one
+cannot have one concept without having many inferentially
+interrelated ones. This does not mean that there could not
+be a language consisting only of expressions for observables,
+however. For the concepts of observables are concepts that
+have noninferential, reporting, uses. The requirement is only
+that the concepts that can be used to make noninferential
+reports must also be available to be applied inferentially, as
+the conclusions of inferences whose premises are the noninferential applications of other concepts.
+Sellars begins by asking about the nature of the autbority
+(a patently normative notion) of noninferential beliefs, that
+is, their capacity to justify other claims. A distinction is
+needed first between sentence types and sentence tokens: the
+type is repeatable and can be instantiated on different occasions, whereas the token is unrepeatable. It is the utterance
+or inscription of the sentence on a particular occasion. So if
+the distinction is applied to letters instead of sentences, the
+sequence 'aeaaeea' contains two letter types and seven letter
+tokens, four of one type and three of the other. Now it can
+be seen that it is sentence tokens whose justification is at
+issue. For though there are some sentences that are justified,
+if they are justified at all, whenever they are tokened, such
+as '2 + 2 = 4,' and 'Red is a color,' there are others that can
+be justified (and true) on one occasion and not justified or
+true on another. Then only the tokens and not the types can
+
+155
+be said to be justified. These are sentences like 'That car is
+red, ' or 'I'm hungry now,' which contain words whose reference is determined by the actual circumstances in which the
+sentence is tokened. These are called "token reflexive" expressions. Many, though not all, of the noninferential beliefs
+putatively described in (1)-(3) above are token reflexive.
+Authority or credibility (positive justification status) is either
+extrinsic, coming from something else, in this case by inferential inheritance, or intrinsic. Intrinsic credibility may be
+associated with types, as in meaning-analytic statements such
+as 'All bachelors are unmarried males,' or with tokens, as
+in 'This is red' (or, given Sellars's account of 'looks,' "This
+looks red).
+Section 33: Sellars now considers a line of thought according
+to which intrinsically credible types and intrinsically credible
+tokens, analytic claims 3 and observation reports, are similar
+in that they are both types such that their being correctly
+tokened, that is, tokened according to the rules for the use of
+all the component expressions, is a sufficient, not just a
+necessary, condition of their being true and justified (hence
+not just believed but known). Sellars can swallow all of this
+13. In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" Quine objects to the notion of meaninganalytic claims (claims true in virtue solely of the meanings of their words) on the
+broadly pragmatist grounds that there is no practically discernible status corresponding to this supposed category. Claims taken to be analytic, such as "All
+bachelors are unmarried males."
+are not immune from revision, known a priori, or
+otherwise distinguished from statements of very general fact, such as "There have
+been black dogs." Sellars accepts analyticity, which he associates with the practical
+status of counterfactual robustness. This line of thought ties our concepts to what
+we take to be laws of nature. (See Sellars's "Concepts as Involving Laws, and
+Inconceivable without Them," in Pure Pragmaties and Powsible Worles, and "Counterfactuals, Dispositions, and the Causal Modalities, " in Minnesota Studies in the Philosoplay of Science, ed. Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven, and Grover Maxwell, vol. 2,
+pp. 225-308 [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958].) So conceived,
+analytic claims are neither immune from revision nor known a priori.
+
+156
+except the bit about rules. The idea that he will reject is that
+analytic statements are true by virtue of discursive definition
+(definition of a linguistic expression in terms of other linguistic expressions), while observation reports are true by virtue
+of ostensive definitions. Ostensive definitions are the only
+sort we can give of terms like 'red.' They consist of defining
+the expression by exhibiting samples of the things it applies
+to (pointing to red objects). The usual foundationalist infinite
+regress argument can be applied to show that not all expressions of the language can be discursively defined on pain of
+circularity or infinite regress (in either case no definition
+is achieved). So there must be ostensive definitions in the
+language. These definitions, just like the discursive ones,
+codify the rules of appropriate usage of the expressions they
+define. Just as following those rules is sufficient for the truth
+of analytic statements, so following the 'rules' of ostensive
+definition is to be sufficient for the truth of observation
+reports. (Such a rule might look like the definition in [13].)
+At this point Sellars disagrees. One can imagine following
+the rules for the use of 'this, 'is,' and 'green'
+only if one has
+some idea of prelinguistic awareness of green-the Myth.
+For Sellars it is incoherent to talk of ostensive definitions
+setting up rules for using 'green,' for there is no language
+available in which
+such rules could be stated. Ostensive
+definitions establish practices; they are regular, but not rule
+governed.'4
+Section 34: The notion that the authority of noninferential
+reports rests on episodes of nonverbal, hence nonconceptual,
+14. This distinction, and the need for some sense in which a practice (paradignatıcally, a lil
+maticallyan linge isaid practice can be govered larsorm evich thomph is practi
+"Some Reflections on Language Games," reprinted in Science, Perception, and Reality
+(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1963).
+
+157
+awareness, which verbal performances express, is a version
+of the Myth. From Sellars's point of view, such episodes are
+the tortoise underneath the elephant.
+Section 35: Here Sellars presents his alternative view. It begins
+with the observation that "... a token of "This is green' in
+the presence of a green item ... expresses observational
+knowledge [only if] it is a manifestation of a tendency to
+produce tokens of 'This is green' -given a certain 'set' (context of collateral commitments and circumstances) if and
+only if a green object is being looked at in standard conditions. ..." That is, it must be the expression of a reliable
+differential responsive disposition. But photocells and parrots could satisfy this condition, which shows that so far only
+the responsive dispositions part of the observation report has
+been specified. It remains to add conditions to capture the
+epistemic side, the dimension of endorsement, of undertaking
+inferentially articulated commitments, of producing a performance with a distinctive kind of authority.
+To have the authority of knowledge, the report must not
+only he reliable; it must be taken to be reliable. In fact Sellars
+claims that it must be known by the reporter to be reliable
+(and in this he perhaps goes too far): "... the perceiver must
+know that tokens of "This is green' are symptoms of the
+presence of green objects in conditions which are standard
+for visual perception." 'Justification' has the "ing/ed' ambiguity (cf. [24]): justifying, a practical activity, or being justified,
+a normative status. Sellars claims that one cannot have the
+status except when it is possible to redeem that claim to
+authority and epistemic privilege by engaging in the activity
+of justifying it. This claim of the priority of practice over
+status is a specific variety of pragmatism, to which Sellars
+adheres. The difference between a noninferential reporter
+
+158
+and a photocell, or a parrot trained to utter 'It's getting
+warmer' as the temperature rises, does not lie in the reliability
+or range of their responsive dispositions. It lies in the capacity of the reporter to redeem the commitment undertaken,
+the authority claimed by the reporting, by justifying the claim
+(if challenged) by giving reasons for it. The by now familiar
+basic point is that in order to count as making a claim
+(expressing a belief) at all, the reporter must be "in the space
+of giving and asking for reasons," in addition to having the
+right responsive dispositions. The further claim being forwarded here is that for a noninferential report to express
+knowledge (or the belief it expresses to constitute knowl
+edge), the reporter must be able to justify it, by exhibiting
+reasons for it. This is to say that the reporter must be able
+to exhibit it as the conclusion of an inference, even though
+that is not how the commitment originally came about.
+The inference in question is what might be called a "reliability inference." One justifies a noninferentially elicited
+report that something is red by noting that one was disposed
+noninferentially to apply the concept red to it, and pointing
+out that one is a reliable reporter of red things in these
+circumstances. To say that one is reliable is just to say that
+the inference from one's being disposed to call something red
+to its actually being red is a good one. Thus the reliability of
+one's differential responsive dispositions, together with the
+reports being an exercise of those dispositions, justifies -offers good reasons for-the report. In insisting that in order
+properly to be credited with knowledge a reporter must be
+able to offer an inferential justification of the belief in question, Sellars is endorsing an epistemological internalism that
+puts him at odds with more recent reliabilist externalists in
+epistemology. Their claim is that the real function of the
+
+159
+traditional justification condition on knowledge is to rule
+out accidentally true beliefs. If so, then the rationale for engaging in assessments of whether various beliefs qualify as
+knowledge is perfectly well-served by insisting only that
+candidate beliefs result from reliable belief-forming mechanisms -that is, mechanisms that are likely to lead to truths,
+whether or not the reporter knows that they are. Forming
+beliefs that one can justify then appears as one reliable
+mechanism among others.
+Of course, from Sellars's point of view it would be a
+mistake to conclude from this line of thought that one could
+trade inferential justification for reliable belief-formation in
+a wholesale fashion. For that it is belief that one is forming,
+that what one is doing is applying concepts, is a matter of their
+specifically inferential articulation - their role in the game of
+giving and asking for reasons, justifying and demanding
+justifications. Against that background of inferential practice,
+however, it is not obvious why Sellars should resist the
+reliabilist's suggestion. Why isn't it enough that the attributor
+of knowledge know that the reporter is reliable, that the
+attributor of knowledge endorse the inference from the reporter's responsive disposition noninferentially to apply the
+concept red to the thing's (probably) being red? Why should
+the reporter herself have to be able to offer the inferential justification for her noninferential report? (This is the
+thought behind the qualification offered parenthetically early
+in the second paragraph above.)
+Section 36: The moral is that on the true view "one could not
+have observational knowledge of any fact unless one knew
+many other things as well." This is not to say that observation
+reports are somehow results of inferences after all, but only
+
+160
+that, though noninferential, they must be justifiable to be
+justified. The false view thinks it is supposed to give a causal
+description of how knowledge is possessed, but "
+... in characterizing an episode or state as that of knowing we are not
+giving an empirical description of that episode or state: we
+are placing it in the logical space of reasons, or justifying and
+being able to justify what one says." Thus everything irrelevant to justification, either to knowing what would be a
+justification or to being entitled to produce one, is a noncognitive causal antecedent, perhaps a necessary condition of
+empirical knowledge, but not one that is constitutive of it.
+Nor is the general point specific to the normative, epistemic
+status of knowledge-though Sellars does not point this out.
+He could as well have said that in characterizing an episode
+or state as one of believing, or applying concepta, or grasping
+propositional contents we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state but placing it in the logical space
+of reasons, or justifying and being able to justify what one
+says. For only what is inferentially articulated is conceptually
+contentful (and hence qualifies as a believable or claimable)
+at all. As we saw in the previous section, however, Sellars
+does want to insist further that one cannot know noninferentially that something is green unless one also knows that one
+is a reliable reporter of green things under the prevailing
+circumstances.
+Section 37: This view -the one Sellars endorses -seems to
+involve an infinite regress. For how could we have acquired
+knowledge that tokens of "This is green'
+are reliable symptoms ... unless we had had knowledge of such facts as "This
+is green, ' and "This is a token of' this is green'" beforehand? 15
+15. Notice that this is a problem Sellars need not have faced, had he endorsed
+the modified externalism offered to him in [[35]] above.
+
+STUDY GuIdE
+161
+Sellars's answer is that we can acquire knowledge of facts of
+these three types simultaneously, but that we can know facts
+that bear on events that occurred before we acquired any of
+this knowledge. Thus: "... it requires only that it is correct
+to say that Jones now knows, thus remembers, that these
+particular facts did obtain. It does not require that it be
+correct to say that at the time these facts did obtain he then
+knew them to obtain. And the regress disappears." Thus
+children at the age of six can know that at four they saw - in
+the sense of reliably responded to-a fire, although at the
+age of four all they could do was say 'fire' parrot-fashion,
+without knowing there was a fire. 16 The important difference
+is not one of responsive disposition but one of capacity to
+endorse. The six-year-old has moved into the space of giving
+and asking for reasons; he can commit himself to a claim and
+be treated as authoritative; he is responsible for the claim he
+undertakes. For this he must at least be able to tell what he
+is thereby committing himself to and what evidence would
+entitle him to it, that is, he must understand his claim. But
+even that is not sufficient. For this new normative status is
+socially conferred. No nonepistemic description of the candidate reporter suffices for the conferral of this status, unless
+and only insofar as the community conferring that status,
+treating the individual as responsible, reliable, and so on,
+takes it to be sufficient. Compare achieving one's majority
+and being able for the first time to undertake contractual
+obligations. This status consists in the community's recognition of it. Some minors are more reliable at carrying out the
+commitments they undertake than many over the age of
+twenty-one, but this fact does not make their signature mean
+16. Commenting on this point for the 1963 edition, Sellars said that his thought
+was that one could have direct (in the sense of noninferential) knowledge of a past
+fact which one could not conceptualize at the time that it occurred.
+
+162
+that they have entered into a contract. This is how "the light
+dawns slowly over the whole": at some point one masters
+the moves, inferential and noninferential, sufficiently that
+one's noises come to be taken by ones community as having
+the significance of making claims, undertaking commitments,
+giving reasons.
+Section 38: The only sense in which there is no foundation for
+empirical knowledge is the sense in which the observation
+reports, which in a certain sense are its foundation, themselves rest (not inferentially, but in the order of understanding
+and sometimes of justification) on other sorts of knowledge.
+Observation reports, whether of inner episodes or outer
+happenings, do not constitute an autonomous stratum of the
+language —a game one could master though one had as yet
+not mastered the inferential use of any expressions. That is,
+Sellars rejects only claim (2) of the three foundationalist
+theses considered in [32]. But there is no need for a foundation in this sense: "Empirical knowledge is rational, not
+because it has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting
+enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not
+all at once."
+Part IX [39]-[44]
+Science and Ordinary Usage
+Sections 39-44: Here Sellars sketches his Scientific Realism.
+He includes this discussion because if science is viewed in
+the opposite, positivist fashion, the notion of inner episodes
+as theoretical entities, which he is about to introduce, is
+incoherent. Thus [41] claims that "science is the measure of
+all things. ..." This is a view about the authority of claims
+
+163
+couched in scientific vocabulary relative to the authority of
+claims couched in other vocabularies. [43] briefly indicates
+the positivist view. According to the positivist scheme, there
+is an observation language in which data are formulated and
+the results of experiments expressed. All we directly know
+about are the objects of observation (observation reports are
+the Konstatierungen of [33]). According to this account, a
+theoretical language is introduced in order to systematize our
+observations and facilitate prediction and control. But the
+objects the theory postulates are virtual, mere calculational
+devices or instruments for the expression and systematization
+of observations. Theories are instruments, and their assertions should not be taken as entailing the existence of the
+objects they postulate. Sellars points out that only someone
+who thought that the observations themselves were given,
+not the product of the learning of concepts with which to
+report, would be tempted by this picture. Once it is discarded, another way of thinking about the distinction between theoretical and observable objects and concepts comes
+into view.
+According to Sellarss view, the distinction between purely
+theoretical objects and observable objects is methodological,
+rather than ontological. That is, theoretical and observable
+objects are not different kinds of things. They differ only in
+how we come to know about them. Theoretical objects
+are ones of which we can only have inferential knowledge,
+whereas observable objects can also be known noninferentially; theoretical concepts are ones we can be entitled to apply only as the conclusions of inferences, whereas concepts
+of observables also have noninferential uses. But the line
+between things to which we have only inferential cognitive
+access and things to which we also have noninferential cog-
+
+164
+STuDY GuIdE
+nitive access can shift with time, for instance, as new instruments are developed. Thus when first postulated to explain
+perturbations in the orbit of Neptune, Pluto was a purely
+theoretical object; the only claims we could make about it
+were the conclusions of inferences. But the development of
+more powerful telescopes eventually made it accessible to
+observation, and so a subject of noninferential reports. Pluto
+did not undergo an ontological change; all that changed was
+its relation to us. (Notice that this realism about theoretical
+entities does not entail scientific realism in the sense that
+privileges science over other sorts of cognitive activity, although Sellars usually discusses the two sorts of claims together.)
+It might be objected to this view that when the issue of
+the ontological status of theoretical entities is raised, they are
+not considered merely as objects in principle like any others
+save that they happen at the moment to be beyond our
+powers of observation. They are thought of as undervable in
+a much stronger sense: permanently and in principle inaccessible to observation. But Sellars denies that anything is
+unobservable in this sense. To be observable is just to be
+noninferentially reportable. Noninferential reportability requires only that there are circumstances in which reporters
+can apply the concepts in question (the dimension of inferentially articulated endorsement) by exercising reliable differential dispositions to respond to the objects in question
+(the causal dimension), and know that they are doing so. In
+this sense, physicists with the right training can noninferentially report the presence of mu mesons in bubble chambers.
+In this sense of 'observation,' nothing real is in principle
+beyond the reach of observation. (Indeed, in Sellars's sense,
+one who mastered reliable differential responsive dispositions
+
+165
+noninferentially to apply normative vocabulary would be
+directly observing normative facts. It is in this sense that we
+might be said to be able to bear, not just the noises someone
+else makes, but their words, and indeed, what they are saying -
+their meaningd.)
+Once one sees that observation is not based on some
+primitive sort of preconceptual awareness (the tortoise beneath the elephant), the fact that some observation reports
+are riskier than others and that when challenged we sometimes retreat to safer ones from which the originals can be
+inferred will not tempt one to think that the original reports
+were in fact the products of inference from those basic or
+minimal observations. The physicist, if challenged to back
+up his report of a mu meson, may indeed justify his claim
+by citing the distinctively hooked vapor trail in the bubble
+chamber. This is something else observable, from which the
+presence of the mu meson can, in the right circumstances,
+be inferred. But to say that is not to say that the original
+report was the product of an inference after all. It was the
+exercise of a reliable differential responsive disposition keyed
+to a whole chain of reliably covarying events, which includes
+mu mesons, hooked vapor trails, and retinal images. What
+makes it a report of mu mesons, and not of hooked vapor
+trails or retinal images, is the inferential role of the concept
+the physicist noninferentially applies. (It is a consequence of
+something's being a mu meson, for instance, that it is much
+smaller than a finger, which does not follow from something's
+being a hooked vapor trail.) If mu meson is the concept the
+physicist applies noninferentially, then if he is sufficiently
+reliable, when correct, that is what he deed. His retreat, when
+a question is raised, to a report of a hooked vapor trail, whose
+presence provides good inferential reason for the original,
+
+166
+noninterentially elicited claim, is a retreat to a report that is
+safer in the sense that he is a more reliable reporter of hooked
+vapor trails than of mu mesons, and that it takes less training
+to be able reliably to report vapor trails of a certain shape,
+so that is a skill shared more widely. But the fact that an
+inferential justification can be offered, and that the demand
+for one may be in order, no more undermines the status of
+the original report as noninferential (as genuinely an observation) than does the corresponding fact that I may under
+various circumstances be obliged to back up my report of
+something as red by invoking my reliability as a reporter of
+red things in these circumstances -from which, together
+with my disposition to call it red, the claim originally endorsed noninferentially may be inferred
+Part X [45]
+Private Episodes: The Problem
+Section 45: Sellars starts by setting the problem that will
+occupy him for the rest of the essay: "the problem of how
+the similarity among the experiences of seeing that an object
+over there is red, its looking to one that an object over there i red
+(when in point of fact it is not red), and its looking to one a
+though there were a red object over there (when in fact there is
+nothing over there at all). Part of this similarity, we saw,
+consists in the fact that they all involve the ... proposition
+... that the object over there is red. But over and above this
+there is, of course, the aspect which many philosophers have
+attempted to clarify by the notion of impressions or immediate
+eixperience." Sellars's response to this problem will not be fully
+in place until [62].
+Next Sellars summarizes [32]-[38] (the meat of his epis-
+
+167
+temological discussion): we now recognize that instead of
+coming to have a concept of something because we have
+noticed that sort of thing, to have the ability to notice requires already having the concept, and cannot account for it.
+For to notice something-to be aware of it in the sense relevant to assessments of sapience, rather than of mere sentience - is to respond to it by applying a concept, making a
+noninferential judgment about it. So until one has the concept 'green,' one cannot notice or be aware of green things,
+though one can respond differentially to them - obviously, in
+ways other than by applying the concept green. The title of
+this essay is "Empiricium and the Philosophy of Mind," but
+Sellars never comes right out and tells us what his attitude
+toward empiricism is. One might think he endorses it, misled
+by remarks such as he offers in [6] in discussing the inconsistent triad of commitments characteristic of classical sensedatum theories. For there he dismisses the option of rejecting the third element of the trilemma by doing no more
+than observing that to abandon it would "do violence to the
+predominantly nominalistic proclivities of the empiricist
+tradition" (proclivities that he discusses in more detail in
+[24]-[28]). But to interpret this remark as an endorsement
+by Sellars of the nominalistic proclivities of empiricism that
+he invokes here would be to mistake the role the remark plays in his argument. It is often hard to tell when
+Sellars is speaking in his own voice, and this is one of the
+occasions on which he is not. It is the classical sense-datum
+theorists who are committed to this tenet of empiricism, not
+Sellars —although, as will emerge just below, he does as a
+matter of fact share with empiricists the belief that "the
+capacity to have classicatory beliefs of the form :
+l' is F' is
+acquired."
+
+168
+Indeed, we can see at this point that one of the major tasks
+of the whole essay is to dismantle empiricism. For traditional
+empiricism depends on episodes of nonverbal, nonconceptual
+awareness, which serve both as the raw material for a process of abstraction by which concepts can be formed and
+grasped, and as our warrant for the ground-level (noninferential) applications of those concepts. (Compare [34].) This
+whole picture depends essentially on the Myth of the Given.
+Sellars's own view is one he is elsewhere happy to call
+'rationalist':! conscious experience presupposes that the experiencer already has concepts, and so cannot account for
+their acquisition. In this claim, Sellars aligns himself with
+the Leibniz of the New Essay, writing against his Lockean
+target. Sellars's task in the rest of the essay is to show how
+the philosophy of mind can understand inner episodes once
+one has rejected hoth Cartesianism and empiricism, having
+recognized that both depend upon the Myth of the Given.
+The classical pre-Kantian rationalists, having won their
+way through to the realization that awareness in the sense
+that distinguishes us from prerational animals presupposes
+the possession of concepts, took it that that claim committed
+them to seeing concepts as innate-perhaps not all concepts,
+but at least the most basic or general ones. Sellars shows that
+that is not so. For he shows how to put together
+a) reliable differential responsive dispositions, causally
+keyed to things; and
+b) inferential uses of concepts, which actually apply to
+those things,
+each of which can be acquired separately, to get the capacity
+for conscious conceptual awareness of things. He shows us
+17. For instance, in his important essay "Inference and Meaning," reprinted in
+Pure Pragmatics and Possile Worlds.
+
+169
+how to build out of those ingredients noninferentially elicited
+reports in which the concepts are applied to the things that
+causally elicit the reports. In this way he can explain how
+concepts such as red and green can be acquired, by a route
+that does not presuppose preconceptual awareness of red and
+green things (though it does require the preconceptual capacity to discriminate them, and so to learn reliably to respond differentially to them). That allows him to agree with
+the empiricists (without indulging in their 'nominalist proclivities'- see [24]-[29]) that "the capacity to have classificatory beliefs of the form it is F is acquired," as he puts the
+point in [6]. In the rest of the essay, he is going to tell a
+corresponding story about the concepts thought and sense
+impression, ending with our capacity to be directly (in the
+sense of noninferentially) aware of them.
+His question at this point is, If this rationalistic 'psychological nominalism'18 is right (and Sellars insists that it is),
+how could we come to have the idea of an inner episode?
+Descartes thought it a satisfactory answer to this question
+that we get the idea just by having inner episodes. But this
+must now be rejected as a sufficient condition of our noticing
+(being aware of, believing that we have) them, for that is just
+the Myth. The empiricists thought we could get the concept
+of thoughts and impressions by abstraction from the thoughts
+and impressions we were already in any case aware of. That
+too is a version of the Myth. "In short, we are brought face
+to face with the general problem of understanding how there
+can be inner episodes-episodes that is, which somehow
+combine privacy in that each of us has privileged access to
+his own, with intersubjectivity, in that each of us can, in
+principle, know about the other's." In other words, how
+18. Here 'nominalism' has a sense quite distinct from that invoked in the previous
+paragraph, picking up on its use in [6]. See [29].
+
+170
+could we ever have come to know that reports of the form
+'I'm seeing something that looks red,' or 'I am thinking that
+Vienna is in Austria,' were reliable signs of certain inner
+facts, given that we can make no empirical correlation by
+induction as we can with 'This is red'? The Jones myth is
+the answer to this question -indeed, the only answer available once we have given up both the self-authenticating
+nonverbal episode notion of Descartes and the empiricists,
+and the anti-inner-episode strain in Ryle and Wittgenstein
+(as promised in [10]).
+Sellars will "use a myth to kill a myth" [63]. He will tell
+a story about how a community that turns out always already
+to have had thoughts and sense impressions might work its
+way up to having the concepts thought and sense impression,
+and then come to be able to apply them noninferentially
+and so for the first time to notice and be aware of those
+thoughts and sense impressions. This is explicitly put forward as a myth. Sellars is not claiming that things actually
+happened this way, that we really had Rylean ancestors, or
+owe our concepts to a primitive genius (never mind one
+called 'Jones'). Sellars's pragmatism dictates that issues of
+conceptual priority be translated into questions of the relative
+autonomy of different strata of language — that is, into questions concerning what language games can be played independently of and antecedently to which others. Telling an asif historical, developmental story is a way of exhibiting those
+relations of conceptual dependency and presupposition.
+Part XI [46]-[47]
+Thoughts: The Classical View
+Section 46: The previous section explained (contra Ryle) that
+there really are impressions to be accounted for. This section
+
+171
+just says the same thing about thoughts. There isn't much in
+the way of argument here: Sellars points out that it is hard
+to explain these things away, and we may agree that a theory
+that can keep them is, other things being equal, superior to
+one that must deny them.
+Section 47: This bit is directly addressed to Ryle, and dismisses
+his claims that
+a) 'privileged access' must mean invariable accesswhich Sellars rejects because often someone else can
+tell what I must have been thinking, even when I am
+not aware of having thought it; and
+b) introspectible thoughts are just rotto voce verbal imagery: words running through one's head, 'perceived"
+as if the words were either heard or seen. (This
+point is discussed further in [56].)
+We have to free ourselves from these preconceptions if we
+are to understand Sellars's positive story about thoughts and
+sense impressions.
+Part XII [48]-[50]
+Our Rylean Ancestors
+Section 48: Sellars introduces the notion of 'our Rylean ancestors,' who have and can talk about dispositional traits that
+are relatively long term, the sort of thing for which Ryle's
+account works well: beliets, desires, hopes, fears, plans,
+moods, character traits, etc. Ryle got these more or less right
+(wed still have to put holist qualifications on his atomistic
+approach), but he injudiciously thought that his success at
+giving dispositional-behavioral accounts of this sort of mental
+phenomenon meant that anything that could not be ex-
+
+172
+STuDy GuIDe
+plained this way must be metaphysical and illegitimate. Sellars, via Jones, will show that this is not so. Sellars insists
+(on the basis of the distinction between dispositions and
+episodes) that having subjunctive conditionals of the Rylean
+sort does not yet give the Ryleans the ability to talk about
+thoughts and experiences. Sellars is going to show what
+additional conceptual resources they need to develop the
+concept of thoughts, and then on that basis, the concept of
+sense impressions.
+Section 49: The problem is, what would have to be added to
+the Rylean language so that those who speak it "might come
+to recognize each other and themselves as animals that think,
+observe, and have feelings and sensations as we use the
+terms." (The last clause is meant to eliminate the merely
+dispositionally analyzable bits of mentalistic discourseitems, paradigmatically such propositional attitudes as beliefs
+and desires, that are psychological, but do not qualify as
+mental episodes.) The first requirement is semantic discourse
+(see [30]). Semantic discourse falls on the side of the
+epistemic. It is not "definitional shorthand for statements
+about the causes and effects of verbal performances," although it may have such statements as contingent consequences. Semantic discourse is a kind of normative discourse,
+discussing how expressions aught to be used, or are properly
+or correctly used. This is one of Sellarss most fundamental
+ideas, appearing in nearly all of his earliest essays. ([5l] and
+[52] will tell us about the second requirement.)
+Section 50: "My immediate problem is to see if I can reconcile
+the classical idea of thoughts as inner episodes which are
+neither overt behavior nor verbal imagery and which are
+
+173
+properly referred to in terms of the vocabulary of intentionality, with the idea that the categories of intentionality are,
+at bottom, semantical categories pertaining to overt verbal
+performances." This latter idea is that thought must be understood by analogy to talk, in the sense that the concepts
+we put in play to talk about the meanings or contents of our
+thoughts are understood in terms of their role in their original
+or 'home' language game of talking about what we day, rather
+than about what we think. (Compare Dummett's commitment
+to understanding judging as the interiorization of an act of
+asserting, rather than understanding asserting as the exteriorization of an act of judging.)"'
+Part XIII [5I]-[52]
+Theories and Models
+Section 5l: Here Sellars returns to the discussion of theoretical
+language (discussed under the heading "Scientific Realism"
+in Part IX). Theoretical discourse is just a sophistication of
+a dimension of ordinary empirical language. One way it can
+arise is by model and commentary. Sellars is telling us this
+because "the distinction between theoretical and observational discourse is involved in the logic of concepts pertaining
+to inner episodes."
+Section 52: So "the second stage in the enrichment of their
+Rylean language is the addition of theoretical discourse."
+This matters because Sellars claims that "the distinction between theoretical and observational discourse is involved in
+the logic of concepts pertaining to inner episodes."
+19. Michael Dummett, Freges Philosopby of Logic (New York: Harper and Row,
+1973), p. 362.
+
+174
+Part XIV [53]-[55]
+Methodological versus Philosophical Behaviorism
+Section 53: Jones is a forerunner of methodological behaviorism (which is clarified below, and which Sellars endorses).
+Section 54: Behaviorists need not present their accounts as
+analyses of the concepts we already employ; nor need they
+introduce their theoretical notions by means of explicit definitions. The former would be analytic or logical behaviorism,
+the latter a kind of instrumentalism. Both are mistakes. In-
+stead, the behavioristic requirement that all concepts should
+be introduced in terms of a basic vocabulary pertaining
+to overt behavior is compatible with the idea that some behavioristic concepts are to be introduced as theoretical concepts, relative to a behavioral observational vocabulary. This
+view becomes available once one sees (as we did in [39]-
+[44]) that the distinction between theoretical and observable
+objects is methodological, not ontological, i.e., that it has to
+do with our access to those objects, either purely inferential
+or also noninferential, and says nothing about the kind of
+object involved. To say that they are theoretical concepts in
+this sense is to say that (at this stage in the development of
+the language game) they can only be applied as the conclusions of inferences. Thus they are not equivalent to any
+descriptions of behavior (which could be applied observationally). This idea is one of Sellars's cardinal innovations.
+Section 55: Behaviorism in this methodological sense is compatible with physicalism, since the theoretical concepts it
+employs might turn out to refer to neurophysiologically de-
+
+175
+scribable items (just as 'Pluto,' introduced as a name for
+whatever is perturbing the orbit of Neptune, might have
+turned out to apply to an astronomical ball of cheese). But
+it is also compatible with denying such physicalism. Behaviorism and physicalism are two different and independent
+sorts of commitment.
+Part XV [56]-[59]
+The Logic of Private Episodes: Thoughts
+Section 56: Jones's model for thinking is inner speech. His
+commentary ensures that this is not conceived of as verbal
+imagery. What is objectionable about the verbal imagery
+proposal (introduced in [47]) is that it consists in the use of
+a quasi-perceptual model: hearing the wagging of an inner
+tongue.
+Section 57: The model carries the applicability of semantical categories over from overt utterances to thoughts; so
+thoughts can be 'about' things.
+Section 58:
+(1) This Jonesian theory is compatible with dualism as
+well as with materialism.
+(2) Inner episodes are to be unobservable the way molecules or the cause of the crack in the dam are, not
+the way ghosts are. That is, we happen (at this
+stage in the story) not to be able to report them noninferentially, though there is nothing that rules out
+such observation in principle. Thus they might turn
+out to be identical to physiological events. Neverthe-
+
+176
+STuDy GuIDe
+less, at this point only the third-person use is available, even for characterizing our own episodes.
+(3) One can't think until one has learned to speak —one
+can't assert anything 'mentally' (think to oneself
+that ...) until one has caught on to the social practice of public assertion. Thus talk is prior to thought
+in the order of explanation. Once one has learned simultaneously to talk and think, however, thought
+often precedes talk in the order of causation.
+(4) So the notion of language having a meaning, being
+'about' things, is not to be explained in terms of
+thoughts having meanings (for instance, in the
+Cartesian or Lockean fashion). The project must explain the meaning of thoughts in terms of the meaning of talk, which must be explained some other
+way (e.g., in terms of social practices). 20
+(5) Jones does not think of these episodes as immediate
+experiences, that is, things to which thinkers have
+privileged access, since he doesn't have this concept
+yet. His episodes are 'inner' only in the mundane
+sense of 'under the skin.'
+Section 59: But it turns out that when Jones teaches his theory
+to other people, they "can be trained to give reasonably
+reliable self-descriptions, using the language of the theory,
+without having to observe [their own] overt behavior." That
+is, one can develop a conditioned reflex in someone (perhaps
+depending on some ultimately discoverable neurophysiological event related to his thought) to report noninferentially
+what heretofore could only be inferred. "What began as a
+20. "Intentionality and the Mental" (a symposium by correspondence with
+Roderick Chisholm), Minnesota Studies in the Philauphy of Science, pp. 507-539.
+
+177
+language with a purely theoretical use has gained a reporting
+role.
+" It might not have turned out this way. But insofar as
+Jones's theory is a good one (a question in principle independent of the eventual identifiability of these episodes with
+ones characterizable in neurophysiological terms), his fellows
+were already reliably differentially responding to these episodes. So one would expect that they would be able to learn
+to expand their differential responses to include reports. This
+story explains why: recognizing "that these concepts have a
+reporting use in which one is not drawing inferences from
+behavioral evidence, [the account] nevertheless insists that
+the fact that overt behavior is evidence for these episodes is
+built into the very logic of these concepts, just as the fact
+that the observable behavior of gases is evidence for molecular episodes is built into the very logic of molecule talk."
+Part XVI [60]-[63]
+The Logic of Private Episodes: Impressions
+Section 60: Jones now does for sense impressions what he
+previously did for thoughts. This category presupposes the
+category of thoughts. We start from a sub-class of thoughts
+called 'perceptions.' Seeing that something is the case is an
+inner episode in the Jonesian theory, which has as its model
+reporting on looking that something is the case. But these
+perceptions are not yet sense impressions. We still have a
+kind of claim, something in the epistemic order, not a kind of
+particular, something in the causal order. To get sense impressions we need the notion of a 'state of the perceiver' common
+to those occasions when the perceiver is right and those
+occasions when he's wrong about there being something red
+and triangular. This will be the 'intrinsic characterization' of
+
+178
+impressions that Sellars talks about in the third paragraph
+of [45], and in [22]. Here is an outline of the theory of
+perception on the causal side that was appealed to in [7].
+Section 6l: Whereas thoughts were modeled on sentences,
+impressions are modeled on pictures or, more generally, replicas, which
+are particulars. The essential feature of the
+model is that visual impressions stand to one another in a
+system of ways of resembling and differing that is structurally similar to the ways in which the colors and shapes of
+visible objects resemble and differ. That is, there are states
+of the perceiver which, though neither red nor triangular,
+have features (call them 'of-red' and 'of-triangular') that are
+isomorphic to the kinds of features visible physical objects
+have. This is a sort of functionalism about sense impressions.
+The occurrence of these replicas is to be understood as a
+nonepistemic relation of particulars (which neurophysiology
+or dualistic mind science might further specify for us). "Thus
+the model for an impression of a red triangle is a red and
+triangular replica, not a seeing of a red and triangular replica,"
+which would be an epistemic affair. Their overall explanatory
+role can be summarized thus: It is sense impressions "which
+(from the standpoint of the theory) are being responded to
+by the organism when it looks to the person as though there
+were a red and triangular physical object over there."
+Section 62: This section just does for sense impressions what
+[59] did for thoughts. It points out that people can be trained
+to develop conditioned reflexes for reporting these theoretical entities called 'impressions.' (Perhaps some neurophysiological mechanism will be discovered eventually that explains the acquisition of such responsive dispositions.) At this
+
+179
+point, since Jones's students can make noninferential reports
+of their sense impressions as well as of their thoughts, they
+are directly (in the sense of noninferentially -the only sense
+available once the Myth of the Given has been rejected)
+aware of both sorts of inner episode. In the case of sense
+impressions, this is awareness of the impressions "of the sort
+which is common to those experiences in which we either
+see that something is red and triangular, or something merely
+looks red and triangular, or there merely looks to be a red
+and triangular object over there" [45]. Such noninferential
+reports of sense impressions, reports of the form "I am now
+sensing a sense impression of a red triangle," are quite different from those made using 'looks,' which were considered
+in the first half of the essay. A noninferential report using
+'looks' takes a 'that' clause as its content-specification, and
+indicates the inferential potential that is being forwarded as
+a candidate for endorsement. A noninferential report of a
+sense impression takes a description of a particular of a sort
+modeled on replicas as its content-specification, and indicates
+the causal antecedent common to reports of how things are
+and of how things look. (Recall the diagnosis of [7].) Running the two together would re-enact the Myth of the Given.
+These two essentially derivative and parasitic strata of language, both centering on noninferential uses, express different aspects of perceptual experience. The conceptual awareness of sense impressions that Sellars has now made available
+in an unmysterious and unthreatening way is the "something
+more" that (according to the opening sentences of [16]) our
+perception involves, besides endorsement of propositional
+contents "wrung [noninferentially] from the perceiver by the
+object perceived." They are what was promised in the first
+paragraph of [45]. The sense impressions of which we are
+
+180
+aware (once both the concept of sense impressions and the
+corresponding noninferential reporting practices are fully in
+place) explain the fact that "when I say 'X looks green to me
+now'
+... my experience is, so to speak, intrinsically, « an
+experience indistinguishable from a veridical one of seeing that
+i is green [16]." For both sorts of speech act arise as the
+result of exercising reliable differential dispositions to respond to the presence of sense impressions-as they did
+already before Jones gave us the concepts without which we
+could not be aware of them. All that needed to be added to
+those responsive dispositions was the new concept sende impression, with the kind of inferential articulation appropriate
+to its model of replicas of, e.g., visible surfaces.
+Sellars has now completed his task. We now have recipes
+telling us how to diagnose and treat the Myth of the Given
+in all its multifarious manifestations, whether what is given
+shows up in the guise of particulars whose occurrence entails
+knowing or believing something (e.g., sense-datum theories),
+or in the form of noninferentially acquired propositionally
+contentful beliefs (e.g., what is expressed by 'looks' talk).
+Epistemologically foundationalist appeals to the given of the
+Cartesian sort have been shown to fail because noninferential
+uses of concepts (no matter whether their subject matter is
+construed as 'inner' or 'outer') turn out to presuppose inferential uses of concepts. Empiricist appeals to the preconceptual given to explain concept acquisition (whether by abstraction or otherwise) fail because "we now recognize that
+instead of coming to have a concept of something because
+we have noticed that sort of thing, to have the ability to
+notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that
+sort of thing, and cannot account for it" [45]. Nonetheless,
+Sellars has shown us how we can make sense of the idea that
+
+181
+we have direct awareness of mental episodes (the applications of inferentially articulated concepts of thoughts and sense
+impressions elicited noninferentially by thoughts and sense
+impressions), including the limited but very real privileged
+access each of us has to such inner episodes, without committing ourselves to the Myth of the Given.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/b6abbfcf95255fa2e845b1f8fc25142e9b43870b5decd668bbb658fedd7084e7.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/b6abbfcf95255fa2e845b1f8fc25142e9b43870b5decd668bbb658fedd7084e7.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..35723bce60d2fbcd8a1c29856ebce0a3f785d065
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/b6abbfcf95255fa2e845b1f8fc25142e9b43870b5decd668bbb658fedd7084e7.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -6146,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "b6abbfcf95255fa2e845b1f8fc25142e9b43870b5decd668bbb658fedd7084e7",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 759,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "5a0426793bce7448321c5ce9e1919c2059a85f47ef4d9576a46b6094ea5688b3",
+  "output_sha256": "eaa9dea2eeaa39fe0e07d2c9def47f5a75e1c0fe385e113dad5e487c441c3b32",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c1f4bea62a47093755ef4e0594fd7fc263bba6242243ad5c3693b266cb08c259.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c1f4bea62a47093755ef4e0594fd7fc263bba6242243ad5c3693b266cb08c259.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dee6e356d4627f881ed3c24c752da51d0996543d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c1f4bea62a47093755ef4e0594fd7fc263bba6242243ad5c3693b266cb08c259.md
@@ -0,0 +1,21921 @@
+PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED
+PROCESSING
+
+Computational Models of Cognition and Perception
+Editors
+Jerome A. Feldman
+Patrick J. Hayes
+David E. Rumelhart
+Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of
+Cognition. Volume 1: Foundations, by David E. Rumelhart,
+James L. McClelland, and the PDP Research Group
+Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of
+Cognition. Volume 2: Psychological and Biological Models, by
+James L. McClelland, David E. Rumelhart, and the
+PDP Research Group
+Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain, by
+Patricia S. Churchland
+Qualitative Reasoning About Physical Systems, edited by
+Daniel G. Bobrow
+Visual Cognition, edited by Steven Pinker
+
+PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED
+PROCESSING
+Explorations in the Microstructure
+of Cognition
+Volume 1: Foundations
+David E. Rumelhart James L. McClelland
+and the PDP Research Group
+Chisato Asanuma
+Francis H. C. Crick
+Jeffrey L. Elman
+Geoffrey E. Hinton
+Michael I. Jordan
+Alan H. Kawamoto
+Paul W. Munro
+Donald A. Norman
+Daniel E. Rabin
+Terrence J. Sejnowski
+Paul Smolensky
+Gregory O. Stone
+Ronald J. Williams
+David Zipser
+Institute for Cognitive Science
+University of California, San Diego
+A Bradford Book
+The MIT Press
+Cambridge, Massachusetts
+London, England
+
+Twelfth printing, 1999
+© 1986 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology
+All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any
+electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information
+storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.
+Printed and bound in the United States of America
+Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
+Rumelhart, David E.
+Parallel distributed processing.
+(Computational models of cognition and perception)
+Vol. I by David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland and the PDP Research Group.
+"A Bradford book."
+Includes bibliographies and indexes.
+Contents: v. 1. Foundations—v.2. Psychological
+and biological models.
+1. Human information processing. 2. Cognition. I. McClelland. James L.
+II. University of California, San Diego. PDP Research Group. III. Title. IV. Series.
+BF 455.R853
+85-24073
+ISBN
+0-262-18120-7 (v.1) he
+ISBN
+0-262-68053-X (v.1) pb
+0-262-13218-4 (v.2)
+0-262-63110-5 (v.2)
+0-262-18123-1 (set)
+00-262-63112-1 (set)
+
+Contents
+VOLUME 1
+FOUNDATIONS
+Preface
+Acknowledgments
+Addresses of the PDP Research Group
+XV
+xiX
+Part I THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+1 The Appeal of Parallel Distributed Processing
+J. L. MCCLELLAND, D. E. RUMELHART, and G. E. HINTON
+2 A General Framework for Parallel Distributed Processing
+D. E. RUMELHART, G. E. HINTON, and J. L. MCCLELLAND
+3 Distributed Representations
+G. E. HINTON, J. L. MCCLELLAND, and D. E. RUMELHART
+4 PDP Models and General Issues in Cognitive Science
+D. E. RUMELHART and J. L. MCCLELLAND
+1
+3
+45
+77
+110
+
+vi
+PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING
+Part II BASIC MECHANISMS
+5 Feature Discovery by Competitive Learning
+D. E. RUMELHART and D. ZIPSER
+6 Information Processing in Dynamical Systems:
+Foundations of Harmony Theory
+P. SMOLENSKY
+7 Learning and Relearning in Boltzmann Machines
+G. E. HINTON and T. J. SEJNOWSKI
+8 Learning Internal Representations by Error Propagation
+D. E. RUMELHART, G. E. HINTON, and R J. WILLIAMS
+Part III FORMAL ANALYSES
+9 An Introduction to Linear Algebra in Parallel Distributed
+Processing
+M. I. JORDAN
+10 The Logic of Activation Functions
+R. J. WILLIAMS
+11 An Analysis of the Delta Rule and the Learning of
+Statistical Associations
+G. O STONE
+12 Resource Requirements of Standard and Programmable
+Nets
+J L. MCCLELLAND
+13 P3: A Parallel Network Simulating System
+D. ZIPSER and D. E. RABIN
+References
+Index
+147
+151
+194
+282
+318
+363
+365
+423
+444
+460
+488
+507
+517
+
+CONTENTS Vii
+VOLUME 2
+PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MODELS
+Preface to Volume 2
+Addresses of the PDP Research Group
+ix
+Part IV PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
+14 Schemata and Sequential Thought Processes in PDP Models
+D. E. RUMELHART. P. SMOLENSKY. J. L. MCCLELLAND, and G. E. HINTON
+15 Interactive Processes in Speech Perception:
+The TRACE Model
+J. L. MCCLELLAND and J. L. ELMAN
+16 The Programmable Blackboard Model of Reading
+J L. MCCLELLAND
+17 A Distributed Model of Human Learning and Memory
+J. L. MCCLELLAND and D. E. RUMELHART
+18 On Learning the Past Tenses of English Verbs
+D.E. RUMELHART and J. L. MCCLELLAND
+19 Mechanisms of Sentence Processing: Assigning Roles
+to Constituents
+J. L. MCCLELLAND and A. H. KAWAMOTO
+1
+7
+58
+122
+170
+216
+272
+Part V BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
+20 Certain Aspects of the Anatomy and Physiology of the
+Cerebral Cortex
+F H C. CRICK and C. ASANUMA
+21 Open Questions About Computation in Cerebral Cortex
+T. J. SEJNOWSKI
+22 Neural and Conceptual Interpretation of PDP Models
+P. SMOLENSKY
+327
+333
+372
+390
+
+vili PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING
+23 Biologically Plausible Models of Place Recognition and
+Goal Location
+D. ZIPSER
+24 State-Dependent Factors Influencing Neural Plasticity:
+A Partial Account of the Critical Period
+P. W. MUNRO
+25 Amnesia and Distributed Memory
+J. L. MCCLELLAND and D. E. RUMELHART
+432
+471
+503
+Part VI CONCLUSION
+26 Reflections on Cognition and Parallel Distributed
+Processing
+D. A. NORMAN
+Future Directions
+References
+Index
+529
+531
+547
+553
+581
+
+Preface
+One of the great joys of science lies in the moment of shared
+discovery. One person's half-baked suggestion resonates in the mind of
+another and suddenly takes on a definite shape. An insightful critique
+of one way of thinking about a problem leads to another, better understanding. An incomprehensible simulation result suddenly makes sense
+as two people try to understand it together.
+This book grew out of many such moments. The seeds of the book
+were sown in our joint work on the interactive activation model of word
+perception. Since then, each of us has worked with the other and with
+other collaborators. The results of these collaborations are reported in
+several of the chapters of this book. The book also contains many
+chapters by other colleagues whose explorations have become
+intertwined with ours. Each chapter has its own by-line, but each also
+reflects the influences of other members of the group.
+We hope the
+result reflects some of the benefits of parallel distributed processing!
+The idea of parallel distributed processing-the notion that intelligence emerges from the interactions of large numbers of simple processing units-has come and gone before. The idea began to seem
+more and more attractive to us as the contrast between our convictions
+about basic characteristics of human perception, memory, language, and
+thought and the accepted formal tools for capturing mental processes
+became more apparent. Symbol-processing machines, for all their Turing equivalence, had failsbylighted Matshay frameworks for capturing
+
+X PREFACE
+the simple insights about the interactive nature of processing that had
+lead to such models as the HEARSAY model of speech understanding.
+More generally, they had failed to provide a framework for representing
+knowledge in a way that allowed it to be accessed by content and effectively combined with other knowledge to produce useful automatic
+syntheses that would allow intelligence to be productive. And they
+made no contact with the real strengths and weaknesses of the
+hardware in the brain. A Cray computer can perform on the order of
+100 million double-precision multiplications in a second, but it does not
+exhibit natural intelligence. How then are we to understand the capabilities of human thought, given the time constants and noisiness
+inherent in neural systems?
+It seemed obvious that to get any processing done in real time, the slow, noisy hardware in the brain would have
+to do massively parallel processing.
+As our interest in parallel mechanisms developed, we began to study
+the work of others who shared our convictions and to build on their
+work. Particularly important in this regard was Hinton and J. A.
+Anderson's (1981) Parallel Models of Associative Memory. Indeed, we
+see our book as a descendant of their book on two accounts. First, the
+material presented here represents further developments on the work
+presented in Hinton and Anderson's book. Second, we owe a particular
+intellectual debt to both Hinton and Anderson. Our interest in distributed, associative memories goes back to interactions with Jim Anderson, beginning as early as 1968. Our interest in these topics began in
+earnest, however, during the period when
+we were developing the
+interactive activation model of word perception, in 1979, shortly after
+Geoffrey Hinton began a postdoctoral fellowship at UCSD. Geoffrey's
+crisp explanations showed us the potential power and generality of
+models created from connections among simple processing units, and
+fit together nicely with our own developing conviction that various
+aspects of perception, language processing, and motor control were best
+thought of in terms of massively parallel processing (see McClelland,
+1979, and Rumelhart, 1977, for our earliest steps in this direction).
+The project culminating in this book formally began in December,
+1981 when the two of us and Geoffrey Hinton decided to work together
+exploring the implications of network models and to write a book outlining our conclusions. We expected the project to take about six
+months. We began in January 1982 by bringing a number of our colleagues together to form a discussion group on these topics. During
+the first six months we met twice weekly and laid the foundation for
+most of the work presented in these volumes. Our first order of business was to develop a name for the class of models we were investigating. It seemed to us that the phrase parallel distributed processing (PDP
+
+PREFACE Xi
+for short) best captured what we had in mind. It emphasized the parallel nature of the processing, the use of distributed representations and
+distributed control, and the fact that these were general processing systems, not merely memories we were studying, as the phrase associative
+memory suggests. Thus the PDP research group was born. Hinton and
+McClelland left after the first six months-Hinton to CMU and
+McClelland to MIT and later to CMU. The PDP research group, however, has continued regular meetings at UCSD up to the present time.
+The group has varied from five or six of us at times to as many as 15
+or more at other times, and there is now a parallel group of about 15 or
+so psychologists and computer scientists at CMU.
+Shortly after leaving UCSD in 1982, Hinton began working with
+Terrence Sejnowski on the Boltzmann machine (Chapter 7) and decided
+to diop from the role of organizer of the project to a contributor, so he
+could spend more time working on the implications of the Boltzmann
+machine. Thus, the primary responsibility for putting the book
+together fell to the two of us. At first we expected to complete the
+book within a year after we began our work. Soon, however, it became
+clear that there was much work to be done and many directions to
+explore. Thus, our work continued and expanded as we and our colleagues followed the implications of the PDP approach in many different ways.
+A good deal has happened since we began this project. Though much
+of the initial groundwork was laid in early 1982, most of the material
+described in these volumes did not take its present form until much
+later.
+The work has been interdisciplinary and represents what we consider
+a true cognitive science approach. Although the two of us have been
+trained as cognitive psychologists, the PDP group as a whole includes
+people from a wide range of backgrounds. It includes people trained in
+physics, mathematics, neuroscience, molecular biology, and computer
+sciences, as well as in psychology. We also envision an interdisciplinary
+audience for our book. We are cognitive psychologists and we hope,
+primarily, to present PDP models to the community of cognitive
+psychologists as alternatives to the models that have dominated cognitive psychology for the past decade or so. We also, however, see ourselves as studying architectures for computation and methods for artificial intelligence. Therefore, we hope that this book will be seen as
+relevant to researchers in computer science and artificial intelligence.
+Also, the PDP approach provides a set of tools for developing models
+of the neurophysiological basis of human information processing, and
+so we hope portions of these books will seem relevant to neuroscientists as well.
+
+Xii PREFACE
+ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK
+Our book consists of six parts, three in each of the two volumes.
+The overall structure is indicated in the accompanying table. Part I provides an overview. Chapter 1 presents the motivation for the approach
+and describes much of the early work that lead to the developments
+reported in later sections. Chapter 2 describes the PDP framework in
+more formal terms. Chapter 3 focuses on the idea of distributed
+representation, and Chapter 4 provides a detailed discussion of several
+general issues that the PDP approach has raised and explains how these
+issues are addressed in the various later chapters of the book.
+The remaining parts of the book present different facets of our
+explorations in parallel distributed processing. The chapters in Part II
+address central theoretical problems in the development of models of
+parallel distributed processing, focusing for the most part on fundamental problems in learning. The chapters in Part III describe various
+mathematical and computational tools that have been important in
+the development and analysis of PDP models. Part IV considers
+A CONDENSED TABLE OF CONTENTS
+VOLUME I
+I. THE PDP PERSPECTIVE II. BASIC MECHANISMS
+III. FORMAL ANALYSES
+1. The Appeal of PDP
+2. A Framework for PDP
+3. Distributed
+Representations
+4. General Issues
+5. Competitive Learning
+6. Harmony Theory
+7. Boltzmann Machines
+8. Learning by
+Error Propagation
+9. Linear Algebra
+10. Activation Functions
+11. The Delta Rule
+12. Resource Requirements
+13. Parallel Network
+Simulator
+IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL
+PROCESSES
+14. Schemata and PDP
+15. Speech Perception
+16. Model of Reading
+17. Learning and Memory
+18. Morphology Acquisition
+19. Sentence Processing
+VOLUME II
+V. BIOLOGICAL
+MECHANISMSR
+20. Anatomy and
+he Brair
+2. Neural anc
+VI. CONCLUSION
+26. Reflections
+Future Directions
+25. Amnesia
+
+PREFACE XIII
+applications and implications of PDP models to various aspects of
+human cognition, including perception, memory, language, and higherlevel thought processes. Part V considers the relation between parallel
+distributed processing models and the brain, reviews relevant aspects of
+the anatomy and physiology, and describes several models that apply
+PDP models to aspects of the neurophysiology and neuropsychology of
+information processing, learning, and memory. Part VI contains two
+short pieces: a reflection on PDP models by Don Norman and a brief
+discussion of our thoughts about promising future directions.
+How to read this book? It is too long to read straight through. Nor
+is it designed to be read this way. Chapter 1 is a good entry point for
+readers unfamiliar with the PDP approach, but beyond that the various
+parts of the book may be approached in various orders, as one might
+explore the different parts of a complex object or machine. The various facets of the PDP approach are interrelated, and each part informs
+the others; but there are few strict sequential dependencies. Though
+we have tried to cross-reference ideas that come up in several places,
+we hope that most chapters can be understood without reference to the
+rest of the book. Where dependencies exist they are noted in the introductory sections at the beginning of each part of the book.
+This book charts the explorations we and our colleagues have made
+in the microstructure of cognition. There is a lot of terrain left to be
+explored. We hope this book serves as a guide that helps others join us
+in these ongoing explorations.
+December 1985
+James L. McClelland
+PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA
+David E. Rumelhart
+LA JOLLA, CALIFORNIA
+
+Acknowledgments
+As we have already said, nearly all the ideas in this book were born
+out of interactions, and one of our most important acknowledgments is
+to the environment that made these interactions possible. The Institute
+for Cognitive Science at UCSD and the members of the Institute have
+made up the core of this environment.
+Don Norman, our colleague and friend, the Founder and Director of
+the Institute, deserves special credit for making ICS an exciting and
+stimulating place, for encouraging our explorations in parallel distributed processing, and for his central role in arranging much of the financial support this book has benefited from (of which more below). The
+atmosphere depends as well on the faculty, visiting scholars, and graduate students in and around ICS. The members of the PDP Research
+Group itself, of course, have played the most central role in helping to
+shape the ideas found in this book. All those who contributed to the
+actual contents of the book are listed on the cover page; they have all
+contributed, as well, in many other ways. Several other participants in
+the group who do not have actual contributions to the book also
+deserve mention. Most prominent among these are Mike Mozer and
+Yves Chauvin, two graduate students in the Cognitive Science Lab, and
+Gary Cottrell, a recent addition to the group from the University of
+Rochester.
+Several other members of the intellectual community in and around
+ICS have played very important roles in helping us to shape our
+thoughts. These include Liz Bates, Michael Cole, Steve Draper, Don
+
+xvi
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+Gentner, Ed Hutchins, Jim Hollan, Jean Mandler, George Mandler,
+Jeff Miller, Guy van Orden, and many others, including the participants
+in Cognitive Science 200.
+There are also several colleagues at other universities who have
+helped us in our explorations. Indeed, the annual connectionist
+workshops (the first of which resulted in the Hinton and Anderson
+book) have been important opportunities to share our ideas and get
+feedback on them from others in the field, and to learn from the contributions of others. Jim Anderson, Dana Ballard, Jerry Feldman,
+Geoff Hinton and Terry Sejnowski all had a hand in organizing different ones of these meetings; and we have learned a great deal from
+discussions with them and other participants, particularly Andy Barto,
+Scott Fahlman, Christof von der Malsburg, John Hopfield, Dave
+Touretzky,
+and more recently Mark Fanty and Gene Charniak.
+McClelland's discussions at MIT (particularly with Jerry Fodor and
+Molly Potter) helped in the clarification of several aspects of our thinking, and various colleagues at and around CMU-particularly John
+Anderson, Mark Derthick, Dave Klahr, Brian MacWhinney, and Jeff
+Sokolov-have contributed a great deal through discussions over the
+last year and a half or so, as we have worked toward the completion of
+the book. Others one or both of us have interacted with a great deal
+include Bill Brewer, Neal Cohen, Al Collins, Billy Salter, Ed Smith, and
+Walter Schneider. All of these people have contributed more or less
+directly to the development of the ideas presented in this book.
+An overlapping group of colleagues deserves credit for helping us
+improve the book itself. Jim Anderson, Andy Barto, Larry Barsalou,
+Chris Reisbeck, Walter Schneider, and Mark Seidenberg all read several
+chapters of the book and sent useful comments and suggestions. Many
+other people read and commented on individual chapters, and we are
+sincerely grateful for their careful contributions, which we acknowledge
+in the appropriate chapters.
+This project owes a tremendous amount to the help of the excellent
+staff of the Institute for Cognitive Science. Kathy Farrelly, in particular, has played an enormous role in all aspects of the production of the
+book; her cheerful, thoughtful, and very careful assistance made the
+production of the book run much more smoothly than we have had any
+right to hope and allowed us to keep working on the content of some of
+the chapters even as the final production was rolling forward on other
+sections.
+Eileen Conway's assistance with graphics and formatting has
+also been invaluable and we are very grateful to her as well. Mark Wallen kept the computers running, served as chief programming consultant and debugger par excellence, and tamed troff, the phototypesetter.
+Without him we would never have gotten all the formatting to come
+out right. Karol Lightner worked very hard toward the end of the
+
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xvii
+project on final proofing and indexing, and Sondra Buffett, as the
+Administrative Director of ICS, held everything together and kept
+everything running throughout the entire four years of the project.
+Our project has been supported by a number of different agencies
+and foundations. Primary support came from the System Development
+Foundation and the Office of Naval Research. The System Development Foundation has provided direct support for the PDP research
+group through a grant to Norman and Rumelhart, and has also supported several of the individual members of the group (Crick, Hinton,
+hends on 4-79-C-0323 VR 667-37: 00014 - 0450. 5 660-
+548; and N00014-82-C-0374, NR 667-483.
+The people behind both SDF and ON deserve acknowledgment too.
+The entire PDP enterprise owes a particular debt of gratitude to Charlie
+Smith, formerly of SDF, who appreciated the appeal of parallel distributed processing very early on, understood our need for computing
+resources, and helped provide the entire PDP research group with the
+funds and encouragement needed to complete such project. Henry
+Halff, formerly of ONR, was also an early source of support,
+encouragement, and direction. Charlie Smith has been succeeded by
+Carl York, and Henry Halff has been succeeded by Susan Chipman,
+Michael Shafto, and Harold Hawkins. We are grateful to all of these
+people for their commitment to the completion of this book and to the
+ongoing development of the ideas.
+Several other sources have contributed to the support of individual
+members of the group. These include the National Institute of Mental
+Health, through a Career Development Award-PHS-MH-00385-10
+McClelland and post-doctoral fellowships to Paul Smolensky and Paul
+Munro under Grant PHS-MH-14268 to the Center for Human Information Processing at UCSD. Smolensky received support in the form of a
+fellowship from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and some of
+McClelland's work was supported by a grant from the National Science
+Foundation (BNS-79-24062). These and other sources of support for
+specific individuals or projects are acknowledged in the appropriate
+chapters.
+Finally, we would like to thank our wives, Heidi and Marilyn. Their
+understanding, encouragement, and support throughout the four years
+of this project helped to make the process of bringing this book to life
+much more rewarding than it might have been.
+JLM/DER
+
+Addresses of the PDP Research Group
+Chisato Asanuma
+Francis H. C. Crick
+Jeffrey L. Elman
+Geoffrey E. Hinton
+Michael I. Jordan
+Alan H. Kawamoto
+Salk Institute
+P.O. Box 85800
+San Diego, CA 92138
+Salk Institute
+P.O. Box 85800
+San Diego, CA 92138
+Department of Linguistics
+University of California, San Diego
+La Jolla, CA 92093
+Department of Computer Science
+Carnegie-Mellon University
+Pittsburgh, PA 15213
+Department of Computer and
+Information Science
+University of Massachusetts
+Amherst, MA 01003
+Department of Psychology
+Carnegie-Mellon University
+Pittsburgh, PA 15213
+
+xX
+ADDRESSES OF THE PDP RESEARCH GROUP
+James L. McClelland
+Paul W. Munro
+Donald A. Norman
+Daniel E. Rabin
+David E. Rumelhart
+Terrence J. Sejnowski
+Paul Smolensky
+Gregory O. Stone
+Ronald J. Williams
+David Zipser
+Department of Psychology
+Carnegie-Mellon University
+Pittsburgh, PA 15213
+Department of Information Science
+University of Pittsburgh
+Pittsburgh, PA 15260
+Institute for Cognitive Science
+University of California, San Diego
+La Jolla, CA 92093
+Intellicorp
+1975 El Camino Real West
+Mountain View, CA 94040
+Institute for Cognitive Science
+University of California, San Diego
+La Jolla, CA 92093
+Department of Biophysics
+Johns Hopkins University
+Baltimore, MD 21218
+Department of Computer Science
+University of Colorado
+Boulder, CO 80309
+Center for Adaptive Systems
+Department of Mathematics
+Boston University
+Boston, MA 02215
+Institute for Cognitive Science
+University of California, San Diego
+La Jolla, CA 92093
+Insitute for Cognitive Science
+University of California, San Diego
+La Jolla, CA 92093
+
+PART I
+
+CHAPTER 1
+The Appeal of
+J. L. McCLELLAND, D. E. RUMELHART, and G. E. HINTON
+What makes people smarter than machines? They certainly are not
+quicker or more precise. Yet people are far better at perceiving objects
+in natural scenes and noting their relations, at understanding language
+and retrieving contextually appropriate information from memory, al
+making plans and carrying out contextually appropriate actions, and at a
+wide range of other natural cognitive tasks. People are also far better at
+learning to do these things more accurately and fluently through processing experience.
+What is the basis for these differences? One answer, perhaps the
+classic one we might expect from artificial intelligence, is "software." If
+we only had the right computer program, the argument goes, we might
+be able to capture the fluidity and adaptability of human information
+processing.
+Certainly this answer is partially correct. There have been great
+breakthroughs in our understanding of cognition as a result of the
+development of expressive high-level computer languages and powerful
+algorithms. No doubt there will be more such breakthroughs in the
+future. However, we do not think that software is the whole story.
+In our view, people are smarter than today's computers because the
+brain employs a basic computational architecture that is more suited to
+deal with a central aspect of the natural information processing tasks
+that people are so good at. In this chapter, we will show through examples that these tasks generally require the simultaneous consideration of
+many pieces of information or constraints. Each constraint may be
+imperfecily specified add pyngined water fach can play a polentially
+
+4 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+decisive role in determining the outcome of processing. After examining these points, we will introduce a computational framework for
+modeling cognitive processes that seems well suited to exploiting these
+constaints and that seems closer than other frameworks to the style of
+computation as it might be done by the brain. We will review several
+early examples of models developed in this framework, and we will
+show that the mechanisms these models employ can give rise to powerful emergent properties that begin to suggest attractive alternatives to
+traditional accounts of various aspects of cognition. We will also show
+that models of this class provide a basis for understanding how learning
+can occur spontaneously, as a by-product of processing activity.
+Multiple Simultaneous Constraints
+Reaching and grasping. Hundreds of times each day we reach for
+things. We nearly never think about these acts of reaching. And yet,
+each time, a large number of different considerations appear to jointly
+determine exactly how we will reach for the object. The position of the
+object, our posture at the time, what else we may also be holding, the
+size, shape, and anticipated weight of the object, any obstacles that may
+be in the way-all of these factors jointly determine the exact method
+we will use for reaching and grasping.
+Consider the situation shown in Figure 1. Figure 1A shows Jay
+McClelland's hand, in typing position at his terminal. Figure 1B indicates the position his hand assumed in reaching for a small knob on the
+desk beside the terminal. We will let him describe what happened in
+the first person:
+On the desk next to my terminal are several objects-a chipped
+coffee mug, the end of a computer cable, a knob from a clock
+radio. I decide to pick the knob up. At first I hesitate, because
+it doesn't seem possible. Then I just reach for it, and find
+myself grasping the knob in what would normally be considered
+a very awkward position -but it solves all of the constraints.
+I'm not sure what all the details of the movement were, so l let
+myself try it a few times more. I observe that my right hand is
+carried up off the keyboard, bent at the elbow, until my
+forearm is at about a 30° angle to the desk top and parallel to
+the side of the terminal. The palm is facing downward through
+most of this. Then, my arm extends and lowers down more or
+less parallel to the edge of the desk and parallel to the side of
+the terminal and, as it drops, it turns about 90° so that the
+
+1. THE APPEAL OF PDP
+5
+FIGURE 1. A: An everyday situation in which it is necessary to take into account a large
+number of constraints to grasp a desired object. In this case the target object is the small
+knob to the left of the cup. B: The posture the arm arrives at in meeting these
+constraints.
+
+palm is facing the cup and the thumb and index finger are
+below. The turning motion occurs just in time, as my hand
+drops, to avoid hitting the coffee cup. My index finger and
+thumb close in on the knob and grasp it, with my hand completely upside down.
+Though the details of what happened here might be quibbled with,
+the broad outlines are apparent. The shape of the knob and its position
+on the table; the starting position of the hand on the keyboard; the
+positions of the terminal, the cup, and the knob; and the constraints
+imposed by the structure of the arm and the musculature used to control it-all these things conspired to lead to a solution which exactly
+suits the problem. If any of these constraints had not been included,
+the movement would have failed. The hand would have hit the cup or
+the terminal-or it would have missed the knob.
+The mutual influence of syntax and semantics. Multiple constraints
+operate just as strongly in language processing as they do in reaching
+and grasping. Rumelhart (1977) has documented many of these multiple constraints. Rather than catalog them here, we will use a few
+examples from language to illustrate the fact that the constraints tend
+to be reciprocal: The example shows that they do not run only from
+syntax to semantics -they also run the other way.
+It is clear, of course, that syntax constrains the assignment of meaning. Without the syntactic rules of English to guide us, we cannot
+correctly understand who has done what to whom in the following sentence:
+The boy the man chased kissed the girl.
+But consider these examples (Rumelhart, 1977; Schank, 1973):
+I saw the grand canyon flying to New York.
+I saw the sheep grazing in the field.
+Our knowledge of syntactic rules alone does not tell us what grammatical role is played by the prepositional phrases in these two cases. In the
+first, "flying to New York" is taken as describing the context in which
+the speaker saw the Grand Canyon-while he was flying to New York.
+In the second, "grazing in the field" could syntactically describe an
+analogous situation, in which the speaker is grazing in the field, but this
+possibility does not typically become available on first reading. Instead
+we assign "grazing in the field" as a modifier of the sheep (roughly,
+"who were grazing in the field"). The syntactic structure of each of
+
+1. THE APPEAL OF PDP
+7
+these sentences, then, is determined in part by the semantic relations
+that the constituents of the sentence might plausibly bear to one
+another. Thus, the influences appear to run both ways, from the syntax to the semantics and from the semantics to the syntax.
+In these examples, we see how syntactic considerations influence
+semantic ones and how semantic ones influence syntactic ones. We
+cannot say that one kind of constraint is primary.
+Mutual constraints operate, not only between syntactic and semantic
+processing, but also within each of these domains as well. Here we
+consider an example from syntactic processing, namely, the assignment
+of words to syntactic categories. Consider the sentences:
+I like the joke.
+I like the drive.
+I like to joke.
+I like to drive.
+In this case it looks as though the words the and to serve to determine
+whether the following word will be read as a noun or a verb. This, of
+course, is a very strong constraint in English and can serve to force a
+verb interpretation of a word that is not ordinarily used this way:
+I like to mud.
+On the other hand, if the information specifying whether the function
+word preceding the final word is to or the is ambiguous, then the typical
+reading of the word that follows it will determine which way the function word is heard. This was shown in an experiment by Isenberg,
+Walker, Ryder, and Schweikert (1980). They presented sounds halfway
+between to (actually /f/) and the (actually /d'/) and found that words
+like joke, which we tend to think of first as nouns, made subjects hear
+the marginal stimuli as the, while words like drive, which we tend to
+think of first as verbs, made subjects hear the marginal stimuli as to.
+Generally, then, it would appear that each word can help constrain the
+syntactic role, and even the identity, of every other word.
+Simultaneous mutual constraints in word recognition. Just as the
+syntactic role of one word can influence the role assigned to another in
+analyzing sentences, so the identity of one letter can influence the identity assigned to another in reading. A famous example of this, from
+Selfridge, is shown in Figure 2. Along with this is a second example in
+which none of the letters, considered separately, can be identified
+unambiguously, but
+in
+which the possibilities that the visual
+
+8 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+THE CAT
+REB
+SROT
+BISH
+DEBT
+FIGURE 2. Some ambiguous displays. The first one is from Selfridge, 1955. The
+second line shows that three ambiguous characters can each constrain the identity of the
+others. The third, fourth, and fifth lines show that these characters are indeed ambiguous in that they assume other identities in other contexts. (The ink-blot technique of
+making letters ambiguous is due to Lindsay and Norman, 1972).
+information leaves open for each so constrain the possible identities of
+the others that we are capable of identifying all of them.
+At first glance, the situation here must seem paradoxical: The identity of each letter is constrained by the identities of each of the others.
+But since in general we cannot know the identities of any of the letters
+
+I THE APPEAL OF PDP
+9
+until we have established the identities of the others, how can we get
+the process started?
+The resolution of the paradox, of course, is simple. One of the different possible letters in each position fits together with the others. It
+appears then that our perceptual system is capable of exploring all these
+possibilities without committing itself to one until all of the constraints
+are taken into account.
+Understanding through the interplay of multiple sources of
+knowledge. It is clear that we know a good deal about a large number
+of different standard situations. Several theorists have suggested that
+we store this knowledge in terms of structures called variously: scripts
+(Schank, 1976), frames (Minsky, 1975), or schemata (Norman &
+Bobrow, 1976; Rumelhart, 1975). Such knowledge structures are
+assumed to be the basis of comprehension. A great deal of progress
+has been made within the context of this view.
+However, it is important to bear in mind that most everyday situations cannot be rigidly assigned to just a single script. They generally
+involve an interplay between a number of different sources of information. Consider, for example, a child's birthday party at a restaurant.
+We know things about birthday parties, and we know things about restaurants, but we would not want to assume that we have explicit
+knowledge (at least, not in advance of our first restaurant birthday
+party) about the conjunction of the two. Yet we can imagine what such
+a party might be like. The fact that the party was being held in a restaurant would modify certain aspects of our expectations for birthday
+parties (we would not expect a game of Pin-the-Tail-on-the-Donkey,
+for example, while the fact that the event was a birthday party would
+inform our expectations for what would be ordered and who would pay
+the bill.
+Representations like scripts, frames, and schemata are useful structures for encoding knowledge, although we believe they only approximate the underlying structure of knowledge representation that emerges
+from the class of models we consider in this book, as explained in
+Chapter 14. Our main point here is that any theory that tries to
+account for human knowledge using script-like knowledge structures
+will have to allow them to interact with each other to capture the generative capacity of human understanding in novel situations. Achieving
+such interactions has been one of the greatest difficulties associated
+with implementing models that really think generatively using script- or
+frame-like representations.
+
+10 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING
+In the examples we have considered, a number of different pieces of
+information must be kept in mind at once. Each plays a part, constraining others and being constrained by them.
+What kinds of
+mechanisms seem well suited to these task demands? Intuitively, these
+tasks seem to require mechanisms in which each aspect of the information in the situation can act on other aspects, simultaneously influencing other aspects and being influenced by them. To articulate these
+intuitions, we and others have turned to a class of models we call Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) models. These models assume that
+information processing takes place through the interactions of a large
+number of simple processing elements called units, each sending excitatory and inhibitory signals to other units. In some cases, the units
+stand for possible hypotheses about such things as the letters in a particular display or the syntactic roles of the words in a particular sentence. In these cases, the activations stand roughly for the strengths
+associated with the different possible hypotheses, and the interconnections among the units stand for the constraints the system knows to
+exist between the hypotheses. In other cases, the units stand for possible goals and actions, such as the goal of typing a particular letter, or
+the action of moving the left index finger, and the connections relate
+goals to subgoals, subgoals to actions, and actions to muscle movements. In still other cases, units stand not for particular hypotheses or
+goals, but for aspects of these things. Thus a hypothesis about the
+identity of a word, for example, is itself distributed in the activations of
+a large number of units.
+PDP Models: Cognitive Science or Neuroscience?
+One reason for the appeal of PDP models is their obvious "physiological" flavor: They seem so much more closely tied to the physiology of
+the brain than are other kinds of information-processing models. The
+brain consists of a large number of highly interconnected elements
+(Figure 3) which apparently send very simple excitatory and inhibitory
+messages to each other and update their excitations on the basis of
+these simple messages. The properties of the units in many of the PDP
+models we will be exploring were inspired by basic properties of the
+neural hardware. In a later section of this book, we will examine in
+some detail the relation between PDP models and the brain.
+
+1. THE APPEAL OF PDP
+11
+FIGURE 3. The arborizations of about 1 percent of the neurons near a vertica' slice
+through the cerebral cortex. The full height of the figure corresponds to the thickness of
+the cortex, which is in this instance about 2 mm. (From Mechanics of the Mind, p. 84, by
+C. Blakemore, 1977, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Copyright 1977
+by Cambridge University Press. Reprinted by permission.)
+Though the appeal of PDP models is definitely enhanced by their
+physiological plausibility and neural inspiration, these are not the primary bases for their appeal to us. We are, after all, cognitive scientists,
+and PDP models appeal to us for psychological and computational reasons. They hold out the hope of offering computationally sufficient
+and psychologically accurate mechanistic accounts of the phenomena of
+human cognition which have eluded successful explication in conventional computational formalisms; and they have radically altered the
+way we think about the time-course of processing, the nature of
+representation, and the mechanisms of learning.
+
+12 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+The Microstructure of Cognition
+The process of human cognition, examined on a time scale of
+seconds and minutes, has a distinctly sequential character to it. Ideas
+come, seem promising, and then are rejected; leads in the solution to a
+problem are taken up, then abandoned and replaced with new ideas.
+Though the process may not be discrete, it has a decidedly sequential
+character, with transitions from state-to-state occurring,
+say, two or
+three times a second. Clearly, any useful description of the overall
+organization of this sequential flow of thought will necessarily describe
+a sequence of states.
+But what is the internal structure of each of the states in the
+sequence, and how do they come about? Serious attempts to model
+even the simplest macrosteps of cognition -say, recognition of single
+words-require vast numbers of microsteps if they are implemented
+sequentially. As Feldman and Ballard (1982) have pointed out, the
+biological hardware is just too sluggish for sequential models of the
+microstructure to provide a plausible account, at least of the
+microstructure of human thought. And the time limitation only gets
+worse, not better, when sequential mechanisms try to take large
+numbers of constraints into account. Each additional constraint
+requires more time in a sequential machine, and, if the constraints are
+imprecise, the constraints can lead to a computational explosion. Yet
+people get faster, not slower, when they are able to exploit additional
+constraints.
+Parallel distributed processing models offer alternatives to serial
+models of the microstructure of cognition. They do not deny that there
+is a macrostructure, just as the study of subatomic particles does not
+deny the existence of interactions between atoms. What PDP models
+do is describe the internal structure of the larger units, just as
+subatomic physics describes the internal structure of the atoms that
+form the constituents of larger units of chemical structure.
+We shall show as we proceed through this book that the analysis of
+the microstructure of cognition has important implications for most of
+the central issues in cognitive science. In general, from the PDP point
+of view, the objects referred to in macrostructural models of cognitive
+processing are seen as approximate descriptions of emergent properties
+of the microstructure. Sometimes these approximate descriptions may
+be sufficiently accurate to capture a process or mechanism well enough;
+but many times, we will argue, they fail to provide sufficiently elegant
+or tractable accounts that capture the very flexibility and openendedness of cognition that their inventors had originally intended to
+capture. We hope that our analysis of PDP models will show how an
+
+1. THE APPEAL OF PDP
+13
+examination of the microstructure of cognition can lead us closer to an
+adequate description of the real extent of human processing and learning capacities.
+The development of PDP models is still in its infancy. Thus far the
+models which have been proposed capture simplified versions of the
+kinds of phenomena we have been describing rather than the full elaboration that these phenomena display in real settings. But we think
+there have been enough steps forward in recent years to warrant a concerted effort at describing where the approach has gotten and where it
+is going now, and to point out some directions for the future.
+The first section of the book represents an introductory course in
+parallel distributed processing. The rest of this chapter attempts to
+describe in informal terms a number of the models which have been
+proposed in previous work and to show that the approach is indeed a
+fruitful one. It also contains a brief description of the major sources of
+the inspiration we have obtained from the work of other researchers.
+This chapter is followed, in Chapter 2, by a description of the quantitative framework within which these models can be described and examined. Chapter 3 explicates one of the central concepts of the book: distributed representation. The final chapter in this section, Chapter 4,
+returns to the question of demonstrating the appeal of parallel
+distributed processing models and gives an overview of our explorations
+in the microstructure of cognition as they are laid out in the remainder
+of this book.
+EXAMPLES OF PDP MODELS
+In what follows, we review a number of recent applications of PDP
+models lo problems in motor control, perception, memory, and
+language. In many cases, as we shall see, parallel distributed processing
+mechanisms are used to provide natural accounts of the exploitation of
+multiple, simultaneous, and often mutual constraints. We will also see
+that these same mechanisms exhibit emergent properties which lead to
+novel interpretations of phenomena which have traditionally been interpreted in other ways.
+Motor Control
+Having started with an example of how multiple constraints appear to
+operate in motor prografflyfightad Materiappropriate to mention two
+
+14 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+models in this domain. These models have not developed far enough
+to capture the full details of obstacle avoidance and multiple constraints
+on reaching and grasping, but there have been applications to two problems with some of these characteristics.
+Finger movements in skilled typing. One might imagine, at first
+glance, that typists carry out keystrokes successively, first programming
+one stroke and then, when it is completed, programming the next.
+However, this is not the case. For skilled typists, the fingers are continually anticipating upcoming keystrokes. Consider the word vacuum.
+In this word, the v, a, and c are all typed with the left hand, leaving the
+right hand nothing to do until it is time to type the first u. However, a
+high speed film of a good typist shows that the right hand moves up to
+anticipate the typing of the u, even as the left hand is just beginning to
+type the v. By the time the c is typed the right index finger is in position over the u and ready to strike it.
+When two successive key strokes are to be typed with the fingers of
+the same hand, concurrent preparation to type both can result in similar
+or conflicting instructions to the fingers and/or the hand. Consider, in
+this light, the difference between the sequence ev and the sequence er.
+The first sequence requires the typist to move up from home row to
+type the e and to move down from the home row to type the v, while in
+the second sequence, both the e and the rare above the home row.
+The hands take very different positions in these two cases. In the
+first case, the hand as a whole stays fairly stationary over the home
+row. The middle finger moves up to type the e, and the index finger
+moves down to type the v. In the second case, the hand as a whole
+moves up, bringing the middle finger over the e and the index finger
+over the r. Thus, we can see that several letters can simultaneously
+influence the positioning of the fingers and the hands.
+From the point of view of optimizing the efficiency of the typing
+motion, these different patterns seem very sensible. In the first case,
+the hand as a whole is maintained in a good compromise position to
+allow the typist to strike both letters reasonably efficiently by extending
+the fingers up or down. In the second case, the need to extend the
+fingers is reduced by moving the whole hand up, putting it in a nearoptimal position to strike either key.
+Rumelhart and Norman (1982) have simulated these effects using
+PDP mechanisms. Figure 4 illustrates aspects of the model as they are
+illustrated in typing the word very. In brief, Rumelhart and Norman
+assumed that the decision to type a word caused activation of a unit for
+that word. That unit, in turn, activated units corresponding to each of
+the letters in the word. The unit for the first letter to be typed was
+made to inhibit the units for the second and following letters, the unit
+
+1 THE APPEAL OF PDP
+15
+for the second to inhibit the third and following letters, and so on. As
+a result of the interplay of activation and inhibition among these units,
+the unit for the first letter was at first the most strongly active, and the
+units for the other letters were partially activated.
+Each letter unit exerts influences on the hand and finger involved in
+typing the letter. The v unit, for example, tends to cause the index
+finger to move down and to cause the whole hand to move down with
+it. The e unit, on the other hand, tends to cause the middle finger on
+the left hand to move up and to cause the whole hand to move up also.
+The r unit also causes the left index finger to move up and the left
+hand to move up with it.
+The extent of the influences of each letter on the hand and finger it
+directs depends on the extent of the activation of the letter. Therefore,
+at first, in typing the word very, the v exerts the greatest control.
+MIDDLE
+MIDDLE
+• RING
+• LITTLE
+upward
+outwarden-tinward
+inward «
+THUMB
+PALM
+PALM
+upward
+downward
+•outward
+Response
+System
+RESPONSE SYSTEM
+LI(-1, + 05)
+LM (+ 1-03)
+LI (+ 1,- 0 3)
+RI(+ 1, + 1 3)
+target finger position
+current finger position
+Keypress
+Schemata
+Word
+Schema
+ACTIVATION
+"very
+FIGURE 4. The interaction of activations in typing the word very. The very unit is
+activated from outside the model. It in turn activates the units for each of the component letters. Each letter unit specifies the target finger positions, specified in a keyboard coordinate system. L and R stand for the left and right hands, and 1 and M for the
+index and middle fingers. The letter units receive information about the current finger
+position from the response system. Each letter unit inhibits the activation of all letter
+units that follow it in the word: inhibitory connections are indicated by the lines with
+solid dots at their terminations. (From "Simulating a Skilled Typist: A Study of Skilled
+Motor Performance" by D. E. Rumelhart and D. A. Norman, 1982, Cognitive Science, 6,
+p. 12. Copyright 1982 by Ablex Bybistynte & artertay permission.)
+
+16 THE POP PERSPECTIVE
+Because the e and r are simultaneously pulling the hand up, though, the
+v is typed primarily by moving the index finger, and there is little
+movement on the whole hand.
+Once a finger is within a certain striking distance of the key to be
+typed, the actual pressing movement is triggered, and the keypress
+occurs. The keypress itself causes a strong inhibitory signal to be sent
+to the unit for the letter just typed, thereby removing this unit from the
+picture and allowing the unit for the next letter in the word to become
+the most strongly activated.
+This mechanism provides a simple way for all of the letters to jointly
+determine the successive configurations the hand will enter into in the
+process of typing a word. This model has shown considerable success
+predicting the time between successive keystrokes as a function of the
+different keys involved. Given a little noise in the activation process, it
+can also account for some of the different kinds of errors that have
+been observed in transcription typing.
+The typing model represents an illustration of the fact that serial
+behavior—a succession of key strokes-is not necessarily the result of
+an inherently serial processing mechanism. In this model, the sequential structure of typing emerges from the interaction of the excitatory
+and inhibitory influences among the processing units.
+Reaching for an object without falling over. Similar mechanisms
+can be used to model the process of reaching for an object without losing one's balance while standing, as Hinton (1984) has shown. He considered a simple version of this task using a two-dimensional "person"
+with a foot, a lower leg, an upper leg, a trunk, an upper arm, and a
+lower arm. Each of these limbs is joined to the next at a joint which
+has a single degree of rotational freedom. The task posed to this person is to reach a target placed somewhere in front of it, without taking
+any steps and without falling down. This is a simplified version of the
+situation in which a real person has to reach out in front for an object
+placed somewhere in the plane that vertically bisects the body. The
+task is not as simple as it looks, since if we just swing an arm out in
+front of ourselves, it may shift our center of gravity so far forward that
+we will lose our balance. The problem, then, is to find a set of joint
+angles that simultaneously solves the two constraints on the task. First,
+the tip of the forearm must touch the object. Second, to keep from
+falling down, the person must keep its center of gravity over the foot.
+To do this, Hinton assigned a single processor to each joint. On each
+computational cycle, each processor received information about how far
+the tip of the hand was from the target and where the center of gravity
+was with respect to the foot. Using these two pieces of information,
+each joint adjusted its angle so as to approach the goals of maintaining
+
+1. THE APPEAL OF PDP
+17
+balance and bringing the tip closer to the target. After a number of
+iterations, the stick-person settled on postures that satisfied the goal of
+reaching the target and the goal of maintaining the center of gravity
+over the "feet."
+Though the simulation was able to perform the task, eventually satisfying both goals at once, it had a number of inadequacies stemming
+from the fact that each joint processor attempted to achieve a solution
+in ignorance of what the other joints were attempting to do. This problem was overcome by using additional processors responsible for setting
+combinations of joint angles. Thus, a processor for flexion and extension of the leg would adjust the knee, hip, and ankle joints synergistically, while a processor for flexion and extension of the arm would
+adjust the shoulder and elbow together. With the addition of processors of this form, the number of iterations required to reach a solution
+was greatly reduced, and the form of the approach to the solution
+looked very natural. The sequence of configurations attained in one
+processing run is shown in Figure, S.
+Explicit attempts to program a robot to cope with the problem of
+maintaining balance as it reaches for a desired target have revealed the
+difficulty of deriving explicitly the right combinations of actions for
+each possible starting state and goal state. This simple model illustrates
+that we may be wrong to seek such an explicit solution. We see here
+that a solution to the problem can emerge from the action of a number
+of simple processors each attempting to honor the constraints
+independently.
++
++
++
++
+FIGURE 5. A sequence of configurations assumed by the stick "person" performing the
+reaching task described in the text, from Hinton (1984). The small circle represents the
+center of gravity of the whole stick-figure, and the cross represents the goal to be
+reached. The configuration is Oopyrighted Mater aleration.
+
+18 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+Perception
+Stereoscopic vision. One early model using parallel distributed processing was the model of stereoscopic depth perception proposed by
+Marr and Poggio (1976). Their theory proposed to explain the perception of depth in random-dot stereograms (Julesz, 1971; see Figure 6) in
+terms of a simple distributed processing mechanism.
+Julesz's random-dot stereograms present interesting challenges to
+mechanisms of depth perception. A stereogram consists of two
+random-dot patterns. In a simple stereogram such as the one shown
+here, one pattern is an exact copy of the other except that the pattern
+of dots in a region of one of the patterns is shifted horizontally with
+respect to the rest of the pattern. Each of the two patternscorresponding to two retinal images-consists entirely of a pattern of
+random dots, so there is no information in either of the two views considered alone that can indicate the presence of different surfaces, let
+alone depth relations among those surfaces. Yet, when one of these
+dot patterns is projected to the left eye and the other to the right eye,
+an observer sees each region as a surface, with the shifted region
+hovering in front of or behind the other, depending on the direction of
+the shift.
+FIGURE 6. Random-dot stereograms. The (wo patterns are identical except that the
+pattern of dots in the central region of the left pattern are shifted over with respect 1o
+those in the right. When viewed stereoscopically such that the left pattern projects to the
+left eye and the right pattern to the right eye, the shifted area appears to hover above the
+page. Some readers may be able to achieve this by converging 1o a distant point (e.g., a
+far wall) and then interposing the figure into the line of sight. (From Foundations of
+Cyclopean Perception, p. 21, by B. Julesz, 1971, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
+Copyright 1971 by Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. Reprinted by permission.)
+
+1. THE APPEAL OF PDP k
+19
+What kind of a mechanism might we propose to account for these
+facts? Marr and Poggio (1976) began by explicitly representing the two
+views in two arrays, as human observers might in two different retinal
+images. They noted that corresponding black dots at different perceived distances from the observer will be offset from each other by
+different amounts in the two views. The job of the model is to determine which points correspond. This task is, of course, made difficult
+by the fact that there will be a very large number of spurious
+correspondences of individual dots. The goal of the mechanism, then,
+is to find those correspondences that represent real correspondences in
+depth and suppress those that represent spurious correspondences.
+To carry out this task, Marr and Poggio assigned a processing unit to
+each possible conjunction of a point in one image and a point in the
+other. Since the eyes are offset horizontally, the possible conjunctions
+occur at various offsets or disparities along the horizontal dimension.
+Thus, for each point in one eye, there was a set of processing units
+with one unit assigned to the conjunction of that point and the point at
+each horizontal offset from it in the other eye.
+Each processing unit received activation whenever both of the points
+the unit stood for contained dots. So far, then, units for both real and
+spurious correspondences would be equally activated. To allow the
+mechanism to find the right correspondences, they pointed out two
+general principles about the visual world: (a) Each point in each view
+generally corresponds to one and only one point in the other view, and
+(b) neighboring points in space tend to be at nearly the same depth and
+therefore at about the same disparity in the two images. While there
+are discontinuities at the edges of things, over most of a twodimensional view of the world there will be continuity. These principles are called the uniqueness and continuity constraints, respectively.
+Marr and Poggio incorporated these principles into the interconnections between the processing units. The uniqueness constraint was captured by inhibitory connections among the units that stand for alternative correspondences of the same dot. The continuity principle was
+captured by excitatory connections among the units that stand for similar offsets of adjacent dots.
+These additional connections allow the Marr and Poggio model to
+"solve" stereograms like the one shown in the figure. At first, when a
+pair of patterns is presented, the units for all possible correspondences
+of a dot in one eye with a dot in the other will be equally excited.
+However, the excitatory connections cause the units for the correct
+conjunctions to receive more excitation than units for spurious conjunctions, and the inhibitory connections allow the units for the correct
+conjunctions to turn off the units for the spurious connections. Thus,
+
+20 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+the model tends to settle down into a stable state in which only the
+correct correspondence of each dot remains active.
+There are a number of reasons why Marr and Poggio (1979) modified this model (see Marr, 1982, for a discussion), but the basic
+mechanisms of mutual excitation between units that are mutually consistent and mutual inhibition between units that are mutually incompatible provide a natural mechanism for settling on the right conjunctions
+of points and rejecting spurious ones. The model also illustrates how
+general principles or rules such as the uniqueness and continuity principles may be embodied in the connections between processing units, and
+how behavior in accordance with these principles can emerge from the
+interactions determined by the pattern of these interconnections.
+Perceptual completion of familiar patterns. Perception, of course, is
+influenced by familiarity. It is a well-known fact that we often misperceive unfamiliar objects as more familiar ones and that we can get by
+with less time or with lower-quality information in perceiving familiar
+items than we need for perceiving unfamiliar items. Not only does
+familiarity help us determine what the higher-level structures are when
+the lower-level information is ambiguous; it also allows us to fill in
+missing lower-level information within familiar higher-order patterns.
+The well-known phonemic restoration effect is a case in point. In this
+phenomenon, perceivers hear sounds that have been cut out of words
+as if they had actually been present. For example, Warren (1970)
+presented legi # lature to subjects, with a click in the location marked by
+the #. Not only did subjects correctly identify the word legislature;
+they also heard the missing /s/ just as though it had been presented
+They had great difficulty localizing the click, which they tended to hear
+as a disembodied sound. Similar phenomena have been observed in
+visual perception of words since the work of Pillsbury (1897).
+Two of us have proposed a model describing the role of familiarity in
+perception based on excitatory and inhibitory interactions among units
+standing for various hypotheses about the input at different levels of
+abstraction (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland,
+1982). The model has been applied in detail to the role of familiarity
+in the perception of letters in visually presented words, and has proved
+to provide a very close account of the results of a large number of
+experiments.
+The model assumes that there are units that act as detectors for the
+visual features which distinguish letters, with one set of units assigned
+to detect the features in each of the different letter-positions in the
+word. For four-letter words, then, there are four such sets of detectors.
+There are also four sets of detectors for the letters themselves and a set
+of detectors for the words.
+
+1. THE APPEAL OF PDP 21
+In the model, each unit has an activation value, corresponding
+roughly to the strength of the hypothesis that what that unit stands for
+is present in the perceptual input. The model honors the following
+important relations which hold between these "hypotheses" or activations: First, to the extent that two hypotheses are mutually consistent,
+they should support each other. Thus, units that are mutually consistent, in the way that the letter T in the first position is consistent
+with the word TAKE, tend to excite each other. Second, to the extent
+that two hypotheses are mutually inconsistent, they should weaken each
+other. Actually, we can distinguish iwo kinds of inconsistency: The
+first kind might be called between-level inconsistency. For example,
+the hypothesis that a word begins with a T is inconsistent with the
+hypothesis that the word is MOVE. The second might be called mutual
+exclusion. For example, the hypothesis that a word begins with I
+excludes the hypothesis that it begins with R since a word can only
+begin with one letter. Both kinds of inconsistencies operate in the word
+perception model to reduce the activations of units. Thus, the letter
+units in each position compete with all other letter units in the same
+position, and the word units compete with each other. This type of
+inhibitory interaction is often called competitive inhibition. In addition,
+there are inhibitory interactions between incompatible units on different
+levels.
+This type of inhibitory interaction is simply called
+between-level inhibition.
+The set of excitatory and inhibitory interactions between units can be
+diagrammed by drawing excitatory and inhibitory links between them.
+The whole picture is too complex to draw, so we illustrate only with a
+fragment: Some of the interactions between some of the units in this
+model are illustrated in Figure 7
+Let us consider what happens in a system like this when a familiar
+stimulus is presented under degraded conditions. For example, consider the display shown in Figure 8. This display consists of the letters
+W, O, and R, completely visible, and enough of a fourth letter to rule
+out all letters other than R and K. Before onset of the display, the
+activations of the units are set at or below 0. When the display is
+presented, detectors for the features present in each position become
+active (i.e., their activations grow above 0). At this point, they begin to
+excite and inhibit the corresponding detectors for letters. In the first
+three positions, W, O, and R are unambiguously activated, so we will
+focus our attention on the fourth position where R and K are both
+equally consistent with the active features. Here, the activations of the
+detectors for R and K start out growing together, as the feature detectors below them become activated. As these detectors become active,
+they and the active letter detectors for W, O, and R in the other positions start to activate deerighted Mordsiawhich have these letters in
+
+22
+ABLE
+TRIP
+TIME
+TRAP
+TAKE
+CART
+G
+FIGURE 7. The unit for the letter T in the first position of a four-letter array and some
+of its neighbors. Note that the feature and letter units stand only for the first position; in
+a complete picture of the units needed from processing four-letter displays, there would
+be four full sets of feature detectors and four full sets of letter detectors. (From " An
+Interactive Activation Model of Context Effects in Letter Perception: Part I. An Account
+of Basic Findings" by J. L. McClelland and D. E. Rumelhart, 1981, Psychological Review,
+88. p. 380. Copyright 1981 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by
+permission.)
+them and to inhibit detectors for words which do not have these letters.
+A number of words are partially consistent with the active letters, and
+receive some net excitation from the letter level, but only the word
+WORK matches one of the active letters in all four positions. As a
+result, WORK becomes more active than any other word and inhibits
+the other words, thereby successfully dominating the pattern of activation among the word units. As it grows in strength, it sends feedback
+to the letter level, reinforcing the activations of the W, O, R, and Kin
+the corresponding positions. In the fourth position, this feedback gives
+K the upper hand over R, and eventually the stronger activation of the
+
+I THE APPEAL OF PDP
+23
+Word Level
+0.8
+work
+0.0
+fork
+weak
+-0.4
+- 00
+1
+16
+24
+Letter Level
+32
+40
+0.81
+- K
+0.4
+0.0
+-0.4
+16
+24
+Time
+32
+R
+D
+40
+FIGURE 8. A possible display which might be presented to the interactive activation
+model of word recognition, and the resulting activations of selected letter and word units.
+The letter units are for the letters indicated in the fourth position of a four-letter display.
+K detector allows it to dominate the pattern of activation, suppressing
+the R detector completely.
+This example illustrates how PDP models can allow knowledge about
+what letters go together to form words to work together with natural
+constraints on the task (i.e., that there should only be one letter in one
+place at one time), to produce perceptual completion in a simple and
+direct way.
+Completion of novel patterns. However, the perceptual intelligence
+i human perceivers ar speeded material to recognize familiar par
+terns and fill in missing portions.
+ve also show tacilitation in th
+
+24 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+perception of letters in unfamiliar letter strings which are word-like but
+not themselves actually familiar.
+One way of accounting for such performances is to imagine that the
+perceiver possesses, in addition to detectors for familiar words, sets of
+detectors for regular subword units such as familiar letter clusters, or
+that they use abstract rules, specifying which classes of letters can go
+with which others in different contexts.
+It turns out, however, that the
+model we have already described needs no such additional structure to
+produce perceptual facilitation for word-like letter strings; to this extent
+it acts as if it "knows" the orthographic structure of English. We illustrate this feature of the model with the example shown in Figure 9,
+where the nonword YEAD is shown in degraded form so that the
+second letter is incompletely visible. Given the information about this
+letter, considered alone, either E or F would be possible in the second
+position. Yet our model will tend to complete this letter as an E
+The reason for this behavior is that, when YEAD is shown, a number
+of words are partially activated. There is no word consistent with Y, E
+or F, A, and D, but there are words which match YEA_ (YEAR, for
+example and others which match _tAD (BEAD, DEAD, HEAD, and
+READ, for example). These and other near misses are partially
+activated as a result of the pattern of activation at the letter level.
+While they compete with each other, none of these words gets strongly
+enough activated to completely suppress all the others. Instead, these
+units act as a group to reinforce particularly the letters E and A. There
+are no close partial matches which include the letter F in the second
+position, so this letter receives no feedback support. As a result, E
+comes to dominate, and eventually suppress, the fin the second
+position.
+The fact that the word perception model exhibits perceptual facilitation to pronounceable nonwords as well as words illustrates once again
+how behavior in accordance with general principles or rules can emerge
+from the interactions of simple processing elements. Of course, the
+behavior of the word perception model does not implement exactly any
+of the systems of orthographic rules that have been proposed by
+linguists (Chomsky & Halle, 1968; Venesky, 1970) or psychologists
+(Spoehr & Smith, 1975). In this regard, it only approximates such
+rule-based descriptions of perceptual processing. However, rule systems such as Chomsky and Halle's or Venesky's appear to be only
+approximately honored in human performance as well (Smith & Baker,
+1976). Indeed, some of the discrepancies between human performance
+data and rule systems occur in exactly the ways that we would predict
+from the word perception model (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982).
+This illustrates the possibility that PDP models may provide more
+accurate accounts of the details of human performance than models
+
+1. THE APPEAL OF PDP
+25
+Word Level
+0.8-
+ctiv
+dead
+- - read
+_ bead
+head
+0.0
+- 0.4
+8
+1
+16
+Letter Level
+32
+0.8
+- E
+Activation
+0.4
+0.0
+CaF
+- 0.4
+1
+32
+16
+Time
+24
+MENT
+FIGURE 9. An example of a nonword display that might be presented to the interactive
+activation model of word recognition and the response of selected units at the letter and
+word levels.
+The letter units illustrated are detectors for lelters in the second input
+position.
+based on a set of rules representing human competence-at least in
+some domains.
+Retrieving Information From Memory
+Content addressability. One very prominent feature of human
+memory is that it is concepyagdressarderill seems fairly clear that we
+
+26 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+can access information in memory based on nearly any attribute of the
+representation we are trying to retrieve.
+Of course, some cues are much better than others.
+An attribute
+which is shared by a very large number of things we know about is not
+a very effective retrieval cue, since it does not accurately pick out a particular memory representation. But, several such cues, in conjunction,
+can do the job. Thus, if we ask a friend who goes out with several
+women, "Who was that woman I saw you with?"
+', he may not know
+which one we mean -but if we specify something else about her-say
+the color of her hair, what she was wearing (in so far as he remembers
+this at all, where we saw him with her-he will likely be able to hit
+upon the right one.
+It is, of course, possible to implement some kind of content
+addressability of memory on a standard computer in a variety of different ways. One way is to search sequentially, examining each
+memory in the system to find the memory or the set of memories
+which has the particular content specified in the cue. An alternative,
+somewhat more efficient, scheme involves some form of indexingkeeping a list, for every content
+a memory might have, of which
+memories have that content.
+Such an indexing scheme can be made to
+work with error-free
+probes, but it will break down if there is an error in the specification of
+the retrieval cue. There are possible ways of recovering from such
+errors, but they lead to the kind of combinatorial explosions which
+plague this kind of computer implementation.
+But suppose that we imagine that each memory is represented by a
+unit which has mutually excitatory interactions with units standing for
+each of its properties. Then, whenever any property of the memory
+became active, the memory would tend to be activated, and whenever
+the memory was activated, all of its contents would tend to become
+activated. Such a scheme would automatically produce content
+addressability for us. Though it would not be immune to errors, it
+would not be devastated by an error in the probe if the remaining
+properties specified the correct memory.
+As described thus far, whenever a property that is a part of a number
+of different memories is activated, it will tend to activate all of the
+memories it is in. To keep these other activities from swamping the
+"correct" memory unit, we simply need to add initial inhibitory connections among the memory units.
+An additional desirable feature would
+be mutually inhibitory interactions among mutually incompatible
+property units. For example, a person cannot both be single and married at the same time, so the units for different marital states would be
+mutually inhibitory.
+
+1. THE APPEAL OF PDP
+27
+McClelland (1981) developed a simulation model that illustrates how
+a system with these properties would act as a content addressable
+memory. The model is obviously oversimplified, but it illustrates many
+of the characteristics of the more complex models that will be considered in later chapters.
+Consider the information represented in Figure 10, which lists a
+number of people we might meet if we went to live in an unsavory
+neighborhood, and some of their hypothetical characteristics. A subset
+The Jets and The Sharks
+Name
+Art
+Al
+Sam
+Clyde
+Mike
+Jim
+Greg
+John
+Doug
+Lance
+George
+Pete
+Fred
+Gene
+Ralph
+Phil
+Ike
+Nick
+Don
+Ned
+Karl
+Ken
+Earl
+Rick
+Neal
+Dave
+Gang
+Jets
+Jets
+Jets
+Jets
+Jets
+Jets
+Jets
+Jets
+Jets
+Jets
+Jets
+Jets
+Jets
+Jets
+Jets
+Sharks
+Sharks
+Sharks
+Sharks
+Sharks
+Sharks
+Sharks
+Sharks
+Sharks
+Sharks
+Sharks
+Sharks
+Age
+Edu
+40's
+J.H.
+30's
+J.H.
+20's
+COL.
+40's
+J.H.
+30's
+J.H.
+20's
+J.H.
+20's
+20's
+H.S.
+30's
+J.H.
+H.S.
+20's
+J.H.
+20's
+J.H.
+20's
+H.S.
+20's H.S.
+20's
+30's
+COL.
+J.H.
+30's
+COL.
+30's J.H.
+30's
+H.S.
+30's COL.
+30's
+COL.
+40's H.S.
+20's H.S.
+40's H.S.
+30's H.S.
+30's
+COL.
+30's
+H.S.
+30's H.S.
+Mar
+Sing.
+Mar.
+Sing.
+Sing.
+Sing.
+Div.
+Mar.
+Mar.
+Sing.
+Mar.
+Dir.
+Sing.
+Sing.
+Sing.
+Sing.
+Mar.
+Sing.
+Sing.
+Mar.
+Mar.
+Mar.
+Sing.
+Mar.
+Div.
+Mar.
+Sing.
+Div.
+Occupation
+Pusher
+Burglar
+Bookie
+Bookie
+Bookie
+Burglar
+Pusher
+Burglar
+Bookie
+Burglar
+Burglar
+Bookie
+Pusher
+Pusher
+Pusher
+Pusher
+Bookie
+Pusher
+Pusher
+FIGURE 10. Characteristics of a number of individuals belonging to (wo gangs, the Jets
+and the Sharks. (From "Retrieving General and Specific Knowledge From Stored
+Knowledge of Specifics" by J. L. McClelland, 1981, Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Sociery, Berkeley, CA. Copyright 1981 by J. L. McClelland
+Reprinted by permission.)
+
+28 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+of the units needed to represent this information is shown in Figure 11.
+In this network, there is an "instance unit" for each of the characters
+described in Figure 10, and that unit is linked by mutually excitatory
+connections to all of the units for the fellow's properties. Note that we
+have included property units for the names of the characters, as well as
+units for their other properties.
+Now, suppose we wish to retrieve the properties of a particular individual, say Lance. And suppose that we know Lance's name. Then we
+can probe the network by activating Lance's name unit, and we can see
+what pattern of activation arises as a result. Assuming that we know of
+no one else named Lance, we can expect the Lance name unit to be
+hooked up only to the instance unit for Lance.
+This will in turn
+activate the property units for Lance, thereby creating the pattern of
+Art
+Rick
+20
+Lance
+Ralph
+30
+40
+Sam
+Burglar
+J.H.
+Bookie
+Col
+Pusher
+H.S.
+married
+"Jet"
+single
+divorced
+"Shark"
+FIGURE 11. Some of the units and interconnections needed to represent the individuals
+shown in Figure 10. The units connected with double-headed arrows are mutually excitatory. All the units within the same cloud are mutually inhibitory. (From " Retrieving
+General and Specific Knowledge From Stored Knowledge of Specifics" by J. L.
+McClelland, 1981, Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science
+Society, Berkeley, CA. Copyright 1981 by J. L. McClelland. Reprinted by permission.)
+
+1. THE APPEAL OF PDP 29
+activation corresponding to Lance. In effect, we have retrieved a
+representation of Lance.
+More will happen than just what we have
+described so far, but for the moment let us stop here.
+Of course, sometimes we may wish to retrieve a name, given other
+information.
+In this case, we might start with some of Lance's
+properties, effectively asking the system, say " Who do you know who is
+a Shark and in his 20s?" by activating the Shark and 20s units. In this
+case it turns out that there is a single individual, Ken, who fits the
+description. So, when we activate these two properties, we will activate
+the instance unit for Ken, and this in turn will activate his name unit,
+and fill in his other properties as well.
+Graceful degradation. A few of the desirable properties of this kind
+of model are visible from considering what happens as we vary the set
+of features we use to probe the memory in an attempt to retrieve a particular individual's name. Any set of features which is sufficient to
+uniquely characterize a particular item will activate the instance node
+for that item more strongly than any other instance node. A probe
+which contains misleading features will most strongly activate the node
+that it matches best. This will clearly be a poorer cue than one which
+contains no misleading information-but it will still be sufficient to
+activate the "right answer" more strongly than any other, as long as the
+introduction of misleading information does not make the probe closer
+to some other item. In general, though the degree of activation of a
+particular instance node and of the corresponding name nodes varies in
+this model as a function of the exact content of the probe, errors in the
+probe will not be fatal unless they make the probe point to the wrong
+memory. This kind of model's handling of incomplete or partial probes
+also requires no special error-recovery scheme to work-it is a natural
+by-product of the nature of the retrieval mechanism that it is capable of
+graceful degradation.
+These aspects of the behavior of the Jets and Sharks model deserve
+more detailed consideration than the present space allows. One reason
+we do not go into them is that we view this model as a stepping stone
+in the development of other models, such as the models using more
+distributed representations, that occur in other parts of this book. We
+do, however, have more to say about this simple model, for like some
+of the other models we have already examined, this model exhibits
+some useful properties which emerge from the interactions of the processing units.
+Default assignment. It probably will have occurred to the reader that
+in many of the situations we have been examining, there will be other
+
+30 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+activations occurring which may influence the pattern of activation
+which is retrieved. So, in the case where we retrieved the properties of
+Lance, those properties, once they become active, can begin to activate
+the units for other individuals with those same properties.
+The
+memory unit for Lance will be in competition with these units and will
+tend to keep their activation down, but to the extent that they do
+become active, they will tend to activate their own properties and therefore fill them in. In this way, the model can fill in properties of
+individuals based on what it knows about other, similar instances.
+To illustrate how this might work we have simulated the case in
+which we do not know that Lance is a Burglar as opposed to a Bookie
+or a Pusher.
+It turns out that there are a group of individuals in the set
+who are very similar to Lance in many respects. When Lance's
+properties become activated, these other units become partially
+activated, and they start activating their properties. Since they all share
+the same "occupation," they work together to fill in that property for
+Lance. Of course, there is no reason why this should necessarily be the
+right answer, but generally speaking, the more similar two things are in
+respects that we know about, the more likely they are to be similar in
+respects that we do not, and the model implements this heuristic.
+Spontaneous generalization. The model we have been describing
+has another valuable property as well —it tends to retrieve what is common to those memories which match a retrieval cue which is too general to capture any one memory. Thus, for example, we could probe
+the system by activating the unit corresponding to membership in the
+Jets. This unit will partially activate all the instances of the Jets,
+thereby causing each to send activations to its properties. In this way
+the model can retrieve the typical values that the members of the Jets
+have on each dimension-even though there is no one Jet that has
+these typical values. In the example, 9 of 15 Jets are single, 9 of 15 are
+in their 20s, and 9 of 15 have only a Junior High School education;
+when we probe by activating the Jet unit, all three of these properties
+dominate. The Jets are evenly divided between the three occupations,
+so each of these units becomes partially activated. Each has a different
+name, so that each name unit is very weakly activated, nearly cancelling
+each other out.
+In the example just given of spontaneous generalization, it would not
+be unreasonable to suppose that someone might have explicitly stored a
+generalization about the members of a gang. The account just given
+would be an alternative to "explicit storage" of the generalization. It
+has two advantages, though, over such an account. First, it does not
+require any special generalization formation mechanism. Second, it can
+provide us with generalizations on unanticipated lines, on demand.
+
+1. THE APPEAL OF PDP 31
+Thus, if we want to know, for example, what people in their 20s with a
+junior high school education are like, we can probe the model by
+activating these two units. Since all such people are Jets and Burglars,
+these two units are strongly activated by the model in this case; two of
+them are divorced and iwo are married, so both of these units are partially activated.
+The sort of model we are considering, then, is considerably more
+than a content addressable memory. In addition, it performs default
+assignment, and it can spontaneousiy retrieve a general concept of the
+individuals that match any specifiable probe. These properties must be
+explicitly implemented as complicated computational extensions of
+other models of knowledge retrieval, but in PDP models they are
+natural by-products of the retrieval process itself.
+REPRESENTATION AND LEARNING IN PDP MODELS
+In the Jets and Sharks model, we can speak of the model's active
+representation at a particular time, and associate this with the pattern of
+activation over the units in the system. We can also ask: What is the
+stored knowledge that gives rise to that pattern of activation? In considering this question, we see immediately an important difference
+between PDP models and other models of cognitive processes. In most
+models, knowledge is stored as a static copy of a pattern.
+Retrieval
+amounts to finding the pattern in long-term memory and copying it into
+a buffer or working memory. There is no real difference between the
+stored representation in long-term memory and the active representation in working memory. In PDP models, though, this is not the case.
+In these models, the patterns themselves are not stored. Rather, what
+is stored is the connection strengths between units that allow these patterns to be re-created. In the Jets and Sharks model, there is an
+instance unit assigned to each individual, but that unit does not contain
+a copy of the representation of that individual. Instead, it is simply the
+case that the connections between it and the other units in the system
+are such that activation of the unit will cause the pattern for the
+individual to be reinstated on the property units.
+1 In this and all other cases, there is a lendency for the pattern of activation to be influenced by partially activated, near neighbors, which do not quite match the probe. Thus,
+in this case, there is a Jet Al, who is a Married Burglar. The unit for Al gets slightly
+activated, giving Married a slight edge over Divorced in the simulation.
+
+32 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+This difference between PDP models and conventional models has
+enormous implications, both for processing and for learning. We have
+already seen some of the implications for processing. The representation of the knowledge is set up in such a way that the knowledge necessarily influences the course of processing. Using knowledge in processing is no longer a matter of finding the relevant information in memory
+and bringing it to bear; it is part and parcel of the processing itself.
+For learning, the implications are equally profound. For if the
+knowledge is the strengths of the connections, learning must be a
+matter of finding the right connection strengths so that the right patterns of activation will be produced under the right circumstances. This
+is an extremely important property of this class of models, for it opens
+up the possibility that an information processing mechanism could
+learn, as a result of tuning
+its connections, to capture the
+interdependencies between activations that it is exposed to in the
+course of processing.
+In recent years, there has been quite a lot of interest in learning in
+cognitive science. Computational approaches to learning fall predominantly into what might be called the "explicit rule formulation" tradition, as represented by the work of Winston (1975), the suggestions of
+Chomsky, and the ACT* model of J. R. Anderson (1983). All of this
+work shares the assumption that the goal of learning is to formulate
+explicit rules (propositions, productions, etc.) which capture powerful
+generalizations in a succinct way. Fairly powerful mechanisms, usually
+with considerable innate knowledge about a domain, and/or some starting set of primitive propositional representations, then formulate
+hypothetical general rules, e.g., by comparing particular cases and formulating explicit generalizations.
+The approach that we take in developing PDP models is completely
+different. First, we do not assume that the goal of learning is the formulation of explicit rules. Rather, we assume it is the acquisition of
+connection strengths which allow a network of simple units to act as
+though it knew the rules. Second, we do not attribute powerful computational capabilities to the learning mechanism. Rather, we assume
+very simple connection strength modulation mechanisms which adjust
+the strength of connections between units based on information locally
+available at the connection.
+These issues will be addressed at length in later sections of this book.
+For now, our purpose is to give a simple, illustrative example of the
+connection strength modulation process, and how it can produce networks which exhibit some interesting behavior.
+Local vs. distributed representation. Before we turn to an explicit
+consideration of this issue, we raise a basic question about
+
+1. THE APPEAL OF PDP
+33
+representation. Once we have achieved the insight that the knowledge
+is stored in the strengths of the interconnections between units, a question arises. Is there any reason to assign one unit to each pattern that
+we wish to learn? Another possibility-one that we explore extensively
+in this book-is the possibility that the knowledge about any individual
+pattern is not stored in the connections of a special unit reserved for
+that pattern, but is distributed over the connections among a large
+number of processing units. On this view, the Jets and Sharks model
+represents a special case in which separate units are reserved for each
+instance.
+Models in which connection information is explicitly thought of as
+distributed have been proposed by a number of investigators. The
+units in these collections may themselves correspond to conceptual
+primitives, or they may have no particular meaning as individuals. In
+either case, the focus shifts to patterns of activation over these units
+and to mechanisms whose explicit purpose is to learn the right connection strengths to allow the right patterns of activation to become
+activated under the right circumstances.
+In the rest of this section, we will give a simple example of a PDP
+model in which the knowledge is distributed. We will first explain how
+the model would work, given pre-existing connections, and we will then
+describe how it could come to acquire the right connection strengths
+through a very simple learning mechanism. A number of models which
+have taken this distributed approach have been discussed in this book's
+predecessor, Hinton and J. A. Anderson's (1981) Parallel Models of
+Associative Memory. We will consider a simple version of a common
+type of distributed model, a pattern associator.
+Pattern associators are models in which a pattern of activation over
+one set of units can cause a pattern of activation over another set of
+units without any intervening units to stand for either pattern as a
+whole. Pattern associators would, for example, be capable of
+associating a pattern of activation on one set of units corresponding to
+the appearance of an object with a pattern on another set corresponding
+to the aroma of the object, so that, when an object is presented visually, causing its visual pattern to become active, the model produces the
+pattern corresponding to its aroma.
+How a pattern associator works. For purposes of illustration, we
+present a very simple pattern associator in Figure 12. In this model,
+there are four units in each of two pools. The first pool, the A units,
+will be the pool in which patterns corresponding to the sight of various
+objects might be represented. The second pool, the B units, will be the
+pool in which the pattern corresponding to the aroma will be
+represented. We can preteptighzed parentiye patterns of activation on
+
+34
+From Vision
+A Units
+.25
+•25
+From
+Olfaction
+25
+..25
+.25
+B Units
+FIGURE 12. A simple pattern associator. The example assumes that patterns of activation in the A units can be produced by the visual system and patterns in the B units can
+be produced by the olfactory system. The synaptic connections allow the outputs of the
+A units to influence the activations of the B units. The synaptic weights linking the A
+units to the B units were selected so as to allow the pattern of activation shown on the A
+units to reproduce the pattern of activation shown on the B units without the need for
+any olfactory input.
+the A units are produced upon viewing a rose or a grilled steak, and
+alternative patterns on the B units are produced upon sniffing the same
+objects. Figure 13 shows two pairs of patterns, as well as sets of interconnections necessary to allow the A member of each pair to reproduce
+the B member.
+The details of the behavior of the individual units vary among different versions of pattern associators. For present purposes, we'll
+assume that the units can take on positive or negative activation values,
+with 0 representing a kind of neutral intermediate value. The strengths
+of the interconnections between the units can be positive or negative
+real numbers.
+The effect of an A unit on a B unit is determined by multiplying the
+activation of the A unit times the strength of its synaptic connection
+with the B unit. For example, if the connection from a particular A
+unit to a particular B unit has a positive sign, when the A unit is
+
++1
+-1
+-1
++1
+-.25 +.25 +.25 - 25
+-.25 +.25 +.25
+-.25
+1.25 - 25
+-.25 +.25
++.25 - 25-25 +25
+- 1
+-1
++1
++1
+1. THE APPEAL OF PDP
+35
+-1
++ 1
+- 1
++1
++.25 - 25 +.25 - 25
+-.25 +.25 - 25 +.25
+-25 +.25 - 25 +.25
+1.25 -25 +25 - 25
+-1
++1
++1
+-1
+FIGURE 13. Two simple associators represented as matrices. The weights in the first wo
+matrices allow the A pattern shown above the matrix to produce the B pattern shown to
+the right of it. Note that the weights in the first matrix are the same as those shown in
+excited (activation greater than O), it will excite the B unit.
+For this
+example, we'll simply assume that the activation of each unit is set to
+the sum of the excitatory and inhibitory effects operating on it. This is
+one of the simplest possible cases.
+Suppose, now, that we have created on the A units the pattern
+corresponding to the first visual pattern shown in Figure 13, the rose.
+How should we arrange the strengths of the interconnections between
+the A units and the B units to reproduce the pattern corresponding to
+the aroma of a rose? We simply need to arrange for each A unit to
+tend to excite each B unit which has a positive activation in the aroma
+pattern and to inhibit each B unit which has a negative activation in the
+aroma pattern. It turns out that this goal is achieved by setting the
+strength of the connection between a given A unit and a given B unit
+to a value proportional to the product of the activation of the two units.
+In Figure 12, the weights on the connections were chosen to allow the
+A pattern illustrated there to produce the illustrated B pattern according
+to this principle. The actual strengths of the connections were set to
+I.25, rather than I 1, so that the A pattern will produce the right magnitude, as well as the right sign, for the activations of the units in the B
+pattern. The same connections are reproduced in matrix form in Figure 13A.
+Pattern associators like the one in Figure 12 have a number of nice
+properties. One is that they do not require a perfect copy of the input
+to produce the correct output, though its strength will be weaker in this
+case. For example, suppose that the associator shown in Figure 12 were
+presented with an A pattern of (1,-1,0,1). This is the A pattern shown
+in the figure, with the activation of one of its elements set to 0. The B
+pattern produced in response will have the activations of all of the B
+units in the right direction; however, they will be somewhat weaker
+than they would be, had opyrightedoMaterialttern been shown. Similar
+
+36 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+effects are produced if an element of the pattern is distorted-or if the
+model is damaged, either by removing whole units, or random sets of
+connections, etc. Thus, their pattern retrieval performance of the
+model degrades gracefully both under degraded input and under
+damage.
+How a pattern associator learns. So far, we have seen how we as
+model builders can construct the right set of weights to allow one pattern to cause another. The interesting thing, though, is that we do not
+need to build these interconnection strengths in by hand. Instead, the
+pattern associator can teach itself the right set of interconnections
+through experience processing the patterns in conjunction with each
+other.
+A number of different rules for adjusting connection strengths have
+been proposed. One of the first -and definitely the best known-is due
+to D. O. Hebb (1949). Hebb's actual proposal was not sufficiently
+quantitative to build into an explicit model. However, a number of different variants can trace their ancestry back to Hebb.
+Perhaps the simplest version is:
+When unit A and unit B are simultaneously excited, increase
+the strength of the connection between them.
+A natural extension of this rule to cover the positive and negative
+activation values allowed in our example is:
+Adjust the strength of the connection between units A and B in
+proportion to the product of their simultaneous activation.
+In this formulation, if the product is positive, the change makes the
+connection more excitatory, and if the product is negative, the change
+makes the connection more inhibitory. For simplicity of reference, we
+will call this the Hebb rule, although it is not exactly Hebb's original
+formulation.
+With this simple learning rule, we could train a "blank copy" of the
+pattern associator shown in Figure 12 to produce the B pattern for rose
+when the A pattern is shown, simply by presenting the A and B patterns together and modulating the connection strengths according to the
+Hebb rule. The size of the change made on every trial would, of
+course, be a parameter. We generally assume that the changes made on
+each instance are rather small, and that connection strengths build up
+gradually. The values shown in Figure 13A, then, would be acquired as
+a result of a number of experiences with the A and B pattern pair.
+
+1. THE APPEAL OF PDP 37
+It is very important to note that the information needed to use the
+Hebb rule to determine the value each connection should have is locally
+available at the connection. All a given connection needs to consider is
+the activation of the units on both sides of it. Thus, it would be possible to actually implement such a connection modulation scheme locally,
+in each connection, without requiring any programmer to reach into
+each connection and set it to just the right value.
+It turns out that the Hebb rule as stated here has some serious limitations, and, to our knowledge, no theorists continue to use it in this
+simple form. More sophisticated connection modulation schemes have
+been proposed by other workers; most important among these are the
+delta rule, discussed extensively in Chapters 8 and I; the competitive
+learning rule, discussed in Chapter S; and the rules for learning in stochastic parallel models, described in Chapters 6 and 7. All of these
+learning rules have the property that they adjust the strengths of connections between units on the basis of information that can be assumed
+to be locally available to the unit. Learning, then, in all of these cases,
+amounts to a very simple process that can be implemented locally at
+each connection without the need for any overall supervision. Thus,
+models which incorporate these learning rules train themselves to have
+the right interconnections in the course of processing the members of
+an ensemble of patterns.
+Learning multiple patterns in the same set of interconnections. Up
+to now, we have considered how we might teach our pattern associator
+to associate the visual pattern for one object with a pattern for the
+aroma of the same object. Obviously, different patterns of interconnections between the A and B units are appropriate for causing the visual
+pattern for a different object to give rise to the pattern for its aroma.
+The same principles apply, however, and if we presented our pattern
+associator with the A and B patterns for steak, it would learn the right
+IS Of in fact in corns our that case in adore are sesame Firs
+associator a number of different associations. The matrix representing
+the set of interconnections that would be learned if we taught the same
+pattern associator both the rose association and the steak association is
+shown in Figure 14. The reader can verify this by adding the two
+matrices for the individual patterns together. The reader can also verify
+that this set of connections will allow the rose A pattern to produce the
+rose B pattern, and the steak A pattern to produce the steak B pattern:
+when either input pattern is presented, the correct corresponding output
+is produced.
+The examples used here have the property that the two different
+visual patterns are completely uncorrelated with each other. This being
+
+38 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+- + +
++
+*i+
++ - -
++ - +
+-+-+
+-+-+
++-+-
+#-
+=
+-++
+-- ++
+++-
+FIGURE 14. The weights in the third matrix allow either A pattern shown in Figure 13
+to recreate the corresponding B pattern. Each weight in this case is equal to the sum of
+the weight for the A pattern and the weight for the B pattern, as illustrated.
+the case, the rose pattern produces no effect when the interconnections
+for the steak have been established, and the steak pattern produces no
+effect when the interconnections for the rose association are in effect.
+For this reason, it is possible to add together the pattern of interconnections for the rose association and the pattern for the steak association, and still be able to associate the sight of the steak with the smell
+of a steak and the sight of a rose with the smell of a rose. The two sets
+of interconnections do not interact at all.
+One of the limitations of the Hebbian learning rule is that it can
+learn the connection strengths appropriate to an entire ensemble of patterns only when all the patterns are completely uncorrelated. This
+restriction does not, however, apply to pattern associators which use
+more sophisticated learning schemes.
+Attractive properties of pattern associator models. Pattern associator
+models have the property that uncorrelated patterns do not interact with
+each other, but more similar ones do. Thus, to the extent that a new
+pattern of activation on the A units is similar to one of the old ones, it
+will tend to have similar effects. Furthermore, if we assume that learning the interconnections occurs in small increments, similar patterns
+will essentially reinforce the strengths of the links they share in common with other patterns. Thus, if we present the same pair of patterns
+over and over, but each time we add a little random noise to each element of each member of the pair, the system will automatically learn to
+associate the central tendency of the iwo patterns and will learn to
+ignore the noise. What will be stored will be an average of the similar
+patterns with the slight variations removed. On the other hand, when
+we present the system with completely uncorrelated patterns, they will
+not interact with each other in this way. Thus, the same pool of units
+can extract the central tendency of each of a number of pairs of unrelated patterns. This aspect of distributed models is exploited extensively
+in Chapters 17 and 25 on distributed memory and amnesia.
+
+1. THE APPEAL OF PDP
+39
+Extracting the structure of an ensemble of patterns. The fact that
+similar patterns tend to produce similar effects allows distributed
+models to exhibit a kind of spontaneous generalization, extending
+behavior appropriate for one pattern to other similar patterns. This
+property is shared by other PDP models, such as the word perception
+model and the Jets and Sharks model described above; the main difference here is in the existence of simple, local, learning mechanisms that
+can allow the acquisition of the connection strengths needed to produce
+these generalizations through experience with members of the ensemble of patterns. Distributed models have another interesting property
+as well: If there are regularities in the correspondences between pairs
+of patterns, the model will naturally extract these regularities. This
+property allows distributed models to acquire patterns of
+interconnections that lead them to behave in ways we ordinarily take as
+evidence for the use of linguistic rules.
+A detailed example of such a model is described in Chapter 18.
+Here, we describe the model very briefly. The model is a mechanism
+that learns how to construct the past tenses of words from their root
+forms through repeated presentations of examples of root forms paired
+with the corresponding past-tense form. The model consists of two
+pools of units. In one pool, patterns of activation representing the phonological structure of the root form of the verb can be represented,
+and, in the other, patterns representing the phonological structure of
+the past tense can be represented. The goal of the model is simply to
+learn the right connection strengths between the root units and the
+past-tense units, so that whenever the root form of a verb is presented
+the model will construct the corresponding past-tense form. The model
+is trained by presenting the root form of the verb as a pattern of activation over the root units, and then using a simple, local, learning rule to
+adjust the connection strengths so that this root form will tend to produce the correct pattern of activation over the past-tense units. The
+model is tested by simply presenting the root form as a pattern of
+activation over the root units and examining the pattern of activation
+produced over the past-tense units.
+The model is trained initially with a small number of verbs children
+learn early in the acquisition process. At this point in learning, it can
+only produce appropriate outputs for inputs that it has explicitly been
+shown. But as it learns more and more verbs, it exhibits two interesting behaviors. First, it produces the standard ed past tense when tested
+with pseudo-verbs or verbs it has never seen. Second, it " overregularizes" the past tense of irregular words it previously completed correctly.
+Often, the model will blend the irregular past tense of the word with
+the regular ed ending, and produce errors like CAMED as the past of
+
+40 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+COME. These phenomena mirror those observed in the early phases of
+acquisition of control over past tenses in young children.
+The generativity of the child's responses-the creation of regular
+past tenses of new verbs and the overregularization of the irregular
+verbs-has been taken as strong evidence that the child has induced the
+rule which states that the regular correspondence for the past tense in
+English is to add a final ed (Berko, 1958). On the evidence of its performance, then, the model can be said to have acquired the rule. However, no special rule-induction mechanism is used, and no special
+language-acquisition device is required. The model learns to behave in
+accordance with the rule, not by explicitly noting that most words take
+ed in the past tense in English and storing this rule away explicitly, but
+simply by building up a set of connections in a pattern associator
+through a long series of simple learning experiences. The same
+mechanisms of parallel distributed processing and connection modification which are used in a number of domains serve, in this case, to produce implicit knowledge tantamount to a linguistic rule. The model
+also provides a fairly detailed account of a number of the specific
+aspects of the error patterns children make in learning the rule. In this
+sense, it provides a richer and more detailed description of the acquisition process than any that falls out naturally from the assumption that
+the child is building up a repertoire of explicit but inaccessible rules.
+There is a lot more to be said about distributed models of learning,
+about their strengths and their weaknesses, than we have space for in
+this preliminary consideration.
+For now we hope mainly to have suggested that they provide dramatically different accounts of learning and
+acquisition than are offered by traditional models of these processes.
+We saw in earlier sections of this chapter that performance in accordance with rules can emerge from the interactions of simple, interconnected units. Now we can see how the aquisition of performance that
+conforms to linguistic rules can emerge from a simple, local, connection strength modulation process.
+We have seen what the properties of PDP models are in informal
+terms, and we have seen how these properties operate to make the
+models do many of the kinds of things that they do. The business of
+the next chapter is to lay out these properties more formally, and to
+introduce some formal tools for their description and analysis. Before
+we turn to this, however, we wish to describe some of the major
+sources of inspiration for the PDP approach.
+
+1. THE APPEAL OF POP
+ORIGINS OF PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING
+41
+The ideas behind the PDP approach have a history that stretches
+back indefinitely. In this section, we mention briefly some of the people who have thought in these terms, particularly those whose work has
+had an impact on our own thinking.
+This section should not been seen
+as an authoritative review of the history, but only as a description of
+our own sources of inspiration.
+Some of the earliest roots of the PDP approach can be found in the
+work of the unique neurologists, Jackson (1869/1958) and Luria
+(1966). Jackson was a forceful and persuasive critic of the simplistic
+localizationist doctrines of late nineteenth century neurology, and he
+argued convincingly for distributed, multilevel conceptions of processing systems. Luria, the Russian psychologist and neurologist, put forward the notion of the dynamic functional system. On this view, every
+behavioral or cognitive process resulted from the coordination of a large
+number of different components, each roughly localized in different
+regions of the brain, but all working together in dynamic interaction.
+Neither Hughlings-Jackson nor Luria is noted for the clarity of his
+views, but we have seen in their ideas a rough characterization of the
+kind of parallel distributed processing system we envision.
+Two other contributors to the deep background of PDP were Hebb
+(1949) and Lashley (1950). We already have noted Hebb's contribution of the Hebb rule of synaptic modification; he also introduced the
+concept of cell assemblies—a concrete example of a limited form of distributed processing-and discussed the idea of reverberation of activation within neural networks. Hebb's ideas were cast more in the form
+of speculations about neural functioning than in the form of concrete
+processing models, but his thinking captures some of the flavor of
+parallel distributed processing mechanisms. Lashley's contribution was
+to insist upon the idea of distributed representation. Lashley may have
+been too radical and too vague, and his doctrine of equipotentiality of
+broad regions of cortex clearly overstated the case. Yet many of his
+insights into the difficulties of storing the "engram" locally in the brain
+are telling, and he seemed to capture quite precisely the essence of distributed representation in insisting that "there are no special cells
+reserved for special memories" (Lashley, 1950, p. 500).
+In the 1950s, there were two major figures whose ideas have contributed to the development of our approach. One was Rosenblatt (1959,
+1962) and the other was Selfridge (1955). In his Principles of Neurodynamics (1962), Rosenblatt articulated clearly the promise of a neurally inspired approach to computation, and he developed the perceptron
+convergence procedure, opyrghted Malange over the Hebb rule for
+
+42 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+changing synaptic connections. Rosenblatt's work was very controversial at the time, and the specific models he proposed were not up to all
+the hopes he had for them. But his vision of the human information
+processing system as a dynamic, interactive, self-organizing system lies
+at the core of the PDP approach. Selfridge's contribution was his
+insistence on the importance of interactive processing, and the development of Pandemonium, an explicitly computational example of a
+dynamic, interactive mechanism applied to computational problems in
+perception.
+In the late 60s and early 70s, serial processing and the von Neumann
+computer dominated both psychology and artificial intelligence, but
+there were a number of researchers who proposed neural mechanisms
+which capture much of the flavor of PDP models. Among these figures, the most influential in our work have been J. A. Anderson,
+Grossberg, and Longuet-Higgins. Grossberg's mathematical analysis of
+the properties of neural networks led him to many insights we have
+only come to appreciate through extensive experience with computer
+simulation, and he deserves credit for seeing the relevance of neurally
+inspired mechanisms in many areas of perception and memory well
+before the field was ready for these kinds of ideas (Grossberg, 1978).
+Grossberg (1976) was also one of the first to analyze some of the
+properties of the competitive learning mechanism explored in
+Chapter 5. Anderson's work differs from Grossberg's in insisting upon
+distributed representation, and in showing the relevance of neurally
+inspired models for theories of concept learning (Anderson, 1973,
+1977); the work in Chapters 17 and 25 on distributed memory and
+amnesia owes a great deal to Anderson's inspiration. Anderson's work
+also played a crucial role in the formulation of the cascade model
+(McClelland, 1979), a step away from serial processing down the road
+to PDP. Longuet-Higgins and his group at Edinburgh were also pursuing distributed memory models during the same period, and David
+Willshaw, a member of the Edinburgh group, provided some very
+elegant mathematical analyses of the properties of various distributed
+representation schemes (Willshaw, 1981). His insights provide one of
+the sources of the idea of coarse coding described at length in Chapter
+3. Many of the contributions of Anderson, Willshaw, and others
+distributed modelers may be found in Hinton and Anderson (1981).
+Others who have made important contributions to learning in PDP
+models include Amari (1977a), Bienenstock, Cooper, and Munro
+(1982), Fukushima (1975), Kohonen (1977, 1984), and von der
+Malsburg (1973)
+Toward the middle of the 1970s, the idea of parallel processing began
+to have something of a renaissance in computational circles. We have
+already mentioned the Marr and Poggio (1976) model of stereoscopic
+
+1 THE APPEAL OF PDP 43
+depth perception. Another model from this period, the HEARSAY
+model of speech understanding, played a prominent role in the
+development of our thinking. Unfortunately, HEARSAY's computational architecture was too demanding for the available computational
+resources, and so the model was not a computational success. But its
+basically parallel, interactive character inspired the interactive model of
+reading (Rumelhart, 1977), and the interactive activation model of
+word
+recognition (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart &
+McClelland, 1982).
+The ideas represented in the interactive activation model had other
+precursors as well. Morton's logogen model (Morton, 1969) was one of
+the first models to capture concretely the principle of interaction of different sources of information, and Marslen-Wilson (e.g., Marslen-
+Wilson & Welsh, 1978) provided important empirical demonstrations of
+interaction between different levels of language processing. Levin's
+(1976) Proteus model demonstrated the virtues of activationcompetition mechanisms, and Glushko (1979) helped us see how conspiracies of partial activations could account for certain aspects of
+apparently rule-guided behavior.
+Our work also owes a great deal to a number of colleagues who have
+been working on related ideas in recent years. Many of these colleagues appear as authors or coauthors of chapters in this book. But
+there are others as well. Several of these people have been very
+influential in the development of the ideas in this book. Feldman and
+Ballard (1982) laid out many of the computational principles of the
+PDP approach (under the name of connectionism), and stressed the biological implausibility of most of the prevailing computational models in
+artificial intelligence. Hofstadter (1979, 1985) deserves credit for
+stressing the existence of
+a subcognitive-what
+we call
+microstructural-level, and pointing out how important it can be to
+delve into the microstructure to gain insight. A sand dune, he has said,
+is not a grain of sand. Others have contributed crucial technical
+insights. Sutton and Barto (1981) provided an insightful analysis of the
+connection modification scheme we call the delta rule and illustrated the
+power of the rule to account for some of the subtler properties of classical conditioning. And Hopfield's (1982) contribution of the idea that
+network models can be seen as seeking minima in energy landscapes
+played a prominent role in the development of the Boltzmann machine
+(Chapter 7), and in the crystallization of the ideas presented in
+Chapters 7 and 14 on harmony theory and schemata.
+The power of parallel distributed processing is becoming more and
+more apparent, and many others have recently joined in the exploration
+of the capabilities of these mechanisms. We hope this book represents
+
+44
+the nature of the enterprise we are all involved in, and that it does justice to the potential of the PDP approach.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+This research was supported by Contract N00014-79-C-0323, NR
+667-437 with the Personnel and Training Research Programs of the
+Office of Naval Research, by grants from the System Development
+Foundation, and By a NIMH Career Development Award (MH00385)
+to the first author.
+
+CHAPTER 2
+A General Framework for
+D. E. RUMELHART, G. E. HINTON, and J. L. McCLELLAND
+In Chapter 1 and throughout this book, we describe a large number
+of models, each different in detail —each a variation on the parallel distributed processing (PDP) idea. These various models, and indeed
+many in the literature, clearly have many features in common, but they
+are just as clearly distinct models. How can we characterize the general
+model of which these specific models are instances? In this chapter we
+propose a framework sufficiently general so that all of the various
+models discussed in the book and many models in the literature are
+special cases. We will proceed by first sketching the general framework
+and then by showing properties of certain specific realizations of the
+general model.!
+The General Framework
+It is useful to begin with an analysis of the various components of
+our models and then describe the various specific assumptions we can
+are papers with similarly general aims.
+
+46
+make about these components. There are eight major aspects of a
+parallel distributed processing model:
+• A set of processing units
+A state of activation
+An output function for each unit
+A pattern of connectivity among units
+A propagation rule for propagating patterns of activities through
+the network of connectivities
+• An activation rule for combining the inputs impinging on a unit
+with the current state of that unit to produce a new level of
+activation for the unit.
+• A learning rule whereby patterns of connectivity are modified by
+experience
+• An environment within which the system must operate
+Figure 1 illustrates the basic aspects of these systems. There is a set of
+processing units generally indicated by circles in our diagrams; at each
+point in time, each unit u; has an activation value, denoted in the
+diagram as a, (t); this activation value is passed through a function fi to
+produce an output value o, (t). This output value can be seen as passing through a set of unidirectional connections (indicated by lines or
+arrows in our diagrams) to other units in the system. There is associated with each connection a real number, usually called the weight or
+strength of the connection designated wij which determines the amount
+of effect that the first unit has on the second. All of the inputs must
+then be combined by some operator (usually addition) -and the combined inputs to a unit, along with its current activation value, determine, via a function F, its new activation value. The figure shows illustrative examples of the function f and F. Finally, these systems are
+viewed as being plastic in the sense that the pattern of interconnections
+is not fixed for all time; rather, the weights can undergo modification
+as a function of experience. In this way the system can evolve. What a
+unit represents can change with experience, and the system can come
+to perform in substantially different ways. In the following sections we
+develop an explicit notation for each of these components and describe
+some of the alternate assumptions that have been made concerning
+each such component.
+A set of processing units. Any parallel activation model begins with
+a set of processing units. Specifying the set of processing units and
+what they represent is typically the first stage of specifying a PDP
+model. In some models these units may represent particular conceptual
+objects such as features, letters, words, or concepts; in others they are
+
+2. A FRAMEWORK FOR PDP
+47
+a, (r)
+a, (8)
+a, (r)
+1,(a)
+wijo
+ner,
+0, (1)
+Fi (a, rer,)
+Fi (a,, nes,)
+a,(1)
+1, (a))
++m
+Threshold Output
+Function
+M
+0
+-m
+ner, = 20,10, (r)
+Sigmoid Activation
+Function
+FIGURE 1. The basic components of a parallel distributed processing system.
+simply abstract elements over which meaningful patterns can be
+defined. When we speak of a distributed representation, we mean one
+in which the units represent small, feature-like entities. In this case it is
+the pattern as a whole that is the meaningful level of analysis. This
+should be contrasted to a one-unit-one-concept representational system
+in which single units represent entire concepts or other large meaningful entities.
+We let N be the number of units. We can order the units arbitrarily
+and designate the ith unit u;. All of the processing of a PDP model is
+carried out by these units. There is no executive or other overseer.
+There are only relatively simple units, each doing it own relatively simple job. A unit's job is simply to receive input from its neighbors and,
+as a function of the inputs it receives, to compute an output value
+which it sends to its neighbors. The system is inherently parallel in that
+many units can carry out their computations at the same time.
+
+48 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+Within any system we are modeling, it is useful to characterize three
+types of units: input, output, and hidden. Input units receive inputs from
+sources external to the system under study. These inputs may be either
+sensory input or inputs from other parts of the processing system in
+which the model is embedded. The output units send signals out of the
+system. They may either directly affect motoric systems or simply
+influence other systems external to the ones we are modeling. The hidden units are those whose only inputs and outputs are within the system we are modeling. They are not "visible" to outside systems.
+The state of activation. In addition, to the set of units, we need a
+representation of the state of the system at time t. This is primarily
+specified by a vector of N real numbers, a (t), representing the pattern
+of activation over the set of processing units. Each element of the vector stands for the activation of one of the units at time i. The activation of unit u, at time t is designated a, (t). It is the pattern of activation over the set of units that captures what the system is representing
+at any time. It is useful to see processing in the system as the evolution, through time, of a pattern of activity over the set of units.
+Different models make different assumptions about the activation
+values a unit is allowed to take on. Activation values may be continuous or discrete. If they are continuous, they may be unbounded or
+bounded. If they are discrete, they may take binary values or any of a
+small set of values. Thus in some models, units are continuous and
+may take on any real number as an activation value. In other cases,
+they may take on any real value between some minimum and maximum such as, for example, the interval [0,1]. When activation values
+are restricted to discrete values they most often are binary. Sometimes
+they are restricted to the values 0 and I where 1 is usually taken to
+mean that the unit is active and 0 is taken to mean that it is inactive.
+In other models, activation values are restricted to the values (-1,+ 1)
+(often denoted simply |-,†)). Other times nonbinary discrete values
+are involved.
+Thus, for example, they may be restricted to the set
+(-1,0,+1), or to a small finite set of values such as (1,2,3,4,5,6, 7,8,9).
+As we shall see, each of these assumptions leads to a model with
+slightly different characteristics. It is part of the program of research
+represented in this book to determine the implications of these various
+assumptions.
+Output of the units. Units interact. They do so by transmitting signals to their neighbors. The strength of their signals, and therefore the
+degree to which they affect their neighbors, is determined by their
+degree of activation. Associated with each unit, u;, there is an output
+function, fila; (r)), which maps the current state of activation a; (1) to
+
+2. A FRAMEWORK FOR PDP 49
+an output signal o; (1) (i.e., O, (t) = fila; (t))). In vector notation, we
+represent the current set of output values by a vector, o (r). In some of
+our models the output level is exactly equal to the activation level of
+the unit. In this case fis the identity function f(x)=x. More often,
+however, S is some sort of threshold function so that a unit has no
+affect on another unit unless its activation exceeds a certain value.
+Sometimes the function f is assumed to be a stochastic function in
+which the output of the unit depends in a probabilistic fashion on its
+activation values.
+The pattern of connectivity. Units are connected to one another. It
+is this pattern of connectivity that constitutes what the system knows
+and determines how it will respond to any arbitrary input. Specifying
+the processing system and the knowledge encoded therein is, in a parallel distributed processing model, a matter of specifying this pattern of
+connectivity among the processing units.
+In many cases, we assume that each unit provides an additive contribution to the input of the units to which it is connected. In such cases,
+the total input to the unit is simply the weighted sum of the separate
+inputs from each of the individual units. That is, the inputs from all of
+the incoming units are simply multiplied by a weight and summed to
+get the overall input to that unit. In this case, the total pattern of connectivity can be represented by merely specifying the weights for each
+of the connections in the system. A positive weight represents an excitatory input and a negative weight represents an inhibitory input. As
+mentioned in the previous chapter, it is often convenient to represent
+such a pattern of connectivity by a weight matrix W in which the entry
+Wif represents the strength and sense of the connection from unit u; 10
+unit ui. The weight wij is a positive number if unit u; excites unit u;; it
+is a negative number if unit u; inhibits unit u;; and it is O if unit u; has
+no direct connection to unit u,. The absolute value of wij specifies the
+strength of the connection. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between
+the connectivity and the weight matrix.
+In the general case, however, we require rather more complex patterns of connectivity. A given unit may receive inputs of different kinds
+whose effects are separately summated. For example, in the previous
+paragraph we assumed that the excitatory and inhibitory connections
+simply summed algebraically with positive weights for excitation and
+negative weights for inhibition. Sometimes, more complex
+inhibition/excitation combination rules are required. In such cases it is
+convenient to have separate connectivity matrices for each kind of connection. Thus, we can represent the pattern of connectivity by a set of
+connectivity matrices, Wi, one for each type of connection. It is common, for example, to haypyright&P Malenaonnections in a model: an
+
+Network Representation
+Input
+Matrix Representation
+Us
++ 4
++6
+-2
+FIGURE 2. The connectivity of a network represented by a network drawing and in a matrix. The figure shows an eight-unit network with
+units numbered from 1 to 8. Units 1 to 4 are input units. They receive inputs from the outside world and feedback from the output unitsunits 5 through 8. The connections among the units are indicated by the open and filled disks. The size of the disk indicates the strength of
+connection. Thus, the large black disk on the line connecting unit 1 to unit 8 indicates a strong inhibitory connection from 1 to 8. Similarly, the
+large open disk on the output line from unit 8 to unit 2 indicates that unit 8 strongly excites unit 2. The same connections are shown in the
+matrix representation on the leil. The t6 in the column for ug and the row for u, indicates that unil 8 Strongly excites unit 2. It should be
+noted that whenever there is a disk on a line connecting the output of one unit lo the input of another in the network diagram there is a
+corresponding nonzero entry in the matrix. If the disk is filled, the entry in the matrix is negative. If the disk is open, the entry is positive.
+The larger the disk the greater the magnitude of the entry in the matrix. It might also be noted that the connections in the network have been
+laid out to correspond to the entries of the matrix. The black disk in the upper left corner of the network corresponds to the -6 in the upper
+left corner of the matrix. Each disk in the network is in the corresponding position of its location in the matrix. The network would not have
+to be drawn in this way, of course, and the matrix would still capture all of the connectivity information in the network. In general, because
+network drawings are difficult to work with we will often simply use the matrix representation to specify the pattern of connectivity.
+50
+
+2. A FRAMEWORK FOR PDP
+51
+inhibitory connection and an excitatory connection. When the models
+assume simple addition of inhibition and excitation they do not constitute different types of connections in our present sense. They only constitute distinct types when they combine through some more complex
+rules.
+The pattern of connectivity is very important. It is this pattern which
+determines what each unit represents. As we shall see below, many of
+the issues concerning whether top-down or bottom-up processing systems
+are correct descriptions or whether a system is hierarchical and if so
+how many levels it has, etc., are all issues of the nature of the connectivity matrix. One important issue that may determine both how much
+information can be stored and how much serial processing the network
+must perform is the fan-in and fan-out of a unit. The fan-in is the
+number of elements that either excite or inhibit a given unit. The fanout of a unit is the number of units affected directly by a unit. Note,
+in some cases we need more general patterns of connectivity. Specifying such a pattern in the general case is complex and will be addressed
+in a later section of this chapter.
+The rule of propagation. We also need a rule which takes the output
+vector, o (t), representing the output values of the units and combines
+it with the connectivity matrices to produce a net input for each type of
+input into the unit. We let netij be the net input of type i to unit uj.
+Whenever only one type of connectivity is involved we suppress the
+first subscript and use net; to mean the net input into unit uj. In vector notation we can write net; (t) to represent the net input vector for
+inputs of type i. The propagation rule is generally straightforward. For
+example, if we have two types of connections, inhibitory and excitatory,
+the net excitatory input is usually the weighted sum of the excitatory
+inputs to the unit. This is given by the vector product net. = Weo (r).
+Similarly, the net inhibitory effect can be written as net; = Wo (t).
+When more complex patterns of connectivity are involved, more complex rules of propagation are required. We treat this in the final section
+of the chapter.
+Activation rule. We also need a rule whereby the net inputs of each
+type impinging on a particular unit are combined with one another and
+with the current state of the unit to produce a new state of activation.
+We need a function, F, which takes a (t) and the vectors net; for each
+different type of connection and produces a new state of activation. In
+the simplest cases, when F is the identity function and when all connections are of the same type, we can write a (it 1) = Wo (t) = net (t).
+Sometimes F is a threshold function so that the net input must exceed
+some value before contribuyingnted fateha, state of activation. Often,
+
+52 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+the new state of activation depends on the old one as well as the
+current input. In general, however, we have
+a (it 1) = F (a (r), net (1) 1, net (t) 2,....);
+the function F itself is what we call the activation rule. Usually, the
+function is assumed to be deterministic. Thus, for example, if a
+threshold is involved it may be that a, (t) = 1 if the total input exceeds
+some threshold value and equals 0 otherwise. Other times it is
+assumed that F is stochastic. Sometimes activations are assumed to
+decay slowly with time so that even with no external input the activation of a unit will simply decay and not go directly to zero. Whenever
+a; (t) is assumed to take on continuous values it is common to assume
+that F is a kind of sigmoid function. In this case, an individual unit can
+saturate and reach a minimum or maximum value of activation.
+Perhaps the most common class of activations functions is the quasilinear activation function. In this case the activation function, F, is a
+nondecreasing function of a single type of input. In short,
+a; (it 1) = F (net; (t)) = F
+Ewijo,).
+It is sometimes useful to add the constraint that F be a differentiable
+function. We refer to differentiable quasi-linear activation functions as
+semilinear functions (see Chapter 8).
+Modifying patterns of connectivity as a function of experience.
+Changing the processing or knowledge structure in a parallel distributed
+processing model involves modifying the patterns of interconnectivity.
+In principle this can involve three kinds of modifications:
+1. The development of new connections.
+2. The loss of existing connections.
+3. The modification of the strengths of connections that already
+exist.
+Very little work has been done on (1) and (2) above. To a first order
+of approximation, however, (1) and (2) can be considered a special
+case of (3). Whenever we change the strength of connection away
+from zero to some positive or negative value, it has the same effect as
+growing a new connection. Whenever we change the strength of a connection to zero, that has the same effect as losing an existing connection. Thus, in this section we will concentrate on rules whereby
+strengths of connections are modified through experience.
+
+2. A FRAMEWORK FOR PDP
+53
+Virtually all learning rules for models of this type can be considered a
+variant of the Hebbian learning rule suggested by Hebb in his classic
+book Organization of Behavior (1949). Hebb's basic idea is this: If a
+unit, u;, receives a input from another unit, uj; then, if both are highly
+active, the weight, Wij, from u; to u, should be strengthened. This idea
+has been extended and modified so that it can be more generally stated
+as
+AWij = 8 (a; (1),1, (1))h (o; (1), Wif),
+where 1; (1) is a kind of teaching input to u;. Simply stated, this equation says that the change in the connection from u; to u; is given by the
+product of a function, g(), of the activation of u; and its teaching input
+", and another function, hO), of the output value of u; and the connection strength wij. In the simplest versions of Hebbian learning there
+is no teacher and the functions g and h are simply proportional to their
+first arguments. Thus we have
+Aw, = na,o;,
+where n is the constant of proportionality representing the learning
+rate. Another common variation is a rule in which h (o; (r), Wig) = o, (1)
+and g (a, (t),4(1)) = n(4(1)-a, (t)). This is often called the Widrow-
+Hoff rule (Sutton & Barto, 1981). However, we call it the delta rule
+because the amount of learning is proportional to the difference (or
+delta) between the actual activation achieved and the target activation
+provided by a teacher. (The delta rule is discussed at length in
+Chapters 8 and 11.) In this case we have
+wig = n (1, (1) -a, (1))0, (1).
+This is a generalization of the perceptron learning rule for which the
+famous perception convergence theorem has been proved. Still another
+variation has
+Awij = na; (r) (o, (1)-Wig).
+This is a rule employed by Grossberg (1976) and a simple variant of
+which has been employed in Chapter 5. There are many variations on
+this generalized rule, and we will describe some of them in more detal.
+when we discuss various specific models below.
+Representation of the environment. It is crucial in the development
+of any model to have a clear model of the environment in which this
+model is to exist. In PDP models, we represent the environment as a
+time-varying stochastic function over the space of input patterns. That
+
+54 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+is, we imagine that at any point in time, there is some probability that
+any of the possible set of input patterns is impinging on the input units.
+This probability function may in general depend on the history of
+inputs to the system as well as outputs of the system. In practice, most
+PDP models involve a much simpler characterization of the environment. Typically, the environment is characterized by a stable probability
+distribution over the set of possible input patterns independent of past
+inputs and past responses of the system. In this case, we can imagine
+listing the set of possible inputs to the system and numbering them
+from 1 to M. The environment is then characterized by a set of probabilities, Pi for i = 1, ...,M. Since each input pattern can be considered a vector, it is sometimes useful to characterize those patterns
+with nonzero probabilities as constituting orthogonal or linearly independent sets of vectors.? Certain PDP models are restricted in the kinds of
+patterns they are able to learn: some being able to learn to respond
+correctly only if the input vectors form an orthogonal set; others if they
+form a linearly independent set of vectors; and still others are able to
+learn to respond to essentially arbitrary patterns of inputs.
+CLASSES OF PDP MODELS
+There are many paradigms and classes of PDP models that have been
+developed. In this section we describe some general classes of assumptions and paradigms. In the following section we describe some specific
+PDP models and show their relationships to the general framework outlined here.
+Paradigms of Learning
+Although most learning rules have roughly the form indicated above,
+we can categorize the learning situation into two distinct sorts. These
+are:
+• Associative learning, in which we learn 1o produce a particular
+pattern of activation on one set of units whenever another particular pattern occurs on another set of units. In general, such
+a learning scheme must allow an arbitrary pattern on one set of
+2 See Chapter 9 for explication of these terms.
+
+2. A FRAMEWORK FOR PDP
+55
+units to produce another arbitrary pattern on another set of
+units.
+• Regularity discovery, in which units learn to respond to "interesting" patterns in their input. In general, such a scheme should
+be able to form the basis for the development of feature detectors and therefore the basis for knowledge representation in a
+PDP system.
+In certain cases these two modes of learning blend into one another,
+but it is valuable to see the different goals of the two kinds of learning.
+Associative learning is employed whenever we are concerned with storing patterns so that they can be re-evoked in the future. These rules
+are primarily concerned with storing the relationships among subpatterns. Regularity detectors are concerned with the meaning of a single
+units response. These kinds of rules are used when feature discovery is
+the essential task at hand.
+The associative learning case generally can be broken down into two
+subcases —pattern association and auto-association. A pattern association
+paradigm is one in which the goal is to build up an association between
+patterns defined over one subset of the units and other patterns defined
+over a second subset of units. The goal is to find a set of connections
+so that whenever a particular pattern reappears on the first set of units,
+the associated pattern will appear on the second set. In this case, there
+is usually a teaching input to the second set of units during training indicating the desired pattern association. An auto-association paradigm is
+one in which an input pattern is associated with itself. The goal here is
+pattern completion. Whenever a portion of the input pattern is
+presented, the remainder of the pattern is to be filled in or completed.
+This is similar to simple pattern association, except that the input pattern plays both the role of the teaching input and of the pattern to be
+associated. It can be seen that simple pattern association is a special
+case of auto-association. Figure 3 illustrates the two kinds of learning
+paradigms. Figure 3A shows the basic structure of the pattern association situation. There are two distinct groups of units-a set of input
+units and a set of output units. Each input unit connects with each output unit and each output unit receives an input from each input unit.
+During training, patterns are presented to both the input and output
+units. The weights connecting the input to the output units are modified during this period. During a test, patterns are presented to the
+input units and the response on the output units is measured. Figure
+3B shows the connectivity matrix for the pattern associator. The only
+modifiable connections are from the input units to the output units.
+All other connections aspyrighted kiateriafigure 3C shows the basic
+
+56
+B
+Input Units Output Unita
+Matrix of Connectivities w
+Set of Input Units
+Set of Output Units
+Input|
+Units
+Ourput Modifiable
+Units
+Weights
+Connectivity Matrix
+for
+Pattern Associator
+C
+D
+Insul
+Sal Or N
+Unils
+Input &
+Output Units
+All weights
+aro Modifiable
+Inputs
+Connectivity Matrix
+Auro Associator
+FIGURE 3. A: The basic structure of the pattern association situation. There are two
+distinct groups of units-a set of input units and a set of output units. Each input unit
+connects with each output unit and each output unit receives an input from each input
+unit. During training, patterns are presented to both the input and output units. The
+weights connecting the input to the output units are modified during this period. During
+a test, patterns are presented to the input units and the response on the output units is
+measured. (After Anderson, 1977) B: The connectivity matrix for the pattern associator. The only modifiable connections are from the input units to the output units. All
+other connections are fixed at zero. C: The basic structure of the auto-association situa-
+All units are both input and output units. The figure shows a group of 6 units
+feeding back on itself through modifiable connections. Note that each unit feeds back on
+itself as well as on each of its neighbors. (After Anderson, Silverstein, Ritz, & Jones,
+1977.) D: The connectivity matrix for the auto-associator. All units connect 1o all other
+units with modifiable weights.
+structure of the auto-association situation. All units are both input and
+output units. The figure shows a group of 6 units feeding back on itself
+through modifiable connections. Note that each unit feeds back on
+itself as well as on each of its neighbors. Figure 3D shows the connectivity matrix for the auto-associator. All units connect to all other units
+with modifiable weights. In the case of auto-association, there is
+
+2. A FRAMEWORK FOR PDP
+57
+potentially a modifiable connection from every unit to every other unit.
+In the case of pattern association, however, the units are broken into
+two subpatterns, one representing the input pattern and another
+representing the teaching input. The only modifiable connections are
+those from the input units to the output units receiving the teaching
+input. In other cases of associative learning the teaching input may be
+more or less indirect. The problem of dealing with indirect feedback is
+difficult, but central to the development of more sophisticated models
+of learning. Barto and Sutton (1981) have begun a nice analysis of
+such learning situations.
+In the case of regularity detectors, a teaching input is not explicitly
+provided; instead, the teaching function is determined by the unit itself.
+The form of the internal teaching function and the nature of its input
+patterns determine what features the unit will learn to respond to. This
+is sometimes called unsupervised learning. Each different kind of
+unsupervised learning procedure has its own evaluation function. The
+particular evaluation procedures are mentioned when we treat these
+models. The three unsupervised learning models discussed in this book
+are addressed in Chapters S, 6, and 7.
+Hierarchical Organizations of PDP Networks
+It has become commonplace in cognitive science to describe such
+processes as top-down, bottom-up, and interactive to consist of many
+stages of processing, etc. It is useful to see how these concepts can be
+represented in terms of the patterns of connectivity in the PDP framework. It is also useful to get some feeling for the processing consequences of these various assumptions.
+Bottom-Up Processing
+The fundamental characteristic of a bottom-up system is that units at
+level i may not affect the activity of units at levels lower than i. To
+see how this maps onto the current formulation, it is useful to partition
+the coalitions of units into a set of discrete categories corresponding to
+the levels their inputs come from. There are assumed to be no coalitions with inputs from more than one level. Assume that there are Li
+units at level i in the system. We then order the units such that those
+in level L, are numbered u1,...,uz,, those in level La are numbered
+"L,tlr...,4L,tL,, etc. Copnigited Materialt that the system be a pure
+
+58 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+bottom-up system is equivalent to the constraint that the connectivity
+matrix, W, has zero entries for wij in which u; is the member of a level
+no higher than u;. This amounts to the requirement that the upper
+right-hand region of W contains zero entries. Table 1 shows this constraint graphically. The table shows an example of a three-level system
+with four units at each level. This leads to a a × 12 connectivity matrix
+and an a vector of length 12. The matrix can be divided up into 9
+regions.
+The upper-left region represents interactions among Level 1
+units. The entries in the left-middle region of the matrix represents
+the effects of Level 1 units on Level 2 units. The lower-left region
+represents the effects of Level 1 units on Level 3 units. Often
+bottom-up models do not allow units at level i effect units at level it 2.
+Thus, in the diagram we have left that region empty representing no
+effect of Level 1 on Level 3. It is typical in a bottom-up system to
+assume as well that the lowest level units (Level 1) are input units and
+that the highest level units (Level 3) are output units. That is, the
+lowest level of the system is the only one to receive direct inputs from
+outside of this module and only the highest level units affect other
+units outside of this module.
+Level 1
+Units
+Level 2
+Units
+ul
+u3
+us
+u6
+u7
+u8
+TABLE 1
+Level 1
+Input Units
+Level 2
+Hidden Units
+within
+Level 1
+effects
+Level 1
+affecting
+Level 2
+Level 3
+Output Units
+u9 ul0 ull ul2
+Level 3
+Units
+ull
+u12
+within
+Level 2
+effects
+Level 2
+affecting
+Level 3
+within
+Level 3
+effects
+3 In general, of course, we would expect many levels and many units at each level.
+
+2. A FRAMEWORK FOR PDP 59
+Top-Down Processing
+The generalization to a hierarchical top-down system should be clear
+enough. Let us order the units into levels just as before. A top-down
+model then requires that the lower-left regions of the weight matrix be
+empty - that is, no lower level unit affects a higher level unit. Table 2
+illustrates a simple example of a top-down processing system. Note, in
+this case, we have to assume a top-down input or "message" that is
+propagated down the system from higher to lower levels as well as any
+data input that might be coming directly into Level 1 units.
+Interactive Models
+Interactive models are simply models in which there can be both
+top-down and bottom-up connections. Again the generalization is
+straightforward. In the general interactive model, any of the cells of
+the weight matrix could be nonzero. The more restricted models in
+which information flows both ways, but in which information only
+flows between adjacent levels, assume only that the regions of the
+matrix more than one region away from the main diagonal are zero.
+Table 3 illustrates a simple three-level interactive model with both topdown and bottom-up input. Most of the models that actually have been
+suggested count as interactive models in this sense.
+TABLE 2
+Level 1
+Level 2
+Input Units Hidden Units
+Level 3
+Output Units
+u9 u10 ull ul2
+Level 1
+Units
+ul
+u2
+43
+within
+Level 1
+effects
+Level 2
+affecting
+Level 1
+u5
+Level 2
+Units
+46
+u7
+u8
+49
+Level 3 u10
+Units
+ull
+u12
+within
+Level 2
+effects
+Level 3
+affecting
+Level 2
+within
+Level 3
+effects
+Copyrighted Materiat
+
+60
+THE POP PERSPECTIVE
+ul
+Level 1
+Units
+u2
+u3
+u4
+us
+Level 2
+Units
+u7
+48
+u9
+Level 3 u10
+Units
+ull
+u12
+TABLE 3
+Level 1
+Level 2
+Input Units
+Hidden Units
+ul 424344
+uS u6 u7 u8
+within
+Level 1
+effects
+Level 2
+affecting
+Level 1
+Level 1
+affecting
+Level 2
+within
+Level 2
+effects
+Level 2
+affecting
+Level 3
+Level 3
+Output Units
+49 ul0 ull ul2
+Level 3
+affecting
+Level 2
+within
+Level 3
+effects
+It is sometimes supposed that a "single level" system with no
+hierarchical structure in which any unit can communicate with any other
+unit is somehow less powerful than these multilevel hierarchical systems. The present analysis shows that, on the contrary, the existence of
+levels amounts to a restriction, in general, of free communication among
+all units. Such nonhierarchical systems actually form a superset of the
+kinds of layered systems discussed above. There is, however, something to the view that having multiple levels can increase the power of
+certain systems. In particular, a "one-step" system consisting of only
+input and output units and no communication between them in which
+there is no opportunity for feedback or for hidden units is less powerful
+than systems with hidden units and with feedback. Since, in general,
+hierarchical systems involve many hidden units, some intralevel communication, and some feedback among levels, they are more powerful
+than systems not involving such hidden units. However, a system with
+an equal number of hidden units, but one not characterizable as
+hierarchical by the communication patterns is, in general, of more
+potential computational power. We address the issue of hidden units
+and "single-step" versus "multiple-step" systems in our discussion of
+specific models below.
+
+2. A FRAMEWORK FOR PDP 61
+Synchronous Versus Asynchronous Update
+Even given all of the components of the PDP models we have
+described so far, there is still another important issue to be resolved in
+the development of specific models; that is the timing of the application
+of the activation rule. In some models, there is a kind of central timing
+pulse and after each such clock tick a new value is determined simultaneously for all units. This is a synchronous update procedure. It is
+usually viewed as a discrete, difference approximation to an underlying
+continuous, differential equation in which all units are continuously
+updated. In some models, however, units are updated asynchronously
+and at random. The usual assumption is that at each point in time each
+unit has a fixed probability of evaluating and applying its activation rule
+and updating its activation value. This later method has certain
+theoretical advantages and was developed by Hopfield (1982) and has
+been employed in Chapters 6, 7, and 14. The major advantage is that
+since the units are independently being updated, if we look at a short
+enough time interval, only one unit is updating at a time. Among
+other things, this system can help the stability of the network by
+keeping it out of oscillations that are more readily entered into with
+synchronous update procedures.
+SPECIFIC VERSIONS OF THE GENERAL PARALLEL
+ACTIVATION MODEL
+In the following sections we will show how specification of the particular functions involved produces various kinds of these models. There
+have been many authors who have contributed to the field and whose
+work might as well have been discussed. We discuss only a representative sample of this work.
+Simple Linear Models
+Perhaps the simplest model of this class is the simple linear model.
+In the simple linear model, activation values are real numbers without
+restriction. They can be either positive or negative and are not
+bounded. The output function, f (a), in the linear model is just equal
+to the activation level a;. Typically, linear models consist of two sets of
+units: a set of input upissy tighted haleriguepur units. (As discussed
+
+62 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+below, there is no need for hidden units since all computation possible
+with a multiple-step linear system can be done with a single-step linear
+system.) In general, any unit in the input layer may connect to any unit
+in the output layer. All connections in a linear model are of the same
+type. Thus, only a single connectivity matrix is required. The matrix
+consists of a set of positive, negative, and zero values, for excitatory
+values, inhibitory values, and zero connections, respectively. The new
+value of activation of each unit is simply given by the weighted sums of
+the inputs. For the simple linear model with connectivity matrix W we
+have
+a (it 1) = Wa (1).
+In general, it can be shown that a linear model such as this has a
+number of limitations. In particular, it can be shown that nothing can
+be computed from two or more steps that cannot be computed by a
+single step. This follows because the above equation implies
+a (t) = W'a (0).
+We can see this by proceeding step by step. Clearly,
+a (2) = Wa (1) = W (Wa (O)) = W 2a (0).
+It should be clear that similar arguments lead to a (1) = W'a (O).
+From this, it follows that for every linear model with connectivity
+matrix W that can attain a particular state in t steps, there is another
+linear model with connectivity matrix W' that can reach the same state
+in one step. This means, among other things, that there can never be
+any computational advantage in a linear model of multiple-step systems, nor can there ever be any advantage for allowing feedback.
+The pattern association paradigm is the typical learning situation for a
+linear model. There is a set of input units and a set of output units. In
+general, each input unit may be connected to any output unit. Since
+this is
+a linear network, there is no feedback in the system nor are
+there hidden units between the inputs and outputs. There are two
+sources of input in the system. There are the input patterns that establish a pattern of activation on the input units, and there are the teaching units that establish a pattern of activation on the output units. Any
+of several learning rules could be employed with a linear network such
+as this, but the most common are the simple Hebbian rule and the
+delta rule. The linear model with the simple Hebbian rule is called the
+simple linear associator (cf. Anderson, 1970; Kohonen, 1977, 1984). In
+this case, the increment in weight wy is given by Awi = naji. In
+matrix notation, this means that AW = nTaT
+• The system Is
+then
+tested by presenting an input pattern without a teaching input and
+
+2. A FRAMEWORK FOR PDP
+63
+seeing how close the pattern generated on the output layer matches the
+original teaching input. It can be shown that if the input patterns are
+orthogonal,* there will be no interference and the system will perfectly
+produce the relevant associated patterns exactly on the output layer. If
+they are not orthogonal, however, there will be interference among the
+input patterns. It is possible to make a modification in the learning rule
+and allow a much larger set of possible associations. In particular, it is
+possible to build up correct associations among patterns whenever the
+set of input patterns are linearly independent. To achieve this, an error
+correcting rule must be employed. The delta rule is most commonly
+employed. In this case, the rule becomes A wij = n(1-a;)aj. What is
+learned is essentially the difference between the desired response and
+that actually attained at unit u, due to the input. Although it may take
+many presentations of the input pattern set, if the patterns are linearly
+independent the system will eventually be able to produce the desired
+outputs. Kohonen (1977, 1984) has provided an important analysis of
+this and related learning rules.
+The examples described above were for the case of the pattern associator. Essentially the same results hold for the auto-associator version
+of the linear model. In this case, the input patterns and the teaching
+patterns are the same, and the input layer and the output layer are also
+the same. The tests of the system involve presenting a portion of the
+input pattern and having the system attempt to reconstruct the missing
+parts.
+Linear Threshold Units
+The weaknesses of purely linear systems can be overcome through
+the addition of nonlinearities. Perhaps the simplest of the nonlinear
+system consists of a network of linear threshold units. The linear
+threshold unit is a binary unit whose activation takes on the values
+10,1). The activation value of unit u; is 1 if the weighted sum of its
+inputs is greater than some threshold o; and is 0 otherwise. The connectivity matrix for a network of such units, as in the linear system, is
+a matrix consisting of positive and negative numbers. The output function, S, is the identity function so that the output of a unit is equal to
+its activation value.
+4 See Chapter 9 for a discussion of orthogonality, linear independence, etc.
+
+64
+It is useful to see some of the kinds of functions that can be computed with linear threshold units that cannot be computed with simple
+linear models. The classic such function is the exclusive or (XOR) illustrated in Figure 4. The idea is to have a system which responds (1) if it
+receives a (0,1) or a (1,0) and responds (O) otherwise.
+The figure
+shows a network capable of this pattern. In this case we require two
+XOR Network
+Unit
++1
++ 1
+Internal
+Units
+Thresholds=.01
++1
+- 1
+-1
++1
+Input
+Units
+Input Output
+10}
+1
+FIGURE 4. A network of linear threshold units capable of responding correctly on the
+XOR problem.
+
+2. A FRAMEWORK FOR PDP
+65
+layers of units. Each unit has a zero threshold and responds just in case
+its input is greater than zero. The weights are ‡1. Since the set of
+stimulus patterns is not linearly independent, this is a discrimination
+that can never be made by a simple linear model and cannot be done in
+a single step by any network of linear threshold units
+Although multilayered systems of linear threshold units are very
+powerful and, in fact, are capable of computing any boolean function,
+there is no generally known learning algorithm for this general case
+(see Chapter 8). There is, however, a well-understood learning algorithm for the special case of the perceptron. A perceptron is essentially
+a single-layer network of linear threshold units without feedback. The
+learning situation here is exactly the same as that for the linear model.
+An input pattern is presented along with a teaching input. The perceptron learning rule is precisely of the same form as the delta rule for
+error correcting in the linear model, namely, Awi =ne,-a,)a,. Since
+the teaching input and the activation values are only 0 or 1, the rule
+reduces to the statements that:
+1. Weights are only changed on a given input line when that line
+is turned on (i.e..,a; = 1).
+2. If the system is correct on unit i (i.e., 4i = a;), make no change
+on any of the input weights.
+3. If the unit j responds 0 when it should be 1, increase weights
+on all active lines by amount n.
+4. If the unit j responds 1 when it should be 0, decrease weights
+on all active lines by amount n.
+There is a theorem, the perceptron convergence theorem, that guarantees that if the set of patterns are learnable by a perceptron, this learning procedure will find a set of weights which allow it to respond
+correctly to all input patterns. Unfortunately, even though multilayer
+linear threshold networks are potentially much more powerful than the
+linear associator, the perceptron for which a learning result exists can
+learn no patterns not learnable by the linear associator. It was the limitations on what perceptrons could possibly learn that led to Minsky and
+Papert's (1969) pessimistic evaluation of the perceptron. Unfortunately
+that evaluation has incorrectly tainted more interesting and powerful
+networks of linear threshold and other nonlinear units. We have now
+developed a version of the delta rule -the generalized delta rule -which
+is capable of learning arbitrary mappings. It does not work for linear
+threshold units, but does pyrignted Material
+class of semilinear activation
+
+66
+functions (i.e., differentiable activation functions). See Chapter 8 for a
+full discussion. As we shall see in the course of this book, the limitations of the one-step perceptron in no way apply to the more complex
+networks.
+Brain State in a Box
+The brain state in a box model was developed by J. A. Anderson
+(1977). This model too is a close relative of the simple linear associator. There is, however, a maximum and minimum activation value
+associated with each unit. Typically, units take on activation values in
+the interval [-1,1]. The brain state in a box (BSB) models are organized so that any unit can, in general, be connected to any other unit.
+The auto-associator illustrated in Figure 3 is the typical learning paradigm for BSB. Note that with this pattern of interconnections the system feeds back on itself and thus the activation can recycle through the
+system in a positive feedback loop. The positive feedback is especially
+evident in J. A. Anderson and Mozer's (1981) version. Their activation
+rule is given by
+aj (1+1) = a (1) + 2 wija; (1)
+if a; is less than 1 and greater than - 1. Otherwise, if the quantity is
+greater than 1, a; = 1 and if it is less than - 1, a; = -1. That is, the
+activation state at time i+1 is given by the sum of the state at time t
+and the activation propagated through the connectivity matrix provided
+that total is in the interval [-1,1]. Otherwise it simply takes on the
+maximum or minimum value. This formulation will lead the system to
+a state in which all of the units are at either a maximum or minimum
+value. It is possible to understand why this is called a brain state in a
+box model by considering a geometric representation of the system.
+Figure S illustrates the "activation space" of a simple BSB system consisting of three units. Each point in the box corresponds to a particular
+value of activation on each of the three units. In this case we have a
+three-dimensional space in which the first coordinate corresponds to the
+activation value of the first unit, the second coordinate corresponds to
+the activation value of the second unit, and the third coordinate
+corresponds to the activation value of the third unit. Thus, each point
+in the space corresponds to a possible state of the system. The feature
+that each unit is limited to the region I-1,1] means that all points must
+lie somewhere within the box whose vertices are given by the points
+(-1,-1,-1), (-1,-1,+1), (-1,+1,-1), (-1,+1,+1), (+1,-1-1),
+(t1,-1,t1), (t1,t1,-1), and (t1,t1,t1). Moreover, since the
+
+2. A FRAMEWORK FOR PDP
+67
+(-t,+)
+(t,t,+)
+(-,-.+)
+(+,-,+)
+- (t,+.-)
+Activation
+of Unit 2
+Activation of Unit 3
+/
+/
+/
+(--,-)
+(t.-,-)
+Activation of Unit 1
+FIGURE S. The state space for a three-unit version of a BSB model. Each dimension of
+the box represents the activation value of one unit. Each unit is bounded in activation
+between (-1,1). The curving arrow in the box represents the sequence of states the system moved through. It began at the black spot near the middle of the box and, as processing proceeded, moved to the (-,t,+) corner of the box. BSB systems always end up
+in one or another of the corners. The particular corner depends on the start state of the
+network, the input to the system, and the pattern of connections among the units.
+system involves positive feedback, it is eventually forced to occupy one
+of these vertices. Thus, the state of the system is constrained to lie
+within the box and eventually, as processing continues, is pushed to
+one of the vertices. Of course, the same geometric analogy carries over
+to higher dimensional systems. If there are N units, the state of the
+system can be characterized as a point within this N-dimensional hypercube and eventually the system ends up in one of the 2N corners of the
+hypercube.
+
+68
+Learning in the BSB system involves auto-association. In different
+applications two different learning rules have been applied. J. A.
+Anderson and Mozer (1981) applied the simplest rule. They simply
+allowed the system to settle down and then employed the simple Hebbian learning rule. That is, Awi = na,aj. The error correction rule has
+also been applied to the BSB model. In this case we use the input as
+the teaching input as well as the source of activation to the system.
+The learning rule thus becomes Awij = n(t,-a;)a; where i; is the input
+to unit i and where a; and aj are the activation values of the system
+after it has stabilized in one of the corners of the hypercube.
+Thermodynamic Models
+Other more recent developments are the thermodynamic models.
+Two examples of such models are presented in the book. One, harmony theory, was developed by Paul Smolensky and is described in
+detail in Chapter 6. The other, the Boltzmann machine, was developed
+by Hinton and Sejnowski and is described in Chapter 7. Here we
+describe the basic idea behind these models and show how they relate
+to the general class of models under discussion. To begin, the thermodynamic models employ binary units which take on the values (0,1).
+The units are divided into two categories: the visible units corresponding to our input and output units and the hidden units. In general, any
+unit may connect to any other unit. However, there is a constraint that
+the connections must be symmetric. That is, the wif = Wii.
+In these
+models, there is no distinction between the output of the unit and its
+activation value. The activation values are, however, a stochastic function of the inputs. That is,
+1
+p (a; (1)= 1) =
+1 + e
+where ni is the input from outside of system into unit i, o; is the
+threshold for the unit, and T is a parameter, called temperature, which
+determines the slope of the probability function. Figure 6 shows how
+the probabilities vary with various values of T. It should be noted that
+as T approaches zero, the individual units become more and more like
+linear threshold units. In general, if the unit exceeds threshold by a
+great enough margin it will always attain value 1. If it is far enough
+below threshold, it always takes on value 0. Whenever the unit is
+above threshold, the probability that it will turn on is greater than 1/2.
+
+2. A FRAMEWORK FOR PDP
+69
+1.0
+0.8
+Temperature =
+51
+2
+4
+8
+Probability
+0.6
+0.4
+0.2
+0.0
+-25 -20
+-15
+-10
+-5
+5
+Net Input
+10
+15
+20
+25
+FIGURE 6. Probability of attaining value 1 as a function of the distance of the input of
+the unit from threshold. The function is plotted for several values of T.
+Whenever it is below threshold, the probability that it will turn off is
+greater than 1/2. The temperature simply determines the range of
+uncertainty as to whether it will turn on or off. This particular
+configuration of assumptions allows a formal analogy between these
+models and thermodynamics and allows the proof of theorems concerning its performance as a function of the temperature of the system.
+This is not the place to discuss these theorems in detail, suffice it to say
+that this system, like the BSB system, can be viewed as attaining states
+on the corners of a hypercube. There is a global measure of the degree
+to which each state of the system is consistent with its input. The system moves into those states that are maximally consistent with the
+input and with the internal constraints represented by the weights. It
+can be shown that as the temperature approaches 0, the probability that
+the system attains the maximally consistent state approaches 1. These
+results are discussed in some detail in Chapters 6 and 7.
+There is a learning scheme associated with the Boltzmann machine
+which is somewhat more complex than the others. In this case, the
+learning events are divided into two phases. During one phase, a set of
+patterns is randomly presented to the visible units and the system is
+allowed to respond to each in turn. During this phase of learning, the
+system is environmentalgopinghtea MadriaHebbian rule is assumed to
+
+70 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+apply so that Aw, = na;aj.. Note, since activations take on values of 0
+and I this says that the weight is incremented by an amount n whenever unit i and j are on, otherwise no change occurs. During the
+second phase of learning, the system is allowed to respond for an equal
+period of time in a so-called free-running state in which no inputs are
+presented. Since the system is stochastic, it will continue to respond
+even though no actual stimuli are presented. During this phase, a simple anti-Hebbian rule is employed, AWij = -na;aj. The intuition is
+roughly that the performance during the environmentally driven phase
+is determined by both the pattern of interconnections and by the
+environment. The performance during the free-running phase is determined only by the internal set of connections. To correctly reflect the
+environment, we should look at its performance due to the environment plus internal structure and then subtract out its performance due
+to internal structure alone. This is actually quite a powerful learning
+scheme. It can be shown that if a portion of the input units are turned
+on after the system has learned, it will complete the remaining portion
+of the visible units with the probability that those units had been
+present in the stimulus patterns given the subpattern that had been
+turned on. These issues are again addressed in Chapter 7.
+Grossberg
+Stephen Grossberg has been one of the major contributors to models
+of this class over the years. His work is complex and contains many
+important details which we cannot review here. We will instead
+describe some of the central aspects of his work and show how it relates
+to the general framework.
+Perhaps the clearest summary of
+Grossberg's work appears in Grossberg (1980). Grossberg's units are
+allowed to take on any real activation value between a minimum and a
+maximum value. The output function is, in many of Grossberg's applications, a threshold function so that a given unit will affect another unit
+only if its activation level is above its threshold. Moreover, Grossberg
+argues that the output function must be a sigmoid or S-shaped function
+of the activation value of the unit. Grossberg's activation rule is rather
+more complex than the others we have discussed thus far in that excitatory and inhibitory inputs don't simply sum, but appear separately in
+the activation rule. Grossberg has presenied a number of possible
+activation rules, but they typically have the form
+
+2. A FRAMEWORK FOR PDP
+71
+a; (1+1) = a; (1) (1-A) + (B-a, (r)) nelej (1) - (a; (1)+C) netij (z)
+where A is the decay rate, B represents the maximal degree of excitation of the unit, and C is much smaller in magnitude than B and
+represents the maximal amount the unit can be inhibited below the
+resting value of 0. Grossberg generally assumes that the inhibitory
+inputs come from a kind of recurrent inhibitory field in which the unit
+is embedded and the excitatory inputs come from the unit itself and
+from another level of the system.
+Grossberg has studied learning in these networks over a number of
+years and has studied several different learning schemes. The learning
+rule he has studied most, however, is similar to the one analyzed in
+Chapter 5 and is given by
+Awij = na, (0,-Wij).
+Grossberg has applied this and similar learning rules in a number of
+cases, but a review of these applications is beyond the scope of the
+present discussion.
+Interactive Activation Model
+The interactive activation model of McClelland and Rumelhart
+(1981) and Rumelhart and McClelland (1982) had units which
+represented visual features, letters and words. Units could take on any
+value in the range [min,max]. The output function was a threshold
+function such that the output was O if the activation was below
+threshold and was equal to the difference of the activation value and
+the threshold if the activation was above threshold. The interactive
+activation model involves a connectivity pattern in which units are
+organized in layers, such that an element in a layer connects with excitatory connections with all elements in the layers above and below that
+are consistent with that unit, and connects negatively to all units in the
+layers above and below that are inconsistent with that unit. In addition,
+each unit inhibits all units in its own layer that are inconsistent with the
+unit in question. Thus, the interactive activation model is a kind of
+positive feedback system. with maximum and minimum values for each
+unit, like the BSB model. The information coming into each unit is
+weighted (by the interconnection strengths) and summed algebraically
+to yield a "net input" to the unit. Let net; = {wija; be the net input to
+unit j. This net input is then combined with the previous activation
+
+72 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+value to produce the new activation value according to the following
+activation rule:
+net; (a; (1)- min)) otherwise
+where © is the decay rate of the activation given no input. In other
+words, the new activation value is given by the old activation value
+properly decayed, plus (or minus) a factor that pushes toward the
+minimum or maximum value depending on the magnitude of the net
+input into the unit. This activation rule is similar to that employed by
+Grossberg, except in this formulation the excitation and inhibition are
+algebraically combined.
+The interactive activation model was designed as a model for a processing system and our goals were to show how we could account for
+specific aspects of word perception. Thus, there was no specific model
+of learning proposed to explain where the particular network we
+assumed came from. As we shall see, much of the work on learning
+reported in this book has been aimed at giving plausible accounts of
+how such a network might have been learned. (See especially Chapters
+5 and 6.)
+Feldman and Ballard
+Feldman and Ballard (1982) have proposed a framework they call
+connectionist modeling. The units have continuous activation values,
+which they call potential which can take on any value in the range
+-10,10). Their output function is a kind of threshold function which
+is allowed to take on a small number of discrete integer values
+(0<0, ≤9). They have proposed a number of other unit types each
+with a somewhat different activation rule. Their simplest unit type is
+what they call the P-unit. In this case the activation rule is given by
+aj (it 1) = a; (1) + Bnet; (t).
+Once the activation reaches its maximum or minimum value it is simply pinned to that value. Decay is implemented by self inhibition.
+Feldman and Ballard also have a conjunctive unit similar to our sigma-pi
+units described below. Feldman (1981) has also considered learning.
+In general, the approach to learning offers more machinery than is
+available within our current framework. In practice, however, the
+learning rules actually examined are of the same class we have already
+discussed.
+
+2. A FRAMEWORK FOR PDP
+73
+SIGMA-PI UNITS
+Before completing our section on a general framework, it should be
+mentioned that we have sometimes found it useful to postulate units
+that are more complex than those described up to this point in this
+chapter. In our descriptions thus far, we have assumed a simple additive unit in which the net input to the unit is given by {wiga,. This is
+certainly the most common form in most of our models. Sometimes,
+however, we want multiplicative connections in which the output values
+of two (or possibly more) units are multiplied before entering into the
+sum. Such a multiplicative connection allows one unit to gate another.
+Thus, if one unit of a multiplicative pair is zero, the other member of
+the pair can have no effect, no matter how strong its output. On the
+other hand, if one unit of a pair has value 1, the output of the other is
+passed unchanged to the receiving unit. Figure 7 illustrates several
+such connections. In this case, the input to unit A is the weighted sum
+of the products of units B and C and units D and E. The pairs, BC and
+DE are called conjuncts. In this case we have conjuncts of size 2. In
+general, of course, the conjuncts could be of any size. We have no
+applications, however, which have required conjuncts larger than size 2.
+In general, then, we assume that the net input to a unit is given by the
+weighted sum of the products of a set of individual inputs. That is, the
+net input to a unit is given by willa, ai,.. aig where i indexes the
+conjuncts impinging on unit j and ui, Uig..... Uin are the k units in
+the conjunct. We call units such as these sigma-pi units.
+In addition to their use as gates, sigma-pi units can be used to convert the output level of a unit into a signal that acts like a weight connecting two units. Thus, assume we have the pattern of connections
+illustrated in the figure. Assume further that the weights on those connections are all 1. In this case, we can use the output levels of units B
+and D to, in effect, set the weights from C to A and E to A respectively. Since, in general, it is the weights among the units that determine the behavior of the network, sigma-pi units allow for a dynamically programmable network in which the activation value of some units
+determine what another network can do.
+In addition to its general usefulness in these cases, one might ask
+whether we might not sometime need still more complex patterns of
+interconnections. Interestingly, as described in Chapter 10, we will
+never be forced to develop any more complex interconnection type,
+since sigma-pi units are sufficient to mimic any function monotonic of
+its inputs.
+
+74
+Sigma Pi Units
+WZA
+WLA
+Con, = ав ас
+Conz= aD. aF
+E
+FIGURE 7. Two conjunctive inputs to unit A from the conjunct B and C and D and E.
+The input to unit A is the sum of the product of the outputs of units BC and DE.
+CONCLUSION
+We have provided a very general mathematical and conceptual
+framework within which we develop our models. This framework provides a language for expressing PDP models, and, though there is a lot
+of freedom within it, it is at least as constrained as most computational
+formalisms, such as production systems or high-level languages such as
+Lisp.
+We must take note of the fact, however, that the framework does
+not specify all of the constraints we have imposed on ourselves in our
+model building efforts. For example, virtually any computing device,
+serial or parallel, can be described in the framework we have described
+here.
+
+2. A FRAMEWORK FOR PDP
+75
+There is a further set of considerations which has guided our particular formulations. These further considerations arise from two sources:
+our beliefs about the nature of the hardware available for carrying out
+mental processes in the brain and our beliefs about the essential character of these mental processes themselves. We discuss below the additional constraints on our model building which arise from these two
+beliefs.
+First, the operations in our models can be characterized as "neurally
+inspired." We wish to replace the "computer metaphor" as a model of
+mind with the "brain metaphor" as model of mind. This leads us to a
+number of considerations which further inform and constrain our
+model building efforts. Perhaps the most crucial of these is time. Neurons are remarkably slow relative to components in modern computers.
+Neurons operate in the time scale of milliseconds whereas computer
+components operate in the time scale of nanoseconds-a factor of 106
+faster. This means that human processes that take on the order of a
+second or less can involve only a hundred or so time steps. Since most
+of the processes we have studied-perception, memory retrieval, speech
+processing, sentence comprehension, and the like-take about a second
+or so, it makes sense to impose what Feldman (1985) calls the "100-
+step program" constraint. That is, we seek explanations for these mental phenomena which do not require more than about a hundred elementary sequential operations. Given that the processes we seek to
+characterize are often quite complex and may involve consideration of
+large numbers of simultaneous constraints, our algorithms must involve
+considerable parallelism. Thus, although
+a serial computer could be
+created out of the kinds of components represented by our units, such
+an implementation would surely violate the 100-step program constraint
+for any but the simplest processes.
+A second consideration differentiates our models from those inspired
+by the computer metaphor: that is, the constraint that all the
+knowledge is in the connections. From conventional programmable computers we are used to thinking of knowledge as being stored in the state
+of certain units in the system. In our systems we assume that only very
+short term storage can occur in the states of units; long term storage
+takes place in the connections among units.
+Indeed, it is the
+connections-or perhaps the rules for forming them through
+experience-which primarily differentiate one model from another.
+This is a profound difference between our approach and other more
+conventional approaches, for it means that almost all knowledge is
+implicit in the structure of the device that carries out the task rather
+than explicit in the states of units themselves. Knowledge is not directly
+accessible to interpretation by some separate processor, but it is built
+into the processor itself and directly determines the course of
+
+76 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+processing. It is acquired through tuning of connections as these are
+used in processing, rather than formulated and stored as declarative
+facts.
+In addition to these two neurally inspired working assumptions, there
+are a number of other constraints that derive rather directly from our
+understanding of the nature of neural information processing. These
+assumptions are discussed more fully in Chapter 4.
+The second class of constraints arises from our beliefs about the
+nature of human information processing considered at a more abstract,
+computational level of analysis. We see the kinds of phenomena we
+have been studying as products of a kind of constraint satisfaction procedure in which a very large number of constraints act simultaneously
+to produce the behavior. Thus, we see most behavior not as the product of a single, separate component of the cognitive system, but as the
+product of large set of interacting components, each mutually constraining the others and contributing in its own way to the globally observable behavior of the system. It is very difficult to use serial algorithms
+to implement such a conception, but very natural to use highly parallel
+ones. These problems can often be characterized as best match or
+optimization problems. As Minsky and Papert (1969) have pointed out,
+it is very difficult to solve best match problems serially. However, this
+is precisely the kind of problem that is readily implemented using
+highly parallel algorithms of the kind we consider in this book. See
+Kanerva (1984) for a discussion of the best match problem and its
+solution with parallel processing systems.
+To summarize, the PDP framework consists not only of a formal
+language, but a perspective on our models. Other qualitative and quantitative considerations arising from our understanding of brain processing and of human behavior combine with the formal system to form
+what might be viewed as an aesthetic for our model building enterprises. The remainder of our book is largely a study of this aesthetic in
+practice.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+This research was supported by Contract N00014-79-C-0323, NR
+667-437 with the Personnel and Training Research Programs of the
+Office of Naval Research, by grants from the System Development
+Foundation, and by a NIMH Career Development Award (MH00385)
+to the second author.
+
+CHAPTER 3
+Distributed Representations
+G. E. HINTON, J. L. McCLELLAND, and D. E. RUMELHART
+Given a network of simple computing elements and some entities to
+be represented, the most straightforward scheme is to use one computing element for each entity. This is called a local representation. It is
+easy to understand and easy to implement because the structure of the
+physical network mirrors the structure of the knowledge it contains.
+The naturalness and simplicity of this relationship between the
+knowledge and the hardware that implements it have led many people
+to simply assume that local representations are the best way to use
+parallel hardware. There are, of course, a wide variety of more complicated implementations in which there is no one-to-one correspondence
+bely worn considering if hey lead to increased efficienty or te
+interesting emergent properties that cannot be conveniently achieved
+using local representations.
+This chapter describes one type of representation that is less familiar
+and harder to think about than local representations. Each entity is
+represented by a pattern of activity distributed over many computing
+elements, and each computing element is involved in representing
+many different entities. The strength of this more complicated kind of
+representation does not lie in its notational convenience or its ease of
+implementation in a conventional computer, but rather in the efficiency
+with which it makes use of the processing abilities of networks of simple, neuron-like computing elements.
+
+78 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+Every representational scheme has its good and bad points. Distributed representations are no exception. Some desirable properties arise
+very naturally from the use of patterns of activity as representations.
+Other properties, like the ability to temporarily store a large set of arbitrary associations, are much harder to achieve. As we shall see, the
+best psychological evidence for distributed representations is the degree
+to which their strengths and weaknesses match those of the human
+mind.
+The first section of this chapter stresses some of the virtues of
+distributed representations. The second section considers the efficiency
+of distributed representations, and shows clearly why distributed
+representations can be better than local ones for certain classes of problems. A final section discusses some difficult issues which are often
+avoided by advocates of distributed representations,
+such as the
+representation of constituent structure and the sequential focusing of
+processing effort on different aspects of a structured object.
+Disclaimers. Before examining the detailed arguments in favor of
+distributed representations, it is important to be clear about their status
+within an overall theory of human information processing. It would be
+wrong to view distributed representations as an alternative to representational schemes like semantic networks or production systems that have
+been found useful in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence. It
+is more fruitful to view them as one way of implementing these more
+abstract schemes in parallel networks, but with one proviso: Distributed representations give rise to some powerful and unexpected emergent properties. These properties can therefore be taken as primitives
+when working in a more abstract formalism. For example, distributed
+representations are good for content-addressable memory, automatic
+generalization, and the selection of the rule that best fits the current
+situation. So if one assumes that more abstract models are implemented in the brain using distributed representations, it is not unreasonable to treat abilities like content-addressable memory, automatic
+generalization, or the selection of an appropriate rule as primitive
+operations, even though there is no easy way to implement these operations in conventional computers. Some of the emergent properties of
+distributed representations are not easily captured in higher-level formalisms. For example, distributed representations are consistent with
+the simultaneous application of a large number of partially fitting rules
+to the current situation, each rule being applied to the degree that it is
+relevant. We shall examine these properties of distributed representations in the chapter on schemata (Chapter 14). There we will see clearly
+that schemata and other higher-level constructs provide only approximate characterizations of mechanisms which rely on distributed
+
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS
+79
+representations. Thus, the contribution that an analysis of distributed
+representations can make to these higher-level formalisms is to legitimize certain powerful, primitive operations which would otherwise
+appear to be an appeal to magic; to enrich our repertoire of primitive
+operations beyond those which
+can conveniently be captured in many
+higher-level formalisms; and to suggest that these higher-level formalisms may only capture the coarse features of the computational capabilities of the underlying processing mechanisms.
+Another common source of confusion is the idea that distributed
+representations are somehow in conflict with the extensive evidence for
+localization of function in the brain (Luria, 1973). A system that uses
+distributed representations still requires many different modules for
+representing completely different kinds of thing at the same time. The
+distributed representations occur within these localized modules. For
+example, different modules would be devoted to things as different as
+mental images and sentence structures, but two different mental images
+would correspond to alternative patterns of activity in the same module.
+The representations advocated here are local at a global scale but global
+at a local scale.
+VIRTUES OF DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS
+This section considers three important features of distributed
+representations: (a) their essentially constructive character; (b) their
+ability to generalize automatically to novel situations; and (c) their
+tunability to changing environments.
+Several of these virtues are
+shared by certain local models, such as the interactive activation model
+of word perception, or McClelland's (1981) model of generalization and
+retrieval described in Chapter 1.
+Memory as Inference
+People have a very flexible way of accessing their memories: They
+can recall items from partial descriptions of their contents (Norman &
+Bobrow, 1979). Moreover, they can do this even if some parts of the
+partial description are wrong. Many people, for example, can rapidly
+retrieve the item that satisfies the following partial description: It is an
+actor, it is intelligent, it is a politician. This kind of content-addressable
+memory is very useful and it is yery hard to implement on a conventional computer becausE eiffel atrial each item at a particular
+
+80 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+address, and to retrieve an item they must know its address. If all the
+combinations of descriptors that will be used for access are free of
+errors and are known in advance, it is possible to use a method called
+hash coding that quickly yields the address of an item when given part
+of its content. In general, however, content-addressable memory
+requires a massive search for the item that best fits the partial description. The central computational problem in memory is how to make
+this search efficient. When the cues can contain errors, this is very difficult because the failure to fit one of the cues cannot be used as a filter
+for quickly eliminating inappropriate answers.
+Distributed representations provide an efficient way of using parallel
+hardware to implement best-fit searches. The basic idea is fairly simple, though it is quite unlike a conventional computer memory. Different items correspond to different patterns of activity over the very
+same group of hardware units. A partial description is presented in the
+form
+of a partial activity pattern, activating some of the hardware
+units. ' Interactions between the units then allow the set of active units
+to influence others of the units, thereby completing the pattern, and
+generating the item that best fits the description. A new item is
+"stored" by modifying the interactions between the hardware units so as
+to create a new stable pattern of activity. The main difference from a
+conventional computer memory is that patterns which are not active do
+not exist anywhere. They can be re-created because the connection
+strengths between units have been changed appropriately, but each connection strength is involved in storing many patterns, so it is impossible
+to point to a particular place where the memory for a particular item is
+stored.
+Many people are surprised when they understand that the connections between a set of simple processing units are capable of supporting
+a large number of different patterns. Illustrations of this aspect of distributed models are provided in a number of papers in the literature
+(e.g., Anderson, 1977; Hinton, 198la); this property is illustrated in
+the model of memory and amnesia described in Chapters 17 and 25.
+One way of thinking about distributed memories is in terms of a very
+large set of plausible inference rules. Each active unit represents a
+"microfeature" of an item, and the connection strengths stand for plausible "microinferences" between microfeatures. Any particular pattern
+1 This is easy if the partial description is simply a set of features, but it is much more
+difficult if the partial description mentions relationships to other objects.
+If, for example,
+the system is asked to retrieve John's father, it must represent John, but if John and his
+father are represented by mutually exclusive patterns of activily in the very same group
+of units, it is hard to see how this can be done without preventing the representation of
+John's father. A distributed solution to this problem is described in the text.
+
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS
+81
+of activity of the units will satisfy some of the microinferences and
+violate others. A stable pattern of activity is one that violates the plausible microinferences less than any of the neighboring patterns. A new
+stable pattern can be created by changing the inference rules so that the
+new pattern violates them less than its neighbors. This view of
+memory makes it clear that there is no sharp distinction between
+genuine memory and plausible reconstruction. A genuine memory is a
+pattern that is stable because the inference rules were modified when it
+occurred before. A "confabulation" is a pattern that is stable because of
+the way the inference rules have been modified to store several different previous patterns. So far as the subject is concerned, this may
+be indistinguishable from the real thing.
+The blurring of the distinction between veridical recall and confabulation or plausible reconstruction seems to be characteristic of human
+memory (Bartlett, 1932; Neisser, 1981). The reconstructive nature of
+human memory is surprising only because it conflicts with the standard
+metaphors we use. We tend to think that a memory system should
+work by storing literal copies of items and then retrieving the stored
+copy, as in a filing cabinet or a typical computer database. Such systems are not naturally reconstructive.
+If we view memory as a process that constructs a pattern of activity
+which represents the most plausible item that is consistent with the
+given cues, we need some guarantee that it will converge on the
+representation of the item that best fits the description, though it might
+be tolerable to sometimes get a good but not optimal fit. It is easy to
+imagine this happening, but it is harder to make it actually work. One
+recent approach to this problem is to use statistical mechanics to
+analyze the behavior of groups of interacting stochastic units. The
+analysis guarantees that the better an item fits the description, the more
+likely it is to be produced as the solution. This approach is described in
+Chapter 7, and a related approach is described in Chapter 6. An alternative approach, using units with continuous activations (Hopfield,
+1984) is described in Chapter 14.
+Similarity and Generalization
+When a new item is stored, the modifications in the connection
+strengths must not wipe out existing items. This can be achieved by
+modifying a very large number of weights very slightly. If the modifications are all in the direction that helps the pattern that is being
+stored,
+there will be a conspiracy effect: The total help for the
+intended pattern will be CapsugArb Mariamall separate modifications.
+
+82 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+For unrelated patterns, however, there will be very little transfer of
+effect because some of the modifications will help and some will
+hinder. Instead of all the small modifications conspiring together, they
+will mainly cancel out. This kind of statistical reasoning underpins
+most distributed memory models, but there are many variations of the
+basic idea (See Hinton & Anderson, 1981, for several examples).
+It is possible to prevent interference altogether by using orthogonal
+patterns of activity for the various items to be stored (a rudimentary
+example of such a case is given in Chapter I). However, this eliminates one of the most interesting properties of distributed representations: They automatically give rise to generalizations. If the task is
+simply to remember accurately a set of unrelated items, the generalization effects are harmful and are called interference. But generalization
+is normally a helpful phenomenon. It allows us to deal effectively with
+situations that are similar but not identical to previously experienced
+situations.
+People are good at generalizing newly acquired knowledge. If you
+learn a new fact about an object, your expectations about other similar
+objects tend to change. If, for example, you learn that chimpanzees like
+onions you will probably raise your estimate of the probability that
+gorillas like onions. In a network that uses distributed representations,
+this kind of generalization is automatic. The new knowledge about
+chimpanzees is incorporated by modifying some of the connection
+strengths so as to alter the causal effects of the distributed pattern of
+activity that represents chimpanzees. 2 The modifications automatically
+change the causal effects of all similar activity patterns. So if the
+representation of gorillas is a similar activity pattern over the same set
+of units, its causal effects will be changed in a similar way.
+The very simplest distributed scheme would represent the concept of
+onion and the concept of chimpanzee by alternative activity patterns
+over the very same set of units. It would then be hard to represent
+chimps and onions at the same time. This problem can be solved by
+using separate modules for each possible role of an item within a larger
+structure. Chimps, for example, are the "agent" of the liking and so a
+pattern representing chimps occupies the "agent" module and the pattern representing onions occupies the "patient" module (see Figure 1).
+2 The internal structure of this pattern may also change. There is always a choice
+between changing the weights on the outgoing connections and changing the pattern itself
+so that different outgoing connections become relevant. Changes in the pattern itself
+alter its similarity to other patterns and thereby alter how generalization will occur in the
+future. It is generally much harder to figure out how to change the pattern that represents
+an item than it is to figure out how to change the outgoing connections so that a particular pattern will have the desired effects on another part of the network.
+
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS 83
+Each module can have alternative patterns for all the various items, so
+this scheme does not involve local representations of items. What is
+localized is the role.
+If you subsequently learn that gibbons and orangutans do not like
+onions your estimate of the probability that gorillas like onions will fall,
+though it may still remain higher than it was initially. Obviously, the
+combination of facts suggests that liking onions is a peculiar quirk of
+chimpanzees. A system that uses distributed representations will
+automatically arrive at this conclusion, provided that the alternative patterns that represent the various apes are related to one another in a particular way that is somewhat more specific than just being similar to
+one another: There needs to be a part of each complete pattern that is
+identical for all the various apes. In other words, the group of units
+used for the distributed representations must be divided into two
+RELATIONSHIP
+AGENT
+PATIENT
+FIGURE 1. In this simplified scheme there are two different modules, one of which
+represents the agent and the other the patient. To incorporate the fact that chimpanzees
+like onions, the pattern for chimpanzees in one module must be associated with the pattern for onions in the other module. Relationships other than "liking" can be implemented by having a third group of units whose pattern of activity represents the relationship. This pattern must then "gate"
+the interactions between the agent and patient
+groups. Hinton (198la) describes one way of doing this gating by using a fourth group of
+units.
+
+84 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+subgroups, and all the various apes must be represented by the same
+pattern in the first subgroup, but by different patterns in the second
+subgroup. The pattern of activity over the first subgroup represents the
+type of the item, and the pattern over the second subgroup represents
+additional microfeatures that discriminate each instance of the type
+from the other instances. Note that any subset of the microfeatures
+can be considered to define a type. One subset might be common to all
+apes, and a different (but overlapping) subset might be common to all
+pets. This allows an item to be an instance of many different types
+simultaneously.
+When the system learns a new fact about chimpanzees, it usually has
+no way of knowing whether the fact is true of all apes or is just a
+property of chimpanzees. The obvious strategy is therefore to modify
+the strengths of the connections emanating from all the active units, so
+that the new knowledge will be partly a property of apes in general and
+partly a property of whatever features distinguish chimps from other
+apes. If it is subsequently learned that other apes do not like onions,
+correcting modifications will be made so that the information about
+onions is no longer associated with the subpattern that is common to all
+apes. The knowledge about onions will then be restricted to the subpattern that distinguishes chimps from other apes. If it had turned out
+that gibbons and orangutans also liked onions, the modifications in the
+weights emanating from the subpattern representing apes would have
+reinforced one another, and the knowledge would have become associated with the subpattern shared by all apes rather than with the patterns
+that distinguish one ape from another.
+A very simple version of this theory of generalization has been
+implemented in a computer simulation (Hinton, 198la). Several applications that make use of this property can be found in Part IV of this
+book.
+There is an obvious generalization of the idea that the representation
+of an item is composed of two parts, one that represents the type and
+another that represents the way in which this particular instance differs
+from others of the same type. Almost all types are themselves
+instances of more general types, and this can be implemented by dividing the pattern that represents the type into two subpatterns, one for
+the more general type of which this type is an instance, and the other
+for the features that discriminate this particular type from others
+instances of the same general type. Thus the relation between a type
+and an instance can be implemented by the relationship between a set
+of units and a larger set that includes it. Notice that the more general
+the type, the smaller the set of units used to encode it. As the number
+of terms in an intensional description gets smaller, the corresponding
+extensional set gets larger.
+
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS 85
+In traditional semantic networks that use local representations, generalization is not a direct consequence of the representation. Given
+that chimpanzees like onions, the obvious way of incorporating the new
+knowledge is by changing the strengths of connections belonging to the
+chimpanzee unit. But this does not automatically change connections
+that belong to the gorilla unit. So extra processes must be invoked to
+implement generalization in a localist scheme. One commonly used
+method is to allow activation to spread from a local unit to other units
+that represent similar concepts (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Quillian,
+1968). Then
+when one concept unit is activated, it will partially
+activate its neighbors and so any knowledge stored in the connections
+emanating from these neighbors will be partially effective. There are
+many variations of this basic idea (Fahlman, 1979; Levin, 1976;
+McClelland, 1981).
+It is hard to make a clean distinction between systems that use local
+representations plus spreading activation and systems that use distributed representations. In both cases the result of activating a concept is
+that many different hardware units are active. The distinction almost
+completely disappears in some models such as McClelland's (1981)
+generalization model, where the properties of a concept are represented
+by a pattern of activation over feature units and where this pattern of
+activation is determined by the interactions of a potentially very large
+number of units for instances of the concept.
+The main difference is
+that in one case there is a particular individual hardware unit that acts
+as a "handle" which makes it easy to attach purely conventional properties like the name of the concept and easier for the theorist who constructed the network to know what the individual parts of the network
+stand for.
+If we construct our networks by hand-specifying the connections
+between the units in the network, a local representation scheme has
+some apparent advantages. First, it is easier to think one understands
+the behavior of a network if one has put in all the "knowledge" - all the
+connections-oneself. But if it is the entire, distributed pattern of
+interacting influences among the units in the network that is doing the
+work, this understanding can often be illusory. Second, it seems intuitively obvious that it is harder to attach an arbitrary name to a distributed pattern than it is to attach it to a single unit. What is intuitively
+harder, however, may not be more efficient. We will see that one can
+actually implement aribitrary associations with fewer units using distributed representations. Before we turn to such considerations, however,
+we examine a different advantage of distributed representations: They
+make it possible to create new concepts without allocating new
+hardware.
+
+86 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+Creating New Concepts
+Any plausible scheme for representing knowledge must be capable of
+learning novel concepts that could not be anticipated at the time the
+network was initially wired up. A scheme that uses local representations must first make a discrete decision about when to form a new concept, and then it must tind a spare hardware unit that has suitable connections for implementing the concept involved. Finding such a unit
+may be difficult if we assume that, after a period of early development,
+new knowledge is incorporated by changing the strengths of the existing
+connections rather than by growing new ones. If each unit only has
+connections to a small fraction of the others, there will probably not be
+any units that are connected to just the right other ones to implement a
+new concept. For example, in a collection of a million units each connected at random to ten thousand others, the chance of there being any
+unit that is connected to a particular set of 6 others is only one in a
+million.
+In an attempt to rescue local representations from this problem,
+several clever schemes have been proposed that use two classes of
+units. The units that correspond to concepts are not directly connected
+to one another. Instead, the connections are implemented by indirect
+pathways through several layers of intermediate units (Fahlman, 1980;
+Feldman, 1982). This scheme works because the number of potential
+pathways through the intermediate layers far exceeds the total number
+of physical connections. If there are k layers of units, each of which
+has a fan-out of n connections to randomly selected units in the following layer, there are nk potential pathways.
+There is almost certain to be
+a pathway connecting any two concept-units, and so the intermediate
+units along this pathway can be dedicated to connecting those two
+concept-units. However, these schemes end up having to dedicate
+several intermediate units to each effective connection, and once the
+dedication has occurred, all but one of the actual connections emanating from each intermediate unit are wasted. The use of several intermediate units to create a single effective connection may be appropriate
+in switching networks containing elements that have units with relatively small fan-out, but it seems to be an inefficient way of using the
+hardware of the brain.
+The problems of finding a unit to stand for a new concept and wiring
+it up appropriately do not arise if we use distributed representations.
+All we need to do is modify the interactions between units so as to
+create a new stable pattern of activity. If this is done by modifying a
+large number of connections very slightly, the creation of a new pattern
+need not disrupt the existing representations. The difficult problem is
+
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS 87
+to choose an appropriate pattern for the new concept. The effects of
+the new representation on representations in other parts of the system
+will be determined by the units that are active, and so it is important to
+use a collection of active units that have roughly the correct effects.
+Fine-tuning of the effects of the new pattern can be achieved by
+slightly altering the effects of the active units it contains, but it would
+be unwise to choose a random pattern for a new concept because major
+changes would then be needed in the weights, and this would disrupt
+other knowledge. Ideally, the distributed representation that is chosen
+for a new concept should be the one that requires the least modification
+of weights to make the new pattern stable and to make it have the
+required effects on other representations.
+Naturally, it is not necessary to create a new stable pattern all in one
+step. It is possible for the pattern to emerge as a result of modifications
+on many separate occasions. This alleviates an awkward problem that
+arises with local representations: The system must make a discrete allor-none decision about when to create a new concept. If we view concepts as stable patterns, they are much less discrete in character. It is
+possible, for example, to differentiate one stable pattern into two
+closely related but different variants by modifying some of the weights
+slightly. Unless we are allowed to clone the hardware units (and all
+their connections), this kind of gradual, conceptual differentiation is
+much harder to achieve with local representations.
+One of the central problems in the development of the theory of distributed representation is the problem of specifying the exact procedures by which distributed representations are to be learned. All
+such procedures involve connection strength modulation, following
+"learning rules" of the type outlined in Chapter 2. Not all the problems
+have been solved, but significant progress is being made on these problems. (See the chapters in Part II.)
+DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS THAT
+WORK EFFICIENTLY
+In this section, we consider some of the technical details about the
+implementation of distributed representations. First, we point out that
+certain distributed representation schemes can fail to provide a sufficient basis for differentiating different concepts, and we point out what
+is required to avoid this limitation. Then, we describe a way of using
+distributed representations to get the most information possible out of a
+simple network of connected units. The central result is a surprising
+one It you want to ence get
+accurately using as few units as
+
+88 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+possible, it pays to use units that are very coarsely tuned, so that each
+feature activates many different units and each unit is activated by
+many different features. A specific feature is then encoded by a pattern
+of activity in many units rather than by a single active unit, so coarse
+coding is a form of distributed representation.
+To keep the analysis simple, we shall assume that the units have only
+two values, on and off. We shall also ignore the dynamics of the system because the question of interest, for the time being, is how many
+units it takes to encode features with a given accuracy. We start by
+considering the kind of feature that can be completely specified by giving a type (e.g., line-segment, corner, dot) and the values of some
+continuous parameters that distinguish it from other features of the
+same type (e.g., position, orientation, size.) For each type of feature
+there is a space of possible instances. Each continuous parameter
+defines a dimension of the feature space, and each particular feature
+corresponds to a point in the space. For features like dots in a plane,
+the space of possible features is two-dimensional. For features like
+stopped, oriented edge-segments in three-dimensional space, the
+feature space is six-dimensional. We shall start by considering twodimensional feature spaces and then generalize to higher dimensionalities.
+Suppose that we wish to represent the position of a single dot in a
+plane, and we wish to achieve high accuracy without using too many
+units. We define the accuracy of an encoding scheme to be the number
+of different encodings that are generated as the dot is moved a standard
+distance through the space. One encoding scheme would be to divide
+the units into an X group and a Y group, and dedicate each unit to
+encoding a particular X or Y interval as shown in Figure 2. A given dot
+would then be encoded by activity in two units, one from each group,
+and the accuracy would be proportional to the number of units used.
+Unfortunately, there are two problems with this. First, if two dots have
+to be encoded at the same time, the method breaks down. The two
+dots will activate iwo units in each group, and there will be no way of
+telling, from the active units, whether the dots were at (x1, y l) and
+(x2, y2) or at (x1, y2) and (x2, yl). This is called the binding problem. It arises because the representation does not specify what goes
+with what.
+3 Similar arguments apply with multivalued activity levels, but it is important not to
+allow activity levels to have arbitrary precision because this makes it possible to represent
+an infinite amount of information in a single activity level. Units that transmit a discrete
+impulse with a probability that varies as a function of their activation seem to approximate the kind of precision that is possible in neural circuitry (see Chapters 20 and 21).
+
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS
+89
+Y group
+X group
+Y group
+X group
+FIGURE 2. A: A simple way of using two groups of binary units to encode the position
+of a point in a iwo-dimensional space. The active units in the X and Y groups represent
+the x- and y-coordinates. B: When (wo points must be encoded at the same time, it is
+impossible to tell which x-coordinate goes with which y-coordinate.
+The second problem arises even if we allow only one point to be
+represented at a time. Suppose we want certain representations to be
+associated with an overt response, but not others: We want (xl, y 1)
+and (x2, y 2) to be associated with a response, but not (x1, y 2) or
+(x2, y l). We cannot implement this association using
+, standard
+weighted connections to response units from units standing for the
+values on the two dimensions separately. For the unit for xl and the
+unit for × 2 would both have to
+cave righteti latena, response, and the unit for
+
+90 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+yl and the unit for y 2 would both have to activate the response. There
+would be no way of preventing the response from being activated when
+the unit for x1 and the unit for y 2 were both activated. This is another
+aspect of the binding problem since, again, the representation fails to
+specify what must go with what.
+In a conventional computer it is easy to solve the binding problem.
+We simply create two records in the computer memory. Each record
+contains a pair of coordinates that go together as coordinates of one
+dot, and the binding information is encoded by the fact that the two
+coordinate values are sitting in the same record (which usually means
+they are sitting in neighboring memory locations). In parallel networks
+it is much harder to solve the binding problem.
+Conjunctive Encoding
+One approach is to set aside, in advance, one unit for each possible
+combination of X and Y values. This amounts to covering the plane
+with a large number of small, nonoverlapping zones and dedicating a
+unit to each zone. A dot is then represented by activity in a single unit
+so this is a local representation. The use of one unit for each discriminable feature solves the binding problem by having units which stand for
+the conjunction of values on each of two dimensions. In general, to
+permit an arbitrary association between particular combinations of
+features and some output or other pattern of activation, some conjunctive representation may be required.
+However, this kind of local encoding is very expensive. It is much
+less efficient than the previous scheme because the accuracy of pinpointing a point in the plane is only proportional to the square root of
+the number of units. In general, for a k-dimensional feature space, the
+local encoding yields an accuracy proportional to the k' root of the
+number of units. Achieving high accuracy without running into the
+binding problem is thus very expensive.
+The use of one unit for each discriminable feature may be a reasonable encoding if a very large number of features are presented on each
+occasion, so that a large fraction of the units are active. However, it is
+a very inefficient encoding if only a very small fraction of the possible
+features are presented at once. The average amount of information
+conveyed by the state of a binary unit is 1 bit if the unit is active half
+the time, and it is much less if the unit is only rarely active.* It would
+4 The amount of information conveyed by a unit that has a probability of p of being on
+is -plog/ - (1 -p) log|1 - PCopyrighted Material
+
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS
+91
+therefore be more efficient to use an encoding in which a larger fraction of the units were active at any moment. This can be done if we
+abandon the idea that each discriminable feature is represented by
+activity in a single unit.
+Coarse Coding
+Suppose we divide the space into larger, overlapping zones and assign
+a unit to each zone. For simplicity, we will assume that the zones are
+circular, that their centers have a uniform random distribution
+throughout the space, and that all the zones used by a given encoding
+scheme have the same radius. The question of interest is how
+accurately a feature is encoded as a function of the radius of the zones.
+If we have a given number of units at our disposal is it better to use
+large zones so that each feature point falls in many zones, or is it better
+to use small zones so that each feature is represented by activity in
+fewer but more finely tuned units?
+The accuracy is proportional to the number of different encodings
+that are generated as we move a feature point along a straight line from
+one side of the space to the other. Every time the line crosses the
+boundary of a zone, the encoding of the feature point changes because
+the activity of the unit corresponding to that zone changes. So the
+number of discriminable features along the line is just twice the
+number of zones that the line penetrates. S The line penetrates every
+zone whose center lies within one radius of the line (see Figure 3).
+This number is proportional to the radius of the zones, r, and it is also
+proportional to their number, n. Hence the accuracy, a, is related to
+the number of zones and to their radius as follows:
+aoc nr.
+In general, for a k-dimensional space, the number of zones whose
+centers lie within one radius of a line through the space is proportional
+to the volume of a k-dimensional hypercylinder of radius r. This
+volume is equal to the length of the cylinder (which is fixed) times its
+(k - area cross-sectional area which is proportional to pk-!
+5 Problems arise if you enter and leave a zone without crossing other zone borders in
+between because you revert to the same encoding as before, but this effect is negligible if
+the zones are dense enough for there to be many zones containing each point in the
+space.
+
+92
+FIGURE 3. The number of zone boundaries that are cut by the line is proportional 1o
+the number of zone centers within one-zone radius of the line.
+Hence, the accuracy is given by
+ao nrk-!.
+So, for example, doubling the radius of the zones increases by a factor of 32, the linear accuracy with which a six-dimensional feature like a
+stopped oriented three-dimensional edge is represented. The intuitive
+idea that larger zones lead to sloppier representations is entirely wrong
+because distributed representations hold information much more efficiently than local ones. Even though each active unit is less specific in
+its meaning, the combination of active units is far more specific.
+Notice also that with coarse coding the accuracy is proportional to the
+number of units, which is much better than being proportional to the
+kth root of the number.
+Units that respond to complex features in retinotopic maps in visual
+cortex often have fairly large receptive fields. This is often interpreted
+as the first step on the way to a translation invariant representation.
+However, it may be that the function of the large fields is not to
+achieve
+translation invariance but to pinpoint accurately where the
+feature is!
+Limitations on coarse coding. So far, only the advantages of coarse
+coding have been mentioned, and its problematic aspects have been
+ignored. There are a number of limitations that cause the coarse coding strategy to break deypyrighted Watergeptive fields" become too
+
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS 93
+large. One obvious limitation occurs when the fields become comparable in size to the whole space. This limitation is generally of little
+interest because other, more severe, problems arise before the receptive fields become this large.
+Coarse coding is only effective when the features that must be
+represented are relatively sparse. If many feature points are crowded
+together, each receptive field will contain many features and the activity
+pattern in the coarse-coded units will not discriminate between many
+alternative combinations of feature points. (If the units are allowed to
+have integer activity levels that reflect the number of feature points falling within their fields, a few nearby points can be tolerated, but not
+many.) Thus there is a resolution/accuracy trade-off. Coarse coding
+can give high accuracy for the parameters of features provided that
+features are widely spaced so that high resolution is not also required
+As a rough rule of thumb, the diameter of the receptive fields should
+be of the same order as the spacing between simultaneously present
+feature points!
+The fact that coarse coding only works if the features are sparse
+should be unsurprising given that its advantage over a local encoding is
+that it uses the information capacity of the units more efficiently by
+making each unit active more often. If the features are so dense that
+the units would be active for about half the time using a local encoding,
+coarse coding can only make things worse.
+A second major limitation on the use of coarse coding stems from
+the fact that the representation of a feature must be used to affect other
+representations. There is no point using coarse coding if the features
+have to be recoded as activity in finely tuned units before they can
+have the appropriate effects on other representations. If we assume
+that the effect of a distributed representation is the sum of the effects
+of the individual active units that constitute the representation, there is
+a strong limitation on the circumstances under which coarse coding can
+be used effectively. Nearby features will be encoded by similar sets of
+active units, and so they will inevitably tend to have similar effects.
+Broadly speaking, coarse coding is only useful if the required effect of a
+feature is the average of the required effects of its neighbors. At a fine
+enough scale this is nearly always true for spatial tasks. The scale at
+which it breaks down determines an upper limit on the size of the
+receptive fields.
+6 It is interesting that many of the geometric visual illusions illustrate interactions
+between features at a distance much greater than the uncertainty in the subjects'
+knowledge of the position of a feature. This is just what would be expected if coarse cod-
+
+94 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+Another limitation is that whenever coarse-coded representations
+interact, there is a tendency for the coarseness to increase. To counteract this tendency, it is probably necessary to have lateral inhibition
+operating within each representation. This issue requires further
+research.
+Extension to noncontinuous spaces. The principle underlying coarse
+coding can be generalized to noncontinuous spaces by thinking of a set
+of items as the equivalent of a receptive field. A local representation
+uses one unit for each possible item. A distributed representation uses
+a unit for a set of items, and it implicitly encodes a particular item as
+the intersection of the sets that correspond to the active units.
+In the domain of spatial features there is generally a very strong
+regularity: Sets of features with similar parameter values need to have
+similar effects on other representations. Coarse coding is efficient
+because it allows this regularity to be expressed in the connection
+strengths.
+In other domains, the regularities are different, but the efficiency arguments are the same: It is better to devote a unit to a set of
+items than to a single item, provided that the set is chosen in such a
+way that membership in the set implies something about membership
+in other sets. This implication can then be captured as a connection
+strength. Ideally, a set should be chosen so that membership of this
+set has strong implications for memberships of other sets that are also
+encoded by individual units.
+We illustrate these points with a very simple example. Consider a
+microlanguage consisting of the three-letter words of English made up
+of w or 1, followed by i or e, followed by g or r. The strings wig and leg
+are words, but weg, lig, and all strings ending in r are not. Suppose we
+wanted to use a distributed representation scheme as a basis for
+representing the words, and we wanted to be able to use the distributed
+pattern as a basis for deciding whether the string is a word or a nonword. For simplicity we will have a single "decision" unit. The problem is to find connections from the units representing the word to the
+decision unit such that it fires whenever a word is present but does not
+fire when no word is present.'
+7 Note that the problem remains the same if the decision unit is replaced by a set of
+units and the task of the network is to produce a different pattern for the word and nonword decisions. For when we examine each unit, it either takes the same or a different
+value in the iwo patterns; in the cases where the value is the same, there is no problem,
+but neither do such units differentiate the two patterns. When the values are different,
+the unit behaves just like the single decision unit discussed in the text.
+
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS 95
+Figure 4 shows three representation schemes: a distributed scheme
+that does not work, a distributed scheme that does work, and a local
+scheme. In the first scheme, each letter/position combination is
+represented by a different unit. Since there are only five letter/position
+possibilities, only five units have connections to the output unit. Each
+word and nonword produces a different and unique pattern over these
+five units, but the connections from the five units to the decision unit
+cannot be set in such a way as to make the decision unit fire whenever
+one of the words is present and fail to fire whenever one of the nonwords is present.
+The reason for the problem is simply that the connections between
+the letter/position units and the decision units can only capture the
+degree to which each letter indicates whether the string is a word or
+not. The g tends to indicate that a word is present, whereas the r indicates that the item is not a word; but each of the other letters, taken
+individually, has absolutely no predictive ability in this case.
+Whether a letter string is a word or not cannot be determined conclusively from the individual letters it contains; it is necessary to consider also what combinations of letters it contains. Thus, we need a
+representation that captures what combinations of letters are present in
+a way that is sufficient for the purposes of the network. One could capture this by using local representations and assigning one node to each
+word, as in the third panel of Figure 4. However, it is important to see
+that one need not go all the way to local representations to solve the
+FIGURE 4. Three networks applied to the problem of determining which of the strings
+that can be made from w or 1, followed by i or e, followed by g or r form words.
+Numbers on the connections represent connection strengths; numbers on the units
+represent the units' thresholds.
+A unit will take on an activation equal to l if its input
+exceeds it threshold; otherwise, its activation is O.
+
+96 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+problem facing our network. Conjunctive distributed representations
+will suffice.
+The scheme illustrated in the second panel of the figure provides a
+conjunctive distributed representation. In this scheme, there are units
+for pairs of letters which, in this limited vocabulary, happen to capture
+the combinations that are essential for determining whether a string of
+letters is a word or not. These are, of course, the pairs wi and le.
+These conjunctive units, together with direct input to the decision unit
+from the g unit, are sufficient to construct a network which correctly
+classifies all strings consisting of a w or an I, followed by an i or an e,
+followed by a g or r.
+This example illustrates that conjunctive coding is often necessary if
+distributed representations are to be used to solve problems that might
+easily be posed to networks. This same point could be illustrated with
+many other examples-the exclusive or problem is the classic example
+(Minsky & Papert, 1969). Other examples of problems requiring some
+sort of conjunctive encoding can be found in Hinton (198la) and in
+Chapters 7 and 8. An application of conjunctive coding to a psychological model is found in Chapter 18.
+Some problems (mostly very simple ones) can be solved without any
+conjunctive encoding at all, and others will require conjuncts of more
+than two units at a time. In general, it is hard to specify in advance just
+what "order" of conjunctions will be required. Instead, it is better to
+search for a learning scheme that can find representations that are adequate. The mechanisms proposed in Chapters 7 and 8 represent two
+steps toward this goal.
+Implementing an Arbitrary Mapping Between Two Domains
+The attentive reader will have noticed that a local representation can
+always be made to work in the example we have just considered. However, we have already discussed several reasons why distributed
+representations are preferable. One reason is that they can make more
+efficient use of parallel hardware than local representations.
+This section shows how a distributed representation in one group of
+units can cause an appropriate distributed representation in another
+group of units. We consider the problem of implementing an arbitrary
+pairing between representations in the two groups, and we take as an
+example an extension of the previous one: the association between the
+visual form of a word and its meaning. The reason for considering an
+arbitrary mapping is that this is the case in which local representations
+seem most helpful. If distributed representations are better in this
+
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS
+97
+case, then they are certainly better in cases where there are underlying
+regularities that can be captured by regularities in the patterns of activation on the units in one group and the units in another. A discussion
+of the benefit distributed representations can provide in such cases can
+be found in Chapter 18.
+If we restrict ourselves to monomorphemic words, the mapping from
+strings of graphemes onto meanings appears to be arbitrary in the sense
+that knowing what some strings of graphemes mean does not help one
+predict what a new string means.® This arbitrariness in the mapping
+from graphemes to meanings is what gives plausibility to models that
+have explicit word units. It is obvious that arbitrary mappings can be
+implemented if there are such units. A grapheme string activates
+exactly one word unit, and this activates whatever meaning we wish to
+associate with it (see Figure SA). The semantics of similar grapheme
+strings can then be completely independent because they are mediated
+by separate word units. There is none of the automatic generalization
+that is characteristic of distributed representations.
+Intuitively, it is not at all obvious that arbitrary mappings can be
+implemented in a system where the intermediate layer of units encodes
+the word as a distributed pattern of activity instead of as activity in a
+single local unit. The distributed alternative appears to have a serious
+drawback. The effect of a pattern of activity on other representations is
+the combined result of the individual effects of the active units in the
+pattern. So similar patterns tend to have similar effects. It appears that
+we are not free to make a given pattern have whatever effect we wish
+on the meaning representations without thereby altering the effects that
+other patterns have. This kind of interaction appears to make it difficult to implement arbitrary mappings from distributed representations
+of words onto meaning representations. We shall now show that these
+intuitions are wrong and that distributed representations of words can
+work perfectly well and may even be more efficient than single word
+units.
+Figure SB shows a three-layered system in which grapheme/ position
+units feed into word-set units which, in turn, feed into semantic or
+sememe units. Models of this type, and closely related variants, have
+been analyzed by Willshaw (1981), V. Dobson (personal communication, 1984), and by David Zipser (personal communication, 1981);
+some further relevant analyses are discussed in Chapter 12. For simpli-
+& Even for monomorphemic words there may be particular fragments that have associated meaning. For example, words starting with sn usually mean something unpleasant
+to do with the lips or nose (sneer, snarl, snigger), and words with long vowels are more
+likely to stand for large, slow things than words with short vowels (George Lakoff, personal communication). Much of Lewis Carroll's poetry relies on such effects.
+
+98
+flies
+animate
+bat
+hairy
+cat
+b/1
+a/2
+flat
+mat
+e/2
+round
+metallic
+big
+can
+i/2
+n/2
+car
+t/3)
+n/3)
+1/3
+flies
+aninate
+B
+¡alry
+cat
+can
+car
+flat
+round
+cal
+bat
+mat
+metallic
+big
+b/1
+a/2
+e/2
+1/2
+/3
+1/3
+FIGURE S. A: A three-layer network. The bottom layer contains units that represent
+particular graphemes in particular positions within the word. The middle layer contains
+units that recognize complete words, and the top layer contains units that represent
+semantic features of the meaning of the word. This network uses local representations of
+words in the middle layer. B: The top and bottom layers are the same as in (A), but the
+middle layer uses a more distributed
+representation. Each unit in this layer can be
+activated by the graphemic representation of any one of a whole set of words. The unit
+then provides input to every semantic feature that occurs in the meaning of any of the
+words that activate it. Only those word sets containing the word cat are shown in this
+example. Notice that the only semantic features which receive input from all these word
+sets are the semantic features of cat.
+city, we shall assume that each unit is either active or inactive and that
+there is no feedback or cross-connections. These assumptions can be
+relaxed without substantially affecting the argument. A word-set unit is
+activated whenever the pattern of the grapheme/ position units codes a
+word in a particular set. The set could be all the four-letter words starting with HE, for example, or all the words containing at least two T's.
+All that is required is that it is possible to decide whether a word is in
+
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS
+99
+the set by applying a simple test to the activated grapheme/position
+units. So, for example, the set of all words meaning "nice" is not
+allowed as a word set. There is an implicit assumption that word meanings can be represented as sets of sememes. This is a contentious
+issue. There appears to be a gulf between the componential view in
+which a meaning is a set of features and the structuralist view in which
+the meaning of a word can only be defined in terms of its relationships
+to other meanings. Later in this chapter we consider one way of
+integrating these iwo views by allowing articulated representations to be
+built out of a number of different sets of active features.
+Returning to Figure SB, the question is whether it is possible to
+implement an arbitrary set of associations between grapheme/ position
+vectors and sememe vectors when the word-set units are each activated
+by more than one word. It will be sufficient to consider just one of the
+many possible specific models. Let us assume that an active word-set
+unit provides positive input to all the sememe units that occur in the
+meaning of any word in the word set. Let us also assume that each
+sememe unit has a variable threshold that is dynamically adjusted to be
+just slightly less than the number of active word-set units. Only
+sememe units that are receiving input from every active word-set unit
+will then become active.
+All the sememes of the correct word will be activated because each
+of these sememes will occur in the meaning of one of the words in the
+active word sets. However, additional sememes may also be activated
+because, just by chance, they may receive input from every active
+word-set unit. For a sememe to receive less input than its threshold,
+there must be at least one active word set that does not contain any
+word which has the sememe as part of its meaning. For each active
+word set the probability, i, of this happening is
+i = (1 -p)(w-"
+where p is the proportion of words that contain the sememe and w is
+the number of words in the word set of the word-set unit. The reason
+for the term w - 1 is that the sememe is already assumed not to be
+part of the meaning of the correct word, so there are only w- 1
+remaining words that could have it in their meaning.
+Assume that when a word is coded at the graphemic level it activates
+u units at the word-set level. Each sememe that is not part of the
+word's meaning has a probability i of failing to receive input from each
+word-set unit. The probability, f, that all of these word-set units will
+provide input to it is therefore
+
+100
+§= (1- i)"
+= 11- (1-p) (w-114.
+By inspection, this probability of a "false-positive" sememe reduces
+to zero when w is 1. Table 1 shows the value of f for various combinations of values of p, u, and w. Notice that if p is very small, I can
+remain negligible even if w is quite large. This means that distributed
+representations in which each word-set unit participates in the representation of many words do not lead to errors if the semantic features are
+relatively sparse in the sense that each word meaning contains only a
+small fraction of the total set of sememes. So the word-set units can be
+fairly nonspecific provided the sememe units are fairly specific (not
+shared by too many different word meanings). Some of the entries in
+the table make it clear that for some values of p, there can be a negligible chance of error even though the number of word-set units is considerably less than the number of words (the ratio of words to word-set
+units is w/u).
+The example described above makes many simplifying assumptions.
+For example, each word-set unit is assumed to be connected to every
+relevant sememe unit. If any of these connections were missing, we
+could not afford to give the sememe units a threshold equal to the
+number of active word-set units. To allow for missing connections we
+could lower the threshold. This would increase the false-positive error
+rate, but the effect may be quite small and can be compensated by
+adding word-set units to increase the specificity of the word-level
+representations (Willshaw, 1981). Alternatively, we could make each
+word-set unit veto the sememes that do not occur in any of its words.
+This scheme is robust against missing connections because the absence
+of one veto can be tolerated if there are other vetos (V. Dobson, personal communication, 1984).
+There are two more simplifying assumptions both of which lead to an
+underestimate of the effectiveness of distributed representations for the
+arbitrary mapping task. First, the calculations assume that there is no
+fine-tuning procedure for incrementing some weights and decrementing
+others to improve performance in the cases where the most frequent
+errors occur. Second, the calculations ignore cross-connections among
+the sememes. If each word meaning is a familiar stable pattern of
+sememes, there will be a strong "clean-up" effect which tends to
+suppress erroneous sememes as soon as the pattern of activation at the
+sememe level is sufficiently close to the familiar pattern for a particular
+word meaning. Interactions among the sememes also provide an explanation for the ability of a single grapheme string (e.g., bank) to elicit
+two quite different meanings. The bottom-up effect of the activated
+
+u
+5
+10
+10
+10
+10
+10
+40
+40
+40
+40
+40
+1
+10
+20
+40
+80
+10
+20
+40
+80
+160
+40
+80
+160
+320
+640
+100
+100
+100
+200
+100
+400
+100
+800
+.2
+2
+2
+.2
+0.071
+0.49
+0.93
+1.0
+1.0
+.2
+.2
+2
+0.24
+0.86
+1.0
+1.0
+2 1.0
+.2
+.2
+2
+2
+0.99
+1.0
+1.0
+1.0
+1.0
+.2
+2
+2
+.2
+1.0
+1.0
+1.0
+1.0
+u
+10
+10
+10
+10
+10
+40
+40
+40
+40
+40
+10
+10
+100
+100
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS
+101
+TABLE 1
+W
+5
+10
+20
+40
+80
+10
+20
+40
+80
+160
+40
+80
+160
+320
+640
+100
+200
+400
+800
+P
+.1
+.1
+.1
+.1
+.1
+.1
+.1
+.1
+.1
+1
+f
+0.0048
+0.086
+0.48
+0.92
+1.0
+0.0074
+0.23
+0.85
+1.0
+1.0
+0.52
+0.99
+1.0
+1.0
+1.0
+0.99
+1.0
+1.0
+1.0
+5
+5
+10
+10
+10
+10
+40
+40
+40
+40
+40
+100
+100
+100
+100
+W
+5
+10
+20
+40
+80
+10
+20
+40
+80
+160
+40
+80
+160
+320
+640
+100
+200
+400
+800
+.01
+.01
+.01
+.01
+.01
+.01
+.01
+.01
+.01
+.01
+.01
+.01
+01
+.01
+.01
+.01
+.01
+.01
+.01
+f
+9.5x108
+4.8x 10-6
+0.00016
+0.0036
+0.049
+2.3×10-11
+2.5x10-8
+1.3x105
+0.0024
+0.10
+2.7x10-20
+3.5x10"
+0.00012
+0.19
+0.94
+9.0x10-21
+4.8×107
+0.16
+0.97
+The probability, J, of a false-positive sememe as a function of the number of active wordset units per word, u, the number of words in each word-set, w, and the probability, p. of
+a sememe being part of a word meaning.
+word-set units helps both sets of sememes, but as soon as top-down factors give an advantage to one meaning, the sememes in the other
+meaning will be suppressed by competitive interactions at the sememe
+level (Kawamoto & Anderson, 1984).
+A simulation. As soon as there are cross-connections among the
+sememe units and fine-tuning of individual weights to avoid frequent
+errors, the relatively straightforward probabilistic analysis given above
+breaks down. To give the cross-connections time to clean up the output, it is necessary to use an iterative procedure instead of the simple
+"straight-through" processing in which each layer completely determines
+the states of all the units in the subsequent layer in a single, synchronous step. Systems containing cross-connections, feedback, and asynchronous processing elements are probably more realistic, but they are
+generally very hard to analyze. However, we are now beginning to discover that there are subclasses of these more complex systems that
+behave in tractable wayS onighteah petentathis subclass is described in
+
+102 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+more detail in Chapter 7.
+It uses processing elements that are
+inherently stochastic. Surprisingly, the use of stochastic elements
+makes these networks better at performing searches, better at learning,
+and easier to analyze.
+A simple network of this kind can be used to illustrate some of the
+claims about the ability to "clean up" the output by using interactions
+among sememe units and the ability to avoid errors by fine-tuning the
+appropriate weights. The network contains 30 grapheme units, 20
+word-set units, and 30 sememe units. There are no direct connections
+between grapheme and sememe units, but each word-set unit is connected to all the grapheme and sememe units. The grapheme units are
+divided into three sets of ten, and each three-letter word has one active
+unit in each group of ten (units can only have activity levels of 1 or 0).
+The "meaning" of a word is chosen at random by selecting each
+sememe unit to be active with a probability of 0.2. The network shown
+in Figure 6 has learned to associated 20 different grapheme strings with
+their chosen meanings. Each word-set unit is involved in the representation of many words, and each word involves many word-set units.
+The details of the learning procedure used to create this network and
+the search procedure which is used to settle on a set of active sememes
+when given the graphemic input are described in Chapter 7. Here we
+simply summarize the main results of the simulation.
+After a long period of learning, the network was able to produce the
+correct pattern of sememes 99.9% of the time when given a graphemic
+input. Removal of any one of the word-set units after the learning typically caused a slight rise in the error rate for several different words
+rather than the complete loss of one word. Similar effects have been
+observed in other distributed models (Wood, 1978). In our simulations, some of the erroneous responses were quite interesting. In
+10,000 tests with a missing word-set unit there were 140 cases in which
+the model failed to recover the right sememe pattern. Some of these
+consisted of one or two missing or extra sememes, but 83 of the errors
+were exactly the pattern of sememes of some other word. This is a
+result of the cooperative interactions among the sememe units. If the
+input coming from the word-set units is noisy or underspecified as it
+may be when units are knocked out, the clean-up effect may settle on a
+similar but incorrect meaning.
+This effect is reminiscent of a phenomenon called deep dyslexia which
+occurs with certain kinds of brain damage in adults. When shown a
+word and asked to read it, the subject will sometimes say a different
+word with a very similar meaning. The incorrect word sometimes has a
+very different sound and spelling. For example, when shown the word
+PEACH, the subject might say APRICOT. (See Coltheart, Patterson, &
+Marshall, 1980, for more information about acquired dyslexia.)
+
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS
+103
+3BESE
+BEEEEE
+ESEE
+SLEE
+EBBE
+=
+FIGURE 6. A compaci display that shows all the connection strengths of the 20 units in
+the middle layer of a three-layer network. The network can map from a pattern of
+activity over the 30 units in the bottom layer (representing graphemes) 1o an associaled
+pattern of activity over the 30 units of the lop layer (representing sememes). Within
+each of the large rectangles thal are used to depict middle-layer units, the 30 black and
+white rectangles at the top depict the weights of the connections to the top layer, and the
+30 reciangles at the bottom depict the weights from the bottom layer. White rectangles
+are positive weights, black are negative, and the area of a rectangle depicts the magnitude
+of the weight. The single weight that occurs somewhere in the middle of a unit is its
+threshold (black means a positive threshold). The weights between the 30 units in the
+lop layer are not shown in this display.
+Semantic errors of this kind seem bizarre because it seems as if the
+subject must have accessed the lexical item PEACH in order to make
+the semantically related error, and if he can get to the lexical item why
+can't he say it? (These subjects may know and be able to say the
+words that they misread.) Distributed representations allow us to
+dispense with the rigid distinction between accessing a word and not
+accessing it. In a network that has learned the word PEACH, the graphemic representation of PEACH will cause approximately the right
+input to the sememe units, and interactions at the sememe level can
+then cause exactly the pattern of sememes for APRICOT. Another
+psychologically interesting faghee&Walthan the network relearns after
+
+104 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+it has been damaged. The network was damaged by adding noise to
+every connection that involved a word-set unit. This reduced the
+performance from 99.3% correct to 64.3%.9 The network was then
+retrained and it exhibited very rapid relearning, much faster than its
+original rate of learning when its performance was 64.3% correct. This
+rapid recovery was predicted by a geometrical argument which shows
+that there is something special about a set of connection strengths that
+is generated by adding noise to a near-perfect set. The resulting set is
+very different from other sets of connection strengths that exhibit the
+same performance. (See Chapter 7 for further discussion.)
+An even more surprising effect occurs if a few of the words are omitted from the retraining. The error rate for these words is substantially
+reduced as the retraining proceeds, even though the other graphemesememe pairings have no intrinsic relation to them because all the pairings were selected randomly. The "spontaneous" recovery of words
+that the network is not shown again is a result of the use of distributed
+representations. All the weights are involved in encoding the subset of
+the words that are shown during retraining, and so the added noise
+tends to be removed from every weight. A scheme that used a separate
+unit for each word would not behave in this way, so one can view spontaneous recovery of unrehearsed items as a qualitative signature of distributed representations.
+STRUCTURED REPRESENTATIONS AND PROCESSES
+In this section we consider two extensions of distributed representations. These extensions illustrate that the idea of distributed representations is consistent with some of the major insights from the field of
+artificial intelligence concerning the importance of structure in
+representations and processes. Perhaps because some proponents of
+distributed representations have not been particularly attuned to these
+issues, it is often unclear how structure is to be captured in a distributed representational scheme. The two parts of this section give some
+indication of the directions that can be taken in extending distributed
+representations to deal with these important considerations.
+9 The error rate was 99.3% rather than 99.9% in this example because the network was
+forced to respond faster, so the cooperative effects had less time to settle on the optimal
+output.
+
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS
+105
+Representing Constituent Structure
+Any system that attempts to implement the kinds of conceptual
+structures that people use has to be capable of representing two rather
+different kinds of hierarchy. The first is the "IS-A" hierarchy that
+relates types to instances of those types.
+The second is the part/ whole
+hierarchy that relates items to the constituent items that they are composed of. The most important characteristics of the IS-A hierarchy are
+that known properties of the types must be "inherited" by the instances,
+and properties that are found to apply to all instances of a type must
+normally be attributed to the type. Earlier in this chapter we saw how
+the IS-A hierarchy can be implemented by making the distributed
+representation of an instance include, as a subpart, the distributed
+representation for the type. This representational trick automatically
+yields the most important characteristics of the IS-A hierarchy, but the
+trick can only be used for one kind of hierarchy. If we use the
+part/whole relationship between patterns of activity to represent the
+type/instance relationship between items, it appears that we cannot also
+use it to represent the part/whole relationship between items. We cannot make the representation of the whole be the sum of the representations of its parts.
+The question of how to represent the relationship between an item
+and the constituent items of which it is composed has been a major
+stumbling block for theories that postulate distributed representations.
+In the rival, localist scheme, a whole is a node that is linked by labeled
+arcs to the nodes for its parts. But the central tenet of the distributed
+scheme is that different items correspond to alternative patterns of
+activity in the same set of units, so it seems as if a whole and its parts
+cannot both be represented at the same time.
+Hinton (198la) described one way out of this dilemma. It relies on
+the fact that wholes are not simply the sums of their parts. They are
+composed of parts that play particular roles within the whole structure.
+A shape, for example, is composed of smaller shapes that have a particular size, orientation, and position relative to the whole. Each constituent shape has its own spatial role, and the whole shape is composed
+of a set of shape/role pairs.!° Similarly, a proposition is composed of
+objects that occupy particular semantic roles in the whole propositional
+10 Relationships between parts are important as well. One advantage of explicitly
+representing shape/role pairs is that it allows different pairs to support each other. One
+can view the various different locations within an object as slots and the shapes of parts
+of an object as the fillers of these slots. Knowledge of a whole shape can then be implemented by positive interactions between the various slot-fillers.
+
+106 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+structure. This suggests a way of implementing the relationship between
+wholes and parts: The identity of each part should first be combined
+with its role to produce a single pattern that represents the combination
+of the identity and the role, and then the distributed representation for
+the whole should consist of the sum of the distributed representations
+for these identity/role combinations (plus some additional "emergent"
+features). This proposal differs from the simple idea that the representation of the whole is the sum of the representations of its parts
+because the subpatterns used to represent identity/ role combinations
+are quite different from the patterns used to represent the identities
+alone. They do not, for example, contain these patterns as parts.
+Naturally, there must be an access path between the representation
+of an item as a whole in its own right and the representation of that
+same item playing a particular role within a larger structure. It must be
+possible, for example, to generate the identity/ role representation from
+two separate, explicit, distributed patterns one of which represents the
+identity and the other of which represents the role. It must also be
+possible to go the other way and generate the explicit representations of
+the identity and role from the single combined representation of the
+identity/ role combination (see Figure 7).
+The use of patterns that represent identity/role combinations allows
+the part/ whole hierarchy to be represented in the same way as the
+type/instance hierarchy. We may view the whole as simply a particular
+instance of a number of more general types, each of which can be
+defined as the type that has a particular kind of part playing a particular
+role (e.g., men with wooden legs).
+Sequential Symbol Processing
+If constituent structure is implemented in the way described above,
+there is a serious issue about how many structures can be active at any
+one time. The obvious way to allocate the hardware is to use a group
+of units for each possible role within a structure and to make the pattern of activity in this group represent the identity of the constituent
+that is currently playing that role. This implies that only one structure
+can be represented at a time, unless we are willing to postulate multiple
+copies of the entire arrangement. One way of doing this, using units
+with programmable rather than fixed connections, is described in
+Chapter 16. However, even this technique runs into difficulties if more
+than a few modules must be "programmed" at once. However, people
+do seem to suffer from strong constraints on the number of structures
+of the same general type that they can process at once. The
+
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS
+107
+IDENTITY
+John
+ROLE
+Agent
+John
+as
+agent
+Mary
+as
+patient
+Park
+as
+location
+AGENT
+PATIENT
+LOCATION
+FIGURE 7. A sketch of the apparatus that might be necessary for combining separate
+representations of an identity and a role into a single pattern. Only one identity and only
+one role can be explicitly represented at a time because the identity and role groups can
+each have only one pattern of activity at a time. However, the various role groups allow
+many identity/role combinations to be encoded simultaneously. The small triangular
+symbols represent the ability of the pattern of activity in the group that explictly
+represents a role to determine which one of the many role groups is currently interacting
+with the identity group. This allows the identity occupying a particular role to be "read
+out" as well as allowing the reverse operation of combining an identity and a role.
+sequentiality that they exhibit at this high level of description is initially
+surprising given the massively parallel architecture of the brain, but it
+becomes much easier to understand if we abandon our localist predelictions in favor of the distributed alternative which uses the parallelism
+to give each active representation a very rich internal structure that
+allows the right kinds of generalization and content-addressability.
+There may be some truth to the notion that people are sequential symbol processors if each "symbolic representation" is identified with a
+
+108
+successive state of a large interactive network. See Chapter 14 for
+further discussion of these issues.
+One central
+tenet of the sequential symbol processing approach
+(Newell, 1980) is the ability to focus on any part of a structure and to
+expand that into a whole that is just as rich in content as the original
+whole of which it was a part. The recursive ability to expand parts of a
+structure for indefinitely many levels and the inverse ability to package
+up whole structures into a reduced form that allows them to be used as
+constituents of larger structures is the essence of symbol processing. It
+allows a system to build structures out of things that refer to other
+whole structures without requiring that these other structures be
+represented in all their cumbersome detail.
+In conventional computer implementations, this ability is achieved by
+using pointers. These are very convenient, but they depend on the use
+of addresses. In a parallel network, we need something that is functionally equivalent to arbitrary pointers in order to implement symbol
+processing. This is exactly what is provided by subpatterns that stand
+for identity/role combinations. They allow the full identity of the part
+to be accessed from a representation of the whole and a representation
+of the role that the system wishes to focus on, and they also allow
+explicit representations of an identity and a role to be combined into a
+less cumbersome representation, so that several identity/role combinations can be represented simultaneously in order to form the representation of a larger structure.
+SUMMARY
+Given a parallel network, items can be represented by activity in a
+single, local unit or by a pattern of activity in a large set of units with
+each unit encoding a microfeature of the item. Distributed representations are efficient whenever there are underlying regularities which can
+be captured by interactions among microfeatures. By encoding each
+piece of knowledge as a large set of interactions, it is possible to
+achieve useful properties like content-addressable memory
+and
+automatic generalization, and new items can be created without having
+to create new connections at the hardware level. In the domain of continuously varying spatial features it is relatively easy to provide a
+mathematical analysis of the advantages and drawbacks of using distributed representions.
+Distributed representations seem to be unsuitable for implementing
+purely arbitrary mappings because there is no underlying structure and
+so generalization only causes unwanted interference. However, even
+
+3. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS
+109
+for this task, distributed representations can be made fairly efficient and
+they exhibit some psychologically interesting effects when damaged
+There are several difficult problems that must be solved before
+distributed representations can be used effectively. One is to decide on
+the pattern of activity that is to be used for representing an item. The
+similarities between the chosen pattern and other existing patterns will
+determine the kinds of generalization and interference that occur.
+The
+search for good patterns to use is equivalent to the search for the
+underlying regularites of the domain. This learning problem is
+addressed in the chapters of Part II.
+Another hard problem is to clarify the relationship between distributed representations and techniques used in artificial intelligence like
+schemas, or hierarchical structural descriptions. Existing artificial intelligence programs have great difficulty in rapidly finding the schema that
+best fits the current situation. Parallel networks offer the potential of
+rapidly applying a lot of knowledge to this best-fit search, but this
+potential will only be realized when there is a good way of implementing schemas in parallel networks. A discussion of how this might be
+done can be found in Chapter 14.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+This chapter is based on a technical report by the first author, whose
+work is supported by a grant from the System Development Foundation. We thank Jim Anderson, Dave Ackley, Dana Ballard, Francis
+Crick, Scott Fahlman, Jerry Feldman, Christopher Longuet-Higgins,
+Don Norman, Terry Sejnowski, and Tim Shallice for helpful
+discussions.
+
+CHAPTER 4
+PDP Models and
+General Issues in Cognitive Science
+D. E. RUMELHART and J. L. MCCLELLAND
+We are naturally optimistic about parallel distributed processing as a
+valuable framework for creating cognitive models. This does not mean,
+however, that there are no tough problems to be solved. Indeed, we
+have spent much of our effort convincing ourselves that PDP models
+could form a reasonable basis for modeling cognitive processes in general. In this chapter we shall address some of the objections that we
+and others have raised to the work and sketch our answers to these
+objections. However, we should like to say at the outset that we do not
+believe that any such general considerations as those discussed here
+will, in the end, bear much weight. The real proof is in the pudding.
+If PDP models are a valuable way to proceed, their usefulness will be
+proved in the added insights they bring to the particular substantive
+areas in which they are applied. The models we describe in later
+chapters are largely intended to constitute the beginnings of such a
+proof.
+Many of the questions and issues raised below are addressed by
+material described in detail in other chapters in the book. For this reason, much of our present discussion is in the form of pointers to the
+relevant discussions. In this sense, this chapter serves not only as a
+discussion of our approach but as an overview of the issues and topics
+that are addressed in the chapters that follow.
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES
+111
+SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE PDP APPROACH
+PDP Models Are Too Weak
+The one-layer perceptron. The most commonly heard objection to
+PDP models is a variant of the claim that PDP models cannot perform
+any interesting computations. One variant goes like this: "These PDP
+models sound a lot like perceptrons to me. Didn't Minsky and Papert
+show that perceptron-like models couldn't do anything interesting?"
+This comment represents a misunderstanding of what Minsky and
+Papert (1969) have actually shown. A brief sketch of the context in
+which Minsky and Papert wrote will help clarify the situation. (See
+Chapter S for a somewhat fuller account of this history.)
+In the late 1950s and early 1960s there was a great deal of effort in
+the development of self-organizing networks and similar PDP-like computational devices. The best known of these was the perceptron
+developed by Frank Rosenblatt (see, for example, Rosenblatt, 1962).
+Rosenblatt was very enthusiastic about the perceptron and hopeful that
+it could serve as the basis both of artificial intelligence and the modeling of the brain. Minsky and Papert, who favored a serial symbol processing approach to artificial intelligence, undertook a very careful
+mathematical analysis of the perceptron in their 1969 book entitled,
+simply, Perceptrons.
+The perceptron Minsky and Papert analyzed most closely is illustrated
+in Figure 1. Such machines consist of what is generally called a retina,
+an array of binary inputs sometimes taken to be arranged in a twodimensional spatial layout; a set of predicates, a set of binary threshold
+units with fixed connections to a subset of units in the retina such that
+each predicate computes some local function over the subset of units to
+which it is connected; and one or more decision units, with modifiable
+connections to the predicates. This machine has only one layer of
+modifiable connections; for this reason we will call it a one-layer perceptron.
+Minsky and Papert set out to show which functions can and cannot
+be computed by this class of machines. They demonstrated, in particular, that such perceptrons are unable to calculate such mathematical
+functions as parity (whether an odd or even number of points are on in
+the retina) or the topological function of connectedness (whether all
+points that are on are connected to all other points that are on either
+directly or via other points that are also on) without making use of
+absurdly large numbers of predicates. The analysis is extremely elegant
+and demonstrates the importance of a mathematical approach to analyzing computational syster@spyrighted Material
+
+112 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+9 9_9
+FIGURE 1. The one-layer perceptron analyzed by Minsky and Papert. (From Perceptrons
+by M. L. Minsky and S. Papert, 1969, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Copyright 1969 by
+MIT Press. Reprinted by permission.)
+Minsky and Papert's analysis of the limitations of the one-layer perceptron, coupled with some of the early successes of the symbolic processing approach in artificial intelligence, was enough to suggest to a
+large number of workers in the field that there was no future in
+perceptron-like computational devices for artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology. The problem is that although Minsky and Papert
+were perfectly correct in their analysis, the results apply only to these
+simple one-layer perceptrons and not to the larger class of perceptronlike models. In particular (as Minsky and Papert actually conceded), it
+can be shown that a multilayered perceptron system, including several
+layers of predicates between the retina and the decision stage, can compute functions such as parity, using reasonable numbers of units each
+computing a very local predicate. (See Chapters 5 and 8 for examples
+of multilayer networks that compute parity). Similarly, it is not difficult to develop networks capable of solving the connectedness or
+inside/outside problem. Hinton and Sejnowski have analyzed a version
+of such a network (see Chapter 7).
+Essentially, then, although Minsky and Papert were exactly correct in
+their analysis of the one-layer perceptron, the theorems don't apply to
+systems which are even a little more complex. In particular, it doesn't
+apply to multilayer systems nor to systems that allow feedback loops.
+Minsky and Papert argued that there would not be much value to
+multilayer perceptrons. First, they argued that these systems are sufficiently unrestricted as to be vacuous. They pointed out, for example,
+that a universal compute pyrighted Mite at of linear threshold units.
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES
+113
+Therefore, restricting consideration of machines made out of linear
+threshold units is no restriction at all on what can be computed.
+We don't, of course, believe that the class of models sketched in
+Chapter 2 is a small or restrictive class. (Nor, for that matter, are the
+languages of symbol processing systems especially restrictive.) The real
+issue, we believe, is that different algorithms are appropriate to different architectural designs. We are investigating an architecture in
+which cooperative computation and parallelism is natural. Serial symbolic systems such as those favored by Minsky and Papert have a
+natural domain of algorithms that differs from those in PDP models.
+Not everything can be done in one step without feedback or layering
+(both of which suggest a kind of "seriality"). We have been led to consider models that have both of these features. The real point is that we
+seek algorithms that are as parallel as possible. We believe that such
+algorithms are going to be closer in form to the algorithms which could
+be employed by the hardware of the brain and that the kind of parallelism we employ allows the exploitation of multiple information sources
+and cooperative computation in a natural way.
+A further argument advanced by Minsky and Papert against
+perceptron-like models with hidden units is that there was no indication
+how such multilayer networks were to be trained. One of the appealing
+features of the one-layer perceptron is the existence of a powerful
+learning procedure, the perceptron convergence procedure of Rosenblatt. In Minsky and Papert's day, there was no such powerful learning
+procedure for the more complex multilayer systems. This is no longer
+true. Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 all provide schemes for learning in systems with hidden units. Indeed, Chapter 8 provides a direct generalization of the perceptron learning procedure which can be applied to arbitrary networks with multiple layers and feedback among layers. This
+procedure can, in principle, learn arbitrary functions including, of
+course, parity and connectedness.
+The problem of stimulus equivalence. A second problem with early
+PDP models-and one that is not necessarily completely overcome by
+multilayer systems- is the problem of invariance or stimulus equivalence.
+An A is an A is an A, no matter where on the retina it appears or how
+large it is or how it is oriented; and people can, in general, recognize
+patterns rather well despite various transformations. It has always
+seemed elegant and natural to imagine that an A, no matter where it is
+presented, is normalized and then processed
+• for recognition using
+stored knowledge of the appearance of the letter (Marr, 1982; Neisser,
+1967).
+In conventional computer programs this seems to be a rather
+straightforward matter religingnted Materaalization of the input, and,
+
+114 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+second, analysis of the normalized input. But in early PDP models it
+was never clear just how normalization could be made to work. Indeed,
+one of the main criticisms of perceptrons-one that is often leveled at
+more recent PDP models, too-is that they appear to provide no
+mechanism of attention, no way of focusing the machine on the
+analysis of a part of a larger whole and then switching to another part or
+back to the consideration of the whole.
+While it is certainly true that certain PDP models lack explicit attentional mechanisms, it is far from true that PDP mechanisms are in
+principle incapable of exhibiting attentional phenomena. Likewise,
+while it is true that certain PDP models do not come to grips with the
+stimulus equivalence problem, it far from true that they are incapable
+of doing this in principle. To prove these points, we will describe a
+method for solving the stimulus equivalence problem that was
+described by Hinton (1981b). The idea is sketched in Figure 2. Essentially, it involves two sets of feature detectors. One (at the bottom of
+the figure consists of retinocentric feature detectors and the other
+(above the retinocentric units) consists of canonical feature detectors.
+Higher order units that recognize canonical patterns (in this example,
+letters) sit above the canonical feature detectors and can have mutually
+excitatory connections to these feature detectors, just as in the interactive activation model of word recognition. What Hinton described was
+a method for mapping retinocentric feature patterns into canonical patterns. In general, for patterns in three-space, there are six degrees of
+freedom, but for present purposes we will consider only figures that are
+rotated around a fixed point in the plane. Here normalization simply
+amounts to a one-dimensional rotational transformation.
+A fixed mapping from retinocentric units to canonical units would
+involve connecting
+each retinocentric feature detector to the
+corresponding canonical feature detector. Thus, to correct for a 90°
+clockwise rotation in the plane, we would want each retinal unit to project to the canonical unit corresponding to it at an offset of 90°
+How to implement variable mappings? Hinton proposed the use of a
+set of mapping units which act to switch on what amount to dynamically
+programmable connections from the retinocentric units to the canonical
+units. In the figure, three different mapping units are shown on the
+right: one that produces no rotation at all, one that produces a 90°
+clockwise rotation, and one that produces a 90° counterclockwise rotation. When one of these mapping units is active, it provides one of two
+inputs to a subset of the programmable connections. Thus, when the
+90° clockwise mapping unit is active, it provides one of two inputs to
+the connection from each retinocentric unit to the central unit that
+corresponds to it under the 90° clockwise rotation. These connections
+are multiplicative-they pass the product of their two inputs on to the
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES
+115
+Lotter Units
+Canonical
+Feature
+Units
+Mapping
+Units
+Retinocentric
+Feature
+Units
+1900
+FIGURE 2. Hinton's (1981b) scheme for mapping patterns in one coordinate system
+into patterns in another coordinate system. At the top are (wo letter-detector units, with
+mutual excitatory connections 1o the six canonical feature units (the position and orientation of the line segment each of these detectors represents is indicated by the line segment in the "body" of each unit). At the bottom are six retinocentric feature units, and at
+the right are units corresponding to each of three different mappings from retinocentric
+to canonical features. (The arrows on the units indicate which direction in the retinocentric frame corresponds to upright in the canonical frame, and the arrow outside the unit
+indicates the nature of the transformation imposed on the retinocentric pattern). Each
+canonical unit receives three pairs of inputs, with each pair arriving at a multiplicative
+connection. These inputs are illustrated for one canonical unit only.
+receiving unit. In this case, if a particular retinocentric feature is on
+and the 90° clockwise mapping unit is on, then the canonical feature
+corresponding to the active retinal feature will receive an excitatory
+input.
+If just one of the two inputs to the connection is on, no activation will flow to the central unit. In this way, when a mapping unit is
+active, it effectively programs the multiplicative connections needed to
+implement the corresponding mapping by activating one of the two
+inputs to each of the programmable connections.
+Using this mechanism, it is possible to map from retinal to central
+coordinates if the mapping is known in advance. Object recognition can
+now proceed as follows: A mapping is chosen (perhaps on the basis of
+processing the preceding stimulus), and this is used to map a retinal
+input onto the canon Cobylgited Materiasystem involving variable
+
+116 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+translational mappings, in addition to the rotational mappings shown
+here, it would be possible to focus the attention of the system successively on each of several different patterns merely by changing the
+mapping. Thus it would not be difficult to implement a complete system for sequential processing of a series of patterns using Hinton's
+scheme (a number of papers have proposed mechanisms for performing
+a set of operations in sequence, including Grossberg, 1978, and
+Rumelhart & Norman, 1982; the latter paper is discussed in Chapter 1).
+So far, we have described what amounts to a PDP implementation of
+a conventional pattern recognition system. First, map the pattern into
+the canonical frame of reference, then recognize it. Such is the procedure advocated, for example, by Neisser (1967) and Marr (1982).
+The demonstration shows that PDP mechanisms are in fact capable of
+normalization and of focusing attention successively on one pattern
+after another.
+But the demonstration may also seem to give away too much. For it
+seems to suggest that the PDP network is simply a method for implementing standard sequential algorithms of pattern recognition. We
+seem to be left with the question, what has the PDP implementation
+added to our understanding of the problem?
+It turns out that it has added something very important.
+It allows us
+to begin to see how we could solve the problem of recognizing an input
+pattern even in the case where we do not know in advance either what
+the pattern is or which mapping is correct. In a conventional sequential
+algorithm, we might proceed by serial search, trying a sequence of mappings and looking to see which mapping resulted in the best recognition
+performance. With Hinton's mapping units, however, we can actually
+perform this search in parallel. To see how this parallel search would
+work, it is first necessary to see how another set of multiplicative connections can be used to choose the correct mapping for a pattern given
+both the retinal input and the correct central pattern of activation.
+In this situation, this simultaneous activation of a central feature and
+a retinal feature constitutes evidence that the mapping that connects
+them is the correct mapping. We can use this fact to choose the mapping by allowing central and retinal units that correspond under a particular mapping to project to a common multiplicative connection on
+the appropriate mapping unit. Spurious conjunctions will of course
+occur, but the correct mapping units will generally receive more conjunctions of canonical and retinal features than any other (unless there
+is an ambiguity due to a symmetry in the figure). If the mapping units
+compete so that the one receiving the most excitation is allowed to win,
+the network can settle on the correct mapping.
+We are now ready to see how it may be possible to simultaneously
+settle on a mapping and a central representation using both sets of
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES
+117
+multiplicative connections. We simply need to arrange things so that
+when the retinal input is shown, each possible mapping we wish to consider is partially active. Each retinal feature then provides partial
+activation of the canonical feature corresponding to it under each of the
+mappings. The correct mapping allows the correct canonical pattern to
+be partially activated, albeit partially obscured by noise generated by the
+other partially activated mappings. Interactive activation between this
+central pattern and higher level detectors for the pattern then reinforces
+the elements of the pattern relative to the noise. This process by itself
+can be sufficient for correct recognition. Further cleanup of the central
+pattern can be achieved, though, by allowing the pattern emerging on
+the central units to work together with the input pattern to support the
+correct mapping over the other partially active mappings via the multiplicative connections onto the mapping units. This then results in
+further suppression of the noise. As this process continues, it eventually locks in the correct interpretation of the pattern, the correct canonical feature representation, and the correct mapping, all from the retinal
+input alone. Prior activation of the correct mapping facilitates the process of settling in, as do prior cues to the identity of the figure (see
+Rock, 1973, and Palmer, 1980, for evidence that these clues do facilitate performance), but are not, in general, essential unless the input is
+in fact ambiguous without them.
+Hinton's mapping scheme allows us to make iwo points. First, that
+parallel distributed processing is in fact compatible with normalization
+and focusing of attention; and second, that a PDP implementation of a
+normalization mechanism can actually produce a computational advantage by allowing what would otherwise be a painful, slow, serial search
+to be carried out in a single settling of a parallel network. In general,
+Hinton's mapping system illustrates that PDP mechanisms are not restricted to fixed computations but are quite clearly capable of modulation and control by signals arising from other parts of an integrated processing system; and that they can, when necessary, be used to implement a serial process, in which each of several patterns is considered,
+one at a time.
+The introduction of multiplicative or contingent connections (Feldman & Ballard, 1982) is a way of greatly increasing the power of PDP
+networks of fixed numbers of units (Marr, 1982; Poggio & Torre, 1978;
+see Chapter 10). It means, essentially, that each unit can perform computations as complex as those that could be performed by an entire
+one-layer perceptron, including both the predicates and the decision
+unit. However, it must also be noted that multiplicative connections are
+not strictly necessary to perform the required conjunctive computational
+operations. Nonlinear, quasi-multiplicative interactions can be implemented in a variety ofcyayrignted faterfast case, whole units could
+
+118 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+be dedicated to each multiplicative operation (as in the predicate layer
+of the perceptron). '
+While Hinton's mapping mechanism indicates how attention might
+be implemented in PDP systems and imports some of the power of
+parallel distributed processing into the problem of simultaneously solving the mapping problem and the recognition problem, it does leave
+something to be desired. This is the fact that it allows only a single
+input pattern to be processed at one time since each pattern must be
+mapped separately onto the canonical feature units. Serial attention is
+sometimes required, but when we must resort to it, we lose the possibility of exploiting simultaneous, mutual constraints among several patterns. What has been processed before can still influence processing,
+but the ensemble of to-be-processed patterns cannot exert simultaneous, mutual influence on each other.
+There is no doubt that sequentiality is forced upon us in some
+tasks-precisely those tasks in which the thought processes are
+extended over several seconds or minutes in time-and in such cases
+PDP mechanisms should be taken to provide potential accounts of the
+internal structure of a process evolving in time during the temporally
+extended structure of the thought process (see Chapter 14). But, in
+keeping with our general goals, we have sought to discover ways to
+maximally exploit simultaneous mutual constraints-that
+is, to
+maximize parallelism.
+One mechanism which appears to make some progress in this direction is the connection information distribution mechanism described in
+Chapter 16. That mechanism uses multiplicative connections like those
+used in Hinton's model to send connection information out from a central knowledge store so that it can be used in local processing networks,
+each allocated to the contents of a different display location. The
+mechanism permits multiple copies of the same knowledge to be used
+at the same time, thereby effectively allowing tokens or local copies of
+patterns to be constructed from centrally stored knowledge of types in a
+parallel distributed processing system. These tokens then can interact
+with each other, allowing several patterns, all processed using the same
+centrally stored information, to exert simultaneous, mutual constraints
+on each other. Since these ideas, and their relation to attention, are
+discussed at length in Chapter 16, we will not elaborate on them further
+here.
+1 The linear threshold unit provides a quasi-multiplicative combination rule, and
+Sejnowski (1981) has described in detail how close approximation of the quantitative
+properties of multiplication of signals can be achieved by units with properties very much
+like those observed in real neurons.
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES
+119
+Recursion. There are many other specific points that have been
+raised with respect to existing PDP models. Perhaps the most common
+one has to do with recursion. The ability to perform recursive function
+calls is a major feature of certain computational frameworks, such as
+augmented transition network (ATN) parsers (Woods, 1973; Woods &
+Kaplan, 1971), and is a property of such frameworks that gives them
+the capability of processing recursively defined structures such as sentences, in which embedding may produce dependencies between elements of a surface string that are indefinitely far removed from each
+other (Chomsky, 1957). It has often been suggested that PDP
+mechanisms lack the capacity to perform recursive computations and so
+are simply incapable of providing mechanisms for processing sentences
+and other recursively defined structures.
+As before, these suggestions are simply wrong. As we have already
+seen, one can make an arbitrary computational machine out of linear
+threshold units, including, for example, a machine that can carry out all
+the operations necessary for implementing a Turing machine; the one
+limitation is that real biological systems cannot be Turing machines
+because they have finite hardware. In Chapter 14, however, we point
+out that with external memory aids (such as paper and pencil and a
+notational system) such limitations can be overcome as well.
+We have not dwelt on PDP implementations of Turing machines and
+recursive processing engines because we do nut agree with those who
+would argue that such capabilities are of the essence uf human computation. As anyone who has ever attempted to process sentences like
+"The man the boy the girl hit kissed moved" can attest, our ability to
+process even moderate degrees of center-embedded structure is grossly
+impaired relative to that of an ATN parser. And yet, the human ability
+to use semantic and pragmatic contextual information to facilitate
+comprehension far exceeds that of any existing sentence processing
+machine we know of.
+What is needed, then, is not a mechanism for flawless and effortless
+processing of center-embedded constructions. Compilers of computer
+languages generally provide such facilities, and they are powerful tools,
+but they have not demonstrated themselves sufficient for processing
+natural language. What is needed instead is a parser built from the
+kind of mechanism which facilitates the simultaneous consideration of
+large numbers of mutual and interdependent constraints. The challenge
+is to show how those processes that others have chosen to explain in
+terms of recursive mechanisms can be better explained by the kinds of
+processes natural for PDP networks.
+This challenge is one that has not yet been fully met. However,
+some initial steps toward a PDP model of language processing are
+described in Chapter dopyrighted Materia whose implementation is
+
+120 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+described in that chapter illustrates how a variety of different constraints may be combined by PDP models to aid in the assignment of
+underlying roles to the constituents of sentences. The chapter also provides a discussion of three different ways in which the model could be
+extended to process embedded clauses in a way that is roughly consistent with human capabilities and limitations in this regard.
+We do not claim to have solved these problems. Our existing models
+have limitations and much remains to be done. Our explorations have
+just begun. The question is not, is the job done-no computational
+framework can claim much on this score. The question instead is, can
+more progress be made through further exploration of the PDP perspective on the microstructure of cognition? The discovery of multilayer learning rules, the use of multiplicative connections to implement transformations of input patterns, the distribution of connection
+information, and the host of other developments described throughout
+this book, indicate to us that the answer to the question is "yes."
+PDP Models Are Not Cognitive
+We have observed that the cooperative character of parallel
+distributed processing often allows us to account for behavior which has
+previously been attributed to the application of specific rules of
+grammar or rules of thought. This has sometimes led us to argue that
+lawful behavior is not necessarily rule-driven behavior. Here, we must
+distinguish between rules and regularities. The bouncing ball and the
+orbiting planet exhibit regularities in their behavior, but neither is
+applying rules. We have demonstrated the power of this approach in
+our earlier work on word perception (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981;
+Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982) and on the learning of English morphology (Chapter 18). In these cases we have been able to show how
+the apparent application of rules could readily emerge from interactions
+among simple processing units rather than from application of any
+higher level rules.
+Some have viewed our argument against explicit rules as an argument against the cognitive approach to psychology. We do not agree.
+We believe that we are studying the mechanisms of cognition. The
+application of a rule (e.g., the firing of a production) is neither more
+nor less cognitive than the activation of our units. The real character
+of cognitive science is the attempt to explain mental phenomena
+through an understanding of the mechanisms which underlie those
+phenomena.
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES
+121
+A related claim that some people have made is that our models
+appear to share much in common with behaviorist accounts of
+behavior. While they do involve simple mechanisms of learning, there
+is a crucial difference between our models and the radical behaviorism
+of Skinner and his followers. In our models, we are explicitly concerned with the problem of internal representation and mental processing, whereas the radical behaviorist explicitly denies the scientific utility
+and even the validity of the consideration of these constructs. The
+training of hidden units is, as is argued in Chapters 5 to 8, the construction of internal representations. The models described throughout
+the book all concern internal mechanisms for activating and acquiring
+the ability to activate appropriate internal representations. In this
+sense, our models must be seen as completely antithetical to the radical
+behaviorist program and strongly committed to the study of representation and process.
+PDP Models Are the Wrong Level of Analysis
+It is sometimes said that although PDP models are perfectly correct,
+they are at the wrong level of analysis and therefore not relevant to
+psychological data. 2 For example, Broadbent (1985) has argued that
+psychological evidence is irrelevant to our argument about distributed
+memory because the distribution assumption is only meaningful at what
+Marr (1982) has called the implementational (physiological) level and
+that the proper psychological level of description is the computational
+level.
+The issues of levels of analysis and of theorizing is difficult and
+requires a good deal of careful thought. It is, we believe, largely an
+issue of scientific judgement as to what features of a lower level of
+analysis are relevant to a higher one. We are quite sure that it is not a
+matter for prescription. We begin our response to this objection with a
+review of Marr's analysis and his three levels of description. We then
+suggest that indeed our models are stated at the same level (in Marr's
+sense) as most traditional models from cognitive science. We then
+describe other senses of levels, including one in which higher level
+accounts can be said to be convenient approximations to lower level
+accounts. This sense comes closest to capturing our view of the
+2 The following discussion is based on a paper (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1985) written
+in response lo a critique by Donald Broadbent (1985) on our work on distributed
+memory (cf. Chapter 17 and McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985).
+
+122
+relation between our PDP models and other traditional information
+processing models.
+Marr's Notion of Levels
+David Marr (1982) has provided an influential analysis of the issue
+of levels in cognitive science. Although we are not sure that we agree
+entirely with Marr's analysis, it is thoughtful and can serve as a starting
+point. Whereas Broadbent acknowledges only two levels of theory, the
+computational and the implementational, Marr actually proposes three,
+the computational, the algorithmic, and the implementational levels.
+Table 1 gives a description of Marr's three levels. We believe that PDP
+models are generally stated at the algorithmic level and are primarily
+aimed at specifying the representation of information and the processes
+or procedures involved in cognition. Furthermore, we agree with
+Marr's assertions that "each of these levels of description will have their
+place" and that they are "logically and causally related." Thus, no particular level of description is independent of the others. There is an
+implicit computational theory in PDP models as well as an appeal to
+certain implementational (physiological) considerations. We believe
+this to be appropriate. It is clear that different algorithms are more
+naturally implemented on different types of hardware and, therefore,
+information about the implementation can inform our hypotheses at the
+algorithmic level.
+TABLE 1
+THE THREE LEVELS AT WHICH ANY MACHINE CARRYING OUT
+INFORMATION PROCESSING TASKS MUST DE UNDERSTOOD
+Representation and
+Hardware
+Computational Theory
+Algorithm
+Implementation
+What is the goal of the
+How can this computa-
+How can the representacomputation, why is it
+tional theory be impletion and algorithm be
+appropriate,
+and what is
+mented? In particular,
+realized physically?
+the logic of the strategy
+what is the representation
+by which it can be carried
+for the input and output,
+out?
+and what is the algorithm
+for the transformation?
+Note. From Vision by D. Marr, 1982, San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. Copyright 1982
+by W. H. Freeman. Reprinted by permission.
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES 123
+Computational models, according to Marr, are focused on a formal
+analysis of the problem
+the system is solving-not the methods by
+which it is solved. Thus, in linguistics, Marr suggests that Chomsky's
+(1965) view of a competence model for syntax maps most closely onto a
+computational level theory, whereas a psycholinguistic theory is more of
+a performance theory concerned with how grammatical structure might
+actually be computed. Such a theory is concerned with the algorithmic
+level of description.
+It is the algorithmic level at which we are concerned with such issues as efficiency, degradation of performance under
+noise or other adverse conditions, whether a particular problem is easy
+or difficult, which problems are solved quickly and which take a long
+time to solve, how information is represented, etc. These are all questions to which psychological inquiry is directed and to which psychological data is relevant. Indeed, it would appear that this is the level to
+which psychological data speaks most strongly. At the computational
+level, it does not matter whether the theory is stated as a program for a
+Turing machine, as a set of axioms, or as a set of rewrite rules. It does
+not matter how long the computation takes or how performance of the
+computation is affected by "performance" factors such as memory load,
+problem complexity, etc. It doesn't matter how the information is
+represented, as long as the representation is rich enough, in principle,
+to support computation of the required function. The question is simply what function is being computed, not how is it being computed.
+Marr recommends that a good strategy in the development of theory
+is to begin with a careful analysis of the goal of a particular computation
+and a formal analysis of the problem that the system is trying to solve.
+He believes that this top-down approach will suggest plausible algorithms more effectively than a more bottom-up approach. Thus, the
+computational level is given some priority. However, Marr certainly
+does not propose that a theory at the computational level of description
+is an adequate psychological theory.
+As psychologists, we are committed to an elucidation of the algorithmic level. We have no quarrel with Marr's top-down approach as a
+strategy leading to the discovery of cognitive algorithms, though we
+have proceeded in a different way. We emphasize the view that the
+various levels of description are interrelated. Clearly, the algorithms
+must, at least roughly, compute the function specified at the computational level. Equally clearly, the algorithms must be computable in
+amounts of time commensurate with human performance, using the
+kind and amount of hardware that humans may reasonably be assumed
+to possess. For example, any algorithm that would require more
+specific events to be stored separately than there are synapses in the
+brain should be given a lower plausibility rating than those that require
+much less storage. Similarlyrighted ate domain, those algorithms that
+
+124 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+would require more than one serial step every millisecond or so would
+seem poor candidates for implementation in the brain (Feldman &
+Ballard, 1982).
+In short, the claim that our models address a fundamentally different
+level of description than other psychological models is based on a
+failure to acknowledge the primary level of description to which much
+psychological theorizing is directed. At this level, our models should
+be considered as competitors of other models as a means of explaining
+psychological data.
+Other notions of levels. Yet we do believe that in some sense PDP
+models are at a different level than other cognitive models such as prototype theories or schema theory. The reason is that there is more
+between the computational and the implementational levels than is
+dreamt of, even in Marr's scheme. Many of our colleagues have challenged our approach with a rather different conception of levels borrowed from the notion of levels of programming languages. It might
+be argued that a model such as, say, schema theory or the ACT* model
+of John R. Anderson (1983) is a statement in a "higher level" language
+analogous, let us say, to the Pascal or LISP programming languages and
+that our distributed model is a statement in a "lower level" theory that
+is, let us say, analogous to the assembly code into which higher level
+programs can be compiled. Both Pascal and assembler, of course, are
+considerably above the hardware level, though the latter may in some
+sense be closer to the hardware and more machine dependent than the
+former.
+From this point of view one might ask why we are mucking around
+trying to specify our algorithms at the level of assembly code when we
+could state them more succinctly in a high-level language. We believe
+that most people who raise the levels issue with regard to our models
+have a relationship something like this in mind. People who adopt this
+notion have no objection to our models. They only believe that
+psychological models are more simply and easily stated in an equivalent
+higher level language-so why bother?
+We believe that the programming language analogy is very misleading, unless it is analyzed more carefully. The relationship between a
+Pascal program and its assembly code counterpart is very special indeed
+It is necessary for the Pascal and assembly language to map exactly onto
+one another only when the program was written in Pascal and the
+assembly code was compiled from the Pascal version. Had the original
+"programming" taken place in assembler, there is no guarantee that
+such a relationship would exist. Indeed, Pascal code will, in general,
+compile into only a small fraction of the possible assembly code programs that could be written. Since there is every reason to suppose
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES
+125
+that most of the programming that might be taking place in the brain is
+taking place at a "lower level" rather than a "higher level," it seems
+unlikely that some particular higher level description will be identical to
+some particular lower level description. We may be able to capture the
+actual code approximately in a higher level language-and it may often
+be useful to do so-but this does not mean that the higher level
+language is an adequate characterization.
+There is still another notion of levels which illustrates our view.
+This is the notion of levels implicit in the distinction between
+Newtonian mechanics on the one hand and quantum theory on the
+other. 3 It might be argued that conventional symbol processing models
+are macroscopic accounts, analogous to Newtonian mechanics, whereas
+our models offer more microscopic accounts, analogous to quantum
+theory. Note, that over much of their range, these two theories make
+precisely the same predictions about behavior of objects in the world.
+Moreover, the Newtonian theory is often much simpler to compute
+with since it involves discussions of entire objects and ignores much of
+their internal structure. However, in some situations Newtonian theory
+breaks down. In these situations we must rely on the microstructural
+account of quantum theory. Through a thorough understanding of the
+relationship between the Newtonian mechanics and quantum theory we
+can understand that the macroscopic level of description may be only an
+approximation to the more microscopic theory. Moreover, in physics,
+we understand just when the macrotheory will fail and the microtheory
+must be invoked. We understand the macrotheory as a useful formal
+tool by virtue of its relationship to the microtheory. In this sense the
+objects of the macrotheory can be viewed as emerging from interactions
+of the particles described at the microlevel.
+The basic perspective of this book is that many of the constructs of
+macrolevel descriptions such as schemata, prototypes, rules, productions, etc. can be viewed as emerging out of interactions of the
+microstructure of distributed models.
+These points are most explicitly
+considered in Chapters 6, 14, 17, and 18. We view macrotheories as
+approximations to the underlying microstructure which the distributed
+model presented in our paper attempts to capture. As approximations
+they are often useful, but in some situations it will turn out that an
+examination of the microstructure may bring much deeper insight.
+Note for example, that in a conventional model of language acquisition,
+one has to make very delicate decisions about the exact circumstances
+under which a new rule will be added to the rule system. In our PDP
+models no such decision need be made. Since the analog to a rule is
+3 This analogy was suggested to us by Paul Smolensky.
+
+126
+not necessarily discrete but simply something that may emerge from
+interactions among an ensemble of processing units, there is no problem with having the functional equivalent of a "partial" rule. The same
+observation applies to schemata (Chapter 14), prototypes and logogens
+(Chapter 18), and other cognitive constructs too numerous to mention.
+Thus, although we imagine that rule-based models of language
+acquisition -the logogen model, schema theory, prototype theory, and
+other macrolevel theories-may all be more or less valid approximate
+macrostructural descriptions, we believe that the actual algorithms
+involved cannot be represented precisely in any of those macrotheories.
+It may also be, however, that some phenomena are too complex to
+be easily represented as PDP models. If these phenomena took place at
+a time frame over which a macrostructural model was an adequate
+approximation, there is no reason that the macrostructural model ought
+not be applied. Thus, we believe that the concepts of symbols and
+symbol processing can be very useful. Such models may sometimes
+offer the simplest accounts. It is, however, important to keep in mind
+that these models are approximations and should not be pushed too far.
+We suspect that when they are, some account similar to our PDP
+account will again be required. Indeed, a large part of our own motivation for exploring the PDP approach came from the failure of schema
+theory to provide an adequate account of knowledge application even to
+the task of understanding very simple stories.
+Lest it may seem that we have given too much away, however, it
+should be noted that as we develop clearer understandings of the
+microlevel models, we may wish to formulate rather different
+macrolevel models. As pointed out in Chapter 3, PDP mechanisms
+provide a powerful alternative set of macrolevel primitives.*
+Imagine a computational system that has as a primitive, "Relax into a
+state that represents an optimal global interpretation of the current
+input." This would be, of course, an extremely powerful place to begin
+building up a theory of higher level computations. Related primitives
+would be such things as "Retrieve the representation in memory best
+matching the current input, blending into it plausible reconstructions of
+details missing from the original memory trace," and "Construct a
+dynamic configuration of knowledge structures that captures the present
+situation, with variables instantiated properly." These sorts of primitives would be unthinkable in most conventional approaches to higher
+level cognition, but they are the kinds of emergent properties that PDP
+mechanisms give us, and it seems very likely that the availability of
+4 We thank Walter Schneider for stressing in his comments on an earlier draft of this
+chapter the importance of the differences between the computational primitives offered
+by PDP and those offered by other formalisms for modeling cognitive processes.
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES
+127
+such primitives will change the shape of higher level theory
+considerably.
+PDP mechanisms may also place some constraints on what we might
+realistically ask for in the way of computational primitives because of
+the costs of implementing certain kinds of computations in parallel
+hardware in a single relaxation search. The parallel matching of variablized productions is one case in point. Theories such as ACT* (J. R
+Anderson, 1983) assume that this can be done without worrying about
+the implementation and, therefore, provide no principled accounts of
+the kinds of crosstalk exhibited in human behavior when processing
+multiple patterns simultaneously. However, it appears to be a quite
+general property of PDP mechanisms that they will exhibit crosstalk
+when processing multiple patterns in parallel (Hinton & Lang, 1985;
+Mozer, 1984; see Chapters 12 and 16).
+High-level languages often preserve some of the character of the
+lower level mechanisms that implement them, and the resource and
+time requirements of algorithms drastically depends on the nature of
+the underlying hardware. Higher level languages that preserve the
+character of PDP mechanisms and exploit the algorithms that are effective descriptions of parallel networks are not here yet,
+but we expect
+such things to be coming along in the future. This will be a welcome
+development, in our view, since certain aspects of cognitive theory
+have been too strongly influenced by the discrete, sequential algorithms
+available for expression in most current high-level languages.
+As we look closely, both at the hardware in which cognitive algorithms are implemented and at the fine structure of the behavior that
+these algorithms are designed to capture, we begin to see why it may be
+appropriate to formulate models which come closer to describing the
+microstructure of cognition. The fact that our microstructural models
+can account for many of the facts about the representation of general
+and specific information, for example, as discussed in Chapter 18,
+makes us ask why we should view constructs like logogens, prototypes,
+and schemata as anything other than convenient approximate descriptions of the underlying structure of memory and thought.
+Reductionism and Emergent Properties
+A slightly different, though related, argument is that the PDP enterprise is an
+exercise in reductionism-an exercise in which all of
+psychology is reduced to neurophysiology and ultimately to physics. It
+is argued that coherent phenomena which emerge at any level (psychology or physics or sociolgynghted Materiawn language of description
+
+128 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+and explanation and that we are denying the essence of what is cognitive by reducing it to units and connections rather than adopting a more
+psychologically relevant language in our explanations.
+We do not classify our enterprise as reductionist, but rather as
+interactional. We understand that new and useful concepts emerge at
+different levels of organization. We are simply trying to understand the
+essence of cognition as a property emerging from the interactions of
+connected units in networks.
+We certainly believe in emergent phenomena in the sense of
+phenomena which could never be understood or predicted by a study of
+the lower level elements in isolation. These phenomena are functions
+of the particular kinds of groupings of the elementary units. In general,
+a new vocabulary is useful to talk about aggregate phenomena rather
+than the characteristics of isolated elements. This is the case in many
+fields. For example, we could not know about diamonds through the
+study of isolated atoms; we can't understand the nature of social systems through the study of isolated individuals; and we can't understand
+the behavior of networks of neurons from the study of isolated neurons. Features such as the hardness of the diamond is understandable
+through the interaction of the carbon atoms and the way they line up.
+The whole is different than the sum of the parts. There are nonlinear
+interactions among the parts. This does not, however, suggest that the
+nature of the lower level elements is irrelevant to the higher level of
+organization- on the contrary, the higher level is, we believe, to be
+understood primarily through the study of the interactions among lower
+level units. The ways in which units interact is not predictable from the
+lower level elements as isolated entities. It is, however, predictable if
+part of our study involves the interactions among these lower level
+units. We can understand why diamonds are hard, not as an isolated
+fact, but because we understand how the atoms of carbon can line up to
+form a perfect lattice. This is a feature of the aggregate, not of the
+individual atom, but the features of the atom are necessary for understanding the aggregate behavior. Until we understand that, we are left
+with the unsatisfactory statement that diamonds are hard, period.
+useful fact, but not an explanation. Similarly, at the social level, social
+organizations cannot be understood
+without understanding the
+individuals which make up the organization. Knowing about the
+individuals tells us little about the structure of the organization, but we
+can't understand the structure of the higher level organizations without
+knowing a good deal about individuals and how they function. This is
+the sense of emergence we are comfortable with. We believe that it is
+entirely consistent with the PDP view of cognition.
+There is a second, more practical reason for rejecting radical reductionism as a research strategy. This has nothing to do with emergence;
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES
+129
+it has to do with the fact that we can't know everything and find out
+everything at once. The approach we have been arguing for suggests
+that to understand something thoroughly at some level requires
+knowledge at that level, plus knowledge of the lower levels. Obviously,
+this is impractical. In practice, even though there might be effects of
+lower levels on higher levels, one cannot always know them. Thus,
+attempting to formulate a description at this higher level as a first order
+of approximation is an important research strategy. We are forced into
+it if we are to learn anything at all. It is possible to learn a good deal
+about psychology without any reference whatsoever to any lower levels.
+This practical strategy is not, however, an excuse for ignoring what is
+known about the lower levels in the formulation of our higher level
+theories. Thus, the economist is wrong to ignore what we might know
+about individuals when formulating his theories. The chemist would be
+wrong to ignore what is known about the structure of the carbon atom
+in explaining the hardness of diamonds. We argued above that the
+view that the computational level is correct derives from experience
+with a very special kind of device in which the higher level was designed
+to give the right answers-exactly. In describing natural intelligence
+that can't, we suspect, be right-exactly. It can be a first order of
+approximation. As we learn more about a topic and as we look at it in
+more and more detail we are going to be forced to consider more and
+more how it might emerge (in the above sense) from the interactions
+among its constituents. Interaction is the key word here. Emergent
+properties occur whenever we have nonlinear interactions. In these
+cases the principles of interaction themselves must be formulated and
+the real theory at the higher level is, like chemistry, a theory of interactions of elements from a theory one level lower.
+Not Enough Is Known From Neuroscience to Seriously
+Constrain Cognitive Theories
+Many cognitive scientists believe that there will eventually be an
+understanding of the relationships between cognitive phenomena and
+brain functioning. Many of these same people feel, however, that the
+brain is such an exceptionally powerful computational device that it is
+capable of performing just about any computation. They suppose that
+facts now known from neuroscience place little or no restriction on
+what theories are possible at a cognitive level. In the meantime, they
+suppose, a top-down analysis of possible mechanisms of cognition can
+lead to an understanding of cognition that will stand independently of
+whatever might be discosepdighat Maitrilynctioning. Moreover, they
+
+130 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+believe that neuroscientists can be guided in their bottom-up search for
+an understanding of how the brain functions.
+We agree with many of these sentiments. We believe that an understanding of the relationships between cognitive phenomena and brain
+functions will slowly evolve. We also believe that cognitive theories can
+provide a useful source of information for the neuroscientist. We do
+not, however, believe that current knowledge from neuroscience provides no guidance to those interested in the functioning of the mind.
+We have not, by and large, focused on the kinds of constraints which
+arise from detailed analysis of particular circuitry and organs of the
+brain. Rather we have found that information concerning brain-style
+processing has itself been very provocative in our model building
+efforts. Thus, we have, by and large, not focused on neural modeling
+(i.e., the modeling of neurons), but rather we have focused on neurally
+inspired modeling of cognitive processes. Our models have not
+depended strongly on the details of brain structure or on issues that are
+very controversial in neuroscience. Rather, we have discovered that if
+we take some of the most obvious characteristics of brain-style processing seriously we are led to postulate models which differ in a number of
+important ways from those postulated without regard for the hardware
+on which these algorithms are to be implemented. We have found that
+top-down considerations revolving about a need to postulate parallel,
+cooperative computational models (cf. Rumelhart, 1977) have meshed
+nicely with a number of more bottom-up considerations of brain style
+processing.
+There are many brain characteristics which ought to be attended to in
+the formulation of our models (see Chapters 20 and 21). There are a
+few which we have taken most seriously and which have most affected
+our thinking. We discuss these briefly below.
+Neurons are slow. One of the most important characteristics of
+brain-style processing stems from the speed of its components. Neurons are much slower than conventional computational components.
+Whereas basic operations in our modern serial computers are measured
+in the nanoseconds,
+neurons operate at times measured in the
+milliseconds-perhaps 10s of milliseconds. Thus, the basic hardware of
+the brain is some 10° times slower than that of serial computers. Imagine slowing down our conventional Al programs by a factor of 10°
+More remarkable is the fact that we are able to do very sophisticated
+processing in a few hundred milliseconds. Clearly, perceptual processing, most memory retrieval, much of language processing, much intuitive reasoning, and many other processes occur in this time frame.
+That means that these tasks must be done in no more than 100 or so
+serial steps. This is what Feldman (1985) calls the 100-step program
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES
+131
+constraint. Moreover, note that individual neurons probably don't compute very complicated functions. It seems unlikely that a single neuron
+computes a function much more complex than a single instruction in a
+digital computer. Imagine, again, writing an interesting program in
+even 1000 operations of this limited complexity of a serial computer.
+Evidently, the brain succeeds through massive parallelism. Thus, we
+conclude, the mechanisms of mind are most likely best understood as
+resulting from the cooperative activity of very many relatively simple
+processing units operating in parallel.
+There is a very large number of neurons. Another self-evident, but
+important, aspect of brain-style processing is the very large number of
+processing units involved. Conventional estimates hold that there are
+on the order of 1010 to 10" neurons in the brain. Moreover, each neuron is an active processing unit. This suggests parallelism on a very
+large scale indeed. An understanding of parallel computation involving
+a few hundred reasonably complex processors provides the wrong
+model. It may well be that it is the massive scale of the parallelism of
+the brain that gives it its amazing power.
+Although the human brain is large, the number of neurons is not
+unlimited. It happens that our models sometimes push the limits of
+plausibility because of the large number of units they require. This is a
+real constraint, one that we and others have begun to take into account
+in evaluating our models (see Chapter 12 for a discussion of this issue).
+Neurons receive inputs from a large number of other neurons.
+Another important feature of brain processing is the large fan-in and
+fan-out to and from each unit. Estimates vary, but single cortical neurons can have from 1,000 to 100,000 synapses on their dendrites and,
+likewise, can make from 1,000 to 100,000 synapses on the dendrites of
+other neurons. Generally, one or a small number of action potentials
+received are not enough to generate an action potential (see, for example, Chapter 20). This suggests that human computation does not
+involve the kind of logic circuits out of which we make our digital computers, but that it involves a kind of statistical process in which the single units do not make decisions, but in which decisions are the product
+of the cooperative action of many somewhat independent processing
+units. Reliability derives from the stability of the statistical behavior of
+large numbers of units. Again, this degree of connectivity should be
+contrasted with the number of immediate neighbors of processors in
+current parallel computers. Usually these numbers are measured in the
+tens (or less) rather than in the thousands. Moreover, this large degree
+of connectivity suggests that no neuron is very many synapses away
+from any other neuron. Copyignteumateriafake, we assume that every
+
+132 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+cortical neuron is connected to 1,000 other neurons and that the system
+forms a lattice, all of the neurons in the brain would be within, at most,
+four synapses from one another. Thus, large fan-in and fan-out leads
+to shallow networks. It should finally be noted that even though the
+fan-in and fan-out is large, it is not unlimited. As described in Chapter
+12, the limitations can cause problems for extending some simple ideas
+of memory storage and retrieval.
+Learning involves modifying connections. Another key feature of
+our models which derives from our understanding of learning mechanisms in the brain is that the knowledge is in the connections rather than in
+the units themselves. Moreover, learning is generally assumed to
+involve modifying connection strengths. There are real computational
+advantages to such a simple learning procedure. Its simplicity and
+homogeneity allow us to develop powerful learning procedures which
+work simply and incrementally. (See Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8; Chapters 11,
+17,18, 24, and 25 consider the implications of this view.)
+Neurons communicate by sending activation or inhibition through
+connections. Communication among neurons involves simple excitatory and inhibitory messages. Only a few bits can be communicated per
+second. Thus, unlike other parallel message passing systems such as
+Hewitt's (1975) ACTOR system which allows arbitrary symbolic messages to be passed among its units, we require simple, signed numbers
+of limited precision. This means that the currency of our systems is
+not symbols, but excitation and inhibition. To the degree that symbols
+are required, they must emerge from this subsymbolic level of
+processing (Hofstadter, 1979).
+Connections in the brain seem to have a clear geometric and
+topological structure. There are a number of facts about the pattern of
+connections in the brain which, we believe, are probably important, but
+which have not yet had a large impact on our models. First, most connections are rather short. Some are long (these tend to be excitatory),
+but not most.
+• There are rather strong geometric and topological constraints. There is a rough mapping in that input parameters (such as
+spatial location in vision or frequency in audition) are mapped onto spatial extent in the brain. In general it seems that nearby regions in one
+part of the brain map onto nearby regions in another part of the brain.
+Moreover, there is a general symmetry of connections. If there are
+connections from one region of the brain to another, there are usually
+connections in the reverse direction. Some of these features have been
+implemented in our models, though, interestingly, most often for computational reasons rather
+than for biological
+verisimilitude. For
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES 133
+example, rough symmetry was a feature of our earlier work on word
+perception (cf. McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981), and it is a feature of
+the work described in Chapters 6, 7, 14, 15, and 16. The error propagation learning rule of Chapter 8 requires a back path for an error signal
+to be propagated back through. In general, reciprocally interacting systems are very important for the kind of processing we see as characteristic of PDP models. This is the defining feature of interactive activation models. We have also employed the view that connections
+between systems are excitatory and those within a region are inhibitory.
+This is employed to advantage in Chapters 5 and 15.
+The geometric structure of connections in the brain have not had
+much impact on our work. We generally have not concerned ourselves
+with where the units might physically be with respect to one another.
+However, if we imagine that there is a constraint toward the conservation of connection length (which there must be), it is easy to see that
+those units which interact most should be the closest together. If you
+add to this the view that the very high-dimensional space determined
+by the number of interconnections must be embedded into the two-or
+three-dimensional space (perhaps iwo and a half dimensions) of the
+cortex, we can see the importance of mapping the major dimensions
+physically in the geometry of the brain (see Ballard, in press, for a discussion of embedding high-dimensional spaces into (wo dimensions).
+Information is continuously available. Another important feature of
+neural information processing is that the neurons seem to provide continuously available output (Norman & Bobrow, 1975). That is, there
+does not seem to be an appreciable decision phase during which a unit
+provides no output. Rather it seems that the state of a unit reflects its
+current input. To the degree that a unit represents a hypothesis and its
+activation level (instantaneous firing rate or probability of firing)
+represents the degree to which evidence favors that hypothesis, the
+activation level of the unit provides continuous information about the
+current evaluation of that hypothesis. This hypothesis was incorporated
+into the precursors of our own work on parallel distributed processing,
+especially the cascade model (McClelland, 1979) and the interactive
+model of reading (Rumelhart, 1977), and it is a feature of virtually all
+of the PDP models in this book. S Interestingly, this contrasts starkly
+with what used to be the standard approach, namely, stage models of
+information processing (Sternberg, 1969), and thereby offers a very
+S Though some PDP models use discrete binary units (e.g., Hinton, 198la; Hopfield,
+1982), they generally use large numbers of these to represent any object, so that when a
+few of the units that form part of a pattern are on, the pattern can be said to be partially
+active.
+
+134
+different perspective on decision-making processes and the basic notion
+of stages.
+Graceful degradation with damage and information overload.
+From the study of brain lesions and other forms of brain damage, it
+seems fairly clear there is not some single neuron whose functioning is
+essential for the operation of any particular cognitive process. While
+reasonably circumscribed regions of the brain may play fairly specific
+roles, particularly at lower levels of processing, it seems fairly clear that
+within regions, performance is characterized by a kind of graceful degradation in which the system's performance gradually deteriorates as more
+and more neural units are destroyed, but there is no single critical point
+where performance breaks down. This kind of graceful degradation is
+characteristic of such global degenerative syndromes as Alzheimer's
+disease (cf. Schwartz, Marin, & Saffran, 1979). Again, this is quite different from many serial symbol processing models in which the disruption of a single step in a huge program can catastrophically impact the
+overall performance of the system. Imagine the operation of a computer in which a particular instruction did not work. So long as that
+instruction was not used, there would be no effect on the system.
+However, when that instruction was employed in some process, that
+process simply would not work.
+In the brain it seems that the system is
+highly redundant and capable of operating with a loss in performance
+roughly similar in magnitude to the magnitude of the damage (see
+Chapter 12 for details). This is a natural performance characteristic of
+PDP models.
+Distributed, not central, control. There is one final aspect of our
+models which is vaguely derived from our understanding of brain functioning. This is the notion that there is no central executive overseeing
+the general flow of processing. In conventional programming frameworks it is easy to imagine an executive system which calls subroutines
+to carry out its necessary tasks. In some information processing models
+this notion of an executive has been carried over. In these models, all
+processing is essentially top-down or executive-driven; if there is no
+executive, then no processing takes place at all.
+Neuropsychological investigation of patients with brain damage indicates that there is no part of the cortex on whose operation all other
+parts depend. Rather it seems that all parts work together, influencing
+one another, and each region contributes to the overall performance of
+the task and to the integration into it of certain kinds of constraints or
+sources of information. To be sure, brainstem mechanisms control
+vital bodily functions and the overall state of the system, and certain
+parts of the cortex are critical for receiving information
+in particular
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES
+135
+modalities. But higher level functions seem very much to be characterized by distributed, rather than central control.
+This point has been made most clearly by the Russian neuropsychologist Luria (1966; 1973). Luria's investigations show that for every
+integrated behavioral function (e.g., visual perception, language
+comprehension or production, problem solving, reading), many different parts of the cortex play a role so that damage to any part influences performance but is not absolutely crucial to it. Even the frontal
+lobes, most frequently associated with executive functions, are not
+absolutely necessary in Luria's view, in that some residual function is
+generally observed even after massive frontal damage (and mild frontal
+damage may result in no detectable symptomatology at all). The frontal lobes have a characteristic role to play, facilitating strategy shifts and
+inhibiting impulsive responding, but the overall control of processing
+can be as severely impaired by damage to parietal lobe structures that
+appear to be responsible for maintaining organized representations that
+support coordinated and goal-directed activity.
+Our view of the overall organization of processing is similar to
+Luria's. We have come to believe that the notion of subroutines with
+one system "calling" another is probably not a good way to view the
+operation of the brain. Rather, we believe that subsystems may modulate the behavior of other subsystems, that they may provide constraints
+to be factored into the relaxation computation. An elaboration of some
+aspects of these ideas may be found in Chapter 14.
+Relaxation is the dominant mode of computation. Although there
+is no specific piece of neuroscience which compels the view that brainstyle computation involves relaxation, all of the features we have just
+discussed have led us to believe that the primary mode of computation
+in the brain is best understood as a kind of relaxation system (cf.
+Chapters 6, 7, 14, 15, and 21) in which the computation proceeds by
+iteratively seeking to satisfy a large number of weak constraints. Thus,
+rather than playing the role of wires in an electric circuit, we see the
+connections as representing constraints on the co-occurrence of pairs of
+units. The system should be thought of more as settling into a solution
+than calculating a solution. Again, this is an important perspective
+change which comes out of an interaction of our understanding of how
+the brain must work and what kinds of processes seem to be required
+to account for desired behavior.
+As can be seen, this list does not depend on specific discoveries from
+neuroscience. Rather,
+it depends on rather global considerations.
+Although none of these general properties of the brain tell us in any
+detail how the brain functions to support cognitive phenomena,
+together they lead to abobyngrita Waterarhow the brain works that
+
+136
+serves as a set of constraints on the development of models of cognitive processes. We find that these assumptions, together with those
+that derive from the constraints imposed by the tasks we are trying to
+account for, strongly influence the form of our models of cognitive
+processes.
+PDP Models Lack Neural Realism
+On the one hand, it is sometimes said-as indicated in the previous
+section -that there is little or no constraint to be gained through looking at the brain. On the other hand, it is often said that we don't look
+closely enough. There are many facts of neuroscience that are not factored directly into our models. Sometimes we have failed to capture
+the fine structure of neural processing in our models. Other times we
+have assumed mechanisms that are not known to exist in brains (see
+Chapter 20). One prominent example is the near-ubiquitous assumption that units can have both excitatory and inhibitory connections
+when it seems reasonably clear that most cortical units are either excitatory or inhibitory. If, as we argued above, it is important to understand
+the microstructure of cognition, why do we ignore such detailed characteristics of the actual physical processes underlying that microstructure?
+To be sure, to the extent that our models are directly relevant to
+brains, they are at best coarse approximations of the details of neurophysiological processing. Indeed, many of our models are clearly
+intended to fall at a level between the macrostructure of cognition and
+the details of neurophysiology. Now, we do understand that some of
+our approximations may
+have ramifications for the cognitive
+phenomena which form our major area of interest; by missing certain
+details of neurophysiology, we may be missing out on certain aspects of
+brain function that would make the difference between an accurate
+account of cognitive-level phenomena and a poor approximation. Our
+defense is simply that we see the process of model building as one of
+successive approximations. We try to be responsive to information from
+both the behavioral and the neural sciences. We also believe that the
+key to scientific progress is making the right approximations and the
+right simplifications. In this way the structure can be seen most clearly.
+This point is considered further in Chapter 21.
+We have been pleased with the structure apparent through the set of
+approximations and simplifications we have chosen to make. There
+are, however, a number of other facts from neuroscience that we have
+not included in most of our models, but that we imagine will be important when we learn how to include them. The most obvious of these is
+
+4 GENERAL ISSUES
+137
+the fact that we normally assume that units communicate via numbers.
+These are sometimes associated with mean firing rates. In fact, of
+course, neurons produce spikes and this spiking itself may have some
+computational significance (see Chapters 7 and 21 for discussions of the
+possible computational significance of neural spiking). Another example of possibly important facts of neuroscience which have not played a
+role in our models is the diffuse pattern of communication which
+occurs by means of the dispersal of chemicals into various regions of
+the brain through the blood stream or otherwise. We generally assume
+that communication is point-to-point from one unit to another. However, we understand that diffuse communication can occur through
+chemical means and such communication may play an important role in
+setting parameters and modulating the networks so that they can perform rather different tasks in different situations. We have employed
+the idea of diffuse distribution of chemicals in our account of amnesia
+(Chapter 25), but, in general, we have not otherwise integrated such
+assumptions into our models. Roughly, we imagine that we are studying networks in which there is a fixed setting of such parameters, but
+the situation may well be much more complex than that. (See Chapter
+24 for some discussion of the role of norepinephrine and other neuromodulators.)
+Most of our models are homogeneous with respect to the functioning
+of our units. Some of them may be designated as inhibitory and others
+as excitatory, but beyond that, they are rarely differentiated.
+We
+understand that there are perhaps hundreds of kinds of neurons (see
+Chapter 20). No doubt each of these kinds play a slightly different role
+in the information processing system.
+Our assumptions in this regard
+are obviously only approximate. Similarly, we understand that there
+are many different kinds of neurotransmitters and that there are different systems in which different of these neurotransmitters are dominant. Again, we have ignored this difference (except for excitatory
+and inhibitory connections) and presume that as more is understood
+about the information processing implications of such facts we will be
+able to determine how they fit into our class of models.
+It is also true that we have assumed a number of mechanisms that
+are not known to exist in the brain (see Chapter 20).
+In general, we
+have postulated mechanisms which seemed to be required to achieve
+certain important functional goals, such as, for example, the development of internal representations in multilayer networks (see Chapter
+8). It is possible that these hypothesized mechanisms do exist in the
+brain but have not yet been recognized. In that sense our work could
+be considered as a source of hypotheses for neuroscience. It is also
+possible that we are correct about the computations that are performed,
+but that they are perforcerhed Marena, kind of neural mechanism
+
+138 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+than our formulations seem at first glance to suggest. If this is the
+case, it merely suggests that the most obvious mapping of our models
+onto neural structures is incorrect.
+A neuroscientist might be concerned about the ambiguity inherent in
+the fact that many of the mechanisms we have postulated could be
+implemented in different ways. From our point of view, though, this is
+not a serious problem. We think it useful to be clear about how our
+mechanisms might be implemented in the brain, and we would certainly
+be worried if we proposed a process that could not be implemented in
+the brain. But since our primary concern is with the computations
+themselves, rather than the detailed neural implementation of these
+computations, we are willing to be instructed by neuroscientists on
+which of the possible implementations are actually employed. This
+position does have its dangers. We have already argued in this chapter
+that the mechanism whereby a function is computed often has strong
+implications about exactly what function is being computed. Nevertheless, we have chosen a level of approximation which seems to us the
+most fruitful, given our goal of understanding the human information
+processing system.
+We close this section by noting two different ways in which PDP
+models can be related to actual neurophysiological processes, apart from
+the possibility that they might actually be intended to model what is
+known about the behavior of real neural circuitry (see Chapters 23 and
+24 for examples of models of this class). First, they might be intended
+as idealizations. In this approach, the emergent properties of systems
+of real neurons are studied by idealizing the properties of the individual
+neurons, in much the same way that the emergent properties of real
+gasses can be studied by idealizing the properties of the individual gas
+molecules. This approach is described at the end of Chapter 21. An
+alternative is that they might be intended to provide a higher level of
+description, but one that could be mapped on to a real neurophysiological implementation. Our interactive activation model of word recognition has some of this flavor, as do most of the models described in
+Chapters 14 through 19. Specifically with regard to the word recognition model, we do not claim that there are individual neurons that
+stand for visual feature, letter, and word units, or that they are connected together just as we proposed in that model. Rather, we really
+suppose that the physiological substrate provides a mechanism whereby
+various abstract informational states-such as, for example, the state in
+which the perceptual system is entertaining the hypothesis that the
+second letter in a word is either an H or an A-can give rise to other
+informational states that are contingent upon them.
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES
+139
+Nativism vs. Empiricism
+Historically, perceptron-like models have been associated with the
+idea of "random self-organizing" networks, the learning of arbitrary
+associations, very general, very simple learning rules, and similar ideas
+which show the emergence of structure from the tabula rasa. We often
+find, especially in discussion with colleagues from linguistics surrounding issues of language aquisition (see Chapters 18 and 19), that PDP
+models are judged to involve learning processes that are too general
+and, all in all, give too little weight to innate characteristics of language
+or other information processing structures. This feeling is brought out
+even more by demonstrations that some PDP learning mechanisms are
+capable of learning to respond to symmetry and of learning how to deal
+with such basic perceptual problems as perceptual constancy under
+translation and rotation (see Chapter 8). In fact, however, PDP models
+are, in and of themselves, quite agnostic about issues of nativism
+versus empiricism. Indeed, they seem to us to offer a very useful perspective on the issue of innate versus acquired knowledge.
+For the purposes of discussion let us consider an organism that consists of a very large set of very simple but highly interconnected processing units. The units are assumed to be homogeneous in their
+properties except that some are specialized to serve as "input" units
+because they receive inputs from the environment and some are specialized to serve as "output" units because they drive the effectors of
+the system. The behavior of such a system is thus entirely determined
+by the pattern of inputs, the pattern of interconnections among the
+units, and the nature of and connections to the effectors. Note, that
+interconnections can have various strengths-positive, negative, and
+zero. If the strength of connection is positive, then activity in one unit
+tends to increase the activity of the second unit. If the strength of connection is negative, then the activity in the first unit tends to decrease
+the activity of the second unit. If the strength is zero, then activity of
+the first unit has no effect on the activity of the second
+In such a system the radical nativism hypothesis would consist of the
+view that all of the interconnections are genetically determined at birth
+and develop only through a biologically driven process of maturation.
+If such were the case, the system could have any particular behavior
+entirely wired in. The system could be designed in such a way as to
+respond differentially to human speech from other acoustic stimuli, to
+perform any sort of computation that had proven evolutionarily adaptive, to mimic any behavior it might observe, to have certain stimulus
+dimensions to which it was pretuned to respond, etc. In short, if all of
+the connections were genetically predetermined, the system coulo
+copyrighted Material
+
+140 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+perform any behavior that such a system of units, interconnections, and
+effectors might ever be capable of. The question of what behaviors it
+actually did carry out would presumably be determined by evolutionary
+processes.
+In this sense, this simple PDP model is clearly consistent
+with a rabidly nativist world view.
+The radical empiricist hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that
+there are no a priori limits on how the network of interconnections
+could be constituted. Any pattern of interconnections is possible.
+What determines the actual set of connections is the pattern of experiences the system gets. In this sense there is no prior limit on the
+nature of language; any language that could be processed by such a network could be learned by such an organism. The only limitations
+would be very general ones due to the nature of the learning rule in the
+system. With a sufficiently powerful learning rule, the organism could
+organize itself into whatever state proved maximally adaptive. Thus,
+there would be no limitation on the degree to which the behavior of the
+system could adapt to its environment. It could learn completely arbitrary associations. In short, if all connections in the system were
+modifiable by experience, the system could learn to perform any
+behavior at all that such a system of units, interconnections, and effectors might ever be capable of. The question of what behaviors it actually did carry out would presumably be determined by the learning process and the patterns of inputs the system actually experienced. In this
+sense, the simple PDP model is clearly consistent with a rabidly empiricist world view.
+Obviously, it would be a straightforward matter to find a middle
+ground between the radical nativist view and the radical empiricist view
+as we have laid them out. Suppose, for sake of argument, that we have
+an organism whose initial state is wholly determined genetically. Suppose further that all of the connections were modifiable so that whatever the start state, any pattern of interconnections could emerge
+through interaction of the organism with its environment. In such a
+system as this we have, it seems to us, the benefits of both nativism
+and empiricism. Like good nativists, we have given the organism a
+starting point that has been selected by its evolutionary history. We
+have not, however, strapped the organism with the rigid predeterminism that traditionally goes along with the nativist view. If there are
+6 Obviously both of these views are overstatements. Clearly the genes do not determine every connection at birth. Probably some sort of random processes are also
+involved. Equally clearly, not every pattern of interconnectivity is possible since the spatial layout of the neurons in the cortex, for example, surely limit the connectivity. Still,
+there is probably a good deal of genetic specification of neural connection, and there is a
+good deal of plasticity in the pattern of connectivities after birth.
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES
+141
+certain patterns of behavior which, in evolutionary time, have proven
+to be useful (such as sucking, reaching, or whatever) we can build
+them in, but we leave the organism free to modify or completely
+reverse any of these behavioral predispositions? At the same time, we
+have the best of the empiricist view-namely, we place no a priori limitations on how the organism may adapt to its environment. We do,
+however, throw out the weakest aspect of the empiricist dogmanamely, the idea of the tabula rasa (or totally random net) as a starting
+point. The organism could start at whatever initial state its evolutionary
+history prepared it for.
+Perhaps, at this stage, all of this seems painfully obvious. It seems
+obvious to us too, and nevertheless, it gives us a new perspective on
+the nativism/empiricism issue. The issue is not what is the set of
+predetermined modules as some would suggest (cf. Fodor, 1983). On
+this view it seems quite reasonable, we submit, that to the degree that
+there are modules, they are co-determined by the start state of the system (the genetic predisposition) and by the environment. (We take a
+module to be roughly a set of units which are powerfully interconnected among themselves and relatively weakly connected to units outside of the set; of course, this concept admits all gradations of modularity, just as our view of schemata allows all degrees of schematization
+of knowledge.) There is, on this view, no such thing as "hardwiring."
+Neither is there any such thing as "software." There are only connections. All connections are in some sense hardwired (in as much as they
+are physical entities) and all are software (in as much as they can be
+changed.) Thus, it may very well be that there is a part of the network
+prewired to deal with this or that processing task. If that task is not
+relevant in the organism's environment, that part of the network can be
+used for something else. If that part of the network is damaged,
+another part can come to play the role "normally" carried out by the
+damaged portion. These very properties have been noted characteristics
+of the brain since Hughlings-Jackson's work in the late 19th century
+(e.g., Jackson, 1869/1958); Jackson pointed them out as difficulties for
+the strict localizationist views then popular among students of the brain.
+Note too that our scheme allows for the organism to be especially sensitive to certain relationships (such as the relationship between nausea
+and eating, for which there might be stronger or more direct prewired
+" Here again, our organism oversimplifies a bit. It appears that some parts of the nersion see Teitelbaum (1967) and Galliste! (1980)
+
+142 THE PDP PERSPECTIVE
+connections) while at the same time allowing quite arbitrary associations to be learned.
+Finally, it should be mentioned that all of the learning schemes that
+have been proposed for networks of the sort we have studied are incremental (cf. Chapters 7, 8, 11, 18, 19, and 25), and therefore as an
+organism moves from its primarily genetically predetermined start state
+to its primarily environmentally determined final state, it will pass
+through a sequence of more or less intermediate states. There will be a
+kind of trajectory through the space of possible networks. This trajectory will constitute the developmental sequence for the organism. To
+the degree that different individuals share the same genetics (start
+state) and to the degree that their environments are similar, they will
+pass through similar trajectories. It should also be said that since, in
+PDP systems, what is learned is a product of both the current state of
+the organism and the current pattern of inputs, the start state will have
+an important effect on what is learned and the shape of the network
+following any given set of experiences. However, the greater the
+amount of experience, the more independent the system should be
+from its start state and the more dependent it should be on the structure of its environment.
+Of course, not all connections may be plastic-certainly, many subcortical mechanisms are considerably less plastic than cortical ones.
+Also, plasticity may not continue throughout life (see Chapter 24). It
+would, of course, be a simple matter to suppose that certain connections are not modifiable. This is an issue about which our framework
+provides no answer. The major point is that there is no inconsistency
+between prewired, innate knowledge, and mutability and adaptability.
+We cannot
+resist making
+one
+more point about
+the
+nativism/empiricism issue. This is that our PDP account of innate
+knowledge seems to provide a rather plausible account of how we can
+come to have innate "knowledge." To the extent that stored knowledge
+is assumed to be in the form of explicit, inaccessible rules of the kind
+often postulated by linguists as the basis for linguistic competence (see
+Chapter 18), it is hard to see how it could "get into the head" of the
+newborn. It seems to us implausible that the newborn possesses elaborate symbol systems and the systems for interpreting them required
+to put these explicit, inaccessible rules to use in guiding behavior. On
+our account, we do not need to attribute such complex machinery. If
+the innate knowledge is simply the prewired connections, it is encoded
+from the start in just the right way to be of use by the processing
+mechanisms.
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES
+143
+Why Are People Smarter Than Rats?
+Some have argued that since we claim that human cognition can be
+explained in terms of PDP networks and that the behavior of lower
+animals such as rats can also be described in terms of such networks we
+have no principled way of explaining why rats are not as smart as people. Given all of the above, the question does seem a bit puzzling. We
+are not claiming, in any way, that people and rats and all other organisms start out with the same prewired hardware. People have much
+more cortex than rats do or even than other primates do; in particular
+they have very much more prefrontal and parietal cortex-more brain
+structure not dedicated to input/output-and presumably, this extra
+cortex is strategically placed in the brain to subserve just those functions that differentiate people from rats or even apes. A case in point
+is the part of the brain known as the angular gyrus. This part of the
+brain does not exist even in chimpanzees. It sits at the intersection
+between the language areas of the temporal lobe and the visual areas of
+the parietal lobe, and damage to this area produces serious deficits in
+language and in the mapping of words onto meanings. While it is possible that structures like the angular gyrus possess some special internal
+wiring that makes them fundamentally different, somehow, in the kinds
+of cognitive operations they perform, their cytoarchitecture is not
+markedly different from that of other parts of the brain (see Chapters
+20 and 21). Thus it seems to us quite plausible that some of the differences between rats and people lie in the potentiality for forming connections that can subserve the vital functions of language and thought
+that humans exhibit and other animals do not.
+But there must be another aspect to the difference between rats and
+people as well. This is that the human environment includes other
+people and the cultural devices that they have developed to organize
+their thinking processes. Some thoughts on how we imagine these cultural devices are exploited in higher forms of intelligent behavior are
+presented in Chapter 14.
+Conscious Knowledge and Explicit Reasoning
+There may be cognitive scientists who accept some or all of what we
+have said up to this point, but still feel that something is missing,
+namely, an account of how we guide behavior using explicit, conscious
+knowledge, how we reason from what we know to new conclusions
+based on that knowledgeop/Aghrew watenal a path through a problem
+
+144
+space through a series of sequential steps. Can parallel distributed processing have anything to say about these explicit, introspectively accessible, temporally extended acts of thinking? Some have suggested that
+the answer is no-that PDP models may be fine as accounts for perception, motor control, and other low-level phenomena, but that they are
+simply unable to account for the higher level mental processing of the
+kind involved in reasoning, problem solving, and other higher level
+aspects of thought.
+We agree that many of the most natural applications of PDP models
+are in the domains of perception and memory (see, for example,
+Chapters 15, 16, and 17). However,
+we are convinced that these
+models are equally applicable to higher level cognitive processes and
+offer new insights into these phenomena as well. We must be clear,
+though, about the fact that we cannot and do not expect PDP models to
+handle complex, extended, sequential reasoning processes as a single
+settling of a parallel network. We think that PDP models describe the
+microstructure of the thought process, and the mechanisms whereby
+these processes come, through practice, to flow more quickly and run
+together into each other.
+Partly because of the temporally extended nature of sequential
+thought processes-the fact that they involve many settlings of a network instead of just one-they are naturally more difficult to deal with,
+and our efforts in these areas are, as yet, somewhat tentative.
+Nevertheless, we have begun to develop models of language processing
+(Chapter 19), language acquisition (Chapter 18), sequential thought
+processes and consciousness (Chapter 14), and problem solving and
+thinking in general (Chapters 6, 8, and 14). We view this work as
+preliminary, and we firmly believe that other frameworks provide additional, important levels of description that can augment our accounts,
+but we are encouraged by the progress we have made in these areas and
+believe that the new perspectives that arise from these efforts are sufficiently provocative to be added to the pool of possible explanations of
+these higher level cognitive processes. Obviously, the extension of our
+explorations more deeply into these domains is high on our ongoing
+agenda. We see no principled reasons why these explorations cannot
+succeed, and every indication is that they will lead us somewhat further
+toward an understanding of the microstructure of cognition.
+MANY MODELS OR JUST ONE?
+Before concluding this chapter, some comment should be made
+about the status of the various models we and other members of the
+
+4. GENERAL ISSUES
+145
+PDP research group offer throughout the book. As the title of the
+book suggests, we understand our work as an exploration. We have
+been impressed with the potential of PDP models for changing our perspectives on the human information processing system. We have tried
+1o maintain the kinds of general principles outlined in this chapter, but
+we have felt free to vary the details from application to application.
+Sometimes the variations are due to the fact that certain features of the
+models need to be elaborated to deal with certain phenomena but can
+be suppressed for other phenomena.
+Other times, we have simply
+made a different choice to explore a different part of the space of PDP
+models. We do not see ourselves capable as yet to produce the supermodel which would connect all of our areas of exploration together.
+Rather, we feel that the PDP framework which we are developing
+forms a kind of metatheory from which specific models can be generated
+for specific applications. The success of the particular models reflects
+indirectly on the metatheory, but we feel that the proper approach is to
+study detailed models of detailed applications while at the same time
+keeping one eye on the bigger picture. Thus, we don't really have a
+single model. Rather, we have a family of related models. In the best
+of all worlds each of our specific models may turn out to be a rough
+approximation to some unifying, underlying model as specialized to the
+problem area in question. More likely, however, each represents an
+exploration into a more or less uncharted region of the space of PDP
+models. Each application has lead to useful insights-both into the
+phenomena under study and into the behavior of the specific versions
+of the models used to account for them.
+CONCLUSION
+Some of the issues we have considered in this chapter are quite
+specific to our particular enterprise, but in the main, they are more
+general. They concern such questions as the scope of cognitive theory,
+the relation between levels, the question of nature vs. nurture, and the
+relevance of neural mechanisms to an analysis of cognition.
+The present chapter has provided an overview of our views on a
+number of these central questions. In so doing, it has also provided an
+overview of the work that is described in the rest of the book, along
+with some of the reasons for doing it. Indeed, in many ways the rest of
+the book is our response to the issues we have touched on here. The
+chapters in Part Il seek ways to overcome the computational limitations
+of earlier network models, and the chapters in Part III provide some of
+the formal tools that arecopyrightedMaltharthese kinds of goals. The
+
+146
+chapters in Part IV address themselves to cognitive constructs and
+attempt to redefine the cognitive structures of earlier theories in terms
+of emergent properties of PDP networks. The chapters in Part V consider the neural mechanisms themselves and their relation to the algorithmic level that is the focus of most of the work described in Parts II
+and IV.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+people include John Anderson, Francis Crick, Steve Draper, Jerry
+Fodor, Jim Greeno, Allen Newell, Zenon Pylyshyn, Chris Riesbeck,
+Kurt van Lehn, and many others in San Diego, Pittsburgh, and elsewhere. In addition, we would like to thank Allan Collins, Keith
+Holyoak, and Walter Schneider for organizing seminars and symposia
+around these issues, and we would like to thank our many colleagues
+who have helped us formulate our answers to some of these questions,
+particularly Geoff Hinton, Paul Smolensky, and the other members of
+the PDP Research Groun
+Preparation of this chapter was supported by ONR contracts
+N00014-82-C-0374, NR 667-483 and N00014-79-C-0323, NR 667-437,
+by a grant from the System Development Foundation, and by a
+Research Scientist Career Development Award MH00385 to the second
+author from the National Institute of Mental Health.
+
+PART IT
+The chapters of Part II represent explorations into specific architectures and learning mechanisms for PDP models. These explorations
+proceed through mathematical analysis coupled with results from simulations. The major theme which runs through all of these explorations
+is a focus on the learning problem. How can PDP networks evolve to
+perform the kinds of tasks we require of them? Since one of the primary features of PDP models in general is their ability to self-modify,
+these studies form an important base for the application of these
+models to specific psychological and biological phenomena.
+In Chapter S, Rumelhart and Zipser begin with a summary of the
+history of early work on learning in parallel distributed processing systems. They then study an unsupervised learning procedure called competitive learning. This is a procedure whereby feature detectors capable
+of discriminating among the members of a set of stimulus input patterns evolve without a specific teacher guiding the learning. The basic
+idea is to let pools of potential feature detector units compete among
+themselves to respond to each stimulus pattern. The winner within
+each pool-the one whose connections make it respond most strongly
+to the pattern-then adjusts its connections slightly toward the pattern
+that it won. Several earlier investigators have considered variants of
+the competitive learning idea (e.g., Grossberg, 1976; von der Malsberg,
+1973). Rumelhart and Zipser show that when a competitive network is
+trained through repeated presentations of members of a set of patterns,
+each unit in a pool conspyigitted Matehan patterns with a particular
+
+148
+attribute or property are presented. If there are two units in a pool,
+each comes to respond to opposite values of a binary feature which is
+useful in describing the stimulus set. If there are three units in the
+pool, each unit comes to respond to a value of a trinary feature, etc. It
+is shown through simulations and mathematical analysis that the competitive learning system can serve as a basis for the development of
+useful pattern descriptions.
+Chapters 6 and 7 describe Smolensky's harmony theory and Hinton
+and Sejnowski's Boltzmann machine, respectively. These approaches
+were developed at the same time, and they have much in common.
+Both harmony theory and Boltzmann machines employ binary units
+whose values are determined probabilistically according to the
+Boltzmann equation. Each employs simulated annealing in which the
+temperature of the Boltzmann equation is moved slowly to zero as the
+system relaxes into its solution state where it finally freezes. Both systems apply mathematical formulations borrowed from physics to their
+systems to describe and analyze their behavior.
+In spite of these similarities, the two systems were developed from
+very different perspectives. The similarities arose largely because both
+systems tapped mathematical physics as a tool for formalizing their
+ideas. Smolensky's harmony theory grew from an attempt to formalize
+the notion of schema and the ideas of schema theory. Hinton and
+Sejnowski's Boltzmann machine is based on the idea that stochastic
+units can be used as a mechanism of search-for finding globally good
+states of networks through simulated annealing.
+It combines insights
+on simulated annealing from Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, and Vecchi (1983)
+with the proof by Hopfield (1982) that there is a global energy function
+that can be locally minimized through a process of asynchronously
+updating individual units.
+Chapter 6 provides a mathematical development of harmony theory
+and shows how a symbolic level of description can be seen as emerging
+from interactions among the individual processing units in harmony
+theory. It shows how harmony theory can be applied to a variety of
+phenomena, including intuitive problem solving and aspects of perception. It also provides a useful description of the mathematical relationships among harmony theory, Boltzmann machines, and the related
+mechanisms studied by S. Geman and D. Geman (1984).
+Chapter 7 focuses on the issue of learning in Boltzmann machines.
+One of the most important contributions of the work on Boltzmann
+machines is the development of the two phase (wake/sleep) learning
+procedure. Hinton and Sejnowski show that if a Boltzmann machine
+runs under the influence of environmental inputs for a while and then
+runs "freely" - without inputs from the environment-there is a very
+simple learning rule which will allow the Boltzmann machine to pick up
+
+INTRODUCTION TO PART II
+149
+environmental regularities and develop its own internal representations
+for describing those regularities. The major part of Chapter 7 is an
+analysis of this learning procedure.
+Chapter 8 is the study of still another learning procedure. In this
+chapter, Rumelhart, Hinton, and Williams show that it is possible to
+develop a generalization of the delta rule described in Chapter 2 so that
+arbitrary multilayered networks of units can be can be trained to do
+interesting tasks. Using this learning rule, the system can learn to associate arbitrary input/output pairs and in this way can learn to compute
+arbitrary input/output functions. The generalized delta rule is shown to
+provide a method of modifying any weight in any network, based on
+locally available information, so as to implement a gradient descent process that searches for those weights that minimize the error at the output units.
+Further, simulation work presented in the chapter shows
+that the problems of local minima often associated with gradient descent and other hill-climbing methods are suprisingly rare.
+In general, the chapters in this section demonstrate that the barriers
+to progress in understanding learning in networks of simple neuron-like
+units have begun to crumble. There are still deep problems that remain
+unsolved, but the learning mechanisms described in these chapters
+make several inroads into some of the most challenging aspects of the
+theory of parallel distributed processing.
+
+CHAPTER 5
+Feature Discovery by Competitive Learning
+D. E. RUMELHART and D. ZIPSER
+This chapter reports the results of our studies with an unsupervised
+learning paradigm that we call competitive learning. We have examined
+competitive
+learning using both computer simulation and formal
+analysis and have found that when it is applied to parallel networks of
+neuron-like elements, many potentially useful learning tasks can be
+accomplished.
+We were attracted to competitive learning because it
+seems to provide a way to discover the salient, general features which
+can be used to classify a set of patterns. The basic components of the
+competitive learning scheme are:
+• Start with a set of units that are all the same except for some
+randomly distributed parameter which makes each of them
+respond slightly differently to a set of input patterns.
+• Limit the "strength" of each unit.
+• Allow the units to compete in some way for the right to
+respond to a given subset of inputs.
+The net result of correctly applying these three components to a learning paradigm is that individual units learn to specialize on sets of
+This chapter originally appeared in Cognitive Science, 1985, 9, 75-112. Copyright 1985
+by Ablex Publishing. Reprinted by permission.
+
+152
+similar patterns and thus become "feature detectors" or "pattern classifiers." In addition to Frank Rosenblatt, whose work will be discussed
+below, several others have exploited competitive learning in one form
+or another over the years. These include von der Malsburg (1973),
+Grossberg (1976), Fukushima (1975), and Kohonen (1982). Our
+analyses differ from many of these in that we focus on the development of feature detectors rather than pattern classification. We address
+these issues further below.
+One of the central issues in the study of the processing capacities of
+neuron-like elements concerns the limitations inherent in a one-level
+system and the difficulty of developing learning schemes for multilayered systems. Competitive learning is a scheme in which important
+features can be discovered at one level that a multilayer system can use
+to classify pattern sets which cannot be classified with a single level
+system.
+Thirty-five years of experience have shown that getting neuron-like
+elements to learn some easy things is often quite straightforward, but
+designing systems with powerful general learning properties is a difficult
+problem, and the competitive learning paradigm does not change this
+fact. What we hope to show is that competitive learning is a powerful
+strategy which, when used in a variety of situations, greatly expedites
+some difficult tasks. Since the competitive learning paradigm has roots
+which go back to the very beginnings of the study of artificial learning
+devices, it seems reasonable to put the whole issue into historical perspective. This is even more to the point, since one of the first simple
+learning devices, the perceptron, caused great furor and debate, the
+reverberations of which are still with us.
+In the beginning, thirty-five or forty years ago, it was very hard to
+see how anything resembling a neural network could learn at all, so any
+example of learning was immensely interesting. Learning was elevated
+to a status of great importance in those days because it was somehow
+uniquely associated with the properties of animal brains. After
+McCulloch and Pitts (1943) showed how neural-like networks could
+compute, the main problem then facing workers in this area was to
+understand how such networks could learn.
+The first set of ideas that really got the enterprise going were contained in Donald Hebb's Organization of Behavior (1949). Before Hebb's
+work, it was believed that some physical change must occur in a network to support learning, but it was not clear what this change could
+be. Hebb proposed that a reasonable and biologically plausible change
+would be to strengthen the connections between elements of the network only when both the presynaptic and postsynaptic units were active
+simultaneously. The essence of Hebb's ideas still persists today in
+many learning paradigms. The details of the rules for changing weight
+
+S. COMPETITIVE LEARNING 153
+may be different, but the essential notion that the strength of connections between the units must change in response to some function of
+the correlated activity of the connected units still dominates learning
+models.
+Hebb's ideas remained untested speculations about the nervous system until it became possible to build some form of simulated network
+to test learning theories. Probably the first such attempt occurred in
+1951 when Dean Edmonds and Marvin Minsky built their learning
+machine. The flavor of this machine and the milieu in which it
+operated is captured in Minsky's own words which appeared in a
+wonderful New Yorker profile of him by Jeremy Bernstein (1981):
+In the summer of 1951 Dean Edmonds and I went up to
+Harvard and built our machine. It had three hundred tubes and
+a lot of motors.
+It needed some automatic electric clutches,
+which we machined ourselves. The memory of the machine
+was stored in the positions of its control knobs, 40 of them,
+and when the machine was learning, it used the clutches to
+adjust its own knobs. We used a surplus gyropilot from a B24
+bomber to move the clutches. (p. 69)
+This machine actually worked and was so fascinating to watch that
+Minsky remembers:
+We sort of quit science for awhile to watch the machine. We
+were amazed that it could have several activities going on at
+once in this little nervous system. Because of the random
+wiring it had
+a sort of fail safe characteristic. If one of the
+neurons wasn't working, it wouldn't make much difference and
+with nearly three hundred tubes, and the thousands of
+connections we had soldered there would usually be something
+wrong somewhere.
+I don't think we ever debugged our
+machine completely, but that didn't matter. By having this
+crazy random design it was almost sure to work no matter how
+you built it. (p. 69)
+In fact, the functioning of this machine apparently stimulated Minsky
+sufficiently to write his PhD thesis on a problem related to learning
+(Minsky, 1954). The whole idea must have generated rather wide
+interest; von Neumann, for example, was on Minsky's PhD committee
+and gave him encouragement. Although Minsky was perhaps the first
+on the scene with a learning machine, the real beginnings of meaningful neuron-like network learning can probably be traced to the work of
+Frank Rosenblatt, a Beepyriglifed Saterar of Science classmate of
+
+154
+Minsky's. Rosenblatt invented a class of simple neuron-like learning
+networks which he called perceptrons. In his book, Principles of Neurodynamics (1962), Rosenblatt brought together all of his results on perceptrons. In that book he gives a particularly clear description of what
+he thought he was doing:
+Perceptrons are not intended to serve as detailed copies of any
+actual nervous system. They're simplified networks, designed
+to permit the study of lawful relationships between the organization of a nerve net, the organization of its environment, and
+the "psychological" performances of which it is capable.
+Perceptrons might actually correspond to parts of more extended
+networks and biological systems; in this case, the results
+obtained will be directly applicable. More likely they represent
+extreme simplifications of the central nervous system, in which
+some properties are exaggerated and others suppressed. In this
+case, successive perturbations and refinements of the system
+may yield a closer approximation.
+The main strength of this approach is that it permits meaningful questions to be asked and answered about particular
+types of organizations, hypothetical memory mechanisms, and
+neural models. When exact analytical answers are unobtainable,
+experimental methods, either with digital simulation or
+hardware models, are employed. The model is not the terminal
+result, but a starting point for exploratory analysis of its
+behavior. (p. 28)
+Rosenblatt pioneered two techniques of fundamental importance to the
+study of learning in neural-like networks: digital computer simulation
+and formal mathematical analysis, although he was not the first to
+simulate neural networks that could learn on digital computers (cf.
+Farley & Clark, 1954).
+Since the paradigm of competitive learning uses concepts that appear
+in the work of Rosenblatt, it is worthwhile reviewing some of his ideas
+in this area. His most influential result was the "perceptron learning
+theorem" which boldly asserts:
+Given an elementary a-perceptron, a stimulus world W, and
+any classification C (W) for which a solution exists; let all
+stimuli in W occur in any sequence, provided that each
+stimulus must reoccur in finite time; then beginning from an
+arbitrary initial state, an error correction procedure will always
+yield a solution to C (W) in finite time,... (p. 596)
+
+s. COMPETITIVE LEARNING
+155
+As it turned out, the real problems arose out of the phrase "for which a
+solution exists" - more about this later.
+Less widely known is Rosenblatt's work on what he called "spontaneous learning." All network learning models require rules which tell how
+to present the stimuli and change the values of the weights in accordance with the response of the model. These rules can be characterized
+as forming a spectrum, at one end of which is learning with an errorcorrecting teacher, and
+at the other is completely spontaneous, unsupervised discovery. In between is a continuum of rules that depend on
+manipulating the content of the input stimulus stream to bring about
+learning. These intermediate rules are often referred to as "forced
+learning." Here we are concerned primarily with attempts to design a
+perceptron that would discover something interesting without a teacher
+because this is similar to what happens in the competitive learning case.
+In fact, Rosenblatt was able to build a perceptron that was able to spontaneously dichotomize a random sequence of input patterns into classes
+such that the members of a single class were similar to each other, and
+different from the members of the other class. Rosenblatt realized that
+any randomly initialized perceptron would have to dichotomize an arbitrary input pattern stream into a "1-set," consisting of those patterns
+that happened to produce a response of 1, and a "O-set," consisting of
+those that produced a response of 0. Of course one of these sets could
+be empty by chance and neither would be of much interest in general.
+He reasoned that if a perceptron could reinforce these sets by an
+appropriate rule based only on the perceptron's spontaneous response
+and not on a teacher's error correction, it might eventually end up with
+a dichotomization in which the members of each set were more like
+each other than like the members of the opposite set. What was the
+appropriate rule to use to achieve the desired dicotomization? The first
+rule he tried for these perceptrons, which he called C-type, was to
+increment weights on lines active with patterns in the 1-set, and decrement weights on lines active with patterns in the O-set. The idea was to
+force a dichotomization into sets whose members were similar in the
+sense that they activated overlapping subsets of lines. The results were
+disastrous. Sooner or later all the input patterns were classified in one
+set. There was no dichotomy but there was stability. Once one of the
+sets won, it remained the victor forever.
+Not to be daunted, he examined why this undesirable result occurred
+and realized that the problem lay in the fact that since the weights
+could grow without limit, the set that initially had a majority of the patterns would receive the majority of the reinforcement. This meant that
+weights on lines which could be activated by patterns in both sets would
+grow to infinite magnitudes in favor of the majority set, which in turn
+would lead to the capturo Byrigined Wateharns by the majority set and
+
+156 BASIC MECHANISMS
+ultimate total victory for the majority. Even where there was initial
+equality between the sets, inevitable fluctuations in the random presentation of patterns would create a majority set that would then go on to
+win. Rosenblatt overcame this problem by introducing mechanisms to
+limit weight growth in such a way that the set that was to be positively
+reinforced at active lines would compensate the other set by giving up
+some weight from all its lines. He called the modified perceptrons C'.
+An example of a C' rule is to lower the magnitude of all weights by a
+fixed fraction of their current value before specifically incrementing the
+magnitude of some of the weights on the basis of the response to an
+input pattern. This type of rule had the desired result of making an
+equal dichotomy of patterns a stable rather than an unstable state. Patterns in each of the sets were similar to each other in the sense that
+they depended on similar sets of input lines to produce a response. In
+Rosenblatt's initial experiment, the main feature of similarity was not
+so much the shape of the patterns involved, but their location on the
+retina. That is, his system was able to spontaneously learn something
+about the geometry of its input line arrangement. Later, we will examine this important property of spontaneous geometry learning in considerable detail. Depending on the desired learning task, it can be either a
+boon or a nuisance.
+Rosenblatt was extremely enthusiastic about his spontaneous learning
+results. In fact, his response can be described as sheer ecstasy. To see
+what he thought about his achievements, consider his claim
+(Rosenblatt, 1959):
+It seems clear that the class C' perceptron introduces a new
+kind of information processing automaton: For the first time,
+we have a machine which is capable of having original ideas.
+As an analogue of the biological brain, the perceptron, more
+precisely, the theory of statistical separability, seems to come
+closer to meeting the requirements of a functional explanation
+of the nervous system than any system previously proposed.
+(p. 449)
+Although Rosenblatt's results were both interesting and significant, the
+claims implied in the above quote struck his contemporaries as
+unfounded. What was also significant was that Rosenblatt appeared to
+be saying that the type of spontaneous learning he had demonstrated
+was a property of perceptrons, which could not be replicated by ordinary computers. Consider the following quote from the same source:
+As a concept, it would seem that the perceptron has
+established, beyond doubt, the feasibility and principle of
+
+157
+non-human systems which may embody human cognitive functions at a level far beyond that which can be achieved through
+present day automatons. The future of information processing
+devices which operate on statistical, rather then logical principles seems to be clearly indicated. (p. 449)
+It is this notion of Rosenblatt's-that perceptrons are in some way
+superior to computers-that ignited a debate in artificial intelligence
+that had significant effects on the development of neural-like network
+models for both learning and other cognitive processes. Elements of
+the debate are still with us today in arguments about what the brain can
+do that computers can't do. There is no doubt that this was an important issue in Rosenblatt's mind, and almost certainly contributed to the
+acrimonious debate at that time. Consider the following statement by
+Rosenblatt made at the important conference on Mechanization of
+Thought Processes back in 1959:
+Computers seem to share two main functions with the brain:
+(a) Decision making, based on logical rule, and (b) control,
+again based on logical rules. The human brain performs these
+functions, together with a third: interpretation of the environment. Why do we hold interpretation of the environment to be
+so important? The answer, I think, is to be found in the laws
+of thermodynamics. A system with a completely self contained
+logic can never spontaneously improve its ability to organize,
+and to draw valid conclusions from information. (Rosenblatt,
+1959, p. 423)
+Clearly in some sense, Rosenblatt was saying that there were things
+that the brain and perceptrons, because of their statistical properties,
+could do which computers could not do. Now this may seem strange
+since Rosenblatt knew that a computer program could be written that
+would simulate the behavior of statistical perceptrons to any arbitrary
+degree of accuracy. Indeed, he was one of the pioneers in the application of digital simulation to this type of problem. What he was actually
+referring to is made clear when we examine the comments of other participants at the conference, such as Minsky (1959) and McCarthy
+(1959), who were using the symbol manipulating capabilities of the
+computer to directly simulate the logical processes involved in decision
+making, theorem proving, and other intellectual activities of this sort.
+Rosenblatt believed the computer used in this way would be inadequate
+to mimic the brain's true intellectual powers. This task, he thought,
+could only be accomplished if the computer or other electronic devices
+were used to simulate perceptrons. We can summarize these divergent
+
+158
+points of view by saying that Rosenblatt was concerned not only with
+what the brain did, but with how it did it, whereas others, such as Minsky and McCarthy, were concerned with simulating what the brain did,
+and didn't really care how it was done. The subsequent history of Al
+has shown both the successes and failures of the standard Al approach.
+We still have the problems today, and it's still not clear to what degree
+computational strategies similar to the ones used by the brain must be
+employed in order to simulate its performance.
+In addition to producing fertilizer, as all debates do, this one also
+stimulated the growth of some new results on perceptrons, some of
+which came from Minsky. Rosenblatt had shown that a two layer perceptron could carry out any of the 22N
+possible classifications of N
+binary inputs; that is, a solution to the classification problem had always
+existed in principle. This result was of no practical value however,
+because 2N
+units were required to accomplish the task in the completely general case. Rosenblatt's approach to this problem was to use a
+much smaller number of units in the first layer with each unit connected to a small subset of the N inputs at random. His hope was that
+this would give the perceptron a high probability of learning to carry
+out classifications of interest. Experiments and formal analysis showed
+that these random devices could learn to recognize patterns to a significant degree but that they had severe limitations. Rosenblatt (1962)
+characterized his random perceptron as follows:
+It does not generalize well to similar forms occurring in new
+positions in the retinal field, and its performance in detection
+experiments, where a familiar figure appears against an
+unfamiliar background, is apt to be weak. More sophisticated
+psychological capabilities, which depend on the recognition of
+topological properties of the stimulus field, or on abstract relations between the components of a complex image, are lacking.
+(pp. 191-192)
+Minsky and Papert worked through most of the sixties on a mathematical analysis of the computing powers of perceptrons with the goal of
+understanding these limitations. The results of their work are available
+in a book called Perceptrons (Minsky & Papert, 1969). The central
+theme of this work is that parallel recognizing elements, such as perceptrons, are beset by the same problems of scale as
+serial
+pattern
+recognizers. Combinatorial explosion catches you sooner or later,
+although sometimes in different ways in parallel than in serial. Minsky
+and Papert's book had a very dampening effect on the study of
+neuron-like networks as computational devices. Minsky has recently
+come to reconsider this negative effect:
+
+5. COMPETITIVE LEARNING
+159
+I now believe the book was overkill.. So after being irritated
+with Rosenblatt for overclaiming and diverting all those people
+along a false path, I started to realize that for what you get out
+of it - the kind of recognition it can do-it is such a simple
+machine that it would be astonishing if nature did not make use
+of it somewhere. (Bernstein, 1981, p. 103)
+Perhaps the real lesson from all this is that it really is worthwhile trying
+to put things in perspective.
+Once the problem of scale has been understood, networks of
+neuron-like elements are often very useful in practical problems of
+recognition and classification. These networks are somewhat analogous
+to computers, in that they won't do much unless programmed by a
+clever person; networks, of course, are not so much programmed as
+designed. The problem of finding networks of practical size to solve a
+particular problem is challenging because relatively small changes in
+network design can have very large effects on the scale of a problem.
+Consider networks of neuron-like units that determine the parity of
+their N binary inputs (see Figure 1). In the simple perceptrons studied
+by Minsky and Papert, units in the first layer output 1 only if all their
+inputs are 1 and output O otherwise. This takes 2N units in the first
+layer, and a single linear threshold unit with a fan-in of 2N
+in the
+second layer, to determine parity. If the units in the first layer are
+changed to linear threshold elements, then only N of them are
+required, but all must have a fan-in of N. If we allow a multilayer network to do the job, then about 3N units are needed, but none needs a
+fan-in of more than 2. The number of layers is of order logN. The
+importance of all this to the competitive learning paradigm, or any
+other for that matter, is that no network can learn what it is not capable
+ol doing in principle. What any particular network can do is dependent
+on its structure and the computational properties of its component elements. Unfortunately, there is no canonical way to find the best network or to determine what it will learn, so the whole enterprise still has
+much of the flavor of an experimental science.
+THE COMPETITIVE LEARNING MECHANISM
+Paradigms of Learning
+It is possible to classify learning mechanisms in several ways. One
+useful classification is izopyngned Wateraling paradigm in which the
+
+160
+2
+C
+Ф
+= P
+FIGURE 1. A: Parity network from Minsky and Papert (1969). Each $ unit has an output of 1 only if all of its inputs are 1. I is a linear threshold unit with threshold of 0, i.e.,
+like all the other linear threshold units in the figure, it fires only when the sum of its
+weighted inputs is greater than the threshold. This and all the other networks signal odd
+parity with a 1 in the rightmost unit of the network. B: Parity network made from two
+layers of linear threshold units. C: Three-unit network for determining the parity of a
+pair of inputs. D: Two-layer network using the subnetwork described in (C). In general,
+the number of P-units is of order Nand the number of layers is of order log.
+model is supposed to work. There are at least four common learning
+paradigms in neural-like processing systems:
+
+S. COMPETITIVE LEARNING 161
+• Auto Associator. In this paradigm a set of patterns are repeatedly presented and the system is supposed to "store" the patterns. Then, later, parts of one of the original patterns or possibly a pattern similar to one of the original patterns is
+presented, and the task is to "retrieve" the original pattern
+through a kind of pattern completion procedure. This is an
+auto-association process in which a pattern is associated with
+itself so that a degraded version of the original pattern can act
+as a retrieval cue.
+• Pattern Associator. This paradigm is really a variant on the
+auto-association paradigm. A set of pairs of patterns are repeatedly presented. The system is to learn that when one member
+of the pair is presented it is supposed to produce the other. In
+this paradigm one seeks a mechanism in which an essentially
+arbitrary set of input patterns can be paired with an arbitrary set
+of output patterns.
+• Classification Paradigm. The classification paradigm also can be
+considered as a variant on the previous learning paradigms,
+although the goals are sufficiently different and it is sufficiently
+common that it deserves separate mention. In this case, there
+is a fixed set of categories into which the stimulus patterns are
+to be classified. There is a training session in which the system
+is presented with the stimulus patterns along with the categories
+to which each stimulus belongs. The goal is to learn to
+correctly classify the stimuli so that in the future when a particular stimulus or a slightly distorted version of one of the
+stimuli is presented, the system will classify it properly. This is
+the typical paradigm in which the perceptron is designed to
+operate and in which the perceptron convergence theorem is
+proved.
+• Regularity Detector. In this paradigm there is a population of
+stimulus patterns and each stimulus pattern, Sk is presented
+with some probability Pk The system is supposed to discover
+statistically salient features of the input population. Unlike the
+classification paradigm, there is no a priori set of categories into
+which the patterns are to be classified; rather, the system must
+develop its own featural representation of the input stimuli
+which captures the most salient features of the population of
+input patterns.
+Competitive learning is a mechanism well-suited for regularity detection, as in the environmenpyrigrile iatehare.
+
+162 BASIC MECHANISMS
+Competitive Learning
+The architecture of a competitive learning system (illustrated in Figure 2) is a common one. It consists of a set of hierarchically layered
+units in which each layer connects, via excitatory connections, with the
+layer immediately above it. In the most general case, each
+unit of a
+layer receives an input from each unit of the layer immediately below
+and projects output to each unit in the layer immediately above it.
+Moreover, within a layer, the units are broken into a set of inhibitory
+clusters in which all elements within a cluster inhibit all other elements
+in the cluster. Thus the elements within a cluster at one level compete
+with one another to respond to the pattern appearing on the layer
+below. The more strongly any particular unit responds to an incoming
+stimulus, the more it shuts down the other members of its cluster.
+There are many variations on the competitive learning theme. A
+number of researchers have developed variants of competitive learning
+mechanisms and a number of results already exist in the literature. We
+have already mentioned the pioneering work of Rosenblatt. In addition, von der Malsburg (1973), Fukushima (1975), and Grossberg
+(1976), among others, have developed models which are competitive
+learning models, or which have many properties in common with competitive learning. We believe that the essential properties of the competitive learning mechanism are quite general. However, for the sake
+of concreteness, in this paper we have chosen to study, in some detail,
+the simplest of the systems which seem to be representative of the
+essential characteristics of competitive learning. Thus, the system we
+have analyzed has much in common with the previous work, but wherever possible we have simplified our assumptions. The system that we
+have studied most is described below:
+• The units in a given layer are broken into a set of nonoverlapping clusters.
+Each unit within a cluster inhibits every other
+unit within a cluster. The clusters are winner-take-all, such
+that the unit receiving the largest input achieves its maximum
+value while all other units in the cluster are pushed to their
+minimum value. ' We have arbitrarily set the maximum value
+to 1 and the minimum value to 0.
+1A simple circuit for achieving this result is attained by having each unit activate itself
+and inhibit its neighbors. Grossberg (1976) employs just such a network lo choose the
+maximum value of a set of units.
+
+5. COMPETITIVE LEARNING
+163
+Layer 3
+Inhibitory Clusters
+Excitatory
+Connections
+Layer 2
+Inhibitory Clusters
+08
+Excitatory
+Connections
+Layer 1
+Input Units
+INPUT PATTERN
+FIGURE 2. The architecture of the competitive learning mechanism. Competitive learning takes place in a context of sets of hierarchically layered units. Units are represented
+in the diagram as dots. Units may be active or inactive. Active units are represented by
+filled dots, inactive ones by open dots. In general, a unit in a given layer can receive
+inputs from all of the units in the next lower layer and can project outputs lo all of the
+units in the next higher layer. Connections between layers are excitatory and connections
+within layers are inhibitory. Each layer consists of a set of clusters of mutually inhibitory
+units. The units within a cluster inhibit one another in such a way that only one unit per
+clusters can have different numbers of units.
+
+164
+• Every element in every cluster receives inputs from the same
+lines.
+• A unit learns if and only if it wins the competition with other
+units in its cluster.
+• A stimulus pattern S, consists of a binary pattern in which each
+element of the pattern is either active or inactive. An active element is assigned the value 1 and an inactive element is
+assigned the value 0.
+• Each unit has a fixed amount of weight (all weights are positive) which is distributed among its input lines. The weight on
+the line connecting unit i on the lower (or input) layer to unit j
+on the upper layer, is designated Wij. The fixed total amount of
+weight for unit j is designated {Wij = 1. A unit learns by
+i
+shifting weight from its inactive to its active input lines. If a
+unit does not respond to a particular pattern, no learning takes
+place in that unit. If a unit wins the competition, then each of
+its input lines give up some proportion g of its weight and that
+weight is then distributed equally among the active input lines.?
+More formally, the learning rule we have studied is:
+0
+if unit j loses on stimulus k
+AWij
+Сік
+if unit j wins on stimulus k
+where Cik is equal to 1 if in stimulus pattern Sk, unit i in the
+lower layer is active and zero otherwise, and no is the number
+of active units in pattern Sk (thus nk = 2 Cik).
+i
+Figure 3 illustrates a useful geometric analogy to this system. We
+can consider each stimulus pattern as a vector. If all patterns contain
+the same number of active lines, then all vectors are the same length
+and each can be viewed as a point on an N-dimensional hypersphere,
+2 This learning rule was proposed by von der Malsburg (1973). As Grossberg (1976)
+points out, renormalization of the weights is not necessary. The same result can be
+obtained by normalizing the input patterns and then assuming that the weights approach
+the values on the input lines. Normalizing weights is simpler to implement than normalizing patterns, so we chose that option. For most of our experiments, however, it does
+not matter which of these two rules we chose since all patterns were of the same
+magnitude.
+
+5. COMPETITIVE LEARNING
+165
+B
+FIGURE 3. A geometric interpretation of competitive learning. A: It is useful to conceptualize stimulus patterns as vectors whose tips all lie on the surface of a hypersphere. We
+can then directly see the similarity among stimulus
+patterns as distance between the
+points on the sphere. In the figure, a stimulus pattern is represented as an x. The figure
+represents a population of eight stimulus patterns. There are two clusters of three patterns and iwo stimulus patterns which are rather distinct from the others. B: It is also
+useful to represent the weights of units as vectors falling on the surface of the same
+hypersphere. Weight vectors are represented in the figure as o's. The figure illustrates
+the weights of (wo units falling on rather different parts of the sphere. The response rule
+of this model is equivalent to the rule that whenever a stimulus pattern is presented, the
+unit whose weight vector is closest to that stimulus pattern on the sphere wins the competition. In the figure, one unit would respond to the cluster in the northern hemisphere
+and the other unit would respond to the rest of the stimulus patterns. C: The learning
+rule of this model is roughly equivalent to the rule that whenever a unit wins the competition (i.e., is closest to the stimulus pattern), that weight vector is moved toward the
+presented stimulus. The figure shows a case in which there are three units in the cluster
+and three natural groupings of the stimulus patterns. In this case, the weight vectors for
+the three units will each migrate toward one of the stimulus groups.
+where N is the number of units in the lower level, and therefore, also
+ne number of input lines received bi
+copyrighted Materia
+each unit in the upper level.
+
+166 BASIC MECHANISMS
+Each x in Figure 3A represents a particular pattern. Those patterns
+that are very similar are near one another on the sphere; those that are
+very different will be far from one another on the sphere. Now note
+that since there are N input lines to each unit in the upper layer, its
+weights can also be considered a vector in N-dimensional space. Since
+all units have the same total quantity of weight, we have N-dimensional
+vectors of approximately fixed length for each unit in the cluster. 3
+Thus, properly scaled, the weights themselves form a set of vectors
+which (approximately) fall on the surface of the same hypersphere. In
+Figure 3B, the O's represent the weights of two units superimposed on
+the same sphere with the stimulus patterns. Now, whenever a stimulus
+pattern is presented, the unit which responds most strongly is simply
+the one whose weight vector is nearest that for the stimulus. The
+learning rule specifies that whenever a unit wins a competition for a
+stimulus pattern, it moves a percentage g of the way from its current
+location toward the location of the stimulus pattern on the hypersphere.
+Now, suppose that the input patterns fell into some number, M,
+"natural" groupings. Further, suppose that an inhibitory cluster receiving inputs from these stimuli contained exactly M units (as in Figure
+3C). After sufficient training, and assuming that the stimulus groupings are sufficiently distinct, we expect to find one of the vectors for
+the M units placed roughly in the center of each of the stimulus groupings. In this case, the units have come to detect the grouping to which
+the input patterns belong. In this sense, they have "discovered" the
+structure of the input pattern sets.
+Some Features of Competitive Learning
+There are several characteristics of a competitive learning mechanism
+that make it an interesting candidate for further study, for example:
+• Each cluster classifies the stimulus set into M groups, one for
+each unit in the cluster. Each of the units captures roughly an
+equal number of stimulus patterns.
+It is possible to consider a
+cluster as forming an M-ary feature in which every stimulus
+pattern is classified as having exactly one of the M possible
+constraint would ensure that all vectors are in fact the same length. Our assumption only
+assures that they will be approximately the same length.
+
+5. COMPETITIVE LEARNING
+167
+values of this feature. Thus, a cluster containing 2 units acts as
+a binary feature detector. One element of the cluster responds
+when a particular feature is present in the stimulus pattern, otherwise the other element responds.
+• If there is structure in the stimulus patterns, the units will break
+up the patterns along structurally relevant lines. Roughly
+speaking, this means that the system will find clusters if they
+are there. (A key problem, which we address below, is specifying the nature of the structure that this system discovers.)
+• If the stimuli are highly structured, the classifications are highly
+stable. If the stimuli are less well-structured, the classifications
+are more variable, and a given stimulus pattern will be
+responded to first by one and then by another member of the
+cluster. In our experiments, we started the weight vectors in
+random directions and presented the stimuli randomly. In this
+case, there is rapid movement as the system reaches a relatively
+stable configuration (such as one with a unit roughly in the
+center of each cluster of stimulus patterns). These configurations can be more or less stable. For example, if the stimulus
+points don't actually fall into nice clusters, then the configurations will be relatively unstable, and the presentation of each
+stimulus will modify the pattern of responding so that the system will undergo continual evolution. On the other hand, if
+the stimulus patterns fall rather nicely into clusters, then the
+system will become very stable in the sense that the same units
+will always respond to the same stimuli.*
+• The particular grouping done by a particular cluster depends on
+the starting value of the weights and the sequence of stimulus
+patterns actually presented. A large number of clusters, each
+receiving inputs from the same input lines can, in general, classify the inputs into a large number of different groupings, or
+alternatively, discover a variety of independent features present
+in the stimulus population. This can provide a kind of coarse
+coding of the stimulus patterns. S
+4 Grossberg (1976) has addressed this problem in his very similar system. He has
+proved that if the patterns are sufficiently sparse, and/or when there are enough units in
+the cluster, then a system such as this will find a perfectly stable classification. He also
+points out that when these conditions don't hold, the classification can be unstable. Mosi
+of our work is with cases in which there is no perfectly stable classification and the
+umber of patterns is much larger than the number of units in the inhibitory cluster
+opyrighted Materia
+
+168
+Formal Analysis
+Perhaps the simplest mathematical analysis that can be given of the
+competitive learning model under discussion involves the determination
+of the sets of equilibrium states of the system that is, states in which
+the average inflow of weight to a particular line is equal to the average
+outflow of weight on that line. Let Pk be the probability that stimulus
+Sk is presented on any trial. Let Vik be the probability that unit j wins
+when stimulus Sk is presented. Now we want to consider the case in
+ed. Now ne
+which 2AWij jkPk = O, that is, the case in which the average change in
+the weights is zero. We refer to such states as equilibrium states. Thus,
+using the learning rule and averaging over stimulus patterns we can
+write
+0=82
+Cik
+k
+which implies that at equilibrium
+w0 Рк V/к = [Р*Сі 'Ук
+and thus
+[ Р*Сік Ук
+Wij =
+There are a number of important observations to note about this equation. First, note that Pk Vik is simply the probability that unit j wins
+averaged over all stimulus patterns. Note further that &PKCik lik is the
+probability that input line i is active and unit j wins. Thus, the ratio
+ЕрАсік Ук
+• is the conditional probability that line i is active given unit j
+5 There is a problem in that one can'i be certain that the different clusters will discover
+different features. A slight modification of the system in which clusters "repel" one
+another can insure that different clusters find different features. We shall not pursue that
+further in this paper.
+
+5. COMPETITIVE LEARNING
+169
+wins, piline, = 1 unit, wins). Thus, if all patterns are of the same
+size, i.e., No = n for all k, then the weight wij becomes proportional to
+the probability that line i is active given unit j wins. That is,
+Wij →
+-P (line, = 1| unit; wins).
+We are now in a position to specify the response, at equilibrium, of
+unit j when stimulus S, is presented. Let aj, be the input to unit j in
+the face of stimulus Sy. This is simply the sum of weights on the active
+input lines. This can be written
+5 РаСік уїк
+which implies that at equilibrium
+Epirli Vii
+Epi Vii
+where li represents the overlap between stimulus I and stimulus i,
+Mi = I
+СкіскІ
+Thus, at equilibrium a unit responds most strongly to
+patterns that overlap other patterns to which the unit responds and
+responds most weakly to patterns that are far from patterns to which it
+responds. Finally, it should be noted that there is another set of
+restrictions on the value of Vik - the probability that unit j responds to
+stimulus Sk. In fact, the competitive learning rule we have studied has
+the further restriction that
+1 ajk > dik for all i#j
+Vik =
+O otherwise.
+Thus, in general, there are many solutions to the equilibrium equations
+described above. The competitive learning mechanisms can only reach
+those equilibrium states in which the above-stated relationships
+between the vik and the a jk
+also hold.
+Whenever the system is in a state in which, on average, the weights
+are not changing, we say that the system has reached an equilibrium
+state. In such a state the values of a,k become relatively stable, and
+therefore, the values of Vik become stable. When this happens, the system always responds the same way to a particular stimulus pattern.
+However, it is possible that the weights will be pushed out of
+
+170 BASIC MECHANISMS
+equilibrium by an unfortunate sequence of stimuli. In this case, the
+system can move toward a new equilibrium state (or possibly back to a
+previous one). Some equilibrium states are more stable than others in
+the sense that the vik become very unlikely to change values for long
+periods of time. In particular, this will happen whenever the largest a jk
+is much larger than any other dik for all stimulus patterns Sk. In this
+case, small movements in the weight vector of one of the units is very
+unlikely to change which unit responds to which stimulus pattern. Such
+equilibrium states are said to be highly stable. We should expect, then,
+that after it has been learning for a period of time, the system will
+spend most of its time in the most highly stable of the equilibrium
+states. One good measure of the stability of an equilibrium state is
+given by the average amount by which the input to the winning units is
+greater than the response of all of the other units averaged over all patterns and all units in a cluster. This measure is given by T below:
+T = 2Pk
+M
+(ajk -Oik).
+The larger the value of T, the more stable the system can be expected
+to be and the more time we can expect the system to spend in that
+state. Roughly, if we assume that the system moves into states which
+maximize T, we can show that this amounts to maximizing the overlap
+among patterns within a group while minimizing the overlap among
+patterns between groups. In the geometric analogy above, this will
+occur when the weight vectors point toward maximally compact
+stimulus regions that are as distant as possible from other such regions.
+SOME EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
+Dipole Experiments
+The essential structure that a competitive learning mechanism can
+discover is represented in the overlap of stimulus patterns. The simplest stimulus population in which stimulus patterns can overlap with
+one another is one constructed out of dipoles-stimulus patterns consisting of exactly two active elements and the rest inactive. If we have
+a total of N input units there are N(N-1) / 2 possible dipole stimuli. Of
+course, if the actual stimulus population consists of all N(N-I)| 2 possibilities, there is no structure to be discovered. There are no clusters
+for our units to point at (unless we have one unit for each of the possible stimuli, in which case pyrghted ate aight vector at each of the
+
+5. COMPETITIVE LEARNING 171
+possible input stimuli). If, however, we restrict the possible dipole
+stimuli in certain ways, then there can be meaningful groupings of the
+stimulus patterns that the system can find. Consider, as an example, a
+case in which the stimulus lines could be thought of as forming a twodimensional grid in which the only possible stimulus patterns were
+those which formed adjacent pairs in the grid. If we have an N x M
+grid, there are N (M- 1) + M (N- 1) possible stimuli. Figure 4 shows
+one of the 24 possible adjacent dipole patterns defined on a 4x4 grid.
+We carried out a number of experiments employing stimulus sets of
+this kind. In most of these experiments we employed a two-layer system with a single inhibitory cluster of size two. Figure S illustrates the
+architecture of one of our experiments. The results of three runs with
+this architecture are illustrated in Figure 6, which shows the relative
+values of the weights for the two units. The values are shown laid out
+on a 4 ×4 grid so that weights are next to one another if the units with
+which they connect are next to one another. The relative values of the
+weights are indicated by the filling of the circles. If a circle is filled,
+that indicates that Unit 1 had the largest weight on that line. If the circle is unfilled, that means that Unit 2 had the largest weight on that
+line.
+The grids on the left indicate the initial configurations of the
+weights. The grids on the right indicate the final configurations of
+weights. The lines connecting the circles represent the possible stimuli.
+For example, the dipole stimulus pattern consisting of the upper left
+input line and the one immediately to the right of it is represented by
+the line connecting the upper-left circle in the grid with its right neighbor. The unit that wins when this stimulus is presented is indicated by
+the width of the line connecting the two circles. The wide line indicates
+O
+FIGURE 4. A dipole stimulus defined on a 4x4 matrix of input units. The rule for generating such stimuli is simply that any iwo adjacent units may be simultaneously active.
+Nonadjacent units may not be active and more than two units may not be simultaneously
+active. Active units are indica go byndated Material
+
+172 BASIC MECHANISMS
+FIGURE 5. The architecture of a competitive learning system with 16 input units and
+one cluster of size two in the second layer.
+that Unit 1 was the winner, the narrow line indicates that Unit 2 was
+the winner. It should be noted, therefore, that two unfilled circles
+must always be joined by a narrow line and iwo filled circles must
+always be joined by a wide line. The reason for this is that if a particular unit has more weight on both of the active lines then that unit must
+win the competition. The results clearly show that the weights move
+from a rather chaotic initial arrangement to an arrangement in which
+essentially all of those on one side of the grid are filled and all on the
+other side are unfilled. The border separating the two halves of the
+grid may be at any orientation, but most often it is oriented vertically
+and horizontally, as shown in the upper two examples. Only rarely is
+the orientation diagonal, as in the example in the lower right-hand grid.
+Thus, we have a case in which each unit has chosen a coherent half of
+the grid to which they respond. It is important to realize that as far as
+the competitive learning mechanism is concerned the sixteen input
+
+5. COMPETITIVE LEARNING
+173
+400
+400
+50
+400
+FIGURE 6. Relative weight values for the two members of the inhibitory cluster. A:
+The results for one run with the dipole stimuli defined over a two-dimensional grid. The
+left-hand grid shows the relative values of the weights initially and the right-hand grid
+shows the relative values of the weights after 400 trials. A filled circle means that Unit 1
+had the larger weight on the corresponding input. An unfilled circle means that Unit 2
+had the larger weight. A heavy line connecting two circles means that Unit 1 responded
+to the stimulus pattern consisting of the activation of the iwo circles, and a light line
+means that Unit 2 won the corresponding pattern. In this case the system has divided the
+grid horizontally. B: The results for a second run under the same conditions. In this
+case the system has divided the grid horizontally. C: The results for a third run. In this
+case the left-hand grid represents the state of the system after 50 trials. Here the grid
+was divided diagonally.
+
+174 BASIC MECHANISMS
+lines are unordered. The two-dimensional grid-like arrangement exists
+only in the statistics of the population of stimulus patterns. Thus, the
+system has discovered the dimensional structure inherent in the stimulus
+population and has devised binary feature detectors that tell which half
+of the grid contains the stimulus pattern. Note, each unit responds to
+roughly half of the stimulus patterns. Note also that while some units
+break the grid vertically, some break the grid horizontally, and some
+break it diagonally; a combination of several clusters offers a rather
+more precise classification of a stimulus pattern.
+In other experiments, we tried clusters of other sizes. For example,
+Figure 7 shows the results for a cluster of size four. It shows the initial
+configuration and its sequence of evolution after 100, 200, 400, 800,
+and after 4000 training trials. Again, initially the regions are chaotic.
+After training, however, the system settles into a state in which stimuli
+in compact regions of the grid are responded to by the same units. It
+can be seen, in this case, that the trend is toward a given unit responding to a maximally compact group of stimuli. In this experiment, three
+of the units settled on compact square regions while the remaining one
+settled on two unconnected stimulus regions. It can be shown that the
+state into which the system settled does not quite maximize the value
+T, but does represent a relatively stable equilibrium state.
+In the examples discussed thus far, the system, to a first approximation, settled on a highly compact representation of the input patterns in
+which all patterns in a region are captured by one of the units. The
+grids discussed above have all been two-dimensional. There is no need
+to restrict the analysis to a two-dimensional grid. In fact, a two-unit
+cluster will, essentially, pass a plane through a space of any dimensionality. There is a preference for planes perpendicular to the axes of
+the spaces. Figure 8 shows a typical result for the system learning a
+three-dimensional space. In the case of three dimensions, there are
+three equally good planes which can be passed through the space and,
+depending on the starting directions of the weight vectors and on the
+sequence of stimuli, different clusters will choose different ones of
+these planes. Thus, a system which receives input from a set of such
+clusters will be given information as to which quadrant of the space in
+which the pattern appears. It is important to emphasize that the coherence of the space is entirely in the choice of input stimuli, not in the
+architecture of the competitive learning mechanism. The system discovers the spatial structure in the input lines.
+Formal analysis. For the dipole examples described above, it is possible to develop a rather precise characterization of the behavior of the
+competitive learning system. Recall our argument that the most stable
+equilibrium state (and therefore the one the system is most likely to
+
+175
+100
+200
+400
+800
+4000
+FIGURE 7. The relative weights of each of the four elements of the cluster after 0, 100,
+200,400, 800, and 4000 stimulus presentations.
+end up in) is the one that maximizes the function
+Т=Ерк 2vik (ajk-alik).
+K
+Now, in the dipole examples, all stimulus patterns of the stimulus
+population are equally likely (l.e., Pk = 1/N), all stimulus patterns
+involve two active lines, and for every stimulus pattern in the populaion of patterns there are a fixed number of other stimulus patterns il
+copyrighted Materia
+
+176
+FIGURE 8. The relative weights for a system in which the stimulus patterns were
+chosen from a three-dimensional grid after 4000 presentations.
+the population which overlap it. This implies that
+= R for all j.
+With these assumptions, it is possible to show that maximizing T is
+equivalent to minimizing the function
+N
+(see appendix for derivation), where N; is the number of patterns on
+which unit i wins, M is the number of units in the cluster, and B, is the
+number of cases in which unit i responds to a particular pattern and
+does not respond to a pattern which overlaps it. This is the number of
+border patterns to which unit i responds. Formally, we have
+B, =
+MR
+Vij (1- Vik) for rik > 0.
+i k
+From this analysis, it is clear that the most stable states are ones in
+which the size of the border is minimized. Since total border region is
+minimized when regions are spherical, we can conclude that in a situation in which stimulus pairs are drawn from adjacent points in a
+6 Note that this latter condition does not quite hold for the examples presented above
+due to edge effects. Il is possible to eliminate edge effects by the use of a torus. We
+have carried our experiments on tori as well, and the results are essentially the same.
+
+5. COMPETITIVE LEARNING
+177
+high-dimensional hyperspace, our competitive learning mechanism will
+form essentially spherical regions that partition the space into one such
+spherical region for each element of the cluster.
+Another result of our simulations which can be explained by these
+equations is the tendency for each element of the cluster to capture
+roughly equally sized regions. This results from the interconnectedness
+of the stimulus population. The result is easiest in the case in which
+M= 2. In this case, the function we want to minimize is given by
++
+N,
+N2
+Now, in the case of M= 2, we have Bi= B2, since the iwo regions
+must border on one another. Moreover, we have N, + N2 = N, since
+every pattern is either responded to by Unit 1 or Unit 2. Thus, we
+want to minimize the function
+B
+N
++-
+N-N,
+This function is minimized when N, = N/ 2. Thus, there are two pressures which determine the performance of the system in these cases:
+• There is a pressure to reduce the number of border stimuli to a
+minimum.
+• There is a pressure to divide the stimulus patterns among the
+units in a way that depends on the total amount of weight that
+unit has. If two units have the same amount of weight, they
+will capture roughly equal numbers of equally likely stimulus
+patterns.
+Learning Words and Letters
+It is common practice to handcraft networks to carry out particular
+tasks. Whenever one creates such a network that performs a task
+rather successfully, the question arises as to how such a network might
+have evolved. The word perception model developed in McClelland
+and Rumelhart (1981) and Rumelhart and McClelland (1982) is one
+such case-in-point. That model offers rather detailed accounts of a
+variety of word perception experiments, but it was crafted to do its job.
+
+178 BASIC MECHANISMS
+How could it have evolved naturally? Could a competitive learning
+mechanism create such a network?
+Let's begin with the fact that the word perception model required a
+set of position-specific letter detectors.
+Suppose that a competitive
+learning mechanism is faced with a set of words-to what features
+would the system learn to respond? Would it create position-specific
+letter detectors or their equivalent? We proceeded to answer this question by again viewing the lower level units as forming a iwodimensional grid.
+Letters and words could then be presented by
+activating those units on the grid corresponding to the points of a standard CRT font. Figure 9 gives examples of some of the stimuli used in
+our experiments.
+The grid we used was a 7x14 grid. Each letter
+occurred in a 7x5 rectangular region on the grid. There was room for
+iwo letters with some space in between, as shown in the figure. We
+then carried out a series of experiments in which we presented a set of
+word and/or letter stimuli to the system allowing it to extract relevant
+features.
+Before proceeding with a description of our experiments, it should be
+mentioned that these experiments required a slight addition to the competitive learning mechanism. The problem was that, unlike the dipole
+stimuli, the letter stimuli only sparsely covered the grid and many of
+the units in the lower level never became active at all. Therefore,
+there was a possibility that, by chance, one of the units would have
+most of its weight on input lines that were never active, whereas
+another unit may have had most of its weight on lines common to all of
+the stimulus patterns. Since a unit never learns unless it wins, it is
+....
+:::::
+B
+:%:
+C
+::
+:::
+•...
+• •
+FIGURE 9. Example stimuli for the word and letter experiments.
+
+5. COMPETITIVE LEARNING 179
+possible that one of the units will never win, and therefore never learn.
+This, of course, takes the competition out of competitive learning.
+This situation is analogous to the situation in the geometric analogy in
+which all of the stimulus points are relatively close together on the
+hypersphere, and one of the weight vectors, by chance, points near the
+cluster while the other one points far from the stimuli. (See Figure
+10).
+It is clear that the more distant vector is not closest to any
+stimulus and thus can never move toward the collection. We have
+investigated two modifications to the system which deal with the problem. One, which we call the leaky learning model, modifies the learning rule to state that both the winning and the losing units move toward
+the presented stimulus: the close vector simply moves much further.
+In symbols this suggests that
+Cik
+81
+- 81 Wij
+if unit j loses on stimulus k
+AWij =
+- 8w Wij
+if unit j wins on stimulus k
+where g, is the learning rate for the losing units, 8w is the learning rate
+for the winning unit, and where 81<8w. In our experiments we made
+X
+FIGURE 10.
+• A geometric interpretation of changes in
+stimulus
+sensitivity. The larger
+the circle around the head of the weight vector the more sensitive the unit. The decision
+as to which unit wins is made on the basis of the distance from the circle rather than
+from the head of the weight vector. In the example, the stimulus pattern indicated by
+they is actually closer to the head of one vector o, but since it is closer to the circle surrounding vector punit way harl
+
+180 BASIC MECHANISMS
+8ı an order of magnitude smaller than 8w. This change has the property
+that it slowly moves the losing units into the region where the actual
+stimuli lie, at which point they begin to capture some units and the
+ordinary dynamics of competitive learning take over.
+The second method is similar to that employed by Bienenstock,
+Cooper, and Munro (1982), in which a unit modulates its own sensi
+tivity so that when it is not receiving enough inputs, it becomes
+increasingly sensitive.
+When it is receiving too many inputs, it
+decreases its sensitivity. This mechanism can be implemented in the
+present context by assuming that there is a threshold and that the
+relevant activation is the degree to which the unit exceeds its threshold
+If, whenever a unit fails to win it decreases its threshold and whenever
+it does win it increases its threshold, then this method will also make
+all of the units eventually respond, thereby engaging the mechanism of
+competitive learning. This second method can be understood in terms
+of the geometric analogy that the weight vectors have a circle surrounding the end of the vector. The relevant measure is not the distance to
+the vector itself but the distance to the circle surrounding the vector.
+Every time a unit loses, it increases the radius of the circle; every time
+it wins, it decreases the radius of the circle. Eventually, the circle on
+the losing unit will be large enough to be closer to some stimulus pattern than the other units.
+We have used both of these mechanisms in our experiments and
+they appear to result in essentially similar behavior. The former, the
+leaky learning method, does not alter the formal analysis as long as the
+ratio 81/8w is sufficiently small. The varying threshold method is more
+difficult to analyze and may, under some circumstances, distort the
+competitive learning process somewhat. After this diversion, we can
+now return to our experiments on the development of word/positionspecific letter detectors and other feature detectors.
+Position-specific letter detectors.
+In our first experiment, we
+presented letter pairs drawn from the set: AA, AB, BA, and BB.
+We
+began with clusters of size two. The results were unequivocal. The system developed position-specific letter detectors. In some experimental
+runs, one of the units responded whenever AA or AB was presented,
+and the other responded whenever BA or BB was presented. In this
+case, Unit 1 represents an A detector in position 1 and Unit 2
+represents a B detector for position 1. Moreover, as in the word perception model, the letter detectors are, of course, in a mutually inhibitory pool. On other experimental runs, the pattern was reversed. One
+of the units responded whenever there was an A in the second position
+and the other unit responded whenever there was a B in the second
+position. Figure 11 shows the final configuration of weights for one of
+
+5. COMPETITIVE LEARNING
+181
+:°..
+Unit 1
+::.
+Unit 2
+FIGURE 1I. The final configuration of weights for a system trained on the stimulus
+patterns A, B, C. D.
+our experimental runs. Note that although the units illustrated here
+respond only to the letter in the first position, there is still weight on
+the active lines in the second position. It is just that the weights on the
+first position differentiate between A and B, whereas those on the
+second position respond equally to the iwo letters. In particular, as suggested by our formal analysis, asymptotically the weights on a given
+line are proportion? to the probability that that line is active when the
+unit wins. That is, wij -p (unit; = 1| unit; wins). Since the lower
+level units unique to A occur equally as often as those unique to B, the
+weights on those lines are roughly equal. The input lines common to
+the iwo letters are on twice as often as those unique to either letter,
+and hence, they have twice as much weight. Those lines that never
+come on reach zero weight.
+Word detection units. In another experiment, we presented the
+same stimulus patterns, but increased the elements in the cluster from
+two to four. In this case, each of the four level-two units came 1o
+respond to one of the four input patterns-in short, the system
+developed word detectors. Thus, if layer two were to consist of a
+number of clusters of various sizes, large clusters with approximately
+one unit per word pattern will develop into word detectors, while
+smaller clusters with approximately the number of letters per spatial
+position will develop into position-specific letter detectors. As we shall
+see below, if the number of elements of a cluster is substantially less
+than the number of letters per position, then the cluster will come to
+detect position-specific letter features.
+Effects of number of elements per serial position. In another experiment, we varied the number of elements in a cluster and the number
+of letters per serial postopyrigmedhvaerisd stimulus patterns drawn
+
+182 BASIC MECHANISMS
+from the set: AA, AB, AC, AD, BA, BB, BC, BD. In this case, we
+found that with clusters of size two, one unit responded to the patterns
+beginning with A and the other responded to those beginning with B.
+In our previous experiment, when we had the same number of letters
+in each position, we found that the clusters were indifferent as to which
+serial position they responded. Some responded to position 1 and others to position 2.
+In this experiment, we found that a two-element
+cluster always becomes a letter detector specific to serial position in
+which two letters vary. Similarly, in the case of clusters of size four we
+found that they always became letter detectors for the position in which
+four letters varied. Thus, in this case one responded to an A in the
+second position, one responded to a B in the second position, one
+responded to a C in the second position, and one responded to a D in
+the second position. Clearly, there are two natural ways to cluster the
+stimulus patterns-two levels of structure. If the patterns are to be put
+in two categories, then the binary feature A or B in the first position is
+the relevant distinction. On the other hand, if the stimuli are to be
+grouped into four groups, the four value feature determining the
+second letter is the relevant distinction. The competitive learning algorithm can discover either of the levels of structure-depending on the
+number of elements in a cluster.
+Letter similarity effects. In another experiment, we studied the
+effects of letter similarity to look for units that detect letter features.
+We presented letter patterns consisting of a letter in the first position
+only. We chose the patterns so they formed two natural clusters based
+on the similarity of the letters to one another. We presented the letters
+A, B, S, and E. The letters were chosen so that they fell naturally into
+two classes. In our font, the letters A and E are quite similar and the
+letters B and S are very similar. We used a cluster of size two. Naturally, one of the units responded to the A or the E while the other unit
+responded to the B or the S. The weights were largest on those
+features of the stimulus pairs which were common among each of these
+similar pairs. Thus, the system developed subletter-size feature detectors for the features relevant to the discrimination.
+Correlated teaching inputs. We carried out one other set of experiments with the word/letter patterns. In this case, we used clusters of
+size iwo and presented stimuli drawn from the set: AA, BA, SB, EB.
+Note that on the left-hand side, we have the same four letters as we
+had in the previous experiment, but on the right-hand side we have
+only two patterns; these two patterns are correlated with the letter in
+the first position. An A in the second position means that the first
+position contains either an A or a B, whereas a B in the second position
+
+5. COMPETITIVE LEARNING 183
+means that the first position contains either an S or an E. Note further
+that those correlations between the first and second positions are in
+opposition to the "natural" similarity of the letters in the first serial
+position. In this experiment, we first trained the system on the four
+stimuli described above. Since the second serial position had only two
+letters in it, the size-two cluster became a position-specific letter detector for the second serial position. One unit responded to the A and one
+to the B in the second position. Notice that the units are also responding to the letters in the first serial position as well. One unit is
+responding to an A or a B in the first position while the other responds
+to an E or an S. Figure 12 shows the patterns of weights developed by
+the two units. After training, the system was then presented patterns
+containing only the first letter of the pair and, as expected, the system
+had learned the "unnatural" classification of the letters in the first position. Here the strong correlation between the first and second position
+led the competitive learning mechanism to override the strong correlation between the highly similar stimulus patterns in the first serial position. This suggests that even though the competitive learning system is
+an "unsupervised" learning mechanism, one can control what it learns
+by controlling the statistical structure of the stimulus patterns being
+presented to it. In this sense, we can think of the right-hand letter in
+this experiment as being a kind of teaching stimulus aimed at determining the classification learned for other aspects of the stimulus. It
+should also be noted that this teaching mechanism is essentially the
+same as the so-called errorless learning procedure used by Terrace
+(1963) in training pigeons to peck a certain color key by associating that
+color with a response situation where their pecking is determined by
+other factors. As we shall see below,
+this correlational teaching
+mechanism is useful in allowing the competitive learning mechanism to
+discover features which it otherwise would be unable to discover.
+....
+Unit 1
+..
+....
+Unit 2
+FIGURE 12. The pattern of weights developed in the correlated learning experiment.
+
+184
+Horizontal and Vertical Lines
+One of the classically difficult problems for a linear threshold device
+like a perceptron is to distinguish between horizontal and vertical lines.
+In general, horizontal and vertical lines are not linearly separable and
+require a multilayer perceptron system to distinguish them. One of the
+goals of the competitive learning device is for it to discover features
+that, at a higher level of analysis, might be useful for discriminating
+patterns which might not otherwise be discriminable with a linear
+threshold-type device. It is therefore of some interest to see what
+kinds of features the competitive learning mechanism discovers when
+presented with a set of vertical and horizontal lines. In the following
+discussion, we chronicle a series of experiments on this problem.
+Several of the experiments ended in failure, but we were able to discover a way in which competitive learning systems can be put together
+to build a hierarchical feature detection system capable of discriminating vertical and horizontal lines. We proceed by sketching several of
+our failures as well as our successes because the way in which the system fails is elucidating. It should be noted at the outset that our goal is
+not so much to present a model of how the human learns to distinguish
+between vertical and horizontal lines (indeed, such a distinction is probably prewired in the human system, but rather to show how competitive learning can discover features which allow for the system to learn
+distinctions with multiple layers of units that cannot be learned by
+single-layered systems. Learning to distinguish vertical and horizontal
+lines is simply a paradigm case.
+In this set of experiments, we represented the lower level of units as
+if they were on a 6x6 grid. We then had a total of 12 stimulus patterns, each consisting of turning on six Level 1 units in a row on the
+grid. Figure 13 illustrates the grid and several of the stimulus patterns.
+Ideally, one might hope that one of the units would respond whenever
+a vertical line is presented; the other would respond whenever a
+horizontal line is presented. Unfortunately, a little thought indicates
+that this is impossible. Since every input unit participates in exactly
+one vertical and one horizontal line, there is no configuration of
+weights which will distinguish vertical from horizontal. This is exactly
+why no linear threshold device can distinguish between vertical and
+horizontal lines in one level. Since that must fail, we might hope that
+some clusters in the competitive learning device will respond to vertical
+lines by assigning weights as illustrated in Figure 14. In this case, one
+unit of the pair would respond whenever the first, second, or fourth
+vertical line was presented, and another would respond whenever the
+third, fifth, or sixth vertical line was presented; since both units would
+
+185
+B
+•••
+•..
+:
+• •
+• •
+• •
+..
+::::
+•..
+D
+FIGURE 13. Stimulus patterns for the horizontal/ vertical discrimination experiments.
+receive about the same input in the face of a horizontal line, we might
+expect that sometimes one and sometimes the other would win the
+competition but that the primary response would be to vertical lines. If
+other clusters settled down similarly to horizontal lines, then a unit at
+the third level looking at the output of the various clusters could distinguish vertical and horizontal. Unfortunately, that is not the pattern of
+weights discovered by the competitive learning mechanism. Rather, a
+typical pattern of weights is illustrated in Figure 15. In this arrangement, each cluster responds to exactly three horizontal and three vertical lines. Such a cluster has lost all information that might distinguish
+vertical from horizontal. We have discovered a feature of absolutely no
+use in this distinction. In fact, such features systematically throw away
+the information relevant to
+horizontal vs. vertical. Some further
+thought indicates why such a result occurred. Note, in particular, that
+two horizontal lines have exactly nothing in common. The grid that we
+show in the diagrams is merely for our convenience. As far as the
+units are concerned there are 36 unordered input units; sometimes
+some of those units are active. Pattern similarity is determined entirely
+by pattern overlap. Since horizontal lines don't intersect, they have no
+units in common, thus they are not seen as similar at all. However,
+every horizontal line intersects with every vertical line and thus has
+much more in commoncopyrighsicadions/than with other horizontal
+
+186
+Unit 1 Cluster 1
+Unit 2 Cluster 1
+Unit 1 Cluster 2
+....
+Unit 2 Cluster 2
+FIGURE 14.
+A possible weight configuration which could distinguish vertical from
+horizontal.
+:::::
+::
+Unit 1
+... ...
+:::
+......
+Unit 2
+FIGURE 15. A typical configuration of weights for the vertical/horizontal discrimination.
+ones. It is this similarity that the competitive learning mechanism has
+discovered.
+Now, suppose that we change the system somewhat. Suppose that
+we "teach" the system the difference between vertical and horizontal
+(as we did in the previous experiments with letter strings). In this
+experiment we used a 12x6 grid. On the right-hand side of the grid we
+presented either a vertica pygnted steliline, as we did before. On
+
+5. COMPETITIVE LEARNING 187
+the left-hand side of the grid we always presented the uppermost
+horizontal line whenever any horizontal line was presented on the
+right-hand grid, and we always presented the vertical line furthest to
+the left on the left-hand grid whenever we presented any vertical line
+on the right-hand side of the grid. We then had a cluster of two units
+receiving inputs from all 12×6 = 72 lower level units. (Figure 16
+shows several of the stimulus patterns.)
+As expected, the two units soon learned to discriminate between
+vertical and horizontal lines. One of the units responded whenever a
+vertical line was presented and the other responded whenever a
+horizontal line was presented. They were responding, however, to the
+pattern on the left-hand side rather than to the vertical and horizontal
+pattern on the right. This too should be expected. Recall that the
+value of the wij approaches a value which is proportional to the probability that input unit i is active, given that unit j won the competition.
+Now, in the case of the unit that responds to vertical lines for example,
+every unit on the right-hand grid occurs equally often so that all of the
+weights connecting to units in that grid have equal weights. The same
+is true for the unit responding to the horizontal line. The weights on
+::::
+••••
+••...
+:::::
+::
+B
+•.
+••
+•.
+•.....
+••••
+•....
+D
+••...
+:::::
+.....
+•.
+•..
+••.
+••...
+•.
+FIGURE 16. Stimulus patterns for the vertical/horizontal discrimination experiments
+with a correlated "teaching" inDu parighter Arate Pidf.
+
+188 BASIC MECHANISMS
+the right-hand grid are identical for the two cluster members. Thus,
+when the "teacher" is turned off, and only the right-hand figure is
+presented, the two units respond randomly and show no evidence of
+having learned the horizontal/ vertical distinction.
+Suppose, however, that we have four, rather than two, units in the
+level-two clusters. We ran this experiment and found that of the four
+units, two of them divided up the vertical patterns and two of them
+divided up the horizontal patterns. Figure 17 illustrates the weight
+values for one of our runs. One of the units took three of the vertical
+line patterns; another unit took three other vertical patterns. A third
+unit responded to three of the horizontal line patterns, and the last unit
+responded to the remaining three horizontal lines.
+Moreover, after we
+took away the "teaching" pattern, the system continued to classify the
+vertical and horizontal lines just as it did when the left-hand "teaching"
+pattern was present.
+Cluster 1
+Unit 1
+Unit 2
+Unit 3
+••...
+......
+Unit 4
+....
+:::
+:
+Cluster 2
+Unit 1
+:
+Unit 3
+Unit 2
+.....
+:::::
+•..
+Unit 4
+.....
+••
+FIGURE 17. The weight values for the iwo clusters of size four for the
+vertical/horizontal discrimination experiment with a correlated "teaching" stimulus.
+
+5. COMPETITIVE LEARNING 189
+In one final experiment with vertical and horizontal lines, we
+developed a three-level system in which we used the same stimulus patterns as in the previous experiment; the only difference was that we
+had two clusters of four units at the second level and one cluster of two
+units at the third level. Figure 18 shows the architecture employed. In
+this case, the two four-element clusters each learned to respond to subsets of the vertical and horizontal lines as in the previous experiment.
+The two clusters generally responded to different subsets, however.
+Thus, when the upper horizontal line was presented, Unit 1 of the first
+cluster responded and Unit 3 of the second cluster responded. When
+responded again, bal line a presented no cluster also responde
+Thus, the cluster of size two at the highest level was receiving a kind of
+dipole stimulus. It has four inputs and on any trial, two of them are
+active. As with our analysis of dipole stimuli, we know that stimuli that
+overlap are always put in the same category. Note that when a vertical
+line is presented, one of the two units in each of the middle layers of
+clusters that responds to vertical lines will become active, and that none
+of the units that respond to horizontal lines will ever be active; thus,
+this means that there are two units in each middle layer cluster that
+respond to vertical lines. Whenever a vertical line is presented, one of
+the units in each cluster will become active. None of the horizontal
+units will ever be active in the face of a vertical stimulus. Thus, one of
+the units at the highest level learns to respond whenever a vertical line
+is presented, and the other unit responds whenever a horizontal line is
+Layer 1
+Layer 2
+Input Units
+FIGURE 18. The architecture for the three-level horizontal/ vertical discrimination
+experiment.
+
+190 BASIC MECHANISMS
+presented. Once the system has been trained, this occurs despite the
+absence of the "teaching" stimulus. Thus, what we have shown is that
+the competitive learning mechanism can, under certain conditions,
+develop feature detectors which allow the system to distinguish among
+patterns that are not differentiable by a simple linear unit in one level.
+CONCLUSION
+We have shown how a very simple competitive mechanism can discover a set of feature detectors that capture important aspects of the set
+of stimulus input patterns. We have also shown how these feature
+detectors can form the basis of a multilayer system that can serve to
+learn categorizations of stimulus sets that are not linearly separable.
+We have shown how the use of correlated stimuli can serve as a kind of
+"teaching" input to the system to allow the development of feature
+detectors which would not develop otherwise. Although we find the
+competitive learning mechanism a very interesting and powerful learning principle, we do not, of course, imagine that it is the only learning
+principle. Competitive learning is an essentially nonassociative, statistical learning scheme. We certainly imagine that other kinds of learning
+mechanisms will be involved in the building of associations among patterns of activation in a more complete neural network. We offer this
+analysis of these competitive learning mechanisms to further our
+understanding of how simple adaptive networks can discover features
+important in the description of the stimulus environment in which the
+system finds itself.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+This research was supported by grants from the System Development
+Foundation and by Contract N00014-79-C-0323, NR 667-437 with the
+Personnel and Training Research Programs of the Office of Naval
+Research.
+
+191
+APPENDIX
+For the case of homogeneous dipole stimulus patterns, it is possible
+to derive an expression for the most stable equilibrium state of the system. We say that a set of dipole stimulus patterns is homogeneous if
+(a) they are equally likely and (b) for every input pattern in the set
+there are a fixed number of other input patterns that overlap them.
+These conditions were met in our simulations. Our measure of stability
+is given by
+Since Pk = -
+N. we can write
+Summing the first portion of the equation over i and the second over j
+we have
+M
+T=-
+N
+NELan "к.
+Now note that when Dx = 1/N, we have d1 = Ekil Ever. Furthermore, Evik = 1 and vik = Ni, where N, is the number of patterns
+captured by unit l. Thus, we have
+T = -
+N
+NIE÷
+-.
+Now, since all stimuli are the same size, we have ri = ji. Moreover,
+since all stimuli have the same number of neighbors, we have
+Ery= [ry = R, where R is a constant determined by the dimensionality of the stimulus space from which the dipole stimuli are drawn.
+Thus, we have
+Evil
+T = -
+МЕчікок -
+RE N
+N;
+
+192 BASIC MECHANISMS
+and we have
+T=
+RM
+i k
+Since R, M, and N are constants, we have that I is maximum whenever T'= 22 vik@jk is maximum. Now substituting for dik, we can
+i K
+write
+N,
+We can
+substitute for the product
+Vik - Vik (1 - Njr). We then can write
+T'= 2-
+the
+term
+7 N; * 1
+Summing the first term of the equation first over 1, then over k, and
+then over j, gives us
+T'= MR - I
+EErk Vik Vik - Vjl).
+Now, recall that rk is given by the degree of stimulus overlap between
+stimulus 1 and stimulus k. In the case of dipoles there are only three
+possible values of rki:
+0
+no overlap
+k=/
+1/2 otherwise
+Now, the second term of the equation for T'is O if either rk = 0 or if
+Vik (1 - Vjr) = O. Since Vik is either 1 or 0, this will be zero whenever
+j=l. Thus, for all nonzero cases in the second term we have rk = 12.
+Thus we have
+T' = MR-.
+12
+N,
+22 vik (1 - Vjl).
+Finally, note that Elial-ll is 1 and to is in each case in
+which different units capture neighboring patterns. We refer to this as
+a case of bad neighbors and let B; designate the number of bad
+neighbors for unit j. Thus, we have
+
+5. COMPETITIVE LEARNING
+193
+T'= MR -
+Finally, we can see that T' will be a maximum whenever T" = 2
+- is
+N;
+minimum. Thus, minimizing T" leads to the maximally stable solution
+in this case.
+
+CHAPTER 6
+Information Processing in Dynamical Systems:
+Foundations of Harmony Theory
+P. SMOLENSKY
+INTRODUCTION
+The Theory of Information Processing
+At this early stage in the development of cognitive science, methodological issues are both open and central. There may have been times
+when developments in neuroscience, artificial intelligence, or cognitive
+psychology seduced researchers into believing that their discipline was
+on the verge of discovering the secret of intelligence. But a humbling
+history of hopes disappointed has produced the realization that understanding the mind will challenge the power of all these methodologies
+combined.
+The work reported in this chapter rests on the conviction that a
+methodology that has a crucial role to play in the development of cognitive science is mathematical analysis. The success of cognitive science, like that of many other sciences, will, I believe, depend upon the
+construction of a solid body of theoretical results: results that express in
+a mathematical language the conceptual insights of the field; results
+that squeeze all possible implications out of those insights by exploiting
+powerful mathematical techniques.
+This body of results, which I will call the theory of information processing, exists because information is a concept that lends itself to
+mathematical formalization. One part of the theory of information processing is already well-developed. The classical theory of computation
+provides powerful and elegant results about the notion of effective
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+195
+procedure, including languages for precisely expressing them and
+theoretical machines for realizing them. This body of theory grew out
+of mathematical logic, and in turn contributed to computer science,
+physical computing systems, and the theoretical paradigm in cognitive
+science often called the (von Neumann) computer metaphor.'
+In his paper "Physical Symbol Systems," Allen Newell (1980) articulated the role of the mathematical theory of symbolic computation in
+cognitive science and furnished a manifesto for what I will call the symbolic paradigm. The present book offers an alternative paradigm for
+cognitive science, the subsymbolic paradigm, in which the most powerful
+level of description of cognitive systems
+is hypothesized to be lower
+than the level that is naturally described by symbol manipulation.
+The fundamental insights into cognition explored by the subsymbolic
+paradigm do not involve effective procedures and symbol manipulation.
+Instead they involve the "spread of activation," relaxation, and statistical
+correlation. The mathematical language in
+which these concepts are
+naturally expressed are probability theory and the theory of dynamical
+systems. By dynamical systems theory I mean the study of sets of
+numerical variables (e.g., activation levels) that evolve in time in parallel and interact through differential equations. The classical theory of
+dynamical systems includes the study of natural physical systems (e.g.,
+mathematical physics) and artificially designed systems (e.g., control
+theory). Mathematical characterizations of dynamical systems that formalize the insights of the subsymbolic paradigm would be most helpful
+in developing the paradigm.
+This chapter introduces harmony theory, a mathematical framework
+for studying a class of dynamical systems that perform cognitive tasks
+according to the account of the subsymbolic paradigm. These dynamical systems can serve as models of human cognition or as designs for
+artificial cognitive systems. The ultimate goal of the enterprise is to
+develop a body of mathematical results for the theory of information
+processing that complements the results of the classical theory of (symbolic) computation. These results would serve as the basis for a manifesto for the subsymbolic paradigm comparable to Newell's manifesto
+for the symbolic paradigm. The promise offered by this goal will, I
+hope, be suggested by the results of this chapter, despite their very limited scope.
+• Mathematical logic has recently given rise to another approach to formalizing information: situation semantics (Barwise
+& Perry, 1983). This is related to Shannon's
+(1948/ 1963) measure of information through the work of Dretske (1981). The approach
+of this chapter is more faithful to the probabilistic formulation of Shannon than is the
+symbolic approach of situation semantics. (This results from Dretske's move of identifying information with conditional probabilities of 1.
+
+196 BASIC MECHANISMS
+It should be noted that harmony theory is a "theory" in the
+mathematical sense, not the scientific sense. By a "mathematical
+theory" - e.g., number theory, group theory, probability theory, the
+theory of computation -1 mean a body of knowledge about a part of the
+ideal mathematical world; a set of definitions, axioms, theorems, and
+analytic techniques that are tightly interrelated. Such mathematical
+theories are distinct from scientific theories, which are of course bodies
+of knowledge about a part of the "real" world. Mathematical theories
+provide a language for expressing scientific theories; a given mathematical theory can be used to express a large class of scientific theories.
+Group theory, for example, provides a language for expressing many
+competing theories of elementary particles. Similarly, harmony theory
+can be used to express many alternative theories about various cognitive phenomena. The point is that without the concepts and techniques
+of the mathematical language of group theory, the formulation of any
+of the current scientific theories of elementary particles would be essentially impossible.
+The goal of harmony theory is to provide a powerful language for
+expressing cognitive theories in the subsymbolic paradigm, a language
+that complements the existing languages for symbol manipulation.
+Since harmony theory is conceived as a language for using the subsymbolic paradigm to describe cognition, il embodies the fundamental
+scientific claims of that paradigm. But on many important issues, such
+as how knowledge is represented in detail for particular cases, harmony
+theory does not itself make commitments. Rather, it provides a
+language for stating alternative hypotheses and techniques for studying
+their consequences.
+A Top-Down Theoretical Strategy
+How can mathematical analysis be used to study the processing
+mechanisms underlying the performance of some cognitive task?
+One strategy, often associated with David Marr (1982), is to characterize the task in a way that allows mathematical derivation of mechanisms that perform it. This top-down theoretical strategy is pursued in
+harmony theory. My claim is not that the strategy leads to descriptions
+that are necessarily applicable to all cognitive systems, but rather that
+the strategy leads to new insights, mathematical results, computer
+architectures, and computer models that fill in the relatively unexplored
+conceptual world of parallel, massively distributed systems that perform
+cognitive tasks. Filling in this conceptual world is a necessary subtask,
+I believe, for understanding how brains and minds are capable of intelligence and for assessing whether computers with novel architectures
+might share this capabili Copyrighted Material
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+197
+The Centrality of Perceptual Processing
+The cognitive task I will study in this chapter is an abstraction of the
+task of perception. This abstraction includes many cognitive tasks that
+are customarily regarded as much "higher level" than perception (e.g.,
+intuiting answers to physics problems). A few comments on the role of
+perceptual processing in the subsymbolic paradigm are useful at this
+point.
+The vast majority of cognitive processing lies between the highest
+cognitive levels of explicit logical reasoning and the lowest levels of
+sensory processing. Descriptions of processing at the extremes are relatively well-informed-on the high end by formal logic and on the low
+end by natural science. In the middle lies a conceptual abyss. How are
+we to conceptualize cognitive processing in this abyss?
+The strategy of the symbolic paradigm is to conceptualize processing
+in the intermediate levels as symbol manipulation. Other kinds of processing are viewed as limited to extremely low levels of sensory and
+motor processing. Thus symbolic theorists climb down into the abyss,
+clutching a rope of symbolic logic anchored at the top, hoping it will
+stretch all the way to the bottom of the abyss.
+The subsymbolic paradigm takes the opposite view, that intermediate
+processing mechanisms are of the same kind as perceptual processing
+mechanisms. Logic and symbol manipulation are viewed as appropriate
+descriptions only of the few cognitive processes that explicitly involve
+logical reasoning. Subsymbolic theorists climb up into the abyss on a
+perceptual ladder anchored at the bottom, hoping it will extend all the
+way to the top of the abyss.?
+2 There is no contradiction between working from lower level, perceptual processes up
+towards higher processes, and pursuing a top-down theoretical strategy. It is important to
+distinguish levels of processing entities from levels of theoretical entities. Higher level
+processes involve computational entities that are computationally distant from the peripheral, sensorimotor entities that comprise the "lowest level" of processing. These processing levels taken together form the processing system as a whole; they causally interact
+with each other through bottom-up and top-down
+processing.
+Higher level theories
+involve descriptive entities that are descriptively distant from entities that are directly part
+of an actual processing mechanism; these comprise the "lowest level" description. Each
+theoretical level individually describes the processing system as a whole; the interaction of
+descriptive levels is not causal, but definitional.
+(For example, changes in individual
+neural firing rates at the retina cause changes in individual firing rates in visual cortex
+after a delay related to causal information propagation. The same changes in individual
+retinal neuron firing rates by definition change the average firing rates of pools of retinal
+neurons; these higher level descriptive entities change instantly, without any causal information propagation from the lower level description.) Thus in harmony theory, models
+of higher level processes are derived from models of lower level, perceptual, processes,
+hile lower level descriptions Copyrighted Matera
+derıyed from higher level descriptions
+
+198
+In this chapter, I will analyze an abstraction of the task of perception
+that encompasses many tasks, from low, through intermediate, to high
+cognitive levels. The analysis leads to a general kind of "perceptual"
+processing mechanism that is a powerful potential component of an
+information processing system. The abstract task I analyze captures a
+common part of the tasks of passing from an intensity pattern to a set
+of objects in three-dimensional space, from a sound pattern to a
+sequence of words, from a sequence of words to a semantic description,
+from a set of patient symptoms to a set of disease states, from a set of
+givens in a physics problem to a set of unknowns. Each of these
+processes is viewed as completing an internal representation of a static
+state of an external world. By suitably abstracting the task of interpreting
+a static sensory input, we can arrive at a theory of interpretation of static
+input generally, a theory of the completion task that applies to many cognitive phenomena in the gulf between perception and logical reasoning
+An application that will be described in some detail is qualitative problem solving in circuit analysis.3
+The central idea of the top-down theoretical strategy is that properties
+of the task are powerfully constraining on mechanisms. This idea can
+be well exploited within a perceptual approach to cognition, where the
+constraints on the perceptual task are characterized through the constraints operative in the external environment from which the inputs
+come. This permits an analysis of how internal representation of these
+constraints within the cognitive system itself allows it to perform its
+task. These kinds of considerations have been emphasized in the
+psychological literature prominently by Gibson and Shepard (see
+Shepard, 1984); they are fundamental to harmony theory.
+Structure of the Chapter
+The goal of harmony theory is to develop a mathematical theory of
+information processing in the subsymbolic paradigm. However, the
+theory grows out of ideas that can be stated with little or no mathematics. The organization of this chapter reflects an attempt to ensure that
+the central concepts are not obscured by mathematical opacity. The
+analysis will be presented in three parts, each part increasing in the
+level of formality and detail. My hope is that the slight redundancy
+3 Many cognitive tasks involve interpreting or controlling events that unfold over an
+extended period of time. To deal properly with such tasks, harmony theory must be
+extended from the interpretation of static environments to the interpretation of dynamic
+environments.
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+199
+introduced by this expository organization will be repaid by greater
+accessibility.
+Section 1 is a top-down presentation of how the perceptual perspective on cognition leads to the basic features of harmony theory. This
+presentation starts with a particular perceptual model, the letterperception model of McClelland and Rumelhart (1981), and abstracts
+from it general features that can apply to modeling of higher cognitive
+processes. Crucial to the development is a particular formulation of
+aspects of schema theory, along the lines of Rumelhart (1980).
+Section 2, the majority of the chapter, is a bottom-up presentation of
+harmony theory that starts with the primitives of the knowledge
+representation. Theorems are informally described that provide a competence theory for a cognitive system that performs the completion
+task, a machine that realizes this theory, and a learning procedure
+through which the machine can absorb the necessary information from
+its environment.
+Then an application of the general
+theory is
+described: a model of intuitive, qualitative problem-solving in elementary electric circuits. This model illustrates several points about the
+relation between symbolic and subsymbolic descriptions of cognitive
+phenomena; for example, it furnishes a sharp contrast between the
+description
+at these two levels of the nature and acquisition of
+expertise.
+The final part of the chapter is an Appendix containing a concise but
+self-contained formal presentation of the definitions and theorems.
+SECTION 1: SCHEMA THEORY AND
+SELF-CONSISTENCY
+THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF HARMONY THEORY
+The logical structure of harmony theory is shown schematically in
+Figure 1. The box labeled Mathematical Theory represents the use of
+mathematical analysis and computer simulation for drawing out the
+implications of the fundamental principles. These principles comprise a
+mathematical characterization of computational requirements of a cognitive system that performsphigamanwarenaask. From these principles
+
+200
+schemata
+Inference
+harmony
+probability
+CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS
+descriptive characterization
+of computational requirementa
+--
+--
+mathematical characterization
+of computation requirements
+• characterization
+of performance
+machine implementation
+(simulation): PROCESS
+MATHEMATICAL THEORY
+---
+simulation
+formalization
+derivation
+FIGURE 1. The logical structure of harmony theory.
+it is possible to mathematically analyze aspects of the resulting performance as well as rigorously derive the rules for a machine implementing
+the computational requirements. The rules defining this machine have
+a different status from those defining most other computer models of
+cognition: They are not ad hoc, or post hoc; rather they are logically
+derived from a set of computational requirements. This is one sense in
+which harmony theory has a top-down theoretical development.
+Where do the "mathematically characterized computational requirements" of Figure I come from? They are a formalization of a descriptive characterization of cognitive processing, a simple form of schema
+theory.
+In Section 1 of this chapter, I will
+give a description of this
+form of schema theory and show how 1o transform the descriptive characterization into a mathematical one-how lo gel from the conceptual
+box of Figure 1 into the mathematical box. Once we are in the formal
+world, mathematical analysis and computer simulation can be put 10
+work.
+Throughout Section 1, the main points of the development will be
+explicitly enumerated.
+Point 1. The mathematics of harmony theory is founded on familiar
+concepts of cognitive science: inference through activation of schemara.
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+201
+DYNAMIC CONSTRUCTION OF SCHEMATA
+The basic problem can be posed à la Schank (1980). While eating at
+a fancy restaurant, you get a headache. Without effort, you ask the
+waitress if she could possibly get you an aspirin. How is this plan
+created? You have never had a headache in a restaurant before. Ordinarily, when you get a headache your plan is to go to your medicine
+cabinet and get yourself some aspirin. In the current situation, this
+plan must be modified by the knowledge that in good restaurants, the
+management is willing to expend effort to please its customers, and that
+the waitress is a liaison to that management.
+The cognitive demands of this situation are schematically illustrated
+in Figure 2. Ordinarily, the restaurant context calls for a "restaurant
+script" which supports the planning and inferencing required to reach
+the usual goal of getting a meal. Ordinarily, the headache context calls
+for a "headache script" which supports the planning required to get aspirin in the usual context of home. The completely novel context of a
+headache in a restaurant calls for a special-purpose script integrating the
+knowledge that ordinarily manifests itself in two separate scripts.
+What kind of cognitive system is capable of this degree of flexibility?
+Suppose that the knowledge base of the system does not consist of a set
+of scripts like the restaurant script and the headache script. Suppose
+Headache in a Restaurant
+restaurant
+context
+knowledge
+restaurant
+script
+inferences, goals
+headache
+context
+knowledge
+headache
+script
+→
+inferences, goals
+restaurant
+& headache
+context
+knowledge
+specialpurpose
+script
+→
+'ask waitress
+for aspirin'
+FIGURE 2. In three different contexts, the knowledge base must produce three different
+scripts.
+
+202 BASIC MECHANISMS
+instead that the knowledge base is a set of knowledge atoms that configure themselves dynamically in each context to form tailor-made scripts.
+This is the fundamental idea formalized in harmony theory. 4
+The degree of flexibility demanded of scripts is equaled by that
+demanded of all conceptual structures. S For example, metaphor is an
+extreme example of the flexibility demanded of word meanings; even
+so-called literal meaning on closer inspection actually relies on extreme
+flexibility of knowledge application (Rumelhart, 1979). In this chapter
+I will consider knowledge structures that embody our knowledge of
+objects, words, and other concepts of comparable complexity; these 1
+will refer to as schemata. The defining properties of schemata are that
+they have conceptual interpretations and that they support inference.
+For lack of a better term, I will use knowledge atoms to refer to the
+elementary constituents of which I assume schemata to be composed. 6
+These atoms will shortly be given a precise description; they will be
+interpreted as a particular instantiation of the idea of memory trace.
+Point 2. At the time of inference, stored knowledge atoms are dynamically assembled into context-sensitive schemata.
+This view of schemata was explicitly articulated in Feldman (1981).
+It is in part embodied in the McClelland and Rumelhart (1981) letterperception model (see Chapter 1). One of the observed phenomena
+accounted for by this model is the facilitation of the perception of
+letters that are embedded in words. Viewing the perception of a letter
+as the result of a perceptual inference process, we can say that this
+inference is supported by a word schema that appears in the model as a
+single processing unit that encodes the knowledge of the spelling of that
+word. This is not an instantiation of the view of schemata as dynamically created entities.
+4 Schank (1980) describes a symbolic implementation of the idea of dynamic script construction; harmony theory constitutes a subsymbolic formalization.
+5 Hofstadter has long been making the case for the inadequacy of traditional symbolic
+descriptions to cope with the power and flexibility of concepts. For his most recent argument, see Hofstadter (1985). He argues for the need to admit the approximate nature of
+symbolic descriptions, and to explicitly consider processes that are subcognitive. In
+Hofstadter (1979, p. 324(f), this same case was phrased in terms of the need for "active
+symbols," of which the "schemata" described here can be viewed as instances.
+& A physicist might call these particles gnosons or sophons, but these terms seem quite
+uneuphonious. An acronym for Units for Constructing Schemata Dynamically might serve,
+but would perhaps be taken as an advertising gimmick. So I have stuck with "knowledge
+atoms."
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+• 203
+However, the model also accounts for the observed facilitation of
+letter perception within orthographically regular nonwords or pseudowords like MAVE. When the model processes this stimulus, several
+word units become and stay quite active, including MAKE, WAVE,
+HAVE, and other words orthographically similar to MAVE. In this
+case, the perception of a letter in the stimulus is the result of an inference process that is supported by the collection of activated units. This
+collection is a dynamically created pseudoword schema.
+When an orthographically irregular nonword is processed by the
+model, letter perception is slowest. As in the case of pseudowords,
+many word units become active. However, none become very active,
+and very many are equally active, and these words have very little similarity to each other, so they do not support inference about the letters
+effectively. Thus the knowledge base is incapable of creating schemata
+for irregular nonwords.
+Point 3. Schemata are coherent assemblies of knowledge atoms; only
+these can support inference.
+Note that schemata are created simply by activating the appropriate
+atoms. This brings us to what was labeled in Figure 1 the "descriptively
+characterized computational requirements" for harmony theory:
+Point 4: The harmony principle. The cognitive system is an engine for
+activating coherent assemblies of atoms and drawing inferences that are
+consistent with the knowledge represented by the activated atoms.
+Subassemblies of activated atoms that tend to recur exactly or approximately are the schemata.
+This principle focuses attention on the notion of coherency or consistency. This concept will be formalized under the name of harmony,
+and its centrality is acknowledged by the name of the theory.
+MICRO- AND MACROLEVELS
+It is important to realize that harmony theory, like all subsymbolic
+accounts of cognition, exists on two distinct levels of description: a
+microlevel involving knowledge atoms and a macrolevel involving schemata (see Chapter 14). These levels of description are completely
+analogous to other micro- and macrotheories, for example, in physics.
+The microtheory, quantum physics, is assumed to be universally valid.
+Part of its job as a theory is to explain why the approximate
+macrotheory, classical physics.
+sper mediaterait does and why it breaks
+
+204 BASIC MECHANISMS
+down when it does. Understanding of physics requires understanding
+both levels of theory and the relation between them.
+In the subsymbolic paradigm in cognitive science, it is equally important to understand the two levels and their relationship. In harmony
+theory, the microtheory prescribes the nature of the atoms, their
+interaction, and their development through experience. This description is assumed to be a universally valid description of cognition. It is
+also assumed (although this has yet to be explicitly worked out) that in
+performing certain cognitive tasks (e.g., logical reasoning), a higher
+level description is a valid approximation. This macrotheory describes
+schemata, their interaction, and their development through experience.
+One of the features of the formalism of harmony theory that distinguishes it from most subsymbolic accounts of cognition is that it
+exploits a formal isomorphism with statistical physics. Since the main
+goal of statistical physics is to relate the microscopic description of
+matter to its macroscopic properties, harmony theory can bring the
+power of statistical physics concepts and techniques to bear on the
+problem of understanding the relation between the micro- and macroaccounts of cognition.
+THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE
+In the previous section, the letter-perception model was used to illustrate the dynamic construction of schemata from constituent atoms.
+However, it is only pseudowords that correspond to composite schemata; word schemata are single atoms. We can also represent words as
+composite schemata by using digraph units at the upper level instead of
+four-letter word units. A portion of this modified letter-perception
+model is shown in Figure 3. Now the processing of a four-letter word
+involves the activation of a set of digraph units, which are the
+knowledge atoms of this model. Omitted from the figure are the
+Knowledge
+Atoms
+W,AZ
+M, AZ
+Representational
+Features
+W
+FIGURE 3. A portion of a modified reading model.
+M2
+Ma
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+205
+Knowledge
+Atoms
+W,AZ
+M,A
+Representational
+Features
++
+(W.
++
+MAZ
+ALKs
+→ 10
++
++→
+FIGURE 4. Each knowledge atom is a vector of t, -, and O values of the representational feature nodes.
+line-segment units, which are like those in the original letter-perception
+model.
+This simple model illustrates several points about the nature of
+knowledge atoms in harmony theory. The digraph unit W1A2
+represents a pattern of values over the letter units: Wy and A2 on, with
+all other letter units for positions 1 and 2 off. This pattern is shown in
+Figure 4, using the labels +, -, and 0 to denote on, off, and irrelevant.
+These indicate whether there is an excitatory connection, inhibitory
+connection, or no connection between the corresponding nodes.'
+Figure 4
+shows the basic structure of harmony models. There are
+atoms of knowledge, represented by nodes in an upper layer, and a
+lower layer of nodes that comprises a representation of the state of the
+perceptual or problem domain with which the system deals. Each node
+is a feature in the representation of the domain. We can now view
+"atoms of knowledge" like W, and A2 in several ways. Mathematically,
+each atom is simply a vector of t, -, and O values, one for each node
+in the lower, representation layer. This pattern can also be viewed as a
+fragment of a percept: The 0 values mark those features omitted in the
+fragment. This fragment can in turn be interpreted as a trace left
+behind in memory by perceptual experience.
+7 Omitted are the knowledge atoms that relate the letter nodes to the line segment
+nodes. Both line segment and letter nodes are in the lower layer, and all knowledge
+atoms are in the upper layer. Hierarchies in harmony theory are imbedded within an
+architecture of only iwo layers of nodes, as will be discussed in Section 2.
+
+206
+Point 5. Knowledge atoms are fragments of representations that accumulate with experience.
+THE COMPLETION TASK
+Having specified more precisely what the atoms of knowledge are, it
+is time to specity the task in which they are used.
+Many cognitive tasks can be viewed as inference tasks. In problem
+solving, the role of inference is obvious; in perception and language
+comprehension, inference is less obvious but just as central. In harmony theory, a tightly prescribed but extremely general inferential task
+is studied: the completion task. In a problem-solving completion task, a
+partial description of a situation is given (for example, the initial state
+of a system); the problem is to complete the description to fill in the
+missing information (the final state, say). In a story understanding
+completion task, a partial description of some events and actors' goals is
+given; comprehension involves filling in the missing events and goals.
+In perception, the stimulus gives values for certain low-level features of
+the environmental state, and the perceptual system must fill in values
+for other features. In general, in the completion task some features of
+an environmental state are given as input, and the cognitive system
+must complete that input by assigning likely values to unspecified
+features.
+A simple example of a completion task (Lindsay & Norman, 1972) is
+shown in Figure S. The task is to fill in the features of the obscured
+portions of the stimulus and to decide what letters are present. This
+task can be performed by the model shown in Figure 3, as follows.
+The stimulus assigns values of on and off to the unobscured letter
+features. What happens is summarized in Table 1.
+Note that which atoms are activated affects how the representation is
+MAKe
+FIGURE 5. A perceptual completion task.
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+207
+TABLE 1
+A PROCEDURE FOR PERFORMING THE COMPLETION TASK
+Input:
+Activation:
+Inference:
+Assign values to some features in the representation
+Activate atoms that are consistent with the representation
+Assign values to unknown features of representation that
+are consistent with the active knowledge
+filled in, and how the representation is filled in affects which atoms are
+activated. The activation and inference processes mutually constrain
+each other; these processes must run in parallel. Note also that all the
+decisions come out of a striving for consistency.
+Point 6. Assembly of schemata (activation of atoms) and inference
+(completing missing parts of the representation) are both achieved by
+finding maximally self-consistent states of the system that are also consistent with the input.
+The completion of the stimulus shown in Figure S is shown in
+Figure 6. The consistency is high because wherever an active atom is
+M, A2
+A,K3
+к,Е,
+M,
+3/
+=
+active;
+on
+= inactive:
+off
+FIGURE 6. The state of the reptignted Waleira, of the stimulus shown in Figure 5.
+
+208
+connected to a representational feature by a + (respectively, -) connection, that feature has value on (respectively, off). In fact, we can define
+a very simple measure of the degree of self-consistency just by considering all active atoms, counting +1 for every agreement between one
+of its connections and the value of the corresponding feature, and
+counting -1 for every disagreement. (Here + with on or - with off
+constitutes agreement.) This is the simplest
+example of a harmony
+function-and brings us into the mathematical formulation.
+THE HARMONY FUNCTION
+Point 6 asserts that a central cognitive process is the construction of
+cognitive states that are "maximally self-consistent." To make this precise, we need only measure that self-consistency.
+Point 7. The self-consistency of a possible state of the cognitive system
+can be assigned a quantitative value by a harmony function, H.
+Figure 7 displays a harmony function that generalizes the simple example discussed in the preceding paragraph. A state of the system is
+defined by a set of atoms which are active and a vector of values for all
+representational features. The harmony of such a state is the sum of
+terms, one for each active atom, weighted by the strength of that atom.
+Each weight multiplies the self-consistency between that particular atom
+and the vector of representational feature values. That self-consistency
+is the similarity between the vector of features defining the atom (the
+vector of its connections) and the representational feature vector. In
+the simplest case discussed above, the function h that measures this
+similarity is just the number of agreements between these vectors
+minus the number of disagreements. For reasons to be discussed, I
+have used a slightly more complicated version of h in which the
+simpler form is first divided by the number of (nonzero) connections
+to the atom, and then a fixed value « is subtracted.
+harmonyknowadge representational feature vector, activations)
+=
+of atom a
+atoms
+FIGURE 7. A schematic represeopyrighted heater function.
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+209
+A PROBABILISTIC FORMULATION
+OF SCHEMA THEORY
+The next step in the theoretical development requires returning to
+the higher level, symbolic description of inference, and to a more
+detailed discussion of schemata.
+Consider a typical inference process described with schemata. A
+child is reading a story about presents, party hats, and a cake with candles. When asked questions, the child says that the girl getting the
+presents is having a birthday. In the terminology of schema theory,
+while reading the story, the child's birthday party schema becomes active
+and allows many inferences to be made, filling in details of the scene
+that were not made explicit in the story.
+The birthday party schema is presumed to be a knowledge structure
+that contains variables like birthday cake, guest of honor, other guests,
+gifts, location, and so forth. The schema contains information on how
+to assign values to these variables. For example, the schema may
+specify: default values to be assigned to variables in the absence of any
+counterindicating information; value restrictions limiting the kind of
+values that can be assigned to variables; and dependency information,
+specifying how assigning a particular value to one variable affects the
+values that can be assigned to another variable.
+A convenient framework for concisely and uniformly expressing all
+this information is given by probability theory. The default value for a
+variable can be viewed as its most probable value: the mode of the marginal probability distribution for that variable. The value restrictions on
+a variable specify the values for which it has nonzero probability: the
+support of its marginal distribution. The dependencies between variables are expressed by their statistical correlations, or, more completely,
+by their joint probability distributions.
+So the birthday party schema can be viewed as containing information about the probabilities that its variables will have various possible
+values. These are clearly statistical properties of the particular domain
+or environment in which the inference task is being carried out. In reading the story, the child is given a partial description of a scene from the
+everyday environment-the values of some of the features used to
+represent that scene-and to understand the story, the child must complete the description by filling in the values for the unknown features.
+These values are assigned in such a way that the resulting scene has the
+highest possible probability. The birthday party schema contains the
+probabilistic information needed to carry out these inferences.
+In a typical cognitive task, many schemata become active at once and
+interact heavily during the inference process. Each schema contains
+probabilistic informationdopyhgANa NAsiebaf, which are only a fraction
+
+210
+of the complete set of variables involved in the task. To perform a
+completion, the most probable set of values must be assigned to the
+unknown variables, using the information in all the active schemata.
+This probabilistic formulation of these aspects of schema theory can
+be simply summarized as follows.
+Point 8. Each schema encodes the statistical relations among a few
+re presentational features. During inference, the probabilistic information
+in many active schemata are dynamically folded together to find the most
+probable state of the environment.
+Thus the statistical knowledge encoded in all the schemata allow the
+estimation of the relative probabilities of possible states of the environment. How can this be done?
+At the macrolevel of schemata and variables, coordinating the folding
+together of the information of many schemata is difficult to describe.
+The inability to devise procedures that capture the flexibility displayed
+in human use of schemata was in fact one of the primary historical reasons for turning to the microlevel description (see Chapter 1). We
+therefore return to the microdescription to address this difficult
+problem.
+At the microlevel, the probabilistic knowledge in the birthday party
+schema is distributed over many knowledge atoms, each carrying a
+small bit of statistical information. Because these atoms all tend to
+match the representation of a birthday party scene, they can become
+active together; in some approximation, they tend to function collectively, and in that sense they comprise a schema.
+Now, when many
+schemata are active at once, that means the knowledge atoms that
+comprise them are simultaneously active. At the microlevel, there is
+no real difference between the decisions required to activate the
+appropriate atoms to instantiate many schemata simultaneously and the
+decisions required to activate the atoms to instantiate a single schema.
+A computational system that can dynamically create a schema when it is
+needed can also dynamically create many schemata when they are
+needed. When atoms, not schemata, are the elements of computation,
+the problem of coordinating many schemata becomes subsumed in the
+problem of activating the appropriate atoms. And this is the problem
+that the harmony function, the measure of self-consistency, was created
+to solve.
+HARMONY THEORY
+According to Points 2, 6, and 7, schemata are collections of
+knowledge atoms that become active in order 1o maximize harmony,
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+211
+and inferences are also drawn to maximize harmony. This suggests that
+the probability of a possible state of the environment is estimated by
+computing its harmony: the higher the harmony, the greater the probability. In fact, from the mathematical properties of probability and harmony, in Section 2 we will show the following:
+Point 9. The relationship berween the harmony function H and
+estimated probabilities is of the form
+probability « eHIT
+where T is some constant that cannot be determined a priori.
+This relationship between probability and harmony is mathematically
+identical to the relationship between probability and (minus) energy in
+statistical physics: the Gibbs or Boltzmann law. This is the basis of the
+isomorphism between cognition and physics exploited by harmony
+theory. In statistical physics, His called the Hamiltonian function; it
+measures the energy of a state of a physical system. In physics, T is
+the temperature of the system. In harmony theory, T is called the computational temperature of the cognitive system. When the temperature is
+very high, completions with high harmony are assigned estimated probabilities that are only slightly higher than those assigned to low harmony completions; the environment is treated as more random in the
+sense that all completions are estimated to have roughly equal probability. When the temperature is very low, only the completions with
+highest harmony are given nonnegligible estimated probabilities. 8
+Point 10. The lower the computational temperature, the more the
+estimated probabilities are weighted towards the completions of highest
+harmony.
+In particular, the very best completion can be found by lowering the
+temperature to zero. This process, cooling, is fundamental to harmony
+theory. Concepts and techniques from thermal physics can be used to
+understand and analyze decision-making processes in harmony theory.
+A technique for performing Monte Carlo computer studies of thermal systems can be readily adapted to harmony theory.
+Point 11. A massively parallel stochastic machine can be designed that
+performs completions in accordance with Points 1-10.
+8 Since harmony corresponds 10 minus energy, at low physical temperatures only the
+state with the lowest energy (the ground stare) has nonnegligible probability.
+
+212 BASIC MECHANISMS
+For a given harmony model (e.g., that of Figure 4), this machine is
+constructed as follows. Every node in the network becomes a simple
+processor, and every link in the network becomes a communication link
+between two processors. The processors each have two possible values
+(+1 and - 1 for the representational feature processors; 1 = active and
+O = inactive for the knowledge atom processors). The input to a completion problem is provided by fixing the values of some of the feature
+processors. Each of the other processors continually updates its value
+by making stochastic decisions based on the harmony associated at the
+current time with its two possible values. It is most likely to choose the
+value that corresponds to greater harmony; but with some
+probability-greater the higher is the computational temperature T-it
+will make the other choice. Each processor computes the harmony
+associated with its possible values by a numerical calculation that uses
+as input the numerical values of all the other processors to which it is
+connected. Alternately, all the atom processors update in parallel, and
+then all the feature processors update in parallel. The process repeats
+many times, implementing the procedure of Table 1. All the while, the
+temperature T is lowered to zero, pursuant to Point 10. It can be
+proved that the machine will eventually "freeze" into a completion that
+maximizes the harmony.
+I call this machine harmonium because, like the Selfridge and Neisser
+(1960) pattern recognition system pandemonium, it is a parallel distributed processing system in which many atoms of knowledge are simultaneously "shouting" out their little contributions to the inference process; but unlike pandemonium, there is an explicit method to the madness: the collective search for maximal harmony.?
+The final point concerns the account of learning in harmony theory.
+Point 12. There is a procedure for accumulating knowledge atoms
+through exposure to the environment so that the system will perform the
+completion task optimally.
+The precise meaning of "optimality" will be an important topic in the
+subsequent discussion.
+This completes the descriptive account of the foundations of harmony theory. Section 2 fills in many of the steps and details omitted
+9 Harmonium is closely related to the Boltzmann machine discussed in Chapter 7. The
+basic dynamics of the machines are the same, although there are differences in most
+details. In the Appendix, it is shown that in a certain sense the Boltzmann machine is a
+special case of harmonium, in which knowledge atoms connected 1o more than iwo
+features are forbidden. In another sense, harmonium is a special case of the Boltzmann
+machine, in which the connections are restricted to go only between two layers.
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+213
+above, and reports the results of some particular studies. The most formal matters are treated in the Appendix.
+SECTION 2: HARMONY THEORY
+... the privileged unconscious phenomena, those susceptible of
+becoming conscious, are those which... affect most profoundly our
+emotional sensibility... Now, what are the mathematic entities to
+which we attribute this character of beauty and elegance...?
+They are those whose elements are harmoniously disposed so that
+the mind without effort can embrace their totality while realizing the
+details. This harmony is at once a satisfaction of our esthetic needs
+and an aid to the mind, sustaining and guiding.... Figure the
+future elements of our combinations as something like the unhooked
+atoms of Epicurus.... They flash in every direction through the
+space... like the molecules of a gas in the kinematic theory of
+gases.
+Then their mutual impacts may produce new combinations.
+Henri Poincare (1913)
+Mathematical Creation'°
+In Section 1, a top-down analysis led from the demands of the completion task and a probabilistic formulation of schema theory to perceptual features, knowledge atoms, the central notion of harmony, and the
+role of harmony in estimating probabilities of environmental states. In
+Section 2, the presentation will be bottom-up, starting from the
+primitives.
+KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION
+Representation Vector
+tive pocess is a set of represe tationai features or a paricular cosei
+... • hese
+101 am indebted to Yves Chauvin for recently pointing out this remarkable passage by
+the great mathematician. See optighter Materify 655-656).
+
+214
+features constitute the cognitive system's representation of possible
+states of the environment with which it deals. In the environment of
+visual perception, these features might include pixels, edges, depths of
+surface elements, and identifications of objects. In medical diagnosis,
+features might be symptoms, outcomes of tests, diseases, prognoses,
+and treatments. In the domain of qualitative circuit analysis, the
+features might include increase in current through resistor x and increase
+in voltage drop across resistor x.
+The representational features are variables that I will assume take on
+binary values that can be thought of as present and absent or true and
+false. Binary values contain a tremendous amount of representational
+power, so it is not a great sacrifice to accept the conceptual and technical simplification they afford. It will turn out to be convenient to
+denote present and absent respectively by +1 and - 1, or, equivalently,
++ and -. Other values could be used if corresponding modifications
+were made in the equations to follow. The use of continuous numerical feature variables, while introducing some additional technical complexity, would not affect the basic character of the theory."
+A representational state of the cognitive system is determined by a
+collection of values for all the representational variables (ri). This collection can be designated by a list or vector of t's and -'s: the
+representation vector r.
+Where do the features used in the representation vector come from?
+Are they "innate" or do they develop with experience? These crucial
+questions will be deferred until the last section of this chapter. The
+evaluation of various possible representations for a given environment
+and the study of the development of good representations through
+exposure to the environment is harmony theory's raison d'être. But a
+prerequisite for understanding the appropriateness of a representation is
+understanding how the representation supports performance on the task
+for which it used; that is the primary concern of this chapter. For now,
+we simply assume that somehow a set of representational features has
+already been set up: by a programmer, or experience, or evolution.
+I While continuous values make the analysis more complex, they may well improve
+the performance of the simulation models. In simulations with discrete values, the syslem state jumps between corners of a hypercube; with continuous values, the system
+state crawls smoothly around inside the hypercube. It was observed in the work reported
+in Chapter 14 that "bad" corners corresponding to stable nonoptimal completions (local
+harmony maxima) were typically nor visited by the smoothly moving continuous state:
+these corners typically are visited by the jumping discrele state and can only be escaped
+from through thermal stochasticity. Thus continuous values may sometimes eliminate
+the need for stochastic simulation.
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+215
+Activation Vector
+The representational features serve as the blackboard on which the
+cognitive system carries out its computations. The knowledge that
+guides those computations is associated with the second set of entities,
+the knowledge atoms. Each such atom a is characterized by a knowledge
+vector ka, which is a list of +1, -1, and O values, one for each
+representation variable ri. This list encodes a piece of knowledge that
+specifies what value each r; should have: +1, -1, or unspecified (0).
+Associated with knowledge atom a is its activation variable, aa. This
+variable will also be taken to be binary: 1 will denote active; O, inactive.
+Because harmony theory is probabilistic, degrees of activation are
+represented by varying probability of being active rather than varying
+values for the activation variable. (Like continuous values for
+representation variables, continuous values for activation variables
+could be incorporated into the theory with little difficulty, but a need to
+do so has not yet arisen.) The list of 10,1) values for the activations
+laal comprises the activation vector a.
+Knowledge atoms encode subpatterns of feature values that occur in
+the environment. The different frequencies with which various such
+patterns occur is encoded in the set of strengths, (oal, of the atoms.
+In the example of qualitative circuit analysis, each knowledge atom
+records a pattern of qualitative changes in some of the circuit features
+(currents, voltages, etc.). These patterns are the ones that are consistent with the laws of physics, which are the constraints characterizing
+the circuit environment. Knowledge of the laws of physics is encoded
+in the set of knowledge atoms. For example, the atom whose
+knowledge vector contains all zeroes except those features encoding the
+pattern < current decreases, voltage decreases, resistance increases> is one
+of the atoms encoding qualitative knowledge of Ohm's law. Equally
+important is the absence of an atom like one encoding the pattern
+<current increases, voltage decreases, resistance increases>, which
+violates Ohm's law.
+There is a very useful graphical representation for knowledge atoms;
+it was illustrated in Figure 4 and is repeated as Figure 8. The representational features are designated by nodes drawn in a lower layer; the
+activation variables are depicted by nodes drawn in an upper layer. The
+connections from an activation variable da to the representation variables (ri) show the knowledge vector ka.
+When ka contains a + or -
+for ri, the connection between do and r; is labeled with the appropriate
+sign; when ka contains a 0 for ri, the connection between do and r, is
+omitted.
+In Figure 8, all atoms are assumed to have unit strength. In general,
+different atoms will haveoffagate@matether the strength of each atom
+
+216
+Knowledge
+Atoms
+W,AZ
+(
+M, A
+A,K3
+Representational
+Features
+EW, A2 = 1-
+=
+KA,k, = 10
+(M.)
++
++
++
++
+FIGURE 8. The graphical representation of a particular harmony model.
+would them be indicated above the atom in the drawing. (For the completely general case, see Figure 13.)
+Hierarchies and the Architecture of Harmony Networks
+One of the characteristics that distinguishes harmony models from
+other parallel network models is that the graph always contains two
+layers of nodes, with rather different semantics. As in many networks,
+the nodes in the upper layer correspond to patterns of values in the
+lower layer.
+In the letter-perception model of McClelland and
+Rumelhart, for example, the word nodes correspond to patterns over
+the letter nodes, and the letter nodes in turn correspond to patterns
+over the line-segment nodes. The letter-perception model is typical in
+its hierarchical structure: The nodes are stratified into a sequence of
+several layers, with nodes in one layer being connected only to nodes in
+adjacent layers. Harmony models use only two layers.
+The formalism could be extended to many layers, but the use of two
+layers has a principled foundation in the semantics of these layers.
+• The
+nodes in the representation layer support representations of the environment at all levels of abstractness. In the case of written words, this layer
+could support representation at the levels of line segments, letters, and
+words, as shown schematically in Figure 9. The upper, knowledge,
+layer encodes the patterns among these representations. If information
+is given about line segoshlighted malena, of the knowledge atoms
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+217
+connect that information with the letter nodes, completing the
+representation to include letter recognition. Other knowledge atoms
+connect patterns on the letter nodes with word nodes, and these complete the representation to include word recognition.
+The pattern of connectivity of Figure 9 allows the network to be
+redrawn as shown in Figure 10. This network shows an alternation of
+representation and knowledge nodes, restoring the image of a series of
+layers. In this sense, "vertically" hierarchical networks of many layers
+can be imbedded as "horizontally" hierarchical networks within a twolayer harmony network.
+Figure 10 graphically displays the fact that in a harmony architecture,
+the nodes that encode patterns are not part of the representation; there
+is a firm distinction between representation and knowledge nodes. This
+distinction is not made in the original letter-perception model, where
+the nodes that detect a pattern over the line-segment features are identical with the nodes that actually represent the presence of letters. This
+distinction seems artificial; why is it made?
+I claim that the artificiality actually resides in the original letterperception model, in which the presence of a letter can be identified
+with a single pattern over the primitive graphical features (line segments). In a less idealized reading task, the presence of a letter would
+have to be inferable from many different combinations of primitive
+graphical features. In harmony theory, the idea is that there would be a
+set of representation nodes dedicated to the representation of the presence of letters independent of their shapes, sizes, orientations, and so
+forth. There would also be a set of representation nodes for graphical
+segment/letter
+knowledge atoms
+letter/word
+knowledge atoms
+ABLE
+..
+CANE)..•
+line-segment nodes
+letter nodes
+FIGURE 9.
+The representational features support representations al
+abstractness.
+word nodes
+all levels of
+
+218
+word nodes
+ABLE
+) ...
+CANE
+•..
+letter/word
+atoms
+letter nodes
+segment/letter
+atoms
+line-segment
+nodes
+•..
+..
+FIGURE 10. A rearrangement of the network of Figure 9.
+features, and for each letter there would be a multitude of knowledge
+atoms, each relating a particular configuration of graphical features with
+the representation of that letter. Thus the knowledge or schema for
+that letter would be distributed over many knowledge atoms, all of
+which would be involved in setting up the same representation on the
+letter nodes. To provide a broader context, Figure 11 schematically
+depicts a possible model for language processing. The full representation consists of graphical features, phonological features, syntactic
+features, and semantic features. Some of the knowledge atoms provide
+connections among features within a single category, while others connect features in different categories. The nodes in the upper layer do
+not themselves comprise parts of the representation, but rather encode
+relations between parts of the representation.
+The advantages of the iwo-layer scheme come from simplicity and
+uniformity. There are no connections within layers, only between
+layers. This simplifies maopynghired Maresis, considerably and permits a
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+219
+knowledge atoms
+graphical
+features
+letter
+nodes
+word
+nodes
+phonological
+features
+syntactic
+features
+semantic
+features
+FIGURE I1. A complete model for language processing would involve representational
+variables of many types, and the atoms relating them.
+truly parallel implementation. The uniformity means that we can imagine a system starting out with an "innate" two-layer structure and
+learning a pattern of connections like that of Figure 9, ie., learning a
+hierarchical representation scheme that was in no sense put into the
+model in advance. The formalism is set up to analyze the environmental conditions under which certain kinds of representations (e.g.,
+hierarchical ones) might emerge or be expedient.
+The lack of within-layer connections in harmony networks is symptomatic of a major difference between the goals of harmony theory and
+the goals of other similar approaches. The effect of a binary connection
+between iwo representation nodes can be achieved by creating a pair of
+upper level nodes that connect to the two lower level nodes. 2 Thus we
+can dispense with lower level connections at the cost of creating upper
+level nodes. Harmony theory has been developed with a systematic commitment to buy simplicity with extra upper level nodes. The hope is that by
+placing all the knowledge in the patterns encoded by knowledge atoms,
+we will be better able to understand the function and structure of the
+models. This explains why restrictions have been placed on the network that to many would seem extraordinarily confining.
+If the goal is instead to get the most "intelligent" performance out of
+the fewest number of nodes and connections, it is obviously wiser to
+12 A negalive connection between iwo lower level nodes means that the value pairs
+(t,-) and (-.t) are favored relative to the other two pairs. This effect can be achieved
+by creating iwo knowledge atoms that each encode one of the two favored patterns. A
+positive connection similarly can be replaced by iwo aloms for the patterns (t,+) and
+(-.-).
+
+220 BASIC MECHANISMS
+allow arbitrary connectivity patterns, weights, and thresholds, as in the
+Boltzmann machine. There are, however, theoretical disadvantages to
+having so many degrees of freedom, both in psychological modeling
+and in artificial intelligence applications. Too many free parameters in
+a psychological model make it too theoretically unconstrained and
+therefore insufficiently instructive. And as suggested in Chapter 7, networks that take advantage of all these degrees of freedom may perform
+their computations in ways that are completely inscrutable to the theorist. Some may take delight in such a result, but there is reason to be
+concerned by it. It can be argued that getting a machine to perform
+intelligently is more important than understanding how it does so. If a
+magic procedure-say for learning-did in fact lead to the level of performance desired, despite our inability to understand the resulting computation, that would of course be a landmark accomplishment. But to
+expect this kind of breakthrough is just the sort of naiveté referred to
+in the first paragraph of the chapter. We now have enough disappointing experience to expect that any particular insight is going to take us a
+very small fraction of the way to the kind of truly intelligent mechanisms
+we seek. The only way to reasonably expect to make progress is by
+chaining together many such small steps. And the only way to chain
+together these steps is to understand at the end of each one where we
+are, how we got there, and why we got no further, so we can make an
+informed guess as to how to take the next small step. A "magic" step is
+apt to be a last step; it is fine, as long as it takes you exactly where you
+want to go.
+HARMONY AND PROBABILITY
+The Harmony Function
+The preceding section described how environmental states and
+knowledge
+are represented in harmony theory. The use of this
+knowledge in completing representations of environmental states is
+governed by the harmony function, which, as discussed in Section 1,
+measures the self-consistency of any state of a harmony model. I will
+now discuss the properties required of a harmony function and present
+the particular function I have studied.
+A state of the cognitive system is determined by the values of the
+lower and upper level nodes. Such a state is determined by a pair
+(r, a) consisting of a representation vector r and an activation vector a.
+A harmony function assig8syritanetrymaheridlk (r, a) to each such state.
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+221
+The harmony function has as parameters the set of knowledge vectors
+and their strengths: | (ka,ra)); I will call this the knowledge base K.
+The basic requirement on the harmony function H is that it be additive under decompositions of the system. ' This means that if a network
+can be partitioned into two unconnected networks, as in Figure 12, the
+harmony of the whole network is the sum of the harmonies of the
+parts:
+H(r, a) = H (r, al) + H (12, 82).
+In this case, the knowledge and representational feature nodes can each
+be broken into two subsets so that the knowledge atoms in subset 1 all
+have 0 connections with the representational features in subset 2, and
+vice versa. Corresponding to this partition of nodes there is a decomposition of the vectors r and a into the pieces r1, 12 and al, a2.
+The harmony function I have studied (recall Figure 7) is
+(1)
+Here, hu(r, Ka) is the harmony contributed by activating atom a,
+given the current representation r. I have taken this to be
+I•ka
+h×(r, Ka) =
+kal
+- - K.
+- a
+X
+C
+FIGURE 12. A decomposable harmony network.
+13 In physics, one says that H must be an exiensive quantity.
+
+222
+The vector inner product (see Chapter 9) is defined by
+r-ka=Erickali
+and the norm
+14
+is defined by
+I will now comment on these definitions.
+First note that this harmony function Hk is a sum of terms, one for
+each knowledge atom, with the term for atom a depending only on
+those representation variables r; to which it has nonzero connection
+(Kali. Thus Hk satisfies the additivity requirement.
+The contribution to H of an inactive atom is zero. The contribution
+of an active atom a is the product of its strength and the consistency
+between its knowledge vector ka and the representation vector r; this is
+measured by the function h, (r, ka). The parameter « always lies in
+the interval (-1,1). When « = 0, Ma(r, Ka) is the number of
+representational features whose values agree with the corresponding
+value in the knowledge vector minus the number that disagree. This
+gives the simplest harmony function, the one described in Section 1.
+The trouble is that according to this measure, if over 50% of the
+knowledge vector ka agrees with r, the harmony is raised by activating
+atom a. This is a pretty weak criterion of matching, and sometimes it
+is important to be able to have a more stringent criterion than 50%. As
+* goes from -1 through O towards 1, the criterion goes from 0%
+through 50% towards 100%. In fact it is easy to see that the criterial
+fraction is (1+ k)/ 2. The total harmony will be raised by activating
+any atom for which the number of representational features on which
+the atom's knowledge vector agrees with the representation vector
+exceeds this fraction of the total number of possible agreements (Ka!).
+An important limit of the theory is k → 1. In this limit, the criterion
+approaches perfect matching. For any given harmony model, perfect
+matching is required by any k greater than some definite value less
+than 1 because there is a limit to how close to 100% matching one can
+achieve with a finite number of possible matches. Indeed it is easy to
+compute that if n is the largest number of nonzero connections to any
+atom in a model (the maximum of kal), then the only way to exceed a
+14 This is the so-called L, norm, which is different from the La norm defined in
+Chapter 9. For each p in (0,00) the L, norm of a vector y is defined by
+Ivl=
+ElvielVe
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+223
+criterion of 1 - 2/n is with a perfect match. Any r value greater than
+this will place the model in what I will call the perfect matching limit.
+Note that since harmony theory is probabilistic, even in the perfect
+matching limit, atoms will sometimes become active even when they do
+not match the current representation perfectly; the closer the match,
+the more likely they will be active.
+By choosing +1 and -1 as the binary values for representational
+features, we have ensured that the product (kair, will be +1 if the
+knowledge vector agrees with ri, -1 if it disagrees, and O if it doesn't
+specify a value for feature i. The maximum value that can be attained
+by kat is kal, the number of nonzero connections to node a, irrespective of whether those connections are + or -
+In fact, this harmony function is invariant under the exchange of + and
+- at any representation node. That is, simultaneously flipping the signs
+of r, and (kal, for all a leaves the value of Hk(r, a) unchanged, for
+every a. This symmetry was deliberately inserted into the general harmony function because I could think of no principled reason to break it.
+If a systematic bias in the representation variables toward one of the
+binary values is to be built in from the outset, how large should the
+bias be? It seemed reasonable to start the theory in a symmetric way,
+unbiased toward either value. Of course a bias can be inserted through
+the knowledge K. To take an extreme example, if the value of feature i
+is + in all knowledge atoms, ie., (ka), =+ for all o, then the ith
+feature r; will be strongly biased toward +.
+There is nothing sacred about the values +1 and -1 in this theory.
+The values 1 and 0, for example, could be used as well. The preceding
+harmony function can easily be rewritten to give the same harmony
+values when r is changed from the (+1,-1) form to the (1,0, form.
+The underlying invariance under sign
+change would however be
+transformed into a more complicated in variance.
+Estimating Probabilities With the Harmony Function
+In Section 1, I suggested that a cognitive system performing the completion task could use a harmony function for estimating the probabilities of values for unknown variables. In fact, Point 9 asserted that the
+estimated probability of a set of values for unknown variables was an
+exponential function of the corresponding harmony value:
+probability o eH/T
+(2)
+It is this relationship that establishes the mapping with statistical physics. In this section andorigid Materidationship between harmony
+
+224
+and probability is analyzed. In this section I will point out that if probabilities are to be estimated using H, then the exponential relationship
+of Equation 2 should be used. In the next section I adapt an argument
+of Stuart Geman (personal communication, 1984) to show that, starting
+from the extremely general probabilistic assumption known as the principle of maximum missing information, both Equation 2 and the form of
+the harmony function (Equation I) can be jointly derived.
+What we know about harmony functions in general is that they are
+additive under network decomposition. If a harmony network consists
+of two unconnected components, the harmony of any given state of the
+whole network is the sum of the harmonies of the states of the component networks. In the case of such a network, what is required of
+the probability assigned to the state? I claim it should be the product of
+the probabilities assigned to the states of the component networks. The
+meaning of the unconnectedness is that the knowledge used in the
+inference process does not relate the features in the two networks to
+each other. Thus the results of inference about these
+two sets of
+features should be independent. Since the probabilities assigned to the
+states in the iwo networks should be independent, the probability of
+their joint occurrence-the state of the network as a whole-should be
+the product of their individual probabilities.
+In other words, adding the harmonies of the components' states
+should correspond to multiplying the probabilities of the components
+states. The exponential function of Equation 2 establishes just this
+correspondence. It is a mathematical fact that the only continuous
+functions f that map addition into multiplication,
+are the exponential functions,
+S (x) = a*
+for some positive number a. Equivalently, these functions can be
+written
+1(x) = ex/T
+for some value T ( where T = 1/Ina).
+This general argument leaves undetermined the value of T, the computational temperature. However several observations about the value
+of T can be made.
+First, the sign of T must be positive, for otherwise greater harmony
+would correspond to smaller probability.
+For the second observation, consider a cognitive system a that estimates its environmental eopyahility disariersion with a certain value for
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+225
+Ta and a certain harmony function Ha. Then given any other positive
+temperature To, we could hypothesize another cognitive system b using
+that computational temperature and the modified harmony function
+Ho = (TolTa) Ha. Both cognitive systems would have the same estimates of environmental probabilities since HolT, = HalTa. Thus their
+behavior on the completion task would be indistinguishable.
+Thus, the magnitude of T is only meaningful once a specific scale has
+been set for H. This means that if His being learned by the system,
+rather than programmed in by the modeler, then any convenient choice
+of T will do; the choice simply determines the scale of H that the system will learn.
+The third observation refines the second. A convenient way of
+expressing Equation 2 is to use the likelihood ratio of two states s, and
+S2:
+prob(s,)
+(3)
+prob(52)
+Thus, T sets the scale for those differences in harmony that correspond to
+significant differences in probability. (It is understood here that "differences" in harmony are measured by subtraction while "differences" in
+probability are measured by division.) The smaller the value of T, the
+smaller the harmony differences that will correspond to significant likelihood ratios. Thus, once a scale of H has been fixed, decreasing the
+value of T makes the probability distribution more sharply peaked. In
+fact, Equation 3 can be rewritten
+prob(s,)
+prob (52)
+If state s, has greater harmony than s2, the likelihood ratio at T = 1
+will be the number in square brackets, a number greater than one; as T
+goes to zero this number'gets raised to higher and higher powers so
+that the likelihood ratio goes to infinity. In other words, compared to
+I, the fixed difference in harmony between the two states looks larger
+and larger as T gets smaller and smaller.
+In the preceding argument, the exponential functions emerged as the
+only continuous functions mapping addition into multiplication. Of
+course we could consider discontinuous functions, one example being
+the limit as T → O of the exponential. In this limit, the estimated
+probability of all states is zero, except the ones with maximal harmony.
+if there are several states with exactly the same maximal harmony, in
+the zero temperature limit they will all end up with equal, nonzero
+probability. This probability distribution will be called the zero temperaure alstribution. It does Copyrighted Materia
+an exponential distribution
+
+226 BASIC MECHANISMS
+but it can be obtained as the limit of exponential distributions; in fact,
+the zero-temperature limit plays a major role in the theory since the
+states of maximal harmony are the best answers to completion
+problems.
+THE COMPETENCE, REALIZABILITY, AND
+LEARNABILITY THEOREMS
+In this section, the mathematical results that currently form the core
+of harmony theory are informally described.
+A formal presentation
+may be found in the Appendix.
+The Competence Theorem
+In harmony theory, a cognitive system's knowledge is encoded in its
+knowledge atoms. Each atom represents a pattern of values for a few
+features describing environmental states, values that sometimes cooccur in the system's environment. The strengths of the atoms encode
+the frequencies with which the different patterns occur in the environment. The atoms are used to estimate the probabilities of events in the
+environment.
+Suppose then that a particular cognitive system is capable of observing the frequency with which each pattern in some pre-existing set (kal
+occurs in its environment. (The larger the set (kal, the greater is the
+potential power of this cognitive system.) Given the frequencies of
+these patterns, how should the system estimate the probabilities of
+environmental events? What probability distribution should the system
+guess for the environment?
+There will generally be many possible environmental distributions
+that are consistent with the known pattern frequencies. How can one
+be selected from all these possibilities?
+Consider a simple example. Suppose there are only two environmental features in the representation, ry and r2, and that the system's only
+information is that the pattern ry = occurs with a frequency of 80%.
+There are infinitely many probability distributions for the four environmental events (r1,12) € | (t,t) (t,-) (-,+) (--)i that are consistent
+with the given information. For example, we know nothing about the
+relative likelihood of the two events (t,t) and (t,-); all we know is
+that together their probability is. 80.
+One respect in which the possible probability distributions differ is in
+their degree of homoge@ejbyrighteipWilteriap P in which P(t,+) = .?
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+227
+and P(t,-) = .1 is less homogeneous than one for which both these
+events have probability .4.
+Another way of saying this is that the uncertainty associated with the
+second distribution is greater than that of the first. In Shannon's
+(1948/1963) terms, if the second, more homogeneous, distribution
+applies, then at any given moment there is a greater amount of missing
+information about the current state of the environment than there is if
+the more inhomogenous distribution applies.
+Shannon's formula for
+the missing information of a probability distribution P is
+-[P(x) InP(x).
+Thus the missing information in the inhomogeneous probabilities
+(.7,.1) is
+- 7In(7) + .lIn(.1) = .48
+while the missing information in the homogeneous probabilities (.4, 4)
+- 4In(4) + .41n(4) = .73.
+The cognitive system's information on the frequency of patterns contains some information about any lack of homogeneity in the environmental distribution. One principle for guessing the environmental distribution is to select, of all probability distributions that are consistent
+with the known frequencies, the one that is most homogenous; the one
+that supposes the environment to have no more inhomogeneity than is
+needed to account for the known information. This principle can be
+formalized as the principle of maximal missing
+information; it is often
+used to extrapolate from some given statistical information to an estimate for an entire probability distribution (Christensen, 1981; Levine &
+Tribus, 1979).
+For the simple example discussed above, the principle of maximal
+missing information implies that the cognitive system should estimate
+the environmental distribution to be P(t,t) = P(t,-) = 40,
+P(-,t) = P(-,-) = .10. This distribution is
+inhomogeneous with
+respect to the first feature, r1, because it must be to account for the
+known fact that P(r, = +) = .80. It is homogeneous in the second
+reature, "2, because it can be without violating any known information.
+The justification for choosing this distribution is that there is not
+enough given information to justify selecting any other distribution with
+less missing information.
+In the general case, one can use the formula for missing information
+10 derive the distributiaopyinteralissing information that is
+
+228 BASIC MECHANISMS
+consistent with the observed frequencies of the patterns Ka. The result
+is a probability distribution I will call m:
+т (I) oc eV (r)
+where the function U is defined by
+U(r) = ElaXa (r).
+The values of the real parameters da (one for each atom) are constrained by the known pattern frequencies; they will shortly be seen to
+be proportional to the atom strengths, da, the system should use for
+modeling the environment. The value of Xa (r) is simply 1 when the
+environmental state r includes the pattern a defining atom a, and O
+otherwise.
+Now that we have a formula for estimating the probability of an
+environmental state, we can in principle perform the completion task.
+An input for this task is a set of values for some of the features. The
+best completion is formed by assigning values to the unknown features
+so that the resulting vector r represents the most probable environment
+state, as estimated by m.
+It turns out that the completions performed in this way are exactly
+the same as those that would be formed by using the same procedure
+with the different distribution
+р (г, а) ос еН(т.а).
+Here, H is the harmony function defined previously, where the
+strengths are
+0x=
+1 - K
+and k is any value satisfying
+1>K> 1 - 2/max/kal.
+(This condition on r is the exact matching limit defined earlier.)
+In passing from r (r) to p (r,a), new variables have been introduced:
+the activations a. These serve to eliminate the functions a from the
+formula for estimating probabilities, which will be important shortly
+when we try to design a device to actually perform the completion computation. The result is that in addition to filling in the unknown
+features in r, all the activations in a must be filled in as well. In other
+words, to perform the coopleted aestative system must find those
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+229
+values of the unknown r; and those values of the a« that together maximize the harmony H (r,a) and thereby maximize the estimated probability p (r,a).
+This discussion is summarized in the following theorem:
+Theorem 1: Competence. Suppose a cognitive system can observe
+the frequency of the patterns (ka) in its environment. The probability distribution with the most Shannon missing information that is
+consistent with the observations is
+тт (г) о eV (x)
+with U defined as above. The maximum-likelihood completions of
+this distribution are the same as those of
+р (т, а) ос eH (r,a)
+with the harmony function defined above.
+This theorem describes how a cognitive system should perform completions, according to some mathematical principles for statistical extrapolation and inference. In this sense, it is a competence theorem. The
+obvious next question is: Can we design a system that will really compute completions according to the specifications of the competence
+theorem?
+The "Physics Analogy"
+It turns out that designing a machine to do the required computations is a relatively straightforward application of a computational technique from statistical physics. It is therefore an appropriate time to discuss the "analogy" to physics that is exploited in harmony theory.
+Why is the relation between probability and harmony expressed in
+the competence theorem the same as the relation between probability
+and energy in statistical physics? The mapping between statistical physics and inference that is being exploited is one that has been known
+for a long time.
+The second law of thermodynamics states that as physical systems
+evolve in time, they will approach conditions that maximize randomness or entropy, subject to the constraint that a few conserved quantities
+like the systems' energy must always remain unchanged. One of the
+triumphs of statistical mechanics was the understanding that this law is
+the macroscopic manifestapyightarM atrip/ing microscopic description
+
+230
+of matter in terms of constituent particles. The particles will occupy
+various states and the macroscopic properties of a system will depend
+on the probabilities with which the states are occupied. The randomness or entropy of the system, in particular, is the homogeneity of this
+probability distribution. It is measured by the formula
+-[P(x) In P(x).
+A system evolves to maximize this entropy, and, in particular, a system
+that has come to equilibrium in contact with a large reservoir of heat
+will have a probability distribution that maximizes entropy subject to
+the constraint that its energy have a fixed average value
+Shannon realized that the homogeneity of a probability distribution,
+as measured by the microscopic formula for entropy, was a measure of
+the missing information of the distribution. He started the book of
+information theory with a page from statistical mechanics.
+The competence theorem shows that the exponential relation
+between harmony and probability stems from maximizing missing
+information subject to the constraint that given information be
+accounted for. The exponential relation between energy and probability
+stems from maximizing entropy subject to a constraint on average
+energy. The physics analogy therefore stems from the fact that entropy
+and missing information share exactly the same relation to probability.
+It is not surprising that the theory of information processing should
+share formal features with the theory of statistical physics.
+Shannon began a mapping between statistical physics and the theory
+of information by mapping entropy onto information content. Harmony theory extends this mapping by mapping self-consistency (i.e.,
+harmony) onto energy. In the next subsection, the mapping will be
+further extended to map stochasticity of inference (i.e., computational
+temperature) onto physical temperature.
+The Realizability Theorem
+The mapping with statistical physics allows harmony theory to exploit
+a computational technique for studying thermal systems that was
+developed by N. Metropolis, M. Rosenbluth,
+A. Rosenbluth, A.
+Teller, and E. Teller in 1953. This technique uses stochastic or "Monte
+Carlo" computation
+• to simulate the probabilistic dynamical system
+under study. (See Binder, 1979.)
+The procedure for simulating a physical system at temperature T is
+as follows: The variablopyrightedymarriare assigned random initial
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+231
+values. One by one, they are updated according to a stochastic rule:
+The probability of assigning a new value x to the variable is proportional to eH, T
+, where Hy is (minus) the energy the system would have
+if the value x
+were chosen. Thus the higher I, the more random are
+the decisions. As the computation proceeds, the probability that the
+system is in states at any moment becomes proportional to the desired
+value, eH (s/ T
+Adapting this technique to the computations of harmony theory
+leads, through an analysis described in the Appendix, to the following
+theorem. It defines the machine harmonium that realizes the theory of
+completions expressed in Theorem 1.
+Theorem 2: Realizability. In the graphical representation of a harmony system (see Figure 13) let each node denote a processor.
+Each feature node processor can have a value of +1 or - 1, and each
+knowledge atom a value of 1 or 0 (its activation). Let the input to a
+completion problem be specified by assigning the given feature
+nodes their correct values; these are fixed throughout the computation. All other nodes repeatedly update their values during the computation. The features not specified in the input are assigned random initial values, and the knowledge atoms initially all have value
+0. Let each node stochastically update its value according to the
+rule:
+prob(value = 1) =
+where T is a global system parameter and I is the "input" to the
+node from the other nodes attached to it (defined below). All the
+(kali,
+(kali
+(kali
+••.
+(kali
+FIGURE 13. A general harma opyrighted Material
+
+232
+nodes in the upper layer update in parallel, then all the nodes in the
+lower layer update in parallel, and so on
+alternately throughout the
+computation. During the update process, T starts out at some positive value and is gradually lowered. If T is lowered to 0 sufficiently
+slowly, then asymptotically, with probability 1, the system state
+forms the best completion (or one of the best completions if there
+are more than one that maximize harmony.
+To define the input I to each node, it is convenient to assign to the
+link in the graph between atom a and feature i a weight Wia whose
+sign is that of the link and whose magnitude is the strength of the atom
+divided by the number of links to the atom:
+Oa
+Wia = Okali
+Using these weights, the input to a node is essentially the weighted sum
+of the values of the nodes connected to it. The exact definitions are
+1=2 EWiara
+for feature nodes, and
+la- I Wali- oak
+for knowledge atoms.
+The formulae for I, and la are both derived from the fact that the
+input to a node is precisely the harmony the system would have if the
+given node were to choose the value 1 minus the harmony resulting
+from not choosing 1. The factor of 2 in the input to a feature node is
+in fact the difference (+1) - (-1) between its possible values. The
+term a in the input to an atom comes from the a in the harmony function; it is a threshold that must be exceeded if activating the atom is to
+increase the harmony.
+The stochastic decision rule can be understood with the aid of Figure
+14. If the input to the node is large and positive (i.e., selecting value 1
+would produce much greater system harmony, then it will almost certainly choose the value 1. If the input to the node is large and negative
+(i.e., selecting value 1 would produce much lower system harmony,
+then it will almost certainly not choose the value 1. If the input to the
+node is near zero, it will choose the value 1 with a probability near.S.
+The width of the zone of random decisions around zero input is larger
+the greater is T.
+The process of graduat panghing Materiade thought of as cooling the
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+233
+slope = 1/T
+prob(value= 1)
+FIGURE 14. The relation berween the input / to a harmonium processor node and the
+probability the processor will choose the value 1.
+randomness out of the initial system state. In the limit that T-O, the
+zone of random decisions shrinks to zero and the stochastic decision
+rule becomes the deterministic linear threshold rule of perceptrons
+(Minsky & Papert, 1969; see Chapter 2). In this limit, a node will
+always select the value with higher harmony. At nonzero T, there is a
+finite probability that the node will select the value with lower harmony.
+Early in a given computation, the behavior of the processors will be
+highly random. As T is lowered, gradually the decisions made by the
+processors will become more systematic. In this way, parts of the network gradually assume values that become stable; the system commits
+itself to decisions as it cools; it passes from fluid behavior to the rigid
+adoption of an answer. The decision-making process resembles the
+crystallization of a liquid into a solid.
+Concepts from statistical physics can in fact usefully be brought to
+bear on the analysis of decision making in harmony theory, as we shall
+see in the next section. As sufficient understanding of the computational effects of different cooling procedures emerges, the hope is that
+harmony theory will acquire an account of how a cognitive system can
+regulate its own computational temperature.
+Theorem 2 describes how to find the best completions by lowering to
+zero the computational temperature of a parallel computerharmonium-based on the function H. Harmonium thus realizes the
+second half of the competence theorem, which deals with optimal completions. But Theorem 1 also states that estimates of environmental
+probabilities are obtained by exponentiating the function U. It is also
+possible to build a stochastic machine based on U that is useful for
+simulating the environment. I will call this the simulation machine.
+Figure 15 shows the portion of a harmonium network involving the
+atom a, and the corresponding portion of the processor network for the
+corresponding simulation machine. The knowledge atom with strength
+
+234
+Simulation Machine Graph
+Harmonium Graph
+FIGURE 15. The graph for a one-atom harmony function and the graph for the
+corresponding U function. In the latter, there are only feature nodes. Each feature node
+has a single input point labeled I1, where the sign is the same as that assigned to the
+feature by the knowledge atom. Into this input point come links from all the other
+features assigned values by the knowledge atom. The label on each arc leaving a feature
+is the same as the value assigned to that feature by the knowledge atom.
+Ta and feature pattern (t,-,-) is replaced by a set of connections
+between pairs
+of features. In accordance with Theorem
+da = Ga (1-k). For every atom a connected to a given feature in harmonium, in the simulation machine there is a corresponding input
+point on that feature, labeled with da.
+The update rule for the simulation machine is the same as for harmonium. However, only one node can update at a time, and the definition of the input / to a node is different.! The input to a feature node
+is the sum of the inputs coming through all input points to the node. If
+an input point on node i is labeled Ida, then the input coming to i
+through that point is I do if the values of all the nodes connected to i
+agree with the label on the are connecting it to i, and zero otherwise.
+If the simulation machine is operated at a fixed temperature of 1, the
+probability that it will be found in state r asymptotically becomes proportional to e(r)/!. By Theorem 1, this is the cognitive system's estimate m (r) of the probability that the environment will be in the state
+represented by r. Thus running this machine at temperature 1 gives a
+simulation of the environment. As we are about to see, this will turn
+out to be important for learning.
+The general type of search procedure used by harmonium, with a
+random "thermal noise" component that is reduced during the computation, has been used to find maxima of functions other than harmony
+15 Analogously to harmonium, the input to a node is the value U would have if the
+node adopted the value + 1, minus the value U it would have if it adopted the value - 1.
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY 235
+functions. Physicists at IBM independently applied the technique,
+under the name simulated annealing, to both practical computer design
+problems and classical maximization problems (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, &
+Vecchi, 1983). Benchmarks of simulated annealing against other search
+procedures have produced mixed results (Aragon, Johnson, &
+McGeoch, 1985).
+The contribution of harmony theory is not so much the search procedure for finding maxima of H, but rather the function H itself.
+Theorem 2 is important: It describes a statistical dynamical system that
+performs completions; it gives an implementation-level description of a
+kind of completion machine. But Theorem 1 is more central: It gives a
+high, functional-level characterization of the performance of the
+system - says what the machine does-and introduces the concept of
+harmony. More central to the theory also is Theorem 3, which says
+how the harmony function can be tuned with experience.
+The Learnability Theorem
+Performing the completion task in different environments calls for
+different knowledge. In the formalism of Theorem 1, a given cognitive
+system is assumed to be capable of observing the frequency in its
+environment of a predetermined set of feature patterns. What varies
+for a given cognitive system across environments is the frequencies of
+the patterns; this manifests itself in the variation across environments
+of the strengths of the knowledge atoms representing those patterns.
+Theorem 3: Learnability. Suppose states of the environment are
+selected according to the probability distribution defining that
+environment, and each state is presented to a cognitive system.
+Then there is a procedure for gradually modifying the strengths of
+the knowledge atoms that will converge to the values required by
+Theorem 1.
+The basic idea of the learning procedure is simple. Whenever one of
+the patterns the cognitive system can observe is present in a stimulus
+from the environment, the parameter associated with that pattern is
+incremented. In harmonium, this means that whenever a knowledge
+atom matches a stimulus, its strength increases by a small amount Ao.
+In the simulation machine, this means that the d parameter on all the
+connections corresponding to that atom must be incremented by
+A1 = Ao (1-K). In isyngied Matera, corresponds to a memory
+
+236 BASIC MECHANISMS
+trace of a feature pattern, and the strength of the atom is the strength
+of the trace: greater the more often it has been experienced.
+There is an error-correcting mechanism in the learning procedure
+that decrements parameters when they become too large. Intermixed
+with its observation of the environment, the cognitive system must perform simulation of the environment.
+As discussed above, this can be
+done by running the simulation machine at temperature 1 without input
+from the environment. During simulation, patterns that appear in the
+feature nodes produce exactly the opposite effect as during environmental observation, i.e., a decrement in the corresponding parameters.
+Harmonium can be used to approximate the simulation machine. By
+running harmonium at temperature 1, without input, states are visited
+with a probability of el
+, which approximates the probabilities of the
+simulation machine, el. 16 When harmonium is used to approximately
+simulate the environment, every time an atom matches the feature vector its strength is decremented by Ao.
+This error-correcting mechanism has the following effect. The
+strength of each atom will stabilize when it gets (on the average) incremented during environmental observation as often as it gets decremented during environmental simulation. If environmental observation
+and simulation are intermixed in equal proportion, the strength of each
+atom will stabilize when its pattern appears as often in simulation as in
+real observation. This means the simulation is as veritical as it can be,
+and that is why the procedure leads to the strengths required by the
+competence theorem.
+DECISION-MAKING AND FREEZING
+The Computational Significance of Phase Transitions
+Performing the completion task requires simultaneously satisfying
+many constraints. In such problems, it is often the case that it is easy
+to find "local" solutions that satisfy some of the constraints but very
+difficult to find a global solution that simultaneously satisfies the maximum number of constraints. In harmony theory terms, often there are
+many completions of the input that are local maxima of H, in which
+some knowledge atoms are activated, but very few completions that are
+global maxima, in which many atoms can be simultaneously activated.
+When harmonium solves
+such problems, initially, at high
+16 Theorem I makes this approximation precise: These two distributions are not equal,
+but the maximum-probability states are the same for any possible input.
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+237
+temperatures, it occupies states that are local solutions, but finally, at
+low temperatures, it occupies only states that are global solutions. If
+the problem is well posed, there is only one such state.
+Thus the process of solving the problem corresponds to the passage
+of the harmonium dynamical system from a high-temperature phase to
+a low-temperature phase. An important question is: Is there a sharp
+transition between these phases? This is a "freezing point" for the system, where major decisions are made that can only be undone at lower
+temperatures by waiting a very long time. It is important to cool slowly
+through phase transitions, to maximize the chance for these decisions
+to be made properly; then the system will relatively quickly find the
+global harmony maximum without getting stuck for very long times in
+local maxima.
+In this section, I will discuss an analysis that suggests that phase transitions do exist in very simple harmony theory models of decisionmaking. In the next section, a more complex model that answers simple physics questions will furnish another example of a harmony system
+that seems to possess a phase transition.!
+The cooling process is an essentially new feature of the account of
+cognitive processing offered by harmony theory. To analyze the implications of cooling for cognition, it is necessary to analyze the temperature dependence of harmony models. Since the mathematical framework of harmony theory significantly overlaps that of statistical
+mechanics, general concepts and techniques of thermal physics can be
+used for this analysis. However, since the structure of harmony models
+is quite different from the structure of models of real physical systems,
+specific results from physics cannot be carried over. New ideas particular to cognition enter the analysis; some of these will be discussed in a
+later section on the macrolevel in harmony theory.
+Symmetry Breaking
+At high temperatures, physical systems typically have a disordered
+phase, like a fluid, which dramatically shifts to a highly ordered phase,
+17 It is tempting 1o identify freezing or "crystallization" of harmonium with the
+phenomenal experience of sudden "crystallization" of scattered thoughts into a coherent
+form. There may even be some usefulness in this identification. However, it should be
+pointed out that since cooling should be slow at the freezing point, in terms of iterations
+of harmonium, the transition from the disordered 10 the ordered phase may nor be sudden. If iterations of harmonium are interpreted as real cognitive processing time, this
+calls into question the argument that "sudden" changes as a function of remperature
+correspond 1o "sudden" changesopenyrned riatellie.
+
+238 BASIC MECHANISMS
+like a crystal, at a certain freezing temperature. In the low-temperature
+phase, a single ordered configuration is adopted by the system, while at
+high temperatures, parts of the system shift independently among
+pieces of ordered configurations so that the system as a whole is a constantly changing, disordered blend of pieces of different ordered states.
+Thus we might expect that at high temperatures, the states of harmonium models will be shifting blends of pieces of reasonable completions of the current input; it will form locally coherent solutions. At
+low temperatures (in equilibrium), the model will form completions
+that are globally coherent.
+Finding the best solution to a completion problem may involve fine
+discriminations among states that all have high harmonies. There may
+even be several completions that have exactly the same harmonies, as
+in interpreting ambiguous input. This is a useful case to consider, for
+in an ordered phase, harmonium must at any time construct one of
+these "best answers" in its pure form, without admixing parts of other
+best answers (assuming that such mixtures are not themselves best
+answers, which is typically the case). In physical terminology, the system must break the symmetry between the equally good answers in order
+to enter the ordered phase. One technique for finding phase transitions
+is to look for critical temperatures above which symmetry is respected,
+and below which it is broken.
+An Idealized Decision
+This suggests we consider the following idealized decision-making
+task. Suppose the environment is always in one of two states, A and
+B, with equal probability. Consider a cognitive system performing the
+completion task. Now for some of the system's representational
+features, these two states will correspond to the same feature value.
+These features do not enter into the decision about which state the
+environment is in, so let us remove them. Now the two states
+correspond to opposite values on all features. We can assume without
+loss of generality that for each feature, + is the value for A, and - the
+value for B (for if this were not so
+we could redefine the features,
+exploiting the symmetry of the theory under flipping signs of features.
+After training in this environment, the knowledge atoms of our system
+each have either all + connections or all - connections to the features.
+To look for a phase transition, we see if the system can break symmetry. We give the system a completely ambiguous input: no input at
+all. It will complete this to either the all-t state, representing A, or
+the all-- state, representing., each outcome being equally likely.
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+239
+Observing the harmonium model we see that for high temperatures, the
+states are typically blends of the all-+ and all-- states. These blends
+are not themselves good completions since the environment has no
+such states. But at low temperatures, the model is almost always in one
+pure state or the other, with only short-lived intrusions on a feature or
+two of the other state.
+It is equally likely to cool into either state and,
+given enough time, will flip from one state to the other through a
+sequence of (very improbable) intrusions of the second state into the
+first. The transition between the high- and low-temperature phases
+occurs over a quite narrow temperature range. At this freezing temperature, the system drifts easily back and forth between the two pure
+states.
+The harmonium simulation gives empirical evidence that there is a
+critical temperature below which the symmetry between the interpretations of ambiguous input is broken. There is also analytic evidence for
+a phase transition in this case. This analysis rests on an important concept from statistical mechanics: the thermodynamic limit.
+The Thermodynamic Limit
+Statistical mechanics relates microscopic descriptions that view matter
+as dynamical systems of constituent particles to the macrolevel descriptions of matter used in thermodynamics. Thermodynamics provides a
+good approximate description of the bulk properties of systems containing an extremely large number of particles. The thermodynamic limit is
+a theoretical limit in which the number of particles in a statistical
+mechanical system is taken to infinity, keeping finite certain aggregate
+properties like the system's density and pressure. It is in this limit that
+the microtheory provably admits the macrotheory as a valid approximate description.
+The thermodynamic limit will later be seen to relate importantly to
+the limit of harmony theory in which symbolic macro-accounts become
+valid. But for present purposes, it is relevant to the analysis of phase
+transitions. One of the important insights of statistical mechanics is
+that qualitative changes in thermal systems, like those characteristic of
+genuine phase transitions, cannot occur in systems with a finite number
+of degrees of freedom (e.g., particles). It is only in the thermodynamic
+limit that phase transitions can occur.
+This means that an analysis of freezing in the idealized-decision
+model must consider the limit in which the number of features and
+knowledge atoms go to infinity. In this limit, certain approximations
+become valid that suggestophighlea warefaf a phase transition.
+
+240 BASIC MECHANISMS
+Robustness of Coherent Interpretation
+To conclude this section, let me point out the significance of this
+simple decision-making system. Harmony theory started out to design
+an engine capable of constructing coherent interpretations of input and
+ended up with a class of thermal models realized by harmonium. We
+have just seen that the resulting models are capable of taking a completely ambiguous input and nonetheless constructing a completely
+coherent interpretation (by cooling below the critical temperature).
+This suggests a robustness in the drive to construct coherent interpretations that should prove adequate to cope with more typical cases characterized by less ambiguity but greater complexity. The greater complexity will surely hamper our attempts to analyze the models' performance;
+it remains to be seen whether greater complexity will hamper the
+models' ability to construct coherent interpretations. With this in
+mind, we now jump to a much more complex decision-making problem: the qualitative analysis of a simple electric circuit.
+AN APPLICATION: ELECTRICITY PROBLEM SOLVING
+Theoretical context of the model. In this section I show how the
+framework of harmony theory can be used to model the intuition that
+allows experts to answer, without any conscious application of "rules,"
+questions like that posed in Figure 16. Theoretical conceptions of how
+such problems are answered plays an increasingly significant role in the
+design of instruction. (For example, see the new journal, Cognition and
+Vrotal
+FIGURE 16. If the resistance of R, is increased assuming that Vial and R, remain the
+same), what happens to the current and voltage drops?
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+241
+Instruction, and Ginsburg, 1983) Even such simple problems as that of
+Figure 16 have important instructional implications (Riley, 1984).
+The model I will describe was studied in collaboration with Mary S.
+Riley (Riley & Smolensky, 1984) and Peter DeMarzo (1984). This
+model provides answers, without any symbolic manipulation of rules, to
+qualitative questions about the particular circuit of Figure 16. It should
+not be assumed that we imagine that a different harmony network like
+the one I will describe is created for every different circuit that is
+analyzed. Rather we assume that experts contain a small number of
+fixed networks like the one we propose, that these networks represent
+the effects of much cumulated experience with many different circuits,
+that they form the "chunks" with which the expert's intuition represents
+the circuit domain, and that complex problem solving somehow
+employs these networks to direct the problem solving as a whole
+through intuitions about chunks of the problem. At this early stage we
+cannot say much about the coordination of activity in complex problem
+solving. But we do claim that by giving an explicit example of a nonsymbolic account of problem solving, our model offers insights into
+expertise that complement nicely those of traditional production-system
+models. The model also serves to render concrete many of the general
+features of harmony theory that have been described above.
+Representational features. The first step in developing a harmony
+model is to select features for representing the environment. Here the
+environment is the set of qualitative changes in the electric circuit of
+Figure 16 that obey the laws of physics. What must obviously be
+represented are the changes in the physical components: whether R,
+goes up, goes down, or stays the same, and similarly for R2 and the
+battery's voltage Voral. We also hypothesize that experts represent
+deeper features of this environment, like the current 1, the voltage
+drops V, and V2 across the two resistors, and the effective resistance
+Rocal of the circuit. We claim that experts "see" these deeper features;
+that perceiving the problem of Figure 16 for experts involves filling in
+the deeper features just as for all sighted people-experts in visionperceiving a scene involves filling in the features describing objects in
+three-dimensional space. Many studies of expertise in the psychological
+literature show that experts perceive their domain differently from
+novices: Their representations are much richer; they possess additional
+representational features that are specially developed for capturing the
+structure of the particular environment. (See, for example, Chase &
+Simon, 1973; Larkin, 1983.)
+So the representational features in our model encode the qualitative
+changes in the seven circuit variables: R1, R2, Rotal, V1, V2, Voral, and
+1. Our claim is that expopyrighted salema, set of features like these;
+
+242 BASIC MECHANISMS
+there are undoubtedly many other possibilities, with different sets being
+appropriate for modeling different experts.
+Next, the three qualitative changes up, down, and same for these
+seven variables need to be given binary encodings. The encoding I will
+discuss here uses one binary variable to indicate whether there is any
+change and a second to indicate whether the change is up. Thus there
+are two binary variables, I.c and l.u, that represent the change in the
+current, 1. To represent no change in I, the change variable I.c is set
+to - 1; the value of l.u is, in this case, irrelevant. To represent
+increase or decrease of 1, l.c is given the value +1 and I.u is assigned
+a value of +1 or -1, respectively. Thus the total number of representational features in the model is 14: two for each of the seven circuit
+variables.
+Knowledge atoms. The next step in constructing a harmony model
+is to encode the necessary knowledge into a set of atoms, each of which
+encodes a subpattern of features that co-occur in the environment. The
+environment of idealized circuits is governed by formal laws of physics,
+so a specification of the knowledge required for modeling the environment is straightforward. In most real-world environments, no formal
+laws exist, and it is not so simple to give a priori methods for directly
+constructing an appropriate knowledge base.
+However,
+in such
+environments, the fact that harmony models encode statistical information rather than rules makes them much more natural candidates for
+can probably be derived for directly passing from statistics about the
+domain (e.g., medical statistics) to an appropriate knowledge base.
+The fact that the environment of electric circuits is explicitly rulegoverned makes a probabilistic model of intuition, like the model under
+construction, a particularly interesting theoretical contrast to the obvious rule-applying models of explicit conscious reasoning.
+For our model we selected a minimal set of atoms; more realistic
+models of experts would probably involve additional atoms. A minimal
+specification of the necessary knowledge is based directly on the equations constraining the circuit: Ohm's law, Kirchoff's law, and the equation for the total resistance of two resistors in series. Each of these is
+an equation constraining the simultaneous change in three of the circuit
+variables. For each law, we created a knowledge atom for each combination of changes in the three variables that does not violate the law.
+These are memory traces that might be left behind after experiencing
+nany problems in this domain, 1,€
+copyrighted Materia serving many states of thi
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+243
+environment. It turns out that this process gives rise to 65 knowledge
+atoms, all of which we gave strength 1.
+A portion of the model is shown in Figure 17. The two atoms shown
+are respectively instances of Ohm's law for R, and of the formula for
+the total resistance of two resistors in series.
+It can be shown that with the knowledge base I have described,
+whenever a completion problem posed has a unique correct answer,
+that answer will correspond to the state with highest harmony. This
+assumes that k is set within the range determined by Theorem 1: the
+perfect matching limit."
+The parameter . According to the formula defining the perfect
+matching limit, k must be less than 1 and greater than 1 - 2/6 = 2/3
+because the knowledge atoms are never connected to more than 6
+features (two binary features for each of three variables). In the
+Knowledge
+Atoms
+R," R," Riotal
+•..
+d
+U
+Representational
+Features
+R
+R
+2
+Protal
+V2
+Vrotal
+FIGURE 17. A schematic diagram of the feature nodes and two knowledge atoms of the
+model of circuit analysis. u, d, and s denote up, down, and same. The box labeled /
+denotes the pair of binary feature nodes representing I, and similarly for the other six circuit variables. Each connection labeled d denotes a pair of connections labeled with the
+binary encoding (t,-) representing down, and similarly for connections labeled u and s.
+18 Ohm's law applies three times for this circuit; once each for R,, R2, and Roal. This
+together with the other two laws gives five constraint equations. In each of these equations, the three variables involved can undergo 13 combinations of qualitative changes.
+19 Proof: The correct answer satisfies all five circuit equations, the maximum possible.
+Thus it exactly matches five atoms, and no possible answer can exactly match more than
+five atoms. In the exact matching limit, any nonexact matches cannot produce higher
+harmony, so the correct answer has the maximum possible harmony. If enough information is given in the problem so that there is only one correct answer, then there is only
+one state with this maximal harmony value.
+
+244
+simulations I will describe, « was actually raised during the computation
+to a value of. 75, as shown in Figure 18. (The model actually performs
+better if « = .75 throughout: DeMarzo, 1984.)
+Cooling schedule. It was not difficult to find a cooling rate that permitted the model to get the correct answer to the problem shown in
+Figure 16 on 28 out of 30 trials. This cooling schedule is shown in Figure 19.20 The initial temperature (4.0) was chosen to be sufficiently high
+1.00
+0.75
+0.50
+0.25
+0.00
+1
+1
+100
+200
+Time
+300
+FIGURE 18. The schedule showing « as a function of time during the computation.
+400
+20 In the reported simulations, one node, selected randomly, was updated at a time.
+The computation lasted for 400 "iterations" of 100 node updates each; that is, on the
+average each of the 79 nodes was updated about 500 times. "Updating" a node means
+deciding whether to change the value of that node, regardless of whether the decision
+changes the value. (Note on "psychological plausibility": 500 updates may seem like a lot to
+solve such a simple problem. But I claim the model cannot be dismissed as implausible
+on this ground. According to current very general hypotheses about neural computation
+[see Chapter 20), each node update is a computation comparable to what a neuron can
+perform in its "cycle time" of about 10 msec. Because harmonium could actually be
+implemented in parallel hardware, in accordance with the realizability theorem, the 500
+updates could be achieved in 500 cycles. With the cycle time of the neuron, this comes
+to about 5 seconds. This is clearly the correct order of magnitude for solving such problems intuitively. While it is also possible to solve such problems by firing a few symbolic
+productions, it is not so clear that an implementation of a production system model could
+be devised that would run in 500 cycles of parallel computations comparable to neural
+computations.)
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+245
+2
+100
+200
+300
+Time
+400
+FIGURE 19. The schedule showing Tas a function of time during the computation.
+that nodes were flipping between their values essentially at random; the
+final temperature (0.25) was chosen to be sufficiently small that the
+representational features hardly ever flipped, so that the completion
+could be said to be its "final decision." Considerable computation time
+was probably wasted at the upper and lower ends of the cooling
+schedule.
+The simulation. The graphical display used in the simulation provides a useful image of the computational process. On a gray background, each node was denoted by a box that was white or black
+depending on the current node value. Throughout the computation,
+the nodes encoding the given information maintain their fixed values
+(colors). Initially, all the atoms are black (inactive) and the unknown
+features are assigned random colors. When the computation starts, the
+temperature is high, and there is much flickering of nodes between
+black and white. At any moment many atoms are active. As computation proceeds and the system cools, each node flickers less and less and
+eventually settles into a final value.? The "answer" is read out by
+21 It may happen that some representation
+variables will be connected only to
+knowledge atoms that are inactive towards the end of the computation; these representation variables will continue to flicker at arbitrarily low temperatures, spending 50% of the
+time in each state. In fact, this happens for bits of the representation (like Rj.u) that
+encode the "direction of change" of circuit variables that are in state no change, indicated
+by - on the "presence of change" bit. These bits are ignored by the active knowledge
+atoms (those involving no change for the circuit variable) and are also ignored when we
+"read our" the final answer producey ghedwaterial
+
+246
+decoding the features for the unknowns. Ninety-three percent of the
+time, the answer is correct.
+The microdescription of problem solving. Since the model correctly
+answers physics questions, it "acts as though" it knows the symbolic
+rules governing electric circuits. In other words, the competence of the
+harmonium model (using Chomsky's meaning of the word) could be
+accurately described by symbolic inference procedures (e.g., productions) that operate on symbolic representations of the circuit equations.
+However the performance of the model (including its occasional errors)
+is achieved without interpreting symbolic rules.? In fact, the process
+underlying the model's performance has many characteristics that are
+not naturally represented by symbolic computation. The answer is
+computed through a series of many node updates, each of which is a
+microdecision based on formal numerical rules and numerical computations. These microdecisions are made many times, so that the eventual
+values for the different circuit variables are in an important sense being
+computed in parallel. Approximate matching is an important part of the
+use of the knowledge: Atoms whose feature patterns approximately
+match the current feature values are more likely to become active by
+thermal noise than atoms that are poorer matches (because poorer
+matches lower the harmony by a greater amount). And all the
+knowledge that is active at a given moment blends in its effects: When
+a given feature updates its value, its microdecision is based on the
+weighted sum of the recommendations from all the active atoms.
+The macrodescription of problem solving. When watching the simulation, it is hard to avoid anthropomorphizing the process. Early on,
+when a feature node is flickering furiously, it is clear that "the system
+can't make up its mind about that variable yet." At some point during
+the computation, however, the node seems to have stopped
+flickering-"it's decided that the current went down." It is reasonable to
+say that a macrodecision has been made when a node stops flickering,
+22 The distinction belween characterizing the competence and performance of dynamical systems is a common one in physics, although I know of no terminology for it. A
+production system expressing the circuit laws can be viewed as a grammar for generating
+the high-harmony states of the dynamical system. These laws neatly express the states into
+which the system will settle. However, completely different laws govern the dynamics
+through which the system enters equilibrium states. Other examples from physics of this
+distinction are to be found essentially everywhere. Kepler's laws, for example, neatly
+characterize the planetary orbits, but completely different laws, Newton's laws of motion
+and gravitation, describe the dynamics of planetary motion. Balmer's formula neatly
+characterizes the light emitted by the hydrogen atom, but utterly different laws of quanlum physics describe the dynaspyrighter Waterial
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+247
+although there seems to be no natural formal definition for the concept.
+To study the properties of macrodecisions, it is appropriate to look at
+how the average values of the stochastic node variables change during
+the computation. For each of the unknown variables, the node values
+were averaged over 30 runs of the completion problem of Figure 16,
+separately for each time during the computation. The resulting graphs
+are shown in Figure 20. The plots hover around O initially, indicating
+that values + and - are equally likely at high temperatures-lots of
+flickering. As the system cools, the average values of the representation variables drift toward the values they have in the correct solution
+10 the problem (Roral = up, I = down, V, = down, Vz = up).
+Emergent seriality. To better see the macrodecisions, in Figure 21
+the graphs have been superimposed and the "indecisive" band around O
+has been removed. The striking result is that out of the statistical din
+of parallel microdecisions emerges a sequence of macrodecisions.
+Propagation of givens. The result is even more interesting when it
+is observed that in symbolic forward-chaining reasoning about this
+problem, the decisions are made in the order R. I. V., V2. Thus not
+only is the compelence of the model neatly describable svmbolicallv. but
+even the performance, when described al the macrolevel, could be
+modeled by the sequential firing of productions that chain through the
+inferences. Of course, macrodecisions emerge first about those variables that are most directly constrained by the given inputs, but not
+because rules are being used that have conditions that only allow them
+to apply when all but one of the variables is known. Rather it is
+because the variables given in the input are fixed and do not fluctuate:
+They provide the information that is the most consistent over time, and
+therefore the knowledge consistent with the input is most consistently
+activated, allowing those variables involved in this knowledge to be
+more consistently completed than other variables. As the temperature
+is lowered, those variables "near" the input (with respect to the connections provided by the knowledge) stop fluctuating first, and their relative constancy of value over time makes them function somewhat like
+the original input to support the next wave of completion. In this
+sense, the stability of variables "spreads out" through the network,
+starting at the inputs and propagating with the help of cooling. Unlike
+the simple feedforward " spread of activation" through a standard activation network, this process is a spread of feedback-mediated coherency
+through a decision-making network. Like the growth of droplets or
+crystals, this amounts to the expansion of pockets of order into a sea of
+disorder.
+
+Feature Value
+Average Feature History: R
+1.0
+0.5
+-0.5
+- 1.0
+100
+200
+Time
+300
+Average Feature History: V1
+-0.5
+- 1.0
+100
+300
+nr
+400
+200
+Time
+Feature Value
+Average Feature History: 1
+1.0
+0.5
+0.0
+-0.5
+- 1.06
+100
+200
+Time
+300
+Average Feature History: V2
+1.0
+0.5
+0.0
+-0.5
+- 1.0
+100
+200
+Time
+300
+400
+248
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+249
+1.0
+N V2
+Feature Value
+0.5
+0.0
+- 0.5
+Lv1,
+300
+- 1.0
+100
+1
+200
+Time
+400
+FIGURE 21. Emergent seriality: The decisions about the direction of change of the circuit variables "freeze in" in the order R= Roral,/= lo, V1, V2 1R and / are very
+close).
+Phase transition. In the previous section, a highly idealized
+decision-making model was seen to have a freezing temperature at
+which the system behavior changed from disordered (undecided) to
+ordered (decided). Does the same thing occur in the more complicated
+circuit model? As a signal for such a phase transition, physics says to
+look for a sharp peak in the quantity
+C=<H> - <H>?
+This is global property of the system which is proportional to the rate at
+which entropy-disorder-decreases as
+the temperature decreases; in
+physics, it is called the specific heat. If there is rapid increase in the
+order of the system at some temperature, the specific heat will have a
+peak there.
+Figure 22 shows that indeed there is a rather pronounced peak. Does
+this macrostatistic of the system correspond to anything significant in
+the macrodecision process? In Figure 23, the specific heat curve is
+superimposed on Figure 21. The peak in the specific heat coincides
+remarkably with the first two major decisions about the total resistance
+and current.
+
+250 BASIC MECHANISMS
+20
+15
+U
+10
+5
+1
+100
+200
+Time
+1
+300
+400
+FIGURE 22. The specific heat of the circuit analysis model through the course of the
+computation.
+R
+V2
+--
+--
+/
+- f
+/
+V1
+1
+100
+200
+Time
+300
+400
+FIGURE 23. There is a peak in the specific heat at the time when the R and / decisions
+are being made.
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+251
+MACRODESCRIPTION: PRODUCTIONS, SCHEMATA,
+AND EXPERTISE
+Productions and Expertise
+While there are similarities in the production-system account of problem solving and the macrodescription of the harmony account, there
+are important differences. These differences are most apparent in the
+accounts of how experts' knowledge is acquired and represented.
+A symbolic account of expertise acquisition. A standard description
+within the symbolic paradigm of the acquisition of expertise is based on
+the idea of knowledge compilation (Anderson, 1982). Applied to circuit
+analysis, the account goes roughly like this. Novices have procedures
+for inspecting equations and using them to assign values to unknowns.
+At this stage of performance, novices consciously scan equations when
+solving circuit problems. As circuit problems are solved, knowledge is
+proceduralized: specialized circuit-analysis productions are stored in the
+knowledge base. An example of might be "IF given: R, and R2 both
+go up, THEN conclude: Roal goes up" which can be abbreviated
+R,"R," → Rotal" Another might be Rotal" Voral → ld At this stage
+of performance, a series of logical steps is consciously experienced, but
+no equations are consciously searched. As the circuit productions are
+used together to solve problems, they are composed together (Lewis,
+1978). The iwo productions just mentioned, for example, are composed into a single production, R, "R,"Vioral → Rioral" 1ª
+As the productions are composed, the conditions and actions get larger, more is
+inferred in each production firing, and so fewer productions need to
+fire to solve a given problem. Eventually, the compilation process has
+produced productions like R, "R," Voral → Roral" Jd Vid V2". Now we
+have an expert who can solve the problem in Figure 16 all at once, by
+firing this single production. The reason is that the knowledge base
+contains, prestored, a rule that says "whenever you are given this problem, give this answer."
+A subsymbolic account. By contrast, the harmony theory account of
+the acquisition of expertise goes like this. (This account has not yet
+been tested with simulations.) Beginning physics students are novices in
+circuit analysis but experts (more or less) at symbol manipulation.
+Through experience with language and mathematics, they have built
+up-by means of the learning process referred to in the learnability
+theorem —a set of features and knowledge atoms for the perception and
+manipulation of symbol op Tighted Mater used to inspect the circuit
+
+252 BASIC MECHANISMS
+equations and draw inferences from them to solve circuit problems.
+With experience, features dedicated to the perception of circuits evolve,
+and knowledge atoms relating these features develop. The final network for circuit perception contains within it something like the model
+described in the previous section (as well as other portions for analyzing other types of simple circuits). This final network can solve the
+entire problem of Figure 16 in a single cooling. Thus experts perceive
+the solution in a single conscious step. (Although sufficiently careful
+perceptual experiments that probe the internal structure of the construction of the percept should reveal the kind of sequential filling-in
+that was displayed by the model.) Earlier networks, however, are not
+sufficiently well-tuned by experience; they can only solve pieces of the
+problem in a single cooling. Several coolings are necessary to solve the
+problem, and the answer is derived by a series of consciously experienced steps. (This gives the symbol-manipulating network a chance to
+participate, offering justifications of the intuited conclusions by citing
+circuit laws.) The number of circuit constraints that can be satisfied in
+parallel during a single cooling grows as the network is learned. Productions are higher level descriptions of what input/output pairscompletions-can be reliably performed by the network in a single cooling.
+Thus, in terms of their productions, novices are described by productions with simple conditions and actions, and experts are described by
+complex conditions and actions.
+Dynamic creation of productions. The point is, however, that in the
+harmony theory account, productions are just descriptive entities; they are
+not stored, precompiled, and fed through a formal inference engine; rather
+they are dynamically created at the time they are needed by the appropriate collective action of the small knowledge atoms. Old patterns that
+have been stored through experience can be recombined in completely
+novel ways, giving the appearance that productions had been precompiled even though the particular condition/action pair had never before
+been performed. When a familiar input is changed slightly, the network can settle down in a slightly different way, flexing the usual production to meet the new situation. Knowledge is not stored in large
+frozen chunks; the productions are truly context sensitive. And since
+the productions are created on-line by combining many small pieces of
+stored knowledge, the set of available productions has a size that is an
+exponential function of the number of knowledge atoms. The
+exponential explosion of compiled productions is virtual, not precompiled and stored.
+Contrasts with logical inference. It should be noted that the harmonium model can ansepyrightose Majestions just as it can answer
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+253
+well-posed ones.
+If insufficient information is provided, there will be
+more than one state of highest harmony, and the model will choose one
+of them.
+It does not stop dead due to "insufficient information" for
+any formal inference rule to fire. If inconsistent information is given,
+no available state will have a harmony as high as that of the answer to a
+well-posed problem; nonetheless, those answers that violate as few circuit laws as possible will have the highest harmony and one of these
+will therefore be selected. It is not the case that "any conclusion follows from a contradiction." The mechanism that allows harmonium to
+solve well-posed problems allows it to find the best possible answers to
+ill-posed problems, with no modification whatever.
+Schemata
+Productions are higher level descriptions of the completion process
+that ignore the internal structures that bring about the input/output
+mapping. Schemata are higher level descriptions of chunks of the
+knowledge base that ignore the internal structure within the chunk. To
+suggest how the relation between knowledge atoms and schemata can
+be formalized, it is useful to begin with the idealized two-choice decision model discussed in the preceding section entitled Decision-Making
+and Freezing.
+Two-choice model. In this model, each knowledge atom had either
+all + or all - connections. To form a higher level description of the
+knowledge, let's lump all the + atoms together into the + schema, and
+denote it with the symbol St. The activation level of this schema,
+A (St), will be defined to be the average of the activations of its constituent atoms. Now let us consider all the feature nodes together as a
+slot or variable, s, for this schema. There are two states of the slot that
+occur in completions: all + and all -. We can define these to be the
+possible fillers or values of the slot and symbolize them by f+ and f-.
+The information in the schema S+ is that the slots should be filled
+with f+; the proposition s = f+. The "degree of truth" of this proposition, (s = f+), can be defined to be the average value of all the
+feature nodes comprising the slot: If they are all t, this is 1 or true; if
+all - this is -1 or false. At intermediate points in the computation
+when there may be a mixture of signs on the feature nodes, the degree
+of truth is somewhere between 1 and -1.
+Repeating the construction for the schema S-, we end up with a
+higher level description copyheismeltemadel depicted in Figure 24.
+
+254
+Microdescription
+Macrodescription
+A(S+)
+S
+A(S_)
+s=1+
+s=f_
+FIGURE 24. Micro- and macrodescriptions of the idealized decision model.
+The interesting fact is that the harmony of any state of the original
+model can now be re-expressed using the higher level variables:
+H = A (St)|т (s = f+) - к] + A (S-)/т (s = S-)-к).
+In this simple homogeneous case, the aggregate higher level variables
+contain sufficient information to exactly compute
+the harmony
+function.
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+255
+The analysis of decision making in this model considered the limit as
+the number of features and atoms goes to infinity-for only in this
+"thermodynamic limit" can we see real phase transitions. In this limit,
+the set of possible values for the averages that define the aggregate
+variables comes closer and closer to a continuum. The central limit
+theorem constrains these averages to deviate less and less from their
+means; statistical fluctuations become less and less significant; the
+model's behavior becomes more and more deterministic.
+Thus, just as the statistical behavior of matter disappears into the
+deterministic laws of thermodynamics as systems become macroscopic
+in size, so the statistical behavior of individual features and atoms in
+harmony models becomes more and more closely approximated by the
+higher level description in terms of schemata as the number of constituents aggregated into the schemata increases. However there are two
+important differences between harmony theory and statistical physics
+relevant here. First, the number of constituents aggregated into schemata is nowhere near the number-1023—of particles aggregated into
+bulk matter. Schemata provide a useful but significantly limited
+description of real cognitive processing. And second, the process of
+aggregation in harmony theory is much more complex than in physics.
+This point can be brought out by passing from the grossly oversimplified two-choice decision model just considered to a more realistic cognitive domain.
+Schemata for rooms. In a realistically complicated and large network, the schema approximation would go something like this. The
+knowledge atoms encode clusters of values for features that occur in
+the environment. Commonly recurring clusters would show up in
+many atoms that differ slightly from each other. (In a different
+language, the many exemplars of a schema would correspond to
+knowledge atoms that differ slightly but share many common features.)
+These atoms can be aggregated into a schema, and their average activation at any moment defines the activation of the schema. Now among
+the atoms in the cluster corresponding to a schema for a living-room, for
+example, might be a subcluster corresponding to the schema for
+sofa/coffee-table. These atoms comprise a subschema and the average of
+their activations would be the activation variable for this subschema.
+The many atoms comprising the schema for kitchen share a set of
+connections to representational features relating to cooking devices. It
+is convenient to group together these connections into a cooking-device
+slor, Scooking: Different atoms for different instances of kitchen encode
+various patterns of values over these representational features,
+corresponding to instances of stove, conventional oven, microwave oven,
+and so forth. Each of these mykets dateria, a possible filler, Jr, for the
+
+256 BASIC MECHANISMS
+slot. The degree of truth of a proposition like Scooking = fi is the
+number of matches minus the number of mismatches between the pattern defining Ji and the current values over the representation nodes in
+the slot cooking, all divided by the total number of features in the slot.
+Now the harmony obtained by activating the schema is determined by
+the degrees of truth of propositions specifying the possible fillers for
+the slots of the schema. Just like in the simple two-decision model, the
+harmony function, originally expressed in terms of the microscopic
+variables, can be re-expressed in terms of the macroscopic variables,
+the activations of schemata, and slot fillers. However, since the
+knowledge atoms being aggregated no longer have exactly the same
+links to features, the new expression for H in terms of aggregate variables is only approximately valid. The macrodescription involves fewer
+variables, but the structure of these variables is more complex. The
+objects are becoming richer, more like the structures of symbolic computation.
+This is the basic idea of the analytic program of harmony theory for
+relating the micro- and macro-accounts of cognition. Macroscopic variables for schemata, their activations, their slots, and propositional content are defined.
+The harmony function is approximately rewritten in
+terms of these aggregate variables, and then used to study the macroscopic theory that is determined by that new function of the new variables. This theory can be simulated, defining macroscopic models.
+The nature of the approximation relating the macroscopic to the
+microscopic models is clearly articulated, and the situations and senses
+in which this approximation is valid are therefore specified.
+The kind of variable aggregation involved in the schema approximation is in an important respect quite unlike any done in physics. The
+physical systems traditionally studied by physicists have homogeneous
+structure, so aggregation is done in homogeneous ways. In cognition,
+the distinct roles played by different schemata mean aggregates must be
+specially defined. The theory of the schema limit corresponds at a very
+general level to the theory of the thermodynamic limit, but is rather
+sharply distinguished by a much greater complexity.
+The Schema Approximation
+In this subsection I would like to briefly discuss the schema approximation in a very general information-processing context.
+In harmony theory, the cognitive system fills in missing information
+with reference to an internal model of the environment represented as
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+257
+a probability distribution. Such a distribution of course contains potentially a phenomenal amount of information: the joint statistics of all
+combinations of all features used to represent the environment. How
+can we hope to encode such a distribution effectively? Schemata provide an answer. They comprise a way of breaking up the environment
+into modules-schemata-that can individually by represented as a
+miniprobability distribution. These minidistributions must then be
+folded together during processing to form an estimate of the whole distribution. To analyze a room scene, we don't need information about
+the joint probability of all possible features; rather, our schema for
+"chair" takes care of the joint probability of the features of chairs; the
+schema for "sofa/coffee-table" contains information about the joint
+probability of sofa and coffee-table features, and so on. Each schema
+ignores the features of the others, by and large.
+This modularization of the encoding can reduce tremendously the
+amount of information the cognitive system needs to encode. If there
+are S binary features, the whole probability distribution requires 2'
+numbers to specify.
+If we can break the features into s groups
+corresponding to schemata, each involving f/s features, then only
+s2jls numbers are needed. This can be an enormous reduction; even
+with such small numbers as = 100 and s = 10, for example, the
+reduction factor is 10x2-90~ 10-28
+The reduction in information afforded by schemata amounts to an
+assumption that the probability distribution representing the environment has a special, modular structure-at least, that it can be usefully
+so approximated.
+A very crude approximation
+would be to divide the
+features into disjoint groups, to separately store in schemata the probabilities of possible combinations of features within each group, and then
+to simply multiply together these probabilities to estimate the joint probability of all features. This assumes the features in the groups are completely statistically independent, that the values of features of a chair
+interact with other features of the chair but not with features of the
+sofa. To some extent this assumption is valid, but there clearly are
+limits to its validity.
+A less crude approximation is to allow schemata to share features so
+that the shared features can be constrained simultaneously by the joint
+probabilities with the different sets of variables contained in the different schemata to which it relates. Now we are in the situation
+modeled by harmony theory. A representational feature node can be
+attached to many knowledge atoms and thereby participate in many
+schemata. The distribution eHIT manages to combine into a single
+probability distribution all the separate but interacting distributions
+corresponding to the separate schemata. Although the situation is not
+
+258
+as simple as the case of nonoverlapping schemata and completely
+independent subdistributions, the informational savings is still there.
+The trick is to isolate groups of environmental features which each
+comprise a small fraction of the whole feature set, to use these groups
+to define more abstract features, and record the probability distributions
+using these features. The groups must be selected to capture the most
+important interrelationships in the environment. This is the problem of
+constructing new features. The last section offers a few comments on
+this most important issue.
+LEARNING NEW REPRESENTATIONS
+The Learning Procedure and Abstract Features
+Throughout this chapter 1 have considered cognitive systems that
+represent states of their environment using features that were established prior to our investigation, either through programming by the
+modeler, or evolution, or learning. In this section I would like to make
+a few comments about this last possibility, the establishment of features
+through learning.
+Throughout this chapter I have emphasized that the features in harmony models represent the environment at all levels of abstractness.
+In the preceding account of how expertise in circuit analysis is acquired,
+it was stated that through experience, experts evolve abstract features
+for representing the domain. So the basic notion is that the cognitive
+system comes into existence with a set of exogenous features whose
+values are determined completely by the state of the external environment, whenever the environment is being observed. Other endogenous
+features evolve, through a process now to be described, through experience, from an initial state of meaninglessness to a final state of abstract
+meaning. Endogenous features always get their values through internal
+completion, and never directly from the external environment.23
+As a specific example, consider the network of Figure 9, which is
+repeated as Figure 25. In this network, features of several levels of
+23 In Chapter 7, Hinton and Sejnowski use the terms visible and hidden units. The
+former correspond to the exogenous feature nodes, while the latter encompass both the
+endogenous feature nodes and'opknighted Material
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+259
+segment/letter
+knowledge atoms
+letter/word
+knowledge atoms
+(M2)...
+ABLE
+CANE) ...
+line-segment nodes
+letter nodes
+word nodes
+FIGURE 25. A network representing words at several levels of abstractness.
+abstractness are used to represent words. Here is a hypothetical account
+of how such a network could be learned.?4
+The features representing the line segments are taken to be the exogenous features given a priori. This network comes into existence with
+these line-segment nodes, together with extra endogenous feature
+nodes which, through experience, will become the letter and word
+nodes.
+As before, the cognitive system is assumed to come into existence
+with a set of knowledge atoms whose strengths will be adjusted to
+match the environment. Some of these atoms have connections only to
+exogenous features, some only to endogenous features, and some to
+both types of features.
+The environment (in this case, a set of words) is observed. Each
+time a word is presented, the appropriate values for the line-segment
+nodes are set. The current atom strengths are used to complete the
+input, through the cooling procedure discussed above. The endogenous
+features are thus assigned values for the particular input. Initially,
+24 The issue of selecting patterns on exogenous features for use in defining endogenous
+features-including the word domain-is discussed in Smolensky (1983). To map the
+terminology of that paper on to that of this chapter, replace schemas by knowledge atoms
+and beliefs by feature values. That paper offers an alternative use of the harmony concept
+in learning. Rather than specifying a learning process, it specifies an optimality condition
+on the atom strengths: They should maximize the total harmony associated with interpreting all environmental stimuli. This condition is related, but not equivalent, lo
+information-theoretic conditions on the strengths.
+
+260 BASIC MECHANISMS
+when the atoms' strengths have received little environmental tuning,
+the values assigned to the endogenous features will be highly random.
+Nonetheless, after the input has been completed, learning occurs: The
+strengths of atoms that match the feature nodes are all increased by
+Ao.
+Intermixed with this incrementing of strengths during environmental
+observation is a process of decrementing strengths during environmental simulation.
+Thus the learning process is exactly like the one
+referred to in the learnability theorem, except that now, during observation, not all the features are set by the environment; the
+endogenous features must be filled in by completion.
+Initially, the values of the endogenous features are random. But as
+learning occurs, correlations between recurring patterns in the exogenous features and the random endogenous features will be amplified
+by the strengthening of atoms that encode those correlations. An
+endogenous feature by chance tends to be + when patterns of line segments defining the letter A are present and so leads to strengthening of
+atoms relating it to those patterns; it gradually comes to represent A.
+In this way, self-organization of the endogenous features can potentially
+lead them to acquire meaning.
+The learnability theorem states that when no endogenous features are
+present, this learning process will produce strengths that optimally
+encode the environmental regularities, in the sense that the completions they give rise to are precisely the maximum-likelihood completions of the estimated environmental probability distribution with maximal missing information that is consistent with observable statistics. At
+present there is no comparable theorem that guarantees that in the
+presence of endogenous features this learning procedure will produce
+strengths with a corresponding optimality characterization.?5
+Among the most important future developments of the theory is the
+study of self-organization of endogenous features. These developments
+include a possible extension of the learnability theorem to include
+endogenous features as well as computer simulations of the learning
+procedure in specific environments.
+25 In Chapter 7, Hinton and Sejnowski use a different but related optimality condition.
+They use a function G which measures the information-theoretic difference between the
+true environmental probability distribution and the estimated distribution eH For the
+case of no endogenous features, the following is true (see Theorem 4 of the Appendix).
+The strengths that correspond 1o the maximal-missing-information distribution consistent
+with observable statistics are the same as the strengihs that minimize G. That the
+estimated distribution is of the form el must be assumed a priori in using the minimal-G
+criterion; it is entailed by the maxipyriginted i/aterion criterion.
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+261
+Learning in the Symbolic and Subsymbolic Paradigms
+Nowhere is the contrast between the symbolic and subsymbolic
+approaches to cognition more dramatic than in learning. Learning a
+new concept in the symbolic approach entails creating something like a
+new schema. Because schemata are such large and complex knowledge
+structures, developing automatic procedures for generating them in original and flexible ways is extremely difficult.
+In the subsymbolic account, by contrast, a new schema comes into
+being gradually, as the strengths of atoms slowly shifts in response to
+environmental observation, and new groups of coherent atoms slowly
+gain important influence in the processing. During learning, there need
+never be any decision that "now is the time to create and store a new
+schema." Or rather, if such a decision is made, it is by the modeler
+observing the evolving cognitive system and not by the system itself.
+Similarly there is never a time when the cognitive system decides
+"now is the time to assign this meaning to this endogenous feature."
+feature. Eventually, the atoms that emerge with dominant strength
+may create a network like that of Figure 25, and the modeler observing
+the system may say "this feature means the letter A and this feature the
+word ABLE." Then again, some completely different representation may
+emerge.
+The reason that learning procedures can be derived for subsymbolic
+systems, and their properties mathematically analyzed, is that in these
+systems knowledge representations are extremely impoverished. It is
+for this same reason that they are so hard for us to program. It is
+therefore in the domain of learning, more than any other, that the
+potential seems greatest for the subsymbolic paradigm to offer new
+insights into cognition. Harmony theory has been motivated by the
+goal of establishing a subsymbolic computational environment where
+the mechanisms for using knowledge are simultaneously sufficiently
+powerful and analytically tractable to facilitate-rather than hinder-the
+study of learning.
+CONCLUSIONS
+In this chapter I have described the foundations of harmony theory, a
+formal subsymbolic framework for performing an important class of
+generalized perceptual Cop/get Materiar completion
+of partial
+
+262 BASIC MECHANISMS
+descriptions of static states of an environment. In harmony theory,
+knowledge is encoded as constraints among a set of well-tuned perceptual features. These constraints are numerical and are imbedded in an
+extremely powerful parallel constraint satisfaction machine: an informal
+inference engine. The constraints and features evolve gradually
+through experience. The numerical processing mechanisms implementing both performance and learning are derived top-down from
+mathematical principles. When the computation is described on an
+aggregate or macrolevel, qualitatively new features emerge (such as
+seriality). The competence of models in this framework can sometimes
+be neatly expressed by symbolic rules, but their performance is never
+achieved by explicitly storing these rules and passing them through a
+symbolic interpreter.
+In harmony theory, the concept of self-consistency plays the leading
+role. The theory extends the relationship that Shannon exploited
+between information and physical entropy: Computational selfconsistency is related to physical energy, and computational randomness
+to physical temperature. The centrality of the consistency or harmony
+function mirrors that of the energy or Hamiltonian function in statistical physics. Insights from statistical physics, adapted to the cognitive
+systems of harmony theory, can be exploited to relate the micro-and
+macrolevel accounts of the computation.
+Theoretical concepts,
+theorems, and computational techniques are being pursued, towards the
+ultimate goal of a subsymbolic formulation of the theory of information
+processing.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+The framework presented in this chapter grew out of an attempt to formalize approaches to understanding cognition that I have learned from
+Dave Rumelhart, Doug Hofstadter, and Geoff Hinton. I thank them
+for sharing their insights with me over several years. Thanks too to
+Steve Greenspan, Jay McClelland, Mary Riley, Gerhard Dirlich, Francis
+Crick, and especially Stu Geman for very instructive conversations.
+Peter DeMarzo has made important contributions to the theory and I
+have benefited greatly from working with him. I would like to thank
+the members of the UCSD Cognitive Science Lab and particularly the
+Parallel Distributed Processing research group for all their help and
+support. Special thanks go to Judith Stewart, Dan Rabin, Don
+Gentner, Mike Mozer, Rutie Kimchi, Don Norman, and Sondra Buffett. Thanks to Eileen Conway and Mark Wallen for excellent graphics
+and computer support. COPYROWER aslasupported by the System
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+263
+Development Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, National
+Institute of Mental Health Grant PHS MH 14268 to the Center for
+Human Information Processing, and Personnel and Training Research
+Programs of the Office of Naval Research Contract N00014-79-C-0323,
+NR 667-437.
+
+264
+APPENDIX:
+FORMAL PRESENTATION OF THE THEOREMS
+Formal relationships between parallel (or neural) computation and
+statistical mechanics have been exploited by several researchers. Three
+research groups in particular have been in rather close contact since
+their initially independent development of closely related ideas. These
+groups use names for their research which reflect the independent perspectives that they maintain: the Boltzmann machine (Ackley, Hinton, &
+Sejnowski, 1985; Fahlman, Hinton, & Sejnowski, 1983; Hinton &
+Sejnowski, 1983a, 1983b; Chapter 7), the Gibbs sampler (Geman &
+Geman, 1984), and harmony theory (Smolensky, 1983, 1984; Smolensky & Riley, 1984). In this appendix, all results are presented from the
+perspective of harmony theory, but ideas from the other groups have
+been incorporated and are so referenced. 2
+Because the ideas have been informally motivated and pursued at
+some length in the text, this appendix is deliberately formal and concise. The proofs are presented in the final section. In making the formal
+presentation properly self-contained, a certain degree of redundancy with the text is necessarily incurred; this is an inevitable consequence of presenting the theory at three levels of formality within a
+single, linearly ordered document.
+Preliminary Definitions
+Overview of the definitions. The basic theoretical framework is
+schematically represented in Figure 26. There is an external environment with structure that allows prediction of which events are more
+likely than others. This environment is passed through transducers to
+become represented internally in the exogenous features of a representational space.
+(Depending on the application, the transducers might
+include considerable perceptual and cognitive processing, so that the
+exogenous features might in fact be quite high level; they are just
+unanalyzed at the level of the particular model.) The features in the
+26 Hofstadier (1983) uses the idea of computational temperature in a heuristic rather
+than formal way 1o modulate the parallel symbolic processing in an Al system for doing
+anagrams. His insights into relationships beiween statistical mechanics and cognition
+were inspirational for the development of harmony theory (see Hofstadter, 1985, pp.
+654-665).
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+265
+Distal
+Environment
+Mental Space: M
+knowledge
+Representation Space
+ex
+Pen
+Transducer
+FIGURE 26. A schematic representation of the theoretical framework.
+representation are taken to be binary. The prediction problem is to
+take some features of an environmental state as input and make best
+guesses about the unknown features. This amounts to extrapolating
+from some observed statistics of the environment to an entire probability distribution over all possible feature combinations. This extrapolation proceeds by constructing the distribution that adds minimal information (in Shannon's sense) to what is observed.
+Notation. B = (-1, +1), the default binary values. R = the real
+numbers. X" = XxXx... xX (n times), where x is the cartesian
+pro is the sex or all subsis of X. Ix is he number of elements or x.
+B" is called a binary hypercube. The ith coordinate function of B"
+(i = 1,..
+, n) gives for any point (i.e., vector) in B" its ith B-valued
+coordinate (i.e., component).
+Def. A distal environment Edisial = (E, P) is a set E of environmental
+events and a probability distribution P on E.
+Def. A representational space R is a cartesian product RexXRen of
+two binary hypercubes. Each of the N (Nex; Nen) binary-valued coordinate functions r; of R (Rex; Ren) is called an (exogenous; endogenous)
+feature.
+Def. A transduction map T from an environment Edistal to a representational space R = RexXRen
+is a map T: E → Rex. T induces a probability distribution p on Rex: P= Po
+. This distribution is the
+(proximal) environment.
+
+266
+Def. Let R be a representational space. Associated with this space
+is the input space I = 1-1, 0, +1)"ex
+Def. A point r in R is called a completion of a point a in I if every
+nonzero feature of & agrees with the corresponding feature of r. This
+relationship will be designated r 2c. A completion function c is a map
+from 1 to 2R (the subsets of R) for which r € c(e) implies r 2 c. The
+features of ‹ with value O are the "unknowns" that must be filled in by
+the completion function.
+Def. Let p be a probability distribution on a space X = RexXA.
+The maximum-likelihood completion function determined
+Cp: 1-2P, is defined by
+by
+P.
+c(l) =/rE R| for somea € A, and all (a',r') € RXA
+such that r > c: p(r,a) > p(ґ, a) |
+(A will be either empty or the set of possible knowledge atom activation vectors.)
+Def. A basic event a has the form
+a: li, = bil de liz= ba &e... de lig = bal
+where (ri, liz....Pig
+is a collection of exogenous features and
+(b1,b2
+can be characterized by the function
+Xa: R -0,1) defined by
+which is 1 if the features all have the correct values, and O otherwise.
+A convenient specification of a is as the knowledge vector
+ка = (0,0,..., 0, bi, 0,.... 0, bi 0,...,0, b, 0,...,0)
+€ 1-1, 0,+1)N
+in which the luth element is bu and the remaining elements are all
+zero.
+Def. A set O of observables is a collection of basic events.
+Def. Let p be an environment and O be a set of observables. The
+observable statistics of p is the set of probabilities of all the events in O:
+Ip (a)la € O.
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+267
+Def. The entropy (or the missing information; Shannon, 1948/1963)
+of a probability distribution p on a finite space X is
+Sp) = - 2p(x) Inp (x).
+x EX
+Def. The maximum entropy estimate Mp.o of environment p with
+observables O is the probability distribution with maximal entropy that
+possesses the same observable statistics as p.
+This concludes the preliminary definitions. The distal environment
+and transducers will play no further role in the development. They
+were introduced to acknowledge the important conceptual role they
+play: the root of all the other definitions. A truly satisfactory theory
+would probably include analysis of the structure of distal environments
+and the transformations on that structure induced by adequate
+transduction maps. Endogenous features will also play no further role:
+Henceforth, Ren is taken to be empty. It is an open question how to
+incorporate the endogenous variables into the following results. They
+were introduced to acknowledge the important conceptual role they
+must play in the future development of the theory.
+Cognitive Systems and the Harmony Function H
+Def. A cognitive system is a quintuple (R, P, O
+, п, c) where:
+R is a representational space,
+p is an environment,
+O is a set of statistical observables,
+• is the maximum-entropy estimate mp.o of environment p
+with observables O,
+c is the maximum-likelihood completion function determined
+by m.
+Def. Let X be a finite space and V: X - R. The Gibbs distribution
+determined by Vis
+pr (x) =Z-'eV(x)
+where Z is the normalization constant:
+X EX
+
+268 BASIC MECHANISMS
+Theorem 1: Competence. A: The distribution a of the cognitive
+system (R, p, O, mr, c) is the Gibbs distribution pu determined by
+the function
+U(r) = 21a Xa (r)
+a € O
+for suitable parameters 1 = (dalaę O (S. Geman, personal communication, 1984). B: The completion function c is the maximumlikelihood completion function CPH
+of the Gibbs distribution PH,
+where H: M-R, M = RX A, A = (0,1)°!, is defined by
+H(ra) = ¿"aach (r, ka)
+a € O
+and
+h(r,ka) = rka/kal-k
+for suitable parameters o = lala € o and fork sufficiently close
+to l:
+Theorem 2 will describe how the variables a = laala € o can be used
+to actually compute the completion function. Theorem 3 will describe
+how the parameters o can be learned through experience in the
+environment. Together, these theorems motivate the following
+interpretation.
+Terminology. The triple (Ka, Oa, aa) defines the knowledge atom or
+memory trace a. The vector ka is called the knowledge vector of atom a.
+The knowledge vector is an unchanging aspect of the atom. The real
+number da is called the strength of atom a. This strength changes with
+experience in the environment. The (0,1) variable da is called the
+activation of atom a. The activation of an atom changes during each
+computation of the completion function. The set K=1 (ka, Dalla€ 0
+is the long-term memory state or knowledge base of the cognitive system.
+The vector a of knowledge atom activations laala to is the workingmemory state. The value h(r, ka) is a measure of the consistency
+between the representation vector r and the knowledge vector of atom
+a; it is the potential contribution (per unit strength) of atom a to H.
+The value H (r, a) is a measure of the overall consistency between the
+entire vector a of knowledge atom activations and the representation r,
+relative to the knowledgob}fgrited Mareren K, H internalizes within
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY 269
+the cognitive system some of the statistical regularities of the environment. Viewing the completion of an input as an inference process,
+we can say that H allows the system to distinguish which patterns of
+features r are more self-consistent than others, as far as the environmental regularities are concerned. This is why His called the harmony
+junction.
+Dej. The cognitive system determined by a harmony function H can
+be represented by a graph which will shortly be interpreted as a network
+of stochastic parallel processors (see Figure 27). For each coordinate of
+the cognitive system's mental space M, that is, for each feature r; and
+each atom a, there is a node. These nodes carry binary values; the
+node for feature r, carries the value of r; € I+1, - 1), while the node
+for atom a carries the activation value aa € (1,0). If the value of ka
+for a feature r; is +1 or -1, there is a link with the corresponding +1
+label joining the nodes for a. and ri. Finally, each node a is labeled by
+its strength, ox. The graphs of harmony networks are iwo-color; if
+feature nodes are assigned one color and atom nodes another, all links
+go between nodes of different colors. This will turn out to permit a
+high degree of parallelism in the processing network.
+Retrieving Information From H: Performance
+Def. Let (Pili= o be a sequence of probability distributions on a
+binary cube X = B"
+• The paths of the (one-variable heat bath) stochastic process * determined by (pi) is defined by the following procedure.
+At time t = 0, x occupies some state x (0) = x € X, described by
+(kali
+(kali
+(kali
+•..
+FIGURE 27. A harmony new hopyrightesiMateriald with a harmony function.
+
+270 BASIC MECHANISMS
+some arbitrary initial distribution, pr(x (0) =x). Given the initial state
+x, the new state at Time 1, x (1), is constructed as follows. One of the
+n coordinates of M is selected (with uniform distribution) for updating.
+All the other n-1 coordinates of x (1) will be the same as those of
+x (0) = x. The updated coordinate can retain its previous value, leading to x (1) = x, or it can flip to the other binary value, leading to a
+new state that will be denoted x'. The selection of the value of the
+updated coordinate for x (1) is stochastically chosen according to the
+likelihood ratio:
+pr(x (1) = x')
+PO(x')
+=
+pr(x (1) =x)
+po(x)
+(where Po is the probability distribution for 1 = 0 in the given
+sequence (pi);"-o). This process-randomly select a coordinate to
+update and stochastically select a binary value for that coordinate-is
+iterated
+indefinitely, producing states x (1) for all
+times
+1 = 1,2,.... At each time 1, the likelihood ratio of values for the
+stochastic choice is determined by the distribution pr.
+Def. Let p be a probability distribution. Define the one-parameter
+family of distributions pr by
+PT = NT'p"T
+where the normalization constants are
+Ny =Ep(x)"T.
+x EX
+T is called the temperature parameter. An annealing schedule T is a
+sequence of positive values (T,)i=o that converge to zero. The annealing process determined by p and T is the heat bath stochastic process
+determined by the sequence of distributions, Pr; If p is the Gibbs distribution determined by V, then
+where
+ZT =Ze"(x)/T.
+x EX
+This is the same (except for the sign of the exponent) as the relationship that holds in classical statistical mechanics between the probability
+p(x) of a microscopic state x, its energy V (x), and the temperature T.
+This is the basis for the names "temperature" and "annealing schedule."
+In the annealing process Tepyrightado atstibution pH of Theorem 1 on
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+271
+the space M, the graph of the harmony network has the following significance. The updating of a coordinate can be conceptualized as being
+performed by a processor at the corresponding node in the graph. To
+make its stochastic choice with the proper probabilities, a node updating
+at time t must compute the ratio
+Pr, (x)
+PT, (x)
+The exponent is the difference in harmony between the two choices of
+value for the updating node, divided by the current computational temperature. By examining the definitions of the harmony function and its
+graph, this difference is easily seen to depend only on the values of
+nodes connected to the updating node. Suppose at times t and i+ 1 two
+nodes in a harmony network are updated. If these nodes are not connected, then the computation of the second node is not affected by the
+outcome of the first: They are statistically independent. These computations can be performed in parallel without changing the statistics of
+the outcomes (assuming the computational temperature to be the same
+at t and (+1). Because the graph of harmony networks is two-color,
+this means there is another stochastic process that can be used without
+violating the validity of the upcoming Theorem 2.2' All the nodes of one
+color can update in parallel. To pass from x (t) to x (i+ 1), all the nodes
+of one color update in parallel; then to pass from x (it 1) to x (i+2), all
+the nodes of the other color update in parallel. In twice the time it
+takes a processor to perform an update, plus twice the time required to
+pass new values along the links, a cycle is completed in which an
+entirely new state (potentially different in all N+ |O| coordinates) is
+computed.
+Theorem 2: Realizability. A: The heat bath stochastic process
+determined by Pu converges, for any initial distribution, to the distribution i of the cognitive system (R, p, O, m, c) [Metropolis et
+al., 1953). B: The annealing process determined by Pr converges,
+for any initial distribution, to the completion function of the cognitive system, for any annealing schedule that approaches zero sufficiently slowly (Geman & Geman, 1984).
+Part A of this theorem means the following. Suppose an input • is
+given. Those features specified in • to have values +1 or -1 are
+21 This is an important respect in which harmony networks differ from the arbitrary
+networks allowed in the Boltz@@pyrigfed Material
+
+272 BASIC MECHANISMS
+assigned their values, which
+are thereafter fixed. The remaining
+features are assigned random initial values; these will change through
+the stochastic process. Now we begin the stochastic process determined
+by pu. (The state space X is now R, and the same distribution pu is
+used for all times.) The nonfixed variables flip back and forth between
+their binary values. As time progresses, the probability of finding the
+system in any state r2 approaches the maximum-entropy estimate
+т (r) (conditioned on i, so that only completions of i have nonzero
+probability). The meaning of Part B of Theorem 1 is this: As in Part
+A, we fix the features specified in the input • and start the other
+features off with random values. The activation variables are assigned
+initial values, say, of 0. We start the annealing process determined by
+PH. (The state space X is now M = RxA.) The unfixed features and
+all the activations flip between their values. The temperature drops
+according to the annealing schedule. As time progresses, the probability of finding the system in a state other than a maximum-likelihood
+completion of ‹ goes to zero. (If there are multiple maximumlikelihood completions, these completions become equally likely as time
+progresses.)
+Storing Information in H: Learning
+Def. (After Hinton & Sejnowski, 1983a.) Let (R, p, O, m, c) be a
+cognitive system. The trace learning procedure is defined iteratively as
+follows. Initially, let da = 0 for all a € O. Present the system with a
+sample of states, r, drawn from the environmental distribution, p
+(environmental observation). Now store an increment for each la equal
+to the mean of Xa (r) in this sample. Next, use the current a to define
+U as in Theorem 1 and use the stochastic process determined by Pu to
+generate a sample of values of r from the distribution pu, following
+Theorem 2 (environmental simulation). Now store a decrement for each
+da equal to the mean of Xa (r) in this sample. Finally, change each do
+by the stored increment minus the decrement. Repeat this observeenvironment/simulate-environment/modify-d cycle. Throughout the
+learning, define
+Ta=
+1 a
+1 - K
+For small Ad, a good approximate way to implement this procedure is
+to alternately observeCanytightarMatende environment in equal
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+273
+proportions, and to increment (respectively, decrement) da by Ad each
+time the feature pattern defining a appears during observation (respectively, simulation). It is in this sense that o. is the strength of the
+memory trace for the feature pattern ka defining a. Note that in learning, equilibrium is established when
+the frequency of occurrence of
+each pattern ka during simulation equals that during observation (i.e.,
+da has no net change.
+Theorem 3: Learnability. Suppose all knowledge atoms are
+independent. Then if sufficient sampling is done in the trace learning procedure to produce accurate estimates of the observable statistics, 1 and o will converge to the values required by Theorem 1.
+Independence of the knowledge atoms means that the functions
+IXala € o are linearly independent. This means no two atoms can have
+exactly the same knowledge vector. It also means no knowledge atom
+can be simply the "or" of some other atoms: for example, the atom
+with knowledge vector +0 is the "or" of the atoms ++ and t-, and so
+is not independent of them. (Indeed, X+0 = X++ +X+-.) The sampling
+condition of this theorem indicates the tradeoff between learning speed
+and performance accuracy. By adding higher order statistics to 0
+(longer patterns), we can make m a more accurate representation of p
+and thereby increase performance accuracy, but then learning will
+require greater sampling of the environment.
+Second-Order Observables and the Boltzmann Machine
+Consider the special case in which the observables O each involve no
+more than two features. The largest independent set of such observables is the set of all observables either of the form
+a;: (r; =+]
+or the form
+01: [0 = 11 8 | =
+with i<j, i.e.,
+aij: a, de aj.
+
+274 BASIC MECHANISMS
+To see that the other first- or second-order observations are not
+independent of these, consider a particular pair of features ri and ri,
+and let
+and
+Xb,0
+= XIr, =b,)
+Then notice:
+X+- = X+0 - X++
+x-o = 1-x+0
+X-- = 1-X++-X+--X-+
+= 1-X++- X++- Ixot -X++).
+Thus, the x-functions for all first- and second-order observations can
+be linearly generated from the set
+O = xilisi U Ixili
+which will now be taken to be the set of observables. I will abbreviate
+da, ashij and da, as A;. Next, consider the U function for this set, O:
+a € O
+= Exxix; + Ex,xi.
+i<j
+Here I have used
+Xij = XiXj
+which follows from
+aij = a; d aj.
+Now using the formula for x given above,
+11 ifri = +
+x="½(r+ 1) = 10 itr=-.
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+275
+If we regard the variables of the system to be the xi instead of the ri,
+this formula for U can be identified with minus the formula for energy,
+E, in the Boltzmann machine formalism (see Chapter 7). The mapping
+takes the harmony feature r; to the Boltzmann node X., the harmony
+parameter dij to the Boltzmann weight wij, and minus the parameter d;
+to the threshold o;. Harmony theory's estimated probability for states
+of the environment, e"
+, is then mapped onto the Boltzmann machine's
+estimate, e E
+• For the isomorphism to be complete, the value of d
+that arises from learning in harmony theory must map onto the weights
+and thresholds given by the Boltzmann machine learning procedure.
+This is established by the following theorem, which also incorporates
+the preceding results.
+Theorem 4. Consider a cognitive system with the above set of firstand second-order observables, O. Then the weights Wijli<j and
+thresholds (;), learned by the Boltzmann machine are related to the
+parameters & generated by the trace learning procedure by the relations wij = Aij and o; =-A;. It follows that the Boltzmann
+machine energy function, E, is equal to - U, and the Boltzmann
+machine's estimated probabilities for environmental states are the
+same as those of the cognitive system.
+This result shows that the Boltzmann criterion of minimizing the
+information-theoretic distance, G, between
+the environmental and
+estimated distributions, subject to the constraint that the estimated distribution be a Gibbs distribution determined by a quadratic function,
+-E, is a consequence of the harmony theory criterion of minimizing
+the information of the estimated distribution subject to environmental
+constraints, in the special case that these constraints are no higher than
+second order.
+Proofs of the Theorems
+Theorem 1. Part A: The desired maximum-entropy distribution i is
+the one that maximizes S (T) subject to the constraints
+ET (r) = 1
+TER
+and
+< Xa>== Pa
+where <> denotes the expected value with respect to the distribution, and (Pala o argopyrighted wale statistics of the environment.
+
+276
+We introduce the Lagrange multipliers d and da (see, for example,
+Thomas, 1968) and solve for the values of m (r) obeying
+0=
+дт (г). ER
+- [ла 2 Ха(т) (ґ)-Pa - 1 2
+»E O
+rE R
+This leads directly to A. Part B: Since a can be expressed as the product of kal terms each linear in the feature variables, the function U is
+a polynomial in the features of degree |k.|. By introducing new variables aa, U will now be replaced by a quadratic function H. The trick
+is to write
+xa(r) - 1!
+if r-kakal =1
+otherwise
+as
+Ха (т) =
+"а є 10,1) | 1-к
+- h (r, ka)
+a € 10,1) 1-K
+where a is chosen close enough to 1 that r-ka/|kal can only exceed
+by equaling 1. This is assured by the condition on k of the theorem.
+Now U can be written
+Max
+a € O
+lach (I, ka)) = max H (a, r)
+a € A
+where the strengths o« are simply the Lagrange multipliers, rescaled:
+Ta=
+1-K
+Computing the maximum-likelihood completion function C, requires
+maximizing (r) a eU(r) over those r € R that are completions of the
+input i. This is equivalent to maximizing U (r), since the exponential
+function is monotonically increasing. But,
+max U (r) = max max H (r, a).
+1De 8 € A
+Thus the maximum-likelihood completion function C= Cpu
+determined by m, the Gibbs distribution determined by U, is the same as
+the maximum-likelihood completion function CPH
+determined by PH,
+the Gibbs distribution despiggle yatertapte that P is a distribution
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+277
+on the enlarged space M = Rx A. For Theorem 3, the conditions
+determining the Lagrange multipliers (strengths) will be examined.
+Theorem 2. Part A: This classic result has, since Metropolis et al.
+(1953), provided the foundation for the computer simulation of thermal systems. We will prove that the stochastic process determined by
+any probability distribution p always converges to p. The stochastic
+process x is a Markov process with a stationary transition probability
+matrix. (The probability of making a transition from one state to
+another is time-independent. This is not true of a process in which
+variables are updated in a fixed sequence rather than by randomly
+selecting a variable according to some fixed probability distribution.
+For the sequential updating process, Theorem 2A still holds, but the
+proof is less direct [see, for example, Smolensky, 19811). Since only
+one variable can change per time step, IX steps are required to completely change from one state to another. However in |X| time steps,
+any state has a nonzero probability of changing to any other state. In
+the language of stochastic processes, this means that the process is
+irreducible. It is an important result from the theory of stochastic
+processes that in a finite state space any irreducible Markov process
+approaches, in the above sense, a unique limiting distribution as 1→∞
+(Lamperti, 1977). It remains only to show that this limiting distribution is p. The argument now is that p is a stationary distribution of the
+process. This means that if at any time i the distribution of states of
+the process is p, then at the next time i+1 (and hence at all later
+times) the distribution will remain p. Once p is known to be stationary, it follows that p is the unique limiting distribution, since we could
+always start the process with distribution p, and it would have to converge to the limiting distribution, all the while remaining in the stationary distribution p. To show that p is a stationary distribution for the
+process, we assume that at time i the distribution of states is p. The
+distribution at time tt 1 is then
+* € Xx
+= L p(x') Wxx.
+* E Xx
+The sum here runs over Xx, the set of states that differ from x in at
+most one coordinate; for the remaining states, the one time-step transi -
+tion probability We'x = pr(x(r+1) = x/x (1) = x') is zero. Next we
+use the important detailed balance condition,
+p(x)Wxx =p(x) Wxx
+
+278
+which states that in an ensemble of systems with states distributed
+according to p, the number of transitions from x' to x is equal to the
+number from x 1o x'. Detailed balance holds because, for the nontrivial case in which x' and x differ in the single coordinate v, the transition matrix W determined by the distribution p is
+p(x)
+Wxx = Pr
+p(x) + p(x)
+where P, is the probability of selecting for update the coordinate v.
+Now we have
+p(1+1)=x)=[p(x)Wxx = Ep(x)Wxx
+* € Xx
+=p (x) 2
+Wxx=p (x).
+The last equality follows from
+Wxx = 1
+* E Xx
+which simply states that the probability of a transition from x to some
+state x' is 1. The conclusion is that the probability distribution at time
+It 1 remains p, which is therefore a stationary distribution.
+Part B: Part A assures us that with infinite patience we can arbitrarily
+well approximate the distribution Pr at any finite temperature T. It
+seems intuitively clear that with still further patience we could sequentially approximate in one long stochastic process a series of distributions
+Pr, with temperatures I, monotonically decreasing to zero. This process would presumably converge to the zero-temperature distribution
+that corresponds to the maximum-likelihood completion function. A
+proof that this is true, provided
+T, > C/ Int
+for suitable C, can be found in S. Geman and D. Geman (1984).
+Theorem 3. We now pick up the analysis from the end of the proof
+of Theorem 1.
+Lemma. (S. Geman, personal communication, 1984.) The values of
+the Lagrange multipliers & = (Mala& o defining the function U of
+Theorem 2 are those that minimize the convex function
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+279
+Proof of Lemma: Note that
+PU(r) = Pr (r) = Zy (1) ' eV(r)
+where
+V(r) = ¿ laXa (r) - Pal = U(r)- ElaPa.
+a € O
+a € O
+From this it follows that the gradient of Fis
+aF
+= < Xa
+>
+ал.
+PU - Pa
+The constraint that 1 enforces is precisely that this vanish for all a;
+then pu = i. Thus the correct & is a critical point of F. To see that
+in fact the correct • is a minimum of F, we show that F has a
+positive-definite matrix of second-partial derivatives and is therefore
+convex. It is straightforward to verify that the quadratic form
+a'F
+9a
+aлa dia
+9á
+is the variance
+< 10-<8>pu
+PU
+of the random variable & defined by 2(1) = ¿ da Xa (r).
+This
+variance is clearly nonnegative definite. That & cannot vanish is
+assured by the assumption that the a are linearly independent. Since a
+Gibbs distribution Pu is nowhere zero, this means that the variance of
+@ is positive, so the Lemma is proved.
+Proof of Theorem 3: Since F is convex, we can find its minimum, d,
+by gradient descent from any starting point. The process of learning
+the correct d, then, can proceed in time according to the gradient descent equation
+дло
+=-1<Xa> PU-Pa) = <Xa>p- <Xa> pu
+where it is understood that the function U changes as 1 changes. The
+two phases of the trace learning procedure generate the two terms in
+this equation. In the entironigantal Motiation phase, the increment
+
+280
+<Xa>p is estimated; in the environmental simulation phase, the decrement <Xa> pu is estimated (following Theorem 2). By hypothesis,
+these estimates are accurate. (That is, this theorem treats the ideal case
+of perfect samples, with sample means equal to the true population
+means.) Thus & will converge to the correct value. The proportional
+relation between or and & was derived in the proof of Theorem 1.
+Theorem 4. The proof of Theorem 3 shows that the trace learning
+procedure does gradient descent in the function F. The Boltzmann
+learning procedure does gradient descent in the function G:
+PU (r)
+G(1) = -2p (r) In
+p (г)
+where, as always, the function U implicitly depends on 1. Theorem 4
+will be proved by showing that in fact F and G differ by a constant
+independent of d, and therefore they define the same gradient descent
+trajectories. From the above definition of V, we have
+V (r) = U(r) -
+<Xa> = U(r) - <U>
+a € O
+where, here and henceforth, < > denotes expectation values with
+respect to the environmental distribution p. This implies
+Zek(r) = e<U>
+[eU(r).
+i.e.,
+Zv = Zue-sus.
+By the definition of F,
+To evaluate the last quantity in angle brackets, note that
+pu(r) = Zu'el(r)
+implies
+Inpu (r) =-InZut U(r)
+so that the preceding equation for F becomes
+F=< In Zu-U>=-‹Inpu>=-2p(r) Inpu(r).
+
+6. HARMONY THEORY
+281
+Now,
+G = - [p (г) Inpu (r) + 2p (r) Inp (r),
+so we have
+G (1) = F(x) - Sp).
+Thus, as claimed, G is just F minus a constant that is independent of
+1: the entropy of the environment.
+
+CHAPTER 7
+Learning and Relearning in Boltzmann Machines
+G. E. HINTON and T. J. SEJNOWSKI
+Many of the chapters in this volume make use of the ability of a parallel network to perform cooperative searches for good solutións to problems.
+The basic idea is simple: The weights on the connections
+between processing units encode knowledge about how things normally
+fit together in some domain and the initial states or external inputs to a
+subset of the units encode some fragments of a structure within the
+domain. These fragments constitute a problem: What is the whole
+structure from which they probably came? The network computes a
+"good solution" to the problem by repeatedly updating the states of
+units that represent possible other parts of the structure until the network eventually settles into a stable state of activity that represents the
+solution.
+One field in which this style of computation seems particularly
+appropriate is vision (Ballard, Hinton, & Sejnowski, 1983). A visual
+system must be able to solve large constraint-satisfaction problems
+rapidly in order to interpret a two-dimensional intensity image in terms
+of the depths and orientations of the three-dimensional surfaces in the
+world that gave rise to that image. In general, the information in the
+image is not sufficient to specify the three-dimensional surfaces unless
+the interpretive process makes use of additional plausible constraints
+about the kinds of structures that typically appear. Neighboring pieces
+of an image, for example, usually depict fragments of surface that have
+similar depths, similar surface orientations, and the same reflectance.
+The most plausible interpretation of an image is the one that satisfies
+
+7. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+283
+constraints of this kind as well as possible, and the human visual system stores enough plausible constraints and is good enough at applying
+them that it can arrive at the correct interpretation of most normal
+images.
+The computation may be performed by an iterative search which
+starts with a poor interpretation and progressively improves it by reducing a cost function that measures the extent to which the current
+interpretation violates the plausible constraints. Suppose, for example,
+that each unit stands for a small three-dimensional surface fragment,
+and the state of the unit indicates the current bet about whether that
+surface fragment is part of the best three-dimensional interpretation.
+Plausible constraints about the nature of surfaces can then be encoded
+by the pairwise interactions between processing elements. For
+example, two units that stand for neighboring surface fragments of
+similar depth and surface orientation can be mutually excitatory to
+encode the constraints that each of these hypotheses tends to support
+the other (because objects tend to have continuous surfaces).
+RELAXATION SEARCHES
+The general idea of using parallel networks to perform relaxation
+searches that simultaneously satisfy multiple constraints is appealing. It
+might even provide a successor to telephone exchanges, holograms, or
+communities of agents as a metaphor for the style of computation in
+cerebral cortex. But some tough technical questions have to be
+answered before this style of computation can be accepted as either
+efficient or plausible:
+• Will the network settle down or will it oscillate or wander aimlessly?
+• What does the network compute by settling down? We need
+some characterization of the computation that the network performs other than the network itself. Ideally we would like to
+be able to say what ought to be computed (Marr, 1982) and
+then to show that a network can be made to compute it.
+• How long does the network take to settle on a solution? If
+thousands of iterations are required the method becomes
+implausible as a model of how the cortex solves constraintsatisfaction problems.
+
+284 BASIC MECHANISMS
+• How much information does each unit need to convey to its
+neighbors? In many relaxation schemes the units communicate
+accurate real values to one another on each iteration. Again
+this is implausible if the units are intended to be like cortical
+neurons which communicate using all-or-none spikes. To send
+a real-value, accurate to within 5%, using firing rates requires
+about 100 ms which is about the time allowed for the whole
+iterative process to settle down.
+• How are the weights that encode the knowledge acquired? For
+models of low-level vision it is possible for a programmer to
+decide on the weights, and evolution might do the same for the
+earliest stages of biological visual systems. But if the same kind
+of constraint-satisfaction searches are to be used for higher
+level functions like shape recognition or content-addressable
+memory, there must be some learning procedure that automatically encodes properties of the domain into the weights.
+This chapter is mainly concerned with the last of these questions, but
+the learning procedure we present is an unexpected consequence of our
+attempt to answer the other questions, so we shall start with them.
+Relaxation, Optimization, and Weak Constraints
+One way of ensuring that a relaxation search is computing something
+sensible (and will eventually settle down) is to show that it is solving an
+optimization problem by progressively reducing the value of a cost
+function. Each possible state of activity of the network has an associated cost, and the rule used for updating activity levels is chosen so
+that this cost keeps falling. The cost function must be chosen so that
+low-cost states represent good solutions to problems in the domain.
+Many optimization problems can be cast in a framework known as
+linear programming.
+There are some variables which take on real
+values and there are linear equality and inequality constraints between
+variables. Each combination of values for the variables has an associated cost which is the sum over all the variables of the current value
+times a cost-coefficient. The aim is to find a combination of values
+that satisfies all the constraints and minimizes the cost function. If the
+variables are further constrained to take on only the values 1 or 0 the
+problem is called zero-one programming. Hinton (1977) has shown
+that certain zero-one programming problems can be implemented as
+relaxation searches in parallel networks. This allows networks to find
+
+1. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+285
+good solutions to problems in which there are discrete hypotheses that
+are true or false. Even though the allowable solutions all assign values
+of 1 or O to the hypotheses, the relaxation process works by passing
+through intermediate states in which hypothesis units have real-valued
+activity levels lying between 1 and 0. Each constraint is enforced by a
+feedback loop that measures the amount by which the current values
+violate the constraint and tries to alter the values of the variables to
+reduce this violation.
+Linear programming and its variants make a sharp distinction
+between constraints (which must be satisfied) and costs. A solution
+which achieves a very low cost by violating one or two of the constraints is simply not allowed. In many domains, the distinction
+between constraints and costs is not so clear-cut. In vision, for
+example, it is usually helpful to use the constraint that neighboring
+pieces of surface are at similar depths because surfaces are mostly continuous and are rarely parallel to the line of sight. But this is not an
+absolute constraint.
+It doesn't apply at the edge of an object. So a
+visual system needs to be able to generate interpretations that violate
+this constraint if it can satisfy many other constraints by doing so.
+Constraints like these have been called "weak" constraints (Blake, 1983)
+and it is possible to formulate optimization problems in which
+all the
+constraints are weak and there is no distinction between constraints and
+costs. The optimal solution is then the one which minimizes the total
+constraint violation where different constraints are given different
+strengths depending on how reliable they are. Another way of saying
+this is that all the constraints have associated plausibilities, and the
+most plausible solution is the one which fits these plausible constraints
+as well as possible.
+Some relaxation schemes dispense with separate feedback loops for
+the constraints and implement weak constraints directly in the excitatory and inhibitory interactions between units. We would like these
+networks to settle into states in which a few units are fully active and
+the rest are inactive. Such states constitute clean "digital" interpretations. To prevent the network from hedging its bets by settling into a
+state where many units are slightly active, it is usually necessary to use
+a strongly nonlinear decision rule, and this also speeds convergence.
+However, the strong nonlinearities that are needed to force the network
+to make a decision also cause it to converge on different states on different occasions: Even with the same external inputs, the final state
+depends on the initial state of the net. This has led many people (Hopfield, 1982; Rosenfeld, Hummel, & Zucker, 1976) to assume that the
+particular problem to be solved should be encoded by the initial state of
+the network rather than by sustained external input to some of its
+units.
+
+286 BASIC MECHANISMS
+Hummel and Zucker (1983) and Hopfield (1982) have shown that
+some relaxation schemes have an associated "potential" or cost function
+and that the states to which the network converges are local minima of
+this function. This means that the networks are performing optimization of a well-defined function. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee
+that the network will find the best minimum. One possibility is to
+redefine the problem as finding the local minimum which is closest to
+the initial state. This is useful if the minima are used to represent
+"items" in a memory, and the initial states are queries to memory
+which may contain missing or erroneous information. The network
+simply finds the minimum that best fits the query. This idea was used
+by Hopfield (1982) who introduced an interesting kind of network in
+which the units were always in one of two states.' Hopfield showed that
+if the units are symmetrically connected (i.e., the weight from unit i to
+unit j exactly equals the weight from unit j to unit i) and if they are
+updated one at a time, each update reduces (or at worst does not
+increase) the value of a cost function which he called "energy" because
+of the arialogy with physical systems. Consequently, repeated iterations
+are guaranteed to find an energy minimum. The global energy of the
+system is defined as
+E=-EwiSis; + Eoisi
+(1)
+i<j
+i
+where wij is the strength of connection (synaptic weight) from the jth
+to the ith unit, s; is the state of the ith unit (0 or 1), and o; is a
+threshold.
+The updating rule is to switch each unit into whichever of its iwo
+states yields the lower total energy given the current states of the other
+units. Because the connections are symmetrical, the difference between
+the energy of the whole system with the kth hypothesis false and its
+energy with the kth hypothesis true can be determined locally by the
+kth unit, and is just
+ДЕК = EWKiS, - OK.
+(2)
+Therefore, the rule for minimizing the energy contributed by a unit is
+to adopt the true state if its total input from the other units exceeds its
+threshold. This is the familiar rule for binary threshold units.
+1 Hopfield used the states 1 and -I because his model was derived from physical sysems called spin glasses in which spins are either "up" or "down." Provided the unit
+ave thresholds, models that use 1 and - 1 can be translated into models that use 1 and
+and have different thresholds.
+
+7. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+287
+Using Probabilistic Decisions to Escape From Local Minima
+At about the same time that Hopfield showed how parallel networks
+of this kind could be used to access memories that were stored as local
+minima, Kirkpatrick, working at IBM, introduced an interesting new
+search technique for solving hard optimization problems on conventional computers.
+One standard technique is to use gradient descent: The values of the
+variables in the problem are modified in whatever direction reduces the
+cost function (energy). For hard problems, gradient descent gets stuck
+at local minima that are not globally optimal. This is an inevitable
+consequence of only allowing downhill moves. If jumps to higher
+energy states occasionally occur, it is possible to break out of local
+minima, but it is not obvious how the system will then behave and it is
+far from clear when uphill steps should be allowed.
+Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, and Vecchi (1983) used another physical analogy
+to guide the use of occasional uphill steps. To find a very low energy
+state of a metal, the best strategy is to melt it and then to slowly reduce
+its temperature. This process is called annealing, and so they named
+their search method "simulated annealing." Chapter 6 contains a discussion of why annealing works. We give a simple intuitive account
+here.
+One way of seeing why thermal noise is helpful is to consider the
+energy landscape shown in Figure 1. Let us suppose that a ball-bearing
+starts at a randomly chosen point on the landscape. If it always goes
+downhill (and has no inertia), it will have an even chance of ending up
+at A or B because both minima have the same width and so the initial
+B
+FIGURE 1. A simple energy landscape containing iwo local minima separated by an
+energy barrier. Shaking can be used to allow the state of the network (represented here
+by a ball-bearing) to escape frogoloyightedaMaterial
+
+288 BASIC MECHANISMS
+random point is equally likely to lie in either minimum. If we shake
+the whole system, we are more likely to shake the ball-bearing from A
+to B than vice versa
+• because the energy barrier is lower from the A
+side. If the shaking is gentle, a transition from A to B will be many
+times as probable as a transition from B to A, but both transitions will
+be very rare. So although gentle shaking will ultimately lead to a very
+high probability of being in B rather than A, it will take a very long
+time before this happens. On the other hand, if the shaking is violent,
+the ball-bearing will cross the barrier frequently and so the ultimate
+probability ratio will be approached rapidly, but this ratio will not be
+very good: With violent shaking it is almost as easy to cross the barrier
+in the wrong direction (from B to A) as in the right direction. A good
+compromise is to start by shaking hard and gradually shake more and
+more gently. This ensures that at some stage the noise level passes
+through the best possible compromise between the absolute probability
+of a transition and the ratio of the probabilities of good and bad transitions. It also means that at the end, the ball-bearing stays right at the
+bottom of the chosen minimum.
+This view of why annealing helps is not the whole story. Figure 1 is
+misleading because all the states have been laid out in one dimension.
+Complex systems have high-dimensional state spaces, and so the barrier
+between two low-lying states is typically massively degenerate: The
+number of ways of getting from one low-lying state to another is an
+exponential function of the height of the barrier one is willing to cross.
+This means that a rise in the level of thermal noise opens up an enormous variety of paths for escaping from a local minimum and even
+though each path by itself is unlikely, it is highly probable that the system will cross the barrier. We conjecture that simulated annealing will
+only work well in domains where the energy barriers are highly
+degenerate.
+Applying Simulated Annealing to Hopfield Nets
+There is a simple modification of Hopfield's updating rule that allows
+parallel networks to implement simulated annealing. If the energy gap
+between the 1 and O states of the kth unit is AEk then, regardless of
+the previous state set, sk = 1 with probability
+1
+PK =
+(Ite sENT)
+(3)
+
+7. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+289
+where T is a parameter which acts like the temperature of a physical
+system. This local decision rule ensures that in thermal equilibrium the
+relative probability of two global states is determined solely by their
+energy difference, and follows a Boltzmann distribution:
+Pa =é lEa-EglIT
+(4)
+PB
+where Pa is the probability of being in the ath global state, and Ea is
+the energy of that state.
+At low temperatures there is a strong bias in favor of states with low
+energy, but the time required to reach equilibrium may be long. At
+higher temperatures the bias is not so favorable, but equilibrium is
+reached faster. The fastest way to reach equilibrium at a given temperature is generally to use simulated annealing: Start with a higher
+temperature and gradually reduce it.
+The idea of implementing constraints as interactions between stochastic processing elements was proposed by Moussouris (1974) who
+discussed the identity between Boltzmann distributions and Markov
+random fields. The idea of using simulated annealing to find low
+energy states in parallel networks has been investigated independently
+by several different groups. S. Geman and D. Geman (1984) established limits on the allowable speed of the annealing schedule and
+showed that simulated annealing can be very effective for removing
+noise from images. Hinton and Sejnowski (1983b) showed how the use
+of binary stochastic elements could solve some problems that plague
+other relaxation techniques, in particular the problem of learning the
+weights. Smolensky (1983) has been investigating a similar scheme
+which he calls "harmony theory." This scheme is discussed in detail in
+Chapter 6. Smolensky's harmony is equivalent to our energy (with a
+sign reversal).
+Pattern Completion
+One way of using a parallel network is to treat it as a pattern completion device. A subset of the units are "clamped" into their on or off
+states and the weights in the network then complete the pattern by
+determining the states of the remaining units. There are strong limitations on the sets of binary vectors that can be learned if the network
+has one unit for each component of the vector. These limits can be
+transcended by using extra units whose states do not correspond to
+components in the vectors to be learned. The weights of connections
+to these extra units can dipyrgh 8a parentat complex interactions that
+
+290 BASIC MECHANISMS
+cannot be expressed as pairwise correlations between the components
+of the vectors. We call these extra units hidden units (by analogy with
+hidden Markov processes) and we call the units that are used to specify
+the patterns to be learned the visible units. The visible units are the
+interface between the network and the environment that specifies vectors for it to learn or asks it to complete a partial vector. The hidden
+units are where the network can build its own internal representations.
+Sometimes, we would like to be able to complete a pattern from any
+sufficiently large part of it without knowing in advance which part will
+be given and which part must be completed. Other times we know in
+advance which parts will be given as input and which parts will have to
+be completed as output. So there are two different completion paradigms. In the first, any of the visible units might be part of the
+required output. In the second, there is a distinguished subset of the
+visible units, called the input units, which are always clamped by the
+environment, so the network never needs to determine the states of
+these units.
+EASY AND HARD LEARNING
+Consider a network which is allowed to run freely, using the probabilistic decision rule in Equation 3, without having any of its units
+clamped by the environment. When the network reaches thermal
+equilibrium, the probability of finding it in any particular global state
+depends only on the energy of that state (Equation 4). We can therefore control the probabilities of global states by controlling their energies. If each weight only contributed to the energy of a single global
+state, this would be straightforward, but changing a weight will actually
+change the energies of many different states so it is not immediately
+obvious how a weight-change will affect the probability of a particular
+global state. Fortunately, if we run the network until it reaches thermal
+equilibrium, Equations 3 and 4 allow us to derive the way in which the
+probability of each global state changes as a weight is changed:
+a In Pa
+(5)
+д Wij
+where si" is the binary state of the ith unit in the ath global state and
+Pa is the probability, at thermal equilibrium, of global state a of the
+network when none of the visible units are clamped (the lack of clamping is denoted by the superscript -). Equation 5 shows that the effect
+
+7. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+291
+of a weight on the log probability of a global state can be computed
+from purely local information because it only involves the behavior of
+the two units that the weight connects (the second term is just the
+probability of finding the ith and j th units on together). This makes it
+easy to manipulate the probabilities of global states provided the desired
+probabilities are known (see Hinton & Sejnowski, 1983a, for details).
+Unfortunately, it is normally unreasonable to expect the environment
+or a teacher to specify the required probabilities of entire global states
+of the network. The task that the network must perform is defined in
+terms of the states of the visible units, and so the environment or
+teacher only has direct access to the states of these units. The difficult
+learning problem is to decide how to use the hidden units to help
+achieve the required behavior of the visible units. A learning rule
+which assumes that the network is instructed from outside on how to
+use all of its units is of limited interest because it evades the main
+problem which is to discover appropriate representations for a given
+task among the hidden units.
+In statistical terms, there are many kinds of statistical structure implicit in a large ensemble of environmental vectors. The separate probability of each visible unit being active is the first-order structure and
+can be captured by the thresholds of the visible units. The v22 pairwise correlations between the v visible units constitute the secondorder structure and this can be captured by the weights between pairs of
+units.? All structure higher than second-order cannot be captured by
+pairwise weights between the visible units. A simple example may help to
+clarify this crucial point.
+Suppose that the ensemble consists of the vectors: (1 1 0), (1 0 1),
+(0 1 1), and (0 0 0), each with a probability of 0.25. There is clearly
+some structure here because four of the eight possible 3-bit vectors
+never occur. However, the structure is entirely third-order. The firstorder probabilities are all O.5, and the second-order correlations are all
+O, so if we consider only these statistics, this ensemble is indistinguishable from the ensemble in which all eight vectors occur equiprobably.
+The Widrow-Hoff rule or perceptron convergence procedure (Rosenblatt, 1962) is a learning rule which is designed to capture second-order
+structure and it therefore fails miserably on the example just given. If
+the first two bits are treated as an input and the last bit is treated as the
+required output, the ensemble corresponds to the function "exclusiveor" which is one of the examples used by Minsky and Papert (1969) to
+show the strong limitations of one-layer perceptrons. The Widrow-Hoff
+& Factor analysis confines itself to capturing as much of the second-order structure as
+possible in a few underlying "factors." It ignores all higher order structure which is where
+much of the interesting inform@opyrighted Wat entamost simple ensembles of vectors.
+
+292 BASIC MECHANISMS
+rule can do easy learning, but it cannot do the kind of hard learning
+that involves deciding how to use extra units whose behavior is not
+directly specified by the task.
+It is tempting to think that networks with pairwise connections can
+never capture higher than second-order statistics. There is one sense in
+which this is true and another in which it is false. By introducing extra
+units which are not part of the definition of the original ensemble, it is
+possible to express the third-order structure of the original ensemble in
+the second-order structure of the larger set of units. In the example
+given above, we can add a fourth component to get the ensemble
+( (1101), (1010), (0110), (0000)). It is now possible to use the thresholds and weights between all four units to express the third-order structure in the first three components. A more familiar way of saying this
+is that we introduce an extra "feature detector" which in this example
+detects the case when the first two units are both on. We can then
+make each of the first two units excite the third unit, and use strong
+inhibition from the feature detector to overrule this excitation when
+both of the first two units are on. The difficult problem in introducing
+the extra unit was deciding when it should be on and when it should be
+off-deciding what feature it should detect.?
+One way of thinking about the higher order structure of an ensemble
+of environmental vectors is that it implicitly specifies good sets of
+underlying features that can be used to model the structure of the
+environment. In common-sense terms, the weights in the network
+should be chosen so that the hidden units represent significant underlying features that bear strong, regular relationships to each other and to
+the states of the visible units. The hard learning problem is to figure
+out what these features are, i.e., to find a set of weights which turn the
+hidden units into useful feature detectors that explicitly represent
+properties of the environment which are only implicitly present as
+higher order statistics in the ensemble of environmental vectors.
+Maximum Likelihood Models
+Another view of learning is that the weights in the network constitute a generative model of the environment-we would like to find a
+set of weights so that when the network is running freely, the patterns
+of activity that occur over the visible units are the same as they would
+be if the environment was clamping them. The number of units in the
+3 In this example there are six different ways of using the extra unit to solve the task.
+
+7. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+293
+network and their interconnectivity define a space of possible models of
+the environment, and any particular set of weights defines a particular
+model within this space. The learning problem is to find a combination
+of weights that gives a good model given the limitations imposed by the
+architecture of the network and the way it runs.
+More formally, we would like a way of finding the combination of
+weights that is most likely to have produced the observed ensemble of
+environmental vectors. This is called a maximum likelihood model and
+there is a large literature within statistics on maximum likelihood estimation. The learning procedure we describe actually has a close relationship to a method called Expectation and Maximization (EM)
+(Dempster, Laird, & Rubin, 1976). EM is used by statisticians for
+estimating missing parameters. It represents probability distributions by
+using
+parameters like our weights that are exponentially related to
+probabilities, rather than using probabilities themselves. The EM algorithm is closely related to an earlier algorithm invented by Baum that
+manipulates probabilities directly. Baum's algorithm has been used successfully for speech recognition (Bahl, Jelinek, & Mercer, 1983). It
+estimates the parameters of a hidden Markov chain-a transition network which has a fixed structure but variable probabilities on the arcs
+and variable probabilities of emitting a particular output symbol as it
+arrives at each internal node. Given an ensemble of strings of symbols
+and a fixed-topology transition network, the algorithm finds the combination of transition probabilities and output probabilities that is most
+likely to have produced these strings (actually it only finds a local maximum).
+Maximum likelihood methods work by adjusting the parameters to
+increase the probability that the generative model will produce the
+observed data. Baum's algorithm and EM are able to estimate new
+values for the probabilities (or weights) that are guaranteed to be better
+than the previous values. Our algorithm simply estimates the gradient
+of the log likelihood with respect to a weight, and so the magnitude of
+the weight change must be decided using additional criteria. Our algorithm, however, has the advantage that it is easy to implement in a
+parallel network of neuron-like units.
+The idea of a stochastic generative model is attractive because it provides a clean quantitative way of comparing alternative representational
+schemes. The problem of saying which of two representational schemes
+is best appears to be intractable. Many sensible rules of thumb are
+available, but these are generally pulled out of thin air and justified by
+commonsense and practical experience. They lack a firm mathematical
+foundation. If we confine ourselves to a space of allowable stochastic
+models, we can then get a simple Bayesian measure of the quality of a
+representational schemecopyAghtlik Wateriahe observed ensemble of
+
+294
+environmental vectors given the representational scheme? In our networks, representations are patterns of activity in the units, and the
+representational scheme therefore corresponds to the set of weights that
+determines when those patterns are active.
+THE BOLTZMANN MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHM
+If we make certain assumptions it is possible to derive a measure of
+how effectively the weights in the network are being used for modeling
+the structure of the environment, and it is also possible to show how
+the weights should be changed to progressively improve this measure.
+We assume that the environment clamps a particular vector over the
+visible units and it keeps it there long enough for the network to reach
+thermal equilibrium with this vector as a boundary condition (i.e., to
+"interpret" it). We also assume (unrealistically) that the there is no
+structure in the sequential order of the environmentally clamped vectors. This means that the complete structure of the ensemble of
+environmental vectors can be specified by giving the probability,
+ph pt, a ac of deper on or wer the i vine networs. cause that
+environment clamps the visible units.
+A particular set of weights can be said to constitute a perfect model
+of the structure of the environment if it leads to exactly the same
+probability distribution of visible vectors when the network is running
+freely with no units being clamped by the environment. Because of the stochastic behavior of the units, the network will wander through a variety
+of states even with no environmental input and it will therefore generate a probability distribution, P-(Va), over all 2" visible vectors.
+This distribution can be compared with the environmental distribution,
+p+ (Va). In general, it will not be possible to exactly match the 2"
+environmental probabilities using the weights among the v visible and
+h hidden units because there are at most (vth-1)(vth)/2
+symmetrical weights and (vt h) thresholds. However, it may be possible to do very well if the environment contains regularities that can be
+expressed in the weights. An information theoretic measure (Kullback,
+1959) of the distance between the environmental and free-running
+probability distributions is given by:
+G=
+p+ (Va)
+(6)
+p+(Va) In-
+P-(Va)
+where p+ (Va) is the probeusted materialstate of the visible units in
+
+7. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+295
+phaset when their states are determined by the environment, and
+P- (Va) is the corresponding probability in phase when the network is
+running freely with no environmental input.
+G is never negative and is only zero if the distributions are identical.
+G is actually the distance in bits from the free running distribution to
+the environmental distribution.* It is sometimes called the asymmetric
+divergence or information gain. The measure is not symmetric with
+respect to the two distributions. This seems odd but is actually very
+reasonable. When trying to approximate a probability distribution, it is
+more important to get the probabilities correct for events that happen
+frequently than for rare events. So the match between the actual and
+predicted probabilities of an event should be weighted by the actual
+probability as in Equation 6.
+It is possible to improve the network's model of the structure of its
+environment by changing the weights so as to reduce G. S To perform
+gradient descent in G, we need to know how G will change when a
+weight is changed. But changing a single weight changes the energies
+of one quarter of all the global states of the network, and it changes the
+probabilities of all the states in ways that depend on all the other
+weights in the network. Consider, for example, the very simple network shown in Figure 2. If we want the two units at the ends of the
+chain to be either both on or both off, how should we change the
+weight W3,4? It clearly depends on the signs of remote weights like w1,2
+because we need to have an even number of inhibitory weights in the
+chain. ' So the partial derivative of G with respect to one weight
+depends on all the other weights and minimizing G appears to be a
+input
+unit
+output
+unit
+FIGURE 2. A very simple network with one input unit, one output unit, and two hidden
+unic this that in to make vile out unit adopt lensas on sane as informationik The
+value of weight W1,2.
+4 If we use base 2 logarithms.
+5 Peter Brown (personal communication) has pointed out that minimizing G is
+equivalent to maximizing the log of the likelihood of generating the environmental
+probability distribution when the network is running freely at equilibrium.
+• The thresholds must also be agyright ital
+
+296 BASIC MECHANISMS
+difficult computational problem that requires nonlocal information.
+Fortunately, all the information that is required about the other
+weights in order to change wij appropriately shows up in the behavior
+of the ith and jth units at thermal equilibrium. In addition to performing a search for low energy states of the network, the process of reaching thermal equilibrium ensures that the joint activity of any two units
+contains all the information required for changing the weight between
+them in order to give the network a better model of its environment.
+The joint activity implicitly encodes information about all the other
+weights in the network. The Appendix shows that
+(7)
+-= -
+T
+[pit - pijl
+where pit is the probability, averaged over all environmental inputs and
+measured at equilibrium, that the ith and jth units are both on when
+the network is being driven by the environment, and pj is the
+corresponding probability when the network is free running. One
+surprising feature of Equation 7 is that it does not matter whether the
+weight is between two visible units, two hidden units, or one of each.
+The same rule applies for the gradient of G
+Unlearning
+Crick and Mitchison (1983) have suggested that a form of reverse
+learning might occur during REM sleep in mammals. Their proposal
+was based on the assumption that parasitic modes develop in large networks that hinder the distributed storage and retrieval of information.
+The mechanism that Crick and Mitchison propose is based on
+More or less random stimulation of the forebrain by the brain
+stem that will tend to stimulate the inappropriate modes of
+brain activity... and especially those which are too prone to be
+set off by random noise rather than by highly structured
+specific signals. (p. 112)
+During this state of random excitation and free running they postulate
+that changes occur at synapses to decrease the probability of the
+spurious states.
+A simulation of reverse learning was performed by Hopfield, Feinstein, and Palmer (1983) who independently had been studying ways to
+improve the associative storage capacity of simple networks of binary
+processors (Hopfield, 1982). In their algorithm an input is presented to
+the network as an initiat splitied Mater system evolves by falling
+
+1. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+297
+into a nearby local energy minimum. However, not all local energy
+minima represent stored information. In creating the desired minima,
+they accidentally create other spurious minima, and to eliminate these
+they use "unlearning": The learning procedure is applied with reverse
+sign to the states found after starting from random initial conditions.
+Following this procedure, the performance of the system in accessing
+stored states was found to be improved.
+There is an interesting relationship between the reverse learning proposed by Crick and Mitchison and Hopfield et al. and the form of the
+learning algorithm which we derived by considering how to minimize
+an information theory measure of the discrepancy between the environmental structure and the network's internal model (Hinton &
+Sejnowski, 1983b). The two phases of our learning algorithm resemble
+the learning and unlearning procedures:
+Positive Hebbian learning
+occurs in phaset during which information in the environment is captured by the weights; during phase the system randomly samples states
+according to their Boltzmann distribution and Hebbian learning occurs
+with a negative coefficient.
+However, these two phases need not be implemented in the manner
+suggested by Crick and Mitchison. For example, during phase the
+average co-occurrences could be computed without making any changes
+to the weights. These averages could then be used as a baseline for
+making changes during phaset; that is, the co-occurrences during
+phaset could be computed and the baseline subtracted before each permanent weight change. Thus, an alternative but equivalent proposal for
+the function of dream sleep is to recalibrate the baseline for
+plasticity-the break-even point which determines whether a synaptic
+weight is incremented or decremented. This would be safer than making permanent weight decrements to synaptic weights during sleep and
+solves the problem of deciding how much "unlearning" to do.
+Our learning algorithm refines Crick and Mitchison's interpretation
+of why two phases are needed. Consider a hidden unit deep within the
+network: How should its connections with other units be changed to
+best capture regularity present in the environment? If it does not
+receive direct input from the environment, the hidden unit has no way
+to determine whether the information it receives from neighboring
+units is ultimately caused by structure in the environment or is entirely
+a result of the other weights. This can lead to a "folie a deux" where
+two parts of the network each construct a model of the other and
+ignore the external environment. The contribution of internal and
+external sources can be separated by comparing the co-occurrences in
+phaset with similar information that is collected in the absence of
+environmental input. phase thus acts as a control condition. Because
+of the special properties Opyjlikri Dateria possible to subtract off this
+
+298
+purely internal contribution and use the difference to update the
+weights. Thus, the role of the two phases is to make the system maximally responsive to regularities present in the environment and to
+prevent the system from using its capacity to model internallygenerated regularities.
+Ways in Which the Learning Algorithm Can Fail
+The ability to discover the partial derivative of G by observing p.
+and Pir does not completely determine the learning algorithm. It is still
+necessary to decide how much to change each weight, how long to collect co-occurrence statistics before changing the weight, how many
+weights to change at a time, and what temperature schedule to use during the annealing searches.
+For very simple networks in very simple
+environments, it is possible to discover reasonable values for these
+parameters by trial and error. For more complex and interesting cases,
+serious difficulties arise because it is very easy to violate the assumptions on which the mathematical results are based (Derthick, 1984).
+The first difficulty is that there is nothing to prevent the learning
+algorithm from generating very large weights which create such high
+energy barriers that the network cannot reach equilibrium in the allotted time. Once this happens, the statistics that are collected will not be
+the equilibrium statistics required for Equation 7 to hold and so all bets
+are off. We have observed this happening for a number of different
+networks. They start off learning quite well and then the weights
+become too large and the network "goes sour"-its performance
+deteriorates dramatically.
+One way to ensure that the network gets close to equilibrium is to
+keep the weights small. Pearlmutter (personal communication) has
+shown that the learning works much better if, in addition to the weight
+changes caused by the learning, every weight continually decays towards
+a value of zero, with the speed of the decay being proportional to the
+absolute magnitude of the weight. This keeps the weights small and
+eventually leads to a relatively stable situation in which the decay rate
+of a weight is balanced by the partial derivative of G with respect to the
+weight. This has the satisfactory property that the absolute magnitude
+of a weight shows how important it is for modeling the environmental
+structure.
+The use of weight-decay has several other consequences which are
+not so desirable. Because the weights stay small, the network cannot
+construct very deep minima in the energy landscape and so it cannot
+make the probability ratios for similar global states be very different.
+
+7. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+299
+This means that it is bound to give a significant number of errors in
+modeling environments where very similar vectors have very different
+probabilities. Better performance can be achieved by annealing the network to a lower final temperature (which is equivalent to making all the
+weights larger), but this will make the learning worse for iwo separate
+reasons.
+First, with less errors there is less to drive the learning
+because it relies on the difference between the phaset and phasé
+statistics. Second, it will be harder to reach thermal equilibrium at this
+lower temperature and so the co-occurrence statistics will be unreliable.
+One way of getting good statistics to drive the learning and also getting
+very few overt errors is to measure the co-occurrence statistics at a
+temperature higher than the final one.
+Another way of ensuring that the network approaches equilibrium is
+to eliminate deep, narrow minima that are often not found by the
+annealing process.
+Derthick (1984) has shown that this can be done
+using a longer gentler annealing schedule in phase. This means that
+the network is more likely to occupy the hard-to-find minima in phasethan in phaset
+, and so these minima will get filled in because the learning rule raises the energies of states that are occupied more in phase
+than in phase+
+AN EXAMPLE OF HARD LEARNING
+A simple example which can only be solved by capturing the higher
+order statistical structure in the ensemble of input vectors is the
+"shifter" problem. The visible units are divided into three groups.
+Group V, is a one-dimensional array of 8 units, each of which is
+clamped on or off at random with a probability of 0.3 of being on.
+Group V2 also contains 8 units and their states are determined by shifting and copying the states of the units in group Vi. The only shifts
+allowed are one to the left, one to the right, or no shift. Wrap-around
+is used so that when there is a right shift, the state of the right-most
+unit in V, determines the state of the left-most unit in Vz. The three
+possible shifts are chosen at random with equal probabilities. Group V3
+contains three units to represent the three possible shifts, so at any one
+time one of them is clamped on and the others are clamped off.
+The problem is to learn the structure that relates the states of the
+three groups. One facet of this problem is to "recognize" the shift-
+i.e., to complete a partial input vector in which the states of V, and V2
+are clamped but the units in V3 are left free. It is fairly easy to see why
+this problem cannot possibly be solved by just adding together a lot of
+pairwise interactions between units in V1, V2, and Vz. If you know
+
+300 BASIC MECHANISMS
+that a particular unit in V, is on, it tells you nothing whatsoever about
+what the shift is. It is only by finding combinations of active units in Vi
+and V2 that it is possible to predict the shift, so the information
+required is of at least third-order. This means that extra hidden units
+are required to perform the task.
+The obvious way to recognize the shift is to have extra units which
+detect informative features such as an active unit in Vi and an active
+unit one place to the right in V2 and then support the unit V3 that
+represents a right shift. The empirical question is whether the learning
+algorithm is capable of turning some hidden units into feature detectors
+of this kind, and whether it will generate a set of detectors that work
+well together rather than duplicating the same detector. The set of
+weights that minimizes G defines the optimal set of detectors but it is
+not at all obvious what these detectors are, nor is it obvious that the
+learning algorithm is capable of finding a good set.
+Figure 3 shows the result of running a version of the Boltzmann
+machine learning procedure. Of the 24 hidden units, 5 seem to be
+doing very little but the remainder are sensible looking detectors and
+most of them have become spatially localized. One type of detector
+which occurs several times consists of two large negative weights, one
+above the other, flanked by smaller excitatory weights on each side.
+This is a more discriminating detector of no-shift than simply having
+two positive weights, one above the other. It interesting to note that
+the various instances of this feature type all have different locations in
+V, and V2, even though the hidden units are not connected to each
+other. The pressure for the feature detectors to be different from each
+other comes from the gradient of G, rather than from the kind of
+lateral inhibition among the feature detectors that is used in "competitive learning" paradigms (Fukushima, 1980; Rumelhart & Zipser,
+1985).
+The Training Procedure
+The training procedure alternated between two phases. In phase+
+, all
+the units in Vi, V2, and V3 were clamped into states representing a pair
+of 8-bit vectors and their relative shift. The hidden units were then
+allowed to change their states until the system approached thermal
+equilibrium at a temperature of 10. The annealing schedule is
+described below. After annealing, the network was assumed to be close
+to thermal equilibrium and it was then run for a further 10 iterations
+during which time the frequency with which each pair of connected
+units were both on was measured. This was repeated 20 times with
+
+7. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+301
+EET
+FIGURE 3. The weights of the 24 hidden units in the shifter network. Each large region
+corresponds to a unit. Within this region the black rectangles represent negative weights
+and the white rectangles represent positive ones. The size of a rectangle represents the
+magnitude of the weight. The two rows of weights at the bottom of each unit are its connections to the two groups of input units, V, and V2. These weights therefore represent
+the "receptive field" of the hidden unit. The three weights in the middle of the top row
+of each unit are its connections to the three output units that represent shift-left, noshift, and shift-right. The solitary weight at the top left of each unit is its threshold.
+Each hidden unit is directly connected to all 16 input units and all 3 output units. In this
+example, the hidden units are not connected to each other. The top-left unit has weights
+that are easy to understand: Its optimal stimulus is activity in the fourth unit of V, and
+the fifth unit of V2, and it votes for shift-right. It has negative weights to make it less
+likely to come on when there is an alternative explanation for why its two favorite input
+units are active.
+different clamped vectors and the co-occurrence statistics were averaged
+over all 20 runs to yield an estimate, for each connection, of pit in
+Equation 7. In phase-, none of the units were clamped and the network was annealed in the same way. The network was then run for a
+further 10 iterations and the co-occurrence statistics were collected for
+all connected pairs of units. This was repeated 20 times and the cooccurrence statistics werf@perighted Matsdian estimate of Pij.
+
+302
+The entire set of 40 annealings that were used to estimate pif and pir
+was called a sweep. After each sweep, every weight was incremented
+by 5(pit - Pi). In addition, every weight had its absolute magnitude
+decreased by 0.0005 times its absolute magnitude. This weight decay
+prevented the weights from becoming too large and it also helped to
+resuscitate hidden units which had predominantly negative or predominantly positive weights. Such units spend all their time in the same
+state and therefore convey no information. The phaset and phase
+statistics are identical for these units, and so the weight decay gradually
+erodes their weights until they come back to life (units with all zero
+weights come on half the time.
+The Annealing Schedule
+The annealing schedule spent the following number of iterations at
+the following temperatures: 2 at 40, 2 at 35, 2 at 30, 2 at 25, 2 at 20, 2
+at 1S, 2 at 12, 2 at 10. One iteration is defined as the number of random probes required so that each unit is probed one time on average.
+When it is probed, a unit uses its energy gap to decide which of its two
+states to adopt using the stochastic decision rule in Equation 3. Since
+each unit gets to see the most recent states of all the other units, an
+iteration cannot be regarded as a single parallel step. An truly parallel
+asynchronous system must tolerate time delays. Units must decide on
+their new states without being aware of very recent changes in the
+states of other units. It can be shown (Sejnowski, Hinton, Kienker, &
+Schumacher, 1985) that first-order time delays act like added temperature and can therefore be tolerated by networks of this kind.
+The Performance of the Shifter Network
+The shifter network is encouraging because it is a clear example of
+the kind of learning of higher order structure that was beyond the capability of perceptrons, but it also illustrates several weaknesses in the
+current approach.
+• The learning was very slow. It required 9000 learning sweeps,
+each of which involved reaching equilibrium 20 times in phaset
+with vectors clamped on VI, V2, and V3, and 20 times in
+phasé with no units clamped. Even for low-level perceptual
+learning, this seems excessively slow.
+
+1. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+303
+• The weights are fairly clearly not optimal because of the S hidden units that appear to do nothing useful. Also, the
+performance is far from perfect. When the states of the units
+in V, and Vare clamped and the network is annealed gently to
+half the final temperature used during learning, the units in V3
+quite frequently adopt the wrong states. If the number of on
+units in V, is 1,2,3,4,5,6,7, the percentage of correctly recognized shifts is 50%, 71%, 81%, 86%, 89%, 82%, and 66%
+respectively. The wide variation in the number of active units
+in V, naturally makes the task harder to learn than if a constant
+proportion of the units were active. Also, some of the input
+patterns are ambiguous. When all the units in V, and V2 are
+off, the network can do no better than chance.
+ACHIEVING RELIABLE COMPUTATION WITH
+UNRELIABLE HARDWARE
+Conventional computers only work if all their individual components
+work perfectly, so as systems become larger they become more and
+more unreliable. Current computer technology uses extremely reliable
+components and error-correcting memories to achieve overall reliability.
+The brain appears to have much less reliable components, and so it
+must use much more error-correction. It is conceivable that the brain
+uses the kinds of representations that would be appropriate given reliable hardware and then superimposes redundancy to compensate for its
+unreliable hardware.
+The reliability issue is typically treated as a tedious residual problem
+to be dealt with after the main decisions about the form of the computation have been made. A more direct approach is to treat reliability as
+a serious design constraint from the outset and to choose a basic style
+of computation that does not require reliable components. Ideally, we
+want a system in which none of the individual components are critical
+to the ability of the whole system to meet its requirements. In other
+words, we want some high-level description of the behavior of the system to remain valid even when the low-level descriptions of the
+behavior of some of the individual components change. This is only
+possible if the high-level description is related to the low level descriptions in a particular way: Every robust high-level property must be
+implemented by the combined effect of many local components, and no
+single component must be crucial for the realization of the high-level
+property. This makes distributed representations (see Chapter 3) a
+natural choice when desigajssigne@aategistant system.
+
+304 BASIC MECHANISMS
+Distributed representations tend to behave robustly because they
+have an internal coherence which leads to an automatic "clean-up"
+effect. This effect can be seen in the patterns of activity that occur
+within a group of units and also in the interactions between groups. If
+a group of units, A, has a number of distinct and well-defined energy
+minima then these minima will remain even if a few units are removed
+or a little noise is added to many of the connections within A. The
+damage may distort the minima slightly and it may also change their
+relative probabilities, but minor damage will not alter the gross topography of the energy landscape, so it will not affect higher level descriptions that depend only on this gross topography.
+Even if the patterns of activity in A are slightly changed, this will
+often have no effect on the patterns caused in other groups of units. If
+the weights between groups of units have been fixed so that a particular
+pattern in A regularly causes a particular pattern in B, a small variation
+in the input coming from A will typically make no difference to the pattern that gets selected in B, because this pattern has its own internal
+coherence, and if the input from A is sufficiently accurate to select
+approximately the right pattern, the interactions among the elements in
+B will ensure that the details are right.
+Damage resistance can be achieved by using a simple kind of
+representation in which there are many identical copies of each type of
+unit and each macroscopic item is encoded by activity in all the units of
+one type. In the undamaged system all these copies behave identically
+and a lot of capacity is therefore wasted. If we use distributed
+representations in which each unit may be used for representing many
+different items we can achieve comparable resistance to damage without
+wasting capacity. Because all the units behave differently from each
+other, the undamaged system can implement many fine distinctions in
+the fine detail of the energy landscape. At the macroscopic level, these
+fine distinctions will appear as somewhat unreliable probabilistic tendencies and will be very sensitive to minor damage.
+The fine details in the current energy landscape may contain the
+seeds of future changes in the gross topography. If learning novel distinctions involves the progressive strengthening of regularities that are
+initially tentative and unreliable, then it follows that learning may well
+suffer considerably when physical damage washes out these minor
+regularities. However, the simulations described below do not bear on
+this interesting issue.
+AN EXAMPLE OF THE EFFECTS OF DAMAGE
+To show the effects of damage on a network, it is necessary to
+choose a task for the copynghted wateram. Since we are mainly
+
+7. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+305
+concerned with properties that are fairly domain-independent, the
+details of the task are not especially relevant here. For reasons
+described in Chapter 3, we were interested in networks that can learn
+an arbitrary mapping between items in two different domains, and we
+use that network to investigate the effects of damage. As we shall see,
+the fact that the task involves purely arbitrary associations makes it
+easier to interpret some of the interesting transfer effects that occur
+when a network relearns after sustaining major damage.
+The Network
+The network consisted of three groups or layers of units. The grapheme group was used to represent the letters in a three-letter word. It
+contained 30 units and was subdivided into three groups of 10 units
+each. Each subgroup was dedicated to one of the three letter positions
+within a word, and it represented one of the 10 possible letters in that
+position by having a single active unit for that letter. The three-letter
+grapheme strings were not English words. They were chosen randomly,
+subject to the constraint that each of the 10 possible graphemes in each
+position had to be used at least once. The sememe group was used to
+encode the semantic features of the "word." It contained 30 units, one
+for each possible semantic feature. The semantic features to be associated with a word were chosen randomly, with each feature having a
+probability of 0.2 of being chosen for each word. There were connections between all pairs of units in the sememe group to allow the network to learn familiar combinations of semantic features. There were
+no direct connections between the grapheme and sememe groups.
+Instead, there was an intermediate layer of 20 units, each of which was
+connected to all the units in both the grapheme and the sememe
+groups. Figure 4 is an artist's impression of the network. It uses
+English letters and words to convey the functions of the units in the
+various layers. Most of the connections are missing.
+The Training Procedure
+The network was trained to associate each of 20 patterns of activity
+in the grapheme units with an arbitrarily related pattern in the sememe
+" The representation of meaning is clearly more complicated than just a set of features,
+so the use of the word "semantic" pyrigshed Materilaken 1oo literally.
+
+306
+flies
+animate
+hairy
+flat
+round
+metallic
+big
+cat
+can
+car
+cal
+bat
+mat
+e/2
+i/2
+d/3
+n/3
+1/3
+V3
+FIGURE 4. Part of the network used for associating three-letter words with sets of
+semantic features. English words are used in this figure to help convey the functional
+roles of the units. In the actual simulation, the letter-strings and semantic features were
+chosen randomly.
+units. As before, the training procedure alternated between two phases.
+In phaset all the grapheme and sememe units were clamped in states
+that represented the physical form and the meaning of a single word,
+and the intermediate units were allowed to change their states until the
+system approached thermal equilibrium at a temperature of 10. The
+annealing schedule was: 2 at 30, 2 at 26, 2 at 22, 2 at 20, 2 at 18, 2 at
+16, 2 at 15, 2 at 14, 2 at 13, 4 at 12, 4 at 11, 8 at 10. After annealing,
+the network was assumed to be close to thermal equilibrium and it was
+then run for a further 5 iterations during which time the frequency with
+which each pair of connected units were both on was measured. This
+was repeated twice for each of the 20 possible grapheme/sememe associations and the co-occurrence statistics were averaged over all 40
+annealings to yield an estimate, for each connection, of pit. In phase,
+only the grapheme units were clamped and the network settled to
+equilibrium (using the same schedule as before and thus decided for
+itself what sememe units should be active. The network was then run
+for a further 5 iterations and the co-occurrence statistics were collected
+for all connected pairs of units. This was repeated twice for each of the
+20 grapheme strings and the co-occurrence statistics were averaged to
+yield an estimate of Pij. Each learning sweep thus involved a total of
+80 annealings.
+After each sweep, every weight was either incremented or decreon red by win the sign some a the being detended i abs ie
+8 See Hinton, Sejnowski, and Ackley (1984) for a discussion of the advantages of
+discrete weight increments over the more obvious steepest descent technique in which
+the weight increment is propoteßytighted Material
+
+7. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+307
+magnitude decreased by 1. For each weight, the probability of this happening was 0.0005 times the absolute magnitude of the weight.
+We found that the network performed better if there
+was a
+preliminary learning stage which just involved the sememe units. In
+this stage, the intermediate units were not yet connected. During
+phaset the required patterns were clamped on the sememe units and pif
+was measured (annealing was not required because all the units
+involved were clamped). During phase no units were clamped and the
+network was allowed to reach equilibrium 20 times using the annealing
+schedule given above. After annealing, Pi was estimated from the cooccurrences as before, except that only 20 phasé annealings were used
+instead of 40. There were 300 sweeps of this learning stage and they
+resulted in weights between pairs of sememe units that were sufficient
+to give the sememe group an energy landscape with 20 strong minima
+corresponding to the 20 possible "word meanings." This helped subsequent learning considerably, because it reduced the tendency for the
+intermediate units to be recruited for the job of modeling the structure
+among the sememe units. They were therefore free to model the structure between the grapheme units and the sememe units.? The results
+described here were obtained using the preliminary learning stage and
+so they correspond to learning to associate grapheme strings with
+"meanings" that are already familiar.
+The Performance of the Network
+Using the same annealing schedule as was used during learning, the
+network can be tested by clamping a grapheme string and looking at the
+resulting activities of the sememe units. After 5000 learning sweeps, it
+gets the semantic features exactly correct 99.3% of the time. A
+performance level of 99.9% can be achieved by using a "careful"
+annealing schedule that spends twice as long at each temperature and
+goes down to half the final temperature.
+The Effect of Local Damage
+The learning procedure generates weights which cause each of the
+units in the intermediate layer to be used for many different words.
+9 There was no need to have a similar stage for learning the structure among the grapheme units because in the main stage of learning the grapheme units are always clamped
+and so there is no tendency foCusy get Materiayodel the structure among them.
+
+308 BASIC MECHANISMS
+This kind of distributed representation should be more tolerant of local
+damage than the more obvious method of using one intermediate unit
+per word. We were particularly interested in the pattern of errors produced by local damage. If the connections between sememe units are
+left intact, they should be able to "clean up" patterns of activity that are
+close to familiar ones. So the network should still produce perfect output even if the input to the sememe units is slightly disrupted. If the
+disruption is more severe, the clean-up effect may actually produce a
+different familiar meaning that happens to share the few semantic
+features that were correctly activated by the intermediate layer.
+To test these predictions we removed each of the intermediate units
+in turn, leaving the other 19 intact. We tested the network 25 times on
+each of the 20 words with each of the 20 units removed. In all 10,000
+tests, using the careful annealing schedule, it made 140 errors (98.6%
+correct). Many errors consisted of the correct set of semantic features
+with one or iwo extra or missing features, but 83 of the errors consisted
+of the precise meaning of some other grapheme string. An analysis of
+these 83 errors showed that the hamming distance between the correct
+meanings and the erroneous ones had a mean of 9.34 and a standard
+deviation of 1.27 which is significantly lower (p < .01) than the complete set of hamming distances which had a mean of 10.30 and a standard deviation of 2.41. We also looked at the hamming distances
+between the grapheme strings that the network was given as input and
+the grapheme strings that corresponded to the erroneous familiar meanings. The mean was 3.95 and the standard deviation was 0.62 which is
+significantly lower (p < .01) than the complete set which had mean
+5.53 and standard deviation 0.87. (A hamming distance of 4 means
+that the strings have one letter in common.)
+In summary, when a single unit is removed from the intermediate
+layer, the network still performs well. The majority of its errors consist
+of producing exactly the meaning of some other grapheme string, and
+the erroneous meanings tend to be similar to the correct one and to be
+associated with a grapheme string that has one letter in common with
+the string used as input.
+The Speed of Relearning
+The original learning was very slow. Each item had to be presented
+5000 times to eliminate almost all the errors. One reason for the slowness is the shape of the G-surface in weight-space. It tends to have
+long diagonal ravines which can be characterized in the following way:
+In the direction of steepest descent, the surface slopes steeply down for
+
+7. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES 309
+a short distance and then steeply up again (like the cross-section of a
+ravine).'° In most other directions the surface slopes gently upwards. In
+a relatively narrow cone of directions, the surface slopes gently down
+with very low curvature. This narrow cone corresponds to the floor of
+the ravine and to get a low value of G (which is the definition of good
+performance) the learning must follow the floor of the ravine without
+going up the sides. This is particularly hard in a high-dimensional
+space. Unless the gradient of the surface is measured very accurately, a
+step in the direction of the estimated gradient will have a component
+along the floor of the ravine and a component up one of the many
+sides of the ravine. Because the sides are much steeper than the floor,
+the result of the step will be to raise the value of G which makes
+the measurable gradient will be down towards the floor of the ravine
+instead of along the ravine. As a result, the path followed in weight
+space tends to consist of an irregular sloshing across the ravine with
+only a small amount of forward progress. We are investigating ways of
+ameliorating this difficulty, but it is a well-known problem of gradient
+descent techniques in high-dimensional spaces, and it may
+be
+unavoidable.
+The ravine problem leads to a very interesting prediction about
+relearning when random noise is added to the weights. The original
+learning takes the weights a considerable distance along a ravine which
+is slow and difficult because most directions in weight space are up the
+sides of the ravine. When a lot of random noise is added, there will
+typically be a small component along the ravine and a large component
+up the sides. Performance will therefore get much worse (because
+height in this space means poor performance), but relearning will be
+fast because the network can get back most of its performance by simply descending to the floor of the ravine (which is easy) without making progress along the ravine (which is hard).
+The same phenomenon can be understood by considering the energy
+landscape rather than the weight-space (recall that one point in weightspace constitutes a whole energy landscape). Good performance
+requires a rather precise balance between the relative depths of the 20
+energy minima and it also requires that all the 20 minima have considerably lower energy than other parts of the energy landscape. The balance between the minima in energy-space is the cross-section of the
+ravine in weight-space (see Figure 5) and the depth of all the minima
+compared with the rest of the energy landscape corresponds to the
+direction along the ravine. Random noise upsets the precise balance
+10 The surface is never very steep. Its gradient parallel to any weight axis must always
+lie berween 1 and -1 because it'öpyrignfer matera probabilities.
+
+310
+increase weights that help B →
+FIGURE 5. One cross-section of a ravine in weight-space. Each point in weight space
+corresponds to a whole energy landscape. To indicate this, we show how a very simple
+landscape changes as the weights are changed. Movement to the right along the x-axis
+corresponds to increasing the weights between pairs of units that are both on in state B
+and not both on in state A. This increases the depth of A. If the task requires that A
+and B have about the same depth, an imbalance between them will lower the
+performance and thus raise G.
+between the various minima without significantly affecting the gross
+topography of the energy landscape. Relearning can then restore most
+of the performance by restoring the balance between the existing
+minima.
+The simulation behaved as predicted. The mean absolute value of
+the weights connecting the intermediate units to the other two groups
+was 21.5. These weights were first perturbed by adding uniform random noise in the range -2 to +2. This had surprisingly little effect,
+reducing the performance using the normal annealing schedule from
+99.3% to 98.0%. This shows that the network is robust against slight
+noise in the weights. To cause significant deterioration, uniform random noise between - 22 and + 22 was added. On average, this perturbs
+each weight by about half its magnitude which was enough to reduce
+normal performance to 64.3% correct. Figure 6 shows the course of the
+relearning and compares it with the speed of the original learning when
+performance was at this level. It also shows that other kinds of damage
+produce very similar relearning curves.
+
+7. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+311
+Percent correct
+100
+9
+8
+60
+50
+40%
+30-
+20
+10
+To
+15
+20
+25
+30
+Learning sweeps
+FIGURE 6. The recovery of performance after various types of damage. Each datapoint represents 500 tests (25 with each word). The heavy line is a section of the original
+learning curve after a considerable number of learning sweeps. It shows that in the originai learning, performance increases by less than 10% in 30 learning sweeps. All the other
+lines show recovery after damaging a net that had very good performance (99.3%
+correct). The lines with open circles show the rapid recovery after 20% or 50% of the
+weights to the hidden units have been set to zero (but allowed to relearn). The dashed
+line shows recovery after 5 of the 20 hidden units have been permanently ablated. The
+remaining line is the case vhen uniform random noise between - 22 and + 22 is added to
+all the connections to the hidden units. In all cases, a successful trial was defined as one
+in which the network produced exacily the correct semantic features when given the graphemic input.
+Spontaneous Recovery of Unrehearsed Items
+When it learns the associations, the network uses distributed
+representations among the intermediate units. This means that many
+of the weights are involved in encoding several different associations,
+and each association is encoded in many weights. If a weight is
+changed, it will affect several different energy minima and all of them
+will require the same chapffigittel areint to restore them to their
+
+312
+previous depths. So, in relearning any one of the associations, there
+should be a positive transfer effect which tends to restore the others.
+This effect is actually rather weak and is easily masked so it can only be
+seen clearly if we retrain the network on most of the original associations and watch what happens to the remaining few. As predicted,
+these showed a marked improvement even though they were only randomly related to the associations on which the network was retrained.
+We took exactly the same perturbed network as before (uniform random noise between + 22 and - 22 added to the connections to and from
+the intermediate units) and retrained it on 18 of the associations for 30
+learning sweeps. The two associations that were not retrained were
+selected to be ones where the network made frequent minor errors
+even when the careful annealing schedule was used. As a result of the
+retraining, the performance on these two items rose from 30/100
+correct to 90/100 correct with the careful schedule, but the few errors
+that remained tended to be completely wrong answers rather than
+minor perturbations of the correct answer. We repeated the experiment
+selecting two associations for which the error rate was high and the
+errors were typically large. Retraining on the other 18 associations
+caused an improvement
+from 17/100 correct to 98/100 correct.
+Despite these impressive improvements, the effect disappeared when
+we retrained on only 15 of the associations. The remaining S actually
+got slightly worse. It is clear that the fraction of the associations which
+needs to be retrained to cause improvement in the remainder depends
+on how distributed the representations are,
+but more analysis is
+required to characterize this relationship properly.
+The spontaneous recovery of unrehearsed items seems paradoxical
+because the set of 20 associations was randomly generated and so there
+is no way of generalizing from the 18 associations on which the network is retrained to the remaining two. During the original learning,
+however, the weights capture regularities in the whole set of associations.
+In this example, the regularities are spurious but the network
+doesn't know that-it just finds whatever regularities it can and
+expresses the associations in terms of them. Now, consider two different regularities that are equally strong among 18 of the associations.
+If one regularity also holds for the remaining two associations and the
+other doesn't, the first regularity is more likely to be captured by the
+weights. During retraining, the learning procedure restores the weights
+to the values needed to express the regularities it originally chose to
+capture and it therefore tends to restore the remaining associations.
+It would be interesting to see if any of the neuro-psychological data
+on the effects of brain damage could be interpreted in terms of the
+kinds of qualitative effects exhibited by the simulation when it is
+
+7. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+313
+damaged and relearns. However, we have not made any serious
+attempt to fit the simulation to particular data.
+CONCLUSION
+We have presented three ideas:
+• Networks of symmetrically connected, binary units can escape
+from local minima during a relaxation search by using a stochastic decision rule.
+• The process of reaching thermal equilibrium in a network of
+stochastic units propagates exactly the information needed to do
+credit assignment. This makes possible a local learning rule
+which can modify the weights so as to create new and useful
+feature detectors. The learning rule only needs to observe how
+often two units are both active (at thermal equilibrium) in two
+different phases.
+It can then change the weight between the
+units to make the spontaneous behavior of the network in one
+phase mimic the behavior that is forced on it in the other
+phase.
+• The learning rule tends to construct distributed representations
+which are resistant to minor damage and exhibit rapid relearning after major damage. The relearning process can bring back
+associations that are not practiced during the relearning and are
+only randomly related to the associations that are practiced.
+These three ideas can be assessed separately. In particular, resistance
+to damage, rapid relearning, and spontaneous recovery of unrehearsed
+items can
+be exhibited by other kinds of parallel network that use
+distributed representations. The use of stochastic units, annealing
+Search, and the two-phase learning algorithm are not crucial for these
+properties, though they are a convenient testbed in which to investigate
+them. Hogg and Huberman (1984) have demonstrated self-repair
+effects in nonstochastic, layered networks similar to those used by
+Fukushima (1980).
+We have left many loose ends, some of which are discussed elsewhere. Sejnowski and Hinton (in press) give a detailed example of a
+search problem where annealing helps, and they also discuss the relationship between between these networks and the mammalian cortex.
+Ackley, Hinton, and Segpyrighted Materiye a different example of
+
+314
+learning in which the network constructs efficient internal codes for
+communicating information across narrow bandwidth channels. At
+present, the learning algorithm is too slow to be tested properly on
+large networks and future progress hinges on being able to speed it up.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+This research was supported by grants from the System Development
+Foundation.
+We thank David Ackley, Peter Brown, Francis Crick,
+Mark Derthick, Scott Fahlman, Stuart Geman, John Hopfield, Paul
+Kienker, Jay McClelland, Barak Pearlmutter, David Rumelhart, Tim
+Shallice, and Paul Smolensky for helpful discussions.
+
+7. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+315
+APPENDIX:
+DERIVATION OF THE LEARNING ALGORITHM
+When a network is free-running at equilibrium the probability distribution over the visible units is given by
+Ee-FaBl T
+p-(Va) = EP-(VaN Hp) =
+Ee ExulT
+(8)
+where Va is a vector of the states of the visible units, He is a vector of
+states of the hidden units, and Eaß is the energy of the system in state
+Eas =
+i<j
+Hence,
+dwij
+Differentiating (8) then yields
+ap-(Va)
+59B s98
+This derivative is used to compute the gradient of the G-measure
+G= EP+ (Va)In-
+p+ (Va)
+p-(Va)
+where p+ (Va) is the clamped probability distribution over the visible
+units and is independent of wij. So
+aG. - IP+ (Va) AP- (Va)
+Pa) dWij
+
+316
+=-
+- Ep-(v)
+Now,
+p+(VaHp) = pt (HalYa)P+ (Va),
+P-(VaNH)=P-(HBlYaP-(Val,
+and
+P-(HalVa =P+ (HalYa).
+(9)
+Equation 9 holds because the probability of a hidden state given some
+visible state must be the same in equilibrium whether the visible units
+were clamped in that state or arrived there by free-running. Hence,
+p+ (Va)
+= р+ (V«Л Hp).
+P-(Va)
+Also,
+Therefore,
+LP+ (Va) =1.
+dWij
+where
+aß
+and
+The Boltzmann machine learning algorithm can also be formulated as
+an input-output model. The visible units are divided into an input set /
+and an output set O, and an environment specifies a set of conditional
+probabilities of the form P+ (Op| la). During phaset the environment
+
+7. LEARNING IN BOLTZMANN MACHINES
+317
+clamps both the input and output units, and the pits are estimated.
+During phase the input units are clamped and the output units and
+hidden units free-run, and the pirs are estimated. The appropriate G
+p+ (OB|La)
+p-(OBlla)
+Similar mathematics apply in this formulation and aG/dwij is the same
+as before.
+
+CHAPTER 8
+Learning Internal Representations
+by Error Propagation
+D. E. RUMELHART, G. E. HINTON, and R. J. WILLIAMS
+THE PROBLEM
+We now have a rather good understanding of simple two-layer associative networks in which a set of input patterns arriving at an input layer
+are mapped directly to a set of output patterns at an output layer. Such
+networks have no hidden units. They involve only input and out put
+units. In these cases there is no internal representation. The coding provided by the external world must suffice. These networks have proved
+useful in a wide variety of applications (cf. Chapters 2, 17, and 18).
+Perhaps the essential character of such networks is that they map similar input patterns to similar output patterns. This is what allows these
+networks to make reasonable generalizations and perform reasonably on
+patterns that have never before been presented. The similarity of patterns in a PDP system is determined by their overlap. The overlap in
+such networks is determined outside the learning system itself-by
+whatever produces the patterns.
+The constraint that similar input patterns lead to similar outputs can
+lead to an inability of the system to learn certain mappings from input
+to output. Whenever the representation provided by the outside world
+is such that the similarity structure of the input and output patterns are
+very different, a netwoopyrigtitoutMaterial representations (i.e., a
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+319
+network without hidden units) will be unable to perform the necessary
+mappings. A classic example of this case is the exclusive-or (XOR)
+problem illustrated in Table 1. Here we see that those patterns which
+overlap least are supposed to generate identical output values. This
+problem and many others like it cannot be performed by networks
+without hidden units with which to create their own internal representations of the input patterns. It is interesting to note that had the input
+patterns contained a third input taking the value 1 whenever the first
+two have value 1 as shown in Table 2, a two-layer system would be able
+to solve the problem.
+Minsky and Papert (1969) have provided a very careful analysis of
+conditions under which such systems are capable of carrying out the
+required mappings. They show that in a large number of interesting
+cases, networks of this kind are incapable of solving the problems. On
+the other hand, as Minsky and Papert also pointed out, if there is a
+layer of simple perceptron-like hidden units, as shown in Figure 1, with
+which the original input pattern can be augmented, there is always a
+recoding (i.e., an internal representation) of the input patterns in the
+hidden units in which the similarity of the patterns among the hidden
+units can support any required mapping from the input to the output
+units. Thus, if we have the right connections from the input units to a
+large enough set of hidden units, we can always find a representation
+that will perform any mapping from input to output through these hidden units. In the case of the XOR problem, the addition of a feature
+that detects the conjunction of the input units changes the similarity
+TABLE 1
+Input Patterns
+00
+01
+10
+11
+Output Patterns
+1
+1
+TABLE 2
+Input Patterns
+Output Patterns
+000
+010
+100
+111
+--
+0
+
+320
+Output Patterns
+• . .
+Internal
+Representation
+Units
+..
+Input Patterns
+FIGURE 1. A multilayer network. In this case the information coming to the input
+units is recoded into an internal representation and the outputs are generated by the internal representation rather than by the original pattern. Input patterns can always be
+encoded, if there are enough hidden units, in a form so that the appropriate output partern can be generated from any input pattern.
+structure of the patterns sufficiently to allow the solution to be learned.
+As illustrated in Figure 2, this can be done with a single hidden unit.
+The numbers on the arrows represent the strengths of the connections
+among the units. The numbers written in the circles represent the
+thresholds of the units. The value of +1.5 for the threshold of the hidden unit insures that it will be turned on only when both input units
+are on. The value 0.5 for the output unit insures that it will turn on
+only when it receives a net positive input greater than 0.S. The weight
+of -2 from the hidden unit to the output unit insures that the output
+unit will not come on when both input units are on. Note that from the
+point of view of the output unit, the hidden unit is treated as simply
+soner parent Copyrighted Material
+. pallerns consistea or inre
+rather than two units.
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+321
++1
+.5
+At
+- 2
+Output Unit
++ 1
+Hidden Unit
+.5
++1
+Input Units
+FIGURE 2. A simple XOR network with one hidden unit. See text for explanation.
+The existence of networks such as this illustrates the potential power
+of hidden units and internal representations. The problem, as noted by
+Minsky and Papert, is that whereas there is a very simple guaranteed
+learning rule for all problems that can be solved without hidden units,
+namely, the perceptron convergence procedure (or the variation due
+originally to Widrow and Hoff, 1960, which we call the delta rule; see
+Chapter 11), there is no equally powerful rule for learning in networks
+with hidden units. There have been three basic responses to this lack
+One response is represented by competitive learning (Chapter 5) in
+which simple unsupervised learning rules are employed so that useful
+hidden units develop. Although these approaches are promising, there
+is no external force to insure that hidden units appropriate for the
+required mapping are developed. The second response is to simply
+assume an internal representation that, on some a priori grounds, seems
+reasonable. This is the tack taken in the chapter on verb learning
+(Chapter 18) and in the interactive activation model of word perception
+(McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982).
+The third approach is to attempt to develop a learning procedure capable
+of learning an internal representation adequate for performing the task
+at hand. One such development is presented in the discussion of
+Boltzmann machines in Chapter 7. As we have seen, this procedure
+involves the use of stochastic units, requires the network to reach
+equilibrium in two different phases, and is limited to symmetric networks. Another recent approach, also employing stochastic units, has
+been developed by Bartodd 8ighdad Manderia/ of his colleagues (cf. Barto
+
+322
+& Anandan, 1985). In this chapter we present another alternative that
+works with deterministic units, that involves only local computations,
+and that is a clear generalization of the delta rule. We call this the generalized delta rule. From other considerations, Parker (1985) has
+independently derived a similar generalization, which he calls learninglogic. Le Cun (1985) has also studied a roughly similar learning
+scheme. In the remainder of this chapter we first derive the generalized delta rule, then we illustrate its use by providing some results of
+our simulations, and finally we indicate some further generalizations of
+the basic idea.
+THE GENERALIZED DELTA RULE
+The learning procedure we propose involves the presentation of a set
+of pairs of input and output patterns. The system first uses the input
+vector to produce its own output vector and then compares this with
+the desired output, or target vector. If there is no difference, no learning
+takes place. Otherwise the weights are changed to reduce the difference. In this case, with no hidden units, this generates the standard
+delta rule as described in Chapters 2 and 11. The rule for changing
+weights following presentation of input/output pair p is given by
+(1)
+where ipj is the target input for jth component of the output pattern for
+pattern p, Opj is the jth element of the actual output pattern produced
+by the presentation of input pattern p, ip is the value of the ith element of the input pattern, Spi = Ipi-Opj, and A, wif is the change to be
+made to the weight from the ith to the jth unit following presentation
+of pattern p.
+The delta rule and gradient descent. There are many ways of deriving this rule. For present purposes, it is useful to see that for linear
+units it minimizes the squares of the differences between the actual and
+the desired output values summed over the output units and all pairs of
+input/output vectors. One way to show this is to show that the derivative of the error measure with respect to each weight is proportional to
+the weight change dictated by the delta rule, with negative constant of
+proportionality. This corresponds to performing steepest descent on a
+surface in weight space whose height at any point in weight space is
+equal to the error measure. (Note that some of the following sections
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+323
+are written in italics. These sections constitute informal derivations of
+the claims made in the surrounding text and can be omitted by the
+reader who finds such derivations tedious.)
+To be more specific, then, let
+ED -LE 6 - 00112
+(2)
+be our measure of the error on inpul/ outpur pattern p and ler E = LE, be our
+he l mes re E her the We are or sear. hat the prete in simply sowin
+that
+dEp
+aw,i
+= Spipis
+which is proportional to A, Wji as prescribed by the della rule. When there are no
+hidden units it is straightforward 1o compute the relevant derivative. For this purpose
+we use the chain rule to write the derivative as the product of two parts: the derivative of the error with respect to the output of the unit times the derivative of the outpur with respect to the weight.
+DEp
+=
+дЕ, дор.
+(3)
+дорі д,;
+The first part tells how the error changes with the ourpur of the jih unit and the
+second part tells how much changing Wii changes that ourpur. Now, the derivatives
+are easy 1o compute. First, from Equation 2
+dER =- (Ips -Op)=- Sps.
+дорі
+(4)
+Not surprisingly, the contribution of unit u; to the error is simply proportional to Spj.
+Moreover, since we have linear units,
+(5)
+from which we conclude that
+dopi = ipi
+dwii
+Thus, substituting back into Equation 3, we see that
+(6)
+
+324
+as desired. Now, combining this with the observation that
+aw,i
+should lead us to conclude that the net change in Wii after one complete cycle of partern presentations is proportional 1o this derivative and hence that the delta rule
+implements a gradient descent in E. In fact, this is strictly true only if the values of
+the weights are not changed during this cycle. By changing the weights after each
+pattern is presented we depart to some extent from a true gradient descent in E.
+Nevertheless, provided the learning rate (i.e., the constant of proportionality) is sufficiently small, this departure will be negligible and the delta rule will implement a very
+close approximation 1o gradient descent in sum-squared error. In particular, with
+small enoush learning rate, the delta rule will find a set of weights minimizing this
+error function.
+The delta rule for semilinear activation functions in feedforward
+networks. We have shown how the standard delta rule essentially
+implements gradient descent in sum-squared error for linear activation
+functions. In this case, without hidden units, the error surface is shaped
+like a bowl with only one minimum, so gradient descent is guaranteed
+to find the best set of weights. With hidden units, however, it is not so
+obvious how to compute the derivatives, and the error surface is not
+concave upwards, so there is the danger of getting stuck in local
+minima. The main theoretical contribution of this chapter is to show
+that there is an efficient way of computing the derivatives. The main
+empirical contribution is to show that the apparently fatal problem of
+local minima is irrelevant in a wide variety of learning tasks.
+At the end of the chapter we show how the generalized delta rule can
+be applied to arbitrary networks, but, to begin with, we confine ourselves to layered feedforward networks. In these networks, the input
+units are the bottom layer and the output units are the top layer. There
+can be many layers of hidden units in between, but every unit must
+send its output to higher layers than its own and must receive its input
+from lower layers than its own. Given an input vector, the output vector is computed by a forward pass which computes the activity levels of
+each layer in turn using the already computed activity levels in the earlier layers.
+Since we are primarily interested in extending this result to the case
+with hidden units and since, for reasons outlined in Chapter 2, hidden
+units with linear activation functions provide no advantage, we begin by
+generalizing our analysis to the set of nonlinear activation functions
+which we call semilinear (see Chapter 2). A semilinear activation function is one in which the output of a unit is a nondecreasing and differentiable function of theoparighted Material
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+325
+netpi = EW,; Opis
+i
+(7)
+where o; = i; if unit i is an input unit. Thus, a semilinear activation
+function is one in which
+Opi = f, (nelp;)
+(8)
+and I is differentiable and nondecreasing. The generalized delta rule
+works if the network consists of units having semilinear activation functions.
+Notice that linear threshold units do not satisfy the requirement
+because their derivative is infinite at the threshold and zero elsewhere.
+To get the correct generalization of the delta rule, we must set
+dEp
+A, Wji a-
+where E is the same sum-squared error funclion defined earlier. As in the standard
+delta rule it is again useful to see this derivalive as resulting from the product of two
+parts: one part reflecting the change in error as a function of the change in the net
+inpur to the unit and one part representing the effect of changing a particular weight
+on the net inpul. Thus we can write
+2E, =
+onelpi
+-.
+(9)
+aWji
+By Equation 7 we see that the second factor is
+a nelpi
+(10)
+dwji
+LWік Орк = Opir
+dWji
+Now let us define
+dEp.
+брі =-anetpi
+(By comparing this 10 Equation 4, note that this is consistent with the definition of
+Spi used in the original delta rule for linear units since Opi = netp; when unit u; is
+linear.) Equation 9 thus has the equivalent form
+dER = 8pj Opi
+This says that to implement gradient descent in E we should make our weight
+changes according to
+Ap W no."' Copyrighted Material
+(11)
+
+326
+just as in the standard delta rule. The trick is to figure our what Spi should be for
+each unit U; in the network. The interesting result, which we now derive, is that
+there is a simple recursive computation of these &'s which can be implemented by
+propagating error signals backward through the network.
+To compute 8pj = -
+, we apply the chain rule to write this partial derivaanetpj
+live as the product of two factors, one factor reflecting the change in error as a function of the output of the unit and one reflecting the change in the output as a function of changes in the inpur. Thus, we have
+dE.
+8p =-anelpi
+•= —
+-.
+(12)
+Let us compute the second factor. By Equation 8 we see that
+дор)
+= f', (netpj),
+anelpi
+which is simply the derivative of the squashing function fi for the jeh unit,
+evaluated at the net inpur nelp; io that unil. To compute the first factor, we consider two cases. First, assume that unit u; is an ousput unit of the network. In this
+case, it follows from the definition of Ep that
+дор;
+= - (ips -Opj).
+which is the same result as we obtained with the standard delta rule. Substituting
+for the iwo factors in Equation 12, we get
+(13)
+for any ourpur unit Uj. If u; is not an ourput unit we use the chain rule to write
+« дпетрк
+дорі
+In this case, substituting for the iwo factors in Equation 12 yields
+брі = 5', (петрі) Дбрк Шкі
+(14)
+whenever u, is not an ourput unit. Equations 13 and 14 give a recursive procedure
+for computing the &'s for all units in the network, which are then used to compute
+the weight changes in the network according to Equation 11. This procedure constilutes the generalized delta rule for a feedforward network of semilinear units.
+These results can be summarized in three equations. First, the generalized delta rule has exactly the same form as the standard delta rule
+of Equation 1. The weight on each line should be changed by an
+amount proportional to dopyoted Materiattror signal, 8, available to
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+327
+the unit receiving input along that line and the output of the unit sending activation along that line. In symbols,
+A, Wii = napjopi
+The other two equations specify the error signal. Essentially, the determination of the error signal is a recursive process which starts with the
+output units. If a unit is an output unit, its error signal is very similar
+to the standard delta rule. It is given by
+8ps = (Ip; -Op;)S'; (nelp;)
+where f', (netpj) is the derivative of the semilinear activation function
+which maps the total input to the unit to an output value. Finally, the
+error signal for hidden units for which there is no specified target is
+determined recursively in terms of the error signals of the units to
+which it directly connects and the weights of those connections. That is,
+Spi = S'; (nelp;) [8pk Wk;
+whenever the unit is not an output unit.
+The application of the generalized delta rule, thus, involves two
+phases: During the first phase the input is presented and propagated
+forward through the network to compute the output value opi for each
+unit. This output is then compared with the targets, resulting in an
+error signal 8pj for each output unit. The second phase involves a
+backward pass through the network (analogous to the initial forward
+pass) during which the error signal is passed to each unit in the network and the appropriate weight changes are made. This second, backward pass allows the recursive computation of 8 as indicated above.
+The first step is to compute & for each of the output units. This is simply the difference between the actual and desired output values times
+the derivative of the squashing function. We can then compute weight
+changes for all connections that feed into the final layer. After this is
+done, then compute 's for all units in the penultimate layer. This
+propagates the errors back one layer, and the same process can be
+repeated for every layer. The backward pass has the same computational complexity as the forward pass, and so it is not unduly expensive.
+We have now generated a gradient descent method for finding
+weights in any feedforward network with semilinear units. Before
+reporting our results with these networks, it is useful to note some
+further observations. It is interesting that not all weights need be variable. Any number of weights in the network can be fixed. In this
+case, error is still propagaepytigheeralerialxed weights are simply not
+
+328
+modified.
+It should also be noted that there is no reason why some
+output units might not receive inputs from other output units in earlier
+layers.
+In this case, those units receive two different kinds of error:
+that from the direct comparison with the target and that passed through
+the other output units whose activation it affects. In this case, the
+correct procedure is to simply add the weight changes dictated by the
+direct comparison to that propagated back from the other output units.
+SIMULATION RESULTS
+We now have a learning procedure which could, in principle, evolve
+a set of weights to produce an arbitrary mapping from input to output.
+However, the procedure we have produced is a gradient descent procedure and, as such, is bound by all of the problems of any hill climbing procedure-namely, the problem of local maxima or (in our case)
+minima. Moreover, there is a question of how long it might take a system to learn. Even if we could guarantee that it would eventually find
+a solution, there is the question of whether our procedure could learn
+in a reasonable period of time. It is interesting to ask what hidden
+units the system actually develops in the solution of particular problems. This is the question of what kinds of internal representations the
+system actually creates. We do not yet have definitive answers to these
+questions. However, we have carried out many simulations which lead
+us to be optimistic about the local minima and time questions and to be
+surprised by the kinds of representations our learning mechanism discovers. Before proceeding with our results, we must describe our simulation system in more detail. In particular, we must specify an activation function and show how the system can compute the derivative of
+this function.
+A useful activation function. In our above derivations the derivative
+of the activation function of unit uj, t
+¡(net), always played a role.
+This implies that we need an activation function for which a derivative
+exists. It is interesting to note that the linear threshold function, on
+which the perceptron is based, is discontinuous and hence will not suffice for the generalized delta rule. Similarly, since a linear system
+achieves no advantage from hidden units, a linear activation function
+will not suffice either. Thus, we need a continuous, nonlinear activation function. In most of our experiments we have used the logistic
+activation function in whiskyrighted Material
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+329
+1
+(15)
+Opi =
+1+ e
+where A; is a bias similar in function to a threshold. ' In order to apply
+our learning rule, we need to know the derivative of this function with
+respect to its total input, netpi, where netpj = {w,;Opi +9,. It is easy to
+show that this derivative is given by
+дорі
+- = Opj (1 - Opj).
+dnetpi
+Thus, for the logistic activation function, the error signal, Spj, for an
+output unit is given by
+and the error for an arbitrary hidden u; is given by
+8p; = Op; (I- Op;) Espk Wkj.
+It should be noted that the derivative, Opi (1 - Opj, reaches its maximum for Opi = 0.5 and, since 05 Opi ≤1, approaches its minimum as
+Opj approaches zero or one. Since the amount of change in a given
+weight is proportional to this derivative, weights will be changed most
+for those units that are near their midrange and, in some sense, not yer
+committed to being either on or off. This feature, we believe, contributes to the stability of the learning of the system.
+One other feature of this activation function should be noted. The
+system can not actually reach its extreme values of 1 or 0 without infinitely large weights. Therefore, in a practical learning situation in which
+the desired outputs are binary (0,1), the system can never actually
+achieve these values. Therefore, we typically use the values of 0.1 and
+0.9 as the targets, even though we will talk as if values of (0,1) are
+sought.
+The learning rate. Our learning procedure requires only that the
+change in weight be proportional to dEp/dw. True gradient descent
+requires that infinitesimal steps be taken. The constant of proportionality is the learning rate in our procedure. The larger this constant, the
+larger the changes in the weights. For practical purposes we choose a
+1 Note that the values of the bias, Aj, can be learned just like any other weights. We
+simply imagine that A, is the weighy righted laterall ways on.
+
+330 BASIC MECHANISMS
+learning rate that is as large as possible without leading to oscillation.
+This offers the most rapid learning. One way to increase the learning
+rate without leading to oscillation is to modify the generalized delta rule
+to include a momentum term. This can be accomplished by the following rule:
+wj(n+1)=n(8pj9pi)+aAw¡(n)
+(16)
+where the subscript n indexes the presentation number, n is the learning rate, and a is a constant which determines the effect of past weight
+changes on the current direction of movement in weight space. This
+provides a kind of momentum in weight space that effectively filters
+out high-frequency variations of the error-surface in the weight space.
+This is useful in spaces containing long ravines that are characterized by
+sharp curvature across the ravine and a gently sloping floor. The sharp
+curvature tends to cause divergent oscillations across the ravine. To
+prevent these it is necessary to take very small steps, but this causes
+very slow progress along the ravine. The momentum filters out the
+high curvature and thus allows the effective weight steps to be bigger.
+In most of our simulations a was about 0.9. Our experience has been
+that we get the same solutions by setting a = 0 and reducing the size of
+n, but the system learns much faster overall with larger values of a
+and n.
+Symmetry breaking. Our learning procedure has one more problem
+that can be readily overcome and this is the problem of symmetry
+breaking. If all weights start out with equal values and if the solution
+requires that unequal weights be developed, the system can never learn.
+This is because error is propagated back through the weights in proportion to the values of the weights. This means that all hidden units connected directly to the output inputs will get identical error signals, and,
+since the weight changes depend on the error signals, the weights from
+those units to the output units must always be the same. The system is
+starting out at a kind of local maximum, which keeps the weights equal,
+but it is a maximum of the error function, so once it escapes it Will
+never return. We counteract this problem by starting the system with
+small random weights. Under these conditions symmetry problems of
+this kind do not arise.
+The XOR Problem
+It is useful to begin with the exclusive-or problem since it is the classic problem requiring hidden units and since many other difficult
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+331
+problems involve an XOR as a subproblem. We have run the XOR
+problem many times and with a couple of exceptions discussed below,
+the system has always solved the problem. Figure 3 shows one of the
+solutions to the problem. This solution was reached after 558 sweeps
+through the four stimulus patterns with a learning rate of n= 0.5. In
+this case, both the hidden unit and the output unit have positive biases
+so they are on unless turned off. The hidden unit turns on if neither
+input unit is on. When it is on, it turns off the output unit. The connections from input to output units arranged themselves so that they
+turn off the output unit whenever both inputs are on. In this case, the
+network has settled to a solution which is a sort of mirror image of the
+one illustrated in Figure 2.
+We have taught the system to solve the XOR problem hundreds of
+times. Sometimes we have used a single hidden unit and direct connections to the output unit as illustrated here, and other times we have
+allowed two hidden units and set the connections from the input units
+to the outputs to be zero, as shown in Figure 4. In only two cases has
+the system encountered a local minimum and thus been unable to solve
+the problem. Both cases involved the two hidden units version of the
+6.3
+Output Unit
+-4.2 /
+/
+-9.4l
+2.2
+1-42
+Hidden Unit
+--6.4
+-6.4-
+Input Units
+FIGURE 3. Observed XOR network. The connection weights are written on the arrows
+and the bases are written in 's pyrighted Materiare bias means that the unit is on
+unless turned off.
+
+332
+FIGURE 4. A simple architecture for solving XOR with two hidden units and no direct
+connections from input to output.
+problem and both ended up in the same local minimum. Figure S
+shows the weights for the local minimum. In this case, the system
+correctly responds to two of the patterns -namely, the patterns 00 and
+10. In the cases of the other two patterns I1 and Ol, the output unit
+gets a net input of zero. This leads to an output value of 0.5 for both
+of these patterns. This state was reached after 6,587 presentations of
+each pattern with n=0.25. 2 Although many problems require more
+presentations for learning to occur, further trials on this problem
+merely increase the magnitude of the weights but do not lead to any
+improvement in performance. We do not know the frequency of such
+local minima, but our experience with this and other problems is that
+they are quite rare. We have found only one other situation in which a
+local minimum has occurred in many hundreds of problems of various
+sorts. We will discuss this case below.
+The XOR problem has proved a useful test case for a number of
+other studies. Using the architecture illustrated in Figure 4, a student
+in our laboratory, Yves Chauvin, has studied the effect of varying the
+the best way to avoid locaboved 0e at/erima values general, however.
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+333
+- 8
+-4.5
+2.0
+5.3
+-.1
+-2.0
+8.8
+4.3
+9.2
+FIGURE S. A network at a local minimum for the exclusive-or problem. The dotted
+lines indicate negative weights. Note that whenever the right most input unit is on it
+turns on both hidden units. The weights connecting the hidden units to the output are
+arranged so that when both hidden units are on, the output unit gets a net input of zero.
+This leads to an output value of 0.5. In the other cases the network provides the correct
+answer.
+number of hidden units and varying the learning rate on time to solve
+the problem. Using as a learning criterion an error of 0.01 per pattern,
+Yves found that the average number of presentations to solve the problem with n = 0.25 varied from about 245 for the case with two hidden
+units to about 120 presentations for 32 hidden units. The results can
+be summarized by P = 280 - 33log2H, where P is the required
+number of presentations and H is the number of hidden units
+employed. Thus, the time to solve XOR is reduced linearly with the
+logarithm of the number of hidden units. This result holds for values of
+H up to about 40 in the case of XOR. The general result that the time
+to solution is reduced by increasing the number of hidden units has
+been observed in virtually all of our simulations. Yves also studied the
+time to solution as a function of learning rate for the case of eight hidden units. He found an average of about 450 presentations with
+n = 0.1 to about 68 presentations with n.= 0.75. He also found that
+
+334
+learning rates larger than this led to unstable behavior. However,
+within this range larger learning rates speeded the learning substantially.
+In most of our problems we have employed learning rates of n = 0.25
+or smaller and have had no difficulty.
+Parity
+One of the problems given a good deal of discussion by Minsky and
+Papert (1969) is the parity problem, in which the output required is 1 if
+the input pattern contains an odd number of 1s and O otherwise. This
+is a very difficult problem because the most similar patterns (those
+which differ by a single bit) require different answers. The XOR problem is a parity problem with input patterns of size two. We have tried a
+number of parity problems with patterns ranging from size two to eight.
+Generally we have employed layered networks in which direct connections from the input to the output units are not allowed, but must be
+mediated through a set of hidden units. In this architecture, it requires
+at least N hidden units to solve parity with patterns of length N. Figure 6 illustrates the basic paradigm for the solutions discovered by the
+system. The solid lines in the figure indicate weights of +1 and the
+dotted lines indicate weights of -1. The numbers in the circles
+represent the biases of the units. Basically, the hidden units arranged
+- .5
+.5
+- 1.5
+• 2.5
+- П
+FIGURE 6. A paradigm for the solutions to the parity problem discovered by the learning system. See text for explanation.
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+335
+themselves so that they count the number of inputs. In the diagram,
+the one at the far left comes on if one or more input units are on, the
+come com is all of the input lines are on The first hide dies comis
+on whenever m bits are on in the input pattern. The hidden units then
+connect with alternately positive and negative weights. In this way the
+net input from the hidden units is zero for even numbers and +1 for
+odd numbers. Table 3 shows the actual solution attained for one of our
+simulations with four input lines and four hidden units. This solution
+was reached after 2,825 presentations of each of the sixteen patterns
+with n= 0.5. Note that the solution is roughly a mirror image of that
+shown in Figure 6 in that the number of hidden units turned on is
+equal to the number of zero input values rather than the number of
+ones. Beyond that the principle is that shown above. It should be noted
+that the internal representation created by the learning rule is to
+arrange that the number of hidden units that come on is equal to the
+number of zeros in the input and that the particular hidden units that
+come on depend only on the number, not on which input units are on.
+This is exactly the sort of recoding required by parity. It is not the kind
+of representation readily discovered by unsupervised learning schemes
+such as competitive learning.
+The Encoding Problem
+Ackley, Hinton, and Sejnowski (1985) have posed a problem in
+which a set of orthogonal input patterns are mapped to a set of orthogonal output patterns through a small set of hidden units. In such cases
+the internal representations of the patterns on the hidden units must be
+rather efficient. Suppose that we attempt to map N input patterns onto
+N output patterns. Suppose further that log,N hidden units are provided. In this case, we expect that the system will learn to use the
+TABLE 3
+Number of On
+Input Units
+Hidden Unit
+Patterns
+Value
+0
+1
+2
+4
+1111
+1011
+1010
+0010
+Copyrighted Afterial
+1
+0
+1
+0
+
+336
+N Output Units
+log, N Hidden Units
+680
+N Input Units
+FIGURE 7. A network for solving the encoder problem. In this problem there are N
+orthogonal input patterns each paired with one of N orthogonal output patterns.
+are only logN hidden units. Thus, if the hidden units take on binary values, the hidden
+units must form a binary number to encode each of the input patterns. This is exactly
+what the system learns to do.
+hidden units to form a binary code with a distinct binary pattern for
+each of the N input patterns. Figure 7 illustrates the basic architecture
+for the encoder problem. Essentially, the problem is it learn an encoding of an N bit pattern into a logN bit pattern and then learn to
+decode this representation into the output pattern. We have presented
+trated in Table 4. The problem is simply to turn on the same bit in the
+TABLE 4
+Input Patterns
+Output Patterns
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+337
+output as in the input. Table S shows the mapping generated by our
+learning system on this example. It is of some interest that the system
+employed its ability to use intermediate values in solving this problem.
+It could, of course, have found a solution in which the hidden units
+took on only the values of zero and one. Often it does just that, but in
+this instance, and many others, there are solutions that use the intermediate values, and the learning system finds them even though it has
+a bias toward extreme values. It is possible to set up problems that
+require the system to make use of intermediate values in order to solve
+a problem. We now turn to such a case.
+Table 6 shows a very simple problem in which we have to convert
+from a distributed representation over two units into a local representation
+over four units. The similarity structure of the distributed input patterns is simply not preserved in the local output representation.
+We presented this problem to our learning system with a number of
+constraints which made it especially difficult. The two input units were
+only allowed to connect to a single hidden unit which, in turn, was
+allowed to connect to four more hidden units. Only these four hidden
+units were allowed to connect to the four output units. To solve
+this problem, then, the system must first convert the distributed
+Input
+Patterns
+10000000 —
+01000000 →
+
+00010000-
+
+
+
+
+TABLE 5
+Hidden Unit
+Patterns
+.5 O
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+0
+1
+1
+.S
+→
+→
+→
+→
+Patterns
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+TABLE 6
+Input Patterns
+00
+01
+10
+11
+Output Patterns
+=
+1000
+0100
+0010
+0001
+
+338
+representation of the input patterns into various intermediate values of
+the singleton hidden unit in which different activation values
+correspond to the different input patterns. These continuous values
+must then be converted back through the next layer of hidden unitsfirst to another distributed representation and then, finally, to a local
+representation. This problem was presented to the system and it
+reached a solution after 5,226 presentations with n = 0.05.3 Table 7
+shows the sequence of representations the system actually developed in
+order to transform the patterns and solve the problem. Note each of
+the four input patterns was mapped onto a particular activation value of
+the singleton hidden unit. These values were then mapped onto distributed
+patterns at the next layer of hidden units which were finally
+mapped into the required local representation at the output level. In
+principle, this trick of mapping patterns into activation values and then
+converting those activation values back into patterns could be done for
+any number of patterns, but it becomes increasingly difficult for the
+system to make the necessary distinctions as ever smaller differences
+among activation values must be distinguished. Figure 8 shows the
+network the system developed to do this job. The connection weights
+from the hidden units to the output units have been suppressed for
+clarity. (The sign of the connection, however, is indicated by the form
+of the connection-e.g., dashed lines mean inhibitory connections).
+The four different activation values were generated by having relatively
+large weights of opposite sign. One input line turns the hidden unit full
+on, ore turns it full off. The two differ by a relatively small amount so
+that when both turn on, the unit attains a value intermediate between 0
+and 0.5. When neither turns on, the near zero bias causes the unit to
+attain a value slightly over 0.S. The connections to the second layer of
+hidden units is likewise interesting. When the hidden unit is full on,
+TABLE 7
+Input
+Patterns
+10
+=
+00
+01
+Singleton
+Hidden Unit
+.2
+1
+→
+Remaining
+Hidden Units
+1110
+1
+1
+•S O
+0
+0 0
+.3
+1
+Patterns
+0010
+0001
+1000
+0100
+3 Relatively small learning rates make units employing intermediate values easier 10
+obtain.
+
+LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+339
+Units
+-3
++1
+-12
+- 7
+Hidden
+Units
++9
+• 6
+)
++4
+Input
+Units
+FIGURE 8. The network illustrating the use of intermediate values in solving a problem.
+See text for explanation.
+the right-most of these hidden units is turned on and all others turned
+off. When the hidden unit is turned off, the other three of these hidden units are on and the left-most unit off. The other connections
+from the singleton hidden unit to the other hidden units are graded so
+that a distinct pattern is turned on for its other two values. Here we
+have an example of the flexibility of the learning system.
+Our experience is that there is a propensity for the hidden units to
+take on extreme values, but, whenever the learning problem calls for it,
+they can learn to take on graded values. It is likely that the propensity
+to take on extreme values follows from the fact that the logistic is a sigmoid so that increasing magnitudes of its inputs push it toward zero or
+one. This means that in a problem in which intermediate values are
+required, the incoming weights must remain of moderate size. It is
+interesting that the derivation of the generalized delta rule does not
+depend on all of the units having identical activation functions. Thus,
+it would be possible for some units, those required to encode information in a graded fashion, to be linear while others might be logistic.
+The linear unit would have a much wider dynamic range and could
+encode more different values. This would be a useful role for a linear
+unit in a network with hiddsyriyhiled Material
+
+340
+Symmetry
+Another interesting problem we studied is that of classifying input
+strings as to whether or not they are symmetric about their center. We
+used patterns of various lengths with various numbers of hidden units.
+To our surprise, we discovered that the problem can always be solved
+with only two hidden units. To understand the derived representation,
+consider one of the solutions generated by our system for strings of
+length six. This solution was arrived at after 1,208 presentations of each
+six-bit pattern with n= 0.1. The final network is shown in Figure 9.
+For simplicity we have shown the six input units in the center of the
+diagram with one hidden unit above and one below. The output unit,
+which signals whether or not the string is symmetric about its center, is
+shown at the far right. The key point to see about this solution is that
+for a given hidden unit, weights that are symmetric about the middle
+are equal in magnitude and opposite in sign. That means that if a symmetric pattern is on, both hidden units will receive a net input of zero
+from the input units, and, since the hidden units have a negative bias,
+both will be off. In this case, the output unit, having a positive bias,
+O.
+Hidden Unit
+-3.18
++ 632
+- 1256/
++ 1256 1-6.33
+18.44
++ 3.17
+(6.89) Output
+Unit
++ 3.16
+-6.34
++ 12.52
+-1251
++6.31,
+1.3.17
+1.9.11
+-1.0
+Hidden Unit
+FIGURE 9. Network for solving the symmetry problem. The six open circles represent
+the input units. There are iwo hidden units, one shown above and one below the input
+units. The output unit is shown to the far right. See text for explanation.
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+341
+will be on. The next most important thing to note about the solution is
+that the weights on each side of the midpoint of the string are in the
+ratio of 1:2:4. This insures that each of the eight patterns that can
+occur on each side of the midpoint sends a unique activation sum to
+the hidden unit. This assures that there is no pattern on the left that
+will exactly balance a non-mirror-image pattern on the right. Finally,
+the two hidden units have identical patterns of weights from the input
+units except for sign. This insures that for every nonsymmetric pattern, at least one of the two hidden units will come on and turn on the
+output unit. To summarize, the network is arranged so thai both hidden units will receive exactly zero activation from the input units when
+the pattern is symmetric, and at least one of them will receive positive
+input for every nonsymmetric pattern.
+This problem was interesting to us because the learning system
+developed a much more elegant solution to the problem than we had
+previously considered. This problem was not the only one in which this
+happened. The parity solution discovered by the learning procedure
+was also one that we had not discovered prior to testing the problem
+with our learning procedure. Indeed, we frequently discover these
+more elegant solutions by giving the system more hidden units than it
+needs and observing that it does not make use of some of those provided. Some analysis of the actual solutions discovered often leads us
+to the discovery of a better solution involving fewer hidden units.
+Addition
+Another interesting problem on which we have tested our learning
+algorithm is the simple binary addition problem. This problem is
+interesting because there is a very elegant solution to it, because it is
+the one problem we have found where we can reliably find local
+minima and because the way of avoiding these local minima gives us
+some insight into the conditions under which local minima may be
+found and avoided. Figure 10 illustrates the basic problem and a
+minimal solution to it. There are four input units, three output units,
+and two hidden units. The output patterns can be viewed as the binary
+representation of the sum of two iwo-bit binary numbers represented
+by the input patterns. The second and fourth input units in the
+diagram correspond to the low-order bits of the two binary numbers
+and the first and third units correspond to the two higher order bits.
+The hidden units correspond to the carry bits in the summation. Thus
+the hidden unit on the far right comes on when both of the lower order
+bits in the input patternCapyrighted Materia/ the one on the left comes
+
+342
+Output Units
+-2
+-2
+Hidden
+Units
+-1.5
+Input Units
+FIGURE 10. Minimal network for adding two iwo-bit binary numbers. There are four
+input units, three output units, and two hidden units. The output patterns can be viewed
+as the binary representation of the sum of two iwo-bit binary numbers represented by the
+input patterns. The second and fourth input units in the diagram correspond to the loworder bits of the iwo binary numbers, and the first and third units correspond 1o the wo
+higher order bits. The hidden units correspond to the carry bits in the summation. The
+hidden unit on the far right comes on when both of the lower order bits in the input paltern are turned on, and the one on the left comes on when both higher order bits are
+turned on or when one of the higher order bits and the other hidden unit is turned on.
+The weights on all lines are assumed 1o be +1 except where noted. Negative connections are indicated by dashed lines. As usual, the biases are indicated by the numbers in
+the circles.
+on when both higher order bits are turned on or when one of the
+higher order bits and the other hidden unit is turned on. In the
+diagram, the weights on all lines are assumed to be + 1 except where
+noted. Inhibitory connections are indicated by dashed lines. As usual,
+the biases are indicated by the numbers in the circles. To understand
+how this network works, it is useful to note that the lowest order output bit is determined by an exclusive-or among the two low-order input
+bits. One way to solve this XOR problem is to have a hidden unit
+come on when both low-order input bits are on and then have it inhibit
+the output unit. Otherwise either of the low-order input units can turn
+on the low-order output bit. The middle bit is somewhat more
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+343
+difficult. Note that the middle bit should come on whenever an odd
+number of the set containing the two higher order input bits and the
+lower order carry bit is turned on. Observation will confirm that the
+network shown performs that task. The left-most hidden unit receives
+inputs from the two higher order bits and from the carry bit. Its bias is
+such that it will come on whenever two or more of its inputs are turned
+on. The middle output unit receives positive inputs from the same
+three units and a negative input of - 2 from the second hidden unit.
+This insures that whenever just one of the three are turned on, the
+second hidden unit will remain off and the output bit will come on.
+Whenever exactly two of the three are on, the hidden unit will turn on
+and counteract the two units exciting the output bit, so it will stay off.
+Finally, when all three are turned on, the output bit will receive - 2
+from its carry bit and +3 from its other three inputs. The net is positive, so the middle unit will be on. Finally, the third output bit should
+turn on whenever the second hidden unit is on-that is, whenever
+there is a carry from the second bit. Here then we have a minimal network to carry out the job at hand. Moreover, it should be noted that
+the concept behind this network is generalizable to an arbitrary number
+of input and output bits. In general, for adding two m bit binary
+numbers we will require 2m input units, m hidden units, and mt 1 output units.
+Unfortunately, this is the one problem we have found that reliably
+leads the system into local minima. At the start in our learning trials
+on this problem we allow any input unit to connect to any output unit
+and to any hidden unit. We allow any hidden unit to connect to any
+output unit, and we allow one of the hidden units to connect to the
+other hidden unit, but, since we can have no loops, the connection in
+the opposite direction is disallowed. Sometimes the system will discover
+essentially the same network shown in the figure. Often, however, the
+system ends up in a local minimum. The problem arises when the XOR
+problem on the low-order bits is not solved in the way shown in the
+diagram. One way it can fail is when the "higher" of the two hidden
+units is "selected" to solve the XOR problem. This is a problem
+because then the other hidden unit cannot "see" the carry bit and therefore cannot finally solve the problem. This problem seems to stem
+from the fact that the learning of the second output bit is always dependent on learning the first (because information about the carry is necessary to learn the second bit and therefore lags behind the learning of
+the first bit and has no influence on the selection of a hidden unit to
+4 The network is the same except for the highest order bit. The highest order bit is
+always on whenever three or more of the input units are on. This is always learned first
+and always learned with direct copyrignice warayanits.
+
+344 BASIC MECHANISMS
+solve the first XOR problem. Thus, about half of the time (in this
+problem) the wrong unit is chosen and the problem cannot be solved
+In this case, the system finds a solution for all of the sums except the
+11+11 - 110 (3+3 = 6) case in which it misses the carry into the
+middle bit and gets 11 + 11 - 100 instead. This problem differs from
+others we have solved in as much as the hidden units are not "equipotential" here. In most of our other problems the hidden units have
+been equipotential, and this problem has not arisen.
+It should be noted, however, that there is a relatively simple way out
+of the problem -namely, add some extra hidden units. In this case we
+can afford to make a mistake on one or more selections and the system
+can still solve the problems.
+For the problem of adding two-bit
+numbers we have found that the system always solves the problem with
+one extra hidden unit. With larger numbers it may require two or three
+more. For purposes of illustration, we show the results of one of our
+runs with three rather than the minimum two hidden units. Figure 11
+shows the state reached by the network after 3,020 presentations of
+each input pattern and with a learning rate of n = 0.5. For convenience, we show the network in four parts. In Figure 11A we show the
+connections to and among the hidden units. This figure shows the
+internal representation generated for this problem. The "lowest" hidden unit turns off whenever either of the low-order bits are on. In
+other words it detects the case in which no low-order bit is turn on.
+The "highest" hidden unit is arranged so that it comes on whenever the
+sum is less than two. The conditions under which the middle hidden
+unit comes on are more complex. Table 8 shows the patterns of hidden
+units which occur to each of the sixteen input patterns. Figure 11B
+shows the connections to the lowest order output unit. Noting that the
+relevant hidden unit comes on when neither low-order input unit is on,
+it is clear how the system computes XOR. When both low-order inputs
+are off, the output unit is turned off by the hidden unit. When both
+low-order input units are on, the output is turned off directly by the
+two input units. If just one is on, the positive bias on the output unit
+keeps it on. Figure 11C gives the connections to the middle output
+unit, and in Figure 1ID we show those connections to the left-most,
+highest order output unit. It is somewhat difficult to see how these
+connections always lead to the correct output answer, but, as can be
+verified from the figures, the network is balanced so that this works.
+It should be pointed out that most of the problems described thus far
+have involved hidden units with quite simple interpretations.
+It is
+much more often the case, especially when the number of hidden units
+exceeds the minimum number required for the task, that the hidden
+units are not readily interpreted. This follows from the fact that there
+is very little tendency for localist representations to develop. Typically
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+345
+Output Units
+Output Units
+- 10
+Hidden
+Units
+• 5
+Hidden
+Units
+1-5
+Input Units
+Input Units
+B
+Output Units
+Output Units
++ 14
+Hidden
+Units
+Hidden
+Units
++ 2!
+1+2
+Input Units
+Input Units
+C
+D
+FIGURE 1I. Nerwork found for the summation problem. A: The connections from the
+input units to the three hidden units and the connections among the hidden units. B:
+The connections from the input and hidden units to the lowest order output unit. C: The
+connections from the input and hidden units to the middle output unit. D: The conneclions from the inpur and hidden upyrighted iate nader our unil.
+
+346
+Input
+Patterns
+00 + 00
+00 + 01
+00 + 10
+00 + 11
+01 + 00
+01 + 01
+01 + 10
+01 + 11
+10 + 00
+10 + 01
+10 + 10
+10 + 11
+11 + 00
+11 + 01
+11 + 10
+11 + 11
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+TABLE 8
+Hidden Unit
+Patterns
+111
+110
+011
+010
+110
+010
+010
+000
+011
+010
+001
+000
+010
+000
+000
+000
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+Patterns
+000
+001
+010
+011
+001
+010
+011
+100
+010
+011
+100
+101
+011
+100
+101
+110
+the internal representations are distributed and it is the pattern of
+activity over the hidden units, not the meaning of any particular hidden
+unit that is important.
+The Negation Problem
+Consider a situation in which the input to a system consists of patterns of nt1 binary values and an output of n values. Suppose further
+that the general rule is that n of the input units should be mapped
+directly to the output patterns. One of the input bits, however, is special. It is a negation bit. When that bit is off, the rest of the pattern is
+supposed to map straight through, but when it is on, the complement
+of the pattern is to be mapped to the output. Table 9 shows the
+appropriate mapping. In this case the left element of the input pattern
+is the negation bit, but the system has no way of knowing this and
+must learn which bit is the negation bit. In this case, weights were
+allowed from any input unit to any hidden or output unit and from any
+hidden unit to any output unit. The system learned to set all of the
+problem was reduced to a set of three XORs between the negation bit
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+347
+TABLE 9
+Input Patterns
+0000
+0001
+0010
+0011
+0100
+0101
+0110
+0111
+1000
+1001
+1010
+1011
+1100
+1101
+1110
+1111
+Output Patterns
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+→
+and each input. In the case of the two right-most input units, the XOR
+problems were solved by recruiting a hidden unit to detect the case in
+which neither the negation unit nor the corresponding input unit was on.
+In the third case, the hidden unit detects the case in which both the
+negation unit and relevant input were on. In this case the problem was
+solved in less than 5,000 passes through the stimulus set with n = 0.25.
+11.10
+10.10
+i 1-10
++ 2
+FIGURE 12. The solution discovered for the negation problem. The left-most unit is
+the negation unit. The problem has been reduced and solved as three exclusive-ors
+between the negation unit and each of the other three units.
+
+348 BASIC MECHANISMS
+The T-C Problem
+Most of the problems discussed so far (except the symmetry problem) are rather abstract mathematical problems. We now turn to a
+more geometric problem-that of discriminating between a T and a
+C-independent of translation and rotation. Figure 13 shows the
+stimulus patterns used in these experiments. Note, these patterns are
+each made of five squares and differ from one another by a single
+square. Moreover, as Minsky and Papert (1969) point out, when considering the set of patterns over all possible translations and rotations
+(of 90°, 180°
+, and 270°), the patterns do not differ in the set of distances among their pairs of squares. To see a difference between the
+sets of patterns one must look, at least, at configurations of triplets of
+squares. Thus Minsky and Papert call this a problem of order three. S
+In order to facilitate the learning, a rather different architecture was
+employed for this problem. Figure 14 shows the basic structure of the
+network we employed. Input patterns were now conceptualized as twodimensional patterns superimposed on a rectangular grid. Rather than
+allowing each input unit to connect to each hidden unit, the hidden
+units themselves were organized into a two-dimensional grid with each
+unit receiving input from a square 3x3 region of the input space. In
+this sense, the overlapping square regions constitute the predefined
+receptive field of the hidden units. Each of the hidden units, over the
+entire field, feeds into a single output unit which is to take on the value
+LLL
+00
+• •
+FIGURE 13. The stimulus set for the T-C problem. The set consists of a block T and a
+block C in each of four orientations. One of the eight patterns is presented on each trial.
+S Terry Sejnowski pointed out to us that the T-C problem was difficult for models of
+this sort to learn and therefore worthy of study.
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+349
+Unit
+0
+B
+Hidden
+Units
+D
+Input
+Units
+FIGURE 14. The network for solving the T-C problem. See text for explanation.
+1 if the input is a T (at any location or orientation) and O if the input is
+a C. Further, in order that the learning that occurred be independent
+of where on the field the pattern appeared, we constrained all of the
+units to learn exactly the same pattern of weights. In this way each unit
+was constrained to compute exactly the same function over its receptive
+field-the receptive fields were constrained to all have the same shape.
+This guarantees translation independence and avoids any possible "edge
+effects" in the learning. The learning can readily be extended to arbitrarily large fields of input units. This constraint was accomplished by
+simply adding together the weight changes dictated by the delta rule for
+each unit and then changipyrill ted hat exactly the same amount. In
+
+350 BASIC MECHANISMS
+this way, the whole field of hidden units consists simply of replications
+of a single feature detector centered on different regions of the input
+space, and the learning that occurs in one part of the field is automatically generalized to the rest of the field.
+We have run this problem in this way a number of times. As a
+result, we have found a number of solutions. Perhaps the simplest way
+to understand the system is by looking at the form of the receptive
+field for the hidden units. Figure 15 shows several of the receptive
+fields we have seen. ' Figure 15A shows the most local representation
+developed. This on-center-off-surround detector turns out to be an
+excellent T detector. Since, as illustrated, a T can extend into the oncenter and achieve a net input of +1, this detector will be turned on for
+a T at any orientation. On the other hand, any C extending into the
+center must cover at least iwo inhibitory cells. With this detector the
+bias can be set so that only one of the whole field of inhibitory units
+will come on whenever a T is presented and none of the hidden units
+will be turned on by any C. This is a kind of protrusion detector which
+differentiates between a T and C by detecting the protrusion of the T.
+The receptive field shown in Figure 15B is again a kind of T detector.
+Every T activates one of the hidden units by an amount +2 and none
+of the hidden units receives more than +1 from any of the C's. As
+shown in the figure, T's at 90° and 270° send a total of +2 to the hidden units on which the crossbar lines up. The T's at the other two
+orientations receive +2 from the way it detects the vertical protrusions
+of those two characters. Figure 15C shows a more distributed representation. As illustrated in the figure, each T activates five different hidden units whereas each C excites only three hidden units. In this case
+the system again is differentiating between the characters on the basis
+of the protruding end of the Twhich is not shared by the C.
+Finally, the receptive field shown in Figure 15D is even more
+interesting. In this case every hidden unit has a positive bias so that it
+is on unless turned off. The strength of the inhibitory weights are such
+that if a character overlaps the receptive field of a hidden unit, that unit
+turns off. The system works because a C is more compact than a Tand
+therefore the T turns off more units that the C. The T turns off 21
+hidden units, and the C turns off only 20. This is a truly distributed
+• A similar procedure has been employed by Fukushima (1980) in his neocognitron and
+by Kienker, Sejnowski, Hinton, and Schumacher (1985).
+" The ratios of the weights are about right. The actual values can be larger or smaller
+than the values given in the figure.
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+351
+B
+1+2.
+-141-1
+-1 + 1-1
+•1 + 1
+- 1
+-1-1+
+- 1 + 2-1
++ 1-1-1
+1.1t
+1-1 + 2-1
++ 11-1
+D
+-2 - 2 -2
+- 2-2-2
+-2 -2 -2
+FIGURE 15. Receptive fields found in different runs of the T-C problem. A: An oncenter-off-surround receptive field for detecting T's. B: A vertical bar detector which
+responds to T's more strongly than C's. C: A diagonal bar detector. A T activates five
+such detectors whereas a C activates only three such detectors. D: A compactness detector. This inhibitory receptive field turns off whenever an input covers any region of its
+receptive field. Since the C is more compact than the T it turns off 20 such detectors
+whereas the T turns off 21 of them.
+representation. In each case, the solution was reached in from about
+5,000 to 10,000 presentations of the set of eight patterns.
+It is interesting that the inhibitory type of receptive field shown in
+Figure 1SD was the most common and that there is a predominance of
+inhibitory connections in this and indeed all of our simulations. This
+can be understood by considering the trajectory through which the
+learning typically moves. At first, when the system is presented with a
+8 Since translation independence was built into the learning procedure, it makes no
+difference where the input occurs; the same thing will be learned wherever the pattern is
+presented. Thus, there are onesisyrdilled materiap be presented to the system.
+
+352 BASIC MECHANISMS
+difficult problem, the initial random connections are as likely to mislead
+as to give the correct answer. In this case, it is best for the output
+units to take on a value of 0.5 than to take on a more extreme value.
+This follows from the form of the error function given in Equation 2.
+The output unit can achieve a constant output of 0.5 by turning off
+those units feeding into it. Thus, the first thing that happens in virtually every difficult problem is that the hidden units are turned off. One
+way to achieve this is to have the input units inhibit the hidden units.
+As the system begins to sort things out and to learn the appropriate
+function some of the connections will typically go positive, but the
+majority of the connections will remain negative. This bias for solutions involving inhibitory inputs can often lead to nonintuitive results
+in which hidden units are often on unless turned off by the input.
+More Simulation Results
+We have offered a sample of our results in this section. In addition
+to having studied our learning system on the problems discussed here,
+we have employed back propagation for learning to multiply binary
+digits, to play tic-tac-toe, to distinguish between vertical and horizontal
+lines, to perform sequences of actions, to recognize characters, to associate random vectors, and a host of other applications. In all of these
+applications we have found that the generalized delta rule was capable
+of generating the kinds of internal representations required for the
+problems in question. We have found local minima to be very rare and
+that the system learns in a reasonable period of time. Still more studies
+of this type will be required to understand precisely the conditions
+under which the system will be plagued by local minima. Suffice it to
+say that the problem has not been serious to date. We now turn to a
+pointer to some future developments.
+SOME FURTHER GENERALIZATIONS
+We have intensively studied the learning characteristics of the generalized delta rule on feedforward networks and semilinear activations
+functions. Interestingly these are not the most general cases to which
+the learning procedure is applicable. As yet we have only studied a few
+examples of the more fully generalized system, but it is relatively easy
+to apply the same learning rule to sigma-pi units and to recurrent networks. We will simply sferewigh easMateei here.
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+353
+The Generalized Delta Rule and Sigma-Pi Units
+It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that in the case of sigma-pi units
+we have
+(17)
+where i varies over the set of conjuncts feeding into unit j and k varies
+over the elements of the conjuncts. For simplicity of exposition, we
+restrict ourselves to the case in which no conjuncts involve more than
+two elements. In this case we can notate the weight from the conjunction of units i and j to unit k by Wij. The weight on the direct connection from unit i to unit j would, thus, be wii, and since the relation
+is multiplicative, Wkij = Wkji. We can now rewrite Equation 17 as
+0; = 5; 2 WiniOn 0i).
+inh
+We now set
+A, Wkij 0-.
+д Wkij
+Taking the derivative and simplifying, we get a rule for sigma-pi units
+strictly analogous to the rule for semilinear activation functions:
+АрШкід = бк0;0;.
+We can see the correct form of the error signal, 8, for this case by
+inspecting Figure lo. Consider the appropriate value of o; for unit u;
+in the figure. As before, the correct value of 8, is given by the sum of
+the o's for all of the units into which u; feeds, weighted by the amount
+of effect due to the activation of u; times the derivative of the activation function. In the case of semilinear functions, the measure of a
+unit's effect on another unit is given simply by the weight w connecting the first unit to the second. In this case, the u,'s effect on uk
+depends not only on wkij, but also on the value of Uj. Thus, we have
+8; = f': (net,) Eôk Wki, 0i
+j,k
+if u; is not an output unit and, as before,
+8; = f': (net;) (1,-0i)
+if it is an output unit.
+
+354
+Wkij
+Wini
+Un
+h
+FIGURE 16. The generalized delta rule for sigma-pi units. The products of activation
+values of individual units activate output units. See text for explanation of how the 8
+values are computed in this case.
+Recurrent Nets
+We have thus far restricted ourselves to feedforward nets. This may
+seem like a substantial restriction, but as Minsky and Papert point out,
+there is, for every recurrent network, a feedforward network with identical behavior (over a finite period of time). We will now indicate how
+this construction can proceed and thereby show the correct form of the
+learning rule for the recurrent network. Consider the simple recurrent
+network shown in Figure 17A. The same network in a feedforward
+architecture is shown in Figure 17B. The behavior of a recurrent network can be achieved in a feedforward network at the cost of duplicating the hardware many times over for the feedforward version of the
+network. 9 We have distinct units and distinct weights for each point in
+time. For naming convenience, we subscript each unit with its unit
+number in the corresponding recurrent network and the time it
+represents. As long as we constrain the weights at each level of the
+feedforward network to be the same, we have a feedforward network
+which performs identically with the recurrent network of Figure 17A.
+9 Note that in this discussion, and indeed in our entire development here, we have
+assumed
+a discrete time system with synchronous update and with each connection
+involving a unit delay.
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+355
+W21
+w11
+W22
+112
+Time
+B
+U
+1,1+1
+W11
+W12
+W21
+U
+1,0
+(U2,1+1
+W22
+U2,1
+1+1
+1,1
+U
+2,1
+W12
+W21
+W11
+W22
+41,0
+2.0
+FIGURE 17. A comparison of a recurrent neiwork and a feedforward network with
+identical behavior. A: A completely connected recurrent network with two units. B: A
+feedforward network which behaves the same as the recurrent network. In this case, we
+have a separate unit for each time step and we require that the weights connecting each
+layer of units to the next be the same for all layers. Moreover, they must be the same as
+the analogous weights in the recurrent case.
+The appropriate method for maintaining the constraint that all weights
+be equal is simply to keep track of the changes dictated for each weight
+at each level and then change each of the weights according to the sum
+of these individually prescribed changes. Now, the general rule for
+determining the change prescribed for a weight in the system for a particular time is simply @opalighted Material of an appropriate error
+
+356
+measure & and the input along the relevant line both for the appropriate
+times. Thus, the problem of specifying the correct learning rule for
+recurrent networks is simply one of determining the appropriate value
+of & for each time. In a feedforward network we determine & by multiplying the derivative of the activation function by the sum of the S's
+for those units it feeds into weighted by the connection strengths. The
+same process works for the recurrent network-except in this case, the
+value of 8 associated with a particular unit changes in time as a unit
+passes error back, sometimes to itself. After each iteration, as error is
+being passed back through the network, the change in weight for that
+iteration must be added to the weight changes specified by the preceding iterations and the sum stored.
+This process of passing error
+through the network should continue for a number of iterations equal
+to the number of iterations through which the activation was originally
+passed. At this point, the appropriate changes to all of the weights can
+be made.
+In general, the procedure for a recurrent network is that an input
+(generally a sequence) is presented to the system while it runs for some
+number of iterations. At certain specified times during the operation of
+the system, the output of certain units are compared to the target for
+that unit at that time and error signals are generated. Each such error
+signal is then passed back through the network for a number of iterations equal to the number of iterations used in the forward pass.
+Weight changes are computed at each iteration and a sum of all the
+weight changes dictated for a particular weight is saved. Finally, after
+all such error signals have been propagated through the system, the
+weights are changed. The major problem with this procedure is the
+memory required. Not only does the system have to hold its summed
+weight changes while the error is being propagated, but each unit must
+somehow record the sequence of activation values through which it was
+driven during the original processing. This follows from the fact that
+during each iteration while the error is passed back through the system,
+the current & is relevant to a point earlier in time and the required
+weight changes depend on the activation levels of the units at that time.
+It is not entirely clear how such a mechanism could be implemented in
+the brain. Nevertheless, it is tantalizing to realize that such a procedure
+is potentially very powerful, since the problem it is attempting to solve
+amounts to that of finding a sequential program (like that for a digital
+computer) that produces specified input-sequence/output-sequence
+pairs. Furthermore, the interaction of the teacher with the system can
+be quite flexible, so that, for example, should the system get stuck in a
+local minimum, the teacher could introduce "hints" in the form of
+desired output values for intermediate stages of processing. Our experience with recurrent net terrighter ate?lat we have carried out some
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+357
+experiments. We turn first to a very simple problem in which the system is induced to invent a shift register to solve the problem.
+Learning to be a shift register. Perhaps the simplest class of
+recurrent problems we have studied is one in which the input and output units are one and the same and there are no hidden units. We simply present a pattern and let the system process it for a period of time.
+The state of the system is then compared to some target state. If it
+hasn't reached the target state at the designated time, error is injected
+into the system and it modifies its weights. Then it is shown a new
+input pattern and restarted. In these cases, there is no constraint on
+the connections in the system. Any unit can connect to any other unit.
+The simplest such problem we have studied is what we call the shift
+register problem. In this problem, the units are conceptualized as a circular shift register. An arbitrary bit pattern is first established on the
+units. They are then allowed to process for two time-steps. The target
+state, after those two time-steps, is the original pattern shifted two
+spaces to the left. The interesting question here concerns the state of
+the units between the presentation of the start state and the time at
+which the target state is presented. One solution to the problem is for
+the system to become a shift register and shift the pattern exactly one
+unit to the left during each time period. If the system did this then it
+would surely be shifted two places to the left after two time units. We
+have tried this problem with groups of three or five units and, if we
+constrain the biases on all of the units to be negative (so the units are
+off unless turned on), the system always learns to be a shift register of
+this sort. "Thus, even though in principle any unit can connect to any
+other unit, the system actually learns to set all weights to zero except
+the ones connecting a unit to its left neighbor. Since the target states
+were determined on the assumption of a circular register, the left-most
+unit developed a strong connection to the right-most unit. The system
+learns this relatively quickly. With n= 0.25 it learns perfectly in fewer
+than 200 sweeps through the set of possible patterns with either threeor five-unit systems.
+The tasks we have described so far are exceptionally simple, but they
+do illustrate how the algorithm works with unrestricted networks. We
+have attempted a few more difficult problems with recurrent networks.
+10 If the constraint that biases be negative is not imposed, other solutions are possible.
+These solutions can involve the units passing through the complements of the shifted
+pattern or even through more complicated intermediate states.
+These trajectories are
+interesting in that they match a simple shift register on all even numbers of shifts, but do
+not match following an odd number of shifts.
+
+358 BASIC MECHANISMS
+One of the more interesting involves learning to complete sequences of
+patterns. Our final example comes from this domain.
+Learning to complete sequences. Table 10 shows a set of 25
+sequences which were chosen so that the first two items of a sequence
+uniquely determine the remaining four. We used this set of sequences
+to test out the learning abilities of a recurrent network. The network
+consisted of five input units (A, B, C, D, E), 30 hidden units, and
+three output units (1, 2, 3). At Time 1, the input unit corresponding
+to the first item of the sequence is turned on and the other input units
+are turned off. At Time 2, the input unit for the second item in the
+sequence is turned on and the others are all turned off. Then all the
+input units are turned off and kept off for the remaining four steps of
+the forward iteration. The network must learn to make the output units
+adopt states that represent the rest of the sequence. Unlike simple
+feedforward networks (or their iterative equivalents), the errors are not
+only assessed at the final layer or time. The output units must adopt
+the appropriate states during the forward iteration, and so during the
+paring rope reine mered erroral ste insole da ouchut unstepy their
+desired states.
+The learning procedure for recurrent nets places no constraints on
+the allowable connectivity structure." For the sequence completion
+problem, we used one-way connections from the input units to the hidden units and from the hidden units to the output units. Every hidden
+unit had a one-way connection to every other hidden unit and to itself,
+AA1212
+BA2312
+CA3112
+DA2112
+EA1312
+TABLE 10
+25 SEQUENCES TO BE LEARNED
+AB1223
+AC1231
+AD1221
+BB2323
+BC2331
+BD2321
+CB3123
+CC3131
+CD3121
+DB2123
+DC2131
+DD2121
+EB1323
+EC1331
+ED1321
+AE1213
+BE2313
+CE3113
+DE2113
+EE1313
+11 The constraint in feedforward networks is that it must be possible to arrange the
+units into layers such that units do not influence units in the same or lower layers. In
+recurrent networks this amounts to the constraint that during the forward iteration,
+future states must not affect past ones.
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+359
+and every output unit was also connected to every other output unit
+and to itself. All the connections started with small random weights
+uniformly distributed between - 0.3 and +0.3. All the hidden and output units started with an activity level of 0.2 at the beginning of each
+sequence.
+We used a version of the learning procedure in which the gradient of
+the error with respect to each weight is computed for a whole set of
+examples before the weights are changed. This means that each connection must accumulate the sum of the gradients for all the examples
+and for all the time steps involved in each example. During training,
+we used a particular set of 20 examples, and after these were learned
+almost perfectly we tested the network on the remaining examples to
+see if it had picked up on the obvious regularity that relates the first
+two items of a sequence to the subsequent four. The results are shown
+in Table 11. For four out of the five test sequences, the output units
+all have the correct values at all times (assuming we treat values above
+0.5 as 1 and values below 0.5 as O). The network has clearly captured
+the rule that the first item of a sequence determines the third and
+fourth, and the second determines the fifth and sixth. We repeated the
+simulation with a different set of random initial weights, and it got all
+five test sequences correct.
+The learning required 260 sweeps through all 20 training sequences.
+The errors in the output units were computed as follows: For a unit
+that should be on, there was no error if its activity level was above 0.8,
+otherwise the derivative of the error was the amount below 0.8. Similarly, for output units that should be off, the derivative of the error was
+the amount above 0.2. After each sweep, each weight was decremented
+by .02 times the total gradient accumulated on that sweep plus 0.9
+times the previous weight change.
+We have shown that the learning procedure can be used to create a
+network with interesting sequential behavior, but the particular problem
+we used can be solved by simply using the hidden units to create "delay
+lines" which hold information for a fixed length of time before allowing
+it to influence the output. A harder problem that cannot be solved
+with delay lines of fixed duration is shown in Table 12. The output is
+the same as before, but the two input items can arrive at variable times
+so that the item arriving at time 2, for example, could be either the
+first or the second item and could therefore determine the states of the
+output units at either the fifth and sixth or the seventh and eighth
+times. The new task is equivalent to requiring a buffer that receives
+two input "words" at variable times and outputs their "phonemic realizations" one after the other. This problem was solved successfully by a
+network similar to the one above except that it had 60 hidden units and
+half of their possible interpgagffeiMaterfal omitted at random. The
+
+360 BASIC MECHANISMS
+TABLE 11
+PERFORMANCE OF THE NETWORK ON FIVE NOVEL TEST SEQUENCES
+Input Sequence
+D
+Desired Outputs
+2
+Actual States of:
+Output Unit 1
+Output Unit 2
+Output Unit 3
+0.2
+0.2
+0.2
+0.12
+0.16
+0.07
+0.90
+0.13
+0.08
+0.22
+0.82
+0.03
+0.11
+0.88
+0.01
+0.83
+0.03
+0.22
+Input Sequence
+Desired Outputs
+Actual States of:
+Output Unit 1
+Output Unit 2
+Output Unit 3
+Input Sequence
+Desired Outputs
+Actual States of:
+Output Unit 1
+Output Unit 2
+Output Unit 3
+Input Sequence
+Desired Outputs
+Actual States of:
+Output Unit 1
+Output Unit 2
+Output Unit 3
+Input Sequence
+Desired Outputs
+Actual States of:
+Output Unit 1
+Output Unit 2
+Output Unit 3
+0.2
+0.2
+0.2
+0.2
+0.2
+0.2
+D
+0.2
+0.2
+0.2
+E
+0.2
+0.2
+0.2
+E
+0.12
+0.16
+0.07
+0.07
+0.12
+0.16
+0.07
+0.12
+0.16
+0.07
+2
+0.20
+0.80
+0.02
+3
+0.19
+0.19
+0.80
+2
+0.16
+0.80
+0.20
+1
+0.80
+0.20
+0.07
+3
+0.25
+0.05
+0.79
+1
+0.80
+0.00
+0.13
+1
+0.79
+0.15
+0.01
+3
+0.09
+0.13
+0.94
+1
+0.48
+0.04
+0.48
+1
+0.87
+0.13
+0.01
+2
+0.07
+0.87
+0.13
+3
+0.27
+0.01
+0.76
+0.26
+0.09
+0.53
+2
+0.11
+0.70
+0.25
+3
+0.11
+0.05
+0.96
+1
+0.78
+0.02
+0.13
+learning was much slower, requiring thousands of sweeps through all
+136 training examples. There were also a few more errors on the 14
+test examples, but the generalization was still good with most of the
+test sequences being coraleier nredeMilterial
+
+8. LEARNING INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
+361
+TABLE 12
+SIX VARIATIONS OF THE SEQUENCE EA1312 PRODUCED BY
+PRESENTING THE FIRST TWO ITEMS AT VARIABLE TIMES
+EA--1312
+E-A-1312
+E--A1312
+- EA-1312
+-E-A1312
+- -EA1312
+Note: With these temporal variations, the 25 sequences shown in
+Table 10 can be used to generate 150 different sequences.
+CONCLUSION
+In their pessimistic discussion of perceptrons, Minsky and Papert
+(1969) finally discuss multilayer machines near the end of their book.
+They state:
+The perceptron has shown itself worthy of study despite (and
+even because of!) its severe limitations. It has many features
+that attract attention: its linearity; its intriguing learning
+theorem; its clear paradigmatic simplicity as a kind of parallel
+computation. There is no reason to suppose that any of these
+virtues carry over to the many-layered version. Nevertheless,
+we consider it to be an important research problem to elucidate
+(or reject) our intuitive judgement that the extension is sterile.
+Perhaps some powerful convergence theorem
+will be
+discovered, or some profound reason for the failure to produce
+an interesting "learning theorem" for the multilayered machine
+will be found. (pp. 231-232)
+Although our learning results do not guarantee that we can find a solution for all solvable problems, our analyses and results have shown that
+as a practical matter, the error propagation scheme leads to solutions in
+virtually every case.
+In short, we believe that we have answered Minsky and Papert's challenge and have found a learning result sufficiently
+powerful to demonstrate that their pessimism about learning in multilayer machines was misplaced.
+One way to view the procedure we have been describing is as a parallel computer that, having been shown the appropriate input/output
+exemplars specifying some function, programs itself to compute that
+function in general. Parallel computers are notoriously difficult to program. Here we have a mechanism whereby we do not actually have to
+know how to write the program in order to get the system to do it.
+Parker (1985) has emphasizerighied Material
+
+362
+On many occasions we have been surprised to learn of new methods
+of computing interesting functions by observing the behavior of our
+learning algorithm. This also raised the question of generalization. In
+most of the cases presented above, we have presented the system with
+the entire set of exemplars. It is interesting to ask what would happen
+if we presented only a subset of the exemplars at training time and then
+watched the system generalize to remaining exemplars. In small problems such as those presented here, the system sometimes finds solutions to the problems which do not properly generalize. However, preliminary results on larger problems are very encouraging in this regard
+This research is still in progress and cannot be reported here. This is
+currently a very active interest of ours.
+Finally, we should say that this work is not yet in a finished form.
+We have only begun our study of recurrent networks and sigma-pi
+units. We have not yet applied our learning procedure to many very
+complex problems. However, the results to date are encouraging and
+we are continuing our work.
+
+PART III
+Part III is focused on the formal tools employed in the study of PDP
+models and their application in the analysis of several specific aspects of
+PDP mechanisms.
+In Chapter 9, Jordan provides a very accessible introduction to linear
+algebra and its applications to the analysis of PDP models. This chapter
+is designed to be a tutorial for those who are not familiar with the
+basics of linear algebra. Most of the book can be read and understood
+without knowledge of linear algebra,
+but an understanding of this
+important tool will greatly enhance a reader's understanding of the
+mathematical discussions that can be found in several chapters of the
+book.
+In Chapter 10, Williams provides a useful analysis of activation functions. Throughout the book we employ several different activation
+functions. There is a question as to whether we will need to look for
+more complex activation functions to carry out some of the more complex computations. Williams shows that we will never have to consider
+activation functions more complex than the sigma pi function.
+In Chapter 11, Stone provides a useful analysis of the delta rule,
+which plays an important role throughout the book. Stone shows how a
+change of basis can be employed to reveal the internal workings of the
+delta rule. He shows that when there is no deterministic relationship
+between inputs and targets, the delta rule leads to a system whose outputs match the central tendencies of the target patterns. Finally, he
+shows how the delta rule is related to linear regression.
+
+364 FORMAL ANALYSES
+In Chapter 12, McClelland analyzes the capacity limitations of two
+kinds of networks. He studies the effects of limitations of fan-in and
+fan-out on the capacities of standard pattern-association networks, and
+he explores the costs in units and connections of using programmable
+networks of the kind outlined in Chapter 16.
+Finally, in Chapter 13, Zipser and Rabin describe a computer simulation system, called P3, for building computer simulations of PDP
+models. P3 provides both a language for describing networks and an
+interface for interacting with these networks and observing their
+behavior. Chapter 13 gives as an example a description of how the
+competitive learning algorithm can be built in P3.
+In general, the chapters in this section are useful for two reasons.
+First, they describe several useful basic results-results that lie behind
+many of the simulation models described in other sections of the book.
+Second, and perhaps more importantly, they indicate some of the formal tools that are available for analyzing parallel networks, and show
+through example how these tools can be used to produce useful results.
+
+CHAPTER 9
+An Introduction to Linear Algebra in
+M. I. JORDAN
+Many of the properties of the models described in this book are captured by the mathematics of linear algebra. This chapter serves as a
+introduction to linear algebra and is a good starting place for the reader
+who wishes to delve further into the models presented in other parts of
+the book. I will focus on the aspects of linear algebra most essential for
+the analysis of parallel distributed processing models, particularly the
+notions of a vector space, the inner product, and linearity. I will also
+discuss some simple PDP models, and show how their workings
+correspond to operations on vectors.
+VECTORS
+A vector is a useful way to describe a pattern of numbers. Consider
+for example the pattern of numbers that describe the age, height, and
+weight of an average person. Suppose that Joe is 37 years old, 72
+inches tall, and weighs 175 pounds. This information can be summarized in a vector or ordered list of numbers. For each person, there is a
+corresponding vector, as in Figure 1A.
+Each vector has three comonents: age, height
+, and wenghted Matersano reason to limit ourselves
+
+366
+Joe
+1125)
+Mary
+Carol
+Brad
+118s)
+Joe
+132
+175
+8
+1946]
+FIGURE 1.
+to only three components, however. If, for example, we also wanted to
+keep track of Joe's shoe size and year of birth, then we would simply
+make a vector with five components, as in Figure 1B.
+One important reason for the great utility of linear algebra lies in the
+simplicity of its notation. We will use bold, lower-case letters such as v
+to stand for vectors. With this notation, an arbitrarily long list of information can be designated by a single symbol.
+When a vector has no more than three components, it can be
+represented graphically by a point or an arrow in three-dimensional
+space. An example with three components is given in Figure 2 for the
+vector corresponding to Mary. Each axis in the figure corresponds to
+one of the three components of the vector.
+It will prove helpful to try and visualize vectors as points or arrows in
+two-and three-dimensional space in proceeding through this chapter in
+order to develop geometric intuition for the operations on vectors.
+Notice, however, that there is no fundamental distinction between such
+vectors and vectors with more than three components. All of the
+operations upon vectors described in later sections apply equally well to
+vectors with any finite number of components.
+In a parallel distributed processing model, many quantities are best
+represented by vectors. The pattern of numbers representing the
+activations of many processing units is one example. Other examples
+are the set of weights on the input lines to a particular processing unit,
+or the set of inputs to a system.
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+367
+Weight A
+80-
+60
+40
+20-
+Height
+730=
+102-
+'Age
+1/'
+FIGURE 2.
+BASIC OPERATIONS
+Multiplication by Scalars
+In linear algebra, a single real number is referred to as a scalar. A
+vector can be multiplied by a scalar by multiplying every component of
+the vector by the scalar.
+Examples:
+-15
+• 4 =
+20
+1
+Geometrically, scalar multiplication corresponds to lengthening or
+shortening the vector, while leaving it pointing in the same or opposite
+direction. As can be seen in Figure 3, multiplying a vector by 2 leaves
+it pointing in the same direction but twice as long. In general, multiplying a vector by a positive scalar produces a new vector that is longer
+or shorter by an amount corresponding to the magnitude of the scalar.
+Multiplication by a negative scalar produces a vector pointing in the
+opposite direction. It, too, is longer or shorter depending on the magnitude of the scalar. Two vectors that are scalar multiples of one
+another are said to be coltigs/righted Material
+
+368
+4
+3 г
+2
+1
+2
+FIGURE 3.
+Addition of Vectors
+Two or more vectors can be added by adding their components. The
+vectors must have the same number of components to be added; otherwise the operation is undefined.
+Examples:
+13 + 9 + 23 - 1i)
+Vector addition is associative (the vectors can be grouped in any
+manner) and commutative (the order of addition is unimportant) just
+like addition in ordinary algebra. This is true because if we consider
+one component at a time, vector addition is just addition in ordinary
+algebra.
+How can vector addition be represented graphically? Consider Figure
+3
+4, where the vectors v, =
+and v2=
+are being added. It can be
+4
+seen that the sum v, tv2 is a vector 3
+which lies between v, and v2.
+Forming the parallelogram with sides v, and v2, we see that the sum of
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+369
+........•*
+2
+= 3
+5
+FIGURE 4.
+the two vectors is the diagonal of this parallelogram. In two and three
+dimensions this is easy to visualize, but not when the vectors have
+more than three components. Nevertheless, it will be useful to imagine
+vector addition as forming the diagonal of a parallelogram. One implication of this view, which we will find useful, is that the sum of two
+vectors is a vector that lies in the same plane as the vectors being
+added.
+Example: Calculating averages. We can demonstrate the use of the
+two operations thus far defined in calculating the average vector. Suppose we want to find the average age, height, and weight of the four
+individuals in Figure IA. Clearly this involves summing the components separately and then dividing each sum by 4. Using vectors,
+this corresponds to adding the four vectors and then multiplying the
+resulting sum by the scalar 1/4. Using u to denote the average vector,
+371
+72
+175
+61]
+65 +
+121)
+67
+(155)
+Using vector notation, if we denote the four vectors by v1, V2, V3, and
+V4, then we can write the averaging operation as
+4 = 4
+
+370
+The vector u, then, is a vector whose components are the averages of
+the components of the four individual vectors. Notice that the same
+result is obtained if each vector is first multiplied by 1/4, and the
+resulting vectors are added. This shows that multiplication by scalars
+and vector addition obey a distributive law, as in ordinary algebra.
+LINEAR COMBINATIONS AND LINEAR
+INDEPENDENCE
+Linear Combinations of Vectors
+The average vector calculated in the last section is an example of a
+linear combination of vectors. In this section, we pursue this idea
+further.
+Consider the vectors v, =
+Can u be
+10
+written as the sum of scalar multiples of v, and y2? That is, can scalars
+c, and c2 be found such that u can be written in the form
+1 = GIVI+ C2V2?
+If so, then u is said to be a linear combination of the vectors v, and v2.
+The reader can verify that cy = 3 and c2 = 2 will work, and thus u is a
+linear combination of v, and v2.
+This can also be seen directly in Figure S, where these vectors are
+plotted. Remembering that multiplication by a scalar shortens or
+10
+5
+V
+FIGURES.
+5
+10
+15
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+371
+lengthens a vector and that vector addition corresponds to forming the
+diagonal of a parallelogram, it seems clear that we can find scalars to
+adjust v, and v2 to form a parallelogram that yields u. This is indicated
+in the figure. It also seems clear that, using positive scalars, any vector
+in the shaded area of the figure can be generated this way. By using
+both negative and positive scalars, any vector in the plane can be written as a linear combination of v, and v2. This is true because multiplication by a negative scalar reverses the direction of a vector as well as
+shortening or lengthening it. The vectors v, and v2 are said to span the
+plane, because any vector in the plane can be generated from these two
+vectors.
+In general, given a set v1,Y2,.... Yn of vectors, a vector v is said to
+be a linear combination of the y, if scalars c1, c2,..., In can be found
+such that
+(1)
+The set of all linear combinations of they, is called the set spanned by
+the v.
+0
+Example. The three vectors
+1
+0
+and
+span all of three-
+dimensional space since any vector v =
+can be written as a linear
+1
+combination v=
+ot o
+The vectors are referred to
+as the standard basis for three-dimensional space (more on the idea of a
+basis in the next section).
+Linear Independence
+To say that a set of vectors span a space is to say that all vectors in
+the space can be generated from the original set by linear combination.
+We have shown examples in which two vectors span two-dimensional
+space and three vectors span three-dimensional space. We might be led
+to expect that, in general, n vectors suffice to span n-dimensional
+space. In fact, we have been using the term "dimension" without defining what it
+means; it would seem that a good definition of n-
+dimensional space is the 58byfigt8 apared by a vectors.
+
+372
+To make this definition work, we would require that the same size
+space be generated by any set of n vectors. However, this is not the
+case, as can be easily shown. Consider any pair of collinear vectors, for
+example. Such vectors lie along a single line, thus any linear combination of the vectors will lie along the same line. The space spanned by
+these two vectors is therefore only a one-dimensional set. The collinear vectors
+and
+2
+are a good example. Any linear combination of these vectors will have equal components, thus they do not span
+the plane.
+Another example is a set of three vectors that lie on a plane in
+three-dimensional space. Any parallelograms that we form will be in
+the same plane, thus all linear combinations will remain in the plane
+and we can't span all of three-dimensional space.
+The general rule arising from these examples is that of a set of n
+vectors, if at least one can be written as a linear combination of the
+others, then the vectors span something less than a full n-dimensional
+space.
+We call such a set of vectors linearly dependent. If, on the other
+hand, none of the vectors can be written as a linear combination of the
+others, then the set is called linearly independent. We now revise the
+definition of dimensionality as follows: n-dimensional space is the set
+of vectors spanned by a set of n linearly independent vectors. The n
+vectors are referred to as a basis for the space.
+Examples:
+and
+are linearly dependent. They span only a onedimensional space.
+2. and 3)
+are linearly independent. Thus they span the
+plane, a two-dimensional space.
+3. 6). 13.
+and are linearly dependent since 7 times the
+first vector minus
+4 times the second vector is equal to the third
+vector.
+4.
+13131-013
+are linearly dependent. Clearly they cannot
+span all of three-dimensional space, because no vector with a
+nonzero third component can be generated from this set.
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+373
+Notice the relationship between examples (2) and (3). The vectors in
+example (2) are linearly independent, therefore they span the plane.
+Thus any other vector with two components is a linear combination of
+these two vectors. In example (3), then, we know that the set will be
+linearly dependent before being told what the third vector is. This suggests the following rule: There can be no more than n linearly independent vectors in n-dimensional space.
+A linearly independent set of vectors has the important property that
+a vector can be written as a linear combination of the set in only one
+way. In other words, the coefficients c; in Equation 1 are unique if the
+vectors v; are linearly independent. This fact can be easily seen, for
+example, in the case of the standard basis, for there is only one vector
+in the basis which has a nonzero entry for any given component.
+For linearly dependent vectors, however, the situation is different. If
+a vector can be written as a linear combination of a linearly dependent
+set of vectors, then there are an infinite number of sets of coefficients
+that will work. Let us attempt to demonstrate this fact with the aid of
+geometric intuition. Suppose that we wish to write vector y as a linear
+combination of three vectors v1, Y2, and v3 in the plane. Let us choose
+any arbitrary coefficient c, for the vector v1. As shown in Figure 6,
+there must be a vector w such that v = civ, + w. Thus, if we can write
+w as a linear combination of v2 and v3, i.e., w = carat c3y3, then we
+have succeeded in writing v as a linear combination of v1, V2, and v3.
+But clearly we can do this, because w is a vector in the plane, and v2
+and v3 together span the plane.
+......
+FIGURE 6.
+
+374
+VECTOR SPACES
+Let us pause to reflect for a moment upon what a vector is. I have
+implied that a vector is a list of numbers, and I have also used the term
+to refer to a point or an arrow in space. Are both of these objects vectors, or is one just a heuristic representation for the other? Are there
+other objects that should be called vectors? Just what is a vector?
+As is often the case in mathematics, these kinds of questions are
+solved by being avoided.
+Consider the following definition of an
+abstract vector space, and try to decide what a vector is.
+A vector space is a set V of elements, called vectors, with the following properties:
+• To every pair, u and v, of vectors in V. there corresponds a
+vector u + v also in V, called the sum of u and v, in such a way
+that addition is commutative and associative.
+• For any scalar c and any vector v in V, there is a vector cv in
+V, called the product of c and v, in such a way that multiplication by scalars is associative and distributive with respect to
+vector addition.'
+The answer to the question is that a vector is an undefined object in
+linear algebra, much like a line in geometry. The definition of a vector
+space simply lists the properties that vectors must have, without specifying what a vector must be. Thus, any set of objects that obey these
+properties can be called a vector space. Lists of numbers are vectors
+when addition is defined as adding components separately and scalar
+multiplication is defined as multiplying all the components by the
+scalar, because these operations fill all the requirements of a vector
+space.
+Arrows or points in space are also vectors when addition is
+defined geometrically as taking the diagonal of a parallelogram and
+scalar multiplication is defined as lengthening or shortening the arrow,
+because again, these operations fill the requirements of a vector space.
+A seemingly unrelated example of a vector space is the set of polynomials of order n, with addition and scalar multiplication defined in the
+obvious way.
+This sort of abstraction is common in mathematics. It is useful
+because any theorem that is true about a general vector space must be
+1 I have left out certain technicalities usually included as axioms for a vector space.
+These include the axiom that there must be a zero vector, and for every vector, there is
+an additive inverse.
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+375
+true about any instantiation of a vector space. We can therefore discuss
+general properties of vector spaces without being committed to choosing a particular representation such as a list of numbers. Much of the
+discussion about linear combinations and linear independence was of
+this nature.
+When we do choose numbers to represent vectors, we use the following scheme. First we choose a basis for the space. Since every vector in the space can be written as a linear combination of the basis vectors, each vector has a set of coefficients c1, 62...., Cn which are the
+coefficients in the linear combination. These coefficients are the
+numbers used as the components of the vector. As was shown in the
+previous section, the coefficients of a given vector are unique because
+basis vectors are linearly independent.
+There is a certain arbitrariness in assigning the numbers, since there
+are infinitely many sets of basis vectors, and each vector in tha space
+has a different description depending on which basis is used. That is,
+the coefficients, which are referred to as coordinates, are different for
+different choices of basis. The implications of this fact are discussed
+further in a later section where I also discuss how to relate the coordinates of a vector in one basis to the coordinates of the vector in
+another basis. Chapter 22 contains a lengthy discussion of several
+issues relating to the choice of basis.
+INNER PRODUCTS
+As of yet, we have no way to speak of the length of a vector or of
+the similarity between two vectors. This will be rectified with the
+notion of an inner product.
+The inner product of two vectors is the sum of the products of the
+vector components. The notation for the inner product of vectors
+y and w is y • w. As with vector addition, the inner product is defined
+only if the vectors have the same number of components.
+Example:
+V=
+-1
+2
+W=
+1
+2
+1
+v. W = (3. 1) + (-1: 2) + (2: 1) = 3.
+
+376 FORMAL ANALYSES
+The inner product is a kind of multiplication between vectors,
+although somewhat of a strange sort of multiplication, since it produces
+a single number from a pair of vectors. What does this single number
+Length
+As a special case, consider taking the inner product of a vector with
+13
+itself. An example is the vector v =
+4
+in Figure 7. The inner product of v with itself is
+v. 7 = 32 + 42= 25.
+Consider the right triangle in Figure 7 with sides corresponding to the
+components of v. and hypotenuse v itself. The Pythagorean theorem
+tells us that the square of the length of v is equal to the sum of the
+squares of the sides. Since this is exactly what is calculated by the
+inner product v. v, it appears that a reasonable definition of the length
+of a vector is the square root of the inner product of the vector with
+itself. Thus we define the length of a vector v, denoted by vl, as
+Although the definition was motivated by an example in two dimensions, it can be applied to any vector. Notice that many of the
+4
+2
+1
+1
+2
+3
+4
+FIGURE 7.
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+377
+properties we intuitively associate with length are included in this definition. For example, if a vector has larger components than another
+vector, it will be longer, because the squared components will contribute to a larger inner product.
+Multiplying a vector by a scalar produces a new vector whose length is the absolute value of the scalar
+times the length of the old vector:
+This is a property that can be easily proved. Somewhat harder to prove
+is the so-called triangle inequality, which states that the length of the
+sum of two vectors is less than or equal to the sum of the lengths of
+the two vectors:
+Geometrically, the triangle inequality corresponds to the statement that
+one side of a triangle is no longer than the sum of the lengths of the
+other two sides.
+Thus, in the special case where the operands are the same vector, the
+inner product is closely related to the idea of length. What if the
+operands are different vectors?
+Angle
+The angle between two vectors v and w is defined in terms of the
+inner product by the following definition:
+V•W
+(2)
+where o is the angle between v and w. Note that all of the quantities on
+dimensional ved side of the end of this see on i willed eri
+I will show geometrically why this formula is correct in two-dimensional space, using the
+ordinary geometrical definition of angle.
+Esamale Find the angle o between ine vestors v, - fil and
+First, we calculate the necessary inner product and lengths:
+V1.V2=1
+Hobyrighted NaderíaN2,
+
+378
+and then substitute these values in Equation 2:
+cos @ =
+T. 52 = 0.707.
+Thus,
+• = cos ' (0.707) = 45°.
+This result could also have been found using basic trigonometry, but
+clearly the inner product method is superior in general (consider finding the angle between vectors with forty components!).
+The inner product is often said to measure the "match" or "similarity"
+between two vectors. In a vague sense, this seems to be the case from
+the definition of the inner product as the sum of products. Equation 2,
+however, shows this in a clearer way:
+Writing out the equation in
+terms of the components of the vectors gives
+V; W;
+COS 0 =
+-.
+i=l
+i-l
+This is the formula for the correlation between two sets of numbers
+with zero means.
+We can use our geometrical intuitions about angles and our understanding of correlation to turn Equation 2 around and gain a better
+understanding of the inner product. This understanding is important
+for the analysis of PDP models, because as will be seen, PDP models
+often compute inner products. Let us imagine moving two vectors
+around in space like the hands on a clock. If we hold the lengths of the
+vectors constant, then Equation 2 says that the inner product is proportional to the cosine of the angle: v • ₩ = |
+cos A. For example, if
+the angle between the vectors is zero, where the cosine is at a maximum, the inner product must therefore be at a maximum. As the two
+vectors move farther apart, the cosine decreases, thus the inner product
+decreases. It reaches zero when the angle is 90°
+, and its most negative
+value when the angle between the vectors is 180°, that is, when the
+vectors point in opposite directions. Thus, the closer the two vectors
+are, the larger the inner product. The more the vectors point in opposite directions, the more negative the inner product.
+We must be careful, however, in claiming that two vectors are closer
+together than two others because they have a larger inner product. We
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+379
+must remember to divide the inner product by the lengths of the vectors involved to make such comparative statements.
+An important special case occurs when the inner product is zero. In
+this case, the iwo vectors are said to be orthogonal. Plugging zero into
+the right side of Equation 2 gives
+COs 0 = 0.
+which implies that the angle between the vectors is 90°. Thus, orthogonal vectors are vectors which lie at right angles to one another.
+We will often speak of a set of orthogonal vectors. This means that
+every vector in the set is orthogonal to every other vector in the set.
+That is, every vector lies at a right angle to every other vector. A good
+earlier. in urge die eil skip the prost it is parably car eat aro
+orthogonal set is linearly independent. Indeed, orthogonality is
+stronger than linear independence: whereas every orthogonal set is
+linearly independent, there are very many linearly independent sets of
+vectors that are not orthogonal. An example in two-dimensional space
+is the pair
+When we choose a basis for a space, we typically choose an orthogonal basis. In fact, in much of classical physics
+and mathematics, there is not the slightest hint that a basis should be
+anything but orthogonal.
+Projections
+A further application of the inner product, closely related to the ideas
+of length and angle, is the notion of a projection of one vector onto
+another. An example is given in Figure 8. The distance x is the projection of v on w. In two dimensions, we readily know how to calculate
+the projection. It is
+x= |v| cos o
+(3)
+where o is the angle between v and w. This formula generalizes, and
+for any vectors v and w, the projection of v on w is given by Equation
+3. It is a scalar which can be thought of as indicating how much v is
+pointing in the direction of w.
+
+380
+FIGURE 8.
+There is a close relationship between the inner product and the projection. Using Equation 2, we can rewrite the formula for the projection:
+x= l|v|| cos o
+V •W
+= |v|l
+=
+r •w
+//wl
+Thus, the projection is the inner product divided by the length of w. In
+particular, if w has length one, then ||w|| = 1, and the projection of v
+on w and the inner product of y and w are the same thing. This way of
+thinking about the inner product is consistent with our earlier comments. That is, if we hold the lengths of v and w constant, then we
+know that the inner product gets larger as v moves toward w. From the
+picture, we see that the projection gets larger as well. When the two
+vectors are orthogonal, the projection as well as the inner product are
+zero.
+Inner Products in Two Dimensions
+Equation 2 can be shown to be correct in two-dimensional space with
+the help of some simple geometry. Let y and w be two vectors in the
+plane, and o be the angle between them, as shown in Figure 9. Denote
+the x and y coordinates ofyngled Material and wx, wy, respectively.
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+381
+V
+FIGURE 9.
+Let I denote the projection of v on w. We have | = ||v|| cose from
+geometry. We can break / into two pieces x and ly as shown in the figure. ly can be computed from the diagram by noticing that triangles
+OAD and COB, in Figure 10, are similar triangles. Thus, the ratio of
+corresponding sides is constant:
+Wy
+Vy
+giving
+1y = r, My
+My
+-pul
+ÖF1,
+B
+FIGURE 10.
+
+382
+E
+Int-
+OH
+- Wx
+D
+FIGURE 11.
+In Figure 11, we see how to compute lx, by observing that triangles
+EOD and CAB are similar. Thus,
+Wx
+=
+Vx
+Iwll '
+giving
+Vx Wx
+1x=
+/wll
+We can now write / = Ix + ly, which yields
+y• W
+//wll
+Thus,
+cose =
+y•W
+Algebraic Properties of the Inner Product
+In this section, we collect together some useful algebraic theorems
+concerning inner products. Most of these theorems can be easily
+proved using the definition of the inner product and properties of real
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+383
+numbers. In what follows, c and c; will be any scalars, and the v and w
+will be n-dimensional vectors.
+V •W=W•V
+c(.) = (cy)•w= v. (cw)
+(4)
+(5)
+(6)
+The first theorem says simply that order is unimportant; the inner product is commutative. The second and third theorems show that the
+inner product is a linear function, as we will discuss at length in a later
+section. We can combine these two equations to get
+w-(/t(/)=((w.)+c(w.yz). It is also well worth our
+while to use mathematical induction to generalize this formula, giving
+us
+w.(cvitcar2t...+CnYn)=
+(7)
+This important result tells us how to calculate the inner product of w
+and a linear combination of vectors.
+Another useful theorem is
+(8)
+This is known as the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. It gives an upper
+bound on the inner product.
+ONE UNIT IN A PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED
+PROCESSING SYSTEM
+In this section, we show how some of the concepts we have introduced can be used in analyzing a very simple PDP model. Consider the
+processing unit in Figure 12 which receives inputs from the n units
+below. Associated with each of the nt 1 units there is a scalar activation value. We shall use the scalar u to denote the activation of the output unit and the vector v to denote the activations of the n input units.
+That is, the ith component of v is the activation of the ith input unit.
+Since there are n input units, v is an n-dimensional vector.
+Associated with each link between the input units and the output
+unit, there is a scalar weisyrigales water can think of the set of n
+
+384
+w2/
+W
+n
+FIGURE 12.
+• .
+FIGURE 13.
+weights as an n-dimensional vector w. This is the weight vector
+corresponding to the output unit. Later we will discuss a model with
+many output units, each of which will have its own weight vector.
+Another way to draw the same model is shown in Figure 13. Here
+we have drawn the n input units at the top with the output unit on the
+right. The components of the weight vector are stored at the junctions
+where the vertical input lines meet the horizontal output line. Which
+diagram is to be preferred (Figure 12 or Figure 13) is mostly a matter
+of taste, although we will see that the diagram in Figure 13 generalizes
+better to the case of many output units.
+Now to the operation of the model: Let us assume that the activation of each input unit is multiplied by the weight on its link, and that
+these products are added up to give the activation of the output unit.
+Using the definition of the inner product, we translate that statement
+into mathematics as follows:
+U =₩•V.
+The activation of the output unit is the inner product of its weight vector with the vector of input activations.
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+385
+The geometric properties of the inner product give us the following
+picture to help in understanding what the model is computing. We
+imagine that the set of possible inputs to the model is a vector space.
+It is an n-dimensional space, where n is the number of input lines.
+The weight vector also has n components, thus we can plot the weight
+vector in the input space. The advantage of doing this is that we can
+now state how the system will respond to the various inputs. As we
+have seen, the inner product gives an indication of how close two vectors are. Thus, in this simple PDP model, the output activation gives
+an indication or measurement of how close the input vector is to the
+stored weight vector. The inputs lying close to the weight vector will
+yield a large positive response, those lying near 90 ° will yield a zero
+response, and those pointing in the opposite direction will yield a large
+negative response. If we present a succession of input vectors of constant length, the output unit will respond most strongly to that input
+vector which is closest to its weight vector, and will drop off in
+response as the input vectors move away from the weight vector.
+One way to describe the functioning of the processing unit is to say
+that it splits the input space into two parts, the part where the response
+is negative and the part where the response is positive. We can easily
+imagine augmenting the unit in the following way: if the inner product
+is positive, output a l; if the inner product is negative, output a 0.
+This unit, referred to as a linear threshold unit, explicitly computes
+which part of the space the input lies in.
+In some models, the weight vector is assumed to be normalized, that
+is, |w|| = 1. As we have seen, in this case, the activation of the output
+unit is simply the projection of the input vector on the weight vector.
+MATRICES AND LINEAR SYSTEMS
+The first section introduced the concepts of a vector space and the
+inner product. We have seen that vectors may be added together and
+multiplied by scalars. Vectors also have a length, and there is an angle
+between any pair of vectors. Thus, we have good ways of describing
+the structure of a set of vectors.
+The usefulness of vectors can be broadened considerably by introducing the concept of a matrix. From an abstract point of view, matrices
+are a kind of "operator PABYfibRAMatatipling from one vector space
+
+386
+to another vector space. They are at the base of most of the models in
+this book which take vectors as inputs and yield vectors as outputs.
+First, we will define matrices and show that they have an algebra of
+their own which is analogous to that of vectors. In particular, matrices
+can be added together and multiplied by scalars.
+MATRICES
+A matrix is simply an array of real numbers. If the array has m rows
+and n columns, then we will refer to the matrix as an mx n matrix.
+Capital letters will be used to denote matrices.
+Examples:
+M- 3
+10 - 1
+N=
+0 7 0
+P=
+0 0 1
+M is a 2 x 3 matrix, N is a 3 x 3 matrix, and P is a 2 x 2 matrix.
+Some special matrices. There are several classes of matrices that are
+useful to identify. A square matrix is a matrix with the same number
+of rows and columns. The matrices N and P are examples of square
+matrices. A diagonal matrix is a square matrix that is zero everywhere
+except on its main diagonal. An example is matrix N. A symmetric
+matrix is a square matrix whose i,jth element is equal to its j, ith element. Any diagonal matrix is symmetric. Matrix P is an example of a
+symmetric matrix that is not diagonal. Finally, the diagonal matrix that
+has all ones on its main diagonal is referred to as the identity matrix,
+and is denoted I.
+Multiplication by Scalars
+A matrix can be multiplied by a scalar by multiplying every element
+in the matrix by that scalar.
+Example:
+9 12 15
+M=3 345-11215
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+387
+Addition of Matrices
+Matrices are added together by adding corresponding elements. Only
+matrices that have the same number of rows and columns can be added
+Example:
+M+N-|105)+ |49-3)-
+247
+510
+Notice that there is a close relationship between these definitions and
+the corresponding definitions for vectors. In fact, for fixed integers
+m and n, the set of all m x n matrices is another example of a vector
+space. However, we will not exploit this fact, rather, we will think
+about matrices in another way, in terms of functions from one vector
+space to another. This is the subject of the next section.
+Multiplication of a Vector by a Matrix
+We now link up vectors and matrices by showing how a vector can be
+multiplied by a matrix to produce a new vector. Consider the matrix
+W=
+[3 4 5
+"1 O
+=
+and the vector v =
+We wish to define a vector u
+which is the product of W and y. and denoted
+u = Wy=
+11010.
+To define this operation, first imagine breaking the matrix into its rows.
+Each row of the matrix is a list of three numbers. We can think of the
+row as a three-dimensional vector and speak of the row vectors of the
+matrix. There are two such row vectors. Now consider forming the
+inner products of each of these row vectors with the vector v. This will
+yield two numbers. These two numbers can be thought of as a twodimensional vector u, which is defined to be the product W v.
+
+388
+Example:
+131+4.0+52
+a-wo-110810-11-1+0-07121
+- 13
+The components of u are the inner products of v with the row vectors
+ofW.
+For a general m x n matrix W and an n-dimensional vector v? the
+product Wv is an m-dimensional vector u, whose elements are the
+inner products of v with the row vectors of W. As suggested by Figure
+14, the ith component of u is the inner product of v with the ith row
+vector of W. Thus, the multiplication of a vector by a matrix can be
+thought of as simply a shorthand way to write down a series of inner
+products of a vector with a set of other vectors. The vector u tabulates
+the results. This way of thinking about the multiplication operation is a
+good way to conceptualize what is happening in a PDP model with
+many output units, as we will see in the next section.
+There is another way of writing the multiplication operation that
+gives a different perspective on what is occurring. If we imagine breaking the matrix up into its columns, then we can equally well speak of
+the column vectors of the matrix.
+multiplication operation Wy produces a vector u that is a linear combination of the column vectors of W.
+the linear combination are the components of v. For example, letting
+W1, W2, W3 be the column vectors of W, we have
+W
+ish
+component
+=
+row
+FIGURE 14.
+2 The dimensionality of v must be equal to the number of columns of W so that the
+inner products can be defined.
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+389
+where the v; are the components of v. This way of viewing the multiplication operation is suggested in Figure 15 for a matrix with n
+columns.
+If we let the term column space refer to the space spanned by the
+column vectors of a matrix, then we have the following interesting
+result: The vector u is in the column space of W.
+Finally, it is important to understand what is happening on an
+abstract level. Notice that for each vector v, the operation Wv produces another vector u. The operation can thus be thought of as a
+mapping or function from one set of vectors to another set of vectors.
+That is, if we consider an n-dimensional vector space V (the domain)
+and an
+, m-dimensional vector space U (the range), then the operation
+of multiplication by a fixed matrix W is a function from V to U, as
+shown in Figure 16. It is a function whose domain and range are both
+vector spaces.
+Algebraic Properties of Matrix Mapping
+Several properties of matrix-vector multiplication follow directly from
+the properties of the inner product. In all cases, the number of
+u
+V1
+w1...
+Wn
+=
+rw,+...
+|'
+FIGURE 15.
+W
+FIGURE 16.
+
+390 FORMAL ANALYSES
+components of the vector must be the same as the number of columns
+of the matrix.
+W(av) = aWv
+(9)
+(10)
+W(u tv) = Wu + Wv
+These equations are the counterparts to Equations 5 and 6. As in that
+section, they can be combined and generalized to general linear combinations:
+C(Wv1)+C2(Wr2)+...+Cn(Wvn)
+(11)
+In the next theorem, the matrices M and N must have the same
+number of rows and columns.
+Mv + Nv = (M + N)v
+(12)
+ONE LAYER OF A PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED
+PROCESSING SYSTEM
+I now generalize the simple model presented earlier to show how
+matrices can be used in analyzing PDP models. Consider Figure 17,
+which is the generalization of Figure 12 to the case of many output
+units. Suppose that there are m output units, each one connected to all
+of the n input units. Denote the activation of the output units by
+separate from tine oice ouput unis. As fore, the activation rule
+Outputs :
+W
+Inputs :
+FIGURE 17.
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+391
+says that the activation of an output unit is given by the inner product
+of its weight vector with the input vector, thus,
+U; = WI'V.
+If we form a matrix W whose row vectors are the wi, then we can use
+the rule for matrix-vector multiplication to write all of the computations
+at once. Let u be the vector whose components are the u;. Then
+u = Wv.
+This is a very succinct expression of the computation performed by the
+network. It says that for each input vector v, the network produces an
+output vector u whose components are the activations of the output
+units.
+Another way to draw the network is shown in Figure 18, which is the
+generalization of Figure 13 to the case of many output units. At each
+junction in the diagram there is a weight connecting an input unit with
+an output unit. The weight vectors associated with each output unit
+appear on the horizontal lines. When drawn this way, it is clear why a
+matrix appears in the equation linking the output vector to the input
+vector: The array of junctions in the diagram is exactly the weight
+matrix W.
+Now let us attempt to understand geometrically what is being computed by the model. Each output unit is computing the inner product
+Inputs
+• • •
+W12
+'22
+• . .
+"i n
+W2n
+4,)
+: Outputs
+Wmn
+FIGURE 18.
+3 Note that the weight in the ith row and jth column connects the jth input unit to the
+ith output unit.
+
+392
+of its weight vector and the input vector (which is common to all output units). Thus, each unit can be thought of as computing how close
+its weight vector is to the input vector. A larger activation is attained
+the closer the two vectors are.
+If all of the weight vectors have the
+same length, then that output unit with the largest activation will be the
+unit whose weight vector is closest to the input vector.
+In the model with only one output unit, we imagined plotting the
+weight vector in the input vector space. This enabled us to see directly
+which input vectors led to a large response and which input vectors led
+to a small response. In the model with several output units, we can
+generalize by plotting each weight vector in the input space. Now we
+can see for each unit which inputs it responds to. If the weight vectors
+are spread around in the space, then every input will lead to some
+response. Also, the different units will respond to different inputs. If
+the weight vectors are assumed to have unit length, then the activation
+of the ith output unit is just the projection of v on the ith weight vector. For a given input, we can draw the projections of the input on the
+weight vectors. This gives us a graphic representation of the output of
+the network. It should be emphasized, however, that this representation is useful mostly as a conceptual tool. The graphic approach cannot
+be used in most systems, which can have hundreds or thousands of
+input lines.
+Another perspective on the operation of the model can be obtained
+by focusing on the columns of the weight matrix rather than on its
+rows. Whereas the rows of the matrix are the weights on the lines coming in to the processing units, the columns correspond to the weights
+on the lines going out from the processing units. Each unit on the
+lower row in Figure 17 is associated with such a vector: The components of the vector are the weights linking that unit with the output
+units above. These vectors are referred to as the outgoing weight vectors, as contrasted with the incoming weight vectors which are the rows of
+the weight matrix. In the previous section, it was seen that when a
+matrix multiplies a vector, the resulting vector is a linear combination
+of the columns of the matrix. This view applies to the PDP model as
+follows: The output vector u
+is a linear combination of the outgoing
+weight vectors from the input units. The coefficients in the linear combination are the activations of the input units. Thus, in this perspective, each input unit multiplies its outgoing weight vector by its activation, and the resulting vectors are added to yield the output vector of
+the system.
+In general, as will be discussed further in a later section, a unit can
+1 his is not Standard terminology, and i will continue to use the term weign vector
+ter to the incoming weight vetopyrighted Materi
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+393
+appear in a multilayer system and thus have both an incoming weight
+vector and an outgoing weight vector, as shown in Figure 19. In this
+case, both views of matrix-vector multiplication can be useful: The unit
+can be thought of as matching its incoming weight vector to the current
+input using the inner product, and sending the result of this match
+multiplied by the outgoing weight vector to the next level.
+LINEARITY
+A distinction is often made between a linear system and a nonlinear
+system. In general, linear systems are relatively easy to analyze and
+understand, whereas nonlinear systems can be difficult. In this section,
+I will characterize linear systems. Nonlinear systems are defined simply
+as everything else. In a later section, I will give some specific examples
+of nonlinear systems.
+Suppose that there is a function f which represents a system in that
+for each input x to the system, the output y is given by
+y=S (x).
+The x and y might be scalars or they might be vectors, depending on
+the particular system. The function f is said to be linear if for any
+inputs xy and x2, and any real number c, the following two equations
+hold:
+(13)
+(14)
+FIGURE 19.
+
+394 FORMAL ANALYSES
+The first of these two equations implies that if we multiply the input by
+some constant, then the output is multiplied by the same constant.
+The second equation is more important. Consider presenting the inputs
+x, and x2 separately to the system and measuring the outputs. In a
+linear system, knowing how the system responds separately to the
+inputs is all we need to predict the output of the system when the sum
+xy+ x2 is presented. We simply add the outputs found separately to
+obtain the response to the sum. In a nonlinear system, on the other
+hand, we might find that the response to the sum is much larger or
+smaller than would be expected based on the inputs taken separately.
+The response to the sum might be zero even when strong responses are
+obtained separately.
+If we restrict ourselves to scalar functions of a scalar variable, then
+the only linear functions are those in which the output is proportional
+to the input, i.e., for some real number c:
+y = CX.
+However, many systems are scalar or vector functions of a vector input.
+For example, for a fixed vector w, the function
+U = W •V
+is a scalar function of a vector input y This function is a linear function because
+w• (cv) = c (w•v)
+and
+The PDP model with one output unit is an example of such a linear
+system.
+A system in which the output is obtained from the inpur by matrix
+multiplication is also a linear system, according to Equations 9 and 10.
+It turns out that these are the only linear vector functions. That is, if a
+function f which maps from one vector space to another vector space
+is linear, then it can be represented by matrix multiplication. S
+The PDP model discussed in the previous section is an example of a
+linear system because it is represented by matrix multiplication. In
+such a system, because of linearity, we know what the output will be
+when the sum of two vectors is presented if we know the outputs when
+5 Let v; be the ith standard basis vector and let w, = / (vi). Then if W is a matrix
+whose columns are the wi, GopyrightedaMaterial
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+395
+the vectors are presented separately. We also know what the output
+will be to scalar multiples of a vector. These properties imply that if we
+know the output to all of the vectors in some set (vil, then we can calculate the output to any linear combination of the vi. That is, if
+v= avit carat... + CYn, then the output when v is presented to
+the system is
+c(WY,) + C2(Wvz)+... + Cn (Wrn)
+(15)
+The terms in the parentheses on the right are known vectors: They are
+the outputs to the vectors v;. Thus, we simply multiply these vectors
+by the c; to calculate the output when y is presented. If the v; are a
+basis for some vector space, then every vector in the space is a linear
+combination of the vi. Therefore, knowing the outputs of the system
+to the basis vectors allows us to calculate immediately the output to any
+other vector in the vector space without reference to the system matrix
+W. The preceding statement should be studied carefully, because it
+expresses an extremely important defining property of linear systems.
+Another way to say the same thing is as follows: Imagine that we are
+studying some physical system by measuring its responses to various
+set of inputs that constitute a basis for the input space. We then have
+no need to make any further measurements. The responses of the system to any other input vector can be immediately calculated based on
+the measurements that we have already made.
+MATRIX MULTIPLICATION AND MULTILAYER
+SYSTEMS
+The systems considered until now have been one-layer systems. That
+is, the input arrives at a set of input units, is passed through a set of
+weighted connections described by a matrix, and appears on a set of
+output units. Let us now arrange two such systems in cascade, so that
+the output of the first system becomes the input to the next system, as
+shown in Figure 20. The composite system is a two-layer system and is
+described by two matrix-vector multiplications. An input vector v is
+first multiplied by the matrix N to produce a vector z on the set of
+intermediate units:
+z = Ny.
+
+396
+= 2
+FIGURE 20.
+and then z is multiplied by M to produce a vector u on the uppermost
+set of units:
+u = Mz.
+Substituting Ny for z yields the response for the composite system:
+u = M (Nv).
+(16)
+This equation relates the input vectors v to the output vectors u.
+We will now define an operation on matrices, called matrix multiplication, which will simplify the analysis of cascaded systems, allowing us to
+replace the two matrices M and N in Equation 16 by a single matrix P.
+Matrices M and N can be multiplied to produce a matrix P = MN as
+follows: The i, jth element of P is the inner product of the ith row of
+M with the jth column of N. Note that the order of multiplication is
+important the product MN is generally not equal to the product NM.
+This is to be expected from the asymmetric treatment of M and N in
+the definition.
+Example:
+3 4 5
+12
+(3+8-5116+0+5)
+101
+20
+(1+ 0-1) (2+0+1)
+• |||
+0
+3
+101,2l
+1-1 1l
+(0+2-2) (0+0+2))
+Another way to think about matrix multiplication follows from the
+definition of matrix-vector multiplication. Each column vector of P is
+the product of the matrix M with the corresponding column vector of
+N. For example, the fisperightf&Materiabmputed by multiplying the
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+397
+first column of N by the matrix M. This is shown in Figure 21, where
+we have explicitly shown the column vectors of N and P
+The product of two matrices is defined only if the number of
+columns of the first matrix is equal to the number of rows of the
+second matrix. Otherwise, the inner products cannot be formed. A
+handy rule is the following: Multiplying an rxs matrix and an s*t
+matrix yields an r x 1 matrix.
+Let us return to Figure 20 and Equation 16, which describes the system. I make the claim that the matrices M and N in the equation can
+be replaced by the matrix P, if P is the matrix product of M and N. In
+other words,
+u = M (Nv ) = (MN) v = Pr.
+What this equation says is that the two-layer system in Figure 20 is
+equivalent to a one-layer system with weight matrix P. For every input
+vector v, the two systems will produce the same output vector u. Thus,
+for linear systems at least, the distinction between two-layer systems
+and one-layer systems is more apparent than real.
+We can attempt to justify our claim and, in so doing, get a better
+understanding of matrix multiplication if we examine the system in Figure 20 more closely. Let us assume that a matrix P exists which can
+replace the cascaded pair M, N, and consider what the element in the
+first row and the first column of P should be. This element gives the
+strength of the connection between the first component of the input
+vector v and the first component of the output vector u. In the cascaded system, there are s paths through which this connection can
+occur, as shown in Figure 22.
+We must multiply the weights along
+each path and add the values for the paths to get the strength of the
+connection in the equivalent one-layer system. This is calculated as
+M
+N
+P
+Mn, Mn 2 ... Mns
+FIGURE 21.
+6 The lwo systems are identical in the sense that they compute the same function. Or
+course, they may have different internal dynamics and therefore take different amounts
+of time 1o compute their outputopyrighted Material
+
+398
+MIs
+FIGURE 22.
+This equation can be easily generalized to give the strength of the connection between the jth element of y and the ith element of u:
+This formula calculates the inner product between the ith row of M
+and the jth column of N, which shows that P is equal to the product
+This result can be extended to systems with more than two layers by
+induction. For example, in a three-layer system, the first two layers
+can be replaced with a matrix (as we have just seen), and then that
+matrix can be multiplied by the matrix of the remaining layer to get a
+single matrix for the whole system. In general, the cascaded matrices
+of any n-layer linear system can be replaced by a single matrix which is
+the product of the n matrices.
+As a final comment, the definition of matrix multiplication may
+seem somewhat odd, especially since it would seem more straightforward to define it by analogy with matrix addition as the element-wise
+product. In fact, it would be perfectly acceptable to define multiplication as the element-wise product, and then to use another name for the
+operation we have discussed in this section. However, element-wise
+multiplication has never found much of an application in linear algebra.
+Therefore, the term multiplication has been reserved for the operation
+described in this section, which proves to be a useful definition, as the
+application to multilayer systems demonstrates.
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+399
+Algebraic Properties of Matrix Multiplication
+The following properties are identical to the corresponding properties
+of matrix-vector multiplication. This is to be expected given the relationship between matrix multiplication and matrix-vector multiplication
+(cf. Figure 21).
+M (cN ) = cMN
+(17)
+M (N + P) = MN + MP
+(18)
+(N + P)M = NM + PM
+(19)
+EIGENVECTORS AND EIGENVALUES
+The next two sections develop some of the mathematics important
+for the study of learning in PDP networks. First, I will discuss eigenvectors and eigenvalues and show how they relate to matrices. Second, I
+will discuss outer products. Outer products provide one way of constructing matrices from vectors. In a later section, I will bring these
+concepts together in a discussion of learning.
+Recall the abstract point of view of matrices and vectors that was discussed earlier: The equation u = Wy describes a function or mapping
+from one space, called the domain, to another space, called the range.
+In such vector equations, both the domain and the range are vector
+spaces, and the equation associates a vector u in the range with each
+vector v in the domain.
+In general, a function from one vector space to another can associate
+an arbitrary vector in the range with each vector in the domain. However, knowing that u = Wy is a linear function highly constrains the
+form the mapping between the domain and range can have. For example, if v, and vz are close together in the domain, then the vectors
+u1 = Wv, and U2 = Wyz must be close together in the range. This is
+known as a continuity property of linear functions. Another important
+constraint on the form of the mapping is the following, which has
+already been discussed. If v3 is a linear combination of v, and v2, and
+the vectors u, = Wv, and u2 = Wvz are known, then u3 = Wyz is completely determined-it is the same linear combination of u, and U2.
+Furthermore, if we have a set of basis vectors for the domain, and it is
+known which vector in the range each basis vector maps to, then the
+
+400 FORMAL ANALYSES
+mappings of all other vectors in the domain are determined (cf. Equation 15).
+In this section, let us specialize to the case of square matrices, that
+is, matrices with the same number of rows as columns. In this case,
+the domain and the range will have the same number of dimensions
+(because the vectors v and u must have the same number of components), and the vectors in the domain and the range can be plotted in
+the same space. This is done in Figure 23, where we have shown two
+vectors before and after multiplication by a matrix.
+In general, vectors in this space will change direction as well as
+length when multiplied by a matrix. However, as demonstrated by one
+of the vectors in Figure 23, there will be some vectors that will change
+only in length, not direction. In other words, for these vectors, multiplication by the matrix is no different than multiplication by a simple
+scalar. Such vectors are known as eigenvectors. Each eigenvector v of a
+matrix obeys the equation
+Wy = 1v
+(20)
+where d is a scalar. A is called an eigenvalue, and indicates how much v
+is shortened or lengthened after multiplication by W.
+Example:
+|2=12-21
+WV2
+Wv,
+FIGURE 23.
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+401
+A matrix can have more than one eigenvector, which, geometrically,
+means that it is possible to have eigenvectors in more than one direction.
+For example, the leftmost matrix above also has the eigenvector
+with eigenvalue 3, and the diagonal matrix on the right also has the
+eigen vector
+with eigenvalue 4.
+There is another, more trivial, sense in which a matrix can have multiple eigenvectors: Each vector that is collinear with an eigenvector is
+itself an eigenvector. If v is an eigenvector with eigenvalue 1, and if
+y = cv, then it is easy to show that y is also an eigenvector with eigenvalue 1. For the ensuing discussion, the collinear eigenvectors will just
+confuse things, so I will adopt the convention of reserving the term
+eigenvector only for vectors of length 1. This is equivalent to choosing
+a representative eigenvector for each direction in which there are eigenvectors.
+Let us now return to the diagonal matrix
+We have seen that
+this matrix has two eigenyectors, o
+0
+and
+1
+, with eigenvalues 3 and
+4. The fact that the eigenvalues are the same as the diagonal elements
+of the matrix is no coincidence: This is true for all diagonal matrices,
+as can be seen by multiplying any diagonal matrix by one of its
+eigenvectors—a vector in the standard basis. It is also true that this
+matrix has only two eigen vectors. This can be seen by considering any
+vector of the form
+have
+where a and b are both nonzero. Then we
+13a1l)
+За
+=
+4b
+Such a vector is not an eigenvector, because the components are multiplied by different scalars. The fact that the matrix has distinct eigenvalues is the determining factor here. If the diagonal elements had
+been identical, then any two-dimensional vector would indeed have
+been an eigenvector. This can also be seen in the case of the n× n
+identity matrix I, for which every n-dimensional vector is an eigenvector with eigen value 1.
+In general, an n x n matrix can have up to, but no more than, n distinct eigenvalues. Furthermore, distinct eigenvalues correspond to distinct directions.
+To beop higher Witeral a matrix has n distinct
+
+402
+eigenvalues, then the n associated eigenvectors are linearly independent.
+Although the conditions under which a matrix has a full set of distinct
+eigenvalues are beyond the scope of this chapter, it is quite possible to
+have matrices with fewer than n eigenvalues, as in the case of the identity matrix.
+I will not discuss how to find eigenvectors and eigenvalues for a particular matrix, but refer the reader to the books on linear algebra listed
+at the end of the chapter. There are several methods, all of which can
+be computationally expensive for large matrices. In a later section I
+will discuss how to construct a certain class of matrices given a set of
+desired eigenvectors.
+The goal now is to show how eigenvectors can be used. To do so, let
+us begin by assuming that we are dealing with the most favorable case:
+an nn matrix W with n distinct eigenvalues 11, 12,....An.
+Denote
+the associated linearly independent eigenvectors
+V1, V2..... Vn. Recall that if we have a set of basis vectors for the
+domain of a matrix, and if we know the vectors in the range associated
+with each basis vector, then the mapping of all other vectors in the
+domain are determined. The eigenvectors of W form such a basis.
+This is because there are n eigenvectors, and they are linearly independent. Furthermore, we know the vectors in the range associated with
+each eigenvector vi; they are simply the scalar multiples given by
+Wv =1v.
+To show how to take advantage of these observations, pick an arbitrary vector v in the domain of W. It can be written as a linear combination of the eigenvectors, because the eigenvectors form a basis:
+We can now write:
+u = WV
+Using linearity,
+u= c(Wy,) + C2(Wyz)+... + Cn (Wyn).
+If we next substitute for each of the quantities Wvi, using Equation 20:
+(21)
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+403
+Notice that there are no matrices in this last equation. Each term cid; is
+a scalar; thus we are left with a simple linear combination of vectors
+after having started with a matrix multiplication.
+This equation should give some idea of the power and utility of the
+eigenvectors and eigenvalues of a matrix. If we know the eigenvectors
+and eigenvalues, then, in essence, we can throw away the matrix. We
+simply write a vector as a linear combination of eigenvectors, then multiply each term by the appropriate eigenvalue to produce Equation 21,
+which can be recombined to produce the result. Eigenvectors turn
+matrix multiplication into simple multiplication by scalars.
+It is also revealing to consider the magnitudes of the eigenvalues for
+a particular matrix. In Equation 21, all of the vectors v; are of unit
+length, thus the length of the vector u depends directly on the product
+of the magnitudes of the c; and the eigenvalues 1;. Consider the vectors that tend to point in the directions of the eigenvectors with large
+eigenvalues. These are the vectors with large c; for those eigenvectors.
+Equation 21 says that after multiplication by the matrix they will be
+longer than vectors of the same initial length that point in other directions. In particular, of all unit length vectors, the vector that will be
+the longest after multiplication by the matrix is the eigen vector with the
+largest eigenvalue. In other words, knowledge of the eigenvectors and
+eigenvalues of a system tells which input vectors the system will give a
+large response to. This fact can be useful in the analysis of linear
+models.
+TRANSPOSES AND THE OUTER PRODUCT
+WT. traitselement ox w is the / Yi element or matix denoted
+Example:
+Another way to describe the transpose is as follows: The row vectors of
+WT are the column vectors of W, and the column vectors of WT are
+the row vectors of W.
+
+404
+Algebraic Properties of the Transpose
+(WT)T = W
+(cW)T = cWT
+(M + N)T = MT + NT
+(MN )T = NTMT
+If a matrix is its own transpose, that is if WT = W, then the matrix is
+symmetric.
+Outer Products
+Before discussing outer products, let me attempt to ward off what
+could be a confusing aspect of the notation we are using. Consider, for
+example, the entity below. Is it a matrix with one column or is it a
+vector?
+The answer is that it could be either-there is no way of distinguishing
+one from the other based on the notation. There is nothing wrong with
+this failure to distinguish between vectors and n× 1 matrices for the
+following reason. In equations involving vectors and matrices, the
+same results will be obtained whether entities such as the one above are
+treated as vectors or as matrices. This is true because the algebra for
+vectors and matrices is exactly the same, as a review of the relevant
+earlier sections will show. Thus, as long as we are simply interested in
+calculating values and manipulating equations, there is no need to distinguish between vectors and n x 1 matrices.
+Rather, by treating them
+as the same thing, we have a uniform set of procedures for dealing with
+all equations involving vectors and matrices.
+Nevertheless, on the conceptual level, it is important to distinguish
+between vectors and matrices. The way we are using the terms, a vector is an element in a vector space, whereas a matrix can be used to
+define a linear mapping from one vector space to another. These are
+very different concepts.
+With this caveat in mind, we will continue to take advantage of the
+uniformity of notation, GaRylightfe fiftion between a vector and an
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+405
+n× 1 matrix. For example, for every n-dimensional vector v, we can
+form the transpose vT
+, which is simply a matrix with one row. We can
+then form the product v Tu, where u is any n-dimensional vector, as in
+the following example.
+Example:
+.lil
+4
+1
+ro-1314/9-10
+Notice that the result has only a singie component, and that this component is calculated by taking the inner product of the vectors v and u.
+In many applications, there is no need to distinguish between vectors
+with one component and scalars, thus the notation y Tu is often used
+for the inner product.
+Let us next consider the product uv T
+• This is a legal product
+because the number of columns in u and the number of rows in vT are
+the same, namely one. Following the rule for matrix multiplication, we
+find that there are n? inner products to calculate and that each inner
+product involves vectors of length one.
+Example:
+1 2|
+4 L
+312=
+12 4 81
+lood
+The i, jth element of the resulting matrix is equal to the product u; vi.
+For those who may have forgotten the noncommutativity of matrix
+multiplication, this serves as a good reminder: Whereas the product
+v Tu has a single component, a simple change in the order of multiplication yields an n x n matrix.
+Products of the form uv are referred to as outer products, and will
+be discussed further in the next section. Note that the rows of the
+resulting matrix are simply scalar multiples of the vector v. In other
+words, if we let W be the matrix urT, and let w; be the ith row of W,
+then we have
+Wi = U;V
+where u, is the ith comporewightest Metroph.
+
+406 FORMAL ANALYSES
+OUTER PRODUCTS, EIGENVECTORS, AND LEARNING
+In this section, I discuss two example PDP systems that bring
+together several of the concepts discussed previously, including eigenvectors and outer products. These systems are described in J. A.
+Anderson, Silverstein, Ritz, and Jones (1977) and Kohonen (1977).
+We have seen that simple linear PDP systems can be modeled with
+the equation u = Wy, where W is a weight matrix. The rows of W are
+the weight vectors associated with each of the units in the upper level
+of the system. Until now, we have taken the matrix W to be a given,
+and have discussed how it maps input vectors to output vectors. Let us
+now consider a simple scheme, referred to as a Hebbian learning rule,
+whereby we can choose a matrix that associates a particular output vector u with a particular input vector v. A system that can autonomously
+implement such a scheme is capable of a rudimentary form of associative learning.
+The scheme will only work with input vectors of unit length, so let
+us begin by making that assumption. Thus, we have v • v = 1. Let us
+consider the simplest case, in which the output vector u has only one
+component, which we will denote by u. This is the system discussed in
+Figure 13. We wish a weight vector w such that when v is present as
+the input, the output is u: u = w. v. Note that u and y are the given
+here, and w is the unknown. To make a choice for w, we can use the
+following logic. We wish to convert the vector v into a scalar u. If we
+were to choose v itself as the weight vector, then we would have
+v . v = 1. Since we wish the scalar u, not 1, we choose v multiplied by
+u, which gives the desired result. This can be seen using simple algebra
+as follows:
+W•V= (UV) •v
+=U(v. v)
+= И.
+Geometrically, the problem of finding w corresponds to finding a
+vector whose projection on v is u. As shown in Figure 24, any vector
+along the dotted line will work, because each such vector projects to the
+same place on v. Our solution involved making the simple choice of
+the vector that points in the same direction as v.
+It is not difficult to generalize to the case of an output vector u with
+more than one component. To do so, let us consider the PDP system
+of Figure 18. Each output unit has a weight vector, and these weight
+vectors form the rows of the weight matrix W. As discussed earlier,
+each unit calculates the naeyrgot Meteran its weight vector and the
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+407
+V
+и
+FIGURE 24.
+input vector y, and these inner products are the components of the output vector u. To implement a learning scheme, we need to be able to
+choose weight vectors that produce the desired components of u.
+Clearly, for each component, we can use the scheme already described
+for the single unit model above. In other words, the ith weight vector
+should be given by
+W, = U,V.
+(22)
+The ith unit will then produce the ith component of u when presented
+with v. Thus, the system as a whole will produce the vector u when
+presented with v. We now would like a way to write a matrix W whose
+rows are given by Equation 22. This is done by noting that Equation 22
+is a set of equations calculating the outer product of u and v. Thus, W
+can be written as follows:
+We can check the correctness of this choice for Was follows:
+Wv = (urT) v
+= u (vTv)
+using the fact that v is of length one in making the last step.
+The fact that Wis an outer product has important implications for
+the implementation of HeBBIES@ AD networks. As discussed
+
+408 FORMAL ANALYSES
+in the previous section, the i,jth element of W is equal to the product
+U; Vi, which is the product of the activation of the jth input unit and
+the ith output unit. Both of these quantities are available in a physically circumscribed area on the link joining these two units. Thus, the
+weight on that link can be changed by autonomous local processes. The
+Hebb rule is often referred to as a local learning rule for this reason.
+To summarize, we have established a procedure for finding a matrix
+W which will associate any particular pair of input and output vectors.
+Clearly for every pair of vectors, we can find a different weight matrix
+to perform the association. What is less obvious is that the same
+matrix can be used for several pairs of associations. Let us assume that
+we are given n n-dimensional output vectors u1, 42. ..., un which
+we want to associate with n n-dimensional input
+vectors
+V1V2....
+, Yn. In other words, for each i, we wish to have
+u; = Wv;.
+Let us further assume that the vectors v, form a mutually orthogonal
+set and that each vector v; is of unit length. That is, we assume
+/1 ifi = j
+O otherwise.
+We now form a set of matrices W; using the learning scheme
+developed above:
+Finally, we form a composite weight matrix W which is the sum of
+the W:
+W=W1t...+Wi+
+.... + Wn.
+We already know that, for example, W, above will associate v1 and
+u1. It is also true that W will perform all such associations. Thus, for
+arbitrary i:
+=(upv|t...
+tu,ví+..
+= (ur/)vit... + (uv/)v,+
+... + (u„vn)v;
+= 0+
+=U;.
++u, (vivi)+... +0
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+409
+The property of orthogonality was crucial here, because it forced the
+disappearance of all terms involving vectors other than u; in the next to
+last step. The reader may find it useful to justify the steps in this
+derivation.
+When the set of input vectors is not orthogonal, the Hebb rule will
+not correctly associate output vectors with input vectors. However, a
+modification of the Hebb rule, known as the delta rule, or the Widrow-
+Hoff rule, can make such associations. The requirement for the delta
+rule to work is that the input vectors be linearly independent. The
+delta rule is discussed further in Chapter 11, and at length in Kohonen
+(1977).
+Earlier it was discussed how, at least for square matrices, knowledge
+of the eigenvectors of a matrix permits an important simplification to
+be made. The matrix multiplication of a vector can be replaced by
+scalar multiplication (cf. Equation 21). I will now show that the Hebbian learning scheme fits nicely with the notion of eigenvectors. Suppose that we wish to associate vectors with scalar copies of themselves.
+This is what is done, for example, in an auto-associator like those discussed in J. A. Anderson et al. (1977); see Chapters 2 and 17. In other
+words, we want the vectors u, to be of the form d, v, where v; are the
+input vectors. Let us further assume that the n scalars 1; are distinct.
+Using the outer product learning rule, we have
+w=W,t...+Wt..+Wn
+where
+If we now present the vector v; to the matrix W thus formed, we have
+Wv;=(Wt..+W+...+Wn)v;
++ O
+= A;Vi.
+This equation shows that v; is an eigenvector of W with eigenvalue 1;.
+Let me summarize. When we calculate a weight matrix W using the
+Hebbian learning rule and associate input vectors to scalar multiples of
+themselves, then those input vectors are the eigenvectors of W. It is
+important to note that the matrix W need not even be calculated-as
+was stated in the section on eigenvectors, once we have the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of a matrix, we can throw away the matrix. All
+input-output computation@p/sighteddaterta/ using Equation 21.
+This
+
+410
+approach is in contrast to a scheme in which we first calculate a matrix
+W from the input vectors, and then calculate the eigenvectors from the
+matrix W. Here, the eigenvectors are available in the statement of the
+problem.
+Why should one want to associate vectors with scalar copies of themselves? Essentially, the answer is that a system which learns in this
+way will exhibit the desirable property of completion. That is, when partial versions of previously learned vectors are presented to the system,
+it will be able to produce the whole vector. Readers desiring more
+details on how this is done should consult Anderson et al. (1977).
+MATRIX INVERSES
+Throughout this chapter, I have discussed the linear vector equation
+u = Wv. First, I discussed the situation in which y was a known vector
+and W a known matrix. This corresponds to knowing the input to a
+system and its matrix, and wanting to know the output of the system.
+Next, I discussed the situation in which v and u were known vectors,
+and a matrix W was desired to associate the two vectors. This is the
+learning problem discussed in the previous section. Finally, in this section, I discuss the case in which both u and W are known, but v is
+unknown. There are many situations in which this problem arises,
+including the change of basis discussed in the next section.
+As we will see, the solution to this problem involves the concept of a
+matrix inverse. Let us first assume that we are dealing with square
+matrices. The inverse of a matrix W, if it exists, is another matrix
+denoted W-' that obeys the following equations:
+w-W =1
+ww-'=I
+where I is the identity matrix.
+Example:
+w-I=
+Copyrighied Malton?
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+411
+-.
+ww-!=
+1 k
+1
+3
+10
+~/m
+3
+2
+3
+--
+w-'w=
+B3E*-09
+~/m
+A good discussion of how to calculate a matrix inverse can be found
+in Strang (1976).
+Let us now show that the matrix inverse is the tool we need to solve
+the equation u = Wy. where v is the unknown. We multiply both
+sides of the equation by W-!, which yields
+= Iv
+=V.
+Thus the solution of the equation simply involves multiplying u by the
+matrix W-!.
+Example. We wish to find the vector v that satisfies the equation
+1113
+To do so, we use the matrix W-' given above:
+NIm
+r=
+2
+3
+We can now check the result as follows:
+11-1l
+It is important to realize that W-!, despite the new notation, is simply a matrix like any other. Furthermore, the equation v = Wu is
+nothing more than a linear mapping of the kind we have studied
+throughout this chapter copyrighra Malerais mapping is the range of
+
+412 FORMAL ANALYSES
+W, and the range of the mapping is the domain of W. This inverse
+relationship is shown in Figure 25. The fact that W represents a
+function from one vector space to another has an important consequence. For every u in the domain of W-!
+, there can be only one v in
+the range such that v = W-'u. This is true because of the definition of
+a function. Now let us look at the consequence of this fact from the
+point of view of the mapping represented by W. If W maps any two
+distinct points v, and v2 in its domain to the same point u in its range,
+that is, if W is not one-to-one, then there can be no W-' to represent
+the inverse mapping.
+We now wish to characterize matrices that can map distinct points in
+the domain to a single point in the range, for these are the matrices
+that do not have inverses. To do so, first recall that one way to view
+the equation u = Wy is that u is a linear combination of the column
+vectors of W. The coefficients of the linear combination are the components of v. Thus, there is more than one v which maps to the same
+point u exactly in the case in which there is more than one way to write
+u as a linear combination of the column vectors of W. These are completely equivalent statements. As discussed earlier, we know that a
+vector u can be written as a unique linear combination of a set of vectors only in the case where the vectors are linearly independent. Otherwise, if the vectors are linearly dependent, then there are an infinite
+number of ways to write u as a linear combination. heretore, we have
+the result that a matrix has an inverse only if its column vectors are
+linearly independent.
+For square matrices with linearly dependent column vectors and for
+non-square matrices, it is possible to define an inverse called the generalized inverse, which performs part of the inverse mapping. In the
+case in which an infinite number of points map to the same point, there
+will be an infinite number of generalized inverses for a particular
+matrix, each of which will map from the point in the range to one of
+the points in the domain.
+W
+FIGURE 25.
+W-1
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+413
+In summary, the matrix inverse W-' can be used to solve the equation u = Wy, where v is the unknown, by multiplying u by W-!. The
+inverse exists only when the column vectors of W are linearly independent. Let me mention in passing that the maximum number of linearly
+independent column vectors of a matrix is called the rank of the
+matrix? An nn matrix is defined to have full rank if the rank is equal
+to n. Thus, the condition that a matrix have an inverse is equivalent to
+the condition that it have full rank.
+CHANGE OF BASIS
+As was discussed earlier, a basis for a vector space is a set of linearly
+independent vectors that span the space. Although we most naturally
+tend to think in terms of the standard basis, for a variety of reasons it
+is often convenient to change the basis. For example, some relationships between vectors or operations on vectors are easier to describe
+when a good choice of basis has been made. To make a change of
+basis, we need to be able to describe the vectors and matrices we are
+using in terms of the new basis. In this section, I use the results of the
+previous section to discuss the problems that arise under a change of
+basis. I also discuss some of the implications of a change of basis for
+linear PDP models.
+The numbers that are used to represent a vector, it should be
+remembered, are relative to a particular choice of basis. When we
+change the basis, these numbers, which we refer to as coordinates,
+change. Our first task, then, is to find a way to relate the coordinates
+in a new basis to the coordinates in the old basis. Let me begin with an
+example. In Figure 26, there is a vector v, which in the standard basis
+has the cordinates
+We now change basis by choosing two new
+basis vectors, yI =
+As shown in Figure 27, v can
+be written as a linear combination of yi and yz. It turns out, as we
+shall see below, that the coefficients 1 and 2 are the correct coefficients
+of y and yz in the linear combination. Let the symbol y represent v
+in the new basis. Thus, v
+- 2.
+" An important theorem in linear algebra establishes that, for any matrix, the maximum number of linearly independent column vectors is equal to the maximum number
+of linearly independent row vecopyrighted Materan be taken as either.
+
+414
+FIGURE 26.
+We now want to show how to find the coordinates of a vector v ir
+new basis y1,92, ...,Yn. These coordinates are simply the coef
+cients c; in the equation
+V= c191+ czyt... +Cnyn.
+Let us form a matrix Y whose columns are the new basis vectors :
+and let v° be the vector whose components are the c. Then Equati
+23 is equivalent to the following equation:
+v = Yvi
+(2
+v° = Y-'v.
+Example. Letting y, =
+~/m
+and Y-'=
+3
+1
+3
+-1 and yz -
+• " we have & - 1'
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+415
+121
+FIGURE 27.
+Thus,
+r°= y-ly =
+2
+3
+2
+3
+Notice that we have also solved the inverse problem along the way.
+That is, suppose that we know the coordinates v° in the new basis, and
+we wish to find the coordinates v in the old basis. This transformation
+is that shown in Equation 24: We simply multiply the vector of new
+coordinates by Y.
+We have shown how to represent vectors when the basis is changed.
+Now, let us accomplish the same thing for matrices. Let there be a
+square matrix W that transforms vectors in accordance with the equation u = Wv.
+Suppose we now change basis and write v and u in the
+new basis as v' andu"
+. We want to know if there is a matrix that does
+the same thing in the new basis as W did in the original basis. In other
+words, we want to know if there is a matrix W° such that u = W°v°
+This is shown in the diagram in Figure 28, where it should be remembered that v and v° (and u and u") are really the same vector, just
+described in terms of different basis vectors.
+To see how to find W°
+, consider a somewhat roundabout way of
+solving u' = W°v°
+. We can convert v back to the original basis, then
+map from v to u using the matrix W, and finally convert u to u
+
+416 FORMAL ANALYSES
+W*
+y*-
+au*
+Y
+V
+= u
+W
+FIGURE 28.
+Luckily, we already know how to make each
+transformations- they are given by the equations:
+of these
+u = Wv
+u' = Y-'u.
+Putting these three equations together, we have
+u' = y-'u
+= Y-'Wv
+= Y-'WYv.
+Thus, We must be equal to Y-' WY. Matrices related by an equation of
+the form W° = Y-'WY are called similar.
+One aspect of this discussion needs further elaboration. We have
+been treating matrices as linear operators on a vector space. However,
+as the results of this section make clear, a matrix is tied to a particular
+basis. That is, the numbers in the matrix are just as arbitrary as the
+numbers used for corresen in ectorio were base hake ar
+lying mapping, which remains the same when the matrix w is used in
+the original basis and the matrix W° is used in the new basis, is called a
+linear transformation. The same linear transformation is represented by
+different matrices in different bases.
+It is interesting to recast the results on eigenvectors in terms of a
+change of basis. For so@pyrried afer consider changing basis to
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+417
+the eigenvectors of W. Let us find the matrix W° in the new basis.
+For each eigenvector yi, by definition
+Wy, = 1,y;.
+(25)
+If Y is a matrix whose columns are the y,, then we can write Equation
+25 for all of the eigenvectors at once as follows (cf. Figure 21):
+WY = YA
+where 1 is a diagonal matrix whose entries on the main diagonal are
+the eigenvalues d,. You should try to convince yourself of the correctness of this equation, particularly the placement of 1. Now premultiply
+both sides by Y-' to give
+Y-'WY = A.
+Thus, the matrix W° is equal to 1. In other words, when we use the
+eigenvectors of W as the new basis, the matrix corresponding to W in
+the new basis is a diagonal matrix whose entries are the eigenvalues.
+This is really nothing more than a restatement of the earlier results on
+eigenvectors, but seen in a different perspective.
+It is worthwhile to consider the implications of a change of basis for
+PDP models. How does the behavior of the model depend on the basis
+that is chosen? This question is discussed in depth in Chapter 22. For
+now, let us simply note that the linear structure of a set of vectors
+remains the same over a change of basis. That is, if a vector can be
+written as a linear combination of a set of vectors in one basis, then it
+can be written as the same linear combination of those vectors in all
+bases. For example, let w = av, + bv2. Let Y be the matrix of a
+change of basis. Then we have
+w° = Y-'w
+=Y-'(av, + bra)
+= aY-'v, + bY-'v2
+= avi+ bri.
+The coefficients in the linear combination are the same in the old and
+in the new basis. The equations show that this result holds because
+change of basis is a linear operation.
+The behavior of a linear PDP model depends entirely on the linear
+structure of the input vectors. That is, if w= av, + brz, then the
+response of the system to w is determined by its response to v, and v2
+and the coefficients a arsbbyriched amalbaba change of basis preserves
+
+418 FORMAL ANALYSES
+the linear structure of the vectors shows that it is this linear structure
+that is relevant to the behavior of the model, and not the particular
+basis chosen to describe the vectors.
+NONLINEAR SYSTEMS
+The use of nonlinearity occurs throughout this book and throughout
+the literature on parallel distributed processing systems (Anderson et
+al., 1977; Grossberg, 1978; Hopfield, 1982; Kohonen, 1977). In this
+section, I will indicate some of the reasons why nonlinearities are
+deemed necessary. Although these reasons are based on the desire for
+behaviors outside the domain of linear models, it should be stated that
+linear systems have a great deal of power in themselves, and that many
+of the nonlinearities represent comparatively small changes to underlying models which are linear. Other models are more fundamentally
+nonlinear. Further discussions of nonlinear mathematics can be found
+in Chapters 10 and 22.
+One simple nonlinearity has already arisen in the discussion of a PDP
+system with one output unit. Such a system computes the inner product of its weight vector and the input vector. This is a linear system,
+given the linearity of the inner product. The geometrical properties of
+the inner product led us to picture the operation of this system as computing the closeness of input vectors to the weight vector in space.
+Suppose we draw a line perpendicular to the weight vector at some
+point, as in Figure 29. Since all vectors on this line project to the same
+point on the weight vector, their inner products with the weight vector
+are equal. Furthermore, all vectors to the left of this line have a
+smaller inner product, and all vectors to the right have a larger inner
+product. Let us choose a fixed number as a threshold for the unit by
+requiring that if the inner product is greater than the threshold, the unit
+outputs a 1, otherwise it outputs a 0. Such a unit breaks the space into
+two parts by producing a different response to vectors in the two parts.
+This use of a threshold is natural in using the unit to classify patterns
+as belonging to one group or another. The essential point is that the
+threshold permits the unit to make a decision. Other units in a larger
+8 Since nonlinear systems in general are systems that are defined as "not linear," it is
+important to understand clearly what "linear" means. A review of the section on linearity
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+419
+W
+FIGURE 29.
+system that take their input from this unit could choose completely different behaviors based on the decision. Notice also that the unit is a
+categorizer: All input vectors that are on the same side of the space
+lead to the same response.
+To introduce a threshold into the mathematical description of the
+processing unit, it is necessary to distinguish between the activation of
+the unit and its output. A function relating the two quantities is shown
+in Figure 30. It produces a one or a zero based on the magnitude of
+the activation. It is also possible to have a probabilistic threshold.
+this case, the farther the activation is above the threshold, the more
+1
+OUTPUT
+FIGURE 30.
+ACTIVATION
+
+420 FORMAL ANALYSES
+likely the unit is to have an output of one, and the farther the activation is below the threshold, the more likely the unit is to have an output of zero. Units such as these are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.
+The threshold unit is a good example of many of the nonlinearities
+that are to be found in PDP models. An underlying linear model is
+modified with a nonlinear function relating the output of a unit to its
+activation. Another related example of such a nonlinearity is termed
+subthreshold summation. It is often observed in biological systems that
+two stimuli presented separately to the system provoke no response,
+although when presented simultaneously, a response is obtained. Furthermore, once the system is responding, further stimuli are responded
+to in a linear fashion. Such a system can be modeled by endowing a
+linear PDP unit with the nonlinear output function in Figure 31. Note
+that only if the sum of the activations produced by vectors exceeds T
+will a response be produced. Also, there is a linear range in which the
+system responds linearly. It is often the case in nonlinear systems that
+there is such a linear range, and the system can be treated as linear provided that the inputs are restricted to this linear range.
+One reason why subthreshold summation is desirable is that it
+suppresses noise. The system will not respond to small random inputs
+that are assumed to be noise.
+All physical systems have a limited dynamic range. That is, the
+response of the system cannot exceed a certain maximum response.
+This fact can be modeled with the output function in Figure 32, which
+shows a linear range followed by a cutoff. The system will behave
+linearly until the output reaches M, at which point no further increase
+can occur. In Figure 33, a nonlinear function is shown which also has a
+OUTPUT
+FIGURE 31.
+T
+ACTIVATION
+
+9. INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR ALGEBRA
+421
+M
+OUTPUT
+ACTIVATION
+FIGURE 32.
+M
+OUTPUT
+ACTIVATION
+FIGURE 33.
+maximum output M. This curve, called a sigmoid, is a sort of hybrid
+between Figure 31 and Figure 32. It combines noise suppression with a
+limited dynamic range. Chapter 8 shows how such units are necessary
+for certain kinds of interesting behavior to arise in layered networks.
+To summarize, I have described some of the ways in which linear
+systems are modified to produce nonlinear systems that exhibit certain
+desired behaviors. All of these systems have an important linear component and are sometimes referred to as semilinear. Furthermore,
+several of the systems have a linear range in which the nonlinearities
+can be ignored. The next chapter discusses more fundamentally nonlinear systems.
+
+422
+FURTHER READING
+Halmos, P. R. (1974). Finite-dimensional vector spaces. New York:
+Springer-Verlag. For the more mathematically minded. An excellent
+account of linear algebra from an abstract point of view.
+Kohonen, T. (1977). Associative memory: A system theoretic approach.
+Berlin: Springer-Verlag. This book has a short tutorial on linear algebra. The discussion of associative memory depends heavily on the
+mathematics of linear algebra.
+Strang, G. (1976). Linear algebra and its applications.
+New York:
+Academic Press. A general textbook treating most of the essentials of
+linear algebra. It is especially good in its treatment of computational
+topics. A good place to find out about calculating matrix inverses and
+eigenvalues.
+
+CHAPTER 10
+The Logic of Activation Functions
+R. J. WILLIAMS
+The notion of logical computation, in some form or other, seems to
+provide a convenient language for describing the operation of many of
+the networks we seek to understand. Digital computers are built out of
+such constituents as AND and OR gates. Feature-detecting neurons in
+biological sensory systems are often idealized as signaling the presence
+or absence of their preferred features by becoming highly active or
+inactive, respectively. It seems a relatively simple extension of this
+concept to allow the activity of units in the network to range over some
+interval rather than over just two values; in this case the activity of a
+unit is regarded as signaling its degree of confidence that its preferred
+feature is present, rather than just the presence or absence of this
+feature. There are several ways one might attempt to formalize this
+degree-of-confidence notion. For example, if the activation values
+range over the closed unit interval [0,1), one might treat such
+an
+activation value as a conditional probability; alternatively, it might be
+viewed as a measure of truth in some unit-interval-valued logic, such as
+fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1965).
+There is at least one alternative to the notion of activation as degree
+of confidence which sometimes provides a convenient language for discussing the role of, for example, neural feature detectors in sensory
+systems. In this view, the activation of a unit encodes (within finite
+limits) the amount of its preferred feature present. This rival view
+seems advantageous particularly when the computation performed is
+described in the languageopyrighted Waterar linear signal processing;
+
+424
+examples of this are the concepts of spatial filtering and spatial Fourier
+analysis in the visual system and the concept of correlational processing
+in matrix models of associative memory (Kohonen, 1977). Chapter 9
+describes the relevant mathematics for this approach, that of linear
+algebra.
+This chapter explores some ideas motivated by the first of these two
+views of a PDP unit's computation (i.e., as some generalization of the
+notion of a Boolean function), but the approach is implicitly based on a
+very liberal interpretation of what this means. Essentially, the only
+structure assumed for the set of confidence values is that it be a totally
+ordered set with a Boolean interpretation of its endpoints. While a fully
+developed mathematical theory along these lines would deal with those
+properties that are invariant under any transformations preserving this
+structure, the ideas presented here do not go this far.
+The specific program to be embarked upon here is probably best
+described as an exploratory interweaving of several threads, all related
+to these notions of logical computation and their potential applicability
+to the study of activation functions. First, the point of view is taken
+that any function whatsoever is a candidate for being an activation
+function. From this perspective, the traditional linear and thresholded
+linear activation functions may be viewed as very isola:ed examples
+from a much larger range of possibilities. Next, several ways to shrink
+this vast space of possibilities are suggested. One way proposed here is
+the imposition of a constraint based on the requirement that the notion
+of excitatory or inhibitory input be meaningful. Another way is the
+introduction of an equivalence relation on activation functions based on
+invariance under transformations preserving the logical and ordinal
+structure. Finally, an investigation is carried out to determine just
+where certain familiar types of activation functions, built out of the
+more traditional ingredients such as additive, subtractive, and multiplicative interactions among input values and weights, fit into this
+scheme. As a by-product of this development, some elementary results
+concerning implementation of Boolean functions via real-valued functions are also obtained
+This last aspect is closely related to what is historically one of the
+oldest formal approaches to the theory of neural computation, in which
+neurons are treated as Boolean devices. This approach was pioneered
+by McCulloch and Pitts (1943); an introductory overview of this whole
+subject can be found in the text by Glorioso and Colón Osorio (1980).
+An important influence on much of the work done in this area has
+been the perceptron research of Rosenblatt (1962; Minsky & Papert,
+1969).
+In what follows, several simplifying assumptions will be made. The
+first is that the range of values over which each input to a unit may
+
+10. ACTIVATION FUNCTIONS
+425
+vary is the same as the range of values over which the output of the
+unit (its activation) may vary. Another is that time may be ignored as a
+variable. The activation function of a unit will be taken to be a function that computes the output of the unit (at a fixed but unspecified
+time) as a function of its inputs (at a presumably slightly earlier but
+unspecified time). Thus, given a unit with n inputs whose activation
+values range over the set A, the activation function a for this unit is
+just a function from A" (the set of ordered n-tuples of elements of A)
+to A, denoted a : A"→A.
+In order to avoid cluttering the presentation, detailed proofs of the
+results have been omitted; in their place are short sketches indicating
+the key steps. A more rigorous and abstract formulation of the basic
+concepts introduced here, along with detailed proofs of the results, may
+be found in Williams (1983).
+EXAMPLES OF ACTIVATION RULES
+The following are some examples of activation functions from which
+models have been constructed.
+Example I. A = (0,1) (the iwo-point set), a = f°8, where g is
+linear into R and J: RA is a thresholding function. (The operator o
+between two functions here denotes composition in a right-to-left
+manner.) A unit using this activation function is called a threshold logic
+unit or a linear threshold unit and is the basis of the simple perceptron
+(Rosenblatt, 1962; Minsky & Papert, 1969).
+Example 2. A = R, a linear (Kohonen, 1977).
+Example 3. A = I (the closed unit interval 10,1]), a = f°g, where
+8 is linear into R and f is nondecreasir.? into I. This is a commonly
+used variant of Example 1. Let us call this a quasi-linear activation function. The function f is sometinies called a squashing function for obvious reasons.
+Example 4. A = I, a= fo8, where f is nondecreasing into I and g
+is a multilinear function into R of the form
+... +Xn-In
+(where n is assumed to be even). Such an activation function is suggested by Hinton (198 Copyrighted Wateras is similar to Example 3
+
+426
+except that the coefficients have now become explicit inputs. This type
+of activation function will be called a gating activation function because
+the odd-numbered inputs gate the even-numbered ones (and viceversa).
+Example S. A = 1, a= fog, where f is nondecreasing into I and g
+is an arbitrary multilinear function into R. That is, g is of the form
+8(xy...,xn) = [w; Ilxi,
+SEP
+iES,
+where P is the power set (i.e., set of subsets) of (I,...,n). Such an
+activation function is called a sigma-pi activation function, with the coefficients w; being called weights. (We might also call this a quasimultilinear activation function to emphasize its relationship to Example
+3.) Note that Examples 3 and 4 are just special cases of this activation
+function.
+THE MAIN CONCEPTS
+Henceforth in this chapter the set of activation values will be
+assumed to be the closed unit interval [0,1], denoted I. An activation
+function is then simply a function a:I"→L
+It will be convenient to
+identify OfI with the Boolean value false and 1€I with the Boolean
+value true.
+Now we introduce a key concept of this chapter by considering the
+extension of the familiar notion of a monotonic function to the multidimensional case in two different ways. In order to get a feeling for the
+precise definitions to be given below, first consider what it means for
+an input to a unit to have an excitatory influence on the output of that
+unit. Such an input must have the property that an increase in its value
+must result in an increase in the output of the unit, as long as all other
+inputs are held constant. Furthermore, this should be true regardless
+of the values of the other inputs. A similar property should hold for an
+inhibitory input, where the output of the unit must decrease as the
+value of the input is increased in this case. This is the basic idea
+behind the notion of uniform monotonicity, as defined below. The
+weaker notion of monotonicity-in-context corresponds to the situation in
+which an input may be sometimes excitatory and sometimes inhibitory,
+depending on the values taken on by the other inputs.
+Now we make these concepts rigorous. Let a :I'→I. Pick one of
+the coordinates, say the kth, and fix all coordinates but this one, which
+is allowed to vary. This opyrighteDli hapf a single variable which is
+
+10. ACTIVATION FUNCTIONS
+427
+parameterized by the remaining coordinates. Such a function is called a
+section of the original function a along the kth coordinate. Note that
+there is one such section along the kth coordinate for each possible
+combination of values for the remaining n-1 coordinates. Now make
+the following definitions:'
+1. a is monotonic-in-context along the kth coordinate if all its sections along the kth coordinate are monotonic.
+2. a is uniformly monotonic in the kth coordinate if all sections
+along the kth
+coordinate are monotonic and have the same
+sense (i.e., all are nondecreasing or all are nonincreasing).
+3. a is monotonic-in-context if it is monotonic-in-context along all
+its coordinates.
+4. a is uniformly monotonic if it is uniformly monotonic along all
+its coordinates.
+One special case of a uniformly monotonic function is a uniformly
+nondecreasing function, which has the property that all its sections along
+all coordinates are nondecreasing. This special case will be used later.
+Note that if a is uniformly monotonic then it is monotonic-incontext, but the converse need not be true, unless a is a function of a
+single variable, in which case both definitions collapse onto the usual
+notion of monotonicity. The key distinction between uniformly monotonic and monotonic-in-context is that the sense of monotonicity of the
+sections of a along the kth coordinate must be fixed for each k in
+order for a to be uniformly monotonic.
+It is important to emphasize the significance of these monotonicity
+concepts for activation functions. An activation function is uniformly
+monotonic if and only if each input may be classified as solely excitatory or solely inhibitory, independently of the values actually taken on
+by any other inputs. Thus the usual sense of excitatory or inhibitory
+input to a unit is meaningful exactly when the unit's activation function
+is uniformly monotonic. If a unit's activation function is monotonicin-context, then it may not be possible to categorize its inputs as solely
+excitatory or solely inhibitory, but the following may be a useful conceptualization of such a unit's operation: Certain inputs to the unit are
+1 The reader should be warned that the names introduced here for these concepts are
+not standard; these terms were chosen because it was felt that they helped to clarify the
+important distinctions being made in the current context.
+
+428 FORMAL ANALYSES
+used to set the context for the computation of its output as a function
+of the remaining inputs, and each input in this latter group has purely
+excitatory or purely inhibitory effect on the unit's output in this particular context. Whether this turns out to be a useful way to view the
+monotonic-in-context activation function and its possible role in activation models will not be explored here. The main reason for introducing
+the concept is simply that it appears to be the strongest variant on
+monotonicity satisfied by any activation function capable of computing
+an arbitrary Boolean function (such as the multilinear and sigma-pi
+activation functions, as will be seen later).
+In order to capture the notion of an activation function being simply
+an extension of a Boolean function, define an activation function
+a: I"→I to be Boolean-like if a (x),...,Xn) = 0 or 1 whenever all the
+*, are 0 or 1. In other words, an activation function is Boolean-like if
+and only if it can be viewed as a Boolean function when restricted to
+the vertices of ["
+. It is also useful to say that such an activation function realizes the Boolean function obtained by restricting to vertices.
+In order to capture the notion of two activation functions agreeing
+for Boolean input values, define two activation functions a 1, 02:1"→1
+to be vertex-equivalent f(x...n) = a2(xy...Xn) whenever all
+the x; are 0 or 1. In other words, two activation functions are vertexequivalent if and only if they agree on the vertices of I" It is clear that
+vertex-equivalence is indeed an equivalence relation.
+The reason for introducing this notion is the suggestion that there
+may be a certain interchangeability between different activation functions that are vertex-equivalent, in that the logic of a unit's computation might be considered to reside solely in what it does when all input
+lines are set to their extreme values (corresponding to true or false). If
+two vertex-equivalent activation functions are additionally monotonicin-context and continuous, then an even stronger case can be made for
+their interchangeability in certain models, but these ideas will not be
+pursued here.
+ILLUSTRATION OF THESE CONCEPTS
+A number of examples of activation functions a :I2→I will now be
+presented to clarify the definitions given in the previous section. The
+figure corresponding to each example consists of three different graphical representations for that particular function: (a) a three-dimensional
+plot of a (x1, X2) versus (x1, x2); (b) a contour plot showing at which
+points (x), x2) certain values of a (x1, x2) are attained; and (c) various
+
+10. ACTIVATION FUNCTIONS
+429
+sections of a along x, superimposed on a single two-dimensional plot.
+The activation function being displayed in each figure is defined in the
+caption of that figure.
+Figures 1, 2, and 3 show three different activation functions that
+realize the Boolean AND function at the vertices, while Figures 4, 5,
+and 6 show three different activation functions realizing the Boolean
+OR function at the vertices. These functions are all Boolean-like and
+uniformly monotonic.
+Figure 7 shows a realization of the Boolean XOR (exclusive or) function. The activation function depicted is Boolean-like and monotonicin-context, but not uniformly monotonic. In fact, no realization of
+XOR can be uniformly monotonic. Figure 8 shows an activation function that is uniformly monotonic but not Boolean-like. Its restriction to
+vertices thus does not have a straightforward Boolean interpretation;
+this activation function might be viewed as a unit-interval confidence
+measure based on the number of active inputs. Finally, Figure 9 shows
+a rather pathological example of an activation function. It is Booleanlike and vertex-equivalent to the constant function 1, but intuition suggests that any unit in a PDP network which performs such a computation will behave very differently from one which puts out the constant
+value 1. This essential difference in behavior is formalized here in
+terms of the observation that such an activation function fails to be
+monotonic-in-context while the constant function 1 is uniformly monotonic.
+SOME RESULTS
+Before stating the main results, it will be helpful to define two functions, the first of which maps vertices of I" to Boolean expressions in
+formal variables X1....,Xn, and the second of which maps such
+Boolean expressions to real algebraic expressions in formal variables
+x1....Xn. In our notation for Boolean expressions we will use " +"
+to denote disjunction and juxtaposition to denote conjunction but it will
+always be clear from the context whether Boolean or real operations are
+intended.
+The mapping from vertices to Boolean expressions is defined by
+assigning to a vertex (v1,....vn) the conjunction in which each Xi
+appears once, with the negation operator applied to X; if and only if
+V, = 0. For example, applying_this function to the vertex (0,1,1,0) of 14
+yields the expression X,X2X3X4.
+
+430
+X2
+X,
+1/
+.75
+.5
+a = 25
+a = 0
+15
+5
+x, = 25/
+x2 = 0
+- x,
+1
+= X,
+B
+FIGURE 1. a(x,,x2) = x1x2. A: Three-dimensional plot. The cube is bounded by the
+planes where each coordinate is 0 or 1. B: Contour plot. C: Some sections along xy.
+Note that cach section along x, is a linear function with nonnegative slope; by symmetry
+the same is true of each section along xz. Thus this function is uniformly nondecreasing.
+
+10. ACTIVATION FUNCTIONS
+431
+2
+=
+a =75,
++2
+a = .5
+x 2
+a = 25
+→ 23
+a = o
+x, = 0
+1
+- X,
+B
+FIGURE 2. a (x)x 2) = (x1,x2). A: Three-dimensional plot. The cube is bounded
+Ky the lanes here each insinal plot of this funero copies or a serious alon
+Evidently, each section along x, is a nondecreasing function; by symmetry the same is
+true of each section along x,. Thus this function is uniformly nondecreasing
+
+432
+X2
+8-
+9
+a=.75
++2
+= 1
++2
++2
++2
+x2 = 0
+B
+FIGURE 3. alx1x2) = max (0,x,tx=-I). A: Three-dimensional plot. The cube is
+bounded by the planes where each coordinate is 0 or 1. B: Contour plot. C: Some sections along xy. Note that the three-dimensional plot of this function consists of two
+planar surfaces. Clearly, each section along x, is a nondecreasing function; by symmetry
+the same is true of each section along X2. Thus this function is uniformly nondecreasing.
+
+10. ACTIVATION FUNCTIONS
+433
+X,
++2
+a = 1
+X2
+=1
+X2
+=
+75
+5
+a = 75
+a = 5
+a = 25
++2
+a= 0
+B
+C
+1 ve lane a here cach cordinate is 00 1. BiConsour lol. C. Some se is nos alde
+* the hame is se on alone, is linear ta rian ith nonsign is uper by nom.
+decreasing.
+
+434
+X,
+X2
+a = 1
+x2 = 1
+15
+a = 75
++2
+5
+a = .5
++2
+a = 25
+a = 0
+"
++2
+1
+= X,
+= X,
+B
+FIGURE 5. a (x,, x2) = max (x,,x2). A: Three-dimensional plot. The cube is bounded
+y the planes where each coordinate is 0 or 1. B: Contour plot. C: Some sections alon
+. Note that the three-dimensional plot of this function consists of iwo planar surfaces
+Note also that each section along x, is a nondecreasing function; by symmetry the same
+is true of each section along x,. Thus this function is uniformly nondecreasing.
+
+10. ACTIVATION FUNCTIONS
+435
+X1
+X
+1
++ 515
++2
++2
+B
+C
+FIGURE 6. a (x1x2) = min(1, x,†x2). A: Three-dimensional plot. The cube is bounded
+by the planes where each coordinate is 0 or 1. B: Contour plot. C: Some sections along
+x1. Note that the three-dimensional plot of this function consists of two planar surfaces.
+Evidently, each section along x, is a nondecreasing function; by symmetry the same is
+true of each section along x2. Thus this function is uniformly nondecreasing.
+
+436
+X,
+X2
+a = 75
+a =
+25
+=
+1
++2
+= 5
+25
+x2 =
+.5
+a = 25
+a = 75
+a = 1
+1
+= X,
+= X,
+B
+C
+FIGURE 7. a (x,, 2) - x,tx=-2x172. A: Three-dimensional plot. The cube is bounded
+oy the planes where each coordinate is 0 or 1. B: Contour plot. C: Some sections alon
+r1. Note the saddle shape of the three-dimensional plot of this function. Also note thal
+the sections along x, are linear functions with slopes ranging from 1 to -1; by symmetry
+the same is true of the sections along x2. Thus this function is monotonic-in-context but
+not uniformly monotonic.
+
+10. ACTIVATION FUNCTIONS
+437
+Xz
+X,
+=
+.75
+X2
+= 75
+x 2
+5
+x2
+25
+a = 5
+a = 25
+La = o
+O
+0 '
+B
+FIGURE 8. a(1x2) = ½(x,+x2). A: Three-dimensional plot. The cube is bounded by
+the planes where each coordinate is 0 or 1. B: Contour plot. C: Some sections along xy.
+Note that the three-dimensional plot of this function consists of a single planar surface.
+Each section along x, is a linear function with slope ½, as is each section along x2, by
+symmetry. Thus this function is uniformly nondecreasing.
+
+438
+X,
+X2
+=
+.75
+.25
+X
+X
+2
+a = 0
+= 5
+X,
+B
+FIGURE 9. a (x,,x2) = (2x,- 1)2(2x2-1)2. A: Three-dimensional plot. The cube is
+bounded by the planes where each coordinate is 0 or l. B: Contour plot. C: Some sections along xy. Note that the sections along x, are parabolas of varying widths. Evidently, this function is not monotonic-in-context since, for example, when x2= 0, a first
+decreases and then increases as x, increases.
+
+10. ACTIVATION FUNCTIONS
+439
+The mapping from Boolean expressions to real algebraic expressions
+is defined by replacing:
+1. True by 1.
+2. False by 0
+3. The disjunction operator by addition.
+4. The conjunction operator by multiplication.
+5. The negation operator by subtraction from 1.
+6. Xi by xi, for each i.
+For example, applying this function to the Boolean expression
+XX2+ X1 yields the real expression x, (1-x2) + (1-xy). It should be
+emphasized that this is a function defined only on formal expressions;
+two expressions that are equivalent under Boolean algebra will not, in
+general, be mapped to the same real algebraic expression or even
+equivalent real algebraic expressions. In other words, it is not a mapping from Boolean functions to real functions.
+A standard result from Boolean algebra is that any Boolean function
+may be expressed in a certain canonical form, called the disjunctive normal form. A simple prescription for this form is as follows: Form a disjunction of terms, each of which is the result of applying the verticesto-Boolean-expressions function described above to those vertices of I"
+for which the function takes on the value true. For example, the disjunctive_normal form for the Boolean function B (X1X2) = X1+ X2 is
+x,Xz+X,Xz+X,X2.
+A closely related result for multilinear functions is the following:
+Lemma. For any function assigning arbitrary real numbers to the
+vertices of I" there is a unique multilinear function agreeing with
+the given function on these vertices.
+This function is formed in a manner generalizing the prescription
+given above for the disjunctive normal form: For each vertex of I"
+form the corresponding Boolean conjunct; then apply the other function
+described above to turn each of these conjuncts into a real expression;
+finally, form the sum of these individual expressions with each one
+weighted by the value of the given function at the corresponding vertex. It will be convenient to dub the result the vertex normal form for
+the given function. For example, the vertex normal form for a multilinear function a of two variables is
+a (x1,12) = a (0,0) (1-x; (1-22) + a (01) (1-01052
++a (1,0)x, (1x2) + a (1,1)x x2.
+
+440
+This lemma has the following immediate consequence:
+Theorem 1. Given any Boolean function, there is a unique multilinear activation function realizing it.
+In contrast, not every Boolean function can be realized by a quasilinear activation function. Those Boolean functions that can be so realized are called linearly separable. It is easily shown that any linearly
+separable Boolean function is necessarily uniformly monotonic, but the
+converse is not true. A simple example of a function that is not
+linearly separable is the OR function (X)= XX2+X,Xz. The
+easiest way to see that it is not linearly separable is to observe that it is
+not uniformly monotonic. An example of a function that is uniformly
+monotonic but not linearly separable is
+Our next result, also a consequence of the lemma, shows that the
+very general class of all activation functions may be represented up to
+vertex-equivalence by the narrower class of multilinear activation
+functions.
+Theorem 2. Every activation function is vertex-equivalent to a
+unique multilinear activation function.
+The next result suggests that monotonicity-in-context is enjoyed by a
+fairly wide variety of activation functions.
+Theorem 3. Every sigma-pi activation function is monotonic-incontext.
+This is an easy consequence of three facts: (a) that a multilinear
+function is linear in each variable when the other variables are held
+constant; (b) that a linear function is monotonic; and (c) that the composition of monotonic functions is monotonic.
+The following result characterizes uniform monotonicity for multilinear activation functions.
+Theorem 4. A multilinear activation function is uniformly monotonic if and only if its restriction to vertices is uniformly monotonic.
+The key step in the proof of this result is the observation that a
+multilinear function may be built up inductively through linear interpolation, starting with the values at the vertices. This follows from the
+fact that a multilinear function is linear in each variable when the other
+variables are held constant. The remainder of the proof consists of verifying that each step of this inductive construction preserves uniform
+
+10. ACTIVATION FUNCTIONS
+441
+monotonicity. This result may be extended to the sigma-pi case as
+well, under certain mild restrictions, using the fact that a strictly
+increasing function has a monotonic inverse.
+Corollary. Let a = fog be a sigma-pi activation function, where g is
+multilinear and f is a squashing function. If f is strictly increasing,
+then a is uniformly monotonic if and only if its restriction to vertices is uniformly monotonic.
+The results presented up to this point would seem to suggest that the
+class of multilinear activation functions provides us with sufficient
+power that we need not consider the more general class of sigma-pi
+activation functions. However, from the standpoint of uniform monotonicity, there may be some drawbacks in restricting ourselves to multilinear activation functions. One such potential drawback is that a uniformly nondecreasing multilinear activation function may have some
+negative weights. For example, the
+Boolean function
+B (X1,x2) = Xy+ X2 corresponds, by Theorem 1, to the multilinear
+activation function a (x1,x2) = x1+ x2-x,x2, which requires a negative
+weight even though it is uniformly nondecreasing. But what if a more
+general sigma-pi activation function were to be used? Is there a
+sigma-pi realization of this same Boolean function for which all weights
+are nonnegative? Of course there is in this case: The sigma-pi activation function a (x1,x2) = min(x,+ x2,1) is one such realization; many
+others could be devised. (These two realizations of the OR function
+are displayed in Figures 4 and 6. It seems reasonable to suspect that
+the following is true:
+Conjecture. Every uniformly nondecreasing activation function is
+vertex-equivalent to a sigma-pi activation function with nonnegative
+weights.
+Note that any sigma-pi activation function with nonnegative weights
+is certainly uniformly nondecreasing. The conjecture is that the converse is true (up to vertex equivalence). Under the assumption that
+the uniformly nondecreasing activation function is Boolean-like (as in
+the preceding example, the conjecture is indeed valid, as the following
+theorem shows. In fact, the conclusion may be made even stronger in
+this case.
+Theorem 5. Every uniformly nondecreasing Boolean-like activation
+function is vertex-equivalent to a sigma-pi activation function whose
+weights are all 0 or 1.
+The essential step in the proof of this result is showing that any uniformly nondecreasing Bopkeightelancarenialmay be expressed as a
+
+442
+disjunction of conjunctions containing no negated factors. Once such
+an expression is available, the desired sigma-pi activation function is
+obtained by converting this Boolean expression to a real expression and
+then composing this with the function f (z) = min (z,1).
+This theorem may be generalized to cover arbitrary senses of uniform monotonicity by running any inputs for which the activation function is nonincreasing through the "inverter" f(x) = 1-x. Thus the
+general class of all uniformly monotonic Boolean-like activation functions may be represented up to vertex-equivalence by a narrower class
+of sigma-pi activation functions of a certain form.
+It is instructive to contrast the sigma-pi activation functions which
+result from applying Theorems 1 and 5 to a particular uniformly monotonic activation function. Consider the Boolean function of six variables B(X1X2X3X5X6)=X,X_+ XXx+ XsX6. Theorem 1 realizes this using the vertex normal form, which, after simplification,
+becomes
+01(X1X2X3X4X5X6=X1X2+X3X4+X586
++ X1223056.
+In contrast, Theorem 5 implies a realization of this same function by
+the gating activation function
+02(x1,213,44,15,76) = min(x, x2+ x3xat x586, 1).
+CONCLUSION
+As suggested in the introduction, the ideas and results presented
+here represent an exploratory set of concepts intended to help in understanding PDP networks. There is a clear need for a general language
+and set of concepts for describing and understanding PDP computation,
+both at the local, individual unit level, as explored here, and at the
+level of whole networks. (In fact, the greatest need is for a means of
+these bino and tanderstandin the eas cohined i his chapatio cat
+thesed ma leaty to become usel frametaine or thierstaper can
+behavior of whole networks is difficult to foresee. One way that this
+gap between local and global computation might be bridged is by dealing with questions of learning in such networks. The goal of learning is
+particular global behavior, bu
+
+10. ACTIVATION FUNCTIONS
+443
+the learning should be implemented locally. An example of how the
+requirement that the network be capable of learning might interact with
+the ideas explored here can be found by considering the recently
+discovered back-propagation learning algorithm, described in Chapter 8.
+To be able to apply such a learning algorithm requires imposing the
+constraint on activation functions that they be differentiable, a property
+not satisfied by all the examples considered here. As our understanding of learning in PDP networks progresses, we may find still further
+restrictions useful or even necessary.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+This research was supported by a grant to David Zipser from the System Development Foundation. I am also grateful to James McClelland
+and David Zipser for their many helpful comments and suggestions.
+
+CHAPTER 11
+An Analysis of the Delta Rule
+and the Learning of Statistical Associations
+G. O. STONE
+The development of parallel distributed processing models involves
+iwo complementary enterprises: first, the development of complete
+models with desired operating characteristics; and second, the in-depth
+analysis of component mechanisms and basic principles. The primary
+objective in modeling is the development and testing of complete systems. In general these models are complex and their behavior cannot
+be fully deduced directly from their mathematical description. In such
+cases, simulation plays an important role in understanding the properties of a model. Although simulations are useful in determining the
+properties of a specific model, they do not, on their own, indicate how
+a model should be modified when a desired behavior is not achieved.
+An understanding of basic principles and a collection of potential
+mechanisms with known properties provide the best guides to the
+development of complex models.
+This chapter provides an analysis of one of the most popular
+components-namely, the error correction learning rule developed by
+Widrow and Hoff (1960). This learning rule which has been analyzed
+and employed by a number of authors (Amari, 1977a, 1977b;
+Kohonen, 1974, 1977; Sutton & Barto, 1981), has been called the
+Widrow-Hoff rule by Sutton and Barto (1981) and is generally referred
+to as the delta rule in this book. This rule is introduced in Chapter 2,
+discussed extensively and generalized in Chapter 8, and employed in
+models discussed in a number of chapters-most notably Chapters 17
+and 18. In the present chapter I show how concepts from linear algebra
+
+11. THE DELTA RULE
+445
+and vector spaces can provide insight into the operation of this learning
+mechanism. I then show how this mechanism can be used for learning
+statistical relationships between patterns, and finally show how the delta
+rule relates to multiple linear regression. Concepts from linear algebra
+are used extensively; for explanation of these concepts, especially as
+applied to PDP models, the reader is referred to Chapter 9.
+The Delta Rule in Vector Notation
+The delta rule is typically applied to the case in which pairs of patterns, consisting of an input pattern and a target output pattern, are to
+be associated so that when an input pattern is presented to an input
+layer of units, the appropriate output pattern will appear on the output
+layer of units.
+It is possible to represent the patterns as vectors in which
+each element of the vector corresponds to the activation value of a
+corresponding unit. Similarly, we can represent the connections from
+input units to the output units by the cells of a weight matrix. For
+linear units, the output vector can be computed by multiplying the
+input vector by the weight matrix. In the present chapter our analysis
+is restricted to linear units. (See Chapter 8 for a discussion of the delta
+rule for nonlinear units.)
+Now we imagine a learning situation in which the set of input/output
+pairs are presented (possibly repeatedly) to the system. If the set of
+input vectors are orthogonal (i.e., at right angles to each other), a simple pattern associator can be constructed using a product learning rule
+in which the change in weight wi, following the presentation of pattern
+P is given by the product of the ith input element and the jth target
+element, that is,
+Ap Wii = Ipjlpi
+where pj represents the value of the desired or target output for the
+jth element of pattern p and ip, is the activation value of the ith element of the input for that pattern. ' In vector notation, we can write the
+change for the entire weight matrix as
+1 Note this is essentially the Hebbian learning rule. In the Hebbian rule it is assumed
+hat the product of the activation levels of the input and output units determine th
+veight change. If we assume that the activation of the output unit is entirely determinec
+by the target input the product rule described here is identically the Hebbian rule.
+
+446
+where, as usual, bold letters indicate vectors, uppercase indicates
+matrices and the superscript T indicates the transpose of a vector or
+matrix. This learning rule was described in some detail in Chapter 9
+and that discussion will not be repeated here. It was shown there that
+if the input vectors are normalized in length so that ip ip = 1 and are
+orthogonal, the product rule will, after the presentation of all of the
+input/output patterns, lead to the following weight matrix:
+w=
+p=1
+If the input vectors are orthogonal, there will be no interference from
+storing one vector on others already stored so that the presentation of
+input i, will lead to the desired output 1p, that is,
+Wi, = 1p
+for all patterns p from 1 to P. Unfortunately, we cannot always insure
+that the input vectors are orthogonal. Generally, the storage of one
+input/output pair can interfere with the storage of another and cause
+crosstalk. For this case a more sophisticated learning rule is required.
+Fortunately, as we saw in Chapter 8, the delta rule is a rule that will
+work when the input patterns are not orthogonal. This rule will produce perfect associations so long as the input patterns are merely
+linearly independent (see Chapter 9) and will find a weight matrix which
+will produce a "least squares" solution for the weight matrix when an
+exact solution is not possible (i.e., the input patterns are not linearly
+independent). In matrix notation the rule can be written as
+W(n) = W(n- 1) + n8 (n)i" (n)
+(1)
+where W(n) is the state of the connection matrix after n presentations,
+i(n) is the input presented on the nth presentation, n is a scalar constant which determines the rate of learning, and 8 (n) is the difference
+between the desired and actual output on trial n, such that
+8(n) = t (n) - W(n- 1)i (n)
+(2)
+where t (n) is the desired output (or target) for presentation n and
+W(n- 1)i (n) = o (n) is the output actually produced on that presentation. W (0) is assumed to be the matrix with all zero entries. In other
+words, the weight matrix is updated by adding the outer product of the
+response error and the input. (See Chapter 9 for discussion of outer
+product.) Proofs concerning the convergence of this recursion to the
+optimum weight matrix (in the sense outlined above) are provided by
+Kohonen (1974, 1977, 1284)
+copyrighted Material
+
+11. THE DELTA RULE 447
+The Delta Rule in Pattern-Based Coordinates
+To this point we have discussed the delta rule for what Smolensky
+(Chapter 22) has called the neural or unit level of representation.
+Before proceeding, it is useful to consider the form that the rule takes
+in the conceptual level of representation in which there is one vector
+component for each concept. In general, the input and output patterns
+correspond to an arbitrary set of vectors. Interestingly, it is possible to
+show that the delta rule applies only to the "structure" of the input and
+output vectors and not to other details of the representation. In a
+linear system, it is only the pattern of correlations among the patterns
+that matter, not the contents of the specific patterns themselves.
+We can demonstrate this by deriving the same learning rule following
+a change of basis from the unit basis to the pattern basis. Since a detailed
+discussion of the process whereby bases can be changed is given in
+Chapter 9 and, in more detail, in Chapter 22, I will merely sketch the
+concept here. Each pattern over a set of units corresponds to a vector.
+If there are N units, then the vector is of dimension N.
+In the unit
+basis, each element of the vector corresponds to the activation value of
+one of the units. Geometrically, we can think of each unit as specifying a value on a dimension and the entire vector as corresponding to
+the coordinates of a point in N-dimensional space. Thus, the dimensions of the space correspond directly to the units (this is why it is
+called the unit basis). Now, a change of basis amounts essentially to a
+change in coordinate system. This can be accomplished through rotation, as well as other linear transformations. Converting to the pattern
+basis merely involves transforming the coordinate system so that the
+patterns line up with the axes. Figure 1 illustrates a simple case of this
+process. In Figure lA we give the geometric representation of the palterns. Pattern 1, P1, involves two units, each with activation value +1.
+Pattern 2, P2, has activation values <+1,-1>. The patterns described
+in the unit basis are
+and p2- til
+Figure 1B shows the same two vectors, but now expressed with respect
+to a new coordinate system, the pattern coordinate system. In this case
+the axes correspond to the patterns not the units.
+The vectors
+corresponding to patterns 1 and 2 now become
+and p*, - lol.
+
+448
+Unit 2
++1
+Pattern 1
+< +1,+1>
+-1 —
++1
+Unit 1
+Pattern 2
+< +1,-1>
++1
+Pattern 1
+<0,+1>
+-1
+Pattern 2
+< +1,0 >
++1
+FIGURE 1. An example of conversion from unit-based coordinates into pattern-based
+coordinates.
+In general, conversion to a new basis requires a matrix P which
+specifies the relationship between the new and old coordinate systems.
+For each vector, Pi, we write the new vector p*; as p*; = Ppi. If all of
+the vectors and matrices of the original system are converted into the
+new basis, we simply have a new way to describe the same system. For
+present purposes we copyrighted Maternation matrices,
+one that
+
+11. THE DELTA RULE 449
+transforms the input patterns into a coordinate space based on the input
+patterns, which we denote Py, and one that transforms the target patterns into a coordinate space based on the target patterns, Pr. In this
+case, we have i*, = P, i, for the input vectors and t*, = Prt, for the
+target vectors. Moreover, since the output vectors must be in the same
+space as the target vectors we have 0*; = Pro,. We must also
+transform the weight matrix W to the new basis.
+Since the weight
+matrix maps the input space onto the output space, both transformations must be involved in transforming the weight matrix. We can see
+what this transformation must be by considering the job that the weight
+matrix must do. Suppose that in the old bases Wi = o for some input i
+and output o. In the new bases we should be able to write W*i*=0*
+Thus, W*P,i = Pro and Pr'W*P, i = o= Wi. From this we can
+readily see that Pr'W*P, = W and finally, we can write the appropriate
+transformation matrix for Was
+w*=P,WPi!
+We can multiply both sides of Equation 1 by Pr on the right and Pi'
+on the left. This leads to
+PWP,'(n) = PWP,'(n- 1) + Prn& (n)i" (n)P,'
+which, by substitution, can be written as
+where
+8*(n) = 1*(n)- W*(n-1)i"(n).
+(3)
+Finally, by rearranging we have
+W*(1) = W*(n- 1)+n8* (n)i* (n)TC
+(4)
+where the matrix C, given by C = (Pr') P,'
+, is a matrix which holds
+the correlational information among the original input patterns. To see
+this, recall that we are changing the input patterns into their pattern
+basis and the target patterns into their pattern basis. Therefore, the
+vector i*, consists of a 1 in the jth cell and zeros everywhere else.
+Thus, since i, = P¡'i*
+!, we see that Pi' must be a matrix whose jth
+column is the jth original input vector. Therefore, C is a matrix with
+the inner product of the input vectors i, and i; occupying the ith row
+and jth column. This inner product is the vector correlation between
+the two patterns.
+
+450
+We have finally constructed a new description which, as we shall see,
+allows many insights into the operation of the delta rule which are normally obscured by the internal structure of the patterns themselves.
+Instead, we have isolated the critical interpattern structure in the
+matrix C.
+One advantage of this new description is that the output the system
+actually produces-even when it does not match any target exactly -can
+easily be interpreted as the weighted average of the various target patterns. The value in each cell of the output vector is the coefficient
+determining the amount of that target in the output. In this case the
+sum squared error for input/output pattern p, given by
+Ep = [ (1*, - 0",)2,
+measures the error directly in terms of the degree to which each target
+pattern is present in the output, rather than the degree to which each
+unit is present.
+It should be noted, of course, that this new patternbased error function is related to the old unit-based error by the same
+change of basis matrices discussed above.
+It might be observed further that under this description, the perfect
+associator- which results when the input and output
+patterns are
+linearly independent -will be the identity matrix, I, in which the main
+diagonal has a 1 in each entry and all other entries are 0. It should be
+noted, however, that the preceding analysis of this new description has
+assumed the input and target output patterns were linearly independent.
+If they are not, no such pattern basis exists. However, there is an
+analogous, but somewhat more complex, development for the case in
+which these vectors cannot form a legitimate basis.
+I will now demonstrate some of the useful insights which can be
+gained through this analysis by comparing the unit and pattern basis
+descriptions for a sample learning problem. The upper portion of Figure 2 gives the representations of the four input/output patterns to be
+learned in the unit basis. These patterns are all linearly independent and
+were generated under the constraint that each pattern has unit length
+and that the input patterns have the correlation structure given in the
+matrix shown in the figure.
+Figure 3 shows the states of W and W* after one, four, and eight
+sweeps through the four input/output patterns. While inspection of the
+unit-based representations gives no direct information about the degree
+of learning and crosstalk between targets, this information is explicit in
+the pattern-based representation. For example, one can discern that
+the error for the pairs with highly correlated inputs (pairs 1 and 2) is
+greater at each stage than that for the pairs with slightly correlated input
+
+11. THE DELTA RULE 451
+1
+2
+.36
+.20
+49
+.44
+-.01
+.28
+.09
+.55)
+→ Y1
+- 10]
+- .66
+•30
+-.08
+- 45
+.50
+*2
+.57
+.05
+.12
+.23
+.08
+→ y2
+.47
+- 36
+.50 ]
+-.07 |
+-.39
+.74
+- 21
+46
+- 19]
+3
+4
+.25
+.48
+- 48
+.56
+18
+- 28
+.04
+-.22|
+→ Уз
+- 10
+.40
+.27
+.27
+-.56
+.61l
+*4
+-11 |
+-.08
+.03
+.36
+.01
+-71
+-54
+.24
+→ YA
+.47)
+.17
+-21
+.01
+-. 66
+-51/
+C=
+1.00.75
+.75 1.00
+• 1.00
+.25
+251.00]
+FIGURE 2. Key-larget pairs and the key correlation structure.
+patterns (pairs 3 and 4). Moreover, there is no intrusion of targets
+associated with orthogonal inputs. In addition, the intrusion of targets
+from correlated pairs is least for the pair most recently learned, pairs 2
+and 4. (The patterns were presented in order 1-2-3-4 on each sweep.)
+Pinally, it is clear from inspection of the pattern-based weight matrix
+that after eight sweeps the patterns have been almost perfectly learned.
+The pattern-based formulation also allows a more detailed analysis of
+the general effect of a learning trial on the error. We can define the
+"potential error" to pattern j, 8, * as
+
+452
+Pattern Based: mse =0.09
+0.39
+-0.18 0.00
+0.90
+1.20
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+1.11
+0.00
+0.00
+0.30
+0.00
+0.00
+- 0.06
+1.20
+Pattern Based: mse=0.00
+0.98
+0.03
+0.00
+0.00
+-0.01
+1.01
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+1.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+1.00
+Patter Bascd: mse -0.00
+1.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+1.00
+0.00
+0.00
+1.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+0.00
+1.00
+Learning with g = 1.20
+AFTER 1 Learning Cycle
+Unit Basod: mse -0.049
+- 0.12
+- 0.03
+0.57
+- 0.04
+0.30
+0.05
+-0.13
+0.08
+0.02
+0.10
+- 0.01
+- 0.59
+0.00
+0.12
+0.28
+0.08
+0.13
+-0.23
+-033
+0.50
+0.17
+- 0.17
+- 0.59
+0.20
+-0.04
+0.06
+-0.42
+-0.29
+0.52
+-0.14
+0.9
+0.20
+AFTER 4 Learning Cycles
+-0.15
+- 0.07
+0.59
+- 0.05
+0.36
+0.06
+-0.18
+0.02
+0.13
+0.16
+- 0.42
+0.66
+0.07
+- 0.57
+- 0.30
+- 0.10
+- 0.47
+0.16
+Unir Basod: mse =0.00
+0.01
+- 0.04
+- 0.08
+0.10
+0.11
+0.16
+0.14
+0.02
+- 0.81
+0.08
+0.53
+0.02
+AFTER 8 Learning Cycles
+- 0.15
+- 0.07
+0.59
+- 0.05
+0.35
+0.06
+-0.18
+0.02
+0.13
+0.16
+- 0.43
+0.66
+0.07
+- 0.57
+- 0.32
+- 0.10
+- 0.49
+0.17
+Unit Based: mse =0.00
+0.01
+- 0.04
+• 0.08
+0.10
+0.10
+0.16
+0.14
+0.02
+- 0.82
+0.08
+0.54
+0.02
+- 0.34
+-0.28
+0.50
+-0.15
+0.86
+0.09
+- 0.34
+• 0.28
+0.50
+-0.15
+0.85
+0.10
+-0.35
+- 0.18
+0.03
+0.10
+-0.13
+0.81
+- 0.31
+- 0.20
+- 0.29
+0.17
+- 0.53
+1.01
+- 0.31
+- 0.20
+- 0.30
+0.18
+- 0.54
+1.01
+0.12
+- 0.40
+0.33
+-0.23
+0.23
+- 0.42
+0.13
+- 0.41
+0.13
+- 0.16
+- 0.12
+- 0.19
+0.13
+- 0.41
+0.12
+- 0.15
+- 0.13
+- 0.18
+FIGURE 3. Comparison of unit-based and pattern-based weight matrices after one, four,
+and eight learning cycles.
+8, " (n) = 1*; -W* (n)i".
+(5)
+Substituting for W* (n) from Equation 1, gives
+where k is the index of the pattern presented on trial n- 1. Simplifying further, we have the recursive form:
+8, (n) = 8, copyrighed Materia 2Ci*,.
+(6)
+
+11. THE DELTA RULE
+453
+Since the vectors i*
+entire expression i Cand if consist of a 1 and the rest zeros, the
+¡ reduces to ckj, the entry in the kth row ano
+jth column of matrix C. Thus, Equation 6 becomes simply
+8; " (п) - 8; "(n- 1) =- пскібк" (n-1).
+(7)
+In other words, the decrease in error to the jth input/output pair due
+to a new learning trial is a constant times the error pattern on the new
+learning trial. The constant is given by the learning rate, n, times the
+correlation of the currently tested input and input from the learning
+trial. Thus, the degree to which learning affects performance on each
+test input is proportional to its correlation with the pattern just used in
+learning. Note that if n is small enough, the error to the presented pattern always decreases. In this case Equation 7 can be rewritten
+бк" (n) = 8к" (п- 1) (1- пкк).
+Recalling that Ckk is given by ikik, the length of the kth input vector,
+we can see that the error will always decrease provided |1 - nikik < 1.
+To summarize, this exercise has demonstrated that a mechanism can
+often be made more conceptually tractable by a judicious transforma-
+In this case, expressing the possible input and output representations in the appropriate pattern bases clarified the importance, indeed
+the sufficiency, of the input "structure" (i.e., the pattern of inner products among the input vectors) in determining the role of the input
+representations in learning. Furthermore, converting the weight matrix
+into a form from which the errors at any stage of learning can be read
+directly allowed us to "see" the learning more obviously. The result
+has been a clearer understanding of the operation of the delta rule for
+learning.
+STATISTICAL LEARNING
+In this section we extend our analysis of the delta rule from the case
+in which there is a fixed target output pattern for each input pattern to
+the case in which sets of input patterns are associated with sets of output patterns. We can think of the sets as representing categories of
+input and outputs. Thus, rather than associate particular input patterns
+with particular output patterns, we analyze the case in which categories
+of input patterns are associated with categories of output patterns. This,
+for example, might be the case if the system is learning that dogs bark.
+The representation for dog might differ on each learning trial with
+respect to size, shaggin@58pyfighted aleRa epresentation for the bark
+
+454 FORMAL ANALYSES
+might vary with regard to pitch, timbre, etc. In this case, the system is
+simultaneously learning the categories of dog and bark at the same time
+it is learning the association between the two concepts.
+In addition, when we have category associations, statistical relationships between the input and output patterns within a category can be
+picked up. For example, the system could learn that small dogs tend to
+have high-pitched barks whereas large dogs may tend to have lowpitched barks.
+In order to analyze the case of statistical learning, we now treat the
+input/output pairs of patterns as random variables. In other words,
+each time pattern ij is selected as input, its entries can take different
+values. Similarly, the target output for pair j, ty will have variable
+entries. The probability distributions of these random variables may
+take any form whatsoever, but they are assumed not to change over
+time. Moreover, we can consider the entire set of input/output pairs to
+form a single probability distribution. We then assume that on each
+trial an input/output pair is randomly sampled from this overall probability distribution.
+We proceed with our analysis of statistical learning by computing the
+expected or average change in the weight matrix following a presentation. From Equations 1 and 2 we get the following form of the delta
+rule:
+W(n)=W(n-1) +n/t(n)-W(n-1)i(n)JiT (n).
+Simplifying and taking the expected value of each side we have
+E[W(n)] = EIW(n-1)I(I-nEli(n)i"(n)I) +nE|t (n)iT (n)). (8)
+Note, we may take
+EW(n-1)i(n)iT(n)) = EIW(n-1)IEli(n)iT (n)]
+since each trial is assumed to be statistically independent of all preceding trials, upon which W(n - 1) depends. Letting R, = EliiT] be the
+pattern of statistical correlations among the input patterns and
+Rio = Elti"] be the statistical correlations between the input and target patterns, we can rewrite Equation 7 as
+ElW(n)]= EW(n-1)](I-mR,)+mR,o.
+If we solve the recursion by replacing W (n - 1) with an expression in
+terms of W (n- 2) etc. down to W(0) and assuming that W (0) = 0, the
+matrix of all O entries, we can write the expected value of the weight
+matrix after n trials as
+
+I1. THE DELTA RULE 455
+(9)
+EIW(n)]= nRo.
+Fortunately, in the limit, this matrix reduces to a simpler form. To see
+this, we must introduce the concept of the pseudo-inverse of a matrix.
+This is a matrix which, unlike the inverse, is certain to exist for all
+matrices, but which has a number of properties in common with an
+true inverse. (See Chapter 9 for a discussion of matrix inverses and the
+conditions under which they exist.) In particular, it is the true inverse,
+if the true inverse exists. The pseudo-inverse of a matrix B, designated
+Bt, is given by
+B+ = nB™Ž(1-nBB™
+j=1
+provided n is sufficiently small. (See Rao & Mitra, 1971, and
+Kohonen, 1977, 1984, for a full discussion of the pseudo-inverse.)
+In order to convert Equation 9 into a form that includes the expression for the pseudo-inverse, we observe that since the square matrix
+R, = EliiT] has independent rows and columns, we can select a
+matrix P such that PPT = R, and P also has linearly independent rows
+and columns. Since the generalized inverse of P, P+
+, is also the true
+inverse of P, it satisfies (PT)-IPT = I. Thus, taking the limit as
+n—∞ of Equation 9 and substituting P, we can write
+limEIW(n)|=EIW∞)=Rjo(PT)-'nPT[(I-nPPTy] (10)
+j=1
+Now, by substituting in for the pseudo-inverse of P and simplifying we
+get
+E[W.] = RIo (PT)-p+= Rio (PPT)'= RoR, ' (11)
+Since the rows and columns of R, are linearly independent, R,' = R$.
+So we finally get
+E|Wa]= RioRT.
+(12)
+Now we wish to show that, after training, the system will respond
+appropriately. Without further restrictions,
+we can demonstrate a
+minimal appropriateness of the response, namely, we can show that
+E[Wol) = Elt]. In other words, we can show that the mean output
+of the system, after learning, is the mean target. Since the test trials
+and learning trials are statistically independent we can write
+E[Woi|= E[W∞]Eli).
+
+456
+Now, substituting in from Equation 9 we have
+E[Wol] = RoR†Eli] = EltiT (iT)+lEli].
+Although it is not generally true that (BC) = C*Bt, this relation does
+hold for B = i and C = iT
+, where i is a column vector. Thus, we have
+E[Wai] = Elt (iti)T (iti)].
+Finally, since i has only one column, its columns are linearly independent and iti = 1. We have therefore obtained the desired result.
+Thus far we have only shown that the mean response to inputs is
+equivalent to the mean of the target patterns. This result says nothing
+about the appropriateness of the response to a particular pattern.
+Ideally we would want the expected response to a particular pattern to
+yield the expected value of our target given the input. We can show
+that the input will produce this result as long as i and t are distributed
+normally with zero means. Although this seems to be a strong assumption, it is not a difficult situation to obtain. First, we can easily arrange
+that the input patterns have zero means by simply having a bias feeding
+into each unit equal to minus the mean of the value for that cell of the
+pattern. This is not especially difficult, but we will not dwell on the
+process here. (See Chapter 8 for a discussion of biases and the learning
+of biases.) Suffice it to say that it is not very difficult to convert a set of
+input vectors into a set of patterns with zero mean.
+The requirement of normal distributions is often not as restrictive as
+it appears.
+When input patterns being associated are themselves the
+output cf a linear system, each entry in the pattern will be a linear combination of the original input's entries. If the patterns have large
+dimensionality (i.e., there are many components to the vectors), one
+obtains an approximation to an infinite series of random variables. A
+powerful central-limit theorem due to Lyapunov (Eisen, 1969, Ch. 13)
+shows that such a series will converge to a normal distribution so long
+as several weak assumptions hold (most importantly, the means and
+variances of each random variable must exist and none of the random
+variables may be excessively dominant).
+Under these conditions, it can be shown that the expected value of
+the target t given the input i, takes the form Elt|i] = RoR, 'i
+(Meditch, 1969, chap. 3). Since E[W.] = RoR, -'
+', we have shown
+that
+E[Woi]= Elt|i],
+(13)
+so that after a sufficient number of learning trials, the law of large
+numbers and the convegg&pyrighted alliarule learning process imply
+
+I1. THE DELTA RULE
+457
+that, given a particular input, the system will produce an output equal
+to the average of the targets paired with that input. In this sense, systematic covariation of input/output pairs will be learned.
+The Delta Rule and Multiple Linear Regression
+Some readers may have already noticed the similarity of the learning
+task we have been analyzing to the problem encountered in multiple
+linear regression. In a linear regression problem the objective is to
+predict, to the degree possible, one variable, say y, from a set of variables x. In these problems we typically wish to find a set of coefficients, b, such that
+(where xo is taken to be 1) and the sum-squared error
+j=]
+is minimized. This is precisely the problem that the delta rule seeks to
+solve. In this case, each element of the target vector for input/output
+pair (p tp) is analogous to a to-be-predicted observation y;; our prouiction variables x; are analogous to our input vectors ip; our regression
+coefficients b correspond to a row of the weight matrix W; and the
+intercept of the regression line, bo, corresponds to the bias often
+assumed for our units (cf. Chapter 8). In our typical case the target
+vectors have many components, so we are simultaneously solving a
+multiple regression problem for each of the components of the target
+vectors.
+Now, the standard result from linear regression, for zero-mean
+random variables, is that our estimate for the vector b, b is given by
+6 = (XTX)-'XTy
+where X is the matrix whose columns represent the values of the predictors and whose rows represent the individual observations. (Again,
+we take the first column to be all Is.) Now, note from Equation 12
+that the delta rule converges to
+E[W.] = (EliTi])+EliTt).
+
+458
+This equation is the strict analog of that from linear regression theory.?
+If we assume that each output unit has a bias corresponding to the
+intercept bo of the regression line, we can see that the delta rule is, in
+effect, an iterative method of computing the best, in the sense of least
+squares, linear regression coefficients for our problems.
+SUMMARY
+To summarize, this chapter has shown that close examination of the
+delta rule reveals a number of interesting and useful properties. When
+fixed patterns are being learned, the rule's operation can be elucidated
+by converting from a unit-based description to a pattern-based description. In particular, the analysis showed that the correlations between
+the input patterns, and not the specific patterns used, determined their
+effect on the learning process. Thus, any alteration of the specific
+input patterns that does not alter the correlations will have no effect on
+learning by a linear delta rule. It was also shown that expressing the
+inputs and outputs in terms of the patterns being learned facilitated
+analysis of the learning process by allowing one to read directly from
+the output produced the degree to which each target was present in the
+output generated by a given input pattern.
+When the patterns being learned are variable, it was noted that the
+final weight matrix could be expressed simply in terms of the intercorrelations among the input patterns, R,, and the correlations between
+the input and output patterns, Rio. It was also shown that when
+several reasonable requirements for the distribution of the input/output
+random variables are met, the delta rule will learn the pattern of covariation between the inputs and targets. Finally, we showed that the delta
+rule carries out the equivalent of a multiple linear regression from the
+input patterns to the targets. Those familiar with linear regression
+should conclude from this both the power of the rule and its
+weaknesses. In particular, wherever a linear regression is insufficient to
+provide a good account of the relationship between input and target palterns, the system will perform poorly. The solution to this problem is
+to have nonlinear units and intermediate layers of hidden units.
+Chapter 8 is a detailed discussion of the generalized delta rule and its
+application to these situations.
+2 Actually, there is a slight difference in convention between our development and that
+typical of linear regression. In our case, the stimulus vectors are the column vectors,
+whereas in linear regression the predictor variables are the rows of the matrix X. Thus
+this equation differs by a transposition from Equation 12. This has no consequences for
+the points made here.
+
+11. THE DELTA RULE
+459
+The preceding discussion does not, by any means, provide a complete analysis of the delta rule. Rather, it illustrates two important
+ideas. First, that a basic principle (in this case, the use of patternbased, rather than unit-based representations) can provide valuable
+insights into the operation of a useful mechanism; and second, that the
+analysis of component mechanisms which were designed for one use
+can often reveal new applications.
+
+CHAPTER 12
+Resource Requirements of
+Standard and Programmable Nets
+J. L. MCCLELLAND
+In several places in this book we have examined the capabilities of
+various models of parallel distributed processing. We have considered
+models that are guaranteed to do one thing or another-to learn, say,
+up to some criterion of optimality or to settle into global states with
+probabilities proportional to the goodness of the states. In later
+chapters, we describe various models of psychological or neurophysiological processes and consider how well they account for the data. The
+models, then, are held up against various criteria of computational,
+psychological, and sometimes physiological adequacy.
+In this chapter 1 raise another question about PDP models.
+I consider the resources they require, in terms of units and connections, to
+carry out a particular amount of work. This issue is touched on in various other places in the book, particularly Chapter 3. There we showed
+that a distributed model can often perform even an arbitrary mapping
+with less hardware than a local model would require to do the same
+task.
+In this chapter I continue this line of thinking and extend it in various ways, drawing on the work of several other researchers, particularly
+Willshaw (1971, 1981). The analysis is far from exhaustive, but it
+focuses on several fairly central questions about the resource requirements of PDP networks. In the first part of the chapter, I consider the
+resource requirements of a simple pattern associator.
+I review the
+analysis offered by Willshaw (1981) and extend it in one or two small
+ways, and I consider how it might be possible to overcome some
+
+12. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
+461
+limitations that arise in networks consisting of units with limited connectivity. In the second part of the chapter, I consider the resource
+requirements of a distributed version of the dynamically programmable
+networks described in Chapter 16.
+THE STANDARD PATTERN ASSOCIATOR
+In this section, we will consider pattern associator models similar to
+the models studied by J. A. Anderson (e.g., Anderson, 1983) and
+Kohonen (1977, 1984), and to the past-tense learning model described
+in Chapter 18. A small pattern associator is illustrated in Figure 1. A
+pattern associator consists of two sets of units, called input and output
+units, and a connection from each input unit to each output unit. The
+associator takes as input a pattern of activation on its input units and
+produces in response a pattern on the output units based on the connections between the input and output units.
+Different pattern associators make slightly different assumptions
+about the processing characteristics of the units. We will follow
+Willshaw's (1981) analysis of a particular, simple case; he used binary
+units and binary connections between units. Thus, units could take on
+activation values of 0 or 1. Similarly, the connections between the
+units could take on only binary values of 0 and 1.
+In Willshaw nets, processing is an extremely simple matter. A pattern of activation is imposed on the input units, turning each one either
+on or off. Each active input unit then sends a quantum of activation to
+each of the output units it has a switched-on connection to. Output
+units go on if the number of quanta they receive exceeds a threshold;
+otherwise they stay off.
+The learning rule Willshaw studied is equally simple. Training
+amounts to presenting each input pattern paired with the corresponding
+output pattern, and turning on the connection from each active input
+unit to each active output unit. This is, of course, a simple variant of
+Hebbian learning. Given this learning rule, it follows that when the
+input pattern of a known association is presented to the network, each
+of the activated input units will send one quantum of activation to all of
+the correct output units. This means that the number of quanta of
+activation each correct output unit will receive will be equal to the
+number of active input units.
+In examining the learning capacity of this network, Willshaw made
+several further assumptions. First, he assumed that all of the associations (or pairs of patterns) to be learned have the same number of
+active input units and thespyrightta Marthaftive output units. Second,
+
+462
+LY
+y
+y
+FIGURE 1. A pattern associator consisting of a set of input units (across the bottom)
+and output units (along the right side), with a connection from each input unit to each
+output unit.
+he assumed that the threshold of each output unit is set equal to the
+number of active input units. Given this assumption, only those output units with switched-on connections from all of the active input
+units will reach threshold.
+Now we can begin to examine the capacity of these networks. In
+particular, we can ask questions like the following. How many input
+units (n,) and output units (no) would be needed to allow retrieval of
+the correct mate of each of r different input patterns?
+The answer to such a question depends on the criterion of correct
+retrieval used. For present purposes, we can adopt the following criterion: All of the correct output units should be turned on, and, on the
+average, no more than one output unit should be turned on spuriously.
+
+12. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS 463
+Since the assumptions of the model guarantee that all the correct output units will be turned on when the correct input is shown, the
+analysis focuses on the number of units needed to store r patterns
+without exceeding the acceptable number of spurious activations.
+The answer to our question also depends on the number of units
+active in the input and output patterns in each pattern pair and on the
+similarity relations among the patterns. A very useful case that
+Willshaw considered is the case in which each of the r associations
+involves a random selection of m; input units and mo output units.
+From the assumption of randomness, it is easy to compute the probability that any given junction will be turned on after learning all r associations. From this it is easy to compute the average number of spurious activations. We will now go through these computations.
+First we consider the probability Pon that any given junction will end
+up being turned on, for a particular choice of the parameters ni, Mo, mi,
+mo, and r. Imagine that the r patterns are stored, one after the other,
+in the nino connections between the n; input units and the no output
+units. As each pattern is stored, it turns on m;m, of the nin, connec
+tions, so each junction in the network is turned on with probability
+m;mo/nino. The probability that a junction is not turned on by a single
+association is just 1 minus this quantity. Since each of the r associations is a new random sample of m; of the n; input units and mo of the
+no output units, the probability that a junction has not been turned
+on-or 1 minus the probability that it has been turned on-after r patterns have been stored is
+m; mo
+1 - Pon =
+1-
+Rearranging to solve for Pon we obtain
+т; т.
+Pon =1-
+nino
+Now that we know Pon, it is easy to calculate the number of spurious
+activations of output units. First, any output unit that should not be
+activated will be turned on if and only if all of its junctions from the mi
+active input units happen to be on. Given the assumption of randomness, this will occur with probability Pon
+, since each junction is on
+with probability Pon. Since there are no - mo output units that are candidates for spurious activation, the average number of spuriously
+activated units is
+(по -то) Pon
+
+464
+We want to keep this number less than 1. Adopting a slightly more
+stringent criterion to simplify the calculations, we can set
+1 > nopon,
+> Pon
+>1-1-
+nino
+Rearranging, we get
+<1-
+ть".
+For small positive x, log(1-x) = -x. If we restrict ourselves to cases
+where m; mo/n;m. <.1 - that is, reasonably sparse patterns in the sense
+that m<n/ VTO-the approximation will hold for the right-hand side of
+the equation, so that taking logs we get
+10111=
+т,т.
+ni no
+We can solve this for r, the number of patterns, to obtain
+(1)
+r<--
+т, т.
+Now, -108.1 to
+ranges upward from .69 for very sparse patterns
+where m, = logzno. Using .69 as a lower bound, we are safe if we say:
+т, то
+or
+n, no > 1.45rm, m..
+
+12. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS 465
+This result tells us that the number of storage elements (that is, connections, n; n.) that we need is proportional to the number of associations we wish to store times the number of connections (m;m.)
+activated in storing each association. This seems about right, intuitively. In fact, this is an upper bound rather greater than the true
+number of storage elements required for less sparse patterns, as can be
+seen by plugging values of m; greater than log2n, into Equation 1.
+It is interesting to compare Willshaw nets to various kinds of local
+representation. One very simple local representation would associate a
+single, active input unit with one or more active output units. Obviously, such a network would have a capacity of only n; patterns. We
+can use the connections of a Willshaw net more effectively with a distributed input if the input and output patterns are reasonably sparse.
+For instance, in a square net with the same number n of input and output units and the same number m of active elements in each, if
+n = 1000 and m = 10, we find that we can store about 7,000 associations instead of the 1,000 we could store using local representation over
+the input units.
+Another scheme to compare to the Willshaw scheme would be one
+that encodes each pattern to be learned with a single hidden unit
+between the input and output layers. Obviously a net that behaved perfectly in performing r associations between m; active input elements
+and mo active output units could be handcrafted using r hidden units,
+each having m; input connections and m. output connections. Such a
+network can be economical once it is wired up exactly right: It only
+needs r (m;t+m.) connections. However, there are two points to note.
+First, it is not obvious how to provide enough hardware in advance to
+handle an arbitrary r patterns of m, active input units and mo active
+output units. The number of such patterns possible is approximately
+(n."'/m;!) (no
+mmo!), and if we had to provide a unit in advance for
+each of these our hardware cost would get out of hand very fast.
+Second, the economy of the scheme is not due to the use of local
+representation, but to the use of hidden units. In many cases even
+more economical representation can be achieved with coarse-coded hidden units (see Chapter 3 and Kanerva, 1984).
+Randomly Connected Nets
+Returning to the standard Willshaw net, there are several minor difficulties with Willshaw's scheme. First, it assumes that each input unit
+sends one and only one connection to each output unit. In a neural
+network, we might assomyrigidedimaterianit sends out a randomly
+
+466 FORMAL ANALYSES
+distributed array of connections to the set of output units without any
+guarantee that each output unit actually receives a connection. Second,
+the analysis depends on a rather strict and sharp threshold for output
+unit activation. In a random net rather than a fully connected net, we
+could not actually guarantee that a given output unit would in fact
+receive m; inputs; and in realistic nets, we would expect there to be
+some inherent variability in the activations of the units. Thus, we
+would not be able to guarantee that all correct units woold exceed the
+sharp threshold, nor that all incorrect units would fall below it.
+However, it turns out that we can reformulate the problem just
+slightly and get a handle on networks that have these properties.
+Assume that we have a square network of n input and n output units
+and that we wish to store associations between m active input units and
+m active output units. Suppose each input unit has f output connections which fall where they may among the n output units so that the
+output units have an average of f inputs each. Note again that the
+connections are randomly distributed without restriction so that there is
+no guarantee that input unit i projects to output unit j.
+To study the performance of this net, imagine storing some number
+r of patterns using the Willshaw learning scheme. During testing, we
+will examine the number of active inputs each output unit that should
+be turned on will receive and the number of active inputs each unit
+that should not be turned on will receive, and we will then calculate the
+signal-detection measure of sensitivity d' (Green & Swets, 1966) as an
+index of the ability of inputs reaching each output unit to distinguish
+between units that should be on and units that should not be on. Since
+d'is independent of the threshold, this measure allows us to bypass the
+question of the threshold itself.
+Let us first consider what happens in our random network as we train
+it with pairs of patterns using Willshaw's scheme. Pick an arbitrary
+connection in our net between an arbitrary input unit and an arbitrary
+output unit. Now, consider learning an arbitrary pattern. The probability that a particular input unit will be on is m/n. Similarly, the probability that a particular output unit will be on is m/n. The probability
+that the units joined by the particular connection we are considering
+will be one of the ones turned on in learning a particular pattern, then,
+is mn? just as before. The rest of the earlier analysis still applies, and
+we get
+m'
+Pon =1-
+1-
+This is exactly the same value that we had before in the original
+Willshaw model, and it is independent of S, the number of connections
+
+12. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
+467
+each unit makes. This factor will become important soon, but it does
+not affect the probability that a particular connection will be on after
+learning r patterns.
+Now consider what happens during the testing of a particular learned
+association. We activate the correct m input units and examine the
+mean number of quanta of activation that each output unit that should
+be on will receive. The m active input units each have f outputs, so
+there are mf total "active" connections.
+A particular one of these connections reaches a particular output unit with probability 1/n, since
+each connection is assumed to fall at random among the n output units.
+Thus, the average number of active connections each output unit
+receives will simply be mf/n. For output units that should be on, each
+of these connections will have been turned on during learning, so
+mf/n is the average number of quanta that unit will receive. Assuming that n is reasonably large, the distribution of this quantity is
+approximately Poisson, so its variance is also given by mf/n.
+Units that should not be on also receive an arbitrary connection from
+an active input unit with probability 1/n, but each such connection is
+only on with probability Pon. Thus, the average number of quanta such
+units receive is (mf/n)Don. This quantity is also approximately Poisson, so its variance is also equal to its mean.
+Our measure of sensitivity, d', is the difference between these means
+divided by the square root of the average of the variances. That is,
+mf/n (1-Pon)
+d'=
+ms/n) (1 + Pon)/2
+Simplifying, this becomes
+d'= Smf/n
+1-Pon
+(2)
+We can get bounds on the true value of d'by noting that the denominator above cannot be greater than 1 or less than h. The largest
+value of the denominator sets a lower bound on d', so we find that
+d'> Vmf/n (1-Pon).
+Substituting for 1 - Pon, we obtain
+d'= ums/n 1-
+m'
+(3)
+
+468
+Taking logs of both sides, invoking the log(1 - x) = -x approximation, and solving for r, we obtain
+n?
+10g(mf/n) - 2l0g(d) .
+One of the first things to note from this expression is its similarity to
+the expression we had for the case of Willshaw's fully connected net.
+In particular, if we let f = n, so that each unit sends an average of one
+connection to reach another unit, we get
+rS.5 m7 108(m) - 2108(d)]
+(4)
+The expression in brackets on the right expresses the fact that the capacity of the net goes down as the sensitivity we want to achieve goes up
+and captures the fact that there is a slight benefit as we increase m,
+independent of its effect on the ratio of total connections to connections activated per association. This is due to the fact that the distributions of activations of correct and spurious units pull apart as m gets
+larger. These are relatively small factors for moderate values of m and
+d'. More important, as before, is the ratio of the number of connections (n?) relative to the average number of connections each pattern
+takes up (m').
+Effects of Limited Fan-Out
+A new result emerges when we consider other possible values for f:
+Equation 3 indicates that d' is directly proportional to the square root of
+f. Thus, we can achieve any degree of fidelity we require by increasing
+I though returns diminish as f gets bigger and bigger. Alternatively,
+the performance of our network will degrade gracefully as fan-out is
+reduced.
+We can also see that increases in n are no longer uniformly beneficial. The term log(mf /n) decreases a n increases; we can no longer
+increase the capacity indefinitely simply by increasing n.
+Figure 2 indicates a discovery of Mitchison (personal communication, 1984) concerning the capacity r of a network as a function of n
+for several values of m and I, with d'= 5. Capacity depends roughly
+on n'/m' and is relatively insensitive to S as long as vmf/n >> d'
+However, as n increases we reach a point where Vmf/n approaches d';
+
+12. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
+469
+Log Capacity
+5.0
+4.0
+3.0
+2.0
+100 1060
+-1.0
+1.0
+2.0
+3.0
+4.0
+5.0
+6.0
+Log number of Units
+7.0
+8.0
+FIGURE 2. Effects of limited fan-out in a randomly connected associative net as a function of the log of n, the number of input and output units; for different values of m, the
+number of active units in each input and output pattern, indicated below each pair of
+curves. The upper member of each pair of curves is for fan-out of 10,000; the lower
+member is for fan-out of 1,000. In all cases, the y-axis reflects the log of the maximum
+number of patterns that can be stored while maintaining a d'of 5. Calculations are based
+on Equation 2 (Equation 3 gives misleading results for V mf /n near d').
+here capacity levels off and further increases in n result in no further
+increase in sensitivity. The maximal capacity achievable by increasing
+n is invariant, regardless of the value of m, and depends only on d'and
+f. Thus, if we were to pick a fixed value of d', we would find that the
+maximum number of patterns we could store would be strictly limited
+by j.
+Biological limits on storage capacity of neural nets. With these analyses in mind, we can now consider what limits biological hardware
+might place on the storage capacity of a neural net. Of course, we must
+be clear on the fact that we are considering a very restricted class of
+distributed models and there is no guarantee that our results will generalize. Nevertheless, it is reasonably interesting to consider what it
+would take to store a large body of information, say, a million different
+pairs of patterns, with each pattern consisting of a 1,000 active input
+units and 1,000 active output units.
+To be on the safe side, let's adopt a d'of 5. With this value, if the
+units have an unbiased threshold, the network will miss less than 1% of
+
+470 FORMAL ANALYSES
+the units that should be on and false alarm to less than 1% of the units
+that should be off.'
+How big would a net have to be to meet these specifications?
+Assuming a fully connected net, and consulting Equation 4, we find
+that we need to set n equal to a value near about 106 to get r large
+enough.
+This number of units is not a serious problem since estimates of the
+number of units in the brain generally range upward from 101° (see
+Chapter 20). However, individual units are not generally assumed to
+have enough connections for this scheme to work as stated. If there
+are 1,000 to 10,000 connections per unit, as suggested in Chapter 20,
+we are off by two to three orders of magnitude in the number of connections per unit.
+Given this limitation on fan-out, we had better consult Figure 2.
+The figure indicates that the maximum capacity of a net with a fan-out
+of 1,000 and a d'of 5 is only about 150 patterns. With f = 10,000 we
+get up to a capacity of about 15,000 patterns, but we are still well short
+of the mark. It seems, then, that the fan-out of neurons drastically
+limits the capacity of a distributed network.
+A simple method for overcoming the fan-out limitation. But all is
+not completely lost. It turns out that it is a relatively simple matter to
+overcome the fan-out limitation. The trick is simply to use multiple
+layers of units. Let each input unit activate a set of what we might call
+dispersion units, and let each output unit receive input from a set of collection units. Let the f outgoing connections of each of the dispersion
+units be randomly distributed among the "dendrites" of the collection
+units. A miniature version of this scheme is illustrated in Figure 3.
+Note that it is assumed that each dispersion unit is driven by a single
+input unit, and each collection unit projects to a single output unit.
+Collection units are assumed to be perfectly linear so that the net input
+to each output unit is just the sum of the net inputs to the collector
+units that project to it. Assuming each input unit and each dispersion
+unit has a fan-out of f, the effective fan-out of the input and dispersion layers together becomes f'. Similarly, the set of collection units
+feeding into each output unit collect an average of f' connections. To
+construct an associator of 1 million input units by 1 million output
+units assuming each unit has a fanout of 1,000, we will need 1 billion
+dispersion units and 1 billion collection units. The number of connections between the dispersion units and the collection units would be on
+the order of 1012
+, or 1 trillion connections.
+1 It should be pointed out that any intrinsic noise in the units would reduce the actual
+observed sensitivity.
+
+12. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
+471
+FIGURE 3. A diagram of a multilayer network consisting of an input layer, a dispersion
+layer, a collection layer, and an output layer. The network serves to square the effective
+fan-out of each input unit, relative to the simple two-layer case.
+The network would require about 20% of human cortex, based on
+the estimate that there are 105 neurons under each square millimeter of
+the brain and that there are about 10' square millimeters of cortical surface. This might be a little tight, but if the fan-out were 10,000, the
+network would fit handily. In that case, it would only require about 2
+percent of the 101° units.
+There are, of course, a lot of reasons to doubt that these figures
+represent anything more than a first-order estimate of the capacity of
+real associative networks. There are several oversimplifications, including for example the assumption that the dispersion units are each
+driven by a single connection.
+We must also note that we have
+assumed a two-layer net along with an extremely simple learning rule.
+The intermediate layers postulated here merely serve to provide a way
+of overcoming the fan-out limits of individual units. However, as was
+pointed out in Chapters 7 and 8, a multilayer net can often learn to
+construct its own coding schemes that are much more efficient than the
+random coding schemes used here. Even simple two-layer nets can
+profit if there are some pyramited Matera network and if they use a
+
+472
+sensible learning rule, as shown in Chapter 18. Thus random nets like
+the ones that have been analyzed in this section probably represent a
+lower limit on efficiency that we can use as a benchmark against which
+to measure "smarter" PDP mechanisms.
+Effects of Degradation and the Benefits of Redundancy
+One virtue of distributed models is their ability to handle degradation, either of the input pattern or of the network itself. The d'
+analysis allows us to tell a very simple story about the effects of degradation. In this section I will just consider the effects of degradation by
+removal, either of a random fraction of the pattern or of a random fraction of the connections in the network; effects of added noise will be
+considered later on. In the case of removal, we can think of it either in
+terms of presenting an incomplete pattern or actually destroying some
+of the input units so that parts of the pattern are simply no longer
+represented. Consider the case of a network that has already been
+trained with some number of patterns so that Pon can be treated as a
+constant. Then we can write the equation relating d'to m, f, and n as
+d'→ KVmf/n.
+Now, suppose that during testing we turn on only some proportion Pi
+of the m units representing a pattern. The m in the above equation
+becomes mp,, so we see that the sensitivity of the network as indexed
+by d' falls off as the square root of the fraction of the probe that is
+presented. Similarly, suppose some of the connections leading out of
+each unit are destroyed, leaving a random intact proportion pi of the
+mf active connections. Again, the sensitivity of the network will be
+proportional to the square root of the number of remaining connections. Thus, performance degrades gracefully under both kinds of
+damage.
+Another frequently noted virtue of distributed memories is the
+redundancy they tend naturally to provide. The ability of simple distributed memories to cope with degraded input patterns is really just a
+matter of their redundancy, as Willshaw (1981) pointed out. For, if a
+network is fully loaded, in the sense that it can hold no more associations and still meet some predetermined standard of accuracy with complete patterns, it will not be able to meet that same criterion with degradation. The only way to guard against this problem is to load the network lightly enough so that the criterion can still be met after subjecting the network or the inputs to the specified degree of degradation.
+
+12. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
+473
+PROGRAMMABLE PATTERN ASSOCIATORS
+In this section, I extend the sort of analysis we have performed on
+simple associator models to the resource requirements of connection
+information distribution (CID) networks of the type discussed in
+Chapter 16.
+The mechanism shown in Figure 4 is a distributed CID mechanism.
+The purpose of this network is to allow connection information stored
+in a central associative network to be used to set connections in several
+local or programmable networks in the course of processing so that more
+Centrai Output Units
+CA Units
+Central
+Input
+Units
+-0
+g5555
+Local Input Units
+• Local Input Units
+FIGURE 4. A connection information distribution (CID) network consisting of two
+local, programmable networks; a central, standard
+network; and a set of connection
+activation (CA) units. Each local input unit projects to the corresponding central input
+unit, and each CA unit projects to the corresponding connection in both local networks.
+Central output units turn on CA units relevant to processing the patterns they program
+the local modules to process. Topyrighted Material are a few examples of each type.
+
+474 FORMAL ANALYSES
+than one input pattern can be processed at one time. The mechanism
+works as follows: One or more patterns to be processed are presented
+as inputs, with each pattern going to the input units in a different programmable network. The input pattern to each local net is also
+transmitted to the input units of the central associative network. When
+more than one pattern is presented at a time, the input to the central
+network is just the pattern that results from superimposing all of the
+input patterns. This pattern, via the connections in the central associative network, causes a pattern of activation over the central output
+units. The central output pattern, of course, is a composite representation of all of the input patterns. It is not itself the desired output of
+the system, but is the pattern that serves as the basis for programming
+(or turning on connections) in the local, programmable networks. The
+local networks are programmed via a set of units called the connection
+activation (CA) units. The CA units act essentially as switches that
+turn on connections in the programmable networks. In the version of
+the model we will start with, each CA unit projects to the one specific
+connection it corresponds to in each programmable network, so there
+are as many CA units as there are connections in a single programmable net. In the figure, the CA units are laid out so that the location of
+each one corresponds to the location of the connection it commands in
+each of the programmable networks.
+To program the local networks, then, central output units activate the
+CA units corresponding to the connections needed to process the patterns represented on the central output units. The CA units turn on
+the corresponding connections. This does not mean that the CA units
+actually cause activation to pass to the local output units. Rather, they
+simply enable connections in the programmable nets. Each active local
+input unit sends a quantum of activation to a given local output unit if
+the connection between them is turned on.
+The question we will be concerned with first is the number of CA
+units required to make the mechanism work properly. In a later section, we will consider the effect of processing multiple items simultaneously on the resource requirements of the central network.
+Connection Activation Unit Requirements
+Consider a CID mechanism containing programmable networks of n;
+by no units in which we wish to be able to associate each of s different
+output patterns with each of s different input patterns arising at the
+same time in different local networks. Input and output patterns consist of m; by mo active units, respectively.
+Following the assumptions
+
+12. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
+475
+for Willshaw nets, we assume binary units and connections, and we
+assume that output units are turned on only if they receive m
+quanta of
+activation.
+Now, let us consider how many CA units are needed to implement
+this mechanism. For now we bypass the bottom-up activation of CA
+units and assume instead that we know in advance which connections
+need to be turned on. If each local network must be as complex as a
+standard network capable of processing r different patterns, we are in
+serious trouble. In the previous analysis of Willshaw networks, we
+found that the number of connections we needed to process r associations of m by m active units was
+n.= nin. =1.45rm;m..
+It looks as though the number of connections required in each local
+network grows linearly with the number of known patterns times the
+content of each. If we had one CA unit for each programmable connection, a programmable version of our square 1-million-pattern associator would require 10' CA units, a figure which is one or two orders of
+magnitude larger than conventional estimates of the number of units in
+the brain. Just putting the matter in terms of the cost we must bear to
+use programmable connections, it appears that we need n? CA units
+just to specify the connections needed for a standard net that could do
+the same work with just the connections between n input and n output
+units.?
+However, things are not nearly as bad as this argument suggests.
+The computation I just gave misses the very important fact that it is
+generally not necessary to pinpoint only those connections that are
+relevant to a particular association. We can do very well if we allow
+each CA unit to activate a whole cohort of connections, as long as (a)
+we activate all the connections that we need to process any particular
+pattern of interest, and (b) we do not activate so many that we give rise
+to an inordinate number of spurious activations of output units.
+The idea of using one CA unit for a whole cohort of programmable
+connections is a kind of coarse coding. In this case, we will see that we
+can reap a considerable benefit from coarse coding, compared to using
+one CA unit per connection. A simple illustration of the idea is shown
+in Figure S. The figure illustrates CA units projecting to a single one
+2 Many readers will observe that the CA units are not strictly necessary. However, the
+specificity of their connections to connections in local networks is an issue whether CA
+units are used as intermediaries or not. Thus, even if the CA units were eliminated, it
+would not change the relevance of the following results. In a later section, the CA units
+and central output units will be collapsed into one set of units; in that case, this analysis
+will apply directly to the numberopyhighted Matertape required.
+
+476
+FIGURE 5. A programmable network with 8 input units and 8 output units and 64 programmable connections. Each of the 16 connection activation units is assumed to project
+1o a random set of 4 programmable connections. These connections are only drawn in
+for two of the CA units. The sets of connections are chosen without replacement so that
+each connection is programmed by one and only one CA unit. Whenever a CA unit is
+on it turns on all of the connections it projects to.
+of iwo programmable networks. Note that a given CA unit must
+activate the same connections in each programmable net when there is
+more than one.
+One Pattern at a Time
+To see how much this scheme can buy us, I will start by considering
+the case in which we want to program some local nets to process a single pattern. We ask, how small a number nca of CA units can we ge:
+
+12. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
+477
+by with, assuming that each one activates a distinct, randomly selected
+set of n, no/ Nca connections?
+First of all, the number of CA units that must be activated may have
+to be as large as mimo, in case each of the different connections
+required to process the pattern is a member of a distinct cohort.
+Second, for comparability to our analysis of the standard network, we
+want the total fraction of connections turned on to allow no more than
+an average of 1 output unit to be spuriously activated. As before, this
+constraint is represented by
+Pon 5
+1
+n;
+m;
+As long as m; > logzni,.S will be less than the right-hand side of the
+expression, so we will be safe if we keep Pon less than or equal to. 5.
+Since we may have to activate mim, CA units to activate all the right
+connections and since we do not want to activate more than half of the
+connections in all, we conclude that
+Mca ≥ 2m;mo.
+From this result we discover that the number of CA units required
+does not depend at all on the number of connections in each programmable network. Nor in fact does it depend on the number of different
+known patterns. The number of known patterns does of course influence the complexity of the central network, but it does not affect the
+number of CA units. The number of CA units depends on m; mo, the
+number of connections that need to be turned on per pattern. Obviously, this places a premium on the sparseness of the patterns. Regardless of this, we are much better off than before.
+Several Patterns at a Time
+So far we have considered the case in which only one item is
+presented for processing at a time. However, the whole point of the
+connection information distribution scheme is that it permits simultaneous processing of several different patterns. There is, however, a cost
+associated with simultaneous processing, since for each pattern we need
+to turn on all the connections needed to process it.
+In this situation,
+we will need to increase the total number of CA units to increase the
+specificity of the set of connections each association requires if we are
+10 keep the total fractio@pfightedemic nathat have been turned on
+
+478
+below .S. Formally, assume that we know which s patterns we want to
+process. Each one will need to turn on its own set of mim. CA units
+out of the total number nca of CA units. The proportion of connections turned on will then be
+m; mo
+Pon = 1-
+1-
+Mca
+This formula is, of course, the same as the one we saw before for the
+number of connections activated in the standard net with s, the
+number of different patterns to be processed simultaneously, replacing
+r, the number of patterns stored in the memory, and with Mca, the
+number of connection activation units, replacing n, no, the total number
+of connections. Using Pon = . 5 and taking the log of both sides we get
+- 69 - s108 1-
+Mca
+Invoking the log(1 - x) = -x approximation, we obtain
+пса > 1.45sm?.
+This formula underestimates nca slightly for s< 3. With this caveat,
+the number of CA units required is roughly proportional to the number
+of patterns to be processed at one time, times the number of connections needed to process each pattern.
+Overlapping the Programmable Networks
+In Chapter 16, the CID scheme we have been considering thus far
+was generalized to the case where the programmable networks overlapped with each other. This allowed strings of letters starting in any of
+a large number of input locations to correctly activate units for the
+corresponding word at the appropriate location at the next higher level.
+Here I will consider a more general overlapping scheme using distributed representations in the overlapping local networks. A set of three
+overlapping local networks is illustrated in Figure 6.
+In this scheme,
+both the input and the output units can play different roles depending
+on the alignment of the input pattern with the input units. In consequence, some of the connections also play more than one role. These
+connections are assumed to be programmable by a number of different
+CA units, one for each of the connection's different roles. Obviously,
+this will tend to increase the probability that a connection will be turned
+
+12. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
+479
+JJ
+
+FIGURE 6. Three overlapping programmable networks of 8x8 units each. The networks overlap every four units, so the input and output units can participate in two different, partially overlapping networks.
+on, and therefore will require a further revision of our estimate of the
+number of CA units required.
+Unfortunately, an exact mathematical analysis is a bit tricky due to
+the fact that different junctions have different numbers of opportunities
+to be turned on. In addition, input patterns in adjacent locations will
+tend to cross-activate each other's output units. If the patterns to be
+processed are well separated, this will not be a problem. Restricting our
+attention to the well-separated case, we can get an upper bound on the
+cost in CA units of allowing overlapping modules by considering the
+case where all of the connections are assumed to play the maximum
+number of roles. This number is equivalent to the step size or grain,
+8, of the overlap, relative righfed Maleriale pattern as a whole. For
+
+480
+example, for four-letter words, if the increments in starting places of
+successive overlapping networks were one letter wide, 8 would be 4.
+Assuming that the connections turned on for each slice of a pattern are
+independent of those turned on by each other slice, it is easy to show
+that the formula for Pon becomes
+т,т.
+sg
+Pon ≤1-
+1-
+Mca
+and the number of CA units required to keep Pon less than S is approximated by
+Mca > 1.45s g m; mo.
+The cost goes up with the number of patterns to be processed simultaneously times the grain of the overlap.
+Summary of CA Unit Requirements
+In summary, the number of CA units required to program a programmable network depends on different variables than the number of
+connections required in a standard associator. We can unify the two
+analyses by noting that both depend on the number of patterns the net
+must be ready to process at any given time. For the standard associator, the number is r, the number of known patterns; for the programmable net, the number is s8, the number of patterns the net is programmed for times the grain of overlap allowed in the starting locations
+of input patterns.
+This analysis greatly increases the plausibility of the CID scheme.
+For we find that the "initial investment" in CA units needed to program a set of networks to process a single association is related to the
+content of the association or the number of connections required to
+allow each of the active input elements to send a quantum of activation
+to each of the active output elements. Incorporating a provision for
+overlapping networks, we find that the investment required for processing one association is related to the content of the association times the
+grain of the overlap. This cost is far more reasonable than it looked
+like it might be at first, and, most importantly, it does not depend on
+the number of patterns known.
+An additional important result is that the cost of programming a set
+of networks grows with the number of patterns we wish to program for
+at one time. This cost seems commensurate with the linear speedup we
+would get by being ab&obyngree matena
+sęveral patterns simultaneously.
+
+12. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
+481
+The somewhat intangible benefit to be derived from mutual constraint
+among the patterns would come over and above the simple linear
+throughput effect. However, this benefit, as we shall see in the next
+section, is balanced by the extra cost associated with the possibility that
+there might be spurious patterns in the intersection of input elements
+of the presented patterns.
+The Cost of Simultaneous Access
+So far, we have proceeded as though we already knew what patterns
+to prepare each local module for. However, the CID mechanism was
+intended to allow several inputs to access the central network simultaneously and thereby program the local networks in the course of processing. This simultaneous access costs something; in this section we
+consider how much. The discussion here is relevant to the general issue
+of the costs of simultaneous access to a PDP network, as well as to the
+specific question of the capacity requirements of CID.
+For simplicity I will begin by considering local representations at the
+central output level. That is, I will assume that each central output unit
+represents a different pattern and that it is switched on only when all of
+the central input units corresponding to its pattern are active.
+Now, recall that a central input unit is switched on if the corresponding unit is active in any of the programmable nets. Thus, what the central output units actually see is the pattern of activation that results
+from the superimposition of the input patterns presented for simultaneous processing. The effect of this is that there is some possibility that
+ghosts of patterns not actually presented will show up in the result.
+This is just the kind of situation that is described in Chapter 16 when
+similar words such as SAND and LANE are presented to each of two
+programmable networks for simultaneous processing. When the activation patterns of the two words are superimposed, the central word units
+for LAND and SANE get turned on just as strongly as the central word
+units for SAND and LANE. Thus, the programmable networks end up
+being programmed to process any one of these four words, rather than
+just any one of the two actually presented.
+Is there anything that can be done to control the number of different
+patterns that show up when several patterns are superimposed? In fact,
+there/is. If we increase the number of input units in each programmable network or if we reduce the number of input units active in each
+pattern, we will reduce the possibility of spurious patterns showing up
+in the superposition.
+
+482
+To get a quantitative grip on this matter, assume that the input patterns are random selections of m out of the n input units as we have
+been assuming throughout. The probability that a spurious pattern is
+present in the superposition of s patterns can now be easily calculated
+First, we calculate the probability that a randomly selected unit will be
+on; this is just
+1 - (1- m/n)s.
+The probability that a particular spurious pattern is fully represented in
+the set of units activated by the s patterns is just this number to the
+power m, and the average number of such patterns out of r known patterns is just this probability times r - s. Thus, the average number of
+spurious patterns present in the superposition is
+(r-s)[1- (1-m/n)sm.
+Assuming r >> s, we can simplify by replacing r - s with r. If we
+take acceptable performance to be an average of one or fewer spurious
+patterns present and therefore of spurious CP units active, we get
+1=r|1- 11-m/n)sm.
+Rearranging and taking logs,
+log
+1-(÷)m
+= slog (1 - m/n).
+Several things are apparent from this equation. First, the number of
+patterns that can be processed at one time increases with the number of
+input units. The effect is approximately linear as long as m/n ≤ 1.
+Second, though it is not quite as straightforward, s tends to increase
+with a decrease in m. For example, suppose n= 5,000 and
+r = 10,000. In this case, when m drops from 1,000 to 500, s increases
+from 21 to about 37; if m drops to 100, s goes up to about 120. Third,
+for a fixed m and n, especially for large m, we can make very large
+changes in r with only minimal impact on s. Thus, if we have, say,
+n = 10,000 and m = 1,000 with r = 10%, we get s = 43; if we reduce r
+to 105
+S, we only get an increase of 2 in s, to 45.
+If we allow overlapping local networks, and we assume that the patterns are random with independent subparts, we need only replace s in
+the preceeding equation with sg. While this is a fairly steep cost, it is
+still the case that reasonably moderate values of n (about 2.5 x105)
+would be sufficient to process 10 out of 10° known patterns of size
+1,000 simultaneously with a grain of 100.
+
+12. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
+483
+Simultaneous Access to Distributed Representations
+The results just described, it must be remembered, depend on the
+use of local representations at the central output level. What happens if
+we consider simultaneously accessing distributed representations
+instead? Obviously this question remains relevant to general questions
+about simultaneous access, as well as to the situation that would arise
+using distributed central output units in CID. Furthermore, we should
+note that the central output units in Figure 4 simply mediate a mapping
+from one distributed representation-on the central input units-to
+another-on the CA units. The present analysis describes what would
+happen if we simply collapsed these two sets of units into one, activating the connections directly from the central output units.
+We consider a case exactly like the one we were just considering,
+except that now the output representation is not a single unit per pattern, but mo active units on out of no central output units. We consider iwo somewhat separate questions. First, if we superimpose
+several input patterns, what effect does this have on d'at the central
+output level, relative to the case where only a single pattern is shown?
+Second, what is the probability that ghosts of whole patterns not
+presented will show up in the output of the central network?
+To begin our analysis of the first question, recall from Equation 2 the
+expression for d'in random nets with full fan-out (n = f):
+d'=
+1 - Pon
+m;
+1 + Pon /2
+We first ask, what is the effect on d'of turning on spurious input units
+with probability p, in addition to the m units representing a particular
+pattern to be processed? The number M; of input units that will then
+be on is
+M; = m; + (n; -m;)p.
+Consider first, output units that should not be on. These will receive
+M, active inputs, and each of these connections will be on with probability Pon. The output units that should be on will receive m; inputs on
+the input lines whose connections were turned on in learning the
+presented pattern plus (n; - m;)p inputs to connections that will have
+been turned on in learning other patterns with probability Pon. The
+numerator for our revised expression will then simply reduce to its old
+value, with the (n, - m;)p term canceling out. However, there will be
+an increase in variance, and hence a decrease in d'. The denominator
+is as before the square ropyrghed wateraof the variances of the iwo
+
+484
+means, which are, also as before, equal to the means. The expression
+for d' therefore becomes
+(1 - Pon)
+d'= m
+Im; + MiPon + 2(n, -m,)p 12'
+We get a simpler expression if we approximate by replacing Pon in the
+denominator with its maximum value of 1; this gives us a slight overestimate of the variance and therefore a slight underestimate of d':
+d'> m
+(1 - Pon)
+The variance goes up with the mean number of spuriously activated
+units, and d' goes down with the effect of this on the square root of the
+variance.
+To determine the effect of presenting several patterns on d', we note
+that from the point of view of the units that belong to one of the patterns, all the units activated by the other patterns are spurious. The
+number of such units is
+1 - (1 - m;/n,)s-1
+Inserting this for p in the previous equation gives
+(1 - Pon)
+d'= m
+m; + (n; -m;)[I - (1- m;/ n.)s]
+Using this equation we can examine the effects of increasing s on the
+value of d'. Not too surprisingly, d' does go down as s goes up, but
+the effect is relatively benign. For example, with n = 106, r = 10°
+m = 1,000, and s = 1, d' is about 11.6. It drops to half that value at
+s = 4, and drops much more gradually thereafter. With n= 2x10°
+units and the same values of r and m, we can get an acceptable value
+of d' (> 6) with s as high as 16.
+The final issue we will consider is the possibility that new spurious
+output patterns have been introduced in the superposition of the s output patterns simultaneously activated in processing the s input patterns.
+For simplicity, we will just consider the probability of a "ghost," given
+that all and only the correct mo units are active for each of the s patterns. The analysis is entirely the same as the one we gave before for
+the probability of ghosts showing up in the input patterns. We get an
+average of one ghost when
+1>11 - 11-m/n)slm
+
+12. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
+485
+As before, the number of simultaneous patterns we can tolerate
+increases with n and decreases with m and is relatively insensitive to
+In general, it appears that the probability of ghosts occurring can be
+kept small with sufficiently large dedication of resources, but these
+trade off approximately linearly with s. With fixed n, we must simply
+make the patterns sparser or tolerate some loss of sensitivity.
+Discussion
+This analysis of the resource requirements of networks like the CID
+model has discovered a number of basic results. In essence, the picture
+is really a very simple one. The resource requirements of CID depend
+on the number of programmable networks one wants to program for at
+once.
+The number of connections needed in each local network
+depends on the number of patterns to be programmed for and is
+independent of r. the number of known patterns. In the central network, the number of units required to keep spurious activations under
+control grows with s, as does the number of units required to keep
+ghosts from emerging in the input and output patterns. It is worth
+noting, also, that the probability of ghosts increases as we increase m.
+The fact that the resource requirements of the local networks are
+independent of the number of patterns known is obviously important.
+Relative to the central network, it means that the local networks are
+very cheap. The number of distinct inputs that are needed to program
+them is quite reasonable, and, as I will explain, we can even get by with
+far fewer units in the local networks than we need at the central level.
+On the other hand, the results concerning the costs of simultaneous
+access to the central network are much less encouraging for the CID
+scheme. Using local or distributed representations in the central
+module, the unit requirements grow with the product of s and r-a
+very expensive proposition since the number of central connections will
+then grow as sr?
+However, there are several important further observations. One is
+that, at fixed numbers of units and patterns known, the degradation of
+sensitivity as a function of s is rather gradual. And, given a lightly
+loaded network, one can take s up to reasonable values without catastrophe. Simultaneous access by multiple patterns is very much like
+degradation: a network can handle it without a noticeable decrement of
+function if it is lightly loaded. A second observation concerns the limits of coarse coding. Foespyightedmaleria of m essentially amounts
+
+486 FORMAL ANALYSES
+to a question of how coarse the code is: Large m corresponds to very
+coarse coding, and small m corresponds to very fine coding. As we saw
+in Chapter 3, the ability to represent several patterns at a time goes
+down as the coding gets coarser. For simultaneous processing we need
+sparse patterns, with each unit serving as a rather sharply tuned conjunctive detector.
+The final observation is that large costs are associated with simultaneous access to the central network. This fact has lead me to the
+view that it is probably most reasonable to imagine that we must probably restrict simultaneous access, except perhaps in the case of small,
+compact and well-differentiated subpatterns like letters. I incorporated
+this idea of restricted access in the programmable blackboard model of
+reading by assuming that we program successive parts of the programmable blackboard sequentially, using only the contents of the spotlight
+of attention to access the central network; but that the local networks
+so programmed continue to process and hold patterns of activation and
+to allow those patterns to interact with one and other after the spotlight
+of attention has moved on. In this way we get the best of both worlds:
+sequential access to central knowledge, combined with interactive parallel processing of several stimuli in the programmable nets. Another
+point is that it may be a good idea to dissociate the inputs to the local
+networks and the inputs to the central networks. Throughout this
+chapter and Chapter 16, I have assumed that the units in each local network would be isomorphic to units in the central network. However,
+there is no reason for them to be. The central network needs much
+higher "resolution" (n proportional to r) than the local networks (n
+proportional to s). Thus, the units in the programmable modules need
+only provide a few primitive clues to which of the s patterns are to be
+represented in their outputs, while the units in the central network
+would require a much higher-resolution representation.
+CONCLUSION
+This chapter has indicated how Willshaw's fruitful analysis of simple
+pattern associator models can be extended in several directions. These
+extensions have lead to several interesting observations, particularly
+into the effects of limited connectivity (Mitchison, personal communication, 1984) and into the capacity requirements of programmable networks. A large number of issues remain to be explored. I hope that
+this discussion and elaboration of Willshaw's analysis will aid in this
+continuing exploration.
+
+12. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
+487
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+This work was supported by Contract N-00014-82-C-0374, NR 667-
+483 with the Personnel and Training Research Programs of the Office
+of Naval Research, by a grant from the System Development Foundation to the Institute for Cognitive Science at UCSD, and by an NIMH
+Research Scientist Career Development Award (MH-00385). This
+chapter was developed in response to a number of questions raised by
+Geoff Hinton and Scott Fahlman about the resource requirements of
+programmable nets. I thank Dave Rumelhart for several useful discussions and for encouraging me to pursue the issues described herein.
+The material described in the section entitled "Randomly Connected
+Nets" was developed in collaboration with Dave, and the application of
+the d'analysis to the problem of simultaneous access to a distributed
+memory network was Dave's suggestion.
+
+CHAPTER 13
+P3: A Parallel Network Simulating System
+D. ZIPSER and D. RABIN
+Research on parallel distributed processing is to a large extent dependent upon the use of computer simulation, and a good deal of the
+researcher's time is spent writing programs for this purpose. Virtually
+all the PDP systems described in this book require special-purpose computer programs to emulate the networks under study. In writing programs of this type, it is usually found that the basic algorithms of the
+PDP network are easy to program but that these rather simple "core"
+programs are of little value unless they are embedded in a system that
+lets the researcher observe and interact with their functions. These
+user interface programs are generally tedious and very time consuming
+to write. What is more, when they are directed toward one particular
+system they can be quite inflexible, making it difficult to easily modify
+the PDP network being studied. Also, because of the time involved,
+particularly for interactive graphics programs, the researcher often
+makes do with very limited facilities for analyzing the performance of
+the network. In this chapter we will describe a general-purpose parallel
+system simulator called P3. It was developed with PDP research explicitly in mind and its major goal is to facilitate simulation by providing
+both the tools for network description and a powerful user interface
+that can be used with any network described using the tools. There are
+many problems to be faced and tradeoffs to be made in designing such
+a system but in the process of doing this we feel that not only has a
+useful system been developed, but also that we have learned a great
+deal about the whole problem of PDP simulations.
+
+13. P3 SYSTEM
+489
+In P3 networks, each computing element, called a unit, contains a
+computer program that reads inputs from connections and sets outputs
+on other connections, possibly also modifying some local state parameters. The major components of P3 are:
+• The plan language, which describes the collection of units in a
+model and
+specifies the connections between them. This
+description is called a "plan."
+• The method language, an extension to LISP, which implements
+the internal computational behaviors of the units in a model.
+• The constructor, which transforms the plan and associated
+methods into a computer program and, when run, simulates the
+network.
+• The simulation environment, which provides an interactive
+display-oriented facility for observing and testing P3 models.
+Input to units described in a P3 plan can come only from other units
+in the plan. That is, there is no "outside world" in a P3 plan language
+description of a network. This means that at the level of description of
+the P3 plan language, the P3 network is closed. Access to the outside
+world must occur inside a unit through its method. Methods may
+access the world outside the P3 system through any available computer
+peripheral. The only thing that methods are not allowed to do is to
+reconfigure with the P3 system itself or communicate with other
+methods through "underground connections" not mentioned in the P3
+plan.
+In any simulation, the relationship between real and modeled time is
+of key importance. A real unit, such as a neuron, would read inputs
+continuously and update its outputs asynchronously, but this cannot be
+simulated exactly on a digital computer. Many simulations use a simple
+synchronous approximation to real time. However, sometimes this produces unwanted artifacts and a closer approximation of asynchrony is
+required. Often, in fact, what the investigator really wants to do is to
+experiment with the effect of different kinds of time simulation on the
+network under study. Since there is no way for the system designer to
+know in advance all the possible ways that the investigator will want to
+handle time, some strategy has to be used that allows great flexibility.
+The approach taken by P3 is that this flexibility can come through the
+methods that can use conditional updating.
+The P3 system itself is
+completely synchronous and updates all units on each cycle. Since
+updating a unit involves invoking its method, the question of whether
+or not the outputs of acuprigileaKseage or any P3 cycle can be
+
+490 FORMAL ANALYSES
+decided by the method. For example, to model asynchronous updating,
+each unit can have an additional input that controls whether or not it is
+updated on a cycle. Then the decision as to which units are to be
+updated can be given to a control unit that is connected by a separate
+line to the update inputs of all the other units. The method program
+inside this control unit decides which units in the network will be
+updated on each cycle. Note that this approach is very flexible since
+small changes in the method program of the control unit can implement a large range of possible update time schemes.
+A typical P3 plan might contain a large number of simple neuron-like
+units forming the core of the network together with a few special purpose units to generate input to the core network and control its function. The master control unit, used above to implement asynchronous
+updating, is an example of this kind of special-purpose unit. They can
+also be used to sequence simulated experiments and to interpret output
+of other units. How all this can be done will become clearer as we
+describe the use of P3 in detail. They key point here is that the P3
+"style" is to include within the P3 plan all aspects of the simulation
+including input to and control of the core network. This approach simplifies the problem of constantly having to interfere special-purpose
+routines to a general-purpose modeling environment.
+It often happens that networks are modular, that is, made up of distinct subnetworks. P3 facilitates the use of modularity by allowing subnetworks to be treated as single processing units. This feature is of particular use when several P3 units are used to simulate a single object
+such as a "realistic" neuron. The modular feature also facilitates "topdown" and "structured" definition of the plan even when the underlying networks are not particularly modular.
+The P3 plan language has an additional feature that is not directly
+concerned with describing the functional aspects of a parallel network.
+Every unit in a P3 plan has a location in a three-dimensional Euclidean
+reference frame call P3 space. This means that every P3 plan not only
+describes a network, but it also describes a geometrical structure. Since
+the functioning of a P3 network does not depend on its geometrical
+structure, it might seem odd to go to all the trouble of describing the
+geometry. There are two main reasons for locating P3 units in space.
+The first reason is to facilitate visualizing a P3 network while observing
+its function during the simulation of a model. The units can be placed
+so that they appear at the same relative positions on the computer
+display during simulation as they have in the investigator's conceptual
+image of the model. The second reason to give each unit a position in
+space is to make it possible to specify connections between units implicitly on the basis of their spatial locations rather than explicitly. This
+latter feature is of particular importance when modeling systems in
+
+13. P3 SYSTEM
+491
+which the connectivity is described in terms of geometrical relations.
+This is often the case when dealing with realistic neuronal modeling,
+especially of primary sensory processing structures.
+The P3 Plan Language
+The job of the P3 plan language is to describe the units and connections that constitute the network being simulated. To do this, the
+language uses a small but rich set of statements that make it possible to
+succinctly describe large groups of complex, connected units. The
+three fundamental constituents of the plan language are the UNIT
+TYPE, UNIT, and CONNECT statements. The UNIT TYPE statement
+names and describes a kind of unit. The UNIT statement instantiates
+and names actual units. This statement can instantiate either a single
+unit or a whole array of units of the same type. The CONNECT statement makes connections. Since the statement can be used inside of
+loops, a single connect statement can make an arbitrarily large number
+of connections using the available array features.
+A unit in P3 can have any number of inputs and outputs together
+with any number of parameters. Before the start of a simulation,
+values must be given to all parameters and to all outputs. Each value is
+always a single computer word in length. The interpretation of this
+word depends on how the methods use it. As the simulation proceeds,
+these initial values are continuously updated. Taken together, the
+values of the parameters and the outputs constitute the state of the system at any time during simulation. The major difference between
+parameter values and output values is that outputs are available to
+other units in a network through connections, while the value of
+parameters can only be read by the unit to which they belong. P3 units
+can have two classes of parameters: unit parameters and terminal parameters. The unit parameters apply to the whole unit, for example, the
+threshold in a linear threshold unit. The terminal parameters are associated with individual inputs or outputs and correspond, for example, to
+weights.
+An important function of the P3 plan language is to describe the connections between units. Since units can have multiple inputs and outputs there has to be some way to name them so that the CONNECT
+statements will know which connections to make. These names are
+also used within the method programs to read inputs and set outputs.
+The basic form of the CONNECT statement is
+(CONNECT < unit-name > OUTPUT < output-name >
+TO < unit-raspyrighted Materiainput-name >)
+
+492 FORMAL ANALYSES
+For units with only a few inputs or outputs each input or output can be
+given a separate name. When a unit has a large number of inputs or
+outputs it is more convenient to group them together in input or output
+arrays. The individual items in these arrays are referenced by giving
+the array name and a set of subscript values. These arrays can be used
+in iterative statements in plans and methods.
+An output value can serve as input to any number of units, i.e., the
+fan-out is arbitrarily large. Each individual input can receive only one
+value. This is easy to enforce as long as it is known that just one connection is to be made to each input. This works well in many cases but
+it often happens that it is very hard or impossible for the programmer
+to know exactly how many connections will be made. This is the case,
+for example, when connection decisions are being made implicitly by
+some computational procedure such as "connection by location" or random connection. To overcome this, P3 secretly treats each individual
+input as an array and automatically adjusts its size to fit the number of
+inputs.
+This process is transparent to the programmer which means
+that multiple connections can be made freely to a single input. There is
+a special iteration statement in the method language to access these
+multiple inputs. Each individual input that actually gets generated is
+called a TERMINAL and there are procedures for associating parameters with terminals and initializing their values.
+The method programs that implement the internal functionings of
+units are written in the form of ordinary computer programs in an
+appropriate language. In the current implementation, which runs on
+the Symbolics 3600, the language is LISP. In order to allow the
+methods to use the values of inputs and parameters in their computations, a set of special access statements is incorporated into this system
+and is available to LISP programs. These statements make it possible
+for methods to read and set inputs, outputs, and parameters more or
+less as if they are ordinary variables.
+In order to illustrate how P3 works, we will describe a model of a
+simple competitive learning network of the type described in Chapter S.
+The basic network contains two types of units: a pattern generator to
+supply stimuli and a cluster of competitive learners connected to it,
+which spontaneously discover some features of the patterns. Since
+learning is spontaneous and does not require a teacher, the functioning
+of the network is simple and straightforward. The pattern generators
+sequentially produce output patterns that serve as input stimuli to the
+cluster units. Each pattern is an activation vector specifying which of
+the inputs are active and which are not. Each cluster unit produces an
+output indicating its response to the current stimulus which is transmitted to all other members of the cluster to create a "winner take all" network. The cluster unit which wins is the only one that learns and it
+
+13. P3 SYSTEM
+493
+uses the weight redistribution procedure described in the competitive
+learning chapter, that is,
+O if unit j loses on stimulus k
+Away =
+- gwij if unit j wins on stimulus k
+where Cik is equal to 1 if in stimulus pattern Sk, element i in the lower
+layer is active and zero otherwise, and no is the number of active elements in pattern Sk (thus nk = [cik).
+The first step in creating a P3 plan is to supply the UNIT TYPE
+statements. The UNIT TYPE statement for the pattern generator is
+given below:
+(unit type dipole
+parameters flag il jl i2 j2
+outputs (d array i j)
+method < update routine code in lisp>)
+In this, and all our other examples, words in italics are part of the P3
+plan language while the nonitalicized words are supplied by the user.
+The UNIT TYPE statement gives the type a name that will be used
+throughout the plan. The name for the pattern generator type is
+"dipole." There are five parameters that are used internally for pattern
+generation. The technicalities of the use of these parameters is
+irrelevant here. The UNIT TYPE statement describes the output of the
+unit. This output is a two-dimensional array of lines called "d." This
+array of outputs is the retina on which stimulus patterns are generated
+which serves as an input to the competitive learning cluster units. The
+"¡" and "j" that follow the word array are dummy variables that tell P3
+how many dimensions the array has. The actual size of the array is
+variable and is initialized when we instantiate units of the type dipole.
+Note that the unit type dipole had no inputs since it is itself the source
+of patterns.
+The second basic unit type is the competitive learning unit, which in
+our plan we call "competitor." The unit type statement for it is given
+below:
+(unit type competitor
+parameters pg flag
+inputs (C array i j terminal parameters W)
+(i-A)
+outputs (o-A)
+method < lisreepsrighted Material
+
+494 FORMAL ANALYSES
+Note that the input array "C" of this unit corresponds exactly in form
+to the output array "d" of the dipole unit described previously. This
+correspondence will make it possible to make one-to-one connections
+between the output of dipole type units and the input of competitor
+type units. Also notice that a terminal parameter "W" has been associated with the input array "C."
+input called "i-A" which will receive information from the outputs of all
+the other members of the cluster.
+We have described the two unit types we will need. We can now go
+ahead and instantiate units of these types. The statement that creates a
+pattern generator unit of type dipole is shown below:
+(unit stimulus of type dipole
+at (@ 000)
+outputs (d array (i 0 5) ( 0 5))))
+The unit statement names the unit it is creating. This is the name of a
+real unit that is actually going to exist in our model and it is the name
+that will be referred to when this unit is connected to other units. For
+P3 to build such a unit, it has to be told the type. There can be any
+number of units of the same type and they can all have different
+names. Since every real unit in P3 has a location in P3 space, we must
+specify it in the unit statement that instantiates the unit. The at clause
+is used for this. The at is followed by a location specifier that simply
+evaluates to the x-, y-, and z-coordinates of the unit in P3 space. For
+simplicity we locate the pattern generator at the origin of P3 space
+which will initially be located at the center of the display window when
+we simulate the model. Since we are building a real unit, we have to
+give a size to its array of output lines. This is done in the outputs clause
+of the UNIT statement. Each subscript specifier consists of a subscript
+name and initial value, which in the current implementation must be 0,
+and final value, which in this example is 5 for both the "i" and the "j"
+subscripts. This statement will generate a 6x6 array of output lines on
+connector "d."
+Now that we have a source of patterns, we need to create a cluster of
+units that will receive these patterns. The statement that instantiates
+these units is given below:
+(unit cluster array (k 0 - cluster-size 1) of type competitor
+at (@ (*k (t cluster-size 4)) (+ cluster-size 10) 0)
+initialize (g = 0.05)
+inputs (C array (i 0 (- stimulus-size 1))(j 0 (- stimulus-size 1)))
+In this case, we are not instantiating a single unit but an array of units.
+In the competitive learning model, the learning cluster always consists
+
+13. P3 SYSTEM
+495
+of two or more units, so we want a way to vary the number of units in
+a cluster. In the first line of the unit statement we give the name cluster to the array and then we indicate the size of the array with a subscript specifier. The name of this subscript is "k"; its initial value is 0.
+Its final value is one less than the global constant "cluster-size." The
+value of cluster-size, which will occur at various points in the plan, is
+set by a statement at the beginning of the P3 plan that determines the
+value of global constants. This feature means that we can change the
+parameters such as cluster-size globally throughout the plan by only fiddling with a single value. The upper bound of the stimulus input line
+array has also been set with the use of a global constant "stimulus-size"
+rather than with an integer as was done previously. Also notice that
+the variable "k" is used in an at clause to place each unit of the array at
+a different place in P3 space.
+Our next task is to connect the units together in the appropriate
+fashion. We have iwo classes of connections: those that go from the
+stimulus generator to the learning cluster and those that interconnect
+the units within the learning cluster. Each of these classes of connections has many individual connections within it, but these individual
+connections can be specified algorithmically in such a way that only a
+few CONNECT statements are needed to generate the entire network.
+What is more, the algorithmic specification of these connections makes
+it possible to change the size of the cluster or the size of the stimulus
+array without altering the CONNECT statements at all. The code
+required to connect the stimulus to the learning cluster is given below:
+(for (k 0 (+ 1 k))
+exit when (> k cluster-size) do
+(for (i 0 (+ li))
+exit when (> i stimulus-size) do
+(for (i 0 (+ 1j))
+exit when (> j stimulus-size) do
+(connect unit stimulus output di j
+1o unit (cluster k) input Ci j
+terminal initialize (W = (si:random-in-range
+0.0 (// 2.0 (expt (+ stimulus-size 1) 2))))))))
+There are three nested loops. The first ranges over each member of
+the cluster, and the next two range over each dimension of the
+stimulus array. Inside these three nested loops is a single CONNECT
+statement. The CONNECT statement has the job of initializing the
+value of any terminal parameters. In our model we have a very important terminal parameter, "W," the weight between a stimulus line and a
+cluster unit, which we wabbyAginisia lateriay random value which sums
+
+496
+to one for the whole input array.
+initial value of "W" with a LISP function that evaluates to the required
+quantity. In general, in a P3 plan wherever a number is required, a
+function (in our case a LISP function) that evaluates to a number can
+replace the number itself. The sum of the random numbers generated
+by our simple LISP function is not exactly one, but only averages one.
+This is satisfactory for the competitive learning algorithm because it is
+self-normalizing and will force the sum to one in the course of learning.
+The connections that link the members of a cluster are a bit more
+complex. Each member of the cluster must receive input from all
+other members except itself. The code for doing this in a completely
+general way for clusters of any size is given below:
+for (k 0 (+ 1 k))
+exit when (> k cluster-size) do
+(for G0 (+ 1j))
+exit when (= j k) do
+(connect unit cluster k output o-A
+to unit cluster j input i-A))
+(for (j (+ k 1) (+ 1j))
+exit when (> j cluster-size) do
+(connect unit cluster k output o-A
+to unit cluster j input i-A)))
+The idea here is that we first connect each unit to those units whose
+subscripts are lower than it and then to each unit whose subscript is
+higher than it. This requires two separate loops, each with its own
+CONNECT statement, both nested within an outer loop that ranges
+over all units in the cluster. Note that this is a case of making multiple
+connections to a single input line. We don't have to know how many
+connections there are because within the method there is code that will
+examine all connections on this line to decide if the unit has won. This
+feature is very useful and can be applied whenever a method needs to
+know the value of an input but not its originating unit.
+We have now specified all the features of a plan that describes the
+basic competitive learning network.
+used to construct a running model if we have available the appropriate
+method programs. Since these are ordinary computer programs written
+in LISP, we won't analyze them in detail. The code for the methods
+used here is given in the appendix of this chapter, which shows a complete plan for a simulation of competitive learning. It is worthwhile,
+however, to see how the method language accesses the inputs and outputs of the units about which we have been saying so much in the
+development of the plan.
+
+13. P3 SYSTEM
+497
+The only difference between the arguments to a P3 method and the
+arguments to a normal LISP function is that the P3 arguments are
+accessed by special access functions. For example, to get the value of a
+parameter, the following form is used:
+(read-unit-parameter flag)
+This form returns the current value of flag. To read an input from an
+array of input lines the following form can be used:
+(read-input (C i j))
+In this case the value of "i" and "j" must be bound at the point in the
+program where an expression using them occurs. There are
+corresponding forms for reading terminal parameters, setting outputs,
+and setting parameter values.
+The P3 Simulation System
+The P3 simulation system is the environment in which models in P3
+are simulated. It is highly interactive and makes extensive use of the
+window system and the "mouse" pointer of the Symbolics 3600. The
+first step in simulating a model is to compile the methods and construct
+the plan. The constructor is a program similar in purpose to a compiler.
+However, the input is a P3 description of a network, rather than a computer language description of a program. The output of the constructor
+is a data structure containing all the relevant information about the network that can be used by the P3 simulation system to run a simulation
+of the model. As with any form of computer programming, a model
+must be debugged before it can be simulated. There are really two
+levels of debugging for network models.
+that the network that has been created is connected up in the way
+intended.
+network can be debugged. P3 provides tools for both of these phases
+of the debugging process.
+To check the correctness of connections, P3 provides a display that
+shows each unit in the model at its location in P3 space. The user
+interacts with this display with a mouse pointing device. Clicking on a
+particular unit provides a menu that enables the user to trace out any of
+the connections emanating from that unit. This facility for tracing out
+connections, one at a time, has proved much more useful than simply
+presenting a user with the wiring diagram of the model. Once the user
+is convinced that the constructed model corresponds to the envisioned
+network, the job of analyzipinghted flitenaf the model can begin.
+
+498 FORMAL ANALYSES
+Analyzing the running of a complex simulation is a demanding task.
+It is in this analysis that we have found that all the features of the P3
+system come together and begin to justify their existence. Because
+every object in the model has a location in P3 space that corresponds to
+the user's mental image of the network, the simulation system can
+display values representing the state of the system at locations on the
+screen that have meaning to the user. This means that during the
+course of a simulation, meaningful patterns of P3 variables can be
+displayed.
+This approach is widely used in analyzing the function of
+parallel systems. What P3 has done is to standardize it and relieve the
+user of the need to implement the details of this display strategy for
+each new model.
+In the current implementation of P3, each object in the model is
+represented at its designated location by a small rectangular icon. By
+the use of a mouse pointer driven menu system, the user can assign the
+icon representing a unit the variable whose value is to be displayed.
+Thus, for example, the icons representing the input terminals of a cluster unit in our example can be assigned either the value of the input to
+that terminal or the value of the weight on that terminal. These assignments can be made or changed at any time during a simulation run.
+They can be set to be updated continually as a simulation proceeds, or
+they can be examined in detail when the simulation is temporarily
+interrupted. The current P3 implementation displays the relevant state
+values at two possible levels of precision. The approximate value of the
+state value is indicated by the degree of darkening of the icon. There
+are five levels of intensity. Their range is under user control and can
+be changed at any time. This enables the user to adjust the range so
+that the difference between the lightest and the darkest icons will
+optimize the information content of the display. There is also a high
+precision display that permits the exact value of any P3 variable to be
+examined.
+Figure 1 shows how the screen of the Symbolics 3600 looks after 588
+P3 cycles of simulation of a competitive learning model with a 6×6
+stimulus array and a dipole stimulus. There are six windows displayed
+and each shows a different aspect of the simulation. Window A shows
+the three units in the model at their respective positions in P3 space.
+The upper narrow rectangle is the pattern generator. It is not displaying
+any value. The lower two rectangles represent the two cluster units.
+They are displaying the approximate value of their outputs by the size
+of the contained black rectangle. Clearly the unit on the left has a
+lower output value than the one on the right. Window B shows the
+output of the pattern generator unit, which was called "stimulus" in the
+plan. The lines form a square array because that is the way they were
+specified in the plan. The two dark rectangles show the current dipole
+
+13. P3 SYSTEM
+499
+Select Model
+Flash Model
+Mudel 3-terictmart s'model-e1ze.p3plan
+Iteration 588 Stop interval: 588] Me.! stop: 9fter ineratior 117°
+(sylatel (Initialize Instrumentation) lope 4 per-Suspend to mate an inscheduled stop
+Unil of model ELMER: Rabia)p-beachmarks) medel-size piplas
+ExIt
+18, 0.0 to 0.1
+Lines on outpat Dof mait STIMULUS
+B
+Strip Chart lor Unit (CLUSTER 1), line (C 22), termine 0, parameler W
+E
+00G0GO
+
+COCOOC
+
+
+
+Stmp Chart for Unit (CLUSTER 1), line (C 22), terminal 4, parapeter W
+F
+¿caie: 0.U tu 3i
+i preivin
+11, 0.9 to 1.0
+Lines on inpat C of mait (CLUSTER O)
+Lines on iapal C of unit (CLUSTEB 1)
+D
+0OOOG0
+00
+•0
+•0
+
+TA, i.0 to 8.03
+
+00
+•10
+J00OD
+
+
+8.8 to 8.03
+FIGURE 1. Display of Symbolics 3600 during P3 session. The mouse arrow is pointing
+to the "simulate" command in the upper left. Clicking a mouse button will start simulapattern. Windows C and D show the approximate values of the weights
+on the input line arrays of each of the two cluster units. The fact that
+competition has pretty well separated the weights along a horizontal line
+is clearly visible from these two windows. Windows E and Fare "strip
+chart" records that produce a graphical record of any P3 variable. The
+strip charts have been set up to record the value of a pair of
+corresponding weights, one from each unit in the cluster. Time
+increases to the right so the initial state is at the extreme left side of
+the strip charts. It is interesting to note that one of the weights became
+dominant for a while but at later times seems to have lost its
+dominance.
+
+500
+In addition to the special functions of P3, the user also has available
+all the powerful program development tools of the Symbolics 3600.
+For example, suppose that the user believes that an observed bug is
+due to an error in the code of a method. It is possible to interrupt the
+simulation, go directly to the editor buffer that contains the method
+code, alter it, recompile the alteration, and then return to the simulation at exactly the point at which it was interrupted. This facility has
+proved invaluable in debugging.
+As we work with the P3 simulation system, we constantly find new
+features that are useful in the analytical process. We view the implementation of each of these new analytical techniques as analogous to
+adding a new instrument to a laboratory. Thus, we call the features of
+P3 that enable the user to analyze a functioning model "instruments."
+Each of these instruments can be called up at any time. Every instrument has a window that displays the results of the instrument's
+analysis. For example, one instrument is the "strip chart recorder"
+used in Figure 1. The strip chart recorder has a probe that can be connected to any particular state variable of any unit. Since multiple
+instances of any instrument can be created, any number of strip charts
+can be running at the same time. In addition to instruments that
+display the values of variables, we also envision a class of instruments
+that record these variables. Clearly, it is very important for a serious
+modeler to be able to record the results of a simulation. The instrument concept will enable the modeler to record just those variables
+required. This is a very important feature since simply recording the
+entire state of the model as it develops in time would produce an
+overwhelming flow of data.
+Performance
+So far we have said nothing about the speed at which simulations
+run. This is a problem of tremendous importance for PDP models. Big
+models inherently run slowly on serial computers. Generally, parallel
+programming systems like P3 stress ease of model definition and simulation. How much penalty must we pay in model performance? There
+is always some performance penalty for a general-purpose system. For
+any given piece of computer hardware, it is generally possible to write a
+specially tailored program that will run some particular model faster
+than any general system will run it. However, this special tailoring
+itself takes considerable time and makes it much harder to change the
+details of the model structure. Thus, we envision that programs like P3
+will be useful in the early stages of model development when the size
+
+13. P3 SYSTEM
+501
+of the models are modest and there is frequent need for changes in
+structure. When the structure and parameters of a model have been
+decided upon and it is necessary to scale the model up and have it run
+extremely rapidly, it may in some cases be advantageous to write a specia. program to implement the model.
+The general-purpose systems, however, have several things going for
+them with respect to model performance. First of all, since the data
+structure has the same form for models, it is possible to put a lot of
+effort into optimizing running speed for the particular hardware on
+which the system is implemented. This optimization only has to be
+done once rather than for each model. A second way in which generalpurpose systems can improve performance is through the use of
+special-purpose hardware. The models generated by the P3 system are
+inherently parallel models and map well to some parallel computer
+architectures. The one way to get blinding speed from parallel models
+is to implement real parallelism in parallel computers. In some cases,
+array processors can also be highly beneficial. Since all the P3 models
+are of the same sort, a constructor can be made that will provide the
+appropriate data structures to run any P3 model on these kinds of
+hardware. This will make the hardware transparently available to the
+user of systems like P3. This, we believe, is a significant plus, since it
+is notoriously difficult to program any particular application for array
+processors or truly parallel hardware.
+In conclusion, the P3 system illustrates some of the general issues
+that arise in any attempt to simulate PDP models, and provides a
+number of useful tools that can greatly facilitate model development.
+General-purpose systems like P3 have promise for speeding and facilitating the programming of parallel models and the ultimate ability to
+run these models very fast using specialized hardware.
+
+502
+APPENDIX A
+P3 Plan for Competitive Learning
+(NOTE the use of the "plan constant" and "include" statements.)
+1******
+Unit types
+******************************************
+*********
+** Dipole pattern generator ********
+(unit type dipole
+parameters flag il jl jl i2 j2
+outputs (d array i j
+include dipole-generator)... (see code file on p. 506)
+;,******** Learning unit ********
+(unit type competitor
+parameters p q flag
+inputs (C array i j terminal parameters W)
+(i-A)
+outputs (o-A)
+include comp-learn)
+;,***
+:,#************
+***********.
+Unit instances
+*******.
+*#***
+****
+(plan constant stimulus-size = 6) (plan constant cluster-size = 2)
+******** Dipole pattern generator*******
+(unit stimulus of type dipole
+at (@ 000)
+outputs (d array (i Ostimulus-size) (i Ostimulus-size) linesat (@ i j 0)))
+
+13. P3 SYSTEM
+503
+******** Learning units ********
+(unit cluster array (k 0 (- cluster-size 1)) of type competitor
+at (@ (*| (+ cluster-size 4)) (+ cluster-size 10) 0)
+initialize (q = 0.05)
+inputs (C array (i 0 (- stimulus-size I)) (i O stimulus-size)))
+********
+********
+*****
+Connections
+************:
+****
+***
+•******** Stimulus to both clusters ********
+(for (KO (+ (+1k))
+exit when (= k cluster-size) do
+(for (i 0 (t li))
+exit when (= i stimulus-size ) do
+(for GO (+ 1j))
+exit when (= j stimulus-size) do
+(connect unit stimulus output d i j
+to unit cluster k input Cij
+terminal initialize
+(W = (si:random-in-range
+0.0 (// 2.0 (expt (+ stimulus-size 1) 2))))))))
+******** Interconnect the clusters to implement competition
+*******
+(for (k 0 (+ 1 k))
+exit when (= k cluster-size 1) do
+(for G0 (+ 1j))
+exit when (= j k) do
+(connect unit cluster k output o-A
+to unit cluster j input i-A))
+for (i (+ k 1) (+ 1j))
+exit when (= j cluster-size 1) do
+(connect unit cluster k output o-A
+to unit cluster j input i-A)))
+
+504
+APPENDIX B
+Competitive Learning: Methods
+Method for unit in cluster of competitive learners
+***
+method
+(let ((imax (input-dimension-n C 1))
+(imax (input-dimension-n C 2))
+(win t)
+(N O))
+;******** Is this a learning iteration? ********
+(cond
+********* No ********
+;; Accumulate the weighted sum of the pattern inputs into
+; unit parameter p, and set the competition output p-A to
+;; that value
+(> (read-unit-parameter flag) 0)
+(loop initially (set-unit-parameter p 0)
+for i from 0 below imax do
+(loop for j from 0 below jmax do
+(set-unit-parameter p
+(+ (read-unit-parameter p)
+(* read-terminal-parameter (C i j) W)
+(read-input (C i j))))))
+finally (set-output o-A (read-unit-parameter p)))
+*********Flip the iteration-parity flag********
+(set-unit-parameter flag 0))
+************
+
+13. P3 SYSTEM
+505
+********* Yes ********
+;; Figure out whether this unit wins on this cycle. Winning
+;; requires that this unit's parameter p be greater than those
+; for the other units of this type. Those values are available
+;; on the terminals of input i-A.
+;; NOTE: On iteration 0, everything is 0, so no unit thinks it
+; wins, and hence all avoid learning.
+(t
+*** Find out whether we won ********
+; Win was initialized to t in the let at the top level of this method.
+(for-terminals k of input i-A
+(if (< = (read-unit-parameter p)
+(read-input (i-A terminal k)))
+(setq win nil)))
+(when win
+;; ******** Accumulate sum of all inputs into N********
+;; This will become a normalizing constant.
+(loop for i from 0 below imax do
+(loop for j from 0 below jmax do
+(setqN (+ N (read-input (C i j))))))
+*********Compute new weights ********
+;;But only if the total input was greater than O.
+(if (> NO)
+(loop with q-factor = (read-unit-parameter g)
+for i from 0 below imax do
+(loop for j from 0 below jmax do
+********* Compute one new weight ********
+(let* (old-weight
+(read-terminal-parameter
+(C ij) W))
+(new-weight
+(+ old-weight
+(* g-factor
+(- (1/ (read-input (C i j)) (float N))
+Copyriahter& Material
+
+506
+;; Update the terminal parameter to the new weight
+(set-terminal-parameter
+(Cij) W
+new-weight))))))
+;: ******** Flip the iteration-parity flag ********
+(set-unit-parameter flag 1))))
+******:
+********
+Dipole pattern generator method
+4*·****************************************
+********
+******
+method
+;******** Do we need a new pattern on this iteration? ********
+(cond
+** Yes. Erase old dipole and make new one.********
+((< (read-unit-parameter flag) 1)
+(let (( imax (- (output-dimension-n d 1) 2))
+(jmax (- (output-dimension-n d 1) 2)))
+(set-output (d (read-unit-parameter il) (read-unit-parameter il)) O)
+(set-output (d (read-unit-parameter i2) (read-unit-parameter i2)) O)
+(set-unit-parameter il (+ (random imax) 1))
+(set-unit-parameter jl († (random jmax 1))
+(cond ((> (random 2) 0.5
+(cond ((> (random 2 0.5)
+(set-unit-parameter i2 (+ (read-unit-parameter il) 1)))
+(set-unit-parameter i2 (- (read-unit-parameter il 1))))
+(set-unit-parameter i2 (read-unit-parameter jl)))
+(cond ((> (random 2) 0.5)
+(set-unit-parameter i2 (+ (read-unit-parameter jl) 1)))
+(t
+(set-unit-parameter i2 (- (read-unit-parameter j1) 1))))
+(set-unit-parameter i2 (read-unit-parameter il))))
+(set-output (d (read-unit-parameter il) (read-unit-parameter j1)) |)
+(set-output (d (read-unit-parameter i2) (read-unit-parameter j2)) 1)
+(set-unit-parameter flag 1)))
+(t
+(set-unit-parameter flag 0)))
+
+References
+Ackley, D. H., Hinton, G. E., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1985). A learning algorithm
+for Boltzmann machines. Cognitive Science, 9, 147-169.
+Amari, S. A. (1977a). A mathematical
+approach to neural systems. In J.
+Metzler (Ed.), Systems neuroscience (pp. 67-117). New York: Academic
+Press.
+Amari, S. A. (1977b). Neural theory of association and concept formation.
+Biological Cybernetics, 26, 175-185.
+Anderson, J. A. (1970). Two models for memory organization using interacting traces. Mathematical Biosciences, 8, 137-160.
+Anderson, J. A. (1973). A theory for the recognition of items from short
+memorized lists. Psychological Review, 80, 417-438.
+Anderson, J. A. (1977). Neural models with cognitive implications. In D.
+LaBerge & S. J. Samuels (Eds.), Basic processes in reading perception and
+comprehension (pp. 27-90). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Anderson, J. A. (1983). Cognitive and psychological computation with neural
+models. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 13, 799-815.
+Anderson, J. A., & Mozer, M. C. (1981). Categorization and selective neurons. In G. E. Hinton & J. A. Anderson (Eds.), Parallel models of associarive memory (pp. 213-236). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Anderson, J. A., Silverstein, J. W., Ritz, S. A., & Jones, R. S. (1977). Distinctive features, categorical perception, and probability learning: Some
+applications of a neural model. Psychological Review, 84, 413-451.
+Anderson, J. R. (1982). Acquisition of cognitive skill. Psychological Review,
+89, 369-406.
+Anderson, J. R. (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
+
+508 REFERENCES
+Aragon, C. R., Johnson, D. S., & McGeoch, L. A. (1985). Optimization by
+simulated annealing: An experimental evaluation. Unpublished manuscript.
+Bahl, L. R., Jelinek, F., & Mercer, R. L. (1983).
+A maximum likelihood
+approach to continuous speech recognition.
+IEEE Transactions on Pattern
+Analysis and Machine Intelligence, S, 179-190.
+Ballard, D. H. (in press). Cortical connections and parallel processing: Structure and function. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
+Ballard, D. H., Hinton, G. E., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1983). Parallel visual computation. Nature, 306, 21-26.
+Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Univer-
+Barto, A. G. (1985). Learning by statistical cooperation of self-interested neuronlike computing elements (COINS Tech. Rep. 85-11). Amherst: University of
+Massachusetts, Department of Computer and Information Science.
+Barto, A. G., & Anandan, P. (1985). Pattern recognizing stochastic learning
+automata. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 15, 360-375.
+Barto, A. G., & Sutton, R. S. (1981). Landmark learning: An illustration of
+associative search. Biological Cybernetics, 42, 1-8.
+Barwise, J., & Perry, J. (1983). Situations and attitudes. Cambridge, MA: MIT
+Press/ Bradford.
+Berko, J. (1958). The child's learning of English morphology. Word, 14,
+150-177.
+Bernstein, J. (1981, December 14). Profiles: AI, Marvin Minsky. The New
+Yorker, pp. 50-126.
+Bienenstock, E. L., Cooper, L. N., & Munro, P. W. (1982). Theory for the
+development of neuron activity: Orientation specificity and binocular
+interaction in visual cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 2, 32-48.
+Binder, K. (1979). Monte Carlo methods in statistical physics. Berlin: Springer-
+Verlag.
+Blake, A. (1983). The least disturbance principle and weak constraints. Pattern Recognition Letters, 1, 393-399.
+Blakemore, C. (1977). Mechanics of the mind. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
+Broadbent, D. (1985). A question of levels: Comment on McClelland and
+Rumelhart. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 114, 189-192.
+Chase, W. G., & Simon, H. A. (1973). Perception in chess. Cognitive Psychol-
+08y, 4, 55-81.
+Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. The Hague: Mouton.
+Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT
+Press.
+Chomsky, N., & Halle, M. (1968). The sound pattern of English. New York:
+Harper & Row.
+Christensen, R. (1981). Entropy minimax sourcebook (Vols. 1-4). Lincoln,
+MA: Entropy Limited.
+Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. F. (1975). A spreading-activation theory of
+semantic processing. Psychological Review, 82, 407-425.
+Coltheart, M., Patterson, K., & Marshall, J. C. (1980). Deep dyslexia. London:
+Routledge & Kegan.
+
+509
+Crick, F., & Mitchison, G. (1983). The function of dream sleep. Nature, 304,
+111-114.
+DeMarzo, P. M. (1984). Gibbs potentials, Boltzmann machines, and harmony
+theory. Unpublished manuscript.
+Dempster, A. P., Laird, N. M., & Rubin, D. B. (1976). Maximum likelihood
+from incomplete data via the EM algorithm. Proceedings of the Royal Statistical Society, 1-38.
+Derthick, M. (1984). Variations on the Boltzmann machine learning algorithm
+(Tech. Rep. No. CMU-CS-84-120). Pittsburgh: Carnegie-Mellon University, Department of Computer Science.
+Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the fow of information. Cambridge, MA:
+MIT Press/ Bradford.
+Eisen, M. (1969). Introduction to mathematical probability theory. Englewood
+Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
+Fahlman, S. E. (1979). NETL: A system for representing and using real-world
+knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+Fahlman, S. E. (1980). The Hashnet interconnection scheme (Tech. Rep. CMU-
+CS-80-125). Pittsburgh: Carnegie-Mellon University, Department of Computer Science.
+Fahlman, S. E., Hinton, G. E., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1983). Massively parallel
+architectures for Al: NETL, Thistle, and Boltzmann machines. Proceedings
+of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence AAAI-83.
+Farley, B. G., & Clark, W. A. (1954). Simulation of self-organizing systems by
+digital computer. IRE Transactions of Information Theory, 4, 76-84.
+Feldman, J. A. (1981). A connectionist model of visual memory. In G. E
+Hinton & J. A. Anderson (Eds.), Parallel models of associative memory (pp.
+49-81). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Feldman, J. A. (1982). Dynamic connections in neural networks. Biological
+Cybernetics, 46, 27-39.
+Feldman, J. A. (1985). Connectionist models and their applications: Introduction. Cognitive Science, 9, 1-2.
+Feldman, J. A., & Ballard, D. H. (1982). Connectionist models and their
+properties. Cognitive Science, 6, 205-254.
+Fodor, J. A. (1983). Modularity of mind: An essay on faculty psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+Fukushima, K. (1975). Cognitron: A self-organizing multilayered neural network. Biological Cybernetics, 20, 121-136.
+Fukushima, K. (1980). Neocognitron: A self-organizing neural network model
+for a mechanism of pattern recognition unaffected by shift in position. Biological Cybernetics, 30, 193-202.
+Gallistel, C. R. (1980). The organization of action: A new synthesis. Hillsdale,
+NJ: Erlbaum.
+Geman, S., & Geman, D. (1984). Stochastic relaxation, Gibbs distributions,
+and the Bayesian restoration of images. IEEE Transactions on Pattern
+Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 6, 721-741.
+Ginsburg, H. P. (1983). The development of mathematical thinking. New York:
+Academic Press.
+
+510
+Glorioso, R. M., & Colón Osorio, F. C. (1980). Engineering intelligent systems.
+Bedford, MA: Digital Press.
+Glushko, R. J. (1979). The organization and activation of orthographic
+knowledge in reading words aloud. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
+Human Perception and Performance, S, 674-691.
+Green, D. M., & Swets, J. A. (1966). Signal detection theory and psychophysics.
+New York: Wiley.
+Grossberg, S. (1976). Adaptive pattern classification and universa! recoding:
+Part I. Parallel development and coding of neural feature detectors. Biological Cybernetics, 23, 121-134.
+Grossberg, S. (1978). A theory of visual coding, memory, and development.
+In E. L. J. Leeuwenberg & H. F. J. M. Buffart (Eds.), Formal theories of
+visual perception. New York: Wiley.
+Grossberg, S. (1980). How does the brain build a cognitive code? Psychological Review, 87, 1-51.
+Halmos, P. R. (1974). Finite-dimensional vector spaces. New York: Springer-
+Verlag.
+Hebb, D. O. (1949). The organization of behavior. New York: Wiley.
+Hewitt, C. (1975). Stereotypes as an ACTOR approach towards solving the
+problem of procedural attachment in FRAME theories. In Proceedings of
+Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing: An interdisciplinary
+workshop. Cambridge, MA: Bolt, Beranek, & Newman.
+Hinton, G. E. (1977). Relaxation and its role in vision. Unpublished doctoral
+dissertation, University of Edinburgh.
+Hinton, G. E. (198la). Implementing semantic networks in parallel hardware.
+In G. E. Hinton & J. A. Anderson (Eds.), Parallel models of associative
+memory (pp. 161-188). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Hinton, G. E. (1981b). A parallel computation that assigns canonical objectbased frames of reference. Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
+Hinton, G. E. (1984). Parallel computations for controlling an arm. Journal of
+Motor Behavior, 16, 171-194.
+Hinton, G. E., & Anderson, J. A. (Eds.). (1981). Parallel models of associative
+memory. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Hinton, G. E., & Lang, K. (1985). Shape recognition and illusory conjunctions. Proceedings of the Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial
+Intelligence.
+Hinton, G. E., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1983a). Analyzing cooperative computation. Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science
+Society.
+Hinton, G. E., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1983b). Optimal perceptual inference.
+Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and
+Pattern Recognition, 448-453.
+Hinton, G. E., Sejnowski, T. J., & Ackley, D. H. (1984). Boltzmann machines:
+Constraint satisfaction networks that learn (Tech. Rep. No. CMU-CS-84-119).
+Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie-Mellon University, Department of Computer
+Science.
+
+511
+Hofstadter, D. R. (1979). Gödel, Escher, Bach: An eternal golden braid. New
+York: Basic Books.
+Hofstadter, D. R. (1983). The architecture of Jumbo. Proceedings of the International Machine Learning Workshop.
+Hofstadter, D. R. (1985). Metamagical themas. New York: Basic Books.
+Hogg, T., & Huberman, B. A. (1984). Understanding biological computation.
+Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 81, 6871-6874.
+Hopfield, J. J. (1982). Neural networks and physical systems with emergent
+collective computational abilities. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 79, 2554-2558.
+Hopfield, J. J. (1984). Neurons with graded response have collective computational properties like those of two-state neurons. Proceedings of the National
+Academy of Sciences, USA, 81, 3088-3092.
+Hopfield, J. J., Feinstein, D. I., & Palmer, R. G. (1983).
+"Unlearning" has a
+stabilizing effect in collective memories. Nature, 304, 158-159.
+Hummel, R. A., & Zucker, S. W. (1983). On the foundations of relaxation
+labeling processes. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 5, 267-287.
+Isenberg,
+D., Walker, E. C. T., Ryder, J. M., & Schweikert, J. (1980,
+November). A rop-down effect on the identification of function words. Paper
+presented at the Acoustical Society of America, Los Angeles.
+Jackson, J. H. (1958). On localization. In Selected writings (Vol. 2). New
+York: Basic Books. (Original work published 1869)
+Julesz, B. (1971). Foundations of cyclopean perception. Chicago: University of
+Chicago Press.
+Kanerva, P. (1984). Self-propagating search: A unified theory of memory (Rep.
+No. CSLI-84-7). Stanford, CA: Stanford University, Center for the Study
+of Language and Information.
+Kawamoto, A. H., & Anderson, J. A. (1984). Lexical access using a neural
+network. Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science
+Sociery, 204-213
+Kienker, P. K., Sejnowski, T. J., Hinton, G. E., & Schumacher, L. E. (1985).
+Separating figure from ground with a parallel network. Unpublished.
+Kirkpatrick, S., Gelatt, C. D. Jr., & Vecchi, M. P. (1983). Optimization by
+simulated annealing. Science, 220, 671-680.
+Kohonen, T. (1974). An adaptive associative memory principle. IEEE Transactions, C-23, 444-445.
+Kohonen, T. (1977). Associative memory: A system theoretical approach. New
+York: Springer.
+Kohonen, T. (1982). Clustering, taxonomy, and topological maps of patterns.
+In M. Lang (Ed.), Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Partern
+Recognition (pp. 114-125). Silver Spring.
+MD: IEEE Computer Society
+Press.
+Kohonen, T. (1984). Self-organization and associative memory.
+Berlin:
+Springer-Verlag.
+Kullback, S. (1959). Information theory and statistics. New York: Wiley.
+Lamperti, J. (1977). Lecture notes in applied mathematical sciences:
+Stochastic
+processes. Berlin: Springebyrafted Material
+
+512 REFERENCES
+Larkin, J. H. (1983). The role of problem representation in physics. In D.
+Gentner & A. L. Stevens (Eds.), Mental models (pp. 75-98). Hillsdale, NJ:
+Erlbaum.
+Lashley, K. S. (1950). In search of the engram. In Society of Experimental
+Biology Symposium No. 4: Psychological mechanisms in animal behavior (pp.
+478-505). London: Cambridge University Press.
+Le Cun, Y. (1985, June). Une procedure d'apprentissage pour reseau a seuil
+assymetrique (A learning procedure for assymetric threshold network).
+Proceedings of Cognitiva 85, 599-604. Paris.
+Levin, J. A. (1976). Proteus: An activation framework for cognitive process models
+(Tech. Rep. No. ISI/WP-2). Marina del Rey, CA: University of Southern
+California, Information Sciences Institute.
+Levine, R. D., & Tribus, M. (1979). The maximum entropy formalism.
+bridge, MA: MIT Press.
+Lewis, C. H. (1978). Production system models of practice effects. Unpublished
+doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan.
+Lindsay, P. H., & Norman, D. A. (1972). Human information processing: An
+introduction to psychology. New York: Academic Press.
+Luria, A. R. (1966). Higher cortical functions in man. New York: Basic Books.
+Luria, A. R. (1973). The working brain. London: Penguin.
+Marr, D. (1982). Vision. San Francisco: Freeman.
+Marr, D., & Poggio, T. (1976). Cooperative computation of stereo disparity.
+Science, 194, 283-287.
+Marr, D., & Poggio, T. (1979). A computational theory of human stereo
+vision. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 204, 301-328.
+Marslen-Wilson, W. D., & Welsh, A. (1978). Processing interactions and lexical access during word recognition in continuous speech. Cognitive Psychol-
+McCarthy, J. (1959). Comments. In Mechanisation of thought processes:
+Proceedings of a symposium held at the National Physical Laboratory, November
+1958. Vol. 1 (p. 464). London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
+McClelland, J. L. (1979). On the time-relations of mental processes: An
+examination of systems of processes in cascade. Psychological Review, 86,
+287-330.
+McClelland, J. L. (1981). Retrieving general and specific information from
+stored knowledge of specifics. Proceedings of the Third Annual Meeting of the
+Cognitive Science Society, 170-172.
+McClelland, J. L., & Rumelhart, D. E. (1981). An interactive activation model
+of context effects in letter perception: Part 1. An account of basic findings.
+Psychological Review, 88, 375-407.
+McClelland, J. L., & Rumelhart, D. E. (1985). Distributed memory and the
+representation of general and specific information. Journal of Experimental
+Psychology: General, 114, 159-188.
+McCulloch, W. S., & Pitts, W. (1943). A logical calculus of the ideas immanent
+in nervous activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 5, 115-133.
+Meditch, J. S. (1969). Stochastic optimal linear estimation and control. New
+York: McGraw-Hill.
+
+513
+Metropolis, N., Rosenbluth, A. W., Rosenbluth, M. N., Teller, A. H., &
+Teller, E. (1953). Equation of state calculations for last computing
+machines. Journal of Chemical Physics, 6, 1087.
+Minsky, M. (1954). Neural nets and the brain-model problem. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Princeton University.
+Minsky, M. (1959). Some methods of artificial intelligence and heuristic programming. In Mechanisation of thought processes: Proceedings of a symposium
+held at the National Physical Laboratory, November 1958.
+Vol. 1
+(pp. 3-28). London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
+Minsky, M. (1975). A framework for representing knowledge. In P. H. Winston (Ed.), The psychology of computer vision (pp. 211-277). New York:
+McGraw-Hill.
+Minsky, M., & Papert, S. (1969). Perceptrons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+Morton, J. (1969). Interaction of information in word recognition. Psychological Review, 76, 165-178.
+Moussouris, J. (1974). Gibbs and Markov random systems with constraints.
+Journal of Statistical Physics, 10, 11-33.
+Mozer, M. C. (1984). The perception of multiple objects: A parallel, distributed
+processing approach. Unpublished manuscript, University of California, San
+Diego, Institute for Cognitive Science.
+Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
+Neisser, U. (1981). John Dean's memory: A case study. Cognition, 9, 1-22.
+Newell, A. (1980). Physical symbol systems. Cognitive Science, 4, 135-183.
+Norman, D. A., & Bobrow, D. G. (1975). On data-limited and resourcelimited processes. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 44-64.
+Norman, D. A., & Bobrow, D. G. (1976). On the role of active memory
+processes in perception and cognition. In C. N. Cofer (Ed.), The structure of
+human memory (pp. 114-132). Freeman: San Francisco.
+Norman, D. A., & Bobrow, D. G. (1979). Descriptions: An intermediate stage
+in memory retrieval. Cognitive Psychology, 11, 107-123.
+Palmer, S. E. (1980). What makes triangles point: Local and global effects in
+configurations of ambiguous triangles. Cognitive Psychology, 9, 353-383.
+Parker, D. B. (1985). Learning-logic (TR-47). Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts
+Institute of Technology, Center for Computational Research in Economics
+and Management Science.
+Pillsbury, W. B. (1897). A study in apperception. American Journal of Psychology, 8, 315-393.
+Poggio, T., & Torre, V. (1978). A new approach to synaptic interactions. In
+R. Heim & G. Palm (Eds.), Approaches 1o complex systems.
+Berlin:
+Springer-Verlag.
+Poincaré, H. (1913). Foundations of science (G. B. Halstead, Trans.). New
+York: Science Press.
+Quillian, M. R. (1968). Semantic memory. In M. Minsky (Ed.), Semantic
+information processing (pp. 227-270). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+Rao, C. R., & Mitra, S. K. (1971). Generalized inverse of a matrix and applications. Sixth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability,
+1, 601-620.
+
+514
+Riley, M. S. (1984). Structural understanding in performance and learning.
+Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
+Riley, M. S., & Smolensky, P. (1984). A parallel model of (sequential) problem solving. Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
+Rock, I. (1973). Orientation and form. New York: Academic Press.
+Rosenblatt, F. (1959). Two theorems of statistical separability in the perceptron. In Mechanisation of thought processes: Proceedings of a symposium held
+at the National Physical Laboratory, November 1958. Vol. 1 (pp. 421-456).
+Rosenblatt, F. (1962). Principles of neurodynamics. New York: Spartan.
+Rosenfeld, A., Hummel, R. A., & Zucker, S. W. (1976). Scene labeling by
+relaxation operations. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics,
+Rumelhart, D. E. (1975). Notes on a schema for stories. In D. G. Bobrow &
+A. Collins (Eds.), Representation and understanding (pp. 211-236). New
+York: Academic Press.
+Rumelhart, D. E. (1977). Toward an interactive model of reading. In S.
+Dornic (Ed.), Altention & Performance VI. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Rumelhart, D. E. (1979). Some problems with the notion of literal meanings.
+In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and thought. Cambridge, England: Cambridge
+University Press.
+Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. In R.
+Spiro, B. Bruce, & W. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading comprehension (pp. 33-58). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Rumelhart, D. E., & McClelland, J. L. (1982). An interactive activation model
+of context effects in letter perception: Part 2. The contextual enhancement
+effect and some tests and extensions of the model. Psychological Review,
+89, 60-94.
+Rumelhart, D. E., & McClelland, J. L. (1985). Levels indeed! A response to
+Broadbent. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 114, 193-197.
+Rumelhart, D. E., & Norman, D. A. (1982). Simulating a skilled typist: A
+study of skilled cognitive-motor performance. Cognitive Science, 6, 1-36.
+Rumelhart, D. E., & Zipser, D. (1985). Feature discovery by competitive
+learning. Cognitive Science, 9, 75-112.
+Schank, R. C. (1973). Identification of conceptualizations underlying natural
+language. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of
+thought and language (pp. 187-247). San Francisco: Freeman.
+Schank, R. C. (1976). The role of memory in language processing. In C. N
+Cofer (Ed.), The siructure of human memory (pp. 162-189). Freeman: San
+Francisco
+Schank, R. C. (1980). Language and memory. Cognitive Science, 4, 243-284.
+Schwartz, M. F., Marin, O. S. M., & Saffran, E. M. (1979). Dissociations of
+language function in dementia: A case study. Brain and Language, 1,
+277-306.
+Sejnowski, T. J. (1981). Skeleton filters in the brain. In G. E. Hinton & J. A.
+Anderson (Eds.), Parallel models of associative memory (pp. 49-82). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+
+515
+Sejnowski, T. J., & Hinton, G. E. (in press). Separating figure from ground
+with a Boltzmann machine. In M. A. Arbib & A. R. Hanson (Eds.), Vision,
+brain, and cooperative computation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford.
+Sejnowski, T. J., Hinton, G. E., Kienker, P., & Schumacher, L. E. (1985).
+Figure-ground separation by simulated annealing. Unpublished manuscript.
+Selfridge, O. G. (1955). Pattern recognition in modern computers. Proceedings
+of the Western Joint Computer Conference.
+Selfridge, O. G., & Neisser, U. (1960). Pattern recognition by machine. Scienlific American, 203, 60-68.
+Shannon, C. E. (1963). The mathematical theory of communication. In C. E.
+Shannon & W. Weaver (Eds.), The mathematical theory of communication
+(pp. 29-125). Urbana: University of Illinois Press. (Reprinted from Bell
+System Technical Journal, 1948, July and October)
+Shepard, R. N. (1984). Ecological constraints on internal representation:
+Resonant kinematics of perceiving, imagining, thinking, and dreaming.
+Psychological Review, 91, 417-447.
+Smith, P. T., & Baker, R. G. (1976). The influence of English spelling patterns on pronounciation. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior,
+15, 267-286.
+Smolensky, P. (1981). Lattice renormalization of $* theory. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Indiana University.
+Smolensky, P. (1983). Schema selection and stochastic inference in modular
+environments. Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
+AAAI-83, 109-113.
+Smolensky, P. (1984). The mathematical role of self-consistency in parallel
+computation. Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
+Smolensky, P., & Riley, M. S. (1984). Harmony theory: Problem solving, parallel
+cognitive models, and hermal physics (Tech. Rep. No. 8404). La Jolla:
+University of California, San Diego, Institute for Cognitive Science.
+Spoehr, K., & Smith, E. (1975). The role of orthographic and phonotactic
+rules in perceiving letter patterns. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
+Human Perception and Performance, 1, 21-34.
+Sternberg, S. (1969). Memory scanning: Mental processes revealed by
+reaction-time experiments. American Scientist, 57, 421-457.
+Strang, G. (1976). Linear algebra and its applications. New York: Academic
+Press.
+Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1981). Toward a modern theory of adaptive
+networks: Expectation and prediction. Psychological Review, 88, 135-170.
+Teitelbaum, P. (1967). The biology of drive. In G. Quarton, T. Melnechuk, &
+F. O. Schmitt (Eds.), The neurosciences: A sludy program. New York:
+Rockefeller Press.
+Terrace, H. S. (1963). Discrimination learning with and without errors. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 0, 1-27.
+Thomas, G. B. Jr. (1968). Calculus and analytic geometry (4th ed.). Reading,
+MA: Addison-Wesley.
+Venesky, R. L. (1970). The struciure of English orthography. The Hague:
+Mouton.
+
+516
+von der Malsberg, C. (1973). Self-organizing of orientation sensitive cells in
+the striate cortex. Kybernetik, 14, 85-100.
+Warren, R. M. (1970). Perceptual restoration of missing speech sounds. Science, 167, 393-395.
+Widrow, G., & Hoff, M. E. (1960). Adaptive switching circuits. Institute of
+Radio Engineers, Western Electronic Show and Convention, Convention Record,
+Part 4, 96-104.
+Williams, R. J. (1983). Unit activation rules for cognitive network models (Tech.
+Rep. No. ICS 8303). La Jolla: University of California, San Diego, Institute
+for Cognitive Science.
+Willshaw, D. J. (1971). Models of distributed associative memory. Unpublished
+doctoral dissertation, University of Edinburgh.
+Willshaw, D. J. (1981). Holography, associative memory, and inductive generalization. In G. E. Hinton & J. A. Anderson (Eds.), Parallel models of
+associative memory (pp. 83-104). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
+Winston, P. H. (1975). Learning structural descriptions from examples. In
+P. H. Winston (Ed.), The psychology of computer vision (pp. 157-209). New
+York: McGraw-Hill.
+Wood, C. C. (1978). Variations on a theme by Lashley: Lesion experiments
+on the neural model of Anderson, Silverstein, Ritz, & Jones. Psychological
+Review, 85, 582-591.
+Woods, W. (1973). An experimental parsing system for transition network
+grammars. In R. Rustin (Ed.), Natural language processing. New York:
+Algorithmics Press.
+Woods, W., & Kaplan, R. (1971). The lunar sciences natural language information system (Rep. No. 2265). Cambridge, MA: Bolt, Beranek, and Newman.
+Zadeh, L. A. (1965). Fuzzy sets. Information and Control, 8, 338-353.
+
+Index
+Page numbers in roman type refer to Volume I; page numbers in
+italic type refer 10 Volume 2.
+Abeles, M., 367, 369, 385, 553
+unit, 425
+Abelson, R. P., 18, 19, 574
+logic of
+Abrams, r. A.S.541, 560
+conclusions on, 442-443
+description of, 363
+Abstraction models of memory,
+examples of, 428-429
+199-206
+main concepts of, 426-428
+comparison of experimental and
+as major aspect of PDP models,
+simulation results, 203-205
+51-52
+other findings on, 205-206
+results of, 429, 439-442
+summary of training and test
+rules, examples of, 425-426
+stimuli, 202-203
+three-dimensional plots, 429,
+Whittlesea's experiments on, 201-
+430-438 (Figs.)
+202
+views of, 423-425
+Ackley, D. H., 264, 306, 313, 317,
+Activation rule. See Activation
+335, 507, 510, 393, 562
+functions
+ACT* model, 32, 124, 127
+Activation vector of harmony
+Activation functions
+¡heoretical model, 215-216
+examples of
+Active representation in PDP
+gating activation function, 426
+models. See PDP models, active
+semilinear, 52, 324-328
+representation in
+quasi-linear, 425
+Addition problem, simple binary,
+quasi-multilinear, 426
+341-346. See also Delta rule,
+squashing function, 425
+generalized
+threshold logic or linea Gapestiglded Matteright, T. D., 368, 558
+
+518
+Algebra, linear. See Linear algebra
+Algebraic properties of inner
+products, 382-383. See also
+Vectors
+Allman, J., 347, 374, 375, 553, 554
+Alternative activity patterns, 82-83
+AM. See Monocular occlusion
+Amari, S. A., 42, 45, 444, 507, 489,
+495, 553
+Ambiguity
+lexical, 302-304
+structural, 304-305
+and shading of feature patterns,
+305-306
+Ambiguous characters, 8, 155-157.
+See also Reading, programmable
+blackboard model of
+Amnesia. See also Memory, a
+distributed model of
+anterograde, 504, 505-506, 512-513
+bitemporal, basic aspects of, 505-
+506
+conclusions on, 527
+description of, 503-505
+neurochemistry of synaptic change,
+hypothetical account of, 507-509
+paradox of, resolution to, 506-507
+quantitative model, formulation of,
+relation to other accounts of, 510-
+511
+residual learning in, 518-524
+simulations, 511-518
+anterograde amnesia, 512-513
+lost memories, recovery of, 515-
+516
+retrograde amnesia, 513-515
+retrograde and anterograde
+amnesia, correlation of, 513
+studies on, 516-518
+summary of, 518
+spared learning in, 207-208, 518,
+524-526
+Anandan, P., 322, 508, 550, 554
+AND function, 429. See also
+Boolean function
+Andén, N. E., 350, 553
+Andersen, P., 336, 553
+Anderson, C. W., 539, 554
+Anderson, J. A., 33, 42, 56, 62, 66,
+68,80, 82, 101, 406, 409, 410,
+418, 507, 510, 511, 8, 173, 183,
+200, 226, 277, 311, 380, 389,
+394,399, 432, 551, 553, 554,
+562,564
+Anderson, J. R., 32, 124, 127, 251,
+461, 507, 173, 206, 209,524,
+549.554,558
+Anlezark, G. M., 477, 554
+Annealing, simulated. See Simulated
+annealing
+Aragon, C. R., 235, 508
+Arbib, M. A., 362, 577
+Arbitrary mapping, implementing,
+96-104
+grapheme strings, 97-99, 102
+sememe units, 97-98, 99, 101-102
+three-layer network, 97-98. See
+also Boltzmann machines
+Arguments, missing, filling in, 301-
+302. See also Case role
+assignment, model of
+Агу, М., 477, 564
+Asanuma, H., 357, 554
+Asynchronous update vs.
+synchronous update, 61
+ATN. See Augmented transition
+network parsers
+Attention
+networks for focusing, 114-118
+shifting focus of, 147-151
+Augmented transition network
+parsers (ATN), 119
+Auto-associative paradigm. See also
+Memory, a distributed model of
+definition of, 55, 161
+modification of, 211-212
+Back-propagation simulator,
+description ol, 328-330
+Bagley, W. C., 58, 98, 106, 554
+Bahl, L. R., 293, 508
+Baker, J. F., 347, 554
+Baker, R. G., 24, 515
+Ballard, D. H., 12, 43, 45, 72, 117,
+Copyrighted Material 133, 282, 508, 509, 128,
+
+373, 381, 554, 559
+Banerjee, S. P., 477, 561
+Barber, R. P., 351, 562
+Bard, P., 352, 579
+Barlow, H. В., 373, 554
+Barnes, C. A., 448, 568
+Barrow, H. G., 63, 554
+Bartlett, F. C., 81, 508, 17, 19, 554
+Barto, A. G., 43, 53, 57, 321-322,
+444, 508, 515, 383, 539, 550,
+554,576
+Barwise, J., 195, 508
+Basket cells, 363-364
+Bates, E., 217, 273, 274, 554, 567
+Baumgartner, G., 376, 578
+B-coefficient constants, (App.), 467-
+468. See also B-coefficient model
+B-coefficient model, 460-466. See
+also Place recognition and goal
+location, biologically plausible
+models of
+concept, network using, 461-462
+constants (App.), 467-468
+description of, 469-461
+issue in, 463
+performance of, 464
+programming, 463
+simulation of, 469-470
+testing, 463-464
+BD. See Binocular deprivation
+Bear, M. F., 477, 554
+Becker, J. T., 435, 554
+Benoit, R., 364, 569
+Bentivoglio, M., 350, 567
+Berko, J., 40, 508, 219, 220, 265,
+555
+Berman, N., 475, 478, 558
+Bernstein, J., 153, 159, 508
+Best, P., 435, 571
+Bever, T. G., 274, 555, 559
+Bienenstock, E. L., 42, 180, 508,
+480,487, 489, 495, 555
+Binder, K., 230, 508
+Binding problem, 88-90
+of neurons, 377-378
+Binocular deprivation (BD), 474, 475
+Bipolar cells, 363
+Bishop, P. O., 480, 574
+519
+Bitemporal amnesia. See Amnesia,
+bitemporal
+Bixby, J. L., 345, 577
+Blake, A., 285, 508
+Blakemore, C., 11, 508, 475, 489,
+490,491,497, 500, 555, 571, 577
+Blanchard, H. Е., 161, 568
+Blank, M. A., 79, 111, 559
+Blasdel, G. G., 487, 490, 555
+Blends of memory traces, 208. See
+also Memory, a distributed model
+of
+Bloom, F. E., 364, 385, 569
+Bloom, M. J., 385, 560
+Blumstein, S., 62, 576
+Bobillier, P., 350, 555
+Bobrow, D. G., 9, 79, 133, 513, 18,
+19,536,555,570
+Boltzmann machines
+damage, example of effects of,
+304-313
+description of, 43, 148-149
+hard learning, example of, 299-303
+annealing schedule, 302
+shifter network performance,
+302-303
+training procedure, 300
+learning algorithm, 294-303, 209
+conclusions on, 313-314
+derivation of (App.), 315-317
+failure of algorithm, 298-299
+hardware, unreliable, achieving
+reliable computation with, 303-
+304
+learning, easy and hard, 290-294
+relaxation searches, use of to
+perform, 283-290
+research with, 264
+second-order observables and,
+273-275
+unlearning, 296-298
+Bond, Z. S., 61, 555
+Bonds, A. B., 476, 478, 560
+Boolean function, 428, 429, 439-442
+activation function as extension of,
+428
+AND function, 429
+Copyrighted Matthalctive normal form, 439
+
+520
+Boolean function (continued)
+linearly separable functions, 440
+mapping from expressions, 439
+neurons treated as devices, 424-425
+XOR function, 429
+B units, simulations of (App.), 469-
+470. See also B-coefficient model
+Bunt, A. H., 357, 566
+Bybee, J. L., 221, 247, 249, 250,
+251,254,255, 256,556
+Bottom-up approach to analysis of
+information processing systems,
+123
+CA. See Connection activation unit
+Bottom-up presentation of harmony
+Caan, W., 368, 571
+theory, 199, 213-261. See also
+Cajal, S. Ramon y, 336, 350, 358,
+Harmony theory
+359, 361,363, 367,556
+Bottom-up processing system, Sl
+Caminiti, R., 377-378, 560
+matrix representation of, 57-58
+Canonical feature detectors, 114
+Boycott, В. В., 336, 558
+Caplan, C. J., 478, 570
+Brachman, R. J., 313, 555
+Carew, T. J., 552, 561
+Brain. See Cerebral cortex, anatomy
+Carlson, M., 275, 573
+and physiology of; Cerebral
+Carman, J. B., 350, 556
+cortex, questions about
+Carnes, K. M., 477, 554
+computation in
+Carpenter, P. A., 153, 161, 549, 564,
+Brain damage. See also Amnesia;
+577
+Damage, effects of on a network
+Carroll, Lewis, 97
+graceful degradation and, 29, 134
+Cascade model, 42
+neuropsychological investigation of
+Case role assignment, model of
+patients with, 134-135
+architecture of, 277-289
+simulated effects of, 304-313
+case role representation, 286-288
+Brain state in a box model (BSB),
+semantic microfeatures, 278-283
+66-68
+sentence processing and learning,
+Branch, M., 435, 571
+details of, 288-289
+Brayton, R. K., 381, 382, 575
+sentence-structure units, 283-286
+Bresnan, J., 274, 559, 564
+descriptions of, 3-4
+Brightman, M. W., 336, 572
+discussion of, 313-325
+Broadbent, D. E., 121, 508, 97, 532,
+context-sensitive coding,
+555
+iteration, and center embedding,
+Brock, L. G., 367, 555
+323-325
+Brodmann, K., 345, 346, 555
+fixed-length, 320-322
+Brodmann's areas of the neocortex,
+limitation myths, 322-323
+345-346. See also Cerebral
+meaning, representation of, 315-
+cortex, anatomy and physiology
+316
+of
+model, basic features of, 314-315
+Brooks, С. МcС., 336, 553
+parsers, conventional interfacing
+Brooks, L. R., 171, 556
+with, 317-318
+Brown, P., 295
+recursion, 318-320
+Brown, R., 219, 241, 556
+goals of, 276-277
+Bruce, C. J., 368, 556, 558
+studies on, 277
+Brugge, J. F., 356, 563
+multiple constraints on, 272-275
+BSB model. See Brain state in a box
+studies on, 273, 275, 277
+model
+simulation experiments of, 289-292
+Buisseret, P., 476, 478, 556
+basic results of, 292-293
+
+INDEX 521
+feature patterns, shading of, 305-
+306
+387-389
+neuronal plasticity in, 385-387
+lexical ambiguity resolution, 302-
+neuronal processing in, 378-382
+nonlinear computations, 381
+missing arguments, filling in,
+single-shot algorithms, 380-381
+301-302
+timing problem, 378-380
+novel words, generalization to,
+representing information in, 373-
+307-310
+377
+other creative errors, 306-307
+binding problem, 377
+roles, distributed representation
+surround effects, 374-377
+of, 312-313
+temporal binding, 383-385
+semantic and word-order cues,
+Chace, P., 513, 576
+use of in, 293-300
+Chandelier cells, 362-363
+straightforward extensions, 310-
+Changeux, J. -P., 387, 556
+312
+Chapman, R. A., 485, 556
+structural ambiguity of, 304-305
+verb-frame selection, 300-301
+Charniak, E., 324, 556
+Chase, W. G., 241, 508
+Central module, 130-131
+Chauvin, Y., 213, 332-334,
+Cerebral cortex, anatomy and
+Chomsky, N., 24, 119, 123, 246, 508
+physiology of
+Christen, W. G., 478, 570
+cortex inputs, 346-356
+Christensen, R., 227, 508
+irregularities within, 353-356
+CID. See Connection information
+topographic representation of,
+distribution mechanism
+352-353
+Clark, W. A., 154, 509
+cortical areas of, 345
+Class C' perceptron (Rosenblatt),
+cortical outputs, 356-357
+155-156
+feature detection of, 367-371
+Classification paradigm, 161
+firing, rates of, 366-367
+Coarse coding, 91-96. See also
+general organization of, 340-345
+Conjunctive encoding:
+main layers, 341-345
+Distributed representations
+general points on, 333-335
+limitations on, 92-94
+group neuron behavior in, 365-366
+principle underlying, 94-96
+neocortical neurons, nature of
+Cognition and parallel distributed
+cell types in, 358-360
+processing. See PDP approach,
+excitatory vs. inhibitory neurons,
+introduction to
+362
+Cognition, microstructure of, 12-13
+experimental methods, 357-358
+Cognitive science. See PDP approach
+neurons without many spines,
+and cognitive science
+361
+Cognitive theories, constraints on,
+neurons with spines, 360-361
+129-130
+special cell types, 362
+Cohen, M. A., 389, 556
+neuron behavior in, 364-365
+Cohen, M. M., 81, 86, 568
+neuron, classical, 335-337
+Cohen, N. J., 510, 519, S20, 521-
+peptides, 339
+522,524,525.527,556,576
+synapses, types of, 338-339
+COHORT model (Marslen- Wilson),
+Cerebral cortex, questions about
+77, 97-106
+computation in
+basic assumptions of, 98-99
+computational models, roopyighted Materrama for, 99-100, 101
+
+522
+COHORT model (continued)
+resolution of, 101-106
+Cole, K. S., 364, 556
+Cole, R. A., 58, 61, 98, 99, 100,
+107,111, 556, 557
+Collins, A. M., 85, 508
+Colonnier, M., 348, 361, 557, 571
+Colon Osorio, F. C., 424, 510
+Coltheart, M., 102, 508
+Competence theorem, 226-229
+Competitive inhibition, 21. See also
+Phoneme identification, factors
+influencing
+effect of at phoneme level, 89-90
+Competitive learning
+architecture of competitive learning
+system, 162-166
+basic components of, 151-152
+characteristics of, 166-167
+conclusions on, 190
+definition of, 147
+dipole experiments, results of,
+170-177
+correlated teaching inputs, 182-
+183
+letter similarity effects, 182
+number of elements, effect of per
+serial position, 181-182
+position-specific letter detectors,
+180-181
+word detection units, 181
+word perception model, 177-180
+formal analysis of, 168-170
+geometric interpretation of, 164-
+cerebral cortex in, 387-389
+Computational temperature (T), 211
+Computational viewpoint on PDP
+models, 397-398
+Conel, J. LeRoy, 358, 557
+Confabulation, as a stable pattern, 81
+Conjunctive encoding, 90-91, 96.
+See also Coarse coding;
+Distributed representations
+CONNECT statements for P3
+system, 495-496. See also P3
+system
+Connection activation system, 130-
+134
+Connection activation unit (CA).
+See also Connection information
+distribution mechanism
+definition of, 132-134
+multiple pattern processing, 477-
+478
+requirements of, 474-476
+single pattern processing, 476-477
+summary of requirements, 480-481
+Connection information distribution
+(CID) mechanism, 473-486,
+129-134,137, 139-140
+benefits of, 164-166
+central knowledge store in, 130-134
+computer simulation of word
+ecognition using, 134-131
+extensions of. 167-16d
+resource requirements of, 473-486,
+166-167
+Connectionist models, 72
+Connolly, M., 353, 355, 566
+history of, 152-159
+Connors, B. W., 364, 369, 557
+horizontal and vertical lines,
+Constructor, as major component of
+experiments with, 184-190
+P3 system, 489. See also P3
+mechanism of, 159
+system
+neural-like processing systems,
+Content-addressable memory, 79-80
+160-161
+Continuity and uniqueness
+in P3 simulation system
+constraints in depth perception,
+methods (App. B), 504-506
+19-20
+plans for (App. A), 502-503
+Cooling schedule, 244-245. See also
+Completion task, example of, 206-
+Electricity problem-solving;
+Simulated annealing
+Computational level, 121
+Coombs, J. S., 367, 555
+Computational models, role of
+Cooper, F. S., 92, 94, 495, 566, 576
+
+523
+Cooper, L. N., 42, 180, 508, 480,
+487,489, 499, 555, 557, 573
+Corkin, s., 579, 524, S50
+Cortical areas of the neocortex
+Brodmann's cortical parcellation
+scheme, 345
+input systems, 346
+irregularities within, 353-356
+thalamus, as gateway to cerebral
+cortex, 349-352
+topographic representation, 352-
+353
+output systems, 356-357
+Cortical plasticity, processes that
+modulate, 476-478
+Cotton, S., 99, 105, 557
+Cottrell, G., 165, 277, 311, 314, 557
+Coulter, J. D., 357, 570
+Cowan, J. D., 381, 389, 578
+Cowan, W. M., 350, 351, 556, 572
+Cowey, A., 363, 576
+Crain, S., 274, 557
+Crane, A. M., 350, 572
+Crick, F. H. C., 296, 297, 509, 351,
+384,387,557
+Critical or sensitive period of
+plasticity, 473-484
+cortical plasticity, processes that
+modulate, 476-477
+effect of environment on, 478
+hypothesis for, 483-484
+ocular dominance statistics, 474-
+476
+other examples of, 477-478
+Crosstalk, 139-142. See also
+Reading, programmable
+blackboard model of
+Crow, T. J., 476, 477, 554, 557
+Crowder, R. G., 64, 94, 209, 557
+Cynader, M., 475, 476, 478, 492,
+498,557,558
+in Boltzmann machines, 304-313
+Daniel, P. M., 354, 558
+Daniels, J. D., 477, 554
+Darien-Smith, J., 480, 574
+Davis, E., 432, 558
+Daw, N. W., 497, 500, 558, 577
+Deacedo, B. S., 519, 524, 556
+Decay process in increments to
+weights, 181. See also Memory, a
+distributed model of
+Decision-making and freezing in
+harmony theory
+coherent interpretation, robustness
+of, 240
+idealized task, 238-239
+phase transitions, computational
+significance of, 236-237
+symmetry breaking, 237-238
+thermodynamic limit, 239
+Deep dyslexia, 102
+Degradation, effects of and benefits
+of redundancy, 472. See also
+Standard pattern associators
+Deliberate conscious control (DCC),
+543-545. See also PDP approach,
+reflections on
+Delta rule, 43, 53, 62, 63, 363, 417-
+418
+Delta rule, analysis of. See also
+Delta rule, generalized
+and multiple linear regression,
+457-458
+in pattern-based coordinates, 447-
+453
+statistical learning and, 453-457
+summary of, 458-459
+in vector notation, 445-447
+Delta rule, generalized, 149
+application of, 327-328
+conclusions on, 361-362
+general cases, 352-361
+recurrent nets, 354-361
+and gradient descent, 322-324
+Dahlström, A., 350, 553
+problem of, 318-323
+Damage, effects of on a network, 29,
+XOR problem, 319-321
+134, 472. See also Amnesia;
+for semilinear activation functions
+Boltzmann machines; Brain
+in feedforward networks, 324-328
+damage; Graceful degradabyrighted Materiaigma-pi units, 353
+
+524 INDEX
+Delta rule, generalized (continued)
+simulation results, 328-330, 352
+encoding problem, 335-339
+negation problem, 346-347
+parity, 334-335
+simple binary addition problem,
+341-346
+symmetry, 340-341
+T-C problem, 348-352
+XOR problem, 330-334
+use of to determine size and
+direction of changes in
+connections, 179-181
+generalized, 209
+DeMarzo, P. M., 241, 242, 509
+Dempster, A. P., 293, 509
+Dendrites, studies on, 381-382. See
+also Cerebral cortex, questions
+about computation in
+Denes, P., 87, 558
+de Riboupierre, F., 385, 553
+de Riboupierre, Y., 385, 553
+Derthick, M., 298, 299, 509, 313
+Desimone, R., 368, 374, 556, 558
+Dipole experiments for competitive
+learning mechanisms, 170-174
+formal analysis of, 174-177
+homogeneous stimulus patterns,
+191-193
+Distal landmarks for biologically
+plausible models of place
+recognition and goal location, 445
+Distributed representations. See also
+Memory, a distributed model of;
+Schemata, concept of
+features of
+generalization effects, 82-85
+memory, 79-81
+new concepts, 86-87
+status of, 78-79
+structure in representations and
+processes, 104-108
+constituent structure,
+representing, 105-106
+sequential symbol processing,
+106-108
+summary on, 108-109
+technical details of, 87-104
+arbitrary pairing, implementing,
+96-104
+binding problem, 88-90
+coarse coding, 91-96
+conjunctive encoding, 90-91
+Distributed view-field model for goal
+location, 449-460. See also Place
+recognition and goal location,
+biologically plausible models of
+description of, 451-453
+network used in, 450-451
+P3 simulation of, 453-454
+Symbolics 3600 LISP machine,
+use of for, 454-456
+problems of, 451
+properties of, 453
+testing of, 453
+Dobson, V., 97, 100
+Dostrovsky, J., 435, S71
+Dowling, J. E., 336, 558, 578
+Dräger, U. C., 490, 558
+Dretske, F., 195, 509
+Duckrow, R. B., 477, 561
+Duda, R. O., 380, 558
+Dukes, K., 61, 110, 570
+Durham, D., S00, 358
+Dynamic functional system, 41
+Dynamical systems, perspective of
+PDP models as, 397-398
+Eccles, J. C., 336, 367, 370, 553,
+555, 558
+Edelman, G. M., 387, 558
+Edmonds, D., 153,
+Ehrlich, S., 163, 573
+Eichenbaum, H., 385, 519, 524, 556,
+565
+Eigenvalues. See Eigenvectors and
+eigen values
+Eigen vectors and eigenvalues, 399-
+403. See also Matrices and linear
+systems
+Eimas, P. D., 94, 473, 558, 560
+Eisen, M., 456, 509
+Elbaum, C., 499, 573
+Electricity problem-solving, 240-250
+Electroencephalography (EEG), 335
+
+INDEX 525
+Elio, R., 172, 558
+Elman, J. L., 58, 63, 69, 71, 80, 81,
+119, 558, 559, 568
+EM. See Expectation and
+maximization method
+Empiricism vs. nativism, 139-142
+Emson, P. C., 364, 559
+Encoding problem, 335-339. See also
+Delta rule, generalized
+Equilibrium states of the competitive
+learning system, 168-170
+Erman, L. D., 63, 122, 559, 573
+Error correction rule. See Delta rule
+Error propagation, learning internal
+representations by. See Delta
+rule, generalized
+Ervin, S., 219, 220, 254, 559
+Espinosa, 1. E., 385, 560
+Evanczuk, S., 385, 560
+Exclusive or (XOR) problem, 64-65,
+96, 319-321, 330-334. See also
+Delta rule, generalized
+Executive-driven processing, 134
+Expectation and maximization (EM)
+method, 293
+Explicit inaccessible rule, 217. See
+also Verbs, learning past tenses of
+Explicit rule formulation, tradition,
+32
+on amount of, 159-161. See also
+Reading, programmable
+blackboard model of
+Feedforward networks, delta rule for
+semilinear activation functions in,
+324-328. See also Delta rule,
+generalized
+Feinstein, D. J., 296, S11
+Feirtag, M., 334, 342, 570
+Feldman, J. A., 12, 43, 45, 72, 75,
+86, 117, 124, 130, 181, 509, 9,
+128,559
+Feldman, M. L., 363, 377, 559
+Feldman and Ballard units, 72
+conjunctive units, 72
+relation to sigma-pi units, 72
+Felleman, D. J., 352, 354, 385, 569,
+570
+Fennell, R. D., 63, 122, 573
+Feustel, T. C., 197, 198, 559, 574
+Fillmore, C. J., 273, 559
+Finlay, B. L., 367, 574
+Firing, rates of in neocortical
+neurons, 366-367. See also
+Neocortical neurons, nature of
+First formant onset frequency
+(FIOF), 84, 85. See also
+Phoneme identification, factors
+influencing
+Fixations. See also Reading,
+programmable blackboard model
+Fahlman, S. E., 85, 86, 264, 509
+of
+Fairén, A., 363, 559
+sequences of, 161-164
+Famiglietti, E. V., 330, 559
+single and multiple, 153-155
+Fan-in. See Fan-out
+Fodor, J. A., 141, 509, 274, 559
+Fan-out
+Foley, J. D., 467, 559
+definition of, 51
+Ford, M., 274, 559
+limited, effects of, 468-472
+Foss, D. J., 79, 111, 559
+method for overcoming limitation,
+Fowler, C. А., 60, 73, 77, 95, 118,
+470-472
+559
+neural nets, biological limits on
+Fox, R. A., 79, 559, 560
+storage capacity of, 469-470
+Frames, use of as knowledge
+Fanty, M., 320, 321, 322, 559
+structure, 9. See also Schemata,
+Farley, B. G., 154, 509
+concept of
+Feature discovery by competitive
+Francis, W., 74, 240, 565
+learning.
+See Competitive
+Frazier, L., 275, 560, 573
+learning
+Freeman, R. D., 475, 476, 478, 481,
+Feedback, effects of display Deprighted Material 560, 567, 571
+
+526 INDEX
+Freezing and decision-making in
+harmony theory. See Decisionmaking and freezing in harmony
+theory
+Freund, T. F., 363, 576
+Friedlander, M. J., 351, 560
+Fry, D. B., 94, 560
+Fuchs, A. F., 357, 566
+Fujimura, O., 62, 473, 560, 569
+Fujisaki, H., 77, 94, 560
+Fukushima, K., 42, 152, 162, 300,
+313, 350, 509
+Future directions for PDP, 547-552
+Fuxe, K., 350, 364, 553, 560
+Fuzzy map theory, 432-433. See also
+Place recognition and goal
+location, biologically plausible
+models.of
+Glaser, E. M., 366, 577
+Glass, L.., 494, 571
+Glorioso, R. M., 424, 510
+Gluck, M. A., 383, 552, 561
+Glushko, R. J., 43, 510, 171, 561
+Goal location. See Place recognition
+and goal location, biologically
+plausible models of
+Goldman-Rakic, P. S., 350, 572
+Goodness-of-fit function, 14-16, 31,
+32-33, 35-36. See also Schemata,
+concept of
+Graceful degradation, 29, 134. See
+also Damage, effects of on a
+network
+Gradient descent
+and delta rule, 322-324
+use of to solve hard optimizing
+problems on conventional
+Gallistel, C. R., 141, 509
+computers, 287-288
+Gamma factor in bitemporal
+Grapheme strings, 97-99, 102. See
+amnesia, 507
+also Arbitrary mapping,
+Ganong, W. F., 60, 78, 560
+implementing
+Garey, L. J., 348, 497, 500, 555,
+Gray, E. G., 339, 361, 561
+560,577
+Green, D. M., 466, 510, 225, 561
+Garnes, S., 61, 555
+Green, K., 96, 569
+Garrett, M. F., 274, 559
+Greenberg, Z., 254
+Garrud, P., 434, 466, 569
+Greenway, A. P., 477, 554
+Gary-Bobo, E., 476, 478, 556
+Grinvald, A., 385, 56l
+Gati, I., 499, 560
+Grosjean, F., 60, 63, 99, 100, 105,
+Gating activation function, 426. See
+107,114,115.557, 56l
+also Activation functions
+Gross, C. G., 368, 556, 558
+Gee, J., 60, 63, 107, 115, 561
+Grossberg, S., 42, 53, 70, 116, 146,
+Gelatt, C. D., Jr., 48, 235, 287, 511
+152, 162, 164, 167, 418, 510, 90,
+Geman, D., 148, 264, 271, 278, 289,
+389, 494, 535, 556, 561
+509
+Grossberg's models, 70-71
+Geman, S., 148, 264, 268, 271, 278,
+Guillery, R. W., 351, 561
+289, 509
+Gutnick, M. J., 364, 369, 557
+Generalization, 30, 85. See also
+Memory, a distributed model of
+Georgopoulos, A. P., 377-378, 560
+Haggard, M., 85, 576
+Gernsbacher, M. A., 79, 559
+Hale, B. L., 159, 563
+Gerstein, G. L., 385, 560
+Halle, M., 24, 508, 168, 561
+Gibbs sampler, research with, 264
+Halmos, P. R., 422, 510
+Gibson, E. J., 198
+Hamiltonian function (H), 211
+Gilbert, C. D., 356, 358, 366, 385,
+Hámori, J., 351, 577
+480, 560, 561, 577, 578
+Hard learning, example of, 299-303.
+Ginsburg, H. P., 241, 509
+See also Boltzmann machines
+
+INDEX 527
+Harik, S. J., 477, 561
+Harmonium machine, 212
+Harmony function (H). See also
+Harmony theory
+basic requirements of, 220-223
+cognitive systems and, 267-268
+mathematic formulation of, 208,
+211
+retrieving information from, 269-
+272
+terminology, 268-269
+Harmony theory, 213-220
+conclusions on, 261-262
+decision-making and freezing, 236-
+240
+definition of, 148
+electricity, problem-solving of,
+240-250
+goal of, 198-199
+learning new representations, 258-
+261
+macrodescription, 251-258
+mathematical results, description
+of, 226-236
+competence theorem, 226-229
+learnability theorem, 235-236
+physics analogy, 229-230
+realizability theorem, 230-235
+perceptual processing centrality,
+197-198
+and probability, 220-226
+research with, 264
+schema theory and self-consistency
+of, 199-213
+theorems on, formal presentation
+of, 264-281
+top-down strategy pursued in, 196
+Harris, K. S., 92, 576
+Hart, P. E., 380, 558
+Hash coding, 80
+Hawken, M. J., 490, 555
+Hawkins, R. D., 552, 561
+HEARSAY model of speech
+understanding, 43, 119, 122-123,
+Hebbian learning rule, 36, 37, 38,
+53, 69-70,297
+Heggelund, P., 497, 564
+Heidmann, T., 387, 556
+Hein, A., 475, 478, 558
+Heise, G., 63, 569
+Hendrickson, A. E., 344, 357, 566,
+572
+Henneberg, R., 341, 561
+Hewitt, C., 132, 510
+Hidden units, augmenting memory
+with, 209-214. See also Memory,
+a distributed model of
+Hidden units, definition of, 48
+Hierarchy, kinds of, 105-106
+Hinton, G. E., 17, 20, 33, 42, 80, 82,
+83, 84, 96, 107, 114, 115, 127,
+133, 264, 272, 282, 283, 289.
+297, 302, 306, 313, 317, 335,
+350, 507, 508, 510, 511, 515, 8,
+23,24,63,68, 128, 129,151.
+173, 175, 209, 210, 277, 278,
+312, 313, 314, 318, 322, 373,
+377, 381, 389, 393, 394, 533,
+539,548, 554, 562, 575, 577
+Hinton's scheme for mapping
+patterns, 114-115, 117, 118. See
+also Attention, networks for
+focusing
+Hintzman, D., 171, 172, 200, 562
+Hiorns, R. W., 344, 573
+Hirst, G., 321, 575
+Hoff, M. E., 321, 444, 516
+Hofstadter, D. R., 43, 132, 202, 213,
+264,511,20,562
+Hogg, Т., 313, 511, 389, 562
+Hökfelt, T., 350, 364, 560, 577
+Homogeneous dipole stimulus
+patterns (App.), 191-193
+Hopfield, J. J., 43, 61, 81, 133, 148,
+285, 286, 296, 297, 418, 511, 13,
+14,389,394.562
+Hopfield nets, applying simulated
+annealing to, 288-289. See also
+Simulated annealing
+BLACKBOARD, 123
+Hopkins, W. F., 477, 562
+Hebb, D. O., 36, 41, 53, 152-153,
+Horizontal and vertical lines,
+510
+Copyrighted Mateiyafriments with, 184-190
+
+528
+Horizontally hierarchical networks,
+217
+Houde, J., 353, 355, 566
+Houser, C. R., 351, 562
+Hubel, D. H., 340, 353, 356, 367,
+373, 474, 475, 483, 497, 500,
+562,563,566,578
+Huberman, B. A., 313, 511, 389, 562
+Hughlings-Jackson, J., 41, 141-142
+Human information processing. See
+also PDP approach, reflections on
+essential properties of, 537
+new understanding of, 545-546
+Human memory. See Memory, a
+distributed model of; Memory,
+retrieving information from
+Hummel, R. A., 285, 286, 511, 514
+Hunt, S. P., 364, 559
+Huppert, F. A., 516, 517, 563
+6-hydroxydopamine (6-OHDA),
+477-496
+associators; Reading,
+programmable blackboard model
+of; Standard pattern associators
+Interference of memories, 208-209.
+See also Memory, a distributed
+model of
+Internal representations. See Delta
+rule, generalized; Representation,
+learning of
+IS-A hierarchy, I0S
+Isenberg, D., 7, 511
+Isomorphism hypothesis. See also
+PDP models, neural and
+conceptual interpretation of
+of conceptual and neural levels,
+395-396
+failure of in nonlinear models,
+422-424
+levels and localized damage, 413-
+416
+levels, learning of connections and,
+416-418
+Identity/role combinations, 106. See
+in linear systems, 411-413
+also Case role assignment, model
+Iverson, L. L., 340, 563
+of; Distributed representations
+Imbert, M., 476, 478, 556
+Jackson, J. H., 41, 141, S11
+Imig, T. J., 356, 563
+Implementational (physiological)
+Jacoby, L. L., 171, 172, 192, 193,
+level of distributed memory, 121
+556,563
+Jakimik, J., 61, 98, 99, 100, 107,
+Inner products. See also Vectors
+111,557
+algebraic properties of, 382-383
+Jelinek, F., 293, 508
+in two-dimensional space, 380-382
+Jenkins, J. J., 473, 569
+Input units, definition of, 48
+Jenkins, W. M., 385, 563
+Interactive activation model of word
+Johnson, D. S., 235, 508
+perception, 43, 71-72, 177-180,
+Johnson, E., 324, 563
+216-217, 125-129, 137-138
+Johnston, D., 477, 562
+Interactive model of reading
+Johnston, J. C., 159, 160, 563, 574
+(Rumelhart), 43, 122
+Jones, E. G., 351, 352, 357, 363,
+Interactive models, representation of
+563, 564
+in matrix form, 57, 59-61. See
+Jones, R. S., 56, 406, 409, 410, 418,
+also Interactive activation model
+507, 173, 226, 311, 551, 554
+of word perception
+Jouvet, M., 350, 555
+layered systems, 60
+Julesz, B., 18, 511
+one-step system, 60
+Just, M. А., 153, 161, 549, 564, 577
+single-level, 60
+three-level, 59
+Kaas, J. H., 345, 352, 354, 385, 386,
+Interference of patterns, 139-142.
+387,569,570,578
+See also Programmable pattern
+Kahneman, D., 536, 564
+
+INDEX 529
+Kaiserman-Abramof, 1. R., 336, 361,
+365, 571
+Kalaska, J. F., 378, 560
+Kandel, E. R., 333, 364, 507, 552,
+561, 564,576
+Kanerva, P., 76, 465, S11
+Kant, E., 17, 19, 564
+Kaplan, R. M., 119, 516, 274, 559,
+564
+Kasamatsu, Т., 476, 477, 492, 497,
+Kawamoto, A. H., 101, 511, 277,
+311,564
+Kawashima, T., 77, 94, 560
+Keele, S. W., 171, 183, 200, 203,
+572
+Kelly, J. P., 480, 560
+Kewley-Port, D., 85, 564
+Kienker, P. K., 302, 350, S11, S15
+Kinematics of the dynamical system,
+398-399, 400-403. See also PDP
+models, neural and conceptual
+interpretation of
+Kirkpatrick, S., 148, 235, 287, 511
+Kisvárdy, Z. F., 363, 576
+Klatt, D. H., 59, 60, 62, 564
+Kliegl, R., 273, 567
+Кпарр, А., 173, 200, 564
+Knowledge atoms
+definition of, 202
+and electricity problem-solving, 242
+Koch, C., 365, 381, 383, 564, 565
+Kohonen, T., 42, 45, 62, 63, 152,
+406, 409, 418, 422, 424, 425,
+444, 446, 455, 461, 511, 222,
+226,380, 565
+Konishi, M., 473, 565
+Kratz, K. E., 490, 565
+Krnjevic, K., 339, 565
+Kubie, J. L., 435, 441, 445, 447,
+565, 570
+Kucera, H., 74, 240, 565
+Kuczaj, S. A., 219, 220, 221, 253,
+257,258, 565
+Kuffler, S. W., 367, 565
+Kuipers, B., 433, 565
+Kullback, S., 294, 511
+Kuno, M., 336, 565
+Kuperstein, M., 385, 565
+Kupperman, B., 478, 572
+Kurtzman, H. S., 275, 565
+Kuypers, H. G. J. M., 352, 571
+Laird, N. M., 293, 509
+Lakoff, G., 97
+LaManna, J. C., 477, 561
+Lamperti, J., 277, 511
+Lane, H. L., 91, 565
+Lang, K., 127, 510
+Lang, M., 511
+Language acquisition device (LAD),
+217. See also Verbs, learning past
+tenses of
+Larkin, J. H., 241, 512
+Larsson, K., 350, 553
+Lashley, K. S., 41, 512
+Law of mass action, 509-510. See
+also Amnesia
+Layered systems in interactive
+models, 60
+Lazarus, J. H., 94, 572
+LC. See Locus coeruleus
+Leaky learning model, 179
+Learnability theorem, 235-236, 260
+Learning. See also Boltzmann
+machines; Delta rule, generalized;
+Memory, a distributed model of;
+Neural plasticity and learning
+in Boltzmann machines
+easy and hard, 290-299
+hard, example of, 299-303
+learning algorithm, derivation of,
+315-318
+establishing features through, 258-
+260
+in symbolic and subsymbolic
+paradigms, 261-262
+Learning machine (Minsky and
+Edmonds), 153-154
+Learning paradigms, 54-57
+Learning rule, general form of, 52-53
+Leavitt, R. Y., 351, 563
+Le Cun, Y., 322, 512
+Lehiste, I., 61, 565
+Lenneberg, Е. H., 473, 565
+Copyrighted MaterialU. R., 63, 559
+
+530 INDEX
+Letter-perception model. See
+Interactive activation model of
+word perception
+LeVay, S., 350, 353, 355, 361, 374,
+497, 500, 563, 565, 566
+Levels of analysis, 121-129. See also
+Isomorphism hypothesis
+Marr's levels, 122-124
+other notions of levels, 124-127
+reductionism and emergent
+properties, 127-129
+Levin, J. A., 43, 85, 512, 90, 566
+Levin's proteus model, 43
+Levine, R. D., 227, 512
+Lewis, B., 341, 566
+Lewis, C. H., 251, 512
+LGN cells, 480
+Liberman, A. M., 61, 62, 73, 92, 94,
+95,473,560, 566, 569,573, 576
+Lichten, W., 63, 569
+Licklider, J. C. R., 106, 566
+Lieberman, F., 489, 557
+Limited fan-out. See Fan-out,
+limited; Standard pattern
+associators
+Limited increment hypothesis, 520.
+See also Amnesia
+Lin, C. S., 351, 560
+Lindsay, P. H., 8, 206, 512
+Linear algebra
+matrices and linear systems
+basis for vector space, change of,
+description of, 385-386
+eigenvectors and eigen values,
+399-403
+matrices, 386-390
+matrix inverses, 410-413
+matrix multiplication and
+multilayer systems, 395-399
+one-layer PDP system, 390-393
+PDP systems, 2 examples, 406-
+vectors
+basic operations of, 367-370
+concepts, use of in analysis of
+simple PDP model, 383-385
+description of, 365-366
+inner products, 375
+linear combinations and
+independence, 370-373
+vector spaces, 374-375
+Linear models, simple, 61-63. See
+also Linear algebra
+auto-associator version of, 63
+pattern associator, 63
+simple linear associator, 62
+weaknesses of, 63
+Linear threshold units, 63-66, 425,
+224. See also Activation
+functions
+perceptron, 65
+XOR function, 64-65
+LISP programming language, 124
+use of in P3 system, 492, 496-497
+Llinás, R., 364, 370, 558, 566
+Local representations, 77, 85, 96
+Locus coeruleus (LC), 476-477, 493
+Loeb, G. E., 383, 566
+Loftus, E. F., 85, 508, 208, 566
+Logical computation, notion of. See
+Activation functions
+Logogen model, 43, 192-193
+Loomis, L. H., 402, 566
+Lorente de No, R., 344, 358, 566
+Lovins, J. B., 62, 560
+Luce, R. D., 75, 93, 195, 566
+Luce choice rule, application of, 90-
+91,195
+Lund, J. S., 357, 358, 361, 366, 374,
+566, 573
+Lund, R. D., 336, 357, 566
+Luria, A. R., 41, 79, 135, 512
+Luria's dynamic functional system,
+41
+Lynch, J. C., 366, 567
+transposes and the outer product,
+Ma, S. -K., 388, 567
+403-405
+Macchi, G., 350, 567
+nonlinear systems, 418-420
+Macrodescription of harmony
+Copyrighted Matelfghanism, 246-258
+
+problem solving for, 246-247
+productions and expertise, 251-253
+schemata, 253
+approximation, 256-258
+for rooms, 255-256
+two-choice model, 253-255
+Mac Whinney, B., 273, 274, 554, 567
+Macy, A., 481, 567
+Magistretti, P. J., 364, 569
+Mann, V. A., 95, 118, 567
+Mapping from expressions, 439. See
+also Boolean function
+Marcus, M. P., 317, 324, 567
+Marin, O. S. M., 134, 514
+Marin-Padilla, M., 363, 567
+Mark, R. F., 490, 555
+Marr, D., 18, 19, 20, 42, 113, 116,
+117, 121-122, 123, 196, 283, 512,
+63,119,378, 567
+Marr's levels of analysis, 122-124.
+See also Levels of analysis
+Marrocco, R. T., 480, 567
+Marshall, J. C., 102, 508
+Marshall, W. H., 352, 579
+Marslen-Wilson, W. D., 43, 512, 63,
+17,19,80,91,98,99,275,507
+Martin, K. A. С., 363, 567, 576
+Massaro, D. W., 77, 81, 86, 94, 567,
+568, 571
+Massey, T., 378, 560
+Matrices and linear systems. See also
+Linear algebra
+basis for vector space, change of,
+413-418
+descriptions of, 385-386
+eigen vectors and eigen values, 399-
+INDEX 531
+examples of PDP systems, 406-410
+linearity, 393-395
+matrices, 386
+addition of, 387-389
+matrix mapping, algebraic
+properties of, 389-390
+scalars, multiplication by, 386
+matrix inverses, 410-413
+multiplication and multilayer
+systems, 395-398
+algebraic properties of, Copyrighted Materfal
+one-layer PDP system, 390-39?
+transposes and outer product, 403-
+405
+Matrix inverses, 410-413. See also
+Matrices and linear systems
+Matrix mapping, algebraic properties
+of, 389-390. See also Matrices
+and linear systems
+Maunsell, J. H. R., 345, 352, 353,
+356, 500, 568, 577
+Maximum-likelihood model, 292-294
+McCarthy, J., 157-158, 512
+McClelland, J. L., 20, 22, 24, 27, 28,
+42, 43, 71, 79, 85, 120, 121, 133,
+177, 199, 202, 216, 321, 512,
+514, 8, 58, 59, 63, 69, 71, 75, 77,
+80,90, 119, 123, 126, 127, 130,
+131,135,138, 140,141,142,
+170, 172, 195, 217, 370, 380,
+381,383, 394, 532, 558, 559,
+568,574
+McClurkin, J. W., 480, 567
+McConkie, G. W., 161, 163, 568,
+573
+McCulloch, W. S., 152, 424, 512
+McDermott, D., 432, 568
+McGeoch, L. A., 235, 508
+McGill, J., 145, 575
+McGuinness, E., 374, 375, 553
+McNaughton, B. L., 448, 568
+MD. See Monocular deprivation
+Medin, D. L., 171, 181, 200, 205,
+536, 568
+Meditch, J. S., 456, S12
+Memory, a distributed model of. See
+also Distributed representations;
+Memory, retrieving information
+from
+conclusions on, 214-215
+detailed assumptions of, 176-182
+experimental results of simulations
+repetition and familiarity effects,
+192-199
+representation of general and
+specific information, 199-206
+extensions of model
+amnesia, spared learning in, 207-
+
+532
+Memory, a distributed model of
+Miller, W., 254
+extensions of model (continued)
+Milner, B., 504, 506, S10, 514, 569
+interference and fan effects, 208-
+Minciacchi, D., 350, 567
+209
+Minsky, ., 65, 76, 96, 111-113,
+memory blends, 208
+153, 154, 157-158, 160, 233, 291,
+regularities of behavior,
+319, 321, 334, 348, 354, 361,
+emergence of, 207
+424, 513, 18, 19, 535, 569
+semantic memory, emergence of
+Mitchell, D. E., 475, 558
+from episodic traces, 206
+Mitchinson, G., 296, 297, 468, 486,
+general properties of, 173-175
+509
+modular structure, 174-175
+Mitra, S. K., 455, 513
+pattern of activation, 1/
+Miyuwaki, K., 473, 569
+hidden units, augmenting model
+Models, similarities and differences
+with, 209-214
+between, 4-5
+model's behavior, key aspects of,
+Modifications of patterns of
+182-192
+interconnectivity in PDP models,
+relation to basic concept in, 176
+52-53. See also Learning
+theories of, 2-3, 170-171
+Modular structure of memory, 79,
+Memory, retrieving information
+174-175. See also Memory, a
+from. See also Distributed
+distributed model of
+representations, features of;
+Molinari, M., 35, 567
+Memory, a distributed model of
+Monocular deprivation (MD), 474,
+content addressability, 25-29
+475
+default assignment, 29-30
+OD shift under, 487
+graceful degradation, 29
+rearing, 489
+spontaneous generalization, 30-31
+Monocular occlusion (AM), 474
+Mercer, R. L., 293, 508
+Monotonicity concepts for activation
+Merzenich, M. M., 385, 386, 387,
+functions, 427-428. See also
+563,569
+Activation functions
+Mesulam, M. M., 350, 569
+Monotonicity-in-context, 426-428
+Metropolis, N., 230, 277, 513
+Montero, V. M., 351, 569
+Meyer, D. R., 352, 579
+Moran, J., 374, 558
+Michael, C. R., 367, 368, 569
+Morrell, F., 379, 569
+Micro- and macrolevels of harmony
+Morris, R. G. M., 434, 460, 56)
+theory, 203-204, 210
+Morrison, J. H., 364, S6)
+Microdescription, problem-solving
+Morton, J., 43, 513, 97, 106, 192,
+of, 246. See also Electricity
+570
+problem-solving
+Microfeature, 80-81
+Moser, M. G., 313, 570
+Motor control
+Microfeatures, semantic. See
+example of multiple constraints in,
+Semantic microfeatures
+4-6
+Microstructure of cognition, 12-13
+PDP models for, examples of, 13-
+Miezin, J., 374, 375, 553
+18
+Miller, D. T., 536, 564
+finger movements in skilled
+Miller, G. A., 63, 106, 323, 566, 569
+typing, 14-16
+Miller, J. L., 62, 96, 569
+reaching for objects, 16-18
+Miller, J. P., 381, 382, 569, 575
+Mountcastle, V. B., 356, 366, 373,
+Miller, P., 515, 576
+Copyrighted Material 567, 570
+
+INDEX 533
+Moussouris, J., 289, 513
+Mower, G. D., 478, 570
+Mozer, M. C., 68, 127, 507, 513,
+125,139,140,142,570
+Muller, R. U., 435, 441, 445, 447,
+565, 570
+Multiple linear regression and the
+delta rule, 457-458. See also
+Delta rule, analysis of
+Multiple simultaneous constraints,
+4-9,58, 124, 272-275
+mutual constraints, 7
+operation of in syntax and
+semantics, 6-7
+duplication of connection
+information, need for to exploit,
+124
+role assignment, use of in, 272-275
+simultaneous mutual constraints in
+word recognition, 7-9
+speech perception, role of in, 124
+Munro, P. W., 42, 180, 508, 480,
+487,489, 495, 496, 555, 570
+Murray, E. A., 357, 570
+Mutt, V., 364, 560
+groups of neurons behavior in
+cerebral cortex, 365-366
+neurons without many spines, 361
+neurons with spines, 360-361
+single-neuron behavior in cerebral
+cortex, 364-365
+special cell types, 362-364
+Network damage. See Damage,
+effects of on a network; Graceful
+degradation
+Neural and conceptual interpretation
+of PDP models. See PDP models,
+neural and conceptual
+interpretation of
+Neural-like processing systems,
+common learning paradigms in,
+160-161
+Neural modeling, 130
+Neural nets, biological limits on
+storage capacity of, 469-470. See
+also Fan-out, limited
+Neural or unit level of
+representation. See Pattern-based
+coordinates, delta rule in
+Neural plasticity in cerebral cortex,
+385-387. See also Cerebral
+Nadel, L., 435, 445, 510, 527, 571,
+cortex, questions about
+576
+computation in
+Nakatani, L., 61, 110, 570
+Neural plasticity and learning
+Nathan, P. W., 514, 515, 574
+critical period, effect of
+Nativism vs. empiricism, 139-142
+environment on, 478
+Nauta, W. J. H., 334, 342, 570
+critical period of, 473-478
+NE. See Norepinephrine
+ocular dominance, measuring
+Necker cube, II, 13, 16, 28. See also
+changes in, 474-476
+Schemata, concept of
+plasticity-modulating processes,
+Neely, R. B., 63, 122, 573
+476-478
+Negation problem, 346-348. See also
+discussion of, 471-473, 494-499
+Delta rule, generalized
+existing modification rules, state
+Neisser, U., 81, 113, 116, 212, 513,
+dependence and, 494-496
+515
+global modulators as dynamic
+Nelson, R. J., 352, 354, 385, 477,
+variables, 496-497
+569,570
+predictions for, 497-499
+Nelson, S. B., 477, 554
+experimental data on, comparison
+Neocortical neurons, nature of
+with, 489-494
+cell types in, 358-360
+ocularity state and its effect on,
+experimental methods, 357-358
+478-489
+feature detection, 367-371
+model neuron, 479-480
+firing, rates of, 366-367 Copyrighted Matenaarity plane, 480-484
+
+534
+Neural plasticity and learning
+(continued)
+state dependencies of plasticity,
+484-489
+PDP models, learning rate as factor
+in, 472
+single-unit learning, focus on, 472
+summary of, 501
+terminology. 473
+visual cortex, ideas described with
+respect to ocular dominance in,
+499-501
+Neural processing in cerebral cortex,
+378-382. See also Cerebral
+cortex, questions about
+computation in
+Neural realism, lack of in PDP
+models, 136-138
+Neurons. See also Cerebral cortex,
+anatomy and physiology of;
+Neocortical neurons, nature of
+isomorphism, failure of in, 422-424
+quasi-linear systems with, 418-422
+use of, 418-421
+limited dynamic range and, 420-
+421
+subthreshold summation, 420
+Nonpyramidal cells, 358-360. See
+also Neocortical neurons, nature
+of
+Norepinephrine (NE), 476-477, 478,
+480, 493
+as potential modulator of neural
+plasticity, 476-477, 492-494, 497
+Normal rearing (NR), 474
+Norman, D. A., 8, 9, 14, 15, 79,
+116, 133, 206, 512, 513, 514, 18,
+19,531,539, 540.543, 545, 555,
+570,574
+Norris, D., 63, 100, 571
+NR. See Normal rearing
+Nusbaum, H. C., 120, 571
+behavior in the cerebral cortex
+groups of neurons, 365-366
+Ochs, M. T., 385, 563
+single neuron, 364-365
+Ocular dominance (OD)
+classical description of, 335-337
+class, 484
+connections between, in brain,
+histograms, 475, 479, 489, 490
+132-133
+shift, under MD, 487
+communication among, 132
+statistics, 474-476
+continuous output of, 133-134
+Ocular dominance index, 481-483,
+graceful degradation of, 134
+484,490
+neocortical, 358-365
+vs. responsivity plot, 492
+number of, 131
+Ocularity plane, power of as tool in
+speed of, 130-131
+theoretical analyses of ocular
+systems, 131-132
+dominance plasticity, 483-484
+treated as devices, 424-425 (see
+Ocularity state and its effect on
+also Boolean function)
+plasticity, 478-480. See also
+without many spines, 361
+Neural plasticity and learning
+with spines, 360-361
+ideal neuron, 479-480
+Newell, A., 108, 195, 513
+ocularity plane, 480-484
+Newsome, W. T., 347, 356, 554, 568
+plasticity, state dependence of,
+Newtonian mechanics, 125
+484-489
+Nicholson, C., 364, 566
+OD. See Ocular dominance
+Ninteman, F. W., 493, 572
+Oden, G. C., 77, 275, 568, 571
+Nonlinear systems. See also PDP
+ODH. See Ocular dominance,
+models, neural and conceptual
+histogram
+interpretation of
+ODI. See Ocular dominance index
+distributed, natural competition in,
+6-OHDA. See 6-hydroxydopamine
+424-428
+Copyrighted Matera, .., 481, 492, 560, 567
+
+INDEX 535
+Oja, E., 489, 557
+O'Keefe, J., 434, 435, 445, 448, 466,
+568,569,571
+O Kusky, J., 348, 571
+Olson, C. R., 475, 571
+Olson, L., 350, 553
+Olton, D. S., 435, 522, 554, 571
+One-layer PDP systems, use of
+matrices in analyzing, 390-393.
+See also Matrices and linear
+systems
+One-layer perceptron, 111-113
+limitations of, 112-113
+One-step system in interactive
+models, 60
+Optimization problems, use of linear
+programming for, 284-286
+Organization of Behavior, 53, 152
+Ortony, A., 19, 32, 574
+Output units
+definition of, 48
+as mair aspect of PDP models, 46,
+system), 453-454
+competitive learning methods (App.
+B), 504-506
+description of, 364, 488-489
+major components of, 489-490
+performance of, 500-501
+plan for competitive learning, (App.
+A), 502-503
+plan language of, 490, 491-497
+simplified diagrams of, 454-455,
+464
+simulation system, 497-500
+typical plan for, 490
+Parity networks, 159, 160
+Parity problem, 334-335 See also
+Delta rule, generalized
+Parker, D. B., 322, 361, 513
+PARSIFAL (Marcus), 317
+Parsing in PDP models, 317-323
+Part/ whole hierarchy, 105
+Past-tense acquisition, three stages
+of, 219-221. See also Verbs,
+learning past tenses of
+Patte, P., 387, 556
+Pattern of activation, in distributed
+P3 system. See Parallel process
+model of memory, 175
+programmer
+PABLO. See Reading, programmable
+memory traces as change in
+weights, 176
+blackboard model of
+mental state as, 176
+Palay, S. L., 338, 571
+prior, retrieval as reinstatement of,
+Palmer, R. G., 296, 511, 513
+176
+Palmer, S. E., 117, 513
+and response strength, 194-195
+Pandemonium, 42
+Pattern association paradigm,
+Pandya, D. N., 352, 571, 573
+definition of, 55
+Papert, S., 65, 76, 96, 111-113, 158,
+Pattern associators. See also
+160, 233, 291, 319, 321, 334,
+Programmable pattern associators;
+348, 354, 361, 424, 513, 535, 569
+Standard pattern associators;
+Paradigms of learning
+Verbs, learning past tenses of
+associative, 54-55
+basic properties of, 33-37, 220-228
+regularity discovery, S5
+definition of, 161
+Paradiso, M. A., 477, 554
+learning regular and exceptional
+Parallel distributed processing. See
+patterns in, 226
+PDP.
+models, attractive properties of, 38
+Parallel Models of Associative Memory,
+restrictions of, 228-233
+33,533
+Pattern-based coordinates, delta rule
+Parallel network simulating system.
+in, 447-453
+See Parallel process programmer
+in conceptual interpretation of PDP
+Parallel process programmetoßyrighted Materialels, 406-411
+
+536
+Pattern completion device, use of
+probiems of, 543-545
+Boltzmann machine as, 289-290.
+new directions in, 545-546
+See also Boltzmann machines
+strengths of, 535-539
+Pattern of connectivity as major
+description, levels of, 538-539
+aspect of PDP models, 46, 49-51
+human information processing,
+Patterson, K., 102, 508
+essential properties of, 537
+PDP approach and cognitive science
+schema, 536-537
+conclusions on, 145-146
+useful result of, 537-538
+natural applications of, 144
+weaknesses of, 539-543
+objections to
+evaluative structure, need for,
+analysis, wrong level of, 121-127
+541-542
+cognitive approach, lack of, 120-
+multiple systems, required for,
+121
+542-543
+cognitive theories, constraints of,
+type-token problem, 539-540
+129-136
+variables, 540-541
+conscious knowledge and explicit
+PDP models, active representation
+reasoning, 143-145
+in, 31-40, 175-176
+human vs. rat intelligence, 143
+local vs. distributed, 32
+lack of neural realism in, 136-138
+pattern associator models attractive
+Marr's levels, 122-124
+properties of, 38
+nativism vs. empiricism, 139-142
+pattern associators, 33-37
+other notions of levels, 124-127
+structure of ensemble of patterns,
+reductionism and emergent
+extracting, 39-40
+properties, 127-129
+PDP models and the brain. See also
+weaknesses of, 111-120
+Cerebral cortex, anatomy and
+status of various models, 144-145
+physiology of; Cerebral cortex,
+PDP approach, introduction to
+questions about computation in
+active representation in, 31-40
+relationship between, 328-330
+as alternative to serial models, 12-
+13
+models of neural mechanisms,
+330-331
+appeal of, 3-4, 10-12
+neurophysiology relevant to, 327-
+examples of
+328
+memory retrieval, 25-31
+PDP models, future directions for,
+motor control, 13-17
+547-552
+perception, 18-24
+PDP models, general framework for
+history of, 41-44
+bottom-up processing, 57-59
+local vs. distributed representation,
+conclusions on, 74-76
+32-33
+hierarchical organizations, 57
+pattern associator models
+interactive models, 59-60
+attractive properties of, 38
+learning paradigms, 54-57
+ensemble of patterns, extracting
+major aspects of, 46-54
+structure from, 39-40
+activation rule, 51-52
+learning multiple patterns, 37-38
+learning rule, 52-54
+learning rules of, 36-37
+propagation rule, s
+workings of, 33-36
+sigma-pi units, 73-74
+PDP approach, reflections on
+synchronous vs. asynchronous
+computer metaphor and, 533-353
+update, 61
+learning and consciousnesopyrighted Materiapwn processing, 59
+
+versions, specific
+brain state in a box model (BSB),
+66-68
+Feldman and Ballard's units, 72
+Grossberg's units, 70-71
+interactive activation model, 71
+linear threshold units, 63-66
+simple linear models, 61-63
+thermodynamic models, 68-70
+PDP models, learning rate as factor
+in, 472-473. See also Neural
+plasticity and learning
+PDP models, neural and conceptual
+interpretation of
+conclusions on, 429-431
+consideration of, 390-391
+distributed nonlinear models,
+natural competition in, 424-429
+as dynamical systems, 397-398
+interpretations, 391-396
+isomorphism hypothesis, failure of
+in nonlinear models, 422-424
+kinematics, 400-403
+kinematics and dynamics, 398-399
+learning connections and
+isomorphism of levels, 416-418
+linear systems, isomorphism of
+levels in, 411-413
+localized damage and, 413-416
+nonlinearity, quasi-linear systems
+with, 418-422
+pattern coordinates, 406-411
+vector space, structure of, 403-406
+Pearlmutter, B., 298
+Pearson, J. C.,
+, 385, 575
+Peck, C. K., 475, 571
+Peptides in the cerebral cortex, 340
+Perez, R., 494, 571
+Perception, examples of for PDP
+models
+familiar patterns and, 20-23
+novel patterns, completion of, 23-
+25
+stereoscopic vision, 18-20
+Perceptrons (Rosenblatt), 154-158
+convergence procedure, 41-42, 65,
+225-226
+class C', 157-158
+learning rule, 53, 154-157
+parallel reorganizing elements,
+158-159
+Perceptual processing, centrality of,
+197-198. See also Harmony
+theory
+Perkel, D. H., 381, 571
+Perkel, D. J., 381, 571
+Perrett, D. I., 368, 571
+Perry, J., 195, 508
+Peterhans, E., 376, 578
+Peters, A., 336, 338, 361, 363, 365,
+559,571,572
+Petersen, S. E., 347, 554
+Petitjean, F., 350, 555
+Pettigrew, J. D., 476, 477, 487, 490,
+492,555,564
+Phase transitions, computational
+significance of, 236-237
+Phillis, J. W., 339, 565
+Phoneme identification, factors
+influencing
+categorical perception, 84, 88-95
+detectors, retuning of by context,
+95-97
+lexical effects on, 77-78
+factors influencing, 78-80
+simulations, summary of, 97
+trading relations, 84-88
+use of phonotactic rules in, 81-83
+Phonemic restoration effect, 20
+Piaget, J., 17, 19,572
+Piercy, M., 516, 517, 563
+Pillsbury, W. B., 20, 513
+Pinker, S., 217, 572
+Pinto-Hamuy, T., 352, 579
+Pisoni, D. B., 60, 77, 92, 94, 100,
+572,574
+Pitts, W, 152, 424, 512
+Place-field model. See also Place
+recognition and goal location,
+biologically plausible models of
+description of, 436-441
+goal location, 449
+properties of, 439-440
+scope of, 448
+shape and size, 445-446
+537
+
+538
+Place recognition and goal location,
+biologically plausible models of
+B-coefficient constants (App.),
+467-468
+B-coefficient model, 460-466
+B units (App.), 469-470
+conclusions on, 466
+distal landmarks, 445
+distributed view-field model, 449-
+460
+goal location, 449
+location parameters, 441-443
+model, description of, 436-441
+properties of, 439-440
+place-field location, 446-448
+place-field model, scope of, 448
+place-field shape and size, 445-446
+place recognition, 434-436
+simulated experiments, 443-445
+Plan language, as major component
+of P3 system, 489, 490, 491-497
+creating P3 plan for, 493-497
+features of, 490
+functions of, 491-493
+Plasticity, neural. See Neural
+plasticity
+Podgorny, P., 501, 575
+Poggio, T., 18, 19, 20, 42, 117, 512,
+513, 129, 365, 381, 383, 564,
+565,572
+Poincare, H., 213, 513
+Pollack, J. B., 277, 278, 311, 314,
+578
+reading. See Reading,
+programmable blackboard model
+of
+Programmable pattern associators.
+See also Connection information
+distribution mechanism; Reading,
+programmable blackboard model
+of
+CA units, requirements of, 474-476
+CID networks, requirements of,
+473-474
+conclusions on, 486
+discussion of, 485-486
+distributed representations,
+simultaneous access 1o, 483-485
+multiple pattern processing, 477-
+478
+overlapping, 478-480
+simultaneous access, cost of, 481-
+482
+single pattern processing, 476-477
+summary of CA requirements,
+480-481
+Proskauer, C. С., 336, 361, 363, 571,
+572
+Prototypes
+coexistence of and repeated
+exemplars, 189-192
+learning from exemplars, 182-184
+multiple, nonorthogonal, 184-188
+Pyramidal cells, 358-360. See also
+Neocortical neurons, nature of
+Porrino, L. J., 350, 572
+Quasi-linear activation function, 52,
+Poschel, B. Р. H., 493, 572
+425. See also Activation
+Posner, M. I., 171, 183, 200, 203,
+functions
+572
+Quasi-linear systems with
+Powell, T. P. S., 344, 348, 350, 351,
+352,556, 560, 563, 564, 572, 573
+nonlinearity, 418-422. See also
+Nonlinear systems; PDP models,
+Prince, D. A., 364, 369, 557
+neural and conceptual
+Principles of Neurodynamics, 41-42,
+interpretation of
+154
+Quasi-local interpretations, 394-395.
+Probability theory, 209-210
+See also PDP models, neural and
+Processing units, set of for PDP
+conceptual interpretation of
+model, 46-48
+Quasi-multilinear activation function,
+vs. one-unit-one-concept
+426. See also Activation
+representational system, 47
+functions
+Programmable blackboard 28d righted Mate/ra, M. R., 85, 513
+
+INDEX 539
+Rader, R. K., 497, 577
+conspiracies of, 157-159
+Rall, ., 336, 381, 382, 569, 572,
+Realizability theorem, 230-235
+Receptor, cartoon of, 508-509. See
+Ralston, H. J., 336, 572
+also Amnesia
+Ramachandran, V. S., 478, 572
+Recurrent networks, 354-360. See
+Ranck, J. B., Jr., 435, 441, 445, 447,
+also Delta rule, generalized
+565, 570
+performance of, 359-360
+Random-dot stereograms, 18
+sequence completion, learning of,
+Rao, C. R., 455, 513
+358-359
+Rauschecker, J. P., 476, 478, 576
+shift register problem and, 357-358
+Rawlins, J. N. P., 434, 466, 569
+Recursion, 119-120, 318-320
+Rayner, К., 153, 161, 163, 164, 275,
+Reddy, D. R., 63, 107, 122, 573
+560,572,573
+Reductionism, PDP models as
+Reading, programmable blackboard
+exercise in, 127-129
+model of (PABLO)
+Redundancy, benefits of, 472. See
+ambiguous characters, 155-157
+also Standard pattern associators
+amount of feedback, effect of
+Reese, T. S., 336, 572
+display length on, 159-161
+Regularity detector paradigm, 161
+CID computer simulation, results
+Reich, P. A., 323, 573
+of, 136-141
+Reilly, D. L., 499, 573
+conclusions on, 168-169
+Reitboek, H. J. P., 385, 573
+connection information
+Relaxation searches, use of parallel
+distribution,
+networks to perform, 283-290
+benetits of, 104-100
+learning, difficult and easy, 290-292
+computer simulation of word
+maximum likelihood models, 292-
+recognition using, 134-136
+294
+cost of, 166-167
+optimization problems and, 284-
+extensions of, 167-168
+286
+mechanism, details of, 129-136
+pattern completion, 289-290
+(see also Programmable pattern
+probabilistic decisions, use of to
+associators)
+escape from local minima, 287-
+description of, 2, 125
+288
+fixations, sequences of, 161-164
+simulated annealing, application of
+fixations, single and multiple, 153-
+to Hopfield nets, 288-289
+155
+Relaxation system, 135-136
+interactive activation model,
+Relearning, speed of in Boltzmann
+bottom-up activations of word
+machines, 308-310
+units in CID version of, 137-138
+Repetition and familiarity effects,
+interference and crosstalk, 139-141
+192-199
+PABLO simulation model
+alternative interpretation of, 193-
+coarse coding, 146-147
+194
+details of, 151-153
+pattern action and response
+feedback, 147
+strength, 194-195
+focus of attention, shifting, 147-
+time-accuracy curves, effects of
+151
+experimental variables on, 195-
+overlapping slots in, 143-147
+199
+role-specific letter units, 145-146
+traditional interpretation of, 192-
+words of different lengthsCopyrighted Materal
+
+540
+керр, в. п., 23, 110, 301, 3/3
+Representation, distributed. See
+Distributed representation
+Representation of environment as
+major aspect of PDP models, 53-
+54
+Representation vector of harmony
+theory, 213-214
+Representational features of
+harmony theoretical model, 213-
+214
+Representation, learning of. See
+Boltzmann machines;
+Competitive learning; Delta rule,
+generalized
+Representation, learning of new in
+harmony theory
+procedure and abstract features,
+258-260
+in symbolic and subsymbolic
+paradigms, 261
+Reproduction trials, 520. See also
+Amnesia
+Residual learning skills in amnesia,
+518-524.
+Retinocentric feature detectors, 114
+Retrograde amnesia, 505-506, 513-
+515
+See also Reading, programmable
+blackboard model of
+Rolls, E. T., 368, 571
+Rosch, E., 171, 573
+Rose, J. E., 345, 573
+Rosén, 1., 357, 554
+Rosenblatt, F., 41, 111, 152, 153-
+154, 155-157, 158, 291, 424, 514,
+226,289,535,573
+Rosenbluth, A. W., 230, 277, 513
+Rosenbluth, M. N., 230, 277, 513
+Rosenfeld, A., 285, 514
+Rosenthal, M., 477, 561
+Ross, B. H., 206, 554
+RS. See Reverse suture
+Rubin, D. S., 293, 509
+Rudnicky, A., 58, 557
+Rule of propagation as major aspect
+of PDP models, 46, Sl
+Rumelhart, D. E., 6, 9, 14, 15, 20,
+22, 24, 43, 71, 116, 120, 121,
+130, 133, 177, 199, 202, 216,
+300, 321, 512, 514, 7, 18, 19,31,
+59,71, 75, 77, 90, 170, 195, 217,
+316,380, 394, 532, 539, 540,
+545,568, 573, 574
+Russell, W. R., 514, 515, 574
+Ryder, J. M., 7, 511
+Reverse learning, occurrence of,
+296-298
+Sachs, M. B., 383, 574
+Reverse suture (RS), 474, 487-488,
+Saffran, E. M., 134, 514
+489
+Said, S., 364, 560
+Reverse suture paradigm, time
+Sakaski, K., 370, 558
+course of, 489-490. See also
+Salasoo, А., 60, 100, 197, 198, 559,
+Visual cortex, developmental
+574
+models of
+Salvert, D., 350, 555
+Ribak, C. E., 363, 572
+Samuel, A. G., 95, 160, 574
+Riley, M. S., 241, 264, 514, S15
+Sanderson, K. J., 480, 574
+Rinzel, J., 381, 382, 569, 575
+Sayers, F. C., 324, 563
+Ritz, S. A., 56, 406, 409, 410, 418,
+Scalars, multiplication by, 367, 386.
+507, 173, 226, 311, 399,551,554
+See also Matrices and linear
+Roberts, E., 351, 562
+systems; Vectors
+Rock, 1., 117,514
+Schacter, D., 519, 574
+Rockel, A. J., 344, 573
+Schaffer, M. M., 171, 200, 536, 568
+Rockland, K. S., 352, 366, 374, 573
+Schank, R. C., 6, 9, 201, 202, 514,
+Role-assignment model. See Case
+18,19,324,574
+role assignment, model of
+Scheibel, A. B., 351, 574
+Role-specific letter units, Espyfighted Makeirat. M. E., 351, 574
+
+INDEX 541
+Schein, S. J., 374, 558
+Schemata, concept of, 9, 78-79,
+199-213, 1, 7-37, 536-537
+account of mental processing, 38-
+consciousness, content of, 39
+control, problem of, 39-40
+conversations and, 42-44
+external representations and
+formal reasoning, 44-48
+mental models and, 40-42
+mental stimulation and practice,
+42
+assumptions made abour, 30-31
+conclusions on, 53-57
+constraint satisfaction and, 17
+description of, 1, 7-8
+example of, 22-25
+examples of processing of, 25-31
+goodness-of-fit landscapes of, 15,
+16,28,29,30,31, 32-33,35
+in harmony theory, 199-213
+completion task, 206-208
+construction of, 201-203
+formulation of, 209-210
+function of, 208
+knowledge atoms, nature of in,
+205-206
+logical structure of, 199-200
+mathematical properties of
+probability and, 211-213
+micro- and microlevels of, 203-
+204
+modified letter perception model,
+204-205
+history of, 17-19
+important features of, 19-20
+interpretation differences and, 21
+PDP models as constraint
+networks, 8-17
+properties of
+active processes, 36
+additional features, 36-37
+goodness-of-fit evaluation to data,
+36
+knowledge representation, 36
+subschema, 35
+variables, 33-34
+summary of, 31, 48
+thinking, goal direction in, 48
+use of as knowledge structures, 9
+Schermer, T. M., 96, 569
+Schiller, P. H., 367, 574
+Schmolze, J. G., 313, 555
+Schneider, W., 126, 549, 575
+Schumacher, L. E., 302, 350, 511,
+515
+Schwanenflugel, P. J., 181, 205, 568
+Schwartz, J. H., 333, 507, 552, 564
+Schwartz, M. F., 134, 514
+Schwartz, M., 477, 554
+Schweikert, J., 7, S11
+Sclar, G., 492, 560
+Scolt, G. L., 351, 569
+Scott, J. P., 473, 575
+Scripts, use of as knowledge
+structure, 9
+Sears, T. A., 336, 553
+Segev, I., 381, 382, 575
+Seguin, S., 350, 555
+Sejnowski, T. J., 118, 264, 272, 282,
+289, 297, 302, 306, 313, 317,
+335, 348, 350, 507, 508, 509.
+510, 511, 514, 515, 23, 24, 63,
+128, 373, 311, 379, 380, 393,
+554,562,575
+Selfridge, O. G., 8, 41, 212, 515
+Selman, B., 321, 575
+Semantic cues. See Word-order and
+semantic cues to role assignment
+Semantic memory, emergence of
+from episodic traces, 206. See
+also Memory, a distributed model
+of
+Semantic microf eatures, 278-283.
+See also Case role assignment,
+model of
+Sememe units, 97-98, 99, 101-102,
+305-310. See also Arbitrary
+mapping; Damage, effects of on a
+network
+Semilinear activation functions. See
+Activation functions, semilinear
+Sencer, W., 352, 579
+
+542
+Sentence processing in PDP
+418,507. 173, 226, 311, 399,
+networks. See Case role
+551,554
+assignment, model of
+Simon, H. A., 241, 508
+Sentence-structure (SS)
+Simple binary addition problem,
+representation, 283-286. See also
+341-346. See also Delta rule,
+Case role assignment, model of
+generalized
+Sequential symbol processing, 106-
+Simulated annealing, 287, 288-289,
+313. See also Cooling schedule;
+Sequential thought processes in PDP
+Harmony theory
+models. See also Recurrent
+Simulation system environment, as
+networks; Sequential symbol
+major component of P3 system,
+processing; Seriality, emergent
+489,497-500
+account of mental processing,
+Singer, W., 476, 478, 575, 576
+development of, 38-39
+Single-level interactive model, 60
+conclusions on, 53-57
+Single-shot algorithms, 380. See also
+consciousness, contents of, 39
+Cerebral cortex, questions about
+control, problem of, 39-40
+computation in
+conversations, 42-44
+Single-unit learning, focus on, 472.
+external representations and formal
+See also Neural plasticity and
+reasoning, 44-48
+learning
+important aspects of, 47
+Singley, 209
+role of language in, 47
+Skirboll, L. R., 350, 577
+mental models and, 40-42
+Slater, P. C., 513, 515, 576
+mental simulations and practice, 42
+Slobin, D. I., 221, 247, 249, 250,
+summary of, 48
+thinking, goal direction in, 48
+251,254,255,256,556
+Slowiaczek, L. M., 120, 571
+tic-tac-toe example of, 48-53, 54
+Seriality, emergent, 247, 249. See
+Small, S. L., 277, 314, 557, 576
+Smith, D. C., 490, 565
+also Electricity problem-solving
+Smith, E., 24, S15
+Settlage, P. H., 352, 579
+Smith, P. T., 24, 515
+Shallice, T., 145, 543, 570, 575
+Smolensky, P., 125, 241, 259, 264,
+Shankweiler, D., 92, 94, 566
+277,289,447, 514, 515
+Shannon, C. E., 195, 267, 515
+Sokolov, J. L., 274, 567
+Sharma, V. K., 477, 561
+Somogyi, P., 362, 363, 567, 576
+Shaw, G. L., 385, 575
+Spared learning in amnesia, 518-519,
+Shepard, R. N., 198, 515, 501, 536,
+521-524. See also Amnesia
+575
+Spear, P. D., 490, 565
+Shepherd, G. M., 336, 381, 382,
+Speech, fundamental aspects for
+572,575
+development of TRACE model
+Sherk, H., 350, 374, 566
+architecture for TRACE model,
+Sherman, S. M., 351, 560
+importance of, 03-64
+Shiffrin, R. M., 197, 198, 559, 574
+context effects, left and right, 60
+Shlaer, R., 494, 571
+cues, sensitivity of, 62
+Sickels, E. R., 324, 563
+lack of boundaries, 60, 0l
+Sigma-pi units, 72, 73-74, 426
+speech signal, noise and
+generalized delta rule for, 353
+indeterminacy in, 62-63
+Silverman, D. J., 385, 575
+stimulus, temporal nature of, 59-60
+Silverstein, J. W., 56, 406, 409, 410,
+temporal overlap, 60-61
+
+Spencer, W. A., 364, 576
+Spoehr, K., 24, 515
+Spoken word recognition, study of,
+97-98
+Spontaneous learning (Rosenblatt),
+155-156
+Squashing function, 425, 485-489.
+See also Activation functions;
+Ocularity state and its effect on
+plasticity
+Squire, L. R., SOS, 510, 513, 515,
+516,517,525, 527, 556.576
+Standard pattern associators. See also
+Programmable pattern associators
+conclusions on, 486
+degradation, effects of, 472
+limited fan-out, effects of, 468-472
+programmable nets, resource
+requirements, 465-468
+redundancy, benefits of, 472
+resource requirements of, 460,
+461-465
+computations of, 463-465
+Stanford, L. R., 351, 560
+State of activation as major aspect of
+PDP model, 46,48
+State space (S), 398-399. See also
+Kinematics of the dynamical
+system
+coordinate system for, 400
+of general nonlinear activation
+model, 402
+pattern view of, 406
+unit coordinates for, 400-401
+Statistical learning, analyzing case of,
+453-457. See also Delta rule,
+analysis of
+Steedman, M., 274, 557
+Stemberger, J. P., 248, 576
+Sternberg, S., 133, 515, 402, 566
+Stevens, K. N., 62, 168, 561, 576
+Stimulus equivalence, problem of,
+113-114
+Stochastic generative model, 293-
+294,313
+Stochastic units, 81
+Strang, G., 411, 422, 515
+Strange, W.. 473, 569
+INDEX 543
+Structure in representations and
+processes, 104-108
+constituent structure, 105-106
+sequential symbol processing, 106-
+108
+Studdert-Kennedy, М., 92, 94, 566,
+576
+Subsymbolic and symbolic
+paradigms, learning in, 261-262
+Subthreshold summation, 420. See
+also Nonlinear systems, use of
+Summerfield, Q., 85, 576
+Sur, M., 352, 354, 385, 569, 570
+Surround effects in visual cortex,
+374-377. See also Cerebral
+cortex, questions about
+computation in
+Sutton, R. S., 43, 53, 57, 444, 508,
+515, 383, 539, 554, 576
+Swanson, L. W., 350, 576
+Swets, J. A., 466, 510, 225, 561
+Swinney, D. A., 109, 577
+Symbolic and subsymbolic
+paradigms, learning in, 261-262
+Symmetry problem, 340-341. See
+also Delta rule, generalized
+Synapses in the cerebral cortex,
+basic types, 338-339
+Synaptic change, neurochemistry of,
+507-509. See also Amnesia
+Synchronous update vs.
+asynchronous update, 61
+Syntactic processing in PDP models,
+317-323
+Szentágothai, J., 351, 362, S77
+T-C problem, 348-352. See also
+Delta rule, generalized
+Tabula rasa, 139, 141
+Takeuchi, A., 489, 495, 553
+Talbot, W. H., 366, 567
+Tank, D., 389, 562
+Tash, J., 92, 572
+Teitelbaum, P., 142, 515
+Teller, A. H., 230, 277, 513
+Teller, E., 230, 277, 513
+Copyrighted Materjaum, J. M., 63, 554
+
+544
+Terminal parameters, 491. See also
+57-59
+P3 system
+Top-down theoretical strategy
+Terrace, H. S., 183, SIS
+pursued in harmony theory, 196,
+Theorems, harmony, (App.)
+199-213
+Boltzmann machines, second-order
+Torre, V., 117, 513, 129, 365, 381,
+observables and, 273-275
+565,572
+harmony function H, cognitive
+Touret, M., 350, 555
+systems and, 267-268
+Touretzky, D., 322, 548, 577
+terminology, 268-269
+TRACE model of speech perception
+overview of definitions, 264-267
+compared to Fanty's parser, 321-
+proofs of, 275-281
+322
+retrieving information from H,
+conclusions on, 120-121
+269-272
+deficiencies of, 119-120
+storing information in H, 272-273
+description of, 2, 58-59, 64-68,
+Thermal equilibrium of network,
+123-124,143, 153-154
+290-291, 313
+phoneme identification, factors
+Thermodynamic limit, 239
+influencing
+Thermodynamic models, 68-70
+categorical perception, 84, 88-95
+Boltzmann machines, 68, 69
+lexical effects of on, 77-81
+harmony theory, 68
+phoneme detectors, retuning of
+Thibadeau, R., 161, 549, 577
+by context, 95-97
+Thomas, G. B., Jr., 276, SIS
+simulations, summary of, 97
+Thompson, Н., 60, 63, 84, 107, 577
+trading relations, 84-88
+Thompson, R. F., 383, 552, 561
+use of phonotactic rules in, 81-83
+Three-dimensional plots, 429, 430-
+phoneme units, context-sensitive
+438. See also Activation
+tuning of, 08-69
+functions
+programmable version of, 167-168
+Three-layer network, 97-98. See also
+speech, fundamental aspects for,
+Arbitrary mapping, implementing
+59-63
+Three-level interactive model, 59
+spoken word recognition, study of,
+Three-stage learning curve, 240-245.
+COHORT model, 98-101, 102,
+See also Verbs, learning past
+103
+tenses of
+word segmentation, lexical basis
+Threshold logic unit, 425. See also
+of, 106-115
+Activation functions
+word segmentation simulations,
+Tic-tac-toe, as example of sequential
+summary of, 115-117
+thought processes in PDP models,
+successes, summary of, 117-119
+48-53,54
+Tigges, J., 348, 577
+TRACE 1 model, 69, 70-71, 75, 76
+TRACE II model, 69, 70, 71-75,
+Tigges, M., 348, 577
+76, 102, 110
+Timing
+Travis, A. M., 352, 579
+problem of, 378-380
+Tribus, M., 227, 512
+of sensory stimulation, 383-384
+T'so, D. Y., 385, 577
+temporal binding, 383-385
+Turner, M. R., 385, 560
+Timney, B. N., 475, 558
+Tversky, A., 499, 560
+Tömböl, T., 351, 361, 363, 577
+Two-dimensional space, inner
+Top-down approach, 123
+products in, 380-382. See also
+Top-down processing syste@opyrighted Materfafors
+
+INDEX 545
+Two-layer scheme in harmony
+theory, advantages of, 218-219
+Tyler, L. K., 97, 98, 99, 104, 275,
+567,577
+Type-token problem, as weakness of
+PDP approach to cognition, 539-
+540
+inner products, 375-376
+algebraic properties of inner
+product, 382-383
+angle, 377-379
+length, 376-377
+projections, 379-380
+two-dimensional space, inner
+products in, 380-382
+Uchizono, K., 339, 577
+Ungerleider, L. G., 374, 558
+Ungerstredt, U., 350, 553
+Uniform monotonicity, 426-428
+Uniformly nondecreasing function,
+as special case of uniformly
+monotonic function, 427
+Uniqueness and continuity
+constraints, 19-20
+Unit parameters, 491. See also P3
+system
+UNIT TYPE statement for pattern
+generator in P3, 493-494
+Unlearning, 296-298. See also
+Boltzmann machines
+linear combinations and
+independence
+combinations of vectors, 370-371
+linear independence, 371-373
+vector spaces, 374-375
+structure of, 403-406
+Venesky, R. L., 24, 515
+Verb-frame selection for roleassignment models, 300-301
+Verbs, irregular, types of, 245-246,
+247-254. See also Verbs, learning
+past tenses of
+Verbs, learning past tenses of
+binding networks for (App.), 269-
+271
+conclusions on, 266-268
+Valverde, F., 363, 559
+example of model based on LAD
+Van Dam, A., 467, 559
+approach, 217-219
+Van der Loos, H., 366, 577
+issue of, 3, 216-217
+Van Essen, D. C., 352, 353, 355,
+model of
+356,368, 500, 566, 568, 577
+learning and, 225-226
+Van Hoesen, G. W., 350, 569
+operation of, 223-225
+van Santen, J. P. H., 159, 160, 563,
+phonological patterns, featural
+574
+representations of, 233-239
+Van Sluyters, R. C., 489, 490, 491,
+simple pattern associator model,
+555
+226-233
+Variable translational mappings, 116
+structure of, 221-223
+Vaughn, J. E., 351, 562
+summary of structure of, 239-240
+Vecchi, M. P., 148, 235, 287, 511
+novel verbs, transfer to, 261-266
+Vector notation, delta rule in, 445-
+simulations, main points of
+447. See also Delta rule, analysis
+irregular verbs, types of, 245-246,
+of
+247-254
+Vectors. See also Linear algebra
+regularization, types of, 257-260
+basic operations of
+regular verbs, types of, 245-246,
+calculating averages, 369
+247
+scalars, multiplication by, 367
+three-stage learning curve, 240-
+vectors, addition of 368-369
+245
+concepts, use of to analyze simple
+vowel-change verbs, 254-257
+PDP model, 383-385.
+stages, sequence of in acquisition
+description of, 365-366
+Copyrighted Materiafse of, 219-221
+
+546
+Verbs, regular, 245-246, 247, 254-
+257,258-260. See also Verbs,
+learning past tenses of
+Verbrugge, R., 473, 569
+Vertical and horizontal lines,
+experiments with, 184-190
+Vertically hierarchical networks, 217
+Videen, T. O., 497, 577
+View-field model, distributed. See
+Distributed view-field model
+Vincent, S. R., 350, 577
+Visual cortex, developmental models
+of, 489-494
+alternating monocular occlusion,
+490,491
+norepinephrine, role of, 492-494
+responsivity, relation of to
+connectivity, 490, 492
+reverse suture paradigm, time
+course of, 489-490
+Visual system, 282-283. See also
+Boltzmann machines
+Vital-Durand, F., 497, 500, 555, 577
+Voight, H. F., 383, 574
+Volman, S. F., 367, 574
+von der Heydt, R., 376, 578
+von der Malsberg, C., 42, 147, 152,
+162,164,516,384,489,494.578
+Von Neumann architecture, 534-535.
+See also PDP approach,
+reflections on
+Von Neumann computer metaphor,
+195
+Vygotsky, L. S., 43, 47, 578
+Walker, A. E., 349, 578
+Walker, E. C. T., 7, S11
+Walker, J. A., 435, 554
+Wall, J. T., 385, 569
+Waltz, D. L., 277, 278, 311, 314,
+578
+Warren, R. M., 20, 516
+Webster, H. de F., 338, 571
+Weight-decay, use of in Boltzmann
+machine, 298-299.
+Weller, R. E., 345, 578
+Welsh, А., 43, 512, 63, 77, 79, 80,
+98,99.567
+Werblin, F. S., 336, 578
+Wessels, J., 99, 104, 577
+Westrum, L. E., 336, 578
+Whitteridge, D., 354, 363, 558, 567,
+576
+Whittlesea, B. W. A., 171, 172, 200,
+201,202,203,204.556,578
+Wickelfeature representation
+(Wickelgren)
+blurring, 238-239
+details of, 234-239
+Wickelgren, W. A., 62, 181, 233,
+510,511, 527,578
+Wickelphones, 233-234, 236-238
+Widrow, G., 321, 516
+Widrow-Hoff rule, 53, 291-292. See
+also Delta rule
+Wiener, 534
+Wiesel, T. N., 340, 353, 356, 358,
+366.367, 373, 374, 385, 474,
+475, 483, 497, 500, 561, 562,
+563.566,577,578
+Williams, R. J., 425, 516
+Willshaw, D. J., 42, 97, 100, 460,
+461, 465-466, 468, 472, 475, 516
+Willshaw nets, 461-465
+comparison of to various kinds of
+local representation, 465
+difficulties with, 465-468
+Wilson, H. R., 381, 389, 578
+Winston, P. H., 32, 516, 524, 578
+Wise, R. A., 493, 578
+Wise, S. P., 357, 564
+Wolverton, G. S., 161, 568
+Wood, C. C., 102, 516, 551, 578
+Woods, W., 119, 516, 322, 578
+Woolsey, C. N., 352, 579
+Woolsey, T. A., 355, 500, 558, 579
+Word identification simulations in
+TRACE, summary of, 115-117
+Word-order and semantic cues to
+role assignment, 293-300. See
+also Case role assignment, model
+of
+Word perception model (McClelland
+& Rumelhart). See Interactive
+activation model of word
+perception
+
+547
+Word segmentation, lexical basis of
+for TRACE, 106-115
+identification, word, 112-115
+nonwords, end of, 111-112
+short sentence example, 115
+word inputs, single and multiple,
+107-111
+Wu, Т. Y., 350, 577
+Wyatt, H. J., 500, 558
+XOR problem, 319-321, 330-334.
+See also Delta rule, generalized
+Yin, T. C. T., 366, 567
+Young, E. D., 383, 574
+Zadeh, L. A., 423, 516
+Zeki, S. M., 368, 374, 577, 579
+Zipser, D., 97, 300, 514, 432, 437,
+438,440,442,443,444,447,579
+Lola, D., 161, 568
+Zucker, S. W., 285, 286, S11, 514
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c1f4bea62a47093755ef4e0594fd7fc263bba6242243ad5c3693b266cb08c259.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c1f4bea62a47093755ef4e0594fd7fc263bba6242243ad5c3693b266cb08c259.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..62fe910ae41042129fbe61e74d60bd9266a4f467
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c1f4bea62a47093755ef4e0594fd7fc263bba6242243ad5c3693b266cb08c259.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -14697,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "c1f4bea62a47093755ef4e0594fd7fc263bba6242243ad5c3693b266cb08c259",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 2072,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "964b3c709893878aed43b5af84398af98f6bd9d1df9e0b5def7174a8f12264bd",
+  "output_sha256": "ef131c2faae74d9d4df3eb7f5e069d7ffe454351fd5cbdd84aeaf884bbc4ded8",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c2752c7f29364c113647cb202009e3c01ee16f8423cf80f0bd9f0950e632b056.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c2752c7f29364c113647cb202009e3c01ee16f8423cf80f0bd9f0950e632b056.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a23b42210e769495c8004e2af1ba06c9b65c90f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c2752c7f29364c113647cb202009e3c01ee16f8423cf80f0bd9f0950e632b056.md
@@ -0,0 +1,32034 @@
+Jean van Heijenoor!
+
+21 1500 236905
+FROM
+A Sateet lie )
+Logic,
+1879-1931
+Jean van Heijenoort
+Jean van Heienoor!
+50 10090
+Jean van Henenoort
+W
+19:8= 1
+FROM
+0 10092
+GODEL
+Jean van Heyendort
+303dE
+
+FROM FREGE TO GÖDEL
+A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931
+Jean van Heijenoort
+PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
+HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
+CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS • 1967
+
+© Copyright 1967 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
+All rights reserved
+Distributed in Great Britain by Oxford University Press, London
+Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 67-10905
+Printed in the United States of America
+
+General Editor's Preface
+The Source Books in this series are collections of classical papers that have shaped the
+structure of the various sciences. Some of these classics are not readily available and
+many of them have never been translated into English, thus being lost to the general
+reader and in many cases to the scientist himself. The point of this series is to make
+these texts easily accessible and to provide good translations of the ones that have not
+been translated at all, or only poorly.
+The series was planned to include volumes in all the major sciences from the
+Renaissance through the nineteenth century. It has been extended to include ancient
+and medieval Western science and the development of the sciences in the first half of
+the present century. Many of these books have been published already and others are
+in various stages of preparation.
+The Carnegie Corporation originally financed the series by a grant to the American
+Philosophical Association. The History of Science Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science have approved the project and are represented
+on the Editorial Advisory Board. This Board at present consists of the following
+members:
+Marshall Clagett, History of Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton
+I. Bernard Cohen, History of Science, Harvard University
+C. J. Ducasse, Philosophy, Brown University
+Ernst Mayr, Zoology, Harvard University
+Ernest Moody, Philosophy, University of California at Los Angeles
+Ernest Nagel, Philosophy, Columbia University
+Harlow Shapley, Astronomy, Harvard University
+Harry Woolf, History of Science, Johns Hopkins University
+everes was all and sustained heral editors. am in de Cre try De, falcote
+members of the Advisory Board, and to Joseph D. Elder, Science Editor of Harvard
+University Press, for their indispensable aid in guiding the course of the Source
+Books.
+EDWARD H. MADDEN
+Department of Philosophy,
+State University of New York at Buffalo
+
+Preface
+The second half of the nineteenth century saw a rebirth of logic. That science-which,
+many felt, had reached its completion and lacked any future-entered a renaissance
+that was to transform it radically. Though it had been heralded by Leibniz, the new
+development did not actually start till the middle of the nineteenth century. Boole,
+De Morgan, and Jevons are regarded as the initiators of modern logic, and rightly so.
+This first phase, however, suffered from a number of limitations. It tried to copy
+mathematics too closely, and often artificially. The multiplicity of interpretations of
+what became known as Boolean algebra created confusion and for a time was a hindrance rather than an advantage. Considered by itself, the period would, no doubt,
+leave its mark upon the history of logic, but it would not count as a great epoch.
+A great epoch in the history of logic did open in 1879, when Gottlob Frege's
+Begriffsschrift was published. This book freed logic from an artificial connection with
+mathematics but at the same time prepared a deeper interrelation between these two
+sciences. It presented to the world, in full-fledged form, the propositional calculus
+and quantification theory. Although Frege's work was slow in winning recognition,
+the next decades saw striking advances in logic. Iwo new fields, set theory and foundations of mathematics, emerged on the borders of logic, mathematies, and philosophy.
+The texts printed below have been chosen so as to depict this development. Their
+selection had to satisfy various conditions, sometimes hard to reconcile. The main
+constraint was that the texts to be selected had to fit between the covers of a single
+volume. This precluded encyclopedic completeness; the book had to hold to the main
+lines of the development. Some texts were included in the volume because they
+have become classics, others because they are perhaps not as well known as they
+deserve. Some works had to be omitted because of their length, some because of
+copyright restrictions. If the main strands were to be adequately covered, a number of
+accessory topics, such as modal logic, had to be left aside.
+The volume opens with Frege's Begriffsschrift, which is followed by Peano's
+Arithmetices principia. These two works, each in its own manner, initiate the era of
+the logical reconstruction of mathematics that led to Principia mathematica. Dedekind's letter (1890a) fits into this trend. But soon difficulties arise; the modern
+paradoxes appear. Burali-Forti's paper, Cantor's letter (1899) to Dedekind, Russell's
+letter (1902) to Frege and Frege's answer, Richard's (1905) and König's (1905a)
+papers mark the troublesome spots. Hilbert (1904), Russell (1908a), Zermelo (1908a)
+present various responses to these difficulties and, with their different methods of
+overcoming the paradoxes, initiate three important developments in logic: proof
+theory and the search for a consistency proof, the theory of types, and axiomatic set
+theory.
+vi
+
+PREFACE
+vii
+Löwenheim's paper (1915), which links up with the work of Schröder, brings to the
+fore notions (validity, decision methods) that had remained in the background
+(Padoa's paper (1900), however, already deals with semantic questions) and presents
+the first proof-incomplete-of a very disquieting theorem. The work of Skolem
+belongs to several trends. In two papers (1920, 1922) he gives new proofs of Löwenheim's theorem and generalizes it; in another (1923) he studies primitive recursive
+arithmetic, which will become an important tool in foundations of mathematics, and
+in a fourth (1928) he deals with a proof procedure and decision problems. Frankel
+(1922b) and Skolem (1922) amend and broaden Zermelo's axiomization of set theory,
+while von Neumann (1923, 1925) offers a somewhat different system.
+The twenties heard a fiery dialogue between two conceptions of mathematics,
+Hilbert's and Brouwer's. Hilbert's doctrine is expounded in two papers (1925, 1927),
+and with them are connected those of Weyl, Bernays, and Ackermann. One of
+Brouwer's papers (1923b) presents an aspect of his critique of classical mathematics,
+another (1927a) tries to draw the balance of the controversy with Hilbert, while a
+third (1927) sets forth some positive contributions of intuitionism (fan theorem, bar
+theorem). Kolmogorov's paper (1925) is the first systematic study of intuitionistic
+logic.
+The last chapter of Herbrand's thesis (1930) presents his important theorem.
+Gödel's proof of the completeness of the first-order predicate calculus (1930) marks
+the end of a period in the history of quantification theory.
+Gödel's incompleteness paper (1931) is here, of course. Herbrand's paper on the
+consistency of arithmetic (193la), although published a few months after Gödel's,
+belongs to the preceding period. The importance of Gödel's results and methods,
+their direct impact and their indirect influence, the profound revision that they imposed upon Hilbert's program, the development of the theory of recursive functions,
+finally, the emergence in the thirties of an American school of logicians-all that
+makes the year 1931 a fitting terminal date for the selection presented here.
+The volume is a source book in "mathematical logic". "Mathematical" here means
+that derivations in logic proceed according to definite and explicit rules, the way we
+do sums (Frege's system, as he says, is "modeled upon the language of arithmetic").
+Thus "mathematical" perhaps expresses a deeper feature of present-day logic than
+does "symbolic". Logic today is symbolic indeed, but the use of symbols, though
+convenient and perhaps even indispensable, is possible because logic is mathematical
+in the sense just mentioned. "Formal logic"
+', too, would still be a perfectly appropriate
+name. But there is no point in searching for an epithet. There are no two logics.
+Mathematical logic is what logic, through twenty-five centuries and a few transformations, has become today.
+The papers selected are reproduced in extenso, except for five: those of Peano,
+Brouwer (1927, 1927a), Skolem (1920), and Herbrand (1930). For each of these papers
+the reasons for the excision and its extent are indicated in the corresponding introductory note.
+Bibliographical references have been given a uniform style, and the list of them
+will be found on pages 629-655. Footnotes are numbered consecutively in each paper,
+even when they were not so in the original; when they were, the author's numeration
+has not been disturbed. Trifling mistakes have been corrected without further ado,
+
+viil
+PREFACE
+but when a mistake, misprint, or inconsistency could provoke a misunderstanding, an
+editorial comment has been inserted. These editorial interpolations are given in "I I"
+Professors Burton Dreben, W. V. Quine, and Hao Wang generously contributed
+their time in helping me to select the texts. They also lent a hand with clarifying
+passages in the originals or smoothing out phrases in the translations. Quine wrote the
+introductory notes to Russell 1908, Whitehead and Russell 1910, and Schönfinkel 1924.
+Wang wrote that to Kolmogorov 1925. Dreben wrote a number of footnotes and ten
+Notes for Herbrand 1930, and we jointly wrote the introductory note to Skolem 1928.
+Professor Charles Parsons wrote the introductory note to Brouwer 1927. The other
+introductory notes were written by me.
+The volume contains forty-six papers, originally written in seven languages. Some
+authors were not writing in their mother tongues; some papers were hastily written,
+and many have a fair sprinkling of ambiguities, minor errors, and misprints; before
+1930 the standards of editorship were not what they are today. All this means that the
+translators and the editor had their share of problems. They strove above all to
+produce a clear and unambiguous text, but they have endeavored to follow that
+narrow path where accuracy combines with good style. The translations were made by
+Mr. Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg (of the IBM Systems Research Institute), Dr. Dagfinn
+Føllesdal, Miss Beverly Woodward, and the editor; moreover, several other persons
+were enlisted to assist in translating one paper or another. For each paper the credit
+for the translation will be found in the introductory note. As a rule, the authors
+have not seen the translations of their texts. The exceptions are Lord Russell, who
+saw and approved the translation of his 1902 letter to Frege (written in German),
+Professor Fraenkel, who read and approved the translation of his paper, Professor
+Finsler, who approved the translation of his paper after suggesting a few changes,
+and Professor Gödel, who read the translations of his papers and approved them after
+introducing a number of changes in 1931.
+A teaser for translators of German texts on foundations of mathematics is the word
+"inhaltlich"
+'. Mr. Bauer-Mengelberg coined the neologism "contentual" and used it
+at a number of places. Elsewhere various periphrases were adopted; in particular,
+Professor Gödel suggested those that are used in the translation of his 1931.
+As the reader will see, a large share of the translations from the German devolved
+on Mr. Bauer-Mengelberg. Moreover, he went over the whole manuscript and suggested many changes for the better. Miss Paula Thibault read a good part of the volume
+and wielded her red pencil on many phrases that had been left awkward by the translators' desire for accuracy. Mr. Joseph D. Elder, Science Editor of Harvard University
+Press, has been at all times a dispenser of sound editorial advice.
+JEAN VAN HEIJENOORT
+The Springs, Last Hampton, New York
+23 July 1966
+
+Contents
+Frege (1879). Begriffsschrift, a formula language, modeled upon that
+of arithmetic, for pure thought
+Peano (1889). The principles of arithmetic, presented by a new method
+Dedekind (1890a). Letter to Keferstein
+Burali-Forti (1897 and 1897a). A question on transfinite numbers and
+On well-ordered classes
+Cantor (1899). Letter to Dedekind
+Padoa (1900). Logical introduction to any deductive theory
+Russell (1902). Letter to Frege
+Frege (1902). Letter to Russell
+Hilbert (1904). On the foundations of logic and arithmetic
+Zermelo (1904). Proof that every set can be well-ordered
+Richard (1905). The principles of mathematics and the problem of
+sets
+König (1905a). On the foundations of set theory and the continuum
+problem
+Russell (1908a). Mathematical logic as based on the theory of types
+Zermelo (1908). A new proof of the possibility of a well-ordering
+Zermelo (1908a). Investigations in the foundations of set theory I
+Whitehead and Russell (1910). Incomplete symbols: Descriptions
+Wiener (1914). A simplification of the logic of relations
+Löwenheim (1915). On possibilities in the calculus of relatives
+Skolem (1920). Logico-combinatorial investigations in the satisfiability
+or provability of mathematical propositions: A simplified proof of
+a theorem by L. Löwenheim and generalizations of the theorem
+Post (1921). Introduction to a general theory of elementary
+propositions
+Fraenkel (19226). The notion "definite" and the independence of the
+axiom of choice
+Skolem (1922). Some remarks on axiomatized set theory
+iX
+1
+83
+98
+104
+113
+118
+124
+126
+129
+139
+142
+145
+150
+183
+199
+216
+224
+228
+252
+264
+284
+290
+
+CONTENTS
+Skolem (1923). The foundations of elementary arithmetic established
+by means of the recursive mode of thought, without the use of
+apparent variables ranging over infinite domains
+Brouwer (1923b, 1954, and 1954a). On the significance of the principle
+of excluded middle in mathematics, especially in function theory,
+Addenda and corrigenda, and Further addenda and corrigenda
+von Neumann (1923). On the introduction of transfinite numbers
+Schönfinkel (1924). On the building blocks of mathematical logic
+Hilbert (1925). On the infinite
+von Neumann (1925). An axiomatization of set theory
+Kolmogorov (1925). On the principle of excluded middle
+Finsler (1926). Formal proofs and undecidability
+Brouwer (1927). On the domains of definition of functions
+Hilbert (1927). The foundations of mathematics
+Weyl (1927). Comments on Hilbert's second lecture on the foundations
+of mathematics
+Bernays (1927). Appendix to Hilbert's lecture "The foundations of
+mathematics"
+Brouwer (1927a). Intuitionistic reflections on formalism
+Ackermann (1928). On Hilbert's construction of the real numbers
+Skolem (1928). On mathematical logic
+Herbrand (1930). Investigations in proof theory: The properties of
+true propositions
+Gödel (1930a). The completeness of the axioms of the functional
+calculus of logic
+Gödel (19306, 1931, and 193la). Some metamathematical results on
+completeness and consistency, On formally undecidable propositions of Principia mathematica and related systems I, and On
+completeness and consistency
+Herbrand (19316). On the consistency of arithmetic
+References
+Index
+302
+334
+346
+355
+367
+393
+414
+438
+446
+464
+480
+485
+490
+493
+508
+525
+582
+592
+618
+629
+657
+
+FROM FREGE TO GÖDEL
+A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931
+
+Begriffsschrift, a formula language, modeled upon
+that of arithmetic, for pure thought
+GOTTLOB FREGE
+(1879)
+This is the first work that Frege wrote
+written with special symbols, "for pure
+in the field of logic, and, although a mere
+thought"
+, that is, free from rhetorical
+booklet of eighty-eight pages, it is perembellishments, "modeled upon that of
+haps the most important single work ever
+arithmetic"
+, that is, constructed from
+written in logic. Its fundamental contrispecific symbols that are manipulated
+butions, among lesser points, are the
+according to definite rules. The last
+truth-functional propositional
+calculus,
+phrase does not mean that logic mimics
+the analysis of the proposition into funcarithmetic, and the analogies, uncovered
+tion and arguments) instead of subject
+by Boole and others, between logic and
+and
+predicate, the theory of quantiarithmetic are useless for Frege, precisely
+fication, a system of logic in which
+because he wants to employ logic in
+derivations are carried out exclusively
+according to the form of the expressions,
+and a logical definition of the notion of
+mathematical sequence. Any single one
+of these achievements would suffice to
+secure the book a permanent place in the
+logician's library.
+Frege was a mathematician by train.
+ing;" the point of departure of his
+investigations in logic was a mathematical question, and mathematics left its
+mark upon his logical accomplishments.
+In studying the concept of number,
+Frege was confronted with difficulties
+when he attempted to give a logical
+analysis of the notion of sequence. The
+imprecision and ambiguity of ordinary
+language led him to look for a more appropriate tool; he devised a new mode of
+expression, a language that deals with
+the "conceptual content" and that he
+came to call "Begriffsschrift""
+This
+ideography is a "formula language"
+that is, a lingua characterica, a language
+ª See his Inaugural-Dissertation (1873) and
+his thesis for venia docendi (1874).
+b In the translation below this term is rendered by
+"ideography", a word used by
+Jourdain in a paper (1912) read and annotated
+by Frege; that Frege acquiesced in its use was
+the reason why ultimately it was adopted here.
+Another acceptable rendition is "concept writing", used by Austin (Frege 1950, p. 92e).
+Professor Günther Patzig was so kind as to
+report in a private communication that a
+student of his, Miss Carmen Diaz, found an
+occurrence of the word "Begriffsschrift" in
+Trendelenburg (1867, p. 4, line 1), a work that
+Frege quotes in his preface to Begriffsschrift
+(see below, p. 6). Frege used the word in
+other writings, and in particular in his major
+work (1893, 1903), but subsequently he seems
+to have become dissatisfied with it. In an
+unpublished fragment dated 26 July 1919 he
+writes: "I do not start from concepts in order to
+build up thoughts or propositions out of them;
+rather, I obtain the components of a thought
+by decomposition [Zerfällung] of the thought.
+In this respect my Begriffsschrift differs from
+the similar creations of Leibniz and his successors—in spite of its name, which perhaps I
+did not chose very aptly".
+
+2
+order to provide a foundation for arith- It is only in his subsequent writings (1891
+metic. He carefully keeps the logical and thereafter) that Frege will devote a
+symbols distinct from the arithmetic
+great deal of attention to the nature of a
+ones. Schröder (1880) criticized him for
+function.
+doing just that and thus wrecking a
+Frege's booklet presents the propositradition established in the previous
+tional calculus in a version that uses the
+thirty years. Frege (1882, pp. 1-2)
+conditional and negation as primitive
+answered that his purpose had been quite
+connectives. Other connectives are exadifferent from that of Boole: "My intenmined for a moment, and their intertion was not to represent an abstract
+translatability with the conditional and
+logic in formulas, but to express a content
+negation is shown. Mostly to preserve
+through written signs in a more precise
+the simple formulation of the rule of
+and clear way than it is possible to do
+detachment, Frege decides to use these
+through words. In fact, what I wanted to
+last two. The notation that he introduces
+create was not a mere calculus ratiofor the conditional has often been criticinator but a
+lingua characterica in
+cized, and it has not survived. It presents
+Leibniz's sense"
+difficulties in printing and takes up a
+Mathematics led Frege to an innovalarge amount of space. But, as Frege
+tion that was to have a profound inhimself (1896, p. 364) says, "the comfort
+fluence upon modern logic. He observes
+of the typesetter is certainly not the
+that we would do violence to mathematisummum bonum"
+, and the notation
+cal statements if we were to impose upon
+undoubtedly allows one to perceive the
+them the distinction between subject and
+structure of a formula at a glance and to
+predicate. After a short but pertinent
+perform substitutions with ease. Frege's
+critique of that distinction, he replaces
+definition of the conditional is purely
+it by another, borrowed from mathetruth-functional, and it leads him to the
+matics but adapted to the needs of logic,
+rule of detachment, stated in §6. He
+that of function and argument. Frege
+notes the discrepancy between this truthbegins his analysis by considering an
+functional definition and ordinary uses of
+ordinary sentence and remarks that the
+the word "if". Frege dismisses modal
+expression remains meaningful when
+considerations from his logic with the
+certain words are replaced by others. A
+remark that they concern the grounds for
+word for which we can make such succesaccepting a judgment, not the content of
+sive substitutions occupies an argument
+the judgment itself. Frege's use of the
+place, and the stable component of the
+words "affirmed" and "denied", with
+sentence is the function. This, of course,
+his listing of all possible cases in the
+is not a definition, because in his system
+assignment of these terms to proposi-
+Frege deals not with ordinary sentences
+tions, in fact amounts to the use of the
+but with formulas; it is merely an extruth-table method. His axioms for the
+planation,
+after which
+he introduces
+propositional calculus (they are not
+functional letters and gives instructions
+independent) are formulas (1), (2), (8),
+for handling them and their arguments.
+(28), (31), and (41). His rules of inference
+Nowhere in the present text does Frege
+are the rule of detachment and an unstate what a function is or speak of the
+stated rule of substitution. A number of
+value of a function. He simply says that a
+theorems of the propositional calculus
+judgment is obtained when the argument
+are proved, but no question of completeplaces between the parentheses attached ness, consistency, or independence is
+to a functional letter have been properly raised.
+filled (and, should the case so require,
+Quantification theory is introduced in
+quantifiers
+have been properly used). §11. Frege's instructions how to use
+
+3
+italic and German letters contain, in be provided with a pair of parentheses
+effect, the rule of generalization and the
+and one or more arguments. Frege,
+rule that allows us to infer A > (x)F(x) however, does not say as much, and in the
+from A > F(x) when x does not occur
+derivation of formula (77) he substitutes
+free in A. There are three new axioms:
+§ for a in f(a), at least as an intermediate
+(58) for instantiation, (52) and (54) for
+step. If we also observe that in the deriidentity. No rule of substitution
+is
+vation of formula (91) he substitutes & for
+explicitly stated, and one has to examine
+I, we see that he is on the brink of a
+Frege's practice in his derivations to see
+paradox. He will fall into the abyss when
+what he allows. The substitutions are
+(1891) he introduces the course-of-values
+indicated by tables on the left of the
+of a function as something "complete in
+derivations. These substitutions are simulitself"
+, which "may be taken as an
+taneous substitutions. When a substituargument". For the continuation of the
+tion is specified with the help of "F"
+story see pages 124-128.
+which plays the role of what we would
+This flaw in Frege's system should not
+today call a syntactic variable, particular
+make us lose sight of the greatness of his
+care should be exercised, and it proves
+achievement. The analysis of the propoconvenient to perform the substitutions
+sition into function and argument, rather
+that do not involve "F" before that inthan subject and predicate, and quantivolving "I" is carried out. The point will
+fication theory, which became possible
+become clear to the reader if he compares,
+only after such an analysis, are the very
+for example, the derivation of (51) with
+foundations of modern logic. The probthat of (98). Frege's derivations are quite
+lems connected with quantification over
+detailed and, even in the absence of an
+functions could
+be approached
+• only
+explicit rule of substitution, can be unamafter a quantification theory had already
+biguously reconstructed.
+been established. When the slowness and
+Frege allows a functional letter to
+the wavering that marked the developoccur in a quantifier (p. 24 below). This
+ment of the propositional calculus are
+license is not a necessary feature of remembered, one cannot but marvel at
+quantification theory, but Frege has to
+seeing quantification theory suddenly
+admit it in his system for the definitions
+coming full-grown into the world. Many
+and derivations of the third part of the
+years later (1894, p. 21) Peano still
+book. The result is that the difference
+finds quantification theory
+"abstruse"
+between function and argument is blurand prefers to deal with it by means of
+red. In fact, even before coming to just a few examples. Frege can proudly
+quantification
+over functions, Frege
+answer (1896, p. 376) that in 1879 he had
+states (p. 24 below) that we can conalready given all the laws of quantisider $(A) to be a function of the
+fication theory; "these laws are few in
+argument $ as well as of the argument
+number, and I do not know why they
+A. (This is precisely the point that Russell
+should be said to be abstruse".
+will seize upon to make it bear the brunt
+In distinguishing his work from that of
+of his paradox—see below, p. 125). It is
+his predecessors and contemporaries,
+true that Frege writes (p. 24 below) that,
+Frege repeatedly opposes a lingua characif a functional letter occurs in a quantiterica to a calculus ratiocinator. He uses
+fier, "this circumstance must be taken
+these terms, suggested by Leibniz, to
+into account"
+. But the phrase remains
+bring out an important feature of his
+vague. The most generous interpretation
+system, in fact, one of the greatest
+would be that, in the scope of the quantiachievements of his Begriffsschrift. In the
+fier in which it occurs, a functional letter
+has to be treated as such, that is, must
+pre-Fregean calculus of propositions and
+classes, logic, translated into formulas,
+
+4
+is studied by means of arguments resting a conception, and Prege will soon recogupon
+an intuitive logic. What Frege
+nize them. This will lead him to split the
+does is to construct logic as a language
+notion of conceptual content into sense
+that need not be supplemented by any
+('Sinn") and reference ("Bedeutung")
+intuitive reasoning. Thus he is very care-
+(1892a, but see also 1891, p. 14; these
+ful to describe his system in purely
+two papers can be viewed as long emendaformal terms (he even speaks of letters—
+tions to Begriffsschrift).
+Latin, German, and so on—rather than
+In 1910 Jourdain sent to Frege the
+of variables, because of the imprecision
+manuscript of a long paper that he had
+of the latter term). He is fully aware
+written on the history of logic and that
+that any system requires rules that cancontained a summary of Begriffsschrift.
+not be expressed in the system; but these
+Frege answered with comments on a
+rules are
+void of any intuitive logic;
+number of points, and Jourdain incorthey are "rules for the use of our signs"
+porated Frege's remarks in footnotes to
+(p. 28 below): the rule of detachment,
+his paper (1912). Some of these footnotes
+the rules for dealing with quantifiers.
+are reproduced below, at their appro-
+This is one of the great lessons of Frege's
+priate places, with slight revisions in
+book. It was a new one in 1879, and it
+Jourdain's translation of Frege's comdid not at once pervade the world of
+ments (moreover, the German text used
+logic.
+here is Frege's copy, and there are in-
+The third part of the book introduces a
+dications that the text that he sent to
+theory of mathematical sequences. Frege
+Jourdain and the copy that he preserved
+is moving toward his goal, the logical
+are not identical).
+reconstruction of arithmetic. He defines
+A few words should be said about
+the relation that Whitehead and Russell
+Frege's use of the term "Verneinung"
+(1910, part II, sec. E) came to call the
+In a first use, "Verneinung" is opposed
+ancestral relation and that later (1940)
+to "Bejahung", "verneinen" to "beja-
+Quine called the ancestral. The proper
+hen", and what these words express is, in
+ancestral appears in § 26 and the ancesfact, the ascription of truth values to
+tral proper in §29. Subsequently Frege
+contents of judgments; they are transwill use the notion for the justification of
+lated, respectively, by "denial" and
+mathematical induction (1884, p. 93).
+"affirmation"
+"to deny" and "to
+Dedekind (below, p. 101, and
+1893,
+affirm".
+• The second use of " Verneinung"
+XVII) recognized that the ancestral
+is for the connective, and when so used it
+agrees in essence with his own notion of
+is translated by "negation"
+chain, which was publicly introduced
+A number of misprints in the original
+nine years after Frege's notion.
+were discovered during the translation.
+At times Begriffsschrift begs for a
+Most of them are included in the errata
+clarification of linguistic usage, for a
+list that the reader will find in the reprint
+distinction between expressions and what
+of Frege's booklet (1964, pp. 122-123).
+these expressions refer to. In his sub-
+Those that are not in that list are the
+sequent writings Frege will devote a
+following:
+great deal of attention to this problem.
+(1) On page XV, lines 6u, 5u, and 3u
+On one point, however, the book touches
+of the German text, "A" and "B"
+upon them, and not too happily. In §8
+(which are alpha and beta) are not of the
+identity of content is introduced as a
+same font as "$" and "Y", while
+relation between names, not their conthey should be;
+tents. "—A = B" means that the
+signs "A" and "B" have the same
+conceptual content and, according to
+Frege, is a statement about signs.°
+There are strong arguments against such
+° On the nature of identity see comments in
+the present volume by Whitehead and Russell
+(below, pp. 218-219) and by Skolem (below,
+pp. 304-305).
+
+5
+(2) On page 29 of the German text, in its own: on page 1, line fu, we find
+§ 15, the letters to the left of the long
+where there should be "—";
+vertical line under (1) should be "a" and on page 62, near the top of the page,
+"b", not "a" and "b";
+(3) The misprint indicated in footnote
+"*'" should be "".;
+:; on page 65 there
+18, p. 57 below;
+(4) The misprint indicated in footnote
+should be a vertical negation stroke
+attached to the stroke preceding the first
+21, p. 65 below.
+occurrence of "h(y)"; on page 39 an un-
+Moreover, Misprint 3 in the reprint's list
+readable broken "c" has been left undoes not occur in the German text used
+corrected.
+for the present translation; apparently,
+The translation is by Stefan Bauerit is not a misprint at all but is simply Mengelberg, and it is published here by
+due to the poor printing of some copies.
+arrangement with Georg Olms Verlags-
+The reprint also introduces misprints of buchhandlung.
+PREFACE
+In apprehending a scientific truth we pass, as a rule, through various degrees of
+certitude. Perhaps first conjectured on the basis of an insufficient number of particular
+cases, a general proposition comes to be more and more securely established by being
+connected with other truths through chains of inferences, whether consequences are
+derived from it that are confirmed in some other way or whether, conversely, it is seen
+to be a consequence of propositions already established. Hence we can inquire, on the
+one hand, how we have gradually arrived at a given proposition and, on the other,
+how we can finally provide it with the most secure foundation. The first question
+may have to be answered differently for different persons; the second is more definite,
+and the answer to it is connected with the inner nature of the proposition considered.
+The most reliable way of carrying out a proof, obviously, is to follow pure logic, a
+way that, disregarding the particular characteristics of objects, depends solely on those
+laws upon which all knowledge rests. Accordingly, we divide all truths that require
+justification into two kinds, those for which the proof can be carried out purely by
+means of logic and those for which it must be supported by facts of experience. But
+that a proposition is of the first kind is surely compatible with the fact that it could
+nevertheless not have come to consciousness in a human mind without any activity of
+the senses. ' Hence it is not the psychological genesis but the best method of proof that
+is at the basis of the classification. Now, when I came to consider the question to
+which of these two kinds the judgments of arithmetic belong, I first had to ascertain
+how far one could proceed in arithmetic by means of inferences alone, with the sole
+support of those laws of thought that transcend all particulars. My initial step was
+to attempt to reduce the concept of ordering in a sequence to that of logical consequence, so as to proceed from there to the concept of number. To prevent anything
+intuitive [Anschauliches] from penetrating here unnoticed, I had to bend every effort
+to keep the chain of inferences free of gaps. In attempting to comply with this requirement in the strictest possible way I found the inadequacy of language to be an
+1 Since without sensory experience no mental development is possible in the beings known to
+us, that holds of all judgments.
+
+6
+obstacle; no matter how unwieldy the expressions I was ready to accept, I was less
+and less able, as the relations became more and more complex, to attain the precision
+that my purpose required. This deficiency led me to the idea of the present ideography.
+Its first purpose, therefore, is to provide us with the most reliable test of the validity
+of a chain of inferences and to point out every presupposition that tries to sneak in
+unnoticed, so that its origin can be investigated. That is why I decided to forgo expressing anything that is without significance for the inferential sequence. In §3 I
+called what alone mattered to me the conceptual content [begriflichen Inhalt]. Hence
+this definition must always be kept in mind if one wishes to gain a proper understanding of what my formula language is. That, too, is what led me to the name "Begriffsschrift". Since I confined myself for the time being to expressing relations that are
+independent of the particular characteristics of objects, I was also able to use the
+expression "formula language for pure thought". That it is modeled upon the formula
+language of arithmetic, as I indicated in the title, has to do with fundamental ideas
+rather than with details of execution. Any effort to create an artificial similarity by
+regarding a concept as the sum of its marks [Merkmalel was entirely alien to my
+thought. The most immediate point of contact between my formula language and that
+of arithmetic is the way in which letters are employed.
+I believe that I can best make the relation of my ideography to ordinary language
+[Sprache des Lebens] clear if I compare it to that which the microscope has to the
+eye. Because of the range of its possible uses and the versatility with which it can
+adapt to the most diverse circumstances, the eye is far superior to the microscope.
+Considered as an optical instrument, to be sure, it exhibits many imperfections, which
+ordinarily remain unnoticed only on account of its intimate connection with our mental
+life. But, as soon as scientific goals demand great sharpness of resolution, the eye
+proves to be insufficient. The microscope, on the other hand, is perfectly suited to
+precisely such goals, but that is just why it is useless for all others.
+This ideography, likewise, is a device invented for certain scientific purposes, and
+one must not condemn it because it is not suited to others. If it answers to these
+purposes in some degree, one should not mind the fact that there are no new truths in
+my work. I would console myself on this point with the realization that a development
+of method, too, furthers science. Bacon, after all, thought it better to invent a means
+by which everything could easily be discovered than to discover particular truths, and
+all great steps of scientific progress in recent times have had their origin in an improvement of method.
+Leibniz, too, recognized—and perhaps overrated—the advantages of an adequate
+system of notation. His idea of a universal characteristic, of a calculus philosophicus
+or ratiocinator, 2 was so gigantic that the attempt to realize it could not go beyond the
+bare preliminaries. The enthusiasm that seized its originator when he contemplated
+the immense increase in the intellectual power of mankind that a system of notation
+directly appropriate to objects themselves would bring about led him to underestimate
+the difficulties that stand in the way of such an enterprise. But, even if this worthy
+goal cannot be reached in one leap, we need not despair of a slow, step-by-step approxi.
+mation. When a problem appears to be unsolvable in its full generality, one should
+2 On that point see Trendelenburg 1867 Ipp. 1-47, Ueber Leibnizens Entwurf einer allgemeinen
+CharakteristikI.
+
+7
+temporarily restrict it; perhaps it can then be conquered by a gradual advance. It is
+possible to view the signs of arithmetic, geometry, and chemistry as realizations, for
+specific fields, of Leibniz's idea. The ideography proposed here adds a new one to these
+fields, indeed the central one, which borders on all the others. If we take our departure
+from there, we can with the greatest expectation of success proceed to fill the gaps in
+the existing formula languages, connect their hitherto separated fields into a single
+domain, and extend this domain to include fields that up to now have lacked such a
+language. 3
+I am confident that my ideography can be successfully used wherever special value
+must be placed on the validity of proofs, as for example when the foundations of the
+differential and integral calculus are established.
+It seems to me to be easier still to extend the domain of this formula language to
+include geometry. We would only have to add a few signs for the intuitive relations
+that occur there. In this way we would obtain a kind of analysis situs.
+The transition to the pure theory of motion and then to mechanics and physics
+could follow at this point. The latter two fields, in which besides rational necessity
+[Denknothwendigkeit] empirical necessity [Naturnothwendigkeit| asserts itself, are
+the first for which we can predict a further development of the notation as knowledge
+progresses. That is no reason, however, for waiting until such progress appears to
+have become impossible.
+If it is one of the tasks of philosophy to break the domination of the word over the
+human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often
+almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts and by freeing
+thought from that with which only the means of expression of ordinary language,
+constituted as they are, saddle it, then my ideography, further developed for these
+purposes, can become a useful tool for the philosopher. To be sure, it too will fail to
+reproduce ideas in a pure form, and this is probably inevitable when ideas are
+represented by concrete means; but, on the one hand, we can restrict the discrepancies
+to those that are unavoidable and harmless, and, on the other, the fact that they are
+of a completely different kind from those peculiar to ordinary language already affords
+protection against the specific influence that a particular means of expression might
+exercise.
+The mere invention of this ideography has, it seems to me, advanced logic. I hope
+that logicians, if they do not allow themselves to be frightened off by an initial impression of strangeness, will not withhold their assent from the innovations that, by a
+necessity inherent in the subject matter itself, I was driven to make. These deviations
+from what is traditional find their justification in the fact that logic has hitherto always
+followed ordinary language and grammar too closely. In particular, I believe that the
+replacement of the concepts subject and predicate by argument and function, respectively, will stand the test of time. It is easy to see how regarding a content as a function
+of an argument leads to the formation of concepts. Furthermore, the demonstration
+of the connection between the meanings of the words if, and, not, or, there is, some, all,
+and so forth, deserves attention.
+Only the following point still requires special mention. The restriction, in § 6, to a
+3 [On that point see Frege 1879a.]
+
+8
+single mode of inference is justified by the fact that, when the foundations for such an
+ideography are laid, the primitive components must be taken as simple as possible, if
+perspicuity and order are to be created. This does not preclude the possibility that
+later certain transitions from several judgments to a new one, transitions that this
+one mode of inference would not allow us to carry out except mediately, will be
+abbreviated into immediate ones. In fact this would be advisable in case of eventual
+application. In this way, then, further modes of inference would be created.
+I noticed afterward that formulas (31) and (41) can be combined into a single one,
+-(Tra = a),
+which makes some further simplifications possible.
+As I remarked at the beginning, arithmetic was the point of departure for the train
+of thought that led me to my ideography. And that is why I intend to apply it first of
+all to that science, attempting to provide a more detailed analysis of the concepts of
+arithmetic and a deeper foundation for its theorems. For the present I have reported
+in the third chapter some of the developments in this direction. To proceed farther
+along the path indicated, to elucidate the concepts of number, magnitude, and so
+forth—all this will be the object of further investigations, which I shall publish
+immediately after this booklet.
+Jena, 18 December 1878.
+CONTENTS
+I. DEFINITION OF THE SYMBOLS
+§ 1. Letters and other signs
+•..
+10
+Judgment
+§ 2. Possibility that a content become a judgment. Content stroke, judgment
+stroke ........
+... ..
+...
+§ 3. Subject and predicate. Conceptual content....
+..••
+.....
+§ 4. Universal, particular; negative; categoric, hypothetic, disjunctive; apodictic, assertory, problematic judgments.….…….…........
+Conditionality
+§ 5. If. Condition stroke......
+.•...
+...
+§ 6. Inference. The Aristotelian modes of inference..
+......
+...
+Negation
+§ 7. Negation stroke. Or, either—or, and, but, and not, neither—nor.....
+11
+12
+13
+13
+15
+17
+
+Identity of content
+§ 8. Need for a sign for identity of content, introduction of such a sign. ......
+Funclions
+§ 9. Definition of the words "function" and "argument". Functions of several
+arguments. Argument places. Subject, object. ..........
+.......
+§ 10. Use of letters as function signs. "A has the property $." "B has the
+relation "' to A." "B is a result of an application of the procedure Y' to
+the object A." The function sign as argument..............
+Generality
+§ 11. German letters. The concavity in the content stroke. Replaceability of
+German letters. Their scope. Latin letters..
+§ 12. There are some objects that do not ——. There is no —. There are
+some —. Every. All. Causal connections. None. Some do not. Some. It
+is possible that —. Square of logical opposition.
+9
+20
+21
+23
+24
+27
+II. REPRESENTATION AND DERIVATION OF SOME JUDGMENTS OF PURE THOUGHT
+§ 13. Usefulness of the deductive mode of presentation.
+§ 14. The first two fundamental laws of conditionality.
+§ 15. Some of their consequences........
+§ 16. The third fundamental law of conditionality, consequences.......
+§ 17. The first fundamental law of negation, consequences.
+§ 18. The second fundamental law of negation, consequences
+§ 19. The third fundamental law of negation, consequences.
+§ 20. The first fundamental law of identity of content, consequence......
+§ 21. The second fundamental law of identity of content, consequences....
+§ 22. The fundamental law of generality, consequences.
+28
+29
+31
+36
+44
+45
+47
+50
+50
+51
+III. SOME TOPICS FROM A GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES
+§ 23. Introductory remarks.
+§ 24. Heredity. Doubling of the judgment stroke. Lower-case Greek letters..
+§ 25. Consequences..
+§ 26. Succession in a sequence.
+§ 27. Consequences
+§ 28. Further consequences ..
+§ 29.
+"" belongs to the f-sequence beginning with x." Definition and consequences.
+§ 30. Further consequences.......
+.•...
+§ 31. Single-valuedness of a procedure. Definition and consequences. .........
+55
+55
+57
+59
+60
+65
+69
+71
+74
+
+10
+I. DEFINITION OF THE SYMBOLS
+§1. The signs customarily employed in the general theory of magnitudes are of
+two kinds. The first consists of letters, of which each represents either a number left
+indeterminate or a function left indeterminate. This indeterminacy makes it possible
+to use letters to express the universal validity of propositions, as in
+(a + b)c= ac + be.
+The other kind consists of signs such as t, -, V, O, 1, and 2, of which each has its
+particular meaning.*
+I adopt this basic idea of distinguishing two kinds of signs, which unfortunately is
+not strictly observed in the theory of magnitudes, in order to apply it in the more
+* [Footnote by Jourdain (1912, p. 230):
+Russell (1908) has expressed it: "A variable is a symbol which is to have one of a certain set
+of values, without its being decided which one. It does not have first one value of a set and then
+another; it has at all times some value of the set, where, so long as we do not replace the variable
+by a constant, the 'some' remains unspecified."
+On the word "variable" Frege has supplied the note: "Would it not be well to omit this
+expression entirely, since it is hardly possible to define it properly? Russell's definition immediately raises the question what it means to say that 'a symbol has a value'. Is the relation of a
+sign to its significatum meant by this? In that case, however, we must insist that the sign be
+univocal, and the meaning (value) that the sign is to have must be determinate; then the variable
+would be a sign. But for him who does not subscribe to a formal theory a variable will not be a
+sign, any more than a number is. If, now, you write 'A variable is represented by a symbol that
+is to represent one of a certain set of values',
+, the last defect is thereby removed; but what is the
+case then? The symbol represents, first, the variable and, second, a value taken from a certain
+supply without its being determined which. Accordingly, it seems better to leave the word 'symbol' out of the definition. The question as to what a variable is has to be answered independently
+of the question as to which symbol is to represent the variable. So we come to the definition: 'A
+variable is one of a certain set of values, without its being decided which one'. But the last
+addition does not yield any closer determination, and to belong to a certain set of values means,
+properly, to fall under a certain concept; for, after all, we can determine this set only by giving
+the properties that an object must have in order to belong to the set; that is, the set of values will
+be the extension of a concept. But, now, we can for every object specify a set of values to which
+it belongs, so that even the requirement that something is to be a value taken from a certain set
+does not determine anything. It is probably best to hold to the convention that Latin letters serve
+to confer generality of content on a theorem. And it is best not to use the expression 'variable' at
+all, since ultimately we cannot say either of a sign, or of what it expresses or denotes, that it is
+variable or that it is a variable, at least not in a sense that can be used in mathematics or logic.
+On the other hand, perhaps someone may insist that in '(2 † x)(3 + x)' the letter 'x' does not
+serve to confer generality of content on a proposition. But in the context of a proof such a formula
+will always occur as a part of a proposition, whether this proposition consists partly of words or
+exclusively of mathematical signs, and in such a context x will always serve to confer generality
+of content on a proposition. Now, it seems to me unfortunate to restrict to a particular set the
+values that are admissible for this letter. For we can always add the condition that a belong to
+this set, and then drop that condition. If an object 4 does not belong to the set, the condition is
+simply not satisfied and, if we replace 'a' by '4' in the entire proposition, we obtain a true proposition. I would not say of a letter that it has a signification, a sense, a meaning, if it serves to
+confer generality of content on a proposition. We can replace the letter by the proper name '4'
+of an object 4; but this 4 cannot anyhow be regarded as the meaning of the letter; for it is not
+more closely allied with the letter than is any other object. Also, generality cannot be regarded as
+the meaning of the Latin letter; for it cannot be regarded as something independent, something
+that would be added to a content already complete in other respects. I would not, then, say
+'terms whose meaning is indeterminate' or 'signs have variable meanings'. In this case signs have
+no denotations at all." [Frege, 1910.]]
+5 Consider 1, log, sin, lim.
+
+11
+comprehensive domain of pure thought in general. I therefore divide all signs that I use
+into those by which we may understand different objects and those that have a completely
+determinate meaning. The former are letters and they will serve chiefly to express
+generality. But, no matter how indeterminate the meaning of a letter, we must insist
+that throughout a given context the letter retain the meaning once given to it.
+Judgment
+§ 2. A judgment will always be expressed by means of the sign
+which stands to the left of the sign, or the combination of signs, indicating the content
+of the judgment. If we omit the small vertical stroke at the left end of the horizontal
+one, the judgment will be transformed into a mere combination of ideas [Vorstellungsverbindung], ° of which the writer does not state whether he acknowledges it to be true
+or not. For example, let
+stand for [bedeute ] the judgment "Opposite magnetic poles attract each other";?
+then
+-A
+till dea express faulticket this fudget, a in to prods in the reader merely
+consequences from it and to test by means of these whether the thought is correct.
+When the vertical stroke is omitted, we express ourselves paraphrastically, using the
+words "the circumstance that" or "the proposition that".?
+Not every content becomes a judgment when F
+— is written before its sign; for
+6 [Footnote by Jourdain (1912, p. 242) :
+"For this word I now simply say 'Gedanke'. The word 'Vorstellungsinhalt' is used now in a
+psychological, now in a logical sense. Since this creates obscurities, I think it best not to use this
+word at all in logic. We must be able to express a thought without affirming that it is true. If we
+want to characterize a thought as false, we must first express it without affirming it, then negate
+it, and affirm as true the thought thus obtained. We cannot correctly express a hypothetical
+connection between thoughts at all if we cannot express thoughts without affirming them, for in
+the hypothetical connection neither the thought appearing as antecedent nor that appearing as
+consequent is affirmed." [Frege, 1910.]]
+7 I use Greek letters as abbreviations, and to each of these letters the reader should attach an
+appropriate meaning when I do not expressly give them a definition. [The "A" that Frege is now
+using is a capital alpha.]
+• [Jourdain had originally translated "bedeuten" by "signify", and Frege wrote (see Jourdain
+1912, p. 242):
+"Here we must notice the words 'signify' and 'express'. The former seems to correspond to
+'bezeichnen' or 'bedeuten', the latter to 'ausdrücken'. According to the way of speaking I adopted
+I say 'A proposition expresses a thought and signifies its truth value'. Of a judgment we cannot
+properly say either that it signifies or that it is expressed. We do, to be sure, have a thought in the
+judgment, and that can be expressed; but we have more, namely, the recognition of the truth of
+this thought."]
+° [Footnote by Jourdain (1912, p. 243) :
+"Instead of 'circumstance' and 'proposition' I would simply say 'thought'. Instead of
+'beurtheilbarer Inhalt' we can also say 'Gedanke'. " [Frege, 1910.]]
+
+12
+PREGE
+example, the idea "house" does not. We therefore distinguish contents that can become a judgment from those that cannot.10
+The horizontal stroke that is part of the sign
+- combines the signs that follow it
+into a totality, and the affirmation expressed by the vertical stroke at the left end of the
+horizontal one refers to this totality. Let us call the horizontal stroke the content stroke
+and the vertical stroke the judgment stroke. The content stroke will in general serve
+to relate any sign to the totality of the signs that follow the stroke. Whatever follows
+the content stroke must have a content that can become a judgment.
+§ 3. A distinction between subject and predicate does not occur in my way of representing a judgment. In order to justify this I remark that the contents of two judgments may differ in two ways: either the consequences derivable from the first, when
+it is combined with certain other judgments, always follow also from the second, when
+it is combined with these same judgments, [and conversely,] or this is not the case.
+The two propositions "The Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea" and "The
+Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea" differ in the first way. Even if one
+can detect a slight difference in meaning, the agreement outweighs it. Now I call that
+part of the content that is the same in both the conceptual content. Since it alone is of
+significance for our ideography, we need not introduce any distinction between propositions having the same conceptual content. If one says of the subject that it "is
+the concept with which the judgment is concerned"
+', this is equally true of the object.
+We can therefore only say that the subject "is the concept with which the judgment
+is chiefly concerned"
+• In ordinary language, the place of the subject in the sequence
+of words has the significance of a distinguished place, where we put that to which we
+wish especially to direct the attention of the listener (see also § 9). This may, for
+example, have the purpose of pointing out a certain relation of the given judgment
+to others and thereby making it easier for the listener to grasp the entire context.
+Now, all those peculiarities of ordinary language that result only from the interaction
+of speaker and listener—as when, for example, the speaker takes the expectations of
+the listener into account and seeks to put them on the right track even before the
+complete sentence is enunciated-have nothing that answers to them in my formula
+language, since in a judgment I consider only that which influences its possible consequences. Everything necessary for a correct inference is expressed in full, but what
+is not necessary is generally not indicated; nothing is left to guesswork. In this I faithfully follow the example of the formula language of mathematics, a language to
+which one would do violence if he were to distinguish between subject and predicate
+in it. We can imagine a language in which the proposition "Archimedes perished at
+the capture of Syracuse" would be expressed thus: "The violent death of Archimedes
+at the capture of Syracuse is a fact"
+. To be sure, one can distinguish between subject
+and predicate here, too, if one wishes to do so, but the subject contains the whole
+content, and the predicate serves only to turn the content into a judgment. Such a
+10 On the other hand, the circumstance that there are houses, or that there is a house (see § 12
+[footnote 15]), is a content that can become a judgment. But the idea "house" is only a part of
+it. In the proposition "The house of Priam was made of wood" we could not put "circumstance
+that there is a house" in place of "house". For a different kind of example of a content that
+cannot become a judgment see the passage following formula (81).
+[In German Frege's distinction is between "beurtheilbare" and "unbeurtheilbare" contents.
+Jourdain uses the words "judicable" and "nonjudicable" ]
+
+13
+language would have only a single predicate for all judgments, namely, "is a fact".
+We see that there cannot be any question here of subject and predicate in the ordinary
+sense. Our ideography is a language of this sort, and in it the sign |— is the common
+predicate for all judgments.
+In the first draft of my formula language I allowed myself to be misled by the
+example of ordinary language into constructing judgments out of subject and predicate. But I soon became convinced that this was an obstacle to my specific goal and
+led only to useless prolixity.
+§ 4. The remarks that follow are intended to explain the significance for our
+purposes of the distinctions that we introduce among judgments.
+We distinguish between universal and particular judgments; this is really not a
+distinction between judgments but between contents. We ought to say "a judgment
+with a universal content"
+"a judgment with a particular content"
+'. For these properties
+hold of the content even when it is not advanced as a judgment but as a [mere]
+proposition (see § 2).
+The same holds of negation. In an indirect proof we say, for example, "Suppose
+that the line segments AB and CD are not equal"
+'. Here the content, that the line
+segments AB and CD are not equal, contains a negation; but this content, though it
+can become a judgment, is nevertheless not advanced as a judgment. Hence the
+negation attaches to the content, whether this content becomes a judgment or not. I
+therefore regard it as more appropriate to consider negation as an adjunct of a content
+that can become a judgment.
+The distinction between categoric, hypothetic, and disjunctive judgments seems
+to me to have only grammatical significance. 11
+The apodictic judgment differs from the assertory in that it suggests the existence
+of universal judgments from which the proposition can be inferred, while in the case
+of the assertory one such a suggestion is lacking. By saying that a proposition is
+necessary I give a hint about the grounds for my judgment. But, since this does not
+affect the conceptual content of the judgment, the form of the apodictic judgment has no
+significance for us.
+If a proposition is advanced as possible, either the speaker is suspending judgment
+by suggesting that he knows no laws from which the negation of the proposition
+would follow or he says that the generalization of this negation is false. In the latter
+case we have what is usually called a particular affirmative judgment (see § 12). "It is
+possible that the earth will at some time collide with another heavenly body" is an
+instance of the first kind, and "A cold can result in death" of the second.
+Conditionality
+§5. If A and B stand for contents that can become judgments (§ 2), there are the
+following four possibilities:
+(1) A is affirmed and B is affirmed;
+(2) A is affirmed and B is denied;
+(3) A is denied and B is affirmed;
+(4) A is denied and B is denied.
+11 The reason for this will be apparent from the entire book.
+
+14
+Now
+stands for the judgment that the third of these possibilities does not take place, but one
+of the three others does. Accordingly, if
+is denied, this means that the third possibility takes place, hence that A is denied
+and B affirmed.
+Of the cases in which
+• B
+is affirmed we single out for comment the following three:
+(1) A must be affirmed. Then the content of B is completely immaterial. For
+example, let ———A stand for 3 × 7 = 21 and B for the circumstance that the sun is
+shining. Then only the first two of the four cases mentioned are possible. There need
+not exist a causal connection between the two contents.
+(2) B has to be denied. Then the content of A is immaterial. For example, let B
+stand for the circumstance that perpetual motion is possible and A for the circumstance that the world is infinite. Then only the second and fourth of the four cases are
+possible. There need not exist a causal connection between A and B.
+(3) We can make the judgment
+TA
+without knowing whether A and B are to be affirmed or denied. For example, let B
+stand for the circumstance that the moon is in quadrature with the sun and A for the
+circumstance that the moon appears as a semicircle. In that case we can translate
+B
+by means of the conjunction "if": "If the moon is in quadrature with the sun, the
+moon appears as a semicircle". The causal connection inherent in the word "if",
+however, is not expressed by our signs, even though only such a connection can provide the ground for a judgment of the kind under consideration. For causal connection is something general, and we have not yet come to express generality (see § 12).
+Let us call the vertical stroke connecting the two horizontal ones the condition
+stroke. The part of the upper horizontal stroke to the left of the condition stroke is the
+content stroke for the meaning, just explained, of the combination of signs
+TA
+-B;
+
+15
+to it is affixed any sign that is intended to relate to the total content of the expression.
+The part of the horizontal stroke between A and the condition stroke is the content
+stroke of A. The horizontal stroke to the left of B is the content stroke of B.
+Accordingly, it is easy to see that
+denies the case in which A is denied and B and Fare affirmed. We must think of this
+as having been constructed from
+LA
+and in the same way as
+was constructed from A and B. We therefore first have the denial of the case in which
+TA
+is denied and I is affirmed. But the denial of
+means that A is denied and B is affirmed. From this we obtain what was given above.
+If a causal connection is present, we can also say " A is the necessary consequence of
+B and I", or "If the circumstances B and l'occur, then A also occurs".
+It is no less easy to see that
+denies the case in which B is affirmed but A and Fare denied. 12 If we assume that
+there exists a causal connection between A and B, we can translate the formula as
+"If A is a necessary consequence of B, one can infer that I takes place".
+§ 6. The definition given in § 5 makes it apparent that from the two judgments
+and B
+the new judgment
+- A
+12 [There is an oversight here, already pointed out by Schröder (1880, p. 88).]]
+
+16
+follows. Of the four cases enumerated above, the third is excluded by
+and the second and fourth by
+- B,
+so that only the first remains.
+We could write this inference perhaps as follows:
+1A.
+This would become awkward if long expressions were to take the places of A and B,
+since each of them would have to be written twice. That is why I use the following
+abbreviation. To every judgment occurring in the context of a proof I assign a
+number, which I write to the right of the judgment at its first occurrence. Now
+assume, for example, that the judgment
+TE.
+or one containing it as a special case, has been assigned the number X. Then I write
+the inference as follows:
+(X):
+IA.
+Here it is left to the reader to put the judgment
+together for himself from
+-B and FA and to see whether it is the judgment
+X above.
+If, for example, the judgment B has been assigned the number XX, I also
+write the same inference as follows:
+(XX)::
+LA.
+Here the double colon indicates that B, which was only referred to by XX,
+would have to be formed, from the two judgments written down, in a way different
+from that above.
+
+17
+Furthermore if, say, the judgment |—T had been assigned the number XXX, I
+would abbreviate the two judgments
+(XXX)::
+(XX)::
+still more thus:
+Г
+(XX, XXX):: =
+FA.
+Following Aristotle, we can enumerate quite a few modes of inference in logic; I
+employ only this one, at least in all cases in which a new judgment is derived from
+more than a single one. For, the truth contained in some other kind of inference can
+be stated in one judgment, of the form: if M holds and if N holds, then A holds also,
+or, in signs,
+TEM
+-N.
+From this judgment, together with IN and |M, there follows, as above,
+T1. In this way an inference in accordance with any mode of inference can be
+reduced to our case. Since it is therefore possible to manage with a single mode of
+inference, it is a commandment of perspicuity to do so. Otherwise there would be no
+reason to stop at the Aristotelian modes of inference; instead, one could continue to
+add new ones indefinitely: from each of the judgments expressed in a formula in
+§§ 13-22 we could make a particular mode of inference. With this restriction to a single
+mode of inference, however, we do not intend in any way to state a psychological proposition; we wish only to decide a question of form in the most expedient way. Some of the
+judgments that take the place of Aristotelian kinds of inference will be listed in § 22
+(formulas (59), (62), and 65)).
+Negation
+§ 7. If a short vertical stroke is attached below the content stroke, this will express
+the circumstance that the content does not take place. So, for example,
+means "A does not take place"
+. I call this short vertical stroke the negation stroke.
+
+18
+The part of the horizontal stroke to the right of the negation stroke is the content
+stroke of A; the part to the left of the negation stroke is the content stroke of the
+negation of A. If there is no judgment stroke, then here—as in any other place where
+the ideography is used—no judgment is made.
+merely calls upon us to form the idea that A does not take place, without expressing
+whether this idea is true.
+We now consider some cases in which the signs of conditionality and negation are
+combined.
+means "The case in which B is to be affirmed and the negation of A to be denied does
+not take place"; in other words, "The possibility of affirming both A and B does not
+exist"
+', or "A and B exclude each other". Thus only the following three cases remain :
+A is affirmed and B is denied;
+A is denied and B is affirmed;
+A is denied and B is denied.
+In view of the preceding it is easy to state what the significance of each of the three
+parts of the horizontal stroke to the left of A is.
+means "The case in which A is denied and the negation of B is affirmed does not
+obtain", or " A and B cannot both be denied". Only the following possibilities remain :
+A is affirmed and B is affirmed;
+A is affirmed and B is denied;
+A is denied and B is affirmed;
+A and B together exhaust all possibilities. Now the words "or" and "either—or"
+are used in two ways: " A or B" means, in the first place, just the same as
+hence it means that no possibility other than A and B is thinkable. For example, if
+a mass of gas is heated, its volume or its pressure increases. In the second place, the
+expression "A or B" combines the meanings of both
+- A
+and
+- A
+B
+- B,
+so that no third is possible besides A and B, and, moreover, that A and B exclude
+each other. Of the four possibilities, then, only the following two remain :
+A is affirmed and B is denied;
+A is denied and B is affirmed.
+
+19
+Of the two ways in which the expression " A or B" is used, the first, which does not
+exclude the coexistence of A and B, is the more important, and we shall use the word
+"or" in this sense. Perhaps it is appropriate to distinguish between "or" and "either
+—or" by stipulating that only the latter shall have the secondary meaning of mutual
+exclusion. We can then translate
+- A
+by "A or B". Similarly,
+TEA
+has the meaning of "A or B or T".
+means
+"TA is denied",
+or "The case in which both A and B are affirmed occurs". The three possibilities that
+remained open for
+are, however, excluded. Accordingly, we can translate
+by "Both A and B are facts". It is also easy to see that
+can be rendered by " A and B and T". If we want to represent in signs "Either A or
+B" with the secondary meaning of mutual exclusion, we must express
+"If and
+This yields
+TEA
+or also
+LB.
+
+20
+Instead of expressing the "and", as we did here, by means of the signs of conditionality and negation, we could on the other hand also represent conditionality by
+means of a sign for "and" and the sign of negation. We could introduce, say,
+as a sign for the total content of I and 4, and then render
+by
+TA
+B.
+I chose the other way because I felt that it enables us to express inferences more
+simply. The distinction between "and" and "but"' is of the kind that is not expressed
+in the present ideography. The speaker uses "but" when he wants to hint that what
+follows is different from what one might at first expect.
+means "Of the four possibilities the third, namely, that A is denied and B is affirmed,
+occurs". We can therefore translate it as "B takes place and (but) A does not".
+We can translate the combination of signs
+by the same words.
+means "The case in which both A and B are denied occurs". Hence we can translate
+it as "Neither A nor B is a fact"
+'. What has been said here about the words "or"
+"and"
+', and "neither —nor" applies, of course, only when they connect contents that
+can become judgments.
+Identity of content
+§ 8. Identity of content differs from conditionality and negation in that it applies
+to names and not to contents. Whereas in other contexts signs are merely representatives of their content, so that every combination into which they enter expresses only
+a relation between their respective contents, they suddenly display their own selves
+when they are combined by means of the sign for identity of content; for it expresses
+the circumstance that two names have the same content. Hence the introduction of a
+sign for identity of content necessarily produces a bifurcation in the meaning of all
+
+21
+signs: they stand at times for their content, at times for themselves. At first we have
+the impression that what we are dealing with pertains merely to the expression and
+not to the thought, that we do not need different signs at all for the same content and
+hence no sign whatsoever for identity of content. To show that this is an empty
+illusion I take the following example from geometry. Assume that on the circumference of a circle there is a fixed point A about which a ray revolves. When this ray
+passes through the center of the circle, we call the other point at which it intersects
+the circle the point B associated with this position of the ray. The point of intersection, other than A, of the ray and the circumference will then be called the point
+B associated with the position of the ray at any time; this point is such that continuous variations in its position must always correspond to continuous variations in
+the position of the ray. Hence the name B denotes something indeterminate so long
+as the corresponding position of the ray has not been specified. We can now ask:
+what point is associated with the position of the ray when it is perpendicular to the
+diameter? The answer will be: the point A. In this case, therefore, the name B has the
+same content as has the name A; and yet we could not have used only one name from
+the beginning, since the justification for that is given only by the answer. One point is
+determined in two ways: (1) immediately through intuition and (2) as a point B
+associated with the ray perpendicular to the diameter.
+To each of these ways of determining the point there corresponds a particular
+name. Hence the need for a sign for identity of content rests upon the following
+consideration: the same content can be completely determined in different ways; but
+that in a particular case two ways of determining it really yield the same result is the
+content of a judgment. Before this judgment can be made, two distinct names,
+corresponding to the two ways of determining the content, must be assigned to what
+these ways determine. The judgment, however, requires for its expression a sign for
+identity of content, a sign that connects these two names. From this it follows that
+the existence of different names for the same content is not always merely an irrelevant question of form; rather, that there are such names is the very heart of the matter
+if each is associated with a different way of determining the content. In that case the
+judgment that has the identity of content as its object is synthetic, in the Kantian
+sense. A more extrinsic reason for the introduction of a sign for identity of content
+is that it is at times expedient to introduce an abbreviation for a lengthy expression.
+Then we must express the identity of content that obtains between the abbreviation
+and the original form.
+Now let
+-(A =B)
+mean that the sign A and the sign B have the same conceptual content, so that we can
+everywhere put B for A and conversely.
+Functions
+§9. Let us assume that the circumstance that hydrogen is lighter than carbon
+dioxide is expressed in our formula language; we can then replace the sign for hydrogen by the sign for oxygen or that for nitrogen. This changes the meaning in such a
+
+22
+way that "oxygen" or "nitrogen" enters into the relations in which "hydrogen"
+stood before. If we imagine that an expression can thus be altered, it decomposes
+into a stable component, representing the totality of relations, and the sign, regarded
+as replaceable by others, that denotes the object standing in these relations. The
+former component I call a function, the latter its argument. The distinction has
+nothing to do with the conceptual content; it comes about only because we view the
+expression in a particular way. According to the conception sketched above, "hydrogen" is the argument and "being lighter than carbon dioxide" the function; but we
+can also conceive of the same conceptual content in such a way that " carbon dioxide"
+becomes the argument and "being heavier than hydrogen" the function. We then
+need only regard "carbon dioxide" as replaceable by other ideas, such as "hydrochloric acid " or "ammonia"
+"The circumstance that carbon dioxide is heavier than hydrogen" and "The
+circumstance that carbon dioxide is heavier than oxygen" are the same function with
+different arguments if we regard "hydrogen" and "oxygen" as arguments; on the
+other hand, they are different functions of the same argument if we regard "carbon
+dioxide" as the argument.
+To consider another example, take "The circumstance that the center of mass of
+the solar system has no acceleration if internal forces alone act on the solar system".
+Here "solar system"
+occurs in two places. Hence we can consider this as a function
+of the argument "solar system" in various ways, according as we think of "solar
+system"
+as replaceable by something else at its first occurrence, at its second, or at
+both (but then in both places by the same thing). These three functions are all different. The situation is the same for the proposition that Cato killed Cato. If we here
+think of "Cato" as replaceable at its first occurrence, "to kill Cato" is the function;
+if we think of "Cato" as replaceable at its second occurrence, "to be killed by Cato"
+is the function; if, finally, we think of "Cato" as replaceable at both occurrences,
+"to kill oneself" is the function.
+We now express the matter generally.
+If in an expression, whose content need not be capable of becoming a judgment, a simple
+or a compound sign has one or more occurrences and if we regard that sign as replaceable
+in all or some of these occurrences by something else (but everywhere by the same thing),
+then we call the part that remains invariant in the expression a function, and the replace.
+able part the argument of the function.
+Since, accordingly, something can be an argument and also occur in the function
+at places where it is not considered replaceable, we distinguish
+• in the function
+between the argument places and the others.
+Let us warn here against a false impression that is very easily occasioned by
+linguistic usage. If we compare the two propositions "The number 20 can be represented as the sum of four squares" and "Every positive integer can be represented
+as the sum of four squares"
+, it seems to be possible to regard "being representable
+as the sum of four squares" as a function that in one case has the argument "the
+number 20" and in the other "every positive integer". We see that this view is
+mistaken if we observe that "the number 20" and "every positive integer" are not
+concepts of the same rank [gleichen Ranges]. What is asserted of the number 20 cannot be asserted in the same sense of "every positive integer"
+, though under certain
+
+23
+circumstances it can be asserted of every positive integer. The expression "every
+positive integer" does not, as does "the number 20", by itself yield an independent
+idea but acquires a meaning only from the context of the sentence.
+For us the fact that there are various ways in which the same conceptual content
+can be regarded as a function of this or that argument has no importance so long as
+function and argument are completely determinate. But, if the argument becomes
+indeterminate, as in the judgment "You can take as argument of ' being representable
+as the sum of four squares' an arbitrary positive integer, and the proposition will
+always be true"
+, then the distinction between function and argument takes on a
+substantive [inhaltliche] significance. On the other hand, it may also be that the
+argument is determinate and the function indeterminate. In both cases, through the
+opposition between the determinate and the indeterminate or that between the more
+and the less determinate, the whole is decomposed into function and argument
+according to its content and not merely according to the point of view adopted.
+If, given a function, we think of a sign'3 that was hitherto regarded as not replaceable
+as being replaceable at some or all of its occurrences, then by adopting this conception we
+obtain a function that has a new argument in addition to those it had before. This procedure yields functions of two or more arguments. So, for example, "The circumstance
+that hydrogen is lighter than carbon dioxide" can be regarded as function of the two
+arguments "hydrogen" and "carbon dioxide"
+In the mind of the speaker the subject is ordinarily the main argument; the next
+in importance often appears as object. Through the choice between [grammatical]
+forms, such as active—-passive, or between words, such as "heavier"-"lighter" and
+"give"— "receive"
+', ordinary language is free to allow this or that component of the
+sentence to appear as main argument at will, a freedom that, however, is restricted by
+the scarcity of words.
+§ 10. In order to express an indeterminate function of the argument A, we write A,
+enclosed in parentheses, to the right of a letter, for example
+Ф(А).
+Likewise,
+7(A, B)
+means a function of the two arguments A and B that is not determined any further. Here
+the occurrences of A and B in the parentheses represent the occurrences of A and B in the
+function, irrespective of whether these are single or multiple for A or for B. Hence in
+general
+4(A, B)
+differs from
+7(B, A).
+Indeterminate functions of more arguments are expressed in a corresponding way.
+We can read
+\—$(А)
+13 We can now regard a sign that previously was considered replaceable [in some places as
+replaceable also in those places in which up to this point it was considered fixed
+
+24
+as "A has the property $".
+14(A, B)
+can be translated by "B stands in the relation Y to A" or "B is a result of an
+application of the procedure Y' to the object A".
+Since the sign $ occurs in the expression $(A) and since we can imagine that it is
+replaced by other signs, I or X, which would then express other functions of the
+argument A, we can also regard $(A) as a function of the argument $. This shows quite
+clearly that the concept of function in analysis, which in general I used as a guide, is
+far more restricted than the one developed here.
+Generality
+§ 11. In the expression of a judgment we can always regard the combination of
+signs to the right of |— as a function of one of the signs occurring in it. If we replace
+this argument by a German letter and if in the content stroke we introduce a concavity
+with this German letter in it, as in
+- Ф(а),
+this stands for the judgment that, whatever we may take for its argument, the function is a
+fact. Since a letter used as a sign for a function, such as $ in $(A), can itself be
+regarded as the argument of a function, its place can be taken, in the manner just
+specified, by a German letter. The meaning of a German letter is subject only to the
+obvious restrictions that, if a combination of signs following a content stroke can
+become a judgment (§ 2), this possibility remain unaffected by such a replacement
+and that, if the German letter occurs as a function sign, this circumstance be taken
+into account. All other conditions to be imposed on what may be put in place of a German
+letter are to be incorporated into the judgment. From such a judgment, therefore, we can
+always derive an arbitrary number of judgments of less general content by substituting
+each time something else for the German letter and then removing the concavity in
+the content stroke. The horizontal stroke to the left of the concavity in
+is the content stroke for the circumstance that, whatever we may put in place of a,
+Ф(a) holds; the horizontal stroke to the right of the concavity is the content stroke of
+$(a), and here we must imagine that something definite has been substituted for a.
+According to what we said above about the significance of the judgment stroke, it
+is easy to see what an expression like
+= X(a)
+means. It can occur as a part of a judgment, like
+-(a)
+- A
+
+25
+It is clear that from these judgments we cannot derive less general judgments by
+substituting something definite for a, as we could from
+Hа-ф(а).
+Hi X(a) denies that, whatever we may put in place of a, X(a) is always a fact.
+This does not by any means deny that we could specify some meaning 4 for a such
+that X(4) would be a fact.
+— A
+Lex (a)
+means that the case in which —X(a) is affirmed and A is denied does not
+occur. But this does not by any means deny that the case in which X(4) is affirmed
+and A is denied does occur; for, as we just saw, 4(4) can be affirmed and -X(a)
+can still be denied. Hence we cannot put something arbitrary in place of a here either
+without endangering the truth of the judgment. This explains why the concavity
+with the German letter written into it is necessary: it delimits the scope [Gebiet] that
+the generality indicated by the letter covers. The German letter retains a fixed meaning
+only within its own scope; within one judgment the same German letter can occur in
+different scopes, without the meaning attributed to it in one scope extending to any
+other. The scope of a German letter can include that of another, as is shown by the
+example
+— A(a)
+EB(a,e).
+In that case they must be chosen different; we could not put a for e. Replacing a
+German letter everywhere in its scope by some other one is, of course, permitted, so
+long as in places where different letters initially stood different ones also stand afterward. This has no effect on the content. Other substitutions are permitted only if the
+concavity immediately follows the judgment stroke, that is, if the content of the entire
+judgment constitutes the scope of the German letter. Since, accordingly, that case is
+a distinguished one, I shall introduce the following abbreviation for it. An [italic]
+Latin letter always is to have as its scope the content of the entire judgment, and this fact
+need not be indicated by a concavity in the content stroke. If a Latin letter occurs
+in an expression that is not preceded by a judgment stroke, the expression is meaningless. A Latin letter may always be replaced by a German one that does not yet occur in the
+judgment; then the concavity must be introduced immediately following the judgment stroke. For example, instead of
+we can write
+if a occurs only in the argument places of X (a).
+
+26
+It is clear also that from
+we can derive
+-A
+if A is an expression in which a does not occur and if a stands only in the argument places
+of $(a). 14 If
+—P(a) is denied, we must be able to specify a meaning for a
+such that $(a) will be denied. If, therefore,
+-Ф(a) were to be denied and
+A to be affirmed, we would have to be able to specify a meaning for a such that A
+would be affirmed and $(a) would be denied. But on account of
+we cannot do that; for this means that, whatever a may be, the case in which $(a) is
+denied and A is affirmed is excluded. Therefore we cannot deny -"-$(a) and
+affirm A; that is,
+TV-Ф(a)
+-A.
+Likewise, from
+we can deduce
+TL
+~ Ф(а)
+A
+- B
+if a does not occur in A or B and $(a) contains a only in the argument places. This
+case can be reduced to the preceding one, since
+can be written
+14 [Footnote by Jourdain (1912, p. 248):
+Frege remarked [Frege, 1910] that "it is correct that one can give up the distinguishing use of
+Latin, German, and perhaps also of Greek letters, but at the cost of perspicuity of formulas".I]
+
+27
+and since we can transform
+back into
+$(a)
+- A
+- B.
+Similar considerations apply when still more condition strokes are present.
+§ 12. We now consider certain combinations of signs.
+means that we could find some object, say 4, such that X(4) would be denied. We can
+therefore translate it as "There are some objects that do not have property X".
+The meaning of
+HiT x(a)
+differs from this. The formula means "Whatever a may be, X(a) must always be
+denied", or "There does not exist anything having property X", or, if we call something that has property X an X, 'There is no X".
+IT 1(a)
+is denied by
+traT1(a).
+We can therefore translate the last formula as "There are 1".15
+T"(a)
+means "Whatever we may put in place of a, the case in which P(a) would have to
+be denied and X (a) to be affirmed does not occur". Thus it is possible here that, for
+some meanings that can be given to a, P(a) would have to be affirmed and X(a) to
+be affirmed, for others P(a) would have to be affirmed and X(a) to be denied, and for
+others still P(a) would have to be denied and X (a) to be denied. We could therefore
+translate it as "If something has property X, it also has property P"
+', "Every X is a
+P", or "All X are P".
+This is the way in which causal connections are expressed.
+Tra
+- la
+15 This must be understood in such a way as to include the case "There exists one 1" as well.
+If, for example, 1(x) means the circumstance that x is a house, then
+MüT 1(a)
+reads "There are houses or there is at least one house". See footnote 10.
+
+28
+means "No meaning can be given to a such that both P(a) and Y (a) could be affirmed". We can therefore translate it as "What has property If does not have
+property P" or "No #' is a P".
+denies
+and can therefore be rendered by "Some 1 are not P".
+denies that no M is a P and therefore means "Some16 M are P", or "It is possible
+that a M be a P".
+Thus we obtain the square of logical opposition:
+L P(a)
+• X (a)
+contrary
+subalternate
+[sub]contrary
+-X (a)
+TP(a)
+• X (a)
+subalternate
+- P(a)
+-X (a)
+II. REPRESENTATION AND DERIVATION OF SOME JUDGMENTS
+OF PURE THOUGHT
+§ 13. We have already introduced a number of fundamental principles of thought
+in the first chapter in order to transform them into rules for the use of our signs.
+These rules and the laws whose transforms they are cannot be expressed in the ideography because they form its basis. Now in the present chapter a number of judgments of pure thought for which this is possible will be represented in signs. It seems
+natural to derive the more complex of these judgments from simpler ones, not in
+order to make them more certain, which would be unnecessary in most cases, but in
+order to make manifest the relations of the judgments to one another. Merely to know
+the laws is obviously not the same as to know them together with the connections that
+16 The word "some" must always be understood here in such a way as to include the case "one"
+as well. More explicitly we would say "some or at least one".
+
+29
+some have to others. In this way we arrive at a small number of laws in which, if we
+add those contained in the rules, the content of all the laws is included, albeit in an
+undeveloped state. And that the deductive mode of presentation makes us acquainted
+with that core is another of its advantages. Since in view of the boundless multitude of laws that can be enunciated we cannot list them all, we cannot achieve completeness except by searching out those that, by their power, contain all of them.
+Now it must be admitted, certainly, that the way followed here is not the only one in
+which the reduction can be done. That is why not all relations between the laws of
+thought are elucidated by means of the present mode of presentation. There is perhaps another set of judgments from which, when those contained in the rules are
+added, all laws of thought could likewise be deduced. Still, with the method of reduction presented here such a multitude of relations is exhibited that any other derivation
+will be much facilitated thereby.
+The propositions forming the core of the presentation below are nine in number.
+To express three of these, formulas (1), (2), and (8), we require besides letters only
+the sign of conditionality; formulas (28), (31), and (41) contain in addition the sign
+of negation; two, formulas (52) and (54), contain that of identity of content; and in
+one, formula (58), the concavity in the content stroke is used
+The derivations that follow would tire the reader if he were to retrace them in
+every detail; they serve merely to insure that the answer to any question concerning
+the derivation of a law is at hand.
+§14.
+b
+— a
+(1)
+says "The case in which a is denied, b is affirmed, and a is affirmed is excluded". This
+is evident, since a cannot at the same time be denied and affirmed. We can also express
+the judgment in words thus, "If a proposition a holds, then it also holds in case an
+arbitrary proposition b holds"
+. Let a, for example, stand for the proposition that the
+sum of the angles of the triangle ABC is two right angles, and b for the proposition
+that the angle ABC is a right angle. Then we obtain the judgment "If the sum of the
+angles of the triangle ABC is two right angles, this also holds in case the angle ABC
+is a right angle".
+The (1) to the right of
+T:
+is the number of this formula.
+— c
+
+30
+means "The case in which
+is denied and
+L:
+is affirmed does not take place".
+But
+means the circumstance that the case in which a is denied, b is affirmed, and e is
+affirmed is excluded. The denial of
+says
+La is denied and
+I' is affirmed. But the denial of
+Za means that a is denied and c is affirmed. Thus the denial of
+L°
+means that a is denied, c is attirmed, and -
+To is affirmed. But the affirmation
+of
+To and that of c entails the afirmation of b. That is why the denial of
+has as a consequence the denial of a and the affirmation of b and c. Precisely this case
+is excluded by the affirmation of
+— C.
+Thus the case in which
+
+31
+is denied and
+is affirmed cannot take place, and that is what the judgment
+asserts. For the case in which causal connections are present, we can also express this
+as follows: "If a proposition a is a necessary consequence of two propositions b and
+c, that is, if
+c,
+and if one of these, b, is in turn a necessary consequence of the other, c, then the
+proposition a is a necessary consequence of this latter one, c, alone".
+For example, let c mean that in a sequence Z of numbers every successor term is
+greater than its predecessor, let b mean that a term M is greater than I, and let a
+mean that the term N is greater than L. Then we obtain the following judgment:
+"If from the propositions that in the number sequence Z every successor term is
+greater than its predecessor and that the term M is greater than I it can be
+inferred that the term N is greater than I, and if from the proposition that in the
+number sequence Z every successor term is greater than its predecessor it follows that
+M is greater than L, then the proposition that N is greater than I can be inferred from
+the proposition that every successor term in the number sequence Z is greater than
+its predecessor"
+§ 15.
+2
+— C
+(1) :
+C
+(3).
+
+32
+The 2 on the left indicates that formula (2) stands to its right. The inference that
+brings about the transition from (2) and (I) to (3) is expressed by an abbreviation in
+accordance with § 6. In full it would be written as follows:
+2
+- a
+perpeppi
+- b
+- C
+• a
+• c
+(3).
+The small table under the (1) serves to make proposition (1) more easily recognizable in the more complicated form it takes here. It states that in
+- a
+
+33
+we are to put
+in place of a and
+in place of b.
+3
+(2) :
+- C
+- c
+(4).
+The table under the (2) means that in
+TE
+LE:
+
+34
+we are to put in place of a, b, and c, respectively, the expressions standing to the right
+of them; as a result we obtain
+- c
+Lo
+L6.
+We readily see how (4) follows from this and (3).
+4
+L:
+L:
+(1) : :
+L*
+(5).
+The significance of the double colon is explained in § 6.
+
+35
+Example for (5). Let a be the circumstance that the piece of iron E becomes
+magnetized, b the circumstance that a galvanic current flows through the wire D, and
+c the circumstance that the key I' is depressed. We then obtain the judgment: "If
+the proposition holds that E becomes magnetized as soon as a galvanic current flows
+through D and if the proposition holds that a galvanic current flows through D as
+soon as T' is depressed, then E becomes magnetized if T' is depressed".
+If causal connections are assumed, (5) can be expressed thus: "If b is a sufficient
+condition for a and if c is a sufficient condition for b, then c is a sufficient condition for
+a".
+5
+1E
+(5) :
+TLa
+- c
+L:
+(6).
+(6) :
+" T°
+' T.
+E:
+(7).
+
+36
+This proposition differs from (5) only in that instead of one condition, c, we now have
+two, c and d.
+Example for (7). Let d mean the circumstance that the piston K of an air pump is
+moved from its leftmost position to its rightmost position, c the circumstance that
+the valve H is in position I, b the circumstance that the density D of the air in the
+cylinder of the air pump is reduced by half, and a the circumstance that the height H
+of a barometer connected to the inside of the cylinder decreases by half. Then we
+obtain the judgment: "If the proposition holds that the height H of the barometer
+decreases by half as soon as the density D of the air is reduced by half, and if the
+proposition holds that the density D of the air is reduced by half if the piston K is
+moved from the leftmost to the rightmost position and if the valve is in position I,
+then it follows that the height H of the barometer decreases by half if the piston K is
+moved from the leftmost to the rightmost position while the valve H is in position
+1".
+§ 16.
+(8).
+L:
+means that the case in which a is denied but b and d are affirmed does not take place;
+TLi
+means the same, and (8) says that the case in which
+TLa
+— 6
+is denied and
+L:
+is affirmed is excluded. This can also be expressed thus: "If two conditions have a
+proposition as a consequence, their order is immaterial"
+5
+(8):
+
+37
+T°
+- 0
+(9).
+This proposition differs from (5) only in an unessential way.
+8
+- e
+- e
+—d
+(9):
+L'
+• a
+• e
+(10).
+(11).
+We can translate this formula thus: "If the proposition that b takes place or c does
+not is a sufficient condition for a, then b is by itself a sufficient condition for a".
+L:
+— C
+(5) :
+
+38
+• b
+L:
+c d
+(12).
+Propositions (12)-(17) and (22) show how, when there are several conditions, their
+order can be changed.
+12
+TL:
+L:
+(12) :
+" I°
+- C
+(13).
+(5):
+L
+• b
+- b
+L
+- a
+• b
+- c
+(14).
+(12) :
+
+- 6
+Lo
+- d
+L:
+- d
+12
+TIE®
+L:
+- d
+(5):
+- C
+• b
+- C
+- d
+IL:
+• e
+IL:
+• e
+:i=
+- c
+- d
+(16) :
+39
+(15).
+(16).
+
+40
+B C
+Ti
+(16) :
+(18) :
+La
+'L:
+(17).
+(18).
+(19).
+
+This proposition differs from (7) only in an unessential way.
+19
+TLE:
+L:
+41
+18):
+b
+- e
+- a
+_b
+Li
+(20).
+al r
+- b
+Lo
+19):
+- 0
+- c
+T:
+Ti
+(21).
+
+42
+16
+(5):
+18
+a e
+(22):
+f
+Lo
+•d
+c
+- d
+L.
+- d
+- e
+L:
+(22).
+(23)
+
+43
+(12):
+(24).
+(5):
+L°
+• C
+• d
+L°
+(25).
+TE.
+(8):
+ala
+(26).
+TE
+(1) : :
+(27).
+
+44
+We cannot (at the same time) affirm a and deny a.
+§ 17.
+TE:
+(28)
+means: "The case in which
+b is denied and
+- a is affirmed does not take
+place". The denial of
+- b means that
+Ta is affirmed and To is denied,
+that is, that a is denied and b is affirmed. This case is excluded by
+a. This
+judgment justifies the transition from modus ponens to modus tollens. For example,
+let b mean the proposition that the man M is alive, and a the proposition that M
+breathes. Then we have the judgment: "If from the circumstance that M is alive his
+breathing can be inferred, then from the circumstance that he does not breathe his
+death can be inferred".
+28
+- b
+La
+• a
+b
+(5) :
+- a
+L
+- а
+- C
+- и
+- b
+(29).
+If b and c together form a sufficient condition for a, then from the affirmation of one
+condition, c, and that of the negation of a [that of] the negation of the other condition
+can be inferred.
+29
+L
+- C
+(10) :
+"TE:
+(30).
+
+45
+$ 18.
+- a
+Tra
+(31).
+Tr a means the denial of the denial, hence the affirmation of a. Thus a cannot be
+denied and (at the same time) T a affirmed. Duplex negatio affirmat. The denial
+of the denial is affirmation.
+31
+al6
+(7) :
+i Fi
+46
+(32).
+(28) : :
+6|T6
+(33).
+If a or b takes place, then b or a takes place.
+33
+La
+(5):
+IL:
+" T:
+- C
+(34).
+If as a consequence of the occurrence of the circumstance c, when the obstacle b is
+
+46
+removed, a takes place, then from the circumstance that a does not take place while c
+occurs the occurrence of the obstacle b can be inferred.
+34
+L
+Ta
+- C
+- C
+(12) :
+Ta
+"TE:
+TE:
+• C
+(35).
+TE:
+(34) :
+T:
+(36).
+The case in which b is denied, —a is affirmed, and a is affirmed does not occur.
+We can express this as follows: "If a occurs, then one of the two, a or b, takes place".
+36
+alo
+"T:
+(37).
+If a is a necessary consequence of the occurrence of b or c, then a is a necessary
+consequence of c alone. For example, let b mean the circumstance that the first factor
+of a product P is 0, c the circumstance that the second factor of P is 0, and a the
+circumstance that the product P is 0. Then we have the judgment: "If the product
+P is 0 in case the first or the second factor is 0, then from the vanishing of the second
+factor the vanishing of the product can be inferred".
+
+47
+36
+(8):
+(38).
+(2) :
+L:
+(39).
+(35) :
+° Ta
+819.
+(40).
+(41).
+The affirmation of a denies the denial of a.
+27
+(41) :
+"IT*
+(40):
+"IT:
+(42).
+(43).
+If there is a choice only between a and a, then a takes place. For example, we have
+to distinguish two cases that between them exhaust all possibilities. In following the
+first, we arrive at the result that a takes place; the same result holds when we follow
+the second. Then the proposition a holds.
+43
+(21) :
+
+48
+3|=.
+Ti
+(44).
+(5) :
+all
+Ta
+T°
+(45).
+(33) : :
+(46).
+If a holds when c occurs as well as when c does not occur, then a holds. Another way
+of expressing it is: "If a or c occurs and if the occurrence of e has a as a necessary
+consequence, then a takes place".
+46
+(21) :
+- a
+• a
+Le
+• b
+(47).
+We can express this proposition thus: "If c, as well as b, is a sufficient condition for a
+and if b or c takes place, then the proposition a holds". This judgment is used when
+
+49
+two cases are to be distinguished in a proof. When more cases occur, we can always
+reduce them to two by taking one of the cases as the first and the totality of the others
+as the second. The latter can in turn be broken down into two cases, and this can be
+continued so long as further decomposition is possible.
+47
+TL
+al
+(23) :
+Ld
+• a
+L
+- a
+(48).
+If d is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of b or e and if b, as well as c, is a
+sufficient condition for a, then d is a sufficient condition for a. An example of an
+application is furnished by the derivation of formula (101).
+47
+(12) :
+' I°
+E:
+(49).
+(17) :
+
+50
+"T:
+- 6
+L°
+(50).
+(18) :
+To
+'I"
+- b
+• C
+(51).
+820.
+Tra)
+- (c = d)
+(52).
+The case in which the content of c is identical with the content of d and in which f(c)
+is affirmed and f(d) is denied does not take place. This proposition means that, if
+c = d, we could everywhere put d for c. In f(c), c can also occur in other than the
+argument places. Hence c may still be contained in f(d).
+52
+(8) :
+a f(d
+b f(c)
+d| (c = d)
+L fl
+- (0 = d)
+(53).
+§ 21.
+The content of c is identical with the content of c.
+54
++ (0=c)
+(53) :
+(54).
+
+T1d=0
+c=a
+51
+1(A) (A = c)
+6 (d = c)
+(0 = d)
+- f(d)
+(55).
+-(c = d)
+- j(c)
+L1(đ)
+-d = c)
+(56).
+(52) : :
+- (0 = d)
+(57).
+822.
+1Le1(a)
+(58).
+C f(a) means that f (a) takes place, whatever we may understand by a. If therefore
+E f(a) is affirmed, f(c) cannot be denied. This is what our proposition expresses.
+Here a can occur only in the argument places of f, since in the judgment this function
+also occurs outside the scope of a.
+58
+1(4) 9(4)
+g(A)
+L.L 10)
+L (a)
+- g (a)
+(12):
+9(b)
+- 1(a)
+g(a)
+° (la)
+f(0)
+- 9(b)
+(59).
+Example. Let b mean an ostrich, that is, an individual animal belonging to the
+species, let g(A) mean " A is a bird", and let f(A) mean " A can fly". Then we have
+the judgment "If this ostrich is a bird and cannot fly, then it can be inferred from
+this that some" birds cannot fly".
+17 See footnote 16.
+
+52
+We see how this judgment replaces one mode of inference, namely, Felapton or
+Fesapo, between which we do not distinguish here since no subject has been singled
+out.
+58
+- f(A)
+- g(A)
+- h(A)
+TL1b)
+-J (
+- g(c
+- k(a)
+(12):
+: 96)
+h(b)
+- h(a)
+T1(b)
+9(b)
+- 1(a)
+- 9(a)
+h (a)
+(60).
+58
+He710)
+(9):
+: 1(9 1(a))
+- a
+La fla)
+Lic)
+(61).
+58
+1(4)|T 1(4)
+• g(A)
+C | X
+L1(2)
+L (a)
+- 9(a)
+(8):
+8 9(2)
+g(a)
+— 9(x)
+(62).
+This judgment replaces the mode of inference Barbara when the minor premiss, g(x),
+has a particular content.
+
+62
+- f(x)
+g(a)
+9 (x)
+(24):
+6 m
+9(x)
+f(x)
+• g(a)
+- f(x)
+- f (a)
+• g(a)
+m
+g(7)
+62
+- f(x)
+L g(a)
+— д(х)
+(18):
+• g(a)
+a (m(g)
+- g(a)
+L 1(4)
+64
+y |х
+9(2
+(61):
+- f(x)
+- h (x)
+-J(a)
+g (a)
+14) I 1(4)
+• g(a
+53
+(63).
+(64).
+(65).
+
+54
+Here a occurs in two scopes, but this does not indicate any particular relation between
+them. In one of these scopes we could also write, say, e instead of a. This judgment
+replaces the mode of inference Barbara when the minor premiss
+- 9(a)
+- h (a)
+has a general content. The reader who has familiarized himself with the way derivations are carried out in the ideography will be in a position to derive also the judgments that answer to the other modes of inference. These should suffice as examples
+here.
+65
+- g(a)
+h (a)
+(8):
+I 1(2)
+g(a)
+Г g(a)
+- h(a)
+[ f(a)
+- g(a)
+(66).
+58
+• f (c)
+• f(a)
+(7) :
+a f(c)
+b
+- d(a)
+(67).
+(57)::
+$(A)| A
+Ef(a)
+(68).
+
+55
+III. SOME TOPICS FROM A GENERAL THEORY OF SEQUENCES
+§ 23. The derivations that follow are intended to give a general idea of the way in
+which our ideography is handled, even if they are perhaps not sufficient to demonstrate its full utility. This utility would become clear only when more involved
+propositions are considered. Through the present example, moreover, we see how
+pure thought, irrespective of any content given by the senses or even by an intuition
+a priori, can, solely from the content that results from its own constitution, bring
+forth judgments that at first sight appear to be possible only on the basis of some
+intuition. This can be compared with condensation, through which it is possible to
+transform the air that to a child's consciousness appears as nothing into a visible fluid
+that forms drops. The propositions about sequences developed in what follows far
+surpass in generality all those that can be derived from any intuition of sequences.
+If, therefore, one were to consider it more appropriate to use an intuitive idea of
+sequence as a basis, he should not forget that the propositions thus obtained, which
+might perhaps have the same wording as those given here, would still state far less
+than these, since they would hold only in the domain of precisely that intuition upon
+which they were based.
+§ 24.
+- F(a)
+- f(8,a)
+- F(8)
+F (a)
+1(8, a)
+(69).
+This proposition differs from the judgments considered up to now in that it contains
+signs that have not been defined before; it itself gives the definition. It does not say
+"The right side of the equation has the same content as the left", but "It is to have
+the same content". Hence this proposition is not a judgment, and consequently not
+a synthetic judgment either, to use the Kantian expression. I point this out because
+Kant considers all judgments of mathematics to be synthetic. If now (69) were a
+synthetic judgment, so would be the propositions derived from it. But we can do
+without the notation introduced by this proposition and hence without the proposition itself as its definition; nothing follows from the proposition that could not also
+be inferred without it. Our sole purpose in introducing such definitions is to bring
+about an extrinsic simplification by stipulating an abbreviation. They serve besides
+to emphasize a particular combination of signs in the multitude of possible ones, so
+that our faculty of representation can get a firmer grasp of it. Now, even though
+the simplification mentioned is hardly noticeable in the case of the small number
+of judgments cited here, I nevertheless included this formula for the sake of the
+example.
+Although originally (69) is not a judgment, it is immediately transformed into one;
+for, once the meaning of the new signs is specified, it must remain fixed, and therefore
+formula (69) also holds as a judgment, but as an analytic one, since it only makes
+apparent again what was put into the new signs. This dual character of the formula
+is indicated by the use of a double judgment stroke. So far as the derivations that
+follow are concerned, (69) can therefore be treated like an ordinary judgment.
+
+56
+Lower-case Greek letters, which occur here for the first time, do not represent an independent content, as do German and Latin ones. The only thing we have to observe is
+whether they are identical or different; hence we can put arbitrary lower-case Greek
+letters for a and 8, provided only that places previously occupied by identical letters
+are again occupied by identical ones and that different letters are not replaced by
+identical ones. Whether Greek letters are identical or different, however, is of significance
+only within the formula for which they were especially introduced, as they were here for
+F (a)
+J (8, a).
+Their purpose is to enable us to reconstruct unambiguously at any time from the abbreviated form
+8
+F (a)
+f (8, a)
+the jull one,
+For example,
+- F(8).
+F (8)
+f (8, a)
+means the expression
+J (a, i
+— F(8),
+whereas
+" (a)
+§ J (0, a)
+has no meaning. We see that the complete expression, no matter how involved the
+functions F and f may be, can always be retrieved with certainty, except for the
+arbitrary choice of German letters.
+can be rendered by "4 is a result of an application of the procedure f to T", by "I
+is the object of an application of the procedure f, with the result 4", by "4 bears the
+relation f to Г"
+, or by "T bears the converse relation of f to 4"; these expressions
+are to be taken as equivalent.
+9(8(a)
+'f (8, a)
+
+57
+can be translated by "the circumstance that property F is hereditary in the f-sequence
+[sich in der f-Reihe vererbt]". Perhaps the following example can make this expression acceptable. Let 1(M, N) mean the circumstance that N is a child of M, and
+I(P) the circumstance that P is a human being. Then
+2(a)
+1(
+[Ia)
+- 1(8, a)
+1(8, a)
+- 2(8)
+is the circumstance that every child of a human being is in turn a human being, or
+that the property of being human is hereditary. 18 We see, incidentally, that it can
+become difficult and even impossible to give a rendering in words if very involved
+functions take the places of F and f. Proposition (69) could be expressed in words as
+follows:
+If from the proposition that & has property F it can be inferred generally, whatever s
+may be, that every result of an application of the procedure f to i has property F, then I
+say: "Property F is hereditary in the f-sequence".
+§ 25.
+69
+F (a)
+L f(0, a)
+=|/.
+- F(8) /
+(68) :
+f(T)
+- F(a)
+f (T, a)
+- F(Г)
+F (a)
+f (8, a)
+f(x, a)
+— F(x)
+8 F(x)
+a f(8, 0)
+(70).
+(19) :
+al
+- F(a)
+• f(x, a)
+F(x)
+§ F(0)
+'f (8, a)
+- J (X, y)
+ТР(У)
+- f(x, y)
+— F(x)
+8 F(a)
+a f(8, a)
+- F(y)
+- 1(2, y)
+- J(х, а
+(71).
+(58) ::
+18 [In the German text the formulas contain two misprints: at the extreme left "g" and the
+"a" below it are interchanged, and, instead of " 1(0,a)", the second formula contains " 1(d,a) " ]
+
+58
+-!!
+: J (8, a)
+(72).
+If property I' is hereditary in the f-sequence, if x has property
+1 F, and if y is a result
+of an application of the procedure f to x, then y has property F.
+72
+8 F(a)
+f (8, a)
+(2) :
+- f(x, y)
+F(x)
+LE(y)
+- f(x, y)
+f (8, 0)
+F(x)
+F (a)
+'f (8, a)
+(73).
+72
+F (a)
+f (8, a)
+(8):
+_ †(X, Y
+F(x)
+1((a)
+'f (8, a)
+, F (a)
+-|(
+'J (8, a)
+— F(x)
+(74)
+
+59
+If x has a property F that is hereditary in the f-sequence, then every result of an
+application of the procedure f to x has property F.
+69
+, F(a)
+- F(8) |
+(52) :
+- F(a)
+f (8, a)
+F (8)
+- I(
+a f (8, a)
+- F (a)
+— F(0)
+8.
+, F (a)
+1d 5,0)
+f(Г) Г
+(75).
+at ern the proposion irat on at propere ire that her bmay be it then be infered
+is hereditary in the f-sequence.
+§ 26.
+- 5(a)
+f(x, a)
+8, 5(a)
+f (8, a)l
+(76).
+This is the definition of the combination of signs on the right, f(x, 8). I refer the
+reader to § 24 for the use of the double judgment stroke and Greek letters. It would
+not do to write merely
+ту (2, 3)
+instead of the expression above since, when a function of x and y is fully written out,
+these letters could still appear outside of the argument places; in that case we should
+not be able to tell which places were to be regarded as argument places. Hence these
+must be characterized as such. This is done here by means of the subscripts y and B.
+These must be chosen different since it is possible that the two arguments may be
+identical with each other. We use Greek letters for this, so that we have a certain
+freedom of choice and thus can choose the symbols for the argument places of the
+enclosed expression different from those [used for the argument places] of the
+enclosing expression in case
+
+60
+should enclose within itself a similarly constructed expression. Whether Greek letters
+are identical or different is of significance here only within the expression
+· (x, Ув);
+outside, the same letters could be used, and this would not indicate any connection
+with the occurrences inside.
+We translate
+7J(x» 48)
+by "y follows x in the f-sequence", a way of speaking that, to be sure, is possible
+only when the function f is determined. Accordingly, (76) can be rendered in words
+somewhat as follows:
+If from the two propositions that every result of an application of the procedure f to x
+has property F and that property F is hereditary in the f-sequence, it can be inferred,
+whatever F may be, that y has property F, then I say: "Y follows x in the f-sequence", or
+"x precedes y in the f-sequence" 19
+§ 27.
+76
+- J(y)
+8(a)
+f(x, a)
+E(a)
+• (8, a)
+В 1(%, 98)
+(68):
+a lif
+f(P)
+- Г(у)
+- Г(а)
+- J (x, a)
+8 Г (a)
+'f (8, a)
+6 · 1(0, ye)
+• F(y)
+- F (a)
+- f(x, a)
+, F(a)
+f (8, a)
+· (* 90)
+(77).
+Here F(y), F(a), and F(a) must be regarded, in accordance with § 10, as different
+functions of the argument F. (77) means:
+If y follows x in the f-sequence, if property F is hereditary in the f-sequence, and if
+every result of an application of the procedure f to x has property F, then y has property F.
+19 To make clearer the generality of the concept, given hereby, of succession in a sequence, l
+remind the reader of a number of possibilities. Not only juxtaposition, such as pearls on a string
+exhibit, is subsumed here, but also branching like that of a family tree, merging of several branches,
+and ringlike self-linking.
+
+77
+— F(y)
+- f(x, a)
+F (a)
+1(8,0)
+7 (x, 9e)
+(17):
+C
+- F (a)
+- f(x, a)
+8, El()
+f(8, a)
+(2):
+(5):
+F(У)
+Lig, 10)
+- E(a)
+J (x, a)
+, " (У)
+i(g18,0)
+F(Y)
+7 (x, 96)
+J (0,0)
+F(a)
+f(x, a)
+F (a)
+f (8, 0)
+_f(x,'
+,F (a)
+f (8, 0)
+_ F(y)
+· 1(*„90)
+б, f (a)
+f (8, a)
+~ F(a)
+- J (X, a)
+8
+, F (a)
+f(8, a)
+— 1(У
+- (P(a)
+J (8, a)
+- F(x)
+b
+c| F(x)
+(74) : :
+J (8, 0)
+— F(x)
+61
+(78).
+(79).
+(80).
+
+62
+y/a
+- F (У)
+, F (a)
+f (8, a)
+- F(x)
+(81).
+Since in (74) y occurs only in
+the concavity can, according to § I1, immediately precede this expression, provided
+y is replaced by the German letter a. We can translate (81) thus:
+If x has a property F that is hereditary in the f-sequence, and if y follows x in the
+f-sequence, then y has property F.20
+For example, let F be the property of being a heap of beans; let f be the procedure
+of removing one bean from a heap of beans; so that f(a, b) means the circumstance
+that b contains all beans of the heap a except one and does not contain anything else.
+Then by means of our proposition we would arrive at the result that a single bean,
+or even none at all, is a heap of beans if the property of being a heap of beans is
+hereditary in the f-sequence. This is not the case in general, however, since there are
+certain z for which F(z) cannot become a judgment on account of the indeterminate.
+ness of the notion "heap"
+81
+_ F(y)
+8
+F (a)
+=
+f (8, a)
+- F(x)
+(18) :
+F(y)
+· (x,, y0))
+F (a)
+f (8, a)
+2 1(0)
+— F (У)
+- a
+8
+F (a)
+f(8, a)
+(82).
+20 Bernoulli's induction rests upon this. [Jakob Bernoulli is considered one of the originator
+of mathematical induction, which he used from 1686 on (see Bernoulli 1686).1
+
+82
+— 9(У)
+4k(3)
+- f(Xy, Ув)
+— h(х)
+9(0
+-hla
+— g(х)
+4h(x)
+(36) : :
+81242)
+81
+(8):
+-· (*, 9a)
+- h(x)
+—gla
+" [ra, a)
+- F(y)
+8
+, F (0)
+'f (8, a)
+- F(x)
+— F(y)
+a — F(y)
+- (*, y)
+'f(8, a)
+d F(x)
+77
+- F(x)
+F (a)
+J (8, a)
+- F(У)
+• F(a)
+f (x, a)
+8
+F (a)
+f (8, 0)
+(12):
+63
+(83).
+(84).
+
+64
+a | F(y)
+6
+- F(y)
+F (a)
+1(
+f (8, a)
+- F(a)
+- J(x, a)
+- E(a)
+•f(x, a)
+f (8, a)
+2%88, 90)
+(19):
+F (y)
+8.
+F (a)
+f (8, 0)
+- F (a)
+• J (x, a)
+(85).
+7 * 96)
+• F (z)
+J (Y, 2)
+, F(x)
+J (8, 0)
+- F(z)
+[1(3, 2)
+f (8, a)
+F(a)
+f (x, a)
+· Na, ye)
+F (z)
+J (Y, 2)
+8
+F (a)
+f (8, a)
+F(y)
+F (a)
+f (8, a)
+(86).
+(73)::
+У Z
+Х У
+LI (z)
+• f(Y, 2)
+8
+F (a)
+f (8, a)
+LE (a)
+• f(x, a)
+(87).
+In words, the derivation of this proposition will be somewhat as follows. Assume that
+(a) y follows x in the f-sequence,
+(B) Every result of an application of the procedure f to x has property F, and
+(y) Property F is hereditary in the f-sequence.
+
+65
+From these assumptions it follows according to (85) that
+(8) y has property f.
+Now,
+(e) Let z be a result of an application of the procedure f to y.
+Then by (72) it follows from (y), (8), and (e) that z has property f. Therefore,
+If z is a result of an application of the procedure f to an object y that follows x in the
+f-sequence and if every result of an application of the procedure f to x has a property F
+that is hereditary in the f-sequence, then » has this property F. 21
+87
+- J (Y, z)
+1 fis, a)
+• F(a)
+f(x, a)
+B (X, 98)
+(15) :
+F(z)
+J (Y, 2)
+8
+F (a)
+f (8, a)
+F(z)
+8
+F (a)
+f (8, 0)
+F (a)
+f (x, a)
+• F(a)
+J (x, a)
+- f(Y, 2)
+(88).
+§ 28.
+76
+- §(a)
+- j (x, a)
+8, 8(a)
+f(8, a))
+= 1+40)
+(52) :
+21 [At the place that corresponds to the last occurrence of "f" in this sentence the German text
+mistakenly has "F".]
+
+66
+f(Г) Г
+J(Y)
+• F(a)
+f (x, a)
+, 5(a)
+a ·1(x,УD)
+f (8, a)
+В 1(2, 40))
+5(y)
+- 8(a)
+f(x, a)
+, F(a)
+'J (ò, a)
+(89).
+(5) :
+· 1(216)
+8(y)
+- E(a)
+f (x, a)
+8, 8(0)
+f (8, a)
+63
+F(Y)
+- 55(a)
+f(x, a)
+, 8(0)
+(
+f(8, a)
+- C
+5(3) 22
+• F(a)
+f(x, a)
+8(0)
+f (8, 06)
+f(x, y)
+(90).
+У
+9 (Г)
+f (х, Г)
+8, J(a)
+m
+f (8, a)
+(90):
+с | f (х, у)
+f(x, y)
+(91).
+Let us give here the derivation of proposition (91) in words. From the proposition
+(a), "Every result of an application of the procedure f to x has property &", it can
+be inferred, whatever & may be, that every result of an application of the procedure
+f to x has property 5. Hence it can also be inferred from proposition (a) and the
+proposition that property & is hereditary in the f-sequence, whatever & may be, that
+every result of an application of the procedure f to x has property 5.
+Therefore, according to (90) the following proposition holds :
+Every result of an application of a procedure f to an object x follows that x in the
+j-sequence.
+22 Concerning the concavity with & see § 11. [In fact, Frege has already used the concavity
+with § several times, the first occurrence being in (76).]
+
+91
+- f (x, y)
+(53) :
+f(A)|
+L1(1, 30)
+- f (X, Y)
+[B 1(2m ga)
+-f(X, Y)
+(x = z)
+60
+[1 (y)
+,T(a)
+g(Г)
+1 d'1(8, a)
+h(Г)
+T(a)
+- f (x, a)
+— J(У)
+- J(a)
+- J (x, a)
+8
+F(a)
+f (8, a)
+- {(У)
+, 8 (a)
+f(8, a)
+- J(a)
+f(x, a)
+(90) :
+8(1)
+E(a)
+1' 1(5,4)
+- F(a)
+f (x, a)
+93
+y/=
+- J(У)
+-1,(340)
+f (8, a)
+[s(a)
+- f(x, a)
+B1( „20)
+8(z)
+2(8la)
+J(8, a)
+- J(a)
+f(x, a)
+(7) :
+67
+(92).
+(93).
+
+68
+8(z)
+8, 5(0)
+• F(a)
+f (x, a)
+F ((x" 98)
+d f(Y, =)
+f (8, a)
+· No, 70)
+· ((x, ye)
+5(z)
+J (8, 0)
+- 5(9)
+f(x, a)
+7 , 4a)
+f (Y, 2)
+(94).
+(88):
+· 1(0 ye)
+- f(Y, 2)
+(95).
+(8):
+· (* 70))
+d J (Y, 2)
+I (Y, 2)
+7 *, Уo)
+(96).
+Every result of an application of the procedure f to an object that follows x in the f-
+sequence follows x in the f-sequence.
+96
+f (8, a)
+(75) :
+f (8, a)
+(97).
+
+The property of following x in the f-sequence is hereditary in the f-sequence.
+97
+69
+of (8, 0)
+(84) :
+У =
+(98).
+If y follows x in the f-sequence and if z follows y in the f-sequence, then z follows x in
+the j-sequence.
+§ 29.
+(==x)
+(99).
+Here I refer the reader to what was said about the introduction of new signs in
+connection with formulas (69) and (76). Let
+be translated by "z belongs to the f-sequence beginning with x" or by "x belongs to
+the f-sequence ending with z". Then in words (99) reads:
+If z is identical with x or follows x in the f-sequence, then I say: "« belongs to the
+f-sequence beginning with x" or "x belongs to the f-sequence ending with z".
+2 = X
+99.
+(57):
+f(Г)| Г
+- (2=x)
+(= =×)
+· (, 2e)
+(100).
+(48) :
+
+70
+b
+1(2=0)
+- J (z.0,
+· (x„z0)
+f (2, 0)
+- f(2,0)
+- (2=x)
+(101).
+(96, 92) : :
+У = Х
+х
+f (2,00)
+· 1(2, 20)
+(102).
+Let us here give the derivation of (102) in words.
+If z is the same as x, then by (92) every result of an application of the procedure
+f to z follows x in the f-sequence. If z follows x in the f-sequence, then by (96) every
+result of an application of f to « follows x in the f-sequence.
+From these two propositions it follows, according to (100), that:
+If = belongs to the f-sequence beginning with a, then every result of an application of
+the procedure f to z follows x in the f-sequence.
+100
+- (z = x)
+· (,, 2e)
+(19) :
+- (X = Z)
+Т 1(2, 20)
+a (x = z)
+23 Concerning the last inference see § 6.
+- |x = 2
+- (2 = 2
+(103).
+
+71
+(55) :
+• (× = 2)
+471030)
+(104).
+§ 30.
+99
+(52) :
+1(1) 1
+Z = X
+• (2 = ×)
+(105).
+(37):
+(2 = 0)
+(106).
+Whatever follows x in the f-sequence belongs to the f-sequence beginning with x.
+106
+(7) :
+"l·8l2, val
+Bf 7, 08)
+J (Y, V)
+a 7(13,90)
+฿ (2, 0B)
+71(2, 08)
+- J (y, 0)
+· ( ya)
+- 1(2, 00)
+712, 30)
+(107).
+(102) : :
+
+72
+х /=
+= Y
+71(208)
+(108).
+Let us here give the derivation of (108) in words.
+If y belongs to the f-sequence beginning with », then by (102) every result of an
+application of the procedure f to y follows » in the f-sequence. Then by (106) every
+result of an application of the procedure f to y belongs to the f-sequence beginning
+with z. Therefore,
+If y belongs to the f-sequence beginning with z, then every result of an application of the
+procedure f to y belongs to the f-sequence beginning with z.
+108
+- f(D, a)
+- (x, 88)
+(75) :
+f (8, a)
+(109).
+The property of belonging to the f-sequence beginning with x is hereditary in the
+j-sequence.
+109
+8
+1(B
+f (8, a)
+(78) :
+F(T) 7 7, To))
+У
+L"(y, a)
+(110).
+108
+- f(Y, 0)
+5(2, 98)
+(25) :
+
+73
+a 71(2, 0)
+f(Y, 0)
+·112, 46)
+·12, 00)
+· 0, 20)
+- f(Y, 0)
+-· 5(390)
+(111).
+In words the derivation of (I11) is as follows :
+If y belongs to the f-sequence beginning with z, then by (108) every result of an
+application of the procedure f to y belongs to the f-sequence beginning with z. Hence
+every result of an application of the procedure f to y belongs to the f-sequence
+beginning with z or precedes z in the f-sequence. Therefore,
+If y belongs to the f-sequence beginning with », then every result of an application of
+the procedure f to y belongs to the f-sequence beginning with z or precedes z in the f-sequence.
+105
+(2 = 0)
+(11) :
+(= = x)
+(z=x)
+(112).
+(7) :
+(= = ×)
+· 1220)
+-*/„z0)
++ 7$320)
+- 5(2, 08)
+- (z = x)
+- 61(2, 0)
+(113).
+(104) ::
+
+74
+х 2
+2 х
+- ½f(X 78)
+·12,40)
+(114).
+In words the derivation of this formula is as follows:
+Assume that x belongs to the f-sequence beginning with z. Then by (104) z is the
+same as x or x follows z in the f-sequence. If z is the same as x, then by (112) z belongs
+to the f-sequence beginning with x. From the last two propositions it follows that z
+belongs to the f-sequence beginning with x or x follows z in the f-sequence. Therefore,
+If x belongs to the f-sequence beginning with z, then z belongs to the f-sequence beginning
+with x or x follows » in the f-sequence.
+§ 31.
+- f(0, e)
+72t
+= 1(8, a)
+(115).
+I translate
+8
+I f(8, e)
+by "the circumstance that the procedure f is single-valued". Then (115) can be
+rendered thus:
+If from the circumstance that e is a result of an application of the procedure f to 8,
+whatever i may be, it can be inferred that every result of an application of the procedure f
+to s is the same as e, then I say: "The procedure f is single-valued".
+115
+(68):
+- (а = Г)
+f (0, a)
+f (8, Г)
+(0=x)
+- I (D, a)
+S (D, x)
+L (8, e)
+(116).
+24 See § 24.
+
+- (a = x)
+• f(8, a)
+f (D, x)
+3 (l8, e)
+- (a = x)
+- f(Y, a)
+J(Y, x)
+(a = x)
+J (Y, a)
+- J (У, х)
+-[1(8, e)
+'(. a)
+- f (y, a)
+- f (У, х)
+- (а = x)
+J(D, a)
+- f(0, x)
+(58) ::
+f(T)
+(19) :
+[ (a = x)
+j(Г, a)
+f (T, x)
+с У
+— J (У, х)
+( 8, e)
+- J (Y, a)
+f (Y, X)
+a (r(o, e)
+- (a = x)
+- f (Y, a)
+[ 1(5 a)
+• J (Y, a)
+— f(У, х)
+(1(6, e)
+L 11 2)
+•J(Y, a
+(58) ::
+L(=x)
+- f(y, Г)
+— (а = X)
+- J(У, х)
+- ( (8, e)
+(20) :
+75
+(117).
+(118).
+(119).
+(120).
+
+76
+6 | (a = x)
+J (y, a)
+J(Y, x)
+e ((8, e)
+• · s(8, ap)
+((1(8,0)
+Lớl(3, ap)
+— (a = X
+(112) ::
+zla
+EJ (Xy, OB
+- J(У, х)
+( s(8, e)
+122
+ala
+-SJ(Xy AB
+— f(y, x)
+1 ((8, e)
+(19) :
+f (Y,a)
+J(У, х)
+(1(8, e)
+7 (x„ me))
+hT
+-* (xm.)
+- Bf(9» ma)
+— J(У,х)
+- [/(8, e)
+-· (*„mo)
+L·1(9" mo)
+— J(У, а)
+(110)::
+(121).
+(122).
+(123).
+
+-· (x, mo)
+77
+- f(У, х)
+- 11(8, 8)
+(124).
+Let us give the derivation of formulas (122) and (124) in words.
+Assume that x is a result of an application of the single-valued procedure f to y.
+Then by (120) every result of an application of the procedure f to y is the same as x.
+Hence by (112) every result of an application of the procedure f to y belongs to the
+f-sequence beginning with x. Therefore,
+If x is a result of an application of the single-valued procedure f to y, then every result
+of an application of the procedure f to y belongs to the f-sequence beginning with x.
+(Formula (122).)
+Assume that m follows y in the f-sequence. Then (110) yields: If every result of an
+application of the procedure f to y belongs to the f-sequence beginning with x, then
+m belongs to the f-sequence beginning with x. This, combined with (122), shows that,
+if x is a result of an application of the single-valued procedure f to y, then m belongs
+to the f-sequence beginning with x. Therefore,
+If x is a result of an application of the single-valued procedure f to y and if m follows
+y in the f-sequence, then m belongs to the f-sequence beginning with x. (Formula (124).)
+124
+—f(У, х)
+8
+- 11(8, 6)
+(20) :
+В (У, mo)
+J(Y,x)
+31(8, e)
+· 1(am)
+J (Y, x)
+1s(8,e)
+· 1(amo)
+(125).
+
+78
+(114)::
+**
+— J(У, х)
+8
+- [1(8, 6)
+(126).
+The derivation of this formula follows here in words.
+Assume that x is a result of an application of the single-valued procedure f to y.
+Assume that m follows y in the f-sequence. Then by (124) m belongs to the f-sequence
+beginning with x. Consequently, by (114) x belongs to the f-sequence beginning with
+m or m follows x in the f-sequence. This can also be expressed as follows: x belongs to
+the f-sequence beginning with m or precedes m in the f-sequence. Therefore,
+If m follows y in the f-sequence and if the procedure fis single-valued, then every result
+of an application of the procedure f to y belongs to the f-sequence beginning with m or
+precedes m in the f-sequence.
+126
+- (* ma)
+— J(Y, X)
+- If (8, e)
+(12) :
+· (* me)
+— J(У, х)
+J (У, х)
+a 3118,0)
+(51) :
+2(8, 0)
+(127).
+
+79
+· (m, a)
+f (Y, x)
+J (У, х)
+· m., ye)
+[(0..)
+1f((m., ye)
+{1(8,e)
+J (У, х)
+·sm, ye)
+(128).
+(111) ::
+(m, 70))
+- f(Y, x)
+4 7 (4, ma)
+(129).
+In words (129) reads:
+If the procedure f is single-valued and y belongs to the f-sequence beginning with m or
+precedes m in the f-sequence, then every result of an application of the procedure f to y
+belongs to the f-sequence beginning with m or precedes m in the f-sequence.
+129
+х 1а
+-71(„me)
+- f(s, a)
+T75(0,me)
+-(8, 0)
+
+80
+· /(amo)
+f (8, a)
+J (8, 0)
+21(8, e)
+71(0 mo)
+(((8,e)
+f (8, a)
+J (ô, a)
+-J (8, a)
+· (m, ba)
+(130).
+(75) ::
+F(Г)
+L;M(,mn)
+7(a, ma)
+1(8, 0)
+If (8, e)
+(131).
+In words (131) reads :
+If the procedure f is single-valued, then the property of belonging to the f-sequence
+beginning with m or of preceding m in the f-sequence is hereditary in the f-sequence.
+131
+[((8,e)
+
+81
+8
+- (m, ye)
+f (8, a)
+§ 1(8, e)
+· (m., ye)
+→ 71(4,m.)
+· (ye)
+· („ 48)
+· (x, mo)
+б
+11(8, 6)
+· (,, yo)
+8
+- * (a,m.)
+f(8, a)
+(132).
+(83) :
+h(Г)
+- 1(9, mo)
+- 71(25, 90)
+· (x, ma)
+3,15,0)
+(133).
+In words this proposition reads:
+If the procedure f is single-valued and if m and y follow x in the f-sequence, then y
+belongs to the f-sequence beginning with m or precedes m in the f-sequence.
+
+82
+Below I give a table that shows where use has been made of one formula in the
+derivation of another. The table can be used to look up the ways in which a formula
+has been employed. From it we can also see how frequently a formula has been used.
+The right column always contains the number of the formula in whose derivation
+the one listed in the left column was used.
+1
+7
+7
+7
+8
+8
+8
+8
+8
+•N N
+2
+4
+63
+64
+65
+66
+67
+68
+68
+68
+69
+70
+71
+7
+74
+7.
+76
+76
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+32
+1
+12
+12
+82
+83
+
+The principles of arithmetic,
+presented by a new method
+GIUSEPPE PEANO
+(1889)
+Written in Latin, this small book was
+principle of mathematical induction.
+Peano's first attempt at an axiomatiza-
+It is formulated in terms of classes, and
+tion of mathematies in a symbolic lanit contains a class variable, "k" (it even
+guage. Peano had already (1888) used
+involves the class of all classes, K).
+the logic of Boole and Schröder in mathe-
+Peano acknowledges (18916, p. 93) that
+matical investigations and introduced
+his axioms come from Dedekind (1888,
+into it a number of innovations that
+art. 71, definition of a simply infinite
+marked a definite advance upon the work
+system; see also below, pp. 100-101). As
+of his predecessors: for instance, the use
+for Frege, Peano learned of his work
+of different signs for logical and matheimmediately after the publication of
+matical operations, and a distinction
+Arithmetices principia."
+between categorical and conditional pro-
+From the outset, Peano uses the notapositions that was to lead him to quantion x + 1 for the successor function. He
+tification theory (these were innovations
+then introduces addition (§1, 18) and
+relatively to Boole and Schröder-not
+multiplication (§4, 1 and 2) as "defito Frege, whose work Peano did not
+nitions". These definitions are recursive
+know at that time). In the present work,
+definitions, although Peano does not
+after having introduced logical notions
+have at his disposal in his system anyand formulas, Peano undertakes to re- thing like Dedekind's powerful Theorem
+write arithmetic in symbolic notation.
+126 (1888), which justifies such defini-
+But he aspires to more than that: the
+tions. Peano does not explicitly claim
+book deals also with fractions, real numthat these definitions are eliminable, but,
+bers, even the notion of limit and defi- just as he does for ordinary definitions
+nitions in point-set theory.
+(that of subtraction, for example, he
+The initial arithmetic notions are
+puts them under the heading "Defini-
+"number", "one", "successor"
+, and "is
+tion"
+', although they do not satisfy his
+equal to",
+, and nine axioms are stated
+own statement on that score (p. 93),
+concerning these notions. Today we
+namely, that the right side of a definiwould consider that Axioms 2, 3, 4, and
+tional
+equation is "an aggregate of
+5, which deal with identity, belong to the
+underlying logic. This leaves the five
+a In the list of references appended to Arithaxioms that have become universally
+metices principia (below, p. 86, footnote 1)
+Frege's name does not occur; but Peano
+known as "the Peano axioms"
+. The last
+mentions and even quotes Frege in his very
+one, Axiom 9, is the translation of the next paper on logic (1891).
+
+84
+signs having a known meaning". He proof is actually a list of formulas that
+proves for addition a theorem (§ 1, 19)
+are such that, from the point of view of
+stating that "for every a and b, a, b & N
+the working mathematician, each one is
+D. a + bEN"
+, and a similar theorem
+very close to the next. But, however
+(§4, 3) for multiplication; but these
+close two successive formulas may be, the
+theorems are far from having the same
+logician cannot pass from one to the next
+effect as Dedekind's Theorem 126.
+because of the absence of rules of in-
+The ease with which we read Peano's
+ference. The proof does not get off the
+booklet today shows how much of his
+notation has found its way, either directly
+ground.
+In the proof just mentioned (and it is
+or in a somewhat modified form, into
+typical of Peano's proofs), the passage
+contemporary logic. & is there, with the
+from formulas (1) and (2) to formula (3)
+distinction between
+elementhood and
+cannot be carried out by a formal prosubclasshood (except for classes of one
+cedure; it requires some intuitive logical
+element—see formula 56 in Part IV, argument, which the reader has to supply.
+p. 90 below; for such classes the dis-
+The proof brings out the whole difference
+tinction will appear the following year
+between an axiomatization, even written
+(1890, p. 192)). The inverted C, D, will
+in symbols and however careful it may be,
+become 3.
+and a formalization. The absence of a
+The logical part of the work presents
+rule of detachment in Peano's booklet
+formulas of the propositional calculus, of
+(and other works) is apparently connecthe calculus of classes, and
+a few of
+ted with his inadequate interpretation of
+quantification theory. Peano's notation
+the conditional. He reads "aD" as
+is quite superior to that of Boole and
+"from a one deduces 6" ("ab a deducitur
+Schröder, and it marks an important
+"), which remains vague; truth values
+transition toward modern logic. Some
+are not used at all in the work below,
+distinction is made between the calculus
+and only marginally in Peano's subseof propositions and that of classes (a, for
+quent writings.
+example, already introduces an asym-
+In a series of papers (1891, 189la,
+metry between propositions and classes) ;
+189Ib; see also 1890) that form a sequel
+we now have two different calculi, not
+to Arithmetices principia and a transition
+just two interpretations of the same caltoward the first volume of the Formulaire
+culus. The notation for the universal
+(1895), Peano undertakes to prove the
+quantifier is new and convenient. There
+logical formulas that he simply listed in
+is, however, a grave defect. The formulas
+the logical part of the work below. Just
+are simply listed, not derived; and they
+like his arithmetic proofs, his logical
+could not be derived, because no rules of
+proofs suffer from the absence of rules
+inference are given. Peano introduces a
+of inference. In the proof of proposition
+notation for substitution (V 4, p. 91)
+9 (189la, p. 27), for example, he strings
+but does not state any rule. What is far
+conditionals one after another; when
+more important, he does not have any
+ultimately he does detach, it is by a
+rule that would play the role of the rule
+move totally unjustified in his system.
+of detachment. The result is that, for all
+For a pertinent critique of that aspect of
+his meticulousness in
+the writing of
+Peano's work see Frege 1896 and 1896a.
+formulas, he has no logic that he can
+Some of Peano's explanations tend to
+use. The point is vividly illustrated by the
+suggest that his logical laws should perfirst proof he gives, that of
+haps be taken as rules of inference, not
+11.
+2 = N
+as formulas in a logical language; this,
+however, would not yield a coherent
+(below, p. 94). What is presented as a interpretation of his system.
+
+85
+In the work below and in the various tion, § 3 Maxima and minima, § 4 Multieditions of the Formulaire that were to
+plication, §5 Powers, §6 Division, §7
+follow, Peano intends to cover much more
+Various theorems, § 8 Ratios of numbers,
+ground than Frege does in his Begriffs-
+§9 Systems of
+rationals, irrationals,
+schrift and his subsequent works, but he
+§10 Systems of quantities. Below we
+does not till that ground to any depth
+print the preface and § 1 in extenso; from
+comparable to what Frege does in his
+§§ 2, 4, 5, and 6 we give the "explanaself-alloted field. Peano's writings, of
+tions" and "definitions"
+, omitting the
+minor significance for
+logic proper,
+theorems, and we leave out the other
+showed how mathematical theories can
+sections entirely. The omitted parts
+be expressed in one symbolic language.
+consist almost exclusively of formulas
+These writings rapidly gained a wide
+and are readily available in Peano's colinfluence and greatly contributed to the lected works (1958).
+diffusion of the new ideas.
+The
+• translation
+is by the editor,
+Arithmetices principia consists of a and it is printed here with the kind
+long explanatory preface and ten sections: permission of the Unione matematica
+§ 1 Number and addition, §2 Subtrac- italiana.
+PREFACE
+Questions that pertain to the foundations of mathematics, although treated by
+many in recent times, still lack a satisfactory solution. The difficulty has its main
+source in the ambiguity of language.
+That is why it is of the utmost importance to examine attentively the very words we
+use. My goal has been to undertake this examination, and in this paper I am presenting
+the results of my study, as well as some applications to arithmetic.
+I have denoted by signs all ideas that occur in the principles of arithmetic, so that
+every proposition is stated only by means of these signs.
+The signs belong either to logic or to arithmetic proper. The signs of logic that occur
+here are ten in number, although not all are necessary. In the first part of the present
+paper [Logical notations] the use of these signs, as well as some of their properties,
+is explained in ordinary language. It was not my intention to present their theory
+more fully there. The signs of arithmetic are explained wherever they occur.
+With these notations, every proposition assumes the form and the precision that
+equations have in algebra; from the propositions thus written other propositions are
+deduced, and in fact by procedures that are similar to those used in solving equations.
+This is the main point of the whole paper.
+Thus, having introduced the signs with which I can write the propositions of arithmetic, I have, in dealing with these propositions, used a method that, because it will
+have to be followed in other studies too, I shall present briefly here.
+Among the signs of arithmetic, those that can be expressed by other signs of arithmetic together with the signs of logic represent the ideas that we can define. Thus, I
+have defined all signs except the four that are contained in the explanations of §1.
+If, as I think, these cannot be reduced any further, it is not possible to define the
+ideas expressed by them through ideas assumed to be known previously.
+Propositions that are deduced from others by the operations of logic are theorems;
+propositions that are not thus deduced I have called axioms. There are nine of these
+
+86
+axioms (§ 1), and they express the fundamental properties of the signs that lack
+definition.
+In §§ 1-6 I have proved the ordinary properties of numbers. For the sake of brevity
+I have omitted proofs that are similar to other proofs given before. In order to express
+proofs with the signs of logic, the ordinary form of these proofs has to be changed;
+this transformation is sometimes rather difficult, but it is by means of it that the nature
+of the proof reveals itself most clearly.
+In subsequent sections I deal with various subjects, so that the power of the method
+will be more apparent.
+§ 7 contains a few theorems that pertain to number theory. In §§ 8-9 the definitions
+of rational and irrational numbers are found.
+Finally, in § 10 I present a few theorems, which, I think, are new, pertaining to the
+theory of those objects that Cantor has called Punktmengen (ensembles de points).
+In the present paper I have made use of the studies of other writers. The logical
+symbols and propositions contained in parts II, III, and IV, except for a few, are to
+be traced to the works of many writers, especially Boole.!
+I introduced the sign e, which should not be confused with the sign D; I also introduced applications of inversion in logic, as well as a few other conventions, in order to
+be able to express any proposition whatsoever.
+For proofs in arithmetic, I used Grassmann 1861.
+The recent work of Dedekind (1888) was also most useful to me; in it, questions
+pertaining to the foundations of numbers are acutely examined
+This little book of mine is intended to give an example of the new method. With
+these notations we can state and prove innumerable other propositions, whether they
+pertain to rational or to irrational numbers. But to deal with other theories new signs
+denoting new objects must be introduced. However, I think that the propositions of
+any science can be expressed by these signs of logic alone, provided we add signs
+representing the objects of that science.
+LOGICAL NOTATIONS
+I. Punctuation
+The letters a, b, .., x, у,.. X, У',... denote indeterminate objects. We denote
+well-determined objects by signs or by the letters P, K, N,....
+We shall generally write signs on a single line. To show the order in which they
+should be taken, we use parentheses, as in algebra, or dots, .,:,..,::, and so on.
+To understand a formula divided by dots we first take together the signs that are
+not separated by any dot, next those separated by one dot, then those separated by
+two dots, and so on.
+for example, let a, b,c,... be any signs. Then ab.cd means (ab)(cd); and
+ab.cd:ef.gh: kmeans (\(ab)(cd))\(ef)(gh)))K.
+Punctuation signs may be omitted if formulas differing in punctuation have the
+1 See Boole 1847, 1848, 1854, and Schröder 1877. Schröder had already dealt with some questions
+relevant to logic in an earlier work (1873). I presented the theories of Boole and Schröder very
+briefly in a book of mine (1888). See also Peirce 1880, 1885, Jevons 1883, MacColl 1877, 1878,
+1878a, and 1880.
+
+87
+same meaning or if only one formula, which is just the one we want to write, has
+meaning.
+To avoid the danger of ambiguity we never use . or : as signs for arithmetic operations.
+The only kind of parentheses is (); if parentheses and dots occur in the same formula, what is contained within parentheses is taken together first.
+II. Propositions
+The sign P means proposition.
+The sign n is read and. Let a and b be propositions; then a n b is the simultaneous
+affirmation of the propositions a and b. For the sake of brevity, we ordinarily write ab
+instead of anb.
+The sign - is read not. Let a be a P; then -a is the negation of the proposition a.
+The sign u is read or [vell. Let a and b be propositions; then a ub is the same as
+-:-а. -в.
+[The sign V means the true, or identity; but we never use this sign.]
+The sign 1 means the false, or the absurd.
+[The sign C means is a consequence of; thus b Ca is read b is a consequence of the
+proposition a. But we never use this sign.]
+The sign D means one deduces [deducitur];? thus a 06 means the same as b Ca.
+If propositions a and b contain the indeterminate objects x, y, ..., that is, are conditions between these objects, then a Dx, y.... b means: whatever x, y, ... may be, from
+the proposition a one deduces b. If there is no danger of any ambiguity, we write
+only D instead of Dx.y....
+The sign = means is equal to [est aequalis]. Let a and b be propositions; then
+a = b means the same as a D6.bDa; the proposition a =x.y.... b means the same as
+а Дх. у.... в. БДх.у.... а.
+III. Propositions of logic
+Let a, b, c,... be propositions. Then we have:
+1.
+•i l
+3.
+4.
+5.
+6.
+7.
+а Да.
+аДЬ.БДС:Д.аДс.
+а = b =: аДЬ.ЬДа.
+a = a.
+a =b.=.b = a.
+а = в.БД с:Д.аД с.
+аДв.в = С:Д. аД С.
+a=6.6 = C:D.a =c.
+9.
+а = в.Д. адь.
+2 [Peano reads a D 6 "ab a deducitur b". Translated word for word, this either would be awkward
+déduit" for "deducitur" when writing in French (for instance, 1890, p. 184), and this led to the
+translation adopted here.]
+
+88
+10.
+Il.
+12.
+13.
+14.
+15.
+16.
+17.
+18.
+19.
+20.
+21.
+22.
+23.
+24.
+25.
+26.
+27.
+28.
+29.
+30.
+31.
+32.
+33.
+34.
+35.
+36.
+37.
+38.
+39.
+40.
+41.
+а = в .Д. БД а.
+abD a.
+ab = ba.
+a(bc) = (ab)c = abc.
+aa = a.
+a = b.D.ac = bc.
+аДЬ Д. асД Бс.
+аДв.адс:=. аД bc.
+a=b.c=diD.ac=bd.
+--a) = a.
+a =b.=. -a = -b.
+аДв.=. -Д-а.
+aub.=..-:-a.-b.
+-(ab) = (-a)U (-b).
+-(aUb) = (-a)(-b).
+aD.aub.
+aub=bua.
+au(buc) = (aub)uc=aubuc.
+a va = a.
+albuc) = abuac.
+a=b.D.auc=bUc.
+адbД.auсдbuc.
+aDb.cDd:D:auc.D.bud.
+bДa.сДа:=.bucDa.
+a-a = A.
+a1 = A.
+aud = a.
+аД A.=. а = A.
+аД.=. а-b = 1.
+АДа.
+aub=1.=:a = 1.6 = 1.
+42.
+aD.D:=: abDc.
+43.
+аД.b = с :=. ab = ас.
+Let a be a relation sign (for example, =, D), so that a a b is a proposition. Then,
+instead of -.a a b, we write a -a b; that is,
+a-=b=:-.a = b.
+а - Дв.=: - аДв.
+Thus the sign -= means is not equal to. If proposition a contains the indeterminate
+
+89
+x, then a -= x A means: there are x that satisfy condition a. The sign -D means one
+does not deduce.
+Similarly, it a and B are relation signs, instead of a a b.a Bb and a a b .u. aßb, we
+can write a aß. b and a a Uß. b, respectively. Thus, if a and b are propositions, the
+formula a.D-=. b says: from a one deduces b, but not conversely.
+a D-=. b :=: аД.Ъ-Да.
+We have the formulas:
+аДв.Д с.а-Дс:= 1.
+a=b.b= c.a -=c:= A.
+aDb.D-=CD.aD-=с.
+@D==b.bDcD.aD-=c.
+But we shall rarely use these devices.
+IV. Classes
+The sign K means class, or aggregate of objects.
+The sign e means is. Thus a e b is read a is a b; a e K means a is a class; a e P means
+a is a proposition.
+Instead of - (a = b) we write a -= b; the sign - means is not; that is,
+44.
+а -єв.=: -.а єв.
+The sign a, b, c em means: a, b, and c are m; that is,
+45. а, b, сєт.=: а єт.в ет. сет.
+Let a be a class; then —a means the class composed of the individuals that are not a.
+46. а єК .Д: хє-а =. х-є а.
+Let a and b be classes; a nb, or ab, is the class composed of the individuals that are
+at the same time a and b; a ub is the class composed of the individuals that are a or b.
+47.
+а, b & К.Д.. хе. а :=: хе а.х = b.
+48.
+a,bek.D:xE.aub:=:x=a.U.x=b.
+The sign A denotes the class that contains no individuals. Thus,
+49. aEK.D.. a = A:=:xEd.=x A.
+[We shall not use the sign V, which denotes the class composed of all individuals
+under consideration.]
+The sign D means is contained in. Thus a D 6 means class a is contained in class b.
+50. а, 6 = К.Д.. аДь:=: х є а Дж. х єв.
+[The formula 6 C a could mean class b contains class a; but we shall not use the sign
+C.]
+The signs A and D here have a meaning that differs somewhat from the meaning
+given above; but no ambiguity will arise. If we are dealing with propositions, these
+signs are read the absurd and one deduces; but, if we are dealing with classes, they are
+read nothing and is contained in.
+
+90
+If a and b are classes, the formula a = 6 means a D6.6D a. Thus,
+51.
+а, 6 & К .Д.. а = 6 :=: х єа.=х•х єв.
+Propositions 1-41 still hold if a, b, ... denote classes; in addition, we have:
+52. а єв.Д.6 = К
+53.
+a = b .D. b -= A.
+54. а єв. = С :Д. а є с.
+55.
+Let s be a class and k a class contained in s; then we say that k is an individual of
+class s if k consists of just one individual. Thus,
+SEK. KDs:D:: kes.=:.k-=A:x, у=k .Дх.yX=y.
+56.
+V. Inversion
+The sign of inversion is [ ], and we shall explain its use in Part VI. Here we simply
+present some special cases.
+1. Let a be a proposition containing the indeterminate x; then the expression
+[x e] a, which is read the x for which a, or the solutions of the condition a, or its roots,
+means the class composed of the individuals that satisfy condition a. Thus,
+57.
+a & PD: [x z]a .a K.
+58.
+a & K.D.. [x €]. x=a:= a.
+59. a EP.D.: xE. [x =]a:= a.
+Let a and B be propositions containing the indeterminate x; we have:
+60.
+61.
+[x=]-a=-[x=]a.
+62.
+63.
+64.
+a=xB.=. [x=] a = [x =] B.
+2. Let x and y be any objects whatsoever; we consider as a new object the system
+composed of the object x and the object y, and we denote it by the sign (x, y); and
+similarly if we have a greater number of objects. Let a be a proposition containing
+the indeterminates x and y; then [(X, Y) &] a means the class composed of the objects
+(x, y) that satisfy the condition a. We have:
+65.
+а Дх. у В. =. [(х, У) =] аД [(х, У) =| В.
+66.
+3. Let x a y be a relation between the indeterminates x and y (for example, in logic,
+the relations x=Y, x-= Y, x D y; in arithmetic, x < Y, x > Y, and so on). Then the
+sign [e] a y denotes the x that satisfy the relation x a y. For the sake of convenience,
+we use the sign 3 instead of the sign [e]. Thus, 3 a y.= : [x =]. x a Y, and the sign a is read
+the objects that. For example, let y be a number; then a « y denotes the class formed by
+the numbers a that satisfy the condition x ‹ y, that is, the objects that are smaller than
+y, or simply the objects smaller than y. Similarly, if the sign D means divides or is a
+
+91
+divisor of, the formula a D means the objects that divide or the divisors. It follows that
+ХЕЗАУ= ХаУ.
+4. Let a be a formula containing the indeterminate x. Then the expression x' [x] a,
+which is read x' being substituted for x in a, denotes the formula obtained if, in a, we
+read x' for x. It follows that x [x] a = a.
+5. Let a be
+a formula that contains the indeterminates
+х, У,.... Then
+(x', ý',...)Ix, y,... ]a, which is read x', y'... being substituted for x, y, ... in a, denotes
+the formula obtained if, in a, the letters x'í, y', ... are written for x, y,.
+...It follows
+that (x, y) [x, y] a = a.
+VI. Functions
+The symbols of logic introduced above suffice to express any proposition of arithmetic, and we shall use only these. We explain here briefly some other symbols that
+may be useful.
+Let s be a class; we assume that equality is defined between the objects of the system
+s so as to satisfy the conditions:
+a = a.
+a =b.=.b=a.
+a =6.6 = C:D.a = c.
+Let o be a sign or an aggregate of signs such that, if x is an object of the class s, the
+expression ox denotes a new object; we assume also that equality is defined between
+the objects ox; further, if x and y are objects of the class s and if x = y, we assume it
+is possible to deduce ox = y. Then the sign o is said to be a function presign [praesignum] in the class s, and we write o & F's :
+8 є K.Д:: фєF's.=..Х, У ES.Х = У :Дх. у. Фх = ФУ.
+If, x being any object of the class s, the expression xo denotes a new object and
+хф =Уф follows from x = y, then we say that o is a function postsign [postsignum] in
+the class s, and we write oe s'F:
+SEK.D:: Ф=8F.=:. X, YES.Х = У :Дх. у. ХФ = Уф.
+Examples. Let a be a number; then a + is a function presign in the class of numbers, and ta is a function postsign; for any number x, formulas a + x and x + a
+denote new numbers; a + x = a † y and x + a = y + a follow from x = y. Thus,
+a = N D: at .e. F'N.
+a = N .D: ta.e. N'F.
+Let o be a function presign in the class s. Then [q] y denotes the class composed of
+the x that satisfy the condition ox = y; that is,
+Def. s& K.q & F's :D: [Ф]y.=. [x =] (фх = y).
+The class [q] y may contain one or several individuals, or none at all. We have
+8 & К. ф є F'S :Д: У =фх.=.х = [Ф] У.
+But if qy consists of just one individual, we have y = фх.=. x = [ф]y.
+
+92
+Let o be a function postsign; we write similarly:
+5 & К. ф є з'F :Д: . у [Ф] = [х =] (хф = у).
+The sign [ ] is called the inversion sign, and we have already presented some of its
+uses in logic. If a is a proposition containing the indeterminate x and a is a class
+composed of the individuals x that satisfy the condition a, we have x & a = a, and
+then a = [x =] a, as in VI.
+Let a be a formula containing the indeterminate x and let o be a function presign
+that yields the formula a when written before the letter x; that is, let a = ox. Then
+we have o = a [x], and, if x' is a new object, we have ox' = a [x]x'; that is, if a is a
+formula containing the indeterminate x, then a [x]x' means what is obtained when, in
+a, we put x' for x.
+Similarly, let a be a formula containing the indeterminate x and let o be a function
+postsign, such that xo = a; it follows that q = [x] a. Then, if x' is a new object, we
+have x'ф = x' [x] a; that is, x' [x] a again denotes what is obtained when, in a, we
+read x' for x, as in V 4.
+The sign [ ] can have other uses in logic, which we present only briefly, since we
+shall not use it in these ways. Let a and 6 be two classes; then [an]6 (or b [na])
+denotes the classes x that satisfy the condition b = a nx (or the condition b = x na).
+If b is not contained in a, no class satisfies this condition; if b is contained in a, the sign
+6 [na] denotes all classes that contain b and are contained in bu-a.
+In arithmetic, let a and b be numbers; then b [ + a] (or [a +]6) denotes the number
+x that satisfies the condition b = x + a (or b = a + x), that is, b - a. Similarly we
+have b [× a] = [a ×] 6 = bla. This sign can even find a use in analysis; thus,
+y = sin x.=. x = [sin] y
+(instead of x = are sin y)
+dF(x)=f(x)dx.=. F(x) =[d] f(x)dx (instead of F(x) = J f(x)dx).
+Let o again be a function presign in a class s and let 4 be a class contained in s; then
+ok denotes the class consisting of all ox, where the x are the objects of class k; that is,
+Def. S є K.k & K.KDs.ф є F's :Д. фк = [У=] (k.[ф]У:-= (k.[ф]У:-=1),
+or
+5 є К.k є К.kDs.ф є F's :Д. фк = [У =] ([x =]: х = К.фх =у :.-= 1).
+Def. Se K.k& & K. KD :Д.кф=[У=](k.y[ø]:==1).
+Thus, if o= F's, then os denotes the class composed of all ox, where the x are
+objects of the class s. We have:
+5є К. феТ's.У ЕФО :Д: ф /Ф]У = У.
+s є К.а, b & К.аД s.bDs.ф є F's :Д. ф b) = (фа) U (ф).
+5 є К. ф & F's :Д. фЛ = 1.
+s& K.a,beK.bDs.aDb.фєF's:Д. фаД фв.
+s є К.а, b = К.аД s.bDs.ф є F's :Д. фав) Д (фа) (фб).
+Let a be a class; then a n K (or K na, or Ka) denotes all classes of the form a n x
+(or x na, or xa), where x is any class; that is, Ka denotes the classes that are contained
+in a. The formula x & Ka means the same as x & K.x D a. We shall sometimes use this
+convention; thus KN means a class of numbers.
+Similarly, if a is a class, K u a denotes the classes that contain a.
+
+93
+Let a be a number; then a + N (or N + a) denotes the numbers greater than the
+number a; a × N (or N x a or Na) denotes the multiples of the number a; a" denotes
+the powers of the number a; N?, N3,... denote the squares, the cubes, and so on.
+Equality, product, and powers can be defined thus for function signs:
+Def. SEK.0, 4E l'S D:.Ф= W:=: X=8 Dx. Ox = vex.
+Thus, if we assume this definition, we have the new function presign 4ф; it is called
+the product of the signs we and o.
+Similarly if o and & are function postsigns.
+The following proposition holds:
+s&K.p=F's. SSDs:D: 4psDs. 4фpsDs.and so on.
+The functions фф, ффф, ... are said to be iterated and are generally denoted by the
+signs o', o°,..., as powers of the operation o.
+But if o is a function postsign, we can use the following more convenient notation
+without ambiguity:
+Def. s & К.ф є.ФД s:Д: фІ=Ф.ф2=фФ.ф3=ффф.and so on.
+Assuming this definition, if m, neN, we have q(m + n) = (ф)(ф); (m)n =ф(mn).
+If we use this definition in arithmetic, we obtain the following. We can denote the
+number that follows the number a by the more convenient sign at ; then a + 1,
+a + 2,..., and, if b is a number, a + b, have the meaning of at, at +,..., which
+is clear from the definition in § 1 below. Proposition 6 in § 1 can be written N + D N.
+If a, b, and c are numbers, then a :+ b.c means a + bc, and a: x b.c means abc.
+Function signs possess many other properties, especially if they satisfy the condition
+фх =фу.Д. x=y. A function sign that satisfies this condition is called similar by
+Dedekind (ähnliche Abbildung). 3
+But we lack the space to present these properties.
+Remarks
+A definition, or Def. for short, is a proposition of the form x = a or a D.x = a,
+where a is an aggregate of signs having a known meaning, x is a sign or an aggregate
+of signs, hitherto without meaning, and a is the condition under which the definition
+is given.
+A theorem (Theor. or Th.) is a proposition that is proved. If a theorem has the form
+aDB, where a and ß are propositions, then a is called the hypothesis (Hyp. or, even
+shorter, Hp.) and B the thesis (Thes. or Ts.). Hyp. and Ts. depend on the form of the
+theorem; in fact, if we write -BD -a instead of a D B, then -B is the Hp. and -a the
+Is.; if we write a-ß = A, Hp. and Is. do not exist.
+In any section below, the sign P followed by a number denotes the proposition
+indicated by that number in the same section. Propositions of logic are indicated by
+the sign L and the number of the proposition.
+Formulas that do not fit on one line are continued on the next line without any
+intervening sign.
+3 [Today "similar" has another meaning and instead we would say "equivalent". I
+
+94
+§1. NUMBERS AND ADDITION
+Explanations
+The sign N means number (positive integer).
+The sign 1 means unity.
+The sign a + 1 means the successor of a, or a plus 1.
+The sign = means is equal to. We consider this sign as new, although it has the
+form of a sign of logic.
+Axioms
+1.
+2.
+3.
+4.
+5.
+6.
+7.
+8.
+9.
+10.
+1 E N.
+a = N.D. a = a.
+a, b=N.D: a = b.=.b= a.
+а, в, с є N .Д.. а = 6.6 = С:Д. а = с.
+a = 6.6 = N :D. a eN.
+aEN D.a t lEN.
+a,bEND:a=b=.at1=bt1.
+a є N .D. a t 1-= 1.
+kEk::1ck:.x=N.x=k:Dxx+1=k: D.NDK.
+Definitions
+2=1+1;3=2+1;4=3 + 1; and so forth.
+Theorems
+Il.
+2 EN.
+Proof:
+PI.Д:
+1 € N
+1[a] (P 6)Д:
+1 END. 1 + 1 EN
+(1) (2) .Д:
+1 + 18N
+P10.Д:
+2 = 1+1
+(4). (3). (2, 1 + 1) [a, b] (P 5) :D: 2 = N
+(1)
+(3)
+(4)
+(Theorem).
+Note. We have written explicitly all the steps of this very easy proof. For the sake
+of brevity, we now write it as follows:
+P1.1 [a] (P 6) D: 1 + 1= N.P 10. (2, 1+1) [a, b] (P 5) :D: Th.
+or
+P1.P6:D:1 + 1=N.P10.P5:D: Th.
+12.
+13.
+3, 4,... є N.
+a,b,c, deN.a=b.b= c.c=d:D:a = d.
+Proof: Hyp. P 4 :D: a, c, d = N.a = c.c= =d.P 4:D: Thes.
+14.
+a, b, c= N.a = 6.b = c.a -= c:= A.
+
+95
+Proof: P 4. L 39 :0. Theor.
+15.
+16.
+a, b, c N.a = b.b-= C:D. a == c.
+a, beN.a = bD.a + 1=6 + 1.
+16'. a,beN.a+1= 6 + 1D. a = b.
+Proof: P 7 = (P 16)(P 16).
+17.
+a,bEND:a-=b.=.a+1==b+1.
+Proof: P 7.L 21 D. Theor.
+Definition
+18.
+a,beND.a + (6+1) = (a+b) + 1.
+Note. This definition has to be read as follows: if a and b are numbers, and if
+(a + b) + 1 has a meaning (that is, if a + b is a number) but a + (6 + 1) has not
+yet been defined, then a + (b + 1) means the number that follows a + b.
+From this definition and also the preceding it follows that
+aEND:.a + 2= a + (1 + 1) = (a + 1) + 1,
+aEND.. a + 3= a + (2 + 1) = (a + 2) + 1,
+and so forth.
+Theorems
+19. a, beND.a + bEN.
+Proof: a = N. P6 :D: a + 1=N :D: 1 = [b 8] Ts.
+a = N.D:: 6 = N.b = [ba] Ts D: a + be N.P 6 :D: (a + b) + 1 = N.P 18 :D: a +
+(6 + 1) = N:D: :D: + 1) = [b =] Ts.
+a = N. (1). (2) D:: =]Ts..b [ba]Ts..b= N.b= = [ba] Ts D: b † 1= [be] =]Ts.• ([b =] Ts) [k]P 9
+::D: ND [bE] Ts. (L 50) : :D: 6 = N .D Ts.
+(3). (L :D: :D: a, be N.D. Thesis.
+(1)
+(3)
+(Theor.).
+20. Def.a +b+c= (a +b) + c.
+21.
+a, b, c END.a + 6 + CEN.
+22.
+a, b, cEND:a =6=.a +0=6 + c.
+Proof: a, be N.P7 :D. :D. 1 = [CE] Ts.
+a,beND::cEN.c=[CaTs D.. a=b=.a +o=b tc:a + c, b + CaN:a +
+0=6+=.atc+1=b+c+1.D:.a=b=.at (ct 1) = 6+ (ct 1)
+:.D. (c+ 1) = [CE] Ts.
+(1)
+a, beN. (1). (2):::1=[ce]Ts.=[ce]Is.D.(c+1)=[CE] Ts: D:: 0=N.D. Is. (3)
+(3) D Theor.
+23. a,b, cEND.a + (6 + c) = a +b+ c.
+Proof: a, be N.P 18.P P :D. :D. 1 = [ce] Ts.
+(1)
+a, bEND.. C= N.c=[08] Ts :D: a + (6+c) = a +b+ c. PT :D: a + (6 + c) +
+1=a+b+c+1P18D:a +16+ (ot 1)) = a +b+ (ct 1) :D.c+1€
+[cE] Ts.
+
+96
+(1) (2) (P 9) .D. Theor.
+a E N D. 1 + a = a t 1.
+24.
+Proof: P 2 .D. 1 = [a a]Is.
+a = N.a = [a e] Ts :D:| + a = a + 1:0: 1 + (a + 1) = (a + 1) + 1 :D: (a + 1)
+= [a €] Is.
+(1)
+(1) (2) .D. Theor.
+24'. a.beN0.1+a+6= a+1+b.
+Proof: Hyp. P 24 :D: 1 + a = a + 1.P 22 :D. Thesis.
+25.
+a,b= N.D.a +6 =6 + a.
+Proof: a E N. P 24 :D: 1 = [b a] Is.
+(1)
+a:N::N.:[ETs:0+6=6+a.P/D:(a+b)+1= (6+a) +
+1a+b) +1= a + (6 +1) (6 +a) + 1=1 + (6 + a).1 + (6 + a) = (1+ b)
+a(1+)+a=(6+1) I@D:a + (6 + 1) = 16 +1) + a :D: (6 + 1)
+= [b E] Ts.
+(1) (2) .D. Theor.
+26.
+a, b, cEN D:a=6=.0+a = c+ b.
+27.
+a, b, cEN D:a+bto=a+c+b.
+28.
+a,b,c. deN.a=b.c=dD.a+ c=b +d.
+§ 2. SUBTRACTION
+Explanations
+The sign - is read minus.
+The sign < is read is less than.
+The sign > is read is greater than.
+Definitions
+1.
+a=N:a=N[x]0=b)
+2. a, bEN.D:a <6.=.6- a-=A.
+3.
+a, b= N.D: b > a.=. a < b.
+a+b-C= (a +b)- c;a-6+C=(a b) + c;a -b-c= (a -b) - c.
+§4. MULTIPLICATION
+Definitions
+1. aEND.ax 1= a.
+2.
+a,b= N.D.a x(6+1)= a xb+ a.
+ab=a x b;ab + c= (ab) + c; abc= (ab) c.
+§5. POWERS
+Definitions
+1.
+2.
+a E N.D. a- = a.
+a, b= N .D. a°+1 = a° a.
+
+97
+§ 6. DIVISION
+Explanations
+The sign/ is read divided by.
+The sign D is read divides, or is a divisor of.
+The sign C is read is a multiple of.
+The sign Np is read prime number.
+The sign i is read is prime to.
+Definitions
+a, b = N .D. b/a = N [x =] (xa = b).
+2.
+a, b= N.D: a Db.=. bla-= A.
+3. a, beN.D: bCa.=.a Db.
+4.
+Np = N [x &] (3 Dx.3 > 1.6 < x := A).
+5.
+а, 6є ND:: атв. =: з Da.з Db.3 > 1 : = 1.
+6.
+a,b= N.D..3 D (a, b) :=: a Da.n.a Db.
+7.
+a,b= N.D..3 ((a,b):=: 3 Ca.n.a CIb.
+ab/c= (ab)/c;a/b/c= (a/b)/c; a/b x c= (a/b) c.
+
+Letter to Keferstein
+RICHARD DEDEKIND
+(1890a)
+Hans Keferstein, Oberlehrer in Hamother. The third point was the substituburg, published a paper (1890) on the
+tion by Keferstein of a new definition of
+notion of number in which he commented
+simply infinite sets for that given by
+on Frege's (1884) and Dedekind's (1888)
+Dedekind (1888, art. 71). Keferstein's
+books on the subject. His comments on
+purpose was to avoid the notion of chain,
+Dedekind's work, although not entirely
+and his proposal amounted in effect to
+negative, included a number of suggesthe abandonment of mathematical inductions for amending the text that revealed
+tion; Dedekind showed that this prohis lack of real understanding of some
+posal would bar the possibility of providfundamental points, for example, the
+ing an adequate foundation for the theory
+equivalence of two sets. Dedekind felt
+of natural numbers.
+obliged to answer with an essay (1890)
+On 14 February 1890 Keferstein acin which he showed how pointless the
+knowledged receipt of the essay, announc-
+"corrections" were. He sent it to Kefering that at the next meeting of the
+stein on 9 February 1890, with a letter
+Society he would propose its publication,
+in which he suggested that the Hamburg
+that he was confident that the proposition
+Mathematical Society, in whose yearly
+would be accepted, that, moreover, he
+Mitteilungen Keferstein's paper had apdid not consider his criticisms, especially
+peared, publish either the essay or,
+the third one, as mere misunderstandings
+should Keferstein realize that his sugon his part and would return to them in
+gestions were based upon misunderstand- case the essay should be published.
+On 27 February 1890 Dedekind sent to
+Dedekind's essay dealt with three Keferstein a long letter that is a brilliant
+points. The first was an objection of
+presentation of the development of his
+Keferstein's to Dedekind's proof that
+ideas on the notion of natural number.
+there exists an infinite set. This proof has
+In it he tried to show that his assumpotten been criticized (see, for instance,
+tions had not been haphazardly chosen
+below, p. 131) ; but Keferstein's objection
+and that each one of them had a prorested upon a wrong argument, a plain
+found justification. This is especially
+confusion of the equivalence relation
+true, Dedekind insisted, of the notion of
+between sets with their identity, and
+chain, which Keferstein wanted to elimi-
+Dedekind had no difficulty in answering
+nate. Professor Hao Wang published
+him. The second point was Keferstein's
+(1957) an English translation of a major
+claim that he had found two conflicting
+part of the letter, with commentaries.
+definitions of infinite sets in the book;
+The text below is a translation of the
+Dedekind pointed out that one was in
+whole letter.
+fact merely a stylistic variant of the
+On 19 March 1890 Keferstein thanked
+
+99
+Dedekind for the letter and asked his as well as of a copy of Keferstein's
+permission to use it in a lecture before the
+"Erwiderung". He expressed his regrets
+Hamburg Mathematical Society. Dede- that, although the polemic and the corkind granted this permission in his next
+respondence had taken so much of his
+letter, dated 1 April 1890, adding a few
+time, Keferstein's reply still contained
+lines of explanation on the notion of many misunderstandings.
+chain.
+Dedekind's time and efforts were,
+On 17 November 1890, as publication
+however, not wasted at all. The conof the yearly volume of the Mitteilungen
+troversy produced the letter below, which
+of the Society was drawing near, Keferremains a masterly presentation of his
+stein wrote an "Erwiderung" (18906) ideas.
+that was to follow Dedekind's essay
+Dedekind's essay and the Dedekind-
+(1890) in the volume. But on 19 December
+Keterstein correspondence are preserved
+1890 he had to inform Dedekind that the
+in the Niedersächsische Staats- und
+editorial board of the Society had de- Universitätsbibliothek in Göttingen. They
+clined to publish Dedekind's essay, as
+come from the Dedekind estate. Keferwell as Keferstein's rejoinder, the reason
+stein's letters are the originals, as reinvoked being the lack of space and the
+ceived by Dedekind; Dedekind's letters
+fact that Dedekind's reply was longer
+and his essay, as well as Keferstein's
+than Keferstein's original criticism of
+"Erwiderung"
+, are clean
+copies in
+Dedekind's book. Keferstein also an-
+Dedekind's hand. Dedekind's letter of 27
+nounced his intention of publishing in
+February 1890 is reproduced below with
+the Society's coming yearly volume a
+the kind permission of the Library (where
+note withdrawing his proposed "correcit has the classmark: Göttingen, UB,
+tions" to Dedekind's work. The note
+Cod. Ms. Nachlass Dedekind, 13).
+appeared in volume 3 of the Mitteilungen
+Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg translated
+(p. 31), published in February 1891;
+the parts of the letter omitted from Proit consisted of a few lines incorporated in
+fessor Wang's paper and introduced
+a report of the 11 October 1890 meeting
+some changes into the text of Professor
+of the Society.
+Wang's translation. Permission to make
+On 23 December 1890 Dedekind wrote
+use of that translation was granted by
+his last letter to Keferstein, acknowledg-
+Professor Wang and The journal of
+ing receipt of his returned manuscript
+symbolic logic.
+My dear Doctor,
+I should like to express my sincerest thanks for your kind letter of the 14th of this
+month and for your willingness to publish my reply. But I would ask you not to rush
+anything in this matter and to come to a decision only after you have once more
+carefully read and thoroughly considered the most important definitions and proofs
+in my essay on numbers, if you have the time. For I think that most probably you
+will then be converted on all points to my conception and to my treatment of the
+subject; and this is just what I should value most, since I am convinced that you really
+have a deep interest in the matter.
+In order to further this rapprochement wherever possible, I should like to ask you
+to lend your attention to the following train of thought, which constitutes the genesis
+of my essay. How did my essay come to be written? Certainly not in one day; rather,
+it is a synthesis constructed after protracted labor, based upon a prior analysis of the
+sequence of natural numbers just as it presents itself, in experience, so to speak, for our
+consideration. What are the mutually independent fundamental properties of the
+
+100
+DEDEKIND
+sequence N, that is, those properties that are not derivable from one another but from
+which all others follow? And how should we divest these properties of their specifically
+arithmetic character so that they are subsumed under more general notions and under
+activities of the understanding without which no thinking is possible at all but with
+which a foundation is provided for the reliability and completeness of proofs and for
+the construction of consistent notions and definitions?
+When the problem is posed in this way, one is, I believe, forced to accept the following facts:
+(1) The number sequence N is a system of individuals, or elements, called numbers.
+This leads to the general consideration of systems as such (§ 1 of my essay).
+(2) The elements of the system N stand in a certain relation to one another; a
+certain order obtains, which consists, to begin with, in the fact that to each definite
+number n there corresponds a definite number n', the succeeding, or next greater,
+number. This leads to the consideration of the general notion of a mapping o of a
+system (§ 2), and since the image q(n) of every number n is again a number, n', and
+therefore q(N) is a part of N, we are here concerned with the mapping o of a system
+N into itself, of which we must therefore make a general investigation (§ 4).
+(3) Distinct numbers a and b are succeeded by distinct numbers a' and b'; the
+mapping o, therefore, has the property of distinctness, or similarity! (§ 3).
+(4) Not every number is a successor n'; in other words, $(N) is a proper part of N.
+This (together with the preceding) is what makes the number sequence N infinite (§ 5).
+(5) And, in particular, the number 1 is the only number that does not lie in q(N).
+Thus we have listed the facts that you (p. 124, II. 8-14) regard as the complete characterization of an ordered, simply infinite system N.
+(6) I have shown in my reply (III), 2 however, that these facts are still far from being
+adequate for completely characterizing the nature of the number sequence N. All
+these facts would hold also for every system S that, besides the number sequence N,
+contained a system I, of arbitrary additional elements t, to which the mapping o
+could always be extended while remaining similar and satisfying q(T) = T. But such
+a system S is obviously something quite different from our number sequence N, and
+I could so choose it that scarcely a single theorem of arithmetic would be preserved in
+it. What, then, must we add to the facts above in order to cleanse our system S again
+of such alien intruders t as disturb every vestige of order and to restrict it to N?
+This was one of the most difficult points of my analysis and its mastery required lengthy
+reflection. If one presupposes knowledge of the sequence N of natural numbers and,
+accordingly, allows himself the use of the language of arithmetic, then, of course, he
+has an easy time of it. He need only say: an element n belongs to the sequence N
+if and only if, starting with the element 1 and counting on and on steadfastly, that is,
+going through a finite number of iterations of the mapping • (see the end of article
+131 in my essay), I actually reach the element n at some time; by this procedure,
+however, I shall never reach an element t outside of the sequence N. But this way
+of characterizing the distinction between those elements t that are to be ejected
+from S and those elements n that alone are to remain is surely quite useless for our
+purpose; it would, after all, contain the most pernicious and obvious kind of vicious
+1 [See footnote 3, p. 93 above.]]
+2 [This refers to sec. III in Dedekind 1890; see introductory note.]
+
+101
+circle. The mere words "finally get there at some time".
+', of course, will not do either;
+they would be of no more use than, say, the words "karam sipo tatura", which I
+invent at this instant without giving them any clearly defined meaning. Thus, how
+can I, without presupposing any arithmetic knowledge, give an unambiguous conceptual foundation to the distinction between the elements n and the elements t?
+Merely through consideration of the chains (articles 37 and 44 of my essay), and yet,
+by means of these, completely! If I wanted to avoid my technical expression "chain"
+I would say: an element n of S belongs to the sequence N if and only if n is an
+element of every part K of S that possesses the following two properties: (i) the element
+1 belongs to K and (ii) the image q(K) is a part of K. In my technical language: N
+is the intersection [Gemeinheit] 1o, or фo(1), of all those chains K (in S) to which the
+element 1 belongs. Only now is the sequence N characterized completely. In passing
+I would like to make the following remark on this point. Frege's Begriffsschrift and
+Grundlagen der Arithmetik came into my possession for the first time for a brief period
+last summer (1889), and I noted with pleasure that his way of defining the nonimmediate succession of an element upon another in a sequence agrees in essence
+with my notion of chain (articles 37 and 44); only, one must not be put off by his
+somewhat inconvenient terminology.
+(7) After the essential nature of the simply infinite system, whose abstract type is
+the number sequence N, had been recognized in my analysis (articles 71 and 73), the
+question arose: does such a system exist at all in the realm of our ideas? Without a
+logical proof of existence it would always remain doubtful whether the notion of
+such a system might not perhaps contain internal contradictions. Hence the need
+for such proofs (articles 66 and 72 of my essay).
+(8) After this, too, had been settled, there was the question: does what has been
+said so far also contain a method of proof sufficient to establish, in full generality,
+propositions that are supposed to hold for all numbers n? Yes! The famous method of
+proof by induction rests upon the secure foundation of the notion of chain (articles
+59, 60, and 80 of my essay).
+(9) Finally, is it possible also to set up the definitions of numerical operations consistently for all numbers n? Yes! This is in fact accomplished by the theorem of article
+126 of my essay.
+Thus the analysis was completed and the synthesis could begin; but this still
+caused me trouble enough! Indeed the reader of my essay does not have an easy task
+either; apart from sound common sense, it requires very strong determination to
+work everything through completely.
+I shall now turn to some parts of your paper that I did not mention in my recent
+reply [1890] because they are not as important; but perhaps my remarks about them
+will contribute something more to the clarification of the issue.
+(a) P. 121, 1. 19.3 Why the mention of a part here? I later (article 161 of my essay)
+ascribe a number [Anzahl] to each finite system and to no other.
+(6) P. 122, 1. 8.4 Here we have a confusion between mapping and map; instead of
+з [Keferstein had written: "In fact he [Dedekind] later ascribes each number to a certain part
+[Teill of such a system...".]
+* [Keferstein had written: "... to the mapping o
+of S we can match
+1 an inverse mapping
+ф(S")..."•J
+
+102
+DEDEKIND
+"mapping (S')" it should be "mapping " of the system S'". Not "(S") but o is a mapping (the mapping cartographer) [Abbildung (der abbildende Maler)], which generates
+the map (S') = S from the system s' (the original). Such confusions can become quite
+dangerous in our investigations.
+(c) P. 123, II. 1-2.5 These words might perhaps apply to Frege, but they certainly
+do not apply to me. I define the number [Zahl] 1 as the basic element of the number
+sequence without any ambiguity in articles 71 and 73, and, just as unambiguously, I
+arrive at the number [Anzahl] 1 in the theorem of article 164 as a consequence of the
+general definition in article 161. Nothing further may be added to this at all if the matter is not to be muddled.
+(d) P. 123, II. 29-31.® The preceding remark, (c), has already taken care of this. And
+how would the greater reliability and the lesser prolixity shape up in actual fact?
+(e) P. 124, II. 21-24.? The meaning of these lines (as well as of the preceding and
+subsequent ones) is not quite clear to me. Do they perhaps express the desire that my
+definition of the number sequence N and of the way in which the element n' follows
+the element n be propped up, if possible, by an intuitive sequence? If so, I would resist
+that with the utmost determination, since the danger would immediately arise that
+from such an intuition we might perhaps unconsciously also take as self-evident
+theorems that must rather be derived quite abstractly from the logical definition of
+N. If I call (article 73) n' the element following n, that is only a new technical expression
+by means of which I merely bring some variety into my language; this language would
+sound even more monotonous and repelling if I had to deny myself this variety and
+were always to call n' only the map p(n) of n. But one expression is to mean exactly
+the same as the other.
+(f) P. 124, 1. 33—p. 125, 1. 7.8 The word "merely" ["lediglich"], taken from the
+third line of my definition in article 73, is obviously meant to indicate the sole restriction to which the word "entirely" ["gänzlich "], which occurs just before, is subject;
+5 [Keferstein had written: "In our opinion, both Frege (1884, pp. 89-90) and Dedekind, who
+incidentally derives the notion of cardinal number only from the previously defined notion of
+ordinal number (1888, pp. 21 [article 73] and 54 [article 161]), have, when all is said and done,
+introduced the notion of the number 1 without an adequate definition" .]
+6 [Keferstein had written: "... especially since, by the previous introduction of the number 1,
+the latter [Dedekind] seems not only to gain in reliability but also to lose in prolixity" .]
+" [Keferstein had written: "Since Dedekind does not emphasize this fact Ithat N can be regarded as a sequence in which p(n) = n' immediately follows nI, the notions of sequence and of
+succession in a sequence turn up in an apparently abrupt way in the definition of ordinal numbers
+that comes at that point".]
+• [Keferstein had written: "When the above comments are properly taken into account,
+there remains in these propositions at most one point that could give offense, namely, the demand
+that we entirely disregard the particular character of the elements and retain merely their distinguishability, since objects remain distinguishable, after all, only if they still exhibit differences.
+If we strike out the words 'ihre Unterscheidbarkeit festhält und nur' [see footnote 9], however,
+the difficulty vanishes, since the relations in which the elements are put with one another by the
+ordering mapping o are conceived by precisely a pure mental activity that remains completely
+independent of the particular character of the objects toward which it is directed".]
+• [The German text to which Dedekind refers reads: 'Wenn man bei der Betrachtung eines
+einfach unendlichen, durch eine Abbildung 4 geordneten Systems N von der besonderen Beschaffenheit der Elemente gänzlich absieht, lediglich ihre Unterscheidbarkeit festhält und nur die Beziehungen auffaßt, in die sie durch die ordnende Abbildung & zueinander gesetzt sind, so heißen diese
+Elemente natürliche Zahlen oder Ordinalzahlen oder auch schlechthin Zahlen, und das Grundelement
+1 heißt die Grundzahl der Zahlenreihe N". (1888, art. 73).I
+
+103
+if one were to remove this restriction—if, in other words, the word "entirely" were to
+assume its full meaning-then we would lose the distinguishability of the elements,
+which, after all, is indispensable for the notion of the simply infinite system. This
+"merely", therefore, does not seem at all superfluous to me, but necessary. I do not
+understand how it could arouse any objection.
+Repeating the wish I expressed at the beginning and begging you to excuse the
+thoroughness of my discussion, I remain with kindest regards
+Yours very truly,
+R. DEDEKIND
+27 February 1890
+Petrithorpromenade 24
+
+A question on transfinite numbers
+CESARE BURALI-FORTI
+(1897)
+Dated "Turin, February 1897"
+, Burall-
+Forti's paper was communicated at the
+28 March 1897 meeting of the Circolo
+matematico di Palermo and published
+in its Rendiconti.
+The paper is the first published statement of a modern paradox. It immediately aroused the interest of the
+mathematical world, and it provoked
+lively discussions in the years
+that
+followed its publication. Dozens of papers
+dealt with it, and it gave a strong impulse
+to a reexamination of the foundations
+of set theory.
+The statement of the paradox is quite
+simple. On naive set-theoretic assumptions, the set of ordinals is well-ordered,
+hence has an ordinal; this ordinal is at
+once an element of the set of ordinals
+and greater than any ordinal in the
+set.
+Burali-Forti himself considered the
+contradiction as establishing, by reductio
+ad absurdum, the result that the natural
+ordering of ordinals is just a partial
+ordering (thus contradicting the result
+that Cantor was to publish a few months
+later (1897), that the set of ordinals is
+linearly ordered). Burali-Forti was not
+followed on that road. Russell's first
+explanation (1903, p. 43) was that the
+set of ordinals, although linearly ordered,
+is not well-ordered; but this could not be
+maintained, in the face of the result that
+the initial segment up to any given ordinal is well-ordered. Jourdain saw a way
+out in the distinction between consistent
+and inconsistent multiplicities, a distinction already privately used by Cantor for several years (see below, p. 114).
+Soon Russell (1905a) questioned the
+existence of the set of ordinals; Zermelo
+took the same path (see below, p. 199),
+and so did subsequent workers in the
+field (although for some the ordinals
+form a class, in a technical sense of that
+word).
+The paper contains an erroneous conception of well-ordered sets. This notion,
+introduced by Cantor in 1883, was somehow slow in finding its way; in August
+1897, hence after the writing of Burali-
+Forti's paper, at the First International
+Congress of Mathematicians, Hadamard
+(1897, p. 201) still gave a wrong definition
+of well-ordered set. Since what Burali-
+Forti conceived to be Cantor's notion of
+well-ordered set was much too weak, he
+had to introduce his own "perfectly
+ordered" sets. However, the two notions
+do not coincide; every well-ordered set is
+perfectly ordered, but not conversely.
+Burali-Forti soon realized his oversight
+and wrote a short note, "On well-ordered
+classes"
+', dated "Turin, October 1897"
+and reproduced below, in which he indi.
+cates the difference
+between the two
+notions, but does not recast his proof.
+In fact, in a letter to Couturat written
+sometime in 1905 or at the beginning of
+1906 (see Couturat 1906), he seems to
+think that the contradiction revealed in
+his paper vanishes once the distinction
+between "well-ordered" and "perfectly
+
+105
+ordered" sets is recognized. (The dis- Couturat 1906, Poincaré 1906, and Young
+cussion
+is befogged by a number of 1929.
+editorial errors in the key passages of
+The reader should not have any diffi.
+Couturat's paper (see Poincaré 1906, culty with the notation used in the
+p. 304).) The conclusion, however, is
+present paper, especially if he has read
+quite clear and simple: Burali-Forti's
+Peano 1889, reproduced above, pp. 85-
+argument is readily transferred to Can-
+97. It should perhaps be mentioned that
+tor's ordinal numbers, and the antinomy
+"he?...}" denotes the class of the h's
+stands in its full force. The crux of the
+such that {...} (see Peano 1894, p. 20).
+argument is given by Cantor in his letter
+The translation is by the editor, and it
+to Dedekind in 1899 (below, p. 115). On is printed here with the kind permission of
+Burali-Forti's oversight one can consult the Circolo matematico di Palermo.
+The principal object of this note is to prove that there actually exist transfinite
+numbers! (or order types) a and b such that a is not equal to b, not smaller than b,
+and not larger than b.
+On the basis of results already known, we could prove in a few words what we have
+just stated; but to remove any doubt from the reader's mind as to the validity of our
+proof we have deemed it necessary to establish exactly (in §§ 1-8) the meaning of the
+terms we use,? repeating—perhaps in a somewhat different form—matters already
+presented by us in these Rendiconti (1894).
+§ 1. Order of the elements of a class. Let u be a class. We say that h is an "order of the
+u's" if:3
+(a) h is a correspondence between the elements of u and classes formed of elements
+of u;
+(b) The correspondence h is transitive; that is, if x, y, and z are elements of u, if x
+is an element of the class hy, and if y is an hz, then x is an hz;
+(c) If x and y are elements of u, then it cannot be that, at the same time, x is an hy
+and y an hx;
+(d) If x and y are arbitrary elements of u, then always x is identical with y, or x is
+an hy, or y is an hx.
+In symbols, writing Ord u for "order of the u's", we have
+1. u= K.a. Ord u = (Ku)fun hE {x, y, 2 EU. = hy. Y = ha Ox. y=. x=hz:.x, YE U.
+(Det).
+If, x being an element of u, we call the elements of the class ha "successors of x in
+u with respect to the order h"
+, we easily see that the properties (a)-(d) attributed to
+hare those ordinarily attached to the idea of order.
+We invert the relation y = hx (y is a successor of x) by writing x eh y, and from
+now on hly can be used for "predecessor of y in u with respect to the order h". We
+call the element x of u that has no predecessors (h|x = A) "the first u with respect
+1 Cantor 1895; Italian translation, 1895a. For the previous works of Cantor on this subject
+consult the Lista bibliografica of Vivanti appended to Part VI of the Formulaire published by the
+Rivista di matematica [Vivanti 1893].
+2 For the meaning of the terms class, correspondence, finite class,... we refer the reader to
+Burali-Forti 1896.
+3 For further explanations regarding the matters contained in §§ 1-8 see Burali-Forti 1894.
+
+106
+to the order h"
+, and we call the element y of u that has no successors (hy = A)
+"the last u with respect to the order h". If x is an element of u, we use the term
+"immediate successor of x" for the element y of u that is a successor of x and is such
+that there exists no u that is at the same time a successor of x and a predecessor of y
+(yehx.unhxnh|y = 1). The first u or the last u or the immediate successor of an
+arbitrary element of u need not exist; but if it exists, it is uniquely determined (which
+readily follows from conditions (a)-(d)).
+§ 2. Ordered class.* Let u and v be arbitrary classes; let h be an order of the u's
+and k an order of the u's. We write (u, h) for "class u whose elements are arranged in
+the order h"
+, or for "class u ordered by criterion h"
+It does not seem possible at present to define (u, h) by putting (u, h) equal (identical)
+to a complex of signs having a known meaning. We define (u, h) as an abstract object.
+stating the condition under which two ordered classes have to be considered identical.
+We write
+2. uu=K.h=Ord u.k = OrduD..(u,k) = (u,k).=: u = v.h = k
+(Def) ;
+that is, we assume that (u, h) is identical with (v, k) if u is identical with v and the
+correspondence h is identical with the correspondence k.
+If u is a class containing just one element x (u = Un), then every order h of the u's is
+such that hx = A. We can henceforth agree to indicate by the sign A every order of
+u, and consequently (u,1) will represent the class u ordered.
+Writing Ko for "ordered class"
+, we put
+3. Ko = (u, h) = {u = K.h = Ord u}
+(Det) ;
+that is, we say that (u, h) is an ordered class if u is a class and h is an order of the us.
+§ 3. Perfectly ordered class. Let u be a nonempty class (one that actually contains
+some elements) and let h be an order of the us.
+We say that (u, h) is a "perfectly ordered class" if:
+(a) There exists an element of u that occupies the first place with respect to the
+order h;
+(b) Every element of u that has successors has an immediate successor ;
+(c) For any arbitrary element x of u either x has no immediate predecessor, or
+there exists a predecessor y of x that has no immediate predecessor and is such that
+the u's that are at the same time successors of y and predecessors of x form a finite
+class.
+In symbols, writing Kpo for "perfectly ordered class", we have
+pehx:mshy.unhmnhy=1.=m1:(unhynh|x)&Kfin:==y135
+(Def).
+4 Cantor (1895, p. 496 [or 1932, p. 296]) states: "We say that a set M is simply ordered if there
+exists between its elements a definite order by rank (Rangordnung) according to which, for any two
+elements m1 and mz, one occupies the lower rank and the other the higher rank, and this in such a
+way that, if of three elements, m1, Mz, and Mz, my is lower in rank than mo and mo lower than mz,
+then mi is also lower in rank than mz."
+5 The definition just given appears in a somewhat complicated symbolic form because we did
+not want to introduce signs for immediate predecessor or immediate successor of x, for first or last u,
+and so on. It would be convenient to introduce such signs if we wanted to give a complete treatment of the theory of ordered classes.
+
+107
+G. Cantor calls an ordered class satisfying conditions (a) and (b) a "well-ordered
+class". There is a marked difference between a well-ordered class and a perfectly
+ordered class. Let, for example, a1, Az, Az, ... and 61, b2, b3, ... be the elements of two
+denumerable classes; if we consider the ordered class
+a1, Az, аз,..., з, b2, 61,
+we easily see that it is a well-ordered, but not a perfectly ordered, class, while
+ay, 02, Oz,..., 61, 62, 63,...
+is a perfectly ordered, hence a well-ordered, class.
+§ 4. Relations between ordered classes. Let (u, h) and (v, k) be ordered classes. We write
+(v, k)f (u, h) for "ordered correspondence between the u's and the u's ordered by criteria
+h and k". We say that f is such a correspondence if f is a single-valued and reciprocal
+correspondence between the u's and the u's and is such that, if x and y are elements of
+u and x is a successor of y with respect to h, fx is a successor of fy with respect to k.
+In symbols we have:
+5. (2, 7), (0, t) = Ko.D. (0, k)E(2,h) = (vfu)rep of e{x, ye u.x e hy Ox. y. Ix e k(fy)}
+(Def).
+We say that (u, h) is equivalent to (v, k), and we write (u, h) ~ (v, k), if an ordered
+correspondence can be established between (u, h) and (v, k). We say that (u, h) is smaller
+than (v, k), and we write (u, h) < (v, k), if there exists a class w contained in v such that
+(u, h) ~ (W, k).? In symbols we have:
+6. (u, h), (v, k) = Ко.D: (u, h) ~ (v, k).=. (V,k)f (u, h) -= A
+7.....D:. (u,k) < (0,k).=: w0=Kv.(2,h) ~ (W,k).-=w 1
+(Det);
+(Det).
+From propositions 6 and 7 the following are easily deduced:
+(2, h), (v, К), (20, l) « Ко.D..
+8. (и, h) ~ (и, k),
+9. (u, k) ~ (0, k).=. (v,k) ~ (u, h),
+10. (u, h) ~ (0, k). (v, k) ~ (W, l).D. (u, h) ~ (20, l),
+11. (u, h) ~ (v, k).J. (u, h) < (v, k),
+12. (u, h) ~ (0, k). (v, k) < (w, 4).D. (u, h) < (20, l);
+13. (u, h) < (v, k). (v, k) < (20, 4).O. (u, h) < (w, 2),
+14. (2, k) ~ (v,k). O.u~0,
+15. (и, h) < (г, k) .д.и < 0.3
+§5. Operation S. Let (u, h) and (v, k) be ordered classes such that u and u have no
+common elements. By the symbol (u, h)S(v, k), which we read "ordered class (u, h)
+followed by ordered class (v, k)"
+", we shall denote the class u uv (logical sum of u and v)
+when ordered by a criterion l such that, x and y being elements of u uv, the statement
+6 Cantor says that the two classes are similar (ähnlich). We keep the term equivalent because
+this term, having been defined for two classes (see Burali-Forti 1896), is now without meaning for
+two ordered classes. The same can be said about the sign < introduced by us in the same paper.
+- We observe that every order of the u's is also an order of every class contained in v (§ 1);
+hence, if w is a part of v, then (w, k) is also an ordered class.
+8 See Burali-Forti 1896.
+
+108
+х e ly amounts to saying: x and y are elements of u and x a hy, or x and y are elements
+of v and x e ky, or x is a v and y is a u. In symbols we have
+16. (u,k)(uk)eKo.uno =A.D. (u,h)S(v,k) = i[(uUU, 1) & {l= Ord (UUU):.:x, y=
+(UUD)Ix.y:: xEly.=:. x, Y Eu.x 8hy:U: x, Y 80.×& K:U: X EV.У = U}]
+(Det).
+It is rather easy to prove that (u, h)S(v, k) is a uniquely determined ordered class. In
+an analogous way we have
+17. (u, k), (v, k) « Kpo. ио = A.D. (u, h)S(v, k) = Кро.
+§ 6. Order type. If (u, h) is an ordered class, we write T°(u, h) for "order type of the
+u's ordered by criterion h".
+. We regard T'(u, h) as an abstract object that is a function
+of (u, h) and that (u, h) has in common with all ordered classes equivalent to itself;
+that is, we put
+18. (u, k), (v, k) «Ко.D: T'(u, h) = T°(v, T°(v, (u, h) ~ (0, k)
+(Det)
+Writing I for "order type", we put
+19. Т = х = { (и, h) & Ко.х = T° (u, h). - = (u, n) 1}
+(Def).
+From propositions 8, 9, and 10 it immediately follows that for order types the
+equality defined by proposition 18 has the properties of being reflexive, symmetric,
+and transitive; that is, if a and b are arbitrary order types, we have
+a=a; a=b=.b=a; a=b.b=c..a =c.
+§ 7. Greater and smaller order types. Let (u, h) and (v, k) be ordered classes. We say
+that T'(u, h) is smaller than T°(v, k), or that T°(v, k) is greater than T°(u, h), and we write
+T'(u, h) < T'(v, k), or
+T'(v, k) > T (u, h),
+if there exists a part v, of v such that (u, h) ~ (V1, K) but no part u, of u such that
+(U1, k) ~ (v, k). By virtue of proposition 7 we have
+20. (u, h), (v, k) & Ko.D.. T°(u, h) < T°(v, k):=: T°(v, k) > T°(u, h) : =: (u, h) <
+(v, k). (v, k) - < (u, h).
+(Def).
+We have the following propositions:
+а, b, с = T.J:
+21. a = b.a < b.=. A,
+22. a < b.a > b.=.A,
+23. a = b.b < с.Д.а < c,
+24. а < 6.6 < с.Д.а < с.
+Propositions 21 and 22 express the fact that, of the three cases a = b, a > b, a < b,
+two cannot occur at the same time; they are immediate consequences of the propositions of § 4. Proposition 23 is also an immediate consequence of these propositions.
+We now prove proposition 24. Let (u, h), (v, k), and (w, l) be ordered classes. From
+proposition 13 we obtain
+(21, h2) < (u, k). (0, l) < (W0, 1). (20, l) < (u, h).D: (0, l) < (u, h).U. (20, l) < (U, k);°
+transferring the two terms of the thesis into the hypothesis and the third factor of the
+hypothesis into the thesis, we have
+(u, h) < (u, k). (v, k) → < (u, h). (v, k) < (20, l). (W0, l) - < (v, k).д. (г0, l) - < (u, h);
+° Because, if a, b, and c are propositions, we have 6.0. buc and therefore a 06.0: a .d. bu c.
+
+109
+affixing to the thesis the factor (u, h) < (W, 1), which is a consequence of the hypothesis, and recalling proposition 20, we obtain proposition 24.
+However, we cannot prove that
+A. a. beI.D:a=bu.a<b.u.a>b
+that is, that for two arbitrary types one of the three cases a = b, a < b, a > b must
+always occur. Proceeding as in our 1896a, we reduce proposition A to the logical
+product of the following two:
+1. (u, h), (v, K) = Ko.D: (u, h) < (u, k).U. (v, k) < (u, h),
+II. (u, h), (v, k) = Ko. (u, k) < (v, k). (v, k) < (u, h). D. (u, k) ~ (v, k).
+If we assume for a moment that proposition A, or at least proposition II, is true,
+it follows from proposition 20 after some simple logical transformations that
+В. (u, h), (v, k) «Ко.D.. T (u, h) < T°(v, k).=: (u, k) < (0, k). (u, h) →~ (0, k);
+that is, T'(u, h) is smaller than T°(v, k) 1° if they are not equal and there exists a part
+v1 of v such that (u, h) ~ (v1, k). It is in this form that Cantor (1887) gives the definition
+of the relation containing the sign <. Our proposition 20 and proposition B are equivalent if proposition A, or at least proposition II, holds. If we assumed proposition B as
+a definition, we would not know how to prove proposition 24 unless we assumed
+proposition II.
+From proposition 20 and proposition B it follows quite readily that
+С. (u, h), (v, k) & Ko. (u, h) < (v, k).D. T'(u, h) ≤ T°(v, k).
+§8. Ordinal numbers and sum. We say "ordinal number"
+' 11 and we write No, for
+"order type of a perfectly ordered class";
+25. No = T'Kpo.
+(Det).
+We put
+26. 1 = i I {Ko n (u, h) = (u = Un)}
+(Def),
+that is, we say that one is the order type of the ordered classes (u, h) such that u
+contains just one element. It immediately follows that
+27. 1 E No.
+We define the sum of two order types, and therefore also that of two ordinal
+numbers, by writing
+28. (u, h), (v, K) = Ko.uno = A.D. T'(u, h) + Tv, k) = T'{(u, h)S(v, k)} (Def).
+If we observe that two equivalent ordered classes followed by the same class are still
+equivalent, we have the result that the sum now defined is independent of u, v, h, k;
+moreover, from proposition 17 it follows that
+29. a, be No.D. a + be No,
+and this proposition still holds if we put T for No.12
+1º [Here the text reads, "il T'(u, h) è minore del I'(u, h)", which is a misprint.]
+11 Cantor in fact says ordinal number for "order type of a well-ordered class". However, the
+properties of our ordinal numbers seem to us to agree with those of Cantor's ordinal numbers.
+Besides, this does not affect our conclusions, for which it suffices to prove that our I are precisely
+Cantor's order types.
+12 It is understood that we have to assume the existence of at least one infinite class (see Burali-
+Forti 1896). Besides, if there exist no infinite classes, the order types are the integers.
+
+110
+§ 9. Consequences of proposition A. Let us assume that proposition A is true and see
+what propositions logically follow from it.
+30. a = No.D.a + 1 > a.
+(A)
+Proof. Let (u, h) be a perfectly ordered class having a for its ordinal number and let
+v be a class containing just one element. If we write
+P= (4, (u,h) and Q = (u, h)S(v, A),
+we have P < Q. Proposition 30 will be proved if, using proposition B, we can prove
+that P=~ Q. If P has no last element, then P=~O, because & has a last element,
+namely iv. If P has a last element, x, then there exists (§ 3) an element y of u that has
+no immediate predecessor and is such that the elements (unhy) Uly form a finite
+class of n elements; then, if P~Q, the classes P1 and 91 that we obtain when we
+remove the last n elements from P and Q will also be equivalent; but this is absurd,
+because Pi has no last element and 81 has y as last element. Hence Hence -~Q, and
+consequently proposition 30 holds. If, following Cantor, we call the order type of a
+well-ordered class an ordinal number, we observe that proposition 30 is not true in
+general, as immediately follows from the example given at the end of § 3.
+31. a & No.O: x = No.a < x.x < a + 1.=x A
+(A).
+This proposition-which says that there exists no ordinal number between a and
+a + 1—readily follows from proposition C.
+If a is an ordinal number, we can denote by e > a the ordinal numbers greater than
+a, because the relation x > a is equivalent to the relation x = (= > ) a. Consequently,
+if = > is an order criterion for ordinal numbers, (No, ¿ >) denotes the class of ordinal
+numbers thus ordered.
+We now want to prove that
+32. (No, è >) = Kpo
+(A).
+Proof. Since (No, è >) is an ordered class because conditions (b) and (c) of §1
+hold by virtue of propositions 24, 21, and 22, condition (d) is equivalent to proposition A. Propositions 27, 30, and 31 prove that conditions (a) and (b) of § 3 are satisfied by the ordered class (No, è >). Let now (u, h) be a perfectly ordered class whose
+ordinal number is a ; since (u, 7) satisfies condition (c) of § 3, either a has no immediate
+predecessor (that is, by the criterion = >), or there exists an ordinal number x smaller
+than a that has no immediate predecessor and is such that we obtain a if we repeat
+the operation +1 a finite number of times on x. Hence (No, ¿ >) also satisfies condition (c) of § 3.
+Since (No, è >) is a perfectly ordered class, we can put
+33. S = 1° (No, = >)
+(Def),
+and we have
+34. So = No.
+(A).
+We can now prove that
+35. a E No .O. a = l
+(A).
+13 It is understood that we make use here of the principle of mathematical induction, proved in
+Burali-Forti 1896.
+
+111
+Proof. Let (u, h) be a perfectly ordered class having ordinal number a. Let (v, k)
+be the ordered class obtained by the following specifications: for any element a of u,
+let the class u n-hx be an element of v, and let v have only such elements (hence v
+turns out to be a class of classes); if x and y are elements of u and if x & hy, let us put
+(un -hx) = k(un -hy).
+It immediately follows that (u, h) ~ (v, k) and therefore (v, k) is a perfectly ordered
+class having ordinal number a. From the preceding propositions we also readily
+obtain the result that the class of the ordinal numbers of the elements of v, this class
+being ordered by the criterion k, is a class of ordinal numbers smaller than a, perfectly
+ordered in increasing order, and having ordinal number a; but such a class is smaller
+than (No, è >) and thus proposition 35 follows from proposition C.
+§ 10. Conclusion. If we write S for a in proposition 30 and S + 1 for a in proposition 35, we have, by virtue of propositions 34, 26, and 29,
+8+1 > 8
+and these, by propositions 21 and 22, turn out to be contradictory.
+Hence if we assume proposition A, we are led to an absurdity, and therefore it has
+been rigorously proved that there exist at least two order types a and b (and there
+certainly exist some among the ordinal numbers) such that a is not equal to b, is not
+larger than b, and is not smaller than b.
+It is therefore impossible to order the order types in general, or even the ordinal
+numbers in particular; that is to say, the order types cannot provide a standard
+class for the ordered classes, as the class of integers, ordered according to magnitude,
+does for the finite classes and the denumerable class [that is, the class of order type
+w]. 14 It seems that the order types thus necessarily fall short of one of their most
+important objectives.
+ON WELL-ORDERED CLASSES
+(1897a)
+In my note A question on transfinite numbers I said that, according to Cantor, a
+class u is well-ordered if it satisfies the following two conditions :
+(a) There is in u a first element;
+(b) Every element of u that has successors has an immediate successor.
+In a recent paper (1897) and also, as I was able to verify, in volume 21 of Mathematische Annalen (1883, p. 548) Cantor, to define well-ordered classes, adds to conditions (a) and (b) the following :
+(c) If u, is a class included in u and such that there exist in u elements greater than
+any element of u1, then there exists an element a of u such that there exists no
+element smaller than a and greater than every element of U1.
+14 Nor can the class of order types that are not ordinal numbers form the standard ordered class
+for the ordered classes that are not perfectly ordered. It can in fact be proved rather easily that,
+for the T there are —No, either proposition A is not true, or the following proposition is not true:
+"Given a Ko-Kpo there exist two T-No, x and y, such that the order types not smaller than
+x and not greater than y, ordered in increasing order, form an ordered class equivalent to the given
+class". Naturally this proposition must be verified together with A if the class of the T-No is to
+be a standard class for the Ko-Kpo.
+
+112
+I thought it advisable to indicate explicitly this involuntary omission of mine,
+although I made use neither of the well-ordered classes defined by Cantor nor of the
+ordered classes that satisfy conditions (a) and (b), but only of the classes that I called
+perfectly ordered classes and that, besides satisfying conditions (a) and (b), are also
+such that:
+(c) For any arbitrary element x of u, either x has no immediate predecessor, or
+there exists a predecessor y of x that has no immediate predecessor and is such that
+there is a finite number of u's that are at the same time successors of y and predecessors of x.
+It readily follows that every well-ordered class is also perfectly ordered, but not
+conversely. The reader can check which propositions in the note of mine mentioned
+above are verified also by the well-ordered classes.
+
+Letter to Dedekind
+GEORG CANTOR
+(1899)
+In his edition of Cantor's collected
+element of another multiplicity. The dispapers (1932), Zermelo included a few
+tinction between consistent and inconletters exchanged between Cantor and
+sistent multiplicities had already been
+Dedekind and left unpublished until then.
+introduced by Schröder (1890, p. 213), a
+The one reproduced below in translation
+multiplicity being consistent if its eleis dated "Halle, 28 July 1899"
+ments are compatible ("verträglich")
+In the first part of the letter Cantor
+with each other, and inconsistent if they
+deals with the same contradiction as
+are not. It is remarkable that Schröder
+Burali-Forti considered in the paper
+introduced this distinction independently
+printed immediately above, that engenof the paradoxes, still unknown then in
+dered by the ordinal of the multiplicity of
+their modern form.
+all ordinals. The contradiction leads Can-
+One of Cantor's statements about
+tor to abandon, not the well-ordering of
+multiplicities ("Two equivalent multithe multiplicity, but its sethood. Multiplicities either are both 'sets' or are both
+plicities
+become divided into "consisinconsistent") can be considered an early
+tent" and "inconsistent" multiplicities,
+formulation of the axiom of replacement,
+the former alone being called sets. This
+introduced by Fraenkel and Skolem in
+partition prefigures the distinction be-
+1922 (see below, p. 291).
+tween sets and classes, introduced (under
+Cantor and Dedekind exchanged letters
+different names) by von Neumann in
+over a long period (1872-1899), and their
+1925, a quarter of a century later (see correspondence was published by Emmy
+below, pp. 393-394). However, Cantor's
+Noether and Jean Cavaillès (1937).
+criterion for the distinction remains im-
+In the text below interpolations in
+precise: a multiplicity is a set if we can
+square brackets are by Zermelo.
+consider it, without contradiction, as one
+Cantor's letter was translated by
+object. The idea will become sharply de. Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg and the editor,
+fined when it will be specified that a
+and the translation is printed here with
+multiplicity is a set whenever it is an the kind permission of Springer Verlag.
+•..As you know, many years ago I had already arrived at a well-ordered sequence
+of cardinalities [Mächtigkeiten], or transfinite cardinal numbers, which I call
+"alephs":
+No, X1. 82...0....
+No means the cardinality of the sets "denumerable" in the usual sense, , is the
+
+114
+CANTOR
+next greater cardinal number, *2 is the next greater still, and so on; wo
+is the one
+next following (that is, next greater than) all the X, and equals
+V → WO
+and so on.
+The big question was whether, besides the alephs, there were still other cardinalities
+of sets; for two years now I have been in possession of a proof that there are no others,
+so that, for example, the arithmetic linear continuum (the totality of all real numbers)
+has a definite aleph as its cardinal number.
+If we start from the notion of a definite multiplicity [Vielheit] (a system, a totality)
+of things, it is necessary, as I discovered, to distinguish two kinds of multiplicities (by
+this I always mean definite multiplicities).
+For a multiplicity can be such that the assumption that all of its elements "are
+together " leads to a contradiction, so that it is impossible to conceive of the multiplicity as a unity, as "one finished thing". Such multiplicities I call absolutely infinite
+or inconsistent multiplicities.
+As we can readily see, the "totality of everything thinkable", for example, is such
+a multiplicity; later still other examples will turn up.
+If on the other hand the totality of the elements of a multiplicity can be thought
+of without contradiction as "being together"
+', so that they can be gathered together
+into "one thing"
+', I call it a consistent multiplicity or a "set"
+'. (In French and in
+Italian this notion is aptly expressed by the words "ensemble" and "insieme".)
+Two equivalent multiplicities either are both "sets" or are both inconsistent.
+Every submultiplicity [Teilvielheit] of a set is a set.
+Whenever we have a set of sets, the elements of these sets again form a set.
+If a set M is given, I call the general notion that applies to it and to all sets equivalent to it, and to these alone, its cardinal number or also its cardinality, and I denote
+it by m. I then arrive at the system of all cardinalities—which will later turn out to be
+an inconsistent multiplicity-in the following way.
+A multiplicity is said to be "simply ordered" if between its elements there exists a
+rank order such that, for any two of its elements, one is the earlier and the other the
+later, and that, for any three of its elements, one is the earliest, another is the middle
+one, and the remaining one is the last by rank among them.
+If a simply ordered multiplicity is a set, then by its type u I understand the general
+notion that applies to it and to all ordered sets similar to it, and to these alone. (I
+use the notion of similarity in a more restricted sense than you do; I say that two
+simply ordered multiplicities are similar if they can be brought into a one-to-one
+relation such that the rank order of corresponding elements is the same in both.)
+A multiplicity is said to be well-ordered if it satisfies the condition that every submultiplicity of it has a first element; I call such a multiplicity a "sequence" for short.
+Every part [Teill of a sequence is a sequence.
+If now a sequence F is a set, I call the type of F its ordinal number or, more briefly,
+its number; thus, when in what follows I speak simply of numbers, I shall have in
+mind only ordinal numbers, that is, types of well-ordered sets.
+I now consider the system of all numbers and denote it by S.
+1 [Dedekind uses "ähnlich" in the sense of "equivalent" .]
+
+LETTER TO DEDEKIND
+115
+I proved (1897, p. 216) that, of two distinct numbers a and B, one is always the
+smaller, the other the greater, and that, if for three numbers we have a < B and
+B < y, we also have a < y.
+S is therefore a simply ordered system.
+But it also follows easily from the theorems on well-ordered sets proved in § 13
+that every multiplicity of numbers, that is, every part of S, contains a least number.
+Hence the system S, when naturally ordered according to magnitude, forms a sequence.
+If we then add O to this sequence as an element—putting it first, of course—we
+obtain a sequence S',
+0, 1, 2, 3,..., що, wo t 1,...,y,....
+in which, as we can readily see, every number is the type of the sequence of all elements
+preceding it (including 0). (The sequence & has this property only from wo + 1 on [in
+fact, from wo on].)
+S' cannot be a consistent multiplicity (and therefore neither can S?); if S' were
+consistent, then, since it is a well-ordered set, there would correspond to it a number
+& greater than all numbers of the system S; but the number & also occurs in the
+system S, because this system contains all numbers; & would thus be greater than 8,
+which is a contradiction. Therefore
+A. The system S of all numbers is an inconsistent, absolutely infinite multiplicity.
+Since the similarity of well-ordered sets establishes at the same time their equivalence, to every number y there corresponds a definite cardinal number (y) = j,
+namely, the cardinal number of any well-ordered set whose type is y.
+The cardinal numbers that correspond in this sense to the transfinite numbers of
+the system S I call "alephs"
+', and the system of all alephs is denoted by » (tav, the
+last letter of the Hebrew alphabet).
+I call the system of all numbers y corresponding to one and the same cardinal
+number c a "number class"
+', and, more specifically, the number class Z(c). We readily
+see that in every number class there occurs a least number yo and that there is a
+number y falling outside of Z(c) such that the condition
+is equivalent to the fact that the number y belongs to the number class Z(c). Every
+number class is therefore a definite "segment" of the sequence S?
+Certain numbers of the system S form, each one by itself, a number class; they
+are the finite numbers, 1, 2, 3, ..,v,..., to which correspond the various "finite"
+cardinal numbers, 1, 2, 3, ..., »,....
+Let wo be the least transfinite number; I call the aleph corresponding to it No, so
+that
+%0 =∞о;
+%, is the least aleph and determines the number class
+Z(x) = So.
+2 Here we constantly use the theorem mentioned a few paragraphs above according to which
+every totality of numbers, hence every submultiplicity of 9, has a minimum, a least number.
+
+116
+CANTOR
+The numbers a of Z(8.) satisfy the condition
+Wo = a < ∞1
+and are characterized by it; here wy is the least transfinite number whose cardinal
+number is not equal to Xo. If we put
+then X, is not only distinct from No, but it is also the next greater aleph, for we can
+prove that there is no cardinal number at all that would lie between N, and X,. We
+thus obtain the number class 81 = Z(,), which immediately follows So. It contains
+all numbers ß that satisfy the condition
+W1 = B < ∞2;
+here wą is the least transfinite number whose cardinal number differs from *, and X,.
+%, is the next greater aleph after X1; it determines the number class Sz = Z($2)
+that immediately follows S1 and consists of all numbers y that are Zwa and < wz,
+where wz is the least transfinite number whose cardinal number differs from do, N1,
+and X2; and so on.
+I would still like to stress the following:
+50 = 11, 51 = 12..,5, =
+X,. =X,;
+V' = 0.1,2....v
+all this is easy to prove.
+Among the transfinite numbers of the system S to which no x, [with finite v]
+corresponds as a cardinal number, there is again a least, which we call wwo, and with
+it we obtain a new aleph,
+#wo = cowo,
+which is also definable by means of the equation
+*wo=
+y= 1,2,3,..
+and which we recognize as the next greater cardinal number after all the Xy.
+We see that this process of formation of the alephs and of the number classes of
+the system S that correspond to them is absolutely limitless.
+B. The system i of all alephs, when ordered according to magnitude,
+Хо, Х1,..., Хао, Хо +1,..., Хал....
+forms a sequence that is similar to the system S. and therefore likewise inconsistent, or
+absolutely infinite.
+The question now arises whether all transfinite cardinal numbers are contained in
+the system n. In other words, is there a set whose cardinality is not an aleph?
+This question is to be answered negatively, and the reason for this lies in the
+inconsistency that we discerned in the systems S and n.
+Proof. If we take a definite multiplicity V and assume that no aleph corresponds
+to it as its cardinal number, we conclude that V must be inconsistent.
+
+LETTER TO DEDEKIND
+117
+For we readily see that, on the assumption made, the whole system I is projectible
+into the multiplicity V, that is, there must exist a submultiplicity V' of V that is
+equivalent to the system S2.3
+V' is inconsistent because & is, and the same must therefore be asserted of V.
+[See page 444 [of Cantor 1932, or 115 of the present volume].]
+Accordingly, every transfinite consistent multiplicity, that is, every transfinite set,
+must have a definite aleph as its cardinal number. Hence
+C. The system » of all alephs is nothing but the system of all transfinite cardinal
+numbers.
+All sets, and in particular all "continua", are therefore "denumerable" in an
+extended sense.
+Furthermore C makes it clear that I was right when I stated (1895, p. 484) the
+theorem :
+"If a and b are arbitrary cardinal numbers, then a = bor a < b or a > b."
+For, as we have seen, these relations of magnitude obtain between the alephs.
+3 [It is precisely at this point that the weakness of the proof sketched here lies. It has not been
+proved that the entire number sequence I would necessarily be "projectible" into every multiplicity V that has no aleph as its cardinal number. Cantor apparently thinks that successive and
+arbitrary elements of V are assigned to the numbers of & in such a way that every element of V
+is used only once. Either this procedure would of necessity come to an end once all elements of V
+had been exhausted, and then V would be mapped onto a segment of the number sequence and its
+cardinality would be an aleph, contrary to the assumption, or V would remain inexhaustible,
+hence contain a constituent part that is equivalent to all of l and therefore inconsistent. Thus
+the intuition of time is applied here to a process that goes beyond all intuition, and a fictitious
+entity is posited of which it is assumed that it could make successive arbitrary choices and thereby
+define a subset V' of V that, by the conditions imposed, is precisely not definable. Only through the
+use of the "axiom of choice", which postulates the possibility of a simultaneous choice and which
+Cantor uses unconsciously and instinctively everywhere but does not formulate explicitly anywhere, could V' be defined as a subset of V. But even then there would still remain a doubt:
+perhaps the proof involves "inconsistent" multiplicities, indeed possibly contradictory notions,
+and is logically inadmissible already because of that. It is precisely doubts of this kind that impelled
+the editor a few years later to base his own proof of the well-ordering theorem (1904) purely upon
+the axiom of choice without using inconsistent multiplicities.]
+
+Logical introduction to any deductive theory
+ALESSANDRO PADOA
+(1900)
+The text given here is part of an
+"Essai d'une théorie algébrique des nombres entiers, précédé d'une introduction
+logique
+à une théorie déductive quelconque", which was Padoa's contribution to the Third International Congress
+of Philosophy, held in Paris on 1-5
+August 1900, a congress at which were
+present, among others, Poincaré, Peano,
+and Russell. (In the days that immediately followed the congress some of the
+participants were again together at the
+Second International Congress of Mathematicians (6-12 August), at which Hilbert delivered his famous address on unsolved mathematical problems (1900a);
+Padoa again presented his method at this
+congress (1900a).)
+Padoa read his paper, dated "Rome, 1
+July 1900"
+", on 3 August 1900. His
+"logical introduction" deals with the
+relation between a system and its interpretations. In particular, it shows how to
+solve two symmetric problems concerning a deductive system: (1) Is a term
+definable by means of other terms? (2)
+Is a proposition derivable from other
+propositions? Peano already knew at
+that time how to deal with
+the second
+problem and had elaborated a method
+that was to become standard in independence proofs. (On this point see footnote
+539 in Church 1956.) Padoa was the first
+to present a method for establishing the
+Padoa seems to consider it intuitively
+evident." He does not offer a proof of its
+correctness, and such a proof could
+hardly have been undertaken then, because, first, Padoa's system (which is
+Peano's) is ill-defined and, second, many
+results requisite for such a proof were
+still unknown at the time.
+Padoa's method somehow remained in
+the twilight for years. Tarski and Lindenbaum (1926) drew attention to it, announcing a theorem of Tarski's that would
+justify it. Tarski's results were subsequently published (1934, 1935; see also
+1956, chap. X), and they establish that
+the method can be applied to any system
+formalized in a theory of types. McKinsey, apparently not knowing Tarski's
+work, gave (1935) a partial justification
+of the method and some examples of its
+application. Beth (1953, but see also
+1959, pp. 288-293) dealt with the case of
+first-order logic. In the case of this
+weaker logic the proof that Padoa's
+method is correct is essentially more involved because the predicate whose independence has to be ascertained is not in
+the range of any quantifier.
+Using his previously proved interpolation lemma (1957), Craig gave (1957a;
+see also 1956) a simpler proof of Beth's
+result. A. Robinson (1955) had obtained
+a theorem that is equivalent to the interpolation lemma and had derived Beth's
+undefinability, in a given system, of a
+term by means of other terms.
+a He also seems to have overestimated its
+The method is merely stated, and power (see Padoa 1903).
+
+LOGICAL INTRODUCTION TO ANY DEDUCTIVE THEORY 119
+result from it. Schütte (1962) extended
+One point should perhaps be mentioned
+the interpolation lemma and Beth's
+concerning the translation. Padoa, as a
+theorem to intuitionistic logic; for furmember of the Peano school, uses the
+ther results on Padoa's method see
+symbols "P" and "Df" for "proposi-
+Svenonius (1959), Craig (1963), Makkai
+tion " and "definition" respectively, even
+(1964), and Chang (1964); de Bouvère's
+in the plural; he speaks, for instance, of
+work (1959) is closely connected with
+"all particular P". In the translation the
+Padoa's method.
+words "proposition" and "definition"
+The part of the "Essai" not reprohave been restored.
+duced here contains an axiomatization of
+The translation is by the editor, and it
+the signed integers using the primitive is reproduced here with the kind pernotions "integer"
+', "successor", and mission of the Société française de philo-
+"opposite"
+sophie and the Librairie Armand Colin.
+If x and y are individuals, then x = y or x # y. For us, these are the only relations
+that we can consider between individuals without transgressing the boundaries that
+separate general logic from particular deductive theories.?
+As is customarily done, we assume at the beginning of any deductive theory that
+the symbols and the propositions of general logic used in the theory are known; and
+all other symbols considered in it and all other propositions stated in it we call particular symbols and particular propositions of the theory, respectively.
+If to define a symbol means to express it by means of other symbols already considered and if to prove a proposition means to deduce it from other propositions already
+stated, then it is obvious, for any deductive theory, that
+1. When a particular symbol is said to be or not to be definable, we must add: by
+means of the other particular symbols a, b, c,...; and when a particular proposition
+is said to be or not to be provable, we must add: by means of the other particular
+propositions a, b, с,...;3
+2. It is not possible to define all particular symbols and to prove all particular
+propositions.*
+1 Whatever x and y may be, they are individuals of the class "[equal to x] or [equal to y]".
+2 We say particular deductive theories (but in the title and in what follows we omit the word
+particular, leaving it implied) because we could first frame a general deductive theory by considering
+only the symbols and the propositions of general logic.
+Concerning this we read in Peano 1899, p. I1: 'The proof of a proposition of logic has as its
+purpose, in general, not to assure us of its truth, but rather to reduce this mode of reasoning to
+simpler ones, which cannot be decomposed any further and which will be called primitive propositions. Leibniz has expressed several proofs in ordinary language; many can be found in Schröder
+1890. Systems of primitive propositions and of symbolic proofs, as well as remarks about them, are
+contained in Peano 1895, 1897, Revue de mathématiques, Burali-Forti 1894a, Padoa 1898, and
+Couturat 1899. It would be interesting to coordinate these theories". However, we do not intend to
+undertake that here.
+3 Whereas, according to Blaise Pascal (De l'esprit géométrique, I), "there are words that cannot
+be defined... because these terms designate so naturally the things they mean... that to try to
+clarify them would bring obscurity rather than enlightenment", and there are propositions that
+are not provable because there is "nothing clearer to prove them".
+* In the same passage Blaise Pascal, before stating "the way to prove truth and to present it
+to men... as geometry does", gives "the idea of a still superior and more accomplished method,
+but one that men can never attain.... This true method... would consist of two main things...
+to define all terms and prove all propositions".
+. Having arrived at what is our statement 2, he
+
+120
+PADOA
+Thus, in any deductive theory there necessarily are particular symbols that are not
+defined and that, accordingly, we call undefined symbols of the theory.
+Since there is some arbitrariness in the choice of the system of undefined symbols
+of a deductive theory (because it is almost always possible to interchange the role of
+defined and undefined symbols for some of the particular symbols of a given theory),
+it seems to us necessary and natural to begin any deductive theory by explicitly
+and completely stating what this system of symbols is; it seems, however, that few
+authors bother about that.
+(Should we remark that the undefined symbols of a theory do not necessarily
+represent its simplest ideas? Besides, could we imagine a rule enabling us to choose
+infallibly the simpler of two ideas ?)
+In any deductive theory a symbolic definition is nothing but the convention of
+replacing a sequence a of already considered symbols (that is, logical, undefined, or
+already defined symbols) by a new symbol x (new so far as the theory is concerned),
+namely, the convention of taking x = a from now on.
+Therefore, although symbolic definitions are very useful for the conciseness of the
+propositions that follow them, they are not necessary. In fact, by a simple symbolic
+translation (that is, replacing each defined symbol by the sequence of symbols that
+defines it) we can reduce the system of particular symbols of the theory to the system
+of undefined symbols.
+It also follows from what we have said that, among the particular propositions of
+any deductive theory that are not symbolic definitions, there necessarily are propositions that are not proved; accordingly we call them unproved propositions.
+For these propositions we can repeat the remarks made about undefined symbols,
+replacing the words "symbol", "defined", "idea", and "simple" by the words
+"proposition", "proved", "fact"
+', and "obvious", respectively.
+We have already seen that the necessary point of departure for any deductive theory
+whatsoever is a system of undefined symbols and a system of unproved propositions.
+Besides, it is obvious that a deductive theory has no practical significance if its
+undefined symbols and its unproved propositions do not represent (or cannot represent) ideas and facts, respectively. Thus the psychological origin of a deductive theory
+is empirical; nevertheless, its logical point of departure can be considered to be a
+matter of convention.
+Indeed, during the period of elaboration of any deductive theory we choose the ideas
+to be represented by the undefined symbols and the facts to be stated by the unproved
+propositions; but, when we begin to formulate the theory, we can imagine that the
+undefined symbols are completely devoid of meaning and that the unproved propositions (instead of stating facts, that is, relations between the ideas represented by the
+undefined symbols) are simply conditions imposed upon the undefined symbols.
+Then, the system of ideas that we have initially chosen is simply one interpretation
+of the system of undefined symbols; but from the deductive point of view this interpretaconcludes, "Hence it seems that men are naturally and immutably incapable of treating any
+science whatsoever in an absolutely perfect order".
+This pessimism seems unjustified to us, for, if men can never attain the method that Pascal calls
+true, it is not because they are naturally incapable, and so on, but because there is a contradiction
+between this method and the meaning of the words "to define" and "to prove".
+
+LOGICAL INTRODUCTION TO ANY DEDUCTIVE THEORY 121
+tion can be ignored by the reader, who is free to replace it in his mind by another
+interpretation that satisfies the conditions stated by the unproved propositions. And
+since these propositions, from the deductive point of view, do not state facts, but
+conditions, we cannot consider them genuine postulates.
+Logical questions thus become completely independent of empirical or psychological
+questions (and, in particular, of the problem of knowledge), and every question concerning the simplicity of ideas and the obviousness of facts disappears.
+Still, if a script is adopted by convention, it is appropriate to state the system of
+ideas intended to be represented by the system of undefined symbols; or, what
+amounts to the same, it is appropriate to propose a reading of these symbols by words
+or sentences of the ordinary language (adding also explanations in order to make
+more precise the meaning of these words or sentences), provided all that is nothing but a commentary on the theory, very useful in facilitating the reading and the
+understanding of the text but completely useless from the deductive point of view;
+for what is necessary to the logical development of a deductive theory is not the
+empirical knowledge of properties of things, but the formal knowledge of relations
+between symbols.
+From now on we shall consider only deductive theories in which the meaning of
+undefined symbols is stated as mere commentary and that we may call generic
+theories.
+It may be that there are several (or even infinitely many) interpretations of the
+system of undefined symbols that verify the system of unproved propositions and,
+therefore, all the propositions of a theory. The system of undefined symbols can then
+be regarded as the abstraction obtained from all these interpretations, and the generic
+theory can be regarded as the abstraction obtained from the specialized theories that
+result when in the generic theory the system of undefined symbols is successively
+replaced by each of the interpretations of this theory.
+Thus, by means of just one argument that proves a proposition of the generic
+theory we prove implicitly a proposition in each of the specialized theories.®
+We may add that a symbolic definition does not individualize the meaning of the
+symbol it defines; it simply expresses a relation between this symbol and the symbols
+already considered, a relation sufficient to individualize its meaning as soon as we
+choose an interpretation of the system of undefined symbols (or only of the undefined
+symbols that explicitly constitute the definition considered).
+We can now settle completely (and, we believe, for the first time) a question of the
+greatest logical importance.
+Let us consider an arbitrary generic theory and assume (to facilitate our study
+without decreasing its generality) that in the unproved propositions no particular
+symbols are used other than the undefined symbols.?
+We say that the system of undefined symbols is IRREDUCIBLE with respect to the system
+of unproved propositions when no symbolic definition of any undefined symbol can be
+5 Sometimes this empirical knowledge is even dangerous, because it may fill in and hide gaps
+in the arguments.
+6 The principle of duality in projective geometry offers a confirmation of what we assert and
+provides one of the most interesting examples for it.
+" If we do not want to give up symbolic definitions, it is sufficient to state them after the unproved
+propositions.
+
+122
+PADOA
+deduced from the system of unproved propositions, that is, when we cannot deduce from
+the system a relation of the form x = a, where x is one of the undefined symbols and
+a is a sequence of other such symbols (and logical symbols).
+Obviously, the failure of attempts to deduce some relation of the form mentioned
+from the system of unproved propositions is not sufficient to prove the irreducibility
+of which we are speaking; we have to find a method of proving this irreducibility.®
+Let us assume that, after an interpretation of the system of undefined symbols that
+verifies the system of unproved propositions has been determined, all these propositions are still verified if we suitably change the meaning of the undefined symbol x
+only. Then, since the meaning of x is not individualized once we have chosen an
+interpretation of the other undefined symbols, we can assert that it is impossible to
+deduce a relation of the form x = a, where a is a sequence of other undefined symbols,
+from the unproved propositions.
+Conversely, in order to be able to assert that it is impossible to deduce, from the
+unproved propositions, a relation of the form mentioned we must show that the
+meaning of x is not individualized once we have chosen an interpretation of the other
+undefined symbols; and this we do by establishing an interpretation of the system of
+undefined symbols that verifies the system of unproved propositions and that still
+does so if we suitably change the meaning of x only.
+Consequently, to prove that the system of undefined symbols is irreducible with respect
+to the system of unproved propositions it is necessary and sufficient to find, for each
+undefined symbol, an interpretation of the system of undefined symbols that verifies the
+system of unproved propositions and that continues to do so if we suitably change the
+meaning of only the symbol considered.
+In our essay on algebra,' we prove that the system of undefined symbols is irreducible
+with respect to the system of unproved propositions; and that, we believe, has never
+been done before, not even for other theories.
+Let us again consider a theory satisfying the conditions stated above.
+We say that the system of unproved propositions is IRREDUCIBLE (or that these propositions are absolutely independent) when it is not possible to deduce any unproved
+proposition from other such propositions (and the logical propositions).
+Just as above in the case of the irreducibility of the system of primitive symbols,
+we could not accept as a proof of the irreducibility now considered the failure of
+attempts to deduce any unproved proposition from other such propositions. But a
+method of proving this irreducibility has been known for a long time. 1°
+Let us assume that we have established an interpretation of the system of undefined
+symbols that verifies the system of unproved propositions, except for one of these
+propositions. Then this proposition is not a logical consequence of the other propositions; that is, it is not possible to deduce the proposition in question from the other
+unproved propositions.
+Conversely, in order to deny the possibility of deducing the proposition in question
+from the other unproved propositions, we must show that it could be false even if all
+• In case it obtains, of course.
+° ['This refers to the part of the paper that follows the text reproduced here.I
+10 In case it obtains, of course. For example, Peano 1899, p. 30, contains a proof of the absolute
+independence of the unproved propositions of arithmetic.
+
+LOGICAL INTRODUCTION TO ANY DEDUCTIVE THEORY
+123
+the others were true; and this we do by establishing an interpretation of the system
+of undefined symbols that verifies all the other unproved propositions.
+Consequently, to prove that the system of unproved propositions is irreducible it is
+necessary and sufficient to find, for each of these propositions, an interpretation of the
+system of undefined symbols that verifies all the other unproved propositions but not that
+one.
+In our essay on algebra we prove that the system of unproved propositions is
+irreducible.
+Another remark has to be made about symbolic definitions.
+It is sometimes convenient to represent the unique individual belonging to a class
+(already considered in the theory), for example a, by a new symbol, for example x.
+But before stating the proposition "x = the a"
+as a symbolic definition we have to
+ascertain that, from the preceding propositions of the theory or from the hypothesis
+of the definition itself, we can deduce the existence and the uniqueness of the individual
+to be defined, that is, whether from them we can deduce the propositions "there is
+some a" and "for every y and z, if y and z are a, then y = z" (that is, there are no
+two distinct a). For, if we could not deduce them, then, after the proposition "x = the
+a" [had been introduced], we would have the logical right to assert the existence and
+the uniqueness of x, whereas we did not have that right before [introducing the proposition]; this would make the proposition "x = the a" lose the character of a
+symbolic definition [and become an additional axiom]."
+11 Otherwise we would justify those who used to say that God exists by definition. (This is not
+intended to be a theological criticism, but merely a logical remark.)
+Nevertheless, some authors state as symbolic definitions propositions of the form "x = the a"
+without taking the trouble of first deducing from the preceding propositions of the theory the
+existence and the uniqueness of the individual to be defined or of restricting the definition by a
+suitable hypothesis to the case in which this existence and this uniqueness obtain. If they almost
+never make mistakes, it is simply because from their empirical knowledge they draw a proof that
+does not always follow from the propositions stated; and sometimes, by doing this, they seem to
+decrease the number of unproved propositions.
+
+Letter to Frege
+BERTRAND RUSSELL
+(1902)
+Bertrand Russell discovered what became known as the Russell paradox in
+June 1901 (see 1944, p. 13). In the letter
+below, written more than a year later and
+hitherto unpublished, he communicates
+the paradox to Prege. The paradox shook
+the logicians' world, and the rumbles are
+still felt today.
+The Burali-Forti paradox, discovered a
+few years earlier, involves the notion of
+ordinal number; it seemed to be intimately connected
+with Cantor's set
+theory, hence to be the mathematicians'
+concern rather than the logicians'
+. Russell's paradox, which makes use of the
+bare notions of set and element, falls
+squarely in the field of logic. The paradox
+was first published by Russell in The
+principles of mathematics (1903) and is
+discussed there in great detail (see
+especially pp.
+101-107). After various
+attempts, Russell considered the paradox
+solved by the theory of types (1908a).
+Zermelo (below, p. 191, footnote 9) states
+that he had discovered the paradox independently of Russell and communicated
+it to Hilbert, among others, prior to its
+publication by Russell.
+In addition to the statement of the
+paradox, the letter offers a vivid picture
+of Russell's attitude toward Frege and
+his work at the time.
+The formula in Peano's notation at the
+end of the letter can be read more easily
+if one compares it with formula 450 in
+Peano 1898a, p. VII (or 1897, p. 15).
+Russell wrote the letter in German,
+and it was translated by Beverly Woodward. Lord Russell read the translation
+and gave permission to print it here.
+Friday's Hill, Haslemere, 16 June 1902
+Dear colleague,
+For a year and a half I have been acquainted with your Grundgesetze der Arithmetik,
+but it is only now that I have been able to find the time for the thorough study I
+intended to make of your work. I find myself in complete agreement with you in all
+essentials, particularly when you reject any psychological element [Moment] in logic
+and when you place a high value upon an ideography [Begriffsschrift] for the foundations of mathematics and of formal logic, which, incidentally, can hardly be distinguished. With regard to many particular questions, I find in your work discussions,
+distinctions, and definitions that one seeks in vain in the works of other logicians.
+Especially so far as function is concerned (§ 9 of your Begriffsschrift), I have been led
+on my own to views that are the same even in the details. There is just one point
+where I have encountered a difficulty. You state (p. 17 [p. 23 above]) that a function,
+
+LETTER TO FREGE
+125
+too, can act as the indeterminate element. This I formerly believed, but now this view
+seems doubtful to me because of the following contradiction. Let w be the predicate:
+to be a predicate that cannot be predicated of itself. Can w be predicated of itself?
+From each answer its opposite follows. Therefore we must conclude that w is not a
+predicate. Likewise there is no class (as a totality) of those classes which, each taken
+as a totality, do not belong to themselves. From this I conclude that under certain
+circumstances a definable collection [Mengel does not form a totality.
+I am on the point of finishing a book on the principles of mathematics and in it I
+should like to discuss your work very thoroughly.' I already have your books or shall
+buy them soon, but I would be very grateful to you if you could send me reprints of
+your articles in various periodicals. In case this should be impossible, however, I will
+obtain them from a library.
+The exact treatment of logic in fundamental questions, where symbols fail, has
+remained very much behind; in your works I find the best I know of our time, and
+therefore I have permitted myself to express my deep respect to you. It is very
+regrettable that you have not come to publish the second volume of your Grundgesetze; I hope that this will still be done.
+Very respectfully yours,
+BERTRAND RUSSELL
+The above contradiction, when expressed in Peano's ideography, reads as follows:
+=^x3(0X).D:W=W.=.W ~EW.
+I have written to Peano about this, but he still owes me an answer.
+1 [This was done in Russell 1903,
+Appendix A, "The logical and arithmetical doctrines
+of
+Frege " .]
+
+Letter to Russell
+GOTTLOB FREGE
+(1902)
+This is Frege's prompt answer to This is the "transformation of the
+Russell's letter published above. Frege
+generalization of an equality into an
+first calls Russell's attention to an error
+equality of courses-of-values". Whereas
+in Begriffsschrift; it is a mere oversight,
+the function is unsaturated and is not an
+without any consequence (see above,
+object, its Werthverlauf is "something
+p. 15, footnote 12). He then describes his
+complete in itself", an object, in particureaction to the paradox that Russell has
+lar so far as substitution is concerned.
+just communicated to him, and he begins
+There Frege sees the origin of the parato look for the source of the predicament.
+He incriminates the "transformation of
+dox.
+the generalization of an equality into an
+Prege soon made his point more specific. He received Russell's letter while the
+equality of courses-of-values". For Frege
+a function is something incomplete, "unsecond volume of his Grundgesetze der
+Arithmetik was at the printshop, and he
+saturated". When it is written f(x), x is
+something extraneous that merely serves
+barely had the time to add an appendix
+in which he shows how the schema (*)
+to indicate the kind of supplementation
+that is needed; we might just as well
+above (or rather half of it, the implicawrite f(). Consider now two functions
+tion from right to left) allows the derivation of the paradox; he also proposed a
+that, for the same argument, always have
+the same value: (x)(f(x) = g(x)). (This is
+restriction in the schema to prevent that.
+not Frege's notation, but its modern
+Russell, whose Principles of mathematics
+was at the printshop when he received
+equivalent.) Since fand g, or rather f()
+and gl), are something incomplete, we
+Frege's volume, added to his book an
+hame, hoped her
+appendix in which he endorsed Frege's
+cannot simply write f = g. Functions are
+emendation. But soon thereafter he tried
+not objects, and in order to treat them,
+out various other solutions (1905a); he
+in some respect, as objects Frege introduces their Werthverlauf. The Werthverfinally proposed his theory of types
+(1908a).
+lauf of a function f(x) is denoted by
+Russell's paradox has been leaven in
+if (E) (where & is a dummy; we can also
+modern logic, and countless works have
+write åf(a),...). The expression
+"the
+dealt with it. For a late and thorough
+function f(x) has the same Werthverlauf
+as the function g(x)" is taken to mean
+study of Frege's "way out"
+, see Quine
+1955.
+"for the same argument the function
+When Lord Russell was asked whether
+f(x) always has the same value as the
+function g(x)"
+he would consent to the publication of
+, and we can write (in
+modern notation)
+his letter to Frege (1902), he replied with
+(*) (X)(f(x) = g(x)) = (Ef (E) = 3g (x)).
+the following letter, in which the reader
+will find a stirring tribute to Frege.
+
+LETTER TO RUSSELL
+127
+Penrhyndeudraeth, 23 November 1962
+Dear Professor van Heijenoort,
+I should be most pleased if you would
+publish the correspondence between
+Frege and myself, and I am grateful to
+you for suggesting this. As I think
+about acts of integrity and grace, I
+personal disappointment. It was almost
+superhuman and a telling indication of
+that of which men are capable if their
+dedication
+is to creative work and
+knowledge instead of cruder efforts to
+dominate and be known.
+Yours sincerely,
+Bertrand Russell
+realise that there is nothing in my
+knowledge to compare with Frege's
+dedication to truth. His entire life's
+The translation of Frege's letter is by
+work was on the verge of completion,
+Beverly Woodward, and it is printed here
+much of his work had been ignored to
+with the kind permission of Verlag Felix
+the benefit of men infinitely less cap-
+Meiner and the Institut für mathemaable, his second volume was about to tische Logik und Grundlagenforschung in
+be published, and upon finding that his
+Münster, who are preparing an edition
+fundamental assumption was in error,
+of Frege's scientific correspondence and
+he responded with intellectual pleasure
+hitherto unpublished writings; this edition
+clearly submerging any feelings of will include the German text of the letter.
+Jena, 22 June 1902
+Dear colleague,
+Many thanks for your interesting letter of 16 June. I am pleased that you agree
+with me on many points and that you intend to discuss my work thoroughly. In
+response to your request I am sending you the following publications:
+1. "Kritische Beleuchtung" [1895],
+2. "Ueber die Begriffsschrift des Herrn Peano" [1896],
+3. "Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand" [18921,
+4. "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" [1892a],
+5. "Veber formale Theorien der Arithmetik" [1885]].
+I received an empty envelope that seems to be addressed by your hand. I surmise
+that you meant to send me something that has been lost by accident. If this is the
+case, I thank you for your kind intention. I am enclosing the front of the envelope.
+When I now read my Begriffsschrift again, I find that I have changed my views on
+many points, as you will see if you compare it with my Grundgesetze der Arithmetik.
+I ask you to delete the paragraph beginning "Nicht minder erkennt man" on page
+7 of my Begriffsschrift ["'It is no less easy to see", p. 15 abovel, since it is incorrect;
+incidentally, this had no detrimental effects on the rest of the booklet's contents.
+Your discovery of the contradiction caused me the greatest surprise and, I would
+almost say, consternation, since it has shaken the basis on which I intended to build
+arithmetic. It seems, then, that transforming the generalization of an equality into
+an equality of courses-of-values [die Umwandlung der Allgemeinheit einer Gleichheit
+in eine Werthverlaufsgleichheit]] (§ 9 of my Grundgesetze) is not always permitted,
+that my Rule V (§ 20, p. 36) is false, and that my explanations in § 31 are not sufficient
+to ensure that my combinations of signs have
+a meaning in all cases. I must reflect
+further on the matter. It is all the more serious since, with the loss of my Rule V, not
+
+128
+only the foundations of my arithmetic, but also the sole possible foundations of
+arithmetic, seem to vanish. Yet, I should think, it must be possible to set up conditions for the transformation of the generalization of an equality into an equality of
+courses-of-values such that the essentials of my proofs remain intact. In any case your
+discovery is very remarkable and will perhaps result in a great advance in logic,
+unwelcome as it may seem at first glance.
+Incidentally, it seems to me that the expression "a predicate is predicated of itself"
+is not exact. A predicate is as a rule a first-level function, and this function requires
+an object as argument and cannot have itself as argument (subject). Therefore I
+would prefer to say "a notion is predicated of its own extension". If the function
+$(§) is a concept, I denote its extension (or the corresponding class) by "ZФ(e)" (to
+be sure, the justification for this has now become questionable to me). In "Ф(₴Ф(є))"
+оґ "¿Ф(є) n ₴Ф(c) '1 we then have a case in which the concept $(§) is predicated of its
+own extension.
+The second volume of my Grundgesetze is to appear shortly. I shall no doubt have
+to add an appendix in which your discovery is taken into account. If only I already
+had the right point of view for that!
+Very respectfully yours,
+G. FREGE
+" I"n" is a sign used by Frege for reducing second-level functions to first-level functions. See
+Frege 1893, § 34.])
+
+On the foundations of logic and arithmetic
+(1904)
+This is the text of an address delivered
+the various points of view held at that
+by Hilbert on 12 August 1904 at the
+time on the foundations of arithmetic and
+Third International Congress of Matheintroduces the themes that Hilbert is
+maticians, held in Heidelberg on 8-13
+going to develop, modify, or make more
+August 1904.
+precise in his further work in the founda-
+In the last years of the nineteenth
+tions of mathematics: the reduction of
+century Hilbert provided a satisfactory
+mathematics to a collection of formulas,
+axiomatization of geometry (1899). He
+the extralogical existence of basic obthen (1900) offered a set of axioms for
+jects, like 1, and their combinations, and
+the real numbers and indicated that the
+the construction of logic in parallel with
+question of the consistency of geometry
+the study of these combinations.
+comes down to that of the real-number
+The presentation remains tentative and
+system. At the Paris International Con- sketchy. Only many years later (1917)
+gress of Mathematicians in 1900, as a
+will Hilbert come back to the problems of
+natural continuation of this work, he
+the foundations of mathematics and then
+placed the consistency of the real-number
+present the mature and enriched papers
+system on a list of problems challenging
+of the twenties (1922, 1922a, 1925, 1927).
+the mathematical world (1900a, pp. 261
+The 1904 paper provides a helpful land-
+266). He did not outline any approach,
+mark in the development of Hilbert's
+simply stressing that a relative consisconceptions.
+tency proof seemed out of the question
+The paper was commented upon by
+and that, therefore, the problem pre- Poincaré (1905, pp. 17-27; 1908, pp.
+sented a fundamental difficulty.
+179-191) and Pieri (1906). Later com-
+Meanwhile the Russell paradox be- mentaries can be found in Bernays (1935,
+came known, and the question of consispp. 199-200) and Blumenthal (1935,
+tency became more pressing. In 1904, in
+p. 422). The paper greatly influenced
+the paper below, Hilbert presents a first
+Julius König's book (1914), which in turn
+attempt at proving the consistency of inspired von Neumann in his search for a
+arithmetic. In fact, his plan-to show
+consistency proof of arithmetic (1927,
+that all the formulas of a certain class
+footnote 8, p. 22).
+possess a certain property (that ot being
+An English translation of Hilbert's
+"homogeneous") by showing that the paper was published (1905) in The
+initial formulas have it and the rules
+monist, but we have not found it possible
+transmit it—is the prototype of a device
+to use it. The present translation is by
+now current in investigations of that
+Beverly Woodward, and it is printed here
+nature. Besides the search for a consiswith the kind permission of B. G. Teubner
+tency proof the paper offers a critique of Verlagsgesellschaft, Stuttgart.
+
+130
+While we are essentially in agreement today as to the paths to be taken and the
+goals to be sought when we are engaged in research into the foundations of geometry,
+the situation is quite different with regard to the inquiry into the foundations of
+arithmetic; here investigators still hold a wide variety of sharply conflicting opinions.
+In fact, some of the difficulties in the foundations of arithmetic are different in
+nature from those that had to be overcome when the foundations of geometry were
+established. In examining the foundations of geometry it was possible for us to leave
+aside certain difficulties of a purely arithmetic nature; but recourse to another fundamental discipline does not seem to be allowed when the foundations of arithmetic are
+at issue. The principal difficulties that we encounter when providing a foundation
+for arithmetic will be brought out most clearly if I submit the points of view of
+several investigators to a brief critical discussion.
+I. Kronecker, as is well known, saw in the notion of the integer the real foundation
+of arithmetic; he came up with the idea that the integer-and, in fact, the integer
+as a general notion (parameter value)—is directly and immediately given; this prevented him from recognizing that the notion of integer must and can have a foundation. I would call him a dogmatist, to the extent that he accepts the integer with
+its essential properties as a dogma and does not look further back.
+H. Helmholtz represents the standpoint of the empiricist; the standpoint of pure
+experience, however, seems to me to be refuted by the objection that the existence,
+possible or actual, of an arbitrarily large number can never be derived from experience, that is, through experiment. For even though the number of things that
+are
+objects of our experience is large, it still lies below a finite bound.
+E. B. Christoffel and all those opponents of Kronecker's who, guided by the correct
+feeling that without the notion of irrational number the whole of analysis would be
+condemned to sterility, attempt to save the existence of the irrational number by
+discovering "positive"
+properties of this notion or by similar means, I would call
+opportunists. In my opinion they have not succeeded in giving a pertinent refutation
+of Kronecker's conception.
+Among the scholars who have probed more deeply into the essence of the integer
+I mention the following.
+G. Frege sets himself the task of founding the laws of arithmetic by the devices of
+logic, taken in the traditional sense. He has the merit of having correctly recognized
+the essential properties of the notion of integer as well as the significance of inference
+by mathematical induction. But, true to his plan, he accepts among other things the
+fundamental principle that a concept (a set) is defined and immediately usable if only
+it is determined for every object whether the object is subsumed under the concept
+or not, and here he imposes no restriction on the notion "every"; he thus exposes
+himself to precisely the set-theoretic paradoxes that are contained, for example, in the
+notion of the set of all sets and that show, it seems to me, that the conceptions and
+means of investigation prevalent in logic, taken in the traditional sense, do not
+measure up to the rigorous demands that set theory imposes. Rather, from the very
+beginning a major goal of the investigations into the notion of number should be to avoid
+such contradictions and to clarify these paradoxes.
+R. Dedekind clearly recognized the mathematical difficulties encountered when a
+foundation is sought for the notion of number; for the first time he offered a construc-
+
+131
+tion of the theory of integers, and in fact an extremely sagacious one. However, I
+would call his method transcendental insofar as in proving the existence of the infinite
+he follows a method that, though its fundamental idea is used in a similar way by
+philosophers,
+I cannot recognize as practicable or secure because it employs the
+notion of the totality of all objects, which involves an unavoidable contradiction.
+G. Cantor sensed the contradictions just mentioned and expressed this awareness
+by differentiating between "consistent" and "inconsistent" sets. But, since in my
+opinion he does not provide a precise criterion for this distinction, I must characterize
+his conception on this point as one that still leaves latitude for subjective judgment
+and therefore affords no objective certainty.
+It is my opinion that all the difficulties touched upon can be overcome and that we
+can provide a rigorous and completely satistying foundation for the notion of number,
+and in fact by a method that I would call axiomatic and whose fundamental idea I
+wish to develop briefly in what follows.
+Arithmetic is often considered to be a part of logic, and the traditional fundamental
+logical notions are usually presupposed when it is a question of establishing a foundation for arithmetic. If we observe attentively, however, we realize that in the
+traditional exposition of the laws of logic certain fundamental arithmetic notions are
+already used, for example, the notion of set and, to some extent, also that of number.
+Thus we find ourselves turning in a circle, and that is why a partly simultaneous
+development of the laws of logic and of arithmetic is required if paradoxes are to be
+avoided.
+In the brief space of an address I can merely indicate how I conceive of this common
+construction. I beg to be excused, therefore, if I succeed only in giving you an approximate idea of the direction my researches are taking. In addition, to make myself more
+easily understood, I shall make more use of ordinary language "in words" and of the
+laws of logic indirectly expressed in it than would be desirable in an exact construction.
+Let an object of our thought be called a thought-object [Gedankending] or, briefly,
+an object [Ding] and let it be denoted by a sign.
+We take as a basis of our considerations a first thought-object, 1 (one). We call
+what we obtain by putting together two, three, or more occurrences of this object,
+for example,
+I1, Ill, 1111,
+combinations [Kombinationen] of the object 1 with itself; also, any combinations of
+these combinations, such as
+(1)(11), (11)(11)(11), ((11)(11))(11), ((111)(1))(1),
+are again called combinations of the object 1 with itself. The combinations likewise
+are just called objects and then, to distinguish it, the basic thought-object 1 is called
+a simple object.
+We now add a second simple thought-object and denote it by the sign = (equals).
+Then we form combinations of these two thought-objects, for example,
+1=, 11=,..., (1)(=1)(===), ((11)(1)(=))(==), 1=1, (11) = (1) (1).
+We say that the combination a of the simple objects 1 and = differs from the
+
+132
+combination b of these objects if the combinations deviate in any way from each
+other with regard to the mode and order of succession in the combinations or the
+choice and place of the objects 1 and = themselves, that is, if a and b are not identical
+with each other.
+Now we think of the combinations of these two simple objects as falling into two
+classes, the class of entities [die Klasse der Seienden] and that of nonentities [die der
+Nichtseienden]: each object belonging to the class of entities differs from each object
+belonging to the class of nonentities. Every combination of the two simple objects 1
+and = belongs to one of these two classes.
+If a is a combination of the two objects 1 and = taken as primitive, then we
+denote also by a the proposition that a belongs to the class of entities and by à the
+proposition that a belongs to the class of nonentities. We call a a true proposition if a
+belongs to the class of entities; on the other hand, let à be called a true proposition if
+a belongs to the class of nonentities. The propositions a and à form a contradiction.
+The composite [Inbegriff] of two propositions A and B, expressed in signs by
+A B,
+and in words by "from A, B follows" or "if A is true, so is B", is also called a
+proposition; here A is called the supposition [Voraussetzung] and B the assertion
+[Behauptung]. Supposition and assertion may themselves in turn consist of several
+propositions A1, Az, or B1, Bz, Bz, and so forth, and we have in signs
+A1a. A2/ By O. Bz O. Bz,
+in words "from A1 and Az, B, or Bz or Bз follows"
+, and so forth.
+With the sign o. (or) at our disposal it would be possible to avoid the sign |, since
+negation has already been introduced; I use it in this address merely in order to follow
+ordinary language as closely as possible.
+We shall understand by A1, Az,... the propositions that, briefly stated, result
+from a proposition A(x) if we take the thought-objects 1 and = and their combinations in place of the "arbitrary object" [der "Willkürlichen"] x; then we write the
+propositions 410. Azo. Az... and Aja. Aza. Az... also as follows: A(x), in
+words "for at least one x"
+', and A(x'a)), in words "for every x", respectively; we
+regard this merely as an abbreviated way of writing.
+From the two objects 1 and = taken as primitive we now form the following
+propositions:
+1.
+X = Х,
+2.
+{x = у а.Ш(х)}/ Ш(У).
+Here x (in the sense of x'a)) means each of the two thought-objects taken as primi.
+tive and every combination of them; in 2, y (in the sense of ya) likewise can be each
+of these objects and every combination; further, W(x) is an "arbitrary" combination
+containing the "arbitrary object" x (in the sense of xa)). Proposition 2 reads in words
+"from x = y and w(x), W(Y) follows"
+Propositions 1 and 2 form the definition of the notion = (equals) and accordingly
+are also called axioms.
+If we put the simple objects 1 and = or particular combinations of them in place
+
+133
+of the arbitrary objects x and y in Axioms 1 and 2, particular propositions result,
+which may be called consequences [Folgerungen] of these axioms. We consider a
+sequence of certain consequences such that the suppositions of the last consequence
+of the sequence are identical with the assertions of the preceding consequences. If we
+then take the suppositions of the preceding consequences as supposition, and the
+assertion of the last consequence as assertion, a new proposition results, which can
+in turn be called a consequence of the axioms. By continuing this deduction process we
+can obtain further consequences.
+We now select from these consequences those that have the simple form of the
+proposition a (assertion without supposition), and we gather the objects a thus
+obtained into the class of entities, whereas the objects that differ from these are to
+belong to the class of nonentities. We recognize that only consequences of the form
+a = a result from 1 and 2, where a is a combination of the objects 1 and =. Axioms
+1 and 2 for their part, too, are satisfied with regard to this partition of the objects into
+the two classes, that is, they are true propositions, and because of this property of
+Axioms 1 and 2 we say that the notion = (equals) defined by them is a consistent
+notion.
+I would like to call attention to the fact that Axioms 1 and 2 do not contain any
+proposition of the form à at all, that is, a proposition according to which a combination is to be found in the class of nonentities. Therefore, we could also satisfy the
+axioms by including all the combinations of the two simple objects in the class of
+entities and leaving the class of nonentities empty. But the partition, chosen above,
+into two classes shows better how we must proceed in subsequent, more difficult, cases.
+We now carry the construction of the logical foundations of mathematical thought
+further by adjoining to the two thought-objects 1 and = the three additional thoughtobjects u (infinite set, infinite [UnendlichI), f (following [Folgendes]]), f' (accompanying operation [begleitende Operation]) and stipulating for them the following axioms:
+3.
+f(U1X) = 1 (f'x),
+4.
+f(11X) = f(11Y)|IX = HY,
+5.
+f(112) = u1.
+Here the arbitrary object x (in the sense of xa)) stands for each of the five thoughtobjects now taken as primitive and every combination of them. The thought-object
+I will be called, simply, infinite set and the combination ux (for example, uI, 4(11),
+uf) an element of this infinite set u. Axiom 3 then states that each element ux is
+followed by a definite thought-object f(ux), which is equal to an element of the set 11,
+namely, the element u(f'x), that is, which likewise belongs to the set u. Axiom 4
+expresses the fact that, if the same element follows two elements of the set u, these
+two elements themselves are equal. According to Axiom 5 there is no element in u
+that is followed by the element ul; the element ul may therefore be called the first
+element in u.
+We now have to subject Axioms 1-5 to an investigation corresponding to that
+previously carried out for Axioms 1 and 2; in doing so we must observe that Axioms
+I and 2 now apply to a larger class of objects inasmuch as the arbitrary objects x
+and y now denote any arbitrary combination of the five simple objects taken as
+primitive.
+
+134
+We ask again whether certain consequences from Axioms 1-5 form a contradiction
+or whether, on the contrary, the five thought-objects taken as primitive, 1, =, u, f,
+f', and their combinations can be so distributed into the class of entities and the class
+of nonentities that Axioms 1-5 are satisfied with regard to this partition into two
+classes, that is, that every consequence of these axioms becomes a true proposition
+with regard to this partition. To answer this question we note that Axiom 5 is the
+only one giving rise to propositions of the form à, that is, to propositions asserting
+that a combination a of the five thought-objects taken as primitive is to belong to
+the class of nonentities. Accordingly, propositions that form a contradiction with 5
+must certainly be of the form
+but such a consequence cannot result from Axioms 1-4 in any way.
+To see this, we call the equation (that is, the thought-object) a = b a homogeneous
+equation if a and b are combinations of two simple objects each, likewise if a and b
+are combinations of three simple objects each or of four, and so forth; for example,
+(11) = (fu), (ff = (uf), (f11) = (41=),
+(1)(111))=(1)(11)(11)) (14111== (441111)
+are called homogeneous equations. From Axioms 1 and 2 alone follow, as we have
+seen previously, only homogeneous equations, namely, the equations of the form
+a = a. In the same way Axiom 3 yields only homogeneous equations if in it we take
+any thought-object for x. Likewise Axiom 4 certainly always exhibits a homogeneous
+equation in the assertion if the assumption is a homogeneous equation, and consequently from Axioms 1-4 only homogeneous equations can appear as consequences.
+But now equation 6, which after all was the one to be proved, is certainly not a
+homogeneous equation, since in it we are to take a combination in place of xlo) and
+the left side thereby becomes a combination of three or more simple objects, while
+the right side remains a combination of the two simple objects u and 1.
+The fundamental idea needed for recognizing the truth of my assertion has thus, I
+believe, been presented. In order to carry out the proof completely we need the
+notion of finite ordinal number, as well as certain theorems concerning the notion of
+equinumerousness, which we could in fact easily state and derive at this point; to
+develop completely the fundamental idea presented here, we must still consider those
+points of view to which I shall refer briefly at the close of my address (see V below).
+Thus we obtain the desired partition if we put all objects a, where a is a consequence of Axioms 1-4, into the class of entities and all objects that differ from these
+—in particular, the objects f(ux) = ul—into the class of nonentities. Having thus
+established a certain property for the axioms adopted here, we recognize that they
+never lead to any contradiction at all, and therefore we speak of the thought-objects
+defined by means of them, u, f, and f', as consistent notions or operations, or as
+consistently existing. So far as the notion of the infinite u, in particular, is concerned,
+the assertion of the existence of the infinite u appears to be justified by the argument
+outlined above; for it now receives a definite meaning and a content that henceforth
+is always to be employed.
+
+135
+The considerations just sketched constitute the first case in which a direct proof of
+consistency has been successfully carried out for axioms, whereas the method of a
+suitable specialization, or of the construction of examples, which is otherwise customary for such proofs—in geometry in particular-necessarily fails here.
+We see that the success of this direct proof here is essentially due to the fact that a
+proposition of the form à, that is, a proposition according to which a certain combination is to belong to the class of nonentities, occurs as assertion in only one place,
+namely, in Axiom 5.
+If we translate the well-known axioms for mathematical induction into the
+language I have chosen, we arrive in a similar way at the consistency of this larger
+number of axioms, that is, at the proof of the consistent existence of what we call the
+smallest infinite' (that is, of the ordinal type 1, 2, 3,...).
+It is not difficult to provide a foundation for the notion of finite ordinal according
+to the principles adopted above; this can be done on the basis of an axiom stating
+that every set containing the first element of the ordinal and, whenever any element
+belongs to it, containing the succeeding one also, must certainly always contain the
+last element. Here we very easily obtain a proof of the consistency of the axioms by
+adducing an example, for instance, the number two. The point then is to show that
+the elements of the finite ordinal can be so ordered that every subset of it has a first
+and a last element—a fact that we prove by defining a thought-object < through
+the axiom
+(x <ya.y <z|× <z
+and then recognizing the consistency of the axioms obtained when this new axiom is
+added, provided x, y, and z denote arbitrary elements of the finite ordinal. If we also
+make use of the fact that the smallest infinite exists, it then follows that for every
+finite ordinal a still greater one can be found.
+The principles that must constitute the standard for the construction and further
+elaboration of the laws of mathematical thought in the way envisaged here are,
+briefly, the following.
+I. Once arrived at a certain stage in the development of the theory, I may say that
+a further proposition is true as soon as we recognize that no contradiction results if it
+is added as an axiom to the propositions previously found true, that is, that it leads
+to consequences that all are true propositions with regard to a certain partition of the
+objects into the class of entities and that of nonentities.
+II. In the axioms the arbitrary objects—taking the place of the notion "every"
+or "all" in ordinary logic-represent only those thought-objects and their mutual
+combinations that at this stage are taken as primitive or are to be newly defined.
+In the derivation of consequences from the axioms the arbitrary objects that occur in
+the axioms may therefore be replaced only by such thought-objects and their combinations. We must also duly note that, when a new thought-object is added and
+taken as primitive, the axioms previously assumed apply to a larger class of objects
+or must be suitably modified.
+III. A set is generally defined as a thought-object m, and the combinations ma are
+called the elements of the set m, so that—contrary to the usual conception-the
+1 See Hilbert 1900a, sec. 2, "Die Widerspruchslosigkeit der arithmetischen Axiome".
+
+136
+notion of element of a set appears only as a subsequent product of the notion of set
+itself.
+Just like the notion "set"
+, the notions "mapping"
+, "transformation"
+', "relation",
+and "function" are also thought-objects, for which, exactly as was the case above
+with the notion "infinite", we have to consider suitable axioms and which can then
+be recognized as consistently existing if the combinations in question can be distributed into the class of entities and that of nonentities.
+Point I expresses the creative principle that, in its freest use, justifies us in forming
+ever new notions, with the sole restriction that we avoid a contradiction. The paradoxes mentioned at the beginning of this address become impossible by virtue of II
+and III; this holds in particular for the paradox of the set of all sets that do not contain themselves as elements.
+To show that the notion of set defined in III agrees to a large extent in content
+with the ordinary notion of set, I will prove the following theorem :
+Let 1,...,a,.... I be the thought-objects taken as primitive at a certain stage in
+the development and let a(§) be a combination of them containing the arbitrary
+object §; further let ala) be a true proposition (that is, let ala) be in the class of
+entities). Then there certainly exists a thought-object m such that a(mx) represents
+only true propositions for the arbitrary object x (that is, that alm) is always in the
+class of entities), and conversely, also, every object § for which a(§) represents a true
+proposition is equated to a combination malo), so that the proposition
+is true, that is, the objects § for which a(5) becomes a true proposition form the
+elements of a set m in the sense of the above definition.
+To prove this, we take the following axiom: let m be a thought-object for which
+the propositions
+a(5)|m§ =$,
+a(5)|m§= a,
+are true; that is, if § is an object such that a(§) belongs to the class of entities, then
+mš = § is to hold, otherwise m§ = a. We add this axiom to the axioms that hold for
+the objects 1,...,a,..., I, and we then assume that a contradiction thus appears,
+that is, that for the objects 1,..., a,..., t, m, the propositions
+p(m)
+and p(m),
+say, are at the same time consequences, p(m) being a certain combination of the
+objects 1,..., t, m. Here 8 means in words the stipulation: m§ = a if a(f) belongs to
+the class of nonentities. Wherever in p(m) the object m appears in the combination
+mš, let us, in accordance with Axioms 7 and 8 and taking 2 into account, replace the
+combination m§ by § or a; let q(m) (where q(m) now no longer contains the object m
+in a combination mx) be obtained in this way from p(m); then q(m) would have to be
+a consequence of the axioms? originally posited for 1,..., a,.... I, and therefore
+would have to remain true even if we took for m any one of these objects, say, the
+2 [The German text has "dem..Axiome", but the argument seems to call for the plural;
+the version in Hilbert 1930a has the plural.]
+
+137
+object 1. Since the same considerations also hold for the proposition p(m), the
+contradiction
+q(1) and q(1)
+would therefore also exist at the original stage at which the objects 1, ...,a,.... t
+were taken as primitive; but this cannot be, if we assume that the objects 1,...., t
+exist consistently. We must therefore reject our assumption that a contradiction
+occurs; that is, m exists consistently, which was to be proved.
+IV. If we want to investigate a given system of axioms according to the principles
+above, we must distribute the combinations of the objects taken as primitive into
+two classes, that of entities and that of nonentities, with the axioms playing the role
+of prescriptions that the partition must satisfy. The main difficulty will consist in
+recognizing the possibility of distributing all objects into the two classes, that of
+entities and that of nonentities. The question whether this distribution is possible is
+essentially equivalent to the question whether the consequences we can obtain from
+the axioms by specialization and combination in the sense explained earlier lead to a
+contradiction or not, if we still add the familiar modes of logical inference such as
+{(a b) a. (a/b)} |b,
+{(ao.b) a. (ao. c)} | {a0. (ba. c)}.
+We can then recognize the consistency of the axioms either by showing how a possible
+contradiction would already have to have occurred at an earlier stage in the development of the theory or by making the assumption that there is a proof leading from
+the axioms to a certain contradiction and then showing that such a proof is not possible, because it would itself contain a contradiction. Thus the proof sketched above
+for the consistent existence of the infinite came down to the recognition that a proof
+of equation 6 from Axioms 1-4 is not possible.
+V. Whenever in the preceding we spoke of several thought-objects, of several
+combinations, of various kinds of combinations, or of several arbitrary objects, a
+bounded number of such objects was to be understood. Now that we have established
+the definition of the finite number we are in a position to comprehend the general
+meaning of this way of speaking. The meaning of the "arbitrary" consequence and
+of the "differing" of one proposition from all propositions of a certain kind is also
+now, on the basis of the definition of the finite number (corresponding to the idea of
+mathematical induction) susceptible of an exact description by means of a recursive
+procedure. It is in this way that we can carry out completely the proof, sketched
+above, that the proposition f(ux)) = ul differs from every proposition obtained as a
+consequence of Axioms 1-4 by a finite number of steps; we need only consider the
+proof itself to be a mathematical object, namely, a finite set whose elements are
+connected by propositions stating that the proof leads from 1-4 to 6, and we must
+then show that such a proof contains a contradiction and therefore does not exist
+consistently in the sense defined by us.
+The existence of the totality [Inbegriff] of real numbers can be demonstrated in a
+way similar to that in which the existence of the smallest infinite can be proved; in
+fact, the axioms for real numbers as I have set them up (1903, pp. 24-26) can be
+expressed by precisely such formulas as the axioms hitherto assumed. In particular,
+
+138
+so far as the axiom I called the completeness axiom [Vollständigkeitsaxiom] is concerned, it expresses the fact that the totality of real numbers contains, in the sense of
+a one-to-one correspondence between elements, any other set whose elements satisfy
+also the axioms that precede; thus considered, the completeness axiom, too, becomes
+a stipulation expressible by formulas constructed like those above, and the axioms
+for the totality of real numbers do not differ qualitatively in any respect from, say,
+the axioms necessary for the definition of the integers. In the recognition of this fact
+lies, I believe, the real refutation of the conception of the foundations of arithmetic
+associated with L. Kronecker and characterized at the beginning of my lecture as
+dogmatic.
+In the same way we can show that the fundamental notions of Cantor's set theory,
+in particular Cantor's alephs, have a consistent existence.
+
+Proof that every set can be well-ordered
+(1904)
+Zermelo's very short paper is a part of
+The proof remains relatively simple
+a letter to Hilbert dated 'Münden in
+because it makes use of a powerful new
+Hannover, 24 September 1904". Cantor
+mathematical tool, the axiom of choice.
+(1883, p. 550, or 1932, p. 169) had con-
+What Zermelo proves is, in fact, that
+jectured that "every well-defined set can
+the axiom of choice implies the wellbe brought into the form of a well-ordered
+ordering theorem. Tacitly used for years
+set" and had seen in that a "fundamental
+in mathematical arguments, incidentally
+law of thought [Denkgesetz] of great
+stated and rejected by Peano (1890,
+consequence, particularly noteworthy for
+p. 210), recognized as a new matheits universal validity". Several times he
+matical principle by Beppo Levi (1902,
+announced a proof of the conjecture. At
+p. 864), suggested to Zermelo by Erhard
+the International Congress of Mathema-
+Schmidt, the axiom was immediately
+ticians in Paris Hilbert (1900a, p. 264)
+put in the limelight by the importance
+listed the discovery of such a proof as
+of the theorem that could
+now
+be
+one of the most important tasks conproved.
+fronting the mathematical world. At the
+The proof provoked sharp reactions
+Third International Congress of Mathemaamong mathematicians, so sharp that a
+ticians in Heidelberg, J. König presented
+few years later Zermelo had to discuss
+on 10 August 1904 what he considered a
+them at length, after presenting a second
+proof that there is no well-ordering of the
+version of the proof (see below, pp. 183-
+continuum, but he had to withdraw it 198).
+shortly afterward (see below, p. 192,
+The translation is by Stefan Bauerfootnote 10). Less than two months Mengelberg, and it is printed here
+later, Zermelo completed his proof of the with the kind permission of Springer
+existence of such a well-ordering.
+Verlag.
+...The proof in question grew out of conversations that I had last week with Mr.
+Erhard Schmidt, and it is as follows.
+(1) Let M be an arbitrary set of cardinality m, let m denote an arbitrary element
+of it, let M', of cardinality m', be a subset of M that contains at least one element m
+and may even contain all elements of M, and let M - M' be the subset "complementary" to M'. Two subsets are regarded as distinct if one of them contains some
+element that does not occur in the other. Let the set of all subsets M' be denoted
+by M.
+(2) Imagine that with every subset M' there is associated an arbitrary element m'i that
+
+140
+occurs in M' itself: let m' be called the "distinguished" element of M'. This yields a
+"covering" y of the set M by certain elements of the set M. The number of these
+coverings y is equal to the product Im' taken over all subsets M' and is therefore
+certainly different from O. In what follows we take an arbitrary covering y and derive
+from it a definite well-ordering of the elements of M.
+(3) Definition. Let us apply the term "y-set" to any well-ordered set M, that
+consists entirely of elements of M and has the following property: whenever a is an
+arbitrary element of My and A is the "associated" segment, which consists of the
+elements x of M such that x < a, a is the distinguished element of M - A
+(4) There are y-sets included in M. Thus, for example, [the set containing just] m1,
+the distinguished element of M' when M' = M, is itself a y-set; so is the (ordered)
+set Mz = (my, Mz), where m, is the distinguished element of M - my.
+(5) Whenever M', and M", are any two distinct y-sets (associated, however, with the
+same covering y chosen once for all!), one of the two is identical with a segment of the
+other.
+For, of the two well-ordered sets, let M', be the one for which there exists a similar
+mapping onto the other, M',, or onto one of its segments. Then any two elements
+corresponding to each other under this mapping must be identical. For the first
+element of every y-set is my, since the associated segment A contains no element and
+therefore M - A = M. If now m' were the first element of M', that differs from the
+corresponding element m", the associated segments A' and A" would still have to be
+identical, consequently also the complements M - A' and M - A", and thus their
+distinguished elements m'and m" themselves, contrary to assumption.
+(6) Consequences. If two y-sets have an element a in common, they also have the
+segment A of the preceding elements in common. If they have two elements a and b
+in common, then either in both sets a < b or in both sets b < a.
+(7) If we call any element of M that occurs in some y-set a "y-element", the following theorem holds: The totality L, of all y-elements can be so ordered that it will itself be a
+y-set, and it contains all elements of the original set M. M itself is thereby well-ordered.
+(I) If a and b are two arbitrary y-elements and if M', and. M", are any two y-sets
+to which they respectively belong, then according to (5) the larger of the two y-sets
+contains both elements and determines whether the order relation is a < 6 or b < a.
+According to (6) this order relation is independent of the y-sets selected.
+(II) If a, b, and c are three arbitrary y-elements and if a < band b < c, then always
+a < c. For according to (6) every y-set containing c also contains b, hence also a,
+and then, since it is simply ordered, within the set, a ‹ c indeed follows from a < b
+and b < c. The set I, is therefore simply ordered.
+(III) If I', is an arbitrary subset of I and a is one of its elements, belonging, say,
+to the y-set My then according to (6) M, contains all elements preceding a, hence
+includes the subset L', that is obtained from Li, when all elements following a are
+removed; I',, being a subset of the well-ordered set My possesses a first element,
+which is also the first element of I,. L, is therefore also well-ordered
+(IV) If a is an arbitrary y-element and A the totality of all preceding elements
+x < a, then according to (6), in every set M, containing a, A is the segment associated
+with a; according to (3), consequently, a is the distinguished element of M - A.
+Therefore I, is itself a y-set.
+
+EVERY SET CAN BE WELL-ORDERED
+141
+(V) If there existed an element of M that belonged to no y-set, that consequently
+was an element of M - Ly, there would also exist a distinguished element mí of
+M - Iy, and the ordered set (Ly, m), in which every y-element precedes the element
+min world tell according to l be a 1,a. Then mi too would lo a redoment,
+Accordingly, to every covering y there corresponds a definite well-ordering of the
+set M, even if the well-orderings that correspond to two distinct coverings are not
+always themselves distinct. There must at any rate exist at least one such wellordering, and every set for which the totality of subsets, and so on, is meaningful
+may be regarded as well-ordered and its cardinality as an "aleph". It therefore
+follows that, for every transfinite cardinality,
+m = 2m = x,m = m', and so forth;
+and any two sets are "comparable"; that is, one of them can always be mapped oneto-one onto the other or one of its parts.
+The present proof rests upon the assumption that coverings y actually do exist,
+hence upon the principle that even for an infinite totality of sets there are always
+mappings that associate with every set one of its elements, or, expressed formally,
+that the product of an infinite totality of sets, each containing at least one element,
+itself differs from zero. This logical principle cannot, to be sure, be reduced to a still
+simpler one, but it is applied without hesitation everywhere in mathematical deduction. For example, the validity of the proposition that the number of parts into
+which a set decomposes is less than or equal to the number of all of its elements
+cannot be proved except by associating with each of the parts in question one of its
+elements.
+I owe to Mr. Erhard Schmidt the idea that, by invoking this principle, we can take
+an arbitrary covering y as a basis for the well-ordering; the proof, as I carried it
+through, then rests upon the fusion of the various possible "y-sets", that is, of the
+well-ordered segments resulting from the ordering principle.
+
+The principles of mathematics
+and the problem of sets
+JULES RICHARD
+(1905)
+Richard's paper was written as a letter
+to the editor of the Revue générale des
+sciences pures et appliquées and was published in the issue of 30 June 1905, with
+comments by the editor (Louis Olivier);
+it was reprinted in Acta mathematica
+(1906).
+Richard, then a mathematics teacher
+at the lycée in Dijon, was prompted to
+write his letter by some editorial comments in the issue of 30 March 1905 of
+the Revue. There it was stated that at
+the Heidelberg Congress of Mathematicians (8-15 August 1904) J. König had
+established that the continuum cannot be
+well-ordered, while shortly thereafter (24
+September 1904) Zermelo had given a
+proof that any set can be well-ordered
+No indication of König's argument was
+given. What Richard learned from the
+30 March issue of the Revue was simply,
+as he states at the beginning of his letter,
+that there are "certain contradictions"
+in set theory and these contradictions are
+somehow connected with the notions of
+well-ordering and ordinal number. Meanwhile König abandoned the argument
+that he had presented at the 1904 congress (see König 1904, 1905, and footnote
+10, p. 192 below). The new argument that
+he advanced for the impossibility of the
+well-ordering of the continuum took the
+form of a paradox, which bears a resemblance to Richard's. König communicated this paradox to the Hungarian
+Academy of Sciences on 20 June 1905.
+Hence the letter presenting Richard's
+paradox and the paper presenting
+König's were written during the same
+weeks, perhaps even the same days, and
+independently of each other.
+Richard's paradox became known
+when the stir aroused by Russell's, published two years before, had not yet
+abated. It bears some similarity to
+Russell's in that both rest upon the most
+elementary set-theoretic notions, namely,
+set, subset, and element, and are independent of more involved notions like
+well-ordering, used in Burali-Forti's and
+König's paradoxes. In his letter Richard
+himself offered a solution of the paradox,
+and this solution was soon endorsed by
+Poincaré (1906). Yet perhaps the most
+penetrating commentaries on the paradox
+were made by Peano (1906a), who rejected Richard's explanation and proposed his own: "Richard's example does
+not belong to mathematics, but to linguistics; an element that is fundamental in
+the definition of [the diagonal number]
+N cannot be defined in an exact way
+(according to the rules of mathematics)"
+Today the paradox is generally considered solved by the distinction of
+language levels. Gödel's informal presentation of his famous proof (1931) bears
+some similarity to Richard's argument
+but skirts the paradox (see p. 598 below).
+The translation is by the editor, and it
+is printed here with the kind permission
+of the Librairie Armand Colin.
+
+PRINCIPLES OF MATHEMATICS AND THE PROBLEM OF SETS 143
+In its issue of 30 March 1905 the Revue draws attention to certain contradictions
+that are encountered in general set theory.
+It is not necessary to go so far as the theory of ordinal numbers to find such
+contradictions. Here is one that presents itself the moment we study the continuum
+and to which some others could probably be reduced.
+I am going to define a certain set of numbers, which I shall call the set E, through
+the following considerations.
+Let us write all permutations of the twenty-six letters of the French alphabet
+taken two at a time, putting these permutations in alphabetical order; then,
+after them, all permutations taken three at a time, in alphabetical order; then, after
+them, all permutations taken four at a time, and so forth. These permutations
+may contain the same letter repeated several times; they are permutations with
+repetitions.
+For any integer p, any permutation of the twenty-six letters taken p at a time
+will be in the table; and, since everything that can be written with finitely many
+words is a permutation of letters, everything that can be written will be in the table
+formed as we have just indicated
+The definition of a number being made up of words, and these words of letters, some
+of these permutations will be definitions of numbers. Let us cross out from our permutations all those that are not definitions of numbers.
+Let u, be the first number defined by a permutation, u2 the second, uz the third,
+and so on.
+We thus have, written in a definite order, all numbers that are defined by finitely many
+words.
+Therefore, the numbers that can be defined by finitely many words form a denumerably infinite set.
+Now, here comes the contradiction. We can form a number not belonging to this
+set. "Let p be the digit in the nth decimal place of the nth number of the set E;
+let us form a number having 0 for its integral part and, in its nth decimal place,
+p + 1 if p is not 8 or 9, and I otherwise." This number N does not belong to the set
+E. If it were the nth number of the set E, the digit in its nth decimal place would
+be the same as the one in the nth decimal place of that number, which is not the
+case.
+I denote by G the collection of letters between quotation marks.
+The number N is defined by the words of the collection G, that is, by finitely
+many words; hence it should belong to the set E. But we have seen that it does
+not.
+Such is the contradiction.
+Let us show that this contradiction is only apparent. We come back to our permutations. The collection G of letters is one of these permutations; it will appear in my
+table. But, at the place it occupies, it has no meaning. It mentions the set E, which
+has not yet been defined. Hence I have to cross it out. The collection G has meaning
+only if the set E is totally defined, and this is not done except by infinitely many
+words. Therefore there is no contradiction.
+We can make a further remark. The set containing [the elements of] the set E
+and the number N represents a new set. This new set is denumerably infinite. The
+
+144
+RICHARD
+number N can be inserted into the set E at a certain rank k if we increase by 1 the
+rank of each number of rank [equal to or] greater than k. Let us still denote by E
+the thus modified set. Then the collection of words G will define a number N' distinct
+from N, since the number N now occupies rank k and the digit in the kth decimal
+place of N' is not equal to the digit in the kth decimal place of the kth number of
+the set E.
+
+On the foundations of set theory
+and the continuum problem
+JULIUS KÖNIG
+(1905a)
+König's paper was written at about the taking for granted Zermelo's result that
+same time as Richard's (see above, p. the set of real numbers can be well-
+142). Like Richard, König deals with the
+ordered, we infer the existence of a first
+set of finitely definable numbers, but,
+element in the complement of the set of
+instead of using a diagonal construction,
+finitely definable real numbers, and we
+he considers the complement of that set.
+thus have a paradox (sometimes called
+If the set of real numbers could be wellthe Zermelo-König paradox) bearing on
+ordered, the set of not finitely definable
+the notion of definability.
+real numbers would have a first element,
+A third paradox, related to both
+which, after all, would be finitely defin-
+Richard's and König's, is Berry's paraable. König's conclusion is that the set of
+dox, first published by Bertrand Russell
+real numbers cannot be well-ordered.
+(see below, p. 153). The paradox is formu-
+(This would imply the rejection of the
+lated in terms of integers, rather than
+continuum hypothesis; at the 1904 Interreal numbers, but this is unessential.
+national Congress of Mathematicians
+The notion "finitely definable" is re-
+König had presented another argument,
+placed by (say) "definable in fewer than
+subsequently withdrawn, for that rejecnineteen syllables"
+'. The set of numbers
+tion; see footnote 10, below, p. 192.)
+thus definable being finite, the argument
+After the discovery of the Richard
+is perhaps still simpler.
+paradox, in which the well-ordering prob-
+The translation is by Stefan Bauerlem does not play any role, König's con- Mengelberg, and it is printed here with
+clusion can hardly be accepted. Rather, the kind permission of Springer Verlag.
+It is only after overcoming serious misgivings that I have decided to publish what
+follows. But no matter how the conception advanced here may be received, I believe
+that the questions raised cannot be ignored in the further development of set theory.
+That the word "set" is being used indiscriminately for completely different
+notions and that this is the source of the apparent paradoxes of this young branch of
+science, that, moreover, set theory itself can no more dispense with axiomatic assumptions than can any other exact science and that these assumptions, just as in other
+disciplines, are subject to a certain arbitrariness, even if they lie much deeper here—I
+do not want to represent any of this as something new. But I believe that even in this
+fragmentary preliminary communication I offer some new points of view concerning
+
+146
+KÖNIG
+these questions. In particular, it is presumably impossible to regard the special theory
+of well-ordered sets as having been provided with a complete foundation so long as
+the questions treated in Section 4 below are not clarified.
+I. It a1, A2,..., Aks... is a denumerably infinite sequence (a sequence of type w)
+of positive integers, the objects
+(а1, А2,..., акл...)
+shall define the set called the "continuum". Or, if some other definition of the continuum is taken as a point of departure, the objects (a1, d2, ..., Ax, ...) are symbols
+that on the one hand univocally determine the elements of the continuum and on the
+other clearly distinguish them from one another.
+An element of the continuum will be said to be "finitely defined" if, by means of a
+language capable of giving a definite form to our scientific thinking, we can in a
+finite span of time specify a procedure (law) that conceptually distinguishes that
+element of the continuum from any other one, or—to put it differently-that for an
+arbitrarily chosen k leads to the existence of one and only one associated number ak•
+At the
+same time it must be expressly emphasized that the finite conceptual
+differentiation demanded here is not to be confused with the demand for a welldefined, or even finite, procedure by which the dr can be determined.
+It is easy to show that the finitely defined elements of the continuum determine a
+subset of the continuum that has the cardinality No, a subset that we shall henceforth
+denote by E.
+For such a finite definition must be completely given by means of a finite number
+of letters and punctuation marks, and of these only a definite, finite number is avail.
+able. Furthermore, we can then order these various finite definitions in such a way that
+to any definition there corresponds one and only one definite positive integer as a
+(finite) ordinal.
+Since, now, for every finitely defined element of the continuum several finite
+definitions can and actually do exist, every such element determines a sequence of
+positive integers, among which, then, the least is uniquely determined; conversely,
+this integer, by means of the associated combination of signs, uniquely determines the
+corresponding finitely defined element of the continuum.
+E is therefore equivalent to a subset of the set of positive integers. But since
+(а, a,..., а,...),
+where a is an arbitrary positive integer, is a finitely defined element of the continuum,
+it in turn follows that
+e = No,
+where e stands for the cardinality of E.
+However, since the continuum, in consequence of its definition, is not denumerable, there must exist elements of the continuum that cannot be finitely defined.
+2. Even if at present I must still forgo giving an exact and systematic presentation,
+it is nevertheless absolutely necessary to make precise the axiomatic assumptions
+contained in the train of thought up to this point.
+(a) Above all, the "fact" has been assumed that there are processes taking place
+
+SET THEORY AND THE CONTINUUM PROBLEM
+147
+in our consciousness that satisfy the formal laws of logic and are called "scientific
+thinking" and that among these there are some that stand in a one-to-one relation to
+other processes of that kind, namely, the generation of the previously described
+sequences of signs.
+The question how such a relation comes to be, or even how far these relations can
+be extended, is not touched upon at all here. (Metalogical axiom.)
+(b) All "arbitrary" sequences of type w formed from the positive integers-and
+the "totality of all such sequences", which we call the "continuum"—are " possible
+concepts"
+, that is, they do not in themselves lead to a logical contradiction. (Continuum axiom.)
+A further, thorough analysis of this assertion is, I believe, contained in the considerations presented by Hilbert (1904) at the Third International Congress of Mathematicians in Heidelberg.
+In particular, this definition of the continuum entails the assertion that its
+cardinality is x.*o.
+That, furthermore, s,". > X, can be proved, for example, by a method that I gave
+in my 1905.
+I am aware that I am thus adopting a position in conflict with the assumption that
+it is not permissible to go beyond "finite laws". To make this assumption is, in my
+opinion, to deny the existence of the continuum and of the continuum problem. The
+assumption I employ here is, on the contrary, that there exist elements of the continuum that we cannot "think through to the end" ["zu Ende denken "] and that
+are nevertheless consistent; thus they are "ideal" elements, if I may be permitted
+to use this expression in what is, to be sure, an entirely new sense.
+(c) If, with the assumptions we have made so far, we may now speak of an "arbitrary" element of the continuum, it is because we are employing, lastly, the logical
+antithesis "given an arbitrary element of the continuum, either it is finitely defined or
+this is not the case". In view of (a) and (b) it is presumably impossible to reject this
+antithesis, especially since without changing our inferences we can also formulate it
+subjectively: "For an arbitrary element of the continuum we surely have a finite
+definition or this is not the case"
+3. The assumptions developed thus far lead in a remarkably simple way to the
+conclusion that the continuum cannot be well-ordered.
+If we think of the elements of the continuum as a well-ordered set, then those
+elements that cannot be finitely defined form a subset of that well-ordered set, and
+this subset certainly contains elements of the continuum. But then this subset, too,
+is well-ordered and contains one and only one first element. Let us observe, further,
+that according to the assumptions now in force the continuum, like any well-ordered
+set, defines an unbroken sequence of specific ordinals; it does so in such a way,
+moreover, that to every element of the continuum there corresponds one and only
+one of these ordinals, and conversely. Accordingly, "the ordinal corresponding to a
+finitely defined element of the continuum"
+', as well as "the element of the continuum
+corresponding to a finitely defined ordinal of that kind"
+', is finitely defined. Therefore
+in that sequence there would have to occur a first ordinal that was not finitely
+definable. But this is impossible.
+For there exists a definite (well-ordered) set of finitely defined ordinals that follow
+
+148
+KÖNIG
+each other in an unbroken sequence beginning with the first. But "the first ordinal
+that exceeds all of these in magnitude" would in fact be finitely defined by the very
+words in quotation marks, whereas according to the assumption it cannot be finitely
+defined.
+The assumption that
+the continuum can be well-ordered has therefore led to a
+contradiction.
+4. Militating against the considerations presented thus far is the objection, which
+almost immediately suggests itself, that they can be applied word for word to every
+well-ordered nondenumerable set, that therefore such sets could not exist at all.
+But since Cantor's second number class Z(8o), "the totality of all order types of
+well-ordered sets of cardinality X."
+', defines such a "set" consistently, an error must
+have occurred in our reasoning up to this point. That this seemingly paradoxical
+result need not necessarily imply such an error is yet to be explained in greater
+detail.
+The word "set" is used for two completely different notions in the two cases.
+When the notion of the continuum is formed, it is the "arbitrary"
+sequence
+(a1, 02,..., Oks...) that is primary, or fundamental. Through the stipulation that
+ay, 0z,... are to be replaced by definite positive integers, it becomes a "definite"
+sequence, an element of the continuum, which cannot become an object of our
+thought without being conceptually distinct from any other element. The further
+stipulation that we consider the totality [Inbegriff] of these "well-distinguished"
+objects then leads to the continuum.
+The situation is quite different in the case of the number class Z($.). Its "elements"
+are determined by the "property" of being order types of well-ordered sets of
+cardinality No. To be sure, we know such elements: w, w + 1,...; but this property
+is only an abstraction, at best a means of distinguishing between objects belonging
+and objects not belonging to the class; however, it is certainly not a rule according
+to which every element of Z(X) can be formed. What is primary, or fundamental,
+here is the collective notion [Kollektivbegriff], which for this very reason,
+following Cantor's nomenclature, I would not call a "set" but a "class"; it is only
+afterward that elements belonging to the class are constructed that exemplify this
+notion.
+That the second number class Z(8o) is definable as a "completed" set of welldistinguished elements, that is, of elements conceptually altogether distinct, cannot
+be considered probable even at the present stage of our knowledge of set theory. To
+the extent that the conclusions derived earlier are correct, the present discussion
+might even be said to contain a proof that the second number class cannot be considered to be a completed set, that is, a totality of well-distinguished elements that are
+altogether conceptually distinet.t
+1 In this fact, I believe, lies the origin of those paradoxes that appear in the theory of ordinal
+numbers and to which Burali-Forti first called attention.
+I should like to add here a few short remarks that may perhaps facilitate understanding of the
+considerations in Section 4.
+Even the totality of the positive integers is originally given only as a "class". Hilbert, too,
+defines (1904) the
+"smallest infinite" in this way. But, it seems, the stipulation that this class
+be considered a completed set is possible, that is, consistent in itself.
+On the other hand, the continuum would be conceivable only as a "completed set", and the
+
+SET THEORY AND THE CONTINUUM PROBLEM
+149
+In closing these fragmentary remarks I take satisfaction in being able to note that,
+insofar as they are correct, they only throw a new light on the great value of what
+Cantor's genius created, despite their partially oppositionist character. The opposition
+is directed only against certain of Cantor's conjectures; the content of the theorems
+that he proved remains completely intact. I remark, finally, that the distinction here
+drawn between "set" and "class" completely resolves the paradoxes cited (" set of
+all sets", and so forth).
+In substance the above is a lecture given before the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
+on 20 June 1905.
+second number class only as a class, or (if the expression be permitted) as a "set in the process of
+becoming".
+I should like, still, to point out a very elementary collective notion that certainly does not
+permit being considered a "completed set".
+We take as a point of departure the totality of all terminating decimal fractions, which, however, we write as nonterminating decimal fractions by putting the digit 0 in all places in which
+In these objects every place may be arbitrarily filled; that is, for any digit we can put any other
+digit without going out of the totality of the defined objects.
+It would nevertheless be wholly inadmissible to speak of the totality of all places as places that
+can be arbitrarily filled; obviously this would eliminate the "principle of inhibition" ["Hemmungsprinzip "] contained in the definition of the places that can be arbitrarily filled. This
+principle of inhibition can be formulated as follows: "The kth place can be arbitrarily filled, but
+there must exist a positive integer I > k such that from the ith place on only the digit O is used"
+The question "How many places are there that can simultaneously be arbitrarily filled?
+cannot be answered with any cardinal number (in Cantor's sense) and requires the creation of a
+new "concept of numeration" [eines neuen "Zählbegriffs "].
+
+Mathematical logic as based on the theory of types
+BERTRAND RUSSELL
+(1908a)
+[It was in June 1901 that Russell disthe difficulties raised by the paradoxes
+covered the paradox of the class of all
+he then presented (1905a) three theories:
+classes that do not contain themselves as
+(1) the zigzag theory ('propositional
+elements. He communicated it to Frege
+functions determine classes when they
+on 16 June 1902 (see pp. 124-125 above).
+are fairly simple, and only fail to do so
+Discussing "the Contradiction"
+, as he
+when they are complicated and reconcalls it, in The principles of mathematics
+dite"), (2) the theory of limitation of size
+(1903) in a passage probably written in
+("there is not such a thing as the class of
+1901, he mentions, without much elaboraall entities"), and (3) the no-classes
+tion, that "the class as many is of a
+theory ("classes and relations
+are
+different type from the terms of the
+class" and that "it is the distinction of
+banished altogether"). The theory of
+types is not even mentioned in the paper.
+logical types that is the key to the whole
+In a note added at the end of the paper,
+mystery".
+• The solution to the problem
+on 5 February 1906, Russell wrote:
+is presented in less than thirty lines
+"From further investigation I now feel
+(§ 104). He also examines other solutions,
+hardly any doubt that the no-classes
+finds them less satisfactory, and contheory affords the complete solution of all
+cludes that "no peculiar philosophy is
+the difficulties stated in the first section
+involved in the above contradiction,
+of this paper", that is, the paradoxes. I
+which springs directly from common
+The central idea of the no-classes
+sense, and can only be solved by abantheory was that, instead of speaking of
+doning some common-sense assumption".
+the class of all the objects that fulfill
+But before the volume came out (the
+some given sentence, one might speak of
+preface is dated December 1902 and the
+the sentence itself and of substitutions
+volume 1903), Russell felt that the subwithin it. Now discourse about specified
+ject deserved more attention. He wrote
+classes lends itself well enough to para-
+Appendix B, of almost six pages, where
+phrase in terms thus of sentences and
+the doctrine of types is put forward
+substitution, but when we talk rather of
+"tentatively", since "it requires, in all
+classes in general, as values of quantifiprobability, to be transformed into some
+able variables, it is not evident how to
+subtler shape before it can answer all
+continue such paraphrase. Russell (1905a)
+difficulties"
+'. At that time Russell knew,
+had already acknowledged that the no.
+of course, of other paradoxes, for instance
+classes theory might prove inadequate to
+the Burali-Forti paradox and that of the
+much of classical mathematics; and his
+greatest cardinal.
+more sanguine postscript of February
+By December 1905 Russell had aban-
+1906 was the expression only of a redoned the theory of types. To overcome newed hope that he was shortly to
+
+151
+abandon. For he soon turned back to his rate they can contain variables. Yet, like
+theory of types and proceeded to develop
+the individuals, they have type and they
+it in detail. The result, published in July
+figure as values of quantified variables.
+1908, is the paper reproduced below.
+From his hierarchy of types of pro-
+Russell sees the universe as dividing
+positions Russell derives a hierarchy of
+into levels, or types. We can speak of all
+types of propositional functions. He
+the things fulfilling a given condition only
+speaks here of substitution, in a way that
+if they are all of the same type. The
+suggests that his functions also are notamembers of a class, then, must all be of
+tional in character; they seem simply to
+one type. So must the values of the
+be open sentences, sentences with free
+variable of any one quantification.
+variables. Still, he assigns them types and
+Russell is thus led to propound a dislets them be values of quantified varitinction between "all" and "any": "all"
+ables. Insofar, they should be viewed
+is expressed by the bound ("apparent")
+not as open sentences but as attributes,
+variable of universal quantification,
+or, when they are functions of two or
+which ranges over a type, and "any" is
+more arguments, relations. Failure to disexpressed by the free ("real") variable,
+tinguish thus between open sentences on
+which refers schematically to any unthe one hand and attributes and relations
+specified thing irrespective of type.
+on the other had grave consequences for
+Because the free variable is in this way
+this paper and equally for Principia
+unhampered, Russell likes to suppress a
+mathematica, for which this paper sets
+universal quantifier when it has the whole
+the style.
+of a theorem as its scope. This contrast
+This theory of types of propositional
+between asserting a universal quantificafunctions is what has come to be called
+tion and asserting a "propositional functhe ramified theory of types. It has been
+tion" carries over into the first edition
+so called because the type of a function
+of Whitehead and Russell's Principia
+depends both on the types of its argumathematica and puzzles readers who
+ments and on the types of the apparent
+do not perceive that it is pointless apart
+variables contained in it (or in its expresfrom a certain aspect of the theory of
+sion), in case these exceed the types of
+types.
+the arguments.
+Russell sees the key to the paradoxes
+This second limitation on types proved
+in what he calls the vicious-circle prinonerous. It would make for a construcciple: "No totality can contain members
+tive set theory like Weyl's or that of in.
+defined in terms of itself". He impletuitionism, both inadequate as a foundaments it by declaring "whatever contion for classical analysis. So Russell
+tains an apparent variable" to be of
+canceled the second limitation, the one
+higher type than the things over which
+concerning apparent variables, by prothat variable ranges. The formulation is
+pounding his axiom of reducibility. It says
+troublesome. Variables, in the easiest
+that any function is coextensive with
+sense, are letters; and what contain them
+what he calls a predicative function: a
+are notational expressions. Is Russell
+function in which the types of apparent
+then assigning types to his objects or to
+variables run no higher than the types of
+his notations? The confusion persists as
+the arguments. Granted this axiom, the
+he proceeds to define "nth-order propopredicative functions will suffice for the
+sitions". His lowest type comprises indiwork of propositional functions generally.
+viduals; his next comprises what he calls
+Restrictions occasioned by apparent varifirst-order propositions; and so on up.
+ables that out-type the arguments are
+These propositions, unlike the indivisummarily abolished.
+duals, are evidently notation; at any
+The method is indeed oddly devious.
+
+152
+If for every propositional function there Bernays (1926) to be derivable from the
+is a coextensive predicative one, then the others.
+symbols for propositional functions could
+The difference between classes and
+have been construed from the start as attributes is extensionality: classes with
+referring outright just to the correspondentirely the same members are identical,
+ing predicative ones. In short, the types
+whereas attributes of entirely the same
+of propositional functions could have
+objects can be distinct.
+Accordingly
+been described in the first place as depend-
+Russell introduces discourse of classes as
+ing simply on the types of the argu-
+a transcription of discourse of attributes
+ments. The axiom of reducibility is self-
+(or propositional functions), the traneffacing: if it is true, the ramification
+scription being so contrived as to assure
+that it is meant to cope with was pointextensionality of classes. This treatment
+less to begin with. Russell's failure to
+of classes, like the theory of descriptions
+appreciate this point is due to his failure
+dealt with in Whitehead and Russell
+to distinguish between propositional
+(1910, pp. 216-223 below), illustrates the
+functions as notations and propositional
+stratagem of incomplete symbols. There
+functions as attributes and relations.
+is perhaps some trace in it, indeed, of
+The wisdom of dropping the ramifica-
+Russell's no-classes theory. He finally
+tion and the axiom of reducibility was
+found that theory untenable, but this
+urged by Ramsey (1931, pp. 20-29),
+trace is innocent enough.
+though he likewise failed to grasp the
+The treatment of relations (or relapoint in its full simplicity. Ramsey was
+tions-in-extension, as against proposiprompted rather by Peano's observation
+tional functions) is parallel to that of
+(see above, p. 142) that the paradoxes
+classes. And the theory of descriptions is
+divide into two kinds: those of pure set
+stated here too, consonantly with the
+theory and those which, like (1), (4), (5),
+later selection but more briefly.
+and (6) of Russell's list, hinge rather on
+Numerous useful concepts from the
+semantic concepts such as falsity and
+theory of relations are defined. They go
+specifiability. The only use Russell made
+back largely to Peano, Peirce,
+and
+of the ramification in his theory of types
+Schröder. There is a needless proliferawas, Ramsey rightly observed, in his
+tion of notation; thus Russell's Rx,
+effort to solve the semantic paradoxes;
+R'x, D'R, and d'R could be rendered
+and these paradoxes, Ramsey pursued,
+might better have been left out of account
+quite briefly enough, using others of his
+because they hinge on concepts extraneous
+notations, as R"x, R"ix, R"V, and
+to logic and mathematics. I would add
+R"V. In Principia mathematica, where
+that because of the confusion of proposithe ideas of this essay are reproduced
+tions with sentences, and of attributes
+and developed in great detail, the price
+with their expressions, Russell's purof this notational excess is evident;
+ported solution of the semantic paradoxes
+scores of theorems serve merely to link up
+was enigmatic anyway.
+the various ways of writing things.
+Proceeding to the formal presentation
+W. V. Quine
+of his system, Russell begins with a list
+of axioms and rules of inference for the
+The paper is printed here with the kind
+logic of truth functions and quantifiers.
+permission of Lord Russell and the Johns
+His axiom (5) was later shown by Hopkins Press.
+The following theory of symbolic logic recommended itself to me in the first
+instance by its ability to solve certain contradictions, of which the one best known to
+
+153
+mathematicians is Burali-Forti's concerning the greatest ordinal. But the theory in
+question seems not wholly dependent on this indirect recommendation; it has also,
+if I am not mistaken, a certain consonance with common sense which makes it inherently credible. This, however, is not a merit upon which much stress should be
+laid; for common sense is far more fallible than it likes to believe. I shall therefore
+begin by stating some of the contradictions to be solved and shall then show how the
+theory of logical types effects their solution.
+I. The contradictions
+(1) The oldest contradiction of the kind in question is the Epimenides. Epimenides
+the Cretan said that all Cretans were liars, and all other statements made by Cretans
+were certainly lies. Was this a lie? The simplest form of this contradiction is afforded
+by the man who says "I am lying"; if he is lying, he is speaking the truth, and vice
+versa.
+(2) Let w be the class of all those classes which are not members of themselves.
+Then, whatever class x may be, "x is a w" is equivalent? to "x is not an x"
+. Hence,
+giving to x the value w, "w is a w" is equivalent to "w is not a w"
+(3) Let I be the relation which subsists between two relations R and S whenever
+R does not have the relation R to S. Then, whatever relations R and S may be, "R
+has the relation I to S" is equivalent to "R does not have the relation R to S'"
+Hence, giving the value I' to both R and S, "T has the relation T to I" is equivalent
+to "I does not have the relation I to I".
+(4) The number of syllables in the English names of finite integers tends to increase
+as the integers grow larger and must gradually increase indefinitely, since only a
+finite number of names can be made with a given finite number of syllables. Hence
+the names of some integers must consist of at least nineteen syllables, and among these
+there must be a least. Hence "the least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen
+syllables" must denote a definite integer; in fact, it denotes 111,777. But " the least
+integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables" is itself a name consisting of
+eighteen syllables; hence the least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen
+syllables can be named in eighteen syllables, which is a contradiction.3
+(5) Among transfinite ordinals some can be defined, while others cannot; for the
+total number of possible definitions is %o, while the number of transfinite ordinals
+exceeds Xo. Hence there must be indefinable ordinals, and among these there must
+be a least. But this is defined as "the least indefinable ordinal", which is a contradietion.*
+(6) Richard's paradox" is akin to that of the least indefinable ordinal. It is as
+follows: Consider all decimals that can be defined by means of a finite number of
+words; let E be the class of such decimals. Then E has No terms; hence its members
+can be ordered as the Ist, 2nd, 3rd, .... Let N be a number defined as follows: If the
+1 See below.
+2 Two propositions are called equivalent when both are true or both are false.
+3 This contradiction was suggested to me by Mr. G. G. Berry of the Bodleian Library.
+* See König 1905a, Dixon 1906, and Hobson 1906. The solution offered in the last of these papers
+does not seem to me adequate.
+5 See Poincaré 1906, especially sections VII and IX, and Peano 1906a, pp. 149-157.
+
+154
+nth figure in the nth decimal is p, let the nth figure in N be p + 1 (or 0, if p = 9).
+Then N is different from all the members of E, since, whatever finite value n may
+have, the nth figure in N is different from the nth figure in the nth of the decimals
+composing E, and therefore N is different from the nth decimal. Nevertheless we
+have defined N in a finite number of words, and therefore N ought to be a member
+of D. Thus N both is and is not a member of E.
+(7) Burali-Forti's contradiction (1897) may be stated as follows: It can be shown
+that every well-ordered series has an ordinal number, that the series of ordinals up to
+and including any given ordinal exceeds the given ordinal by one, and (on certain
+very natural assumptions) that the series of all ordinals (in order of magnitude) is
+well-ordered. It follows that the series of all ordinals has an ordinal number, s
+say. But in that case the series of all ordinals including & has the ordinal number
+S + 1, which must be greater than S. Hence S is not the ordinal number of all
+ordinals.
+In all the above contradictions (which are merely selections from an indefinite
+number) there is a common characteristic, which we may describe as self-reference
+or reflexiveness. The remark of Epimenides must include itself in its own scope. If
+all classes, provided they are not members of themselves, are members of w, this must
+also apply to w; and similarly for the analogous relational contradiction. In the cases
+of names and definitions, the paradoxes result from considering nonnameability and
+indefinability as elements in names and definitions. In the case of Burali-Forti's
+paradox, the series whose ordinal number causes the difficulty is the series of all
+ordinal numbers. In each contradiction something is said about all cases of some
+kind, and from what is said a new case seems to be generated, which both is and is
+not of the same kind as the cases of which all were concerned in what was said. Let us
+go through the contradictions one by one and see how this occurs.
+(1) When a man says "I am lying", we may interpret his statement as: "There
+is a proposition which I am affirming and which is false". All statements that "there
+is"
+so-and-so may be regarded as denying that the opposite is always true; thus "I
+am lying" becomes "It is not true of all propositions that either I am not affirming
+them or they are true"; in other words, "It is not true for all propositions p that if
+I affirm p, p is true". The paradox results from regarding this statement as affirming
+a proposition, which must therefore come within the scope of the statement. This,
+however, makes it evident that the notion of "all propositions" is illegitimate; for
+otherwise, there must be propositions (such as the above) which are about all propositions and yet cannot, without contradiction, be included among the propositions
+they are about. Whatever we suppose to be the totality of propositions, statements
+about this totality generate new propositions which, on pain of contradiction, must
+lie outside the totality. It is useless to enlarge the totality, for that equally enlarges
+the scope of statements about the totality. Hence there must be no totality of
+propositions, and "all propositions" must be a meaningless phrase.
+(2) In this case, the class w is defined by reference to "all classes" and then turns
+out to be one among classes. If we seek help by deciding that no class is a member of
+itself, then u becomes the class of all classes, and we have to decide that this is not a
+member of itself, that is, is not a class. This is only possible if there is no such thing
+as the class of all classes in the sense required by the paradox. That there is no such
+
+155
+class results from the fact that, if we suppose there is, the supposition immediately
+gives rise (as in the above contradiction) to new classes lying outside the supposed
+total of all classes.
+(3) This case is exactly analogous to (2) and shows that we cannot legitimately
+speak of "all relations"
+(4) "The least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables" involves the
+totality of names, for it is "the least integer such that all names either do not apply
+to it or have more than nineteen syllables". Here we assume, in obtaining the contradiction, that a phrase containing "all names" is itself a name, though it appears
+from the contradiction that it cannot be one of the names which were supposed to be
+all the names there are. Hence "all names" is an illegitimate notion.
+(5) This case, similarly, shows that "all definitions" is an illegitimate notion.
+(6) This is solved, like (5), by remarking that "all definitions" is an illegitimate
+notion. Thus the number E is not defined in a finite number of words, being in fact
+not defined at all.®
+(7) Burali-Forti's contradiction shows that "all ordinals" is an illegitimate notion;
+for if not, all ordinals in order of magnitude form a well-ordered series, which must
+have an ordinal number greater than all ordinals.
+Thus all our contradictions have in common the assumption of a totality such that,
+if it were legitimate, it would at once be enlarged by new members defined in terms
+of itself.
+This leads us to the rule: "Whatever involves all of a collection must not be one
+of the collection"
+', or, conversely: "If, provided a certain collection had a total, it
+would have members only definable in terms of that total, then the said collection
+has no total"?
+The above principle is, however, purely negative in its scope. It suffices to show
+that many theories are wrong, but it does not show how the errors are to be rectified.
+We cannot say: "When I speak of all propositions, I mean all except those in which
+'all propositions' are mentioned"; for in this explanation we have mentioned the
+propositions in which all propositions are mentioned, which we cannot do significantly.
+It is impossible to avoid mentioning a thing by mentioning that we won't mention it.
+One might as well, in talking to a man with a long nose, say: "When I speak of noses,
+I except such as are inordinately long"
+', which would not be a very successful effort
+to avoid a painful topic. Thus it is necessary, if we are not to sin against the above
+negative principle, to construct our logic without mentioning such things as "all
+propositions" or "all properties" and without even having to say that we are excluding such things. The exclusion must result naturally and inevitably from our positive
+doctrines, which must make it plain that "all propositions" and "all properties"
+are meaningless phrases.
+The first difficulty that confronts us is as to the fundamental principles of logic
+known under the quaint name of "laws of thought". "All propositions are either true
+or false"
+, for example, has become meaningless. If it were significant, it would be a
+6 See Russell 1906a.
+7 When I say that a collection has no total, I mean that statements about all its members are
+nonsense. Furthermore, it will be found that the use of this principle requires the distinction of
+all and any considered in Section II.
+
+156
+proposition and would come under its own scope. Nevertheless, some substitute must
+be found, or all general accounts of deduction become impossible.
+Another more special difficulty is illustrated by the particular case of mathematica.
+induction. We want to be able to say: "If n is a finite integer, n has all properties
+possessed by O and by the successors of all numbers possessing them". But here "all
+properties" must be replaced by some other phrase not open to the same objections.
+It might be thought that "all properties possessed by O and by the successors of all
+numbers possessing them" might be legitimate even if "all properties" were not. But
+in fact this is not so. We shall find that phrases of the form "all properties which
+etc." involve all properties of which the "etc." can be significantly either affirmed or
+denied, and not only those which in fact have whatever characteristic is in question;
+for, in the absence of a catalogue of properties having this characteristic, a statement
+about all those that have the characteristic must be hypothetical and of the form:
+"It is always true that, if a property has the said characteristic, then ete."
+. Thus
+mathematical induction is prima facie incapable of being significantly enunciated if
+"all properties" is a phrase destitute of meaning. This difficulty, as we shall see later,
+can be avoided; for the present we must consider the laws of logic, since these are far
+more fundamental.
+II. All and any
+Given a statement containing a variable x, say "x = x", we may affirm that this
+holds in all instances, or we may affirm any one of the instances without deciding as
+to which instance we are affirming. The distinction is roughly the same as that
+between the general and particular enunciation in Euclid. The general enunciation
+tells us something about (say) all triangles, while the particular enunciation takes one
+triangle and asserts the same thing of this one triangle. But the triangle taken is any
+triangle, not some one special triangle; and thus, although, throughout the proof,
+only one triangle is dealt with, yet the proof retains its generality. If we say: "Let
+ABC be a triangle, then the sides AB and AC are together greater than the side
+BC",
+, we are saying something about one triangle, not about all triangles; but the
+one triangle concerned is absolutely ambiguous, and our statement consequently is
+also absolutely ambiguous. We do not affirm any one definite proposition, but an
+undetermined one of all the propositions resulting from supposing ABC to be this or
+that triangle. This notion of ambiguous assertion is very important, and it is vital
+not to confound an ambiguous assertion with the definite assertion that the same
+thing holds in all cases.
+The distinction between (1) asserting any value of a propositional function and (2)
+asserting that the function is always true is present throughout mathematics, as it is
+in Euclid's distinction of general and particular enunciations. In any chain of mathematical reasoning, the objects whose properties are being investigated are the arguments to any value of some propositional function. Take as an illustration the following
+definition:
+"We call f(x) continuous for x = a if, for every positive number o, different from 0,
+there exists a positive number e, different from O, such that, for all values of & which
+are numerically less than e, the difference f (a + 8) - f(a) is numerically less than o."
+
+157
+Here the function f is any function for which the above statement has a meaning;
+the statement is about f, and varies as f varies. But the statement is not about o or &
+or 8, because all possible values of these are concerned, not one undetermined value.
+(In regard to e, the statement "there exists a positive number e such that etc." is the
+denial that the denial of "etc." is true of all positive numbers.) For this reason, when
+any value of a propositional function is asserted, the argument (for example, f in the
+above) is called a real variable, whereas, when a function is said to be always true, or
+to be not always true, the argument is called an apparent variable.® Thus in the
+above definition, f is a real variable, and o, e, 8 are apparent variables.
+When we assert any value of a propositional function, we shall say simply that we
+assert the propositional function. Thus if we enunciate the law of identity in the form
+"X =x".
+, we are asserting the function "x = x"; that is, we are asserting any value
+of this function. Similarly we may be said to deny a propositional function when we
+deny any instance of it. We can only truly assert a propositional function if, whatever
+value we choose, that value is true; similarly we can only truly deny it if, whatever
+value we choose, that value is false. Hence in the general case, in which some values
+are true and some false, we can neither assert nor deny a propositional function.?
+If ox is a propositional function, we will denote by "(X) «x" the proposition
+"ox is always true". Similarly " (X, У) Ф(x, y)" will mean "Ф(x, y) is always true", and
+so on. Then the distinction between the assertion of all values and the assertion of
+any is the distinction between (1) asserting (x). ox and (2) asserting ox where x is
+undetermined. The latter differs from the former in that it cannot be treated as one
+determinate proposition.
+The distinction between asserting ox and asserting (x). ox was, I believe, first
+emphasized by Frege (1893, p. 31). His reason for introducing the distinction explicitly was the same which had caused it to be present in the practice of mathematicians, namely, that deduction can only be effected with real variables, not with
+apparent variables. In the case of Euclid's proofs, this is evident: we need (say) some
+one triangle ABC to reason about, though it does not matter what triangle it is.
+The triangle ABC is a real variable; and although it is any triangle, it remains the
+same triangle throughout the argument. But in the general enunciation the triangle
+is an apparent variable. If we adhere to the apparent variable, we cannot perform
+any deductions, and this is why in all proofs real variables have to be used. Suppose,
+to take the simplest case, that we know "ox is always true", that is, "(x).фх"
+, and
+we know "ox always implies fx"
+, that is, "(x) {ox implies 4x}". How shall we infer
+"Ax is always true"
+', that is, "(x). 4x"? We know it is always true that, if ox is true
+and if ox implies fx, then ux is true. But we have no premisses to the effect that ox is
+true and ox implies ux; what we have is: ox is always true, and ox always implies fx.
+In order to make our inference, we must go from "
+ox is always true" to ox, and
+from "ox always implies fx" to "ox implies fx", where the x, while remaining any
+possible argument, is to be the same in both. Then, from "øx" and "ox implies fix",
+8 These two terms are due to Peano (1903a), who uses them approximately in the above sense.
+° Mr. MacColl speaks of "propositions" as divided into the three classes of certain, variable, and
+impossible. We may accept this division as applying to propositional functions. A function which
+can be asserted is certain, one which can be denied is impossible, and all others are (in Mr. MacColl's
+sense) variable.
+
+158
+we infer "Ix"; thus ux is true for any possible argument and therefore is always
+true. Thus, in order to infer "(x). 4x" from "(x). ox" and "(x) {ox implies x}", we
+have to pass from the apparent to the real variable and then back again to the apparent variable. This process is required in all mathematical reasoning which proceeds
+from the assertion of all values of one or more propositional functions to the assertion
+of all values of some other propositional function, as, for example, from "all isosceles
+triangles have equal angles at the base" to "all triangles having equal angles at the
+base are isosceles"
+'. In particular, this process is required in proving Barbara and the
+other moods of the syllogism. In a word, all deduction operates with real variables (or
+with constants).
+It might be supposed that we could dispense with apparent variables altogether,
+contenting ourselves with any as a substitute for all. This, however, is not the case.
+Take, for example, the definition of a continuous function quoted above: in this
+definition o, &, and 8 must be apparent variables. Apparent variables are constantly
+required for definitions. Take, for example, the following: "An integer is called a
+prime when it has no integral factors except 1 and itself". This definition unavoidably
+involves an apparent variable in the form: "If n is an integer other than 1 or the
+given integer, n is not a factor of the given integer, for all possible values of n"
+The distinction between all and any is, therefore, necessary to deductive reasoning
+and occurs throughout mathematics, though, so far as I know, its importance
+remained unnoticed until Frege pointed it out.
+For our purposes it has a different utility, which is very great. In the case of such
+variables as propositions or properties, "any value" is legitimate, though "all values"
+is not. Thus we may say: "p is true or false, where p is any proposition", though we
+cannot say "all propositions are true or false". The reason is that, in the former, we
+merely affirm an undetermined one of the propositions of the form "p is true or
+false"
+', whereas in the latter we affirm (if anything) a new proposition, different from
+all the propositions of the form "p is true or false"
+'. Thus we may admit "any value"
+of a variable in cases where "all values" would lead to reflexive fallacies; for the
+admission of "any value" does not in the same way create new values. Hence the
+fundamental laws of logic can be stated concerning any proposition, though we cannot
+significantly say that they hold of all propositions. These laws have, so to speak, a
+particular enunciation but no general enunciation. There is no one proposition which
+is the law of contradiction (say); there are only the various instances of the law. Of
+any proposition p, we can say: "p and not-p cannot both be true"; but there is no
+such proposition as: "Every proposition p is such that p and not-p cannot both be
+true"
+A similar explanation applies to properties. We can speak of any property of x, but
+not of all properties, because new properties would be thereby generated. Thus we
+can say: "If n is a finite integer, and if 0 has the property o and m + 1 has the
+property a provided m has it, it follows that n has the property o". Here we need
+not specify o; $ stands for "any property". But we cannot say: "A finite integer is
+defined as one which has every property o possessed by O and by the successors of
+possessors". For here it is essential to consider every property, 1° not any property;
+and in using such a definition we assume that it embodies a property distinctive of
+10 This is indistinguishable from "all properties".
+
+159
+finite integers, which is just the kind of assumption from which, as we saw, the
+reflexive contradictions spring.
+In the above instance, it is necessary to avoid the suggestions of ordinary language,
+which is not suitable for expressing the distinction required. The point may be illustrated further as follows: If induction is to be used for defining finite integers, induction must state a definite property of finite integers, not an ambiguous property.
+But, if o is a real variable, the statement "n has the property o provided this property
+is possessed by O and by the successors of possessors" assigns to n a property which
+varies as o varies, and such a property cannot be used to define the class of finite
+integers. We wish to say: "'n is a finite integer' means: 'Whatever property o may
+be, n has the property a provided o is possessed by 0 and by the successors of possessors'"
+• But here o has become an apparent variable. To keep it a real variable, we
+should have to say: "Whatever property o may be, 'n is a finite integer' means: 'n
+has the property a provided o is possessed by O and by the successors of possessors'".
+But here the meaning of 'n is a finite integer' varies as o varies, and thus such a definition is impossible. This case illustrates an important point, namely the following:
+"The scope!! of a real variable can never be less than the whole propositional function
+in the assertion of which the said variable occurs". That is, if our propositional function is (say) "ox implies p", the assertion of this function will mean "any value of
+'ox implies p' is true"
+', not "'any value of ox is true' implies p"
+'. In the latter, we
+have really "all values of ox are true"
+, and the x is an apparent variable.
+III. The meaning and range of generalized propositions
+In this section we have to consider first the meaning of propositions in which the
+word all occurs and then the kind of collections which admit of propositions about all
+their members.
+It is convenient to give the name generalized propositions not only to such as contain all, but also to such as contain some (undefined). The proposition "ox is sometimes true" is equivalent to the denial of "not-ox is always true"; "some A is B" is
+equivalent to the denial of "all A is not B", that is, of "no A is B". Whether it is
+possible to find interpretations which distinguish "ox is sometimes true" from the
+denial of "not-ox is always true"
+, it is unnecessary to inquire; for our purposes we
+may define "ox is sometimes true" as the denial of "not-øx is always true"
+. In any
+case, the two kinds of propositions require the same kind of interpretation and are
+subject to the same limitations. In each there is an apparent variable; and it is the
+presence of an apparent variable which constitutes what I mean by a generalized
+proposition. (Note that there cannot be a real variable in any proposition; for what
+contains a real variable is a propositional function, not a proposition.)
+The first question we have to ask in this section is: How are we to interpret the
+word all in such propositions as "all men are mortal"? At first sight, it might be
+thought that there could be no difficulty, that "all men" is a perfectly clear idea, and
+that we say of all men that they are mortal. But to this view there are many
+objections.
+11 The scope of a real variable is the whole function of which "any value" is in question. Thus
+in "ox implies p" the scope of x is not ox, but "ox implies p".
+
+160
+(1) If this view were right, it would seem that "all men are mortal" could not be
+true if there were no men. Yet, as Mr. Bradley has urged (1883, p. 47), "Trespassers
+will be prosecuted" may be perfectly true even if no one trespasses; and hence, as he
+further argues, we are driven to interpret such propositions as hypotheticals, meaning
+"if anyone trespasses, he will be prosecuted", that is,
+"if x trespasses, x will be
+prosecuted"
+', where the range of values which x may have, whatever it is, is certainly
+not confined to those who really trespass. Similarly "all men are mortal" will mean
+"if x is a man, x is mortal, where x may have any value within a certain range".
+What this range is, remains to be determined; but in any case it is wider than "men"
+for the above hypothetical is certainly often true when x is not a man.
+(2) "All men" is a denoting phrase; and it would appear, for reasons which I have
+set forth elsewhere (1905), that denoting phrases never have any meaning in isolation, but only enter as constituents into the verbal expression of propositions which
+contain no constituent corresponding to the denoting phrases in question. That is to
+say, a denoting phrase is defined by means of the propositions in whose verbal
+expression it occurs. Hence it is impossible that these propositions should acquire
+their meaning through the denoting phrases; we must find an independent interpretation of the propositions containing such phrases and must not use these phrases in
+explaining what such propositions mean. Hence we cannot regard "all men are
+mortal" as a statement about 'all men"
+(3) Even if there were such an object as "all men"
+, it is plain that it is not this
+object to which we attribute mortality when we say "all men are mortal". If we
+were attributing mortality to this object, we should have to say "all men is mortal".
+Thus the supposition that there is such an object as "all men" will not help us to
+interpret "all men are mortal"
+(4) It seems obvious that, if we meet something which may be a man or may be
+an angel in disguise, it comes within the scope of "all men are mortal" to assert "if
+this is a man, it is mortal". Thus again, as in the case of the trespassers, it seems
+plain that we are really saying "if anything is a man, it is mortal", and that the
+question whether this or that is a man does not fall within the scope of our assertion,
+as it would do if the all really referred to "all men".
+(5) We thus arrive at the view that what is meant by "all men are mortal" may
+be more explicitly stated in some such form as "it is always true that if x is a man,
+x is mortal". Here we have to inquire as to the scope of the word always.
+(6) It is obvious that always includes some cases in which x is not a man, as we saw
+in the case of the disguised angel. If x were limited to the case when x is a man, we
+could infer that x is a mortal, since if x is a man, x is a mortal. Hence, with the same
+meaning of always, we should find "it is always true that x is mortal". But it is plain
+that, without altering the meaning of always, this new proposition is false, though
+the other was true.
+(7) One might hope that "always" would mean "for all values of x". But "all
+values of x", if legitimate, would include as parts "all propositions" and "all functions"
+, and such illegitimate totalities. Hence the values of x must be somehow
+restricted within some legitimate totality. This seems to lead us to the traditional
+doctrine of a "universe of discourse" within which x must be supposed to lie.
+(8) Yet it is quite essential that we should have some meaning of always which
+
+161
+does not have to be expressed in a restrictive hypothesis as to x. For suppose "always"
+means "whenever x belongs to the class i". Then "all men are mortal" becomes
+"whenever x belongs to the class i, if x is a man, x is mortal"
+', that is, "it is always
+true that if x belongs to the class i, then, if x is a man, x is mortal". But what is our
+new always to mean? There seems no more reason for restricting x, in this new
+proposition, to the class i, than there was before for restricting it to the class man.
+Thus we shall be led on to a new wider universe, and so on ad infinitum, unless we
+can discover some natural restriction upon the possible values of (that is, some
+restriction given with) the function "if x is a man, a is mortal", and not needing to
+be imposed from without.
+(9) It seems obvious that, since all men are mortal, there cannot be any false
+proposition which is a value of the function "if x is a man, x is mortal". For if this
+is a proposition at all, the hypothesis "a is a man" must be a proposition, and so must
+the conclusion "x is mortal". But if the hypothesis is false, the hypothetical is true;
+and if the hypothesis is true, the hypothetical is true. Hence there can be no false
+propositions of the form "if x is a man, x is mortal"
+(10) It follows that, if any values of x are to be excluded, they can only be values
+for which there is no proposition of the form "if x is a man, x is mortal", that is, for
+which this phrase is meaningless. Since, as we saw in (7), there must be excluded
+values of x, it follows that the function "if x is a man, x is mortal" must have a
+certain range of significance, 12 which falls short of all imaginable values of x, though
+it exceeds the values which are men. The restriction on x is therefore a restriction to
+the range of significance of the function "if x is a man, x is mortal"
+(11) We thus reach the conclusion that "all men are mortal" means "if x is a man,
+x is mortal, always", where always means "for all values of the function 'if x is a
+man, x is mortal''. This is an internal limitation upon x, given by the nature of the
+function; and it is a limitation which does not require explicit statement, since it is
+impossible for a function to be true more generally than for all its values. Moreover,
+if the range of significance of the function is i, the function "if x is an i, then if x is a
+man, x is mortal" has the same range of significance, since it cannot be significant
+unless its constituent "'if x is a man, x is mortal" is significant. But hera the range of
+significance is again implicit, as it was in "if x is a man, x is mortal"; thus we cannot
+make ranges of significance explicit, since the attempt to do so only gives rise to a new
+proposition in which the same range of significance is implicit.
+Thus generally: "(x) ox" is to mean "ox always". This may be interpreted,
+though with less exactitude, as "ox is always true"
+', or, more explicitly: "All propositions of the form ox are true"
+', or "All values of the function ox are true" 13
+Thus the fundamental all is "all values of a propositional function"
+, and every
+other all is derivative from this. And every propositional function has a certain range
+of significance, within which lie the arguments for which the function has values.
+12 A function is said to be significant for the argument x if it has a value for this argument. Thus
+we may say shortly " ox is significant", meaning "the function o has a value for the argument x".
+The range of significance of a function consists of all the arguments for which the function is true,
+together with all the arguments for which it is false.
+13 A linguistically convenient expression for this idea is "ox is true for all possible values of x",
+a possible value being understood to be one for which ox is significant.
+
+162
+Within this range of arguments, the function is true or false; outside this range, it is
+nonsense.
+The above argumentation may be summed up as follows:
+The difficulty which besets attempts to restrict the variable is that restrictions
+naturally express themselves as hypotheses that the variable is of such or such a kind,
+and that, when so expressed, the resulting hypothetical is free from the intended
+restriction. For example, let us attempt to restrict the variable to men, and assert
+that, subject to this restriction, "x is mortal" is always true. Then what is always true
+is that if x is a man, x is mortal; and this hypothetical is true even when x is not a man.
+Thus a variable can never be restricted within a certain range if the propositional
+function in which the variable occurs remains significant when the variable is outside
+that range. But if the function ceases to be significant when the variable goes outside
+a certain range, then the variable is ipso facto confined to that range, without the need
+of any explicit statement to that effect. This principle is to be borne in mind in the
+development of logical types, to which we shall shortly proceed
+We can now begin to see how it comes that "all so-and-so's" is sometimes a
+legitimate phrase and sometimes not. Suppose we say "all terms which have the
+property o have the property 4". That means, according to the above interpretation,
+фх always implies fex"
+'. Provided the range of significance of ox is the same as that
+of fix, this statement is significant; thus, given any definite function ox, there are
+propositions about "all the terms satisfying x". But it sometimes happens (as we
+shall see more fully later on) that what appears verbally as one function is really
+many analogous functions with different ranges of significance. This applies, for
+example, to "p is true", which, we shall find, is not really one function of p, but is
+different functions according to the kind of proposition that p is. In such a case, the
+phrase expressing the ambiguous function may, owing to the ambiguity, be significant
+throughout a set of values of the argument exceeding the range of significance of any
+one function. In such a case, all is not legitimate. Thus if we try to say "all true
+propositions have the property q"
+', that is, "'p is true' always implies op", the
+possible arguments to "p is true" necessarily exceed the possible arguments to o,
+and therefore the attempted general statement is impossible. For this reason, genuine
+general statements about all true propositions cannot be made. It may happen,
+however, that the supposed function o is really ambiguous like "p is true"; and, if
+it happens to have an ambiguity precisely of the same kind as that of "p is true"
+we may be able always to give an interpretation to the proposition "''p is true"
+implies op". This will occur, for example, if op is "not-p is false". Thus we get an
+appearance, in such cases, of a general proposition concerning all propositions; but
+this appearance is due to a systematic ambiguity about such words as true and false.
+(This systematic ambiguity results from the hierarchy of propositions which will be
+explained later on.) We may, in all such cases, make our statement about any proposition, since the meaning of the ambiguous words will adapt itself to any proposition. But if we turn our proposition into an apparent variable and say something
+about all, we must suppose the ambiguous words fixed to this or that possible
+meaning, though it may be quite irrelevant which of their possible meanings they
+are to have. This is how it happens both that all has limitations which exclude "all
+propositions" and that there nevertheless seem to be true statements about "all
+
+163
+propositions". Both these points will become plainer when the theory of types has
+been explained.
+It has often been suggested'4 that what is required in order that it may be legitimate to speak of all of a collection is that the collection should be finite. Thus "all
+men are mortal" will be legitimate because men form a finite class. But that is not
+really the reason why we can speak of "all men". What is essential, as appears from
+the above discussion, is not finitude, but what may be called logical homogeneity.
+This property is to belong to any collection whose terms are all contained within the
+range of significance of some one function. It would always be obvious at a glance
+whether a collection possessed this property or not, if it were not for the concealed
+ambiguity in common logical terms such as true and false, which gives an appearance
+of being a single function to what is really a conglomeration of many functions with
+different ranges of significance.
+The conclusions of this section are as follows: Every proposition containing all
+asserts that some propositional function is always true; and this means that all
+values of the said function are true, not that the function is true for all arguments,
+since there are arguments for which any given function is meaningless, that is, has
+no value. Hence we can speak of all of a collection when and only when the collection
+forms part or the whole of the range of significance of some propositional function,
+the range of significance being defined as the collection of those arguments for which
+the function in question is significant, that is, has a value.
+IV. The hierarchy of types
+A type is defined as the range of significance of a propositional function, that is, as
+the collection of arguments for which the said function has values. Whenever an
+apparent variable occurs in a proposition, the range of values of the apparent variable
+is a type, the type being fixed by the function of which "all values" are concerned.
+The division of objects into types is necessitated by the reflexive fallacies which
+otherwise arise. These fallacies, as we saw, are to be avoided by what may be called
+the "vicious-circle principle", that is, "no totality can contain members defined in
+terms of itself". This principle, in our technical language, becomes: "Whatever contains an apparent variable must not be a possible value of that variable". Thus
+whatever contains an apparent variable must be of a different type from the possible
+values of that variable; we will say that it is of a higher type. Thus the apparent
+variables contained in an expression are what determines its type. This is the guiding
+principle in what follows.
+Propositions which contain apparent variables are generated from such as do not
+contain these apparent variables by processes of which one is always the process of
+generalization, that is, the substitution of a variable for one of the terms of a proposi.
+tion and the assertion of the resulting function for all possible values of the variable.
+Hence a proposition is called a generalized proposition when it contains an apparent
+variable. A proposition containing no apparent variable we will call an elementary
+proposition. It is plain that a proposition containing an apparent variable presupposes
+others from which it can be obtained by generalization; hence all generalized
+14 For example, by Poincaré (1906).
+
+164
+propositions presuppose elementary propositions. In an elementary proposition we can
+distinguish one or more terms from one or more concepts; the terms are whatever can
+be regarded as the subject of the proposition, while the concepts are the predicates or
+relations asserted of these terms.' The terms of elementary propositions we will call
+individuals; these form the first or lowest type.
+It is unnecessary, in practice, to know what objects belong to the lowest type, or
+even whether the lowest type of variable occurring in a given context is that of
+individuals or some other. For in practice only the relative types of variables are
+relevant; thus the lowest type occurring in a given context may be called that of
+individuals, so far as that context is concerned. It follows that the above account of
+individuals is not essential to the truth of what follows; all that is essential is the way
+in which other types are generated from individuals, however the type of individuals
+may be constituted.
+By applying the process of generalization to individuals occurring in elementary
+propositions, we obtain new propositions. The legitimacy of this process requires only
+that no individuals should be propositions. That this is so, is to be secured by the
+meaning we give to the word individual. We may define an individual as something
+destitute of complexity; it is then obviously not a proposition, since propositions are
+essentially complex. Hence in applying the process of generalization to individuals
+we run no risk of incurring reflexive fallacies.
+Elementary propositions together with such as contain only individuals as apparent
+variables we will call first-order propositions. These form the second logical type.
+We have thus a new totality, that of first-order propositions. We can thus form new
+propositions in which first-order propositions occur as apparent variables. These we
+Will call second-order propositions; these form the third logical type. Thus, for example,
+if Epimenides asserts "all first-order propositions affirmed by me are false", he
+asserts a second-order proposition; he may assert this truly, without asserting truly
+any first-order proposition, and thus no contradiction arises.
+The above process can be continued indefinitely. The (n + 1)th logical type will
+consist of propositions of order n, which will be such as contain propositions of order
+n - 1, but of no higher order, as apparent variables. The types so obtained are
+mutually exclusive, and thus no reflexive fallacies are possible so long as we remember
+that an apparent variable must always be confined within some one type.
+In practice, a hierarchy of functions is more convenient than one of propositions.
+Functions of various orders may be obtained from propositions of various orders by
+the method of substitution. If p is a proposition and a a constituent of p, let "plax"
+denote the proposition which results from substituting x for a wherever a occurs in p.
+Then pla, which we will call a matrix, may take the place of a function; its value for
+the argument x is plax, and its value for the argument a is p. Similarly, if "P/(a, b);
+(x, y) " denotes the result of first substituting x for a and then substituting y for b, we
+may use the double matrix p/(a, b) to represent a double function. In this way we can
+avoid apparent variables other than individuals and propositions of various orders.
+The order of a matrix will be defined as being the order of the proposition in which
+the substitution is effected, which proposition we will call the prototype. The order
+15 See Russell 1903, § 48.
+
+165
+of a matrix does not determine its type: in the first place because it does not determine the number of arguments for which others are to be substituted (that is, whether
+the matrix is of the form pla or p/(a, b) or p/(a, b, c), etc.); in the second place because,
+if the prototype is of more than the first order, the arguments may be either propositions or individuals. But it is plain that the type of a matrix is definable always by
+means of the hierarchy of propositions.
+Although it is possible to replace functions by matrices, and although this procedure
+introduces a certain simplicity into the explanation of types, it is technically inconvenient. Technically, it is convenient to replace the prototype p by pa, and to replace
+plax by ox; thus where, if matrices were being employed, p and a would appear as
+apparent variables, we now have o as our apparent variable. In order that o may be
+legitimate as an apparent variable, it is necessary that its values should be confined
+to propositions of some one type. Hence we proceed as follows.
+A function whose argument is an individual and whose value is always a first-order
+proposition will be called a first-order function. A function involving a first-order
+function or proposition as apparent variable will be called a second-order function,
+and so on. A function of one variable which is of the order next above that of its argument will be called a predicative function; the same name will be given to a function
+of several variables if there is one among these variables in respect of which the
+function becomes predicative when values are assigned to all the other variables.
+Then the type of a function is determined by the type of its values and the number
+and type of its arguments.
+The hierarchy of functions may be further explained as follows. A first-order
+function of an individual a will be denoted by o! (the letters 4, x, 0, f, 9, F, G' will
+also be used for functions). No first-order function contains a function as apparent
+variable; hence such functions form a well-defined totality, and the o in o!x can be
+turned into an apparent variable. Any proposition in which o appears as apparent
+variable and there is no apparent variable of higher type than o is a second-order
+proposition. If such a proposition contains an individual x, it is not a predicative
+function of x; but, if it contains a first-order function o, it is a predicative function of
+• and will be written f!(4! 2). Then f is a second-order predicative function; the possible
+values of f again form a well-defined totality, and we can turn f into an apparent
+variable. We can thus define third-order predicative functions, which will be such as
+have third-order propositions for their values and second-order predicative functions
+for their arguments. And in this way we can proceed indefinitely. A precisely similar
+development applies to functions of several variables.
+We will adopt the following conventions. Variables of the lowest type occurring in
+any context will be denoted by small Latin letters (excluding f and 9, which are
+reserved for functions); a predicative function of an argument x (where x may be of
+any type) will be denoted by o!x (where 4, x, 0, f, g, F or G may replace q); similarly
+a predicative function of two arguments x and y will be denoted by o! (x, y) ; a general
+function of x will be denoted by ox, and a general function of x and y by (x, y). In
+ox, o cannot be made into an apparent variable, since its type is indeterminate; but
+in p!x, where o is a predicative function whose argument is of some given type, o can
+be made into an apparent variable.
+It is important to observe that since there are various types of propositions and
+
+166
+functions, and since generalization can only be applied within some one type, all
+phrases containing the words "all propositions" or "all functions" are prima facie
+meaningless, though in certain cases they are capable of an unobjectionable interpretation. The contradictions arise from the use of such phrases in cases where no
+innocent meaning can be found
+If we now revert to the contradictions, we see at once that some of them are solved
+by the theory of types. Wherever "all propositions" are mentioned, we must substitute "all propositions of order n"
+, where it is indifferent what value we give to n but
+it is essential that n should have some value. Thus when a man says "I am lying"
+, we
+must interpret him as meaning: "There is a proposition of order n which I affirm and
+which is false". This is a proposition of order n + 1; hence the man is not affirming
+any proposition of order n; hence his statement is false, and yet its falsehood does not
+imply, as that of "I am lying" appeared to do, that he is making a true statement.
+This solves the Liar.
+Consider next "the least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables".
+It is to be observed, in the first place, that nameable must mean "nameable by means
+of such-and-such assigned names"
+, and that the number of assigned names must be
+finite. For if it is not finite, there is no reason why there should be any integer not
+nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables, and the paradox collapses. We may next
+suppose that "nameable in terms of names of the class N" means "being the only
+term satisfying some function composed wholly of names of the class N". The
+solution of this paradox lies, I think, in the simple observation that "nameable in
+terms of names of the class N' is never itself nameable in terms of names of that
+class. If we enlarge N by adding the name "nameable in terms of names of the class
+, our fundamental apparatus of names is enlarged; calling the new apparatus N',
+"nameable in terms of names of the class N'" remains not nameable in terms of
+names of the class N'. If we try to enlarge N till it embraces all names, "nameable"
+becomes (by what was said above) "being the only term satisfying some function
+composed wholly of names". But here there is a function as apparent variable;
+hence we are confined to predicative functions of some one type (for nonpredicative
+functions cannot be apparent variables). Hence we have only to observe that
+nameability in terms of such functions is nonpredicative in order to escape the
+paradox.
+The case of "the least indefinable ordinal" is closely analogous to the case we have
+just discussed. Here, as before, "definable" must be relative to some given apparatus
+of fundamental ideas; and there is reason to suppose that " definable in terms of ideas
+of the class N" is not definable in terms of ideas of the class N. It will be true that
+there is some definite segment of the series of ordinals consisting wholly of definable
+ordinals and having the least indefinable ordinal as its limit. This least indefinable
+ordinal will be definable by a slight enlargement of our fundamental apparatus; but
+there will then be a new ordinal which will be the least that is indefinable with the
+new apparatus. If we enlarge our apparatus so as to include all possible ideas, there
+is no longer any reason to believe that there is any indefinable ordinal. The apparent
+force of the paradox lies largely, I think, in the supposition that if all the ordinals
+of a certain class are definable, the class must be definable, in which case its successor
+is of course also definable; but there is no reason for accepting this supposition.
+
+167
+The other contradictions, that of Burali-Forti in particular, require some further
+developments for their solution.
+V. The axiom of reducibility
+A propositional function of x may, as we have seen, be of any order; hence any
+statement about "all properties of x" is meaningless. (A "property of x" is the same
+thing as a "propositional function which holds of x".) But it is absolutely necessary,
+if mathematics is to be possible, that we should have some method of making statements which will usually be equivalent to what we have in mind when we inaccurately) speak of "all properties of x". This necessity appears in many cases, but
+especially in connection with mathematical induction. We can say, by the use of any
+instead of all, "Any property possessed by O, and by the successors of all numbers
+possessing it, is possessed by all finite numbers". But we cannot go on to: "A finite
+number is one which possesses all properties possessed by O and by the successors of
+all numbers possessing them"
+. If we confine this statement to all first-order properties of numbers, we cannot infer that it holds of second-order properties. For example,
+we shall be unable to prove that, if m and n are finite numbers, then m + n is a finite
+number. For, with the above definition, "m is a finite number" is a second-order
+property of m; hence the fact that m + O is a finite number, and that, if m + n is a
+finite number, so is m + n + 1, does not allow us to conclude by induction that
+m + n is a finite number. It is obvious that such a state of things renders much of
+elementary mathematics impossible.
+The other definition of finitude, by the nonsimilarity of whole and part, fares no
+better. For this definition is: "A class is said to be finite when every one-one relation
+whose domain is the class and whose converse domain is contained in the class has
+the whole class for its converse domain". Here a variable relation appears, that is, a
+variable function of two variables; we have to take all values of this function, which
+requires that it should be of some assigned order; but any assigned order will not
+enable us to deduce many of the propositions of elementary mathematics.
+Hence we must find, if possible, some method of reducing the order of a propositional function without affecting the truth or falsehood of its values. This seems to be
+what common sense effects by the admission of classes. Given any propositional
+function, ox, of whatever order, this is assumed to be equivalent, for all values of x,
+to a statement of the form "x belongs to the class a"
+'. Now this statement is of the
+first order, since it makes no allusion to "all functions of such-and-such a type".
+Indeed its only practical advantage over the original statement ox is that it is of the
+first order. There is no advantage in assuming that there really are such things as
+classes, and the contradiction about the classes which are not members of themselves
+shows that, if there are classes, they must be something radically different from
+individuals. I believe the chief purpose which classes serve, and the chief reason which
+makes them linguistically convenient, is that they provide a method of reducing the
+order of a propositional function. I shall, therefore, not assume anything of what may
+seem to be involved in the common-sense admission of classes, except this : that every
+propositional function is equivalent, for all its values, to some predicative function.
+This assumption with regard to functions is to be made whatever may be the type
+
+168
+of their arguments. Let ox be a function, of any order, of an argument x, which may
+itself be either an individual or a function of any order. If o is of the order next above
+x, we write the function in the form o!; in such a case we will call o a predicative
+function. Thus a predicative function of an individual is a first-order function; and
+for higher types of arguments, predicative functions take the place that first-order
+functions take in respect of individuals. We assume, then, that every function is
+equivalent, for all its values, to some predicative function of the same argument.
+This assumption seems to be the essence of the usual assumption of classes; at any
+rate, it retains as much of classes as we have any use for, and little enough to avoid
+the contradictions which a less grudging admission of classes is apt to entail. We will
+call this assumption the axiom of classes, or the axiom of reducibility.
+We shall assume similarly that every function of two variables is equivalent, for
+all its values, to a predicative function of those variables, where a predicative function of two variables is one such that there is one of the variables in respect of which
+the function becomes predicative (in our previous sense) when a value is assigned to
+the other variable. This assumption is what seems to be meant by saying that any
+statement about two variables defines a relation between them. We will call this
+assumption the axiom of relations, or the axiom of reducibility.
+In dealing with relations between more than two terms, similar assumptions would
+be needed for three, four, ... variables. But these assumptions are not indispensable
+for our purpose and are therefore not made in this paper.
+By the help of the axiom of reducibility, statements about "all first-order functions
+of x" or "all predicative functions of a" yield most of the results which otherwise
+would require "all functions". The essential point is that such results are obtained in
+all cases where only the truth or falsehoold of values of the functions concerned are
+relevant, as is invariably the case in mathematics. Thus mathematical induction, for
+example, need now only be stated for all predicative functions of numbers; it then
+follows from the axiom of classes that it holds of any function of whatever order. It
+might be thought that the paradoxes for the sake of which we invented the hierarchy
+types would now reappear. But this is not the case, because, in such paradoxes,
+either something beyond the truth or falsehood of values of functions is relevant, or
+expressions occur which are unmeaning even after the introduction of the axiom of
+reducibility. For example, such a statement as "Epimenides asserts fx" is not equivalent to "Epimenides asserts o!x", even though fx and o!x are equivalent. Thus "I
+am lying" remains unmeaning if we attempt to include all propositions among those
+which I may be falsely affirming and is unaffected by the axiom of classes if we confine it to propositions of order n. The hierarchy of propositions and functions, therefore, remains relevant in just those cases in which there is a paradox to be avoided.
+VI. Primitive ideas and propositions of symbolic logic
+The primitive ideas required in symbolic logic appear to be the following seven:
+(1) Any propositional function of a variable x or of several variables x, y, z....
+This will be denoted by фх ог ф(х. у, %,...).
+(2) The negation of a proposition. If p is the proposition, its negation will be
+denoted by ~p.
+
+169
+(3) The disjunction or logical sum of two propositions, that is, "this or that". If
+p and q are the two propositions, their disjunction will be denoted by p V q.16
+(4) The truth of any value of a propositional function, that is, of ox where x is not
+specified
+(5) The truth of all values of a propositional function. This is denoted by (x). фх
+or (x): фх or whatever larger number of dots may be necessary to bracket off the
+proposition. ' In (x). øx, x is called an apparent variable, whereas when ox is asserted,
+where x is not specified, x is called a real variable.
+(6) Any predicative function of an argument of any type; this will be represented
+by p!x or p!a or p! R, according to circumstances. A predicative function of x is one
+whose values are propositions of the type next above that of x, if x is an individual
+or a proposition, or that of values of x if x is a function. It may be described as one in
+which the apparent variables, it any, are all of the same type as x or of lower type;
+and a variable is of lower type than x if it can significantly occur as argument to x,
+or as argument to an argument to x, and so forth.
+(7) Assertion, that is, the assertion that some proposition is true, or that any
+value of some propositional function is true. This is required to distinguish a proposition actually asserted from one merely considered, or from one adduced as hypothesis to some other. It will be indicated by the sign "+" prefixed to what is asserted,
+with enough dots to bracket off what is asserted. Is
+Before proceeding to the primitive propositions, we need certain definitions. In the
+following definitions, as well as in the primitive propositions, the letters p, 9, and r
+are used to denote propositions.
+p>g.=. ~pV 9 Df.
+This definition states that "p›q" (which is read "p implies g") is to mean "p is
+false or g is true". I do not mean to affirm that "implies" cannot have any other
+meaning, but only that this meaning is the one which it is most convenient to give
+to "implies" in symbolic logic. In a definition, the sign of equality and the letters
+"Df." are to be regarded as one symbol, meaning jointly "is defined to mean"
+. The
+sign of equality without the letters "Df." has a different meaning, to be defined
+shortly.
+p.g.=.~(~pV ~9) Df.
+This defines the logical product of two propositions p and q, that is, "p and q are
+both true". The above definition states that this is to mean: "It is false that either
+p is false or q is false". Here again, the definition does not give the only meaning
+which can be given to "p and q are both true" but gives the meaning which is most
+convenient for our purposes.
+p=g=p>q.g?p Df.
+16 In a previous article (1906), I took implication as indefinable, instead of disjunction. The choice
+between the two is a matter of taste; I now choose disjunction, because it enables us to diminish
+the number of primitive propositions.
+17 The use of dots follows Peano's usage. It is fully explained by Whitehead (1902; 1906,
+18 This sign, as well as the introduction of the idea which it expresses, is due to Frege. See
+Prege 1879, p. 1, and 1893, p. 9.
+
+170
+That is, "p = 9", which is read "p is equivalent to g", means "p implies q and q
+implies p"; whence, of course, it follows that p and q are both true or both false.
+(Нх). фх.=. ~ {(х). ~ фх} Df.
+This defines "there is at least one value of x for which ox is true". We define it as
+meaning "it is false that ox is always false".
+Х =У.=: (Ф):Ф!Х.І. ФУ DI.
+This is the definition of identity. It states that x and y are to be called identical
+when every predicative function satisfied by x is satisfied by y. It follows from the
+axiom of reducibility that if x satisfies fx, where & is any function, predicative or
+nonpredicative, then y satisfies /y.
+The following definitions are less important and are introduced solely for the
+purpose of abbreviation.
+(Х, У). Ф(Х, У). =: (Х): (У). Ф(Х, У)
+(Нх, У). Ф(х, У). =: (Нх): (Пy). ф(х, У)
+ФХ. Ух. Цх : =: (х):фх ] цх
+ФХ. Ех. х: =: (Х):фх. =. гох
+Df.
+Df.
+Df.
+Df.
+Ф(Х, У) .Ух. у. Н(Х, У) : =: (Х, У):Ф(x, У). J. 4(x, y) Df.,
+and so on for any number of variables.
+The primitive propositions required are as follows. (In 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10, p, 9,
+and r stand for propositions.)
+(1) A proposition implied by a true premiss is true.
+(2) I:P V p.J.p.
+(3) 1:9.3.p V 9.
+(4) I:PV 9.3.9Vp.
+(6) t:.g3x.x:pvg.a.pVr.
+(7) І : (х). Фх. І. ФУ;
+that is, "if all values of pi are true, then py is true, where py is any value" 19
+(8) If py is true, where py is any value of pi, then (x). ox is true. This cannot be
+expressed in our symbols; for if we write "py.). (X) o," that means "фу implies
+that all values of pi are true, where y may have any value of the appropriate type",
+which is not in general the case. What we mean to assert is: "If, however y is chosen,
+фУ is true, then (x). х is true"
+', whereas what is expressed by "Фу.). (x). фх" is:
+"However y is chosen, if qy is true, then (x) ox is true", which is quite a different
+statement, and in general a false one.
+(9) 1: (x). фх.). фа, where a is any definite constant.
+This principle is really as many different principles as there are possible values of
+a. That is, it states that, for example, whatever holds of all individuals holds of Socrates; also that it holds of Plato; and so on. It is the principle that a general rule
+19 It is convenient to use the notation oû to denote the function itself, as opposed to this or that
+value of the function.
+
+171
+may be applied to particular cases; but in order to give it scope, it is necessary to
+mention the particular cases, since otherwise we need the principle itself to assure us
+that the general rule that general rules may be applied to particular cases may be
+applied (say) to the particular case of Socrates. It is thus that this principle differs
+from (7); our present principle makes a statement about Socrates, or about Plato, or
+some other definite constant, whereas (7) made a statement about a variable.
+The above principle is never used in symbolic logic or in pure mathematics, since
+all our propositions are general, and even when (as in "one is a number") we seem to
+have a strictly particular case, this turns out not to be so when closely examined.
+In fact, the use of the above principle is the distinguishing mark of applied mathematics. Thus, strictly speaking, we might have omitted it from our list.
+(10) 1:. (x).P V ф.D: p. V. (x). Фх;
+that is, "if'p or øx' is always true, then either p is true, or ox is always true".
+(11) When f(x) is true whatever argument x may be, and F(qy) is true whatever
+possible argument y may be, then {f (øx). F(ox)} is true whatever possible argument
+x may be.
+This is the axiom of the "identification of variables". It is needed when two
+separate propositional functions are each known to be always true and we wish to
+infer that their logical product is always true. This inference is only legitimate if the
+two functions take arguments of the same type, for otherwise their logical product is
+meaningless. In the above axiom, x and y must be of the same type, because both
+occur as arguments to o.
+(12) If фх.фх > x is true for any possible x, then ux is true for any possible x.
+This axiom is required in order to assure us that the range of significance of x, in
+the case supposed, is the same as that of ox. ox > Ux. 3. Ix; both are in fact the same
+as that of ox. We know, in the case supposed, that fx is true whenever ox. х > /x
+and o. ox > Ix. > Ix are both significant, but we do not know, without
+an axiom,
+that x is true whenever x is significant. Hence the need of the axiom.
+Axioms (II) and (12) are required, for example, in proving
+(х). Фх: (х). фх > цх: д. (х). гех.
+By (7) and (11),
+1: (х).ф:(/).:І: ФУ.ФУ> УУ,
+whence by (12)
+1:. (х). Фх: (х). Фх > 4x: 2: 4У,
+whence the result follows by (8) and (10).
+(13):(Ff):(x):ф.=.f!x.
+This is the axiom of reducibility. It states that, given any function oi, there is a
+predicative function flé such that f!x is always equivalent to ox. Note that, since a
+proposition beginning with "(If)" is, by definition, the negation of one beginning
+with "(f)", the above axiom involves the possibility of considering "all predicative
+functions of x". If ox is any function of x, we cannot make propositions beginning
+with "(p)" or "(Eq)", since we cannot consider "all functions"
+, but only "any
+function" or "all predicative functions"
+(14) +:. (4 f) ::(ХУ): Ф(Х, У). =.J. (Х, У).
+
+172
+This is the axiom of reducibility for double functions.
+In the above propositions, our x and y may be of any type whatever. The only way
+in which the theory of types is relevant is that (11) only allows us to identity real
+variables occurring in different contents when they are shown to be of the same type
+by both occurring as arguments to the same function, and that, in (7) and (9), y and
+a must respectively be of the appropriate type for arguments to qi. Thus, for example,
+suppose we have a proposition of the form (q) f! (p! 2, x), which is a second-order
+function of x. Then by (7),
+1: (8) J. (p! 2, x). J.J. (48. 2, X),
+where 4! 2 is any first-order function. But it will not do to treat (9) f! (p! 2, x) as if it
+were a first-order function of x, and take this function as a possible value of 4! 2 in
+the above. It is such confusions of types that give rise to the paradox of the Liar.
+Again, consider the classes which are not members of themselves. It is plain that,
+since we have identified classes with functions, 20 no class can be significantly said to
+be or not to be a member of itself; for the members of a class are arguments to it,
+and arguments to a function are always of lower type than the function. And if we
+ask: "But how about the class of all classes? Is not that a class, and so a member of
+itself?", the answer is twofold. First, if "the class of all classes" means "the class
+of all classes of whatever type"
+', then there is no such notion. Secondly, if "the class
+of all classes" means "the class of all classes of type t", then this is a class of the next
+type above t and is therefore again not a member of itself.
+Thus although the above primitive propositions apply equally to all types, they do
+not enable us to elicit contradictions. Hence in the course of any deduction it is never
+necessary to consider the absolute type of a variable; it is only necessary to see that
+the different variables occurring in one proposition are of the proper relative types.
+This excludes such functions as that from which our fourth contradiction was obtained, namely: "The relation R holds between R and S". For a relation between
+R and S is necessarily of higher type than either of them, so that the proposed
+function is meaningless.
+VII. Elementary theory of classes and relations
+Propositions in which a function o occurs may depend, for their truth-value, upon
+the particular function o, or they may depend only upon the extension of o, that is,
+upon the arguments which satisfy o. A function of the latter sort we will call extensional. Thus, for example, "I believe that all men are mortal" may not be equivalent
+to "I believe that all featherless bipeds are mortal", even if men are coextensive with
+featherless bipeds; for I may not know that they are coextensive. But "all men are
+mortal" must be equivalent to "all featherless bipeds are mortal" if men are coextensive with featherless bipeds. Thus "all men are mortal" is an extensional function of
+the function "x is a man"
+, while "I believe all men are mortal" is a function which
+is not extensional; we will call functions intensional when they are not extensional.
+The functions of functions with which mathematics is specially concerned are all
+extensional. The mark of an extensional function f of a function o! 2 is
+20 This identification is subject to a modification to be explained shortly.
+
+173
+From any function f of a function p!ê we can derive an associated extensional
+function as follows. Put
+f{2(412)}=: (1ф):Ф!.=x. 4x: f{p! 2} Df.
+The function f{2(4z)} is in reality a function of fi, though not the same function as
+f (42), supposing this latter to be significant. But it is convenient to treat f{2(4z)}
+technically as though it had an argument {(4z), which we call "the class defined by
+4". We have
+whence, applying to the fictitious objects 2(pz) and {(4z) the definition of identity
+given above, we find
+This, with its converse (which can also be proved), is the distinctive property of
+classes. Hence we are justified in treating 2(фz) as the class defined by o. In the same
+way we put
+f{Xý(x, У)}. =: (Пф): ф! (Х, У). Ех. у. 4 (х, У): П{ф! ((2, Y)} Df.
+A few words are necessary here as to the distinction between ! (î, ý) and ф! (Y, ).
+We will adopt the following convention: When a function (as opposed to its values)
+is represented in a form involving i and ý, or any other two letters of the alphabet,
+the value of this function for the arguments a and b is to be found by substituting a
+for * and b for ý; that is, the argument mentioned first is to be substituted for the
+letter which comes earlier in the alphabet, and the argument mentioned second for the
+later letter. This sufficiently distinguishes between ф! (*, ý) and o! (Y, X); for example:
+The value of o! (i, ý) for arguments a and b is o! (a, b).
+The value of o! (i, ý) for arguments b and a is o! (6, a).
+The value of 4! (Y, s) for arguments a and b is o! (b, a).
+The value of ф! (Y, S) for arguments b and a is o! (a, b).
+We put
+хЕф! Е.=. ф!х Df.,
+whence
+1:. х = {(4z). =: (Нф): Ф!У. Е у. Ку: ф!х.
+Also by the reducibility axiom we have
+(Еф): Ф!У. =y. ФУ,
+whence
+1: x= 2(42). =. Ux.
+This holds whatever x may be. Suppose now we want to consider 2(Vz) = Pf {2(ф! z)}.
+We have, by the above,
+
+174
+whence
+where « is written for any expression of the form 4f (2(p! z)}.
+We put
+Here cls has a meaning which depends upon the type of the apparent variable p.
+Thus, for example, the proposition "cls e cls"
+, which is a consequence of the above
+definition, requires that "cls" should have a different meaning in the two places
+where it occurs. The symbol "cs" can only be used where it is unnecessary to know
+the type; it has an ambiguity which adjusts itself to circumstances. If we introduce
+as an indefinable the function "Indiv!"
+', meaning "x is an individual"
+, we may put
+Kl = á{(H).a = 2(ф!z.Indivlz)} Df.
+Then Kl is an unambiguous symbol meaning " classes of individuals".
+We will use lower-case Greek letters (other than e, ф, y, X, 9) to represent classes of
+whatever type, that is, to stand for symbols of the form 2(p! 2) or 2(pz).
+The theory of classes proceeds, from this point on, much as in Peano's system;
+{(фz) replaces z3 (qz). Also I put
+a CB.=: xEa.Ix. xEß Df.
+А! а =. (Нх). х є а
+Df.
+V = X(X = x)
+Df.
+A = X{~ (x = x)}
+Df.
+where A, as with Peano, is the null class. The symbols #, A, V, like ds and e, are
+ambiguous and acquire a definite meaning only when the type concerned is otherwise
+indicated.
+We treat relations in exactly the same way, putting
+оіф! (Х, У) зв.=. ф! (а, b) Df.
+(the order being determined by the alphabetical order of x and y and the typographical order of a and b); whence
+1: . а{КУН(х, У)}В. =: (Нф): 4(х, У). Ех. у. Ф! (Х, У):Ф! (а, b),
+whence, by the reducibility axiom,
+We use Latin capital letters as abbreviations for such symbols as xýf(x, y), and we
+find
+where
+We put
+r:. R = S.=.xRy.=х. у. ХбУ,
+R=S= fRO,.f!S Df.
+Rel= R{(1ф).R =Xý!(x, y)} Df.,
+
+175
+and we find that everything proved for classes has its analogue for dual relations.
+Following Peano, we put
+01B=X(xEa.x=B) Dt.,
+defining the product, or common part, of two classes;
+aUB =x(x= a.V. x =B) Df..
+defining the sum of two classes; and
+- a =X≤~ (x = a)} Df.,
+defining the negation of a class. Similarly for relations we put
+ROS =Xý(xRy.xSy) Df.
+RUS=Xý(xRy.V.xSy) Df.
+- R= Xý≤~ (xRy)}
+Df.
+VIII. Descriptive functions
+The functions hitherto considered have been propositional functions, with the
+exception of a few particular functions such as RiS. But the ordinary functions of
+mathematics, such as x?, sin x, log x, are not propositional. Functions of this kind
+always mean "the term having such-and-such a relation to x"
+'. For this reason they
+may be called descriptive functions, because they describe a certain term by means of
+its relation to their argument. Thus "sin /2" describes the number 1; yet propositions in which sin /2 occurs are not the same as they would be if 1 were substituted.
+This appears,
+for example, from the proposition "sin n|2 = 1"
+, which conveys
+valuable information, whereas "1 = 1" is trivial. Descriptive functions have no
+meaning by themselves, but only as constituents of propositions; and this applies
+generally to phrases of the form "the term having such-and-such a property". Hence
+in dealing with such phrases, we must define any proposition in which they occur,
+not the phrases themselves. 21 We are thus led to the following definition, in which
+"(1x)(фx)" is to be read "the term x which satisfies ox".
+44(12) (фх)}. =: (1в) : Фх.Ex.X = b: 4b Df.
+This definition states that "the term wl ich satisfies o satisfies 4" is to mean:
+"There is a term b such that ox is true wher. and only when x is b, and fb is true".
+Thus all propositions about "the so-and-so" vill be false if there are no so-and-so's
+or several so-and-so's.
+The general definition of a descriptive function is
+Ry = (1)(xRy) Df.;
+that is, "R'y" is to mean "the term which has the relation R to y". If there are '
+several terms or none having the relation R to y, all propositions about R'y will be
+false. We put
+Е! (12) (фх). =: (Нв):фх. =x.x = b Df.
+21 See Russell 1905, where the reasons for this view are given at length.
+
+176
+Here "E!(1x)(фx)" may be read "there is such a term as the x which satisfies qx",
+or "the x which satisfies ox exists"
+. We have
+:.E! Ry.=: (Hb): xRy.=x. x = b.
+The inverted comma in R'y may be read of. Thus if R is the relation of father to son,
+"Ry" is "the father of y". If R is the relation of son to father, all propositions
+about R'y will be false unless y has one son and no more.
+From the above it appears that descriptive functions are obtained from relations.
+The relations now to be defined are chiefly important on account of the descriptive
+functions to which they give rise.
+Cnv=QP{xQy.=xy.УРx} Dt.
+Here "Cnv" is short for "converse". It is the relation of a relation to its converse,
+for example, of greater to less, of parentage to sonship, of preceding to following, and
+so on. We have
+For a shorter notation, often more convenient, we put
+P= Chr'P Df.
+We want next a notation for the class of terms which have the relation R to y. For
+this purpose, we put
+R =âý{a = 2(xRy)} Dt.,
+whence
++. Ry = x(xRy).
+Similarly we put
+R=Bx{B = ý(xRy)} Df.,
+whence
++. R'x = ý(xRy).
+We want next the domain of R (that is, the class of terms which have the relation
+R to something), the converse domain of R (that is, the class of terms to which something has the relation R), and the field of R, which is the sum of the domain and the
+converse domain. For this purpose we define the relations of the domain, converse
+domain, and field, to R. The definitions are:
+D = âR{a = x((Пy).xRy)}
+Df.
+a = BR{B Ý((Пх).xRy)}
+Df.
+C=ýR{y= {((Hy):xRy.V.yRx)} Df.
+Note that the third of these definitions is only significant when R is what we may
+call a homogeneous relation, that is, one in which, if xRy holds, x and y are of the
+same type. For otherwise, however we may choose x and y, either x Ry or y Rx will be
+meaningless. This observation is important in connection with Burali-Forti's contradiction.
+
+177
+We have, in virtue of the above definitions,
+/. DR = X{(Нy).xRy},
+r. dR =ý{(1x).xRy},
++. CR = 3{(Hy):xRy. V. y Rx},
+the last of these being significant only when R is homogeneous. "D'R" is read
+"the domain of R"; "C'R" is read "the converse domain of R", and "C'R" is read
+"the field of R". The letter C' is chosen as the initial of the word "campus"
+We want next a notation for the relation, to a class a contained in the domain of
+R, of the class of terms to which some member of a has the relation R, and also for
+the relation, to a class ß contained in the converse domain of R, of the class of terms
+which have the relation R to some member of B. For the second of these we put
+Ro = âB{a = î((Hy).y=B.xBy)} Df.
+So that
+1. R•B = {{(Hy) У = =B.x Ry}.
+Thus it R is the relation of father to son, and ß is the class of Etonians, Reß will be
+the class "fathers of Etonians"; if R is the relation "less than" and B is the class
+of proper fractions of the form 1 - 2-" for integral values of n, R'ß will be the class
+of fractions less than some fraction of the form 1 - 2-"; that is, R°ß will be the
+class of proper fractions. The other relation mentioned above is (R).
+We put, as an alternative notation often more convenient,
+R"B = R°B Df.
+The relative product of two relations R and S is the relation which holds between
+x and z whenever there is a term y such that xRy and y Rz both hold. The relative
+product is denoted by R,S. Thus
+R|S = X2{(Hy) xRy.y Rz} Df.
+We put also
+R2 = R|R Df.
+The product and sum of a class of classes are often required. They are defined as
+follows:
+8K = X{(Ha). aEK.XE 0) Df.
+рік = Хаєк Оа-ХЕ а}
+Df.
+Similarly for relations we put
+$ 1 = Xý{(1 R). R = \.xRy} Df.
+DI.
+We need a notation for the class whose only member is x. Peano uses ex, hence we
+shall use ix. Peano showed (what Frege also had emphasized) that this class cannot
+be identified with x. With the usual view of classes, the need for such a distinction
+remains a mystery; but with the view set forth above, it becomes obvious.
+
+178
+We put
+1= QX{a= Y(Y = x)} Df.,
+whence
+and
+r. ix =Ý(y = x),
++: E!Ta.J. Ta = (1)(x= a);
+that is, if a is a class which has only one member, then i'a is that one member.??
+For the class of classes contained in a given class, we put
+Cla = B(B Ca) Df.
+We can now proceed to the consideration of cardinal and ordinal numbers, and of
+how they are affected by the doctrine of types.
+IX. Cardinal numbers
+The cardinal number of a class a is defined as the class of all classes similar to a,
+two classes being similar when there is a one-one relation between them. The class of
+one-one relations is denoted by 1 → 1 and defined as follows :
+1→1= R{xRy.хВу.xRý Іхух.y-Х=Х'.У= У} Df.
+Similarity is denoted by "Sim"; its definition is
+Sim = Qß{(IR).R=1→1.D'R=a.AR = B} Df.
+Then Sim'a is, by definition, the cardinal number of a; this we will denote by Nca;
+hence we put
+No = Sim Dt.,
+whence
+r. Néa = Sim'a.
+The class of cardinals we will denote by NC; thus
+NC = Nc"ds Df.
+O is defined as the class whose only member is the null class, A, so that
+0 = iA Df.
+The definition of 1 is:
+1= 2(EC):x= a.=x=X = C} Dt.
+It is easy to prove that 0 and 1 are cardinals according to the definition.
+It is to be observed, however, that 0 and 1 and all the other cardinals, according
+to the above definitions, are ambiguous symbols, liks cls, and have as many meanings
+as there are types. To begin with O: the meaning of 0 depends upon that of A, and
+the meaning of 1 is different according to the type of which it is the null class. Thus
+22 Thus t'a is what Peano calls 1a.
+
+179
+there are as many O's as there are types; and the same applies to all the other cardinals. Nevertheless, if two classes a and ß are of different types, we can speak of them
+as having the same cardinal, or of one as having a greater cardinal than the other,
+because a one-one relation may hold between the members of a and the members of
+B, even when a and B are of different types. For example, let B be i"a, that is, the
+class whose members are the classes consisting of single members of a. Then i"a is of
+higher type than a, but similar to a, being correlated with a by the one-one relation ..
+The hierarchy of types has important results in regard to addition. Suppose we
+have a class of a terms and a class of ß terms, where a and ß are cardinals; it may be
+quite impossible to add them together to get a class of a and ß terms, since, if the
+classes are not of the same type, their logical sum is meaningless. Where only a finite
+number of classes are concerned, we can obviate the practical consequences of this,
+owing to the fact that we can always apply operations to a class which raise its type
+to any required extent without altering its cardinal number. For example, given any
+class a, the class «"a has the same cardinal number, but is of the next type above a.
+Hence, given any finite number of classes of different types, we can raise all of them
+to the type which is what we may call the lowest common multiple of all the types
+in question; and it can be shown that this can be done in such a way that the resulting
+classes shall have no common members. We may then form the logical sum of all the
+classes so obtained, and its cardinal number will be the arithmetical sum of the
+cardinal numbers of the original classes. But where we have an infinite series of
+classes of ascending types, this method cannot be applied. For this reason, we cannot
+now prove that there must be infinite classes. For suppose there were only n individuals altogether in the universe, where n is finite. There would then be 2n classes of
+individuals, and 22n classes of classes of individuals, and so on. Thus the cardinal
+number of terms in each type would be finite; and though these numbers would grow
+beyond any assigned finite number, there would be no way of adding them so as to
+get an infinite number. Hence we need an axiom, so it would seem, to the effect that
+no finite class of individuals contains all individuals; but if any one chooses to assume
+that the total number of individuals in the universe is (say) 10,367, there seems no
+a priori way of refuting his opinion.
+From the above mode of reasoning, it is plain that the doctrine of types avoids all
+difficulties as to the greatest cardinal. There is a greatest cardinal in each type,
+namely, the cardinal number of the whole of the type; but this is always surpassed
+by the cardinal number of the next type, since, if a is the cardinal number of one type,
+that of the next type is 2ª, which, as Cantor has shown, is always greater than a.
+Since there is no way of adding different types, we cannot speak of "the cardinal
+number of all objects, of whatever type", and thus there is no absolutely greatest
+cardinal.
+If it is admitted that no finite class of individuals contains all individuals, it
+follows that there are classes of individuals having any finite number. Hence all
+finite cardinals exist as individual-cardinals, that is, as the cardinal numbers of
+classes of individuals. It follows that there is a class of X, cardinals, namely, the class
+of finite cardinals. Hence %, exists as the cardinal of a class of classes of classes of
+individuals. By forming all classes of finite cardinals, we find that 2%o exists as the
+cardinal of a class of classes of classes of classes of individuals; and so we can
+
+180
+proceed indefinitely. The existence of Xn for every finite value of n can also be
+proved; but this requires the consideration of ordinals.
+It, in addition to assuming that no finite class contains all individuals, we assume
+the multiplicative axiom (that is, the axiom that, given a set of mutually exclusive
+classes, none of which are null, there is at least one class consisting of one member
+from each class in the set), then we can prove that there is a class of individuals
+containing X, members, so that %, will exist as an individual-cardinal. This somewhat
+reduces the type to which we have to go in order to prove the existence theorem for
+any given cardinal, but it does not give us any existence theorem which cannot be got
+otherwise sooner or later.
+Many elementary theorems concerning cardinals require the multiplicative axiom. 23
+It is to be observed that this axiom is equivalent to Zermelo's,2 and therefore to the
+assumption that every class can be well-ordered." These equivalent assumptions are,
+apparently, all incapable of proof, though the multiplicative axiom, at least, appears
+highly self-evident. In the absence of proof, it seems best not to assume the multipli.
+cative axiom, but to state it as a hypothesis on every occasion on which it is used.
+X. Ordinal numbers
+An ordinal number is a class of ordinally similar well-ordered series, that is, of
+relations generating such series. Ordinal similarity or likeness is defined as follows:
+Smor = PQES).S=1→1S= CQ.P = S|Q|S} Df.,
+where "Smor" is short for "similar ordinally"
+The class of serial relations, which we will call "Ser", is defined as follows:
+Ser=p{xpypx.y.~(x=y):xPy.yPz.Dx.y.z.xPz:
+x=CP PxUíxuPx=CP} Df.
+That is, reading Pas "precedes"
+', a relation is serial if (1) no term precedes itself,
+(2) a predecessor of a predecessor is a predecessor, (3) if x is any term in the field of
+the relation, then the predecessors of x together with x together with the successors
+of x constitute the whole field of the relation.
+Well-ordered serial relations, which we will call S, are defined as follows:
+8 = P{P&Ser:a COP.I!a. Da. I! (a-P"a)} Df.;
+that is, P generates a well-ordered series if P is serial and any class a contained in
+23 See Russell 1905a, Part III.
+24 See Russell 1905a for a statement of Zermelo's axiom and for the proof that this axiom implies
+the multiplicative axiom. The converse implication results as follows: Putting Prod'k for the
+multiplicative class of k, consider
+Z'B=É{(Ex)x=ß.D'R=iB.ŒR=ix} Df.,
+and assume
+y & Prod'Z"cla. R = Ex||S) AS = y. §Sx}.
+Then R is a Zermelo correlation. Hence if Prod'Z"'d'a is not null, at least one Zermelo correlation
+for a exists.
+25 See Zermelo 1904.
+
+181
+the field of P and not null has a first term. (Note that P"'a are the terms coming after
+some term of a.)
+If we denote by No'P the ordinal number of a well-ordered relation P and by NO
+the class of ordinal numbers, we shall have
+No =âP{P=R.a = Smor P} Df.
+NO = No"S.
+From the definition of No we have
+r: PeDo. NOP = Smor P
+1:~(P=8)J.~E!NoP.
+If we now examine our definitions with a view to their connection with the theory
+of types, we see, to begin with, that the definitions of "Ser" and I involve the felds
+of serial relations. Now the field is only significant when the relation is homogeneous;
+hence relations which are not homogeneous do not generate series. For example, the
+relation ‹ might be thought to generate series of ordinal number w, such as
+х, їх, мїх,..., «'х,...,
+and we might attempt to prove in this way the existence of w and No. But x and ix
+are of different types, and therefore there is no such series according to the definition.
+The ordinal number of a series of individuals is, by the above definition of No, a
+class of relations of individuals. It is therefore of a different type from any individual
+and cannot form part of any series in which individuals occur. Again, suppose all the
+finite ordinals exist as individual-ordinals, that is, as the ordinals of series of individuals. Then the finite ordinals themselves form a series whose ordinal number is ∞ ;
+thus w exists as an ordinal-ordinal, that is, as the ordinal of a series of ordinals. But
+the type of an ordinal-ordinal is that of classes of relations of classes of relations of
+individuals. Thus the existence of w has been proved in a higher type than that of
+the finite ordinals. Again, the cardinal number of ordinal numbers of well-ordered
+series that can be made out of finite ordinals is 81; hence X, exists in the type of
+classes of classes of classes of relations of classes of relations of individuals. Also the
+ordinal numbers of well-ordered series composed of finite ordinals can be arranged in
+order of magnitude, and the result is a well-ordered series whose ordinal number is
+wy. Hence wi exists as an ordinal-ordinal-ordinal. This process can be repeated any
+finite number of times, and thus we can establish the existence, in appropriate types,
+of In and on for any finite value of n.
+But the above process of generation no longer leads to any totality of all ordinals,
+because, if we take all the ordinals of any given type, there are always greater ordinals
+in higher types; and we cannot add together a set of ordinals of which the type rises
+above any finite limit. Thus all the ordinals in any type can be arranged by order of
+magnitude in a well-ordered series, which has an ordinal number of higher type than
+that of the ordinals composing the series. In the new type, this new ordinal is not
+the greatest. In fact, there is no greatest ordinal in any type, but in every type all
+ordinals are less than some ordinals of higher type. It is impossible to complete the
+series of ordinals, since it rises to types above every assignable finite limit; thus
+
+182
+although every segment of the series of ordinals is well-ordered, we cannot say that
+the whole series is well-ordered, because the "whole series"
+is a fiction. Hence
+Burali-Forti's contradiction disappears.
+From the last two sections it appears that, if it is allowed that the number of
+individuals is not finite, the existence of all Cantor's cardinal and ordinal numbers
+can be proved, short of No and wo. (It is quite possible that the existence of these
+may also be demonstrable.) The existence of all finite cardinals and ordinals can be
+proved without assuming the existence of anything. For, if the cardinal number of
+terms in any type is n, that of terms in the next type is 2^. Thus if there are no indi.
+viduals, there will be one class (namely, the null class), two classes of classes (namely,
+that containing no class and that containing the null class), four classes of classes
+of classes, and generally 2n-1 classes of the nth order. But we cannot add together
+terms of different types, and thus we cannot in this way prove the existence of any
+infinite class.
+We can now sum up our whole discussion. After stating some of the paradoxes of
+logic, we found that all of them arise from the fact that an expression referring to
+all of some collection may itself appear to denote one of the collection; as, for example,
+"all propositions are either true or false" appears to be itself a proposition. We
+decided that, where this appears to occur, we are dealing with a false totality and that
+in fact nothing whatever can significantly be said about all of the supposed collection.
+In order to give effect to this decision, we explained a doctrine of types of variables,
+proceeding upon the principle that any expression which refers to all of some type
+must, if it denotes anything, denote something of a higher type than that to all of
+which it refers. Where all of some type is referred to, there is an apparent variable
+belonging to that type. Thus any expression containing an apparent variable is of
+higher type than that variable. This is the fundamental principle of the doctrine of
+types. A change in the manner in which the types are constructed, should it prove
+necessary, would leave the solution of contradictions untouched so long as this fundamental principle is observed. The method of constructing types explained above was
+shown to enable us to state all the fundamental definitions of mathematics and at
+the same time to avoid all known contradictions. And it appeared that in practice
+the doctrine of types is never relevant except where existence theorems are concerned
+or where applications are to be made to some particular case.
+The theory of types raises a number of difficult philosophical questions concerning
+its interpretation. Such questions are, however, essentially separable from the
+mathematical development of the theory and, like all philosophical questions, introduce elements of uncertainty which do not belong to the theory itself. It seemed
+better, therefore, to state the theory without reference to philosophical questions,
+leaving these to be dealt with independently.
+
+A new proof of the possibility of a well-ordering
+(1908)
+The present paper consists of two parts.
+numerous, and they sprang from three
+In the first, Zermelo offers a new proof of
+main
+sources: the old mistrust, still
+the well-ordering theorem. Like the origilingering, of Cantor's set theory; a warinal (1904), the new proof makes use of
+ness of the new device, the principle of
+the axiom of choice, and with the same
+choice; and a suspicion of any argument
+strength: the choice set contains an
+reminiscent of those leading to the paraelement of every nonempty subset of any
+doxes. Zermelo's answer to the objections
+given set. The difference between the two
+is lively and on the whole cogent, and it
+proofs lies in the remaining set-theoretic
+has been upheld by subsequent developassumptions. The second proof assumes
+ments. After Zermelo's second proof the
+much
+less, especially with respect to
+discussion subsided, and his result, at
+well-ordering and ordinals, and what is
+least in the sense that the principle of
+needed for the proof is derived anew,
+choice implies the well-ordering theorem,
+through the use of O-chains, which are a
+was generally accepted by the mathegeneralization of Dedekind's "chains"
+matical world.
+The second part of the paper is a dis-
+The translation is by Stefan Bauercussion of the objections raised against
+Mengelberg, and it is printed here with
+the first proof. These objections had been the kind permission of Springer Verlag.
+Although I still fully uphold my "Proof that every set can be well-ordered",
+published in 1904, in the face of the various objections that will be thoroughly discussed in § 2, the new proof that I give below of the same theorem may yet be of
+interest, since, on the one hand, it presupposes no specific theorems of set theory and,
+on the other, it brings out, more clearly than the first proof did, the purely formal
+character of the well-ordering, which has nothing at all to do with spatiotemporal
+arrangement.
+§ 1. THE NEW PROOF
+The assumptions and forms of inference that I use in the proof of the theorem below
+can be reduced to the following postulates.
+I. All elements of a set M that have a property & well-defined for every single
+element are the elements of another set, Me, a "subset" of M.
+Thus to every subset My of M there corresponds a "complementary
+subset",
+
+184
+M - My, that contains all elements not occurring in M1 and, when M1 = M, reduces
+to the (empty) "null set"
+II. All subsets of a set M, that is, all sets M1 whose elements are also elements of
+M, are the elements of a set 1I(M) determined by M.
+Postulate I easily yields the following proposition:
+III. All elements that are common to all of the sets A, B, C,..., these being
+elements of a higher set I, are the elements of a set Q = D(T), which will be called
+the "intersection" or the "common component" of the sets A, B, C,....
+THEOREM. If with every nonempty subset of a set M an element of that subset is
+associated by some law as "distinguished element"
+, then U(M), the set of all subsets of
+M, possesses one and only one subset M such that to every arbitrary subset P of M there
+always corresponds one and only one element Po of M that includes P as a subset
+and contains an element of P as its distinguished element. The set M is well-ordered
+by M.
+Proof. If A is any nonempty subset of M and hence an element of U(M), and if
+a = ф(A) is its distinguished element, let A' = A - {a} be the part of A that results
+when the distinguished element is removed. Now U(M), the set of all subsets of M,
+possesses the following three properties:
+(1) It contains the element M;
+(2) Along with each of its elements A it also contains the corresponding A';
+(3) Along with each of its subsets A = {A, B, C,...) it also contains the corresponding intersection Q= D(A) as an element.
+If now a subset O of II(M) that also has these three properties is called a "O-chain"
+it immediately follows that the intersection of several O-chains is itself always a
+O-chain, and the intersection M of all existing O-chains, which according to I and II
+are the elements of a well-defined subset of UI(M), is therefore the smallest possible
+O-chain; therefore no proper subset of M can be a O-chain any longer.
+Now let A be an element of M such that all other elements X of M fall into two
+classes with respect to A: (1) elements Us that are parts of A, and (2) elements VA
+that include the set A as a part, as for instance M itself does. Then, as we shall now
+show, every Us always has the property of being a Wa; that is to say, it is a subset
+of A' = A - {p(A)}. In fact, every V'4, since it cannot be a Ua and yet must be an
+element of M, is either A itself or a Va, and every intersection of several Va is again
+a Va or A. On the other hand, A', as well as every W'a, is again a Wa; and likewise
+every intersection of several Wa, as well as the intersection of some Wa and some Va
+or A, is again a Wa. Thus the Wa together with the Va and A already form a O-chain;
+they therefore exhaust the smallest O-chain M, and every Us is actually a Wa, that
+is, a subset of A'. But from this it immediately follows that A', too, has the same
+property as A, namely, that all other elements of M are either parts of A' or include
+A' as a part. If, finally, & is the intersection of several A, B, C,... that have the
+property just assumed of A and if X is any other element of M, then only two cases
+are possible: either & includes one of the sets A, B, C,..., and therewith also Q, as
+a part, or X is included in all of the sets A, B, C,..., and therewith also in Q, as a
+subset, that is, Q too possesses the above-mentioned property of A. Since, finally, M
+includes all elements of M as subsets and therefore is itself an A, the elements of M
+that are constituted like A again form a O-chain, namely, M itself, and for two
+
+185
+arbitrary [distinct] elements A and B of M the alternative holds that either B must
+be a subset of A' or A a subset of B'.
+Now let P be an arbitrary subset of M, and let Po be the intersection of all elements
+of M that include P as a subset and to which at least the element M belongs. Then Po
+also is an element of M, and the distinguished element po of Po must be an element
+of P, since otherwise P! = Po - {Po) also would contain all elements of P and would
+still only be a part of Po. Every other element P1 of M that includes P as a subset
+must then include Po as a part; that is, Po, according to what has just been proved,
+is a subset of P'í, and the distinguished element pi of Pi cannot be an element of
+P, since it does not occur in Pí and hence not in Po either. So there really exists only
+a single element Po of M that includes P as a subset and contains an element of Pas
+its distinguished element.
+If we here choose for P a set of the form {a}, where a is any element of M, it follows
+in particular that to every element a of M there corresponds a single element A of
+M in which a is the distinguished element; let this element A be denoted by A(a).
+If a and b are any two distinct elements of M, then either A(a) or A(b) is the element
+Po of M corresponding to the set P = {a, b}, that is, either f(a) contains the element
+b or K(b) the element a, but never both. If, finally, a, b, and c are any three [distinct]]
+elements of M and if, say, b is an element of A(a) and c an element of A(b), then only
+A(a) can be the element Po corresponding to the set P = {a, b, c}, that is, c also is an
+element of f(a). Therefore, if we write a < b when b is an element of f(a) and a ‡ b
+(we then say that the element a "precedes the element 5") the trichotomy
+a<b, a =6, or b<a
+obtains for any two elements a and b, and from
+a <b and b<c
+it always follows that a < c.
+The set M, therefore, is "simply ordered" by means of the set M, and, moreover,
+it is "well-ordered" in the sense of Cantor; for to every subset P of M there corresponds a "first element"
+', namely, the distinguished element po of Po = A(Po), which
+precedes all other elements p of P, since all these p are elements of Po.
+It, conversely, the set M is well-ordered in any way, then to every element a of M
+there corresponds a certain subset fi(a) of M that contains, besides a, all elements
+"following a"; let us call it the "remainder" associated with a. If from such a
+remainder A(a) we remove the first element a, what is left is the remainder of the
+"next" element a'. Likewise, the common component, or intersection, of several
+remainders is always again a remainder, and, finally, the entire set M is the remainder
+A(e) of its first element. Thus the totality of all remainders, in the sense specified
+above, forms a O-chain, in which for every remainder the first element is the distinguished element. If now U(M) were to include, besides M, a second subset M,
+constituted as required by the theorem, then My also would determine a well-ordering
+of M with the same distinguished elements and would therefore, as a O-chain, include
+the intersection M of all O-chains as a component. If zo then denotes the distinguished
+element of an element Z of My - M, zo would be the distinguished element of two
+elements of My-namely, of Z as well as of the A(zo) determined by M-and this
+
+186
+would contradict the property assumed of Mi. Therefore, the well-ordering M is
+indeed uniquely determined by the choice of distinguished elements, and the theorem
+asserted is proved in its entirety.
+Now in order to apply our theorem to arbitrary sets, we require only I'I the
+additional assumption that a simultaneous choice of distinguished elements is in
+principle always possible for an arbitrary set of sets, or, to be more precise, that the
+same consequences always hold as if such a choice were possible. In this formulation,
+to be sure, the principle taken as fundamental still appears to be somewhat tainted
+with subjectivity and liable to misinterpretation. But since, as I shall show in more
+detail elsewhere [below, p. 209], we can, by means of elementary and indispensable
+set-theoretic principles, always replace an arbitrary set I' of sets A', B', C',... by a
+set I of mutually disjoint sets A, B, C,... that are equivalent to the sets A', B',
+C',..., respectively, the general principle of choice can be reduced to the following
+axiom, whose purely objective character is immediately evident.
+IV. Axiom. A set S that can be decomposed into a set of disjoint parts A, B, C,....
+each containing at least one element, possesses at least one subset S, having exactly one
+element in common with each of the parts A, B, C,... considered.
+Then the application of this axiom, just as in my note of 1904, yields the general
+theorem that every set can be well-ordered.
+The definition of well-ordering that has already appeared in the formulation of the
+Theorem and forms the basis of our new proof has the advantage that it rests exclusively upon the elementary notions of set theory, whereas experience shows that, with
+the usual presentation, the uninformed are only too prone to look for some mystical
+meaning behind Cantor's relation a < b, which is suddenly introduced. Let us now
+once more formulate our definition explicitly, as follows.
+Definition. A set M is said to be well-ordered if to any element a of M there corresponds
+a unique subset A(a) of MI, the remainder of a, and every nonempty subset P of M
+contains one and only one first element, that is, an element po such that its remainder
+A(po) includes the set P as a subset.
+§ 2. DISCUSSION OF THE OBJECTIONS TO THE EARLIER PROOF
+Since 1904, the date of my "Proof that every set can be well-ordered"
+, a number
+of objections have been made to it and various critiques of it have been published.
+Let me take this opportunity to discuss them together.
+a. Objections to the principle of choice
+In first place we here consider the objections that are directed against the "postulate of choice" formulated above and therefore strike at both of my proofs in the
+same way. I concede that they are to some extent justified, since I just cannot prove
+this postulate, as I expressly emphasized at the end of my note,' and therefore
+cannot compel anyone to accept it apodictically. Hence it Borel (1905, but see also
+1905a) and Peano (1906a, Pp. 145-148) in their critiques note the lack of a proof, they
+1 "This logical principle cannot, to be sure, be reduced to a still simpler one..." (1904, p. 516
+[above, p. 141]).
+
+187
+have merely adopted my own point of view. They would even have put me in their
+debt had they now for their part established the unprovability I asserted-namely,
+that this postulate is logically independent of the others—thereby corroborating my
+conviction.
+Now even in mathematics unprovability, as is well known, is in no way equivalent
+to nonvalidity, since, after all, not everything can be proved, but every proof in turn
+presupposes unproved principles. Thus, in order to reject such a fundamental principle, one would have had to ascertain that in some particular case it did not hold
+or to derive contradictory consequences from it; but none of my opponents has made
+any attempt to do this.
+Even Peano's Formulaire (1897), which is an attempt to reduce all of mathematics
+to "syllogisms" (in the Aristotelian-Scholastic sense),? rests upon quite a number of
+unprovable principles; one of these is equivalent to the principle of choice for a single
+set and can then be extended syllogistically to an arbitrary finite number of sets.3
+But the general axiom that, following other researchers, I permitted myself to apply
+to arbitrary sets in this new case just is not to be found among Peano's principles,
+and Peano himself assures us that he could not derive it from them either. He is
+content to note this fact, and that finishes the principle for him. The idea that
+possibly his Formulaire might be incomplete in precisely this point does, after all,
+suggest itself, and, since there are no infallible authorities in mathematics, we
+must also take that possibility into account and not reject it without objective
+examination.
+First, how does Peano arrive at his own fundamental principles and how does he
+justify their inclusion in the Formulaire, since, after all, he cannot prove them either?
+Evidently by analyzing the modes of inference that in the course of history have
+come to be recognized as valid and by pointing out that the principles are intuitively
+evident and necessary for science—considerations that can all be urged equally well
+in favor of the disputed principle. That this axiom, even though it was never formulated in textbook style, has frequently been used, and successfully at that, in the
+most diverse fields of mathematics, especially in set theory, by Dedekind, Cantor,
+F. Bernstein, Schoenflies, J. König, and others is an indisputable fact, which is only
+corroborated by the opposition that, at one time or another, some logical purists
+directed against it. Such an extensive use of a principle can be explained only by its
+self-evidence, which, of course, must not be confused with its provability. No matter
+if this self-evidence is to a certain degree subjective—it is surely a necessary source
+of mathematical principles, even if it is not a tool of mathematical proofs, and Peano's
+assertion (1906a, p. 147) that it has nothing to do with mathematies fails to do justice
+to manifest facts. But the question that can be objectively decided, whether the
+principle is necessary for science, I should now like to submit to judgment by presenting
+2 See Peano 1906a, p. 147.
+3 See Peano 1906a, pp. 145-147. This proof, incidentally, can be carried out only by mathematical induction; hence it is binding only if we define the finite numbers in Peano's way by
+means of their order type. If on the other hand we take as a basis Dedekind's definition of a finite
+set as one that is not equivalent to any of its parts, no proof is possible even for finite sets, since
+the reduction of the two definitions to each other, as we shall show below (example 4), again
+requires the principle of choice. In this sense, therefore, Poincaré's remark in 1906, p. 313
+[see below, p. 190, footnote 6], is justified.
+
+188
+a number of elementary and fundamental theorems and problems that, in my opinion,
+could not be dealt with at all without the principle of choice.
+(1) If a set M can be decomposed into disjoint parts, A, B, C,..., the set of these
+parts is equivalent to a subset of M, or, in other words, the set of summands always
+has a cardinality lower than, or the same as, that of the sum.
+To prove this we must mentally associate with each of these parts one of its
+elements.*
+(2) The sums of equivalent sets are
+again equivalent, provided
+all terms
+are mutually disjoint, a theorem upon which the entire calculus of cardinalities
+rests.
+Here it is necessary to consider a system of mappings that simultaneously correlate
+any two equivalent summands with each other; thus from all the possible mappings
+associated with each pair of equivalent summands we must choose a single one, and
+we must make this choice for every pair.
+(3) The product of several cardinalities can vanish only if one factor vanishes,
+that is, Cantor's "connection set" [see below, p. 204] of several sets A, B, C,...,
+each containing at least one element, must likewise contain at least one element.
+But since every such element is a set having exactly one element in common with
+each of the sets A, B, C,..., the theorem is merely another expression of the postulate of choice for disjoint sets (the axiom in IV, end of § 1 above).
+(4) A set that is not equivalent to any of its parts can always be ordered in such
+a way that every subset possesses a first as well as a last element.
+This theorem, upon which the theory of finite sets rests, is most simply proved by
+means of my well-ordering theorem. Dedekind (1888, art. 159) proved a logically
+equivalent theorem—that a set not equivalent to any segment of his "number
+sequence" must have a component equivalent to the entire number sequence—by
+simultaneously mapping a system of equivalent pairs of sets, hence, as in (2) above,
+also by using the principle of choice. I do not know of any other proof.
+(5) A denumerable set of finite or denumerable sets always possesses a denumerable
+sum.
+Upon this theorem rests the theory of denumerable sets and of the "second
+number class"; but it can be proved only if we simultaneously order all the
+finite or denumerable sets in question like the natural numbers [nach dem Normaltypus.
+4 That a particular principle of inference is used here was probably first stated by Beppo Levi
+(1902) in connection with a proot by F. Bernstein. According to Bernstein (1905, p. 193), however,
+the "hypothesis" that a choice is possible is said to be "dispensable" in all similar cases, for
+instance also in my proof, if one employs the notion "multivalued equivalence" that he introduces. According to him (1904) two sets M and N are said to stand in the relation of multivalued
+equivalence if an entire set A of one-to-one mappings q, x, 4,..., "among which none is dis-
+" distisguded fiven for them instead of just a single one. Hence a pure relational notion such as
+is used here, without supplementary determination or definition, as an absolute
+characteristic, and the attempt to differentiate between multivalued and ordinary equivalence is
+logically not realizable. In the examples considered, however, we are not at all concerned with the
+"multiplicity", that is, the cardinality of the set A of mappings, but merely with the question
+whether at least one such mapping o exists, a question that cannot be evaded here by any definition
+and can be settled only by means of an axiom.
+5 This fact, which has frequently been overlooked, is expressly acknowledged also by Hessenberg (1906, preface).
+
+189
+(6) Does there exist a "base" for all real numbers, that is, a system of real numbers
+such that no linear relation with a finite number of integral coefficients holds between
+them and that any other real number can be obtained from them by a linear relation
+with a finite number of integral coefficients?
+(7) Are there discontinuous solutions of the functional equation
+f(x+Y) = f(x) + J (Y) ?
+The last two questions were answered affirmatively by Hamel (1905) on the
+assumption that the continuum can be well-ordered
+Cantor's theory of cardinalities, therefore, certainly requires our postulate, and so
+does Dedekind's theory of finite sets, which forms the foundation of arithmetic.
+That in the theory of functions we can usually circumvent its use is to be explained
+simply by the fact that there as a rule we deal with "completed" ["abgeschlossenen "] sets, for which distinguished elements can be unambiguously defined without
+any difficulty. Where this is not the case, hence especially in the theory of everywhere
+discontinuous functions, the principle is often indispensable, as our last example
+shows.
+Now so long as the relatively simple problems mentioned here remain inaccessible
+to Peano's expedients, and so long as, on the other hand, the principle of choice
+cannot be definitely refuted, no one has the right to prevent the representatives of
+productive science from continuing to use this "hypothesis" —as one may call it for all
+I care-and developing its consequences to the greatest extent, especially since any
+possible contradiction inherent in a given point of view can be discovered only in that
+way. We need merely separate the theorems that necessarily require the axiom from
+those that can be proved without it in order to delimit the whole of Peano's mathematics as a special branch, as an artificially mutilated science, so to speak. Banishing
+fundamental facts or problems from science merely because they cannot be dealt
+with by means of certain prescribed principles would be like forbidding the further
+extension of the theory of parallels in geometry because the axiom upon which
+this theory rests has been shown to be unprovable. Actually, principles must be
+judged from the point of view of science, and not science from the point of view
+of principles fixed once and for all. Geometry existed before Euclid's Elements,
+just as arithmetic and set theory did before Peano's Formulaire, and both of them
+will no doubt survive all further attempts to systematize them in such a textbook
+manner.
+Of course, there remains to Peano a simple way of proving the theorems in question,
+as well as many others, from his own principles. He need only use Russell's antinomy,
+lately much discussed, since, as is well known, everything can be proved from contradictory premisses. Indeed the principles of the Formulaire, which make no distinction
+between "set" and "class"
+, do not exclude this contradiction. On the other hand,
+as I shall soon show elsewhere [1908a], those who champion set theory as a purely
+mathematical discipline that is not confined to the basic notions of traditional logic
+are certainly in a position to avoid, by suitably restricting their axioms, all antinomies discovered until now. Thus while the domain of Peano's principles, as we have
+just shown, is too narrow to permit the development of our science in its full beauty,
+it is on the other hand too wide to exclude internal contradictions; and, so long as
+
+190
+the antinomies of this system are not eliminated, one is hardly justified in seeking in
+it the definitive foundation for the science of mathematics.
+b. Objection concerning nonpredicative definition
+The point of view maintained here, that we
+are dealing with a productive science
+resting ultimately upon intuition,
+was recently urged, in opposition to Peano's
+"logistic",
+, by Poincaré, too, in a series of essays (1905, 1906, 1906a); in these he also
+does tull justice to the principle of choice, which he considers an unprovable but
+indispensable axiom.® However, he presses his attack so far-since his opponents
+made use chiefly of set theory-as to identify all of Cantor's theory, this original
+creation of specifically mathematical thought and the intuition of a genius, with the
+logistic that he combats and to deny it any right to exist, without regard for its
+positive achievements, solely on the ground of antinomies that have not yet been
+resolved.? If he was concerned only to show that in the foundations of arithmetic
+there are "synthetic judgments a priori", among which, he believed, he could reckon
+the principle of mathematical induction above all, it would have sufficed, so far as
+the set-theoretic proofs of this principle are concerned, to ascribe a synthetic character
+to the fundamental propositions upon which these proofs rest; even the champions
+of set theory could have accepted that, since the distinction between "synthetic" and
+"analytic" would then be a purely philosophical one and not touch mathematics as
+such. Instead, he undertook to combat mathematical proofs with the weapons of
+formal logic, thus venturing upon a territory in which his logistic opponents are his
+betters.
+To make Poincaré's conception clearer, the simplest thing would probably be to
+choose an example from the proof given in § 1 of the present paper. There I defined
+a special class of sets, which I called O-chains, and then proved that the common
+component M of all these O-chains is itself a O-chain. This procedure is modeled upon
+the theory of "chains" on which Dedekind (1888, § 4) bases his theory of finite numbers, and it is also customary elsewhere in set theory. But according to Poincaré
+(1906, p. 307) a definition is "predicative" and logically admissible only if it excludes
+all objects that are "dependent" upon the notion defined, that is, that can in any
+way be determined by it. Accordingly, in the example cited here the set M, which
+itself is determined only by the totality of the O-chains, would have had to be excluded
+from the definition of these chains, and my definition, which counts M itself as a
+O-chain, would be "nonpredicative" and contain a vicious circle. In two passages
+that are quite similar (1906, pp. 314-315), the latter referring to the "y-sets" of my
+1904 proof, this is expressly elaborated as a criticism of my proof procedure.
+Now, on the one hand, proofs that have this logical form are by no means confined
+to set theory; exactly the same kind can be found in analysis wherever the maximum
+or the minimum of a previously defined "completed" set of numbers Z is used for
+6 See Poincaré 1906, pp. 311-313, especially p. 313: "Hence this is a synthetic judgment a
+priori; without it the theory of cardinals would be impossible, for finite numbers as well as for
+infinite ones"
+" See Poincaré 1906, p. 316: "There is no actual infinite; the Cantorians forgot that, and they
+fell into contradiction".
+
+191
+further inferences. This happens, for example, in the well-known Cauchy proof of the
+fundamental theorem of algebra, and up to now it has not occurred to anyone to
+regard this as something illogical. On the other hand, it is precisely the form of
+definition said to be predicative that contains something circular; for unless we
+already have the notion, we cannot know at all what objects might at some time be
+determined by it and would therefore have to be excluded. In truth, of course, the
+question whether an arbitrary given object is subsumed under a definition must be
+decidable independently of the notion still to be defined, by means of an objective
+criterion. But once such a criterion is given, as is in fact the case everywhere in
+the examples drawn from my proofs, nothing can prevent some of the objects subsumed under the definition from having in addition a special relation to the same
+notion and thus being determined by, or distinguished from, the remaining onessay, as common component or minimum. After all, an object is not created through
+such a "determination"; rather, every object can be determined in a wide variety of
+ways, and these different determinations do not yield identical but merely equivalent
+notions, that is, notions having the same extension. In fact, the existence of equivalent
+notions seems to be what Poincaré has overlooked in his critique, as Peano® especially
+emphasizes in this connection. A definition may very well rely upon notions that are
+equivalent to the one to be defined; indeed, in every definition definiens and definiendum are equivalent notions, and the strict observance of Poincaré's demand would
+make every definition, hence all of science, impossible.
+c. Objections based upon the set W
+The criticisms discussed so far, which are directed against the principles and proof
+methods of set theory in general, naturally met with little approval among the
+mathematicians who, like J. König, Jourdain, and F. Bernstein, already have themselves been productively active in this field and thus had the opportunity of convincing themselves that the devices mentioned are indispensable. On the other hand,
+the "Burali-Forti antinomy"
+', recently again so much the subject of discussion, concerning the "set W of all Cantor ordinals" seems to have instilled in some of them
+an all too pervasive skepticism toward the theory of well-ordering. And yet, even the
+elementary form that Russell° gave to the set-theoretic antinomies could have
+8 1906a, p. 152. At issue here is the new proof of the Schröder-Bernstein theorem on the equivalence of sets that I had communicated to Poincaré by letter in January 1906. He had reproduced
+this proof, correctly as to content, on pages 314-315 of the May number of the Revue de métaphysique et de morale and had made it the object of a critique, to which the cited passage from
+Peano refers (in part quoting literally). But Peano, without mentioning this state of affairs, links
+his presentation to a previous version of his own proof, which essentially coincides with mine,
+except that it is formulated in his ideography; Poincaré apparently had not yet seen this first
+form (Peano 1906) of the proof when he wrote his article. Why does Peano avoid mentioning
+my name here, where he agrees with me, and then direct his opposition to the principle of choice
+immediately afterward so expressly at me? It would seem obvious, after all, that not mathematical
+principles, which are common property, but only the proofs based upon them can be the possession
+of an individual mathematician. I had expressly stated at the end of my note, incidentally, that
+I owe to a suggestion by Erhard Schmidt (now in Bonn) the idea of invoking the principle of
+choice in order to form a "y-covering"
+° 1903, pp. 366-368. I had, however, discovered this antinomy myself, independently of Russell,
+and had communicated it prior to 1903 to Professor Hilbert among others.
+
+192
+persuaded them that the solution of these difficulties is not to be sought in the
+surrender of well-ordering but only in a suitable restriction of the notion of set.
+Already in my 1904 proof, having such reservations in mind, I avoided not only all
+notions that were in any way dubious but also the use of ordinals in general; I clearly
+restricted myself to principles and devices that have not yet by themselves given rise
+to any antinomy. If some critics nevertheless deploy this ominous "set W" against
+my proof, they must first project it into that proof artificially, and all arguments
+drawn from the inconsistent character of this "set" turn back upon their authors.
+Now I succeeded in completing my new proof without even the device of rankordering, and I hope thereby to have definitively cut off every possibility of introducing W.
+J. König, it seems, is at least not far from this W point of view. For although he
+himself still relied upon the principle of choice in his Heidelberg lecture, 1°
+thus
+accepting the most essential assumption of my theorem, he treated the question
+whether the continuum can be well-ordered as an unsolved problem in later publications," without regard for my already published note; but up to now he has abstained
+from giving public expression to his reservations about any specific step in my
+proof.
+Jourdain claims to have proved the well-ordering theorem before I did,12 and,
+10 1904. [This is the published version of König's address at the Third International Congress
+of Mathematicians, in Heidelberg. On what happened at the congress itself we have the testimony
+of Schoenflies (1922a, p. 100): "For Cantor to claim that every set can be well-ordered and, in
+particular, that the continuum has the second cardinality was a kind of dogma that was part and
+parcel of what he knew and believed in set theory. Consequently König's address, which culminated in the proposition that the continuum could not be an aleph (hence could
+not be wellordered either), had a stunning effect, especially since its presentation was extremely elaborate
+and precise. It was based upon a relation between alephs that had been established by F. Bernstein; since this relation soon turned out not to be universally valid, König's result, as is well
+known, had to be restricted to alephs with transfinite subscripts and thus was robbed of its initial
+significance." (See also Schoenflies 1928, pp. 560-561.) The published version of König's address
+(1904) contains an indication of the loophole in the proof.]]
+11 1905, 1905a. [Save for an emendation, the first paper is identical with 1904.] Concerning the
+Richard antinomy, which Konig tries to adduce in the second of these papers, see Peano 1906a,
+pp. 140-157, as well as, especially, Hessenberg 1906, chap. 23, "Die Paradoxie der endlichen
+Bezeichnung", where the present fallacy is in my opinion appropriately exposed. "Finitely
+definable" is not an absolute notion but only a relative one, and it is always related to the chosen
+language, or notation. The conclusion that [the set of] all finitely definable objects must be de.
+numerable holds only if one and the same system of signs is to be used for all of them, and the
+question whether a single individual can or cannot have a finite designation is in and of itself
+meaningless, since to any object we could, if necessary, arbitrarily assign any designation whatever. That the continuum can be well-ordered, incidentally, does not have much more to do with
+this antinomy, basically, than does any other proposition; all can equally well be proved and
+refuted by the use of a contradiction. In fact, it is precisely by means of finite definability that
+F. Bernstein once (1905a) wanted to prove that the continuum is equivalent to the second number
+class, hence to a well-ordered set; thus, starting from the same notion as König, he arrived at the
+opposite conclusion. To be sure, the promised realization of this "proof" was never published.
+12 Jourdain 1905a. In the earlier papers cited by him (1904, 1904a, 1905), upon which he rests
+his claims to priority, there is, however, no mention at all of the possibility of a well-ordering.
+Rather, in the first of these articles his "proof that every cardinal number is an aleph" confines
+itself merely to an attempt to exclude the possibility of cardinalities greater than all alephs by
+reference to the Burali-Forti antinomy. Hence it is assumed there without proof that a set whose
+cardinal number is not itself an aleph must have a constituent part similar to the totality of all
+alephs; a mere reference to the methods and results of Cantor and Hardy, which concern the first
+two cardinalities, cannot, after all, possibly replace a proof.
+
+193
+moreover, in a simpler and more complete way; but, having W in his mind, he
+interprets the theorem in such a way that, as he expressly states (1905a, p. 469), not
+even the continuum need be an aleph. According to him, only "consistent" sets, that
+is, those that have no component similar to W, are to possess order types and cardinal
+numbers, and precisely in thus allowing "inconsistent" sets he sees the greater
+"completeness" of his result. But now, since in Cantor's theory "order types" and
+"cardinal numbers" are nothing but convenient means of expression for the comparison of sets with respect to the similarity or equivalence of their parts, I cannot
+extract any intelligible meaning from the proposition that a well-ordered set possesses
+no order type or cardinal number, and this attempt to resolve the antinomy while
+retaining W seems to me to amount to a mere word game. One can, to be sure, arbitrarily ignore all higher order types, from, say, the second or third number class on;
+one can refuse to recognize them as such any longer and thus obtain a W of type w,
+or S, respectively, which is certainly consistent under the assumptions made, insofar
+as one disregards its "order type". But then this W remains completely indeterminate,
+and, what is more, it is just not the same W as is at issue in the antinomy, namely, a
+set so constituted that to every arbitrary well-ordered set an element of W corresponds as order type. A similar reservation seems afterward to have occurred to
+Jourdain himself and to have led him, if not to renounce his W, in any event to introduce a second, likewise well-ordered
+set 25, which being "absolutely infinite" like
+Bernstein's W, to be discussed below, is claimed to be no longer capable of any
+"continuation"
+Now, finally, concerning the proof that Jourdain, in the note cited (1905a, p. 468),
+opposes to mine as being simpler, the procedure he proposes for well-ordering an
+arbitrary set M is the following. Take an arbitrary element as first, then another,
+and so forth; after an arbitrary finite or infinite number of elements take an arbitrary
+element of the remainder as the next one; and continue in this way until the entire
+set is exhausted. This idea of a stepwise construction is not new; it was communicated to me orally quite some time ago by F. Bernstein, and it probably goes back
+to Cantor, who, however, apparently had reservations about accepting it as a proof.
+Borel (1905), too, recommends the same construction, only to reject it immediately
+without further explanation, thereby, as he believes, reducing the principle of choice
+to absurdity. But in this he does not succeed at all; for it is not the infinitely repeated
+choice that vitiates this "proof", but simply the fact that the proof does not lead to
+the goal. For, once we accept the above-mentioned principle of Peano, which permits
+a choice from a single set, there is no longer any limit to its repeated application.
+But what, then, do all these considerations prove? Evidently no more than that every
+well-ordered proper subset M' of M can still be extended by the addition of an
+arbitrary element m' taken from the remainder; or, rather, this is the assumption
+that—in strict contrast to the conception of Bernstein and Schoenflies-forms the
+basis of the entire procedure. If it can now be proved that among the well-ordered
+components of M there exists a largest one, I, in the same way as, for example,
+I prove the existence of a largest y-set Ly, then necessarily I = M, and M is wellordered. Jourdain, too, wants to make precisely the same inference; only he lacks
+the essential premiss, the proof of the existence of L. Rather, he presupposes it without proof, by assuming that his procedure, insofar as it does not exhaust the set
+
+194
+M, would have to terminate in a well-ordered part similar to 23. Thus this proof is so
+"simple" that it reduces to a single inference, albeit a fallacious one. 13
+While for all that Jourdain, as we saw, looks upon the "inconsistent" set W with
+some doubts, F. Bernstein (1905) already makes it the object of a dogmatic theory.
+Since, as is well known, the contradictory character of this set of all ordinals becomes
+manifest when we add to it a further element, e, that follows all elements of W,
+Bernstein believes that he can overcome all difficulties by declaring that to append
+such a new element is inadmissible on the grounds that this would contradict the
+definition of W. The set W is to contain only the order types of all "continuable"
+well-ordered sets, or of all "segments of well-ordered sets"
+, but W itself is to be
+"noncontinuable". From this point of view he then criticizes the transition (7 V)
+from the well-ordered set I to (L, m'í) in my proof of 1904, since, after all, I might
+possibly be similar to the set W,14 and by means of W he constructs a set Z that is
+said not to be capable of any well-ordering.
+This, of course, is love's labor lost. For, as Bernstein expressly admits, once the
+set W exists, it is well-ordered, with a definite order type B, and any other well-ordered
+set is similar either to W itself or to a segment of W. According to Cantor's definition,
+which is fixed once and for all, of the relations "greater than" and "less than" for
+ordinals, B would hence be greater than any other ordinal a, and, in the set (W, B),
+when it is ordered according to magnitude, B would rank behind all elements of W,
+that is, W would in fact be "continuable", contrary to its definition and in spite of
+all prohibitions. Bernstein does not know what to say in reply to this undesired
+consequence other than "that the contradiction comes about only because B is
+assumed to follow upon all elements of W. If only the union (W; B) is formed and no
+order relation is stipulated between ß and the elements of W, no contradiction is
+generated" 15 As if it were only a matter of the term "order relation" or the notation
+a <B, and as if we could eliminate an objective mathematical fact by avoiding a
+term! Mathematics would not be an international science if its propositions did not
+have an objective content independent of the language in which we express them. In
+the examination of a contradiction the issue, after all, is not whether a questionable
+consequence is actually realized and officially accepted, but merely whether it is formally possible at all; and to deny this possibility merely because it leads to a contradiction would obviously be begging the question or falling into a vicious circle. In
+13 Hardy's alleged "construction of a part of the continuum having the second cardinality"
+(1904), which was expressly accepted also by Schoentlies (1905) among others, suffers from the
+same indefiniteness as the procedure of Cantor and Jourdain. He gives a rule for deriving, from a
+that is distinct from all preceding ones. Since this rule is not univocal, however, but depends upon
+the representation [of an element of the continuum] by means of fundamental sequences, which is
+arbitrary within wide limits, there is no reason to prefer his procedure to Cantor's very much
+simpler diagonal procedure, which merely requires a reordering according to the type w; no more
+than Cantor's does Hardy's procedure yield a definite part having the second cardinality; rather,
+at best it yields a new proof of the fact that the cardinality of the continuum is ≥*1.
+14 Therewith Bernstein rejects not only a "part", as he says, but the entire content of Jourdain's proof, even though his own W corresponds exactly to Jourdain's 23. For Jourdain, I, precisely because it is continuable, cannot be similar to 23, whereas Bernstein, on the contrary, infers
+that it is not continuable because it is similar to W. Hence here, too, opposite consequences are
+drawn from a common assumption.
+15 1905, p. 189. I have merely replaced e by ß and italicized a few words.
+
+195
+fact, however, the procedure followed in the justification of W amounts to this: the
+contradiction inherent in its definition is not resolved but ignored. If according to
+universal principles an assumption A yields two contrary consequences B and B',
+then A must be rejected as untenable. But in the present case, we are told, it is permissible to opt for one of these consequences, B, while prohibiting the other, B', by
+means of some special decree or veiling it by a change of name, lest it yield a contradiction with B. Since this procedure would obviously be applicable to every arbitrary
+hypothesis A, there would never be any contradiction at all; we could assert everything but prove nothing, since along with the possibility of a contradiction that of a
+proof would also be eliminated, and no science of mathematics could exist. 16
+That it is in fact always possible to add a further element u as a last element to an
+arbitrary well-ordered set M can, incidentally, be proved in an elementary way from
+the general principles of set theory, provided we adopt a purely formal definition of
+well-ordering, such as that given here at the end of § 1. For if the well-ordering of M
+is given by the system of remainders A(x) associated with the elements x of M, we
+need merely add the new element to each of these remainders (independently of its
+ordering) by means of a simple union with the set {u; to obtain then, together with
+the set {uj, a new system of remainders that furnishes the desired well-ordering of
+My = M + {u}. In fact it is then very easy to see that every subset of M1 again
+possesses a first element in the sense defined above and that all elements of M precede
+the element u. This proof, which, merely on account of its trivial simplicity, I did
+not find it necessary to include in my note of 1904, also assures, according to what
+was said above, the nonexistence of W, and all consequences drawn from W come to
+nought. Since now, on the other hand, "order type of a well-ordered set" is certainly
+a logically admissible notion, it follows further—as already appears in a much simpler
+way from Russell's antinomy, to be sure-that it is not permissible to treat the
+extension of every arbitrary notion as a set and that therefore the customary definition of set is too wide. But if in set theory we confine ourselves to a number of established principles such as those that constitute the basis of our proof—principles that
+enable us to form initial sets and to derive new sets from given ones—then all such
+contradictions can be avoided.
+d. Objection concerning particular generating principles and the set Z
+The critique of Schoenflies (1905, p. 181), likewise directed against the last step
+(7 V) of my proof, is inspired by the same belief in W and is therefore taken care of
+by the preceding discussion simultaneously with Bernstein's. His paper, however,
+contains further errors and misunderstandings that cannot be ignored here.
+To begin with, Schoenflies distinguishes in the theory of well-ordered sets between
+"a general and a special part" and claims that only the theorems of the general part
+rest upon Cantor's familiar definition of well-ordering (1897), while the others rest
+16 Concerning the various attempts to "save W", see also Hessenberg 1906, chap. 24, "Ultrafinite Paradoxieen", where at the end of § 98 we read: 'The set W itself is, incidentally, ungrateful
+in the highest degree for all attempts to redeem its honor. Thus in volume 60 of Mathematische
+Annalen both Bernstein and Jourdain exert themselves on behalf of its consistency, the former
+proving on the basis of the properties of W that there are sets that cannot be well-ordered, while
+the latter succeeds in proving the opposite."
+
+196
+upon "generating principles". In truth, however, all theorems concerning a notion
+must be provable from its definition; otherwise they would not be proved at all. If
+there are two definitions at hand for a notion, we must opt definitely for one of them
+or prove the equivalence of the two; to vacillate in any way between two definitions
+or to complement one by means of the other is logically completely inadmissible.
+Schoenflies then continues: "If we want to prove the theorem in question on this
+general basis, we must show that no infinite sequence of sets M1 with decreasing
+cardinalities can exist; every decreasing sequence of cardinalities, 171 > M2 > M3 >
+..., would have to terminate after a finite number of terms. This is the necessary and
+sufficient condition for the theorem." Necessary but not sufficient, and for precisely
+this reason not usable for a proof of the theorem. The criterion cited applies merely
+to the well-ordering of the cardinalities ordered according to magnitude, and not at all
+to the well-ordering of the sets themselves, which is the subject of my theorem. If all
+cardinalities are alephs, then, to be sure, they are also well-ordered according to
+magnitude, but one cannot infer the converse, whereas Schoenflies's proposal apparently requires that. This method does not even allow one to prove that arbitrary sets
+can be compared with respect to their cardinality; rather, the method already presupposes this as a basis. "Zermelo's proof does not follow this path." Indeed not,
+since a proof just cannot be carried out in that way. "He operates with devices that
+concern the special part of the theory of well-ordered sets, namely, their generation."
+Quite on the contrary, my proof rests exclusively upon Cantor's classical definition
+and has nothing to do with generating principles, in the sense assumed, as independent
+sources of proof.
+"Generating principles can at first only be postulated axiomatically; then one must
+demonstrate that they are justified. Even the introduction of the numbers of the
+second number class and of the principle of passage from n to w was originally
+possible only by means of such an axiom. The proof that this axiom is admissible was
+carried out, as we must recognize, by the detailed theory that Cantor gave of these
+numbers, whose regularity admits of no exception." Rather, Cantor (1897, p. 221)
+defines the numbers of the second number class as the order types that can be associated with well-ordered denumerable sets, and he proves everything else from this
+definition. Only the existence of denumerable sets, or the type w by which they are
+defined, is assumed; there is no need of a further axiom. But if the existence of such
+order types were in any way doubtful, not even the most beautiful formalism would
+be of help. In an analogous way every higher number class is defined by means of the
+preceding one, without "any need of a new creation, or of a new axiom and the proof
+of its justification". In my proof, too, Schoenflies discovered a new "postulate"
+"which concerns the generation of well-ordered sets. For it asserts that, if L is any
+well-ordered set, so is (I, m)". Actually not a postulate at all, but, as we saw above,
+a provable proposition. "This assumption, and in particular the use that Zermelo
+makes of it, so to speak includes within itself all possible generating principles. It
+contains even more, however, and for precisely this reason it is inadmissible." Here,
+too, everything is just the opposite of what Schoenflies asserts. Cantor does not use
+the generating principles for the production of well-ordered sets but for the systematic
+discovery of all order types of a given number class. For him the addition of a single
+element at the end of a set of given order type 5, hence the operation § + 1, is the
+
+197
+first generating principle, which yields new order types within each number class and
+constitutes the presupposition of all other generating principles. But already in the
+second number class it fails to suffice, since, beginning with w, it could not even
+generate w. 2 and hence requires supplementation by the second generating principle, which relates to the "fundamental sequences" of type w. In the higher number
+classes one would require still further principles besides these two. But the first
+generating principle $ + 1 never leads us out of any number class, since the cardinality
+of a transfinite set, which by definition forms the distinguishing characteristic of the
+various number classes, is, as is well known, not changed by the addition of just a
+single element. Accordingly, the well-ordering of the entire set is, of course, not
+"produced" by means of this operation in my proof either, but, as I expressly noted
+at the end, by the "fusion of the various possible y-sets"
+. It is only that each single
+y-set can be "continued" in accordance with this principle, a fact upon which I then
+base the inference that necessarily I, = M. Very strange, furthermore, is the assertion that "nowhere else is an assumption required such as Zermelo's proof employs"
+—when in fact the entire theory of ordinals and generating principles is based upon
+this operation § + 1.
+But now we come to the main point. "The notion of the totality of all possible
+generating principles for well-ordered sets is in my opinion a well-defined set-theoretic
+notion, as is the notion of the well-ordered sets that can be produced with them ...
+in the same sense ... as the totality of all integers." Thus the dogma of W is proclaimed. Schoenflies does not even venture to justify this inconsistent notion, as
+F. Bernstein after all had at least attempted to do; his "opinion" is to suffice for us
+here. The distinction that he then makes between well-ordered sets that "can be
+produced" and those that "cannot be produced" is not really intelligible, especially
+since already in the next paragraph a set that cannot be produced is also characterized without further ado as "logically inconsistent"
+. "In any case we arrive at a
+totality of well-ordered sets that is likewise well-defined. ... Let Z be the well-ordered
+set thus determined. According to its definition, it provides the limit beyond which
+we never proceed when we actually produce a well-ordered set." Apparently this Z
+is to be the totality of the possible order types of such sets, but the notions of an
+ordered "set" and its "order type"
+, so carefully differentiated by Cantor, are not
+distinguished at all in Schoenflies's paper, an imprecision that, as we shall see
+immediately, has not remained without fatal consequences either.
+"Let us assume for the time being that Z is the second number class, that is, that
+no well-ordered set that we... can form ever takes us beyond the second number
+class. ... In that case the set (Z, m) represents a notion that is inconsistent in itself."
+Thus according to this passage Schoenflies seems to regard the order type of (Z, m) as
+the
+first that no longer belongs to the second number class. But now Cantor proved
+that the totality of the numbers of the second number class is itself no longer denumerable,
+hence that its order type already belongs to the next higher number class, whereas
+when we employ the first generating principle § + 1 we always remain within the
+same number class. Accordingly, on the basis of the assumption made, not only
+(Z, m) but already Z would itself be a contradictory notion. And in fact Schoenflies's Z,
+just like Bernstein's W, is afflicted with internal contradictions in any case, precisely
+because, as we saw above, it cannot contain its own order type as an element.
+
+198
+"On the preceding basis" a new method for the examination of the theorem in
+question is then proposed, a method that, as Schoenflies strains to show, also leads to
+no result. There are always various methods of not proving a given theorem, to be
+sure, and in particular it would seem that vague and inconsistent notions are especially appropriate when one wants to avoid giving a proof. But then, of course, one
+cannot refute genuine proofs by means of such devices. The proposed procedure,
+however, consists in comparing the well-ordered component I of the set M under
+consideration with the sets W and Z characterized above. This, then, yields several
+cases, all of which are said to be logically equally possible, whereas only one of them
+corresponds to the assumptions made in my proof. This cannot surprise us, of course,
+after Schoenflies has already incorporated into his assumptions all those contradictions that lead to the exclusion of the other cases.
+Thus, when Schoenflies remarks at the end of his paper that "in my opinion we
+should, in set theory, treat assumptions that lead to inconsistent notions or results
+just as we are accustomed to treating them elsewhere"
+, we can surely concur. For
+this means that such assumptions are to be excluded and that no consequences
+should be derived from inconsistent notions. In my proof this procedure has been
+strictly observed, too, but not in Schoenflies's critique.
+e. Summary
+The preceding discussion of the opposition to my 1904 proof can perhaps be
+summarized most simply by the following statements. Except for Poincaré, whose
+critique, based on formal logic—a critique that would threaten the existence of all
+of mathematics—has hitherto not met with any assent whatsoever, all opponents can
+be divided into two classes. Those who have
+no objection at all to my deductions
+protest the use of an unprovable general principle, without reflecting that such
+axioms constitute the basis of every mathematical theory and that precisely the one
+I adduced is indispensable for the extension of the science in other respects, too. The
+other critics, however, who have been able to convince themselves of this indispensability by a deeper involvement with set theory, base their objections upon the
+Burali-Forti antinomy, which in fact is without significance for my point of view,
+since the principles I employed exclude the existence of a set W.
+The relatively large number of criticisms directed against my short note testifies
+to the fact that, apparently, strong prejudices stand in the way of the theorem that
+any arbitrary set can be well-ordered. But the fact that in spite of a searching examination, for which I am indebted to all the critics, no mathematical error could be
+demonstrated in my proof and the objections raised against my principles are mutually contradictory and thus in a sense cancel each other allows me to hope that in
+time all of this resistance can be overcome through adequate clarification.
+
+Investigations in the foundations of set theory I
+(1908a)
+This paper presents the first axiomatic they are objects satisfying certain axioset theory. Cantor's definition of set had
+matic conditions. Zermelo's axioms are
+hardly more to do with the development
+surprisingly few in number. The most
+of set theory than Euclid's definition of
+original is perhaps Axiom III, the axiom
+point with that of geometry. Dedekind,
+of separation. In Peano and Russell sets
+whom Zermelo considers one of the two
+were part of logic, being intimately concreators of set theory, had explicitly
+nected with "conditions", or proposistated (1888, § 1) a number of principles
+tional functions. To express the relation,
+about sets (which he called "systems"),
+generally felt to exist, between a set and
+but his attempt had remained fragmen-
+a stipulation asserted by a statement,
+tary and had been somewhat discredited
+Zermelo introduces the notion "definite
+by the nonmathematical way in which he
+property" and, together with it, the
+justified the existence of an infinite set
+axiom of separation: a definite property
+(1888, art. 66). In spite of the great adseparates a subset from an already given
+vances that set theory was making, the
+set. His definition of "definite property"
+very notion of set remained vague. The
+however, invokes "the universally valid
+situation became critical after the appearlaws of logic"; since Zermelo pays no
+ance of the Burali-Forti paradox and
+attention at all to the underlying logic,
+intolerable after that of the Russell parathese laws are left unspecified, and the
+dox, the latter involving the bare notions
+notion of definite property remains hazy.
+of set and element. One response to the The flaw will be removed, in different
+challenge was Russell's theory of types
+manners, by Weyl, Fraenkel, Skolem, and
+(above, pp. 150-182). Another, coming at
+von Neumann (see below, p. 285).
+almost the same time, was Zermelo's
+Zermelo was perhaps the first to see
+axiomatization of set theory. The two
+clearly that the existence of infinite sets
+responses are extremely different; the
+has to be insured by a special axiom
+former is a far-reaching theory of great
+(Axiom VII, of infinity). The powerful
+significance for logic and even ontology,
+new tool that he used in his proofs of the
+while the latter is an immediate answer
+well-ordering theorem appears in two
+to the pressing needs of the working
+mathematician.
+forms, as axiom of choice (Axiom VI) and
+as general principle of choice (Article 29).
+Zermelo's basic idea resembles, if any-
+The latter, which does not assume that
+thing, Russell's "theory of limitation of
+size" (1905a); both refuse to take as sets
+a See below, p. 200, footnote 1.
+collections that are too "big", that of all
+• Cantor already had a similar idea; see
+above, p. 114. See also König 1905a, above,
+"things" or that of all ordinals, for ex-
+p. 148, and von Neumann 1925, below, pp. 396-
+ample." Sets are not simply collections;
+398.
+
+200
+the sets from which the choice is made are
+two notions of infinitude. A second
+disjoint, is here derived from Axiom VI.
+paper, dealing with a theory of well-
+Zermelo does not have the Cartesian
+ordering and a set-theoretic definition of
+frontet; he makes do with the "connecnatural numbers, is announced at the end
+', the set of unordered pairs, and
+of the introduction but was never pubthat renders his treatment of equivalence
+lished. However, in a paper (1908b) preof sets (§2), for example, somewhat
+pared shortly after the one below,
+cumbersome.
+Zermelo briefly shows how the natural
+Zermelo states his axioms, declares
+numbers can be defined in a theory of
+that he has been unable to prove their
+finite sets.
+consistency, and shows that the usual
+The paper is dated "'Chesières, 30 July
+derivations of a number of known para-
+1907". The translation is by Stefan
+doxes cannot be obtained from them. He
+Bauer-Mengelberg, and it is printed here
+then proves theorems about sets. The
+with the kind permission of Springer
+development goes as far as Cantor's
+Verlag.
+theorem, König's theorem, and the
+• "Every set is of lower cardinality than the
+theorem of Article 36, which connects set of its subsets."
+Set theory is that branch of mathematics whose task is to investigate mathematically the fundamental notions "number", "order"
+', and "function", taking them in
+their pristine, simple form, and to develop thereby the logical foundations of all of
+arithmetic and analysis; thus it constitutes an indispensable component of the science
+of mathematics. At present, however, the very existence of this discipline seems to be
+threatened by certain contradictions, or "antinomies"
+, that can be derived from its
+principles—principles necessarily governing our thinking, it seems-and to which no
+entirely satisfactory solution has yet been found. In particular, in view of the "Russell
+antinomy" (1903, pp. 101-107 and 366-368) of the set of all sets that do not contain
+themselves as elements, it no longer seems admissible today to assign to an arbitrary
+logically definable notion a set, or class, as its extension. Cantor's original definition
+of a set (1895) as "a collection, gathered into a whole, of certain well-distinguished
+objects of our perception or our thought'1 therefore certainly requires some restriction; it has not, however, been successfully replaced by one that is just as simple and
+does not give rise to such reservations. Under these circumstances there is
+at this
+point nothing left for us to do but to proceed in the opposite direction and, starting
+from set theory as it is historically given, to seek out the principles required for
+establishing the foundations of this mathematical discipline. In solving the problem
+we must, on the one hand, restrict these principles sufficiently to exclude all contradictions and, on the other, take them sufficiently wide to retain all that is valuable in
+this theory.
+Now in the present paper I intend to show how the entire theory created by Cantor
+and Dedekind can be reduced to a few definitions and seven principles, or axioms,
+which appear to be mutually independent. The further, more philosophical, question
+about the origin of these principles and the extent to which they are valid will not
+be discussed here. I have not yet even been able to prove rigorously that my axioms
+1 [Cantor's full definition reads: "Unter einer 'Menge' verstehen wir jede Zusammenfassung M
+von bestimmten wohlunterschiedenen Objekten m unsrer Anschauung oder unseres Denkens
+(welche die 'Elemente' von M genannt werden) zu einem Ganzen" (1895, p. 481, or 1932, p. 282).]
+
+201
+are consistent, though this is certainly very essential; instead I have had to confine
+myself to pointing out now and then that the antinomies discovered so far vanish one
+and all if the principles here proposed are adopted as a basis. But I hope to have done
+at least some useful spadework hereby for subsequent investigations in such deeper
+problems.
+The present paper contains the axioms and their most immediate consequences, as
+well as a theory of equivalence based upon these principles that avoids the formal use
+of cardinal numbers. A second paper, which will develop the theory of well-ordering
+together with its application to finite sets and the principles of arithmetic, is in
+preparation.?
+§1. FUNDAMENTAL DEFINITIONS AND AXIOMS
+1. Set theory is concerned with a domain 13 of individuals, which we shall call
+simply objects and among which are the sets. If two symbols, a and b, denote the same
+object, we write a = b, otherwise a ‡ b. We say of an object a that it "exists" if it
+belongs to the domain 23; likewise we say of a class A of objects that "there exist
+objects of the class f" if 23 contains at least one individual of this class.
+2. Certain fundamental relations of the form a & b obtain between the objects of
+the domain 3. If for two objects a and b the relation a a b holds, we say "a is an
+element of the set b"
+, "b contains a as an element", or "b possesses the element a".
+An object b may be called a set if and —with a single exception (Axiom II)-only if
+it contains another object, a, as an element.
+3. If every element x of a set M is also an element of the set N, so that from x & M
+it always follows that x a N, we say that M is a subset of N and we write M € N.3
+We always have M € M, and from M € N and N € R it always follows that M € R.
+Two sets M and N are said to be disjoint if they possess no common element, or if
+no element of M is an element of N.
+4. A question or assertion & is said to be definite if the fundamental relations of the
+domain, by means of the axioms and the universally valid laws of logic, determine
+without arbitrariness whether it holds or not. Likewise a "propositional function"
+[''Klassenaussage"] G(x), in which the variable term x ranges over all individuals of
+a class S, is said to be definite if it is definite for each single individual x of the class
+S. Thus the question whether a & b or not is always definite, as is the question whether
+M € N or not.
+The fundamental relations of our domain B, now, are subject to the following
+axioms, or postulates.
+Ахтом I. (Axiom of extensionality [Axiom der Bestimmtheit].) If every element
+of a set M is also an element of N and vice versa, if, therefore, both M € N and
+N € M, then always M = N; or, more briefly: Every set is determined by its
+elements.
+The set that contains only the elements a, b, c,.. r will often be denoted briefly
+by {a, b, c,..., r3.
+2 [This paper is apparently 1909; see also 19086.]]
+3 This sign of inclusion was introduced by Schröder (1890). Peano and, following him, Russell,
+Whitehead, and others use the sign o instead.
+
+202
+AxIOM II. (Axiom of elementary sets [Axiom der Elementarmengen].) There
+exists a (fictitious) set, the null set, 0, that contains no element at all. If a is any
+object of the domain, there exists a set fa, containing a and only a as element; if a
+and b are any two objects of the domain, there always exists a set {a, b} containing
+as elements a and 6 but no object x distinct from both.
+5. According to Axiom I, the elementary sets {a} and {a, b, are always uniquely
+determined and there is only a single null set. The question whether a = b or not is
+always definite (No. 4), since it is equivalent to the question whether or not a = {b}.
+6. The null set is a subset of every set M: 0 € M; a subset of M that differs from
+both 0 and M is called a part [Teil]* of M. The sets O and {a} do not have parts.
+AxIoM III. (Axiom of separation [Axiom der Aussonderung].) Whenever the
+propositional function G(x) is definite for all elements of a set M, M possesses a
+subset Me containing as elements precisely those elements x of M for which G(x) is
+true.
+By giving us a large measure of freedom in defining new sets, Axiom III in a sense
+furnishes a substitute for the general definition of set that was cited in the introduction and rejected as untenable. It differs from that definition in that it contains the
+following restrictions. In the first place, sets may never be independently defined by
+means of this axiom but must always be separated as subsets from sets already given;
+thus contradictory notions such as "the set of all sets" or "the set of all ordinal
+numbers", and with them the "ultrafinite paradoxes", to use Hessenberg's expression (1906, chap. 24), are excluded. In the second place, moreover, the defining
+criterion must always be definite in the sense of our definition in No. 4 (that is, for
+each single element x of M the fundamental relations of the domain must determine
+whether it holds or not), with the result that, from our point of view, all criteria such
+as "definable by means of a finite number of words"
+', hence the "Richard antinomy"
+and the "paradox of finite denotation", 5 vanish. But it also follows that we must,
+prior to each application of our Axiom III, prove the criterion E(x) in question to be
+definite, if we wish to be rigorous; in the considerations developed. below this will
+indeed be proved whenever it is not altogether evident.
+7. If M1 € M, then M always possesses another subset, M - M1, the complement
+of Mi, which contains all those elements of M that are not elements of My. The
+complement of M - My is M1 again. If My = M, its complement is the null set, O;
+the complement of any part (No. 6) My of M is again a part of M.
+8. If M and N are any two sets, then according to Axiom III all those elements of
+M that are also elements of N are the elements of a subset D of M; D is also a subset
+of N and contains all elements common to M and N. This set D is called the common
+component, or intersection, of the sets M and N and is denoted by [M, NJ. If M = N,
+then [M, N] = M; if N = O or if M and N are disjoint (No. 3), then [M, NJ = 0.
+9. Likewise, for several sets M, N, R,... there always exists an intersection
+D = [M, N, R,...]. For, if I is any set whose elements are themselves sets, then
+according to Axiom III there corresponds to every object a a certain subset Ta of I
+that contains all those elements of I' that contain a as an element. Thus it is definite
+* [Below, Zermelo also uses the expression "echter Teil" in the same sense. In the translation
+"part" has been used throughout for "nonempty proper subset" .]
+5 See Hessenberg 1906, chap. 23; on the other hand, see König 1905a.
+
+203
+for every a whether Ta = I, that is, whether a is a common element of all elements
+of T; if A is an arbitrary element of I, all elements a of A for which Ia = T'are the
+elements of a subset D of A that contains all these common elements. This set D is
+called the intersection associated with I' and is denoted by DI. If the elements of I
+do not possess a common element, DT = 0, and this is always the case if, for
+example, an element of T' is not a set or if it is the null set.
+10. THEOREM. Every set M possesses at least one subset M, that is not an element
+of M.
+Proof. It is definite for every element a of M whether x a x or not; the possibility
+that x ex is not in itself excluded by our axioms. If now M, is the subset of M that,
+in accordance with Axiom III, contains all those elements of M for which it is not
+the case that x ex, then Mo cannot be an element of M. For either Mo& Mo or not.
+In the first case, M, would contain an element x = Mo for which x ex, and this
+would contradict the definition of Mo. Thus Mo is surely not an element of Mo, and
+in consequence Mo, if it were an element of M, would also have to be an element of
+Mo, which was just excluded.
+It follows from the theorem that not all objects x of the domain B can be elements
+of one and the same set; that is, the domain 33 is not itself a set, and this disposes of the
+Russell antinomy so far as we are concerned.
+AXIOM IV. (Axiom of the power set [Axiom der Potenzmenge].) To every set I
+there corresponds another set UT, the power set of I, that contains as elements
+precisely all subsets of T.
+AxIoM V. (Axiom of the union [Axiom der Vereinigung].) To every set I' there
+corresponds a set GT, the union of T, that contains as elements precisely all elements
+of the elements of T.
+I1. If no element of I is a set different from 0, then, of course, GT = O. If
+T = {M, N, R,...), where M, N, R,... all are sets, we also write GT = M + N +
+R t... and call &T the sum of the sets M, N, R,..., whether some of these sets
+M, N, R,... contain common elements or not. Always M = M + O = M +. M =
+M+M+....
+12. For the "addition" of sets that we have just defined, the commutative and
+associative laws hold:
+M + N= N + M, M + (N + R) = (M + N) + R.
+Finally, for sums and intersections (No. 8) the distributive law also holds, in the
+two forms:
+[M + N, R] = [M, R] + [N, R]
+and
+[M, N] + R = [M + R, N + R].
+The proof is carried out by means of Axiom I and consists in a demonstration that
+every elment of the set on the left is also an element of the set on the right, and
+conversely.®
+6 The complete theory of this logical addition and multiplication can be found in Schröder
+1890.
+
+204
+13. Introduction of the product. If M is a set different from 0 and a is any one of its
+elements, then according to No. 5 it is definite whether M = {a} or not. It is therefore
+always definite whether a given set consists of a single element or not.
+Now let I' be a set whose elements, M, N, R,..., are various (mutually disjoint)
+sets, and let Sy be any subset of its union GT. Then it is definite for every element
+M of T' whether the intersection [M, S,] consists of a single element or not. Thus all
+those elements of I' that have exactly one element in common with S1 are the elements
+of a certain subset T1 of I, and it is again definite whether I1 = I or not. All
+subsets S, of &I' that have exactly one element in common with each element of T
+then are, according to Axiom III, the elements of a set P = BT, which, according to
+Axioms III and IV, is a subset of UGT and will be called the connection set [Verbindungsmenge] associated with I or the product of the sets M, N, R,.... If I =
+{M, N), or I = {M, N, R), we write BT = MN, or BT = MNR, respectively, for
+short.
+In order, now, to obtain the theorem that the product of several sets can vanish (that
+is, be equal to the null set) only if a factor vanishes we need a further axiom.
+Ахтом VI. (Axiom of choice [Axiom der Auswahl].) If I is a set whose elements
+all are sets that are different from 0 and mutually disjoint, its union &T includes at
+least one subset Sy having one and only one element in common with each element
+of T.
+We can also express this axiom by saying that it is always possible to choose a
+single element from each element M, N, R,... of T and to combine all the chosen
+elements, m, n, r,..., into a set S1.'
+The preceding axioms suffice, as we shall see, for the derivation of all essential
+theorems of general set theory. But in order to secure the existence of infinite sets we
+still require the following axiom, which is essentially due to Dedekind.8
+AxIoM VII. (Axiom of infinity [Axiom des Unendlichen].) There exists in the
+domain at least one set Z that contains the null set as an element and is so constituted
+that to each of its elements a there corresponds a further element of the form {a}, in
+other words, that with each of its elements a it also contains the corresponding set
+{a} as an element.
+14vII.° If Z is an arbitrary set constituted as required by Axiom VII, it is definite
+for each of its subsets Z1 whether it possesses the same property. For, if a is any
+element of 21, it is definite whether {a}, too, is an element of Z1, and all elements a
+of Z, that satisfy this condition are the elements of a subset Z'i for which it is definite
+whether Z1 = Z1 or not. Thus all subsets Z1 having the property in question are the
+elements of a subset I of UZ, and the intersection (No. 9) Zo = DT that corresponds
+to them is a set constituted in the same way. For, on the one hand, O is a common
+element of all elements 21 of 1', and, on the other, if a is a common element of all of
+these Z1, then {a} is also common to all of them and is thus likewise an element of Zo.
+- For the justification of this axiom see my 1908, where in § 2, pp. 111-128 [above, pp. 186-198],
+the relevant literature is discussed.
+8 1888, art. 66. The "proof" that Dedekind there attempts to give of this principle cannot be
+satisfactory, since it takes its departure from "the set of everything thinkable"
+, whereas from our
+point of view the domain B itself, according to No. 10, does not form a set.
+° The subscript VI, or VII, on the number of a section indicates that explicit or implicit use has
+been made of Axiom VI, or VII, respectively, in establishing the theorem of that section.
+
+205
+Now if Z' is any other set constituted as required by the axiom, there corresponds
+to it a smallest subset Zó having the same property, exactly as Zo corresponds to Z.
+But now the intersection [2o, Zo], which is a common subset of Z and Z', must be
+constituted in the same way as Z and Z'; and just as, being a subset of Z, it must
+contain the component Zo, so, as a subset of Z', it must contain the component Zo.
+According to Axiom I it then necessarily follows that [Zo, Zó] = Zo = Zó and that
+Zo thus is the common component of all possible sets constituted like Z, even though
+these need not be elements of a set. The set Zo contains the elements 0, {0), {0}), and
+so forth, and it may be called the number sequence, because its elements can take the
+place of the numerals. It is the simplest example of a denumerably infinite set (below,
+No. 36).
+§2. THEORY OF EQUIVALENCE
+From our point of view, the equivalence of two sets (Cantor 1895, p. 483) cannot be
+defined at first except for the case in which the sets are disjoint (No. 3); it is only
+atterward that the definition can be extended to the general case.
+15. Definition A. Two disjoint sets M and N are said to be immediately equivalent,
+M~ N, if their product MN (No. 13) possesses at least one subset • such that each
+element of M + N occurs as an element in one and only one element {m, n, of $. A
+subset • of MN thus constituted is called a mapping of M onto N; two elements m
+and n that occur together in one element of $ are said to be "mapped onto each
+other"; they "correspond to each other"
+', or one "is the image of the other"
+16. If is any subset of MN and therefore an element of 1(MN) and if x is any
+element of M + N, it is always definite (No. 4) whether the elements of Ø that contain x form a set consisting of a single element (No. 13). Thus it is also definite
+whether all elements x of M + N possess this property, that is, whether $ represents
+a mapping of M onto N or not. According to Axiom III, all of the mappings • therefore are the elements of a certain subset S of UI(MN), and it is definite whether S
+differs from O or not. It is therefore always definite for two disjoint sets M and N whether
+they are equivalent or not.
+17. If two equivalent disjoint sets M and N are mapped onto each other by $,
+there also corresponds to each subset M1 of M an equivalent subset Ny of N under a
+mapping $1, that is a subset of $.
+For it is definite for every element {m, n; of $ whether m a My or not, and therefore
+all elements of Ø thus associated with My are the elements of a subset Ø, of D. If we
+now denote by N, the intersection (No. 8) of G$, with N, each element of Mı + N1
+occurs as an element in only a single element of $1, since otherwise it would occur more
+than once in D as well; and, according to No. 15, we in fact have M1 ~ Ny.
+18. If two disjoint sets M and N are disjoint from and equivalent to one and the
+same third set, R, or if M ~ R, R~ R', and R'~ N, where each of these pairs of
+equivalent sets is assumed to be disjoint, then always also M~ N.
+Let the subset D of MR, the subset X of RR', and the subset Y of R'N be three
+mappings (No. 15) that map M onto R, R onto R', and R' onto N, respectively. If
+then {m, n} is any element of MN, it is definite whether there exist an element r of R
+and an element r' of R' such that {m, r} ¿ D, {r, r'} e X, and {r', n} & Y. All elements
+
+206
+{m, ny for which this is the case therefore are the elements of a subset S of MN, which
+represents a mapping of M onto N. For, if m is any element of M, there always
+correspond to it a single element r of R, a single element r' of R', and therefore also a
+single element n of N that satisfy the required condition; an analogous statement
+holds for each element n of N. Therefore to each element of M + N there actually
+corresponds a single element {m, n} of S, and we in fact have M ~ N.
+19. THeOReM. If M and N are any two sets, there always exists a set M' that is
+equivalent to one, M, and disjoint from the other, N.
+Proof. Let S = G{M + N}, in accordance with Axiom V, be the set that contains
+the elements of M + N, and let r, in accordance with No. 10, be an object that is not
+an element of M + S. Then the sets M and R = {r} are disjoint, and the product
+M' = MR possesses the property required by the theorem. Indeed, every element of
+M' is then, according to No. 13, a set m' of the form {m, r} (where m = M) but never
+an element of M + N, since otherwise r would be an element of an element of
+M + N, hence, by Axiom V, an element of S, contrary to the assumption. Thus M'
+is disjoint from both sets, M and N.
+Further, there corresponds to each element m of M one and only one element
+m' = {m, r}, and conversely each m' contains as an element only a single element m
+of M, since r was assumed not to be an element of M. To each element of M + M',
+therefore, there corresponds a single element {m, m'} of MM' for whichm' = {m, r},
+and if all pairs {m, m', that are so constituted are assumed to form a subset $ of MM',
+then, according to No. 15, Ø is a mapping of M onto M', and M ~ M'.
+It follows from our theorem that it is not possible for all sets equivalent to a nonempty
+set M to be the elements of a set I; for if I is an arbitrary set, there always exists
+a set M', equivalent to M, that is disjoint from the union GT and therefore not an
+element of 1.
+20. If M and N are any two sets, it is always definite whether there is a set R that
+is simultaneously disjoint from and equivalent to both sets, M and N.
+For let M', in accordance with No. 19, be a set that is equivalent to M and disjoint
+from M + N. Then, according to No. 16, it is definite whether M' ~ N or not. If
+M'~ N, then R = M' is a set constituted as required; otherwise, such a set R cannot
+exist at all, since, according to No. 18, it would always necessarily follow from M'~ M,
+M ~ R, and R ~ N that M'~N, contrary to the assumption.
+The preceding theorem, in combination with No. 18, now justifies the following
+extension of our Definition A:
+21. Definition B. Two arbitrary (not disjoint) sets M and N are said to be mediately
+equivalent, M~ N, if there exists a third set, R, that is disjoint from both and
+immediately equivalent to both in the sense of Definition A.
+Such an equivalence, "mediated" by R, of two sets M and N is given by means of
+two simultaneous mappings, a subset Ø of M R and a subset Y of NR, and two elements,
+m of M and n of N, are said to "correspond" or "be mapped onto each other" if
+they correspond to one and the same element r of R, so that both {m, r} & D and
+in, rye 4. In the case of such a mediated mapping, too, there corresponds to each
+subset M1 of M, as in No. 17, an equivalent subset R, of R, and consequently again
+an equivalent subset N1 Of N.
+On account of No. 18, Definition B may also be applied to disjoint sets M and N,
+
+207
+and according to No. 20 it is always definite whether two arbitrary sets are equivalent
+or not in the sense of this definition.
+22. Every set is equivalent to itself. If two sets, M and N, are equivalent to a
+third, R, they are equivalent to each other.
+For if, in accordance with No. 19, M' is a set that is disjoint from and equivalent
+to M, both M~ M' and M'~ M; therefore, according to No. 21, we in fact have
+M~ M.
+If, furthermore, the equivalence of the sets M and R is mediated by M', and that
+of R and N by N', where M' is assumed to be disjoint from M and R, and N' to be
+disjoint from N and R, then we choose, in accordance with No. 19, a sixth set, R',
+equivalent to R and disjoint from the sum M + N + R, and we now have, on
+account of No. 18, M~ M'~ R~ R', therefore M ~ R', and N~ N'~ R~ R',
+therefore N~ R', so that according to No. 21 the equivalence of M and N is
+mediated by R'.
+23. The null set is equivalent only to itself. Every set of the form {a} is equivalent
+to all other sets {b} of the same form, and to no other set.
+For, since the product O. M is always equal to 0,1° no set M # 0 can be (immediately) equivalent to the null set in the sense of No. 15, and therefore no set M' can
+be mediately equivalent to it in the sense of No. 21.
+It, furthermore, {a} is disjoint from M, that is, if a is not an element of M, then all
+elements of the product {a}M are of the form {a, m}, and, if M were to contain, besides
+m, another element, p, then {a, m} and {a, p} would not be disjoint, and this, according
+to No. 15, would prevent any subset • of {a}M from being a mapping. On the other
+hand, {a} {b3 = fa, b} is always a mapping of fa; onto {6}.
+24. THEOREM. If M ~ M' and N~ N', while M and N on the one hand, and M'
+and N' on the other, are mutually disjoint, then always M + N~ M'+ N'
+Proof. We first consider the case in which M + N and M' + N' are disjoint.
+Then Definition A (No. 15) is applicable to both of the equivalences M ~ M' and
+N~N', and there are two mappings, the subset • of MM' and the subset Y of
+NN', whose sum • + Y represents the required mapping of M + N onto M' + N'.
+For, if p = (M + N), either p & M or p = N, but, since [M, N] = 0, not both; and Ø in
+one case, and Y in the other, contains a single element of the form {p, 9}. Likewise
+there corresponds to each element q of M' + N' one and only one element {p, g} of
+Ø + 4.
+If M + N and M' + N' are not themselves disjoint, there exists, according to
+No. 19, a set S" equivalent to M' + N' and disjoint from the sum M + N + M' +
+N'; and, given a mapping X of M' + N' onto S", equivalent and disjoint parts M"
+and N" of S" will, according to No. 17, correspond to the two parts M' and N'. Then
+M~M'~ M", as well as N~ N' ~ N", and, since now M + N and M" + N" are
+disjoint,
++N~M"+N"=S"~ M'+ N
+according to what has just been proved; therefore again
+M+N~M'+ N'.
+10 [Up to this point Zermelo has used only juxtaposition for the product; from here on he
+occasionally uses a dot.]
+
+208
+25. THEOREM. If a set M is equivalent to one of its parts, M', it is also equivalent
+to any other part Mi, that includes M'as component.
+Proof. Let
+M~M'€ M_€M and Q= MI-M'.
+Because of the equivalence M ~ M' that has been assumed, there exists, according
+to No. 21, a mapping {, 4} of M onto M', mediated by, say, M". If now A is an
+arbitrary subset of M, a certain subset A' of M' will correspond to it under the mapping
+in question, and it is definite whether A' € A or not. Thus all elements A of UM for
+which we have both Q € A and A' € A are, according to Axiom III, the elements of
+a certain subset T of UM, and, in particular, M is itself an element of 1'. The common
+component A, = DI (No. 9) of all elements of I' now possesses the following properties: (1) Q€ Ao, since Q is a common subset of all elements A of I'; (2) As € Ao,
+because every element x of Ao is a common element of all elements A of T' and its
+map x' e A'€ A is thus also a common element of all A. On account of (1) and (2),
+therefore, also Ao & T. Finally we have (3) Ao = Q + A'. For, since A! € Ao and also
+A' € M'€ M - Q, on the one hand A, € Ao - Q. On the other hand, however,
+every element r of Ao - Q is also an element of Aó, and therefore Ao - Q€ A'.
+Indeed, if r were not an element of Aý, then A1 = Ao - {r} would still have A', and
+a fortiori Aí, as a component, and, since it still includes Q, it would itself be an element
+of I, whereas it is in fact only a part of Ao = DT. Therefore
+where the two summands on the right have no element in common, since @ and M'
+are disjoint. But now, since A, is equivalent to A' and M' — A' is equivalent to itself,
+it follows according to No. 24 that
+MI~A'+(M'-Aó)=M'~M;
+that is, My ~ M as asserted.
+26. Corollary. If a set M is equivalent to one of its parts, M', it is also equivalent
+to any set M1 that is obtained from M when a single element is removed or added.
+Let M~M' = M - Rand My = M - {r}, where r is some element of R. Then
+M'=M- {7}- (R- {73) €M - {r} = Mi,
+and, according to the previous theorem, M ~ M1.
+It, furthermore, M2 = M - {a}, where a = M' = M - R, let Mo = M - {a, r}, and
+we have, according to Nos. 23 and 24,
+therefore also Mz ~ M.
+If, finally, M3 = M + {c), where c is not an element of M, it follows from M ~ M',
+again according to No. 24, that
+3=+{~+{C}= M- R + {c} = M3 - R,
+and furthermore, according to what was proved previously,
+M= M3 - {C}~ M3;
+thus the theorem is proved in its entirety.
+
+209
+27. EQUIVALENCE THEOREM. If each of the two sets M and N is equivalent to a
+subset of the other, M and N are themselves equivalent.
+Let M~ M'€ N and N~ N' € M. Then on account of No. 21 there corresponds
+to the subset M' of N an equivalent set M" such that M" € N' € M, and we have
+M~M'~M"; therefore, according to the theorem of No. 25, also M~ N'~ N,
+q.e.d.i
+28. THEOREM. If all the sets M, N, R,... are elements of an arbitrary set I, they
+can all be simultaneously mapped onto [respectively] equivalent sets M', N', R',...
+that are the elements of a new set, I', and are disjoint from one another as well as
+from a given set 2.
+Proof. Let S = GT = M + N + Rt..., in accordance with Axiom V, be the
+sum of all elements of T, and, in accordance with No. 19, let I" be a set equivalent
+to I and disjoint from the sum I + S + G(S + 2), so that under a mapping Sl to
+each element of I there corresponds a certain element of I": M", N", R"
+,... to
+M, N, R,..., respectively. An arbitrary element of the product ST" (No. 13) will
+then have the form {s, M"), where s e S and M" « I", and for every such element it is
+definite (No. 4) whether s & M, where M is assumed to be the element of I corresponding to M" under S, that is, according to No. 15, to be such that {M, M"} = SL.
+All elements of the product that are so constituted then are, on account of Axiom III,
+the elements of a subset S' of ST"
+", and this set S" is disjoint from S + Z, since otherwise an element M" of T"
+", being an element of is, M"., would be an element of an
+element of S + Z and thus, on account of Axiom V, also an element of G(S + Z),
+contrary to the assumption made about I". If, furthermore, M is an arbitrary
+element of I and M" the corresponding one of I", those elements {s, M", of S' that
+contain M" as an element form, according to Axiom III, a certain subset M' of S',
+and M'~ M by virtue of a mapping M (M € MM' € SS') under which to each
+element m of M there corresponds an element m' = {m, M"} of M' and conversely.
+Likewise, with any other element N of I there are associated an equivalent subset
+N' of S' and a mapping N (N € NN' € SS') under which to each element n of N there
+corresponds an element {n, N"} of N'. The two subsets M' and N', which correspond to
+two different elements M and N of I, are, however, always disjoint, for, if, say,
+{m, M"} = {n, N"' were a common element of M' and N', then M", being an element
+of {n, N"), would have to be equal either to N" or to n, and in the first case M would
+also be equal to N, and in the second I" and S would not be disjoint, contrary to the
+assumption. The subsets M', N', R',... of S', which by virtue of the mappings M
+N, P,... are equivalent to the elements M, N, R,... of T, are thus indeed disjoint
+from one another, and they are also disjoint from the set Z since S' is. Finally, it is
+always definite for every subset Si of S' containing an element {s, M") whether
+that subset is identical with the corresponding set M', and all of those among
+M', N', R',... for which this is the case are, according to Axioms III and IV,
+11 The proof of the equivalence theorem given here in Nos. 25 and 27 (first published by Poincaré
+(1906, pp. 314-315) on the basis of a letter that I wrote in January 1906) rests solely upon Dedekind's chain theory (1888, § 4) and, unlike the older proofs by Schröder and F. Bernstein as well
+as the latest proof by J. König (1906), avoids any reference to ordered sequences of order w or
+to the principle of mathematical induction. At approximately the same time Peano (1906) published a proof that was quite similar; the paper containing that proof also contains a discussion of
+the objection directed by Poincaré against my proof. See § 2 b in my 1908 [above, pp. 190-191].
+
+210
+the elements of a certain subset I' of US. The theorem is therefore proved in its
+entirety.
+29VI• GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF CHOICE. If I' is a set whose elements M, N, R,...
+all are sets different from the null set, there always exist sets P that, according to a
+certain rule, uniquely correlate with each element M of T one element m of that M.
+Proof. Apply to I' the procedure specified in No. 28 above, letting Z = 0.12 This
+yields simultaneous mappings of all sets M, N, R,... onto the equivalent sets
+M', N', R',..., which are mutually disjoint and form the elements of a set I'. If now
+P, in accordance with Axiom VI, is a subset of GT' that has exactly one element in
+common with each element of I', then P provides the desired correlation. For, if M
+is any element of T and M' the corresponding element of I', P contains only a single
+element m' of M', and to this there again corresponds a well-determined element m
+of M.
+30vI. THEOREM. Let I and I" be two equivalent sets containing as elements the
+mutually disjoint sets M, N, R,... and the mutually disjoint sets M', N', R'
+respectively. If I and I" are mapped onto each other in such a way that to each
+element M of one set there corresponds an equivalent set M' as an element of the
+other, the associated sums GT and GI', as well as the corresponding products
+฿T and BT', are also equivalent.
+Proof. We first prove the theorem on the assumption that S = ET and S" = ST'
+are mutually disjoint, in which case each element of I would have to be disjoint
+from each element of I', too. It then follows from M ~ M', according to No. 15,
+that I1(MM') possesses a subset Am, different from 0, that contains as elements all
+possible mappings M, M', M",... of M onto M'. Likewise, to any other element N
+of I' there corresponds a subset An of U(NN') that contains all mappings of N onto
+N', and Av is also different from 0. All these mapping-sets Am, AN, AR, ... are subsets
+of I(SS') and therefore are, according to Axioms III and IV, the elements of a certain
+subset T of UISS'). Since, now, all elements of T are sets that are different from O
+and mutually disjoint (because from the fact that MM' and NN' are disjoint it follows that their subsets are disjoint), according to Axiom VI the product BT is also
+different from 0, and an arbitrary element O of fT is a set of the form ‹M, N, P,...}
+that contains exactly one element of each of the sets Am, AN, AR, .... We could also
+have inferred the existence of such a "combined" mapping from the theorem of No.
+29, and more quickly at that. If we now form, in accordance with Axiom V, the union
+8=50 = =M+N+P+...ESS',
+then S provides the required mapping of S onto S'. For each element s of S must
+belong as an element to one and only one element of T, say M, and must therefore
+occur as an element in a single element of the corresponding mapping M, while no
+element of M occurs in any of the remaining summands N, P,.... An analogous
+statement holds for every element of s' of S', and according to Definition A (No. 15)
+we thus have S~s.
+By means of the same S and its subsets, each subset p of S is also mapped, on
+account of No. 17, onto an equivalent subset p' of S', and if in particular p = {m, n,
+...}is, in accordance with No. 13, an element of P = $T, the subset j' = {m', n',
+12 [Instead of "I" the German text has "I'", which is a misprint.]
+
+INVESTIGATIONS IN THE FOUNDATIONS OF SET THEORY 21l
+...} of S' corresponding to it is an element of T". For, if M' is an arbitrary element
+of I' and M the corresponding element of T, p contains one and only one element
+m of M and p' contains the corresponding element m' of M' but no other element of
+M', since such an element would also have to correspond to a second element of M
+in p. Likewise, there corresponds to each element p' of T" one and only one element
+p of BT, and we indeed obtain a certain subset 1 of BT. BT" as a mapping of BT
+onto #I', so that these two products are mutually equivalent.
+But if now S and S' are no longer assumed to be disjoint, we can, according to
+No. 19, introduce a third set, S", that is equivalent to S' and disjoint from S + S'.
+Then, on account of No. 17, there corresponds to a subset M' of S' an equivalent
+subset M" of S"
+", and, since M', N', R',... are mutually disjoint, the same holds of the
+corresponding M", N", R"
+,....Since, furthermore, every element s" of S" corresponds to an element s' of S' belonging to one of the sets M', N', R',..., s" is the sum
+of all these M", N", R",..., which are the elements of a certain subset I'" of US".
+But now we have M~M'~M", N~ N'~N",...; thus every element M of I
+is equivalent to the corresponding element M" of I", and, since now S" = ST" is
+disjoint from both of the sums S' = GT' and S = ET, it follows according to what
+has been proved above that
+ET~ET"~ET' and $T~$T"~$I";
+thus the theorem is proved in full generality.
+31. Definition. If a set M is equivalent to a subset of the set N, but N is not
+equivalent to a subset of M, we say that M is of lower cardinality than N, and we write
+M < N for short.
+Corollaries. (a) Since according to No. 21 it is definite for any two sets whether they
+are equivalent or not, it is also definite whether M is equivalent to at least one
+element of UN, as well as whether N is equivalent to some element of UM. It is therefore always definite whether M < N or not.
+(6) The three relations M < N, M ~ N, and M > Nare mutually exclusive.
+(c) Whenever we have M < N and either N < R or N~ R, we have M < R.
+(d) If M is equivalent to a subset of N, then either M ~ N or M < N. This is a
+consequence of the equivalence theorem (No. 27).
+(e) The null set is of lower cardinality than any other set; likewise, every set {a}
+consisting of a single element is of lower cardinality than any set M that has parts
+(see No. 23).
+32. CANTOR'S THEOREM. If M is an arbitrary set, then always M < UM. Every set
+is of lower cardinality than the set of its subsets.
+Proof. To each element m of M there corresponds a subset {m} of M. Now since it
+is definite for each subset M, of MI whether it contains only a single element (No. 13),
+all subsets of the form {m; are the elements of a subset U, of UM, and M~ Uo.
+If on the other hand U = IM were equivalent to a subset M, of M, then under a
+mapping $ of U onto Mo there would correspond to each subset M1 of M a certain
+element m, of Mo, so that {M 1, my) would be an element of D, and it would always be
+definite whether my = My or not. All those elements m, of Mo for which my is not an
+element of M, would then be the elements of a set M' (M' € Mo € M), which likewise
+would be an element of U. But no element m' of Mo could correspond to this subset
+
+212
+M' of M. For if m' were an element of M', this would contradict the definition of M'.
+But if m' were not an element of M', then, according to the same definition, M'
+would also have to contain this element m', contrary to the assumption. Thus it
+follows that U cannot be equivalent to any subset of M, and, in combination with
+what was proved first, M < UM.
+The theorem holds for all sets M, even, for instance, for M = O, and indeed
+0 < {03 = 110.
+Likewise, for every a,
+{a} < {0, {a}} = 1{a}.
+Finally, it follows from the theorem that for every arbitrary set I of sets M, N,
+R,... there always exist further sets of higher cardinality; for example, the set
+P= UGT > GI ≥ M, N, R,...
+possesses this property.
+33vI. THeOREM. Let I and I" be two equivalent sets containing as elements the
+mutually disjoint sets M, N, R, ... and the mutually disjoint sets M', N', R',....
+respectively. If T'and I" are mapped onto each other in such a way that each element
+MI of T' is of lower cardinality than the corresponding element M' of I', the sum
+S = ET of all elements of T' is also of lower cardinalty than the product P' = $T'
+of all elements of T'.
+Proof. It suffices to prove the theorem for the case in which the two sums S = GI
+and S' = GT" are disjoint. The extension to the general case is then accomplished by
+a method analogous to that used for the theorem in No. 30, through interposition of
+a third set, S", equivalent to S and disjoint from S', and by means of that theorem.
+First it must be shown that S' is equivalent to a subset of P'. Because M < M',
+there exists a subset Am of II(MM'), different from O, all of whose elements M, M',
+M",... are mappings that map M onto subsets M', Mź... of M'. Such mappingsets Am, AN, Ap,... exist for any two corresponding elements {M, M',, {N, N'},
+{R, R'),... of T'and I', and each element • = {M, N, P,...) of their product $T =
+Am'AN•AR... furnishes, just as in No. 30, a simultaneous mapping of all elements
+M, N, R,... of I onto equivalent subsets Mí, Ní, Rí,... of the corresponding
+elements of I'. By means of S = G0 € SS', therefore, every element s of S' is mapped
+onto an element s' of S', even though not every element of S' is mapped onto one
+of S.
+But now the complements M' - Mi, N' - Ni, R' - Rí, ..., which are the
+elements of a subset T'í of US', all are different from O, since, because MI < M', the
+case M ~ Mí = M' is always excluded. Thus also the product $T1 ‡ 0, and there
+exists at least one set q ‹ ฿Tí of the form {mó, nó, ró,...) ES' that has exactly one
+element in common with each of the sets M' - M'í, N' - N1, ... and is therefore
+also an element of P'
+If now s is any element of S, and s' is the element of S' corresponding to it under
+S2, there corresponds to both of them yet another element s, of the subset q of S', such
+that s' and so always belong to one and the same element of I', and consequently
+
+INVESTIGATIONS IN THE FOUNDATIONS OF SET THEORY 213
+for s & M always só = mó, and so forth.13 But, since só & (M' - M'í) whenever
+s' e Mí, s' and só are always distinct. If we now form the set 9s = q - {5ó} + {s'},
+which we obtain from q when we replace one of these elements, só, by the other, s',
+we again obtain an element of P', namely, a subset of S' that has exactly one element
+in common with each of the sets M', N', R',.... But the elements of P' such as 9s,
+which are the elements of a subset P! of P', all are distinct. For if, say, m, and ma
+are two distinct elements of the same element M of T, the corresponding elements
+m'i and mó of Mí, which take the place of s', are also distinct, and thus
+since, except for mó, g has no element in common with M'. But if m and n are two
+elements of S that belong to distinct sets M and N, then 9m = q - {mós + {m'} has
+one element m' of Mí in common with M', while In = q - {nós + in} has only the
+element mó of (M' - M'í) in common with M', and the two sets are likewise distinct.
+Thus the pairs {s, 9s} are the elements of a subset D of SP!, which, according to No. 15,
+possesses the character of a mapping, and we in fact have S ~ P! € P'.
+On the other hand, P' cannot be equivalent to any subset So of S. For if this were
+the case, there would have to correspond to every element s of So an element ps of
+P' under a mapping Y (Y € S,P' € SP'). Let us consider in particular those elements
+Im that correspond to elements m of the intersection Mo = [M, S.]. Each of these Pm
+contains, then, an element m" of M', namely, the one that 2m, as an element of P',
+has in common with M'; but the m" belonging to distinct m are not necessarily
+always distinct. In any case, all m" belonging to the elements m of Mo are the elements of a subset M'½ of M' that is distinct from M' itself, since otherwise M' would be
+equivalent to a subset of Mo, which in turn is a subset of M, contrary to the assumption that M < M'. Similarly, there answer to all elements M, N, R,... of T certain
+parts M'½, Nź, Rz,... of the corresponding elements M', N', R',... of I'. The
+respective complements M' - M½, N' - Nź, R' - Rz, ..., therefore, all are different
+from O and are the elements of a subset I'½ of lIS'. It, now, pó is any element of
+$I½ ‡ O, it is also an element of P', but under the mapping Y whose existence was
+assumed it cannot correspond to any element s of So. For if, say, pó were equal to
+Im, if, therefore, pó were to correspond to an element of Mo, then according to the
+assumption made it would necessarily have an element m" of M'½ in common with M',
+while actually pó cannot have any element in common with M' other than one of
+M' - M'½. Nor can pó correspond to any element of No, Ro,...; thus it corresponds
+to no element of the subset S, of S at all, and the assumption that P'~ So leads to
+a contradiction, which completes the proof of the assertion that s < P.
+This theorem (communicated by me to the Göttingen Mathematical Society at the
+end of 1904) is the most general theorem now known concerning the comparison of
+cardinalities, one from which all the others can be derived. The proof rests upon a
+generalization of a procedure applied by J. König in a special case (see below).
+34vI. Corollary. (J. König'stheorem.) If a set I whose elements all are sets that are
+mutually disjoint is mapped onto a subset I' of T in such a way that to each element
+13 [For the first occurrence in this sentence of "so" the German text has "so", which is a misprint.]l
+14 Here, too, use is made of Axiom VI (axiom of choice).
+
+214
+M of T' there corresponds an element M' of I" of higher cardinality (M < M'), then
+ET < $T whenever $T ‡ 0.15
+According to the theorem of No. 33, we always have GT < T" in the case under
+consideration; it therefore remains to be shown only that T" is here equivalent to
+a subset of $T. When I'' = I' this is trivial; but in the other case we have (T - I')
+# O, else, on account of Axiom VI, the null set would be any element of I - I', and,
+contrary to the assumption, T would equal O. But if q is any element of (T - I')
+and p'any element of BI', then p' + q is an element of BT, namely, a subset of
+ET" + G(T-I')= &T that has exactly one element in common with each
+element of I" as well as of I - I'. Thus for a fixed g there corresponds to each
+element ¿' of $T" a certain element p' + q of BT, and all these p' + gare the
+elements of a certain subset P, of BT that is equivalent to BT.
+35. Cantor's theorem (No. 32) can also be obtained as a special case of the general
+theorem of No. 33.
+Let M be an arbitrary set; let M' be a set-and according to No. 19 such a set
+does exist-equivalent to and disjoint from M, and let the subset • of MM' be an
+arbitrary mapping of M onto M'. Then to each element m of M there corresponds a
+definite element {m, m'} of • and, according to No. 31 (e), always
+{m} < {m, m'}.
+These sets {m; obviously are the elements of a new set, I', that is equivalent to M,
+and, according to the theorem of No. 33,
+M = GT < $Ф.
+It thus remains to be shown only that $$ ~ IM. Now every element of $$ is a set
+of the form My + (M' - Mí), where My is a subset of M and Mi the corresponding subset of M'. Then there indeed corresponds to each element My of UM one and
+only one element of f and conversely; and, as asserted,
+M < $Ф~UM.
+36VII• THEOREM. The number sequence Zo (No. 14) is an infinite set, that is, one
+that is equivalent to one of its parts. Conversely, also, every infinite set M contains
+a denumerably infinite component Mo, that is, one that is equivalent to the number
+sequence.
+Proof. Let Z be an arbitrary set that, in accordance with Axiom VII, contains the
+element 0 and, for each of its elements a, also the corresponding element {a}, and let
+this set Z be mapped by means of the subset S of ZZ onto a set Z' equivalent to
+and disjoint from it, which, according to No. 19, is possible. Now, whenever {z, x'}
+is an arbitrary element of ZZ' and {x, x'} an element of Sl for the same x', it is
+definite whether z = {x} or not. All elements of ZZ' that in fact have the form
+{x}, x'} thus are, according to Axiom III, the elements of a certain subset • of ZZ',
+and $ is a mapping of Z' onto the subset Z1 of Z that contains all elements z of the
+form {x}. In fact, to every element x' of Z' there corresponds a certain element {x}
+of Zy and conversely; that is, each element of Z1 + Z' occurs in one and only one
+15 See König 1905 for the special case in which the elements of I, when ordered according to
+cardinality, form a sequence of type w.
+
+INVESTIGATIONS IN THE FOUNDATIONS OF SET THEORY 215
+element of D. Thus, according to No. 21, 7 ~ Zi ~ Z1, where Z1, since it does not
+contain the element 0, is only a part of Zi; and every set constituted like 4, hence also
+Zo, is infinite.
+To prove now the second half of the theorem as well, we consider an arbitrary
+infinite set M, which, however, we may in view of No. 19 assume without loss of
+generality to be disjoint from Zo. Thus let M ~ M' = M - R, let r be an arbitrary
+element of R # O, and let {Ø, Y} be a mapping, whose existence is possible according
+to No. 21, under which there corresponds to each element m of M an element m' of
+M'and conversely. Furthermore let A be a subset of M Z, that possesses the following
+properties: (1) it contains the element {r, O}; and (2) if {m, z} is any element of A, then
+A also contains the further element {m', «'}, where m' is the element of M' corresponding to m, and ' = {z} is likewise an element of Zo on account of No. 14. If now
+A, = DT is the common component of all subsets of MZ, constituted like A, which,
+on account of Axioms III and IV, are the elements of a certain subset T of I(MZo),
+then A, also possesses properties (1) and (2), as we see immediately, and is thus
+likewise an element of T. Furthermore, with the sole exception of {r, 0}, every element
+of Ao, too, has the form {m', z'}; for in the contrary case we could remove it, and the
+remainder of Ao would still possess properties (1) and (2), without, however, including the component Ao, which all elements of T do include. From this it follows
+first that the element {r, 0} is disjoint from all other elements of Ao, since neither
+y = m' e M' nor O = {z} = »' is possible, and therefore no further element {m', 2} can
+contain one of the elements r or O. Furthermore, if an element {m, z} of Ao is disjoint
+from all the remaining ones, the same also holds for the corresponding element
+{m', z'}, since to each element of the form {m', z'i} or {m',, z} there would have to correspond a further element, {m, z1} or {m1, 2}. All those elements of Ao that are disjoint
+from all the others, therefore, are the elements of a subset As of Ao possessing properties (1) and (2); hence, being an element of T, A' now includes A, as a subset, that is,
+is identical with Ao. Every element of
+GA. = Mo+ 200€M + Z0,
+where M, is the common component of GA, and M, and Zoo that of GA, and Zo,
+can therefore figure as an element in only a single element of Ao, and, on account of
+No. 15, Mo ~ Z00. But now Zoo is a subset of Zo containing the element 0 and, for
+every one of its elements z, also the associated ' = {z}; Zoo must therefore on account
+of No. 14 contain the entire number sequence Zo as a component; that is, we have
+Zoo = Z, and, as asserted, Zo ~ Mo € M.
+
+Incomplete symbols: Descriptions
+ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD
+AND BERTRAND RUSSELL
+(1910)
+Whitehead published the first thick
+volume of A treatise of universal algebra
+in 1898. His pupil Russell published the
+first thick volume of The principles of
+mathematics in 1903. Then Whitehead
+was persuaded to abandon plans for his
+second volume and rather to collaborate
+with Russell on the second volume of T'he
+principles. This volume never materialized either. Instead, the collaboration
+bore as its fruit a decade later a work
+independent of The principles, the threevolume Principia |
+mathematica, from
+which the present selection is drawn.
+This monumental work is a detailed study
+of logic and set theory, and a construction, on that basis, of classical mathematics. It came as a fulfillment of what
+Frege and Peano, in their different
+ways, had projected and partly carried
+through.
+The present selection from the Introduction to Principia is concerned with
+the logical device of description, "(x)(фх)"
+"the object x such that ox"
+. In Peano's
+notation
+. (1899, pp. 22-23) the class
+whose sole member is x was referred to
+as ex, and conversely the sole member x
+of a class y was 1y; so Whitehead and
+Russell's "(1)(7x)"
+was an adaptation
+of Peano's "I з фх", "the member of the
+class хзфх". Frege had a notation for
+the same purpose earlier (1893, § 11).
+But there were differences in the handling of the waste cases—cases in which
+there is not one and only one object x
+such that ox. Peano left his "," unexplained in the waste cases. Frege arbitrarily equated description to class abstraction in the waste cases; "the"
+object x fulfilling a given condition became for him the class of all such objects
+x if there were many or none.
+Whitehead and Russell contrive to
+avoid both the incompleteness of Peano's
+line and the artificiality of Frege's by
+defining the notation of description for
+all cases and yet giving it no object in
+the waste cases. They use contextual
+definition: they indicate how any sentence containing a description can as a
+whole be expanded into primitive notation, but they equate the description by
+itself to no term in primitive notation.
+The general idea of contextual definition goes back to Jeremy Bentham (1843,
+vol. 8, pp. 246-247), who called it
+paraphrasis and saw in it a method of
+accounting for fictions by explaining
+various purported terms away. A mathematical application of the method became familiar in the differential operators; and it is with this illustration that
+the selection from Whitehead and Russell
+begins.
+The theory of descriptions that occupies these pages was expounded earlier
+by Russell (1905) in a way that showed
+motives not unlike Bentham's. Russell
+was dissatisfied with such theories as
+"that of Meinong, [which] regards any
+grammatically correct denoting phrase as
+
+217
+standing for an object. Thus 'the present
+More generally, Whitehead and
+King of France', 'the round square'
+etc., are supposed to be genuine objects » Russell's way of eliminating descriptions
+enables us to make a clean sweep not
+(1905, p. 483). At Whitehead and Rusonly of class abstracts but of all other
+sell's hands the method of paraphrasis
+sorts of singular terms as well, except
+receives sharper formulation than it had
+variables. Instead of assuming a constant
+had from Bentham.
+singular term or proper name, say "a"
+A disadvantage of Whitehead
+and
+we can always assume or define a predi-
+Russell's way of handling descriptions, as
+cate "A" that is true only of the object
+compared with Frege's or Peano's, is that
+a, and then take "a" itself as short for
+it raises the question of scope, to which a
+the eliminable description "(x)Ax".
+good part of the appended selection is
+Similarly, instead of assuming functors,
+given over. An advantage, we saw, is
+say the two-place functor "+"
+, we can
+completeness without artificiality. An-
+assume or define a three-place predicate
+other advantage is that this way of intro-
+"I" such that Ezxy =.* = x † Y, and
+ducing description does not use class abthen take "x + y" itself as short for the
+straction, and hence leaves us free to
+eliminable description "(1z)Ezxy". An
+define the notation "х з фх" Or "Хох" of
+important thing about thus absorbing all
+class abstraction in terms of description
+singular terms other than variables is
+as (1У) (X)(X =У. = фх). But this is an adthat the logic of quantification and idenvantage that, in the continuing pages of
+tity no longer needs to be conceived
+Principia mathematica, Whitehead and
+otherwise than in its simplest form, in-
+Russell do not use. Instead they assume,
+volving just predicate letters, variables,
+not quite explicitly, a primitive notation
+quantifiers, truth functions, and "="
+for the abstraction of attributes (or pro-
+W. V. Quine
+positional functions), and then with its
+help they introduce class abstraction by
+The text is reproduced here by arrangecontextual definition (see above, p. 152).
+ment with Cambridge University Press.
+By an "incomplete" symbol we mean a symbol which is not supposed to have any
+meaning in isolation, but is only defined in certain contexts. In ordinary mathematics,
+for example, d/dx and J" are incomplete symbols: something has to be supplied before we have anything significant. Such symbols have what may be called a "definition in use". Thus, if we put
+22
+22
+22
+72 =
+5x= +
+Df,
+we define the use of V2, but V' by itself remains without meaning. This distinguishes
+such symbols from what (in a generalized sense) we may call proper names: "Socrates", for example, stands for a certain man and therefore has a meaning by itself,
+without the need of any context. If we supply a context, as in "Socrates is mortal",
+these words express a fact of which Socrates himself is a constituent: there is a
+certain object, namely Socrates, which does have the property of mortality, and this
+object is a constituent of the complex fact which we assert when we say "Socrates
+is mortal". But in other cases this simple analysis fails us. Suppose we say: "The
+round square does not exist." It seems plain that this is a true proposition, yet we
+cannot regard it as denying the existence of a certain object called "the round
+
+218
+square". For if there were such an object, it would exist: we cannot first assume that
+there is a certain object and then proceed to deny that there is such an object.
+Whenever the grammatical subject of a proposition can be supposed not to exist,
+without rendering the proposition meaningless, it is plain that the grammatical subject is not a proper name, that is, not a name directly representing some object.
+Thus, in all such cases, the proposition must be capable of being so analyzed that
+what was the grammatical subject shall have disappeared. Thus, when we say "the
+round square does not exist", we may, as a first attempt at such analysis, substitute
+"it is false that there is an object x which is both round and square"
+• Generally,
+when "the so-and-so" is said not to exist, we have a proposition of the form'
+" ~E!(1X)(фх)",
+that is,
+~ {((С): фх.=x•Х = С],
+or some equivalent. Here the apparent grammatical subject (1x)(фx) has completely
+disappeared; thus, in "~E!(1x)(фx)", (1x)(фx) is an incomplete symbol.
+By an extension of the above argument, it can easily be shown that (1x)(фx) is
+always an incomplete symbol. Take, for example, the following proposition: "Scott
+is the author of Waverley". (Here "the author of Waverley" is (x)(x wrote
+Waverley).) This proposition expresses an identity; thus, if " the author of Waverley"
+could be taken as a proper name and supposed to stand for some object c, the proposition would be "Scott is c". But if c is any one except Scott, this proposition is
+false; while if c is Scott, the proposition is "Scott is Scott", which is trivial and
+plainly different from "Scott is the author of Waverley". Generalizing, we see that
+the proposition
+а = (гХ) (фх)
+is one which may be true or may be false, but is never merely trivial, like a = a;
+whereas, if (1x)(фx) were a proper name, a = (1x)(фx) would necessarily be either false
+or the same as the trivial proposition a = a. We may express this by saying that
+a = (1x)(фx) is not a value of the propositional function a = y, from which it follows
+that (1x)(фx) is not a value of y. But, since y may be anything, it follows that (1x)(фх)
+is nothing. Hence, since in use it has meaning, it must be an incomplete symbol.
+It might be suggested that "Scott is the author of Waverley" asserts that "Scott"
+and "the author of Waverley" are two names for the same object. But a little
+reflection will show that this would be a mistake. For if that were the meaning of
+"Scott is the author of Waverley", what would be required for its truth would be
+that Scott should have been called the author of Waverley: if he had been so called,
+the proposition would be true, even if some one else had written Waverley; while, if
+no one called him so, the proposition would be false, even if he had written Waverley.
+But in fact he was the author of Waverley at a time when no one called him so, and
+he would not have been the author if every one had called him so but some one else
+had written Waverley. Thus the proposition "Scott is the author of Waverley" is
+not a proposition about names, like "Napoleon is Bonaparte"; and this illustrates the
+sense in which "the author of Waverley" differs from a true proper name.
+1 See Whitehead and Russell 1910, pp. 31-32 [or 1925, pp. 30-31].
+
+219
+Thus all phrases (other than propositions) containing the word the (in the singular)
+are incomplete symbols: they have a meaning in use, but not in isolation. For "the
+author of Waverley" cannot mean the same as "Scott", or "Scott is the author of
+Waverley" would mean the same as "Scott is Scott", which it plainly does not; nor
+can "the author of Waverley" mean anything other than "Scott"
+', or "Scott is the
+author of Waverley" would be false. Hence " the author of Waverley" means nothing.
+It follows from the above that we must not attempt to define " (1x)(фx)"
+, but must
+define the uses of this symbol, that is, the propositions in whose symbolic expression
+it occurs. Now in seeking to define the uses of this symbol, it is important to observe
+the import of propositions in which it occurs. Take as an illustration: "The author
+of Waverley was a poet'. This implies (1) that Waverley was written, (2) that it was
+written by one man, and not in collaboration, (3) that the one man who wrote it was
+a poet. It any one of these fails, the proposition is false. Thus "the author of
+'Slawkenburgius on Noses' was a poet" is false, because no such book was ever
+written; "the author of "The Maid's Tragedy' was a poet" is false, because this play
+was written by Beaumont and Fletcher jointly. These two possibilities of falsehood
+do not arise if we say "Scott was a poet". Thus our interpretation of the uses of
+(1x)(фx) must be such as to allow for them. Now taking ox to replace "x wrote
+Waverley", it is plain that any statement apparently about (1x)(фx) requires (1)
+(Нх). (фх) and (2) ф.фу.Ix. y X=Y; here (1) states that at least one object satisfies
+фх, while (2) states that at most one object satisfies ox. The two together are equivalent
+to
+(Пс): фх. =x.X = C,
+which we defined as
+Е!(1x)(фх).
+Thus "E! must must be part of what is affirmed by any proposition about (1x)(фх).
+If our proposition is fí(x)(ox)}, what is further affirmed is fc, if ox. Ex. x = c. Thus
+we have
+К(1x)(x)}.=: (IC):ф. =x. x = C:J Dt,
+that is, "the x satisfying ox satisfies fx" is to mean: "There is an object c such that
+ox is true when, and only when, x is c, and fe is true"
+, or, more exactly: "There is a
+c such that 'ox' is always equivalent to 'x is c' and fc". In this, "(x)(ox)" has completely disappeared; thus "(1x)(фx)" is merely symbolic, and does not directly
+represent an object, as single small Latin letters are assumed to do.?
+The proposition "a = (1x)(фж)" is easily shown to be equivalent to "ox. =x.x = a".
+For, by the definition, it is
+(Пс): Фх. Ex.x = с: а = с,
+that is, "there is a c for which ox. =x. x = c, and this c is a", which is equivalent to
+"фх.=x.x =a". Thus "Scott is the author of Waverley" is equivalent to
+"a wrote Waverley' is always equivalent to 'x is Scott'",
+that is, "x wrote Waverley" is true when x is Scott and false when x is not Scott.
+2 We shall generally write "f(x)(ox)" rather than "J {(x)(x)} " in future.
+
+220
+Thus, although "(x)(x)" has no meaning by itself, it may be substituted for y in
+any propositional function fy, and we get a significant proposition, though not a
+value of fy.
+When f{(1x)(фx)}, as above defined, forms part of some other proposition, we shall
+say that (1x)(фx) has a secondary occurrence. When (1x)(px) has a secondary occurrence, a proposition in which it occurs may be true even when (1x)(фx) does not exist.
+This applies, for example, to the proposition: "There is no such person as the King of
+France"
+. We may interpret this as
+~{E! (1X)(фX)}
+or as
+~ {(Ec). C = (фx)},
+if "ox" stands for "x is King of France". In either case, what is asserted is that a
+proposition p in which (1x)(фx) occurs is false, and this proposition p is thus part of
+a larger proposition. The same applies to such a proposition as the following: "If
+France were a monarchy, the King of France would be of the House of Orleans".
+It should be observed that such a proposition as
+is ambiguous; it may deny f{(1x)(ox)}, in which case it will be true if (1x)(фx) does not
+exist, or it may mean
+(Нс): Фх. =x.X = с:~ fC,
+in which case it can be true only if (1x)(фx) exists. In ordinary language, the latter
+interpretation would usually be adopted. For example, the proposition "the King of
+France is not bald" would usually be rejected as false, being held to mean "the King
+of France exists and is not bald"
+', rather than "it is false that the King of France
+exists and is bald". When (1x)(фx) exists, the two interpretations of the ambiguity
+give equivalent results; but, when (x)(ox) does not exist, one interpretation is true
+and one is false. It is necessary to be able to distinguish these in our notation; and
+generally, if we have such propositions as
+4(2х) (фх) .J. Д,
+р.З. 4(1Х) (Фх),
+4(1) (фх) . І. Х(1X) (фх),
+and so on, we must be able by our notation to distinguish whether the whole or
+only part of the proposition concerned is to be treated as the "f(x)(x)" of our definition. For this purpose, we will put "[(x)(x)]" followed by dots at the beginning
+of the part (or whole) which is to be taken as f(x)(ox), the dots being sufficiently
+numerous to bracket off the f(1x)(фx); that is, f(x)(ox) is to be everything following
+the dots until we reach an equal number of dots not signifying a logical product, or
+a greater number signifying a logical product, or the end of the sentence, or the end
+of a bracket enclosing "[(x)(фх)]". Thus
+will mean
+
+221
+but
+will mean
+(Пс): фх.=x.х = с: гс.э. р.
+It is important to distinguish these two, for, if (1x)(фx) does not exist, the first is true
+and the second false. Again
+[(1Х) ФХ)]. ~ 4(1Х) (Фх)
+will mean
+(Fc): фх.=x.x =C:~ гс,
+while
+will mean
+Here again, when (rx)(фx) does not exist, the first is false and the second true.
+In order to avoid this ambiguity in propositions containing (1x)(px), we amend our
+definition, or rather our notation, putting
+By means of this definition, we avoid any doubt as to the portion of our whole
+asserted proposition which is to be treated as the "f(x)(ox)" of the definition. This
+portion will be called the scope of (1x)(px). Thus in
+[(1X)(фх] f(1x)(ф2) .2. p
+the scope of (1x)(фх) is f(1x)(ox); but in
+the scope is
+J (1x)(0x) .J. p;
+in
+the scope is f(1x)(фx); but in
+[(1х) (фх)]. ~f (12) (фх)
+the scope is
+It will be seen that, when (1x)(фx) has the whole of the proposition concerned for its
+scope, the proposition concerned cannot be true unless E! (1x)(фx); but, when (1x)(фх)
+has only part of the proposition concerned for its scope, it may often be true even when
+(1x)(фх) does not exist. It will be seen further that, when E! (1x)(x), we may enlarge
+or diminish the scope of (1x)(px) as much as we please without altering the truth
+value of any proposition in which it occurs.
+If a proposition contains two descriptions, say (1x)(фx) and (1x)(fx), we have to
+distinguish which of them has the larger scope, that is, we have to distinguish
+(1)
+
+222
+The first of these, eliminating (1x)(фx), becomes
+(3)
+(4)
+(5)
+(Нс): фх. = x. х = с: [(1) (1x)] F{c, (1x) (x)},
+which, eliminating (1x)(Jx), becomes
+(Hc):.*.=x. X=C:. (Hd): 4x. =x. x = c:f(c, d),
+and the same proposition results if, in (1), we eliminate first (1x)(4x) and then (1x)(фх).
+Similarly (2) becomes, when (1x) (ox) and (1x)(x) are eliminated,
+(Ed):ex.=xx=d:. (Hc):ф.=x. X= c:f(c, d).
+(4) and (5) are equivalent, so that the truth value of a proposition containing two
+descriptions is independent of the question which has the larger scope.
+It will be found that, in most cases in which descriptions occur, their scope is, in
+practice, the smallest proposition enclosed in dots or other brackets in which they
+are contained. Thus, for example,
+[(1) (фх)]. 4(1Х) (фх) І. [("Х) (фх)]- Х(1Х) (фх)
+will occur much more frequently than
+[(1Х) (фх)]: « (1х) (фх). J. Х(1Х) (фх).
+For this reason it is convenient to decide that, when the scope of an occurrence of
+(1x)(фх) is the smallest proposition, enclosed in dots or other brackets, in which the
+occurrence in question is contained, the scope need not be indicated by "[(x)(x)]".
+Thus, for example,
+pa=(2))
+will mean
+p.D. [(1х) (фх)]. а = (1) (фх) ;
+and
+р .J. (На). а = (1x) (фх)
+will mean
+and
+р.2. (Па) [(1x) (фх)]. a = (1x) (ф) ;
+p.J.а a # (фx)
+will mean
+but
+p.J. ~ {a= (1x)(Qx)}
+will mean
+р.J. ~{[(1X) (ФХ)]. а = (1х) (фх)}.
+This convention enables us, in the vast majority of cases that actually occur, to
+dispense with the explicit indication of the scope of a descriptive symbol; and it will
+be found that the convention agrees very closely with the tacit conventions of
+ordinary language on this subject. Thus, for example, if "(rx)(фx)" is "the so-and-
+sO",
+, "a # (1x)(фx)" is to be read "a is not the so-and-so"
+, which would ordinarily
+be regarded as implying that "the so-and-so" exists; but "~{a = (1x) (ox)} " is to be
+
+223
+read "it is not true that a is the so-and-so", which would generally be allowed to
+hold if "the so-and-so" does not exist. Ordinary language is, of course, rather loose
+and fluctuating in its implications on this matter; but, subject to the requirement of
+definiteness, our convention seems to keep as near to ordinary language as possible.
+In the case when the smallest proposition enclosed in dots or other brackets
+contains two or more descriptions, we shall assume, in the absence of any indication
+to the contrary, that one which typographically occurs earlier has a larger scope than
+one which typographically occurs later. Thus
+12)(9) = (1x)(21x)
+will mean
+(Нс): фх. = х. Х = С: [(1х) ({x)]. с = (12) (2x),
+while
+(1Х) (цх) = (1х) (фх)
+will mean
+(ud):/x.=xX=d: [(1x)(x)] (1x)(4x) = d.
+These two propositions are easily shown to be equivalent.
+
+A simplification of the logic of relations
+NORBERT WIENER
+(1914)
+Wiener obtained his doctorate
+at
+Harvard University in June 1913, with a
+hesis (1913) in which Schröder's
+system
+was compared with that of Whitehead
+and Russell. Harvard University then
+granted him a traveling fellowship, and
+from June 1913 till April 1914 he was in
+Cambridge, England, where he attended
+two courses by Bertrand Russell, one
+being a reading course on Principia
+mathematica. It is in these circumstances
+that he came to write the note below.
+This piece of work, as Wiener recalls
+(1953, p. 191), excited no particular
+approval on the part of Russell.
+Wiener's note was a communication to
+the Cambridge Philosophical Society; it
+was presented on 23 February 1914 by
+G. H. Hardy, with whom Wiener had
+taken a mathematics course and who
+came to greatly influence his mathematical training (1953, p. 190). By giving
+a definition of the ordered pair of two
+elements in terms of class operations,
+the note reduced the theory of relations
+to that of classes.
+Wiener introduces the dissymmetry between the two elements of an ordered
+pair by using the null set. At approximately the same time, Hausdorff (1914,
+p. 32) gave the definition of the ordered
+pair (a, b) as {a, 1}, {b, 2}}, where 1 and 2
+are two distinct objects different from a
+and b. A few years later Kuratowski
+(1921) offered a definition that has been
+widely used ever since, namely ‹a, bs, {a}}.
+The Wiener-Hausdorff-Kuratowski definition has the effect that the ordered
+pair has a type higher by 2 than that of
+the elements (when these are of the same
+type). Under certain set-theoretic assumptions this difference in type can be
+reduced to 1 or even to 0 (see Goodman
+1941, Quine 1945, and Schwabhäuser
+1954).
+The paper is reproduced here with the
+kind permission of Professor Wiener and
+the Cambridge Philosophical Society.
+Two axioms, known as the axioms of reducibility, are stated on page 174 of the first
+volume of Principia mathematica of Whitehead and Russell. One of these, *12.1, is
+essential to the treatment of identity, descriptions, classes, and relations; the other,
+*12-11, is involved only in the theory of relations. *12.11 is applied directly only in
+*20-701•702-703
+and
+*21•12•13-151•3-701-702-703.
+It states that, given any propositional function o of two variable individuals, there
+is another propositional function of two variable individuals, involving no apparent
+variables, and having the same truth value as o for the same arguments, or in symbols:
+:(If):Ф(xY).=.f! (X, Y).
+
+THE LOGIC OF RELATIONS
+225
+In *20 and *21•701•702•703 all that is done with *12.11 is to extend it to cases
+where the arguments of o and fare classes and relations; *12.11 is essential to the
+development of the calculus of relations only owing to its application in *21•12-13•151.3.
+Here it is needed to make the transition between the definition of a binary relation
+and its uses. This is due to the fact that a binary relation itself is not defined, but
+only propositions about it, and *12.11 is needed to assure us that these propositions
+about it behave as if there were a real object with which they concern themselves.
+The authors of Principia wish to treat a binary relation as the extension of a propositional function of two variables; that is, when they speak about the relation
+between x and y when p(x, y), they mean to speak of any propositional function
+which holds of those values of x and y, and only those values, of which o holds.
+Now, as it leads one into vicious-circle paradoxes to speak directly of "any propositional function which holds of those values of x and y, and those only, of which o
+holds", they first define a proposition concerning the relation between x and y when
+9(X, Y) as a proposition concerning a propositional function involving no apparent
+variables which holds of x and y when and only when p(x, y). Then they need to use
+*12-11 to assure us that, whatever o may be, there always is some such propositional
+function. Now, if we can discover a propositional function f of one variable so correlated with o that its extension is determined uniquely by that of 4, and vice versa
+—if, to put it in symbols, when y' bears to o' the same relation that of bears to ,
+І:.Ф'(Х, Y) =х. y. Ф(x, Y) : =: 'a. =o: Ia-we can entirely avoid the use of *12.11 and
+interpret any proposition concerning the extension of o as if it concerned the extension
+of 4; for the existence of the extension of a propositional function of one variable is
+assured to us by *12-1, quite as that of one of two variables is by *12.11. Now,
+the propositional function
+is such a y. For it is clear that for each ordered pair of values of x and y there is one
+and only one value of a, and vice versa. On the one hand, as ‹ (‹ 'x u «A) is determined
+uniquely by x, and «ily is determined uniquely by y, «(xudA) Uddy is
+determined uniquely by x and y. On the other hand, if
+either diy = "izu«s or vly = «íw. The former supposition is clearly impossible,
+for, as i» ‡ A, «ízu«A is not a unit class. From the latter alternative we conclude
+immediately that y = w. Similarly, x = z.
+Therefore, when x and y are of the same type, we can make the following definition:
+It will be seen that in this definition of *ýq(x, y) it is essential that the x and the y
+should be of the same type, for if they are not «(xu «A) and ily will not be, and
+"(ix viA) uly Will be meaningless. To overcome this limitation and secure
+typical ambiguity for domain and converse domain of Kýq(x, y) separately, we make
+the following definitions:
+for ix may be defined directly as the class ý(y = x).
+ayay comod dia as as ho lion do a in Principia a 7, but it ely is not cireular,
+
+226
+WIENER
+and so forth,
+and so forth.
+Though these definitions may seem to conflict with one another, they really do not
+conflict, for where one of them is applicable, the others are meaningless, since they
+define relations between objects of different types. Moreover, it is easy to see that our
+definitions are so chosen that
+This is important, as we might easily have defined relations so that they might have
+several domains or converse domains of different types. This is why we did not define
+âý(a, Y) simply as
+for this would also represent
+аВ{(ПУ) ф(а, У) В = іУ}.
+It will be seen that what we have done is practically to revert to Schröder's treatment of a relation as a class of ordered couples. The complicated apparatus of is
+and A's of which we have made use is simply and solely devised for the purpose of
+constructing a class which shall depend only on an ordered pair of values of x and y,
+and which shall correspond to only one such pair. The particular method selected of
+doing this is largely a matter of choice; for example, I might have substituted V, or
+any other constant class not a unit class, and existing in every type of classes, in every
+place I have written A.
+Our changed definition of *ф(x, y) renders it necessary to give new definitions of
+several other symbols fundamental to the theory of relations. I give the following
+table of such definitions:
+Rel = к{к СХ (X = Х.У = У)}
+xRy.=.2û{z=x.w = Y} C R.Re Rel
+R.=. (Ha). a = R. a s Rel, фа
+(R). R :=: а = Rel. За- фа
+(HR). R:=. (Ha). a e Rel. pa
+Df.
+Df.
+Df.2
+Df.
+Df.
+2 We shall understand in this way any propositional functions containing capital letters in the
+positions proper to their arguments. Thus ~qR shall be understood as
+(Ia). a = R.as Rel. ~pa,
+and not as
+a = R. a = Rel. Ja. ~qa.
+We make this definition as well as the two following ones because a propositional function of i
+›lass of the sort we have defined as a relation may significantly take as arguments classes of th
+same type which are not relations, and we wish to define propositional functions of relations in
+such a manner as to require that their arguments be relations.
+
+THE LOGIC OF RELATIONS
+227
+The first two and the last two of these definitions replace *21•03•02 and *21•07.071
+respectively. From these definitions and the laws of the calculus of classes it is an
+exceedingly simple matter to deduce any of the propositions of *21 which are not
+explicitly used for the purpose of deriving the properties of relations from the particular definition of relations given there, and from this it is easy to prove that the
+formal properties of the objects I call relations are essentially the same as those of the
+relations of Principia.
+But it is obvious that since they are also classes, our relations will possess some
+formal properties not possessed by those of Principia. I give in conclusion a table of
+some of the more interesting of these:
+F.RUS = RUN
++RnS = RAS
+I:RCS.=. RES
++.R-S.=.R -S
+1. VCV
++.1 = 1
+r. Rel C Cls
+r: Rpk.=. Rpk
+1: Rsk .=. Rsk
+r.ax osmars.
+
+On possibilities in the calculus of relatives
+LEOPOLD LÖWENHEIM
+(1915)
+Löwenheim's paper deals with prob- mains 1?, 13,... are the Cartesian prolems connected with the validity, in ducts 1 × 11,11 x 11 × 11
+different domains, of formulas of the
+...
+A binary relative coefficient, dij, defirst-order predicate calculus and with
+notes the proposition stating that a
+various aspects of the reduction and the
+certain property holds of the ordered
+decision problems. All these topics had
+pair (i, j). (The calculus suffers from the
+remained alien to the trend that had
+ambiguities inherent in the "algebra of
+by then become dominant in logic, that
+logic" and due to the confusion between
+of Frege-Peano-Russell. In the following
+the class interpretation and the prodecades, however, these problems were to
+positional interpretation; in the paper
+come more and more into the foreground,
+below the binary relative coefficients in
+and the paper is now rightly considered
+fact play the role of predicate variables
+a pioneer work in logic.
+or constants provided with individual
+Löwenheim's work links up with that
+variables, like F(x, y) or x = y in conof Peirce and Schröder. The latter's
+temporary notation.) We write dig = bij
+treatise (1890, 1891, 1895), although
+if and only if both dij and bij hold or
+often prolix, followed lines that led to
+neither does. (The sign "=" is also used
+some of the problems treated here.
+for identity of individuals, as in i = j.)
+Löwenheim's paper uses Schröder's nota-
+The negation of ai, aij, holds if and only
+tion, today fallen into disuse (for a late
+if di; does not. The converse of dij, ăij, is
+defense of Schröderian see Löwenheim
+such that i = di. The sum dis + bi; is
+1940 and Bernays's comments (1940a)),
+the alternation dij V bij. The product
+and some explanations are perhaps in
+ai bij or aibij is the conjunetion
+order.
+ai; 1 bij. What in German is called
+The logic of relatives was introduced
+by Peirce (1870, 1880, 1882, 1883) and
+"Subsumption"
+, dij € bij, is the condicodified, more or less in agreement with
+The universal quantifier is denoted by
+what Peirce had done, by Schröder. A I and the existential by E. Several I, or
+basic domain of individuals, or universe
+I, can be replaced by one. IT is replaced
+of discourse, called Denkbereich and de.
+noted by I, contains at least one indivi.
+by t and so on. It is a multiple Il; !
+dual (for Löwenheim; two for Schröder is a simple П.
+—see footnote 2 below, p. 234); a it may
+A binary relative a is the set of ordered
+be finite or infinite and, if infinite, de-
+• Occasionally Löwenheim speaks of the
+numerable or not. Subscripts i, j, k, l,.
+domain of individuals as the domain of the first
+range over these individuals.
+The do-degree (erster Ordnung).
+
+SHE CALCULUS OF RELATIVES
+229
+pairs for which ai; holds. a = b if and the relative sum (some of these being
+only if air = bij for all ordered pairs (i, j).
+definable in terms of others). The singu-
+à is a relative such that (a)i; = dij. ă is
+lary predicate calculus of first order can,
+such that (ă)i; = ăi = aji. The identical
+as is well known, be translated into a
+sum, a +b, is such that (a +b)is = di;
+Boolean algebra of classes. The calculus
++ bij The identical product, a b, or ab, is
+such that (a.b)ij = dij bij.
+The relative
+of relations considered by Löwenheim
+can be regarded as an analogous algebra,
+product, a;b, is such that (a;b)i; =
+and the question arises whether the
+Edin'ni The relative sum, a + b, is such
+binary predicate calculus of first order
+that (a + b)is = I(ain + bni).
+can be translated into such a calculus of
+relations. Following Schröder (1895, p.
+We now define four relatives, 1, 0, I'
+550), Löwenheim calls a formula that is
+O', called modules (Moduln): 1 is such
+thus translatable a condensable formula,
+that lif holds of all ordered pairs (i, j),
+and he presents Korselt's result (comand 0 = 1; l' is such that lýj holds if and
+municated to him in a letter) that not
+only if i = j, and O' = T
+every formula is condensable. This result
+We can define n-ary relative coethwas subsequently sharpened by Tarski
+cients and relatives in a completely
+(1941, p. 89) and by Lyndon (1950). A
+analogous manner.
+more general calculus of relations (not
+The quantifiers I and I can range over
+necessarily binary) was presented by
+relatives also, but then letters other than
+Bernays (1957).
+г, j, k, l are used as subscripts. A formula
+Theorem 2, in §2, is the now famous
+that contains no such quantifier is what
+Löwenheim theorem. It states that, if a
+Löwenheim calls a Zählausdruck. In the
+finitely valid well-formed formula is not
+paper below (as well as in some other
+valid, it is not Xo-valid. By contraposition,
+papers in the present volume) this term
+we obtain the more customary formulahas been translated as first-order exprestion of the theorem (for the first-order
+sion, and since the relatives l' and O'
+predicate calculus with identity): If a
+are used, it should be understood as wellwell-formed formula is Xo-valid, it is valid,
+formed formula of the first-order predicate
+provided there is not some finite domain
+calculus with identity.
+in which it is invalid.
+In § 1 Löwenheim introduces a number
+A preliminary part of the proof conof definitions and symbols. In particular,
+sists in showing that, given a first-order
+an "identical equation" is a valid wellformula, one can obtain a formula that
+formed formula; a "fleeing equation" is
+has a certain normal form and is equiva-
+a formula that is not valid but is n-valid
+lent, so far as satisfiability is concerned,
+for every finite n; a "halting equation"
+to the given formula (there is a shift from
+is a formula that, for some finite n, is not
+validity to satisfiability because the for-
+n-valid.
+mula constitutes the left side of an equa-
+At the beginning of 82 Löwenheim
+tion whose right side is O, and to write
+deals with a calculus of relatives that
+that a formula is equal to 0 amounts to
+contains no individual variables, hence
+writing a negation sign in front of the
+no relative coefficients and no quantiformula). The formula in normal form
+fiers. The relative product and relative
+contains existential quantifiers, universal
+sum
+permit this
+elimination of the
+quantifiers, and a quantifier-free expresquantifiers. The calculus thus obtained
+sion, in that order. It is the left side of
+contains variables and constants for
+(3) below, on page 237. Outwardly, it
+binary relations, and the operations are
+resembles a formula in Skolem normal
+the Boolean operations, together with
+form. There is an essential difference,
+the converse, the relative product, and
+however. In Löwenheim's normal form the
+
+230
+number of existential quantifiers depends as expressing the existence of a value of
+on the number of individuals in the k; for each i. But, now, we can adopt a
+Denkbereich. For domains of different
+convention
+that is more natural than
+cardinalities, the original formula is re-
+Löwenheim's and regard
+the twofold
+placed by different formulas; for infinite
+sigma as ranging over functions from indomains there are infinitely many quantidividuals of 1' to individuals of I1. If we
+fiers, and the formula is replaced by what
+change "i" to "x", "K" to "Y"
+the
+now is sometimes called an infinitely long
+fleeing subscript "K," to "f(x)"
+", "="
+expression, which no longer
+satisfies
+to"="
+, and use the notation now current
+Löwenheim's own definition of Zählausfor quantifiers, (I) becomes
+druck ("I and I occur only a finite
+number of times", p. 232 below). Löwen-
+(II) (x)(Ey) A (x, y) = (Ef)(x) A (x, f(x)).
+heim obtains his normal form by com-
+The right side of (II), just like that of (I)
+muting a universal and an existential
+above, is not a Zählausdruck; it is a wellquantifier through a procedure that he
+formed formula of a second-order prediborrows from Schröder (1895, pp. 513-
+cate calculus. But, since Löwenheim is
+517). This yields, on page 236 below, the
+dealing with the satisfiability of the
+equivalence
+formula, the initial existential quantifier
+can be discarded, and the problem is
+(I)
+i k
+in which Ai is quantifier-free, I is a
+universal quantifier, k; is a "fleeing subscript" (in fact, a function of i), and the
+twofold sigma represents a (not necessarily finite, not even necessarily denumerably infinite) "string" of existential quantifiers; 1 ranges over the
+individuals of the domain I', and
+stands for
+reduced to that of the satisfiability of the
+formula
+(III)
+(X) A (x, J (X)),
+which is again a Zählausdruck. This
+shows that Löwenheim's normal form
+does not correspond to Skolem's normal
+form, but to the universal closure of the
+functional form for satisfiability (see
+below, p. 508). The fleeing subscripts, just
+like the "Skolem functions"
+, allow the
+[X..
+k1 k2 k3
+with as many sigmas as there are individuals in the domain 14. For example, for
+a domain of two individuals the right side
+of (I) becomes
+elimination of the existential quantifiers.
+Since the formula is again of finite length,
+Löwenheim has taken, according to
+Skolem (below, p. 293), a detour through
+the transfinite.
+During this detour an
+argument that justifies the equivalence
+(I), or (II), in the case of a finite domain
+is—unwarrantedly-extended to the case
+k1 kz
+of an infinite domain. But this could easily
+and for a domain of X, individuals it have been avoided, for instance by the
+becomes
+2 2 2...А1к1 4242А3к3...
+К1 k2 kз
+The example presented by Löwenheim on
+page 237 should help the reader to follow
+the method.
+The twofold sigma is to be regarded as
+a "string" of a existential quantifiers (a
+being the cardinal number of 1), hence
+use of the axiom of choice. (A few paragraphs below we shall see that Löwenheim, when he wants to establish the law
+of infinite conjunction, again unjustifiably extends an argument from the finite
+to the infinite case.)
+At this point Löwenheim considers that
+he has reduced the question of the validity of an arbitrary first-order equation
+to that of the satisfiability of a formula
+
+231
+F, where F is quantifier-free. The proof there exists, for each i, a PI", to be called
+proceeds by arguments that were
+li and an assignment of truth values
+subsequently used by Skolem, Herbrand,
+such that di is truth-functionally true
+and Gödel. If IF contains individual
+under the assignment. At this point of
+constants or free variables, an initial dohis argument Löwenheim concludes, from
+main (here called C1, a notation not used
+the existence of a li for each i, to the
+by Löwenheim and in fact borrowed from
+satisfiability of IF (hence to the non-
+Herbrand) is assumed to consist of indivalidity of F = 0) in the (denumerable)
+viduals corresponding to them; otherunion of the Oj. His line of reasoning is
+wise, C, consists of an arbitrary indivithat, since for each i some assignment
+dual. For every assignment of individuals
+makes Qi equal to 1 (which, in the Booleof C, to the productation subscripts of F
+Schröder notation, means that it is true),
+in IF, that is, the subscripts of II,
+there is an assignment such that the inindividuals are introduced for the fleeing
+finite product Q18283... is equal to 1.
+subscripts of F. These individuals to-
+Löwenheim writes: "Now, for those
+gether with those of Ci form Cz. When
+values of the summation subscripts whose
+the productation subscripts of f range
+substitution yielded 01, Qz, O3, ..., ПЕ
+over C2, new individuals are again introis = Q122l3..., hence = 1." What has
+duced for the fleeing subscripts of F, and
+to be proved is that, from the assignwe obtain Ci. And so forth. The ni
+ments thus obtained for all i, there can
+possible assignments of individuals of C1
+be formed one assignment such that F
+to the productation subscripts of f are
+is true, that is, HE = O is false. This
+ordered according to some rule, with the
+Löwenheim does not do. The missing step
+condition that, for 1 ≤ a < i, no assignis what Quine (1955a) calls the law of
+ment entirely in GuCzu...uCa
+, folinfinite conjunction, which, incidentally,
+lows any assignment that contains an
+is graphically represented by Löwenelement of Ca+1 u... UC;. Let Fl be the
+heim's (unproved) formula
+result of replacing the productation subscripts of F by the ith such assignment,
+1 = 212293... ad infinitum.
+and let P; be defined as follows:
+The first application that Löwenheim
+makes of his theorem is to the Boolean
+calculus of classes. Schröder's "Gebiete-
+P2 = PIA FLA... ^ E22,
+kalkul" had been codified by Eugen
+Müller in his edition of some of Schröder's
+manuscripts (Schröder 1909, 1910), and
+the calculus, under the name of "algebra
+To take identity in account,' we now
+assign to each equation do = aB, where
+au and as are elements of Ci+1, the value
+"true"
+or the value "false"
+• For any
+such system of equations, the relatives l'
+and O' can now be evaluated in Pi, and
+we call the result Pj. Performing the
+operation for all possible such systems of
+equations, we obtain Pi, P", ..., P,S,.
+We now assign truth values to the
+atomic parts of the FY. If, for some i and
+every such assignment, the alternation
+P! v P" V ... V Pj, is truth-functionally false, MF = O is valid. Otherwise,
+of logic", had been studied by Huntington (1904) and Couturat (1905). (The
+precise formulation and interpretation of
+the calculus vary from author to author;
+for Löwenheim's see Löwenheim 1910.)
+It is interesting to note that, although
+this calculus is a very small fragment of
+set theory, Löwenheim's application of
+b Löwenheim deals directly with the predicate calculus
+with identity. Compare
+his
+method with that of Gödel (1930a), who first
+settles the case of the pure calculus and then
+deals with identity by means of an entirely new
+argument.
+
+232
+his theorem to it somewhat foreshadows the decision problem for the singulary
+Skolem's paradoxical result in 1922 conpredicate calculus of first order with
+cerning Zermelo's set theory (see below,
+identity. The proof of this result was
+p. 295). (Löwenheim's criticism of Hungreatly simplified by Skolem (1919) and
+tington's work (below, p. 242) is hardly
+Behmann (1922). § 4 presents the reducjustified; this work was important on
+tion of the decision problem for the firstaccount of the methods used as well as
+order predicate calculus to that of its
+the results obtained.) The end of §2
+binary fragment. Herbrand (1931) and
+shows Löwenheim wrestling with the
+Kalmár (1932, 1934, 1936) sharpened
+startling consequences of his theorem for
+Löwenheim's result and used simpler
+set theory; these difficulties were settled
+methods.
+much later, after the work of Skolem,
+The translation is by Stefan Bauer-
+Gödel, and others.
+Mengelberg, and it is printed here with
+§ 3 contains the (positive) solution of the kind permission of Springer Verlag.
+81. DEFINITIONS
+We put
+lijk = lis + Lik + like,
+and, in general,
+Otjkz•.. = Oi,2;11•...
+We could, moreover, also put
+like...
+and similarly, by duality, for O", O'',....
+Then we would have, for example,
+Lijk = 0.
+Lüsk and Ofjk can perhaps be important, but they will not be used in the present
+paper.
+Let us note in passing that the definition of a' follows from the expansion theorem :
+á= a.l'+à.O'.
+In what follows we shall always understand by relative expression [| Relativausdruck]
+an expression that is formed from relatives or (not necessarily binary) relative
+coefficients and in which I and I occur only a finite number of times, each & or I
+ranging either over the subscripts—that is, over all individuals of the domain of the
+first degree, which, following Schröder, we call I'—or over all relatives that can be
+formed by means of this domain. All sums and products that do not range over the
+individuals of 1' or over all the relatives are assumed to be finite and will always be
+denoted by + or by • (or the juxtaposition of factors) and never by & or by I.
+Equating two relative expressions yields a relative equation [| Relativgleichung], which
+
+233
+we shall always think of as brought into zero form. All important problems of mathematies and of the calculus of logic can, it seems, be reduced to questions about] such
+relative equations.
+A relative expression in which every I and I ranges over the subscripts, that is,
+over the individuals of 1' (in other words, none ranges over the relatives), will be
+called a first-order expression [Zählausdruck]. By equating two such expressions we
+obtain a first-order equation [Zählgleichung]. An example of such an equation is
+or, condensed, that is, transformed into an equation between relatives, not relative
+coefficients,
+0 = 0
+To condense a relative expression means to transform it so that no I or I occurs
+any longer. For example, Janons, when condensed, yields (a; b)u-
+A relative equation can be
+(a) An identical equation;
+(6) A fleeing equation [Fluchtgleichung], that is, an equation that is not satisfied
+in every 1 but is satisfied in every finite 1' (or, more explicitly, an equation that is not
+identically satisfied but is satisfied whenever the summation or productation subscripts run through a finite 1);
+(c)
+A halting equation [Haltgleichung], that is, one that is not even satisfied in every
+finite 11 for arbitrary values of the subscripts.
+§2. FIRST-ORDER EQUATIONS
+THEOREM 1. There are uncondensable equations, for example,
+2 Onijk = 0 or1,
+h.i.j,k
+"Onijk = 0 or 1
+h.l.j.k.l
+•
+hence there certainly are uncondensable first-order expressions.
+By means of the examples above, Korselt proved the theorem (except for unessential gaps) in a letter to me, and he noted in addition that the following can be
+condensed:
+2Oi; = O into O'= 0,
+2 Oíin = O into O'(0'; 0) = 0.
+i.j.k
+Also, we have?
+[Oi; = (1; 0'; 1),
+I Oíin = [1; 0(0'; 0'); 1].
+1,j.k
+1 [In the original the right side of each of the two equations that follow has i and j as subscripts,
+which is an error.]
+
+234
+So far as the equation
+E Onisk = 0
+n.t.j.k
+is concerned, however, it is easy to see that it is a halting equation that is satisfied
+if and only if 1' contains at most three elements. The equation
+therefore asserts in words "11 contains at least four elements". Similarly,
+asserts "I' contains at most four elements", and so on.
+If now the equations in Theorem 1 could be condensed, then, after they were
+condensed and brought into zero form, on the left side there would occur no relative
+coefficient but merely the "modules"
+', 1, 0, 1', and O', connected by means of some of
+the six logical operations +, , +, ;;
+, and ". Negation and conversion can always
+be performed on module expressions; thus we can see to it that only the connectives
++,', t, and; occur on the left side.
+The expression on the left side could then be computed by means of Schröder's
+"abacus of relatives" (1895, pp. 122-123, (13)-(19)).
+But now we have (see (19)):
+0'; 0=
+0 = 0' if 1 consists of one element,
+l'
+1
+if 11 consists of two elements,
+if 1' consists of more than two elements.
+Also, and here Schröder errs,? we have
+1; 0 = 0;1 =
+if 1' consists of one element,
+I1 if I' consists of more than one element.
+Similarly, by duality, for I' † l'and O † I', which is = 1' + O.
+The remaining module connectives are independent of the number of elements in 1'.
+Therefore, whenever a connective is applied to two modules in a I' of three elements,
+the result is exactly the same as in one of four elements. Hence, when the left side is
+computed, the final result must be the same for a 11 of three elements as for one of
+four elements; if, therefore, the equation obtained by condensation is satified in a 11
+of three elements, it is also satisfied in one of four elements. Thus it cannot have
+resulted by mere transformation (condensation) of the equations in Theorem 1, since
+for these the opposite is the case.
+Schröder (1895, p. 551) declares that condensation can always be performed; but
+to carry it out he employs the formula ax = (ř; a; Mi;, in which the elements of 11
+2 [It is true that Schröder (1895, p. 123) gives 1; 0' = O'; 1 = 1 without any condition. But on
+page 5 of the same volume he states that the domains he will consider have more than one element
+and that "this assumption is requisite for the validity of almost all the theorems of the theory".]
+
+235
+are interpreted as relatives. If we consider this admissible, however, condensation
+becomes such a trivial matter that it does not deserve the name and is utterly worthless.
+I should like to take this opportunity to remark that the condition that the system
+a contain at most three elements can be written more clearly than in Schröder if we
+use the form
+n.i.j,k
+That Schröder's attempted condensation of the condition is impossible follows from
+the preceding if we set a = 1. We can similarly express the condition that the system
+a possess at most 4, 5, ... elements. "The system a possesses at least three elements"
+is expressed by
+I can +à; +à, + I'nis) = 0,
+n.t.j
+and the conjunction of the last two equations asserts that the system a contains
+exactly three elements.
+THEOREM 2. If the domain is at least denumerably infinite, it is no longer the case that
+a first-order fleeing equation is satisfied for arbitrary values of the relative coefficients.
+For the proof we think of the equation as brought into zero form. We prove first
+that every first-order equation can be brought into a certain normal form, which is
+given on page 237 under (3). First we try to see to it that no I or I ever occurs under a
+(simple or multiple) I. If we assume that a productand contains at least one I! or
+I [which may be • or +, respectively, as a special case], we can distinguish four
+cases:
+1. The productand is a • product. We can eliminate such a product by using the
+formula
+ПА,В, = ПАДВ
+(In particular, for example, we have I^;B,O, = HA¡B¡i)
+2. The productand is a IT product (say IA, where the An are functions of relative
+coefficients). Then I can be extricated from the productand by means of the formula
+1(ПАік) = ПАік•
+і к
+3. The productand is a † sum, hence something like, say,
+A + B + Ct ... not ad infinitum.
+Here we distinguish two subcases:
+(a) One or several of the A, B,... are (• or I) products. This case can be reduced
+3 [Following Peirce, Schröder (1895, p. 25) treats elements as relatives by introducing the
+definition
+ікз = lik.
+With this definition condensation can always be carried out, but the interesting point, that the
+value of a condensable expression is independent of the cardinality (beyond 2) of the domain, is
+no longer correct.]
+
+236
+to Case 1 or Case 2 by means of the formula a + be = (a + b)(a + c), that is, by
+what we may call "adding out"
+(6) None of the A, B,... is a product. Indeed, a + sum cannot be one if the A,
+B,... are really the last summands into which the productand can be decomposed
+without the use of 2. Therefore each of the A, B, ... is either a (negated or unnegated)
+relative coefficient or a I. If all of these summands are relative coefficients, we have
+already reached our goal; but if, for example,
+then the productand can be written in the form
+L (Aik + Bix + C+...),
+which reduces this case to Case 4.
+4. The productand is a 2 sum. Then our task consists in transforming the IZ into
+a ZII, that is, in multiplying out the product. This is done by means of the formula
+ПДАН = Д^ПАік
+Here the k, under the 2 means that k, is to run through all subscripts, that is, through
+all elements of 1', and the 1 on the right of the 2 means that each of the k, is to run
+through these subscripts, hence that we have an n-fold sum if 11 possesses n elements
+(where n can also denote a transfinite cardinality). The A are functions of (not
+necessarily binary) relative coefficients.
+In order to make the formula above more intelligible, I want once to expand in
+part the I and I that occur in it, that is, I want to use the symbol + and juxtaposition (or dots) for these in one exceptional case here (contrary to the stipulation
+on page 232). I shall denote the subscripts by 1, 2, 3,.... Then the formula reads
+M(Ai1 + Aiz + Ais +... =
+к1. К2. Кз....
+A1K1A 2k243k3
+...А1к А2к2А3к3"...
+K1=1,2,3.... Kz=1,2,3.... кз = 1,2,3,..
+In case a multiple 2 is preceded by a multiple I our formula must be generalized as
+follows :
+ПП А...к... =
+Ail'.. 11... '11......
+і.ї'.... k.K'....
+Kil....
+By means of the procedure described in Cases 1-4 every E and I can be removed
+from the factor step by step. In this process it may very well happen that the transformation given in Case 4 must be applied several times in succession, and we still
+want to indicate how this is done:
+ПДПДАп = ПД ДПАп = Д ДкП Aninklen"
+That we do not have to write lan) instead of lun is, to be sure, unessential for the
+course of the proof; but I want to make it clear nevertheless by expanding the
+formula for a 11 with only two elements, 1 and 2, again exceptionally using the +
+
+237
+and juxtaposition (contrary to the stipulation on page 232). Also I shall write (hikl)
+for short in place of Aniki
+ПZПZ(hikl) = П2[(hil1)(hi21) + (hill)(hi22) + (hil2)(hi21) + (hi12)(hi22)]
+=[/111)(/121)+(h111)(k122) + (h112)(2121) + (h112)(h122)
++ (h211)(h221) + (h211)(h222) + (h212)(h221) + (h212)(h222)]
+p.arsku=1,2(p1r)(1023)(292t)(2924).
+For 1' = (1, 2, 3) we obtain
+1s-/21.1133=12(44,1/2)16,2l12)(11,3413) /2igll21) (2iz2l22) 2103/23)
+(Зіз|/з1) (3232132) (3i33l33).
+After the productands have all been freed from I and I, it remains only to remove
+all parentheses that do not immediately follow a I or I and to multiply out the
+products of the I. This is done by means of the formula
+44,4В, = 1KA,Вк)
+and similarly in the case of multiple sums.
+In exactly the same way a I can also be multiplied by another, or by a I, and
+likewise for multiple sums.
+The final result is an equation of the form
+(1)
+C + ID, + SDz+... not ad infinitum
++ IE1 + IEz + ... not ad infinitum
++ 211f1 + If + not ad infinitum = 0,
+where the sums and products will in general be multiple ones and the C, Du, Ev, and
+F, are identical functions of relative coefficients without I or I. In our example of
+page 233 we obtain, by means of the transformations sketched,
+ka i.j.h
+Now in (1), to begin with, we can see to it that exactly the same summation subscripts occur under each of the 2 by merely adding any missing ones (since La, = Lai).
+To the terms without I we can simply add a I (since a = La). Thereupon we can
+combine all 2 into a single 2 (since ça, + 40, = {(a, + 0,)). We obtain an equation
+of the following form:
+2(Fo + IF, + IIF≥ + ..• not ad infinitum) = 0
+or, added out according to the formula a, + I, = I (a, + b,),
+LI(F + F1 + F2t... not ad infinitum) = 0,
+or, for short,
+(3)
+СП = 0.
+
+238
+If we now want to decide whether or not (3) is identically satisfied in some domain,
+then in our discussion we can omit the & and examine the equation
+(4)
+ПЕ = 0,
+or, in our example,
+n.i.j
+For, after all, that this equation be identically satisfied means nothing but that it be
+satisfied for arbitrary values of (z and) I, as well as of the k; (that is, of k1, kz,...).
+But the omitted I did not assert anything else, either, and was therefore superfluous,
+at least for us. (It would have been better to omit all 2 already in (1) and, likewise,
+in our example of page 233 to omit the I before transforming the formuli into normal
+form, but not the 2 in that example and in general no 2 that occurs under a M, since
+for such a 2 the considerations above do not hold.)
+A can contain three kinds of subscripts:
+(i) Constant subscripts, that is, such as must always be the same in every factor
+of the I (I in our example); let us denote them, in some order, by the numbers 1, 2,
+...,n; hence we put l = 1 in our example;
+(ii) Productation subscripts (i, j, and k in our example); they run through all
+elements of the domain independently of one another, so that to every system of
+values for these subscripts there corresponds a factor of the M, and conversely;
+(iii) Fleeing subscripts (like k; in our example, as well as in and Ion on page 236);
+their subsubscripts (i, h, or k and h, respectively) are productation subscripts, and
+the fleeing subscripts are (not necessarily one-to-one) functions of their subsubscripts;
+that is, lon, for example, denotes one and the same element in all those factors of I
+in which the productation subscripts k and h have the same values (but lon does not
+necessarily denote different elements in other factors).
+Now of the factors of the I in (4) we first write down only all those in which no
+productation subscript has any value other than the values 1, 2,..., n defined above
+under (i), or, if constant subscripts are lacking, we take any element of the domain,
+denote it by 1, and write down the factor in which all productation subscripts have
+the value 1. In this case we put n = 1. But in F there will also occur fleeing subscripts, say
+гj, Kim.....
+In each of the factors written down so far, j, l, m, ..., being productation subscripts,
+have as their values some of the numbers 1, 2, ..., n; hence in these factors we shall
+have as fleeing subscripts
+ig, iz,..., in, K11, K12, K21,..., Knns....
+These are no longer functions of subscripts but denote quite specific elements, which
+we shall denote, again in some order, by the numbers n + 1, n + 2,...,n. (Let us
+remark expressly that two elements denoted by distinct numbers taken
+• among
+1,..., ny are not assumed to be either equal or distinct.)
+The product written down thus far we call P1. Hence in our example we would
+have
+P1=Z11211 † 211 † 111221 = Z11721•
+
+239
+(Here we were permitted to put 111 = 1; but, if l'í2 had occurred, we would not have
+been permitted to set it equal to 0, since it is not being assumed, after all, that 2
+denotes an element different from that denoted by 1. Rather, we would have had to
+let 112 stand.)
+F will certainly vanish identically in every domain if P1 does, that is, if P1
+vanishes when all elements 1, 2,..., ny are mutually distinct as well as when arbitrarily many equations hold among them. In order to see whether this is the case, we
+go through all these possibilities; thus we form from P1 all those (finitely many)
+specializations Pi, Pi, Pï,... that we obtain when we introduce arbitrarily many
+or few equations among the elements 1, 2, .., n, (and then in the course of this the
+relative coefficients of l' and O' are evaluated, too).
+Therefore, if all Pl vanish identically, (4) is identically satisfied. If not, we now
+write down, in addition to the factors of IF already included in P1, all those that
+are not yet included in P1 and in which no productation subscript has a value other
+than a number from 1 to ny. The resulting product (which, therefore, will also contain the old factors of PI) we call Pz. In Pz the fleeing subscripts i;, kms... will have
+the values
+21, і2,..., ing, kid, k1z, kz1,..., Knуnд...;
+of these we denote by the numbers n, + 1, ny + 2,...,nz those that are not already
+denoted by some number. (We do not assume of these, either, that they represent
+mutually distinct elements or elements that differ from the old ones.)
+If in our example we write for short «d instead of zxx, we have
+P2=P(11 + 12 + 112(12 + 11 + 121(12 + 12 + 122(21 + 21 + 111)
+(21 + 22 + 112)(22 + 21 + 121)(22 + 22 + 1'22)12.32
+= P1(21 + 22 + 112)12.32 = (22 + 112) • 11.12.21.32.
+Now in Pz (as before in P1) the subscripts used are taken as either equal to or distinct
+from each other in every conceivable way. The products thus resulting from Pa we
+call
+Pz, Pź, P2,....
+If they all vanish, equation (4) is identically satisfied. If not, we form Ps by writing
+down all the factors of IF in which the productation subscripts lie between 1 and
+No. We call the new fleeing subscripts na + 1, nz + 2,.... nz.
+In our example we have
+Рз = (22 † 112)(23 + 1í3)(22 + 23 + 123)(31 + 112)(31 + 33 + 11a)(33 + 123)
+• 11. 12. 13•21•32•43.
+By taking the subscripts as either equal or distinct we now form
+Рз, Рз, Р,..
+And so forth. Since at this point it is easy to describe how, starting from Pn, we form
+Pn+1, as well as P'n+1, Pn+1, Pn+I,..., the denumerably infinite sequence of the Px
+is to be regarded as defined herewith, and likewise the Px.
+
+240
+If for some « (hence also for all succeeding ones) all P. vanish, the equation is
+identically satisfied. If they do not all vanish, then the equation is no longer satisfied in the denumerable domain of the first degree just constructed. For then among
+Pj, P", P',... there is at least one Q1 that occurs in infinitely many of the nonvanishing Py as a factor (since, after all, each of the infinitely many nonvanishing
+PIV contains one of the finitely many Pl as a factor). Furthermore, among P2,
+Pr, P",... there is at least one Q2 that contains Q1 as a factor and occurs in infinitely
+many of the nonvanishing PV as a factor (since each of the infinitely many nonvanishing P"' that contain Q1 as a factor contains one of the finitely many Py as
+a factor). Likewise, among P3, P, P'",... there is at least one 03 that contains Q2
+as a factor and occurs in infinitely many of the nonvanishing Py as a factor. And so
+forth.
+Every Q, is =1; therefore we also have
+1 = 212283... ad infinitum.
+But now, for those values of the summation* subscripts whose substitution yielded
+Q1, 22. 93... Fis =@12293.., hence = 1. Therefore IF does not vanish identically. Hence equation (4) is no longer satisfied even in a denumerable domain.
+Q.e.d.
+Application: All questions concerning the dependence or independence of Schröder's,
+Müller's, or Huntington's class axioms [Gebietsaxiome] are decidable (if at all) already
+in a denumerable domain.
+The axiom systems for the class calculus [Gebietekalkül] of Schröder, Müller, and
+others can be written as relative equations if we let the domain of the first degree 11
+consist of all classes and denote the relation "sub" between two classes by a relative, s.
+(Thus we must carefully distinguish here between the relations of inclusion, addition,
+and so forth for the classes, on the one hand, and the relations for the relative coefficients on the other. The former inclusion, "a sub b", will be denoted by sao = 1, the
+latter, say "Sao sub sca", by sab € Sca.)
+Müller's axioms (I)-(V), namely,
+(I)
+a € al,
+(II)
+(TII)
+(a€b)(b€C) € (a€c),
+(a €b)(6€a) = (a =b),
+(IV x)
+0 € a,
+(IV +)
+a €1,
+(V)
+1#0,
+yield, if in them we write n for 0 and e for 1 to avoid confusion,
+(I)
+Saa = 1,
+(II)
+Sabibe € Sacs
+(III)
+Saboba = labs
+(IV x)
+Sna = 1,
+(IV +)
+Sae = 1,
+(V)
+Sen = 0.
+* [The "summation subscripts" are those that should be attached to 2 in (3); they are in fact
+the free variables of ПF.]
+
+241
+But, since the axioms are to hold for arbitrary a, b, and c, we should still prefix I,
+.!, o" b to them and, in addition, I and I to (IVx) and (IV +), respectively, in
+accordance with the meaning of these axioms.
+(VI) could be expressed by means of ternary relations n and o if we put (Tabc = 1)
+=(ab = c) and (cab = 1) = (a + b = c). But we can also express (VI) without
+recourse to these ternary relatives. (VIx) stipulates that for every two classes a and
+b there exists a largest subclass c (that is, one that ranks above all other subclasses),
+called the product of a and b, a class c, therefore, for which in the Schröder-Müller
+notation
+(1)
+(0€a) (c€b)
+and
+that is, in the new notation to be used here,
+(1)
+and
+Scasco = 1
+I (xasxo € Sxc).
+Accordingly we have
+(Tabc = 1) = (Scalco = 1)I| (Sxasxo € Sxc),
+or
+Tabc = Scalco! (Sxa + 5xb + 8xc),
+and similarly, by duality, for daoc
+We have
+(VIx)
+and
+(VI +)
+ПЕПарс = 1
+a.b c
+ПЕдао = 1,
+а, b с
+where the expressions above, which contain only binary coefficients, are to be
+substituted for nab and Cab, that is,
+(V1x)
+112Scascol! (sda + Sab + Sac) = 1,
+and similarly, by duality, for (VI +).
+In Müller, (VII) reads (a + z)(ā + z) = = = az † àz and stipulates the existence of
+a "complement" of a that satisfies precisely this equation. If we then write b for à,
+we must still put 2 before the entire equation and then I before the entire expression.
+In order to be able to replace the notation for products and sums of classes, which is
+not admissible here, by a and o, we decompose VII as follows:
+
+242
+Thus, through the use of mand o, VII becomes
+a. z b c.d.s.g,h,i
+where the values given on the preceding page are still to be substituted for the relative
+coefficients of n and o.
+Now in investigations concerning independence it must be decided whether from
+certain axioms another follows. That this is the case can, however, be expressed by a
+relative equation that can be made primary.5 Thus the problem in such investigations
+is to decide whether a certain relative equation, and in particular, in view of the
+preceding, a first-order equation, is identically satisfied or not. But, if this is not the
+case, then according to Theorem 2 it is possible to give a counterexample already in
+a finite or denumerable domain. Q.e.d.
+On the basis of these reflections I have investigated the independence of the
+individual axioms, and I am thinking of publishing the results on another occasion.®
+I regard the work of Huntington on this topic as mistaken, since, when axioms turn
+out to be inconvenient, he simply adds to their formulation "if the preceding axioms
+are satisfied"
+', a cheap way of evading difficulties at will!
+THEOREM 3. The evaluation of a product or a sum over relatives is not always possible.
+For by means of Schröder's devices it is at once possible to write down an equation
+that asserts that the domain is finite or denumerable, that is, that every system a; 1
+is finite or ~1 (equivalent to the domain) :
+(a;1 finite) + (a; 1 ~ 1).
+That a ; 1 is finite means that no mapping z maps a; 1 one-to-one onto a proper part b
+of itself. But that z maps a system a one-to-one onto b is expressed, according to
+Schröder (1895, p. 605, (10)), by
+(1)
+that b is a proper part of a by
+(6€a)(6 ‡a)b‡ 0),
+and a; 1 ~ 1, according to (1), by
+Thus, that 1' is finite or denumerable is expressed by
+This, like any secondary equation, is easily transformed into a primary equation (see
+Schröder 1895, pp. 150-151), and that in turn into a relation between coefficients. If
+now I and I could be evaluated, the equation would, according to Theorem 2, either
+have to be identically satisfied or, already in a finite or denumerable domain, fail to
+be satisfied, none of which is the case.
+5 [A relative equation is primary if its left and right sides do not contain any conditional or
+equivalence.]
+6 ['This was never done.]
+
+243
+The reader will ask why the proof of Theorem 2 cannot be carried over word for
+word to the equation above, too, since this equation certainly is not satisfied in a
+finite or denumerable I. To be sure, by the method of that proof a domain in which
+the equation is not identically satisfied can be constructed; but this domain will
+turn out to be nondenumerable. For, since we are taking products also over relatives z,
+there will also occur fleeing subscripts of the form iz, where z is not a "subsubscript"
+but a "subrelative"
+, so that a subscript is associated with every z. But if the number
+of subscripts approaches infinity, the number of possible z, and hence also the number
+of fleeing subscripts required (that is, the cardinality of the required domain),
+approaches the continuum. (Therewith, however, the set of possible z in turn becomes
+one of yet higher cardinality than that of the continuum, and consequently so does
+the set of required fleeing subscripts, and so on ad infinitum.)
+§ 3. SINGULARY EQUATIONS
+THEOREM 4. There are no fleeing equations between singulary relative coeficients, not
+even when the relative coefficients of I' and O' are included as the only binary ones.
+If no binary coefficient occurs, it is very easy to show that we can do without
+fleeing subscripts altogether and that consequently in the construction of the domain
+as on pages 238-240 we have no occasion at all to make it infinite.
+If coefficients of l' and O' occur, we construct a certain normal form. The left side
+of the equation in zero form is symmetric with respect to all subscripts, that is, all
+the elements of I', except for a finite number of quite specific ones, which I shall call
+the distinguished subscripts. The relative coefficients corresponding to these subscripts,
+as well as the classes without subscript that perhaps occur, I shall call the distinguished classes. They may, however, also be lacking. All subscripts written down in
+the equation are summation, productation, or distinguished subscripts.
+We now consider the Boolean expansion, in terms of the distinguished classes, of
+the left side of the equation. I first wish to describe the normal form in question,
+whose constructibility I asserted above. It is characterized
+(1) By the fact that the coefficients of the expansion are functions that are
+symmetric with respect to all (even the distinguished) subscripts;
+(2) By a property of precisely these symmetric functions that is now to be
+discussed.
+We may assume, first, that these symmetric functions (which, after all, were
+coefficients in the Boolean expansion in terms of the distinguished classes) no longer
+contain classes without subscript (since these also belong to the distinguished classes
+in terms of which the expansion was carried out). The symmetric functions, we claim,
+contain no coefficients of I' or O'. Following Boole, we can expand them in such a
+way that only the coefficients O and I occur. Although we shall think only of the
+terms with the coefficient 1 as written down, there may yet be infinitely many terms,
+so that we must consider an abbreviation.
+If, for example, the term
+
+244
+occurs in the expansion, then there also occur all the terms that we obtain from this
+one by interchanging subscripts. I denote their sum by (3, 00)a; hence
+and the sum of the terms that result from
+by interchange of subscripts I denote by (00, 3)a. In general, we put
+(n, 00)a =
+11.12....1n
+Similarly, we obtain (00, n)a from this by interchange of a, and à, for every 1.
+If several relatives occur, say a and b, then, for example, we denote by
+(2, 3, 1, 00)a.o
+the sum of the terms that result from
+by interchange of subscripts. Likewise, for example, we denote by
+(2, 00, k, 1) a, o
+the sum of the terms resulting from
+(a,babba. abi, +112 statial la: + 1: +20472017201+200
+by interchange of subscripts. At this point, the general law of formation should be
+clear. That indeed there are always only finite numbers in all places except one will
+have to be taken as one characteristic of precisely these symmetric functions.
+But even in this abbreviated notation the expansion can still contain infinitely
+many terms. As an example, we now denote by
+(≤2, = 5)a
+the sum of all those terms in which there occur at least two unnegated and at least
+five negated a; that is, we have
+(≥2,≥5)a= (2,00)a + (3,00)a + (4,00)at.... + (00,5)a + (00, 6)a + (00, 7)at...
+=
+к.Л, н....,0
+In general,
+(≥p, ≥9)a =
+11.t2 a
+That with the use of this notation the entire symmetric function can now be represented as a sum of finitely many terms is a second characteristic of precisely these
+symmetric functions, and this is really the essential point of the entire proof.
+" [The German text has "Summe" for what should apparently be "Glieder" I
+
+245
+I shall only sketch the method of obtaining such a normal form. Every relative
+expression is constructed from relative expressions that do not contain any & or ,
+and therefore already possess the desired normal form, by means of repeated use of
+the four operations +, ', 2, and II. Thus we can bring any relative expression into
+normal form if we can bring into normal form an expression that results from a single
+application of any of those four operations to expressions already in normal form.
+The elaboration of a method for each of these four operations is not difficult and is
+left to the reader.
+Thus the normal form can be constructed. It is a Boolean expansion. If during its
+construction everything drops out, the equation is identically satisfied in every
+domain whatsoever. But, if even a single term remains, we can immediately specify a
+finite domain in which this term, and consequently the entire left side of the equation,
+does not vanish identically. If, for example, a term
+1(≥2, ≥3,1,00)a,o
+remains, where p is a product of distinguished classes, then the term does not vanish
+in a domain of six elements in which
+p = 1,
+01 =az=1,
+b1 = 62=1,
+az=04 = 05 = 1,
+03=64 = 65 = 0,
+a6 = 0,
+66 = 1
+Corollary. Fleeing equations contain, besides the modules, other relatives.
+THEOREM 5. The evaluation of a I or I over all relatives is always possible for an
+expression that contains only singulary relative coefficients (or, in addition, at most the
+coefficients of l' or 0') and finitely many I or I over all subscripts.
+Assume that we have to evaluate a I over relatives (for a I we would proceed
+similarly, by duality).
+Expand into the normal form of the previous theorem. Then the terms can be
+evaluated individually. For example, we have
+[ (5, 7, 3, 00) ab = (5 + 7,3 + 00)a = (12, 00)a,
+25, 1, 23, 4)ao = (25 + 3, 7 + 4)a = (28, 11)a.
+If under a I there occurs a distinguished coefficient ai, then in the evaluation it must
+be struck out (that is, set = 1); à; would have to be struck out likewise.
+There remains only the task of transforming the result back from the normal form
+into an ordinary relative expression. The following example will indicate how this is
+done:
+(2, 1, 3, 00)ao =
+h.i.j.k.l.m
+'niskim/a"En + I'niskimn).
+§ 4. REDUCTION OF THE HIGHER CALCULUS OF RELATIVES TO THE BINARY
+THeOReM 6. Every relative equation (or first-order equation) is equivalent to a binary
+one; that is, it an arbitrary relative equation (or first-order equation) f = O is given,
+then we can specify a binary relative equation (or binary first-order equation) F = 0
+
+246
+that is satisfied identically, not identically, or never (that is, for no system of values
+of the parameters) if and only if the corresponding statement holds for f = 0; likewise, we can specify a binary equation (or binary first-order equation) F' = 0 that
+is satisfied for some systems of values if and only if f = 0 is. The latter statement
+can, after all, be reduced to the former. But F' does not coincide with F.
+In the calculus of relatives this theorem has the same significance as does in
+algebra the theorem of Weierstrass [1884] according to which we can solve by means
+of the complex numbers with two fundamental units all the problems that can be
+solved by means of complex numbers that have more than two fundamental units
+and for which the same formulas hold as for our numbers. Likewise, all problems
+that can be solved by means of a calculus containing ternary or higher relatives can
+already be settled in the binary calculus. (Under certain circumstances, to be sure,
+recourse to ternary and higher relatives may be simpler.)
+We can gauge the significance of our theorem by reflecting upon the fact that every
+theorem of mathematics, or of any calculus that can be invented, can be written as a
+relative equation; the mathematical theorem then stands or falls according as the
+equation is satisfied or not. This transformation of arbitrary mathematical theorems
+into relative equations can be carried out, I believe, by anyone who knows the work
+of Whitehead and Russell. Since, now, according to our theorem the whole relative
+calculus can be reduced to the binary relative calculus, it follows that we can decide
+whether an arbitrary mathematical proposition is true provided we can decide
+whether a binary relative equation is identically satisfied or not.
+Now, first, let a quaternary relative equation be given; the ternary can be considered a special case of this. For, if ternary relative coefficients dijk are given, we can
+define quaternary ones by means of the equations aik! = dijk.
+We consider a new domain, whose elements are the element-pairs of the old 1', and
+which we must therefore call 12. Thus if
+11 = (і, j, k,...),
+then
+12 = ((i, i), (i, j), (j, i), (j, j), (i, k), ....).
+The new domain G, which we shall take as basic in what follows, now results from
+12 by replacement of (i, i) by i, (j, j) by j, and so on. Thus
+@ = (i, (i, j), (j, i), j, (i, k), ...).
+It is convenient to denote the elements by single letters, say I, K, I, .... If I = (i, i),
+we call i the first element and j the last element of I. We shall regard i as its own first
+and last element.
+Now, with every quaternary relative a whose subscripts must run through 1' we
+associate a binary relative A whose subscripts are to run through G, and we do this
+in such a way that for I = (i, j) and K = (k, l)
+01j= Ark, Arka= Aik, Oijkk= Ark and Alikk = Aik.
+Thus, if a is regarded as given, A is completely defined as a binary relative with G
+as a domain of the first degree.
+On the basis of this correspondence we now replace all quaternary relatives in
+
+247
+f= 0 by the associated binary ones. Since the relative coefficients are no longer
+simply elements of 1' but elements of (5 also, the summation and productation subscripts, too, must be modified so that they range over the entire C. If, for example,
+(1)
+occurs in f, and if dijk is replaced by Ark and bikli by Biz, then the summation subscript i occurs in I (= (i, j)) and in I (= (l, i)); therefore we first replace the summation
+over i by one over I and I, and we write
+IL
+But now we must realize that this new sum contains more summands than the old
+(since I and L now range over the entire G and not only over 1'). We must remedy
+this inconvenience, for, after all, we want to construct an equation that contains
+exactly as many summands and factors as the old one, that, in fact, does not differ
+from the old one in anything but the notation (with one exception, to be sure). We
+achieve our purpose by multiplying each Ark Br by a factor equal to 1 for those
+summands that also occur in the old sum and equal to 0 for the others. We define
+two relatives V and H by
+(3)
+/(Vy = 1) = (1 is the first element of c),
+((HIy = 1) = (1 is the last element of J.
+These definitional properties of V and H will still have to be incorporated into the
+equation. In the meantime we regard V and H as given relatives whose subscripts
+denote elements of G; for, the first and the last elements also are elements of G. We
+have
+(4)
+(V; V)Is = 1) = (first element of I = first element of J,
+((V; H)i = 1) = (first element of I = last element of J,
+list, = 1) - shut element of lust elment us t
+The sum
+(5)
+is a summation over & in form only;® in reality it is just a summation over 1', since
+the factors added to (2) cancel all terms but those in which the summation subscripts
+have j as their last element and I as their first. Nevertheless, even this sum still
+contains more summands than (1); and only those summands are to be kept for which
+the first element of I coincides with the last element of L; that is, the factor (V; H)II.
+must still be added.
+(6)
+now contains exactly as many terms as the given formula (1), but (6) is more general
+• [In the original the second subscript on "H" in formula (5) is a "J", which is a misprint.]]
+
+248
+than (1), since the coincidence of the two subscripts i, of the two k, and of the two i,
+which is visible in (1), is not expressed in (6). This must still be done by means of (4).
+(7)
+must take the place of (1), and it is of the same generality as (1). By duality, we can
+proceed for productation in a way similar to that for summation.
+Just as in this example we expressed the equality of certain subscripts of the given
+equation (an equality that for a time was no longer expressed when the new relative
+coefficients were introduced) by means of the last factors, so in f = 0 we must look
+for all places where identical subscripts occur or where the equality (or inequality) of
+subscripts is expressed by coefficients such as lý; (or Ofj); and where, then, through the
+introduction of the new relative coefficients this equality (or inequality) is no longer
+expressed, we must see to it that it is expressed by introducing suitable summands or
+factors, as in the last example. Only then can we be sure that the new equation
+permits exactly the transformations corresponding to those of f = 0 and consequently
+is identically satisfied exactly in case f = O is, since both equations then contain
+exactly the same functions of relative coefficients, except that the arguments, that is,
+the relative coefficients, are named differently.
+Now we must still incorporate the properties of V and H in the new equation. In
+what follows I shall always write relatives in the form of a table; that is, if, for
+example, a, B, y,... are the elements of a domain of the first degree, I shall write the
+relative a in the following way:
+•.•
+a =
+06
+B
+daß
+ава aBB
+a yo
+ay B
+Ayy...
+•
+•
+••
+To every subset of the domain of the first degree there then corresponds a "system"
+in the sense of Schröder; for example, to the set
+21 = (a, x, 8)
+there corresponds the system
+21=
+1а В у 8 є...
+б
+•
+1
+1
+1
+•
+1
+1
+11...
+• • • • ...
+1
+1
+1
+1.•.
+1
+1
+1
+1...
+00 ...
+in which the lines associated with the elements a, y, & of 2i contain only ones and
+the remaining lines only zeros.
+
+249
+Now to the subset I' of & there corresponds a system q, namely,
+i (i, j) (j, i) j (i, k)...
+i
+1
+1
+0
+1
+1
+1
+9=
+(j, i)
+j
+(2, k)
+1
+1
+0
+•••
+••.
+...
+•••
+...
+•
+Further we have
+i (i, j) (j, i) j (i, k) ...
+V =
+i
+(i, j)
+(j, i)
+j
+(i, k)
+•
+1
+1
+0
+1
+0
+0
+0
+0
+0
+•..
+•
+and
+i (i, j) (j, i) j (i, k)
+i
+1
+1
+0
+0
+(i, j)
+H=
+(ji)
+j
+1
+0
+0
+(i, k)
+0
+0
+••.
+...
+•..
+•..
+...
+•
+•
+•
+•
+...
+Now we want to express the properties of V and H by means purely of relative
+equations. What these properties amount to is, briefly stated, that the elements of
+& are arranged by them into a square schema. In what follows, this property must
+now be logically analyzed and translated into relative equations.
+First of all, V and H are what Schröder calls functions in the strict sense; that is,
+V and H associate with each element I of Gone and only one element (namely, the
+first element, or the last element, respectively, of I). This property is expressed by
+(1)
+H;H € I'€ H;H
+(see Schröder 1895, p. 587, (17)).
+The set of all first elements is the former 1'. Thus the system of all first elements
+is g; that is, we have q = V. But, since also q = H; 1, we have
+(3)
+V; 1 = H; 1.
+A further property of V and H is that every element of I' is its own first element,
+that is,
+q. 1'€ V.l',
+
+250
+or
+(4)
+V; 1•1'€ V.I';
+likewise
+(5)
+H; 1. 1'€ H•1.
+On account of V € V; 1 we may also write = instead of € in (4) and (5).
+Let us now imagine that we have constructed a square schema of the following
+kind:
+i
+i
+j
+k
+where i, j, k,... are all the elements of I', that is, all the first and last elements.
+Now we write the element of & that possesses the first element m and the last element
+n in the square that is at the intersection of the mth row and the nth column of our
+schema. (1), (2), and (3) express the fact that every element of & has exactly one
+first element and one last element, that is, that according to our rule it is written in
+exactly one square of our schema. We must now express the fact that every square
+contains one and only one element.
+That every square contains at most one element means the following: it two elements I and J have the same first element and the same last element, if therefore
+(V; 7)u = 1 and (H; H)is = 1,
+then I and J coincide, that is, lýy = 1; hence we have
+(V; V)ı(Й; H)ı € lfs,
+and, since this holds for arbitrary I and J, we have
+(6)
+V; V. H; H € 1'.
+Finally, that every square of the schema contains at least one element of & means
+the following: if I and J belong to I', if therefore
+91s and and = 91 = 1,
+then there must exist an element K having I as its first element and I as its last
+element; hence we must have?
+° [In the formula that follows, the penultimate subscript is, in the German text, "K", which
+is a misprint.Il
+
+251
+Therefore 9uău € (V; H), for arbitrary I and J; that is,
+gğ € V; H,
+or
+(7)
+V; 1•1; H € V; H.
+Therefore we must still write (1)-(7) as a premiss before the equation F' = O:
+(8)
+(1) -(7) € (F" = 0).
+This, when transformed into a primary equation and brought into zero form, yields
+the desired equation F = 0.
+If in fact f = O is not identically satisfied, then there are a domain 1' and a system
+of values of the relative coefficients of the relatives a, b, ... occurring in f for which
+the equation is not satisfied. If we then construct the domain G from 1' by the
+formation of pairs and define V and H as on page 247, the premiss (1)-(7) is satisfied
+for these V and H and can therefore be omitted, and F = 0 can be replaced by
+F' = 0. But to every coefficient occurring in f = 0 there corresponds a coefficient
+occurring in F' = O; and for any system of values that does not satisfy f = 0 there
+is also one that does not satisfy F' = 0, hence not F = 0 either. Q.e.d.
+If, conversely, a domain G and a system of values for the relative coefficients of
+the relatives A, B,..., H, and V occurring in F = O are given such that F = O is
+not satisfied, then to this system of values there also belong values of V and H, and,
+in particular, such values as satisfy (1)-(7); for F = O is, after all, identically satisfied for other systems of values, according to (8). Therefore, by (8), F' = 0 cannot be
+satisfied by the given system of values. We can now find a domain 1' and, associated
+with it, a system of values of the relative coefficients occurring in f = 0 for which
+f = O is not satisfied either. For, if we put V; 1 = 9, then to this system there corresponds a set that we shall take as a domain 1 for f = O. If in F' = O there occurs a
+coefficient Ark, then by (1)-(7) there exist exactly one element i, one j, one k, and
+one l, such that
+Vis = 1, Hip = 1, Vur = 1, and His = 1.
+When these values i, j, k, and I have been determined, we let duji correspond to AIk
+and assign to dijki the value that is given for Ark. Thus we arrive at a system of
+values that does not satisfy f=0, since it does not satisfy F' = 0. Consequently,
+F= O is identically satisfied along with f= O, and conversely.
+If now a higher relative equation is given, say a senary one with coefficients
+arjkimn, then we can transform it by the same method into a ternary one (whose
+transformation into a binary one we already know) if we put
+(i,j) = I, (k, l) = K, and (m, n) = MI,
+or, with an unessential modification of the method, we can also transform it into a
+binary one immediately by putting
+(i, j, k) = I and (I,m, n) = I.
+Equations that are quinary, septenary, and so forth can be reduced to equations that
+are senary, octonary, and so forth.
+
+Logico-combinatorial investigations in the satisfiability
+or provability of mathematical propositions:
+A simplified proof of a theorem by I. Löwenheim
+and generalizations of the theorem
+THORALF SKOLEM
+(1920)
+The text below is § 1 of Skolem's paper
+(the other sections deal with decision
+procedures for Boolean algebras and
+elementary geometry, as well as with
+dense sets). The first result presented in
+the paper is that every well-formed formula of the first-order predicate calculus
+has what is now known as a Skolem normal form for satisfiability. Such a normal
+form consists of a string of universal
+quantifiers, followed by a string of existential quantifiers and then a quantifier-free matrix. Skolem proves that a
+well-formed formula is satisfiable in a
+given domain if and only if its Skolem
+normal form for satisfiability is satisfiable
+in the domain. Skolem normal forms have
+since become one of the logician's standard
+tools. These forms were used, in particular, by Gödel in his proof of the completeness of quantification theory (1930a)
+and by Bernays in his arithmetization of
+that proof (Hilbert and Bernays 1939, pp.
+234-253). Skolem's result can be regarded
+as establishing that the well-formed formulas in Skolem normal form constitute
+a reduction class for quantification
+theory. More generally, formulas in prenex form came to play a major role in
+the study of the reduction problem and
+of special cases of the decision problem.
+The number and order of quantifiers in
+the prefix of a prenex formula came to
+yield a convenient standard for measuring the complexity of a formula of
+quantification theory. All decision and
+reduction problems of quantification
+theory, so far as classes of formulas are
+determined by this standard, were eventually solved, the last gap being filled
+by the result of Kahr, Moore, and Wang
+(1961).
+After having introduced the normal
+form of a formula, Skolem offers (Theorem 2) a new proof of Löwenheim's
+theorem. With the normal form at his
+disposal, he can dispense with the infinite strings of quantifiers considered by
+Löwenheim (see above, Pp. 229-230),
+and, thanks to considerations suggested
+by Dedekind's notion of chain, he is able
+to fill a serious gap left open by Löwenheim in his proof (see above, p. 231).
+Skolem notes the use of the axiom of
+choice in his proof. In 1929, p. 24,
+Skolem gives a simplified version of his
+1920 proof, likewise using the axiom of
+choice.
+In Skolem's formulation of Löwenheim's theorem and its generalizations
+the phrases "is a contradiction" and "is
+contradictory" have to be understood in
+
+253
+the semantic sense, that is, as "is not formula ("si on conserve la signification"
+satisfiable"; this is apparent from the
+of the predicate letters, 1938, p. 25;
+assumption that Skolem actually uses in
+see also 1929, p. 23, last sentence of first
+the proofs. The same remark applies to
+paragraph of § 4).
+Skolem's subsequent papers (1922, 1928,
+In order to state (II) in a somewhat
+and 1929), where he also uses
+"conmore precise form, let us first recall a
+sistent" ("widerspruchsfrei"
+"widerfew definitions. An interpretation ‹D, a)
+spruchslos") in the sense of "satisfiable".
+of F is a nonempty domain D together
+Skolem generalizes Löwenheim's theowith an assignment a that with each
+rem
+to denumerably infinite sets of n-ary predicate letter of F associates an
+formulas (actually, he deals with infinite
+n-ary relation defined in D. By the usual
+conjunctions of formulas, but this is unrules, an interpretation assigns the letter
+essential). The remainder of the part of t or the letter f to F. If the letter is t, the
+the paper that is given below presents a
+interpretation is a model of F. The cardinumber of theorems about expressions of nality of the model is the cardinality of
+infinite length. The first are about infi-
+D. A model ‹D', a'> of F is a submodel of
+nite conjunctions and alternations, and
+a model ‹D, a) of F if and only if D' is
+the results can readily be translated into
+a subdomain of D and, for each predicate
+terms of infinite sets of formulas; then
+letter o of F, a'(p) is the restriction of
+Theorems 7 and 8 introduce formulas
+a(p) to D.
+that contain an infinite sequence of in-
+We can now state (Il) as
+dividual variables bound by an infinite
+(III) If F has a model <D, a), F has
+string of existential quantifiers. Skolem
+a denumerable model (D, a › such that
+never again worked with expressions of {D', a'> is a submodel of ‹D, «).
+infinite length; rather, soon afterward he
+Skolem's 1920 proof of the Löwenheimcame to stress the finite character of Skolem theorem, which makes uses of the
+formal systems.
+axiom of choice, establishes (I1), or (Ill),
+Some years later (1938, pp. 25-30)
+while his 1922 proof (see below, pp. 293-
+Skolem compares various proofs of the
+294), which does not make use of the
+Löwenheim-Skolem theorem (for a single
+axiom of choice, establishes the weaker
+formula, but everything we are going to
+statement (I). Löwenheim's proof consay applies to the case of a set of fortains several gaps, which can be filled in
+mulas) and remarks that these proofs
+various ways; but it seems to be closer to
+yield, in fact, two different versions of Skolem's 1922 proof than to that of 1920.
+the theorem. Let us consider a formula
+In Skolem's 1920 proof the denumer-
+A of quantification theory and, not to
+able submodel is obtained from the
+burden the discussion with unessential
+original model by a process of thinning
+details, assume that E contains no indiviout, a process performed with the help
+dual constant and no free individual
+of the axiom of choice. In the 1922 proof
+variable. Skolem's two versions of the
+the denumerable model is built up by a
+theorem can be stated as :
+process of successive "approximations"
+(1) If f is satisfiable, it is satisfiable in
+and it may be unrelated to the original
+the domain of natural numbers, some
+model. In particular, if version (I) of the
+suitable assignment being made to the
+Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is used to
+predicate letters of F;
+show that a certain axiomatic set theory
+(II) If F is satisfiable, that is, if there
+T' has a denumerable model ‹D, a) and
+is a domain D in which F is satisfiable,
+if the elements of D are individuals of a
+F is satisfiable in a denumerable substandard model of I, then a(e), that is,
+domain D' of D, the same meaning being the relation that in D corresponds to the
+assigned to the predicate letters of the a that enters in the axioms of T, is not
+
+254
+necessarily the standard e. If version (II)- the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem men-
+(III) of the theorem is used, a(e) is the
+tioned in the last paragraph of Bemerkung
+standard e. (Compare the notion "absoder Redaktion in Skolem 1934, p. 161, the
+lute" in Gödel 1940, p. 42.) In Maltser's
+distinction is not made.
+(1936, § 6, pp. 332-335) and Tarski and
+The translation is by Stefan Bauer-
+Vaught's (1956, p. 92, Theorem 2.1) ex-
+Mengelberg, and it is printed here with
+tensions of the Löwenheim-Skolem theothe kind permission of Professor Skolem
+rem the distinction is made between the
+and the Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i
+two versions. In Tarski's extension of Oslo.
+In volume 76 of Mathematische Annalen Löwenheim proved an interesting and very
+remarkable theorem on what are called "first-order expressions". The theorem states
+that every first-order expression is either contradictory or already satisfiable in a
+denumerably infinite domain. By a first-order expression Löwenheim understands an
+expression constructed from relative coefficients by means of the five fundamental
+logical operations, namely, in Schröder's terminology, identical multiplication and
+addition, negation, productation, and summation, with productations and summations ranging over individuals only. The five operations mentioned are denoted by a
+dot (or simply juxtaposition), the sign +, the bar -, and the signs I and I, respectively. Löwenheim proves his theorem by means of Schröder's "development" of
+products and sums, a procedure that takes a I sign across and to the left of a
+¿ sign, or vice versa. But this procedure is somewhat involved and makes it
+necessary to introduce for individuals symbols that are subsubscripts on the relative
+coefficients. In what follows I want to give a simpler proof, in which such subsubscripts are avoided, and, besides, prove some lemmas that are of interest in
+themselves; finally I shall also establish some generalizations of Löwenheim's
+theorem.
+Instead of speaking of first-order expressions I would rather speak of first-order
+propositions.
+DEFINITIoN 1. A first-order proposition is a proposition constructed from relative
+coefficients in the sense of Schröder by means of the five operations mentioned above, with
+productations and summations ranging over individuals only.
+Examples. (1) EyRxy. In words this reads: For every x there exists a y such that
+the relation R obtains between x and y.
+(2) [хПуГ(xy + Іху). In words this reads: There exists an x such that for every
+y it is possible to determine a z such that either the binary relation R holds between
+x and y or the ternary relation T holds between x, y, and z.
+(3) IxAx.IyП„Ry2zx In words this reads: There exists an x that belongs to the
+class A, and moreover there exists a y such that for every z the relation R obtains
+between y and z, and the relation S between z and x.
+DEFINITION 2. A first-order proposition will be said to be in normal form if it is written
+in such a way that it begins with I signs, these being followed by I signs and then by an
+expression that is free of I and I signs. Every first-order proposition that contains only
+I or only I signs will also be said to be in normal form, provided these signs stand
+at the beginning and follow each other.
+Examples. IxEy Rxy is in normal form, likewise MEL(Rxy + Suz) and Illy z
+
+255
+(BaySz + Ax). On the other hand, Ex 1y Ray is not in normal form. But a(Ax + Bx)
+and ExAx again are in normal form.
+THeoReM 1. If U is an arbitrary first-order proposition, there exists a first-order
+proposition U' in normal form with the property that U is satisfiable in a given domain
+whenever U' is, and conversely.
+Proof. We can consider first a proposition of the form
+(1)
+where Ux..ip is a proposition constructed from relative coefficients by exclusive
+use of the three operations of identical multiplication, identical addition, and negation. We can introduce a relative coefficient Rx1XmY1..'yn
+here, setting
+for all values of x1,..., Xm, Y1,..., Yn; hence, if we wish, we can write
+It is clear that, no matter how the relatives whose coefficients occur in U might be
+chosen, there exists in the domain (or, more accurately, in the domain Imtn, as it
+would be written in Schröder's notation) an (m + n)-ary relative R such that (2) is
+satisfied. In fact, (2) is nothing other than an ordinary definition of a relation R.
+Now proposition (2) can be transformed into
+Пхі.•ПатПур•• Пул(Ваунул + Пар..ПарУхднzр)
+(Eus... Eup"
+and this in turn into
+(3) ••хНу• ПулПа.• ПарЕи.. Тир
+and (3) is in normal form. But in consequence of (2) we can also write (1) as
+(4)
+which is also in normal form. The logical conjunction (propositional product) of (3)
+and (4), finally, can be written thus:
+This proposition, too, is in normal form.
+Now, if there exist in the given domain values of the relative symbols occurring
+in (1) such that (1) is satisfied, it will also be possible to specify in the domain values
+for the relative symbols occurring in (5) such that (5) will be satisfied. In fact, apart
+from R, the relative symbols occurring in (5) are the same as those in (1), and R can
+always be found by virtue of the "definition" (2) if the relatives occurring in (1) are
+known. It is immediately clear that, conversely, (1) is satisfiable if (5) is, since (5) is
+the logical conjunction of (2) and (4), from which (1) follows.
+This proves that Theorem 1 is true in the case of a formula in which we encounter
+
+256
+only two changes from a I to a 2 sign as we read from left to right. But it is now easy
+to see how the general proof is to be carried out.
+For let the proposition
+be given. (Thus I assume here that the rightmost quantifiers are 2 signs, whereas in
+the case just considered we had I signs as rightmost quantifiers; but the procedure
+is always the same.) I then define a number of auxiliary relations by means of the
+following equations:
+12XT1t.+Ry-1+14221+114-172
+(7)
+= R22...xng+...+ ng-z'
+Strictly speaking, every equation here should be prefixed by I signs, namely,
+those corresponding to all variables x that occur free. We can then easily convince
+ourselves that each of these propositions, hence the definitions of R', R(2),..., can
+be brought into normal form in the same way as we brought (2) into the normal form
+(3) above. But then, of course, the logical conjunction of these definitions of R(1)
+R(2)
+,..., can also be written in normal form. By virtue of (7), however, proposition
+(6) takes the form
+(8)
+X1/x1+12
+which is also normal. Hence the logical conjunction of (7) and (8) can also be written
+as a proposition U' in normal form. If it is possible now to find, for the relative
+symbols occurring in (6), values such that (6) is satisfied, we can by (7) successively
+find R'?, R!2)
+,..., and thus U' will be satisfied. If, conversely, U' is satisfied for
+certain values of the relative symbols occurring in U', then (7) and (8) are satisfied
+and therefore also (6). This proves in full generality that Theorem 1 is true.
+The question when a first-order proposition is satisfiable can therefore be replaced
+by the simpler one: when is a proposition in normal form satisfiable? On that point
+the following theorem holds:
+THEOREM 2. Every proposition in normal form either is a contradiction or is already
+satisfiable in a finite or denumerably infinite domain.
+It would now be extremely easy to prove this theorem in Löwenheim's way, but
+without the use of symbols for individuals as subsubscripts. However, I would rather
+carry out the proof in another way, one in which we do not reason with successive
+choices but proceed more directly according to the customary methods of mathematical logic.1
+1 For the more general theorems that appear later in this section I shall carry out the proofs in
+a way closer to Löwenheim's.
+
+257
+First we can consider the simplest possible case of a first-order proposition in
+normal form containing both II and I signs, namely,
+where Uxy is a proposition constructed by means of conjunction, disjunction, and
+negation from relative coefficients having only x and y as subscripts. Let us now
+assume that this proposition is satisfied in a given domain for certain values of the
+relatives. Then, by virtue of the principle of choice, we can imagine that for every x a
+uniquely determined y is chosen in such a way that Uxy comes out true. For this is
+a choice of one element from each of the classes that we obtain if for every x we
+gather the y for which Uxy is true. This defines a single-valued mapping of the
+domain into itself. Assume that, for every x, x' is the image of x. Then, for the values
+assigned to the relative symbols, the proposition Uxx' is true for every x. We can
+write that as follows:
+where O is the domain. Let a be a particular individual of O. Then there exist certain
+classes X included in O that, first, contain a as element (X, is true) and, second,
+contain x' whenever they contain x (Xy' is true whenever Xx is true, or, in other
+words, Xx + Xx' is true for every x). Now let X° be the logical (identical) product
+(intersection) of all these classes. Then, as is well known, X° is either a finite or a
+denumerably infinite class (see Dedekind's theory of chains in 1888). But it is clear,
+further, that
+must hold. Hence this proves that, if xEyU xy is satisfied in a domain O, it is also
+satisfiable in a finite or denumerably infinite domain.
+In order to prove Theorem 2 in full generality it is most convenient to prove first
+two simple lemmas.
+Lemma 1. Let Rx. xmI... yn be an (m + n)-ary relation with the property that,
+if x1,..., Xm are arbitrarily given (in the given domain O), there is one and only one
+Y1, one and only one yz, and so forth up to one and only one yn such that Bx... m11
+...Уп
+holds. Let K be an arbitrary finite class, and let K, be the class of all values of
+Y1,..., Yn that correspond to the various possible choices of x1, ..., Xm in K. Further,
+let K' = * + Ky be the sum of the two classes K and Ky. Then K', too, is a finite
+class.
+It is indeed quite clear that this proposition is true. If K consists of k objects, there
+exist altogether k possible choices of X1,..., Xm, hence also km corresponding sequences yi, ..., Yn. Thus the number of elements of Ki is at most kin, and K'
+contains at most kmn + k objects.
+Lemma 2. Let R be an (m + n)-ary relative with the property mentioned in
+Lemma 1, and let E be the logical product of all classes X that possess the following
+two properties:
+(1) a is an element of X;
+(2) If x1,..,Xm are arbitrarily chosen in X, then X also contains the objects
+Y1,...,Yn for which Rxy.xmy1»yn
+holds.
+Then E is either a finite or a denumerably infinite class.
+
+258
+Proof. We can denote by K, the class of all objects y occurring in the sequences
+Y1,..., Yn that correspond to the various possible choices of x1, ..., X'm in K, and in
+general we denote by K' the class K + K1. The passage from K to K' therefore yields
+a single-valued mapping of the totality of all classes into itself. I shall denote by {a} the
+class that contains a as its only element. I then first consider those classes of classes
+having the two properties that (1) they contain {a} as element and (2) whenever they
+contain a class K, they contain K' as element. Let A be the intersection of these
+classes of classes. Then A is an ordinary Dedekind chain and, as is well known,
+consists of the classes {a}, {a}', {a]", and so forth ad infinitum. The classes that are
+elements of A need not, however, all be mutually distinct; in any case A is a finite or
+a denumerably infinite class of classes.
+In consequence of Lemma 1 it is clear, moreover, that every element of A must be
+a finite class. For, first, {a) is finite, and, second, K' is finite whenever K is. The class
+of all finite classes must therefore, according to the definition of A, contain all of A;
+that is, every element of A is a finite class.
+By well-known set-theoretic theorems it then follows that the sum of all classes
+that are elements of A-call it SA-must be a finite or a denumerably infinite class.
+Finally, it can be shown that E = SA. For, first, {a} is included in E as a subclass,
+and it is clear that, if K is a subclass of E, K' too is a subclass of E. From this it
+follows that every element of A is a subclass of E, and thence it follows that SA is
+included in E as a subclass. But, conversely, E must also be a subelass of SA. For a
+is an element of SA, and, if x1, ..., Xm are arbitrarily chosen in SA, then —since {a} is
+a subelass of {a}', {ay' in turn a subclass of {a]", and so forth-there exists an element
+K of A that contains all of x1,..., Xm; then every y of the corresponding sequence
+Y1,..., Yn belongs to K', which is the successor element of K in A, and consequently
+all of these y belong to SA. According to the definition of E, E must then be a subclass of
+SA. Hence SA = E, from which it follows that E is either finite or denumerably infinite.
+It is now easy to carry out the proof of Theorem 2. Let a first-order proposition in
+normal form,
+be given, and let us assume that it is satisfied in a given domain for certain values of
+the relative symbols occurring in U. By the principle of choice we can then, for every
+choice of x1, ..., Xm, imagine a definite sequence chosen from among the corresponding
+sequences y1,..., Yn, that is, the sequences y1, ...Yn for which U
+X1..'XmYI...yn is true.
+We can appropriately denote by YI (X1, ..., Xm), У2(X1, ...,Хт),..., Уп(X1,...,Хт), Or,
+more briefly, by YI (X), Y2(x),...,Yn(x) the sequence of the y that correspond to the
+sequence x1, ..., Xm. Then the proposition
+holds for every choice of x1, ..., Xm. Moreover, Ux..xmI(x)...yn(x) is a relation with
+the property considered in the lemmas. Hence, if we assume that a is a particular
+individual and that E is the intersection of all classes X that contain a as element
+and contain the y of the sequence yI (21, ..., Xm), 2(21,..., Xm),..., Уп(Ж1,...,Хт)
+whenever they contain xy,...,Xm, then E is either finite or denumerably infinite,
+and, moreover,
+
+259
+of course holds for all possible choices of x1, ..., Xm in E, with YI (x),...,Yn(x) belonging to E whenever x1,..., xm do.
+Theorem 2 admits generalizations of high order. Thus, it is not difficult to prove
+the following: Either it is contradictory to suppose that a simply infinite sequence of
+first-order propositions in normal form is simultaneously satisfiable or the sequence is
+already simultaneously satisfiable in a denumerably infinite domain. By means of the
+reduction, presented above, of arbitrary first-order propositions to normal form we
+recognize that this must also hold for every product of a simply infinite sequence of
+arbitrary first-order propositions. It will be proved below that such a theorem will
+continue to hold even if an infinite number of logical disjunctions occur. To make the
+presentation simpler, I shall here confine myself to giving a proof for the case in which
+we have a logical product of a simply infinite sequence of propositions of the form
+IxEUxy. The extension to the general case of an infinite sequence of arbitrary propositional factors in normal form presents no difficulty in principle.
+Thus, let the propositional product
+(9)
+be given, where the U are propositions constructed from relative coefficients by means
+of a finite number of applications of conjunction, disjunction, and negation only. Of
+course, we need not consider in greater detail the case in which no two arbitrary
+propositional factors of the product (9) have any common relative symbol at all; for,
+if the entire propositional product is then not a contradiction, it is immediately clear
+that none of the propositional factors is a contradiction, and then each of these by
+itself can be satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain. But, since the propositional
+factors are in this case completely independent of one another, that will also make the
+entire product a true proposition. Incidentally, if no two of the individual propositional factors ever have relative symbols in common, it is clear that it is not necessary
+to assume that the set of factors is denumerable. Hence we shall from now on consider
+only the case in which the factors have relative symbols in common.
+Let us now assume that proposition (9) is satisfied in a domain O. Then, a fortiori,
+the proposition
+is satisfied for every r. By virtue of the principle of choice we can then choose, for
+every xy, a uniquely determined y, from among those for which Ury, is true; let us
+denote it by y (x). Furthermore we choose an arbitrary individual in O and call it 1.
+Then, further, 1(1) will be called 2, yı (2) will be called 3, y2(1) will be called 4, and
+so forth. The law governing these successive assignments of names will be clear from
+the following table:
+Yı(5) = 9
+Yı (3) = 5
+Y1(6) = 10
+...
+Y1(1) = 2
+Y1(2) = 3
+Y2(1) = 4
+У1 (4) = 6
+Y2(2) = 7
+Yı (7) = 11
+YI (8) = 12
+Уз(2) = 15
+Y4(1) = 16
+..
+Уз(1) = 8
+Y½(3) = 13
+Y2(4) = 14
+
+260
+Now, according to the assumption, all the propositions Ury x)r
+, are true, and
+consequently the propositional product
+must also be true. But from this we see that the proposition
+is satisfied, even if the productations and summations range only over the values
+1, 2, 3, ... of the subscripts; that is, proposition (9) is also satisfiable in a denumerable domain.
+Hence the following theorem holds:
+THEOREM 3. If a proposition can be represented as a product of a denumerable set of
+first-order propositions, it either is a contradiction or is already satisfiable in a denumerable domain.
+Remark. One easily obtains propositions of that form when dealing with the
+formation of chains. If, for example, R denotes the chain corresponding to the binary
+relation R (the "ancestral relation" of Russell and Whitehead (1910, p. 569)), then
+we have
+*
+Rxy =1y + Rxy +ERxzRay +IIRxuRunRoy+...,
+where I' is Schröder's notation for the relation "identical with". The negation of
+Bry will then be the product of an infinite sequence of frst-order propositions.
+In order to be able to answer the question what will happen when an infinite
+number of disjunctions also occur in the given proposition, it is necessary to take into
+consideration above all the following self-evident fact:
+A propositional sum is satisfied in a certain domain for certain values of the relative
+symbols that occur in it if and only if at least one of the propositional summands is satisfied for precisely these values of the symbols.
+The following theorem can then be proved:
+THEOREM 4. A (denumerable or nondenumerable) sum of infinitely many first-order
+propositions either is not satisfiable at all or is already satisfied in a denumerably infinite
+domain for certain values of the relative symbols that occur in the propositions.
+Proof. If the given propositional sum U is satisfied in a domain for certain values
+of the relative symbols that occur in the propositions, then (according to the remark
+that we have just made) at least one of the summands, say A, must be satisfied for
+precisely these values of the symbols. But, since all summands are first-order propositions, A must, according to Theorem 2, already be satisfied in a denumerable
+domain for certain values of the symbols occurring in A. In this way, now, the entire
+propositional sum U will also be satisfied in the denumerable domain if in addition
+arbitrary values are chosen in this very domain for the relative symbols, if any, that
+occur in U but not in A.
+It is now easy to see also that in general all propositions constructed from first-order
+propositions by means of a finite or denumerably infinite number of applications of
+conjunction and disjunction can already be satisfied in the denumerable infinite if they
+can be satisfied at all.
+
+261
+In the first place it is clear that an infinite sum U1 + Uz+.... where every Up
+is a product of infinitely many first-order propositions Us (s = 1,2,...), is either never
+satisfied or already satisfied in the denumerable infinite. The proof of this can, in fact,
+be carried out in exactly the same way as the proof of Theorem 4; it makes use of
+Theorem 3.
+We further have the following theorem :
+THEOREM 5. Assume that the proposition U is a product of infinitely many propositions U,, each of which in turn is a sum of infinitely many first-order propositions,
+namely,
+where each Us, is a first-order proposition. Then U is either never satisfied or already
+satisfied in a denumerable domain for a suitable choice of values for the relative
+symbols.
+Proof. The propositional multiplication can be carried out so that U becomes a
+sum of products of first-order propositions, though, to be sure, the set of these products is not denumerable. If U is satisfied for certain values of the relative symbols
+that occur in it, at least one summand must be satisfied for these values of the
+symbols. But such a summand is the product of a simply infinite sequence of firstorder propositions and, by Theorem 3, is therefore already satisfied in a denumerable
+domain. Then U itself is also satisfied in the denumerable domain if in addition
+arbitrary values are chosen in this denumerable domain for the relative symbols, if
+any, that occur in U but not in the summand in question.
+The same method of proof can, of course, also be employed if the structure of the
+given proposition is still more complex. We could, for example, prove a very similar
+theorem about all the propositions U that are a product of infinitely many propositions U,, each of which is a sum of propositions Uș, where each Us is a product of
+propositions Uș.r, each of which in turn is a sum of first-order propositions Usir, and
+so forth.
+From these theorems there follows, among others, the following interesting result:
+THEOREM 6. Every proposition constructed from relative coefficients by means of a
+finite number of applications of conjunction, disjunction, negation, and productation and
+summation over symbols for individuals, as well as by chain formation, is either never
+satisfied or already satisfied in a denumerable domain for certain values of the relative
+symbols.
+It is indeed quite clear that the theorem is true, since every proposition generated
+by chain formation can be written in the form of a simply infinite sum of first-order
+propositions. See the remark on page 260.
+Examples. A relative equation like the one below (only binary relatives are to
+occur, and the notation is Schröder's except for the symbol f for the chain of R and
+the sign t for relative addition (see the remark on page 260)):
+(xx + xx) +*; x+*; x = 0
+is solvable either in no domain or already in a denumerably infinite domain.
+
+262
+Likewise, the relative equation
+is also either not solvable at all or already solvable in a denumerable domain.
+Precisely the same, of course, holds for the following equation, too:
+(х, У) + (Х, у); ху = 0,
+where (u) is to mean the relative/u:;:+U;4;4; 0;0;0 + ... ad
+infinitum for arbitrary values of the binary relatives u and v.
+And so forth.
+But I also want to present other generalizations of Theorem 2 as well. The following
+theorem, too, holds:
+THEOREM 7. A proposition of the form
+either is a contradiction or is satisfied in a denumerable domain for certain values of the
+relative symbols occurring in U.
+Proof. We assume that a proposition of this form is satisfied in a domain O for certain values of the relative symbols. We then imagine that for every sequence of
+values x1, ..., Xm we have chosen, with the help of the principle of choice, a definite
+sequence from among the sequences of values y1, Y2,...
+for which Ux1-.XmVIy2... is
+true. The y that occur in this sequence I denote by y, (X1, ..., Xm), or, more briefly, by
+y, (R), where R denotes the sequence of the x. Let a be a particular individual in O.
+The objects y (a, a,..., a) then form an at most denumerably infinite set Mí. (In-
+deed, it may be a finite set since the y need not all be distinct.) Let My be the set
+containing the elements of M'í and, besides, also a ; hence M1 = M'í + {a}. Then M1
+is at most denumerably infinite. The sequences of values x1,..., xm that can be
+chosen within M1 and are distinct from the sequence a, a, .... a already considered
+again form an at most denumerably infinite set. The sequences of the y corresponding
+to these sequences R of values therefore also form an at most denumerably infinite
+set, and the same holds for the objects y (R) that occur in these sequences. Let M'2 be
+the set of these y and let M2 = My + Mź. The set of all sequences of values x1, ....
+Xm that can be chosen in M2 but not yet in My is again at most denumerable. Consequently the set of the corresponding sequences y (X1, .., Xm), just like the set of
+objects y (X1, ..., Xm) occurring in them, is itself at most denumerable. Let M3 be the
+set of these y and let M3 = Mz + M3. We continue in this way indefinitely. We
+obtain an infinite sequence M1, M2, M3,... of ever more comprehensive sets. The
+limit set Mo = My + M2t... is then also at most denumerably infinite. If
+X1,..., Xm are arbitrarily chosen within Mo, then x1,..., Xm must already occur in
+the sets My , ..., Mym respectively, where y1,..., Ym are finite numbers, and among
+these numbers there exists a largest, y. Then x1, ..., Xm all occur in My, and consequently every y (21,.. Xm) (r = 1, 2,...) occurs in M',, hence in My+1, and
+therefore also in Mo. Moreover, the proposition
+holds for every choice of x1,..., Xm in Mo. This proves the theorem.
+
+263
+In a similar way we can also prove the following still more general theorem :
+THEOREM 8. If a proposition U is the product of a denumerable set of propositions of
+the form mentioned in Theorem 7, then U is already satisfied in a denumerably infinite
+domain for certain values of the relative symbols occurring in U, provided U can be
+satisfied at all.
+Proof. If the proposition U = I, U,, where, for every r, U, is a proposition of the
+form
+is satisfied for certain values of the relatives that occur in it, then we imagine, for
+every sequence x],.... Xm,, a definite sequence chosen from among the corresponding
+sequences yi, Y½, ... for which Ur is true. For every choice of the number r and of the
+objects xi,..., xm,, then, the yi, Y½, ... are uniquely determined. Let a be a particular
+individual of the domain. Then the objects y corresponding to the choice xi = a,
+xcz = a,..., am, = a form an at most denumerable set Mí. Let My = Mi + {a3. The
+various new sequences of values xi, .., Xmy, together with all possible sequences of
+values x],..., Xmą that are taken within M1, again form an at most denumerable
+set, and the objects y occurring in the sequences of the y that correspond to these
+sequences therefore also form an at most denumerably infinite set M'2. Let Mz = M1
++ M'½. Then the sequences of values x},.. xmy, x},..., xmz, xi,..., xma that can be
+chosen in M2 but were not already chosen in My form an at most denumerable set,
+and so do the objects y that occur in the various corresponding sequences. Let M'3
+be this latter set and let M3 = M2 + Mz. We continue in this way indefinitely and
+ultimately obtain a limit set Mo, the sum of the increasing sets M1, M2, ..., which
+is also at most denumerably infinite, whereas, as is easily seen, each of the propositions
+U,, and consequently also U', is satisfied in Ma.
+
+Introduction to a general theory of elementary
+propositions
+EMIL LEON POST
+(1921)
+The present paper is Post's doctoral
+dissertation
+at Columbia University,
+completed in 1920 and published the following year. The propositional calculus,
+carved out of the system of Principia
+mathematica, is systematically studied in
+itself,
+as a
+well-defined fragment of
+logic; moreover, a sharp line is drawn
+between the formal system and considerations about the system. Both the
+truth-table and the axiomatic approaches
+are clearly presented. The calculus is
+proved to be complete, in the sense that
+the set of provable well-formed formulas
+coincides with the set of truth-functionally valid formulas. The paper also establishes another kind of completeness,
+sometimes called completeness in the
+sense of Post; a system is complete in
+that sense if every well-formed formula
+becomes provable once we adjoin to the
+axioms any well-formed formula that is
+not provable. What Post himself calls a
+"complete" system is one in which every
+truth function can be written in terms of
+the primitive truth functions, and he
+shows that the calculus under study, in
+which the connectives are ~ and V, is
+complete in that sense. A consistency
+proof of the calculus is given. A new
+definition of consistency,
+sometimes
+called consistency in the sense of Post,
+is presented; a calculus that contains
+propositional variables is consistent in
+that sense if no well-formed formula consisting of a single propositional variable
+is provable. Consistency in that sense,
+too, is established.
+Post then generalizes the propositional
+fragment of Principia in two directions:
+by considering, first, an arbitrary number of (not necessarily binary) primitive
+truth functions, and, second, an arbitrary finite number of axioms and rules
+of inference. (On problems connected
+with the first generalization see Post
+1920a and 1941, and on problems connected with the second see Post 194la,
+pp. 346-402.) This part of Post's study of
+the propositional calculus forms the point
+of departure of his investigations of
+formal systems (1941a, 1943).
+The last part of the paper contains a
+generalization of another character: m-
+valued truth tables are introduced. At
+the same time Lukasiewicz (1920) was
+studying three-valued logic, but while he
+had a philosophical interest in the new
+logics, Post's was almost exclusively
+mathematical.
+Two points rather naturally connected
+with Post's investigations are not discussed in the present paper. One is the
+question of the independence of the
+axioms that Post took over from Principia for the propositional calculus. The
+problem had been solved by Bernays in
+1918 (though Bernays's paper was not
+published till 1926), and it turns out that
+the second formula on the
+first line of
+
+265
+IV, on page 267, can be proved when the lus, a problem subsequently investigated
+other four formulas of IV are taken as
+by Zylinski (1925), Post himself (1941),
+axioms. The second point left untouched
+and Wernick (1942).
+by Post here is the problem of finding the
+The paper is reprinted here with the kind
+minimal bases of the propositional calcu- permission of the Johns Hopkins Press.
+INTRODUCTION
+In the general theory of logic built up by Whitehead and Russell (1910, 1912, 1913)
+to furnish a basis for all mathematics there is a certain subtheory! which is unique
+in its simplicity and precision, and, though all other portions of the work have their
+roots in this subtheory, it itself is completely independent of them. Whereas the
+complete theory requires for the enunciation of its propositions real and apparent
+variables, which represent both individuals and propositional functions of different
+kinds, and as a result necessitates the introduction of the cumbersome theory of types,
+this subtheory uses only real variables, and these real variables represent but one kind
+of' entity, which the authors have chosen to call elementary propositions. The most
+general statements are formed by merely combining these variables by means of the
+two primitive propositional functions of propositions, negation and disjunction; and
+the entire theory is concerned with the process of asserting those combinations which
+it regards as true propositions, employing for this purpose a few general rules, which
+tell how to assert new combinations from old, and a certain number of primitive
+assertions from which to begin.
+This theory in a somewhat different form has long been the subject matter of
+symbolic logic.? However, although it had reached a high state of development as a
+theory of classes, it had this incurable defect as a logic of propositions that it used
+informally in its proofs the very propositions whose formal statements it tried to
+prove. This defect appears to be entirely overcome in the development of Principia.
+But owing to the particular purpose the authors had in view they decided not to
+burden their work with more than was absolutely necessary for its achievement, and
+so gave up the generality of outlook which characterized symbolic logic.
+It is with the recovery of this generality that the first portion of our paper deals.
+We here wish to emphasize that the theorems of this paper are about the logic of propositions but are not included therein. More particularly, whereas the propositions of
+Principia are particular assertions introduced for their interest and usefulness in
+later portions of the work, those of the present paper are about the set of all such
+possible assertions. Our most important theorem gives a uniform method for testing
+the truth of any proposition of the system; and by means of this theorem it becomes
+possible to exhibit certain general relations which exist between these propositions.
+These relations definitely show that the postulates of Principia are capable of developing the complete system of the logic of propositions without ever introducing
+results extraneous to that system—a conclusion that could hardly have been arrived
+at by the particular processes used in that work.
+Further development suggests itself in two directions. On the one hand this general
+1 Whitehead and Russell 1910, part I, sec. A.
+2 See Lewis 1918. An extensive bibliography is given there.
+
+266
+procedure might be extended to other portions of Principia, and we hope at some
+future time to present the beginning of such an attempt. On the other hand we might
+take cognizance of the fact that the system of Principia is but one particular development of the theory—particular in the primitive functions it employs and in the
+postulates it imposes on those functions-and so might construct a general theory of
+such developments. This we have tried to do in the other portions of the paper. Our
+first generalization leads to systems which are essentially equivalent to that of
+Principia and connects up with the work of Sheffer (1913) and Nicod (1916) in
+reducing the number of primitive functions and of primitive propositions respectively.
+The second generalization, on the other hand, while including the first, also seems to
+introduce essentially new systems. One class of such systems, and we study these in
+detail, seems to have the same relation to ordinary logic that geometry in a space of
+an arbitrary number of dimensions has to the geometry of Euclid. Whether these
+"non-Aristotelian" logics and the general development which includes them will have
+a direct application we do not know; but we believe that, inasmuch as the theory of
+elementary propositions is at the base of the complete system of Principia, this
+broadened outlook upon the theory will serve to prepare us for a similar analysis of
+that complete system, and so ultimately of mathematics.
+Finally a word must be said about the viewpoint that is adopted in this paper and
+the method that is used. We have consistently regarded the system of Principia and
+the generalizations thereof as purely formal developments, and so have used whatever
+instruments of logic or mathematics we found useful for a study of these developments.
+The fact that one of the interpretations of the system of Principia is part of the
+informal logic we have used in this study makes the full significance of this interpretation, at least with regard to proofs of consistency, uncertain, but it in no way
+affects the actual content of the paper, which is in connection with the formal systems.
+THE SYSTEM OF PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA
+1. Description of the system
+Let p, PI, P2,..., 9, 91, 92...,r, r1, '2... arbitrarily represent the variable elementary propositions mentioned in the introduction. Then by means of the two primitive
+functions ~p (read not p, the function of negation) and p V q (p or q, the function
+of disjunction) with the aid of the primitive propositions
+I. If p is an elementary proposition, ~p is an elementary proposition,
+If p and q are elementary propositions, p V q is an elementary proposition,
+we combine these variables to form the various propositions or, rather, ambiguous
+values of propositional functions of the system. It is desirable in what follows to have
+before us the vision of the totality of these functions streaming out from the unmodified
+variable p through forms ofever-growing complexity to form the infinite triangular array
+P V ~P,
+PVP, PIVPz ~p
+~PI V ~p2,
+(P1 V P2) V (P3 V PA),
+~ (21 V P2),
+V P),
+~~P
+3 For a general statement of this viewpoint see Lewis 1918, chap. VI, sec. III.
+
+267
+and to note and remember that this array of functions formed merely through
+combining p's by ~'s and v's constitutes the entire set of enunications it is possible
+to make in the theory of elementary propositions of Principra.
+But the actual theory is concerned with the assertion of a certain subset of these
+functions. We denote the assertion of a function by writing + before it. Then the
+motive power for the resulting process of deduction is furnished by the two rules of
+operation:
+II. The assertion of a function involving a variable p produces the assertion of any
+function found from the given one by substituting for p any other variable q, or ~q,
+or (g V r);*
+III. "+ P" and "t: ~P.V.Q" produce "+ Q"
+These enable us to assert new functions from old or rather, in the form in which we
+have put them, generate new assertions from old. And the complete set of assertions
+is produced by applying II and III both to the following assertions, which give us the
+start, and to all derived assertions that may result:
+IV.:~(pVp).V.p,t:~[pV (gVr)].V.gV(pVr),
+t:~g.V.pVq,
+1:~(~9Vr).V:~(pV 9).V.pVr,
+1:~(p V 9).V.9Vp.
+We here again point out what was emphasized in the introduction that this theory
+concerns itself exclusively with the production of particular assertions through the
+detailed use of the rules of operation upon the primitive assertions, and as a consequence the set of theorems of this portion of Principia consists of the assertions of a
+certain number of particular functions of the above infinite set.5
+2. Truth table development®
+Let us denote the truth value of any proposition p by + if it is true and by - if it
+is false. This meaning of + and - is convenient to bear in mind as a guide to thought,
+but in the actual development that follows they are to be considered merely as symbols which we manipulate in a certain way. Then if we attach these two primitive
+truth tables to ~ and V
+P ~P
++
++
+p, 9
++ +
++
++
+P V9
++
++
++
+* This operation is not explicitly stated in Principia but is pointed out to be necessary by
+Russell (1919, p. 151). Its particular form was suggested to us by the first portion of the operation
+of " substitution" given by Lewis (1918, p. 295). It will be noticed that the effect of II is to enable
+us to substitute any function of the system for a variable of an asserted function.
+5 We have consistently ignored the idea of definition in this description. We here rigorously
+follow the authors in saying that definition is a convenience but not a necessity and so need not
+be considered part of the theoretical development. And so although we too shall at times use its
+shorthand, we do not encumber our theoretical survey with it.
+6 Truth values, truth functions, and our primitive truth tables are described in Whitehead and
+Russell, 1910, pp. 8 and 120, but the general notion of truth table is not introduced. This notion
+is quite precise with Jevons and Venn (see Lewis 1918, pp. 74 and 175ff., respectively) and has its
+foundation in the formula for the expansion of logical functions first given by Boole (1854,
+especially pp. 72-76). For the relation to Schröder see footnote 7.
+
+268
+we have a means of calculating the truth values of ~p and p V g from those of their
+arguments. Now consider any function f(P1, P2,..., Pn) in our system of functions,
+which we will designate by F. Then since f is built up of combinations of ~'s and V's,
+if we assign any particular set of truth values to the p's, successive application of the
+above two primitive tables will enable us to calculate the corresponding truth value
+of f. So corresponding to each of the 2" possible truth configurations of the p's a
+definite truth value of f is determined. The relation thus effected we shall call the
+truth table off.
+For example consider the function
+~(~(~PV 9)V ~(~9VP)),
+which is the ultimate definition of the function p = q of Principia. We have when p
+is t and q is + the following truth values of the successive components of the
+function and so finally of the function:
+p:t, ~p:-, ~pVg:t, ~(~pV 9):-
+g:t, ~g:-~qVp:t, ~(~9Vp):-
+~(~p V 9)V~(~9VP):-,~(~(~pV9)V~(~9VP)):+,
+the successive truth values being found by direct application of the primitive tables.
+In the same way the truth values for pt, 9-, and so forth can be calculated and so
+we finally get the truth table of p= 9, that is,
+p,9 |p =9
+++
++
++
++.
+It is needless to say that in actual work this amount of detail is quite unnecessary.
+We shall call the number of variables which appear in a function the order of that
+function as well as that of its truth table. It is evident that there are 22° tables of the
+nth order. We now prove the
+THEOReM. To every truth table of whatever order there corresponds at least one function
+of I which has it for its truth table.
+For, first, corresponding to the four tables of the first order +|t, +|‡, +|=, -|÷ we
+have the functions p V p,p V ~p, ~ (p V ~p), ~p. Now assume there is a function
+for each mth-order table. Then in any table of order m + 1 the configurations for
+which Pm+1 is + constitute an mth-order table for which there is some function
+JI(PI,P2..., Pm). Likewise corresponding to Pm+1- we obtain f2(PI, P2,..., Pm).
+Let p. q stand for ~ (~p V ~9), a function which has the truth table
+P, 9
++
++
+p.g
++
+
+269
+Then it easily follows that the function
+Pm+1 JI (21, P2.., Pm.V. ~Pm+ 1 J2(21, 12,..,Pm)
+has for its truth-table the given (m + 1)th-order table.
+The functions of F can then be classified according to their tables as follows: those
+which have all their truth values +, all -, or some + and some -. We shall call
+these functions respectively positive, negative, and mixed. This classification is of
+great importance in connection with the process of substitution, which is so fundamental in the postulational development. We shall say that any function obtained
+from another by the process of substitution is contained in that function. We then
+have the
+THeOREM. Every function contained in a positive function is positive; every function
+contained in a negative function is negative; every mixed function contains at least one
+function for every possible truth table.
+The first two results are immediate. In the third case note that any mixed function
+f(P1, P2,..., Pn) has at least one configuration which yields + and one which yields
+-. Let the truth value of p; in the positive configuration be denoted by t; and in the
+negative by tí, and construct a function фi(P) with the truth table
+Фі (2)
++
+ti
+•
+ti
+Then 4(p) = f(DI(P), 2(P),..., n(1)) will be + when p is t and - when p is -.
+But by our first theorem there is at least one function g(91, 92, ..., 9m) corresponding
+to any table of order m. Hence 419(91, 92, ..., Im)] is a function contained in f(PI, P2,
+...,Pn) corresponding to that table.
+COROLLARY. Every mixed function contains at least one positive function and one
+negative function.
+3. The fundamental theorem?
+A necessary and sufficient condition that a function of F' be asserted as a result of the
+postulates II, III, IV is that all its truth values be t.
+" The method for testing propositions embodied in this theorem is essentially the same as that
+given by Schröder (1891, § 32) for the logical system he has developed. But we believe the range of
+significance of the proof we have given to be quite different from that of the work of Schröder.
+For first, as has been emphasized by Lewis (1918, chap. IV), formal and informal logic are inextricably bound together in Schröder's development to an extent that prevents the system as a
+whole from being completely determined. As a result the necessity of the condition of the theorem,
+which evidently requires such a complete determination if it is to be proved, remains unproved.
+As for the sufficiency, parts E and C of our proof appear in the proof for the expression of functions
+given by Schröder (1890). Part A, however, seems not to have been given explicitly, while corresponding to part D are all the theoretical difficulties met with in passing from the theory of classes
+to that of propositions when the development is not strictly formal. Hence the sufficiency of the
+condition is only incompletely proved. The theorem as given by Schröder is therefore of only
+partial significance even in his own system; and when transplanted to the system of Principia
+requires independent proof. Finally we may mention that the applications we have made of the
+theorem depend for their significance on those parts of the proof which do not appear, and could
+not appear, in Schröder.
+
+270
+Note first that each of the primitive assertions of IV is a positive function. Furthermore from the assertion of positive functions we can only get positive functions. For
+the only method we have of producing new assertions from old is through the use of
+II and III. Now II can only produce positive functions since every function contained
+in a positive function is positive. As for III, if P is + and Q is -, ~ P V Qis -, so
+that so long as P is a positive function and ~ P V Q is a positive function & must be
+positive, so that III can produce only positive functions. Hence every asserted
+function is positive and we have proved the condition necessary.
+In order to prove it also sufficient we give a method for deriving the assertion of
+any positive function. It will simplify the exposition to introduce the other two
+defined functions of Principia besides p. q (p and g) given above, namely,
+pog.=.~pv9 Df8
+1 = 9.=. p>9.9>p DJ,
+read "p implies q" and "p is equivalent to q"
+", respectively, and having the tables
+p, 9
+P, 9
+P = 9
++
++
++
++
++
++
+- +
++
++
++
++.
+It will be noticed that if we have "+ f(21,...Pn) = f2(21,...,Pn)" this asserted
+equivalence must have a positive table by the first part of our theorem, and so fi and
+fz must have the same truth values for the same configurations, that is, they must
+have the same truth table.
+The proof is most conveniently given in four stages.
+A. We prove the theorem p = q.J. f(p) = f(g) where the function f may involve
+other arguments besides the one indicated and need not involve that. By means of
+this theorem we shall be able to replace a constituent of a given function by any
+equivalent function, and have the result equivalent to the given function.
+It becomes necessary for the first time to introduce the notion of the rank of a
+function, which we define inductively as follows: the unmodified variable p will be
+said to be of rank zero, the negative of a function of rank m will be of rank m + 1;
+the logical sum of two functions the rank of one of which equals and the other does
+not exceed m will be of rank m + 1. Each function of F then is of finite rank as well
+as of finite order. Returning now to the theorem, we notice that it is true for a
+function of rank zero, since it reduces either to p = g J.p = 9, which follows from
+p> p10 by Il, or top = go. r = r, which follows from po gop, r = r, Ill and II.
+Assume now that the theorem holds for functions of rank m and lower. Then it also
+holds for functions of rank m + 1. For, if f is of rank m + 1, it can be written in the
+form ~fI(p) or fz(p). V fa(p), where fi, f2, and fa are at most of rank m; and then the
+• III can now be written: "t P" and "t P›Q" produce "tO".
+• But whereas the number of functions of given order is infinite, those of given rank are finite
+[in number].
+10 This as well as all other particular assertions that we use without an indication of proof
+appear in Whitehead and Russell 1910, part I, sec. A.
+
+271
+B. Consider now any function f(p1, p2...Pa). Using ~(pVg)=.~p.~gand
+~~p=p, with the aid of the equivalence theorem of A and p=90:g=r
+p =r we finally obtain f(21, P2,..., Pn) equivalent to a function f'(P1, P2, ..., Pri)
+which is expressed merely through combinations of p's and ~p'sby 's and V's
+C." If we then apply the distributive law of logical multiplication to f', it will be
+reduced to an equivalent function consisting of successive logical sums of successive
+logical products of the p's and the ~p's. If any of these products has neither In nor
+~In as a factor, we can introduce them through the propositions p V ~p and p:):
+g.=.p.g, whence:=:(p V~p).g:=:p.q.V.~p.q. Now apply the commutative
+and associative laws of logical multiplication along with p.p.=. p, so that each
+product has at most one p, and one ~pi. Again using the distributive law for purposes of factorization along with the commutative and associative laws of addition,
+we finally obtain f equivalent to
+JI(P1,P2...,Pn-1)-Pr.~Pn:V:J2(P1,...,Pn-1).Pn.V.Js(PI,...,Pn-1).~Pn,
+where one or more of the terms and arguments may not appear.
+D. Suppose now that the original function is positive; then this equivalent function
+will be positive. If in particular it be of first order, it can only be pV ~porp.~. p
+V. PV ~p. The first is an asserted function; likewise the second through p.3.9 V p.
+Hence also f(p) will be asserted through p = 9.J. 9P; and so every positive firstorder function is asserted. Assume now that this is true for all mth and lower-ordered
+functions and let f be any positive (m + 1)th-order function. The reduced function
+being then positive, both fz and fa will be positive and hence will be asserted. From the
+use ofp::p.p=9p.r..p.~p:::p.rV~p.p:3:80.p.sandp.p.gvp,
+the reduced function will be asserted and so finally f. Hence every positive function
+can be asserted and so the proof is complete.
+We thus see that given any function the theorem gives a direct method for testing
+whether that function can or cannot be asserted; and if the test shows that the
+function can be asserted the above proof will give us an actual method for immediately
+writing down a formal derivation of its assertion by means of the postulates of Principia.
+Before we pass on to theorems about the system itself irrespective of truth tables,
+we give the following definitions, which apply directly to the system: a true function
+is one that can be asserted as a result of the postulates, any other is false; a completely
+false function is a false function such that every function therein contained is false—
+otherwise we call it incompletely false. We then have the
+COROLLARY. The sets of true, completely false, and incompletely false functions are
+identical with the sets of positive, negative, and mixed functions, respectively.
+4. Consequences of the fundamental theorem
+In the above development the truth values +, - were arbitrary symbols which
+were found related in certain suggestive ways through the fundamental theorem. We
+are now in a position to give direct definitions of these truth values in terms of the
+postulational development. In fact we shall define + to be the set of true functions,
+- the set of completely false functions. The truth value of a function will then exist
+11 This portion of the proof is essentially that given by Whitehead (1898, p. 46).
+
+272
+when and only when it is true or completely false, and it will be defined as that class
+(t, -) of which it is a member. The content of the fundamental theorem consists
+now of these two theorems :
+1. The truth values of ~p and q V r exist whenever the truth values of p, q, and r
+exist and depend only on those truth values as given by the primitive tables. It
+therefore follows that the same is true of any function of F and that the truth table
+of such a function can be directly calculated from the primitive tables.
+2. The fundamental theorem as stated, or else in the form: if fi and fz is any pair
+of positive and negative functions respectively, then a necessary and sufficient condition that a function f(P1, P2,..., Pn) be asserted is that each of the 2n contained
+functions found by substituting fi and f2 for the p's is asserted. It will be noticed that
+Theorem 1 tells us how to determine whether these latter are asserted.
+We now pass on to several theorems about the system.
+THEOREM. It is possible to find 22" functions of order n such that no two of them are
+equivalent and such that every other function of order n is equivalent to one of these.
+For we can find 22" functions corresponding to the 22" different tables of order n.
+The equivalence of any two of these will then not have a positive table and so will
+not be asserted. On the other hand any other nth-order function will have the same
+table as one of the 22" possible tables, and so the corresponding equivalence will be
+positive and hence asserted.
+THEOREM. An incompletely false function contains at least one function, for each given
+function, which is equivalent to that given function.
+COROLLARY. An incompletely false function contains at least one true function and one
+completely false function.
+THEOREM. The negative of a completely false function is true.
+For a completely false function has a negative truth table, and so its negative will
+have a positive table and hence be asserted. It is worth noticing that although this
+theorem is immediate once we have the fundamental theorem it would be quite
+difficult without it.
+COROLLARY. Every function of F' is either true, or its negative is true, or it contains
+both a true function and one whose negative is true.
+THeOREM. The system of elementary propositions of Principia is consistent.
+For if it were inconsistent we would have both a function and its negative asserted.
+But then both the function and its negative would have to have positive tables
+whereas if a function has a positive table its negative has a negative table.'2
+THeOREM. Every function of the system either can be asserted by means of the postulates
+or else is inconsistent with them.
+For, if a function be not asserted as a result of the postulates, it will contain a
+function whose negative can be so asserted. If then we assert the original function,
+the contained function will be asserted, so that we have asserted both a function and
+its negative, that is, we have a contradiction.
+COROLLARY. A function is either asserted as a result of the postulates or else its assertion
+will bring about the assertion of every possible elementary proposition.
+For by the theorem we would obtain the assertion of both a function and its
+12 This argument requires merely the first part of the fundamental theorem, which was proved
+quite simply.
+
+273
+negative and so by ~p.. p> q the assertion of the unmodified variable q. But q then
+represents any elementary proposition.
+In conclusion let us note that, while the fundamental theorem shows that the
+postulates bring about the assertion of those and only those theorems which should
+belong to the system, this last theorem enables us to say that they also automatically
+exclude the very possibility of any added assertions.
+GENERALIZATION BY TRUTH TABLES
+5. General survey of the systems generated
+The system we have studied in the preceding sections is a particular system
+depending upon the two primitive functions ~p and p V g. Iwo modes of attack
+have presented themselves. On the one hand we have the original postulational
+method, on the other the truth table development. In passing to a general study of
+systems of the kind discussed these two methods present themselves as instruments
+of generalization. We reserve the postulational generalization for the next portion of
+our paper and now take up the truth table generalization.
+To gain complete generality let us assume for our primitives u arbitrary functions
+with an arbitrary number of arguments, which we will designate by
+JI (PI, P2..., Pmy), Jz (11, P2.., Pma),.... JulP1, 12...,Pmu,
+and let us attach an arbitrary truth table to each. By successive combinations of
+these functions with different or repeated arguments we generate the set of derived
+functions, which as before we designate by F. Again each function of E will possess
+a truth table in virtue of the tables of the primitive functions of which each is composed. Denote the set of truth tables thus generated by I. Then, whereas in the
+system of Principia I' consists of all possible truth tables, this will not necessarily be
+the case here.
+In another paper!3 we completely determine all the possible systems T and show that
+there are 66 systems that can be generated by tables of third and lower order, and S infinite
+families of systems that are generated by the introduction of fourth-and higher-order tables.
+If two systems have the same truth tables, the primitives of each can evidently
+be expressed in terms of those of the other so that truth tables are preserved. We can
+then say that each system has a representation in the other and the two are equivalent. In particular every truth system has a representation in the system of Principia while
+every complete system, that is, one having all possible truth tables, is equivalent to it.
+In the aforementioned paper we also determine the ways in which a complete system
+may be generated, and it turns out that one table alone is sufficient to generate it, and
+it can be either of these two
++
++
++
++
+++
++
++-
++
++
+- +
++,
+a result first given by Sheffer as stated in the introduction.
+13 [ Post 1920a. See also 1941, whose Introduction gives the history of Post's work on the
+subject.l
+
+274
+The truth table development for complete systems is essentially the same as that
+given in Section 2. It is easy to prove for all systems the
+THeOREM. Every function contained in a positive function is positive; every function
+contained in a negative function is negative; every mixed function contains a function for
+every table of the system.
+6. Postulates for a complete system
+We now show how to construct a set of postulates for any complete system such
+that: the set of asserted functions is identical with the set of positive functions, while the
+assertion of any other function brings about the assertion of every elementary proposition,
+a property which also characterized the system of Principia.
+Let ~'p and p V'g be functions in the given complete system with the tables of
+~ and V. Out of ~'and V' we then construct pog and p = gas pagand p= 9
+are found from ~ and V, and also fi(21,..., Pm),..., fu (21, ..., Pm.) with the same
+tables as Ji(21,...,Amy),.... Ju(PI,..., Pmu). This is possible since ~ and V, and so
+~'and V', can generate a complete system. All the functions ~', V', »', =',fí,....
+Ju are ultimately expressed in terms of the f's and so belong to the system. Construct
+now the following set of postulates:
+I. If P1,..., Pm are elementary propositions, fI(P1, ..., Pmy) is.
+If P1,.... Pm, are elementary propositions, Ju(P1,..., Pmu) is.
+II. The assertion of a function involving a variable p produces the assertion of any
+function found from the given one by substituting for p any other variable, q, or
+J1(91,...,9mJ),..., or Ju(91,...,9m«).
+II. "
+¡P" and "+ PS'Q" produces "+Q".
+IV. (1) F:@ V'p.s'p
+(5) г...
+(a) +-fI(PI, P2...,Pms) ='fí(PI, P2,...,Pmy),
+(2) F. Ju (Ps, P2... Pmu) ='f" (Ps, Ps...., Pmu).
+where (1)-(5) are the assertions of IV in Section 1 with ~' and V' in place of ~
+and V.
+That all asserted functions are positive can be verified as in the proof of Section 4.
+As for the converse, note that III and IV (1)-(5), being of the same form as III and
+IV of Section 4, will yield the assertion of all positive functions expressed in terms of
+~'and V'. By the use of (a)-(u) every function can be shown to be equivalent
+(=') to some function expressed by »'and V', and so every positive function will be
+asserted. In the same way the assertion of any nonpositive function will bring about
+the assertion of a nonpositive function in ~'and V'alone, and so of any proposition.
+We thus see that complete systems are equivalent to the system of Principia not
+only in the truth table development but also postulationally. As other systems are in
+a sense degenerate forms of complete systems we can conclude that no new logical
+systems are introduced.
+
+275
+7. Application to Nicod's postulate set
+Although, as in most existence theorems, the above set of postulates may not be
+the simplest in any one case, it can be used to advantage in showing that a given set
+has the same property as it possesses. For this purpose we show directly that all
+asserted functions are positive and then that (a) by means of the given postulates
+each of our formal postulates may be derived and (b) the results derivable by our
+informal postulates can also be derived by the given ones. 14
+As an example we consider the set of postulates given by Nicod for the theory of
+elementary propositions in terms of the single primitive function of Sheffer's, which
+Nicod denotes by p|q and is termed incompatibility by Russell (1919, chap. XIV).
+It is the first of the two functions given in Section 5 as generating a complete system.
+Nicod gives the definitions
+~p.=.P|P Df,
+p V 9.=. p/p|9/9 Df,
+which we take to be our «'p and p V'g respectively. His pog.=. p|9/9 Df, however, is not our po'g, which is ~'p v' q. The primary distinction of his system is that
+he uses but one formal primitive proposition.
+In carrying out the proof suggested we merely note that by means of his informal
+proposition
+"+P" and "+ P|R/Q" produce " +Q"
+we get the effect of
+"†P" and "+ P|Q/Q" (that is, "+ P›Q") produce " + Q"
+when R = Q. Since he has pó'q.2.p > q., we thus get the effect of
+"IP" and "1 P''Q" produce " +P",
+our III. Likewise each function IV is proved with, however, › in place of s'. But by
+means of pog.s. pag this too is remedied. We then easily complete the proof of the
+THEOReM. If in Nicod's system we give to p|9 the table
+p, 9
+12l9
+++
++
++
++
++
++,
+then the set of asserted functions is identical with the resulting set of positive functions;
+and the assertion of any other function would bring about the assertion of every elementary
+proposition.
+14 That the informal postulates of a system must be proved effectively replaced by others in
+another system is a precaution rarely taken in discussions of equivalence or dependence of logica
+systems. Such a discussion is unnecessary in ordinary mathematical systems since their distinc
+tive postulates are all formal, the informal ones being those of a common logic. But in comparing
+logical systems, which usually do contain different informal postulates, such a discussion is
+fundamental.
+
+276
+GENERALIZATION BY POSTULATION
+8. The generalized set of postulates
+As in the truth table development we assume arbitrary primitive functions of
+propositions
+JI(PI, P2..., Pms),..., Ju(PI, P2,...,Pmu;
+but in place of the arbitrary associated truth tables we have a set of postulates of the
+following form. We have tried to preserve all the informal properties of the postulates
+of Principia (and of Section 5) but generalize the formal properties completely.
+I. (As in Section 5.)
+II. (As in Section 5.)
+"1 9x2 (Ps, Pas..., Pkx)"
+•
+•.•
+produce
+produce
+"F9I(P1, Pz,..., Plz)"
+"1 9к(Ps, P2,..., Pre)",
+where the P's are any combinations of f's, including the special case of the unmodified variable, while the g's are particular combinations of this kind which need not
+have all the indicated arguments.
++ ha(PI, P2..., P12)
+••Pia),
+where the h's are particular combinations of the f's.
+The retention of I and II, which are characteristic of the theory of elementary
+propositions, is our justification for giving that name to the systems that may be
+generated by the above set of postulates. In what follows we give what we consider
+to be merely an introduction to the general theory.
+9. Definition of consistency and related concepts
+The prime requisite of a set of postulates is that it be consistent. Since the ordinary
+notion of consistency involves that of contradiction, which again involves negation,
+and since this function does not appear in general as a primitive in the above system,
+a new definition must be given.
+Now an inconsistent system in the ordinary sense will involve the assertion of a
+pair of contradictory propositions, which, as we have seen, will bring about the
+assertion of every elementary proposition through the assertion of the unmodified
+variable p. Conversely, since p stands for any elementary proposition, its assertion
+would yield the assertion of contradictory propositions and so render the system in-
+
+277
+consistent. The two notions are thus equivalent in ordinary systems; and since one
+retains significance in the general case we are led to the
+DEFINITION. A system will be said to be inconsistent if it yields the assertion of the
+unmodified variable p.
+In a consistent system we may then define a true function as one that can be
+asserted as a result of the postulates. Instead of defining a false function as one not
+true, we give the following
+DEFINITION. A false function is one such that if its assertion be added to the postulates
+the system is rendered inconsistent.
+We can then state that in the system of Principia every function is true or false.
+This suggests the
+DEFINITION. If every function of a consistent system is true or false, the system will
+be said to be closed. 15
+As a justification of this name we may note that the postulates of such a system
+automatically exclude the possibility of any added assertions—a state of affairs we
+believe to be highly desirable in the final form of a logical theory.
+10. Properties of consistent systems
+In all that follows we assume that the system discussed is consistent. If it be inconsistent one could hardly say anything more about it.
+We turn to a theorem which will give us most of the results of this section. But
+first we must state two lemmas which we do not further prove.
+LEMMA 1. If a given set of functions gives rise to some other function in accordance
+with II and III and if these functions involve certain letters r1, "2, ..., Y, upon which
+no substitution is made in the process, then the same deductive process will be valid
+if we have given the original functions with an arbitrary substitution of the r's as
+described in II provided this substitution is also made throughout the process.
+LEMMA 2. The most general process of obtaining an assertion from a given set of
+assertions in accordance with Il and III can be reduced to first asserting a number of
+functions in accordance with II and then applying II and III in such a way that no
+substitutions are made on the arguments of those functions.16
+THeOReM. Every false function contains a finite set of untrue first-order functions
+ФІ(2), Ф2(2),..., Ф (1) such that whenever p is replaced by an untrue function at least one
+of these functions remains untrue.
+By the definition of false functions there must be some deductive process whereby
+from the given false function and true functions we assert p. By Lemma 2 we can
+replace this process by another where from the given false function and true functions
+we obtain certain contained functions from which without substitution of the
+15 Had the name not been in use in a different connection we should have introduced the term
+"categorical".
+16 [Concerning this passage Post wrote later (1943, footnote 2, p. 197): "We take this opportunity to make the following emendation: Lemma 1 thereof requires the added condition that
+the expressions replacing the r's do not involve any letter upon which a substitution is made in
+the given deductive process. This necessitates several minor changes in the proof of the theorem
+there following. Actually, both Lemma 1 and its companion Lemma 2 admit of further simplification, with the proof of the theorem then being valid as it stands". See also footnote 17 in Post
+1941a, pp. 347-348.]
+
+278
+arguments we obtain p. Now first by Lemma 1 we can equate to p all the arguments
+thus appearing and still have a valid deductive process for obtaining p. Denote the
+resulting untrue functions which are contained in the original false function by
+ФІ(Р), Ф2(Р),..., Ф (P). Then secondly by Lemma 1 we can replace p by any function
+y and still have a valid process, which now consists in obtaining y from certain true
+functions and q (4), ..., (4). If then each qi (4) were true, 4, being obtained from
+true functions in accordance with II and III, would be true. It follows that, if y be
+untrue, some фi(4) must be untrue.
+THeOReM. Every false function contains an infinite number of untrue first-order
+functions; and if the system has at least one false function of order greater than one, then
+each false function contains an infinite number of untrue functions of every order.
+By the above theorem the false function contains at least one untrue function
+Фіз(p). By the same theorem some Pizli,(p) must be untrue, and so on, through
+Фі,Фі-1»..Фіз(p). These are all different, being of different rank, and are all contained
+in the given function.
+The last part of the theorem may then be proved by showing that by replacing
+equal by unequal variables in the infinity of functions thus gotten from the false
+function of order greater than one we get untrue functions of every order, and so by
+the above method an infinite number of every order in every false function.
+We have immediately the
+THeOreM. A necessary and sufficient condition that a function of a closed system be
+true is that all contained first-order functions be true.
+CorOLLArY. It is also necessary and suffcient that all those of rank greater than some
+finite integer p be true.
+In analogy with corresponding ideas in the system of Principia, define a completely
+untrue function as one in which all contained functions are untrue, with a similar
+definition for completely false. We then have the interesting
+THEOREM. If a system has a completely untrue function, then every false function
+contains a completely untrue function.
+Every function contained in the completely untrue function makes at least one
+ф(p) of a false function untrue. If f is such a contained function which makes say
+Фі (p) true, then & will be completely untrue, and all contained functions will make
+Ф;(p) true yet some remaining pi(p) untrue. By repeating this process we finally
+obtain a function y' such that all contained functions make each qi (p) of a set that
+remains untrue. Each such pily') will then be a completely untrue function in the
+given one.
+COROLLArY. If a closed system has a completely false function, every false function
+contains a completely false function.
+If we call such a system completely closed, we have the stronger
+THEOREM. In a completely closed system every false function f(P1, P2, ..., Pn) contains
+a completely false function f(41 (P), 42(1),..., 4n(1)), where each 4, (p) is either true or
+completely false.
+By equating all variables to p in the function of the corollary we get such a completely false function where some f's may be incompletely false. These are then
+eliminated by successively substituting for p functions which make them true.
+COROLLARY. A necessary and sufficient condition that a function of a completely closed
+
+279
+system be true is that all contained first-order functions found by substituting true or
+completely false functions for the arguments be true.
+This property begins to approximate to the truth table method. It leads us easily
+to the following criterion for a completely closed postulational system being a truth
+system, which we state without proof.
+THEOREM. A necessary and suficient condition that a completely closed postulational
+system be a truth system is that a true first-order function remain true whenever we replace
+a true or completely false constituent function by any other true or completely false firstorder function, respectively. 17
+M-VALUED TRUTH SYSTEMS 18
+11. The generalized (~, V) system
+We have seen that the truth-table generalization, at least with regard to complete
+systems, is included in the postulational development. We now show that the latter
+is more general by presenting a new class of systems, distinct from the two-valued
+systems of symbolic logic, which can be generated by a completely closed set of
+postulates.
+In these systems instead of the two truth values +, - we have m distinct "truth
+values" t1, tz, ..., 'm, where m is any positive integer. A function of order n will now
+have m" configurations in its truth table, so that there will be mm" truth tables of
+order n. Calling a system having all possible tables complete, we now show that the
+following two tables generate a complete system.
+~mP
+p,9 P Vm 9
+titI
+tz
+•..
+•. •
+tin
+tin
+•.•
+•••
+Emtm
+We see that ~mp, the generalization of ~p, permutes the truth values cyclically,
+while p Vm 9, the generalization of p V 9, has the higher of the two truth values. 19
+To construct a function for any first-order table, of which there are mm, note that
+tI(P).=.PV ~mp.Vm mp:Vm... ~m-'p Df,
+where ~2p.=. ~~p Df, and so forth, has all its truth values t1. Then
+T_(p).=~~~mI(p).Vm-p): Vm.~mp) Df
+17 In making a more complete study of the postulational generalization it would be desirable
+to classify all the systems that may result more or less in the way in which we have classified
+truth systems through the associated systems of truth tables. In this connection we might define
+the order of a set of postulates as the largest number of premisses used in deriving a conclusion in
+III, and the order of a system as the lowest order a set of postulates deriving it can have. It is
+then of interest to note that whereas the set of postulates of the system of Principia is of the second
+order, the system itself is of the first order.
+18 See Lewis 1918, p. 222, for the term "two-valued algebra".
+19 The higher truth value has here the smaller subscript.
+
+280
+has all values im except the first, which is my. Any first-order table
+to tima
+can then be constructed by the function
+Tm (P). Vm=Tma(~M-'P): Vm-Tmz(~M-21):. Vm...Tmm~mP).
+Construct now a function for the table
+ts tm
+Em -1
+•.•
+Em
+and define p.ma.=. =m/=mP. Vm. m9) Df, which is the generalization of p. g and
+has the lower of the two truth values of its arguments. We can now construct a table
+all of whose values are im except for one configuration my ma'..., Amn when it is
+Emmmamn = tu by the function
+T(~m-m_+1P1)•mTu(~M-Mzt1P2)•m...Tu(~M-Mt1Pn),
+and so any table by constructing such a function for each configuration and then
+"summing up" by Vm-
+12. Classification of functions the m-dimensional space analogy
+The generalization of the classification of functions into positive, negative, and
+mixed is afforded us by the following
+THEOREM. A function contains at least one function for every truth table whose values
+are contained among the values of the given table.
+Let tmy,...,tmu be the truth values that appear in the table of a given function
+f(P1, P2,...,Pn). Then we can pick out u configurations having these values respectively. Construct functions q (p) such that, when p has the value tm, of one of these
+configurations, pi(p) have the value of p, in that configuration. It is then easily seen
+that f(PI (P), ..., n(p)) has the value tm, whenever p has the value im, If then
+4(91,92..,91) have a table whose values are among the tm, f(91(4),.... on(4)) will
+be a function contained in the given function with that table.
+We are thus led to a classification of functions by means of their truth tables such
+that the set of tables of functions contained in a given function is the same for all
+functions in a given class. We then have m classes of functions where but one truth
+value appears, [m(m - 1)]/2! with two truth values, .., [m(m - 1)... (m - u + 1)]
+Iu! with u truth values, ..., one class with all m truth values. We thus have 2m - 1
+classes of functions, which when m = 2 reduces to the three classes of positive,
+negative, and mixed functions.
+
+281
+These formulas suggest an analogy which, if well founded, is of great interest. For
+this purpose replace the set of functions having all of a given set of u truth values by
+all functions whose values are among these u values. If then we compare the functions
+of our complete system to the points of a space of m dimensions, 2° the m classes of
+functions with but one truth value would correspond to the m coordinate axes, the
+[m(m - 1)]/2! classes of functions with no more than two truth values to the
+[m(m - 1)]/2! coordinate planes, and so on, so that except for the absence of an origin
+all properties of determination and intersection within the coordinate configurations
+go over. If then we attach the name "m-dimensional truth space" to our system, we
+observe the following difference, that whereas the highest-dimensioned intuitional
+point space is three, the highest-dimensioned intuitional proposition space is two.
+But just as we can interpret the higher-dimensioned spaces of geometry intuitionally
+by using some other element than point, so we shall later interpret the higherdimensioned spaces of our logic by taking some other element than proposition.
+13. Truth table characteristics of asserted functions
+The following analysis presupposes that in constructing a set of postulates for the
+system we at least wish to impose the
+CONDITION. If a function is asserted, all functions with the same truth table will be
+asserted.
+It follows from the theorem of the preceding section that under the given condition, if a function is asserted, every function of the truth space it determines is asserted.
+We can now prove that, if the system is to be completely closed, its asserted functions
+must constitute a single truth space contained in the given truth space. For, if there were
+at least two such spaces, then a function having all their truth values would be false,
+and so would contain a completely false function. This in turn would contain functions
+with but one truth value; and these being therefore in one of the two given spaces
+would be true, which contradicts their being in a completely false function.
+No loss of generality ensues if we take the truth values of this contained truth
+space of asserted functions to be t1, tz, ...,tu, where, to avoid degenerate cases,
+O < u <m. We now show that a completely closed set of postulates can be constructed for all such systems.
+14. A completely closed set of postulates for the systems
+I and II are determined directly as in the general case. To obtain III, construct a
+function p 2m g whose table is given by the following: when the truth value of p is
+that of g or lower, p aig will have the value ti, while if the truth value of pis above
+that of g, then if the value of p is t„ or higher, p om g will have the value of g, while if
+it is below tw, say ty, and that of q is tu, then the truth value of p amg will be tr-v+1.
+III will then be simply
+"P"and "t POmQ" produce " + Q".
+20 Or we might take the truth table as element, in which case the system is perhaps smoother
+than before.
+
+282
+Now by generalizing each part A, B, C, D of the proof of the fundamental theorem
+of Section 3 it can be shown that by the assertion of a finite number of functions
+with values from ty to tu all such can be obtained.? If then we assert these functions
+in IV, we shall have every function in the u-space asserted. Furthermore no others
+can be asserted, for by the use of II and III we can only get functions with values from
+ty to tu by means of functions similarly restricted. This is obvious in II, while in III
+if the value of P is from ty to tu while that of Q is below tu, then from the above
+definition of the table of P am Q it would have the value of Q and so be below tu. But
+that contradicts the assumption that the premisses had values from ty to tu.
+This set of postulates will then give the proper set of true functions. Furthermore
+let us suppose that we assert a function with at least one value below t. This will
+contain a function «(p) with but one value, and that below tu. By II, q(p) will be
+asserted. Furthermore, since Ф(p) Jm (P) m~m"(p) has its value ti, it will be asserted, and so we obtain by III ~m$(p). Repetition of this process will finally give us a
+function 4(p) with but one value tm. But 4(p) Im p is asserted having but one value t1.
+We thus obtain the assertion of p. The system is therefore closed. And since all
+functions with values from tu +1 to tm are completely false, the system is completely
+closed.
+15. Comparison of systems
+As in the truth-table development we can generalize the systems by using arbitrary
+functions as primitives, and as was done there we can show how to generate a complete
+m-dimensioned system by one second-order function and how to give a completely
+closed set of postulates for all complete systems. The problem of determining all possible
+systems of m-dimensional truth
+tables, however, is one we have not considered,
+though its solution would throw considerable light on the ordinary problem.
+We turn now to the following
+DeFINITIoNs. A closed system S with primitives fi, f2, ..., In has a representation in
+a closed system S' with primitives fí, f2,..., In' if we can so replace the f's by functions
+in S' that a function in S will be true when and only when the correspondent in S' is true.
+Iwo systems are equivalent if each has a representation in the other.
+Denote a complete m-dimensional truth system with the asserted functions forming
+a truth space of u dimensions by «Im. We then have the
+THEOREM. Iwo complete truth systems «I'm and "'I'm are equivalent when and only
+when u = l'andm =m'.
+The conditions are clearly sufficient since we can make truth values correspond.
+To prove them necessary suppose m > m'. If we construct mm functions of first order
+in I with different truth tables, then there will be two, Ф1(P), 42(p), whose correspondents ' (p), '(p) have the same truth tables since there are in I" only mm'm' of
+first order. Let x(p, 9) have value t when p and q have the same value and tm otherwise. Then X(Ф1, Фı) is true; hence x'(Ф1, 1) is. Oź having the same table as Ø'í,
+Х'(Ф'í, Фź) is true, and hence X(91, $2) the correspondent. But that would make i have
+the same table as oz. Now suppose u > u'. If o have all the values from ty to tu and
+no others, there are u" functions with values t, to tu of the form 4p(p). These will then
+21 Lack of space prevents us from giving the details.
+
+283
+be asserted and so the correspondents will be asserted and have values tí to tu. Since
+we can only have u'"' functions 'ф'(2) with different tables, we can find two of the
+u" correspondents with the same table. The above contradiction then results as before.
+For representation we have only found the
+THEOREM. To represent „Im in "I'm it is necessary to have u ≤ u', m ≤ m'; it is
+sufficient to have u = u',m - u =m'-u'.
+COROLLARY. A necessary and sufficient condition that „Im have a representation in
+"I'm' is that m ≤ m'.
+It is of interest to note as a result that the only complete truth systems equivalent
+to the system of Principia are Iz's; and though it can be represented in every
+complete truth system, only iT's can be represented in it. We have thus verified our
+statement that we obtain essentially new logical systems.
+16. Interpretation of m-valued truth systems in terms of ordinary logic
+Let the elementary proposition of the (~m, V m) system be interpreted as an ordered
+set of (m - 1) elementary propositions of ordinary logic P = (21, P2, ..., Pm- 1) such
+that if one proposition is true all those that follow are true. P will be then be said to
+have the truth value ty if all the p's are true, to if all but one are true, and so forth.
+Also P will be said to be true if at most (u - 1) p's are false.
+If P= (PI, P2,..., Pm-1), Q= (91,92,...,9m-1), we define
+P VmP.=. (P1 V 91P2 V 92,..., Pm-1 V 9m-1) DJ,
+~mP.=. (~ (PI V Pz V... V Pm-1), ~ (21 V... V Pm-1). V. PI.P2,...,
+~(PIV... V Pm-1). V. Pm-2-Pm-1) Df.
+We easily justify these definitions by showing first that P Vm& and ~mP are
+"elementary propositions" when P and & are, and secondly that they have the
+proper truth tables. Thus in P VmQ the first p. V gi to be true is the first for which
+either p or q is true; also all later terms will have p or q true and so will be true.
+P Vm Q is therefore elementary and has the required table.
+But in spite of this representation ,T2 still appears to be the fundamental system
+since its truth values correspond entirely to the significance of true and completely
+false, whereas in «Im, m > 2 either u > 1 or m - u > 1, and this equivalence no
+longer holds. We must however take into account the fact that our development has
+been given in the language of 1T2 and for that very reason every other kind of system
+appears distorted. This suggests that if we translate the entire development into the
+language of any one "I'm by means of its interpretation, then it would be the formal
+system most in harmony with regard to the two developments.
+
+The notion "definite" and the independence of
+the axiom of choice
+ABRAHAM A. FRAENKEL
+(19220)
+Russell (1905a, pp. 47-48) gave an
+set of natural numbers); (3) the set
+amusing illustration of the axiom of'
+A = {a1, ay}, {a2, 5z}...) (the set of
+choice. If we have X. pairs of boots, we
+cells); (4) all sets obtained from these
+can, by any one of a number of rules, get
+three sets by any finite number of appli-
+a "choice set" that includes a boot of
+cations of Zermelo's Axioms II-V (with
+every pair: take every left boot, or take
+Axiom III suitably modified).
+the left boot for the even pairs and the
+The key step in the proof (Fundamenright boot for the odd pairs, and so forth.
+tal Theorem) is to show that for every
+If, now, we have No pairs of socks, we
+set M there exists a subset Am of A that
+may be unable to specify a rule of that
+contains all but a finite number of elesort.
+ments of A and is such that Am remains
+In the present paper Fraenkel gives a
+unchanged when the two elements, ar
+precise form to this idea and uses it to
+and ar, of any cell {ar, dr of Am are
+obtain an independence proof of the
+axiom of choice. The independence proof
+interchanged.
+Since, in contradiction with the Fundahas to be carried out for a definite set
+mental Theorem, every choice set for the
+theory, which is known, or assumed, to
+set A would change as soon as, for any
+be consistent; Fraenkel adopts Zermelo's
+k, du and dk are interchanged, there
+axiomatization (1908a), with a modificaexists no such choice set. (Here the
+tion that we shall discuss presently.
+assumption that a, and ar are not sets is,
+Since the principle of choice is provable
+of course, decisive; if they were, there
+for any finite set of sets, the weakest
+might obtain set-theoretic relations such
+form for which independence is in doubt
+that the interchange of dk and ar would
+deals with a denumerably infinite set
+leave the choice set unchanged.) Hence
+of pairs, and this is the version that he
+a model has been constructed in which
+considers.
+the negation of the axiom of choice as
+Frankel introduces a denumerably
+well as Zermelo's axioms (other than the
+infinite number of distinct objects, a1,
+axiom of choice, of course) hold.
+à1, az, àz,..., that are not sets. The
+The proof of the Fundamental Theosets {ar, aks, called cells by Fraenkel,
+rem proceeds by an inductive argument
+represent Russell's pairs of socks in
+that parallels the construction of the set
+the axiomatization. The following sets,
+M from the sets 0, Zo, A, and the objects
+and those exclusively, are assumed to
+a1, à1, Az, à2,.... At a certain stage in
+exist: (1) the null set, 0; (2) the set
+the argument Zermelo's Axiom III (ax-
+70 = {0, {0}, {0}},...; (in essence, the iom of separation) has to be considered.
+
+285
+As stated by Zermelo (above, p. 202), elements of his original characterization
+this axiom asserts that, given a set and a
+of "definite" more explicit, but Skolem
+"definite property"
+, the elements of the
+(1930) showed that its weaknesses could
+set that possess the property form a set.
+hardly be remedied.
+The definition of "definite property"
+Today an axiomatization of set theory
+given by Zermelo is imprecise, and
+is usually embedded in a logical calculus,
+Frankel could not carry out his proof
+and it is Weyl's and Skolem's approach
+with such a vague notion; at the beginto the formulation of the axiom of separaning of his paper he had to reformulate
+tion that is generally adopted. The inthe axiom of separation with the help of
+troduction by von Neumann of classes
+a specific notion of function. By means of
+that are not sets, with appropriate
+a function new objects are constructed
+axioms, can be regarded as a third
+from initial ones through a finite number
+method of making the notion "definite
+of applications of the axioms. Other
+property" more precise (see below, p.
+writings of Frankel's from that period
+393).
+(1921, 1922a, 1922c, 1923, 1923a, 1925)
+Frankel's independence proof is caralso deal with that point.
+ried out for a system in which the exist.
+At about the same time Skolem was
+ence of a denumerably infinite number
+proposing another method for making
+of objects that are not classes can be
+Zermelo's "definiteness" more precise.
+assumed without contradiction. Such ob-
+A property is definite in Skolem's sense if
+jects, now technically known as ureleit is expressed by a well-formed formula
+ments, have become a standard tool used
+of a specified logical system, more prein independence proofs for set theory
+cisely still, by a well-formed formula of
+(Fraenkel 1937, Lindenbaum and Mosthe simple predicate calculus of first order
+towski 1938, Mostowski 1939). But, from
+in which the sole predicate constants are
+a broader perspective, these non-classes
+= and, possibly, = (see below, p. 292).
+are unsatisfactory. In set theory, after
+Weyl's way of solving the difficulty
+all, all mathematical notions (natural
+(1910, p. 112; 1918, chap. 1, §2, and
+numbers, real numbers, functions, and so
+p. 36) anticipates Skolem's and is very
+on) should turn out to be sets or at worst
+close to it. Skolem shows (1929, pp. 7-9)
+classes. But only at the cost of some unthat Fraenkel's method can be reduced
+welcome tampering with the axioms of
+to his own.
+set theory could these non-classes be
+Some years later, Zermelo (1929) conreplaced by (rather special) sets (Bernays
+sidered Frankel's emendation of his
+1937-1954,
+Mendelson 1956,
+Specker
+formulation of the axiom of separation
+1957). Cohen's method (1963, 1963a,
+he apparently did not know Skolem's
+1964) opened another road.
+proposal at the time); he found that he
+The paper was translated by Beverly
+could not accept it, because it makes use
+Woodward. Professor Fraenkel read and
+of the notion of natural number, and this
+approved the translation. It is printed
+notion itself, he thought, should have a
+here with his kind permission and that of
+set-theoretic definition. He made the Walter de Gruyter and Co.
+Whether the principle of choice, or the "axiom of choice", which forms its core,
+is independent of the other principles of mathematics, that is, in effect, of the axioms
+of set theory, is a question to which no answer has yet been found. This question
+acquired increased importance when the principle of choice showed itself, after
+1 See Zermelo 1904, p. 516 [above, p. 141], 1908, p. 110 [above, p. 186], and 1908a, p. 266
+[above, p. 204].
+
+286
+FRAENKEL
+suggestions made by B. Levi, E. Schmidt, and especially E. Zermelo, to be an indispensable device for proofs in nearly all branches of mathematics. On the occasion of
+an investigation into the foundations of set theory and into the independence in
+general of one of the axiom systems that can be taken as a basis for that theory,? I
+found in particular an independence proof for the axiom of choice. Its realization
+proved to be closely connected with a sharp clarification of the notion "definite
+property" in the acceptation requisite for set theory; such a clarification had not
+been attained previously and is even absent from the pioneer work of Zermelo (1908a).
+A preliminary remark about this fundamental notion is therefore required for the
+following proof, but it will be held within the bounds necessary for this purpose.
+Moreover, the independence proof will, for the sake of simplicity, be carried out for
+the Zermelo axiom system (1908a), whose Axioms I, II, IV-VII will therefore remain
+unchanged, as will the "domain" 3 with which
+set theory is concerned and the
+expressions a = b (a is an element of the set b) and a € b (a is a subset of the set b).
+To arrive at a precise formulation of Axiom III (axiom of separation), which as
+formulated in Zermelo 1908a contains the imprecise notion "definite"
+', we shall understand by function a rule of the following kind: an object (x) shall be formed from a
+('variable") object x that can range over the elements of a set, and possibly from
+further given ("constant"') objects, by means of a prescribed application (repeated
+only a finite number of times, of course, and denoted by 4) of Axioms II-VI. For
+example, ф(x) = {{{x}, {03}, Ix + {033}. Clearly this does not include any general
+notion of function or correspondence, or any new fundamental notion whatsoever.
+The axiom of separation now reads:
+AxI III. If a set M is given, as well as, in a definite order, two functions o and
+4, then M possesses a subset Mr (or a subset M.) containing as elements all the
+elements x of M for which p(x) is an element of 4(x) (or for which p(x) is not an
+element of 4(x)), and no others.
+The role of "variables" in the primitive functions defined by Axioms Il and
+IV-VI is clear without further comment. Axiom III can define a function in such a
+way that M is variable or that one of the constant objects occurring in the functions
+o and y is left variable. The choice function of x = I, defined by means of Axiom VI,
+has to do with any object whatsoever of the required kind and not, as is the case for
+the other primitive functions, with a uniquely determined object.
+In this connection some questions (to be discussed in Fraenkel 1925) arise, namely,
+whether and how in legitimate set theory the formation of subsets proceeds according
+to this well-determined schema, that is, in particular, whether this schema is sufficiently comprehensive; further, whether it is possible, without a vicious circle, to
+link Axiom III and the notion of function with each other; and finally whether, in
+introducing the notion of function, we can limit ourselves to Axioms II-V, thus omitting Axiom VI. The last question remains outside the scope of the considerations that
+follow, which take no account of Axiom VI at all, while, as it turns out, the first two
+are partially clarified below.
+To show now that the axiom of choice (VI) is independent of the other axioms
+(I-V and VII) we shall consider as belonging to the domain & (retaining the usual
+meaning of the primitive relation a = b) the following objects: first, the null set 0 and
+2 See Fraenkel 1921, also 1922a and its continuation now in preparation [1925]).
+
+287
+also a denumerably infinite number of distinct objects, a1, ày, Az, àz, Az, àz, ..., none
+of which is considered a set; second, the set 2o = {0,{0}, {{0}},...) (Zermelo 1908a,
+p. 267 [above, p. 204]); third, the set A = {{a1, aJ}, {a2, az}, {az, az},...};3 fourth, the
+(uniquely determined) sets obtained from the objects of 3 on the basis of Axioms
+II-V—and no other objects.* An object (set) "exists" if it occurs in 2. Axioms I-V
+and VII are then satisfied. All objects, except those mentioned in the first clause,
+are sets; every set can be obtained (in at least one way) from the objects mentioned in
+the first, second, and third clauses, the "primitive objects", by a finite number of
+applications of Axioms II-V.
+The axiom of choice (VI) will be proved to be independent when the following has
+been shown:
+FUNDAMENTAL THEOREM: If M is a set, then, corresponding to M, there exists at
+least one subset Am € A that contains almost all elements of A, is of the form Am =
+{Ang, Anz'...), where Ank = {am, anx, and is such that, if an & Ank & Am (that is, if
+Ank &GAm), M is mapped onto itself whenever anx and ank are interchanged.
+If this is proved, there cannot be any choice in the sense of Axiom VI for the set
+A itself, for instance, since clearly every choice set changes as soon as any or is interchanged with ak-
+In what follows, the sets Ak = {ak, aks will be called cells, and a, and as conjugate
+cell elements; every subset of A containing almost all elements of A will be called a
+principal set, so that the intersection of a finite number of principal sets is a principal
+set; a set obtained from an arbitrary set M by the interchange of the elements of a
+cell Ak will be said to be conjugate to M with respect to Ak and will be denoted by
+Mh; if An is here allowed to be any arbitrary cell of a certain principal set B, then we
+shall write MklB. A set conjugate to itself will be said to be symmetric (with respect
+to Ak). The fundamental theorem then states that for every set M there exists a
+principal set such that M is symmetric with respect to all cells of that set. For the
+primitive objects this is patently the case.
+The proof of the fundamental theorem can be carried out on the basis of Theorems
+1-5 below. In order to reveal the essence of the proofs of these theorems without
+becoming prolix and repeating the same fundamental ideas, it will suffice to carry out
+the proofs of Theorems 2 and 4, which are simpler but contain all the essential ideas.
+Only Theorem 1, which at first perhaps looks obvious, occupies a somewhat special
+place.
+THEOREM 1. If M is a set, then the set Mk conjugate to M with respect to an
+arbitrary cell Ak also exists.
+THEOREM 2. If, by the use of Axioms II, IV, and V alone, a set is formed from
+given objects in such a way that for each of these objects there is a principal set with
+respect to whose cells the object is symmetric (hence, for instance, from the primitive
+objects), then that set is symmetric with respect to the cells of a principal set.
+Proof. Assume that the object M is symmetric with respect to the cells of the
+3 I am particularly indebted to Zermelo for his suggestion that it suffices to let the elements of A
+consist of only two elements each, as well as, in general, for his emphasis on the notion of symmetry
+(see below).
+4 See the
+"axiom of limitation" ["Beschränktheitsaxiom"] in Fraenkel 1922a, p. 234, and
+1922, end of § 1, p. 163).
+
+288
+FRAENKEL
+principal set Am and that N is symmetric with respect to those of the principal set
+AN. Then, first, {M} is symmetric with respect to the cells of Am, and {M, N; is symmetric with respect to those of the principal set [Am, AN], the intersection of the two
+sets. Second, let Ak be an arbitrary cell of Am, so that MK = M, and let Mo be EM;
+the set MK € Mr = M, conjugate to Mo with respect to Ak, exists by Theorem 1;
+hence we have M§ = UM; therefore UM is symmetric with respect to the cells of Am.
+Finally, if u em & M and further Ak& Am, then Uk = m° & MK = M, that is, uk & GM
+follows from u = GM; therefore GM too is symmetric with respect to the cells of
+Am. But the set considered in Theorem 2 is obtained, by a finite number of repeated
+applications of the primitive functions just used, from objects such that for each
+there is a principal set with respect to whose cells it is symmetric; so Theorem 2 is
+proved.
+THEOREM 3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2, let one of the given objects be
+left variable and let it be denoted by x, so that instead of a set a function q(x) is
+obtained. Then for o there is a principal set such that, for every object x, p(K) is
+conjugate to p(x) with respect to all cells Ak of that set.
+THEOREM 4. If o and y are given functions of the kind specified in Theorem 3 and
+if M is a set symmetric with respect to the cells of some principal set, then the subset
+ME (or Ms) € M determined in accordance with Axiom III by 0 = 4 (or o not = 4)
+is symmetric with respect to the cells of some principal set.
+Proof. Let An be a principal set for which M = MKAM; let Ap and Au be, in
+conformity with Theorem 3, principal sets such that, for example, for every m = M,
+Let B denote the intersection [Am,A,,Av]. By the definition of Me, we have for every
+ne ME (and for no other element of M) $(n) = 4(n) or even «(n)" = 4(n)k, where k
+from now on stands for the subscript of some arbitrary cell Ak e B. Because of B € Ac
+and B€ Au we have, by Theorem 3, p(n)k = Ф(n*) and 4(n)k = 4(n"), hence also
+"(T*) = 4(nk). Therefore-since, B being € Am, N* is an element of M whenever n is—
+nk & Me holds; that is, Me is symmetric with respect to the cells of the principal set
+B. Consequently, the same clearly holds for Me. too.
+THEOREM 5. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4, let M or one of the constant
+objects that are arguments of o or & be left variable and let it be denoted by x, so
+that instead of the constant set Me (or Mg.) a function x(x) is obtained; then for
+x(x) there is a principal set such that, for every object (x), Xx*) is conjugate to x(x)
+with respect to all cells Ak of that set.
+Having obtained these results, let us state the following recursive definitions.
+(A) A primitive object or a set generated from primitive objects by the use of
+Axioms II, IV, and V alone is said to be of the Oth class. Likewise an associated
+function in whose formation one of the primitive objects is replaced by a variable is
+said to be of the Oth class.
+(B) A subset Me (or Mo) € M defined by o& 4 (or o not = 4) is said to be of at
+most the (p + 1)th class if M, as well as the functions o and 4, is of at most the pth
+class. Likewise an associated function in which M or one of the constant objects that
+are arguments of o or y is left variable is said to be of at most the (p + I)th class.
+
+289
+By Theorem 2 for every object of the Oth class, and by Theorem 4 for every object
+of at most the Ist class, there is a principal set with respect to whose cells the object
+is symmetric. Let us assume that the same holds for every object of at most the pth
+class; further, assume that for every function o of at most the pth class there exists
+a principal set such that, with respect to all cells Ak of that set, p(k) = p(x)k always
+holds, as is the case for p = 0 by Theorem 3 and for p = 1 by Theorem 5. Then, by
+a proof exactly analogous to that of Theorem 4, we obtain the result that every
+object of at most the (p + 1)th class also possesses this very same property of symmetry. Finally, the assertion of Theorem 5 is thereby easily carried over to the
+functions of at most the (p + 1)th class. Accordingly, since for every object M there
+is a p such that M is of at most the pth class, every object M is symmetric with
+respect to the cells of a principal set Am, as the fundamental theorem asserts.
+
+Some remarks on axiomatized set theory
+THORALF SKOLEM
+(1922)
+This is the text of an address delivered
+without using the axiom of choice (the
+before the Fifth Congress of Scandinavian
+gap is now frequently bridged with the
+Mathematicians (Helsinki, 4-7 August
+help of König's infinity lemma (1926,
+1922). It deals with several questions
+1927)).
+encountered in the axiomatization of set
+Skolem then uses Löwenheim's theotheory and contains eight points, which
+rem to show that any formalized set
+are listed in the fourth paragraph.
+theory has a denumerable model. Since
+Point 2, on Zermelo's notion "definite
+natural numbers can be defined in terms
+property"
+, was discussed in the introducof sets (for example, by means of Dedetory note to Fraenkel's paper (above,
+kind's "chains" or in Zermelo's way), he
+p. 285).
+sees the possibility that there might be
+Point 3 presents a new proof of Löwentwo distinct models of set theory giving
+heim's theorem and discusses some of the
+rise to two distinct systems of natural
+implications of the theorem for formanumbers. In a later paper (1929, § 7)
+lized set theory. Löwenheim's theorem
+Skolem comes back to this question in
+states that, if a formula of the predicate
+greater detail; then (1933, 1934) he
+calculus of first order is satisfiable, it is
+actually exhibits a nonstandard model of
+No-satisfiable. Skolem had proved the
+arithmetic.
+theorem earlier (1920) and generalized it
+For Skolem the discrepancy between
+to a denumerably infinite set of formulas.
+an intuitive set-theoretic notion and its
+The 1920 proof (see above, pp. 256-259)
+formal counterpart leads to the "relamakes use of the axiom of choice and of
+tivity" of set-theoretic notions. Thus,
+a result of Dedekind's about chains. The
+two sets are equivalent if there exists a
+new proof dispenses with the axiom of
+one-to-one mapping of the first onto the
+choice and, instead of Dedekind's result,
+second; but this mapping is itself a
+uses an argument whose first part is
+collection of ordered pairs of elements.
+already in Löwenheim's paper. From the
+If, in a formalized set theory, this collecsatisfiability of the formula both Löwention exists as a set, the two given sets are
+heim and Skolem conclude that there is,
+equivalent in the theory; if it does not,
+for every n, a solution of the nth level
+the sets are not equivalent in the theory
+(for a definition of this expression see
+and, when one set is that of the natural
+below, p. 508). At that point Löwenheim
+numbers as defined in the theory, the
+states without justification that the forother becomes "nondenumerable"
+'. The
+mula is Xo-satisfiable (see above, p. 240).
+existence of such a "relativity" is some-
+Skolem supplies the missing step (which
+times referred to as the Löwenheim-
+Quine (1955b, p. 254) called the "law of
+Skolem paradox. But, of course, it is not
+infinite conjunction"), and he does so
+a paradox in the sense of an antinomy;
+
+291
+it is a novel and unexpected feature of categoricity of Zermelo's axioms, not,
+formal systems.
+however, by using the Löwenheim-
+In Point 4 Skolem indicates a limita-
+Skolem theorem, but by actually exhibi.
+tion of Zermelo's set theory: it does not
+ting various models that are subdomains
+ensure the existence of some "large" sets,
+of some initial model B (assumed to
+such as the set {Zo, Z1, Z2,...), where
+exist). In footnote 9 he invokes this non-
+Zo is the set of natural numbers and Zi
+categoricity to suggest that set theory is
+the power set of Zi-1. If the continuum
+perhaps unable to solve all questions
+hypothesis is assumed, this means that
+concerning cardinality and, in particular,
+all of Zermelo's sets are of cardinalities
+that the continuum hypothesis may be
+less than Xo. To remedy this deficiency
+independent of the axioms of set theory
+Skolem proposes a new axiom, the axiom
+(see also below, p. 368).
+of replacement, which will become a
+These indications do not exhaust the
+standard part of set theory. At about
+content of a rich and clearly written
+the same time Fraenkel (1922a, but paper, which when it was published did
+see also 1921 and 1922) and Lennes
+same
+not receive the attention it deserved,
+(1922) make similar suggestions. (See
+although it heralded important future
+above, p. 114, line 22, for an early formudevelopments.
+lation of the axiom of replacement in
+The translation is by Stefan Bauer-
+Cantor.)
+Mengelberg, and it is printed here with
+In Point 6 Skolem deals with the non- the kind permission of Professor Skolem.
+Set theory in its original version led, as we know, to certain contradictions (antinomies), and no one has yet succeeded in giving a clarification of them that has won
+general acceptance. In view of this threat to set theory, attempts have been made
+to develop that theory by means of certain fundamental assumptions, or axioms, in
+such a way that the part presumed to be correct and useful would remain provable
+while the contradictions would be avoided.
+Until now, so far as I know, only one such system of axioms has found rather
+general acceptance, namely, that constructed by Zermelo (1908a). Russell and Whitehead, too, constructed a system of logic that provides a foundation for set theory;
+if I am not mistaken, however, mathematicians have taken but little interest in it.
+In what follows I therefore concern myself almost exclusively with Zermelo's axiomatization, and I touch upon Russell and Whitehead's at only a single point, albeit
+a rather important one.
+Zermelo considers a domain B of objects, among which are the sets. Between these
+objects there obtain relations of the form a = b (a is an element of b) and of the form
+a = b.' In this domain, then, seven axioms, for which I refer the reader to Zermelo's
+paper, are to be satisfied. I shall use the same numbering and nomenclature for the
+axioms here as does Zermelo.
+In this address I wish to discuss the following eight points:
+1. The peculiar fact that, in order to treat of "sets", we must begin with "domains"
+that are constituted in a certain way;
+1 If all objects of the domain are sets, this relation can be reduced to the relation a = b by means
+of the axiom of extensionality. For, if a and b are sets, then (see the definitions in Section 2) a = b
+means the same as
+
+292
+2. A definition, much to be desired, that makes Zermelo's notion "definite
+proposition" precise;
+3. The fact that in every thoroughgoing axiomatization set-theoretic notions are
+unavoidably relative;
+4. The fact that Zermelo's system of axioms is not sufficient to provide a foundation
+for ordinary set theory;
+5. The difficulties caused by the nonpredicative stipulations when one wants
+to prove the consistency of the axioms;
+6. The nonuniqueness [Mehrdeutigkeit] of the domain B;
+7. The fact that mathematical induction is necessary for the logical investigation
+of abstractly given systems of axioms;
+8. A remark on the principle of choice.
+1. If we adopt Zermelo's axiomatization, we must, strictly speaking, have a general
+notion of domains in order to be able to provide a foundation for set theory. The
+entire content of this theory is, after all, as follows: for every domain in which the
+axioms hold, the further theorems of set theory also hold. But clearly it is somehow
+circular to reduce the notion of set to a general notion of domain. If, however, it were
+maintained that only the notion of the single domain B is necessary, hence not a
+general notion "domain"
+', this consideration could also be applied to the sets themselves; thus, if a proposition should be advanced about some unspecified set, we
+could say: no general notion "set" is needed, but only the idea of a single set that we
+assume to be given.
+It must be noted, incidentally, that the domain B is not uniquely determined by
+the axioms (see Section 6 below). Moreover, it will appear clearly from what follows
+that one cannot undertake logical investigations of such domains without to a certain
+extent applying set-theoretic considerations to them as well, if, that is, one wishes
+to follow the purely set-theoretic method and avoid including the notion of number
+among the fundamental ones.
+Furthermore, it seems to be clear that, when founded in such an axiomatic way,
+set theory cannot remain a privileged logical theory; it is then placed on the same level
+as other axiomatic theories.
+2. A very deficient point in Zermelo is the notion "definite proposition". Probably
+no one will find Zermelo's explanations of it satisfactory. So far as I know, no one has
+attempted to give a strict formulation of this notion; this is very strange, since it can
+be done quite easily and, moreover, in a very natural way that immediately suggests
+itself. In order to explain this, and also with a view to later considerations, I mention
+the five basic operations of mathematical logic here, using Schröder's notation (1890) :
+(1x) Conjunction, denoted by a dot or by juxtaposition;
+(1 +) Disjunction, denoted by the sign + ;
+Negation, denoted by a bar over the expression to be negated ;
+(3x) Universal quantification, denoted by the sign ;
+(3+) Existential quantification, denoted by the sign 2
+As is well known, only three of these five operations are really needed, since (1x)
+and (1+), like (3x) and (3+), are mutually definable by means of (2).
+By a definite proposition we now mean a finite expression constructed from elementary
+
+293
+propositions of the form a a b or a = b by means of the five operations mentioned. This is
+a completely clear notion and one that is sufficiently comprehensive to permit us to
+carry out all ordinary set-theoretic proofs. I therefore adopt this conception as a
+basis here.
+3. This third point is the most important: If the axioms are consistent, there exists
+a domain B in which the axioms hold and whose elements can all be enumerated by
+means of the positive finite integers.
+To prove this I must first explain a theorem proved by Löwenheim (1915). By a
+first-order proposition [Zählaussage] (Löwenheim says "first-order expression"
+I'Zählausdruck "]) is meant a finite expression constructed from class and relative
+coefficients in the sense of Schröder (1895) by means of the five logical operations
+mentioned above. Then Löwenheim's theorem reads as follows:
+If a first-order proposition is satisfied in any domain at all, it is already satisfied in a
+denumerably infinite domain.
+Löwenheim's proof is unnecessarily complicated, and moreover the complexity is
+rather essential to his argument, since he introduces subscripts when he expands infinite logical sums or products; in this way he obtains logical expressions with a
+nondenumerably infinite number of terms. Thus he must make a detour, so to
+speak, through the nondenumerable. In a previous paper (1920) I therefore gave a
+simplified proof of Löwenheim's theorem, along with some generalizations of it. One
+of these generalizations, which is of importance here, reads:
+Let there be given an infinite sequence U1, Uz, ... of first-order propositions numbered
+with the integers; if, now, it is consistent to assume that all these propositions hold
+simultaneously, they can all be simultaneously satisfied in the infinite sequence of the
+positive integers, 1, 2, 3, ..., by a suitable determination of the class and relation symbols
+occurring in the propositions.
+I proved these theorems by forming an intersection and using the principle of
+choice. The formation of the intersection can be avoided immediately by use of a
+recursive definition; but here, where we are concerned with an investigation in the
+foundations of set theory, it will be desirable to avoid the principle of choice as well.
+Therefore I now indicate very briefly how this can be done. It will also appear from
+the proof that general set-theoretic notions are unnecessary for the understanding of
+the content of these theorems.
+Since the proof of the generalization mentioned can very easily be carried out in
+the same way as the proof of Löwenheim's theorem, I will concern myself only with
+the latter here.
+As I have shown (1920), every first-order proposition can be put into what I called
+a normal form, provided some auxiliary classes and relations are defined. A first-order
+proposition in normal form has the following structure:
+X1 X2
+Хт У1 У2
+where Ux1..m.y1....un is a proposition constructed from class and relation symbols (class and relative coefficients in the sense of Schröder) by means of the first
+three of the logical operations mentioned above. Let, therefore, such a first-order
+proposition in normal form be given; we assume it to be consistent.
+
+294
+The proof proceeds by way of an infinite sequence of steps. For the first step we
+choose x1 = X2 = ... = Xm = 1. Then it must be possible to choose y1, ..., Yn among
+the numbers 1, 2,...n n+1 in such a way that U1.1...1,y1....un
+is satisfied.
+Thus we obtain one or more solutions of the first step, that is, assignments determining the classes and relations in such a way that U1.1....1.y1....yn is satisfied.
+The second step consists in choosing, for x1,.. Xm, every permutation with repetitions of the n + 1 numbers 1, 2,..., n + 1 taken m at a time, with the exception of
+the permutation 1, 1,..., 1, already considered in the first step. For at least one of
+the solutions obtained in the first step, it must then be possible, for each of these
+(n + 1)m - 1 permutations, to choose y1, ..., Yn among the numbers 1, 2,..., n + 1
++ n((n + 1)m - 1) in such a way that, for each permutation x1, ..., Xm taken within
+the segment 1, 2,...n + 1 of the number sequence, the proposition Ux....m.
+Y1 .....Уп
+holds for a corresponding choice of Y1, ...,n taken within the segment
+1,2,..., n + 1 + n((n + 1)m - 1). Thus from certain solutions gained in the first
+step we now obtain certain continuations, which constitute solutions of the second
+step. It must be possible to continue the process in this way indefinitely if the given
+first-order proposition is consistent.
+In order now to obtain a uniquely determined solution for the entire number
+sequence, we must be able to choose a single solution from among all those obtained
+in a given step. To achieve this, we can always take the first from all of the solutions
+obtained in an arbitrary step, once they have been ordered in a sequence in the
+following way.
+The relative coefficients occurring in the given first-order proposition can be
+linearly ordered so that the relative coefficients formed within the segment 1, 2,.... n
+of the number sequence precede all new relative coefficients that are formed within
+the segment 1, 2, ..., n + 1. For any two different solutions L and L' of an arbitrary
+step, write I < I' if and only if Rij... is equal to 0 in L and 1 in L', where Rjj... is
+the first relative coefficient having different values in L and I'? From L < L' and
+L' < I" it then follows that I < I"; we can also readily see that for two solutions
+In and I'n of the nth step that are, respectively, continuations of the solutions I,
+and I', of the uth step In « In implies Ly ≤ Ly.
+Let L1 ns La,ns..., Lenn be the solutions of the nth step. If we now form the
+sequence [1,1, L1,2' ... of the first solutions, we can verify without difficulty that they
+converge in the logical sense. For let L1,n be a continuation of Lai.v (n > v). Then, if
+n'> n, a" ≤ a"'. But, since the number a" can only have the values 1 to ev, it must
+remain constant for all sufficiently large n. Thus we can obtain as "limit" the fact
+that the first-order proposition is satisfied in the domain of the entire number
+sequence. Q. e. d.
+Now the previously mentioned generalization of Löwenheim's theorem can be
+applied in the present case, that of Zermelo's axiom system, in the following way.
+The definite first-order propositions can be enumerated according to their form
+by means of the positive integers; for we can order them according to how many
+symbols for sets occur in them, and for a given number of such symbols there is only
+a finite number of propositions, so that these in turn can be thought of as ordered
+2 Here 0 and 1 are Schröder's propositional values; 0 means "false" and 1 means "true".
+
+295
+according to some rule. Consequently, Axiom III (axiom of separation) can be replaced by an infinite sequence of simpler axioms—which, like the rest of Zermelo's
+axioms, are first-order propositions in the sense of Löwenheim—containing the two
+binary relations e and =. We may then conclude: If Zermelo's axiom system, when
+made precise, is consistent, it must be possible to introduce an infinite sequence of symbols
+1, 2, 3, ... in such a way that they form a domain B in which all of Zermelo's axioms
+hold provided these symbols are suitably grouped into pairs of the form a & b.
+This is to be understood in the following way: one of the symbols 1, 2, 3,...
+will be the null set (that is, among the remaining symbols there is none that has
+the relation = to the symbol in question); if a is one of the symbols, then {a} is
+another; 3 if M is one of the symbols, then UM, SM, and DM are others; * and so
+forth.
+So far as I know, no one has called attention to this peculiar and apparently
+paradoxical state of affairs. By virtue of the axioms we can prove the existence of
+higher cardinalities, of higher number classes, and so forth. How can it be, then, that
+the entire domain B can already be enumerated by means of the finite positive
+integers? The explanation is not difficult to find. In the axiomatization, "set" does
+not mean an arbitrarily defined collection; the sets are nothing but objects that are
+connected with one another through certain relations expressed by the axioms.
+Hence there is no contradiction at all if a set M of the domain B is nondenumerable
+in the sense of the axiomatization; for this means merely that within B there occurs
+no one-to-one mapping $ of M onto Zo (Zermelo's number sequence). Nevertheless
+there exists the possibility of numbering all objects in B, and therefore also the
+elements of M, by means of the positive integers; of course, such an enumeration too
+is a collection of certain pairs, but this collection is not a "set" (that is, it does not
+occur in the domain B). It is also clear that the set UZ, cannot contain as elements
+arbitrarily definable parts of the set Zo. For, since the elements of UZo are to be found
+among the objects of the domain B, they can be numbered with the positive integers
+just like the elements of Zermelo's number sequence 7o, and in a well-known way a
+new part of Zo can then be defined; but this part will not be a set, that is, will not
+belong to B.
+Even the notions "finite"
+, "infinite"
+, "simply infinite sequence", and so forth
+turn out to be merely relative within axiomatic set theory. A set M is finite, according
+to Dedekind's definition, if it is not equivalent to any of its proper subsets. But the
+fact that the axioms hold does not rule out the possibility that we can define, first,
+parts of M that are not subsets or, second, correspondences that are not mappings,
+that is, "sets" of pairs. It is therefore quite possible that, within a domain B in which
+Zermelo's axioms hold, there exist sets that are "finite" in the sense of Dedekind
+and for which there are one-to-one mappings onto some of their proper parts; but these
+"mappings" are not sets of the domain.
+Likewise, the notion "simply infinite sequence" or that of the Dedekind "chain"
+has only relative significance. If Z is a set having the property required by Axiom
+VII, Zermelo's number sequence Zo is defined as the intersection of all subsets of Z
+3 {a} is the set containing a and only a as an element.
+« UM, SM, and DM are, respectively, the power set, the union set, and the intersection set
+of M.
+
+296
+that have the same (chain) property. But being a subset of Z is not merely to
+be in some way definable, and nothing can prevent a priori the possibility that
+there exist two different Zermelo domains B and B' for which different Zo would
+result.
+These peculiar relativities could easily be illustrated in more detail for simpler
+axiom systems; but I cannot go into that, lest I make this address too
+prolix.
+Thus, axiomatizing set theory leads to a relativity of set-theoretic notions, and this
+relativity is inseparably bound up with every thoroughgoing axiomatization.
+The relativity is due to the fact that to be an object in B means something different
+and far more restricted than merely to be in some way definable. That this relativity
+must be inseparably bound up with every thoroughgoing axiomatization is clear;
+for it rests upon the general theorems of mathematical logic mentioned above. In
+order to obtain something absolutely nondenumerable, we would have to have either
+an absolutely nondenumerably infinite number of axioms or an axiom that could
+yield an absolutely nondenumerable number of first-order propositions. But this
+would in all cases lead to a circular introduction of the higher infinities; that is, on
+an axiomatic basis higher infinities exist only in a relative sense.
+With a suitable axiomatic basis, therefore, the theorems of set theory can be made
+to hold in a merely verbal sense, on the assumption, of course, that the axiomatization
+is consistent; but this rests merely upon the fact that the use of the word "set" has
+been regulated in a suitable way. We shall always be able to define collections that
+are not called sets; if we were to call them sets, however, the theorems of set theory
+would cease to hold.
+4. It is easy to show that Zermelo's axiom system is not sufficient to provide a
+complete foundation for the usual theory of sets. I intend to show, for instance, that
+if M is an arbitrary set, it cannot be proved that M, UM, UM, .., and so forth
+ad infinitum form a "set". To prove this I introduce the notion "level" ["Stufe"] of
+a set. Such sets as 0, {0}, {{0}}, {0,{0}},... I call sets of the first level; they are characterized by the fact that there exists a nonnegative integer n such that S"M = 0.5
+The set Z, (Zermelo's number sequence) already constitutes an example of a set that
+is not of the first level, since, for every n, SZ, = Zo. By a set M of the second level
+I mean one that is not itself of the first level but for which there exists a nonnegative
+integer n such that all elements of S"M are sets of the first level. Thus Zo is a set
+of the second level. In a similar way sets of the third, fourth, and higher levels
+can be defined. We need not discuss whether with every set a level number is
+associated.
+Now let a domain B in which the axioms hold be given. Then the sets in B that are
+of the first or second level form a partial domain B, and it is easy to see that the
+axioms must hold in B' too. The set Zo belongs to B'; if the infinite sequence Zo,
+UZo, U2 Zo,... formed a set M in B', however, it would clearly not be of the second
+level but of the third, and such a set just does not occur in B'. For it is evident that,
+for every n, S"M will contain the set Zo as an element. Thus the sets Zo, UZo, UZZo,
+... do not form the elements of a set in B', even though Zermelo's axioms hold in
+B'; that is to say, the existence of such a set is not provable.
+5 S"M is the nth union; thus S*+ 1M = S(S"M), SM is the (first) union associated with M, and
+S°M = M.
+
+297
+In order to remove this deficiency of the axiom system we could introduce the
+following axiom: Let U be a definite proposition that holds for certain pairs (a, b) in
+the domain B; assume, further, that for every a there exists at most one b such that U
+is true. Then, as a ranges over the elements of a set Ma, b ranges over all elements of a
+set Mo.
+The addition of such an axiom does not, of course, change anything so far as the
+relativity explained above is concerned.®
+5. It has presumably not yet been proved that Zermelo's axiom system is consistent, and it will no doubt be very difficult to do so. In particular, the nonpredicative
+stipulations governing the formation of sets will cause difficulties. It is not far-fetched
+to think of the axioms as generating principles of some sort; we generate new sets
+according to certain rules from sets already known. If, now, the formation of sets
+were a mere matter of constructing each new set solely from a finite number of prior
+sets, we could easily ascertain through an infinite process whether the axioms are
+consistent. But the difficulty is that we have to form some sets whose existence
+depends upon all sets. We then have what is called a nonpredicative definition. Poincaré
+criticized this kind of definition and regarded it as the real logical weakness of set
+theory.?
+In Russell and Whitehead's system this point has been formally taken into account,
+namely, in the theory of what they call the logical types, but they, too, simply content themselves with circumventing the difficulty by introducing a stipulation, the
+axiom of reducibility. Actually, this axiom decrees that the nonpredicative stipulations
+will be satisfied. There is no proof of that; besides, so far as I can see, such a proof
+must be impossible from Russell and Whitehead's point of view as well as from
+Zermelo's. For it could probably be carried out only through the actual construction
+of a domain B with the desired properties by a procedure similar to that used in
+the proof of Löwenheim's theorem given above. There, however, the idea of the
+finite and the recursive mode of thought are employed. But neither in Russell and
+6 That this axiom indeed suffices for the proof of the existence of sets of the type mentioned
+can be seen as follows. (I must content myself here with the sketch of a proof.)
+The segments (as they are called) A of Zo form, according to Axioms III and IV, the elements
+of a set. On the other hand, we can consider sets C that have the following, obviously definite
+properties:
+(1) C is finite;
+(2) M EC;
+(3) If N & C, there exists an N1 & C such that N = UN1, except if N = M.
+The sets C are obviousiy of the form {M, UM, UM, ...,U"M;.
+Furthermore it can be shown by means of inductive inferences (which here are in turn provable
+on the basis of the definition of Z, as an "intersection" or a "chain") that every set C is equivalent to one and only one segment A of Zo, and conversely. If we form the proposition "C ~ A;
+C satisfies (1), (2), and (3); A is a segment of Zo",
+axiom mentioned. Since a set exists that contains all segments A of Zo, the sets C according to
+this axiom also constitute all the elements of a set T. Then the associated union, ST', is the desired
+set, which contains M, UM, U'M,..., and so forth ad infinitum, as elements.
+" A typical nonpredicative stipulation is, for example, that the intersection of all sets that
+have an arbitrary definite property E again be a set. This in fact follows from the axioms. For,
+first, the intersections [M, M'], where M is a fixed set having the property E while M' ranges over
+all sets having this property, constitute according to Axioms III and IV all the elements of a
+set I; this set, then, is already nonpredicatively introduced. Second, the intersection DI
+associated with I must obviously be the intersection of all sets having the property E.
+
+298
+Whitehead's system nor in Zermelo's are these notions supposed to be taken as
+basic; rather, they in turn are supposed to have their foundation in set theory.
+Thus we would come to a vicious circle.
+It is clear that Zermelo's Axioms I-VI (VII excluded) are consistent; for with
+these axioms the domain B need contain only finite sets, formed by means of Axiom
+Il alone.
+6. I do not know whether anyone has proved rigorously that Zermelo's domain B
+is not uniquely determined by his axioms. That it is not so determined is a priori
+very plausible. But it does not suffice (as it would, for example, in the case of a commutative field [Rationalitätsbereich]) to say that we need only adjoin one new object
+in order to obtain a more comprehensive domain by means of the axioms; for we
+could, after all, imagine (though it is very improbable) that the axioms might then
+lead to contradictions, even if this were not the case before. I now present some of
+my reflections on this question.
+If M is an arbitrary set, we can construct sequences of the form
+•..MZEMLEM
+I call them descending a-sequences.
+We now see almost immediately that in a domain B the sets M for which every
+e-sequence necessarily terminates after a finite number of terms must form a part B'
+of B in which the axioms still hold. If now B' is a proper part of B, that is, if there
+are sets in B for which infinite descending e-sequences exist, we already have
+two distinct Zermelo domains B and B'. But if every e-sequence of an arbitrary
+set M in B terminates after a finite number of terms, the sets for which every
+e-sequence terminates with the null set again form a part B' of B in which the
+axioms hold. If, therefore, B and B' are different, we again have two distinct Zermelo
+domains.
+Let us now consider a domain B for whose sets every e-sequence is finite and
+terminates with 0. Then with every set M we can associate a corresponding e-tree
+[e-Verzweigungssystem]] that specifies how M is built up of elements, these in turn
+of elements, and so forth. Such a tree, then, is so constituted that infinitely many
+branches may indeed originate at one node; but, if we follow a connected sequence
+of branches (an e-sequence), we reach 0 after a finite number of steps. If, now, a is an
+object not belonging to B, we can form an extended Zermelo domain B' containing
+a as follows.
+Let M be an arbitrary set, Nan arbitrary subset of S"M + S-IM S-IM + M
++ {M), with n arbitrary, F the tree associated with M, and G the part of this
+system that consists of the points corresponding to N. Then from F we form a tree
+F' by inserting into all points of G a branch ending with a; that is, we adjoin a as a
+new element to each element of N. The trees thus obtained can then be regarded as
+sets of a more comprehensive domain B'.
+We could now prove, by going through the axioms, that they hold for B' if they
+hold for B. The proof is very easy for all the axioms except Axiom III, for which the
+general formulation of the proof becomes rather involved. I therefore do not go into
+the matter in more detail here.
+It would in any case be of much greater interest if we could prove that a new
+
+299
+subset of Z, could be adjoined without giving rise to contradictions; but this would
+probably be very difficult.?
+7. In the investigation of an axiom system with respect to the logical dependence
+of the individual axioms upon one another, it has been regarded as sufficient simply
+to take other theories as a basis. But we cannot always be so fortunate as to be able
+to proceed on the basis of theories developed previously; we must insist on having a
+procedure that allows us to investigate the logical character of the axioms directly.
+That B follows from A, if these are statements concerning certain objects, would,
+of course, from the point of view of set theory have to be regarded as follows: always,
+that is, for every set, the proposition A + B holds. It is, of course, often possible to
+prove this by means of set-theoretic axioms; but in the first place the question of the
+consistency of the axioms of set theory then arises, and in the second place we must
+take into consideration the fact that, whenever an axiomatic foundation has been
+provided, set-theoretic notions are relative, with the result that collections may yet
+be definable for which A + B does not hold. Now, if we were to investigate the
+axioms of set theory themselves in this way, we would have to prove that "domains"
+exist for which the axioms in question hold. If we do not again want to take axioms
+for domains as a basis (and so on ad infinitum), I see no other way out than to pass
+on to considerations such as those employed above in the proof of Löwenheim's
+theorem, considerations in which the idea of the finite integer is taken as basic.
+Besides, the notion that really matters in these logical investigations, namely,
+"proposition following from certain assumptions", also is an inductive (recursive)
+one: the propositions we consider are those that are derivable by means of an
+arbitrary finite number of applications of the axioms. Thus the idea of the arbitrary
+finite is essential, and it would necessarily lead to a vicious circle if the notion
+"finite" were itself based, as in set theory, on certain axioms whose consistency
+would then in turn have to be investigated.
+Set-theoreticians are usually of the opinion that the notion of integer should be
+defined and that the principle of mathematical induction should be proved. But it is
+clear that we cannot define or prove ad infinitum; sooner or later we come to something that is not further definable or provable. Our only concern, then, should be that
+the initial foundations be something immediately clear, natural, and not open
+to question. This condition is satisfied by the notion of integer and by inductive inferences, but it is decidedly not satisfied by set-theoretic axioms of the type of Zermelo's or anything else of that kind; if we were to accept the reduction of the former
+notions to the latter, the set-theoretic notions would have to be simpler than mathematical induction, and reasoning with them less open to question, but this runs
+entirely counter to the actual state of affairs.
+8 As was explained above (Section 3), B, after all, does not have to contain every "definable"
+subset of Zo.
+° Since Zermelo's axioms do not uniquely determine the domain B, it is very improbable that
+all cardinality problems are decidable by means of these axioms. For example, it is quite probable
+that what is called the continuum problem, namely, the question whether 2%o is greater than or
+equal to X1, is not solvable at all on this basis; nothing need be decided about it. The situation
+may be exactly the same as in the following case: an unspecified commutative field is given, and
+we ask whether it contains an element x such that x? = 2. This is just not determined, since the
+domain is not unique.
+
+300
+In a paper (1922) Hilbert makes the following remark about Poincaré's assertion
+that the principle of mathematical induction is not provable: "His objection that
+this principle could not be proved in any way other than by mathematical induction
+itself is unjustified and is refuted by my theory." But then the big question is
+whether we can prove this principle by means of simpler principles and without using
+any property of finite expressions or formulas that in turn rests upon mathematical
+induction or is equivalent to it. It seems to me that this latter point was not sufficiently
+taken into consideration by Hilbert. For example, there is in his paper (bottom of
+page 170), for a lemma, a proof in which he makes use of the fact that in any arithmetic proof in which a certain sign occurs that sign must necessarily occur for a first
+time. Evident though this property may be on the basis of our perceptual intuition
+of finite expressions, a formal proof of it can surely be given only by means of
+mathematical induction. In set theory, at any rate, we go to the trouble of proving
+that every ordered finite set is well-ordered, that is, that every subset has a first
+element. Now why should we carefully prove this last proposition, but not the one
+above, which asserts that the corresponding property holds of finite arithmetic
+expressions occurring in proofs? Or is the use of this property not equivalent to an
+inductive inference?
+I do not go into Hilbert's paper in more detail, especially since I have seen only
+his first communication. I just want to add the following remark: It is odd to see
+that, since the attempt to find a foundation for arithmetic in set theory has not been
+very successful because of the logical difficulties inherent in the latter, attempts, and
+indeed very contrived ones, are now being made to find a different foundation for it
+—as if arithmetic had not already an adequate foundation in inductive inferences and
+recursive definitions.
+8. So long as we are on purely axiomatic ground there is, of course, nothing special
+to be remarked concerning the principle of choice (though, as a matter of fact, new
+sets are not generated univocally by applications of this axiom); but if many mathematicians—indeed, I believe, most of them—do not want to accept the principle of
+choice, it is because they do not have an axiomatic conception of set theory at all.
+They think of sets as given by specification of arbitrary collections; but then they
+also demand that every set be definable. We can, after all, ask: What does it mean
+for a set to exist if it can perhaps never be defined? It seems clear that this existence
+can be only a manner of speaking, which can lead only to purely formal propositions
+—perhaps made up of very beautiful words-about objects called sets. But most
+mathematicians want mathematics to deal, ultimately, with performable computing
+operations and not to consist of formal propositions about objects called this or
+that.
+Concluding remark
+The most important result above is that set-theoretic notions are relative. I had
+already communicated it orally to F. Bernstein in Göttingen in the winter of 1915-16.
+There are two reasons why I have not published anything about it until now: first,
+I have in the meantime been occupied with other problems; second, I believed that
+it was so clear that axiomatization in terms of sets was not a satisfactory ultimate
+
+301
+foundation of mathematics that mathematicians would, for the most part, not be very
+much concerned with it. But in recent times I have seen to my surprise that so many
+mathematicians think that these axioms of set theory provide the ideal foundation
+for mathematics; therefore it seemed to me that the time had come to publish a
+critique.
+
+The foundations of elementary arithmetic
+established by means of the recursive mode of thought,
+without the use of apparent variables
+ranging over infinite domains
+THORALF SKOLEM
+(1923)
+Written in 1919, after Skolem had of thought". Bounded quantifiers are
+studied Principia mathematica, and pubsimply a convenient shorthand notation.
+lished in 1923, the present paper offers a
+This arithmetic is now known as priminew way of developing arithmetic, a way
+tive recursive arithmetic.
+that avoids the difficulties presented by
+Relinquishing existence as a primitive
+the paradoxes and the complexities of the
+notion or as the negation of universalizatheory of types. Unbounded quantifiers
+tion brings Skolem's work somewhat
+are not used, and the theorems become
+close to intuitionism. Skolem himself
+free-variable formulas. Of course, such
+wrote (1929a, p. 13) that in the present
+formulas constitute a limited means of
+paper, "independently of Brouwer and
+expression as compared to those of an
+without knowing his writings, I set forth
+arithmetic embedded in the full predicate
+similar ideas, confining myself, to be
+calculus of first order. To take a simple
+sure, to elementary arithmetic". Actuexample, we can state and prove in freeally, intuitionistic arithmetic, while it
+variable arithmetic that there exist infirefuses to apply the principle of excluded
+nitely many primes, in the sense that, for
+middle to negations of universal proany prime x, there exists a prime y such
+positions, does contain such negations
+that x < Y ≤ x! + 1. The existential
+(even as antecedents of conditionals) and
+quantifier used here is bounded and can
+is wider than primitive recursive aritheasily be dispensed with. But that there
+metic.
+exist infinitely many pairs of twin primes
+Now consider a formula F of primitive
+cannot (today) be stated by means of a
+recursive arithmetic and replace the
+free-variable formula.
+variables by numerals. The defining
+In the arithmetic developed by Skolem
+equations of the primitive recursive functhe limitations of free-variable formulas
+tions that F may contain allow us to
+are overcome, so far as possible, by the
+compute the values of these functions for
+use of primitive recursive definitions for
+the arguments selected. When the functhe introduction of new functions or
+tions of F are replaced by their values, F
+predicates and the use of the rule of
+becomes a variable-free numerical formathematical induction for proofs. This
+mula, which we shall call an instance of
+is what Skolem calls the "recursive mode
+F; the truth of this instance can be de-
+
+303
+termined by the truth-table method. If multiple, as well as elementary theorems
+all the instances of F are true, we say
+about prime numbers.
+that F is verifiable. The existence of in-
+Hilbert and Bernays (1934, pp. 307-
+stances gives to free-variable formulas a
+346) gave an ample presentation of
+transparent meaning that other formulas
+Skolem's work. Their interest in it was
+lack. It is true that free-variable forapparently prompted by the fact that
+mulas are equivalent, from the point of
+they considered the arguments carried
+view of derivation and that of interpreout in this arithmetic to be "finitary"
+tation, to their universal closures. But
+Gödel's constructive arguments in his
+prenex occurrences of universal quantiincompleteness proof for arithmetic (1931)
+fers do not raise the same problems as
+are carried out in what is actually primithose whose scope is not the whole fortive recursive arithmetic (see, for instance,
+mula. With A(x) > B, or the equivalent
+definitions 1-45 below, pp. 603-606; see
+(x)(A(x) > B), contrast (x) A(x) > B. This
+also footnote 34, p. 603). Hilbert and
+last formula has no instances; in fact, it
+Bernays (1934, p. 325) remark that the
+is equivalent to ~ B> (Ex)~ A(x), and
+theorems of this arithmetic are verifiable
+the existential quantifier involves an informulas and that this fact directly
+finite search in the sequence of natural
+yields the consistency of the arithmetic.
+numbers. If we have a proof of a free-
+A consistency proof carried out in a forvariable formula F in a free-variable
+malized metalanguage was given by
+system of arithmetic and if we consider
+H. E. Rose (1961), together with some
+an instance of F, the proof of F can be
+incompleteness results. For further results
+transformed into a proof of this instance
+on, and applications of, primitive recurof F: variables are replaced by numerals,
+sive arithmetic see Church 1955, 1957,
+function values are computed, and an
+1957a, and Rose 1962.
+application of the rule of mathematical
+Gödel (1931, pp. 180-181; below, pp.
+induction is replaced by a sequence of
+602-603) and, following him but in
+conditionals (see Hilbert and Bernays
+greater detail, Hilbert and Bernays (1934,
+1934, pp. 298-299). Hence a proof of
+pp. 310-312) showed that in primitive
+the formula F in free-variable arithmetic
+recursive arithmetic a truth function of
+can be regarded as a schema that, by
+equations is equivalent to an equation of
+effective (and easy) transformations,
+the form a = 0. Using this idea, Curry
+yields proofs of the instances of F.
+(1941) and Goodstein (1941, 1957) were
+Skolem does not raise any metamathe- able to develop primitive recursive arithmatical questions about primitive recurmetic as a logic-free calculus (see some
+sive arithmetic. First, he does not work historical notes on that point in Goodwithin
+a formal system but simply in
+stern 1957, p. 187).
+"naive" arithmetic. Then, what he does
+The translation is by Stefan Baueris to derive theorems to see how far one
+Mengelberg, and it is printed here with
+can go with the limited means that he the kind permission of Professor Skolem
+has adopted. He reaches the greatest
+and the Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i
+common divisor and the least common Oslo.
+The fundamental notions of logic that are customarily regarded as necessary for
+the foundations of mathematics (see, for example, Whitehead and Russell 1910, 1912,
+and 1913) are, in the first place, the following: the notions proposition and propositional function of one, two, or more variables; the three operations of (1) conjunction
+(expressed in ordinary language by means of the word "and" or the words "-
+as well as—"), (2) disjunction (customarily expressed by means of the words
+
+304
+"either -
+- or —"), and (3) negation (indicated by the word "not"); and finally
+Russell and Whitehead's notions "always" and "sometimes". These last two notions
+express the idea that a proposition holds in all cases or in at least one case, respectively.
+To say that a proposition holds in at least one case is to state an existential proposition, and that is customarily done by means of the words "there exists". Throughout the present work I shall use capital letters as symbols for propositional functions,
+so that A(x), B(x), ... denote propositional functions of one variable, A (x, y), B(x, y),
+... denote propositional functions of two variables, and so on. Furthermore, I
+employ Schröder's signs (1890) for conjunction, disjunction, and negation, so that,
+if A and B are propositions, A B means the proposition " A
+as well as B"
+, A + B
+the proposition "either A or B", and finally A the negation of A. In addition, however, Russell and Whitehead introduce the notion "descriptive function"
+. A descriptive function is an expression having an unambiguously determined meaning; it is a
+kind of functional proper name. Finally, according to Russell and Whitehead, it is
+necessary to introduce as a sort of functional assertions propositions that hold generally. We say that we have a functional assertion when it is asserted that a proposition
+holds for the indeterminate case.
+Now what I wish to show in the present work is the following: If we consider the
+general theorems of arithmetic to be functional assertions and take the recursive mode of'
+thought as a basis, then that science can be founded in a rigorous way without use of
+Russell and Whitehead's notions "always" and "sometimes". This can also be expressed
+as follows: A logical foundation can be provided for arithmetic without the use of
+apparent logical variables. To be sure, it will often be advantageous to introduce
+apparent variables; but we shall require that these variables range over only finite
+domains, and by means of recursive definitions we shall then always be able to avoid
+the use of such variables. All this will become clear in what follows.
+I wish to remark, incidentally, that I really regard all functions as descriptive; the
+propositional functions are just characterized by the fact that they can have only the
+two values "true" and "false"
+', which, of course, are also among the fundamental
+logical notions.
+I regard the descriptive functions as functional proper names, that is, proper names
+whose meaning depends upon what we choose for one or more variables. For instance,
+I regard "n + 1"
+, "the number following n", as being the name of a number, but
+one that, depending on what we choose for n, denotes different numbers.
+According to Russell and Whitehead, descriptive functions, such as "the author
+of Waverley", do not really mean anything but are merely incomplete symbols.
+This conception does not seem to me to be beyond doubt; but even if it were correct
+for the descriptive functions of ordinary language, we would not need to adopt it for
+the descriptive functions of arithmetic.
+Russell and Whitehead reason as follows. "The author of Waverley" cannot mean
+Scott; for then the proposition "Scott is the author of Waverley" would mean "Scott
+is Scott", and that is an entirely empty proposition. On the other hand, "the author
+of Waverley" cannot mean any other person; for then the proposition "Scott is the
+author of Waverley" would be false, which, as is well known, is not the case. Consequently, "the author of Waverley" means nothing; it is an incomplete symbol.
+This proof, which has a rather philosophical character, does not, however, seem
+
+305
+entirely compelling to me. What is to prevent us from regarding "the author of X"
+—let us write V(X) for short—as a kind of variable proper name? Then surely, "the
+author of Waverley" names the same person as does "Scott"
+. But the two names are
+distinct, and that is why the proposition "Scott is the author of Waverley" cannot be
+replaced by the proposition "Scott is Scott". The latter proposition is empty, but
+not the former, and the reason for this is that one already knows something in advance
+about the person called V(X), since, after all, it is generally accepted that a person
+is to be called V(X) if and only if he and no one else wrote X. The information conveyed is, in my opinion, of the same kind as in the following case: A man has two
+proper names, A and B. At one time we have heard something about A, for example
+that he has five children. On another occasion we are introduced to Mr. B, and we
+are told that B is Mr. A. This proposition then contains information about B, namely
+that B has five children, because we had some prior knowledge about A. The proposition " B is A" is therefore entirely different from the propositions " A is A" and
+"B is B"; the latter are completely empty, but the former is not, if something is
+already known in advance about A but not about B, or about B but not about A.
+The use of the equal sign in what follows is always to be understood in the sense
+that two names or expressions mean or designate the same thing. That is also why I
+regard it as obvious that I can everywhere replace equals by equals, and I do this
+throughout.
+The notions "natural number" and "the number n + 1 following the number n"
+(thus, the descriptive function n + 1) as well as the recursive mode of thought are
+taken as basis.'
+§1. ADDITION
+I wish to introduce a descriptive function of two variables, a and b, which I shall
+call the sum of a and b; I denote it by a + b since for b = 1 it is to mean precisely
+the number following a, namely, a + 1. This function is therefore to be regarded as
+already defined for b = 1 for arbitrary a. To define it generally, I then need only
+define it for b + 1 for arbitrary a if it is already assumed to be defined for b for
+arbitrary a. This is accomplished by the following definition:
+Definition 1. a + (b + 1) = (a + b) + 1.
+Thus the sum of a and b + I is set equal to the number following a + b. If, therefore, addition is already defined for arbitrary values of a for a certain number b, then
+by Definition 1 addition is defined for arbitrary a for b + 1 and is thereby defined
+generally. This is a typical example of a recursive definition.
+THEOREM 1. (The associative law.) a + (6 + c) = (a +b) + c.
+Proof. The proposition holds for c = 1 by virtue of Definition 1. I assume that it
+holds for a certain e for arbitrary values of a and b. Necessarily, then, for arbitrary
+values of a and b,
+(a)
+a + 16 + (ct 1)) = a + (16 + c) + 1),
+1 The frequently cumbersome formalism of propositional functions in what follows is due to the
+fact that the present paper was written as a kind of sequel [in Anschlußl to Russell and Whitehead's work.
+
+306
+since, according to Definition 1, b + (c + 1) = (6 + c) + 1. But according to
+Definition 1 necessarily also
+(B)
+(y)
+(0)
+a+ (1b+ c) + 1) = (at (6 + c)) + 1.
+Now, according to the assumption, a + (6 + c) = (a + b) + c, whence
+(a+ (6 + c)) + 1= ((a +b) + c) + 1.
+According to Definition 1 we finally also have
+((a+b) + c) + 1= (a +b) + (ct 1).
+From (a), (B), (y), and (8), it follows that
+a + 16 + (ct 1)) = (a +b) + (ct 1),
+which proves the proposition for c + 1 for unspecified a and b. Thus the proposition
+holds generally. This is a typical example of a recursive proof (proof by mathematical
+induction).
+Lemma. a + 1 = 1 + a.
+Proof. The proposition holds for a = 1. I prove that it holds for a + 1, assuming
+that it holds for a. In fact, we obtain
+by virtue of the assumption made and Definition 1. Thus the proposition holds
+generally.
+THeoReM 2. (The commutative law.) a + 6 = 6 + a.
+Proof. In consequence of the lemma the proposition holds for b = 1. I assume that
+it is true for arbitrary a for a certain b and then prove that it is true for b + 1 for
+arbitrary a. This is done as follows:
+a+ (6+1) = (a +b) + 1 = 10+0) + 1=6 + (a + 1)
+=b+ (1+ a) = 16+1) + a,
+by use of Theorem I and the lemma. The functional assertion a + 6 = b + a is
+therefore true.
+§ 2. THE RELATIONS < (LESS THAN) AND > (GREATER THAN)
+Closely connected with addition are the relations "less than" and "greater than",
+denoted by < and >, respectively. Since the latter relation is just the converse of
+the former, only the relation < need be defined. This is customarily done by means
+of an apparent logical variable, with the use of the logical notion of existence, or
+Russell and Whitehead's "sometimes". The usual definition, in fact, has the form
+(a <b) = I(a+x = b),
+where Schröder's sign is used to express that a proposition holds in at least one case
+(Schröder then speaks of propositional summation [Aussagensummation] and
+denotes it by I). In words the definition is as follows: "a is said to be less than b if
+
+307
+and only if there exists a number x such that a + x = b". Hence this definition involves the use of the logical notion of existence, or, in other words, the use of an
+apparent variable. But we can easily avoid using this notion by defining the relation
+"less than" recursively. This can, in fact, be done thus:
+Definition 2. a < 1 is false. (a < 6 + 1) = (a < b) + (a = b).
+It is easily seen that this is a perfectly legitimate recursive definition; for, first, it
+specifies under what conditions a < 6 if b = 1, namely, none; and, second, it specifies
+under what conditions the relation ‹ is to obtain between an arbitrary a and a
+certain b + 1 if it is already defined for b for arbitrary a. As we see, no logical E-sign
+occurs in this definition.
+Definition 2.1. (a > b) = (6 < a).
+THEOREM 3. (a < b)(6 < c) + (a < c), or, which is the same thing, (a < b) +
+(b < c) + (a < c). In words this theorem reads: If both a ‹ 6 and b ‹ c hold, then
+a < C.
+Proof. The proposition holds for arbitrary a and b when c = 1; for, according to
+Definition 2, 6 < 1 is false, that is, (b < 1) is true. I therefore want to prove that the
+proposition is true for o + 1 whenever it is true for c (with the values of a and b
+unspecified). From (a < b)(6 < c + 1) it follows, according to Definition 2, either
+that (a < b)(6 < c) or that (a < b)(6 = c). But, according to the assumption, from
+(a < b)(b < c) it follows that a ‹ c, whence, by Definition 2, a ‹ c + 1. From
+(a < b)(6 = c), ot course, a ‹ c also follows, whence again a ‹ c + 1. In every case,
+therefore, a ‹ c + 1 if both a < b and b < c + 1 hold, so that the proposition must
+also be true for arbitrary a and b for c + 1. This proves Theorem 3.
+Definition 3. (a ≤b) = (a < b) + (a = b).
+Definition 3.1. (a ≥ b) = (a > b) + (a = b).
+These definitions, like Definition 2.1, merely introduce notational variants; they are
+therefore theoretically superfluous, which is not the case for recursive definitions.
+Lemma 1 (for Theorem 4). (a < b) + (a + 1 ≤ b).
+In words: Either a is not less than b, or a + 1 is less than or equal to b. But it is
+better to state it thus: From a < b it follows that a + 1 ≤ b.
+Proof. For an unspecified a the proposition holds for b = 1. I assume that it is
+true for arbitrary a for a certain b and then prove that it is true for arbitrary a for
+b + 1. From a < b + 1 it follows (Definition 2) either that a < 6, whence, in consequence of the assumption, a + 1 ≤ b, which in turn yields (Definition 2) a + 1 ≤
+b + 1, or that a = 6, whence clearly a + 1 = b + 1, which yields (Definition 3)
+a + 1 = 6 + 1. The proposition thus holds, for arbitrary values of a, for b + 1 also
+and therefore holds generally.
+Lemma 2 (for Theorem 4). 1 ≤ a.
+Proof. The proposition holds for a = 1. From the assumption that it holds for a,
+that is, that 1 ≤ a, it follows (Definitions 2 and 3) that 1 < a + 1, which yields
+(Definition 3) 1 ≤ a + 1; that is, the proposition also holds for a + 1.
+THEOREM 4. (a < b) + (a = b) + (a > b).
+Proof. The proposition holds for b = 1, since according to Lemma 2 necessarily
+either a = 1 or a > 1. I assume that the proposition is true for b with unspecified a
+and prove that it is true for b + 1 for arbitrary a. For, if it is not the case that
+
+308
+a < b + 1, neither a < b nor a = b is possible (Definition 2); but then, in consequence of the assumption, a > 6, whence (Lemma 1) a ≥ 6 + 1.
+Lemma. (a <b)(a +1<b + 1) + (a <b) (a + 1 < b+ 1).
+This proposition can be expressed in words thus: From a < b it follows that
+a + 1< b + 1, and conversely.
+Proof. From a < 6 it follows (Lemma 1 for Theorem 4) that a + 1 ≤ 6, whence
+(Definition 2) a + 1 < b + 1. From a + 1 < b + 1 it follows (Definition 2) either
+that a + 1 < b or that a + 1 = b. Hence in either case a < b.
+THeOReM 5. a < a; that is, no number is less than itself.
+Proof. This is true for a = 1 (Definition 2). I assume that it is true for a certain a.
+From a + 1 < a + 1 it would follow, according to the last lemma, that a < a, which
+conflicts with the assumption made.
+Corollary to Theorems 3 and 5. [For distinct a and b] (a < b)(a > b) + (a < b)
+(a > b).
+In words: If a < b, then not a > b, and conversely.
+For, if we were to have a ‹ b and at the same time a > b, it would follow (Theorem
+3) that a < a.
+Corollary. (a < b) + (a ‡ b);" that is, if a ‹ b, then a is not equal to b. For from
+(a < b)(a = b) it would follow that a < a.
+The three relations a < b, a = b, and a > b are thus mutually exclusive, while on
+account of Theorem 4 in every case one of them must be satisfied
+THEOREm 6.(a (a <b)(a +c<b+ c) + (a <b) (a + <b + c).
+Proof. According to the lemma for Theorem 5 this is certainly true when c = 1. We
+assume that it has already been proved to be true for arbitrary a and b for a certain c.
+From a ‹ b it then follows that a + c < b + c, whence, by virtue of Theorem 1 and
+the same lemma, a + (o + 1) < b + (c + 1). Conversely, it follows from a + (c + 1)
+< b + (c + 1) by virtue of Theorem 1 and this lemma that a + c < b + c, whence,
+according to the assumption, a < b.
+THEOREM 7. (a <b)(c<d) + (a +c <6 + d).
+That is, if both a < band e‹d hold, a te < 6 + d.
+Proof. From a < b it follows (Theorem 6) that a + c < 6 + c. From e < d it follows (Theorems 2 and 6) that b + c < b + d. From the assumption that both a + c
+<6+ candb +c<b + d hold it follows (Theorem 3) that a + c < 6 + d.
+This is a typical example of a nonrecursive proof, one that consists merely of a
+finite combination of earlier theorems, whereas a proof by mathematical induction
+represents an infinite process. We have, incidentally, already had several other
+examples of nonrecursive proofs (namely, those of the lemma for Theorem 5 and of
+the corollaries to Theorems 3 and 5).
+THEOrEM (a+(#b (a+c#b+ c) + (a = b).
+That is, from a + c = b + c it follows that a = b. Clearly, the converse is also
+true.
+Proof. If a ‡ b, then necessarily (Theorem 4) either a < b or a > 6. From a < b,
+however, it follows (Theorem 6) that a + c < 6 + c and from a > b, in the same way,
+2 I write a # b, as one customarily does, to express the fact that a is not equal to b, that is,
+that (a = b) holds.
+
+309
+that a + c > b + c, and both contradict (corollary to Theorem 5) the equation
+atc=b + C.
+The special case c = 1 of this theorem asserts that there can exist at most one
+number having a certain successor, or, in other words, each number can have one
+predecessor at most.
+THeorem 9. a < a + b.
+Proof. True for b = 1 for unspecified a (Definition 2). We assume that the proposition is true for arbitrary a for a certain b. But from a < a + b we obtain further
+(Definition 2) a < (a + b) + 1, that is (Definition 1), a < a + (6 + 1).
+§3. MULTIPLICATION
+Definition 4. a.1 = a. alb + 1) = ab + a.
+This is a recursive definition of a descriptive function ab of two variables, a and b,
+which is called the product of a and b.
+THEoreM I0. (First distributive law.) alb + c) = ab + ac.
+Proof. The proposition holds (Definition 4) for c = 1. We therefore assume that it
+holds for arbitrary a and b for a certain c. We then obtain
+alb+ (c+1)) = al16+c)+1) = alb + c) ta
+= (ab + ac) +a= ab + (ac + a) = ab tale t 1),
+making use of Theorem 1, Definition 4, and the assumption made.
+THEOREM 11. (The associative law.) a(be) = (ab)c.
+Proof. The proposition holds (Definition 4) for c = 1. We therefore assume that it
+is true for arbitrary a and b for a certain c. Then we obtain
+alb(c+ 1)) = a(be + b) = albe) + ab = (ab)c + ab = (ab)(c + 1),
+applying Definition 4, Theorem 10, and the assumption made.
+THEOREM 12. (Second distributive law.) (a + b)c = ac + bc.
+Proof. When c = 1, the proposition is true (Definition 4). We assume that it is true
+for arbitrary a and b for a certain c. Then by applying Definition 4 and Theorems 1
+and 2 we obtain
+(a+b)(c+ 1) = (a +b)c+(a +b) = (ac+ be) + (at b) = (lac+ be) + a) +b
+=(ac+ (bo+ a)) +b= (ac+ (a +bc)) +b= ((act a) + be) +b
+=(ac+1) +b) +b= al+ 1) + (bo+b) = alot 1) + b(ct 1).
+Lemma. 1.a = a.
+Proof. True for a = 1 (Definition 4). If the proposition is true for a, then 1 (a + 1)
+= (1.a) + 1 = a + 1; that is, it is also true for a + 1.
+THEOREM 13. (The commutative law.) ab = ba.
+Proof. This proposition holds (by the lemma) for arbitrary a when b = 1. From the
+assumption that it is true for b for arbitrary a it follows (Theorem 12 and the lemma)
+that
+alb+1) = ab +a= ba + a = 16 + 1)a.
+THEOREM 14. (a < b)(ac < bc) + (a < b) (ac < bc).
+
+310
+In words: From a < b it follows that ac < bc, and conversely.
+Proof. Clearly, the proposition is true for arbitrary a and b when c = 1. Therefore
+we now assume that it holds for arbitrary a and b for a certain c. Then from a < b it
+follows that ac < bc, whence (Theorem 7) ac + a < be + b, that is (Definition 4),
+alc + 1) < b(c + 1). The converse must also be true; for from a = b it would follow
+that ac = bc, and from a > b, according to what has been proved, that ac > bc.
+Corollary. (ac ‡ bc) + (a = b); that is, from ac = be it follows that a = b.
+THEOREM 15. a ≤ ab.
+Proof. True for b = 1 (Definition 4). From the assumption that the proposition is
+true for b it follows by Theorem 3, since (Theorem 9) ab < ab + a, that a < alb + 1);
+that is, the proposition is also true for b + 1.
+Corollary. From ab ≤ c it follows that a ≤ c, or, alternatively, (ab > c) + (a ≤ c).
+§4. THE RELATION OF DIVISIBILITY
+Closely connected with multiplication is the notion of divisibility. It is generally
+defined by means of an apparent variable. For we say that a is divisible by b if there
+exists a number x such that a = bx. If we use Schröder's symbols and let D(a, b)
+mean the propositional function "a is divisible by b", this definition takes
+• the
+following form:
+D(a, b) = E(a = bx).
+Such a definition involves an infinite task-that means one that cannot be completed-since the criterion of divisibility is whether, by successive trials through the
+entire number sequence, we can find a number x such that a = bx.
+Here, however, it is easy to free ourselves from the infinitude that adheres to this
+definition. For it is clear that a number x having the required property, if such a one
+exists at all, must occur among the numbers 1, 2,..,a; for from bx = a it follows
+by Theorem 15 that x ≤ a. Therefore the relation of divisibility can equally well be
+defined as follows:
+D(a, b) = 2x(a=bx) = ((a =b) + (a= 26) + (a = 36) +... + (a= ab)).
+To be sure, an apparent variable x still occurs here; but it ranges over a finite domain
+only, namely, just the values from 1 to a. Therefore this definition furnishes us with a
+finite criterion of divisibility; we can in every case, by completing a finite task, that
+is, by performing a finite number of operations, ascertain whether the proposition
+D(a, b) holds or not. Since now the Schröder propositional sum in this definition is a
+finite one, it can itself in turn be defined by recursion, and thus the use of an apparent
+variable can ultimately be avoided altogether. To achieve this we need only define,
+as a first step, a ternary relation 4(a, b, c) that is to mean that a is equal to b multiplied by a number between 1 and c (both inclusive). The precise definition of 4(a, b, c)
+reads as follows:
+Definition 5. 4(a, b, 1) = (a= b). A(a, b, c + 1) = 4(a, b, c) + (a = b(c + 1)).
+By means of the propositional function 4 the divisibility relation D is defined thus :
+Definition 6. D(a, b) = 4(a, b, a).
+
+311
+It is very easy to see that the propositional equivalence
+4(a, b, c) = Ex (a = bx)
+obtains, so that Definition 6 coincides completely with the finite definition of divisibility mentioned above. In fact this equivalence holds for c = 1, since the propositional sum on the right then reduces to the single term a = b, and from the
+assumption that it is true for c it follows that it is true for c + 1; for, 'Erla = ba),
+after all, means the same as 2x(a = bx) + (a = b(c + I)).
+THEOREM 16. (a # bc) + 4(a, b, c); that is, from a = be it follows that 4(a, b, c).
+This immediately follows from Definition 5.
+THEOReM 17. A(a, b, c) + (c > c') + 4(a, b, c').
+This can also be expressed thus: From 4(a, b, c)(c ≤ c') it follows that 4(a, b, c').
+Proof. Clearly, the proposition is true for c' = 1. We assume that it is true for a
+certain c' for arbitrary values of a, b, and c. From c ≤ c' + 1 it follows either that
+• ≤ c', which, together with 4(a, b, c) yields, according to the assumption, 4(a, b, c')
+and consequently (Definition 5) also 4(a, b, c' + 1), or that e = c' + 1, which, together with 4(a, b, c), of course yields 4(a, b, c' + 1). Hence the proposition is also
+true for c' + 1 for arbitrary values of a, b, and c and thus holds in full generality.
+THEORem 18. A(a, b, c) + D(a, b); that is, from A(a, b, c) it follows that D(a, b).
+Proof. From 4(a, b, 1), that is, a = b, it follows by Theorem 17, since (Lemma 2
+for Theorem 4) 1 ≤ a, that 4(a, b, a), that is, D(a, b). Let us now assume that the
+proposition holds for c. From 4(a, b, c + 1) it follows (Definition 5) either that
+A(a, b, c), whence, in consequence of the assumption, D(a, b), or that a = b(c + 1),
+whence (Theorem 15) c + 1 ≤ a; but from 4(a, b, c + 1)(c + 1 ≤ a) it follows
+(Theorem 17) that 4(a, b, a), that is, Da, b).
+Corollary to Theorems 16 and 18. (a ‡ bc) + D(a, b); that is, from a = be it follows
+that D(a, b).
+THEOREM 19. (a ‡ bd) + 4(b, c, e) + 4(a, c, de); that is, from (a = bd)4(b, c, e) it
+follows that 4(a, c, de).
+Proof. It e = 1, then 4(6, c, e) = (6 = c); from (a = bd)4(b, c, 1) it thus follows that
+a = cd, whence (Theorem 16) 4(a, c, d). We therefore assume that the proposition is
+true for e (with arbitrary a, b, c, and d). From (a = bd)4(b, c, e + 1) we obtain (Definition 5) either (a = bd)4(b, c, e), whence 4(a, c, de), whence in turn by Theorem 17
+A(a, c, dle + 1)), since (de ‹ de + d by Theorem 9) de < de + 1), or (a = bd)(6 =
+ce t 1)), whence a = cale + 1), which again yields (Theorem 16) 4(a, c, dle + 1)).
+Corollary to Theorems 18 and 19. (a ‡ bd) + D(b, c) + Da, c); that is, from
+(a = bd)D(b, c) it follows that D(a, c).
+For from (a = bd)4(b, c, b) it follows (Theorem 19) that 4(a, c, bd), whence (Theorem 18) D(a, c).
+THEOREM 20. 4(a, b, d) + D(b, c) + D(a, c).
+Proof. From 4(a, b, 1) D(b, c) it follows, of course, that Da, c), since 4(a, b, 1) =
+(a = b). We assume that the proposition is true for arbitrary a, b, and c for a certain
+d. From 4(a, b, d + 1) D(b, c) we obtain (Definition 5) either 4(a, b, d) D(b, c), whence,
+
+312
+in consequence of the assumption, Da, c), or (a = b(d + 1)) D(b, c), whence, according to the corollary to Theorems 18 and 19, it follows that Da, c). This proves that
+the proposition is true for c + 1.
+Corollary. Da, b)D(b, c) + Da, c); that is, from Da, b)D(b, c) it follows that
+D(a, c).
+This is in fact just the special case that we obtain from Theorem 20 if we put
+d= a.
+This last proposition, that D(a, c) follows from D(a, b)D(b, c), is closely related to
+the proposition that states that a = cde follows from (a = bd)(6 = ce), but it has a
+quite different meaning. Even according to the ordinary conception that makes use
+of apparent variables ranging over an infinite domain, the two propositions are quite
+different in content, as becomes clear immediately the two are formulated precisely.
+The one proposition is, in Schröder's symbols,
+(a)
+П(2(a=bx) + 2(b = cy) + I(a = cz)).
+The other proposition is
+(8)
+ППППП((a # bd) + (b # ce) + (a = cde)).
+a be a e
+When, nevertheless, one proves that the proposition Da, b) + D(b, c) + D(a, c),
+or (a), is true by proving proposition (B), as is usually done, he does so on the basis
+of certain logical schemata concerning the use of the signs II and 2; in ordinary
+mathematical thinking, however, these schemata are passed over in silence.
+THEOREM 21. A(a, c, d) + (6 ‡ ce) + Ala + b, c, d te).
+Proof. From 4(a, c, 1)(b = ce), or, in other words, (a = c)(b = ce), it follows that
+a + b = c(1 + e) and thence (Theorem 16) that 4(a + b, c, 1 + e). The proposition
+is therefore true for d = 1. We assume that it is true for a certain d and prove as
+follows that it is true for d + 1. From 4(a, c, d + 1)(6 = ce) it follows either that
+4(a, c, d)(6 = ce), whence, in consequence of the assumption, 4(a + b, c, d + e), which
+in turn implies (Theorems 1 and 2, and Definition 5) 4(a + b, c, (d + 1) + e), or that
+(a = c/d + I))(b = ce), whence a + b = c(ld + 1) + e), which again implies (Theorem 16) 4(a + b, c, (d + 1) + e).
+Corollary. 4(a, c, d) + 4(b, c, 1) + 4(a + b, c, d + 1).
+THEOREM 22. A(a, c, d) + 4(6, c, e) + A(a + b, c, d + e).
+Proof. According to the corollary to Theorem 21 this holds for e = 1. We therefore
+assume that the proposition is true for a certain e and prove as follows that it is true
+for e + 1. From 4(a, c, d)4(6, c, e + 1) we obtain either 4(a, c, d)4(b, c, e) and thence,
+in consequence of the assumption, 4(a + b, c, d + e), which in turn implies 4la + b,
+c, d + (e + 1)), or 4(a, c, d)(6 = cle + 1)), whence (Theorem 21) 4(a + b, c, d +
+(e + 1)).
+Corollary. Da, c)D(b, c) + D(a + b, c).
+In words: If both a and b are divisible by c, then a + b too is divisible by c.
+For from 4(a, c, a)4(6, c, b) we obtain, by Theorem 22, Ala + b, c, a + b).
+Lemma. A(a + b, b, c + 1) + 4(a, b, c).
+Proof. From 4(a + b, b, 2) it follows (Definition 5) either that a + b = b, which is,
+
+313
+however, impossible, since necessarily (Theorem 9) a + b > b and since (Theorem 5)
+the relations > and = are mutually exclusive, or that a + b = b. 2, whence b = a
+(since from a + b = b + b it must follow, according to Theorem 8, that a = b).
+Thus our lemma is true for c = 1. We assume that it holds for c and then prove it
+for c + 1. From 4(a + b, b, c + 2) it follows in fact either that 4(a + b, b, c + 1),
+whence, in consequence of the assumption, 4(a, b, c) and therefore also 4(a, b, c + 1),
+or that a + b = b(c + 2), whence (Theorem 8) a = b(c + 1), which again implies
+4(a, b, C + 1).
+By making use of subtraction, even before it is introduced (see § 5), we can also
+state this lemma in the following form: From 4(a + b, b, c)(c > 1) it follows that
+4(a, b, c - 1). For this is true when c = 1, because the hypothesis is then false.
+Whenever the proposition holds for c, it holds also for c + 1; for from Ala + 6, 6,
+c + 1) we obtain, according to what has just been proved, 4(a, b, c), and c = (c + 1)
+- 1 (see Definition 7 [below]).
+THEOREM 23. A(a + bd, b, c + d) + 4(a, b, c).
+Proof. In case d = 1 we are back at the lemma. We therefore assume that the
+proposition is true for d and prove that it is true for d + 1. From Ala + bd + b, b,
+c+d + 1) it follows (Definition (Definition either that a + bd + b = b(c + d + 1) or that
+A(a + ba + b, b, c + d). In the first case, since (Theorem 10) b(c + d + 1) = be +
+bld + 1), we obtain (Theorem 8) a = bc, whence (Theorem 16) 4(a, b, c). In the second
+case, since necessarily (Lemma 2 for Theorem 4, and Theorem 9) c + d > 1, we
+obtain, by the lemma, A(a + bd, b, c + d - 1), whence 4(a + bd, b, c + d), which,
+according to the assumption, implies 4(a, b, c).
+THEOREM 24. 4(a + b,c, d + e) + 4(b, c, e) + 4(a, c, d + e).
+Proof. This is true for e = 1; for from 4(a + b, c, d + 1)(b = c) we obtain, according to the lemma for Theorem 23, 4(a, c, d) and therefore also 4(a, c, d + 1). We shall
+therefore assume that the proposition is true for e (with arbitrary a, b, c, and d) and
+then prove that it is true for e + 1 (for arbitrary values of a, b, c, and d). From
+4(a+ b,c, d + le + 1))4(6, c, e + 1) we obtain either 4(a + b, c, (d + 1) + e)4l6,
+с, e), which, according to the assumption, implies 4(a, c, (d + 1) + e), in other words
+4(a, c, d + (e + 1)), or 4(a + b, c, d + (e + 1))(6 = cle + 1)), whence (Theorem 23)
+4(a, c, d), which again implies (Theorem 17) A(a, c, d + (e + 1)).
+Corollary. Da + b, c) Da, c) + D(b, c).
+For, first, 4(b, c, a + b) must follow (Theorem 24) from 4(a + b, c, a + b)Ala, c, a)
+and, second, D(b, c) is a consequence (Theorem 18) of 4(6, c, a + b).
+After the introduction of subtraction we shall be able to write this theorem also as
+follows: (a > b) + D(a, c) + D(b, c) + D(a - b, c).
+That is, if both a and b are divisible by c and if a is greater than b (so that the
+difference a - b exists), then a - b is divisible by c.
+THEOREM 25. 4(a, b, c) + (a ≥ b).
+Proof. Clearly, the proposition holds for c = 1. If we assume that it holds for c, we
+obtain from 4(a, b, c + 1) either 4(a, b, c), which thus yields a ≥ b, or a = bc + 1),
+from which (Theorem 15) a ≥ b also follows.
+Corollary 1. Da, b) + (a ≥ b).
+Corollary 2. D(a, b) + D(b, a) + (a = b).
+
+314
+For from (a ≥ b)(6 ≥ a) it must follow (Theorem 5) that a = b.
+THEOReM 26. A(a, b, d)4(ac, bc, d) + 4(a, b, d) 4(ac, be, d).
+In words: From 4(a, b, d) it follows that 4(ac, bc, d), and conversely.
+Proof. The proposition is true for d = 1; for from ac = be it follows, according to
+the corollary to Theorem 14, that a = b, and conversely from a = b it of course
+follows that ac = bc. We assume that the proposition is true for d and prove that it is
+true for d + 1. From 4(a, b, d + 1) we obtain either 4(a, b, d), which according to the
+assumption implies 4(ac, bc, d) and therefore also 4(ac, bc, d + 1), or a = b(d + 1),
+whence (Theorems 11 and 13) ac = (6/d+1))c= bld + 1)c) = bcd + 1)) = (bc)
+(d + 1), and from ac = bo(d + 1) it again follows (Theorem 16) that 4(ac, bc, d + 1).
+Likewise we obtain from 4(ac, bc, d + 1) either 4(ac, bc, d), whence 4(a, b, d) and
+therefore also 4(a, b, d + 1), or ac = bold + 1) = bld + 1)c, whence, in consequence
+of the corollary to Theorem 14, a = b(d + 1), whence (Theorem 16) 4(a, b, d + 1).
+Corollary. D(a, b) D(ac, be) + Da, b) D(ac, be).
+THEOREM 27. (a ‡ bd) + 4(d, c, e) + 4la, bc, e).
+Proof. True for e = 1. We therefore assume that the proposition is true for e and
+prove that it is true for e + 1. From 4(d, c, e + 1) we obtain either 4(d, c, e), which
+together with a = bd yields, according to the assumption, 4(a, bc, e) and therefore
+also 4(a, bc, e + 1), or d = cle + 1), which together with a = bd yields (Theorem 11)
+a = (bc)(e + 1), whence (Theorem 16) 4(a, bc, e + 1).
+§5. SUBTRACTION AND DIVISION. DESCRIPTIVE FUNCTIONS WITH A RESTRICTED
+DOMAIN OF EXISTENCE
+Subtraction, as is well known, can be defined in the following manner:
+Definition 7. (c - b = a) = (c= a + b).
+It is clear that in this way a descriptive function c - b, called the difference, is
+defined; for, by means of the equation a + b = c, a is uniquely determined by b and
+c. This, however, is a descriptive function with a restricted domain of existence; for,
+if c ≤ b, no equation of the form c = a + b can obtain, and then according to Definition 7 the inequality c - b ‡ a obtains for every number a; that is, c - b is not
+equal to any number. On the other hand it can be proved that c - b will certainly
+have a value when c > b. One would be inclined to formulate this proposition thus:
+(c>b) + I(x+b = c),
+where the propositional summation over x would have to be extended over "all"
+numbers from 1 to 0o. But it is not necessary to adduce such an actual infinity here
+either; we can in fact prove the following proposition:
+[0 > 6) + İ
+which, after all, will more readily serve to secure the existence of a value for c - b.
+But the propositional function
+Ди(и + У = х) = L(х, У, 2)
+
+315
+of the three variables x, y, and z again can be defined recursively, so that we can avoid
+the apparent variable u altogether. The theorem that is to be proved is then obviously
+the following:
+THEOREM 28. c > 6 + Ic, b, c).
+In words this theorem reads as follows: If c > b, there exists among the numbers
+from 1 to c a number x such that x + b = c, or, in other words, x = c -b.
+We need the recursive definition of the function L and a few simple theorems about
+it.
+Definition 8(7, 1)=(x=1+y). I(x, y: 2 + 1) = I(x, Y, z) + (x = (z + 1)
++ У).
+THEOREM 29. I(x, у, 2)(= ≤ '') + I (x, Y, 2).
+Proof. True for z' = 1. I assume that it is true for z' and from that prove that it is
+true for ' + 1. From » ≤ «' + 1 it in fact follows either that « ≤ z', which together
+with I(x, Y, z), according to the assumption, yields I(X, Y, z') and therefore (Definition
+8) also I(x, y, %' + 1), or that a = * + 1, which with I(x, y, z) obviously yields
+I(x, y, 2' + 1).
+THEOREM 30. I(x, y, 2) + I(x + 1,y, z + 1).
+Proof. True when z = 1; for from x = 1 + y it follows (Theorems 1 and 2) that
+11=(1+1) +1=1+(1+1) =1+(1+1) = 11+1) +Y. I assume that
+the proposition is true for z and prove that it is true for z + 1. From I(x, y, = + 1) it
+follows (Definition 8) either that I(x, y, z), whence, according to the assumption
+made, I(x + 1, y, z + 1) and therefore also I(x + 1,y, z + 2) follow, or that x =
+(+1)=(=+1)+(1+y) = (z+ 2) +Y, whence (Definition 8) L(x + 1,Y,
+z + 2).
+Now the proof of Theorem 28 can be carried out.
+The proposition stated as Theorem 28 is certainly true for c = 1; for, in that case,
+already 1 > 6 is true. I therefore assume that it is true for c and prove that it is true
+for c + 1. From c + 1 > b we obtain (see Lemma 1 for Theorem 4, the lemma for
+Theorem 5, and Theorem 8) either c > b, which, according to the assumption made,
+gives us L(c, b, c), whence it further follows (Theorem 30) that L(c + 1,b, c + 1), or
+c = b, whence (Theorem 2) c + 1 = b + 1 = 1 + b; hence (Definition 8) Lc + 1,
+b, 1), and thence (Theorem 29) again L(c + 1,6, c + 1).
+Division is introduced in a manner analogous to subtraction.
+Definition 9. (c/b = a) = (c = ab).
+The expression c/b, called the quotient, is clearly again a function with a restricted
+domain of definition; for from c = ab it follows (corollary to Theorems 16 and 18)
+that D(c, b), so that c/b has a value only if D(c, b) is true. Conversely, this is also
+sufficient; for, the proposition D(c, b), or, in other words (see Definition 6), 4(c, b, c),
+is equivalent to the propositional sum
+(see p. 311), and (c = bx) = (c = xb), so that this propositional sum can be formulated
+in words thus: Among the numbers from 1 to c [inclusive] there exists a number
+x such that c = xb, or, in other words, c/b = x.
+
+316
+The propositional function D(c, b) is therefore completely equivalent to the
+assertion that between 1 and c there exists a value for c/b.
+I now give some simple theorems about differences and quotients. Presumably I do
+not have to give the proofs, which are trivial; these theorems are, after all, mere
+transformations of the simplest theorems about sums and products.
+THEOREM 31+. (a-b) + b= a.
+31 x. (a/b)b = a.
+32+. (a-b) +c= (a + c) - b.
+32 x. (a/b)c = ac/b.
+33+. (a-b) - c= a - (6 + c).
+33x. (a/b)/c=a/bc.
+34+. a - (6 - c) = (a-b) + C.
+34x. a/(b/c) = (a/b)c.
+35. (a -b)c = ac - bc.
+36a. (a/c) + (b/c) = (a + b)/c.
+36b. (a/c) - (b/c) = (a -b)/c.
+§ 6. GREATEST COMMON DIVISOR AND LEAST COMMON MULTIPLE
+The customary definitions of the greatest common divisor and the least common
+multiple of two numbers make use of apparent variables that range over an infinite
+domain. In Schröder's symbols these definitions in fact have the following form:
+(c is the greatest common divisor of a and b)
+= D(a, с)D(b, c)I (Dla, a) + D(b, x) + D(c, x)),
+(c is the least common multiple of a and b)
+= D(c, a) D(c, b)II (D(x, a) + D(x, b) + D(x, c)).
+Since, however, x ≤ a follows (Corollary 1 to Theorem 25) from D(a, x), the infinite
+domain over which the variable ranges in the definition of the greatest common
+divisor can at once be cut down to a finite one, and we can just as well write
+(c is the greatest common divisor of a and b)
+= Da, c)D(6, c)f (Da, 2) + D(b, e) + D(c, al)).
+A disadvantage of this definition is, however, that it is asymmetric with respect to
+a and b. But this, too, can easily be remedied, since over the sign II we can write
+a + b instead of the upper bound a, or even better Min(a, b), where Mina, b) is the
+minimum of the numbers a and b. For the definition of the least common multiple
+such a reduction of the range of the variable to a finite domain cannot be carried out
+quite so easily.
+In what follows I shall introduce these notions in a different way, one that avoids
+apparent variables altogether. In doing this, however, I must make use of the recursive method of definition in a different way from before (though, as I shall soon show,
+the difference is purely superficial). Until now we have always given recursive definitions strictly as follows: we defined a notion for the number 1 and then, on the
+
+317
+assumption that the definition for an arbitrarily given number n is already complete,
+we defined the notion for n + 1. Furthermore, a formal logical principle will be used
+here, namely, that we can give separate definitions for each one of mutually exclusive
+cases. I introduce two descriptive functions of two variables a and b, namely a 1 b
+and a V b, which I shall later show to be identical with the greatest common divisor
+and the least common multiple, respectively.
+Definition10. (a#b)+(a1b=a)) ((a >b+(a 1b= (a-b) 1 b))(a<b)
++ (a 1b = a 1 (6 - a))).
+This is a pertectly legitimate recursive definition of the descriptive function
+a 1 b; if we assume that it is already defined for those values of a and b for which
+a + b < n, then by Definition 10 it is defined for a + b = n. For, if a and b are two
+numbers such that a + b = n, then a = 6 or a > b or a < b, and these three cases
+are mutually exclusive, while Definition 10 specifies for each case what a 1 b is to
+mean. Moreover, Definition 10 gives us the value of a 1 b when a + b = 2, in which
+case necessarily a = b = 1.
+In the proofs of some of the theorems that follow I shall also make use of mathematical induction in a different way from before (though, as I shall soon show, the
+difference is purely superficial). Until now this inductive inference has always been
+made thus: we prove a proposition for the number 1 and then we prove it for n + 1
+on the assumption that it holds for n. Now I shall also prove inductively as follows: I
+prove a proposition for 1, and then, assuming that it holds for an arbitrary number
+<n, I prove it for n.
+Lemma. a ^ 1 = 1.
+Proof. True for a = 1 in consequence of Definition 10. If we assume that the
+proposition is true for a, we obtain, according to Definition 10, since (Theorem 9)
+a + 1 > 1, (a + 1) 11 = a 1 1, and therefore also (a + 1) ^ 1 = 1.
+Likewise it can be proved that 1 1 a = 1. In general, of course, a 16 = b 1 a.
+THEOREM 37. D(a, a 1 b)D(b, a 1 b).
+Proof. This proposition is true for arbitrary b for a = 1 and for arbitrary a for b = 1;
+for, according to the lemma, a 1 1 = 1 1 b = 1. I assume that the proposition is
+true for a + b < n and then prove that it is true for a + b = n. For if, first, a = 6,
+then, according to Definition 10, a 1 b = a, and consequently the proposition holds.
+If, second, a > b, then (a - b) + 6 < n, and then, in consequence of the assumption,
+Da - b, (a - b) 1 b)D(b, (a - b) 1 b) holds. But, according to Definition 10,
+(a-b) 1b=a1 a and and we therefore obtain D(a - b, a b) b)D(b, a 1 b), whence
+by the corollary to Theorem 22 and by Theorem 31+, Da, a 1 b) also follows. The
+proposition, therefore, is true in this case also. If, third, a < b, we can proceed in an
+exactly analogous way.
+THEOREM 38. D(a, c)D(b, c) + D(a 1b, c).
+Proof. The proposition holds for arbitrary b when a = 1 and for arbitrary a when
+b = 1; for then it follows from D(a, c), or D(b, c), respectively, that c = 1. I assume
+that the proposition holds for such a and b as will make a + b < n, and I prove from
+that assumption that it holds for such a and b as will make a + b = n. Therefore, let
+a and b be numbers such that a + b = n. First, then, it may be that a = b; in this
+case, according to Definition 10, a 1 b = a, and the proposition is therefore true.
+Second, it may be that a > b. Since (a - b) + b < n, D|(a - b) 1b, c) must, by the
+
+318
+assumption, follow from D(a - b, c)D(b, c); but D(a - b, c) in turn is a consequence
+of Da, c)D(b, c) (corollary to Theorem 24), and finally (Definition 10) in this case
+(a -b) b) a b. Thus D(a 1 b, c) follows from Dla, c)D(b, c). In the third case,
+a < b, we proceed in exactly the same way.
+Theorems 37 and 38 together express the characteristic properties of the greatest
+common divisor.
+THEOREM 39. D(a, b) + (a 1 b = b).
+Proof. In consequence of Theorem 37 we have D(b, a 1 b). On the other hand,
+D(a 1 b, 6) follows (Theorem 38) from D(a, b)D(6, b). From D(6, a 1 b)D (a 1
+1 6,6),
+however, it follows (Corollary 2 to Theorem 25) that a 1b = b.
+Corollary. ab 1 a = a.
+THeOReM 40. ас Л bc = (а Л b)с.
+Proof. The proposition is true for arbitrary a for b = 1 and for arbitrary b for a = 1,
+as immediately follows from the lemma for Theorem 37 and the corollary to Theorem
+39. We therefore assume that we have already proved that the proposition holds for
+a + b < n, and on this basis we prove that it holds for such a and b that a + b = n.
+It is possible, first, that a = b. Then also ac = bc, and, according to Definition 10,
+we have ac 1 be = ac and a 1 b = a, which yield ac 1 be = (a 1 b)c. The second
+case is a > b. Since (a - b) + b < n, we have, according to the assumption made,
+(a-b)c 1 bc = ((a-b) 1 b)c. But furthermore a 1b = (a-b) 1 6, and since,
+then, also (Theorem 14) ac > be, we necessarily, according to Definition 10, have
+(ac - bc) ^ be = ac 1 bc. Finally (Theorem 35), (a - b)c = ac - bc. Thus the equation ac 1 be = (a 1 b)e holds. In the third case, when a ‹ b, we of course proceed
+in the same way.
+Definition. We say that two numbers a and b are relatively prime if a 1b = 1.
+I do not introduce a special symbol for this, since we can always use the short equation
+a 1 b = 1 as an expression for it.
+THEOREM 41. D(ac, b)(a 1 b = 1) + D(c, b).
+This is the well-known theorem that a number b that divides a product ac whereas
+it is relatively prime to the factor a must divide the other factor, c.
+Proof. From D(ac, b) D(bc, b) it follows (Theorem 38) that D(ac 1 bc, b). But from
+a 1 b = 1 it follows (Theorem 40) that ac 1 be = c, so that D(c, b) must be true.
+THEOREM 42. (a 1 b = 1)D(a, a') + (a' ^ b = 1).
+Proof. In consequence of Theorem 37, D(a', a' 1 b)D(b, a' 1 b) holds; but from
+Da, a')D(a', a' 1 b) it follows (corollary to Theorem 20) that Da, a' 1 b), which
+together with D(b, a' 1 b) yields (Theorem 38) D(a 1 b, a' 1 b). Then from (a 1 b
+= 1)D(a, a') it must therefore surely follow that a' 1 6 = 1; for from D(1, a) it
+follows (Corollary 1 to Theorem 25) that a = 1.
+THEOREM 43. (a 1b ‡ 1) + (a ^ c ‡ 1) + (a 1 bc = 1).
+Proof. If a number d divides a as well as bo, then necessarily (Theorem 42) d 1 6
+= 1 as well as d 1 c = 1, provided (a 1 b = 1)(a 1 c = 1) obtains. Further, it
+must, according to Theorem 41, follow from D(bc, d)(c 1 d = 1) that D(b, d). But
+from D(b, d) it follows (Theorem 39) that b ^ d = d; on the other hand, we had
+b ^ d = 1; therefore d = 1. But now (Theorem 37) a 1 be divides a as well as be;
+therefore a 1 bc = 1.
+
+319
+THEOREM 44. (Generalization of Theorem 41.) D(ac, b) + D(c, b/(a 1 b)).
+Proof. In the first place it is clear that necessarily (a/(a 1 b)) ^ (b/(a 1 b)) = 1;
+for, by Theorem 40, we have ((a/(a 1 b)) ^ (b/(a 1 b)))(a 1 b) = a л b. From
+D(ac, b) it follows (corollary to Theorem 26) that D(ac/(a 1 b), b/(a 1 b)), whence,
+according to Theorem 41, D(c, b/(a 1 b)), since al(a 1 b) and b/(a 1 b) are relatively
+prime.
+Definition I1. a V b = ab/(a 1 b).
+THEOREM 45. 4(a, b, d) D(a, c) + 4(a, b V c, d).
+Proof. True when d = 1; for from (a = b) D(a, c) it follows that D(b, c), whence
+(Theorem 39) b 1 c = c and consequently, by Definition 11, b V c = b. I assume
+that the proposition is true for d and prove that it is true for d + 1. From 4(a, b,
+d + 1) it follows either that 4(a, b, d), which together with D(a, c) yields, according to
+the assumption, A(a, b V c, d) and therefore also 4(a, 6 V c,d + 1), or that a =
+b(d + 1), which together with D(a, c) yields (Theorem 44) D(d + 1, c/(6 ^ c)). But
+from (a = b(d + 1)) D(d + 1, c/(6 1 c)) we again
+obtain 4(a, b V c,d + 1), by
+Theorem 27.
+THEOREM 46. D(a V b, a) D(a V b, b).
+Proof. According to Theorem 37, D(a, a 1 b) holds, whence (corollary to Theorem
+26) D(ab/(a 1 b), b), that is, D(a V b, b). Likewise D(b, a 1 b) implies that Dla V
+b, a) is true.
+THEOREM 47. D(c, a) D(c, b) + D(c, a V b).
+This is merely a special case of Theorem 45, which results when d and a are equated.
+Theorems 46 and 47 together express the characteristic properties of the least
+common multiple of two numbers a and 6. Thus a V b denotes the least common
+multiple of a and b.
+An important special case of Theorem 47 is the one in which a 1 b = 1. From
+D(c, a) D(c, b) (a 1 b = 1) it follows that D(c, ab).
+We have, corresponding to Theorem 39,
+THEOREM 48. D(a, b) + (a Vb= a).
+That this proposition is true follows immediately from Theorem 39 and Definition
+11.
+We have, corresponding to Theorem 40,
+THEOREM 49. ac V bc = (a V b)c.
+Proof. ac V bc = (ac-bc)/(ас 1 bc) = (ac-bc)/(a 1 b)c = (ab.c)/(a 1 b) = (a V b)c;
+here use is made of Theorems 11, 13, 32, and 40.
+I want to conclude this section by giving a proof that the more involved kinds of
+recursive definition and recursive proof used above differ only formally, not actually,
+from the ordinary simple recursive procedure that goes from n ton + 1. The standard
+form of a recursive definition, after all, is as follows: a propositional function U (x)
+is defined first for x = 1 and then, if U(n) has already been defined, for x = n + 1.
+But above we also considered recursive definitions of the following kind : first we
+defined U(1) and then, with U(m) assumed to have been defined for arbitrary m < n,
+U(n). It is clear that the value of the propositional function U(Y)(y ≤ x) for arbitrarily selected x and y will be known if U(y) is defined for the y in question; but
+conversely it will also be known whether U(y) is true or false for a y ≤ x if U(y)
+
+320
+(Y ≤ x) is defined for the x and y in question. To define U(x), therefore, it will suffice
+to define U(Y)(y ≤ x) for arbitrary x and y; here we can observe that, for every pair
+of values (x, Y) for which y > x, U(Y)(Y ≤ x) must necessarily be false. To specify the
+value of U(y) (y ≤ x) generally, we can now apply the standard recursive procedure.
+For x = 1, U(Y)(y ≤ x) is necessarily false, according to the definition of the relation
+"less than",
+, whenever y > 1; we thus need merely specify U(1) in order to have the
+value of U(Y)(y ≤ 1) for arbitrary y. Further, we specify the value of U(y)(Y ≤ x) for
+* + 1 for arbitrary y when it has already been specified for x for arbitrary y. Whenever
+y > х + 1, U(Y)(Y ≤ x † 1) is false. When y ≤ x, we already know the value of the
+propositional function; that is, we must merely specify U(x + 1). Therefore, to
+specify the value of U(x + 1) when this function is regarded as known for arbitrary
+y <x+ 1 amounts precisely to specifying the value of the propositional function
+U(X)(Y =x) for x =n + 1 for arbitrary y when this propositional function is already
+known for x = n for arbitrary y. Thus the apparently divergent kind of recursive
+definition has been reduced to the standard form.
+Likewise it is easy to see that the more complicated form of inductive inference,
+which consists in proving a proposition for n when it is assumed to be true for arbitrary m < n, differs only formally but not actually from the standard form of inductive inference, the inference from n to n + 1. To say that U(y) has been proved
+for arbitrary y < x is, after all, equivalent to saying that (y ≥ x) + U(y) has been
+proved for this x for arbitrary y, and it is then not difficult to see that to prove U(x),
+with U(Y) assumed to be true for arbitrary y < x, is equivalent to proving (y ≥ x + 1)
++ U(Y) for arbitrary y when (y ≥ x) + U(y) has already been proved for arbitrary y.
+§ 7. THE NOTION OF PRIME NUMBER
+Definition 12. P(x, 1) is true. P(x, y + 1) = P(X, y) ((x = y + 1) + D(x, y + 1)).
+Definition 13. P(x) = P(x, x)(x ‡ 1).
+The propositional function P(x) means "x is a prime number".
+Definition 14. De(x, 1) is false. De(x, y + 1) = De(x, y) + D(x, y + 1)(y + 1 < x).
+Definition 15. Dp(x, 1) is false. Dp(x, y + 1) = Dp(x, y) + D(x, y + 1) P(y + 1).
+Definition 16. T(1) is true. I(x + 1) = T(x)Dp(x + 1, x + 1).
+In the customary definition of the notion of prime number an apparent variable is
+used. If the relation of divisibility is regarded as already defined, the definition of
+prime number can be given as follows:
+Р(х) = (х ‡ 1)П(D(x, y) + (y = 1) + (Y = x)).
+An infinite propositional product (or, in other words, Russell and Whitehead's
+"always") occurs here. But in Definitions 12 and 13 above no apparent variable
+occurs. The infinite propositional product can be avoided since it can immediately be
+replaced by a finite one. For, according to the corollary to Theorem 25, we necessarily
+have y ≤ x if D(x, y) is true, and thence it follows that in the infinite product all
+factors for which y > x holds become inoperative. Consequently we can just as well
+define P(x) thus:
+Р(х) = (х # 1)Й, (D(x, y) + (y = 1) + (У = x)).
+
+321
+The finite propositional product occurring here is nothing but the factor P(x, x) on
+the right side of Definition 13; P(x, y) is recursively defined by Definition 12 and is
+equivalent to the product
+П (Д(х, 2) + (2 =х)).
+Precisely because these propositional products are finite can they be defined recursively and thus apparent variables avoided altogether.
+The remaining propositional functions introduced above, De, Dp, and I, have, as
+is easily seen, the following meanings in words:
+De(x, y) means "x is divisible by a number > 1, ≤Y, and <x"
+Dp(x, y) means "x is divisible by a prime ≤Y".
+I'(x) means that all numbers from 2 to x are divisible by at least one prime ≤x.
+THEOREM 50. P(x, y) D(x, 2)(z {Y) + (z= 1) + (z= x).
+Proof. When y = 1, the proposition is clearly true. I prove the proposition for
+y + 1, assuming that it holds for y. From & ≤ y + 1 it follows that either z ≤ y or
+z = Y + 1. From & ≤ y, together with P(x, y) (which follows from P(x, y + 1)) and
+D(x, z), we obtain, according to the assumption, either z = 1 or z = x. From ≥ =
+y + 1, together with (x = y + 1) + D(x, y + 1) (which also follows from P(x, y + 1))
+and D(x, z), we obtain z = x.
+Corollary. P(x)D(x, y) + (y = 1) + (Y = x).
+For from P(x, x)(x ‡ 1)D(x, Y) it follows (Theorem 25) that P(x, x) D(x, Y)(У ≤ x),
+whence, according to the theorem just proved, (y = 1) + (Y = x).
+THEOREM 51. P(y) + D(x, y) + (x 1y = 1).
+Proof. Since D(y, x 1 Y) is true (Theorem 37), we necessarily have, whenever P(y)
+holds, either x ^ y = 1 or x ^ Y = Y, according to the corollary to Theorem 50; but
+from x 1 y = y it follows (Theorem 37) that D(x, y).
+THEOREM 52. D(xy, z) P(z) + D(x, z) + D(y, z).
+Proof. According to the preceding theorem, if P(z) is true, either D(x, z) or x ^ z
+= 1 holds. From D(xy, z) P(z), therefore, either D(x, z) or D(xy, z)(x 1 z = 1) must
+follow; but from D(xy, z)(x 1 z = 1) it in turn follows (Theorem 41) that D(y, z).
+THEOREM 53. P(X, Y) + De(x, y).
+Proof. True for y = 1, since (Definition 12) P(x, 1) already is true. I assume that
+the proposition is true for y and on this basis prove that it is true for y + 1. From
+P(x, y + 1) it follows (Definition 12) either that P(x, y), whence we have De(x, y)
+and consequently (Definition 14) also De(x, Y + 1), or that (x ‡ y + 1)D(x, y + 1),
+whence (Corollary 1 to Theorem 25) Dx, y + 1)(y + 1 < x), which, on account of
+Definition 14, yields De(x, y +. 1).
+THEOREM 54. (у ≤ Y')Dp(x, Y) + Dp (x, y').
+Proof. Clearly true when y' = 1. I assume that the proposition is true for y' and
+then prove that it is true for y' + 1. From y ≤ y' + 1 it follows either that y ≤ y',
+which together with Dp(x, y), according to the assumption, implies Dp(x, y') and
+therefore (Definition 15) also Dp(x, ý' + 1), or that y = y' + 1, which together with
+Dp(x, y) of course implies Dp(x, y' + 1).
+THEorem 55. D(x, y) Dp (y, 2) + Dp (x, z).
+
+322
+Proof. For z = 1 this proposition is true, since (Definition 15) Dp(y, 1) is false. I
+therefore assume that the proposition holds for z and then prove that it holds for
+≥ + 1. From Dp(y, = + 1) we obtain (Definition 15) either Dp(y, z), which together
+with D(x, y) implies Dp(x, 2) and consequently also Dp(x, z + 1), or D(y, z + 1)
+P(z + 1), which together with D(x, y), according to the corollary to Theorem 20, makes
+D(x, z + 1) true, whence, according to Definition 15, Dp(x, = + 1).
+THEOREM 56. Dp(x, y) + Dp (x, x).
+Proof. According to Definition 15 this must be true for y = 1. I assume that it is
+true for y and prove that it is true for y + 1. From Dp(x, y + 1) it follows either that
+Dp(x, y), whence we have Dp(x, x), or that D(x, y + 1) P(y + 1), whence, according
+to Corollary 1 to Theorem 25, y + 1 ≤ x; but from Dp(x, y + 1)(y † 1 ≤ x) it
+follows (Theorem 54) that Dp(x, x).
+THEOREM 57. De(x, y) T(y) + Dp (x, x).
+Proof. The proposition holds for y = 1; for De(x, 1) is false. I assume that the
+proposition holds for y and prove it for y + 1. From De(x, y + 1)T(y + 1) it follows
+either that De(x, y)I(y + 1), whence (Definition 16) De(x, y)T(y), whence, in consequence of the assumption, Dp(x, x), or that D(X, Y + 1)(y + 1 < x)T(y + 1), whence
+(Definition 16) D(x, y + 1)(y + 1 < x)Dp(y † 1, y + 1), whence in turn, according
+to Theorem 55, Dp(x, y + 1)(y + 1 < x), which implies (Theorem 54) that Dp(x, x)
+holds.
+THEOREM 58. I (x).
+Proof. True for x = 1 (Definition 16). I prove that T(x + 1) holds on the assumption that I(x) does. According to Definition 16 I need only prove Dp(x + 1, x + 1)
+in order to accomplish this. According to Definition 13 we have either P(x + 1) or
+P(x + 1, x + 1). From P(x + 1)D(x + 1, x + 1) it follows, according to Definition
+15, that Dp(x + 1, x + 1). From P(x + 1, x + 1) it follows, according to Theorem
+53, that De(x + 1, x + 1), which must (see Definition 14) have De(x + 1, x) as a
+consequence; but from De(x + 1, x)I(x) it follows, according to Theorem 57, that
+Dp(x + 1,x + 1).
+Corollary. Dp(x + 1, x + 1).
+For from T(x + 1) it follows (Definition 16) that Dp(x + 1, x + 1).
+This is the theorem to the effect that every number > 1 is divisible by at least one
+prime. Dp(x + 1,x + 1) really means that x + 1 is divisible by at least one prime
+Ex + 1.
+Now, to be able to formulate and prove the theorem that every number > 1 is a
+product of primes, I introduce a ternary relation P(X, y, z) that is to mean "x is the
+product of y primes that are all ≤z"
+Definition 17. P(x, y, z) = P(x, y, z - 1) + P(x/z, y - 1, z)P(z)D(x, z). P(X, 1, z)
+= (x ≤ z)P(x). P(x, y, 1) is false.
+This is a doubly recursive definition, for it is recursive with respect to y as well as
+z. P(x, 1, z) is defined for arbitrary z (and x) and, if it is assumed that P(x, y - 1, 2)
+is already defined for arbitrary z (and x), then, by means of the first equation of
+Definition 17 and the stipulation that P(x, y, 1) is to be false, we have a recursive
+definition of the propositional function P(x, y, z), recursive, that is, with respect to z.
+Through the last stipulation of Definition 17, P(x, y, 1) is determined and, through
+
+323
+the first equation, P(x, y, z) is determined on the basis of the assumption that
+P(X, Y - 1, z) is already known.
+I want to introduce three additional propositional functions.
+Definition 18. P'(x, 1, 2) = P(x, 1, z). P'(x, у + 1, 2) = P'(x, y, 2) + P(x, y + 1,
+z).
+Definition 19. П(x) = P' (x, x, x).
+Definition 20. П'(1) is true. П'(x + 1) = П'(х)П(x + 1).
+The proposition P'(x, y, z) obviously means that x is a product of at most y primes,
+each ≤z. The proposition I(x) means that x is a product of at most x primes, each
+≤х. П'(x) means that every number y from 1 to x either is equal to 1 or is a product
+of at most y primes ≤y, or, in other words, that every number y from 2 to x is a
+product of at most y primes ≤y. The real purpose of the considerations that follow
+is to prove that I (x + 1) holds.
+THEOREM 59. P(X, y, z) = ≤ ½) + P(x, Y, 2).
+Proof. Clearly, the proposition is true when z' = 1. I prove it for ¿ + 1 on the
+assumption that it holds for z'. From » ≤ "' + 1 it follows either that » ≤ z, which
+together with P(x, y, x) has P(x, Y, z') and therefore also (Definition 17) P(x, y, '' + 1)
+as consequences, or that z = ' † 1, and from (z = «' + 1) P(x, Y, z) it clearly again
+follows that P(x, y, %' + 1).
+Lemma 1 (for Theorem 60). P(X1, 1, z) P(X2, 1, 2) + P(X,X2, 2, z).
+Proof. True for z = 1; for (Definitions 17 and 13) P(x, 1, 1) already is false. I prove
+the proposition for z + 1 on the assumption that it holds for z. From P(X1, 1, z + 1)
+P(X2, 1, z + 1) it follows according to Definition 17 that P(X1, 1, 2) P(X2, 1, z), whence
+we have P(x,X2, 2, z), which in turn has P(x,X2, 2, z + 1) as a consequence, or that
+(x_==+ 1) P(x]) P(X2, 1, z + 1), or that (X2 = = + 1) P(x2) P(x1, 1, z + 1). But from
+P(z + 1) P(xx2/(z + 1), 1,2 + 1) it follows (Definition 17) that P(x1X2, 2, 2 + 1). We
+proceed analogously in the third case.
+Lemma 2 (for Theorem 60). P(x1, y, 2) P(X2, 1, 2) + P(X2, y + 1, 2).
+Proof. According to Lemma 1 this is true for y = 1. I prove that the proposition is
+true for y + 1 on the assumption that it holds for y. Now, in case z = 1 we indeed
+obtain P(XyX2, y + 2, 2) from P|X1, Y † 1, 2) P(X2, 1, %), for P(X2, 1, 1) is false. Therefore, on the assumption that the inductive step from y to y + 1 holds for z, I prove
+that it holds for z + 1. From P(X1, Y † 1, z † 1) P(X2, 1, z + 1) we obtain (Definition
+17) three possibilities: (1) P(X1, Y + 1, 2) P(X2, 1, 2) already holds; then according to
+the assumption we have P(X1X2, y + 2, 2), whence (Definition 17) P(X1X2, y + 2,
+z + 1). (2) We have P(x]/(z + 1), Y, z + 1)P(z + 1) P(X2, 1, z + 1); but from P(x1/
+(= + 1), Y, = + 1) P(X2, 1, z + 1) it follows, since our proposition was assumed to be
+true for y for arbitrary z, that P(X,X2|(z + 1), y + 1,z + 1), which together with
+P(z + 1) by virtue of Definition 17 implies P(xX2, y + 2, 2 + 1). (3) We have
+P(X1, Y + 1,7 + 1)(x2 = = + 1)P(X2); but from this we obtain (Definition 17)
+P(X,X2, y + 2, z + 1).
+THEOREM 60. P(X1, Y1, 2) P(X2, Y2, U)(U ≤2) + P(x,X2, Y1 + Y2, 2).
+Proof. On account of Lemma 2, when y1 = 1 or y2 = 1, this proposition is certainly
+true for arbitrary values of the remaining variables. Thus it surely holds for the least
+possible value of the sum y1 + Y2 + = + u, namely 4, for which necessarily y1 = Y2
+
+324
+= ≥ = u = 1. I now prove that the proposition is true for values of yI, Yz, 2, and u
+such that y1 + Y2 + z + u = n, assuming it to be true for those cases in which
+Y1 +Y2+=+U=n- 1. P(X1, Y1,2) is equivalent to either P(XI, Y1, 2 - 1) Or
+P(x1/z, Y1 - 1,2)P(z)D(x, z). Furthermore we have either u ≤ z - 1 or u = z. The
+first possibility is therefore P(X1, Y1, 7 - 1) P(X2, Y2, U)(u ≤= - 1). But, since
+y1+Y2 + (2-1) +4=n- 1, it follows according to the assumption made that
+P(X_X2, Y1 + Y2, z - 1) and thence (Definition 17) in turn that P(X1X2, Y1 + Y2, z).
+The second possibility is P(1, Y1, 2 - 1) P(X2, Y2, 2). But, since here, too, necessarily
+Y1 + Y2 + (=- 1) + u = n - 1, it follows that P(X,X2, Y1 + Y2, z). The third possibility is P(x |z, Y1 - 1, 2) P(z) P(X2, Y2, U)(u ≤ z). But thence it follows, since (91 - 1)
++Y2 += + U=n - 1, that P/X,X2|2, Y1 + Y2 - 1, 2)P(z), and thence (Definition
+17) again that P(X,X2, y1 + Yz, z).
+Corollary. P(X1, Y1, z) P(X2, Y2, 2) + P(X,X2, Y1 + Y2, z).
+Lemma. P' (x1, У1, 2)P(X2, P(X2, У2, 2) + P'(x,X2, У1 +У2, z).
+Proof. True for y1 = 1 (Definition 18 and Lemma 2 for Theorem 60). I prove that
+the proposition is true for y1 + 1 on the assumption that it holds for yI. From
+P' (X1, Y1 + 1, 2) it follows either that P'(X1, Y1, z), which together with P(X2, Y2, 2)
+has, according to the assumption, P' (x,X2, Y1 † Y2, z) and therefore also P'(x,X2,
+y1 + Y2 + 1, 2) as consequences, or that P(X1, Y1 + 1, z), whence together with
+P(X2, Y2, 2) it follows according to the corollary to Theorem 60 that P(x,2, y1 + 1
++ Yz, 2), whence (Definition 18) again P' (X,X2, Y1 + 1 + Y2, 2).
+Theorem 61. P' (x1, У1, 2)P' (X2, У2, 2) +P' (x,X2, Y1 + Y2, 2).
+Proof. According to the lemma this is true for y2 = 1. I prove that the proposition
+is true for Y2 + 1 on the assumption that it is true for Yz. From P'(X2, Y2 + 1, z) it
+follows (Definition 18) either that P'(X2, Y2, z), whence together with P' (X1, Y1, 2),
+according to the assumption made, P'(X,X2, Y1 † Y2, z), and therefore also P'(X,X2,
+Y1 + Y2 + 1, 2), or that P(X2, Y2 + 1, 2), which together with P' (x1, Y1, z), according
+to the lemma, implies P' (x,Xz, Y1 + Y2 + 1,z).
+Lemma. P'(x, y, z) + P' (X, y, » + 1).
+Proof. By virtue of Definitions 17 and 18 this is true for y = 1. I prove the proposition for y + 1 on the assumption that it holds for y. From P'(x, y + 1, z) it follows
+either that P'(x, y, z), whence we obtain P'(x, y, ≥ + 1), hence (Definition 18) in turn
+P' (x, y + 1,z + 1), or that P(X, y + 1, z), whence (Definition 17) P(x, y + 1,z + 1),
+hence (Definition 18) P (x, y + 1, z + 1).
+THEOREM 62. P'(x, У, z)(z {2') + P'(X, Y, z).
+Proof. Clearly true when z' = 1. I assume that the proposition is true for z'
+and then prove it for i + 1. From & ≤ « + 1 either it follows that z ≤ž, and
+then from P'(x, y, z)(z ≤ 2) it follows, according to the assumption made, that
+P'(x, y, "'), and thence, according to the lemma, that P'(x, y, ' + 1), or it follows
+that z = z + 1, and thence together with P'(x, y, z) it clearly follows that
+P' (x, y, %' + 1).
+THEOREM 63. P' (x, y, z)(У ≤У') + P'(X, Y', z).
+Proof. Clearly true when y' = 1. I assume that the proposition is true for y'. From
+y ≤Ý + 1 it follows either that y ≤ y' or that y = y' + 1. Now, according to
+the assumption it follows from P'(X, Y, z)(У ≤ Y') that P'(x, y', z) and therefore
+
+325
+(Definition 18) also that P'(x, y' + 1, 2). From P' (x, y, z)(y = ý' + 1) it follows, of
+course, that P'(x, y' + 1, 2). Thus the proposition holds for y' + 1 too.
+THeoreM 64. (х = 1) + (у = 1) + П(х) + П(у) + П(ху).
+Proof. Since according to Theorem 15 necessarily x ≤ xy and likewise y ≤ xy, it
+follows according to Theorem 62 from P' (x, x, х) P'(У, У, y), that is, from (x)П(у),
+that P'(х, х, ХУ) P'(У, У, ХУ). But according to Theorem 61 it follows from P'(х, х, ху)
+P'(У, У, ХУ) in turn that P' (ху, х + Y, ХУ). If now in addition (x > 1)(y > 1), then
+x+У ≤xy, so that by using Theorem 63 we obtain P'(XY, Xy, Xy), that is,
+П(ху). Thus from (x > 1)(у > 1)П(х)П(y) it follows that П(xy), which was to be
+proved.
+Lemma 1 (for Theorem 65). П' (x)(у ≤х) +П'(y).
+Proof. Clearly true for x = 1. I assume that the proposition is true for x. From
+У ≤ x + 1 it follows either that y ≤ x or that y = x † 1. From П'(x + 1) it follows
+(Definition 20) that I'(x), and therefore it follows from ' (x + 1)(y ≤ x) first that
+П'(x)(У ≤ х) and thence further that П'(y). From П'(x + 1)(y = x + 1) it follows,
+of course, that П' (y).
+Lemma 2 (for Theorem 65). 4(х, y, ")П(у)П'(z)(у > 1) + П(х).
+Proof. This is true when z = 1. I assume that the proposition is true for z. From
+A(x, y, x + 1) it follows (Definition 5) either that 4(x, y, 2) Or that x = y(z + 1).
+From 4(x, У, z)I (У)П'(z + 1)(y > 1) we obtain, according to Definition 20, 4(x, y, z)
+П(У)П'(z)(y > 1) and thence, according to the assumption made, (x). From (x =
+У(ч + 1))П(У)П'(z + 1)(y > 1) it follows (Definition 20) that (x = y(z + 1))I|(y)
+|(z + 1)(y > 1) and thence, according to Theorem 64, that (x). Thus the proposition holds for z + 1 too.
+Lemma 3 (for Theorem 65). De(x, у)П' (x - 1) + П(х).
+Proof. This holds for y = 1, as may be seen from Definition 14. I assume that the
+proposition holds for y. From De(x, y + 1) it follows (Definition 14) either that
+De(x, Y) Or that D(x, y + 1)(y + 1 < x). From De(x, y)I|' (x - 1) it must follow,
+according to the assumption, that I(x). According to Definition 2, D(x, y + 1)(y + 1
+< x) must be equivalent to D(x, y + 1)(y + 1 ≤ x - 1); but from II'(x - 1)(y +
+1 ≤ x - 1) it follows (Lemma 1) that I'(y + 1), whence (Definition 20) I(y + 1),
+and since furthermore, as is easily seen, we necessarily (see Definitions 5 and 6) have
+D(X, Y + 1) = 4(x, y + 1, x - 1), it follows from D(x, y + 1)П(y + 1)II'(x - 1),
+according to Lemma 2, that (x).
+THEOREM 65. I (x).
+Proof. True for x = 1 (Definition 20). I assume that IT'(x - 1) is true and then
+prove II(x), which also proves (Definition 20) I'(x). Either P(x) or P(x) holds. From
+P(x) it follows (Definition 17) that P(x, 1, x), that is (Definition 18), that P'(x, 1, x),
+whence, according to Theorem 63, P' (x, x, x), that is, П(x). From P(x)(x > 1) it
+follows (Definition 13) that P(x, x), whence (Theorem 53) De(x, x). But, according to
+Lemma 3, De(x, x)I| (x - 1) implies II(x).
+Corollary. П(x + 1).
+For, according to Definition 20, П(x + 1) follows from I'(x + 1). This, however, is the important theorem that every number >1 is a product of prime
+numbers.
+
+326
+§ 8. SOME EXPLICIT USES OF FINITE LOGICAL SUMS AND PRODUCTS
+If we are concerned with avoiding only the use of logical variables ranging over
+infinite domains, we can, of course, still make free use of variables ranging over finite
+domains; we need not trouble ourselves either about ways in which these might be
+avoided by means of recursive definitions or about ways in which the conclusions they
+allow us to reach might be derived, by mathematical induction, from those that hold
+for propositions not containing apparent variables.
+If we take this approach, then the theory of prime factorization, for example, can
+be presented more simply, as I show below. I use the definition of prime numbers
+given on page 320:
+Definition. P(x) = (х # 1) F (D(x, y) + (y = 1) + (y = x)).
+THEOREM 66. E D(n, p) P(p) + (n = 1).
+Proof. Holds for n = 1. Assume that the proposition holds for all v < n, with
+n > 1. Then either the proposition 2 D(n, v) (v < n)(v > 1) or its negation /I (D(n, v) +
+(v = n2) + (v = 1)) holds (since here v ≥ n is
+equivalent to v = n, and v = 1 to
+v = 1). In the latter case we have D(n, n)P(n). In the former case, according to the
+assumption,
+I D(v, p)P(p) holds; consequently & E D(n, v)D(v, p)P(p), whence
+≥ D(n, p)P(p).
+p = 1
+Since D(n, p) is equivalent to the propositional sum
+(n=vp), we have the
+Corollary. (n = 1) + =
+(n= vp)P(p).
+v = 1 p = 1
+I now define recursively a propositional function that in words is "n is equal to a
+product of u prime factors, all of which are ≤n".
+Definition 21. P(n, 1) = P(n); P(n, u + 1) = 2
+I (n= up) P(v, 4) P(p).
+The theorem on the factorization of any number >1 into a product of primes
+can then be formulated as follows:
+THEOREM 67. (n = 1) + I P(n, 1).
+Proof. Holds for n = 1. Assume that the proposition holds for » < n when n > 1.
+Then, according to the corollary to Theorem 66, ¿ E(n = up)P(p) holds. However,
+from (n = vp)P(p) it follows (Theorem 15) that v < n and thus, according to the
+assumption, ¿ P(v, p). Hence "Z" P(v, 4) and further E E "2'
+(n= vp)P(V, M) P(P),
+y = 1 p= 1 4= 1
+which is = I P(n, u + 1), whence I P(n, p).
+I want to prove, further, the theorem on the existence of infinitely many primes.
+First I define the function n! by
+Definition 22. 1! = 1; (n + 1)! = n!(n + 1).
+Lemma. (m > n) + D(n!, m).
+
+FOUNDATIONS OF ELEMENTARY ARITHMETIO
+327
+Proof. Clearly true for n = 1. Assume that it is true for a certain n. If not m > n
++ 1, then either m = n + 1 orm < n + 1 (that is, m ≤ n). According to Definition
+22 and Theorem 18 we have D||n + I)!, n + 1). Ifm ≤ n, we have, according to the
+assumption, D(n!, m), and, since (Theorems 16 and 18) D|(n + I)!, n!) also holds, we
+obtain (corollary to Theorem 20) D((n + 1)!, m).
+THEOREM 68.
+"I P(p)(p > n). (In words: For arbitrary n there is a prime p > n
+and ≤ n! + 1)
+nI+1
+Proof. According to Theorem 66 the proposition
+• 2 D(n! + 1,p)P(p) holds. But
+from D(n! + 1, p)P(p) it follows that p > n. For, if we had p ≤ n, it would follow,
+according to the lemma, that DIn!, p), and this together with D(n! + 1, p) would
+imply (corollary to Theorem 24) D(1, p) and therefore p = 1, which is impossible on
+account of P(p).
+To prove the uniqueness of the factorization of a number into a product of prime
+factors I must first advance some considerations on sums and products of arbitrarily
+many terms or factors, as well as define a function I(a, b; m, n).
+Let f(r) be an arbitrary descriptive function. I define the expressions E f(r) and
+i f(r) recursively as follows:
+7 = 1
+I f(r). f(n + 1).
+7 = 1
+Instead of f(r) we often write oy, by, and so forth. For an arbitrary descriptive
+function a, I state
+Definition 24. a'' = ay if <v, and al" = ay+1 if ≥».
+THEOREN 69. (2 = 1) + (v > n) + (Êa, = a, +"Zai Ha, = ar.
+r = 1
+Proof. I need consider only the sum. The proposition holds when n = 1. Assume
+that it holds for n. To show that it then holds for n + 1 also, first let v ≤ n. Then
+"E'
+a, = Ia, + An+1 = a, t
+Iaf" + AntI
+and furthermore a! = AntI• Consequently (according to Definition 24)
+and thence
+n+1
+¿a, =a, + Ial".
+r=1
+r =1
+On the other hand, let v = n + 1. Then a,"' = a, for r ≤ n. Consequently
+La, = 2
+In many derivations we make use of the argument that such a sum (or product)
+remains unchanged whenever the terms (or factors) a are replaced by numbers b,
+
+328
+provided these are in some sequential order identical with the a. To be able to formulate this conveniently I introduce a propositional function I(a, b; m, n), where a and
+b are signs for two arbitrary descriptive functions.
+Definition 25(a11) =(a1 = ab;1,2)(n > 1) is false. Ia, b; m, 1)
+(m > 1) isfalse. I(a, b; m + 1, n) = I (am+1 = b)I (a, b'V; m, n- 1) (6'" was defined
+in Definition 24).
+I(a, b; m, n) then means in words: "The numbers a1, ..., am are in some ordering
+identical with the numbers b1, ..., bn"
+THEOREM 70. I(a, b; m,n) + (m= n).
+Proof. True when m = 1, by Definition 25. Assume that it is true for m. From
+I(a, b; m + 1, n) it follows that 2(am+1 = 6")I (a, bl";m, n- 1). But I (a, bl»; m, n- 1)
+impliesm = n - 1. Hencem + 1 = n.
+Proof. I consider only the sum. First, when n = 1, it follows that m = n and the
+proposition clearly holds. Assume that it holds for n - 1. From I(a, b; m, n) it follows
+that E (an= 6)I(a, bo); n - 1, n- 1). But, according to the assumption, I (a, bro);
+n - 1, n - 1) yields "2'a, ="
+n-1
+"Eb", and furthermore we have (Theorem 69) 6, + 2 6,*)
+= Eb,. From an = b, and "Ea,
+I by it therefore follows that 2
+ay = 2b,.
+THEOREM 72. D( fIa,, p)P(p) + ¿ D(a,, p).
+Proof. The proposition holds for n = 1; assume that it holds for a certain n. From
+DantI" It a,, p)P(p) it follows (Theorem 52) that D(an+1, p) + DIF a, p)P(p).
+From D( I ar, p)P(p) it follows, according to the assumption, that 2 D(a, p). Thus
+in any case Dia+ P) + E Dia, p), which is =" Dia, p), holds.
+Proof. By Theorem 72, from D( fI pr, 9) we derive È D(pr, 9). From D(pr, 9) P(pr)
+P(9), however, it follows that ((p, = 9) + (g = 1))P(g); hence p, = q. Therefore
+= (Pr = 9).
+• = 1
+The theorem on the uniqueness of the prime factorization now reads as follows:
+THEOREM 74. (fpr # 119s) + 2 P(p) + 2 P(9s) + I(p, 9; pe, v).
+Proof. I first prove the proposition for u = 1. If (ps = П qs) P(pL) I P(gs), then it
+follows, according to Theorem 73, that 2 (P1 = 90). Further, from ps = 9o and pr =
+po'It ' the equation 1 = 'fla follows, which is impossible if v > 1.
+
+329
+Assume that the proposition is true for a certain u. Then from the proposition
+in turn, according to Theorem 73,
+2(Pu+1 = 90) Furthermore 1 9s = 90
+I q!, and
+we therefore obtain
+I (fIp. = 1lp!), whence, according to the assumption,
+I I(p, gos; je, v- 1)(Pu+1 = 90), which is = I(p, 9; 4 + 1, u).
+Pinally I wish to engage in some reflections of a more general kind. We have the
+following
+THEOREM 75a. Un) + I
+V = 1 u = 1
+•I U(V)(U(M) + (u = v)), where U denotes an arbitrary
+propositional function 3
+In words: If we know a number n for which the proposition U is true, there exists
+a least number for which U is true. It must be noted here that the propositions with
+which we are now concerned are always regarded as given without apparent variables
+ranging over infinite domains, so that it is always finitely decidable whether U(x) is
+true or not for an arbitrary x.
+Proof. For n = 1 the proposition is clearly true. Assume that it is true for all
+x ≤ a certain n. Then if Un + 1) is true, so is either I U(x) or 2 U(x). In the former
+case, therefore, U(n + 1) II (U(v) + (v = n + I)) holds. In the latter case it follows
+from (a) ≤ m), according to the assumption, that 2 1, U(0)U(s) + (2 = yl) and
+therefore a fortiori that I
+I U(V)(U(u) + (M = v)).
+y= 1u = 1
+THEOREM 75b. From U(a) i (U(x) + (x = U(b) /İ (Uly) + (y = b)) it follows
+that a = b.
+This theorem expresses the uniqueness of the least number.
+Proof. If we had a ‡ b, we would have (a < b) + (a > b). But from a ‹ b it follows
+at once that U(a) and likewise, from b < a, that U(b).
+Because of this uniqueness we can introduce a very important descriptive function
+of the general propositional function U, which denotes the least number for which U
+is true. This descriptive function, to be sure, has a restricted domain of definition
+since it has no value if the proposition U is true of no number. But it must be emphasized here that we are concerned only with the natural numbers up to certain upper
+bound, which, however, may be chosen arbitrarily large. The descriptive function,
+therefore, may be denoted here by Min(U, n). This means the least number among the
+numbers 1 to n for which U is true, and it has no meaning if U is false for all these
+3 Of course, we can, for example, also write
+U(n) + 2
+V = 1 4 = 1
+* [In the German toxt the matrix of the formula that follows is, erroneously, "U(x)U(y) +
+(Y=x))"￾]
+
+330
+numbers. Thus we are not dealing with a function Min(U), or Min(U, 00), that would
+mean the least number satisfying the proposition U and would have no meaning if
+U is false for every number; for all this would require the "actual infinite", hence
+the use of apparent logical variables ranging over infinite domains. But the restriction
+that we must here impose on the meaning of this minimum function does no harm in
+practice; for, whenever we use the theorem asserting that in a class of positive
+integers there exists a least, we must in any case first have come to know a number
+n of this class, and then we can make do with this very function Min(U, n).
+Finally I wish to make some remarks on the notion of cardinality Izum Anzahlbegriffe]. If certain objects (numbers, number pairs, number triples, and so forth, or
+perhaps descriptive functions) are mapped one-to-one onto all numbers ≤ a certain
+number n, then I say that their cardinality is n.
+In order to show that this number n is invariant with respect to the different
+mappings, we must prove the following
+where f is an arbitrary descriptive function, it follows that m = n.
+In words: Assume that the numbers that are ≤m are mapped one-to-one onto all
+numbers ≤n; then m = n.
+Proof. I first take the case in which m = 1. From [I E (y = f(z)) = İ (y = f(1))
+it follows on account of the uniqueness of f(1) that necessarily n = 1.
+Assume that the proposition holds for a certain m. Then, if I take the value m + 1,
+in any case necessarily n > 1. Otherwise from "IT" ( (2) ≤ 1) we would obtain f(1) = 1
+as well as f(2) = 1, whereas we were supposed to have had f(1) # f(2). Consequently
+we can write n + 1 instead of n, and we must now prove that m = n.
+Consider first the assumption f(m + I) = n + 1. Then I (f(x) # f(m + I)), or
+#I (f(x) ‡ n + 1). Since furthermore II (f(x) ≤ n + 1), it follows that IT (f(x) ≤ n).
+2+1m + 1
+From
+. П
+5(y = f(z)) itfollows that #™I (y = f(z)) (y ≤n), that is.
+y = 12=1
+y = 12=1
+HI((y= f(z)) + (Y= f(m+1))(y<f(m+I))),
+y = z= 2=1
+which is = T I (y = f(z)). By virtue of the assumption made, therefore, necessarily
+m = n.
+that
+Consider next the assumption f(m + 1) = v < n + 1. According to the assumption
+(y = f(z)), we have I (n + 1 = f(z)), that is,
+y=12=1
+In+1= f(u)) + (n+ 1 = jm + 1)),
+hence I (n + 1 = f(u). Here the number u is uniquely determined. Now I introduce
+a new descriptive function f', which is defined thus: f'(x) = f(x) if x # u and ≤ m.
+
+331
+Further, f'(u) = f(m + 1) = v; f'(m + 1) = f(u) = n + 1. We must then show
+merely that f' satisfies the same conditions as f.
+From (f(x) ≤ n + 1)(x # u)(x ≤ m) it follows that f'(x) ≤ n + 1, since in this
+case f'(x) = f(2). Besides, clearly both f' (4) and f'(m) are ≤ n + 1. Thus "II (f'(2) =
+n + 1).
+m + 1
+From 2 (x = f(y)) it follows that
+whence
+™I (x=f'(9)) + 12 = f'm + 1)) + (2 = f'(e)), which is = "E(x = f'(y)).
+Thus from 2 0 = (0) it follows that 2, 1 = 5(9) also.
+According to the assumption,
+™I™E(x = y) + (f(x) # f(3))) holds. If we have
+x=1y =1
+then it follows immediately that f'(x) ‡ f'(y). If we have
+then
+holds and consequently f'(x) ‡ f'(y). Similarly if
+(x)/F(Y)(x=M))(x≤m)((y = p) + (y = m)).
+Finally,
+yields
+(X)//(1))(x=u)+(x=m+1))||y=") + (y= m + 1))
+(x=p)(y=m+1)+(x=m+1)(y=u),
+and therefore also
+and consequently f(x) ‡ f(y). Thus the proposition
+"Пї "І ((x = 9) + (f'(2) + #'(3)))
+х = 1 y = 1
+is true.
+Remark. When a certain class of objects is given, one will be tempted to say: that
+these objects are n in number, n being finite, means that a one-to-one mapping of
+these objects onto the first n numbers exists. But an apparent logical variable (the
+mapping) occurs in this definition, and there is no a priori reason to expect that the
+domain over which this variable ranges is finite, unless one has in advance a theorem
+asserting that the number of possible mappings is finite. From the strictly finitist point
+of view adopted here, therefore, such a theorem would first have to be proved if the
+
+332
+notion of cardinality is to be definable for the objects in question. This seems to be a
+vicious circle, but it is not: we do not need the general definition, given above, of the
+notion of cardinality in order to establish a special theorem asserting that certain
+objects are n in number, for we can establish such a theorem by actually giving a
+mapping; in this way we avoid treating the mapping as a logical variable. Thus even
+in the cases mentioned we can first establish a special theorem to the effect that the
+number of mappings that are possible at all is finite and after that give the general
+definition of the notion of cardinality for classes of objects.
+For any class, the number of positive integers that are In and belong to that
+class can be given in a general way by a function definable in the following manner.
+Let U be an arbitrary propositional function; I states
+Definition 26. (NU(1) = 1)U(1) + (NU(1) = 0)U(I) and (NU(n + 1) = NU(n)
++1)U(n+1) + (NU(n+1) = NU(n))U(n+ 1).
+In words: The descriptive function NU(x) will have the value 1 or 0 for x = 1
+according to whether U(1) is true or not. Furthermore NU(n + 1) will be equal to
+NU(n) + 1 or NU(n) according to whether U(n + 1) is true or not.
+It is easy to show that NU(n) then in fact gives the number of numbers x ≤ n for
+which U(x) is true. I do not go into this more closely here.
+It is frequently the case that certain objects are numbered by means of integers,
+but in such a way that several numbers are assigned as subscripts to each object.
+The number of distinct objects among them can then be given by means of a function
+I (x) that I now define.
+Let the objects be a1, ..., An; we state
+1) I (ay +1 # as).
+s = 1
+Furthermore, by means of the function Min(U, n), defined on page 329, a uniquely
+determined choice of a complete system of representatives of distinct objects a can
+be given. Besides, it is possible to define the associated frequencies [Häufigkeitszahlen], which indicate how often each distinct object occurs in the sequence a 1, ...,
+an; and so on. I do not want to elaborate this any further here.
+CONCLUDING REMARK
+This paper was written in the autumn of 1919, after I had studied the work of
+Russell and Whitehead. It occurred to me that already the use of the logical variables
+that they call "real" would surely suffice to provide a foundation for large parts of
+mathematics. (In this connection, then, it must be noted that apparent variables
+ranging over finite domains can be removed by means of recursive definitions.) The
+justification for introducing apparent variables ranging over infinite domains therefore seems very problematic; that is, one can doubt that there is any justification for
+the actual infinite or the transfinite.
+On the other hand, I myself am no longer satisfied with the way in which the
+5 Strictly speaking, the number 0 has not been introduced; but we can make the convention
+that the cardinality O is to mean that there are no "objects".
+
+333
+logical elaboration proceeds here, since by following the pattern of Russell and
+Whitehead's work I made it too cumbersome from the purely formal point of
+view. Yet, even in providing a foundation for mathematics it is the substance that is
+important, not the notation. Soon I shall publish another work on the logical foundations of mathematies that is free from this formal cumbrousness. ® But that work, too,
+is a consistently finitist one; it is built upon Kronecker's principle that a mathematical
+definition [Bestimmung] is a genuine definition if and only if it leads to the goal by
+means of a finite number of trials.
+® [Never published.]
+
+On the significance of the principle of excluded middle
+in mathematics, especially in function theory
+(19236)
+The text below is the translation of an
+theorems of classical analysis in Brouwer
+address delivered in German on 21 Sept-
+1928a.
+ember 1923 at the annual convention
+§ 3 is an example of the "splitting" of
+of the Deutsche Mathematiker-Vereinig-
+a classical notion, that of a convergent
+ung in Marburg an der Lahn. It had
+sequence, into several overlapping but
+been delivered in Dutch at the 22nd
+distinct intuitionistic notions, here posi-
+Vlaamsch Natuur- en Geneeskundig Contively convergent sequence, negatively
+gres, in Antwerp in August 1923, in an
+convergent sequence, and nonoscillating
+approximately similar form (Brouwer
+sequence. These notions were further in-
+1923a).
+vestigated by one of Brouwer's disciples,
+§1 shows how the principles of logic,
+M. J. Belinfante, and we refer the reader
+which have their origin in finite matheto Belinfante's papers listed below, p.
+matics, came to be applied to discourse
+630. In order to avoid a number of
+about the physical world and then to noncomplications that arise in the theory of
+finite mathematics; but in that last field
+infinite sequences
+as elaborated by
+there is not necessarily a justification for
+Brouwer and Belinfante, J. G. Dijkman
+each of these principles. In particular,
+found it convenient (1948) to introduce
+such a justification seems to be lacking
+the notions of strictly negatively converfor the principle of excluded middle and
+gent sequence and of strictly nonoscillathat of double negation.
+ting sequence.
+§ 2 shows how several important re-
+Two notes, "Addenda and corrigenda"
+sults of classical analysis become unjustiand "Further addenda and corrigenda"
+fied once the principle of excluded
+middle is abandoned. Here Brouwer's
+published by Brouwer in 1954, are appended to the 1923 paper. They reflect the
+critique is essentially negative, being
+development of Brouwer's ideas in the
+based on counterexamples to classical
+intervening years. In the main paper
+theorems; but elsewhere he investigates
+below (1923b) Brouwer had introduced
+which fragments of the Bolzano-Weieran infinite sequence whose definition destrass theorem can be preserved in intuipends upon the occurrence of a certain
+tionistic analysis (1919, sec. 1, and 1952a;
+finite sequence of digits in the decimal
+see also Heyting 1956, arts. 3.4.4 and
+expansion of T. In 1948 he introduced an
+8.1.3) and gives an intuitionistic form of
+infinitely proceeding sequence whose defithe Heine-Borel theorem (1926a and
+nition depends upon whether a certain
+1926b; see also Heyting 1956, art. 5.2.2).
+mathematical problem has, or has not,
+There are further counterexamples to been solved at a certain time: let a be a
+
+335
+mathematical assertion that so far has 1948b, 1949, 1949a, 1950, 1950a, 1951,
+not been tested, that is, such that neither
+and 1952a). It is in these conditions that
+→ a nor →— a has been proved; then, if
+he came to write the two appendices,
+between the choice for Cn-1 and the
+1954 and 1954a; 1954b and 1954c constichoice for Cn
+"the creating subject has
+tute a sequel to 195fa.
+experienced either the truth or the ab-
+The translation of the main paper
+surdity of a" (1948, p. 1246), a certain (1923b) is by Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg
+value is chosen for On; otherwise, another
+and the editor, and it is printed here with
+value is chosen for Cn. This method of the kind permission of Professor Brouwer
+definition, by which the choices for the
+and Walter de Gruyter and Co. The first
+constituents of an infinitely proceeding
+appended paper (1954) was translated by
+sequence "may, at any stage, be made
+Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg, Claske M.
+to depend on possible future mathemati-
+Berndes Franck, Dirk van Dalen, and
+cal experiences of the creating subject" the editor; the second appended paper
+(1953, p. 2), allowed Brouwer to offer (1954a) was translated by Stefan Bauer-
+1 рарот
+new counterexamples to classical theor-
+Mengelberg, Dirk van Dalen, and the
+ems, in particular in analysis (1948a, editor.
+81
+Within a specific finite "main system" we can always test (that is, either prove
+or reduce to absurdity) properties of systems, that is, test whether systems can be
+mapped, with prescribed correspondences between elements, into other systems; for
+the mapping determined by the property in question can in any case be performed
+in only a finite number of ways, and each of these can be undertaken by itself and
+pursued either to its conclusion or to a point of inhibition. (Here the principle of
+mathematical induction often furnishes the means of carrying out such tests without
+individual consideration of every element involved in the mapping or of every
+possible way in which the mapping can be performed; consequently the test even for
+systems with a very large number of elements can at times be performed relatively
+rapidly.)
+On the basis of the testability just mentioned, there hold, for properties conceived
+within a specific finite main system, the principle of excluded middle, that is, the
+principle that for every system every property is either correct [richtig] or impossible,
+and in particular the principle of the reciprocity of the complementary species, that is,
+the principle that for every system the correctness of a property follows from the
+impossibility of the impossibility of this property.
+If, for example, the union G(p, 9) of two mathematical species' p and q contains at
+least eleven elements, it follows on the basis of the principle of excluded middle (which
+in this case appears as "principle of disjunction") that either p or q contains at least
+six elements.
+Likewise, if we have proved in elementary arithmetic that, whenever none of the
+positive integers a1, Az, ..., an is divisible by the prime number c, the product a a ar
+...an is not divisible by c either, it follows on the basis of the principle of the reciprocity of the complementary species that, if the product a daz... an is divisible by
+the prime number c, at least one of the factors of the product is divisible by c.
+' [For the definition of "species" see below, p. 454.]
+
+336
+For properties derived within a specific finite main system by means of the principle of excluded middle it is always certain that we can arrive at their empirical
+corroboration if we have a sufficient amount of time at our disposal.
+It is a natural phenomenon, now, that numerous objects and mechanisms of the
+world of perception, considered in relation to extended complexes of facts and events,
+can be mastered if we think of them as (possibly partly unknown) finite discrete systems that for specific known parts are bound by specific laws of temporal concatenation. Hence the laws of theoretical logic, including the principle of excluded middle,
+are applicable to these objects and mechanisms in relation to the respective complexes
+of facts and events, even though here a complete empirical corroboration of the
+inferences drawn is usually materially excluded a priori and there cannot be any
+question of even a partial corroboration in the case of (juridical and other) inferences
+about the past. To this incomplete verifiability of inferences that are nevertheless
+considered irrefutably correct, as well as to our partial ignorance of the representing
+finite systems and to the fact that theoretical logic is applied more often and by more
+people to such material objects than to mathematical ones we must probably attribute the fact that an a priori character has been ascribed to the laws of theoretical
+logic, including the principle of excluded middle, and that one lost sight of the
+conditions of their applicability, which lie in the projection of a finite discrete system
+upon the objects in question, so that one even went so far as to look to the laws of
+logic for a deeper justification of the completely primary and autonomous mental
+activity [Denkhandlung] that the mathematics of finite systems represents. Accordingly, in the logical treatment of the world of perception the appearance of a contradiction never led us to doubt that the laws of logic were unshakable but only to modify
+and complete the mathematical fragments projected upon this world.
+An a priori character was so consistently ascribed to the laws of theoretical logic
+that until recently these laws, including the principle of excluded middle, were applied
+without reservation even in the mathematics of infinite systems and we did not allow
+ourselves to be disturbed by the consideration that the results obtained in this way
+are in general not open, either practically or theoretically, to any empirical corroboration. On this basis extensive incorrect theories were constructed, especially in the last
+half-century. The contradictions that, as a result, one repeatedly encountered gave
+rise to the formalistic critique, a critique which in essence comes to this: the language
+accompanying the mathematical mental activity is subjected to a mathematical examination. To such an examination the laws of theoretical logic present themselves as
+operators acting on primitive formulas or axioms, and one sets himself the goal of
+transforming these axioms in such a way that the linguistic effect of the operators
+mentioned (which are themselves retained unchanged) can no longer be disturbed by
+the appearance of the linguistic figure of a contradiction. We need by no means despair
+of reaching this goal,? but nothing of mathematical value will thus be gained: an
+incorrect theory, even if it cannot be inhibited by any contradiction that would
+refute it, is none the less incorrect, just as a criminal policy is none the less criminal
+even if it cannot be inhibited by any court that would curb it.
+2 For the unjustified application of the principle of excluded middle to properties of wellconstructed mathematical systems can never lead to a contradiction (see Brouwer 1908, Ip. 157,
+or 1919a, p. 11]).
+
+337
+§ 2
+The following two fundamental properties, which follow from the principle of
+excluded middle, have been of basic significance for this incorrect "logical" mathematics of infinity ("logical" because it makes use of the principle of excluded middle),
+especially for the theory of real functions (developed mainly by the Paris school):
+1. The points of the continuum form an ordered point species; 3
+2. Every mathematical species is either finite or infinite.*
+The following example shows that the first fundamental property is incorrect.
+Let d, be the uth digit to the right of the decimal point in the decimal expansion of t,
+and let m = k, if, as the decimal expansion of a is progressively written, it happens
+at am for the nth time that the segment dndm+1... Am+s of this decimal expansion
+forms the sequence 0123456789. Further, let c, = (-[)k if v ≥ ki, otherwise let
+c, = (- ½)'; then the infinite sequence C1, C2, C3, ... defines a real number r for which
+none of the conditions r = 0, r > O, or r < 0 holds.5
+When the first fundamental property ceases to hold, the Paris school's notion of
+integral, the notion of I-integral, as it is called, ceases to be useful, because this
+notion of integral is bound to the notion "measurable function" and, according to
+the above, not even a constant function satisfies the conditions of "measurability"
+For in the case of the function f(x) = r, where r represents the real number defined
+above, the values of x for which f(x) > O do not form a measurable point species.®
+That the second fundamental property is incorrect is seen from the example
+provided by the species of the positive integers in defined above.
+When the second fundamental property ceases to hold, so does the "extended
+disjunction principle"
+, according to which, if a fundamental sequence of elements is
+contained in the union E(p, 9) of two mathematical species p and q, either p or q
+contains a fundamental sequence of elements; and when the extended disjunction
+principle ceases to hold, so does the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, which rests upon
+it and according to which every bounded infinite point species has a limit point.
+The following two theorems are less basic and simple than the fundamental properties mentioned, yet they are equally indispensable for the construction of the
+"logical" theory of functions.
+1. Every continuous function f(x) defined everywhere in a closed interval i possesses a
+maximum, that is, an abscissa value xi having a neighborhood a such that f(X1) ≥ f(x)
+for every a that belongs to the intersection of a and i.
+3 That is, if on the one hand a < b either holds or is impossible, or on the other a > b either
+holds or is impossible, then one of the conditions a < bor a > b or a = b holds.
+4 For according to the principle of excluded middle a species s either is finite or cannot possibly
+be finite. In the latter case s possesses an element, e1; for otherwise, on the basis of the principle
+of excluded middle, s could not possibly possess an element and would therefore be finite, which
+is excluded. Furthermore s possesses an element, ez, distinct from e1; for otherwise s would not
+possibly possess an element distinct from e1 and would therefore be finite, which is excluded.
+Continuing in this manner, we show that s possesses a fundamental sequence of distinct elements,
+e1, ez,.... [For the definition of "fundamental sequence" see below, p. 455.]
+5 Of course, we can also define r by means of any other property x whose existence or impossibility can be derived for every definite positive integer, while we can neither determine a positive
+at at for all positive integers.
+integer that possesses x nor prove the impossibility of x for all positive integers.
+6 However, the notion of R-integral, that is, the notion of Riemann integral, can be applied to
+f(x) without further ado.
+
+338
+The incorrectness of this theorem appears from the following example: If we
+enumerate the irreducible binary fractions between 0 and 1 (excluding O and 1) by
+means of a fundamental sequence 81, 02, ... in the ordinary way, that is, so that any
+fraction follows all those with a smaller denominator and fractions with the same
+denominator are ordered according to the magnitude of the numerator, if we assign
+to ky the same meaning as above, if by f(x) we understand the function that has the
+value 2-" for x = in and vanishes for x = O as well as for x = 1, while it remains
+linear between x = 0 and x = in as well as between x = in and x = 1, and if we put
+9n(x) = Jn(x) for n = ki, otherwise gn(x) = O, then the continuous function
+9(ж) = 2 9n (ж),
+n = 1
+which is defined everywhere in the closed unit interval, possesses no maximum.
+2. (Heine-Borel covering theorem.) If a neighborhood is assigned to every point
+core? of the point species A formed by the points and the limit points of a bounded entires
+point species B, then the whole point species A can be covered by a finite number of these
+neighborhoods.
+The incorrectness of this theorem appears from the following example: If we choose
+for B the number sequence C1, C2, C3, ..., defined above, while we assign to the number
+cy for v ≥ky, the interval (C, - 2-Ky-2, c, + 2-k1-2), otherwise the interval
+(c, - 2-"-2, c, + 2-"-2), and to a limit point e (if any) of the sequence the interval
+(e - ½, e + 7), then A cannot be covered by a finite number of these neighborhoods.?
+In view of the fact that the foundations of the logical theory of functions are
+indefensible according to what was said above, we need not be surprised that a large
+part of its results becomes untenable in the light of a more precise critique. As an
+example, we shall refute one of the best-known classical theorems in this domain,
+namely, the theorem that a monotonic continuous function defined everywhere is
+"almost everywhere" differentiable, by constructing a monotonic continuous function that is defined everywhere in the closed unit interval but is nowhere differentiable.
+Let 0 ≤ X1 < X2 ≤ 1. By the elementary function corresponding to the interval
+(X], Xz) we shall understand the continuous function, defined everywhere in the closed
+unit interval, that, for x1 ≤ x ≤ Xz, is equal to
+sin 2m
+Х — ХІ
+2T
+xz — X1
+and, for 0 ≤ x ≤ X1 and xz E x ≤ 1, is equal to O; by X', X", X"
+,... we shall understand the intervals (a/2", (a + 2)/2^) (where a and n denote positive integers) belonging to the closed unit interval and enumerated in the customary way; and by fn(X)
+we shall understand the elementary function corresponding to \(n). Furthermore we
+" [For the definition of "point core" see below, p. 458.]]
+" ["The species of the points that coincide with points of the point species & is called the
+completing [ergänzendel point species or, for short, the completion [Ergänzung] of Q. A point species
+that is identical with its completion is called an entire [ganze] Punktspecies." (Brouwer 1919, p. 6.)
+For the definition of "coincide" see below, p. 458, and for that of "identical with", p. 454.]
+° Nor does the theorem hold for a closed bounded entire point species A. Counterexample: take
+for A a species of abscissas (- 2) -" such that an abscissa (- 2) -" belongs to A if and only if a
+natural number ki satisfying the characterization above is known and y is a natural number
+≤k1; then with each abscissa that may belong to A associate the same interval as in the text.
+
+339
+assign to ky the same meaning as above; we put gi(x) = x and (for n ≥ 2) 9n(x) =
+fn(x) for n = ki, otherwise gn(x) = 0. Then the function
+is a monotonic continuous function that is defined everywhere in the closed unit
+interval but is nowhere differentiable.
+83
+As an example illustrating the fact that even older and more firmly consolidated
+theories in the field of the mathematics of infinity are affected by the rejection of the
+principle of excluded middle and the consequent rejection of the Bolzano-Weierstrass
+theorem, even if in much smaller measure than the theory of real functions, we take
+the notion of convergence of infinite series.
+Let us say that an infinite series u, + U2 + Uz + ... with real terms, for which
+the sum of the first n terms is denoted by sn, is nonoscillating if for every & > 0 it
+has been established that it is impossible to have at the same time an infinite sequence
+of positive integers n1, N2, Nz,... increasing beyond all bounds and an infinite
+sequence of positive integers m1, Mz, Mz, ... such that
+Sno+ma-Say > a for every v;
+then according to the classical theory on the basis of the principle of excluded middle
+such a nonoscillating series is :
+1. Negatively convergent, that is, there exists a real number s with the property
+that for every & > O it has been established that it is impossible to have an infinite
+sequence of positive integers n1, N2, Nz, ... increasing beyond all bounds such that
+18 - Spyl > & for every v;
+2. Bounded, that is, there exist two real numbers 91 and 92 such that
+91 < Sn < 92 for every n;
+3. Positively convergent, that is, there exists a real number s with the property that
+for every & > O there exists a positive integer n such that
+Is - Snl < = for every n > no.
+Let us now consider the following five nonoscillating series (where k1 again has
+the same meaning as above):
+(a) Un = 1/2n for every n;
+(b) Un = 2 + 1/2n for n = K1, Un = -2 † 1/2^ for n = k1 + 1, otherwise un =
+1/2n;
+(e) Un=n + 1/2" for n = K1, Un =-n + 1/2" for n = k1 + 1, otherwise un =
+1/2n;
+(d) Ил
+= 1 for n = k1, otherwise un = 1/2n;
+(e) Un = n for n = K1, otherwise Un = 1/2n.
+
+340
+The series (a) turns out to be positively convergent and therefore also negatively convergent and bounded; the series (b) to be negatively convergent and bounded, but
+not positively convergent; the series (c) to be negatively convergent, but not bounded
+and therefore not positively convergent either; the series (d) to be bounded, but not
+negatively convergent and therefore not positively convergent either; the series (e),
+finally, to be not bounded, not negatively convergent, and not positively convergent.
+To illustrate the consequences of the distinction made above we shall consider the
+Kummer convergence criterion, which reads as follows: "If B1, Bz, ... are positive
+numbers and if, for the infinite series of positive terms r = u1 + u2 + uz + ..., we
+have
+lim
+Brun + 1- Ba+1
+O,
+then r is positively convergent".
+The proof of this convergence criterion is customarily carried out as follows.
+On the basis of what has been assumed we select M and k in such a way that, for
+n ≥ M,
+Bn
+Un + I - Ba+1 > 7,
+BrUn -Bn+IUn+1>KUn+11
+BrUn-ButpUn+p> >k(Un+1t...+
+- Un +p),
+Un+1t...+Un+D
+<
+whence boundedness follows for the series in
+=Un+1+Un+2+... (2 ≥ M) and
+therefore also for the series r = u, + U2 + .... On the basis of this boundedness the
+series r is then declared to be not only nonoscillating, which is permitted for a series
+of positive terms, but also positively convergent.
+The last inference, however, rests upon the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem and must
+be rejected along with it.
+Pringsheim (1916, p. 378) offers an altogether different and more instructive proof.
+After he has proved the positive convergence of r for the case of the positive convergence as well as for the case of the positive divergence of b = 1/B1 + 1/B, + ..., he
+assumes that the series b must be either positively convergent or positively divergent,
+and for this reason he declares that the general criterion has been proved.
+But the assumption mentioned is inadmissible; for it, too, rests upon the Bolzano-
+Weierstrass theorem.
+It is worth noting, now, that Kummer himself expressed (1835) his criterion only
+with the auxiliary condition lim Brun = O and that with this auxiliary condition the
+positive convergence of the series r is actually ensured by the criterion, as is
+immediately evident from the proof above.
+That not only the derivations of the Kummer convergence criterion without any
+auxiliary condition are inadequate'° but also the criterion itself is incorrect is shown
+10 The inadequacy of these derivations, in contradistinction to the correctness
+originally carried out by Kummer himself for the restricted criterion, was indicated to me by my
+student M. J. Belinfante as an example of the significance of the principle of excluded middle for
+the theory of infinite series.
+
+341
+by the series (d) above, which is neither positively convergent nor negatively convergent. For, if we determine the successive B, for this series from the relations
+B1=4 and
+Un
+Brun + 1
+-- Bn+1=1 for every n,
+all Bn turn out to be positive, so that the extended convergence criterion is satisfied
+here, although positive convergence does not exist. This omission of the Kummer
+auxiliary condition, which took place after Kummer and was prompted by Dini, has
+thus considerably curtailed the scope of the convergence criterion in question.
+ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA
+(1954)
+Regarding my paper "Over de rol van het principium tertii exclusi in de wiskunde,
+in het bijzonder in de functietheorie" (1923a), published thirty years ago in volume 2
+of Wis-en Natuurkundig Tijdschrift, which has since been discontinued, I would now
+like to make the following remarks.
+I. Page 1, line 4 [above, page 335, line 1], the term "to test" ["toetsen" (1923a),
+or "prüfen" (19236)] is used for either proving or reducing to absurdity. In subse.
+quent intuitionistic literature, however, a property of a mathematical entity is said
+to be "tested" if either its contradictoriness or its noncontradictoriness is ascertained,
+and "judged" [" geoordeeld"] if either its presence or its absurdity is ascertained.
+II. Page 3, footnote (*) [above, page 336, footnote 2], the noncontradictoriness of
+applications of the principle of excluded middle to the attribution of a property E to
+a well-constructed mathematical system was pointed out. In subsequent intuitionistic
+literature, however, it became apparent that for the simultaneous application of the
+principle mentioned to the attribution of a property E to each element of a mathematical species S noncontradictoriness remains ensured only for finite S. For infinite
+S the simultaneous attribution mentioned can very well be contradictory.
+III. Page 3, footnote (****) [above, page 337, footnote 5], for the construction,
+given in the text, of a real number r for which none of the relations r = 0, r > 0,
+and r < 0 holds, we allowed every property x for which neither a finite number
+possessing x nor the impossibility of x for every finite number is known. To this
+we must add the condition that x can be judged for every finite number.
+IV. Page 4, line 18 up [above, page 338, line 12], the classical Heine-Borel covering
+theorem was formulated for an arbitrary "closed" bounded point species. The intuitionistic critique of this theorem that follows there should have been preceded by an
+exposition of the intuitionistic splitting of the classical notion "closed". For, if in a
+Cartesian or in a "located" ['"afgebakende"] compact topological space R we understand by a core the species of the points that coincide with a given point, by an
+accumulation core of a core species Q a core of which every neighborhood contains an
+infinitely proceeding sequence of cores of Q that are mutually apart, and by a limit
+core of a core species & a core of which every neighborhood contains a core of Q, if we
+then say that a core species & containing all of its accumulation cores is a-closed and
+that a core species & that contains all of its limit cores is ß-closed, if, accordingly, we
+call the union of a core species Q and its accumulation cores the a-closure of Q and the
+
+342
+species of limit cores of Q the ß-closure of Q, if we take the formulation cited above
+of the classical Heine-Borel covering theorem as applying to "closed" bounded core
+species Q, then this formulation is intuitionistically correct only if by "closed" is meant
+"B-closed" and if, moreover, & is a core species located in R, that is to say, it is from
+every core of R at a distance that is computable with unlimited accuracy. In particular, therefore, with regard to the number sequence c1, C2, C3, ... referred to on page 4,
+line 13 up Labove, page 338, line 17], which is bounded and is located in the number
+continuum, the classical covering theorem is intuitionistically valid only for its
+B-closure, that is to say, for its union with its limit number, but not for its a-closure,
+referred to on page 4, line 13 up [above, page 338, line 19], that is to say, for its union
+with the number O, if this number should turn out to be identical with the limit number.
+Nor is the classical covering theorem intuitionistically valid for number core species
+that are ß-closed and bounded but not located in the number continuum, as, for example,
+the union of the number cores p1, P2, P3,..., in which pr = I for v < ki and pr = - 1
+for v ≥ ki.
+V. The example given on page 5, lines 1-13 Labove, page 338, line Su, to page 339,
+line 5], of a monotonic, continuous, nowhere differentiable function defined everywhere in the closed unit interval possesses these properties exclusively as a function
+of the (classical) continuum of approximations made according to a law, not as a
+function of the (intuitionistic) continuum of more or less freely proceeding approxi.
+mations. A connection between monotonicity and differentiability of full functions
+of the intuitionistic continuum can be found in my 1923, p. 24.
+FURTHER ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA
+(1954a)
+With reference to point V of my 1954, pp. 104-105 [above, pp. 341-342], I give
+below an example of a continuous, monotonic, nowhere differentiable, real, full function
+of the intuitionistic closed unit continuum K.
+For a natural number n we understand by Xn(x) the real function of K that for the
+"even n-cores"2 x = aln (a being an integer and O ≤ a ≤ n) is equal to 0, for the
+"odd n-cores" x = (2a + 1)/2n (a being an integer and O ≤ a ≤ n) is equal to 1/4n,
+and for every a (0 ≤ a ≤ n) is linear between x = a/n and x = (2a † 1)/2n as well
+as between x = (2a + 1)/2n and x = (a + 1)/n." Further we put 4 (x) = x and, for
+n ≥ 2, f being an opaque fleeing property and ki(f) being its critical number,* we
+1 [For the definitions of "continuous", "full", and "unit continuum" see below, pp. 458-459 ;
+see also Brouwer 1953, p. 3, line 2u, to p. 4, line 6.]
+2 [For the definition of "core" see below, p. 458; see also Brouwer 1953, p. 3, line 2u, to p. 4,
+line 6.]
+3 [From the intuitionistic point of view the definition of Xn(x) does not seem unobjectionable;
+see Remark in 2.2.8 of Heyting 1956, p. 27.]
+* ['We shall call a hypothetical property f of natural numbers a fleeing property if it satisfies
+the following conditions:
+(1) For each natural number it can be decided either that it possesses the property f or that it
+cannot possibly possess the property f;
+(2) No method is known for calculating a natural number possessing the property f;
+(3) The assumption of existence of a natural number possessing the property f is not known to
+lead to an absurdity.
+In particular, a fleeing property is called opaque if the assumption of existence of a natural
+
+343
+put 4n(x) = Xn(x) if n = K(f), otherwise 4'n(x) = O. Then
+4(2) = 24(2)
+v=1
+is a continuous, monotonic, nowhere differentiable, real, full function of K.
+For one must take into account the possibility (a) that at some time it turns out
+that KI(f) is nonexistent, so that, for all values of x, 4(x) possesses an ordinary
+derivative equal to 1.
+But one must also take into account the possibility (B) that at some time a natural
+number m = kı(f) will be found. In that case 4(x) has, for all values of x that lie
+apart from the m-cores, an ordinary derivative, either equal to 3/2 or equal to 1/2;
+for all even m-cores x it has a right derivative (nonexistent for x = 1) equal to 3/2,
+and a left derivative (nonexistent for x = 0) equal to 1/2; and for all odd m-cores x
+it has a right derivative equal to 1/2 and a left derivative equal to 3/2, while for every
+value of x the possibility must be taken into account that at some time it shall turn
+out either to be an m-core or to lie apart from the m-cores.
+Therefore, with respect to the existence of an ordinary derivative, or of a right and
+a left derivative, of 4(x) one must, for every value of x, take into account possibilities
+lying mutually apart, so that for no single value of x an ordinary derivative can be
+calculated
+By the nature of the case this function f(x) is not "completely differentiable" in
+the sense of Brouwer 1923, § 3, p. 20.6
+So far as the function g(x), mentioned in Brouwer 1923a, p. 5 [above, p. 339], is
+concerned, it must, according to the explanations that follow below, be abandoned
+as an example of a continuous, monotonic, nowhere differentiable function, even for
+the classical closed unit continuum Ky?
+§ 2
+By a k'" we understand a closed 1(tv+1) interval;" for v ≥ 0, by an h'" we understand a k(" entirely or partially covered by K; further, after ordering the h'" for all
+values of v in a single fundamental sequence? O', 0", O'",..., to be called f, by a
+number possessing f is not known to be noncontradictory either." (Brouwer 1952, p. 14]; see also
+1928a, p. 161.)
+The critical number of a fleeing property is apparently what Brouwer (1929a, p. 161) calls the
+Lösungszahl of the property, that is, the (hypothetical) least natural number that possesses the
+property.Il
+5 ["We say that [a number core] a lies apart from [a number core] b if there is some natural
+number n such that |6 - a ! > 2-"." (Brouwer 1953, p. 4.) See also below, p. 462, footnote 10a.]
+" [The definition of "completely differentiable" requires too many preliminary definitions to be
+reproduced here; we refer the reader to the passage indicated in the text.]|
+" A similar disappearance of a counterexample, due to the disappearance of the absence of a
+requisite algorithm, belongs to the realm of possibilities when one considers 4(x) simply for a
+fixed fleeing property f.
+['The classical continuum is the species of predeterminate intuitionistic real numbers; see
+Brouwer 1952, p. 142, bottom half of first column, and p. 143, top of first column, as well as
+above, p. 342, V.]
+" [For the definition of "J'v-interval" see below, p. 457.]
+° [For the definition of "fundamental sequence" see below, p. 455.]
+
+344
+unitary standard number we understand an infinitely proceeding sequence 0 f'1, 0(2),
+g(c3),... in which, for every v, g,' is an h'" and ga,+1' consists entirely of inner
+points of O""'. Then, the species of unitary standard numbers is identical with the
+species of accretion sequences!1 of a dressed fan w,12 of which we can say—because
+every unitary number core, that is, every number core of K, coincides with a unitary
+standard number-that it represents K.
+As a function of a variable number core x, either of K, or of K, g(x) is now obtained
+as follows. 13 Let f be a fleeing property; let ki(f) be its critical number; let p, and
+qu be respectively the least and the greatest endcores of O"; and let q (x) be the
+continuous function of Ky, or of K, that for the part of on that belongs to Ky, or to
+K, is equal to
+9v - Pr sin 2m * - Pr
+9v - Pr
+and, for x ≤ P, as well as for x ≥ 9v, is equal to 0. Then we put gu(x) = x for v = 1,
+9v (ж) =Ф(x) for v = Ki(f), and g(x) = O for all other values of v. Finally, we put
+g(x) =
+: I g.(x).
+v =1
+If we call a ov for which v = ki(f) the critical interval of f and if we represent this
+by i(f), then (at least for the current examples of f and f) not a single indication is
+at hand concerning the position of a possible i(f); therefore, it seems at the outset
+that for every x every possibility of obtaining a guarantee for the nonbelonging to
+i(f) is lacking, and so is for every unitary finite binary fraction! x every possibility
+of computing a ratio 1/3 for the lengths of the segments into which it would have to
+divide a possible i(f) to which it would belong; therefore finally it seems that for
+every x every possibility of computing an ordinary derivative is lacking.
+§ 3
+This situation, however, changes when one intends to make the infinitely proceeding
+process of the creation, by free choices, of a unitary standard number u run parallel to
+the infinitely proceeding process of the successive judgments of the assignment of f
+to the successive natural numbers and moreover to take care that the creation process of u continually lags sufficiently far behind the process of judging that was just
+mentioned to prevent contact with an i (f) that might possibly appear, so that there
+must come into existence a number core x of K for which g(x) possesses an ordinary
+derivative equal to 1.
+Once this insight has been obtained, it is not far-fetched to observe that the way,
+indicated here, in which u comes to exist is at hand for all the accretion sequences
+sequEnce the defied in Brue undo f. ha, beque or slov. 8e, iso ... in eding
+1956, pp. 32-34.]]
+11 ["Accretion sequence" ("accretiereeks") is here apparently used for "infinitely proceeding
+sequence in a dressed spread " I
+12 [For the definition of "dressed fan" see Brouwer 1953, p. 16, first paragraph.]
+13 [The remark made in footnote 3 applies to the function g(x).]
+14 [For the definition of "finite binary fraction" see below, p. 457, footnote 1.]
+
+345
+of the elements of a subfan w' of w that is obtained from w by the deletion, from the
+species of constituents's that are admitted for the nodes of w, of a possible i(f), as
+well of the two 1-intervals that are of the same length as (f) and are partially covered
+by i(f). Therefore, for every number core x of K that is represented by this dressed
+tan w, g(x) possesses an ordinary derivative.
+By means of the same fan w' it is even possible to exhibit, for every natural number
+n, a measurable core species S, that is contained in K, has a content greater than
+1 - 2-4n, and in which g(x) everywhere possesses an ordinary derivative. 16 For that
+one establishes first of all for every n one of the following facts: either for v ≤ n no
+critical interval of f occurs among the h'" or for some m ≤ n a critical interval of
+f occurs among the hm). Further, there is chosen for Sn, in the first case, the core
+species of K represented by w' and, in the second case, the species of the cores of K
+that lie apart from the two endcores of i(f). If we further observe that the union of
+the infinitely proceeding sequence of the s, forms a measurable core species that is
+contained in K and has content 1, then g(x) turns out to be a continuous, monotonic,
+real, full function of K that is differentiable almost everywhere.
+And since the predeterminate elements of w' represent number cores of Ky, K, also
+possesses an (everywhere dense, ever unfinished, and ever enumerable) core species in
+which g(x) is everywhere differentiable.
+15 [For the definition of "constituent" see Brouwer 1953, p. 7.7
+16 [For the definitions of "measurable core species"
+and "content"
+26-33 ; see also Heyting 1956, chap. V, secs. 1 and 3.]
+Brouwer 1919, pp.
+
+On the introduction of transfinite numbers
+JOHN VON NEUMANN
+(1923)
+Cantor defined
+ordinal numbers as
+order types of well-ordered sets (1897).
+The order type of an ordered set M he
+defined as the notion obtained from M
+when, while retaining the succession of
+its elements, we disregard, by an act of
+abstraction, their nature, so that we obtain mere units in a definite order. This
+method of "definition by abstraction"
+was used by Cantor when dealing with
+objects between which an equivalence
+relation obtains. Subsequently (for instance, in Russell 1903) it was found to
+be more convenient to speak of equivalence classes. Since similarity is an equivalence relation, order types can be
+defined as equivalence classes of ordered
+sets under the relation of similarity, and
+the ordinals become equivalence classes
+of well-ordered sets. These equivalence
+classes being determined in the set of all
+well-ordered sets, we come close to
+regions of set theory where paradoxes
+lurk, and this approach is not without
+danger if set theory is not axiomatized;
+if it is, the proof that an equivalence class
+exists as a set in the theory may present
+difficulties.
+In the paper below von Neumann
+offers an alternative method. Instead of
+taking the equivalence class as the ordinal, he selects a particular well-ordered
+set as a representative of the class. Ordinals are specific well-ordered sets, and
+set of ordinals preceding it; O being the
+null set, the ordinals are O, {0}, {0, {O}},
+.... This is simply a description of the
+generating procedure, not a definition,
+since the principle of definition by transfinite induction is not at hand. The
+theory is presented in the language of
+naïve set theory; it can be incorporated
+in any of the usual axiomatic set theories,
+for instance, in von Neumann's own .
+(1925, p. 228 (below, p. 402) and 1928a,
+pp. 679, 710-721).
+The idea of regarding an ordinal as the
+set of the preceding ordinals has been
+adopted by the authors of most recent
+set theories (Gödel (1940), Bernays (1941,
+1958), Quine (1963)). It has two great
+advantages: first, it is applicable to intinite ordinals as well as to finite ones,
+and, second, the order relation for ordinals is given simply by the relation e.
+However, von Neumann's method of
+carrying out this idea is rather roundabout; he assumes the notions of wellordered set and similarity, and he
+proves, for every well-ordered set, the
+existence and the uniqueness of the corresponding ordinal. Ordinals can be defined outright, and their theory can be
+constructed independently of the theory
+of ordered sets. In presenting a simplification of von Neumann's set theory, Raphael
+M. Robinson (1937) gave such a direct
+definition of ordinals: an ordinal u is a seta
+any well-ordered set is similar to one of
+them. A standard scale is thus obtained
+a In the specific sense of "set", as distinct
+for well-ordered sets: any ordinal is the from that of "class", see below, p. 393.
+
+347
+such that
+every well-ordered set is similar to an
+(1) If x eu and y & u, then x= Y, X= Y,
+ordinal. For a comparison of the methods
+of R. M. Robinson, Gödel, Bernays, and
+ОГ У ЕХ;
+(2) If x = y and y & u, then x = u.
+Quine, see Quine 1963, p. 155, footnote 2.
+At the end of the paper below (foot-
+We see that the definition does not em- note 4) von Neumann sketches a proof of
+ploy anything beyond the relation
+8.
+the principle of definition by transfinite
+According to Bernays (1941, pp. 6, 10), induction. The proof is given in detail in
+Zermelo had in 1915 obtained (but left
+a subsequent paper (1928), in which von
+unpublished) a theory of ordinals that is
+Neumann presents his theory of ordinals
+also independent of the notion of order;
+in a new and succinct form, with interestvon Neumann (1928, p. 374) conjectures
+ing variations and additions.
+that Zermelo had difficulties with his
+The translation is by the editor. It is
+theory because he did not have at his
+reproduced here with the kind permission
+disposal the axiom of replacement (first of Mrs. Klara von Neumann-Eckart and
+published in 1921—see above, p. 291), the editorial board of Acta scientiarum
+proposal che
+which is indispensable for the proof that mathematicarum.
+The aim of the present paper is to give unequivocal and concrete form to Cantor's
+notion of ordinal number.
+Ordinarily, following Cantor's procedure, we obtain this notion by "abstracting" a
+common property from certain classes of sets.! We wish to replace this somewhat
+vague procedure by one that rests upon unequivocal set operations. The procedure
+will be presented below in the language of naive set theory, but, unlike Cantor's
+procedure, it remains valid even in a "formalistic" axiomatized set theory. Thus our
+conclusions retain their full validity even in the framework of Zermelo's axiomatization (if we add Fraenkel's axiom?).
+What we really wish to do is to take as the basis of our considerations the proposi.
+tion: "Every ordinal is the type of the set of all ordinals that precede it"
+. But, in
+order to avoid the vague notion "type", we express it in this form: "Every ordinal
+is the set of the ordinals that precede it".
+. This is not a proposition proved about
+ordinals; rather, it would be a definition of them if transfinite induction had already
+been established. According to it, we have
+0 = 0,
+1 = (0),
+2 = (0, (0)),
+3 = (0, (0), (0, (O))),
+-..
+where O is the null set and (a, b, c,...) is the set whose elements are a, b, c,....
+1 See Cantor 1895 and 1897.
+2 See Zermelo 1908a and Fraenkel 1922a.
+Frankel's axiom reads: "If E is a set and every element x of E is replaced by a 5, then there
+exists a set E' whose elements are the §". It fills a substantial gap in Zermelo's axiomatization.
+
+348
+But, of course, we do not assume that transfinite induction has already been
+established; rather, we assume as given only the notions "well-ordered set" and
+"similarity".! For the rest we shall proceed in a strictly formalistic way; we shall
+everywhere avoid the symbol "
+..." and similar devices.
+Our notation is as follows: If E and H are sets, then E ≤ H or H ≥ E means that
+E is a subset of H, and E < H or H > E means that E is a proper subset of H. If E
+is a set, then x & E means that x is an element of E. Let O be the empty set; let (a),
+(a, b), and (a, b, c) be the sets whose elements are, respectively, a, a and b, and a, b,
+and c. If x and y are elements of an ordered set, x < y or y < x means that x comes
+before y in the given ordering.
+Let E(x) be a property and let f(x) be a function defined for all x that have the
+property E(x). Then let
+M (f(x); E(x))
+be the set of all [values of] f(x) when x runs through all x that have the property
+E(x).3 Let E be an ordered set and x an element of E. Then we call the set
+М(У; У = Е, У <x)
+of all elements y of E that precede x the segment [Abschnitt] of x in E, and we also
+denote it more briefly by A(x, E).
+CHAPTER I
+1. Let E be a well-ordered set. We call a function f(x) defined in E a "numeration"
+[''Zählung"] of E if for all elements x of E we have
+f(x) = M(f(Y); y = A (x, E)).
+If f(x) is a numeration of E, then we call
+M (f(x); x = E)
+an "ordinal number" of E. And if there exists any numeration of E, we say that E is
+"numerable" ["zählbar"].
+If x1, Xz, Xz, and xy are the Ist, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th elements of E, respectively, then
+clearly for every numeration f(x) of E we have
+f(x1) = 0,
+f(x2) = (0),
+J (23) = (0, (0)),
+24) = (0;
+consequently, if E has 0, 1, 2, or 3 elements, its ordinal is, respectively,
+O,
+(0),
+(0, (0)), or
+(0, (0), (0, (0))).
+2. Let E be a well-ordered set. Iwo numerations f(x) and g(x) of E are always
+identical.
+3 From the axiomatic point of view it is not at all certain that such a set exists. Rather, we must
+require that all x having the property E(x) form a set. Then Frankel's axiom guarantees the
+existence of M(f(x); E(x)). This condition will always be satisfied in what follows.
+
+349
+For otherwise there would exist a first x for which f(x) # g(x). For all y < x we
+would have f(y) = g(y), hence
+М(f(y) ; У є Е, У <Х) = M(9(y); У є Е, У <х),
+and that means precisely that f(x) = g(x), contrary to the assumption.
+A numerable E, therefore, has one and only one numeration. Hence numeration
+and ordinal number are univocally determined notions for all numerable E. In what
+follows we shall denote the ordinal of E by OZ(E).
+3. Let E be numerable, let f(x) be the numeration of E, and let x be an element of
+E. Then A (x, E) is numerable and its ordinal is f(x).
+For the function f'(x), which is defined in A(x, E) and is there equal to f(x), is a
+numeration of A(x, E). We have in fact for all elements y of A(x, E)
+M(f'(Y); y & A (x, A (x, E))) = M(f(y); y & A(x, A(x, E)))
+Hence A (i, E) is numerable and its ordinal is
+OZ(A(x, E)) = M(f'(x); x = A(X, E)) = M(f(x); x = A(x, E)) = f(T).
+4. Let all segments in E be numerable. Then E too is numerable.
+For we define, for every x of E,
+f (x) = OZ(A(x, Z)).
+(We can do this, since all A(x, E) are numerable.) Then f(x) is a numeration of E.
+For, if x belongs to E and if q(y) is the numeration of A(x, E), then for every element
+y of A (X, 2) we have
+ФУ) = 04(4(У, А(x, Z))) = 02(A(Y, 2)) = f(Y),
+so that
+f(x) = OZ(A(x, E)) = M (p(y); y & A(x, E)) = M(f(y); y = A (x, E)).
+5. Let E be well-ordered. Then E is numerable.
+For otherwise not every segment in E would be numerable. Hence there would
+exist a first x for which A(x, E) would not be numerable. Now every segment in
+A (x, E) is equal to
+A(Y, A (x, E)) = A(y, E)
+for some element y of A(x, E). Since y < x, A(y, E) is then numerable. Hence all
+segments in A(x, E) are numerable, that is, A(x, E) is numerable, contrary to the
+assumption.
+Thus we have proved that numeration and ordinal number are univocally determined notions for all well-ordered sets.
+CHAPTER II
+6. Let E be well-ordered and let f(x) be the numeration of E. Then for no element x
+of E is f(x) an element of f(x).
+For if, for any element x of E, f(x) belonged to f(x), there would exist a first such x.
+
+350
+Since f(x) is the set of all f(y) for y <x, we would then have f(x) = f(y) for some
+y <x. But then f(y) would belong to f(y) and y would be <x, contrary to the
+assumption.
+7. Let E be well-ordered, let f(x) be the numeration of E, and let x and y be two
+elements of E such that x < Y. Then f(x) < f(Y).
+For from x < y it follows that A(x, E) < A(Y, E), hence
+M(f(u); " = A(x, E)) ≤ M(f(u); " = A(Y, I)),
+and
+f(x) ≤ f(Y) ;
+since f(x) belongs to f(y) (because x «Y) but not to f(x), f(x) is distinct from f(Y).
+Therefore f(x) < f(y).
+8. Using an expression of Hessenberg's [1910], we say that a set of sets E is
+"capable of being ordered by inclusion" ["durch Subsumption ordnungsfähig "] if
+for two distinct elements x and y of E we always havex < y or x > y. And, if this is
+the case, we define an ordering by stipulating that x < y whenever x < y. We call
+this ordering the "inclusion ordering"
+Now let E be well-ordered. Then OZ(E) is always capable of being ordered by
+inclusion and is similar to E under the inclusion ordering.
+For let f(x) be the numeration of E. Any two elements P and Q of OZ(E) are then
+equal to f(x) and f(Y), respectively, because
+02(E) = M (f(x); x = Z).
+And, since x «y or x > Y, we have J(X) < J(Y) or f(x) > f(y), hence P< Q or
+P > Q. Therefore OZ(E) is capable of being ordered by inclusion.
+The assignment of x to f(x) is clearly a mapping of E onto OZ(E). And since it
+always follows from x < y that f(x) < f(y), and hence, by the inclusion ordering,
+that f(x) <f(y), the mapping is also one-to-one and similar. Hence E is similar to
+02(E).
+9. P is an ordinal number if and only if
+(1) It is a set of sets that is capable of being ordered by inclusion;
+(2) Its inclusion ordering is a well-ordering;
+(3) For every element { of P, always § = A(§, P).
+First, we assume that P is an ordinal number. Then let P be the ordinal number of
+the well-ordered set E whose numeration is f(x). P is a set of sets that, by the theorem
+just proved, is capable of being ordered by inclusion (hence (1) is satisfied) and is
+similar to the well-ordered E, thus is itself well-ordered (hence (2) is satisfied). For
+every § of P, since necessarily § = f(x) (x being an element of E), we have
+§ = f(x) = M(J(Y); y = I, Y <X) = M(f(Y); Y = I, f(Y) < f(x))
+= M(n; 7=P, n < 5) = A(5, P)
+(hence (3) is also satisfied).
+Second, we assume that P satisfies conditions (I), (2), and (3). Then it is capable
+of being ordered by inclusion and is well-ordered in the inclusion ordering. If by
+
+351
+definition we take f(x) = x for all elements x of P, then f(x) is a numeration of P.
+In fact, because of (3), we have for all § of P,
+f (5) =§= A(§, P) = M(n; n= A(§, P)) = M(f(7); n= A(š, P));
+accordingly we have
+02(P) = M J (5); §= P) = M (§; §= P) = P;
+hence P is an ordinal and indeed its own ordinal.
+CHAPTER III
+10. Let P be an ordinal. Then P is the set of all ordinals that are < P.
+For let P be the ordinal of the well-ordered set E whose numeration is f(x). First,
+we assume that Q is an element of P. Because of (3), we then have
+Q= A(Q, P) <P,
+and, since necessarily Q = f(x) (x being an element of E) and we have
+J (x) = 02(A(x, 2)),
+f(x), hence also Q, is an ordinal.
+Second, we assume that Q is an ordinal such that & < P. We order P by inclusion.
+Let y < 5, and let § belong to Q. Since, then, $ belongs to & and to P, and P and Q
+are ordinals, we have
+§ = A(5, Q) = A(§, P).
+Since n belongs to Pand n < 5, n belongs to A A(5, P). And since
+A (5, P) = A(5, 2) < Q,
+it also belongs to Q. That is, Q < P. If n « § and § belongs to Q, then y also belongs
+to Q. According to a well-known theorem about well-ordered sets (and P is wellordered), Q is therefore a segment in P. For some element § of P we therefore have
+Q = A(š, P) = §;
+hence & belongs to P.
+We can express the theorem just proved thus: If P and Q are ordinals, P < Q is
+equivalent to P & Q. Hence for an ordinal P it is never the case that P & P.
+11. Let P and Q be two distinct ordinals. Then either P < Q or P > Q.
+Let R be the intersection of P and Q. Since P is capable of being ordered by
+inclusion and its inclusion ordering is a well-ordering (by (1) and (2)), since furthermore R ≤ P, the same statements hold of R; that is, R satisfies conditions (1) and
+(2). Every element § of R belongs to P and to Q, and, since P and Q are ordinals,
+§ = A(5, P) = A(5, 2).
+A (5, R) is the intersection of A(5, P) and A(5, Q), hence
+§ = A (5, R);
+thus R also satisfies (3). Therefore R is an ordinal.
+
+352
+We have R ≤ P and R ≤ Q. If R = P or R = Q, then P ≤ Q or & ≤ P, hence
+P < Q or P > Q (since P # Q). But the antecedent always holds; for if we had
+R < P and R < Q, then, since P, Q, and R are ordinals, we would have Re P and
+R = Q. Hence we would have & = R (because & is the intersection of P and Q), which
+is impossible since R is an ordinal.
+12. Let U be a set of ordinals. Iwo distinct elements P and Q of U are always
+ordinals; hence we have P ‹ Q or P > Q. That is, U is capable of being ordered by
+inclusion. The inclusion ordering of U, however, is a well-ordering.
+To prove this we must show that every V ≤ U, with V # O, has a first element.
+Let P be an element of V. (P is an ordinal number.) If there does not exist an element
+of V that is < P, then V has a first element, namely P. If such elements do exist, let
+their set be W. Since all elements of W are ordinal numbers (because W < V ≤ U)
+and are < P, they all belong to P; hence we have W ≤ P. Since W ≤ P, W # O,
+and P is well-ordered, W has a first element Q. (Because Q= W, Q < P.) Since
+every element of V is either ≥ P (hence >Q) or < P (hence an element of W and
+consequently ≥Q), Q is also the first element of V. Therefore V always has a first
+element.
+13. P is an ordinal if and only if every element of P is an ordinal and is ≤P.
+First, let P be an ordinal. Every element of P is an ordinal and is < P.
+Second, let P satisfy our conditions. As a set of ordinals, P is then capable of being
+ordered by inclusion and its inclusion ordering is a well-ordering; hence (1) and (2)
+are satisfied. Moreover, for every element § of P,
+A (5, P) = M(n; n= P, y < $);
+hence, since all elements n of P are ordinals,
+A(5, P) = M (n; n= P, nOZ, n < 5) = M(n; n= P, n= §);
+and hence, because § ≤ P, also
+A(5,P) = M(n; 7=8) = §;
+thus (3) is also satisfied. P is therefore an ordinal.
+If P is a set of ordinals, then, for every element § of P, $ ≤ P means (since P is
+an ordinal) that all ordinals that are ‹ § (that is, all elements of §) belong to P. We
+can therefore also express the theorem just proved thus: P is an ordinal if and only
+if all elements of P are ordinals and if, for every element $ of P, all ordinals n such
+that n < § are also elements of P.
+CHAPTER IV
+14. Let E and H be well-ordered sets. E and H are similar if and only if OZ(E) =
+OZ(H).
+First, let OZ(E) = OZ(H). Since E is similar to OZ(E), which is ordered by inclusion, and H is similar to OZ(H), which is ordered by inclusion, E is indeed similar
+to H.
+Second, let E be similar to H. Then let q(x) be a similar mapping of E onto H and
+
+353
+let g(x') be the numeration of H. If by definition we take f(x) = 9(p(x)) for all elements
+x of E, then f(x) is a numeration of E. In fact, for all x in E,
+М ||(У) ; У є І, У <х) = М (9(Ф(У)); У є Е, У <Х)
+= М (9(Ф(У)) ; у є І, ф (0) < *(x))
+= М (9(У); у' є Н, у < Ф(ж)) = 9(p(x)) = f(x) ;
+but from this it follows that
+OZ(E) = M(f(x); x & E) = M(9(ф(x)); x = Z) = M(g(x); x = H) = 0Z(H).
+15. E is similar to a segment in H if and only if OZ(E) < OZ(H).
+First, let OZ(E) < OZ(H). Then, by 10,3a OZ(E) is an element of OZ(H), hence a
+segment in H (its own). And since E is similar to OZ(E) and H to OZ(H), E is also
+similar to a segment of H.
+Second, let E be similar to a segment in H. Let the numeration of H be g(x); let
+the segment in question be A(X, H). Then, because of the similarity, we have
+OZ(З) = О(А(x, H)) = g(x) ;
+hence OZ(E) is an element of OZ(H), and therefore, by 10,3a
+OZ(E) < OZ(H).
+16. Since (because of 11) always one and only one of the following three cases
+obtains:
+OZ(E) < OZ(H), OZ(E) = OZ(H), and OZ(2) > OZ(H),
+always one and only one of the following three cases obtains too:
+E is similar to a segment of H,
+E is similar to H, and
+H is similar to a segment of E.
+And these three cases are equivalent, respectively, to
+OZ(E) < OZ(H), or OZ(E) & OZ(H),
+OZ(E) = OZ(H),
+OZ(E) > OZ(H), or OZ(H) = OZ(E).
+17. Let E be well-ordered. Then there is one and only one ordinal (ordered by
+inclusion) similar to E, namely OZ(E).
+OZ(E) is indeed similar to E. And if the ordinal P is similar to 2, then let P be the
+ordinal of H. Since H is similar to P and P to E, H is similar to E, hence
+P = OZ(H) = OZ(E);
+from this it also follows that two ordinals ordered by inclusion are similar if and only
+if they are identical.
+From this point on it is easy to develop the theory of ordinals further. Addition
+and multiplication of ordinals are not difficult to establish. "Definition by transfinite
+induction" is, to be sure, admissible only when the following theorem has been
+proved:
+"Let f(x) be a function that is defined for all sets of objects of a domain B and
+3a [The German text has "12", which is apparently a misprint.]
+
+354
+whose values are always objects of the domain B. Then there is one and only one
+function $(P), defined for all ordinals P and having values that are always objects of
+the domain B, such that for all ordinals P
+$(P)= f(M($(Q); @OZ,Q<P)= f(M(Ф(Q); Q=P)),
+where QOZ means that Q is an ordinal."
+The proof of this theorem, which is not at all self-evident, is, however, not difficult
+to supply.* Once this theorem is proved, the theory of exponentiation of ordinals, as
+well as that of "continuous" or "normal"" functions of ordinals, can also be developed
+without further ado.
+* The theorem is proved (in strong analogy with the proofs in Chapter I, 1-5 [the German text
+erroneously has "1-6"]) somewhat as follows:
+(a) Let P be an ordinal. Is there then a function *(Q), defined for all ordinals & < P, such
+·(Q) = f(M(·(R); RU4, R < Q))?
+And how many such functions are there?
+(b) If there is any, there is exactly one. In that case let P be said to be "normal" and let y
+be called Yp. Furthermore, for a normal P, let
+$(P) = f(M(·p(Q); QOZ, 8 <P)).
+(c) If P is normal, then every ® < P is normal, and for all R < Q we have
+*(R)= Yp(R), and $(Q) = Yp(Q).
+(d) If all Q < P are normal, then P is also normal. (We have Yp(Q) = Ф(Q).)
+(e) All P are normal. It follows immediately from (d) that
+$(P)=(M(·(8);Q07,Q<P|=j(M($(Q;QOZ, Q <P)),
+hence $(P) is the desired function.
+(f) There is only one such function.
+5 See Hausdorff 1914.
+
+On the building blocks of mathematical logic
+MOSES SCHÖNFINKEL
+(1924)
+These ideas were presented before the to do the work of quantifiers and their
+Göttingen Mathematical Society by variables altogether, go far beyond the
+Schönfinkel on 7 December 1920 but
+algebra of classes and relations, for that
+came to be written up for publication
+algebra makes no special provision for
+only in March 1924, by Heinrich Behclasses of classes, relations of classes,
+mann. The last three paragraphs are
+classes of relations, or relations of relagiven over to supplementary remarks of
+tions. Schönfinkel's notions provide for
+Behmann's own.
+these things, and for the whole sweep of
+The initial aim of the paper is reducabstract set theory. The crux of the
+tion of the number of primitive notions
+matter is that Schönfinkel lets functions
+of logic. The economy that Sheffer's
+stand as arguments.
+stroke function had wrought in the pro-
+For Schönfinkel, substantially as for
+positional calculus is here extended to the
+Frege," classes are special sorts of funcpredicate calculus, in
+the form of
+generalized copula
+"U" of mutual
+tions. They are propositional functions,
+exfunctions whose values are truth values.
+clusiveness. Then presently the purpose
+All functions, propositional and otherdeepens. It comes to be nothing less than
+wise, are for Schönfinkel one-place functhe general elimination of variables.
+tions, thanks to the following ingenious
+Examples of how to eliminate variables
+device (which was anticipated by Frege
+had long been known in logic. The in-
+(1893, § 36)). Where F is what we would
+clusion notation "F< G" gets rid of the
+ordinarily call a two-place function,
+universally quantified "X" of "(X)(Ex>
+Schönfinkel reconstrues it by treating
+Gx) "
+• The notation "F|G" of relative
+Exy not as F(x, Y) but as (Ex)y. Thus F
+product gets rid of an existentially
+becomes a one-place function whose value
+quantified "X"
+, since "(Ax)(Fyx-Gxz)"
+is a one-place function. The same trick
+becomes "(F|G)yz". These devices and
+applies to functions of three or more
+others figured already in Peirce's 1870
+places; thus "Exyz" is taken as "((Ex)
+algebra of absolute and relative terms,
+y)z". In particular, a dyadic relation, as
+thus even antedating any coherent logic
+an ostensibly two-place propositional
+of the variable itself, for such a logic,
+function, thus becomes a one-place funcquantification theory, came only in
+tion whose value is a class. An example
+Frege's work of 1879. The algebra of absois U, above, where "UFG" means that
+lute and relative terms, however, or of
+F and G are exclusive classes; UFG
+classes and relations, is not rich enough
+to do the work of quantifiers and their
+a See Frege 1879, § 9. What prompts my
+qualification "substantially" is that in later
+variables altogether (see above, p. 229).
+writings Frege draws a philosophical distinc-
+Schönfinkel's notions, which do suffice
+tion between a function and its Wertverlauf.
+
+356
+becomes (UF)G, so that U becomes a
+drastic but very curious reduction of O,
+function whose value, for a class f as
+S, and U. He adopts a new function J,
+argument, is the class Uf of all classes
+interpreted as having U as value for C'as
+G that share no members with
+F. Or
+argument, C as value for S as argument,
+better, using general variables "X",
+, "У"
+and S as value for other arguments. Then
+and
+so forth hereafter for classes and
+he defines "S" as "JJ"
+, "C" as "JS"
+other functions and all other things as
+and "U" as "JC". This trick reduces
+well, we may say that U is the function
+every closed sentence (of logic and set
+whose value Ux is the class of all classes
+theory) to a string of "J" and parenthat share no members with x.
+theses.
+Schönfinkel assumes one operation,
+In the second of his three added parathat of application of a function to an
+graphs, Behmann proposes an alternaargument. It is expressed by juxtapositive reduction, which, at the cost of
+tion as in "Ux" above, or "(Ux)y", or in
+resting with C, S, U, and yet a fourth
+general "zy". Also he assumes three
+basic function instead of just J, would get
+specific functions, as objects: U above,
+rid of parentheses by maneuvering them
+C, and S. C'is the constancy function, such
+all into a left-converging position, where
+that (Cx)y is always x, and S' is the fusion
+they could be tacit. However, as Behfunction, such that ((Sx)y)z is always (xz)
+mann recognized later in a letter to
+(yz). Any sentence that can be built up
+H. B. Curry, ' there is a fallacy here; the
+of truth functions and quantification and
+routine can generate new parentheses and
+the"
+=" of class membership can be transnot terminate.
+lated into a sentence built up purely by
+But, if we want to get rid of parenthethe application operation, purely from
+"C",
+"S"
+ses, we can easily do so by adapting an
+"U".
+, and whatever free
+idea that was used elsewhere in logic by
+variables the given sentence may have
+Lukasiewicz (1929, footnote 1, pp. 610-
+had. This is made evident in the course of
+612; 1929a; 1958; 1963). Instead of using
+the paper. The elimination of quantificamere juxtaposition to express the applition and bound variables is thus comcation of functions, we can use a prepoplete. Since sentences with free variables
+nent binary operator "o". Thus "Xy"
+are wanted finally only as ingredients of
+"х(уZ)"
+may indeed be said at this point to have
+"охоуz"
+; and "(y)z" give way to "oxy"',
+closed sentences, the notion of variables
+, and "ooxyz"
+'. All Schönfinkel's
+sentences built of "J" and parentheses
+been analyzed away altogether. All we
+go over unambiguously into strings of
+have is C, S, U, and application.
+"J" and "O"
+Variables seem to survive in rules of
+Schönfinkel's reduction to J, with
+transformation, as when (Cx)y is equated
+parentheses or whatever, is interesting
+tox, and ((Sx)y)z to (xy)(xz). But here the
+for its effortlessness and its broad applivariables may be seen as schematic letters
+cability. One would like to rule it out as
+for metalogical exposition. If one cared to
+spurious reduction, but where can a line
+formalize one's metalanguage in turn, one
+be drawn? The only contrast I think of
+could subject it too to Schönfinkel's
+between serious reduction and this reelimination of variables.
+duction to J is that in serious reduction
+C, S, and U, economical as they are, are
+the axioms tend to diminish along with
+further reducible. It is now known that
+we can get U from C, S, and the mere
+identity relation'-which, by the doctrine
+of relations noted above, is the same as
+the unit-class function.
+• This reduction figured in my seminar, from
+about 1952 on. The essential reasoning is recoverable from the last two pages of Quine
+1956.
+Schönfinkel himself contrives a more
+" See Curry and Feys 1958, p. 184.
+
+357
+the primitive ideas: what had been axio. theory in turn; all set theory was his
+matic connections reduce in part to defi- province. His C, S, U, and application
+nitions. Schönfinkel does not get to
+are a marvel of compact power. But a
+axioms, but any axioms he might have
+consequence is that the analysis of the
+adopted regarding C, S, and U would
+variable, so important a result of Schön-
+obviously have been diminished none by finkel's construction, remains all bound
+his reduction of these functions to J.
+up with the perplexities of set theory.
+Axioms for C, S, and U pose, as it
+It proves possible, thanks to the perhappens, a major problem. Since these
+spective afforded by Schönfinkel's pioneer
+three functions cover set theory, the
+work, to separate these considerations.
+question of axioms for them is as broad
+Ordinary quantification theory, the firstas axiomatic set theory itself. Moreover,
+order predicate calculus, can actually be
+this present angle of analysis is so radireworked in such a way as to get rid of
+cally different from the usual that we
+the variables without thus increasing
+cannot easily adapt the hitherto known the power of the notation. The method
+ways of getting around the set-theoretic
+turns on adopting a few operators attachparadoxes. The quest for an optimum
+able to predicates. They are reminiscent
+axiomatization of the Schönfinkel appaof Schönfinkel's functions, but with the
+ratus has accounted for much work and
+difference that they do not apply to
+many writings from 1929 onward, mainly
+themselves or one another. An analysis
+by H. B. Curry, under the head of
+of the variable is obtained that is akin to
+combinatory logic.d
+Schönfinkel's but untouched by the prob-
+It was by letting functions admit
+lems of set theory.®
+functions generally as arguments that
+W. V. Quine
+Schönfinkel was able to transcend the
+bounds of the algebra of classes and relations and so to account completely for
+quantifiers and their variables, as could
+The translation is by Stefan Bauer-
+Mengelberg, and it is printed here with
+the kind permission of Springer Verlag.
+not be done within that algebra. The
+same expedient carried him, we see, far
+beyond the bounds of quantification
+d See Curry and Feys 1958.
+• See Bernays 1957 and Quine 1960.
+It is in the spirit of the axiomatic method as it has now received recognition, chiefly
+through the work of Hilbert, that we not only strive to keep the axioms as few and
+their content as limited as possible but also attempt to make the number of fundamental undefined notions as small as we can; we do this by seeking out those notions
+from which we shall best be able to construct all other notions of the branch of science
+in question. Understandably, in approaching this task we shall have to be appropriately modest in our demands concerning the simplicity of the initial notions.
+As is well known, the fundamental propositional connectives of mathematical logic,
+which I reproduce here in the notation used by Hilbert in his lectures,
+à, a V a &b, a → b, a ~b
+(read: "not a", "a or b", "a and b"
+, "if a, then b", "a is equivalent to b"), cannot
+be defined at all in terms of any single one of them; they can be defined in terms of
+two of them only if negation and any one of the three succeeding connectives are
+
+358
+taken as undefined elements constituting the base. (Of these three kinds of reduction
+Whitehead and Russell employed the first and Frege the third.)
+That the reduction to a single fundamental connective is nevertheless entirely
+possible provided we remove the restriction that the connective be taken only from
+the sequence above was discovered not long ago by Sheffer (1913). For, it we take as
+the base, say, the connective "not a or not b",
+, that is, "of the propositions a and b at
+least one is false", which can be written with the signs above in the two equivalent
+forms
+a V5 and a &b,
+and if we adopt
+alb
+as the new sign for it, then obviously
+a=ala and a Vb = (ala) | (6|b);
+thus, because
+a&b= à V5, (a→b) = à V6, and (a~b) = (a→b) & (0 →a),
+the reduction has in principle been accomplished.
+It is remarkable, now, that it is possible to go beyond this and, by suitably modi.
+fying the fundamental connective, to encompass even the two higher propositions
+(x)f(x) and (Ex)f(x),
+that is,
+"all individuals have the property f" and "there exists an individual having
+the property f", in other words, the two operations (x) and (Ex), which, as is well
+known, together with those above constitute a system of fundamental connectives for
+mathematical logic that is complete from the point of view of the axiomatization.
+For, if from now on we use
+(x)If(x)V g(x)], or (x)f(x) & g(x),
+as a fundamental connective and if we write
+f(x) |* g(x)
+for it, then evidently (since we can treat constants formally as functions of an
+argument)
+and
+(2)(/(2)(2)) = F(x)|*F(x) = (f(a) |"f(x))|*(f(x)("f(x));
+thus, because
+(Ex)f (x) = (x)f (x)
+the last assertion is proved also.
+The successes that we have encountered thus far on the road taken encourage us to
+attempt further progress. We are led to the idea, which at first glance certainly
+appears extremely bold, of attempting to eliminate by suitable reduction the remaining fundamental notions, those of proposition, propositional function, and variable,
+
+359
+from those contexts in which we are dealing with completely arbitrary, logically
+general propositions (for others the attempt would obviously be pointless). To examine
+this possibility more closely and to pursue it would be valuable not only from the
+methodological point of view that enjoins us to strive for the greatest possible conceptual uniformity but also from a certain philosophic, or, if you wish, aesthetic point
+of view. For a variable in a proposition of logic is, after all, nothing but a token
+[Abzeichen] that characterizes certain argument places and operators as belonging
+together; thus it has the status of a mere auxiliary notion that is really inappropriate
+to the constant, "eternal" essence of the propositions of logic.
+It seems to me remarkable in the extreme that the goal we have just set can be
+realized also; as it happens, it can be done by a reduction to three fundamental signs.
+82
+To arrive at this final, deepest reduction, however, we must first present a number
+of expedients and explain a number of circumstances.
+It will therefore be necessary to leave our problem at the point reached above and
+to develop first a kind of function calculus [Funktionenkalkül]; we are using this term
+here in a sense more general than is otherwise customary.
+As is well known, by function we mean in the simplest case a correspondence between the elements of some domain of quantities, the argument domain, and those
+of a domain of function values (which, to be sure, is in most cases regarded as coinciding with the former domain) such that to each argument value there corresponds
+at most one function value. We now extend this notion, permitting functions themselves to appear as argument values and also as function values. We denote the value
+of a function f for the argument value x by simple juxtaposition of the signs for the
+function and the argument, that is, by
+fx.
+Functions of several arguments can, on the basis of our extended definition of
+function, be reduced to those of a single argument in the following way.
+We shall regard
+F(x, У),
+for example, as a function of the single argument y, say, but not as a fixed given
+function; instead, we now consider it to be a variable function that depends on x for
+its form. (Of course we are here concerned with a dependence of the function, that is,
+of the correspondence itself; we are not referring to the obvious dependence of the
+function value upon the argument.) In mathematics we would say in such a case that
+the function depends upon a parameter, too, and we would write, say,
+Gx (y).
+We can regard this function G itself-its form, so to speak—as the value (function
+value) of a new function f, so that G = fx.
+We therefore write
+(fx)y
+
+360
+in our symbolism, or, by agreeing, as is customary in the theory of infinite series for
+example, that parentheses around the left end of such a symbolic form may be
+omitted, more simply,
+fxy,
+where the new function, f, must be clearly distinguished from the former one, E.
+I should like to make the transformation just described more intelligible by applying
+it to the specific number-theoretic function x - y. If we regard the expression as a
+function of y alone, this function has the "form" x- and therefore means "the
+difference between x and any given quantity"; in that case the expression is to be
+taken as (x-)y. The essential point here is that we must not think of a simultaneous
+substitution of values for x and y, but, to begin with, of the substitution of a value—
+a, for instance—for x alone, so that we first obtain the function a - y (in short: the
+function a -) as an intermediate step; only then does the replacement of y—by the
+fixed value b, say—become admissible.
+In the foregoing case, therefore, fx is the value of a function that, upon substitution
+of a value for x, does not yet yield an object of the fundamental domain (if indeed
+such an object was intended as the value of F(x, y)) but yields another function,
+whose argument now is y; that is, f is a function whose argument need not be subject
+to any restriction but whose function value is again a function. On functions of more
+than one variable we shall henceforth always carry out the transformation described
+above (or think of it as having been carried out), so that these will appear throughout in the form
+Jxyz...,
+which, as we have already stated, is to be taken as an abbreviation of
+(((JX)Y)z)....
+§ 3
+Now a sequence of particular functions of a very general nature will be introduced.
+I call them the identity function [Identitätsfunktion] I, the constancy function
+[Konstanzfunktion] C, the interchange function [Vertauschungsfunktion] I, the
+composition function [Zusammensetzungsfunktion] Z, and the fusion
+. function
+[Verschmelzungsfunktion] S.
+1. By the identity function I we mean that completely determined function whose
+argument value is not subject to any restriction and whose function value always
+coincides with the argument value, that function, in other words, by which each
+object, as well as each function, is associated with itself. It is therefore defined by the
+equation
+Ix = x,
+where the equal sign is not to be taken to represent logical equivalence as it is ordi.
+narily defined in the propositional calculus of logic but signifies that the expressions
+on the left and on the right mean the same thing, that is, that the function value Ix
+is always the same as the argument value x, whatever we may substitute for x. (Thus,
+for instance, II would be equal to I.)
+
+361
+2. Now let us assume that the argument value is again arbitrary without restriction, while, regardless of what this value is, the function value will always be the
+fixed value a. This function is itself dependent upon a; thus it is of the form Ca. That
+its function value is always a is written
+(Ca)y = a.
+And by now letting a, too, be variable we obtain
+(Cx)y = x, or Cxy =х,
+as the defining equation of the constancy function C. This function C' is obviously of
+the kind considered on page 360; for only when we substitute a fixed value for x does
+it yield a function with the argument y. In practical applications it serves to permit
+the introduction of a quantity x as a "blind" variable.
+3. Conversely, we can obviously always think of an expression like
+fxy
+as having been obtained from
+F(x, y),
+where F is uniquely determined by the given f. If, however, we now rewrite this
+expression as
+дух,
+taking y as a parameter, then this new function, too, is uniquely given by F and
+therefore indirectly also by f.
+Hence we may think of the function g as the value of a function T for the argument
+value f. This interchange function I' has as its argument a function of the form oxy,
+and the function value
+4 = Іф
+is that function fxy whose value xy coincides with yx for all argument values x and
+y for which yx has meaning. We write this definition briefly as
+(1 ф)хУ = фух,
+where the parentheses may again be omitted.
+The function I makes it possible to alter the order of the terms of an expression,
+and in this way it compensates to a certain extent for the lack of a commutative law.
+4. If in the argument place of a function f there occurs the value (dependent upon
+x) of another function, g, then
+f (9x)
+obviously also depends upon x and can in consequence be regarded as the value of a
+third function, E, which is uniquely determined by f and g. In analysis, as is well
+known, we speak loosely in such cases of a "function of a function"-strictly, it
+should be a "function of a function value" —and we call F the function "compounded" from f and g. The function F is thus itself the value of a certain function
+Z' of fand g.
+
+362
+We could therefore define
+[2 (Ф, Х)Іх = Ф(XX).
+But, following our earlier convention, we prefer to replace Zi by the corresponding
+function of one argument, and we consequently obtain
+КФХХ = Ф(XX)
+as the defining equation of the composition function Z.
+By means of the function Z parentheses can be shifted (not really eliminated, since
+they must always be thought of as still being there) within a more comprehensive
+expression; its effect is therefore somewhat like that of the associative law, which is
+not satisfied here either.
+5. If in
+fxy
+we substitute the value of a function g for y, and in particular the value taken for the
+same x as that which appears as argument of f, we come upon the expression
+fx(gx),
+or, as we shall write it for the moment to make it clearer,
+(fx) (gx).
+This, of course, is the value of a function of x alone; thus
+(fx) (gx) = Ex,
+where
+# =S (J, 9)
+again depends in a completely determined way upon the given functions f and g.
+Accordingly we have
+[S' (Ф, Х)]х = (фх) (XX),
+or, if we carry out the same transformation as in the preceding case,
+as the defining equation of the fusion function S.
+It will be advisable to make this function more intelligible by means of a practical
+example. If we take for fxy, say, the value logxy (that is, the logarithm of y to the
+base x) and for gz the function value 1 + z, then (fx)(gx) obviously becomes logx
+(1 + x), that is, the value of a function of x that is univocally associated with the two
+given functions precisely by our general function S.
+Clearly, the practical use of the function S will be to enable us to reduce the number
+of occurrences of a variable-and to some extent also of a particular function—from
+several to a single one.
+84
+It will prove to be relevant to the solution of the problem that we have raised
+concerning the symbolism of logic that the five particular functions of the function
+
+363
+calculus that were defined above, I, C, I, Z, and S, are not mutually independent,
+that, rather, two of them, namely C and S, suffice to define the others. In fact, the
+following relations obtain here.
+1. According to the definitions of the functions I and C,
+Іх = x = Сху.
+Since y is arbitrary, we can substitute any object or any function for it, hence, for
+example, Cx. This yields
+According to the definition of S, however, this means
+SCCx,
+so that we obtain
+I = SCC.1
+The last C, incidentally, does not occur in the expression SCC in an essential way.
+For, if above we put for y not Cx but an arbitrary function ox, we obtain in a similar
+way
+І = Сф,
+where any function can then be substituted for ф.?
+2. According to the definition of 2,
+Zfgx =f (gx).
+Furthermore, by virtue of the transformations already employed,
+f(9x) = (Cfx)(9x) =S(Cf)gx= (CSf)(Cf)gx.
+Fusion over f yields
+S(CS)Cfgx:
+therefore
+Z = S(CS)C.
+3. In an entirely analogous way,
+Ifyx =fxy
+can be further transformed thus:
+52 (Си0) = (J0) (Сух) = f ((y)x = (SJ) (Су)х = 4(8J)Сух
+= ZZ$fCyx = (ZZ$f)yx = (ZZSf)(CCf)yx = S(2ZS)(CC)fx.
+Therefore we have
+T = S(ZZS)(CC).
+If we here substitute for Z the expression found above, I' too will have been reduced
+to C and S.
+1 This reduction was communicated to me by Boskowitz; some time before that, Bernays had
+called the somewhat less simple one (SC)(CC) to my attention.
+2 Only such a function, of course, as has meaning for every x.
+
+364
+85
+Let us now apply our results to a special case, that of the calculus of logic in which
+the basic elements are individuals and the functions are propositional functions.
+First we require an additional particular function, which is peculiar to this calculus.
+The expression
+fx|*gx,
+where f and g are propositional functions of one argument-in view of an earlier
+remark we may confine ourselves to these—is obviously a definite function of the two
+functions f and g; thus it is of the form U(f, 9), or, by our principle of transformation,
+Ufg. Thus we have
+Ufg =fx"gx,
+where f and g, of course, now are propositional functions, as the defining equation of
+the incompatibility function U.
+It is a remarkable fact, now, that every formula of logic can be expressed by means
+of our particular functions I, C, T, Z, S, and U alone, hence, in particular, by means
+solely of C, S, and U.
+First of all, every formula of logic can be expressed by means of the generalized
+stroke symbol, with the bound variables (apparent variables) at the upper ends of the
+strokes. This holds without restriction; hence it holds for arbitrary orders of propositions [Aussagenordnungen] and also if relations occur. Furthermore, we can introduce
+the function U step by step in place of the stroke symbol by suitable use of the
+remaining constant functions.
+We will not give the complete demonstration here but only explain the role of the
+different particular functions in this reduction.
+By means of the function C we can see to it that the two expressions standing to
+the left and the right of the stroke become functions of the same argument.
+Thus, for example, the expression
+fx|"gy,
+which depends upon f, g, and y and in which x does not occur on the right, would have
+to be rewritten as
+fx|"C(gY)x.
+If, however, x occurs on the right at some place other than the end, we can move it
+there by means of the function I; in doing this we must use the function 4 to
+extricate it from parentheses, if there are any, and the function S to fuse it, if it occurs
+several times. Thus, for example,
+[x *дху =jx *Іду = UJ(19y).
+Or, to take a somewhat more involved example,
+(fxy|'gy) |*(hxz|*kxz) = U(fx)(gx) |×U(hx)(kx).
+Here, for instance, the expression preceding the stroke must be dealt with further as
+follows:
+U(fx)(gx) = ZUfx(gx) = S(ZUf)gx.
+
+365
+The entire expression thus becomes
+S(ZUf)gx|aS(ZUh)kx,
+which is equal to
+UIS(ZUf)g][S(ZUh)k].
+If in the last example f and g were identical, we would obtain the expression
+S(ZUf)f.
+To be able to achieve the fusion over f here, we make use of the function I by
+calculating further:
+S\ZUf)f=S\ZUf)(If) =[ZS\ZU)f]If) = S[ZS\ZU)|/f.
+To give a practical example of the claim of this section we shall deal with the
+following proposition: "For every predicate there exists a predicate incompatible
+with it", that is, "For every predicate f there exists a predicate g such that the propositional function fx & ga is not true of any object a".
+In Hilbert's symbolism this sentence is written
+(f) (Eg)(x)Ix & gx.
+This becomes, first,
+(f) (Eg) (fx|*gx)
+and then, if we write the particular judgment as the negation of a universal one,
+(f) (9)Fx/*gx,
+or
+(f) (9)fx|*gx & fx|* gx.
+This is
+(f)(fx|*gx) |° (Ix |Xgx).
+If we proceed similarly for f as well, we obtain, further,
+(f)fx|* x) |° (fx|* gx) & (fx|* g) |° (Ix|* gx),
+which is equal to
+From this point on the stroke symbol occurs as the sole logical connective. If we now
+introduce the incompatibility function U, we obtain first
+[Uf9) |º(Uf9)1|'[(Uf9)|º(Uf9)]
+and then
+But now
+U(Uf) (Uf) = (ZUUf)(Uf) = S(ZUU)Uf;
+hence the expression above becomes
+[S(ZUU)Uf||'[S(ZUU)Uf];
+but this is
+VIS(ZUU)US(ZUU)U].
+
+366
+§ 6
+So far as we can see, we cannot carry the reduction to anything beyond the symbols
+C, S, and U without doing violence to it.
+Purely schematically, to be sure, we could replace even C, S, and U by a single
+function if we were to introduce the new function J through the definitions
+JC = U, JS = C, and
+IX = S,
+where x is any object distinct from C'and S. We ascertain, first, that J is itself distinct
+from C and S, since J takes on only three function values whereas C and S take on
+infinitely many. Consequently we have
+JJ=S, JJJ=JS = C, and J|JJJ)] = JC = U,
+which in fact accomplishes the reduction. But on account of its obvious arbitrariness
+it is probably without any real significance.
+However,3 we can in a certain sense free ourselves at least from the sign U in
+another, more natural way. Every formula of logic [when transformed as indicated]
+certainly contains the sign U and-quite in accordance with our earlier conclusion
+about an arbitrary symbol—can be written in terms of the particular functions of the
+general function calculus (hence, in particular, by means of C' and S) in such a way
+that U occurs as the argument of the entire expression; the expression thus assumes
+the form FU, where F itself no longer contains U. If in writing the expression down
+we omit the U, regarding it as understood, we can in fact manage with C and S.
+On the other hand we could, while relinquishing the most extreme reduction of the
+basic function symbols, demand that parentheses be entirely avoided. If now we take
+the form FU as a point of departure, then, by means of Z alone, F can be transformed in such a way that all parentheses disappear. By means of C, 2, and S, therefore, every formula of logic can be written without parentheses as a simple sequence
+of these signs and can therefore be characterized completely by a number written to
+the base 3.
+So far as the uniqueness of the reduction considered is concerned, it is, purely from
+the point of view of the symbolism, quite out of the question, since every formula
+both of the old and of the new calculus can be transformed in various ways. Yet in a
+certain more limited sense we can ascertain a uniqueness of correspondence here. For
+if we use the term "equivalent", on the one hand, for the formulas of the old calculus
+that can be reduced to one another purely on the basis of the definitions, that is,
+without use of the logical axioms (in which, of course, the generalized Sheffer connective would now have to figure as the fundamental connective), and, on the other
+hand, for those that differ from one another only in the typography of the variables
+occurring in them, then to a given formula of the new calculus and, likewise, to any
+one that can be obtained from it through symbolic calculation there in fact correspond
+precisely those formulas of the old calculus that are equivalent to one another in the
+sense just defined. The reduction here considered of the formulas of logic has the
+remarkable peculiarity, therefore, of being independent of the axioms of logic.
+3 The considerations that follow are the [German] editor's.
+
+On the infinite
+Hilbert devoted to the foundations of
+time on the foundations of mathematics.
+mathematics a series of papers (1904, It starts by recalling how Weierstrass
+1917, 1922, 1922a, 1925, 1927, 1928a,
+eliminated references to "infinity" in
+1930, 1931, all but the last read as adanalysis (Hilbert could have mentioned
+dresses), to which must be added his
+Cauchy and even D'Alembert) and repaper on the axiomatization of the real
+views the role played by the infinite in
+number system (1900) and some parts of
+physics, set theory, and, when we deal
+his address to the Paris International
+with general propositions, logic. Leaning
+Congress of Mathematicians (1900a),
+on the example of arithmetic, it intronamely, those on the continuum hypoduces the distinction between finitary and
+thesis, the well-ordering hypothesis, and
+ideal propositions, and it undertakes a
+the consistency of the
+real-number
+simultaneous formalization of logic and
+system."
+arithmetic (the system presented by
+Among all these contributions the 1925
+Hilbert is described in greater detail in
+paper stands out as the most comprehenhis 1927 paper, pp. 465-469 below; on
+sive presentation of Hilbert's ideas. It is
+this system see also Supplement IV in
+the text of an address delivered in Mün-
+Hilbert and Bernays 1939 and, for a
+ster on 4 June 1925 at a meeting organized by the Westphalian Mathematical
+critical study, Asser 1957).
+The second part of the paper is the
+Society to honor the memory of Weiersketch of an attempted proof of the constrass. In addition to the original version
+tinuum hypothesis. Stated for the first
+(1925), two modified ones (1925a; 1930a,
+time by Cantor at the very beginning of
+Appendix VIII) were published. These,
+the development of set theory (1878,
+however, are abbreviated and, besides
+p. 258), presented by Hilbert as Problem
+other passages, omit entirely the section
+no. 1 in his famous list of unsolved mathethat deals with the continuum problem;
+matical problems (1900a), the continuum
+the third version contains a number of
+problem for years resisted the efforts of
+minor emendations and additions. The
+mathematicians. The only partial result
+translator followed the original version,
+known at the time of Hilbert's attempted
+but he used the third to clarify the meanproof was König's: the power of the
+ing of a few passages, and some of the
+continuum is not a limit of denumerably
+additions contained in this third version
+many smaller cardinal numbers (see
+are reproduced in the translation below
+Hausdorff 1914, pp. 67-68); for a general
+between square brackets.
+survey of the continuum problem see
+The paper consists of two quite dis- Gödel 1947).
+tinct parts. The first is a clear and forceful presentation of Hilbert's ideas at the
+a Perhaps 19306 should also be added.
+
+368
+Instead of the set of real numbers
+Hilbert considers the equivalent set of
+number-theoretic functions
+and undertakes to prove that there is a mapping of
+the set of ordinals of the second number
+class onto the set of these functions. By
+dealing with the definitions of functions
+rather than with the functions themselves the argument takes on a metamathematical aspect that is absent from
+Cantor's work. The fact that the values
+of a number-theoretic function may be
+made to depend on the solvability of a
+certain mathematical problem
+establishes a connection between the second
+part of the paper and the first, and
+Hilbert invokes his previously expressed
+conviction that every well-posed mathematical problem is solvable. If the definition of a function involves the solvability
+of a mathematical problem, it will contain an unbounded existential quantifier,
+or, in Hilbert's system, the a-function.
+Convinced of the possibility of justifying
+the transfinite part of mathematies by
+metamathematical means, Hilbert states
+as Lemma I that such definitions of funetions can be replaced by recursive definitions, in which, except for a string of
+prenex universal quantifiers, no quantifier occurs. (In 1927 Hilbert claims that
+his proof does not require Lemma I; see
+below, p. 476.)
+Once all the methods of defining number-theoretic functions have been reduced
+to (substitution and) recursion, Hilbert
+considers two basic schemas of recursion,
+ordinary and transfinite (in which the
+individual variables range, respectively,
+over the natural numbers and the ordinals of the second number class). He extends these schemas by allowing the use
+of functionals, that is, of functions from
+previously introduced functionals to
+natural numbers, the initial functionals
+being the number-theoretic functions. He
+presents Ackermann's function in order
+to show that the introduction of functionals leads to a genuine extension of the
+recursion schema.
+Hilbert then proceeds to show that,
+since recursion equations defining funetions contain "variable-types" of increasing height, these equations parallel
+the definitions of the ordinals of the second number class. The argument is far
+from being a proof. Among several unproved statements, it contains in particular, as Lemma II, the assertion that in
+the definitions of number-theoretic functions transfinite recursion can be replaced
+by ordinary recursion.
+Hilbert's attempt aroused few comments. Paul Lévy recalls (1964, p. 89) :
+"Zermelo told me in 1928 that even in
+Germany nobody understood what Hilbert meant". After 1927 Hilbert himself
+laid the problem aside. The scale of
+"variable-types" has not been further
+investigated. The continuum hypothesis
+was proved by Gödel (1938, 1939, 1940)
+to be consistent with the customary
+axioms of set theory and by Cohen (1963,
+1963a, 1964) to be independent of these
+axioms.
+In a review of Ackerman 1928 Skolem
+(1928a; see also 1929a, pp. 18-19) stated
+again his previously expressed conviction
+(see above, footnote 9, p. 299) that, in
+view of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem,
+some problems that concern cardinal
+numbers might be undecidable in any
+formalized set theory and that the continuum problem might be one of them.
+A number of remarks on Hilbert's attempted proof were made by Luzin (1928,
+1933, 1935). In his review of Gödel's
+second paper on the consistency of the
+continuum hypothesis (1939), Bernays
+wrote (1940, p. 118): "The whole Gödel
+reasoning may also be considered as a
+way of modifying the Hilbert project for
+a proof of the Cantor continuum hypothesis, as described in 10813 [Hilbert
+1925], so as to make it practicable and
+at the same time generalizable to higher
+powers". About the relation of Gödel's
+work on the continuum problem to Hilbert's 1925 paper, Professor Gödel wrote,
+in a letter to the editor dated 8 July
+
+369
+1965: "There is a remote analogy be- tency proof was obtained. Of course there
+tween Hilbert's Lemma II
+and my is no need in this approach for anything
+Theorem 12.2 (1940, p. 54) for a = O. like Hilbert's Lemma I. Hilbert probably
+There is, however, this great difference hoped to prove it as a special case of a
+that Hilbert considers only strictly congeneral theorem to the effect that transstructive definitions
+and,
+moreover,
+finite modes of inference applied to a
+transfinite iterations of the defining
+constructively correct system of axioms
+operations only up to constructive ordilead to no inconsistency."
+nals, while I admit, not only quantifiers
+Hilbert's paper gave an impulse to the
+in the definitions, but also iterations of
+study of the hierarchy of numberthe defining operations up to any ordinal
+theoretic functions and to that of the
+number, no matter whether or how it can
+various schemas for the recursive definibe defined. The term 'constructible set'
+tions of functions. In particular, Hilin my proof, is justified only in a very
+bert's work provides an approach to the
+weak sense and, in particular, only in the problem of associating ordinals with
+sense of 'relative to ordinal numbers'
+number-theoretic functions defined by
+where the latter are subject to no condirecursions (see Kleene 1958 and Péter
+tions of constructivity. It was exactly by
+195la, 1953).
+viewing the situation from this highly
+The translation is by Stefan Bauertransfinite, set-theoretic point of view
+Mengelberg, and it is reproduced here
+that in my approach the difficulties were
+with the kind permission of Springer
+overcome and a relative finitary consis-
+Verlag.
+Weierstrass, through a critique elaborated with the sagacity of a master, created a
+firm foundation for mathematical analysis. By clarifying, among other notions, those
+of minimum, function, and derivative, he removed the remaining flaws from the
+calculus, cleansed it of all vague ideas concerning the infinitesimal, and conclusively
+overcame the difficulties that until then had their roots in the notion of infinitesimal.
+If today there is complete agreement and certitude in analysis whenever modes
+of inference are employed that rest upon the notions of irrational number and
+of limit in general, and if there is unanimity on all results concerning the most
+complicated questions in the theory of differential and integral equations, despite
+the boldest use of the most diverse combinations of superposition, juxtaposition, and nesting of limits, this is essentially due to the scientific activity of
+Weierstrass.
+Nevertheless, the discussions about the foundations of analysis did not come to an
+end when Weierstrass provided a foundation for the infinitesimal calculus.
+The reason for this is that the significance of the infinite for mathematics had not
+yet been completely clarified. To be sure, the infinitely small and the infinitely large
+were eliminated from analysis, as established by Weierstrass, through a reduction of
+the propositions about them to [propositions about] relations between finite magnitudes. But the infinite still appears in the infinite number sequences that define the
+real numbers, and, further, in the notion of the real number system, which we conceive
+to be an actually given totality, complete and closed
+The forms of logical inference in which this conception finds its expression—
+namely, those that we employ when, for example, we deal with all real numbers
+having a certain property or assert that there exist real numbers having a certain
+
+370
+property—are called upon quite without restriction and are used again and again by
+Weierstrass precisely when he is establishing the foundations of analysis.
+Thus the infinite, in a disguised form, was able to worm its way back into Weierstrass' theory and escape the sharp edge of his critique; therefore it is the problem of
+the infinite in the sense just indicated that still needs to be conclusively resolved. And
+just as the infinite, in the sense of the infinitely small and the infinitely large, could,
+in the case of the limiting processes of the infinitesimal calculus, be shown to be a
+mere way of speaking, so we must recognize that the infinite in the sense of the infinite
+totality (wherever we still come upon it in the modes of inference) is something merely
+apparent. And just as operations with the infinitely small were replaced by processes
+in the finite that have quite the same results and lead to quite the same elegant
+formal relations, so the modes of inference employing the infinite must be replaced
+generally by finite processes that have precisely the same results, that is, that permit
+us to carry out proofs along the same lines and to use the same methods of obtaining
+formulas and theorems.
+That, then, is the purpose of my theory. Its aim is to endow mathematical method
+with the definitive reliability that the critical era of the infinitesimal calculus did not
+achieve; thus it shall bring to completion what Weierstrass, in providing a foundation
+for analysis, endeavored to do and toward which he took the first necessary and
+essential step.
+But in clarifying the notion of the infinite we must still take into consideration a
+more general aspect of the question. If we pay close attention, we find that the literature of mathematics is replete with absurdities and inanities, which can usually be
+blamed on the infinite. So, for example, some stress the stipulation, as a kind of
+restrictive condition, that, if mathematics is to be rigorous, only a finite number of
+inferences is admissible in a proof-as if anyone had ever succeeded in carrying out
+an infinite number of them!
+Even old objections that have long been regarded as settled reappear in a new
+guise. So in recent times we come upon statements like this: even if we could introduce a notion safely (that is, without generating contradictions) and if this were
+demonstrated, we would still not have established that we are justified in introducing
+the notion. Is this not precisely the same objection as the one formerly made against
+complex numbers, when it was said that one could not, to be sure, obtain a contradiction by means of them, but their introduction was nevertheless not justified, for,
+after all, imaginary magnitudes do not exist? No, if justifying a procedure means
+anything more than proving its consistency, it can only mean determining whether
+the procedure is successful in fulfilling its purpose. Indeed, success is necessary; here,
+too, it is the highest tribunal, to which everyone submits.
+Another author seems to see contradictions, like ghosts, even when nothing has
+been asserted by anyone at all, namely, in the concrete world of perception [Sinnenwelt] itself, whose "consistent functioning" is regarded as a special assumption. I,
+for one, have always believed that only assertions and, insofar as they lead to assertions by means of inferences, assumptions could contradict each other, and the view
+that facts and events themselves could come to do so seems to me the perfect example
+of an inanity.
+By these remarks I wanted to show only that the definitive clarification of the
+
+371
+nature of the infinite has become necessary, not merely for the special interests of the
+individual sciences, but rather for the honor of the human understanding itself.
+The infinite has always stirred the emotions of mankind more deeply than any other
+question; the infinite has stimulated and fertilized reason as few other ideas have;
+but also the infinite, more than any other notion, is in need of clarification.
+If we now turn to this task, to the clarification of the nature of the infinite, we
+must ever so briefly call to mind the contentual significance that attaches to the
+infinite in reality; first we see what we can learn about this from physics.
+The initial, naive impression that we have of natural events and of matter is one
+of uniformity, of continuity. If we have a piece of metal or a volume of liquid, the
+idea impresses itself upon us that it is divisible without limit, that any part of it,
+however small, would again have the same properties. But, wherever the methods of
+research in the physics of matter were refined sufficiently, limits to divisibility were
+reached that are not due to the inadequacy of our experiments but to the nature of
+the subject matter, so that we could in fact view the trend of modern science as an
+emancipation from the infinitely small and, instead of the old maxim "natura non
+facit saltus", now assert the opposite, "nature makes leaps"
+As is well known, all matter is composed of small building blocks, atoms, which,
+when combined and connected, yield the entire multiplicity of macroscopic substances.
+But physics did not stop at the atomic theory of matter. Toward the end of the last
+century the atomic theory of electricity, which at first seemed much stranger, took
+its place beside that theory. Whereas until that time electricity had been considered
+a fluid and had been the very model of an agent with a continuous effect, it too now
+proved to be made up of particles, namely, positive and negative electrons.
+Besides matter and electricity there is in physics still something else that is real,
+for which the law of conservation also holds, namely, energy. Now not even energy,
+as we know today, permits of infinite division in an absolute and unrestricted way;
+Planck discovered that energy comes in quanta.
+And the net result is, certainly, that we do not find anywhere in reality a homogeneous continuum that permits of continued division and hence would realize the
+infinite in the small. The infinite divisibility of a continuum is an operation that is
+present only in our thoughts; it is merely an idea, which is refuted by our observations
+of nature and by the experience gained in physics and chemistry.
+We find the second place at which the question of infinity confronts us in nature
+when we consider the universe as a whole. Here we must investigate the vast expanse
+of the universe to see whether there is something infinitely large in it.
+For a long time the opinion that the world is infinite was dominant; until the time
+of Kant and even afterward no one had entertained any doubt whatsoever about the
+infinitude of space.
+Here again it is modern science, especially astronomy, that raises this question
+anew and seeks to decide it, not by the inadequate means of metaphysical speculation,
+but through reasons that are supported by experience and rest upon the application
+of the laws of nature. And weighty objections against infinity have appeared. Euclidean geometry necessarily leads to the assumption that space is infinite. Now, to be
+sure, Euclidean geometry, as a structure and a system of notions, is consistent in
+
+372
+HILBERI
+itself, but this does not imply that it applies to reality. Whether that is the case,
+only observation and experience can decide. In the attempt to prove the infinitude
+of space in a speculative way, moreover, obvious errors were committed. From the
+fact that outside of a region of space there always is still more space it follows only
+that space is unbounded but by no means that it is infinite. Unboundedness and finitude, however, do not exclude each other. In the geometry usually referred to as
+elliptic, mathematical research furnishes the natural model of a finite world. And the
+abandonment of Euclidean geometry is today no longer merely a purely mathematical
+or philosophical speculation; rather, we have come to abandon it also on account of
+other considerations, which originally had nothing at all to do with the question of
+the finitude of the world. Einstein showed that it was necessary to relinquish Euclidean geometry. On the basis of his theory of gravitation he attacks the cosmological
+questions and shows that a finite world is possible, and all the results discovered by
+astronomers are compatible also with the assumption of an elliptic world.
+We have now ascertained in two directions, toward the infinitely small and toward
+the infinitely large, that reality is finite. Yet it could very well be the case that the
+infinite has a well-justified place in our thinking and plays the role of an indispensable
+notion. We shall examine what the situation in the science of mathematics is in this
+respect, and we shall first consult the purest and most naive child of the human
+intellect, the theory of numbers. Let us here select any formula from the rich multitude
+of elementary formulas, for example,
+12+22+32+...+22 =En(n + 1)(2n + 1).
+Since in it we may substitute any integer for n, for example, n = 2 or n = 5, this
+formula contains infinitely many propositions, and this is obviously what is essential
+about it; that is why it constitutes the solution of an arithmetic problem and why its
+proof requires a genuine act of thought, whereas each of the specific numerical
+equations
+12 + 22 = 8.2.3.5
+and
+12+22+32 + 42+52=8.5.6.11
+can be verified by computation and hence is of no essential interest when considered
+by itself.
+We come upon quite another, wholly different interpretation, or fundamental
+characterization, of the notion of infinity when we consider the method—so extremely
+important and fertile-of ideal elements. The method of ideal elements has an application already in the elementary geometry of the plane. There the points and straight
+lines of the plane are initially the only real, actually existing objects. The axiom of
+connection, among others, holds for them: for any two points there is always one and
+only one straight line that goes through them. From this it follows that two straight
+lines intersect each other in one point at most. The proposition that any two straight
+lines intersect each other in some point, however, does not hold; rather, the two lines
+can be parallel. But, as is well known, the introduction of ideal elements, namely,
+points at infinity and a line at infinity, renders the proposition according to which two
+straight lines always intersect each other in one and only one point universally valid.
+The ideal elements "at infinity" have the advantage of making the system of the
+
+373
+laws of connection as simple and perspicuous as is at all possible. As is well known,
+the symmetry between point and straight line then yields the duality principle of
+geometry, which is so fecund
+The ordinary complex magnitudes of algebra likewise are an instance of the use of
+ideal elements; they serve to simplify the theorems on the existence and number of
+the roots of an equation.
+Just as in geometry infinitely many straight lines, namely, those that are parallel to
+one another, are used to define an ideal point, so in higher arithmetic certain systems
+of infinitely many numbers are combined into a number ideal, and indeed probably no
+use of the principle of ideal elements is a greater stroke of genius than this. When this
+procedure has been carried out generally within an algebraic field, we find in it again
+the simple and well-known laws of divisibility, just as they hold for the ordinary
+integers 1, 2, 3, 4, .... Here we have already entered the domain of higher arithmetic.
+Now we come to analysis, the structure that in mathematical science is the most
+elaborate and has branched out more delicately than any other. You know what a
+dominant role the infinite plays there, how in a sense mathematical analysis is but a
+single symphony of the infinite.
+The mighty advances made in the infinitesimal calculus rest for the most part
+upon operations with mathematical systems of infinitely many elements. Since, now,
+it was extremely tempting to identify the infinite with the "very large"
+, there soon
+arose inconsistencies, the paradoxes of the infinitesimal calculus, as they are called,
+which in part were already known to the Sophists in antiquity. A fundamental
+advance was made when it was recognized that many propositions valid for the
+finite-for example, that the part is smaller than the whole, that a minimum or a
+maximum exists, that the order of terms or factors can be changed-may not be
+directly carried over to the infinite. At the beginning of my lecture I mentioned the
+fact that, chiefly through the sagacity of Weierstrass, these questions have been
+completely clarified, and today analysis has within its domain become an infallible
+guide and at the same time a practical instrument for the use of the infinite.
+But analysis alone does not yet give us the deepest insight into the nature of the
+infinite. Rather, this is conveyed to us only by a discipline that is closer to the general
+philosophical way of thinking and was destined to place the entire complex of questions concerning the infinite in a new light. This discipline is set theory, whose
+creator was Georg Cantor. Here, however, we are concerned only with what was truly
+unique and original in Cantor's theory and constituted its real core, namely, his
+theory of transfinite numbers. This appears to me to be the most admirable flower of
+the mathematical intellect and in general one of the highest achievements of purely
+rational human activity. Now what is it all about?
+If we wanted to characterize briefly the new conception of the infinite that Cantor
+introduced, we could no doubt say: in analysis we deal with the infinitely small or the
+infinitely large only as a limit notion—as something that is becoming, coming to be,
+being produced —that is, as we say, with the potential infinite. But this is not the real
+infinite itself. That we have when, for example, we consider the totality of the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4,... itself as a completed entity, or when we regard the points of a line
+segment as a totality of objects that is actually given and complete. This kind of
+infinite is called the actual infinite.
+
+374
+Frege and Dedekind, two mathematicians who did highly meritorious work in the
+foundations of mathematics, already used—independently of each other—the actual
+infinite. Their specific aim was to make pure logic provide for arithmetic a foundation
+that would be independent of all intuition and experience as well as to derive arithmetic by means of logic alone. Dedekind even went so far as to refuse to draw upon
+intuition for the notion of finite number; instead, he strove to derive it by purely
+logical means, making essential use of the notion of infinite sets. It was Cantor, however, who systematically developed the notion of the actual infinite. If we look at the
+two examples of the infinite that we have mentioned, (1) 1, 2, 3, 4,... and (2) the
+points of the line segment from O to 1, or, what is the same, the totality of real
+numbers between 0 and 1, then the idea that suggests itself most readily is to consider them purely from the point of view of cardinality, and when we do this we
+observe surprising facts that are familiar to every mathematician today. For, if we
+consider the set of all rational numbers, hence of all fractions b, 3, 3, 4,..., ,..., it
+turns out that, purely from the point of view of cardinality, this set is not larger than
+the set of integers; we say that the rational numbers can be denumerated in the
+ordinary way, or that they are denumerable. And the same still holds of the set of all
+numbers that can be obtained [from the rational numbers] by root extraction, and
+indeed of the set of all algebraic numbers. In our second example we have a similar
+situation: unexpectedly, the set of all points in a square or a cube is, purely from the
+point of view of cardinality, not larger than the set of points on the line segment
+from 0 to 1; indeed, the same still holds even of the set of all continuous functions.
+Someone who first learns of this might come to think that purely from the point of
+view of cardinality there is but a single infinite. No, the sets in our two examples, (1)
+and (2), are not "equivalent", as we say. Rather, the set in (2) cannot be denumerated; it is larger than the set in (1). Here Cantor's ideas take their distinctive turn.
+The points of the line segment cannot be denumerated in the ordinary way by means
+of 1, 2, 3,...! But, if we admit the actual infinite, we are not at all limited to this
+ordinary kind of denumeration or in any way compelled to leave off there. Rather,
+when we have counted 1, 2, 3,..., we can view the objects thus denumerated as an
+infinite set that has been completed in this definite order; if we denote the type of
+this ordering, as Cantor does, by w, then the denumeration continues in a natural way
+with w + 1, w + 2,... to w t w, or w. 2, and then again ∞ 2 + 1, ∞ 2 + 2,∞. 2 +
+3,..,∞.2 + w(=w.3), and further ∞• 2, ∞0-3, ∞0-4,..., ∞•∞ (= w'), w? + 1,..., so
+that we finally obtain the following table:
+1, 2, 3,...,
+wu, w + 1,00 + 2,...,
+w.2,∞0.2+1,w.2 + 2,...,
+w. 3, ш. 3 + 1, ш. 3 + 2,...,
+cu?, co? + 1,....
+w? + ∞, ∞? + ∞-2, we + ∞.3,....
+щ2. 2,...,
+w2.2 +w,...,
+w,...,
+wo*,....
+wо",....
+
+375
+These are Cantor's first transfinite numbers, the numbers of the second number
+class, as he calls them.' Thus we come to them simply by a transnumeration [Hin-
+überzählen]] beyond the ordinary denumerable infinite, that is, by an entirely natural
+and unambiguously determined, systematic continuation of ordinary counting as it
+takes place in the finite. Just as till now we merely counted the Ist, 2nd, 3rd, ...
+object of a set, so we now also count the wth, (w + 1)th, ..., woth object.
+Given this state of affairs, the question obviously immediately arises whether by
+means of this transfinite counting one could now actually enumerate the elements of
+sets that are not denumerable in the ordinary sense.
+Now Cantor, in following these thoughts, developed the theory of transfinite
+numbers in a most successful way and created a complete calculus for them. So,
+finally, through the gigantic collaboration of Frege, Dedekind, and Cantor the infinite
+was enthroned and enjoyed the period of its greatest triumph. In the boldest flight
+the infinite had reached a dizzy pinnacle of success.
+The reaction did not fail to set in; it took very dramatic forms. Events took quite
+the same turn as in the development of the infinitesimal calculus. In their joy over
+the new and rich results, mathematicians apparently had not examined critically
+enough whether the modes of inference employed were admissible; for, purely
+through the ways in which notions were formed and modes of inference used —ways
+that in time had become customary-contradictions appeared, sporadically at first,
+then ever more severely and ominously. They were the paradoxes of set theory, as
+they are called. In particular, a contradiction discovered by Zermelo and Russell had,
+when it became known, a downright catastrophic effect in the world of mathematics.
+Confronted with these paradoxes, Dedekind and Frege actually abandoned their
+standpoint and quit the field; for a long time Dedekind had reservations about permitting a new edition of his epoch-making booklet (1888), and Frege, too, was forced
+to recognize that the tendency of his book (1893, 1903) was mistaken, as he confesses
+in an appendix. From the most diverse quarters extremely vehement attacks were
+directed against Cantor's theory itself. The reaction was so violent that the commonest
+and most fruitful notions and the very simplest and most important modes of inference in mathematics were threatened and their use was to be prohibited. There were,
+to be sure, defenders of the old; but the defensive measures were rather feeble, and
+moreover they were not put into effect at the right place in a unified front. Too many
+remedies were recommended for the paradoxes; the methods of clarification were too
+checkered.
+Let us admit that the situation in which we presently find ourselves with respect
+to the paradoxes is in the long run intolerable. Just think: in mathematics, this
+paragon of reliability and truth, the very notions and inferences, as everyone learns,
+teaches, and uses them, lead to absurdities. And where else would reliability and truth
+be found if even mathematical thinking fails ?
+But there is a completely satisfactory way of escaping the paradoxes without
+committing treason against our science. The considerations that lead us to discover
+this way and the goals toward which we want to advance are these:
+(1) We shall carefully investigate those ways of forming notions and those modes
+1 [Unlike Cantor, Hilbert takes the number classes to be cumulative; see his definition of the
+second number class below, p. 386.]
+
+376
+of inference that are fruitful; we shall nurse them, support them, and make them
+usable, wherever there is the slightest promise of success. No one shall be able to drive
+us from the paradise that Cantor created for us.
+(2) It is necessary to make inferences everywhere as reliable as they are in ordinary
+elementary number theory, which no one questions and in which contradictions
+and paradoxes arise only through our carelessness.
+Obviously we shall be able to reach these goals only if we succeed in completely
+clarifying the nature of the infinite.
+We saw earlier that the infinite is not to be found anywhere in reality, no matter
+what experiences and observations or what kind of science we may adduce. Could it
+be, then, that thinking about objects is so unlike the events involving objects and
+that it proceeds so differently, so apart from all reality? Is it not clear, rather, that
+when we believed we had discovered that the infinite was in some sense real we were
+only allowing ourselves to be led to that belief by the circumstance that we so often
+actually encounter in reality such immeasurable dimensions in the large and in the
+small? And has the contentual logical inference ever deceived and abandoned us
+anywhere when we applied it to real objects or events? No, contentual logical inference is indispensable. It has deceived us only when we accepted arbitrary abstract
+notions, in particular those under which infinitely many objects are subsumed. What
+we did, then, was merely to use contentual inference in an illegitimate way; that is,
+we obviously did not respect necessary conditions for the use of contentual logical
+inference. And in recognizing that such conditions exist and must be respected we
+find ourselves in agreement with the philosophers, especially with Kant. Kant already
+taught-and indeed it is part and parcel of his doctrine-that mathematics has at its
+disposal a content secured independently of all logic and hence can never be provided
+with a foundation by means of logic alone; that is why the efforts of Frege and
+Dedekind were bound to fail. Rather, as a condition for the use of logical inferences
+and the performance of logical operations, something must already be given to our
+faculty of representation [in der Vorstellung], certain extralogical concrete objects
+that are intuitively [anschaulich] present as immediate experience prior to all
+thought. If logical inference is to be reliable, it must be possible to survey these
+objects completely in all their parts, and the fact that they occur, that they differ
+from one another, and that they follow each other, or are concatenated, is immediately
+given intuitively, together with the objects, as something that neither can be reduced
+to anything else nor requires reduction. This is the basic philosophical position that
+I consider requisite for mathematics and, in general, for all scientific thinking, understanding, and communication. And in mathematics, in particular, what we consider
+is the concrete signs themselves, whose shape, according to the conception we have
+adopted, is immediately clear and recognizable.
+Let us call to mind the nature and methods of ordinary finitary number theory.
+It can certainly be developed through the construction of numbers by means solely
+of intuitive contentual considerations. But the science of mathematics is by no means
+exhausted by numerical equations and it cannot be reduced to these alone. One can
+claim, however, that it is an apparatus that must always yield correct numerical
+equations when applied to integers. But then we are obliged to investigate the structure of the apparatus sufficiently to make this fact apparent. And the only tool at our
+
+377
+disposal in this investigation is the same as that used for the derivation of numerical
+equations in the construction of number theory itself, namely, a concern for concrete
+content, the finitist frame of mind. This scientific requirement can in fact be satisfied;
+that is, it is possible to obtain in a purely intuitive and finitary way, just like the
+truths of number theory, those insights that guarantee the reliability of the mathematical apparatus. Let us now consider number theory in more detail.
+In number theory we have the numerals
+1, 11, 111, 11111,
+each numeral being perceptually recognizable by the fact that in it 1 is always again
+followed by 1 [if it is followed by anything]. These numerals, which are the object
+of our consideration, have no meaning at all in themselves. In elementary number
+theory, however, we already require, besides these signs, others that mean something
+and serve to convey information, for example, the sign? 2 as an abbreviation for the
+numeral I1, or the numeral 3 as an abbreviation for the numeral I11; further we use
+the signs +, =, >, and others, which serve to communicate assertions. So 2 + 3 =
+3 + 2 serves to communicate the fact that 2 + 3 and 3 + 2, when the abbreviations
+used are taken into account, are the same numeral, namely, the numeral 11111.
+Likewise, then, 3 > 2 serves to communicate the fact that the sign 3 (that is, 111)
+extends beyond the sign 2 (that is, 11), or that the latter sign is a proper segment of
+the former.
+When communicating, we also use letters, such as a, b, c, for numerals. Accordingly,
+b > a is the communication that the numeral b extends beyond the numeral a. And
+likewise, from the present point of view, we would regard a + D = 5 + a merely as
+the communication of the fact that the numeral a + b is the same as b + a. Here,
+too, the contentual correctness of this communication can be proved by contentual
+inference, and we can go very far with this intuitive, contentual kind of treatment.
+I should now like to show you a first example in which we go beyond the bounds
+of this contentual way of thinking. The largest prime number known up to now
+(39 digits) is
+* = 170 141 183 460 469 231 731 687 303 715 884 105 727.
+By means of Euclid's well-known procedure we can, completely within the framework
+of the attitude we have adopted, prove the theorem that between * + 1 and p! + 1
+there certainly exists a new prime number. This proposition itself, moreover, is
+completely in conformity with our finitist attitude. For "there exists" here serves
+merely to abbreviate the proposition:
+Certainly* + 1 or * + 2 or * + 3 or ... or p! + 1 is a prime number.
+But let us go on. Obviously, to say
+There exists a prime number that (1) is >* and (2) is at the same time ≤p! + 1
+2 [In the present paragraph and the next, "Zeichen" is uniformly translated as "sign' and
+"Zahlzeichen" as "numeral", although Hilbert on occasion uses the former as a short form for
+the latter; the Zahlzeichen are, of course, included among the Zeichen. Furthermore, when Hilbert
+uses "Abkürzung", here rendered as "abbreviation", he wavers between two meanings: pure
+abbreviation of a symbol and name of that symbol.]
+
+378
+would amount to the same thing, and this leads us to formulate a proposition that
+expresses only a part of Euclid's assertion, namely: there exists a prime number that
+is >p. So far as content is concerned, this is a much weaker assertion, stating only a
+part of Euclid's proposition; nevertheless, no matter how harmless the transition
+appears to be, there is a leap into the transfinite when this partial proposition, taken
+out of the context above, is stated as an independent assertion.
+How can that be? We have here an existential proposition with "'there exists". To
+be sure, we already had one in Euclid's theorem. But the latter, with its "there
+exists", was, as I have already said, merely another, shorter expression for
+"" + 1 or p + 2 or p + 3 or ... or p! + 1 is a prime number",
+just as, instead of saying: This piece of chalk is red or that piece of chalk is red or...
+or the piece of chalk over there is red, I say more briefly: Among these pieces of chalk
+there exists a red one. An assertion of this kind, that in a finite totality "there
+exists" an object having a certain property, is completely in conformity with our
+finitist attitude. On the other hand, the expression
+"* + 1 or * + 2 or p + 3 or ... ad infinitum is a prime number"
+is, as it were, an infinite logical product,3 and such a passage to the infinite is no more
+permitted without special investigation and perhaps certain precautionary measures
+than the passage from a finite to an infinite product in analysis, and initially it has no
+meaning at all.
+In general, from the finitist point of view an existential proposition of the form
+"There exists a number having this or that property" has meaning only as a partial
+proposition, that is, as part of a proposition that is more precisely determined but
+whose exact content is unessential for many applications.
+Thus we here encounter the transfinite when from an existential proposition we
+extract a partial proposition that cannot be regarded as a disjunction.* In like manner
+we come upon a transfinite proposition when we negate a universal assertion, that is,
+one that extends to arbitrary numerals. So, for example, the proposition that, if a is
+a numeral, we must always have
+atl=1t a
+is from the finitist point of view incapable of being negated. This will become clear for
+us if we reflect upon the fact that [from this point of view] the proposition cannot be
+interpreted as a combination, formed by means of "and", of infinitely many numerical
+equations, but only as a hypothetical judgment that comes to assert something when
+a numeral is given.
+From this it follows, in particular, that in the spirit of the finitist attitude we
+3 [It is rather a logical sum, or disjunction. In the version published in Grundlagen der Geometrie
+(1930a) "logisches Produkt" is replaced by "Oder-Verknüpfung" ]
+* [The German text says: "Wir stoßen also hier auf das Transfinite durch Zerlegung einer
+existentialen Aussage, die sich nicht als eine Oder-Verknüpfung deuten läßt". In the version
+published in Grundlagen der Geometrie (1930a) this sentence has been amended thus: "Wir stoßen
+also hier auf das Transfinite durch Zerlegung einer existentialen Aussage in Teile, deren keiner
+sich als eine Oder-Verknüpfung deuten läßt". The English translation that we propose seems to
+be closer to what Hilbert's train of thought requires than either of these two German sentences.]]
+
+379
+cannot make use of the alternative according to which an equation like the one above,
+in which an unspecified numeral occurs, is either satisfied by every numeral or refuted
+by a counterexample. For, being an application of the principle of excluded middle,
+this alternative essentially rests upon the assumption that the assertion of the validity
+of that equation is capable of being negated.
+At all events we observe the following. In the domain of finitary propositions, in
+which we should, after all, remain, the logical relations that prevail are very imperspicuous, and this lack of perspicuity mounts unbearably if "all" and "there exists"
+occur combined or appear in nested propositions. In any case, those logical laws that
+man has always used since he began to think, the very ones that Aristotle taught, do
+not hold. Now one could attempt to determine the logical laws that are valid for the
+domain of finitary propositions; but this would not help us, since we just do not
+want to renounce the use of the simple laws of Aristotelian logic, and no one, though
+he speak with the tongues of angels, will keep people from negating arbitrary assertions, forming partial judgments, or using the principle of excluded middle. What,
+then, shall we do?
+Let us remember that we are mathematicians and as such have already often found
+ourselves in a similar predicament, and let us recall how the method of ideal elements,
+that creation of genius, then allowed us to find an escape. I presented some shining
+examples of the use of this method at the beginning of my lecture. Just as i = V-1
+was introduced so that the laws of algebra, those, for example, concerning the existence and number of the roots of an equation, could be preserved in their simplest
+form, just as ideal factors were introduced so that the simple laws of divisibility
+could be maintained even for algebraic integers (for example, we introduce an ideal
+common divisor for the numbers 2 and 1 + V-5, while an actual one does not exist),
+so we must here adjoin the ideal propositions to the finitary ones in order to maintain
+the formally simple rules of ordinary Aristotelian logic. And it is strange that the
+modes of inference that Kronecker attacked so passionately are the exact counterpart
+of what, when it came to number theory, the same Kronecker admired so enthusiastically in Kummer's work and praised as the highest mathematical achievement.
+How, then, do we come to the ideal propositions? It is a remarkable circumstance,
+and certainly a propitious and favorable one, that to enter the path that leads to
+them we need only continue in a natural and consistent way the development that
+the theory of the foundations of mathematics has already taken. Indeed, let us
+acknowledge that elementary mathematics already goes beyond the point of view of
+intuitive number theory. For the method of algebraic calculation with letters is not
+within the resources of contentual, intuitive number theory as we have hitherto
+conceived of it. This theory always uses formulas for communication only; letters
+stand for numerals, and the fact that two signs are identical is communicated by
+an equation. In algebra, on the other hand, we consider the expressions formed with
+letters to be independent objects in themselves, and the contentual propositions of
+number theory are formalized by means of them. Where we had propositions concerning numerals, we now have formulas, which themselves are concrete objects that
+in their turn are considered by our perceptual intuition, and the derivation of one
+formula from another in accordance with certain rules takes the place of the numbertheoretic proof based on content.
+
+380
+Hence, as soon as we consider algebra, there is an increase in the number of finitary
+objects. Up to now these were only the numerals, such as 1, I1, ..., HIll. They
+alone had been the objects of our contentual consideration. But in algebra mathematical practice already goes beyond that. Yes, even when a proposition, so long as
+it is combined with some indication as to its contentual interpretation, is still admissible from our finitist point of view, as, for example, the proposition that always
+a +b=b + a,
+where a and b stand for specific numerals, we yet do not select this form of communication but rather take the formula
+a+b=b ta.
+This is no longer an immediate communication of something contentual at all, but a
+certain formal object, which is related to the original finitary propositions
+2+3 = 3+2
+and
+5+7=7 + 5
+by the fact that, if we substitute numerals, 2, 3, 5, and 7, for a and b in that formula
+(that is, if we employ a proof procedure, albeit a very simple one), we obtain these
+finitary particular propositions. Thus we arrive at the conception that a, b, =, and
++, as well as the entire formula
+a +b=b + a,
+do not mean anything in themselves, any more than numerals do. But from that
+formula we can indeed derive others; to these we ascribe a meaning, by treating them
+as communications of finitary propositions. If we generalize this conception, mathematics becomes an inventory of formulas—first, formulas to which contentual communications of finitary propositions [hence, in the main, numerical equations and
+inequalities] correspond and, second, further formulas that mean nothing in themselves and are the ideal objects of our theory.
+Now, what was our goal? In mathematics, we found, first, finitary propositions
+that contain only numerals, like
+3 > 2, 2 + 3 = 3 + 2,
+2 = 3, and 1 # 1,
+which according to our finitist conception are immediately intuitive and directly
+intelligible. These are capable of being negated, and the result will be true or false;
+one can manipulate them at will, without any qualms, in all the ways that Aristotelian
+logic allows. The law of contradiction holds; that is, it is impossible for any one of
+these propositions and its negation to be simultaneously true. The principle of
+"excluded middle" holds; that is, of the two, a proposition and its negation, one is
+true. To say that a proposition is false is equivalent to saying that its negation is true.
+Besides these elementary propositions, which are of an entirely unproblematic
+character, we encountered finitary propositions of problematic character, for example,
+those that were not decomposable [into partial propositions]. Now, finally, we have
+introduced the ideal propositions to ensure that the customary laws of logic again
+
+381
+hold one and all. But since the ideal propositions, namely, the formulas, insofar as
+they do not express finitary assertions, do not mean anything in themselves, the logical
+operations cannot be applied to them in a contentual way, as they are to the finitary
+propositions. Hence it is necessary to formalize the logical operations and also the
+mathematical proofs themselves; this requires a transcription of the logical relations
+into formulas, so that to the mathematical signs we must still adjoin some logical
+signs, say
+&, V, →,
+-,
+and or implies not
+and use, besides the mathematical variables, a, b, c, ..., also logical variables, namely,
+variable propositions A, B, C, ....
+How can this be done? It is our good fortune to find the same preestablished harmony here that we observe so often in the history of science, a harmony that benefited
+Einstein when he found the general calculus of invariants fully developed for his
+theory of gravitation; we discover that considerable spadework has already been
+done: the logical calculus has been developed. To be sure, it was originally created in
+an entirely different context, and, accordingly, its signs were initially introduced for
+purposes of communication only; but we will be consistent in our course if we now
+divest the logical signs, too, of all meaning, just as we did the mathematical ones, and
+declare that the formulas of the logical calculus do not mean anything in themselves
+either, but are ideal propositions. In the logical calculus we possess a sign language
+that is capable of representing mathematical propositions in formulas and of expressing logical inference through formal processes. In a way that exactly corresponds to
+the transition from contentual number theory to formal algebra we regard the signs
+and operation symbols of the logical calculus as detached from their contentual
+meaning. In this way we now finally obtain, in place of the contentual mathematical
+science that is communicated by means of ordinary language, an inventory of formulas that are formed from mathematical and logical signs and follow each other according to definite rules. Certain of these formulas correspond to the mathematical
+axioms, and to contentual inference there correspond the rules according to which
+the formulas follow each other; hence contentual inference is replaced by manipulation of signs [äußeres Handeln] according to rules, and in this way the full transition
+from a naive to a formal treatment is now accomplished, on the one hand, for the
+axioms themselves, which originally were naively taken to be fundamental truths
+but in modern axiomatics had already for a long time been regarded as merely
+establishing certain interrelations between notions, and, on the other, for the logical
+calculus, which originally was to be only another language.
+Let me still explain briefly just how a mathematical proof is formalized. As I said,
+certain formulas, which serve as building blocks for the formal edifice of mathematics,
+are called axioms. A mathematical proof is an array that must be given as such to
+our perceptual intuition; it consists of inferences according to the schema
+G→2
+
+382
+where each of the premisses, that is, the formulas & and G → 2 in the array, either
+is an axiom or results from an axiom by substitution, or else coincides with the end
+formula of a previous inference or results from it by substitution. A formula is said
+to be provable if it is the end formula of a proof.
+Through our program the choice of axioms for our proof theory is already indicated.
+Although the choice of axioms is to a certain extent arbitrary, they nevertheless fall
+into a number of qualitatively distinct groups, just as in geometry; we cite a few
+examples from each.
+I. Axioms of implication:
+A → (B → A) (introduction of an assumption),
+(B → C) → { (A → B) → (A → C)} (elimination of a proposition).
+II. Axioms of negation :
+{A → (B & B)} → A (principle of contradiction),
+À → A (principle of double negation).
+[From the principle of contradiction the formula
+(A & A) → B
+follows, and from the principle of double negation the principle of excluded middle,
+{ (A → B) & (A → B)} → B,
+follows.] These axioms of groups I and II are nothing but the axioms of the propositional calculus.
+III. Transfinite axioms:
+(a) A (a) → A(b) (inference from the universal to the particular, Aristotle's dictum),
+(a) A(a) → (Ea)A (a) (if a predicate does not hold of all individuals, then there exists
+a counterexample),
+(Ea) A(a) → (a)A(a) (if there is no individual for which a proposition holds, then the
+proposition is false for all a).
+Here, moreover, we come upon a very remarkable circumstance, namely, that all
+of these transfinite axioms are derivable from a single axiom, one that also contains
+the core of one of the most attacked axioms in the literature of mathematics, namely,
+the axiom of choice:
+A (a) → A(E(A)),
+where & is the transfinite logical choice function.
+In addition there are the specifically mathematical axioms.
+IV. Axioms of equality:
+a = a,
+a = b → (A(a) → A(b)),
+and finally
+5 [The full system of axioms is given below, Pp. 465-469.1
+
+383
+V. Axioms of number:
+at1#0
+and
+[{A(0) & (x)(A(x) → A (x'))} → A (a),]
+the axiom of mathematical induction.
+In this way we are able to develop our proof theory and to construct the system
+of provable formulas, that is, the science of mathematics.
+But in our joy over the fact that we have, in general, been so successful and that,
+in particular, we found ready-made that indispensable tool, the logical calculus, we
+must nevertheless not forget the essential prerequisite of our procedure. For there is
+a condition, a single but absolutely necessary one, to which the use of the method of
+ideal elements is subject, and that is the proof of consistency; for, extension by the
+addition of ideals is legitimate only if no contradiction is thereby brought about in
+the old, narrower domain, that is, if the relations that result for the old objects
+whenever the ideal objects are eliminated are valid in the old domain.
+In the present situation, however, this problem of consistency is perfectly amenable to treatment. As we can immediately recognize, it reduces to the question of
+seeing that "1 # 1" cannot be obtained as an end formula from our axioms by the
+rules in force, hence that "1 ‡ 1" is not a provable formula. And this is a task that
+fundamentally lies within the province of intuition just as much as does in contentual
+number theory the task, say, of proving the irrationality of V2, that is, of proving
+that it is impossible to find two numerals a and b satisfying the relation a? = 262, a
+problem in which it must be shown that it is impossible to exhibit two numerals
+having a certain property. Correspondingly, the point for us is to show that it is
+impossible to exhibit a proof of a certain kind. But a formalized proof, like a numeral,
+is a concrete and surveyable object. It can be communicated from beginning to end.
+That the end formula has the required structure, namely "1 # 1", is also a property
+of the proof that can be concretely ascertained. The demonstration [that "1 ‡ 1" is
+not a provable formula] can in fact be given, and this provides us with a justification
+for the introduction of our ideal propositions.
+At the same time we experience the pleasant surprise that this gives us the solution
+also of a problem that became urgent long ago, namely, that of proving the consistency
+of the arithmetic axioms.® For the problem of proving consistency arises wherever the
+axiomatic method is used. After all, in selecting, interpreting, and manipulating the
+axioms and rules we do not want to have to rely on good faith and pure confidence
+alone. In geometry and the physical theories the consistency proof is successfully
+carried out by means of a reduction to the consistency of the arithmetic axioms.
+This method obviously fails in the case of arithmetic itself. By making this important
+final step possible through the method of ideal elements, our proof theory forms the
+necessary keystone in the edifice of axiomatic theory. And what we have experienced
+twice, first with the paradoxes of the infinitesimal calculus and then with the paradoxes of set theory, cannot happen a third time and will never happen again.
+But our proof theory as it is sketched here is not only able to secure the foundations
+" [In his various papers on the foundations of mathematics Hilbert means by "arithmetic
+axioms" at times axioms for the real number system, at times axioms for number theory.]
+
+384
+of the science of mathematics; I believe, rather, that it also opens up a path that,
+if we follow it, will enable us to deal for the first time with general problems of a
+fundamental character that fall within the domain of mathematics but formerly
+could not even be approached.
+Mathematics in a certain sense develops into a tribunal of arbitration, a supreme
+court that will decide questions of principle-and on such a concrete basis that
+universal agreement must be attainable and all assertions can be verified.
+Even the assertions of the recent doctrine called "intuitionism", modest though
+they may be, can in my opinion obtain their certificate of justification only from this
+tribunal.
+As an example of the way in which fundamental questions can be treated I would
+like to choose the thesis that every mathematical problem can be solved. We are all
+convinced of that. After all, one of the things that attract us most when we apply
+ourselves to a mathematical problem is precisely that within us we always hear the
+call: here is the problem, search for the solution; you can find it by pure thought,
+for in mathematics there is no ignorabimus. Now, to be sure, my proof theory cannot
+specify a general method for solving every mathematical problem; that does not
+exist. But the demonstration that the assumption of the solvability of every mathematical problem is consistent falls entirely within the scope of our theory.
+I would still like to play a last trump. The final test of every new theory is its success in answering preexistent questions that the theory was not specifically created to
+answer. By their fruits ye shall know them-that applies also to theories. As soon
+as Cantor had discovered his first transfinite numbers, the numbers of the second
+number class as they are called, the question arose, as I have already mentioned,
+whether by means of this transfinite counting one could actually enumerate the
+elements of sets known in other contexts but not denumerable in the ordinary sense.
+The line segment was the first and foremost set of this kind to come under consideration. This question, whether the points of the line segment, that is, the real numbers,
+can be enumerated by means of the numbers of the table constructed above, is the
+famous problem of the continuum, which was formulated but not solved by Cantor.
+Some mathematicians believed that they could dispose of this problem by denying
+its existence. The considerations that follow show how mistaken this attitude is. The
+problem of the continuum is distinguished by its originality and inner beauty; in
+addition it is characterized by two features that raise it above other famous problems:
+its solution requires new ways, since the old methods fail in its case, and, besides, this
+solution is in itself of the greatest interest on account of the result to be determined.
+The solution of the continuum problem can be carried out by means of the theory
+I have developed, and indeed the first and most important step toward this solution
+is precisely the demonstration that every mathematical problem can be solved. The
+answer turns out to be affirmative: the points of a line segment can be enumerated
+by means of the numbers of the second number class, that is, by mere transnumeration beyond the denumerable infinite, to express it in a popular way. I should like to
+call this assertion itself the continuum theorem and offer a brief intuitive presentation
+here of the fundamental idea of its proof.
+Instead of the set of real numbers we consider—which is evidently the same here
+—the set of number-theoretic functions, that is, of those functions of an integral
+
+385
+argument whose values are also integers. If we want to order the set of these functions
+in the way required by the problem of the continuum, we must consider how an
+individual function is generated. Now a function of one argument can be defined in
+such a way that the values of the function for some or even all values of the argument
+are made to depend upon whether certain well-defined mathematical problems have
+a solution, for example, whether certain diophantine problems are solvable, whether
+prime numbers having certain properties exist, or whether a given number, say 22
+is irrational. In order to avoid the difficulty inherent in this we make use of precisely
+the assertion mentioned above, namely, that every well-posed mathematical problem
+is solvable. This assertion is a general lemma belonging to metamathematics, as I
+would like to call the contentual theory of formalized proofs. To the part of the
+lemma that is of relevance here I now give the following precise formulation :
+LEMMA I. If a proof of a proposition contradicting the continuum theorem is given
+in a formalized version with the aid of functions defined by means of the transfinite
+symbol e (axiom group III), then in this proof these functions can always be replaced
+by functions defined, without the use of the symbol &, by means merely of ordinary
+and transfinite recursion, so that the transfinite appears only in the guise of the
+universal quantifier.
+Further, I need to make a few stipulations in order to carry out my theory.
+For variable [atomic] propositions (indeterminate formulas) we always use capital
+[italic] Latin letters, but for constant [atomic] propositions (specific formulas) capital
+Greek letters; for example,
+Z(a): "a is an ordinary integer";
+N(a): "a is a number of the second number class"
+For mathematical variables we always use lower-case [italic] Latin letters, but for
+constant mathematical objects (specific functions) lower-case Greek letters.?
+Concerning the procedure of substitution the following general conventions hold.
+For propositional variables only other indeterminate or constant propositions
+(formulas) may be substituted
+Any array may be substituted for a mathematical variable; however, when a
+mathematical variable occurs in a formula, the constant proposition that specifies of
+what kind it is, together with the implication sign, must always precede; for example,
+Z(a) → (...a...)
+and
+N(a) → (...a...).
+" [Hilbert's terms require some comments. Capital italic Latin letters, like A or B, stand for
+propositional variables (Aussagenvariablen) or predicate variables; when provided with parentheses
+and individual variables, they represent what Hilbert calls variable Aussagen (variable propositions
+in the translation) ; these "propositions" are in fact propositional functions. Capital Greek letters
+stand for predicate constants and, when provided with parentheses and individual variables,
+represent what Hilbert calls individuelle Aussagen or Individualaussagen (constant propositions in
+the translation); they are in fact propositional functions, and an example is Z(a), "a is a natural
+number". Lower-case italic Latin letters stand for what Hilbert calls mathematische Variablen
+(mathematical variables in the translation); they are individual variables ranging over the natural
+numbers, the numbers of the second number class, or the number-theoretic functions, as specified
+in each case. Lower-case Greek letters stand for individuelle mathematische Gebilde (constant
+mathematical objects in the translation); they are individual constants that stand for numbers or
+functions (spezielle Funktionen, or specific functions in the translation).
+
+386
+The effect of this convention is that only ordinary numbers or numbers of the second
+number class come into consideration after all as substituends, for example for a in
+Z(a) or N(a), respectively.
+German capital as well as lower-case letters have reference and are used only to
+convey information.
+It must still be remarked that by "array" we are to understand a perceptually
+given object composed of primitive signs.
+In order to understand the idea of the proof of the continuum theorem we must
+above all gain a precise understanding of the notion of mathematical variable in its
+most general sense. Mathematical variables are of two kinds: (1) primitive variables
+[Grundvariablen] and (2) variable-types [Variablentypen]
+(1) Now, while in all of arithmetic and analysis [the variable that ranges over] the
+ordinary integers suffices as sole primitive variable, with each of Cantor's transfinite
+number classes there is associated a primitive variable that ranges over precisely the
+ordinals of that class. Accordingly, to each primitive variable there corresponds a
+proposition that characterizes it as such; this proposition is implicitly characterized
+by the axioms, for example,
+Z(0),
+Z(a) → Z(a + 1),
+{A(0) & (a) (A(a) → Ala + 1))} → {Z(a) → A(a)}
+(formula of ordinary induction),
+N(O),
+N(a) → N(a + 1),
+(n){Z(n) → N(a(n))} → N(lim a(n)),
+and, in addition, the formula of transfinite induction for the numbers of the second
+class.
+With each kind of primitive variable there is associated one kind of recursion, by
+means of which we define functions whose argument is a primitive variable of that
+kind. The recursion associated with the number-theoretic variable is "ordinary recursion", by means of which a function of a number-theoretic variable n is defined
+when we indicate what value it has for n = O and how the value for n + 1 is obtained
+from that for n. The generalization of ordinary recursion is transfinite recursion; it
+rests upon the general principle that the value of the function for a value of the
+variable is determined by the preceding values of the function.
+(2) From the primitive variables we derive further kinds of variables by applying
+logical connectives to the propositions associated with the primitive variables, for
+example, to Z and N. The variables thus defined are called variable-types, and the
+propositions defining them type-propositions; for these, new constant signs are introduced each time. Thus the formula
+(a)[Z(a) → Z(f(a))}
+offers the simplest instance of a variable-type; for this formula defines the function
+variable f and, as type-proposition, will be denoted by $(f) ("being-a-function"). A
+further example is the formula
+(fX{Ф(f)→Z(g(f))};
+
+387
+it defines the "being-a-function-of-a-function" Y'(g), where the argument g is the
+new function-of-a-function variable.®
+To characterize the higher variable-types we must provide the type-propositions
+themselves with subscripts; a type-proposition thus provided with a subscript is
+defined by recursion, the place of equality (= ) being taken by logical equivalence (~).
+In all of arithmetic and analysis only the function variable, the function-of-a-function variable, and so on in finite iteration, are used as higher variables. A variable-type
+that goes beyond these simplest examples is offered by the variable g that assigns a
+numerical value g (In) to a sequence fn consisting of
+a function fi of an integer, $(fI),
+a function f2 of a function, Y'(f2),
+a function fa of a function-of-a-function,
+and so forth.
+The corresponding type-proposition $u(9) is represented by means of the following
+equivalences:
+80(a) ~2(a),
+Pn+I(f) ~ (6){9n(6) → Z(f16)13,
+Pu(9)~ {(n)Pn(Jn) →Z(9(J))};
+these at the same time offer an example of the definition of a type-proposition by
+means of recursion.
+The variable-types can be classified according to their "heights". Among those of
+height 0 we include all number-theoretic constants and among those of height I all
+those functions whose arguments and values have the property of a primitive variable,
+for example, the property Z or the property N. A function whose argument and value
+have certain heights possesses a height greater by 1 than the greater, or possibly than
+both, of those two heights. A sequence of functions of various heights has the limit
+of those heights as its height.
+After these preparations we return to our task and recall that, in order to prove
+the continuum theorem, it is essential to correlate those definitions of numbertheoretic functions that are free from the symbol & one-to-one with Cantor's numbers
+of the second number class, or at least to establish a correspondence between them in
+such a way that every number-theoretic function is associated with at least one
+number of the second number class.
+Clearly, the elementary means that we have at our disposal for forming functions
+are substitution (that is, replacement of an argument by a new variable or function)
+and recursion (according to the schema of the derivation of the function value for
+n + 1 from that for n).
+One might think that these two processes, substitution and recursion, would have
+to be supplemented with other elementary methods of definition, for example, definition of a function by specification of its values up to a certain argument value, beyond
+which the function is to be constant, and also definition by means of elementary
+processes obtained from arithmetic operations, such as that of the remainder in
+& ['"Function-of-a-function" is used here in the sense of "functional", not "compound
+function".]
+
+388
+division, say, or of the greatest common divisor of two numbers, or even the definition
+of a number as the least of finitely many given numbers.
+It turns out, however, that any such definition can be represented as a special case
+of the use of substitutions and recursions. The method of search for the recursions
+required is in essence equivalent to that reflection by which one recognizes that the
+procedure used for the given definition is finitary.
+Having ascertained this, we must now survey the results of the two operations of
+substitution and recursion. On account of the variety of ways in which we can pass
+from n to n + 1, however, we cannot, as it turns out, bring the recursions that are to
+be used into a standard form if we confine ourselves to operating with ordinary
+number-theoretic variables. This difficulty already becomes apparent in the following
+example.
+Let us consider the functions a + b; from them we obtain by n-fold iteration and
+equating
+In the same way we pass from a b to
+atat...+a = a.n.
+a.a.....a =a",
+and, further, from a' to
+alaa, alalaa,....
+Thus we successively obtain the functions
+a + b = qi(a, b),
+а. Б = ф2(а, b),
+а° = фз(а, b).
+Ф (a, b) is the bth term in the sequence
+a, a", alad, alaraa,....
+In a corresponding way we arrive at as (a, b), 86(a, b), and so on.
+To be sure, we could now define «n(a, b) for variable n by means of substitutions
+and recursions, but these recursions would not be ordinary, stepwise ones; rather,
+we would be led to a manifold simultaneous recursion, that is, a recursion on different
+variables at once, and a resolution of it into ordinary, stepwise recursions would be
+possible only if we make use of the notion of function variable; the function pala, a)
+is an instance of a function, of the number-theoretic variable a, that cannot be
+defined by substitutions and ordinary, step-wise recursions alone if we admit only
+number-theoretic variables.' How we can define the function on(a, b) by using the
+function variable is shown by the following formulas:
+«(J, a, 1) = a,
+(Ja, n+ 1) = fa, «(J, a, n));
+«(a, b) = a + b,
+On+I (a, 6) = 1(8n, a, b).
+• This assertion was proved by W. Ackermann [1928].
+
+389
+Here ‹ stands for a specific function of three arguments, of which the first is itself a
+function of two ordinary number-theoretic variables.
+Another example of a more complicated recursion is this :
+*o(a) = a(a),
+Фп+1(a) = ia, N, Фп(Ф(n + a))),
+where a stands for a known expression containing one argument, and f for a known
+expression containing three arguments. What is characteristic of this recursion is that
+here we cannot obtain a numerical value for n + 1 from one for n but must make
+use of the range of the function on in determining Øn+1.
+The difficulties that come to light in these examples are overcome when we make
+use of variable-types; then the general recursion schema reads as follows:
+p(g, a, 0) = a,
+p(g, a, n + 1) = g(p(g, a, n), n) ;
+here a is a given expression of arbitrary variable-type; g likewise is a given expression, having two arguments, of which the first is of the same variable-type as a and
+the second is a number; the additional condition that g must satisfy is that its value
+again be of the same variable-type as a. Finally, pis the expression to be defined by the
+recursion; it depends on three arguments and, after the substitutions for g, a, and n
+have been made, is of the same variable-type as a; in addition, other arbitrary
+parameters are permitted to occur in a and g, and consequently also in p.
+From this general schema we obtain specific recursions through substitution. Thus
+we obtain the recursions of our examples by considering, in the first example, fand a
+as parameters and by representing, in the second, the transition from n(a) to On+ 1(a)
+as a transition, mediated by the function-of-a-function g, from a function Øn to the
+function Øn+1, so that a is not regarded as a parameter at all in the recursion.
+Compared with elementary recursion, the recursion used in our two examples is
+of a wider kind, since in one case we introduce a higher parameter that is not an
+ordinary integer and in the other choose a function for a and a function-of-a-function
+for g.
+The variable-types form the link that makes possible the correspondence between
+the functions of a number-theoretic variable and the numbers of the second number
+class. Indeed, we arrive at such a correspondence between the numbers of the second
+number class and certain variable-types if we compare the two generating processes for
+the numbers of the second number class, namely, the process of adding 1 and the limit
+process for denumerable sequences, with the way in which variable-types increase in
+height. Let us establish a correspondence between the process of adding 1 and the
+taking of a function (that is, substitution of a given variable-type into a function as
+argument) and between the limit process and the aggregating of the denumerable
+sequence associated with a variable-type into a new variable-type, and let us designate
+the variable-types that in this way come to correspond to the numbers of the second
+number class specifically as Z-types. Thus, when the Z-types are formed, we use,
+besides the logical operations, only ordinary (not transfinite) recursions, that is, just
+those necessary for the denumeration of a type sequence as a preparatory step for the
+
+390
+limit process. If we order these Z-types according to their heights, we have a one-toone correspondence by means of which the variable-types of a given height are
+associated with a number of the second number class.
+But therewith we also arrive at a one-to-one correspondence between the numbers
+of the second number class and the functions defined by means of the Z-types. To
+make that clear the following considerations suffice. Whenever we begin with variable.
+types up to a given height only and then form functions solely by means of substitution and recursion, we obtain only denumerably many functions. We can even
+formalize this denumeration rigorously; in particular, we can do this by first constructing a recursion function p that subsumes all the recursions in question and,
+consequently, contains a parameter that exceeds the variable-types admitted up to
+that point. In the definition of p we apply the general recursion schema in a way that
+makes essential use of this higher variable-type. Now we order according to their
+heights the relevant specializations of the variable-types occurring in p and therewith
+obtain the various initial substitutions. These we arrange in an enumerated sequence.
+Once this enumeration has been established, the introduction of an ordering according
+to the number of substitutions to be performed yields the functions that were to be
+defined.
+In the argument just described I essentially presupposed the theory of the numbers
+of the second number class. I introduced the numbers of the second number class
+simply as resulting from transnumeration beyond the denumerable infinite, and the
+constant proposition N, "to be a number of the second number class"
+, was characterized afterwards by a listing of axioms. But these axioms furnish only the general
+framework of a theory. To provide a more precise foundation for it, it is necessary to
+determine how the process of transnumeration beyond the denumerable infinite is
+to be formalized. This is done by applying the process of transnumeration to a
+sequence; this sequence can be given only by means of an ordinary recursion, and for
+these recursions certain types are in turn necessary.
+This circumstance seems to present a difficulty, but in fact it turns out that
+reflecting upon precisely this point enables us to make the correspondence between
+the numbers of the second number class and the functions of a number-theoretic
+variable a much closer one. For the variable-types that we need for the production
+of the numbers of the second number class are obtained by formal replacement of
+the sign Z by the sign N at one or more places in the defining type-propositions that
+we have up to this point. We shall call the variable-types that then result N-types;
+as is apparent, corresponding Z-types and N-types have the same height. Now we do
+not need to associate with a given number of the second number class all functions
+of the same height, but we can let the numbers of the second number class and the
+functions correspond to each other according to the heights of the variable-types
+required for their definition. Let us now come to a more precise formulation of this
+correspondence.
+If in the Z-types we go up to a certain height only, the heights of the corresponding
+N-types are also bounded. From the numbers of the second number class that can be
+produced with these types we can, by means of an increasing sequence, obtain a
+greater number of the second number class, which is defined by means of a higher
+variable-type. If, on the other hand, we have N-types up to a certain height, the
+
+391
+functions definable by means of the corresponding Z-types can also be denumerated
+—in the way described above, according to the number of substitutions. As is well
+known, we obtain from such an enumeration p(a, n) by means of Cantor's diagonal
+procedure (for example, by forming p(a, a) + 1) a function that differs from all of
+the enumerated functions and therefore could not be defined by means of the variabletypes previously admitted.
+Thus we have made it possible to establish a one-to-one correspondence between
+the numbers of the second number class that are definable at the height in question,
+but not at any lower one, and the denumerably many functions that are definable at
+the same height, and in this way each function is associated with at least one number
+of the second number class.
+With this, however, the proof of the continuum theorem is not yet complete;
+rather, it still requires essential supplementation. For in our entire investigation up to
+now we have, in order to establish the correspondence, made restrictive assumptions
+in two respects: first, our general recursion schema for p embodies only the case of
+ordinary recursion (the number-theoretic variable being the variable on which the
+recursion proceeds), and, second, we also restricted the variable-types to those that
+result from transnumeration beyond denumerated sequences. It is certain that, in
+general, transfinite recursions and, accordingly, higher variable-types are necessarily
+used in mathematical investigations, for example, for the formation of certain kinds
+of functions of real variables. But here in our problem, where it is a matter of forming
+functions of a number-theoretic variable, we do not in fact require such higher
+recursions and variable-types; for the following lemma holds.
+LEMMA II. In the formation of functions of a number-theoretic variable transfinite
+recursions are dispensable; in particular, not only does ordinary recursion (that is, the
+one that proceeds on a number-theoretic variable) suffice for the actual formation process of the functions, but also the substitutions call merely for those variable-types
+whose definition requires only ordinary recursion. Or, to express ourselves with
+greater precision and more in the spirit of our finitist attitude, if by adducing a higher
+recursion or a corresponding variable-type we have formed a function that has only
+an ordinary number-theoretic variable as argument, then this function can always be
+defined also by means of ordinary recursions and the exclusive use of Z-types.
+The following typical example will make the meaning and scope of this lemma clear
+to us.
+If we imagine that the correspondence between the functions of a number-theoretic
+argument and the numbers of the second number class has been formalized, then by
+this very fact we have a certain function 5(a, n) that associates an ordinary number
+with an arbitrary number a of the second number class and the ordinary number n
+(for fixed a and variable n, 5(a, n) represents precisely the function associated with a).
+If we now substitute for a a number on, of the second number class, that depends on
+n, the sequence [of the a l being defined by ordinary or even transfinite recursion,
+for example,
+an+ 1 = coon,
+then |(a,, n) is a function of a number-theoretic variable n; and our Lemma II now
+asserts of this function that it can be defined through ordinary recursion by means of
+
+392
+Z-types, whereas it is certainly impossible to define 5(a, n) by these means, since,
+after all, the contrary assumption clearly leads to a contradiction.
+I should like to note expressly once more that the presentation given here of the
+proof of the continuum theorem contains only the fundamental ideas; its complete
+realization would require, besides the proofs of the two lemmas, a recasting strictly
+faithful to the finitist attitude.
+Finally let us recall our real subject and, so far as the infinite is concerned, draw
+the balance of all our reflections. The final result then is: nowhere is the infinite
+realized; it is neither present in nature nor admissible as a foundation in our rational
+thinking—a remarkable harmony between being and thought. We gain a conviction
+that runs counter to the earlier endeavors of Frege and Dedekind, the conviction that,
+if scientific knowledge is to be possible, certain intuitive conceptions [Vorstellungen]
+and insights are indispensable; logic alone does not suffice. The right to operate with
+the infinite can be secured only by means of the finite.
+The role that remains to the infinite is, rather, merely that of an idea-if, in
+accordance with Kant's words, we understand by an idea a concept of reason that
+transcends all experience and through which the concrete is completed so as to form
+a totality—an idea, moreover, in which we may have unhesitating confidence within
+the framework furnished by the theory that I have sketched and advocated here.
+In closing I should like to express my thanks to P. Bernays for his sympathetic
+collaboration and the valuable aid that he extended to me in questions both of
+matter and of form, especially in the proof of the continuum theorem.
+
+An axiomatization of set theory
+JOHN VON NEUMANN
+In the twenties von Neumann wrote a
+in 1921-1922 (see above, p. 291), many
+cluster of papers on set theory (1923,
+more sets were at hand; also at that time
+1925, 1926, 1928, 1928a, 1929). The first
+the vagueness attached to a notion used
+paper presents, in naive set theory, a
+by Zermelo, that of definite property,
+new theory of ordinal numbers, which is
+was eliminated (see above, p. 285). Thus
+easily adapted to various axiomatized set
+amended, the system became known as
+theories. The fourth paper, which offers
+the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.
+a justification of definition by trans-
+The set theory proposed by von Neufinite induction, is connected with the
+mann is still further removed from
+first. The second paper, given below in
+Zermelo's original system and represents
+translation, offers a new axiomatization
+a new departure. Its fundamental innoof set theory. The presentation is terse.
+vation is the introduction of two kinds of
+A detailed development of the system,
+collections: sets and classes.' A set is a
+with proofs, is given in the fifth paper.
+class, but there are classes-Quine will
+The third paper, in Hungarian, is von
+call them ultimate classes-that are not
+Neumann's doctoral dissertation; it consets; an ultimate class is not an element
+tains the main points of the fifth paper.
+of any other class. Sets and classes are
+In the sixth, von Neumann discusses
+characterized by axioms. As von Neuquestions of relative consistency.*
+mann points out (below, p. 397), elasses
+Recoiling from the pitfalls of the newly can be regarded as Zermelo's "definite
+discovered paradoxes, Zermelo had propruperties"
+"now precisely delineated
+duced what seemed a relatively safe sys-
+(see also Gödel 1940, p. 2). There is a
+tem (although, of course, its consistency
+universal class, the class of all sets, and
+had not been proved). The Burali-Forti
+there is a class of all ordinals; these two
+and Russell paradoxes cannot be reproclasses are both ultimate, so that Rusduced in this system because the set of
+sell's and Burali-Forti's paradoxes cannot
+all ordinals and the set of all sets that do
+be reproduced in the system.
+not contain themselves as elements do
+The present paper, however, is not
+not exist in the system. But, being chary
+couched in the language of sets and
+of sets, the system is in some respects
+classes. The basic notion is that of
+remote from intuition. It has no universal set, and, what is more troublesome, a
+sequence of sets of the system is not
+necessarily a set of the system. Thus, if
+we assume the continuum hypothesis, it
+has no set of cardinality ≥*.. With the
+introduction of the axiom of replacement
+a Concerning the circumstances in which von
+Neumann 1925 was written, see Ulam 1958,
+p. 10, footnote 3.
+• Prior to von Neumann, Cantor (see above,
+p. 114) and König (see above, p. 148) had distinguished two kinds of collections in order to
+avoid the paradoxes.
+
+394
+function; more specifically, the paper
+deals with I-objects (arguments), II-
+objects (characteristic functions
+classes), and I-II-objects, that is, objects
+that are at once I-objects and II-objects
+(characteristic functions of sets). This
+adventitious idiom is easily translated
+into a more customary language.°
+An important feature of von Neumann's system is that, unlike Zermelo's,
+it is finitely axiomatizable. No axiom
+schema, such as that of separation, is
+required.
+Having formulated his system, von
+Neumann devotes a great deal of attention to the question of categoricity and
+the import of the Löwenheim-Skolem
+theorem for set theory. In his search for
+a minimal model that could be uniquely
+characterized, he is led to consider models
+relative consistency (von Neumann 1929,
+Mostowski 1939, Gödel 1938, 1939, 1940,
+Cohen 1963, 1963a, 1964).
+The system presented by von Neumann
+was simplified, revised, and expanded by
+R. M. Robinson (1937), Bernays (1937—
+1954, 1958), and Gödel (1940), and it has
+come to be known as the von Neumann-
+Bernays-Gödel set theory. For the relation of this system of set theory to other
+systems, in particular to the Zermelo-
+Fraenkel set theory, we refer the reader
+to Chapter 14 in Quine 1963.
+Errata pointed out by the author in a
+Be exting.
+Berichtigung have been incorporated in
+the text. The translation is by Stefan
+Bauer-Mengelberg and Dagfinn Føllesdal, and it is printed here with the kind
+permission of Mrs. Klara von Neumann-
+Eckart and Walter de Gruyter and Co.
+that are contained in other models. Such
+models, subsequently called inner models
+" A paper of Skolem's (1938, pp. 32-34) conby Shepherdson (1951-1953), have been
+tains a translation of von Neumann's axioms
+particularly useful in investigations of into the first-order predicate calculus.
+I. The axiom system
+§ 1. Fundamentals concerning the axiomatization of set theory
+§ 2. General remarks on the axiomatization
+§ 3. The axioms and their meaning.
+§ 4. On the derivation of set theory.
+II. Investigation of the axioms .
+§ 1. Statement of the problem. Fundamentals.
+§ 2. On subsystems
+§ 3. Denumerability •
+§ 4. Models of set theory . . . .
+§ 5. Categoricity . .
+..
+Page
+394
+394
+396
+398
+402
+403
+403
+405
+408
+409
+411
+I. THE AXIOM SYSTEM
+§ 1. FUNDAMENTALS CONCERNING THE AXIOMATIZATION OF SET THEORY
+The aim of the present work is to give a logically unobjectionable axiomatic
+presentation of set theory. I would like to make a few preliminary remarks about the
+difficulties that have made such a construction of set theory desirable.
+It is well known that set theory in its first, "naive" version, due to Cantor, led to
+
+395
+contradictions. These are the well-known antinomies of the set of all sets that do not
+contain themselves (Russell), of the set of all transfinite ordinal numbers (Burali-
+Forti), and of the set of all finitely definable real numbers (Richard).! Since naive set
+theory undeniably led to these contradictions, while on the other hand a certain part
+of its propositions seemed to be precise and reliable, and since, moreover, the modern
+formulation of mathematics absolutely required a set-theoretic foundation, there has
+been no lack of attempts to "rehabilitate" set theory.
+In discussing these we must draw a fundamental distinction between two different
+tendencies. A number of writers were led by the antinomies of set theory to submit
+the entire logical foundation of the exact sciences to a critique. They made it their
+goal to put all of exact science on a new, universally evident basis from which they
+could again reach what is "correct" in mathematics and set theory, but from which
+they had to exclude a priori, by seeking a foundation in immediate intuition, what is
+self-contradictory. Here Russell, J. König, Weyl, and Brouwer must be mentioned.?
+They arrived at entirely different results, but the over-all effect of their activity
+seems to me outright devastating. In Russell, all of mathematics and set theory
+seems to rest upon the highly problematic "axiom of reducibility"
+, while Weyl and
+Brouwer systematically reject the larger part of mathematics and set theory as
+completely meaningless. What we have here is not a rehabilitation of set theory at
+all, but rather a very sharp critique of the modes of inference hitherto used in
+elementary logic, in particular, of the principle of "excluded middle" and of the
+principles governing "all" and " there exists"
+The other group, Zermelo, Frankel, and Schoenflies, has eschewed so radical a
+revision. The methods of logic are not criticized to any extent, but are retained; only
+the (no doubt useless) naive notion of set is prohibited. To replace this notion the
+axiomatic method is employed; that is, one formulates a number of postulates in
+which, to be sure, the word "set" occurs but without any meaning. Here (in the spirit
+of the axiomatic method) one understands by "set" nothing but an object of which
+one knows no more and wants to know no more than what follows about it from the
+postulates. The postulates are to be formulated in such a way that all the desired
+theorems of Cantor's set theory follow from them, but not the antinomies. In these
+axiomatizations, however, we can never be perfectly sure of the latter point. We see
+only that the known modes of inference leading to the antinomies fail, but who knows
+whether there are not others? A standard consistency proof is obviously altogether
+unthinkable in this context. For the method by which Hilbert (1899) proved the
+consistency of the various geometries-reduction to the consistency of arithmetic and
+analysis—fails here. A direct consistency proof (without a shift of the problem) would,
+however, obviously belong to the domain of the first group mentioned above, since
+there still remains much to be clarified in logic itself. The announced works of Hilbert?
+have this proof as their goal.
+The second group, then, while painstakingly avoiding the naive notion of set
+1 See, for example, Poincaré 1908.
+2 Whitehead and Russell 1910, 1912, 1913, König 1914, Weyl 1920, Brouwer 19196.
+3 Zermelo 1908a, Fraenkel 19226, 1923, 1923a, 1925, Schoenflies 1921, 1922.
+$ 1922, 1922a. [These "announced" works appeared between the writing and the publication
+of the present paper.]
+
+396
+(Cantor's), want to specify an axiom system from which set theory (without its antinomies) follows. Their investigations can, to be sure, never settle the real problem so
+completely as those by the first group, but their goal is much clearer and closer at
+hand. Of course, it can never be shown in this way that the antinomies have really
+been eliminated, and much arbitrariness always attaches to the axioms. But one
+thing can be attained here with certainty, namely, a precise determination of what
+the rehabilitated part of set theory is and what is at issue when henceforth we speak
+of the complete "formalistic set theory".
+The present work is in the spirit of the second group. Below we shall specify a
+system of postulates from which all that is known in set theory follows in a logically
+unobjectionable way. "Logically unobjectionable", it is true, must be understood in
+the sense in which it has hitherto been understood in mathematics. There will be no
+attempt to make derivations unobjectionable also in the sense of the intuitionism of
+Brouwer and Weyl. I would like to remark, nevertheless, that this, too, could be
+attained rather easily (through a few insignificant modifications); but I forgo this as
+a matter of principle, since the axiomatic method is in itself contrary to the essence
+of intuitionism. (From the point of view of intuitionism an axiom system would have
+any meaning only if the consistency proof for it had itself been carried out in an
+intuitionistically correct way. To judge by a remark of Brouwer's, not even that
+would do.®)
+A number of essential questions concerning fundamentals will not be dealt with
+until Part II, since they presuppose knowledge of the axiom system.
+§ 2. GENERAL REMARKS ON THE AXIOMATIZATION
+The task of our axiomatization is obviously to produce, by means of a finite number
+of purely formal operations (and that these can be performed is guaranteed precisely
+by the postulates), all the sets that we want to see formed. We must, however, avoid
+forming sets by collecting or separating elements [durch Zusammenfassung oder
+Aussonderung von Elementen], and so on, as well as eschew the unclear principle of
+"definiteness" that can still be found in Zermelo.
+We prefer, however, to axiomatize not "set" but "function". The latter notion
+certainly includes the former. (More precisely, the two notions are completely equivalent, since a function can be regarded as a set of pairs, and a set as a function that
+can take two values.) The reason for this departure from the usual way of proceeding
+is that every axiomatization of set theory uses the notion of function (axiom of
+separation, axiom of replacement, see pages 400 and 403), and thus it is formally
+simpler to base the notion of set on that function than conversely. The intuitive
+picture of the axiomatized system is as follows.
+We consider two domains of objects, that of "arguments" and that of "functions".
+(Both words are, of course, to be taken in a purely formal way, as if they had no
+5 There is, to be sure, a certain justification for the axioms in the fact that they go into evident
+propositions of naive set theory if in them we take the word "set"
+, which has no meaning in the
+axiomatization, in the sense of Cantor. But what is omitted from naive set theory-and to
+circumvent the antinomies some omission is essential—is absolutely arbitrary.
+6 Brouwer 19196. See Fraenkel 19236, p. 98.
+
+397
+meaning.) The two domains are not identical, but they partly overlap. (There are
+"argument-functions", which belong to both domains.)
+Now a two-variable operation [x, y] (read "the value of the function x for the
+argument y"), whose first variable x must always be a "function" and whose second
+variable y must always be an "argument", is defined in these domains. What is
+formed by means of it is always an "argument"
+',[x, y].
+The operation [x, y] corresponds to a procedure that is encountered everywhere in
+mathematics, namely, the formation, from a function f (which must be carefully
+distinguished from its values f(x)!) and an argument x, of the value f(x) of the function f for the argument x. Instead of f(x) we write [f, x] to indicate that f, just like
+x, is to be regarded as a variable in this procedure. Through the use of [x, y] we replace, as it were, all one-variable functions by a single two-variable function. In this
+scheme the elements of the domain of "functions" answer to the functions (conceived
+naively) that are defined for the "arguments" and whose values are "arguments"
+(Later, certain of these "functions" x will be distinguished as "sets", namely,
+those for which [x, y] can take only two given values as y runs through all "arguments"; see also § 3 and § 4.)
+For [x, y], moreover, the "axiom of extensionality" ["Bestimmtheitsaxiom"]
+holds in the following sense:
+If a and b are "functions" and if for every argument x we have [a, x] = [b, x], then
+a = b. (See Axiom I 4.)
+A "function" a is thus determined without any ambiguity by its "values" [a, x],
+but there is no reason to assume that these "values"
+can be assigned to it arbitrarily. (For then we would, after all, relapse into naive set theory.) Rather, the
+following question arises: what operations are available for the production of functions? It will be answered in axiom groups II and III
+But one more question presents itself: what "functions" are at the same time
+"arguments"? Obviously the most convenient answer would be: all of them. But
+with the ways of producing "functions" that are listed in axiom groups II and III
+this would again entangle us in the antinomies of naive set theory, in Russell's first
+of all. And, since we need all these possible ways of producing functions, we must
+forgo treating certain functions as arguments.
+We impose this unavoidable restriction by going in the direction pointed out by
+Zermelo.
+We arbitrarily select an "argument", A, and in effect declare that a function a is
+also an argument if and only if it does not too often, that is, for too many arguments x,
+take "values" [a, x] differing from A. (Since a "set" will be defined as a function that
+can take two values only, one of these being A, this is a reasonable adaptation of
+Zermelo's point of view.)
+We now make the expression "too often" more precise as follows: The "function"
+a will fail to be an "argument" if and only if the totality of arguments x for which
+[a, x] # A can be mapped onto the totality of all arguments. (The mapping must,
+however, be accomplished by one of our "functions"; that is, it must have the
+form y = [b, x]. It must be single-valued, but it need not be one-to-one.) (See Axiom
+IV 2.)
+This definition has the advantage that it guarantees that we can treat as
+
+398
+"argument" any "function" a that is #A less often than a "function" b that has
+already been recognized to be an "argument". "Less often" means that the totality
+of all x for which [a, x] # A is an image of the totality of all x for which [b, x] # A
+(or of a part of it).? The definition thus contains the axiom of separation, as it is called,
+which is due to Zermelo, and the axiom of replacement, due to Fraenkel.® But it
+accomplishes more: it also contains the well-ordering theorem and hence makes the
+principle of choice supertluous.
+That the well-ordering theorem appears in this new context is due to the fact that
+we can construct an unobjectionable theory of ordinal numbers. "Naively", the
+totality of all ordinals leads to the Burali-Forti antinomy; in our system this has the
+consequence that a function having values # A for all ordinals is not an argument.
+Accordingly, it must be possible to map the totality of all ordinals onto the totality
+of all "arguments", and this, of course, yields a well-ordering of the totality of all
+"arguments". (This reasoning, of course, must and can be carried through rigorously.)
+I should like to make a further remark. It may seem odd that notions such as
+"totality" and "function" are used naively in an axiomatization of set theory (contrary to what was said in § 1). But that is done only here, in § 2, in order to give an
+intuitive picture of the system; of course, nothing of the kind will happen in the
+precise formulation, in § 3.
+§ 3. THE AXIOMS AND THEIR MEANING
+Concerning what has been said above we must still make the following remarks.
+Besides the universal two-variable operation [x, y] already introduced, we must
+introduce another two-variable operation (x, y) (read "the [ordered] pair x, y"),
+whose variables x and y must both be "arguments" and which itself produces an
+"argument" (X,Y). Its most important property is that x1 = x2 and Y1 = y½ follow
+from (X1, Y1) = (X2, Y2). (That property does not appear explicitly among the axioms,
+since it follows from Axioms II 3 and II 4.) This operation does not have the fundamental character of [x, y] at all ; it is necessary only because the notion "pair" has to
+be introduced.
+Further, in addition to the "argument" A, already mentioned, another arbitrary
+"argument"
+', B, will be introduced from the very beginning. (A and B will be the two
+values of those functions that represent the "sets".)
+And, finally, we shall always speak of "I-objects"
+', "II objects", and "I-II-
+objects" instead of "arguments",
+, "functions", and "argument-functions", respectively.
+The axiom system reads as follows:
+We are concerned with I-objects, II-objects, the two distinct objects A and B, and
+the two operations [x, y] and (x, y). The following axioms hold.
+" [Hence "less often" should be understood as "not more often".T
+8 The "axiom of replacement" can be expressed as follows: Let !)i be a set and f(x) a function
+(defined in I); then there exists a set I that contains, for every element x of M, the value of f(x)
+[and contains nothing else]. This axiom is due to Fraenkel (1922a). He was the first to point out
+that without this axiom the existence of sets of cardinality Xu is unprovable in Zermelo's axiomatization. (In his more recent work, however, he tries to manage with a weaker axiom.) In fact, I
+believe that no theory of ordinals is possible at all without this axiom.
+
+399
+I. Introductory axioms
+1. A and B are I-objects.
+2. [x, y] has meaning if and only if x is a II-object and y a I-object; it is itself
+always a I-object.
+3. (x, y) has meaning if and only if x and y are I-objects; it is itself always a
+1-object.
+4. Let a and b be II-objects; if [a, x] = [b, x] for all I-objects x, then a = b.
+No further comment is needed concerning these axioms; all of them were already
+discussed in § 2.
+II. Arithmetic construction axioms
+1. There exists a II-object a such that always [a, x] = x.
+2. Let u be a I-object; then there exists a II-object a such that always [a, x] = и.
+3. There exists a II-object a such that always [a, (x, y)] = x.
+4. There exists a II-object a such that always [a, (x, y)] = y.
+5. There exists a II-object a such that always (if x is a I-II-object) [a, (x, y)] =
+[х, у].
+6. Let a and b be II-objects; then there exists a II-object c such that always
+[с, x] = ([а, x], [o, х]).
+7. Let a and b be II objects; then there exists a II-object c such that always
+[с, х] = [а, [b, x]].
+All these are ways of producing functions. They have been put together in such a
+manner that the functions in a certain sense form a group. For they have as a
+consequence (we do not go into the very simple proof) the following
+Reduction theorem. Let 2(X1, X2,..., Xn) be an expression constructed from the
+variables x1, X2,..., Xp and some constants a1, Az, ... (I-objects or II-objects) by
+means of the operations [x, y] and (x, y). Such an expression need not always have
+meaning in case x1, Xz,..., Xn are I-objects (for example, [X1, X2] has meaning only
+if xy is a I-II-object); but let us assume that, whenever it is meaningful, it is a I-
+object. (This excludes the case in which 2(x1, X2,..., Xn) is simply a constant a that
+is a II-object but not a I-object.) Then there exists a II-object a such that, for all
+I-objects x1, x2,...,n for which 2(X1, X2,..., Xn) has meaning, 2(X1, x2,...,Xn) =
+Га, ((... ((Х1, Хz), Хз), ...), Хл)].
+Thus, in [a, (... ((X1, X2), xz),...), Xn)] we now have a normal form for expressions
+in n variables; it is the general function of n variables, just as [a, x] is the general
+function of one variable.
+HI. Logical construction axioms
+1. There exists a Il-object a with the following property: x = y it and only if
+La, (x, y)] # A.
+2. Let a be a II-object; then there exists a Il-object b with the following property:
+[b, x] # A if and only if, for all y, [a, (x, y)] = A.
+3. Let a be a II-object; then there exists a II-object b such that, whenever
+[a, (x, y)] # A for a unique y, [b, x] is equal to that y.
+
+400
+These ways of producing functions complement those of group II. They make it
+possible to bring every logical condition on the I-objects x1, X2, ..., X" into the normal
+form [a, (... ((X1, Х2), X3),...), Xx)] # A and also to bring every I-object y that is
+0g.., um. or it makes , redution to normal form possible for ta),
+Хз),...), Xn)]. For III 1 makes the «
+identity relation x = y, and III 2 for the notions "all" and "there exists"; III 3,
+finally, permits the y that is uniquely determined by an implicit condition [a, (x, y)]
+# A to be explicitly represented as y = [b, x].
+Incidentally, while the axioms of group II are mutually independent, they are no
+longer so after group III has been added; thus, for example, Axiom II 1 follows from
+III 1 and III 3.
+IV. I-Il-objects
+1. There exists a II-object a with the following property: a I-object x is a I-II-
+object if and only if [a, x] # A.
+2. A II-object a is not a I-II-object if and only if there exists a Il-object b such
+that for every I-object x there exists a y for which both [a, y] # A and [b, y] = x.
+We have here two formally analogous axioms; IV 1 states when a I-object is a
+I-Il-object, and IV 2 does the same for a II-object. As for their content, however,
+IV 1 and IV 2 are fundamentally different.
+In IV 1 we could more simply have required that every I-object be a I-II-object
+(that is, that all the objects considered be functions; Zermelo makes no such stipulation, but Fraenkel does; more will be said about this in Part II). But for the time
+being we keep the axioms as general as possible, we shall take up this restriction, as
+well as some others, in Part II. IV 1, however, requires nothing meritorious; it
+merely demands that for a I-object the property "being a I-II-object", just like any
+other property, be capable of being brought into normal form.
+IV 2, on the other hand, is a very essential axiom, with many consequences. It was
+already discussed in § 2; Zermelo's axiom of separation, Frankel's axiom of replacement, and the well-ordering theorem follow from it. Zermelo and Frankel use no
+such general criterion to decide when a set is "too big". Also, departing from their
+procedure, we obtain the well-ordering theorem from this axiom and not from the
+principle of choice (the multiplicative axiom in Zermelo).
+For the next group of axioms it is practical (but by no means necessary) to introduce a number of signs:
+Let a be a II-object. For [a, x] # A we also write x = a. Let a and b be II-objects.
+If x = b follows from xe a, then a ≤ 6. For For ≤ a we also write a ≥ b. If a ≤ b and
+a ≥b, we write a ~ b. If a ≤ b but not a >b, we write a < b; if a > b but not
+a ≤ b, we write a > b. (See also § 4.)
+V. Axioms of infinity
+1. There exists a I-II-object a with the following properties: there exist I-II-
+objects x for which x є a; if x e a for a I-II-object x, there exist I-II-objects y = a for
+which X <У,
+
+401
+2. Let a be a I-II-object; then there exists a I-II-object b for which, from x = y
+and y e a (y thus being a I-II-object), x = b follows.
+3. Let a be a I-II-object; then there exists a I-II-object b with the following
+property: if x ≤ a for a I-II-object x, there exists a I-II object y for which both
+x~ y and yeb.
+These three relatively complicated axioms occur in Zermelo and Frankel, too, and
+specifically as the "axiom of infinity" (V 1), the "axiom of the union" (V 2), and the
+"axiom of the power set" (V 3). But we call all three of them axioms of infinity since
+they are necessary only for the specific theory of infinite cardinalities. Not only the
+theory of finite sets and finite ordinals (that is, nonnegative integers) but even partly
+that of the continuum can be constructed without them, solely on the basis of the
+axioms of groups I-IV.
+The axioms of infinity are ways of producing I-II objects (analogous to groups II
+and III, which were ways of producing II-objects). Their meaning (naively formulated) is approximately as follows:
+There is an infinite set a that is not too big.
+If a is a set, not too big, of sets that are themselves not too big, then the set b of the
+elements of the elements of a is not too big either.
+If a is a set that is not too big, then the set b of all subsets of a is not too big
+either.
+To speak of functions rather than of sets, it is true, somewhat complicates the
+formulation of the axioms (in particular of V 3); nevertheless, the existence of infinite
+sets, as well as that of unions and power sets, readily follows by means of the axioms
+of group V (as soon as the notion "set" is strictly defined as a special case of "function "). Axiom V 1, incidentally, deviates from Zermelo's (and Fraenkel's) version of
+the axiom of infinity; in V 1 the existence of some infinite set is required, but not that
+of a specific one, as is the case in their version. This circumstance, however, is of no
+consequence.
+The axioms of groups I-V constitute our axiom system. Outwardly, the grouping
+and formulation differ widely from those of Zermelo and Frankel; nevertheless, there
+are many analogies. Especially if we compare them with Frankel's axioms and
+definitions, we see that most of our axioms have analogues among his. There are, however, some quite essential differences. That we speak of "functions" rather than of
+"sets" is no doubt a superficial difference; it is essential, however, that the present
+set theory deals even with sets (or "functions") that are "too big"
+', namely, those
+II-objects that are not I-II-objects. Rather than being completely prohibited, they
+are only declared incapable of being arguments (they are not I-objects!). This suffices
+to avoid the antinomies. At the same time, the existence of those sets is necessary for
+certain modes of inference. Axiom IV 2, finally, deviates quite essentially from what
+Zermelo and Fraenkel have, and indeed it is the distinctive feature of our axiomatization. It is, to be sure, related in a certain sense to the axioms of separation and replacement, but it goes much further. On the one hand it guarantees the existence of subsets
+and image sets, and in general it makes possible the theory of ordinals and alephs
+(which can hardly be developed successfully in an axiom system that lacks the axiom
+of replacement); yet all that could essentially be achieved by the axiom of replace.
+ment alone. But beyond this, IV 2 occupies an altogether central position in the
+
+402
+axiom system; in several cases it enables us to prove that a set is "not too big", and
+finally it yields the well-ordering theorem.
+Axiom IV 2, to be sure, requires something more than what was up to now regarded
+as evident and reasonable for the notion "not too big". One might say that it somewhat overshoots the mark. But, in view of the confusion surrounding the notion
+"not too big" as it is ordinarily used, on the one hand, and the extraordinary power
+of this axiom on the other, I believe that I was not too crassly arbitrary in introducing
+it, especially since it enlarges rather than restricts the domain of set theory and
+nevertheless can hardly become a source of antinomies. (We shall consider this latter
+point more closely in Part II.)
+§4. ON THE DERIVATION OF SET THEORY
+In § 2 and § 3 an axiomatization of set theory was described, with emphasis on the
+fundamental points of view that governed its formulation. In what follows, something
+will be said about the derivation of set theory from these axioms.
+Such a derivation of set theory would be arranged as follows:
+1. General set theory. Here we have to take care of those general theorems and
+definitions that proceed more from the nature of the axiomatization than from that
+of set theory and are quite trivial in naive set theory. They are theorems like those on
+the existence of the union and the intersection of sets, the existence of the power set,
+and so forth. There is no mention here of order or of cardinality.
+2. Order and well-ordering. We define what is to be understood by these notions and,
+further, by certain auxiliary notions like similarity, segment (initial section), and so
+on. Some quite trivial theorems on order and well-ordering follow, for example: if two
+ordered sets are similar to a third, they are similar to each other; if of two similar
+ordered sets one is well-ordered, so is the other; and so forth.
+3. Ordinal numbers. Here the theory proper begins. A strict definition of ordinals
+is given, and then the most important properties of these ordinals are developed,
+among others the comparability of well-ordered sets and the admissibility of definition
+by transfinite induction.?
+4. The well-ordering theorem. By means of the ordinals and Axiom IV 2 the wellordering theorem is proved (without the principle of choice).
+5. Cardinalities. When the theory of ordinals and the well-ordering theorem are at
+hand, the theory of alephs (cardinal numbers or cardinalities) can easily be developed.
+(This arrangement, which puts the cardinalities after well-ordering, deviates from the
+one generally adopted; but it leads to the goal more quickly.)
+6. Infinitude. Finally the definition of finitude and infinitude for sets follows. The
+simplest properties of finitude and infinitude are developed and the existence of infinite sets is proved. The least infinite ordinal w is defined
+In what follows we shall not carry through this derivation (which already exists in
+finished form). With all proofs it would take up a great deal of space and go beyond
+the scope of this presentation. It will be set forth in detail in another paper [1928a].
+Let us introduce only the most important terms here.
+9 See von Neumann 1923 [and 1928].
+
+403
+The exact definition of "set" (as a special case of "function") reads as follows:
+A II-object a is called a class [Bereich] if [a, x] is always equal to A or B.
+A I-II-object satisfying that condition is called a set.
+That is,
+, "sets" are the sets that (in the earlier terminology) are "not too big", and
+"classes" are all totalities [Gesamtheiten]] irrespective of their "size". A class is
+"capable of being an argument" (that is, a I-II-object) if and only if it is a set.
+The definitions of the relations x e a (x belongs to a, x' is an element of a, a contains
+x), a < b (a is a part of b), a ‹ b (a is a proper part of b), and a ~ b la and b are of
+the same size) have already been given in § 3. (If a and b are classes, a = b of course
+follows from a ~ b because of I 4; for II-objects in general, on the other hand, this
+is not a necessary consequence.)
+If a and b are classes, a + b, a b, and a - b are their union, intersection, and
+difference classes, respectively (in the same sense as these are understood in naive set
+theory; of course, the existence proofs must first be produced for all these classes;
+this applies also to what follows). If a is a class and its elements are sets, S(a) and D(a)
+are respectively the union and intersection classes of (the elements of) a. If a is a
+class and c a II-object, |[c, a]| is the image of a mediated by c. If, finally, a is a class,
+P(a) is the power class of a (and contains all subsets of a; classes that are not sets
+are, after all, "incapable of being arguments"). Moreover, if a and b are sets, a + b
+is also a set; if a or b is a set, a. b is also a set; and if a is a set, S(a), D(a), and Pla)
+are also sets.
+If a is a class, we call all classes b that have the following properties orderings of a :
+Every x that is an element of 6 has the form x = (u, v), where u = a, ved, and
+u ‡ v. If u and v are two distinct elements of a, then (u, v) or (v, u) belongs to 6.1º
+If (u, v) and (0, W) belong to b, then (u, w) also belongs to b.
+(b)
+(b)
+If (u, v) belongs to b, we also write u ‹ v or v > u (u precedes v in the ordering b,
+v follows u in the ordering b).
+And, should a be a set, all its orderings are sets and they, too, form a set, O(a).
+The remaining definitions (those of similarity, well-ordering, ordinal number,
+cardinality, equivalence, finitude, and infinitude) will not be given here; some of them
+are obvious. In another paper (1923) I have already set forth the theory of ordinals
+that would be appropriate here (I used the language of naive set theory, to be sure;
+but a translation into the present axiomatization would not cause any difficulty).
+II. INVESTIGATION OF THE AXIOMS
+§ 1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. FUNDAMENTALS
+From the axioms, as they were presented in Part I, all the well-known theorems
+of set theory follow; on the other hand, these axioms (insofar as they are not of a
+restrictive kind) are nothing but trivial facts of naive set theory. In this sense, then,
+we could say that neither too much nor too little has been required by our axioms.
+For several reasons, however, such an appraisal would not be sound. The first is
+that, while our axioms do enable us, starting with finite and denumerable sets, to
+10 ['The German text erroneously has "a" instead of "f".]
+
+404
+construct the familiar sets a + b, S(a), Pla), and |[c, a]l, as well as to use "separation", they do not guarantee that besides the sets thus obtained there are no further
+sets that cannot be reached in this way. A priori there might very well exist sets of
+this kind too, for example, a set having a single element that is the set itself, a = {a},
+or a "descending sequence of sets"
+a1 = {02), 02 = {03}... (a) means the set whose
+sole element is a).! It would now be desirable to eliminate all these superfluous sets,
+and this is certainly not accomplished by the axioms that we have adopted so far.
+In order to fill this gap, Fraenkel regards as desirable the introduction of a further
+axiom (the axiom of restriction [Beschränktheitsaxiom]l), which has not yet been
+precisely formulated; it has no analogue among our axioms, and it would read
+approximately as follows:
+Besides the sets (or, in our system, the I-objects and II-objects) whose existence is
+absolutely required by the axioms, there are no further sets.
+We wish to express this axiom in our formalism in a precise way. To this end we
+introduce the following definitions:
+Let I be the system of I-objects and II-objects. Let I' be a subsystem of 2. Let
+In-objects and Ily-objects be the I objects and II-objects, respectively, that are in
+I'. Let [x, y]z (where x is a II, -object and y a Is-Object) mean [x, y]; let (X, Y)I'
+(where x and y are Is-Objects) mean (x, y); let As be A and let Bi. be B.
+Now, if these Is-objects and II -objects, the operations [x, y]s' and (x, y)=, and the
+objects Ai and Bs also satisfy our axioms, we say for short that I' satisfies our
+axioms.
+Then the axiom of restriction just mentioned simply requires that besides I itself
+no other subsystem Z' of 2 shall satisfy Axioms I-V.
+This formulation makes it clear that two serious objections can immediately be
+raised against such an axiom (this, of course, is equally true in Frankel's system).
+First, this axiom is of a type quite different from the previous ones, since, contrary
+to the principle we have followed hitherto, it does not avoid the notions of naive set
+theory. For what are we to understand by "subsystems" of 2? Certainly not sets or
+classes in the sense of the previous axioms, for these can have only I-objects as elements, while I' and I contain I-objects and Il-objects. But what else, then, since
+after all the naive notion of set was to be strictly prohibited? Such an axiom would
+make the whole process of axiomatization circular!
+This difficulty could, however, be eliminated if we were to suppose, for example, that
+there was given a larger system P (of Ip-objects and IIp-objects, with the operations
+[x, y]p and (x, Y)p, and two objects Ap and Bp, the system also satisfying our Axioms
+I-V) such that all I-objects and II-objects are Ip-objects and that both [x, y] and
+(x, y) can in P be brought into the normal form [a, (x, y) p]p (where a is a IIp-object)
+of P. Then I is a class in P and its "subsystems" I' are simply to be taken as its
+subelasses (in P). We would have overlaid 2 with a "higher set theory" P, in which
+even objects incapable of being arguments in I are arguments. This in itself is not
+absurd. If we make the sets that are "too big" and incapable of being arguments
+capable of being arguments in a new system P, we can still circumvent the antinomies
+if in turn we admit the sets that are formed from all of these and are "still bigger"
+11 Mirimanoff 1917, p. 42. ["(a)" has been changed to "{a}", the latter being the notation used
+by von Neumann below.]
+
+405
+(that is, too big in P) but declare them incapable of being arguments. The idea is
+partly the same as the one upon which Russell's "hierarchy of types" rests.
+In such a "higher set theory" P it would thus make sense to ask whether the
+axiom of restriction!2 mentioned above is satisfied (for the "lower set theory" E). In
+what follows we shall, to be sure, use the terminology of naive set theory for the sake
+of simplicity, but in doing so we must always keep in mind that the existence of a
+"higher"
+system P has been assumed. Without such a hypothesis (which is somewhat more problematic still than that of the consistency of set theory) one just
+cannot undertake an investigation of the systems I' satisfying the axioms, unless one
+wishes to find oneself uncritically using the terminology of (inconsistent) naive set
+theory.
+And now the second difficulty appears. It is easy to demonstrate that a system
+satisfying Axioms I-V need not satisfy the axiom of restriction (see above). We would
+therefore, have to know something like this: If the system I satisfies Axioms I-V,
+there exists among those of its subsystems that also satisfy them at least one smallest
+one I'
+", that is, one having the property that besides I' itself no subsystem of Z'
+satisfies Axioms I-V.
+Hence this subsystem would satisfy the axiom of restriction. For example, the
+common part (intersection) of all the subsystems I' of 2 that satisfy Axioms I-V
+might be such a smallest system (and it would be if it, too, should satisfy Axioms
+I-V). This, however, is not necessarily the case. A closer examination now shows that
+the only known way by which such
+a subsystem might be produced fails. Later we
+shall identify the circumstance to which this is due. For these reasons we believe that
+we must conclude, first, that the axiom of restriction absolutely has to be rejected and,
+second, that one cannot possibly succeed in formulating an axiom to the same effect.
+That, incidentally, is also connected with the fact that the axiom system I-V lacks
+"categoricity"
+; more will be said about this in § 5.
+But, even if it is not possible to find a smallest subsystem of I satisfying Axioms
+I-V, we still wish to investigate what subsystems of I satisfying Axioms I-V can
+exist. In doing so we encounter a most peculiar phenomenon, which was first noticed
+by Löwenheim and Skolem. 13
+§ 2. ON SUBSYSTEMS
+Let a subsystem I' be given. We now wish to give a precise formulation to the
+condition that Z' satisfies the axioms.
+For Axioms I 1-3 this is very easy. They simply read as follows:
+1. A and B belong to Z'.
+2. If x and y belong to I', then [x, y] and (x, Y) also belong to I.
+12 [The German text has "Bestimmtheitsaxiom" in place of what should clearly be "Be-
+schränktheitsaxiom" .]
+13 Löwenheim 1915, Skolem 1920, 1922; in this connection see Fraenkel 19236.
+In the first two of these papers a general proof is given of the theorem whose special case for
+set theory is the subject of § 2 below: Every axiom system that is satisfiable at all is already
+satisfiable by denumerable systems. In the third paper Skolem draws (unfavorable) conclusions
+from this about set theory.
+Although the content of § 2 and § 3 is therefore not new, we believe that it is not useless to call
+attention again in some detail to this interesting circumstance.
+
+406
+In connection with II 1-7, III I, and IV 1, there is a certain difficulty. II 1, for
+instance, requires that there belong to Z' a II-object a such that, for all II-objects x of
+I', [a, x] = x. Similarly for II 2-IV 1 [of the list just given, that is, not including
+III 2 and III 3].
+To avoid this difficulty, however, we shall simply require something more in each
+case, namely:
+3. There belongs to I' a II-object a such that always (that is, for all I-objects in
+I; similarly below) [a, x] = х.
+4. Assume that the I-object u belongs to I'; then there belongs to 2' a II-object a
+such that always [a, x] = u.
+5. There belongs to I' a II-object a such that always [a, (x, y)] = x.
+6. There belongs to 2' a II-object a such that always [a, (x, y)] = у.
+7. There belongs to I' a II-object a such that always [a, (x, y)] = [x, y].
+8. If the II-objects a and b belong to I', then there belongs to I' a II-object e such
+that always [c, x] = ([a, x], [b, x]).
+9. If the II-objects a and b belong to I', then there belongs to L' a II-object c such
+that always [c, x] = [a, [b, x]].
+10. There belongs to L' a II-object a with the following property: [a, (x, y)] # A if
+and only if x = y.
+11. There belongs to 2' a II-object a with the following property: [a, x] ‡ A if and
+only if x is a I-Il-object.
+(That there exist such II-objects at all is guaranteed by the corresponding axioms
+from II I to IV 1.) From here on, therefore, we have sufficient conditions but no longer
+necessary ones. And therewith the possibility of finding a smallest subsystem satisfying the axioms vanishes, since the conditions to be formulated all go too far.
+A further difficulty appears in connection with Axioms III 2 and III 3. Let us, for
+example, consider III 2; it reads as follows:
+Assume that the II-object a belongs to Z'; then there exists a II-object b in 2' with
+the following property: for all I-objects x in I', [b, x] # A if and only if, for all
+I-objects у in I', [a, (x, y)] = A.
+Again 2' enters in the definition of the 6 that is to belong to 2'; for in order to know
+whether something holds of "all I-objects y in Z'" we must, of course, know all of
+I'. However, we can overcome this difficulty by forcing "for all I-objects y in Z'" to
+mean the same as "for all I-objects y" in the cases that come under consideration.
+And this we achieve simply as follows.
+12. (Preliminary condition.) Assume that both the II-object a and the I object x
+belong to I'; if there exists any I-object y such that [a, (x, y)] # A, then at least one
+such y also is to belong to I'.
+And now, for III 2, we can require the condition that follows (here again, as with
+Il 1-IV 1, it is a trifle too much).
+13. (Principal condition.) Assume that the II-object a belongs to 2'; then there
+belongs to I' a II-object b with the following property: [b, x] # A if and only if
+always [a, (x, y)] = A.
+In the case of III 3 the situation is the same. To express the "uniqueness" of y
+here, we must add the following condition to the "preliminary condition" 12:
+14. Assume that the II-object a and the I-objects x and y belong to I'; if
+
+407
+[a, (x, y)] # A and if there exists a ý' such that [a, (x, y)] # A and ý ‡ y, then one
+such y' also belongs to I'.
+And now the principal condition reads:
+15. Assume that the II-object a belongs to I'; then there belongs to 2' a II-object
+b such that, whenever [a, (x, y)] # A for a unique y, [b, x] = y.
+In the case of Axiom I 4 we again require a "preliminary condition":
+16. Assume that the II-objects a and b belong to I'; if there exists an x such
+that [a, x] # [b, x], then one such x also belongs to I.
+A principal condition is not necessary here, since we are not stipulating that anything exist. (All these conditions are sufficient but not necessary.)
+Finally there remain Axioms IV 2 and V 1-3. Here, too, we must formulate
+corresponding preliminary conditions (17-19 for IV 2, since "all" and "there exists"
+are nested three times; 20 and 21 for V 1; 22 for V 2; and 23 for V 3), but we shall not
+actually write them down one by one.
+As for principal conditions, one is necessary for one half of IV 2 ('If a is not a
+I-II-object, then there exists a b such that..."). It reads as follows:
+24. Let a be a Il-object that is not a I-II-object and assume that it belongs to I';
+then there belongs to 2' a II-object b such that for every x there exists a y such that
+both [a, y] # A and [b, y] = x.
+But for the other half of IV 2 ("If there exists a b for which..., then a is not a
+I-II-object") no principal condition is necessary at all. The reason is the same as in
+the case of Axiom I 4; after all, we are not demanding that anything exist.
+Finally, we do not need any principal conditions in the case of Axioms V 1-3 either.
+For, while we do indeed demand that some objects exist, these are I-II-objects.
+Now, that II -objects with the required properties exist follows already from the
+axioms of groups I-IV, that is, for I', from conditions 1-19 and 24. But, since these
+Ily-objects certainly are I-II-objects in I (E, after all, satisfies the axioms of group
+V), they must also be (I-II)r-objects. (For (I-II)r-objects are defined as I-II-objects
+that belong to Z').
+We are now in a position to summarize.
+For I' to satisfy the axioms it is certainly sufficient that conditions 1-24 be satisfied. Each of these conditions has the following form :
+Assume that the I-objects or II-objects u1, U2, ..., Un belong to I'; if they satisfy
+the condition AUL, U2,...,Un), then any I-object or II-object v satisfying the
+condition Bu,, Uz,..., Up, ") also belongs to 2.
+Here (besides u1, Uz,... Un and U1, Uz,..., Un, ") only properties of I enter in
+conditions A and B; I' does not occur in them. For certain of these conditions (1, 3,
+5-7, 10, and I1) we must set n = 0; that is, it is required that any o having the
+property Blu) belong to I'.
+But we can easily satisfy such conditions. There obviously exists a smallest 2'
+satisfying these conditions (which, however, go farther than the original requirement
+that I satisfy the axioms). We need only apply the following procedure:
+Take all of the conditions 1-24 in which n = 0 (see above) and construct the
+I-objects and II-objects v1, Uz, ..., Vu that are postulated by them. Then take all of
+the conditions 1-24 in which n ≥ 1 (that is, that actually contain some of the variables u1, Uz,...,Un). Substitute all possible combinations of 01, U2, ...,"« in these
+
+408
+conditions and construct the I-objects and II objects v1, 0½,..., ""' that are then
+postulated. Then substitute all possible combinations of v1, Uz, ..., "4, "1, U2,..., "i'
+in the conditions and construct the I objects and II objects v", "2,...,"". that are
+then postulated, and so on, and so on.
+If we now choose I' as the system of the objects o1, u2,..., Un, "í, U½,..., "i",
+"", "½,..., '''",..., we have a system that satisfies our axioms.
+§3. DENUMERABILITy
+The Z' obtained in § 2 has a most surprising property: it is obviously denumerable.
+But attention must be paid here to the meaning of the word "denumerable".
+'. I' is
+not denumerable in the sense that it has cardinality % as a class in the system I (or
+I'), that is, that it can be mapped one-to-one onto the first infinite ordinal a by
+means of a II-object in 2.14 That, of course, is out of the question, for I' is not a class
+at all; it also contains II-objects (see § 1). Moreover, parts of it (namely, all nondenumerable subclasses of Z') are "nondenumerable" in the sense that this notion
+has in the system Z'. But it is "denumerable" if we regard it (and together with it all
+the subclasses mentioned above) as a class in the "higher" system P, or, in the words
+of naive set theory, if its elements can de facto be written as a sequence.
+It is essential to prevent any misunderstanding here. The system I' contains a
+number of sets and mappings. They satisfy the formal requirements of set theory.
+For every possible cardinality there are sets of that cardinality. But all these cardinalities are specious; they are cardinalities only with respect to the group of mappings
+that belong to the system. For (in spite of its formal completeness) the system Z' does
+not by any means contain all conceivable mappings; any "higher" system P must
+already contain new mappings, for example, mappings that map all (infinite) sets in
+I' onto one another. For as parts of Z', which is denumerable (in P), all of these sets
+are, of course, denumerable, hence of the same cardinality (in P). One might perhaps
+believe that this would contradict Axiom IV 2; the Il-object w (or any infinite
+I-II-object) can be mapped onto the class of all I-objects, and it is nevertheless a
+I-II-object! But it is clear what the answer must be: the mapping in question belongs
+to P (is a IIp-object) and not to I', and Axiom IV 2, of course, refers only to
+II objects in 2'
+This relativity of cardinalities is very striking evidence of how far abstract formalistic set theory is removed from all that is intuitive. One can indeed construct
+systems like I' that, by satisfying certain formal axioms, faithfully represent set
+theory down to the last detail and that, therefore, to all intents and purposes are
+formal set theory itself. In these systems, all known cardinalities occur, in their
+infinite multiplicity, which is larger than any cardinality. But as soon as one applies
+finer instruments of investigation ("higher" systems P) all this fades away to nothing.
+Of all the cardinalities only the finite ones and the denumerable one remain. Only
+these have real meaning; everything else is formalistic fiction.
+This circumstance, incidentally, is by no means a special feature of our axiomatization. We could apply the procedure used in § 2 in almost exactly the same way (see
+14 This is indeed equivalent to "denumerable", since according
+to our definition of ordinal
+number (see von Neumann 1923) w is a denumerable set.
+
+409
+the papers of Löwenheim and Skolem) if our axioms were replaced by any other
+logical conditions. The construction just carried out stamps every axiomatic set
+theory with the mark of unreality (or, to employ a frequently used word, "impredicativity" ['"Imprädikativität "]).
+§4. MODELS OF SET THEORY
+We now know that, if it is at all possible to find a system & satisfying the axioms,
+we can also find some such system in which there are only denumerably many I-objects
+and denumerably many Il-objects. But this tends to suggest that we can find a model
+of set theory by purely arithmetic means. We could, perhaps, make an attempt along
+the following lines.
+Let the I-objects be the integers 1, 2, ....
+Let the II-objects all be functions f in a set $ of functions ($, of course, is likewise
+denumerable) whose domain of definition and range of values are the integers.
+Let (x, Y) be a given function p(x, y), defined for x, y = 1, 2,....
+Let [x, y] be f(y) if x is the function f in $ and y = 1, 2, ....
+Let A be 1 and let B be 2.
+But an amendment must still be made concerning the I-II-objects; for, as these
+specifications read at this point, the I-objects all are distinct from the II-objects.
+This can, however, easily be remedied. We assume that all I-objects are also I-II-
+objects. This extension of Axiom IV 1 is nonessential; we can show that, if the axioms
+are consistent, they are still so after the extension. Then we must simply indicate for
+each I-object, that is, for each number 1, 2,..., with which II object, that is, with
+which function in $, it is to be identified. For this purpose we need a further twovariable function «(x, y); then we shall assign to each number x the function q(x, y)
+considered as a function of y (the function must therefore belong to $). To summarize:
+Let the function o(x, y) be defined for x, y = 1, 2,.... For a fixed X, p(x, y) is a
+function of y; as such it belongs to $ for every x.
+The following question remains: what conditions must be met by the two functions
+p and o and the set of functions $ (only these are still arbitrary in our specifications)
+for the axioms to be satisfied?
+We can show, to begin with, that for p(x, y) (which is = (x,y)) we may choose,
+say, 2x (2y - 1) (from (from = p(x2, p(x2, it follows that that = x2 and YI = =Y2),
+since this function plays no particularly deep role. Essential, however, is what we
+choose for (x, y) and D.
+Now we can formulate the conditions for these two. We shall not carry this out in
+detail here but only indicate something of their form.
+The conditions are rendered substantially more strict and complex (as against
+those in § 3) by the fact that now the system is no longer part of a larger one that
+satisfies the axioms (as I' was a part of 2). Consequently, the conditions will no
+longer have the characteristic of being easily satisfiable. Axiom IV 2, in particular,
+raises problems. For it requires that no function that maps a set q(x, y) # 1 (x fixed,
+y being the element) onto the set of all numbers can belong to $. Now, while most of
+the conditions prescribe a lower bound for $ (that is, require that certain functions
+must belong to $), this axiom prescribes an upper bound for it. We have no guarantee,
+
+410
+initially, that the two bounds do not collide; if they did, there would be new antinomies. This, however, is not as weighty an objection against the choice of Axiom
+IV 2 as one might at first believe. For, instead of IV 2, one would in any case have to
+adopt at least Zermelo's axiom of separation (and even that would not suffice for
+many purposes), say, in the following form:
+IV 2. If b is a I-II-object, a is a II-object, and a ≤ b, then a too is a I-II-object.
+This axiom corresponds to the axiom of separation. For, that a is a II-object is
+precisely what Zermelo means when he says that a is "determined by a definite
+property"
+. From this, together with a ≤ b, where b is a I-II-object, the admissibility
+of a (that is, that a is a I-II-object) must follow.
+And, as we can easily convince ourselves, this (absolutely unavoidable) axiom
+would create exactly the same difficulties as [the original] IV 2. The place of IV 2
+absolutely must be occupied by some specifically "impredicative" axiom; and such
+an axiom is bound to cause difficulties in the construction of a model.
+The conditions that are obtained in this way are so difficult to survey and so
+complex that we cannot specify any model and indeed cannot even determine
+whether they are compatible at all, although the construction must be feasible if set
+theory can in any way be erected on a nonintuitionistic basis.
+I would like to make one final remark. If we omit the axioms of group V (infinity),
+the remaining axioms provide an adequate foundation for the theory of finite numbers;
+indeed, even the theory of real numbers remains possible to a limited extent: they
+are infinite classes, hence not sets (I-II-objects). We obtain a mathematics in which
+a theory of real numbers that rests on fundamental sequences is possible, the theorems
+on the convergence of sequences and series hold, and the theory of continuous functions, algebra, analysis, and the Riemann integral are possible. But, since sets of
+II-objects are impossible, the Weierstrass theorem on the upper bound (for sets of
+numbers, not sequences) becomes meaningless, as do the general notion of function,
+the well-ordering of the continuum, and the Lebesgue integral.
+Since the axioms now considered deal with finite sets only (all I-II-objects are,
+after all, finite), we can specify a model for them. P(x, y) must be so chosen that we
+can represent all functions that are #1 for only finitely many numbers.
+For example, assume that the prime numbers have been arranged in order of
+increasing magnitude, P1, P2, .... If
+x = i pin
+n = 0
+(all an ≥ O, only finitely many > 0), then
+f(x, y) = ay + 1.
+The choice of $ is then easy; we have only constructive conditions, as we can see
+rather easily (for in this case IV 2 is automatically satisfied; the collision of the two
+bounds on $ that were mentioned above does not occur).
+We thus obtain, as further evidence of what was said in § 3 about denumerability,
+a denumerable model of a pseudomathematics that agrees with the "real" one in
+many essential respects. To be sure, the model of the "big" set theory is unknown,
+but it, too, must exist if a formalistic set theory is at all possible.
+
+411
+§ 5. CATEGORICITY
+Now we must still investigate whether our axiom system is categorical [kategorisch], that is, whether it uniquely determines the system it describes. 15 We shall
+now explain this notion in more detail.
+It is known that from Euclid's axioms without the fifth postulate nothing follows
+about this fifth postulate. That is, there can be two systems-both satisfying these
+axioms-of which the first satisfies the postulate while the second does not. Such a
+situation, however, can never prevail once geometry is properly axiomatized; a
+geometric proposition that is true in one system satisfying the axioms of geometry is
+true also in any other such system. (We shall for the moment disregard the fact that
+the axioms of geometry in the last analysis depend upon those of set theory—on
+account of "continuity".) That this is so is due to the following
+Isomorphism theorem. Let A1 and A, be two systems that satisfy the axioms of
+geometry. Then there is a one-to-one mapping of A, onto A, under which the relations
+underlying the axioms are preserved, that is, under which incident points and lines,
+segments of equal length, congruent triangles, and so on go over into their likes (that
+is what "isomorphism"
+means).
+From this theorem, which is easy to prove, it obviously follows that, if a proposition
+formulated in terms of these basic relations is satisfied in A1, it is also satisfied in Az.
+Therefore an axiom system of this latter kind, one for which an isomorphism
+theorem analogous to the theorem just stated holds, uniquely determines the logical
+properties of the systems described by it; it is said to be categorical. Now, is our
+axiom system of this kind?
+This is most important. For we know only that the propositions of set theory that
+have already been settled follow from it. But those that have not yet been decided,
+for example, the continuum problem, might (if categoricity is lacking) be true in one
+system satisfying the axioms and false in another. That is, we would have no assurance at all that these axioms suffice to settle, say, the continuum problem.
+It is clear that the axioms in their present form are far too broad to be categorical.
+After all, we do not know, for example, whether there exist I-objects that are not
+I-II-objects, whether A and B are sets, whether (A, B) = A or # A, and so forth.
+This can, however, easily be remedied. We require the following (it can be proved that
+these axioms do not generate any contradiction if the previous ones are consistent 6).
+VI
+1. All I-objects are I-II-objects. (This makes IV 1 superfluous.)
+2. A = O and B = {03. (O is the set without elements, {O, contains only O.)
+3. (u, 0) = {íu, v}, {us}. (a, B} is the set with the elements a and B. From {{41, "1},
+{u,}} = {{uz, vz} {Uz}} it follows that u, = Uz and v1 = Uz, as we can easily prove.)
+We can also remove a further obstacle, to which we already alluded in § 1, namely,
+the possibility that there might exist "inaccessible" sets, such as, for example,
+"descending sequences of sets" (see § 1). In §1 we presented the reasons why it is
+15 This notion of "categoricity" is due to Veblen (1904, p. 346).
+16 [This problem is treated in von Neumann 1929.]
+
+412
+impossible to achieve this directly through an "axiom of restriction". But, formally,
+the exclusion of "descending sequences of sets"
+', too, is sufficient (we do not enter into
+the proof here). Hence
+4. There exists no II-object a such that, for every finite ordinal (that is, integer) n,
+[a, n + 1] = [a, n].
+(Here, too, it can be proved that Axiom VI 4 cannot generate any new contradiction. Strictly speaking, one further source of noncategoricity would still have to be
+excluded, namely, the possible existence of what are called regular initial numbers
+with a limit index." This leads us too far into the field of special set theory, however,
+to be treated here; moreover, this difficulty, too, can be eliminated.)
+But even now that this axiom group VI has been added our axiom system is in
+reality most likely still not categorical. Notwithstanding all our efforts, the required
+isomorphic mapping onto each other of two systems 2, and Iz that satisfy the axioms
+cannot be successfully constructed. It is wrecked, ultimately, on the fact that Axiom
+VI 4 does not exclude all "descending sequences of sets" but only those having the
+normal form of sequences in the system &1 (or 22), namely, [a, 1], [a, 2], [a, 3], ...
+(where a is a II-object in 2, (or [z)). However, it is, of course, always possible that
+there remain some "outside the system". In the interest of the isomorphic mapping
+we would have to forbid these, too; that is, we would again have to reach for a system
+P "higher" than both of the systems 2, and Iz. And this is impossible with Axiom
+VI 4, which has to do with 2, (or 22) singly.
+The consequence of all this is that no categorical axiomatization of set theory seems
+to exist at all; for probably no axiomatization will be able to avoid the difficulty
+connected with the axiom of restriction and the "higher" systems. And since there is
+no axiom system for mathematics, geometry, and so forth that does not presuppose
+set theory, there probably cannot be any categorically axiomatized infinite systems
+at all. This circumstance seems to me to be an argument for intuitionism.
+In connection with the question of categoricity, let us still mention the following.
+Let two systems 2, and 2z be given, let a, and az be sets in them, and let the elements
+of ay in I, be exactly the same as the elements of dz in Zz. We know that it may then
+very well happen that a is nondenumerable in 21 while this is not the case for a, in
+Ez (if Zz is "higher" than 21). But perhaps the situation is the same even for finitude.
+Since the notions "all" and "there exists" occur with reference to the entire system
+(E, or Iz), the definition of finitude is in any case such that we cannot say anything
+definite.1 For well-ordering the situation is the same. Thus we must take the relativity of cardinalities into consideration not only upward (from the denumerable;
+see § 3) but also downward (in the finite). In any case, elementary notions such as
+finitude and well-ordering depend upon the system chosen (41 Or 22); and it is not
+precluded that this dependence is of an essential nature, that a set a appears to be
+well-ordered (or to be finite) in the system 21 and turns out to be not well-ordered (or
+to be infinite) in the "finer" system Ez, merely because a certain part of a, namely
+17 [This possibility was discussed for the first time by Hausdorff (1908, pp. 443-444, and 1914,
+p. 131).]
+18 Finitude can, for example, be defined as follows :
+A class a is said to be finite if there is no class b possessing the following properties: 6 has
+elements that are <a; if x is an element of b and is <a, then b also has elements that are ≤a and
+at the same time < x.
+
+413
+b, that has no first element was not a set in the system 21 and thus went unnoticed
+there, while it is a set in the system Iz (analogously for finitude).
+Indeed, in the last analysis it would be conceivable that every system 21 could be
+further "refined" in such a way that finite (or well-ordered) sets turn out to be infinite
+(or not well-ordered). (For "nondenumerable" this is surely the case.) Of the notion
+of finitude, too, nothing but the shell of its formal characterization would then
+remain (just as was the case for nondenumerability). It is difficult to say whether this
+would militate more strongly, so far as finitude is concerned, against its intuitive
+character, championed by intuitionism, or its formalization as given by set theory.
+It is really an objection against both; after all, a new difficulty appears here, one
+that is essentially different from those pointed out by Russell and Brouwer. The
+denumerable infinite as such is beyond dispute; indeed, it is nothing more than the
+general notion of the positive integer, on which mathematics rests and of which even
+Kronecker and Brouwer admit that it was "created by God"
+. But its boundaries
+seem to be quite blurred and to lack intuitive, substantive meaning [anschaulichinhaltliche Bedeutung]. Upward, in the "nondenumerable", this is quite certain in
+view of Löwenheim's and Skolem's investigations. Downward, in the "finite"
+is at least very plausible, for categoricity is lacking, as is any foothold that would
+enable us to make the definition of "finite" determinate. Moreover, even Hilbert's
+approach is powerless here, since this objection does not concern consistency but the
+univocality (categoricity) of set theory.
+At present we can do no more than note that we have one more reason here to
+entertain reservations about set theory and that for the time being no way of rehabilitating this theory is known.
+
+On the principle of excluded middle
+ANDREI NIKOLAEVICH KOLMOGOROV
+To a large extent, this paper anticipated not only Heyting's formalization of
+intuitionistic logic, but also results on the
+translatability of classical mathematics
+into intuitionistic mathematics. It provides an important link between intuitionism and other works on the foundations of mathematics.
+Two formal systems B and 5 (Brouwer's and Hilbert's) of the propositional
+calculus are proposed. Both contain a
+(somewhat uneconomical but) complete
+set of axioms of the positive implicational
+calculus (I, § 5, (1), Axioms 1, 2, 3, 4)
+and rules of modus ponens and substitution. In addition, 2 contains also (II,
+86):
+Axiom 5. (A → B) → ((A → B) → A).
+The system 5 is obtained from 8 by the
+addition (II, § 7) of
+Axiom 6. À → A.
+It is proved that s is equivalent to
+Hilbert's formulation of the classical
+propositional calculus.
+The system B is nowadays known as
+the minimal calculus and differs from
+Heyting's system in that the latter contains, in addition to Axioms 1-5, also
+Axiom h. A → (A → B).
+The status of h in intuitionistic logic is
+not without question. Thus, according to
+Kolmogorov, it "is used only in a symbolic presentation of the logic of judgments; therefore it is not affected by
+Brouwer's critique" (I, § 6), and it "does
+not have and cannot have any intuitive
+foundation since it asserts something
+about the consequences of something impossible: we have to accept B if the true
+judgment A is regarded as false" (II,
+§ 4). Heyting appears rather diffident
+about defending the inclusion of h. Thus,
+according to him (1956, p. 102), if we
+have deduced a contradiction from the
+supposition that the construction A was
+carried out, "then, in a sense, this can be
+considered as a construction.... I shall
+interpret implication in this wider sense"
+Hence it is fair to say that, as a codification of Brouwer's ideas, 28 is no less
+reasonable than Heyting's propositional
+calculus.
+Kolmogorov makes no attempt in this
+paper to formalize intuitionistic quantification theory completely: Rather, he
+just lists as intuitively obvious the rule P
+of generalization, which allows us to
+prefix (a) to any given formula, and four
+axioms, I, II, III, IV (V, §3). In the
+same context, however, he also argues
+to the effect that
+Axiom g. (a)Ala) → A(t)
+is intuitively true. If, therefore, to the
+system B we adjoin the explicitly stated
+rule P and Axioms I-IV plus Axiom g,
+we obtain an adequate axiomatization
+BD of intuitionistic logic that differs from
+Heyting's system only in the omission of
+the questionable Axiom h. This is the extent of the anticipation of Heyting's
+formalization.
+The main purpose of the paper is to
+
+415
+prove that classical mathematics is trans- I-IV, g, with rules of inference) of quantilatable into intuitionistic mathematics.
+fication theory and extend his illustra-
+For this purpose, with each formula & of
+tion to cover also the rule P and the
+mathematics there is associated a transremaining axioms, and if we let 50 be
+lation &* in a perfectly general manner
+25 plus Axiom 6, then we have also:
+(IV, § 2). If —
+, →, (a), and (Ea) are the
+Theorem III.
+It 1l t§s 5, then
+only symbols we use for forming new
+11* +3D G*
+formulas from given formulas, the defini-
+In that case, all the derivations in V,
+tion amounts to: for atomic 5, G* is its
+§ 4, can be dispensed with because they
+double negation E, or nE; (B)* is n(B*);
+would follow from Theorem Ill.
+(A → B)* is n(A* → B*); ((a)Ala))* is
+A very suggestive remark (beginning
+n(a) (A(a))*; ((Ea)Ala))* is n(Ea)(A(a))*.
+of IV, §5, and last two paragraphs of
+The following results are proved ex-
+IV, § 6) is that every axiom A of matheactly (III, § 3) :
+matics is of type f, that is, A* is (intui-
+Lemma 1. +ZnA → A.
+tionistically) true. From this it would
+Lemma 2. If F3NA → A and tanB
+seem to follow that all classical mathe-
+→ B, then 13 n(A → B) → (A → B).
+matics is intuitionistically consistent (V,
+Theorem I. If &1,...,Ex are all the
+§ 1). As we know, however, this conatomic formulas in A and A is construcclusion, even today, has not yet been
+ted from 51,..., 5k by negation and
+firmly established
+so far as classical
+implication only, then, provided
+analysis and set theory are concerned.
+On the other hand, it seems not un-
+nEI → 81....nEK →EK
+reasonable to assert that Kolmogorov did
+are true (or taken as additional axioms),
+foresee that the system of classical num-
+(1) IgNA → A and (2) FB A if F§A.
+ber theory is translatable into intuitionis.
+If II = {111,..., 1k} is a set of axioms
+tic theory and therefore is intuitionisticand 11* is {11*,..., 1k}, then (IV, § 3):
+ally consistent. In fact, it is not hard to
+Theorem II. If II F$ G, then 11* 13 G*.
+work out his general indications and
+The proof of this theorem uses Lemma
+verify such a conclusion.
+2 for the rule of modus ponens and (in
+This completes the summary of the
+IV, § 4) the fact that the translations
+anticipations of results on the intuition-
+Gt,..., Em of the atomic formulas have
+istic consistency of classical mathematics.
+the property
+It remains to mention a few of the incidental remarks.
+Kolmogorov (V, § 1.1) states that, con-
+This last fact and Theorem I yield the
+result that the translation of Axioms
+1-6 all are theorems of 23.
+Strictly speaking, Theorem II is established only for the case in which & is
+built up by implication and negation (in
+particular, & does not contain quantifiers). However, Kolmogorov does envisage a much stronger result and illustrates by an example the treatment of
+axioms about quantifiers, axioms that
+he tends to take as being on the same
+footing as axioms about numbers and
+sets (IV, § 5).
+If we take his system BE. (Axioms 1-5,
+trary to a remark by Brouwer, a finitary
+conclusion established by nonintuitionis.
+tic methods is (intuitionistically) true.
+Two new examples are given of pro.
+positions not provable without the help
+of illegitimate uses of the principle of
+excluded middle. One of them, suggested
+by Novikov, is that every point in the
+complement C of a closed set is contained
+in an interval in C (V, 85). The other
+example is the Cantor-Bendixson theorem (V, § 6).
+With respect to system 2, it is stated
+explicitly (II, §6) that "the question
+whether this axiom system is a complete
+
+416
+axiom system for the intuitionistic gene- positive implicational calculus classically
+ral logic of judgments remains open".
+complete.
+At the end of II, § 2, the question of
+Hao Wang
+the classical completeness of Axioms 1-4
+for implication alone is raised. As we
+The paper was translated by the editor.
+know, the answer to the question is
+When informed of the projected publinegative. In fact, it is now a familiar
+cation of the translation of his paper
+result that it is necessary to add Peirce's Professor Kolmogorov signified his acquilaw, (\A → B) → A) → A, to render the escence.
+INTRODUCTION
+Brouwer's writings have revealed that it is illegitimate to use the principle of
+excluded middle in the domain of transfinite arguments. Uur task here will be to
+explain why this illegitimate use has not yet led to contradictions and also why the
+very illegitimacy has often gone unnoticed.
+Only the finitary conclusions of mathematies can have significance in applications.
+But transfinite arguments are often used to provide a foundation for finitary conclusions. Brouwer considers, therefore, that even those who are interested only in the
+finitary results of mathematics cannot ignore the intuitionistic critique of the
+principle of excluded middle.
+We shall prove that all the finitary conclusions obtained by means of a transfinite
+use of the principle of excluded middle are correct and can be proved even without
+its help.
+A natural question is whether the transfinite premisses that are used to obtain
+correct finitary conclusions have any meaning.
+We shall prove that every conclusion obtained with the help of the principle of
+excluded middle is correct provided every judgment that enters in its formulation
+is replaced by a judgment asserting its double negation. We call the double negation
+of a judgment its "pseudotruth". Thus, in the mathematics of pseudotruth it is
+legitimate to apply the principle of excluded middle.
+The necessity of introducing such notions as "pseudoexistence" and "pseudotruth" has long been felt in mathematics, if only in connection with the question of
+Zermelo's axiom. It is only now, however, that one of the forms of pseudotruth has
+received a strict determination and has been given a firm basis through axioms used
+in the domain of pseudotruth but not used for truth proper.
+I. FORMALISTIC AND INTUITIONISTIC POINTS OF VIEW
+§ 1. From the formalistic point of view mathematics is a collection of formulas.!
+Formulas are combinations of elementary symbols taken from a definite supply. At
+the basis of mathematics lie a certain group of formulas, called axioms, and certain
+rules that enable us to construct new formulas from given formulas; as rules of this
+kind we have at the present time the inference according to the schema G, 5 → Z | I
+and the rule of substitution of particular values for the symbols of variables of various
+kinds.
+1 See Hilbert 1922a, p. 152.
+
+417
+In contradistinction to the axioms, wittingly taken as "true"
+, a certain group of
+formulas are wittingly taken as "false". A system of axioms is said to be "consistent"
+if no formula considered "false" can be obtained from them by a derivation carried
+out according to the rules.
+§ 2. The formalistic point of view in mathematics asserts that the selection of the
+axioms constituting its basis is arbitrary and subject only to considerations of practical
+convenience that lie outside of mathematics and are, of course, more or less conventional.2 The sole absolute demand made upon every mathematical system is, from the
+point of view now considered, the demand that the axioms constituting its basis be
+consistent.
+The formulas proved on the basis of the axioms are said to be true, those leading
+to a contradiction false. The question of the truth or falsity of a consistent but unprovable formula has no meaning from the formalistic point of view. The existence of
+such formulas shows that the system of axioms is incomplete. We can complete an
+incomplete system of axioms, if for some reason this is desirable, by taking as an
+axiom an unprovable and consistent formula, or, with the same right, its contradictory. The selection of the formula taken as the new axiom, from each pair of contradictory formulas, is thus subject only to considerations of convenience.
+§ 3. The point of departure of the intuitionistic conception is the recognition of the
+real meaning of mathematical propositions. The axioms that constitute the basis of
+mathematics are adopted in order to express facts given to us. This conception
+tolerates the formalistic method in the study of mathematical constructions as one
+among other possible methods but goes against the formalistic conception of mathematics as a whole.
+To the question of the nature of unprovable but consistent propositions the intuitionistic conception gives an answer completely different from that given by the
+purely formalistic conception. Suppose that a system of axioms is given for a certain
+branch of mathematics, geometry for example. These axioms express properties of
+the subject under investigation, in this particular case, of space. Suppose, further,
+that a certain proposition of the branch selected cannot be proved on the basis of the
+given axioms but does not lead to a contradiction either. From the intuitionistic point
+of view two cases can occur. First, it may happen that the truth or falsity of the
+proposition considered follows from direct examination; in that case the given
+proposition, if it is true-or, if it is false, its contradictory-can be taken as a new
+axiom. Second, it may happen that the proposition is indeterminate, that is, that its
+truth or falsity does not follow from direct examination; in that case the only thing
+that we can do is to try to derive the proposition in question from others that are
+immediately obvious; if this does not succeed, the proposition has to be regarded as
+indeterminate, since it is possible that we shall subsequently have to adopt as obviously true axioms from which its truth or falsity can be derived; but whether this
+will be the case is precisely what we do not know at the present time.
+2 See Whitehead and Russell 1910, Introduction. Hilbert, too, is close to this point of view; for
+him absolute truths (absolute Wahrheiten) are propositions of "metamathematies" only, that is,
+assertions of consistency, but, on the other hand, the formulas of ordinary mathematics (eigentliche Mathematik), too, are in his opinion expressions of certain thoughts (Gedanken). (See Hilbert
+1922a, pp. 152-153.)
+
+418
+§ 4. The formalistic point of view is advanced in mathematical logic too. In the
+present paper we confront it precisely in the field of logic. To deny any real meaning
+to mathematical propositions is, however, what constitutes the basis of the formalistic
+point of view in mathematical logic. In fact, no one would propose applying to reality
+any logical formula that has no real meaning. Thus, so long as mathematical logic is
+regarded only as a formal system whose formulas have no real meaning, it diverges
+from general logic; the formalistic point of view can exist only in mathematics and
+mathematical logic but not in the ordinary logic that lays claim to significance in
+applications to reality.
+As for us, we do not isolate a special "mathematical logic" from general logic, but
+we admit only that the originality of mathematics as a science creates for logic special
+problems that are investigated by a specialized "mathematical logic". Only in this
+logic does a doubt arise concerning the unconditional applicability of the principle of
+excluded middle.
+§ 5. The difference between the two points of view presented manifests itself even
+in the domain of the logic of judgments. In what follows we understand by the general
+logic of judgments the science that investigates the properties of arbitrary judgments
+independently of their content, so far as their truth, their falsity, and the ways in
+which they are derived are concerned. (Each judgment is regarded as an unanalyzable
+element in the investigation.) The general logic of judgments is formally expressed
+with the help of symbols for arbitrary judgments, A, B, C,..., of the symbol for
+implication, A → B, and of the symbol for negation, A.
+Hilbert (1922a, p. 153) offered the following system of axioms for the logic of
+judgments:
+(1)
+Axioms of implication
+1. A → (B→ 4),
+2. {A → (A → B)} → (A → B),
+3. {A→ (B→C)} → {B→ (A→C)},
+(4. (B → C) → {(A → B) → (A →C)}.
+Axioms of negation
+55. A → (A → B),
+16. (A → B) → {(A → B) → B}.
+The inner consistency of these axioms can be proved in an extremely elementary
+way.3 From the formalistic point of view this is sufficient for accepting them as a
+basis for the general logic of judgments.
+Moreover, Hilbert's system is complete: no new independent axiom can be added
+without contradiction. More precisely, for every formula written with the symbols of
+the logic of judgments, even such a formula as
+(A →B) → (A → B),
+3 See Ackermann 1924.
+
+419
+either the formula can be proved on the basis of Hilbert's axioms or the consequence
+A,
+that is, the truth of an arbitrary judgment, can be derived from it by means of the
+same axioms.
+§ 6. From the intuitionistic point of view the mutual consistency of Hilbert's
+axioma is by no means sufficient for their acceptance. In the next chapter we shall
+analyze the source of their significance for judgments in general and for particular
+forms of judgments.
+One of Hilbert's two axioms of negation, Axiom 6, expresses the principle of
+excluded middle in a somewhat unusual form. Brouwer proved that the application
+of this principle to arbitrary judgments is without any foundation.* Axiom 5 is used
+only in a symbolic presentation of the logic of judgments; therefore it is not affected
+by Brouwer's critique, especially since it has no intuitive foundation either.
+Thus, together with a critique of Hilbert's axioms, we shall have to present new
+axioms of negation, whose applicability to arbitrary judgments has been ascertained.
+II. AXIOMS OF THE LOGIC OF JUDGMENT
+§ 1. The axioms of the general logic of judgments lay claim to having significance
+for all judgments; therefore, they must follow from the general properties of judgments. To be sure, what comes immediately below is not at all a definition of fundamental notions or a proof of the axioms of the logic of judgments, but a search for
+their intuitive sources that already uses all the notions and devices of logic.
+In the logic of judgments the judgment is considered the ultimate element in the
+investigation. When we consider the judgment independently of the synthesis of
+subject and predicate that it contains, there remains the sole characteristic property
+of a judgment, the one that distinguishes it from other forms of expression and was
+stated by Aristotle:" it can be appraised from the point of view of truth or falsity.
+It is natural to try to derive the axioms of the general logic of judgments without
+going beyond its own boundaries, that is, purely from the property of judgments that
+4 See Brouwer 1923d, p. 252. Hilbert, too, thinks that the principle of excluded middle is not
+intuitively obvious when applied to infinite collections of objects. In that case he expresses it
+symbolically by the two formulas
+(a) A (a) äq. (Ea)A(a),
+(Ea)A (a) äq. (a)A(a).
+are not inseparably linked with the fundamental and purely formal task that he set himself, the
+investigation of consistency; they seem incorrect to us.
+First, Axiom 6 is not intuitively obvious. Its relation to finitary logic (finite Logik) is only illusory; while the truth of the axioms of implication (1-4) is perceived independently of the content
+of the judgments, the truth of Axiom 6, as will be explained in the next chapter, demands for its
+justification that the content of the judgments be considered, and this content may be transfinite.
+Second, if Axioms 1-6 are adopted, the two formulas given above can be proved with the help
+of a few axioms whose intuitive obviousness cannot be questioned. We shall give the proof in
+Chapter V, but the first argument is sufficient to justify the investigations that now follow.
+5 De interpretatione, 4; De anima, III, 6.
+
+420
+was just mentioned. In the next sections of the present chapter we shall investigate
+to what extent this is possible.
+§ 2. The meaning of the symbol A → B is exhausted by the fact that, once convinced of the truth of A, we have to accept the truth of B too. Or, in the formalistic
+interpretation: if formula A is written down, we can also write down formula B.®
+Thus, the relation of implication between two judgments does not establish any
+connection between their contents.
+Hilbert's first axiom of implication, which means that "the true follows from
+anything"
+', results from such a formalistic interpretation of implication: once B is
+true by itself, then, after having accepted A, we also have to regard B as true.
+The truth of the remaining three axioms of implication is
+seen just as easily on
+the basis of the interpretation given for the notion of implication. Moreover, the
+character of the judgments considered is not in the least affected; consequently,
+no doubt can arise about the possibility of applying these axioms to arbitrary
+judgments.
+The question of the completeness of the system of the four axioms of implication
+is interesting. After what has been said concerning the completeness of Hilbert's full
+system of axioms for the logic of judgments, the question has to be put thus: A formula proved by means of the axioms of implication and the axioms of negation is
+said to be true; can every true formula written with the help of only the symbols for
+arbitrary judgments and implication, without the symbol for negation, be proved on
+the basis of the four axioms of implication alone?
+§ 3. So far as a completed judgment, considered as a whole, is concerned, negation
+is merely the interdiction from regarding the judgment as true. We can obtain a
+fuller view of what negation is by considering the judgment as a statement attributing a predicate to a subject; negation then is the assertion that the predicate is
+incompatible with the subject.
+The symbol A of the logic of judgments, of course, expresses the first interpretation of negation, that is, the interdiction from considering the judgment A true.
+However, the usual tradition in logic has been to pass from the first interpretation
+to the second, regarded as more primitive.? In the application to mathematical
+judgments this turns out to be impossible.
+In so far as the negation of a judgment is the product of direct examination, the
+second interpretation, which takes its point of departure in the idea of the impossibility of the synthesis that creates the judgment, is actually closer to the substance
+of the matter than the first, which rests upon the purely formal idea of interdiction.
+But, when a negation is obtained as the result of a derivation, the reduction of the
+first interpretation to the second is no longer necessary and, in the case of mathematical judgments, is sometimes even impossible. In fact, many negative judgments
+in mathematics are proved by means of a reduction to a contradiction, according to
+the schema 5 → 2, 2 | 6,8 and cannot be proved in any other way.
+6 This is precisely what is expressed by the schema 6, 6 → {| 2 in Hilbert's metamathematies.
+Sigwart, too, regards this schema as the most general schema in any inference (see Sigwart 1908,
+р. 372, [or 1904, p. 434J).
+" See, for instance, Sigwart 1908, pp. 135ff., [or 1904, pp. 155ff.]
+8 See § 6 on the principle of contradiction.
+
+421
+Thus, the first interpretation of negation is independent. It was originally introduced by Brouwer (1923d), who defines negation as absurdity. It rests upon the
+second, since to derive a negative judgment by reduction to a contradiction we must
+already have some negative judgments, but at the same time it is broader than the
+second.
+§ 4. Hilbert's first axiom of negation, "Anything follows from the false", made its
+appearance only with the rise of symbolic logic, as did also, incidentally, the first
+axiom of implication. But, while the first axiom of implication follows with intuitive
+obviousness from a correct interpretation of the idea of logical implication, the axiom
+now considered does not have and cannot have any intuitive foundation since it
+asserts something about the consequences of something impossible: we have to accept
+B if the true judgment A is regarded as false.
+Thus, Hilbert's first axiom of negation cannot be an axiom of the intuitionistic
+logic of judgments, no matter which interpretation of negation we take as a point of
+departure. This, of course, does not exclude the possibility that the axiom can be
+a formula proved on the basis of other axioms.
+§ 5. Hilbert's second axiom of negation expresses the principle of excluded middle.
+The principle is expressed here in the form in which it is used for derivations: if B
+follows from A as well as from A, then B is true. Its usual form, "Every judgment is
+either true or false"
+° is equivalent to that given above. 10
+Clearly, from the first interpretation of negation, that is, the interdiction from
+regarding the judgment as true, it is impossible to obtain the certitude that the
+principle of excluded middle is true; incidentally, no such attempts have been made.
+Consequently, to justify the principle we must turn to the structure of the judgment,
+the relation of predicate to subject. Even in the very simple case of a judgment of
+the type "All A are B" the relations of all possible A, the supply of which can be
+infinite, to the predicate B inevitably enter into consideration. Brouwer showed11
+that in the case of such transfinite judgments the principle of excluded middle cannot,
+precisely for this reason, be considered obvious.
+§ 6. Thus, from the intuitionistic point of view neither of Hilbert's two axioms of
+negation can be taken as an axiom of the general logic of judgments. We offer here the
+following axiom, which we shall call the principle of contradiction:
+(3)
+5. (A → B) → {(A → B) → A}.
+• This is Leibniz's very simple formulation (see Nouveaux essais, IV, 2). The formulation " A
+is either B or not-B" has nothing to do with the logic of judgments.
+10 Symbolically the second form is expressed thus:
+A V A,
+where V means "or". The equivalence of the two forms is easily proved on the basis of the
+axioms of implication and the following axioms, which determine the meaning of the symbol V and
+are taken from Ackermann 1924 :
+1. A → A V B,
+2. B → A V B,
+3. (A → C) → (B → C) → (A V B) → C.
+[In these formulas V binds more strongly than →, and for → there is association on the right.]
+11 See Brouwer 1923d or the example of a proposition unprovable except by an illegitimate use
+of the principle of excluded middle, discussed in detail in Brouwer 1920.
+
+422
+Its meaning is: If both the truth and the falsity of a certain judgment B follow from
+A, the judgment A itself is false.
+The usual principle of contradiction, "A judgment cannot be true and false', cannot be formulated in terms of an arbitrary judgment, implication, and negation. Our
+principle contains something else; namely, from it, together with the first axiom of
+implication, there follows the principle of reductio ad absurdum: If B is true and if
+the falsity of B follows from A, then A is false.
+The truth of the proposed axiom follows from the simplest interpretation of
+negation, the interdiction from regarding a judgment as true, and does not depend
+upon whether the content of the judgments is considered
+The system of five axioms, the four axioms of implication (1) and the axiom of
+negation (3) just adopted, I shall call the system 23. We do not know any formula of
+the general logic of judgments that possesses intuitive obviousness when applied to
+arbitrary judgments but is not provable on the basis of this system of axioms.
+Nevertheless, the question whether this axiom system is a complete axiom system
+for the intuitionistic general logic of judgments remains open.
+§ 7. Although, as we have seen, the principle of excluded middle cannot be regarded
+as an axiom of the general logic of judgments, it has validity in the limited domain of
+the judgments that Brouwer calls finitary judgments. We shall not investigate here
+what the boundaries of the domain of finitary judgments are; this task is not as easy
+as it may seem. We therefore limit ourselves to the recognition of the fact that such
+a domain exists.
+Besides the principle of excluded middle, the principle of double negation, which
+is expressed symbolically by
+(4)
+6. A → A,
+has validity in the domain of the finitary. 12
+It is self-evident that all five axioms of the general logic of judgments (the system
+28) are valid in the domain of the finitary too. The system of axioms that consists of
+the axioms of the system 23—that is, (1) and (3)-and the axiom of double negation
+(4) we shall call the system 5.
+The system 5 is equivalent to the system consisting of Hilbert's axioms (1) and (2).
+The axioms of implication are common to both. For the proof it is therefore sufficient
+to prove formulas (3) and (4) on the basis of the formulas (2), and conversely, the
+axioms of implication being used in both cases. We shall not carry out the proof of
+formulas (3) and (4) on the basis of Hilbert's axioms (1) and (2), but the converse
+proof, which rests upon axioms (3) and (4), introduced here for the first time, is
+carried out in the next section.
+For us the system 5) has the advantage of being obtained from the system 23 of the
+general logic of judgments by the addition solely of the axiom of double negation;
+this considerably facilitates further investigation.
+It is clear that the system 5, just like Hilbert's system, is complete. In it we can
+derive all the formulas of the traditional logic of judgments. They are all true, if only
+we replace in them the symbols for arbitrary judgments, A, B, C, ..., by symbols for
+12 The formula A → À is provable on the basis of the system 2. See formula (34) below.
+
+423
+arbitrary finitary judgments, A', B', O",.... The proof of this fact meets with some
+difficulties, which are explained and overcome in the next chapter. 13
+§ 8. We shall designate the axioms of the system S, (1), (3), and (4), by the numbers
+1-6. The numbers of formulas that rest upon Axiom 6 are doubly underlined to indicate that these formulas have validity only in the domain of the finitary, while the
+others are valid for arbitrary judgments.
+A → (B → A)
+(5)
+Axiom 1
+B → (A → B)
+{A → (B→C)}→{B→(A→C)}
+(6) [[B→C)→{(4→В)→(А>Ơ)]→[(4→B)→{(B→C)→(A→0
+Axiom 3
+(7)
+(8)
+(9)
+(10)
+(11)
+(12)
+(13)
+(14)
+(15)
+[(B→ C) → {(A→B) → (A→C)31→[(A→B)→{B→C→(A→C 16)
+(B → C) → {(A → B) → (A → C)}
+Axiom 4
+(A → B) → {B →C)→(A→C)}
+(A → B) → {(B → C) → (A →C)}
+(7)
+{B → (A → B)} → K(A → B) → A} → (B → A)]
+{B → (A → B)} → [ (A → B) → A} → (B → A)]
+(8)
+B → (A → B)
+(5)
+{\A → B) → A} → (B → A)
+(A → B) → { (A → B) → A)
+Axiom 5
+{(A → B) → A; → (B→A)
+(9)
+(A → B) → (B → A)
+(A → B) → (B → A)
+(10)
+(B → A) → (A → B)
+A → (B →A)
+Axiom 1
+(B → A) → (A → B)
+(11)
+A → (A → B)
+A → (A →B)
+A → (A → B)
+(12)
+À→ A
+B → B
+Axiom 6
+(B → C) → {(A →B) → (A → C)}
+Axiom 4
+(B → B) → {(A → B) → (A → B)}
+(B→B) → {(A → B) → (A →B)}
+(15)
+13 See Chapter III, § 4.
+
+424
+B → B
+(16)
+(A → B) → (A → B)
+(1Z)
+(4 → B) → (1→ B)
+(A → B) → (À → B)
+A → (A → B)
+(18)
+(A → B) → (A → B)
+A → (A → B).
+Thus Hilbert's first axiom of negation is proved.
+(19)
+(4 → B) → (B →À)
+(A → B) → (B→Ã)
+(20)
+(A → B) → { (A → B) → A}
+(B → A) → {(B → A) → B}
+(A → B) → (B → A)
+(14)
+(16)
+(13)
+(16)
+(10)
+Axiom 5
+(10)
+(В → A) → {(B→ A) → B}
+(21)
+(20)
+(A → B) → {(B → A) → B}
+(A → B) → { (B → C) → (A →C)}
+(22)
+(7)
+{(Ã→B)→(B→Ã)}→К(B→Ã)→B} → {(À →B)→B}
+{(Ä→B)→(B→Ã)}→К(B→A) → B;→ {(À → B)→B}]
+(22)
+(A → B) → (B → A)
+(23)
+(19)
+{(B→Ã)→B}→{(Ã→ В)→ Б}
+(A →B) → {(B→À) → B}
+(21)
+{(B → A) → B} → {A → B) → B}
+(24)
+(23)
+(A → B) → { (A → B) → B}
+(25)
+(A → B) → (A → B)
+(16)
+{(A → B) → B} → { (A → B) → B}
+(A → B) → { (A → B) → B}
+(24)
+(26)
+{(A → B) → B, → {(4 → B) → B}.
+(25)
+(A → B) → {(A → B) → B}
+Thus Hilbert's second axiom, too, is proved.
+Among the formulas proved with the help of axioms B, without the axiom of
+double negation, formulas (12) and (24) are those that are closest to Hilbert's axioms
+of negation. Formula (24), which comes close to the principle of excluded middle,
+
+425
+means: if B follows from the truth of A and from its falsity as well, then it cannot
+be false. Indeed, if we assume that B is false, A cannot be true, since B would follow
+from A; but from the falsity of A the truth of B would follow.
+III. THE SPECIAL LOGIC OF JUDGMENTS AND ITS DOMAIN OF APPLICABILITY
+§1. The formulas provable on the basis of axioms B constitute the general logic of
+judgments. We shall call the totality of formulas provable on the basis of the six
+axioms 5 the special logic of judgments. 14 The content of the special logic of judgments is richer than that of the general logic, but its domain of applicability is
+narrower. Everything below is devoted to the explanation of what the domain of
+applicability of the special logic of judgments is. This domain is perhaps even somewhat narrower than the domain in which the principle of excluded middle in the
+Hilbert form is applicable.
+§ 2. Let us introduce symbols, A', B', C',..., to denote arbitrary judgments for
+which the judgment itself follows from its double negation. The finitary judgments
+are of that kind. All true judgments are also of that kind; this, however, will not
+have any application in what follows. Brouwer proved (1923d) that all negative
+judgments are of that kind. The proof, given below, rests only upon the axioms of
+the system B.
+(27)
+On the basis of the axioms of implication it is easy to prove the formula
+A → A.
+(28)
+(A → B) → { (4 → B) → A}
+(A→ A) → {(A → A)→Ã}
+Axiom 5
+(29)
+4 → (B → 4)
+Axiom 1
+A → (A → A)
+A → (A → A)
+(30)
+(Ă→ 4)→((Ã→A)→À
+(29)
+(28)
+A→{(Ã→À)→Ã}
+(31)
+{A→ (B→C}}→{B→(A→C)}
+Axiom 3
+[A→ {(A→A) →A} → {(A→A)→(A→A}
+[>{\Ã→Ã)→Ã}>{(Ã→Ã)→(A→Ã)}
+(31)
+(32)
+A>{(Ã→Ã)→À}
+(30)
+(A → A) → (A → A)
+(33)
+A → A
+(27)
+A →À
+(A→A) →(A →7)
+(32)
+14 The general logic of judgments also has another, real interpretation (see Chapter I, § 5).
+The special logic of judgments can for the present be defined merely formally, since the real
+meaning of its formulas will be established only in what follows.
+
+426
+(34)
+(35)
+(36)
+A→ A
+A →À
+(4 → B) → (B→A)
+(A →À)→(À→À)
+(A→À)→ (À→À)
+4→ A
+(33)
+(10)
+(35)
+(34)
+The last formula shows that all negative judgments are judgments of type 4'.
+The axiom system § differs from the system 2, which is universally applicable,
+only by the axiom of double negation. For judgments of type A' this axiom is
+expressed by the following formula:
+(37)
+We consider only this formula to be true; we consider formula (4) to be unfounded.
+But it does not yet follow from what has been said that all formulas of the special
+logic of judgments are true for judgments of type A'; in fact, in the derivation of
+these formulas the axiom of double negation (4) is applied not only to elementary
+judgments—which for our case, that of judgments of type A', is justified by formula
+(37)—but also to complex formulas; whether a formula of type A' → B', for example,
+is a formula of type A' is, however, not yet apparent.
+§ 3. We shall now prove that every formula expressed by means of the symbols
+A', B', C',..., and the symbols of implication and negation is a formula of type A'.
+For that it suffices to consider two very simple cases.
+First, every negative judgment is a judgment of type A' by virtue of Brouwer's
+formula (36).
+Second, we now prove that a judgment of type A' → B' is also a judgment of
+type A.
+(38)
+A → A
+(A → B) → (A → B)
+(27)
+(39)
+Axiom 3
+(40)
+(4l)
+(42)
+(A → B) → (A → B)} → [A → {(A → B) → B
+{\A → B) → (A → B)} → [A → {(A → B) → B}]
+(A → B) →> (A → B)
+A → {(A → B) → B}
+(A → B) → (B → A)
+(B→A) → (À → B)
+(A → B) → (B → A)
+(B→A)→ (Ã→B)
+(A → B) → (Ã→ B)
+(39)
+(38)
+(10)
+(10)
+(41)
+
+427
+(43)
+(A → B) → (À→B)
+(42)
+{(A → B) → B} → {A → B) → B}
+A → {(A → B) → B}
+(40)
+{(A → B) → B} → {A → B) → B}
+(44)
+(43)
+A → {TA →B) →B}
+(45)
+{A→ (B → C)} → {B→ (A →C)}
+Axiom 3
+[A→ {A → B) → B}] → {A → B) → (A →B)}
+[A → {A → B) → B}] → {A→ B) → (A → B)}
+(45)
+A → {A → B) → B}
+(46)
+(44)
+(A → B) → (A→B)
+This formula is true for arbitrary judgments A and B. Replacing A by A and B
+by B' and making use of formula (37), we easily obtain the formula
+(47)
+(4' → B) → (A' → B),
+which shows precisely that judgments of type A' → B' are of type A'.
+By gradually passing to more complex formulas, we can prove the assertion made
+at the beginning of the present section.
+§ 4. We can now assert that all formulas of the special logic of judgments are true
+for judgments of type A', including all finitary and all negative judgments. In fact,
+the symbols A', B', C,..., A' → B', and A' allow all the operations that the symbols
+of the general logic of judgments do: substitution for the symbols A', B', C,... of
+an arbitrary formula written by means of the symbols considered and inference
+according to the schema & → 2, 2 | E; moreover, all six axioms so are true for them.
+The precise boundary of the domain in which the special logic of judgments is
+applicable has thus been found; this domain coincides with the domain in which the
+formula of double negation (4) is applicable.
+IV. THE MATHEMATICS OF PSEUDOTRUTH
+§ 1. In the preceding chapter we established that all the formulas of the traditional
+logic of judgments can actually be proved as formulas of the special logic of judgments. We must merely recognize that they deal only with judgments of type A.
+Moreover, these formulas themselves turn out to be formulas of type A'.
+The following question now arises: Can we in a similar way, after we have placed
+some restrictions on their real interpretation, again give a
+, meaning to all those
+formulas of mathematies that are proved by an illegitimate use (that is, a use outside
+the domain in which they are applicable) of formulas of the special logic of judgments, in particular by use of the principle of excluded middle? It turns out that this
+task can be fulfilled.
+§ 2. We shall construct, alongside of ordinary mathematics, a new mathematics, a
+"pseudomathematics" that will be such that to every formula of the first there
+
+428
+corresponds a formula of the second and, moreover, that every formula of pseudomathematics is a formula of type A'. For the time being we are not concerned with
+the question of the truth of the formulas of pseudomathematics; we shall turn to it
+in § 5 of the present chapter.
+A symbol, simple or complex, that expresses a judgment is called
+a formula.
+Formulas of which no part is a formula will be called elementary formulas, or formulas of the first order; a = a is such a formula. A formula whose parts are formulas
+of the (n-l)th order at most will be called a formula of the nth order. For example,
+the formula
+a = b → {A(a) → B(a)}
+is a formula of the third order since its constituent part A(a) → B(a) is a formula of
+the second order.
+To an elementary formula & there corresponds in pseudomathematies the formula
+G*, which expresses the double negation of & :
+(48)
+In what follows we shall, for convenience, denote the double negation of 5 by nG.
+To the formula of the nth order F(G1, E2,..., Ek), where 61, E2,..., Ex are
+formulas of the (n-1)th order at most, there corresponds in pseudomathematics the
+formula F(G1, 52, ..., 5к)* such that
+(49)
+F(G1, 52,..., Ek)* = nF(G*, 6ž,..., E*),
+G1, G2,..., Ot being regarded as already determined. For example, to the formula
+a = b → {A(a) → B(a)}
+there corresponds in pseudomathematics the formula
+n[n(a =b) → n{nA(a) → n B(a)}].
+To every symbol that is not a formula there also corresponds a definite symbol of
+pseudomathematics. To a symbol, simple or complex, of which no part is a formula
+there corresponds in pseudomathematics a symbol that is identical with it. To a
+complex symbol in which formulas enter there corresponds a symbol in which each
+formula & is replaced by the formula 6*.
+§ 3. All the formulas of mathematics are derived from axioms, 15 which we denote
+by 11, 12,..., Hu, with the help of the operations of substitution of particular values
+for variables and of inference according to the schema 8, 5 → I | I. To the axioms
+there correspond in pseudomathematics the formulas 11*, Už, ..., U*. We shall prove
+that every formula of pseudomathematics that corresponds to a formula proved on
+the basis of the axioms Il is a consequence of the formulas 1*. For the proof it suffices
+to establish the following two facts.
+First, if, when particular values are substituted for variables in a formula 6, we
+obtain a formula 2, then, when the corresponding formulas and symbols are substituted at the corresponding places in the formula G*, we obtain the formula 2*.
+15 Here all the axioms of logic are included among the axioms of mathematics.
+
+Second, in analogy with the schema G, & → I | I, the schema
+G*, (5→2)*|2*
+429
+(50)
+is correct.
+In fact,
+(51)
+(52)
+(& → 2)*= (&* →2*);
+since G* and I* are formulas of type A', we have, according to formula (47),
+(&* → {*) → (©*→**),
+(53)
+2*.
+Thus, we see that to every correct proof in the domain of ordinary mathematics
+there corresponds a correct proof in the domain of pseudomathematics. From that
+follows the truth of the proposition advanced at the beginning of the present section.
+§ 4. To the five axioms of the general logic of judgments there correspond in pseudomathematics the following formulas:
+1. NinA→n(nB →nA)},
+2.n[n{nA→n(nA→nB)}→n(nA→nB)],
+(54)
+3.n[n{nA→n(nB→nC)}→n{nB→n(nA→nC)}1,
+4. n[n(nB → nC) →n≤n(nA → nB) →n(nA → nC)}],
+These formulas can be obtained from
+1. n{A → n(B' → A)},
+(55)
+....
+5. n[n(A'→B)→n{(A→n)→^Ã}]
+by substitution of nA, nB, and nC for A', B', and C', respectively. Since formulas
+(55) are formulas of the special logic of judgments, we have the right to prove them
+by using all the axioms of 5, or all of Hilbert's axioms. Their proof does not present
+any difficulty. Thus, all the formulas (54) turn out to be true. It follows from this that
+all the formulas of pseudomathematics that correspond to the formulas of the general
+logic of judgments are true.
+§ 5. All the axioms of mathematics that we know possess the same property as the
+axioms of the general logic of judgments, namely, that the formulas corresponding
+to them in the domain of pseudomathematies are true. For example, to the axiom
+(a) A (a) → Ala)
+there corresponds the true formula
+nín(a)nAla) → nA(a)}.
+
+430
+We shall call the axioms that possess the property formulated above axioms of type
+A. Further, let us call the formulas provable on the basis of the axioms of type A
+formulas of type A. All the axioms and formulas of mathematics that we know are of
+type A.16
+By virtue of what was said above, the part of pseudomathematies whose formulas
+correspond to the formulas of type A acquires a real meaning: all its formulas are
+true, since they are consequences of the true formulas that in pseudomathematics
+correspond to the axioms of type . The name "pseudomathematies" becomes inappropriate for this part, the only one that for the time being exists; as a collection
+of true formulas, it is part of genuine mathematics.
+We shall say that a judgment is pseudotrue if its double negation is true. A judgment of the form n& thus asserts the pseudotruth of the judgment 5. The formulas
+of pseudomathematics always express only judgments about pseudotruth. We have
+the right, therefore, to call the part of pseudomathematies that has real meaning the
+mathematics of pseudotruth.
+§ 6. In the usual presentation of mathematics a number of conclusions are obtained
+by an illegitimate use of formulas of the special logic of judgments, for example, by
+use of the principle of excluded middle. All these cases, as has been shown, can be
+reduced to the use of the principle of double negation,
+(4)
+6. A → A.
+Among these conclusions let us consider those that, except for the illegitimate
+formula (4), rest only upon axioms of type f. The formulas that express them we
+shall call formulas of type A'
+Let us construct the formulas of pseudomathematics that correspond to the formulas A'. They will all follow from the formulas 1* that correspond to axioms of type
+A and from the formula
+(56)
+nín(nA) → nA},
+which corresponds to formula (4).
+Formula (56) is true. In fact, by virtue of formula (34), it follows from
+(57)
+n (nA) → nA.
+Formula (57) can be obtained by means of substitution from a formula of the special
+logic of judgments,
+(58)
+n(A) → A';
+in the special logic of judgments, as we know, an even number of negations reduces to
+afirmation.
+Thus, while the formulas of ordinary mathematics that we have considered are based
+on an illegitimate use of formula (4), the corresponding formulas of pseudomathematics rest upon the true formula (56).
+So we finally obtain the following result: None of the conclusions of ordinary
+16 In mathematics formulas whose truth is not obvious, for example, what is called Zermelo's
+axiom, are sometimes taken as axioms. But they, too, possess the property that 1 → 11*.
+
+431
+mathematics that are based on the use, outside the domain of the finitary, of the
+formula of double negation and of other formulas that depend upon it (like the principle
+of excluded middle) can be regarded as firmly established. But, for those conclusions
+whose derivations require, besides this formula [that of double negation], only
+axioms of type f (and no other axioms are known at present), the corresponding
+formulas of pseudomathematics are true and consequently become part of the mathematics of pseudotruth.
+In other words, all the conclusions that rest upon axioms of type f and on the
+formula of double negation are correct if we understand every judgment that enters
+into them in the sense of the affirmation of its pseudotruth, that is, of its double
+negation.
+V. ADDENDA
+§ 1. After having shown that it is illegitimate to apply the principle of excluded
+middle to transfinite judgments, Brouwer set himself the task of providing a foundation for mathematics without the help of that principle, and to a considerable extent
+he carried out this task.17 But it then turned out that there exist a number of mathematical propositions that cannot be proved without the help of the principle of excluded middle, rejected by Brouwer. We consider below a few examples of such
+propositions.
+We proved in the preceding chapters that, alongside of the development of mathematics without the help of the principle of excluded middle, we can also retain the
+usual development. To be sure, a limited interpretation then has to be given to all
+propositions; namely, every judgment of ordinary mathematics has to be replaced by
+the affirmation of its pseudotruth. But this development nevertheless retains two
+remarkable properties.
+1. If a finitary conclusion is obtained with the help of arguments based on the use,
+even in the domain of the transfinite, of the principle of excluded middle, the conclusion is true in the usual sense. In view of what precedes, it can in fact be proved as
+a conclusion about pseudotruth; but, in the domain of the finitary, pseudotruth
+coincides with ordinary truth.
+2. The use of the principle of excluded middle never leads to a contradiction. In
+fact, if a false formula were obtained with its help, then the corresponding formula of
+pseudomathematics would be proved without its help and would also lead to a
+contradiction. 18
+The first of these assertions contradicts a remark by Brouwer (1923d, p. 252,
+footnote), who thinks that finitary conclusions based on a transfinite use of the
+principle of excluded middle must also be considered unreliable.
+§ 2. Generally, the propositions that we do not know how to prove without an
+illegitimate use of the principle of excluded middle ordinarily rest directly, not upon
+the principle of excluded middle of the logic of judgments, but upon another principle
+that bears the same name. In fact, from the principle of excluded middle in the form
+17 See, for example, Brouwer 1918 and 1919.
+18 We assume that all the axioms considered are axioms of type A and, moreover, that any
+formula wittingly taken as false, 6, is such that the corresponding E* is also false.
+
+432
+peculiar to the logic of judgments, namely, "Every judgment is either true or false",
+we can obtain further conclusions by following the schema that corresponds to
+Hilbert's formula: If B follows from A as well as from A, then B is true. But in the
+case that interests us, that of transfinite judgments, it is difficult to obtain any positive conclusion B from the pure negation A; for that we must first transform the
+judgment A into some other.
+The following type of transfinite judgment is the most customary: for all a, Ala)
+is true; symbolically, this judgment is written (a)A(a). When we want to derive a
+positive conclusion from the negation (a)A(a) of this judgment, we put it in the form
+(Ea) A(a), that is, there exists an a for which 4(a) is not true. The equivalence of the
+last assertion to the simple negation of the judgment (a)A(a) is expressed by the
+following two formulas:
+(59)
+(a) A (a) → (Ea) A(a),
+(60)
+(Ea) A(a) → (a)A(a).
+In § 4 of the present chapter we shall demonstrate that formula (59) requires for its
+proof only the acceptance of the principle of double negation (4) in addition to
+formulas whose intuitive obviousness is unquestionable, among which the axioms of
+the general logic of judgments are included. But formula (60) can be proved without
+the help of that principle.
+If we adopt formulas (59) and (60), we shall have the right to formulate the
+principle of excluded middle for judgments of the form (a) A(a) as follows :
+(a) A(a) V (Ea)A(a),
+that is, either A(a) is true for all a or there exists an a for which A(a) is not true.
+To formulas (59) and (60) Hilbert adds (1922a, p. 157) the following :
+(61)
+(Ea) A (a) → (a) A (a),
+(62)
+(a)À(a) → (Ea)A(a).
+In accordance with what was said above, he deems that formulas (59)-(62) justify the
+application of the principle of excluded middle to infinite collections of objects a.
+Unlike formulas (59) and (60), formulas (61) and (62) can both be proved on the
+basis only of axioms that are intuitively obvious. The proof is given in § 4.
+Thus, formulas (60)-(62) simply are true formulas, while formula (59) is proved on
+the basis of the principle of double negation (4); everything presented in the preceding
+chapter, therefore, applies to the conclusions that rest upon that principle.
+§ 3. Let us remark first of all that, having determined the meaning of the symbol
+(a) A(a) as "for all a, A(a) is true", we understand by "for all a" the same thing as by
+"for each a", that is, the meaning is that, whatever a may be given, we can assert
+that A(a) is true.
+Every formula of the general logic of judgments, when written by itself, means that
+it is true for all possible judgments, A, B, C,.... Thus, the formula A → A means
+that for any judgment the double negation of the judgment follows from its truth.
+
+433
+Accordingly, it is impossible to assert that the symbolic expression (a)A(a), when
+introduced, is the first to lead us out of the domain of the finitary; the notion "for
+all a" is contained in hidden form in all formulas in which there are symbols for
+variables.
+In general, the formula A(a) written by itself means that, whatever the particular
+meaning of a may be, A(a) is true. From this the following principle, which cannot be
+expressed symbolically, results: whenever a formula & stands by itself [in a derivation], we can write the formula (a)G. When we have to refer to this principle, we
+denote it by P.19
+Furthermore, we adopt the following axioms,
+I. (a){Ala) → B(a)} → {(a) A(a) → (a)B(a)},
+II. (a){A → B(a)} → {A → (a) B(a)},
+(63)
+III. (a){A(a) → C} → {Ea)A(a) → C},
+(IV. A(a) → (Ea) A(a).
+We believe that all these axioms are intuitively obvious. The choice of these axioms
+and their number are exclusively determined by our goal, which is to prove formulas
+(59) -(62).
+§4.
+(A → B) →
+→ (B→A)
+A(a) → (Ea)A(a)
+(64)
+(65)
+(Ea) A(a) → A(a)
+(a)}(Ea) A (a) → A(a)}
+(a){A → B(a)} →
+→ {A → (a)B(a)}
+(66)
+(a)(Ea) A(a) → A(a)}
+(Ea) A(a) → (a)A(a).
+Thus formula (61) is proved.
+{A→ (B →C)} →
+→ {B→ (A→C)}
+A → (A → B)
+(67)
+(68)
+(69)
+A → (A → B)
+A → (A →B)
+A (a) → {A(a) → (Ea)A(a)}
+(a)[A(a) → {A(a) → (Ea) A(a)}]
+(11)
+Axiom IV
+(64) P
+Axiom II
+(65)
+Axiom 3
+(12)
+(67)
+(68) P
+itself can be substituted for V.
+
+434
+(70)
+(71)
+(72)
+(73)
+(a){A(a) → B(a)} →
+→ {(a)A(a) → (a) B(a)}
+(a)[A(a) → {A(a) → (Ea) A(a)}]
+(a)A (a) → (a){A(a) → (Ea) A(a)}
+(a){A(a) → C} → {(Ea) A(a) → C}
+(a){A(a) → (Ea) A(a)} → {(Ea) A(a) → (Ea) A(a)}
+(A → B) →
+→ {(A → B) → A}
+A→ A
+(1>1) →4
+(A → A) → A
+{(Ea)A(a) → (Ea)A(a)} → (Ea)A(a)
+(a)A(a) → (a){A(a) → (Ea) A(a)
+(a){A(a) → (Ea) A(a)} → {(Ea) A(a) → (Ea)A(a)}
+{(Ea) A(a) → (Ea)A(a)} → (Ea) A(a)
+(a) A(a) → (Ea)A(a).
+(74)
+Thus formula (62) is proved.
+(75)
+(76)
+(77)
+(78)
+(79)
+(a)A (a) → (Ea) A(a)
+(a)A(a) → (Ea)A(a)
+A → À
+A(a) → A(a)
+(a){A (a) → À(a)}
+(a){A(a) → B(a)} →
+→ {(a)A(a) → (a)B(a)}
+(a){A(a)→ A(a)}
+(a) A(a) → (a)Ă (a)
+(a) A(a) → (a)Ă (a)
+(a)À (a) → (Ea) A(a)
+(a) A(a) → (Ea) A(a)
+(A → B) →
+→ (B→ A)
+Axiom I
+(69)
+Axiom III
+Axiom 5
+(27)
+(72)
+(70)
+(71)
+(73)
+(74)
+(34)
+(76) P
+Axiom I
+(77)
+(78)
+(75)
+(11)
+
+435
+(80)
+(81)
+(82)
+(a) A (a) → (Ea)A(a)
+(Ea)A(a) → (a)A(a)
+A →À
+(Ea) A (a) → (Ea)À(a)
+(Ea)À(a) → (Ea)A(a)
+(a)A (a) → (a) A(a)
+(Ea) A (a) → (a)A(a).
+(79)
+(34)
+(81)
+(80)
+Thus formula (60) is proved.
+The proof of formula (59) cannot be carried out without the help of the axiom of
+double negation. The numbers of the formulas that rest upon this axiom are doubly
+underlined.
+(83)
+(84)
+(85)
+(86)
+(87)
+(Ea) 4(a) → (a) A (a)
+(Ea)A (a) → (a)À(a)
+À →A
+A (a) → A (a)
+(a){A (a) → (a)}
+(a){A(a) → B(a)} →
+→ {(a)A (a) → (a)B(a)}
+(a)(A (a) → A (a)}
+(a) A (a) → (a) A(a)
+(Ea)À (a) → (a)À(a)
+(a) A (a) → (a) A(a)
+(Ea) A (a) → (a) A(a)
+(A → B) →
+(66)
+Axiom 6
+(84) P
+Axiom I
+(85)
+(83)
+(86)
+(11)
+→ (B→A)
+(88)
+(a) A (a) → (Ea) 4(a)
+(89)
+À → A
+(Ea)A(a)→ (Ea)À(a)
+(a) A(a) → (Ea)Á(a)
+(90)
+(Ea) A(a) → (Ea)A (a)
+(a) A(a) → (Ea)A (a).
+Thus formula (59) is proved by means of the axiom of double negation.
+(87)
+Axiom 6
+(88)
+(89)
+
+436
+§ 5. An excellent example of a proposition unprovable without the help of an
+illegitimate use of the principle of excluded middle is given by Brouwer (1920); he
+shows that it cannot be considered proved that every real number has an infinite
+decimal expansion. He even exhibits a definite number for which it is not known
+whether it has a first digit in its decimal expansion.
+Another example is the proposition stating that the complement of a closed set is
+a region, that is, that every point not belonging to a given closed set is contained in
+some interval that does not contain any point of the set.? The proof, as is well known,
+is carried out in the following way: by the principle of excluded middle in the form
+given in § 2 of the present chapter, either all intervals containing the point considered
+contain points of the set or there exists at least one interval that does not contain
+any such point; the first assumption leads to a contradiction, since it implies that the
+point belongs to the set, and therefore the second proposition is true. This example
+differs from Brouwer's in that here we do not know how to exhibit a definite closed
+set and a definite point exterior to it for which the existence of the required interval
+is doubtiul.
+§ 6. The following example is interesting: without the help of the principle of
+excluded middle it is impossible to prove any proposition whose proof usually comes
+down to an application of the principle of transfinite induction. For example, a
+proposition of that kind is: every closed set is the sum of a perfect set and a denumerable set.
+The proof of such propositions is often carried out without the help of the principle
+of transfinite induction. But all these proofs rest upon the principle of excluded
+middle, applied to infinite collections, or upon the principle of double negation.
+It is important to observe that the principle of transfinite induction itself can be
+derived without any assumption that, from the point of view of the theory of point
+sets, is new, but that the principle of excluded middle is necessarily used. It suffices
+merely to formulate the principle of transfinite induction without the use of the term
+"transfinite number"
+, whose introduction would demand new axioms. Let us consider, instead, sets of rational numbers that are completely ordered from left to
+right. For such a set, a part that starts on the left from some point, which may or
+may not belong to the set, will be called a segment of the set. A segment, too, will
+always be a completely ordered set. The set of segments will itself be also completely
+ordered. Let us say that a segment is proper if there exists a point of the set that
+does not belong to it. The principle of transfinite induction can now be formulated
+in the following way.
+Let a certain property J, which may or may not obtain of a completely ordered set
+of rational numbers, satisfy the following conditions :
+(1) Sets consisting of one point alone have property J;
+(2) If all the proper segments of a set have property J, then the set itself has it.
+Under these conditions all completely ordered sets of rational numbers possess
+property J.
+This formulation of the principle of transfinite induction can be used in the same
+cases as the ordinary one. Its proof is carried out thus: either all sets possess property
+20 This example was pointed out by P. S. Novikov.
+
+437
+J or there exists a set E that does not possess it; the second assumption leads to a
+contradiction, for among the segments of E there must be a first one that does not
+possess property J, and the existence of such a segment contradicts the conditions.
+The examples adduced suffice to show that, alongside of the development of
+mathematics presented by Brouwer without the help of the principle of excluded
+middle, we must preserve the usual development, which uses this principle, if only as
+the development of mathematics of pseudotruth.
+
+Formal proofs and undecidability
+PAUL FINSLER
+(1926)
+This paper, which was received for
+nondenumerably many real numbers and
+publication on 28 November 1925, presince only denumerably many such prosents an example of a proposition that,
+positions can be expressed in language,
+although false, is formally undecidable.
+there are propositions of that form that
+Finsler establishes the undecidability of
+belong to the purely conceptual realm
+the proposition by suitably modifying
+and not to the formal domain.
+the argument used by Richard in stating
+Finsler then considers the list of infihis famous paradox (see above, pp. 143-
+nite binary sequences such that each is
+144); first, the argument now bears on
+definable by a linguistic, hence finite,
+the notion of provability, rather than on
+expression. The antidiagonal sequence of
+that of finite definability, and, second, it
+the list is defined as the sequence whose
+keeps clear of the paradox and thus
+kth term is 1 - Ckk, where Cir is the jth
+reaches a valid conclusion. Because of
+term of the ith sequence in the list. From
+Finsler's result as well as his method, the
+the conclusion that the antidiagonal
+paper has often been regarded as a foresequence is finitely definable and should
+runner of Gödel's 1931 paper. However,
+appear in the list he escapes by denying
+Finsler's conception of formal provability
+that this sequence has a finite definition:
+is so profoundly different from Gödel's
+the sequence has been characterized by a
+that the affinity between the two papers
+grammatically correct sentence of the
+should not be exaggerated.
+language, but, since this finite character-
+Finsler first introduces a distinction
+ization demands that the sequence be not
+between "formal" and "conceptual"
+finitely definable, it contradicts itself,
+The "formal" domain consists of all the
+hence is no definition at all—at least so
+expressions of a certain language, whose
+long as we remain in the formal domain.
+dictionary and grammar have been
+If the definition is regarded as belonging
+cleansed of vagueness; this language may
+to the conceptual domain, it becomes unbe all-embracing, containing all the linobjectionable; no longer formal, it is no
+guistic resources that have been or will
+longer a finite definition; hence it does
+ever be used. Outside this domain there
+not contradict itself. What we now have
+is the "purely conceptual" domain,
+is a sequence, namely, the antidiagonal
+which contains nonlinguistic objects:
+sequence, that is definable but not forunwritten and unwritable propositions,
+mally definable.
+definitions, and proofs. Finsler elucidates
+A parallel argument applies to proofs.
+the distinction by means of an example.
+Consider a formal proof establishing that,
+For every real number a there is a proin a given binary sequence, O occurs infiposition, true or false, of the form "a is a
+nitely many times or that, in the setranscendental number". Since there are quence, 0 does not occur infinitely many
+
+439
+times. All such proofs can be ordered, say 1 - ajj and 1 - bij. Now there is no k
+lexicographically. To each proof corres- such that for every j
+ponds the binary sequence to which the
+(1)
+proof refers. The binary sequences cor-
+1 - djj =akji
+responding to proofs are therefore ordered
+. the existence of such a k would lead to
+once the proofs are. No formal proof (2)
+1 - акк = акк»
+corresponds to the antidiagonal sequence.
+Hence the proposition
+"In the antiwhich expresses the Richard paradox.
+diagonal sequence 0 does not occur infi-
+But there may very well be a k such that
+nitely many times" is not formally defor every j
+cidable. Nevertheless this proposition is
+(3)
+false: there are infinitely many formal
+This is precisely where Gödel's shif
+proofs establishing that 0 does not occur
+from "true" to "provable" occurs. The
+intinitely many
+• times in the binary
+sequence Ill.., and to each of these
+antidiagonal sequence is not located on a
+line of its own table, which would lead to
+proofs there
+corresponds a 0 in the
+the paradox, but on a line of some other
+antidiagonal sequence.
+table. (That a k satisfying (3) for every j
+Clearly, the argument bears a strong
+resemblance to Richard's. We also obactually exists has to be proved, and a
+large part of Gödel's paper is devoted to
+serve how it foreshadows Gödel's. Gödel's
+the proof of just this statement, expressed
+proof of his incompleteness result rests
+in other terms.) By substitution, (3)
+upon an argument that can be regarded
+yields
+as having been adapted from the Liar
+paradox, by a shift from
+"true" to
+(4)
+1 - акк = Окк.
+"provable", but also, as Gödel himself
+Since P is assumed to be consistent and
+notes (below, p. 598), from the Richard
+its intended interpretation is assumed to
+paradox. Consider the well-formed formube sound, no nontruth is provable; hence
+las of Gödel's system P that contain
+diZ bij and (4) yields ark = 1 and
+exactly one free variable, say x. These
+Br = 0, that is, the existence of an
+formulas can be ordered, say lexicounprovable true proposition.
+graphically; let F(x) be the ith such
+Finsler, too, considers a table of O's
+formula. We define ai; and bij by
+and I's, and from the fact that the corresponding antidiagonal sequence cannot
+(1 it Fij) is true,
+occur on any line of the table he con-
+(O it FiJ is not true,
+cludes that there is no formal proof corresponding to the antidiagonal sequence;
+(1 if Fi(j) is provable,
+O if Fij) is not provable.
+(Here j is the representation of the
+number j in the system P). For j = 0,1,
+2,... we have the sequence
+hence the proposition that corresponds
+to this sequence, although false, is
+formally undecidable. Both Gödel's and
+Finsler's arguments, with their similarities and their differences, skirt the
+Richard paradox without falling into it;
+dio, dil, diz,...;
+both exploit Richard's argument to
+obtain new and valid conclusions.
+then for i = 0, 1, 2,...
+we have a
+Finsler's paper, however, remains a
+sequence of sequences, that is, a table of sketch. The point that begs hardest for
+O's and I's that is infinite in two direc- clarification is the nature of the purely
+tions. Similarly for bij. The general terms
+conceptual realm. Undoubtedly, in introof the antidiagonal sequences correspond- ducing this domain Finsler remains faithing to these two tables are respectively ful to the conviction, long unchallenged
+
+440
+among mathematicians, that mathe- and fairly simply at that—in a language.
+matics cannot be reduced to its linguistic Hence, according to Finsler, Gödel has
+expression. According to him, a definition
+not exhibited a formally undecidable
+or a proof that leads to a linguistic conproposition at all: Gödel's true undecidtradiction "becomes unobjectionable as
+able proposition is formally decidable and
+soon as we transfer it from the formal to
+is simply a true and provable proposition
+the purely conceptual realm and leave
+that turns out to be unprovable in some
+the formal out of consideration". The
+artificially limited system, namely, Gö-
+phrase is repeated but not discussed at
+del's system P. This clearly shows the
+length or elucidated. The distinction that
+limits of Finsler's anticipation of Gödel's
+Finsler introduces between
+a sentence
+results. While Gödel puts the notion of
+written on a blackboard and the same
+formal
+system at the very center of his
+sentence spoken in front of the blackinvestigations, Finsler attempts to lay
+board would suggest that the relation of
+bare the fallacy hidden in any paradox
+the formal domain to the purely conand to remove this fallacy by means
+ceptual realm may resemble that of a
+adapted to the specific case, without a
+language to an associated metalanguage.
+general reconstruction of language. Other
+But, since
+Finsler views the formal
+papers by Finsler (1923, 1927, 1944 with
+language as possibly all embracing, this
+its discussion of the Liar) complement
+interpretation can hardly be sustained.
+the one reproduced here.
+It would also conflict with Finsler's own
+The paper was translated by Stefan
+comments (1944) on Gödel's 1931 results.
+Bauer-Mengelberg. Professor Finsler read
+The nonformal argument by means of
+the translation and suggested a number
+which Gödel's undecidable proposition is
+of emendations. The translation is reprorecognized as true Finsler considers to be
+duced here with the kind permission of
+"formal"
+, since it can be expressed-
+Professor Finsler and Springer Verlag.
+I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
+1. In order to demonstrate the consistency of certain systems of axioms, Hilbert!
+employs a theory of mathematical proofs in which these proofs are thought of as
+strictly formalized—as arrays, composed of certain signs, that are actually written
+down. "A proof is an array that must be given as such to our perceptual intuition."z
+And further, "A formula will be said to be provable either if it is an axiom or results
+from an axiom by substitution, or if it is the end formula of a proof" 3 The goal then
+is to show that on the basis of a given axiom system a formula representing a
+(likewise formalized) contradiction is certainly not provable. Axiom systems for
+which this can be demonstrated are said to be "consistent"* In what follows, once
+we have adopted a certain general notion of formal proof, we shall refer to these
+systems somewhat more precisely as formally consistent systems.
+2. The question to what extent this formal consistency permits us to infer a
+genuine absence of internal contradictions in the axiom system under consideration
+is related to the problem of decidability.
+For, if every mathematical assertion whose truth or falsity represents a logical
+1 See Hilbert 1922, 1922a, 1925, Bernays 1922, and Ackermann 1924.
+2 Hilbert 1922a, p. 152.
+3 Hilbert 1922a, pp. 152-153.
+4 Hilbert 1922a, p. 157, and 1925, p. 179 [above, p. 383].
+
+441
+consequence of the axioms were decidable by means of purely formal proofs, we could
+at once infer absolute consistency from formal consistency.
+But this ceases to be the case as soon as there exists a proposition that, though its
+truth is from the logical point of view unambiguously decided by the axiom system,
+can be neither proved nor refuted by purely formal means. For then we can add this
+proposition, or also its contradictory, to the system as a new axiom and thus obtain
+two formally consistent axiom systems, of which one certainly contains an internal
+contradiction.
+3. Now this possibility in fact exists in the case of the axiom system for the real
+numbers if we have only a finite or denumerably infinite number of signs available
+for use in the formal proofs, as is certainly the case for proofs that are actually written
+down.
+Then there can exist only denumerably many formal proofs altogether, since each
+individual one must consist of a finite arrangement of these signs. But from the
+axiom system for the real numbers there follow, purely logically, more than denumerably many propositions. Consider, for example, the propositions of the form "a is a
+transcendental number". For each particular value of a this is a particular proposition,
+which is either true or false. It is not possible for every single one of these nondenumerably many propositions to be formally decidable, since to each specific proposition
+there would have to correspond a specific proof, which might have to be obtained from
+a general proof through substitution or specialization. It follows from this, however,
+that there exist propositions that are not formally decidable.
+4. To be sure, it would still be conceivable that all those propositions that could
+themselves be formally represented were formally decidable. ® In that case the axiom
+to be newly added would not be formally representable.
+One might, moreover, readily be led to conjecture that such a nonformal contradiction could never be noticed and hence were harmless-that one could always
+pretend, therefore, that contradictions of this kind did not exist.
+But we shall now show by means of an example that we can in fact exhibit propositions that are not formally decidable by general methods, that are therefore formally
+consistent, but in which we can nevertheless recognize a contradiction in another way.
+It follows, therefore, that the proof of the formal consistency of a system does not
+afford a guarantee against recognizable contradictions.
+Since, however, these matters are closely connected with the "paradox of finite
+definability", we shall first give a precise statement and an explanation of this
+paradox.?
+II. THE PARADOX OF FINITE DEFINABILITY
+5. Let a fixed system & of finitely many signs be given. This system shall contain,
+in particular, all signs used for mathematical purposes; it may even contain all signs
+5 Ackermann 1924, p. 9.
+6 That we cannot formally represent arbitrarily chosen objects-simply by introducing a new
+sign, say—is to be understood here as follows: we must start from a fixed fundamental system and
+carry out all further steps, including the definition of new signs, formally, lest the representation
+not be purely formal. (See footnote 9.)
+" See also F'insler 1923, p. 143.
+8 Without essential changes we could also assume denumerably infinitely many.
+
+442
+used until now (or even in the future) for writing or printing. A fixed ordering of these
+signs will be taken as the "alphabetic" one.
+Further, assume that there is given a fixed "dictionary" 3, including a "grammar",
+that unambiguously specifies the meaning associated with certain finite combinations
+of these signs, with the "words"
+. Assume that words having a finite number of different significations in ordinary linguistic usage have been unambiguously distinguished,
+say, by means of subscripts. It is also possible, however, that certain signs or combinations of signs are defined as "variables", which will obtain an unambiguous meaning
+in context by virtue of the grammar. In particular, let 23 contain all words occurring
+in the present paper, with the meanings employed here, and besides, say, all other
+words written or printed anywhere until now (or even in the future). The "definitions" of the dictionary need not consist of signs of the system &; they may be
+thought of as given in a purely conceptual way.
+An arrangement of signs for which 13 does not yield an unambiguous meaning is to
+be regarded as meaningless.
+Any object will be said to be finitely definable if there is a finite arrangement of
+signs of the system & such that this arrangement has a meaning, to be ascertained
+by means of 23, that unambiguously determines the object.
+6. Let us call the sequences formed from the numbers 0 and 1, including the
+sequences 0, 0, 0,... and 1, 1, 1,..., binary sequences.
+Two binary sequences are to be regarded as equal if and only if every term of one
+sequence coincides with the corresponding term of the other.
+According to a familiar argument of Cantor's, the totality of all binary sequences
+is not denumerable.
+For, if an arbitrary sequence of binary sequences is given, it will not contain the
+unambiguously determined binary sequence—let us call it the antidiagonal sequence
+—in which for every n the nth term differs from the nth term of the nth binary sequence. Hence no sequence of binary sequences can contain all binary sequences.
+The totality of all binary sequences that are finitely definable (by means of 23) is,
+however, denumerable.
+For all the finite combinations that can be formed from signs of the system & can
+be arranged in a denumerable sequence: we put first, of any two of these combinations,
+the one containing fewer signs and observe "alphabetic" order for those having the
+same number of signs. This ordering establishes a denumerable sequence of all the
+combinations that unambiguously define any binary sequence and therewith also of
+the finitely definable binary sequences themselves. The same binary sequence can
+occur several times in that sequence, but that is immaterial here.
+7. It follows from these considerations that there exist binary sequences that are
+not finitely definable (by means of 28).
+This is not in itself surprising, for, once the totality of the binary sequences has
+been completely defined, it would be a restriction to demand further that every single
+one of them have itself a finite definition as well.
+But what is paradoxical is that we can unambiguously specify a certain one of the
+binary sequences that are not finitely definable, namely, the antidiagonal sequence
+associated with the sequence of finitely definable sequences that was defined above. This
+sequence seems hereby to have been finitely defined after all.
+
+443
+In reality, however, this is not the case. The definition just given does, to be sure,
+consist of signs of the system & and of words that are listed in 13. But that is precisely
+the reason why it is not logically unobjectionable.
+For every object that is unambiguously characterized by a definition consisting of
+words of 23 must be finitely definable. But a binary sequence cannot have this property and at the same time the other property required by the definition above. This
+definition, therefore, demands something that is impossible; hence there does not
+exist a binary sequence that satisfies it.
+This result is really obvious since, of course, every attempt to define in a given way
+something that is not definable in that way must necessarily fail.
+The given definition, however, becomes unobjectionable as soon as we transfer it from
+the formal to the purely conceptual realm and leave the formal out of consideration [und
+vom Formalen abstrahiert]. Then it indeed unambiguously defines a certain binary
+sequence that is not finitely definable by means of 2.°
+8. The situation obtaining here can be made still clearer by means of a simple
+example. 1°
+Let us write on a blackboard the numbers 1, 2, 3, and the phrase " the least natural
+number that is not listed on this blackboard". The phrase on the blackboard cannot
+define a natural number in an unobjectionable way. But just as we cannot infer from
+this the nonexistence of the number 4, so we cannot infer from the paradox above
+the nonexistence of binary sequences that are not finitely definable. The same holds
+also for real numbers that are not finitely definable.
+III. A FORMALLY UNDECIDABLE PROPOSITION
+9. We shall now construct a formally undecidable proposition. To this end we state
+the following definitions, using the notions already introduced.
+A formal proof is a finite combination of signs of the system & such that this
+combination has
+a meaning, to be ascertained by means of B, that constitutes a
+logically unobjectionable proof.
+A proposition is said to be formally undecidable if no formal proof is possible
+either for this proposition or for its contradictory.
+Now consider all the combinations, of signs of the system &, that constitute a formal
+proof of the fact that in a certain binary sequence the number 0 occurs infinitely
+many times, or, alternatively, that it does not occur infinitely many times. Then with
+every such proof there is associated an unambiguously determined binary sequence,
+namely, precisely the one for which the proof holds. There may, however, be several
+such proofs for the same binary sequence.
+A denumerable sequence of these proofs can be established by means of the ordering
+defined in Article 6; then the associated binary sequences, too, form a denumerable
+sequence. Now take the antidiagonal sequence associated with this sequence and
+construct the proposition:
+• Nor can this binary sequence be represented purely formally through the introduction of a
+new sign (see footnote 6), particularly if the notions that will be formally represented in the
+future, too, are already contained in 2 in their entirety.
+10 See footnote 7.
+
+444
+In the antidiagonal sequence just defined the number 0 does not occur infinitely many
+times.
+This proposition is formally undecidable since the associated binary sequence
+cannot belong to the sequence established above. We can therefore say that the
+proposition is formally consistent.
+10. But, for all that, we can see that this proposition is false, hence inconsistent.
+For the number 0 must nevertheless occur infinitely many times in the antidiagonal
+sequence under consideration since we can obviously prove formally, by means of
+arbitrarily many words, that in the binary sequence whose first term is 1, whose
+second term also is 1, and whose succeeding terms likewise all are 1, the number 0 will
+not occur infinitely many times. But to every such proof there corresponds a zero in
+the antidiagonal sequence; hence this sequence certainly contains infinitely many zeros.
+11. There seems to be a contradiction here, in that the formally undecidable
+proposition apparently was decided formally after all.
+In reality, however, this is not the case. The formal proof just given, which consists
+of words of B, is not unobjectionable as a formal proof; for, in referring to a binary
+sequence that cannot occur in the sequence defined above, it implicitly demands that
+it should not itself be included among the valid formal proofs. Hence, if it is to represent such a proof after all, this brings about an internal contradiction in the proof
+itself, which is therefore invalid. Nor could we by any other means succeed in formally
+deciding the proposition under consideration in an unobjectionable way.
+But the proof becomes unobjectionable as soon as we transfer it from the formal to the
+purely conceptual realm and leave the formal out of consideration.
+The formal definition of the antidiagonal sequence under consideration is certainly
+unobjectionable in itself since it contains no such contradiction.
+Thus there actually does exist a formally representable proposition that is formally
+consistent but logically false.
+12. Here, too, we can offer a simpler example, corresponding to that considered in
+Article 8, for purposes of comparison.
+Let us write the proofs of the following four theorems on a blackboard:
+VI is rational; V2 is irrational; V3 is irrational; V4 is rational.
+Furthermore let us write the following on the same blackboard:
+"Definition. Let m be the least natural number for which it is not decided by any
+of the proofs appearing on this blackboard whether its square root is rational or
+irrational.
+"Assertion. V m is irrational.
+"Proof. Since on this blackboard it is decided for the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4
+whether their square roots are rational or irrational, m > 4. But, since the proofs
+appearing on the blackboard concern at most five numbers, certainly m ‹ 9. Therefore 2 < Vm < 3. Now the square root of a natural number is either an integer or an
+irrational number. Since Vm cannot be an integer, it therefore follows that Vm is
+irrational."
+In this example m is necessarily equal to 5, since for m > 5 the number 5 would
+still be the least natural number about which nothing was proved on the blackboard.
+
+445
+And indeed m = 5, since the last proof appearing on the blackboard is not unobjectionable as a proof. The fact that it appears on the blackboard constitutes a
+demand that it be invalid, for otherwise m would not be the correct number.
+But the given proof is unobjectionable if we take it as purely conceptual, that is,
+if it does not itself appear on the blackboard.
+The definition of m that appears on the blackboard is certainly unobjectionable in
+itself; it unambiguously defines the number 5
+If in addition we were to write the proposition "Vm is rational" on the blackboard, it would be a proposition that appears on the blackboard but is not decided,
+and therefore also not refuted, there; nevertheless the proposition would be false. It
+would be impossible, moreover, to write on the blackboard any proof that would
+refute this proposition.
+
+On the domains of definition of functions
+(1927)
+In a series of papers published from
+1918 onward, Brouwer set forth an intuitionistic "set theory" and on this basis
+an intuitionistic reconstruction of pointset topology and analysis. The text below
+is part of a paper published in 1927 (received for publication on 28 April 1926)
+and contains the proof that every function that is (in the intuitionistic sense)
+everywhere defined on the closed interval
+[O, 1] of the continuum is uniformly continuous (T'heorem 3). In the course of the
+argument Brouwer proves the fundamental theorem on "sets" that he later
+(1953) called the bar theorem, as well as
+its corollary, the fan theorem (Theorem
+2).a
+The text brings together and reworks
+previous expositions of these
+results.
+The uniform-continuity theorem had
+been asserted earlier (1923, p. 4), with
+only an indication of the fan theorem.
+The bar theorem and the fan theorem
+were proved, again for the sake of uniform continuity, in a subsequent paper
+(1924 (or its German translation, 1924a),
+amended and added to in 1924b (or
+1924c)).
+The intuitionistic theory of the continuum is based on Brouwer's own notion
+of set (see below, p. 453). Brouwer was
+dissatisfied, it seems, with the treatment
+of the continuum by earlier constructivist
+mathematicians. They either abandoned
+their constructivism at this point and
+adopted an axiom of completeness or, as
+is done in theories of the continuum
+based on ramified type theory, rejected
+any means of quantifying over more than
+a denumerable subset of real numbers at
+a time (see Brouwer 1952, p. 140, and
+1953, p. 1). So what was required was an
+intuitionistic interpretation of quantification over all sequences of natural numbers or over all sequences satisfying some
+condition.
+To explain the classical conception of
+such quantification, one sometimes pictures an arbitrary sequence as that
+which results from one choice for each
+term, these infinitely many choices being
+conceived sub specie aeternitatis, so that
+questions about the sequence as a whole
+(such as whether for some n the nth term
+is zero) are always objectively determined. Brouwer's idea was to substitute
+for this the picture of an infinitely proceeding sequence of choices that is such
+that at the nth choice one could restrict
+one's freedom as to future choices by
+laying down some (not necessarily deterministic) law. This is presented as a process in time: only so much about the
+sequence is determined at a given stage
+of its generation as follows from what the
+initial segment up to that stage is and
+from the laws that have been laid down.
+If there are no such laws, nothing will be
+true of the sequence but what is determined to be true on the basis of some
+a The earliest printed use of "fan theorem"
+is, it seems, in Brouwer 1952, p. 143; Brouwer
+used "waaierstelling" earlier in lectures.
+
+447
+initial segment of it. This means that is admissible and is assigned the interval
+functions whose arguments are free- Is (n),pz(n) If (a1, ...,An) is admissible
+choice sequences will be continuous.
+and is assigned the interval Iy.s, then
+The conception that gives mathe-
+{a1,..., On, k) is admissible if and only if
+matical form to this picture is Brouwer's
+notion of set, or spread." The definition
+PI(k) + 2
+* + 2
+can be expressed as follows (see Heyting
+20 2(k)
+202 (k)
+<
+25
+1956, pp. 34-35). We have a law Am that
+and then the interval
+is
+characterizes certain finite sequences of
+natural numbers as admissible for the
+assigned to (a1, ...,an, k).
+Brouwer says that a spread is finitary
+spread M and is such that
+if for every n there can be determined a
+(1) Every finite sequence of natural
+numbers is either admissible or not (this
+kn such that the nth term of an admismeans that the law enables us to decide
+sible sequence, if it exists, is always less
+than kn (below, p. 454). This is equivaof a given sequence whether it is admissible or not);°
+lent to the following condition: there
+exists a ko such that (n) is admissible
+(2) If (a1,..., An+ 1) is admissible, so is
+only if n ‹ ko, and for any admissible a
+<01, ...,On);
+there exists a kn such that a*<m) is
+(3) An admissible sequence of length 1
+admissible only if m < ka! That is, at
+can be specified;
+(4) If (a1,..., An) is admissible, either
+» See below, p. 453.
+an m can be found so that (a1, ...,An,
+" In 1953, p. 8, Brouwer admits a species of
+m) is admissible or there is no such m
+admissible sequences that is "not necessarily
+(termination of the process).
+predeterminate". Although what this means is
+Then we have a second law Im that to
+not altogether clear, he apparently does not
+intend to relax the requirement that we have
+each sequence admissible for M assigns a
+stated. It seems, however, that Brouwer indefinite mathematical object.d
+tends to allow the definition of a not necessarily
+Thus, given a sequence a1, az, ... of
+predeterminate species to contain a free-choice
+natural numbers such that, for every n,
+parameter. Then, as Kreisel points out (1964,
+pp. 0.35-0.36), an example due to Kleene im-
+<01,..., An Is admissible, we obtain a
+plies that the statement of the bar theorem
+corresponding sequence 51 = 2(01)), 52
+given in Brouwer 1953, p. 14, requires
+= I (a1, 02)),.... A sequence such as
+modification.
+§1,520...
+is what Brouwer calls an
+a Brouwer's definition specifies a
+"sign
+element of the spread M.e
+series" (below, p. 453); this would suggest that
+species and free-choice sequences are not
+As an example, we consider the spread
+allowed. It seems that this restriction is not
+of points of the continuum, discussed in
+held to in subsequent intuitionistic writings. In
+the paper below. There are many ways of
+1952, p. 142, Brouwer speaks of "infinitely
+defining a spread that corresponds to the
+proceeding sequences p1, Pz,.... whose terms
+intuitive notion of the continuum. Brouare chosen more or less freely from mathematical
+entities previously acquired", which would
+wer defines a point of the continuum as
+seem to allow anything compatible with a
+an infinitely proceeding sequence of instep-by-step generation of mathematical entitervals that are of the form Im.n = ties. But see Brouwer 1942.
+[m/2^,(m + 2)/2^] and are such that each
+• The sequence is finite if an n is reached for
+one lies in the interior of its predecessor.
+which {a1, ...,An) is terminal (that is, the
+second side of the alternative under (4) holds).
+The spread of such points could be de-
+Clearly, we cannot say of a given sequence
+fined formally as follows. Let p1, P2, ...
+that it either comes to an end or does not.
+be an enumeration of the pairs of natural
+‹ We shall use lower-case German letters as
+numbers, and let pi(x) and pa(x) be such
+variables ranging over finite sequences of
+natural numbers. a*t is the concatenation of
+that, if Pi = (r, 8), r = pı(2) and s =
+a and b; if a = (a1,...,an) and b = ‹b1....
+pa(i). Then any sequence ‹n> of length 1
+bm>, then a*b = (a1....an, bi,...,bm>.
+
+448
+each stage there are only finitely many every element a of M there exists a
+choices.
+number n such that, if ß agrees with a on
+The unit continuum can be represented
+the first n terms, that is, if the sequence
+by a finitary spread if one sets a limit on
+how much smaller an interval can be than
+• The first of these two statements is the conits predecessor (and on how small the
+tinuity requirement that Brouwer makes in his
+initial interval may be), for then there
+proofs of the bar and fan theorems and of uniare only finitely many choices.
+form continuity. But what in Theorem 1 below
+Before we go on, the reader's attention
+is stated to follow directly from the intuitionisis called to Brouwer's conception of a
+tie conception of a full function is a condition,
+weaker than the second statement, of negative
+species. The definition that he gives in
+continuity. It is puzzling why Brouwer states
+1925 will be found below, p. 454. Later,
+negative continuity with some fanfare and then
+species are defined as "properties supgoes on, at the beginning of § 2, to state quietly
+posable for mathematical entities pre-
+a stronger continuity requirement. The explanation seems to be as follows. Theorem 1 states
+viously acquired and satisfying the conthe negative continuity of a full function in
+dition that, if they hold for a certain
+terms of the definition of § 1, that is, of the
+mathematical entity, they also hold for
+definition of negative continuity for a function
+all mathematical entities that have been
+of point cores. If f is a function that maps point
+cores onto point cores, it induces a function fo
+defined to be equal to it" (1953, p. 2).
+that maps points onto points. From the
+Since two species are equal if they have
+assumption of § 2 it follows immediately that,
+the same members, the notion of species
+if f is a full function, fo is positively continuous.
+has about the same role as that of class
+But it is not quite immediate that f is posiin nonintuitionistic mathematics.
+tively continuous.
+Let 5o be a point core; we must prove that
+Before we can explain the results of
+f is continuous at 5o. Let po be a point belongthe paper below, we need to ask the
+ing to fo; then the point fo(Po) belongs to
+question what meaning we can give to
+f(50). Note that a point p is a sequence of
+the notion of a function that maps one
+intervals p(n); we can denote by "p(m)" the
+sequence of the first m intervals of p. From the
+spread into another or into the natural
+continuity requirements of § 2 it follows that
+numbers. It is by the analysis of this
+for any n we can find an m such that, if p(m)
+notion that Brouwer obtains the infor-
+=Fo(m), then [fo(p)](n) = [fo(po)](n).
+mation necessary to prove the bar
+Given & > O, chose no so that the diameter of
+theorem and
+the uniform-continuity
+[fo(po)](no) < €. For each m let am and om be
+theorem.
+the end points of polm). Let mo be the m ob-
+The essence of the analysis is that,
+tained as above with n = no. Now let
+when a function is defined on a spread
+8 = 2(min (amo+1 — Amo, Umo - bmo+1)).
+and has definite objects such as natural
+numbers as its values, its value for a
+& is positive since polmo + 1) lies entirely within polmo). Suppose that | § - Sol < 8 and that
+given sequence that is an element of the
+p is a point of §. Let k be such that the diaspread must be determined by a finite
+meter of p(k) < 8. Then p(k) lies entirely within
+number of terms of the sequence. If the
+p(mo). Therefore p coincides with the point
+value itself is to be a free-choice sequence,
+9 = po(O),.... po(mo), p(k), p(k + 1),..., and
+a certain initial segment of the argument
+fo(p) coincides with fo(g). Since [fo(9)](no) =
+must suffice to determine the first term
+[Jo(po)](no), and fo(9) is a point of f($), we have
+of the value, a certain further segment to
+If(8) - f(50) < =q.e.d.
+Since the number & obtained for a given 5o
+determine the second term, and so on.®
+and a given a depends on the particular point
+We must state this point with precision
+Po that represents So, the argument does not
+in order to avoid ambiguities. Consider a
+show that there is a function giving 8 in terms
+functional F that is defined on a spread
+of fo and e. The existence of such a function is
+equivalent to uniform continuity in some
+M and whose values are natural numneighborhood containing 5o and presumably
+bers, as in the bar theorem. Then for
+cannot be proved without the fan theorem.
+
+449
+of natural numbers of length n is the the members of S' being the subscript
+same for both, F (a) = F(B).
+sequences for the constructional under-
+This implies that F can be represented
+species of S. We can specify S, up to isoby f, a function from finite sequences of
+morphism, by giving S' and stating, for
+natural numbers to natural numbers, in
+each sequence associated with a primithe following sense: if, in attempting to
+tive species, whether the element of that
+compute F(a) on the basis of the choices
+species is a full or a null element.
+for a prescribed by the sequence a, we
+Consider now the following ordering of
+reach a point at which we lack the inforfinite sequences:..an< b1,...,
+mation about a needed to continue the
+bm> if either
+computation, we set f(a) = O. If we can
+complete the computation without meet-
+(1) m < n and ai = b, for
+i = 1,..., m
+ing such an obstacle, we set f(a) = F(a)
+or
++ 1. This equation will hold for any a
+generated by a sequence of choices be-
+(2) for some i < min(m, n), a; = b, for
+ginning with the choices of a.
+all i ≤ i, while di+ 1 < bi+1;
+The species u1 of § 2 in the text below
+that is, the sequences are so ordered by
+can be identified with the species of
+< that an extension of a sequence preadmissible sequences a for which f(a) #0,
+cedes it and that otherwise two sequences
+but f(b) = 0 for any proper initial segare ordered lexicographically. Clearly,
+ment b of a. Brouwer says that a sequence
+this is a primitive recursive linear orderis secured if it belongs to u1, has an initial
+ing." If Sa and So are the constructional
+segment belonging to u1, or is inadmisunderspecies of s with the subscript
+sible. The argument for the bar theorem,
+sequences a and b respectively, then
+as well as for later results along the same
+a < b if and only if Sa precedes So in the
+lines, turns on an analysis of the species
+construction of S, that is, Sa is a construcof unsecured sequences. If (a1, ...,an) is
+tional underspecies of Ss, or every elesecured and either n = l or ‹a1,...,
+ment of su precedes every element of S5
+an-1> is unsecured, <a1,...,an) is said
+in the ordering of S. Since the latter side
+to be immediately secured
+of the alternative must hold if Sa and So
+The important mathematical content
+are primitive species, the ordering < reof the paper is contained in the bar
+stricted to the subscript sequences of
+theorem. The fan theorem and the uniprimitive species is isomorphic (as a
+form-continuity theorem are corollaries.
+linear ordering) to the ordering of S. The
+Below, the bar theorem is stated in the
+ordering ‹ restricted to S" satisfies the
+fourth paragraph of § 2. The claim is that,
+condition that every descending chain is
+for a functional F from a spread M to the
+finite, by virtue of the well-founded
+natural numbers, the species of unsecured
+nature of the construction of S. Thus it
+sequences is capable of a certain kind of
+well-ordering according to the
+well-ordered construction. In order to classical conception.
+explain this, we must make some re-
+The bar theorem can now be stated as
+marks about Brouwer's theory of well- follows. Let F be a functional that to
+ordering.
+each element a of a spread M assigns a
+The basic definitions are given below,
+natural number. With F is associated
+pp. 456-457. I use the terminology prethe species I' of its unsecured and imsented in these definitions. It follows
+mediately secured sequences. Then T is
+from the definition of a well-ordered
+the species S' of subscript sequences of
+species that with each
+well-ordered
+species s there is associated a species S'
+of finite sequences of natural numbers,
+* We identify the sequence <a1,..., an) with
+the number I piit1t1.
+i<n
+
+450
+some well-ordered species S. The ele- generated as a finitary spread, functions
+ments of S can be taken to be the defined everywhere on the unit continimmediately secured sequences of F. uum, with points of the continuum as
+The sequence a is a full element if it is
+values, are uniformly continuous (Theoadmissible (and a fortiori if f(a) ‡ 0) and
+rem 3).
+a null element otherwise.'
+The result of this analysis is that many
+All this means that I can be induc- definitions of functions of a real variable
+tively defined as follows:
+that, from the classical point of view,
+(1) If a is immediately secured, then
+assign a value to the function for each
+а = 1;
+value of the argument do not do so
+(2) If a*<n) = I for every n, then
+intuitionistically. The question arises
+а є 1
+whether one can single out certain sub-
+Hence we have the following induction
+species of the continuum such that a
+principle: If a property holds of every
+function defined on such
+a subspecies
+immediately secured sequence and holds
+will be analogous to a classically everyof a if it holds of a*‹n) for every n, then
+where defined function. Such a function
+it holds of every sequence in T. In recent
+could be said to be pseudo-full. In the
+writings (Spector 1961, p. 9, Arersel 1963)
+sections of the paper that are not rean essentially equivalent principle Is
+printed here, Brouwer discusses a number
+formalized under the title "bar inducof possible criteria for the domain D of
+tion". Different versions of this prin-
+a pseudo-full function of the unit conciple are stated and compared in Kleene
+tinuum. Clearly, D should be a species
+and Vesley 1965, § 6, where, however, the
+that possesses
+a property classically
+name "bar induction" is not used, and
+equivalent to coincidence with the unit
+in Howard and Kreisel 1966.
+continuum. The one that Brouwer selects
+An equivalent statement is that the
+is congruence-that it is absurd that there
+representing function f of f' belongs to a
+should be a point of the unit continuum
+certain inductively generated species K
+not coinciding with any point of the
+of functions from finite sequences of
+species (1923d, p. 255). The further renatural numbers to natural numbers,
+quirement concerns measure: for every
+defined as follows:
+measure on the unit continuum D must
+(1) Any constant function belongs to
+be measurable and possess the measure 1.
+K;
+A point that requires some discussion
+(2) If I enumerates a sequence of is the nature of the proof of the bar
+functions in K, then
+theorem. Even if we accept the continuity condition as expressing part of
+what we mean by a constructive func-
+Theorem 2, later called the fan theotional on a spread, this is not sufficient
+rem, states that, if the spread M on
+for the proof. Brouwer goes on to exploit
+which F is defined is finitary, there can
+more fully than in any other intuitionistic
+be found an n such that, for any a, the
+argument the following peculiarity of
+value of F depends only on the first n
+intuitionistic mathematics: the supposichoices for a. This follows because one
+tion that a mathematical proposition is
+can show by an induction parallel to the
+true is just the supposition that one has
+generation of I that in this case there
+a (constructive) proof of it. In particular
+are only finitely many unsecured
+sethis will be the case, given a sequence a,
+quences. Clearly, the fan theorem in
+for the statement that a is securable, that
+effect asserts the uniform continuity of
+1 This statement differs only in minor details
+F. Since, as we indicated above, the from that of the text (fourth paragraph of § 2,
+points of the unit continuum can be p. 461 below).
+
+451
+is, that every sequence a, a* (b1),....
+and logic makes it difficult and perhaps
+a*<b1,..., bm),... contains a term that impossible to consider possible counteris secured. Brouwer goes on to make a conexamples to his claim. However, it seems
+troversial assumption about the possible
+that his point of view implies the existform of a proof of such a statement.
+ence of cut-free canonical proofs, in which
+He claims that a proof of securability is
+inductions are replaced by infinitary inbased on the "givenness" of the secured
+terences (footnote 8 below, p. 460). This
+sequences and on the relations between
+might be the answer to the objection that
+sequences that are formed by the comthe assertion (represented as "9") of the
+position of the relation of immediate
+securability of a sequence might be insuccession, that is, the relation between
+ferred from statements "p" and "p>9"
+a and a*‹n). Then the proof can
+be
+while there might be no reason to expect
+brought into a canonical form that uses
+the proofs of these premisses to contain
+only inferences resting upon the basic
+the inferences that he claims. That
+relations:
+modus ponens should be eliminable is
+1Iо it
+(1) If a is (immediately) secured, it is
+suggested by Heyting's subsequent exsecurable;
+planation of the conditional, together
+(2) If a is securable, so is a*(n)
+with the thesis that mathematics is
+(5-inference) ;
+independent of logic. According to Hey-
+(3) If a*‹n) is securable for every n,
+ting "p›q" is the claim that there exists
+a is securable (f-inference).
+a method of reaching a proof of "g" from
+In the remainder of the argument it is
+one of "p". Now, if the logical connecshown that, for each unsecured sequence
+tives are explained in terms of a notion
+a for which the canonical proof estabof proof, one might expect that the
+lishes that it is securable, there exists a
+"proofs" referred to in the explanation
+well-ordered construction of the species
+of a statement not containing the con-
+Ta of descendants of a in T. It seems to
+ditional should not themselves contain
+follow, and indeed this is explicitly
+conditionals.
+stated in Brouwer 1953, that the I-infer-
+The general intuitionistic conceptions
+ences are superfluous. We obtain a wellleave the meaning of quantification over
+ordered construction in I itself by one
+free-choice sequences somewhat vague.
+more second generating operation (be-
+It is made clearer by Brouwer's conceplow, p. 456), taking as the nth term 1 ‹n>
+tion of a spread and by the continuity
+if (n) is admissible and a species conrequirement, but there is room for further
+sisting of a single null element (below,
+clarification. In the case of universal
+p. 456) otherwise.
+quantification over natural numbers,
+What can be said in justification of
+ordinary induction provides a very clear
+the claim that the proofs of securability
+proof procedure, which arises directly
+have a canonical form? It does not seem
+from the inductive generation of the
+to be at all evident. Indeed, it seems not
+sequence of natural numbers itself.
+to follow from Brouwer's remark that no
+Nothing comparable is available for freeother basis is available for the proofs
+choice sequences. Indeed, it is not even
+than the relations of a sequence to those
+certain whether they are to be regarded
+immediately issuing from it. For, perhaps,
+as individual mathematical objects at all
+the proof might make some use of these
+or whether quantification over them is to
+relations that is not reducible to inferbe regarded as a façon de parler.
+ences directly involving the notion of
+In the latter case we may be free to
+securability.
+stipulate some criteria for the truth of
+Unfortunately, Brouwer's thesis that statements containing such quantificamathematies is independent of language tion. Even if free-choice sequences are
+
+452
+individual mathematical objects, the Hence, if every unsecured sequence is
+notion seems vague enough, so that a securable, we have
+stipulation as to truth or proof conditions
+of statements of certain forms may serve
+(a)(En)(X$M <aco)....a(n)>),
+to clarify it. Indeed, Brouwer himself
+that is, x * M. This will hold if and only
+suggests in footnote 7, p. 460 below, that
+if the ordering < restricted to sequences
+a stipulation underlies the bar theorem;
+he says that, "when carefully considered
+unsecured with respect to x is a wellordering. So we have
+from the intuitionistic point of view"
+securability is just the property defined
+M = X < well-orders â(x є Mr)).
+by an inductive definition like that given
+above for the species T.
+Taking the real line as the set S, Suslin
+In summary, Brouwer's justification
+(1917) defines a class of sets called A-sets,
+for the har thi
+for the bar theorem is certainly not eviwhich are those subsets of S that can be
+dent or even satisfactory. His work
+obtained by the operation A from sysmakes clear that to obtain powerful
+tems of closed intervals. These sets are
+results in intuitionistic analysis it is
+the same as the analytic sets, which can
+necessary to make some strong assumpbe defined in other ways, for example, as
+tion that exploits the specifically intuithe images of S by functions continuous
+tionistic force of quantification over freefor all but countably many arguments or
+choice sequences. If the assumptions that
+as the projections of Borel subsets of the
+he makes are less evident than, say, the
+plane. Suslin states that a set M is a
+axiom of choice is in terms of the classical
+Borel set if and only if both M and M
+conception of set, this may be due to the
+are A-sets. A proof of this that uses the
+newness of the whole subject.
+above definition of M in terms of un-
+Another point worth mentioning is that
+secured sequences was given by Luzin
+the well-ordering of unsecured sequences
+and Sierpiński (1918, pp. 36-42). Extenof continuous functionals was used in a
+sive use of this method was made by
+classical context in descriptive set theory,
+Luzin in the twenties (1927; 1930, chap.
+prior to Brouwer's publication. Let S be
+III), for example, to prove the first and
+a topological space, and suppose that we
+second separation principles for analytic
+have a function that to each sequence a
+sets. Luzin (1927, pp. 2-3; 1930, pp. 197-
+assigns a subset Ma of s. Then M is de-
+200) finds the germ of the idea in a confined by the operation A applied to the
+struction by Lebesgue (1905).* From
+sets Ma if
+Brouwer's eminence as a topologist it
+would be plausible to conclude that he
+knew Luzin and Sierpinski's proof, but
+a n= 0
+direct evidence is lacking.
+that is, if
+The ideas of Brouwer and of the descriptive set theorists come together in
+XE M = (Ela)(N)(xE M<acO)....a(n)»)
+Kleene's work on the hyperarithmetic
+(a ranging over one-place number-theorand analytic hierarchies (1955). If we let
+etic functions). Then we can say that a
+the space S mentioned above be the set
+sequence a is secured with respect to x if
+x * Ma; if a satisfies the condition'
+a(m) = am form <ã,
+then in case a is secured we have
+(En)(x$M <aco)....a(n))).
+1 Am = the (m + 1)th term of a, 7 = the
+least m for which am does not exist.
+* A special case of the operation A was introduced by Aleksandrov (1916). Although he
+does not give a definition of A-sets that is
+equivalent to Suslin's, he proves in effect that
+every Borel set is an A-set.
+
+453
+of natural numbers, the 2} sets are just induction" that would serve to justify
+those that we obtain by applying the Spector's form of bar recursion is a
+operation A, with the condition that
+generalization in which the "unsecured
+"x E Ma" be primitive recursive. In this
+sequences" can be objects of any finite
+case the ordering of unsecured sequences
+type. It is thus a substantial extension,
+is also primitive recursive. Kleene seems
+for which no constructive foundation is
+to have derived the idea of the wellknown, of what has previously counted
+ordering from Brouwer by observing that
+as intuitionistic mathematics.
+in this
+case (a)(En)(x$M caco).... a(n))
+Charles Parsons'
+says that a certain recursive (and therefore continuous) functional is everywhere
+To help the reader in his study of the
+defined. He can thus show that any Ili
+paper, we now print, in their logical order,
+set is recursive in the set O of notations
+the definitions, culled from Brouwer's
+for recursive ordinals. Spector (1955) writings, of a number of intuitionistic
+shows that any I; set is recursive also in notions used in the paper.™
+the set W of Gödel numbers of recursive
+"A set [Menge] is a law on the basis
+well-orderings. (Since W and O are IIi, of which, if repeated choices of arbitrary
+they are therefore recursive in each
+natural numbers [Nummer| are made,
+other.)
+each of these choices either generates a
+Further use by Kleene of the welldefinite sign series [Zeichenreihe], with or
+ordering (for example, to show that the
+without termination of the process, or
+hyperarithmetic sets are those that are
+brings about the inhibition of the process
+I] and Il) is very close to that of destogether with the definitive annihilation
+criptive set theory. The analogies are
+of its result; for every n > 1, after every
+made very clear by Addison (1958), who,
+unterminated and uninhibited sequence
+however, neglects to mention Kleene's
+ofn - 1 choices, at least one natural numdebt to Brouwer.
+ber can be specified that, if selected as the
+As this example illustrates, the greatnth number, does not bring about the
+est influence of Brouwer's ideas has been
+inhibition of the process. Every sequence
+on the development of theories of effectof sign series generated in this manner by
+iveness and
+constructivity at higher
+an unlimited choice sequence [unbegrenztypes, in which the analysis of unsecured
+ten Wahlfolge] (and hence generally not
+sequences is now a standard tool. Applirepresentable in a finished form) is called
+cation of conceptions related to the bar
+an element of the set. We shall also speak
+theorem in proof theory has become quite
+of the common mode of formation of the
+extensive in recent work by Spector,
+elements of a set M as, for short, the set
+Kreisel, and others. Although this work
+M." (Brouwer 1925, pp. 244-245 (a footwas motivated mainly by the consistency
+note is omitted); see also 1918, p. 3, and
+problem for classical analysis, it has also
+1919b, pp. 204-205, or in the reprint pp.
+served to clarify the intuitionistic ideas
+950-951.)
+themselves. The hope entertained by
+Subsequently, the terms that Brouwer
+many that the idea of the bar theorem
+uses for this notion are "spreiding"
+would yield a proof of the consistency of (1947, in Dutch) and "spread" (1953).
+classical analysis led to a precise result by
+Spector (1961), who proved the consis-
+1 I am indebted to Dirk van Dalen, Burton
+tency of classical analysis relative to that Dreben, J. J. de Iongh, Yiannis Moschovakis,
+of a quantifier-free system containing
+and especially to Georg Kreisel and the editor,
+functionals of arbitrary finite types and
+for their assistance and suggestions.
+m I am grateful to Professor Richard E.
+a schema for the definition of functionals Vesley for having helped me to understand a
+by "bar recursion"
+. But the form of "bar number of passages in Brouwer's writings.
+
+454
+"If for every n in 5 [the sequence of element of M an equal element of N
+natural numbers, 1, 2, 3,...] a natural
+exists. If, moreover, it is possible to
+number kn is determined such that the
+specify an element of N that cannot be
+inhibition of the process takes place
+equal to any element of M, then M is
+whenever a natural number lying in 5
+called a proper subspecies of N.
+above kin is
+selected at the nth choice,
+"Two set elements are said to be
+then the set is said to be finitary [finit]"
+distinct [verschieden] if the impossibility
+(Brouwer 1925, p. 245.)
+of their equality has been established,
+«Two set elements are said to be equal
+that is, if we are sure that, in the course
+[gleich], or identical [identisch], if we are
+of their generation, their equality can
+sure that for every n the nth choice
+never be proved.
+generates the same sign series for the two
+"Two species are said to be distinct if
+elements.
+the impossibility of their equality has
+"Two sets are said to be equal, or
+been established." (Brouwer 1925, pp.
+identical, if for every element of one set
+245-246.
+an equal element of the other can be
+"A species of which any two elements
+specified.
+can be recognized either to be equal or to
+'The set M is called a subset [Teilbe distinct is said to be discrete." (Broumengel of the set N if for every element
+wer 1925, p. 246.)
+of M an equal element of N exists.
+"The species that
+contains those
+"Sets and elements of sets are called
+elements that belong either to the species
+mathematical entities.
+M or to the species N is called the union
+"By a species [Spezies] of first order we
+of M and N, and it is denoted by
+understand a property (defined in a
+conceptually complete form) that only a
+G(M, N)." (Brouwer 1925, p. 247.)
+"Two species M and N are said to be
+mathematical entity can possess, and, if
+disjoint [elementefremd] if they are disit does, the entity is called an element of
+tinct and it is impossible that there exist
+the species of first order. Sets constitute
+an element of M and an element of N
+special cases of species of first order.
+that are identical with each other."
+"Two species of first order are said to
+(Brouwer 1925, p. 247.)
+be equal, or identical, if for every element
+"If M' and M" are disjoint subspecies
+of one species an equal element of the
+of N and if G(M', M") and N are identiother can be specified.
+cal, then we say that N splits _zerlegt ist_
+"By a species of second order we underinto M' and M"; we call M' and M"
+stand a property that only a mathematiconjugate splitting species of N, and M',
+cal entity or a species of first order can
+as well as M", is called a removable
+possess, and, if it does, the entity or the
+[abtrennbare] subspecies of N." (Brouwer
+species is called an element of the species
+1925, p. 247 ; see also Brouwer 1918, p. 4,
+of second order.
+Heyting 1956, p. 39, where, instead of
+"Two species of second order are said
+"removable", "detachable" is used, and
+to be equal, or identical, if for every
+Brouwer 1953, p. 6.) If M' and M" are
+element of one species an equal element
+removable subspecies of N, we can decide
+of the other can be specified.
+whether an arbitrary element of N
+"In an analogous manner we define
+belongs to M'or to M"
+species of nth order, as well as their
+"If between two species M and N
+equality, or identity, n representing an
+there can be established a one-to-one
+arbitrary element of A [the set of
+relation, that is, a law that with every
+natural numbers].
+element of M associates an element of N
+"The species M is called a subspecies
+in such a way that equal elements of N
+[Teilspezies] of the species N if for every correspond to equal, and only to equal,
+
+455
+elements of M and that every element of
+N is associated with an element of M, we
+write M~ N and say that M and N
+have the same cardinality [Mächtigkeit],
+or cardinal number, or are equipollent
+[gleichmächtig]." (Brouwer 1925, p. 247.)
+"The simplest example of an infinite
+set is the set A itself, and we denote its
+cardinal number by a. Species that possess that cardinal number are said to be
+denumerably infinite Labzählbar unendlich]." (Brouwer 1925, p. 249; see also
+Brouwer 1918, pp. 6-7, and Heyting 1956,
+p. 39.)
+"A species M [of cardinal number m]
+satisfying the formula m ≤ a is said to
+be denumerable [abzählbar]. In particular, it is said to be numerable [zählbar]
+if it can be mapped one-to-one onto a
+removable subspecies of A." (Brouwer
+1925, p. 255; see also Brouwer 1918,
+p. 7, and Heyting 1929 and 1956,
+p. 40.)
+"A species P is said to be virtually
+ordered [virtuell geordnet] if an asymmetric relation, which will be called the
+ordering relation, is defined for the
+elements of a subspecies of the species of
+pairs (a, b) of elements of P; we express
+this relation by 'a ‹ b', 'a before b', 'a
+to the left of b', 'a lower than b', 'b > a'
+"b after a', 'b to the right of a', or b higher
+than a', and, if we express the identity of
+two elements p and q of P by the formula 'p = g', stipulate that it possess
+the following 'order properties':
+(1) The relations r = s, r < s, and
+r > s are mutually exclusive;
+(2) From r = u, s = v, and r < s it
+follows that u < V;
+(3) From the simultaneous absurdity
+[Ungereimtheit] of the relations r > s
+and r = s it follows that r < s;
+(4) From the simultaneous absurdity
+of the relations r > sandr < s it follows
+that r = s;
+(5) From r < s and s < t it follows
+that r < t." (Brouwer 1925a, p. 453; see
+also Brouwer 1918, p. 13, and Heyting
+1955, p. 33, and 1956, p. 107.)
+"The virtually ordered species P is
+said to be everywhere dense in the extended
+sense, or, for short, everywhere dense, if
+between any two distinct elements of P
+there lie elements of P, and it is said to
+be everywhere dense in the strict sense if
+moreover an element of P can be specified and elements of P lie to the right as
+well as to the left of an arbitrary element
+of P." (Brouwer 1925a, p. 454; see also
+Brouwer 1918, p. 16.)
+"If between two virtually ordered
+species P and Q there has been established a one-to-one relation that leaves
+the ordering relations invariant, we say
+that P and Q possess the same ordinal
+number, or are similar." (Brouwer 1925a,
+p. 455; see also Brouwer 1918, p. 14.)
+"A virtually ordered species is said
+to be ordered if an ordering relation
+obtains for every pair (a, b) of distinct
+elements" (Brouwer 1925a, p. 455 (a
+footnote is omitted); see also Heyting
+1956, p. 106.)
+"A discrete ordered species is also said
+to be completely ordered." (Brouwer 1925a,
+p. 455)
+The ordinal number of the set A in its
+natural ordering is denoted by w.
+"Ordered species of ordinal number w
+are also called fundamental sequences
+[F'undamentalreihen]." (Brouwer 1925a,
+p. 455; see also Brouwer 1918, p. 14.)
+"Let R be a virtually ordered species
+of virtually ordered species N such that
+equal elements e of M = G(N) always
+belong only to equal species N and that
+equal species N are always virtually
+ordered in the same way. We denote the
+ordering relations of the given virtual
+orderings of R and the N by > and <,
+and we define a virtual ordering of M as
+follows: We write e'» e", or e" «e', if
+either N' > N" or both N' = N" and
+é' → e"; we write é' 2e", or e" Se', if
+e «e" is impossible; we write é' > e" if
+é' ≥ e", and, moreover, é' ‡e".
+... We
+call the species M, once it is virtually
+ordered as above, (or its ordinal number
+m) the ordinal sum Lordnungsgemäße
+
+456
+Summe] of the species N (or of their entail the validity of the five ordering
+ordinal numbers n), and we call the for- properties. We call the thus virtually
+mation of this sum the addition of the N
+ordered species of intercalation elements
+(or of the n). In case R possesses a finite
+of M the continuum over M and denote it
+complete ordinal number or the ordinal
+by K(M)." (Brouwer 1925a, p. 467.)
+number w, the sign + is used in the
+"The well-ordered species are ordered
+ordinary
+way
+to denote addition."
+species that are defined on the basis of
+(Brouwer 1925a, p. 456-457.)
+the following stipulations:
+"Let M be a denumerably infinite
+(1) An arbitrary element of a wellordered species that is everywhere dense
+ordered species is either an element of the
+in the strict sense and whose elements
+first kind and will be called a 'full
+are denumerated by the fundamental
+element' ['Vollelement'I or an element of
+sequence 91, 92, 93, . ... We put 5/91,92,
+the second kind and will be called a 'null
+...gv) = sy. In M we establish
+an
+element' [' Nullelement'];
+'intercalation partition' [' Einschaltungs-
+(2) A species with a unique element,
+teilung']; that is, we generate in M, by
+once this element has been provided with
+an unlimited sequence of free choices, a
+either the predicate of being a full
+left and a right subspecies (an arbitrary
+element or the predicate of being a null
+element of the left subspecies preceding
+element, will be called a well-ordered
+an arbitrary element of the right one) in
+species and, more particularly, a primisuch a way that the left and the right
+tive species [Urspezies];
+subspecies are determined successively in
+(3) From known well-ordered species
+S1, 82, 83,..., the procedure being such
+further well-ordered species are derived
+that only a single element ga, of s, may
+through the first generating operation,
+remain excluded from these subspecies of
+which consists in the addition of a non-
+s, and that for every v the element
+vanishing finite number of known wellgav+1, if it exists, is identical either with
+ordered species, and through the second
+Ja, or with 9v+1. The species of the intergenerating operation, which consists in the
+calation partitions t of M (corresponding
+addition of a fundamental sequence of
+to arbitrary distinct denumerations of M)
+such species.
+that 'coincide' with a certain intercala-
+«Every
+well-ordered species
+that
+tion partition t1 of M, in the sense that
+played a role in the construction of the
+an element of the left subspecies of one
+well-ordered species F according to the
+partition never lies to the right of an
+preceding paragraph is called a construcelement of the right subspecies of the
+tional underspecies [konstruktive Unterother, is what we call an intercalation
+spezies] of F. The constructional underelement of M, and t, as well as t1, is a
+species that played a role in the last
+'partition' of this intercalation element.
+generating operation of Fare called the
+We virtually order the species of the inconstructional underspecies of first order of
+tercalation elements e of M by adopting
+f' and are distinguished from one another
+the following stipulations: we write
+by a subscript v, hence are denoted by
+é «e" if we can specify a partition t' of
+F1, Ez..., Em or by Fs, Ez, Ez,....
+é, a partition t" of e", and two elements
+The constructional underspecies of the
+go and 9, of M that belong to the right
+first order of an F, are called the consubspecies of t' and to the left subspecies
+structional underspecies of second order
+of t"
+", respectively; we write é Se" if
+of F and are denoted by EvI, Evz,
+é' » e" is impossible; we write é' < e"if
+....Fum
+or by Evi, Fvz, Fvs,.... The
+é' «e" and also é' ‡e". The method
+constructional underspecies of the first
+already used several times above yields
+order of a Fu...vn
+are called the conthe result that these stipulations indeed
+structional underspecies of (n + 1)th order
+
+457
+of F and are denoted by Fy...vn1, basis of the second generating operation,
+the property in question, in case it holds
+Fup...vn2, Fvp.vn3,... (Fitself is taken
+for every Sv, also obtains for §.
+as the constructional underspecies of Oth
+"By means of the inductive method
+order of F). Thus every primitive species
+we see that for an arbitrary well-ordered
+used in the construction of F turns out
+species F the species of the subscript
+to be a constructional underspecies of some
+sequences of the elements, as well as the
+finite order of F (although for suitably
+species of the subscript sequences of the
+chosen primitive species of F' this order
+constructional underspecies, forms a recan, of course, increase beyond any
+movable subspecies of the species of
+bound). To see that, we need only use the
+finite sequences of natural numbers;
+inductive method, that is, observe that the
+further, that for an arbitrary construcproperty in question is satisfied for primitional underspecies Fvi...n of F' the cartive species, that, if 5=51+52+...
+dinal number of the Fv,..wu is known."
++ Im on the basis of the first generating (Brouwer 1926, pp. 451-452; see also
+operation and§'=$1+52+... + $m-1
+Brouwer 1918, pp. 22-23, and Heyting
+on the basis of the first generating opera-
+1955, pp. 33-34.)
+tion (m ≥ 2), the property in question,
+The translation is by Stefan Bauerin case it holds for 51, $2,..., Em as well
+Mengelberg, and it is printed here with
+as for "', also obtains for 5, and, finally,
+the kind permission of Professor Brouthat, if 5=51+52+53+. on the wer and Walter de Gruyter and Co.
+81
+Following § 5 of my paper "Zur Begründung der intuitionistischen Mathematik I"
+we define the «-intervals and the 1-intervals in the "naturally ordered" species of
+finite binary fractions;' in particular, we shall say that these intervals are «'"- intervals
+or 1v- intervals, respectively, if their length is equal to 2-.
+By a point of the linear continuum we understand an unlimited sequence of 1-
+intervals (the "generating intervals" of the point) such that each of them is contained, in the strict sense, in the preceding one; their size, therefore, converges
+positively to zero.
+If in a set every choice that does not lead to the inhibition of the process generates
+a 1-interval, while each of these 1-intervals is contained, in the strict sense, in the
+1-interval generated by the preceding choice, the set is called a point set of the linear
+continuum.
+Let the species of those points p of the linear continuum that "coincide" with a
+certain point p, of the linear continuum (by which we mean that every generating
+interval of p completely or partially covers every generating interval of pi) be called
+1 Brouwer 1925, p. 253. ["In the number continuum an interval with the end points a. 2-" and
+(a + 1)2-" or with the end points a. 2-" and (a † 2)2-" (where a is an arbitrary integer and n an
+arbitrary natural number) is called a «-interval or a 1-interval, respectively."]
+["Naturally ordered" means in order of increasing magnitude. Binary fractions are fractions
+of the form a. 2-", where a is an integer and n a natural number. Brouwer adds the word "finite"
+because he regards these fractions as finite sums of the form b + ¿ a,2-", where b is an integer,
+r is a natural number, ay, for 1 ≤ " ≤ r - 1, is equal to 0 or 1, and a, is equal to 1.]
+2 Brouwer 1923b, p. 6 [above, p. 339].
+
+458
+a point core [Punktkern] of the linear continuum. In what follows we shall denote the
+point cores of the linear continuum by y.
+The points or point cores that are generated exclusively by 1-intervals partially
+covering the interval (0, 1) are called points or point cores, respectively, of the unit
+continuum. In what follows, the point cores of the unit continuum are denoted by x.
+In a way similar to that followed in § 7 of my paper "Zur Begründung der intuitionistischen Mathematik II"3 for the species of the intercalation elements of a denumerably infinite ordered species that is everywhere dense in the strict sense, the species
+of the point cores of the linear continuum or of the unit continuum can also be
+virtually ordered; once provided with this virtual ordering, this species is called the
+linear continuum or the unit continuum, respectively
+If the "naturally ordered" species of finite binary fractions between 0 and I is
+denoted by M, we shall say that the point core a of the unit continuum and the
+element e of K(M)3 coincide if no element of the right, or left, subspecies of an intercalation partition of M that belongs to e can ever lie to the left, or right, respectively,
+of a generating interval of a point of n. These coincidence relations obviously determine a similarity correspondence* between the unit continuum and K(M).
+By a real function, or, for short, a function, f(x) of x we understand a law that, with
+each of certain point cores of the unit continuum, which will be denoted by § and form
+the "domain of definition" of the function, associates one point core of the linear
+continuum, which will be denoted by n= f(5).
+A function f(x) is said to be negatively continuous for the value 5o if, for an arbitrary
+fundamental sequence $1, 52,... that converges positively to šo, the fundamental
+sequence f (51), f(52),... converges negatively? to f(5o).
+A function f(x) is said to be positively continuous for the value 5o, or, for short,
+continuous for the value fo, if for every positive rational e a positive rational a can
+be determined such that for |5 - 5o| < as the inequality If (5) - f(5o)| < = holds.
+A function that is negatively continuous or positively continuous for every § will
+be called, for short, a negatively continuous or a continuous function, respectively.
+A function f(x) is said to be uniformly continuous if for every positive rational e a
+positive rational a can be determined such that for |52 - 51| < as the inequality
+A function f(x) is said to be discontinuous for the value Šo if a natural number n
+and a fundamental sequence $1, 52,... that converges positively? to 5o can be
+specified such that f(5I), f(5z),... all differ from f(5o) by more than 1/n.
+3 Brouwer 1925a, p. 467 [above, p. 456].
+* See Brouwer 1925a, p. 455 [above, p. 455].
+5 It is only for the sake of simplicity that the definitions of continuity have been brought into
+the metric form above, of which they are independent so far as their content is concerned. To see
+that, we resort to the denumerably infinite, everywhere dense, ordered sets u' and u", of ordinals
+1 + y + 1 and n, respectively, that generate the intercalation elements corresponding to the
+x and y, respectively; we denumerate u' and u" by fundamental sequences 9'1, 9'2, ... and gi, 9z,
+..., respectively, we denote E(91, 92, ..., g) and E(9", g½ ..., 9" by s, and s", respectively, and
+we understand by an i, or an i, a closed interval of ' or u", respectively, whose end elements
+belong to s, or s", respectively, but whose interior contains at most one element of s', or s",, respectively. On this basis, then, a uniformly continuous function, for example, is a function such that,
+given an arbitrary denumeration of u' and an arbitrary denumeration of u", we can, for every
+natural number m, determine a natural number n such that, if 51 and 52 belong to the same in,
+f(51) and f(5z) belong to the same im.
+
+459
+A function that is discontinuous for any specific value belonging to its domain of
+definition is also said, for short, to be discontinuous.
+A function f(x) is said to be full [voll] if its domain of definition coincides with the
+unit continuum.
+THEOREM 1. Every full function is negatively continuous.
+Proof. Let f(x) be a full function, let 5o be an arbitrary point core x, and let 51,
+52,... be a fundamental sequence of point cores x that converges positively to 5o.
+We now assume for the moment that there exist a natural number p and a fundamental sequence 11, 12, ... of monotonically increasing natural numbers such that
+If(Sp.) - f(50)| > 1/p for every v, and we define a point core 5o of the unit continuum by starting from an unlimited sequence fi of generating intervals of a point
+belonging to 5o and then constructing, by means of an unlimited sequence of choices
+of 1-intervals, a point fz of the unit continuum in such a way that we temporarily
+choose, for every natural number n that we have already considered, the first n
+intervals identical with the first n intervals of fi but reserve the right to determine,
+at any time after the first, second,..., (m - 1)th, and mth intervals have been
+chosen, the choice of all further intervals (that is, of the (m + 1)th, (m + 2)th, and
+so on) in such a way that either a point belonging to 5o or one belonging to a certain
+Sp, is generated. Then the function f(x) is not defined for the point core 5o containing
+Fa; this brings us to a contradiction, and our assumption has proved to be illegiti.
+mate. But this means that the function f(x) is negatively continuous.
+Theorem 1, which is an immediate consequence of the intuitionistic point of view
+and has since 1918 frequently been mentioned by me in lectures and conversations,
+suggests the conjecture that Theorem 3 below, which asserts much more, is valid; I
+did not, however, succeed in proving it until much later.® The object of the following
+two sections is to present this proof in as lucid as way as possible.
+§ 2
+Let M be an arbitrary set, let u be the denumerably infinite set of finite (inhibited
+or uninhibited) choice sequences fsn...., upon which M is based (where s and the
+n, represent the natural numbers chosen one after the other for the choice sequence
+in question), and let a natural number B be associated with each element of M.
+Then there is distinguished in u a removable numerable subset u1 of uninhibited
+finite choice sequences such that with an arbitrary element of u, the same natural
+number ß is associated for all elements of M issuing from M1, while furthermore a
+proof [Beweisführung]a h is given that makes it apparent, for an arbitrary uninhibited element of u, that every uninhibited infinite choice sequence issuing from it
+possesses an [initial] segment belonging to u1. (For an uninhibited element of u is to
+be taken as belonging to un if and only if for it—but for none of its proper segments
+—the decision with respect to ß, according to the algorithm of the rule establishing
+the correspondence, is not postponed to further choices; it is of course by no means
+excluded here that we can afterward also specify elements of u that neither belong
+6 See Brouwer 1924 and 1924a [and also 1923, pp. 3-5].
+6a [In a paper published in English (1953) Brouwer uses the expression "mathematical argument".]
+
+460
+to l1 nor possess a segment belonging to u1 but have the property that the same
+natural number is associated with all elements of M that issue from such an element
+of u. )
+If we say that an element of u is secured when it either is inhibited or possesses a
+(proper or improper) segment belonging to M1, then u splits into a numerable set +
+of secured and a numerable set o of unsecured finite choice sequences, and the proof
+h shows that an arbitrary Fs is securable, that is, that every infinite choice sequence
+that issues from it and is uninhibited for M possesses a certain segment belonging to
+My.? Let hsny..n, be a proof in which the securability of the element Esn..... Of o
+is derived; then what this securability and this proof rest upon is, if we leave aside
+the fact that u1 and the inhibited choice sequences of u are given, exclusively the
+relations, obtaining between the elements of u, that are formed by the composition
+of [welche sich zusammensetzen aus] elementary relations e of the kind obtaining
+between two elements Emmy mg and Emmy..myng+ 1, of which one is an [immediate]
+extension [Verlängerungl'" of the other. Now, if the relations employed in any
+given proof can be decomposed into basic relations, its "canonical" form (that is,
+the one decomposed into elementary inferences®) employs only basic relations; in the
+case of the canonical form ksn...n. of the proof hsny.n, we can therefore ultimately
+infer the securability of Esn...n, exclusively from a combination of the species
+Snym formed from the elementary relations e connecting Eng.., to Esn...n. -1
+and to the Esn..v, with a property previously derived from arbitrary elementary
+relations e and also from the fact that My and the inhibited choice sequences
+are given. For the last step of lisn,..n, we therefore must previously have established
+the securability either of Esn..m.-i Or of all Esn...n,v.
+If we now call the derivation of the securability of an Emmy.my from that of
+" When carefully considered from the intuitionistic point of view [Intuitionistisch durchdacht],
+this securability is seen to be nothing but the property defined by the stipulation that it shall hold
+for every element of u1 and for every inhibited element of u, and that it shall hold for an arbitrary
+Esnin, as soon as it is satisfied, for every v, for Esnin. This remark immediately implies
+the well-ordering property for an arbitrary isni..n. The proot carried out in the text for the
+latter property, however, seems to me to be of interest nevertheless on account of the propositions
+contained in its elaboration.
+7ª [In a paper published in English (1953) Brouwer uses the expression "immediate descendant" .]
+• Just as, in general, well-ordered species are produced by means of the two generating operations from primitive species (Brouwer 1926, p. 451), so, in particular, mathematical proofs are
+produced by means of the two generating operations from null elements and elementary inferences
+that are immediately given in intuition (albeit subject to the restriction that there always occurs
+a last elementary inference). These mental mathematical proofs that in general contain infinitely
+many terms must not be confused with their linguistic accompaniments, which are finite and
+necessarily inadequate, hence do not belong to mathematics.
+The preceding remark contains my main argument against the claims of Hilbert's metamathematics. A second argument is that the way in which Hilbert seeks to settle the question
+(which, incidentally, was taken over from intuitionism) of the reliability of the principle of
+excluded middle is a vicious circle; for, if we wish to provide a foundation for the correctness of
+this principle by means of the proof of its consistency, this implicitly presupposes the principle
+of the reciprocity of the complementary species and hence the principle of excluded middle itself
+(see Brouwer 1923c, p. 252) [Concerning this passage Brouwer (1953, p. 14, footnote 1) writes:
+"The equivalence of the principles of the excluded third and of reciprocity of complementarity,
+mentioned there in a footnote by way of remark, subsequently has been recognized as nonexistent.
+In fact, as was also shown in the present paper, the fields of validity of these two principles have
+turned out to be essentially different" 1
+
+461
+E'mm...mg-, a S-inference and the derivation of the securability of an Fmmy..m, from
+that of all Fmmy..mov a f-inference, then the proof ksn...n, forms a well-ordered
+species of which every full element is formed by an elementary inference that, in case
+it constitutes the derivation of the securability of an element of o, represents either
+a f-inference or a L-inference.
+We now assert that every element Esn...n, of o possesses the well-ordering property
+[Wohlordnungseigenschaft], that is, that the subset Msn..., of M determined by
+Esny..n, splits into a species of subsets Ma that is similar to the species of the full
+elements of a well-ordered species Isn...n, each of these subsets being determined
+by a finite initial segment E« of choices that contains Esn...n, and belongs to M1. The
+species I'sn...n, is constructed by means of generating operations w of the second
+kind, of which each corresponds to the inversion of the continuation, by a new free
+choice, of a certain finite initial segment of choices that is uninhibited for M. Then
+to a new choice that is inhibited for M or terminates an element of u1 there corresponds, for the operation w in question, a primitive species consisting of a null element
+or a full element, respectively.
+For the proof of this assertion we denote by fsn...n, the species of those elements
+of o whose securability we ascertain in the course of ksn...n, and we say that a
+constructional underspecies u of lisn...n, possesses the well-ordering property if every
+element of o whose securability we ascertain in the course of u possesses the property
+of being well-ordered. Further we shall say that the preservation property [Erhaltungseigenschaft] holds for a constructional underspecies u of lisn...n, if, in case every
+element of fsn..., upon whose securability the proof u is based possesses the wellordering property, every element of fsn..., whose securability is derived in the
+course of u likewise possesses the well-ordering property. Then, as we observe the
+generation of ksn..n, we see by means of the inductive method that for every
+constructional underspecies of ksn..n,, hence in particular for ksn...n, itself, the
+preservation property holds. But from the preservation property for ksn...n, the
+well-ordering property immediately follows for lsn...n, hence for Esn...n,°
+In case M is a finitary set, the well-ordered species Isn_...n, has the same content a
+as a well-ordered species Osn...n, that is constructed without the use of null elements
+and, moreover, in a way parallel to the construction, discussed above, of Isn....n,
+namely, in a way such that to each operation wa used for the construction of Isn....n,
+• If the securability of Fsn...n, is ascertained in several proofs ksn...n, or in several places of
+one and the same proof ksn1...my
+the corresponding Isn1...m,
+all are generation-equivalent, as
+follows by virtue of the inductive method when we observe the generation of one of them. This
+remark, incidentally, is superfluous for the proof above. ['Two well-ordered primitive species F'
+and F" have the same generating value [besitzen denselben Erzeugungswert], or are said to be
+generation-equivalent [erzeugungsgleich], if the single element of which each of them consists is
+either a full element for both or a null element for both. Two well-ordered species F" and F" are
+said to be generation-equivalent it for an arbitrary v the two constructional underspecies of the first
+order F'" and F, either both fail to exist or both exist and are generation-equivalent." (Brouwer
+1926, p. 452)]
+9a ["'Two well-ordered species (or subspecies of well-ordered species) F' and F" are said to have
+the same content [heißen inhaltsgleich] if the species of the full elements of F' and the species of
+the full elements of F" are similar." (Brouwer 1926, p. 453.) ]
+
+462
+there corresponds a generating operation va of the first kind used for the construction
+of Osn...n. the terms of va being similar, in sequence, to the species of the full
+elements of those terms of w. that contain full elements. The well-ordered species
+Irst kind. But form this it follows that the species leerating operations el as
+the species of full elements of Isn,...n,, is finite, hence that in particular for every
+natural number s the species of the full elements of T's is finite. Thus a natural number
+z can be specified such that an arbitrary element of u1 possesses at most z subscripts;
+therefore the natural number Be associated with
+an arbitrary element e of M is
+completely determined by the first z generating choices of e, and we have established
+the property expressed in the following
+THEOREM 2. If with each element e of a finitary set MI a natural number ße is associated, a natural number z can be specified such that Be is completely determined by the first
+z choices generating e.
+§ 3
+In the unit continuum we now determine for every natural number v the k,-
+intervals k", k",...,Ks"', that is, the 1'4v+1) intervals, ordered from left to right, that
+partially cover the interval (0, 1). Then the finitary point set J formed by the
+nestings of intervals k(4), k42)
+', kl3),... (where each interval is contained, in the
+strict sense, in the preceding one) coincides with the species of the x; that is, every
+such nesting of intervals belongs to an x, and every x contains such a nesting of
+intervals. 1°
+Now in the case of a full function f(x) a nesting of 1-intervals 11, 12, ... is associated
+with every nesting of intervals k"!', K4",..., and by Theorem 2 there exists, for
+every natural number v, a natural number m, (of which we may assume that it does
+not decrease with increasing v) such that 1, is determined by the choice of k1""?, K2z)
+• Hence for each v only a finite number l, of 1-intervals can occur as 1y, and
+there exists for them a maximal width b, that converges to zero as v increases beyond
+all bounds.
+Let us denote by to the interval that is concentric with ko› and whose width is 3
+of the width of l', and let Py and Pa be two arbitrary point cores of the unit continuum that are <2-4v-3, that is, «I of the width of the k,-intervals, apart. Then a
+fu,' can be determined that contains both P1 and P2, and by means of this t"' a
+nesting of intervals kf!),.., k"", kyt1
++1, ky72,... belonging to P1 and a nesting of
+intervals l"'), ..., Kk"', kv+'1, lv72, ... belonging to P2 can be determined.
+Let a be an arbitrary positive quantity that is positively different10a from zero. If
+we choose vs so great that by, ‹ e and if we put 2-4my -3 = as, then, according to the
+10 If in an analogous way we consider a suitable finitary set of pairs of points that coincides with
+the species of the pairs of point cores of the unit continuum, then on the basis of Theorem 2 the
+impossibility of splitting [Unzerlegbarkeit] the continuum readily follows, that is, the property that,
+for an arbitrary splitting of the unit continuum into a discrete species of subspecies, one of these
+subspecies is identical with the unit continuum.
+10a [On this notion see Brouwer 1919, p. 3, lines 7u-5u, and 1923d, p. 254, lines 3-5; compare
+Definition 1 in 2.2.3 of Heyting 1956, p. 19.].
+
+463
+second paragraph of the present section, to any two elements of I for which M1, M2,
+.... Mm, are equal there correspond two "values" of f(x) whose difference is less than
+bve: hence less than s, in absolute value. According to the third paragraph of the
+present section, therefore, it is also the case that to any two point cores P1 and P2
+of the unit continuum that are <a, apart there correspond two values of f(x) whose
+difference is less than e in absolute value, so that f(x) turns out to be uniformly
+continuous and we have proved
+THEOREM 3. Every full function is uniformly continuous.
+
+The foundations of mathematics
+(1927)
+The present paper,
+the text of an
+consistency of arithmetic, and on this
+address delivered in July 1927 at the last point we refer the reader to the intro-
+Hamburg Mathematical Seminar, can be
+ductory note to Bernays's paper (below,
+considered a sequel to Hilbert's 1925
+pp. 485-486).
+paper. It restates the salient points of
+The translators followed the original
+Hilbert's conception. The formal system
+version of the paper, but they used the
+used by Hilbert is described in greater
+version of 1930a to clarify the meaning
+detail here, and, by discussing a number
+of a few passages, and some of the
+of criticisms, the paper takes on a
+additions contained in this version are
+polemical tone absent from that of 1925.
+reproduced in the translation below be-
+Hilbert comes back to his attempted
+tween square brackets.
+proof of the continuum hypothesis and
+The translation is by Stefan Bauerprovides some explanations on Lemmas
+Mengelberg and Dagfinn Føllesdal, and
+I and II. The paper ends with some
+it is printed here with the kind permission
+remarks on Ackermann's proof of the of Teubner Verlag.
+It is a great honor and at the same time a necessity for me to round out and
+develop my thoughts on the foundations of mathematics, which I expounded here
+one day five years ago and which since then have constantly kept me most actively
+occupied.' With this new way of providing a foundation for mathematics, which we
+may appropriately call a proof theory, I pursue a significant goal, for I should like
+to eliminate once and for all the questions regarding the foundations of mathematics,
+in the form in which they are now posed, by turning every mathematical proposition
+into a formula that can be concretely exhibited and strictly derived, thus recasting
+mathematical definitions and inferences in such a way that they are unshakable and
+yet provide an adequate picture of the whole science. I believe that I can attain this
+goal completely with my proof theory, even if a great deal of work must still be done
+before it is fully developed.
+No more than any other science can mathematics be founded by logic alone;
+rather, as a condition for the use of logical inferences and the performance of logical
+operations, something must already be given to us in our faculty of representation
+[in der Vorstellung], certain extralogical concrete objects that are intuitively [anschaulich] present as immediate experience prior to all thought. If logical inference is
+1 See my previous publications on this topic (1922, 1922a, 1925). [The first is the text of the
+address delivered in Hamburg five years earlier, in the summer of 1922.]
+
+465
+to be reliable, it must be possible to survey these objects completely in all their parts,
+and the fact that they occur, that they differ from one another, and that they follow
+each other, or are concatenated, is immediately given intuitively, together with the
+objects, as something that neither can be reduced to anything else nor requires
+reduction. This is the basic philosophical position that I regard as requisite for mathematics and, in general, for all scientific thinking, understanding, and communication.
+And in mathematics, in particular, what we consider is the concrete signs themselves,
+whose shape, according to the conception we have adopted, is immediately clear and
+recognizable. This is the very least that must be presupposed; no scientific thinker
+can dispense with it, and therefore everyone must maintain it, consciously or not.
+I shall now present the fundamental idea of my proof theory.
+All the propositions that constitute mathematics are converted into formulas, so
+that mathematics proper becomes an inventory of formulas. These differ from the
+ordinary formulas of mathematics only in that, besides the ordinary signs, the logical
+signs
+→,
+St,
+V, -
+(x),
+(Ex)
+implies
+and
+Or
+not
+all
+there exists
+also occur in them. Certain formulas, which serve as building blocks for the formal
+edifice of mathematics, are called axioms. A proof is an array that must be given as
+such to our perceptual intuition; it consists of inferences according to the schema
+G→$
+where each of the premisses, that is, the formulas & and & → I in the array,
+either is an axiom or results directly from an axiom by substitution, or else coincides
+with the end formula of an inference occurring earlier in the proof or results from it
+by substitution. A formula is said to be provable if it is either an axiom or the end
+formula of a proof.
+The axioms and provable propositions, that is, the formulas resulting from this
+procedure, are copies [Abbilder] of the thoughts constituting customary mathematics
+as it has developed till now.
+Through the program outlined here the choice of axioms for our proof theory is
+already indicated; we arrange them as follows.
+I. Axioms of implication
+1. A → (B → A) (introduction of an assumption) ;
+2. (A → (A → B)) → (A → B) (omission of an assumption);
+3. (A → (B → C)) → (B → (A → C)) (interchange of assumptions) ;
+4. (B → C) → ( (A → B) → (A → C)) (elimination of a proposition).
+I. Axioms about & and V
+5. A & B → A ;
+6. А & B → B;
+7. A → (B → A & B);
+
+466
+8. A → A V B;
+9. B→ A V B;
+10. ((A → C) & (B → C)) → ((A V B) →C)).
+III. Axioms of negation
+11. (A → B & B) → A (principle of contradiction);
+12. A → A (principle of double negation).
+The axioms of groups I, II, and III are nothing but the axioms of the propositional
+calculus. From I1 and 12 there follows, in particular, the formula
+(A & A) → B
+and further the logical principle of excluded middle,
+((A → B) & (A → B)) → B.
+IV. The logical e-axiom
+13. Ala) → A(E(A)).
+Here e(A) stands for an object of which the proposition A(a) certainly holds if it
+holds of any object at all; let us call a the logical ‹-function. [The substitution of any
+given formula for Ala) will be made possible if, instead of «(A), we write more
+precisely ExA(x), EyA(Y),....] To elucidate the role of the logical a-function let us
+make the following remarks.
+In the formal system the a-function is used in three ways.
+1. By means of e, "all" and "there exists" can be defined, namely, as follows:
+(a) A (a) == Alo(A)),
+(La) A (a) = A(E(A)).
+Here the double arrow stands for a combination of two implication formulas; in its
+place we shall henceforth use the "equivalence" sign ~.
+On the basis of this definition the e-axiom IV 13 yields the logical relations that
+hold for the universal and the existential quantifier, such as
+(a) A (a) → A(b) (Aristotle's dictum),
+and
+(a) A (a) → (Ea)A(a) (principle of excluded middle).
+2. If a proposition 2 holds of one and only one object, then e(21) is the object of
+which 2(a) holds.
+The e-function thus enables us to resolve a proposition such as 2l(a), when it holds
+of only one object, so as to obtain
+a = E(21).
+3. Beyond this, e takes on the role of the choice function; that is, in case A(a) holds
+of several objects, e(2) is some one of the objects a of which 2(a) holds.
+In addition to these purely logical axioms we have the following specifically
+mathematical axioms.
+
+V. Axioms of equality
+467
+14. a = a;
+15. (a = b) → (A(a) → A(b)).
+VI. Axioms of number
+16. a # 0;
+17. (A(0) & (a) (Ala) → Ala'))) → A(b) (principle of mathematical induction).
+Here a' denotes the number following a, and the integers 1, 2, 3, ... can be written
+in the form O', O", O",....
+For the numbers of the second number class and of Cantor's higher number classes
+the corresponding induction axioms must be added; they would have to be combined,
+however, into a schema in agreement with Cantor's theory.
+Finally, we also need explicit definitions, which introduce the notions of mathematics and have the character of axioms, as well as certain recursion axioms, which
+result from a general recursion schema. Before we discuss the formulation of these
+axioms, we must first lay down the rules that govern the use of axioms in general.
+For in my theory contentual inference is replaced by manipulation of signs [äußeres
+Handeln] according to rules; in this way the axiomatic method attains that reliability
+and perfection that it can and must reach if it is to become the basic instrument of all
+theoretical research
+First, the following stipulations hold.
+For mathematical variables we always use lower-case [italic]] Latin letters, but for
+constant mathematical objects (specific functions) lower-case Greek letters.
+For [variable atomic] propositions (indeterminate formulas) we always use capital
+[italic] Latin letters, but for constant [atomic] propositions capital Greek letters,
+for example,
+Z(a) [a is a [natural] number]
+and
+N(a) [a is a number of the second number class].?
+Concerning the procedure of substitution, the following general conventions hold.
+For propositional variables we may substitute only formulas, that is, arrays
+constructed from elementary formulas by means of the logical signs
+→, 8, V, -, (x), (Ex).
+The elementary formulas are the formula variables, possibly with arguments
+attached, and the signs for constant propositions, such as
+Z, N, =, <,
+with the associated argument places filled.
+Any array may be substituted for a mathematical variable; however, when a
+mathematical variable occurs in a formula, the constant proposition that states of
+2 [See footnote 7, p. 385, above.]
+
+468
+what kind the variable is, followed by the implication sign, must always precede, for
+example,
+Z(a) →a +1=1 + a,
+N(a) → N(a').
+This convention has the effect that only substituends that are ordinary numbers or
+numbers of the second number class come into consideration after all. In Axioms V
+and VI the propositions Z(a) and Z(b), which should precede, were omitted for the
+sake of brevity.
+German capital and lower-case letters have reference and are used only to convey
+information.
+The mathematical variables are of two kinds: (1) the primitive variables [Grundvariablen] and (2) the variable-sorts [Variablengattungen].
+1. Now while in all of arithmetic and analysis the ordinary integer suffices as sole
+primitive variable, with each of Cantor's transfinite number classes there is associated
+a primitive variable that ranges over precisely the ordinals of that class. Hence to
+each primitive variable there corresponds a proposition that states of what kind it is;
+this proposition is implicitly characterized by axioms.
+With each primitive variable there is associated one kind of recursion, by means of
+which we define functions whose argument is that primitive variable. The recursion
+associated with the number-theoretic variable is "ordinary recursion"
+, by means of
+which a function of a number-theoretic variable n is defined when we indicate what
+value it has for n = O and how the value for n' is obtained from that for n. The
+generalization of ordinary recursion is transfinite recursion; it rests upon the general
+principle that the value of the function for a value of the variable is determined by
+means of the preceding values of the function.
+2. From the primitive variables we derive further kinds of variables by applying
+logical connectives to the propositions associated with the primitive variables, for
+example, to 4. The variables thus defined are called variable-sorts, and the propositions defining them are called sort-propositions; for each of these a new particular
+sign is introduced. Thus the formula
+#(J)~ (a)(Z(a) → 2(J(a)))
+offers the simplest instance of a variable-sort; this formula defines the sort of the
+function variable ("being-a-function"). A further example is the formula
+1(9)~ (f)(P(f) →Z(9(f)));
+it defines the "being-a-function-of-a-function",3 the argument g is the new functionof-a-function variable.
+To produce the higher variable-sorts we must provide the sort-propositions themselves with subscripts, thus making a recursion procedure possible.
+We can now characterize what is to be understood by explicit definitions and by
+recursion axioms: an explicit definition is an equivalence or identity that on its left
+side has the sign to be defined (capital or lower-case Greek letter), along with certain
+3 [See footnote 8, p. 387, above.]
+
+469
+variables as arguments, and on its right side has an array in which only these arguments occur as free variables and in which no signs for constants occur except those
+that have already been introduced.
+In a corresponding way, the recursion axioms are formula systems that are modeled
+upon the recursive procedure.
+These are the general foundations of my theory. To familiarize you with the way
+in which it is applied I would like to adduce some examples of particular functions as
+they are defined by recursion.
+If we want to define the function ‹(a), which is 0 for the argument O and everywhere
+else has the value 1, the equations
+‹(0) = 0,
+1(á) = 1,
+as we see, already form a recursion in themselves. How the sum, the product, and the
+function a! can be defined by recursion is well known.
+The function ula, b), too, whose value is the minimum of the two numbers a and b,
+is easily definable by recursion.
+I mention, further, two more complicated examples, namely, the function
+т(a) = 1 if a is a prime number,
+(a) = O otherwise,
+and the function (a), which gives the number of primes ≤a.
+In fact, these too can be defined by recursion; to this end we must first introduce
+the following two functions of three arguments each:
+«(a, b, c) = O ifb is equal to one of the numbers 1.a, 2.a,..., c. a (6 > 0),
+= 1 otherwise,
+4(a, b, c) = the least of those of the numbers 1, 2,..., a that are divisors of b and > c,
+= b if none of these numbers has this property.
+If we now begin to construct mathematics, we shall first set our sights upon
+elementary number theory; we recognize that we can obtain and prove its truths
+through contentual intuitive considerations. The formulas that we encounter when
+we take this approach are used only to impart information. Letters stand for numerals,
+and an equation informs us of the fact that two signs stand for the same thing.
+The situation is different in algebra; in algebra we consider the expressions formed
+with letters to be independent objects in themselves, and the propositions of number
+theory, which are included in algebra, are formalized by means of them. Where we
+had numerals, we now have formulas, which themselves are concrete objects that in
+their turn are considered by our perceptual intuition, and the derivation of one
+formula from another in accordance with certain rules takes the place of the numbertheoretic proof based on content.
+Thus algebra already goes considerably beyond contentual number theory. Even
+the formula
+I+a = at 1,
+for example, in which a is a genuine number-theoretic variable, in algebra no longer
+
+470
+merely imparts information about something contentual but is a certain formal
+object, a provable formula, which in itself means nothing and whose proof cannot be
+based on content but requires appeal to the induction axiom.
+The formulas
+1+3 = 3+1
+and 1+7=7 + 1,
+which can be verified by contentual considerations, can be obtained from the algebraic
+formula above only by a proof procedure, such as formal substitution of the numerals
+3 and 7 for a, that is, by the use of a rule of substitution.
+Hence even elementary mathematics contains, first, formulas to which correspond
+contentual communications of finitary propositions (mainly numerical equations or
+inequalities, or more complex communications composed of these) and which we may
+call the real propositions of the theory, and, second, formulas that-just like the
+numerals of contentual number theory—in themselves mean nothing but are merely
+things that are governed by our rules and must be regarded as the ideal objects of the
+theory.
+These considerations show that, to arrive at the conception of formulas as ideal
+propositions, we need only pursue in a natural and consistent way the line of development that mathematical practice has already followed till now. And it is then natural
+and consistent for us to treat henceforth not only the mathematical variables but also
+the logical signs
+→, 8, V, -, (x), (Ex),
+and the logical variables, namely, the propositional variables
+A, B, C,...,
+just like the numerals and letters in algebra and to consider them, too, as signs that
+in themselves mean nothing but are merely building blocks for ideal propositions.
+Indeed, we have an urgent reason for thus extending the formal point of view of
+algebra to all of mathematics. For it is the means of relieving us of a fundamental
+difficulty that already makes itself felt in elementary number theory. Again I take
+as an example the equation
+a +1=1 + a;
+if we wanted to regard it as imparting the information that
+a+1 = 1 + a,
+where a stands for any given number, then this communication could not be negated,
+since the proposition that there exists a number a for which
+at1#1+a
+holds has no finitary meaning; one cannot, after all, try out all numbers. Thus, if we
+adopted the finitist attitude, we could not make use of the alternative according to
+which an equation, like the one above, in which an unspecified numeral occurs either
+is satisfied for every numeral or can be refuted by a counterexample. For, as an
+application of the "principle of excluded middle", this alternative depends essentially
+
+471
+on the assumption that it is possible to negate the assertion that the equation in
+question always holds.
+But we cannot relinquish the use either of the principle of excluded middle or of
+any other law of Aristotelian logic expressed in our axioms, since the construction of
+analysis is impossible without them.
+Now the fundamental difficulty that we face here can be avoided by the use of
+ideal propositions. For, if to the real propositions we adjoin the ideal ones, we obtain
+a system of propositions in which all the simple rules of Aristotelian logic hold and all
+the usual methods of mathematical inference are valid. Just as, for example, the
+negative numbers are indispensable in elementary number theory and just as modern
+number theory and algebra become possible only through the Kummer-Dedekind
+ideals, so scientific mathematics becomes possible only through the introduction of
+ideal propositions.
+To be sure, one condition, a single but indispensable one, is always attached to the
+use of the method of ideal elements, and that is the proof of consistency; for, extension
+by the addition of ideal elements is legitimate only if no contradiction is thereby
+brought about in the old, narrower domain, that is, if the relations that result for the
+old objects whenever the ideal objects are eliminated are valid in the old domain.
+In the present situation, however, this problem of consistency is perfectly amenable
+to treatment. For the point is to show that, when ideal objects are introduced, it is
+impossible for us to obtain two logically contradictory propositions, 2 and 2. Now,
+as I remarked above, the logical formula
+(A & A) → B
+follows from the axioms of negation. If in it we substitute the proposition 2 for A
+and the inequality O # 0 for B, we obtain
+(21 & 21) → (0 ‡ 0).
+And, once we have this formula, we can derive the formula 0 ‡ 0 from Q and 2.
+To prove consistency we therefore need only show that O # O cannot be obtained
+from our axioms by the rules in force as the end formula of a proof, hence that 0 # 0
+is not a provable formula. And this is a task that fundamentally lies within the
+province of intuition just as much as does in contentual number theory the task,
+say, of proving the irrationality of V2, that is, of proving that it is impossible to
+find two numerals a and b satisfying the relation a? = 262, a problem in which it must
+be shown that it is impossible to exhibit two numerals having a certain property.
+Correspondingly, the point for us is to show that it is impossible to exhibit a proof of
+a certain kind. But a formalized proof, like a numeral, is a concrete and surveyable
+object. It can be communicated from beginning to end. That the end formula has
+the required structure, namely "O # O", is also a property of the proof that can be
+concretely ascertained. The demonstration [that "O ‡ 0" is not a provable formula]
+can in fact be given, and this provides us with a justification for the introduction
+of our ideal propositions. At the same time we recognize that this also gives us the
+solution of a problem that became urgent long ago, namely, that of proving the consistency of the arithmetic axioms.
+
+472
+Wherever the axiomatic method is used it is incumbent upon us to prove the
+consistency of the axioms. In geometry and the physical theories this proof is successfully carried out by means of a reduction to the consistency of the arithmetic axioms.*
+This method obviously fails in the case of arithmetic itself. By making this important
+final step possible through the method of ideal elements, our proof theory forms the
+necessary keystone of the axiomatic system.
+The final test of every new theory is its success in answering preexistent questions
+that the theory was not specifically created to answer. As soon as Cantor had discovered his first transfinite numbers, the numbers of the second number class as they
+are called, the question arose whether by means of this transfinite counting one could
+actually enumerate the elements of sets known in other contexts but not denumerable
+in the ordinary sense. The line segment was the first and foremost set of this kind to
+come under consideration. This question, whether the points of the line segment,
+that is, the real numbers, can be enumerated by means of the numbers of the second
+number class, is the famous problem of the continuum, which was formulated but not
+solved by Cantor. In my paper "On the infinite" (1925) I showed how through our
+proof theory this problem becomes amenable to successful treatment.
+In order to show that this continuum hypothesis of Cantor's constitutes a perfectly
+concrete problem of ordinary analysis, I mention further that it can be expressed as a
+formula in the following way:
+where, to abbreviate, we have put
+Ф(f) for (a)(Z(a) → Z(f(a)))
+and
+=(f,g) for (a)(Z(a) → (f(a) = g(a))).
+In this formula there still occurs the proposition N, which is associated with the
+primitive variable of the second number class. But this can be avoided, since, as is
+well known, the numbers of the second number class can be represented by wellorderings of the number sequence-that is, by certain functions that have two
+number-theoretic variables and take the values 0 and 1—in such a way that the
+proposition in question takes the form of a proposition purely about functions.
+I have already set forth the basic features of this proof theory of mine on different
+occasions, in Copenhagen [1922], here in Hamburg [1922], in Leipzig [1922a], and
+in Münster [1925]; in the meantime much fault has been found with it, and objections
+of all kinds have been raised against it, all of which I consider just as unfair as it
+can be. I would now like to elucidate some of these points.
+Poincaré already made various statements that conflict with my views; above all,
+he denied from the outset the possibility of a consistency proof for the arithmetic
+axioms, maintaining that the consistency of the method of mathematical induction
+could never be proved except through the inductive method itself. But, as my theory
+shows, two distinct methods that proceed recursively come into play when the foundations of arithmetic are established, namely, on the one hand, the intuitive construction
+* [see footnote 6, p. 383, above.]
+
+473
+of the integer as numeral (to which there also corresponds, in reverse, the decomposition of any given numeral, or the decomposition of any concretely given array
+constructed just as a numeral is), that is, contentual induction, and, on the other hand,
+formal induction proper, which is based on the induction axiom and through which
+alone the mathematical variable can begin to play its role in the formal system.
+Poincaré arrives at his mistaken conviction by not distinguishing between these
+two methods of induction, which are of entirely different kinds. Regrettably Poincaré,
+the mathematician who in his generation was the richest in ideas and the most fertile,
+had a decided prejudice against Cantor's theory, which prevented him from forming
+a just opinion of Cantor's magnificent conceptions. Under these circumstances
+Poincaré had to reject my theory, which, incidentally, existed at that time only in its
+completely inadequate early stages." Because of his authority, Poincaré often exerted
+a one-sided influence on the younger generation.
+My theory is opposed on different grounds by the adherents of Russell and Whitehead's theory of foundations, who regard Principia mathematica as a definitively
+satisfying foundation for mathematics.
+Russell and Whitehead's theory of foundations is a general logical investigation of
+wide scope. But the foundation that it provides for mathematics rests, first, upon the
+axiom of infinity and, then, upon what is called the axiom of reducibility, and both
+of these axioms are genuine contentual assumptions that are not supported by a
+consistency proof; they are assumptions whose validity in fact remains dubious and
+that, in any case, my theory does not require.
+In my theory Russell's axiom of reducibility has its counterpart in the rule for
+dealing with function variables. But reducibility is not presupposed in my theory;
+rather, it is recognized as something that can be compensated for: the execution of
+the reduction would be required only in case a proof of a contradiction were given,
+and then, according to my proof theory, this reduction would always be bound to
+succeed.
+Now with regard to the most recent investigations, the fact that research on foundations has again come to attract such lively appreciation and interest certainly
+gives me the greatest pleasure. When I reflect on the content and the results of these
+investigations, however, I cannot for the most part agree with their tendency; I feel,
+rather, that they are to a large extent behind the times, as if they came from a period
+when Cantor's majestic world of ideas had not yet been discovered.
+In this I see the reason, too, why these most recent investigations in fact stop short
+of the great problems of the theory of foundations, for example, the question of the
+construction of functions, the proof or refutation of Cantor's continuum hypothesis,
+the question whether all mathematical problems are solvable, and the question
+whether consistency and existence are equivalent for mathematical objects.
+Of today's literature on the foundations of mathematics, the doctrine that Brouwer
+advanced and called intuitionism forms the greater part. Not because of any inclination for polemics, but in order to express my views clearly and to prevent misleading
+conceptions of my own theory, I must look more closely into certain of Brouwer's
+assertions.
+5 [Hilbert is apparently referring to his 1904 and its criticism by Poincaré (1905, pp. 17-34;
+1908, pp. 179-191).]
+
+474
+Brouwer declares [just as Kronecker did in his day] that existence statements, one
+and all, are meaningless in themselves unless they also contain the construction of
+the object asserted to exist; for him they are worthless scrip, and their use causes
+mathematics to degenerate into a game.
+The following may serve as an example showing that a mere existence proof carried
+out with the logical a-function is by no means a piece of worthless scrip.
+In order to justify a remark by Gauss to the effect that it is superfluous for analysis
+to go beyond the ordinary complex numbers formed with i, Weierstrass and Dedekind
+undertook investigations that also led to the formulation and proof of certain theorems.
+Now some time ago I stated a general theorem (1896) on algebraic forms that is a
+pure existence statement and by its very nature cannot be transformed into a statement involving constructibility. Purely by use of this existence theorem I avoided
+the lengthy and unclear argumentation of Weierstrass and the highly complicated
+calculations of Dedekind, and in addition, I believe, only my proof uncovers the
+inner reason for the validity of the assertions adumbrated by Gauss and formulated
+by Weierstrass and Dedekind.
+But even if one were not satisfied with consistency and had further scruples, he
+would at least have to acknowledge the significance of the consistency proof as a
+general method of obtaining finitary proofs from proofs of general theorems-say of
+the character of Fermat's theorem-that are carried out by means of the a-function.
+Let us suppose, for example, that we had found, for Fermat's great theorem, a
+proof in which the logical function & was used. We could then make a finitary proof
+out of it in the following way.
+Let us assume that numerals
+р, а, Б, с (# > 2)
+satisfying Fermat's equation
+at + 5# = ct
+are given; then we could also obtain this equation as a provable formula by giving
+the form of a proof to the procedure by which we ascertain that the numerals
+at + bP and « coincide. On the other hand, according to our assumption we would
+have a proof of the formula
+(2(0) & Z(6) & Z(c) & Z(p) & (p > 2)) → (a" + BP # CP),
+from which
+is obtained by substitution and inference. Hence both
+at +Bt = ct
+and
+at + bt # it
+would be provable. But, as the consistency proof shows in a finitary way, this cannot
+be the case.
+The examples cited are, however, only arbitrarily selected special cases. In fact,
+mathematics is replete with examples that refute Brouwer's assertions concerning
+existence statements.
+
+475
+What, now, is the real state of affairs with respect to the reproach that mathematics
+would degenerate into a game?
+The source of pure existence theorems is the logical -axiom, upon which in turn
+the construction of all ideal propositions depends. And to what extent has the formula
+game thus made possible been successful? This formula game enables us to express
+the entire thought-content of the science of mathematics in a uniform manner and
+develop it in such a way that, at the same time, the interconnections between the
+individual propositions and facts become clear. To make it a universal requirement
+that each individual formula then be interpretable by itself is by no means reasonable; on the contrary, a theory by its very nature is such that we do not need to fall
+back upon intuition or meaning in the midst of some argument. What the physicist
+demands precisely of a theory is that particular propositions be derived from laws of
+nature or hypotheses solely by inferences, hence on the basis of a pure formula game,
+without extraneous considerations being adduced. Only certain combinations and
+consequences of the physical laws can be checked by experiment-just as in my
+proof theory only the real propositions are directly capable of verification. The value
+of pure existence proofs consists precisely in that the individual construction is
+eliminated by them and that many different constructions are subsumed under one
+fundamental idea, so that only what is essential to the proof stands out clearly;
+brevity and economy of thought are the raison d'être of existence proofs. In fact, pure
+existence theorems have been the most important landmarks in the historical development of our science. But such considerations do not trouble the devout intuitionist.
+The formula game that Brouwer so deprecates has, besides its mathematical value,
+an important general philosophical significance. For this formula game is carried out
+according to certain definite rules, in which the technique of our thinking is expressed.
+These rules form a closed system that can be discovered and definitively stated. The
+fundamental idea of my proof theory is none other than to describe the activity of our
+understanding, to make a protocol of the rules according to which our thinking actually proceeds. Thinking, it so happens, parallels speaking and writing: we form statements and place them one behind another. If any totality of observations and
+phenomena deserves to be made the object of a serious and thorough investigation,
+it is this one—since, after all, it is part of the task of science to liberate us from arbitrariness, sentiment, and habit and to protect us from the subjectivism that already
+made itself felt in Kronecker's views and, it seems to me, finds its culmination in
+intuitionism.
+Intuitionism's sharpest and most passionate challenge is the one it flings at the
+validity of the principle of excluded middle, for example, in the simplest case, at the
+validity of the mode of inference according to which, for any assertion containing a
+number-theoretic variable, either the assertion is correct for all values of the variable
+or there exists a number for which it is false. The principle of excluded middle is a
+consequence of the logical e-axiom and has never yet caused the slightest error. It is,
+moreover, so clear and comprehensible that misuse is precluded. In particular, the
+principle of excluded middle is not to be blamed in the least for the occurrence of
+the well-known paradoxes of set theory; rather, these paradoxes are due merely to
+the introduction of inadmissible and meaningless notions, which are automatically
+excluded from my proof theory. Existence proofs carried out with the help of the
+
+476
+principle of excluded middle usually are especially attractive because of their surprising brevity and elegance. Taking the principle of excluded middle from the
+mathematician would be the same, say, as proscribing the telescope to the astronomer
+or to the boxer the use of his fists. To prohibit existence statements and the principle
+of excluded middle is tantamount to relinquishing the science of mathematics
+altogether. For, compared with the immense expanse of modern mathematics, what
+would the wretched remnants mean, the few isolated results, incomplete and unrelated, that the intuitionists have obtained without the use of the logical e-axiom?
+The theorems of the theory of functions, such as the theory of conformal mapping and
+the fundamental theorems in the theory of partial differential equations or of Fourier
+series—to single out only a few examples from our science—are merely ideal proposi.
+tions in my sense and require the logical e-axiom for their development.
+In these circumstances I am astonished that a mathematician should doubt that
+the principle of excluded middle is strictly valid as a mode of inference. I am even
+more astonished that, as it seems, a whole community of mathematicians who do the
+same has now constituted itself. I am most astonished by the fact that even in
+mathematical circles the power of suggestion of a single man, however full of temperament and inventiveness, is capable of having the most improbable and eccentric effects.
+Not even the sketch of my proof of Cantor's continuum hypothesis has remained
+uncriticized. I would therefore like to make some comments on this proof.
+First, as for Lemma I, which I used there without proof, it is certainly very useful
+in fixing the train of thought, but it is dispensable for the proof itself. For the introduction of the a-functions does not affect the denumerability of the objects that can
+be produced up to a certain height of variable-sorts.
+We can, moreover, normalize these e-functions in a certain way. In the domain of
+number-theoretic variables, for example, we need only take the particular functionof-a-function e(f), which is 0 if always f(a) = O and otherwise represents some number a for which f(a) # O, in place of the general e-function e(A), whose value is some
+individual of which the proposition A holds, if it holds of any at all.
+Indeed, I also took this function-of-a-function as a point of departure when I wanted
+to formalize the principle of excluded middle in connection with the axiom of choice. ®
+In order to explain Lemma II, which I did not prove either, and at the same time
+to elucidate my conception of the numbers of the second number class, I will mention
+the following proposition, which is entailed by the assertion of the lemma. If a
+definition of a certain number of the second number class is given by means of
+transfinite recursion, then from this definition another one that uses only ordinary
+recursion on a number-theoretic variable can be obtained for the same number. The
+meaning of this proposition is that a recursively defined function of a number of the
+second number class can be computed for a given argument, just as a number-theoretic
+function defined by recursion can always be computed for a given numerical value.
+In the proof of this the difficulty is, above all, in showing that, when a sequence
+a(n) of numbers of the second number class is given by a recursion
+a (n') = p(a(n)),
+where o is defined by transfinite recursion, this transfinite recursion can be eliminated.
+6 [In Hilbert 1922a, pp. 158-159, but with + instead of є.]
+
+477
+In certain cases this elimination has been successfully carried out. Examples of this
+are the first e-number and the first critical e-number, as they have been introduced
+and named by Cantor.
+The first e-number is the limit number of the sequence a(n), where
+a (0) = ∞0,
+(n being an ordinary number),
+and w" is defined in the usual way by transfinite recursion.
+Following Cantor, we understand by an e-number a number a such that
+For the definition of the first e-number by ordinary recursion we already need variable-sorts with numerical subscripts:
+No(a) ~ N(a),
+Nn. (a) ~ (6) (N(b) → N(a(b))).
+W. Ackermann recently succeeded in making considerable progress in the proof of
+consistency." I would like to end my lecture with a very short report on that.
+In proving consistency for the a-function the point is to show that from a given
+proof of O # 0 the a-function can be eliminated, in the sense that the arrays formed
+by means of it can be replaced by numerals in such a way that the formulas resulting
+from the logical axiom of choice by substitution, the "critical formulas", go over into
+"true" formulas by virtue of those replacements.
+The replacements are found by stepwise trials after the elimination of the free
+variables has been completed, and it must be shown that this process always terminates.
+We here make the following particular assumptions:
+1. Only Z and = occur as signs for constant propositions.
+2. Whenever the arrays occurring as arguments—we call them "functionals" —are
+free of the e-function they either are themselves numerals or are constructed from
+numerals by means of signs for functions defined by recursion axioms.
+For the case in which only one functional formed with & and only a single critical
+formula occur, we can see in the following way that the process of stepwise replacements is finite. Let
+21(t) → 2l(Eall(a))
+be the critical formula (where cal(a) may occur also in t). We first replace sal(a)
+everywhere by O.
+Then all functionals will be free of the a-function; we can calculate everything and
+obtain numerical values for the functionals. Among the elementary propositions we
+can now distinguish between the "true" and the "false", since every Z-proposition
+is considered true and for equations the criterion is that the numerals on both sides
+be identical. In place of the critical formula we now have
+A (3) → 21(0)
+" [Hilbert is referring to the new version of Ackermann's proof, different from the published one
+(1924) and only communicated, by letter, to Bernays; see below, p. 486 and footnote 3, p. 489.]
+
+478
+Either this formula is true (then we have reached our goal) or 21(3) is true. Hence we
+have then found a value 3 for which 2 holds.
+We now make a new replacement, replacing al(a) everywhere by the numeral 3.
+If we carry out the computation of all functionals, the critical formula goes over into
+a formula,
+11(31) → 21(3),
+that is certainly true.
+When several e-functions occur, they may be compounded in complicated ways; in
+particular, this may take either the form of "embedding" ["Einlagerung"], for
+example,
+Eal (a, EyA(b)),
+where epA(b) is free of the variable a, or that of "superposition" ["Überordnung "I,
+sall (a, Enf(a, b)).
+In the case of mere embedding no difficulty of principle yet appears. We must take
+care to perform the replacements from the inside out and to give the axiom of equality
+its due, seeing to it, for example, that, if the replacements for 60(6) and e A(b) are
+the same in two e-arrays,
+and
+we also replace the outer & in the same way.
+So long as the replacements for the inner e's remain unchanged, the values found
+for the outer e's are final. Hence they can become void only if a new value is found
+for an inner &.
+Consequently, in finding values for the e's, we penetrate steadily further inward,
+so that finally values are found for the innermost e's, provided the procedure does not
+already terminate earlier; these values are then final, and the maximal number of
+layers in the embedding is thus decreased by 1.
+An upper bound for the total number of steps of replacement needed to transform
+any critical formula into a true one can be given beforehand in a simple way on the
+basis of the given proof array; this makes the finitary character of these considerations
+apparent.
+The case of superposition is more difficult. Here, if we want to perform the replacement from the inside out, we cannot, for example, in
+Earl (a, EnS (a, b))
+replace the inner e, that is, & A (a, b), by a number, but only by a function. As replacement functions we need take only those that have the value 0 everywhere except for
+a finite number of arguments. We always begin with the function that has the value
+O everywhere (" zero replacement").
+It is now by no means immediately obvious, though it can be proved, that the
+replacement procedure terminates in this case also; again we obtain in an elementary
+way an upper bound for the number of steps required. In this it is essential that,
+
+479
+whenever a new function replacement is made for the inner e's, the replacement for
+the outer e's begin anew with the zero replacement.
+In this proof of finiteness it is assumed that the e's occur only in the proof array
+itself but not in the recursion axioms introduced to define functions.
+From my presentation you will recognize that it is the consistency proof that
+determines the effective scope of my proof theory and in general constitutes its core.
+The method of W. Ackermann permits a further extension still. For the foundations
+of ordinary analysis his approach has been developed so far that only the task of
+carrying out a purely mathematical proof of finiteness remains. Already at this time
+I should like to assert what the final outcome will be: mathematics is a presuppositionless science. To found it I do not need God, as does Kronecker, or the assumption of
+a special faculty of our understanding attuned to the principle of mathematical
+induction, as does Poincaré, or the primal intuition of Brouwer, or, finally, as do
+Russell and Whitehead, axioms of infinity, reducibility, or completeness, which in fact
+are actual, contentual assumptions that cannot be compensated for by consistency
+proofs.
+I would like to note further that P. Bernays has again been my faithful collaborator.
+He has not only constantly aided me by giving advice but also contributed ideas of
+his own and new points of view, so that I would like to call this our common work.
+We intend to publish a detailed presentation of the theory soon.
+8 [Hilbert is apparently referring to Hilbert and Bernays 1934 and 1939.]
+
+Comments on Hilbert's second lecture on the
+foundations of mathematics
+HERMANN WEYL
+(1927)
+In 1920 Weyl delivered several lectures proach to the problem of the consistency
+on intuitionism before a mathematical
+of arithmetic (1904), Poincaré (1905, PP.
+colloquium in Zurich.
+These lectures
+18-23) pointed out that, even if Hilbert
+constitute an illuminating exposition of
+could justify mathematical induction,
+some of Brouwer's ideas, and in the
+this justification would come too late,
+course of them Weyl declared: "I now
+since he had applied the principle in
+give up my own attempt and join Brouarguments leading up to this justificawer" (1920, p. 56). Hilbert read the text
+tion. Although the distinction between
+of the lectures with attention, as refermathematics and metamathematics had
+ences in his writings of the twenties indinot yet been clearly expressed by Hilbert,
+cate, and the attack upon intuitionism
+Poincaré recognized that mathematical
+at the beginning of his 1922 lecture
+induction in fact splits into two prin-
+(delivered in Copenhagen and in Hamciples, one that applies to intuitive
+burg) can to some extent be regarded as
+sequences (of signs or of sequences of
+a reply to Weyl. The present paper is the
+signs) and one that is represented in an
+text of remarks made by Weyl immediallegedly meaningless formal system; he
+ately after Hilbert's 1927 lecture in
+drew the conclusion that, even if a con-
+Hamburg, and it is a new contribution
+sistency proof could justify the second
+to the controversy. Weyl's strict allegi. principle, it would not justify the first.
+ance to intuitionism had been only His objection to Hilbert's approach was
+momentary, and here, while defending
+that the first principle is not weaker than
+Brouwer against some of Hilbert's critithe second. Answering Poincaré years
+cisms, he attempts to bring out the
+later (1922), Hilbert claims that the first
+significance of Hilbert's approach to the
+of the two principles is not mathematical
+problems of the foundations of matheinduction. He presents a proof of the
+matics.
+commutative law of addition for numer-
+On one specific point Weyl opposes
+als that are intuitively constructed as
+Hilbert. In his lecture Hilbert had taken
+sequences of I's, and he writes: "This
+up the accusation of circularity that, he
+proof, as I would still like to emphasize
+claimed, Poincaré had directed against
+particularly, is a procedure that rests...
+the metamathematical use of matheexclusively upon the composition and
+matical induction. Weyl, in his remarks,
+decomposition of the numerals [auf dem
+undertakes to defend Poincaré. The issue
+Auf- und Abbau der Zahlzeichen] and is
+deserves some attention.
+in essence different from the principle
+Commenting on Hilbert's first ap- that, as the principle of mathematical
+
+COMMENTS ON HILBERT'S SECOND LECTURE
+481
+induction, or inference from n to n t 1, whether a formula, taken as an axiom,
+plays such a prominent role in higher
+leads to a contradiction, the question is
+mathematics" (1922, p. 164). Later, in
+whether a proof that leads to a contrathe lecture on which Weyl comments,
+diction can be presented to me. If no such
+Hilbert contrasts "contentual induction"
+proof can be presented to me, all the
+with "formal induction proper" (above,
+better; 1 am spared the trouble of having
+p. 473); in preparing a reprint (1928) of
+to react. If such a proof is presented to
+the lecture, he crossed out the words
+me, I have the right to extract certain
+"die inhaltliche Induktion" and "forparts of it and to consider them in themmale",
+, leaving the first principle nameselves, and, in particular, to decompose
+less and calling the second merely 'in-
+[abbauen] again the numerals that, comduction proper
+". Ackermann (1924, p. 1)
+posed and constructed, occur in them.
+ranges mathematical induction among
+This does not yet employ the inference
+the questionable transfinite methods of
+from n to n + 1 in any way." But in a
+inference and stresses that metamathe- consistency proof the argument does not
+matics deals only with concretely given
+deal with one single specific formula; it
+objects, to which finitary methods of
+has to be extended to all formulas. This
+inference are applied. Herbrand gives a
+is the point that Weyl has in mind when,
+description of recursive metamathematiin his remarks, he says: "One may here
+cal arguments (1930, pp. 3-4; see also
+stress the 'concretely given'
+; on the
+1930a, p. 248, and 19316, footnote 3,
+other hand, it is just as essential that the
+p. 3) that is perhaps more precise than
+contentual arguments in proof theory be
+any given by Hilbert and his disciples.
+carried out in hypothetical generality, on
+Metamathematical induction, according
+any proof, on any numeral". And the
+to Herbrand, "stops in the finite'
+generality, he adds, is secured by
+("cette récurrence qui s'arrête dans le
+induction.
+fini"
+', 1930, p. 4) and differs from induc-
+Hilbert's idea seems to have been that
+tion as it is applied in mathematics: in
+in metamathematical arguments we can
+metamathematics an inductive argument
+avoid the use of mathematical induction
+"is never more than the indication, in
+"proper" by appealing to the paradigone formula, of a procedure that will
+matic case." To be sure, this is a method
+have to be applied a certain number of
+frequently used in mathematics. In altimes in each particular case"
+gebra, to prove that a certain group is
+Thus to meet Poincaré's objection
+commutative, we may consider two
+Hilbert and those inspired by him strove
+elements of the group, x and y, and,
+to show that metamathematical methods
+reasoning about these two fixed but
+do not go beyond the typical case of a
+arbitrary individuals, we prove that
+concretely given object. In fact, Hilbert
+x•y = y-x; since no assumption is made
+wrote (1922a, p. 156) that arguments
+on x and y except that they are elements
+containing "all" belong to the transfinite
+of the group, we come to the conclusion
+—that is, nonfinitary-modes of inferthat the commutative law holds in the
+ence. This position is hard to maintain.
+Metamathematics has to make universal
+statements. In particular, a consistency
+proof for a certain system, as Poincaré
+has already noted, involves all the propositions that are provable in the system.
+Answering Poincaré on precisely this
+point, Hilbert says (1928a, p. 140):
+"Hence, when I
+want to ascertain
+a Herbrand writes (19316, p. 3 (below, p. 622),
+footnote 3): "We never consider the totality
+of all the objects x of an infinite collection; and
+when we say that an argument (or a theorem)
+is true for all these x, we mean that, for each x
+taken by itself, it is possible to repeat the
+general argument in question, which should be
+considered to be merely the prototype of these
+particular arguments". Here "prototype" is
+just another word for "paradigm".
+
+482
+WEYL
+group. In geometry we take, say, a point position and even that we must be told
+P, and any conclusion reached about P what actually are the operations reis valid for any point so long as our
+quired for that test"
+, the method ot
+argument does not rest upon any prothe paradigmatic case can lead to the
+perty that, while holding of P, does not
+successive introduction of only initial unihold of all points to which we extend the
+versal quantifiers. Therefore, the inducconclusion. In formalized logic the method
+tion used in Hilbert's metamathematics
+of the paradigmatic case leads to the
+is weaker than the principle of mathe-
+"rule of generalization" (Church), or the
+matical induction as formalized in full
+"rule of universal generalization" (Quine).
+number theory (say the system Z of
+In the case of intuitively constructed ob-
+Hilbert and Bernays 1934), where the
+jects (intuitionistically defined numbers,
+formula to which induction is applied
+Hilbert's numerals, formulas, sequences
+may contain, if written in prenex form,
+of formulas, and so on) this method blends
+any sequence of universal
+and existenwith induction. Take the case of numertial quantifiers. The arithmetic that
+als and assume that a property P holds
+allows only initial universal quantifiers is
+of 1 and that it holds of al whenever it
+Skolem's primitive recursive arithmetic
+holds of a. For a given numeral a, a
+(1923), and Hilbert came to recognize
+logical proof that parallels the constructhis arithmetic as the proper frametion of a establishes that a has the
+work for the formalization of metamatheproperty P. But, since nothing was
+matics. To point out the distinction
+assumed about a except that it is a
+between Z and primitive recursive arithnumeral, the property P holds of every
+metic would perhaps be Hilbert's final
+numeral.' The argument uses the method
+answer to Poincaré and Weyl. Gödel's
+of the paradigmatic case but, in addition,
+incompleteness theorem (1931) and Gentrests squarely upon the fact that any
+zen's consistency proof for arithmetic
+numeral either is 1 or is constructed from
+(1936 and 1938; see also 1943) showed
+I by writing 1 to the right of 1 one or
+that some metamathematical problems
+more times, hence upon the notion of
+can be solved only by the use of forms
+natural number.
+of induction stronger than even the un-
+The recursive inferences considered in
+restricted principle of mathematical
+Hilbert's metamathematics are not weakinduction in full number theory.
+er than mathematical induction applied
+The translation is by Stefan Bauerto intuitively constructed numbers. Since,
+Mengelberg and Dagfinn Føllesdal, and
+according to Herbrand (1930a, p. 248), a
+it is printed here with the kind permission
+property that is to be generalized by a
+of Teubner Verlag.
+metamathematical inductive argument
+must be such "that we can always test
+b This is, in essence, the intuitionistic justification of mathematical induction; see Heyting
+whether it holds or not for a given pro- 1956, p. 14.
+Permit me first to say a few words in defense of intuitionism.
+Before Hilbert constructed his proof theory everyone thought of mathematics as a
+system of contentual [inhaltliche], meaningful [sinnerfüllte], and evident [einsichtige] truths; this point of view was the common platform of all discussions.
+When Poincaré claimed that mathematical induction is for mathematical thought
+an ultimate basis that cannot be reduced to anything more primal, he had in mind
+precisely the processes, of composition and decomposition of numerals, that
+Hilbert himself employs in his contentual considerations and that are completely
+transparent to our perceptual intuition. For after all Hilbert, too, is not merely
+
+COMMENTS ON HILBERT'S SECOND LECTURE
+483
+concerned with, say, O' or O"
+", but with any O"...', with an arbitrary concretely given
+numeral. One may here stress the "concretely given"; on the other hand, it is just as
+essential that the contentual arguments in proof theory be carried out in hypothetical
+generality, on any proof, on any numeral. This, of course, is not to be taken as an
+objection, for the procedure of the "one after the other" can appeal to unshakable
+intuitive evidence; but, evident and primal though it be, we may nevertheless give it
+expression—not by formulating it as an "axiom"
+', but simply by describing its concrete use-making its self-evidence and primal quality explicit, and we are no doubt
+justified in seeing in it the characteristic mark of contentual mathematical thought.
+It seems to me that Hilbert's proof theory shows Poincaré to have been completely
+right on this point. That in Hilbert's formalized mathematics the principle of mathematical induction in the Peano-Dedekind version occurs as an axiom, whose consistent compatibility with the other axioms is to be established by contentual
+considerations, is quite a different matter, of course; but Poincaré was not concerned
+with that at all.
+Brouwer, like everyone else, required of mathematics that its theorems be (in
+Hilbert's terminology) "real propositions"
+', meaningful truths. But he was the first
+to see exactly and in full measure how it had in fact everywhere far exceeded the
+limits of contentual thought. I believe that we are all indebted to him for this recognition of the limits of contentual thought. In the contentual considerations that are
+intended to establish the consistency of formalized mathematics Hilbert fully respects
+these limits, and he does so as a matter of course; we are really not dealing with artificial prohibitions here by any means. Accordingly, it does not seem strange to me that
+Brouwer's ideas have found a following; his position resulted of necessity from a
+thesis shared by all mathematicians before Hilbert proposed his formal approach and
+from a new, indubitable fundamental logical insight that even Hilbert acknowledged.
+That from this point of view only a part, perhaps only a wretched part, of classical
+mathematics is tenable is a bitter but inevitable fact. Hilbert could not bear this
+mutilation. And it is again a different matter that he succeeded in saving classical
+mathematics by a radical reinterpretation of its meaning without reducing its inventory,
+namely, by formalizing it, thus transforming it in principle from a system of
+intuitive results into a game with formulas that proceeds according to fixed rules.
+Let me now by all means acknowledge the immense significance and scope of this
+step of Hilbert's, which evidently was made necessary by the pressure of circumstances. All of us who witnessed this development are full of admiration for the genius
+and steadfastness with which Hilbert, through his proof theory of formalized mathematies, crowned his axiomatic lifework. And, as I am very glad to confirm, there is
+nothing that separates me from Hilbert in the epistemological appraisal of the new
+situation thus created. He asserted, first of all, that the passage through ideal propositions is a legitimate formal device when real propositions are proved; this even
+the strictest intuitionist must acknowledge. We may perhaps still doubt whether this
+role makes the effort of the whole proof theory worth while (this is merely a question
+of economy). For in most cases the difficulty lies not so much in the discovery of a
+finitary proof as in finding real judgments at all that are acceptable to the intuitionist
+and yet can fill out the theorems of classical mathematics. For example, in order to
+accomplish this for the fundamental theorem of algebra on the existence of roots, we
+
+484
+WEYL
+must specify the finitary construction that, as the coefficients are determined more and
+more precisely step by step, sets going an analogous process generating the values of
+the roots; once this construction is found, it is easy to see that the values it yields
+with ever closer approximation really are the roots of the given equation.
+But Hilbert furthermore pointed with emphasis to the related science of theoretical
+physics. Its individual assumptions and laws have no meaning that can immediately
+be realized in intuition; in principle, it is not the propositions of physics taken in
+isolation, but only the theoretical system as a whole, that can be confronted with
+experience. What is achieved here is not a perceptual insight into particular or
+general states of affairs or a description that faithfully copies the given, but a
+theoretical, in the last analysis purely symbolic, construction of the world. It has
+been said that physics is concerned only with establishing pointer coincidences;
+Mach, especially, advocated a pure phenomenalism in the field of physics. But, if we
+are honest, we must admit that our theoretical interest does not attach exclusively
+or even primarily to the "real propositions"
+, the reports that this pointer coincides
+with that part of the scale; it attaches, rather, to the ideal assumptions that according
+to the theory disclose themselves in such coincidences, but of which no perception
+directly gives the full meaning—as, for example, the assumption of the electron as a
+universal elementary quantum of electricity. According to Hilbert, already pure
+mathematics goes beyond the bounds of intuitively ascertainable states of affairs
+through such ideal assumptions.
+What "truth" or objectivity can be ascribed to this theoretic construction of the
+world, which presses far beyond the given, is a profound philosophical question. It is
+closely connected with the further question: what impels us to take as a basis precisely the particular axiom system developed by Hilbert? Consistency is indeed a
+necessary but not a sufficient condition for this. For the time being we probably
+cannot answer this question except by asserting our belief in the reasonableness of
+history, which brought these structures forth in a living process of intellectual
+development—although, to be sure, the bearers of this development, dazzled as they
+were by what they took for self-evidence, did not realize how arbitrary and bold their
+construction was. Hilbert's appeal to the practical success of the method, too, seems
+to me to rest upon such a belief. Or is it his opinion that, the nearer we bring the
+construction of the axiomatic system to its completion, the more we shall eliminate
+arbitrariness and bring to the fore that which is unambiguously compelling? If
+Hilbert's view prevails over intuitionism, as appears to be the case, then I see in this
+a decisive defeat of the philosophical attitude of pure phenomenology, which thus proves
+to be insufficient for the understanding of creative science even in the area of
+cognition that is most primal and most readily open to evidence--mathematics.
+
+Appendix to Hilbert's lecture
+"The foundations of mathematics"
+PAUL BERNAYS
+(1927)
+In formalizing arithmetic Hilbert
+where 3 is the numeral obtained from the
+(1922a, but see also 1922, p. 177) introterm a by the substitution of 0 for (p).
+duced a functional (f) whose argument
+From the equations defining o we can
+is a number-theoretic function and whose
+decide whether 4(3) = O. If so, formula
+value is a natural number. An interpre-
+(3) is true, and the substitution of 0 for
+tation of (f) is that, if f(a) = 0 for every
+т(p) is adopted. All the formulas in the
+a, the value of (f) is 0 and, otherwise, it
+proof have then become true numerical
+is the least a for which f(a) ‡ O. Besides
+formulas, hence the end formula cannot
+truth-functional and quantifier-free axbe O # O. If $(3) # 0, we adopt the subioms, just one "transfinite" axiom, or
+stitution of ¿ for T($), and formula (2)
+rather axiom schema,
+becomes, for some 3,
+(1) f((f)) = 0→ f(a) = 0,
+Ф(3) = 0→ Ф(3) = 0,
+is required for the formalization. The
+universal and existential quantifiers used
+which is certainly true, and we can conclude as before.
+in current formulations of first-order
+arithmetic can be defined in terms of +(f),
+Ackermann undertook (1924) to transform Hilbert's brief sketch into a fulland the axioms governing them can be
+derived from these definitions and axiom
+Hedged consistency proof of analysis.
+schema (1).
+First, a new notation, used from then on
+by Hilbert and his disciples, is introduced.
+Hilbert then takes up the problem of
+consistency for a system containing just
+The functional (f) is replaced by &(A),
+one primitive function, o, hence just one
+or EaA (a), and formula (1) by
+-term, (p); * has been introduced by
+(4)
+A (a) → A(EaA (a)) ;
+recursion equations (not containing ).
+Assume that we have a proof of 0 ‡ O. EaAla) denotes a number of which the
+In that proof we replace free variables by
+propositional function Ala) holds if it
+numerals; (p) is tentatively replaced by
+holds of any number. Although Acker-
+O everywhere. Every formula of the proof
+mann is still able to make use of Hilbert's
+becomes a numerical formula. The forargument, there are considerable differmula
+ences between Hilbert's fragmentary ex-
+*(т(Ф)) = 0 → ф(а) = 0,
+ample and the general case now treated.
+In particular, we now have more than
+which is an axiom obtained from schema
+one propositional function, hence more
+(1), becomes
+than one s-term; therefore, in schema (4)
+(3)
+Ф(0) = 0→ Ф(3) = 0,
+some &aBla) may occur in Ala), and
+
+486
+BERNAYS
+whether A(a) becomes a true or a false When several a-terms occur, their comnumerical formula will depend on what is
+position, as Hilbert explains, can take
+substituted for the inner e. This complicathe form of "embedding" or of "supertion, as well as others connected with the
+position".
+. Hilbert shows that, in the case
+equations defining functions and funcof embedding, faAla) is replaced, at the
+tionals, can be overcome and, after a
+first trial, by O; if the substitution is not
+finite number of steps, we can obtain a
+successful, that is, does not yield true
+definite sequence of substitutions, called
+numerical formulas, a second trial takes
+a total replacement (Gesamtersetzung), that
+place; EaA(a) is replaced by a numeral
+transforms the proof into a sequence of
+¿ # 0, and this substitution is certainly
+numerical formulas. Let instances of
+successful. In the case of superposition,
+schema (4) be called critical formulas. In
+Bernays introduces a function xo(a) that
+any total replacement all noncritical foris equal to 0 for all values of the argumulas are transformed into formulas that
+ment, and he is able to reduce, for the
+are true. If a critical formula is transcase of one e-formula, superposition to
+formed into a false formula, new total
+embedding. Proceeding as Hilbert did in
+replacements are successively generated
+the case of embedding, he then obtains
+in a definite manner, and after a finite
+what he calls "one or two total replacenumber of steps the process leads to a
+ments"
+, Go, or G and Go, that correstotal replacement by which all critical
+pond, respectively, to the cases of one
+formulas
+are
+transformed into true
+or of two trials. Now, either the first
+numerical formulas.
+or the second of these replacements is
+At the time of publication Ackermann
+certainly successful for the e-formula
+came to realize that his proof was inadequate to insure the consistency of the
+considered. If it is successful for all the
+other e-formulas, it becomes final. If not,
+full system of analysis. He added a
+a new function, xi(a), which is O for all
+footnote (1924, p. 9) restricting his rule
+values of the argument but one, is tried.
+of substitution and thus decreased the
+We thus obtain a sequence of functions,
+strength of his system (see also von
+xo(a), Xı(a),.... To any one of these
+Neumann 1927, pp. 41-46). Ackermann
+functions, Xp(a), there correspond either
+communicated a new version of his proof,
+one replacement, Gp, or two, Gp and Gp.
+still for the restricted system, to Bernays
+Bernays is able to show. that the proceby letter, and this version was presented
+dure terminates and to find an upper
+in Hilbert and Bernays 1939, pp. 93- bound for the number of steps involved.
+130.
+The translation is by Stefan Bauer-
+Hilbert's remarks above (Pp. 477-479) Mengelberg, and Dagfinn Follesdal, and
+and Bernays's paper below refer to this
+second
+it is printed here with the kind permission
+• version of Ackermann's proof. of Professor Bernays and Teubner Verlag.
+1. To supplement the preceding paper [by Hilbert] let me add some more detailed
+explanations concerning the consistency proof by Ackermann that was sketched
+there.
+First, as for an upper bound on the number of steps of replacement in the case of
+embedding, it is given by 2n, where n is the number of a-functionals distinct in form.
+The method of proof described furnishes yet another, substantially closer bound,
+which, for example, for the case in which there is no embedding at all yields the
+upper bound n + 1.1
+1 [See in Hilbert and Bernays 1939, pp. 96-97, how this bound is obtained.]
+
+APPENDIX TO HILBERT'S LECTURE
+487
+2. Let the argument by which we recognize that the procedure is finite in the case
+of superposition be carried out under simple specializing assumptions.
+The assumptions are the following: Let the a-functionals occurring in the proof be
+call (a, enA(a, b))
+and
+where a1, .., On may contain ea"(a, ejA (a, b)) but no other a-functional.
+The procedure now consists in a succession of "total replacements"
+; each of these
+consists of a function replacement x(a) for eR(a, b), by means of which salla,
+Epst (a. b)) goes over into salla, X(a)), and a replacement for sal(a, X(a)), by means
+of which a1,..., an go over into numerals 31,..., in and the values
+x(31),...,X(3n)
+are obtained for
+We begin with the function Xo(a), which has the value O for all a ("zero replace.
+ment"), and accordingly also replace all the terms
+8yR (a1, b),..., epA(an, b)
+"Holding this replacement fixed, we apply to
+EalI(a, Xo(a))
+the original testing procedure, which after two steps at most leads to the goal; that
+is, all the critical formulas corresponding to
+E all (a, Xo (a))
+then become true.
+Thus we obtain one or two total replacements, Go, or Go and C, respectively. Now
+either Go (or Eó) is final or one of the critical formulas corresponding to egf(a1, b),
+el (az, b),... becomes false. Assume that this formula corresponds to, say, e, (a1, b)
+and that a goes into 31. Then we find a value z such that
+Si (31, 3)
+is true. Now that we have this value, we take as replacement function for
+not xo(a), but the function xi(a) defined by
+X1 (81) = 3
+XI(a) = 0 for a # 31
+At this point we repeat the above procedure with XI(a), the values of the sofa,, b)
+(v = 1,..., n) now being determined only after a value has been chosen for
+Earl (a, XI (a)),
+and thus we obtain one or two total replacements, G1, or G, and G1.
+
+488
+BERNAYS
+Now either G, (or (1) is final or for one of the a-functionals that result from
+epA (a1, b),..., epS(an, b)
+by the previous total replacement we again find a value s', such that for a certain 32
+A (32, 3)
+is true, while
+8(32, X1(32))
+is false. From this it directly follows that 32 # 31.
+Now, instead of XI(a) we introduce Xa(a) as replacement function by means of the
+following definition:
+X2(31) = 3,
+X2(32) = з',
+X2(a) = 0 for a # 31, 32.
+The replacement procedure is now repeated with this function X2(a).
+As we continue in this way, we obtain a sequence of replacement functions
+xo (a), XI(a), X2(a),....
+each of which is formed from the preceding one by addition, for a new argument
+value, of a function value different from O; and for every function Xp(a) we have one
+or two replacements, Gp, or Gp and Of. The point is to show that this sequence of
+replacements terminates. For this purpose we first consider the replacements
+Go. G1,02....
+In these,
+EalI(a, EnR(a, b))
+is always replaced by O; the e f(av, b) (v = 1,..., n) therefore always go over into the
+same e-functionals; for each of these we put either O or a numeral different from O,
+and this is then kept as a final replacement. Accordingly, at most n + 1 of the
+replacements Go, G1, Gz,... can be distinct.? If, however, O, is identical with G,,
+then neither one has, or else each has, a successor replacement Ok, or Gí, and in
+these
+call (a, Ep A (a, b))
+is then in both cases replaced by the same number found as a value, so that, for both
+replacements, the e, A (av, b) (v = 1,..., n) also go over into the same e-functionals.
+Accordingly, of the replacements &; for which O, coincides with a fixed replacement Ok again at most n + 1 can be distinct. Hence there cannot be more than
+(n + 1)2 distinct Gp, or G, and Op, altogether.
+From this it follows, however, that our procedure comes to an end at the latest
+with the replacement function Xin+ 1, (a). For, the replacements associated with two
+distinct replacement functions xp(a) and Xala), g>p, cannot coincide completely,
+since otherwise we would by means of Xala) be led
+I to the same value 3* that has
+already been found by means of Xp(a), whereas this value is already used in the
+= [See footnote 1.]]
+
+APPENDIX TO HILBERT'S LECTURE
+489
+definition of the replacement functions following Xp(a), hence in particular also in that
+of Xa(a).
+3. Let us note, finally, that in order to take into consideration the axiom of
+mathematical induction, which for the purpose of the consistency proof may be
+given in the form
+(EaA (a) = b') → A (6),
+we need only, whenever we have found a value z for which a proposition 2(a) holds,
+go to the least such value by seeking out the first true proposition in the sequence
+25(0), 2(0),..., 8(8)
+of propositions that have been reduced to numerical formulas. 3
+3 [In 1935, p. 213, end of footnote 1, Bernays writes that this last paragraph, on mathematical
+induction, should be deleted. In 1927 Hilbert and his collaborators had not yet gauged the diffi.
+culties facing consistency proofs of arithmetic and analysis. Ackermann had set out (in 1924) to
+prove the consistency of analysis; but, while correcting the printer's proofs of his paper, he had to
+introduce a footnote, on page 9, that restricts his rule of substitution. After the introduction of
+such a restriction it was no longer clear for which system Ackermann's proof establishes consistency.
+Certainly not for analysis. The proof suffered, moreover, from imprecisions in its last part. Ackermann's paper was received for publication on 30 March 1924 and came out on 26 November 1924.
+In 1927, received for publication on 29 July 1925 and published on 2 January 1927, von Neumann
+criticized Ackermann's proof and presented a consistency proof that followed lines somewhat
+different from those of Ackermann's. The proof came to be accepted as establishing the consistency
+of a first-order arithmetic in which induction is applied only to quantifier-free formulas. When he
+was already acquainted with von Neumann's proof, Ackermann communicated, in the form of a
+letter, a new consistency proof to Bernays. This proof developed and deepened the arguments
+used in Ackermann's 1924 proof, and, like von Neumann's, it applied to an arithmetic in which
+induction is restricted to quantifier-free formulas. It is with this proof of Ackermann's that Hilbert's remarks above (pp. 477-479) and Bernays's present comments are concerned. It was felt
+at that point, among the members of the Hilbert school, that the consistency of full first-order
+arithmetic could be established by relatively straightforward extensions of the arguments used by
+von Neumann or by Ackermann (see Hilbert 1928a, p. 137, lines 20-21; 1930, p. 490, line 4u, to
+p. 491, line 2; Bernays 1935, p. 211, lines 4-7). These hopes were dashed by Gödel's 1931. Ackermann's unpublished proof was presented in Hilbert and Bernays 1939, pp. 93-130. In 1940 Ackergave a consistency proof for full first-order arithmetic, using a principle of transfinite
+induction (up to 6o) that is not formalizable in this arithmetic.]]
+
+Intuitionistic reflections on formalism
+(1927a)
+While logicism and intuitionism were
+too far apart to allow a dialogue between
+them, the emergence of Hilbert's metamathematics created between Hilbert
+and Brouwer a ground on which a discussion could proceed, however deep
+might be the disagreement between these
+two mathematicians on the role of consistency proofs. In 1912 Brouwer ended
+a presentation of intuitionism (1912, or
+1912a) on a pessimistic note, despairing
+of any communication between
+two
+groups of scholars who were not speaking
+the same tongue and could not learn
+each other's tongue. In the text below,
+which is § 1 of 1927a, Brouwer lists four
+points concerning which he considers that
+intuitionism and formalism could enter
+into a dialogue. This, it seems, could
+be true of the first three points, which
+bring out the similarities between finitary
+metamathematics and a certain part of
+intuitionistic mathematics, but
+could
+hardly be true of the fourth point, which
+states that consistency proofs are unable
+to provide a foundation for mathematics.
+There is a commentary on § 1 of Brouwer's
+paper in Heyting 1934, pp. 54-57, or
+Heyting 1955, pp. 60-63.
+The omitted §2, which has no direct
+connection with § 1, investigates various
+intuitionistic versions of the principle of
+excluded middle as well as the conditions
+in which each of these versions is applicable; Brouwer returned to this question in
+1948, p. 1243-1248, and 1953, pp. 3-5.
+The translation is by Stefan Bauer-
+Mengelberg, and it is printed here with
+the kind permission of Professor Brouwer
+and Walter de Gruyter and Co.
+The disagreement over which is correct, the formalistic way of founding mathematics anew or the intuitionistic way of reconstructing it, will vanish, and the choice
+between the two activities be reduced to a matter of taste, as soon as the following
+insights, which pertain primarily to formalism but were first formulated in the
+intuitionistic literature, are generally accepted. The acceptance of these insights is
+only a question of time, since they are the results of pure reflection and hence contain
+no disputable element, so that anyone who has once understood them must accept
+them. Two of the four insights have so far been understood and accepted in the
+formalistic literature. When the same state of affairs has been reached with respect
+to the other two, it will mean the end of the controversy concerning the foundations
+of mathematics.
+FIRST INSIGHT. I'he differentiation, among the formalistic endeavors, between a
+construction of the "inventory of mathematical formulas" (formalistic view of mathematics) and an intuitive (contentual) theory of the laws of this construction, as well as the
+
+INTUITIONISTIC REFLECTIONS ON FORMALISM
+491
+recognition of the fact that for the latter theory the intuitionistic mathematics of the set of
+natural numbers is indispensable.
+SECOND INSIGHT. The rejection of the thoughtless use of the logical principle of
+excluded middle, as well as the recognition, first, of the fact that the investigation of the
+question why the principle mentioned is justified and to what extent it is valid constitutes
+an essential object of research in the foundations of mathematics, and, second, of the fact
+that in intuitive (contentual) mathematics this principle is valid only for finite systems.
+THIRD INSIGHT. The identification of the principle of excluded middle with the
+principle of the solvability of every mathematical problem.
+FOURTH INSIGHT. The recognition of the fact that the (contentual) justification of
+formalistic mathematics by means of the proof of its consistency contains a vicious circle,
+since this justification rests upon the (contentual) correctness of the proposition that from
+the consistency of a proposition the correctness of the proposition follows, that is, upon the
+(contentual) correctness of the principle of excluded middle.
+1. The first insight is still lacking in Hilbert 1904, see in particular Section V, pp.
+184-185 [above, pp. 137-138], which is in contradiction with it. After having been
+strongly prepared by Poincaré, it first appears in the literature in Brouwer 1907,
+where on pp. 173-174 the terms mathematical language and mathematics of the second
+order are used to distinguish between the parts of formalistic mathematies mentioned
+above and where the intuitive character of the latter part is emphasized.' This
+insight penetrated into the formalistic literature with Hilbert 1922 (see in particular
+p. 165 and p. 174), where mathematics of the second order was given the name metamathematics. The claim of the formalistic school to have reduced intuitionism to
+absurdity by means of this insight, borrowed from intuitionism, is presumably not to
+be taken seriously.
+2. The thoughtless use of the logical principle of excluded middle is still to be found
+in Hilbert 1904 and 1917 (see, for example, 1917, p. 413, II. Ilu-4u, and in particular
+1904: p. 182, I1. 16-19; p. 182, 1. 2u, to p. 183, 1. 2; p. 184, II. 2lu-13u Labove, p. 135,
+Il. 13u-Ilu; p. 136, II. 5-7; p. 137, II. 13-18]; in each of these places the principle
+of excluded middle is regarded as essentially equivalent to the principle of contradiction). The second insight is found in the literature for the first time in Brouwer
+1908 and then at greater or lesser length in Brouwer 1912, 1914, 1917, 19196,
+1923b, and 1923d. Except for the recognition, most intimately connected with it, of
+the intuitionistic consistency of the principle of excluded middle, it penetrates the
+formalistic literature with Hilbert 1922a,? where, on the one hand, the limited contentual validity of the principle of excluded middle is acknowledged (see in particular
+pp. 155-156) and, on the other, the task is posed of consistently combining a logical
+formulation of the principle of excluded middle with other axioms in the framework
+of formalistic mathematics. The limited contentual validity of the principle of excluded middle is pointed out with particular eloquence in Hilbert 1925 (pp. 173-174
+[above, pp. 378-3791), where, however, the goal is overshot when the area called into
+question is extended to include the remaining Aristotelian laws.
+1 An oral discussion of the first insight took place in several conversations I had with Hilbert in
+the autumn of 1909.
+2 After attention had already been paid to the principle of exeluded middle in Hilbert 1922,
+p. 160.
+
+492
+3. During the period of the thoughtless use of the principle of excluded middle in
+the formalistic literature, the principle of the solvability of every mathematical
+problem is first advanced in Hilbert 1900b, p. 52, as an axiom or a conviction and then
+in Hilbert 1917, pp. 412-413, in two different forms (in which, instead of "solvability",
+', "solvability in principle" and, after that, "decidability by means of a
+finite number of operations" are mentioned) as the object of problems still to be
+settled. But even after the discussion of the third insight in Brouwer 1908, p. 156,
+1914, p. 80, 1919b, pp. 203-204, and the penetration of the second insight into the
+formalistic literature, we find that in Hilbert 1925, p. 180 [above, p. 384]—where the
+problem of the consistency of the axiom of the solvability of any mathematical
+problem is offered as an example of a "problem of a fundamental character that
+falls within the domain of mathematics but formerly could not even be approached"
+-this question is presented as still open, irrespective of whether the foundations of
+the science of mathematics (which also comprise the consistency of the principle of
+excluded middle) be secured or not.
+4. The fourth insight is expressed in Brouwer 1927, p. 64 [above, p. 460]. No trace
+of it is to be found thus far in the formalistic literature but many an utterance
+contradicting it, for example in Hilbert 1900b, pp. 55-56, and above all in Hilbert
+1925, where on pp. 162-163 [above, p. 370] we still find the exclamation: "No,
+if justifying a procedure means anything more than proving its consistency, it
+can only mean determining whether the procedure is
+successful in fulfilling its
+purpose."
+According to what precedes, formalism has received nothing but benefactions from
+intuitionism and may expect further benefactions. The formalistic school should
+therefore accord some recognition to intuitionism, instead of polemicizing against it
+in sneering tones while not even observing proper mention of authorship. Moreover,
+the formalistic school should ponder the fact that in the framework of formalism
+nothing of mathematics proper has been secured up to now (since, after all, the metamathematical proof of the consistency of the axiom system is lacking, now as before),
+whereas intuitionism, on the basis of its constructive definition of set and the fundamental property it has exhibited for finitary sets,* has already erected anew several
+of the theories of mathematics proper in unshakable certainty. If, therefore, the
+formalistic school, according to its utterance in Hilbert 1925, p. 180 [above, p. 384],
+has detected modesty on the part of intuitionism, it should seize the occasion not to
+lag behind intuitionism with respect to this virtue.
+' [Later Brouwer uses the word "spread" for this notion; here the word "Menge", translated
+as "set", suggests that Brouwer considers spreads to be constructive substitutes for classical sets.
+See above, p. 453.]l
+4 See Brouwer 1927, p. 66, Theorem 2 [above, p. 462].
+
+On Hilbert's construction of the real numbers
+WILHELM ACKERMANN
+(1928)
+The notion of primitive recursive function appeared, in Dedekind 1888, as a
+natural generalization of the recursive
+definitions of addition and multiplication.
+Primitive recursive functions are obtained from 0, the successor function, and
+the identity function by composition and
+the following schema:
+= д(х1, Х2,
+• , Хк),
+J (XI, X2,
+Xx, n + 1)
+= h(X1, Х,..., Хк, N, f (X1, Х2,
+Хі, п)),
+where g(х1, X2, ...,Хк) and h(Xy, Xz,....
+Xk+2) are previously introduced primitive recursive functions."
+If one looks, in turn, for a generalization of the notion of primitive recursive
+function, he can either introduce more
+involved combinations of functions and
+variables, thus abandoning the specific
+form of schema A, or preserve the form
+of schema A while extending the range of
+the variables occurring in it. The first
+method was explored by Skolem (1923,
+pp. 319-320 above), who showed that
+changing schema A to "course-of-values " recursion does not actually enlarge
+the class of functions obtained. The second method was followed by Hilbert in
+his attempt (1925, pp. 385-390 above) to
+classify number-theoretic functions. He
+introduced a hierarchy of functions by
+allowing the use of functionals. A function of type 1 is a number-theoretic function; a function of type i is a functional
+whose values are natural numbers and
+whose arguments include at least one
+function of type i - 1 and no function of a
+type greater than i - 1. An example of a
+function of type 2 is the iteration function, which in Ackermann's paper below
+is defined thus:
+Pc(F(C), a, 0) = a,
+Polf(C), a, n + 1) = F(Pc(F(C), a, n)) ;
+c is a dummy variable indicating that f is
+a function of one variable. (This function
+is the function (f, a, n) in Hilbert 1925,
+p. 388 above.)
+This distinction of types leads to a
+ª Schema A is Gödel's schema of primitive
+recursion (1931; see below, p. 602), and it is
+the schema generally adopted today. Ackermann uses another schema, that of Hilbert
+(1925; see above, p. 389):
+((1) f(X1, Х,..., хк» О) = 9(Х1, Х2, ..., Хк),
+(2) f(X1, X2,..., хк, N t 1)
+A'
+= БУДУ2.Ук (Х1, Х2, ..., Хк» П, F(У1,
+У2, . . ., Ук, п),
+where h) is a function obtained by composition
+from the initial functions (0, the successor function,
+the identity function), previously obtained primitive recursive functions, and the
+function f(Y1, Y2,..., Yk, N) considered as a
+function of Y1, Y2,..., Yks but not of n; the
+subscripts y1, Y2, ..., Ук indicate that the variables 1, Yz,..., Yk merely mark argument
+places of f but do not actually occur in the
+function f; the argument places marked by y1,
+the net hate been oed ind by functions of
+schemas A and A' was proved by Péter (1934;
+see also 1932).
+
+494
+classification of number-theoretic func- alternative proof, which makes use of the
+tions. A number-theoretic function of diagonal argument.c
+level' n is defined by equations that are
+In the course of Ackermann's proof it
+modeled upon schema A and in which
+turns out that the function ola, b, n)
+essential use is made of a function of type
+satisfies the equations:
+n, but of no function of a greater type,
+for g or h. Primitive recursive functions
+«(а, b, 0) = а + b,
+are the functions of level 1. The first ques-
+1 (6)
+C
+«(a, O, n + 1) = ala, n),
+tion raised by such an approach is whether there actually exist functions of a level
+1(7) pla, b + 1n + 1)
+=pa, p(a, b, n + 1), n).
+greater than 1, that is, whether there
+exist,
+for instance, number-theoretic
+These equations show that p(a, b, n) is
+functions that cannot be defined, by
+effectively computable; if n is succesequations modeled upon schema A, withsively replaced by 0, 1, 2,..., equations
+out the help of functionals.
+(6) and (7) yield, for each n, equations tor
+Ackermann answered the question
+* that obey the primitive recursion
+affirmatively by exhibiting a function of
+schema A' (see footnote a).
+level 2. The example is already mentioned
+Equations C show also that functionals
+in Hilbert 1925 (p. 388 above) but was
+are not needed for the definition of the
+not published till 1928 (received for pubfunction o. But, although they do not
+lication on 20 January 1927). A function
+contain any functional, equations C do
+«(a, b, n) is defined by the equations:
+not follow the schema of primitive recursion, because the recursion proceeds on
+((3) фа, b, 0) = а + 6,
+two
+variables simultaneously. Acker-
+3 (4) ф(а, в, п + 1)
+mann's proof establishes that such mul-
+= pc(ф(a, C, n), ala, n), b),
+tiple recursions
+are not necessarily
+reducible to primitive recursion. (On
+where po is the iteration function and
+multiple recursions see Péter 1937.)
+ala, n) is the primitive recursive function
+The discovery of Ackermann's funcdefined by
+tion gave a stimulus to the classification
+of recursion schemas; Péter's book (1951,
+ala, O) = 0,
+1957) offers ample information on that
+ala, 1) = 1,
+point. The function also seems to have
+ala, n) = a forn > 1.
+guided Herbrand in his search for a
+definition of the notion of effectively cal-
+Definition B follows schema A, except
+culable function (see below, p. 624); in the
+that a function of type 2, po, has been
+definition of what became known as a
+used in the construction of the function
+recursive function, schema C is replaced
+h. Ackermann then considers the function
+by any finite set of equations satisfying
+ф/а, a, A). I фа, b, n) were of level 1, that
+certain rather broad conditions.
+is, primitive recursive, so would be
+The translation is by Stefan Bauer-
+«(a, a, a). The proof that ola, a, a) is not
+Mengelberg, and it is printed here with
+primitive recursive consists in showing
+the kind permission of Professor Ackerthat it increases faster than any function
+mann and Springer Verlag.
+of level 1 (in the sense in which 2ª increases faster than any polynomial in a).
+b Neither Hilbert nor Ackermann uses this
+The proof is rather long. It was simplified
+notion; we introduce it here to facilitate the
+by Péter (1935); see also Hilbert and Berpresentation.
+c Ackermann's construction, too, makes use
+nays 1934, pp. 329-343 and R. M. Robinof the diagonal argument, but in a somewhat
+son 1948. Péter also presented an
+concealed form.
+
+495
+In order to provide a proof of Cantor's conjecture that the set of real numbers, that
+is, of the number-theoretic functions, can be enumerated by means of the numbers of
+the second number class, Hilbert makes use of a special construction of the numbertheoretic functions. Essential in this construction is the notion "type of a function".
+A function of type 1 is one whose arguments and values are integers, hence an ordinary
+number-theoretic function. Functions of type 2 are functions-of-functions. A function
+of that kind assigns a number to each number-theoretic function. A function of type 3
+in turn assigns numbers to the functions-of-functions, and so on. The definition of
+types can also be continued into the transfinite, but this is of no relevance to the subject of the present paper.!
+All functions are defined by recursion on an ordinary number-theoretic variable.
+For instance,
+p(a, 0) = 0,
+«(a,n + 1) =ф(a, n) + a
+is an example of a definition of a function of type 1. Obviously p(a, b) represents the
+function a b. The following recursion defines a function of type 2:
+Pc(f(C), a, O) = a,
+Pc(J(C), a, n+ 1) = J(Pc|F(C), a, n)).
+Pc(f(c), a, n) represents the n-fold iteration of the function f, taken on the argument a.
+(The subscript c on p is to mean that polf (c), a, n) depends on f and not on c.) Along
+with recursion, of course, the formation of functions by substitution, too, is admissible. If, for example, pla, b) and f(a, b) are number-theoretic functions of two variables, then «(pa, a), y(a, b)), too, is a function of that kind
+The construction of the number-theoretic functions now proceeds in such a way that
+they can be sorted into certain groups. In the first group we put the functions for whose
+definition only type 1 is needed; in the second we put the functions for whose definition the use of a recursively defined function of type 2 is essential, while a higher type
+can be circumvented; and so on.
+If the construction described is actually to yield all number-theoretic functions, it
+is essential that every group in fact bring about an extension of the inventory of functions. For it might, after all, be conceivable that we could obtain all functions for
+whose definition we use types 1 and 2 by means of type 1 alone.
+Now in what follows we present a function for which we shall prove that it cannot
+be defined without type 2 or a higher type. By means of the method employed here it
+will be easy to prove for other groups, too, that they extend the inventory of functions.?
+Incidentally, all the recursions are to be on one variable only. Simultaneous recursions are excluded. A function defined by simultaneous recursion can also be represented by ordinary recursion if one is prepared to use higher types.
+1 For details see Hilbert 1925 [Ipp. 386-388 above].
+2 A paper having several points of contact with the present one will be published by G. Sudan
+[1927]. It deals with the definitions of numbers of the second number class, which can be classified
+similarly to the definitions of real numbers.
+
+496
+1
+First we shall give the function just mentioned. When functions are constructed by
+means of recursion, the function a + 1 must be assumed to be known and cannot in
+turn be defined by recursion. Then the function a + b is defined by the recursion
+a + 0 = a,
+a + (6 + 1) = (at b) + 1.
+For the sake of simplicity we shall take two further functions as known initial functions, namely, 1(a, b) and ‹(a, b). 1(a, b) equals 1 if a = b and O if a # b. For «(a, b) it
+is the other way round. But we can also define 1 and ‹ by recursion. We shall write
+a (a, n) for ‹(n, 1) • ‹(n, 0). a + 1(n, 1). Here a b is defined by
+a.0 = a,
+a.16+1) =a-b+a.
+Thus ala, n) is always equal to a, except for n = 0 and n = 1. ala, 0) = 0 and
+ala, 1) = 1. Let p stand for the iteration function mentioned above. Finally, a number-theoretic function o of three variables is given by
+«(а, в, 0) = а + b,
+«(a,b, n + 1) = pc($(a, C, n), ala, n), b).
+As we can see from this, pla, b, 1) is identical with a. b. pla, b, 2) coincides with a'.
+p(a, b, 3) is the b-fold iteration of a', taken on a, and so on. We now obtain our desired
+function by setting all three arguments in ola, b, c) equal. What we claim, then, is that
+pla, a, a) cannot be defined without the use of type 2.3
+The exclusion of simultaneous recursions is essential to our claim. For the following formulas hold:
+ф(а, b, 0) = а + b,
+oa, O,n + 1) = ala, n),
+ola, b + 1,n + 1) = pa, oa, b, n + 1), n).
+(The last two formulas, incidentally, are proved immediately below.)
+We shall prove our claim by showing that the function ola, a, a) increases more
+rapidly than any function for whose definition only type 1 is used. In order to be able
+to show this, we must prove a number of properties and formulas for our function.
+I. pa, O, n + 1) = a(a, n).
+Proof.
+Фа, O,n + 1) = Pc(Ф(a, C, n), ala, n), O) = ala, n)
+3 The function that I have just presented was already mentioned in Hilbert 1925, p. 185
+Labove, p. 388].
+
+497
+ПІ. фа, b + 1, л + 1) = фа, фа, b, n + 1), п).
+Proof.
+«(a, b + 1, n + 1) = pc($(a, c, n), ala, n), b + 1),
+pc($(a, C, n), ala, n), b + 1) =фа, po(p(a, C, n), a(a, n), b), n),
+Pc($(a, C, n), ala, n), b) = ola, b, n + 1),
+whence the assertion is evident.
+Furthermore, we need certain monotonicity properties of .
+III. If a ≥ 2, then p(a, b + 1, n) > pa, b, n).
+Proof. If n = 0 or n = 1, the assertion is true since
+a+2+b+1> a+ 2+6
+and
+(a + 2) (b+ 1) > (a + 2).6.
+It remains to be proved that
+(A)
+p(a+ 2,6 + 1,n + 2) > pa + 2,6, n + 2).
+We prove this formula, together with
+(B)
+«(a+ 2,b, n + 2) > 6,
+by induction on n.
+*(a+ 2,6 + 1,2) > фа + 2,6, 2),
+since
+(a + 2)0+1 > (a + 2)°
+and
+фа + 2,6, 2) = (а + 2)° > b.
+Assume that both formulas have already been proved for n. We first prove (B) for
+n + 1 by induction on b. (B) is correct for n + 1 if b = 0 since for every n we have
+*(a+ 2,0, n + 3) = a + 2 > 0,
+*a+ 2,6 + 1, n + 3) = «a + 2, 9(a + 2, 6, n + 3), n + 2).
+Hence, if «(a + 2, b, n + 3) ≥ b + 1, then, since (A) holds for n,
+*a+ 2, "a+ 2,6, n + 3), n + 2) ≥ pa + 2,6 + 1, n + 2),
+hence
+*(a+ 2,6+1, n + 3) = pat 2,6 + 1, n + 2),
+*(a+ 2,6 + 1,n + 2) > 6 + 1,
+*a+2,6 + 1,1 + 3) > 6+1.
+This proves (B) for n + 1.
+*a+ 2,b + 1, n + 3) = pa + 2, «(a + 2, b, n + 3), n + 2)
+> *(a + 2,b, n + 3)
+(by (B)).
+This proves formulas (A) and (B), hence also III.
+
+498
+The two formulas
+IV. ф(а + 1,6, п) = ф(а, в, п),
+V. pa+ 2,6 + 3, n + 1) > pa + 2,6 + 3, n)
+can be proved in a similar way.
+Proof of IV. We readily convince ourselves that formula IV holds for a = 0 and
+a = 1. For n = 0, 1, 2 this can easily be checked. For n ≥ 3 we have the formulas
+Ф(О, 6, п) ≤ 1,
+Ф(1,b, n) = 1,
+Ф (2, b, п) = 1,
+which we prove by using induction on n and distinguishing the cases b = 0 and 6 ‡ 0.
+To prove IV we must still show that
+«(a + 3, b, n) ≥ *a + 2, 6, n).
+This holds for n = 0, and also for b = O. Assume that it has already been shown for
+smaller n, as well as for the same n and smaller b.
+*(a + 3,6 + 1, n + 1) = «a + 3, 8(a + 3, 6, n + 1), n),
+«(a + 3, «(a + 3, 6, n + 1), n) = pa + 2, ola + 3, b, n + 1), n),
+«(a + 3,6, n + 1) ≥ pa + 2,b, n + 1).
+It then follows from III that
+фа+ 2, фа + 3, b, n + 1), n) ≥ фа + 2, фа + 2,6
+, n + I), n).
+But ola + 2, ola + 2, b, n + 1), n) is the same as ola + 2,6 + 1, n + 1).
+Proof of V. For n = 0 and n = 1 the formula holds. It remains to be shown that
+*a+ 2,6 + 3, n + 3) > a + 2, 6 + 3, n + 2).
+Let us take instead the more general formula
+*a+ 2,6 + 1,n + 3) > pa + 2,6 + 1, n + 2).
+This is correct for b = 0, since
+pa+ 2,1, n + 3) = pa + 2, 0(a + 2, 0, n + 3), n + 2)
+=«a + 2, a + 2, n + 2)
+«(a+ 2, a + 2,n + 2) > a + 2, 1, n + 2)
+(by III).
+For n = 0 likewise. Now assume that it has already been proved for smaller n, as well
+as for the same n and smaller b.
+*a+ 2,6 + 2, n+ 4) = pa + 2, «a + 2,6 + 1, n + 4), n + 3),
+*(a+ 2,b 1,n + 4) > pa + 2,6 + 1, n + 3),
+*(a+ 2,6 + 1,n + 3) =6 + 2
+(by formula (B), p. 497).
+*(a+ 2, "(a + 2,6 + 1, n + 4), n + 3) > pa + 2,6 + 2, n + 3),
+*(a+ 2,6 + 2, n + 4) > a + 2, 6 + 2, n + 3).
+Thus V, too, is proved.
+
+499
+The most important of the properties used in our proof is the following.
+V1. Of the two formulas
+Pc(Ф(C, C, N), a, a) ≤ pla, a, n + 3),
+Pc(Ф(C, C, N), a, a) ≤ 2
+at least one is true.
+(The first of the two formulas, incidentally, always holds except when a = 1 and
+n = 0.)
+We now need a number of auxiliary formulas.
+Formula 1: We first prove
+9(Ф(a + 2, c, 3), "a + 2, c, 3), 1) ≤ a + 2,0 + 1, 3),
+by induction on c. For c = 0 the formula is true, since the left side becomes equal to
+«(a + 2, a + 2, 1), that is, (a + 2) (a + 2), and the right side to (a + 2)(a+ 2). If we
+make use of the fact that for c = 1, 2, 3 the function pla, b, c) represents the specific
+functions that we know it does, we readily obtain the following formulas:
+2 ≤ ф(а + 2, с, 3),
+Ф(Ф(a + 2, c + 1,3), «(a + 2, 0 + 1, 3), 1) = фа + 2, 0 + 1, 3)2
+= (a + 2)2"(at2,c, 3)
+≤ (a + 2)"(a+2, c. 3) "(a+2, c. 3)
+= (a + 2)"(a+2, c+1, 3),
+(a + 2)° (a+2, c+1,3) = pa + 2,0 + 2,3).
+Formula 2:
+Ф(ф(a+ 2,0, 3), «a + 2, 0, 3), 2) = *a + 2, 0 + 2, 3)
+if c ≥ b.
+Proof. (a) Let b = 0.
+"(a + 2,0,3) = a + 2,
+pla + 2, a(a + 2, c, 3), 2) = (a + 2)0(a+2,c, 3)
+=ф(a + 2, c + 1, 3) <фа + 2, 0 + 2,3) (by III).
+(b) 6 ≥ 1.
+Ф(Ф(a + 2, 6, 3), pa + 2, c, 3), 2) = (a + 2)° (a+2, b-1, 334(a+2, c. 3)
+= (a + 2)"(at 2, c, 3) "(a+2, c, 3)
+≤ (a + 2) "(a+2, c+ 1, 3)
+and by formula 1
+(a + 2)"(a+2, c+1, 3) = «(a + 2, 0 + 2, 3).
+Formula 3: Assume that the relation
+Ф(Ф(a, b, n + 3), oa, c, n + 3), n + 2) ≤ pa, c + 2, n + 3)
+holds for all a ≥ 2, c ≥ b, and b # 0 and for a fixed n. Then we assert that the relation
+Ф(Ф(a, b, n + 4), m, n + 3) ≤ pIa, ∞(a, b - 1, n + 4) + 2m, n + 3]
+holds for all such a, b, and c and for arbitrary m.
+
+500
+For m = 0 the right and left sides are equal.
+Ф(Ф(a, b, n + 4), m + 1, n + 3)
+=«{Ф(a, b, n + 4), p/Ф(a, b, n + 4), m, n + 3], n + 2}.
+If the assertion already holds for smaller m, then it follows by virtue of formula III
+that the right side is not greater than
+«íø(a, b, n + 4), pLa, 9(a, b - 1, n + 4) + 2m, n + 3], n + 2},
+with
+ф(а, в, п + 4) = фа, ф(а, b - 1, n + 4), n + 3].
+It then follows from the assumption that the last expression but one is less than or
+equal to
+ф/а, фа, b - 1, n + 4) + 2m + 2, n + 3].
+This proves the assertion.
+Formula 4: Let a ≥ 2 and o ≥ b. Then
+Ф(pa, b,n + 3), pa, c, n + 3), n + 2) ≤ pa, c + 2, n + 3).
+For n = 0 this formula coincides with formula 2. We now prove it for n + 1 on the
+assumption that it holds for n. First, assume that b is different from O. According to
+formula 3 we have
+ф(ф(a, b, n + 4), ф(а, C, n + 4), п + 3)
+≤ фа, фа, b - 1, n + 4) + 2. фа, c, n + 4), n + 3]
+≤ фа, 3. ф(а, с, n + 4), n + 3].
+By induction on c it can easily be proved for c ≥ 2 that
+3с ≤ Ф(2, с, 3).
+Since, furthermore, pa, c, n + 4) ≥ 2 because a ≥ 2, we have
+3. Ф(a, c, n + 4) ≤ Ф(2, ф(а, c, n + 4), 3) ≤ фа, фа, c, n + 4), n + 3),
+pa, фа, c, n + 4), n + 3) =фа, c + 1, n + 4),
+Ф(Ф(a, b, n + 4), oa, c, n + 4), n + 3) ≤ pa, pa, c + 1,N + 4), n + 3),
+4(a, oa, c + 1, n + 4), n + 3) =ф(a, c + 2, n + 4).
+This proves the formula for b # 0.
+Ф(Ф(a, O, n + 3), oa, c, n + 3), n + 2) = ola, ф(a, c, n + 3), n + 2)
+=pa, c + 1, n + 3) ≤ Pa, c + 2, n + 3).
+Hence it is correct for b = 0 too.
+Formula 5:
+Pc(Ф(C, c, n + 2), a + 2, 6) ≤ pa + 2,20, n + 3).
+Proof by induction on b. For b = 0, the formula reduces to
+at 2 ≤ at 2.
+Pc($(c, c, n + 2), a + 2,6 + 1)
+=фіРсФ(C, c, n + 2), a + 2, 6], pol$(c, c, n + 2), a + 2,6], n + 23.
+
+501
+By formulas IV and III, this last expression is
+≤Ф(Ф/a + 2,26, n + 3), «a + 2, 20, n + 3), n + 2).
+By formula 4, in turn, the last term is
+≤ p(a + 2,26 + 2, n + 3).
+This proves formula 5.
+Proof of VI. (a) a = 0.
+(b) a = 1.
+Pc(ф/C, c, n), O, 0) = 0 ≤ Ф(0, 0, 3).
+Pc(Ф(C, C, n), 1, 1) =Ф(1, 1, 2),
+ф(1, 1,0) = 2,
+Ф(1, 1, n + 1) = 1.
+The last equation is easy to prove by induction on n.
+(c) a ≥ 2. VI is easy to verify for n = 0 and n = 1. It remains to be proved that
+for arbitrary a and n
+pc(Ф(c, c,n + 2), a + 2, a + 2) = pa + 2, a + 2, n + 5).
+If in formula 5 we replace b by a + 2, we obtain
+pc(Ф(c, c, n + 2), a + 2, a + 2) ≤ pa + 2,2 (a + 2), n + 3),
+2(a + 2) = (a+ 2)9+2=pa + 2, 1,3),
+"(a+ 2, 1,3) = pat 2, a + 1, n + 4),
+Pc($(c, c, n + 2), a + 2, a + 2) ≤ pa + 2, pa + 2, a + 1,n + 4), n + 3),
+pa+ 2, 9(a + 2, a + 1,n + 4), n + 3) = oat 2,a + 2, n + 4),
+«a+ 2, a + 2, n + 4) = pa + 2, a + 2, n + 5),
+pc(Ф(C, c, n + 2), a + 2, a + 2) ≤ pa + 2, a + 2, n + 5),
+q. e.d
+3
+The formulas given above will make it possible for us to prove that pla, a, a) cannot
+be defined without the use of type 2. If, to abbreviate, we denote by falg(a), f(a)) the
+proposition that, from a certain argument on, the number-theoretic function f(.) is
+not less than g(.), the proof proceeds as follows.
+Let 4(a) be any number-theoretic function defined without the use of type 2. We
+shall then show that there exists an n for which Ha(4(a), p(a, a, n)), or, if we introduce
+an abbreviation, that (San(4(a), ф(a, a, n)) is the case. This would complete the proof,
+since San(p(a, a, a), p(a, a, n)) does not hold, as follows from formula V.
+Our initial functions 1, 4,* and a + 1 have property (. From these initial functions
+we successively obtain new functions by taking the functions already formed and
+using them in turn in the recursions. We shall prove by induction that all the newly
+formed functions will again have property Ss.
+To speak more precisely, we prove the two theorems below. Assume that we have a
+4 [The German text erroneously has "c" instead of "‹".T
+
+502
+finite domain of functions of one, two, or more number-theoretic variables, with the
+following properties:
+1. If J(a1, 0z,..., An) is a function of our domain, the domain also contains a function J'(a1, Az,...,An) that increases monotonically with respect to all variables
+(monotonicity here being understood to allow equality) and is such that for arbitrary
+a1, a2..an
+4(a1, Az,...,an) = 4(01, 0z..., An)
+holds. Of course, f may also be identical with y, if y itself is already monotonic.
+2. For every function 4(a1, a2, ..., an) of the domain,
+San(4 (a, а,..., а), фа, а, п))
+holds.
+Our two theorems then read as follows:
+THEOREM 1. If to our domain we add a new function obtained from the functions of our
+domain by substitution, then the new domain either again has both properties or can again
+be transformed, by the addition of further functions, into such a domain having both
+properties.
+THEOREM 2. If, using functions of our domain, we form a new function 4 by recursion
+and add this function and possibly yet others to the domain, then both properties again hold
+of the newly obtained domain.
+Since our initial functions have properties 1 and 2, everything is settled once these
+two theorems are proved
+Proof of Theorem 1. Assume that a new function has been formed by substitution.
+If all the functions from which the new function was compounded are monotonic
+functions, then the new function, too, is monotonic with respect to all variables
+(monotonic here always being understood in the sense of monotonic nondecreasing).
+Hence the first property then obtains. If not all the functions used in compounding the
+new function are monotonic, then we replace every function in this combination by
+the associated monotonic one and add the function thus obtained to the domain.
+Then the first property obtains. So far as the second property is concerned, it suffices
+to show that it holds for all functions obtained from the monotonic functions of our
+domain by substitution. Furthermore, we can restrict ourselves to showing that, if
+4(01, 0z,..., Am) is a function of our domain having m arguments and if x1(a), Xm(a)
+are m functions, xila) with property San(Xila), p(a, a, n)), then San(V/X1(a),....
+Xm(a)), ф(a, a, n)) holds. For the general case is obtained from this by induction on the
+degree of nesting of the function that results from the functions of our domain by
+substitution. Since now, for n ≥ m, Ral$(a, a, m), pla, a, n)), since y is monotonic,
+and since, for an arbitrary i, "an(xi(a), p(a, a, n)) is true, we have
+Oan(V(Xı(a),..., Xm(a)), 4(ф(a, a, n),..., o(a, a, n))).
+Since further
+San(»а, а,..., а), ф(а, а, п)),
+we also have
+San(4/XI (a),..., Xm(a)), o(Ф(a, a, n), o(a, a, n), n)),
+*(Ф(a, a, n), ф(a, A, N), n) = pc(Ф(C, C, n), a, 2).
+
+503
+Because of
+Halpc(p(c, c, n), a, 2), pc($(C, C, n), a, al))
+and formula VI we finally obtain
+Oan(4(X1(a),..., Xm(a)), o(a, a, n)), q. e. d.
+Proof of Theorem 2. (a) The proof of Theorem 2 is more complicated by far than
+that of Theorem 1, and it will constitute the remainder of this paper. First it will be
+necessary to discuss in more detail the recursion schema that does not use type 2. For
+a function of one variable the recursion looks as follows:
+4(0) = а,
+4(a + 1) = ba, 4(a)),
+where a is a functional not containing any variable and b is a function of two variables
+that might have been obtained by the nesting of several recursive functions. No recursive function of type 2 may occur in a and b, but only functions already defined. For
+functions of two variables the schema reads analogously:
+4(a, 0) = a(a),
+k(a, b + 1) = bca, b, 4(c, b)).
+Here the same remarks hold. It is to be noted especially that the function-of-a-function bla, b, f(c)) must be formed without a recursive function of type 2. Of course, we
+can also form functions-of-functions by mere nesting, without recursion, for example,
+JJ(a)), f(a) + f(b), and so on. But the recursion
+y(a, 0) = a(a),
+4(a, b + 1) = pc(4 (c, b), b, a).
+is ruled out, while, on the other hand,
+4(a, 0) = a + 1,
+4(0, b + 1) = 1 + 414(0 + 6, 6), 61.
+is permitted. Correspondingly, for functions of n variables we have the schema:
+«(а, b,..., m, 0) = а(а, в,..., m),
+#la, b,...,m, n+ 1) = Baro...my la, b,...,m, N, 4(01,..., M1, N)).
+Here we may assume that al...) and b(...) are formed exclusively from monotonic
+functions. If the schema for « does not possess this property initially, let a (a, b,..., m)
+be obtained from ala, b,...,m) by replacement of all functions occurring in
+ala, b,..., m) by the associated greater monotonic functions. We obtain b'(...) from
+b(...) in the same way. Then the function
+f' (a, b,...,m, O) = a (a, b,..., m),
+e'la, b,...m, n+ 1) = bai.myla,...,m, n, 4(a1,..., MI, nI))
+is of the desired kind. It may be considered in place of 4, since it never has a value
+less than 4. Y' is monotonic with respect to a, b,..,m, as we can readily convince
+
+504
+ourselves by induction on n. In all the considerations that follow we shall tacitly
+assume that the transition from & to ' has already been made. We omit the prime for
+the sake of simplicity.
+(b) We now show that instead of our general recursion schema we can take a more
+special one as a basis for our discussion. We shall, however, develop the considerations
+that follow only for functions of two variables. At the end we shall show that this
+restriction is unessential. Thus we consider the schema
+4(a, 0) = a (a),
+4(a, b + 1) = b (a, b, 4(c, b)).
+Here we may assume that De(a, b, 4(c, b)) actually contains the sign 4, since otherwise
+it is a case of mere substitution that would bring us back to Theorem 1. Let us for the
+time being assume that in Dola, b, 4(c, b)) no & occurs within the parentheses associated
+with another 4. In that case every 4 of b has as its first argument a function a, (a, b)
+that results from functions of our domain by substitution and therefore has the two
+properties of our domain. Let these functions a be a_ (a, b), .., ama, b). Further, let
+ala, b) = Max(a1(a, b),..., am(a, b)). Obviously a, too, has the properties of the funetions of our domain. If in the first arguments of all of in Dola, b, 4(c, b)) we now substitute the function ala, b) for the a (a, b) and if we form a recursion with the result, we
+obtain a function that is not less than 4(a, b) for any pair of values. But, if in Dola, b,
+4(c, b)) the function « always has ala, b) as a first argument, we can also write bla, b,
+4(c, b)) in the form wla, b, 4(a(a, b), b)), where w is a function belonging to our domain
+or resulting from functions of our domain by substitution. Thus we may confine ourselves to the consideration of the following schema:
+4(a, 0) = a(a),
+4(a, b + 1) = cla, b, e(a(a, b), b)).
+Now assume that a twofold nesting of the & occurs in Dola, b, 4(c, b)). Then the
+innermost of in b again contain as the first argument functions a, (a, b), which we can
+again replace by a single function ala, b). The first arguments of the next & toward the
+outside are functions u, of a, b, and 4(a(a, b), b). We can now use the maximum of the
+Mi(a, b, c), just as before we took the maximum of the a, (a, b). Thus, if y occurs in
+Dcla, b, 4(c, b)) in an at most twofold nesting, we may consider the following recursion
+schema:
+4(a, 0) = a(a),
+4(a, 6 + 1) = cía, b, 4[a (a, b), b], «(ula, b, 4[a (a, b), b]), b)3.
+We can develop a similar line of reasoning for the case of an n-fold nesting. There it
+suffices to consider the schema
+4(a, 0) = a(a),
+4(a, b + 1) = wla, b,...).
+Here the function w has n arguments besides a and b, hence n + 2 altogether. These
+arguments look as follows: the third argument has the form 4(a(a, b), b); if, furthermore, the first n arguments of w are c1, f2, ..., In, then the (n + 1)th reads
+4/M (CI, (2,..., En), b),
+
+505
+where u is a function belonging to our domain or compounded from functions of our
+domain.
+(c) We must now show that the function /(a, b), or a greater one, increases monotonically with respect to b even for fixed a, and that (an(4(a, a), pla, a, n)) is the case.
+We first specify the greater monotonic function. We replace ala, b) in the recursion by
+the function a (a, b) = Maxa, ala, b)). In place of each function u we use u' la, b,...,
+k) = Max(u(a, b,..., k), k) and in place of wla1, ..., An+ 2) We take w' (a1, ...,On+2) =
+Max(c(01, ...,An+2), An+2). We replace ala) by Maxa, ala)) = ola). The new function is, of course, again monotonic with respect to a, since all of the functions c', o,
+and a' and the functions u' are monotonic. But this function is monotonic also with
+respect to b. We first prove: If, for all a, 4(a, b) ≥ a, then, for all a, 4(a, b + 1) ≥
+4(a, b) and «(a, b + 1) ≥ a.
+For, with the assumption made, the following considerations hold. We have
+4(a, b + 1) = w'la, b, 4la' (a, b), b],...).
+For the third argument, 4[a (a, b), b] ≥ a and 4[a (a, b), b] ≥ 4(a, b)." For, since
+4(a, b) is monotonic with respect to the first argument and since a'(a, b) ≥ a, we have
+4[a (a, b), b] ≥ 4(a, b) and {[a (a, b), b] ≥ a. Assume that it has already been proved
+for an argument c of c' that c ≥ 4(a, b) and c ≥ a. These relations then hold for the
+next argument s, too. For
+8 = 4[m(a, b,.... c), b]
+4lм(а, b,.... c), b] = 4м(а, b,..., 4(а, b)), b],
+p(a, b,.... 4(a, b)) = 4(a, 6),
+4lu(a, b,....«(а, b)), b1 = 44(0, b), b],
+and, according to the assumption,
+4(a,b) = a,
+414(0, 6), 61 ≥ 4(0, 6),
+hence s ≥ 4(a, b) and 8 ≥ a.
+Now since w'la, b,...) is greater than or equal to the last argument of w', we also
+have
+4(a, b + 1) = 4(a, b) and 4(a, b + 1) ≥ a, q. e. d
+But / (a, O) = o(a) ≥ a. Consequently
+4(a, b + 1) ≥ 4(a, b)
+holds generally. This shows that the function f has the first property of our domain.
+Now it still remains to be shown that Gan(V(a, a), p(a, a, n)). So long as in 4(a, b) we
+have b ≤ a, it suffices to consider a simplified recursion:
+4(a, 0) = o(a),
+4(a, b + 1) = c'(a, a, ...).
+Here a has been put for b everywhere except in the second argument of 4. That this
+function is not less than the former one directly follows from the monotonicity of all
+5 [In the last formula the German text erroneously has "a'" instead of "a'".]
+
+506
+functions that occur. We now denote w'(a, a,..., a) by w"(a), a'(a, a) by a" (a), and
+pí(a,..., a) by M"(a). In the formula «a, b + 1) = w'la, a,...) the arguments of c'
+are all less [that is, not greater] than the last argument. For, first, we have
+4(a' (a), b) = 4(a, b) = a.º
+Assume that it has already been shown that the arguments, to the kth one, never
+decrease. Let the kth argument be s. Then the (k + 1)th argument has the form
+«(u(a, a,..., 8), b). Now we have
+ula, a,..., 8) ≥$
+and
+4(u(a,..., 8), b) = 4(8,6) ≥ 8.
+We therefore do not obtain a smaller function if we set all arguments of w' equal to the
+last one. The last argument is /(un- I(a, ..., 8), b), if now i is the last but one. Since
+all arguments of un-1 are ≤ s, we have
+4(Mp-1(a,..., D), b) ≤ 4(Mn - 1(8), b).
+• in turn is less than or equal to 4(u'n-2(e), b), where e is the preceding argument.
+Pinally, we do not obtain a smaller function if we take the recursion
+4(a, 0) = o(a),
+Now we must determine to which degree the functions w", u", a", and o are nested in
+4(a, b + 1) when the recursion is decomposed. We see that, if 4(a, b) consists of an
+x-fold nesting, 4(a, b + 1) consists of an (n(x + 1) + 1)-fold nesting.? Thus the degree
+of nesting of 4(a, b) is equal to 2(n° + n°-1 +
+... + 1) - 1. In place of this number
+we can take 2(b + 1)n°, which is not less. Furthermore there exists an m such that,
+from a certain a on, all of the functions u", w", a".
+", and o are less than pla, a, m).® Thus
+we have
+Oam(4(a, a), Pc($(C, C, m), a, 2(a + 1)nª).
+2(a + 1)nº is a function of a obtained by substitution from functions having the
+properties of our domain. In consequence we have
+Фак (2(а + 1)п°, ф(а, а, K)).
+For every m and k, furthermore, we have
+Ка(pc(ф(с, с, m), а, ф(а, а, к)), рс(ф(с, с, m), ф(а, а, К), ф(а, а, K))).
+Further we have, by formula VI,
+рс(Ф(C, C, m), ф(а, a, K), ф(а, a, K)) ≤ ф(Фа, a, K), ф(а, a, k), m + 3),
+or
+Pc($(C, C, m), ф(a, a, K), pla, a, k)) ≤ 2.
+" [The German text erroneously has "a'" instead of "a"" I
+"¡For the "n" in this sentence, as well as for the next six occurrences of "n", the German text
+has "n".T
+8 [The German text erroneously has "ó'" instead of "o"I
+
+507
+But ф(ф(a, a, K), «(a, a, k), m + 3) is a function having the properties of our domain,
+since it is obtained by substitution from such functions. Thus we have
+(an(4 la, a), ola, a, n)), q. e. d
+(d) This proves Theorem 2 for functions of two variables. We do not need to deal
+with functions of one variable separately. A function «(a) of one variable can be considered as a special case, 4(a, 0), of a function of two variables. Now assume that the
+newly defined function has more than two arguments. This case can be reduced to that
+of two variables. Let
+«(а, в,..., т, О) = ока, в,..., т,.
+4(a, b,....m, n+ 1) = Das...my la, b,.... m, n, 4(a1,..., ML, n)).?
+In Day-.m,(...) functions of a, b,...,m occur in the arguments of the innermost d.
+Hence the y have the following form:
+f(aт(а, в,..., т, х),..., аy(а,..., т, п), п).
+Here we can substitute the maximum of all these functions for all arguments of 4 with
+the exception of the last one. In the same way we can arrange that in the next &
+toward the outside all arguments with the exception of the last one become equal, and
+so on. We now consider the recursion
+«(al,..., a, 0) = ola, a,..., a),
+fla, a,...,a, b +1) = bazor.m, la, a,... a, b, 4(01,..., my, b)).
+This is now a recursion schema for a function '(a, b) of two variables. Hence
+J'an(4(a, al,..., a), p(a, a, n)) holds. The monotonic function associated with & can even
+be specified. The monotonicity with respect to a, b, .., m is already given by the fact
+that, instead of the function o and those occurring in 6, we always take the associated
+monotonic ones. Now we had found a d' (a, b) such that «a, a, ..., a, n) ≤ 4'(a, n)
+We have l' (a, n) ≤ 4"(a, n), where now y'" is monotonic with respect to n also: The
+monotonic function associated with 4(a, b,...m, n) now is 4"(Max(a, b,...,m), n).
+For
+4(а, 6,..., m, п) ≤ 4(Max(а, b,..., m), Мах(...), ..., Мах(...), п)
+≤ 4'(Maxa, b,..., m), n).
+° [In the German text "4" is missing on the right side of the last equation. I
+
+On mathematical logic
+THORALF SKOLEM
+(1928)
+This is the text of a lecture delivered
+before the Norwegian Mathematical Association on 22 October 1928. Skolem briefly presents Boolean algebra and the
+first-order predicate calculus, and makes
+some remarks about the second-order
+predicate calculus. He presents a few
+rules for the first-order predicate calculus
+but then says: "I do not go into this more
+deeply, especially since I believe that it is
+possible to deal with deduction problems
+in another, more expedient way". We
+shall see in a moment what this other way
+is.
+In the first-order predicate calculus
+Skolem considers an arbitrary closed
+well-formed formula Z in prenex form.
+He puts the formula into what we shall
+call its functional form for satisfiability:
+all quantifiers are dropped, and the
+occurrences of each variable bound by an
+existential quantifier are replaced by a
+functional termª containing the variables
+that in Z are bound by universal quantifiers preceding the existential quantifier.
+A formula U is thus obtained. Skolem
+then introduces constants of various
+levels. "O" is the constant of the Oth
+level. The constants of the nth level are
+the expressions obtained when in each
+functional term of U the variables are
+replaced by constants that include at
+least one constant of, but no constant
+beyond, the (n-1)th level. Thus, the funetional
+terms of U, indefinitely compounded, generate from "O" the lexicon'
+of U; the subset of the lexicon of consisting of all constants of levels ≤ n will
+be called the lexicon of level n.
+If W is U or any truth-functional part
+of U, by a lexical instance of W will be
+meant the formula obtained when all the
+variables of W are replaced by elements
+from the lexicon of U. Skolem calls an
+assignment of truth-values to lexical instances of atomic parts of U a solution of
+the nth level if and only if the assignment
+verifies the conjunction of all the lexical
+instances of U formed from the lexicon of
+level n - 1 of U. Clearly, any solution of
+the nth level is an extension of a solution
+of the (n - 1)th level.°
+Either for some n there is no solution
+of the nth level or for every n there is a
+solution of the nth level. In the first case,
+Skolem claims, Z "contains a contradiction" ("'enthält einen Widerspruch"). If
+to the present paper we add the evidence
+furnished by other papers of Skolem's, d
+a We find it convenient to use here the expression "functional term", although it is not
+Skolem's. A functional term is a formula consisting of a function letter followed by variables, with the proper parentheses and commas.
+• This term, not in Skolem, is borrowed from
+Quine 1955a, p. 141.
+• Compare the notions introduced here by
+Skolem with Herbrand's property C: there is a
+solution of the nth level for prenex Z if and
+only if ~Z does not have property C of order
+n (see below, p. 544).
+a In 1920 "ist...ein Widerspruch" (p. 6,
+lines 7u-6u; "is a contradiction", above, p.
+256, line 7u) is opposed to "innerhalb eines gegebenen Denkbereich für gewisse Werte der
+
+509
+we should take "contains a contradic- the "theory" obtained when Z is added
+tion" to mean that Z is not satisfiable, as an axiom to quantification theory is
+and Skolem indeed establishes in those
+syntactically consistent. (Two passages
+papers® that, if Z is satisfiable, there is,
+in Skolem 1929* very similar to the one
+for every n, a solution of the nth level.
+under discussion and somewhat less
+(In the present paper Skolem's argument
+obscure lend weight to this reading.) Thus
+rests upon an implicit use of the axiom of
+Skolem seems to be arguing for a proposichoice; see below, p. 518.) In his other
+tion that is the main consequence of
+papers Skolem also establishes the (deep-
+Herbrand's fundamental theorem (see
+er) converse, namely, if for every n there
+Herbrand 1930, p. 120 (below, p. 561), and
+is a solution of the nth level, Z is satisfialso footnote 103 below, p. 561). Moreable.! (What he actually proves is that Z
+over, in §5 and §6 of 1929 Skolem uses
+is Xo-satisfiable.) We now see what Skothis proposition to study consistency prolem's other way is. It is a proof procedure
+perties of first-order theories in a way
+for the first-order predicate calculus: quite analogous to Herbrand's. (See
+given a formula Z in prenex form and a
+Kalmár's discussion of what he calls the
+number n, we can effectively decide
+Skolem Herbrand lemma in Kalmar
+whether or not there is a solution of the
+1951.)
+nth level for Z; if for some n there is no
+In 1962, p. 47, Skolem writes: "The
+solution of the nth level, Z is not satisfiable, hence ~Z is valid. This approach
+Relative erfüllt ist" (p. 7, lines 9-10; "is satisfurnishes an alternative to the axiomatic
+fied in a given domain for certain values of the
+approach to the first-order predicate calrelatives",
+', above, p. 257, lines 6-7). In 1922
+culus (that is, the approach that follows
+"innerhalb irgend eines Denkbereichs erfüllt
+the lines of Whitehead and Russell 1910
+ist" (p. 220, lines 5-6; "is satisfied in any
+domain at all", above, p. 293, line 13) is
+or Hilbert and Ackermann 1928). Note
+equated to "ist... widerspruchsfrei" (p. 222,
+that this alternative provides proofs that
+lines fu-3u; "is consistent", above, p. 295,
+are cut-free and have the subformula
+line 5). In 1929 the assumption that Z "is
+property. What Skolem has in fact estabcontradictory" ("ist... widerspruchsvoll", p
+lished in these various papers is that his
+23, line 3 of § 4) is taken to be the negation of
+"the assumption that Z is satisfied in a domain
+proof procedure is sound and complete,
+8" ("die Annahme des Erfülltseins von Z in
+in the sense of Quine (1955a, p. 145)—
+einem Bereich 2", p. 23, line 6u). In these
+except for one minor point: it has to be
+papers of Skolem's there is a constant ambiguity
+shown that a formula is satisfiable if and
+whether the expressions that are equated are
+to be taken as synonymous or as logically
+only if one of its prenex forms is satisfiequivalent by a tacit argument.
+able. Skolem does not explicitly discuss
+• 1922, p. 221, lines 10-9u (above, p. 294,
+this question, but the transformation
+lines I-17); 1929, p. 25, lines 4-21, p. 26,
+rules that in the present paper (p. 130;
+lines 8-16, and especially p. 27, lines 12-lu.
+below, p. 516) he gives as examples of
+The first three passages deal with a formula in
+Skolem normal form, the last with an arbitrary
+rules for the first-order predicate calculus
+prenex formula. Note that in the last two
+are precisely the rules that allow us to
+passages no use is made of the axiom of
+pass from a formula to any of its prenex
+choice.
+forms and conversely.®
+' 1922, p. 221, line Su, to p. 222, line 20
+The present paper contains an obscure
+(above, p. 294, lines 18-7u); 1929, p. 25, line
+22, to p. 27, line Il, and p. 27, line 13u, to
+passage (below, p. 519, lines 6-17) that
+p. 28, line 9. The first two passages deal with a
+deals with the second
+. case mentioned
+formula in Skolem normal form, the last with an
+above, namely, the case in which for
+arbitrary prenex formula.
+every n there is a solution of the nth level.
+• Compare these rules with Herbrand's rules
+of passage (below, pp. 528-529).
+Skolem seems to be arguing-and argu-
+" P. 15, line bu, to p. 16, line 4, and p. 29,
+ing finitistically-that, if such is the case, line 10 to bottom of page.
+
+510
+theorem of Löwenheim says that, if Fis a an infinite sequence of satisfying assignwell-formed formula of the first-order
+ments (Skolem's "solutions") the existpredicate calculus with certain predicate
+ence of a satisfying assignment in an
+variables A, B, C,..., either ~ F' is provinfinite domain be inferred, an appeal
+able or F can be satisfied in the natural
+is made to
+"familiar arguments"
+number series by suitable determination
+("bekannten Schlußweisen"; see below,
+of A, B, C,.
+•. In that domain ot indivi-
+p. 589). In a conversation in April 1964
+duals". If "provable" is understood as
+Professor Gödel told the editor that
+derivable from axioms by rules of inference in an axiomatic version of quantification theory, that result was established
+by Gödel (1930a). If "provable" refers
+to some informal version of quantification theory, some of Skolem's arguments,
+when taken together, provide a sketch
+of a proof for the result. Finally, if by
+"~F is provable" we understand, in
+the sense of the proof procedure, that
+for some n there is no solution of the nth
+level for F, the result was firmly established by Skolem in 1922 for any Fin
+Skolem normal form and in 1929 (p. 27,
+line 12, to p. 28, line 9) for any prenex F!
+Compare also 6.2 of Herbrand 1930
+(below, p. 558).
+Let us observe that in these 1922 and
+1929 proofs Skolem is able to dispense
+with the use of the axiom of choice by
+suitably ordering, for every n, the solutions of the nth level. In 1929, p. 25, lines
+9u-bu, he notes that use could be made
+of the following proposition of set theory:
+If a set M of finite sets is such that every
+element of M is a subset of another element of M, then M contains as a subset
+an infinite sequence m1, M2, ... such that,
+for every i, m; is a subset of mi+1. This
+proposition,' which is related to König's
+infinity lemma (1926, 1927), can be
+regarded as a version of the axiom of
+dependent choices (Tarski 1948, p. 96;
+see also Bernays 1937-1954, 7, p. 86).
+Skolem adds that, if the use of the axiom
+of choice is permitted, there is a much
+simpler proof of the Löwenheim theorem,
+namely the proof that he gave in 1920 and,
+in a somewhat different version, in 1929
+(p. 24, lines 20-10u).* In Gödel's completeness proof (1930a), when the argument requires that from the existence of
+" After having pointed out that their formulation of the first-order predicate calculus is not
+syntactically complete, that is, that it contains
+well-formed formulas, even closed well-formed
+formulas, such that neither the formula nor its
+negation is provable, Hilbert and Ackermann
+(1928, p. 68) raised the question of the completeness of the calculus in another sense:
+"Whether the system of axioms is complete at
+least in the sense that all the logical formulas
+that are true in every domain of individuals
+can actually be derived in it is a question that
+has not yet been solved. We can only say, in a
+purely empirical way, that this system of
+axioms has always been sufficient in all applications". Professor Gödel has noted that at the
+time when these lines were written a substantial part of this problem had implicitly been
+solved already by Skolem in his 1922. On 14
+August 1964 he wrote to the editor: 'As for
+Skolem, what he could justly claim, but
+apparently does not claim, is that, in his 1922
+paper, he implicitly proved: 'Either A is proyable or ~A is satisfiable' ('provable' taken in
+an informal sense). However, since he did not
+clearly formulate this result (nor, apparently
+had made it clear to himself), it seems to have
+remained completely unknown, as follows from
+the fact that Hilbert and Ackermann in 1928
+do not mention it in connection with their
+completeness problem".
+' Compare Sierpiński 1958, p. 129, lines 5u-
+3u.
+* This proof requires the general axiom of
+choice: we have a set, of arbitrary cardinality,
+of sets of arbitrary cardinality, and simultaneous choices have to be performed. It is known
+that the axiom of dependent choices does
+not imply the general axiom of choice (for
+systems with urelements see Mostowskr 1948;
+for more general systems the result can be
+established with the help of Cohen's techniques
+(1963, 1963a, 1964). König (1936, p. 82, footnote 1) observes that his proof of the infinity
+lemma makes use of the principle of choice
+(actually, the axiom of dependent choices).
+But he adds: "In most applications of the
+infinity lemma, however, this principle can be
+avoided".
+
+511
+these words refer to König's infinity the formula is satisfiable, if it is satisfiable
+lemma!
+at all. He also solves the more general
+It should be observed that Herbrand's
+case of the prefix (Ex1)... (Exm)(Y) (Ezz)
+fundamental theorem (1929a, 1930, 1931;
+...(Ezn) and finds an upper bound for
+see below, p. 554) can be taken to estabthat case too. Ackermann's method is
+lish the completeness of an
+axiomatic
+somewhat similar to Skolem's. (Later, in
+formulation of quantification theory once
+1954, PP. 72-74, Ackermann follows an
+Skolem's proof procedure is seen to be
+entirely different approach.) In a review
+complete. For Skolem's result of 1929,
+of Ackermann's paper Skolem (1928b)
+partially translated into Herbrand'sterms
+gives an argument that simplifies Acker-
+(see above p. 508, footnote c), reads: If for
+mann's proofs and yields a smaller upper
+no n a prenex formula Z has property C
+bound. Skolem expands these remarks in
+of order n, then ~ Z is satisfiable. And
+a subsequent paper (1935); there he also
+Herbrand's theorem states, in part, that,
+presents his 1928 proof in a more detailed
+if for some n the formula Z has property
+and precise form, and he generalizes his
+C of order n, Z is provable (in an axiomresult in a new direction, namely, to
+atic system), or, by contraposition, if Z
+formulas of the form
+is not provable, for no n does Z have
+property C of order n. Hence, by transi-
+(х) (Дул)... (ДУп) К (х, У1,..., Уп) &
+tivity, if Z is not provable, ~ Z is satisfi-
+(х1) (X2) (Х3)L(X1, Х2, Хз),
+able, or, if Z is valid, Z is provable—
+where I(X1, X2, Xz) contains only binary
+which for prenex Z is Gödel's 1930 compredicates R1, R2, ..., R, and is a conpleteness result. The impact of Herbrand's
+junction stating that each Ry, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
+errors upon this argument is discussed by
+is symmetric and transitive. (For the
+Dreben in Note H below (pp. 578-580).
+significance of this result see Skolem
+In
+the
+present paper Skolem
+1935a.) For the case of the prefix
+approaches the decision problem from the
+(Ехд)... (Exm)(Y) (Ez1)... (Ezn) Herbrand
+point of view of his proof procedure. For
+was able (1931, pp. 45-47; see also 1930,
+certain classes of formulas we can effec-
+PP. 118-119
+(below, pp. 558-560)),
+tively decide whether or not for every n
+through the use of his fundamental
+there is a solution of the nth level. Skotheorem, to simplify Ackermann's proof
+lem first considers a formula whose prefix
+and obtain a smaller upper bound; he also
+consists of a single universal quantifier
+extended the result to a formula consistfollowed by any number of existential
+ing of the prefix (Ex,)... (Exm) followed
+quantifiers, and he shows that in that
+by a conjunction of prenex formulas of
+case we are able to conclude to the satisfithe form (y') (Ex))...(Ez)$i, 1 = i ≤1.
+ability or nonsatisfiability of the given
+The present paper shows also that it is
+formula. The subcase of the prefix (x)
+(Ey) had already been solved by Bernays
+possible to decide the satisfiability of a
+and Schönfinkel (1928). A
+paper
+of
+prenex formula if the prefix is of the form
+Ackermann's (1928a) containing a solu-
+' A number of remarks about Löwenheim's
+tion of the case studied by Skolem was
+and Skolem's arguments, in particular about
+published soon after Skolem's lecture.
+their use of the axiom of choice, can be found
+(Ackermann's paper was received for pubin Skolem 1938. Let us note that in that paper
+Skolem states the Löwenheim theorem thus:
+lication on 9 February 1928 and the fas-
+If a first-order expression is satisfiable ("réaliscicle of the periodical was made ready for
+able"), it is satisfiable in a denumerable dothe press on 28 December 1928.) Ackermain (p. 25). Skolem also says that the results
+mann's result goes beyond Skolem's; he
+obtained by Löwenheim and him concern "a
+predicate logic based upon set theory" ('une
+obtains an upper bound for the number of
+logique du prédicat fondée sur la théorie des
+individuals of the finite domain in which
+ensembles", p. 25).
+
+512
+(х1)... (m)(Ey1)... (Eyn) and all of the of "y" should have the subscript "1",
+variables x1,..., Xm occur in each of the not
+"n'
+atomic parts of the matrix. A few years
+Page 137, line bu, the first occurrence
+later (1935) Skolem again presents
+of "y" should have the subscript "1"
+proof of this result and points out that it
+and 66
+...
+." should be deleted before the
+can easily be extended to the case in
+first and third occurrences of "Y";
+which either all of the variables x1, ...,
+Page 139, lines Su and Tu, the three
+Xm or at least one of the variables
+occurrences of " +" should be deleted
+y1,..., Yn occurs in each atomic formula
+and the resulting spaces closed up;
+of the matrix. Below, Skolem observes
+Page 139, line fu, "einfacheren"
+that, for the prefix in question, the satisshould be replaced by "gegebenen";
+fiability of a formula can be decided if at
+Page 139, the last three lines should be
+least m + 1 distinct variables occur in
+replaced by: "dadurch zu zeigen, dass
+each atomic part of the matrix. At the
+man für jedes Paar X1, Xz ein y > x, und
+end of the paper Skolem presents Lang-
+wählt und allgemein A(x,y) = 1
+ford's result that the theory of open dense
+wählt so oft x < Y, dagegen A(x, y) = 0
+order is decidable.
+so oftx ≥ y".
+Professor Skolem pointed out a num-
+These corrections have been incorporber of corrections that should be introated into the translation below.
+duced into the German text:
+The translation is by Stefan Bauer-
+Page 132, line 9u, there should be a bar
+Mengelberg and Dagfinn Follesdal, and it
+over the second occurrence of "V";
+is printed here with the kind permission
+Page 136, line lu, there should be a bar
+of Professor Skolem and the editing secreover the second occurrence of "B";
+tary of Nordisk Matematisk Tidskrift.
+Page 137, line 7u, the third occurrence
+B. Dreben and the editor
+Logic, as is well known, was established as a science by Aristotle. Everyone knows
+the Aristotelian syllogism. During the entire Middle Ages Aristotle's syllogistic figures
+constituted the principal content of logic. Kant is said to have remarked once that
+logic was the only science that had made no progress at all since antiquity. Perhaps
+this was true at the time, but today it is no longer so.
+For recent times have seen the development of the calculus of logic, as it is called, or
+mathematical logic, a theory that has gone far beyond Aristotelian logic. It has
+been developed by mathematicians; professional philosophers have taken very little
+interest in it, presumably because they found it too mathematical. On the other hand,
+most mathematicians, too, have taken very little interest in it, because they found it
+too philosophical.
+I do not intend to give a precise account of the history of this discipline here. I mention the names of Leibniz, Lambert, Boole, Peirce, Macfarlane, and Frege. The German mathematician Schröder wrote a large work, Algebra der Logik (three volumes:
+1890, 1891, 1895), which is very valuable. A different tendency was initiated by the
+Italian mathematician Peano, as well as by Frege, and carefully developed in all
+details by the Englishmen Russell and Whitehead. They wrote a large work, Principra
+mathematica (1910, 1912, 1913); in it they attempt to develop all of mathematics as a
+part of mathematical logic. Of the more recent writers I would like to mention Löwenheim, Behmann, Schönfinkel, Chwistek, Ramsey, and Langford. Finally, some of the
+investigations in the foundations of mathematics by Hilbert and his collaborators,
+Bernays, von Neumann, and Ackermann, belong here.
+
+513
+First I would like to discuss one of the simplest parts of the calculus of logic, the
+identical calculus [identischen Kalkul], ' in some detail. It can be developed as a calculus of classes or regions (in a plane, say). We consider a totality of objects; this
+totality is called the universal class and is denoted by 1. On the other hand there is to
+be a null class, O; it contains no element at all. If a and b are two arbitrary classes, it
+may happen that every object occurring in a also occurs in b; for that relation I write
+a ≤ b. If both a ≤ band b ≤ a, I write a = b. From the classes a and b we can separate the greatest common part; this class will be denoted by ab. Likewise we can combine the objects occurring in a or b into a class, which will be denoted by a + b.
+Finally, the objects not occurring in a form a class, which we shall denote by à. Then
+we can develop an algebra in which ≤ occurs as the fundamental relation and we have
+the three operations mentioned. Among others, the following laws hold:
+0≤a, a ≤1, a Fa, aù=0, a ta= 1, ab=à +5, a +6= ab,
+alb+c)= ab + ac, a +be = (at b)(at c),
+and, besides, the rules of inference
+(a = 6)16 = c) → (a = c), (C= ab) == (0 = a)(a≤ 6),
+(a +6 ≤ c) => (a ≤ c)(8 = c).
+We must remark, however, that the operations of identical multiplication and
+identical addition can be extended to infinitely many operands, too. By the identical
+product na, of arbitrarily many classes ax, where « ranges over a certain supply of
+values, we understand the class of all elements that are common to all ax. By the
+identical sum La, we understand the class of all objects that occur in at least one of
+the ar.
+I shall not dwell on this calculus for long, but I would like to show, by way of an
+example, how equations containing unknowns can be solved in it. If an equation of the
+form
+ax +bx = 0
+is given (every equation can be brought into the form A = 0, and every system of
+simultaneous equations can be written as a single equation), we find that ab = O is the
+necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a solution and that the general
+solution is given by
+x = au + bu,
+where u stands for an arbitrary class.
+Proof. ab = ab(x +I) = abx + abx ≤ ax + bă = 0. If ax + bx = 0, then x =
+(a + à)x = ax + ax = ax + bă, since both ax and bx are equal to 0. Hence every
+solution has the form au + bu. If x = au + bu, it follows that, when ab = 0, ax =
+aāu + abù = 0.
+1 [Schroder introduced (1890, p. 157) the expression "¡dentical calculus" ("identischer
+Kalkul") for his version of Boolean algebra. He speaks of identical sum and identical product
+when we would say "logical sum" and "logical product". He avoided the word "logical" here
+because he regards the identical calculus as "an auxiliary discipline that precedes logic proper
+or runs parallel... and is of purely mathematical nature".]
+
+514
+But we can also solve equations with an entirely arbitrary number of unknowns.
+For example, let the equation
+be given, where the subscripts range over a given supply of values; assume that the
+classes a are given but that the x are unknowns. Here we find that
+is the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a solution and that
+Хх = ак(Их + Дах. х(ал + Пл))
+is the general solution.
+Another example is
+Е'ан, (Хх, + ХХ») = О (ан. v = ах. и),
+where the prime on I means that u and v shall always take different values. The
+necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a solution here is
+IP = 0,
+where P ranges over all possible finite products of the coefficients a in which the pairs
+of subscripts u, v form a cycle with an odd number of terms. Hence this shows that in
+such problems we are led to peculiar combinatorial questions.
+But I shall not go into problems of this kind in more detail; rather, I shall proceed
+to discuss the general notions and operations of the more recent mathematical logic.
+The fundamental notions of mathematical logic are the following:
+(1) Propositions; true and false;
+(2) Propositional functions of variables; properties (classes) and relations [Beziehungen] (relations [Relationen]] and correspondences).?
+The logical operations are
+(1) The elementary ones: conjunction, disjunction, and negation;
+(2) The higher ones: "all" and "there exists"
+We assume that, if a sentence has meaning, it is either true or false. If a proposition
+expresses something about an object x-I then write it A(x)-it may happen that it
+has meaning for all values of x within a certain domain. Then we say that A(x) is a
+propositional function if x is a variable that can take arbitrary values in that domain.
+If a specific value is substituted for x, we obtain a proposition, which will be true or
+false, depending on the circumstances. In a similar way we can form propositional
+functions of two, three, or more variables: A(X, Y), A (X, y, z), .... If a specific value is
+substituted for y in A(x, y), we obtain a propositional function of x alone; if specific
+values are substituted for x as well as y, we obtain a proposition. The propositional
+2 [Skolem's use of the two words "Beziehungen" and "Relationen" perhaps corresponds to
+his distinction between properties and classes, that is, between the intensional notion and the
+extensional notion. However, a few lines below he writes: "' Beziehungen' oder 'Relationen'" I
+3 [The German text says: "Falls eine Aussage einen Sinn hat"
+, and here the translators had
+to depart from the standard translation "proposition" for "Aussage". ]
+
+515
+function "x is a prime number" is a function P(x) of x; for example, P(3) is true but
+P(6) false. The propositional function "x and y are relatively prime" has two arguments; for x = 8 and y = 15, for example, it yields a true proposition, and for x = 6
+and y = 21 a false one.
+A propositional function like A(x) represents what is called a "property"; we say
+that the objects x for which A(x) becomes a true proposition form a "class"
+' The propositional functions of several variables represent "relations" ["Beziehungen" oder
+"Relationen"].
+The three elementary operations are those that in ordinary language are rendered
+by the words "and"
+', "Or"
+', and "not". In Schröder's notation the propositions " A as
+well as B", "either A or B", and "not A"
+', where A and B are given propositions, are
+written AB, A + B, and A, respectively.
+Hence the expression A + B means "either not A or B". That is clearly the same
+as "if A holds, so does B", or "from A, B follows". This is what is called implication,
+and it is therefore reducible to the first three operations mentioned. Disjunction,
+moreover, can be reduced to conjunction and negation, since A + B means the same
+as AB.
+These elementary operations are clearly applicable to propositions as well as to propositional functions. The two higher operations, which are expressed by the words
+"all" and "there exists", are, however, applicable only to propositional functions.
+They have the effect that for one or more variables substitutions become impossible,
+the variables being transformed from "real", or "free"
+', variables into "apparent",
+or "bound", ones.
+If A(x) is a propositional function, we can form the propositions " A(x) is true for all
+x" and "there exists an x such that A(x) is true"; following Schröder, we write these
+as IA(x) and A(x), respectively. Clearly, no substitution can be made for x here;
+hence x has become an apparent variable, just like a variable of integration. From a
+propositional function A(x, y) we can first form the propositional functions A (X, Y),
+A(x, У), ПА(X, Y), and A(X, y); the first two are functions of x (but not of y), the
+latter two are functions of y. From these, then, the propositions ППА(X, у), ДПА(X, У),
+and so forth can in turn be formed. We readily see that the proposition ZITA (X, Y)
+means that there exists an x such that, when this x is held constant, A(x, y) is true for
+all y, while the proposition I|ZA(X, Y) means that for every y there exists an x, which
+in general depends on y, such that A(x, y) holds. Of course, we can form propositions
+such as I(A(x)ZB(x, y)), and so forth.
+Here are some simple examples from arithmetic:
+ПЕ(Х < У),
+ДП(х ≤У), П2(Х < У)П ((z ≤х) + (У ≤ z)),
+where the variables range over the sequence of natural numbers. The first proposition
+means that for every number there exists a greater one, the second that there exists a
+least natural number, and the third that among all the numbers that are greater than
+x there exists a least.
+
+516
+Now we can not only give a precise formulation to mathematical propositions but
+also represent mathematical proofs as transformations of such logical expressions
+according to certain rules. For example, we have the rules
+ПА В(х) = АПВ(х), Д(A + B(x)) == A + ДВ(x),
+T(A + B(x)) == A + TIB(2),
+LA B(2) == AДB(2),
+ПА(Х) = ДА (Х),
+24(2) = ПА(2).
+But I do not go into this more deeply, especially since I believe that it is possible to
+deal with the deduction problems [Deduktionsprobleme] in another, more expedient
+way, to which I shall return in a moment.
+If certain propositional functions are given, together with a range for the values of
+the variables, we are now in a position to form from them further propositional functions and propositions by means of the five logical operations. The values of the variables may be called "individuals". Propositional functions and propositions that have
+individuals as arguments and in which "all" and "there exists" are applied only to
+variable individuals are often called first-order propositional functions [Zählaussagenfunktionen] and first-order propositions [Zählaussagen], respectively.* It must be
+noted, however, that the logical construction of propositions does not end here. For
+we can have a variable propositional function in a propositional expression, and then
+"all" and "there exists" can be applied to it, too. So, for example,
+П(U(x) + V (х)),
+х
+where U and V are variable propositional functions, is a proposition about U and V;
+that is, the expression is a propositional function of a higher logical kind, having firstorder propositional functions as arguments. But we can also obtain functions of a
+higher kind whose arguments are still individuals. A simple example is
+this expression represents a propositional function whose arguments are x and y, since
+in it the universal quantifier governs the variable propositional function U. In this
+way the construction of propositional functions becomes quite complicated; and it
+cannot be denied that questions arise here that are very difficult to answer. If "all"
+and "there exists" are applied to variable propositional functions, the question arises:
+what is the totality of all propositional functions? It seems to me that only two conceptions are scientifically tenable here; these I now indicate.
+1. We can start from certain actually given, that is, listed, primitive propositional
+functions. Other functions are formed from these, first, by means of the five operations
+in such a way that "all" and "there exists" are applied only to individuals. This
+yields the totality of propositional functions of the first level [Stufe] (the first-order
+functions [Zählfunktionen]). After this totality has been formed, it is meaningful, on
+* It is, of course, understood that in all these expressions the logical operations are used only
+a finite number of times.
+
+517
+the one hand, to form functions whose arguments are functions of the first level; on
+the other hand, we can form functions that have individuals as arguments but that
+result from the application of "all" and "there exists" to functions of the first level.
+Thus we obtain functions of the second level, but of two essentially different kinds.
+Whenever the constructible functions of a certain "level", or "type", are collected
+into a totality, the formation of new functions is made possible.
+2. We can attempt to introduce the notion of propositional function (which, after
+all, corresponds rather precisely to the notion "set") by means of an axiomatization,
+just as we axiomatize set theory. The axioms will then become first-order propositions,
+since the objects of the axiomatization (here the "propositional functions"
+, in set
+theory the "sets") will assume the role of individuals. The relations between arguments and functions will then appear in the axiomatization as primitive functions,
+just as the relation ‹ (element of) appears as primitive function in axiomatic set
+theory.
+I here permit myself a remark about the relation between the fundamental notions
+of logic and those of arithmetic. No matter whether we introduce the notion of propositional function in the first or the second way, we are confronted with the idea of
+the integer. For, even when the notion of propositional function is introduced axiomatically, we shall have to consider (for instance, in investigations concerning consistency) what we can derive by using the axioms an arbitrary finite number of times.
+On the other hand, it is not possible to characterize the number sequence logically
+without the notion of propositional function. For such a characterization must be
+equivalent to the principle of mathematical induction, and this reads as follows: If a
+propositional function A(x) holds for x = 1 and if A(x + 1) is true whenever A(x) is
+true, then A(x) is true for every x. In signs, it takes the form
+Д(U(1) + 2U(х)U(ж + 1) + IU(y)).
+This proposition clearly involves the totality of propositional functions. Therefore, the
+attempt to base the notions of logic upon those of arithmetic, or vice versa, seems to
+me to be mistaken. The foundations for both must be laid simultaneously and in an
+interrelated way.
+I shall not go into these difficult questions more deeply; instead, I shall indicate
+how the deduction problems for first-order propositions can be reduced to a problem
+of combinatorial arithmetic [eine arithmetisch-kombinatorische Frage]]. If U and V
+are first-order propositions and if we pose the question whether V follows from U, this
+is equivalent to asking whether UV is a contradiction or not. It is therefore clear that
+everything depends upon our being able to decide whether a given first-order proposition is contradictory or not.
+Let a first-order proposition Z(A, B, C,...) be given, where A, B, C, ... are the
+given propositional functions occurring in it; I call these the primitive functions. I can
+assume that Z has the form
+П П... Д Д... П П... О(Х1, х2,..., Ул, У2,..., 21, 22, ...).
+Х 1 X2
+У1 У2
+21 22
+This axiom obviously means that, if x1, X2,..., 21, 22,... are arbitrarily given, it is
+possible to introduce y1, Y2, ..., U1, Uz,..., where the y depend only on the x, the u
+
+518
+only on the x and the z, and so on, and to determine the truth values of the functions
+A, B, C,... for these arguments in such a way that U turns out to be true. Since it
+does not matter what notation we use for the symbols, we can introduce the following
+symbolism, which is probably more advantageous for almost all investigations. In-
+stead of y1, Yz, ..., I write f(X1, X2,....), f2(X1, Xz,...),...; instead of U1, U2,..., I
+write 91(X1, Хz,..., 21, 22,...), 92(21, Xz,
+..,21,22.),...; and so on. The given
+first-order proposition then means that
+U(X1, Xz,..., I1 (X1, X2,...), J2 (X1, Xz,...), ..., 21, 22,...,
+91 (X1,..., 21,...), 92 (X1,..., 21,...),...)
+is true for arbitrary values of X1, Xz,..., 21, 22,.
+within a certain domain.
+If we now wish to investigate whether this axiom is satisfiable or not, we can proceed as follows. Let us form, starting from the symbol 0, the symbols fi (0, 0,...),
+f2(0, 0,...),..., 91(0, 0,...), 92(0, 0,...),..., and so on. O will be said to be the
+individual-symbol of the Oth level, while the symbols fi (0, 0,...) and so on will be said
+to be of the Ist level. Once the individual-symbols are defined up to the nth level, the
+symbols of the (n + 1)th level shall be those that result from the insertion of symbols
+up to the nth level as arguments in the "functions" f1, f2,..., 91, 92,... and that do
+not already occur among the symbols of the Oth to the nth level. The sequences
+X1, Xz,..., 21,%2,... formed by the symbols up to the nth level I call argument
+sequences of the nth level. Now we must try to assign values to the functions
+A, B, C,... in such a way that, for each argument sequence in turn, U comes out
+true. To translate everything into ordinary mathematical language I denote the propositional values "false" and "true" by 0 and 1, respectively. If I now denote the
+truth value of A by wA, the following relations hold:
+w(AB) = min(wA, wB), w(A + B) = max(wA, wB), and vA = 1 - WA.
+We thus come to the following purely arithmetic problem.
+A, B, C,... are functions of a finite number of arguments; they can take only the
+values 0 and 1. Further U is a function constructed from A, B, C, ... (these being
+written with certain arguments) by means of the operations min, max, and 1 -; the
+ren re 1, 2...21, 22..., JI (X1, Х2, ...),...,91 (X1, Х2,..., 21, 22,...),....
+As all the argument sequences mentioned above come to be substituted successively
+for x1, X2...21, 22,.., the point is to assign values to A, B, U,... in such a way
+that U takes the value 1 for each argument sequence.
+First, we put O for x1, X2,..., 21, %2,.... Perhaps it is already impossible at this
+point to assign values to A, B, C, ... in such a way that U = 1. In that case the firstorder proposition is not satisfiable; there is a contradiction. Otherwise there exist
+some choices of values for A, B, C,... such that U will have the value 1.5 These
+possibilities I call solutions of the Ist level. Next we have to insert all argument
+sequences of the Ist level. Perhaps it is impossible at this point to choose values for
+A, B, C,... in such a way—the values for the different argument sequences must, of
+course, be chosen in agreement with one another whenever these sequences have symbols in common-that U will always = 1; if so, we have a contradiction. Otherwise
+5 It is convenient to write U as an alternation of terms constructed by means of negation and
+conjunction (Boolean expansion).
+
+519
+there must again be some possibilities available; I call them solutions of the 2nd level.
+Every solution of the 2nd level is the continuation of a solution of the Ist level, in the
+sense that it contains such a solution within itself. In this way we continue indefinitely. The real question now is whether there are solutions of an arbitrarily high level
+or whether for a certain n there exists no solution of the nth level. In the latter case the
+given first-order proposition contains a contradiction. In the former case, on the other
+hand, it is consistent [widerspruchslos]. The following will make this clear. Every
+consequence of the axiom results from repeated and combined uses of it. Every
+theorem derived can therefore be formulated as a proposition formed by means of the
+functions A, B, C,..., and in these functions there will occur, on the one hand, indeterminate symbols a, b, c,... and, on the other, further symbols that have been
+obtained from these by possibly repeated substitutions in the functional expressions
+f1, f2,...,91,92.... Every such proposition must, however, retain its validity when
+a, b, c,... all are replaced by 0. Thus, if a contradiction is derivable, a contradiction
+must be provable in which there occur both 0 and the symbols obtained from 0 by
+substitution in f1, f2,..., 91, 92,... up to, say, the nth level. Hence there cannot then
+exist any solution of the nth level.
+To be sure, this procedure is infinite; but there are some cases in which it is possible
+to make the procedure finite. For example, let a first-order proposition of the form
+ПД... 20(х, У1,..., Уп)
+Х У1
+be given. Here, instead of fi Jz(0), J2(0),..., Jn(0), I simply write 1, 2,...,n; instead of
+f1(1),..., fn(1), I write n + 1,..., 2n; instead of fi(2), ..., Jn(2), I write 2n + 1,....
+3n; and so on, until, instead of fi(n),..., fn(n), I write n? + 1,...,n? + n. First, let
+O be substituted for x and therefore 1, 2,..., n for Y1, Yz,..., Yn, respectively; the
+values that can then be chosen for A, B, C, ... so as to make U = 1 will, when taken
+together, yield certain alternatives 21(0, 1,..., n),..., 2N(0, 1,..., n). When at the
+next step the values 1, 2,..., n are substituted for x, the only possibilities that we
+then have are those that result whenever an alternative 2(0, 1,..., n) is compatible,
+for each r in the sequence 1, 2,...,n, with at least one of the alternatives alternatives (r, rn +
+1,..., (r+ 1)n). Let 2í(0, 1,..., n) be those of the alternatives 21(0, 1,..., n) for
+which this is the case. If the continuation to the next level is possible, the only
+alternatives 2, (r, rn + 1,..., (r + 1)n) that have to be considered are the 2(r, rn +
+1,..., (r + 1)n). Now again let 2; (0, 1,..., n) be those, from among the alternatives
+21(0, 1,..., n), that are compatible, for r = 1, 2,..,n, with at least one of the
+alternatives 2'(r, rn + 1,..., (r + 1)n). Then only the 2'(r, rn + 1,..., (r + 1)n)
+will have to be considered, and let X"(O, 1,..., n) be those, from among the alternatives 2", that are compatible, for r = 1, 2,...,n, with at least one of the alternatives
+2;(r, rn + 1,..., (r + 1)n). And so on. Since only a finite number of alternatives
+[21; (0, 1,..., n) with i = 1, 2, ..., N] is available, this process must actually terminate; that is, after a finite number of steps we arrive at a number s such that the
+alternatives dis+» are the same as the Q,s. It may be that at this point no alternative
+is available any more; in that case the given first-order proposition is contradictory.
+But, if there is at least one alternative Wis, the first-order proposition is consistent.
+For we recognize that it is then possible, for each new argument sequence of the
+
+520
+individual variables x, y1, ..., Yn, to form a corresponding alternative ?, (x, Y1, ....
+yn) that is consistently compatible with the alternatives 2|(s) set up for the earlier
+argument sequences. That it is so simple here is due to the fact that an argument
+sequence Ru, of the nth level, that does not already occur at the (n - 1)th level has an
+element in common with only a single argument sequence Rn -1, of the (n - 1)th level,
+if we disregard argument sequences of levels above the nth. Therefore the determination of the functions A, B, C,... for R, is independent of the determination of these
+functions for all earlier argument sequences with the sole exception of Rn-1.
+Example 1. Let us investigate whether or not the first-order proposition
+П2(A(x, y) + A(x, x) A(Y, Y))
+is contradictory. Here we can put 1 for y if O is put for x, and in general n + 1 for y
+whenever n is put for x.
+In the arithmetic formulation the problem is: Investigate whether it is possible to
+determine the function A(x, y), whose values shall be restricted to 0 and 1, in such a
+way that for all n, n = 0,1,2,....
+max (Aln, n + 1), min(A(n, n), 1 - Aln + 1,n + 1))) = 1.
+The alternatives 2, (0, 1) here are these two:
+211(0, 1): A (0, 1) = 1; 21½(0, 1): A (0, 0) = 1, 4(1, 1) = 0.
+Hence
+211(1, 2): A A(1, 2) = 1; 22(1, 2): A(1, 1) = 1, A(2, 2) = 0.
+Thus 21(0, 1) is here compatible with both 21(1, 2) and 22(1, 2), while 22(0, 1) is
+compatible only with 21(1, 2). But, since both 2(0, 1) can be continued and at the
+same time both 21(1, 2) can occur as continuations, the Wý coincide with the 2l,
+already at this point. Hence the given proposition is consistent. Indeed, we already
+obtain a solution of the arithmetic problem if we set A(n, n + 1) = 1 for all n, no
+matter what values the function has otherwise.
+Example 2. Let us examine whether or not the first-order proposition
+ПД(А (х, у) В(х) B(y) + A(x, x) A(Y, У) В(У))
+Х У
+is consistent. Here we obtain
+21, (0, 1): A (0, 1) = 1, B(0) = 1, B(1) = 0,
+212(0, 1): A(0, 0) = 1, A(1, 1) = 0, B(1) = 0
+as alternatives of the first level. Hence
+211(1, 2): A A(1, 2) = 1, B(1) = 1, B(2) = 0,
+21½(1, 2): A A(1, 1) = 1, A(2, 2) = 0, B(2) = 0.
+Here 21, (0, 1) is compatible with 212(1, 2) but not with 21(1, 2); 212(0, 1) cannot be
+continued at all. Thus there is only one 2í (0, 1), namely 21, (0, 1); but there does not
+occur any 2; at all. Hence the proposition contains a contradiction.
+
+521
+There are some other propositions in IZ-form that can be treated in a precisely
+analogous way.® Let
+П... П Д
+... EU(21,..., Хт, У1,..., Уп)
+Хт У1
+be such a first-order proposition Z. It can be written in such a way that we need take
+only distinct elements x into consideration. That is immediately the case if the truth
+of U for two identical x always follows from the truth of U for distinct x; otherwise we
+can transform the proposition. Let x1, ..., Xm be m distinct individuals; let si,....
+Sm, t = 1, 2,..., mm, be the different permutations with repetitions of these individuals taken m at a time. According to the proposition Z there then exists, for each
+sequence §1),..., "m, a sequence of individuals yl',...,y") such that U(§l,...,
+§m, YI,...,Yn) is true. Now let
+V (хд,..., Хт, УІ,..., Уп", ..., УТ"),
+',...,yт"))
+=U(§1,..., Іт, 41,...,УП)(§…, Ч, У?,...,У2)....
+Then Z can obviously be written thus:
+П Я
+... Д V(х1,..., Хт, УЇ,..., Ут"),
+X1.....Xm YI)
+where now only the various combinations of individuals taken m at a time from the
+domain in question are to be substituted for x1, ..., m. Hence we need only consider
+propositions of the form just mentioned, for example,
+ПІ..Д(Х1,
+...,Хт, Ут,..., Уп).
+X1.....Хт У1
+In order to investigate satisfiability we can first substitute the symbols 1, 2, ..., m
+for x1,..., Xm and the numbersm + 1,..m + n for y1, .... Yn; this yields the argument sequence 1, 2,...,m + n of the Ist level. Next, let all the combinations of the
+numbers 1, 2, ..., m + n taken m at a time that differ from the combination 1, 2, ...,
+m be formed and ordered (say lexicographically). To the first combination let us
+assign the numbers m + n + 1,...,m + 2n as y-values; to the second let us assign
+as y-values the numbers m + 2n + 1,...,m + 3n; and so on. Thus we obtain the
+argument sequences of the 2nd level. Then let us form all new combinations of all the
+numbers, taken m at a time, that we have considered so far (that is, all the combinations that have not yet occurred as values for the x); and so on.
+I now make the assumption that all the primitive functions occurring in our firstorder proposition possess at least m distinct argument symbols; then it is possible to
+decide the question of satisfiability by a finite procedure. This is due to the fact that
+every argument sequence of the uth level has, if we disregard argument sequences of
+higher levels, an argument system a1, ..., Am in common with only a single argument
+sequence of the (v - 1)th level.
+Let 2, (a1,..., am, b1,..., On) be the alternatives that are possible for the argument
+sequence a1, ..., Am, b1, ..., In, where all a and b are distinct symbols. Further, let the
+6 I proved earlier (1920) that the problem whether or not a first-order proposition Z is
+satisfiable can be reduced to the same question for a first-order proposition Z' in Il2-form.
+
+522
+sequence C1, ..., Um be any one of the combinations, of the symbols a1, ..., am, b1, ...,
+On taken m at a time, that are different from the combination a1, ...,Am; with each such
+combination we associate a sequence d1, ..., on of n distinct symbols in such a way
+that the sequences d1, . .., du and d'1, .., d' that correspond to two different combinations C1, ..., Cm are completely distinct and that all d are distinct from all a and b. Then
+we have to select from the set of alternatives 2, (a1, ... am, b1,..., bn) those Di(a1, ....
+am, b1,..., bn) that, for each combination C1, ..., Cm, are compatible with at least one
+of the alternatives 21, (C1, ..., Cm, d1, ..., dn); to select from these alternatives I; again
+the X"(a1,..., am, b1,...,On) that, for each combination 1,..., Cm, are compatible
+with at least one of the alternatives 2'; (1,..,Cm, d1,...,dn); and so on. Just as
+before, we arrive at a number s such that the alternatives dis+1 coincide with the
+2is. If at this point there exist alternatives W,", the given proposition is consistent;
+otherwise it represents a contradiction.
+I give a simple example. Assume that in the proposition
+ПП ZU (X1, X2, У)
+ХІ X2 У
+U(X1, Xz, Y) has the following form:
+A(X1, X2)A(X1,YA(X2, Y) + A(X2, X1) A(X2, Y) A(X1, y) +
+А (Х1, У) А(У, Х) + А(Х2, У) А(У, х) + А(Х1, У) А(У, х1) + А(Х2, У) А(У, Х2).
+Since U (X1, Xz, Y) is symmetric with respect to x1 and Xz, and U (X1, X1, Y)U (X2, Xz, Y)
+is [logically] contained in U(X1, X2, y), the given proposition can at once be written in
+the form
+I 20 (X1, Xz, Y),
+Х1.X2 У
+where the pair (x1, X2) must run through all unordered pairs of the domain considered.
+Here 1, 2, 3 is the argument sequence of the Ist level; the argument sequences of the
+2nd level are 1, 3, 4 and 2, 3, 5. One of the alternatives 21(1, 2, 3) here is 24(1, 2, 3),
+which means A(1, 3) = 1 and A(3, 2) = 0. This alternative is compatible with
+21(1, 3, 4), that is, A(1, 4) = 1 and A(4, 3) = 0, as well as with 21, (2, 3, 5), that is
+A (2, 5) = 1 and A(5, 3) = 0. This already proves the consistency.
+If on the other hand the proposition
+П ПДА (Х1, У) А (У, Х2)
+ХІ X2 У
+were given, then, by the rule of transformation explained above, it would turn into
+П ДЕДД[А(У)А(У1,Х2)А (Х2, У2)А (У2, х1)
+Х1.X2 У1 У2 Уз У4
+А (Х1, Уз) А (Уз, хд) А (Х2, У4) А (У4, Хг)].
+We can then show the consistency of this proposition by the systematic method; but
+it is simpler to show the consistency of the given proposition by choosing for each pair
+(X1, X2) a y greater than xy and X2, and by taking in general A(x, y) = 1 whenever
+x < y but A(x, y) = 0 whenever x ≥ y.
+
+523
+If all primitive functions of the ПД-proposition
+П П... ПД... ДИ(Х,..., Хт, У1,..., уп)
+have at least m + 1 distinct argument symbols, the proposition is consistent if and
+only if U is consistent. For, the distinct argument sequences that we obtain by the
+procedure applied on page 519 never have more than m symbols in common, so that
+values are assigned to the primitive functions for each of the argument sequences, as
+they successively appear, independently of all the others.
+It is possible, of course, to pose further problems concerning first-order propositions.
+An interesting question is whether an axiom, or axiom system, given as a first-order
+proposition Z is categorical [kategorisch]; we say that Z is categorical if it is possible to
+show, for an arbitrary first-order proposition Z' formed by means of the same primitive functions as Z, that it is true or false.? C. H. Langford has recently (1926, 1926a)
+given some examples of such categorical axiom systems. I would like to give a very
+simple but nevertheless not too trivial example of this here. I consider the following
+axioms:
+1. 2R(X, X),
+2. ПП (В(х, 9) + B (g, х)),
+3. ППП (R(x, y) + R(y, z) + R(x, z)),
+Х У 2
+Х У
+Х У
+6. ППД (R(х, у) + R(x, z) R(z, y)).
+Х У 2
+If we write I(x, y) for R(x, y) R(Y, x), we recognize on account of 3 that $(Y)
+almays to law be or cd roma, and pie alert into from lo, i (a) ne.
+propositional function I therefore deserves to be called "identity" in the domain of
+the first-order propositions derivable from R. Since x and y are no longer distinguished
+when I(x, y) holds, it is easy to see that the axioms listed determine an ordering of all
+individuals in an open and dense sequence.
+Let us now consider the expression
+U (х1, Х2,..., Хр, У),
+where U is an elementary propositional function 8 formed from R. I will show that this
+expression, by virtue of the axioms, is always equivalent to an elementary propositional function V (x1, ..., Xn), that is, that both always have the same truth value. In
+order to show that, I of course need only consider the case in which U is constructed
+" The word "categorical", incidentally, is used also in another sense.
+• [That is, a function constructed by means of the "elementary" logical operations, namely,
+conjunction, disjunction, and negation.]
+
+524
+by means of negation and conjunction alone. Moreover, propositional conjuncts like
+R (x,, x,) can be moved to the left of the 2-sign. If the propositional conjunct R (y, y)
+occurs, the proposition is always false. If the conjunct R(y, y) occurs, it can be
+omitted, since on account of 2 it is always true. If we let a1, ...,a.., B1,..., Bu, YI,....
+Yo, 81,..., 8, denote the x that occur in U, we obtain
+ER(a1, У)... R(a", У) R(У, В1)... R(Y, В,) R(21, У)... R(yo, У) R(У, б,)... R(y, б.).
+R (a, B), F(y, a), R(B, б), and F(y, б) follow from this proposition for all a, B, y, and 8.
+I assert that, conversely, the truth of the 2-proposition follows from the conjunction
+of all R(a, B), R(y, a), R(B, 8), and R(y, 8). For we can imagine that the subscripts
+of the letters are so chosen that Ra, a1) holds for all a, and likewise R(ß1, B) for all B,
+R(y1, y) for all y, and R(8, 81) for all 8. Now four cases are possible: (1) We have
+R (a1, 81) R(y1, B1). Since R(v1, 81) holds, there exists, by 6, a y such that R (y, S,)
+R(V1, Y) obtains, from which we can easily derive the truth of the 2-proposition.
+(2) Raz, 81)R(y R(y1, B1) holds. Then the 2-proposition already holds if we substitute B,
+for y. (3) We have R(a1, 8) B(ys, B). Then the Z-proposition holds if we substitute a.
+for y. (4) R(a1, 81) R(y1, B1) holds. If R(B1, a1) is true, the 2-proposition holds if a or B
+is substituted for y. If R(ß1, 01) is true, there exists a y such that R(B1, Y) R(y, a,)
+obtains, and from this the truth of the 2-proposition follows.
+It is easy to discover how the matter stands in the simpler cases in which not all four
+of the sequences a, B, y, and 8 occur.
+Hence any propositional function ZU(x1, ..., X,, Y) is false for all x, true for all x, or
+surely replaceable by an elementary function V (X1,..., X). If we use negation, we see
+that the same holds for ПU(x1,...,Xn,Y). Consequently the apparent variables
+occurring in an arbitrary first-order proposition can gradually be eliminated. When
+all but one have been eliminated, the last elimination directly yields the result "true"
+or "false".
+I hope hereby to have given a little insight into some of the most important problems of mathematical logic.
+
+Investigations in proof theory:
+The properties of true propositions
+JACQUES HERBRAND
+(1930)
+The present text is Chapter 5 of Her- hasty writing; this is especially true of
+brand's thesis. The date given at the end Chapter 5. Some sentences are poorly
+of the thesis is 14 April 1929, but the
+constructed, and the punctuation is hapdefense at the Sorbonne did not take
+hazard. Herbrand's thoughts are not
+place until Il June 1930 (in October 1929
+nebulous, but they are so hurriedly ex-
+Herbrand was drafted for a year of serpressed that many a passage is ambiguvice in the French army). Herbrand was
+ous or obscure. To bring out the proper
+granted his doctorate in
+mathematics
+meaning of the text the translators had
+with highest honors. There is no indicato depart from a literal rendering, and
+tion that he introduced revisions into the
+more rewriting has been allowed in this
+text of the thesis between April 1929 and
+translation than in any other translation
+June 1930; a paper of his (1931), dated
+included in the present volume.
+September 1929, contains emendations
+In 1939 Bernays remarked that "Herto the thesis, and this shows, it seems,
+brand's proof is hard to follow" (Hilbert
+that the text of the thesis remained unand Bernays 1939, footnote 1, p. 158), but
+changed after April 1929.
+he did not point out any specific diffi.
+Chapter 5 of the thesis contains the
+culty. In the fall of 1963 Professor Gödel
+statement of the now famous Herbrand
+informed the editor that in the early
+theorem (fundamental theorem, p. 554
+forties he had discovered an essential gap
+below) and an attempted proof of it. The
+in Herbrand's argument, but he never
+section devoted to the theorem and its
+published anything on the subject.
+proof is preceded by a study of certain
+In the spring of 1963 counterexamples to
+properties (A, B, and C) of provable
+the lemma of 3.3 and to Lemma 3 of
+formulas of
+quantification theory and
+5.3, lemmas upon which Herbrand's
+followed by examples of applications of
+proof of his fundamental theorem rests,
+the theorem (to several cases of the decihad been published by Dreben, Andrews,
+sion problem and to the study of the conand Aanderaa (1963). Dreben (1963)
+sistency of various systems). The chapter
+stated a substitute for the lemma of 3.3,
+is relatively self-contained, and the
+and two notes (Dreben, Andrews, and
+definitions, culled from the previous
+Aanderaa 1963a and Dreben and Aanchapters of the thesis, that we give a few
+deraa 1964) outlined how Herbrand's
+paragraphs below should provide the
+argument could be repaired; Dreben and
+reader with the necessary background
+Denton (1966) gave a detailed proof of an
+information.
+emended version of the crucial lemma of
+Herbrand's thesis bears the marks of 3.3. To deal with these questions and also
+
+526
+to provide a commentary on the text, are prenex. In this difference Gentzen
+Dreben added a number of footnotes,
+sees the greater generality of his result.
+given between square brackets, to the
+From the point of view of the standard
+present translation, as well as ten Notes,
+version of quantification theory, how-
+A through J, given on pages 567-581
+ever, Herbrand's theorem is more general
+below.
+than Gentzen's, since it applies to any
+The heading of Chapter 5 in Herbrand's
+(not necessarily prenex) formula, while
+thesis is "The properties of true propositions".
+Gentzen's theorem, once adapted to this
+. Here "true" means provable in
+version, applies only to formulas of a cerquantification theory, and Herbrand's
+tain class. Also, with the study of the
+intention is to investigate the three
+domains C, (see below, p. 542), Herbrand
+properties A, B, and C that hold of
+supplies more information about the
+formula if and only if the formula is prov-
+Mittelsequenz. Gentzen's Hauptsatz on
+able. The statement and the proof of
+the eliminability of the Schnitt schema
+Herbrand's fundamental theorem are
+(1934, p. 196) is, for Gentzen's system,
+closely connected with these properties.
+the analogue of Herbrand's result that
+Herbrand's work can be viewed as a
+modus ponens is eliminable in quantificareinterpretation, from the point of view
+tion theory (see below, p. 558, and Note
+of Hilbert's program, of the results of
+D). However, Gentzen's Hauptsatz (but
+Löwenheim and Skolem. Of his fundanot, of course, his verschärfter Hauptsatz)
+mental theorem Herbrand writes (19316,
+can be extended to intuitionistic logic
+p. 4) that it is "a more precise statement
+and to various modal logics, while there
+of the well-known Löwenheim-Skolem
+is no similar extension of Herbrand's
+theorem". Having adopted Hilbert's
+result.
+finitistic viewpoint, Herbrand could not
+In Chapter 1 of his thesis Herbrand
+regard
+the
+notion "satisfiable"
+presents the classical propositional cal-
+"valid"), which enters in the statement
+culus, which he calls the theory of identiof the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, as a
+ties of the first kind, and in Chapter 2 his
+proper metamathematical notion. He
+version of quantification theory, which
+knew that from the assumption that for
+he calls the theory of identities of the second
+every p the conjunctive expansion of
+kind. The system presented in Chapter 2
+order p of a formula is satisfiable one can
+is equivalent to any one of the standard
+infer-"easily"
+, as he says in 19316,
+formulations of quantification theory,
+p. 4- that the formula is No-satisfiable,
+and in Section 7 of Chapter 2 Herbrand
+but for him this inference had no proper
+proves that it is equivalent to the quantimetamathematical content (see below:
+fication theory used by Whitehead and
+6.2, p. 558; footnote 67, p. 552; and
+Russell in Principia mathematica. In
+Note
+H, p. 578). On his attitude
+Chapter 3 Herbrand calls any system a
+toward
+Hilbert's program Herbrand
+theory if it is obtained from his system of
+wrote amply (Introduction to his thesis,
+Chapter 2 by the adjunction of some of
+1930a, 193la).
+the following:
+Gentzen claims (1934, footnote 6,
+(1) Function letters (called descriptive
+p. 409) that Herbrand's fundamental
+functions and intended to represent in the
+theorem is a special case of Gentzen's own
+system functions from individuals to inverschärfter Hauptsatz. He interprets Herdividuals) together with an extended rule
+brand's theorem as applying to a sequent
+of existential generalization,
+whose antecedent is empty and whose
+(2) Predicate constants (= or &, for
+succedent consists of a single prenex
+example), and
+formula, while the verschärfter Hauptsatz
+(3) New primitive formulas, called
+applies
+to any sequent whose formulas
+hypotheses or axioms.
+
+527
+The basic system used by Herbrand in scriptive functions for arguments. A
+Chapter 5 is, as he explains at the very
+function in which no variable occurs is
+beginning of the chapter (below, p. 529),
+a constant; a O-place function letter is a
+a theory obtained from the quantification
+primitive constant (constante fondamentale;
+theory of Chapter 2 by the adjunction of
+in 1931 Herbrand uses the expression
+descriptive functions. We shall call this
+"constante élémentaire"). The word
+system Qi, and we now describe it,
+"argument" is used also for the primitive
+omitting details that are of no imporconstants (and sometimes even more
+tance in Chapter 5.
+generally for the functions) that have been
+Herbrand's statement of the rules of
+substituted for the arguments of a funcformation of Qu lacks precision and is not
+tion.ª Variables and descriptive functions
+always consistent with his usage; in a
+are individuals (individus).
+paper (1931) that is in many respects a
+An atomic propositional function (foncsequel to his thesis he found it necessary tion propositionnelle élément) is either a
+to state his rules in an emended form. O-adic predicate letter or, for n > 0, an
+Before and after the emendations, the
+n-adic predicate letter followed by parennotation used by Herbrand frequently
+theses enclosing n individuals separated
+allows confusion between use and menby commas (Herbrand does not always
+tion of letters, although, in practice, this
+use parentheses and commas, but we
+confusion does not create any basic diffihave found it convenient to reestablish
+culty in the kind of problems that he is
+them in the translation below); the indiscussing. Here we shall not undertake a
+dividuals are the arguments of the functotal reconstruction of Herbrand's symtion.
+bolism but merely present it in a simple
+form that will allow the reader to grasp
+A proposition is a well-formed formula
+of Q; it is formed from atomic proposihis formulas with ease.
+tional functions by means of connectives
+For each n ≥ 0 there is a denumerable
+and quantifiers. The primitive connecsupply of n-adic predicate letters. These
+tives are negation (~) and disjunction
+letters are left unspecified; they are
+(V); conjunction (&), the conditional
+mentioned but not used. The syntactic
+(D), and the biconditional (=) are defined
+variables ranging over them are generally
+in terms of these two. Both the universal
+$ and Y. There is a denumerable supply
+and the existential quantifiers, (x) and
+of quantifiable variables. The syntactic
+(Ex), are taken as primitive. The first is
+variables ranging over them are x, y, z,
+sometimes written (+x) and the second
+and occasionally t, with or without sub- (-x). A quantifier left indeterminate is
+scripts, sometimes with primes. For each
+written (1x). A string of quantifiers
+n ≥ 0 there is a finite or denumerable
+(1X1),(Ix2),..., (IXn) is sometimes
+supply of n-place function letters. These
+written
+(1X1, IX2,..., Ixn). As in
+letters are left unspecified; the syntactic
+Principia mathematica, a bound varivariable ranging over them is generally f
+able is said to be apparent (apparente),
+or, if n = 0, a, with or without subscripts.
+and a free variable real (réelle). Her-
+An n-place elementary descriptive function
+brand's name for a quantifier is "symbole
+(fonction descriptive élémentaire) is either
+de variable apparente". In Chapter 5 he
+a O-place function letter or, for n > 0, an
+follows the rule that in any given propo-
+n-place function letter followed by parensition no variable occurs both free and
+theses enclosing n variables separated by
+bound and variables occuring in more than
+commas and called the arguments of the
+function. The descriptive functions are
+a It is used also for the elements of the
+obtained from the elementary descriptive
+domains when these elements are substituted
+functions by iterated substitution of de- for the arguments of a function.
+
+528
+one quantifier are to be taken as distinct "x" for conjunction. In the translation
+(even when the same syntactic letter is
+below "&" is used for conjunction,
+used). Hence he can call the scope of a
+parentheses and brackets are used for the
+quantifier ( 1x) the scope of the variablex.
+punctuation of formulas; when nesting of
+Being a
+well-formed formula,
+an
+parentheses would make the reading of a
+atomic propositional function is a propformula difficult,
+we use, proceeding
+osition, and more specifically an atomic
+from the inside outward, ordinary parenproposition (proposition-élément). A quantheses (| )), square brackets ([]); curly
+tifier-free proposition is an elementary
+brackets ({3), and larger square brackets
+proposition (proposition élémentaire). Her-
+1]).
+brand uses the expression "fonction prop-
+An occurrence of a subproposition A in
+ositionnelle" in two different senses: (1)
+a proposition P (written in terms of the
+A proposition is said to be a propositional
+primitive connectives ~ and V) is said
+function of its real variables (and an
+to be positive, or A occurs positively in P,
+atomic propositional function is a propif this occurrence of A lies within the
+ositional function in that sense); (2) A
+scopes of an even number of negation
+proposition P is said to be a propositional
+signs of P; an occurrence of A is negative,
+function of any atomic proposition that
+or A occurs negatively, in Pif the number
+occurs in P, the propositional function
+is odd.
+being of the first kind if it contains no
+quantifier, of the second kind otherwise
+If (x)Ф(x) occurs positively in P or
+(Hx)Ф(x) occurs negatively in P, the
+hence a propositional function of the
+variable x and its quantifier are said to be
+first kind consists of atomic propositions
+connected by ~ and V)."
+general in P. If (x)Ф(x) occurs negatively
+in P or (Ex)Ф(x) occurs positively in P,
+Herbrand uses the letter p as a syntacthe variable x and its quantifier are said
+tic variable ranging over propositions,
+to be restricted in P.
+but, since p is also frequently used as a
+number ("order p"), in its first usage it
+The axioms of Qu are all the quantifierfree tautologies.
+has, in the translation below, been fre-
+The rules of inference, or, as Herbrand
+quently replaced by Z; when variables
+calls them, the rules of reasoning (règles
+have to be exhibited, the letters & and Y
+de raisonnement), are modus ponens
+together with variables are generally used
+(règle d'implication), simplification (from
+as syntactic variables ranging over propositions. "Ф(x)" denotes a propositional
+ZV Z to infer Z, or rather—since
+function of x. However, the formula thus
+Herbrand does not allow, in one formula,
+two quantifiers to contain the same
+denoted may very well not contain x
+variable-from Z V Z' to infer Z, where
+(in which case x occurs fictitiously in (x))
+Z' is an alphabetical variant of Z), uniand may contain other variables. Herversal generalization (from Ф(x) to infer
+brand may write Ф(x1) or Ф(x2) for one
+(x)Ф(x)), the extended rule of existential
+and the same formula according as x1 or
+generalization (from $(a), where a is
+Xz is the real variable to which he wants
+an individual, to infer (Hy)Ф(y)), a rule
+to draw attention.
+Herbrand uses dots, single and mulallowing relettering, and the following twelve rules of passage (règles de
+tiple, to punctuate his formulas and also to
+conjoin propositions. But throughout the
+passage):
+thesis, in particular in Chapter 5, he frequently flouts the rules stated in Chapters 1 and 2 concerning the use of these
+dots. This creates difficulties. In 1931
+Herbrand found it convenient to use
+• More generally, Herbrand occasionally
+speaks of a proposition P as being a propositional function of a not necessarily atomic
+proposition Q; what he means, then, is that &
+is a well-formed part of P.
+
+529
+Let Z be a proposition that does not simply an identity, of the first kind if it
+contain x; for h = 1,..., 6, let Jn; Kn be is elementary, of the second kind otherthe hth of the following six ordered pairs wise; when the context prevents any
+of propositions:
+misunderstanding, he speaks simply of
+an identity, without specifying the
+(1) ~ (X)Ф(X); (Ex) ~P(x),
+kind.
+(2) ~ (Нх) Ф(х); (х) ~Ф(x),
+Herbrand uses the word "champ" for
+any domain and, in particular, for the
+(3) (х)Ф(х) V Z; (х)[Ф(x) V Z],
+domains C; that play such an important
+(4) ZV (x)Ф(x); (x)[Z V Ф(x)],
+role in his theory. For these C; the
+word "field" has
+occasionally been
+(5) (Нх)Ф(х) V Z; (Нх)[Ф(x) V 2],
+used in English publications on logic.
+(6) Z V (Нх)Ф(х); (Нх)[Z V Ф(x)].
+We have
+not followed this custom
+here, and "champ" has been uniformly
+Also let J6th; Koth be Kn; Jn. Then a translated by "domain". "Réduite"
+proposition I comes from a proposition
+has been translated by "expansion"
+S by one application of the ith rule of
+although the English word "reduction"
+passage (i = 1,..., 12) if I' is the result
+has occasionally been used in this conof replacing one occurrence of Ji in S by
+text.
+one occurrence of Ki. (In Section 2 of
+Herbrand's text was translated by
+Chapter 2 of Herbrand's thesis (4) and
+Burton Dreben and the editor. Wilbur
+(6) are absent; the omission is noted
+Hart III, Marc Venne, Daniel Isaacson,
+and corrected in 1931, p. 22, footnote
+and Dirk van Dalen read the translation
+2.)
+with its editorial comments, and the
+If a proposition is provable from the
+translators are grateful to them for
+axioms by these rules, Herbrand says
+suggesting
+improvements. The transthat it is true (vraie) and sometimes prelation is printed here with the kind perfixes it with the sign r. He also says
+mission of the Instytut matematyczny
+that it is a propositional identity, or Polskiej Akademii nauk.
+1. THOROUGH STUDY OF THE RULES OF PASSAGE
+1. Throughout the present chapter we shall work with the theory of Chapter 3, 1.4,
+which we obtained from the theory of Chapter 2 by adding descriptive functions. As
+we pointed out in Chapter 3, nearly all the results of Chapter 2 continue to hold for this
+extended theory. For the sake of simplicity we assume-and this will not change anything essential-that we have variables of one type only.-
+In the present section we shall study the various forms that a proposition can take
+when the rules of passage are applied to it. Not all the results that we shall obtain will
+be used in the rest of the present chapter, but in deriving them we shall have an
+opportunity to introduce notions that we shall need in Section 2.
+We recall the theorem of Chapter 2, 3.101, which states that by applying the rules
+of passage we can find, for any given proposition P, a certain proposition [in prenex
+1 [In Chapter 3 Herbrand generalizes his system of quantification theory and, indeed, his notion
+of an arbitrary theory to many-sorted systems. Each sort he calls a type. These types play no
+serious role in Chapter 5, except in 6.6. Below, in 1.1, Herbrand uses the word "type" in a totally
+different sense.]
+
+530
+form] equivalent to P and said to be tied to P. We refer the reader to the same place
+for the definition of proposition in prenex form.?
+To avoid ambiguities we shall assume throughout the present chapter that no two
+quantifiers contain the same letter.
+1.1. A sequence of quantifiers will be called a type. Two types will be said to be
+similar if they differ only in the variables that they contain; thus
++ X1, - X2, +X3
+and
++Y1,-Y2,+93
+are similar types.
+1.11. The type of a proposition P will be the type formed by the quantifiers that
+occur at the beginning of the prenex proposition tied to P.
+We shall now investigate in more detail [than in Chapter 2] what are the types of
+those prenex propositions obtained from a given proposition P by means of the rules
+of passage. 3 These types will be called the types attached [attachés] to P.
+To say that I x1, I x2,..., IX, is a type attached to a proposition P is, as we see,
+to say that we can, by means of the rules of passage, first put P into the
+form (1x) P1(x), then put P1(x2) into the form (Ix2)P2(X2), and so forth; this
+amounts to saying that we can pull the quantifiers
+(121)(122),.. (1X1)
+out of the proposition one after another.
+1.12. Let us recall the following remark (proved in Chapter 2, 3.12*):
+LEMMA 1. There exist types attached to the proposition $|( I x)A (x)] that have (1x) as
+their leftmost quantifier; here $(Z) is a propositional function of the first kind in Z and
+may, moreover, contain atomic propositions other than Z.
+1.2. Now, using [just] the rules of passage, we shall decrease the scope of x as much
+as we can. To decrease this scope step by step, we make use of the following two
+consequences of the rules of passage:
+(1) If the scope of x is ~ P(x), we can decrease this scope so that it becomes $(x);
+(2) If the scope of x is (x) V Zor Z V $(x), we can decrease this scope so that it
+becomes $(x), provided Z does not contain x.
+'['"'A proposition P is said to be in prenex form [de forme normale] if it has the form
+(1X1,1x2...,IXn)M(X1, X2,..",X2),
+where M (X1, X2,.., Xn) is an elementary proposition, called the matrix. By applying the rules of
+such that in it the quantifiers occur, from left to right, in the same order as in P."
+Herbrand's "forme normale" has been translated by "prenex form" since below he uses
+"normal" in a different sense. (Occasionally, we use "prenex proposition" or "prenex form" for
+"proposition in prenex form".) Moreover, even if a proposition P is not in prenex form, Herbrand
+will call the elementary proposition that we obtain from P by deleting all quantifiers occurring in
+P the matrix of P.I
+"[This question is answered in 1.5 below, p. 533.]
+rules of passage, transform A[(Ix)Ф(x), P2, . .., Pn] into a prenex proposition in which the variable
+a proposaloma unction of the nor repod, mon in, hya ine vant the
+x occurs in the leftmost quantifier. This is readily proved by recursion on the construction of
+A (P1, Pz,..., Pn)."]
+
+531
+Thus we shall finally bring the proposition into a form in which the scope of x will
+be an atomic proposition, or a proposition of the form D(x) V F(x), where D(x) and
+†(x) actually contain x, lor a proposition of the form (IY)Ф(y)].
+We now start from a given proposition P; we consider the rightmost quantifier and,
+using (1) and (2), reduce its scope as much as possible. We thus obtain its minimal
+scope. Once this is done, we perform the same operation on the second quantifier,
+counted from the right; we proceed thus until the scope of the leftmost quantifier has
+been minimized. The proposition has then taken what we shall call its canonical form,
+which is characterized by the fact that the scopes of all its variables are minimal
+[with respect to the rules of passage].
+For example, the canonical form of
+(X) (Пу) (ч){[Ф(х) & У (х, У)] V Ф(=)},
+(х)[Ф(х) & (Пу) # (х, У)] V (2) Ф(z);
+the minimal scope of z is P(z), that of y is Y(x, Y), and that of x is
+Ф(х) & (Ну) Ф (x, У).5
+Merely by considering each rule of passage we see that, if a proposition results from
+another by the rules of passage, the two propositions have the same canonical form.
+1.3. It is quite obvious that, if we consider the scopes of two different variables,
+either these scopes are disjoint or one scope is included in the other. A variable x will
+be dominant in a proposition P if [in the canonical form of P] the scope of x is not included in the scope of any other variable.
+For example, x and z are dominant in the proposition given above.
+LEMMA 2. If X1, Xz,..., Xn are the dominant variables of a given proposition and
+$ (21), $2(2),..., $n(Xn) are their respective minimal scopes, the proposition, once in
+A(Z1, Z2,..., Zn) is a propositional function of the first kind
+We observe, incidentally, that if this lemma is true we can give a similar form to the
+$(x), and so on.
+The lemma follows immediately from the fact that, except for the scopes of the
+dominant variables [and their quantifiers], a proposition in canonical form contains
+no signs other than ~ and V. Since, as we just saw, the scopes of the x; do not overlap, the proposition is a propositional function of these scopes [together with their
+quantifiers], hence cannot, relative to these scopes, be a propositional function of the
+second kind.
+1.4. We can now define what we shall call the scheme [schème] of a proposition. It
+will be an array, formed of signed letters [that is, each letter is preceded by the sign +
+or - I and braces, that will be defined by recursion on the number of apparent vari.
+ables of the proposition.
+First, the scheme of an elementary proposition is taken to be empty.
+" [In this example it must be assumed that $(x) and Y(x) are such that no further application
+of (Ĩ) and (2) is possible; moreover, contrary to Herbrand's system, here & is takon as primi.
+
+532
+Then, the scheme of a [nonelementary] proposition P-which, as we just saw, can
+be put into the [canonical] form
+where x; is the dominant variable of Ф, (x) —is to be obtained from the schemes of the
+propositions 1(х1), Ф2(X2),..., Pn(Xn) thus: if the schemes of these propositions are
+respectively the arrays S1, S2, ..., Sp, the scheme of P will be
+.....
+Ixn{Sn.
+In this list the vertical ordering is of no consequence. The variables Xz, X2,..., Xn
+will be called the dominant variables of the scheme.
+For example, the scheme of the proposition already considered in 1.2 is
++x {-Y
+That of
+(Пх)[(У) Ф(х, У) V (<) Ф(х, ч)] V (х') (У") Ф(х
+:, У )
+[if this proposition is assumed to be in canonical form] is
+I TY
++x'{+Y'.
+We shall agree to omit the brace when it separates two successive variables on the
+same line, as in the first scheme, which we now write
++x
+- У
+Hence we see that the scheme of a proposition is an array formed of signed letters;
+the letters are the apparent variables of the proposition, the sign that goes with each
+of them tells us whether it is general or restricted, ' and each letter may be followed by
+a [signed] letter or by a brace joining several [signed] letters. [Even if no proposition
+is given, I such an array will, in what follows, still be called a scheme.?
+6 [The convention that Herbrand makes here clearly conflicts with the one that he has previously
+made in Chapter 2, 1.5, namely, that "(tx)" stands for the universal quantifier "(x)" and
+"(-x)" for the existential quantifier "(Ix)". Herbrand observes his new convention in Sections
+1 and 2 of Chapter 5, then occasionally reverts to his previous convention in subsequent sections.]
+" It is convenient to agree that in a scheme no two letters shall ever be identical.
+[When no proposition is given, Herbrand still calls the letters in the scheme that are not behind
+any brace the dominant variables of the scheme; moreover, he refers to the letters in the scheme
+that are preceded by " + " as the general variables of the scheme and to those that are preceded by
+"_" as the restricted variables of the scheme. This generalized notion of scheme becomes important in Section 2.
+Herbrand (1931, p. 45) points out that his notion of scheme is related to Ackermann's "Stammbaum" (1928a, p. 646) and also to the notion of free group.]
+
+533
+A line of a scheme will be a sequence of signed letters of the scheme such that [the
+first letter of the sequence is a dominant variable of the scheme and] each letter [in
+the sequence after the first] occurs in the scheme immediately on the right of the
+letter that precedes it in the sequence or immediately on the right of the brace
+affixed to that letter. Hence every line of a scheme can be regarded as a type, and this
+type will be said to be the type of the line (see 1.1).
+Thus the lines of the scheme of the proposition considered above are
+- X
++Y,
+- X
++z,
+and
+tx ty.
+In particular, a type is a scheme that has a single line.
+1.41. We see immediately that, according to Lemma 2 and the definition of the
+scheme [of a proposition], a variable y comes after a variable x in a line of the scheme
+[of a proposition P] if and only if [in P] the minimal scope of y is included in the
+minimal scope of x.
+We shall say that in a proposition P a variable x dominates a variable y if and only
+if the minimal scope of y is included in the minimal scope of x. We shall also say that
+in a proposition P a variable x is superior to a variable y if the scope of y is included in
+the scope of x (hence x dominates y if and only if, when the proposition P is in canonical form (1.2), x is superior to y).
+We readily see that, if x dominates y, y cannot be superior to x.
+1.42. A type is said to be deduced from a scheme if the variables of the type are all
+the letters of the scheme and, whenever in some line of the scheme one letter precedes
+another, the first letter also precedes the second in the type. Thus, in the example
+considered above, we obtain a type deduced from the scheme by writing on one line
+the five signs -x, +y, +z, +x', and ty' in such a way that x' precedes y' and x precedes y and z (there are twenty such permutations).
+Given any type deduced from the scheme [of a proposition P], we see that, if x
+dominates y [in PI, then x precedes y in the type.
+1.43. Before we proceed to the proof of the theorem that concludes the present section, let us observe that, given a proposition P and the proposition P' that we obtain
+from P by deleting a quantifier governing a dominant variable, we obtain the scheme
+of P' by deleting the variable [and the brace that immediately follows it, if any] from
+the scheme of P; this can be readily seen from the recursive definition of scheme and
+from Lemma 2.
+1.5. THEOREM. The types attached to a proposition are the types deduced from the
+scheme of that proposition.
+This theorem, which answers the question raised at the beginning of the present
+section, is proved as follows.
+(1) Any type deduced from the scheme is a type attached to the proposition.
+For, to obtain a type deduced from the scheme, we can proceed thus: we delete a
+dominant variable [and the brace affixed to it, if any] from the scheme [and write the
+variable somewhere]; from the new scheme so obtained we delete a variable that is
+dominant in this new scheme and write it to the right of the variable first considered;
+
+534
+we continue in this manner until we have exhausted all the variables of the original
+scheme. It follows from Remark 1.43 and Lemma 1 (1.12) that we can exhaust in this
+fashion all the [apparent]] variables of the proposition in question, hence that the
+variables that we have thus successively selected form a type attached to the proposi-
+(2) Any type attached to the proposition is a type deduced from the scheme.
+To see this it suffices to observe that, if x is superior to y in a proposition, y cannot
+dominate x and to remember the characteristic property (1.42) of a type deduced from
+the scheme.
+2. PROPERTY A
+2. In the present section we shall study the most general properties that are sufficient for a proposition to be true, in subsequent sections we shall see that these properties are also necessary.
+For the sake of simplicity we assume, first, that there are no descriptive functions in
+the propositions under investigation.
+2.1. We begin by defining the notion of normal identity. Let P be a proposition
+with which, by means of the rules of passage, we have associated some prenex form,
+In the matrix M of this prenex form we replace each restricted variable either by a
+real variable of P (we can even assume that this real variable does not actually occur
+in P—in which case it will be said to be fictitious) or by a general variable that is
+superior (1.41) to the restricted variable in the prenex form (that is, a general variable
+whose quantifier, in the type of this prenex form, precedes that of the restricted
+variable considered). We shall say that the proposition P is a normal identity if [for
+some prenex form P' of P] at least one elementary proposition I obtained [from P'T
+in the manner just described is an identity of the first kind. We say also that such an
+identity is associated with P and that the type Ix1, Ix2,.... IXn Lof P'I is a normal
+type.
+For example,
+is a normal identity; for we can turn it into
+and, if y is replaced by x, the matrix becomes
+(х)Ф(x) V (Hy)~Ф(У)
+(X)(Hy)[$(x) V~Ф(y)],
+$(x) V ~Ф(x),
+which is an identity. 10
+• [Here "true" should be understood as "provable in Qn" ]
+• [The case in which the proposition contains descriptive functions is taken up in 2.4, p. 539
+below.]
+1º [In the last formula the French text has "y" for "x", which is a misprint.]]
+
+535
+2.11. We see that to pass from a proposition P to an identity I associated with P
+we must repeatedly perform the following operations [on some prenex form of P]:
+(1) Delete a quantifier of a general variable, so that the variable becomes real;
+(2) Delete a quantifier of a restricted variable and replace the restricted variable by
+a real variable, that is, pass from a proposition of the form (fly)Ф(x, y) to the proposition P(x, x).
+In the example above we would first replace the [prenex form of thel proposition by
+(Ну)[Ф(x) V ~Ф(У)]
+and this in turn by
+P(X) V ~Ф(x).
+We readily see that every normal identity is true: by the rules of generalization, in
+each of the two operations just described the first proposition is true provided the
+second proposition is true.!1
+We can always actually decide whether a proposition P is a normal identity: we
+take all the types attached to P and [for each type] consider all the propositions obtained when in the matrix of Peach restricted variable y is replaced [by some real
+variable or] by some general variable that precedes y in the type; the criterion of
+Chapter 1, 5.21,12 then enables us to decide whether one of the propositions thus obtained is an identity. Thus we have to run through only a finite number of tests.
+2.12. From a normal identity we obtain another normal identity (equivalent to the
+first, according to Chapter 2, 4.613) if, in a normal type, we permute two successive
+restricted quantifiers or two successive general quantifiers. We obtain other normal
+identities (implied by the first) if, in a normal type, we shift a restricted quantifier to
+the right or a general quantifier to the left.
+2.13. We obtain an example of a class of normal identities when we put nonelementary propositions for the atomic propositions in those identities of the first kind
+in which each atomic proposition has at most one positive occurrence and at most one
+negative occurrence.!4 To see this it suffices to look again at our proof in Chapter 2,
+Section 4,15 that the identities of the second kind thus obtained are true.
+2.2. Henceforth we shall use the following notation: if M (X1, X2,..., Xn) is an elementary proposition (in general, the matrix of a proposition), a substitution on the x;,
+that is, the replacement of x1, X2,.. Xn by other letters y1, Y2, ..., Yn, will be denoted
+by a letter such as S, with or without subscripts, and the result of this substitution,
+namely M (У1, У2,...,Уп), by M (S).
+Let us now consider a scheme such that each of its lines is similar (1.1) to a type
+attached to some proposition P.16 For each line of the scheme, let us take a similar
+11 [Thus a proposition is a normal identity if and only if it is provable from a quantifier-free
+identity by the use of at most the two rules of generalization and the rules of passage. Moreover, if
+the proposition is in prenex form, it can be proved from the quantifier-free identity by the two
+rules of generalization alone.]
+12 [The truth-table method.]
+13 [" A proposition in prenex form is equivalent to those that we obtain from it by permuting
+two [successivel general quantifiers or two [successive] restricted quantifiers; it implies those that
+we obtain from it by shifting a restricted quantifier to the right or a general quantifier to the left."]
+14 [For the definition of positive occurrence and negative occurrence see above, p. 528.]
+15 [See Note A, p. 567 below.]
+16 [The scheme now being considered is not in general the scheme of P, nor need all the lines of
+this scheme be similar to one and the same type attached to P. See Note C, p. 569 below.]
+
+536
+type attached to P and correlate the kth letter of the line with the kth letter of the
+type. The replacement of the apparent variables of P by the corresponding letters of
+a line of the scheme defines a substitution; there are as many substitutions as there are
+lines. Let us denote these substitutions by S1, Nz, ..., Sm; if M is the matrix of P and
+I' is any type deduced from the scheme, the proposition
+(T)[M(S,) V M(Sz) V ... V M(Sm)]
+is said to be a proposition derived from P. We readily see that this proposition does not
+[essentially] depend upon the particular type I selected (this, incidentally, is of no
+importance for what follows). The scheme is said to generate the derived proposition,
+and the proposition is said to be derived from P by the scheme.
+For example, given the proposition
+(Пх) (У) M (х, у),
+in which M (x, y) is elementary, and the scheme
+we obtain the derived proposition
+(-х, +У, +z)[M (x, y) V M (x, z)].
+We see quite easily that, to pass from a proposition P to a proposition derived from
+P, we must repeatedly perform the following operation: if (IX1... IXn)M(x1,....
+Xn) is any prenex form of P, we go from a proposition & of the form
+to a proposition &' of the form
+V (1Ут+1,..», †Уп)M (х1,..., Хр, Ут + 1,...,Уп)].
+This operation enables us to pass from a proposition derived from P by a given scheme
+to a proposition derived from P by a new scheme that differs from the given scheme
+in having just one more line. Therefore, a proposition is equivalent to any proposition
+that is derived from it (because of the identity'" (P V P) = Pand Chapter 2, 6.118).19
+2.3. Let us now assume that we have found a proposition P' that is derived from P,
+is a normal identity, and—this further hypothesis is not essential —is such that one of
+the normal types (2.1) of P' is deduced (1.42) from the scheme generating P',20
+17 [See Note B, p. 568 below.]
+18 ["If F(p) is a propositional function of the proposition p, then + (p = q) ›[F(p) = F(g)]"]
+19 [See Note C, p. 569 below.]
+2° [The scheme I generating P' from P need not be the scheme of P'. Hence it might not be
+let P'be(x1)(1yı)(y2)(HX2)(EX1y1>FXzY2), and let I be
++XI -YI tY2 -X2.
+Then
+TY2 +XI -Y1 - X2
+is a normal type of P', but neither this type nor any other normal type of P' can be deduced from
+I. See 1.42 above, p. 533.]
+
+537
+moreover, [for that normal type] let I be some identity associated with P'. We shall
+then say that P has property A, that I is an identity associated with P, that the
+scheme generating P' is associated with P,21 and that the normal type of P' in
+question is associated with P.22
+We see that every proposition having property A is an identity. 23 Furthermore,
+a normal identity has property A (the associated scheme is simply the normal
+type).
+In the scheme [associated with P] let us put for each restricted variable the general
+or real variable by which we replaced it [in P'] in order to obtain I. Then, as in 2.2,
+the lines of the [resulting] scheme determine substitutions, namely T1, Iz, ..., Im. If
+M is the matrix of P, we see that I is nothing but M (1 1) V M(12) V ... V M (Im)
+We observe that property A is not a property in the sense of the Introduction, 24
+for, given an arbitrary proposition P, we do not know how to decide whether P has
+property A. Hence, only if we can actually show that a proposition satisfies our
+definition shall we say that the proposition has property A. The same remark will
+apply to properties B and C, to be defined in the next section.
+2.31. Thus, to show that a proposition has property A we must first construct an
+associated scheme, then deduce from it an associated type [if possible, otherwise find
+a normal type for the derived proposition], and finally specify those general [and real]
+variables by which we must replace the restricted ones in order to obtain an associated
+identity (this will yield what we shall call associated equations between restricted and
+general variables).
+For example, let P be a proposition that can, by means of the rules of passage, take
+the [prenex] forms
+(У) (x)(z)(It) M (x, У, », t)
+and
+(2) (It) (У) (Нх) М (х, У, %, t).
+Let us assume that
+M (2", Y, %, Y') V M (Y', Y', ґ, z") V M(Y', Y', z"
+', z")
+21 [In general, the lines of the scheme generating P' cannot all be disjoint; for consider the fol-
+Lowing proposition P:
+P has property A, an associated scheme being
+But from P no normal identity can be generated by any scheme all of whose lines are disjoint.]
+22 [According to these definitions, a proposition P need not be in prenex form in order to have
+property A, but any normal identity P' generated from P by any associated scheme must be in
+prenex form. However, it is possible to generalize the notion of a generating scheme so that a
+normal identity associated with P need not be in prenex form. Such a generalization is important
+because of the falsity of the lemma of 3.3 below. See below: Notes E, p. 571, and F, p. 577, and also
+footnote 77, p. 555.]
+23 [See Note D, p. 571 below.]
+24 [In the Introduction to Herbrand's thesis, on page 4, we read: "The properties to which we
+shall apply recursion arguments will be such that for a particular proof or proposition we should
+always be able to decide whether the properties hold or not."]
+
+538
+is an identity. Then P has property A, an associated scheme, as we can easily verify,
+being
++7
+-t tY
++2"
+- X
+-t'
+-t.
+An associated type is
++Y, +z, - t, +Y, -x, +7, +z"
+, -x, -t, -t,
+and the associated equations for that associated type are
+t='', x'=Y', x=z", t'=%", and t"=z".
+The proposition derived from Pis
+(+Y', +z, - 1, +Y, -x', +x', +z", - x, -ť, -t")[M (x, Y, z, t)
+V M (x', y', z', t') V M(x', y', z", t"')],
+which is a normal identity.
+2.32. REMARK 1. We can always replace an associated type by another differing
+only in that a given general variable has been shifted to the left (for this will not prevent us from retaining the same associated equations); this remark is the analogue of
+2.12.
+2.33. REMARk 2. If a proposition has property A, we can assume that immediately
+behind each brace in the associated scheme only restricted variables occur. For, if an
+isolated fragment of the scheme is
+we can replace this fragment by
+Ix +Y.
+This can always be done, because, according to Remark 1 (2.32), from any type
+associated with P we can obtain one in which y' follows y; hence we can, by deleting
+y' in the first type, obtain a type that is associated with P but is deduced from the
+second scheme, since this deletion amounts to replacing y' by y in the associated
+identity.25
+2.34. ReMARk 3. We have not obtained a uniform procedure that would enable us
+to decide whether any given proposition has property A, for in general we do not
+know how to find the associated scheme.
+However, there is a class of propositions for which we have such a procedure,
+namely, the class of propositions such that the matrix of each is a disjunction of
+atomic propositions and of negations of atomic propositions. Using the same notation
+25 [Let us say that a scheme in which no general variable occurs immediately behind a brace is
+reduced. Then Remark 2 tells us that a proposition P has property A only if there is at least one
+reduced scheme that generates a normal identity from P. But, by the definition of property A, a
+proposition P has property A if there is at least one scheme generating a normal identity from P.
+Hence Herbrand has proved that in order to show that a proposition has property A we need consider only reduced schemes. See below: 4.3, p. 553; 5.1, p. 554; and footnote 74, p. 554.]
+
+539
+as above, in 2.2, let us assume that an identity associated with a given member P of
+this class is 26
+M(S1) V ... V M(Sm).
+It follows from Chapter 1, 5.22, that for two suitable subscripts, i and j, M(S,) V M(S,)
+would also be an identity, 27 The two substitutions [S, and S,I would correspond to two
+lines of the scheme, and these lines together would form a new scheme. If the lines
+the new
+scheme would be
+JIY1... IYB
+and clearly this scheme, too, would be associated with P. 28 But there are only finitely
+many such [two-line] schemes; hence by means of only a finite number of tests (this
+number can be computed quite easily as soon as the proposition P has been stated) we
+can decide whether P has property A.29
+To carry out this test efficiently one should remember that not all the lines of a
+scheme need be similar to one and the same type attached to the proposition P (see
+5.1).
+2.4. We shall now assume that the propositions being studied contain descriptive
+functions. We shall give the same definitions as above for the notions "normal
+identity" and "property A", the only modification being that in a normal identity
+we can now replace a restricted variable either by a superior general variable, or by
+an (actually occurring or fictitious) real variable, as before, or by a descriptive funetion whose arguments are such variables. An equation between a restricted variable
+and a descriptive function of superior general or real variables will still be called an
+associated equation (2.31).30
+Let us try to test whether a proposition P [which may now contain descriptive
+functions] is a normal identity. To do this we have to decide whether the type (1.11)
+of at least one prenex form of P is normal. Hence let P' be any prenex form of P. In
+P' we shall replace each restricted variable by a superior general variable, by an
+(actually occurring or fictitious) real variable, or by a function of such variables; [for at
+least one replacement] the proposition I thus obtained must [if the type of P' is
+26 [The French text has "E" for "S"; but this is an oversight.]
+27 [In Chapter 1, 5.22, Herbrand shows that in the propositional calculus a disjunction of atomic
+propositions and negations of atomic propositions is provable if and only if it is of the form
+pV ~p VA,
+where p is a propositional letter.]
+28 [In the French text the letters of the scheme are unsigned.]
+29 [In 6.3 below, p. 559, Herbrand remarks that the class of propositions just considered constitutes a solvable case of the decision problem because of the proof in Section 5 below that a proposition is provable if and only if it has property A.]
+30 [In a given occurrence of a descriptive function f(21, 22, . .., 7к) in a proposition P, each of the
+variables 21, 22, ..., Ik may be real or apparent, and, if apparent, general or restricted. When, in
+trying to obtain a normal identity, we replace a restricted variable y by the descriptive function
+f(X1, Xz,...,хk), the variables x1, Xz,..., k must be general variables that are superior to y in
+P or (possibly fictitious) real variables of P, no matter what the variables z1, 22,..., zk are in
+the occurrence of f (21, 22, ..., zk) in P.]
+
+540
+normal] turn out to be an identity of the first kind. We consider all individuals
+(variables and descriptive functions) that in P' are arguments of propositional
+functions. In I, because of the associated equations, some of these arguments
+become identical (hence any proposition that is obtained from P' by the consideration of other equations, but is such that the same arguments turn out to be
+identical, is also an identity of the first kind). Thus we must find those [associated]
+equations between arguments that turn P' into an identity of the first kind. There
+are only a finite and determinate number of equations between individuals. We
+obtain the associated equations by first equating restricted variables to general
+variables, to (actually occurring or fictitious) real variables, or to functions of such
+variables; then we have only to check whether these equations are associated
+equations.
+Now, to find an appropriate set of associated equations is easy, if such a set exists; it
+suffices, for each system of equations between arguments, to proceed by recursion,
+using one of the following procedures, which simplify the system of equations to be
+satisfied. 31
+(1) If one of the equations to be satisfied equates a restricted variable x to an
+individual, either this individual contains x [or some other restricted variable], and
+then the equation cannot be satisfied, or else the individual does not contain x [lor any
+other restricted variable, or any general variable that is not superior to x], and then
+the equation will be one of the associated equations that we are looking for; in the
+other equations to be satisfied we replace x by the individual;
+(2) If one of the equations to be satisfied equates a general variable to an individual
+that is not a restricted variable, the equation cannot be satisfied;
+(3) If one of the equations to be satisfied equates fi (91, $2,..., On) to J2(41, 42,...,
+Ym), either the elementary functions f1 and fz are different, and then the equation cannot be satisfied, or they are the same, and then we turn to those equations that equate
+the oi to the ti.
+Therefore, if we successively consider each prenex form of P, we shall be able, after
+a finite and determinate number of steps, to decide whether the proposition P is a
+normal identity.
+Similarly, given a proposition Pand any scheme, we can test whether a proposition
+P' derived from P by the scheme is a normal identity, hence whether the scheme permits us to show that P has property A.32
+3. ProPertIes B AND C
+3.1. In what follows we shall consider certain collections of letters; these collections
+will be called domains [champs], and the letters the elements of the domains.
+We shall also consider functions that will be either descriptive functions or new
+functions; the new functions will be called index functions (and will play a role anal-
+31 [That an equation "is to be satisfied" means here that it is to be shown to be associated.]
+32 [The last paragraph of Section 2 in the French text reads: "Au bout d'un nombre fini et
+déterminé d'opérations de ce genre, on arrivera à vérifier si une proposition est normale (ou done si
+elle possède la propriété A pour un schème associé donné)". Herbrand's parenthesis was expanded
+into the last paragraph of the English text.]
+
+541
+ogous to that of the descriptive functions). 33 In general, we shall have a number of
+symbols,
+f(X1, Xz,..., Xn), i = 1,2,...,m,
+which will be called the elementary functions (the x; will be their arguments); from
+these we shall form further functions by the following procedure: if 41, $2,..., On are
+functions and f(X1, Xz, ..., X„) is an elementary function, f (91, Ф2, ..., Øn) will also be
+a function. 34
+We now define the height of a function. The height of an elementary function is 1;
+the height of a nonelementary function f(91, 42 : .., On) will be greater by 1 than the
+maximum of the heights of the functions i. We shall also say that the height of an
+element of a domain is 0.
+By definition the height of a proposition will be the maximum of the heights of the
+descriptive functions occurring in it.
+If with a system consisting of an elementary function f(x1, X2, ..., Xn) and n letters
+aig, Mliz'..., Ain taken from a given domain (these letters being in a definite order) we
+correlate an element of the domain, this element will be called the value of the function
+for these values of the arguments, or the value of f(aiy, diz'..., ain). We define the
+value of a nonelementary function, when this value exists, in terms of the values of
+the elementary functions as follows: if the functions 41, $2, ..., Øn take respectively
+the values dig, dig'..., a in when values are assigned to their arguments, then the value
+assigned to the function f (91, Ф2,..., "n) is the value assigned to f(aig, Oiz'...,Ain).
+We consider also functions of 0 argument; with each of them we correlate a fixed
+element of the domain, which will be its value. These functions are similar to constants
+(Chapter 3, 1.1235).
+A function that [whenever the values of its arguments are taken in a given domain]]
+has its value in the domain is said to be attached to the domain.
+3.11. In what follows we shall often have to equate 36 two elements of a domain. We
+now define this operation.
+Let C be any domain consisting of the elements a1, az,...,an. To equate da to as
+33 Observe the close relation between the index functions and Hilbert's logical functions (see
+Hilbert 1927). [See Note I, p. 580 below.]
+34 [See above, p. 527.]
+35 [This article states that in a theory there may be constants. See above, p. 527.]
+36 [The notion of equating elements of a domain will be used repeatedly by Herbrand. Although
+the definition he now gives is rather unclear, the underlying idea is simple.
+A domain C with its attached functions can be viewed as a slight generalization of an abstract
+algebra (generalization because an attached function need not be defined for all elements in C).
+Let R be any congruence relation on C. Then any two elements da and as of C will be said to be
+equated (under R) if and only if they are congruent under R. (Of course, da and as can be congruent
+only if they are accepted as arguments by the same functions.) But then the domain I introduced
+by Herbrand can be taken to be the quotient algebra C/R. Hence the homomorphism in stipulation
+(4) is the natural homomorphism of C' onto Г. Finally, as Herbrand says, by picking one representative from each of the congruence classes, we can embed I in C, and the natural homomorphism
+becomes an endomorphism on C. (When, however, Herbrand comes to apply his notion of equating,
+he usually does not begin with a specification of the congruence R on C; rather, he first specifies an
+endomorphism on C'and then uses this endomorphism to determine R. See especially the argument
+for (c) in 3.3 below, p. 548, as well as footnotes 51, 54, and 59.)]
+
+542
+in the domain C' is to replace C by any domain I satisfying the following four conditions:
+(1) I has the same attached functions as C;
+(2) To each element of C there corresponds exactly one element of I and to each
+element of I there corresponds at least one element of C;
+(3) Any two elements of C correspond to the same element of I if and only if they
+are the values of individuals obtained thus: we consider the individuals whose expressions, formed from the elementary functions attached to the domain, contain da or
+ap, and in these expressions we replace a number of occurrences of da by ap, or vice
+versa (thus, the elements do and as of C correspond to the same element b; of F;
+if f(x) is a function attached to the domain C, f(da) and f(ag) correspond to the same
+element b; of I);
+(4) If f(X1, Xz,..., Xn) is a function attached to C [hence, by (1), to F], the value of
+f(big, biz'..., bin) is taken to be the element of that corresponds to f(aj,, Aj2'..., ajin),
+where the elements dis of C correspond to the elements bi, of F (clearly, this assignment
+specifies a unique value).
+This definition allows us to take for the letter b, any letter that is one of the corresponding elements of C, for example the letter with the least subscript. Then I becomes
+a part of C, and the values of the attached functions [for arguments in T] are the same
+in the two domains. Henceforth this is what we shall do.
+3.2 From now on we shall consider a proposition P in which there may occur descriptive functions (and even variables of various types, if we so desire; the occurrence
+of such types would change nothing essential in what follows, but to simplify notation
+we shall always assume that there is only one type). We shall assume that P contains
+no real variable: if P does contain the real variables x1, X2, ..., Xn, we replace it by
+(х])(х2) ... (X)P; see Chapter 2, 4.7;37 in 3.221 we shall see that the order in which we
+take x1, Xz,..., Xn is immaterial for the considerations that follow.
+With each general variable y we correlate an index function whose arguments are
+the restricted variables that dominate y (1.41). In particular, to a real variable there
+corresponds a function of 0 argument (a "constant").
+3.21. We now consider a domain C, consisting of the letters a1, a2, .... Any. In what
+follows we shall assume that this domain is fixed; later (3.51) we shall see that we can
+take any domain for C1. A domain C2 is then obtained thus: to each elementary function (index function or descriptive function) taken together with a given system of
+arguments chosen in C, we assign a letter that will be in Cz; this letter is to be the value
+of the function for the system of arguments, and the assignment is such that each
+letter of C2 will be the value of just one function for just one system of arguments. Let
+Anq+1»..., Ana be the elements of C2. In general, we construct Cu from C1, C2,..., Cк-1
+by assigning a letter of Ck to each elementary function taken together with a given
+system of arguments; these arguments are chosen in [the union of] C1, Cz,..., and
+Cк-1, and at least one argument is taken in Ck-1; the assignment is so made that each
+element of Ck corresponds to just one function for just one system of arguments. The
+letter assigned is to be the value of the function for the system of arguments.
+We thus construct C1, Cz, ..., Cp+1; finally, if h is the height of the proposition P,
+37 [This article states that $(x) is provable in Herbrand's system of quantification theory if and
+only if (y)Ф(Y) is.]l•
+
+543
+we construct Cp+2,..., Cp+n+1 (omitting from these latter domains, if we so desire,
+elements corresponding to the index functions; it is easily seen that this will not affect
+our argument). 38
+For each k let anx-1+1,..., Any be the elements of Cr. We shall call the number k the
+order of Cr. Moreover, we shall write N for np.3º We note that Cu contains the values of
+all the functions of height k - 1 when their arguments are taken in C1.
+We could construct similar domains by starting from any descriptive or index functions whatever, and not from [just] those supplied by the proposition P. The functions thus used will be said to generate the domains.
+3.211. When we say that we equate (3.11) two elements in the domains C1, Cz,...,
+Cp, we mean that we equate them in the domain that is the union of these domains;
+using the convention made at the end of 3.11, we see that each domain C, is replaced
+by a domain I; that consists of elements of C, 40
+3.212. We shall say that we have a system of logical values in these domains whenever a logical value has been assigned to each atomic proposition that we obtain by
+replacing the arguments of the atomic propositions of P with elements of the domains.
+From such a system we can derive the logical value of any proposition that is free of
+both apparent variables and descriptive functions and contains as real variables only
+elements of the domains.
+3.22. Any proposition included in a given proposition P, that is, any proposition of
+which P is a propositional function (the first proposition is always the scope of some
+logical sign), will be called a part, or a subproposition, of P. With each part of the
+proposition P we correlate a proposition, called an expansion [réduite] (Chapter 2,
+Section 8), 41 according to the following rules:42
+(1) The expansion of an atomic proposition is the proposition itself;
+(2) If the expansion of A is a, that of ~ A is ~a;
+(3) If [the expansion of A is a and] that of B is b, that of A V Bisa V b;
+(4) In case x is a general variable, if the expansion of $(x) is q(x), the expansion of
+(1X)$(X)iS D[fx(YI,Y2,..,yn)], where fa(Y1, Y2, ...,Yn) is the index function corresponding to x (hence y1, Y2, ..., Yn are real variables of $(x));
+38 [The subscripts "p", "p + 1", and "p + h + 1" that Herbrand introduces here find their
+justification on page 544 below.]
+39 [Several points to be made in footnotes below can be stated more easily if we now say that
+each element of Ca is also of order k and write Gp for the union CUCU... Up. Thus N = n
+is the cardinality of G". (This use of Gp should not be confused with Herbrand's use of Dp, introduced on page 552 below; see footnote 71 below, p. 553.) Moreover it will henceforth be assumed
+that all the elements of Gp are arranged in some sequence in which, for each k ≤ p, no element of
+order k precedes any element of order less than k.]
+40 [Apparently, Herbrand is here stipulating that only elements of the same order (that is,
+elements belonging to the same domain C,) are to be equated in G. = CUCa... UCp. (Let us
+say that such an equating is order-preserving.) But in all subsequent important applications of
+equating he flouts this stipulation (see footnote 51, footnote 59, and Note E).]
+41 [The expansion correlated in Section 8 of Chapter 2 with a proposition P must be sharply distinguished from the expansion now to be specified. The former is, for each finite domain, merely the
+truth-functional expansion of P that we obtain by turning existential quantifications into disjunctions and universal quantifications into conjunctions. Such an expansion of P over a finite domain
+will henceforth be called the common expansion of P over the domain.]
+42 [For each p ≥ 1 these rules specify the expansion of P with respect to the elements of Gp (see
+Rule 5, where N is the cardinality of Gp). To make this dependence on Gp explicit, we shall sometimes speak of the expansion of P over Gp.]
+
+544
+(5) In case x is a restricted variable, if the expansion of $(x) is q(x), the expansion
+of (-х)Ф(x) is
+Фа1) У Ф2)V... V Ф(AN),
+and the expansion of (+x)$(x) is
+These rules enable us to associate an expansion with any proposition assumed to
+contain no real variables. Let us now replace by their values all the functions that
+occur in the expansion, so that no function remains in the expansion. Obviously we
+can do this, by introducing elements of the domains Cp+1, Cp+ 2, ..., Opth+1. We thus
+obtain a proposition . If I is an identity of the first kind, we shall say that P has
+property B of order p. 73
+Let us perform the same operations again, but now let the index functions that replace
+the general variables have for their arguments not the [restricted] variables dominating
+these general variables but the [restricted] variables superior (1.41) to these general variables. If the proposition II thus obtained is an identity, we shall say that P has
+property C of order p. 44
+3.221. We see immediately that—as was noted in 3.2—if we start from a proposition containing real variables, properties B and C are independent of the order in
+which we generalize these variables (hence do not depend upon which of these variables dominate a given variable). For the index functions of 0 argument that correspond to the real variables have their values in Cz; they play no role in the construction
+of the domains that come after Cz.
+We see that property B and property C'are identical if the proposition is in canonical
+form (1.2 and 1.41).
+3.3. LEMMA. For every p, if a proposition has property B, or property C, of order p,
+any proposition derived from it by the rules of passage has property B, or property C, of
+order p, provided the domain C, is the same in both cases.45
+We shall show that the properties are preserved when any rule of passage is applied.
+43 [Herbrand will also call the expression I, which is free of both quantifiers and functions, an
+expansion of P. Note that I contains elements of Cp+1 U... UCp+n+1, h ≥ 0, but the expansion
+of P determined just by Rules 1-5 contains elements only of G. = Ciu... UCp.
+Note further that, if A is any subproposition of P, the expansion of A need not occur in the expansion of P. Indeed, if A lies within the scopes of n > 0 restricted quantifiers Ix1,..., ‡Xnand
+if either at least one variable x, i = 1,..,n, occurs in A or at least one general quantifier occurs
+in A, the expansion of A does not occur in the expansion of P. Rather, with respect to each given
+system of values for x1,..., Xn, a substitution instance of the expansion of A occurs in the expansion of P. However, for convenience we shall continue to speak in subsequent footnotes of each
+such substitution instance as the expansion of A in the expansion of P (for a given set of values of
+x1,...,хл). Ifn = 0, the expansion of A in the expansion of P is the expansion of A.]
+44 [In the present paragraph Herbrand has again, just as we noted in the first paragraph of foot.
+note 43, specified two expressions, both of which he will again call expansions of P. We shall need
+to distinguish the two expansions defined in the preceding paragraph from the two expansions just
+defined. So, in analogy with Herbrand's usage on page 549 below, let us call each of the former a
+first expansion of P over G», and each of the latter a second expansion of P over Gp.]
+45 [This is the basic lemma of Herbrand's thesis (see, for example, his remarks below, p. 559).
+But for certain cases of property C it is false (see Note E, p. 571 below). To be able to carry out
+Herbrand's argument in the remainder of the present chapter—in particular, the argument for his
+Fundamental Theorem—we must substantially emend this lemma (see Note E).]
+
+545
+(1) Case of property B.
+For the rules of passage governing the sign ~, the lemma immediately follows from
+Chapter 1, 3.42.46
+If we consider the rules of passage governing the sign V, we see immediately (by
+using Chapter 1, 5.341) that (x)[P(x) V Z] and (x)Ф(x) V
+•Z always have equivalent
+expansions; similarly for (Ex)[Ф(x) V Z] and (Ex)Ф(x) V Z.
+(2) Case of property C.
+For the rules of passage governing the sign ~, the result follows from Chapter 1,
+3.42.46
+Let us now consider the rules of passage governing the sign V.
+(a) Passage from (Ix)Ф(x) V Zto (Ix)[$(x) V Z], and inverse passage, in case x is
+a general variable.
+It is sufficient to observe that these two subpropositions have identical expansions.
+(6) Passage from (Ex)Ф(x) V L to (Ex)[$(x) V 2], and inverse passage, in case x is a
+restricted variable (hence the occurrence is positive).
+In its first form P will be written P1 and, in its second, P2. In P2 the index functions of the general variables of the subproposition Z are functions of x. If y is a
+general variable of Z and x1, X2, ..., Xn are the restricted variables superior to x, let
+fu(X1, X2,..., Xn, x) be the index function of y in Pa and let Ju(21, X2,..., In) be the
+index function of y in P1.*8
+The descriptive and index functions of P, will, from C1, generate the domains
+O2), O3),.... The functions of Pa differ from those of P, only in that, for each
+general variable y of Z, fu(x1, X2,..., Xn, x) has taken the place of fy (X1, X2,..., Xn),
+and they will, from C1, generate the domains (2), Cs2)
+(1) 49 Let us observe that we can pass from the C{2) to the Cft) thus: for each general
+variable y of Z and for50 each given system of elements x1, X2, ..., Xn [in the union]
+of the Cf2), the values of fu(X1, X2,..., Xn, x) for all a in the C{2) are all equated (3.211)
+to one of these values, namely fy (21, X2,..., Xn, di), where a, is an arbitrary element
+of the Cf2. The domains Ci can then be regarded as part of the domains Cf2.51
+46 [This article gives
+(p182288p1)=~|~PV~pzV...V~Pn),
+1~(p1&P28.. &Pn) = (~PI V ~PzV... V ~Pr),
+and
+1 ~ 1P1 V P2 V ... V PA) = 1~01 & ~228.. &~pn•|
+47 [Distributivity of logical products and sums.]
+8 The notations fu (X1, X2,..., Xn, X) and Jy X1, Xz
+..Xn) exhibit just the restricted variables
+hat are now at the center of Herbrand's attention. For, in general, the index functions of y wil
+have as arguments also those s ≥ O restricted variables zy1, %y2'..., Zys whose quantifiers occur in
+Z and are superior to y.]
+49 [In this paragraph Herbrand considers the case of the passage from (x)[$(x) V Z] to
+(x)Ф(x) V Z. Hence he proves that, if the expansion of P2 over G'2) is an identity, so is the
+expansion of Pi over G"]
+50 [Herbrand writes "for each given system of elements x1, X2,..., Xn, Y", but "Y" is extraneous.ll
+51 [For n > O and p > 2 the element a, cannot be completely arbitrary if Gpt 1 is to be embedded
+in Gpt1. Let X1, Xz,.
+"Xns x be elements of G'ti that are all of order 1, but let a, in Got be of
+order p. Then the element 6 in Gp+1 that is the value of fy (X1, X2,..., Xn, x) is of order 2 and the
+lement d in Gp+1 that is the value of Ju(X1, X2,..., Xn, Aı) is of order p t 1. Hence the element
+
+546
+So we see that we can pass from the expansion of P, to a proposition equivalent to the
+expansion of P, by doing the following: for50 each given system of values of x1, X2, ...,
+n, we replace, in the expansion of P2, the values of Ju(X1, Xz,..., Xn, x) obtained for
+all x by the one value among them that is in the domains Ci. Hence, if the expansion
+of P2 is an identity, so is the expansion of P1.
+(2) If the expansion I2 of P2 is not an identity, there exists, according to Chapter
+1, 5.21,52 a system of logical values (3.212) falsifying 1z; hence, as we shall now show,
+there exists a system of logical values falsifying the expansion I, of P1.53
+To do this we replace the expansion I, of P, by another expansion, obtained as follows. Let a1, A2,..., av be the elements of the domains C12)
+",..., C2; in these domains
+we define the value of Ju(21, X2.., Xx) to be the value of fu(X1, X2,...Xn, a,) for
+some ay, which we shall select shortly and which will depend upon X1, X2, ..., Xn. This
+definition will permit us to take subdomains of these domains as the domains Ci.
+The modification that we intend to introduce consists in using all N elements of [the
+union of] the Cí2) to form the expansion of P1, just as they are used to form that of P2.
+In other words, of the five rules stated in 3.22 the fifth alone will undergo a modification, namely the following: the letters a1, A2, ..., au Will denote the elements of the
+domains C12), O2), ..., C(2)
+", not those of the domains Ct, C4,.., Op. The transformation described at the end of 3.22 [that is, the replacement of functions by their
+values] will, of course, be carried out in the Cf2) and not in the Cfl. We thus construct
+a new expansion Ií of P1.*
+If we observe that
+and
+:.... & Ф(0)]
+in Gpt1 that is the value of fu(b, x2,..., Xn, x1) is of order 3. But the value of fuld, x2,..., Xn, x1) is
+of order p t 2, hence is not an element of Gp+1. Therefore C9) cannot be embedded in Gp+1•
+Hence a, must always be of an order less than or equal to the maximum of the orders of x1, Xz, ...,
+Xp. However, to satisty this requirement we need only take a, to be always a1. (Interestingly
+enough, in the original French text "fu(x1, ..., Xy, Al)" occurs; but in his list of errata Herbrand
+changed this formula to "f(x1,..., Xn, a)".) Note that even this emended equating is not orderpreserving (see above: footnotes 36, p. 54l, and 40, p. 543).]
+52 [This article states that a proposition is an identity of the first kind if and only if it has the
+logical value "true" for any assignment of logical values to the atomic parts of the proposition.I
+53 [It is indeed true that, if the expansion of P2 over G'2) is not an identity, neither is the expansion of P, over G'', but the argument that Herbrand is about to give is faulty (see footnote 59).]
+54 [Herbrand is doing two different things in this paragraph. First, to each ordered n-tuple
+<ai1)..., Oin) of elements of G") he assigns a unique element a, of G so that for all a in G) the
+value in Gp+1 Of fu(di1)..., Ain, a) is equated to the value of fu(ar1,..., din, 0y). (This a, is specified
+on page 547, lines 19-27. Herbrand makes it depend upon both ay,..., ai and the particular system S of logical values that is assumed to falsify Пz.) Herbrand concludes—falsely, as we shall see
+in footnote 59—that, as a result of this equating, G) is embedded in G"), and so he takes the expansion I, of Py as being formed over this subset of Gp. That is, the value of fu(ar1)..., Oup, a) in
+Gp is defined by Herbrand to be fu(al1,..., in, a1). (See footnote 36 above, p. 541.)
+However, this is not the modification that Herband intends to introduce. Rather, as he says in
+the latter part of the paragraph, he constructs a new expansion Ilí of Pi over all of Gp, still assuming that the same a, has been chosen. (Remember, an expansion can be formed over any union of
+domains.) He will then in the next few paragraphs show that 11 > Ií is an identity and argue that
+I' is false under y.]
+
+547
+are identities and apply the theorem of Chapter 2, 3.2,55 we can conclude that 11 > 1
+is an identity. Hence, if Ií is not an identity, neither is 11.56
+We now show that, if we have a system of logical values that falsifies 1z, we can, by
+suitably choosing the value of each fy(X1, X2, ..., n), obtain a system of logical values
+that falsifies П1.57
+The expansions of the subpropositions (Hx)Ф(x) V Z and (x)[Ф(x) V Z] depend
+upon the [restricted] variables x1, X2, ...,Xn, which are superior to x. But we shall
+consider these expansions only for given values of these variables, namely, dig, diz'
+...Ain; then these expansions have only one occurrence in I2 and one in M, [rather,
+/i], as we can readily see. 58
+For these values, let (x) be the expansion [in Hal of Z when Z occurs in P2 and let
+a, be the [still to be selected] element such that, for each general variable y of Z, the
+value of fu(91, aiz..., Ain, ai) is the value of fulli, dig,...ain). We readily see that,
+when Z occurs in P1, its expansion [in I/l is ma.). Hence, when (Hx)Ф(x) V Z
+occurs in P1, its expansion [in Mil is
+[9(01)V02)... Up(aN)]V m(ai),
+(1)
+but, when (Hx)[$(x) V Z] occurs in P2, its expansion [in Ml is
+To proposition (2) the system S of logical values now under consideration [for 2]
+assigns either the logical value "true" or the logical value "false"
+1. If the logical value is "true"
+, then either at least one of the pla;) has the logical
+value "true", and we set
+Judiy, Aiz...,Ain) = JulAig, Aiz'...,Ain, Al),
+or at least one of the (ai), say (ar), has the logical value "true", and we set
+2. If the logical value is "false",
+, we set
+Julig, liz...,Ain) =Juldig, Oliz'.., Alin, Or).
+55 ["Let F(p) be a propositional function of the proposition p such that the occurrences of p are
+all positive or all negative. If these occurrences are positive, then
+If they are negative, then
+56 [The inductive argument that Herbrand has just sketched in order to show that 11 > If is an
+identity justifies the following more general result, which is used below in Note E, p. 571, and Note
+F, p. 577.
+Let P be any proposition, I an expansion of P over G, and I' an expansion of P over G'. If G
+is a subset of G', then I » I' is an identity. Thus, if P has property C of order p, it has property C
+of order q for each q greater than p. See 3.54, p. 550 below and footnote 66.]
+57 [Thus the specification of each a, must satisfy the following two requirements: (1) G"' is
+embeddable in G(2); (2) the extended expansion Ií of P, is false under a system of logical values if
+Il2 is false under some system of logical values.]
+58 [See the second paragraph of footnote 43.]
+
+548
+Thus we see that propositions (1) and (2) will have the same logical value. 59 So the
+method just described [of selecting a I does indeed give the same logical value to nz
+and I1.
+(C) Passage from (X)Ф(X) V L to (x)[P(x) V Z], and inverse passage, in a negative
+occurrence. 60
+The argument is the same as in (6). Only the end is slightly modified. We have to
+consider
+(1)
+and
+To proposition (2) the system of logical values under consideration [for |2] assigns
+either the logical value "true" or the logical value "false"
+1. If the logical value is "true", either all the p(a,) have the same logical value, and
+we put
+or some m(a), say (a), has the logical value "true", and we put
+2. If the logical value is "false"
+', some (a), say mak), has the logical value "false",
+and we put
+...акт, ак).
+The end of the argument is then unchanged.
+3.31. CorOLLARY. Since properties B and C of order p are identical for a proposition in canonical form (3.221), these two properties are always equivalent 61
+3.4. By considering the relation between the expansion of an arbitrary proposition P
+and the expansion of a prenex form of P, we can give property B a simple formulation.62
+We consider the domains C, (of 3.21) that are generated by the elementary descriptive
+functions and by the index functions corresponding to the general variables of the
+proposition P, the arguments of each of these index functions being the [restricted]
+59 [In his specification of a, Herbrand goes wrong. The difficulty is the same as the one described
+in footnote 51. If ar is of too high an order, Gp' cannot be embedded in Gp. So let us once again
+modify Herbrand's argument and take a, to be always a, (for all systems of logical values assigned
+to 2). But now we can no longer say, as Herbrand does, that, for each given set of elements
+dig,..., din, the expansion of (Hx)Ф(x) V Z in Ií has the same logical value under S as the corresponding expansion of (x)[Ф(x) V Z] in 12. However, we can say that, if any given expansion of
+(x)[Ф(x) V Z] in Iz is false under S, the corresponding expansion of (x) $(x) V Z in Ií is also
+false under 9. But nothing more is required in order to prove that, if S falsifies I2, as we are
+assuming, then S falsifies Ií. For, by hypothesis, each expansion of (x)Ф(x) V Z occurs positively in [1 and each expansion of (Ex)[Ф(x) V Z] occurs positively in 12. Hence, if 9 verifies an
+expansion of (Hx)[Ф(x) V Z] in Iz and proposition (1) is the corresponding expansion of
+(x)Ф(x) V Z in Ií, it does not matter for the falsity of Ií under S whether S verifies or falsifies
+proposition (1). So we need consider only those expansions of (x)[Ф(x) V Z] in 12 that are falsified by S. (Compare the proof of Lemma I in Note E, p. 574 below.)]
+60 [See Note E, p. 571 below.]
+61 [See Note F, p. 577 below.]
+62 [In the French text the paragraph begins: "En mettant les propositions sous une forme normale, on peut mettre la propriété B sous une forme simple". The translators found it advisable to
+somewhat expand the text.]
+
+549
+variables dominating the general variable with which the function is correlated. In the
+matrix of P we replace each restricted variable by an element arbitrarily chosen in
+[the union of] C1, C2,..., and Op; then we replace each general variable y by the
+value of the corresponding index function fy(di1, Aiz'....Ain), the arguments dig, diz'
+.... ain being the elements by which the restricted variables dominating y have been
+replaced; from the resulting proposition we eliminate each descriptive function by
+replacing it with its value. We now form the disjunction of all the elementary propositions that are thus obtained when we replace the restricted variables in all possible
+ways. To say that P has property B of order p amounts to saying that this disjunction
+is an identity; we can see this by simply going back to the definition of property Band
+applying it to a prenex form of P. This disjunction will henceforth be called the first
+disjunction of order p associated with P.
+To show that P has property C we would now consider index functions that have
+superior [restricted] variables as arguments and we would construct the domains
+generated by the descriptive functions and these index functions. On P we would perform the same operations as above, but now we would replace each general variable y
+by the value of the corresponding index function fu(di1, diz'..., ain), where the arguments dig, Aiz'..., Ain are the elements by which we replaced the restricted variables
+preceding y in the prefix (for these are the [restricted] variables superior to y in the
+prenex form). We thus obtain the second disjunction of order p associated with P, and
+this disjunction must be an identity if P is to have property C.
+3.5. We shall now make some very important remarks about properties B and C
+(the arguments are the same for both).
+3.51. (1) The number of elements in the domain C, is immaterial (hence we can in
+general take it equal to 1).
+(a) We can increase the number. For let C1, Cz,..., Cp,... be any domains, and
+assume that C, has n elements, a1, az, ...,an. Let F1, Iz,..., Ip,... be some other
+domains generated by the same functions, and assume that I, has m elements,
+a1, Az:..., Am. Assume that m ‹ n. The elements of I; are denoted by the same letters
+as certain elements of C;, so that a function f(ai1, 912'..., Ain) Will have the same value
+on Fias on C;. Then the terms of the first associated disjunction of order p that corresponds to the domains I; are some of the terms of the first associated disjunction of
+order p that corresponds to the domains Ci; hence, if the former is an identity, so is
+the latter, since rA > (A V B).
+tence of this paragraph by the following sentence:
+On P we would perform the same operations as above, but now we would replace each general
+variable y by the value of the corresponding index function fula,y, di2'..., Ain), where the arguments arg, drz'..., On are the elements by which we replaced the restricted variables whose quantifers have within their scopes the quantifier of y (for these variables are the restricted variables
+superior to y).
+But, when thus emended, the second disjunction of order p associated with P is what in Note E,
+p. 572 below, is called the standard expansion of P of order p. So, to avoid confusion in footnotes
+below, we shall preserve the term "second disjunction of order p associated with P" for the nonemended notion. (Note, however, that, if P is in prenex form, the (nonemended) second disjunction
+of order p associated with P is still the standard expansion of P of order p.)]
+
+550
+(b) We can decrease the number. Let us use the same notation. We can pass from
+C, to I by equating (3.11; 3.211) Am +1, Am+2,..., An to, say, ay. In the first associated
+disjunction of order p that corresponds to the domains C, we replace Am + 1, Am+2, ...,
+An by ay. We see immediately that the disjuncts thus obtained are disjuncts of the
+first associated disjunction of order p that corresponds to the domains I; and are in
+fact all of these disjuncts. Hence, if the former disjunction is an identity, so is the
+latter, as we see by Remark 3.31 of Chapter 1.64
+3.52. (2) Without modifying properties B and C, we can assume that the domains that
+we construct in order to show that a proposition has property B, or property C, are generated
+not only by the functions introduced above but also by other functions (called "fictitious
+functions"). We can, in particular, introduce fictitious real variables, and this will lead
+to the introduction of fictitious constants (3.2).
+Let ф (21, X2,..., Xm), with i = 1,2,..., a, be the new functions that are introduced;
+let 4, (X1, Xz,..., Xm,), with j = 1, 2,....B, be the original functions; let C1, Cz,....
+Cp.... be the domains generated by the фi and the 4j. We equate all the elements that
+are values of the functions pilai, až,..., añ,) to some element of Cy. We thus obtain
+the domains C1, Iz, Iz,.., Ip, generated by the functions 4j. By the argument used
+above in (b [rather, aI) we see that, if the first associated disjunction of order p
+obtained by means of the former [rather, latter] domains is an identity, so is the
+disjunction obtained by means of the latter [rather, former] domains.
+3.53. (3) I For every p,] if both P and Q have property B lof order pJ, then P & Qhas
+property B Lof order p].85
+Let us construct the domains that correspond to the proposition P & Q, namely
+C1, Cz,..., Cp..... In these domains the first disjunction of order p associated with P
+is of the form
+PIV P2V... VPN,
+where each P, results from the matrix of P by the operations described in 3.4. According to 3.52, this first disjunction is an identity. Similarly, the disjunction associated
+with & is of the form
+81 V 82 V... V PM.
+Now, clearly, the disjunction associated with P & Q contains all terms of the form
+P. & Q;; according to Chapter 1, 5.34,ª7 it is an identity.
+3.54. 14) For everyp, if a proposition P has property B, or property C, of order p, then
+P has property B, or property C, of order a for every q greater than p. 66
+The domains considered are in one case C1, C2, ..., Cp and in the other Cí, C½, ...,
+Ops..., Co. Let us use the same letters for the elements of Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ p, as for those
+of C;. Then the disjuncts of the first disjunction of order p associated with P are
+64 ["Since +p = (p V p), we can always in a true® [quantifier-freel proposition replace p V p
+by p, and conversely."T
+65 [Using the standard expansion of order p of P and that of Q, we can similarly prove:
+If both P and Q have property C of order p, then P & Q has property C of order p. (This is
+needed for the proof of Lemma 3 in 5.3 below.)]
+66 [To appreciate the simplicity gained by the use of the notion of standard expansion compare
+the argument that Herbrand now gives for this result with the argument that is implicit in Herbrand's text on pp. 546-547 above (see footnote 56).]
+
+551
+among those of the first disjunction of order q associated with P; hence, if the former
+disjunction is an identity, so is the latter (by virtue of the identity +A> (A V B)).
+3.6. Consider the following example of a proposition assumed to have property C of
+order 2:
+(х)(Ну) (х)Р(х, У, 2, f(У, z)),
+where f(y, z) is an elementary descriptive function; this proposition is of height 1.
+Two index functions have to be introduced: Фx, with no argument, for x and фa(Y)
+for z.
+The domain C, will consist of a1.
+The domain Cz will consist of az, which will be Фx,
+az, which will be Фz(a1),
+and aç, which will be f(a1, a1).
+The domain C3 will consist of
+as, d6, ar, which will be Ф2(a2), Фа(dз), Ф2(a4),
+Og, ag, aro, which will be f(a2, 0z), f (az, Oz), f(a4, 04),
+011, 012, 013, which will be f(a1, 0z), f(a1, Oz), f(a1, 0q),
+014, 015, 016, which will be f(a2, 03), f(A2, 04), J (az, Oz),
+a'11, A'12, A'13, which will be f(az, A1), f(az, AI), f(a4, 01),
+a14, ais, A16, which will be f(az, a2), f(aç, dz), f(az, Oz).
+In Cy we consider only a1z, which will be f (az, 06), a18, which will be f(a4, ar), and
+a19, which will be f (a2, as).
+For y we have to take successively ay, a2, az, and aq.
+The disjunction of order 2 is
+P(0z, d1, Oz, 012) V Plaz, Az, As, 019) V Plaz, Oz, O6, 01z) V Plaz, Aq, Or, 018).
+We see that ag, ag, A10, A11, A13, A14, A15, A16 Land ali- dil play no role.
+If the rules of passage permit us to put the proposition into the form
+(х)(2) (Ну) Р(х, У, 7, f (У, z)),
+then we have to equate az, as, A6, and Ay.
+4. THE INFINITE DOMAINS
+We now introduce the fundamental notion of infinite domain.
+4.1. Let Cy be a domain consisting of the elements a1, a2, ..., Any, and let us assume
+that we have a certain number of descriptive functions, index functions, and atomic
+propositional functions. We shall say that we have an infinite domain if we have a
+definite procedure for correlating with every number p: first, a domain C" that contains C1; then, for the functions, a system of values (3.1) in C" that permits us to obtain
+in C" the value of any function of height not greater than p whenever the arguments
+are taken in C1; and, finally, a system of logical values that are assigned to the atomic
+propositional functions whenever the variables of these functions are replaced by
+elements of C'. These functions, propositional functions, and logical values will be said
+to be attached to the infinite domain.
+
+552
+We shall sometimes consider also domains to which no propositional functions
+or logical values are attached; we shall always indicate explicitly when this is the
+case.
+It is quite obvious that generally the number of elements of C' increases with p.
+We shall say that C" is the domain of order p in the infinite domain; C, is the domain
+of order o.
+We observe that this definition differs from the definition that would seem the most
+natural only in that, as the number p increases, the new domain C' and the new values
+need not be regarded as forming an "extension" [" prolongement"] of the previous
+ones. Clearly, if we know C" and the values for a given number p, then for each smaller
+number we know a domain and values that answer to the number; but only a "principle of choice" could lead us to take a fixed system of values in an infinite domain.°
+We now start from a proposition P of height h, with no real variables. With each
+restricted variable y of P we correlate an index function whose arguments are the
+general variables that dominate y. Let us consider an infinite domain for which the
+attached functions are these index functions and the elementary [rather, descriptive]
+functions of P, and the attached propositional functions are the atomic propositional
+functions occurring in P; let C, be the domain of order 0, D, the domain of order p.
+[We delete all quantifiers and] in the matrix of P we replace each restricted variable
+of P by the corresponding index function. We thus obtain a proposition P'. Replacing
+its variables by some elements of Dp, we obtain another proposition, P". We try to
+eliminate all the functions that occur in P" by replacing them with their values. We
+thus obtain a proposition I. (This is not always possible. But we carry out this replacement whenever we can, and we always can if p is greater than the height of the
+proposition P, for then it suffices to take elements of C, as arguments of the functions.)
+We shall say that P is true in the infinite domain if for every number p we have a
+procedure enabling us to verify that each of the propositions [obtained over Dp in the
+way I was] has "true" as its logical value (derived from the logical values that its
+atomic propositions take in the domain).
+Let us start again from P; but now with each general variable y we correlate an
+index function whose arguments are the restricted variables that dominate y. We
+construct an infinite domain as above, using the new index functions instead of the
+old ones; in the matrix of P we now replace each general variable by the corresponding index function and perform the same operations as above; if all the propositions
+thus obtained have the logical value "false"
+domain.
+', we shall say that P is false in this infinite
+It is absolutely necessary to adopt such definitions if we want to give a precise sense
+to the words "true in an infinite domain", words that have frequently been used
+without sufficient explanation, and also if we want to justify a proposition proved
+by Löwenheim, ® a proposition to which many refer
+without clearly seeing that
+67 [See 6.2, Remark 3 in 6.4, page 4 in Herbrand 19316 (below, p. 623, lines 8-11), and especially
+page 53 with its footnote in Herbrand 1931. From this last reference it seems clear that by a "principle of choice" Herbrand meant the axiom of choice and not an argument such as Skolem's
+(1922; above, p. 294), nor an application of König's infinity lemma (1926, 1927) such as Gödel's
+(1930a; below, p. 589). See the introductory note to Skolem 1928 (above, p. 510) and also Note H,
+p. 578 below.]
+68 1915; see also Skolem 1920.
+
+553
+Löwenheim's proof is totally inadequate for our purposes (see 6.269) and that,
+indeed, the proposition has no precise sense until such a definition has been given.
+4.11. We observe at once that, if P is true in an infinite domain, ~ P is false in it
+and, if P is false in it, ~ P is true in it.
+4.2. To clarify the notion of infinite domain let us for the moment ignore the associated logical values; we can then classify the elements of Dp in the following manner:
+first we take the elements of Cy; then we take all the elements that are values of the
+functions of height 1 when the arguments of these functions are chosen in Cr; these
+elements form a domain Iz (which may have elements in common with C1); then we
+take all the elements that are values of the functions of height 2 when the arguments
+of these functions are chosen in Ci; they form Iz; we thus form 1, Г2, Гз,....
+Ip,.... We shall have at least p terms; but, clearly, this sequence will terminate when
+some domain is entirely contained in the previous ones.?°
+Let us now look again at the domains considered in 3.21 for the proposition P; if we
+take C, as the first domain, we see that 12 can be regarded as resulting from Cz when
+some elements of C2 are equated to some elements of C, or C2 (see the conventions of
+3.211); we see that in general I, results from Ok when some elements of C, are equated
+to some elements of C1, Cz,..., Ck-1, or Ck.
+If we recall the theorem of Chapter 1, 5.21,52 we obtain the following two basic
+theorems:
+4.21. (1) A proposition P that is false in some [infinite] domain cannot Ifor any pI
+have property B lof order pI.
+(2) If Ifor every pJ a proposition P does not have property B [of order pI, we can construct an infinite domain in which P is false.
+The first theorem follows from the fact that for the union of| C1, Cz,..., and
+Cpth+1 we can immediately obtain from the infinite domain a system of logical values
+that gives the logical value "false" to the first disjunction of order p associated with
+P (see 3.4). The second theorem follows from the fact that Cp determines precisely the
+domain of order p in the infinite domain that we are trying to find and that. the logical
+values assigning the value "false" to this disjunction (according to Chapter 1, 5.2152)
+yield the attached logical values."
+To simplify we shall say (the meaning of the assertion being determined by Theorems (1) and (2) above):
+The necessary and sufficient condition for a proposition not to have property B is that it
+be false in some infinite domain.??
+4.3. The preceding considerations show that we need concern ourselves only with
+infinite domains of the following kind. Let C, be an arbitrary domain (consisting, for
+example, of one element). Let Ck be, for each k > 1, the domain obtained when, as in
+3.21, with each function of height k - 1 that can be constructed from the elementary
+functions at our disposal and whose arguments are taken in C, we correlate one-to-one
+some element, which will be the value of the function. It then suffices, in defining the
+truth (or falsity) of a proposition of height h, to assume that the domain of order p in
+69 [The French text has "6.4", but this seems to be an oversight.]]
+70 There may be elements of Dp that will not be contained in any of these domains; these elements will play no role in what follows.
+" [Thus, for each p, Dp can be taken to be Gp+n+1 = C1UCzu...uCp+h+1•]
+12 [Compare 6.2.]
+
+554
+the infinite domain is given by the union of C1, Cz,..., Cp+h+1 (the attached functions being the descriptive functions and the index functions mentioned in 4.1) and by
+a system of logical values for the propositional functions having arguments in these
+domains. Such an infinite domain will be called a reduced domain. All the previous
+results still hold when the words "infinite domain" are replaced by "reduced domain"
+For we can always assume that two different functions have different values: if two
+different functions have an element b as their common value, we replace b by two
+other elements, b, and bz; the value of the first function will be b1, that of the second b2;
+and we stipulate that, for every atomic propositional function o and for every system
+of arguments, the logical values of ф(61, X2, Хз, ..., Хл) and ф(b2, X2, Xz, ..., X.) will be
+the same as that of ф(b, X2, X3,..., Xx). We can similarly assume that any function
+takes different values for different arguments.
+4.31. We can even start from several propositions; to define their truth we construct
+the domains Cu that correspond to their logical product (to define their falsity, those that
+correspond to their logical sum); we see immediately that, if each proposition is true in
+a reduced domain associated with their product (or false in a reduced domain associated
+with their sum), this product (or sum) is true (or false) in this domain, and conversely.
+5. FUNDAMENTAL THEOREM
+5. THEOREM. (1) If for some number p a proposition P has property B of order p, the
+proposition P is true.® Once we know any such p, we can construct a proof of P.
+(2) If we have a true 8 proposition P, together with a proof of P, we can, from this proof,
+derive a number p such that P has property B of order p.
+We shall say: The necessary and sufficient condition for a proposition P to be true ® is
+that for some p the proposition P have property B of order p.
+5.1. LEMMA 1. A proposition P that Ifor some pI has property C Lof order pI has
+property A.
+This will be proved when we have stated a scheme, a type, and a set of equations
+associated with the proposition P (see Section 2).
+Assume that P has property C of order p [and is of height k]; let N be the number
+of elements in [the union of all the domains up to and including] C, (same notation as
+in 3.21). Consider some prenex form of P without real variables, and take property C
+in the form of 3.4.73 We shall construct a scheme associated with P (2.2) such that
+each restricted variable lof the scheme] is immediately behind a brace joining N
+rows;'* we shall say that the restricted variable occurring in the ith row immediately
+73 [Since, if P is not in prenex form, no prenex form of P need have property C of order p (see
+Note F, p. 577 below), to carry through the argument that Herbrand is about to give we must be
+able to calculate from the number p and the proposition P some number q such that some prenex
+form of P has property C of order g. Hence in the light of 3.3l' of Note F the first two sentences in
+the present paragraph should be replaced by the following paragraph:
+Let P contain j quantifiers and d descriptive functions, the maximum height of these functions
+being h, and assume that P has property C of order p. Let P' be a prenex form of P without real
+variables. Then P' has property C of order q = 8(j, d, p, n1). Let N be the number of elements in
+Ga, and let us consider the second disjunction of order q associated with P'.
+Moreover, throughout the remainder of Herbrand's proof of Lemma 1 in 5.1 read "g" wherever
+the text has "p".]
+74 [To Herbrand's definition of a scheme (above, p. 531) we must add here the stipulation that
+the dominant variables of the scheme are joined by an initial brace. A row
+should not be
+
+555
+on the right of the brace is attached to the element a;. Hence, in an arbitrary line of the
+scheme, each restricted variable is attached to an element ai, with i ≤ N.
+We shall now define a correspondence between the elements of all the domains [up
+to and including Cath+i]] and the general variables of the scheme (and descriptive
+functions of such variables, if any) " We stipulate that each general variable y shall
+correspond to the element that is the value of Julai,, Oiz'..., Ain), where fy is the index
+function of y, and dig, Aiz'..., Ain
+are the elements attached to the restricted variables
+that occur on the same line as y but to its left. With the elements of C, we correlate
+fictitious (in the sense of 2.1) general variables. Finally, with each element of the
+domains [up to and including Cath+i] we correlate either a general variable, in
+accordance with the preceding rule, or a descriptive function of general variables,
+stipulating that for a descriptive function f, if aig, diz'..., Ain correspond to the general
+variables or to the functions 91, Ф2,..., Øn of general variables,? the value of
+f(aig, liz'.., Ain) in the domains corresponds to the function f(91, 92,..., $n). We
+readily see that to each element of the domains there thus corresponds one and only
+one general variable or function of general variables.
+Let the order of a line [in the scheme] be the greatest of the orders of the domains
+of any of the elements that correspond to the restricted variables of that line.
+We obtain the associated type by selecting, one after another, all the variables
+occurring in the lines of order 1, then all those occurring in the lines of order 2, then
+all those occurring in the lines of order 3, and so on up to and including order p.
+We obtain the associated equations by equating each restricted variable to the
+general variable, or the function of general variables, that corresponds to the element
+attached to the restricted variable. We see that a restricted variable is always equated
+to a general variable, or to a function of general variables, occurring in lines whose
+order is less than its own; hence these equations yield associated equations that are
+compatible with the type considered.
+Now we only have to see that the disjunction thus obtained is an identity. But,
+clearly, this disjunction comes from the second disjunction of order p associated with
+P (3.4)76 when each element of the domains is replaced by its corresponding general
+variable or function of general variables (each line of the scheme corresponds to a disjunct of this identity).?
+COROLLARY. A proposition that [for some number pJ has property B Lof order pI is
+true.®
+confused with a line of the scheme. A row consists of just one signed letter immediately to the right
+of a brace.
+Let us note that, if P contains r restricted quantifiers, the scheme now being constructed has Nr
+lines and is what in footnote 25 was called a reduced scheme.Il
+75 [See footnote 30, p. 539 above.]l
+76 [Rather, of order g associated with P' (see footnote 73).]
+7 [Thus, under the correspondence between elements of Ga+n+ 1 and members of the associated
+scheme, the standard expansion of the prenex proposition P' (see footnotes 63 and 73) yields the
+identity associated with P, hence shows that P has property A. But, then, a far more informative
+way of correcting Herbrand's argument for Lemma 1 than that given in footnote 73 would be to
+use the generalized notion of generating scheme mentioned in footnote 22 above, p. 537. For we
+would not need to consider a second disjunction of order q associated with P (that is, the standard
+expansion of P' of order q); rather, we would be able to set up a correspondence between the elenents of Gp+h+ 1 and members of the new scheme such that the standard expansion of P of order 1
+vould vield an identity associated with P.
+
+556
+For we have seen that
+(1) Property B is equivalent to property C (3.31) 61 and
+(2) A proposition that has property A is true (2.3).23
+This proves the first part of the theorem.
+5.2. To prove the second part of the theorem we proceed by recursion on the proof
+of the proposition.
+(I) [For every p,l if P V P has property B lof order pI, then P has property B
+lof order pI. This is seen at once from the definition lof property BI given in 3.22.
+(2) [For every p, I if $(x) has property B lof order p, then (x) $(x) has property B
+[of order pJ. For, as we saw in 3.2, in order to construct the expansions of $(x) and
+(x)Ф(x), we must first replace each of these propositions by the same proposition
+(У1, У2, "Уп, х)Ф(x), where Y1, Y2,..., n are the real variables of (x)Ф(x).
+LEMMA 2. Property C' is preserved when the second rule of generalization (in the form
+given in Chapter 3, 1.478) is used. 19
+[This second rule of generalization is:] If t is an individual that depends upon
+[possibly fictitious]] real variables, we can go from +$(t) to + (1x)Ф(x).
+Let us take property C' in the form given in 3.4.80
+We know (3.221) that to the real variables there will correspond some fixed elements
+of C2; so the element that will correspond to t will be in Ct for some k ≥ 2; let us call
+this element a;. Suppose that the first proposition has property C of order p. For the
+second proposition we consider the second associated disjunction (see 3.4) of order
+p + k - 1, and in this disjunction we consider only the disjuncts in which x is replaced by aj. We see immediately that their disjunction constitutes a second disjunction of order p associated with the proposition $(t), the first domain being C1; hence
+it is a propositional identity; but then so is the original disjunction.
+5.3. LEMMA 3. For every p, if the propositions P and P& have property C of order
+p, then Q has property C of order p. 81
+According to 3.53, P & (P) Q) has property O of order p. p.2 We put P and & into
+prenex form; they are then written
+(ІУ1, 1У2,..., 1У)М (У1, У2,..., Ут, Х1, Х2,..., Хп)
+and
+respectively, if we exhibit all the real variables (some may be fictitious (3.52) in P or
+in Q). The conjunction P & (P › Q) can be written, when transformed according to
+the rules of passage,
+{М (Уі, У2,..., Ут, Х1, Х2,..., хл) & [М(УТ, У2,..., УП, х1, Х2, ..., Хп)
+78 ["If Ф(f, x1, X2,...,Xn) is true& (f being a real variable, a descriptive function whose arguments are real variables, or a constant), then (Hy)Ф(У, X1, Х2,..., Xn) is true."]
+79 [In general the order does not remain invariant. If t is of height k ≥ 2 and $(t) has property
+C of order p, then (Ax) $(x) has property C of some order less than or equal to p + k - 1.]
+8° [Throughout this proof of Lemma 2 we should use the standard expansion of a proposition
+instead of the second disjunction of order p associated with the proposition; see footnote 63.]
+81 [See Note G, p. 578 below.]
+82 [See footnote 65.]
+
+557
+In this proposition a, is O or 1 according as y; is restricted or general in P; moreover,
+for each pair of variables yi and yi we have a pair of successive quantifiers, of which
+the first is restricted and the second general (since, whenever Yi is restricted, Yİ is
+general, and conversely, according to Chapter 2, 3.10283). For the proposition in question we take property C in the form given in 3.4. We therefore have domains C1, Cz,
+...,Cks..., Cp+h+1 generated by the descriptive and index functions of the proposition. We transform them into domains C1, C2, ..., Co..., Cp+n+ 1 as follows. First, Ci
+is C1. Then, for each k > 1, C½ is obtained from C, thus: let f + be the index function of
+the [general] variable t; for each value of yi, we consider the elements of Cu that are
+values of fut-a (YII, Yğz, ..., Y%') for all possible values of yi, yåz, yžz,..., Yi-I', and [in
+CUCzu... UCk] we equate all these elements to the value of yi:; moreover, for
+each system of values of 21, Zuz'..., Zu,, we consider the elements of Ck that are values
+of J= (YI, YŠ2,...Y$,, Zuy, zuz'=..,zuy) for all possible values of yit, yåz, ..., Yir and
+[in C1UCzu... UCk] we equate all these elements to one of them.
+Clearly, these new domains are the very domains that are generated from C, by the
+descriptive and index functions of Q. And we see, once the equating just presented is
+taken into account, that the second disjunction of order p associated with P & ( P> Q)
+[over the original domains] becomes the identity
+(I)
+where P, and Qi, 1 ≤ i = y, are the propositions obtained when the operations described in 3.4 are carried out over these new domains on the matrices of P and Q.
+Moreover,
+(II)
+QI V 82 V... VQY
+differs from the [second] disjunction of order p associated with & only in that certain
+disjuncts are repeated several times. 87
+Now, Theorem 5.21 of Chapter 152 shows that the truth of the disjunction (I) implies that of the disjunction (II), since, for each given system of logical values, there
+is an i such that the logical value "true" is assigned to P, & (P, > Qi), hence to
+P, > Qi, hence to Qi, and hence to the disjunction (II).
+If P should contain descriptive functions not occurring in Q, we would use Remark
+3.52.
+5.31. We now recall that
+(1) Identities of the first kind, that is, with no apparent variables, have property B,
+(2) Property B and property Care equivalent (3.31),®1 and
+(3) For every p, if a proposition P has property B of order p, then P has property
+B of order q for every 9 greater than p (3.54).
+Therefore, Lemma 2, Lemma 3,81 the lemma of 3.3,60 and the remarks of 5.2 prove
+the second part of the Fundamental Theorem.
+REMARKs. (1) Properties A, B, and C are therefore equivalent85 and can be said
+83 [If the quantifier (x) occurs positively, x is general; if it occurs negatively, x is restricted; the
+situation is the opposite for the quantifier (Ex).I
+84 [Throughout this last paragraph the prenex forms of P, Q, and P & ( P › Q) should be under.
+stood when Herbrand speaks simply of P, Q, and P & ( P › Q); see Note G, p. 578 below. However,
+Herbrand's argument could be slightly modified so that & need not be in prenex form.]
+85 [See Note F and footnote 73.]
+
+558
+to be necessary and sufficient for the truth ® of a proposition. The preceding theorem
+then shows that the proof of any true proposition can be reduced to a canonical form,
+namely, one in which the proposition is obtained from its associated identity (2.3)
+(which is the [second] disjunction of order p associated with the proposition). 86
+(2) We could easily show that, if in the proof of a proposition P the second rule of
+generalization is used n times, for individuals of heights h1, ha,...,hn, then P has
+property B of an order at most equal to hi that... + In + n.87
+(3) If there should be more than one type in the proposition under study, we would
+have to distinguish, in each domain, elements of different types (the value of a function, in particular, is of the type of that function) and replace a variable only by
+elements of the same type. But, aside from these points, nothing would be changed in
+the previous considerations. (An index function is taken to be of the same type as the
+variable to which it is attached.)88
+6. CONSEQUENCES
+A. Consequences concerning the decision problem
+6.1. COROLLARY 1. We have seen 89 that the rule of implication is not necessary for
+the proof of a proposition having property A, provided we replace the rule of simplification by the following
+GENERALIZED RULE OF SIMPLIFICATION. If in a true® proposition the subproposition
+P V P is replaced by P, we obtain another true proposition.
+Now, from our theorem and Lemma 1 in 5.1 it follows that every true 8 proposition has
+property A. Hence the only rules of reasoning that are needed are the rules of passage,
+the two rules of generalization and the generalized rule of simplification. The rule of
+implication drops out.
+Because of the difficulties that the rule of implication might create in certain
+[metamathematical] demonstrations that proceed by recursion on [formall proofs,
+we consider this result most important. It shows, moreover, that the rule of implication, whose origin, after all, is in the classical syllogism, is not necessary in building
+logic. (The rule remains necessary, however, in mathematical theories, which contain
+hypotheses.)
+6.2. The theorems stated in Section 5 and in 4.21 permit us to set forth the following results:
+THEOREM 1. If P is an identity, ~ P is not true in any infinite domain;
+THEOREM 2. If P is not an identity, we can construct an infinite domain in which ~ P
+is true.
+Similar results have already been stated by Löwenheim (1915), but his proofs,
+it seems to us, are totally insufficient for our purposes. First, he gives an intuitive
+36 [In this canonical form for a proof of P, some prenex form P' of P is first proved, and then P
+is obtained by use of the rules of passage. Hence the associated identity (2.3) of P is indeed a second disjunction associated with P, for it is the standard expansion of P' (see footnotes 63 and 73).
+Compare Remark 4 in 6.4 below, p. 560.]
+87 [This is false because of the falsity of the lemma of 3.3 and Lemma 3 in 5.3.]
+88 [Here Herbrand extends his Fundamental Theorem to many-sorted logies; see footnote 1
+above and article 6.6 below.]
+89 [See 2.2, 2.3, and Note D, p. 571 below.]
+
+559
+meaning to the notion "true in an infinite domain"
+', hence his proof of Theorem 2 does
+not attain the rigor that we deem desirable (indeed the [required] proof is contained in
+the considerations of Section 4 and of 5.1). Then-and this is the gravest reproach—
+because of the intuitive meaning that he gives to this notion, he seems to regard
+Theorem 1 as obvious. This is absolutely impermissible; such an attitude would lead
+us, for example, to regard the consistency of arithmetic as obvious. On the contrary,
+it is precisely the proof of this theorem (of which the lemma of 3.3 is a part) that presented us with the greatest difficulties.
+We could say that Löwenheim's proof was sufficient in mathematics; but, in the
+present work, we had to make it "metamathematical" (see Introduction 90) so that it
+would be of some use to us.
+6.3. The two theorems that we just stated provide us with a method for investigating the decision problem. By means of this method we have succeeded in obtaining
+new solutions for all the particular cases already solved and even in somewhat extending these cases." Moreover, we can now deal with a case that is essentially different
+from those already known, namely, the case of a proposition whose matrix is a disjunction of atomic propositions and negations of atomic propositions (the atomic propositions may contain descriptive functions). A proposition is an identity if and only if it
+has property A; in the present case, whether a proposition has property A can readily
+be decided by the use of 2.34 and 2.4.
+6.4. REMARK 1. We see without difficulty that a proposition true in some finite
+domain (Chapter 2, 8.392) is also true in some infinite domain (here there is a bound,
+namely, the number of elements in the finite domain, on the number of elements in
+each field Dn in the infinite domain); hence the theorem of Chapter 2, Section 8,93
+immediately follows from Theorem 1.
+REMARk 2. The notion "satisfiability" ("Erfüllbarkeit") that Ackermann used
+in 1928a does not seem to us to be defined in a sufficiently complete manner, for we
+have not been given a precise stipulation that would permit us to state that a proposition is "satisfiable".
+94 Theorem 1 immediately allows us to remove this objection.
+Now, let P be a proposition of the form
+(Х1, X2,...,Хп) (Fz) (У1, У2,.., Ур) А(Х1, Х2,..., Хт, », У1, У2,.., Ур).
+If P is not an identity, we can construct an infinite domain in which ~ P is true;
+90 [In the Introduction to his thesis, on page 6, Herbrand presents the distinction between
+mathematies and metamathematics. Here he suggests that the set-theoretic notion of satisfiability
+is not a proper object of metamathematical investigations.|
+91 For example, to the case of a disjunction of propositions of the form
+(Х1, Х,..., хл) (НУ) (21, 22,.., 2р) А(Х1, Ха,..",Хл, У, 21, 22,..., 2p).
+92 [In Section 8 of Chapter 2 Herbrand stipulates that a proposition is true in a finite domain if
+and only if the common expansion (see footnote 41) of the proposition over the domain is truthfunctionally valid. Here, however, he apparently uses "true in a finite domain" to mean that the
+common expansion of the proposition is truth-functionally satisfiable. The same shift in meaning
+occurs on page 60 of the thesis.]
+93 ["If Ф(У1, У2,..
+"Yp) is a true® proposition containing only y1, Y2,..., Yp as real variables,
+the [common] expansion of (Y1, У2,..Ур)Ф(У1, У2,...,Ур) [over any finite domain], which no
+longer contains any apparent variable, is, relative to its atomic propositions, a propositional
+identity of the first kind."]
+94 [Herbrand is here contrasting Ackermann's intuitive (that is, set-theoretic) notion "satisfiable" with his own metamathematical (that is, finitistic) notion "true in an infinite domain"
+which by Theorems 1 and 2 of 6.2 is equivalent to the notion "irrefutable in Qu". Herbrand isnot
+
+560
+clearly, merely by repeating Ackermann's argument, we see that there is also a finite
+domain, consisting of a known number of elements, in which ~ P is true.° On the other
+hand, if P is an identity, ~ P cannot be true in such a finite domain (according to
+Chapter 2, 8.193); we therefore have a criterion that enables us to decide whether P is
+an identity or not.
+Moreover, it is possible, and simpler, to show by a similar argument that, if a proposition P of the form considered has property C, it has this property with an order
+that we can determine in advance; and this provides a criterion equivalent to the
+previous one.95
+REMARK 3. We see the following: if to our rules of reasoning, listed at the beginning
+of Chapter 2,90 we were to adjoin other rules that could not be derived from them, then
+we would be led to regard as true [that is, provable] some propositions that are in fact
+false in some infinite domain. We must acknowledge that such a consequence would
+be difficult to accept. This fact corresponds to what the Germans call the Vollständigkeit of our system of rules. (If we could prove that these additional rules lead us to
+regard as true a proposition P that, without them, would not be so, then, as we can
+readily see, the inconsistency of classical mathematics would follow, because we could
+construct a denumerable set over which P would be false.) 97
+REMARK 4. We can view the theorem of Section 5 as giving us a canonical form for
+every mathematical proof; for, if we know the order p with which a proposition has
+property B, we can, according to 5.1, specify the proof of this proposition. 86 More
+generally, we can say that, if a theorem P is true [that is, provablell in a theory on the
+basis of hypotheses (containing no apparent variables98) whose logical product is H,
+the proof of P can be obtained in the following manner (according to 6.2 and Chapter
+3, 2.499): we try to construct an infinite domain in which H > P is false, and after a certain number of operations we see that the construction is impossible. ° Thus we can say
+demanding that a decision procedure for satisfiability be given. Indeed, he is objecting to Ackermann's use of "satisfiability" with respect to a class K of propositions for which he knows that
+Ackermann (1928a) has shown that
+For each proposition P in K, there is effectively obtainable a number n such that ~ P is
+satisfiable if and only if the common expansion of ~ P over a domain of cardinality n is
+truth-functionally satisfiable.
+Rather, Herbrand is demanding that the notion "satisfiability" not be used in metamathematics.
+(Of course, Herbrand permits "truth-functional satisfiability".) Hence, in this first paragraph of
+Remark 2, Herbrand exploits Ackermann's argument to prove that
+For each proposition P in K, there is effectively obtainable a number n such that P is
+provable in Qu if and only if the common expansion of ~ P over a domain of cardinality n is not
+truth-functionally satisfiable.]
+95 [See Herbrand's treatment of this solvable case (1931, pp. 45-46); see also Dreben 1962.]
+96 [These are the rules of Herbrand's system of quantification theory, see above, p. 528.]
+9 [See Note H, p. 578 below.]
+98 [Rather, containing no real variables. Herbrand's argument here rests upon his version of the
+deduction theorem (see footnote 99 and Note I, p. 580 below).]
+99 [In this article Herbrand states and proves the deduction theorem in the following form:
+Let P be a proposition in a theory having only a finite number of hypotheses; let H be the product of these hypotheses. If H does not contain any real variable, P is provable in the theory if and
+only if H > P is provable in Herbrand's QH•J
+100 [See the "no-counterexample" proof techniques of Beth (1955) and Hintikka (1955); see also
+Skolem 1928 and 1929, § 5. Kreisel (1958, p. 36) pointed out that Beth's constructive argument for
+modus ponens elimination (1956a, pp. 38-40; see also 1959, pp. 278-280) contains an error. But it
+should be noted that no argument that proceeds, as does Beth's, just by recursion on the construction of the "eliminable formula" can succeed.]
+
+561
+that, if the proposition is indeed a theorem, we can always give a proof of it that does
+not use any artifice, the role of artifices being only to make proofs shorter. 101
+B. Consequences concerning the investigation of mathematical theories
+6.5. The theorems obtaired in the previous sections have many applications; they
+provide a general method for the investigation of mathematical theories. We shall
+briefly point out some of these applications, laying stress on the most important of
+them, the consistency of ordinary arithmetic.
+(I) If all the hypotheses of a theory are true in some infinite domain (4.31), the theory is
+consistent (Chapter 3, 2.1 102). 103
+For, if a theory is inconsistent, we see immediately that we can find hypotheses
+H1, Hz,..., Hn, which can always be
+assumed to contain no apparent variables, 98
+such that ~ (Hy & H2&... & Hn) is an identity, hence has property B. But,
+according to 4.11, this is impossible, since H, & Hz&... & Hn by 4.31, is true
+in some infinite domain, and so ~ (H, & H2 & ... & Hn) is false [in this infinite
+domain]].
+(2) If a theory is consistent and has only a finite number of hypotheses, 104 we can construct an infinite domain in which these hypotheses are true. 105
+It suffices, as we see immediately by virtue of 4.3, to make the logical product of
+these hypotheses true in a reduced domain (4.3).
+We shall now briefly present some immediate consequences [of (1) and (2)]]. But
+first we note that, if a theory contains constants, that is, descriptive functions of O
+argument, we shall have to represent these constants in the infinite domains by certain
+elements that we include in the domain of order 1.
+6.6. The theorems stated in 6.5 can be used to show that no proposition [written in
+the notation of but] unprovable in a given theory becomes provable when certain
+changes are made in the theory. 106
+Let us assume, for example, that we have a theory with a certain number of types;
+for each type we can introduce the propositional function x = y, of arguments x and
+y, to be read "x is equal to y", in which x and y will be of the type considered (hence
+we shall have different propositional functions, represented by arrays of signs that
+differ only in the type of the variables).
+101 [See Gentzen 1934, p. 177; in particular, consider Gentzen's "Er macht keine Umwege".]
+102 [" A theory is said to be consistent if it does not contain any proposition Z such that both Z
+and ~ Z are true [that is, provable in the theory]."]
+103 [This is one of the most important consequences of Herbrand's Fundamental Theorem and
+supplies much of the motivation for it; indeed, the present statement (1) greatly simplifies the
+Hilbert-Ackermann-von Neumann approach to proving the consistency of theories (see 6.8 below,
+Ackermann 1924, Hilbert 1925 and 1927, Bernays 1927, von Neumann 1927, also Bernays's discussion of this point (1934a; 1936, remark 1, pp. 115-116; Hilbert and Bernays 1939, pp. 38 and 48)
+as well as Kleene 1952, pp. 475-476).]
+104 It is easy but unnecessary to remove the latter restriction.
+105 This proposition is the "metamathematical" form of the proposition known as the "Skolem
+paradox"; for one should observe that [metamathematical] arguments about infinite domains,
+when translated into mathematical arguments, become arguments about denumerable sets. [See
+footnote 67, p. 552 above.]
+106 [Compare 6.6 with §§ 5-6 in Skolem 1929 and with Herbrand 1931, pp. 30-33. Also, compare
+the last paragraph of 6.6 with Craig 1957a and 1960.]
+
+562
+We add the following hypotheses, hereafter denoted by (1):
+x=x,(x=1)(y=x), and [(x=y) & (Y =z)]>(x=z)
+for each type,
+[=12=12)&&(n=Yn)]>[Ф(X1, Х2,...,хп)>Ф(У1, У2,..», Уп)]
+for each atomic propositional function P(X1, X2, ..., Xn), and
+(n=Уn)]>|J(X1, Х2...,Хn)=J(У1,Уz«..,Уп)І
+for each elementary descriptive function f(x1, X2, ..., Xn)
+Clearly, the last two formulas of (1) can be proved in the extended theory for every
+propositional function and every descriptive function.
+Let us further assume that the hypotheses (1), together with the original ones, bring
+about the truth [that is, the provability in the theoryl of a certain proposition P, which
+does not contain the new propositional function and was not true [that is, provable in
+the theory] before the introduction of this new propositional function. Let H1, Hz,
+..., Hn be the hypotheses of the original theory that are necessary for the proof of P;
+then the hypotheses H1, H2, ..., Hn, and ~ P, which were conjointly consistent, become inconsistent when taken together with the hypotheses (1). Now, we can construct
+an infinite domain in which H1, H2, ..., Hy, and ~ Pare true; moreover, to make the
+hypotheses (1) true in this infinite domain we merely have to agree that a. = a;
+(where a, and a; are elements of the domain) has the logical value "true" just if the
+letters a, and a are the same. But, since the hypotheses H1, H2, ..., Hn: ~ P, and (1)
+are true in some infinite domain, they cannot be conjointly inconsistent.
+Therefore, if a proposition is not true that is, provable| before equality has been introduced, it cannot be so afterward.
+We could show by the same method that it is also possible to introduce into a theory
+the notion "couple"
+', <x, y>, along with the axiom
+(provided that a couple is not of the type of its arguments). This would show the consistency of the theory of rational numbers. 107
+Let us now go back to the case in which equality was introduced and see how we can
+obtain a proof of a proposition P, not containing equality, in a theory without equality [once we have a proof of P in the extension of the theory obtained by adjunction
+of equalityl. Let us assume that the proposition
+where H is the product of those hypotheses (1) that we are using, has property B of
+order p. If we look at the proof of the results obtained in 4.21 and 4.3, we can conclude
+that
+\H, & Hz &
+has property B of order p; from this last fact we can obtain a proof of P.
+107 And of Euclidean geometry, in Hilbert's axiomatization, without the completeness axiom.
+[See Hilbert and Bernays 1939, pp. 33-48, especially 38-48.]
+
+563
+6.7. According to Löwenheim (1915), the decision problem would be solved for the
+general case if it were solved for the case in which each [atomic] propositional function has only two arguments; the proof, which rested on his insufficiently established
+results, is now completely justified. 108 We can even go further and:
+(a) Prove that we can restrict ourselves to the case in which there is no longer any
+constant or descriptive function. For this we use, primarily, Russell and Whitehead's
+theory of descriptions. It would suffice first to introduce equality as in 6.6, and then
+to replace each descriptive function f(X1, X2, ...,Xn) by a propositional function
+Ф(У, Х1, X2,...,Xn), which is to be taken as y = f(X1, X2,..., Xn), and add the hypotheses (1z) (У)[Ф(У, х1, Х2,..., Хл) > (У = z)].
+(b) Prove that we can restrict ourselves to the case in which either there is only one
+propositional function of three arguments [rather, one ternary predicate letter] or
+there are no more than three propositional functions of two arguments [rather, three
+binary predicate letters].
+(c) Prove easily that we can dispense with apparent variables if, following Hilbert,
+we introduce the "logical function"
+(each proposition will give rise to such a function,
+with the real variables as arguments, and to a corresponding axiom; see Hilbert 1927).
+In particular, we can always assume that the hypotheses of a theory contain only real
+variables. 109
+6.8. Consistency of arithmetic."° The results of 6.5 enable us to solve the problem
+of the consistency of arithmetic much more completely [that is, for more extensive
+subsystems] than we did in Chapter 4.
+Let us recall that in arithmetic there is one atomic propositional function, x = y,
+one primitive descriptive function, x + 1, and one primitive constant, O; we can,
+moreover, introduce new descriptive functions, which are defined by recursion (Chapter 4, 8.5111). 112
+Let the domain A be the unbounded sequence of letters ao, a1, a2, ...,An,...; we
+stipulate that ao shall be the constant O. With these letters we shall form the domains
+that we need; we stipulate that a; = a shall have the logical value "true" just if the
+subscripts i and j are identical.
+Let J (X1, X2,..., Xn) be a (descriptive or index) function; we shall say that we know
+its value in the domain A if we have a procedure that enables us to assign a value to
+flaig, liz'..., Ain) for each system of arguments taken in the domain.
+A proposition P will be said to be true in the domain A if, after correlating with each
+restricted variable x of P an index function whose arguments are the general variables
+superior to x and the real variables, we can so assign values in the domain A to these
+functions that the proposition obtained when the restricted variables of P are
+108 [See Herbrand 1931, pp. 33-41, for Herbrand's new proof of this result of Löwenheim and also
+for his proofs of the results announced here in (a) and (b).]
+109 [See footnote 33, p. 541 above, and Note I, p. 580 below.]
+11° [See Note J, p. 580 below.]
+111 [This article extends Theory 3 (see Note J) by introducing functions defined by primitive
+recursion. But the consistency proof that Herbrand is about to give works just for the unextended
+Theory 3. See footnotes 115 and 118.]
+112 [In the next five paragraphs of the text Herbrand gives a new and very simple proof, based on
+Theorem 1 of 6.5, of the consistency of Theory 3 (see Note J); this proof, however, does not show
+the decidability of Theory 3, as did the more complex argument of Chapter 4.]
+
+564
+replaced by their index functions has the logical value (calculated as in 4.1) "true",
+no matter which elements of the domain A are put for the general [and real]
+variables.
+Clearly, if several propositions are true in the domain A, then A yields an infinite
+domain in which these propositions are true.
+Now, if we stipulate that the value of a; + 1 is ai+1, we can immediately see that
+all the axioms of Section 5 of Chapter 4110 are true in the domain A; moreover, the
+domain A yields an infinite domain once we agree that for each p the domain [D,] of
+order p in this infinite domain consists of do, a1, ..., ap. Hence these axioms are consistent.
+But now we can go further. 113
+I. Introduction of recursive definitions. Proceeding in a more general way than in
+Chapter 4, 8.5, 114 we shall assume that to the theory considered 115 we can adjoin new
+descriptive functions and new hypotheses in the following manner: we assume that
+the modifications introduced above [in 6.6] have already led to a theory I whose
+hypotheses are true in the domain A; we introduce a new descriptive function
+J(Y, X1,...,Xn), of arguments y, X1,..., n, and add hypotheses of the form
+Ф[f (О, х1,..., х")],
+#[f(У, х1,..., Хл), f(У + 1, X1,..., Xn)],
+(1)
+(3)
+provided that the propositions
+(Нх) Ф(х)
+(4)
+and
+(У) (Нх) # (У, х)
+(5)
+are true [that is, provable] in the theory I ($ and I may contain other variables
+Х1, X2,..., 20216).
+We shall prove the consistency [of this extended theory] on the very weak assumption that propositions (4) and (5) are true in the domain A (in other words, that they
+can be "interpreted" in that domain). It suffices to observe that propositions (1) and
+(2) are true in the domain A when, first, as index functions of the [restricted] variables
+of these propositions we take the index functions of the corresponding variables of (4)
+and (5) and, second, we choose the values of the function f(Y, X1, X2,..., Xn) in the
+following way: f(0, X1, X2, ..., Xn) shall be the index function of x in (4); if the index
+function of x in (5) is q(Y, X1, Xz,..., Xn), we shall take the value of q(f (Y, X1, X2, ....
+Хл), Х1, Хz,..., Xn) for that of f(y + 1, X1, X2,..., Xn); this completely defines the value
+off (Y, X1, X2,..., Xn) in the domain A. Proposition (3) is, of course, true in the domain.
+113 [Later (19316; below, pp. 623-626) Herbrand gave much clearer and simpler proofs for results
+(I) and (II) obtained immediately below.]
+114 [This article deals with the introduction of primitive recursive definitions into arithmetic. J
+115 [This theory has as its axioms just the first six axioms of Theory 3 (see Note J). It is called
+Theory 2 by Herbrand in Chapter 4.]
+116 [This parenthetical remark is unclear. Formulas (4) and (5) contain no other free variables
+than x1, Xz,..., Xn, while their bound variables are x, y, and possibly others.]
+
+565
+II. Introduction of the axiom of mathematical induction. We recall (Chapter 4,
+8.1117) that propositions of the form
+(6)
+must be added to the hypotheses. 118
+When we attempt to prove the consistency of the theory thus obtained, ' we are
+confronted with difficulties that we shall not try to resolve here, our goal being only to
+show the fruitfulness of the notion "infinite domain". If hypotheses of the form (6)
+are introduced among the hypotheses [referred to at the end of the preceding paragraph], we shall prove the consistency [of the theory thus obtained] only in either of
+the following two cases (which, however, as can easily be seen, are the principal cases
+in which the axiom of mathematical induction is used).
+(a) Case in which $(a) is true in the domain A for every numeral a. It is then quite
+obvious that (x)P(x) is true in the domain A and can be added to the hypotheses
+without contradiction.
+(b) Case in which $(x) contains no apparent variable. 12° Let us now assume that to
+the hypotheses we add all the propositions P1, P2, ..., Pm obtained when in (6) we
+successively substitute D1(x), Ф2(x),..., Pm(x) for $(x). Corresponding to
+the
+[restricted] quantifier (x) in P¡, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let us introduce the new index function
+Ji(Y1, Y2...,Yn), Where Y1, Y2..., Yn, are the real variables of $(x) other than x.
+We seek to construct an infinite domain in which all the hypotheses of the theory
+under consideration are true. Hence we must show that, in addition to the original
+hypotheses (those of Chapter 4 and those due to the recursive definitions), each
+proposition
+(7)
+which results from the matrix of (6) when x is replaced by its index function, also can
+be made true. (Whenever we wish to exhibit all the real variables, $i(x) will be written
+Ф,(Х, У 1, У2, ..., Уп).)
+[For an arbitrary p ≥ 1] let E be the [set of| individuals of height not greater than
+p that are constructed from the constant O, the original descriptive functions, and the
+new index functions.
+We now have to construct an infinite domain in which all the hypotheses will come
+out true. The domain of order 0 will consist of do, and for each k the domain of order k
+will consist of letters from the domain A. Let be the domain of order p [in the infinite domain to be constructed]; every element of l' is to be the value of an individual
+of E, and conversely every individual of E is to have a value in I. The hypotheses
+117 [This article iniroduces the axiom schema of mathematical induction.]
+118 [These hypotheses are the first six axioms of Theory 3 (see Note J), together with propositions (1), (2), and (3) just given for the introduction of primitive recursive functions.]
+119 [This theory is Theory 4 (see Note J) with primitive recursive functions added. It is full
+elementary number theory. To understand the difficulties with which "we are confronted"
+whose true nature Herbrand had as yet no inkling, see Gödel 1931 and Herbrand 19316, § 4 (below,
+pp. 626-628); see also Gentzen 1936 and 1938, Ackermann 1940, and Schütte 1951 and 1960.]
+120 [Although in 19316 (below, pp. 623-626) Herbrand gives a much simpler proof of this result,
+the argument that he sketches here, once clarified, can be extended so as to establish the consistency of full elementary number theory (see Dreben and Denton 1967). Moreover, the present
+argument is closely related to the argument for (c') in Note E below, pp. 572-576.]
+
+566
+under consideration will be true in the infinite domain provided the following two
+conditions hold:
+(1) The original descriptive functions have the same values as in A, and the propositional function x = y has the same logical value as in A;
+(2) For each given sequence of n, elements, u1, u2, ..., Un, in I, the function
+Ji(21, U2,..., Un) has the value 0 [that is, aol unless there is a j > 0 such that
+(a) a; and aj+ 1 are in I,
+(B) * (a;, U1, Uz,..., Um) has the logical value "true", and
+(V) $ (a; +1, U1, U2,..., Um) has the logical value "false"
+in which case the function fi (u1, 42,..., Un) has the value aj.
+Thus to actually construct the domain I we need only find the values that the new
+index functions have to take in Г.
+Every function (of whatever height) obtained from the original elementary descriptive functions will be called a function of the first kind; the new index functions
+(which are all of height I) will be called functions of the second kind.
+On any domain C [contained in A] in which the values of certain individuals of E
+are known, we shall perform, whenever possible, the following [two-step| operation:
+(i) For each function of the first kind that is a function of individuals of D whose
+values in C' are known, we add to C the value that this function has in the domain A
+(this value may or may not already occur in C; if it does, we simply have one more
+individual of E whose value in C is known);
+(ii) Once this is done, for each function fi (Y1, Y2, ..., Yn) of the second kind that is a
+function of individuals of E whose values 41, Uz, ..., Un, in C'are known, we proceed thus:
+(a) If Фi(0, U1, Uz,..., Un,) is false in A, we assign the value 0 to fi(u1, Uz, ..., Un);
+(b) If there is a j > O such that a, and a; + 1 are in C and Pila;, U1, U2, ..., Un,) has
+the logical value "true" but $ (a; +1, U1, U2, ..., Un,) has the logical value "false",
+then we assign the value a, to filU1, Uz,..., Uns)
+So let us start from the domain consisting of do and perform the preceding operation
+a sufficient number of times; we obtain larger and larger domains, in which an everincreasing number of individuals of E have values. It is quite obvious that we shall
+reach a point (after a number of operations at most equal to the number of individuals
+of E) where we have a domain I' in which it is no longer possible to perform the preceding operation. The individuals of E will then fall into three sets:
+(1) e1, [the set of] those that have a value in the domain I;
+(2) ez, Ithe set of] those that are functions of the second kind of elements of e, but
+do not satisfy either (a) or (b) above;
+(3) es, [the set of] those that are functions of elements of ez.
+To the elements of ez we assign the value O. The elements of ez are functions of
+elements of ez; in these functions we replace the elements of ez by O. The elements of
+ez remain individuals of E, and their heights are not increased. Io each of these
+elements of ez that thus become elements of e, or ez we assign the value of the indi.
+vidual of E into which it is transformed. For those that become other elements of
+ez we repeat the same transformation.
+Thus we finally assign values in I' to all the individuals of E. Hence we obtain the
+domain of order p that we were looking for. We observe immediately that this domain
+
+567
+satisfies conditions (1) and (2) stated above lon page 566]; and so we come to the end
+of our proof.
+This proof is a characteristic application of our method. We hope that our theorems
+will also enable us to prove the consistency of the theory that is obtained when the
+type of classes (Chapter 3, 2.3121) and the corresponding axioms are added to arithmetic; the difficulties that we have encountered in this direction are similar to those
+presented by the general case of the axiom of mathematical induction and are, it
+seems to us, closely related to the questions raised by Hilbert's Lemma I (1925; [above,
+p. 385]). We believe, moreover, that it may be possible by this approach to arrive at
+a general theorem of which a particular case would be: transcendental methods will not
+enable us to prove in arithmetic any theorem that cannot be proved without their help. 122
+Our theorem of Section 5, which provides a canonical form for every proof, would
+then enable us to give the purely arithmetic proof of these [arithmetic] theorems.
+In the present Section 6 we have given some simple applications of our theorems.
+We hope that in a paper soon to be written we shall be able to show their usefulness
+in the study of " completely determined" theories (Chapter 3, 2.1 123) and in that of the
+constructibility of mathematical objects.124
+But it is quite certain that the most interesting line to pursue, and no doubt the
+most difficult, would be the one in which we search for a solution of the decision
+problem.125 The solution of this problem would yield a general method in mathematics and would enable mathematical logic to play with respect to classical mathematics
+the role that analytic geometry plays with respect to ordinary geometry.
+[The following ten Notes, A through J, The passage to which a Note is attached
+were written by Burton Dreben. Each Note
+is indicated by a footnote, and this is the
+is connected with a particular passage of footnote mentioned below the title of
+the text and, were it not for its length, each Note. There are, moreover, cross
+would be appended there as a footnote. references between footnotes and Notes.]l
+Note A
+(Footnote 15, p. 535 above)
+In Chapter 2, 4.1, Herbrand proves the following statement:
+Let A(P1,..., In) be an identity of the first kind in the distinct atomic propositions
+121 [There, as an example of a theory with an infinite number of hypotheses, Herbrand presents
+"the simplest case of ' set theory': there are two types, the type of elements and the type of classes,
+and one atomic propositional function, x & a, in which the variable x is of the type of elements and
+the variable a of the type of classes; the hypotheses are all the propositions obtained when in
+(На) (x)[x є а = Ф(х)]
+we replace $(x) by any propositional function of x".]
+122 We ascertained that this theorem could be proved if the decision problem were solved and we
+had a proof of the consistency of Russell and Whitehead's theory (with the assumption that the
+multiplicative axiom and the axiom of infinity are true in it). [See Herbrand 1931, p. 54.]
+123 [" A theory will be said to be completely determined if, for every proposition Z containing no
+real variable, Z or ~ Z is true [that is, provable in the theory]."]
+124 [Parts of Herbrand's subsequent papers (1931 and 19316) touch upon these questions, but
+the paper that he contemplates here was never written.]
+125 [See the last paragraph of the main text (p. 55) as well as the final Appendix (pp. 55-56) of
+Herbrand 1931.]
+
+568
+P1,..., Pn, n ≥ 1, where each pi occurs at most once positively and at most once
+negatively. If A ($1,..., $n) results from A(21, ..., Pn) when each p; is replaced by a
+nonelementary proposition Pi, then A ($1, ..., Pn) is an identity of the second kind.
+Herbrand's argument for this statement is inductive and rests upon repeated use
+of the following:
+For some i = 1, ...,n, put $; into prenex form, say (Ex)Ф|(x), and, if pi occurs
+twice in A(PI,..., Pn), let (Ex) Pí(x) be the positive occurrence and (Hy)Ф:(y) the
+negative occurrence of (x)Ф|(x) in A(Ф1,..., (Нх)Ф'(х), (Ну)Ф'(У),..., $л) (this
+formula displays the two different substitutions for the two occurrences of pi). Now
+assume that A (Ф1, . ..., Ф|(У), Ф|(У),..., $n) is provable. Then, by existential generalization, (Hx) A (Ф1, . ..., Ф'(х), Ф'(У), ..., $n) is provable; then, by universal generalization, (У) (4x)А (Ф1,..., Рі(х), Фі(У),..
+., Pn) is provable; hence, by the rules of
+passage, A(Ф1,..., (Нх)Ф (х), (Пу)Фі(у),...,8л) is provable.
+The requirement that in A(P1,..., Pn) each p, occurs at most once positively and
+once negatively is essential to the proof just given. For take A(p) to be (p V p) > p.
+It is obviously an identity of the first kind; but a quick check shows that the substitution instance
+[(х) (Ну) F(x, У) V (х) (Лу) F(x,y)] > (х) (Іу) F(x, у),
+although an identity of the second kind (see Note B below) is not a normal identity.
+Note B
+(Footnote 17, p. 536 above)
+It is important to note that, for an arbitrary proposition P, not only is the proposition (P v P) = P provable in Herbrand's system Qu, but also each of the propositions P> (P V P) and (P V P) > P is provable in Qu without the use of modus
+ponens (see Note D below; also compare the following argument with 5.3 in the text).
+Assume that P has the prenex form
+(1) We shall first see that P> (P v P) is a normal identity, hence is provable in
+Q without the use of modus ponens (see footnote I1 above). Using the rules of passage,
+we turn P> (P V P) into the provably equivalent prenex proposition Q:
+where a; (i = 1,..., n) is O or 1 according as x; is restricted or general in P.
+But clearly Q is a normal identity. For we get an elementary identity I associated
+with & simply by deleting all quantifiers, replacing each restricted variable at -a, by
+the general variable xi, and replacing each restricted variable among the x? by the
+general variable x*1.
+(2) As we saw in Note A, (P V P) > P is not in general a normal identity. However,
+the following prenex proposition R is a normal identity:
++Y฿, -У^-Bn, 1x},…..,IX?, ‡Yİ,..., ‡Y?)
+
+569
+КЕМ (21,..., Хп) У М(У1,..., Уп)] > М(Х,..., Хп); V
+where a; is O or 1, and x? is general or restricted, according as x; is restricted or general
+in P, and B; is O or 1, and Yi is general or restricted, according as x; is restricted or
+general in P.
+Here we get an elementary identity I associated with R by deleting all quantifiers,
+replacing each restricted variable x! " by the general variable x% and each restricted
+variable yi-" by the general variable yi, and replacing each restricted variable
+among the x; and the yi by the general variable xi. (Thus IT has the form
+[(pV V9)p]V p]V [r Vs) 2 q].)
+Now, by the rules of passage R is equivalent to
+[PV P)P]V [P v P) > P].
+But then by the rule of simplification we get (P V P) > P.
+Note C
+(Footnote 19, p. 536 above)
+Herbrand's argument in this paragraph is ingenious but rather briefly expressed.
+Since it plays an essential role in his proof that modus ponens is eliminable from
+quantification theory (see 6.1 on p. 558 above as well as Note D below), it merits
+expansion.
+Let P be any proposition that contains n ≥ 1 bound variables Ix1,..., IXn,
+let M x1,..., X,) be the matrix of P, and let P' be any proposition derived from P
+by a scheme E. Then P = P' is provable in Qu.
+Proof. Assume that the scheme & has k ≥ 1 lines, each containing n signed letters.
+For each i = k let the ith line of I be 1x1,.... Ix, Ix"+1..., Ixn, where the
+initial segment Ix],.... Ix, O ≤ r, < n, is the longest initial segment common to
+both the ith and the (i - 1)th lines of I. (Take r1 = O. Footnote 21 shows why
+nondisjoint lines are being considered.)
+Now let 2; be the subscheme of 2 that consists of the first i lines of 2, and let Pi
+be a proposition derived from P by Ej Then the matrix M; of the prenex proposition
+P; has the form
+М (21, X2,..., Х1, хід + 1,..., Хл),
+and the type I, (that is, the prefix) of P, can be taken to be
+(21212122111^12300[2/+10^IX).
+But then, if we write r for r1+1, a proposition Pi+1 derived from P by the subscheme
+Li + 1 consisting of the first i + 1 lines of I can be given the form
+,....х1+1
+, x;+1>...,an+1)].
+
+570
+Moreover, for r>0, the initial segment Ix], Ixz,.... Ix, of the ith line is
+identical with the initial segment Ix|1, I x2+1
+;..., Ixit1 of the (i + 1)th line
+and lies in the type 1;. So, if r ≤ r. = s, by using the rules of passage first to turn Pi
+into canonical form and then to pull the quantifiers Ixi, .... Ix}, out again, we can
+turn the proposition P; into the provably equivalent proposition Pi of the form
+and we can turn the proposition Pi+1 into the provably equivalent proposition
+Pi+1 of the form
+,...,xh+)].
+And if r > r, = s, then, similarly, P, can be turned into P; of the form
+....,x,+1) V
+and Pi+1 turned into Pi+1 of the form
+... Ix+1)[A(x)+1, xit 1
+But, by once again using the rules of passage, we can make the disjunct (Ix'+1,...,
+Ix"+ 1)M(x|+1
+,..., xit1) identical with the disjunct
+(Ix's+1,...,xn)M (x],...,xn).
+But then Pi+1 becomes provably equivalent to the proposition P?+1 of the form
+(Ixs+1)..., Ixn)M(x],...,xn)].
+(A strictly analogous transformation of Pi+1 takes place if r > r, = s.) But, for any
+Q, + (Q V Q) = Q (see Note B, p. 568 above). Hence, by the theorem of Chapter 2, 6.1
+(see footnote 18),
++P; = P}+1›
+hence, by the rules of passage,
+hence, by induction on the number of lines in 2,
+Note that, by an argument similar to the one given in part 1 of Note B, Po P'
+can easily be shown to be a normal identity, and hence provable in Q. Thus Herbrand's primary concern in the present argument is to show that P'> P is provable
+in Qn.
+
+571
+Note D
+(Footnote 23, p. 537 above)
+If a proposition P has property A, then there is, in Herbrand's system Qa, a formal
+proof of P that can be divided into two parts. Part 1 is a proof of some prenex normal
+identity P'. Part 2 is a proof of P from P'. (In general, P' is assumed to be derivable
+from P by some scheme 2. But any such derivation is not part of the formal proof of
+P in Qн.)
+Now we know—see footnote 11-that part 1 can always be put into a simple
+standard form consisting of a quantifier-free identity followed by the results of
+successive applications of the rules of generalization.
+However, the discussion in Note C shows us that we can also give part 2 a standard
+form if to the system Qu we add, as a new primitive rule of inference (see p. 558 above),
+the following generalized rule of simplification:
+If a proposition R is like a proposition Q except for containing an occurrence of the
+subproposition P where Q contains an occurrence of the subproposition P V P, then
+from @ we can infer R.
+For assume that P?+ 1 is proved in Qu (see Note C). It has the form
+(1x+1..,IXn)M(X1...,Xn)].
+Hence, by the generalized rule of simplification, we prove Pi of the form
+But then, as Herbrand says in 6.1, a proposition P that has property A can be
+proved from a quantifier-free identity just by the use of the two rules of generalization, the rules of passage, and the generalized rule of simplification. The rule of implication (that is, modus ponens) is not needed. (In Section 5, pp. 554-558 above, Herbrand
+shows constructively that a proposition is provable in Qu if and only if it has property
+A. Hence Qu is equivalent to a system Or that is just like Qu except for containing
+the generalized rule of simplification in place of both the rule of simplification and the
+rule of implication. This constructively proved equivalence between Qu and Q's is the
+basic result of Herbrand's thesis.)
+Note E
+(Footnote 60, p. 548 above)
+The following example, taken from Dreben, Andrews, and Aanderaa 1963, shows
+that the first half of (c) is false. Indeed, it shows that to calculate, in general, a
+number q from a number p such that Pa has property C of order g when P, has
+property C of order p we must know more about P, than just the number p. (P2
+contains (x)[Ф(x) V Z] in one place where P, has (x)Ф(x) V Z.)
+For each p≥ 3 let Ap be
+(y2)(y).(·p+1)[~W(y293)V~W(y3,91)V…..V~W(Yp-1,yp)V
+~H(У2, Ур+1) V (НХз)Н (Ур, Хз)],
+
+572
+let P1.p be
+2~[Щ(2122([)~1((Іyı)Н(X2,Уı)],
+and let Pa.p be
+Now, for each p ≥ 3, Pi,p has property C of order 3 and Pz.p has property C of order
+p but of no smaller order.
+We shall soon see, however, that the only additional information needed about Pi
+to obtain q is the number of quantifiers and descriptive functions occurring in P1.
+For, by combining Herbrand's argument with certain ideas of Hilbert, Ackermann,
+and Bernays (see Hilbert 1927, Bernays 1927, Hilbert and Bernays 1939, pp. 93-130,
+and Ackermann 1940, as well as pp. 485-486 and 565-567 above), we can prove:
+(°') Let P, be any proposition that contains no real variable but does contain j
+quantifiers and d descriptive functions, j, d ≥ O. Let P2 be like P1 except for containing (x)[Ф(x) V Z] in one negative occurrence where P1 contains (x) $(x) V Z. Assume
+that P, has property C of order p. Then P, has property C of some order less than or
+equal to p(1 + Ni)°, where N = np is the cardinality of G" = Clu... uCp. But
+then, since N can obviously be bounded by a primitive recursive function 5(j, d, N1),
+where ny is the cardinality of C1, there is a primitive recursive function y(j, d, p, n1)
+such that, if Pi has property C of order p, then P2 has property C of some order less
+than or equal to y(j, d, p, n1).
+Proof (adapted from Dreben and Denton 1966). We begin by defining the notion
+of a standard expansion of a proposition.
+DEFINITION I. Let P be any proposition of height h ≥ 0. If y is any real or general
+variable of P, and x},.... xty, with ry ≥ O, are the restricted variables of P superior
+to y, call fu(x},..., xžy) the superiority index function correlated with y.
+Let E(P) be the elementary proposition that we obtain from P by deleting all the
+quantifiers of P and replacing each real and each general variable of P with its correlated superiority index function. Call E(P) the elementary proposition associated with
+Pand note that the real variables of E(P) are the restricted variables of P.
+For each c ≥ 1, let G(P, c) be the union of the domains C1, Cz, ..., C, generated
+by a set of functions among which are all the descriptive functions of P and all the
+superiority index functions correlated with the general variables of P. (In the present
+Note we write G(P, c) rather than Gc.)
+Let K be either E(P) or a subproposition of E(P). A substitution instance of K over
+G(P, p) is the elementary proposition that we obtain from K by first replacing each
+real variable of K with some member of G(P, p) and then replacing each function in
+the resulting expression with its value in G(P,p + h + 1). If x1..., Xx are all the
+real variables of K and a1,...,ak are any (not necessarily distinct) members of
+G(P, p), then write K[a1, ..., 0k] for the substitution instance of K that we obtain by
+replacing x; with a; for i = 1,...,k.
+Now let R(P, p) be the disjunction (in some order henceforth assumed fixed) of
+all the distinct substitution instances of E(P) over G(P, p), and call R(P, p) the
+standard expansion of P over G(P, p), or the standard expansion of P of order p. (End
+of Definition I.)
+
+573
+On pages 25-27 and in footnote 1 on page 42 of a paper (1931) that he wrote shortly
+after his thesis, Herbrand introduced both the notion of an elementary proposition
+associated with P and that of a standard expansion of P. (The expression "elementary
+proposition associated with P" comes from Herbrand. He had no name for a standard
+expansion; but see footnote 63 above and Note H below.) Herbrand did not show that
+the (far more perspicuous) notion of standard expansion is interchangeable with the
+notion of expansion given on pages 543-544 above. But, if we take into account the
+associative and distributive laws, it is not hard to see that the standard expansion of P
+over G(P, p) is truth-functionally equivalent to the second expansion of P over
+G(P, p). (For the term "second expansion of P" see footnote 44 above.) Hence a
+proposition P has property C of order p if and only if R(P, p) is an identity. But then
+to prove (c') above it suffices to prove that, if R(P1, P) is an identity, R(Pz, u), where
+u = p(1 + N')", is also an identity.
+Let r ≥ 1 be the number of restricted quantifiers in P1 and let n ≥ 0 be the number
+of restricted quantifiers Ix,, ..., IXn in Py Within whose scopes (x)Ф(x) V 2 lies.
+(Note that n ≤ r ≤ j.) Lett ≥ 0 be the number of restricted quantifiers in $ and let
+m ≥ 0 be the number of restricted quantifiers in Z. We shall assume that $ and Z
+each contains at least one general quantifier. (This innocuous assumption simplifies
+our notational conventions. Also, if Z contains no general quantifier, E(PI) and E(P2)
+are identical, and so Pa obviously has property C of order p.) Let us write $, V Z1
+for what (x)Ф(x) V Z becomes in E(P1), and $2 V Zz for what (x)[$(x) v Z]
+becomes in E(P2). When we wish to exhibit the real variables of $1 and $z, $, will
+be written 1(X1,..., Хл, Х, Хл+1,..., Xn+t) and 92 will be written 2(X1,..., Хп, x,
+Xn+ 1,.., Xn+t). Finally, if S' is any set, let us write [SJ for the k-fold Cartesian product
+of S, k ≥ 0 ([S]° is the unit set of the null set, and an ordered O-tuple is the null set).
+By hypothesis, R(P1, P) is an identity. Let q = p(1 + Nn)". Since n Er = j, to
+prove (°') is suffices to prove that R(P2, 9) is an identity. This we shall now do. The
+argument turns on three main definitions and two lemmas. (In what follows, the
+term "truth value" is used for Herbrand's "logical value", the term "truth-value
+assignment" for Herbrand's " system of logical values", and the sign "1" for the first
+element of CI) = (2.)
+DEFINITION II. Let A be any truth-value assignment to R(P2, 9 + p). A function
+a from [G(Pz, 9 + P)]" into G(P2, 9) is said to be A-admissible if and only if, for
+each ordered n-tuple (a1,..,an) in [G(P2, 9 + P)]", either alas,...,an) = 1 or
+there is some ordered t-tuple (An+ 1, ...An++) in [G(P≥, 9)] such that A falsifies the
+substitution instance
+of Xn+1)...,Xn+t), where where =ala1,...,an).
+By an inductive construction on the orders of the elements we can easily associate
+with each function a from [G(P2, 9 † P)]" into G(P2, 9) a unique one-to-one mapping
+Aa of G(PI, P + h + 1) into G(P2, 9 + 1 + h) that satisfies the following three conditions:
+(1) da(ae) = a, for each element de in Cf) = CI.
+(2) Let ty' be any general quantifier in P, and let ty? be the corresponding
+general quantifier in P2.
+
+574
+(i) Assume that Iy' does not occur in Z. If bI,..., bry are any ry members
+of G(P1, p) and if=fu (bi,...,bry), then 4x0) = Ju? 4a101),... 4alOry)].
+(22) Assume that ty- does occur in Z and lies within the scopes of s,1 restricted
+quantifiers also occurring in 2. If b1,..., On, On+1,..., On+sy are any n. + syl members
+of G(P1, P) and if
+then
+4(0)=fu[4(61),..,40(0n,B, 4a(On+1)...,Aa(On+sys)],
+where B= =a[4a(bs),...,Ax(bn)].
+(3) Let f(Xig,..., Xia) be any descriptive function of height v ≤ h occurring in P1.
+If by,...,be are any members of G(P1, 1) and if b = f(b1,..., b), then 4a(5) =
+f[4a(bs),..., Aa(bo)].
+DEFINITION III. For each A-admissible function a, call the one-to-one mapping 4«
+ofG(PI, P + h + 1) into G(Pz, 9 + 1 + h) that satisfies the above three conditions an
+A-admissible a-mapping.
+Note that, since 4a maps G(PI,P + h + 1) into G(P2, 9 + P + h), da maps
+G(P1, 1 + 1) into G(P2, 9 + P) and not merely into G(P2, 9 + P + 1).
+We now come to our basic definition.
+DEFINITION IV. An A-admissible a-mapping 4« is said to be an A-resolvent if and
+only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
+(1) Aa maps G(P1, P + h + 1) into G(P2, 9 + h);
+(2) For each ordered n-tuple <61, ...,On) in [G(P1, P)]", if A falsifies Ф2[4a(61),
+...,Aa(on), Aa(6*), af,..., a*] for some element 6* in G(P1, P) and for some ordered
+t-tuple <af,...,a*) in [G(P2, 9)], then A falsifies Ø2(4a(bJ),..., Aa(on), B, ay,..., a,]
+for B = a[4(61),..., Aalon)] and for some ordered t-tuple (a1, ...,at) in [G(P2, 9)].
+LEMMA I. Let R(P1, P) be an identity. Let A be any truth-value assignment to
+R("2, 9 + P). If A possesses an A-resolvent 4a, then A verifies R(P2, 9).
+Proof. Let A(Aa) be the truth-value assignment induced on R(P1, p) by A and Ja
+thus: for each k-adie predicate letter W of Py and any k members b1,..., Ok Of G(P1,
+p+h + 1), A(da) assigns to the atomic proposition proposition W[b1,...,bk] the same truth
+value that A assigns to W[4(61), ..., 4a(k)]. By hypothesis, R( P1, P) is an identity.
+But it is also a disjunction. Hence A(4a) must verify at least one disjunct of R(P1, P),
+say the substitution instance E(P1)[b1,...,6,]. Using E(P.)[b1,...,b,] and Aa, We
+shall specify a disjunct of R(P2, 9) that A verifies.
+Let
+abbreviated $i V Zi, be the substitution instance of $, V Z1 that occurs in
+# (P1)[01,..., b,]. Consider now the substitution instance E(P2)[4a(br),..., 4a(br)] of
+E(P2) over G(P2, 9). Then
+4214a0c1),... 4a10cm), 4a (0*), AalOus),..., Aa lOum)],
+
+575
+abbreviated $} V Z, is the substitution instance of $2 V Zz that occurs in
+E(P2)[4a(b1),...,Ax(0,)]. We see at once that 9z takes the same truth value under
+A as i takes under A(4a). More generally, we see at once that
+(†) If o is any atomic proposition in E(PI)[b1, ..., 6,] not occurring just in Zi
+and if x is any homologously occurring atomic proposition in E(P2)[4x(br), ..., 4a(b,)],
+then A assigns to x the same truth value as A(4a) assigns to o.
+However, we cannot see at once that A assigns to Z½ the same truth value as
+A(4a) assigns to Zi. For, by Definition III, A(4a) assigns to Z1 the same truth value
+as A assigns to
+Zz= 22[4a(c),..., Aa(cn), B, da(Ou),..., 4«(bum)],
+where B= a[da(0c1),....4abcn)], and we have no right to assume that 4a(6*) = B.
+Nevertheless, it follows from (t) that A verifies E(P2)[4a(b),..., Aa(b,)] provided
+that A assigns to $½ V Z½ the same truth value as A(4a) assigns to $i V Zi. Moreover, it follows from (t) that A verifies E(P2)[4a(b1),...,Aa(b,)] provided that A
+falsifies $$ V Z% and A(da) verifies $1 V Zi. For, since $1 V Z1 occurs negatively
+in E(PI), the substitution instance Ø} V Zi occurs negatively in E(P.)[o1,..., 6,]
+Hence, if we replace $i V Zi in E(P1)[o1,...,0,] by any proposition that is false
+under A(da), the resulting proposition O is still true under A(4a). But then, since
+$½ V Z½ occurs negatively in E(P2)[4a(bI),..., Aa(6,)] and is assumed to be false
+under A, the propositions 0 and E(P2)[4x(bI),...,4a(b,)] will agree in truth value.
+Hence A verifies E(P2)[4a(b1),..., Aa(b,)].
+Thus we need consider only the case in which A(4.) falsifies Ф} V Z, but A verifies
+$½ V Ziz. But here A falsifies $i and also Zz. Hence, since do is an A-resolvent,
+A falsifies some substitution instance, namely
+$⅔=Ф2[4a(bc),...,Aa(bcn), B, A1,...,0ç],
+where (a1,...,a is some ordered t-tuple in [G(P29)] and B= a[4alca),....
+4a(0cn)]. Obviously, A falsifies $3 V Zz. So, let E*(Pa) be the substitution instance of
+E(Pz) over G(P2, 9) that results from E(P2)[4a(b1), ..., 4a(b,)] when we put $3 V Z}
+for ½ V Zz. But then we see from (†) that A verifies E*(P2). Q. e. d.
+LEMMA II. Let A be any truth-value assignment to R(P2, 9 + P). Then A possesses
+an A-resolvent A«
+Proof. We shall construct by induction a sequence o = (a1, a2, ...,aalp) of g/p
+(not necessarily distinct) A-admissible functions and then show that for some z < 9/p
+there is a function a, in o that determines an A-resolvent.
+If a is any A-admissible function and A« is the mapping determined by a, let no
+be the maximum of the orders of the elements in the range of a, and let so be the
+maximum of the orders of those elements in the range of 4a that are images of elements in G(PI, P + 1). Call na the order of a, and do the order of Au. Now na ≤ 9.
+So 8a ≤ na +P ≤ 9 + p. (For the remainder of the proof of Lemma II we shall
+write 4a, Ma, and da in place of Aaa naa and Sad, respectively, when d = 1,.., 9/p.)
+Begin the construction of o by letting a1 be the A-admissible function that assigns
+1 to all n-tuples in [G(P2, 9 + p)]". Since 1 is of order 1, the mapping 41 has the
+order p + 1. Continue inductively as follows.
+
+576
+Consider successively each g < 9/p and assume that the A-admissible function ag
+has an order n, ≤ p(9 - 1) + 1. Then the mapping 4, has an order 8, ≤ p(9 - 1) +
+1+p= pg + 1. Butg < 9/p. Sopg + 1 = gand then 8, ≤ q. If 4, is an A-resolvent,
+let ag+1 = ag. Then 49+1 coincides with 4, and is also an A-resolvent. If, however,
+A, is not an A-resolvent, since 8, ≤ 9, there must be an ordered n-tuple <b1, ..., On) in
+[G(PI, P)] such that,
+(1) For some element 6* in G(P1, p) and some ordered t-tuple ‹at,
+.., a*> in
+[G(P2, 9)1, A falsifies $2[4, (br),..., 4, (On), 4(6*), at,..., a*], but
+(2) For B= ag[4 ag[4,(b1),...,A,(0n)] and each ordered n-tuple <a1,...,at in
+[G(P2, 9)]', A verifies
+Ф2[4(01),...,A,(On), B, a1,...,atl.
+Hence 4(6*) ‡ B. Moreover, since the function a, is assumed to be A-admissible,
+it follows from Definition II that B = 1. Let ag+ 1 be the function that assigns 4, (6*)
+to the ordered n-tuple <4,(61),..., 4,(0n)> and agrees with ay on all other elements of
+G(P2, 9 + 1). But the order of 4, (6*) is less than or equal to 8, ≤ 9. So 79+1 = 9,
+and ag+ 1 is A-admissible.
+Now, in the sequence o = <a1, a2,..., aalp) just constructed, a function ag is
+identical with the function ag+1 if and only if the mapping 4, is an A-resolvent.
+Hence, to complete the proof of Lemma II, we have only to show that there is at
+least one a, in o such that a _ = az+1.
+For each 9 ≤ 9/p and each k ≤ p, let §(g, k) be the number of ordered n-tuples
+<b,..., On) in [G(P1, k)]" such that a [4, (61),.... 4,(on)] = 1, and let the index of
+ag, abbreviated ind(ag), be the ordered p-tuple <5(g, 1), 5(9, 2),..., 5(g, p)>. Then,
+for each g and each m ≤ g/p, write ind(ag) < ind(om) if and only if, for some k ≤ p
+and for all j < k, §(g, k) < §(m, k) but §(g, j) = §(m, İ). We shall now establish:
+(*) For each g< 9/p either a = ag+1 or ind(ag+1) < ind(ag).
+By the construction of o, if a, # ag+1, there is a unique ordered n-tuple ‹61, ...,
+bn> in [G(P1, P)]" such that
+but
+ag+1[4,(b1),....4,(0n)1‡1.
+Moreover, the functions ag and ogt1 agree on all other ordered n-tuples in
+[G(P2, 9 + P)]". Hence, by the construction of an A-admissible a-mapping, if k ≤ P
+is the maximum of the orders of b1,..., On, then, for each element b in G(P1, k),
+4(6) = 49+1(b). Therefore, for all j < k, 5(g + 1, j) = §(9, j). Also,
+ag+1[4,(01),...,4(bn)1=ag+149+1(01),...,49+1(0n)1‡1.
+So §(g + 1, k) < §(g, k), and ind(ag+ 1) < ind(ag). Thus (*) holds.
+But from (*) Lemma II is proved. For there are fewer than (1 + Nn)" = 9/p
+different possible indices. Hence, for some z < 9/p, a. = ax+1. But then 4, is an
+A-resolvent. Q. e. d.
+Thus, with Lemmas I and II, we have proved that, if R(P1, P) is an identity, every
+truth-value assignment to R(P2, 9) verifies R(Pz, 9). But then R(P2, 9) is an identity.
+Hence (c') is proved, since q = p(1 + Nn)" ≤ p(1 + N')".
+
+577
+Note F
+(Footnote 61, p. 548 above)
+Corollary 3.31 is false, since the lemma in 3.3. is false with respect to property C.
+Indeed, the following argument, based on an example due to Stål Aanderaa, shows
+that for each p ≥ 3 and each 9 ≥ p we can construct a proposition Pp.a that has
+property C of order p but no prenex form of which has property C of order less than q.
+For 9 ≥ p let Pa be the proposition
+(У2)(Уз)... (У)_[G(У2, Уз) & G(Уз, У4) &... & G(Ya-I,Ya)]
+{[(1XZ)(HXg)M(Ya,XZ,Xg)&W(2)]V[(Hx)(Hxy)~M(y2,X6, Xy)&~W(z]
+& [(Hs)~M (X2, X5, X4) V W(z)]}.
+The proposition Pa has property C of order 3, but no prenex form of P, has property C
+of an order less than q. Now, for each p ≥ 3 and each 9 Ep let Pp, a be the conjunction
+Pa& Pa.p, where Pr.p is the proposition defined at the beginning of Note E, p. 572
+above. Then Pp. a has property C of order p, but no prenex form of Pp. a has property C
+of an order less than q.
+Thus, whenever Corollary 3.31 is cited in Herbrand's text, it should be replaced
+by the relevant part of the following:
+3.31'. Let P contain i quantifiers and d descriptive functions, and let the cardinality
+of Cy be n, ≥ 1. Let yi, d, p, n.) be the primitive recursive function introduced in
+Note E, p. 572 above, and let 8(j, d, p, nJ) be the primitive recursive function defined
+thus:
+For every i ≥ 1, let
+rI(j, d, P, N1) = y (j, d, p, NI),
+yi+I (j, d, p, ns) = x (j, d, ri(j, d, p, nI), NI);
+then set
+8(j, d, p, nI) = y;=(j, d, P, NI).
+(i) If P has property C of order p, it has property B of order p.
+(ii) If P has property C of order p, any prenex form of P has property C of some
+order less than or equal to 8(j, d, p, nI).
+(iii) If P has property B of order p, it has property C of some order less than or
+equal to o(j, d, p, nI).
+Part (i) of 3.3l' follows at once from the correct part of the lemma in 3.3 (in its original statement by Herbrand). Part (ii) follows from the lemma in 3.3 as emended (see
+Note E, p. 572 above) and the fact that to get any prenex form of P we need no more
+than j° crucial passages from (x)Ф(x) V Z to (x)[Ф(x) V Z], that is, passages in
+which (x)Ф(x) V Z occurs negatively and Z contains a general quantifier. (We are also
+using the fact that, if a proposition has property C of order p, it has property C of
+order q for each q greater than p. But this was justified in footnote 56.) Part (i)
+
+578
+follows from part (ii), the correct part of the lemma in 3.3 (as stated by Herbrand),
+and the fact that properties B and C'are identical for a proposition in canonical form.
+Note G
+(Footnote 81, p. 556 above)
+Lemma 3 in 5.3 is false, and unlike the lemma in 3.3 it remains false even when
+property B replaces property C. For consider the following example (adapted from
+Example 2 in Dreben and Aanderaa 1964), in which properties B and C coincide:
+For each s ≥ 4 let Ps be
+& [(Ys)~Hs(Ys) V (EXs)Hş(Xs)],
+and let &s be
+V [Н½ (ж) & ~ Нз(У)] V ... V [Hs-1 (x) & ~ H, ()]}.
+Now, for each s ≥ 4, Ps has property C of order 2, Ps › Os has property C of order 3,
+and Qs has property C of order s but of no smaller order.
+Herbrand's argument for the lemma, however, goes wrong in only one point.
+Relying on the false Corollary 3.31 (see Note F, p. 577 above), Herbrand assumes that,
+since the conjunction P & (P > Q) has property C of order p, a certain prenex form
+of this conjunction has property C of order p (see the second and third sentences
+of his argument). So Herbrand does succeed in proving the very interesting sublemma:
+5.3'. If a certain prenex form (specified in the third sentence of his argument) of
+P & (P) Q) has property C of order q, then Q has property C of order q.
+Hence, if we now use part (ii) of 3.3l' (see Note F), then from 5.3' we obtain as a
+replacement for Lemma 3 in 5.3:
+5.3". Let P contain j quantifiers and d descriptive functions. Let Q contain k
+quantifiers and e descriptive functions. (Both P and Q are assumed to contain no real
+variables.) If both P and P»& have property C of order p, then Q has property C
+of some order less than or equal to 8(2j + k, 2d + e, p, n1).
+Note H
+(Footnote 97, p. 560 above)
+Herbrand (1931, p. 54) states the following theorem: "If we assume that the
+decision problem has been solved and if we do not wish R + Infin Ax + Mult Ax
+to be inconsistent, we must not add any rule of reasoning to those already considered."
+('R + Infin Ax + Mult Ax" is Herbrand's name for his version of the simple
+theory of types together with the infinity and multiplicative axioms.)
+Immediately after the theorem Herbrand writes: "This theorem corresponds to
+what the Germans call the Vollständigkeit of our system of rules". (The French text
+of this sentence differs from that of the third sentence in Remark 3, on page 560
+above, only in having "théorème" where the latter has "fait".)
+Page 54 belongs to the part of Herbrand's 1931 paper that was written no later
+
+579
+than September 1929. After Herbrand became acquainted with Gödel's incompleteness results (see Gödel 1931), Herbrand added an appendix dated April 1931, and in
+this appendix, on page 56, he restates the theorem above as follows:
+"If the decision problem is solved for a proposition P, if the solution is formalizable
+in R + Infin Ax + Mult Ax (as it is for all the particular cases of the decision problem
+solved up to now) and if P is not an identity, then
+(1) No new rule of reasoning that makes P an identity can be added without entailing a contradiction in R + Infin Ax + Mult Ax;
+(2) P cannot be true [that is, provable] in R + Infin Ax + Mult Ax."
+Thus it seems clear that by "Vollständigkeit" Herbrand did not primarily mean
+what has come to be called "semantic completeness", that is, the notion of completeness specified in Hilbert and Ackermann 1928, p. 68, which for our purposes is best
+formulated thus:
+I. Every proposition of quantification theory either is provable in Herbrand's
+system Qu or can be given a falsifying interpretation over a denumerable universe.
+(For a discussion of this notion of completeness see above, pp. 508-511, and below,
+pp. 582-583.)
+Rather, the theorem quoted in the first paragraph of the present Note and the
+argument that Herbrand sketches for it (1931, PP. 52-54) should be compared with
+Problem V in Hilbert 1928a, pp. 140-141, and also with the discussion in Hilbert and
+Bernays 1939, pp. 234-253, of what is there called a finitistic sharpening of Gödel's
+completeness theorem (see also Kleene 1952, p. 395, Theorem 36).
+Nevertheless, Herbrand's text contains an argument for the semantic completeness of his system Qu. For, by 4.1 (see footnote 67), if a proposition is false in
+some infinite domain, then by nonconstructive means it can be given a falsifying
+interpretation over a denumerable universe. Moreover, by 4.21, either a proposition
+has property B or it is false in some infinite domain. But, by the corollary in 5.1
+(above, p. 555), a proposition that has property B is provable. Hence every proposition
+either is provable or can be given a falsifying denumerable interpretation. (Naturally,
+this argument is not "metamathematical"; see 6.2 and footnote 94 above.)
+Note, however, that the corollary in 5.1. rests upon the lemma in 3.3. So we cannot
+say that with the preceding argument Herbrand proved the semantic completeness of
+his system, unless we include in Herbrand's argument footnotes 51, 59, and especially
+Note E (or the alternative proof of Lemma 1 in 5.I suggested in footnote 77). But, if
+we make one change in the definition, given above on page 552, of "false in an infinite
+domain"—a change that Herbrand himself makes later (1931, pp. 25-27)—we can
+say that Herbrand has proved the following:
+II. Every prenex quantificational proposition either is provable in Qu or can be
+given a falsifying denumerable interpretation.
+For, if we replace the sentence of lines 30-31, on page 552 above, by "Let us start
+again from P; but now with each general variable y we correlate an index function
+whose arguments are the restricted variables that are superior to y", then we can
+avoid any appeal to 3.3 thus:
+Let P be any prenex proposition. By considerations strictly analogous to those in
+4.21, P either has property C or is false in some infinite domain. But by Lemma 1 in
+5.1, if P has property C, it has property A. (Note that for prenex propositions
+
+580
+Herbrand's proof of Lemma 1 does not depend upon 3.3, hence is correct.) By 2.3 (see
+Note D, p. 571 above), if P has property A, it is provable. So P either is provable or is
+false in some infinite domain. But, if P is false in some infinite domain, it can be given
+a falsifying denumerable interpretation (again see footnote 67). Hence every prenex
+proposition either is provable or has a falsifying denumerable interpretation.
+Now, by the rules of passage every proposition can be turned into a prenex one.
+But this, by itself, permits us to say only that Herbrand has shown that every proposition either is provable or is provably equivalent to a prenex proposition that has
+a falsifying denumerable interpretation. To establish proposition I, Herbrand has to
+show that, if a prenex proposition P has a falsifying interpretation, any proposition
+obtained from P solely by the rules of passage also has a falsifying interpretation.
+Of course, it is not hard to give semantic arguments showing this. And one such
+argument is easily extracted from Hilbert and Ackermann 1928, a book to which
+Herbrand refers in his thesis.
+Note I
+(Footnote 109, p. 563 above)
+Let P be any proposition. The Herbrand functional form of P is the proposition
+F (P) that we obtain from P by deleting all restricted quantifiers of P and replacing
+each occurrence of each restricted variable y of P by an occurrence of the index
+function fy (xy....., Xym), where Xyy, ..., Xym are all the general variables of P superior
+to y; the strict Herbrand functional form of P is that quantifier-free proposition
+F (P) that we obtain by deleting all (general) quantifiers of F(P). (Thus the strict
+Herbrand functional form is a generalization of the Skolem functional form of P,
+since P need not be prenex; see p. 508 above.)
+Call any proposition proper if it contains no index functions. Clearly, if P is any
+proposition and R is any proper proposition, the same elementary proposition can be
+associated with both Po R and F(P) > R. (For the notion "elementary proposition
+associated with a proposition" see Definition I in Note E, p. 572 above. Note that, if a
+proposition P contains no real variables, the elementary proposition associated with P
+is the strict Herbrand functional form of ~ P.) Hence, if R is proper, Po R is provable in Herbrand's Qu if and only if F(P) > R is provable in Qu. But F(P) > F (P) is
+obviously provable in QH, and F(P) is provable in Qu + F (P). Thus, for any proper
+theory I, that is, the system Qu with proper propositions added as hypotheses, we
+can constructively find an inessential extension all of whose hypotheses are quantifierfree, namely, the theory I'' that we obtain from T by replacing each hypothesis with
+its strict Herbrand functional form. (See the discussion of symbolische Auflösung in
+Hilbert and Bernays 1939, pp. 1-18 and 130-137.)
+Note J
+(Footnote 110, p. 563 above)
+In Chapter 4 of his thesis Herbrand used what has come to be called the method
+of "elimination of quantifiers" (see Presburger 1929, Tarski 1948 and 1951, and
+Hilbert and Bernays 1934, pp. 234-238) to show that the following subsystem of
+
+581.
+elementary number theory is consistent, formally complete (or, as Herbrand says,
+"completely determined"), and decidable (or, as Herbrand says, "resoluble"):
+I. The primitive signs of the system, which Herbrand calls Theory 3, are (besides
+punctuation signs) truth functions, variables, quantifiers, the constant "0", the
+descriptive function "x + 1"
+, and the atomic propositional function "x = y"
+II. A numeral is defined as "O + I + 1 + ... + 1"
+, where "1" occurs zero or
+more times.
+III. The axioms of Theory 3 are
+1. X = Х,
+2. (x=У) > (У = x),
+3. [(x=4) & (Y = z)]>(x=z),
+4.(x=y) =(x+1= y+ 1),
+5. x+1 # 0,
+6. x #x + a for any numeral a # 0,
+7. (х = 0) V (Hy)(x = y + 1).
+On page 73 of his thesis Herbrand states that von Neumann (1927) showed the
+consistency of Theory 3, but claims rightly that his argument in Chapter 4 is much
+simpler than von Neumann's. Moreover, on pages 81-82 Herbrand shows that
+Theory 3 is equivalent to another theory-call it Theory 4-consisting of the first
+five axioms of Theory 3 and the following axiom schema of mathematical induction
+8 {Ф(О & („[(„)> {(x+1|> Ф(У)•
+(In $(x) bound variables may occur, but no descriptive or propositional functions
+except those explicitly definable in terms of the primitive ones; Herbrand points out
+that his consistency proof does not work if functions definable by recursion but not
+explicitly definable are introduced into Theory 4.) Herbrand establishes this equivalence by showing that
+(a) All instances of Axiom Schema 8 follow from the axioms of Theory 3, and
+(b) Axioms 1-5 together with Axiom Schema 8 yield Axioms 6 and 7.
+(See Shepherdson 1963, especially theorems 2.2 and 3.3.)
+At the end of Chapter 4 Herbrand remarks that the method he has used to study
+Theory 3 has many applications and that, whenever it shows the consistency of a
+theory, it also establishes its decidability. He then concludes by saying: "It appears
+probable that it [that is, his method of elimination of quantifiers] would also permit
+us to obtain the consistency of the theory of real closed fields (Artin and Schrezer
+1926) [see Tarski 1948 and 1951, top of p. 54]. But the methods of the following
+chapter [that is, the present Chapter 5] would lead us to this result more easily."
+One final point. Although Hilbert, Bernays, Ackermann, and von Neumann (see
+Bernays 1927, p. 489 above, and the editor's footnote 3 on the same page) thought
+—until they became acquainted with Gödel's incompleteness results (19306, 1931)—
+that their consistency arguments could readily be extended to full elementary number
+theory, Herbrand was clearly aware that attempts to so extend the arguments that
+he now gives in 6.8 would meet with difficulties (see pp. 565 and 567 above; but see
+also footnote 120, p. 565).
+
+The completeness of the axioms of the functional
+calculus of logic
+KURT GÖDEL
+(1930a)
+In his doctoral dissertation at the
+1922, 1928, and 1929) but contains a
+University of Vienna (1930)ª Gödel proved
+step (Theorem VI) through which semthat the predicate calculus of first order
+antic arguments are connected with
+is complete, in the sense that every valid
+provability in a definite system. At about
+formula is provable. The present paper is
+the same time, Herbrand, too, was ex-
+a rewritten version of this dissertation.
+panding Löwenheim's and Skolem's
+At the beginning of the paper Gödel
+work; the relation between Gödel's
+mentions Whitehead
+and Russell's
+methods and results and those of Hermethod of deriving logic and mathebrand (1930) was brought out by Dreben
+matics from axioms by means of purely
+(1952; see also above, pp. 510 and 579).
+formal rules, and he writes: "Of course,
+Gödel generalizes his result—that every
+when such a procedure is followed the
+formula is either refutable or satisfiable
+question at once arises whether the
+—in two directions, to the predicate calinitially postulated system of axioms and
+culus of first order with identity (in
+principles of inference is complete". One
+which some irrefutable formulas are finmust acknowledge that Whitehead and
+itely satisfiable without being Xo-satis-
+Russell had not shown much concern for
+fiable) and to infinite sets of formulas.
+that problem, any more than they did in
+The second generalization (Theorem IX)
+general for questions that, being semantic
+is derived from the result now known as
+in character, went beyond provability in
+the finiteness, or compactness, theorem
+their system.
+(Theorem X), of which Gödel gives a
+The statement that the pure predicate
+semantic proof.
+calculus of first order is complete, that is,
+By using the procedure of arithmetizathat every valid formula is provable, is
+tion introduced by Gödel in another
+equivalent to the statement that every
+paper (1931), Hilbert and Bernays (1939,
+formula is either refutable or satisfiable.
+pp. 205-253) were able to give what they
+Gödel actually proves a stronger statecall a "proof-theoretic" version of
+ment, namely, that every formula is
+Gödel's completeness theorem: if a foreither refutable or Xo-satisfiable. Hence
+mula is irrefutable in the pure predicate
+his proof yields, besides completeness, the
+calculus of first order, it is irrefutable
+Löwenheim-Skolem theorem,
+which
+states that a satisfiable formula is xosatisfiable. The proof makes use of a
+number of devices introduced by Löwenheim (1915) and Skolem (1920; see also
+1 I am indebted to Professor H. Hahn for
+several valuable suggestions that were of help
+to me in writing this paper.
+a The degree was granted on 6 February
+1930.
+
+583
+also in every consistent system S that that turn out to be always true coincides
+remains consistent when the axioms of with the class of valid formulas. Kleene
+number theory, as well as any verifiable
+(1952, pp. 394-395), making explicit some
+formulas of the theory, are added to the
+results obtained by Hilbert and Bernays
+axioms of S (p. 252; see also Theorem 36 in their arithmetization of Gödel's comin Kleene 1952, p. 395).
+pleteness proof, showed that the predi-
+This proof-theoretic form of Gödel's
+cates can be further restricted to the
+completeness theorem was extended to
+class 22 ^ 112 (in the hierarchy of ariththe case of infinitely many formulas by
+metic predicates). Putnam (1961 and
+Wang (1951; see also 1950, p. 449,
+1965) refined Kleene's result; he restric-
+Theorem 5, and 1962, pp. 345-352) and
+ted the predicates to the class 21, the
+modified so as to give a sharp form of the
+smallest class that contains the recur-
+Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. If Con(≥)
+sively enumerable predicates and is closed
+is the usual formula expressing the conunder truth functions; earlier Kreisel
+sistency of a first-order system I, the re- (1953) and Mostowski (1955) had shown
+sult, called Bernays's lemma by Wang,
+that the predicates could not be restricted
+says that, if we add Con(2) to number
+to the class of recursive predicates, and
+theory as a new axiom, we can prove in
+Putnam (1956) that they could not be rethe resulting system arithmetic translastricted to the class 21 U 1.
+tions of all theorems of E. This lemma has
+Another proof of the completeness of
+been applied in several directions (see, for first-order logic, along lines somewhat
+instance, Wang 1952 and 1955).
+The
+Löwenheim-Skolem
+different from those of Gödel's proof, was
+theorem
+given by Henkin (1949).
+shows that, if the predicates assigned to
+The translation is by Stefan Bauerpredicate letters in accordance with the Mengelberg, and it is printed here with
+definition of validity are just number- the kind permission of Professor Gödel
+theoretic predicates, the class of formulas and Springer Verlag.
+Whitehead and Russell, as is well known, constructed logic and mathematies by
+initially taking certain evident propositions as axioms and deriving the theorems of
+logic and mathematics from these by means of some precisely formulated principles
+of inference in a purely formal way (that is, without making further use of the meaning
+of the symbols). Of course, when such a procedure is followed the question at once
+arises whether the initially postulated system of axioms and principles of inference is
+complete, that is, whether it actually suffices for the derivation of every true logicomathematical proposition, or whether, perhaps, it is conceivable that there are true
+propositions (which may even be provable by means of other principles) that cannot
+be derived in the system under consideration. For the formulas of the propositional
+calculus the question has been settled affirmatively; that is, it has been shown? that
+every true formula of the propositional calculus does indeed follow from the axioms
+given in Principia mathematica. The same will be done here for a wider realm of
+formulas, namely, those of the "restricted functional caleulus",3 that is, we shall
+prove
+2 See Bernays 1926.
+3 In terminology and symbolism this paper follows Hilbert and Ackermann 1928. According to
+that work, the restricted functional calculus contains the logical expressions that are constructed
+from propositional variables, X, Y, Z, ..., and functional variables (that is, variables for properties and relations) of type 1, F(x), G(x, y), H(x, y, 2),..., by means of the operations V (or), - (not),
+
+584
+THEOREM I. Every valid formula of the restricted functional calculus is provable.
+We lay down the following system of axioms as a basis:
+Undefined primitive notions: V,
+, and (x). (By means of these, &, →, ~, and
+(Ex) can be defined in a well-known way.)
+Formal axioms :
+1. X V * →X,
+2. X → X V I,
+3. X V Y → Y V X,
+4. (X → Y) →[Z v X →Z v Y],
+5. (х) F(x) → F(У),
+6. (x)[X V F(x)] → X V (x) F(x).
+Rules of inference :6
+1. The inferential schema: From A and A → B, B may be inferred;
+2. The rule of substitution for propositional and functional variables;
+3. From A(x), (x) A (x) may be inferred;
+4. Individual variables (free or bound) may be replaced by any others, so long as
+this does not cause overlapping of the scopes of variables denoted by the same sign.
+For what follows, it will be expedient to introduce some abbreviated notations.
+(P), (2), (R), and so on mean prefixes constructed in any way whatever, that is,
+finite sequences of signs of the form (x)(Ly), (Y)(x)(Dz)(u), and the like.
+Lower-case German letters, E, 4, 4, D, and so on, mean n-tuples of individual
+variables, that is, sequences of signs of the form x, y, %, Or X2, X1, X2, Xz, and the like,
+where the same variable may occur several times. The signs (2), (Et), and so on are to
+be understood accordingly. Should a variable occur several times in 2, we must,
+of course, think of it as written only once in (E) or (Et).
+Furthermore we require a number of lemmas, which are collected here. The proofs
+are not given, since they are in part well known, in part easy to supply.
+1. For every n-tuple t
+(a) (x) F(E) → (EE) F(x),
+(c)(E) F(x)~(E(x) F(x))
+are provable.
+2. If E and ' differ only in the order of the variables, then
+(Ex)F(x) → (Er)F(x)
+is provable.
+(x) (for all), (Ex) (there exists), with the variable in the prefixes (x) or (Ex) ranging over individuals
+only, not over functions. A formula of this kind is said to be valid (tautological) if a true proposition
+results from every substitution of specific propositions and functions for X, Y, Z,... and F(x),
+Ca I be more petives, Wosea say )Eld in Fry domain of individuals "
+, which, according
+to well-known theorems, means the same as "valid in the denumerable domain of individuals"
+.,W) is satisfiable, so that
+5 It coincides (except for the associative principle, which P. Bernays proved to be redundant)
+with that given in Whitehead and Russell 1910, *1 and *10.
+® Although Whitehead and Russell use these rules throughout their derivations, they do not
+formulate all of them explicitly.
+
+585
+3. If ¿ consists entirely of distinct variables and if ' has the same number of
+terms as t, then
+(2) F(x) → (2) F(E)
+is provable, even when a number of identical variables occur in «'.
+4. If (pi) means one of the prefixes (x) or (Ex,) and if (9i) means one of the prefixes
+(У1) or (Lyt), then
+(P1) (22)... (Pn) F(X1, Х2,..., Хл) & (g1) (92)... (9m)G(У1, У2,.., Ут)
+~ (P)[F(X1, X2,....Хn) & G(Y1, У2,..,Ym)]
+is provable? for every prefix (P) that is formed from the (pi) and the (gi) and satisfies
+the condition that, for i < * ≤ n, (pi) precedes (2k) and, for i < * ≤ m, (9) precedes
+(9к).
+5. Every expression can be brought into normal form; that is, for every expression
+A there is a normal formula N such that A ~ N is provable.®
+6. If A~ B is provable, so is J(A) ~ J(B), where J(A) represents an arbitrary
+expression containing A as a part (see Hilbert and Ackermann 1928, chap. 3, § 7).
+7. Every valid formula of the propositional calculus is provable; that is, Axioms
+1-4 form a complete axiom system for the propositional calculus.°
+We now proceed to the proof of Theorem I and first note that the theorem can also
+be stated in the following form:
+THEOREM II. Every formula of the restricted functional calculus is either refutable o
+or satisfiable (and, moreover, satisfiable in the denumerable domain of individuals).
+That I follows from II can be seen as follows: Let A be a valid expression; then A
+is not satisfiable, hence according to II it is refutable; that is, A is provable and,
+consequently, so is A. The converse is as apparent.
+We now define a class A of expressions K by means of the following stipulations :
+1. K is a normal formula;
+2. K contains no free individual variable;
+3. The prefix of K begins with a universal quantifier and ends with an existential
+quantifier.
+Then we have
+THEOREM III. If every A-expression is either refutable or satisfiable," so is every
+expression.
+Proof. Let A be an expression not belonging to A. Let it contain the free variables
+I. As is immediately obvious, the refutability of (Et) A follows from that of A, and
+conversely (by Lemma I(c), and either Rule of inference 3 or, for the converse,
+Axiom 5); the same holds, according to the stipulation in footnote 4, for satisfiability.
+Let (P)N be the normal form of (EF) A, so that
+(Ex)A~ (P)N
+(1)
+° See Bernays 1926.
+norm and it aparad of de.
+10 " A is refutable" is to mean "À is provable".
+11 "Satisfiable" without additional specification here and in what follows always means
+"satisfiable in the denumerable domain of individuals". The same holds for "valid".
+
+586
+is provable. Further let
+B = (x)(P)(Ey)[N & {F(x) V F(y)}].12
+Then
+(P)N~ B
+is provable (on the basis of Lemma 4 and the provability of (x)(Ey)[F(x) V F(y)]).
+B belongs to S and thus according to the assumption is either satisfiable or refutable.
+But, by (1) and (2), the satisfiability of B entails that of (Ex) A, hence also that of
+A; the same holds for refutability. Thus A, too, is either satisfiable or refutable.
+Because of Theorem III, therefore, it suffices to show that
+Every A-expression is either satisfiable or refutable.
+For this purpose we define the degree of a St-expression' to be the number of
+blocks in its prefix that consist of universal quantifiers and are separated from each
+other by existential quantifiers, and we first prove
+THEOREM IV. If every expression of degree k is either satisfiable or refutable, so is
+every expression of degreek + 1.
+Proof. Let (P)A be a A-expression of degree k + 1. Let (P) = (E)(Et)(Q) and let
+(Q) = (1)(ED) (R), where (Q) is of degree k and (R) of degree k - 1. Further let f' be
+a functional variable not occurring in A. If we now put!
+and
+O= (E)(z)(1)(1)(En)(ED)(R){F(¿, 1) & [F(E, 1) → 413,15
+then a double application of Lemma 4 in combination with Lemma 6 yields the
+provability of
+B~C;
+(3)
+furthermore,
+B → (P)A
+(4)
+is obviously valid. Now C' is of degree k and by assumption is therefore either satisfiable or refutable. If it is satisfiable, so is (P)A (by (3) and (4)). If it is refutable, so is
+B (by (3)); that is, B is then provable. In that case, if we substitute (Q) A for F in B,
+it follows that
+is provable.
+But since, of course
+is provable, so is (*')(Ey')(Q) A; that is, in that case (P) A is refutable. (P) A is therefore indeed either refutable or satisfiable.
+12 The variables x and y must not occur in (P).
+13 The term "degree of a prefix" is used in the same sense.
+14 An analogous procedure was used by Skolem (1920) in proving Löwenheim's theorem.
+15 The variable-sequences i, "', 1, 1', I, t are, of course, assumed to be pairwise disjoint.
+
+587
+It now remains only to prove
+THEOREM V. Every formula of degree 1 is either satisfiable or refutable.
+A few definitions are required for the proof. Let (E) (Et)) A(z; 1) (abbreviated as
+(P)A) be any formula of degree 1. Let & stand for an r-tuple and t) for an s-tuple of
+variables. We think of the r-tuples taken from the sequence o, X1, X2, ..., Xi,... as
+forming a sequence ordered according to increasing sum of the subscripts Land for
+equal sums according to some convention]:
+Е1 = (Хо, Хо,...,хо), Е2 = (Х1, Хо, ...,хо), Ез = (хо, Х1, Хо....,Хо),
+and so forth; we now define a sequence {An} of formulas derived from (P)A as
+follows:
+A1 = A(EI; XI, X2,..., Xs),
+Az= A (Ez; Xs+1, Xs+2)..., X28) & A1,
+•
+An= A(En; X(n-1)s+1, X(M-I)s+21.., Xns) & An-1.
+Let the s-tuple (n-1)s+ 1,..., Xns be denoted by In, so that we have
+An= A(En; In) & An-1.
+(5)
+Further we define (Pn) An by the stipulation
+(Pn)An = (Ex)(Ex)... (Exns) An.
+As we can easily convince ourselves, it is precisely the variables xo to ns that occur
+in An; hence they all are bound by (Pn). Further it is apparent that the variables of
+the r-tuple En+1 already occur in (Pn) (and therefore certainly differ from those
+occurring in In+ 1). Denote by (Pí) what remains of (Pn) when the variables of the
+r-tuple En+ 1 are omitted, so that, except for the order of the variables, (EEn +1) (Pr)
+This notation once assumed, we have
+THEOREM VI. For every n
+(P)A → (Pn)An
+is provable.
+For the proof we use mathematical induction.
+I. (P)A → (P1) A1 is provable, for we have
+(E)(Et)) A(E; 1)) → (EI(Et)1)A (EI; 71)
+(by Lemma 3 and Rule of inference 4) and
+(EI)(E)1)A(EI; 41)→(E[1)(E)1)A(21;71)
+(by Lemma I(a)).
+II. For every n, (P) A & (Pn)An → (Pn+ 1) An+ 1 is provable, for we have
+(E)(1))A(E:))→(En+1)(Et)n+1)A(En+1; 4n +1)
+(by Lemma 3 and Rule of inference 4) and
+(Pn)An→ (EEn+1) (Pn) An
+(6)
+(7)
+
+588
+(by Lemma 2). Furthermore,
+(En+ 1)(Et)n+1)A(En+1; In+ 1) & (EEn+1) (P'")An
+→ (DEn+1)|(El)n+1) A(En +1; In+ 1) & (Pn) An] (8)
+(by Lemma 1(6) with the substitutions (Et)n+1) A(En+1; In+1) for F and (Pi) An
+for G).
+If we observe that the antecedent of the implication (8) is the conjunction of the
+consequents of (6) and (7), it is clear that
+(P)A & (Pn)An→ (EEn+1)[(Et)n+1)A(En+1;4n+1) & (P)An]
+(9)
+is provable. Furthermore, from (5) and Lemmas 4, 6, and 2 the provability of
+(EEn+1)[(Et)n+1)A(En+1;$n+1)&(Pń)An]~(Pn+1)An+1
+(10)
+follows. II follows from (9) and (10), and from II, together with I, Theorem VI
+follows.
+Assume that the functional variables F1, F2,..., Ek and the propositional variables X1, Xz,..., X, occur in A. Then An consists of elementary components of the
+form
+compounded solely by means of the operations V and . With each An we associate
+a formula Bn of the propositional calculus by replacing the elementary components
+of An by propositional variables, making certain that different components (even if
+they differ only in the notation of the individual variables) are replaced by different
+propositional variables. Furthermore, we understand by " satisfying system of level n
+[Erfüllungssystem n-ter Stufe] of (P)A" a system of functions fin
+', f2,....Ji defined in the domain of integers z (0 ≤ » ≤ ns) as well as of truth values w!)
+w!") for the propositional variables X1, Xz, ..., X, such that a true proposition results
+if in An the F; are replaced by the fin, the x; by the numbers i, and the X, by the
+corresponding truth values w!"). Satisfying systems of level n obviously exist if and
+only if Bn is satisfiable.
+Each Bn, being a formula of the propositional calculus, is either satisfiable or
+refutable (Lemma 7). Thus only two cases are conceivable:
+1. At least one By is refutable. Then, as we can easily convince ourselves (Rules
+of inference 2 and 3, Lemma I(c)), the corresponding (Pn)An is refutable also, and
+consequently, because of the provability of (P)A → (Pn)An, so is (P)A.
+2. No B, is refutable; hence all are satisfiable. Then there exist satisfying systems
+of every level. But, since for each level there is only a finite number of satisfying
+systems (because the associated domains of individuals are finite) and since furthermore every satisfying system of level n + 1 contains one of level n as a partl (as is
+clear from the fact that the An are formed by successive conjunctions), it follows by
+16 That a system {f1, f2,.. I; W1, W2,..., Wi} is part of another, {91, 92,..., 9k; "1, U2,..., V,),
+is to mean that
+1. The domain of individuals of the f, is part of the domain of individuals of the gi;
+2. The fi and the gi coincide within the narrower domain;
+3. For every i, v, = W;.
+
+589
+familiar arguments 6a that in this case there exists a sequence of satisfying systems
+S1, Sz,..., Sk,... (St being of level k) such that each contains the preceding one as
+a part. We now define in the domain of all integers 20 a system S = {Ф1, Ф2, ..., Фк;
+a1, 02,..., 01} by means of the following stipulations:
+1. Фp(a1,..., ai) (1 ≤ P ≤ k) holds if and only if for at least one Sm of the sequence
+above (and then for all subsequent ones also) J" (a1, ..., Ai) holds;
+2. a, = wm) (1 ≤ i ≤ 1) for at least one Sm (and then also for all those that follow).
+Then it is evident at once that S makes the formula (P)A true. In this case, therefore, (P) A is satisfiable, which concludes the proof of the completeness of the system
+of axioms given above. Let us note that the equivalence now proved, "valid =
+provable",
+, contains, for the decision problem, a reduction of the nondenumerable to
+the denumerable, since "valid" refers to the nondenumerable totality of functions,
+while "provable" presupposes only the denumerable totality of formal proofs.
+Theorem I, as well as Theorem II, can be generalized in various directions. First,
+it is easy to bring the notion of identity (between individuals) into consideration by
+adding to Axioms 1-6 above two more:
+7. x = X,
+8. x = y → [F(x) → F(y)].
+An analogue of what we had above now holds for the extended realm of formulas
+too:
+THEOREM VII. Every formula of the extended realm is provable if it is valid (more
+precisely, if it is valid in every domain of individuals),
+and, equivalent to VII,
+THEOREM VIII. Every formula of the extended realm is either refutable or satisfiable
+(and, moreover, satisfiable in a finite or denumerable domain of individuals).
+For the proof, let A denote an arbitrary formula of the extended realm. We construct a formula B as the product (conjunction) of A, (x)(x = x), and all the formulas
+that we obtain from Axiom 8 by substituting for f' the functional variables occurring
+in A, that is, more precisely,
+(X)(Y){x = y → [F(x) → F(y)]}
+for all singulary functional variables of A,
+(X)(Y)(2){x = y → [F(x, 2) → F(y, z)]} & (x)(y)(z){x = Y → [F (z, x) → F(z, y)]}
+for all binary functional variables of A (including "=" itself), and corresponding
+formulas for the n-ary functional variables of A for which n ≥ 3. Let B' be the
+formula resulting from B when the sign "=" is replaced by a functional variable G
+not otherwise occurring in B. Then the sign "=" no longer occurs in the expression
+B', which, therefore, according to what was proved above, is either refutable or
+satisfiable. If it is refutable, so is B, since it results from B' through the substitution
+of"=" for G. But B is the logical product of A and a subformula that is obviously
+provable from Axioms 7 and 8. In this case, therefore, A is also refutable. Let us now
+assume that B' is satisfiable in the denumerable domain Z of individuals for a certain
+system S of functions.! From the way in which B' is formed it is clear that g (that is,
+16a [Apparently by König's infinity lemma (1926, p. 120; see also 1927), which was becoming
+known among mathematicians at the time Gödel was writing.]
+17 If propositional variables also occur in A, S' will, of course, have to contain, besides functions,
+truth values for these propositional variables.
+
+590
+the function of the system s that is to be substituted for G) is a reflexive, symmetric,
+and transitive relation; hence it generates a partition of the elements of I, in such a
+way, moreover, that a function occurring in the system S continues to hold, or not
+to hold, as the case may be, when elements of the same class are substituted for one
+another. If, therefore, we identify with one another all elements belonging to the
+same class (perhaps by taking the classes themselves as elements of a new domain of
+individuals), then g goes over into the identity relation and we have a satisfying
+system of B, hence also of A. Consequently, A is indeed either satisfiable18 or
+refutable.
+We obtain a different generalization of Theorem I by considering denumerably
+infinite sets of logical expressions. For these, too, an analogue of Theorems I and II
+holds, namely
+THEOREM IX. Every denumerably infinite set of formulas of the restricted functional
+calculus either is satisfiable (that is, all formulas of the system are simultaneously
+satisfiable) or possesses a finite subsystem whose logical product is refutable.
+IX follows immediately from
+THEOREM X. For a denumerably infinite system of formulas to be satisfiable it is
+necessary and sufficient that every finite subsystem be satisfiable.
+Concerning Theorem X we first note that in proving it we can confine ourselves to
+systems of normal formulas of degree 1, for, by repeated application of the procedure
+used in the proofs of Theorems III and IV to the individual formulas, we can specify
+for every system I of formulas a system Z' of normal formulas of degree 1 such that
+the satisfiability of any subsystem of I is equivalent to that of the corresponding
+subsystem of 2.
+Thus let
+(EI)(EX)1) A1(21; 121) (E2)(Et2A2(E2;12),..., (En)(En)An(En;Hn),...
+be a denumerable system & of normal expression of degree 1, and let zi be an r-tuple,
+Di an si-tuple of variables. Let 21, 22, ..., En, ... be the sequence of all r, tuples taken
+from the sequence xo, X1, X2,..., Xp... and ordered according to increasing sum of
+the subscripts [and for equal sums according to some convention]; furthermore, let
+Di be an si-tuple of variables, of the sequence above, such that the sequence of
+variables
+becomes identical with the sequence x1, X2,..., Xn.... if every 1i is replaced by the
+corresponding s; tuple of the x. Further we define, in a way analogous to what was
+done above, a sequence {Bn} of formulas by means of the stipulations
+B1 = A1 (El; 1ł),
+...& An- 1(22-1; 12 1) & An(El; 47).
+We can easily see that (Pn)Bn (that is, the formula that results from Bn when all
+18 And, moreover, in an at most denumerable domain (for it consists of disjoint classes of the
+denumerable domain I of individuals).
+
+591
+individual variables occurring in it are bound by existential quantifiers) is a consequence of the first n expressions of the system I given above. If, therefore, every
+finite subsystem of 2 is satisfiable, so is every Bn. But, if every Bn is satisfiable, so
+is the entire system I (as follows by the argument used in the proof of Theorem V
+(see p. 588)), and Theorem X is thus proved. Theorems IX and X can be extended
+without difficulty, by the procedure used in the proof of Theorem VIII, to systems
+of formulas containing the sign "="
+We can also give a somewhat different turn to Theorem IX if we confine ourselves
+to systems of formulas without propositional variables and regard them as systems
+of axioms whose primitive notions are the functional variables occurring in them.
+Then Theorem IX clearly asserts that every finite or denumerable axiom system in
+whose axioms "all" and "there exists" never refer to classes or relations but only to
+individuals!° either is inconsistent (that is, a contradiction can be constructed in a
+finite number of formal steps) or possesses a model [Realisierung!.
+Finally, let us also discuss the question of the independence of Axioms 1-8. So far
+as Axioms 1-4 (those of the propositional calculus) are concerned, it has already been
+shown by P. Bernays? that none of them follows from the other three. That their
+independence is not affected even by the addition of Axioms 5-8 can be shown by
+means of the very same interpretations that Bernays uses, provided that, in order to
+extend them to formulas containing functional variables and the sign "="
+, we make
+the following stipulations:
+1. The prefixes and individual variables are omitted;
+2. In what remains of each formula the functional variables are to be treated just
+like propositional variables;
+3. Only "distinguished" values may ever be substituted for the sign "=".
+To demonstrate the independence of Axiom 5, we associate with each formula
+another one, which we obtain by replacing components of the form
+(х) Е(х), (у) F(у),... ; (х)G(х), (У) G(y), ...;...,21
+should such occur, by X v X. Then Axioms 1-4 and 6-8 go over into valid formulas,
+and the same holds, as we can convince ourselves by mathematical induction, of all
+formulas derived from these axioms by Rules of inference 1-4; Axiom 5, however,
+does not possess this property. The independence of Axiom 6 can be shown in exactly
+the same way, except that here (x) F(x), (Y) F(y),..., and so on must be replaced by
+X & X. To prove the independence of Axiom 7 we note that Axioms 1-6 and 8 (and
+therefore also all formulas derived from them) remain valid if the identity relation
+is replaced by the empty relation, whereas this is not the case for Axiom 7. Similarly,
+the formulas derived from Axioms 1-7 remain valid when the identity relation is
+replaced by the universal relation, whereas this is not the case for Axiom 8 (in a
+domain of at least two individuals). We can also readily see that none of the Rules
+of inference 1-4 is redundant, but we shall not look into this more closely here.
+19 Hilbert's axiom system for geometry, without the axiom of continuity, can perhaps serve as
+an example.
+20 See Bernays 1926.
+21 That is, the singulary functional variables F, G,... preceded by a universal quantifier whose
+scope is just the F, G,.. in question, along with the associated individual variable.
+
+Some metamathematical results on completeness and
+consistency,
+On formally undecidable propositions of
+Principia mathematica and related systems I,
+and
+On completeness and consistency
+KURT GÖDEL
+(19306, 1931, and 193la)
+The main paper below (1931), which
+was to have such an impact on modern
+logic, was received for publication on
+17 November 1930 and published early
+in 1931. An abstract (19306) had been
+presented on 23 October 1930 to the
+Vienna Academy of Sciences by Hans
+Hahn.
+Gödel's results are now accessible in
+many publications, but his original paper
+has not lost any of its value as a guide.
+It is clearly written and does not assume
+any previous result for its main line of
+argument. It is, moreover, rich in interesting details. We now give some indications of its contents and structure.
+Section 1 is an informal presentation
+of the main argument and can be read by
+the nonmathematician; it shows how the
+argument, by dealing with the proposition that states of itself "I am not
+provable",
+', instead of the proposition that
+states of itself "I am not true"
+', skirts
+the Liar paradox, without falling into it.
+Gödel also brings to light the relation
+that his argument bears to Cantor's
+diagonal procedure and Richard's paradox (Herbrand, on pages 626-628 below,
+and Weyl (1949, pp. 219-235) particularly stress this aspect of Gödel's argument; see also above, p. 439).
+Section 2, the longest, is the proof of
+Theorem VI. The theorem states that in
+a formal system satisfying certain precise conditions there is an undecidable
+proposition, that is, a proposition such
+that neither the proposition itself nor its
+negation is provable in the system.
+Before coming to the core of the argument, Gödel takes a number of preparatory steps:
+(1) A precise description of the system
+P with which he is going to work. The
+variables are distinguished as to their
+types and they range over the natural
+numbers (type 1), classes of natural
+numbers (type 2), classes of classes of
+natural numbers (type 3), and so forth.
+The logical axioms are equivalent to the
+logic of Principia mathematica without
+the ramified theory of types. The arithmetic axioms are Peano's, properly
+transcribed. The identification of the
+individuals with the natural numbers and
+
+593
+the adjunction of Peano's axioms (in-
+Gödel can then undertake to prove
+stead of their derivation, as in Principia) Theorem VI. The scope of the theorem is
+have the effect that every formula has an
+enlarged by the addition of any w-consisinterpretation in classical mathematics
+tent primitive recursive class r of forand, if closed, is either true or false in
+mulas to the axioms of P. For each such
+that interpretation; moreover, proofs
+are considerably shortened.
+« a different system is thus obtained (in
+the present note,
+(2) An assignment of natural numbers
+"Px"
+, a notation not
+used by Gödel, will denote the system
+to sequences of signs of P and a similar
+corresponding to a given «). After the
+assignment to sequences of sequences of
+proof Gödel makes a number of important
+signs of P. The first assignment is such
+remarks:
+that, given a sequence, the number
+(a) He points out the constructive conassigned to it can be effectively calcu- tent of Theorem VI.
+lated, and, given a number, we can
+(6) He introduces predicates that are
+effectively decide whether the number is
+entscheidungsdefinit (in the translation
+assigned to a sequence and, if it is,
+below these are called decidable predi.
+actually write down the sequence; simicates, at the author's suggestion). If we
+larly for the second assignment. By
+take into account the few lines added in
+means of these assignments we can corproof at the end of a later note of
+relate number-theoretic predicates with
+Gödel's (1934a), these predicates are in
+metamathematical notions used in the
+fact those that today we call recursive
+description of the system; for example,
+(that is, general recursive) predicates.
+to the notion "axiom" corresponds the
+Gödel somewhat extends the result of
+predicate Ax(x), which holds precisely of
+Theorem VI by assuming only that k is
+the numbers x that are assigned to decidable, and not that it is primitive
+axioms (the "Gödel numbers" of axioms,
+recursive.
+we would say today.
+(c) If « is assumed to be merely consis-
+(3) A definition of primitive recursive
+tent, instead of w-consistent, the proof
+functions (Gödel calls them recursive
+yields the existence of a predicate whose
+functions) and the derivation of a few
+universalization is not provable but for
+theorems about them. These functions
+which no counterexample can be given;
+had already been used in foundational
+Px is w-incomplete, as we would say
+research (for example, by Dedekind
+today.
+(1888), Skolem (1923), Hilbert (1925,
+(d) The adjunction of the undecidable
+1927), and Ackermann (1928)); Gödel
+formula Neg(17 Gen r) to « yields a congives a precise definition of them, which
+sistent but w-inconsistent system.
+has become standard.
+(e) Even with the adjunction of the
+(4) The proof that forty-five number- axiom of choice or the continuum hytheoretic predicates, forty of them pothesis the system contains undecidable
+associated with metamathematical no-propositions.
+tions, are primitive recursive.
+The section ends with a review of the
+(5) The proof that every primitive re- properties of P that are actually used in
+cursive number-theoretic predicate is
+the proot and the remark that all known
+numeralwise representable in P. That is,
+axiom systems of mathematics, or of any
+the predicate holds of some given numsubstantial part of it, have these propbers it and only if a definite formula of P
+erties.
+is provable whenever its free variables
+Section 3 presents two supplementary
+are replaced by the symbols that repreundecidability results. Gödel establishes
+sent these numbers in P.
+(Theorem VII) that a primitive recursive
+(6) The definition of w-consistency.
+number-theoretic predicate is arithmetic,
+
+594
+that is, can be expressed as a formula of character, its applicability to set theory
+first-order number theory (this yields a
+and ordinary analysis, its effect upon
+stronger result than the numeralwise
+Hilbert's conception of mathematics).
+representability of such predicates, as it
+Gödel's paper immediately attracted
+was introduced and used in Section 2).
+the interest of logicians and, although it
+Hence every formula of the form (x) F(x),
+caused some momentary surprise, its
+with F(x) primitive recursive, is equivresults were soon widely accepted. A
+alent to an arithmetic formula; moreover,
+number of studies were directly inspired
+this equivalence is provable in Px: one
+by it. By using a somewhat more comcan review the informal proof presented
+plicated predicate than "is provable in
+by Gödel and check that Px is strong
+P",
+", Rosser (1936) was able to weaken
+enough to express and justify each of its
+the assumption of w-consistency in
+steps.
+Since the proposition that was
+Theorem VI to that of ordinary consisproved to be undecidable in Theorem VI
+tency. Hilbert and Bernays (1939, pp.
+is of the form (x)F(x), with F(x) prim-
+283-340) carried out in all details the
+itive recursive, Px contains undecidable
+proof of the analogue of Theorem XI for
+arithmetic propositions (Theorem VIII).
+two standard systems of number theory,
+For all its strength, the system Px cannot
+Zu and Z, and this proof can be transdecide every first-order number-theoretic
+ferred almost literally to any system
+proposition. Theorem X states that,
+containing Z. As Gödel indicates in a
+given
+a formula (x) F(x), with F(x)
+note appended to the present translation
+primitive recursive, one can exhibit a
+of his paper, Turing's work (1937) gave
+formula of the pure first-order predicate
+to the notion of formal system its full
+calculus, say A, that is satisfiable if and
+generality. The notes of Gödel's Princeton
+only if (x) F(x) holds. Moreover, since Px
+lectures (1934) contain the most imporcontains a set theory, the equivalence
+tant results of the present paper, in a
+more succinct form; they also make pre-
+(x) F(x) = (A is satisfiable)
+cise the notion of (general) recursive
+is expressible in Pr and, as one can verify
+function, already suggested by Herbrand
+by reviewing Gödel's informal argument,
+(see below, p. 618). In developing the
+provable in Px. Therefore (Theorem IX)
+theory of these functions, Kleene (1936)
+there are formulas of the pure first-order
+obtained undecidability results of a
+predicate calculus whose validity is
+somewhat different character from those
+undecidable in Px•
+presented here. Gödel's work led to
+In Section 4 an important consequence
+Church's negative solution (1936) of the
+of Theorem V1 is derived. The statement
+decision problem for the predicate calcu-
+"there exists in Px an unprovable forlus of first order. Tarski (1953) developed
+mula".
+, which expresses the consistency
+a general theory of undecidability. The
+of Px, can be written as a formula of Px;
+device of the "arithmetization" of metabut this formula is not provable in Px
+mathematics became an everyday tool of
+(Theorem XI). The main step in the
+the research worker in foundations.
+demonstration of this result consists in
+Gödel's results, finally, led to a profound
+reviewing the proof of the first half of
+revision of Hilbert's program (on that
+Theorem VI and checking that all the
+point see, among other texts, Bernays
+statements made in that proof can be
+1938, 1954 and Gödel 1958).
+expressed and proved in Pr. It is clear
+These indications are far from giving a
+that this is the case, and Gödel does not
+full account of the deep influence exerted
+go through the details of the demonin the field of foundations of mathestration. The section ends with various
+matics by the results presented in the
+remarks on Theorem XI (its constructive
+paper below and the methods used to
+
+595
+obtain them. There is not one branch of capitalization), however, is used for only
+research, except perhaps intuitionism,
+some of the number-theoretic predicates
+that has not been pervaded by this
+in question. According to Professoi
+influence.
+Gödel, "the idea was to use the notation
+The translation of the paper is by the
+only for those metamathematical notions
+editor, and it is printed here with the
+that had been defined in their usual sense
+kind permission of Professor Gödel and
+before, namely, those defined on pp. 599-
+Springer Verlag. Professor Gödel ap-
+601. From p. 607 up to the general conproved the translation, which in many
+siderations at the end of Section 2, and
+places was accommodated to his wishes.
+again in Section 4, every metamathe-
+He suggested, in particular, the various
+matical term referring to the system P
+phrases used to render the word "inhaltis supposed to denote the corresponding
+lich". He also proposed a number of
+arithmetic one. But, of course, because of
+short interpolations to help the reader,
+the complete isomorphism the distinction
+and these have been introduced in the in many cases is entirely irrelevant"
+text below between square brackets.
+Before the main text the reader will
+Below, on page 601, the author shows
+find a translation, by Stefan Bauerhow a number-theoretic predicate can be
+Mengelberg, of its abstract (1930b);
+associated with a given metamathematiin that translation, at the author's
+cal notion and then used to represent the
+suggestion, "entscheidungsdefinit"
+' when
+notion. In the German text such a predreferring to an axiom system, has
+icate is denoted by the same word as the
+been translated by "complete"
+original notion, except that the word is
+printed in italics. Since in English italics
+Entscheidungsdefinitheit by com
+pleteness"
+are used for emphasis (while the German
+• A translation, by the editor,
+of 193la, a note dated 22 January 1931
+text uses letter spacing for that purpose,
+and closely connected with 1931, follows
+the translation below uses SMALL CAP-
+the main text. Both translations are
+ITALS for the names of these predicates. printed here with the kind permission
+This scheme of italicization (or small- of Professor Gödel.
+SOME METAMATHEMATICAL RESULTS ON COMPLETENESS AND
+CONSISTENCY
+(1930b)
+If to the Peano axioms we add the logic of Principia mathematica! (with the
+natural numbers as the individuals) together with the axiom of choice (for all types),
+we obtain a formal system S, for which the following theorems hold :
+I. The system S is not complete [entscheidungsdefinit]; that is, it contains propositions A (and we can in fact exhibit such propositions) for which neither A nor A
+is provable and, in particular, it contains (even for decidable properties F of natural
+numbers) undecidable problems of the simple structure (Ex) F(x), where x ranges
+over the natural numbers.?
+II. Even if we admit all the logical devices of Principia mathematica (hence in
+particular the extended functional calculust and the axiom of choice) in metamathematics, there does not exist a consistency proof for the system S (still less so if we
+1 With the axiom of reducibility or without ramified theory of types.
+2 Furthermore, S contains formulas of the restricted functional calculus such that neither
+universal validity nor existence of a counterexample is provable for any of them.
+
+596
+restrict the means of proof in any way). Hence a consistency proof for the system s
+can be carried out only by means of modes of inference that are not formalized in the
+system S itself, and analogous results hold for other formal systems as well, such as
+the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiom system of set theory."
+III. Theorem I can be sharpened to the effect that, even if we add finitely many
+axioms to the system S (or infinitely many that result from a finite number of them
+by "type elevation"'), we do not obtain a complete system, provided the extended
+system is w-consistent. Here a system is said to be w-consistent if, for no property
+F(x) of natural numbers,
+F(1), F(2), ..., F(n),... ad infinitum
+as well as
+(Ex) F(x)
+are provable. (There are extensions of the system S that, while consistent, are not
+w-consistent.)
+IV. Theorem I still holds for all w-consistent extensions of the system S that are
+obtained by the addition of infinitely many axioms, provided the added class of
+axioms is decidable [entscheidungsdefinit], that is, provided it is metamathematically
+decidable [entscheidbar] for every formula whether it is an axiom or not (here again
+we suppose that the logic used in metamathematics is that of Principia mathematica).
+Theorems I, III, and IV can be extended also to other formal systems, for example,
+to the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiom system of set theory, provided the systems in question
+are w-consistent.
+The proofs of these theorems will appear in Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik.
+3 This result, in particular, holds also for the axiom system of classical mathematics, as it has
+been constructed, for example, by von Neumann (1927).
+ON FORMALLY UNDECIDABLE PROPOSITIONS OF PRINCIPIA
+MATHEMATICA AND RELATED SYSTEMS I
+(1931)
+1
+The development of mathematics toward greater precision has led, as is well known,
+to the formalization of large tracts of it, so that one can prove any theorem using
+nothing but a few mechanical rules. The most comprehensive formal systems that
+have been set up hitherto are the system of Principia mathematica (PM)' on the one
+hand and the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiom system of set theory (further developed by
+J. von Neumann)3 on the other. These two systems are so comprehensive that in
+1 See a summary of the results of the present paper in Gödel 1930b.
+2 Whitehead and Russell 1925. Among the axioms of the system PM we include also the axiom
+of infinity (in this version: there are exactly denumerably many individuals), the axiom of
+reducibility, and the axiom of choice (for all types).
+3 See Fraenkel 1927 and von Neumann 1925, 1928, and 1929. We note that in order to complete
+the formalization we must add the axioms and rules of inference of the calculus of logic to the
+set-theoretic axioms given in the literature cited. The considerations that follow apply also to the
+formal systems (so far as they are available at present) constructed in recent years by Hilbert
+and his collaborators. See Hilbert 1922, 1922a, 1927, Bernays 1923, von Neumann 1927, and
+Ackermann 1924.
+
+597
+them all methods of proof today used in mathematics are formalized, that is, reduced
+to a few axioms and rules of inference. One might therefore conjecture that these
+axioms and rules of inference are sufficient to decide any mathematical question that
+can at all be formally expressed in these systems. It will be shown below that this is
+not the case, that on the contrary there are in the two systems mentioned relatively
+simple problems in the theory of integers* that cannot be decided on the basis of the
+axioms. This situation is not in any way due to the special nature of the systems that
+have been set up but holds for a wide class of formal systems; among these, in
+particular, are all systems that result from the two just mentioned through the
+addition of a finite number of axioms, provided no false propositions of the kind
+specified in footnote 4 become provable owing to the added axioms.
+Before going into details, we shall first sketch the main idea of the proof, of course
+without any claim to complete precision. The formulas of a formal system (we restrict
+ourselves here to the system PM) in outward appearance are finite sequences of
+primitive signs (variables, logical constants, and parentheses or punctuation dots), and
+it is easy to state with complete precision which sequences of primitive signs are
+meaningful formulas and which are not.® Similarly, proofs, from a formal point of
+view, are nothing but finite sequences of formulas (with certain specifiable properties.)
+Of course, for metamathematical considerations it does not matter what objects are
+chosen as primitive signs, and we shall assign natural numbers to this use.? Consequently, a formula will be a finite sequence of natural numbers, and a proof array a
+finite sequence of finite sequences of natural numbers. The metamathematical notions
+(propositions) thus become notions (propositions) about natural numbers or sequences
+of them;' therefore they can (at least in part) be expressed by the symbols of the
+system PM itself. In particular, it can be shown that the notions "formula", "proof
+array", and "provable formula" can be defined in the system PM; that is, we can,
+for example, find a formula F(v) of PM with one free variable v (of the type of a
+number sequence)1° such that F(v), interpreted according to the meaning of the terms
+of PM, says: v is a provable formula. We now construct an undecidable proposition
+of the system PM, that is, a proposition A for which neither A nor not-A is provable,
+in the following manner.
+* That is, more precisely, there are undecidable propositions in which, besides the logical
+constants - (not), V (or), (x) (for all), and = (identical with), no other notions occur but +
+(addition) and . (multiplication), both for natural numbers, and in which the prefixes (x), too,
+apply to natural numbers only.
+5 In PM only axioms that do not result from one another by mere change of type are counted
+6 Here and in what follows we always understand by "formula of PM" a formula written
+without abbreviations (that is, without the use of definitions). It is well known that [in PM]
+definitions serve only to abbreviate notations and therefore are dispensable in principle.
+" That is, we map the primitive signs one-to-one onto some natural numbers. (See how this is
+done on page 601.)
+8 That is, a number-theoretic function defined on an initial segment of the natural numbers.
+(Numbers, of course, cannot be arranged in a spatial order.)
+° In other words, the procedure described above yields an isomorphic image of the system PM
+in the domain of arithmetic, and all metamathematical arguments can just as well be carried out
+in this isomorphic image. This is what we do below when we sketch the proof; that is, by "formula", "proposition", "variable", and so on, we must always understand the corresponding objects
+of the isomorphic image.
+10 It would be very easy (although somewhat cumbersome) to actually write down this formula.
+
+598
+A formula of PM with exactly one free variable, that variable being of the type of
+the natural numbers (class of classes), will be called a class sign. We assume that the
+class signs have been arranged in a sequence in some way,' we denote the nth one
+by R(n), and we observe that the notion "class sign"
+', as well as the ordering relation
+R, can be defined in the system PM. Let a be any class sign; by [a; n] we denote the
+formula that results from the class sign a when the free variable is replaced by the
+sign denoting the natural number n. The ternary relation x = [y; ¿], too, is seen to
+be definable in PM. We now define a class K of natural numbers in the following way:
+n = K = Bew [R(n); n]
+(1)
+(where Bew x means: x is a provable formula). la Since the notions that occur in the
+definiens can all be defined in PM, so can the notion K formed from them; that is,
+there is a class sign S such that the formula [S; n], interpreted according to the
+meaning of the terms of PM, states that the natural number n belongs to K.12 Since
+S is a class sign, it is identical with some R(g); that is, we have
+S = R(g)
+for a certain natural number q. We now show that the proposition [R(g) ; 9] is undecidable in PM.13 For let us suppose that the proposition [R(g) ; q] were provable;
+then it would also be true. But in that case, according to the definitions given above,
+g would belong to K, that is, by (1), Bew [R(g) ; q] would hold, which contradicts the
+assumption. If, on the other hand, the negation of [R(g) ; q] were provable, then
+9 = K, 13a that is, Bew [R(g); g], would hold. But then [R(9); 9], as well as its negation,
+would be provable, which again is impossible.
+The analogy of this argument with the Richard antinomy leaps to the eye. It is
+closely related to the "Liar" too; '4 for the undecidable proposition [R(g) ; q] states
+that q belongs to K, that is, by (I), that [R(g); 9] is not provable. We therefore have
+before us a proposition that says about itself that it is not provable [in PM].15 The
+method of proof just explained can clearly be applied to any formal system that,
+first, when interpreted as representing a system of notions and propositions, has at
+11 For example, by increasing sum of the finite sequence of integers that is the "class sign",
+and lexicographically for equal sums.
+1la. The bar denotes negation.
+12 Again, there is not the slightest difficulty in actually writing down the formula S.
+13 Note that "[R(q); g]" (or, which means the same,
+"[S; g]") is merely a metamathematical
+description of the undecidable proposition. But, as soon as the formula » has been obtained, we
+can, of course, also determine the number q and, therewith, actually write down the undecidable
+proposition itself. [This makes no difficulty in principle. However, in order not to run into formulas of entirely unmanageable lengths and to avoid practical difficulties in the computation of the
+number q, the construction of the undecidable proposition would have to be slightly modified,
+unless the technique of abbreviation by definition used throughout in PM is adopted.]
+13a [The German text reads n & K, which is a misprint.]]
+14 Any epistemological antinomy could be used for a similar proof of the existence of undecidable propositions.
+15 Contrary to appearances, such a proposition involves no faulty circularity, for initially it
+[only] asserts that a certain well-defined formula (namely, the one obtained from the qth formula
+in the lexicographic order by a certain substitution) is unprovable. Only subsequently (and so to
+speak by chance) does it turn out that this formula is precisely the one by which the proposition
+itself was expressed.
+
+599
+its disposal sufficient means of expression to define the notions occurring in the
+argument above (in particular, the notion "provable formula") and in which, second,
+every provable formula is true in the interpretation considered. The purpose of
+carrying out the above proof with full precision in what follows is, among other
+things, to replace the second of the assumptions just mentioned by a purely formal
+and much weaker one.
+From the remark that [R(g); q] says about itself that it is not provable it follows
+at once that [R (g) ; q] is true, for [R (9); 9] is indeed unprovable (being undecidable).
+Thus, the proposition that is undecidable in the system PM still was decided by metamathematical considerations. The precise analysis of this curious situation leads to
+surprising results concerning consistency proofs for formal systems, results that will
+be discussed in more detail in Section 4 (Theorem XI).
+2
+We now proceed to carry out with full precision the proof sketched above. First
+we give a precise description of the formal system P for which we intend to prove
+the existence of undecidable propositions. P is essentially the system obtained when
+the logic of PM is superposed upon the Peano axioms 6 (with the numbers as individuals and the successor relation as primitive notion).
+The primitive signs of the system P are the following:
+I. Constants: "~ " (not), "V" (or), "П" (for all), "O" (zero), "f" (the successor
+of), "(", ")" (parentheses) ;
+II. Variables of type 1 (for individuals, that is, natural numbers including O) :
+"Х", "Уі", "½1"
+....;
+Variables of type 2 (for classes of individuals): "X2", "У2", "22"
+Variables of type 3 (for classes of classes of individuals): "X"
+66
+Уз
+"Zz"
+....;
+And so on, for every natural number as a type."?
+Remark: Variables for functions of two or more argument places (relations) need
+not be included among the primitive signs since we can define relations to be classes
+of ordered pairs, and ordered pairs to be classes of classes; for example, the ordered
+pair a, b can be defined to be ((a), (a, b)), where (x, y) denotes the class whose sole
+elements are x and y, and (x) the class whose sole element is x. 18
+By a sign of type 1 we understand a combination of signs that has [any one of] the
+forms
+a, fa, fja, ffja, ..., and so on,
+where a is either O or a variable of type 1. In the first case, we call such a sign a
+numeral. For n > 1 we understand by a sign of type n the same thing as by a variable
+of type n. A combination of signs that has the form a(b), where b is a sign of type n
+16 The addition of the Peano axioms, as well as all other modifications introduced in the system
+PM, merely serves to simplify the proof and is dispensable in principle.
+17 It is assumed that we have denumerably many signs at our disposal for each type of
+18 Nonhomogeneous relations, too, can be defined in this manner; for example, a relation
+between individuals and classes can be defined to be a class of elements of the form ((X2), ((21), Xz)).
+Every proposition about relations that is provable in PM is provable also when treated in this
+manner, as is readily seen.
+
+600
+and a a sign of type n + 1, will be called an elementary formula. We define the class
+of formulas to be the smallest class19 containing all elementary formulas and containing ~ (a), (a) V (6), xI (a) (where x may be any variable)18a whenever it contains
+a and b. We call (a) V (6) the disjunction of a and b, ~ (a) the negation and xll (a) a
+generalization of a. A formula in which no free variable occurs (free variable being
+defined in the well-known manner) is called a sentential formula [Satzformel]. A
+formula with exactly n free individual variables (and no other free variables) will be
+called an n-place relation sign; for n = 1 it will also be called a class sign.
+By Subst al:) (where a stands for a formula, u for a variable, and b for a sign of
+the same type as v) we understand the formula that results from a if in a we replace
+u, wherever it is free, by b.20 We say that a formula a is a type elevation of another
+formula b if a results from b when the type of each variable occurring in b is increased
+by the same number.
+The following formulas (I-V) are called axioms (we write them using these abbrevi.
+ations, defined in the well-known manner: ., 2, =, (Ex), = 21 and observing the
+usual conventions about omitting parentheses) ??
+1. 1.~(fX1 = 0),
+II. All formulas that result from the following schemata by substitution of any
+formulas whatsoever for p, 9, r:
+1. PVPIP,
+3. P V929 VP,
+2. pop v9,
+III. Any formula that results from either one of the two schemata
+1. vI(a) > Subst ale),
+2. v1(6 va) 26 v vla)
+when the following substitutions are made for a, v, b, and c (and the operation
+indicated by "Subst" is performed in 1):
+For a any formula, for v any variable, for b any formula in which v does not occur
+free, and for c any sign of the same type as v, provided c does not contain any variable
+that is bound in a at a place where v is free.23
+1º Concerning this definition (and similar definitions occurring below) see Lukasieuicz and
+Tarski 1930.
+18a Hence x(a) is a formula even if a does not occur in a or is not free in a. In this case, of
+course, П(a) means the same thing as a.
+20 In case v does not occur in a as a free variable we put Subst al") = a. Note that "Subst"
+is a metamathematical sign.
+21 x1 = Y1 is to be regarded as defined by x2 x2(X;) > X2(I)), as in PM (I, *13) similarly for
+higher types).
+22 In order to obtain the axioms from the schemata listed we must therefore
+(1) Eliminate the abbreviations and
+(2) Add the omitted parentheses
+(in II, III, and IV after carrying out the substitutions allowed).
+Note that all expressions thus obtained are "formulas" in the sense specified above. (See also
+the exact definitions of the metamathematical notions on pp. 603-606.)
+23 Therefore e is a variable or 0 or a sign of the form f... fu, where u is either 0 or a variable of
+type 1. Concerning the notion "free (bound) at a place in a", see I A 5 in von Neumann 1927.
+
+601
+IV. Every formula that results from the schema
+1. (Du)(v11(2(0) = a))
+when for v we substitute any variable of type n, for u one of type n + 1, and for a
+any formula that does not contain u free. This axiom plays the role of the axiom of
+reducibility (the comprehension axiom of set theory).
+V. Every formula that results from
+by type elevation (as well as this formula itself). This axiom states that a class is
+completely determined by its elements.
+A formula c is called an immediate consequence of a and b if it is the formula
+(~ (6)) V (c), and it is called an immediate consequence of a if it is the formula vIl (a),
+where o denotes any variable. The class of provable formulas is defined to be the
+smallest class of formulas that contains the axioms and is closed under the relation
+"immediate consequence" 24
+We now assign natural numbers to the primitive signs of the system P by the
+following one-to-one correspondence:
+"O"
+1
+"f"
+3
+"~"...
+5
+"V»
+7
+"П"
+...
+9
+"'"
+11
+")"... 13;
+to the variables of type n we assign the numbers of the form pr (where p is a prime
+number > 13). Thus we have a one-to-one correspondence by which a finite sequence
+of natural numbers is associated with every finite sequence of primitive signs (hence
+also with every formula). We now map the finite sequences of natural numbers on
+natural numbers (again by a one-to-one correspondence), associating the number
+2n1. 3n2.....Pl, where Pu denotes the kth prime number (in order of increasing
+magnitude), with the sequence n1, N2,..., No. A natural number [lout of a certain
+subset] is thus assigned one-to-one not only to every primitive sign but also to every
+finite sequence of such signs. We denote by $(a) the number assigned to the primitive
+sign (or to the sequence of primitive signs) a. Now let some relation (or class) Ray,
+d2,...,An) between [or of] primitive signs or sequences of primitive signs be given.
+With it we associate the relation (or class) R' (x1, X2,..., Xn) between [or of] natural
+numbers that obtains between x1, Xz, ... Xn it and only if there are some a1, Az, ...,
+an such that x; = D(a) (i = 1,2,...,n) and Rla, d2,...,An) hold. The relations
+between (or classes of) natural numbers that in this manner are associated with the
+metamathematical notions defined so far, for example, "variable", "formula",
+, "sentential formula"
+', "axiom", "provable formula", and so on, will be denoted by the
+same words in SMALL CAPITALS. The proposition that there are undecidable problems
+in the system P, for example, reads thus: There are SENTENTIAL FORMULAS a such
+that neither a nor the NEGATION of a is a PROVABLE FORMULA.
+We now insert a parenthetic consideration that for the present has nothing to do
+24 The rule of substitution is rendered superfluous by the fact that all possible
+substitutions
+have already been carried out in the axioms themselves. (This procedure was used also by von
+Neumann 1927.)
+
+602
+with the formal system P. First we give the following definition: A number-theoretic
+function25 q(X1, X2,..., Xn) is said to be recursively defined in terms of the numbertheoretic functions 4(X1, X2,..., Xn-1) and and Xz,...,Xn Хz,...,Xn+I) if
+Ф (О, Х2, ..., Хл) = 4(Х2,..., Хл),
+Ф(К + 1, Х2,..", хл) = м(К, ф(К, Х2,...., Хл), Ха, ..., хл)
+hold for all x2, ..., Хр, k.26
+A number-theoretic function o is said to be recursive if there is a finite sequence of
+number-theoretic functions 1, Ф2, ..., n that ends with o and has the property that
+every function ok of the sequence is recursively defined in terms of two of the preceding functions, or results from any of the preceding functions by substitution, 21 or,
+finally, is a constant or the successor function x + 1. The length of the shortest
+sequence of pi corresponding to a recursive function o is called its degree. A relation
+R(X1,..., Xx) between natural numbers is said to be recursive? if there is a recursive
+function o(x1,..., Xn) such that, for all 21, X2,..., Xn,
+R(21,..., хл) ~ [Ф(X1,..., Xn) = 0].29
+The following theorems hold:
+I. Every function (relation) obtained from recursive functions (relations) by substitution
+of recursive functions for the variables is recursive; so is every function obtained from
+recursive functions by recursive definition according to schema (2);
+II. If R and S are recursive relations, so are R and R V S (hence also R & S);
+III. If the functions q(E) and () are recursive, so is the relation q(E) = 4(1); 30
+IV. If the function p(E) and the relation R(x, 1)) are recursive, so are the relations S
+and I defined by
+and
+І (2, 1)) ~ (х) [х ≤ Ф(2) → R (X, 4))],
+as well as the function f defined by
+where exF(x) means the least number x for which F(x) holds and O in case there is no
+such number.
+25 That is, its domain of definition is the class of nonnegative integers (or of n-tuples of nonnegative integers) and its values are nonnegative integers.
+26 In what follows, lower-case italic letters (with or without subscripts) are always variables
+for nonnegative integers (unless the contrary is expressly noted).
+27 More precisely, by substitution of some of the preceding functions at the argument places of
+one of the preceding functions, for example, 9н(21, 2) =Фр[Фа (1, 2), Фх(X2)] (p, g,r < K). Not
+all variables on the left side need occur on the right side (the same applies to the recursion schema
+28 We include classes among relations (as one-place relations). Recursive relations R, of course,
+have the property that for every given n-tuple of numbers it can be decided whether R(x1,...,
+Xn) holds or not.
+29 Whenever formulas are used to express a meaning (in particular, in all formulas expressing
+metamathematical propositions or notions), Hilbert's symbolism is employed. See Hilbert and
+Ackermann 1928.
+30 We use German letters, 4, 1, as abbreviations for arbitrary n-tuples of variables, for example,
+Х1, Х2,..., Хр.
+
+603
+Theorem I follows at once from the definition of "recursive". Theorems II and III
+are consequences of the fact that the number-theoretic functions
+а(Х), Р(Х,У), У(Х, У),
+corresponding to the logical notions —
+, V, and =, namely,
+a (0) = 1, a (x) = O for x # 0,
+В(O, x) =B(x, 0) = 0, B(x, y) = 1 when x and y are both #0,
+(X,y) =0 whenx=y, y(x, y) = 1 whenx ‡ Y,
+are recursive, as we can readily see. The proof of Theorem IV is briefly as follows.
+By assumption there is a recursive p(x, t)) such that
+R(X, 1)) ~ [p(x, 4)) = 0].
+We now define a function X(x, 1)) by the recursion schema (2) in the following way:
+x(0,1)) = 0,
+either to n + 1 (if a = 1) or to x(n, 1)) (if a = 0).32 The first case clearly occurs if and
+only if all factors of a are 1, that is, if
+R(0, 1)) & R(n + 1, 1)) & [x(n, 1)) = 0]
+holds. From this it follows that the function x(n, t)) (considered as a function of n)
+remains 0 up to [but not including] the least value of n for which R(n, t)) holds and,
+from there on, is equal to that value. (Hence, in case R(0, 1)) holds, x(n, 4)) is constant
+and equal to O.) We have, therefore,
+4(2, 1)) =Х(Ф(2), 1),
+The relation I' can, by negation, be reduced to a case analogous to that of S. Theorem
+IV is thus proved.
+The functions x + Y, x.Y, and x, as well as the relations x < y and x = y, are
+recursive, as we can readily see. Starting from these notions, we now define a number
+of functions (relations) 1-45, each of which is defined in terms of preceding ones by
+the procedures given in Theorems I-IV. In most of these definitions several of the
+steps allowed by Theorems I-IV are condensed into one. Each of the functions
+(relations) 1-45, among which occur, for example, the notions "FORMULA"
+', "АХОМ",
+and "IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE"
+, is therefore recursive.
+1. x/y= (Ez)[z ≤x&x= y.z],33
+x is divisible by y.37
+31 We assume familiarity with the fact that the functions x + y (addition) and x. y (multiplication) are recursive.
+32 a cannot take values other than 0 and 1, as can be seen from the definition of a.
+33 The sign = is used in the sense of "equality by definition"; hence in definitions it stands for
+either = or ~ (otherwise, the symbolism is Hilbert's).
+3* Wherever one of the signs (x), (Ex), or ex occurs in the definitions below, it is followed by a
+bound on x. This bound merely serves to ensure that the notion defined is recursive (see Theorem
+IV). But in most cases the extension of the notion defined would not change if this bound were
+omitted.
+
+604
+x is a prime number.
+3. 0 Prx = 0,
+(n + 1) Prx = EY/Y ≤ x & Prim (y) & x/y & y > n Prx],
+n Prxis the nth prime number (in order of increasing magnitude) contained in x.34a
+4. 0! = 1,
+(nt1)!=(n+1).n..
+5. Pr (0) = 0,
+Pr(n + 1) = ¿y[y ≤ {Pr(n)}! + 1 & Prim(y) & y > Pr(n)],
+Pr(n) is the nth prime number (in order of increasing magnitude).
+6.nG/x=EY/y≤x&x/(n Prx)" &x/(n Prx)9+ 1],
+n Gl x is the nth term of the number sequence assigned to the number x (for n > 0
+and n not greater than the length of this sequence).
+7.1(x) =EY[y [x &y Prx > 0& (y + 1) Prx = O],
+1(x) is the length of the number sequence assigned to x.
+*y corresponds to the operation of "concatenating" two finite number sequences.
+9. R(x) = 22,
+R (x) corresponds to the number sequence consisting of x alone (for x > 0).
+10. E(x) = R(1I)*x*R(13),
+E(x) corresponds to the operation of "enclosing within parentheses" (11 and 13 are
+assigned to the primitive signs "(" and ")", respectively).
+11. n Var x = (Ez)[13 < = ≤ x & Prim(z) &x = z] &n ‡ 0,
+x is a VARIABLE OF TYPE n.
+12. Var(x) = (En)[n ≤ x & n Var x],
+x is a VARIABLE.
+13. Neg(x) = R(5)*E(x),
+Neg(x) is the NEGATION Of x.
+14. x Dis y = E(x)*R(7)*E(y),
+x Dis y is the DISJUNCTION of x and y.
+15. x Gen y = R(x)*R(9)*Đ(У),
+x Gen y is the GENERALIZATION of y with respect to the VARIABLE x (provided x is a
+VARIABLE).
+16.ONx =x,
+(n + 1) Nx = R(3)*n N x,
+n N x corresponds to the operation of "putting the sign 'f' n times in front of x".
+17.2(2) = n N [R(1)],
+2(n) is the NUMERAL denoting the number n.
+18. Typí(x) = (Em, n){m, n ≤ x & [m = 1 V 1 Varm] &x = ~ N [R(m)]},346
+x is a SIGN OF TYPE 1.
+34a For O < n ≤ z, where z is the number of distinct prime factors of x. Note that n Prx = 0
+for n = 2 + 1.
+34b m, n ≤ x stands for m ≤ x & n ≤ x (similarly for more than two variables).
+
+605
+19. Typ.(x) = [n = 1 & Typí(x)] V [n > 1 &
+(Ev){0 ≤x&n Varv&x = R(v}]
+x is a SIGN OF TYPE N.
+20. Elf(x) = (Ey, z, n)[y, z, n ≤ x & TyPn(Y) &
+Typn+1(2) & x = 2*D (y)],
+x is an ELEMENTARY FORMULA.
+21. Op(x, y, 2) =x = Neg(y) V x = y Dis z V (Ev)[o ≤ x & Var (v) &
+x = " Gen y].
+00(x0bx, 8 00, 9 0 xõ1ợ & 0 . .
+x is a SEQUENCE OF FORMULAS, each of which either is an ELEMENTARY FORMULA OF
+results from the preceding FoRMuLas through the operations of NEGATION, DIS-
+JUNCTION, Or GENERALIZATION.
+x is a FORMULA (that is, the last term of a FORMULA SEQUENCE n).
+24. u Gebn, x = Var(0) & Form(x) & (Ea, b, c)La, 6, c ≤ x &
+x = a* (v Gen b)*c & Form(b) & La) + 1 ≤ n ≤ la) + l(v Gen b)],
+the VARIABLE v is BOUND in x at the nth place.
+25. u Ern, x = Var (v) & Form(x) & v = n Gl x & n ≤ |(x) & o Geb n, x,
+the VARIABLE v is FREE in x at the nth place.
+v occurs as a FREE VARIABLE in x.
+x=U*R(n Glx)* &z= u*y*v&n = lu) + 1]},
+Sux(y) results from x when we substitute y for the nth term of x (provided that
+0<n = (x)).
+28. O Stu, x = En[n ≤ |(x) & V Frn, x & (Ep)In < V ≤ 1(x) & u Er p, x]},
+(k + 1) Stu, x = Enin < l Stu, x & 0 Ern, x & (Ep)In < p < k Stu, x
+&~ Erp, x]},
+k Stu, x is the (k + 1)th place in x (counted from the right end of the FORMULA X)
+at which v is FREE in x (and O in case there is no such place).
+29. A(U, X) = EN[n = 1(x) &n Stux = O},
+A (v, x) is the number of places at which o is FREE in x.
+30. 56 (xy) = x,
+Sp+1(x})=Su[Sb, (X})](kSty, x).
+31. Sb(xy) = SA(v,x)(X), 36
+Sb(xy) is the notion suBsT al!) defined above.37
+32. x Impy = [Neg(x)] Dis y,
+x Con y = Negil Neg(x)] Dis [Neg(y)]},
+35 That n ≤ (Pr([L(x)]?))x.[(x))2 provides a bound can be seen thus: The length of the shortest
+sequence of formulas that corresponds to x can at most be equal to the number of subformulas
+of x. But there are at most |(x) subformulas of length 1, at most |(x) - I of length 2, and so on,
+hence altogether at most (x)(|(x) + 1)|2 ≤ [x)]. Therefore all prime factors of n can be assumed
+to be less than PrI(x)]), their number ≤[(x)], and their exponents (which are subformulas of
+36 In case v is not a VARIABLE or x is not a FORMULA, S6(xỳ) = x.
+37 Instead of S[S(xy)") we write Sb(xy") (and similarly for more than two VARIABLEs).
+
+606
+* Aeg y = (x Impy) Con (y Impx),
+v Exy = Neg{v Gen [Neg(y)]}.
+33. n Thx = EY{y ≤ Xxn) & (k)[k ≤ l(x) → (k Glx ≤ 13 & k Gly = k G1x) V
+(k Glx > 13 & k Gly = k Glx.[| Pr (k Gl x)]")]},
+n Th x is the nth TYPE ELEVATION of x (in case x and n Th x are FORMULAS).
+Three specific numbers, which we denote by 21, 22, and 2z, correspond to the
+Axioms I, 1-3, and we define
+35. A1-Ах(x) = (Ey)[y ≤ x & Form (y) & x = (y Dis y) Imp y],
+x is
+a FORMuLA resulting from Axiom schema II, 1 by substitution. Analogously,
+A2-Ax, Az-Ax, and Aq-Ax are defined for Axioms [rather, Axiom Schemata] II, 2-4.
+36. A-Ax(x) = A1-Ax(x) V Az-Ax(x) V Az-Ax(x) V Aq-Ax(x),
+x is a FORMULA resulting from a propositional axiom by substitution.
+37. Q(Zy,0) = (En, m, wIn ≤ 49) &m ≤ 12) 8W ≤=8
+W =m Glz & W Gebn, y & 0 Ern, y]
+z does not contain any VARIABLE BOUND in y at a place at which v is FREE.
+38. I1-Ax(x) = (Ev, y, %, n){o, Y, %, N ≤ x & n Var u & Typn(z) & Form(y) &
+Q (z, Y, 0) &x = (0 Gen y) Imp [S(Y≥)]},
+x is a FORMULA resulting from Axiom schema III, 1 by substitution.
+39. Uz-Ax(x) = (Ev, 9, P){v, 9, p ≤ x & Var (v) & Form(p) & v Erp & Form Form(9) &
+x = [v Gen (p Dis q)] Imp [p Dis (v Gen 9)]},
+x is a FORMULA resulting from Axiom schema III, 2 by substitution.
+40. R-Ax(x) = (Eu, V, Y, n)[u, V, Y, N ≤x&n Varu & (n † 1) Varu & u Ery &
+Form(y) & x = u Ex {v Gen [[R(u)*E (R(v))] Aeq y]}],
+x is a FORMULA resulting from Axiom schema IV, 1 by substitution.
+A specific number 24 corresponds to Axiom V, 1, and we define:
+41M-Ax(x)=(En)[n ≤x&x = n Th z4].
+42. Ax(x)=Z-Ax(x)VA-Ax(x)V L-Ax(x)V L2-Ax(x) VR-Ax(x)VM-Ax(x),
+x is an AXIOM.
+43. F(x, Y, 2) =Y = z Impx V (Ev)[o ≤ x & Var(v) &x = v Gen y],
+x is an IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE of y and z.
+44.Bw(x)=(2)0<n≤/(x)→Ax(n(lx) V (Ep, 4)[0 < p,g<n &
+FI(n Glx, p Gl x, [ Gl x)]} & (x) > 0,
+x is a PROOF ARRAY (a finite sequence of FORMULAS, each of which is either an AXIOM
+or an IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE of two of the preceding FORMULAS.
+45. x By = Bu(x) & [x)] Glx = y,
+x is a PROOF of the FORMULA Y.
+46. Bew(x) = (Ey)у Вх,
+x is a PROVABLE FORMULA. (Bew(x) is the only one of the notions 1-46 of which we
+cannot assert that it is recursive.)
+The fact that can be formulated vaguely by saying: every recursive relation is
+definable in the system P (if the usual meaning is given to the formulas of this
+system), is expressed in precise language, without reference to any interpretation of
+the formulas of P, by the following theorem :
+Theorem V. For every recursive relation R(x1,...,Xn) there exists an n-place
+
+607
+RELATION SIGN r (with the FREE VARIABLES38 U1, Uz,..., Un) such that for all n-tuples
+of numbers (X1,..., Xn) we have
+R(X1,..
+(3)
+R(x1,...,xn)→ Bew[Neg(Sb(rzlxi)Z(xn)))].
+(4)
+We shall give only an outline of the proof of this theorem because the proof does
+not present any difficulty in principle and is rather long. 39 We prove the theorem
+for all relations R(x1,..., X.) of the form xy = p(X2,..., X)*° (where o is a recursive
+function) and we use induction on the degree of o. For functions of degree 1 (that is,
+constants and the function x + 1) the theorem is trivial. Assume now that o is of
+degree m. It results from functions of lower degrees, $1, ..., Фи, through the operations of substitution or recursive definition. Since by the induction hypothesis everything has already been proved for 91,.... k there are corresponding RELATION
+SIGNS, rI, ..., Yi, such that (3) and (4) hold. The processes of definition by which o
+results from Ф1, ..., Фк (substitution and recursive definition) can both be formally
+reproduced in the system P. If this is done, a new RELATION SIGN r is obtained from
+r1,..., "kt1 and, using the induction hypothesis, we can prove without difficulty that
+(3) and (4) hold for it. A RELATION SIGN r assigned to a recursive relation*2 by this
+procedure will be said to be recursive.
+We now come to the goal of our discussions. Let « be any class of FORMULAS. We
+denote by Flg(k) (the set of consequences of k) the smallest set of FORMULAS that
+contains all FORMULAS of « and all AXIOMS and is closed under the relation 'IMMEDI-
+ATE CONSEQUENCE". « is said to be w-consistent if there is no CLASS SIGN a such that
+(n)[Sb(azin)) & F|g(k)] & [Neg(v Gen a)] & FIg(k),
+where v is the FREE VARIABLE of the CLASS SIGN a.
+Every w-consistent system, of course, is consistent. As will be shown later,
+however, the converse does not hold.
+The general result about the existence of undecidable propositions reads as follows:
+Theorem VI. For every w-consistent recursive class « of FORMULAS there are recursive
+CLASS SIGNS y such that neither v Gen r nor Neg(u Gen r) belongs to Flg(k) (where v is
+the FREE VARIABLE Of r).
+Proof. Let r be any recursive w-consistent class of FORMULAS. We define
+(Ep, 9){0 < p, 9 < n & Fln Glx, p Gl x, q Gl x)}] & |(x) > 0
+(5)
+FREE VARIABLES 17, 19, 23, ..., and so on, for which (3) and (4) hold.
+the relation R obtains or not.
+40 From this it follows at once that the theorem holds for every recursive relation, since any such
+relation is equivalent to O = ф(x1,..., Xn), where o is recursive.
+41 When this proof is carried out in detail, r, of course, is not defined indirectly with the help of
+its meaning but in terms of its purely formal structure.
+42 Which, therefore, in the usual interpretation expresses the fact that this relation holds.
+
+608
+(see the analogous notion 44),
+xBxY=Bw(x)&[x)]Glx=
+Bewx(X) = (Ду)У Вкх
+(6)
+(6.1)
+(see the analogous notions 45 and 46).
+We obviously have
+(x)[Bewx(x) ~х = F|g(к)]
+(7)
+and
+(x)[Bew(x) → Bew, (x)].
+(8)
+We now define the relation
+Q(X, Y) = x By [Sb (YLi)].
+(8.1)
+Since x Byy (by (6) and (5)) and Sb(y)i) (by Definitions 17 and 31) are recursive, so is Q(x, y). Therefore, by Theorem V and (8) there is a RELATION SIGN q (with
+the FREE VARIABLES 17 and 19) such that
+(9)
+and
+(10)
+We put
+p = 17 Gen q
+(p is a CLASS SIGN with the FREE VARIABLE 19) and
+(11)
+(12)
+(r is a recursive CLASS SIGN43 with the FREE VARIABLE 17).
+Then we have
+SD(PŽp)) = S([17 Gen q]żp)) = 17 Gen S5(92(p)) = 17 Gen r
+(13)
+(by (I1) and (12)); furthermore
+Sb(9ž‹х)z‹)) =Sb(Ž{x))
+(14)
+(by (12)). If we now substitute p for y in (9) and (10) and take (13) and (14) into
+account, we obtain
+х Bx (17 Gen r) → Bew, LSb ("Żx)],
+х Bx (17 Gen r) → Bewx[Neg(Sb(rŽ(x)))].
+(15)
+(16)
+This yields:
+1. 17 Gen r is not K-PROVABLE. 45 For, if it were, there would (by (6.1)) be an n such
+* Since r is obtained from the recursive RELATION SIGN q through the replacement of a VARIABLE
+by a definite number, p. [Precisely stated the final part of this footnote (which refers to a side remark
+unnecessary for the proof) would read thus: "REPLACEMENT Of a VARIABLE by the NUMERAL for
+44 The operations Gen and Sb, of course, can always be interchanged in case they refer to
+different VARIABLES.
+45 By "x is k-provable" we mean x & Flg(k), which, by (7), means the same thing as Bew, (x).
+
+609
+that n B, (17 Gen "). Hence by (16) we would have Bew,[Neg(Sb(rZ(n)))], while, on
+the other hand, from the k-PROVABILITY of 17 Gen r that of Sb(rZn)) follows. Hence,
+« would be inconsistent (and a fortiori w-inconsistent).
+2. Neg(17 Gen r) is not K-PROVABLE. Proof: As has just been proved, 17 Genr
+is not K-PROVABLE; that is (by (6.1)), (n)n Bx (17 Genr) holds. From this,
+(n)Bew,[Sb(rZn))] follows by (15), and that, in conjunction with Bew,[Neg(17 Gen r)],
+is incompatible with the w-consistency of k.
+17 Gen r is therefore undecidable on the basis of k, which proves Theorem VI.
+We can readily see that the proof just given is constructive, 45a that is, the following
+has been proved in an intuitionistically unobjectionable manner: Let an arbitrary
+recursively defined class « of FORMuLAs be given. Then, if a formal decision (on the
+basis of «) of the SENTENTIAL FORMULA 17 Gen r (which [for each «] can actually be
+exhibited) is presented to us, we can actually give
+1. A PROOF of Neg(17 Gen r);
+2. For any given n, a PROOF Of S6(r Z(n)).
+That is, a formal decision of 17 Gen r would have the consequence that we could
+actually exhibit an w-inconsistency.
+We shall say that a relation between (or a class of) natural numbers R(x1, ..., Xn)
+is decidable [entscheidungsdefinit] if there exists an n-place RELATION SIGN r such that
+(3) and (4) (see Theorem V) hold. In particular, therefore, by Theorem V every
+recursive relation is decidable. Similarly, a RELATION SIGN Will be said to be decidable
+if it corresponds in this way to a decidable relation. Now it suffices for the existence
+of undecidable propositions that the class « be w-consistent and decidable. For the
+decidability carries over from « to x Bry (see (5) and (6)) and to Q(x, y) (see (8.1)),
+and only this was used in the proof given above. In this case the undecidable proposition has the form v Genr, where r is a decidable CLASS SIGN. (Note that it even
+suffices that « be decidable in the system enlarged by .)
+If, instead of assuming that « is w-consistent, we assume only that it is consistent,
+then, although the existence of an undecidable proposition does not follow [by the
+argument given above], it does tollow that there exists a property (r) for which it is
+possible neither to give a counterexample nor to prove that it holds of all numbers.
+For in the proof that 17 Gen r is not K-PROVABLE only the consistency of r was used
+(see p. 608). Moreover from Bew, (17 Gen r) it follows by (15) that, for every number
+х, Sb(r'Zx)) is K-PROVABLE and consequently that Neg(Sb(r'Z(x))) is not K-PROVABLE for
+any number.
+If we adjoin Neg(17 Gen r) to k, we obtain a class of FORMULAS ' that is consistent but not w-consistent. ' is consistent,
+since otherwise 17 Genr would be
+K-PROVABLE. However, «' is not w-consistent, because, by Bew, (17 Gen r) and (15),
+(x)Bew Sb(rŽix)) and, a fortiori, (x)BewSb(rZix)) hold, while on the other hand, of
+course, Bew. [Neg(17 Gen r)] holds. 46
+We have a special case of Theorem VI when the class « consists of a finite number
+of FORMULAS (and, if we so desire, of those resulting from them by TYPE ELEVATION).
+45a Since all existential statements occurring in the proof are based upon Theorem V, which, as
+is easily seen, is unobjectionable from the intuitionistic point of view.
+46 Of course, the existence of classes r that are consistent but not w-consistent is thus proved
+only on the assumption that there exists some consistent « (that is, that P is consistent).
+
+610
+Every finite class « is, of course, recursive. 46a Let a be the greatest number contained
+in k. Then we have for r
+x~(Em,x)[m≤x&2≤a&N=K&x=m Thn].
+Hence « is recursive. This allows us to conclude, for example, that, even with the
+help of the axiom of choice (for all types) or the generalized continuum hypothesis,
+not all propositions are decidable, provided these hypotheses are w-consistent.
+In the proof of Theorem VI no properties of the system P were used besides the
+following :
+1. The class of axioms and the rules of inference (that is, the relation "immediate
+consequence") are recursively definable (as soon as we replace the primitive signs in
+some way by natural numbers);
+2. Every recursive relation is definable (in the sense of Theorem V) in the system P.
+Therefore, in every formal system that satisfies the assumptions 1 and 2 and is
+w-consistent there are undecidable propositions of the form (x) F(x), where F is a
+recursively defined property of natural numbers, and likewise in every extension of
+such a system by a recursively definable w-consistent class of axioms. As can easily
+be verified, included among the systems satisfying the assumptions 1 and 2 are the
+Zermelo-Fraenkel and the von Neumann axiom systems of set theory, 47 as well as
+the axiom system of number theory consisting of the Peano axioms, recursive definition (by schema (2)), and the rules of logic. 48 Assumption 1 is satisfied by any system
+that has the usual rules of inference and whose axioms (like those of P) result from a
+finite number of schemata by substitution. 48a
+3
+We shall now deduce some consequences from Theorem VI, and to this end we give
+the following definition:
+A relation (class) is said to be arithmetic if it can be defined in terms of the notions
++ and . (addition and multiplication for natural numbers)49 and the logical constants V,
+(x), and =, where (x) and = apply to natural numbers only."° The
+notion "arithmetic proposition" is defined accordingly. The relations "greater than"
+and "congruent modulo n", for example, are arithmetic because we have
+x>y~ (Ez)[y =x + z],
+46a [On page 190, lines 21, 22, and 23, of the German text the three occurrences of a are misprints and should be replaced by occurrences of .]
+47 The proof of assumption 1 turns out to be even simpler here than for the system P, since there
+is just one kind of primitive variables (or two in von Neumann's system).
+48 See Problem III in Hilbert 1928a.
+48a As will be shown in Part II of this paper, the true reason for the incompleteness inherent in
+all formal systems of mathematics is that the formation of ever higher types can be continued
+into the transfinite (see Hilbert 1925, p. 184 [above, p. 387]), while in any formal system at most
+denumerably many of them are available. For it can be shown that the undecidable propositions
+constructed here become decidable whenever appropriate higher types are added (for example,
+the type w to the system P). An analogous situation prevails for the axiom system of set theory.
+49 Here and in what follows, zero is always included among the natural numbers.
+50 The definiens of such a notion, therefore, must consist exclusively of the signs listed, variables
+for natural numbers, x, y,..., and the signs 0 and 1 (variables for functions and sets are not
+permitted to occur). Instead of x any other number variable, of course, may occur in the prefixes.
+
+611
+We now have
+Theorem VII. Every recursive relation is arithmetic.
+We shall prove the following version of this theorem: every relation of the form
+Хо =Ф(Xд,..., n), where o is recursive, is arithmetic, and we shall use induction on
+the degree of o. Let o be of degree s (s > 1). Then we have either
+1. ф(x1,..., хл) = р[х1(X2,..", Хр), X2(Х1,..., Хп),..., Хт(Х1,..., хп)]1
+(where p and all Xi are of degrees less than s) or
+2.
+Ф(О, Х2,..., Хл) = 4 (Х2,..., Хл),
+ф/К + 1, Х2,..", хл) = м[к, ф(К, Х2,..., Хл), Ха, ..., Хл]
+(where 4 and u are of degrees less than s).
+In the first case we have
+хо = ф(Х1,...,Хп) ~ (ДУл,...,Ут)[ R(Х, У1,..., Ут) 8
+SI (91, X1,..., Xn) &... & Sm(Ут, X1, ..., Xp)],
+where R and S, are the arithmetic relations, existing by the induction hypothesis,
+that are equivalent to x. = p(yI,...Ym) and y=Xi(X1,...,Xn), respectively. Hence
+in this casex = p(x1,...,Xn) is arithmetic.
+In the second case we use the following method. We can express the relation
+xo = p(21,..., Xn) with the help of the notion "sequence of numbers" (f)52 in the
+following way:
+If S(Y, X2,..., Xn) and T'(2, X1,.. Xn+ 1) are the arithmetic relations, existing by
+the induction hypothesis, that are equivalent to y= 4(22,..Xn) and z= u(xI,...,
+Xn +1), respectively, then
+=/)~(Ef/S(10x2...Xn) & (k)[k < x1→
+І (Ік + 1, К, Ік, Х2,..., Хл)] & х =Jx1).
+(17)
+We now replace the notion "sequence of numbers" by "pair of numbers"
+, assigning
+to the number pair n, d the number sequence f(a) (JIn, d) = [n]1+ (+1)d), where [nIp
+denotes the least nonnegative remainder of n modulo p.
+We then have
+Lemma 1. If f is any sequence of natural numbers and k any natural number,
+there exists a pair of natural numbers, n, d such that fin, d) and f agree in the first k
+terms.
+Proof. Let & be the maximum of the numbers k, fo, f1, ..., Jk-1. Let us determine
+an n such that
+n = f[mod(1 + (i + 1)!!)] for i = 0, 1,..., k - 1,
+which is possible, since any two of the numbers 1 + (i + 1)!! (i = 0,1,...,k - 1)
+51 Of course, not all x1,.
+., Xn need occur in the Xi (see the example in footnote 27).
+52 f here is a variable with the [infinite] sequences of natural numbers as its domain of values.
+In denotes the (k + 1)th term of a sequence f (fo denoting the first).
+
+612
+are relatively prime. For a prime number contained in two of these numbers would
+also be contained in the difference (i - iz)!! and therefore, since |is - ial < 1, in !!;
+but this is impossible. The number pair n,!! then has the desired property.
+Since the relation x = [n], is defined by
+× =n (modp) &× < p
+and is therefore arithmetic, the relation P(Xo, X1,..., Xn), defined as follows:
+is also arithmetic. But by (17) and Lemma 1 it is equivalent to xo = 4(X1, ...,Xn)
+(the sequence f enters in (17) only through its first x, + 1 terms). Theorem VII is
+thus proved.
+By Theorem VII, for every problem of the form (x) F(x) (with recursive F) there is
+an equivalent arithmetic problem. Moreover, since the entire proof of Theorem VII
+(for every particular F) can be formalized in the system P, this equivalence is
+provable in P. Hence we have
+Theorem VIII. In any of the formal systems mentioned in Theorem VI53 there are
+undecidable arithmetic propositions.
+By the remark on page 610, the same holds for the axiom system of set theory and
+its extensions by w-consistent recursive classes of axioms.
+Finally, we derive the following result:
+Theorem IX. In any of the formal systems mentioned in Theorem VIS3 there are
+undecidable problems of the restricted functional calculuss* (that is, formulas of the
+restricted functional calculus for which neither validity nor the existence of a
+counterexample is provable). 55
+This is a consequence of
+Theorem X. Every problem of the form (x) F(x) (with recursive F) can be reduced to
+the question whether a certain formula of the restricted functional calculus is satisfiable
+(that is, for every recursive F we can find a formula of the restricted functional calculus that is satisfiable if and only if (x) F(x) is true.
+By formulas of the restricted functional calculus (r. f. c.) we understand expres
+sions formed from the primitive signs -
+= V, (x), =, x, Y, ... (individual variables),
+F(x), G(x, y), H (x, Y, z),... (predicate and relation variables), where (x) and = apply
+to individuals only.56 To these signs we add a third kind of variables, q(x), 4(x, y),
+53 These are the w-consistent systems that result from P when recursively definable classes of
+axioms are added.
+54 See Hilbert and Ackermann 1928.
+In the system P we must understand by formulas of the restricted functional calculus those that
+result from the formulas of the restricted functional calculus of PM when relations are replaced
+by classes of higher types as indicated on page 599.
+55 In 1930a I showed that every formula of the restricted functional calculus either can be
+proved to be valid or has a counterexample. However, by Theorem IX the existence of this
+counterexample is not always provable (in the formal systems we have been considering).
+56 Hilbert and Ackermann (1928) do not include the sign = in the restricted functional calculus.
+But for every formula in which the sign = occurs there exists a formula that does not contain this
+sign and is satisfiable if and only if the original formula is (see Gödel 1930a).
+
+613
+к(x, Y, z), and so on, which stand for object-functions| Gegenstandsfunktionen| (that
+is, p(x), 4(x, y), and so on denote single-valued functions whose arguments and values
+are individuals)." A formula that contains variables of the third kind in addition to
+the signs of the r. f. c. first mentioned will be called a formula in the extended sense
+(i. e. s.), 58 The notions "satisfiable" and "valid" carry over immediately to formulas
+i. e. s., and we have the theorem that, for any formula A i. e. s., we can find a formula
+B of the r. f. c. proper such that A is satisfiable if and only if B is. We obtain B from
+A by replacing the variables of the third kind, q(x), 4(X, Y),..., that occur in A with
+expressions of the form (12) E(z, X), (12)G(z, x, y), ..., by eliminating the "descriptive"
+functions by the method used in PM (I, *14), and by logically multiplying59 the
+formula thus obtained by an expression stating about each E, G,... put in place of
+some q, 4,... that it holds for a unique value of the first argument [for any choice
+of values for the other arguments].
+We now show that, for every problem of the form (x) F(x) (with recursive F), there
+is an equivalent problem concerning the satisfiability of a formula i. e. s., so that, on
+account of the remark just made, Theorem X follows.
+Since F is recursive, there is a recursive function Ф(x) such that F(x) ~[Ф(x) = 0],
+and for • there is sequence of functions, 91, ®2, ..., Pn, such that Pn = D, Ф1(X)
+= x + 1, and for every $k (1 < k ≤ n) we have either
+(Xz,
+«Хт)[Фк(О, X2,.
+«Хт) =Ф(X2,..., Xm)],
+(x, x2,..., хт){Фк[Ф,(х), Х,..
+…Xm] = Ф«[х, Фк(х, Х2, ...,Хт), Х,.., х]}, (18)
+with p, q < K,59a
+or
+(X1,...,Xm)[Фк(21,...,Xm) =Ф,(Di(EI),..., Dis(Es))],80
+with r < k, i, < k (for v = 1,2,..., s),
+(19)
+or
+3.
+(x1,..., Xm)[ Фк(Х1, ...,хт) = Ф(Ф1...., Ф1 (O))].
+(20)
+We then form the propositions
+(х)Ф, (х) = 0 & (х, у)[Ф (х) = Ф(У) → х =у],
+(x)[$"(x) = 0].
+(21)
+(22)
+In all of the formulas (18), (19), (20) (for k = 2, 3, ..., n) and in (21) and (22) we
+now replace the functions &i by function variables i and the number 0 by an
+57 Moreover, the domain of definition is always supposed to be the entire domain of individuals.
+58 Variables of the third kind may occur at all argument places occupied by individual variables,
+for example, у = ф(х), F(x, Ф(У)), G(V(X, Ф(У)), x), and the like.
+59 That is, by forming the conjunction.
+598 [The last clause of footnote 27 was not taken into account in the formulas (18). But an
+explicit formulation of the cases with fewer variables on the right side is actually necessary here
+for the formal correctness of the proof, unless the identity function, I(x) = x, is added to the
+initial functions.]
+60 The E (i = 1,...,s) stand for finite sequences of the variables x1, Xz,..., Xm; for example,
+Х1, Хз, Хз.
+
+614
+individual variable xo not used so far, and we form the conjunction C of all the
+formulas thus obtained.
+The formula (Ex.)C then has the required property, that is,
+1. If (x)[$(x) = 0] holds, (Ex)C is satisfiable. For the functions $1, $z,..., On
+obviously yield a true proposition when substituted for 1, Ф2, ..., Øn in (Ex)C);
+2. If (Exo)C is satisfiable, (x)[Ф(x) = 0] holds.
+Proof. Let 41, 42,..., In be the functions (which exist by assumption) that yield a
+true proposition when substituted for Ф1, Ф2, ..., Фл in (Ex)C. Let & be their domain
+of individuals. Since (Ex)C holds for the functions fi, there is an individual a (in
+3) such that all of the formulas (18)-(22) go over into true propositions, (18')-(22'),
+when the $, are replaced by the 4; and 0 by a. We now form the smallest subclass
+of 8 that contains a and is closed under the operation 41(x). This subclass (J') has the
+property that every function 4i, when applied to elements of S', again yields elements
+of i'. For this holds of 4i by the definition of 5', and by (18'), (19'), and (20) it
+carries over from 4; with smaller subscripts to 4, with larger ones. The functions that
+result from the 4, when these are restricted to the domain s' of individuals will be
+denoted by 4í. All of the formulas (18)-(22) hold for these functions also (when we
+replace 0 by a and $i by kí).
+Because (21) holds for 4í and a, we can map the individuals of J' one-to-one onto
+the natural numbers in such a manner that a goes over into 0 and the function f'i
+into the successor function $1. But by this mapping the functions 4í go over into the
+functions Di, and, since (22) holds for 4'n and a, (x)[Ф(x) = 0], that is, (x)[Ф(x) = 0],
+holds, which was to be proved. 61
+Since (for each particular F) the argument leading to Theorem X can be carried
+out in the system P, it follows that any proposition of the form (x) F(x) (with recursive F) can in P be proved equivalent to the proposition that states about the corresponding formula of the r. f. c. that it is satisfiable. Hence the undecidability of one
+implies that of the other, which proves Theorem IX.62
+4
+The results of Section 2 have a surprising consequence concerning a consistency
+proof for the system P (and its extensions), which can be stated as follows:
+Theorem XI. Let « be any recursive consistentos class of FORMULAS; then the SENTEN-
+TIAL FORMULA stating that « is consistent is not k-PROVABLE; in particular, the consistency of P is not provable in P,64 provided P is consistent (in the opposite case, of
+course, every proposition is provable [in P]).
+The proof (briefly outlined) is as follows. Let « be some recursive class of FORMULAS
+chosen once and for all for the following discussion (in the simplest case it is the
+61 Theorem X implies, for example, that Fermat's problem and Goldbach's problem could be
+solved if the decision problem for the r. f. c. were solved.
+62 Theorem IX, of course, also holds for the axiom system of set theory and for its extensions
+by recursively definable w-consistent classes of axioms, since there are undecidable propositions
+of the form (x)F(x) (with recursive F) in these systems too.
+63 "k is consistent" (abbreviated by "Wid(k)") is defined thus: Wid(k) = (Ex)(Form(x) &
+Bew x (x)).
+64 This follows if we substitute the empty class of FORMULAS for K.
+
+615
+empty class). As appears from 1, page 608, only the consistency of « was used in
+proving that 17 Gen r is not 4-PROVABLE, 65 that is, we have
+Wid(k) → Bew, (17 Gen r),
+(23)
+that is, by (6.1),
+Wid (K) → (x) x Bx (17 Gen r).
+By (13), we have
+17 Gen r = Sb (PZ(p)),
+hence
+Wid (k) → (2) x Bx Sb(pip),
+that is, by (8.1),
+Wid(k) → (x)Q(x), p).
+(24)
+We now observe the following: all notions defined (or statements proved) in Section
+2,66 and in Section 4 up to this point, are also expressible (or provable) in P. For
+throughout we have used only the methods of definition and proof that are customary
+in classical mathematics, as they are formalized in the system P. In particular, « (like
+every recursive class) is definable in P. Let w be the SENTENTIAL FORMULA by which
+Wid(k) is expressed in P. According to (8.1), (9), and (10), the relation Q(x, y) is
+expressed by the RELATION SIGN 9, hence Q(x, p) by r (since, by (12), r = Sb (gzip))),
+and the proposition (x)Q(xp) by 17 Genr.
+Therefore, by (24), w Imp (17 Gen r) is provable in p6 (and a fortiori K-PROVABLE).
+If now w were K-PROVABLE, then 17 Gen r would also be K-PROVABLE, and from this
+it would follow, by (23), that is not consistent.
+Let us observe that this proof, too, is constructive; that is, it allows us to actually
+derive a contradiction from k, once a PROOF of w from « is given. The entire proof of
+Theorem XI carries over word for word to the axiom system of set theory, M, and to
+that of classical mathematics,' A, and here, too, it yields the result: There is no
+consistency proof for M, or for A, that could be formalized in M, or A, respectively,
+provided M, or A, is consistent. I wish to note expressly that Theorem XI (and the
+corresponding results for M and A) do not contradict Hilbert's formalistic viewpoint.
+For this viewpoint presupposes only the existence of a consistency proof in which
+nothing but finitary means of proof is used, and it is conceivable that there exist
+finitary proofs that cannot be expressed in the formalism of P (or of M or A).
+Since, for any consistent class , w is not k-PROVABLE, there always are propositions (namely w) that are undecidable (on the basis of k) as soon as Neg(u) is not
+K-PROVABLE; in other words, we can, in Theorem VI, replace the assumption of
+w-consistency by the following: The proposition "k is inconsistent" is not K-PROV-
+ABLE. (Note that there are consistent « for which this proposition is k-PROVABLE.)
+65 Of course, r (like p) depends on «.
+66 From the definition of "recursive" on page 602 to the proof of Theorem VI inclusive.
+67 That the truth of w Imp (17 Gen r) can be inferred from (23) is simply due to the fact that
+the undecidable proposition 17 Gen r asserts its own unprovability, as was noted at the very
+beginning.
+68 See von Neumann 1927.
+
+616
+In the present paper we have on the whole restricted ourselves to the system P,
+and we have only indicated the applications to other systems. The results will be
+stated and proved in full generality in a sequel to be published soon 68a In that paper,
+also, the proof of Theorem XI, only sketched here, will be given in detail.
+Note added 28 August 1963. In consequence of later advances, in particular of the
+fact that due to A. M. Turing's work69 a precise and unquestionably adequate
+definition of the general notion of formal system'° can now be given, a completely
+general version of Theorems VI and XI is now possible. That is, it can be proved
+rigorously that in every consistent formal system that contains a certain amount of
+finitary number theory there exist undecidable arithmetic propositions and that,
+moreover, the consistency of any such system cannot be proved in the system.
+68a [This explains the "I" in the title of the paper. The author's intention was to publish this
+sequel in the next volume of the Monatshefte. The prompt acceptance of his results was one of the
+reasons that made him change his plan.]
+69 See Turing 1937, p. 249.
+70 In my opinion the term "formal system" or "formalism" should never be used for anything
+but this notion. In a lecture at Princeton (mentioned in Princeton University 1946, p. Il [see
+Davis 1965, pp. 84-88]) I suggested certain transfinite generalizations of formalisms, but these
+are something radically different from formal systems in the proper sense of the term, whose
+characteristic property is that reasoning in them, in principle, can be completely replaced by
+mechanical devices.
+ON COMPLETENESS AND CONSISTENCY
+(193la)
+Let Z be the formal system that we obtain by supplementing the Peano axioms
+with the schema of definition by recursion (on one variable) and the logical rules of
+the restricted functional calculus. Hence Z is to contain no variables other than
+variables for individuals (that is, natural numbers), and the principle of mathematical
+induction must therefore be formulated as a rule of inference. Then the following
+hold :
+1. Given any formal system & in which there are finitely many axioms and in
+which the sole principles of inference are the rule of substitution and the rule of
+implication, if S contains' Z, S' is incomplete, that is, there are in S propositions (in
+1 That a formal system S contains another formal
+system I means that every proposition
+expressible (provable) in I' is expressible (provable) also in S.
+[Remark by the author, 18 May 1966 :]
+[This definition is not precise, and, if made precise in the straightforward manner, it does not
+yield a sufficient condition for the nondemonstrability in S of the consistency of S. A sufficient
+condition is obtained if one uses the following definition: "S contains I if and only if every
+meaningful formula (or axiom or rule (of inference, of definition, or of construction of axioms))
+of I is a meaningful formula (or axiom, and so forth) of S, that is, if S is an extension of T".
+Under the weaker hypothesis that Z is recursively one-to-one translatable into S, with demonstrability preserved in this direction, the consistency, even of very strong systems S, may be
+provable in S and even in primitive recursive number theory. However, what can be shown to be
+unprovable in S' is the fact that the rules of the equational calculus applied to equations, between
+primitive recursive terms, demonstrable in S yield only correct numerical equations (provided
+that S possesses the property that is asserted to be unprovable). Note that it is necessary to
+prove this "outer" consistency of S (which for the usual systems is trivially equivalent with
+consistency) in order to "justify", in the sense of Hilbert's program, the transfinite axioms of a
+
+617
+particular, propositions of Z) that are undecidable on the basis of the axioms of S,
+provided that S is w-consistent. Here a system is said to be w-consistent if, for no
+property F of natural numbers, (Ex) Ex as well as all the formulas F(i), i = 1,2, ...,
+are provable.
+2. In particular, in every system S of the kind just mentioned the proposition that
+S' is consistent (more precisely, the equivalent arithmetic proposition that we obtain
+by mapping the formulas one-to-one on natural numbers) is unprovable.
+Theorems 1 and 2 hold also for systems in which there are infinitely many axioms
+and in which there are other principles of inference than those mentioned above,
+provided that when we enumerate the formulas (in order of increasing length and, for
+equal length, in lexicographical order) the class of numbers assigned to the axioms
+is definable and decidable [entscheidungsdefinit] in the system Z, and that the same
+holds of the following relation R(x1, X2, ..., Xn) between natural numbers: "the formula with number x, follows from the formulas with numbers x2, ..., an by a single
+application of one of the rules of inference". Here a relation (class) R(X1, X2,..., Xn)
+is said to be decidable in Z if for every n-tuple (k1, Kz, ..., Kn) of natural numbers
+either R(k1, Kz, ..., kin) or R(k1, Kz, ..., Kn) is provable in Z. (At present no decidable
+number-theoretic relation is known that is not definable and decidable already in Z.)
+If we imagine that the system Z is successively enlarged by the introduction of
+variables for classes of numbers, classes of classes of numbers, and so forth, together
+with the corresponding comprehension axioms, we obtain a sequence (continuable
+into the transfinite) of formal systems that satisfy the assumptions mentioned above,
+and it turns out that the consistency (w-consistency) of any of those systems is
+provable in all subsequent systems. Also, the undecidable propositions constructed
+for the proof of Theorem 1 become decidable by the adjunction of higher types and
+the corresponding axioms; however, in the higher systems we can construct other
+undecidable propositions by the same procedure, and so forth. To be sure, all the
+propositions thus constructed are expressible in Z (hence are number-theoretic propositions); they are, however, not decidable in Z, but only in higher systems, for
+example, in that of analysis. In case we adopt a type-free construction of mathematies,
+as is done in the axiom system of set theory, axioms of cardinality (that is, axioms
+postulating the existence of sets of ever higher cardinality) take the place of the type
+extensions, and it follows that certain arithmetic propositions that are undecidable
+in Z become decidable by axioms of cardinality, for example, by the axiom that there
+exist sets whose cardinality is greater than every on where a = No, an+1 = 2am.
+system S. (" Rules of the equational calculus" in the foregoing means the two rules of substituting
+primitive recursive terms for variables and substituting one such term for another to which it
+has been proved equal.)
+The last-mentioned theorem and Theorem 1 of the paper remain valid for much weaker systems
+than Z, in particular for primitive recursive number theory, that is, what remains of Z if quantifiers are omitted. With insignificant changes in the wording of the conclusions of the two theorems
+they even hold for any recursive translation into S of the equations between primitive recursive
+terms, under the sole hypothesis of w-consistency (or outer consistency) of S' in this translation.]
+
+On the consistency of arithmetic
+JACQUES HERBRAND
+(19316)
+Dated "Göttingen, 14 July 1931"
+, this
+paper was sent by Herbrand for publication (to the Journal für die reine und
+angewandte Mathematik) just before he
+left for a vacation trip in the Alps.
+The paper was received on 27 July and
+on that day Herbrand was killed in a
+fall.
+The paper presents a consistency proof
+for a segment of arithmetic and was intended, no doubt, to be a contribution to
+the realization of the Hilbert school's
+program. Consistency is proved for an
+arithmetic in which the well-formed formula that can be substituted in the induction schema does not contain any
+bound variable (or, if it does, does not
+contain any function but the successor
+function). Consistency proofs likewise
+requiring some restriction on the induction axiom schema had been presented
+by Ackermann (1924) and von Neumann
+(1927). Herbrand's proof remains relatively simple and straightforward because he has at his disposal his powerful
+fundamental theorem (1930). § 1 consists
+of a very clear presentation of this
+theorem.
+Throughout his work Herbrand applies
+the word "intuitionistic" to the methods
+that he considers admissible in metamathematics, and, although there may
+be some variations in the meaning that
+he gives to the term, this meaning is on
+the whole much closer to that of Hilbert's
+word "finitary" ("finit") than to "intuitionistic" as applied to Brouwer's doctrine. Herbrand writes, for instance, that
+Hilbert had undertaken to solve metamathematical problems "exclusively
+through
+intuitionistic
+arguments"
+("uniquement par des raisonnements intuitionnistes"
+, 193la, p. 187), and in the
+paper below (p. 62%, line lu) he writes
+that the statement and the proof of his
+fundamental theorem are "intuitionistic"
+. The identification of "intuitionistic" with "finitary" was then current
+among members of the Hilbert school
+(see, for example, von Neumann 1927,
+p. 2; the distinction between the two
+notions was to be made explicit a few
+years later (Hilbert and Bernays 1934,
+pp. 34 and 43, Bernays 1934a, 1935, and
+1938).
+A key part of Herbrand's proof is the
+elimination of the induction axiom
+schema (with no apparent variables)
+through the introduction of functions;
+the definition conditions for each of these
+functions are such that, for every set of
+arguments, a well-determined number
+can be proved in a finitary way to be the
+value of the function (Group C of hypotheses). The functions are, in fact,
+(general) recursive functions, and here is
+the first appearance of the notion of recursive (as opposed to primitive recursive)
+function. It is interesting to see how, a
+few months earlier, Herbrand had been
+led to this notion by his conception of
+"intuitionism". (Let us note in passing
+that, it seems, Herbrand's knowledge
+of Brouwer's ideas is not first-hand, but
+
+619
+derived from Hilbert.) He writes (193la, the computational procedure for o, it
+p. 187): "In its extreme form this theory
+may be necessary to add some equations
+[intuitionism] allows only arguments
+to those contained in A($).) So I don't
+dealing with the integers (or with objects
+think there is any discrepancy between
+that can actually be numbered by means
+his two definitions as he meant them.
+of integers) and satisfying the following
+What he failed to see (or to make clear)
+conditions: all the functions that are
+is that the computation, for all computintroduced must be actually computable
+able functions, proceeds by exactly the
+for all values of their arguments, by
+same rules. It is this fact that makes a
+means of operations that are completely
+precise definition of general recursiveness
+described in advance; every time that
+possible. Unfortunately I do not find
+we come to say 'A proposition is true for
+Herbrand's letter among my papers. It
+every integer
+, this means
+We can
+probably was lost in Vienna during
+actually verify
+it for every integer';
+World War II, as many other things
+every time that we come to say 'There
+were. But my recollection is very distinct
+exists an integer x that has
+such and
+and was still very fresh in 1934."
+such a property, this means implicitly
+Herbrand's consistency proof for a
+' In what precedes we gave a means of
+fragment of arithmetic still belongs to the
+constructing such an x''
+period that preceded Gödel's famous re-
+Gödel (1934, p. 26) gives, as "sugsult (1931). He probably started to write
+gested by Herbrand"
+', the following
+his paper before Gödel's paper reached
+definition of a recursive function: "If o
+him. But he had ample opportunity to
+denotes an unknown function and 41,
+examine Gödel's result and he wrote a
+.., 4k are known functions, and if the
+last section dealing with it. Herbrand
+f's and the o are substituted in one
+explains very clearly why this result does
+another in the most general fashions and
+not hold for the fragment of arithmetic
+certain pairs of the resulting expressions
+that he considers: whatever functions
+are equated, then, if the resulting set of
+may be introduced by definition confunctional equations has one and only
+ditions of Group E, these functions
+one solution for p, o is a recursive
+never include a function that enumerates
+function"
+them (this is shown by a diagonal argu-
+Answering a query of the editor's
+ment), hence the metamathematical
+about the history of Herbrand's suggesdescription of the system cannot be
+tion, Professor Gödel wrote in a letter projected into the system.
+dated 23 April 1963:
+The translation is by the editor, and it
+"I have never met Herbrand. His is printed here by permission of Walter
+suggestion was made in a letter in 1931, de Gruyter and Co.
+and it was formulated exactly as on page
+When published, Herbrand's text was
+26 of my lecture notes, that is, without
+preceded by a bibliographical note writany reference to computability. However,
+ten by Hans Hasse in German. Here is its
+since Herbrand was an intuitionist, this
+translation:
+definition for him evidently meant that
+"Jacques Herbrand, born on 12 Februthere exists a constructive proof for the
+ary 1908 in Paris, had a fatal accident on
+existence and unicity of ф. He probably
+27 July 1931 while mountain climbing in
+believed that such a proof can be given
+the Alps. The same day the editors
+only by exhibiting a computational proreceived the manuscript published below.
+cedure. (Note that, if Church's thesis is
+"He spent the last six months of
+correct, it is true that, if (9!4)A (p) holds
+his life at German universities, in close
+intuitionistically, then (p) A (p) is general
+contact with a number of
+German
+recursive, although, in order to obtain mathematicians and engaged in a lively
+
+620
+exchange of ideas with them. They were field of number theory and of matheall profoundly impressed by his noble
+matical logic and the fruitful ideas that
+personality, which was endowed with
+he expressed in mathematical conversarich scientific gifts. With him an extrations justified the greatest hopes. The
+ordinarily gifted mind has perished in the
+science of mathematics has suffered a
+bloom of youth. The beautiful and
+severe and irreparable loss by his unimportant results that he found in the timely death."
+In two previous papers! we stated and proved a general theorem that makes it
+possible to solve many problems in metamathematics, and we gave some applications
+of it. In the present paper we wish to apply it to the problem of the consistency of
+arithmetic more completely than we did in DI. The fundamental result is stated at
+the beginning of 83.
+§ 1. STATEMENT OF A GENERAL THEOREM
+Let us first recall the statement of the theorem in question.
+(a) We use Russell's signs, with slight changes: V, ~, x (and), → (for implication), =, (Ex) (instead of Russell's inverted E), and (x),' as well as Russell's rules of
+inference, which we have slightly modified. In particular, we shall not use Hilbert's
+logical a function in propositions, and instead of his transfinite axiom we shall use
+the axioms and rules of Russell that are equivalent to it. We complete Russell's
+formal system by allowing the use of functions (in the ordinary sense of the word);
+the functions of 0 variable are the constants. For more details see D I, chaps. 1 and 3.
+In a given theory we have certain elementary propositions and functions, and all
+propositions considered within the theory are combinations of logical signs with
+elementary propositions and functions. We have, moreover, certain propositions
+called hypotheses, and the propositions true in the theory are those that we can obtain
+from the hypotheses by applying the rules of inference.
+If a proposition can be proved by application of these rules without the use of any
+hypothesis, we call it an identity. If a proposition P is true in a given theory, there
+exist certain hypotheses H1, H2,..., In such that H, × H2 x... x Hn. → P is
+an identity; and conversely (see D I, chap. 3, 2.4), if this is the case, P is true in the
+theory in question.
+The part of a proposition on which a logical sign operates is called the scope of the
+1 1930, 1931. In what follows these papers are denoted by D I and D II. We take advantage
+of the present opportunity to make the following two remarks about then.
+(a) The theorem in chap. 3, 3.3, of D I is correct only if A(x) contains no restricted variables
+(only under this condition is the expansion of (x)A (x) true).
+(b) In D II, at the bottom of p. 32, we point out that the elements of a domain can be "equated".
+This calls for a clarification, since the values of the index functions are not well-determined in
+the new domain. Among all elements a1 equal to a given one, we choose one, B. These ß form the
+new domain. In this domain the value of a function f (B1, Bz, . .., Bn) (which may be either an elementary descriptive function or an index function) will be the ß equal to the value of f(B1, Bz, ..., Bn)
+in the former domain. We thus see that every proposition true in the former domain remains true
+in the new one.
+2 We recall that the signs x, →, and = can be defined by means of the signs V and ~, these
+alone being taken as primitive. Let us recall their meaning. V, ~, x, →, =, (Ex), (x) mean:
+or, not, and, implies, is equivalent to, there exists an x such that, for all x, respectively.
+
+621
+sign. Thus in (x)~ A(x, y). V. (Ly)~ B(y) the scope of (x) is ~A(x, y), that of
+(Ey) is ~ B(y), that of the first ~ is A(x, y), that of the second ~ is B(y). Instead of
+the scope of (x) or (Ly) we shall also speak of the scope of x or y.
+The variables that occur in signs of the form (x) or (Ex) are said to be apparent;
+the others are said to be real.
+An apparent variable x occurring either in a sign (Ex) that is within the scope of an
+even number of signs ~ or in a sign (x) within the scope of an odd number of signs ~
+is said to be restricted. Otherwise, it is said to be general. Thus in ~ (x) A(x, x). V.
+(Ey) ~ ~ (z)A(y, 2), x and y are restricted, z is general.
+(b) When a proposition contains neither apparent variables nor functions, there is
+a simple criterion that enables us to decide whether or not it is an identity.
+Let us consider the elementary propositions occurring in this proposition (they may
+or may not contain variables; of course, we consider those that contain the same
+variables in the same order to be identical; let us assign to each of them a logical
+value, that is, let us associate with each of them one of the signs V or F, and let us
+agree that to all propositions without apparent variables formed from these propositions we assign a logical value according to the following rules (see footnote 2):
+(a) If F (or V) is associated with P, then V (or F) is associated with ~ P;
+(B) Fis associated with PV @only if f'is associated with P and with Q.
+It can then be proved (D I, chap. 1, 5.21) that P is an identity if and only if P
+has the logical value V whatever may be the logical values assigned to the elementary
+propositions. Hence, if P contains n distinct elementary propositions, we need 2n
+trials to decide the truth of P.
+(c) Let us consider an arbitrary proposition P (we assume that all the variables
+are represented by different letters). We shall apply the remarks that follow to the
+proposition (x)(Ey). A(x, y), which we shall take as an example (A is a proposition
+with no variable other than x and y, formed from elementary propositions and
+functions).
+We shall consider functions that include, first, the elementary functions occurring
+in Pand, then, new functions obtained as follows (it should be clear that by a function
+we understand a mere logical sign and that we are not concerned, at least for the
+time being, with its "values"): with every restricted variable [x] of P we associate
+a function whose arguments are the real variables of P and the general variables
+having a scope containing a quantifier in x, (x) or (Ex); if there are no such real or
+general2a variables, the function has 0 argument (and is a constant). For example, for
+(x) (Ey). A(x, y) we have the function q(x) associated with y.
+Let us now consider all the distinct elementary propositions occurring in P (here
+two elementary propositions differing only in their variables are considered identical),
+denoting them by A,(X1, X2,..., Xn); let us also consider all distinct functions
+(elementary functions as well as those just introduced, with the same convention):
+denoting them by fi(21, X2,..., Xm). For example, if A(x, Y) is B(x, x) × B(Y, Y) . V.
+~B(x, y), we have B(x, y) as the only elementary proposition and p(x) as the only
+function.
+Let us now consider finite sets of the letters do, a1, ..., an; these sets we shall call
+2ª [Instead of "générales" the original text has "restreintes", which is an oversight.]l
+
+622
+domains; let us assume that we assign a "value" to each fiday, daz'..., dan), that is,
+we associate one of the a; with this collection of signs. Let us assume that this has
+been done for some of the filday, da'... Nun) (not necessarily for all).
+From our elementary functions we can construct other functions by "substitution"; for example, from the functions fi(x), f2(x), and f3(x, y) we can construct
+Js(f2(x), fi(y)), and so on. What we should understand by the value of such a function
+is clear. Let us denote by E,(X1, X2,..., Xp) any one of these functions (old or new).
+To every function we assign a height in the following way: elementary functions
+have height 1; if the maximum of the heights of fus f'uz'..., Eum, (the variables are
+omitted) is h, then the height of f. (Eup, Fuz'... Eum,) is h+ 1.
+If in the domain there exist values of a sufficient number of the filday, Oaz'..., acm,)
+for us to compute the values of all Fi (ao, do, ...,ao) of at most height h and if h is
+the greatest number having this property, the domain is said to be of order h, and do
+is the initial element (this element is not always uniquely determined).
+In our example let us set 1(x)= (x), 2(X)=)),..., Фп+1(X) =ФФп(X)),
+..;then the functions of at most height h are dI(x), 42(x),.., Фи(x). A domain of
+order h will be formed by the letters do, a1, a2, ..., On if to pla,) we assign the value
+a¿+ 1 (to express this we shall often write q(ai) = di+ 1. We see that p(an) has no value
+in the domain.
+Let us now associate a logical value with every A (a1 daz'... aan).
+Let us consider P, delete in it all signs of the form (x) and (Ex), and then replace
+each restricted variable by the associated function. We thus obtain a certain proposition without apparent variables (for example, A(X, p(x)).
+Let us replace the variables by some of the a; in any way whatsoever and, in the
+expression thus obtained, let us replace the functions of the form
+Fillas, lag...,
+aan,) by their values. (This is not possible for every choice of the a,; in our example
+we obtain A(ai, di+1), and the operation is impossible if we replace x by an.)
+Since the A (a1, Mag'..., Man) have a logical value, the same holds of the proposition obtained. If this logical value is always V, in whatever way the variables are
+replaced by the ai, then P is said to be true in the domain of order h considered. (We
+see that this domain is characterized by the values of the functions and the logical
+values of the A day, Aaz... Acnp)
+We then have the following fundamental theorem :
+(a) If P is an identity, we can find, given the proof of P, a number h such that ~ P
+is not true in any domain of order h;
+(B) If P' is not an identity, for every h we can construct a domain of order h in which
+~P is true.
+The statement and the proof of this theorem are intuitionistic.3
+3 By an intuitionistic argument we understand an argument satisfying the following conditions:
+in it we never consider anything but a given finite number of objects and of functions; these
+functions are well-defined, their definition allowing the computation of their value in a univocal
+way; we never state that an object exists without giving the means of constructing it; we never
+consider the totality of all the objects x of an infinite collection; and when we say that an argument (or a theorem) is true for all these x, we mean that, for each x taken by itself, it is possible
+to repeat the general argument in question, which should be considered to be merely the prototype
+of these particular arguments.
+
+623
+(d) If for every h we can construct a domain of order h in which P is true, we say that
+there is an infinite domain in which P is true. We say that P is false in an infinite
+domain if ~P is true in it. (This expression
+"infinite domain" is merely an
+abbreviation; in order to have the intuitionistic meaning of the statements we have
+to return to the precise statements (a) and (ß).) We can then state:
+Pis not an identity if and only if there exists an infinite domain in which P is false.
+In this form the theorem is a more precise statement of the well-known Löwenheim-
+Skolem theorem;* in fact, if there exists, in our sense, an infinite domain in which P is
+true, we can easily obtain from it by nonintuitionistic procedures a denumerable set
+in which P is true for certain values of the functions, that is, a model [réalisation]
+of P, and conversely. But
+(a) Our statement is completely intuitionistic; we even have the means, once P
+has been proved, of finding a number h such that in the "partial" domain of order h,
+that is, at the hth step in the construction of the infinite domain, it is impossible to
+make P false;
+(B) We do not restrict ourselves to propositions in canonical form, as Löwenheim
+and, even more, Skolem do;
+(y) Löwenheim and Skolem implicitly assume that, once we have a model of ~P,
+P cannot be proved; but this means that the consistency of mathematics (or at least
+of arithmetic) is implicitly assumed; our theorem, on the contrary, will allow us to
+investigate the consistency of arithmetic.
+(e) Let us now consider a theory with given hypotheses.
+If we can determine an infinite domain such that all the hypotheses of the theory are
+true in it, the theory is not contradictory.
+For, if the theory were contradictory, there would be n hypotheses H1, Hz, ..., Hn
+such that ~.Hy × Hzx... × Hn would be an identity (see DI, chap. 5, 6.5
+[above, p. 561]). But, since H1, H2, ..., Hn are true in the infinite domain, H1 X
+Hz x ... x Hn Would also be true in it (this is easy to see); hence ~.H1 × Hz X
+..• × Hn would be false in it, which is impossible if it is an identity.
+The foregoing theorems have a large number of applications (see D I and especially
+D II). In particular they allow us
+(1) To solve many special cases of the decision problem;
+(2) To prove rigorously (intuitionistically, which Löwenheim did not do) that the
+decision problem can always be reduced to the case in which there are only three
+elementary propositions of two variables or one of three variables.
+By means of them we shall deal with the consistency of arithmetic (see already
+DI, chap. 5, 6.8 [above, PP. 563-567]).
+§ 2. THE AXIOMS OF ARITHMETIC
+The theory that we shall study, which is the formal translation of classical arithmetic, has only one elementary proposition (of two variables), x = y; it has one
+constant, O, one function of one variable, x + 1, and other functions that we shall
+indicate later.
+4 See Löwenheim 1915 and Skolem 1920.
+
+624
+The hypotheses are the following :
+x = х,
+х = У.→. У = Х,
+X=Y XY =2.→.x =7,
+(Group A)
+x=y.=.x+1=y + 1,
+~.x+1=0.
+Then come all the hypotheses obtained when in
+Ф(О) х : (х). Ф(х) → Ф(х + 1) :→. (х)Ф(x)
+Ф(x) is replaced by any proposition containing the variable x (Group B, mathematical
+induction).
+We can also introduce any number of functions fi (X1, X2, ...,Xn.) together with hypotheses such that
+(a) The hypotheses contain no apparent variables;
+(b) Considered intuitionistically, they make the actual computation of the fi(X1, Xz,
+....Xn.) possible for every given set of numbers, and it is possible to prove intuitionistically that we obtain a well-determined result (Group C).
+As a specific example, let us assume that we have already introduced a certain
+number of such functions; then a new one, f(x), can be introduced, together with the
+new hypotheses
+f(0) = a,
+f(x + 1) = B(f(x)),
+a and B(y) being functions formed from previously introduced functions. This is the
+ordinary schema of definition by recursion.
+But we can introduce much more complicated definition schemata, for example,
+multiple recursions on several variables. Thus we can introduce Hilbert's function®
+together with the hypotheses
+*(n + 1, a, b) = p(n, a, p(n + 1, a, b - 1)),
+«(n, a, 1) = а,
+Ф(О, a, b) = a + b.
+Let us finally introduce, following Hilbert,? a fourth group of hypotheses, which
+does not belong to classical arithmetic:
+Let A(x) be a proposition without apparent variables; if it can be proved by intuitionistic procedures that this proposition, intuitionistically considered, is true for every x,
+then we add (x) A(x) to the hypotheses. (Group D)
+§ 3. THE PROBLEM OF CONSISTENCY
+The fundamental result is the following :
+The hypotheses A, B, C, and D yield a consistent theory if we assume that, in the
+hypotheses B, $(x) contains no apparent variables.
+5 This expression means: when they are translated into ordinary language, considered as a
+property of integers and not as a mere symbol.
+6 See Hilbert 1925 [above, p. 388].
+" See Hilbert 1930, p. 491.
+
+625
+The proof is very simple.
+For every $(x) without apparent variables we introduce a new function =(X, Y1, Y2,
+...,Уn), the yi being the variables of $(x) that are distinct from x. We write &(x) for
+short, omitting the yi. We introduce the following hypotheses:
+= (0) = 0,
+(1)
+910).~$/+1)(x)=o..=(x+ 1) =x + 1,
+(Group E)
+~1910).~p(x+1)2)=01:→=X+1)==(X),
+(3)
+8(2)=1+1:1+1) =y+ 1x 8(y) = 0. (4)
+Translated into ordinary language, they mean that, if a is the least number for which
+Da is false, E(x) = 0 for x ‹ a and E(x) = a for x ≥ a. If the number a does not exist,
+E(x) = 0 for every x.
+We can then prove that
+(a) The hypotheses B follow from these new hypotheses.
+To see that, we have merely to formalize the following argument.
+Let us assume that $(O) and (x). Ф(x) → Ф(x + 1) are true and also that there
+exists an x such that ~Ф(x + 1) is true, then it follows from E(2) and E(3) that
+=(x+ 1) = x + 1 if =(x) = 0,
+Ex+ 1)= =(x)
+if(x) ‡ 0.
+Let us then take e(x + 1) = y + 1. By E(4) we have
+Ey+ 1) = y + 1,
+€(Y) = 0.
+Because of E(2) and E(3), this entails that ~ P(y + 1) is true (since $(0) is assumed
+to be true). We have y # 0, since otherwise $(0) and ~ $(0 + 1) would be true,
+which is contrary to the assumption made. Hence we can take y = z + 1. By this
+assumption, ~ $(z + 1) and $(0) are true. E(2), together with the fact that e(z + 1)
+# = + 1, entails that e(z) ‡ O; then E(3) entails that e(z) = ¿(z + 1), which leads to
+a contradiction.
+(b) The new hypotheses are of the form C if $(x) contains no apparent variables.
+For in this case we can actually determine whether $(x) is true or not, and the
+hypotheses E allow us to actually compute the e(x) in a univocal and consistent way.
+It is therefore sufficient to prove the consistency of the hypotheses A, C, and D.
+But this follows immediately from the general theorem. We can indeed construct, by
+intuitionistic procedures, a domain of order h that consists of ordinary integers and in
+which the hypotheses are true; this domain consists of the values (in the intuitive sense
+of the word) of the functions of at most height h that are constructed from the
+elementary functions, here the latter being merely the function x + 1 and the functions introduced in the hypotheses C; 0 is the initial element. According to what has
+been said above, it can then be proved by intuitionistic procedures that all the
+hypotheses are true in that domain.
+The foregoing provides a procedure that enables us to construct, for every h, a
+domain of order h in which all the hypotheses are true. These hypotheses are therefore
+
+626
+true in an infinite domain, and the theory cannot be inconsistent (compare D I, chap.
+5, 6.8 [above, pp. 563-567]; the present argument is simpler because we reduce the
+hypotheses B to the hypotheses C).
+We see how simple the proof is, once we have the general theorem. However, the
+question is not entirely solved. Still to be considered is the case in which, in Group B,
+$(x) contains apparent variables. We can only say:
+In case P(X) contains apparent variables we can add the hypotheses B without introducing a contradiction if the only function occurring in $(x) (besides the constant 0) is
+the function u + 1.
+For we can introduce the function 8(x) together with the hypotheses
+8(0) = 0,
+8(x + 1) = x.
+From this it follows that the proposition
+x=O. V. (Ly)(x =y + 1)
+is true. However, we have shown in D I (chap. 4, 8.1) that the propositions of the
+form x ‡x + 1 + 1 + ... + 1 follow from some hypotheses of Group B in which
+the $(x) have no apparent variables. Finally, we have proved in D I (chap. 4, 8.1) that
+in the case under consideration the propositions above, together with the hypotheses
+A, entail the hypotheses B. Q. e. d.
+We would have a still more general problem by admitting other schemata of
+definition by recursion. For example, we could introduce a function f(x) together
+with the hypotheses
+A (f (0)),
+B(f(x), f(x + 1)),
+(Ex) A(x) and (x)(Ey). B(x, y) being true propositions, proved without the use of the
+new function.
+§ 4. COMPARISON WITH A THEOREM OF GÖDEL'S
+Following 'Gödel's argument, we can prove that?
+The consistency of a theory cannot be proved by arguments formalizable in the theory,
+whenever the theory contains arithmetic.
+The exact meaning of this proposition is easy to understand. For the details one
+8 Bernays drew our attention to the fact that, if an arithmetic containing hypotheses A, B,
+and, as functions, those occurring in A(x) and B(x, y), as well as addition and multiplication, were
+proved consistent, it would follow that we could add the new hypotheses without contradiction,
+for any argument carried out with the new function f(x) could be carried out in the arithmetic
+° See Gödel 1931. To understand this proposition, one has to imagine that all signs occurring in
+metamathematics are represented by objects of the theory being considered, for example, by
+integers in arithmetic; the properties of these signs and the relations among them will then be
+represented by certain propositions of the theory; every argument in the theory in question carried
+out with these objects and these propositions will correspond to a metamathematical argument,
+of which it will be, in a way, the translation.
+
+627
+can consult Gödel's paper, where the theorem is proved for the system of Russell and
+Whitehead. Let us recall briefly the essence of his argument.
+We can intuitionistically number all the propositions containing just one real
+variable and all the proofs of the theory considered. Let P(x, y, 2) be a proposition,
+intuitionistically defined, whose meaning is: proof number x is a proof of proposition
+number y for the value z of its variable. (In his paper Gödel effectively constructs
+this function for the theory he considers.) Let us observe that the computation that
+we have to do in order to check whether P(X, y, z) is true or false for given x, y, and
+"—a computation that is intuitionistically carried out—can also be formally carried
+out in the theory; hence, if P(x, y, z) is true, it is provable in the theory. Let us assume
+that the theory is consistent. Then, if ß is the number of the proposition (x). ~ P
+(x, y, y), the proposition P(x, B, B) cannot be true, for it would mean that proof
+number x is a proof of (x). ~ P(x, B, B); hence ~ P(x, B, B) could be proved in the
+theory, and we would have a contradiction. Moreover, (x). ~ P(x, B, B) is not provable
+in the theory, for, if proof number y were a proof of it, P(y, B, B) would be true (by
+definition); hence, because of what we have said, it would be provable in theory, and
+we would again have a contradiction. If we formalize the foregoing considerations in
+the theory (and they are intuitionistic), we obtain the following result: w being the
+translation'° of the proposition "The theory is consistent", w → ~ P(x, B, B) is a
+true proposition of the theory (x being a variable). If w were provable in the theory
+so would be ~ P(x, B, B), hence also (x). ~ P(x, B, B), and we have just seen that this
+would make the theory inconsistent. Hence w is unprovable.
+Let us apply this method to the arithmetic that contains the hypotheses A, B, and
+C (leaving out the hypotheses D for the sake of simplicity). Our arguments, as well as
+those necessary to establish the fundamental theorem, are formalizable in this
+theory. But, if we want to carry out Gödel's argument, we have to consider a definite
+theory. In Group C we merely have a description of the hypotheses that may be
+introduced. We must consider a definite group of schemata of hypotheses of type C,
+say, Group C'. We shall see that, if we wish to carry out Gödel's argument, we must
+introduce other schemata for the definition of functions; it is therefore impossible to
+apply his considerations to our arithmetic.
+One could object that it is perhaps possible to describe at once all the schemata
+that are included in C for the construction of functions. This would mean that it is
+possible to describe outright all intuitionistic procedures for the construction of
+number-theoretic functions. But this is impossible. For, if this were the case, we
+could, by an intuitionistic procedure, number all the functions of just one variable,
+JI(X), J2(x),...,Jn(x),...; then fx(x) + 1 would be an intuitionistically defined function that would not be among the functions previously listed, hence a contradiction.
+Let us apply this result to all functions definable by C' and those obtained by
+compounding these functions with one another and with x + 1. The function
+Ix(x) + 1 cannot be among these functions. But, to carry out Gödel's argument, we
+have to number all objects occurring in proofs; we are thus led to construct the
+function of two variables fu(x); this justifies what we were saying above, namely,
+that it is impossible, in an arithmetic containing the hypotheses C', to formalize
+Gödel's argument about this arithmetic.
+10 See footnote 9.
+
+628
+Let us make two more remarks.
+(a) Every intuitionistic argument can always be carried out with ordinary integers,
+because we can always replace the objects considered in the argument by ordinary
+integers, for example, if we number them. It seems to us almost certain that every
+intuitionistic argument can then be carried out in an arithmetic containing the
+hypotheses A, B, and C [only]. But the justification of this point (a proof, in the
+mathematical sense of the word, is obviously impossible, just as it is for any statement
+involving the totality of all intuitionistic arguments) would lead us to a detailed
+discussion, which we shall perhaps undertake some other time. It would show that
+the hypotheses of Group D follow from those that precede them.
+(b) It seems to us impossible, contrary to Gödel's opinion,! that there could be
+intuitionistic arguments not formalizable in ordinary analysis. Thus we believe that
+the arithmetic containing the hypotheses A, B, C, and D is a part of ordinary
+analysis. It seems to us probable that the question stands as follows: it will never be
+possible to give an example of an intuitionistic argument not formalizable in ordinary
+analysis, and also it will always be impossible to prove that there exists no such
+argument; for we have shown that it is impossible to describe all intuitionistic
+procedures of reasoning (since it is impossible to describe all procedures for the
+construction of functions). There might be some sort of logical postulate here. It would
+follow that it is impossible to prove the consistency of ordinary analysis.
+It is not even impossible that every intuitionistic argument could be carried out
+in an arithmetic containing the hypotheses A and B and allowing in C only ordinary
+addition and multiplication.!2 If this were so, the consistency of ordinary arithmetic
+would already be unprovable.
+11 See Gödel 1931, p. 197 [above, p. 615].
+12 See Gödel 1931, Theorem VII [p. 611, abovel, and also footnote 8 above.
+
+References
+Throughout this volume, an author's name followed by a year number, both in italics,
+denotes an entry in the present list of references. Thus "Herbrand 1928" denotes the first
+publication listed under Herbrand in this list. When the context leaves no doubt as to the
+author, the year number alone is
+used. For papers that originally were addresses or
+lectures, the year indicated is that in which they were delivered; for communications to
+learned societies, it is that in which they were made; for other papers, it is that of the
+complete volume of the periodical in which they appear (there are a few exceptions, with
+irregular publications—any compiler of a bibliography knows that no rule is without
+exception). For one author, additional titles in the same year are distinguished by a, b,
+and so on; an attempt has been made to follow the actual chronological order. A star in
+front of an entry indicates that the publication is included in the present volume. When
+a book had several editions or when a paper was subsequently reprinted, the fact is
+indicated only when this indication is considered a real service to the reader.
+Aanderaa, Stål
+See Dreben, Burton, and Stål Aanderaa; also Dreben, Burton, Peter Andrews, and Stål
+Aanderaa.
+Ackermann, Wilhelm
+1924
+Begründung des "tertium non datur" mittels der Hilbertschen Theorie der
+Widerspruchsfreiheit, Mathematische Annalen 93, 1-36.
+1928
+*Zum Hilbertschen Aufbau der reellen Zahlen, ibid. 99, 118-133 (493-507 of the
+present volume).
+1928a
+1940
+1954
+Über die Erfüllbarkeit gewisser Zählausdrücke, ibid. 100, 638-649.
+Zur Widerspruchsfreiheit der Zahlentheorie, ibid. 117, 162-194.
+Solvable cases of the decision problem (North-Holland, Amsterdam); 2nd printing
+1962.
+See Hilbert, David, and Wilhelm Ackermann.
+Addison, John West
+1958
+Separation principles in the hierarchies of classical and effective descriptive set
+theory, Fundamenta mathematicae 46, 123-135.
+Leon Henkin, and Alfred Tarski
+(eds.) The theory of models, Proceedings of the 1963 International Symposium at
+Berkeley (North-Holland, 1965).
+Aleksandrov, Pavel Sergeievich (Павел Сергеевич Александров)
+Sur la puissance des ensembles mesurables B, Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des
+séances de l' Academie des sciences (Paris) 162, 323-325.
+Andrews, Peter
+See Dreben, Burton, Peter Andrews, and Stål Aanderaa.
+Artin, Emil, and Otto Schreier
+1926
+Algebraische Konstruktion reeller Körper, Abhandlungen aus dem mathematischen Seminars der Hamburgischen Universität 5 (1927), 85-99.
+Asser, Günter
+1957
+Theorie der logischen Auswahlfunktionen, Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik
+und Grundlagen der Mathematik 3, 30-68.
+
+630
+Baire, René
+See Borel, Emile, 1905a.
+Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua
+See Fraenkel, Abraham A., and Yehoshua Bar-Hillel.
+Bauer-Mengelberg, Stefan
+1965
+Review of Gödel 1962, The journal of symbolic logic 30, 359-362.
+1966
+Review of Elliott Mendelson's translation of Gödel 1931 in Davis 1965, ibid. 31,
+486-489.
+Behmann, Heinrich
+1922
+Beiträge zur Algebra der Logik, insbesondere zum
+Entscheidungsproblem,
+Mathematische Annalen 86, 163-229.
+Belinfante, Maurits Joost
+1929
+Über einen Grenzwertsatz aus der Theorie der unendlichen Folgen, Mathematische Annalen 101, 312-315.
+Zur intuitionistischen Theorie der unendlichen Reihen, Sitzungsberichte der
+Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 639-660.
+Über eine besondere Klasse von non-oszillierenden Reihen, Koninklijke Akademie van wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Proceedings of the section of sciences 33,
+1170-1179.
+1930a
+Absolute
+Konvergenz in der intuitionistischen Mathematik, ibid., 1180-
+1184.
+1931
+Die Hardy-Littlewoodsche Umkehrung des Abelschen Stetigkeitssatzes in der
+intuitionistischen Mathematik, ibid. 34, 401-412.
+1931a
+Über die Elemente der Funktionentheorie und die Picardschen Sätze in der
+intuitionistischen Mathematik, ibid., 1395-1397.
+1932
+Uber den intuitionistischen Beweis der Picardschen Sätze, Verhandlungen des
+Internationalen Mathematiker-Kongresses Zürich 1932 (Orell Füssli, Zurich and
+Leipzig), vol. 2, 345-346.
+1939
+Das Riemannsche Umordnungsprinzip in der intuitionistischen Theorie der
+unendlichen Reihen, Compositio mathematica 6, 118-123.
+1939a
+Der Lévysche Umordnungssatz und seine intuitionistische Übertragung, ibid.,
+124-135.
+1941
+175, 226-230, 322-328.
+Benacerraf, Paul, and Hilary Putnam (eds.)
+1964
+Philosophy of mathematics: selected readings (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs,
+New Jersey).
+Bentham, Jeremy
+1843
+The works of Jeremy Bentham, edited by John Bowring (London); reprinted
+1962 (Russell and Russell, New York).
+Berkeley, Edmund Collis
+The algebra of states and events, The scientific monthly 78, 232-242.
+Bernays, Paul
+Über Hilberts Gedanken zur Grundlegung der Arithmetik, Jahresbericht der
+Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung 31, Ist section, 10-19.
+Erwiderung auf die Note von Herrn Aloys Müller : "Über Zahlen als Zeichen"
+Mathematische Annalen 90, 159-163; reprinted in Annalen der Philosophie und
+philosophischen Kritik 4 (1924), 492-497.
+1926
+Axiomatische Untersuchung des Aussagen-Kalkuls der "Principia mathematica"
+, Mathematische Leitschrift 25, 305-320.
+1927
+*Zusatz zu Hilberts Vortrag über "Die Grundlagen der Mathematik", Abhandlungen aus dem mathematischen Seminar der Hamburgischen Universität 6, 89-92
+(485-489 of the present volume); reprinted in Hilbert 1928, 25-28.
+
+631
+Bernays, Paul-conto.
+1932
+Methoden des Nachweises von Widerspruchsfreiheit und ihre Grenzen, Verhandlungen des Internationalen Mathematiker-Kongresses Zürich 1932 (Orell Füssli,
+Zurich and Leipzig), vol. 2, 342-343.
+1934
+Sur le platonisme dans les mathématiques, L'enseignement mathématique 34,
+(1935), 52-69.
+1934a
+1935
+Quelques points essentiels de la métamathématique, ibid., 70-95.
+Hilberts Untersuchungen über die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, in Hilbert 1935,
+196-216.
+1936
+Logical calculus, lecture notes 1935-1936 (The Institute for Advanced Study,
+Princeton, New Jersey).
+1937-
+1954
+A system of axiomatie set theory, The journal of symbolic logic 2, 65-77; 6
+(1941), 1-17; 7 (1942), 65-89, 133-145; 8 (1943), 89-106; 13 (1948), 65-79;
+19, 81-96.
+1938
+Sur les questions méthodologiques actuelles de la théorie hilbertienne de la
+la démonstration, in Gonseth 1938, 144-152 ; Discussion, 153-161.
+1940
+1940a
+1941
+1954
+Review of Gödel 1939, The journal of symbolic logic 5, 117-118.
+Review of Löwenheim 1940, ibid., 127-128.
+See 1937-1954.
+Zur Beurteilung der Situation in der beweistheoretischen Forschung, Revue
+internationale de philosophie 8, 9-13; Discussion, 15-21.
+1957
+1958
+Über eine natürliche Erweiterung des Relationenkalkuls, in Heyting 1957, I-14.
+Axiomatic set theory, with a historical introduction by Abraham A. Fraenkel
+(North-Holland, Amsterdam).
+1961
+Zur Frage der Unendlichkeitsschemata in der axiomatischen Mengenlehre,
+Essays on the foundations of mathematics dedicated to A. A. Fraenkel on his
+seventieth anniversary (Magnes Press, Jerusalem; distributed by North-Holland,
+Amsterdam).
+See Hilbert, David, and Paul Bernays.
+and Moses Schönfinkel
+1928
+Zum Entscheidungsproblem der mathematischen Logik, Mathematische Annalen
+99,342-372.
+Bernoulli, Jakob
+1686
+Demonstratio rationum etc., Acta eruditorum, 360-361 ; reprinted in Bernoulli
+1744
+1741, 282-283.
+Opera, vol. 1 (Geneva).
+Bernstein, Felix
+1904
+Bemerkung zur Mengenlehre, Nachrichten von der Königlichen Gesellschaft der
+Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Mathematisch-physikalische Klasse, 557-560.
+1905
+Über die Reihe der transfiniten Ordnungszahlen, Mathematische Annalen 60,
+187-193.
+1905a
+Die Theorie der reellen Zahlen, Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-
+Vereinigung 14, 447-449.
+Beth, Evert Willem
+1953
+On Padoa's method in the theory of definition, Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van wetenschappen, Proceedings of the section of sciences 56, series A,
+Mathematical sciences, 330-339 ; also Indagationes mathematicae 15, 330-339.
+1955
+Semantic entailment and formal derivability (Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van wetenschappen, afd. letterkunde, new series, vol. 18,
+no. 13, N. V. Noord-Hollandsche Vitgevers Maatschappij, Amsterdam).
+1956
+1956a
+L'existence en mathématiques (Gauthier-Villars, Paris; Nauwelaerts, Louvain).
+La crise de la raison et la logique (Gauthier-Villars, Paris; Nauwelaerts, Louvain ;
+1957).
+1959
+The foundations of mathematics (North-Holland, Amsterdam).
+
+632
+Blumenthal, Otto
+1935
+Lebensgeschichte, in Hilbert 1935, 388-429.
+Boole, George
+1847
+The mathematical analysis of logic, being an essay toward a calculus of deductive
+1848
+1854
+reasoning (London and Cambridge, England).
+The calculus of logic, The Cambridge and Dublin mathematical journal 3, 183-198.
+An investigation of the laws of thought, on which are founded the mathematical
+theories of logic and probabilities (London).
+Borel, Emile
+1905
+Quelques remarques sur les principes de la théorie des ensembles, Mathematische
+Annalen 60, 194-195.
+1905a
+Cinq lettres sur la théorie des ensembles, Bulletin de la Société mathématique de
+France 33, 261-273 (Hadamard to Borel, Baire to Hadamard, Lebesgue to Borel,
+Hadamard to Borel, Borel to Hadamard); reprinted in Borel, Leçons sur la
+théorie des functions, 2nd ed. (Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1914), 150-160, and in subsequent editions.
+Bradley, Francis Herbert
+1883
+The principles of logic (London).
+Brocard, Henri
+1906
+Réponse à la note 2549, L'intermédiaire des mathématiciens 13, 18.
+Brouwer, Luitzen Egbertus Jan
+1907
+Over de grondslagen der wiskunde (Maas and van Suchtelen, Amsterdam and
+Leipzig; Noordhoff, Groningen).
+1908
+De onbetrouwbaarheid der logische principes, Tijdschrift voor wijsbegeerte 2,
+152-158; reprinted in Brouwer 1919a, 5-12.
+1912
+Intuitionisme en formalisme (Noordhoff, Groningen); reprinted in Brouwer
+1919a, 5-29.
+1912a
+Intuitionism and formalism, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 20
+(1913), 81-96 ; reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam 1964, 66-77.
+1914
+Review of Schoenflies 1913, Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung 23, 2nd section, 78-83.
+1917
+Addenda en corrigenda over de grondslagen der wiskunde, Koninklijke Akademie van wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Verslagen van de gewone vergaderingen
+der wis- en natuurkundige afdeeling 25, 1418-1423; reprinted in Nieuw archief
+voor wiskunde, 2nd series, 12 (1918), 439-445.
+1918
+Begründung der Mengenlehre unabhängig vom logischen Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten. Erster Teil : Allgemeine Mengenlehre, Verhandelingen der
+Koninklijke Akademie van wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Ist section, 12, no. 5;
+errata on last page of Brouwer 1919.
+1919
+* Der Mensons 45g pen Antonian et cocio, 12. no. 3!
+schlossenen Dritten. Zweiter lell: Theorie der Punktmengen, rbrd., no. 7.
+1919a
+19196
+Wiskunde, waarheid, werkelijkheid (Noordhoff, Groningen).
+Intuitionistische Mengenlehre,
+Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-
+Vereinigung 28, Ist section, 203-208; reprinted in Koninklijke Akademie van
+wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Proceedings of the section of sciences 23 (1922),
+949-954.
+1920
+Besitzt jede reelle Zahl eine Dezimalbruchentwickelung ?, Koninklijke Akademie
+van wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Verslag van de gewone vergaderingen der wis-en
+natuurkundige afdeeling 29 (1921), 803-812; also Proceedings of the section of
+sciences 23 (1922), 955-964; reprinted in Mathematische Annalen 83 (1921),
+201-210.
+1923
+Begründung der Funktionenlehre unabhängig vom logischen Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten. Erster Teil : Stetigkeit, Messbarkeit, Derivierbarkeit, Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Ist
+section, 13, no. 2.
+
+633
+Brouwer, Luitzen Egbertus Jan—contd.
+1923a
+Over de rol van het principium tertii exclusi in de wiskunde, in het bijzonder
+in de functietheorie, Wis- en natuurkundig tijdschrift 2, 1-7.
+19236 *Uber die Bedeutung des Satzes vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten in der Mathematik, insbesondere in der Funktionentheorie, Journal für die reine und angewandte Mathematik 154, 1-7 (334-341 of the present volume).
+1923c
+Die Rolle des Satzes vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten in der Mathematik, Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung 33 (1925), 2nd section, 67-68
+(abstract of Brouwer 1923b).
+1923d
+Intuitionistische Zerlegung mathematischer Grundbegriffe, ibid., Ist section,
+251-256.
+1924
+Bewijs, dat iedere volle functie gelijkmatig continu is, Koninklijke Akademie
+van wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Verslag van de gewone vergaderingen der wisen natuurkundige afdeling 33, 189-193.
+Beweis, dass jede volle Funktion gleichmässig stetig ist, Koninklijke Akademie
+van wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Proceedings of the section of sciences 27, 189-193.
+Opmerkingen aangaande het bewijs der gelijkmatige continuiteit van volle
+functies, Koninlijke Akademie van wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Verslag van de
+gewone vergaderingen der wis- en natuurkundige afdeling 33, 646-648.
+Bemerkungen zum Beweise der gleichmässigen Stetigkeit voller Funktionen,
+Koninklijke Akademie van wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Proceedings of the
+section of sciences 27, 644-646.
+1925
+Zur Begründung der intuitionistischen Mathematik I, Mathematische Annalen
+93, 244-257 ; Berichtigung, ibid. 95, 472.
+1925a
+Zur Begründung der intuitionistischen Mathematik II, ibid. 95, 453-472 ;
+Berichtigung, ibid. 96, 488.
+1926
+1926a
+Zur Begründung der intuitionistischen Mathematik III, ibid. 96, 451-488.
+De intuitionistische vorm van het theorema van Heine-Borel, Koninklijke
+Akademie van wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Verslag van de gewone vergaderingen
+19266
+der afdeling natuurkunde 35, 677-678.
+Die intuitionistische Form des Heine-Borelschen Theorems, Koninklijke Akademie van wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Proceedings of the section of sciences 29,
+866-867.
+1927
+*Über Definitionsbereiche von Funktionen, Mathematische Annalen 97, 60-75
+(446-463 of the present volume).
+1927a
+*Intuitionistische Betrachtungen über den Formalismus, Koninklijke Akademie
+van wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Proceedings of the section of sciences 31 (1928),
+374-379 (490-492 of the present volume); also, with slight variations, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Physikalisch-mathematische Klasse (1928), 48-52.
+19276
+Intuitionistische Betrachtungen über den Formalismus, Koninklijke Akademie
+van wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Verslag van de gewone vergaderingen der
+afdeling natuurkunde 36, 1189 (abstract of Brouwer 1927a).
+1928
+Mathematik, Wissenschaft und Sprache, Monatshefte für Mathematik und
+Physik 36 (1929), 153-164.
+1928a
+1942
+Die Struktur des Kontinuums (Gistel, Vienna).
+Zum freien Werden von Mengen und Funktionen, Nederlandsche Akademie van
+wetenschappen, Proceedings of the section of sciences 45, 322-323; also Indagationes mathematicae 4, 107-108.
+1947
+Richtlijnen der intuïtionistische wiskunde, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie
+van wetenschappen, Proceedings of the section of sciences 50, 339; also Indagationes mathematicae, 9, 197.
+1948
+Conscicusness, philosophy, and mathematics, Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy (Amsterdam, August 11-18, 1948) (North-
+Holland, Amsterdam, 1949), 1235-1249.
+
+634
+Brouwer, Luitzen Egbertus Jan-contd.
+1948a
+Essentieel-negatieve eigenschappen, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van
+wetenschappen, Proceedings of the section of sciences 51, 963-964; also Indagationes mathematicae 10, 322-323.
+19486
+Opmerkingen over het beginsel van het uitgesloten derde en over negatieve
+asserties, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van wetenschappen, Proceedings
+of the section of sciences 51, 1239-1243; also Indagationes mathematicae 10, 383-
+387.
+1949
+De non-equivalentie van de constructieve en de negatieve orderelatie in het
+continuum, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van wetenschappen, Proceedings of the section of sciences 52, 122-124; also Indagationes mathematicae 11,
+37-39.
+1949a
+Contradictoriteit der elementaire meetkunde, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van wetenschappen, Proceedings of the section of sciences 52, 315-316 ; also
+Indagationes mathematicae 11, 89-90.
+1950
+Remarques sur la notion d'ordre, Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des séances de
+l'Académie des sciences (Paris) 230, 263-265.
+1950a
+1951
+Sur la possibilité d'ordonner le continu, ibid., 349-350.
+On order in the continuum, and the relation of truth to non-contradictority,
+Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van wetenschappen, Proceedings of the section
+of sciences 54, series A, Mathematical sciences, 357-358; also Indagationes
+mathematicae 13, 357-358.
+1952
+Historical background, principles and methods of intuitionism, South African
+journal of science 49, 139-146.
+1952a
+Over accumulatiekernen van oneindige kernsoorten, Koninklijke Nederlandse
+Akademie van wetenschappen, Proceedings of the section of sciences 55, series A,
+Mathematical sciences, 439-441 ; also Indagationes mathematicae 14, 439-441.
+1953
+1954
+Points and spaces, Canadian journal of mathematics 6 (1954), 1-17.
+*Addenda en corrigenda over de rol van het principium tertii exclusi in de wiskunde, Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van wetenschappen, Proceedings of the
+section of sciences 57, series A, Mathematical sciences, 104-105 (341-342 of the
+present volume); also Indagationes mathematicae 16, 104-105.
+*Nadere addenda en corrigenda over de rol van het principium tertii exclusi in
+de wiskunde, Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van wetenschappen, Proceedings
+of the section of sciences, series A, Mathematical sciences, 109-111 (342-345 of
+the present volume); also Indagationes mathematicae 16, 109-111.
+1954b Intuitionistische differentieerbaarheid, Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van
+wetenschappen, Proceedings of the section of sciences, series A, Mathematical
+sciences, 201-204; also Indagationes mathematicae 16, 201-204.
+1954c
+An example of contradictority in classical theory of functions, Koninklijke
+Nederlandse Akademie van wetenschappen, Proceedings of the section of sciences,
+series A, Mathematical sciences, 204-206 ; also Indagationes mathematicae 16,
+204-206.
+Burali-Forti, Cesare
+1894
+Sulle classi ordinate e i numeri transfiniti, Rendiconti del Circolo matematico di
+Palermo 8, 169-179.
+1894a
+Logica matematica (Milan).
+1896
+Le classi finite, Atti dell'Accademia di Torino 32, 34-52.
+1896a Sopra un teorema del sig. G. Cantor, ibid., 229-237.
+1897 *Una questione sui numeri transfiniti, Rendiconti del Circolo matematico di
+Palermo 11, 154-164 (104-111 of the present volume).
+1897a *Sulle classi ben ordinate, ibid., 260 (111-112 of the present volume).
+Cantor, Georg
+1878
+Ein Beitrag zur Mannigfaltigkeitslehre, Journal für die reine und angewandte
+Mathematik 84, 242-258; reprinted in Cantor 1932, 119-133.
+
+635
+Cantor, Georg-contd.
+Veber unendliche, lineare Punktmannichfaltigkeiten, Mathematische Annalen
+21, 545-591 ; also printed as Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannichfaltigkeitslehre, ein mathematisch-philosophischer Versuch in der Lehre des Unendlichen
+1887
+(Leipzig); reprinted in Cantor 1932, 165-209.
+Mitteilungen zur Lehre vom Transfiniten, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, new series, 91, 81-125, 252-270; 92 (1888), 240-265 ; reprinted
+in Cantor 1932, 378-439.
+Beiträge zur Begründung der transfiniten Mengenlehre (Erster Artikel),
+Mathematische Annalen 46, 481-512; reprinted in Cantor 1932, 282-311.
+Contribuzione al fondamento della teoria degli insiemi transfiniti, Rivista di
+1897
+matematica 5, 129-162.
+Beiträge zur Begründung der transfiniten Mengenlehre (Zweiter Artikel),
+Mathematische Annalen 49, 207-246; reprinted in Cantor 1932, 312-356.
+1899
+*Cantor an Dedekind, in Cantor 1932, 443-447, 451 (113-117 of the present
+volume).
+1932
+Gesammelte Abhandlungen mathematischen und philosophischen Inhalts, edited
+by Ernst Zermelo (Springer, Berlin); reprinted 1962 (Olms, Hildesheim).
+See Noether, Emmy, and Jean Cavaillès.
+Cavailles, Jean
+See Noether, Emmy, and Jean Cavaillès.
+Chang, Chen Chung
+1964
+Some new results in definability, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society
+70,808-813.
+Church, Alonzo
+1936
+A note on the Entscheidungsproblem, The journal of symbolic logic 1, 40-41;
+1956
+correction, ibid., 101-102; reprinted in Davis 1965, 110-115.
+Introduction to mathematical logic (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New
+Jersey), vol. 1.
+1955
+1957
+Review of Berkeley 1954, The journal of symbolic logic 20, 286-287.
+Binary recursive arithmetic, Journal de mathématiques pures et appliquées,
+series 9, 36, 39-55.
+1957a
+Application of recursive arithmetic to the problem of circuit synthesis, Summaries of talks presented at the Summer Institute for symbolic logic, Cornell
+University 1957, 2nd ed. (Institute for Defense Analyses, Princeton, New
+Jersey, 1960), 3-50.
+Cohen, Paul
+1963
+The independence of the axiom of choice (mimeographed, Stanford University).
+1963a
+The independence of the continuum hypothesis, Proceedings of the National
+Academy of Sciences of the U.S. A. 50, 1143-1148.
+1964
+The independence of the continuum hypothesis, II, ibid. 51, 105-110.
+Couturat, Louis
+1899
+La logique mathématique de M. Peano, Revue de métaphysique et de morale 7,
+616-646.
+1905
+1906
+L'algèbre de la logique (Gauthier-Villars, Paris).
+Pour la logistique (Réponse à M. Poincaré), Revue de métaphysique et de morale
+14, 208-250.
+Craig, William
+1956
+1957
+Review of Beth 1953, The journal of symbolic logic 21, 194-195.
+Linear reasoning. A new form of the Herbrand-Gentzen theorem, ibid. 22,
+250-268.
+1957a
+Three uses of the Herbrand-Gentzen theorem in relating model theory and
+proof theory, ibid., 269-285.
+1960
+Bases for first-order theories and subtheories, The journal of symbolic logic 25,
+97-142.
+
+636
+Craig, William-contd.
+1963
+An implicit definition of satisfaction in n-th order theory, ibid. 28, 301; abstract
+of a paper presented at the 28 December 1963 session of a meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic.
+Curry, Haskell Brooks
+1929
+An analysis of logical substitution, American journal of mathematics 51, 363-
+384.
+1930
+1941
+Grundlagen der kombinatorischen Logik, ibid. 52, 509-536, 789-834.
+A formalization of recursive arithmetic, American journal of mathematics 63,
+263-282.
+and Robert Feys
+1958
+Combinatory logic (North-Holland, Amsterdam), vol. 1.
+Davis, Martin (ed.)
+1965
+The undecidable. Basic papers on undecidable propositions, unsolvable problems,
+and computable functions (Raven Press, Hewlett, New York).
+de Bouvère, Karel Louis
+1959
+A method in proofs of undefinability (North-Holland, Amsterdam).
+Dedekind, Richard
+1888
+Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? (Brunswick).
+1890
+Über den Begriff des Unendlichen, unpublished manuscript in the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen (Cod. Ms. Dedekind 3,
+1890a
+folder 1), dated 8 February 1890.
+*Letters to Keferstein, 9 February, 27 February (the latter in the present
+volume, 98-103), 1 April, 23 December 1890, copies in Dedekind's hand in the
+Niedersächsische
+Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen (Cod. Ms.
+Dedekind 13).
+1893
+1911
+1932
+2nd ed. of Dedekind 1888, unchanged but for an additional preface.
+3rd ed. of Dedekind 1888, unchanged but for a third preface.
+Gesammelte mathematische Werke, edited by Robert Fricke, Emmy Noether,
+Öystein Ore (Vieweg, Brunswick), vol. 3.
+See Noether, Emmy, and Jean Cavailles.
+Denton, John
+1963
+Applications of the Herbrand theorem (thesis, Harvard University).
+See Dreben, Burton, and John Denton.
+Dijkman, Jacobus Gerhardus
+1948
+Recherche de la convergence négative dans les mathématiques intuitionnistes,
+Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen, Proceedings of the
+section of sciences 51, 681-692; also Indagationes mathematicae 10, 232-243.
+Dixon, Alfred Cardew
+1906
+On "well-ordered" aggregates, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society,
+2nd series, 4, 18-20.
+Dreben, Burton
+1952
+On the completeness of quantification theory, Proceedings of the National
+Academy of Sciences of the U.S. A. 38, 1047-1052.
+1961
+Solvable Surányi subclasses: An introduction to the Herbrand theory, Proceedings of a Harvard symposium on digital computers and their applications, 3-6
+April 1961 (The annals of the Computation Laboratory of Harvard University
+31; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts), 32-47 (1962).
+1963
+Corrections to Herbrand, American Mathematical Society, Notices 10, 285;
+abstract presented by title at the 29 April-3 May 1963 meeting of the American
+Mathematical Society.
+- and Stål Aanderaa
+1964
+Herbrand analyzing functions, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society
+70,697-698.
+
+637
+Dreben, Burton-conto.
+- Peter Andrews, and Stål Aanderaa
+1963
+Errors in Herbrand, American Mathematical Society, Notices 10, 285 ; abstract
+presented by title at the 29 April-3 May 1963 meeting of the American Mathematical Society.
+1963a
+False lemmas in Herbrand, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 69,
+699-706.
+- and John Denton
+1966
+A supplement to Herbrand, The journal of symbolic logic 31, 393-398.
+1967
+The Herbrand theorem and the consistency of number theory, forthcoming.
+Feys, Robert
+See Curry, Haskell Brooks, and Robert Feys.
+Finsler, Paul
+1923
+Gibt es Widersprüche in der Mathematik?, Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung 34 (1925), Ist section, 143-155.
+1926
+*Formale Beweise und die Entscheidbarkeit, Mathematische Zeitschrift 25, 676-
+682 (438-445 of the present volume).
+1927
+Uber die Lösung von Paradoxien, Philosophischer Anzeiger 2, 183-192.
+1944
+Gibt es unentscheidbare Sätze ?, Commentarii mathematici helvetici 16, 310-320.
+Fraenkel, Abraham A.
+1921
+Über die Zermelosche Begründung der Mengenlehre, Jahresbericht der Deutschen
+Mathematiker-Vereinigung 30, 2nd section, 97-98.
+1922
+Axiomatische Begründung der transfiniten Kardinalzahlen I, Mathematische
+Zeitschrift 13, 153-188.
+1922a
+Zu den Grundlagen der Cantor-Zermeloschen Mengenlehre, Mathematische
+Annalen 86, 230-237.
+19226
+*Der Begriff "definit" und die Unabhängigkeit des Auswahlsaxioms, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Physikalisch-mathematische Klasse, 253-257 (284-289 of the present volume).
+1922c
+Zu den Grundlagen der Mengenlehre, Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-
+1923
+1923a
+Vereinigung 31, 2nd section, 101-102.
+Einleitung in die Mengenlehre, 2nd ed. (Springer, Berlin).
+Die Axiome der Mengenlehre, Scripta Universitatis atque Bibliothecae Hierosolymitanarum, Mathematica et physica 1, VI.
+19236
+Die neueren Ideen zur Grundlegung der Analysis und Mengenlehre, Jahresbericht
+der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung 33 (1924), Ist section, 97-103.
+1925
+Untersuchungen über die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre, Mathematische Zeitschrift 22, 250-273.
+1927
+Zehn Vorlesungen über die Grundlegung der Mengenlehre (Teubner, Leipzig and
+Berlin).
+1935
+Sur la notion d'existence dans les mathématiques, L'enseignement mathématique
+34, 18-32.
+1937
+Ueber eine abgeschwaechte Fassung des Auswahlsaxioms, The journal of symbolic logic 2, 1-25.
+Soe Bernays, Paul, 1958.
+- and Yehoshua Bar-Hillel
+1958
+Foundations of set theory (North-Holland, Amsterdam).
+Frege, Gottlob
+1873
+Ueber eine geometrische Darstellung der imaginären Gebilde in der Ebene, Inaugural-Dissertation der philosophischen Facultät zu Göttingen zur Erlangung
+der Doctorwürde (Jena).
+1874
+Rechnungsmethoden, die sich auf eine Erweiterung des Grössenbegriffes gründen,
+Dissertation zur Erlangung der venia docendi bei der philosophischen Fakultät
+in Jena (Jena).
+
+638
+Frege, Gottlob-contd.
+1878
+Ueber eine Weise, die Gestalt eines Dreiecks als complexe Grösse aufzufassen,
+Sitzungsberichte der Jenaischen Gesellschaft für Medicin und Naturwissenschaft
+für das Jahr 1878 (1879), 18.
+1879
+*Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen
+Denkens (Halle) (1-82 of the present volume); reprinted in Frege 1964.
+1879a
+Anwendungen der Begriffsschrift, Sitzungsberichte der Jenaischen Gesellschaft
+für Medicin und Naturwissenschaft für das Jahr 1879, 29-33; reprinted in Frege
+1964, 89-93.
+1881
+Ueber den Briefwechsel Leibnizens und Huygens mit Papin, Sitzungsberichte der
+Jenaischen Gesellschaft für Medicin und Naturwissenschaft für das Jahr 1881,
+29-32; reprinted in Frege 1964, 93-96.
+1882
+Veber den Zweck der Begriffsschrift, Sitzungsberichte der Jenaischen Gesellschaft für Medicin und Naturwissenschaft für das Jahr 1882 (1883), 1-10;
+reprinted in Frege 1964, 97-106.
+1882a
+Veber die wissenschaftliche Berechtigung einer Begriffschrift, Zeitschrift für
+Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, new series, 81, 48-56; reprinted in Frege
+1962, 89-95, and in Frege 1964, 106-114.
+1883
+Geometrie der Punktpaare in der Ebene, Sitzungsberichte der Jenaischen
+Gesellschaft für Medicin und Naturwissenschaft für das Jahr 1883 (1884), 98-
+102.
+1884
+Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, eine logisch-mathematische Untersuchung über
+den Begriff der Zahl (Breslau); reprinted 1934 (Marcus, Breslau) and in Frege
+1950.
+1885
+Ueber formale Theorien der Arithmetik, Sitzungsberichte der Jenaischen Gesellschaft für Medicin und Naturwissenschaft für das Jahr 1885, 94-104.
+1891
+Function und Begriff. Vortrag gehalten in der Sitzung vom 9. Januar 1891 der
+Jenaischen Gesellschaft für Medicin und Naturwissenschaft (Jena); reprinted in
+1892
+Frege 1962, 16-37 ; English translation in Frege 1952, 21-41.
+sophie 16, 192-205; reprinted in Frege 1962, 64-78; English translation in
+Frege 1952, 42-55.
+1892a
+Über Sinn und Bedeutung, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische
+Kritik, new series, 100, 25-50; reprinted in Frege 1962, 38-63 ; English transla-
+1893
+tion in Frege 1952, 56-78.
+Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet (Jena), vol. 1; reprinted
+1962 (Olms, Hildesheim) ; partial translation in Frege 1964a.
+1895
+Kritische Beleuchtung einiger Punkte in E. Schröder's Vorlesungen über die
+Algebra der Logik, Archiv für systematische Philosophie 1, 433-456 ; reprinted
+in Frege 1966, 92-112
+1896
+Ueber die Begriffsschrift des Herrn Peano und meine eigene, Berichte über die
+Verhandlungen der Königlich Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu
+Leipzig, Mathematisch-physikalische Klasse 18, 361-378.
+1896a
+Lettera del sig. G. Frege all'editore, Revue de mathématiques 6 (1898), 53-59;
+reprinted in Peano 1958, 288-294.
+1902
+1903
+*Letter to Russell (first published in the present volume, 126-128).
+Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet (Pohle, Jena), vol. 2;
+reprinted 1962 (Olms, Hildesheim); partial translation in Frege 1964a.
+1950
+The foundations of arithmetic, A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of
+number, English translation of Frege 1884, with the German text, by John
+Langshaw Austin (Blackwell, Oxford; Philosophical Library, New York); 2nd
+revised ed., 1953; reprinted, but without the German text, 1960 (Harper, New
+York).
+1952
+Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege, edited by Peter
+Geach and Max Black (Blackwell, Oxford); 2nd ed., 1960.
+
+639
+Frege, Gottlob-contd.
+1962
+Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung. Fünf logische Studien, edited by Günther Patzig
+(Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen); 2nd ed., revised, 1965.
+1964
+Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, edited by Ignacio Angelelli (Olms, Hildesheim); contains reprints of Frege
+1879, 1879a, 1881, 1882, and 1882a.
+1964a
+The basic laws of arithmetic. Exposition of the system, translated and edited, with
+an introduction, by Montgomery Furth (University of California Press, Berkeley
+and Los Angeles, California).
+1966
+Logische Untersuchungen, edited, with an introduction, by Günther Patzig
+(Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen).
+Gentzen, Gerhard
+1934
+Untersuchungen über das logische Schliessen, Mathematische Zeitschrift 39,
+176-210, 405-431.
+1936
+Die Widerspruchsfreiheit der reinen Zahlentheorie, Mathematische Annalen 112,
+493-565.
+1938
+Neue Fassung des Widerspruchsfreiheitsbeweises für die reine Zahlentheorie,
+Forschungen zur Logik und zur Grundlegung der exakten Wissenschaften, new
+series, no. 4, 19-44.
+1943
+Beweisbarkeit und Unbeweisbarkeit von Anfangsfällen der transfiniten Induktion in der reinen Zahlentheorie, Mathematische Annalen 119, 140-161.
+Gergonne, Joseph Diez
+1817
+Essai de dialectique rationnelle, Annales de mathématiques pures et appliquées 7
+(1816-1817), 189-228.
+Gödel, Kurt
+1930 Uber die Vollständigkeit des Logikkalküls (thesis, University of Vienna).
+1930a *Die Vollständigkeit der Axiome des logischen Funktionenkalküls, Monatshefte
+für Mathematik und Physik 37, 349-360 (582-591 of the present volume).
+19306 *Einige metamathematische
+Resultate über Entscheidungsdefinitheit
+Widerspruchsfreiheit, Anzeiger der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien,
+Mathematisch-naturwissenschaftliche Klasse 67, 214-215 (communicated on 23
+October 1930 by Hans Hahn; 595-596 of the present volume).
+*Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia mathematica und verwandter
+Systeme I, Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik 38, 173-198 (596-616 of
+the present volume); English translations in Gödel 1962, 35-72, and in Davis
+1931a
+1965, 5-38 (but see Bauer-Mengelberg 1965 and 1966).
+*Uber Vollständigkeit und Widerspruchsfreiheit, Ergebnisse eines mathematischen
+Kolloquiums 3 (1932), 12-13 (616-617 of the present volume).
+1934
+On undecidable propositions of formal mathematical systems, lecture notes by
+Stephen Cole Kleene and John Barkley Rosser (The Institute for Advanced
+Study, Princeton, New Jersey); reprinted with corrections, emendations, and a
+1934a
+postscript in Davis 1965.
+Über die Länge von Beweisen, Ergebnisse eines mathematischen Kolloquiums 7
+(1936), 23-24; English translation in Davis 1965, 82-83.
+1938
+The consistency of the axiom of choice and of the generalized continuumhypothesis, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 24, 556-557.
+1939
+1940
+Consistency-proof for the generalized continuum-hypothesis, ibid. 25, 220-224.
+The consistency of the continuum hypothesis (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey); 2nd printing 1951 ; 3rd printing 1953. ('In the second and
+third printings several misprints and slight errors in the first printing have been
+corrected and some new Notes have been added at the end of the book.")
+1947
+What is Cantor's continuum problem?, The American mathematical monthly, 54,
+515-525; revised and expanded version in Benacerraf and Putnam 1964, 258-
+273.
+1958
+Über eine bisher noch nicht benützte Erweiterung des finiten Standpunktes,
+Dialectica 12, 280-287.
+
+640
+Gödel, Kurt-contd.
+1962
+On formally undecidable propositions of Principia mathematica and related
+systems; English translation of Gödel 1931 by B. Meltzer, with an introduction
+by R. B. Braithwaite (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and London).
+Gonseth, Ferdinand (ed.)
+Les entretiens de Zurich sur les fondements et la méthode des sciences mathé-
+matiques, 6-9 décembre 1938 (Leemann, Zurich, 1941).
+Goodman, Nelson
+1942
+Sequences, The journal of symbolic logic 6, 150-153.
+Goodstein, Reuben Louis
+1941
+Function theory in an axiom-free equation calculus, Proceedings of the London
+1957
+Mathematical Society, 2nd series, 48 (1945), 401-434.
+Recursive number theory. A development of recursive arithmetic in a logic-free
+equation calculus (North-Holland, Amsterdam).
+Grassmann, Hermann
+1861
+Lehrbuch der Arithmetik für höhere Lehranstalten (Berlin).
+Hadamard, Jacques
+1897
+Sur certaines applications possibles de la théorie des ensembles, Verhandlungen
+des ersten Internationalen Mathematiker-Kongresses in Zürich vom 9. bis 11.
+August 1897 (Leipzig, 1898), 201-202.
+See Borel, Emile, 1905a.
+Hamel, Georg
+1905
+Eine Basis aller Zahlen und die unstetigen Lösungen der Funktionalgleichung:
+|(x+Y)=f(x) + f(Y), Mathematische Annalen 60, 459-462.
+Hardy, Godfrey Harold
+A theorem concerning the infinite cardinal numbers, The quarterly journal of
+pure and applied mathematics 35, 87-94.
+Hausdorff, Felix
+1908
+Grundzüge einer Theorie der geordneten Mengen, Mathematische Annalen 65,
+435-505.
+1914
+Grundzüge der Mengenlehre (Veit, Leipzig); reprinted 1949 (Chelsea, New York).
+Henkin, Leon
+1949
+The completeness of the first-order functional calculus, The journal of symbolic
+logic 14, 159-166.
+See Addison, John West, Leon Henkin, and Alfred Tarski.
+Herbrand, Jacques
+1928
+Sur la théorie de la démonstration, Comptes rendus hebdomadarres des séances de
+l'Académie des sciences (Paris) 186, 1274-1276.
+1929
+1929a
+Non-contradiction des axiomes arithmétiques, ibid. 188, 303-304.
+Sur quelques propriétés des propositions vraies et leurs applications, ibid.,
+1076-1078.
+Sur le problème fondamental des mathématiques, ibid. 189, 554-556, 720.
+* Recherches sur la théorie de la démonstration, Thesis at the University of Paris;
+also Prace Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, Wydział III, no. 33 (chap.
+5, 525-581 of the present volume).
+1930a
+Les bases de la logique hilbertienne, Revue de métaphysique et de morale 37,
+243-255.
+1931
+Sur le problème fondamental de la logique mathématique, Sprawozdania z
+posiedzeń Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, Wydzial III, 24, 12-56.
+1931a
+Unsigned note on Herbrand 1930, Annales de l'Université de Paris 6, 186-189.
+19316 *Sur la non-contradiction de l'arithmétique, Journal für die reine angewandte
+Mathematik 166, 1-8 (618-628 of the present volume).
+Hessenberg, Gerhard
+1906
+Grundbegriffe der Mengenlehre, Abhandlungen der Fries'schen Schule, new series,
+1, 479-706 ; separate reprint 1906 (Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen).
+
+641
+Hessenberg, Gerhard-contd.
+1910
+Kettentheorie und Wohlordnung, Journal für Mathematik 135, 81-133.
+Heyting, Arend
+1929
+De telbaarheidspraedicaten van Prof. Brouwer, Nieuw archief
+voor wiskunde,
+2nd series, 16, 47-58.
+1934
+Mathematische Grundlagenforschung. Intuitionismus.
+Beweistheorie (Springer,
+Berlin).
+1955
+Les fondements des mathématiques. Intuitionnisme. Théorie de la démonstration
+(Gauthier-Villars,
+Paris; Nauwelaerts,
+Louvain); French translation,
+with
+additions, of Heyting 1934.
+1956
+1957
+Intuitionism. An introduction (North-Holland, Amsterdam).
+(ed.) Constructivity in mathematics, Proceedings of the colloquium held at Amsterdam, 1957 (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1959).
+Hilbert, David
+Zur Theorie der aus n Haupteinheiten gebildeten complexen Größen, Nachrichten
+von der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Mathematischphysikalische Klasse, 179-183.
+1899
+1900
+Grundlagen der Geometrie (Leipzig).
+Uber den Zahlbegriff, Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung 8,
+180-194; reprinted in Hilbert 1909, 256-262; 1913, 237-242 ; 19226, 237-242;
+1923, 237-242; 1930a, 241-246.
+1900a
+Mathematische Probleme. Vortrag, gehalten auf dem internationalen Mathematiker-Kongress zu Paris 1900, Nachrichten von der Königlichen Gesellschaft
+der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, 253-297; reprinted with some additions as
+Hilbert 19006 and in Hilbert 1935, 290-329 ; French translation, with emendations and additions, in Compte rendu du
+Deuxième congres international des
+mathématiciens tenu á Paris du 6 au 12 août 1900 (Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1902),
+58-114.
+19006
+Mathematische Probleme. Vortrag, gehalten auf dem internationalen Mathematiker-Kongress zu Paris 1900, Archiv der Mathematik und Physik, 3rd series,
+1 (1901), 44-63, 213-237.
+1903
+1904
+Grundlagen der Geometrie, 2nd ed. (Teubner, Leipzig).
+*Uber die Grundlagen der Logik und der Arithmetik, Verhandlungen des Dritten
+Internationalen Mathematiker-Kongresses in Heidelberg vom 8. bis 13. August
+1904 (Teubner, Leipzig, 1905), 174-185 (129-138 of the present volume); reprinted in Hilbert 1909, 263-279 ; 1913, 243-258 ; 19226, 243-258 ; 1923, 243-
+258; 1930a, 247-261.
+1905
+On the foundations of logic and arithmetic, The monist 15, 338-352 ; English
+translation of Hilbert 1904 by George Bruce Halsted.
+1909
+1913
+1917
+Grundlagen der Geometrie (Teubner, Leipzig and Berlin), 3rd ed.
+- 4th ed.
+Axiomatisches Denken, Mathematische Annalen 78 (1918), 405-415; reprinted
+in Hilbert 1935, 146-156.
+1922
+Neubegründung der Mathematik (Erste Mitteilung), Abhandlungen aus dem
+mathematischen Seminar der Hamburgischen Universität 1, 157-177 ; reprinted in
+Hilbert 1935, 157-177.
+1922a
+Die logischen Grundlagen der Mathematik, Mathematische Annalen 88 (1923),
+151-165 ; reprinted in Hilbert 1935, 178-191.
+19226
+1923
+1925
+Grundlagen der Geometrie (Teubner, Leipzig and Berlin), 5th ed.
+— 6th ed
+*Über das Unendliche, Mathematische Annalen 95 (1926), 161-190 (367-392 of
+the present volume); reprinted in abbreviated form as Hilbert 1925a and also in
+abbreviated form, but with minor emendations and additions, in Hilbert 1930a,
+262-288 ; partial translation in Benacerraf and Putnam 1964, 134-151.
+
+642
+Hilbert, David-contd.
+1925a
+Über das Unendliche, Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung 36
+(1927), Ist section, 201-215.
+1927
+*Die Grundlagen der Mathematik, Abhandlungen aus dem mathematischen
+Seminar der Hamburgischen Universität 6 (1928), 65-85 (464-479 of the present
+1928
+volume); reprinted in Hilbert 1928, I-21; 1930a, 289-312.
+Die Grundlagen der Mathematik, mit Zusätzen von Hermann Weyl and Paul
+Bernays, Hamburger Mathematische Einzelschriften 5 (Teubner, Leipzig);
+contains reprints of Hilbert 1927, Weyl 1927, and Bernays 1927.
+1928a
+Probleme der Grundlegung der Mathematik, Atti del Congresso internazionale
+dei matematici, Bologna 3-10 settembre 1928 (Bologna, 1929), vol. 1, 135-141;
+reprinted, with emendations and additions, in Mathematische Annalen 102 (1929),
+1-9, and in Hilbert 1930a, 313-323.
+1930
+Die Grundlegung der elementaren Zahlenlehre, Mathematische Annalen 104
+(1931), 485-494; reprinted in part in Hilbert 1935, 192-195.
+1930a
+19306
+1931
+Grundlagen der Geometrie (Teubner, Leipzig and Berlin), 7th ed.
+Naturerkennen und Logik, Die Naturwissenschaften 18, 959-963.
+Beweis des Tertium non datur, Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Mathematisch-physikalische Klasse, 120-125.
+1935
+Gesammelte Abhandlungen (Springer, Berlin), vol. 3.
+- and Wilhelm Ackermann
+1928
+1938
+Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik (Springer, Berlin).
+— 2nd ed.
+- and Paul Bernays
+1934
+1939
+Grundlagen der Mathematik (Springer, Berlin), vol. 1.
+- vol. 2.
+Hintikka, K. Jaakko J.
+1955
+Form and content in quantification theory, Acta philosophica fennica 8, 7-55.
+Hobson, Ernest William
+1906
+On the arithmetic continuum, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society,
+2nd series, 4, 21-28.
+1921
+The theory of functions of a real variable and the theory of Fourier's series, 2nd
+ed. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England), vol. 1.
+1926
+- vol. 2.
+Howard, William A., and Georg Kreisel
+1966
+Transfinite induction and bar induction of types zero and one, and the role of
+continuity in intuitionistic analysis, The Journal of symbolic logic 31, 325-358.
+Huntington, Edward Vermilye
+1904
+Sets of independent postulates for the algebra of logic, Iransactions of the
+American Mathematical Society 5, 288-309.
+Jevons, William Stanley
+1879
+The principles of science, a treatise on logic and scientific method, 3rd ed. (London).
+1883
+- stereotyped reprint.
+Johansson, Ingebrigt
+1936
+Der Minimalkalkül, ein reduzierter intuitionistischer Formalismus, Compositio
+mathematica 4, 119--136.
+Jourdain, Philip Edward Bertrand
+1904
+On the transfinite cardinal numbers of well-ordered aggregates, Philosophical
+magazine, series 6, 7, 61-75.
+1904a
+1905
+1905a
+On the transfinite cardinal numbers of number classes in general, ibid., 294-303.
+On transfinite cardinal numbers of the exponential form, ibid. 9, 42-56.
+On a proof that every aggregate can be well-ordered, Mathematische Annalen
+60,465-470.
+1912
+The development of the theories of mathematical logic and the principles of
+mathematics, The quarterly journal of pure and applied mathematics 43, 219-314.
+
+643
+Kahr, Andrew Seth, Edward Forrest Moore, and Hao Wang
+1961
+Entscheidungsproblem reduced to the VEV case, Proceedings of the National
+Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 48 (1962), 365-377.
+Kalmár, László
+1932
+Ein Beitrag zum Entscheidungsproblem, Acta litterarum ac scientiarum Regiae
+Universitatis Hungaricae Francisco-Josephinae, Sectio scientiarum mathematica-
+ит 5, 222-236.
+1932a
+Zum Entscheidungsproblem der mathematischen Logik, Verhandlungen des
+Internationalen Mathematiker-Kongresses Zürich 1932 (Orell Füssli, Zurich and
+Leipzig), vol. 2, 337-338.
+1934
+Über einen Löwenheimschen Satz, Acta litterarum ac scientiarum Regiae Universitatis Hungaricae Francisco-Josephinae, Sectio scientiarum mathematicarum 7,
+112-121.
+1936
+Zurückführung des Entscheidungsproblem auf den Fall von Formeln mit einer
+einzigen, binären, Funktionsvariablen, Compositio mathematica 4 (1937), 137-
+144.
+1951
+Contributions to the reduction theory of the decision problem. Fourth paper.
+Reduction to the case of a finite set of individuals, Acta mathematica Academiae
+scientiarum hungaricae 2, 125-142.
+Keferstein, Hans
+1890
+Uber den Begriff der Zahl, Festschrift herausgegeben von der Mathematischen
+Gesellschaft in Hamburg anlässlich ihres 200jährigen Jubelfestes 1890, Zweiter
+Teil: Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen (Teubner, Leipzig), 119-125 (this book is
+considered volume 2 of Mitteilungen der Mathematischen Gesellschaft in Hamburg).
+1890a
+Letters to Dedekind dated 14 February, 19 March, 19 December 1890 ; originals
+in the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen (Cod.
+Ms. Dedekind 13).
+18906
+Erwiderung auf vorstehende Abhandlung, unpublished reply dated 17 November 1890 to Dedekind 1890, copy in Dedekind's hand in the Niedersächsische
+Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen (Cod. Ms. Dedekind 13).
+Kleene, Stephen Cole
+1936
+General recursive functions of natural numbers, Mathematische Annalen 112,
+727-742; for an erratum and a simplification see Kleene 1938, footnote 4,
+Péter 1937a, and The journal of symbolic logic 4, iv; for an addendum see Davis
+1965, 253. Reprinted in Davis 1965, 237-253.
+1938
+194ł
+On notation for ordinal numbers, The journal of symbolic logic 3, 150-155.
+On the forms of the predicates in the theory of constructive ordinals, American
+journal of mathematics 66, 41-58.
+1952
+Introduction to metamathematics (Van Nostrand, New York and Toronto;
+North-Holland, Amsterdam; Noordhoff, Groningen).
+1955
+On the forms of the predicates in the theory of constructive ordinals (Second
+paper), American journal of mathematics 77, 405-428.
+1955a
+Arithmetical predicates and function quantifiers, Transactions of the American
+Mathematical Society 79, 312-340.
+1958
+Extension of an effectively generated
+class of functions by enumeration,
+Colloquium mathematicum 6, 67-78.
+and Richard Eugene Vesley
+1965
+The foundations of intuitionistic mathematics, especially in relation to recursive
+functions (North-Holland, Amsterdam).
+Kneale, William, and Martha Kneale
+1962
+The development of logic (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
+König, Dénes
+1926
+Sur les correspondances multivoques des ensembles, Fundamenta mathematicae
+8, 114-134.
+
+644
+König, Dénes—contd.
+1927
+Uber eine Schlussweise aus dem Endlichen ins Unendliche, Acta litterarum ac
+scientiarum Regiae Universitatis Hungaricae Francisco-Josephinae, Sectio scientiarum mathematicarum 3, 121-130.
+1936
+Theorie der endlichen und unendlichen Graphen (Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, Leipzig); reprinted 1950 (Chelsea, New York).
+König, Julius (Gyula)
+1904
+Zum Kontinuum Problem, Verhandlungen des
+Dritten Internationalen Mathematiker-Kongresses in Heidelberg vom S. bis 13. August 1904 (Teubner, Leipzig,
+1905), 141-147.
+1905
+Zum Kontinuum-Problem, Mathematische Annalen 60, 177-180; Berichtigung,
+ibid., 462.
+1905a
+*Über die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre und das Kontinuumproblem, ibid. 61,
+156-160 (145-149 of the present volume).
+1906
+Uber die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre und das Kontinuumproblem (Zweite
+Mitteilung), ibid. 63, 217-221.
+1914
+Neue Grundlagen der Logik, Arithmetik und Mengenlehre (Veit, Leipzig).
+Kolmogorov, Andrei Nikolaevich (Андрей Николаевич Колмогоров)
+1925
+*О принципе tertium non datur, Математический сборник 32, 646-667 (414-437
+of the present volume).
+Kreisel, Georg
+1953
+Note on arithmetic models for consistent formulae of the predicate calculus II,
+Actes du XIème Congrès international de philosophie, Bruxelles, 20-26 août 1953
+(North-Holland, Amsterdam; Nauwelaerts, Louvain), vol. 14, 39-49.
+1958
+1963
+Review of Beth 1956a, The journal of symbolic logic 23, 35-37.
+Reports of the seminar on foundations of analysis, Stanford University, Summer
+1963 (mimeographed, Stanford University, Stanford, California); contains
+contributions by others.
+1964
+- vol. 2, Introduction.
+See Howard, William A., and Georg Kreisel.
+Kummer, Ernst Eduard
+1835
+Uber die Convergenz und Divergenz der unendlichen Reihen, Journal für die
+reine und angewandte Mathematik 13, 171-184.
+Kuratowski, Kazimierz
+1921
+Sur la notion d'ordre dans la théorie des ensembles, Fundamenta mathematicae
+2, 161-171.
+Langford, Cooper Harold
+1926
+Some theorems on deducibility, Annals of mathematics, 2nd series, 28 (1927),
+16-40.
+1926a
+Theorems on deducibility (Second paper), ibid., 459-471.
+Lebesgue, Henri
+1905
+Sur les fonctions représentables analytiquement, Journal de mathématiques
+pures et appliquées, 6th series, 1, 139-216.
+See Borel, Emile, 1905a.
+Lennes, Nels Johann
+1922
+On the foundations of the theory of sets, Bulletin of the American Mathematical
+Society 28, 300; abstract of a paper read at a session of the 14-15 April 1922
+meeting of the American Mathematical Society.
+Levi, Beppo
+1902
+Intorno alla teoria degli aggregati, Reale Istituto lombardo di scienze e lettere,
+Rendiconti, 2nd series, 35, 863-868.
+Lévy, Paul
+1964
+Remarques sur un théorème de Paul Cohen, Revue de métaphysique et de morale
+69,88-94.
+
+645
+Lewis, Clarence Irving
+1918
+A survey of symbolic logic (University of California Press, Berkeley); reprinted
+1960 with the omission of chaps. V and VI (Dover, New York).
+Lindenbaum, Adolf
+See Tarski, Alfred, and Adolf Lindenbaum.
+- and Andrzej Mostowski
+1938
+Uber die Unabhängigkeit des Auswahlaxioms und einiger seiner Folgerungen,
+Sprawozdania z posiedzeń Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, Wydział III,
+31, 27-32.
+Löwenheim, Leopold
+1910
+Uber die Auflösung von Gleichungen im logischen Gebietekalkul, Mathematische
+Annalen 68, 169-207.
+1915
+*Über Möglichkeiten im Relativkalkül, ibid. 76, 447-470 (228-251 of the present
+volume).
+1940
+Einkleidung der Mathematik in Schröderschen Relativkalkul, The journal of
+symbolic logic 5, 1-15.
+Lukasiewicz, Jan
+1920
+1929
+O logice trójwartościowej, Ruch filozoficzny 5, 170-171.
+O znaczeniu i potrzebach logiki matematycznej, Nauka polska 10, 604-620.
+1929a
+Alementy logikr matematycznej, authorized lecture notes prepared by Mojzesz
+Presburger (Warsaw University, Warsaw).
+1958
+1963
+2nd ed. (PWN, Warsaw).
+Elements of mathematical logic, English translation of Lukasiewicz 1958 by
+Olgierd Wojtasiewicz (PWN and Pergamon, Oxford; Macmillan, New York).
+- and Alfred Tarski
+1930
+Untersuchungen über den Aussagenkalkül, Sprawozdania z posiedzeń Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, Wydział III, 23, 30-50 ; English translation
+in Tarski 1956, 38-59.
+Luzin, Nikolai Nikolaevich (Lusin, Николай Николаевич Лузин)
+1927
+Sur les ensembles analytiques, Fundamenta mathematicae 10, 1-95.
+1928
+Sur les voies de la théories des ensembles, Atti del Congresso internazionale dei
+matematici, Bologna 3-10 settembre 1928 (Zanichelli, Bologna, 1929) vol. 1,
+295-299.
+1930
+1933
+Leçons sur les ensembles analytiques et leurs applications (Gauthier-Villars, Paris).
+Sur les classes des constituantes des complémentaires analytiques, Annali della
+Reale Scuola normale superiore di Pisa, Scienze fisiche e matematiche, 2nd series,
+2,269-282.
+1935
+1953
+Sur les ensembles analytiques nuls, Fundamenta mathematicae 25, 109-131.
+Лекции об аналитических множествах и их приложениях, edited with a preface
+and notes by L. V. Keldysh and P. S. Novikov (Государственное издательство,
+Moscow).
+1958
+1958a
+Собрание сочинений (Издательство Академии Наук CCCP, Moscow), vol. 1.
+Лекции об аналитических множествах и их приложениях, in Luzin 1958, 9-
+269.
+19586
+О путях развития теории множеств, in Luzin 1958, 464-469.
+1958c
+О классах конституант аналитических дополнений, in Luzin 1958, 627-641.
+1958d
+О пустых аналитических множествах, in Luzin 1958, 662-680.
+- and Wacław Sierpiński
+1918
+Sur quelques propriétés des ensembles (A), Bulletin international de l'Académie
+des sciences de Cracovie, Classe des sciences mathématiques et naturelles, série A :
+sciences mathématiques, April-May, 35-48.
+1958
+О некоторых свойствах А-множеств, in Luzin 1958, 273-284.
+Lyndon, Roger Conant
+1950
+The representation of relational algebras, Annals of mathematics, 2nd series, 51,
+707-729.
+
+646
+MacColl, Hugh
+1877
+The calculus of equivalent statements and integration limits, Proceedings of the
+London Mathematical Society 9, 9-20.
+1878
+The calculus of equivalent statements (Second paper), ibid., 177-186.
+1878a
+The calculus of equivalent statements (Third paper), ibid. 10, 16-28.
+1880
+The calculus of equivalent statements (Fourth paper), ibid. 11, 113-121.
+McKinsey, John Charles Chenoweth
+1935
+On the independence of undefined ideas, Bulletin of the American Mathematical
+Society 41, 291-297.
+1940
+Postulates for the calculus of binary relations, The journal of symbolic logic 5,
+85-97.
+Makkai, M.
+1964
+On a generalization of a theorem of E. W. Beth, Acta mathematicae Academiae
+scientiarum hungaricae 15, 227-235.
+Maltsev, Anatolii Ivanovich (Malcev, Анатолий Иванович Мальцев)
+1936
+Untersuchungen aus dem Gebiete der mathematischen Logik, Математический
+сборник 1, 323-336.
+Mendelson, Elliott
+1956
+The independence of a weak axiom of choice, The journal of symbolic logic 21,
+350-366.
+Menger, Karl
+1928
+Bemerkungen zu Grundlagenfragen, Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-
+Vereinigung 37, Ist section, 213-226.
+Mirimanoff, Dimitry
+1917
+Les antinomies de Russell et de Burali-Forti et le problème fondamental de la
+théorie des ensembles, L'enseignement mathématique 19, 37-52.
+Montague, Richard
+1956
+Zermelo-Frankel set theory is not a finite extension of Zermelo set theory,
+Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 62, 260; abstract of a paper presented at the 25 February 1956 meeting of the American Mathematical Society.
+1961
+Frankel's addition to the axioms of Zermelo, Essays on the foundations of
+mathematics dedicated to A. A. Fraenkel on his seventieth anniversary (Magnes
+Press, Jerusalem; distributed by North-Holland, Amsterdam), 91-113.
+Moore, Edward Forrest
+See Kahr, Andrew Seth, Edward Forrest Moore, and Hao Wang.
+Mostowski, Andrzej
+1939
+Über die Unabhängigkeit des Wohlordnungssatzes vom Ordnungsprinzip,
+Fundamenta mathematicae 32, 201-252.
+1948
+On the principle of dependent choices, ibid. 35, 127-130.
+1955
+A formula with no recursively enumerable model, ibid. 42, 125-140.
+See Lindenbaum, Adolf, and Andrzej Mostowski; also Tarski, Alfred, 1953.
+Müller, Eugen
+See Schröder, Ernst, 1909, 1910.
+Nicod, Jean
+1916 A reduction in the number of primitive propositions of logic, Proceedings of the
+Cambridge Philosophical Society 19 (1917-1920), 32-41 (received 30 October
+1916).
+Noether, Emmy, and Jean Cavailles (eds.)
+1937
+Briefwechsel Cantor-Dedekind (Hermann, Paris).
+Padoa, Alessandro
+1898
+Conférences sur la logique mathématique (Brussels).
+1900
+*Essai d'une théorie algébrique des nombres entiers, précédé d'une introduction
+logique à une théorie déductive quelconque, Bibliothèque du Congrès international de philosophie, Paris, 1900 (Armand Colin, Paris, 1901), vol. 3, 309-
+365 (118-123 of the present volume).
+
+647
+Padoa, Alessandro—contd.
+1900a
+Un nouveau système irréductible de postulats pour l'algèbre, Compte rendu du
+Deuxième congrès international des mathématiciens tenu à Paris du 6 au 12 août
+1900 (Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1902), 249-256.
+1903
+Le probleme no. 2 de M. David Hilbert, L'enseignement mathématique 5, 85-91.
+Peano, Giuseppe
+1888
+Calcolo geometrico secondo l'Ausdehnungslehre di H. Grassmann, preceduto dalle
+Operazioni della logica deduttiva (Turin); partly reprinted in Peano 1958, 3-19.
+1889
+*Arithmetices principia, nova methodo exposita (Turin) (83-97 of the present
+volume); reprinted in Peano 1958, 20-55.
+1890
+Démonstration de l'intégrabilité des
+équations différentielles ordinaires,
+Mathematische Annalen 37, 182-288; reprinted in Peano 1957, 119-170.
+1891
+Principii di logica matematica, Rivista di matematica 1, 1-10; reprinted in
+Peano 1958, 92-101.
+1891a
+Formole di logica matematica, Rivista di matematica 1, 24-31, 182-184;
+18916
+reprinted in Peano 1958, 102-113.
+Sul concetto di numero, Rivista di matematica 1, 87-102, 256-267 ; reprinted in
+Peano 1959, 80-109.
+1894
+Notations de logique mathématique. Introduction au formulaire de mathématique
+(Turin).
+1895
+Formulaire de mathématiques (Turin), vol. 1.
+1897
+- vol. 2, 8 1.
+1897a
+Studii di logica matematica, Atti della Reale Accademia delle scienze di Torino
+32, 565-583 ; reprinted in Peano 1958, 201-217.
+1898
+Riposta, Revue de mathématiques 6, 60-61 ; reprinted in Peano 1958, 295-296.
+1898a
+Formulaire de mathématiques (Turin), vol. 2, § 2.
+1899
+- § 3.
+1901
+- vol. 3.
+1903
+Note 2549, L'intermédiaire des mathématiciens 10, 70; see Brocard, Henri, 1906.
+1903a
+Formulaire de mathématiques (Bocca, Turin; Clausen, Turin), vol. 4.
+1906
+Super theorema de Cantor-Bernstein, Rendiconti del Circolo matematico di
+Palermo 21, 360-366; also Revista de mathematica 8, 136-143; reprinted in
+1906a
+Peano 1957, 337-344.
+Additione, Revista de mathematica 8, 143-157 ; reprinted in Peano 1957, 344-
+358.
+1957
+Opere scelte (Edizioni cremonese, Rome), vol. 1.
+1958
+- vol. 2
+1959
+Peirce, Charles Sanders
+1870
+Description of a notation for the logic of relatives, resulting from an amplification of the conceptions of Boole's calculus of logic, Memoirs of the American
+Academy of arts and sciences 9, 317-378; reprinted in Peirce 1933, 27-98.
+1880
+On the algebra of logic, American journal of mathematics 3, 15-57; reprinted in
+Peirce 1933, 104-157.
+1882
+Brief description of the algebra of relatives, in Peirce 1933, 180-186.
+1883
+A theory of probable inference. Note B. The logic of relatives, Studies in logic
+by members of the Johns Hopkins University (Boston), 187-203; reprinted in
+Peirce 1933, 195-209.
+1885
+On the algebra of logie: a contribution to the philosophy of notation, American
+1933
+journal of mathematics 7, 180-202; reprinted in Peirce 1933, 210-238.
+Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, edited by Charles Hartshorne and
+Paul Weiss (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts), vol. 3.
+Péter, Rózsa (Politzer)
+1932
+Rekursive Funktionen, Verhandlungen des Internationalen Mathematiker-Kongresses Zürich 1932 (Orell Füssli, Zurich and Leipzig), vol. 2, 336-337.
+
+648
+Péter, Rózsa (Politzer)-contd.
+1934
+Über den Zusammenhang der verschiedenen Begriffe der rekursiven Funktion,
+Mathematische Annalen 110, 612-632.
+1935
+1937
+1937a
+1951
+Konstruktion nichtrekursiver Funktionen, ibid. 111, 42-60.
+Über die mehrfache Rekursion, ibid. 113, 489-527.
+Review of Kleene 1936, The journal of symbolic logic 2, 38.
+Rekursive Funktionen (Verlag der Ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,
+Budapest).
+1951a
+Probleme der Hilbertschen Theorie der höheren Stufen von rekursiven Funktionen, Acta mathematica Academiae scientiarum hungaricae 2, 247-274.
+1953
+Rekursive Definitionen, wobei frühere Funktionswerte von variabler Anzahl
+verwendet werden, Publicationes mathematicae 3, 33-70.
+1956
+Die beschränkt-rekursiven Funktionen und die Ackermannsche Majorisierungsmethode, ibid. 4, 362-375.
+1957
+2nd, enlarged ed. of Péter 1951.
+Pieri, Mario
+1906
+Sur la compatibilité des axiomes de l'arithmétique, Revue de métaphysique et de
+morale 14, 196-207.
+Poincaré, Henri
+1905
+Les mathématiques et la logique, Revue de métaphysique et de morale 13, 815-
+835; 14 (1906), 17-34.
+1906
+Les mathématiques et la logique, ibid., 294-317.
+1906a
+A propos de la logistique, ibid. 866-868.
+1908
+Science et méthode (Flammarion, Paris).
+Post, Emil Leon
+1920
+Introduction to a general theory of elementary propositions, Bulletin of the
+American Mathematical Society 26, 437; abstract of a paper presented at the 24
+April 1920 meeting of the American Mathematical Society.
+1920a
+Determination of all closed systems of truth tables (abstract of a paper presented at the 24 April 1920 meeting of the American Mathematical Society),
+ibid.
+1921
+*Introduction to a general theory of elementary propositions, American journal
+of mathematics 43, 163-185 (264-283 of the present volume).
+1921a
+On a simple case of deductive systems (abstract of a paper read by title at the
+23 April 1921 meeting of the American Mathematical Society), Bulletin of the
+American Mathematical Society 27, 396-397.
+1936
+Finite combinatory processes, formulation I, The journal of symbolic logic 1,
+103-105; reprinted in Davis 1965, 288-291.
+1941
+The two-valued iterative systems of mathematical logic (Annals of mathematics
+1941a
+series, no. 5, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey).
+Absolutely
+unsolvable problems and relatively
+undecidable propositions.
+Account of an anticipation, in Davis 1965, 340-433.
+1943
+Formal reductions of the general combinatorial decision problem, American
+journal of mathematics 65, 197-215.
+Presburger, Mojżesz
+1929
+Über die Vollständigkeit eines gewissen Systems der Arithmetik ganzer Zahlen,
+in welchem die Addition als einzige Operation hervortritt, Sprawozdanie z I
+Kongresu matematyków krajów stowiańskich, Warszawa 1929 (Warsaw, 1930),
+92-101, 395.
+Princeton University
+1946
+Problems of mathematics, Princeton University bicentennial conferences, series 2,
+conference 2.
+Pringsheim, Alfred
+1916
+Vorlesungen über Zahlen- und Funktionenlehre (Teubner, Leipzig and Berlin),
+vol. 1, part 2.
+
+649
+Putnam, Hilary
+1956
+Arithmetic models for consistent formulas of quantification theory, The journal
+of symbolic logic 22 (1957), 110-111; abstract of a paper presented at the 27
+December 1956 meeting of the Association for Symbolie Logic.
+1961
+Trial and error predicates and the solution to a problem of Mostowski's (New
+York University, New York).
+1965
+Trial and error predicates and the solution to a problem of Mostowski, The
+journal of symbolic logic 30, 49-57.
+See Benacerraf, Paul, and Hilary Putnam.
+Quine, Willard Van Orman
+1940
+Mathematical logic (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts);
+revised edition 1951; reprinted 1962 (Harper, New York).
+1945
+1950
+1955
+1955a
+On ordered pairs, The journal of symbolic logic 10, 95-96.
+Methods of logic (Holt, New York); see Quine 19556.
+On Frege's way out, Mind 64, 145-159; reprinted in Quine 1966, 146-158.
+A proof procedure for quantification theory, The journal of symbolic logic 20,
+141-149; reprinted in Quine 1966, 196-204.
+19556
+Appendix. Completeness of quantification theory. Löwenheim's theorem, enclosed
+as a pamphlet with part of the third printing (1955) of Quine 1950 and incorpo-
+1956
+1960
+rated in the revised edition (1959), 253-260.
+Unification of universes in set theory, The journal of symbolic logic 21, 267-279.
+Variables explained away, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society
+104, 343-347; reprinted in Quine 1966, 227-235.
+1963
+Set theory and its logic (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts).
+1966
+Selected logic papers (Random House, New York).
+Ramsey, Frank Plumpton
+1925
+The foundations of mathematics, Proceedings of the London Mathematical
+Society, series 2, 25, 338-384, reprinted in Ramsey 1931, 1-61.
+1931
+The foundations of mathematics and other logical essays, edited by Richard Bevan
+Braithwaite (Paul, Trench, Trubner, London; Harcourt, Brace, New York);
+reprinted 1950 (Humanities Press, New York).
+Rasiowa, Helena, and Roman Sikorski
+1950
+A proof of the completeness theorem of Gödel, Fundamenta mathematicae 37,
+193-200.
+Richard, Jules
+1905
+*Les principes des mathématiques et le problème des ensembles, Revue génerale
+1906
+des sciences pures et appliquées 16, 541 (142-144 of the present volume).
+Lettre à Monsieur le rédacteur de la Revue générale des sciences, Acta mathematica 30, 295-296.
+1907
+Sur un paradoxe de la théorie des ensembles et sur l'axiome Zermelo, L'enseignement mathematique 9, 94-98.
+Robinson, Abraham
+1955
+A result on consistency and its application to the theory of definition, Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van wetenschappen, Proceedings, series A, Mathematical sciences 59 (1956), 47-58; also Indagationes mathematicae 18, 47-58.
+Robinson, Raphael Mitchel
+1937
+The theory of classes, a modification of von Neumann's system, The journal of
+symbolic logic 2, 29-36.
+1947
+Primitive recursive functions, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 53,
+925-942.
+1948
+Recursion and double recursion, ibid. 54, 987-993.
+See Tarski, Alfred, 1953.
+Rose, Harvey Ernest
+1961
+On the consistency and undecidability of recursive arithmetic, Zeitschrift für
+mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 7, 121-135.
+
+650
+Rose, Harvey Ernest-conto.
+1962
+Ternary recursive arithmetic, Mathematica scandinavica 10, 210-216.
+Rosser, John Barkley
+Extensions of some theorems of Gödel and Church, The journal of symbolic
+logic 1, 87-91; reprinted in Davis 1965, 231-235.
+Russell, Bertrand
+*Letter to Frege (first published in the present volume, 124-125).
+The principles of mathematics, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
+England; 2nd ed., Norton, New York, no date).
+On denoting, Mind, new series, 14, 479-493; reprinted in Russell 1956, 41-56.
+On some difficulties in the theory of transfinite numbers and order types,
+Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 2nd series, 4 (1907), 29-53.
+The theory of implication, American journal of mathematics 28, 159-202.
+Les paradoxes de la logique, Revue de métaphysique et de morale 14, 627-650.
+Mr. Haldane on infinity, Mind, new series, 17, 238-242.
+*Mathematical logic as based on the theory of types, American journal of mathematics 30, 222-262 (150-182 of the present volume); reprinted in Russell
+1956, 59-102.
+1919
+Introduction to mathematical philosophy (Allen and Unwin, London; Macmillan,
+New York).
+1944
+My mental development, The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul
+Arthur Schilpp (Tudor, New York), 3-20.
+1956
+Logic and knowledge, Essays 1901-1950, edited by Robert Charles Marsh (Allen
+and Unwin, London).
+See Whitehead, Alfred North, and Bertrand Russell.
+Schönfinkel, Moses
+1924
+*Über die Bausteine der mathematischen Logik, Mathematische Annalen 92,
+305-316 (355-366 of the present volume).
+See Bernays, Paul, and Moses Schönfinkel.
+Schoenflies, Arthur
+1905
+Über wohlgeordnete Mengen, Mathematische Annalen 60, 181-186.
+1913
+Allgemeine Theorie der unendlichen Mengen und Theorie der Punktmengen
+(Teubner, Leipzig and Berlin), published as first half of Entwickelung der Mengenlehre und ihrer Anwendungen gemeinsam mit Hans Hahn herausgegeben von
+Artur Schoenflies (second half never published).
+1921
+1922
+1922a
+Zur Axiomatik der Mengenlehre, Mathematische Annalèn 83, 173-200.
+Bemerkung zur Axiomatik der Größen und Mengen, ibrd. 85, 60-64.
+Zur Erinnerung an Georg Cantor, Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-
+Vereinigung 31, Ist section, 97-106.
+Georg Cantor, Mitteldeutsche Lebensbilder 3, 548-563.
+Schreier, Otto
+See Artin, Emil, and Otto Schreier.
+Schröder, Ernst
+1873
+Lehrbuch der Arithmetik und Algebra für Lehrer und Studirende. Erster Band:
+Die sieben algebraischen Operationen (Leipzig).
+1877
+1880
+Der Operationskreis des Logikkalkuls (Leipzig).
+Review of Frege 1879, Zeitschrift für Mathematik und Physik 25, Historischliterarische Abtheilung, 81-94.
+1890
+Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik (exakte Logik) (Leipzig), vol. 1; reprinted
+in Schröder 1966.
+1891
+1895
+1909
+- vol. 2, part 1; reprinted in Schröder 1966.
+vol. 3, Algebra und Logik der Relative, part 1; reprinted in Schröder 1966.
+Abriss der Algebra der Logik, edited by Eugen Müller (Teubner, Leipzig and
+Berlin), part 1, Elementarlehre; reprinted in Schröder 1966.
+1910
+- part 2, Aussagentheorie, Funktionen, Gleichungen und Ungleichungen;
+reprinted in Schröder 1966.
+1966
+Vorlesungen ueber die Algebra der Logik (Chelsea, New York).
+
+651
+Schütte, Kurt
+1951
+Beweistheoretische Erfassung der unendlichen Induktion in der Zahlentheorie,
+Mathematische Annalen 122, 369-389.
+1960
+1962
+Beweistheorie (Springer Verlag, Berlin, Göttingen, and Heidelberg).
+Der Interpolationssatz der intuitionistischen Prädikatenlogik, Mathematische
+Annalen 148, 192-200.
+Schwabhäuser, Wolfram
+1954
+Zur Definition des geordneten .
+Pares von Mengen beliebiger Stufe, Mathematische Nachrichten 11, 81-84.
+Sheffer, Henry Maurice
+1913
+A set of five independent postulates for Boolean algebras, with applications to
+logical constants, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 14, 481-
+488.
+Shepherdson, John Cedric
+1951- Inner models for set theory, The journal of symbolic logic 16, 161-190; 17
+1953
+(1952), 225-237 ; 18, 145-167.
+1963
+Non-standard models for fragments of number theory, in Addison, Henkin, and
+Tarski 1963, 342-358.
+Sierpiński, Wacław
+1958
+Cardinal and ordinal numbers (Państwowe wydawnictwo naukowe, Warsaw);
+2nd ed. 1965.
+See Luzin, Nikolai Nikolaevich, and Wacław Sierpiński.
+Sigwart, Christoph
+1904
+Logik, 3rd ed. (Mohr, Tübingen), vol. 1.
+1908
+Логика, vol. 1, Russian translation of Sigwart 1904 by I. A. Davidov (Обще-
+ственная Польза and Провинція, Saint Petersburg).
+Sikorski, Roman
+See Rasiowa, Helena, and Roman Sikorski.
+Skolem, Thoralf
+Untersuchungen über die Axiome des Klassenkalkuls und über Produktationsund Summationsprobleme, welche gewisse Klassen von Aussagen betreffen,
+Videnskapsselskapets skrifter, I. Matematisk-naturvidenskabelig klasse, no. 3.
+1920
+*Logisch-kombinatorische Untersuchungen über die Erfüllbarkeit oder Beweisbarkeit mathematischer Sätze nebst einem Theoreme über dichte Mengen, ibid.,
+no. 4 (§1, 252-263 of the present volume).
+1922
+*Einige Bemerkungen zur axiomatischen Begründung der Mengenlehre, Matematikerkongressen i Helsingfors den 1-7 Juli 1922, Den femte skandinaviska
+matematikerkongressen, Redogörelse (Akademiska Bokhandeln, Helsinki, 1923),
+217-232 (290-301 of the present volume).
+*Begründung der elementaren Arithmetik durch die rekurrierende Denkweise
+ohne Anwendung scheinbarer Veränderlichen mit unendlichem Ausdehnungsbereich, Videnskapsselskapets skrifter, I. Matematisk-naturvidenskabelig klasse,
+no. 6 (302-333 of the present volume).
+1928
+*Über die mathematische Logik, Norsk matematisk tidsskrift 10, 125-142 (508-
+524 of the present volume).
+1928a
+Review of Ackermann 1928, Jahrbuch über die Fortschritte der Mathematik 54
+(for 1928, published 1932), 56-57.
+19286
+1929
+Review of Ackermann 1928a, ibid., 57.
+Über einige Grundlagenfragen der Mathematik, Skrifter utgitt av Det Norske
+Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo, I. Matematisk-naturvidenskapelig klasse, no. 4.
+1929a
+Uber die Grundlagendiskussionen in der Mathematik, Den syvende skandinaviske matematikerkongress i Oslo 19-22 August 1929 (Brøggers, Oslo, 1930),
+3-21.
+1930
+Einige Bemerkungen zu der Abhandlung von E. Zermelo : "Uber die Definitheit
+in der Axiomatik", Fundamenta mathematicae 15, 337-341.
+
+652
+Skolem, Thoralf-contd.
+1933
+Über die Unmöglichkeit einer vollständigen Charakterisierung der Zahlenreihe
+mittels eines endlichen Axiomensystems, Norsk matematisk forenings skrifter,
+series 2, no. 10, 73-82.
+1934
+Über die Nicht-charakterisierbarkeit der
+Zahlenreihe mittels endlich
+oder
+abzählbar unendlich vieler Aussagen
+mit ausschliesslich Zahlenvariablen,
+Fundamenta mathematicae 23, 150-161.
+1935
+Ein Satz über Zählausdrücke, Acta litterarum ac scientiarum Regiae Universitatis Hungaricae Francisco-Josephinae, Sectio scientiarum mathematicarum 7,
+193-199.
+1935a
+Über die Erfüllbarkeit gewisser Zählausdrücke, Skrifter utgitt av Det Norske
+Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo, I. Matematisk-naturvidenskapelig klasse, no. 6.
+1936
+Utvalgte kapitler av den matematiske logikk, Chr. Michelsens Institutt for
+Videnskap og Andsfrihet, Beretninger 6, no. 6.
+1938
+Sur la portée du théorème de Löwenheim-Skolem, in Gonseth 1938, 25-47 ;
+Discussion, 47-52.
+Den rekursive aritmetikk, Norsk matematisk tidsskrift 28, I-12.
+The development of recursive arithmetic, Den 10. skandinaviske matematikerkongress i Kobenhavn 26.-30. August 1946, I-46.
+1950
+Some remarks on the foundation of set theory, Proceedings of the International
+Congress of Mathematicians, Cambridge, Massachussets, U.S. A., August 30-
+September 6, 1950 (American Mathematical Society, Providence, Rhode Island,
+1952), vol. 1, 695-704.
+1962
+Abstract set theory (University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana).
+Specker, Ernst
+Zur Axiomatik der Mengenlehre (Fundierungs- und Auswahlaxiom), Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 3, 173-210.
+Spector, Clifford
+Recursive well-orderings, The journal of symbolic logic 20, 151-163.
+Provably recursive functionals of analysis: A consistency proof of analysis by
+an extension of principles formulated in current intuitionistic mathematics,
+Recursive function theory, Proceedings of symposia in pure mathematics (American
+Mathematical Society, Providence, Rhode Island, 1962), vol. 5, 1-27.
+Sudan, Gabriel
+1927
+Sur le nombre transfini w", Bulletin mathématique de la Société roumaine des
+sciences 30, 11-30.
+Suslin, Mikhail Iakovlevich (Souslin, Михаил Яковлевич Суслин)
+1917
+Sur une définition des ensembles mesurables B sans nombres transfinis, Comptes
+rendus hebdomadaires des séances de l'Académie des sciences (Paris) 164, 88-91
+(session of 8 January 1917).
+Svenonius, Lars
+1959 A theorem on permutations in models, Theoria (Lund) 25, 173-178.
+Tarski, Alfred
+1934
+Z badán metodologicznych nad definiowalnoścą terminów, Przeglad filozoficzny 37, 438-460) (see Bibliographical Note in Tarski 1956, 296).
+1935
+Einige methodologische Untersuchungen über die Definierbarkeit der Begriffe,
+Erkenntnis 5, 80-100; English translation in Tarski 1956, 296-319.
+1941
+1948
+On the calculus of relations, The journal of symbolic logic 6, 73-89.
+A decision method for elementary algebra and geometry (Rand Corporation,
+Santa Monica, California).
+1948a
+Axiomatic and algebraic aspects of two theorems on sums of cardinals, Fundamenta mathematicae 35, 79-104.
+1951
+2nd ed., revised, of Tarski 1948 (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los
+Angeles).
+
+653
+Tarski, Alfred-
+-contd.
+1953
+Undecidable theories, in collaboration with Andrzej Mostowski and Raphael M.
+Robinson (North-Holland, Amsterdam).
+1956
+Logic, semantics, metamathematics (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
+See Addison, John West, Leon Henkin, and Alfred Tarski; also Lukasiewicz, Jan, and
+Alfred Tarski.
+- and Adolf Lindenbaum
+1926
+Sur l'indépendance des notions primitives dans les systèmes mathématiques,
+Annales de la Société polonaise de mathématique 5, 111-113.
+- and Robert Lawson Vaught
+1956
+Arithmetical
+extensions of relational
+systems, Compositio mathematica
+13,
+81-102.
+Trendelenburg, Adolf
+1867
+Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie (Berlin), vol. 3, Vermischte Abhandlungen.
+Turing, Alan Mathison
+1937
+On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem,
+Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 2nd series, 42, 230-265; correction, ibid. 43, 544-546 ; reprinted in Davis 1965, 116-154.
+Ulam, Stanislaw
+1958
+John von Neumann, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 64, no. 3,
+part 2, 1-49.
+Vaught, Robert Lawson
+See Tarski, Alfred, and Robert Lawson Vaught.
+Veblen, Oswald
+1904
+A system of axioms for geometry, Iransactions of the American Mathematical
+Society 5, 343-384.
+Vesley, Richard Eugene
+See Kleene, Stephen Cole, and Richard Eugene Vesley.
+Vieler, Heinrich
+1926
+Untersuchungen über Unabhängigkeit und Tragweite der Axiome der Mengenlehre in der Axiomatik Zermelos und Fraenkels (thesis, University of Marburg).
+Vivanti, Giulio
+1893
+Lista bibliografica della teoria degli aggregati, Rivista di matematica 3, 189-192.
+von Neumann, John
+1923
+*Zur Einführung der transfiniten Zahlen, Acta litterarum ac scientiarum Regiae
+Universitatis Hungaricae Francisco-Josephinae, Sectio scientiarum mathematicarum 1, 199-208 (346-354 of the present volume); reprinted in von Neumann
+1961, 24-33.
+1925
+*Eine Axiomatisierung der Mengenlehre, Journal für die reine und angewandte
+Mathematik 154, 219-240; Berichtigung, ibid. 155, 128 (393-413 of the present
+1926
+volume); reprinted in von Neumann 1961, 34-56.
+Az általános
+nalmazelmélet axiomatikus folépitése (thesis, University of
+Budapest).
+1927
+Zur Hilbertschen Beweistheorie, Mathematische Zeitschrift 26, 1-46 ; reprinted
+in von Neumann 1961, 256-300.
+1928
+Über die Definition durch transfinite Induktion und verwandte Fragen der
+allgemeinen Mengenlehre, Mathematische Annalen 99, 373-391; reprinted in
+von Neumann 1961, 320-338.
+1928a
+Die Axiomatisierung der Mengenlehre, Mathematische Zeitschrift 27, 669-752;
+1929
+reprinted in von Neumann 1961, 339-422.
+Über eine Widerspruchsfreiheitsfrage in der axiomatischen Mengenlehre,
+Journal für die reine und angewandte Mathematik 160, 227-241 ; reprinted in
+von Neumann 1961, 494-508.
+1961
+Collected works (Pergamon Press, New York), vol. 1.
+
+654
+Wang, Hao
+1949
+On Zermelo's and von Neumann's axioms for set theory, Proceedings of the
+National Academy of Sciences of the U. S. A. 35, 150-155.
+1950
+Remarks on the comparison of axiom systems, ibid. 36, 448-453.
+1951
+Arithmetic models for formal systems, Methodos 3, 217-232.
+1952
+Truth definitions and consistency proofs, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 73, 243-275; reprinted with revisions as Chapter 18 of Wang
+1962.
+1955
+Undecidable sentences generated by semantic paradoxes, The journal of symbolic logic 20, 31-43; reprinted with revisions as Chapter 22 of Wang 1962.
+1957
+The axiomization of arithmetic, The journal of symbolic logic 22, 145-157;
+reprinted as Chapter 4 of Wang 1962.
+1962
+A survey of mathematical logic (Science Press, Peking; distributed by North-
+Holland, Amsterdam).
+See Kahr, Andrew Seth, Edward Forrest Moore, and Hao Wang.
+Weierstrass, Karl
+Zur Theorie der aus n Haupteinheiten gebildeten complexen Grössen, Nachrichten von der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, 395-419.
+Wernick, William
+1942
+Complete sets of logical functions, Transactions of the American Mathematical
+Society 51, 117-132.
+Weyl, Hermann
+1910
+Über die Definitionen der mathematischen Grundbegriffe, Mathematisch-naturwissenschaftliche Blätter 7, 93-95, 109-113.
+1918
+Das Kontinuum. Kritische Untersuchungen über die Grundlagen der Analysis
+(Veit, Leipzig); reprinted 1932 (de Gruyter, Berlin and Leipzig) and without
+date (Chelsea, New York).
+1920
+Uber die neue Grundlagenkrise der Mathematik, Mathematische Zeitschrift 10
+(1921), 39-79.
+*Diskussionsbemerkungen zu dem zweiten Hilbertschen Vortrag über die
+Grundlagen der Mathematik, Abhandlungen aus dem Mathematischen Seminar
+der Hamburgischen Universität 6 (1928), 86-88 (480-484 of the present volume) ;
+reprinted in Hilbert 1928, 22-24.
+1949
+Philosophy of mathematics and natural science (Princeton University Press,
+Princeton, New Jersey).
+Whitehead, Alfred North
+1898
+A treatise of universal algebra with applications (Cambridge University Press,
+Cambridge, England), vol. 1.
+1902
+On cardinal numbers, American journal of mathematics 24, 367-394.
+1906
+On mathematical concepts of the material world, Philosophical transactions of
+the Royal Society of London, series A, 205, 465-525.
+and Bertrand Russell
+1910
+*Principia mathematica (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England),
+vol. 1 (sec. (1) of chap. III, 216-223 of the present volume).
+1912
+vol. 2.
+1913
+vol. 3.
+1925
+2nd ed., vol. 1.
+1927
+vol. 2.
+1927a
+vol. 3.
+Wiener, Norbert
+1913
+A comparison between the treatment of the algebra of relatives by Schroeder
+and that by Whitehead and Russell (thesis, Harvard University).
+1914
+*A simplification of the logic of relations, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philo-
+1953
+sophical Society 17, 387-390 (224-227 of the present volume).
+Ex-prodigy, my childhood and youth (Simon and Schuster, New York).
+
+655
+Young, William Henry, and Grace Chisholm Young
+Review of Hobson 1921 and 1926, Second notice, The mathematical gazette 14,
+98-104.
+Zermelo, Ernst
+*Beweis, daß jede Menge wohlgeordnet werden kann, Mathematische Annalen 59,
+514-516 (139-141 of the present volume).
+*Neuer Beweis für die Möglichkeit einer Wohlordnung, ibid. 65, 107-128 (183-
+198 of the present volume).
+*Untersuchungen über die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre I, ibid., 261-281 (199-
+215 of the present volume).
+19086
+Ueber die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Atti del IV Congresso internazionale dei
+matematici, Roma, 6-11 Aprile 1908 (Accademia dei Lincei, Rome, 1909), vol. 2,
+8-11.
+1909
+Sur les ensembles finis et le principe de l'induction complète, Acta mathematica
+32, 183-193.
+1929
+Über den Begriff der Definitheit in der Axiomatik, Fundamenta mathematicae
+14, 339-344.
+Uber Grenzzahlen und Mengenbereiche, ibid. 16, 29-47.
+See Cantor, Georg, 1932.
+Zyliński, Eustachy
+Some remarks concerning the theory of deduction, Fundamenta mathematicae
+7, 203-209.
+
+Index
+Aanderaa, Stål, 525, 571, 577, 578
+Ackermann, Wilhelm, 368, 388, 418, 421, 440,
+441, 464, 477, 479, 481, 485, 486,
+493, 494,
+509-512, 532, 559-561, 565, 572, 579, 580,
+583, 585, 593, 596, 602, 612, 618
+Ackermann's function, 368, 388, 493-507
+Addison, John West, 453
+Aleksandrov, Pavel Sergeievich, 452
+Analytic set, 452
+Ancestral, 4
+Andrews, Peter, 525, 565
+Aristotle, 379, 419, 512
+Artin, Emil, 581
+Austin, John Langshaw, 1
+Axiom of choice, 139, 183, 186-190, 199, 204,
+210, 257, 284-289, 292, 400, 416, 510, 511,
+552, 593; of elementary sets, 202; of extensionality, 201, 397; of infinity, 199, 204,
+400, 401, 473; of reducibility, 151, 152, 167,
+168, 224, 395, 473; of replacement, 113, 291,
+297, 347, 398, 400; of separation, 202, 284,
+286, 400, 410; of the power set, 203, 401; of
+the union, 203, 401
+Bacon, Francis, 6
+Bar induction, 453
+Bar recursion, 453
+Bar theorem, 446, 448, 450, 452, 453
+Bauer-Mengelberg, Stefan, 5, 99, 113, 139, 145,
+183, 200, 232, 254, 291, 303, 335, 357, 369,
+394, 440, 457, 464, 486, 490, 512, 583, 595
+Behmann, Heinrich, 232, 355, 356, 512
+Belinfante, Maurits Joost, 334, 340
+Bentham, Jeremy, 216
+Bernays, Paul, 129, 152, 228, 229, 252, 264, 285,
+303, 346, 347, 357, 363, 367, 368, 392, 394,
+440, 464, 479, 482, 485, 486, 489, 494, 510,
+511, 512, 525, 561, 562, 572, 579-585, 591,
+594, 596, 618, 626
+Bernoulli, Jakob, 62
+Bernstein, Felix, 187, 188, 191-197, 209, 300
+Berry, G. G., 145, 153
+Beth, Evert Willem, 118, 560
+Blumenthal, Otto, 129
+Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, 334, 337, 340,
+410
+Boole, George, 1, 83, 84, 86, 231, 243, 267, 512
+Borel, Emile, 186, 193, 452
+Boskowitz, Alfred, 363
+Bradley, Francis Herbert, 160
+Brouwer, Luitzen Egbertus Jan, 302, 334-336,
+342-345, 395, 396, 413-415, 419-422, 425,
+431, 436, 437, 446-462, 474, 480, 483, 490-
+492, 618
+Burali-Forti, Cesare, 104, 105, 113, 119, 124,
+142, 148, 150, 153-155, 167, 182, 191, 192,
+198, 199, 395, 414
+Cantor, Georg, 86, 104-113, 124, 131, 138, 139,
+148, 149, 179,
+182, 183, 186-200,
+205, 211,
+214, 291, 346, 347, 367, 368, 373-376, 384,
+387, 393-396, 467, 468, 472, 473, 477, 495
+Cantor-Bendixson theorem, 415
+Cantor's theorem, 211, 214
+Cardinal numbers, 178-180
+Cauchy, Augustin-Louis, 191, 367
+Cavaillès, Jean, 113
+Chain (Dedekind's), 98, 183, 290, 295
+Chang, Chen Chung, 119
+Christoffel, Elwin Bruno, 130
+Church, Alonzo, 118, 303, 482, 594
+Chwistek, Leon, 512
+Class (as opposed to set), 393, 403
+Cohen, Paul, 285, 368, 394, 510
+Combinatory logic, 357
+Compactness theorem, 582
+Сольно, 3, 560, 32 970,50, 0 41.
+453, 464, 471, 472, 477-479, 481, 482, 490,
+491, 509, 561, 563, 581, 594, 595, 614-619,
+624-628
+Continuum problem, 139, 142, 147, 291, 299,
+367-369, 384-392, 464, 472, 473, 476, 477,
+495, 593
+Couturat, Louis, 104, 105, 119, 231
+Craig, William, 118, 119, 561
+Curry, Haskell Brooks, 303, 356, 35'
+Cut-free proofs, 451, 509, 52(
+D'Alembert, 367
+de Bouvère, Karel Louis, 119
+Dedekind, Richard, 4, 83-86, 93, 98, 99, 102-
+105, 113, 114, 130, 183, 187-190, 199, 200,
+
+658
+Dedekind, Richard-continued
+204, 209, 252, 290, 295, 374, 375, 392, 471,
+474, 483, 493, 593
+Decision problems, 232, 243-245, 252
+Definite property, 201, 285, 286, 290-293, 393,
+410
+de Iongh, Johan Jilles, 453
+Denton, John, 525, 565, 572
+Descriptions, 216-224, 304, 305
+Descriptive functions, 175-178
+Diaz, Carmen, 1
+Dijkman, Jacobus Gerhardus, 334
+Dixon, Alfred Cardew, 153
+Dreben, Burton, 453, 511, 512, 525, 526, 529,
+560, 567, 571, 572, 578, 582
+Einstein, Albert, 372
+Olimination of quantifiers, 58(
+Duclid, 156, 157, 189, 199
+Fermat's theorem, 474
+Feys, Robert, 356, 357
+Finiteness theorem, 582
+Finsler, Paul, 438-441
+Føllesdal, Dagfinn, 394, 464, 486, 512
+Fraenkel, Abraham A., 199, 284-287, 291, 347,
+348, 395-398, 400, 401, 404, 405, 596
+Franck, Claske M. Berndes, 335
+Free-choice sequence, 447-451
+Frege, Gottlob, 1-4, 10-12, 26, 66, 83-85, 98,
+101, 102, 124-130, 150, 157, 169, 177, 216,
+228, 355, 358, 374, 375, 392, 512
+Functional form for satisfiability, 508
+Gauss, Carl Friedrich, 474
+Gentzen, Gerhard, 526, 561, 565
+Gödel, Kurt, 142, 231, 232, 252, 254, 303, 346,
+347, 367, 368, 393, 394, 438-440, 493, 510,
+511, 525, 552, 565, 579, 582, 583, 589, 592-
+596, 612, 615, 619, 626-628
+Goodman, Nelson, 224
+Goodstein, Reuben Louis, 303
+Grassmann, Hermann, 86
+Hadamard, Jacques, 104
+Hahn, Hans, 582, 592
+Hamel, Georg, 189
+Hardy, Godfrey Harold, 192, 194, 224
+Hart, Wilbur, III, 529
+Hasse, Hans, 619
+Hausdorff, Felix, 224, 354, 367, 412
+Heine-Borel theorem, 334, 338, 342
+Helmholtz, Hermann Ludwig von, 130 •
+Henkin, Leon, 583
+Herbrand, Jacques, 231, 232, 481, 482, 494,
+508-511, 525-532, 537-582, 592, 594, 618,
+619
+Hessenberg, Gerhard, 188, 192, 195, 202, 350
+Heyting, Arend, 334, 342, 414, 447, 454-457,
+462, 482, 490
+Hilbert, David, 118, 124, 129, 135, 139, 147,
+INDEX
+148, 191, 300, 303, 357, 367-369, 377, 378,
+383, 385, 395, 413, 414, 417-425, 429, 432,
+440, 464, 473, 476, 480-486, 489-496, 509,
+510, 526, 541, 561-563, 567, 572, 579-585,
+593-596, 602, 603, 610, 612, 616, 618, 619,
+624
+Hobson, Ernest William, 153
+Howard, William A., 450
+Huntington, Edward Vermilye, 231, 232, 240,
+Identical calculus, 513
+Infinitely proceeding sequence, 41
+Inner model, 394
+Isaacson, Daniel, 529
+Jevons, William Stanley, 86, 267
+Jourdain, Philip Edward Bertrand, 1, 4, 10-12,
+26, 104, 191-195
+Kahr, Andrew Seth, 252
+Kalmár, László, 232, 509
+Kant, Immanuel, 21, 55, 371, 376, 392, 512
+Keferstein, Hans, 98-102
+Kleene, Stephen Cole, 369, 450-453, 561, 579,
+583, 594
+König, Dénes, 290, 510, 511, 552
+König's infinity lemma, 290, 510, 511, 552, 589
+König, Julius (Gyula), 129, 139, 142, 145, 153,
+187, 191, 192, 199-202, 209, 213, 214, 367,
+393, 395
+König's theorem, 200, 213
+Kolmogorov, Andrei Nikolaevich, 414-416
+Korselt, Alwin, 229, 233
+Kreisel, Georg, 447, 450, 453, 560, 583
+Kronecker, Leopold, 130, 379, 413, 474, 475,
+479
+Kummer, Ernst Eduard, 340, 379, 471
+Kuratowski, Kazimierz, 224
+Lambert, Johann Heinrich, 512
+Langford, Cooper Harold, 512, 523
+Lebesgue, Henri, 452
+Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 1, 2, 6, 7, 119, 421,
+Lennes, Nels Johann, 291
+Levi, Beppo, 139, 188, 286
+Lévy, Paul, 368
+Lewis, Clarence Irving, 265-269, 279
+Lexicon, 508
+Lindenbaum, Adolf, 118, 285
+Löwenheim, Leopold, 228-232, 252-256, 290,
+293-295, 405, 409, 413, 510-512, 526, 552,
+558, 559, 563, 582, 623
+Löwenheim's theorem, 229, 235, 253, 256, 290,
+293-295, 368, 394, 405, 526, 582, 583, 586,
+623
+Lukasiewicz, Jan, 264, 356, 600
+Luzin, Nikolai Nikolaevich, 368, 452
+Lyndon, Roger Conant, 229
+
+INDEX
+659
+MacColl, Hugh, 86, 157
+Macfarlane, Alexander, 512
+Mach, Ernst, 484
+McKinsey, John Charles Chenoweth, 118
+Makkai, M., 119
+Maltsev, Anatolii Ivanovich, 254
+Many-valued logics, 264, 279-283
+Mathematical induction, 4, 62, 98,
+100-101,
+Russell, Bertrand, 3, 4, 10, 104, 118, 124-129,
+292, 300, 319, 320, 472, 473, 480-483, 565
+150-152, 155, 189, 191, 195, 199-201, 217,
+Meinong, Alexius, 216
+224, 228, 246, 260, 265, 267, 270, 284, 291,
+Mendelson, Elliott, 285
+297, 303-305, 320, 332, 333, 346, 358, 375,
+Minimal calculus, 414
+395, 397, 405, 413, 417, 473, 479, 509, 512,
+Mirimanoff, Dimitry, 404
+526, 567, 582-584, 596, 620, 627
+Moore, Edward Forrest, 252
+Moschovakis, Yiannis,
+Schmidt, Erhard, 139, 141, 191, 286
+Mostor eligends 20, 234, 510, 583
+Schönfinkel, Moses, 355-357, 511, 512
+Schoenflies, Arthur, 187, 192-198, 395
+Schreier, Otto, 581
+Nicod, Jean, 266, 275
+Schröder, Ernst, 2, 15, 83-86, 113, 119, 152,
+Noether, Emmy, 113
+191, 201, 203, 209, 224, 226-235, 240, 242,
+Nonpredicative, 190-191, 292, 297
+248, 249, 254, 255, 261, 267, 269, 292-294,
+Novikov, Piotr Sergeievich, 415, 436
+304, 310, 312, 513
+Schütte, Kurt, 119, 565
+Oliver, Louis, 142
+Schwabhäuser, Wolfram, 224
+Ordinal numbers, 180-182, 346-354, 374, 375
+Sequence, logical definition of, 1, 55-81
+Sheffer, Henry Maurice, 266, 355, 358, 366
+Padoa, Alessandro, 118, 119
+Sheperdson, John Cedric, 394, 581
+Paradoxes, 3, 130, 153, 200-202, 375, 393, 395,
+Sierpiński, Wacław, 452, 510
+440, 475; Berry's, 145, 153, 155, 166; Burali-
+Sigwart, Christoph, 420
+Forti's, 104-112, 124, 142, 148, 150, 154, 155,
+Skolem, Thoralf, 199, 229-232, 252-254, 285,
+167,
+182,
+19l,
+198, 199, 393, 394, 398;
+291, 302, 303, 368, 394, 405, 409, 413, 493,
+König's, 142, 145-149; Liar, 153, 154, 166,
+508-514, 526, 552, 560, 561, 582, 586, 593,
+439, 440, 592, 598; of finite definability, 441-
+623
+443; Richard's, 142-145, 153, 155, 202, 395,
+Species, 448, 454
+438, 439, 592, 598; Russell's, 104, 113, 124-
+Specker, Ernst, 285
+128, 129, 142, 150, 199, 200, 375, 393, 395
+Spector, Clifford, 450, 453
+Parsons, Charles, 453
+Spread, 447-449, 453, 492
+Pascal, Blaise, 119
+Subformula property, 509
+Patzig, Günther, 1
+Sudan, Gabriel, 495
+Peano, Giuseppe, 3, 83-87, 105, 118, 119, 122,
+Suslin, Mikhail Iakovlevich, 452
+124-127, 139, 142, 152, 153,
+157, 169, 174
+Svenonius, Lars, 119
+178, 186-193, 199, 201, 209, 216, 228, 483,
+512
+Tarski, Alfred, 118, 229, 254, 510, 580, 581, 594,
+Peirce, Charles Sanders, 86, 152, 228, 235, 355,
+600
+512
+Trendelenburg, Adolf, 1
+Peirce's law, 416
+Turing, Alan Mathison, 594, 616
+Péter, Rózsa (Politzer), 369, 493, 494
+lypes, theory of, 150-182, 199, 405; ramified
+151, 152, 592
+Pieri, Mario, 129
+Poincaré, Henri, 105, 118, 129, 142, 153, 163, Ulam, Stanislaw, 393
+190, 191, 198, 209, 300, 395, 473, 479-481,
+van Dalen, Dirk, 335, 453, 529
+Post, Emil Leon, 264, 265, 273, 277
+van Heijenoort, Jean, 127
+Predicative, 165-167
+Variable, 10, 151
+Predicative function, 151, 152
+Vaught, Robert Lawson, 254
+Presburger, Mojżesz, 580
+Veblen, Oswald, 411
+Pringsheim, Alfred, 340
+Venn, John, 267
+Putnam, Hilary, 583
+Vesley, Richard Eugene, 450, 453
+Vivanti, Giulio, 105
+Quine, Willard Van Orman, 4, 126, 152, 217,
+von Neumann, John, 113, 129, 199, 346, 347,
+224, 231, 290, 346, 347, 356, 357, 394, 482,
+393, 394, 486, 512, 561, 581, 596, 600, 601,
+508, 509
+615, 618
+
+660
+Wang, Hao, 98, 99, 252, 416, 583
+Weierstrass, Karl, 246, 369, 370, 474
+Well-ordering theorem, 139, 183, 192, 400, 402,
+Wernick, William, 265
+Weyl, Hermann, 151, 199, 285, 395, 396, 480,
+Whitehead, Alfred North, 4, 151, 152, 169, 201,
+217, 224, 246, 260, 265, 267, 270, 271, 291,
+297, 298, 303-305, 320, 332, 333, 358, 395,
+417, 473, 479, 509, 512, 526, 567, 582-584,
+INDEX
+Wiener, Norbert, 224
+Woodward, Beverly, 124, 127, 129, 285
+Young, Grace Chisholm, 105
+Young, William Henry, 105
+Zermelo, Ernst, 104, 113, 124, 139, 142, 145,
+180, 183, 196-202, 207, 232, 284-287, 290-
+299, 347, 368, 375, 393-401, 410, 430
+Zyliński, Eustachy, 265
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c2752c7f29364c113647cb202009e3c01ee16f8423cf80f0bd9f0950e632b056.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c2752c7f29364c113647cb202009e3c01ee16f8423cf80f0bd9f0950e632b056.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..90afdfd1c4b8899d65d0c5222da58688f020794e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c2752c7f29364c113647cb202009e3c01ee16f8423cf80f0bd9f0950e632b056.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -15294,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "c2752c7f29364c113647cb202009e3c01ee16f8423cf80f0bd9f0950e632b056",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 2040,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.bates-stamp.digits-only\", \"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": false,
+  "input_sha256": "daa01ae3568952636fa14fddaff1091b52078d48aee1a8613a77b963ec247555",
+  "output_sha256": "c9c360a500cc341f6278897834dcdff3463aa6e44f193780ec43f23c7ca2b1b3",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c3566b824ff8bdd1a16d2db1ad2400ee28dee4b1c07402725a5164498e898fde.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c3566b824ff8bdd1a16d2db1ad2400ee28dee4b1c07402725a5164498e898fde.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..36baffa8dc2a8ffe5c46c87d2b193e4e89236073
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c3566b824ff8bdd1a16d2db1ad2400ee28dee4b1c07402725a5164498e898fde.md
@@ -0,0 +1,9651 @@
+EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT
+by HANNAH ARENDT
+
+EIGHT EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT
+HANNAH ARENDT
+For those seeking to understand our times
+Hannah Arendt has become a guide and an
+inspiration. Her penetrating observations of
+the modern world, based on a profound
+knowledge of the past, constitute a major
+contribution to political philosophy.
+In this enlarged edition of a book first published in 1961, she describes the crisis, or
+rather series of crises, that we face as a result
+of the breakdown of tradition. That tradition,
+our heritage from Rome, no longer relieves
+us of the necessity of thought by supplying
+usable, ready-made answers. It has ceased
+to bridge the gap between past and future.
+And so this gap, once visible only to those
+few who made thinking their business, has
+become a tangible reality and perplexity to
+us all. It has become a pressing and inescapable fact of politics.
+The modern world has not been trained for
+the task of re-examining its basic words and
+concepts. Fundamental thinking has never
+been a general requirement. Faced now with
+the imperative need for it, as the traditional
+key words of politics-justice, reason, responsibility, virtue, glory, truth, stature-lose
+their meaning, we see crises developing in
+every direction, and no way of meeting them.
+(Continued on back flap)
+
+(Continued from front flap)
+In fact, we lack the very concepts with which
+to envisage our problems.
+It is to this task of fundamental thinking
+that Hannah Arendt addresses herself, showing how we can distill once more the vital
+essence of traditional concepts by discovering their real origins, and how, by exercise of
+the intelligence, we can appraise our present
+position and regain a frame of reference for
+the future.
+For this edition she has added two new
+full-length essays, one on the conflict between truth and politics, springing from the
+controversy after publication of her Eichmann in Jerusalem, and the other debating
+whether the conquest of space has increased
+or diminished the stature of man. To participate in these eight exercises is to associate,
+in action, with one of the most original and
+fruitful minds of our times.
+HANNAH ARENDT is University Professor of
+Political Philosophy in the Graduate Faculty
+of the New School for Social Research and
+a Visiting Fellow of the Committee on Social
+Thought at the University of Chicago. She is
+the author of The Origins of Totalitarianism,
+The Human Condition, Eichmann in Jerusalem, and On Revolution.
+THE VIKING PRESS
+Publishers of The Viking Portable Library
+and Guide to American Graduate Schools
+625 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022
+PRINTED IN U.S.A.
+
+BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE
+
+Also by Hannah Arendt
+ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM
+THE HUMAN CONDITION
+ON REVOLUTION
+EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM
+MEN IN DARK TIMES
+
+Hannah Arendt
+AND FUTURE
+Eight Exercises in
+Political Thought
+THE VIKING PRESS • NEW YORK
+
+Copyright 1954, © 1956, 1957, 1958, 1960, 1961, 1963, 1967, 1968
+by Hannah Arendt
+All rights reserved
+Published in 1961 by The Viking Press, Inc.
+625 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022
+Reissued with additional text in 1968 in a hardbound edition and a
+Viking Compass edition
+Published simultaneously in Canada by
+The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited
+Part of Chapter III was first published in Nomos I: Authority, edited
+by Carl J. Friedrich for the American Society of Political and Legal
+Philosophy, copyright © 1958 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College, published by The Liberal Arts Press, a division of The
+Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. Part of Chapter VI was fist published
+in Daedalus, copyright © 1960 by the American Academy of Arts and
+Sciences, and other chapters in Chicago Review, Partisan Review, and
+Review of Politics.
+No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without
+permission from The Viking Press, Inc.
+Library of Congress catalog card number: 68-28022
+Printed in U.S.A.
+Second printing June 1969
+
+For Heinrich
+after twenty-five years
+
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+The essays in this book are revised and enlarged versions of those
+which appeared in the following magazines: American Scholar,
+Chicago Review, Daedalus, Nomos, Partisan Review, The Review
+of Politics. "Truth and Politics" originally appeared in The New
+Yorker. "The Crisis in Education" was translated from the German
+by Denver Lindley.
+
+CONTENTS
+PREFACE: The Gap between Past and Future
+1. Tradition and the Modern Age
+2. The Concept of History: ANCIENT AND
+MODERN
+3. What Is Authority?
+4. What Is Freedom?
+5. The Crisis in Education
+6. The Crisis in Culture: ITS SOCIAL AND ITS
+POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE
+7. Truth and Politics
+8. The Conquest of Space and the Stature of
+Man
+3
+17
+41
+91
+143
+173
+197
+227
+NOTES
+INDEX
+265
+283
+303
+
+BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE
+
+PREFACE:
+THE GAP BETWEEN
+PAST AND FUTURE
+Notre héritage n'est précédé d'aucun testament-"our inheritance was left to us by no testament"-this is perhaps the strangest
+of the strangely abrupt aphorisms into which René Char, French
+poet and writer, compressed the gist of what four years in the
+résistance had come to mean to a whole generation of European
+writers and men of letters.! The collapse of France, to them a
+totally unexpected event, had emptied, from one day to the next,
+the political scene of their country, leaving it to the puppet-like
+antics of knaves or fools, and they who as a matter of course had
+never participated in the official business of the Third Republic
+were sucked into politics as though with the force of a vacuum.
+Thus, without premonition and probably against their conscious
+inclinations, they had come to constitute willy-nilly a public realm
+where—without the paraphernalia of officialdom and hidden from
+the eyes of friend and foe-all relevant business in the affairs of the
+country was transacted in deed and word.
+3
+
+4
+It did not last long. After a few short years they were liberated
+from what they originally had thought to be a "burden" and thrown
+back into what they now knew to be the weightless irrelevance of
+their personal affairs, once more separated from "the world of reality" by an épaisseur triste, the "sad opaqueness" of a private life
+centered about nothing but itself. And if they refused "to go back
+to [their] very beginnings, to [their] most indigent behavior," they
+could only return to the old empty strife of conflicting ideologies
+which after the defeat of the common enemy once more occupied
+the political arena to split the former comrades-in-arms into innumerable cliques which were not even factions and to engage
+them in the endless polemics and intrigues of a paper war. What
+Char had foreseen, clearly anticipated, while the real fight was still
+on—"If I survive, I know that I shall have to break with the aroma
+of these essential years, silently reject (not repress) my treasure"
+had happened. They had lost their treasure.
+What was this treasure? As they themselves understood it, it
+seems to have consisted, as it were, of two interconnected parts:
+they had discovered that he who "joined the Resistance, found
+himself," that he ceased to be "in quest of [himself] without mastery, in naked unsatisfaction," that he no longer suspected himself
+of "insincerity," of being "a carping, suspicious actor of life," that
+he could afford "to go naked." In this nakedness, stripped of all
+masks—of those which society assigns to its members as well as
+those which the individual fabricates for himself in his psychological reactions against society-they had been visited for the first
+time in their lives by an apparition of freedom, not, to be sure,
+because they acted against tyranny and things worse than tyranny
+—this was true for every soldier in the Allied armies-but because
+they had become "challengers," had taken the initiative upon
+themselves and therefore, without knowing or even noticing it,
+had begun to create that public space between themselves where
+freedom could appear. "At every meal that we eat together, freedom
+is invited to sit down. The chair remains vacant, but the place is
+set."
+The men of the European Resistance were neither the first nor
+
+5
+the last to lose their treasure. The history of revolutions-from
+the summer of 1776 in Philadelphia and the summer of 1789 in
+Paris to the autumn of 1956 in Budapest—which politically spells
+out the innermost story of the modern age, could be told in parable
+form as the tale of an age-old treasure which, under the most
+varied circumstances, appears abruptly, unexpectedly, and disappears again, under different mysterious conditions, as though it
+were a fata morgana. There exist, indeed, many good reasons to
+believe that the treasure was never a reality but a mirage, that we
+deal here not with anything substantial but with an apparition, and
+the best of these reasons is that the treasure thus far has remained
+nameless. Does something exist, not in outer space but in the
+world and the affairs of men on earth, which has not even a name?
+Unicorns and fairy queens seem to possess more reality than the
+lost treasure of the revolutions. And yet, if we turn our eyes to
+the beginnings of this era, and especially to the decades preceding
+it, we may discover to our surprise that the eighteenth century on
+both sides of the Atlantic possessed a name for this treasure, a
+name long since forgotten and lost—one is tempted to say-even
+before the treasure itself disappeared. The name in America was
+"public happiness," which, with its overtones of "virtue" and
+"glory," we understand hardly better than its French counterpart,
+"public freedom"; the difficulty for us is that in both instances the
+emphasis was on "public."
+However that may be, it is the namelessness of the lost treasure
+to which the poet alludes when he says that our inheritance was
+left us by no testament. The testament, telling the heir what will
+rightfully be his, wills past possessions for a future. Without testament or, to resolve the metaphor, without tradition-which selects and names, which hands down and preserves, which indicates
+where the treasures are and what their worth is—there seems to be
+no willed continuity in time and hence, humanly speaking, neither
+past nor future, only sempiternal change of the world and the
+biological cycle of living creatures in it. Thus the treasure was
+lost not because of historical circumstances and the adversity of
+reality but because no tradition had foreseen its appearance or its
+
+6 Berween Past and Furure
+reality, because no testament had willed it for the future. The loss,
+at any rate, perhaps inevitable in terms of political reality, was
+consummated by oblivion, by a failure of memory, which befell
+not only the heirs but, as it were, the actors, the witnesses, those
+who for a fleeting moment had held the treasure in the palms of
+their hands, in short, the living themselves. For remembrance,
+which is only one, though one of the most important, modes of
+thought, is helpless outside a pre-established framework of reference, and the human mind is only on the rarest occasions capable
+of retaining something which is altogether unconnected. Thus the
+first who failed to remember what the treasure was like were preciscly those who had possessed it and found it so strange that they
+did not even know how to name it. At the time this did not bother
+them; if they did not know their treasure, they knew well enough
+the meaning of what they did and that it was beyond victory and
+defcat: "Action that has a meaning for the living has value only for
+the dead, completion only in the minds that inherit and question
+it." The tragedy began not when the liberation of the country as a
+whole ruined, almost automatically, the small hidden islands of
+freedom that were doomed anyhow, but when it turned out that
+there was no mind to inherit and to question, to think about and
+to remember. The point of the matter is that the "completion,"
+which indeed every enacted event must have in the minds of those
+who then are to tell the story and to convey its meaning, cluded
+them; and without this thinking completion after the act, without
+the articulation accomplished by remembrance, there simply was
+no story left that could be told.
+There is nothing in this situation that is altogether new. We are
+only too familiar with the recurring outbursts of passionate exasperation with reason, thought, and rational discourse which are
+the natural reactions of men who know from their own experiences
+that thought and reality have parted company, that reality has
+become opaque for the light of thought and that thought, no longer
+bound to incident as the circle remains bound to its focus, is liable
+cither to become altogether meaningless or to rehash old veritics
+which have lost all concrete relevance. Even the anticipating rec-
+
+7
+ognition of the predicament has by now become familiar. When
+Tocqueville returned from the New World, which he so superbly
+knew how to describe and to analyze that his work has remained a
+classic and survived more than a century of radical change, he was
+well aware of the fact that what Char called the "completion" of
+act and event had still eluded him; and Char's "Our inheritance
+was left to us by no testament" sounds like a variation of Tocqueville's "Since the past has ceased to throw its light upon the future,
+the mind of man wanders in obscurity." 2 Yet the only exact description of this predicament is to be found, as far as I know, in
+one of those parables of Franz Kafka which, unique perhaps in
+this respect in literature, are real tapaßolai, thrown alongside and
+around the incident like rays of light which, however, do not illuminate its outward appearance but possess the power of x rays
+to lay bare its inner structure that, in our case, consists of the
+hidden processes of the mind.
+Kafka's parable reads as follows: 3
+He has two antagonists: the first presses him from behind,
+from the origin. The second blocks the road ahead. He gives
+battle to both. To be sure, the first supports him in his fight
+with the second, for he wants to push him forward, and in
+the same way the second supports him in his fight with the
+first, since he drives him back. But it is only theoretically so.
+For it is not only the two antagonists who are there, but he
+himself as well, and who really knows his intentions? His
+dream, though, is that some time in an unguarded moment
+—and this would require a night darker than any night has
+ever been yet—he will jump out of the fighting line and be
+promoted, on account of his experience in fighting, to the
+position of umpire over his antagonists in their fight with
+each other.
+The incident which this parable relates and penetrates follows, in
+the inner logic of the matter, upon the events whose gist we found
+contained in René Char's aphorism. It begins, in fact, at precisely
+the point where our opening aphorism left the sequence of events
+hanging, as it were, in mid-air. Kafka's fight begins when the
+
+8
+course of action has run its course and when the story which was
+its outcome waits to be completed "in the minds that inherit and
+question it." The task of the mind is to understand what happened,
+and this understanding, according to Hegel, is man's way of reconciling himself with reality; its actual end is to be at peace with
+the world. The trouble is that if the mind is unable to bring peace
+and to induce reconciliation, it finds itself immediately engaged in
+its own kind of warfare.
+However, historically speaking, this stage in the development of
+the modern mind was preceded, at least in the twentieth century,
+by two, rather than one, previous acts. Before the generation of
+René Char, whom we have chosen here as its representative, found
+itself thrown out of literary pursuits into the commitments of action, another generation, only slightly older, had turned to politics
+for the solution of philosophic perplexities and had tried to escape
+from thought into action. It was this older generation which then
+became the spokesmen and creators of what they themselves called
+existentialism; for existentialism, at least in its French version, is
+primarily an escape from the perplexities of modern philosophy
+into the unquestioning commitment of action. And since, under
+the circumstances of the twentieth century, the so-called intellectuals—writers, thinkers, artists, men of letters, and the like—could
+find access to the public realm only in time of revolution, the revolution came to play, as Malraux once noticed (in Man's Fate),
+"the role which once was played by eternal life": it "saves those
+that make it." Existentialism, the rebellion of the philosopher
+against philosophy, did not arise when philosophy turned out to
+be unable to apply its own rules to the realm of political affairs;
+this failure of political philosophy as Plato would have understood
+it is almost as old as the history of Western philosophy and metaphysics; and it did not even arise when it turned out that philosophy was equally unable to perform the task assigned to it by
+Hegel and the philosophy of history, that is, to understand and
+grasp conceptually historical reality and the events that made the
+modern world what it is. The situation, however, became desperate
+when the old metaphysical questions were shown to be meaning-
+
+9
+less; that is, when it began to dawn upon modern man that he had
+come to live in a world in which his mind and his tradition of
+thought were not even capable of asking adequate, meaningful
+questions, let alone of giving answers to its own perplexities. In
+this predicament action, with its involvement and commitment, its
+being engagée, seemed to hold out the hope, not of solving any
+problems, but of making it possible to live with them without becoming, as Sartre once put it, a salaud, a hypocrite.
+The discovery that the human mind had ceased, for some mysterious reasons, to function properly forms, so to speak, the first act
+of the story with which we are concerned here. I mentioned it
+here, however briefly, because without it the peculiar irony of what
+was to follow would be lost on us. René Char, writing during the
+last months of the Resistance, when liberation—which in our context meant liberation from action-loomed large, concluded his
+reflections with an appeal to thought for the prospective survivors
+no less urgent and no less passionate than the appeal to action of
+those who preceded him. If one were to write the intellectual history of our century, not in the form of successive generations,
+where the historian must be literally true to the sequence of theories
+and attitudes, but in the form of the biography of a single person,
+aiming at no more than a metaphorical approximation to what
+actually happened in the minds of men, this person's mind would
+stand revealed as having been forced to turn full circle not once
+but twice, first when he escaped from thought into action, and
+then again when action, or rather having acted, forced him back
+into thought. Whereby it would be of some relevance to notice that
+the appeal to thought arose in the odd in-between period which
+sometimes inserts itself into historical time when not only the later
+historians but the actors and witnesses, the living themselves, become aware of an interval in time which is altogether determined
+by things that are no longer and by things that are not yet. In
+history, these intervals have shown more than once that they may
+contain the moment of truth.
+We now may return to Kafka, who in the logic of these matters,
+though not in their chronology, occupies the last and, as it were,
+
+10 $
+the most advanced position. (The riddle of Kafka, who in inore
+than thirty-five years of growing posthumous fame has established
+himself as one of the foremost writers' writers, is still unsolved; it
+consists primarily in a kind of breath-taking reversal of the established relationship between experience and thought. While we
+find it a matter of course to associate richness of concrete detail
+and dramatic action with the experience of a given reality and to
+ascribe to mental processes abstract pallor as the price exacted
+for their order and precision, Kafka, by sheer force of intelligence
+and spiritual imagination, created out of a bare, "abstract" minimum of experience a kind of thought-landscape which, without
+losing in precision, harbors all the riches, varieties, and dramatic
+elements characteristic of "real" life. Because thinking to him was
+the most vital and the liveliest part of reality, he developed this
+uncanny gift of anticipation which even today, after almost forty
+years full of unprecedented and unforeseeable events, does not
+cease to amaze us.) The story in its utter simplicity and brevity
+records a mental phenomenon, something which one may call
+a thought-event. The scene is a battleground on which the forces
+of the past and the future clash with each other; between them
+we find the man whom Kafka calls "he," who, if he wants to stand
+his ground at all, must give battle to both forces. Hence, there
+are two or even three fights going on simultaneously: the fight
+between "his" antagonists and the fight of the man in between with
+each of them. However, the fact that there is a fight at all seems
+due exclusively to the presence of the man, without whom the
+forces of the past and of the future, one suspects, would have
+neutralized or destroyed each other long ago.
+The first thing to be noticed is that not only the future-"the
+wave of the future"-but also the past is seen as a force, and not,
+as in nearly all our metaphors, as a burden man has to shoulder
+and of whose dead weight the living can or even must get rid in
+their march into the future. In the words of Faulkner, "the past is
+never dead, it is not even past." This past, moreover, reaching all
+the way back into the origin, does not pull back but presses forward, and it is, contrary to what one would expect, the future
+
+11
+which drives us back into the past. Seen from the viewpoint of
+man, who always lives in the interval between past and future,
+time is not a continuum, a flow of uninterrupted succession; it is
+broken in the middle, at the point where "he" stands; and "his"
+standpoint is not the present as we usually understand it but
+rather a gap in time which "his" constant fighting, "his" making
+a stand against past and future, keeps in existence. Only because
+man is inserted into time and only to the extent that he stands his
+ground does the flow of indifferent time break up into tenses; it
+is this insertion—the beginning of a beginning, to put it into
+Augustinian terms—which splits up the time continuum into
+forces which then, because they are focused on the particle or
+body that gives them their direction, begin fighting with each
+other and acting upon man in the way Kafka describes.
+Without distorting Kafka's meaning, I think one may go a
+step further. Kafka describes how the insertion of man breaks up
+the unidirectional flow of time but, strangely enough, he does not
+change the traditional image according to which we think of time
+as moving in a straight line. Since Kafka retains the traditional
+metaphor of a rectilinear temporal movement, "he" has barely
+cnough room to stand and whenever "he" thinks of striking out
+on "his" own "he" falls into the dream of a region over and above
+the fighting-line—and what else is this dream and this region but
+the old dream which Western metaphysics has dreamed from
+Parmenides to Hegel of a timeless, spaceless, suprasensuous realm
+as the proper region of thought? Obviously what is missing in
+Kafka's description of a thought-event is a spatial dimension
+where thinking could exert itself without being forced to jump out
+of human time altogether. The trouble with Kafka's story in all
+its magnificence is that it is hardly possible to retain the notion of
+a rectilinear temporal movement if its unidirectional flow is broken
+up into antagonistic forces being directed toward and acting upon
+man. The insertion of man, as he breaks up the continuum, cannot but cause the forces to deflect, however lightly, from their
+original direction, and if this were the case, they would no longer
+clash head on but meet at an angle. In other words, the gap where
+
+12
+Between Past and Furure
+"he" stands is, potentially at least, no simple interval but resembles
+wnat the physicists call a parallelogram of forces.
+Ideally, the action of the two forces which form the parallelogram of forces where Kafka's "he" has found his battlefield should
+result in a third force, the resultant diagonal whose origin would
+be the point at which the forces clash and upon which they act.
+This diagonal force would in one respect differ from the two
+forces whose result it is. The two antagonistic forces are both unlimited as to their origins, the one coming from an infinite past and
+the other from an infinite future; but though they have no known
+beginning, they have a terminal ending, the point at which they
+clash. The diagonal force, on the contrary, would be limited as
+to its origin, its starting-point being the clash of the antagonistic
+forces, but it would be infinite with respect to its ending by virtue
+of having resulted from the concerted action of two forces whose
+origin is infinity. This diagonal force, whose origin is known,
+whose direction is determined by past and future, but whose
+eventual end lies in infinity, is the perfect metaphor for the activity
+of thought. If Kafka's "he" were able to exert his forces along
+this diagonal, in perfect equidistance from past and future, walking along this diagonal line, as it were, forward and backward.
+with the slow, ordered movements which are the proper motion for
+trains of thought, he would not have jumped out of the fightingline and be above the melee as the parable demands, for this
+diagonal, though pointing toward the infinite, remains bound to
+and is rooted in the present; but he would have discovered—
+pressed as he was by his antagonists into the only direction from
+which he could properly see and survey what was most his own,
+what had come into being only with his own, self-inserting appearance—the enormous, ever-changing time-space which is created
+and limited by the forces of past and future; he would have found
+the place in time which is sufficiently removed from past and
+future to offer "the umpire" a position from which to judge the
+forces fighting with each other with an impartial eye.
+But, one is tempted to add, this is "only theoretically so." What
+is much more likely to happen-and what Kafka in other stories
+
+13
+and parables has often described—is that the "he," unable to find
+she diagonal which would lead him out of the fighting-line and
+into the space ideally constituted by the parallelogram of forces,
+will "die of exhaustion," worn out under the pressure of constant
+fighting, oblivious of his original intentions, and aware only of the
+existence of this gap in time which, as long as he lives, is the
+ground on which he must stand, though it seems to be a battlefield and not a home.
+To avoid misunderstandings: the imagery I am using here to
+indicate metaphorically and tentatively the contemporary conditions of thought can be valid only within the realm of mental
+phenomena. Applied to historical or biographical time, none of
+these metaphors can possibly make sense because gaps in time
+do not occur there. Only insofar as he thinks, and that is insofar
+as he is ageless—a "he" as Kafka so rightly calls him, and not a
+"somebody"-does man in the full actuality of his concrete being
+live in this gap of time between past and future. The gap, I
+suspect, is not a modern phenomenon, it is perhaps not even a
+historical datum but is coeval with the existence of man on earth.
+It may well be the region of the spirit or, rather, the path paved by
+thinking, this small track of non-time which the activity of thought
+beats within the time-space of mortal men and into which the trains
+of thought, of remembrance and anticipation, save whatever they
+touch from the ruin of historical and biographical time. This small
+non-time-space in the very heart of time, unlike the world and the
+culture into which we are born, can only be indicated, but cannot
+be inherited and handed down from the past; each new generation,
+indeed every new human being as he inserts himself between an
+infinite past and an infinite future, must discover and ploddingly
+pave it anew.
+The trouble, however, is that we seem to be neither equipped
+nor prepared for this activity of thinking, of settling down in the
+gap between past and future. For very long times in our history,
+actually throughout the thousands of years that followed upon the
+foundation of Rome and were determined by Roman concepts.
+this gap was bridged over by what, since the Romans, we have
+
+14
+called tradition. That this tradition has worn thinner and thinner
+as the modern age progressed is a secret to nobody. When the
+thread of tradition finally broke, the gap between past and future
+ceased to be a condition peculiar only to the activity of thought
+and restricted as an experience to those few who made thinking
+their primary business. It became a tangible reality and perplexity
+for all; that is, it became a fact of political relevance.
+Kafka mentions the experience, the fighting experience gained
+by "him" who stands his ground between the clashing waves of
+past and future. This experience is an experience in thinkingsince, as we saw, the whole parable concerns a mental phenomenon-and it can be won, like all experience in doing something,
+only through practice, through exercises. (In this, as in other
+respects, this kind of thinking is different from such mental
+processes as deducing, inducing, and drawing conclusions whose
+logical rules of non-contradiction and inner consistency can be
+learned once and for all and then need only to be applied.) The
+following six essays are such exercises, and their only aim is to
+gain experience in how to think; they do not contain prescriptions
+on what to think or which truths to hold. Least of all do they
+intend to retie the broken thread of tradition or to invent some
+newfangled surrogates with which to fill the gap between past
+and future. Throughout these exercises the problem of truth is
+kept in abeyance; the concern is solely with how to move in this
+gap-the only region perhaps where truth eventually will appear.
+More specifically, these are exercises in political thought as it
+arises out of the actuality of political incidents (though such
+incidents are mentioned only occasionally), and my assumption is
+that thought itself arises out of incidents of living experience and
+must remain bound to them as the only guideposts by which to
+take its bearings. Since these exercises move between past and
+future, they contain criticism as well as experiment, but the experiments do not attempt to design some sort of utopian future,
+and the critique of the past, of traditional concepts, does not
+intend to "debunk." Moreover, the critical and the experimental
+parts of the following essays are not sharply divided, although,
+
+15
+roughly speaking, the first three chapters are more critical than
+experimental and the last five chapters are more experimental
+than critical. This gradual shift of emphasis is not arbitrary, because there is an element of experiment in the critical interpretation of the past, an interpretation whose chief aim is to discover
+the real origins of traditional concepts in order to distill from
+them anew their original spirit which has so sadly evaporated
+from the very key words of political language-such as freedom
+and justice, authority and reason, responsibility and virtue, power
+and glory—leaving behind empty shells with which to settle almost
+all accounts, regardless of their underlying phenomenal reality.
+It seems to me, and I hope the reader will agree, that the essay
+as a literary form has a natural affinity to the exercises I have in
+mind. Like all collections of essays, this book of exercises obviously could contain more or fewer chapters without for that
+reason changing its character. Their unity—which to me is the
+justification of publishing them in book form—is not the unity of
+a whole but of a sequence of movements which, as in a musical
+suite, are written in the same or related keys. The sequence itself
+is determined by content. In this respect, the book is divided into
+three parts. The first part deals with the modern break in tradition
+and with the concept of history with which the modern age hoped
+to replace the concepts of traditional metaphysics. The second part
+discusses two central and interrelated political concepts, authority
+and freedom; it presupposes the discussion of the first part in the
+sense that such elementary and direct questions as What is authority? What is freedom? can arise only if no answers, handed down
+by tradition, are available and valid any longer. The four essays
+of the last part, finally, are frank attempts at applying the kind of
+thinking that was tried out in the first two parts of the book to immediate, topical problems with which we are daily confronted, not,
+to be sure, in order to find definite solutions but in the hope of
+clarifying the issues and gaining some assurance in confrenting specific questions.
+
+1
+TRADITION AND
+THE MODERN AGE
+O
+Ur tradition of political thought had its definite beginning in
+the teachings of Plato and Aristotle. I believe it came to a
+no less definite end in the theories of Karl Marx. The beginning
+was made when, in The Republic's allegory of the cave, Plato
+described the sphere of human affairs—all that belongs to the
+living together of men in a common world—in terms of darkness.
+confusion, and deception which those aspiring to true being must
+turn away from and abandon if they want to discover the clear
+sky of eternal ideas. The end came with Marx's declaration that
+philosophy and its truth are located not outside the affairs of men
+and their common world but precisely in them, and can be "realized" only in the sphere of living together, which he called "society," through the emergence of "socialized men" (vergesellschaftete Menschen). Political philosophy necessarily implies the
+attitude of the philosopher toward politics; its tradition began with
+the philosopher's turning away from politics and then returning
+17
+
+18
+in order to impose his standards on human affairs. The end came
+when a philosopher turned away from philosophy so as to "realize"
+it in politics. This was Marx's attempt, expressed first in his decision (in itself philosophical) to abjure philosophy, and second
+in his intention to "change the world" and thereby the philosophizing minds, the "consciousness" of men.
+The beginning and the end of the tradition have this in common: that the elementary problems of politics never come as
+clearly to light in their immediate and simple urgency as when
+they are first formulated and when they receive their final challenge. The beginning, in Jacob Burckhardt's words, is like a
+"fundamental chord" which sounds in its endless modulations
+through the whole history of Western thought. Only beginning
+and end are, so to speak, pure or unmodulated; and the fundamental chord therefore never strikes its listeners more forcefully
+and more beautifully than when it first sends its harmonizing
+sound into the world and never more irritatingly and jarringly
+than when it still continues to be heard in a world whose sounds—
+and thought—it can no longer bring into harmony. A random
+remark which Plato made in his last work: "The beginning is like
+a god which as long as it dwells among men saves all things"-ápx)
+yàp kai Deòs ¿v andpúos ispupérn crúfee márra 1 *—is true of our tradition; as long as its beginning was alive, it could save all things
+and bring them into harmony. By the same token, it became destructive as it came to its end—to say nothing of the aftermath of
+confusion and helplessness which came after the tradition ended
+and in which we live today.
+In Marx's philosophy, which did not so much turn Hegel upside down as invert the traditional hierarchy of thought and action,
+of contemplation and labor, and of philosophy and politics, the
+beginning made by Plato and Aristotle proves its vitality by leading Marx into flagrantly contradictory statements, mostly in that
+part of his teachings usually called utopian. The most important
+are his prediction that under conditions of a "socialized humanity"
+the "state will wither away," and that the productivity of labor
+* Numbered reference notes may be found following the text.
+
+19
+will become so great that labor somehow will abolish itself, thus
+guaranteeing an almost unlimited amount of leisure time to each
+member of the society. These statements, in addition to being
+predictions, contain of course Marx's ideal of the best form of
+society. As such they are not utopian, but rather reproduce the
+political and social conditions of the same Athenian city-state
+which was the model of experience for Plato and Aristotle, and
+therefore the foundation on which our tradition rests. The
+Athenian polis functioned without a division between rulers and
+ruled, and thus was not a state if we use this term, as Marx did,
+in accordance with the traditional definitions of forms of government, that is, one-man rule or monarchy, rule by the few or
+oligarchy, and rule by the majority or democracy. Athenian citizens, moreover, were citizens only insofar as they possessed leisure
+time, had that freedom from labor which Marx predicts for the
+future. Not only in Athens but throughout antiquity and up to
+the modern age, those who labored were not citizens and those
+who were citizens were first of all those who did not labor or
+who possessed more than their labor power. This similarity becomes even more striking when we look into the actual content
+of Marx's ideal society. Leisure time is seen to exist under the
+condition of statelessness, or under conditions where, in Lenin's
+famous phrase which renders Marx's thought very precisely, the
+administration of society has become so simplified that every cook
+is qualified to take over its machinery. Obviously, under such
+circumstances the whole business of politics, Engels' simplified
+"administration of things," could be of interest only to a cook,
+or at best to those "mediocre minds" whom Nietzsche thought
+best qualified for taking care of public affairs.? This, to be sure,
+is very different from actual conditions in antiquity, where, on
+the contrary, political duties were considered so difficult and timeconsuming that those engaged in them could not be permitted to
+undertake any tiring activity. (Thus, for instance, the shepherd
+could qualify for citizenship but the peasant could not; the painter,
+but not the sculptor, was still recognized as something more than
+a Bávavoos, the distinction being drawn in either case simply by
+
+20 Between Past and Future
+applying the criterion of effort and fatigue.) It is against the timeconsuming political life of an average full-fledged citizen of the
+Greck polis that the philosophers, especially Aristotle, established
+their ideal of oxodý, of leisure time, which in antiquity never meant
+freedom from ordinary labor, a matter of course anyhow, but time
+free from political activity and the business of the state.
+In Marx's ideal society these two different concepts are inextricably combined: the classless and stateless society somehow
+realizes the general ancient conditions of leisure from labor and,
+at the same time, leisure from politics. This is supposed to come
+about when the "administration of things" has taken the place of
+government and political action. This twofold leisure from labor
+as well as politics had been for the philosophers the condition of
+a Bíos Dewpntukós, a life devoted to philosophy and knowledge in the
+widest sense of the word. Lenin's cook, in other words, lives in a
+society providing her with as much leisure from labor as the free
+ancient citizens enjoyed in order to devote their time to rodire'coda,
+as well as as much leisure from politics as the Greek philosophers
+had demanded for the few who wanted to devote all their time to
+philosophizing. The combination of a stateless (apolitical) and
+almost laborless society loomed so large in Marx's imagination as
+the very expression of an ideal humanity because of the traditional
+connotation of leisure as oxodý and otium, that is, a life devoted
+to aims higher than work or politics.
+Marx himself regarded his so-called utopia as simple prediction,
+and it is true that this part of his theories corresponds to certain
+developments which have come fully to light only in our time.
+Government in the old sense has given way in many respects to
+administration, and the constant increase in leisure for the masses
+is a fact in all industrialized countries. Marx clearly perceived
+certain trends inherent in the era ushered in by the Industrial
+Revolution, although he was wrong in assuming that these trends
+would assert themselves only under conditions of socialization of
+the means of production. The hold which the tradition had over
+him lies in his viewing this development in an idealized light, and
+in understanding it in terms and concepts having their origin in
+
+21
+an altogether different historical period. This blinded him to the
+authentic and very perplexing problems inherent in the modern
+world and gave his accurate predictions their utopian quality. But
+the utopian ideal of a classless, stateless, and laborless society was
+born out of the marriage of two altogether non-utopian elements:
+the perception of certain trends in the present which could no longer
+be understood in the framework of the tradition, and the traditional concepts and ideals by which Marx himself understood and
+integrated them.
+Marx's own attitude to the tradition of political thought was one
+of conscious rebellion. In a challenging and paradoxical mood he
+therefore framed certain key statements which, containing his political philosophy, underlie and transcend the strictly scientific part
+of his work (and as such curiously remained the same throughout
+his life, from the early writings to the last volume of Das Kapital).
+Crucial among them are the following: "Labor created man" (in
+a formulation by Engels, who, contrary to an opinion current
+among some Marx scholars, usually rendered Marx's thought adequately and succinctly) .3 "Violence is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one," hence: violence is the midwife
+of history (which occurs in both the writings of Marx and of
+Engels in many variations).* Finally, there is the famous last thesis
+on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world
+differently; the point is, however, to change it," which, in the
+light of Marx's thought, one could render more adequately as:
+The philosophers have interpreted the world long enough; the
+time has come to change it. For this last statement is in fact only
+a variation of another, occurring in an early manuscript: "You
+cannot aufheben [i.e., elevate, conserve, and abolish in the Hegelian sense] philosophy without realizing it." In the later work the
+same attitude to philosophy appears in the prediction that the
+working class will be the only legitimate heir of classical philosophy.
+None of these statements can be understood in and by itself.
+Each acquires its meaning by contradicting some traditionally accepted truth whose plausibility up to the beginning of the modern
+
+22 Beiween Past and Future
+age had been beyond doubt. "Labor created man" means first that
+labor and not God created man; second, it means that man, insofar
+as he is human, creates himself, that his humanity is the result of
+his own activity; it means, third, that what distinguishes man from
+animal, his diferentia specifica, is not reason, but labor, that he
+is not an animal rationale, but an animal laborans; it means, fourth,
+that it is not reason, until then the highest attribute of man, but
+labor, the traditionally most despised human activity, which contains the humanity of man. Thus Marx challenges the traditional
+God, the traditional estimate of labor, and the traditional glorification of reason.
+That violence is the midwife of history means that the hidden
+forces of development of human productivity, insofar as they depend upon free and conscious human action, come to light only
+through the violence of wars and revolutions. Only in those violent
+periods does history show its true face and dispel the fog of mere
+ideological, hypocritical talk. Again the challenge to tradition is
+clear. Violence is traditionally the ultima ratio in relationships between nations and the most disgraceful of domestic actions, being
+always considered the outstanding characteristic of tyranny. (The
+few attempts to save violence from disgrace, chiefly by Machiavelli
+and Hobbes, are of great relevance for the problem of power and
+quite illuminative of the early confusion of power with violence,
+but they exerted remarkably little influence on the tradition of
+political thought prior to our own time.) To Marx, on the contrary, violence or rather the possession of the means of violence
+is the constituent element of all forms of government; the state is
+the instrument of the ruling class by means of which it oppresses
+and exploits, and the whole sphere of political action is characterized by the use of violence.
+The Marxian identification of action with violence implies another fundamental challenge to tradition which may be more difficult to perceive, but of which Marx, who knew Aristotle very
+well, must have been aware. The twofold Aristotelian definition
+of man as a Swor moditerór and a Swor dóyor exor, a being attaining
+his highest possibility in the faculty of speech and the life in a polis,
+
+23
+was designed to distinguish the Greek from the barbarian and the
+free man from the slave. The distinction was that Greeks, living
+together in a polis, conducted their affairs by means of speech,
+through persuasion (Telew), and not by means of violence,
+through mute coercion. Hence, when free men obeyed their government, or the laws of the polis, their obedience was called
+Tellapxía, a word which indicates clearly that obedience was obtained by persuasion and not by force. Barbarians were ruled by
+violence and slaves forced to labor, and since violent action and
+toil are alike in that they do not need speech to be effective, barbarians and slaves were dev dóyou, that is, they did not live with
+each other primarily by means of speech. Labor was to the Greeks
+essentially a nonpolitical, private affair, but violence was related
+to and established a contact, albeit negative, with other men.
+Marx's glorification of violence therefore contains the more specific
+denial of dóyos, of speech, the diametrically opposite and traditionally most human form of intercourse. Marx's theory of ideological superstructures ultimately rests on this anti-traditional hostility to speech and the concomitant glorification of violence.
+For traditional philosophy it would have been a contradiction
+in terms to "realize philosophy" or to change the world in accordance with philosophy-and Marx's statement implies that
+change is preceded by interpretation, so that the philosophers' interpretation of the world has indicated how it should be changed.
+Philosophy might have prescribed certain rules of action, though no
+great philosopher ever took this to be his most important concern.
+Essentially, philosophy from Plato to Hegel was "not of this world,"
+whether it was Plato describing the philosopher as the man whose
+body only inhabits the city of his fellow men, or Hegel admitting
+that, from the point of view of common sense, philosophy is a
+world stood on its head, a verkehrte Welt. The challenge to tradition, this time not merely implied but directly expressed in Marx's
+statement, lies in the prediction that the world of common human
+affairs, where we orient ourselves and think in common-sense
+terms, will one day become identical with the realm of ideas where
+the philosopher moves, or that philosophy, which has always been
+
+24
+only "for the few," will one day be the common-sense reality for
+everybody.
+These three statements are framed in traditional terms which
+they, however, explode; they are formulated as paradoxes and
+meant to shock us. They are in fact even more paradoxical and
+led Marx into greater perplexities than he himself had anticipated.
+Each contains one fundamental contradiction which remained insoluble in his own terms. If labor is the most human and most
+productive of man's activities, what will happen when, after the
+revolution, "labor is abolished" in "the realm of freedom," when
+man has succeeded in emancipating himself from it? What productive and what essentially human activity will be left? If violence
+is the midwife of history and violent action therefore the most
+dignified of all forms of human action, what will happen when,
+after the conclusion of class struggle and the disappearance of
+the state, no violence will even be possible? How will men be
+able to act at all in a meaningful, authentic way? Finally, when
+philosophy has been both realized and abolished in the future society, what kind of thought will be left?
+Marx's inconsistencies are well known and noted by almost all
+Marx scholars. They usually are summarized as discrepancies "between the scientific point of view of the historian and the moral
+point of view of the prophet" (Edmund Wilson), between the
+historian seeing in the accumulation of capital a material means
+for the increase of productive forces" (Marx) and the moralist
+who denounced those who performed "the historical task" (Marx)
+as exploiters and dehumanizers of man. This and similar inconsistencies are minor when compared with the fundamental contradiction between the glorification of labor and action (as against
+contemplation and thought) and of a stateless, that is, actionless
+and (almost) laborless society. For this can be neither blamed on
+the natural difference between a revolutionary young Marx and
+the more scientific insights of the older historian and economist,
+nor resolved through the assumption of a dialectical movement
+which needs the negative or evil to produce the positive or the
+good.
+
+25
+Such fundamental and flagrant contradictions rarely occur in
+second-rate writers, in whom they can be discounted. In the work
+of great authors they lead into the very center of their work and
+are the most important clue to a true understanding of their problems and new insights. In Marx, as in the case of other great
+authors of the last century, a seemingly playful, challenging, and
+paradoxical mood conceals the perplexity of having to deal with
+new phenomena in terms of an old tradition of thought outside of
+whose conceptual framework no thinking seemed possible at all.
+It is as though Marx, not unlike Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, tried
+desperately to think against the tradition while using its own conceptual tools. Our tradition of political thought began when Plato
+discovered that it is somehow inherent in the philosophical experience to turn away from the common world of human affairs;
+it ended when nothing was left of this experience but the opposition
+of thinking and acting, which, depriving thought of reality and
+action of sense, makes both meaningless.
+The strength of this tradition, its hold on Western man's
+thought, has never depended on his consciousness of it. Indeed,
+only twice in our history do we encounter periods in which men
+are conscious and over-conscious of the fact of tradition, identifying age as such with authority. This happened, first, when the
+Romans adopted classical Greek thought and culture as their own
+spiritual tradition and thereby decided historically that tradition
+was to have a permanent formative influence on European civilization. Before the Romans such a thing as tradition was unknown;
+with them it became and after them it remained the guiding thread
+through the past and the chain to which each new generation
+knowingly or unknowingly was bound in its understanding of the
+world and its own experience. Not until the Romantic period do
+we again encounter an exalted consciousness and glorification of
+tradition. (The discovery of antiquity in the Renaissance was a
+
+26
+first attempt to break the fetters of tradition, and by going to the
+sources themselves to establish a past over which tradition would
+have no hold.) Today tradition is sometimes considered an essentially romantic concept, but Romanticism did no more than
+place the discussion of tradition on the agenda of the nineteenth
+century; its glorification of the past only served to mark the moment when the modern age was about to change our world and
+general circumstances to such an extent that a matter-of-course
+reliance on tradition was no longer possible.
+The end of a tradition does not necessarily mean that traditional concepts have lost their power over the minds of men. On
+the contrary, it sometimes seems that this power of well-worn notions and categories becomes more tyrannical as the tradition
+loses its living force and as the memory of its beginning recedes;
+it may even reveal its full coercive iorce only after its end has
+come and men no longer even rebel against it. This at least seems to
+be the lesson of the twentieth-century aftermath of formalistic and
+compulsory thinking, which came after Kierkegaard, Marx, and
+Nietzsche had challenged the basic assumptions of traditional religion, traditional political thought, and traditional metaphysics
+by consciously inverting the traditional hierarchy of concepts.
+However, neither the twentieth-century aftermath nor the nineteenth-century rebellion against tradition actually caused the break
+in our history. This sprang from a chaos of mass-perplexities on
+the political scene and of mass-opinions in the spiritual sphere
+which the totalitarian movements, through terror and ideology,
+crystallized into a new form of government and domination. To
+talitarian domination as an established fact, which in its unprecedentedness cannot be comprehended through the usual categories of political thought, and whose "crimes" cannot be judged
+by traditional moral standards or punished within the legal framework of our civilization, has broken the continuity of Occidental
+history. The break in our tradition is now an accomplished fact.
+It is neither the result of anyone's deliberate choice nor subject to
+further decision.
+The attempts of great thinkers after Hegel to break away from
+
+27
+patterns of thought which had ruled the West for more than two
+thousand years may have foreshadowed this event and certainly
+can help to illuminate it, but they did not cause it. The event itself
+marks the division between the modern age-rising with the
+natural sciences in the seventeenth century, reaching its political
+climax in the revolutions of the eighteenth, and unfolding its
+general implications after the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth-and the world of the twentieth century, which came into
+existence through the chain of catastrophes touched off by the
+First World War. To hold the thinkers of the modern age, especially the nineteenth-century rebels against tradition, responsible
+for the structure and conditions of the twentieth century is even
+more dangerous than it is unjust. The implications apparent in
+the actual event of totalitarian domination go far beyond the most
+radical or most adventurous ideas of any of these thinkers. Their
+greatness lay in the fact that they perceived their world as one
+invaded by new problems and perplexities which our tradition of
+thought was unable to cope with. In this sense their own departure
+from tradition, no matter how emphatically they proclaimed it
+(like children whistling louder and louder because they are lost
+in the dark), was no deliberate act of their own choosing either.
+What frightened them about the dark was its silence, not the
+break in tradition. This break, when it actually occurred, dispelled
+the darkness, so that we can hardly listen any longer to the overloud, "pathetic" style of their writing. But the thunder of the
+eventual explosion has also drowned the preceding ominous
+silence that still answers us whenever we dare to ask, not "What
+are we fighting against" but "What are we fighting for?"
+Neither the silence of the tradition nor the reaction of thinkers
+against it in the nineteenth century can ever explain what actually
+happened. The non-deliberate character of the break gives it an
+irrevocability which only events, never thoughts, can have. The
+rebellion against tradition in the nineteenth century remained
+strictly within a traditional framework; and on the level of mere
+thought, which could hardly be concerned then with more than
+the essentially negative experiences of foreboding, apprehension,
+
+28
+Berween Past and Furure
+and ominous silence, only radicalization, not a new beginning and
+reconsideration of the past, was possible.
+Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche stand at the end of the tradition, just before the break came. Their immediate predecessor was
+Hegel. He it was who for the first time saw the whole of world history
+as one continuous development, and this tremendous achievement
+implied that he himself stood outside all authority-claiming systems and beliefs of the past, that he was held only by the thread
+of continuity in history itself. The thread of historical continuity
+was the first substitute for tradition; by means of it, the overwhelming mass of the most divergent values, the most contradictory
+thoughts and conflicting authorities, all of which had somehow
+been able to function together, were reduced to a unilinear, dialectically consistent development actually designed to repudiate
+not tradition as such, but the authority of all traditions. Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche remained Hegelians insofar as they
+saw the history of past philosophy as one dialectically developed
+whole; their great merit was that they radicalized this new approach
+toward the past in the only way it could still be further developed,
+namely, in questioning the conceptual hierarchy which had ruled
+Western philosophy since Plato and which Hegel had still taken
+for granted.
+Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche are for us like guideposts to
+a past which has lost its authority. They were the first who dared
+to think without the guidance of any authority whatsoever; yet,
+for better and worse, they were still held by the categorical framework of the great tradition. In some respects we are better off. We
+need no longer be concerned with their scorn for the "educated
+philistines," who all through the nineteenth century tried to make
+up for the loss of authentic authority with a spurious glorification
+of culture. To most people today this culture looks like a field of
+ruins which, far from being able to claim any authority, can hardly
+command their interest. This fact may be deplorable, but implicit
+in it is the great chance to look upon the past with eyes undistracted by any tradition, with a directness which has disappeared
+
+29
+from Occidental reading and hearing ever since Roman civilization
+submitted to the authority of Greek thought.
+III
+The destructive distortions of the tradition were all caused by
+men who had experienced something new which they tried almost instantaneously to overcome and resolve into something old. Kierkegaard's leap from doubt into belief was a reversal and a distortion
+of the traditional relationship between reason and faith. It was the
+answer to the modern loss of faith, not only in God but in reason
+as well, which was inherent in Descartes' de omnibus dubitandum
+est, with its underlying suspicion that things may not be as they
+appear and that an evil spirit may willfully and forever hide truth
+from the minds of man. Marx's leap from theory into action, and
+from contemplation into labor, came after Hegel had transformed
+metaphysics into a philosophy of history and changed the philosopher into the historian to whose backward glance eventually, at
+the end of time, the meaning of becoming and motion, not of being and truth, would reveal itself. Nietzsche's leap from the nonsensuous transcendent realm of ideas and measurements into the
+sensuousness of life, his "inverted Platonism" or "trans-valuation
+of values," as he himself would call it, was the last attempt to
+turn away from the tradition, and it succeeded only in turning
+tradition upside down.
+Different as these rebellions against tradition are in content and
+intention, their results have an ominous similarity: Kierkegaard,
+jumping from doubt into belief, carried doubt into religion, transformed the attack of modern science on religion into an inner
+religious struggle, so that since then sincere religious experience
+has seemed possible only in the tension between doubt and belief, in torturing one's beliefs with one's doubts and relaxing from
+this torment in the violent affirmation of the absurdity of both the
+human condition and man's belief. No clearer symptom of this
+
+30 Berween Past and Future
+modern religious situation can be found than the fact that Dostoevski, perhaps the most experienced psychologist of modern religious
+beliefs, portrayed pure faith in the character of Myshkin "the
+idiot," or of Alyosha Karamazov, who is pure in heart because he
+is simple-minded
+Marx, when he leaped from philosophy into politics, carried
+the theories of dialectics into action, making political action more
+theoretical, more dependent upon what we today would call an
+ideology, than it ever had been before. Since, moreover, his springboard was not philosophy in the old metaphysical sense, but as
+specifically Hegel's philosophy of history as Kierkegaard's springboard had been Descartes' philosophy of doubt, he superimposed
+the "law of history" upon politics and ended by losing the signifcance of both, of action no less than of thought, of politics no
+less than of philosophy, when he insisted that both were mere
+functions of society and history.
+Nietzsche's inverted Platonism, his insistence on life and the
+sensuously and materially given as against the suprasensuous and
+transcendent ideas which, since Plato, had been supposed to
+measure, judge, and give meaning to the given, endec in what is
+commonly called nihilism. Yet Nietzsche was no nihilist but, on
+the contrary, was the first to try to overcome the nihilism inherent
+not in the notions of the thinkers but in the reality of modern life.
+What he discovered in his attempt at "trans-valuation" was that
+within this categorical framework the sensuous loses its very raison
+d'être when it is deprived of its background of the suprasensuous
+and transcendent. "We abolished the true world: which world
+has remained? perhaps the world of appearances?
+•.. But no!
+together with the true world we abolished the world of appearances." 5 This insight in its elementary simplicity is relevant for
+all the turning-about operations in which the tradition found its
+end.
+What Kierkegaard wanted was to assert the dignity of faith against
+modern reason and reasoning, as Marx desired to assert again the
+dignity of human action against modern historical contemplation
+and relativization, and as Nietzsche wanted to assert the dignity
+
+of human life against the impotence of modern man. The traditional oppositions of fides and intellectus, and of theory and practice, took their respective revenges upon Kierkegaard and Marx,
+just as the opposition between the transcendent and the sensuously
+given took its revenge upon Nietzsche, not because these oppositions still had roots in valid human experience, but, on the contrary, because they had become mere concepts, outside of which,
+however, no comprehensive thought seemed possible at all.
+That these three outstanding and conscious rebellions against a
+tradition which had lost its apx?, its beginning and principle, should
+have ended in self-defeat is no reason to question the greatness of
+the enterprises nor their relevance to the understanding of the
+modern world. Each attempt, in its particular way, took account
+of those traits of modernity which were incompatible with our
+tradition, and this even before modernity in all its aspects had
+fully revealed itself. Kierkegaard knew that the incompatibility of
+modern science with traditional beliefs does not lie in any specific
+scientific findings, all of which can be integrated into religious systems and absorbed by religious beliefs for the reason that they
+will never be able to answer the questions which religion raises.
+He knew that this incompatibility lay, rather, in the conflict between a spirit of doubt and distrust which ultimately can trust
+only what it has made itsell, and the traditional unquestioning
+confidence in what has been given and appears in its true being to
+man's reason and senses. Modern science, in Marx's words, would
+"be superfluous if the appearance and the essence of things coincided." • Because our traditional religion is essentially a revealed
+religion and holds, in harmony with ancient philosophy, that truth
+is what reveals itself, that truth is revelation (even though the
+meanings of this revelation may be as different as the philosophers'
+ålýoca and inhwars are from the early Christians' eschatological expectations for an nokálufus in the Second Coming), modern
+science has become a much more formidable enemy of religion
+than traditional philosophy, even in its most rationalistic versions,
+ever could be. Yet Kierkegaard's attempt to save faith from the
+onslaught of modernity made even religion modern, that is, subject
+
+32
+to doubt and distrust. Traditional beliefs disintegrated into absurdity when Kierkegaard tried to reassert them on the assuinption that man cannot trust the truth-receiving capacity of his
+reason or of his senses.
+Marx knew that the incompatibility between classical political
+thought and modern political conditions lay in the accomplished
+fact of the French and Industrial Revolutions, which together had
+raised labor, traditionally the most despised of all human activities,
+to the highest rank of productivity and pretended to be able to assert the time-honored ideal of freedom under unheard-of conditions of universal equality. He knew that the question was only
+superficially posed in the idealistic assertions of the equality of
+man, the inborn dignity of every human being, and only superficially answered by giving laborers the right to vote. This was
+not a problem of justice that could be solved by giving the new
+class of workers its due, after which the old order of suum cuique
+would be restored and function as in the past. There is the fact
+of the basic incompatibility between the traditional concepts making labor itself the very symbol of man's subjection to necessity,
+and the modern age which saw labor elevated to express man's
+positive freedom, the freedom of productivity. It is from the impact
+of labor, that is to say, of necessity in the traditional sense, that
+Marx endeavored to save philosophical thought, deemed by the
+tradition to be the freest of all human activities. Yet when he proclaimed that "you cannot abolish philosophy without realizing it,"
+he began subjecting thought also to the inexorable despotism of
+necessity, to the "iron law" of productive forces in society.
+Nietzsche's devaluation of values, like Marx's labor theory of
+value, arises from the incompatibility between the traditional
+"ideas," which, as transcendent units, had been used to recognize
+and measure human thoughts and actions, and modern society,
+which had dissolved all such standards into relationships between
+its members, establishing them as functional "values." Values are
+social commodities that have no significance of their own but, like
+other commodities, exist only in the ever-changing relativity of
+social linkages and commerce. Through this relativization both the
+
+33
+things which man produces for his use and the standards according
+to which he lives undergo a decisive change: they become entities
+of exchange, and the bearer of their "value" is society and not
+man, who produces and uses and judges. The "good" loses its character as an idea, the standard by which the good and the bad can
+be measured and recognized; it has become a value which can be
+exchanged with other values, such as those of expediency or of
+power. The holder of values can refuse this exchange and become
+an "idealist," who prices the value of "good" higher than the value
+of expediency; but this does not make the "value" of good any
+less relative.
+The term "value" owes its origin to the sociological trend which
+even before Marx was quite manifest in the relatively new science
+of classical economy. Marx was still aware of the fact, which the
+social sciences have since forgotten, that nobody "seen in his isolation produces values," but that products "become values only in
+their social relationship." 8 His distinction between "use value" and
+"exchange value" reflects the distinction between things as men
+use and produce them and their value in society, and his insistence
+on the greater authenticity of use values, his frequent description
+of the rise of exchange value as a kind of original sin at the beginning of market production reflect his own helpless and, as it
+were, blind recognition of the inevitability of an impending "devaluation of all values." The birth of the social sciences can be
+located at the moment when all things, "ideas" as well as material
+objects, were equated with values, so that everything derived its
+existence from and was related to society, the bonum and malum no
+less than tangible objects. In the dispute as to whether capital or
+labor is the source of values, it is generally overlooked that at no
+time prior to the incipient Industrial Revolution was it held that
+values, and not things, are the result of man's productive capacity,
+or was everything that exists related to society and not to man
+"seen in his isolation." The notion of "socialized men," whose
+emergence Marx projected into the future classless society, is in
+fact the underlying assumption of classical as well as Marxian economy.
+
+34 Between Past and Future
+It is therefore only natural that the perplexing question which
+has plagued all later "value-philosophies," where to find the one
+supreme value by which to measure all others, should first appear
+in the economic sciences which, in Marx's words, try to "square
+the circle—to find a commodity of unchanging value which would
+serve as a constant standard for others." Marx believed he had found
+this standard in labor-time, and insisted that use values "which can
+be acquired without labor have no exchange value" (though they
+retain their "natural usefulness"), so that the earth itself is of "no
+value"; it does not represent "objectified labor." " With this conclusion we come to the threshold of a radical nihilism, to that denial
+of everything given of which the nineteenth-century rebellions
+against tradition as yet knew little and which arises only in twentieth-century society.
+Nietzsche seems to have been unaware of the origin as well as
+of the modernity of the term "value" when he accepted it as a key
+notion in his assault on tradition. But when he began to devaluate
+the current values of society, the implications of the whole enterprise quickly became manifest. Ideas in the sense of absolute units
+had become identified with social values to such an extent that they
+simply ceased to exist once their value-character, their social status,
+was challenged. Nobody knew his way better than Nietzsche through
+the meandering paths of the modern spiritual labyrinth, where recollections and ideas of the past are hoarded up as though they had
+always been values which society depreciated whenever it needed
+better and newer commodities. Also, he was well aware of the profound nonsense of the new "value-free" science which was soon to
+degenerate into scientism and general scientific superstition and
+which never, despite all protests to the contrary, had anything in
+common with the Roman historians' attitude of sine ira et studio.
+For while the latter demanded judgment without scorn and truthfinding without zeal, the wertfreie Wissenschaft, which could no
+longer judge because it had lost its standards of judgment and could
+no longer find truth because it doubted the existence of truth, imagined that it could produce meaningful results if only it abandoned
+the last remnants of those absolute standards. And when Nietzsche
+
+35
+proclaimed that he had discovered "new and higher values," he was
+the first to fall prey to delusions which he himself had helped to
+destroy, accepting the old traditional notion of measuring with transcendent units in its newest and most hideous form, thereby again
+carrying the relativity and exchangeability of values into the very
+matters whose absolute dignity he had wanted to assert—power and
+life and man's love of his earthly existence.
+IV
+Self-defeat, the result of all three challenges to tradition in the
+nineteenth century, is only one and perhaps the most superficial
+thing Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche have in common. More
+important is the fact that each of their rebellions seems to be concentrated on the same ever-repeated subject: Against the alleged
+abstractions of philosophy and its concept of man as an animal rationale, Kierkegaard wants to assert concrete and suffering men;
+Marx confirms that man's humanity consists of his productive and
+active force, which in its most elementary aspect he calls laborpower; and Nietzsche insists on life's productivity, on man's will
+and will-to-power. In complete independence of one another—none
+of them ever knew of the others' existence-they arrive at the conclusion that this enterprise in terms of the tradition can be achieved
+only through a mental operation best described in the images and
+similes of leaps, inversions, and turning concepts upside down:
+Kierkegaard speaks of his leap from doubt into belief; Marx turns
+Hegel, or rather "Plato and the whole Platonic tradition" (Sidney
+Hook), "right side up again," leaping "from the realm of necessity
+into the realm of freedom"; and Nietzsche understands his philosophy as "inverted Platonism" and "transformation of all values."
+The turning operations with which the tradition ends bring the
+beginning to light in a twofold sense. The very assertion of one side
+of the opposites-fides against intellectus, practice against theory,
+sensuous, perishable life against permanent, unchanging, suprasensuous truth—necessarily brings to light the repudiated opposite and
+
+36
+shows that both have meaning and significance only in this opposition. Furthermore, to think in terms of such opposites is not a matter
+of course, but is grounded in a first great turning operation on
+which all others ultimately are based because it established the opposites in whose tension the tradition moves. This first turning-about
+is Plato's replaywyn ris fuxis, the turning-about of the whole human
+being, which he tells—as though it were a story with beginning and
+end and not merely a mental operation—in the parable of the cave
+in The Republic.
+The story of the cave unfolds in three stages: the first turningabout takes place in the cave itself when one of the inhabitants frees
+himself from the fetters which chain the cave dwellers' "legs and
+necks" so that "they can only see before them," their eyes glued to
+the screen on which shadows and images of things appear; he now
+turns around to the rear of the cave, where an artificial fire illuminates the things in the cave as they really are. There is, second, the
+turning from the cave to the clear sky, where the ideas appear as
+the true and eternal essences of the things in the cave, illuminated
+by the sun, the idea of ideas, enabling man to see and the ideas to
+shine forth. Finally, there is the necessity of returning to the cave, of
+leaving the realm of eternal essences and moving again in the realm
+of perishable things and mortal men. Each of these turnings is accomplished by a loss of sense and orientation: the eyes accustomed
+to the shadowy appearances on the screen are blinded by the fire
+in the cave; the eyes then adjusted to the dim light of the artificial
+fire are blinded by the light that illuminates the ideas; finally, the
+eyes adjusted to the light of the sun must readjust to the dimness of
+the cave.
+Behind these turnings-about, which Plato demands only of the
+philosopher, the lover of truth and light, lies another inversion indicated generally in Plato's violent polemics against Homer and the
+Homeric religion, and in particular in the construction of his story
+as a kind of reply to and reversal of Homer's description of Hades
+in the eleventh book of the Odyssey. The parallel between the images
+of the cave and Hades (the shadowy, unsubstantial, senseless movements of the soul in Homer's Hades correspond to the ignorance and
+
+37
+senselessness of the bodies in the cave) is unmistakable because it
+is stressed by Plato's use of the words cowdor, image, and oría,
+shadow, which are Homer's own key words for the description of
+life after death in the underworld. The reversal of the Homeric
+"position" is obvious; it is as though Plato were saying to him: Not
+the life of bodyless souls, but the life of the bodies takes place in an
+underworld; compared to the sky and the sun, the earth is like
+Hades; images and shadows are the objects of bodily senses, not
+the surroundings of bodyless souls; the true and real is not the world
+in which we move and live and which we have to part from in death,
+but the ideas seen and grasped by the eyes of the mind. In a sense,
+Plato's repraywyń was a turning-about by which everything that was
+commonly believed in Greece in accordance with the Homeric religion came to stand on its head. It is as though the underworld of
+Hades had risen to the surface of the earth.1° But this reversal of
+Homer did not actually turn Homer upside down or downside up,
+since the dichotomy within which such an operation alone can take
+place is almost as alien to Plato's thought, which did not yet operate
+with predetermined opposites, as it is alien to the Homeric world.
+(No turning about of the tradition can therefore ever land us in the
+original Homeric "position," which seems to have been Nietzsche's
+error; he probably thought that his inverted Platonism could lead
+him back into pre-Platonic modes of thought.) It was solely for
+political purposes that Plato set forth his doctrine of ideas in the
+form of a reversal of Homer; but thereby he established the framework within which such turning operations are not far-fetched possibilities but predetermined by the conceptual structure itself. The
+development of philosophy in late antiquity in the various schools,
+which fought one another with a fanaticism unequaled in the pre-
+Christian world, consists of turnings-about and shifting emphases
+on one oi two opposite terms, made possible by Plato's separation
+of a world of mere shadowy appearance and the world of eternally
+true ideas. He himself had given the first example in the turning
+from the cave to the sky. When Hegel finally, in a last gigantic effort,
+had gathered together into one consistent self-developing whole the
+various strands of traditional philosophy as they had developed from
+
+Plato's original concept, the same splitting up into two conflicting
+schools of thought, though on a much lower level, took place, and
+right-wing and left-wing, idealistic and materialistic Hegelians could
+for a short while dominate philosophical thought.
+The significance of Kierkegaard's, Marx's, and Nietzsche's challenges to the tradition—though none of them would have been possible without the synthesizing achievement of Hegel and his concept
+of history—is that they constitute a much more radical turningabout than the mere upside-down operations with their weird oppositions between sensualism and idealism, materialism and spiritualism, and even immanentism and transcendentalism imply. If Marx
+had been merely a "materialist" who brought Hegel's "idealism"
+down to earth, his influence would have been as short-lived and
+limited to scholarly quarrels as that of his contemporaries. Hegel's
+basic assumption was that the dialectical movement of thought is
+identical with the dialectical movement of matter itself. Thus he
+hoped to bridge the abyss which Descartes had opened between
+man, defined as res cogitans, and the world, defined as res extensa,
+between cognition and reality, thinking and being. The spiritual
+homelessness of modern man finds its first expressions in this Cartesian perplexity and the Pascalian answer. Hegel claimed that the
+discovery of the dialectical movement as a universal law, ruling
+both man's reason and human affairs and the inner "reason" of
+natural events, accomplished even more than a mere correspondence
+between intellectus and res, whose coincidence pre-Cartesian philosophy had defined as truth. By introducing the spirit and its selfrealization in movement, Hegel believed he had demonstrated an
+ontological identity of matter and idea. To Hegel, therefore, it
+would have been of no great importance whether one started this
+movement from the viewpoint of consciousness, which at one moment begins to "materialize," or whether one chose as starting point
+matter, which, moving in the direction of "spiritualization," becomes
+conscious of itself. (How little Marx doubted these fundamentals
+of his teacher appears from the role he ascribed to self-consciousness in the form of class-consciousness in history.) In other words,
+Marx was no more a "dialectical materialist" than Hegel was a
+
+39
+"dialectical idealist"; the very concept of dialectical movement, as
+Hegel conceived it as a universal law, and as Marx accepted it,
+makes the terms "idealism" and "materialism" as philosophical
+systems meaningless. Marx, especially in his earlier writings, is quite
+conscious of this and knows that his repudiation of the tradition and
+of Hegel does not lie in his "materialism," but in his refusal to assume that the difference between man and animal life is ratio, or
+thought, that, in Hegel's words, "man is essentially spirit"; for the
+young Marx man is essentially a natural being endowed with the
+faculty of action (ein tätiges Naturwesen), and his action remains
+"natural" because it consists of laboring—the metabolism between
+man and nature." His turning-about, like Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's, goes to the core of the matter; they all question the traditional hierarchy of human capabilities, or, to put it another way, they
+ask again what the specifically human quality of man is; they do not
+intend to build systems or Weltanschauungen on this or that premise.
+Since the rise of modern science, whose spirit is expressed in the
+Cartesian philosophy of doubt and mistrust, the conceptual framework of the tradition has not been secure. The dichotomy between
+contemplation and action, the traditional hierarchy which ruled that
+truth is ultimately perceived only in speechless and actionless seeing,
+could not be upheld under conditions in which science became active
+and did in order to know. When the trust that things appear as they
+really are was gone, the concept of truth as revelation had become
+doubtful, and with it the unquestioning faith in a revealed God.
+The notion of "theory" changed its meaning. It no longer meant a
+system of reasonably connected truths which as such had been not
+made but given to reason and the senses. Rather it became the
+modern scientific theory, which is a working hypothesis, changing
+in accordance with the results it produces and depending for its
+validity not on what it "reveals" but on whether it "works." By the
+same process, Plato's ideas lost their autonomous power to illuminate the world and the universe. First they became what they had
+been for Plato only in their relationship to the political realm,
+standards and measurements, or the regulating, limiting forces of
+
+40 ฿
+man's own reasoning mind, as they appear in Kant. Then, after the
+priority of reason over doing, of the mind's prescribing its rules to
+the actions of men, had been lost in the transformation of the whole
+world by the Industrial Revolution—a transformation the success of
+which seemed to prove that man's doings and fabrications prescribe
+their rules to reason—these ideas finally became mere values whose
+validity is determined not by one or many men but by society as a
+whole in its ever-changing functional needs.
+These values in their ex- and inter-changeability are the only
+"ideas" left to (and understood by) "socialized men." These are
+men who have decided never to leave what to Plato was "the cave"
+of everyday human affairs, and never to venture on their own into
+a world and a life which, perhaps, the ubiquitous functionalization
+of modern society has deprived of one of its most elementary characteristics—the instilling of wonder at that which is as it is. This
+very real development is reflected and foreshadowed in Marx's
+political thought. Turning the tradition upside down within its own
+framework, he did not actually get rid of Plato's ideas, though he
+did record the darkening of the clear sky where those ideas, as well
+as many adier presences, had once become visible to the eyes of
+men.
+
+2
+THE CONCEPT
+OF HISTORY
+Ancient and Modern
+I: History and Nature
+ET us begin with Herodotus, whom Cicero called pater historiae
+‹ and who has remained father of Western history.' He tells us in
+the first sentence of the Persian Wars that the purpose of his enterprise is to preserve that which owes its existence to men, tà yevójeva
+is indpúrwv, lest it be obliterated by time, and to bestow upon the
+glorious, wondrous deeds of Greeks and barbarians sufficient praise
+to assure their remembrance by posterity and thus make their glory
+shine through the centuries.
+This tells us a great deal and yet does not tell us enough. For us,
+concern with immortality is not a matter of course, and Herodotus,
+since this was a matter of course to him, does not tell us much about
+it. His understanding of the task of history—to save human deeds
+from the futility that comes from oblivion —was rooted in the Greek
+concept and experience of nature, which comprehended all things
+
+42 Between Past and Future
+that come into being by themselves without assistance from men or
+gods—the Olympian gods did not claim to have created the world 2
+—and therefore are immortal. Since the things of nature are everpresent, they are not likely to be overlooked or forgotten; and since
+they are forever, they do not need human remembrance for their
+further existence. All living creatures, man not excepted, are contained in this realm of being-forever, and Aristotle explicitly assures
+us that man, insofar as he is a natural being and belongs to the species of mankind, possesses immortality; through the recurrent cycle
+of life, nature assures the same kind of being-forever to things that
+are born and die as to things that are and do not change. "Being for
+living creatures is Life," and being-forever (åci cival) corresponds to
+¿eLyevés, procreation.3
+No doubt this eternal recurrence "is the closest possible approximation of a world of becoming to that of being," + but it does not,
+of course, make individual men immortal; on the contrary, embedded in a cosmos in which everything was immortal, it was mortality
+which became the hallmark of human existence. Men are "the mortals," the only mortal things there are, for animals exist only as
+members of their species and not as individuals. The mortality of
+man lies in the fact that individual life, a Bios with a recognizable
+life-story from birth to death, rises out of biological life, Swn. This
+individual life is distinguished from all other things by the rectilinear
+course of its movement, which, so to speak, cuts through the
+circular movements of biological life. This is mortality: to move
+along a rectilinear line in a universe where everything, if it moves
+at all, moves in a cyclical order. Whenever men pursue their purposes, tilling the effortless earth, forcing the free-flowing wind into
+their sails, crossing the ever-rolling waves, they cut across a movement which is purposeless and turning within itself. When Sophocles
+(in the famous chorus of Antigone) says that there is nothing more
+awe-inspiring than man, he goes on to exemplity this by evoking
+purposeful human activities which do violence to nature because
+they disturb what, in the absence of mortals, would be the eternal
+quiet of being-forever that rests or swings within itself.
+What is difficult for us to realize is that the great deeds and works
+
+43
+of which mortals are capable, and which become the topic of historical narrative, are not seen as parts of either an encompassing whole
+or a process; on the contrary, the stress is always on single instances
+and single gestures. These single instances, deeds or events, interrupt
+the circular movement of daily life in the same sense that the rectilinear ßios of the mortals interrupts the circular movement of biological life. The subject matter of history is these interruptions—the
+extraordinary, in other words.
+When in late antiquity speculations began about the nature of
+history in the sense of a historical process and about the historical
+fate of nations, their rise and fall, where the particular actions and
+events were engulfed in a whole, it was at once assumed that these
+processes must be circular. The historical movement began to be
+construed in the image of biological life. In terms of ancient philosophy, this could mean that the world of history had been reintegrated
+into the world of nature, the world of the mortals into the universe
+that is forever. But in terms of ancient poetry and historiography it
+meant that the earlier sense of the greatness of mortals, as distinguished from the undoubtedly higher greatness of the gods and
+nature, had been lost.
+In the beginning of Western history the distinction between the
+mortality of men and the immortality of nature, between man-made
+things and things which come into being by themselves, was the
+tacit assumption of historiography. All things that owe their existence to men, such as works, deeds, and words, are perishable, infected, as it were, by the mortality of their authors. However, if
+mortals succeeded in endowing their works, deeds, and words with
+some permanence and in arresting their perishability, then these
+things would, to a degree at least, enter and be at home in the world
+of everlastingness, and the mortals themselves would find their
+place in the cosmos, where everything is immortal except men. The
+human capacity to achieve this was remembrance, Mnemosyne, who
+therefore was regarded as the mother of all the other muses.
+In order to understand quickly and with some measure of clarity
+how far we today are removed from this Greek understanding of
+the relationship between nature and history, between the cosmos
+
+44
+and men, we may be permitted to quote four lines from Rilke and
+leave them in their original language; their perfection seems to defy
+translation.
+Berge ruhn, von Sternen überprächtigt;
+aber auch in ihnen flimmert Zeit.
+Ach, in meinem wilden Herzen nächtigt
+obdachlos die Unvergänglichkeit.5
+Here even the mountains only seem to rest under the light of the
+stars; they are slowly, secretly devoured by time; nothing is forever,
+immortality has fled the world to find an uncertain abode in the
+darkness of the human heart that still has the capacity to remember
+and to say: forever. Immortality or imperishability, if and when it
+occurs at all, is homeless. If one looks upon these lines through
+Greek eyes it is almost as though the poet had tried consciously to
+reverse the Greek relationships: everything has become perishable,
+except perhaps the human heart; immortality is no longer the
+medium in which mortals move, but has taken its homeless refuge
+in the very heart of mortality; immortal things, works and deeds,
+events and even words, though men might still be able to externalize,
+reify as it were, the remembrance of their hearts, have lost their
+home in the world; since the world, since nature is perishable and
+since man-made things, once they have come into being, share the
+fate of all being-they begin to perish the moment they have come
+into existence.
+With Herodotus words and deeds and events—that is, those things
+that owe their existence exclusively to men-became the subject
+matter of history. Of all man-made things, these are the most futile.
+The works of human hands owe part of their existence to the material nature provides and therefore carry within themselves some
+measure of permanence, borrowed, as it were, from the beingforever of nature. But what goes on between mortals directly, the
+spoken word and all the actions and deeds which the Greeks called
+páğes Or mpáypara, as distinguished from Toénors, fabrication, can
+never outlast the moment of their realization, would never leave any
+trace without the help of remembrance. The task of the poet and
+
+45
+historiographer (both of whom Aristotle still puts in the same category because their subject is mpăśıs) " consists in making something
+lasting out of remembrance. They do this by translating mpüfis and
+défus, action and speech, into that kind of monous or fabrication
+which eventually becomes the written word.
+History as a category of human existence is of course older than
+the written word, older than Herodotus, older even than Homer.
+Not historically but poetically speaking, its beginning lies rather in
+the moment when Ulysses, at the court of the king of the Phaeacians,
+listened to the story of his own deeds and sufferings, to the story
+of his life, now a thing outside himself, an "object" for all to see
+and to hear. What had been sheer occurrence now became "history."
+But the transformation of single events and occurrences into history
+was essentially the same "imitation of action" in words which was
+later employed in Greek tragedy, where, as Burckhardt once remarked, "external action is hidden from the eye" through the reports of messengers, even though there was no objection at all to
+showing the horrible.® The scene where Ulysses listens to the story
+of his own life is paradigmatic for both history and poetry; the
+"reconciliation with reality," the catharsis, which, according to Aristotle, was the essence of tragedy, and, according to Hegel, was the
+ultimate purpose of history, came about through the tears of remembrance. The deepest human motive for history and poetry appears here in unparalleled purity: since listener, actor, and sufferer
+are the same person, ali motives of sheer curiosity and lust for new
+information, which, of course, have always played a large role in
+both historical inquiry and aesthetic pleasure, are naturally absent
+in Ulysses himself, who would have been bored rather than moved
+if history were only news and poetry only entertainment.
+Such distinctions and reflections may seem commonplace to modern ears. Implied in them, however, is one great and painful paradox
+which contributed (perhaps more than any other single factor) to
+the tragic aspect of Greek culture in its greatest manifestations. The
+paradox is that, on the one hand, everything was seen and measured
+against the background of the things that are forever, while, on the
+other, true human greatness was understood, at least by the pre-
+
+46
+Platonic Greeks, to reside in deeds and words, and was rather rep
+resented by Achilles, "the doer of great deeds and the speaker of
+great words," than by the maker and fabricator, even the poet and
+writer. This paradox, that greatness was understood in terms of
+permanence while human greatness was seen in precisely the most
+futile and least lasting activities of men, has haunted Greek poetry
+and historiography as it has perturbed the quiet of the philosophers.
+The early Greek solution of the paradox was poetic and nonphilosophical. It consisted in the immortal fame which the poets
+could bestow upon word and deed to make them outlast not only
+the futile moment of speech and action but even the mortal life of
+their agent. Prior to the Socratic school—with the possible exception of Hesiod—we encounter no real criticism of immortal fame;
+even Heraclitus thought that it was the greatest of all human aspirations, and while he denounced with violent bitterness the political
+conditions in his native Ephesus, it never would have occurred to
+him to condemn the realm of human affairs as such or doubt its
+potential greatness.
+The change, prepared by Parmenides, came about with Socrates
+and reached its culmination in Plato's philosophy, whose teaching
+regarding a potential immortality of mortal men become authoritative for all philosophy schools in antiquity. To be sure, Plato was
+still confronted with the same paradox and he seems to have been
+the first who considered "the desire to become famous and not to
+lie in the end without a name" on the same level as the natural
+desire for children through which nature secures the immortality
+of the species, though not the alavaría of the individual person. In
+his political philosophy, therefore, he proposed to substitute the
+latter for the former, as though the desire for immortality through
+fame could as well be fulfilled when men "are immortal because they
+leave children's children behind them, and partake of immortality
+through the unity of a sempiternal becoming"; when he declared
+the begetting of children to be a law he obviously hoped this would
+be sufficient for the "common man's" natural yearning for deathlessness. For neither Plato nor Aristotle any longer believed that
+mortal men could "immortalize" (¿lavarilav, in the Aristotelian
+
+47
+terminology, an activity whose object is by no means necessarily
+one's own self, the immortal fame of the name, but includes a variety
+of occupations with immortal things in general through great deeds
+and words.® They had discovered, in the activity of thought itself,
+a hidden human capacity for turning away from the whole realm of
+human affairs which should not be taken too seriously by men
+(Plato) because it was patently absurd to think that man is the
+highest being there is (Aristotle). While begetting might be enough
+for the many, to "immortalize" meant for the philosopher to dwell
+in the neighborhood of those things which are forever, to be there
+and present in a state of active attention, but without doing anything,
+without performance of deeds or achievement of works. Thus the
+proper attitude of mortals, once they had reached the neighborhood
+of the immortal, was actionless and even speechless contemplation:
+the Aristotelian vous, the highest and most human capacity of pure
+vision, cannot translate into words what it beholds, 1º and the ultimate truth which the vision of ideas disclosed to Plato is likewise
+an approv, something which cannot be caught in words."! Hence the
+old paradox was resolved by the philosophers by denying to man
+not the capacity to "immortalize," but the capability of measuring
+himself and his own deeds against the everlasting greatness of the
+cosmos, of matching, as it were, the immortality of nature and the
+gods with an immortal greatness of his own. The solution clearly
+comes about at the expense of "the doer of great deeds and the
+speaker of great words."
+The distinction between the poets and historians on one side and
+the philosophers on the other was that the former simply accepted
+the common Greek concept of greatness. Praise, from which came
+glory and eventually everlasting fame, could be bestowed only upon
+things already "great," that is, things that possessed an emerging,
+shining quality which distinguished them from all others and made
+glory possible. The great was that which deserved immortality, that
+which should be admitted to the company of things that lasted forever, surrounding the futility of mortals with their unsurpassable
+majesty. Through history men almost became the equals of nature,
+and only those events, deeds, or words that rose by themselves to
+
+48
+the ever-present challenge of the natural universe were what we
+would call historical. Not only the poet Homer and not only the
+storyteller Herodotus, but even Thucydides, who in a much more
+sober mood was the first to set standards for historiography, tells
+us explicitly in the beginning of the Peloponnesian War that he wrote
+his work because of the war's "greatness," because "this was the
+greatest movement yet known in history, not only of the Hellenes,
+but of a large part of the barbarian world... almost mankind."
+The concern with greatness, so prominent in Greek poetry and
+historiography, is based on the most intimate connection between
+the concepts of nature and history. Their common denominator is
+immortality. Immortality is what nature possesses without effort and
+without anybody's assistance, and immortality is what the mortals
+therefore must try to achieve if they want to live up to the world
+into which they were born, to live up to the things which surround
+them and to whose company they are admitted for a short while.
+The connection between history and nature is therefore by no means
+an opposition. History receives into its remembrance those mortals
+who through deed and word have proved themselves worthy of nature, and their everlasting fame means that they, despite their mortality, may remain in the company of the things that last forever.
+Our modern concept of history is no less intimately connected
+with our modern concept of nature than the corresponding and very
+different concepts which stand at the beginning of our history. They
+too can be seen in their full significance only if their common root
+is discovered. The nineteenth-century opposition of the natural and
+historical sciences, together with the allegedly absolute objectivity
+and precision of the natural scientists, is today a thing of the past.
+The natural sciences now admit that with the experiment, testing
+natural processes under prescribed conditions, and with the observer, who in watching the experiment becomes one of its conditions, a "subjective" factor is introduced into the "objective" processes of nature.
+The most important new result of nuclear physics was the
+recognition of the possibility of applying quite different types
+
+49
+of natural laws, without contradiction, to one and the same
+physical event. This is due to the fact that within a system of
+laws which are based on certain fundamental ideas only certain quite definite ways of asking questions make sense, and
+thus, that such a system is separated from others which allow
+different questions to be put.!2
+In other words, the experiment "being a question put before
+nature" (Galileo), 13 the answers of science will always remain replies to questions asked by men; the confusion in the issue of "objectivity" was to assume that there could be answers without questions and results independent of a question-asking being. Physics,
+we know today, is no less a man-centered inquiry into what is than
+historical research. The old quarrel, therefore, between the "subjectivity" of historiography and the "objectivity" of physics has lost
+much of its relevance.14
+The modern historian as a rule is not yet aware of the fact that
+the natural scientist, against whom he had to defend his own "scientific standards" for so many decades, finds himself in the same
+position, and he is quite likely to state and restate in new, seemingly
+more scientific terms the old distinction between a science of nature
+and a science of history. The reason is that the problem of objectivity
+in the historical sciences is more than a mere technical, scientific
+perplexity. Objectivity, the "extinction of the self" as the condition
+of "pure vision" (das reine Sehen der Dinge-Ranke) meant the
+historian's abstention from bestowing either praise or blame, together with an attitude of perfect distance with which he would
+follow the course of events as they were revealed in his documentary
+sources. To him the only limitation of this attitude, which Droysen
+once denounced as "eunuchic objectivity," 15 lay in the necessity
+of selecting material from a mass of facts which, compared with the
+limited capacity of the human mind and the limited time of human
+life, appeared infinite. Objectivity, in other words, meant noninterference as well as nondiscrimination. Of these two, nondiscrimination, abstention from praise and blame, was obviously much easier
+to achieve than noninterference; every selection of material in a
+sense interferes with history, and all criteria for selection put the
+
+50 ฿
+historical course of events under certain man-made conditions, which
+are quite similar to the conditions the natural scientist prescribes to
+natural processes in the experiment.
+We have stated here the problem of objectivity in modern terms,
+as it arose during the modern age, which believed it had discovered
+in history a "new science" which then would have to comply to the
+standards of the "older" science of nature. This, however, was a
+self-misunderstanding. Modern natural science developed quickly
+into an even "newer" science than history, and both sprang, as we
+shall see, from exactly the same set of "new" experiences with the
+exploration of the universe, made at the beginning of the modern
+age. The curious and still confusing point about the historical sciences was that they did not take their standards from the natural
+sciences of their own age, but harked back to the scientific and, in
+the last analysis, philosophical attitude which the modern age had
+just begun to liquidate. Their scientific standards, culminating in the
+"extinction of the self," had their roots in Aristotelian and medieval
+natural science, which consisted mainly in observing and cataloguing observed facts. Before the rise of the modern age it was a matter
+of course that quiet, actionless, and selfless contemplation of the
+miracle of being, or of the wonder of God's creation, should also be
+the proper attitude for the scientist, whose curiosity about the particular had not yet parted company with the wonder before the
+general from which, according to the ancients, sprang philosophy-
+With the modern age this objectivity lost its fundament and therefore was constantly on the lookout for new justifications. For the
+historical sciences the old standard of objectivity could make sense
+only if the historian believed that history in its entirety was either a
+cyclical phenomenon which could be grasped as a whole through
+contemplation (and Vico, following the theories of late antiquity,
+was still of this opinion) or that it was guided by some divine
+providence for the salvation of mankind, whose plan was revealed,
+whose beginnings and ends were known, and therefore could be
+again contemplated as a whole. Both these concepts, however, were
+actually quite alien to the new consciousness of history in the modern age; they were only the old traditional framework into which.
+
+51
+the new experiences were pressed and from which the new science
+bad risen. The problem of scientific objectivity, as the nineteenth
+century posed it, owed so much to historical self-misunderstanding
+and philosophical confusion that the real issue at stake, the issue of
+impartiality, which is indeed decisive not only for the "science" of
+history but for all historiography from poetry and storytelling onward, has become difficult to recognize.
+Impartiality, and with it all true historiography, came into the
+world when Homer decided to sing the deeds of the Trojans no
+less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector
+no less than the greatness of Achilles. This Homeric impartiality,
+as it is echoed by Herodotus, who set out to prevent "the great and
+wonderful actions of the Greeks and the barbarians from losing their
+due meed of glory," is still the highest type of objectivity we know.
+Not only does it leave behind the common interest in one's own
+side and one's own people which, up to our own days, characterizes
+almost all national historiography, but it also discards the alternative
+of victory or defeat, which moderns have felt expresses the "objective" judgment of history itself, and does not permit it to interfere with what is judged to be worthy of immortalizing praise. Somewhat later, and most magnificently expressed in Thucydides, there
+appears in Greek historiography still another powerful element that
+contributes to historical objectivity. It could come to the foreground
+only after long experience in polis-life, which to an incrediby large
+extent consisted of citizens talking with one another. In this incessant talk the Greeks discovered that the world we have in common
+is usually regarded from an infinite number of different standpoints,
+to which correspond the most diverse points of view. In a sheer inexhaustible flow of arguments, as the Sophists presented them to
+the citizenry of Athens, the Greek learned to exchange his own viewpoint, his own "opinion"— the way the world appeared and opened
+up to him (Sorei won, "it appears to me," from which comes dója, or
+"opinion") —with those of his fellow citizens. Greeks learned to
+understand—not to understand one another as individual persons,
+but to look upon the same world from one another's standpoint, to
+see the same in very different and frequently opposing aspects. The
+
+52
+speeches in which Thucydides makes articulate the standpoints and
+interests of the warring parties are still a living testimony to the
+extraordinary degree of this objectivity.
+What has obscured the modern discussion of objectivity in the
+historical sciences and prevented its ever touching the fundamental
+issues involved seems to be the fact that none of the conditions of
+either Homeric impartiality or Thucydidean objectivity are present
+in the modern age. Homeric impartiality rested upon the assumption
+that great things are self-evident, shine by themselves; that the poet
+(or later the historiographer) has only to preserve their glory, which
+is essentially futile, and that he would destroy, instead of preserving,
+if he were to forget the glory that was Hector's. For the short duration of their existence great deeds and great words were, in their
+greatness, as real as a stone or a house, there to be seen and heard
+by everybody present. Greatness was easily recognizable as that
+which by itself aspired to immortality—that is, negatively speaking,
+as a heroic contempt for all that merely comes and passes away,
+for all individual life, one's own included. This sense of greatness
+could not possibly survive intact into the Christian era for the very
+simple reason that, according to Christian teachings, the relationship between life and world is the exact opposite to that in Greek
+and Latin antiquity: in Christianity neither the world nor the everrecurring cycle of life is immortal, only the single living individual.
+It is the world that will pass away; men will live forever. The Christian reversal is based, in its turn, upon the altogether different teachings of the Hebrews, who always held that life itself is sacred, more
+sacred than anything else in the world, and that man is the supreme
+being on earth.
+Connected with this inner conviction of the sacredness of life as
+such, which has remained with us even after security of the Christian
+faith in life after death has passed away, is the stress on the all-importance of self-interest, still so prominent in all modern political
+philosophy. In our context this means that the Thucydidean type
+of objectivity, no matter how much it may be admired, no longer
+has any basis in real political life. Since we have made life our
+supreme and foremost concern, we have no room left for an activity
+
+53
+based on contempt for one's own life-interest. Selflessness may still
+be a religious or a moral virtue; it can hardly be a political one.
+Under these conditions objectivity lost its validity in experience, was
+divorced from real life, and became that "lifeless" academic affair
+which Droysen rightly denounced as being eunuchic.
+Moreover, the birth of the modern idea of history not only coincided with but was powerfully stimulated by the modern age's doubt
+of the reality of an outer world "objectively" given to human perception as an unchanged and unchangeable object. In our context
+the most important consequence of this doubt was the emphasis on
+sensation qua sensation as more "real" than the "sensed" object
+and, at any rate, the only safe ground of experience. Against this
+subjectivization, which is but one aspect of the still growing worldalienation of man in the modern age, no judgments could hold out:
+they were all reduced to the level of sensations and ended on the
+level of the lowest of all sensations, the sensation of taste. Our vocabulary is a telling testimony to this degradation. All judgments
+not inspired by moral principle (which is felt to be old-fashioned)
+or not dictated by some self-interest are considered matters of
+"taste," and this in hardly a different sense from what we mean by
+saying that the preference for clam chowder over pea soup is a matter of taste. This conviction, the vulgarity of its defenders on the
+theoretical level notwithstanding, has disturbed the conscience of
+the historian much more deeply because it has much deeper roots
+in the general spirit of the modern age than the allegedly superior
+scientific standards of his colleagues in the natural sciences.
+Unfortunately it is in the nature of academic quarrels that methodological problems are likely to overshadow more fundamental
+issues. The fundamental fact about the modern concept of history
+is that it arose in the same sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
+which ushered in the gigantic development of the natural sciences.
+Foremost among the characteristics of that age, which are still alive
+and present in our own world, is the world-alienation of man, which
+I mentioned before and which is so difficult to perceive as a basic
+condition of our whole life because out of it, and partly at least out
+of its despair, did arise the tremendous structure of the buman
+
+54 Between Past and Future
+artifice we inhabit today, in whose framework we have even discovered the means of destroying it together with all non-man-made
+things on earth.
+The shortest and most fundamental expression this world-alienation ever found is contained in Descartes' famous de omnibus
+dubitandum est, for this rule signifies something altogether different
+from the skepticism inherent in the self-doubt of all true thought.
+Descartes came to his rule because the then recent discoveries in
+the natural sciences had convinced him that man in his search for
+truth and knowledge can trust neither the given evidence of the
+senses, nor the "innate truth" of the mind, nor the "inner light of
+reason." This mistrust of the human capacities has been ever since
+one of the most elementary conditions of the modern age and the
+modern world; but it did not spring, as is usually assumed, from
+a sudden mysterious dwindling of faith in God, and its cause was
+originally not even a suspicion of reason as such. Its origin was
+simply the highly justified loss of confidence in the truth-revealing
+capacity of the senses. Reality no longer was disclosed as an outer
+phenomenon to human sensation, but had withdrawn, so to speak,
+into the sensing of the sensation itself. It now turned out that without confidence in the senses neither faith in God nor trust in reason
+could any longer be secure, because the revelation of both divine
+and rational truth had always been implicitly understood to follow
+the awe-inspiring simplicity of man's relationship with the world: I
+open my eyes and behold the vision, I listen and hear the sound,
+I move my body and touch the tangibility of the world. If we begin
+to doubt the fundainental truthfulness and reliability of this relationship, which of course does not exclude errors and illusions but, on
+the contrary, is the condition of their eventual correction, none of
+the traditional metaphors for suprasensual truth—be it the eyes of
+the mind which can see the sky of ideas or the voice of conscience
+listened to by the human heart—can any longer carry its meaning.
+The fundamental experience underlying Cartesian doubt was the
+discovery that the earth, contrary to all direct sense experience,
+revolves around the sun. The modern age began when man, with
+
+55
+the help of the telescope, turned his bodily eyes toward the universe,
+about which he had speculated for a long time—seeing with the eyes
+of the mind, listening with the ears of the heart, and guided by the
+inner light of reason—and learned that his senses were not fitted
+for the universe, that his everyday experience, far from being able
+to constitute the model for the reception of truth and the acquisition
+of knowledge, was a constant source of error and delusion. After
+this deception—whose enormity we find difficult to realize because
+it was centuries before its full impact was felt everywhere and not
+only in the rather restricted milieu of scholars and philosophers—
+suspicions began to haunt modern man from all sides. But its most
+immediate consequence was the spectacular rise of natural science,
+which for a long time seemed to be liberated by the discovery that
+our senses by themselves do not tell the truth. Henceforth, sure of
+the unreliability of sensation and the resulting insufficiency of mere
+observation, the natural sciences turned toward the experiment,
+which, by directly interfering with nature, assured the development
+whose progress has ever since appeared to be limitless.
+Descartes became the father of modern philosophy because he
+generalized the experience of the preceding as well as his own generation, developed it into a new method of thinking, and thus became the first thinker thoroughly trained in that "school of suspicion" which, according to Nietzsche, constitutes modern philosophy.
+Suspicion of the senses remained the core of scientific pride until
+in our time it has turned into a source of uneasiness. The trouble
+is that "we find nature behaving so differently from what we observe
+in the visible and palpable bodies of our surroundings that no model
+shaped after our large-scale experiences can ever be 'true'", at this
+point the indissoluble connection between our thinking and our
+sense perception takes its revenge, for a model that would leave
+sense experience altogether out of account and, therefore, be completely adequate to nature in the experiment is not only "practically
+inaccessible but not even thinkable." 16 The trouble, in other words.
+is not that the modern physical universe cannot be visualized, for
+this is a matter of course under the assumption that nature does not
+
+56
+reveal itself to the human senses; the uneasiness begins when nature
+tums out to be inconceivable, that is, unthinkaile in terms of pure
+reasoning as well.
+The dependence of modern thought upon factual discoveries of
+the natural sciences shows itself most clearly in the seventeenth century. It is not always admitted as readily as by Hobbes, who attributed his philosophy exclusively to the results of the work of Co-
+pernicus and Galileo, Kepler, Gassendi, and Mersenne, and who
+denounced all past philosophy as nonsense with a violence matched
+perhaps only by Luther's contempt for the "stulti philosophi." One
+does not need the radical extremism of Hobbes's conclusion, not
+that man may be evil by nature, but that a distinction between good
+and evil makes no sense, and that reason, far from being an inner
+light disclosing truth, is a mere "faculty of reckoning with consequences"; for the basic suspicion that man's earthbound experience
+presents a caricature of truth is no less present in Descartes' fear
+that an evil spirit may rule the world and withhold truth forever
+from the mind of a being so manifestly subject to error. In its most
+harmless form, it permeates English empiricism, where the meaningfulness of the sensibly given is dissolved into data of sense perception, disclosing their meaning only through habit and repeated
+experiences, so that in an extreme subjectivism man is ultimately
+imprisoned in a non-world of meaningless sensations that no reality
+and no truth can penetrate. Empiricism is only seemingly a vindication of the senses; actually it rests on the assumption that only
+common-sense arguing can give them meaning, and it always starts
+with a declaration of non-confidence in the truth- or reality-revealing
+capacity of the senses. Puritanism and empiricism, in fact, are only
+two sides of the same coin. The same fundamental suspicion finally
+inspired Kant's gigantic effort to re-examine the human faculties in
+such a way that the question of a Ding an sich, that is the truthrevealing faculty of experience in an absolute sense, could be left
+in abeyance.
+Of much more immediate consequence for our concept of history
+was the positive version of subjectivism which arose from the same
+predicament: Although it seems that man is unable to recognize
+
+51
+the given world which he has not made himself, he nevertheless
+must be capable of knowing at least what he made himself. This
+pragmatic attitude is already the fully articulated reason why Vico
+turned his attention to history and thus became one of the fathers
+of modern historical consciousness. He said: Geometrica demonstramus quia facimus; si physica demonstrare possemus, faceremus." ("Mathematical matters we can prove because we ourselves
+make them; to prove the physical, we would have to make it.")
+Vico turned to the sphere of history only because he still believed
+it impossible "to make nature." No so-called humanist considerations inspired his turning away from nature, but solely the belief
+that history is "made" by men just as nature is "made" by God;
+hence historical truth can be known by men, the makers of history,
+but physical truth is reserved for the Maker of the universe.
+It has frequently been asserted that modern science was born
+when attention shifted from the search after the "what" to the
+investigation of "how." This shift of emphasis is almost a matter of
+course if one assumes that man can know only what he has made
+himself, insofar as this assumption in turn implies that I "know"
+a thing whenever I understand how it has come into being. By the
+same token, and for the same reasons, the emphasis shifted from
+interest in things to interest in processes, of which things were soon
+to become almost accidental by-products. Vico lost interest in nature because he assumed that to penetrate the mystery of Creation
+it would be necessary to understand the creative process, whereas all
+previous ages had taken it for granted that one can very well understand the universe without ever knowing how God created it, or, in
+the Greek version, how the things that are by themselves came into
+being. Since the seventeenth century the chief preoccupation of all
+scientific inquiry, natural as well as historical, has been with processes; but only modern technology (and no mere science, no matter
+how highly developed), which began with substituting mechanical
+processes for human activities-laboring and working-and ended
+with starting new natural processes, would have been wholly adequate to Vico's ideal of knowledge. Vico, who is regarded by many
+as the father of modern history, would hardly have turned to history
+
+58
+under modern conditions. He would have turned to technology; for
+our technology does indeed what Vico thought divine action did in
+the realm of nature and human action in the realm of history.
+In the modern age history emerged as something it never had been
+before. It was no longer composed of the deeds and sufferings of
+men, and it no longer told the story of events affecting the lives of
+men; it became a man-made process, the only all-comprehending
+process which owed its existence exclusively to the human race.
+Today this quality which distinguished history from nature is also
+a thing of the past. We know today that though we cannot "make"
+nature in the sense of creation, we are quite capable of starting new
+natural processes, and that in a sense therefore we "make nature."
+to the extent, that is, that we "make history." It is true we have
+reached this stage only with the nuclear discoveries, where natural
+forces are let loose, unchained, so to speak, and where the natural
+processes which take place would never have existed without direct
+interference of human action. This stage goes far beyond not only
+the pre-modern age, when wind and water were used to substitute
+for and multiply human forces, but also the industrial age, with its
+steam engine and internal-combustion motor, where natural forces
+were imitated and utilized as man-made means of production.
+The contemporary decline of interest in the humanities, and especially in the study of history, which seems inevitable in all completely modernized countries, is quite in accord with the first impulses that led to modern historical science. What is definitely out
+of place today is the resignation which led Vico into the study of
+history. We can do in the natural-physical realm what he thought
+we could do only in the realm of history. We have begun to act into
+nature as we used to act into history. If it is merely a question of
+processes, it has turned out that man is as capable of starting natural
+processes which would not have come about without human interference as he is of starting something new in the field of human
+affairs.
+Since the beginning of the twentieth century, technology has
+emerged as the meeting ground of the natural and historical sciences,
+and although hardly a single great scientific discovery has ever beeD
+
+59
+made for pragmatic, technical, or practical purposes (pragmatism
+in the vulgar sense of the word stands refuted by the factual record
+of scientific development), this final outcome is in perfect accord
+with the innermost intentions of modern science. The comparatively
+new social sciences, which so quickly became to history what technology had been to physics, may use the experiment in a much
+cruder and less reliable way than do the natural sciences, but the
+method is the same: they too prescribe conditions, conditions to
+human behavior, as modern physics prescribes conditions to natural
+processes. If their vocabulary is repulsive and their hope to close
+the alleged gap between our scientific mastery of nature and our
+deplored impotence to "manage" human affairs through an engineering science of human relations sounds frightening, it is only
+because they have decided to treat man as an entirely natural being
+whose life process can be handled the same way as all other processes.
+In this context, however, it is important to be aware how decisively
+the technological world we live in, or perhaps begin to live in, differs
+from the mechanized world as it arose with the Industrial Revolution. This difference corresponds essentially to the difference between action and fabrication. Industrialization still consisted primarily of the mechanization of work processes, the improvement in
+the making of objects, and man's attitude to nature still remained
+that of homo faber, to whom nature gives the material out of which
+the human artifice is erected. The world we have now come to live
+in, however, is much more determined by man acting into nature,
+creating natural processes and directing them into the human artifice
+and the realm of human affairs, than by building and preserving
+the human artifice as a relatively permanent entity.
+Fabrication is distinguished from action in that it has a definite
+beginning and a predictable end: it comes to an end with its end
+product, which not only outlasts the activity of fabrication but from
+then on has a kind of "life" of its own. Action, on the contrary, as
+the Greeks were the first to discover, is in and by itself utterly futile;
+it never leaves an end product behind itself. If it has any consequences at all, they consist in principle in an endless new chain of
+
+60
+happenings whose eventual outcome the actor is utterly incapable
+of knowing or controlling beforehand. The most he may be able to
+do is to force things into a certain direction, and even of this he can
+never be sure. None of these characteristics is present in fabrication.
+Compared with the futility and fragility of human action, the world
+fabrication erects is of lasting permanence and tremendous solidity.
+Only insofar as the end product of fabrication is incorporated
+into the human world, where its use and eventual "history" can
+never be entirely predicted, does even fabrication start a process
+whose outcome cannot be entirely foreseen and is therefore beyond
+the control of its author. This means only that man is never exclusively homo faber, that even the fabricator remains at the same time
+an acting being, who starts processes wherever he goes and with
+whatever he does.
+Up to our own age human action with its man-made processes
+was confined to the human world, whereas man's chief preoccupation with regard to nature was to use its material in fabrication, to
+build with it the human artifice and defend it against the overwhelming force of the elements. The moment we started natural processes
+of our own—and splitting the atom is precisely such a man-made
+natural process—we not only increased our power over nature, or
+became more aggressive in our dealings with the given forces of the
+earth, but for the first time have taken nature into the human world
+as such and obliterated the defensive boundaries between natural
+elements and the human artifice by which all previous civilizations
+were hedged in.
+The dangers of this acting into nature are obvious if we assume
+that the aforementioned characteristics of human action are part
+and parcel of the human condition. Unpredictability is not lack of
+foresight, and no engineering management of human affairs will
+ever be able to eliminate it, just as no training in prudence can ever
+lead to the wisdom of knowing what one does. Only total conditioning, that is, the total abolition of action, can ever hope to cope with
+unpredictability. And even the predictability of human behavior
+which political terror can enforce for relatively long periods of time
+is hardly able to change the very essence of human affairs once and
+
+61
+for all; it can never be sure of its own future. Human action, like
+all strictly political phenomena, is bound up with human plurality,
+which is one of the fundamental conditions of human life insofar
+as it rests on the fact of natality, through which the human world is
+constantly invaded by strangers, newcomers whose actions and reac
+tions cannot be foreseen by those who are already there and are
+going to leave in a short while. If, therefore, by starting natural
+processes, we have begun to act into nature, we have manifestly
+begun to carry our own unpredictability into that realm which we
+used to think of as ruled by inexorable laws. The "iron law" of
+history was always only a metaphor borrowed from nature; and the
+fact is that this metaphor no longer convinces us because it has
+turned out that natural science can by no means be sure of an unchallengeable rule of law in nature as soon as men, scientists and
+technicians, or simply builders of the human artifice, decide to interfere and no longer leave nature to herself.
+Technology, the ground on which the two realms of history and
+nature have met and interpenetrated each other in our time, points
+back to the connection between the concepts of nature and history
+as they appeared with the rise of the modern age in the sixteenth and
+seventeenth centuries. The connection lies in the concept of process:
+both imply that we think and consider everything in terms of processes and are not concerned with single entities or individual occurrences and their special separate causes. The key words of
+modern historiography-"development" and "progress"—were, in
+the nineteenth century, also the key words of the then new branches
+of natural science, particularly biology and geology, one dealing
+with animal life and the other even with non-organic matter in terms
+of historical processes. Technology, in the modern sense, was preceded by the various sciences of natural history, the history of biological life, of the earth, of the universe. A mutual adjustment of
+terminology of the two branches of scientific inquiry had taken
+place before the quarrel between the natural and historical sciences
+preoccupied the scholarly world to such an extent that it confused
+the fundamental issues.
+Nothing seems more likely to dispel this confusion than the latest
+
+62 Beiween Past and Future
+developments in the natural sciences. They have brought us back
+to the common origin of both nature and history in the modern age
+and demonstrate that their common denominator lies indeed in the
+concept of process—no less than the common denominator of nature and history in antiquity lay in the concept of immortality. But
+the experience which underlies the modern age's notion of process,
+unlike the experience underlying the ancient notion of immortality,
+is by no means primarily an experience which man made in the
+world surrounding him; on the contrary, it sprang from the despair
+of ever experiencing and knowing adequately all that is given to
+man and not made by him. Against this despair modern man summoned up the full measure of his own capacities; despairing of ever
+finding truth through mere contemplation, he began to try out his
+capacities for action, and by doing so he could not help becoming
+aware that wherever man acts he starts processes. The notion of
+process does not denote an objective quality of either history or
+nature; it is the inevitable result of human action. The first result of
+men's acting into history is that history becomes a process, and the
+most cogent argument for men's acting into nature in the guise of
+scientific inquiry is that today, in Whitehead's formulation, "nature
+is a process."
+To act into nature, to carry human unpredictability into a realm
+where we are confronted with elemental forces which we shall perhaps never be able to control reliably, is dangerous enough. Even
+more dangerous would it be to ignore that for the first time in our
+history the human capacity for action has begun to dominate all
+others—the capacity for wonder and thought in contemplation no
+less than the capacities of homo faber and the human animal laborans. This, of course, does not mean that men from now on will no
+longer be able to fabricate things or to think or to labor. Not the
+capabilities of man, but the constellation which orders their mutual
+relationships can and does change historically. Such changes can
+best be observed in the changing self-interpretations of man throughout history, which, though they may be quite irrelevant for the ultimate "what" of human nature, are still the brietest and most succinct witnesses to the spirit of whole epochs. Thus, schematically
+
+63
+speaking, Greek classic antiquity agreed that the highest form of
+human life was spent in a polis and that the supreme human capacity
+was speech—Suor noderuków and Sov dóyor Exov, in Aristotle's famous
+twofold definition; Rome and medieval philosophy defined man as
+the animal rationale; in the initial stages of the modern age, man was
+thought of primarily as homo faber, until, in the nineteenth century,
+man was interpreted as an animal laborans whose metabolism with
+nature would yield the highest productivity of which human life is
+capable. Against the background of these schematic definitions, it
+would be adequate for the world we have come to live in to define
+man as a being capable of action; for this capacity seems to have
+become the center of all other human capabilities.
+It is beyond doubt that the capacity to act is the most dangerous
+of all human abilities and possibilities, and it is also beyond doubt
+that the self-created risks mankind faces today have never been
+faced before. Considerations like these are not at all meant to offer
+solutions or to give advice. At best, they might encourage sustained
+and closer reflection on the nature and the intrinsic potentialities
+of action, which never before has revealed its greatness and its
+dangers so openly.
+Il: History and Earthly Immortality
+The modern concept of process pervading history and nature
+alike separates the modern age from the past more profoundly than
+any other single idea. To our modern way of thinking nothing is
+meaningful in and by itself, not even history or nature taken each
+as a whole, and certainly not particular occurrences in the physical
+order or specific historical events. There is a fateful enormity in
+this state of affairs. Invisible processes have engulfed every tangible
+thing, every individual entity that is visible to us, degrading them
+into functions of an over-all process. The enormity of this change
+is likely to escape us if we allow ourselves to be misled by such
+generalities as the disenchantment of the world or the alienation
+of man, generalities that often involve a romanticized notion of the
+
+64 Between Past and Future
+past. What the concept of process implies is that the concrete and
+the general, the single thing or event and the universal meaning,
+have parted company. The process, which alone makes meaningful whatever it happens to carry along, has thus acquired a monopoly
+of universality and significance.
+Certainly nothing more sharply distinguishes the modern concept
+of history from that of antiquity. For this distinction does not hinge
+on whether or not antiquity had a concept of world history or an
+idea of mankind as a whole. What is much more relevant is that
+Greek and Roman historiography, much as they differ from each
+other, both take it for granted that the meaning or, as the Romans
+would say, the lesson of each event, deed, or occurrence is revealed
+in and by itself. This, to be sure, does not exclude either causality
+or the context in which something occurs; antiquity was as aware
+of these as we are. But causality and context were seen in a light
+provided by the event itself, illuminating a specific segment of human
+affairs; they were not envisaged as having an independent existence
+of which the event would be only the more or less accidental though
+adequate expression. Everything that was done or happened contained and disclosed its share of "general" meaning within the
+confines of its individual shape and did not need a developing and
+engulfing process to become significant. Herodotus wanted "to say
+what is" (léyew tà eóvra) because saying and writing stabilize the
+futile and perishable, "fabricate a memory" for it, in the Greek
+idiom: unpen moreolai, yet he never would have doubted that each
+thing that is or was carries its meaning within itself and needs only
+the word to make it manifest (lóyas Sydow, "to disclose through
+words"), to "display the great deeds in public," ¿módefis Epywr
+Meyádwy. The flux of his narrative is sufficiently loose to leave room
+for many stories, but there is nothing in this flux indicative that the
+general bestows meaning and significance on the particular.
+For this shift of emphasis it is immaterial whether Greek poetry
+and historiography saw the meaning of the event in some surpassing
+greatness justifying its remembrance by posterity, or whether the
+Romans conceived of history as a storehouse of examples taken
+from actual political behavior, demonstrating what tradition, the
+
+65
+authority of ancestors, demanded from each generation and what
+the past had accumulated for the benefit of the present. Our notion
+of historical process overrules both concepts, bestowing upon mere
+time-sequence an importance and dignity it never had before.
+Because of this modern emphasis upon time and time-sequence,
+it has often been maintained that the origin of our historical consciousness lies in the Hebrew-Christian tradition, with its rectilinear
+time-concept and its idea of a divine providence giving to the whole
+of man's historical time the unity of a plan of salvation-an idea
+which indeed stands as much in contrast to the insistence on individual events and occurrences of classical antiquity as to the cyclical
+time-speculations of late antiquity. A great deal of evidence has been
+cited in support of the thesis that the modern historical consciousness has a Christian religious origin and came into being through a
+secularization of originally theological categories. Only our religious
+tradition, it is said, knows of a beginning and, in the Christian version, an end of the world; if human life on earth follows a divine
+plan of salvation, then its mere sequence must harbor a significance
+independent of and transcending all single occurrences. Therefore,
+the argument runs, a "well-defined outline of world history" did not
+appear prior to Christianity, and the first philosophy of history is
+presented in Augustine's De Civitate Dei. And it is true that in
+Augustine we find the notion that history itself, namely that which
+has meaning and makes sense, can be separated from the single
+historical events related in chronological narrative. He states explicitly that "although the past institutions of men are related in
+historical narrative, history itself is not to be counted among human
+institutions." 19
+This similarity between the Christian and the modern concept of
+history is deceptive, however. It rests on a comparison with the
+cyclical history-speculations of late antiquity and overlooks the
+classical history-concepts of Greece and Rome. The comparison is
+supported by the fact that Augustine himself, when he refuted pagar.
+time-speculations, was primarily concerned with the cyclical timetheories of his own era, which indeed no Christian could accept
+because of the absolute uniqueness of Christ's life and death on
+
+66 $
+earth: "Once Christ died for our sins; and rising from the dead, ne
+dieth no more." 20 What modern interpreters are liable to forget is
+that Augustine claimed this uniqueness of event, which sounds so
+familiar to our ears, for this one event only—the supreme event in
+human history, when eternity, as it were, broke into the course of
+earthly mortality; he never claimed such uniqueness, as we do, for
+ordinary secular events. The simple fact that the problem of history
+arose in Christian thought only with Augustine should make us
+doubt its Christian origin, and this all the more as it arose, in terms
+of Augustine's own philosophy and theology, because of an accident.
+The fall of Rome, occurring in his lifetime, was interpreted by
+Christians and pagans alike as a decisive event, and it was to the
+refutation of this belief that Augustine devoted thirteen years of
+his life. The point, as he saw it, was that no purely secular event
+could or should ever be of central import to man. His lack of interest
+in what we call history was so great that he devoted only one book
+of the Civitas Dei to secular events; and in commissioning his friend
+and pupil Orosius to write a "world history" he had no more in
+mind than a "true compilation of the evils of the world." 21
+Augustine's attitude toward secular history is essentially no different from that of the Romans, albeit the emphasis is inverted:
+bistory remains a storehouse of examples, and the location of events
+in time within the secular course of history remains without importance. Secular history repeats itself, and the only story in which
+unique and unrepeatable events take place begins with Adam and
+ends with the birth and death of Christ. Thereafter secular powers
+rise and fall as in the past and will rise and fall until the world's end,
+but no fundamentally new truth will ever again be revealed by such
+mundane events, and Christians are not supposed to attach particular significance to them. In all truly Christian philosophy man is a
+"pilgrim on earth," and this fact alone separates it from our own
+bistorical consciousness. To the Christian, as to the Roman, the
+significance of secular events lay in their having the character of
+examples likely to repeat themselves, so that action could follow
+certain standardized patterns. (This, incidentally, is also very far
+removed from the Greek notion of the heroic deed, related by poets
+
+67
+and historians, which serves as a kind of yardstick with which to
+measure one's own capacities for greatness. The difference between
+the faithful following of a recognized example and the attempt to
+measure oneself against it is the difference between Roman-Christian morality and what has been called the Greek agonal spirit,
+which did not know any "moral" considerations but only an dei
+¿ploTEvEw, an unceasing effort always to be the best of all.) For us,
+on the other hand, history stands and falls on the assumption that
+the process in its very secularity tells a story of its own and that,
+strictly speaking, repetitions cannot occur.
+Even more alien to the modern concept of history is the Christian
+notion that mankind has a beginning and an end, that the world
+was created in time and will ultimately perish, like all things temporal. Historical consciousness did not arise when the creation of
+the world was taken as the starting point for chronological enumeration, by the Jews in the Middle Ages; nor did it arise in the sixth
+century when Dionysus Exiguus began counting time from the birth
+of Christ. We know of similar schemes of chronology in Oriental
+civilization, and the Christian calendar imitated the Roman practice of counting time from the year of the foundation of Rome. In
+stark contrast stands the moder computation of historical dates,
+introduced only at the end of the eighteenth century, that takes the
+birth of Christ as a turning point from which to count time both
+backward and forward. This chronological reform is presented in
+the textbooks as a mere technical improvement, needed for scholarly
+purposes to facilitate the exact fixing of dates in ancient history
+without referring to a maze of different time-reckonings. In more
+recent times, Hegel inspired an interpretation which sees in the
+modern time system a truly Christian chronology because the birth
+of Christ now seems to have become the turning point of world
+history22
+Neither of these explanations is satisfactory. Chronological reforms for scholarly purposes have occurred many times in the past
+without being accepted in everyday life, precisely because they were
+invented for scholarly convenience only and did not correspond to
+any changed time-concept in society at large. The decisive thing
+
+68
+in our system is not that the birth of Christ now appears as the
+turning point of world history, for it had been recognized as such
+and with greater force many centuries before without any similar
+effect upon our chronology, but rather that now, for the first time,
+the history of mankind reaches back into an infinite past to which
+we can add at will and into which we can inquire further as it
+stretches ahead into an infinite future. This twofold infinity of past
+and future eliminates all notions of beginning and end, establishing
+mankind in a potential earthly immortality. What at first glance
+looks like a Christianization of world history in fact eliminates all
+religious time-speculations from secular history. So far as secular
+history is concerned we live in a process which knows no beginning
+and no end and which thus does not permit us to entertain eschatological expectations. Nothing could be more alien to Christian thought
+than this concept of an earthly immortality of mankind.
+The great impact of the notion of history upon the consciousness
+of the modern age came relatively late, not before the last third of
+the eighteenth century, finding with relative quickness its climactic
+consummation in Hegel's philosophy. The central concept of Hegelian metaphysics is history. This alone places it in the sharpest possible opposition to all previous metaphysics, which, since Plato, had
+looked for truth and the revelation of eternal Being everywhere
+except in the realm of human affairs—à twv ard púnwr áypara—
+of which Plato speaks with such contempt precisely because no
+permanence could be found in it and therefore it could not be expected to disclose truth. To think, with Hegel, that truth resides and
+reveals itself in the time-process itself is characteristic of all modern
+historical consciousness, however it expresses itself, in specifically
+Hegelian terms or not. The rise of the humanities in the nineteenth
+century was inspired by the same feeling for history and is hence
+clearly distinguished from the recurrent revivals of antiquity that
+took place in previous periods. Men now began to read, as Meinecke
+pointed out, as nobody had ever read before. They "read in order
+to force from history the ultimate truth it could offer to God-seeking people"; but this ultimate truth was no longer supposed to reside
+
+69
+in a single book, whether the Bible or some substitute for it. History itself was considered such a book, the book "of the human soul
+in times and nations," as Herder defined it.23
+Recent historical research has shed much new light on the transitional period between the Middle Ages and modern times, with the
+result that the modern age, previously assumed to have begun with
+the Renaissance, has been traced back into the very heart of the
+Middle Ages. This greater insistence on an unbroken continuity,
+valuable though it is, has one drawback, that by trying to bridge
+the gulf separating a religious culture from the secular world we
+live in, it bypasses, rather than solves, the great riddle of the sudden
+undeniable rise of the secular. If by "secularization" one means no
+more than the rise of the secular and the concomitant eclipse of a
+transcendent world, then it is undeniable that modern historical
+consciousness is very intimately connected with it. This, however,
+in no way implies the doubtful transformation of religious and transcendent categories into immanent earthly aims and standards on
+which the historians of ideas have recently insisted. Secularization
+means first of all simply the separation of religion and politics, and
+this affected both sides so fundamentally that nothing is less likely
+to have taken place than the gradual transformation of religious
+categories into secular concepts which the defenders of unbroken
+continuity try to establish. The reason they can succeed to some
+extent in convincing us lies in the nature of ideas in general rather
+than in the period with which they deal; the moment one separates
+an idea entirely from its basis in real experience, it is not difficult
+to establish a connection between it and almost any other idea. In
+other words, if we assume that something like an independent realm
+of pure ideas exists, all notions and concepts cannot but be interrelated, because then they all owe their origin to the same source:
+a human mind seen in its extreme subjectivity, forever playing with
+its own images, unaffected by experience and with no relationship
+to the world, whether the world is conceived as nature or as history.
+However, if we understand by secularization an event that can be
+dated in historical time rather than a change of ideas, then the
+question is not whether Hegel's "cunning of reason" was a secular-
+
+70
+ization of divine providence or whether Marx's classless society
+represents a secularization of the Messianic Age. The fact is that
+the separation of church and state occurred, eliminating religion
+from public life, removing all religious sanctions from politics, and
+causing religion to lose that political element it had acquired in the
+centuries when the Roman Catholic Church acted as the heir of the
+Roman Empire. (It does not follow that this separation converted
+religion into an entirely "private affair." This type of privacy in
+religion comes about when a tyrannical regime prohibits the public
+functioning of churches, denying the believer the public space in
+which he can appear with others and be seen by them. The publicsecular domain, or the political sphere, properly speaking, comprehends and has room for the public-religious sphere. A believer can
+be a member of a church and at the same time act as a citizen in
+the larger unit constituted by all belonging to the City.) This secularization was frequently brought about by men who did not doubt in
+the least the truth of traditional religious teaching (even Hobbes
+died in mortal fear of "hell-fire," and Descartes prayed to the Holy
+Virgin) and nothing in the sources justifies us in considering all
+those who prepared or helped to establish a new independent secular
+sphere as secret or unconscious atheists. All that we can say is that,
+whatever their faith or lack of it, it was without influence on the
+secular. Thus the political theorists of the seventeenth century accomplished secularization by separating political thinking from
+theology, and by insisting that the rules of natural law provided a
+basis for the body politic even if God did not exist. It was the same
+thought which made Grotius say that "even God cannot cause two
+times two not to make four." The point was not to deny the existence
+of God but to discover in the secular realm an independent, immanent meaning which even God could not alter.
+It has been pointed out before that the most important consequence of the rise of the secular realm in the modern age was that
+belief in individual immortality—whether it be the immortality of
+the soul or, more importantly, the resurrection of the body-lost
+its politically binding force. Now indeed "it was inevitable that
+earthly posterity should once again become the principal substance
+
+71
+of hope," but it does not follow from this that a secularization of
+the belief in a hereafter occurred or that the new attitude was essentially nothing but "a redisposition of the Christian ideas which it
+seeks to displace." 24 What actually happened was that the problem
+of politics regained that grave and decisive relevance for the existence of men which it had been lacking since antiquity because it
+was irreconcilable with a strictly Christian understanding of the
+secular. For Greeks and Romans alike, all differences notwithstanding, the foundation of a body politic was brought about by man's
+need to overcome the mortality of human life and the futility of
+human deeds. Outside the body politic, man's life was not only
+and not even primarily insecure, i.e., exposed to the violence of
+others; it was without meaning and dignity because under no circumstances could it leave any traces behind it. That was the reason
+for the curse laid by Greek thinking on the whole sphere of private
+life, the "idiocy" of which consisted in its being concerned solely
+with survival, just as it was the reason for Cicero's contention that
+only through building and preserving political communities could
+human virtue attain to the ways of the gods.?5 In other words, the
+secularization of the modern age once more brought to the fore that
+activity which Aristotle had called ålavarílev, a term for which we
+have no ready equivalent in our living languages. The reason I mention this word again is that it points to an activity of "immortalizing"
+rather than to the object which is to become immortal. To strive
+for immortality can mean, as it certainly did in early Greece, the
+immortalization of oneself through famous deeds and the acquisition
+of immortal fame; it can also mean the addition to the human artifice of something more permanent than we are ourselves; and it can
+mean, as it did with the philosophers, the spending of one's life
+with things immortal. In any event, the word designated an activity
+and not a belief, and what the activity required was an imperishable
+space guaranteeing that "immortalizing" would not be in vain. 26
+To us, who have been accustomed to the idea of immortality
+only through the lasting appeal of works of art and perhaps through
+the relative permanence we ascribe to all great civilizations, it may
+appear implausible that the drive toward immortality should lie at
+
+72 ฿
+the foundation of political communities.? To the Greeks, however,
+the latter might very well have been much more taken for granted
+than the former. Did not Pericles think that the highest praise he
+could bestow upon Athens was to claim that it no longer needed "a
+Homer or others of his craft," but that, thanks to the polis, Athenians everywhere would leave "imperishable monuments" behind
+them? 28 What Homer had done was to immortalize human deeds,?°
+and the polis could dispense with the service of "others of his craft"
+because it offered each of its citizens that public-political space that
+it assumed would confer immortality upon his acts. The growing
+apolitism of the philosophers after Socrates' death, their demand to
+be freed from political activities and their insistence on performing
+a nonpractical, purely theoretical alavarife outside the sphere of
+political life had philosophical as well as political causes, but among
+the political ones was certainly the increasing decay of polis life,
+making even the permanence, let alone immortality, of this particular body politic more and more doubtful.
+The apolitism of ancient philosophy foreshadowed the much more
+radical anti-political attitude of early Christianity, which, however,
+in its very extremism survived only so long as the Roman Empire
+provided a stable body politic for all nations and all religions. During these early centuries of our era the conviction that things earthly
+are perishable remained a religious matter and was the belief of
+those who wanted to have nothing to do with political affairs. This
+changed decisively with the crucial experience of the fall of Rome,
+the sacking of the Eternal City, after which no age ever again believed that any human product, least of all a political structure,
+could endure forever. As far as Christian thought was concerned,
+this was a mere reaffirmation of its beliefs. It was of no great relevance, as Augustine pointed out. To Christians only individual men
+were immortal, but nothing else of this world, neither mankind as a
+whole nor the earth itself, least of all the human artifice. Only by
+transcending this world could immortalizing activities be performed,
+and the only institution that could be justified within the secular
+realm was the Church, the Civitas Dei on earth, to which had fallen
+the burden of political responsibility and into which all genuinely
+
+73
+political impulses could be drawn. That this transformation of Christianity and its earlier anti-political impulses into a great and stable
+political institution was possible at all without complete perversion
+of the Gospel is almost wholly due to Augustine, who, though hardly
+the father of our concept of history, is probably the spiritual author
+and certainly the greatest theorist of Christian politics. What was
+decisive in this respect was that he, still firmly rooted in the Roman
+tradition, could add to the Christian notion of an everlasting life the
+idea of a future civitas, a Civitas Dei, where men even in the hereafter would continue to live in a community. Without this reformulation of Christian thoughts through Augustine, Christian politics
+might have remained what they had been in the early centuries, a
+contradiction in terms. Augustine could solve the dilemma because
+the language itself came to his help: in Latin the word "to live" had
+always coincided with inter homines esse, "to be in the company of
+men," so that an everlasting life in Roman interpretation was bound
+to mean that no man would ever have to part from human company
+even though in death he had to leave the earth. Thus the fact of the
+plurality of men, one of the fundamental prerequisites of political
+life, bound human "nature" even under the conditions of individual
+immortality, and was not among the characteristics which this "nature" had acquired after Adam's fall and which made politics in the
+mere secular sense a necessity for the sinful life on earth. Augustine's
+conviction that some kind of political life must exist even under
+conditions of sinlessness, and indeed sanctity, he summed up in
+one sentence: Socialis est vita sanctorum, even the life of the saints
+is a life together with other men.3o
+If the insight into the perishability of all human creations had no
+great relevance for Christian thought and could even in its greatest
+thinker be in accord with a conception of politics beyond the secular
+realm, it became very troublesome in the modern age when the
+secular sphere of human life had emancipated itself from religion.
+The separation of religion and politics meant that no matter what
+an individual might believe as a member of a church, as a citizen he
+acted and behaved on the assumption of human mortality. Hobbes's
+
+74
+fear of hell-fire did not influence in the least his construction of
+government as the Leviathan, a mortal god to overawe all men.
+Politically speaking, within the secular realm itself secularization
+meant nothing more or less than that men once more had become
+mortals. If this led them to a rediscovery of antiquity, which we call
+humanism, and in which Greek and Roman sources spoke again
+a much more familiar language corresponding to experiences much
+more similar to their own, it certainly did not allow them in practice
+to mold their behavior in accordance with either the Greek or the
+Roman example. The ancient trust in the world's being more permanent than individual men and in political structures as a guarantee of earthly survival after death did not return, so that the ancient
+opposition of a mortal life to a more or less immortal world failed
+them. Now both life and world had become perishable, mortal, and
+futile.
+Today we find it difficult to grasp that this situation of absolute
+mortality could be unbearable to men. However, looking back upon
+the development of the modern age up to the beginning of our own,
+the modern world, we see that centuries passed before we became
+accustomed to the notion of absolute mortality, so that the thought
+of it no longer bothers us and the old alternative between an individual immortal life in a mortal world and a mortal life in an immortal world has ceased to be meaningful. In this respect, however,
+as in many others, we differ from all previous ages. Our concept of
+history, though essentially a concept of the modern age, owes its
+existence to the transition period when religious confidence in immortal life had lost its influence upon the secular and the new indifference toward the question of immortality had not yet been
+born.
+If we leave aside the new indifference and stay within the limits
+of the traditional alternative, bestowing immortality either upon life
+or upon the world, then it is obvious that alavarijew, immortalizing,
+as an activity of mortal men, can be meaningful only if there is
+no guarantee of life in the hereafter. At that moment, however, it
+becomes almost a necessity as long as there is any concern with immortality whatsoever. It was therefore in the course of its search
+
+75
+for a strictly secular realm of enduring permanence that the modern
+age discovered the potential immortality of mankind. This is what
+is manifestly expressed in our calendar; it is the actual content of
+our concept of history. History, stretching into the twofold infinity
+of past and future, can guarantee immortality on earth in much
+the same way as the Greek polis or the Roman republic had guaranteed that human life and human deeds, insofar as they disclosed
+something essential and something great, would receive a strictly
+human and earthly permanence in this world. The great advantage
+of this concept has been that the twofold infinity of the historical
+process establishes a time-space in which the very notion of an
+end is virtually inconceivable, whereas its great disadvantage, compared with ancient political theory, seems to be that permanence
+is entrusted to a flowing process, as distinguished from a stable
+structure. At the same time the immortalizing process has become
+independent of cities, states, and nations; it encompasses the whole
+of mankind, whose history Hegel was consequently able to see as
+one uninterrupted development of the Spirit. Therewith mankind
+ceases to be only a species of nature, and what distinguishes man
+from the animals is no longer merely that he has speech (dóyor
+Exwv), as in the Aristotelian definition, or that he has reason, as in
+the medieval definition (animal rationale): his very life now distinguishes him, the one thing that in the traditional definition he
+was supposed to share with the animals. In the words of Droysen,
+who was perhaps the most thoughtful of the nineteenth-century historians: "What their species is for animals and plants ... that is
+history for human beings." 31
+Ill: History and Politics
+While it is obvious that our historical consciousness would never
+have been possible without the rise of the secular realm to a new
+dignity, it was not so obvious that the historical process would
+eventually be called upon to bestow the necessary new meaning and
+significance upon men's deeds and sufferings on earth. And indeed,
+
+76
+at the beginning of the modern age everything pointed to an elevation of political action and political life, and the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, so rich in new political philosophies, were still quite
+unaware of any special emphasis on history as such. Their concern,
+on the contrary, was to get rid of the past rather than to rehabilitate
+the historical process. The distinguishing trait of Hobbes's philosophy is his single-minded insistence on the future and the resulting
+teleological interpretation of thought as well as of action. The conviction of the modern age that man can know only that which he
+himself has made seems to be in accordance with a glorification of
+action rather than with the basically contemplative attitude of the
+historian and of historical consciousness in general.
+Thus one of the reasons for Hobbes's break with traditional philosophy was that while all previous metaphysics had followed Aristotle in holding that the inquiry into the first causes of everything
+that is comprises the chief task of philosophy, it was Hobbes's contention that, on the contrary, the task of philosophy was to guide
+purposes and aims and to establish a reasonable teleology of action.
+So important was this point to Hobbes that he insisted that animals
+too are capable of discovering causes and that therefore this cannot
+be the true distinction between human and animal life; he found
+the distinction instead in the ability to reckon with "the effects of
+some present or past cause ... of which I have not at any time
+seen any sign but in man only." 32 The modern age not only produced
+at its very start a new and radical political philosophy—Hobbes is
+only one example, though perhaps the most interesting—it also produced for the first time philosophers willing to orient themselves
+according to the requirements of the political realm; and this new
+political orientation is present not only in Hobbes but, mutatis mutandis, in Locke and Hume as well. It can be said that Hegel's
+transformation of metaphysics into a philosophy of history was preceded by an attempt to get rid of metaphysics for the sake of a philosophy of politics.
+In any consideration of the modern concept of history one of the
+crucial problems is to explain its sudden rise during the last third
+
+77
+of the eighteenth century and the concomitant decrease of interest
+in purely political thinking. (Vico must be said to be a forerunner
+whose influence was not felt until more than two generations after
+his death.) Where a genuine interest in political theory still survived it ended in despair, as in Tocqueville, or in the confusion of
+politics with history, as in Marx. For what else but despair could
+have inspired Tocqueville's assertion that "since the past has ceased
+to throw its light upon the future the mind of man wanders in obscurity"? This is actually the conclusion of the great work in which
+he had "delineated the society of the modern world" and in the
+introduction to which he had proclaimed that "a new science of
+politics is needed for a new world." 33 And what else but confusion
+—a merciful confusion for Marx himself and a fatal one for his
+followers—could have led to Marx's identification of action with
+"the making of history"?
+Marx's notion of "making history" had an influence far beyond
+the circle of convinced Marxists or determined revolutionaries. Al-
+though it is closely connected with Vico's idea that history was made
+by man, as distinguished from "nature," which was made by God,
+the difference between them is still decisive. For Vico, as later for
+Hegel, the importance of the concept of history was primarily theoretical. It never occurred to either of them to apply this concept
+directly by using it as a principle of action. Truth they conceived
+of as being revealed to the contemplative, backward-directed glance
+of the historian, who, by being able to see the process as a whole,
+is in a position to overlook the "narrow aims" of acting men, concentrating instead on the "higher aims" that realize themselves behind their backs (Vico). Marx, on the other hand, combined this
+notion of history with the teleological political philosophies of the
+earlier stages of the modern age, so that in his thought the "higher
+aims"-which according to the philosophers of history revealed
+themselves only to the backward glance of the historian and philosopher—could become intended aims of political action. The point
+is that Marx's political philosophy was based not upon an analysis
+of action and acting men but, on the contrary, on the Hegelian con-
+
+78
+cern with history. It was the historian and the philosopher of history
+who were politicalized. By the same token, the age-old identification of action with making and fabricating was supplemented and
+perfected, as it were, through identifying the contemplative gaze of
+the historian with the contemplation of the model (the cisor or
+"shape" from which Plato had derived his "ideas") that guides the
+craftsmen and precedes all making. And the danger of these combinations did not lie in making immanent what was formerly transcendent, as is often alleged, as though Marx attempted to establish on
+earth a paradise formerly located in the hereafter. The danger of
+transforming the unknown and unknowable "higher aims" into
+planned and willed intentions was that meaning and meaningfulness
+were transformed into ends—which is what happened when Marx
+took the Hegelian meaning of all history—the progressive unfolding
+and actualization of the idea of Freedom-to be an end of human
+action, and when he furthermore, in accordance with tradition,
+viewed this ultimate "end" as the end-product of a manufacturing
+process. But neither freedom nor any other meaning can ever be the
+product of a human activity in the sense in which the table is clearly
+the end-product of the carpenter's activity.
+The growing meaninglessness of the modern world is perhaps
+nowhere more clearly foreshadowed than in this identification of
+meaning and end. Meaning, which can never be the aim of action
+and yet, inevitably, will rise out of human deeds after the action itself
+has come to an end, was now pursued with the same machinery of
+intentions and of organized means as were the particular direct aims
+of concrete action—with the result that it was as though meaning
+itself had departed from the world of men and men were left with
+nothing but an unending chain of purposes in whose progress the
+meaningfulness of all past achievements was constantly canceled out
+by future goals and intentions. It is as though men were stricken
+suddenly blind to fundamental distinctions such as the distinction
+between meaning and end, between the general and the particular,
+or, grammatically speaking, the distinction between "for the sake
+of ..." and "in order to ..." (as though the carpenter, for in-
+
+79
+stance, forgot that only his particular acts in making a table are
+performed in the mode of "in order to," but that his whole life as
+a carpenter is ruled by something quite different, namely an encompassing notion "for the sake of" which he became a carpenter
+in the first place). And the moment such distinctions are forgotten
+and meanings are degraded into ends, it follows that ends themselves
+are no longer safe because the distinction between means and ends
+is no longer understood, so that finally all ends turn and are degraded
+into means.
+In this version of deriving politics from history, or rather, political
+conscience from historical consciousness—by no means restricted
+to Marx in particular, or even to pragmatism in general—we can
+easily detect the age-old attempt to escape from the frustrations and
+fragility of human action by construing it in the image of making.
+What distinguishes Marx's own theory from all others in which the
+notion of "making history" has found a place is only that he alone
+realized that if one takes history to be the object of a process of
+fabrication or making, there must come a moment when this "object" is completed, and that if one imagines that one can "make
+history," one cannot escape the consequence that there will be an
+end to history. Whenever we hear of grandiose aims in politics, such
+as establishing a new society in which justice will be guaranteed forever, or fighting a war to end all wars or to make the whole world
+safe for democracy, we are moving in the realm of this kind of thinking.
+In this context, it is important to see that here the process of history, as it shows itself in our calendar's stretching into the infinity
+of the past and the future, has been abandoned for the sake of an
+altogether different kind of process, that of making something which
+has a beginning as well as an end, whose laws of motion, therefore,
+can be determined (for instance as dialectical movement) and whose
+innermost content can be discovered (for instance as class struggle).
+This process, however, is incapable of guaranteeing men any kind
+of immortality because its end cancels out and makes unimportant
+whatever went before: in the classless society the best mankind can
+
+: 80
+do with history is to forget the whole unhappy affair, whose only
+purpose was to abolish itself. It cannot bestow meaning on particular
+occurrences either, because it has dissolved all of the particular
+into means whose meaningfulness ends the moment the end-product
+• is finished: single events and deeds and sufferings have no more
+• meaning here than hammer and nails have with respect to the
+finished table.
+We know the curious ultimate meaninglessness arising from all
+the strictly utilitarian philosophies that were so common and so
+characteristic of the earlier industrial phase of the modern age, when
+men, fascinated by the new possibilities of manufacturing, thought
+of everything in terms of means and ends, i.e., categories whose
+validity had its source and justification in the experience of producing use-objects. The trouble lies in the nature of the categorical
+framework of ends and means, which changes every attained end
+immediately into the means to a new end, thereby, as it were, destroying meaning wherever it is applied, until in the midst of the
+seemingly unending utilitarian questioning, What is the use
+of ...? in the midst of the seemingly unending progress where
+the aim of today becomes the means of a better tomorrow, the one
+question arises which no utilitarian thinking can ever answer: "And
+what is the use of use?" as Lessing once succinctly put it.
+This meaninglessness of all truly utilitarian philosophies could
+escape Marx's awareness because he thought that after Hegel in
+his dialectics had discovered the law of all movements, natural and
+historical, he himself had found the spring and content of this law
+in the historical realm and thereby the concrete meaning of the story
+history has to tell. Class struggle-to Marx this formula seemed to
+unlock all the secrets of history, just as the law of gravity had appeared to unlock all the secrets of nature. Today, after we have
+been treated to one such history-construction after another, to one
+such formula after another, the question for us is no longer whether
+this or that particular formula is correct. In all such attempts what
+is considered to be a meaning is in fact no more than a pattern, and
+within the limitations of utilitarian thought nothing but patterns can
+
+81
+make sense, because only patterns can be "made," whereas meanings cannot be, but, like truth, will only disclose or reveal themselves.
+Marx was only the first-and still the greatest, among historians—
+to mistake a pattern for a meaning, and he certainly could hardly
+have been expected to realize that there was almost no pattern into
+which the events of the past would not have fitted as neatly and
+consistently as they did into his own. Marx's pattern at least was
+based on one important historical insight; since then we have seen
+historians freely imposing upon the maze of past facts almost any
+pattern they wish, with the result that the ruin of the factual and
+Marie as through the see the b he her tual stry ture neal intonical process, that is, chronology.
+Moreover, Marx construed his pattern as he did because of his
+concern with action and impatience with history. He is the last of
+those thinkers who stand at the borderline between the modern age's
+earlier interest in politics and its later preoccupation with history.
+One might mark the point where the modern age abandoned its
+earlier attempts to establish a new political philosophy for its rediscovery of the secular by recalling the moment at which the French
+Revolutionary calendar was given up, after one decade, and the
+Revolution was reintegrated, as it were, into the historical process
+with its twofold extension toward infinity. It was as though it was
+conceded that not even the Revolution, which, along with the promulgation of the American Constitution, is still the greatest event
+in modern political history, contained sufficient independent meaning in itself to begin a new historical process. For the Republican
+calendar was abandoned not merely because of Napoleon's wish to
+rule an empire and to be considered the equal of the crowned heads
+of Europe. The abandonment also implied the refusal, despite the
+re-establishment of the secular, to accept the conviction of the ancients that political actions are meaningful regardless of their his
+torical location, and especially a repudiation of the Roman faith ir
+the sacredness of foundations with the accompanying custom of numbering time from the foundation date. Indeed, the French Revolu-
+
+82 Beiween Past and Future
+tion, which was inspired by the Roman spirit and appeared to the
+world, as Marx liked to say, in Roman dress, reversed itself in more
+than one sense.
+An equally important landmark in the shift from the earlier concern with politics to the later concern with history is encountered
+in Kant's political philosophy. Kant, who had greeted in Rousseau
+"the Newton of the moral world," and had been greeted by his contemporaries as the theorist of the Rights of Man,34 still had great
+difficulty in coping with the new idea of history, which had probably
+come to his attention in the writings of Herder. He is one of the last
+philosophers to complain in earnest about the "meaningless course
+of human affairs," the "melancholy haphazardness" of historical
+events and developments, this hopeless, senseless "mixture of error
+and violence," as Goethe once defined history. Yet Kant also saw
+what others had seen before him, that once you look at history in
+its entirety (im Grossen), rather than at single events and the everfrustrated intentions of human agents, everything suddenly makes
+sense, because there is always at least a story to tell. The process as
+a whole appears to be guided by an "intention of nature" unknown
+to acting men but comprehensible to those who come after them.
+By pursuing their own aims without rhyme or reason men seem to
+be led by "the guiding thread of reason." 35
+It is of some importance to notice that Kant, like Vico before him,
+was already aware of what Hegel later called "the cunning of reason"
+(Kant occasionally called it "the ruse of nature"). He even had some
+rudimentary insight into historical dialectics, as when he pointed
+out that nature pursues its over-all aims through "the antagonism
+of men in society ... without which men, good-natured like the
+sheep they tend, would hardly know how to give a higher value to
+their own existence than is possessed by their cattle." This shows to
+what extent the very idea of history as a process suggests that in
+their actions men are led by something of which they are not necessarily conscious and which finds no direct expression in the action
+itself. Or, to put it another way, it shows how extremely useful the
+modern concept of history proved to be in giving the secular political realm a meaning which it otherwise seemed to be devoid of. In
+
+83
+Kant, in contrast to Hegel, the motive for the modern escape from
+politics into history is still quite clear. It is the escape into the
+"whole," and the escape is prompted by the meaninglessness of the
+particular. And since Kant's primary interest was still in the nature
+and principles of political (or, as he would say, moral) action, he
+was able to perceive the crucial drawback of the new approach, the
+one great stumbling block which no philosophy of history and no
+concept of progress can ever remove. In Kant's own words: "It will
+always remain bewildering . . . that the earlier generations seem
+to carry on their burdensome business only for the sake of the later
+•..and that only the last should have the good fortune to dwell
+in the [completed] building." 36
+The bewildered regret and great diffidence with which Kant resigned himself to introducing a concept of history into his political
+philosophy indicates with rare precision the nature of the perplexities which caused the modern age to shift its emphasis from a theory
+of politics—apparently so much more appropriate to its belief in the
+superiority of action to contemplation—to an essentially contemplative philosophy of history. For Kant was perhaps the only great
+thinker to whom the question "What shall I do?" was not only as
+relevant as the two other questions of metaphysics, "What can I
+know?" and "What may I hope?" but formed the very center of his
+philosophy. Therefore he was not troubled, as even Marx and
+Nietzsche were still troubled, by the traditional hierarchy of contemplation over action, the vita contemplativa over the vita activa;
+his problem was rather another traditional hierarchy which, because
+it is hidden and rarely articulate, has proved much more difficult to
+overcome, the hierarchy within the vita activa itself, where the acting
+of the statesman occupies the highest position, the making of the
+craftsman and artist an intermediary, and the laboring which pro
+vides the necessities for the functioning of the human organism the
+lowest. (Marx was later to reverse this hierarchy too, although he
+wrote explicitly only about elevating action over contemplation and
+changing the world as against interpreting it. In the course of this
+reversal he had to upset the traditional hierarchy within the vita
+activa as well, by putting the lowest of human activities, the activity
+
+84 Berween Past and Future
+ot labor, into the highest place. Action now appeared to be no more
+than a function of "the productive relationships" of mankind
+brought about by labor.) It is true that traditional philosophy often
+pays only lip service to the estimate of action as the highest activity
+of man, preferring the so much more reliable activity of making, so
+that the hierarchy within the vita activa has hardly ever been fully
+articulated. It is a sign of the political rank of Kant's philosophy that
+the old perplexities inherent in action were brought to the fore
+again.
+However that may be, Kant could not but become aware of the
+fact that action fulfilled neither of the two hopes the modern age
+was bound to expect from it. If the secularization of our world implies the revival of the old desire for some kind of earthly immortality, then human action, especially in its political aspect, must appear
+singularly inadequate to meet the demands of the new age. From the
+point of view of motivation, action appears to be the least interesting
+and most futile of all human pursuits: "Passions, private aims, and
+the satisfaction of selfish desires, are . . . the most effective springs
+of action," 37 and "the facts of known history," taken by themselves,
+"possess neither a common basis nor continuity nor coherence"
+(Vico). From the viewpoint of achievement, on the other hand, action appears at once to be more futile and more frustrating than the
+activities of laboring and of producing objects. Human deeds, unless
+they are remembered, are the most futile and perishable things on
+earth; they hardly outlast the activity itself and certainly by themselves can never aspire to that permanence which even ordinary useobjects possess when they outlast their maker's life, not to mention
+works of art, which speak to us over the centuries. Human action,
+projected into a web of relationships where many and opposing
+ends are pursued, almost never fulfills its original intention; no act
+can ever be recognized by its author as his own with the same happy
+certainty with which a piece of work of any kind can be recognized
+Dy its maker. Whoever begins to act must know that he has started
+something whose end he can never foretell, if only because his own
+deed has already changed everything and made it even more unpredictable. That is what Kant had in mind when he spoke of the
+
+85
+"melancholy haphazardness" (trostlose Ungefähr) which is so striking in the record of political history. "Action: one does not know its
+origin, one does not know its consequences: -therefore, does action
+possess any value at all?" 38 Were not the old philosophers right, and
+was it not madness to expect any meaning to arise out of the realm
+of human affairs?
+For a long time it seemed that these inadequacies and perplexities
+within the vita activa could be solved by ignoring the peculiarities of
+action and by insisting upon the "meaningfulness" of the process of
+history in its entirety, which seemed to give to the political sphere
+that dignity and final redemption from "melancholy haphazardness"
+so obviously required. History-based on the manifest assumption
+that no matter how haphazard single actions may appear in the present and in their singularity, they inevitably lead to a sequence of
+events forming a story that can be rendered through intelligible
+narrative the moment the events are removed into the past-became
+the great dimension in which men could become "reconciled" with
+reality (Hegel), the reality of human affairs, i.e., of things which
+owe their existence exclusively to men. Moreover, since history in
+its modern version was conceived primarily as a process, it showed
+a peculiar and inspiring affinity to action, which, indeed, in contrast
+to all other human activities, consists first of all of starting processes
+—a fact of which human experience has of course always been
+aware, even though the preoccupation of philosophy with making
+as the model of human activity has prevented the elaboration of an
+articulate terminology and precise description. The very notion of
+process, which is so highly characteristic of modern science, both
+natural and historical, probably had its origin in this fundamental
+experience of action, to which secularization lent an emphasis such
+as it had not known since the very early centuries of Greek culture,
+even before the rise of the polis and certainly before the victory of
+the Socratic school. History in its modern version could come to
+terms with this experience; and though it failed to save politics itself from the old disgrace, though the single deeds and acts constituting the realm of politics, properly speaking, were left in limbo,
+it has at least bestowed upon the record of past events that share of
+
+86
+earthly immortality to which the modern age necessarily aspired,
+but which its acting men no longer dared to claim from posterity.
+Epilogue
+Today the Kantian and Hegelian way of becoming reconciled to
+reality through understanding the innermost meaning of the entire
+historical process seems to be quite as much refuted by our experience as the simultaneous attempt of pragmatism and utilitarianism
+to "make history" and impose upon reality the preconceived meaning and law of man. While trouble throughout the modern age has
+as a rule started with the natural sciences and has been the consequence of experience gained in the attempt to know the universe,
+this time the refutation rises simultaneously out of the physical and
+political fields. The trouble is that almost every axiom seems to lend
+itself to consistent deductions and this to such an extent that it is as
+though men were in a position to prove almost any hypothesis they
+might choose to adopt, not only in the field of purely mental constructions like the various over-all interpretations of history which
+are all equally well supported by facts, but in the natural sciences
+as well.39
+As far as natural science is concerned, this brings us back to the
+previously quoted statement by Heisenberg (pp. 48-49), whose
+consequence he once formulated in a different context as the paradox that man, whenever he tries to learn about things which neither
+are himself nor owe their existence to him, will ultimately encounter
+nothing but himself, his own constructions, and the patterns of his
+own actions. 40 This is no longer a question of academic objectivity.
+It cannot be solved by the reflection that man as a question-asking
+being naturally can receive only answers to match his own questions.
+If nothing more was involved, then we would be satisfied that different questions put "to one and the same physical event" reveal
+different but objectively equally "true" aspects of the same phenomenon, just as the table around which a number of people have taken
+
+87
+their places is seen by each of them in a different aspect, without
+ihereby ceasing to be the object common to all of them. One could
+even imagine that a theory of theories, like the old mathesis universalis, might eventually be able to determine how many such questions are possible or how many "different types of natural law"
+can be applied to the same natural universe without contradiction.
+The matter would become somewhat more serious if it turned
+out that no question exists at all which does not lead to a consistent
+set of answers—a perplexity we mentioned earlier when we discussed
+the distinction between pattern and meaning. In this instance the
+very distinction between meaningful and meaningless questions
+would disappear together with absolute truth, and the consistency
+we would be left with could just as well be the consistency of an
+asylum for paranoiacs or the consistency of the current demonstrations of the existence of God. However, what is really undermining
+the whole modern notion that meaning is contained in the process
+as a whole, from which the particular occurrence derives its intelligibility, is that not only can we prove this, in the sense of consistent
+deduction, but we can take almost any hypothesis and act upon it,
+with a sequence of results in reality which not only make sense but
+work. This means quite literally that everything is possible not only
+in the realm of ideas but in the field of reality itself.
+In my studies of totalitarianism I tried to show that the totalitarian
+phenomenon, with its striking anti-utilitarian traits and its strange
+disregard for factuality, is based in the last analysis on the conviction
+that everything is possible—and not just permitted, morally or otherwise, as was the case with early nihilism. The totalitarian systems
+tend to demonstrate that action can be based on any hypothesis and
+that, in the course of consistently guided action, the particular hypothesis will become true, will become actual, factual reality. The
+assumption which underlies consistent action can be as mad as it
+pleases; it will always end in producing facts which are then "objectively" true. What was originally nothing but a hypothesis, to be
+proved or disproved by actual facts, will in the course of consistent
+
+88
+action always turn into a fact, never to be disproved. In other words.
+the axiom from which the deduction is started does not need to be,
+as traditional metaphysics and logic supposed, a self-evident truth;
+it does not have to tally at all with the facts as given in the objective
+world at the moment the action starts; the process of action, if it is
+consistent, will proceed to create a world in which the assumption
+becomes axiomatic and self-evident.
+The frightening arbitrariness with which we are confronted whenever we decide to embark upon this type of action, which is the
+exact counterpart of consistent logical processes, is even more obvious in the political than in the natural realm. But it is more difficult
+to convince people that this holds true for past history. The historian,
+by gazing backward into the historical process, has been so accustomed to discovering an "objective" meaning, independent of the
+aims and awareness of the actors, that he is liable to overlook what
+actually happened in his attempt to discern some objective trend.
+He will, for example, overlook the particular characteristics of
+Stalin's totalitarian dictatorship in favor of the industrialization of
+the Soviet empire or of the nationalistic aims of traditional Russian
+foreign policy.
+Within the natural sciences things are not essentially different,
+but they appear more convincing because they are so far removed
+from the competence of the layman and his healthy, stubborn common sense, which refuses to see what it cannot understand. Here
+too, thinking in terms of processes, on the one hand, and the conviction, on the other, that I know only what I have myself made, has
+led to the complete meaninglessness inevitably resulting from the insight that I can choose to do whatever 1 want and some kind of
+"meaning" will always be the consequence. In both instances the
+perplexity is that the particular incident, the observable fact or single
+occurrence of nature, or the reported deed and event of history, have
+ceased to make sense without a universal process in which they are
+supposedly embedded; yet the moment man approaches this process in order to escape the haphazard character of the particular, in
+order to find meaningorder and necessity—his effort is rebutted
+by the answer from all sides: Any order, any necessity, any mean-
+
+89
+ing you wish to impose will do. This is the clearest possible demonstration that under these conditions there is neither necessity nor
+meaning. It is as though the "melancholy haphazardness" of the
+particular had now caught up with us and were pursuing us into
+the very region where the generations before us had fled in order to
+escape it. The decisive factor in this experience, both in nature and
+in history, is not the patterns with which we tried to "explain," and
+which in the social and historical sciences cancel each other out
+more quickly, because they can all be consistently proved, than they
+do in the natural sciences, where matters are more complex and for
+this technical reason less open to the irrelevant arbitrariness of irresponsible opinions. These opinions, to be sure, have an altogether
+different source, but are liable to becloud the very relevant issue of
+contingency, with which we are everywhere confronted today. What
+is decisive is that our technology, which nobody can accuse of not
+functioning, is based on these principles, and that our social techniques, whose real field of experimentation lies in the totalitarian
+countries, have only to overcome a certain time-lag to be able to do
+for the world of human relations and human affairs as much as has
+already been done for the world of human artifacts.
+The modern age, with its growing world-alienation, has led to a
+situation where nan, wherever he goes, encounters only himself.
+All the processes of the earth and the universe have revealed themselves either as man-made or as potentially man-made. Ihese processes, atter having devoured, as it were, the solid objectivity of the
+given, ended by rendering meaningless the one over-all process which
+originally was conceived in order to give meaning to them, and to
+act, so to speak, as the eternal time-space into which they could all
+flow and thus be rid of their mutual conflicts and exclusiveness. This
+is what happened to our concept of history, as it happened to our
+concept of nature. In the situation of radical world-alienation,
+neither history nor nature is at all conceivable. This twofold loss of
+the world—the loss of nature and the loss of human artifice in the
+widest sense, which would include all history-has left behind it
+a society of men who, without a common world which would at
+once relate and separate them, either live in desperate lonely separa-
+
+90
+Berween Past and Present
+tion or are pressed together into a mass. For a mass-society is
+nothing more than that kind of organized living which automatically establishes itself among human beings who are still related to one another but have lost the world once common to all of
+them.
+
+3
+WHAT IS AUTHORITY?
+I order to avoid misunderstanding, it might have been wiser to
+ask in the title: What was—and not what is—authority? For it
+is my contention that we are tempted and entitled to raise this question because authority has vanished from the modern world. Since
+we can no longer fall back upon authentic and undisputable experiences common to all, the very term has become clouded by controversy and confusion. Little about its nature appears self-evident or
+even comprehensible to everybody, except that the political scientist
+may still remember that this concept was once fundamental to political theory, or that most will agree that a constant, ever-widening
+and deepening crisis of authority has accompanied the development
+of the modern world in our century.
+This crisis, apparent since the inception of the century, is political in origin and nature. The rise of political movements intent
+upon replacing the party system, and the development of a new
+totalitarian form of government, took place against a background
+of a more or less general, more or less dramatic breakdown of all
+traditional authorities. Nowhere was this breakdown the direct result
+91
+
+92
+of the regimes or movements themselves; it rather seemed as though
+totalitarianism, in the form of movements as well as of regimes, was
+best fitted to take advantage of a general political and social atmosphere in which the party system had lost its prestige and the government's authority was no longer recognized.
+The most significant symptom of the crisis, indicating its depth
+and seriousness, is that it has spread to such prepolitical areas as
+child-rearing and education, where authority in the widest sense has
+always been accepted as a natural necessity, obviously required as
+much by natural needs, the helplessness of the child, as by political
+necessity, the continuity of an established civilization which can be
+assured only if those who are newcomers by birth are guided through
+a pre-established world into which they are born as strangers. Be-
+cause of its simple and elementary character, this form of authority
+has, throughout the history of political thought, served as a model
+for a great variety of authoritarian forms of government, so that
+the fact that even this prepolitical authority which ruled the relations between adults and children, teachers and pupils, is no longer
+secure signifies that all the old time-honored metaphors and models
+for authoritarian relations have lost their plausibility. Practically as
+well as theoretically, we are no longer in a position to know what
+authority really is.
+In the following reflections I assume that the answer to this question cannot possibly lie in a definition of the nature or essence of
+"authority in general." The authority we have lost in the modern
+world is no such "authority in general," but rather a very specific
+form which had been valid throughout the Western World over a
+long period of time. I therefore propose to reconsider what authority
+was historically and the sources of its strength and meaning. Yet,
+in view of the present confusion, it seems that even this limited and
+tentative approach must be preceded by a few remarks on what
+authority never was, in order to avoid the more common misunderstandings and make sure that we visualize and consider the same
+phenomenon and not any number of connected or unconnected issues.
+Since authority always demands obedience, it is commonly mis-
+
+93
+taker for some form of power or violence. Yet authority precludes
+the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority
+itself has failed. Authority, on the other hand, is incompatible with
+persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a process of argumentation. Where arguments are used, authority is left
+in abeyance. Against the egalitarian order of persuasion stands the
+authoritarian order, which is always hierarchical. If authority is to
+be defined at all, then, it must be in contradistinction to both coercion by force and persuasion through arguments. (The authoritarian relation between the one who commands and the one who obeys
+rests neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who
+commands; what they have in common is the hierarchy itself, whose
+rightness and legitimacy both recognize and where both have their
+predetermined stable place.) This point is of historical importance;
+one aspect of our concept of authority is Platonic in origin, and
+when Plato began to consider the introduction of authority into the
+handling of public affairs in the polis, he knew he was seeking an
+alternative to the common Greek way of handling domestic affairs,
+which was persuasion (тcíle.v) as well as to the common way of
+handling foreign affairs, which was force and violence (Bía).
+Historically, we may say that the loss of authority is merely the
+final, though decisive, phase of a development which for centuries
+undermined primarily religion and tradition. Of tradition, religion,
+and authority—whose interconnectedness we shall discuss later—
+authority has proved to be the most stable element. With the loss of
+authority, however, the general doubt of the modern age also invaded the political realm, where things not only assume a more
+radical expression but become endowed with a reality peculiar to
+the political realm alone. What perhaps hitherto had been of spiritual significance only for the few now has become a concern of one
+and all. Only now, as it were after the fact, the loss of tradition and
+of religion have become political events of the first order.
+When I said that I did not wish to discuss "authority in general,"
+but only the very specific concept of authority which has been dominant in our history, I wished to hint at some distinctions which we
+are liable to neglect when we speak too sweepingly of the crisis of
+
+our time, and which I may perhaps more easily explain in terms of
+the related concepts of tradition and religion. Thus the undeniable
+loss of tradition in the modern world does not at all entail a loss of
+the past, for tradition and past are not the same, as the believers in
+tradition on one side and the believers in progress on the other would
+have us believe—whereby it makes little difference that the former
+deplore this state of affairs while the latter extend their congratulations. With the loss of tradition we have lost the thread which safely
+guided us through the vast realms of the past, but this thread was
+also the chain fettering each successive generation to a predetermined aspect of the past. It could be that only now will the past open
+up to us with unexpected freshness and tell us things no one has yet
+had ears to hear. But it cannot be denied that without a securely
+anchored tradition—and the loss of this security occurred several
+hundred years ago-the whole dimension of the past has also been
+endangered. We are in danger of forgetting, and such an oblivion—
+quite apart from the contents themselves that could be lost—would
+mean that, humanly speaking, we would deprive ourselves of one
+dimension, the dimension of depth in human existence. For memory
+and depth are the same, or rather, depth cannot be reached by man
+except through remembrance.
+It is similar with the loss of religion. Ever since the radical critcism of religious beliefs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
+it has remained characteristic of the modern age to doubt religious
+truth, and this is true for believers and nonbelievers alike. Since
+Pascal and, even more pointedly, since Kierkegaard, doubt has been
+carried into belief, and the modern believer must constantly guard
+his beliefs against doubts; not the Christian faith as such, but Christianity (and Judaism, of course) in the modern age is ridden by
+paradoxes and absurdity. And whatever else may be able to survive
+absurdity—philosophy perhaps can—religion certainly cannot. Yet
+this loss of belief in the dogmas of institutional religion need not
+necessarily imply a loss or even a crisis of faith, for religion and
+faith, or belief and faith, are by no means the same. Only belief, but
+not faith, has an inherent affinity with and is constantly exposed to
+doubt. But who can deny that faith too, for so many centuries se-
+
+95
+curely protected by religion, its beliefs and its dogmas, has been
+gravely endangered through what is actually only a crisis of institutional religion?
+Some simflar qualifications seem to me to be necessary regarding
+the modern loss of authority. Authority, resting on a foundation in
+the past as its unshaken cornerstone, gave the world the permanence
+and durability which human beings need precisely because they are
+mortals—the most unstable and futile beings we know of. Its loss
+is tantamount to the loss of the groundwork of the world, which indeed since then has begun to shift, to change and transform itself
+with ever-increasing rapidity from one shape into another, as though
+we were living and struggling with a Protean universe where everything at any moment can become almost anything else. But the loss
+of worldly permanence and reliability—which politically is identical with the loss of authority—does not entail, at least not necessarily, the loss of the human capacity for building, preserving, and
+caring for a world that can survive us and remain a place fit to Live
+in for those who come after us.
+It is obvious that these reflections and descriptions are based on
+the conviction of the importance of making distinctions. To stress
+such a conviction seems to be a gratuitous truism in view of the fact
+that, at least as far as I know, nobody has yet openly stated that
+distinctions are nonsense. There exists, however, a silent agreement
+in most discussions among political and social scientists that we can
+ignore distinctions and proceed on the assumption that everything
+can eventually be called anything else, and that distinctions are
+meaningful only to the extent that each of us has the right "to define
+his terms." Yet does not this curious right, which we have come to
+grant as soon as we deal with matters of importance-as though it
+were actually the same as the right to one's own opinion-already
+indicate that such terms as "tyranny," "authority," "totalitarianism"
+have simply lost their common meaning, or that we have ceased to
+live in a common world where the words we have in common possess
+an unquestionable meaningfulness, so that, short of being condemned to live verbally in an altogether meaningless world, we grant
+
+96
+each other the right to retreat into our own worlds of meaning, and
+demand only that each of us remain consistent within his own private terminology? If, in these circumstances, we assure ourselves
+that we still understand each other, we do not mean that together
+we understand a world common to us all, but that we understand
+the consistency of arguing and reasoning, of the process of argumentation in its sheer formality.
+However that may be, to proceed under the implicit assumption
+that distinctions are not important or, better, that in the social-political-historical realm, that is, in the sphere of human affairs, things
+do not possess that distinctness which traditional metaphysics used
+to call their "otherness" (their alteritas), has become the hallmark
+of a great many theories in the social, political, and historical sciences. Among these, two seem to me to deserve special mention because they touch the subject under discussion in an especially significant manner.
+The first concerns the ways in which, since the nineteenth century,
+liberal and conservative writers have dealt with the problem of authority and, by implication, with the related problem of freedom in
+the realm of politics. Generally speaking, it has been quite typical
+of liberal theories to start from the assumption that "the constancy
+of progress ... in the direction of organized and assured freedom
+is the characteristic fact of modern history" 1 and to look upon each
+deviation from this course as a reactionary process leading in the
+opposite direction. This makes them overlook the differences in
+principle between the restriction of freedom in authoritarian regimes,
+the abolition of political freedom in tyrannies and dictatorships, and
+the total elimination of spontaneity itself, that is, of the most general
+and most elementary manifestation of human freedom, at which only
+totalitarian regimes aim by means of their various methods of conditioning. The liberal writer, concerned with history and the progress
+of freedom rather than with forms of government, sees only differences in degree here, and ignores that authoritarian government
+committed to the restriction of liberty remains tied to the freedom
+it limits to the extent that it would lose its very substance if it abolished it altogether, that is, would change into tyranny. The same is
+
+97
+true for the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power
+on which all authoritarian government hinges. The liberal writer
+is apt to pay little attention to it because of his conviction that all
+power corrupts and that the constancy of progress requires constant
+loss of power, no matter what its origin may be.
+Behind the liberal identification of totalitarianism with authoritarianism, and the concomitant inclination to see "totalitarian"
+trends in every authoritarian limitation of freedom, lies an older
+confusion of authority with tyranny, and of legitimate power with
+violence. The difierence between tyranny and authoritarian government has always been that the tyrant rules in accordance with his
+own will and interest, whereas even the most draconic authoritarian
+government is bound by laws. Its acts are tested by a code which
+was made either not by man at all, as in the case of the law of nature or God's Commandments or the Platonic ideas, or at least not
+by those actually in power. The source of authority in authoritarian
+government is always a force external and superior to its own power;
+it is always this source, this external force which transcends the
+political realm, from which the authorities derive their "authority,"
+that is, their legitimacy, and against which their power can be
+checked.
+Modern spokesmen of authority, who, even in the short intervals
+when public opinion provides a favorable climate for neo-conservatism, remain well aware that theirs is an almost lost cause, are of
+course eager to point to this distinction between tyranny and authority. Where the liberal writer sees an essentially assured progress in
+the direction of freedom, which is only temporarily interrupted by
+some dark forces of the past, the conservative sees a process of doom
+which started with the dwindling of authority, so that freedom, after
+it lost the restricting limitations which protected its boundaries, became helpless, defenseless, and bound to be destroyed. (It is hardly
+fair to say that only liberal political thought is primarily interested
+in freedom; there is hardly a school of political thought in our history which is not centered around the idea of freedom, much as the
+concept of liberty may vary with different writers and in different
+political circumstances. The only exception of any consequence to
+
+98
+this statement seems to me to be the political philosophy of Thomas
+Hobbes, who, of course, was anything but a conscrvative.) Tyranny
+and totalitarianism are again identified, except that now totalitarian
+government, if it is not directly identified with democracy, is seen
+as its almost inevitable result, that is, the result of the disappearance
+of all traditionally recognized authorities. Yet the differences between tyranny and dictatorship on one side, and totalitarian domination on the other, are no less distinct than those between authoritarianism and totalitarianism.
+These structural differences become apparent the moment we
+leave the over-all theories behind and concentrate our attention on
+the apparatus of rule, the technical forms of administration, and the
+organization of the body politic. For brevity's sake, it may be permitted to sum up the technical-structural differences between authoritarian, tyrannical, and totalitarian government in the image of
+three different representative models. As an image for authoritarian
+government, I propose the shape of the pyramid, which is well
+known in traditional political thought. The pyramid is indeed a particularly fitting image for a governmental structure whose source of
+authority lies outside itself, but whose seat of power is located at
+the top, from which authority and power is filtered down to the
+base in such a way that each successive layer possesses some authority, but less than the one above it, and where, precisely because
+of this careful filtering process, all layers from top to bottom are
+not only firmly integrated into the whole but are interrelated like
+converging rays whose common focal point is the top of the pyramid
+as well as the transcending source of authority above it. This image,
+it is true, can be used only for the Christian type of authoritarian
+rule as it developed through and under the constant influence of the
+Church during the Middle Ages, when the focal point above and
+beyond the earthly pyramid provided the necessary point of reference for the Christian type of equality, the strictly hierarchical structure of life on earth notwithstanding. The Roman understanding of
+political authority, where the source of authority lay exclusively in
+the past, in the foundation of Rome and the greatness of ancestors,
+leads into institutional structures whose shape requires a different
+
+What Is Authoriry?
+99
+kind of image—about which more later (p. 124). In any event, an
+authoritarian form of government with its hierarchical structure is
+the least egalitarian of all forms; it incorporates inequality and distinction as its all-permeating principles.
+All political theories concerning tyranny agree that it belongs
+strictly among the egalitarian forms of government; the tyrant is the
+ruler who rules as one against all, and the "all" he oppresses are all
+equal, namely equally powerless. If we stick to the image of the
+pyramid, it is as though all intervening layers between top and bottom were destroyed, so that the top remains suspended, supported
+only by the proverbial bayonets, over a mass of carefully isolated,
+disintegrated, and completely equal individuals. Classical political
+theory used to rule the tyrant out of mankind altogether, to call
+him a "wolf in human shape" (Plato), because of this position of
+one against all, in which he had put himself and which sharply distinguished his rule, the rule of one, which Plato still calls indiscriminately mor apxía or tyranny, from various forms of kingship or
+Baouleia.
+In contradistinction to both tyrannical and authoritarian regimes,
+the proper image of totalitarian rule and organization seems to me
+to be the structure of the onion, in whose center, in a kind of empty
+space, the leader is located; whatever he does—whether he integrates the body politic as in an authoritarian hierarchy, or oppresses
+his subjects like a tyrant—he does it from within, and not from
+without or above. All the extraordinarily manifold parts of the movement: the front organizations, the various professional societies, the
+party membership, the party bureaucracy, the elite formations and
+police groups, are related in such a way that each forms the façade
+in one direction and the center in the other, that is, plays the role
+of normal outside world for one layer and the role of radical extremism for another. The great advantage of this system is that
+the movement provides for each of its layers, even under conditions
+of totalitarian rule, the fiction of a normal world along with a consciousness of being different from and more radical than it. Thus,
+the sympathizers in the front organizations, whose convictions
+differ only in intensity from those of the party membership, sur-
+
+100
+round the whole movement and provide a deceptive façade of normality to the outside world because of their lack of fanaticism and
+extremism, while, at the same time, they represent the normal world
+to the totalitarian movement, whose members come to believe that
+their convictions differ only in degree from those of other people,
+so that they need never be aware of the abyss which separates their
+own world from that which actually surrounds it. The onion structure makes the system organizationally shock-proof against the
+factuality of the real world.?
+However, while both liberalism and conservatism fail us the
+moment we try to apply their theories to factually existing political
+forms and institutions, it can hardly be doubted that their over-all
+assertions carry a high amount of plausibility. Liberalism, we saw,
+measures a process of receding freedom, and conservatism measures
+a process of receding authority; both call the expected end-result
+totalitarianism and see totalitarian trends wherever either one or the
+other is present. No doubt, both can produce excellent documentation for their findings. Who would deny the serious threats to freedom from all sides since the beginning of the century, and the rise
+of all kinds of tyranny, at least since the end of the First World War?
+Who can deny, on the other hand, that disappearance of practically
+all traditionally established authorities has been one of the most
+spectacular characteristics of the modern world? It seems as though
+one has only to fix his glance on either of these two phenomena to
+justify a theory of progress or a theory of doom according to his
+own taste or, as the phrase goes, according to his own "scale of
+values." If we look upon the conflicting statements of conservatives
+and liberals with impartial eyes, we can easily see that the truth is
+equally distributed between them and that we are in fact confronted
+with a simultaneous recession of both freedom and authority in the
+modern world. As far as these processes are concerned, one can even
+say that the numerous oscillations in public opinion, which for more
+than a hundred and fifty years has swung at regular intervals from
+one extreme to the other, from a liberal mood to a conservative one
+and back to a more liberal again, at times attempting to reassert
+authority and at others to reassert freedom, have resulted only in
+
+101
+further undermining both, confusing the issues, blurring the distinctive lines between authority and freedom, and eventually destroying
+the political meaning of both.
+Both liberalism and conservatism were bor in this climate of
+violently oscillating public opinion, and they are tied together, not
+only because each would lose its very substance without the presence of its opponent in the field of theory and ideology, but because
+both are primarily concerned with restoration, with restoring either
+freedom or authority, or the relationship between both, to its traditional position. It is in this sense that they form the two sides of
+the same coin, just as their progress-or-doom ideologies correspond
+to the two possible directions of the historical process as such; if
+one assumes, as both do, that there is such a thing as a historical
+process with a definable direction and a predictable end, it obviously
+can land us only in paradise or in hell.
+It is, moreover, in the nature of the very image in which history
+is usually conceived, as process or stream or development, that
+everything comprehended by it can change into anything else, that
+distinctions become meaningless because they become obsolete,
+submerged, as it were, by the historical stream, the moment they
+have appeared. From this viewpoint, liberalism and conservatism
+present themselves as the political philosophies which correspond
+to the much more general and comprehensive philosophy of history
+of the nineteenth century. In form and content, they are the political
+expression of the history-consciousness of the last stage of the
+modern age. Their inability to distinguish, theoretically justified by
+the concepts of history and process, progress or doom, testifies to an
+age in which certain notions, clcar in their distinctness to all previous centuries, have begun to lose their clarity and plausibility
+because they have lost their meaning in the public-political realitywithout altogether losing their significance.
+The second and more recent theory implicitly challenging the importance of making distinctions is, especially in the social sciences,
+the almost universal functionalization of all concepts and ideas. Here,
+as in the example previously quoted, liberalism and conservatism
+differ not in method, viewpoint, and approach, but only in emphasis
+
+102
+and evaluation. A convenient instance may be provided by the widespread conviction in the free world today that communism is a
+new "religion," notwithstanding its avowed atheism, because it fulfills socially, psychologically, and "emotionally" the same function
+traditional religion fulfilled and still fulfills in the free world. The
+concern of the social sciences does not lie in what bolshevism as
+ideology or as form of government is, nor in what its spokesmen have
+to say for themselves; that is not the interest of the social sciences,
+and many social scientists believe they can do without the study of
+what the historical sciences call the sources themselves. Their concern is only with functions, and whatever fulfills the same function
+can, according to this view, be called the same. It is as though I had
+the right to call the heel of my shoe a hammer because I, like most
+women, use it to drive nails into the wall.
+Obviously one can draw quite different conclusions from such
+equations. Thus it would be characteristic of conservatism to insist
+that after all a heel is not a hammer, but that the use of the heel as
+a substitute for the hammer proves that hammers are indispensable.
+In other words, it will find in the fact that atheism can fulfill the
+same function as religion the best proof that religion is necessary,
+and recommend the return to true religion as the only way to counter
+a "heresy." The argument is weak, of course; if it is only a question
+of function and how a thing works, the adherents of "false religion"
+can make as good a case for using theirs as I can for using my heel,
+which does not work so badly either. The liberals, on the contrary,
+view the same phenomena as a bad case of treason to the cause of
+secularism and believe that only "true secularism" can cure us of
+the pernicious influence of both false and true religion on politics.
+But these conflicting recommendations at the address of free society
+to return to true religion and become more religious, or to rid ourselves of institutional religion (especially of Roman Catholicism
+with its constant challenge to secularism hardly conceal the opponents' agreement on one point: that whatever fulfills the function
+of a religion is a religion.
+The same argument is frequently used with respect to authority:
+if violence fulfills the same function as authority-namely, makes
+
+103
+people obey—then violence is authority. Here again we find those
+who counsel a return to authority because they think only a reintroduction of the order-obedience relationship can master the problems
+of a mass society, and those who believe that a mass society can
+rule itself, like any other social body. Again both parties agree on
+the one essential point: authority is whatever makes people obey.
+All those who call modern dictatorships "authoritarian," or mistake
+totalitarianism for an authoritarian structure, have implicitly equated
+violence with authority, and this includes those conservatives who
+explain the rise of dictatorships in our century by the need to find a
+surrogate for authority. The crux of the argument is always the
+same: everything is related to a functional context, and the use of
+violence is taken to demonstrate that no society can exist except in
+an authoritarian framework.
+The dangers of these equations, as I see them, lie not only in the
+confusion of political issues and in the blurring of the distinctive
+lines which separate totalitarianism from all other forms of goverment. I do not believe that atheism is a substitute for or can fulfill
+the same function as a religion any more than I believe that violence
+can become a substitute for authority. But if we follow the recommendations of the conservatives, who at this particular moment
+have a rather good chance of being heard, I am quite convinced that
+we shall not find it hard to produce such substitutes, that we shall
+use violence and pretend to have restored authority or that our rediscovery of the functicnal usefulness of religion will produce a substitute-religion—as though our civilization were not already sufficiently cluttered up with all sorts of pseudo-things and nonsense.
+Compared with these theories, the distinctions between tyrannical,
+authoritarian, and totalitarian systems which I have proposed are
+unhistorical, if one understands by history not the historical space
+in which certain forms of government appeared as recognizable
+entities, but the historical process in which everything can always
+change into something else; and they are anti-functional insofar as
+the content of the phenomenon is taken to determine both the nature
+of the political body and its function in society, and not vice-versa.
+Politically speaking, they have a tendency to assume that in the
+
+104
+modern world authority has disappeared almost to the vanishing
+point, and this in the so-called authoritarian systems no less than in
+the free world, and that freedom—that is, the freedom of movement
+of human beings—is threatened everywhere, even in free socictics,
+but abolished radically only in totalitarian systems, and not in tyrannies and dictatorships.
+It is in the light of this present situation that I propose to raise
+the following questions: What were the political experiences that
+corresponded to the concept of authority and from which it sprang?
+What is the nature of a public-political world constituted by authority? Is it true that the Platonic-Aristotelian statement that every
+well-ordered community is constituted of those who rule and those
+who are ruled was always valid prior to the modern age? Or, to put
+it differently, what kind of world came to an end after the modern
+age not only challenged one or another form of authority in different spheres of life but caused the whole concept of authority to lose
+its validity altogether?
+Authority as the one, if not the decisive, factor in human communities did not always exist, though it can look back on a long
+history, and the experiences on which this concept is based are not
+necessarily present in all bodies politic. The word and the concept
+are Roman in origin. Neither the Greek language nor the varied
+political experiences of Greek history shows any knowledge of
+authority and the kind of rule it implies. This is expressed most
+clearly in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, who, in quite difterent ways but from the same political experiences, tried to introduce
+something akin to authority into the public life of the Greek polis.
+There existed two kinds of rule on which they could fall back
+and from which they derived their political philosophy, one known
+to them from the public-political realm, and the other from the private sphere of Greek household and family life. To the polis, absolute rule was known as tyranny, and the chief characteristics of
+
+105
+the tyrant were that he ruled by sheer violence, had to be protected
+from the people by a bodyguard, and insisted that his subjects
+mind their own business and leave to him the care of the public realm. The last characteristic, in Greek public opinion, signified that he destroyed the public realm of the polis altogether—
+"a polis belonging to one man is no polis" 4—and thereby deprived
+the citizens of that political faculty which they felt was the very
+essence of freedom. Another political experience of the need for
+command and obedience might have been provided by the experience in warfare, where danger and the necessity to make and carry
+out decisions quickly seem to constitute an inherent reason for the
+establishment of authority. Neither of these political models, however, could possibly serve the purpose. The tyrant remained, for
+Plato as for Aristotle, the "wolf in human shape," and the military commander was too obviously connected with a temporary
+emergency to be able to serve as model for a permanent institution.
+Because of this absence of valid political experience on which to
+base a claim to authoritarian rule, both Plato and Aristotle, albeit
+in very different ways, had to rely on examples of human relations
+drawn from Greek household and family life, where the head of
+the household ruled as a "despot," in uncontested mastery over the
+members of his family and the slaves of the household. The despot,
+unlike the king, the Baoules, who had been the leader of household
+heads and as such primus inter pares, was by definition vested with
+the power to coerce. Yet it was precisely this characteristic that
+made the despot unfit for political purposes; his power to coerce
+was incompatible not only with the freedom of others but with his
+own freedom as well. Wherever he ruled there was only one relation, that between master and slaves. And the master, according to
+Greek common opinion (which was still blissfully unaware of Hegelian dialectics), was not free when he moved among his slaves; his
+freedom consisted in his ability to leave the sphere of the household
+altogether and to move among his equals, freemen. Hence, neither
+the despot nor the tyrant, the one moving among slaves, the other
+among subjects, could be called a free man.
+
+106
+Authority implies an obedience in which men retain their freedom, and Plato hoped to have found such an obedience when, in
+his old age, he bestowed upon the laws that quality which would
+make them undisputable rulers over the whole public realm. Men
+could at least have the illusion of being free because they did not
+depend upon other men. Yet the rulership of these laws was construed in an obviously despotic rather than an authoritarian manner,
+the clearest sign of which is that Plato was led to speak of them in
+terms of private household affairs, and not in political terms, and
+to say, probably in a variation of Pindar's vónos Baruleùs márTwr
+("a law is king over everything"): vóuos SeaTórns Twr apxóvroN, oi
+Sè äpOrTEs Soúlor toù vóuov ("the law is the despot of the rulers, and
+the rulers are the slaves of the law")." In Plato, the despotism originating in the household, and its concomitant destruction of the
+political realm as antiquity understood it, remained utopian. But it
+is interesting to note that when the destruction became a reality in
+the last centuries of the Roman Empire, the change was introduced
+by the application to public rule of the term dominus, which in Rome
+(where the family also was "organized like a monarchy") ® had
+the same meaning as the Greek "despot." Caligula was the first
+Roman emperor who consented to be called dominus, that is, to be
+given a name "which Augustus and Tiberius still had rejected as it
+it were a malediction and an injury," " precisely because it implied
+a despotism unknown in the political realm, although all too familiar
+in the private, household realm.
+The political philosophies of Plato and Aristotle have dominated
+all subsequent political thought, even when their concepts have been
+superimposed upon such greatly different political experiences as
+those of the Romans. If we wish not only to comprehend the actual
+political experiences behind the concept of authority—which, at
+least in its positive aspect, is exclusively Roman—but also to understand authority as the Romans themselves already understood it
+theoretically and made it part of the political tradition of the West,
+we shall have to concern ourselves briefly with those features of
+Greek political philosophy which have so decisively influenced its
+shaping.
+
+107
+Nowhere else has Greek thinking so closely approached the concept of authority as in Plato's Republic, wherein he confronted the
+reality of the polis with a utopian rule of reason in the person of
+the philosopher-king. The motive for establishing reason as ruler
+in the realm of politics was exclusively political, although the consequences of expecting reason to develop into an instrument of
+coercion perhaps have been no less decisive for the tradition of
+Western philosophy than for the tradition of Western politics. The
+fatal resemblance between Plato's philosopher-king and the Greek
+tyrant, as well as the potential harm to the political realm that his
+rule would imply, seems to have been recognized by Aristotle; ®
+but that this combination of reason and rule implied a danger to
+philosophy as well has been pointed out, as far as I know, only in
+Kant's reply to Plato: "It is not to be expected that kings philosophize or that philosophers become kings, nor is it to be desired, because the possession of power corrupts the free judgment of reason
+inevitably" —although even this reply does not go to the root of
+the matter.
+The reason Plato wanted the philosophers to become the rulers
+of the city lay in the conflict between the philosopher and the polis,
+or in the hostility of the polis toward philosophy, which probably
+had lain dormant for some time before it showed its immediate
+threat to the life of the philosopher in the trial and death of Socrates.
+Politically, Plato's philosophy shows the rebellion of the philosopher
+against the polis. The philosopher announces his claim to rule, but
+not so much for the sake of the polis and politics (although patriotic
+motivation cannot be denied in Plato and distinguishes his philosophy from those of his followers in antiquity) as for the sake of
+philosophy and the safety of the philosopher.
+It was after Socrates' death that Plato began to discount persuasion as insufficient for the guidance of men and to seek for something liable to compel them without using external means of violence.
+Very early in his search he must have discovered that truth, namely,
+the truths we call self-evident, compels the mind, and that this coercion, though it needs no violence to be effective, is stronger than
+
+108
+persuasion and argument. The trouble with coercion through reason.
+however, is that only the few are subject to it, so that the problem
+arises of how to assure that the many, the people who in their very
+multitude compose the body politic, can be submitted to the same
+truth. Here, to be sure, other means of coercion must be found, and
+here again coercion through violence must be avoided if political
+life as the Greeks understood it is not to be destroyed."° This is the
+central predicament of Plato's political philosophy and has remained
+a predicament of all attempts to establish a tyranny of reason. In
+The Republic the problem is solved through the concluding myth
+of rewards and punishments in the hereafter, a myth which Plato
+himself obviously neither believed nor wanted the philosophers to
+believe. What the allegory of the cave story in the middle of The
+Republic is for the few or for the philosopher the myth of hell at
+the end is for the many who are not capable of philosophical truth.
+In the Laws Plato deals with the same perplexity, but in the opposite
+way; here he proposes a substitute for persuasion, the introduction
+to the laws in which their intent and purpose are to be explained to
+the citizens.
+In his attempts to find a legitimate principle of coercion Plato
+was originally guided by a great number of models of existing relations, such as that between the shepherd and his sheep, betweer
+the helmsman of a ship and the passengers, between the physician
+and the patient, or between the master and the slave. In all these
+instances either expert knowledge commands confidence so that
+neither force nor persuasion are necessary to obtain compliance, or
+the ruler and the ruled belong to two altogether different categories
+of beings, one of which is already by implication subject to the
+other, as in the cases of the shepherd and his flock or the master and
+his slaves. All these examples are taken from what to the Greeks was
+the private sphere of life, and they occur time and again in all the
+great political dialogues, The Republic, the Statesman, and the
+Laws. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the relation between master
+and slave has a special significance. The master, according to the
+discussion in the Statesman, knows what should be done and gives
+his orders, while the slave executes them and obeys, so that know-
+
+109
+ing what to do and actual doing become separate and mutually
+exclusive functions. In The Republic they are the political characteristics of two difierent classes of men. The plausibility of these
+examples lies in the natural inequality prevailing between the ruling
+and the ruled, most apparent in the example of the shepherd, where
+Plato himself ironically concludes that no man, only a god, could
+relate to human beings as the shepherd relates to his sheep. Although
+it is obvious that Plato himself was not satisfied with these models,
+for his purpose, to establish the "authority" of the philosopher over
+the polis, he returned to them time and again, because only in these
+instances of glaring inequality could rule be exerted without seizure
+of power and the possession of the means of violence. What he was
+looking for was a relationship in which the compelling element lies
+in the relationship itself and is prior to the actual issuance of commands; the patient became subject to the physician's authority when
+he fell ill, and the slave came under the command of his master
+when he became a slave.
+It is important to bear these examples in mind in order to realize
+what kind of coercion Plato expected reason to exert in the hands
+of the king-philosopher. Here, it is true, the compelling power does
+not lie in the person or in inequality as such, but in the ideas which
+are perceived by the philosopher. These ideas can be used as measures of human behavior because they transcend the sphere of human
+affairs in the same way that a yardstick transcends, is outside and
+beyond, all things whose length it can measure. In the parable of
+the cave in The Republic, the sky of ideas stretches above the cave
+of human existence, and therefore can become its standard. But
+the philosopher who leaves the cave for the pure sky of ideas does
+not originally do so in order to acquire those standards and learn
+the "art of measurement" I but to contemplate the true essence of
+Being—Blétew eis to åd Oéoraror. The basically authoritative element
+of the ideas, that is, the quality which enables them to rule and
+compel, is therefore not at all a matter of course. The ideas become
+measures only after the philosopher has left the bright sky of ideas
+and returned to the dark cave of human existence. In this part of
+the story Plato touches upon the deepest reason for the conflict
+
+110
+between the philosopher and the polis.!? He tells of the philosopher's
+loss of orientation in human affairs, of the blindness striking the
+eyes, of the predicament of not being able to communicate what he
+has seen, and of the actual danger to his life which thereby arises.
+It is in this predicament that the philosopher resorts to what he has
+seen, the ideas, as standards and measures, and finally, in fear of
+his life, uses them as instruments of domination.
+For the transformation of the ideas into measures, Plato is helped
+by an analogy from practical life, where it appears that all arts and
+crafts are also guided by "ideas," that is, by the "shapes" of objects,
+visualized by the inner eye of the craftsman, who then reproduces
+them in reality through imitation. 13 This analogy enables him to
+understand the transcendent character of the ideas in the same manner as he does the transcendent existence of the model, which lies
+beyond the fabrication process it guides and therefore can eventually become the standard for its success or failure. The ideas become
+the unwavering, "absolute" standards for political and moral behavior and judgment in the same sense that the "idea" of a bed in
+general is the standard for making and judging the fitness of all
+particular manufactured beds. For there is no great difference between using the ideas as models and using them, in a somewhat
+cruder fashion, as actual yardsticks of behavior, and Aristotle in his
+earliest dialogue, written under the direct influence of Plato, already
+compares "the most perfect law," that is, the law which is the
+closest possible approximation to the idea, with "the plummet, the
+rule, and the compass ... [which] are outstanding among all
+tools." 14
+It is only in this context that the ideas relate to the varied multitude of things concrete in the same way as one yardstick relates to
+the varied multitude of things measurable, or as the rule of reason
+or common sense relates to the varied multitude of concrete events
+which can be subsumed under it. This aspect of Plato's doctrine of
+ideas had the greatest influence on the Western tradition, and even
+Kant, though he had a very different and considerably deeper concept of human judgment, still occasionally mentioned this capacity
+for subsuming as its essential function. Likewise, the essential char-
+
+111
+acteristic of specifically authoritarian forms of government—that the
+source of their authority, which legitimates the exercise of power,
+must be beyond the sphere of power and, like the law of nature or
+the commands of God, must not be man-made-goes back to this
+applicability of the ideas in Plato's political philosophy.
+At the same time the analogy relating to fabrication and the arts
+and crafts offers a welcome opportunity to justify the otherwise very
+dubious use of examples and instances taken from activities in which
+some expert knowledge and specialization are required. Here the
+concept of the expert enters the realm of political action for the
+first time, and the statesman is understood to be competent to deal
+with human affairs in the same sense as the carpenter is competent
+to make furniture or the physician to heal the sick. Closely connected with this choice of examples and analogies is the element of
+violence, which is so glaringly evident in Plato's utopian republic
+and actually constantly defeats his great concern for assuring voluntary obedience, that is, for establishing a sound foundation for what,
+since the Romans, we call authority. Plato solved his dilemma
+through rather lengthy tales about a hereafter with rewards and
+punishments, which he hoped would be believed literally by the many
+and whose usage he therefore recommended to the attention of the
+few at the close of most of his political dialogues. In view of the
+enormous influence these tales have exerted upon the images of
+hell in religious thought, it is of some importance to note that they
+were originally designed for purely political purposes. In Plato
+they are simply an ingenious device to enforce obedience upon those
+who are not subject to the compelling power of reason, without
+actually using external violence.
+It is of greater relevance in our context, however, that an element
+of violence is inevitably inherent in all activities of making, fabricating, and producing, that is, in all activities by which men confront nature directly, as distinguished from such activities as action
+and speech, which are primarily directed toward human beings.
+The building of the human artifice always involves some violence
+done to nature—we must kill a tree in order to have lumber, and
+we must violate this material in order to build a table. In the few
+
+112
+instances where Plato shows a dangerous preference for the tyran.
+nical form of government, he is carried to this extreme by his own
+analogies. This, obviously, is most tempting when he speaks about
+the right way to found new communities, because this foundation
+can be easily seen in the light of another "making"
+process. If the
+republic is to be made by somebody who is the political equivalent
+of a craftsman or artist, in accordance with an established réxry and
+the rules and measurements valid in this particular "art," the tyrant
+is indeed in the best position to achieve the purpose.15
+We have seen that, in the parable of the cave, the philosopher
+leaves the cave in search of the true essence of Being without a secord thought to the practical applicability of what he is going to find.
+Only later, when he finds himself again confined to the darkness and
+uncertainty of human affairs and encounters the hostility of his
+fellow human beings, does he begin to think of his "truth" in terms
+of standards applicable to the behavior of other people. This discrepancy between the ideas as true essences to be contemplated and
+as measures to be applied to is manifest in the two entirely different
+ideas which represent the highest idea, the one to which all others
+owe their existence. We find in Plato either that this supreme idea
+is that of the beautiful, as in the Symposion, where it constitutes the
+topmost rung of the ladder that leads to truth, and in Phaedrus,
+where Plato speaks of the "lover of wisdom or of beauty" as though
+these two actually were the same because beauty is what "shines
+forth most" (the beautiful is ekaréoaor) and therefore illuminates
+everything else; 18 or that the highest idea is the idea of the good, as
+in The Republic.1' Obviously Plato's choice was based on the current ideal of the kalòr k'åyalór, but it is striking that the idea of the
+good is found only in the strictly political context of The Republic.
+If we were to analyze the original philosophical experiences underlying the doctrine of ideas (which we cannot do here), it would appear that the idea of the beautiful as the highest idea reflected these
+experiences far more adequately than the idea of the good. Even in
+the first books of The Republic 20 the philosopher is still defined as
+a lover of beauty, not of goodness, and only in the sixth book is the
+idea of good as the highest idea introduced. For the original func-
+
+113
+tion of the ideas was not to rule or otherwise determine the chaos
+of human affairs, but, in "shining brightness," to illuminate their
+darkness. As such, the ideas have nothing whatever to do with politics, political experience, and the problem of action, but pertain
+exclusively to philosophy, the experience of contemplation, and the
+quest for the "true being of things." It is precisely ruling, measuring,
+subsuming, and regulating that are entirely alien to the experiences
+underlying the doctrine of ideas in its original conception. It seems
+that Plato was the first to take exception to the political "irrelevance"
+of his new teaching, and he tried to modify the doctrine of ideas so
+that it would become useful for a theory of politics. But usefulness
+could be saved only by the idea of the good, since "good" in the
+Greek vocabulary always means "good for" or "fit." If the highest
+idea, in which all other ideas must partake in order to be ideas at
+all, is that of fitness, then the ideas are applicable by definition, and
+in the hands of the philosopher, the expert in ideas, they can become
+rules and standards or, as later in the Laws, they can become laws.
+(The difference is negligible. What in The Republic is still the philosopher's, the philosopher-king's, direct personal claim to rule,
+has become reason's impersonal claim to domination in the Laws.)
+The actual consequence of this political interpretation of the doctrine of ideas would be that neither man nor a god is the measure of
+all things, but the good itself—a consequence which apparently
+Aristotle, not Plato, drew in one of his earlier dialogues.21
+For our purposes it is essential to remember that the element of
+rule, as reflected in our present concept of authority so tremendously
+influenced by Platonic thinking, can be traced to a conflict between
+philosophy and politics, but not to specifically political experiences,
+that is, experiences immediately derived from the realm of human
+affairs. One cannot understand Plato without bearing in mind both
+his repeated emphatic insistence on the philosophic irrelevance of
+this realm, which he always warned should not be taken too seriously, and the fact that he himself, in distinction to nearly all philosophers who came after him, still took human affairs so seriously
+that he changed the very center of his thought to make it applicable
+to politics. And it is this ambivalence rather than any formal ex-
+
+114
+position of his new doctrine of ideas which forms the true content
+of the parable of the cave in The Republic, which after all is told
+in the context of a strictly political dialogue searching for the best
+form of government. In the midst of this search Plato tells his parable, which turns out to be the story of the philosopher in this world,
+as though he had intended to write the concentrated biography of
+the philosopher. Hence, the search for the best form of government
+reveals itself to be the search for the best government for philosophers, which turns out to be a government in which philosophers
+have become the rulers of the city— not too surprising solution for
+people who had witnessed the life and death of Socrates.
+Still, the philosopher's rule had to be justified, and it could be
+justified only if the philosopher's truth possessed a validity for that
+very realm of human affairs which the philosopher had to turn away
+from in order to perceive it. Insofar as the philosopher is nothing
+but a philosopher, his quest ends with the contemplation of the
+highest truth, which, since it illuminates everything else, is also the
+highest beauty; but insofar as the philosopher is a man among men.
+a mortal among mortals, and a citizen among citizens, he must
+take his truth and transform it into a set of rules, by virtue of which
+transformation he then may claim to become an actual ruler—the
+king-philosopher. The lives of the many in the cave over which the
+philosopher has established his rule are characterized not by contemplation but by déşis, speech, and mpağis, action; it is therefore
+characteristic that in the parable of the cave Plato depicts the
+lives of the inhabitants as though they too were interested only in
+seeing: first the images on the screen, then the things themselves
+in the dim light of the fire in the cave, until finally those who want
+to see truth itself must leave the common world of the cave altogether and embark upon their new adventure all by themselves.
+In other words, the whole realm of human affairs is seen from
+the viewpoint of a philosophy which assumes that even those who inhabit the cave of human affairs are human only insofar as they too
+want to see, though they remain deceived by shadows and images.
+And the rule of the philosopher-king, that is, the domination or
+human affairs by something outside its own realm, is justified not
+
+115
+only by an absolute priority of seeing over doing, of contemplation
+over speaking and acting, but also by the assumption that what
+makes men human is the urge to see. Hence, the interest of the philosopher and the interest of man qua man coincide; both demand
+that human affairs, the results of speech and action, must not acquire a dignity of their own but be subjected to the domination of
+something outside their realm.
+III
+The dichotomy between seeing the truth in solitude and remoteness and being caught in the relationships and relativities of human
+affairs became authoritative for the tradition of political thought. It
+is expressed most forcefully in Plato's parable of the cave, and one
+is therefore somehow tempted to see its origin in the Platonic doctrine of ideas. Historically, however, it was not dependent upon an
+acceptance of this doctrine, but depended much more upon an attitude which Plato expressed only once, almost casually in a random
+remark, and which Aristotle later quoted in a famous sentence of
+Metaphysics almost verbatim, namely that the beginning of all philosophy is baumáfew, the surprised wonder at everything that is as
+it is. More than anything else, Greek "theory" is the prolongation
+and Greek philosophy the articulation and conceptualization of this
+initial wonder. To be capable of it is what separates the few from
+the many, and to remain devoted to it is what alienates them from
+the affairs of men. Aristotle, therefore, without accepting Plato's
+doctrine of ideas, and even repudiating Plato's ideal state, still followed him in the main not only by separating a "theoretical way of
+life" (Bíos Dewpnterós) from a life devoted to human affairs (Bíos
+толетк) —the first to establish such ways of life in hierarchical
+order had been Plato in his Phaedrus-but accepted as a matter of
+course the hierarchical order implied in it. The point in our context
+is not only that thought was supposed to rule over action, to prescribe principles to action so that the rules of the latter were invariably derived from experiences of the former, but that by way of the
+
+116
+Bior, of identifying activities with ways of life, the principle of rulership was established between men as well. Historically this became
+the hallmark of the political philosophy of the Socratic school, and
+the irony of this development is probably that it was preciscly this
+dichotomy between thought and action that Socrates had feared and
+tried to prevent in the polis.
+Thus it is in the political philosophy of Aristotle that we find the
+second attempt to establish a concept of authority in terms of rulers
+and the ruled; it was equally important for the development of the
+tradition of political thought, although Aristotle took a basically
+different approach. For him reason has neither dictatorial nor tyranrical features, and there is no philosopher-king to regulate human
+affairs once and for all. His reason for maintaining that "each body
+politic is composed of those who rule and those who are ruled"
+does not derive from the superiority of the expert over the layman,
+and he is too conscious of the difference between acting and making
+to draw his examples from the sphere of fabrication. Aristotle, as
+far as 1 can see, was the first to appeal, for the purpose of establishing rule in the handling of human affairs, to "nature," which "established the difference . . . between the younger and the older
+ones, destined the ones to be ruled and the others to rule." 22
+The simplicity of this argument is all the more deceptive since
+centuries of repetition have degraded it into a platitude. This may
+be why one usually overlooks its flagrant contradiction of Aristotle's
+own definition of the polis as also given in Politics: "The polis is
+a community of equals for the sake of a life which is potentially the
+best." 23 Obviously the notion of rule in the polis was for Aristotle
+himself so far from convincing that he, one of the most consistent
+and least self-contradictory great thinkers, did not feel particularly
+bound by his own argument. We therefore need not be surprised
+when we read at the beginning of the Economics (a pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, but written by one of his closest disciples) that the
+essential difference between a political community (the róles) and a
+private household (the oikía) is that the latter constitutes a "monarchy," a one-man rule, while the polis, on the contrary, "is composed of many rulers." 2* In order to understand this characteriza.
+
+117
+tion we must remember first that the words "monarchy" and "tyranny" were used synonymously and in clear contradistinction to
+kingship; second, that the character of the polis as "composed of
+many rulers" has nothing to do with the various forms of government that usually are opposed to one-man rule, such as oligarchy,
+aristocracy, or democracy. The "many rulers" in this context are
+the household heads, who have established themselves as "monarchs" at home before they join to constitute the public-political
+realm of the city. Ruling itself and the distinction between rulers
+and ruled belong to a sphere which precedes the political realm, and
+what disinguishes it from the "economic" sphere of the household
+is that the polis is based upon the principle of equality and knows
+no differentiation between rulers and ruled.
+In this distinction between what we would today call the private
+and the public spheres, Aristotle only articulates current Greek
+public opinion, according to which "every citizen belongs to two
+orders of existence," because "the polis gives each individual ...
+besides his private life a sort of second life, his bios politikos." 2»
+(The latter Aristotle called the "good life," and redefined its content; only this definition, not the differentiation itself, conflicted
+with common Greek opinion.) Both orders were forms of human
+living-together, but only the household community was concerned
+with keeping alive as such and coping with the physical necessities
+(uvaykaia) involved in maintaining individual life and guaranteeing
+the survival of the species. In characteristic difference from the
+modern approach, care for the preservation of life, both of the individual and the species, belonged exclusively in the private sphere
+of the household, while in the polis man appeared kat' apoluóv, as
+an individual personality, as we would say today.2 As living beings,
+concerned with the preservation of life, men are confronted with
+and driven by necessity. Necessity must be mastered before the
+political "good life" can begin, and it can be mastered only through
+domination. Hence the freedom of the "good life" rests on the
+domination of necessity.
+The mastery of necessity then has as its goal the controlling of
+the necessities of life, which coerce men and hold them in their
+
+118
+power. But such domination can be accomplished only by controlling
+and doing violence to others, who as slaves relieve free men from
+themselves being coerced by necessity. The free man, the citizen of
+a polis, is neither coerced by the physical necessities of life nor
+subject to the man-made domination of others. He not only must
+not be a slave, he must own and rule over slaves. The freedom of
+the political realm begins after all elementary necessities of sheer
+living have been mastered by rule, so that domination and subjection, command and obedience, ruling and being ruled, are preconditions for establishing the political realm precisely because they
+are not its content.
+There can be no question that Aristotle, like Plato before him,
+meant to introduce a kind of authority into the handling of public
+affairs and the life of the polis, and no doubt for very good political reasons. Yet he too had to resort to a kind of makeshift solution
+in order to make plausible the introduction into the political realm
+of a distinction between rulers and ruled, between those who command and those who obey. And he too could take his examples and
+models only from a prepolitical sphere, from the private realm of
+the household and the experiences of a slave economy. This leads
+him into glaringly contradictory statements, insofar as he superimposes on the actions and life in the polis those standards which,
+as he explains elsewhere, are valid only for the behavior and life
+in the household community. The inconsistency of his enterprise is
+apparent even if we consider only the famous example from the
+Politics previously mentioned, in which the differentiation between
+rulers and ruled is derived from the natural difference between the
+younger and the elder. For this example is in itself eminently unsuitable to prove Aristotle's argument. The relation between old
+and young is educational in essence, and in this education no more
+is involved than the training of the future rulers by the present rulers.
+If rule is at all involved here, it is entirely different from political
+forms of rule, not only because it is limited in time and intent, but
+because it happens between people who are potentially equals. Yet
+substitution of education for rule had the most far-reaching consequences. On its grounds rulers have posed as educators and edu-
+
+119
+cators have been accused of ruling. Then, as well as now, nothing
+is more questionable than the political relevance of examples drawn
+from the field of education. In the political realm we deal always
+with adults who are past the age of education, properly speaking,
+and politics or the right to participate in the management of public
+affairs begins precisely where education has come to an end. (Adult
+education, individual or communal, may be of great relevance for
+the formation of personality, its full development or greater enrichment, but is politically irrelevant unless its purpose is to supply
+technical requirements, somehow not acquired in youth, needed for
+participation in public affairs.) In education, conversely, we always
+deal with people who cannot yet be admitted to politics and equality
+because they are being prepared for it. Aristotle's example is nevertheless of great relevance because it is true that the necessity for
+"authority" is more plausible and evident in child-rearing and education than anywhere else. That is why it is so characteristic of our
+own time to want to eradicate even this extremely limited and politically irrelevant form of authority.
+Politically, authority can acquire an educational character only
+if we presume with the Romans that under all circumstances ancestors represent the example of greatness for each successive generation, that they are the maiores, the greater ones, by definition.
+Wherever the model of education through authority, without this
+fundamental conviction, was superimposed on the realm of politics
+(and this has happened often enough and still is a mainstay of conservative argument), it served primarily to obscure real or coveted
+claims to rule and pretended to educate while in reality it wanted
+to dominate.
+The grandiose attempts of Greek philosophy to find a concept of
+authority which would prevent deterioration of the polis and safeguard the life of the philosopher foundered on the fact that in the
+realm of Greek political life there was no awareness of authority
+based on immediate political experience. Hence all prototypes by
+which subsequent generations understood the content of authority
+were drawn from specifically unpolitical experiences, stemming
+either from the sphere of "making" and the arts, where there must
+
+120
+be experts and where fitness is the highest criterion, or from the
+private household community. It is precisely in this politically determined aspect that the philosophy of the Socratic school has exerted
+its greatest impact upon our tradition. Even today we believe that
+Aristotle defined man primarily as a political being endowed with
+speech or reason, which he did only in a political context, or that
+Plato exposed the original meaning of his doctrine of ideas in The
+Republic, where, on the contrary, he changed it for political reasons.
+In spite of the grandeur of Greek political philosophy, it may be
+doubted that it would have lost its inherent utopian character if the
+Romans, in their indefatigable search for tradition and authority,
+had not decided to take it over and acknowledge it as their highest
+authority in all matters of theory and thought. But they were able
+to accomplish this integration only because both authority and tradition had already played a decisive role in the political life of the
+Roman republic.
+IV
+At the heart of Roman politics, from the beginning of the republic
+until virtually the end of the imperial era, stands the conviction of
+the sacredness of foundation, in the sense that once something has
+been founded it remains binding for all future generations. To be
+engaged in politics meant first and foremost to preserve the founding
+of the city of Rome. This is why the Romans were unable to repeat
+the founding of their first polis in the settlement of colonies but
+were capable of adding to the original foundation until the whole
+of Italy and, eventually, the whole of the Western world were united
+and administered by Rome, as though the whole world were nothing
+but Roman hinterland. From beginning to end, the Romans were
+bound to the specific locality of this one city, and unlike the Greeks,
+they could not say in times of emergency or overpopulation, "Go
+and found a new city, for wherever you are you will always be a
+polis." Not the Greeks, but the Romans, were really rooted in the
+soil, and the word patria derives its full meaning from Roman his-
+
+121
+tory. The foundation of a new body politic-to the Greeks an almost commonplace experience-became to the Romans the central,
+decisive, unrepeatable beginning of their whole history, a unique
+event. And the most deeply Roman divinities were Janus, the
+god of beginning, with whom, as it were, we still begin our year,
+and Minerva, the goddess of remembrance.
+The founding of Rome-tanta molis erat Romanam condere
+gentem ("so great was the effort and toil to found the Roman people"), as Virgil sums up the ever-present theme of the Aeneid, that
+all wandering and suffering reach their end and their goal dum conderet urbem ("that he may found the city") —this foundation and
+the equally un-Greek experience of the sanctity of house and hearth,
+as though Homerically speaking the spirit of Hector had survived
+the fall of Troy and been resurrected on Italian soil, form the deeply
+political content of Roman religion. In contrast to Greece, where
+piety depended upon the immediate revealed presence of the gods,
+here religion literally meant re-ligare: 27 to be tied back, obligated,
+to the enormous, almost superhuman and hence always legendary
+effort to lay the foundations, to build the cornerstone, to found for
+eternity.28 To be religious meant to be tied to the past, and Livy,
+the great recorder of past events, could therefore say, Mihi vetustas
+res scribenti nescio quo pacto antiquus fit animus et quaedam
+religio tener ("While I write down these ancient events, I do not
+know through what connection my mind grows old and some
+religio holds [me]") 2º Thus religious and political activity could
+be considered as almost identical, and Cicero could say, "In no
+other realm does human excellence approach so closely the paths
+of the gods (numen) as it does in the founding of new and in the
+preservation of already founded communities." 30 The binding power
+of the foundation itself was religious, for the city also offered the
+gods of the people a permanent home-again unlike Greece, whose
+gods protected the cities of the mortals and occasionally dwelt in
+them but had their own home, far from the abode of men, on Mount
+Olympus.
+It is in this context that word and concept of authority originally
+appeared. The word auctoritas derives from the verb augere, "aug-
+
+122
+ment," and what authority or those in authority constantly augment
+is the foundation. Those endowed with authority were the elders,
+the Senate or the patres, who had obtained it by descent and by
+transmission (tradition) from those who had laid the foundations
+for all things to come, the ancestors, whom the Romans therefore
+called the maiores. The authority of the living was always derivative,
+depending upon the auctores imperii Romani conditoresque, as
+Pliny puts it, upon the authority of the founders, who no longer were
+among the living. Authority, in contradistinction to power (potestas), had its roots in the past, but this past was no less present in
+the actual life of the city than the power and strength of the living.
+Moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque, in the words of Ennius.
+In order to understand more concretely what it meant to be in
+authority, it may be useful to notice that the word auctores can be
+used as the very opposite of the artifices, the actual builders and
+makers, and this precisely when the word auctor signifies the same
+thing as our "author." Who, asks Pliny at the occasion of a new
+theater, should be more admired, the maker or the author, the inventor or the invention?-meaning, of course, the latter in both
+instances. The author in this case is not the builder but the one who
+inspired the whole enterprise and whose spirit, therefore, much more
+than the spirit of the actual builder, is represented in the building
+itself. In distinction to the artifex, who only made it, he is the actual
+"author" of the building, namely its founder; with it he has become
+an "augmenter" of the city.
+However, the relation between auctor and artifex is by no means
+the (Platonic) relation between the master who gives orders and
+the servant who executes them. The most conspicuous characteristic
+of those in authority is that they do not have power. Cum potestas
+in populo auctoritas in senatu sit, "while power resides in the people, authority rests with the Senate." 31 Because the "authority," the
+augmentation which the Senate must add to political decisions, is
+not power, it seems to us curiously elusive and intangible, bearing
+in this respect a striking resemblance to Montesquieu's judiciary
+branch of government, whose power he called "somehow nil" (en
+quelque façon nulle) and which nevertheless constitutes the highest
+
+123
+authority in constitutional governments,32 Mommsen called it "more
+than advice and less than a command, an advice which one may not
+safely ignore," whereby it is assumed that "the will and the actions
+of the people like those of children are exposed to error and mistakes and therefore need 'augmentation' and confirmation through
+the council of elders." 33 The authoritative character of the "augmentation" of the elders lies in its being a mere advice, needing
+neither the form of command nor external coercion to make itself
+heard.34
+The binding force of this authority is closely connected with the
+religiously binding force of the auspices, which, unlike the Greek
+oracle, does not hint at the objective course of future events but
+reveals merely divine approval or disapproval of decisions made by
+men.35 The gods too have authority among, rather than power over,
+men; they "augment" and confirm human actions but do not guide
+them. And just as "all auspices were traced back to the great sign
+by which the gods gave Romulus the authority to found the city," 38
+so all authority derives from this foundation, binding every act back
+to the sacred beginning of Roman history, adding, as it were, to
+every single moment the whole weight of the past. Gravitas, the
+ability to bear this weight, became the outstanding trait of the
+Roman character, just as the Senate, the representation of authority
+in the republic, could function—in the words of Plutarch ('Life
+of Lycurgus") —as "a central weight, like ballast in a ship, which
+always keeps things in a just equilibrium."
+Thus precedents, the deeds of the ancestors and the usage that
+grew out of them, were always binding.3 Anything that happened
+was transformed into an example, and the auctoritas maiorum became identical with authoritative models for actual behavior, with
+the moral political standard as such. This is also why old age, as
+distinguished from mere adulthood, was felt by the Romans to contain the very climax of human life; not so much because of accumulated wisdom and experience as because the old man had
+grown closer to the ancestors and the past. Contrary to our concept
+of growth, where one grows into the future, the Romans felt that
+growth was directed toward the past. If one wants to relate this
+
+124
+attitude to the hierarchical order established by authority and to
+visualize this hierarchy in the familiar image of the pyramid, it is as
+though the peak of the pyramid did not reach into the height of a
+sky above (or, as in Christianity, beyond the earth, but into the
+depth of an earthly past.
+It is in this primarily political context that the past was sanctified
+through tradition. Tradition preserved the past by handing down
+from one generation to the next the testimony of the ancestors, who
+first had witnessed and created the sacred founding and then augmented it by their authority throughout the centuries. As long as
+this tradition was uninterrupted, authority was inviolate; and to act
+without authority and tradition, without accepted, time-honored
+standards and models, without the help of the wisdom of the founding fathers, was inconceivable. The notion of a spiritual tradition
+and of authority in matters of thought and ideas is here derived from
+the political realm and therefore essentially derivative-just as
+Plato's conception of the role of reason and ideas in politics was
+derived from the philosophical realm and became derivative in the
+realm of human affairs. But the historically all-important fact is
+that the Romans felt they needed founding fathers and authoritative
+examples in matters of thought and ideas as well, and accepted the
+great "ancestors" in Greece as their authorities for theory, philosophy, and poetry. The great Greek authors became authorities in the
+hands of the Romans, not of the Greeks. The way Plato and others
+before and after him treated Homer, "the educator of all Hellas,"
+was inconceivable in Rome, nor would a Roman philosopher have
+dared "to raise his hand against his [spiritual] father," as Plato said
+of himself (in the Sophistes) when he broke with the teaching of
+Parmenides.
+Just as the derivative character of the applicability of the ideas
+to politics did not prevent Platonic political thought from becoming
+the origin of Western political theory, so the derivative character of
+authority and tradition in spiritual matters did not prevent them
+from becoming the dominant features of Western philosophic
+thought for the longer part of our history. In both instances the political origin and the political experiences underlying the theories
+
+125
+were forgotten, the original conflict between politics and philosophy,
+between the citizen and the philosopher, no less than the experience
+of foundation in which the Roman trinity of religion, authority, and
+tradition had its legitimate source. The strength of this trinity lay
+in the binding force of an authoritative beginning to which "religious" bonds tied men back through tradition. The Roman trinity
+not only survived the transformation of the republic into the empire
+but penetrated wherever the pax Romana created Western civilization on Roman foundations.
+The extraordinary strength and endurance of this Roman spirit
+—or the extraordinary reliability of the founding principle for the
+creation of bodies politic-were subjected to a decisive test and
+proved themselves conspicuously after the decline of the Roman
+Empire, when Rome's political and spiritual heritage passed to the
+Christian Church. Confronted with this very real mundane task,
+the Church became so "Roman" and adapted itself so thoroughly
+to Roman thinking in matters of politics that it made the death and
+resurrection of Christ the cornerstone of a new foundation, erecting
+on it a new human institution of tremendous durability. Thus, after
+Constantine the Great had called upon the Church to secure for the
+declining empire the protection of the "most powerful God," the
+Church was eventually able to overcome the antipolitical and antiinstitutional tendencies of the Christian faith, which had caused so
+much trouble in earlier centuries, and which are so manifest in the
+New Testament and in early Christian writings, and seemingly so
+insurmountable. The victory of the Roman spirit is really almost a
+miracle; in any event, it alone enabled the Church "to offer men in
+the membership of the Church the sense of citizenship which neither
+Rome nor municipality could any longer offer them." 38 Yet, just
+as Plato's politicalization of the ideas changed Western philosophy
+and determined the philosophic concept of reason, so the politicalization of the Church changed the Christian religion. The basis of the
+Church as a community of believers and a public institution was
+now no longer the Christian faith in resurrection (though this faith
+remained its content) or the Hebrew obedience to the commands
+of God, but rather the testimony of the life, of the birth, death, and
+
+126
+resurrection, of Jesus of Nazareth as a historically recorded event.3°
+As witnesses to this event the Apostles could become the "founding
+fathers" of the Church, from whom she would derive her own authority as long as she handed down their testimony by way of tradition from generation to generation. Only when this had happened,
+one is tempted to say, had the Christian faith become a "religion"
+not only in the post-Christian sense but in the ancient sense as well;
+only then, at any rate, could a whole world—as distinguished from
+mere groups of believers, no matter how large they might have been
+—become Christian. The Roman spirit could survive the catastrophe
+of the Roman Empire because its most powerful enemies-those
+who had laid, as it were, a curse on the whole realm of worldly
+public affairs and sworn to live in hiding-discovered in their own
+faith something which could be understood as a worldly event as
+well and could be transformed into a new mundane beginning to
+which the world was bound back once more (religare) in a curious
+mixture of new and old religious awe. This transformation was to
+a large extent accomplished by Augustine, the only great philosopher
+the Romans ever had. For the mainstay of his philosophy, Sedis
+animi est in memoria ("the seat of the mind is in memory"), is
+precisely that conceptual articulation of the specifically Roman experience which the Romans themselves, overwhelmed as they were
+by Greek philosophy and concepts, never achieved.
+Thanks to the fact that the foundation of the city of Rome was
+repeated in the foundation of the Catholic Church, though, of course,
+with a radically different content, the Roman trinity of religion,
+authority, and tradition could be taken over by the Christian era.
+The most conspicuous sign of this continuity is perhaps that the
+Church, when she embarked upon her great political career in the
+fifth century, at once adopted the Roman distinction between authority and power, claiming for herself the old authority of the
+Senate and leaving the power-which in the Roman Empire was
+no longer in the hands of the people but had been monopolized by
+the imperial household—to the princes of the world. Thus, at the
+close of the fifth century, Pope Gelasius I could write to Emperor
+Anastasius I: "Two are the things by which this world is chiefly
+
+127
+ruled: the sacred authority of the Popes and the royal power." 40
+The result of the continuity of the Roman spirit in the history of
+the West was twofold. On one hand, the miracle of permanence repeated itself once more; for within the framework of our history the
+durability and continuity of the Church as a public institution can
+be compared only with the thousand years of Roman history in
+antiquity. The separation of church and state, on the other hand,
+far from signifying unequivocally a secularization of the political
+realm and, hence, its rise to the dignity of the classical period, actually implied that the political had now, for the first time since the
+Romans, lost its authority and with it that element which, at least
+in Western history, had endowed political structures with durability,
+continuity, and permanence.
+It is true that Roman political thought at a very early date began
+to use Platonic concepts in order to understand and interpret the
+specifically Roman political experiences. Yet it seems as though it
+has been only in the Christian era that Plato's invisible spiritual
+yardsticks, by which the visible, concrete affairs of men were to be
+measured and judged, have unfolded their full political effectiveness.
+Precisely those parts of Christian doctrine which would have had
+great difficulty in fitting in and being assimilated to the Roman political structure-namely, the revealed commandments and truths of
+a genuinely transcendent authority which, unlike Plato's, did not
+stretch above but was beyond the earthly realm—could be integrated
+into the Roman foundation legend via Plato. God's revelation could
+now be interpreted politically as if the standards for human conduct
+and the principle of political communities, intuitively anticipated
+by Plato, had been finally revealed directly, so that, in the words of
+a modern Platonist, it appeared as though Plato's early "orientation
+toward the unseen measure was now confirmed through the revelation of the measure itself." 41 To the extent that the Catholic Church
+incorporated Greek philosophy into the structure of its doctrines
+and dogmatic beliefs, it amalgamated the Roman political concept
+of authority, which inevitably was based on a beginning, a founding
+in the past, with the Greek notion of transcending measurements
+and rules. General and transcendent standards under which the par-
+
+128
+ticular and immanent could be subsumed were now required for any
+political order, moral rules for all interhuman behavior, and rational
+measurements for the guidance of all individual judgment. There
+is scarcely anything that eventually was to assert itself with greater
+authority and more far-reaching consequences than the amalgamation itself.
+Since then it has turned out, and this fact speaks for the stability
+of the amalgamation, that wherever one of the elements of the
+Roman trinity, religion or authority or tradition, was doubted or
+eliminated, the remaining two were no longer secure. Thus, it was
+Luther's error to think that his challenge of the temporal authority
+of the Church and his appeal to unguided individual judgment would
+leave tradition and religion intact. So it was the error of Hobbes and
+the political theorists of the seventeenth century to hope that authority and religion could be saved without tradition. So, too, was it
+finally the error of the humanists to think it would be possible to
+remain within an unbroken tradition of Wester civilization without
+religion and without authority.
+V
+Politically the most momentous consequence of the amalgamation of Roman political institutions with Greek philosophic ideas
+was that it enabled the Church to interpret the rather vague and
+conflicting notions of early Christianity about life in the hereafter
+in the light of the Platonic political myths, and thus to elevate to the
+rank of dogmatic certitude an elaborate system of rewards and punishments for deeds and misdeeds that did not find their just retribution on earth. This happened not before the fifth century, when the
+earlier teachings of the redemption of all sinners, even of Satan
+himself (as taught by Origen and still held by Gregory of Nyssa),
+and the spiritualizing interpretation of the torments of hell as torments of conscience (also taught by Origen) were declared to be
+heretical; but it coincided with the downfall of Rome, the disappearance of an assured secular order, the assumption of responsibility
+
+129
+for secular affairs by the Church, and the emergence of the papacy
+as a temporal power. Popular and literate notions about a hereafter
+with rewards and punishments were, of course, widespread then as
+they had been throughout antiquity, but the original Christian version of these beliefs, consistent with the "glad tidings" and the redemption from sin, was not a threat of eternal punishment and
+eternal suffering, but, on the contrary, the descensus ad inferos,
+Christ's mission to the underworld where he had spent the three
+days between his death and his resurrection in order to liquidate
+hell, defeat Satan, and liberate the souls of dead sinners, as he had
+liberated the souls of the living, from death and punishment.
+We find it somewhat difficult to gauge correctly the political, nonreligious origin of the doctrine of hell because the Church incorporated it, in its Platonic version, so early into the body of dogmatic
+beliefs. It seems only natural that this incorporation in its turn should
+have blurred the understanding of Plato himself to the point of
+identifying his strictly philosophic teaching of the immortality of the
+soul, which was meant for the few, with his political teaching of a
+hereafter with punishments and rewards, which was clearly meant
+for the multitude. The philosopher's concern is with the invisible
+which can be perceived by the soul, which itself is something invisible
+(dedés) and hence goes to Hades, the place of invisibility (A-íôns),
+after death has rid the invisible part of man of his body, the organ
+of sense perception.* This is the reason why philosophers always
+seem "to pursue death and dying" and why philosophy can also be
+called "the study of death." 43 Those who have no experience with
+a philosophic truth beyond the range of sense perception, of course,
+cannot be persuaded of the immortality of a bodyless soul; for them,
+Plato invented a number of tales to conclude his political dialogues,
+usually after the argument itself had broken down, as in The Republic, or it had turned out that Socrates' opponent could not be persuaded, as in the Gorgias.4* Of these tales, the Er-myth of The
+Republic is the most elaborate and has exerted the greatest influence.
+Between Plato and the secular victory of Christianity in the fifth
+century, which brought with it the religious sanction of the doctrine
+of hell (so that from then on this became so general a feature of
+
+130 Between Past and Future
+the Christian world that political treatises did not need to mention
+it specifically), there was hardly an important discussion of political
+problems—except in Aristotle-which did not conclude with an
+imitation of the Platonic myth.45 And it is still Plato, as distinguished from the Hebrew and early Christian speculations about an
+afterlife, who is the true forerunner of Dante's elaborate descriptions; for in Plato we find for the first time not merely a concept of
+final judgment about eternal life or eternal death, about rewards
+and punishments, but the geographical separation of hell, purgatory,
+and paradise, as well as the horribly concrete notions of graduated
+bodily punishment.*®
+The purely political implications of Plato's myths in the last book
+of The Republic, as well as in the concluding parts of Phaedon and
+Gorgias, seem to be indisputable. The distinction between the philosophic conviction of the immortality of the soul and the politically
+desirable belief in an afterlife runs parallel to the distinction in the
+doctrine of ideas between the idea of the beautiful as the highest idea
+of the philosopher and the idea of the good as the highest idea of
+the statesman. Yet while Plato, when applying his philosophy of
+ideas to the political realm, somehow blurred the decisive distinction
+between the ideas of the beautiful and of the good, silently substituting the latter for the former in his discussions of politics, the
+same cannot be said for the distinction between an immortal, invisible, bodyless soul and an afterlife in which bodies, sensitive to pain,
+will receive their punishment. One of the clearest indications for
+the political character of these myths is indeed that they, because
+they imply bodily punishment, stand in flagrant contradiction to his
+doctrine of the mortality of the body, and of this contradiction
+Plato himself was by no means unaware! Moreover, when he came
+to telling his tales, he used elaborate precautions to make sure that
+what followed was not truth but a possible opinion of which one better persuaded the multitude "as though it were the truth." 48 Finally,
+is it not rather obvious, especially in The Republic, that this whole
+concept of life after death cannot possibly make sense to those who
+have understood the story of the cave and know that the true underworld is life on earth?
+
+131
+Io doubt Plato relied on popular beliefs, perhaps on Orphic and
+Pythagorean traditions, for his descriptions of an afterlife, just as
+the Church, almost a thousand years later, could choose freely
+which of the then prevalent beliefs and speculations she wanted to
+lay down as dogma and which to declare as heretical. The distinction between Plato and his predecessors, whoever they may have
+been, was that he was the first to become aware of the enormous,
+strictly political potentiality inherent in such beliefs, just as the distinction between Augustine's elaborate teachings about hell, purgatory, and paradise and the speculations of Origen or Clement of
+Alexandria was that he (and perhaps Tertullian before him) understood to what an extent these doctrines could be used as threats in
+this world, quite apart from their speculative value about a future
+life. Nothing, indeed, is more suggestive in this context than that
+it was Plato who coined the word "theology," for the passage in
+which the new word is used occurs again in a strictly political discussion, namely in The Republic, when the dialogue deals with the
+founding of cities. 49 This new theological god is neither a living
+God nor the god of the philosophers nor a pagan divinity; he is a
+political device, "the measurement of measurements," 50 that is, the
+standard according to which cities may be founded and rules of behavior laid down for the multitude. Theology, moreover, teaches
+how to enforce these standards absolutely, even in cases when human
+justice seems at a loss, that is, in the case of crimes which escape
+punishment as well as in the case of those for which even the death
+sentence would not be adequate. For "the main thing" about the
+hereafter is, as Plato says explicitly, that "for every wrong men had
+done to anyone they suffered tenfold." 51 To be sure, Plato had no
+inkling of theology as we understand it, as the interpretation of
+God's word whose sacrosanct text is the Bible; theology to him was
+part and parcel of "political science," and specifically that part which
+taught the few how to rule the many.
+Whatever other historical influences may have been at work to
+elaborate the doctrine of hell, it continued, during antiquity, to be
+used for political purposes in the interest of the few to retain a moral
+and political control over the multitude. The point at stake was al-
+
+132
+ways the same: truth by its very nature is self-evident and therefore
+cannot be satisfactorily argued out and demonstrated.* Hence, belief is necessary for those who lack the eyes for what is at the same
+time self-evident, invisible, and beyond argument. Platonically
+speaking, the few cannot persuade the multitude of truth because
+truth cannot be the object of persuasion, and persuasion is the only
+way to deal with the multitude. But the multitude, carried away by
+the irresponsible tales of poets and storytellers, can be persuaded
+to believe almost anything; the appropriate tales which carry the
+truth of the few to the multitude are tales about rewards and punishments after death; persuading the citizens of the existence of hell
+will make them behave as though they knew the truth.
+As long as Christianity remained without secular interests and
+responsibilities, it left the beliefs and speculations about a hereafter
+as free as they had been in antiquity. Yet when the purely religious
+development of the new creed had come to an end and the Church
+had become aware of, and willing to take over, political responsibilities, she found herself confronted with a perplexity similar to the
+one that had given rise to Plato's political philosophy. Again it had
+become a question of imposing absolute standards on a realm which
+is made up of human affairs and relations, whose very essence therefore seems to be relativity; and to this relativity corresponds the fact
+that the worst man can do to man is to kill him, that is, to bring
+about what one day is bound to happen to him anyhow. The "improvement" on this limitation, proposed in the hell images, is precisely that punishment can mean more than the "eternal death"
+which early Christianity thought to be the appropriate reward of
+sin, namely eternal suffering, compared to which eternal death is
+salvation.
+The introduction of the Platonic hell into the body of Christian
+dogmatic beliefs strengthened religious authority to the point where
+it could hope to remain victorious in any contest with secular power.
+But the price paid for this additional strength was that the Roman
+concept of authority was diluted, and an element of violence was
+permitted to insinuate itself into both the very structure of Western
+
+133
+religious thought and the hierarchy of the Church. How high this
+price actually was might be gauged by the more than embarrassing
+fact that men of unquestionable stature-among them Tertullian
+and even Thomas Aquinascould be convinced that one of the
+joys in heaven would be the privilege of watching the spectacle of
+unspeakable sufferings in hell. Nothing perhaps in the whole development of Christianity throughout the centuries is farther removed
+from and more alien to the letter and spirit of the teaching of Jesus
+of Nazareth than the elaborate catalogue of future punishments and
+the enormous power of coercion through fear which only in the last
+stages of the modern age have lost their public, political significance.
+As far as religious thought is concerned, it certainly is a terrible
+irony that the "glad tidings" of the Gospels, "Life is everlasting,"
+should eventually have resulted not in an increase of joy but of fear
+on earth, should not have made it easier but harder for man to
+die.
+However that may be, the fact is that the most significant consequence of the secularization of the modern age may well be the
+elimination from public life, along with religion, of the only political
+element in traditional religion, the fear of hell. We who had to witness how, during the Hitler and Stalin era, an entirely new and unprecedented criminality, almost unchallenged in the respective
+countries, was to invade the realm of politics should be the last to
+underestimate its "persuasive" influence upon the functioning of
+conscience. And the impact of these experiences is likely to grow
+when we recall that, in the very age of enlightenment, the men of
+the French Revolution no less than the founding fathers in America
+insisted on making the fear of an "avenging God" and hence the
+belief in "a future state" part and parcel of the new body politic.
+For the obvious reason why the men of the revolutions of all people
+should be so strangely out of tune in this respect with the general
+climate of their age was that precisely because of the new separation
+of church and state they found themselves in the old Platonic predicament. When they warned against the elimination of the fear of
+hell from public life because this would pave the way "to make
+
+134
+murder itself as indifferent as shooting plover, and the extermination
+of the Rohilla nation as innocent as the swallowing of mites on i
+morsel of cheese," 53 their words may sound with an almost prophetic ring in our ears; yet they were clearly spoken not out of any
+dogmatic faith in the "avenging God" but out of mistrust in the nature of man.
+Thus the belief in a future state of rewards and punishments, consciously designed as a political device by Plato and perhaps no less
+consciously adopted, in its Augustinian form, by Gregory the Great,
+was to survive all other religious and secular elements which together
+had established authority in Western history. It was not during the
+Middle Ages, when secular life had become religious to such an
+extent that religion could not serve as a political instrument, but
+during the modern age that the usefulness of religion for secular authority was rediscovered. The true motives of this rediscovery have
+been somewhat overshadowed by the various more or less infamous
+alliances of "throne and altar" when kings, frightened at the prospect
+of revolution, believed that "the people must not be permitted to
+lose its religion" because, in Heine's words, Wer sich von seinem
+Gotte reisst,/ wird endlich auch abtrünnig werden/ von seinen
+irdischen Behörden ("who tears himself away from his God will
+end by deserting his earthly authorities as well"). The point is rather
+that the revolutionaries themselves preached belief in a future state,
+that even Robespierre ended by appealing to an "Immortal Legislator" to give sanction to the revolution, that none of the early
+American constitutions lacked an appropriate provision for future
+rewards and punishments, that men like John Adams regarded
+them as "the only true foundation of morality." 54
+It certainly is not surprising that all these attempts at retaining
+the only element of violence from the crumbling edifice of religion,
+authority, and tradition, and at using it as safeguard for the new,
+secular political order should be in vain. And it was by no means the
+rise of socialism or of the Marxian belief that "religion is the opiate
+of the people" which put an end to them. (Authentic religion in
+general and the Christian faith in particular—with its unrelenting
+stress on the individual and his own role in salvation, which led
+
+135
+to the elaboration of a catalogue of sins greater than in any other
+religion—could never be used as tranquilizers. Modern ideologies,
+whether political or psychological or social, are far better fitted to
+immunize man's soul against the shocking impact of reality than
+any traditional religion we know. Compared with the various superstitions of the twentieth century, the pious resignation to God's will
+seems like a child's pocket-knife in competition with atomic weapons.) The conviction that "good morals" in civil society ultimately
+depended upon fear and hope for another life may still have appeared to the political men of the eighteenth century no more than
+good common sense; to those of the nineteenth century it appeared
+simply scandalous that, for instance, English courts took it for
+granted "that the oath is worthless of a person who does not believe
+in a future state," and this not only for political reasons but also
+because it implies "that they who do believe are only prevented
+from lying ... by the fear of hell." 55
+Superficially speaking, the loss of belief in future states is politically, though certainly not spiritually, the most significant distinction between our present period and the centuries before. And this
+loss is definite. For no matter how religious our world may turn
+again, or how much authentic faith still exists in it, or how deeply
+our moral values may be rooted in our religious systems, the fear
+of hell is no longer among the motives which would prevent or
+stimulate the actions of a majority. This seems inevitable if secularity
+of the world involves separation of the religious and political realms
+of life; under these circumstances religion was bound to lose its
+political element, just as public life was bound to lose the religious
+sanction of transcendent authority. In this situation, it would be
+well to recall that Plato's device of how to persuade the multitude
+to follow the standards of the few had remained utopian prior to
+its being sanctioned by religion; its purpose, to establish rule of the
+few over the many, was too patent to be useful. For the same reason
+the beliefs in future states withered from the public realm at once
+when their political usefulness was blatantly exposed by the very
+fact that they, out of the whole body of dogmatic beliefs, were
+deemed worthy of preservation.
+
+136
+VI
+One thing, however, is particularly striking in this context: while
+all the models, prototypes, and examples for authoritarian relationships—such as the statesman as healer and physician, as expert, as
+helmsman, as the master who knows, as educator, as the wise man—
+all Greek in origin, have been faithfully preserved and further articulated until they became empty platitudes, the one political experience which brought authority as word, concept, and reality into our
+history—the Roman experience of foundation—seems to have been
+entirely lost and forgotten. And this to such an extent that the moment we begin to talk and think about authority, after all one of
+the central concepts of political thought, it is as though we were
+caught in a maze of abstractions, metaphors, and figures of speech
+in which everything can be taken and mistaken for something else,
+because we have no reality, either in history or in everyday experience, to which we can unanimously appeal. This, among other things,
+indicates what could also be proved otherwise, namely that the
+Greek concepts, once they had been sanctified by the Romans
+through tradition and authority, simply eliminated from historical
+consciousness all political experiences which could not be fitted into
+their framework.
+However, this statement is not entirely true. There exists in our
+political history one type of event for which the notion of founding
+is decisive, and there is in our history of thought one political thinker
+in whose work the concept of foundation is central, if not paramount. The events are the revolutions of the modern age, and the
+thinker is Machiavelli, who stood at the threshold of this age and,
+though he never used the word, was the first to conceive of a revolution.
+Machiavelli's unique position in the history of political thought
+has little to do with his often praised but by no means unarguable
+realism, and he was certainly not the father of political science, a
+role now frequently attributed to him. (If one understands by
+
+137
+political science political theory, its father certainly is Plato rather
+than Machiavelli. If one stresses the scientific character of political
+science, it is hardly possible to date its birth earlier than the rise of
+all modern science, that is, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In my opinion the scientific character of Machiavelli's theories
+is often greatly exaggerated.) His unconcern with moral judgments
+and his freedom from prejudice are astonishing enough, but they
+do not strike the core of the matter; they have contributed more to
+his fame than to the understanding of his works, because most of
+his readers, then as today, were too shocked even to read him properly. When he insists that in the public-political realm men "should
+learn how not to be good," 56 he of course never meant that they
+should learn how to be evil. After all, there is scarcely another political thinker who has spoken with such vehement contempt of "methods fby which] one may indeed gain power but not glory." 57 The
+truth is only that he opposed both concepts of the good which we
+find in our tradition: the Greek concept of the "good for" or fitness,
+and the Christian concept of an absolute goodness which is not of
+this world. Both concepts in his opinion were valid, but only in the
+private sphere of human life; in the public realm of politics they had
+no more place than their opposites, unfitness or incompetence and
+evil. The virtu, on the other hand, which according to Machiavelli
+is the specifically political human quality, has neither the connotation of moral character as does the Roman virtus, nor that of a
+morally neutral excellence like the Greek apern. Virtù is the response,
+summoned up by man, to the world, or rather to the constellation
+of fortuna in which the world opens up, presents and offers itself
+to him, to his virtù. There is no virtù without fortuna and no fortuna
+without virtu; the interplay between them indicates a harmony between man and world—playing with each other and succeeding
+together—which is as remote from the wisdom of the statesman as
+from the excellence, moral or otherwise, of the individual, and the
+competence of experts.
+His experiences in the struggles of his time taught Machiavelli a
+deep contempt for all traditions, Christian and Greek, as presented,
+nurtured, and reinterpreted by the Church. His contempt was leveled
+
+138
+at a corrupt Church which had corrupted the political life of Italy,
+but such corruption, he argued, was inevitable because of the Christian character of the Church. What he witnessed, after all, was not
+only corruption but also the reaction against it, the deeply religious
+and sincere revival emanating from the Franciscans and Dominicans,
+culminating in the fanaticism of Savonarola, whom he held in considerable respect. Respect for these religious forces and contempt
+for the Church together led him to certain conclusions about a basic
+discrepancy between the Christian faith and politics that are oddly
+reminiscent of the first centuries of our era. His point was that every
+contact between religion and politics must corrupt both, and that a
+noncorrupt Church, though considerably more respectable, would
+be even more destructive to the public realm than its present corruption. 58 What he did not, and perhaps in his time could not, see was
+the Roman influence on the Catholic Church, which, indeed, was
+much less noticeable than its Christian content and its Greek theoretical framework of reference.
+It was more than patriotism and more than the current revival of
+interest in antiquity that sent Machiavelli to search for the central
+political experiences of the Romans as they had originally been presented, equally removed from Christian piety and Greek philosophy.
+The greatness of his rediscovery lies in that he could not simply revive or resort to an articulate conceptual tradition, but had himself
+to articulate those experiences which the Romans had not conceptualized but rather expressed in terms of Greek philosophy vulgarized for this purpose. He saw that the whole of Roman history
+and mentality depended upon the experience of foundation, and he
+believed it should be possible to repeat the Roman experience
+through the foundation of a unified Italy which was to become the
+same sacred cornerstone for an "eternal" body politic for the Italian
+nation as the founding of the Eternal City had been for the Italic
+people. The fact that he was aware of the contemporary beginnings
+of the birth of nations and the need for a new body politic, for
+which he therefore used the hitherto unknown term lo stato, has
+caused him to be commonly and rightfully identified as the father
+of the modern nation-state and its notion of a "reason of state."
+
+139
+What is even more striking, though less well known, is that Machiavelli and Robespierre so often seem to speak the same language.
+When Robespierre justifies terror, "the despotism of liberty against
+tyranny," he sounds at times as if he were repeating almost word
+for word Machiavelli's famous statements on the necessity of violence for the founding of new political bodies and for the reforming of corrupt ones.
+This resemblance is all the more startling since both Machiavelli
+and Robespierre in this respect go beyond what the Romans themselves had to say about foundation. To be sure, the connection between foundation and dictatorship could be learned from the Ro-
+mans themselves, and Cicero, for instance, appeals explicitly to
+Scipio to become dictator rei publicae constituendae, to seize the
+dictatorship in order to restore the republic."° Like the Romans,
+Machiavelli and Robespierre felt founding was the central political
+action, the one great deed that established the public-political realm
+and made politics possible; but unlike the Romans, to whom this
+was an event of the past, they felt that for this supreme "end" all
+"means," and chiefly the means of violence, were justified. They
+understood the act of founding entirely in the image of making; the
+question to them was literally how to "make" a unified Italy or a
+French republic, and their justification of violence was guided by
+and received its inherent plausibility from the underlying argument:
+You cannot make a table without killing trees, you cannot make an
+omelet without breaking eggs, you cannot make a republic without
+killing people. In this respect, which was to become so fateful for
+the history of revolutions, Machiavelli and Robespierre were not
+Romans, and the authority to which they could have appealed would
+have been rather Plato, who also recommended tyranny as the government where "change is likely to be easiest and most rapid." 61
+It is precisely in this double respect, because of his rediscovery of
+the foundation experience and his reinterpretation of it in terms of
+the justification of (violent) means for a supreme end, that Machiavelli may be regarded as the ancestor of modern revolutions, all of
+which can be characterized by Marx's remark that the French Revolution appeared on the stage of history in Roman costume. Unless
+
+140
+it is recognized that the Roman pathos for foundation inspired them,
+it seems to me that neither the grandeur nor the tragedy of Western
+revolutions in the modern age can be properly understood. For if I
+am right in suspecting that the crisis of the present world is primarily
+political, and that the famous "decline of the West" consists primarily
+in the decline of the Roman trinity of religion, tradition, and authority, with the concomitant undermining of the specifically Roman
+foundations of the political realm, then the revolutions of the moder age appear like gigantic attempts to repair these foundations, to
+renew the broken thread of tradition, and to restore, through founding new political bodies, what for so many centuries had endowed
+the affairs of men with some measure of dignity and greatness.
+Of these attempts, only one, the American Revolution, has been
+successful: the founding fathers as, characteristically enough, we
+still call them, founded a completely new body politic without violence and with the help of a constitution. And this body politic has
+at least endured to the present day, in spite of the fact that the
+specifically modern character of the modern world has nowhere else
+produced such extreme expressions in all nonpolitical spheres of
+life as it has in the United States.
+This is not the place to discuss the reasons for the surprising
+stability of a political structure under the onslaught of the most vehement and shattering social instability. It seems certain that the
+relatively nonviolent character of the American Revolution, where
+violence was more or less restricted to regular warfare, is an important factor in this success. It may also be that the founding fathers, because they had escaped the European development of the
+nation-state, had remained closer to the original Roman spirit. More
+important, perhaps, was that the act of foundation, namely the
+colonization of the American continent, had preceded the Declaration of Independence, so that the framing of the Constitution, falling
+back on existing charters and agreements, confirmed and legalized
+an already existing body politic rather than made it anew.62 Thus
+the actors in the American Revolution were spared the effort of
+"initiating a new order of things" altogether; that is, they were spared
+the one action of which Machiavelli once said that "there is nothing
+
+141
+more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more
+dangerous to handle." ü3 And Machiavelli surely must have known,
+for he, like Robespierre and Lenin and all the great revolutionaries
+whose ancestor he was, wished nothing more passionately than to
+initiate a new order of things.
+However that may be, revolutions, which we commonly regard
+as radical breaks with tradition, appear in our context as events in
+which the actions of men are still inspired by and derive their greatest strength from the origins of this tradition. They seem to be the
+only salvation which this Roman-Western tradition has provided
+for emergencies. The fact that not only the various revolutions of
+the twentieth century but all revolutions since the French have gone
+wrong, ending in either restoration or tyranny, seems to indicate
+that even these last means of salvation provided by tradition have
+become inadequate. Authority as we once knew it, which grew out
+of the Roman experience of foundation and was understood in the
+light of Greek political philosophy, has nowhere been re-established,
+either through revolutions or through the even less promising means
+of restoration, and least of all through the conservative moods and
+trends which occasionally sweep public opinion. For to live in a
+political realm with neither authority nor the concomitant awareness
+that the source of authority transcends power and those who are in
+power, means to be confronted anew, without the religious trust in
+a sacred beginning and without the protection of traditional and
+therefore self-evident standards of behavior, by the elementary
+problems of human living-together.
+
+4
+WHAT IS FREEDOM?
+T
+10 raise the question, what is freedom? seems to be a hopeless
+enterprise. It is as though age-old contradictions and antinomies were lying in wait to force the mind into dilemmas of logical
+impossibility so that, depending which horn of the dilemma you are
+holding on to, it becomes as impossible to conceive of freedom or
+its opposite as it is to realize the notion of a square circle. In its
+simplest form, the difficulty may be summed up as the contradiction between our consciousness and conscience, telling us that we
+are free and hence responsible, and our everyday experience in the
+outer world, in which we orient ourselves according to the principle
+of causality. In all practical and especially in political matters we
+hold human freedom to be a self-evident truth, and it is upon this
+axiomatic assumption that laws are laid down in human communities, that decisions are taken, that judgments are passed. In
+all fields of scientific and theoretical endeavor, on the contrary, we
+proceed according to the no less self-evident truth of nihil ex
+nihilo, of nihil sine causa, that is, on the assumption that even "our
+own lives are, in the last analysis, subject to causation" and that if
+143
+
+144
+there should be an ultimately free ego in ourselves, it certainly
+never makes its unequivocal appearance in the phenomenal world,
+and therefore can never become the subject of theoretical ascertainment. Hence freedom turns out to be a mirage the moment
+psychology looks into what is supposedly its innermost domain;
+for "the part which force plays in nature, as the cause of motion,
+has its counterpart in the mental sphere in motive as the cause of
+conduct." 1 It is true that the test of causality—the predictability of
+effect if all causes are known—cannot be applied to the realm of
+human affairs; but this practical impredictability is no test of freedom, it signifies merely that we are in no position ever to know all
+causes which come into play, and this partly because of the sheer
+number of factors involved, but also because human motives, as
+distinguished from natural forces, are still hidden from all onlookers, from inspection by our fellow men as well as from introspection.
+The greatest clarification in these obscure matters we owe to
+Kant and to his insight that freedom is no more ascertainable to
+the inner sense and within the field of inner experience than it is to
+the senses with which we know and understand the world. Whether
+or not causality is operative in the household of nature and the
+universe, it certainly is a category of the mind to bring order into
+all sensory data, whatever their nature may be, and thus it makes
+experience possible. Hence the antinomy between practical freedom and theoretical non-freedom, both equally axiomatic in their
+respective fields, does not merely concern a dichotomy between
+science and ethics, but lies in everyday life experiences from which
+both ethics and science take their respective points of departure. It
+is not scientific theory but thought itself, in its pre-scientific and prephilosophical understanding, that seems to dissolve freedom on
+which our practical conduct is based into nothingness. For the
+moment we reflect upon an act which was undertaken under the
+assumption of our being a free agent, it seems to come under the
+sway of two kinds of causality, of the causality of inner motivation
+on one hand and of the causal principle which rules the outer world
+on the other. Kant saved freedom from this twofold assault upon it
+
+145
+by distinguishing between a "pure" or theoretical reason and a
+"practical reason" whose center is free will, whereby it is important
+to keep in mind that the free-willing agent, who is practically allimportant, never appears in the phenomenal world, neither in the
+outer world of our five senses nor in the field of the inner sense
+with which I sense myself. This solution, pitting the dictate of the
+will against the understanding of reason, is ingenious enough and
+may even suffice to establish a moral law whose logical consistency
+is in no way inferior to natural laws. But it does little to eliminate
+the greatest and most dangerous difficulty, namely, that thought
+itself, in its theoretical as well as its pre-theoretical form, makes
+freedom disappear-quite apart from the fact that it must appear
+strange indeed that the faculty of the will whose essential activity
+consists in dictate and command should be the harborer of freedom.
+To the question of politics, the problem of freedom is crucial,
+and no political theory can afford to remain unconcerned with the
+fact that this problem has led into "the obscure wood wherein
+philosophy has lost its way." 2 It is the contention of the following
+considerations that the reason for this obscurity is that the phenomenon of freedom does not appear in the realm of thought at
+all, that neither freedom nor its opposite is experienced in the
+dialogue between me and myself in the course of which the great
+philosophic and metaphysical questions arise, and that the philosophical tradition, whose origin in this respect we shall consider
+later, has distorted, instead of clarifying, the very idea of freedom
+such as it is given in human experience by transposing it from its
+original field, the realm of politics and human affairs in general, to
+an inward domain, the will, where it would be open to self-inspection. As a first, preliminary justification of this approach, it may be
+pointed out that historically the problem of freedom has been the
+last of the time-honored great metaphysical questions-such as
+being, nothingness, the soul, nature, time, eternity, etc.—to become
+a topic of philosophic inquiry at all. There is no preoccupation
+with freedom in the whole history of great philosophy from the pre-
+Socratics up to Plotinus, the last ancient philosopher. And when
+
+146
+freedom made its first appearance in our philosophical tradition, it
+was the experience of religious conversion—of Paul first and then
+of Augustine—which gave rise to it.
+The field where freedom has always been known, not as a problem, to be sure, but as a fact of everyday life, is the political realm.
+And even today, whether we know it or not, the question of politics
+and the fact that man is a being endowed with the gift of action
+must always be present to our mind when we speak of the problem
+of freedom; for action and politics, among all the capabilities and
+potentialities of human life, are the only things of which we could
+not even conceive without at least assuming that freedom exists,
+and we can hardly touch a single political issue without, implicitly
+or explicitly, touching upon an issue of man's liberty. Freedom,
+moreover, is not only one among the many problems and phenomena of the political realm properly speaking, such as justice, or
+power, or equality; freedom, which only seldom—in times of crisis
+or revolution—becomes the direct aim of political action, is actually
+the reason that men live together in political organization at all.
+Without it, political life as such would be meaningless. The raison
+d'être of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action.
+This freedom which we take for granted in all political theory
+and which even those who praise tyranny must still take into account is the very opposite of "inner freedom," the inward space
+into which men may escape from external coercion and feel free.
+This inner feeling remains without outer manifestations and hence
+is by definition politically irrelevant. Whatever its legitimacy may
+be, and however eloquently it may have been described in late
+antiquity, it is historically a late phenomenon, and it was originally
+the result of an estrangement from the world in which worldly experiences were transformed into experiences within one's own self.
+The experiences of inner freedom are derivative in that they always
+presuppose a retreat from the world, where freedom was denied,
+into an inwardness to which no other has access. The inward space
+where the self is sheltered against the world must not be mistaken
+for the heart or the mind, both of which exist and function only in
+interrelationship with the world. Not the heart and not the mind,
+
+147
+but inwardness as a place of absolute freedom within one's own
+self was discovered in late antiquity by those who had no place of
+their own in the world and hence lacked a worldly condition which,
+from early antiquity to almost the middle of the nineteenth century,
+was unanimously held to be a prerequisite for freedom.
+The derivative character of this inner freedom, or of the theory
+that "the appropriate region of human liberty" is the "inward domain of consciousness," 3 appears more clearly if we go back to its
+origins. Not the modern individual with his desire to unfold, to develop, and to expand, with his justified fear lest society get the
+better of his individuality, with his emphatic insistence "on the importance of genius" and originality, but the popular and popularizing sectarians of late antiquity, who have hardly more in common with philosophy than the name, are representative in this
+respect. Thus the most persuasive arguments for the absolute superiority of inner freedom can still be found in an essay of Epictetus, who begins by stating that free is he who lives as he wishes,*
+a definition which oddly echoes a sentence from Aristotle's Politics
+in which the statement "Freedom means the doing what a man
+likes" is put in the mouths of those who do not know what freedom
+is." Epictetus then goes on to show that a man is free if he limits
+himself to what is in his power, if he does not reach into a realm
+where he can be hindered." The "science of living" " consists in
+knowing how to distinguish between the alien world over which
+man has no power and the self of which he may dispose as he sees
+fit.®
+Historically it is interesting to note that the appearance of the
+problem of freedom in Augustine's philosophy was thus preceded
+by the conscious attempt to divorce the notion of freedom from
+politics, to arrive at a formulation through which one may be a
+slave in the world and still be free. Conceptually, however, Epictetus's freedom which consists in being free from one's own desires is no more than a reversal of the current ancient political
+notions, and the political background against which this whole
+body of popular philosophy was formulated, the obvious decline
+of freedom in the late Roman Empire, manifests itself still quite
+
+148
+clearly in the role which such notions as power, domination, and
+property play in it. According to ancient understanding, man could
+liberate himself from necessity only through power over other men,
+and he could be free only if he owned a place, a home in the
+world. Epictetus transposed these worldly relationships into relationships within man's own self, whereby he discovered that no
+power is so absolute as that which man yields over himself, and
+that the inward space where man struggles and subdues himself is
+more entirely his own, namely, more securely shielded from outside
+interference, than any worldly home could ever be.
+Hence, in spite of the great influence the concept of an inner,
+nonpolitical freedom has exerted upon the tradition of thought, it
+seems safe to say that man would know nothing of inner freedom if
+he had not first experienced a condition of being free as a worldly
+tangible reality. We first become aware of freedom or its opposite in
+our intercourse with others, not in the intercourse with ourselves.
+Before it became an attribute of thought or a quality of the will,
+freedom was understood to be the free man's status, which enabled
+him to move, to get away from home, to go out into the world and
+meet other people in deed and word. This freedom clearly was
+preceded by liberation: in order to be free, man must have liberated
+himself from the necessities of life. But the status of freedom did
+not follow automatically upon the act of liberation. Freedom
+needed, in addition to mere liberation, the company of other men
+who were in the same state, and it needed a common public space
+to meet them—a politically organized world, in other words, into
+which each of the free men could insert himself by word and deed.
+Obviously not every form of human intercourse and not every
+kind of community is characterized by freedom. Where men live
+together but do not form a body politic—as, for example, in tribal
+societies or in the privacy of the household—the factors ruling their
+actions and conduct are not freedom but the necessities of life and
+concern for its preservation. Moreover, wherever the man-made
+world does not become the scene for action and speech—as in
+despotically ruled communities which banish their subjects into the
+narrowness of the home and thus prevent the rise of a public realm
+
+149
+—freedom has no worldly reality. Without a politically guaranteed
+public realm, freedom lacks the worldly space to make its appearance. To be sure it may still dwell in men's hearts as desire or will
+or hope or yearning; but the human heart, as we all know, is a
+very dark place, and whatever goes on in its obscurity can hardly be
+called a demonstrable fact. Freedom as a demonstrable fact and
+politics coincide and are related to each other like two sides of the
+same matter.
+Yet it is precisely this coincidence of politics and freedom which
+we cannot take for granted in the light of our present political experience. The rise of totalitarianism, its claim to having subordinated all spheres of life to the demands of politics and its consistent
+nonrecognition of civil rights, above all the rights of privacy and
+the right to freedom from politics, makes us doubt not only the
+coincidence of politics and freedom but their very compatibility.
+We are inclined to believe that freedom begins where politics ends,
+because we have seen that freedom has disappeared when so-called
+political considerations overruled everything else. Was not the
+liberal credo, "The less politics the more freedom," right after all?
+Is it not true that the smaller the space occupied by the political,
+the larger the domain left to freedom? Indeed, do we not rightly
+measure the extent of freedom in any given community by the free
+scope it grants to apparently nonpolitical activities, free economic
+enterprise or freedom of teaching, of religion, of cultural and intellectual activities? Is it not true, as we all somehow believe, that
+politics is compatible with freedom only because and insofar as it
+guarantees a possible freedom from politics?
+This definition of political liberty as a potential freedom from
+politics is not urged upon us merely by our most recent experiences;
+it has played a large part in the history of political theory. We
+need go no farther than the political thinkers of the seventeenth
+and eighteenth centuries, who more often than not simply identified
+political freedom with security. The highest purpose of politics,
+"the end of government," was the guaranty of security; security, in
+turn, made freedom possible, and the word "freedom" designated a
+quintessence of activities which occurred outside the political realm.
+
+150
+Even Montesquieu, though he had not only a different but a much
+higher opinion of the essence of politics than Hobbes or Spinoza,
+could still occasionally equate political freedom with security." The
+rise of the political and social sciences in the nineteenth and
+twentieth centuries has even widened the breach between freedom
+and politics; for government, which since the beginning of the
+modern age had been identified with the total domain of the political, was now considered to be the appointed protector not so much
+of freedom as of the life process, the interests of society and its individuals. Security remained the decisive criterion, but not the individual's security against "violent death," as in Hobbes (where
+the condition of all liberty is freedom from fear), but a security
+which should permit an undisturbed development of the life process
+of society as a whole. This life process is not bound up with freedom but follows its own inherent necessity; and it can be called
+free only in the sense that we speak of a freely flowing stream. Here
+freedom is not even the nonpolitical aim of politics, but a marginal
+phenomenon-which somehow forms the boundary government
+should not overstep unless life itself and its immediate interests
+and necessities are at stake.
+Thus not only we, who have reasons of our own to distrust
+politics for the sake of freedom, but the entire modern age has
+separated freedom and politics. I could descend even deeper into
+the past and evoke older memories and traditions. The pre-modern
+secular concept of freedom certainly was emphatic in its insistence
+on separating the subjects' freedom from any direct share in
+government; the people's "liberty and freedom consisted in having
+the government of those laws by which their life and their goods
+may be most their own: 'tis not for having share in government,
+that is nothing pertaining to them"—as Charles I summed it up in
+his speech from the scaffold. It was not out of a desire for freedom
+that people eventually demanded their share in government or admission to the political realm, but out of mistrust in those who held
+power over their life and goods. The Christian concept of political
+freedom, moreover, arose out of the early Christians' suspicion of
+and hostility against the public realm as such, from whose concerns
+
+151
+they demanded to be absolved in order to be free. And this Christian
+freedom for the sake of salvation had been preceded, as we saw
+before, by the philosophers' abstention from politics as a prerequisite for the highest and freest way of life, the vita contemplativa.
+Despite the enormous weight of this tradition and despite the
+perhaps even more telling urgency of our own experiences, both
+pressing into the same direction of a divorce of freedom from politics, I think the reader may believe he has read only an old truism
+when I said that the raison d'être of politics is freedom and that
+this freedom is primarily experienced in action. In the following I
+shall do no more than reflect on this old truism.
+11
+Freedom as related to politics is not a phenomenon of the will.
+We deal here not with the liberum arbitrium, a freedom of choice
+that arbitrates and decides between two given things, one good and
+one evil, and whose choice is predetermined by motive which has
+only to be argued to start its operation-"And therefore, since I
+cannot prove a lover,/ To entertain these fair well-spoken days,/
+I am determined to prove a villain,/ And hate the idle pleasures of
+these days." Rather it is, to remain with Shakespeare, the freedom
+of Brutus: "That this shall be or we will fall for it," that is, the
+freedom to call something into being which did not exist before,
+which was not given, not even as an object of cognition or imagination, and which therefore, strictly speaking, could not be known.
+Action, to be free, must be free from motive on one side, from its
+intended goal as a predictable effect on the other. This is not to
+say that motives and aims are not important factors in every single
+act, but they are its determining factors, and action is free to the
+extent that it is able to transcend them. Action insofar as it is determined is guided by a future aim whose desirability the intellect has
+grasped before the will wills it, whereby the intellect calls upon the
+will, since only the will can dictate action-to paraphrase a char-
+
+152
+acteristic description of this process by Duns Scotus.1° The aim
+of action varies and depends upon the changing circumstances of
+the world; to recognize the aim is not a matter of freedom, but of
+right or wrong judgment. Will, seen as a distinct and separate human faculty, follows judgment, i.e., cognition of the right aim, and
+then commands its execution. The power to command, to dictate
+action, is not a matter of freedom but a question of strength or
+weakness.
+Action insofar as it is free is neither under the guidance of the
+intellect nor under the dictate of the will-although it needs both
+for the execution of any particular goal—but springs from something altogether different which (following Montesquieu's famous
+analysis of forms of government) I shall call a principle. Principles
+do not operate from within the self as motives do-"mine own
+deformity" or my "fair proportion" —but inspire, as it were, from
+without; and they are much too general to prescribe particular
+goals, although every particular aim can be judged in the light of
+its principle once the act has been started. For, unlike the judgment
+of the intellect which precedes action, and unlike the command of
+the will which initiates it, the inspiring principle becomes fully manifest only in the performing act itself; yet while the merits of judgment lose their validity, and the strength of the commanding will
+exhausts itself, in the course of the act which they execute in
+cooperation, the principle which inspired it loses nothing in strength
+or validity through execution. In distinction from its goal, the
+principle of an action can be repeated time and again, it is inexhaustible, and in distinction from its motive, the validity of a principle is universal, it is not bound to any particular person or to any
+particular group. However, the manifestation of principles comes
+about only through action, they are manifest in the world as long as
+the action lasts, but no longer. Such principles are honor or glory,
+love of equality, which Montesquieu called virtue, or distinction or
+excellence—the Greek ei plotevew ("always strive to do your best
+and to be the best of all"), but also fear or distrust or hatred. Freedom or its opposite appears in the world whenever such principles
+are actualized; the appearance of freedom, like the manifestation of
+
+153
+principles, coincides with the performing act. Men are free-as
+distinguished from their possessing the gift for freedom—as long as
+they act, neither before nor after; for to be free and to act are the
+same.
+Freedom as inherent in action is perhaps best illustrated by
+Machiavelli's concept of virtù, the excellence with which man
+answers the opportunities the world opens up before him in the
+guise of fortuna. Its meaning is best rendered by "virtuosity," that
+is, an excellence we attribute to the performing arts (as distinguished from the creative arts of making), where the accomplishment lies in the performance itself and not in an end product which
+outlasts the activity that brought it into existence and becomes independent of it. The virtuoso-ship of Machiavelli's virtù somehow
+reminds us of the fact, although Machiavelli hardly knew it, that
+the Greeks always used such metaphors as flute-playing, dancing,
+healing, and seafaring to distinguish political from other activities,
+that is, that they drew their analogies from those arts in which
+virtuosity of performance is decisive.
+Since all acting contains an element of virtuosity, and because
+virtuosity is the excellence we ascribe to the performing arts, politics has often been defined as an art. This, of course, is not a
+definition but a metaphor, and the metaphor becomes completely
+false if one falls into the common error of regarding the state or
+government as a work of art, as a kind of collective masterpiece.
+In the sense of the creative arts, which bring forth something tangible and reify human thought to such an extent that the produced
+thing possesses an existence of its own, politics is the exact opposite of an art—which incidentally does not mean that it is a science.
+Political institutions, no matter how well or how badly designed,
+depend for continued existence upon acting men; their conservation
+is achieved by the same means that brought them into being. Independent existence marks the work of art as a product of making;
+utter dependence upon further acts to keep it in existence marks
+the state as a product of action.
+The point here is not whether the creative artist is free in the
+process of creation, but that the creative process is not displayed
+
+154
+in public and not destined to appear in the world. Hence the element of freedom, certainly present in the creative arts, remains
+hidden; it is not the free creative process which finally appears
+and matters for the world, but the work of art itself, the end
+product of the process. The performing arts, on the contrary, have
+indeed a strong affinity with politics. Performing artists--dancers,
+play-actors, musicians, and the like—need an audience to show
+their virtuosity, just as acting men need the presence of others
+before whom they can appear; both need a publicly organized space
+for their "work," and both depend upon others for the performance
+itself. Such a space of appearances is not to be taken for granted
+wherever men live together in a community. The Greek polis
+once was precisely that "form of government" which provided men
+with a space of appearances where they could act, with a kind of
+theater where freedom could appear.
+To use the word "political" in the sense of the Greek polis is
+neither arbitrary nor far-fetched. Not only etymologically and not
+only for the learned does the very word, which in all European
+languages still derives from the historically unique organization of
+the Greek city-state, echo the experiences of the community which
+first discovered the essence and the realm of the political. It is
+indeed difficult and even misleading to talk about politics and its
+innermost principles without drawing to some extent upon the experiences of Greek and Roman antiquity, and this for no other
+reason than that men have never, either before or after, thought so
+highly of political activity and bestowed so much dignity upon its
+realm. As regards the relation of freedom to politics, there is the
+additional reason that only ancient political communities were
+founded for the express purpose of serving the free-those who
+were neither slaves, subject to coercion by others, nor laborers,
+driven and urged on by the necessities of life. If, then, we understand the political in the sense of the polis, its end or raison d'être
+would be to establish and keep in existence a space where freedom
+as virtuosity can appear. This is the realm where freedom is a
+worldly reality, tangible in words which can be heard, in deeds
+which can be seen, and in events which are talked about, remem-
+
+What Is Freedom!
+155
+bered, and turned into stories before they are finally incorporated
+into the great storybook of human history. Whatever occurs in
+this space of appearances is political by definition, even when it is
+not a direct product of action. What remains outside it, such as
+the great feats of barbarian empires, may be impressive and noteworthy, but it is not political, strictly speaking.
+Every attempt to derive the concept of freedom from experiences
+in the political realm sounds strange and startling because all our
+theories in these matters are dominated by the notion that freedom
+is an attribute of will and thought much rather than of action.
+And this priority is not merely derived from the notion that every
+act must psychologically be preceded by a cognitive act of the intellect and a command of the will to carry out its decision, but also,
+and perhaps even primarily, because it is held that "perfect liberty
+is incompatible with the existence of society," that it can be tolerated in its perfection only outside the realm of human affairs. This
+current argument does not hold—what perhaps is true-that it is
+in the nature of thought to need more freedom than does any other
+activity of men, but rather that thinking in itself is not dangerous,
+so that only action needs to be restrained: "No one pretends that
+actions should be as free as opinions." 1 This, of course, belongs
+among the fundamental tenets of liberalism, which, its name notwithstanding, has done its share to banish the notion of liberty
+from the political realm. For politics, according to the same philosophy, must be concerned almost exclusively with the maintenance of life and the safeguarding of its interests. Now, where
+life is at stake all action is by definition under the sway of necessity,
+and the proper realm to take care of life's necessities is the gigantic
+and still increasing sphere of social and economic life whose administration has overshadowed the political realm ever since the beginning of the modern age. Only foreign affairs, because the relationships between nations still harbor hostilities and sympathies
+which cannot be reduced to economic factors, seem to be left as a
+purely political domain. And even here the prevailing tendency is to
+consider international power problems and rivalries as ultimately
+springing from economic factors and interests.
+
+156
+Yet just as we, despite all theories and isms, still believe that to
+say "Freedom is the raison d'être of politics" is no more than a
+truism, so do we, in spite of our apparently exclusive concern with
+life, still hold as a matter of course that courage is one of the
+cardinal political virtues, although—if all this were a matter of
+consistency, which it obviously is not—we should be the first to
+condemn courage as the foolish and even vicious contempt for life
+and its interests, that is, for the allegedly highest of all goods.
+Courage is a big word, and I do not mean the daring of adventure
+which gladly risks life for the sake of being as thoroughly and intensely alive as one can be only in the face of danger and death.
+Temerity is no less concerned with life than is cowardice. Courage,
+which we still believe to be indispensable for political action, and
+which Churchill once called "the first of human qualities, because
+it is the quality which guarantees all others," does not gratify our
+individual sense of vitality but is demanded of us by the very nature
+of the public realm. For this world of ours, because it existed before
+us and is meant to outlast our lives in it, simply cannot afford to
+give primary concern to individual lives and the interests connected
+with them; as such the public realm stands in the sharpest possible
+contrast to our private domain, where, in the protection of family
+and home, everything serves and must serve the security of the life
+process. It requires courage even to leave the protective security
+of our four walls and enter the public realm, not because of particular dangers which may lie in wait for us, but because we have arrived in a realm where the concern for life has lost its validity.
+Courage liberates men from their worry about life for the freedom
+of the world. Courage is indispensable because in politics not life
+but the world is at stake.
+I1l
+Obviously this notion of an interdependence of freedom and
+politics stands in contradiction to the social theories of the modern
+age. Unfortunately it does not follow that we need only to revert
+
+157
+to older, pre-modern traditions and theories. Indeed, the greatest
+difficulty in reaching an understanding of what freedom is arises
+from the fact that a simple return to tradition, and especially to
+what we are wont to call the great tradition, does not help us.
+Neither the philosophical concept of freedom as it first arose in late
+antiquity, where freedom became a phenomenon of thought by
+which man could, as it were, reason himself out of the world, nor
+the Christian and modern notion of free will has any ground in
+political experience. Our philosophical tradition is almost unanimous in holding that freedom begins where men have left the
+realm of political life inhabited by the many, and that it is not experienced in association with others but in intercourse with one's
+self—whether in the form of an inner dialogue which, since
+Socrates, we call thinking, or in a conflict within myself, the inner
+strife between what I would and what I do, whose murderous
+dialectics disclosed first to Paul and then to Augustine the equivocalities and impotence of the human heart.
+For the history of the problem of freedom, Christian tradition
+has indeed become the decisive factor. We almost automatically
+equate freedom with free will, that is, with a faculty virtually unknown to classical antiquity. For will, as Christianity discovered it,
+had so little in common with the well-known capacities to desire,
+to intend, and to aim at, that it claimed attention only after it had
+come into conflict with them. If freedom were actually nothing but
+a phenomenon of the will, we would have to conclude that the
+ancients did not know freedom. This, of course, is absurd, but if
+one wished to assert it he could argue what I have mentioned before, namely, that the idea of freedom played no role in philosophy
+prior to Augustine. The reason for this striking fact is that, in Greek
+as well as Roman antiquity, freedom was an exclusively political
+concept, indeed the quintessence of the city-state and of citizenship. Our philosophical tradition of political thought, beginning
+with Parmenides and Plato, was founded explicitly in opposition to
+this polis and its citizenship. The way of life chosen by the philosopher was understood in opposition to the Bios moditukós, the
+political way of life. Freedom, therefore, the very center of poli-
+
+158
+tics as the Greeks understood it, was an idea which almost by
+definition could not enter the framework of Greek philosophy.
+Only when the early Christians, and especially Paul, discovered a
+kind of freedom which had no relation to politics, could the concept of freedom enter the history of philosophy. Freedom became
+one of the chief problems of philosophy when it was experienced as
+something occurring in the intercourse between me and myself, and
+outside of the intercourse between men. Free will and freedom became synonymous notions,? and the presence of freedom was experienced in complete solitude, "where no man might hinder the
+hot contention wherein I had engaged with myself," the deadly conflict which took place in the "inner dwelling" of the soul and the
+dark "chamber of the heart." 13
+Classical antiquity was by no means inexperienced in the phenomena of solitude; it knew well enough that solitary man is no
+longer one but two-in-one, that an intercourse between me and
+myself begins the moment the intercourse between me and my fellow men has been interrupted for no matter what reason. In addition to this dualism which is the existential condition of thought,
+classical philosophy since Plato had insisted on a dualism between
+soul and body whereby the human faculty of motion had been
+assigned to the soul, which was supposed to move the body as well
+as itself, and it was still within the range of Platonic thought to interpret this faculty as a rulership of the soul over the body. Yet the
+Augustinian solitude of "hot contention" within the soul itself was
+utterly unknown, for the fight in which he had become engaged
+was not between reason and passion, between understanding and
+Dupós, 14 that is, between two different human faculties, but it was a
+conflict within the will itself. And this duality within the self-same
+faculty had been known as the characteristic of thought, as the
+dialogue which I hold with myself. In other words, the two-in-one
+of solitude which sets the thought process into motion has the
+exactly opposite effect on the will: it paralyzes and locks it within
+itself; willing in solitude is always velle and nolle, to will and not to
+will at the same time.
+The paralyzing effect the will seems to have upon itself comes all
+
+159
+the more surprisingly as its very essence obviously is to command
+and be obeyed. Hence it appears to be a "monstrosity" that man
+may command himself and not be obeyed, a monstrosity which can
+be explained only by the simultaneous presence of an I-will and an
+I-will-not.' This, however, is already an interpretation by Augustine; the historical fact is that the phenomenon of the will originally
+manifested itself in the experience that what I would I do not, that
+there is such a thing as I-will-and-cannot. What was unknown to
+antiquity was not that there is a possible I-know-but-l-will-not, but
+that I-Will and I-can are not the same-non hoc est velle, quod
+posse.' For the I-will-and-I-can was of course very familiar to the
+ancients. We need only remember how much Plato insisted that
+only those who knew how to rule themselves had the right to rule
+others and be freed from the obligation of obedience. And it is
+true that self-control has remained one of the specifically political
+virtues, if only because it is an outstanding phenomenon of virtuosity where I-will and I-can must be so well attuned that they practically coincide.
+Had ancient philosophy known of a possible conflict between
+what I can and what I will, it would certainly have understood the
+phenomenon of freedom as an inherent quality of the I-can, or it
+might conceivably have defined it as the coincidence of I-will and
+I-can; it certainly would not have thought of it as an attribute of the
+I-will or I-would. This assertion is no empty speculation; even the
+Euripidean conflict between reason and Ouuós, both simultaneously
+present in the soul, is a relatively late phenomenon. More typical,
+and in our context more relevant, was the conviction that passion
+may blind men's reason but that once reason has succeeded in
+making itself heard there is no passion left to prevent man from
+doing what he knows is right. This conviction still underlies Socrates' teaching that virtue is a kind of knowledge, and our amazement that anybody could ever have thought that virtue was "rational," that it could be learned and taught, arises from our acquaintance with a will which is broken in itself, which wills and
+wills-not at the same time, much rather than from any superior insight in the alleged powerlessness of reason.
+
+160
+In other words, will, will-power, and will-to-power are for us
+almost identical notions; the seat of power is to us the faculty of
+the will as known and experienced by man in his intercourse with
+himself. And for the sake of this will-power we have emasculated
+not only our reasoning and cognitive faculties but other more
+"practical" faculties as well. But is it not plain even to us that, in
+the words of Pindar, "this is the greatest grief: to stand with his feet
+outside the right and the beautiful one knows [forced away, by
+necessity"? i The necessity which prevents me from doing what I
+know and will may arise from the world, or from my own body, or
+from an insufficiency of talents, gifts, and qualities which are bestowed upon man by birth and over which he has hardly more
+power than he has over other circumstances; all these factors, the
+psychological ones not excluded, condition the person from the outside as far as the I-will and the I-know, that is, the ego itself, are
+concerned; the power that meets these circumstances, that liberates,
+as it were, willing and knowing from their bondage to necessity is
+the I-can. Only where the I-will and the I-can coincide does freedom come to pass.
+There exists still another way to check our current notion of
+free will, born of a religious predicament and formulated in philosophical language, against the older, strictly political experiences
+of freedom. In the revival of political thought which accompanied
+the rise of the modern age, we may distinguish between those
+thinkers who can truly be called the fathers of political "science,"
+since they took their cue from the new discoveries of the natural
+sciences-their greatest representative is Hobbes-and those who,
+relatively undisturbed by these typically modern developments,
+harkened back to the political thought of antiquity, not out of any
+predilection for the past as such but simply because the separation
+of church and state, of religion and politics, had given rise to an
+independent secular, political realm such as had been unknown
+since the fall of the Roman Empire. The greatest representative of
+this political secularism was Montesquieu, who, though indifferent
+to problems of a strictly philosophic nature, was deeply aware of
+the inadequacy of the Christian and the philosophers' concept of
+
+161
+freedom for political purposes. In order to get rid of it, he expressly
+distinguished between philosophical and political freedom, and the
+difference consisted in that philosophy demands no more of freedom than the exercise of the will (l'exercice de la volonté), independent of circumstances and of attainment of the goals the will
+has set. Political freedom, on the contrary, consists in being able
+to do what one ought to will (la liberté ne peut consister qu' à
+pouvoir faire ce que l'on doit vouloir-the emphasis is on pouvoir). 1° For Montesquieu as for the ancients it was obvious that an
+agent could no longer be called free when he lacked the capacity
+to do—whereby it is irrelevant whether this failure is caused by
+exterior or by interior circumstances.
+I chose the example of self-control because to us this is clearly
+a phenomenon of will and of will-power. The Greeks, more than
+any other people, have reflected on moderation and the necessity
+to tame the steeds of the soul, and yet they never became aware of
+the will as a distinct faculty, separate from other human capacities.
+Historically, men first discovered the will when they experienced its
+impotence and not its power, when they said with Paul: "For to will
+is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find
+not." It is the same will of which Augustine complained that it
+seemed "no monstrousness [for it] partly to will, partly to nill";
+and although he points out that this is "a disease of the mind," he
+also admits that this disease is, as it were, natural for a mind possessed of a will: "For the will commands that there be a will, it
+commands not something else but itself. . . . Were the will entire,
+it would not even command itself to be, because it would already
+be." 18 In other words, if man has a will at all, it must always
+appear as though there were two wills present in the same man,
+fighting with each other for power over his mind. Hence, the will is
+both powerful and impotent, free and unfree.
+When we speak of impotence and the limits set to will-power, we
+usually think of man's powerlessness with respect to the surrounding world. It is, therefore, of some importance to notice that in
+these early testimonies the will was not defeated by some overwhelming force of nature or circumstances; the contention which
+
+162
+its appearance raised was neither the conflict between the one
+against the many nor the strife between body and mind. On the
+contrary, the relation of mind to body was for Augustine even the
+outstanding example for the enormous power inherent in the will:
+"The mind commands the body, and the body obeys instantly; the
+mind commands itself, and is resisted." 20 The body represents in
+this context the exterior world and is by no means identical with
+one's self. It is within one's self, in the "interior dwelling" (interior
+domus), where Epictetus still believed man to be an absolute
+master, that the conflict between man and himself broke out and
+that the will was defeated. Christian will-power was discovered as
+an organ of self-liberation and immediately found wanting. It is as
+though the I-will immediately paralyzed the I-can, as though the
+moment men willed freedom, they lost their capacity to be free. In
+the deadly conflict with worldly desires and intentions from which
+will-power was supposed to liberate the self, the most willing
+seemed able to achieve was oppression. Because of the will's impotence, its incapacity to generate genuine power, its constant defeat in the struggle with the self, in which the power of the I-can
+exhausted itself, the will-to-power turned at once into a will-tooppression. I can only hint here at the fatal consequences for political theory of this equation of freedom with the human capacity to
+will; it was one of the causes why even today we almost automatically equate power with oppression or, at least, with rule over
+others.
+However that may be, what we usually understand by will and
+will-power has grown out of this conflict between a willing and a
+performing self, out of the experience of an I-will-and-cannor,
+which means that the I-will, no matter what is wiiled, remains subject to the self, strikes back at it, spurs it on, incites it further, or is
+ruined by it. However far the will-to-power may reach out, and even
+if somebody possessed by it begins to conquer the whole world,
+the I-will can never rid itself of the self; it always remains bound to
+it and, indeed, under its bondage. This bondage to the self distinguishes the I-will from the I-think, which also is carried on between me and myself but in whose dialogue the self is not the ob-
+
+163
+ject of the activity of thought. The fact that the I-will has become
+so power-thirsty, that will and will-to-power have become practically identical, is perhaps due to its having been first experienced in
+its impotence. Tyranny at any rate, the only form of government
+which arises directly out of the I-will, owes its greedy cruelty to an
+egotism utterly absent from the utopian tyrannies of reason with
+which the philosophers wished to coerce men and which they conceived on the model of the I-think.
+I have said that the philosophers first began to show an interest in
+the problem of freedom when freedom was no longer experienced
+in acting and in associating with others but in willing and in the
+intercourse with one's self, when, briefly, freedom had become free
+will. Since then, freedom has been a philosophical problem of the
+first order; as such it was applied to the political realm and thus
+has become a political problem as well. Because of the philosophic
+shift from action to will-power, from freedom as a state of being
+manifest in action to the liberum arbitrium, the ideal of freedom
+ceased to be virtuosity in the sense we mentioned before and became sovereignty, the ideal of a free will, independent from others
+and eventually prevailing against them. The philosophic ancestry of
+our current political notion of freedom is still quite manifest in
+eighteenth-century political writers, when, for instance, Thomas
+Paine insisted that "to be free it is sufficient [for man] that he wills
+it," a word which Lafayette applied to the nation-state: "Pour
+qu'une nation soit libre, il suffit qu'elle veuille l'être."
+Obviously such words echo the political philosophy of Jean-
+Jacques Rousseau, who has remained the most consistent representative of the theory of sovereignty, which he derived directly
+from the will, so that he could conceive of political power in the
+strict image of individual will-power. He argued against Montesquieu that power must be sovereign, that is, indivisible, because
+"a divided will would be inconceivable." He did not shun the consequences of this extreme individualism, and he held that in an
+ideal state "the citizens had no communications one with another,"
+that in order to avoid factions "each citizen should think only his
+own thoughts." In reality Rousseau's theory stands refuted for the
+
+164
+simple reason that "it is absurd for the will to bind itself for the
+future"; " a community actualiy founded on this sovereign will
+would be built not on sand but on quicksand. All political business
+is, and always has been, transacted within an elaborate framework
+of ties and bonds for the future-such as laws and constitutions,
+treaties and alliances—all of which derive in the last instance from
+the faculty to promise and to keep promises in the face of the
+essential uncertainties of the future. A state, moreover, in which
+there is no communication between the citizens and where each
+man thinks only his own thoughts is by definition a tyranny. That
+the faculty of will and will-power in and by itself, unconnected with
+any other faculties, is an essentially nonpolitical and even antipolitical capacity is perhaps nowhere else so manifest as in the
+absurdities to which Rousseau was driven and in the curious cheerfulness with which he accepted them.
+Politically, this identification of freedom with sovereignty is perhaps the most pernicious and dangerous consequence of the philosophical equation of freedom and free will. For it leads either to a
+denial of human freedom—namely, if it is realized that whatever
+men may be, they are never sovereign—or to the insight that the
+freedom of one man, or a group, or a body politic can be purchased
+only at the price of the freedom, i.e., the sovereignty, of all others.
+Within the conceptual framework of traditional philosophy, it is indeed very difficult to understand how freedom and non-sovereignty
+can exist together or, to put it another way, how freedom could
+have been given to men under the condition of non-sovereignty.
+Actually it is as unrealistic to deny freedom because of the fact of
+human non-sovereignty as it is dangerous to believe that one can
+be free-as an individual or as a group-only if he is sovereign.
+The famous sovereignty of political bodies has always been an illusion, which, moreover, can be maintained only by the instruments
+of violence, that is, with essentially nonpolitical means. Under
+human conditions, which are determined by the fact that not man
+but men live on the earth, freedom and sovereignty are so little
+identical that they cannot even exist simultaneously. Where men
+wish to be sovereign, as individuals or as organized groups, they
+
+165
+must submit to the oppression of the will, be this the individual
+will with which I force myself, or the "general will" of an organized
+group. If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must
+renounce.
+IV
+Since the whole problem of freedom arises for us in the horizon
+of Christian traditions on one hand, and of an originally antipolitical philosophic tradition on the other, we find it difficult to
+realize that there may exist a freedom which is not an attribute of
+the will but an accessory of doing and acting. Let us therefore go
+back once more to antiquity, i.e., to its political and pre-philosophical traditions, certainly not for the sake of erudition and not even
+because of the continuity of our tradition, but merely because a
+freedom experienced in the process of acting and nothing else—
+though, of course, mankind never lost this experience altogether—
+has never again been articulated with the same classical clarity.
+However, for reasons we mentioned before and which we cannot
+discuss here, this articulation is nowhere more difficult to grasp than
+in the writings of the philosophers. It would of course lead us too
+far to try to distill, as it were, adequate concepts from the body of
+non-philosophical literature, from poetic, dramatic, historical, and
+political writings, whose articulation lifts experiences into a realm
+of splendor which is not the realm of conceptual thought. And for
+our purposes this is not necessary. For whatever ancient literature,
+Greek as well as Latin, has to tell us about these matters is ultimately rooted in the curious fact that both the Greek and the Latin
+language possess two verbs to designate what we uniformly call
+"to act." The two Greek words are üpyev: to begin, to lead, and,
+finally, to rule; and pátrew: to carry something through. The corresponding Latin verbs are agere: to set something in motion; and
+gerere, which is hard to translate and somehow means the enduring
+and supporting continuation of past acts whose results are the res
+gestae, the deeds and events we call historical. In both instances
+
+166
+action occurs in two different stages; its first stage is a beginning by
+which something new comes into the world. The Greek word apxev,
+which covers beginning, leading, ruling, that is, the outstanding
+qualities of the free man, bears witness to an experience in which
+being free and the capacity to begin something new coincided. Freedom, as we would say today, was experienced in spontaneity. The
+manifold meaning of pxe indicates the following: only those could
+begin something new who were already rulers (i.e., household heads
+who ruled over slaves and family and had thus liberated themselves from the necessities of life for enterprises in distant lands or
+citizenship in the polis; in either case, they no longer ruled, but
+were rulers among rulers, moving among their peers, whose help
+they enlisted as leaders in order to begin something new, to start a
+new enterprise; for only with the help of others could the apxwww,
+the ruler, beginner and leader, really act, párrew, carry through
+whatever he had started to do.
+In Latin, to be free and to begin are also interconnected, though
+in a different way. Roman freedom was a legacy bequeathed by the
+founders of Rome to the Roman people; their freedom was tied to
+the beginning their forefathers had established by founding the
+city, whose aflairs the descendants had to manage, whose consequences they had to bear, and whose foundations they had to
+"augment." All these together are the res gestae of the Roman
+republic. Roman historiography therefore, essentially as political
+as Greek historiography, never was content with the mere narration of great deeds and events; unlike Thucydides or Herodotus,
+the Roman historians always felt bound to the beginning of Roman
+history, because this beginning contained the authentic element of
+Roman freedom and thus made their history political; whatever
+they had to relate, they started ab urbe condita, with the foundation of the city, the guaranty of Roman freedom.
+I have already mentioned that the ancient concept of freedom
+played no role in Greek philosophy precisely because of its exclusively political origin. Roman writers, it is true, rebelled occasionally against the anti-political tendencies of the Socratic school,
+but their strange lack of philosophic talent apparently prevented
+
+167
+their finding a theoretical concept of freedom which could have
+been adequate to their own experiences and to the great institutions
+of liberty present in the Roman res publica. If the history of ideas
+were as consistent as its historians sometimes imagine, we should
+have even less hope of finding a valid political idea of freedom in
+Augustine, the great Christian thinker who in fact introduced Paul's
+free will, along with its perplexities, into the history of philosophy.
+Yet we find in Augustine not only the discussion of freedom as
+liberum arbitriu, though this discussion became decisive for the
+tradition, but also an entirely differently conceived notion which
+characteristically appears in his only political treatise, in De Civitate
+Dei. In the City of God Augustine, as is only natural, speaks more
+from the background of specifically Roman experiences than in
+any of his other writings, and freedom is conceived there not as an
+inner human disposition but as a character of human existence in
+the world. Man does not possess freedom so much as he, or better
+his coming into the world, is equated with the appearance of freedom in the universe; man is free because he is a beginning and
+was so created after the universe had already come into existence:
+[Initium] ut esset, creatus est homo, ante quem nemo fuit."? In the
+birth of each man this initial beginning is reaffirmed, because in
+each instance something new comes into an already existing world
+which will continue to exist after each individual's death. Because
+he is a beginning, man can begin; to be human and to be free are
+one and the same. God created man in order to introduce into the
+world the faculty of beginning: freedom.
+The strong anti-political tendencies of early Christianity are so
+familiar that the notion of a Christian thinker's having been the
+first to formulate the philosophical implications of the ancient
+political idea of freedom strikes us as almost paradoxical. The only
+explanation that comes to mind is that Augustine was a Roman as
+well as a Christian, and that in this part of his work he formulated
+the central political experience of Roman antiquity, which was that
+freedom qua beginning became manifest in the act of foundation.
+Yet I am convinced that this impression would considerably change
+if the sayings of Jesus of Nazareth were taken more seriously in
+
+168
+their philosophic implications. We find in these parts of the New
+Testament an extraordinary understanding of freedom, and particularly of the power inherent in human freedom; but the human
+capacity which corresponds to this power, which, in the words of
+the Gospel, is capable of removing mountains, is not will but faith.
+The work of faith, actually its product, is what the gospels called
+"miracles," a word with many meanings in the New Testament
+and difficult to understand. We can neglect the difficulties here and
+refer only to those passages where miracles are clearly not supernatural events but only what all miracles, those performed by men
+no less than those performed by a divine agent, always must be,
+namely, interruptions of some natural series of events, of some automatic process, in whose context they constitute the wholly unexpected.
+No doubt human life, placed on the earth, is surrounded by
+automatic processes—by the natural processes of the earth, which,
+in turn, are surrounded by cosmic processes, and we ourselves are
+driven by similar forces insofar as we too are a part of organic
+nature. Our political life, moreover, despite its being the realm of
+action, also takes place in the midst of processes which we call
+historical and which tend to become as automatic as natural or
+cosmic processes, although they were started by men. The truth
+is that automatism is inherent in all processes, no matter what their
+origin may be—which is why no single act, and no single event,
+can ever, once and for all, deliver and save a man, or a nation, or
+mankind. It is in the nature of the automatic processes to which
+man is subject, but within and against which he can assert himself
+through action, that they can only spell ruin to human life. Once
+man-made, historical processes have become automatic, they are
+no less ruinous than the natural life process that drives our organism and which in its own terms, that is, biologically, leads from
+being to non-being, from birth to death. The historical sciences
+know only too well such cases of petrified and hopelessly declining
+civilizations where doom seems foreordained, like a biological
+necessity, and since such historical processes of stagnation can
+last and creep on for centuries, they even occupy by far the largest
+
+169
+space in recorded history; the periods of being free have always
+been relatively short in the history of mankind.
+What usually remains intact in the epochs of petrification and
+foreordained doom is the faculty of freedom itself, the sheer capacity to begin, which animates and inspires all human activities and
+is the hidden source of production of all great and beautiful things.
+But so long as this source remains hidden, freedom is not a worldly,
+tangible reality; that is, it is not political. Because the source of
+freedom remains present even when political life has become petrified and political action impotent to interrupt automatic processes,
+freedom can so easily be mistaken for an essentially nonpolitical
+phenomenon; in such circumstances, freedom is not experienced
+as a mode of being with its own kind of "virtue" and virtuosity, but
+as a supreme gift which only man, of all earthly creatures, seems to
+have received, of which we can find traces and signs in almost all
+his activities, but which, nevertheless, develops fully only when
+action has created its own worldly space where it can come out of
+hiding, as it were, and make its appearance.
+Every act, seen from the perspective not of the agent but of the
+process in whose framework it occurs and whose automatism it interrupts, is a "miracle"—that is, something which could not be expected. If it is true that action and beginning are essentially the
+same, it follows that a capacity for performing miracles must likewise be within the range of human faculties. This sounds stranger
+than it actually is. It is in the very nature of every new beginning
+that it breaks into the world as an "infinite improbability," and yet
+it is precisely this infinitely improbable which actually constitutes
+the very texture of everything we call real. Our whole existence
+rests, after all, on a chain of miracles, as it were—the coming into
+being of the earth, the development of organic life on it, the evolution of mankind out of the animal species. For from the viewpoint
+of the processes in the universe and in nature, and their statistically
+overwhelming probabilities, the coming into being of the earth
+out of cosmic processes, the formation of organic life out of inorganic processes, the evolution of man, finally, out of the processes of organic life are all "infinite improbabilities," they are
+
+170
+"miracles" in everyday language. It is because of this element of
+the "miraculous" present in all reality that events, no matter how
+well anticipated in fear or hope, strike us with a shock of surprise
+once they have come to pass. The very impact of an event is never
+wholly explicable; its factuality transcends in principle all anticipation. The experience which tells us that events are miracles is
+neither arbitrary nor sophisticated; it is, on the contrary, most
+natural and, indeed, in ordinary life almost commonplace. Without
+this commonplace experience, the part assigned by religion to
+supernatural miracles would be well-nigh incomprehensible.
+I chose the example of natural processes which are interrupted
+by the advent of some "infinite improbability" in order to illustrate
+that what we call real in ordinary experience has mostly come into
+existence through coincidences which are stranger than fiction. Of
+course the example has its limitations and cannot be simply applied to the realm of human affairs. It would be sheer superstition to hope for miracles, for the "infinitely improbable," in the
+context of automatic historical or political processes, although even
+this can never be completely excluded. History, in contradistinction
+to nature, is full of events; here the miracle of accident and infinite improbability occurs so frequently that it seems strange to
+speak of miracles at all. But the reason for this frequency is merely
+that historical processes are created and constantly interrupted by
+human initiative, by the initium man is insofar as he is an acting
+being. Hence it is not in the least superstitious, it is even a counsel
+of realism, to look for the unforeseeable and unpredictable, to be
+prepared for and to expect "miracles" in the political realm. And
+the more heavily the scales are weighted in favor of disaster, the
+more miraculous will the deed done in freedom appear; for it is
+disaster, not salvation, which always happens automatically and
+therefore always must appear to be irresistible.
+Objectively, that is, seen from the outside and without taking
+into account that man is a beginning and a beginner, the chances
+that tomorrow will be like yesterday are always overwhelming.
+Not quite so overwhelming, to be sure, but very nearly so as the
+chances were that no earth would ever rise out of cosmic occur-
+
+171
+rences, that no life would develop out of inorganic processes, and
+that no man would emerge out of the evolution of animal life. The
+decisive difference between the "infinite improbabilities" on which
+the reality of our earthly life rests and the miraculous character
+inherent in those events which establish historical reality is that, in
+the realm of human affairs, we know the author of the "miracles."
+It is men who perform them—men who because they have received
+the twofold gift of freedom and action can establish a reality of
+their own.
+
+5
+THE CRISIS IN
+EDUCATION
+THE general crisis that has overtaken the moder world every-
+1 where and in almost every sphere of life manifests itself differently in each country, involving different areas and taking on different forms. In America, one of its most characteristic and suggestive
+aspects is the recurring crisis in education that, during the last decade at least, has become a political problem of the first magnitude,
+reported on almost daily in the newspapers. To be sure, no great
+imagination is required to detect the dangers of a constantly progressing decline of elementary standards throughout the entire
+school system, and the seriousness of the trouble has been properly
+underlined by the countless unavailing efforts of the educational
+authorities to stem the tide. Still, if one compares this crisis in education with the political experiences of other countries in the twentieth
+century, with the revolutionary turmoil after the First World War,
+with concentration and extermination camps, or even with the profound malaise which, appearances of prosperity to the contrary not-
+173
+
+174
+withstanding, has spread throughout Europe ever since the end of
+the Second World War, it is somewhat difficult to take a crisis in
+education as seriously as it deserves. It is tempting indeed to regard
+it as a local phenomenon, unconnected with the larger issues of
+the century, to be blamed on certain peculiarities of life in the
+United States which are not likely to find a counterpart in other
+parts of the world.
+Yet, if this were true, the crisis in our school system would not
+have become a political issue and the educational authorities would
+not have been unable to deal with it in time. Certainly more is involved here than the puzzling question of why Johnny can't read.
+Moreover, there is always a temptation to believe that we are dealing with specific problems confined within historical and national
+boundaries and of importance only to those immediately affected.
+It is precisely this belief that in our time has consistently proved
+false. One can take it as a general rule in this century that whatever is possible in one country may in the foreseeable future be
+equally possible in almost any other.
+Aside from these general reasons that would make it seem advisable for the layman to be concerned with trouble in fields about
+which, in the specialist's sense, he may know nothing (and this,
+since 1 am not a professional educator, is of course my case when I
+deal with a crisis in education), there is another even more cogent
+reason for his concerning himself with a critical situation in which
+he is not immediately involved. And that is the opportunity, provided by the very fact of crisis-which tears away façades and
+obliterates prejudices—to explore and inquire into whatever has
+been laid bare of the essence of the matter, and the essence of
+education is natality, the fact that human beings are born into the
+world. The disappearance of prejudices simply means that we have
+lost the answers on which we ordinarily rely without even realizing
+they were originally answers to questions. A crisis forces us back
+to the questions themselves and requires from us either new or old
+answers, but in any case direct judgments. A crisis becomes a
+disaster only when we respond to it with preformed judgments,
+that is, with prejudices. Such an attitude not only sharpens the
+
+175
+crisis but makes us forfeit the experience of reality and the opportunity for reflection it provides.
+However clearly a general problem may present itself in a
+crisis, it is nevertheless impossible ever to isolate completely the
+universal element from the concrete and specific circumstances in
+which it makes its appearance. Though the crisis in education may
+affect the whole world, it is characteristic that we find its most extreme form in America, the reason being that perhaps only in
+America could a crisis in education actually become a factor in
+politics. In America, as a matter of fact, education plays a different and, politically, incomparably more important role than in other
+countries. Technically, of course, the explanation lies in the fact
+that America has always been a land of immigrants; it is obvious
+that the enormously difficult melting together of the most diverse
+ethnic groups—never fully successful but continuously succeeding beyond expectation-can only be accomplished through the
+schooling, education, and Americanization of the immigrants' children. Since for most of these children English is not their mother
+tongue but has to be learned in school, schools must obviously
+assume functions which in a nation-state would be performed as a
+matter of course in the home.
+More decisive, however, for our considerations is the role that
+continuous immigration plays in the country's political consciousness and frame of mind. America is not simply a colonial country
+in need of immigrants to populate the land, though independent
+of them in its political structure. For America the determining factor
+has always been the motto printed on every dollar bill: Novus
+Ordo Seclorum, A New Order of the World. The immigrants, the
+newcomers, are a guarantee to the country that it represents the new
+crder. The meaning of this new order, this founding of a new world
+against the old, was and is the doing away with poverty and oppression. But at the same time its magnificence consists in the fact that
+from the beginning this new order did not shut itself off from the outside world—as has elsewhere been the custom in the founding of
+utopias—in order to confront it with a perfect model, nor was its
+purpose to enforce imperial claims or to be preached as an evangel
+
+176
+to others. Rather its relation to the outside world has been characterized from the start by the fact that this republic, which planned
+to abolish poverty and slavery, welcomed all the poor and enslaved
+of the earth. In the words spoken by John Adams in 1765—that
+is, before the Declaration of Independence-"I always consider
+the settlement of America as the opening of a grand scheme and
+design in Providence for the illumination and emancipation of the
+slavish part of mankind all over the earth." This is the basic intent
+or the basic law in accordance with which America began her
+historical and political existence.
+The extraordinary enthusiasm for what is new, which is shown
+in almost every aspect of American daily life, and the concomitant
+trust in an "indefinite perfectibility" —which Tocqueville noted as
+the credo of the common "uninstructed man" and which as such
+antedates by almost a hundred years the development in other countries of the West—would presumably have resulted in any case in
+greater attention paid and greater significance ascribed to the newcomers by birth, that is, the children, whom, when they had outgrown their childhood and were about to enter the community of
+adults as young people, the Greeks simply called oi véo, the new
+ones. There is the additional fact, however, a fact that has become
+decisive for the meaning of education, that this pathos of the new,
+though it is considerably older than the eighteenth century, only
+developed conceptually and politically in that century. From this
+source there was derived at the start an educational ideal, tinged
+with Rousseauism and in fact directly influenced by Rousseau, in
+which education became an instrument of politics, and political
+activity itself was conceived of as a form of education.
+The role played by education in all political utopias from ancient
+times onward shows how natural it seems to start a new world with
+those who are by birth and nature new. So far as politics is concerned, this involves of course a serious misconception: instead of
+joining with one's equals in assuming the effort of persuasion and
+running the risk of failure, there is dictatorial intervention, based
+upon the absolute superiority of the adult, and the attempt to produce the new as a fait accompli, that is, as though the new already
+
+177
+existed. For this reason, in Europe, the belief that one must begin
+with the children if one wishes to produce new conditions has remained principally the monopoly of revolutionary movements of
+tyrannical cast which, when they came to power, took the children
+away from their parents and simply indoctrinated them. Education
+can play no part in politics, because in politics we always have to
+deal with those who are already educated. Whoever wants to educate adults really wants to act as their guardian and prevent them
+from political activity. Since one cannot educate adults, the word
+"education" has an evil sound in politics; there is a pretense of education, when the real purpose is coercion without the use of force.
+He who seriously wants to create a new political order through education, that is, neither through force and constraint nor through
+persuasion, must draw the dreadful Platonic conclusion: the banishment of all older people from the state that is to be founded. But
+even the children one wishes to educate to be citizens of a utopian
+morrow are actually denied their own future role in the body politic, for, from the standpoint of the new ones, whatever new the
+adult world may propose is necessarily older than they themselves.
+It is in the very nature of the human condition that each new
+generation grows into an old world, so that to prepare a new generation for a new world can only mean that one wishes to strike from
+the newcomers' hands their own chance at the new.
+All this is by no means the case in America, and it is exactly this
+fact that makes it so hard to judge these questions correctly here.
+The political role that education actually plays in a land of immigrants, the fact that the schools not only serve to Americanize
+the children but affect their parents as well, that here in fact one
+helps to shed an old world and to enter into a new one, encourages
+the illusion that a new world is being built through the education of
+the children. Of course the true situation is not this at all. The world
+into which children are introduced, even in America, is an old
+world, that is, a pre-existing world, constructed by the living and
+the dead, and it is new oaly for those who have newly entered it by
+immigration. But here illusion is stronger than reality because it
+springs directly from a basic American experience, the experience
+
+178
+that a new order can be founded, and what is more, founded with
+full consciousness of a historical continuum, for the phrase "New
+World" gains its meaning from the Old World, which, however
+admirable on other scores, was rejected because it could find no
+solution for poverty and oppression.
+Now in respect to education itself the illusion arising from the
+pathos of the new has produced its most serious consequences only
+in our own century. It has first of all made it possible for that complex of modern educational theories which originated in Middle
+Europe and consists of an astounding hodgepodge of sense and
+nonsense to accomplish, under the banner of progressive education, a most radical revolution in the whole system of education.
+What in Europe has remained an experiment, tested out here and
+there in single schools and isolated educational institutions and
+then gradually extending its influences in certain quarters, in America about twenty-five years ago completely overthrew, as though
+from one day to the next, all traditions and all the established
+methods of teaching and learning. I shall not go into details, and I
+leave out of account private schools and especially the Roman
+Catholic parochial school system. The significant fact is that for
+the sake of certain theories, good or bad, all the rules of sound human reason were thrust aside. Such a procedure is always of great
+and pernicious significance, especially in a country that relies so
+extensively on common sense in its political life. Whenever in
+political questions sound human reason fails or gives up the attempt
+to supply answers we are faced by a crisis; for this kind of reason
+is really that common sense by virtue of which we and our five individual senses are fitted into a single world common to us all and
+by the aid of which we move about in it. The disappearance of
+common sense in the present day is the surest sign of the presentday crisis. In every crisis a piece of the world, something common
+to us all, is destroyed. The failure of common sense, like a divining
+rod, points to the place where such a cave-in has occurred.
+In any case the answer to the question of why Johnny can't read
+or to the more general question of why the scholastic standards of
+the average American school lag so very far behind the average
+
+179
+standards in actually all the countries of Europe is not, unfortunately, simply that this country is young and has not yet caught
+up with the standards of the Old World but, on the contrary, that
+this country in this particular field is the most "advanced" and
+most modern in the world. And this is true in a double sense: nowhere have the education problems of a mass society become so
+acute, and nowhere else have the most modern theories in the realm
+of pedagogy been so uncritically and slavishly accepted. Thus the
+crisis in American education, on the one hand, announces the
+bankruptcy of progressive education and, on the other, presents a
+problem of immense difficulty because it has arisen under the conditions and in response to the demands of a mass society.
+In this connection we must bear in mind another more general
+factor which did not, to be sure, cause the crisis but which has
+aggravated it to a remarkable degree, and this is the unique role
+the concept of equality plays and always has played in American
+life. Much more is involved in this than equality before the law,
+more too than the leveling of class distinctions, more even than
+what is expressed in the phrase "equality of opportunity," though
+that has a greater significance in this connection because in the
+American view a right to education is one of the inalienable civic
+rights. This last has been decisive for the structure of the publicschool system in that secondary schools in the European sense exist
+only as exceptions. Since compulsory school attendance extends to
+the age of sixteen, every child must enter high school, and the high
+school therefore is basically a kind of continuation of primary
+school. As a result of this lack of a secondary school the preparation for the college course has to be supplied by the colleges themselves, whose curricula therefore suffer from a chronic overload.
+which in turn affects the quality of the work done there.
+At first glance one might perhaps think that this anomaly lies in
+the very nature of a mass society in which education is no longer a
+privilege of the wealthy classes. A glance at England, where, as
+everyone knows, secondary education has also been made available
+in recent years to all classes of the population, will show that this is
+not the case. For there at the end of primary school, with students
+
+180
+at the age of eleven, has been instituted the dreaded examination
+that weeds out all but some ten per cent of the scholars suited for
+higher education. The rigor of this selection was not accepted even
+in England without protest; in America it would have been simply
+impossible. What is aimed at in England is "meritocracy," which is
+clearly once more the establishment of an oligarchy, this time not
+of wealth or of birth but of talent. But this means, even though people in England may not be altogether clear about it, that the coun
+try even under a socialist government will continue to be governed
+as it has been from time out of mind, that is, neither as a monarchy
+nor as a democracy but as an oligarchy or aristocracy—the latter
+in case one takes the view that the most gifted are also the best,
+which is by no means a certainty. In America such an almost physical division of the children into gifted and ungifted would be considered intolerable. Meritocracy contradicts the principle of equality, of an equalitarian democracy, no less than any other oligarchy.
+Thus what makes the educational crisis in American so especially
+acute is the political temper of the country, which of itself struggles
+to equalize or to erase as far as possible the difference between
+young and old, between the gifted and the ungifted, finally between
+children and adults, particularly between pupils and teachers. It is
+obvious that such an equalization can actually be accomplished only
+at the cost of the teacher's authority and at the expense of the gifted
+among the students. However, it is equally obvious, at least to
+anyone who has ever come in contact with the American educational system, that this difficulty, rooted in the political attitude of
+the country, also has great advantages, not simply of a human kind
+but educationally speaking as well; in any case these general factors
+cannot explain the crisis in which we presently find ourselves nor
+justify the measures through which that crisis has been precipitated.
+These ruinous measures can be schematically traced back to
+three basic assumptions, all of which are only too familiar. The
+
+181
+first is that there exist a child's world and a society formed among
+children that are autonomous and must insofar as possible be left
+to them to govern. Adults are only there to help with this government. The authority that tells the individual child what to do and
+what not to do rests with the child group itself-and this produces,
+among other consequences, a situation in which the adult stands
+helpless before the individual child and out of contact with him. He
+can only tell him to do what he likes and then prevent the worst
+from happening. The real and normal relations between children
+and adults, arising from the fact that people of all ages are always
+simultaneously together in the world, are thus broken off. And so it
+is of the essence of this first basic assumption that it takes into account only the group and not the individual child.
+As for the child in the group, he is of course rather worse off than
+before. For the authority of a group, even a child group, is always
+considerably stronger and more tyrannical than the severest authority of an individual person can ever be. If one looks at it from
+the standpoint of the individual child, his chances to rebel or to do
+anything on his own hook are practically nil; he no longer finds
+himself in a very unequal contest with a person who has, to be sure,
+absolute superiority over him but in contest with whom he can
+nevertheless count on the solidarity of other children, that is, of his
+own kind; rather he is in the position, hopeless by definition, of a
+minority of one confronted by the absolute majority of all the
+others. There are very few grown people who can endure such a
+situation, even when it is not supported by external means of compulsion; children are simply and utterly incapable of it.
+Therefore by being emancipated from the authority of adults the
+child has not been freed but has been subjected to a much more
+terrifying and truly tyrannical authority, the tyranny of the majority.
+In any case the result is that the children have been so to speak
+banished from the world of grown-ups. They are either thrown
+back upon themselves or handed over to the tyranny of their own
+group, against which, because of its numerical superiority, they cannot rebel, with which, because they are children, they cannot reason, and out of which they cannot flee to any other world because
+
+182
+the world of adults is barred to them. The reaction of the children
+to this pressure tends to be either conformism or juvenile delinquency, and is frequently a mixture of both.
+The second basic assumption which has come into question in the
+present crisis has to do with teaching. Under the influence of modern psychology and the tenets of pragmatism, pedagogy bas developed into a science of teaching in general in such a way as to be
+wholly emancipated from the actual material to be taught. A
+teacher, so it was thought, is a man who can simply teach anything;
+his training is in teaching, not in the mastery of any particular subject. This attitude, as we shall presently see, is naturally very closely
+connected with a basic assumption about learning. Moreover, it has
+resulted in recent decades in a most serious neglect of the training
+of teachers in their own subjects, especially in the public high
+schools. Since the teacher does not need to know his own subject, it
+not infrequently happens that he is just one hour ahead of his class
+in knowledge. This in turn means not only that the students are
+actually left to their own resources but that the most legitimate
+source of the teacher's authority as the person who, turn it whatever way one will, still knows more and can do more than oneself
+is no longer effective. Thus the non-authoritarian teacher, who
+would like to abstain from all methods of compulsion because he is
+able to rely on his own authority, can no longer exist.
+But this pernicious role that pedagogy and the teachers' colleges
+are playing in the present crisis was only possible because of a
+modern theory about learning. This was, quite simply, the logical
+application of the third basic assumption in our context, an assumption which the modern world has held for centuries and which
+found its systematic conceptual expression in pragmatism. This
+basic assumption is that you can know and understand only what
+you have done yourself, and its application to education is as
+primitive as it is obvious: to substitute, insofar as possible, doing
+for learning. The reason that no importance was attached to the
+teacher's mastering his own subject was the wish to compel him to
+the exercise of the continuous activity of learning so that he would
+not, as they said, pass on "dead knowledge" but, instead, would
+
+183
+constantly demonstrate how it is produced. The conscious intention
+was not to teach knowledge but to inculcate a skill, and the result
+was a kind of transformation of institutes for learning into vocational institutions which have been as successful in teaching how to
+drive a car or how to use a typewriter or, even more important for
+the "art" of living, how to get along with other people and to be
+popular, as they have been unable to make the children acquire the
+normal prerequisites of a standard curriculum.
+However, this description is at fault, not only because it obviously exaggerates in order to drive home a point, but because it
+fails to take into account how in this process special importance was
+attached to obliterating as far as possible the distinction between
+play and work—in favor of the former. Play was looked upon as
+the liveliest and most appropriate way for the child to behave in
+the world, as the only form of activity that evolves spontaneously
+from his existence as a child. Only what can be learned through
+play does justice to this liveliness. The child's characteristic activity,
+so it was thought, lies in play; learning in the old sense, by forcing
+a child into an attitude of passivity, compelled him to give up his
+owıl playful initiative.
+The close connection between these two things—the substitution of doing for learning and of playing for working—is directly
+illustrated by the teaching of languages: the child is to learn by
+speaking, that is by doing, not by studying grammar and syntax; in
+other words he is to learn a foreign language in the same way that
+as an infant he learned his own language: as though at play and in
+the uninterrupted continuity of simple existence. Quite apart from
+the question of whether this is possible or not—it is possible, to a
+limited degree, only when one can keep the child all day long in the
+foreign-speaking environment—it is perfectly clear that this procedure consciously attempts to keep the older child as far as possible at the infant level. The very thing that should prepare the
+child for the world of adults, the gradually acquired habit of work
+and of not-playing, is done away with in favor of the autonomy of
+the world of childhood.
+Whatever may be the connection between doing and knowing, or
+
+184
+whatever the validity of the pragmatic formula, its application to
+education, that is, to the way the child learns, tends to make
+absolute the world of childhood in just the same way that we noted
+in the case of the first basic assumption. Here, too, under the pretext of respecting the child's independence, he is debarred from the
+world of grown-ups and artificially kept in his own, so far as that
+can be called a world. This holding back of the child is artificial
+because it breaks off the natural relationship between grown-ups
+and children, which consists among other things in teaching and
+learning, and because at the same time it belies the fact that the
+child is a developing human being, that childhood is a temporary
+stage, a preparation for adulthood
+The present crisis in America results from the recognition of the
+destructiveness of these basic assumptions and a desperate attempt
+to reform the entire educational system, that is, to transform it completely. In doing this what is actually being attempted-except for
+the plans for an immense increase in the facilities for training in
+the physical sciences and in technology—is nothing but restoration:
+teaching will once more be conducted with authority; play is to
+stop in school hours, and serious work is once more to be done;
+emphasis will shift from extracurricular skills to knowledge prescribed by the curriculum; finally there is even talk of transforming
+the present curricula for teachers so that the teachers themselves
+will have to learn something before being turned loose on the
+children.
+These proposed reforms, which are still in the discussion stage
+and are of purely American interest, need not concern us here. Nor
+can I discuss the more technical, yet in the long run perhaps even
+more important question of how to reform the curricula of elementary and secondary schools in all countries so as to bring them
+up to the entirely new requirements of the present world. What is
+of importance to our argument is a twofold question. Which aspects
+of the modern world and its crisis have actually revealed themselves
+in the educational crisis, that is, what are the true reasons that for
+decades things could be said and done in such glaring contradiction
+to common sense? And, second, what can we learn from this crisis
+
+185
+for the essence of education—not in the sense that one can always
+learn from mistakes what ought not to be done, but rather by reflecting on the role that education plays in every civilization, that is
+on the obligation that the existence of children entails for every
+human society. We shall begin with the second question.
+11I
+A crisis in education would at any time give rise to serious concern even if it did not reflect, as in the present instance it does, a
+more general crisis and instability in modern society. For education
+belongs among the most elementary and necessary activities of human society, which never remains as it is but continuously renews
+itself through birth, through the arrival of new human beings. These
+newcomers, moreover, are not finished but in a state of becoming.
+Thus the child, the subject of education, has for the educator a
+double aspect: he is new in a world that is strange to him and he is
+in process of becoming, he is a new human being and he is a becoming human being. This double aspect is by no means self-evident
+and it does not apply to the animal forms of life; it corresponds to a
+double relationship, the relationship to the world on the one hand
+and to life on the other. The child shares the state of becoming with
+all living things; in respect to life and its development, the child is a
+human being in process of becoming, just as a kitten is a cat in
+process of becoming. But the child is new only in relation to a
+world that was there before him, that will continue after his death,
+and in which he is to spend his life. If the child were not a newcomer in this human world but simply a not yet finished living
+creature, education would be just a function of life and would need
+to consist in nothing save that concern for the sustenance of life
+and that training and practice in living that all animals assume in
+respect to their young.
+Human parents, however, have not only summoned their children into life through conception and birth, they have simultaneously introduced them into a world. In education they assume
+
+186
+responsibility for both, for the life and development of the child
+and for the continuance of the world. These two responsibilities
+do not by any means coincide; they may indeed come into conflict
+with each other. The responsibility for the development of the
+child turns in a certain sense against the world: the child requires
+special protection and care so that nothing destructive may happen to him from the world. But the world, too, needs protection
+to keep it from being overrun and destroyed by the onslaught of the
+new that bursts upon it with each new generation.
+Because the child must be protected against the world, his traditional place is in the family, whose adult members daily return back
+from the outside world and withdraw into the security of private
+life within four walls. These four walls, within which people's
+private family life is lived, constitute a shield against the world and
+specifically against the public aspect of the world. They enclose a
+secure place, without which no living thing can thrive. This holds
+good not only for the life of childhood but for human life in general. Wherever the latter is consistently exposed to the world without the protection of privacy and security its vital quality is destroyed. In the public world, common to all, persons count, and
+so does work, that is, the work of our hands that each of us contributes to our common world; but life qua life does not matter
+there. The world cannot be regardful of it, and it has to be hidden
+and protected from the world.
+Everything that lives, not vegetative life alone, emerges from
+darkness and, however strong its natural tendency to thrust itself
+into the light, it nevertheless needs the security of darkness to
+grow at all. This may indeed be the reason that children of famous
+parents so often turn out badly. Fame penetrates the four walls,
+invades their private space, bringing with it, especially in presentday conditions, the merciless glare of the public realm, which floods
+everything in the private lives of those concerned, so that the children no longer have a place of security where they can grow. But
+exactly the same destruction of the real living space occurs wherever
+the attempt is made to turn the children themselves into a kind of
+world. Among these peer groups then arises public life of a sort and,
+
+187
+quite apart from the fact that it is not a real one and that the whole
+attempt is a sort of fraud, the damaging fact remains that children
+-that is, human beings in process of becoming but not yet complete-are thereby forced to expose themselves to the light of a
+public existence.
+That modern education, insofar as it attempts to establish a world
+of children, destroys the necessary conditions for vital development and growth seems obvious. But that such harm to the developing child should be the result of modern education strikes one
+as strange indeed, for this education maintained that its exclusive
+aim was to serve the child and rebelled against the methods of the
+past because these had not sufficiently taken into account the
+child's inner nature and his needs. "The Century of the Child," as
+we may recall, was going to emancipate the child and free him from
+the standards derived from the adult world. Then how could it
+happen that the most elementary conditions of life necessary for
+the growth and development of the child were overlooked or simply
+not recognized? How could it happen that the child was exposed
+to what more than anything else characterized the adult world, its
+public aspect, after the decision had just been reached that the
+mistake in all past education had been to see the child as nothing
+but an undersized grown-up?
+The reason for this strange state of affairs has nothing directly
+to do with education; it is rather to be found in the judgments and
+prejudices about the nature of private life and public world and
+their relation to each other which have been characteristic of modem society since the beginning of modern times and which educators, when they finally began, relatively late, to modernize education, accepted as self-evident assumptions without being aware of
+the consequences they must necessarily have for the life of the
+child. It is the peculiarity of modern society, and by no means a
+matter of course, that it regards life, that is, the earthly life of the
+individual as well as the family, as the highest good; and for this
+reason, in contrast to all previous centuries, emancipated this life
+and all the activities that have to do with its preservation and enrichment from the concealment of privacy and exposed them to
+
+158
+the light of the public world. This is the ical meaning of the
+emancipation of workers and women, not as persons, to be sure,
+but insofar as they fulfill a necessary function in the life-process of
+society.
+The last to be affected by this process of emancipation were the
+children, and the very thing that had meant a true liberation for
+the workers and the women-because they were not only workers
+and women but persons as well, who therefore had a claim on the
+public world, that is, a right to see and be seen in it, to speak and
+be heard—was an abandonment and betrayal in the case of the
+children, who are still at the stage where the simple fact of life and
+growth outweighs the factor of personality. The more completely
+modern society discards the distinction between what is private and
+what is public, between what can thrive only in concealment and
+what needs to be shown to all in the full light of the public world,
+the more, that is, it introduces between the private and the public
+a social sphere in which the private is made public and vice versa,
+the harder it makes things for its children, who by nature require
+the security of concealment in order to mature undisturbed.
+However serious these infringements of the conditions for vital
+growth may be, it is certain that they were entirely unintentional;
+the central aim of all modern education efforts has been the welfare
+of the child, a fact that is, of course, no less true even if the efforts
+made have not always succeeded in promoting the child's welfare
+in the way that was hoped. The situation is entirely different in the
+sphere of educational tasks directed no longer toward the child
+but toward the young person, the newcomer and stranger, who has
+been born into an already existing world which he does not know.
+These tasks are primarily, but not exclusively, the responsibility of
+the schools; they have to do with teaching and learning; the failure
+in this field is the most urgent problem in America today. What lies
+at the bottom of it?
+Normally the child is first introduced to the world in school. Now
+school is by no means the world and must not pretend to be; it is
+rather the institution that we interpose between the private domain
+of home and the world in order to make the transition from the
+
+189
+family to the world possible at all. Attendance there is required not
+by the family but by the state, that is by the public world, and so,
+in relation to the child, school in a sense represents the world, although it is not yet actually the world. At this stage of education
+adults, to be sure, once more assume a responsibility for the child,
+but by now it is not so much responsibility for the vital welfare of a
+growing thing as for what we generally call the free development of
+characteristic qualities and talents. This, from the general and essential point of view, is the uniqueness that distinguishes every human being from every other, the quality by virtue of which he is not
+only a stranger in the world but something that has never been here
+before.
+Insofar as the child is not yet acquainted with the world, he must
+be gradually introduced to it; insofar as he is new, care must be
+taken that this new thing comes to fruition in relation to the world
+as it is. In any case, however, the educators here stand in relation
+to the young as representatives of a world for which they must
+assume responsibility although they themselves did not make it,
+and even though they may, secretly or openly, wish it were other
+than it is. This responsibility is not arbitrarily imposed upon educators; it is implicit in the fact that the young are introduced by adults
+into a continuously changing world. Anyone who refuses to assume joint responsibility for the world should not have children
+and must not be allowed to take part in educating them.
+In education this responsibility for the world takes the form of
+authority. The authority of the educator and the qualifications of
+the teacher are not the same thing. Although a measure of qualification is indispensable for authority, the highest possible qualification
+can never by itself beget authority. The teacher's qualification consists in knowing the world and being able to instruct others about
+it, but his authority rests on his assumption of responsibility for
+that world. Vis-à-vis the child it is as though he were a representative of all adult inhabitants, pointing out the details and saying to
+the child: This is our world
+Now we all know how things stand today in respect to authority.
+Whatever one's attitude toward this problem may be, it is obvious
+
+190
+that in public and political life authority either plays no role at all
+—for the violence and terror exercised by the totalitarian countries have, of course, nothing to do with authority—or at most
+plays a highly contested role. This, however, simply means, in essence, that people do not wish to require of anyone or to entrust
+to anyone the assumption of responsibility for everything else, for
+wherever true authority existed it was joined with responsibility
+for the course of things in the world. If we remove authority from
+political and public life, it may mean that from now on an equal
+responsibility for the course of the world is to be required of everyone. But it may also mean that the claims of the world and the requirements of order in it are being consciously or unconsciously
+repudiated; all responsibility for the world is being rejected, the
+responsibility for giving orders no less than for obeying them.
+There is no doubt that in the modern loss of authority both intentions play a part and have often been simultaneously and inextricably at work together.
+In education, on the contrary, there can be no such ambiguity in
+regard to the present-day loss of authority. Children cannot throw
+off educational authority, as though they were in a position of oppression by an adult majority—though even this absurdity of treating children as an oppressed minority in need of liberation has
+actually been tried out in modern educational practice. Authority
+has been discarded by the adults, and this can mean only one
+thing: that the adults refuse to assume responsibility for the world
+into which they have brought the children.
+There is of course a connection between the loss of authority in
+public and political life and in the private pre-political realms of the
+family and the school. The more radical the distrust of authority
+becomes in the public sphere, the greater the probability naturally
+becomes that the private sphere will not remain inviolate. There is
+this additional fact, and it is very likely the decisive one, that from
+time out of mind we have been accustomed in our tradition of
+political thought to regard the authority of parents over children,
+of teachers over pupils, as the model by which to understand political authority. It is just this model, which can be found as early as
+
+191
+Plato and Aristotle, that makes the concept of authority in politics
+so extraordinarily ambiguous. It is based, first of all, on an absolute
+superiority such as can never exist among adults and which, from
+the point of view of human dignity, must never exist. In the second place, following the model of the nursery, it is based on a
+purely temporary superiority and therefore becomes self-contradictory if it is applied to relations that are not temporary by nature
+—such as the relations of the rulers and the ruled. Thus it lies in
+the nature of the matter—that is, both in the nature of the present
+crisis in authority and in the nature of our traditional political
+thought-that the loss of authority which began in the political
+sphere should end in the private one; and it is naturally no accident
+that the place where political authority was first undermined, that is,
+in America, should be the place where the modern crisis in education makes itself most strongly felt.
+The general loss of authority could, in fact, hardly find more
+radical expression than by its intrusion into the pre-political sphere,
+where authority seemed dictated by nature itself and independent
+of all historical changes and political conditions. On the other hand,
+modern man could find no clearer expression for his dissatisfaction with the world, for his disgust with things as they are, than by
+his refusal to assume, in respect to his children, responsibility for
+all this. It is as though parents daily said: "In this world even we
+are not very securely at home; how to move about in it, what to
+‹now, what skills to master, i
+are mysteries to us too. Iou must u
+to make out as best you can; in any case you are not entitled to call
+us to account. We are innocent, we wash our hands of you."
+This attitude has, of course, nothing to do with that revolutionary
+desire for a new order in the world—Novus Ordo Seclorum—
+which once animated America; it is rather a symptom of that
+modern estrangement from the world which can be seen everywhere but which presents itself in especially radical and desperate
+form under the conditions of a mass society. It is true that modern
+educational experiments, not in America alone, have struck very
+revolutionary poses, and this has, to a certain degree, increased the
+difficulty of clearly recognizing the situation and caused a certain
+
+192
+degree of confusion in the discussion of the problem; for in contradiction to all such behavior stands the unquestionable fact that
+so long as America was really animated by that spirit she never
+dreamed of initiating the new order with education but, on the contrary, remained conservative in educational matters.
+To avoid misunderstanding: it seems to me that conservatism, in
+the sense of conservation, is of the essence of the educational
+activity, whose task is always to cherish and protect something—
+the child against the world, the world against the child, the new
+against the old, the old against the new. Even the comprehensive
+responsibility for the world that is thereby assumed implies, of
+course, a conservative attitude. But this holds good only for the
+realm of education, or rather for the relations between grown-ups
+and children, and not for the realm of politics, where we act among
+and with adults and equals. In politics this conservative attitude—
+which accepts the world as it is, striving only to preserve the
+status quo-can only lead to destruction, because the world, in
+gross and in detail, is irrevocably delivered up to the ruin of time
+unless human beings are determined to intervene, to alter, to create
+what is new. Hamlet's words, "The time is out of joint. O cursed
+spite that ever I was born to set it right," are more or less true for
+every new generation, although since the beginning of our century
+they have perhaps acquired a more persuasive validity than before.
+Basically we are always educating for a world that is or is becoming out of joint, for this is the basic human situation, in which
+the world is created by mortal hands to serve mortals for a limited
+time as home. Because the world is made by mortals it wears out;
+and because it continuously changes its inhabitants it runs the risk
+of becoming as mortal as they. To preserve the world against the
+mortality of its creators and inhabitants it must be constantly set
+right anew. The problem is simply to educate in such a way that a
+setting-right remains actually possible, even though it can, of
+course, never be assured. Our hope always hangs on the new
+which every generation brings; but precisely because we can base
+our hope only on this, we destroy everything if we so try to control
+the new that we, the old, can dictate how it will look. Exactly for
+
+193
+ihe sake of what is new and revolutionary in every child, education
+must be conservative; it must preserve this newness and introduce
+it as a new thing into an old world, which, however revolutionary
+its actions may be, is always, from the standpoint of the next generation, superannuated and close to destruction.
+IV
+The real difficulty in modern education lies in the fact that, despite all the fashionable talk about a new conservatism, even that
+minimum of conservation and the conserving attitude without
+which education is simply not possible is in our time extraordinarily
+hard to achieve. There are very good reasons for this. The crisis of
+authority in education is most closely connected with the crisis of
+tradition, that is with the crisis in our attitude toward the realm of
+the past. This aspect of the modern crisis is especially hard for the
+educator to bear, because it is his task to mediate between the old
+and the new, so that his very profession requires of him an extraordinary respect for the past. Through long centuries, i.e., throughout the combined period of Roman-Christian civilization, there was
+no need for him to become aware of this special quality in himself
+because reverence for the past was an essential part of the Roman
+frame of mind, and this was not altered or ended by Christianity,
+but simply shifted onto different foundations.
+It was of the essence of the Roman attitude (though this was by
+no means true of every civilization or even of the Western tradition
+taken as a whole) to consider the past qua past as a model, ancestors, in every instance, as guiding examples for their descendants; to believe that all greatness lies in what has been, and
+therefore that the most fitting human age is old age, the man grown
+old, who, because he is already almost an ancestor, may serve as a
+model for the living. All this stands in contradiction not only to
+our world and to the modern age from the Renaissance on, but, for
+example, to the Greek attitude toward life as well. When Goethe
+said that growing old is "the gradual withdrawal from the world
+
+194
+of appearances," his was a comment made in the spirit of the
+Greeks, for whom being and appearing coincide. The Roman attitude would have been that precisely in growing old and slowly disappearing from the community of mortals man reaches his most
+characteristic form of being, even though, in respect to the world of
+appearances, he is in the process of disappearing; for only now can
+he approach the existence in which he will be an authority for
+others.
+With the undisturbed background of such a tradition, in which
+education has a political function (and this was a unique case), it
+is in fact comparatively easy to do the right thing in matters of education without even pausing to consider what one is really doing,
+so completely is the specific ethos of the educational principle in
+accord with the basic ethical and moral convictions of society at
+large. To educate, in the words of Polybius, was simply "to let you
+see that you are altogether worthy of your ancestors," and in this
+business the educator could be a "fellow-contestant" and a "fellowworkman" because he too, though on a different level, went through
+life with his eyes glued to the past. Fellowship and authority were
+in this case indeed but the two sides of the same matter, and the
+teacher's authority was firmly grounded in the encompassing
+authority of the past as such. Today, however, we are no longer in
+that position; and it makes little sense to act as though we still were
+and had only, as it were, accidentally strayed from the right path
+and were free at any moment to find our way back to it. This means
+that wherever the crisis has occurred in the modern world, one
+cannot simply go on nor yet simply turn back. Such a reversal will
+never bring us anywhere except to the same situation out of which
+the crisis has just arisen. The return would simply be a repeat performance-though perhaps different in form, since there are no
+limits to the possibilities of nonsense and capricious notions that can
+be decked out as the last word in science. On the other hand,
+simple, unreflective perseverance, whether it be pressing forward
+in the crisis or adhering to the routine that blandly believes the
+crisis will not engulf its particular sphere of life, can only, because
+it surrenders to the course of time, lead to ruin; it can only, to be
+
+195
+more precise, increase that estrangement from the world by which
+we are already threatened on all sides. Consideration of the principles of education must take into account this process of estrangement from the world; it can even admit that we are here presumably
+confronted by an automatic process, provided only that it does not
+forget that it lies within the power of human thought and action to
+interrupt and arrest such processes.
+The problem of education in the modern world lies in the fact
+that by its very nature it cannot forgo either authority or tradition,
+and yet must proceed in a world that is neither structured by authority nor held together by tradition. That means, however, that
+not just teachers and educators, but all of us, insofar as we live in
+one world together with our children and with young people, must
+take toward them an attitude radically different from the one we
+take toward one another. We must decisively divorce the realm of
+education from the others, most of all from the realm of public,
+political life, in order to apply to it alone a concept of authority
+and an attitude toward the past which are appropriate to it but
+have no general validity and must not claim a general validity in
+the world of grown-ups.
+In practice the first consequence of this would be a clear understanding that the function of the school is to teach children what the
+world is like and not to instruct them in the art of living. Since
+the world is old, always older than they themselves, learning inevitably turns toward the past, no matter how much living will
+spend itself in the present. Second, the line drawn between children
+and adults should signify that one can neither educate adults nor
+treat children as though they were grown up; but this line should
+never be permitted to grow into a wall separating children from
+the adult community as though they were not living in the same
+world and as though childhood were an autonomous human state,
+capable of living by its own laws. Where the line between childhood and adulthood falls in each instance cannot be determined by
+a general rule; it changes often, in respect to age, from country to
+country, from one civilization to another, and also from individual
+so individual. But education, as distinguished from learning, must
+
+196
+have a predictable end. In our civilization this end probably coincides with graduation from college rather than with graduation
+from high school, for the professional training in universities or
+technical schools, though it always has something to do with education, is nevertheless in itself a kind of specialization. It no longer
+aims to introduce the young person to the world as a whole, but
+rather to a particular, limited segment of it. One cannot educate
+without at the same time teaching; an education without learning
+is empty and therefore degenerates with great ease into moralemotional rhetoric. But one can quite easily teach without educating, and one can go on learning to the end of one's days without
+for that reason becoming educated. All these are particulars, however, that must really be left to the experts and the pedagogues.
+What concerns us all and cannot therefore be turned over to the
+special science of pedagogy is the relation between grown-ups and
+children in general or, putting it in even more general and exact
+terms, our attitude toward the fact of natality: the fact that we have
+all come into the world by being born and that this world is constantly renewed through birth. Education is the point at which we
+decide whether we love the world enough to assume responsibility
+for it and by the same token save it from that ruin which, except
+for renewal, except for the coming of the new and young, would be
+inevitable. And education, too, is where we decide whether we love
+our children enough not to expel them from our world and leave
+them to their own devices, nor to strike from their hands their
+chance of undertaking something new, something unforeseen by us,
+but to prepart them in advance for the task of renewing a common
+world.
+
+6
+THE CRISIS IN CULTURE:
+Its Social and Its Political Significance
+Nor more than ten years now, we have witnessed a still growing
+concern among intellectuals with the relatively new phenomenon
+of mass culture. The term itself clearly derives from the not much
+older term "mass society"; the tacit assumption, underlying all discussions of the matter, is that mass culture, logically and inevitably,
+is the culture of mass society. The most significant fact about the
+short history of both terms is that, while even a few years ago they
+were still used with a strong sense of reprobation-implying that
+mass society was a depraved form of society and mass culture a
+contradiction in terms—they now have become respectable, the
+subject of innumerable studies and research projects whose chief
+effect, as Harold Rosenberg pointed out, is "to add to kitsch an
+intellectual dimension." This "intellectualization of kitsch" is justified on the grounds that mass society, whether we like it or not, is
+going to stay with us into the foreseeable future; hence its "culture,"
+"popular culture [cannot] be left to the populace." 1 However, the
+197
+
+198
+question is whether what is true for mass society is true for mass
+culture also, or, to put it another way, whether the relationship between mass society and culture will be, mutatis mutandis, the same
+as the relation of society toward culture which preceded it.
+The question of mass culture raises first of all another and more
+fundamental problem, namely, the highly problematic relationship
+of society and culture. One needs only to recall to what an extent
+the entire movement of modern art started with a vehement rebellion of the artist against society as such (and not against a still unknown mass society) in order to become aware how much this
+earlier relationship must have left to be desired and thus to beware
+of the facile yearning of so many critics of mass culture for a Golden
+Age of good and genteel society. This yearning is much more widespread today in America than it is in Europe for the simple reason
+that America, though only too well acquainted with the barbarian
+philistinism of the nouveaux-riches, has only a nodding acquaintance with the equally annoying cultural and educated philistinism of
+European society, where culture has acquired snob-value, where it
+has become a matter of status to be educated enough to appreciate
+culture; this lack of experience may even explain why American
+literature and painting has suddenly come to play such a decisive
+role in the development of modern art and why it can make its influence felt in countries whose intellectual and artistic vanguard has
+adopted outspoken anti-American attitudes. It has, however, the
+unfortunate consequence that the profound malaise which the very
+word "culture" is likely to evoke precisely among those who are
+its foremost representatives may go unnoticed or not be understood in its symptomatic significance.
+Yet whether or not any particular country has actually passed
+through all stages in which society developed since the rise of the
+modern age, mass society clearly comes about when "the mass of
+the population has become incorporated into society." " And since
+society in the sense of "good society" comprehended those parts of
+the population which disposed not only of wealth but of leisure
+time, that is, of time to be devoted to "culture," mass society does
+indeed indicate a new state of affairs in which the mass of the popu-
+
+199
+lation has been so far liberated from the burden of physically exhausting labor that it too disposes of enough leisure for "culture."
+Hence, mass society and mass culture seem to be interrelated
+phenomena, but their common denominator is not the mass but
+rather the society into which the masses too have been incorporated.
+Historically as well as conceptually, mass society was preceded by
+society, and society is no more a generic term than mass society;
+it too can be dated and described historically; it is older, to be sure,
+than mass society, but not older than the modern age. In fact, all the
+traits that crowd psychology has meanwhile discovered in mass
+man: nis loneliness—and loneliness is neither isolation nor solitude—regardless of his adaptability; his excitability and lack of
+standards; his capacity for consumption, accompanied by inability
+to judge, or even to distinguish; above all, his egocentricity and that
+fateful alienation from the world which since Rousseau is mistaken
+for self-alienation-all these traits first appeared in good society,
+where there was no question of masses, numerically speaking.
+Good society, as we know it from the eighteenth and nineteenth
+centuries, probably had its origin in the European courts of the age
+of absolutism, especially the court society of Louis XIV, who
+knew so well how to reduce French nobility to political insignificance by the simple means of gathering them at Versailles, transforming them into courtiers, and making them entertain one another through the intrigues, cabals, and endless gossip which this
+perpetual party inevitably engendered. Thus the true forerunner
+of the novel, this entirely modern art form, is not so much the
+picaresque romance of adventurers and knights as the Mémoires
+of Saint-Simon, while the novel itself clearly anticipated the rise
+of the social sciences as well as of psychology, both of which are
+still centered around conflicts between society and the "individual."
+The true forerunner of modern mass man is this individual, who
+was defined and indeed discovered by those who, like Rousseau in
+the eighteenth century or John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century,
+found themselves in open rebellion against society. Since then, the
+story of a conflict between society and its individuals has repeated
+itself time and again in reality no less than in fiction; the modern,
+
+200
+and no longer so modern, individual forms part and parcel of the
+society against which he tries to assert himself and which always
+gets the better of him.
+There is, however, an important difference between the earlier
+stages of society and mass society with respect to the situation of
+the individual. As long as society itself was restricted to certain
+classes of the population, the individual's chances for survival
+against its pressures were rather good; they lay in the simultaneous
+presence within the population of other non-society strata into
+which the individual could escape, and one reason why these individuals so frequently ended by joining revolutionary parties was
+that they discovered in those who were not admitted to society
+certain traits of humanity which had become extinct in society.
+This again found its expression in the novel, in the well-known
+glorifications of the workers and proletarians, but also, more
+subtly, in the role assigned to homosexuals (for instance in Proust)
+or to Jews, that is, to groups which society had never quite absorbed. The fact that the revolutionary élan throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was so much more violently directed
+against society than against states and governments is not only due
+to the predominance of the social question in the sense of the twofold predicament of misery and exploitation. We need only to read
+the record of the French Revolution, and to recall to what an extent
+the very concept of le peuple received its connotations from an outrage of the "heart"—as Rousseau and even Robespierre would
+have said-against the corruption and hypocrisy of the salons, to
+realize what the true role of society was throughout the nineteenth
+century. A good part of the despair of individuals under the conditions of mass society is due to the fact that these avenues of escape
+are now closed because society has incorporated all strata of the
+population.
+Here we are not concerned with the conflict between the individual and society, however, although it is of some importance
+to note that the last individual left in a mass society seems to be the
+artist. Our concern is with culture, or rather with what happens to
+culture under the different conditions of society and of mass society,
+
+201
+and our interest in the artist, therefore, does not so much concern
+his subjective individualism as the fact that he is, after all, the
+authentic producer of those objects which every civilization leaves
+behind as the quintessence and the lasting testimony of the spirit
+which animated it. That precisely the producers of the highest cultural objects, namely works of art, should turn against society,
+that the whole development of modern art—which together with
+the scientific development will probably remain the greatest achievement of our age-should have started from and remained committed to this hostility against society demonstrates an existing
+antagonism between society and culture prior to the rise of mass
+society.
+The charge the artist, as distinguished from the political revolutionary, has laid to society was summed up quite early, at the turn
+of the eighteenth century, in the one word which has since been
+repeated and reinterpreted by one generation after the other. The
+word is "philistinism." Its origin, slightly older than its specific use,
+is of no great significance; it was first used in German student
+slang to distinguish between town and gown, whereby, however,
+the Biblical association indicated already an enemy superior in
+numbers into whose hands one may fall. When first used as a term
+—I think by the German writer Clemens von Brentano, who wrote
+a satire on the philistine bevor, in und nach der Geschichte-it
+designated a mentality which judged everything in terms of immediate usefulness and "material values" and hence had no regard
+for such useless objects and occupations as are implied in culture
+and art. All this sounds fairly familiar even today, and it is not
+without interest to note that even such current slang terms as
+"square" can already be found in Brentano's early pamphlet.
+If matters had rested there, if the chief reproach leveled against
+society had remained its lack of culture and of interest in art, the
+phenomenon with which we deal here would be considerably less
+complicated than it actually is; by the same token, it would be all
+but incomprehensible why modern art rebelled against "culture" instead of fighting simply and openly for its own "cultural" interests.
+The point of the matter is that this sort of philistinism, which
+
+202
+simply consisted in being "uncultured" and commonplace, was very
+quickly succeeded by another development in which, on the contrary, society began to be only too interested in all these so-called
+cultural values. Society began to monopolize "culture" for its own
+purposes, such as social position and status. This had much to do
+with the socially inferior position of Europe's middle classes, which
+found themselves—as soon as they acquired the necessary wealth
+and leisure—in an uphill fight against the aristocracy and its contempt for the vulgarity of sheer moneymaking. In this fight for
+social position, culture began to play an enormous role as one of the
+weapons, if not the best-suited one, to advance oneself socially, and
+to "educate oneself" out of the lower regions, where supposedly
+reality was located, up into the higher, non-real regions, where
+beauty and the spirit supposedly were at home. This escape from
+reality by means of art and culture is important, not only because
+it gave the physiognomy of the cultural or educated philistine its
+most distinctive marks, but also because it probably was the decisive factor in the rebellion of the artists against their newly found
+patrons; they smelled the danger of being expelled from reality into
+a sphere of refined talk where what they did would lose all meaning. It was a rather dubious compliment to be recognized by a
+society which had grown so "polite" that, for instance, during the
+Irish potato famine, it would not debase itself or risk being associated with so unpleasant a reality by normal usage of the word,
+but would henceforth refer to that much eaten vegetable by saying
+"that root." This ancedote contains as in a nutshell the definition of
+the cultured philistine.3
+No doubt what is at stake here is much more than the psychological state of the artists; it is the objective status of the cultural world,
+which, insofar as it contains tangible things—books and paintings, statues, buildings, and music-comprehends, and gives testimony to, the entire recorded past of countries, nations, and ultimately mankind. As such, the only nonsocial and authentic criterion
+for judging these specifically cultural things is their relative permaaence and even eventual immortality. Only what will last through
+the centuries can ultimately claim to be a cultural object. The point
+
+203
+of the matter is that, as soon as the immortal works of the past became the object of social and individual refinement and the status
+accorded to it, they lost their most important and elemental quality,
+which is to grasp and move the reader or the spectator over the
+centuries. The very word "culture" became suspect precisely because it indicated that "pursuit of perfection" which to Matthew
+Arnold was identical with the "pursuit of sweetness and light." The
+great works of art are no less misused when they serve purposes of
+self-education or self-perfection than when they serve any other
+purposes; it may be as useful and legitimate to look at a picture in
+order to perfect one's knowledge of a given period as it is useful
+and legitimate to use a painting in order to hide a hole in the wall.
+In both instances the art object has been used for ulterior purposes.
+All is well as long as one remains aware that these usages, legitimate or not, do not constitute the proper intercourse with art. The
+trouble with the educated philistine was not that he read the classics
+but that he did so prompted by the ulterior motive of self-perfection, remaining quite unaware of the fact that Shakespeare or
+Plato might have to tell him more important things than how to
+educate himself; the trouble was that he fled into a region of "pure
+poetry" in order to keep reality out of his life-for instance, such
+"prosaic" things as a potato famine—or to look at it through a veil
+of "sweetness and light."
+We all know the rather deplorable art products which this attitude inspired and upon which it fed, in short the kitsch of the nineteenth century, whose historically so interesting lack of sense for
+form and style is closely connected with the severance of the arts
+from reality. The astounding recovery of the creative arts in our
+own century, and a perhaps less apparent but no less real recovery
+of the greatness of the past, began to assert itself when genteel
+society had lost its monopolizing grip on culture, together with its
+dominant position in the population as a whole. What had happened before and, to an extent, continued, of course, to happen
+even after the first appearance of modern art, was actually a disintegration of culture whose "lasting monuments" are the neo-
+Classic, neo-Gothic, neo-Renaissance structures that are strewn all
+
+204
+over Europc. In this disintegration, culture, more even than other
+realities, had become what only then people began to call "value,"
+i.e., a social commodity which could be circulated and cashed in in
+exchange for all kinds of other values, social and individual.
+In other words, cultural objects were first despised as useless by
+the philistine until the cultural philistine seized upon them as a
+currency by which he bought a higher position in society or acquired a higher degree of sclf-esteem-higher, that is, than in his
+own opinion he deserved either by nature or by birth. In this process, cultural values were treated like any other values, they were
+what values always have been, exchange values; and in passing
+from hand to hand they were worn down like old coins. They lost
+the faculty which is originally peculiar to all cultural things, the
+faculty of arresting our attention and moving us. When this had
+come about, people began to talk of the "devaluation of values" and
+the end of the whole process came with the "bargain sale of values"
+(Ausverkauf der Werte) during the twenties and thirties in Germany, the forties and fifties in France, when cultural and moral
+"values" were sold out together.
+Since then cultural philistinism has been a matter of the past in
+Europe, and while one may see in the "bargain sale of values" the
+melancholy end of the great Western tradition, it is still an open
+question whether it is more difficult to discover the great authors
+of the past without the help of any tradition than it is to rescue
+them from the rubbish of educated philistinism. And the task of
+preserving the past without the help of tradition, and often even
+against traditional standards and interpretations, is the same for
+the whole of Western civilization. Intellectually, though not socially,
+America and Europe are in the same situation: the thread of
+tradition is broken, and we must discover the past for ourselves —
+that is, read its authors as though nobody had ever read them before. In this task mass society is much less in our way than good
+and educated society, and I suspect that this kind of reading was
+not uncommon in nineteenth-century America precisely because
+this country was still that "unstoried wilderness" from which so
+many American writers and artists tried to escape. That American
+
+205
+fiction and poetry have so richly come into their own ever since
+Whitman and Melville may have something to do with this. It would
+be unfortunate indeed if out of the dilemmas and distractions of
+mass culture and mass society there should arise an altogether unwarranted and idle yearning for a state of affairs which is not better
+but only a bit more old-fashioned.
+Perhaps the chief difference between society and mass society is
+that society wanted culture, evaluated and devaluated cultural
+things into social commodities, used and abused them for its own
+selfish purposes, but did not "consume" them. Even in their most
+worn-out shapes these things remained things and retained a certain objective character; they disintegrated until they looked like a
+heap of rubble, but they did not disappear. Mass society, on the
+contrary, wants not culture but entertainment, and the wares
+offered by the entertainment industry are indeed consumed by
+society just like any other consumer goods. The products needed
+for entertainment serve the life process of society, even though they
+may not be as necessary for this life as bread and meat. They serve,
+as the phrase is, to while away time, and the vacant time which is
+whiled away is not leisure time, strictly speaking-time, that is,
+in which we are free from all cares and activities necessitated by the
+life process and therefore free for the world and its culture—it is
+rather left-over time, which still is biological in nature, left over
+after labor and sleep have received their due. Vacant time which
+entertainment is supposed to fill is a hiatus in the biologically conditioned cycle of labor—in the "metabolism of man with nature,"
+as Marx used to say.
+Under modern conditions, this hiatus is constantly growing;
+there is more and more time freed that must be filled with entertainment, but this enormous increase in vacant time does not
+change the nature of the time. Entertainment, like labor and sleep,
+is irrevocably part of the biological life process. And biological life
+is always, whether laboring or at rest, whether engaged in consumption or in the passive reception of amusement, a metabolism feeding on things by devouring them. The commodities the entertainment industry offers are not "things," cultural objects, whose ex-
+
+206
+cellence is measured by their ability to withstand the life process
+and become permanent appurtenances of the world, and they should
+not be judged according to these standards; nor are they values
+which exist to be used and exchanged; they are consumer goods,
+destined to be used up, just like any other consumer goods.
+Panis et circenses truly belong together; both are necessary for
+life, for its preservation and recuperation, and both vanish in the
+course of the life process-that is, both must constantly be produced anew and offered anew, lest this process cease entirely. The
+standards by which both should be judged are freshness and novelty,
+and the extent to which we use these standards today to judge cultural and artistic objects as well, things which are supposed to remain in the world even after we have left it, indicates clearly the
+extent to which the need for entertainment has begun to threaten
+the cultural world. Yet the trouble does not really stem from mass
+society or the entertainment industry which caters to its needs. On
+the contrary, mass society, since it does not want culture but only
+entertainment, is probably less of a threat to culture than the
+philistinism of good society; despite the often described malaise of
+artists and intellectuals—partly perhaps due to their inability to
+penetrate the noisy futility of mass entertainment—it is precisely
+the arts and sciences, in contradistinction to all political matters,
+which continue to flourish. At any event, as long as the entertainment industry produces its own consumer goods, we can no more
+reproach it for the non-durability of its articles than we can reproach a bakery because it produces goods which, if they are not to
+spoil, must be consumed as soon as they are made. It has always
+been the mark of educated philistinism to despise entertainment
+and amusement, because no "value" could be derived from it. The
+truth is we all stand in need of entertainment and amusement in
+some form or other, because we are all subject to life's great cycle,
+and it is sheer hypocrisy or social snobbery to deny that we can be
+amused and entertained by exactly the same things which amuse
+and entertain the masses of our fellow men. As far as the survival
+of culture is concerned, it certainly is less threatened by those who
+
+207
+fill vacant time with entertainment than by those who fill it with
+some haphazard educational gadgets in order to improve their
+social standing. And as far as artistic productivity is concerned,
+it should not be more difficult to withstand the massive temptations of mass culture, or to keep from being thrown out of gear by
+the noise and humbug of mass society, than it was to avoid the more
+sophisticated temptations and the more insidious noises of the cultural snobs in refined society.
+Unhappily, the case is not that simple. The entertainment industry is confronted with gargantuan appetites, and since its wares
+disappear in consumption, it must constantly offer new commodities. In this predicament those who produce for the mass media
+ransack the entire range of past and present culture in the hope of
+finding suitable material. This material, moreover, cannot be offered
+as it is; it must be altered in order to become entertaining, it must
+be prepared to be easily consumed.
+Mass culture comes into being when mass society seizes upon
+cultural objects, and its danger is that the life process of society
+(Which like all biological processes insatiably draws everything
+available into the cycle of its metabolism) will literally consume
+the cultural objects, eat them up and destroy them. Of course, I am
+not referring to mass distribution. When books or pictures in reproduction are thrown on the market cheaply and attain huge sales,
+this does not aflect the nature of the objects in question. But their
+nature is affected when these objects themselves are changed—
+rewritten, condensed, digested, reduced to kitsch in reproduction,
+or in preparation for the movies. This does not mean that culture
+spreads to the masses, but that culture is being destroyed in order
+to yield entertainment. The result of this is not disintegration but
+decay, and those who actively promote it are not the Tin Pan Alley
+composers but a special kind of intellectuals, often well read and
+well informed, whose sole function is to organize, disseminate, and
+change cultural objects in order to persuade the masses that Hamlet
+can be as entertaining as My Fair Lady, and perhaps educational
+as well. There are many great authors of the past who have sur-
+
+208
+vived centuries of oblivion and neglect, but it is still an open question whether they will be able to survive an entertaining version of
+what they have to say.
+Culture relates to objects and is a phenomenon of the world;
+entertainment relates to people and is a phenomenon of life. An
+object is cultural to the extent that it can endure; its durability is
+the very opposite of functionality, which is the quality which makes
+it disappear again from the phenomenal world by being used and
+used up. The great user and consumer of objects is life itself, the
+life of the individual and the life of society as a whole. Life is indifferent to the thingness of an object; it insists that every thing
+must be functional, fulfill some needs. Culture is being threatened
+when all worldly objects and things, produced by the present or
+the past, are treated as mere functions for the life process of society,
+as though they are there only to fulfill some need, and for this
+functionalization it is almost irrelevant whether the needs in question are of a high or a low order. That the arts must be functional,
+that cathedrals fulfill a religious need of society, that a picture is
+born from the need for self-expression in the individual painter and
+that it is looked at because of a desire for self-perfection in the
+spectator, all these notions are so unconnected with art and historically so new that one is tempted simply to dismiss them as modern
+prejudices. The cathedrals were built ad maiorem gloriam Dei;
+while they as buildings certainly served the needs of the community,
+their elaborate beauty can never be explained by these needs, which
+could have been served quite as well by any nondescript building.
+Their beauty transcended all needs and made them last through the
+centuries; but while beauty, the beauty of a cathedral like the
+beauty of any secular building, transcends needs and functions, it
+never transcends the world, even if the content of the work happens to be religious. On the contrary, it is the very beauty of religious art which transforms religious and other-worldly contents
+and concerns into tangible worldly realities; in this sense all art is
+secular, and the distinction of religious art is merely that it
+"secularizes" —reifies and transforms into an "objective," tangible,
+worldly presence—what had existed before outside the world,
+
+209
+whereby it is irrelevant whether we follow traditional religion and
+localize this "outside" in the beyond of a hereafter, or follow
+modern explanations and localize it in the innermost recesses of
+the human heart.
+Every thing, whether it is a use object, a consumer good, or a
+work of art, possesses a shape through which it appears, and only
+to the extent that something has a shape can we say that it is a thing
+at all. Among the things which do not occur in nature but only
+in the man-made world, we distinguish between use objects and
+art works, both of which possess a certain permanence ranging from
+ordinary durability to potential immortality in the case of works of
+art. As such, they are distinguished from consumer goods on one
+hand, whose duration in the world scarcely exceeds the time necessary to prepare them, and, on the other hand, from the products of
+action, such as events, deeds, and words, all of which are in themselves so transitory that they would hardly survive the hour or day
+they appeared in the world, if they were not preserved first by
+man's memory, which weaves them into stories, and then through
+his fabricating abilities. From the viewpoint of sheer durability, art
+works clearly are superior to all other things; since they stay longer
+in the world than anything else, they are the worldliest of all things.
+Moreover, they are the only things without any function in the life
+process of society; strictly speaking, they are fabricated not for
+men, but for the world which is meant to outlast the life-span of
+mortals, the coming and going of the generations. Not only are
+they not consumed like consumer goods and not used up like use
+objects; they are deliberately removed from the processes of consumption and usage and isolated against the sphere of human life
+necessities. This removal can be achieved in a great variety of ways;
+and only where it is done does culture, in the specific sense, come
+into being.
+The question here is not whether worldliness, the capacity to
+fabricate and create a world, is part and parcel of human "nature."
+We know of the existence of worldless people as we know unworldly men; human life as such requires a world only insofar as
+it needs a home on earth for the duration of its stay here. Certainly
+
+210 Between Past and Future
+every arrangement men make to provide shelter and put a roof
+over their heads—even the tents of nomadic tribes—can serve as a
+home on earth for those who happen to be alive at the time; but
+this by no means implies that such arrangements beget a world, let
+alone a culture. This earthly home becomes a world in the proper
+sense of the word only when the totality of fabricated things is so
+organized that it can resist the consuming life process of the
+people dwelling in it, and thus outlast them. Only where such survival is assured do we speak of culture, and only where we are confronted with things which exist independently of all utilitarian and
+functional references, and whose quality remains always the same,
+do we speak of works of art.
+For these reasons any discussion of culture must somehow take
+as its starting point the phenomenon of art. While the thingness
+of all things by which we surround ourselves lies in their having a
+shape through which they appear, only works of art are made for
+the sole purpose of appearance. The proper criterion by which to
+judge appearances is beauty; if we wanted to judge objects, even
+ordinary use-objects, by their use-value alone and not also by their
+appearance—that is, by whether they are beautiful or ugly or something in between—we would have to pluck out our eyes. But in
+order to become aware of appearances we first must be free to
+establish a certain distance between ourselves and the object, and
+the more important the sheer appearance of a thing is, the more
+distance it requires for its proper appreciation. This distance cannot arise unless we are in a position to forget ourselves, the cares
+and interests and urges of our lives, so that we will not seize what
+we admire but let it be as it is, in its appearance. This attitude of
+disinterested joy (to use the Kantian term, uninteressiertes Wohlgefallen) can be experienced only after the needs of the living organism have been provided for, so that, released from life's necessity, men may be free for the world.
+The trouble with society in its earlier stages was that its members, even when they had acquired release from life's necessity,
+could not free themselves from concerns which had much to do
+with themselves, their status and position in society and the re
+
+211
+dection of this upon their individual selves, but bore no relation
+whatsoever to the world of objects and objectivity they moved in.
+The relatively new trouble with mass society is perhaps even more
+serious, but not because of the masses themselves, but because this
+society is essentially a consumers' society where leisure time is used
+no longer for self-perfection or acquisition of more social status,
+but for more and more consumption and more and more entertainment. And since there are not enough consumer goods around to
+satisfy the growing appetites of a life process whose vital energy,
+no longer spent in the toil and trouble of a laboring body, must be
+used up by consumption, it is as though life itself reached out and
+helped itself to things which were never meant for it. The result is,
+of course, not mass culture which, strictly speaking, does not exist,
+but mass entertainment, feeding on the cultural objects of the
+world. To believe that such a society will become more "cultured"
+as time goes on and education has done its work, is, I think, a fatal
+mistake. The point is that a consumers' society cannot possibly
+know how to take care of a world and the things which belong exclusively to the space of worldly appearances, because its central
+attitude toward all objects, the attitude of consumption, spells ruin
+to everything it touches.
+1 said before that a discussion of culture is bound to take the
+phenomenon of art as its starting point because art works are cultural objects par excellence. Yet while culture and art are closely
+interrelated, they are by no means the same. The distinction between them is of no great importance for the question of what happens to culture under the conditions of society and mass society;
+it is relevant, however, for the problem of what culture is and in
+what relationship it stands to the political realm.
+Culture, word and concept, is Roman in origin. The word "culture" derives from colere—to cultivate, to dwell, to take care, to
+tend and preserve-and it relates primarily to the intercourse of
+
+212
+man with nature in the sense of cultivating and tending nature until
+it becomes fit for human habitation. As such, it indicates an attitude of loving care and stands in sharp contrast to all efforts to subject nature to the domination of man.* Hence it does not only apply
+to tilling the soil but can also designate the "cult" of the gods, the
+taking care of what properly belongs to them. It seems it was Cicero
+who first used the word for matters of spirit and mind. He speaks
+of excolere animum, of cultivating the mind, and of cultura animi
+in the same sense in which we speak even today of a cultured mind,
+only that we are no longer aware of the full metaphorical content
+of this usage." For as far as Roman usage is concerned, the chief
+point always was the connection of culture with nature; culture
+originally meant agriculture, which was held in very high regard in
+Rome in opposition to the poetic and fabricating arts. Even Cicero's
+cultura animi, the result of training in philosophy and therefore
+perhaps coined, as has been suggested, to translate the Greek
+maideía, ' meant tle very opposite of being a fabricator or creator of
+art works. It was in the midst of a primarily agricultural people
+that the concept of culture first appeared, and the artistic connotations which might have been connected with this culture concerned the incomparably close relationship of the Latin people to
+nature, the creation of the famous Italian landscape. According
+to the Romans, art was supposed to rise as naturally as the countryside; it ought to be tended nature; and the spring of all poetry
+was seen in "the song which the leaves sing to themselves in the
+green solitude of the woods." " But though this may be an eminently poetic thought, it is not likely that great art would ever have
+sprung from it. It is hardly the mentality of gardeners which produces art.
+The great Roman art and poetry came into being under the impact of the Greek heritage, which the Romans, but never the
+Greeks, knew how to take care of and how to preserve. The reason
+why there is no Greek equivalent to the Roman concept of culture
+lies in the predominance of the fabricating arts in Greek civilization. While the Romans tended to regard even art as a kind of agriculture. of cultivating nature, the Greeks tended to consider even
+
+213
+agriculture as part and parcel of fabrication, as belonging to the
+cunning, skillful, "technical" devices with which man, more aweinspiring than all that is, tames and rules nature. What we, still
+under the spell of the Roman heritage, consider to be the most
+natural and the most peaceful of man's activities, the tilling of the
+soil, the Greeks understood as a daring, violent enterprise in which,
+year in year out, the earth, inexhaustible and indefatigable, is disturbed and violated.® The Greeks did not know what culture is because they did not cultivate nature but rather tore from the womb
+of the earth the fruits which the gods had hidden from men
+(Hesiod); and closely connected with this was that the great Roman
+reverence for the testimony of the past as such, to which we owe
+not merely the preservation of the Greek heritage but the very
+continuity of our tradition, was quite alien to them. Both together,
+culture in the sense of developing nature into a dwelling place for a
+people as well as in the sense of taking care of the monuments of
+the past, determine even today the content and the meaning we
+have in mind when we speak of culture.
+Yet the meaning of the word "culture" is hardly exhausted by
+these strictly Roman elements. Even Cicero's cultura animi is suggestive of something like taste and, generally, sensitivity to beauty,
+not in those who fabricate beautiful things, that is, in the artists
+themselves, but in the spectators, in those who move among them.
+And this love for beauty the Greeks possessed, of course, to an
+extraordinary degree. In this sense we understand by culture the
+attitude toward, or, better, the mode of intercourse prescribed by
+civilizations with respect to the least useful and most worldly of
+things, the works of artists, poets, musicians, philosophers, and so
+forth. If we mean by culture the mode of intercourse of man with
+the things of the world, then we may try to understand Greek culture (as distinguished from Greek art) by recalling a much quoted
+saying, reported by Thucydides and attributed to Pericles, which
+reads as follows: фелокаЛобек ур мет' єйтела каї філогофойрег
+ävev Malakías." The sentence, utterly simple, almost defies translation. What we understand as states or qualities, such as love of
+beauty or love of wisdom (called philosophy) is described here as
+
+214
+an activity, as though to "love beautiful things" is no less an
+activity than to make them. Our translation of the qualifying words,
+furthermore, "accuracy of aim" and "effeminacy," fails to convey
+that both terms were strictly political, effeminacy being a barbarian vice and accuracy of aim the virtue of the man who knows
+how to act. Pericles therefore is saying something like this: "We
+love beauty within the limits of political judgment, and we philosophize without the barbarian vice of effeminacy."
+Once the meaning of these words, which are so difficult to
+liberate from their hackneyed translation, begins to dawn upon us,
+there is much to be surprised at. First, we are told distinctly that it
+is the polis, the realm of politics, which sets limits to the love of
+wisdom and of beauty, and since we know that the Greeks thought
+it was the polis and "politics" (and by no means superior artistic
+achievements) which distinguished them from the barbarians, we
+must conclude that this difference was a "cultural" difference as
+well, a difference in their mode of intercourse with "cultural" things,
+a different attitude toward beauty and wisdom, which could be
+loved only within the limits set by the institution of the polis. In
+other words, it was a kind of over-refinement, an indiscriminate
+sensitivity which did not know how to choose that was deemed to
+be barbarian—and neither any primitive lack of culture as we understand it nor any specific quality in the cultural things themselves.
+Even more surprising perhaps is that the lack of virility, the vice of
+effeminacy, which we would associate with too great a love of beauty
+or aestheticism, is mentioned here as the specific danger of philosophy; and the knowledge of how to aim or, as we said, of
+how to judge, which we would have expected to be a qualification
+of philosophy, which must know how to aim at truth, is considered
+here to be necessary for the intercourse with the beautiful.
+Could it be that philosophy in the Greek sense-which begins
+with "wonder," with Davuáfew, and ends at least in Plato and
+Aristotle) in the speechless beholding of some unveiled truth—is
+more likely to lead into inactivity than love of beauty? Could it be,
+on the other hand, that love of beauty remains barbarous unless it
+is accompanied by curedcía, by the faculty to take aim in judgment,
+
+215
+discernment, and discrimination, in brief, by that curious and illdefined capacity we commonly call taste? And finally, could it be
+that this right love of beauty, the proper kind of intercourse with
+beautiful things—the cultura animi which makes man fit to take
+care of the things of the world and which Cicero, in contradistinction to the Greeks, ascribed to philosophy—has something to do
+with politics? Could it be that taste belongs among the political
+faculties?
+To understand the problems which these questions raise it is
+important to keep in mind that culture and art are not the same.
+One way to remain aware of the difference between them is to recall that the same men who praised love of the beautiful and the
+culture of the mind shared the deep ancient distrust of those artists
+and artisans who actually fabricated the things which then were displayed and admired. The Greeks, though not the Romans, had a
+word for philistinism, and this word, curiously enough, derives
+from a word for artists and artisans, Búvavoos; to be a philistine,
+a man of banausic spirit, indicated, then as today, an exclusively
+utilitarian mentality, an inability to think and to judge a thing apart
+from its function or utility. But the artist himself, being a Búvavoos,
+was by no means excluded from the reproach of philistinism; on
+the contrary, philistinism was considered to be a vice most likely to
+occur in those who had mastered a réxy, in fabricators and artists.
+To Greek understanding, there was no contradiction between praise
+of okalein, the love of the beautiful, and contempt for those who
+actually produced the beautiful. The mistrust and actual contempt
+of the artists arose from political considerations: fabrication of
+things, including the production of art, is not within the range of
+political activities; it even stands in opposition to them. The chief
+reason of the distrust of fabrication in all forms is that it is utilitarian by its very nature. Fabrication, but not action or speech, always involves means and ends; in fact, the category of means and
+ends derives its legitimacy from the sphere of making and fabricating where a clearly recognizable end, the final product, determines
+and organizes everything that plays a part in the process-the
+material, the tools, the activity itself, and even the persons partici-
+
+216
+pating in it; they all become mere means toward the end and they
+are justified as such. Fabricators cannot help regarding all things
+as means to their ends or, as the case may be, judging all things by
+their specific utility. The moment this point of view is generalized
+and extended to other realms than that of fabrication it will produce
+the banausic mentality. And the Greeks rightly suspected that this
+philistinism threatens not only the political realm, as it obviously
+does because it will judge action by the same standards of utility
+which are valid for fabrication, demand that action obtain a predetermined end and that it be permitted to seize on all means likely
+to further this end; it also threatens the cultural realm itself because it leads to a devaluation of things as things which, if the mentality that brought them into being is permitted to prevail, will again
+be judged according to the standard of utility and thereby lose
+their intrinsic, independent worth, and finally degenerate into mere
+means. In other words, the greatest threat to the existence of the
+finished work arises precisely from the mentality which brought it
+into being. From which it follows that the standards and rules which
+must necessarily prevail in erecting and building and decorating the
+world of things in which we move, lose their validity and become
+positively dangerous when they are applied to the finished world
+itself.
+This, to be sure, does not tell the whole story of the relation between politics and art. Rome in her early period was so convinced
+that artists and poets pursued a childish game which did not accord
+with the gravitas, the seriousness and dignity, proper to a Roman
+citizen, that she simply suppressed whatever artistic talents might
+have flourished in the republic prior to Greek influence. Athens,
+on the contrary, never settled the conflict between politics and art
+unequivocally in favor of one or the other—which incidentally may
+be one of the reasons for the extraordinary display of artistic genius
+in classical Greece-and she kept the conflict alive and did not
+level it out to indifference of the two realms with regard to each
+other. The Greeks, so to speak, could say in one and the same
+breath: "He who has not seen the Zeus of Phidias at Olympia has
+Lived in vain" and: "People like Phidias, namely sculptors, are un-
+
+217
+fit for citizenship." And Pericles, in the same oration in which he
+praises the right фелогофе and флокалє, the active intercourse
+with wisdom and beauty, boasts that Athens will know how to put
+"Homer and his ilk" in their place, that the glory of her deeds will
+be so great that the city will be able to dispense with the professional
+fabricators of glory, the poets and artists who reify the living word
+and the living deed, transforming and converting them into things
+permanent enough to carry greatness into the immortality of fame.
+We today are more likely to suspect that the realm of politics
+and active participation in public business give rise to philistinism
+and prevent the development of a cultivated mind which can regard things in their true worth without reflection upon their function and utility. One of the reasons for this shift of emphasis is, of
+course, that—for reasons outside these considerations-the mentality of fabrication has invaded the political realm to such an extent that we take it for granted that action, even more than fabrication, is determined by the category of means and ends. This situation, however, has the advantage that the fabricators and artists
+have been able to give vent to their own view of these matters and
+to articulate their hostility against the men of action. There is more
+behind this hostility than competition for the public eye. The
+trouble is that Homo faber does not stand in the same relationship
+to the public realm and its publicity as the things he makes, with
+their appearance, configuration, and form. In order to be in a position to add constantly new things to the already existing world, he
+himself must be isolated from the public, must be sheltered and
+concealed from it. Truly political activities, on the other hand,
+acting and speaking, cannot be performed at all without the
+presence of others, without the public, without a space constituted
+by the many. The activity of the artist and of the craftsman is
+therefore subject to conditions very different from those surrounding political activities, and it is quite understandable that the
+artist, as soon as he begins to speak his mind on things political,
+should feel the same distrust for the specifically political realm and
+its publicity as did the polis for the mentality and conditions of
+fabrication. This is the true malaise of the artist, not in society but
+
+218
+in politics, and his scruples and distrust of political activity are no
+less legitimate than the mistrust of men of action against the mentality of Homo faber. At this point the conflict between art and
+politics arises, and this conflict cannot and must not be solved.
+However, the point of the matter is that the conflict, dividing
+the statesman and the artist in their respective activities, no longer
+applies when we turn our attention from the making of art to its
+products, to the things themselves which must find their place in
+the world. These things obviously share with political "products,"
+words and deeds, the quality that they are in need of some public
+space where they can appear and be seen; they can fulfill their own
+being, which is appearance, only in a world which is common to all;
+in the concealment of private life and private possession, art objects cannot attain their own inherent validity, they must, on the
+contrary, be protected against the possessiveness of individuals—
+whereby it does now matter whether this protection takes the form
+of their being set up in holy places, in temples and churches, or
+placed in the care of museums and the keepers of monuments, although the place where we put them is characteristic of our "culture," that is, of the mode of our intercourse with them. Generally
+speaking, culture indicates that the public realm, which is rendered
+politically secure by men of action, offers its space of display to
+those things whose essence it is to appear and to be beautiful. In
+other words, culture indicates that art and politics, their conflicts
+and tensions notwithstanding, are interrelated and even mutually
+dependent. Seen against the background of political experiences
+and of activities which, if left to themselves, come and go without
+leaving any trace in the world, beauty is the very manifestation of
+imperishability. The fleeting greatness of word and deed can endure
+in the world to the extent that beauty is bestowed upon it. Without
+the beauty, that is, the radiant glory in which potential immortality
+is made manifest in the human world, all human life would be
+futile and no greatness could endure.
+The common element connecting art and politics is that they
+both are phenomena of the public world. What mediates the conflict between the artist and the man of action is the cultura animi,
+
+219
+that is, a mind so trained and cultivated that it can be trusted to
+tend and take care of a world of appearances whose criterion is
+beauty. The reason Cicero ascribed this culture to a training in
+philosophy was that to him only philosophers, the lovers of wisdom,
+approached things as mere "spectators" without any wish to acquire something for themselves, so that he could liken the philosophers to those who, coming to the great games and festivals, sought
+neither "to win the glorious distinction of a crown" nor to make
+"gain by buying or selling" but were attracted by the "spectacle
+and closely watched what was done and how it was done." They
+were, as we would say today, completely disinterested and for this
+very reason those best qualified to judge, but also those who were
+most fascinated by the spectacle itself. Cicero calls them maxime
+ingenuum, the most noble group of the free-born men, for what
+they were doing: to look for the sake of seeing only was the freest,
+liberalissimum, of all pursuits.1°
+For lack of a better word that would indicate the discriminating,
+discerning, judging elements of an active love of beauty-that
+lokalein per' curedcias of which Pericles speaks—1 used the word
+"taste," and in order to justify this usage and, at the same time, to
+point out the one activity in which, I think, culture as such expresses itself, I should like to draw upon the first part of Kant's
+Critique of Judgment, which, as "Critique of Esthetic Judgment,"
+contains perhaps the greatest and most original aspect of Kant's
+political philosophy. At any rate, it contains an analytic of the
+beautiful primarily from the viewpoint of the judging spectator, as
+even the title indicates, and it takes its starting point from the
+phenomenon of taste, understood as an active relationship to what
+is beautiful.
+In order to see the faculty of judgment in its proper perspective
+and to understand that it implies a political rather than a merely
+theoretical activity, we must shortly recall what is usually considered to be Kant's political philosophy, namely, the Critique of
+Practical Reason, which deals with the lawgiving faculty of reason.
+The principle of lawgiving, as laid down in the "categorical imperative"—"always act in such a manner that the principle of your
+
+220
+action can become a general law"-is based upon the necessity for
+rational thought to agree with itsclf. The thief, for instance, is
+actually contradicting himself, for he cannot wish that the principle of his action, stealing other people's property, should become a
+general law; such a law would immediately deprive him of his own
+acquisition. This principle of agreement with oneself is very old;
+it was actually discovered by Socrates, whose central tenet, as
+formulated by Plato, is contained in the sentence: "Since I am one,
+it is better for me to disagree with the whole world than to be in
+disagreement with myself." 1 From this sentence both Occidental
+ethics, with its stress upon being in agreement with one's own
+conscience, and Occidental logic, with its emphasis upon the axiom
+of contradiction, took their starting point.
+In the Critique of Judgement, however, Kant insisted upon a
+different way of thinking, for which it would not be enough to be in
+agreement with ore's own self, but which consisted of being able to
+"think in the place of everybody else" and which he therefore called
+an "enlarged mentality" (eine erweiterte Denkungsart) 1? The
+power of judgment rests on a potential agreement with others, and
+the thinking process which is active in judging something is not, like
+the thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and
+myself, but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite
+alone in making up my mind, in an anticipated communication
+with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement. From this potential agreement judgment derives its specific
+validity. This means, on the one hand, that such judgment must
+liberate itself from the "subjective private conditions," that is,
+from the idiosyncrasies which naturally determine the outlook of
+each individual in his privacy and are legitimate as long as they are
+only privately held opinions, but which are not fit to enter the
+market place, and lack all validity in the public realm. And this enlarged way of thinking, which as judgment knows how to transcend
+its own individual limitations, on the other hand, cannot function
+in strict isolation or solitude; it needs the presence of others "in
+whose place" it must think, whose perspectives it must take into
+consideration, and without whom it never has the opportunity to
+
+221
+operate at all. As logic, to be sound, depends on the presence of the
+self, so judgment, to be valid, depends on the presence of others.
+Hence judgment is endowed with a certain specific validity but is
+never universally valid. Its claims to validity can never extend
+further than the others in whose place the judging person has put
+himself for his considerations. Judgment, Kant says, is valid "for
+every single judging person," 13 but the emphasis in the sentence is
+on "judging"; it is not valid for those who do not judge or for
+those who are not members of the public realm where the objects
+of judgment appear.
+That the capacity to judge is a specifically political ability in
+exactly the sense denoted by Kant, namely, the ability to see things
+not only from one's own point of view but in the perspective of all
+those who happen to be present; even that judgment may be one of
+the fundamenta! abilities of man as a political being insofar as it
+enables him to orient himself in the public realm, in the common
+world—these are insights that are virtually as old as articulated
+political experience. The Greeks called this ability pórous, or insight, and they considered it the principal virtue or excellence of
+the statesman in distinction from the wisdom of the philosopher.!t
+The difference between this judging insight and speculative thought
+lies in that the former has its roots in what we usually call common
+sense, which the latter constantly transcends. Common sense—
+which the French so suggestively call the "good sense," le bon sens
+—discloses to us the nature of the world insofar as it is a common
+world; we owe to it the fact that our strictly private and "subjective" five senses and their sensory data can adjust themselves to a
+nonsubjective and "objective" world which we have in common
+and share with others. Judging is one, if not the most, important
+activity in which this sharing-the-world-with-others comes to pass.
+What, however, is quite new and even startlingly new in Kant's
+propositions in the Critique of Judgment is that he discovered this
+phenomenon in all its grandeur precisely when he was examining
+the phenomenon of taste and hence the only kind of judgments
+which, since they concern merely aesthetic matters, have always been
+supposed to lie outside the political realm as well as the domain of
+
+222
+reason. Kant was disturbed by the alleged arbitrariness and subjectivity of de gustibus non disputandum est (which, no doubt, is
+entirely true for private idiosyncrasies), for this arbitrariness offended his political and not his aesthetic sense. Kant, who certainly
+was not oversensitive to beautiful things, was highly conscious of
+the public quality of beauty; and it was because of their public relevance that he insisted, in opposition to the commonplace adage,
+that taste judgments are open to discussion because "we hope that
+the same pleasure is shared by others," that taste can be subject
+to dispute, because it "expects agreement from everyone else." 15
+Therefore taste, insofar as it, like any other judgment, appeals to
+common sense, is the very opposite of "private feelings." In aesthetic no less than in political judgments, a decision is made, and although this decision is always determined by a certain subjectivity,
+by the simple fact that each person occupies a place of his own
+from which he looks upon and judges the world, it also derives from
+the fact that the world itself is an objective datum, something common to all its inhabitants. The activity of taste decides how this
+world, independent of its utility and our vital interests in it, is to
+look and sound, what men will see and what they will hear in it.
+Taste judges the world in its appearance and in its worldliness; its
+interest in the world is purely "disinterested," and that means that
+neither the life interests of the individual nor the moral interests of
+the self are involved here. For judgments of taste, the world is the
+primary thing, not man, neither man's life nor his self.
+Taste judgments, furthermore, are currently held to be arbitrary
+because they do not compel in the sense in which demonstrable
+facts or truth proved by argument compel agreement. They share
+with political opinions that they are persuasive; the judging person
+—as Kant says quite beautifully—can only "woo the consent of
+everyone else" in the hope of coming to an agreement with him
+eventually. 18 This "wooing" or persuading corresponds closely to
+what the Greeks called Telev, the convincing and persuading
+speech which they regarded as the typically political form of people talking with one another. Persuasion ruled the intercourse of
+the citizens of the polis because it excluded physical violence; but
+
+223
+the philosophers knew that it was also distinguished from another
+non-violent form of coercion, the coercion by truth. Persuasion appears in Aristotle as the opposite to diadéycola, the philosophical
+form of speaking, precisely because this type of dialogue was concerned with knowledge and the finding of truth and therefore demanded a process of compelling proof. Culture and politics, then,
+belong together because it is not knowledge or truth which is at
+stake, but rather judgment and decision, the judicious exchange
+of opinion about the sphere of public life and the common world,
+and the decision what manner of action is to be taken in it, as well
+as to how it is to look henceforth, what kind of things are to appear in it.
+To classify taste, the chief cultural activity, among man's political abilities sounds so strange that I may add another much more
+familiar but theoretically little-regarded fact to these considerations.
+We all know very well how quickly people recognize each other,
+and how unequivocally they can feel that they belong to each other,
+when they discover a kinship in questions of what pleases and displeases. From the viewpoint of this common experience, it is as
+though taste decides not only how the world is to look, but also
+who belongs together in it. If we think of this sense of belonging
+in political terms, we are tempted to regard taste as an essentially
+aristocratic principle of organization. But its political significance
+is perhaps more far-reaching and at the same time more profound.
+Wherever people judge the things of the world that are common to
+them, there is more implied in their judgments than these things.
+By his manner of judging, the person discloses to an extent also
+himself, what kind of person he is, and this disclosure, which is
+involuntary, gains in validity to the degree that it has liberated itself from merely individual idiosyncrasies. Now, it is precisely the
+realm of acting and speaking, that is, the political domain in terms
+of activities, in which this personal quality comes to the fore in
+public, in which the "who one is" becomes manifest rather than
+the qualities and individual talents he may possess. In this respect,
+the political realm is again opposed to the domain in which the
+artist and fabricator live and do their work and in which ultimately
+
+224 Between Past and Future
+it is always quality that counts, the talents of the maker and the
+quality of the thing he makes. Taste, however, does not simply
+judge this quality. On the contrary, quality is beyond dispute, it is
+no less compellingly evident than truth and stands beyond the decisions of judgment, beyond the need of persuasion and wooing
+agreement, although there are times of artistic and cultural decay
+when only few are left who are still receptive to the self-evidence
+of quality. Taste as the activity of a truly cultivated mind-cultura
+animi-comes into play only where quality-consciousness is widely
+disseminated, the truly beautiful easily recognized; for taste discriminates and decides among qualities. As such, taste and its everalert judgment of things of the world sets its own limits to an indiscriminate, immoderate love of the merely beautiful; into the
+realm of fabrication and of quality it introduces the personal factor, that is, gives it a humanistic meaning. Taste debarbarizes the
+world of the beautiful by not being overwhelmed by it; it takes
+care of the beautiful in its own "personal" way and thus produces a
+"culture."
+Humanism, like culture, is of course of Roman origin; there is
+again no word in the Greek language corresponding to the Latin
+humanitas. It will not be inappropriate, therefore, if—to conclude
+these remarks—1 choose a Roman example to illustrate the sense
+in which taste is the political capacity that truly humanizes the
+beautiful and creates a culture. There exists an odd statement of
+Cicero which sounds as though it were deliberately framed to
+counter the then current Roman commonplace: Amicus Socrates,
+amicus Plato, sed magis aestimanda veritas. This old adage, whether
+one agrees with it or not, must have offended the Roman sense
+of humanitas, of the integrity of the person as person; for human
+worth and personal rank, together with friendship, are sacrificed
+here to the primacy of an absolute truth. Nothing, at any rate,
+could be further from the ideal of absolute, compelling truth than
+what Cicero has to say: Errare mehercule malo cum Platone ...
+quam cum istis (sc. Pythagoraeis) vera sentire-"I prefer before
+heaven to go astray with Plato rather than hold true views with
+his opponents." 18 The English translation blurs a certain ambiguity
+
+225
+of the text; the sentence can mean: I would rather go astray with
+Platonic rationality than "feel" (sentire) the truth with Pythagorean
+irrationality, but this interpretation is unlikely in view of the answer
+given in the dialogue: "I should not myself be unwilling to go
+astray with such a man" (Ego enim ipse cum eodem isto non
+invitus erraverim), where the stress again is on the person with
+whom one goes astray. Thus, it seems safe to follow the English
+translation, and then the sentence clearly says: It is a matter of
+taste to prefer Plato's company and the company of his thoughts
+even if this should lead us astray from truth. Certainly a very bold,
+even an outrageously bold statement, especially because it concerns truth; obviously the same could be said and decided with
+respect to beauty, which for those who have trained their senses as
+much as most of us have trained our minds is no less compelling
+than truth. What Cicero in fact says is that for the true humanist
+neither the verities of the scientist nor the truth of the philosopher
+nor the beauty of the artist can be absolutes; the humanist, because
+he is not a specialist, exerts a faculty of judgment and taste which is
+beyond the coercion which each specialty imposes upon us. This
+Roman humanitas applied to men who were free in every respect,
+for whom the question of freedom, of not being coerced, was the
+decisive one-even in philosophy, even in science, even in the arts.
+Cicero says: In what concerns my association with men and things,
+I refuse to be coerced even by truth, even by beauty.!'
+This humanism is the result of the cultura animi, of an attitude
+that knows how to take care and preserve and admire the things of
+the world. As such, it has the task of arbitrating and mediating
+between the purely political and the purely fabricating activities,
+which are opposed to each other in many ways. As humanists, we
+can rise above these conflicts between the statesman and the artist
+as we can rise in freedom above the specialties which we all must
+learn and pursue. We can rise above specialization and philistinism
+of all sorts to the extent that we learn how to exercise our taste
+freely. Then we shall know how to reply to those who so frequently
+tell us that Plato or some other great author of the past has been
+superseded; we shall be able to understand that even if all criticism
+
+226
+of Plato is right, Plato may still be better company than his critics.
+At any rate, we may remember what the Romans—the first people
+that took culture seriously the way we do-thought a cultivated
+person ought to be: one who knows how to choose his company
+among men, among things, among thoughts, in the present as well
+as in the past.
+
+TRUTH AND POLITICS*
+THe subject of these reflections is a commonplace. No one has
+ever doubted that truth and politics are on rather bad terms
+with each other, and no one, as far as I know, has ever counted
+truthfulness among the political virtues. Lies have always been regarded as necessary and justifiable tools not only of the politician's
+or the demagogue's but also of the statesman's trade. Why is that
+so? And what does it mean for the nature and the dignity of the
+political realm, on one side, and for the nature and the dignity of
+* This essay was caused by the so-called controversy after the publication
+of Eichmann in Jerusalem. Its aim is to clarify two different, though interconnected, issues of which I had not been aware before and whose importance seemed to transcend the occasion. The first concerns the question
+of whether it is always legitimate to tell the truth—did I believe without
+qualification in "Fias veritas, el pereas mundus"? The second arose through
+the amazing amount of lies used in the "controversy"-lies about what I
+had written, on one hand, and about the tacts i had reported, on the other.
+The following reflections try lo come to grips with both issues. They may
+also serve as an example of what happens to a highly topical subject when
+it is drawn into that gap between past and future which is perhaps the propel
+nabitat of all reflections. The reader will find a brief and preliminary con
+sideration of this gap in the Preface.
+227
+
+228
+truth and truthfulness, on the other? Is it of the very essence of
+truth to be impotent and of the very essence of power to be deceitful? And what kind of reality does truth possess if it is powerless
+in the public realm, which more than any other sphere of human
+life guarantees reality of existence to natal and mortal men-that
+is, to beings who know they have appeared out of non-being and
+will, after a short while, again disappear into it? Finally, is not impotent truth just as despicable as power that gives no heed to truth?
+These are uncomfortable questions, but they arise necessarily out
+of our current convictions in this matter.
+What lends this commonplace its high plausibility can still be
+summed up in the old Latin adage "Fiat iustitia, et pereat mundus"
+("Let justice be done though the world may perish"). Apart from
+its probable author in the sixteenth century (Ferdinand I, successor
+to Charles V), no one has used it except as a rhetorical question:
+Should justice be done if the world's survival is at stake? And the
+only great thinker who dared to go against the grain of the question was Immanuel Kant, who boldly explained that the "proverbial saying . . . means in simple language: Justice shall prevail,
+even though all the rascals in the world should perish as a result.' "
+Since men would not find it worth while to live in a world utterly
+deprived of justice, this "human right must be held sacred, regardless of how much sacrifice is required of the powers that be ...
+regardless of what might be the physical consequences thereof." 1
+But isn't this answer absurd? Doesn't the care for existence clearly
+precede everything elseevery virtue and every principle? Is it not
+obvious that they become mere chimeras if the world, where alone
+they can be manifested, is in jeopardy? Wasn't the seventeenth
+century right when it almost unanimously declared that every commonwealth was duty bound to recognize, in Spinoza's words, "no
+higher law than the safety of [its] own realm"? 2 For surely every
+principle that transcends sheer existence can be put in the place of
+justice, and if we put truth in its place-"Fiat veritas, et pereat
+mundus"—the old saying sounds even more plausible. If we understand political action in terms of the means-end category, we may
+
+229
+even come to the only seemingly paradoxical conclusion that lying
+can very well serve to establish or safeguard the conditions for the
+search after truth—as Hobbes, whose relentless logic never fails to
+carry arguments to those extremes where their absurdity becomes
+obvious, pointed out long ago." And lies, since they are often used
+as substitutes for more violent means, are apt to be considered
+relatively harmless tools in the arsenal of political action.
+Reconsidering the old Latin saying, it will therefore come as
+something of a surprise that the sacrifice of truth for the survival
+of the world would be more futile than the sacrifice of any other
+principle or virtue. For while we may refuse even to ask ourselves
+whether life would still be worth living in a world deprived of such
+notions as justice and freedom, the same, curiously, is not possible
+with respect to the seemingly so much less political idea of truth.
+What is at stake is survival, the perseverance in existence (in suo
+esse perseverare), and no human world destined to outlast the
+short life span of mortals within it will ever be able to survive without men willing to do what Herodotus was the first to undertake
+consciously—namely, Néyew ra eóvra, to say what is. No permanence, no perseverance in existence, can even be conceived of
+without men willing to testify to what is and appears to them because it is.
+The story of the conflict between truth and politics is an old and
+complicated one, and nothing would be gained by simplification
+or moral denunciation. Throughout history, the truth-seekers and
+truthtellers have been aware of the risks of their business; as long
+as they did not interfere with the course of the world, they were
+covered with ridicule, but he who forced his fellow-citizens to take
+him seriously by trying to set them free from falsehood and illusion
+was in danger of his life: "If they could lay hands on [such a] man
+•.. they would kill him," Plato says in the last sentence of the
+cave allegory. The Platonic conflict between truthteller and citizens
+cannot be explained by the Latin adage, or any of the later theories
+that, implicitly or explicitly, justify lying, among other transgressions, if the survival of the city is at stake. No enemy is mentioned
+
+230
+Bern'een Past and Future
+in Plato's story; the many live peacefully in their cave among
+themselves, mere spectators of images, involved in no action and
+hence threatened by nobody. The members of this community have
+no reason whatever to regard truth and truthtellers as their worst
+enemies, and Plato offers no explanation of their perverse love of
+deception and falsehood. If we could confront him with one of his
+later colleagues in political philosophy—namely, with Hobbes, who
+held that only "such truth, as opposeth no man's profit, nor pleasure, is to all men welcome" (an obvious statement, which, however,
+he thought important enough to end his Leviathan with) —he might
+agree about profit and pleasure but not with the assertion that there
+existed any kind of truth welcome to all men. Hobbes, but not
+Plato, consoled himself with the existence of indifferent truth, with
+"subjects" about which "men care not"—e.g., with mathematical
+truth, "the doctrine of lines and figures" that "crosses no man's ambition, profit or lust." For, Hobbes wrote, "I doubt not, but if it
+had been a thing contrary to any man's right of dominion, or to the
+interest of men that have dominion, that the three angles of a
+triangle should be equal to two angles of a square; that doctrine
+should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books
+of geometry, suppressed, as far as he whom it concerned was
+able." 4
+No doubt, there is a decisive difference between Hobbes' mathematical axiom and the true standard for human conduct that
+Plato's philosopher is supposed to bring back from his journey
+into the sky of ideas, although Plato, who believed that mathematical truth opened the eyes of the mind to all truths, was not
+aware of it. Hobbes' example strikes us as relatively harmless; we
+are inclined to assume that the human mind will always be able to
+reproduce such axiomatic statements as "the three angles of a
+triangle should be equal to two angles of a square," and we conclude that "the burning of all books of geometry" would not be
+radically effective. The danger would be considerably greater with
+respect to scientific statements; had history taken a different turn,
+the whole modern scientific development from Galileo to Einstein
+might not have come to pass. And certainly the most vulnerable
+
+231
+truth of this kind would be those highly differentiated and always
+unique thought trains—of which Plato's doctrine of ideas is an
+eminent example-whereby men, since time immemorial, have
+tried to think rationally beyond the limits of human knowledge.
+The modern age, which believes that truth is neither given to
+nor disclosed to but produced by the human mind, has assigned,
+since Leibniz, mathematical, scientific, and philosophical truths to
+the common species of rational truth as distinguished from factual
+truth. I shall use this distinction for the sake of convenience without
+discussing its intrinsic legitimacy. Wanting to find out what injury
+political power is capable of inflicting upon truth, we look into
+these matters for political rather than philosophical reasons, and
+hence can afford to disregard the question of what truth is, and be
+content to take the word in the sense in which men commonly
+understand it. And if we now think of factual truths-of such
+modest verities as the role during the Russian Revolution of a man
+by the name of Trotsky, who appears in none of the Soviet Russian
+history books—we at once become aware of how much more vulnerable they are than all the kinds of rational truth taken together.
+Moreover, since facts and events—the invariable outcome of men
+living and acting together-constitute the very texture of the political realm, it is, of course, factual truth that we are most concerned with here. Dominion (to speak Hobbes' language) when
+it attacks rational truth oversteps, as it were, its domain, while it
+gives battle on its own ground when it falsifies or lies away facts.
+The chances of factual truth surviving the onslaught of power
+are very slim indeed; it is always in danger of being maneuvered
+out of the world not only for a time but, potentially, forever. Facts
+and events are infinitely more fragile things than axioms, discoveries, theories—even the most wildly speculative ones—produced
+by the human mind; they occur in the field of the ever-changing
+affairs of men, in whose flux there is nothing more permanent than
+the admittedly relative permanence of the human mind's structure.
+Once they are lost, no rational efiort will ever bring them back.
+Perhaps the chances that Euclidean mathematics or Einstein's theory of relativity-let alone Plato's philosophy-would have been
+
+232
+reproduced in time if their authors had been prevented from handing them down to posterity are not very good either, yet they are
+infinitely better than the chances that a fact of importance, forgotten or, more likely, lied away, will one day be rediscovered.
+Although the politically most relevant truths are factual, the conflict between truth and politics was first discovered and articulated
+with respect to rational truth. The opposite of a rationally true
+statement is either error and ignorance, as in the sciences, or illusion and opinion, as in philosophy. Deliberate falsehood, the plain
+lie, plays its role only in the domain of factual statements, and it
+seems significant, and rather odd, that in the long debate about this
+antagonism of truth and politics, from Plato to Hobbes, no one,
+apparently, ever believed that organized lying, as we know it today,
+could be an adequate weapon against truth. In Plato, the truthteller is in danger of his life, and in Hobbes, where he has become
+an author, he is threatened with the burning of his books; mere
+mendacity is not an issue. It is the sophist and the ignoramus rather
+than the liar who occupy Plato's thought, and where he distinguishes between error and lie—that is, between "involuntary and
+voluntary feudos" —he is, characteristically, much harsher on people
+"wallowing in swinish ignorance" than on liars." Is this because organized lying, dominating the public realm, as distinguished from
+the private liar who tries his luck on his own hook, was still unknown? Or has this something to do with the striking fact that,
+except for Zoroastrianism, none of the major religions included
+lying as such, as distinguished from "bearing false witness," in their
+catalogues of grave sins? Only with the rise of Puritan morality,
+coinciding with the rise of organized science, whose progress had
+to be assured on the firm ground of the absolute veracity and reliability of every scientist, were lies considered serious offenses.
+However that may be, historically the conflict between truth and
+politics arose out of two diametrically opposed ways of life-the
+
+233
+life of the philosopher, as interpreted first by Parmenides and then
+by Plato, and the way of life of the citizen. To the citizens' everchanging opinions about human affairs, which themselves were in
+a state of constant flux, the philosopher opposed the truth about
+those things which in their very nature were everlasting and from
+which, therefore, principles could be derived to stabilize human
+affairs. Hence the opposite to truth was mere opinion, which was
+equated with illusion, and it was this degrading of opinion that
+gave the conflict its political poignancy; for opinion, and not truth,
+belongs among the indispensable prerequisites of all power. "All
+governments rest on opinion," James Madison said, and not even
+the most autocratic ruler or tyrant could ever rise to power, let
+alone keep it, without the support of those who are like-minded. By
+the same token, every claim in the sphere of human affairs to an
+absolute truth, whose validity needs no support from the side of
+opinion, strikes at the very roots of all politics and all governments.
+This antagonism between truth and opinion was further elaborated
+by Plato (especially in the Gorgias) as the antagonism between
+communicating in the form of "dialogue," which is the adequate
+speech for philosophical truth, and in the form of "rhetoric," by
+which the demagogue, as we would say today, persuades the multitude.
+Traces of this original conflict can still be found in the earlier
+stages of the modern age, though hardly in the world we live in.
+In Hobbes, for instance, we still read of an opposition of two "contrary faculties": "solid reasoning" and "powerful eloquence," the
+former being "grounded upon principles of truth, the other upon
+opinions ... and the passions and interests of men, which are
+different and mutable." • More than a century later, in the Age of
+Enlightenment, these traces have alniost but not quite disappeared,
+and where the ancient antagonism still survives, the emphasis has
+shifted. In terms of pre-modern philosophy, Lessing's magnificent
+"Sage jeder, was ihm Wahrheit dünkt, und die Wahrheit selbst sei
+Gott empfohlen" ("Let each man say what he deems truth, and
+let truth itself be commended unto God") would have plainly
+signified, Man is not capable of truth, all his truths, alas, are
+
+234
+Beleen Past and Future
+óțal, mere opinions, whereas for Lessing it meant, on the contrary, Let us thank God that we don't know the truth. Even where
+the note of jubilation-the insight that for men, living in company,
+the inexhaustible richness of human discourse is infinitely more significant and meaningful than any One Truth could ever be-is
+absent, the awareness of the frailty of human reason has prevailed
+since the eighteenth century without giving rise to complaint or
+lamentation. We can find it in Kant's grandiose Critique of Pure
+Reason, in which reason is led to recognize its own limitations, as
+we hear it in the words of Madison, who more than once stressed
+that "the reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious
+when left alone, and acquires firmness and confidence in proportion to the number with which it is associated." " Considerations of
+this kind, much more than notions about the individual's right to
+self-expression, played a decisive part in the finally more or less
+successful struggle to obtain freedom of thought for the spoken and
+the printed word.
+Thus Spinoza, who still believed in the infallibility of human
+reason and is often wrongly praised as a champion of free thought
+and speech, held that "every man is by indefeasible natural right
+the master of his own thoughts," that "every man's understanding
+is his own, and that brains are as diverse as palates," from which
+he concluded that "it is best to grant what cannot be abolished"
+and that laws prohibiting free thought can only result in "men
+thinking one thing and saying another," hence in "the corruption
+of good faith" and "the fostering of ... perfidy." However,
+Spinoza nowhere demands freedom of speech, and the argument
+that human reason needs communication with others and therefore
+publicity for its own sake is conspicuous by its absence. He even
+counts man's need for communication, his inability to hide his
+thoughts and keep silent, among the "common failings" that the
+philosopher does not share.® Kant, on the contrary, stated that "the
+external power that deprives man of the freedom to communicate
+his thoughts pubiicly, deprives him at the same time of his freedom
+to think" (italics added), and that the only guarantee for "the correctness" of our thinking lies in that "we think, as it were, in com-
+
+235
+munity with others to whom we communicate our thoughts as they
+communicate theirs to us." Man's reason, being fallible, can function only if he can make "public use" of it, and this is equally true
+for those who, still in a state of "tutelage," are unable to use their
+minds "without the guidance of somebody else" and for the
+"scholar," who needs "the entire reading public" to examine and
+control his results.°
+In this context, the question of numbers, mentioned by Madison,
+is of special importance. The shift from rational truth to opinion
+implies a shift from man in the singular to men in the plural, and
+this means a shift from a domain where, Madison says, nothing
+counts except the "solid reasoning" of one mind to a realm where
+"strength of opinion" is determined by the individual's reliance
+upon "the number which he supposes to have entertained the same
+opinions"—a number, incidentally, that is not necessarily limited to
+one's contemporaries. Madison still distinguishes this life in the
+plural, which is the life of the citizen, from the life of the philosopher, by whom such considerations "ought to be disregarded," but
+this distinction has no practical consequence, for "a nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of
+kings wished for by Plato." 10 We may note in passing that the very
+notion of "a nation of philosophers" would have been a contradiction in terms for Plato, whose whole political philosophy, including
+its outspoken tyrannical traits, rests on the conviction that truth
+can be neither gained nor communicated among the many.
+In the world we live in, the last traces of this ancient antagonism
+between the philosopher's truth and the opinions in the market
+place have disappeared. Neither the truth of revealed religion,
+which the political thinkers of the seventeenth century still treated
+as a major nuisance, nor the truth of the philosopher, disclosed to
+man in solitude, interferes any longer with the affairs of the world.
+In respect to the former, the separation of church and state has
+given us peace, and as to the latter, it ceased long ago to claim
+dominion—unless one takes the modern ideologies seriously as philosophies, which is difficult indeed since their adherents openly
+proclaim them to be political weapons and consider the whole
+
+236
+question of truth and truthfulness irrelevant. Thinking in terns of
+the tradition, one may feel entitled to conclude from this state of
+affairs that the old conflict has finally been settled, and especially
+that its original cause, the clash of rational truth and opinion, has
+disappeared.
+Strangely, however, this is not the case, for the clash of factual
+truth and politics, which we witness today on such a large scale,
+has—in some respects, at least—very similar traits. While probably
+no former time tolerated so many diverse opinions on religious or
+philosophical matters, factual truth, if it happens to oppose a given
+group's profit or pleasure, is greeted today with greater hostility
+than ever before. To be sure, state secrets have always existed;
+every government must classify certain information, withhold it
+from public notice, and he who reveals authentic secrets has always
+been treated as a traitor. With this I am not concerned here. The
+facts I have in mind are publicly known, and yet the same public
+that knows them can successfully, and often spontaneously, taboo
+their public discussion and treat them as though they were what
+they are not—namely, secrets. That their assertion then should
+prove as dangerous as, for instance, preaching atheism or some
+other heresy proved in former times seems a curious phenomenon,
+and its significance is enhanced when we find it also in countries
+that are ruled tyrannically by an ideological government. (Even in
+Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia it was more dangerous to talk
+about concentration and extermination camps, whose existence was
+no secret, than to hold and to utter "heretical" views on anti-Semitism, racism, and Communism.) What seems even more disturbing
+is that to the extent to which unwelcome factual truths are tolerated
+in free countries they are often, consciously or unconsciously, transformed into opinions—as though the fact of Germany's support of
+Hitler or of France's collapse before the German armies in 1940
+or of Vatican policies during the Second World War were not a
+matter of historical record but a matter of opinion. Since such factual truths concern issues of immediate political relevance, there is
+more at stake here than the perhaps inevitable tension between
+two ways of life within the framework of a common and commonly
+
+237
+recognized reality. What is at stake here is this common and factual
+reality itself, and this is indeed a political problem of the first order.
+And since factual truth, though it is so much less open to argument
+than philosophical truth, and so obviously within the grasp of everybody, seems often to suffer a similar fate when it is exposed in the
+market place—namely, to be countered not by lies and deliberate
+falsehoods but by opinion—it may be worth while to reopen the old
+and apparently obsolete question of truth versus opinion.
+For, seen from the viewpoint of the truthteller, the tendency to
+transform fact into opinion, to blur the dividing line between them,
+is no less perplexing than the truthteller's older predicament, so
+vividly expressed in the cave allegory, in which the philosopher,
+upon his return from his solitary journey to the sky of everlasting
+ideas, tries to communicate his truth to the multitude, with the
+result that it disappears in the diversity of views, which to him are
+illusions, and is brought down to the uncertain level of opinion, so
+that now, back in the cave, truth itself appears in the guise of the
+бокєї но ("'it seems to me") —the very sógar he had hoped to leave
+behind once and for all. However, the reporter of factual truth is
+even worse ofi. He does not return from any journey into regions
+beyond the realm of human affairs, and he cannot console himself
+with the thought that he has become a stranger in this world. Similarly, we have no right to console ourselves with the notion that
+his truth, if truth it should be, is not of this world. If his simple
+factual statements are not accepted—truths seen and witnessed with
+the eyes of the body, and not the eyes of the mind—the suspicion
+arises that it may be in the nature of the political realm to deny or
+pervert truth of every kind, as though men were unable to come
+to terms with its unyielding, blatant, unpersuasive stubbornness.
+If this should be the case, things would look even more desperate
+than Plato assumed, for Plato's truth, found and actualized in solitude, transcends, by definition, the realm of the many, the world
+of human affairs. (One can understand that the philosopher, in his
+isolation, yields to the temptation to use his truth as a standard to
+be imposed upon human affairs; that is, to equate the transcendence
+inherent in philosophical truth with the altogether different kind
+
+238
+of "transcendence" by which yardsticks and other standards of
+measurement are separated from the multitude of objects they are
+to measure, and one can equally well understand that the multitude
+will resist this standard, since it is actually derived from a sphere
+that is foreign to the realm of human affairs and whose connection
+with it can be justified only by a confusion.) Philosophical truth,
+when it enters the market place, changes its nature and becomes
+opinion, because a veritable peráßaos eis ällo yévos, a shifting not
+merely from one kind of reasoning to another but from one way of
+human existence to another, has taken place.
+Factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people:
+it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved;
+it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs
+in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature. Facts and opinions, though they rust be kept apart, are not antagonistic to each
+other; they belong to the same realm. Facts inform opinions, and
+opinions, inspired by different interests and passions, can differ
+widely and still be legitimate as long as they respect factual truth.
+Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed and the facts themselves are not in dispute. In other words,
+factual truth informs political thought just as rational truth informs
+philosophical speculation.
+But do facts, independent of opinion and interpretation, exist at
+all? Have not generations of historians and philosophers of history
+demonstrated the impossibility of ascertaining facts without interpretation, since they must first be picked out of a chaos of sheer
+happenings (and the principles of choice are surely not factual
+data) and then be fitted into a story that can be told only in a
+certain perspective, which has nothing to do with the original occurrence? No doubt these and a great many more perplexities inherent in the historical sciences are real, but they are no argument
+against the existence of factual matter, nor can they serve as a justification for blurring the dividing lines between fact, opinion, and
+interpretation, or as an excuse for the historian to manipulate facts
+as he pleases. Even if we admit that every generation has the right
+
+239
+to write its own history, we admit no more than that it has the
+right to rearrange the facts in accordance with its own perspective;
+we don't admit the right to touch the factual matter itself. To illustrate this point, and as an excuse for not pursuing this issue any
+further: During the twenties, so a story goes, Clemenceau, shortly
+before his death, found himself engaged in a friendly talk with a
+representative of the Weimar Republic on the question of guilt for
+the outbreak of the First World War. "What, in your opinion," Clemenceau was asked, "will future historians think of this troublesome
+and controversial issue?" He replied, "This I don't know. But I
+know for certain that they will not say Belgium invaded Germany."
+We are concerned here with brutally elementary data of this kind,
+whose indestructibility has been taken for granted even by the most
+extreme and most sophisticated believers in historicism.
+It is true, considerably more than the whims of historians would
+be needed to eliminate from the record the fact that on the night
+of August 4, 1914, German troops crossed the frontier of Belgium;
+it would require no less than a power monopoly over the entire
+civilized world. But such a power monopoly is far from being inconceivable, and it is not difficult to imagine what the fate of factual truth would be if power interests, national or social, had the
+last say in these matters. Which brings us back to our suspicion
+that it may be in the nature of the political realm to be at war with
+truth in all its forms, and hence to the question of why a commitment even to factual truth is felt to be an anti-political attitude.
+When I said that factual, as opposed to rational, truth is not antagonistic to opinion, 1 stated a half-truth. All truths—not only the
+various kinds of rational truth but also factual truth—are opposed
+to opinion in their mode of asserting validity. Truth carries within
+itself an element of coercion, and the frequently tyrannical tendencies so deplorably obvious among professional truthtellers may be
+caused less by a failing of character than by the strain of habitually
+
+240
+living under a kind of compulsion. Statements such as "The three
+angles of a triangle are equal to two angles of a square," "The earth
+moves around the sun," "It is better to suffer wrong than to do
+wrong," "In August 1914 Germany invaded Belgium" are very
+different in the way they are arrived at, but, once perceived as true
+and pronounced to be so, they have in common that they are beyond agreement, dispute, opinion, or consent. For those who accept
+them, they are not changed by the numbers or lack of numbers
+who entertain the same proposition; persuasion or dissuasion is useless, for the content of the statement is not of a persuasive nature
+but of a coercive one. (Thus Plato, in the Timaeus, draws a line
+between men capable of perceiving the truth and those who happen to hold right opinions. In the former, the organ for the perception of truth [ voûs ] is awakened through instruction, which of
+course implies inequality and can be said to be a mild form of
+coercion, whereas the latter had merely been persuaded. The views
+of the former, says Plato, are immovable, while the latter can always be persuaded to change their minds.') What Mercier de la
+Rivière once remarked about mathematical truth applies to all
+kinds of truth: "Euclide est un véritable despote; et les vérités
+géométriques qu'il nous a transmises, sont des lois véritablement
+despotiques." In much the same vein, Grotius, about a hundred
+years earlier, had insisted—when he wished to limit the power of
+the absolute prince—that "even God cannot cause two times two
+not to make four." He was invoking the compelling force of truth
+against political power; he was not interested in the implied limitation of divine omnipotence. These two remarks illustrate how truth
+looks in the purely political perspective, from the viewpoint of
+power, and the question is whether power could and should be
+checked not only by a constitution, a bill of rights, and by a multiplicity of powers, as in the system of checks and balances, in
+which, in Montesquieu's words, "le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir"—
+that is, by factors that arise out of and belong to the political realm
+proper-but by something that arises from without, has its source
+outside the political realm, and is as independent of the wishes and
+desires of the citizens as is the will of the worst tyrant.
+
+2.41
+Seen from the viewpoint of politics, truth has a despotic character. It is therefore hated by tyrants, who rightly fear the competition of a coercive force they cannot monopolize, and it enjoys
+a rather precarious status in the eyes of governments that rest on
+consent and abhor coercion. Facts are beyond agreement and consent, and all talk about them—all exchanges of opinion based on
+correct information—will contribute nothing to their establishment.
+Unwelcome opinion can be argued with, rejected, or compromised
+upon, but unwelcome facts possess an infuriating stubbornness that
+nothing can move except plain lies. The trouble is that factual
+truth, like all other truth, peremptorily claims to be acknowledged
+and precludes debate, and debate constitutes the very essence of
+political life. The modes of thought and communication that deal
+with truth, if seen from the political perspective, are necessarily
+domineering; they don't take into account other people's opinions,
+and taking these into account is the hallmark of all strictly political
+thinking.
+Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to
+my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt
+the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence
+look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question
+neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being
+and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The
+more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am
+pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would
+feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my
+capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my final
+conclusions, my opinion. (It is this capacity for an "enlarged mentality" that enables men to judge; as such, it was discovered by
+Kant in the first part of his Critique of Judgment, though he did
+not recognize the political and moral implications of his discovery.)
+The very process of opinion formation is determined by those in
+whose places somebody thinks and uses his own mind, and the
+
+242
+only condition for this exertion of the imagination is disinterestedness, the liberation from one's own private interests. Hence, even
+if I shun all company or am completely isolated while forming an
+opinion, I am not simply together only with myself in the solitude
+of philosophical thought; I remain in this world of universal interdependence, where 1 can make myself the representative of everybody else. Of course, I can refuse to do this and form an opinion
+that takes only my own interests, or the interests of the group to
+which I belong, into account; nothing, indeed, is more common,
+even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy
+that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge.
+But the very quality of an opinion, as of a judgment, depends upon
+the degree of its impartiality.
+No opinion is self-evident. In matters of opinion, but not in
+matters of truth, our thinking is truly discursive, running, as it
+were, from place to place, from one part of the world to another,
+through all kinds of conflicting views, until it finally ascends from
+these particularities to some impartial generality. Compared to this
+process, in which a particular issue is forced into the open that it
+may show itself from all sides, in every possible perspective, until
+it is flooded and made transparent by the full light of human comprehension, a statement of truth possesses a peculiar opaqueness.
+Rational truth enlightens human understanding, and factual truth
+must inform opinions, but these truths, though they are never obscure, are not transparent either, and it is in their very nature to
+withstand further elucidation, as it is in the nature of light to withstand enlightenment.
+Nowhere, moreover, is this opacity more patent and more irritating than where we are confronted with facts and factual truth,
+for facts have no conclusive reason whatever for being what they
+are; they could always have been otherwise, and this annoying contingency is literally unlimited. It is because of the haphazardness
+of facts that pre-modern philosophy refused to take seriously the
+realm of human affairs, which is permeated by factuality, or to
+believe that any meaningful truth could ever be discovered in the
+"melancholy haphazardness" (Kant) of a sequence of events
+
+243
+which constitutes the course of this world. Nor has any modern
+philosophy of history been able to make its peace with the intractable, unreasonable stubbornness of sheer factuality; modern
+philosophers have conjured up all kinds of necessity, from the dialectical necessity of a world spirit or of material conditions to the
+necessities of an allegedly unchangeable and known human nature,
+in order to cleanse the last vestiges of that apparently arbitrary "it
+might have been otherwise" (which is the price of freedom) from
+the only realm where men are truly free. It is true that in retrospect-that is, in historical perspective-every sequence of events
+looks as though it could not have happened otherwise, but this is
+an optical, or, rather, an existential, illusion: nothing could ever
+happen if reality did not kill, by definition, all the other potentialities originally inherent in any given situation.
+In other words, factual truth is no more self-evident than opinion, and this may be among the reasons that opinion-holders find
+it relatively easy to discredit factual truth as just another opinion.
+Factual evidence, moreover, is established through testimony by
+eyewitnesses—notoriously unreliable-and by records, documents,
+and monuments, all of which can be suspected as forgeries. In the
+event of a dispute, only other witnesses but no third and higher
+instance can be invoked, and settlement is usually arrived at by
+way of a majority; that is, in the same way as the settlement of
+opinion disputes—a wholly unsatisfactory procedure, since there is
+nothing to prevent a majority of witnesses from being false witnesses. On the contrary, under certain circumstances the feeling of
+belonging to a majority may even encourage false testimony. In
+other words, to the extent that factual truth is exposed to the hostility of opinion-holders, it is at least as vulnerable as rational philosophical truth.
+I observed before that in some respects the teller of factual truth
+is worse off than Plato's philosopher-that his truth has no transcendent origin and possesses not even the relatively transcendent
+qualities of such political principles as freedom, justice, honor, and
+courage, all of which may inspire, and then become manifest in,
+human action. We shall now see that this disadvantage has more
+
+244
+serious consequences than we had thought; namely, consequences
+that concern not only the person of the truthteller but-more important—the chances for his truth to survive. Inspiration of and
+manifestation in human action may not be able to compete with
+the compelling evidence of truth, but they can compete, as we shall
+see, with the persuasiveness inherent in opinion. I took the Socratic
+proposition "It is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong" as an
+example of a philosophical statement that concerns human conduct,
+and hence has political implications. My reason was partly that this
+sentence has become the beginning of Western ethical thought,
+and partly that, as far as I know, it has remained the only ethical
+proposition that can be derived directly from the specifically philosophical experience. (Kant's categorical imperative, the only
+competitor in the field, could be stripped of its Judaeo-Christian
+ingredients, which account for its formulation as an imperative instead of a simple proposition. Its underlying principle is the axiom
+of non-contradiction—the thief contradicts himself because he
+wants to keep the stolen goods as his property-and this axiom
+owes its validity to the conditions of thought that Socrates was the
+first to discover.)
+The Platonic dialogues tell us time and again how paradoxical
+the Socratic statement (a proposition, and not an imperative)
+sounded, how easily it stood refuted in the market place where
+opinion stands against opinion, and how incapable Socrates was
+of proving and demonstrating it to the satisfaction not of his adversaries alone but also of his friends and disciples. (The most
+dramatic of these passages can be found in the beginning of the
+Republic.12 Socrates, having tried in vain to convince his adversary Thrasymachus that justice is better than injustice, is told by
+his disciples, Glaukon and Adeimantus, that his proof was far from
+convincing. Socrates admires their speeches: "There must indeed
+be some divine quality in your nature, if you can plead the cause of
+injustice so eloquently and still not be convinced yourselves that
+it is better than justice." In other words, they were convinced before the argument started, and all that was said to uphold the
+truth of the proposition not only failed to persuade the non-
+
+245
+convinced but had not even the force to confirm their convictions.)
+Everything that can be said in its defense we find in the various
+Platonic dialogues. The chief argument states that for man, being
+one, it is better to be at odds with the whole world than to be at
+odds with and contradicted by himself 13—an argument that is
+compelling indeed for the philosopher, whose thinking is characterized by Plato as a silent dialogue with himself, and whose existence therefore depends upon a constantly articulated intercourse
+with himself, a splitting-into-two of the one he nevertheless is; for
+a basic contradiction between the two partners who carry on the
+thinking dialogue would destroy the very conditions of philosophizing.'* In other words, since man contains within himself a partner
+from whom he can never win release, he will be better off not to
+live in company with a murderer or a liar. Or, since thought is the
+silent dialogue carried on between me and myself, I must be careful to keep the integrity of this partner intact; for otherwise I shall
+surely lose the capacity for thought altogether.
+To the philosopher—or, rather, to man insofar as he is a thinking being-this ethical proposition about doing and suffering wrong
+is no less compelling than mathematical truth. But to man insofar
+as he is a citizen, an acting being concerned with the world and the
+public welfare rather than with his own well-being-including, for
+instance, his "immortal soul" whose "health" should have precedence over the needs of a perishable body—the Socratic statement
+is not true at all. The disastrous consequences for any community
+that began in all earnest to follow ethical precepts derived from
+man in the singular—be they Socratic or Platonic or Christian—
+have been frequently pointed out. Long before Machiavelli recommended protecting the political realm against the undiluted principles of the Christian faith (those who refuse to resist evil permit
+the wicked "to do as much evil as they please"), Aristotle warned
+against giving philosophers any say in political matters. (Men who
+for professional reasons must be so unconcerned with "what is good
+for themselves" cannot very well be trusted with what is good for
+others, and least of all with the "common good," the down-to-earth
+interests of the community.) "
+
+246
+Since philosophical truth concerns man in his singularity, it is
+unpolitical by nature. If the philosopher nevertheless wishes his
+truth to prevail over the opinions of the multitude, he will suffer
+defeat, and he is likely to conclude from this defeat that truth is
+impotent—a truism that is just as meaningful as if the mathematician, unable to square the circle, should deplore the fact that a
+circle is not a square. He may then be tempted, like Plato, to win
+the ear of some philosophically inclined tyrant, and in the fortunately highly unlikely case of success he might erect one of those
+tyrannies of "truth" which we know chiefly from the various political utopias, and which, of course, politically speaking, are as tyrannical as other forms of despotism. In the slightly less unlikely event
+that his truth should prevail without the help of violence, simply
+because men happen to concur in it, he would have won a Pyrrhic
+victory. For truth would then owe its prevalence not to its own
+compelling quality but to the agreement of the many, who might
+change their minds tomorrow and agree on something else; what
+had been philosophical truth would have become mere opinion.
+Since, however, philosophical truth carries within itself an element of coercion, it may tempt the statesman under certain conditions, no less than the power of opinion may tempt the philosopher.
+Thus, in the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson declared certain "truths to be self-evident," because he wished to put the basic
+consent among the men of the Revolution beyond dispute and argument; like mathematical axioms, they should express "beliefs of
+men" that "depend not on their own will, but follow involuntarily
+the evidence proposed to their minds." 16 Yet by saying "We hold
+these truths to be self-evident," he conceded, albeit without becoming aware of it, that the statement "All men are created equal"
+is not self-evident but stands in need of agreement and consent—
+that equality, if it is to be politically relevant, is a matter of opinion, and not "the truth." There exist, on the other hand, philosophical or religious statements that correspond to this opinion—
+such as that all men are equal before God, or before death, or
+insofar as they all belong to the same species of animal rationalebut none of them was ever of any political or practical conse-
+
+247
+quence, because the equalizer, whether God, or death, or nature,
+transcended and remained outside the realm in which human intercourse takes place. Such "truths" are not between men but above
+them, and nothing of the sort lies behind the modern or the ancient
+—especially the Greek-consent to equality. That all men are
+created equal is not self-evident nor can it be proved. We hold this
+opinion because freedom is possible only among equals, and we
+believe that the joys and gratifications of free company are to be
+preferred to the doubtful pleasures of holding dominion. Such
+preferences are politically of the greatest importance, and there are
+few things by which men are so profoundly distinguished from each
+other as by these. Their human quality, one is tempted to say, and
+certainly the quality of every kind of intercourse with them, depends
+upon such choices. Still, these are matters of opinion and not of
+truth—as Jefferson, much against his will, admitted. Their validity
+depends upon free agreement and consent; they are arrived at by
+discursive, representative thinking; and they are communicated by
+means of persuasion and dissuasion.
+The Socratic proposition "It is better to suffer wrong than to do
+wrong" is not an opinion but claims to be truth, and though one
+may doubt that it ever had a direct political consequence, its
+impact upon practical conduct as an ethical precept is undeniable;
+only religious commandments, which are absolutely binding for the
+community of believers, can claim greater recognition. Does this
+fact not stand in clear contradiction to the generally accepted impotence of philosophical truth? And since we know from the Platonic dialogues how unpersuasive Socrates' statement remained for
+friend and foe alike whenever he tried to prove it, we must ask
+ourselves how it could ever have obtained its high degree of validity.
+Obviously, this has been due to a rather unusual kind of persuasion;
+Socrates decided to stake his life on this truth—to set an example,
+not when he appeared before the Athenian tribunal but when he
+refused to escape the death sentence. And this teaching by example
+is, indeed, the only form of "persuasion" that philosophical truth
+is capable of without perversion or distortion;1 by the same token,
+philosophical truth can become "practical" and inspire action
+
+248
+without violating the rules of the political realm only when it
+manages to become manifest in the guise of an example. This is
+the only chance for an ethical principle to be verified as well as
+validated. Thus, to verify, for instance, the notion of courage we
+may recall the example of Achilles, and to verify the notion of
+goodness we are inclined to think of Jesus of Nazareth or of St.
+Francis; these examples teach or persuade by inspiration, so that
+whenever we try to perform a deed of courage or of goodness it is
+as though we imitated someone else—the imitatio Christi, or
+whatever the case may be. It has often been remarked that, as
+Jefferson said, "a lively and lasting sense of filial duty is more
+effectually impressed on the mind of a son or daughter by reading
+King Lear than by all the dry volumes of ethics and divinity that
+ever were written," 18 and that, as Kant said, "general precepts
+learned at the feet either of priests or philosophers, or even drawn
+from one's own resources, are never so efficacious as an example
+of virtue or holiness." 18 The reason, as Kant explains, is that we
+always need "intuitions... to verify the reality of our concepts."
+"If they are pure concepts of the understanding," such as the concept of the triangle, "the intuitions go by the name of schemata,"
+such as the ideal triangle, perceived only by the eyes of the mind
+and yet indispensable to the recognition of all real triangles; if,
+however, the concepts are practical, relating to conduct, "the
+intuitions are called examples." 20 And, unlike the schemata, which
+our mind produces of its own accord by means of the imagination, these examples derive from history and poetry, through which,
+as Jefferson pointed out, an altogether different "field of imagination
+is laid open to our use."
+This transformation of a theoretical or speculative statement into
+exemplary truth—a transformation of which only moral philosophy
+is capable-is a borderline experience for the philosopher: by
+setting an example and "persuading" the multitude in the only way
+open to him, he has begun to act. Today, when hardly any philosophical statement, no matter how daring, will be taken seriously
+enough to endanger the philosopher's life, even this rare chance of
+having a philosophical truth politically validated has disappeared.
+
+249
+In our context, however, it is important to notice that such a possibility does exist for the teller of rational truth; for it does not exist
+under any circumstances for the teller of factual truth, who in this
+respect, as in other respects, is worse ofi. Not only do factual statements contain no principles upon which men might act and which
+thus could become manifest in the world; their very content defies
+this kind of verification. A teller of factual truth, in the unlikely
+event that he wished to stake his life on a particular fact, would
+achieve a kind of miscarriage. What would become manifest in his
+act would be his courage or, perhaps, his stubbornness but neither
+the truth of what he had to say nor even his own truthfulness. For
+why shouldn't a liar stick to his lies with great courage, especially
+in politics, where he might be motivated by patriotism or some
+other kind of legitimate group partiality?
+IV
+The hallmark of factual truth is that its opposite is neither error
+nor illusion nor opinion, no one of which reflects upon personal
+truthfulness, but the deliberate falsehood, or lie. Error, of course,
+is possible, and even common, with respect to factual truth, in
+which case this kind of truth is in no way different from scientific
+or rational truth. But the point is that with respect to facts there
+exists another alternative, and this alternative, the deliberate falsehood, does not belong to the same species as propositions that,
+whether right or mistaken, intend no more than to say what is, or
+how something that is appears to me. A factual statement-Germany invaded Belgium in August 1914—acquires political implications only by being put in an interpretative context. But the opposite
+proposition, which Clemenceau, still unacquainted with the art of
+rewriting history, thought absurd, needs no context to be of political significance. It is clearly an attempt to change the record, and
+as such, it is a form of action. The same is true when the liar, lacking the power to make his falsehood stick, does not insist on the
+gospel truth of his statement but pretends that this is his "opinion,"
+
+250
+to which he claims his constitutional right. This is frequently done
+by subversive groups, and in a politically immature public the resulting confusion can be considerable. The blurring of the dividing
+line between factual truth and opinion belongs among the many
+forms that lying can assume, all of which are forms of action.
+While the liar is a man of action, the truthteller, whether he tells
+rational or factual truth, most emphatically is not. If the teller of
+factual truth wants to play a political role, and therefore to be
+persuasive, he will, more often than not, go to considerable lengths
+to explain why his particular truth serves the best interests of some
+group. And, just as the philosopher wins a Pyrrhic victory when his
+truth becomes a dominant opinion among opinion-holders, the
+teller of factual truth, when he enters the political realm and identifies himself with some partial interest and power formation, compromises on the only quality that could have made his truth appear plausible, namely, his personal truthfulness, guaranteed by
+impartiality, integrity, independence. There is hardly a political
+figure more likely to arouse justified suspicion than the professional
+truthteller who has discovered some happy coincidence between
+truth and interest. The liar, on the contrary, needs no such doubtful accommodation to appear on the political scene; he has the great
+advantage that he always is, so to speak, already in the midst of it.
+He is an actor by nature; he says what is not so because he wants
+things to be different from what they are-that is, he wants to
+change the world. He takes advantage of the undeniable affinity of
+our capacity for action, for changing reality, with this mysterious
+faculty of ours that enables us to say, "The sun is shining," when
+it is raining cats and dogs. If we were as thoroughly conditioned
+in our behavior as some philosophies have wished us to be, we
+would never be able to accomplish this little miracle. In other
+words, our ability to lie—but not necessarily our ability to tell the
+truth—belongs among the few obvious, demonstrable data that confirm human freedom. That we can change the circumstances under
+which we live at all is because we are relatively free from them,
+and it is this freedom that is abused and perverted through mendacity. If it is the well-nigh irresistible temptation of the profes-
+
+251
+sional historian to fall into the trap of necessity and implicitly deny
+freedom of action, it is the almost equally irresistible temptation of
+the professional politician to overestimate the possibilities of this
+freedom and implicitly condone the lying denial, or distortion of
+facts.
+To be sure, as far as action is concerned, organized lying is a
+marginal phenomenon, but the trouble is that its opposite, the
+mere telling of facts, leads to no action whatever; it even tends,
+under normal circumstances, toward the acceptance of things as
+they are. (This, of course, is not to deny that the disclosure of
+facts may be legitimately used by political organizations or that,
+under certain circumstances, factual matters brought to public attention will considerably encourage and strengthen the claims of
+ethnic and social groups.) Truthfulness has never been counted
+among the political virtues, because it has little indeed to contribute to that change of the world and of circumstances which is
+among the most legitimate political activities. Only where a community has embarked upon organized lying on principle, and not
+only with respect to particulars, can truthfulness as such, unsupported by the distorting forces of power and interest, become a
+political factor of the first order. Where everybody lies about everything of importance, the truthteller, whether he knows it or not,
+has begun to act; he, too, has engaged himself in political business,
+for, in the unlikely event that he survives, he has made a start
+toward changing the world.
+In this situation, however, he will again soon find himself at an
+annoying disadvantage. I mentioned earlier the contingent character of facts, which could always have been otherwise, and which
+therefore possess by themselves no trace of self-evidence or plausibility for the human mind. Since the liar is free to fashion his
+"facts" to fit the profit and pleasure, or even the mere expectations,
+of his audience, the chances are that he will be more persuasive
+than the truthteller. Indeed, he will usually have plausibility on
+his side; his exposition will sound more logical, as it were, since
+the element of unexpectedness—one of the outstanding characteristics of all events—has mercifully disappeared. It is not only ra-
+
+252
+tional truth that, in the Hegelian phrase, stands common sense on
+its head; reality quite frequently offends the soundness of commonsense reasoning no less than it ofiends profit and pleasure.
+We must now turn our attention to the relatively recent phenomenon of mass manipulation of fact and opinion as it has become
+evident in the rewriting of history, in image-making, and in actual
+government policy. The traditional political lie, so prominent in the
+history of diplomacy and statecraft, used to concern either true
+secrets—data that had never been made public—or intentions,
+which anyhow do not possess the same degree of reliability as accomplished facts; like everything that goes on merely inside ourselves, intentions are only potentialities, and what was intended to
+be a lie can always turn out to be true in the end. In contrast, the
+modern political lies deal efficiently with things that are not secrets
+at all but are known to practically everybody. This is obvious in
+the case of rewriting contemporary history under the eyes of those
+who witnessed it, but it is equally true in image-making of all sorts,
+in which, again, every known and established fact can be denied
+or neglected if it is likely to hurt the image; for an image, unlike
+an old-fashioned portrait, is supposed not to flatter reality but to
+offer a full-fledged substitute for it. And this substitute, because
+of modern techniques and the mass media, is, of course, much
+more in the public eye than the original ever was. We are finally
+confronted with highly respected statesmen who, like de Gaulle
+and Adenauer, have been able to build their basic policies on such
+evident non-facts as that France belongs among the victors of the
+last war and hence is one of the great powers, and "that the barbarism of National Socialism had affected only a relatively small
+percentage of the country." 21 All these lies, whether their authors
+know it or not, harbor an element of violence; organized lying
+always tends to destroy whatever it has decided to negate, although
+only totalitarian governments have consciously adopted lying as the
+first step to murder. When Trotsky learned that he had never
+played a role in the Russian Revolution, he must have known that
+his death warrant had been signed. Clearly, it is easier to eliminate
+a public figure from the record of history if at the same time he
+
+253
+can be eliminated from the world of the living. In other words, the
+difference between the traditional lie and the modern lie will more
+often than not amount to the difference between hiding and destroying.
+Moreover, the traditional lie concerned only particulars and was
+never meant to deceive literally everybody; it was directed at the
+enemy and was meant to deceive only him. These two limitations
+restricted the injury inflicted upon truth to such an extent that to
+us, in retrospect, it may appear almost harmless. Since facts always
+occur in a context, a particular lie—that is, a falsehood that makes
+no attempt to change the whole context—tears, as it were, a hole
+in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot
+a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the junctures of patched-up
+places. As long as the texture as a whole is kept intact, the lie will
+eventually show up as if of its own accord. The second limitation
+concerns those who are engaged in the business of deception. They
+used to belong to the restricted circle of statesmen and diplomats.
+who among themselves still knew and could preserve the truth.
+They were not likely to fall victims to their own falsehoods; they
+could deceive others without deceiving themselves. Both of these
+mitigating circumstances of the old art of lying are noticeably absent from the manipulation of facts that confronts us today.
+What, then, is the significance of these limitations, and why are
+we justified in calling them mitigating circumstances? Why has selfdeception become an indispensable tool in the trade of imagemaking, and why should it be worse, for the world as well as for
+the liar himself, if he is deceived by his own lies than if he merely
+deceives others? What better moral excuse could a liar offer than
+that his aversion to lying was so great that he had to convince
+himselt before he could lie to others, that, like Antonio in The
+Tempest, he had to make "a sinner of his memory, To credit his
+own lie"? And, finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, if the modem political lies are so big that they require a complete rearrangement of the whole factual texture—the making of another reality,
+as it were, into which they will fit without seam, crack, or fissure,
+exactly as the facts fitted into their own original context-what
+
+254
+prevents these new stories, images, and non-facts from becoming
+an adequate substitute for reality and factuality?
+A medieval anecdote illustrates how difficult it can be to lie to
+others without lying to oneself. It is a story about what happened
+one night in a town on whose watchtower a sentry was on duty
+day and night to warn the people of the approach of the enemy.
+The sentry was a man given to practical jokes, and that night he
+sounded the alarm just in order to give the townsfolk a little scare.
+His success was overwhelming: everybody rushed to the walls and
+the last to rush was the sentry himself. The tale suggests to what
+extent our apprehension of reality is dependent upon our sharing
+the world with our fellow-men, and what strength of character is
+required to stick to anything, truth or lie, that is unshared. In
+other words, the more successful a liar is, the more likely it is that
+be will fall prey to his own fabrications. Furthermore, the selfdeceived joker who proves to be in the same boat as his victims
+will appear vastly superior in trustworthiness to the cold-blooded
+liar who permits himself to enjoy his prank from without. Only
+self-deception is likely to create a semblance of truthfulness, and
+in a debate about facts the only persuasive factor that sometimes
+has a chance to prevail against pleasure, fear, and profit is personal
+appearance.
+Current moral prejudice tends to be rather harsh in respect to
+cold-blooded lying, whereas the often highly developed art of selfdeception is usually regarded with great tolerance and permissiveness. Among the few examples in literature that can be quoted
+against this current evaluation is the famous scene in the monastery
+at the beginning of The Brothers Karamazov. The father, an inveterate liar, asks the Staretz, "And what must I do to gain salvation?" and the Staretz replies, "Above all, never lie to yourself!"
+Dostoevski adds no explanation or elaboration. Arguments in support of the statement "It is better to lie to others than to deceive
+yourself' would have to point out that the cold-blooded liar remains aware of the distinction betwen truth and falsehood, so the
+truth he is hiding from others has not yet been maneuvered out of
+the world altogether; it has found its last refuge in him. The injury
+
+255
+done to reality is neither complete nor final, and, by the same token,
+the injury done to the liar himself is not complete or final either.
+He lied, but he is not yet a liar. Both he and the world he deceived
+are not beyond "salvation"—to put it in the language of the Staretz.
+Such completeness and potential finality, which were unknown
+to former times, are the dangers that arise out of the modern
+manipulation of facts. Even in the free world, where the government has not monopolized the power to decide and tell what factually is or is not, gigantic interest organizations have generalized
+a kind of raison d'état frame of mind such as was formerly
+restricted to the handling of foreign affairs and, in its worst excesses,
+to situations of clear and present danger. And national propaganda
+on the government level has learned more than a few tricks from
+business practices and Madison Avenue methods. Images made for
+domestic consumption, as distinguished from lies directed at a
+foreign adversary, can become a reality for everybody and first
+of all for the image-makers themselves, who while still in the act
+of preparing their "products" are overwhelmed by the mere thought
+of their victims' potential numbers. No doubt, the originators of the
+lying image who "inspire" the hidden persuaders still know that
+they want to deceive an enemy on the social or the national level,
+but the result is that a whole group of people, and even whole
+nations, may take their bearings from a web of deceptions to which
+their leaders wished to subject their opponents.
+What then happens follows almost automatically. The main effort
+of both the deceived group and the deceivers themselves is likely
+to be directed toward keeping the propaganda image intact, and
+this image is threatened less by the enemy and by real hostile interests than by those inside the group itself who have managed to
+escape its spell and insist on talking about facts or events that do
+not fit the image. Contemporary history is full of instances in which
+tellers of factual truth were felt to be more dangerous, and even
+more hostile, than the real opponents. These arguments against
+self-deception must not be confused with the protests of "idealists,"
+whatever their merit, against lying as bad in principle and against
+the age-old art of deceiving the enemy. Politically, the point is
+
+256
+that the modern art of self-deception is likely to transform an outside matter into an inside issue, so that an international or intergroup conflict boomerangs onto the scene of domestic politics. The
+self-deceptions practiced on both sides in the period of the Cold
+War are too many to enumerate, but obviously they are a case in
+point. Conservative critics of mass democracy have frequently outlined the dangers that this form of government brings to international aflairs—without, however, mentioning the dangers peculiar
+to monarchies or oligarchies. The strength of their arguments lies
+in the undeniable fact that under fully democratic conditions deception without self-deception is well-nigh impossible.
+Under our present system of world-wide communication, covering a large number of independent nations, no existing power is
+anywhere near great enough to make its "image" foolproof. Therefore, images have a relatively short life expectancy; they are likely
+to explode not only when the chips are down and reality makes its
+reappearance in public but even before this, for fragments of facts
+constantly disturb and throw out of gear the propaganda war between conflicting images. However, this is not the only way, or
+even the most significant way, in which reality takes its revenge
+on those who dare defy it. The life expectancy of images could
+hardly be significantly increased even under a world government
+or some other modern version of the Pax Romana. This is best
+illustrated by the relatively closed systems of totalitarian governments and one-party dictatorships, which are, of course, by far the
+most effective agencies in shielding ideologies and images from the
+impact of reality and truth. (And such correction of the record is
+never smooth sailing. We read in a memorandum of 1935 found in
+the Smolensk Archive about the countless difficulties besetting this
+kind of enterprise. What, for instance, "should be done with
+speeches by Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin, et al., at Party
+Congresses, plenums of the Central Committee, in the Comintern,
+the Congress of Soviets, etc.? What of anthologies on Marxism . . . written or edited jointly by Lenin, Zinoviev, . . . and
+others? What of Lenin's writings edited by Kamenev? ... What
+should be done in cases where Trotsky ... had written an article
+
+257
+in an issue of the Communist International? Should the whole
+number be confiscated?" 22 Puzzling questions indeed, to which the
+Archive contains no replies.) Their trouble is that they must constantly change the falsehoods they offer as a substitute for the real
+story; changing circumstances require the substitution of one history
+book for another, the replacement of pages in the encyclopedias
+and reference books, the disappearance of certain names in favor
+of others unknown or little known before. And though this continuing instability gives no indication of what the truth might be,
+it is itself an indication, and powerful one, of the lying character of
+all public utterances concerning the factual world. It has frequently
+been noticed that the surest long-term result of brainwashing is a
+peculiar kind of cynicism—an absolute refusal to believe in the
+truth of anything, no matter how well this truth may be established.
+In other words, the result of a consistent and total substitution of
+lies for factual truth is not that the lies will now be accepted as
+truth, and the truth be defamed as lies, but that the sense by
+which we take our bearings in the real world-and the category of
+truth vs. falsehood is among the mental means to this end—is being
+destroyed.
+And for this trouble there is no remedy. It is but the other side
+of the disturbing contingency of all factual reality. Since everything
+that has actually happened in the realm of human affairs could just
+as well have been otherwise, the possibilities for lying are boundless, and this boundlessness makes for self-defeat. Only the occasional liar will find it possible to stick to a particular falsehood
+with unwavering consistency; those who adjust images and stories
+to ever-changing circumstances will find themselves floating on the
+wide-open horizon of potentiality, drifting from one possibility to
+the next, unable to hold on to any one of their own fabrications.
+Far from achieving an adequate substitute for reality and factuality, they have transformed facts and events back into the potentiality out of which they originally appeared. And the surest sign
+of the factuality of facts and events is precisely this stubborn thereness, whose inherent contingency ultimately defies all attempts at
+conclusive explanation. The images, on the contrary, can always be
+
+258
+explained and made plausible-this gives them their momentary
+advantage over factual truth—but they can never compete in stability with that which simply is because it happens to be thus and
+not otherwise. This is the reason that consistent lying, metaphorically speaking, pulls the ground from under our feet and provides
+no other ground on which to stand. (In the words of Montaigne,
+"If falsehood, like truth, had but one face, we should know better
+where we are, for we should then take for certain the opposite of
+what the liar tells us. But the reverse of truth has a thousand shapes
+and a boundless field.") The experience of a trembling wobbling
+motion of everything we rely on for our sense of direction and
+reality is among the most common and most vivid experiences of
+men under totalitarian rule.
+Hence, the undeniable affinity of lying with action, with changing
+the world—in short, with politics—is limited by the very nature of
+the things that are open to man's faculty for action. The convinced
+image-maker is in error when he believes that he can anticipate
+changes by lying about factual matters that everybody wishes to
+eliminate anyhow. The erection of Potëmkin's villages, so dear to
+the politicians and propagandists of underdeveloped countries,
+never leads to the establishment of the real thing but only to a
+proliferation and perfection of make-believe. Not the past-and all
+factual truth, of course, concerns the past—or the present, insofar
+as it is the outcome of the past, but the future is open to action.
+If the past and present are treated as parts of the future-that is,
+changed back into their former state of potentiality—the political
+realm is deprived not only of its main stabilizing force but of the
+starting point from which to change, to begin something new. What
+then begins is the constant shifting and shuffling in utter sterility
+which are characteristic of many new nations that had the bad
+luck to be born in an age of propaganda.
+That facts are not secure in the hands of power is obvious, but
+the point here is that power, by its very nature, can never produce
+a substitute for the secure stability of factual reality, which, because it is past, has grown into a dimension beyond our reach.
+Facts assert themselves by being stubborn, and their fragility is
+
+259
+oddly combined with great resiliency-the same irreversibility that
+is the hallmark of all human action. In their stubbornness, facts
+are superior to power; they are less transitory than power formations, which arise when men get together for a purpose but disappear as soon as the purpose is either achieved or lost. This transitory character makes power a highly unreliable instrument for
+achieving permanence of any kind, and, therefore, not only truth
+and facts are insecure in its hands but untruth and non-facts as
+well. The political attitude toward facts must, indeed, tread the
+very narrow path between the danger of taking them as the results
+of some necessary development which men could not prevent and
+about which they can therefore do nothing and the danger of
+denying them, of trying to manipulate them out of the world.
+V
+In conclusion, I return to the questions I raised at the beginning
+of these reflections. Truth, though powerless and always defeated
+in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of
+its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable
+to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it. And this applies
+to rational or religious truth just as it applies, more obviously, to
+factual truth. To look upon politics from the perspective of truth,
+as I have done here, means to take one's stand outside the political
+realm. This standpoint is the standpoint of the truthteller, who forfeits his position—and, with it, the validity of what he has to sayif he tries to interfere directly in human affairs and to speak the
+language of persuasion or of violence. It is to this position and its
+significance for the political realm that we must now turn our attention.
+The standpoint outside the political realm—outside the community to which we belong and the company of our peers—is clearly
+characterized as one of the various modes of being alone. Outstanding among the existential modes of truthtelling are the solitude
+
+260
+Bern'een Past and Future
+of the philosopher, the isolation of the scientist and the artist, the
+impartiality of the historian and the judge, and the independence
+of the fact-finder, the witness, and the reporter. (This impartiality
+differs from that of the qualified, representative opinion, mentioned earlier, in that it is not acquired inside the political realm
+but is inherent in the position of the outsider required for such
+occupations.) These modes of being alone differ in many respects,
+but they have in common that as long as any one of them lasts,
+no political commitment, no adherence to a cause, is possible. They
+are, of course, common to all men; they are modes of human existence as such. Only when one of them is adopted as a way of life—
+and even then life is never lived in complete solitude or isolation
+or independence—is it likely to conflict with the demands of the
+political.
+It is quite natural that we become aware of the non-political
+and, potentially, even anti-political nature of truth-Fiat veritas,
+et pereat mundus-only in the event of conflict, and I have stressed
+up to now this side of the matter. But this cannot possibly tell the
+whole story. It leaves out of account certain public institutions,
+established and supported by the powers that be, in which, contrary to all political rules, truth and truthfulness have always constituted the highest criterion of speech and endeavor. Among these
+we find notably the judiciary, which either as a branch of government or as direct administration of justice is carefully protected
+against social and political power, as well as all institutions of higher
+learning, to which the state entrusts the education of its future citizens. To the extent that the Academe remembers its ancient origins,
+it must know that it was founded by the polis's most determined
+and most influential opponent. To be sure, Plato's dream did not
+come true: the Academe never became a counter-society, and
+nowhere do we hear of any attempt by the universities at seizing
+power. But what Plato never dreamed of did come true: The political realm recognized that it needed an institution outside the
+power struggle in addition to the impartiality required in the administration of justice; for whether these places of higher learning
+are in private or in public hands is of no great importance; not
+
+261
+only their integrity but their very existence depends upon the
+good will of the government anyway. Very unwelcome truths have
+emerged from the universities, and very unwelcome judgments
+have been handed down from the bench time and again; and these
+institutions, like other refuges of truth, have remained exposed to
+all the dangers arising from social and political power. Yet the
+chances for truth to prevail in public are, of course, greatly improved by the mere existence of such places and by the organization of independent, supposedly disinterested scholars associated
+with them. And it can hardly be denied that, at least in constitutionally ruled countries, the political realm has recognized, even in
+the event of conflict, that it has a stake in the existence of men
+and institutions over which it has no power.
+This authentically political significance of the Academe is today
+easily overlooked because of the prominence of its professional
+schools and the evolution of its natural-science divisions, where,
+unexpectedly, pure research has yielded so many decisive results
+that have proved vital to the country at large. No one can possibly
+gainsay the social and technical usefulness of the universities, but
+this importance is not political. The historical sciences and the
+humanities, which are supposed to find out, stand guard over, and
+interpret factual truth and human documents, are politically of
+greater relevance. The telling of factual truth comprehends much
+more than the daily information supplied by journalists, though
+without them we should never find our bearings in an ever-changing world and, in the most literal sense, would never know where
+we are. This is, of course, of the most immediate political importance; but if the press should ever really become the "fourth branch
+of government," it would have to be protected against government
+power and social pressure even more carefully than the judiciary
+is. For this very important political function of supplying information is exercised from outside the political realm, strictly speaking;
+no action and no decision are, or should be, involved.
+Reality is different from, and more than, the totality of facts and
+events, which, anyhow, is unascertainable. Who says what is—
+NéveL tà kóura-always tells a story, and in this story the particular
+
+262
+facts lose their contingency and acquire some hunanly comprehensible meaning. It is perfectly true that "all sorrows can be
+borne if you put them into a story or tell a story about them," in
+the words of Isak Dinesen, who not only was one of the great
+storytellers of our time but also-and she was almost unique in
+this respect-knew what she was doing. She could have added
+that joy and bliss, too, become bearable and meaningful for men
+only when they can talk about them and tell them as a story. To
+the extent that the teller of factual truth is also a storyteller, he
+brings about that "reconciliation with reality" which Hegel, the
+philosopher of history par excellence, understood as the ultimate
+goal of all philosophical thought, and which, indeed, has been the
+secret motor of all historiography that transcends mere learnedness. The transformation of the given raw material of sheer happenings which the historian, like the fiction writer (a good novel is by
+no means a simple concoction or a figment of pure fantasy), must
+effect is closely akin to the poet's transfiguration of moods or movements of the heart—the transfiguration of grief into lamentations
+or of jubilation into praise. We may see, with Aristotle, in the
+poet's political function the operation of a catharsis, a cleansing or
+purging of all emotions that could prevent men from acting. The
+political function of the storyteller-historian or novelist—is to
+teach acceptance of things as they are. Out of this acceptance,
+which can also be called truthfulness, arises the faculty of judgment—that, again in Isak Dinesen's words, "at the end we shall be
+privileged to view, and review, it—and that is what is named the
+day of judgment."
+There is no doubt that all these politically relevant functions are
+performed from outside the political realm. They require non-commitment and impartiality, freedom from self-interest in thought and
+judgment. The disinterested pursuit of truth has a long history; its
+origin, characteristically, precedes all our theoretical and scientific
+traditions, including our tradition of philosophical and political
+thought. I think it can be traced to the moment when Homer chose
+to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans,
+and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man,
+
+263
+no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk. This had
+happened nowhere before; no other civilization, however splendid,
+had been able to look with equal eyes upon friend and foe, upon
+success and defeat—which since Homer have not been recognized
+as ultimate standards of men's judgment, even though they are
+ultimates for the destinies of men's lives. Homeric impartiality
+echoes throughout Greek history, and it inspired the first great teller
+of factual truth, who became the father of history: Herodotus tells
+us in the very first sentences of his stories that he set out to prevent
+"the great and wondrous deeds of the Greeks and the barbarians
+from losing their due meed of glory." This is the root of all so-called
+objectivity—this curious passion, unknown outside Western civilization, for intellectual integrity at any price. Without it no science
+would ever have come into being.
+Since I have dealt here with politics from the perspective of
+truth, and hence from a viewpoint outside the political realm, I
+have failed to mention even in passing the greatness and the dignity
+of what goes on inside it. I have spoken as though the political
+realm were no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing counted but pleasure and profit, partisanship,
+and the lust for dominion. In short, I have dealt with politics as
+though 1, too, believed that all public affairs were ruled by interest
+and power, that there would be no political realm at all if we were
+not bound to take care of life's necessities. The reason for this
+deformation is that factual truth clashes with the political only on
+this lowest level of human affairs, just as Plato's philosophical truth
+clashed with the political on the considerably higher level of opinion and agreement. From this perspective, we remain unaware of
+the actual content of political life—of the joy and the gratification
+that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting
+together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into
+the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our
+personal identity and beginning something entirely new. However,
+what I meant to show here is that this whole sphere, its greatness
+notwithstanding, is limited—that it does not encompass the whole
+of man's and the world's existence. It is limited by those things
+
+264
+which men cannot change at will. And it is only by respecting
+its own borders that this realm, where we are free to act and to
+change, can remain intact, preserving its integrity and keeping its
+promises. Conceptually, we may call truth what we cannot change;
+metaphorically, it is the ground on which we stand and the sky
+that stretches above us.
+
+8
+THE CONQUEST OF SPACE
+AND THE STATURE
+OF MAN
+"HAs man's conquest of space increased or diminished his stat
+ure?"1 The question raised is addressed to the layman, not
+the scientist, and it is inspired by the humanist's concern with man,
+as distinguished from the physicist's concern with the reality of the
+physical world. To understand physical reality seems to demand not
+only the renunciation of an anthropocentric or geocentric world
+view, but also a radical elimination of all anthropomorphic elements and principles, as they arise either from the world given to
+the five human senses or from the categories inherent in the human
+mind. The question assumes that man is the highest being we
+know of, an assumption which we have inherited from the Romans,
+whose humanitas was so alien to the Greeks' frame of mind that
+they had not even a word for it. (The reason for the absence of the
+word humanitas from Greek language and thought was that the
+Greeks, in contrast to the Romans, never thought that man is the
+highest being there is. Aristotle calls this belief atopos, "absurd.")'
+265
+
+266
+This view of man is even more alien to the scientist, to whom man
+is no more than a special case of organic life and to whom man's
+habitat—the earth, together with earthbound laws—is no more
+than a special borderline case of absolute, universal laws, that is,
+laws that rule the immensity of the universe. Surely the scientist
+cannot permit himself to ask: What consequences will the result
+of my investigations have for the stature (or, for that matter, for
+the future) of man? It has been the glory of modern science that
+it has been able to emancipate itself completely from all such
+anthropocentric, that is, truly humanistic, concerns.
+The question propounded here, insofar as it is addressed to the
+layman, must be answered in terms of common sense and in everyday language (if it can be answered at all). The answer is not
+likely to convince the scientist, because he has been forced, under
+the compulsion of facts and experiments, to renounce sense perception and hence common sense, by which we coordinate the perception of our five senses into the total awareness of reality. He
+has also been forced to renounce normal language, which even in
+its most sophisticated conceptual refinements remains inextricably
+bound to the world of the senses and to our common sense. For
+the scientist, man is no more than an observer of the universe in
+its manifold manifestations. The progress of modern science has
+demonstrated very forcefully to what an extent this observed universe, the infinitely small no less than the infinitely large, escapes
+not only the coarseness of human sense perception but even the
+enormously ingenious instruments that have been built for its
+refinement. The data with which modern physical research is
+concerned turn up like "mysterious messenger[s] from the real
+world." 3 They are not phenomena, appearances, strictly speaking, for we meet them nowhere, neither in our everyday world
+nor in the laboratory; we know of their presence only because they
+affect our measuring instruments in certain ways. And this effect,
+in the telling image of Eddington, may "have as much resemblance" to what they are "as a telephone number has to a subscriber." * The point of the matter is that Eddington, without the
+slightest hesitation, assumes that these physical data emerge from
+
+267
+a "real world," more real by implication than the world we live
+in; the trouble is that something physical is present but never
+appears.
+The goal of modern science, which eventually and quite literally has led us to the moon, is no longer "to augment and order"
+human experiences (as Niels Bohr, still tied to a vocabulary that
+his own work has helped to make obsolete, described it); it is
+much rather to discover what lies behind natural phenomena as
+they reveal themselves to the senses and the mind of man. Had the
+scientist reflected upon the nature of the human sensory and mental
+apparatus, had he raised questions such as What is the nature of
+man and what should be his stature? What is the goal of science
+and why does man pursue knowledge? or even What is life and
+what distinguishes human from animal life?, he would never have
+arrived where modern science stands today. The answers to these
+questions would have acted as definitions and hence as limitations
+of his efforts. In the words of Niels Bohr, "Only by renouncing an
+explanation of life in the ordinary sense do we gain a possibility of
+taking into account its characteristics." ®
+That the question proposed here makes no sense to the scientist
+qua scientist is no argument against it. The question challenges
+the layman and the humanist to judge what the scientist is doing
+because it concerns all men, and this debate must of course be
+joined by the scientists themselves insofar as they are fellow citizens.
+But all answers given in this debate, whether they come from laymen
+or philosophers or scientists, are nonscientific (although not antiscientific); they can never be demonstrably true or false. Their
+truth resembles rather the validity of agreements than the compelling validity of scientific statements. Even when the answers
+are given by philosophers whose way of life is solitude, they are
+arrived at by an exchange of opinions among many men, most of
+whom may no longer be among the living. Such truth can never
+command general agreement, but it frequently outlasts the compellingly and demonstrably true statements of the sciences which.
+especially in recent times, have the uncomfortable inclination never
+
+268
+to stay put, although at any given moment they are, and must be,
+valid for all. In other words, notions such as life, or man, or science,
+or knowledge are prescientific by definition, and the question is
+whether or not the actual development of science which has led
+to the conquest of terrestrial space and to the invasion of the space
+of the universe has changed these notions to such an extent that
+they no longer make sense. For the point of the matter is, of
+course, that modern science—no matter what its origins and
+original goals—has changed and reconstructed the world we live
+in so radically that it could be argued that the layman and the
+humanist, still trusting their common sense and communicating
+in everyday language, are out of touch with reality; that they
+understand only what appears but not what is behind appearances
+(as though trying to understand a tree without taking the roots
+into account); and that their questions and anxieties are simply
+caused by ignorance and therefore are irrelevant. How can anyone doubt that a science enabling man to conquer space and to
+go to the moon has increased his stature?
+This sort of bypassing the question would be very tempting
+indeed if it were true that we have come to live in a world that
+only the scientists "understand." They would then be in a position
+of the "few" whose superior knowledge entitles them to rule the
+"many," namely, all non-scientists, laymen from the scientist's
+point of view-be they humanists, scholars, or philosophers—all
+those, in short, who raise pre-scientific questions because of ignorance.
+This division between the scientist and the layman, however,
+is very far from the truth. The fact is not merely that the scientist
+spends more than half of his life in the same world of sense perception, of common sense, and of everyday language as his fellowcitizens, but that he has come in his own privileged field of activity
+to a point where the naïve questions and anxieties of the layman
+have made themselves felt very forcefully, albeit in a different
+manner. The scientist has not only left behind the layman with his
+limited understanding; he has left behind a part of himself and his
+own power of understanding, which is still human understanding,
+
+269
+when he goes to work in the laboratory and begins to communicate
+in mathematical language. Max Planck was right, and the miracle
+of modern science is indeed that this science could be purged "of
+all anthropomorphic elements" because the purging was done by
+men." The theoretical perplexities that have confronted the new
+non-anthropocentric and non-geocentric (or heliocentric) science
+because its data refuse to be ordered by any of the natural mental
+categories of the human brain are well enough known. In the
+words of Erwin Schroedinger, the new universe that we try to
+"conquer" is not only "practically inaccessible, but not even thinkable," for "however we think it, it is wrong; not perhaps quite as
+meaningless as a triangular circle, but much more so than a
+"winged lion'" B
+There are other difficulties of a less theoretical nature. Electronic
+brains share with all other machines the capacity to do man's work
+better and faster than man. The fact that they supplant and enlarge
+human brain power rather than labor power causes no perplexity
+to those who know how to distinguish between the "intellect"
+necessary to play good checkers or chess and the human mind.?
+This, indeed, proves no more than that labor power and brain
+power belong in the same category, and that what we call intelligence and can measure in terms of IOs has hardly any more to
+do with the quality of the human mind than being its indispensable
+conditio sine qua non. There are, however, scientists who state
+that computers can do "what a human brain cannot comprehend," 10 and this is an altogether different and alarming proposition; for comprehension is actually a function of the mind and
+never the automatic result of brain power. If it should be trueand not simply a case of a scientist's self-misunderstanding-that
+we are surrounded by machines whose doings we cannot comprehend although we have devised and constructed them, it would
+mean that the theoretical perplexities of the natural sciences on the
+highest level have invaded our everyday world. But even if we
+remain in the strictly theoretical framework, the paradoxes that
+have begun to worry the great scientists themselves are sufficiently
+serious to alarm the layman. Whereas the often mentioned "lag"
+
+270
+of the social sciences with respect to the natural sciences or of
+man's political development with respect to his technical and scientific know-how is no more than a red herring drawn into this
+debate; it can only divert attention from the main problem, which
+is that man can do, and successfully do, what he cannot comprehend and cannot express in everyday human language.
+It may be noteworthy that among the scientists it was primarily
+the older generation, men like Einstein and Planck, Niels Bohr
+and Schroedinger, who were most acutely worried about this state
+of affairs which their own work had chiefly brought about. They
+were still firmly rooted in a tradition that demanded that scientific
+theories fulfill certain definitely humanistic requirements such as
+simplicity, beauty and harmony. A theory was still supposed to be
+"satisfactory," namely, satisfactory to human reason in that it
+served to "save the phenomena," to explain all observed facts.
+Even today, we still hear that "modern physicists are inclined to
+believe in the validity of general relativity for aesthetic reasons,
+because it is mathematically so elegant and philosophically so satisfying." 11 Einstein's extreme reluctance to sacrifice the principle of
+causality as Planck's Quantum Theory demanded is well known;
+his main objection was, of course, that with it all lawfulness was
+about to depart from the universe, that it was as though God ruled
+the world by "playing dice." And since his own discoveries, according to Niels Bohr, had come about through a "remolding and
+generalizing [of] the whole edifice of classical physics . . . lending
+to our world picture a unity surpassing all previous expectations,"
+it seems only natural that Einstein tried to come to terms with the
+new theories of his colleagues and his successors through "the
+search for a more complete conception," through a new and
+surpassing generalization.!? Thus Max Planck could call the Theory
+of Relativity "the completion and culmination of the structure of
+classical physics," its very "crowning point." But Planck himself,
+although fully aware that the Quantum Theory, in contrast to the
+Theory of Relativity, signified a complete break with classical
+physical theory, held it to be "essential for the healthy develop-
+
+271
+ment of physics that among the postulates of this science we reckon,
+not merely the existence of law in general, but also the strictly
+causal character of this law." 13
+Niels Bohr, however, went one step further. For him, causality,
+determinism, and necessity of laws belonged to the categories of
+"our necessarily prejudiced conceptual frame," and he was no
+longer frightened when he met "in atomic phenomena regularities
+of quite a new kind, defying deterministic pictorial description." 14
+The trouble is that what defies description in terms of the "prejudices" of the human mind defies description in every conceivable
+way of human language; it can no longer be described at all, and
+it is being expressed, but not described, in mathematical processes.
+Bohr still hoped that, since "no experience is definable without a
+logical frame," these new experiences would in due time fall into
+place through "an appropriate widening of the conceptual framework" which would also remove all present paradoxes and "apparent disharmonies." 15 But this hope, I am afraid, will be disappointed. The categories and ideas of human reason have their
+ultimate source in human sense experience, and all terms describing
+our mental abilities as well as a good deal of our conceptual language derive from the world of the senses and are used metaphorically. Moreover, the human brain which supposedly does our
+thinking is as terrestrial, earthbound, as any other part of the human
+body. It was precisely by abstracting from these terrestrial conditions, by appealing to a power of imagination and abstraction that
+would, as it were, lift the human mind out of the gravitational field
+of the earth and look down upon it from some point in the universe,
+that modern science reached its most glorious and, at the same
+time, most baffling achievements.
+In 1929, shortly before the arrival of the Atomic Revolution,
+marked by the splitting of the atom and the hope for the conquest
+of universal space, Planck demanded that the results obtained by
+mathematical processes "must be translated back into the language
+of the world of our senses if they are to be of any use to us." In the
+three decades that have passed since these words were written, such
+
+272
+translation has become even less possible while the loss of contact
+between the physical world view and the sense world has become
+even more conspicuous. But—and in our context this is even more
+alarming-this has by no means meant that results of this new
+science are of no practical use, or that the new world view, as
+Planck had predicted in case the translation back into ordinary
+language should fail, "would be no better than a bubble ready to
+burst at the first puff of wind." 10 On the contrary, one is tempted
+to say that it is much more likely that the planet we inhabit will go
+up in smoke as a consequence of theories that are entirely unrelated
+to the world of the senses, and defy all description in human language, than that even a hurricane will cause the theories to burst
+like a bubble.
+It is, I think, safe to say that nothing was more alien to the minds
+of the scientists, who brought about the most radical and the most
+rapid revolutionary process the world has ever seen, than any will
+to power. Nothing was more remote than any wish to "conquer
+space" and to go to the moon. Nor were they prompted by an unseemly curiosity in the sense of a temptatio oculorum. It was indeed their search for "true reality" that led them to lose confidence
+in appearances, in the phenomena as they reveal themselves of
+their own accord to human sense and reason. They were inspired
+by an extraordinary love of harmony and lawfulness which taught
+them that they would have to step outside any merely given sequence or series of occurrences if they wanted to discover the overall beauty and order of the whole, that is, the universe. This may
+explain why they seem to have been less distressed by the fact their
+discoveries served the invention of the most murderous gadgets
+than disturbed by the shattering of all their most cherished ideals
+of necessity and lawfulness. These ideals were lost when the scientists discovered that there is nothing indivisible in matter, no
+a-tomos, that we live in an expanding, non-limited universe, and
+that chance seems to rule supreme wherever this "true reality," the
+physical world, has receded entirely from the range of human
+senses and from the range of all instruments by which their coarseness was refined. From this, it seems to follow that causality,
+
+273
+necessity, and lawfulness are categories inherent in the human brain
+and applicable only to the common-sense experiences of earthbound creatures. Everything that such creatures "reasonably" demand seems to fail them as soon as they step outside the range of
+their terrestrial habitat.
+The modern scientific enterprise began with thoughts never
+thought before (Copernicus imagined he was "standing in the sun
+•.. overlooking the planets")!? and with things never seen before
+(Galileo's telescope pierced the distance between earth and sky and
+delivered the secrets of the stars to human cognition "with all the
+certainty of sense evidence").1 It reached its classic expression
+with Newton's law of gravitation, in which the same equation
+covers the movements of the heavenly bodies and the motion of
+terrestrial things on earth. Einstein indeed only generalized this
+science of the modern age when he introduced an "observer who is
+poised freely in space" and not just at one definite point like the
+sun, and he proved that not only Copernicus but also Newton still
+required "that the universe should have a kind of center," although
+this center, of course, was no longer the earth." It is, in fact, quite
+obvious that the scientists' strongest intellectual motivation was
+Einstein's "striving after generalization," and that if they appealed
+to power at all, it was the interconnected formidable power of
+abstraction and imagination. Even today, when billions of dollars
+are spent year in and year out for highly "useful" projects that are
+the immediate results of the development of pure, theoretical
+science, and when the actual power of countries and governments
+depends upon the performance of many thousands of researchers,
+the physicist is still likely to look down upon all these space scientists as mere "plumbers." 20
+The sad truth of the matter, however, is that the lost contact between the world of the senses and appearances and the physical
+world view has been re-established not by the pure scientist but by
+the "plumber." The technicians, who account today for the overwhelming majority of all "researchers," have brought the results of
+the scientists down to earth. And even though the scientist is still
+beset by paradoxes and the most bewildering perplexities, the very
+
+274
+Between Past and Furure
+fact that a whole technology could develop out of his results
+demonstrates the "soundness" of his theories and hypotheses more
+convincingly than any merely scientific observation or experiment
+ever could. It is perfectly true that the scientist himself does not
+want to go to the moon; he knows that for his purposes unmanned
+spaceships carrying the best instruments human ingenuity can
+invent will do the job of exploring the moon's surface much better
+than dozens of astronauts. And yet, an actual change of the human
+world, the conquest of space or whatever we may wish to call it,
+is achieved only when manned space carriers are shot into the
+universe, so that man himself can go where up to now only human
+imagination and its power of abstraction, or human ingenuity and
+its power of fabrication, could reach. To be sure, all we plan to do
+now is to explore our own immediate surroundings in the universe,
+the infinitely small place that the human race could reach even if
+it were to travel with the velocity of light. In view of man's life
+span—the only absolute limitation left at the present moment—it
+is quite unlikely that he will ever go much farther. But even for
+this limited job, we have to leave the world of our senses and of
+our bodies not only in imagination but in reality.
+It is as though Einstein's imagined "observer poised in free
+space" —surely the creation of the human mind and its power of
+abstraction—is being followed by a bodily observer who must
+behave as though he were a mere child of abstraction and imagination. It is at this point that all the theoretical perplexities of the
+new physical world view intrude as realities upon man's everyday
+world and throw out of gear his "natural," that is, earthbound,
+common sense. He would, for instance, be confronted in reality
+with Einstein's famous "twin paradox," which hypothetically assumes that "a twin brother who takes off on a space journey in
+which he travels at a sizable fraction of the speed of light would
+return to find his earthbound twin either older than he or little
+more than a dim recollection in the memory of his descendants." 21
+For although many physicists had found this paradox difficult to
+swallow, the "clock paradox," on which it is based, seems to have
+
+275
+been verified experimentally, so that the only alternative to it would
+be the assumption that earthbound life under all circumstances
+remains bound to a time concept that demonstrably does not belong
+among "true realities," but among mere appearances. We have
+reached the stage where the Cartesian radical doubt of reality as
+such, the first philosophical answer to the discoveries of science in
+the modern age, may become subject to physical experiments that
+would make short shrift of Descartes' famous consolation, I doubt,
+therefore I am, and of his conviction that, whatever the state of
+reality and of truth as they are given to the senses and to reason,
+you cannot "doubt of your doubt and remain uncertain whether
+you doubt or not." 22
+The magnitude of the space enterprise seems to me beyond dispute, and all objections raised against it on the purely utilitarian
+level—that it is too expensive, that the money were better spent on
+education and the improvement of the citizens, on the fight against
+poverty and disease, or whatever other worthy purposes may come
+to mind—sound to me slightly absurd, out of tune with the things
+that are at stake and whose consequences today appear still quite
+unpredictable. There is, moreover, another reason why I think
+these arguments are beside the point. They are singularly inapplicable because the enterprise itself could come about only
+through an amazing development of man's scientific capabilities.
+The very integrity of science demands that not only utilitarian considerations but the reflection upon the stature of man as well be
+left in abeyance. Has not each of the advances of science, since the
+time of Copernicus, almost automatically resulted in a decrease in
+his stature? And is the often repeated argument that it was man who
+achieved his own debasement in his search for truth, thus proving
+anew his superiority and even increasing his stature, more than a
+sophism? Perhaps it will turn out that way. At any event, man,
+insofar as he is a scientist, does not care about his own stature in
+the universe or about his position on the evolutionary ladder of
+animal life; this "carelessness" is his pride and his glory. The
+
+276
+simple fact that physicists split the atom without any hesitations the
+very moment they knew how to do it, although they realized full
+well the enormous destructive potentialities of their operation,
+demonstrates that the scientist qua scientist does not even care
+about the survival of the human race on earth or, for that matter,
+about the survival of the planet itself. All associations for "Atoms
+for Peace," all warnings not to use the new power unwisely, and
+even the pangs of conscience many scientists felt when the first
+bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot obscure this simple,
+elementary fact. For in all these efforts the scientists acted not as
+scientists but as citizens, and if their voices have more authority
+than the voices of laymen, they do so only because the scientists
+are in possession of more precise information. Valid and plausible
+arguments against the "conquest of space" could be raised only if
+they were to show that the whole enterprise might be self-defeating
+in its own terms.
+There are a few indications that such might indeed be the case.
+If we leave out of account the human life span, which under no
+circumstances (even if biology should succeed in extending it significantly and man were able to travel with the speed of light) will
+permit man to explore more than his immediate surroundings in
+the immensity of the universe, the most significant indication that
+it might be self-defeating consists in Heisenberg's discovery of the
+uncertainty principle. Heisenberg showed conclusively that there
+is a definite and final limit to the accuracy of all measurements
+obtainable by man-devised instruments for those "mysterious messengers from the real world." The uncertainty principle "asserts
+that there are certain pairs of quantities, like the position and velocity of a particle, that are related in such a way that determining one
+of them with increased precision necessarily entails determining the
+other one with reduced precision." 23 Heisenberg concludes from
+this fact that "we decide, by our selection of the type of observation
+employed, which aspects of nature are to be determined and which
+are to be blurred." 24 He holds that "the most important new result
+of nuclear physics was the recognition of the possibility of applying
+
+277
+quite different types of natural laws, without contradiction, to one
+and the same physical event. This is due to the fact that within a
+system of laws which are based on certain fundamental ideas only
+certain quite definite ways of asking questions make sense, and thus,
+that such a system is separated from others which allow different
+questions to be put." 25 From this he concluded that the modern
+search for "true reality" behind mere appearances, which has
+brought about the world we live in and resulted in the Atomic Re-
+volution, has led into a situation in the sciences themselves in
+which man has lost the very objectivity of the natural world, so that
+man in his hunt for "objective rearity" suddenly discovered that he
+always "confronts himself alone." 20
+The remarks of Heisenberg seem to me to transcend by far the
+field of strictly scientific endeavor and to gain in poignancy if they
+are applied to the technology that has grown out of modern science.
+Every progress in science in the last decades, from the moment it
+was absorbed into technology and thus introduced into the factual
+world where we live our everyday lives, has brought with it a veritable avalanche of fabulous instruments and ever more ingenious
+machinery. All of this makes it more unlikely every day that man
+will encounter anything in the world around him that is not manmade and hence is not, in the last analysis, he himself in a different
+disguise. The astronaut, shot into outer space and imprisoned in
+his instrument-ridden capsule where each actual physical encounter
+with his surroundings would spell immediate death, might well be
+taken as the symbolic incarnation of Heisenberg's man—the man
+who will be the less likely ever to meet anything but himself and
+man-made things the more ardently he wishes to eliminate all anthropocentric considerations from his encounter with the nonhuman world around him.
+It is at this point, it seems to mo, that the humanist's concern
+with man and the stature of man has caught up with the scientist.
+It is as though the sciences had done what the humanities never
+could have achieved, namely, to prove demonstrably the validity
+of this concern. The situation, as it presents itself today, oddly re
+
+278
+sembles an elaborate verification of a remark by Franz Kaika,
+written at the very beginning of this development: Man, he said,
+"found the Archimedean point, but he used it against himself; it
+seems that he was permitted to find it only under this condition."
+For the conquest of space, the search for a point outside the earth
+from which it would be possible to move, to unhinge, as it were,
+the planet itself, is no accidental result of the modern age's science.
+This was from its very beginnings not a "natural" but a universal
+science, it was not a physics but an astrophysics which looked upon
+the earth from a point in the universe. In terms of this development, the attempt to conquer space means that man hopes he will
+be able to journey to the Archimedean point which he anticipated
+by sheer force of abstraction and imagination. However, in doing
+so, he will necessarily lose his advantage. All he can find is the
+Archimedean point with respect to the earth, but once arrived
+there and having acquired this absolute power over his earthly
+habitat, he would need a new Archimedean point, and so ad infinitum. In other words, man can only get lost in the immensity of the
+universe, for the only true Archimedean point would be the absolute void behind the universe.
+Yet even if man recognizes that there might be absolute limits
+to his search for knowledge and that it might be wise to suspect
+such limitations whenever it turns out that the scientist can do more
+than he is capable of comprehending, and even if he realizes that
+he cannot "conquer space," but at best make a few discoveries in
+our solar system, the journey into space and to the Archimedean
+point with respect to the earth is far from being a harmless or unequivocally triumphant enterprise. It could add to the stature of
+man inasmuch as man, in distinction from other living things, desires to be at home in a "territory" as large as possible. In that
+case, he would only take possession of what is his own, although it
+took him a long time to discover it. These new possessions, like all
+property, would have to be limited, and once the limit is reached
+and the limitations established, the new world view that may conceivably grow out of it is likely to be once more geocentric and
+
+279
+anthropomorphic, although not in the old sense of the earth being
+the center of the universe and of man being the highest being there
+is. It would be geocentric in the sense that the earth, and not the
+universe, is the center and the home of mortal men, and it would
+be anthropomorphic in the sense that man would count his own
+factual mortality among the elementary conditions under which his
+scientific efforts are possible at all.
+At this moment, the prospects for such an entirely beneficial development and solution of the present predicaments of modern
+science and technology do not look particularly good. We have
+come to our present capacity to "conquer space" through our new
+ability to handle nature from a point in the universe outside the
+earth. For this is what we actually do when we release energy
+processes that ordinarily go on only in the sun, or attempt to initiate in a test tube the processes of cosmic evolution, or build
+machines for the production and control of energies unknown in
+the household of earthly nature. Without as yet actually occupying
+the point where Archimedes had wished to stand, we have found
+a way to act on the earth as though we disposed of terrestrial nature from outside, from the point of Einstein's "observer freely
+poised in space." If we look down from this point upon what is
+going on on earth and upon the various activities of men, that is,
+if we apply the Archimedean point to ourselves, then these activities will indeed appear to ourselves as no more than "overt behavior," which we can study with the same methods we use to
+study the behavior of rats. Seen from a sufficient distance, the cars
+in which we travel and which we know we built ourselves will look
+as though they were, as Heisenberg once put it, "as inescapable a
+part of ourselves as the snail's shell is to its occupant." All our
+pride in what we can do will disappear into some kind of mutation
+of the human race; the whole of technology, seen from this point,
+in fact no longer appears "as the result of a conscious human
+effort to extend man's material powers, but rather as a large-scale
+biological process." 27 Under these circumstances, speech and
+everyday language would indeed be no longer a meaningful utter-
+
+280
+ance that transcends behavior even if it only expresses it, and it
+would much better be replaced by the extreme and in itself meaningless formalism of mathematical signs.
+The conquest of space and the science that made it possible have
+come perilously close to this point. If they ever should reach it in
+earnest, the stature of man would not simply be lowered by all
+standards we know of, but have been destroyed.
+
+NOTES
+INDEX OF NAMES
+
+NOTES
+1. For this quotation and the following, see René Char, Feuillets
+d'Hypnos, Paris, 1946. Written during the last year of the Resistance,
+1943 to 1944, and published in the Collection Espoir, edited by Albert
+Camus, these aphorisms, together with later pieces, appeared in English
+under the title Hypnos Waking; Poems and Prose, New York, 1956.
+2. The quotation is from the last chapter of Democracy in America, New York, 1945, vol. II, p. 331. It reads in full: "Although the
+revolution that is taking place in the social condition, the laws, the
+opinions, and the feelings of men is still very far from being terminated,
+yet its results already admit of no comparison with anything that the
+world has ever before witnessed. go back from age to age up to the
+remotest antiquity, but I find no parallel to what is occurring before my
+eyes; as the past has ceased to throw its light upon the future, the mind
+of man wanders in obscurity." These lines of Tocqueville anticipate not
+only the aphorisms of René Char; curiously enough, if one reads them
+textually, they also anticipate Kafka's insight (see the following) that it
+is the future that sends man's mind back into the past "up to the remotest
+antiquity."
+3. The story is the last of a series of "Notes from the year 1920,"
+under the title "HE." Translated from the German by Willa and Edwin
+Muir, they appeared in this country in The Great Wall of China, New
+York, 1946. I followed the English translation except in a few places
+where a more literal translation was needed for my purposes. The German original—in vol. 5 of the Gesammelte Schriften, New York, 1946
+—reads as follows:
+283
+
+284
+Notes: Tradition and the Modern Age
+Er hal zwei Gegner: Der ersie bedrängt ihn von hinten, vom
+Ursprung her. Der zweite verwehrt ihm den Weg nach vorn. Er
+kämpft mit beiden. Eigentlich unterstützt ihn der erste im Kampf
+mit dem Zweiten, denn er will ihn nach vorn drängen und ebenso
+unterstützt ihn der zweite im Kampf mit dem Ersten; denn er
+treibt ihn doch zuriick. So ist es aber nur theorelisch. Denn es sind
+ja nicht nur die zwei Gegner da, sondern auch noch er selbst, und
+wer kennt eigentlich seine Absichten? Immerhin ist es sein Traum,
+dass er einmal in einem unbewachten Augenblick-dazu gehöre
+allerdings eine Nacht, so finster wie noch keine war—aus der
+Kampflinie ausspringt und wegen seiner Kampfeserfahrung zum
+Richter über seine miteinander kämpfenden Gegner erhoben wird.
+1. Tradition and the Modern Age
+1. Laws 775.
+2. For Engels, see his Anli-Dühring, Zürich, 1934, p. 275. For
+Nietzsche, see Morgenröte, Werke, München, 1954, vol. I, aph. 179.
+3. The statement occurs in Engels' essay on "The Part played by
+Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man," in Marx and Engels, Se-
+lected Works, London, 1950, vol. II, p. 74. For similar formulations by
+Marx himself, see especially "Die heilige Familie" and "Nationalökonomie und Philosophie" in Jugendschriften, Stuttgart, 1953.
+4. Quoted here from Capital, Modern Library Edition, p. 824.
+5. See Götzendämmerung, ed. K. Schlechta, München, vol. II,
+p. 963.
+6. In Das Kapital, Zürich, 1933, vol. III, p. 870.
+7. I refer here to Heidegger's discovery that the Greek word for
+truth means literally "disclosure"—ả-Aý0cca.
+8. Op. cit., Zürich, p. 689.
+9. Ibid., pp. 697-698.
+10. That "the Cave is comparable with Hades" is also suggested by
+F. M. Cornford in his annotated translation of The Republic, New
+York, 1956, p. 230.
+11. See Jugendschriften, p. 274.
+2. The Concept of History
+1. Cicero, De legibus I, 5; De oratore II, 55. Herodotus, the first
+historian, did not yet have at his disposal a word for history. He used the
+
+285
+word intopeiv, but not in the sense of "historical narrative." Like eidévas,
+1o know, the word itopía is derived from i-, to see, and lorwp means
+originally "eyewitness," then the one who examines witnesses and obtains truth through inquiry. Hence, iatopeiv has a doutle meaning: to
+testify and to inquire. (See Max Pohlenz, Herodor, der erste Ge-
+schichtsschreiber des Abendlandes, Leipzig and Berlin, 1937, p. 44.)
+For recent discussion of Herodotus and our concept of history, see especially C. N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture, New York,
+1944, ch. 12, one of the most stimulating and interesting pieces in the
+literature on the subject His chief thesis, that Herodotus must be regarded as belonging to the Ionian school of philosophy and a follower
+of Heraclitus, is not convincing. Contrary to ancient sources, Cochrane
+construes the science of history as being part of the Greek development of philosophy. See note 6, and also Karl Reinhardt, "Herodots
+Persegeschichten" in Von Werken und Formen, Godesberg, 1948.
+2. "The Gods of most nations claim to have created the world.
+The Olympian gods make no such claim. The most they ever did was to
+conquer it" (Gilbert Murray, Five Stages of Greek Religion, Anchor
+edition, p. 45). Against this statement one sometimes argues that Plato
+in the Timaeus introduced a creator of the world. But Plato's god is no
+real creator; he is a demiurge, a world-builder who does not create out
+of nothing. Moreover, Plato tells his story in the form of a myth in.
+vented by himself, and this, like similar myths in his work, are not proposed as truth. That no god and no man ever created the cosmos is
+beautifully stated in Heraclitus, fragment 30 (Diels), for this cosmical
+order of all things "has always been and is and will be—an ever-living
+fire that blazes up in proportions and dies away in proportions."
+3. On the Soul, 415b13. See also Economics, 1343b24: Nature
+fulfills the being-forever with respect to the species through recurrence
+(Tepíoos) but cannot do this with respect to the individual. In our context, it is irrelevant that the treatise is not by Aristotle but by one of
+his pupils, for we find the same thought in the treatise On Generation
+and Corruption in the concept of Becoming, which moves in a cycle—
+yÉvEdıs dş allýdon rúkdw, 331a8. The same thought of an "immortal
+human species" occurs in Plato, Laws, 721. See note 9.
+4. Nietzsche, Wille zur Macht, Nr. 617, Edition Kröner, 1930.
+5. Rilke, Aus dem Nachlass des Grafen C. W., first series, poem X.
+Although the poetry is untranslatable, the content of these verses might
+be expressed as follows: "Mountains rest beneath a splendor of stars,
+but even in them time flickers. Ah, unsheltered in my wild, darkling heart
+lies immortality." I owe this translation to Denver Lindley.
+6. Poetics, 1448b25 and 1450a16-22. For a distinction between
+poetry and historiography, see ibid., ch. 9
+
+286
+7. For tragedy as an imitation of action, see ibid., ch. 6, 1.
+8. Griechische Kulturgeschichte, Edition Kröner, II, p. 289.
+9. For Plato, see Laws 721, where he makes it quite clear that he
+thinks the human species only in a certain way to be immortal—namely
+insofar as its successive generations taken as a whole are "growing together" with the entirety of time; mankind as a succession of generations and time are coeval: yévos div ảrdpútw ¿oTé TI fluplÈs roi marròs
+XpÓvOv, Sià TÉNOUS aUTu JUVÉTETaL Kai OUVÉNETaL, TOÚT! TỤ TPÓT" ¿lávator
+ov. In other words, it is mere deathlessness—ủlavaría—in which the
+mortals partake by virtue of belonging to an immortal species; it is not
+the timeless being-forever-the ei cival—in whose neighborhood the
+philosopher is admitted even though he is but a mortal. For Aristotle,
+see Nicomachean Ethics, 1177b30-35 and further in what follows.
+10. Ibid., 1143a36.
+11. Seventh Letter.
+12. W. Heisenberg, Philosophic Problems of Nuclear Science,
+New York, 1952, р. 24.
+13. Quoted from Alexandre Koyré, "An Experiment in Measurement," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Sociery, vol. 97, no.
+2, 1953.
+14. The same point was made more than twenty years ago by
+Edgar Wind in his essay "Some Points of Contact between History and
+Natural Sciences" (in Philosophy and History, Essays Presented to
+Ernst Cassirer, Oxford, 1939). Wind already showed that the latest developments of science which make it so much less "exact" lead to the
+raising of questions by scientists "that historians like to look upon as
+their own." It seems strange that so fundamental and obvious an argument should have played no role in the subsequent methodological and
+other discussions of historical science.
+15. Quoted in Friedrich Meinecke, Vom geschichtlichen Sinn und
+vom Sinn der Geschichte, Stuttgart, 1951.
+16. Erwin Schroedinger, Science and Humanism, Cambridge,
+1951, pp. 25-26.
+17. De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, iv. Quoted from the
+bilingual edition by W. F. Otto, Vom Wesen und Weg der geistigen
+Bildung, Godesberg, 1947, p. 41.
+18. No one can look at the remains of ancient or medieval towns
+without being struck by the finality with which their walls separated
+them from their natural surroundings, whether these were landscapes
+or wilderness. Modern city-building, on the contrary, aims at the landscaping and urbanization of whole areas, where the distinction between
+town and country becomes more and more obliterated. This trend could
+possibly lead to the disappearance of cities even as we know them today.
+
+287
+19. In De doctrina Christiana, 2, 28, 44.
+20. De Civitate Dei, XII, 13.
+21. See Theodor Mommsen, "St. Augustine and the Christian Idea
+of Progress," in Journal of the History of Ideas, June 1951. A close
+reading shows a striking discrepancy between the content of this excellent article and the thesis expressed in its title. The best defense of the
+Christian origin of the concept of history is found in C. N. Cochrane,
+op. cit., p. 474. He holds that ancient historiography came to an end
+because it had failed to establish "a principle of historical intelligibility"
+and that Augustine solved this problem by substituting "the logos of
+Christ for that of classicism as a principle of understanding."
+22. Especially interesting is Oscar Cullman, Christ and Time, London, 1951. Also Erich Frank, "The Role of History in Christian
+Thought" in Knowledge, Will and Belief, Collected Essays, Zürich,
+1955.
+23. In Die Entstehung des Historismus, München and Berlin,
+1936, p. 394.
+24. John Baillie, The Belief in Progress, London, 1950.
+25. De Re Publica, 1.7.
+26. The word seems to have been rarely used even in Greek. It
+occurs in Herodotus (book IV, 93 and 94) in the active sense and applies to the rites performed by a tribe that does not believe in death. The
+point is that the word does not mean "to believe in immortality," but
+"to act in a certain way in order to assure the escape from dying." In the
+passive sense (åbavarilcolai, "to be rendered immortal") the word also
+occurs in Polybius (book VI, 54, 2); it is used in the description of
+Roman funeral rites and applies to the funeral orations, which render
+immortal through "constantly making new the fame of good men."
+The Latin equivalent, aeternare, again applies to immortal fame. (Horace, Carmines, book iV, c. 14, S.)
+Clearly, Aristotle was the first and perhaps the last to use this word
+for the specifically philosophic "activity" of contemplation. The text
+ävOpwtor orra oủòè Ovytà ror Ovyróv, Ml' ' Boor evdéxeral ¿lavaTiŞav.
+... (Nichomachean Ethics, 1177b31). "One should not think as do
+those who recommend human things for those who are mortals, but
+immortalize as far as possible. ...
+" The medieval Latin translation
+(Eth. X, Lectio XI) does not use the old Latin word aeternare but
+translates "immortalize" through immortalem facere-to make immortal, presumably one's self. (Oportet autem non secundum suadentes
+humana hominem entem, neque mortalia mortalem; sed inquantum
+contingit immortalem facere....) Modern standard translations fall
+
+288
+into the same error (see for instance the translation by W. D. Ross, who
+translates: "we must . . . make ourselves immortal"). In the Greek
+text, the word ålavaríleur, like the word poveiv, is an intransitive verb,
+it has no direct object. (I owe the Greek and Latin references to the kind
+help of Professors John Herman Randall, Jr., and Paul Oscar Kristeller
+of Columbia University. Needless to say, they are not responsible for
+translation and interpretation.)
+27. It is rather interesting to note that Nietzsche, who once used
+the term "eternize"-probably because he remembered the passage in
+Aristotle-applied it to the spheres of art and religion. In Vom Nutzen
+und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben, he speaks of the "aeternisierenden Mächten der Kunst und Religion."
+28. Thucydides II, 41.
+29. How the poet, and especially Homer, bestowed immortality
+upon mortal men and futile deeds, we can still read in Pindar's Odesnow rendered into English by Richmond Lattimore, Chicago, 1955.
+See, for instance, "Isthmia" IV: 60 ff.; "Nemea" IV: 10, and VI: 50-55.
+30. De Civitate Dei, XIX, S.
+31. Johannes Gustav Droysen, Historik (1882), München and
+Berlin, 1937, para. 82: "Was den Tieren, den Pflanzen ihr Gattungsbegrif-denn die Gattung ist, iva roù deì ai Toi Deíov ueréxwour das ist
+den Menschen die Geschichte." Droysen does not mention author or
+source of the quotation. It sounds Aristotelian.
+32. Leviathan, book I, ch. 3.
+33. Democracy in America, 2nd part, last chapter, and Ist part,
+"Author's Introduction," respectively.
+34. The first to see Kant as the theorist of the French Revolution
+was Friedrich Gentz in his "Nachtrag zu dem Räsonnement des Herrn
+Prof. Kant über das Verhältnis zwischen Theorie und Praxis" in Berliner Monatsschrift, December 1793.
+35. Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher
+Absicht, Introduction.
+36. Op. cit., Third Thesis.
+37. Hegel In The Philosophy of History, London, 1905, p. 21.
+38. Nietzsche, Wille zur Macht, no. 291.
+39. Martin Heidegger once pointed to this weird fact in a public
+discussion in Zürich (published under the title: "Aussprache mit Martin
+Heidegger am 6. November 1951," Photodruck Jurisverlag, Zürich,
+1952): ". . . der Satz: man kann alles beweisen [ist] nicht ein Freibrief,
+sondern ein Hinweis auf die Möglichkeit, dass dort, wo man beweist im
+Sinne der Deduktion aus Axiomen, dies jederzeit in gewissem Sinne
+möglich ist. Das ist das unheimlich Rätselhafte, dessen Geheimnis ich
+
+289
+bisher auch nicht an einem Zipfel aufzuheben vermochte, dass dieses
+Verfahren in der modernen Naturwissenschaft stimmt."
+40. Werner Heisenberg in recent publications renders this same
+thought in a number of variations. See for example Das Naturbild der
+heurigen Physik, Hamburg, 1956.
+3. What Is Authority?
+1. The formulation is Lord Acton's in his "Inaugural Lecture on
+the 'Study of History,'" reprinted in Essays on Freedom and Power,
+New York, 1955, p. 35.
+2. Only a detailed description and analysis of the very original
+organizational structure of totalitarian movements and the institutions
+of totalitarian government could justify the use of the onion image. I
+must refer to the chapter on "Totalitarian Organization" in my book
+The Origins of Toralitarianism, 2nd edition, New York, 1958.
+3. This was already noticed by the Greek historian Dio Cassius,
+who, when writing a history of Rome, found it impossible to translate
+the word auctoritas: Myroar aủtò kaláraę ddúvator Ёaть. (Quoted from
+Theodor Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht, 3rd edition, 1888, vol. III,
+p. 952, n. 4.) Moreover, one need only compare the Roman Senate, the
+republic's specifically authoritarian institution, with Plato's nocturnal
+council in the Laws, which, being composed of the ten oldest guardians
+for the constant supervision of the State, superficially resembles it, to
+become aware of the impossibility of finding a true alternative for coercion and persuasion within the framework of Greek political experience.
+4. MÓlIs yàp our Ë0D' iTS aropòs dol' Évós. Sophocles, Antigone,
+737.
+5. Laws, 715.
+6. Theodor Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, book I, chap. S.
+7. H. Wallon, Histoire de l'Esclavage dans l'Antiquité, Paris, 1847,
+vol. III, where one still finds the best description of the gradual loss of
+Roman liberty under the Empire caused by the constant increase of
+power of the imperial household. Since it was the imperial household
+and not the emperor who gained in power, the "despotism" which always had been characteristic of the private household and family life
+began to dominate the public realm.
+8. A fragment from the lost dialogue On Kingship states that "it
+was not only not necessary for a king to become a philosopher, but actu-
+
+290 Notes: What Is Authority?
+ally a hindrance to his work; that, however, it was necessary [for a good
+king] to listen to the true philosopher and to be agreeable to their advice.
+" See Kurt von Fritz, The Constitution of Athens, and Related
+Texts, 1950. In Aristotelian terms, both Plato's philosopher-king and
+the Greek tyrant rule for the sake of their own interest, and this was
+for Aristotle, though not for Plato, an outstanding characteristic of
+tyrants. Plato was not aware of the resemblance, because for him,
+as for Greek current opinion, the principal characteristic of the tyrant
+was that he deprived the citizen of access to a public realm, to a "market place" where he could show himself, see and be seen, hear and be
+heard, that he prohibited the yopevew and nodireveolas, confined the
+citizens to the privacy of their households, and demanded to be the
+only one in charge of public affairs. He would not have ceased to be a
+tyrant if he had used his power solely in the interests of his subjects—
+as indeed some of the tyrants undoubtedly did. According to the
+Greeks, to be banished to the privacy of household life was tantamount
+to being deprived of the specifically human potentialities of life. In
+other words, the very features which so convincingly demonstrate to
+us the tyrannical character of Plato's republic-the almost complete
+elimination of privacy and the omnipresence of political organs and institutions—presumably prevented Plato from recognizing its tyrannical
+character. To him, it would have been a contradiction in terms to brand
+as tyranny a constitution which not only did not relegate the citizen to
+his household but, on the contrary, did not leave him a shred of private
+life whatsoever. Moreover, by calling the rule of law "despotic," Plato
+stresses its non-tyrannical character. For the tyrant was always supposed to rule over men who had known the freedom of a polis and, being deprived of it, were likely to rebel, whereas the despot was assumed
+to rule over people who had never known freedom and were by nature
+incapable of it. It is as though Plato said: My laws, your new despots,
+will not deprive you of anything you rightfully enjoyed before; they
+are adequate to the very nature of human affairs and you have no more
+right to rebel against their rule than the slave has a right to rebel
+against his master.
+9. "Eternal Peace," The Philosophy of Kant, ed. and trans. C. J.
+Friedrich, Modern Library Edition, 1949, p. 456.
+10. Von Fritz, op. cit., p. 54, rightly insists on Plato's aversion to
+violence, "also revealed by the fact that, wherever he did make an attempt to bring about a change of political institutions in the direction
+of his political ideals, he addressed himself to men already in power."
+11. Werner Jaeger's statement in Paideia, New York, 1943, vol.
+II, p. 416n; "The idea that there is a supreme art of measurement and
+
+291
+that the philosopher's knowledge of values (phronesis) is the ability to
+measure, runs through all Plato's work right down to the end" is true
+only for Plato's political philosophy. The very word pórnous characterizes in Plato and Aristotle the insight of the statesman rather than the
+"wisdom" of the philosopher.
+12. The Republic, book VII, 516-517.
+13. See especially Timaeus, 31, where the divine Demiurge makes
+the universe in accordance with a modei, a mapádayua, and The Republic, 596 fl.
+14. In Protrepticus, quoted from von Fritz, op. cit.
+15. Laws, 710-711.
+16. This presentation is indebted to Martin Heidegger's great interpretation of the cave parable in Platons Lehre von der Wahrheir,
+Bern, 1947. Heidegger demonstrates how Plato transformed the concept
+of truth (ulý®ca) until it became identical with correct statements
+(oplóns). Correctness indeed, and not truth, would be required if the
+philosopher's knowledge is the ability to measure. Although he explicitly mentions the risks the philosopher runs when he is forced to return
+to the cave, Heidegger is not aware of the political context in which
+the parable appears. According to him, the transformation comes to
+pass because the subjective act of vision (the iseiv and the iséa in the
+mind of the philosopher) takes precedence over objective truth
+(ádýoca), which, according to Heidegger, signifies Unverborgenheir.
+17. Symposion, 211-212.
+18. Phaedrus, 248: ilóvodos § ilókalos, and 250.
+19. In The Republic, 518, the good, too, is called avótarov, the
+most shining one. Obviously it is precisely this quality which indicates
+the precedence which the beautiful originally had over the good in
+Plato's thought.
+20. The Republic, 475-476. In the tradition of philosophy, the
+result of this Platonic repudiation of the beautiful has been that it was
+omitted from the so-called transcendentals or universals, that is, those
+qualities possessed by everything that is, and which were enumerated
+in medieval philosophy as unum, alter, ens, and bonum. Jacques Maritain, in his wonderful book, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry,
+Bollingen Series XXXV, I, 1953, is aware of this omission and insists
+that beauty be included in the realm of transcendentals, for "Beauty is
+the radiance of all transcendentals united" (p. 162).
+21. In the dialogue Politicus: "for the most exact measure of all
+things is the good" (quoted from von Fritz, op. cit.). The notion must
+have been that only through the concept of the good do things become
+comparable and hence measurable.
+
+292
+22. Politics, 1332612 and 1332b36. The distinction between the
+younger and older ones goes back to Plato; see Republic, 412, and
+Laws, 690 and 714. The appeal to nature is Aristotelian.
+23. Politics, 1328b35.
+24. Economics, 1343al-4.
+25. Jaeger, op. cit., vol. I, p. 111.
+26. Economics, 1343624.
+27. The derivation of religio from religare occurs in Cicero. Since
+we deal here only with the political self-interpretation of the Romans,
+the question whether this derivation is etymologically correct is irrelevant.
+28. See Cicero, De Re Publica, III, 23. For the Roman belief in
+the eternity of their city, see Viktor Poeschl, Römischer Staal und
+griechisches Staatsdenken bei Cicero, Berlin, 1936.
+29. Annals, book 43, ch. 13.
+30. De Re Publica, 1, 7.
+31. Cicero, De Legibus, 3, 12, 38.
+32. Esprit des Lois, book
+XI, ch. 6.
+33. Professor Carl J. Friedrich drew my attention to the important discussion of authority in Mommsen's Römisches Staatsrecht; see
+pp. 1034, 1038-1039.
+34. This interpretation is further supported by the idiomatic Latin
+use of alicui auctorem esse for "giving advice to somebody."
+35. See Mommsen, op cit., 2nd edition, vol. I, pp. 73 ff. The Latin
+word numen, which is nearly untranslatable, meaning "divine command" as well as the divine modes of acting, derives from nuere, to
+nod in affirmation. Thus the commands of the gods and all their interference in human affairs are restricted to approval or disapproval of
+human actions.
+36. Mommsen, ibid., p. 87.
+37. See also the various Latin idioms such as auctores habere for
+having predecessors or examples; auctoritas maiorum, signifying the
+authoritative example of the ancestors; usus el auctoritas as used in Ro-
+man law for property rights which come from usage. An excellent presentation of this Roman spirit as well as a very useful collection of the
+more important source materials are to be found in Viktor Poeschl,
+op. cit., especially pp. 101 fl.
+38. R. H. Barrow, The Romans, 1949, p. 194.
+39. A similar amalgamation of Roman imperial political sentiment with Christianity is discussed by Erik Peterson, Der Monotheismus
+als politisches Problem, Leipzig, 1935, in connection with Orosius, who
+related the Roman Emperor Augustus to Christ. "Dabei ist deullich,
+
+293
+dass Augustus auf diese Weise christianisiert und Christus zum civis
+romanus wird, romanisiert worden ist" (p. 92).
+40. Duo quippe sunt ... quibus principaliter mundus hic regitur, : auctoritas sacra pontificum et regalis potestas. In Migne, PL,
+vol. 59, p. 42a.
+41. Eric Voegelin, A New Science of Politics, Chicago, 1952,
+p. 78.
+42. See Phaedo 80 for the affinity of the invisible soul with the
+traditional place of invisibility, namely, Hades, which Plato construes
+etymologically as "the invisible."
+43. Ibid., 64-66.
+44. With the exception of the Laws, it is characteristic of Plato's
+political dialogues that a break occurs somewhere and the strictly argumentative procedure has to be abandoned. In The Republic, Socrates
+eludes his questioners several times; the baffling question is whether
+justice is still possible if a deed is hidden from men and gods. The discussion of what justice is breaks down at 372a and is taken up again in
+427d, where, however, not justice but wisdom and củßoulía are defined.
+Socrates comes back to the main question in 403d, but discusses
+owoporúvy instead of justice. He then starts again in 433b and comes
+almost immediately to a discussion of the forms of government, 445d fl.,
+until the se-venth book with the cave story puts the whole argument on
+an entirely different, nonpolitical level. Here it becomes clear why
+Glaukon could not receive a satisfactory answer: justice is an idea and
+must be perceived; there is no other possible demonstration.
+The Er-myth, on the other hand, is introduced by a reversion of
+the whole argument. The task had been to find justice as such, even if
+hidden from the eyes of gods and men. Now (612) Socrates wishes to
+take back his initial admission to Glaukon that, at least for the sake of
+the argument, one would have to assume that "the just man may appear
+unjust and the unjust just" so that no one, neither god nor man, could
+definitely know who is truly just. And in its stead, he puts the assumption that "the nature both of the just and the unjust is truly known to
+the gods." Again, the whole argument is put on an entirely different
+level-this time on the level of the multitude and outside the range of
+argument altogether.
+The case of Gorgias is quite similar. Once more, Socrates is incapable of persuading his opponent. The discussion turns about the So-
+cratic conviction that it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong.
+When Kallikles clearly cannot be persuaded by argument, Plato proceeds to tell his myth of a hereafter as a kind of ultima ratio, and, in
+distinction to The Republic, he tells it with great diffidence, clearly
+
+294
+Notes: What Is Freedom?
+indicating that the teller of the story, Socrates, does not take it seriously.
+45. Imitation of Plato seems to be beyond doubt in the frequent
+cases where the motif of apparent death recurs, as in Cicero and Plutarch. For an excellent discussion of Cicero's Somnium Scipionis, the
+myth which concludes his De Re Publica, see Richard Harder, "Ueber
+Ciceros Somnium Scipionis" (Kleine Schriften, München, 1960), who
+also shows convincingly that neither Plato nor Cicero followed Pythagorean doctrines.
+46. This is especially stressed by Marcus Dods, Forerunners of
+Dante, Edinburgh, 1903.
+47. See Gorgias, 524.
+48. See Gorgias, 522/3 and Phaedo, 110. In The Republic, 614,
+Plato even alludes to a tale told by Ulysses to Alcinous.
+49. The Republic, 379a.
+50. As Werner Jaeger once called the Platonic god in Theology of
+the Early Greek Philosophers, Oxford, 1947, p. 194n.
+S1. The Republic, 615a.
+52. See especially the Seventh Letter for Plato's conviction that
+truth is beyond speech and argument.
+53. Thus John Adams in Discourses on Davila, in Works, Boston,
+1851, vol. VI, p. 280.
+54. From the draft Preamble to the Constitution of Massachusetts,
+Works, vol. IV, 221.
+55. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ch. 2.
+56. The Prince, ch. 15.
+57. The Prince, ch. 8.
+58. See especially the Discourses, book III, ch. 1.
+59. It is curious to see how seldom Cicero's name occurs in
+Machiavelli's writings and how carefully he avoided him in his interpretations of Roman history.
+60. De Re Publica, VI, 12.
+61. Laws, 711a.
+62. These assumptions, of course, could be justified only by a detailed analysis of the American Revolution.
+63. The Prince, ch. 6.
+4. What Is Freedom?
+1. I follow Max Planck, "Causation and Free Will" (in The New
+Science, New York, 1959) because the two essays, written from the
+
+Notes: What Is Freedom?
+295
+standpoint of the scientist, possess a classic beauty in their nonsimplify.
+ing simplicity and clarity.
+2. Ibid.
+3. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty.
+4. See "On Freedom" in Dissertationes, book IV, 1, § 1.
+5. 1310a25 fi.
+6. Op. cit., 875.
+7. Ibid., § 118
+8. 8881 and 83.
+9. See Esprit des Lois, XII, 2: "La liberté philosophique consiste
+dans l'exercice de la volonté. ... La liberté politique consiste dans la
+sûreté."
+10. Intellectus apprehendit agibile antequam voluntas illud velit;
+sed non apprehendit determinate hoc esse agendum quod apprehendere
+dicitur dictare. Oxon. IV, d. 46, qu. 1, no. 10.
+11. John Stuart Mill, op. cit.
+12. Leibniz only sums up and articulates the Christian tradition
+when he writes: "Die Frage, ob unserem Willen Freiheir zukommi,
+bedeuter eigentlich nichts anderes, als ob ihm Willen zukomme. Die
+Ausdrücke 'frei' und 'willensgemäss' besagen dasselbe." (Schriften zur
+Metaphysik I, "Bemerkungen zu den cartesischen Prinzipien." Zu
+Artikel 39.)
+13. Augustine, Confessions, book VIII, ch. 8.
+14. We find this conflict frequently in Euripides. Thus Medea, before murdering her children, says: "and I know which evils I am about
+to commit, but duuós is stronger than my deliberations" (1078 ff.);
+and Phaedra (Hippolylus, 376 ff.) speaks in a similar vein. The point
+of the matter is always that reason, knowledge, insight, etc., are too
+weak to withstand the onslaught of desire, and it may not be accidental
+that the conflict breaks out in the soul of women, who are less under
+the influence of reasoning than men.
+15. "Insofar as the mind commands, the mind wills, and insofar
+as the thing commanded is not done, it wills not," as Augustine put it,
+in the famous ch. 9 of book VIII of the Confessions, which deals with
+the will and its power. To Augustine, it was a matter of course that
+"to will" and "to command" are the same.
+16. Augustine, ibid.
+17. Pythian Ode IV, 287-289:
+фанті бʼєриєк
+18. Esprit des Lois, XII, 2 and XI, 3.
+
+296
+Notes: The Crisis in Culture
+19. Op. cit., ibid.
+20. Ibid.
+21. See the first four chapters of the second book of The Social
+Contract. Among modern political theorists, Carl Schmitt is the most
+able defender of the notion of sovereignty. He recognizes clearly that
+the root of sovereignty is the will: Sovereign is who wills and commands. See especially his Verfassungslehre, München, 1928, pp. 7 ff.,
+146.
+22. Book XII, ch. 20.
+6. The Crisis in Culture
+1. Harold Rosenberg in a brilliantly witty essay, "Pop Culture:
+Kitsch Criticism," in The Tradition of the New, New York, 1959.
+2. See Edward Shils, "Mass Society and Its Culture" in Daedalus,
+Spring 1960; the whole issue is devoted to "Mass Culture and Mass
+Media."
+3. I owe the story to G. M. Young, Victorian England. Portrait of
+an Age, New York, 1954.
+4. For etymological origin and usage of the word in Latin, see,
+in addition to the Thesaurus linguae latinae, A. Walde, Lateinisches
+Etymologisches Wörterbuch, 1938, and A. Ernout & A. Meillet, Diclionnaire Erymologique de la Langue Latine. Histoire des Mors, Paris,
+1932. For the history of word and concept since antiquity, see Joseph
+Niedermann, Kultur-Werden und Wandlungen des Begrifles und
+seiner Ersatzbegrife von Cicero bis Herder, in Biblioteca dell' Archivum Romanum, Firenze, 1941, vol. 28.
+5. Cicero, in his Tusculan Dispurations, I, 13, says explicitly that
+the mind is like a field which cannot be productive without proper
+cultivation-and then declares: Cullura autem animi philosophia est.
+6. By Werner Jaeger in Antike, Berlin, 1928, vol. IV.
+7. See Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, book I, ch. 14.
+8. See the famous chorus in Antigone, 332 fl.
+9. Thucydides, II, 40.
+10. Cicero, op. cit., V, 9.
+11. Plato, Gorgias, 482.
+12. Critique of Judgment, § 40.
+13. Ibid., introduction, VII.
+14. Aristotle, who (Nicomachean Ethics, book 6) deliberately set
+the insight of the statesman against the wisdom of the philosopher,
+
+Notes: Truth and Politics
+297
+was probably following, as he did so often in his political writings.
+the public opinion of the Athenian polis.
+15. Critique of Judgment, §§ 6, 7, 8.
+16. Ibid. § 19.
+17. For the history of word and concept, see Niedermann, op.
+cit., Rudolf Pfeiffer, Humanitas Erasmiana, Studien der Bibliothek
+Warburg, no. 22, 1931, and "Nachträgliches zu Humanitas" in
+Richard Harder's Kleine Schriften, München, 1960. The word was
+used to translate the Greek aw pwnia, a word originally used of gods
+and rulers and therefore with altogether different connotations. Hu-
+manitas, as Cicero understood it, was closely connected with the old
+Roman virtue of clementia and as such stood in a certain opposition
+to Roman gravitas. It certainly was the sign of the educated man but,
+and this is important in our context, it was the study of art and literature rather than of philosophy which was supposed to result in
+"humanity."
+18. Cicero, op. cit., I, 39-40. I follow the translation by J. E.
+King in Loeb's Classical Library.
+19. Cicero speaks in a similar vein in De Legibus, 3, 1: He
+praises Atticus cuius et vita et oratio consecula mihi videtur difficillimam illam societatem gravitatis cum humanitate-"whose life and
+speech seem to me to have achieved this most difficult combination
+of gravity with humanity"-whereby, as Harder (op. cit.), points out,
+Atticus's gravity consists in his adhering with dignity to Epicurus's
+philosophy, whereas his humanity is shown by his reverence for Plato,
+which proves his inner freedom.
+7. Truth and Politics
+1. Eternal Peace, Appendix I.
+2. I quote from Spinoza's Political Treatise because it is noteworthy that even Spinoza, for whom the libertas philosophandi was the
+true end of government, should have taken so radical a position.
+3. In the Leviathan (ch. 46) Hobbes explains that "disobedience
+may lawfully be punished in them, that against the laws teach even
+true philosophy." For is not "leisure the mother of philosophy; and
+Commonwealth the mother of peace and leisure"? And does it not follow that the Commonwealth will act in the interest of philosophy
+when it suppresses a truth which undermines peace? Hence the truth-
+
+298
+Notes: Truth and Politics
+teller, in order to cooperate in an enterprise which is so necessary for
+his own peace of body and soul, decides to write what he knows "to be
+false philosophy." Of this Hobbes suspected Aristotle of all people, who
+according to him "writ it as a thing consonant to, and corroborative of
+[the Greeks'] religion; fearing the fate of Socrates." It never occurred
+to Hobbes that all search for truth would be self-defeating if its conditions could be guaranteed only by deliberate falsehoods. Then, indeed,
+everybody may turn out to be a liar like Hobbes' Aristotle. Unlike this
+figment of Hobbes' logical fantasy, the real Aristotle was of course
+sensible enough to leave Athens when he came to fear the fate of
+Socrates; he was not wicked enough to write what he knew to be
+false, nor was he stupid enough to solve his problem of survival by
+destroying everything he stood for.
+4. Ibid., ch. 11.
+S. I hope no one will tell me any more that Plato was the inventor
+of the "noble lie." This belief rested on a misreading of a crucial passage (414C) in The Republic, where Plato speaks of one of his myths—
+a "Phoenician tale"—as a Vsuõos . Since the same Greek word signifies
+"fiction," "error," and "lie" according to context—when Plato wants
+to distinguish between error and lie, the Greek language forces him to
+speak of "involuntary" and "voluntary" Yeûdos —the text can be rendered with Cornford as "bold flight of invention" or be read with Eric
+Vogelin (Order and History: Plato and Aristotle, Louisiana State
+University, 1957, vol. 3, p. 106) as satirical in intention; under no
+circumstances can it be understood as a recommendation of lying as
+we understand it. Plato, of course, was permissive about occasional lies
+to deceive the enemy or insane people-The Republic, 382; they are
+"useful ... in the way of medicine... to be handled by no one
+but a physician," and the physician of the polis is the ruler (388). But,
+contrary to the cave allegory, no principle is involved in these passages.
+6. Leviathan, Conclusion.
+7. The Federalist, no. 49.
+8. Theologico-Political Treatise, ch. 20.
+9. See "What Is Enlightenment?" and "Was heisst sich im
+Denken orientieren?"
+10. The Federalist, no. 49.
+11. Timaeus, S1D-52.
+12. See The Republic 367. Compare also Crito 49 D: "For I
+know that only a few men hold, or ever will hold, this opinion. Be-
+tween those who do and those who don't there can be no common
+deliberation; they will necessarily look upon each other with contempt
+as to their different purposes."
+
+299
+13. See Gorgias 482, where Socrates tells Callicles, his opponent.
+that he will "not be in agreement with himself but that throughour
+his life. he will contradict himself." He then adds: "I would much
+rather that the whole world be not in agreement with me and talk
+against me than that I, who am one, should be in discord with myself
+and talk in self-contradiction."
+14. For a definition of thought as the silent dialogue between me
+and myself, see especially Theatetus 189-190, and Sophist 263-264.
+It is quite in keeping with this tradition that Aristotle calls the friend,
+with whom you speak in the form of dialogue an auros ällos, another
+self.
+15. Nicomachean Ethics, book 6, especially 114069 and 114164.
+16. See Jefferson's "Draft Preamble to the Virginia Bill Establishing Religious Freedom."
+17. This is the reason for Nietzsche's remark in "Schopenhauer
+als Erzieher": "Ich mache mir aus einem Philosophen gerade so viel,
+als er imstande ist, ein Beispiel zu geben."
+18. In a letter to W. Smith, November 13, 1787.
+19. Critique of Judgmen, Paragraph 32.
+20. Ibid., Paragraph 59.
+21. For France, see the excellent article "De Gaulle: Pose and
+Policy," in Foreign Afairs, July 1965. The Adenauer quotation is from
+his Memoirs 1945-1953, Chicago, 1966, p. 89, where, however, he puts
+this notion into the minds of the occupation authorities. But he has
+repeated the gist of it many times during his chancellorship.
+22. Parts of the archive were published in Merle Fainsod,
+Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, Cambridge, Mass., 1958. See p. 374.
+8. The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man
+1. This question was asked for a "Symposium on Space" by the
+editors of Great Ideas Today (1963) with special emphasis on what
+"the exploration of space is doing to man's view of himself and to
+man's condition. The question does not concern man as a scientist, nor
+man as a producer or consumer, but rather man as human."
+2. Nicomachean Ethics, book Vl, ch. 7, 1141a20 fl.
+3. Max Planck, The Universe in the Light of Modern Physics,
+1929. Quoted from Great Ideas Today, 1962, p. 494.
+4. As quoted by J. W. N. Sullivan, Limitations of Science,
+Mentor Books, 1949, p. 141.
+
+300
+S. See Sullivan's Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, New
+York, 1958, p. 88.
+6. Ibid., p. 76.
+7. Planck, op. cit. p. 503.
+8. See Planck's Science and Humanism, London, 1951, PP.
+25-26.
+9. John Gilmore, in a sharply critical letter when this article first
+appeared in 1963, puts the matter very nicely: "During the last several
+years we have in fact succeeded in writing computer programs that
+enable these machines to exhibit behavior that anyone not familiar
+with the makeup of the programs would unhesitatingly describe as
+intelligent, even highly intelligent. Alex Bernstein, for example, has
+devised a program that enables a machine to play spectacular good
+checkers. In particular, it can play better checkers than Bernstein.
+This is an impressive achievement; but it is Bernstein's and not the
+machine's." I had been misled by a remark of George Gamow-see
+note 10—and have changed my text.
+10. George Gamow, "Physical Sciences and Technology," in
+Great Ideas Today, 1962, p. 207. Italics added.
+11. Sergio de Benedetti, as quoted by Walter Sullivan, "Physical
+Sciences and Technology," in Great Ideas Today, 1961, p. 198.
+12. Bohr, op. cit., pp.70 and 61 respectively.
+13. Planck, op. cit., pP. 493, 517, and 514 respectively.
+14. Bohr, op. cit., pp. 31 and 71 respectively.
+15. Ibid., p. 82.
+16. Planck, op. cit., PP. 509 and 505 respectively.
+17. See J. Bronowski, Science and Human Values, New York,
+1956, p. 22.
+18. See The Starry Messenger, translation quoted from Discoveries
+and Opinions of Galileo, New York, 1957, p. 28.
+19. See Einstein's Relativity, The Special and General Theory
+(1905 & 1916), quoted in Great Ideas Today, 1961, pP. 452 and 465
+respectively.
+20. Walter Sullivan, op. cit., p. 189.
+21. Ibid., p. 202.
+22. I quote from Descartes' dialogue "The Search after Truth by
+the Light of Nature," where his central position in this matter of
+doubting is more in evidence than in the Principles. See E. S. Haldane
+and G. R. T. Ross edition of his Philosophical Works, London, 1931,
+vol. I, pp. 324 and 315.
+23. I owe this definition to John Gilmore's letter, mentioned in
+note 9. Mr. Gilmore, however, does not believe that this imposes
+
+301
+limitations on the knowledge of the practicing physicist. I think that
+Heisenberg's own "popular" statements bear me out on this point. But
+this is by no means the end of this controversy. Mr. Gilmore as well as
+Mr. Denver Lindley believes that the great scientists may very well be
+wrong when it comes to evaluating philosophically their own work.
+Mr. Gilmore and Mr. Lindley accuse me of using the scientists' statements uncritically, as though they could speak about the implications
+of their work with the same authority as they talk about their subjects
+properly speaking. ("Your confidence in the great figures in the scientific community is touching," says Mr. Gilmore.) This argument, I
+think, is valid; no scientist, no matter how eminent, can ever claim
+the same soundness for "philosophical implications" he or somebody
+else discovers in his work or in his utterances about it as he could
+claim for the discoveries themselves. Philosophic truth, whatever it may
+be, is certainly not scientific truth. Still, it is difficult to believe that
+Planck and Einstein, Niels Bohr, Schrödinger and Heisenberg, all of
+whom were puzzled and greatly worried about the consequences and
+general implications of their work as practicing physicists, should all
+have been subject to the delusions of self-misunderstanding.
+24. In Philosophic Problems of Nuclear Science, New York,
+1952, p. 73.
+25. Ibid., p. 24.
+26. In The Physicist's Conception of Nature, New York, 1958,
+P 24.
+27. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
+
+INDEX OF NAMES
+Achilles, 46, 248, 263
+Adam, 66, 73
+Adams, John, 134, 176, 294
+Adeimantus, 244
+Adenauer, Konrad, 252, 299
+Alcinous, 294
+Anastasius I, Emperor, 126
+Aquinas, Thomas, 133
+Bernstein, Alex, 300
+Bohr, Niels, 267, 270, 271, 300,
+301
+Bonaparte, Napoleon, 81
+Brentano, Clemens von, 201
+Bronowski, Jacob, 300
+Bukharin, Nikolai, 256
+Burckhardt, Jacob, 18, 45
+Archimedes, 279
+Aristotle, 17-20, 22, 42, 45-47,
+63, 71, 76, 104-107, 110, 113,
+Caligula, Gaius, 106
+116-20, 130, 147, 191, 223, Camus, Albert, 283
+245, 265, 285, 286, 287, 288,
+Char, René, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 283
+289, 290, 298, 299
+Charles I (King of England), 150
+Arnold, Matthew, 203
+Charles V (Holy Roman
+em-
+Augustine, 65-66, 72-73, 126,
+peror), 228
+131, 146, 147, 157, 159, 161, Christ, Jesus, 65-67, 126, 129,
+162, 167, 287, 295
+133,167,248, 292
+Augustus, 106, 292
+Churchill, Winston, 156
+Cicero, Marcus Tullius, 41, 71.
+121, 139, 212, 213, 215, 219,
+Baillie, John, 287
+Barrow, R. H., 292
+224-25, 284, 292, 294, 296,
+297
+303
+
+304
+Clemenceau, Georges, 239, 249
+Clement of Alexandria, 131
+Cochrane, C. N., 285, 287
+Constantine the Great, 125
+Copernicus,
+Nicolaus, 56, 273,
+275
+Cornford, F. M., 284, 298
+Cullman, Oscar, 287
+Galileo, 49, 56, 230, 273
+Gamow, George, 300
+Gassendi, Pierre, 56
+Gelasius, Pope, 126
+Gentz, Friedrich, 288
+Gilmore, John, 300, 301
+Glaukon, 244, 293
+God, 77, 87, 97, 127, 133, 135
+Goethe, Johann W. von, 82, 193
+Gorgias, 293
+Gregory of Nyssa, 128
+Gregory the Great, 134
+Grotius, Hugo, 70
+De Gaulle, Charles, 252, 299
+Descartes, René, 29, 30, 38, 54-
+56,70, 275, 300
+Dinesen, Isak, 262
+Dionysus, Exiguus, 67
+Dods, M arcus, 294
+Dostoevski, Feodor M., 30, 254
+Droysen, Johannes G., 49, 53, 75,
+288
+Duns Scotus, John, 152
+Haldane, E. S., 300
+Hamlet, 192, 207
+Harder, Richard, 297
+Hector, 51-52, 262
+Hegel, Georg W., 8, 11, 18, 23,
+26, 28-30, 35, 37-39, 45, 67-
+69, 75-77, 80, 83, 85, 262, 288
+Heidegger, Martin, 288, 291
+Eddington, Sir Arthur S., 266
+Einstein, Albert, 230, 270, 273,
+274, 279, 301
+Engels, Friedrich, 19, 21, 284
+Ennius, Quintus, 122
+Ephesus, 46
+Epictetus, 147, 148, 162
+Epicurus, 297
+Ernout, A., 296
+Heine, Heinrich, 134
+Heisenberg, Werner K., 86, 276,
+277, 279, 286, 289, 301
+Heraclitus, 46, 229
+Herder, Johann C. von, 69, 82
+Herodotus, 41, 44-45, 48, 51, 64,
+166, 263, 284, 285, 287
+Hesiod, 46, 213
+Hitler, Adolf, 133, 236
+Hobbes, Thomas, 22, 56, 70, 73,
+76, 98, 128, 150, 160, 230, 231,
+233, 297-98
+Fainsod, Merle, 299
+Homer, 36-37, 48, 51, 72, 124,
+Faulkner, William, 10
+262-63, 288
+Ferdinand I (Holy Roman em- Hook, Sidney, 35
+peror), 228
+Francis, St. 248
+Friedrich, C. J., 290, 292
+Fritz, Kurt von, 290
+Jaeger, Werner, 290, 294, 296
+Janus, 121
+
+305
+Jefferson, Thomas, 246-48, 299
+Jesus of Nazareth, see Christ
+Meinecke, Friedrich, 68, 286
+Melville, Herman, 205
+Mercier de la Rivière, Paul, 240
+Mersenne, Marin, 56
+Mill, John S., 199, 294, 295
+Kafka, Franz, 7, 9-13, 14, 277,
+Minerva, 121
+283
+Mnemosyne, 43
+Kallikles, 293
+Mommsen, Theodor, 123, 287,
+Kamenev, Lev, 256
+289, 292, 296
+Kant, Immanuel, 40, 56, 82-84, Montesquieu, Charles L., 122,
+107, 110, 144, 219, 220-22,
+150, 152, 160-61, 163, 240
+228, 234, 241, 242, 244, 248,
+Muir, Willa and Edwin, 283
+288
+Murray, Gilbert, 285
+Kepler, Johann, 56
+Kierkegaard, Sören,
+25, 26, 28-
+32, 35, 38-39,94
+Koyré, Alexandre, 286
+Kristeller, Paul O., 288
+Napoleon, 81
+Newton, Isaac, 82, 273
+Niedermann, Joseph, 296, 297
+Nietzsche, Friedrich, 19, 25, 26,
+28-32, 34-35, 37-39, 55, 83,
+284, 288, 299
+Lafayette, Marie Joseph, Marquis
+de, 163
+Lattimore, Richmond, 288
+Leibniz, Gottfried, 231, 295
+Lenin, Nikolai, 19-20, 141, 256
+Lessing, Gotthold E., 80, 233-34
+Lindley, Denver, 285, 301
+Livy, 121
+Louis XIV (King of France), 199
+Luther, Martin, 56
+Origen, 128, 131
+Orosius, 66, 292
+Otto, W. F., 286
+Paine, Thomas, 163
+Parmenides, 46, 124, 157, 233
+Pascal, Blaise, 94
+Machiavelli, Niccolò, 22, 136-39,
+•Paul, 146, 157, 158, 161, 167
+140, 141, 153, 245, 294
+Pericles, 72, 213-14, 217, 219
+Madison, James, 233, 234, 235
+Peterson, Erik, 292
+Malraux, André, 8
+Pfeiffer, Rudolf, 297
+Maritain, Jacques, 291
+Phaedra, 295
+Marx, Karl, 17-26, 28-35, 38-40,
+Pindar, 106, 160, 288
+70, 77-81,83, 139, 205, 284
+Planck, Max, 269, 270, 272, 294,
+Meillet, A., 296
+299, 300, 301
+
+306
+Plato, 17-19, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30,
+Smith, W., 299
+35-40, 46-47, 68, 78, 93, 99,
+Socrates. 46, 72, 107, 114, 116,
+104-15, 118,
+120,
+124-27,
+129, 157, 159, 220, 224, 244,
+129-35, 137, 139,
+157-59,
+247, 293, 294, 298
+191, 203, 214, 220, 224, 225-
+Sophocles, 42
+226, 229-33, 235, 237, 240,
+Spinoza, Baruch, 150, 234, 297
+246, 260, 263, 285, 286, 289-
+Stalin, Joseph, 88, 236
+291, 296, 297, 298
+Pliny, 122
+Plotinus, 145
+Plutarch, 123, 294
+Poeschi, Viktor, 292
+Polybius, 194, 287
+Potëmkin, Grigori, 258
+Proust, Marcel, 200
+Pythagorean, 225, 294
+Tertullian, 131, 133
+Thrasymachus, 244
+Thucydides, 48, 51-52, 166, 213,
+288,296
+Tiberius, 106
+Tocqueville, Alexis de, 7, 77, 176,
+283
+Trotsky, Leon, 231, 252, 256
+Randall, John H., Jr., 288
+Ranke, Leopold von, 49
+Reinhardt, Karl, 283
+Rilke, Rainer Maria, 44
+Robespierre,
+Maximilien,
+134,
+139, 141, 200
+Romulus, 123
+Rosenberg, Harold, 197, 296
+Ross, G. R. T., 300
+Ross, W. D., 288
+Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 82, 163-
+164, 176, 199, 200
+Rykou, Aleksei, 256
+Ulysses, 45, 294
+Vico, Giovanni B., 50, 57-58, 77,
+82,84
+Virgil, 121
+Voegelin, Eric, 293, 298
+Walde, A., 296
+Wallon, H., 289
+Whitehead, Alfred N., 62
+Whitman, Walt, 205
+Wilson, Edmund, 24
+Wind, Edgar, 286
+Saint-Simon, Louis, Due de, 199
+Sartre, Jean-Paul, 9
+Satan, 128, 129
+Schroedinger, Erwin, 269, 270,
+286,301
+Scipio, Publius, 139
+Shakespeare, William, 151, 203
+Shils, Edward, 296
+Young, G. N., 296
+Zeus, 216
+Zinoviev, Grigori, 256
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c3566b824ff8bdd1a16d2db1ad2400ee28dee4b1c07402725a5164498e898fde.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c3566b824ff8bdd1a16d2db1ad2400ee28dee4b1c07402725a5164498e898fde.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c6a626f1cb596403c52fd612f876cd3fb3bddff0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/c3566b824ff8bdd1a16d2db1ad2400ee28dee4b1c07402725a5164498e898fde.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -9201,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "c3566b824ff8bdd1a16d2db1ad2400ee28dee4b1c07402725a5164498e898fde",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1563,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "1323a7659a22f46872eb7f817f98cff35c674840adebf475dff34155746dd8c2",
+  "output_sha256": "6980c7cd66bf424372175c891d4eb45675546e5be28041751f53a1e7abda902b",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/f0dad70798149e2ea4270bf2b14bbf19bf36e4d3e271999de5cec5bcd0806c37.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/f0dad70798149e2ea4270bf2b14bbf19bf36e4d3e271999de5cec5bcd0806c37.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a7ad2f7d0e01049ae96d7b00c1820b278d1c3aeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/f0dad70798149e2ea4270bf2b14bbf19bf36e4d3e271999de5cec5bcd0806c37.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1148 @@
+The ILIAD
+By SIMONE WEIL
+A Pendle Hill Pamphlet number 91
+
+The Iliad
+
+SIMONE WEIL
+The ILIAD
+PENDLE HILL
+P
+H
+Wallingford Pennsylvania
+
+First edition December 1956, 5000 copies
+Reprinted October 1959, 3000 copies
+Third Reprinting November 1964, 3000 copies
+Fourth Reprinting July 1967, 3000 copies
+Fifth Reprinting January 1970, 2000 copies
+Sixth Reprinting November 1971, 1500 copies
+Seventh Reprinting June 1973, 1,500 copies
+Eighth Reprinting April 1976, 3,000 copies
+Ninth Reprinting August 1978, 2,000 copies
+Tenth Reprinting January 1981, 2000 copies
+Eleventh Reprinting October 1983. 5.000 copies
+Twelfth Reprinting April 1991, 3,500 copies
+
+The Iliad, or The Poem of Force was written in the summer
+and fall of 1940, after the fall of France. It may thus be read
+as in indirect commentary on that tragic event, which signalized the triumph of the most extreme modern expression of
+force. It was originally published, under the acrostical pseudonym "Emile Novis," in the December 1940 and January
+1941 issues of the Marseilles literary monthly, Cahiers du Sud.
+The present translation is by Mary McCarthy. The quotations
+from Homer were first translated from the French manuscript
+by Miss McCarthy and then checked and revised by Dwight
+Macdonald in accordance with the Greek text. "The Iliad"
+appeared in the November 1945 issue of Politics and was later
+issued in pamphlet form.
+Pendle Hill is grateful to Dwight Macdonald for his permission to reprint the Politics pamphlet edition of Simone Weil's
+essay.
+OUR COVER: Achilles Killing Troilos, a red figured cup made by Euphronios
+and painted by Onesimos, Attic craftsmen of the early 5th century. Discovered at Vulci in Etruria, this work is now in the Perugia Museum. (Drawing
+from Edmond Pottier'sDouris and the Painters of Greek Vases, fig. 18. facing
+p. 64.)
+Books by Simone Weil: The Need for Roots, Graviry and
+Grace, Waiting for God and The Notebooks of Simone Weil,
+(G. P. Putnam, New York); Intimations of Christianity
+among the Ancient Greeks (Beacon, Boston)
+
+THE true hero, the true subject, the center of the
+Iliad is force. Force employed by man, force that enslaves
+man, force before which man's flesh shrinks away. In this
+work, at all times, the human spirit is shown as modified by
+its relations with force, as swept away, blinded, by the very
+force it imagined it could handle, as deformed by the weight
+of the force it submits to. For those dreamers who considered
+that force, thanks to progress, would soon be a thing of the
+past, the Iliad could appear as an historical document; for
+others, whose powers of recognition are more acute and who
+perceive force, today as yesterday, at the very center of human history, the Iliad is the purest and the loveliest of mirrors.
+To define force—it is that x that turns anybody who is subjected to it into a thing. Exercised to the limit, it turns man
+into a thing in the most literal sense: it makes a corpse out
+of him. Somebody was here, and the next minute there is
+nobody here at all; this is a spectacle the lliad never wearies
+of showing us:
+... the horses
+Rattled the empry chariots through the files of battle,
+Longing for their noble drivers. But they on the ground
+Lay, dearer 1o the vultures than to their wives.
+The hero becomes a thing dragged behind a chariot in the
+dust:
+All around, his black hair
+Was spread; in the dust his whole head lay,
+That once-charming head; now Zeus had let his enemies
+Defile it on his native soil.
+3
+
+The bitterness of such a spectacle is offered us absolutely
+undiluted. No comforting fiction intervenes; no consoling
+prospect of immortality; and on the hero's head no washedout halo of patriotism descends.
+His soul, fleeing his limbs, passed to Hades,
+Mourning its fate, forsaking its youth and its vigor.
+Still more poignant—so painful is the contrast—is the sudden
+evocation, as quickly rubbed out, of another world: the faraway, precarious, touching world of peace, of the family, the
+world in which each man counts more than anything else to
+those about him.
+She ordered her bright-haired maids in the palace
+To place on the fire a large tripod, preparing
+A hot bath for Hector, returning from battle.
+Foolish woman! Already he lay, far from hot baths,
+Slain by grey-eyed Athena, who guided Achilles' arm.
+Far from hot baths he was indeed, poor man. And not he
+alone. Nearly all the Iliad takes place far from hot baths.
+Nearly all of human life, then and now, takes place far from
+hot baths.
+Here we see force in its grossest and most summary form—
+the force that kills. How much more varied in its processes,
+how much more surprising in its effects is the other force, the
+force that does not kill, i.e., that does not kill just yet. It will
+surely kill, it will possibly kill, or perhaps it merely hangs,
+poised and ready, over the head of the creature it can kill, at
+any moment, which is to say at every moment. In whatever
+aspect, its effect is the same: it turns a man into a stone. From
+its first property (the ability to turn a human being into a
+thing by the simple method of killing him) flows another,
+quite prodigious too in its own way, the ability to turn a
+human being into a thing while he is still alive. He is alive; he
+4
+
+has a soul; and yet—he is a thing. An extraordinary entity this
+—a thing that has a soul. And as for the soul, what an extraordinary house it finds itself in! Who can say what it costs it,
+moment by moment, to accommodate itself to this residence,
+how much writhing and bending, folding and pleating are
+required of it? It was not made to live inside a thing; if it
+does so, under pressure of necessity, there is not a single element of its nature to which violence is not done.
+A man stands disarmed and naked with a weapon pointing
+at him; this person becomes a corpse before anybody or anything touches him. Just a minute ago, he was thinking, acting,
+hoping:
+Motionless, he pondered. And the other drew near,
+Terrified, anxious to touch his knees, hoping in his heart
+To escape evil death and black destiny...
+With one hand he clasped, suppliant, his knees,
+While the other clung to the sharp spear, not letting go...
+Soon, however, he grasps the fact that the weapon which is
+pointing at him will not be diverted; and now, still breathing,
+he is simply matter; still thinking, he can think no longer:
+Thus spoke the brilliant son of Priam
+In begging words. But he heard a harsh reply:
+He spoke. And the other's knees and heart failed him.
+Dropping his spear, he knelt down, holding out his arms.
+Achilles, drawing his sharp sword, struck
+Through the neck and breastbone. The iwo-edged sword
+Sunk home its full length. The other, face down,
+Lay still, and the black blood ran out, wetting the ground.
+5
+
+IF a stranger, completely disabled, disarmed,
+strengthless, throws himself on the mercy of a warrior, he is
+not, by this very act, condemned to death; but a moment of
+impatience on the warrior's part will suffice to relieve him of
+his life. In any case, his flesh has lost that very important property which in the laboratory distinguishes living flesh from
+dead—the galvanic response. If you give a frog's leg an
+electric shock, it twitches. If you confront a human being
+with the touch or sight of something horrible or terrifying,
+this bundle of muscles, nerves, and flesh likewise twitches.
+Alone of all living things, the suppliant we have just described
+neither quivers nor trembles. He has lost the right to do so.
+As his lips advance to touch the object that is for him of all
+things most charged with horror, they do not draw back on his
+teeth-they cannot:
+No one saw great Priam enter. He stopped,
+Clasped the knees of Achilles, kissed his hands,
+Those terrible man-killing hands that had slaughtered so
+many of his sons.
+The sight of a human being pushed to such an extreme of
+suffering chills us like the sight of a dead body:
+As when harsh misfortune strikes a man if in his own country
+He has killed a man, and arrives at last at someone else's door,
+The door of a rich man; a shudder seizes those who see him.
+So Achilles shuddered to see divine Priam;
+The others shuddered too, looking one at the other.
+But this feeling lasts only a moment. Soon the very presence
+of the suffering creature is forgotten:
+He spoke. The other, remembering his own father, longed
+1o weep;
+Taking the old man's arm, he pushed him away.
+6
+
+Both were remembering. Thinking of Hector, killer of men,
+Priam wept, abased at the feet of Achilles.
+But Achilles wept, now for his father,
+Now for Patroclus. And their sobs resounded through the
+house.
+It was not insensibility that made Achilles with a single movement of his hand push away the old man who had been clinging to his knees; Priam's words, recalling his own old father,
+had moved him to tears. It was merely a question of his being
+as free in his attitudes and movements as if, clasping his knees,
+there were not a suppliant but an inert object. Anybody who
+is in our vicinity exercises a certain power over us by his very
+presence, and a power that belongs to him alone, that is, the
+power of halting, repressing, modifying each movement that
+our body sketches out. If we step aside for a passer-by on the
+road, it is not the same thing as stepping aside to avoid a billboard; alone in our rooms, we get up, walk about, sit down
+again quite differently from the way we do when we have a
+visitor. But this indefinable influence that the presence of
+another human being has on us is not exercised by men whom
+a moment of impatience can deprive of life, who can die before even thought has a chance to pass sentence on them. In
+their presence, people move about as if they were not there;
+they, on their side, running the risk of being reduced to
+nothing in a single instant, imitate nothingness in their own
+persons. Pushed, they fall. Fallen, they lie where they are,
+unless chance gives somebody the idea of raising them up
+again. But supposing that at long last they have been picked
+up, honored with cordial remarks, they still do not venture to
+take this resurrection seriously; they dare not express a wish
+lest an irritated voice return them forever to silence:
+He spoke; the old man trembled and obeyed.
+7
+
+AT least a suppliant, once his prayer is answered,
+becomes a human being again, like everybody else. But there
+are other, more unfortunate creatures who have become
+things for the rest of their lives. Their days hold no pastimes,
+no free spaces, no room in them for any impulse of their own.
+It is not that their life is harder than other men's nor that they
+occupy a lower place in the social hierarchy; no, they are
+another human species, a compromise between a man and a
+corpse. The idea of a person's being a thing is a logical contradiction. Yet what is impossible in logic becomes true in
+life, and the contradiction lodged within the soul tears it to
+shreds. This thing is constantly aspiring to be a man or a
+woman, and never achieving it—here, surely, is death but
+death strung out over a whole lifetime; here, surely is life, but
+life that death congeals before abolishing.
+This strange fate awaits the virgin, the priest's daughter:
+I will not give her up. Sooner shall old age come upon her
+In our house in Argos, far from her native land,
+Tending the loom and sharing my bed.
+It awaits the young wife, the young mother, the prince's bride:
+And perhaps one day, in Argos, you will weave cloth for
+another,
+And the Messeian or Hyperian water you will fetch,
+Much against your will, yielding to a harsh necessity.
+It awaits the baby, heir to the royal scepter:
+Soon they will be carried of in the hollow ships,
+I with them. And you, my child, will either go with me,
+To a land where you will work at wretched tasks,
+Laboring for a pitiless master. ...
+In the mother's eyes, such a fate is, for her child, as terrible
+
+as death; the husband would rather die than see his wife reduced to it; all the plagues of heaven are invoked by the
+father against the army that subjects his daughter to it. Yet
+the victims themselves are beyond all this. Curses, feelings of
+rebellion, comparisons, reflections on the future and the past,
+are obliterated from the mind of the captive; and memory
+itself barely lingers on. Fidelity to his city and his dead is not
+the slave's privilege.
+And what does it take to make the slave weep? The misfortune of his master, his oppressor, despoiler, pillager, of the
+man who laid waste his town and killed his dear ones under
+his very eye.. This man suffers or dies; then the slave's tears
+come. And really why not? This is for him the only occasion
+on which tears are permitted, are, indeed, required. A slave
+will always cry whenever he can do so with impunity—his
+situation keeps tears on tap for him.
+She spoke, weeping, and the women groaned,
+Using the pretext of Patroclus to bewail their own torments.
+Since the slave has no license to express anything except
+what is pleasing to his master, it follows that the only emotion
+that can touch or enliven him a little, that can reach him in
+the desolation of his life, is the emotion of love for his master.
+There is no place else to send the gift of love; all other outlets
+are barred, just as, with the horse in harness, bit, shafts, reins
+bar every way but one. And if, by some miracle, in the slave's
+breast a hope is born, the hope of becoming, some day,
+through somebody's influence, someone once again, how far
+won't these captives go to show love and thankfulness, even
+though these emotions are addressed to the very men who
+should, considering the very recent past, still reek with horror
+for them:
+My husband, to whom my father and respected
+mother gave me,
+9
+
+I saw before the city transfixed by the sharp bronze.
+My three brothers, children, with me, of a single mother,
+So dear to me! They all met their fatal day.
+But you did not allow me to weep, when swift Achilles
+Slaughtered my husband and laid waste the city of Mynes.
+You promised me that I would be taken by divine Achilles,
+For his legitimate wife, that he would carry me away in his
+ships,
+To Pythia, where our marriage would be celebrated among
+the Myrmidons,
+So without respite 1 mourn for you, you who have always
+been gentle.
+To lose more than the slave does is impossible, for he loses
+his whole inner life. A fragment of it he may get back if he
+sees the possibility of changing his fate, but this is his only
+hope. Such is the empire of force, as extensive as the empire
+of nature. Nature, too, when vital needs are at stake, can
+erase the whole inner life, even the grief of a mother:
+But the thought of eating came to her, when she was tired
+of tears.
+FORCE, in the hands of another, exercises over
+the soul the same tyranny that extreme hunger does; for it
+possesses, and in perpetuo, the power of life and death. Its
+rule, moreover, is as cold and hard as the rule of inert matter.
+The man who knows himself weaker than another is more
+alone in the heart of a city than a man lost in the desert.
+Iwo casks are placed before Zeus's doorsill,
+Containing the gifts he gives, the bad in one, the good in
+the other...
+10
+
+The man 1o whom he gives baneful gifts, he exposes to
+outrage,
+A frightful need drives across the divine earth;
+He is a wanderer, and gets no respect from gods or men.
+Force is as pitiless to the man who possesses it, or thinks he
+does, as it is to its victims; the second it crushes, the first it
+intoxicates. The truth is, nobody really possesses it. The human race is not divided up, in the Iliad, into conquered persons, slaves, suppliants, on the one hand, and conquerors and
+chiefs on the other. In this poem there is not a single man
+who does not at one time or another have to bow his neck to
+force. The common soldier in the Iliad is free and has the
+right to bear arms; nevertheless he is subject to the indignity
+of orders and abuse:
+But whenever he came upon a commoner shouting out,
+He struck him with his scepter and spoke sharply:
+"Good for nothing! Be still and listen to your betters,
+You are weak and cowardly and unwarlike,
+You count for nothing, neither in battle nor in council."
+Thersites pays dear for the perfectly reasonable comments
+he makes, comments not at all different, moreover, from
+those made by Achilles:
+He hit him with his scepter on back and shoulders,
+So that he doubled over, and a great tear welled up,
+And a bloody welt appeared on his back
+Under the golden scepter. Frightened, he sat down,
+Wiping away his tears, bewildered and in pain.
+Troubled though they were, the others laughed long at him.
+Achilles himself, that proud hero, the undefeated, is shown
+us at the outset of the poem, weeping with humiliation and
+helpless griet—the woman he wanted for his bride has been
+taken from under his nose, and he has not dared to oppose it:
+11
+
+... But Achilles
+Weeping, sat apart from his companions,
+Bythe white-capped waves, staring over the boundless ocean.
+What has happened is that Agamemnon has deliberately
+humiliated Achilles, to show that he himself is the master:
+...So you will learn
+That I am greater than you, and anyone else will hesitate
+To treat me as an equal and set himself against me.
+But a few days pass and now the supreme commander is
+weeping in his turn. He must humble himself, he must plead,
+and have, moreover, the added misery of doing it all in vain.
+In the same way, there is not a single one of the combatants who is spared the shameful experience of fear. The
+heroes quake like everybody else. It only needs a challenge
+from Hector to throw the whole Greek force into consternation-except for Achilles and his men, and they did not
+happen to be present:
+He spoke and all grew still and held their peace,
+Ashamed to refuse, afraid to accept.
+But once Ajax comes forward and offers himself, fear quickly
+changes sides:
+A shudder of terror ran through the Trojans, making their
+limbs weak;
+And Hector himself felt his heart leap in his breast.
+But he no longer had the right to tremble, or to run
+away....
+Two days later, it is Ajax's turn to be terrified:
+Zeus the father on high, makes fear rise in Ajax.
+He stops, overcome, puts behind him his buckler made of
+seven hides,
+Trembles, looks at the crowd around, like a wild beast. . ..
+12
+
+Even to Achilles the moment comes; he too must shake and
+stammer with fear, though it is a river that has this effect on
+him, not a man. But, with the exception of Achilles, every man
+in the Ilaid tastes a moment of defeat in battle. Victory is less
+a matter of valor than of blind destiny, which is symbolized
+in the poem by Zeus's golden scales:
+Then Zeus the father took his golden scales,
+In them he put the iwo fates of death that cuts down all men,
+One for the Trojans, tamers of horses, one for the
+bronze-sheathed Greeks.
+He seized the scales by the middle; it was the fatal day of
+Greece that sank.
+By its very blindness, destiny establishes a kind of justice.
+Blind also is she who decrees to warriors punishment in kind.
+He that takes the sword, will perish by the sword. The Iliad
+formulated the principle long before the Gospels did, and in
+almost the same terms:
+Ares is just, and kills those who kill.
+PERHAPS all men, by the very act of being born,
+are destined to suffer violence; yet this is a truth to which circumstance shuts men's eyes. The strong are, as a matter of fact,
+never absolutely strong, nor are the weak absolutely weak,
+but neither is aware of this. They have in common a refusal to
+believe that they both belong to the same species: the weak
+see no relation between themselves and the strong, and vice
+versa. The man who is the possessor of force seems to walk
+through a non-resistant element; in the human substance that
+surrounds him nothing has the power to interpose, between
+the impulse and the act, the tiny interval that is reflection.
+13
+
+Where there is no room for reflection, there is none either for
+justice or prudence. Hence we see men in arms behaving
+harshly and madly. We see their sword bury itself in the breast
+of a disarmed enemy who is in the very act of pleading at
+their knees. We see them triumph over a dying man by
+describing to him the outrages his corpse will endure. We see
+Achilles cut the throats of twelve Trojan boys on the funeral
+pyre of Patroclus as naturally as we cut flowers for a grave.
+These men, wielding power, have no suspicion of the fact that
+the consequences of their deeds will at length come home to
+them—they too will bow the neck in their turn. If you can
+make an old man fall silent, tremble, obey, with a single word
+of your own, why should it occur to you that the curses of
+this old man, who is after all a priest, will have their own importance in the gods' eyes? Why should you refrain from
+taking Achilles' girl away from him if you know that neither
+he nor she can do anything but obey you? Achilles rejoices
+over the sight of the Greeks fleeing in misery and confusion.
+What could possibly suggest to him that this rout, which will
+last exactly as long as he wants it to and end when his mood
+indicates it, that this very rout will be the cause of his friend's
+death, and, for that matter, of his own? Thus it happens that
+those who have force on loan from fate count on it too much
+and are destroyed.
+But at the time their own destruction seems impossible to
+them. For they do not see that the force in their possession is
+only a limited quantity; nor do they see their relations with
+other human beings as a kind of balance between unequal
+amounts of force. Since other people do not impose on their
+movements that halt, that interval of hesitation, wherein lies
+all our consideration for our brothers in humanity, they conclude that destiny has given complete license to them, and
+none at all to their inferiors. And at this point they exceed the
+measure of the force that is actually at their disposal. In-
+14
+
+evitably they exceed it, since they are not aware that it is
+limited. And now we see them committed irretrievably to
+chance; suddenly things cease to obey them. Sometimes
+chance is kind to them, sometimes cruel. But in any case there
+they are, exposed, open to misfortune; gone is the armor of
+power that formerly protected their naked souls; nothing, no
+shield, stands between them and tears.
+This retribution, which has a geometrical rigor, which
+operates automatically to penalize the abuse of force, was the
+main subject of Greek thought. It is the soul of the epic. Under
+the name of Nemesis, it functions as the mainspring of
+Aeschylus's tragedies. To the Pythagoreans, to Socrates and
+Plato, it was the jumping-off point of speculation upon the
+nature of man and the universe. Wherever Hellenism has
+penetrated, we find the idea of it familiar. In Oriental countries which are steeped in Buddhism, it is perhaps this Greek
+idea that has lived on under the name of Kharma. The Occident, however, has lost it, and no longer even has a word to
+express it in any of its languages: conceptions of limit, measure, equilibrium, which ought to determine the conduct of
+life are, in the West, restricted to a servile function in the
+vocabulary of technics. We are only geometricians of matter;
+the Greeks were, first of all, geometricians in their apprenticeship to virtue.
+THE progress of the war in the Iliad is simply
+a continual game of seesaw. The victor of the moment feels
+himself invincible, even though, only a few hours before, he
+may have experienced defeat; he forgets to treat victory as a
+transitory thing. At the end of the first day of combat described in the Iliad, the victorious Greeks were in a position
+15
+
+to obtain the object of all their efiorts, i.e., Helen and her
+riches—assuming of course as Homer did, that the Greeks
+had reason to believe that Helen was in Troy. Actually, the
+Egyptian priests, who ought to have known, affirmed later on
+to Herodotus that she was in Egypt. In any case, that evening
+the Greeks are no longer interested in her or her possessions:
+"For the present, let us not accept the riches of Paris;
+Nor Helen; everybody sees, even the most ignorant,
+That Troy stands on the verge of ruin."
+He spoke, and all the Achaeans acclaimed him.
+What they want is, in fact, everything. For booty, all the
+riches of Troy; for their bonfires, all the palaces, temples,
+houses; for slaves, all the women and children; for corpses,
+all the men. They forget one detail, that everything is not
+within their power, for they are not in Troy. Perhaps they
+will be there tomorrow; perhaps not. Hector, the same day,
+makes the same mistake:
+For 1 know well in my entrails and in my hearts,
+A day will come when Holy Troy will perish,
+And Priam, and the nation of. Priam of the good lance.
+But I think less of the grief that is in store for the Trojans,
+And of Hecuba herself, and of Priam the king,
+And of my brothers, so numerous and so brave,
+Who will fall in the dust under the blows of the enemy,
+Than of you that day when a Greek in his bronze breastplate
+Will drag you away weeping and deprive you of your liberty.
+But as for me, may I be dead, and may the earth have
+covered me
+Before I hear you cry out or see you dragged away!
+At this moment what would he not give to turn aside those
+horrors which he believes to be inevitable? But at this moment
+16
+
+nothing he could give would be of any use. The next day but
+one, however, the Greeks have run away miserably, and
+Agamemnon himself is in favor of putting to the sea again.
+And now Hector, by making a very few concessions, could
+readily secure the enemy's departure; yet now he is even
+unwilling to let them go empty-handed:
+Set fires everywhere and let the brightness mount the skies
+Lest in the night the long-haired Greeks,
+Escaping, sail over the broad back of ocean ...
+Let each of them take home a wound to heal
+... thus others will fear
+To bring dolorous war to the Trojans, tamers of horses.
+His wish is granted; the Greeks stay; and the next day they
+reduce Hector and his men to a pitiable condition:
+As for them-they fled across the plain like cattle
+Whom a lion hunts before him in the dark midnight...
+Thus the mighty Agamemnon, son of Atreus, pursued them,
+Steadily killing the hindmost; and still they fled.
+In the course of the afternoon, Hector regains the ascendancy, withdraws again, then puts the Greeks to flight, then is
+repulsed by Patroclus, who has come in with his fresh troops.
+Patroclus, pressing his advantage, ends by finding himself
+exposed, wounded and without armor, to the sword of Hector.
+And finally that evening the victorious Hector hears the
+prudent counsel of Polydamas and repudiates it sharply:
+Now that wily Kronos's son has given me
+Glory at the ships; now that I have driven the Greeks to
+the sea,
+Do not ofer, fool, such counsels to the people.
+No Trojan will listen to you; nor would I permit it...
+So Hector spoke, and the Trojans acclaimed him..
+17
+
+The next day Hector is lost. Achilles has harried him across
+the field and is about to kill him. He has always been the
+stronger of the two in combat; how much the more so now,
+after several weeks of rest, ardent for vengeance and victory,
+against an exhausted enemy? And Hector stands alone, before
+the walls of Troy, absolutely alone, alone to wait for death
+and to steady his soul to face it:
+Alas, were I to slip through the gate, behind the rampart,
+Polydamas at once would heap dishonor on me ...
+And now that through my recklessness I have destroyed
+my people,
+I fear the Trojans and the long-robed Trojan women,
+I fear to hear from some one far less brave than I:
+"Hector, trusting his own strength too far, has ruined his
+people."
+•..
+Suppose I were to down my bossed shield,
+My massive helmet, and, leaning my spear against the wall,
+Should go to meet renowned Achiiles?
+••.
+But why spin out these fancies? Why such dreams?
+I would not reach him, nor would he pity me,
+Or respect me. He would kill me like a woman
+If I came naked thus ...
+Not a jot of the grief and ignominy that fall to the unfortunate
+is Hector spared. Alone, stripped of the prestige of force, he
+discovers that the courage that kept him from taking to the
+shelter of the walls is not enough to save him from flight:
+Seeing him, Hector began to tremble. He had not the heart
+To stay ...
+•.. It is not for a ewe nor the skin of an ox,
+That they are striving, not these ordinary rewards of the
+race;
+It is for a life that they run, the life of Hector, tamer of
+horses.
+18
+
+Wounded to death, he enhances his conqueror's triumph by
+vain supplications:
+I implore you, by your soul, by your knees,
+by your parents....
+But the auditors of the Iliad knew that the death of Hector
+would be but a brief joy to Achilles, and the death of Achilles
+but a brief joy to the Trojans, and the destruction of Troy but
+a brief joy to the Achaeans.
+THUS violence obliterates anybody who feels its
+touch. It comes to seem just as external to its employer as to
+its victim. And from this springs the idea of a destiny before
+which executioner and victim stand equally innocent, before
+which conquered and conqueror are brothers in the same
+distress. The conquered brings misfortune to the conqueror,
+and vice versa:
+A single son, short-lived, was born to him.
+Neglected by me, he grows old—for far from home
+I camp before Troy, injuring you and your sons.
+A moderate use of force, which alone would enable man
+to escape being enmeshed in its machinery, would require
+superhuman virtue, which is as rare as dignity in weakness.
+Moreover, moderation itself is not without its perils, since
+prestige, from which force derives at least three quarters of
+its strength, rests principally upon that marvelous indifference
+that the strong feel toward the weak, an indifference so contagious that it infects the very people who are the objects of
+it. Yet ordinarily excess is not arrived at through prudence or
+19
+
+politic considerations. On the contrary, man dashes to it as
+to an irresistible temptation. The voice of reason is occasionally heard in the mouths of the characters in the Iliad. Thersites' speeches are reasonable to the highest degree; so are the
+speeches of the angry Achilles:
+Nothing is worth my life, not all the goods
+They say the well-built city of Ilium contains..
+A man can capture steers and fatted sheep
+But, once gone, the soul cannot be captured back.
+But words of reason drop into the void. If they come from
+an inferior, he is punished and shuts up; if from a chief, his
+actions betray them. And failing everything else, there is
+always a god handy to advise him to be unreasonable. In the
+end, the very idea of wanting to escape the role fate has allotted one—the business of killing and dyingdisappears
+from the mind:
+We to whom Zeus
+Has assigned sufering, from youth to old age,
+Suffering in grievous wars, till we perish to the last man.
+Already these warriors, like Craonne's so much later, felt
+themselves to be "condemned men."
+IT was the simplest trap that pitched them into
+this situation. At the outset, at the embarkation, their hearts
+are light, as hearts always are if you have a large force on
+your side and nothing but space to oppose you. Their weapons are in their hands; the enemy is absent. Unless your spirit
+has been conquered in advance by the reputation of the en-
+20
+
+emy, you always feel yourself to be much stronger than anybody who is not there. An absent man does not impose the
+yoke of necessity. To the spirits of those embarking no necessity yet presents itself; consequently they go off as though to
+a game, as though on holiday from the confinement of daily
+life.
+Where have they gone, those braggadocio boasts
+We proudly flung upon the air at Lemnos,
+Stuffing ourselves with flesh of horned steers,
+Drinking from cups brimming over with wine?
+As for Trojans—a hundred or iwo each man of us
+Could handle in battle. And now one is too much for us.
+But the first contact of war does not immediately destroy
+the illusion that war is a game. War's necessity is terrible, altogether different in kind from the necessity of peace. So terrible is it that the human spirit will not submit to it so long
+as it can possibly escape; and whenever it can escape it takes
+refuge in long days empty of necessity, days of play, of revery,
+days arbitrary and unreal. Danger then becomes an abstraction; the lives you destroy are like toys broken by a child, and
+quite as incapable of feeling; heroism is but a theatrical gesture and smirched with boastfulness. This becomes doubly
+true if a momentary access of vitality comes to reinforce the
+divine hand that wards off defeat and death. Then war is easy
+and basely, coarsely loved.
+But with the majority of the combatants this state of mind
+does not persist. Soon there comes a day when fear, or defeat,
+or the death of beloved comrades touches the warrior's spirit,
+and it crumbles in the hand of necessity. At that moment war
+is no more a game or a dream; now at last the warrior cannot
+doubt the reality of its existence. And this reality, which he
+perceives, is hard, much too hard to be borne, for it enfolds
+death. Once you acknowledge death to be a practical pos-
+21
+
+sibility, the thought of it becomes unendurable, except in
+flashes. True enough, all men are fated to die; true enough
+also, a soldier may grow old in battles; yet for those whose
+spirits have bent under the yoke of war, the relation between
+death and the future is different than for other men. For other
+men death appears as a limit set in advance on the future; for
+the soldier death is the future, the future his profession assigns
+him. Yet the idea of man's having death for a future is abhorrent to nature. Once the experience of war makes visible the
+possibility of death that lies locked up in each moment, our
+thoughts cannot travel from one day to the next without meeting death's face. The mind is then strung up to a pitch it can
+stand for only a short time; but each new dawn reintroduces
+the same necessity; and days piled on days make years. On
+each one of these days the soul sufiers violence. Regularly,
+every morning, the soul castrates itself of aspiration, for
+thought cannot journey through time without meeting death
+on the way. Thus war effaces all conceptions of purpose or
+goal, including even its own "war aims." It effaces the very
+notion of war's being brought to an end. To be outside a situation so violent as this is to find it inconceivable; to be inside
+it is to be unable to conceive its end. Consequently, nobody
+does anything to bring this end about. In the presence of an
+armed enemy, what hand can relinquish its weapon? The
+mind ought to find a way out, but the mind has lost all capacity to so much as look outward. The mind is completely absorbed in doing itself violence. Always in human life, whether
+war or slavery is in question, intolerable sufierings continue,
+as it were, by the force of their own specific gravity, and so
+look to the outsider as though they were easy to bear; actually,
+they continue because they have deprived the sufferer of the
+resources which might serve to extricate him.
+Nevertheless, the soul that is enslaved to war cries out for
+deliverance, but deliverance itself appears to it in an extreme
+22
+
+and tragic aspect, the aspect of destruction. Any other solution, more moderate, more reasonable in character, would
+expose the mind to suffering so naked, so violent that it could
+not be borne, even as memory. Terror, griet, exhaustion,
+slaughter, the annihilation of comrades—is it credible that
+these things should not continually tear at the soul, if the intoxication of force had not intervened to drown them? The
+idea that an unlimited effort should bring in only a limited
+profit or no profit at all is terribly painful.
+What? Will we let Priam and the Trojans boast
+Of Argive Helen, she for whom so many Greeks
+Died before Troy, far from their native land?
+What? Do you want us to leave the city, wide-streeted
+Troy,
+Standing, when we have suffered so much for it?
+But actually what is Helen to Ulysses? What indeed is Troy,
+full of riches that will not compensate him for Ithaca's ruin?
+For the Greeks, Troy and Helen are in reality mere sources
+of blood and tears; to master them is to master frightful memories. If the existence of an enemy has made a soul destroy in
+itself the thing nature put there, then the only remedy the soul
+can imagine is the destruction of the enemy. At the same time
+the death of dearly loved comrades arouses a spirit of somber
+emulation, a rivalry in death:
+May I die, then, at once! Since fate has not let me
+Protect my dead friend, who far from home
+Perished, longing for me to dejend him from death.
+So now 1 go to seek the murderer of my friend,
+Hector. And death shall 1 find at the moment
+Zeus wills it—Zeus and the other immortal.
+It is the same despair that drives him on toward death, on the
+one hand, and slaughter on the other:
+23
+
+I know it well, my fate is to perish here,
+Far from father and dearly loved mother;
+but meanwhile
+I shall not stop till the Trojans have had their fill of war.
+The man possessed by this twofold need for death belongs, so
+long as he has not become something still different, to a different race from the race of the living.
+What echo can the timid hopes of life strike in such a
+heart? How can it hear the defeated begging for another sight
+of the light of day? The threatened life has already been relieved of nearly all its consequence by a single, simple distinction: it is now unarmed; its adversary possesses a weapon.
+Furthermore, how can a man who has rooted out of himself
+the notion that the light of day is sweet to the eyes respect
+such a notion when it makes its appearance in some futile and
+humble lament?
+I clasp right your knees, Achilles. Have a thought,
+have pity for me.
+I stand here, O son of Zeus, a suppliant, to be respected.
+In your house it was I first tasted Demeter's bread,
+That day in my well-pruned vineyard you caught me
+And sold me, sending me far from father and friends,
+To holy Lemnos; a hundred oxen was my price.
+And now I will pay you three hundred for ransom.
+This dawn is for me my swelfth day in Troy,
+After so many sorrows. See me here, in your hands,
+Through some evil fate. Zeus surely must hate me
+Who again puts me into your hands. Alas, my poor
+mother, Laothoe,
+Daughter of the old man, Altes-a short-lived son you
+have borne.
+What a reception this feeble hope gets!
+24
+
+Come, friend, you too must die. Why make a fuss about it?
+Patroclus, he too has died—a far better man than you are.
+Don't you see how handsome I am, how mighty?
+A noble father begat me, and I have a goddess for mother.
+Yet even I, like you, must some day encounter my fate,
+Whether the hour strikes at noon, or evening, or sunrise,
+The hour that comes when some arms-bearing warrior will
+kill me.
+To respect life in somebody else when you have had to castrate yourself of all yearning for it demands a truly heartbreaking exertion of the powers of generosity. It is impossible
+to imagine any of Homer's warriors being capable of such an
+exertion, unless it is that warrior who dwells, in a peculiar
+way, at the very center of the poem— mean Patroclus, who
+"knew how to be sweet to everybody," and who throughout
+the Iliad commits no cruel or brutal act. But then how many
+men do we know, in several thousand years of human history,
+who would have displayed such god-like generosity? Two or
+three?-even this is doubtful. Lacking this generosity, the
+conquering soldier is like a scourge of nature. Possessed by
+war, he, like the slave, becomes a thing, though his manner
+of doing so is different—over him too, words are as powerless
+as over matter itself. And both, at the touch of force, experience its inevitable effects: they become deaf and dumb.
+SUcH is the nature of force. Its power of converting a man into a thing is a double one, and in its application double-edged. To the same degree, though in different
+fashions, those who use it and those who endure it are turned
+to stone. This property of force achieves its maximum effec-
+25
+
+tiveness during the clash of arms, in battle, when the tide of
+the day has turned, and everything is rushing toward a decision. It is not the planning man, the man of strategy, the man
+acting on the resolution taken, who wins or loses a battle;
+battles are fought and decided by men deprived of these faculties, men who have undergone a transformation, who have
+dropped either to the level of inert matter, which is pure passivity, or to the level of blind force, which is pure momentum.
+Herein lies the last secret of war, a secret revealed by the Iliad
+in its similes, which liken the warriors either to fire, flood,
+wind, wild beasts, or God knows what blind cause of disaster,
+or else to frightened animals, trees, water, sand, to anything
+in nature that is set into motion by the violence of external
+forces. Greeks and Trojans, from one day to the next, sometimes even from one hour to the next, experience, turn and
+turn about, one or the other of these transmutations:
+As when a lion, murderous, springs among the cattle
+Which by thousands are grazing over some vast marshy
+field....
+And their flanks heave with terror; even so the Achaians
+Scattered in panic before Hector and Zeus, the great
+father.
+As when a ravening fire breaks out deep in a bushy wood
+And the wheeling wind scatters sparks far and wide,
+And trees, root and branch, topple over in flames;
+So Atreus' son, Agamemnon, roared through the ranks
+Of the Trojans in flight. ...
+The art of war is simply the art of producing such transformations, and its equipment, its processes, even the casualties
+it inflicts on the enemy, are only means directed toward this
+end—its true object is the warrior's soul. Yet these transformations are always a mystery; the gods are their authors, the
+26
+
+gods who kindle men's imagination. But however caused, this
+petrifactive quality of force, two-fold always, is essential to
+its nature; and a soul which has entered the province of force
+will not escape this except by a miracle. Such miracles are
+rare and of brief duration.
+THE wantonness of the conqueror that knows no
+respect for any creature or thing that is at its mercy or is
+imagined to be so, the despair of the soldier that drives him
+on to destruction, the obliteration of the slave or the conquered man, the wholesale slaughter-all these elements
+combine in the Iliad to make a picture of uniform horror, of
+which force is the sole hero. A monotonous desolation would
+result were it not for those few luminous moments, scattered
+here and there throughout the poem, those brief, celestial
+moments in which man possesses his soul. The soul that
+awakes then, to live for an instant only and be lost almost at
+once in force's vast kingdom, awakes pure and whole; it contains no ambiguities, nothing complicated or turbid; it has no
+room for anything but courage and love. Sometimes it is in
+the course of inner deliberations that a man finds his soul: he
+meets it, like Hector before Troy, as he tries to face destiny
+on his own terms, without the help of gods or men. At other
+times, it is in a moment of love that men discover their souls
+—and there is hardly any form of pure love known to humanity of which the Iliad does not treat. The tradition of hospitality persists, even through several generations, to dispel
+the blindness of combat.
+27
+
+Thus I am for you a beloved guest in the breast of Argos...
+Let us turn our lances away from each other, even in battle.
+The love of the son for the parents, of father for son, of
+mother for son, is continually described, in a manner as
+touching as it is curt:
+Thetis answered, shedding tears,
+"You were born to me for a short life, my child, as you
+say..."
+Even brotherly love:
+My three brothers whom the same mother bore for me,
+So dear....
+Conjugal love, condemned to sorrow, is of an astonishing
+purity. Imaging the humiliations of slavery which await a
+beloved wife, the husband passes over the one indignity which
+even in anticipation would stain their tenderness.
+What
+could be simpler than the words spoken by his wife to the
+man about to die?
+... Better for me
+Losing you, to go under the earth. No other comfort
+Will remain, when you have encountered your death-heavy
+fate,
+Only grief, only sorrow....
+Not less touching are the words expressed to a dead husband:
+Dear husband, you died young, and left me your widow
+Alone in the palace. Our child is still tiny,
+The child you and I, crossed by fate, had together.
+I think he will never grow up ...
+For not in your bed did you die, holding my hand
+And speaking to me prudent words which forever
+Night and day, as / weep, might live in my memory.
+28
+
+The most beautiful friendship of all, the friendship between
+comrades-at-arms, is the final theme of The Epic:
+•.. But Achilles
+Wept, dreaming of the beloved comrade; sleep, allprevailing,
+Would not take him; he turned over again and again.
+But the purest triumph of love, the crowning grace of war, is
+the friendship that floods the hearts of mortal enemies. Before
+it a murdered son or a murdered friend no longer cries out
+for vengeance. Before it-even more miraculous—the distance between benefactor and suppliant, between victor and
+vanquished, shrinks to nothing:
+But when thirst and hunger had been appeased,
+Then Dardanian Priam fell to admiring Achilles.
+How tall he was, and handsome; he had the face of a god;
+And in his turn Dardanian Priam was admired by Achilles,
+Who watched his handsome face and listened to his words.
+And when they were satisfied with contemplation of each
+other...
+These moments of grace are rare in the lliad, but they are
+enough to make us feel with sharp regret what it is that violence has killed and will kill again.
+HOWEVER, such a heaping-up of violent deeds
+would have a frigid effect, were it not for the note of incurable bitterness that continually makes itself heard, though
+often only a single word marks its presence, often a mere
+stroke of the verse, or a run-on line. It is in this that the Iliad
+is absolutely unique, in this bitterness that proceeds from
+29
+
+tenderness and that spreads over the whole human race, impartial as sunlight. Never does the tone lose its coloring of
+bitterness; yet never does the bitterness drop into lamentation.
+Justice and love, which have hardly any place in this study
+of extremes and of unjust acts of violence, nevertheless bathe
+the work in their light without ever becoming noticeable
+themselves, except as a kind of accent. Nothing precious is
+scorned, whether or not death is its destiny; everyone's unhappiness is laid bare without dissimulation or disdain; no
+man is set above or below the condition common to all men;
+whatever is destroyed is regretted. Victors and vanquished
+are brought equally near us; under the same head, both are
+seen as counterparts of the poet, and the listener as well. If
+there is any difference, it is that the enemy's misfortunes are
+possibly more sharply felt.
+So he fell there, put to sleep in the sleep of bronze,
+Unhappy man, far from his wife, defending his own
+people....
+And what accents echo the fate of the lad Achilles sold at
+Lemnos!
+Eleven days he rejoiced his heart among those he
+loved,
+Returning from Lemnos; the iwelfth day, once more,
+God delivered him into the hands of Achilles,
+To him who had to send him, unwilling, to Hades.
+And the fate of Euphorbus, who saw only a single day of war.
+Blood soaked his hair, the hair like to the Graces'
+When Hector is lamented:
+... guardian of chaste wives and little children.
+In these few words, chastity appears, dirtied by force, and
+30
+
+childhood, delivered to the sword. The fountain at the gates
+of Troy becomes an object of poignant nostalgia when Hector
+runs by, seeking to elude his doom:
+Close by there stood the great stone tanks,
+Handsomely built, where silk-gleaming garments
+Were washed clean by Troy's lovely daughters and
+housewives
+In the old days of peace, long ago, when the Greeks
+had not come.
+Past these did they run their race, pursued and
+pursuer.
+The whole of the Iliad lies under the shadow of the greatest
+calamity the human race can experience—the destruction of
+a city. This calamity could not tear more at the heart had the
+poet been born in Troy. But the tone is not different when the
+Achaeans are dying, far from home.
+Insofar as this other life, the life of the living, seems calm
+and full, the brief evocations of the world of peace are felt as
+pain:
+With the break of dawn and the rising of the day,
+On both sides arrows flew, men fell.
+But at the very hour that the woodcutter goes home
+1o fix his meal
+In the mountain valleys when his arms have had
+enough
+Of hacking great trees, and disgust rises in his heart,
+And the desire for sweet food seizes his entrails,
+At that hour, by their valor, the Danaans broke the
+front.
+Whatever is not war, whatever war destroys or threatens, the
+Iliad wraps in poetry; the realities of war, never. No reticence
+veils the step from life to death:
+31
+
+Then his teeth flew out; from iwo sides,
+Blood came to his eyes; the blood that from lips and
+nostrils
+He was spilling, open-mouthed; death enveloped him
+in its black cloud.
+The cold brutality of the deeds of war is left undisguised;
+neither victors nor vanquished are admired, scorned, or hated.
+Almost always, fate and the gods decide the changing lot of
+battle. Within the limits fixed by fate, the gods determine with
+sovereign authority victory and defeat. It is always they who
+provoke those fits of madness, those treacheries, which are forever blocking peace; war is their true business; their only
+motives, caprice and malice. As for the warriors, victors or
+vanquished, those comparisons which liken them to beasts or
+things can inspire neither admiration nor contempt, but only
+regret that men are capable of being so transformed.
+THERE may be, unknown to us, other expressions of the extraorainary sense of equity which breathes
+through the Iliad; certainly it has not been imitated. One is
+barely aware that the poet is a Greek and not a Trojan. The
+tone of the poem furnishes a direct clue to the origin of its
+oldest portions; history perhaps will never be able to tell us
+more. If one believes with Thucydides that eighty years after
+the fall of Troy, the Achaeans in their turn were conquered,
+one may ask whether these songs, with their rare references to
+iron, are not the songs of a conquered people, of whom a few
+went into exile. Obliged to live and die, "very far from the
+homeland," like the Greeks who fell before Troy, having lost
+their cities like the Trojans, they saw their own image both in
+32
+
+the conquerors, who had been their fathers, and in the conquered, whose misery was like their own. They could still
+see the Trojan war over that brief span of years in its true
+light, unglossed by pride or shame. They could look at it as
+conquered and as conquerors simultaneously, and so perceive
+what neither conqueror nor conquered ever saw, for both
+were blinded. Of course, this is mere fancy; one can see such
+distant times only in fancy's light.
+IN any case, this poem is a miracle. Its bitterness
+is the only justifiable bitterness, for it springs from the subjections of the human spirit to force, that is, in the last
+analysis, to matter. This subjection is the common lot, although each spirit will bear it differently, in proportion to its
+own virtue. No one in the Iliad is spared by it, as no one on
+earth is. No one who succumbs to it is by virtue of this fact
+regarded with contempt. Whoever, within his own soul and in
+human relations, escapes the dominion of force is loved but
+loved sorrowfully because of the threat of destruction that
+constantly hangs over him.
+Such is the spirit of the only true epic the Occident possesses. The Odyssey seems merely a good imitation, now of
+the Iliad, now of Oriental poems; the Aeneid is an imitation
+which, however brilliant, is disfigured by frigidity, bombast,
+and bad taste. The chansons de geste, lacking the sense of
+equity, could not attain greatness: in the Chanson de Roland,
+the death of an enemy does not come home to either author
+or reader in the same way as does the death of Roland.
+Attic tragedy, or at any rate the tragedy of Aeschylus and
+Sophocles, is the true continuation of the epic. The conception of justice enlightens it, without ever directly intervening
+33
+
+in it; here force appears in its coldness and hardness, always
+attended by eflects from whose fatality neither those who use
+it nor those who sufier it can escape; here the shame of the
+coerced spirit is neither disguised, nor enveloped in facile pity,
+nor held up to scorn; here more than one spirit bruised and
+degraded by misfortune is offered for our admiration. The
+Gospels are the last marvelous expression of the Greek genius,
+as the Iliad is the first: here the Greek spirit reveals itself not
+only in the injunction given mankind to seek above all other
+goods, "the kingdom and justice of our Heavenly Father," but
+also in the fact that human suffering is laid bare, and we see
+it in a being who is at once divine and human. The accounts
+of the Passion show that a divine spirit, incarnate, is changed
+by misfortune, trembles before suffering and death, feels itself,
+in the depths of its agony, to be cut off from man and God.
+The sense of human misery gives the Gospels that accent of
+simplicity that is the mark of the Greek genius, and that endows Greek tragedy and the Iliad with all their value. Certain
+phrases have a ring strangely reminiscent of the epic, and it is
+the Trojan lad dispatched to Hades, though he does not wish
+to go, who comes to mind when Christ says to Peter: "Another
+shall gird thee and carry thee whither thou wouldst not." This
+accent cannot be separated from the idea that inspired the
+Gospels, for the sense of human misery is a pre-condition of
+justice and love. He who does not realize to what extent shifting fortune and necessity hold in subjection every human
+spirit, cannot regard as fellow-creatures nor love as he loves
+himself those whom chance separated from him by an abyss.
+The variety of constraints pressing upon man give rise to the
+illusion of several distinct species that cannot communicate.
+Only he who has measured the dominion of force, and knows
+how not to respect it, is capable of love and justice.
+34
+
+1 HE relations between destiny and the human soul,
+the extent to which each soul creates its own destiny, the question of what elements in the soul are transformed by merciless
+necessity as it tailors the soul to fit the requirements of shifting
+fate, and of what elements can on the other hand be preserved,
+through the exercise of virtue and through grace-this whole
+question is fraught with temptations to falsehood, temptations
+that are positively enhanced by pride, by shame, by hatred,
+contempt, indifference, by the will to oblivion or to ignorance.
+Moreover, nothing is so rare as to see misfortune fairly portrayed; the tendency is either to treat the unfortunate person
+as though catastrophe were his natural vocation, or to ignore
+the effects of misfortune on the soul, to assume, that is, that
+the soul can suffer and remain unmarked by it, can fail, in
+fact, to be recast in misfortune's image. The Greeks, generally
+speaking, were endowed with spiritual force that allowed them
+to avoid self-deception. The rewards of this were great; they
+discovered how to achieve in all their acts the greatest lucidity,
+purity, and simplicity. But the spirit that was transmitted from
+the Iliad to the Gospels by way of the tragic poets never
+jumped the borders of Greek civilization; once Greece was
+destroyed, nothing remained of this spirit but pale reflections.
+Both the Romans and the Hebrews believed themselves to
+be exempt from the misery that is the common human lot.
+The Romans saw their country as the nation chosen by
+destiny to be mistress of the world; with the Hebrews, it was
+their God who exalted them and they retained their superior
+position just as long as they obeyed Him. Strangers, enemies,
+conquered peoples, subjects, slaves, were objects of contempt
+to the Romans; and the Romans had no epics, no tragedies.
+In Rome gladiatorial fights took the place of tragedy. With
+the Hebrews, misfortune was a sure indication of sin and
+hence a legitimate object of contempt; to them a vanquished
+35
+
+enemy was abhorrent to God himself and condemned to expiate all sorts of crimes—this is a view that makes cruelty
+permissible and indeed indispensable. And no text of the Old
+Testament strikes a note comparable to the note heard in the
+Greek epic, unless it be certain parts of the book of Job.
+Throughout twenty centuries of Christianity, the Romans and
+the Hebrews have been admired, read, imitated, both in deed
+and word; their masterpieces have yielded an appropriate
+quotation every time anybody had a crime he wanted to
+justify.
+Furthermore, the spirit of the Gospels was not handed
+down in a pure state from one Christian generation to the
+next. To undergo suffering and death joyfully was from the
+very beginning considered a sign of grace in the Christian
+martyrs—as though grace could do more for a human being
+than it could for Christ. Those who believe that God himself,
+once he became man, could not face the harshness of destiny
+without a long tremor of anguish, should have understood that
+the only people who can give the impression of having risen to
+a higher plane, who seem superior to ordinary human misery,
+are the people who resort to the aids of illusion, exaltation,
+fanaticism, to conceal the harshness of destiny from their own
+eyes. The man who does not wear the armor of the lie cannot
+experience force without being touched by it to the very soul.
+Grace can prevent this touch from corrupting him, but it cannot spare him the wound. Having forgotten it too well, Christian tradition can only rarely recover that simplicity that
+renders so poignant every sentence in the story of the Passion.
+On the other hand, the practice of forcible proselytization
+threw a veil over the efiects of force on the souls of those who
+used it.
+In spite of the brief intoxication induced at the time of the
+Renaissance by the discovery of Greek literature, there has
+been, during the course of twenty centuries, no revival of the
+36
+
+Greek genius. Something of it was seen in Villon, in Shakespeare, Cervantes, Moliere, and—just once—in Racine. The
+bones of human suffering are exposed in L'Ecole des Femmes
+and in Phèdre, love being the context—a strange century
+indeed, which took the opposite view from that of the epic
+period, and would only acknowledge human suffering in the
+context of love, while it insisted on swathing with glory the
+efiects of force in war and in politics. To the list of writers
+given above, a few other names might be added. But nothing
+the peoples of Europe have produced is worth the first known
+poem that appeared among them. Perhaps they will yet rediscover the epic genius, when they learn that there is no refuge
+from fate, learn not to admire force, not to hate the enemy,
+nor to scorn the unfortunate. How soon this will happen is
+another question.
+37
+
+A Note on Simone Weil
+SIMONE WEll died in England in August 1943 at
+the age of 34.
+Simone Weil was distinguished among her classmates by a
+personality in which the moral and the intellectual were inextricably united. She assimilated as her everyday mental fare
+the highest products of art and science. When she was graduated and began to teach philosophy, mathematics and Greek
+language and literature, she continued to broaden her culture,
+going always to the great primary sources, whether it was
+Homeric poetry, Euclidian geometry, Vitruvius' rules of architecture. ... But even more than her encyclopedic knowledge,
+it was her personal honesty and her delicate sense of human
+relations that won the admiration of her pupils.
+Her temperament led her to communism, when she was
+about 20. Instinctively uniting herself with the poor and
+suffering, she preferred to associate with workers rather than
+with the political militants. In theory as well as in daily
+practice she came to know Communism, outgrowing
+it
+rapidly through experience and through her own intellectual
+efforts. She lived in Germany with the Wandervogel during
+her vacations from the University, and the first shots of the
+Civil War drew her to Spain, to seek out the humblest tasks,
+to share the trials of her comrades in misery and battle.
+Fascinated by the problem of the effect on the worker's
+psychology of modern technology and mechanization, she
+gave up teaching for two years in order to work in the Renault
+38
+
+works and other Parisian factories and to live among the
+workers.
+The ten years of her militant life were years of torment:
+physical suffering from headaches which no doctor could cure,
+and moral suffering at the thought of the cruelties inflicted
+by the totalitarian regimes and of the hideous foreshadowings
+of total warfare. She bore it with a stoic serenity sustained
+by an ardent religious feeling which brought her ever closer
+to Christianity. Simone Weil approached the most distressing
+modern problems with the missionary's calm courage; her unassuming pedagogy might serve as a model.
+During the war, after she was dismissed from her university
+post because of the racist laws imposed by the Germans, she
+accompanied her family to the United States in 1942—rе-
+luctantly, with death in her soul. She was determined to go
+back again to take part in the struggle. She soon sailed for
+England, where she entered the Gaullist organization, about
+which she had no illusions—with the determination to get
+back into France by any means. But the trip in the dead of
+winter, under wartime conditions, was disastrous for her
+health, already undermined by her quasi-ascetic way of life;
+the efforts she made to be useful aggravated her illness; and,
+finally, she would not eat more than the meagre rations the
+French themselves were then getting in France. Tuberculosis
+caused her death in a few weeks and consummated her futile
+sacrifices.
+(The above has been adapted from the article by CANDIDe and
+printed with the Politics edition of "The Iliad.")
+39
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/f0dad70798149e2ea4270bf2b14bbf19bf36e4d3e271999de5cec5bcd0806c37.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/f0dad70798149e2ea4270bf2b14bbf19bf36e4d3e271999de5cec5bcd0806c37.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..38796bf3c891e7aa28063da1d360c028e54251be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/f0dad70798149e2ea4270bf2b14bbf19bf36e4d3e271999de5cec5bcd0806c37.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -253,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "f0dad70798149e2ea4270bf2b14bbf19bf36e4d3e271999de5cec5bcd0806c37",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 96,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "17d4696d57c10eb63fc07fc87cfe69cc89d7b0c0dc279a571aca0058aed8ddfe",
+  "output_sha256": "6ac709bc2bd0f782573b62139632b6e1ba0f35f8a234c6958a6117a3ecdde497",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/fcebdffc867a6bdd23e096f50099eadf293c3206a49cddaecac9a4421ec512b2.md b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/fcebdffc867a6bdd23e096f50099eadf293c3206a49cddaecac9a4421ec512b2.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5b3dc2bc2c9425432d5e40caace98559c6d13cc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/fcebdffc867a6bdd23e096f50099eadf293c3206a49cddaecac9a4421ec512b2.md
@@ -0,0 +1,11719 @@
+M LE
+/ATE L
+FOUCAULT
+DISCIPLINE
+&
+PUNISH
+The
+BIRTH
+of the
+PRISON
+-[FOUCAULT'S]
+GENIUS IS CALLED FORTH
+INTO THE ELOQUENT
+CLARITY OF HIS PASSIONS...
+HIs BEST BOOK.
+- Wasbington Pest
+Book World
+
+Michel Foucault
+DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH
+Michel Foucault was born in Poitiers, France, in 1926. He
+lectured in universities throughout the world; served as the
+director at the Institut Français in Hamburg, Germany, and
+at the Institute de Philosophie at the Faculté des Lettres in
+the University of Clermont-Ferrand, France; and wrote
+frequently for French newspapers and reviews. At the
+time of his death in 1984, he held a chair at France's most
+prestigious institution, the Collège de France.
+
+Michel Foucault
+DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH
+The Birth of the Prison
+Translated from the French
+by Alan Sheridan
+VINTAGE BOOKS
+A DIVISION OF
+RANDOM HOUSE, INC. NEW YORK
+
+SECOND VINTAGE BOOKS EDITION, MAY 1995
+Translarion copynghe © 1977 by Alan Sheridan
+All rights reserved under International and
+Pan-American Copyright Conventions. Published
+in the United States by Random House, Inc., New York,
+and in Canada by Random House of Canada Limited,
+Toronto. Originally published in France
+as Surveiller el Puner: Naissance de la prison by
+Editions Gallimard, Paris. Copynght © 1975
+by Editions Gallimard. English translation
+onginally published in Great Britasn
+by Penguin Books, Lid.
+First American edition published by Pantheon
+Books in January 1978.
+Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
+Foucault, Michel.Translation of Surveiller
+er punır. Bibliography: p
+1. Prsons. 2. Prison discipline.
+3. Punishment. 1. Title.
+HV8666.56813 1979 365 78-11257
+ISBN 0-679-78255-2
+Manufactured in the United States of America
+23456789C
+
+Contents
+List of Plates
+Translator's Note
+PART ONE TORTURE
+1. The body of the condemned
+2. The spectacle of the scaffold
+PART TWO PUNISHMENT
+1. Generalized punishment
+2. The gentle way in punishment
+PART THREE DISCIPLINE
+I. Docile bodies
+The art of discriburions 141
+The conerol of activicy 149
+The organization of geneses I56
+The composicion of forces 16z
+2. The means of correct training
+Hierarchical observation
+170
+Normalizing judgement
+177
+The examination
+184
+3. Panopticism
+vii
+ix
+3
+32
+73
+104
+135
+170
+195
+
+PART FOUR
+PRISON
+1. Complete and austere institutions
+2. Illegalities and delinquency
+3. The carceral
+231
+257
+293
+300
+326
+
+List of Plates
+(berween pages 169 and 170)
+Medal commemorating Louis XIV's first military revue in 1668.
+= Handwriting model.
+3 Plan of the Panopticon by J. Bentham, 1843.
+4 Plan for a penitentiary by N. Harou-Romain, 1840.
+5 The Maison centrale at Rennes in 1877.
+6 Interior of the penitentiary at Stateville, United States, twentieth
+century.
+7 Bedtime at the reformatory of Mettray.
+8 Lecture on the evils of alcoholism in the auditorium of Fresnes
+prison.
+› Steam machine for the "celeriferous' correction of young boys and
+girls.
+10 L'orchopédie ou l'art de prévenir er de corriger dans les enfants les
+difformités du corps (Orthopaedics or the art of preventing and correcting deformities of the body in children) by N. Andry, 1749.
+
+Translator's Note
+Any closer translation of the French title of this book, Surveiller es punir,
+has proved unsatisfactory on various counts. To begin with, Foucault
+uses the infinitive, which, as here, may have the effect of an "impersonal
+imperative'. Such a nuance is denied us in English. More seriously the verb
+"surveiller' has no adequate English equivalent. Our noun 'surveillance'
+has an altogether too restricted and technical use. Jeremy Bentham used
+the term 'inspect' - which Foucault translates as "surveiller' - but the
+range of connotations does not correspond. 'Supervise' is perhaps closest
+of all, but again the word has different associations. 'Observe' is rather
+too neutral, though Foucault is aware of the aggression involved in any
+one-sided observation. In the end Foucault himself suggested Discipline
+and Punish, which relates closely to the book's structure.
+Another problem was posed by the French word 'supplice', which heads
+the first part of the book. For the sake of brevity have entitled this
+first part "Torture', but no single English word will cover the full range
+of the French. Here "supplice' refers specifically to the public torture and
+execution of criminals that provided one of the most popular spectacles of
+eighteenth-century France. By extension the word can also refer to any
+prolonged torture, mental as well as physical. Depending on the context,
+I have translated the word by 'torture', 'public execution' or 'scaffold'.
+The author also refers to another form of torture, "la question', the extraction of confessions by interrogation and the systematic application of
+pain. Here I have followed the accepted translation, "judicial torture'.
+References to other works are usually given not in footnotes but in an
+abbreviated form in the text itself. These references, in brackets, consist
+of the author's name and a page number; dates of publication are used to
+distinguish more than one work by an author, and roman numerals refer
+to volume numbers. Full references are to be found in the Bibliography.
+
+PART ONE
+
+I. The body of the condemned
+On 2 March 1757 Damiens the regicide was condemned 'to make
+the amende honorable before the main door of the Church of Paris,
+where he was to be 'taken and conveyed in a cart, wearing nothing
+but a shirt, holding a torch of burning wax weighing two pounds;
+then, 'in the said cart, to the Place de Grève, where, on a scaffold
+that will be erected there, the flesh will be tom from his breasts,
+arms, thighs and calves with red-hot pincers, his right hand, holding
+the knife with which he committed the said parricide, burnt with
+sulphur, and, on those places where the flesh will be torn away,
+poured molten lead, boiling oil, burning resin, wax and sulphur
+melted together and then his body drawn and quartered by four
+horses and his limbs and body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes
+and his ashes thrown to the winds' (Pièces originales ..., 372-4).
+'Finally, he was quartered, ' recounts the Gazerre d'Amsterdam of
+1 April 1757. "This last operation was very long, because the horses
+used were not accustomed to drawing; consequently, instead of
+four, six were needed; and when that did not suffice, they were
+forced, in order to cut off the wretch's thighs, to sever the sinews
+and hack at the joints...
+'It is said that, though he was always a great swearer, no blasphemy escaped his lips; but the excessive pain made him utter
+horrible cries, and he often repeated: "My God, have pity on me!
+Jesus, help me!" The spectators were all edified by the solicitude
+of the parish priest of St Paul's who despite his great age did not
+spare himself in offering consolation to the patient.'
+Bouton, an officer of the watch, left us his account: "The sulphur
+was lit, but the flame was so poor that only the top skin of the hand
+was burnt, and that only slightly. Then the executioner, his sleeves
+rolled up, took the steel pincers, which had been especially made
+3
+
+for the occasion, and which were about a foot and a half long, and
+pulled first at the calf of the right leg, then at the thigh, and from
+there at the two fleshy parts of the right arm; then at the breasts.
+Though a strong, sturdy fellow, this executioner found it so difficult
+to tear away the pieces of flesh that he set about the same spot two or
+three times, twisting the pincers as he did so, and what he took away
+formed at each part a wound about the size of a six-pound crown
+piece.
+"After these tearings with the pincers, Damiens, who cried out
+profusely, though without swearing, raised his head and looked at
+himself; the same executioner dipped an iron spoon in the pot containing the boiling potion, which he poured liberally over each
+wound. Then the ropes that were to be harnessed to the horses were
+attached with cords to the patient's body; the horses were then
+harnessed and placed alongside the arms and legs, one at each
+limb.
+'Monsieur Le Breton, the clerk of the court, went up to the
+patient several times and asked him if he had anything to say. He
+said he had not; at each torment, he cried out, as the damned in hell
+are supposed to cry out, "Pardon, my God! Pardon, Lord."
+Despite all this pain, he raised his head from time to time and looked
+at himself boldly. The cords had been tied so tightly by the men
+who pulled the ends that they caused him indescribable pain.
+Monsieur le Breton went up to him again and asked him if he had
+anything to say; he said no. Several confessors went up to him and
+spoke to him at length; he willingly kissed the crucifix that was held
+out to him; he opened his lips and repeated: "Pardon, Lord."
+"The horses tugged hard, each pulling straight on a limb, each
+horse held by an executioner. After a quarter of an hour, the same
+ceremony was repeated and finally, after several attempts, the
+direction of the horses had to be changed, thus: those at the arms
+were made to pull towards the head, those at the thighs towards the
+arms, which broke the arms at the joints. This was repeated several
+times without success. He raised his head and looked at himself.
+Two more horses had to be added to those harnessed to the thighs,
+which made six horses in all. Without success.
+Finally, the executioner, Samson, said to Monsieur Le Breton
+that there was no way or hope of succeeding, and told him to ask
+4
+
+their Lordships if they wished him to have the prisoner cut into
+pieces. Monsieur Le Breton, who had come down from the town,
+ordered that renewed efforts be made, and this was done; but the
+horses gave up and one of those harnessed to the thighs fell to the
+ground. The confessors returned and spoke to him again. He said
+to them (I heard him): "Kiss me, gentlemen." The parish priest of
+St Paul's did not dare to, so Monsieur de Marsilly slipped under the
+rope holding the left arm and kissed him on the forehead. The
+executioners gathered round and Damiens told them not to swear,
+to carry out their task and that he did not think ill of them; he
+begged them to pray to God for him, and asked the parish priest
+of St Paul's to pray for him at the first mass.
+'After two or three attempts, the executioner Samson and he who
+had used the pincers each drew out a knife from his pocket and cut
+the body at the thighs instead of severing the legs at the joints; the
+four horses gave a tug and carried off the two thighs after them,
+namely, that of the right side first, the other following; then the
+same was done to the arms, the shoulders, the arm-pits and the four
+limbs; the flesh had to be cut almost to the bone, the horses pulling
+hard carried off the right arm first and the other afterwards.
+When the four limbs had been pulled away, the confessors came
+to speak to him; but his executioner told them that he was dead,
+though the truth was that I saw the man move, his lower jaw moving
+from side to side as if he were talking. One of the executioners even
+said shortly afterwards that when they had lifted the trunk to throw
+it on the stake, he was still alive. The four limbs were untied from
+the ropes and thrown on the stake set up in the enclosure in line
+with the scaffold, then the trunk and the rest were covered with logs
+and faggots, and fire was put to the straw mixed with this wood.
+*•.. In accordance with the decree, the whole was reduced to
+ashes. The last piece to be found in the embers was still burning at
+half-past ten in the evening. The pieces of flesh and the trunk had
+taken about four hours to burn. The officers of whom I was one,
+as also was my son, and a detachment of archers remained in the
+square until nearly eleven o'clock.
+"There were those who made something of the fact that a dog
+had lain the day before on the grass where the fire had been, had
+been chased away several times, and had always returned. But it is
+
+not difficult to understand that an animal found this place warmer
+than elsewhere' (quoted in Zevaes, 201-14).
+Eighty years later, Léon Faucher drew up his rules 'for the House
+of young prisoners in Paris':
+"Art. 17. The prisoners' day will begin at six in the morning in
+winter and at five in summer. They will work for nine hours a day
+throughout the year. Two hours a day will be devoted to instruction. Work and the day will end at nine o'clock in winter and at
+eight in summer.
+Art. 18. Rising. At the first drum-roll, the prisoners must rise and
+dress in silence, as the supervisor opens the cell doors. At the second
+drum-roll, they must be dressed and make their beds. At the third,
+they must line up and proceed to the chapel for morning prayer.
+There is a five-minute interval between each drum-roll.
+Art. 19. The prayers are conducted by the chaplain and followed
+by a moral or religious reading. This exercise must not last more
+than half an hour.
+Art. 20. Work. At a quarter to six in the summer, a quarter to
+seven in winter, the prisoners go down into the courtyard where
+they must wash their hands and faces, and receive their first ration
+of bread. Immediately afterwards, they form into work-teams and
+go off to work, which must begin at six in summer and seven in
+winter.
+Art. 21. Meal. At ten o'clock the prisoners leave their work and
+go to the refectory; they wash their hands in their courtyards and
+assemble in divisions. After the dinner, there is recreation until
+twenty minutes to eleven.
+Art. 22. School. At twenty minutes to eleven, at the drum-roll,
+the prisoners form into ranks, and proceed in divisions to the
+school. The class lasts two hours and consists alternately of reading,
+writing, drawing and arithmetic.
+Art. 23. At twenty minutes to one, the prisoners leave the
+school, in divisions, and return to their courtyards for recreation.
+At five minutes to one, at the drum-roll, they form into workteams.
+Art. 24. At one o'clock they must be back in the workshops: they
+work until four o'clock.
+
+Art. 25. At four o'clock the prisoners leave their workshops and
+go into the courtyards where they wash their hands and form into
+divisions for the refectory.
+Art. 26. 'Supper and the recreation that follows it last until five
+o'clock: the prisoners then return to the workshops.
+Art. 27. At seven o'clock in the summer, at eight in winter,
+work stops; bread is distributed for the last time in the workshops.
+For a quarter of an hour one of the prisoners or supervisors reads a
+passage from some instructive or uplifting work. This is followed
+by evening prayer.
+Art. 28. At half-past seven in summer, half-past eight in winter,
+the prisoners must be back in their cells after the washing of hands
+and the inspection of clothes in the courtyard; at the first drum-roll,
+they must undress, and at the second get into bed. The cell doors
+are closed and the supervisors go the rounds in the corridors, to
+ensure order and silence' (Faucher, 274-82).
+We have, then, a public execution and a time-table. They do not
+punish the same crimes or the same type of delinquent. But they
+each define a certain penal style. Less than a century separates them.
+It was a time when, in Europe and in the United States, the entire
+economy of punishment was redistributed. It was a time of great
+"scandals' for traditional justice, a time of innumerable projects for
+reform. It saw a new theory of law and crime, a new moral or political justification of the right to punish; old laws were abolished, old
+customs died out. 'Modern' codes were planned or drawn up:
+Russia, 1769; Prussia, 1780; Pennsylvania and Tuscany, 1786;
+Austria, 1788; France, 1791, Year IV, 1808 and 181o. It was a new
+age for penal justice.
+Among so many changes, I shall consider one: the disappearance
+of torture as a public spectacle. Today we are rather inclined to ignore it; perhaps, in its time, it gave rise to too much infiated rhetoric;
+perhaps it has been attributed too readily and too emphatically to a
+process of 'humanization', thus dispensing with the need for further
+analysis. And, in any case, how important is such a change, when
+compared with the great institutional transformations, the formulation of explicit, general codes and unified rules of procedure; with
+the almost universal adoption of the jury system, the definition of
+7
+
+the essentially corrective character of the penalty and the tendency,
+which has become increasingly marked since the nineteenth century,
+to adapt punishment to the individual offender? Punishment of a
+less immediately physical kind, a certain discretion in the art of
+inflicting pain, a combination of more subtle, more subdued sufferings, deprived of their visible display, should not all this be treated
+as a special case, an incidental effect of deeper changes? And yet the
+fact remains that a few decades saw the disappearance of the tortured, dismembered, amputated body, symbolically branded on face
+or shoulder, exposed alive or dead to public view. The body as the
+major target of penal repression disappeared.
+By the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth
+century, the gloomy festival of punishment was dying out, though
+here and there it flickered momentarily into life. In this transformation, two processes were at work. They did not have quite the same
+chronology or the same raison d'être. The first was the disappearance
+of punishment as a spectacle. The ceremonial of punishment tended
+to decline; it survived only as a new legal or administrative practice.
+The amende honorable was first abolished in France in 1791, then
+again in 183o after a brief revival; the pillory was abolished in
+France in 1789 and in England in 1837. The use of prisoners in
+public works, cleaning city streets or repairing the highways, was
+practised in Austria, Switzerland and certain of the United States,
+such as Pennsylvania. These convicts, distinguished by their
+"infamous dress' and shaven heads, were brought before the public.
+The sport of the idle and the vicious, they often become incensed,
+and naturally took violent revenge upon the aggressors. To prevent
+them from returning injuries which might be inflicted on them,
+they were encumbered with iron collars and chains to which bombshells were attached, to be dragged along while they performed their
+degrading service, under the eyes of keepers armed with swords,
+blunderbusses and other weapons of destruction' (Roberts Vaux,
+Notices, 21, quoted in Teeters, 1937, 24). This practice was abolished
+practically everywhere at the end of the eighteenth or the beginning
+of the nineteenth century. The public exhibition of prisoners was
+maintained in France in 1831, despite violent criticism - 'a disgusting scene', said Réal (cf. Bibliography); it was finally abolished in
+April 1848. While the chain-gang, which had dragged convicts
+
+across the whole of France, as far as Brest and Toulon, was replaced
+in 1837 by inconspicuous black-painted cell-carts. Punishment had
+gradually ceased to be a spectacle. And whatever theatrical elements
+it still retained were now downgraded, as if the functions of the
+penal ceremony were gradually ceasing to be understood, as if this
+rite that "concluded the crime' was suspected of being in some
+undesirable way linked with it. It was as if the punishment was
+thought to equal, if not to exceed, in savagery the crime itself, to
+accustom the spectators to a ferocity from which one wished to
+divert them, to show them the frequency of crime, to make the
+executioner resemble a criminal, judges murderers, to reverse roles
+at the last moment, to make the tortured criminal an object of pity
+or admiration. As early as 1764, Beccaria remarked: "The murder
+that is depicted as a horrible crime is repeated in cold blood,
+remorselessly' (Beccaria, IOI). The public execution is now seen as
+a hearth in which violence bursts again into flame.
+Punishment, then, will tend to become the most hidden part of
+the penal process. This has several consequences: it leaves the
+domain of more or less everyday perception and enters that of
+abstract consciousness; its effectiveness is seen as resulting from its
+inevitability, not from its visible intensity; it is the certainty of being
+punished and not the horrifying spectacle of public punishment that
+must discourage crime; the exemplary mechanics of punishment
+changes its mechanisms. As a result, justice no longer takes public
+responsibility for the violence that is bound up with its practice.
+If it too strikes, if it too kills, it is not as a glorification of its strength,
+but as an element of itself that it is obliged to tolerate, that it finds
+difficult to account for. The apportioning of blame is redistributed:
+in punishment-as-spectacle a confused horror spread from the
+scaffold; it enveloped both executioner and condemned; and, although it was always ready to invert the shame inflicted on the
+victim into pity or glory, it often turned the legal violence of the
+executioner into shame. Now the scandal and the light are to be
+distributed differently; it is the conviction itself that marks the
+offender with the unequivocally negative sign: the publicity has
+shifted to the trial, and to the sentence; the execution itself is like an
+additional shame that justice is ashamed to impose on the condemned man; so it keeps its distance from the act, tending always to
+
+entrust it to others, under the seal of secrecy. It is ugly to be punishable, but there is no glory in punishing. Hence that double system
+of protection that justice has set up between itself and the punishment it imposes. Those who carry out the penalty tend to
+become an autonomous sector; justice is relieved of responsibility
+for it by a bureaucratic concealment of the penalty itself. It is
+typical that in France the administration of the prisons should for so
+long have been the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior,
+while responsibility for the bagnes, for penal servitude in the convict
+ships and penal settlements, lay with the Ministry of the Navy or
+the Ministry of the Colonies. And beyond this distribution of roles
+operates a theoretical disavowal: do not imagine that the sentences
+that we judges pass are activated by a desire to punish; they are
+intended to correct, reclaim, "cure'; a technique of improvement
+represses, in the penalty, the strict expiation of evil-doing, and
+relieves the magistrates of the demeaning task of punishing. In
+modern justice and on the part of those who dispense it there is a
+shame in punishing, which does not always preclude zeal. This
+sense of shame is constantly growing: the psychologists and the
+minor civil servants of moral orthopaedics proliferate on the wound
+it leaves.
+The disappearance of public executions marks therefore the decline
+of the 'spectacle; but it also marks a slackening of the hold on the
+body. In 1787, in an address to the Society for Promoting Political
+Enquiries, Benjamin Rush remarked: 'I can only hope that the time
+is not far away when gallows, pillory, scaffold, flogging and wheel
+will, in the history of punishment, be regarded as the marks of the
+barbarity of centuries and of countries and as proofs of the feeble
+influence of reason and religion over the human mind' (Teeters,
+1935,30). Indeed, sixty years later, Van Meenen, opening the second
+penitentiary congress, in Brussels, recalled the time of his childhood
+as of a past age: 'I have seen the ground strewn with wheels,
+gibbets, gallows, pillories; I have seen hideously stretched skeletons
+on wheels' (Annales de la Charité, 529-30). Branding had been
+abolished in England (1834) and in France (1832); in 1820, England
+no longer dared to apply the full punishment reserved for traitors
+(Thistlewood was not quartered). Only flogging still remained in a
+number of penal systems (Russia, England, Prussia). But, generally
+IO
+
+speaking, punitive practices had become more reticent. One no
+longer touched the body, or at least as little as possible, and then
+only to reach something other than the body itself. It might be
+objected that imprisonment, confinement, forced labour, penal
+servitude, prohibition from entering certain areas, deportation -
+which have occupied so important a place in modern penal systems -
+are 'physical' penalties: unlike fines, for example, they directly
+affect the body. But the punishment-body relation is not the same
+as it was in the torture during public executions. The body now
+serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it
+to imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the
+individual of a liberty that is regarded both as a right and as property.
+The body, according to this penality, is caught up in a system of
+constraints and privations, obligations and prohibitions. Physical
+pain, the pain of the body itself, is no longer the constituent element
+of the penalty. From being an art of unbearable sensations punishment has become an economy of suspended rights. If it is still
+necessary for the law to reach and manipulate the body of the convict, it will be at a distance, in the proper way, according to strict
+rules, and with a much 'higher' aim. As a result of this new restraint,
+a whole army of technicians took over from the executioner, the
+immediate anatomist of pain: warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists, psychologists, educationalists; by their very presence near the
+prisoner, they sing the praises that the law needs: they reassure it
+that the body and pain are not the ultimate objects of its punitive
+action. Today a doctor must watch over those condemned to death,
+right up to the last moment - thus juxtaposing himself as the agent
+of welfare, as the alleviator of pain, with the official whose task it is
+to end life. This is worth thinking about. When the moment of
+execution approaches, the patients are injected with tranquillizers.
+A utopia of judicial reticence: take away life, but prevent the patient
+from feeling it; deprive the prisoner of all rights, but do not inflict
+pain; impose penalties free of all pain. Recourse to psycho-pharmacology and to various physiological 'disconnectors', even if it is
+temporary, is a logical consequence of this 'non-corporal' penality.
+The modern rituals of execution attest to this double process: the
+disappearance of the spectacle and the elimination of pain. The same
+movement has affected the various European legal systems, each at
+
+its own rate: the same death for all - the execution no longer bears
+the specific mark of the crime or the social status of the criminal; a
+death that lasts only a moment - no torture must be added to it in
+advance, no further actions performed upon the corpse; an execution
+that affects life rather than the body. There are no longer any of
+those long processes in which death was both retarded by calculated
+interruptions and multiplied by a series of successive attacks. There
+are no longer any of those combinations of tortures that were
+organized for the killing of regicides, or of the kind advocated, at
+the beginning of the eighteenth century, by the anonymous author
+of Hanging not Punishment Enough (1701), by which the condemned
+man would be broken on the wheel, then flogged until he fainted,
+then hung up with chains, then finally left to die slowly of hunger.
+There are no longer any of those executions in which the condemned
+man was dragged along on a hurdle (to prevent his head smashing
+against the cobble-stones), in which his belly was opened up, his
+entrails quickly ripped out, so that he had time to see them, with his
+own eyes, being thrown on the fire; in which he was finally decapitated and his body quartered.' The reduction of these "thousand
+deaths' to strict capital punishment defines a whole new morality
+concerning the act of punishing.
+As early as 1700, a hanging machine had been tried out in
+England (for the execution of Lord Ferrer). It made use of a support,
+which opened under the feet of the condemned man, thus avoiding
+slow deaths and the altercations that occurred between victim and
+executioner. It was improved and finally adopted in 1783, the same
+year in which the traditional procession from Newgate to Tyburn
+was abolished, and in which the opportunity offered by the rebuilding of the prison, after the Gordon Riots, was used to set up the
+scaffolds in Newgate itself (see Hibbert, 85-6). The celebrated
+article 3 of the French Code of 1791 - 'Every man condemned to
+death will have his head cut off' - bears this triple signification: an
+equal death for all ('Crimes of the same kind will be punished by the
+same kind of punishment, whatever the rank and state of the guilty
+man may be,' in the words of the motion proposed by Guillotin and
+passed on 1 December 1789); one death per condemned man,
+obtained by a single blow, without recourse to those "long and
+consequently cruel' methods of execution, such as the gallows,
+
+denounced by Le Peletier; lastly, punishment for the condemned
+man alone, since decapitation, the capital punishment of the nobility,
+was the least shaming for the criminal's family (Le Peletier, 720).
+The guillotine, first used in March 1792, was the perfect vehicle for
+these principles. Death was reduced to a visible, but instantaneous
+event. Contact between the law, or those who carry it out, and the
+body of the criminal, is reduced to a split second. There is no
+physical confrontation; the executioner need be no more than a
+meticulous watchmaker. 'Experience and reason demonstrate that
+the method used in the past to cut off the head of a criminal exposed
+him to a torture more frightful than the loss of life alone, which is
+the express intention of the law; the execution should therefore be
+carried out in a single moment and with a single blow; examples
+show how difficult it is to achieve this. For the method to work
+perfectly, it must necessarily depend on invariable mechanical
+means whose force and effect may also be determined... It is an
+easy enough matter to have such an unfailing machine built; decapitation will be performed in a moment according to the intention of
+the new law. If this apparatus seems necessary, it will cause no
+sensation and will be scarcely noticed' (Saint-Edme, I61). The
+guillotine takes life almost without touching the body, just as prison
+deprives of liberty or a fine reduces wealth. It is intended tọ apply
+the law not so much to a real body capable of feeling pain as to a
+juridical subject, the possessor, among other rights, of the right to
+exist. It had to have the abstraction of the law itself.
+No doubt something of the old public execution was, for a time,
+superimposed in France on the sobriety of the new method. Parricides - and the regicides who were regarded as such - were led to
+the scaffold wearing a black veil; there, until 1832, one of their
+hands was cut off. Thereafter, nothing remained but the ornamental
+crêpe. Thus it was in the case of Fieschi, the would-be assassin of
+Louis-Philippe, in November 1836: 'He will be taken to the place
+of execution wearing a shirt, barefoot, his head covered with a black
+veil; he will be exhibited upon a scaffold while an usher reads the
+sentence to the people, and he will be immediately executed.' We
+should remember Damiens - and note that the last addition to penal
+death was a mourning veil. The condemned man was no longer to
+be seen. Only the reading of the sentence on the scaffold announced
+I3
+
+the crime - and that crime must be faceless. (The more monstrous a
+criminal was, the more he must be deprived of light: he must not see,
+or be seen. This was a common enough notion at the time. For the
+parricide one should 'construct an iron cage or dig an impenetrable
+dungeon that would serve him as an eternal retreat' - De Molène,
+275-7.) The last vestige of the great public execution was its annulment: a drapery to hide a body. Benoit, triply infamous (his
+mother's murderer, a homosexual, an assassin), was the first of the
+parricides not to have a hand cut off: 'As the sentence was being
+read, he stood on the scaff old supported by the executioners. It was
+a horrible sight; wrapped in a large white shroud, his face covered
+with black crêpe, the parricide escaped the gaze of the silent crowd,
+and beneath these mysterious and gloomy clothes, life was manifested only by frightful cries, which soon expired under the knife'
+(Gazette des tribunaux, 30 August 1832).
+At the beginning of the nineteenth century, then, the great
+spectacle of physical punishment disappeared; the tortured body
+was avoided; the theatrical representation of pain was excluded from
+punishment. The age of sobriety in punishment had begun. By
+1830-48, public executions, preceded by torture, had almost entirely
+disappeared. Of course, this generalization requires some qualification. To begin with, the changes did not come about at once or as
+part of a single process. There were delays. Paradoxically, England
+was one of the countries most loath to see the disappearance of the
+public execution: perhaps because of the role of model that the
+institution of the jury, public hearings and respect of habeas corpus
+had given to her criminal law; above all, no doubt, because she did
+not wish to diminish the rigour of her penal laws during the great
+social disturbances of the years 1780-1820. For a long time Romilly,
+Mackintosh and Fowell Buxton failed in their attempts to attenuate
+the multiplicity and severity of the penalties laid down by English
+law - that 'horrible butchery', as Rossi described it. Its severity (in
+fact, the juries regarded the penalties laid down as excessive and
+were consequently more lenient in their application) had even
+increased: in 1700, Blackstone had listed io capital crimes in
+English legislation, while by 1819 there were 223. One should also
+take into account the advances and retreats that the process as a
+whole underwent between 1760 and 1840; the rapidity of reform
+I4
+
+in certain countries such as Austria, Russia, the United States,
+France under the Constituent Assembly, then the retreat at the
+time of the counter-revolutions in Europe and the great social fear
+of the years 1820-48; more or less temporary changes introduced by
+emergency courts or laws; the gap between the laws and the real
+practice of the courts (which was by no means a faithful reflection
+of the state of legislation). All these factors account for the irregularity of the transformation that occurred at the turn of the century.
+It should be added that, although most of the changes had been
+achieved by 1840, although the mechanisms of punishment had by
+then assumed their new way of functioning, the process was far
+from complete. The reduction in the use of torture was a tendency
+that was rooted in the great transformation of the years 1760-1840,
+but it did not end there; it can be said that the practice of the public
+execution haunted our penal system for a long time and still haunts
+it today. In France, the guillotine, that machine for the production
+of rapid and discreet deaths, represented a new ethic of legal death.
+But the Revolution had immediately endowed it with a great theatrical ritual. For years it provided a spectacle. It had to be removed to
+the Barrière Saint-Jacques; the open cart was replaced by a closed
+carriage; the condemned man was hustled from the vehicle straight
+to the scaffold; hasty executions were organized at unexpected times.
+In the end, the guillotine had to be placed inside prison walls and
+made inaccessible to the public (after the execution of Weidmann
+in 1939), by blocking the streets leading to the prison in which the
+scaffold was hidden, and in which the execution would take place in
+secret (the execution of Buffet and Bontemps at the Santé in 1972).
+Witnesses who described the scene could even be prosecuted, thereby ensuring that the execution should cease to be a spectacle and
+remain a strange secret between the law and those it condemns. One
+has only to point out so many precautions to realize that capital
+punishment remains fundamentally, even today, a spectacle that
+must actually be forbidden.
+Similarly, the hold on the body did not entirely disappear in the
+mid-nineteenth century. Punishment had no doubt ceased to be
+centred on torture as a technique of pain; it assumed as its principal
+object loss of wealth or rights. But a punishment like forced labour
+or even imprisonment - mere loss of liberty - has never functioned
+
+without a certain additional element of punishment that certainly
+concerns the body itself: rationing of food, sexual deprivation,
+corporal punishment, solitary confinement. Are these the unintentional, but inevitable, consequence of imprisonment? In fact, in its
+most explicit practices, imprisonment has always involved a certain
+degree of physical pain. The criticism that was often levelled at the
+penitentiary system in the early nineteenth century (imprisonment
+is not a sufficient punishment: prisoners are less hungry, less cold,
+less deprived in general than many poor people or even workers)
+suggests a postulate that was never explicitly denied: it is just that a
+condemned man should suffer physically more than other men. It is
+difficult to dissociate punishment from additional physical pain.
+What would a non-corporal punishment be?
+There remains, therefore, a trace of 'torture' in the modern
+mechanisms of criminal justice - a trace that has not been entirely
+overcome, but which is enveloped, increasingly, by the non-corporal
+nature of the penal system.
+The reduction in penal severity in the last 200 years is a phenomenon with which legal historians are well acquainted. But, for a
+long time, it has been regarded in an overall way as a quantitative
+phenomenon: less cruelty, less pain, more kindness, more respect,
+more 'humanity'. In fact, these changes are accompanied by a displacement in the very object of the punitive operation. Is there a
+diminution of intensity! Perhaps. There is certainly a change of
+objective.
+If the penality in its most severe forms no longer addresses itself
+to the body, on what does it lay hold? The answer of the theoreticians - those who, about 1760, opened up a new period that is not
+yet at an end - is simple, almost obvious. It seems to be contained
+in the question itself: since it is no longer the body, it must be the
+soul. The expiation that once rained down upon the body must be
+replaced by a punishment that acts in depth on the heart, the
+thoughts, the will, the inclinations. Mably formulated the principle
+once and for all: 'Punishment, if I may so put it, should strike the
+soul rather than the body' (Mably, 326).
+It was an important moment. The old partners of the spectacle
+of punishment, the body and the blood, gave way. A new character
+
+came on the scene, masked. It was the end of a certain kind of
+tragedy; comedy began, with shadow play, faceless voices, impalpable entities. The apparatus of punitive justice must now bite into
+this bodiless reality.
+Is this any more than a mere theoretical assertion, contradicted
+by penal practice? Such a conclusion would be over-hasty. It is true
+that, today, to punish is not simply a matter of converting a soul;
+but Mably's principle has not remained a pious wish. Its effects can
+be felt throughout modern penality.
+To begin with, there is a substitution of objects. By this I do not
+mean that one has suddenly set about punishing other crimes. No
+doubt the definition of offences, the hierarchy of their seriousness,
+the margins of indulgence, what was tolerated in fact and what was
+legally permitted - all this has considerably changed over the last
+200 years; many crimes have ceased to be so because they were
+bound up with a certain exercise of religious authority or a particular type of economic activity; blasphemy has lost its status as a
+crime; smuggling and domestic larceny some of their seriousness.
+But these displacements are perhaps not the most important fact:
+the division between the permitted and the forbidden has preserved
+a certain constancy from one century to another. On the other
+hand, 'crime", the object with which penal practice is concerned, has
+profoundly altered: the quality, the nature, in a sense the substance
+of which the punishable element is made, rather than its formal
+definition. Undercover of the relative stability of the law, a mass of
+subtle and rapid changes has occurred. Certainly the 'crimes' and
+'offences' on which judgement is passed are juridical objects defined
+by the code, but judgement is also passed on the passions, instincts,
+anomalies, infirmities, maladjustments, effects of environment or
+heredity; acts of aggression are punished, so also, through them, is
+aggressivity; rape, but at the same time perversions; murders, but
+also drives and desires. But, it will be objected, judgement is not
+actually being passed on them; if they are referred to at all it is to
+explain the actions in question, and to determine to what extent the
+the subject's will was involved in the crime. This is no answer. For
+it is these shadows lurking behind the case itself that are judged and
+punished. They are judged indirectly as 'attenuating circumstances'
+that introduce into the verdict not only 'circumstantial' evidence,
+17
+
+but something quite different, which is not juridically codifiable:
+the knowledge of the criminal, one's estimation of him, what is
+known about the relations between him, his past and his crime, and
+what might be expected of him in the future. They are also judged
+by the interplay of all those notions that have circulated between
+medicine and jurisprudence since the nineteenth century (the "monsters' of Georget's times, Chaumie's 'psychical anomalies', the
+"perverts' and "maladjusted' of our own experts) and which, behind
+the pretext of explaining an action, are ways of defining an individual. They are punished by means of a punishment that has the
+function of making the offender 'not only desirous, but also capable,
+of living within the law and of providing for his own needs'; they
+are punished by the internal economy of a penalty which, while
+intended to punish the crime, may be altered (shortened or, in
+certain cases, extended) according to changes in the prisoner's
+behaviour; and they are punished by the "security measures' that
+accompany the penalty (prohibition of entering certain areas, probation, obligatory medical treatment), and which are intended not
+to punish the offence, but to supervise the individual, to neutralize
+his dangerous state of mind, to alter his criminal tendencies, and to
+continue even when this change has been achieved. The criminal's
+soul is not referred to in the trial merely to explain his crime and
+as a factor in the juridical apportioning of responsibility; if it is
+brought before the court, with such pomp and circumstance, such
+concern to understand and such 'scientific' application, it is because
+it too, as well as the crime itself, is to be judged and to share in the
+punishment. Throughout the penal ritual, from the preliminary
+investigation to the sentence and the final effects of the penalty, a
+domain has been penetrated by objects that not only duplicate, but
+also dissociate the juridically defined and coded objects. Psychiatric
+expertise, but also in a more general way criminal anthropology and
+the repetitive discourse of criminology, find one of their precise
+functions here: by solemnly inscribing offences in the field of objects
+susceptible of scientific knowledge, they provide the mechanisms
+of legal punishment with a justifiable hold not only on offences, but
+on individuals; not only on what they do, but also on what they are,
+will be, may be. The additional factor of the offender's soul, which
+the legal system has laid hold of, is only apparently explanatory
+18
+
+and limitative, and is in fact expansionist. During the 150 or 200
+years that Europe has been setting up its new penal systems, the
+judges have gradually, by means of a process that goes back very far
+indeed, taken to judging something other than crimes, namely, the
+'soul' of the criminal.
+And, by that very fact, they have begun to do something other
+than pass judgement. Or, to be more precise, within the very judicial
+modality of judgement, other types of assessment have slipped in,
+profoundly altering its rules of elaboration. Ever since the Middle
+Ages slowly and painfully built up the great procedure of investigation, to judge was to establish the truth of a crime, it was to determine its author and to apply a legal punishment. Knowledge of the
+offence, knowledge of the offender, knowledge of the law: these
+three conditions made it possible to ground a judgement in truth.
+But now a quite different question of truth is inscribed in the course
+of the penal judgement. The question is no longer simply: 'Has the
+act been established and is it punishable?' But also: 'What is this act,
+what is this act of violence or this murder! To what level or to what
+field of reality does it belong? Is it a phantasy, a psychotic reaction, a
+delusional episode, a perverse action.' It is no longer simply: 'Who
+committed it?" But: 'How can we assign the causal process that
+produced it? Where did it originate in the author himself? Instinct,
+unconscious, environment, heredity!' It is no longer simply: 'What
+law punishes this offence.' But: ' What would be the most appropriate
+measures to take? How do we see the future development of the
+offender? What would be the best way of rehabilitating him! A
+whole set of assessing, diagnostic, prognostic, normative judgements concerning the criminal have become lodged in the framework of penal judgement. Another truth has penetrated the truth
+that was required by the legal machinery; a truth which, entangled
+with the first, has turned the assertion of guilt into a strange
+scientifico-juridical complex. A significant fact is the way in which
+the question of madness has evolved in penal practice. According
+to the 1810 code, madness was dealt with only in terms of article 64.
+Now this article states that there is neither crime nor offence if the
+offender was of unsound mind at the time of the act. The possibility
+of ascertaining madness was, therefore, a quite separate matter from
+the definition of an act as a crime; the gravity of the act was not
+19
+
+altered by the fact that its author was insane, nor the punishment
+reduced as a consequence; the crime itself disappeared. It was impossible, therefore, to declare that someone was both guilty and
+mad; once the diagnosis of madness had been accepted, it could not
+be included in the judgement; it interrupted the procedure and
+loosened the hold of the law on the author of the act. Not only the
+examination of the criminal suspected of insanity, but the very
+effects of this examination had to be external and anterior to the
+sentence. But, very soon, the courts of the nineteenth century began
+to misunderstand the meaning of article 64. Despite several decisions
+of the supreme court of appeal confirming that insanity could not
+result either in a light penalty, or even in an acquittal, but required
+that the case be dismissed, the ordinary courts continued to bring
+the question of insanity to bear on their verdicts. They accepted
+that one could be both guilty and mad; less guilty the madder one
+was; guilty certainly, but someone to be put away and treated rather
+than punished; not only a guilty man, but also dangerous, since
+quite obviously sick, etc. From the point of view of the penal code,
+the result was a mass of juridical absurdities. But this was the starting
+point of an evolution that jurisprudence and legislation itself was to
+precipitate in the course of the next 15o years: already the reform
+of 183z, introducing attenuating circumstances, made it possible to
+modify the sentence according to the supposed degrees of an illness
+or the forms of a semi-insanity. And the practice of calling on
+psychiatric expertise, which is widespread in the assize courts and
+sometimes extended to courts of summary jurisdiction, means that
+the sentence, even if it is always formulated in terms of legal punishment, implies, more or less obscurely, judgements of normality,
+attributions of causality, assessments of possible changes, anticipations as to the offender's future. It would be wrong to say that all
+these operations give substance to a judgement from the outside;
+they are directly integrated in the process of forming the sentence.
+Instead of insanity eliminating the crime according to the original
+meaning of article 64, every crime and even every offence now
+carries within it, as a legitimate suspicion, but also as a right that may
+be claimed, the hypothesis of insanity, in any case of anomaly. And
+the sentence that condemns or acquits is not simply a judgement of
+guilt, a legal decision that lays down punishment; it bears within it
+20
+
+an assessment of normality and a technical prescription for a possible
+normalization. Today the judge - magistrate or juror - certainly does
+more than "judge'.
+And he is not alone in judging. Throughout the penal procedure
+and the implementation of the sentence there swarms a whole
+series of subsidiary authorities. Small-scale legal systems and
+parallel judges have multiplied around the principal judgement:
+psychiatric or psychological experts, magistrates concerned with
+the implementation of sentences, educationalists, members of the
+prison service, all fragment the legal power to punish; it might be
+objected that none of them really shares the right to judge; that some,
+after sentence is passed, have no other right than to implement the
+punishment laid down by the court and, above all, that others - the
+experts - intervene before the sentence not to pass judgement, but
+to assist the judges in their decision. But as soon as the penalties and
+the security measures defined by the court are not absolutely determined, from the moment they may be modified along the way,
+from the moment one leaves to others than the judges of the offence
+the task of deciding whether the condemned man 'deserves' to be
+placed in semi-liberty or conditional liberty, whether they may
+bring his penal tutelage to an end, one is handing over to them
+mechanisms of legal punishment to be used at their discretion:
+subsidiary judges they may be, but they are judges all the same.
+The whole machinery that has been developing for years around
+the implementation of sentences, and their adjustment to individuals,
+creates a proliferation of the authorities of judicial decision-making
+and extends its powers of decision well beyond the sentence. The
+psychiatric experts, for their part, may well refrain from judging.
+Let us examine the three questions to which, since the 1958 ruling,
+they have to address themselves: Does the convicted person represent a danger to society! Is he susceptible to penal punishment? Is he
+curable or readjustable? These questions have nothing to do with
+article 64, nor with the possible insanity of the convicted person at
+the moment of the act. They do not concern 'responsibility'. They
+concern nothing but the administration of the penalty, its necessity,
+its usefulness, its possible effectiveness; they make it possible to
+show, in an almost transparent vocabulary, whether the mental hospital would be a more suitable place of confinement than the prison,
+
+whether this confinement should be short or long, whether medical
+treatment or security measures are called for. What, then, is the role
+of the psychiatrist in penal matters! He is not an expert in responsibility, but an adviser on punishment; it is up to him to say whether
+the subject is 'dangerous, in what way one should be protected
+from him, how one should intervene to alter him, whether it would
+be better to try to force him into submission or to treat him. At the
+very beginning of its history, psychiatric expertise was called upon
+to formulate 'true' propositions as to the part that the liberty of the
+offender had played in the act he had committed; it is now called
+upon to suggest a prescription for what might be called his "medicojudicial treatment'.
+To sum up, ever since the new penal system - that defined by the
+great codes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - has been in
+operation, a general process has led judges to judge something
+other than crimes; they have been led in their sentences to do something other than judge; and the power of judging has been transferred, in part, to other authorities than the judges of the offence.
+The whole penal operation has taken on extra-juridical elements and
+personnel. It will be said that there is nothing extraordinary in this,
+that it is part of the destiny of the law to absorb little by little
+elements that are alien to it. But what is odd about modern criminal
+justice is that, although it has taken on so many extra-juridical
+elements, it has done so not in order to be able to define them
+juridically and gradually to integrate them into the actual power to
+punish: on the contrary, it has done so in order to make them function within the penal operation as non-juridical elements; in order
+to stop this operation being simply a legal punishment; in order to
+exculpate the judge from being purely and simply he who punishes.
+'Of course, we pass sentence, but this sentence is not in direct
+relation to the crime. It is quite clear that for us it functions as a way
+of treating a criminal. We punish, but this is a way of saying that
+we wish to obtain a cure! Today, criminal justice functions and
+justifies itself only by this perpetual reference to something other
+than itself, by this unceasing reinscription in non-juridical systems.
+Its fate is to be redefined by knowledge.
+Beneath the increasing leniency of punishment, then, one may
+map a displacement of its point of application; and through this
+22
+
+displacement, a whole field of recent objects, a whole new system of
+truth and a mass of roles hitherto unknown in the exercise of criminal
+justice. A corpus of knowledge, techniques, 'scientific' discourses is
+formed and becomes entangled with the practice of the power to
+punish.
+This book is intended as a correlative history of the modern soul
+and of a new power to judge; a genealogy of the present scientificolegal complex from which the power to punish derives its bases,
+justifications and rules, from which it extends its effects and by which
+it masks its exorbitant singularity.
+But from what point can such a history of the modern soul on
+trial be written? If one confined oneself to the evolution of legislation or of penal procedures, one would run the risk of allowing a
+change in the collective sensibility, an increase in humanization or
+the development of the human sciences to emerge as a massive,
+external, inert and primary fact. By studying only the general social
+forms, as Durkheim did (cf. Bibliography), one runs the risk of
+positing as the principle of greater leniency in punishment processes of individualization that are rather one of the effects of the
+new tactics of power, among which are to be included the new penal
+mechanisms. This study obeys four general rules:
+I. Do not concentrate the study of the punitive mechanisms on
+their 'repressive' effects alone, on their 'punishment' aspects alone,
+but situate them in a whole series of their possible positive effects,
+even if these seem marginal at first sight. As a consequence, regard
+punishment as a complex social function.
+2. Analyse punitive methods not simply as consequences of
+legislation or as indicators of social structures, but as techniques
+possessing their own specificity in the more general field of other
+ways of exercising power. Regard punishment as a political tactic.
+3. Instead of treating the history of penal law and the history of
+the human sciences as two separate series whose overlapping appears
+to have had on one or the other, or perhaps on both, a disturbing
+or useful effect, according to one's point of view, see whether there
+is not some common matrix or whether they do not both derive
+from a single process of 'epistemologico-juridical' formation; in
+short, make the technology of power the very principle both of the
+humanization of the penal system and of the knowledge of man.
+23
+
+4+ Try to discover whether this entry of the soul on to the scene
+of penal justice, and with it the insertion in legal practice of a whole
+corpus of 'scientific' knowledge, is not the effect of a transformation
+of the way in which the body itself is invested by power relations.
+In short, try to study the metamorphosis of punitive methods on
+the basis of a political technology of the body in which might be
+read a common history of power relations and object relations.
+Thus, by an analysis of penal leniency as a technique of power,
+one might understand both how man, the soul, the normal or
+abnormal individual have come to duplicate crime as objects of
+penal intervention; and in what way a specific mode of subjection
+was able to give birth to man as an object of knowledge for a discourse with a 'scientific' status.
+But I am not claiming to be the first to have worked in this
+direction.'
+Rusche and Kirchheimer's great work, Punishment and Social
+Structures, provides a number of essential reference points. We must
+first rid ourselves of the illusion that penality is above all (if not
+exclusively) a means of reducing crime and that, in this role, according to the social forms, the political systems or beliefs, it may be
+severe or lenient, tend towards expiation of obtaining redress, towards the pursuit of individuals or the attribution of collective
+responsibility. We must analyse rather the "concrete systems of
+punishment, study them as social phenomena that cannot be
+accounted for by the juridical structure of society alone, nor by its
+fundamental ethical choices; we must situate them in their field of
+operation, in which the punishment of crime is not the sole element;
+we must show that punitive measures are not simply 'negative'
+mechanisms that make it possible to repress, to prevent, to exclude,
+to eliminate; but that they are linked to a whole series of positive
+and useful effects which it is their task to support (and, in this sense,
+although legal punishment is carried out in order to punish offences,
+one might say that the definition of offences and their prosecution
+are carried out in turn in order to maintain the punitive mechanisms
+and their functions). From this point of view, Rusche and Kirchheimer relate the different systems of punishment with the systems
+of production within which they operate: thus, in a slave economy,
+24
+
+punitive mechanisms serve to provide an additional labour force -
+and to constitute a body of 'civil slaves in addition to those provided
+by war or trading; with feudalism, at a time when money and production were still at an early stage of development, we find a sudden
+increase in corporal punishments - the body being in most cases the
+only property accessible; the penitentiary (the Hôpital Général, the
+Spinhuis or the Rasphuis), forced labour and the prison factory
+appear with the development of the mercantile economy. But the
+industrial system requires a free market in labour and, in the ninereenth century, the role of forced labour in the mechanisms of
+punishment diminishes accordingly and 'corrective' detention takes
+its place. There are no doubt a number of observations to be made
+about such a strict correlation.
+But we can surely accept the general proposition that, in our
+societies, the systems of punishment are to be situated in a certain
+"political economy' of the body: even if they do not make use of
+violent or bloody punishment, even when they use 'lenient' methods
+involving confinement or correction, it is always the body that is at
+issue - the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their
+distribution and their submission. It is certainly legitimate to write
+a history of punishment against the background of moral ideas or
+legal structures. But can one write such a history against the background of a history of bodies, when such systems of punishment
+claim to have only the secret souls of criminals as their objective?
+Historians long ago began to write the history of the body. They
+have studied the body in the field of historical demography or
+pathology; they have considered it as the seat of needs and appetites,
+as the locus of physiological processes and metabolisms, as a target
+for the attacks of germs or viruses; they have shown to what extent
+historical processes were involved in what might seem to be the
+purely biological base of existence; and what place should be given
+in the history of society to biological 'events' such as the circulation
+of bacilli, or the extension of the life-span (cf. Le Roy-Ladurie).
+But the body is also directly involved in a political field; power
+relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it,
+train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies,
+to emit signs. This political investment of the body is bound up,
+in accordance with complex reciprocal relations, with its economic
+25
+
+use; it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested
+with relations of power and domination; but, on the other hand, its
+constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a
+system of subjection (in which need is also a political instrument
+meticulously prepared, calculated and used); the body becomes a
+useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body.
+This subjection is not only obtained by the instruments of violence
+or ideology; it can also be direct, physical, pitting force against
+force, bearing on material elements, and yet without involving
+violence; it may be calculated, organized, technically thought out;
+it may be subtle, make use neither of weapons nor of terror and yet
+remain of a physical order. That is to say, there may be a 'knowledge'
+of the body that is not exactly the science of its functioning, and a
+mastery of its forces that is more than the ability to conquer them:
+this knowledge and this mastery constitute what might be called the
+political technology of the body. Of course, this technology is
+diffuse, rarely formulated in continuous, systematic discourse; it is
+often made up of bits and pieces; it implements a disparate set of
+tools or methods. In spite of the coherence of its results, it is
+generally no more than à multiform instrumentation. Moreover, it
+cannot be localized in a particular type of institution or state
+apparatus. For they have recourse to it; they use, select or impose
+certain of its methods. But, in its mechanisms and its effects, it is
+situated at a quite different level. What the apparatuses and institutions operate is, in a sense, a micro-physics of power, whose field
+of validity is situated in a sense between these great functionings
+and the bodies themselves with their materiality and their forces.
+Now, the study of this micro-physics presupposes that the power
+exercised on the body is conceived not as a property, but as a
+strategy, that its effects of domination are attributed not to 'appropriation',
+", but to dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques,
+functionings; that one should decipher in it a network of relations,
+constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one
+might possess; that one should take as its model a perpetual battle
+rather than a contract regulating a transaction or the conquest of a
+territory. In short this power is exercised rather than possessed;
+it is not the 'privilege', acquired or preserved, of the dominant
+class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions - an effect that
+26
+
+is manifested and sometimes extended by the position of those who
+are dominated. Furthermore, this power is not exercised simply as
+an obligation or a prohibition on those who 'do not have it; it
+invests them, is transmitted by them and through them; it exerts
+pressure upon them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against
+it, resist the grip it has on them. This means that these relations go
+right down into the depths of society, that they are not localized in
+the relations between the state and its citizens or on the frontier
+between classes and that they do not merely reproduce, at the level
+of individuals, bodies, gestures and behaviour, the general form of
+the law or government; that, although there is continuity (they are
+indeed articulated on this form through a whole series of complex
+mechanisms), there is neither analogy nor homology, but a specificity of mechanism and modality. Lastly, they are not univocal; they
+define innumerable points of confrontation, focuses of instability,
+each of which has its own risks of conflict, of struggles, and of an
+at least temporary inversion of the power relations. The overthrow
+of these 'micro-powers' does not, then, obey the law of all or
+nothing; it is not acquired once and for all by a new control of the
+apparatuses nor by a new functioning or a destruction of the institutions; on the other hand, none of its localized episodes may be
+inscribed in history except by the effects that it induces on the entire
+network in which it is caught up.
+Perhaps, too, we should abandon a whole tradition that allows
+us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its
+injunctions, its demands and its interests. Perhaps we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the same token,
+the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge.
+We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not
+simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it
+because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one
+another; that there is no power relation without the correlative
+constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does
+not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.
+These "power-knowledge relations' are to be analysed, therefore,
+not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in
+relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who
+27
+
+knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge
+must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations. In
+short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but
+power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and
+of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible
+domains of knowledge.
+To analyse the political investment of the body and the microphysics of power presupposes, therefore, that one abandons - where
+power is concerned - the violence-ideology opposition, the metaphor of property, the model of the contract or of conquest; that -
+where knowledge is concerned - one abandons the opposition
+between what is "interested' and what is 'disinterested', the model of
+knowledge and the primacy of the subject. Borrowing a word from
+Petty and his contemporaries, but giving it a different meaning from
+the one current in the seventeenth century, one might imagine a
+political 'anatomy'. This would not be the study of a state in terms of
+a 'body' (with its elements, its resources and its forces), nor would
+it be the study of the body and its surroundings in terms of a small
+state. One would be concerned with the 'body politic', as a set of
+material elements and techniques that serve as weapons, relays,
+communication routes and supports for the power and knowledge
+relations that invest human bodies and subjugate them by turning
+them into objects of knowledge.
+It is a question of situating the techniques of punishment -
+whether they seize the body in the ritual of public torture and
+execution or whether they are addressed to the soul - in the history
+of this body politic; of considering penal practices less as a consequence of legal theories than as a chapter of political anatomy.
+Kantorowitz gives a remarkable analysis of 'The King's Body':
+a double body according to the juridical theology of the Middle
+Ages, since it involves not only the transitory element that is born
+and dies, but another that remains unchanged by time and is maintained as the physical yet intangible support of the kingdom;
+around this duality, which was originally close to the Christological
+model, are organized an iconography, a political theory of monarchy,
+legal mechanisms that distinguish between as well as link the person
+28
+
+of the king and the demands of the Crown, and a whole ritual that
+reaches its height in the coronation, the funeral and the ceremonies
+of submission. At the opposite pole one might imagine placing the
+body of the condemned man; he, too, has his legal status; he gives
+rise to his own ceremonial and he calls forth a whole theoretical
+discourse, not in order to ground the 'surplus power' possessed by
+the person of the sovereign, but in order to code the lack of power'
+with which those subjected to punishment are marked. In the darkest
+region of the political field the condemned man represents the symmetrical, inverted figure of the king. We should analyse what might
+be called, in homage to Kantorowitz, 'the least body of the condemned man'.
+If the surplus power possessed by the king gives rise to the
+duplication of his body, has not the surplus power exercised on the
+subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of
+duplication? That of a 'non-corporal', a 'soul', as Mably called it.
+The history of this 'micro-physics' of the punitivepower would then
+be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern "soul".
+Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the
+soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists,
+it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the
+body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those
+punished - and, in a more general way, on those one supervises,
+trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school,
+the colonized, over those who arestuck at a machine and supervised
+for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul,
+which, unlike the soul represented by Christian theology, is not
+born in sin and subject to punishment, but is born rather out of
+methods of punishment, supervision and constraint. This real, noncorporal soul is not a substance; it is the element in which are
+articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference
+of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power
+relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge
+extends and reinforces the effects of this power. On this realityreference, various concepts have beer constructed and domains of
+analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness,
+29
+
+etc. on it have been built scientific techniques and discourses,
+and the moral claims of humanism. But let there be no misunderstanding: it is not that a real man, the object of knowledge, philosophical reflection or technical intervention, has been substituted
+for the soul, the illusion of the theologians. The man described for
+us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a
+subjection much more profound than himself. A 'soul' inhabits him
+and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery
+that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and
+instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body.
+That punishment in general and the prison in particular belong
+to a political technology of the body is a lesson that I have learnt
+not so much from history as from the present. In recent years,
+prison revolts have occurred throughout the world. There was certainly something paradoxical about their aims, their slogans and the
+way they took place. They were revolts against an entire state of
+physical misery that is over a century old: against cold, suffocation
+and overcrowding, against decrepit walls, hunger, physical maltreatment. But they were also revolts against model prisons, tranquillizers, isolation, the medical or educational services. Were they
+revolts whose aims were merely material? Or contradictory revolts:
+against the obsolete, but also against comfort; against the warders,
+but also against the psychiatrists? In fact, all these movements - and
+the innumerable discourses that the prison has given rise to since
+the early nineteenth century - have been about the body and
+material things. What has sustained these discourses, these memories and invectives are indeed those minute material details. One
+may, if one is so disposed, see them as no more than blind demands
+or suspect the existence behind them of alien strategies. In fact, they
+were revolts, at the level of the body, against the very body of the
+prison. What was at issue was not whether the prison environment
+was too harsh or too aseptic, 100 primitive or too efficient, but its
+very materiality as an instrument and vector of power; it is this
+whole technology of power over the body that the technology of
+the "soul' - that of the educationalists, psychologists and psychiatrists - fails either to conceal or to compensate, for the simple reason
+that it is one of its tools. I would like to write the history of this
+
+prison, with all the political investments of the body that it gathers
+together in its closed architecture. Why? Simply because 1 am
+interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of
+the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the
+history of the present.?
+зІ
+
+2. The spectacle of the scaffold
+The ordinance of 1670 regulated the general forms of penal practice
+up to the Revolution. It laid down the following hierarchy of
+penalties: Death, judicial torture pending proof, penal servitude,
+Aogging, amende honorable, banishment.' A high proportion of
+physical punishment. Customs, the nature of the crimes, the status
+of the condemned accounted for still more variations. 'Capital
+punishment comprises many kinds of death: some prisoners may be
+condemned to be hanged, others to having their hands cut off or
+their tongues cut out or pierced and then to be hanged; others, for
+more serious crimes, to be broken alive and to die on the wheel,
+after having their limbs broken; others to be broken until they die
+a natural death, others to be strangled and then broken, others to
+be burnt alive, others to be burnt after first being strangled; others
+to be drawn by four horses, others to have their heads cut off, and
+others to have their heads broken' (Soulatges, 162-71). And Soulatges adds, almost in passing, that there are also lighter penalties
+not mentioned by the ordinance: satisfaction to the injured party,
+warning, reprimand, a short period of imprisonment, prohibition
+from entering a certain area and, lastly, pecuniary punishments -
+fines or confiscation.
+But we must not be misled. There was a considerable gap between
+this arsenal of horrors and everyday penal practice. Public torture
+and execution was by no means the most frequent form of punishment. To us today the proportion of death sentences in the penal
+practice of the classical age may seem high: at the Châteler' during
+the period 1755-85 under 1o per cent of the sentences passed involved capital punishment: the wheel, the gallows or the stake
+(Petrovitch, z26fi); the Parlement of Flanders passed thirty-nine
+death sentences, out of a total of 260 sentences, between 1721 and
+
+1730 (and twenty-six out of so0 between 1781 and 1790 - cf.
+Dautricourt). But it must not be forgotten that the courts found
+many ways of relaxing the rigours of the penal system, either by
+refusing to prosecute offences that were too heavily punished or by
+modifying the definition of the crime; sometimes too the royal
+power indicated that some particularly severe ordinance was not to
+be applied too strictly (which was how Choiseul dealt with the
+declaration of 3 August 1744 on vagabonds - Choiseul, 128-2).
+In any case, the majority of the sentences involved banishment or
+fines: in a court such as that of the Châtelet (which dealt only with
+relatively serious offences), banishment represented over half the
+sentences passed between 1755 and 1785. But many of these noncorporal penalties were accompanied by additional penalties that
+involved a degree of torture: public exhibition, pillory, carcan,
+flogging, branding; this was the case for all sentences to the 'galleys'
+or to what was the equivalent for women - reclusion in the hospital;
+banishment was often preceded by public exhibition and branding;
+fines were sometimes accompanied by flogging. It was not only in
+the great solemn executions, but also in this additional form of
+punishment, that torture revealed the significant part it played in
+penality: every penalty of a certain seriousness had to involve an
+element of torture, of supplice.
+What is a supplice? 'Corporal punishment, painful to a more or
+less horrible degree,' said Jaucourt in his Encyclopédie article and
+added: It is an inexplicable phenomenon that the extension of
+man's imagination creates out of the barbarous and the cruel.'
+Inexplicable, perhaps, but certainly neither irregular nor primitive.
+Torture is a technique; it is not an extreme expression of lawless
+rage. To be torture, punishment must obey three principal criteria:
+first, it must produce a certain degree of pain, which may be measured exactly, or at least calculated, compared and hierarchized;
+death is a torture in so far as it is not simply a withdrawal of the
+right to live, but is the occasion and the culmination of a calculated
+gradation of pain: from decapitation (which reduces all pain to a
+single gesture, performed in a single moment - the zero degree of
+torture), through hanging, the stake and the wheel (all of which
+prolong the agony, to quartering, which carries pain almost
+to infinity; death-torture is the art of maintaining life in pain, by
+33
+
+subdividing it into a "thousand deaths', by achieving before life
+ceases 'the most exquisite agonies' (cf. Ollyffe). Torture rests on a
+whole quantitative art of pain. But thereis more to it: this production
+of pain is regulated. Torture correlates the type of corporal effect, the
+quality, intensity, duration of pain, with the gravity of the crime,
+the person of the criminal, the rank of his victims. There is a legal
+code of pain; when it involves torture, punishment does not fall
+upon the body indiscriminately or equally; it is calculated according
+to detailed rules: the number of lashes of the whip, the positioning
+of the branding iron, the duration of the death agony on the stake
+or the wheel (the court decides whether the criminal is to be
+strangled at once or allowed to die slowly, and the points at which
+this gesture of pity must occur), the type of mutilation to be used
+(hand cut off, lips or tongue pierced). All these various elements
+multiply the punishments and are combined according to the court
+and the crime. 'The poetry of Dante put into laws,' was how Rossi
+described it; a long course in physico-penal knowledge, in any case.
+Furthermore, torture forms part of a ritual. It is an element in the
+liturgy of punishment and meets two demands. It must mark the
+victim: it is intended, either by the scar it leaves on the body, or by
+the spectacle that accompanies it, to brand the victim with infamy;
+even if its function is to 'purge' the crime, torture does not reconcile; it traces around or, rather, on the very body of the condemned
+man signs that must not be effaced; in any case, men will remember
+public exhibition, the pillory, torture and pain duly observed. And,
+from the point of view of the law that imposes it, public torture and
+execution must be spectacular, it must be seen by all almost as its
+triumph. The very excess of the violence employed is one of the
+elements of its glory: the fact that the guilty man should moan and
+cry out under the blows is not a shameful side-effect, it is the very
+ceremonial of justice being expressed in all its force. Hence no doubt
+those tortures that take place even after death: corpses burnt, ashes
+thrown to the winds, bodies dragged on hurdles and exhibited at
+the roadside. Justice pursues the body beyond all possible pain.
+The term 'penal torture' does not cover any corporal punishment:
+it is a differentiated production of pain, an organized ritual for the
+marking of victims and the expression of the power that punishes;
+not the expression of a legal system driven to exasperation and,
+34
+
+forgetting its principles, losing all restraint. In the 'excesses' of
+torture, a whole economy of power is invested.
+The tortured body is first inscribed in the legal ceremonial that
+must produce, open for all to see, the truth of the crime.
+In France, as in most European countries, with the notable
+exception of England, the entire criminal procedure, right up to the
+sentence, remained secret: that is to say, opaque, not only to the
+public but also to the accused himself. It took place without him,
+or at least without his having any knowledge either of the charges
+or of the evidence. In the order of criminal justice, knowledge was
+the absolute privilege of the prosecution. The preliminary investigation was carried out 'as diligently and secretly as may be', as the edict
+of 1498 put it. According to the ordinance of 1670, which confirmed
+and, on certain points, reinforced the severity of the preceding
+period, it was impossible for the accused to have access to the documents of the case, impossible to know the identity of his accusers,
+impossible to know the nature of the evidence before objecting to
+witnesses, impossible to make use, until the last moments of the
+trial, of the documents in proof, impossible to have a lawyer, either
+to ensure the proper conduct of the case, or to take part, on the
+main issue, in the defence. The magistrate, for his part, had the
+right to accept anonymous denunciations, to conceal from the accused the nature of the action, to question him with a view to
+catching him out, to use insinuations. (Up to the eighteenth century,
+lengthy arguments took place as to whether, in the course of
+'captious' questioning, it was lawful for the judge to use false
+promises, lies, words with double meaning - a whole casuistry of
+legal bad faith.) The magistrate constituted, in solitary omnipotence,
+a truth by which he invested the accused; and the judges received
+this truth ready made, in the form of documents and written statements; for them, these factors alone were proof; they met the
+accused only once in order to question him before passing sentence.
+The secret and written form of the procedure reflects the principle
+that in criminal matters the establishment of truth was the absolute
+right and the exclusive power of the sovereign and his judges.
+Ayrault supposed that this procedure (which was more or less
+established by the sixteenth century) originated in 'the fear of the
+35
+
+uproar, shouting and cheering that the people usually indulge in,
+the fear that there would be disorder, violence, and outbursts against
+the parties, or even against the judges'; the king wished to show in
+this that the 'sovereign power' from which the right to punish
+derived could in no case belong to the 'multitude' (cf. Ayrault,
+LIII, chapters LXXII and LXIX). Before the justice of the sovereign, all voices must be still.
+Yet, despite the use of secrecy, certain rules had to be obeyed in
+establishing the truth. Secrecy itself required that a rigorous model
+of penal truth be defined. A whole tradition dating from the Middle
+Ages and considerably developed by the great lawyers of the
+Renaissance laid down what the nature and the use of evidence
+might be. Even in the eighteenth century, it was still common to
+meet distinctions like the following: true, direct, or legitimate proof
+(that provided by witnesses, for example) and indirect, conjectural,
+artificial proof (obtained by argument); or, again, manifest proof,
+considerable proof, imperfect or slight (Jousse, 660); or, again,
+'urgent or necessary' proof that did not allow one to doubt the
+truth of the deed (this was 'full' proof: thus two irreproachable witnesses affirming that they saw the accused, carrying an unsheathed
+and bloody sword, leave the place where, some time later, the body
+of the dead man was found with stab wounds); approximate or semifull proof, which may be regarded as true as long as the accused does
+not destroy it with evidence to the contrary (the evidence of a single
+eye-witness or death threats preceding a murder); lastly, distant or
+"adminicule clues, which consisted only of opinion (rumour, the
+flight of the suspect, his manner when questioned, etc. - Muyart de
+Vouglans, 1757, 345-7). Now, these distinctions are not simply
+theoretical subtleties. They have an operational function. First,
+because each of these kinds of evidence, taken in isolation, may have
+a particular type of judicial effect: "full' proof may lead to any
+sentence; 'semi-full' proof may lead to any of the "peines aflictives',
+or heavy penalties, except death; imperfect and slight clues are
+enough for the suspect to have a writ issued against him, to have
+the case deferred for further inquiry or to have a fine imposed on
+him. Secondly, because they are combined according to precise
+arithmetical rules: two 'semi-full' proofs may make a complete proof;
+"adminicules, providing there are several of them and they concur,
+
+may be combined to form a semi-proof; but, however many there
+may be of them, they can never, of themselves, constitute a complete
+proof. We have, then, a penal arithmetic that is meticulous on many
+points, but which still leaves a margin for a good deal of argument: in
+order for a capital sentence to be passed, is a single full proof enough
+or must it be accompanied by other slighter clues! Are two approximate proofs always equivalent to a full proof? Should not three be
+required or two plus distant clues. Are there elements that may be
+regarded as clues only for certain crimes, in certain circumstances
+and in relation to certain persons (thus evidence is disregarded if it
+comes from a vagabond; it is reinforced, on the contrary, if it is
+provided by 'a considerable person' or by a master in the case of a
+domestic offence). It is an arithmetic modulated by casuistry, whose
+function is to define how a legal proof is to be constructed. On the
+one hand, this system of "legal proofs' makes truth in the penal
+domain the result of a complex art; it obeys rules known only to
+specialists, and, consequently, it reinforces the principle of secrecy.
+It is not enough that the judge should have the conviction that any
+reasonable man may have... Nothing is more incorrect than this
+way of judging, which, in truth, is no other than a more or less wellfounded opinion.' But, on the other hand, it is a severe constraint
+for the magistrate; in the absence of this regularity, 'every sentence
+would be reckless, and in a sense it may be said that it is unjust even
+when, in truth, the accused is guilty' (Poullain du Parc, 112-13 - see
+also Esmein, 260-83 and Mittermaier, 15-19). The day will come
+when the singularity of this judicial truth will appear scandalous:
+as if the law did not have to obey the rules of common truth. What
+would be said of a semi-proof in the sciences capable of demonstration. What would a geometrical or algebraic semi-proof amount
+to?' (Seigneux de Correvon, 63). But it should not be forgotten
+that these formal constraints on legal proof were a mode of regulation internal to absolute power and exclusive of knowledge.
+Written, secret, subjected, in order to construct its proofs, to
+rigorous rules, the penal investigation was a machine that might
+produce the truth in the absence of the accused. And by this very
+fact, though the law strictly speaking did not require it, this procedure was to tend necessarily to the confession. And for two
+reasons: first, because the confession constituted so strong a proof
+37
+
+that there was scarcely any need to add others, or to enter the difficult and dubious combinatory of clues; the confession, provided it
+was obtained in the correct manner, almost discharged the prosecution of the obligation to provide further evidence (in any case, the
+most difficult evidence). Secondly, the only way that this procedure
+might use all its unequivocal authority, and become a real victory
+over the accused, the only way in which the truth might exert all its
+power, was for the criminal to accept responsibility for his own
+crime and himself sign what had been skilfully and obscurely
+constructed by the preliminary investigation. It is not enough', as
+Ayrault, who did not care for these secret procedures, remarked,
+'that wrong-doers be justly punished. They must if possible judge
+and condemn themselves' (Ayrault, 1. I, chapter 14). Within the
+crime reconstituted by writing, the criminal who confessed came to
+play the role of living truth. The confession, an act of the criminal,
+responsible and speaking subject, was the complement to the written,
+secret preliminary investigation. Hence the importance that all this
+procedure of an inquisitorial type accorded to the confession.
+Hepce, too, the ambiguities of its role. On the one hand, an
+attempt was made to introduce it into the general arithmetic of
+evidence; it was stressed that it was no more than one proof among
+many. It was not the evidentia rei; nor was it the strongest of the
+proofs, it was not in itself enough to bring conviction, it had to be
+accompanied by additional, circumstantial evidence; for it is a wellknown fact that the accused sometimes declare themselves to be
+guilty of crimes that they have not committed; the examining magistrate had therefore to carry out additional investigations if he
+possessed no more than the confession of the accused. But, on the
+other hand, the confession had priority over any other kind of
+evidence. To a certain extent, it transcended all other evidence; an
+element in the calculation of the truth, it was also the act by which
+the accused accepted the charge and recognized its truth; it transformed an investigation carried out without him into a voluntary
+affirmation. Through the confession, the accused himself took part
+in the ritual of producing penal truth. As medieval law put it, the
+confession 'renders the thing notorious and manifest'. To this first
+ambiguity was added a second: as a particularly strong proof,
+requiring for a conviction only a few additional clues, thus reducing
+38
+
+to the minimum the work of investigation and the mechanics of
+demonstration, the confession was therefore highly valued; every
+possible coercion would be used to obtain it. But, although it had
+to be, in the procedure, the living and oral counterpart of the
+written preliminary investigation, although it had to be its reply,
+its authentication, as it were, on the part of the accused, it had to be
+surrounded by guarantees and formalities. It preserved something
+of a transaction: that is why it had to be 'spontaneous, why it had
+to be formulated before the competent court, why it had to be made
+in full consciousness, why it should not concern impossible things,
+etc." Through the confession, the accused committed himself to the
+procedure; he signed the truth of the preliminary investigation.
+This double ambiguity of the confession (an element of proof and
+the counterpart of preliminary investigation; the effect of constraint
+and a semi-voluntary transaction) explains the two great means used
+by classical criminal law to obtain it: the oath that the accused was
+asked to make before his interrogatory (and therefore under threat
+of perjury before both human and divine justice; and, at the same
+time, a ritual act of commitment); judicial torture (physical violence
+to obtain truth, which, in any case, had then to be repeated before
+the judges, as a 'spontaneous' confession, if it were to constitute
+proof). At the end of the eighteenth century, torture was to be
+denounced as a survival of the barbarities of another age: the mark
+of a savagery that was denounced as 'Gothic'. It is true that the
+practice of torture is of ancient origin: it goes back at least as far
+as the Inquisition, of course, and probably to the torture of slaves.
+But it did not figure in classical law as a survival or defect. It occupied a strict place in a complex penal mechanism, in which the
+procedure of an inquisitorial type was reinforced with elements of
+the accusatory system; in which the written demonstration required
+an oral correlative; in which the techniques of proof administered
+by the magistrates were mingled with the methods of the ordeal to
+which the accused was challenged; in which he was called upon - if
+necessary by the most violent persuasion - to play the role of
+voluntary partner in the procedure; in which it was a question, in
+short, of producing truth by a mechanism consisting of two elements - that of the investigation carried out in secret by the judicial
+authority and that of the act ritually performed by the accused. The
+39
+
+body of the accused, the speaking and, if necessary, suffering body,
+assured the interlocking of these two mechanisms; that is why,
+until the classical system of punishment was re-examined from top
+to bottom, there were so few radical criticisms of torture (the most
+famous being Nicolas's Si la torture est un moyen à vérifier les crimes
+of 1682). Much more frequent were simple recommendations of
+prudence: 'Judicial torture is a dangerous means of arriving at
+knowledge of the truth; that is why judges must not resort to it without due consideration. Nothing is more equivocal. There are guilty
+men who have enough firmness to hide a true crime... and innocent
+victims who are made to confess crimes of which they were not
+guilty' (Ferrière, 612).
+On this basis one may see the functioning of judicial torture, or
+interrogation under torture, as a torture of the truth. To begin with,
+judicial torture was not a way of obtaining the truth at all costs; it
+was not the unrestrained torture of modern interrogations; it was
+certainly cruel, but it was not savage. It was a regulated practice,
+obeying a well-defined procedure; the various stages, their duration,
+the instruments used, the length of ropes and the heaviness of the
+weights used, the number of interventions made by the interrogating
+magistrate, all this was, according to the different local practices,
+carefully codified (In 1722, Aguesseau ordered an investigation into
+the means and rules of torture used in France. For a summary of the
+findings, cf. Joly de Fleury, 322-8.) Torture was a strict judicial
+game. And, as such, it was linked to the old tests or trials - ordeals,
+judicial duels, judgements of God - that were practised in accusatory
+procedures long before the techniques of the Inquisition. Something
+of the joust survived, between the judge who ordered the judicial
+torture and the suspect who was tortured; the 'patient' - this is the
+term used to designate the victim - was subjected to a series of trials,
+graduated in severity, in which he succeeded if he "held our', or
+failed if he confessed. (The frst degree of torture was the sight of
+the instruments. In the case of children or of persons over the age
+of seventy, one did not go beyond this stage.) But the examining
+magistrate did not employ torture without himself taking certain
+risks (apart, that is, from the danger of causing the suspect's death);
+he had a stake in the game, namely, the evidence that he had already
+collected; for the rule was that if the accused 'held out' and did not
+40
+
+confess, the magistrate was forced to drop the charges. The tortured
+man had then won. Hence the custom, which had been introduced
+for the most serious cases, of imposing judicial torture 'pending
+proof: in this case the magistrate could continue with his investigation after the torture had failed; the suspect was not declared
+innocent by his resistance; but at least his victory saved him from
+being condemned to death. The judge kept all his cards, except the
+principal one. Omnia citra mortem. Hence the recommendation
+often made to magistrates, in the case of the most serious crimes,
+not to subject to judicial torture a suspect against whom the evidence
+was sufficiently convincing for, if he managed to resist the torture,
+the magistrate would no longer have the right to pass the death
+sentence, which he nevertheless deserved; in such a joust, justice
+would be the loser: if the evidence was sufficient to condemn such a
+guilty person to death', one should not leave the conviction to
+chance and to the outcome of a provisional interrogation that often
+leads to nothing; for it is in the interest of public safety to make
+examples of grave, horrible and capital crimes' (Rousseaud de la
+Combe, 503).
+Beneath an apparently determined, impatient search for truth,
+one finds in classical torture the regulated mechanism of an ordeal:
+a physical challenge that must define the truth; if the patient is
+guilty, the pains that it imposes are not unjust; but it is also a mark
+of exculpation if he is innocent. In the practice of torture, pain,
+confrontation and truth were bound together: they worked together on the patient's body. The search for truth through judicial
+torture was certainly a way of obtaining evidence, the most serious
+of all - the confession of the guilty person; but it was also the battle,
+and this victory of one adversary over the other, that 'produced'
+truth according to a ritual. In torture employed to extract a confession, there was an element of the investigation; there also was an
+element of the duel.
+It is as if investigation and punishment had become mixed. And
+this is not the least paradoxical thing about it. Judicial torture was
+indeed defined as a way of complementing the demonstration when
+'there are not sufficient penalties in the trial'. For it was included
+among the penalties; it was a penalty so grave that, in the hierarchy
+of punishments, the ordinance of 1760 placed it immediately after
+41
+
+death. How can a penalty be used as a means? one was later to ask.
+How can one treat as a punishment what ought to be a method of
+demonstration? The reason is to be found in the way in which
+criminal justice, in the classical period, operated the production of
+truth. The different pieces of evidence did not constitute so many
+neutral elements, until such time as they could be gathered together
+into a single body of evidence that would bring the final certainty
+of guilt. Each piece of evidence aroused a particular degree of
+abomination. Guilt did not begin when all the evidence was gathered
+together; piece by piece, it was constituted by each of the elements
+that made it possible to recognize a guilty person. Thus a semiproof did not leave the suspect innocent until such time as it was
+completed; it made him semi-guilty; slight evidence of a serious
+crime marked someone as slightly criminal. In short, penal demonstration did not obey a dualistic system: true or false; but a
+principle of continuous gradation; a degree reached in the demonstration already formed a degree of guilt and consequently involved
+a degree of punishment. The suspect, as such, always deserved a
+certain, punishment; one could not be the object of suspicion and be
+completely innocent. Suspicion implied an element of demonstration
+as regards the judge, the mark of a certain degree of guilt as regards
+the suspect and a limited form of penalty as regards punishment. A
+suspect, who remained a suspect, was not for all that declared innocent, but was partially punished. When one reached a certain degree
+of presumption, one could then legitimately bring into play a
+practice that had a dual role: to begin the punishment in pursuance
+of the information already collected and to make use of this first
+stage of punishment in order to extort the truth that was still missing. In the eighteenth century, judicial torture functioned in that
+strange economy in which the ritual that produced the truth went
+side by side with the ritual that imposed the punishment. The body
+interrogated in torture constituted the point of application of the
+punishment and the locus of extortion of the truth. And just as
+presumption was inseparably an element in the investigation and a
+fragment of guilt, the regulated pain involved in judicial torture
+was a means both of punishment and of investigation.
+Now, curiously enough, this interlocking of the two rituals
+4z
+
+through the body continued, evidence having been confirmed and
+sentence passed, in the actual carrying out of the penalty; and the
+body of the condemned man was once again an essential element in
+the ceremonial of public punishment. It was the task of the guilty
+man to bear openly his condemnation and the truth of the crime
+that he had committed. His body, displayed, exhibited in procession,
+tortured, served as the public support of a procedure that had
+hitherto remained in the shade; in him, on him, the sentence had to
+be legible for all. This immediate, striking manifestation of the
+truth in the public implementation of penalties assumed, in the
+eighteenth century, several aspects.
+I. It made the guilty man the herald of his own condemnation.
+He was given the task, in a sense, of proclaiming it and thus attesting
+to the truth of what he had been charged with: the procession
+through the streets, the placard attached to his back, chest or head
+as a reminder of the sentence; the halts at various crossroads, the
+reading of the sentence, the amende honorable performed at the doors
+of churches, in which the condemned man solemnly acknowledged
+his crime: 'Barefoot, wearing a shirt, carrying a torch, kneeling, to
+say and to declare that wickedly, horribly, treacherously, he has
+committed the most detestable crime, etc.'; exhibition at a stake
+where his deeds and the sentence were read out; yet another reading
+of the sentence at the foot of the scaffold; whether he was to go
+simply to the pillory or to the stake and the wheel, the condemned
+man published his crime and the justice that had been meted out to
+him by bearing them physically on his body.
+2. It took up once again the scene of the confession. It duplicated the forced proclamation of the amende honorable with a
+spontaneous, public acknowledgement. It established the public
+execution as the moment of truth. These last moments, when the
+guilty man no longer has anything to lose, are won for the full light
+of truth. After the passing of the sentence, the court could decide
+on some new torture to obtain the names of possible accomplices.
+It was also recognized that at the very moment he mounted the
+scaffold the condemned man could ask for a respite in order to make
+new revelations. The public expected this new turn in the course of
+truth. Many made use of it in order to gain time, as did Michel
+Barbier, found guilty of armed assault: 'He stared impudently at the
+43
+
+scaffold and said that it had certainly not been set up for him, since
+he was innocent; he first asked to return to the chamber, where he
+beat about the bush for half an hour, still trying to justify himself;
+then, when he was sent back to execution, he ascended the scaffold
+with a purposeful air, but, when he saw himself undressed and tied
+to the cross before being stretched, he asked to go back to the
+chamber a second time and there made a full confession of his
+crimes and even declared that he was guilty of another murder'
+(Hardy, IV, 80). The function of the public torture and execution
+was to reveal the truth; and in this respect it continued, in the public
+eye, the work of the judicial torture conducted in private. It added
+to the conviction the signature of the convicted man. A successful
+public execution justified justice, in that it published the truth of the
+crime in the very body of the man to be executed. An example of the
+good condemned man was François Billiard, a senior postal official,
+who murdered his wife in 1772. The executioner wanted to hide
+his face to spare him the insults of the crowd: • "This punishment,
+which I have merited, has not been inflicted upon me," he said, "so
+that I should not be seen by the public..." He was still wearing
+mourning dress in honour of his wife... He was wearing new
+shoes, his hair had been recently curled and powdered, and he had a
+countenance so modest and so dignified that those present who
+found themselves observing him more closely said that he must be
+the most perfect Christian or the greatest of all hypocrites. The
+placard that he was wearing on his chest had gone askew, and it was
+noticed that he had straightened it himself, no doubt so that people
+could read it the more easily' (Hardy, I, 327). If each of the participants played his role well, the penal ceremony had the effectiveness
+of a long public confession.
+3. It pinned the public torture on to the crime itself; it established
+from one to the other a series of decipherable relations. It was an
+exhibition of the corpse of the condemned man at the scene of his
+crime, or at one of the near-by crossroads. The execution was often
+carried out at the very place where the crime had been committed -
+as in the case of the student who, in 1723, had killed several persons
+and for whom the presidial court of Nantes decided to set up a
+scaffold in front of the inn where he had committed his murders
+(Nantes, F.F. 124; cf. Parfouru, XXV). There was the use of
+44
+
+'symbolic' torture in which the forms of the execution referred to
+the nature of the crime: the tongues of blasphemers were pierced, the
+impure were burnt, the right hand of murderers was cut off; sometimes the condemned man was made to carry the instrument of his
+crime - thus Damiens was made to hold in his guilty right hand the
+famous dagger with which he had committed the crime, hand and
+dagger being smeared with sulphur and burnt together. As Vico
+remarked, this old jurisprudence was "an entire poetics'.
+There were even some cases of an almost theatrical reproduction
+of the crime in the execution of the guilty man - with the same
+instruments, the same gestures. Thus justice had the crime reenacted before the eyes of all, publishing it in its truth and at the
+same time annulling it in the death of the guilty man. Even as late
+in the eighteenth century as 1772, one finds sentences like the following: a servant girl at Cambrai, having killed her mistress, was condemned to be taken to the place of her execution in a cart 'used to
+collect rubbish at the crossroads'; there a gibbet was to be set up
+'at the foot of which will be placed the same chair in which the said
+Laleu, her mistress, was sitting at the time of the murder; and having
+seated the criminal there, the executioner of the fligh Court of
+Justice will cut off her right hand, throw it in her presence into the
+fire, and, immediately afterwards, will strike her four blows with
+the cleaver with which she murdered the said Laleu, the first and
+second being on the head, the third on the left forearm and the
+fourth on the chest; this done, she will be hung and strangled on the
+said gibbet until she be dead; and when two hours have elapsed her
+dead body will be removed and the head separated from it at the
+foot of the said gibbet on the said scaffold, with the same cleaver
+she used to murder her mistress, and the same head exhibited
+on a pole twenty feet high outside the gates of the said Cambrai,
+within reach of the road that leads to Douai, and the rest of the body
+put in a sack, and buried near the said pole at a depth of ten feet'
+(quoted in Dautricourt, 269-70).
+4. Lastly, the slowness of the process of torture and execution,
+its sudden dramatic moments, the cries and sufferings of the condemned man serve as an ultimate proof at the end of the judicial
+ritual. Every death agony expresses a certain truth: but, when it
+takes place on the scaffold, it does so with more intensity, in that it
+45
+
+is Hastened by pain; with more rigour, because it occurs exactly at
+the juncture between the judgement of men and the judgement of
+God; with more ostentation, because it takes place in public. The
+sufferings of the condemned man are an extension of those of the
+judicial torture that precedes them; in the judicial torture, however,
+the game was not yet over and one could still save one's life; now
+one will die, without any doubt, and it is one's soul that one must
+save. The eternal game has already begun: the torture of the execution anticipates the punishments of the beyond; it shows what they
+are; it is the theatre of hell; the cries of the condemned man, his
+struggles, his blasphemies, already signify his irremediable destiny.
+But the pains here below may also be counted as penitence and so
+alleviate the punishments of the beyond: God will not fail to take
+such a martyrdom into account, providing it is borne with resignation. The cruelty of the earthly punishment will be deducted from
+the punishment to come: in it is glimpsed the promise of forgiveness. But, it might be said, are not such terrible sufferings a sign
+that God has abandoned the guilty man to the mercy of his fellow
+creatures. And, far from securing future absolution, do they not
+prefigure imminent damnation; so that, if the condemned man dies
+quickly, without a prolonged agony, is it not proof that God wishes
+to protect him and to prevent him from falling into despair? There
+is, therefore, an ambiguity in this suffering that may signify equally
+well the truth of the crime or the error of the judges, the goodness
+or the evil of the criminal, the coincidence or the divergence between
+the judgement of men and that of God. Hence the insatiable curiosity
+that drove the spectators to the scaffold to witness the spectacle of
+sufferings truly endured; there one could decipher crime and innocence, the past and the future, the here below and the eternal. It was
+a moment of truth that all the spectators questioned: each word, each
+cry, the duration of the agony, the resisting body, the life that clung
+desperately to it, all this constituted a sign. There was the man who
+survived 'six hours on the wheel, and did not want the executioner,
+who consoled and heartened him no doubt as best he could, to leave
+him for a moment'; there was the man who died 'with true Christian
+feeling, and who manifested the most sincere repentance; the man
+who 'expired on the wheel an hour after being put there; it is said
+that the spectators of his torture were moved by the outward signs
+46
+
+of religion and repentance that he gave; the man who had shown
+the most marked signs of contrition throughout the journey to the
+scaffold, but who, when placed alive on the wheel, 'did not cease
+to let forth the most horrible cries'; or again the woman who 'had
+preserved her calm up to the moment when the sentence was read,
+but whose wits then began to turn; she was quite mad by the time
+she was hanged' (Hardy, I, 13; IV, 42; V, 134).
+We have come full circle: from the judicial torture to the execution, the body has produced and reproduced the truth of the crime
+-or rather it constitutes the element which, through a whole set of
+rituals and trials, confesses that the crime took place, admits that the
+accused did indeed commit it, shows that he bore it inscribed in
+himself and on himself, supports the operation of punishment and
+manifests its effects in the most striking way. The body, several
+times tortured, provides the synthesis of the reality of the deeds and
+the truth of the investigation, of the documents of the case and the
+statements of the criminal, of the crime and the punishment. It is an
+essential element, therefore, in a penal liturgy, in which it must
+serve as the partner of a procedure ordered around the formidable
+rights of the sovereign, the prosecution and secrecy.
+The public execution is to be understood not only as a judicial,
+but also as a political ritual. It belongs, even in minor cases, to the
+ceremonies by which power is manifested.
+An offence, according to the law of the classical age, quite apart
+from the damage it may produce, apart even from the rule that it
+breaks, offends the rectitude of those who abide by the law: 'If one
+commits something that the law forbids, even if there is neither harm
+nor injury to the individual, it is an offence that demands reparation,
+because the right of the superior man is violated and because it
+offends the dignity of his character' (Risi, 9). Besides its immediate
+victim, the crime attacks the sovereign: it attacks him personally,
+since the law represents the will of the sovereign; it attacks him
+physically, since the force of the law is the force of the prince.
+'For a law to be in force in this kingdom, it must necessarily have
+emanated directly from the sovereign, or at least been confirmed by
+the seal of his authority' (Muyart de Vouglans, xxxiv). The intervention of the sovereign is not, therefore, an arbitration between
+47
+
+twą adversaries; it is much more, even, than an action to enforce
+respect for the rights of the individual; it is a direct reply to the
+person who has offended him. There can be no doubt that 'the
+exercise of the sovereign power in the punishment of crime is one
+of the essential parts of the administration of justice' (Jousse, vii).
+Punishment, therefore, cannot be identified with or even measured
+by the redress of the injury; in punishment, there must always be a
+portion that belongs to the prince, and, even when it is combined
+with the redress laid down, it constitutes the most important element
+in the penal liquidation of the crime. Now, this portion belonging
+to the prince is not in itself simple: on the one hand, it requires
+redress for the injury that has been done to his kingdom (as an
+element of disorder and as an example given to others, this considerable injury is out of all proportion to that which has been
+committed upon a private individual); but it also requires that the
+king take revenge for an affront to his very person.
+The right to punish, therefore, is an aspect of the sovereign's
+right to make war on his enemies: to punish belongs to 'that
+absolute power of life and death which Roman law calls merum
+imperium, a right by virtue of which the prince sees that his law is
+respected by ordering the punishment of crime' (Muyart de Vouglans, xxxiv). But punishment is also a way of exacting retribution
+that is both personal and public, since the physico-political force
+of the sovereign is in a sense present in the law: 'One sees by the
+very definition of the law that it tends not only to prohibit, but also
+to avenge contempt for its authority by the punishment of those who
+violate its prohibitions' (Muyart de Vouglans, xoxiv). In the execution of the most ordinary penalty, in the most punctilious respect of
+legal forms, reign the active forces of revenge.
+The public execution, then, has a juridico-political function. It is
+a ceremonial by which a momentarily injured sovereignty is reconstituted. It restores that sovereignty by manifesting it at its most
+spectacular. The public execution, however hasty and everyday,
+belongs to a whole series of great rituals in which power is eclipsed
+and restored (coronation, entry of the king into a conquered city,
+the submission of rebellious subjects); over and above the crime
+that has placed the sovereign in contempt, it deploys before all eyes
+an invincible force. Its aim is not so much to re-establish a balance
+
+as to bring into play, as its extreme point, the dissymmetry between
+the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful
+sovereign who displays his strength. Although redress of the private
+injury occasioned by the offence must be proportionate, although the
+sentence must be equitable, the punishment is carried out in such a
+way as to give a spectacle not of measure, but of imbalance and
+excess; in this liturgy of punishment, there must be an emphatic
+affirmation of power and of its intrinsic superiority. And this superiority is not simply that of right, but that of the physical strength
+of the sovereign beating down upon the body of his adversary and
+mastering it: by breaking the law, the offender has touched the very
+person of the prince; and it is the prince - or at least those to whom
+he has delegated his force - who seizes upon the body of the condemned man and displays it marked, beaten, broken. The ceremony
+of punishment, then, is an exercise of 'terror'. When the jurists of
+the eighteenth century began their polemic with the reformers, they
+offered a restrictive, "modernist' interpretation of the physical
+cruelty of the penalties imposed by the law: if severe penalties are
+required, it is because their example must be deeply inscribed in the
+hearts of men. Yet, in fact, what had hitherto maintained this
+practice of torture was not an economy of example, in the sense in
+which it was to be understood at the time of the idéologues (that the
+representation of the penalty should be greater than the interest of
+the crime), but a policy of terror: to make everyone aware, through
+the body of the criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign. The public execution did not re-establish justice; it reactivated
+power. In the seventeenth century, and even in the early eighteenth
+century, it was not, therefore, with all its theatre of terror, a lingering hang-over from an earlier age. Its ruthlessness, its spectacle, its
+physical violence, its unbalanced play of forces, its meticulous
+ceremonial, its entire apparatus were inscribed in the political
+functioning of the penal system.
+This enables us to understand some of the characteristics of the
+liturgy of torture and execution - above all, the importance of a
+ritual that was to deploy its pomp in public. Nothing was to be
+hidden of this triumph of the law. Its episodes were traditionally the
+same and yet the sentences never failed to list them, so important
+were they in the penal mechanism: processions, halts at crossroads
+49
+
+andı church doors, the public reading of the sentence, kneeling,
+declarations of repentance for the offence to God and to the king.
+Sometimes questions of precedence and ceremonial were settled by
+the court itself: "The officers will ride according to the following
+order: namely, at the head two police sergeants; then the patient;
+after the patient, Bonfort and Le Corre on his left will walk together,
+followed by the clerk of the court and in this manner shall go to the
+market square at which place the judgement shall be carried out'
+(quoted in Corre, 7). Now, this meticulous ceremonial was not only
+legal, but quite explicitly military. The justice of the king was
+shown to be an armed justice. The sword that punished the guilty
+was also the sword that destroyed enemies. A whole military machine
+surrounded the scaffold: cavalry of the watch, archers, guardsmen,
+soldiers. This was intended, of course, to prevent any escape or
+show of force; it was also to prevent any outburst of sympathy or
+anger on the part of the people, any attempt to save the condemned
+or to have them immediately put to death; but it was also a reminder
+that every crime constituted as it were a rebellion against the law
+and that the criminal was an enemy of the prince. All these reasons -
+whether a matter of precaution in particular circumstances or a
+functional element in the performance of the ritual - made the public
+execution more than an act of justice; it was a manifestation of
+force; or rather, it was justice as the physical, material and awesome
+force of the sovereign deployed there. The ceremony of the public
+torture and execution displayed for all to see the power relation
+that gave his force to the law.
+As a ritual of armed law, in which the prince showed himself,
+indissociably, both as head of justice and head of war, the public
+execution had two aspects: one of victory, the other of struggle.
+It brought to a solemn end a war, the outcome of which was
+decided in advance, between the criminal and the sovereign; it had
+to manifest the disproportion of power of the sovereign over those
+whom he had reduced to impotence. The dissymmetry, the irreversible imbalance of forces were an essential element in the public
+execution. A body effaced, reduced to dust and thrown to the winds,
+a body destroyed piece by piece by the infinite power of the sovereign constituted not only the ideal, but the real limit of punishment.
+Take the celebrated torture and execution of Massola, which took
+
+place at Avignon and which was one of the first to arouse the
+indignation of contemporaries. This was an apparently paradoxical
+ceremony, since it took place almost entirely after death, and since
+justice dia little more than deploy its magnificent theatre, the ritual
+praise of its force, on a corpse. The condemned man was blindfolded and tied to a stake; all around, on the scaffold, were stakes
+with iron hooks. "The confessor whispered in the patient's ear and,
+after he had given him the blessing, the executioner, who had an
+iron bludgeon of the kind used in slaughter houses, delivered a blow
+with all his might on the temple of the wretch, who fell dead: the
+mortis exactor, who had a large knife, then cut his throat, which
+spattered him with blood; it was a horrible sight to see; he severed
+the sinews near the two heels, and then opened up the belly from
+which he drew the heart, liver, spleen and lungs, which he stuck on
+an iron hook, and cut and dissected into pieces, which he then stuck
+on the other hooks as he cut them, as one does with an animal.
+Look who can at such a sight' (Bruneau, 259). In the explicit
+reference to the butcher's trade, the infinitesimal destruction of the
+body is linked here with spectacle: each piece is placed on display.
+The execution was accompanied by a whole ceremonial of
+triumph; but it also included, as a dramatic nucleus in its monotonous
+progress, a scene of confrontation: this was the immediate, direct
+action of the executioner on the body of the 'patient'. It was a coded
+action, of course, since custom and, often quite explicitly, the sentence prescribed its principal episodes. Nevertheless, it did preserve
+something of the battle. The executioner not only implemented the
+law, he also deployed the force; he was the agent of a violence applied,
+in order to master it, to the violence of the crime. Materially, physically, he was the adversary of this crime: an adversary who could show
+pity or ruthlessness. Damhoudère complained, with many of his
+contemporaries, that the executioners exercised 'every cruelty with
+regard to the evil-doing patients, treating them, buffeting and killing
+them as if they had a beast in their hands' (Damhoudère, 219). And
+for a long time the habit did not die out. There was still an element
+of challenge and of jousting in the ceremony of public execution.
+If the executioner triumphed, if he managed to cut off the head with
+a single blow, he 'showed it to the people, put it down on the ground
+and then waved to the public who greatly applauded his skill by
+§I
+
+clapping'. (A scene observed by T. S. Gueulette, at the execution of
+Montigny in 1737 - cf. Anchel, 62-8.) Conversely, if he failed, if he
+did not succeed in killing the 'patient' as required, he was liable to
+punishment. This was the case of Damiens's executioner who, being
+unable to quarter his patient according to the rules, had to cut him
+up with a knife; as a result, Damiens's hair, which had been promised to him, was confiscated and the money obtained from the sale
+given to the poor. Some years later, an executioner at Avignon
+caused excessive pain to three bandits, who were nevertheless
+formidable characters, whom he had to hang; the spectators became
+angry; they denounced him; in order to punish him and also to
+protect him from mob violence, he was put into prison (Duhamel,
+25). And, behind this punishment of the unskilful executioner,
+stands a tradition, which is still close to us, according to which the
+condemned man should be pardoned if the execution happened to
+fail. It was a custom clearly established in certain countries: in
+Burgundy, for instance (cf. Chassanée, 55). The people often
+expected it to be applied, and would sometimes protect a condemned
+man who had escaped death in this way. In order to abolish both
+custom and expectation, they had to revive the adage, 'the gibbet
+does not lose its prey', to introduce explicit instructions in capital
+sentences, such as 'hanged by the neck until he be dead'. And jurists
+like Serpillon or Blackstone were insisting in the middle of the
+eighteenth century that a failure on the part of the executioner did
+not mean that the condemned man's life was spared (Serpillon, III,
+1100). In his Commensaries on the Laws of England, Blackstone
+remarks: It is clear, that if, upon judgement to be hanged by the
+neck till he is dead, the criminal be not thoroughly killed, but
+revives, the sheriff must hang him again. For the former hanging
+was no execution of the sentence; and, if a false tenderness were to
+be indulged in such cases, a multitude of collusions might ensue'
+(Blackstone, 199). There was something of the ordeal and something
+of God's judgement that was still indecipherable in the ceremony of
+execution. In his confrontation with the condemned man, the executioner was a little like the king's champion. Yet he was an unacknowledgeable and unacknowledged champion: the tradition was, it seems,
+that when the executioner's letters were sealed, they were not placed
+on the table, but thrown on the ground. The various prohibitions
+§z
+
+surrounding this 'very necessary' yet. 'unnatural' office are well
+known (Loyseau, 80-81). The executioner may have been, in a
+sense, the king's sword, but he shared the infamy of his adversary.
+The sovereign power that enjoined him to kill, and which through
+him did kill, was not present in him; it was not identified with his
+own ruthlessness. And it never appeared with more spectacular
+effect than when it interrupted the executioner's gesture with a letter
+of pardon. The short time that usually elapsed between sentence
+and execution (often a few hours) meant that the pardon usually
+arrived at the very last moment. But the ceremony, by the very
+slowness of its progress, was no doubt arranged to leave room for
+this eventuality. (Cf. Hardy, 30 January 1769, I, 125 and 14 December 1779, IV, 229; Anchel, 162-3, tells the story of Antoine Boulleteix, who was already at the foot of the scaffold when a horseman
+arrived carrying the celebrated parchment. Shouts of "God save the
+King' arose and Boulleteix was taken to the tavern, while the clerk
+of the court made a collection on his behalf.) The condemned
+always hoped for a pardon and, in order to drag things out, they
+would pretend, even at the foot of the scaffold, that they had further
+revelations to make. When the people wanted a pardon they called
+for it aloud and tried to postpone the last moment, looking out for
+the arrival of the messenger bearing the letter with the green wax
+seal and if necessary claiming that he was on his way (this happened
+during the execution of those condemned for the uprising against
+child abduction on 3 August 1750). The sovereign was present at
+the execution not only as the power exacting the vengeance of the
+law, but as the power that could suspend both law and vengeance.
+He alone must remain master, he alone could wash away the offences
+committed on his person; although it is true that he delegated to the
+courts the task of exercising his power to dispense justice, he had
+not transferred it; he retained it in its entirety and he could suspend
+the sentence or increase it at will.
+We must regard the public execution, as it was still ritualized in
+the eighteenth century, as a political operation. It was logically
+inscribed in a system of punishment, in which the sovereign, directly
+or indirectly, demanded, decided and carried out punishments, in
+so far as it was he who, through the law, had been injured by the
+crime. In every offence there was a crimen majestatis and in the least
+53
+
+criminal a potential regicide. And the regicide, in turn, was neither
+more nor less, than the total, absolute criminal since, instead of
+attacking, like any offender, a particular decision or wish of the
+sovereign power, he attacked the very principle and physical person
+of the prince. The ideal punishment of the regicide had to constitute
+the summum of all possible tortures. It would be an expression of
+infinite vengeance: French law, in any case, made provisions for no
+fixed penalties for this sort of monstrosity. For the execution of
+Ravaillac the form of the ceremony had to be invented, by combining all the cruellest tortures then practised in France. For Damiens,
+an attempt was made to think up still more atrocious tortures.
+Suggestions were made, but they were considered to be less perfect.
+So the form of Ravaillac's execution was repeated. And it must be
+admitted that it was relatively modest if one thinks how in 1584 the
+assassin of William of Orange was abandoned to what seems like an
+infinity of vengeance. 'On the first day, he was taken to the square
+where he found a cauldron of boiling water, in which was submerged
+the arm with which he had committed the crime. The next day the
+arm was cut off, and, since it fell at his feet, he was constantly
+kicking it up and down the scaffold; on the third day, red-hot
+pincers were applied to his breasts and the front of his arm; on the
+fourth day, the pincers were applied similarly on the back of his
+arm and on his buttocks; and thus, consecutively, this man was
+tortured for eighteen days.' On the last day, he was put to the wheel
+and 'mailloté' [beaten with a wooden club]. After six hours, he was
+still asking for water, which was not given him. Finally the police
+magistrate was begged to put an end to him by strangling, so that
+his soul should not despair and be lost' (Brantôme, II, 191-2).
+There can be no doubt that the existence of public tortures and
+executions were connected with something quite other than this
+internal organization. Rusche and Kirchheimer are right to see it as
+the effect of a system of production in which labour power, and
+therefore the human body, has neither the utility nor the commercial
+value that are conferred on them in an economy of an industrial
+type. Moreover, this "contempt' for the body is certainly related to
+a general attitude to death; and, in such an attitude, one can detect
+not only the values proper to Christianity, but a demographical,
+54
+
+in a sense biological, situation: the ravages of disease and hunger,
+the periodic massacres of the epidemics, the formidable child mortality rate, the precariousness of the bio-economic balances - all this
+made death familiar and gave rise to rituals intended to integrate it,
+to make it acceptable and to give a meaning to its permanent
+aggression. But in analysing why the public executions survived for
+so long, one must also refer to the historical conjuncture; it must
+not be forgotten that the ordinance of 1070 that regulated criminal
+justice almost up to the Revolution had even increased in certain
+respects the rigour of the old edicts; Pussort, who, among the commissioners entrusted with the task of drawing up the documents,
+represented the intentions of the king, was responsible for this,
+despite the views of such magistrates as Lamoignon; the number of
+uprisings at the very height of the classical age, the rumbling close
+at hand of civil war, the king's desire to assert his power at the
+expense of the parlements go a long way to explain the survival of
+so severe a penal system.
+In accounting for a penal system involving so much torture, these
+are general and in a sense external reasons; they explain not only
+the possibility and the long survival of physical punishments, but
+also the weakness and the rather sporadic nature of the opposition
+to them. Against this general background we must bring out their
+precise function. If torture was so strongly embedded in legal
+practice, it was because it revealed truth and showed the operation
+of power. It assured the articulation of the written on the oral, the
+secret on the public, the procedure of investigation on the operation
+of the confession; it made it possible to reproduce the crime on the
+visible body of the criminal; in the same horror, the crime had to
+be manifested and annulled. It also made the body of the condemned
+man the place where the vengeance of the sovereign was applied,
+the anchoring point for a manifestation of power, an opportunity
+of affirming the dissymmetry of forces. We shall see later that the
+truth-power relation remains at the heart of all mechanisms of
+punishment and that it is still to be found in contemporary penal
+practice - but in a quite different form and with very different effects.
+The Enlightenment was soon to condemn public torture and execution as an 'atrocity' - a term that was often used to describe it, but
+without any critical intention, by jurists themselves. Perhaps the
+
+notion of 'atrocity' is one of those that best designates the economy
+of the public execution in the old penal practice. To begin with,
+atrocity is a characteristic of some of the great crimes: it refers to the
+number of natural or positive, divine or human laws that they
+attack, to the scandalous openness or, on the contrary, to the secret
+cunning with which they have been committed, to the rank and
+status of those who are their authors and victims, to the disorder
+that they presuppose or bring with them, to the horror they
+arouse. In so far as it must bring the crime before everyone's eyes,
+in all its severity, the punishment must take responsibility for this
+atrocity: it must bring it to light by confessions, statements, inscriptions that make it public; it must reproduce it in ceremonies that
+apply it to the body of the guilty person in the form of humiliation
+and pain. Atrocity is that part of the crime that the punishment
+turns back as torture in order to display it in the full light of day:
+it is a figure inherent in the mechanism that produces the visible
+truth of the crime at the very heart of the punishment itself. The
+public execution formed part of the procedure that established the
+reality of what one punished. Furthermore, the atrocity of a crime
+was also the violence of the challenge flung at the sovereign; it was
+that which would move him to make a reply whose function was to
+go further than this atrocity, to master it, to overcome it by an
+excess that annulled it. The atrocity that haunted the public execution played, therefore, a double role: it was the principle of the
+communication between the crime and the punishment, it was also
+the exacerbation of the punishment in relation to the crime. It provided the spectacle with both truth and power; it was the culmination of the ritual of the investigation and the ceremony in which the
+sovereign triumphed. And it joined both together in the tortured
+body. The punitive practice of the nineteenth century was to strive
+to put as much distance as possible between the 'serene' search for
+truth and the violence that cannot be entirely effaced from punishment. It set out to mark the heterogeneity that separates the c-ime
+that is to be punished and the punishment imposed by the public
+power. Between truth and punishment, there should no longer be
+any other relation than one of legitimate consequence. The punishing power should not soil its hands with a crime greater than the
+one it wished to punish. It should remain innocent of the penalty
+
+that it inflicts. 'Let us hasten to proscribe such tortures. They were
+worthy only of the crowned monsters who governed the Romans'
+(Pastoret, on the subject of the punishment of regicides, II, 6I). But,
+according to the penal practice of the preceding period, the proximity in the public execution of the sovereign and the crime, the mixture that was produced in it of "demonstration' and punishment,
+were not the result of a barbarous confusion; what joined them
+together was the mechanism of atrocity and its necessary concatenations. The atrocity of the expiation organized the ritual destruction
+of infamy by omnipotence.
+The fact that the crime and the punishment were related and
+bound up in the form of atrocity was not the result of some obscurely accepted law of retaliation. It was the effect, in the rites of
+punishment, of a certain mechanism of power: of a power that not
+only did not hesitate to exert itself directly on bodies, but was
+exalted and strengthened by its visible manifestations; of a power
+that asserted itself as an armed power whose functions of maintaining order were not entirely unconnected with the functions of war;
+of a power that presented rules and obligations as personal bonds, a
+breach of which constituted an offence and called for vengeance;
+of a power for which disobedience was an act of hostility, the first
+sign of rebellion, which is not in principle different from civil war;
+of a power that had to demonstrate not why it enforced its laws,
+but who were its enemies, and what unleashing of force threatened
+them; of a power which, in the absence of continual supervision,
+sought a renewal of its effect in the spectacle of its individual manifestations; of a power that was recharged in the ritual display of its
+reality as "super-power'.
+Of all the reasons why punishment that was not in the least
+ashamed of being 'atrocious' was replaced by punishment that was
+to claim the honour of being 'humane' there is one that must be
+analysed at once, for it is internal to the public execution itself: at
+once an element of its functioning and the principle of its perpetual
+disorder.
+In the ceremonies of the public execution, the main character was
+the people, whose real and immediate presence was required for the
+performance. An execution that was known to be taking place, but
+57
+
+which did so in secret, would scarcely have had any meaning. The
+aim was to make an example, not only by making people aware that
+the slightest offence was likely to be punished, but by arousing
+feelings of terror by the spectacle of power letting its anger fall upon
+the guilty person: In criminal matters, the most difficult point is
+the imposition of the penalty: it is the aim and the end of the
+procedure, and its only fruit, by example and terror, when it is well
+applied to the guilty person' (Bruneau, unnumbered preface to the
+first part).
+But, in this scene of terror, the role of the people was an ambiguous one. People were summoned as spectators: they were assembled
+to observe public exhibitions and amendes honorables; pillories,
+gallows and scaffolds were erected in public squares or by the roadside; sometimes the corpses of the executed persons were displayed
+for several days near the scenes of their crimes. Not only must
+people know, they must see with their own eyes. Because they must
+be made to be afraid; but also because they must be the witnesses,
+the guarantors, of the punishment, and because they must to a
+certain extent take part in it. The right to be witnesses was one that
+they possessed and claimed; a hidden execution was a privileged
+execution, and in such cases it was often suspected that it had not
+taken place with all its customary severity. There were protests
+when at the last moment the victim was taken away out of sight.
+The senior postal official who had been put on public exhibition
+for killing his wife was later taken away from the crowd. 'He was
+put into a hired coach; it was thought that if he had not been well
+escorted, it would have been difficult to protect him from being
+ill-treated by the populace, who yelled and jeered at him' (Hardy, I,
+328). When the woman Lescombat was hanged, care was taken to
+hide her face; she had 'a kerchief over her neck and head, which
+made the public murmur and say that it was not Lescombat'
+(Anchel, 70-71). The people claimed the right to observe the execution and to see who was being executed. The first time the guillotine
+was used the Chronique de Paris reported that people complained
+that they could not see anything and chanted, 'Give us back our
+gallows' (Lawrence, 7iff). The people also had a right to take part.
+The condemned man, carried in procession, exhibited, humiliated,
+with the horror of his crime recalled in innumerable ways, was
+
+offered to the insults, sometimes to the attacks of the spectators.
+The vengeance of the people was called upon to become an unobtrusive part of the vengeance of the sovereign. Not that it was
+in any way fundamental, or that the king had to express in his own
+way the people's revenge; it was rather that the people had to bring
+its assistance to the king when the king undertook 'to be avenged
+on his enemies, especially when those enemies were to be found
+among the people. It was rather like a "scaffold service' that the
+people owed the king's vengeance. This 'service' had been specified
+in the old ordinances; the edict of 1347 concerning blasphemers
+stipulated that they would be exhibited at the pillory from the hour
+of prime, to that of their deaths. And mud and other refuse, though
+no stone or anything injurious, could be thrown at their faces...
+The second time, in case of relapse, it is our will that he be put in the
+pillory on a solemn marke: day, and that his upper lip be split so
+that the teeth appear.' No doubt, at the classical period, this form
+of participation in the torture was no more than tolerated and
+attempts were made to limit it: because of the barbarities that it gave
+rise to and the usurpation it involved of the power to punish. But it
+belonged too closely to the general economy of the public execution
+for it to be eliminated altogether. Even in the eighteenth century,
+there were scenes like the one that accompanied the execution of
+Montigny in 1737; as the executioner was carrying out the execution, the local fish-wives walked in procession, holding aloft an
+effigy of the condemned man, and then cut off its head (Anchel, 63).
+And very often, as they moved slowly in procession through it,
+criminals had to be 'protected' from the crowd - both as an example
+and as a target, a possible threat and a 'prey, promised but also
+forbidden. In calling on the crowd to manifest its power, the
+sovereign tolerated for a moment acts of violence, which he accepted
+as a sign of allegiance, but which were strictly limited by the sovereign's own privileges.
+Now it was on this point that the people, drawn to the spectacle
+intended to terrorize it, could express its rejection of the punitive
+power and sometimes revolt. Preventing an execution that was
+regarded as unjust, snatching a condemned man from the hands of
+the executioner, obtaining his pardon by force, possibly pursuing
+and assaulting the executioners, in any case abusing the judges and
+59
+
+causing an uproar against the sentence - all this formed part of the
+popular practices that invested, traversed and often overturned the
+ritual of the public execution. This often happened, of course, in the
+case of those condemned for rioting: there were the disturbances
+that followed a famous case of child abduction, when the crowd
+wanted to prevent the execution of three supposed rioters, who were
+to be hanged at the cemetery of Saint-Jean, 'because there were
+fewer entrances and processions to guard'; the terrified executioner
+cut down one of the condemned men; the archers let fly their arrows.
+It occurred again after the corn riots of 1775; and again in 1786,
+when the day-labourers marched on Versailles and set about freeing
+their arrested comrades. But apart from these cases, when the process of agitation had been triggered off previously and for reasons
+that did not concern some measure of penal justice, one finds many
+examples when the agitation was provoked directly by a verdict
+and an execution: small, but innumerable 'disturbances around the
+scaffold'.
+In their most elementary forms, these disturbances began with the
+shouts of encouragement, sometimes the cheering, that accompanied
+the condemned man to his execution. Throughout the long procession, he was sustained by 'the compassion of the meek and tenderhearted, and with the applause, admiration and envy of all the bold
+and hardened' (Fielding, 449). If the crowd gathered round the
+scaffold, it was not simply to witness the sufferings of the condemned
+man or to excite the anger of the executioner: it was also to hear an
+individual who had nothing more to lose curse the judges, the laws,
+the government and religion. The public execution allowed the
+luxury of these momentary saturnalia, when nothing remained to
+prohibit or to punish. Under the protection of imminent death, the
+criminal could say everything and the crowd cheered. 'If there were
+annals in which the last words of the tortured and executed were
+scrupulously recorded, and if one had the courage to read through
+them, even if one did no more than question the vile populace that
+gathers around the scaffolds out of cruel curiosity, one would be told
+that no one who had died on the wheel did not accuse heaven for the
+misery that brought him to the crime, reproach his judges for their
+barbarity, curse the minister of the altars who accompanies them
+and blaspheme against the God whose organ he is' (Boucher
+6o
+
+d'Argis, 128-8). In these executions, which ought to show only the
+terrorizing power of the prince, there was a whole aspect of the
+carnival, in which rules were inverted, authority mocked and
+criminals transformed into heroes. The shame was turned round;
+the courage, like the tears and the cries of the condemned, caused
+offence only to the law. Fielding notes with regret: "To unite the
+ideas of death and shame is not so easy as may be imagined... I
+will appeal to any man who hath seen an execution, or a procession
+to an execution; let him tell me. When he hath beheld a poor
+wretch, bound in a cart, just on the verge of eternity, all pale and
+trembling with his approaching fate, whether the idea of shame
+hath ever intruded on his mind? much less will the bold daring
+rogue, who glories in his present condition, inspire the beholder
+with any such sensation' (Fielding, 450). For the people who are
+there and observe, there is always, even in the most extreme vengeance of the sovereign a pretext for revenge.
+This was especially the case if the conviction was regarded as
+unjust - or if one saw a man of the people put to death, for a crime
+that would have merited, for someone better born or richer, a comparatively light penalty. It would seem that certain practices of penal
+justice were no longer supported in the eighteenth century - and
+perhaps for longer - by the lower strata of the population, This
+would explain why executions could easily lead to the beginnings
+of social disturbances. Since the poorest - it was a magistrate who
+made the observation (Dupaty, 1786, 247) - could not be heard in
+the courts of law, it was where the law was manifested publicly,
+where they were called upon to act as witnesses and almost as coadjutors of this law, that they could intervene, physically: enter by
+force into the punitive mechanism and redistribute its effects; take
+up in another sense the violence of the punitive rituals. There was
+agitation against the difference in penalties according to social class:
+in 1781, the parish priest of Champré had been killed by the lord
+of the manor, and an attempt was made to declare the murderer
+insane; 'the peasants, who were extremely attached to their pastor,
+were furious and had at first seemed ready to lay violent hands upon
+their lord and to set fire to the castle... Everyone protested, and
+rightly, against the indulgence of the minister who deprived justice
+of the means of punishing so abominable a crime' (Hardy, IV, 394).
+
+There was agitation, t00, against the excessive sentences passed on
+certain common offences that were not regarded as serious (such as
+house-breaking); or against punishments for certain offences connected with social conditions such as petty larceny; the death penalty
+for this crime aroused a great deal of discontent, because there were
+many domestic servants in a single household and it was difficult
+for them, in such a case, to prove their innocence, and also because
+they could easily be victims of their employers' spite and because
+the indulgence of certain masters who shut their eyes to such
+behaviour made the fate of servants accused, condemned and hanged
+even more iniquitous. The execution of such servants often gave
+rise to protests (cf. Hardy, I, 319, 367; III, 227-8; IV, 180). There
+was a small riot in Paris in 1761 in favour of a servant woman who
+had stolen a piece of cloth from her master. Despite the fact that the
+woman admitted her guilt, handed back the material and begged for
+mercy, the master refused to withdraw his complaint; on the day
+of the execution, the local people prevented the hanging, invaded the
+merchant's shop and looted it; in the end, the servant was pardoned,
+but a, woman, who attempted, unsuccessfully, to stick a needle into
+the wicked master, was banished for three years (Anchel, 226).
+One remembers the great legal affairs of the eighteenth century,
+when enlightened opinion intervened in the persons of the philosophes and certain magistrates: Calas, Sirven and the Chevalier de La
+Barre, for instance. But less attention is given to the popular agitations caused by punitive practice. Indeed, they seldom spread beyond a town, or even a district. Yet they did have a real importance.
+Sometimes these movements, which originated from below, spread
+and attracted the attention of more highly placed persons who,
+taking them up, gave them a new dimension (in the years preceding
+the Revolution, the affair of Catherine Espinas, falsely convicted of
+parricide in 1785, or the case of the three men of Chaumont, condemned to the wheel, for whom Dupaty, in 1786, wrote his celebrated memoir, or that of Marie Françoise Salmon, whom the
+parlement of Rouen in 1782 had condemned to the stake, for poisoning, but who in 1786 had still not been executed). More usually,
+those disturbances had maintained around penal justice and its
+manifestations, which ought to have been exemplary, a state of
+permanent unrest. How often had it proved necessary, in order to
+6z
+
+ensure order around the scaffolds, to take steps that were 'distressing
+to the people' and 'humiliating for the authorities' (Argenson, 241)?
+It was evident that the great spectacle of punishment ran the risk
+of being rejected by the very people to whom it was addressed. In
+fact, the terror of the public execution created centres of illegality:
+on execution days, work stopped, the taverns were full, the authorities were abused, insults or stones were thrown at the executioner,
+the guards and the soldiers; attempts were made to seize the condemned man, either to save him or to kill him more surely; fights
+broke out, and there was no better prey for thieves than the curious
+throng around the scaffold. (Hardy recounts a number of cases like
+the important theft that was committed in the very house in which
+the police magistrate was lodging - IV, 56.) But above all - and this
+was why these disadvantages became a political danger - the people
+never felt closer to those who paid the penalty than in those rituals
+intended to show the horror of the crime and the invincibility of
+power; never did the people feel more threatened, like them, by a
+legal violence exercised without moderation or restraint. The solidarity of a whole section of the population with those we would call
+petty offenders - vagrants, false beggars, the indigent poor, pickpockets, receivers and dealers in stolen goods - was constantly
+expressed: resistance to police searches, the pursuit of informers,
+attacks on the watch or inspectors provide abundant evidence of
+this (cf. Richet, 118-19). And it was the breaking up of this solidarity that was becoming the air of penal and police repression. Yet
+out of the ceremony of the public execution, out of that uncertain
+festival in which violence was instantaneously reversible, it was this
+solidarity much more than the sovereign power that was likely to
+emerge with redoubled strength. The reformers of the eighteenth
+and nineteenth centuries were not to forget that, in the last resort,
+the executions did not, in fact, frighten the people. One of their
+first cries was to demand their abolition.
+To clarify the political problem posed by the intervention of the
+people in the spectacle of the executions, one need only cite two
+events. The first took place at Avignon at the end of the seventeenth
+century. It contained all the principal elements of the theatre of
+horror: the physical confrontation between the executioner and the
+condemned man, the reversal of the duel, the executioner pursued
+63
+
+by the people, the condemned man saved by the ensuing riot and
+the violent inversion of the penal machinery. A murderer by the
+name of Pierre du Fort was to be hanged; several times he 'had
+caught his feet in the steps' and had not been able to swing freely.
+'Seeing this, the executioner had pulled his jerkin up over his face
+and struck him below the knees, on the stomach and on the belly.
+When the people saw that the executioner was causing him too
+much pain, and even believing that he was killing him down there
+with a bayonet... moved by compassion for the patient and fury
+at the executioner, they threw stones at the scaffold just as the
+executioner knocked away the two ladders and threw the patient
+down and leaped on to his shoulders and kicked him, while the wife
+of the said executioner pulled at his feet from under the gallows.
+In doing so, they made blood come from his mouth. But the hail
+of stones came thicker - one stone even struck the hanged man on
+the head - which forced the executioner to dash to the ladder, which
+he descended so rapidly that half-way down he fell from it, and
+struck his head on the ground. Then a crowd of people fell upon
+him. He got to his feet, bayonet in hand, threatening to kill anyone
+who came near him; after falling several times, he finally got to his
+feet, only to be beaten by the crowd, rolled in the mud and nearly
+drowned in the stream, then dragged by the excited and enraged
+crowd to the University and to the Cordeliers Cemetery. His
+servant was also beaten and, with bruises on his head and body, was
+taken to the hospital where he died some days later. However, some
+strangers and unknown people mounted the ladder and cut the rope
+while others caught the hanged man from below after he had been
+hanging there longer than it took to say a full Miserere. The crowd
+then smashed the gallows and broke the executioner's ladder into
+pieces... Children carried off the gallows and threw it into the
+Rhône' The condemned man was then taken to a cemetery 'so that
+he should not be recaptured by the law and from there to the church
+of Sainte-Antoine'. The archbishop gave him his pardon, had him
+taken to the hospital and asked that particular care be taken of him.
+Lastly, adds the writer of the account, 'we had a new suit, two pairs
+of stockings and shoes made for him. We dressed him in new
+clothes from head to toe. Our colleagues gave him shirts, breeches
+and a wig' (Duhamel, 5-6; scenes of this kind were still taking
+64
+
+place in the nineteenth century - cf. Lawrence, 56 and 195-8).
+The other event took place in Paris, a century later. It was in 1775,
+shortly after the corn riot. Because of the state of extreme tension
+among the people, the authorities wanted the execution to take
+place without interruption. Between the scaffold and the public,
+kept at a safe distance, two ranks of soldiers stood on guard, one
+facing the execution that was about to take place, the other facing
+the people in case of riot. Contact was broken: it was a public
+execution, but one in which the element of spectacle was neutralized,
+or rather reduced to abstract intimidation. Protected by force of
+arms, on an empty square, justice quietly did its work. If it showed
+the death that it had dealt, it was from high and far: "The two
+gallows, which were eighteen feet high, no doubt by way of an
+example, were not set up until three o'clock in the afternoon. From
+two o'clock, the Place de Grève and all the surrounding streets had
+been filled with detachments of different troops, some on foot, some
+on horse; the Swiss and the French guards continued to patrol the
+adjacent streets. No one was allowed on to the Grève during the
+execution, and all around one could see a double row of soldiers,
+bayonets at the ready, standing back to back, so that some looked
+outwards and some into the square; the two wretches... cried out
+all the way that they were innocent and continued to protest in like
+manner as they mounted the ladder' (Hardy, III, 67). Whatever the
+part played by feelings of humanity for the condemned in the
+abandonment of the liturgy of the public executions, there was, in
+any case, on the part of the state power, a political fear of the effects
+of these ambiguous rituals.
+Such an equivocal attitude appeared clearly in what might be
+called the 'gallows speeches'. The rite of execution was so arranged
+that the condemned man would himself proclaim his guilt by the
+amende honorable that he spoke, by the placard that he displayed
+and also by the statements that he was no doubt forced to make.
+Furthermore, at the moment of the execution, it seems that he was
+given another opportunity to speak, not to proclaim his innocence,
+but to acknowledge his crime and the justice of his conviction. The
+chronicles relate a good many speeches of this kind. Were they
+actually delivered! In a number of cases, certainly. Or were they
+
+fictional speeches that were later circulated by way of example and
+exhortation? This, no doubt, was more often the case. What credit
+are we to accord, for example, to the account of the death of Marion
+Le Goff, who had been a famous bandit leader in Brittany in the
+mid-eighteenth century! She is supposed to have cried out from the
+scaffold: Fathers and mothers who hear me now, watch over your
+children and teach them well; in my childhood I was a liar and goodfor-nothing; I began by stealing a small six-liard knife... Then I
+robbed pedlars and cattle dealers; finally, I led a robber band and
+that is why I am here. Tell all this to your children and let it be an
+example to them' (Corre, 257). Such a speech is too close, even in its
+turn of phrase, to the morality traditionally to be found in the
+broadsheets and pamphlets for it not to be apocryphal. But the
+existence of the last words of a condemned man' genre is in itself
+significant. The law required that its victim should authenticate in
+some sense the tortures that he had undergone. The criminal was
+asked to consecrate his own punishment by proclaiming the blackness of his crimes; he was made to say, as was Jean-Dominique
+Langlade, three times a murderer: 'Listen to my horrible, infamous
+and lamentable deed, committed in the city of Avignon, where the
+memory of me is execrable, for having inhumanly violated the
+sacred rites of friendship' (Duhamel, 32). In one sense, the broadsheet and the death song were the sequel to the trial; or rather they
+pursued that mechanism by which the public execution transferred
+the secret, written truth of the procedure to the body, gesture and
+speech of the criminal. Justice required these apocrypha in order to
+be grounded in truth. Its decisions were thus surrounded by all
+these posthumous "proofs'. Sometimes, too, accounts of crimes and
+infamous lives were published, simply as propaganda, before any
+trial had taken place, in order to force the hand of a court that was
+suspected of being too tolerant. In order to discredit smugglers, the
+Compagnie des Fermes published 'bulletins' recounting their
+crimes: in 1768, it distributed broadsheets against a certain Montagne, the leader of a gang, of whom the writer himself says: 'Some
+thefts have been ascribed to him the truth of which is somewhat
+uncertain ...; Montagne has been depicted as a wild beast, a second
+hyena to be hunted down; given the hotheads of the Auvergne, this
+idea has caught on' (cf. Juillard, 24).
+66
+
+But the effect, like the use, of this literature was equivocal. The
+condemned man found himself transformed into a hero by the sheer
+extent of his widely advertised crimes, and sometimes the affirmation
+of his belated repentance. Against the law, against the rich, the
+powerful, the magistrates, the constabulary or the watch, against
+taxes and their collectors, he appeared to have waged a struggle
+with which one all too easily identified. The proclamation of these
+crimes blew up to epic proportions the tiny struggle that passed
+unperceived in everyday life. If the condemned man was shown to
+be repentant, accepting the verdict, asking both God and man for
+forgiveness for his crimes, it was as if he had come through some
+process of purification: he died, in his own way, like a saint. But
+indomitability was an alternative claim to greatness: by not giving
+in under torture, he gave proof of a strength that no power had
+succeeded in bending: 'On the day of the execution - this will seem
+scarcely credible - I showed no trace of emotion, as I performed my
+amende honorable, and when I finally lay down on the cross I showed
+no fear' (the Complaince of J.-D. Langlade, executed at Avignon
+12 April 1768). Black hero or reconciled criminal, defender of the
+true right or an indomitable force, the criminal of the broadsheets,
+pamphlets, almanacs and adventure stories brought with him, beneath the apparent morality of the example not to be followed, a
+whole memory of struggles and confrontations. A convicted criminal
+could become after his death a sort of saint, his memory honoured
+and his grave respected. (This was the case of Tanguy, executed in
+Brittany about 1740. Before being convicted, it is true, he had begun
+a long penitence ordered by his confessor. Was this a conflict
+between civil justice and religious penitence? Cf. Corre, 21.) The
+criminal has been almost entirely transformed into a positive hero.
+There were those for whom glory and abomination were not dissociated, but coexisted in a reversible figure. Perhaps we should see
+this literature of crime, which proliferated around a few exemplary
+figures," neither as a spontaneous form of "popular expression', nor
+as a concerted programme of propaganda and moralization from
+above; it was a locus in which two investments of penal practice
+met - a sort of battleground around the crime, its punishment and
+its memory. If these accounts were allowed to be printed and circulated, it was because they were expected to have the effect of an
+67
+
+ideological control - the printing and the distribution of these
+almanacs, broadsheets, etc. was in principle subject to strict control.
+But if these true stories of everyday history were received so avidly,
+if they formed part of the basic reading of the lower classes, it was
+because people found in them not only memories, but also precedents; the interest of 'curiosity' is also a political interest. Thus these
+texts may be read as two-sided discourses, in the facts that they
+relate, in the effects they give to these facts and in the glory they
+confer on those "illustrious' criminals, and no doubt in the very
+words they use (one should study the use of such categories as
+'misfortune' or 'abomination' or such epithets as 'famous' or
+"lamentable' in accounts such as The History of the Life, Great
+Robberies and Tricks of Guilleri and his Companions and of their
+Lamentable and Unhappy End.
+Perhaps we should compare this literature with the 'disturbances
+around the scaffold' in which, through the tortured body of the
+criminal, the power that condemned confronted the people that was
+the witness, the participant, the possible and indirect victim of this
+execution. In the wake of a ceremony that inadequately channelled
+the power relations it sought to ritualize, a whole mass of discourses
+appeared pursuing the same confrontation; the posthumous proclamation of the crimes justified justice, but also glorified the criminal. That was why the reformers of the penal system were soon
+demanding suppression of these broadsheets.? That was why the
+people showed so lively an interest in what served more or less as
+the minor, everyday epic of illegalities. That was why the broadsheets lost their importance as the political function of popular
+illegality altered.
+And they disappeared as a whole new literature of crime developed: a literature in which crime is glorified, because it is one of the
+fine arts, because it can be the work only of exceptional natures,
+because it reveals the monstrousness of the strong and powerful,
+because villainy is yet another mode of privilege: from the adventure
+story to de Quincey, or from the Castle of Orranto to Baudelaire,
+there is a whole aesthetic rewriting of crime, which is also the
+appropriation of criminality in acceptable forms. In appearance, it is
+the discovery of the beauty and greatness of crime; in fact, it is the
+affirmation that greatness too has a right to crime and that it even
+68
+
+becomes the exclusive privilege of those who are really great. The
+great murders are not for the pedlars of petty crime. While, from
+Gaboriau onwards, the literature of crime follows this first shift: by
+his cunning, his tricks, his sharp-wittedness, the criminal represented
+in this literature has made himself impervious to suspicion; and the
+struggle between two pure minds - the murderer and the detective -
+will constitute the essential form of the confrontation. We are far
+removed indeed from those accounts of the life and misdeeds of the
+criminal in which he admitted his crimes, and which recounted in
+detail the tortures of his execution: we have moved from the
+exposition of the facts or the confession to the slow process of
+discovery; from the execution to the investigation; from the physical confrontation to the intellectual struggle between criminal and
+investigator. It was not only the broadsheets that disappeared with
+the birth of a literature of crime; the glory of the rustic malefactor
+and his sombre transformation into a hero by the process of torture
+and execution went with them. The man of the people was now
+too simple to be the protagonist of subtle truths. In this new genre,
+there were no more popular heroes or great executions; the criminal
+was wicked, of course, but he was also intelligent; and although he
+was punished, he did not have to suffer. The literature of crime
+transposes to another social class the spectacle that had surrounded
+the criminal. Meanwhile the newspapers took over the task of
+recounting the grey, unheroic details of everyday crime and punishment. The split was complete; the people was robbed of its old
+pride in its crimes; the great murders had become the quiet game of
+the well behaved.
+69
+
+PART TWO
+
+'Let penalties be regulated and proportioned to the offences, let the
+death sentence be passed only on those convicted of murder, and
+let the tortures that revolt humanity be abolished.' Thus, in 1789,
+the chancellery summed up the general position of the petitions
+addressed to the authorities concerning tortures and executions (cf.
+Seligman, and Desjardin, 13-20). Protests against the public executions proliferated in the second half of the eighteenth century: among
+the philosophers and theoreticians of the law; among lawyers and
+parlementaires; in popular petitions and among the legislators of the
+assemblies. Another form of punishment was needed: the physical
+confrontation between the sovereign and the condemned man must
+end; this hand-to-hand fight between the vengeance of the prince and
+the contained anger of the people, through the mediation of the victim
+and the executioner, must be concluded. Very soon the public execution became intolerable. On the side of power, where it betrayed
+tyranny, excess, the thirst for revenge, and 'the cruel pleasure taken
+in punishing' (Petion de Villeneuve, 641), it was revolting. On the
+side of the victim who, though reduced to despair, was still expected
+to bless 'heaven and its judges who appeared to have abandoned
+him' (Boucher d'Argis, 1781, 125), it was shameful. It was, in any
+case, dangerous, in that it provided a support for a confrontation
+between the violence of the king and the violence of the people. It
+was as if the sovereign power did not see, in this emulation of
+atrocity, a challenge that it itself threw down and which might one
+day be taken up: accustomed as it was to 'seeing blood flow, the
+people soon learnt that 'it could be revenged only with blood'
+(Lachère). In these ceremonies, which were the object of so much
+adverse investment, one sees the intersection of the excess of armed
+justice and the anger of the threatened people. Joseph de Maistre
+73
+
+was to recognize in this relation one of the fundamental mechanisms
+of absolute power: the executioner acts as a cog between the prince
+and the people; the death he deals is like that of the serfs who built
+St Petersburg over swamp and pestilence: it is a principle of universality; of the individual will of the despot, it makes a law for all,
+and of each of those destroyed bodies, a stone for the State; it hardly
+matters that innocents, t00, are struck down! In this same dangerous
+and ritual violence, the eighteenth-century reformers denounced, on
+the contrary, that which exceeded, on both sides, the legitimate
+exercise of power: in this violence, according to them, tyranny
+confronts rebellion; each calls forth the other. It is a double danger.
+Instead of taking revenge, criminal justice should simply punish.
+This need for punishment without torture was first formulated
+as a cry from the heart or from an outraged nature. In the worst of
+murderers, there is one thing, at least, to be respected when one
+punishes: his 'humanity'. The day was to come, in the nineteenth
+century, when this "man', discovered in the criminal, would become
+the target of penal intervention, the object that it claimed to correct
+and transform, the domain of a whole series of 'criminological'
+sciences and strange "penitentiary' practices. But, at the time of the
+Enlightenment, it was not as a theme of positive knowledge that
+man was opposed to the barbarity of the public executions, but as a
+legal limit: the legitimate frontier of the power to punish. Not that
+which must be reached in order to alter him, but that which must
+be left intact in order to respect him. Noli me tangere. It marks the
+end of the sovereign's vengeance. The 'man' that the reformers set
+up against the despotism of the scaffold has also become a manmeasure': not of things, but of power.
+There is, therefore, a problem here: how was this man-measure
+opposed to the traditional practice of punishment? How did he
+become the great moral justification of the reform movement? Why
+this universal horror of torture and such lyrical insistence that
+punishment be 'humane"? Or, which amounts to the same thing,
+how are the two elements, which are everywhere present in demands
+for a more lenient penal system, 'measure' and 'humanity', to be
+articulated upon one another, in a single strategy? These elements
+are so necessary and yet so uncertain that it is they, as disturbing as
+ever and still associated in the same dubious relation, that one finds
+74
+
+today whenever the problem of an economy of punishment is posed.
+It is as if the eighteenth century had opened up the crisis of this
+economy and, in order to resolve it, proposed the fundamental law
+that punishment must have 'humanity' as its "measure', without any
+definitive meaning being given to this principle, which nevertheless
+is regarded as insuperable. We must, therefore, recount the birth
+and early days of this enigmatic leniency'.
+Homage is paid to the 'great reformers' - Beccaria, Servan,
+Dupaty, Lacretelle, Duport, Pastoret, Target, Bergasse, the compilers of the Cahiers, or petitions, and the Constituent Assembly -
+for having imposed this leniency on a legal machinery and on
+"classical" theoreticians who, at the end of the eighteenth century,
+were still rejecting it with well-formulated arguments. (Cf., in particular, Muyart de Vouglans's polemic against Beccaria - Muyart,
+1766.)
+Yet this reform must be situated in a process that historians have
+recently uncovered through the study of legal archives: the relaxation of penality in the eighteenth century or, to be more precise,
+the double movement by which, during this period, crimes seemed
+to lose their violence, while punishments, reciprocally, lost some of
+their intensity, but at the cost of greater intervention. From the end
+of the seventeenth century, in fact, one observes a considerable
+diminution in murders and, generally speaking, in physical acts of
+aggression; offences against property seem to take over from crimes
+of violence; theft and swindling, from murder and assault; the
+diffuse, occasional, but frequent delinquency of the poorest classes
+was superseded by a limited, but 'skilled' delinquency; the criminals
+of the seventeenth century were 'harassed men, ill-fed, quick to act,
+quick to anger, seasonal criminals'; those of the eighteenth, 'crafty,
+cunning, sly, calculating' criminals on the fringes of society (Chaunu,
+1962, 236 and 1966, 107-8). Lastly, the internal organizations of
+delinquency altered; the great gangs of malefactors (looters working
+in small, armed units, groups of smugglers firing on the agents of the
+tax authorities, disbanded soldiers or deserters who roamed the
+countryside together) tended to break up; tracked down more
+efficiently and forced to work in smaller groups - often no more
+than half-a-dozen men - in order to pass undetected, they contented
+75
+
+themselves with more furtive operations, with a more modest
+deployment of forces and less risk of bloodshed: "The physical
+destruction or institutional dislocation of large gangs ... left the
+field free for an anti-property form of delinquency practised by
+individuals or very small groups of robbers and pickpockets, seldom
+more than four in number' (Le Roy-Ladurie). A general movement
+shifted criminality from the attack of bodies to the more or less
+direct seizure of goods; and from a 'mass criminality' to a 'marginal
+criminality, partly the preserve of professionals. It was as if there
+had been a gradual lowering of level - 'a defusion of the tensions
+that dominate human relations, ... a better control of violent
+impulses" - and as if the illegal practices had themselves slackened
+their hold on the body and turned to other targets. Crime became
+less violent long before punishment became less severe. But this
+transformation cannot be separated from several underlying processes. The first of these, as P. Chaunu observes, was a change in
+the operation of economic pressures, a general rise in the standard
+of living, a large demographic expansion, an increase in wealth and
+property and 'a consequent need for security' (Chaunu, 1971, 56).
+Furthermore, throughout the eighteenth century, one can observe a
+certain increased severity in the law: in England, out of the 223
+capital crimes in force at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
+156 had been introduced during the preceding hundred years
+(Buxton, XXXIX); in France, the legislation on vagabondage had
+been revised in the direction of greater severity on several occasions
+since the seventeenth century; a tighter, more meticulous implementation of the law tended to take account of a mass of minor offences
+that it once allowed to escape more easily: 'in the eighteenth century,
+the law became slower, heavier, harder on theft, whose relative
+frequency had increased, and towards which it now assumed the
+bourgeois appearances of a class justice';? the growth in France
+above all, and especially in Paris, of a police apparatus that prevented
+the development of organized, open criminality, shifted it towards
+more discreet forms; to this set of precautions, one should add the
+very widespread belief in a constant and dangerous rise in crime.
+Whereas the historians of today observe a diminution in the great
+gangs of malefactors, Le Trosne saw them roaming the French
+countryside like swarms of locusts: 'It is these voracious insects who
+76
+
+daily lay waste the subsistence of the cultivators. They are, quite
+literally, enemy troops spreading over the surface of the territory,
+living as they wish, as in a conquered country, exacting levies under
+the name of alms.' They cost the poorest peasants more than taxes:
+the richer peasants had to pay anything up to a third of their
+incomes (Le Trosne, 1764, 4). Most observers maintained that crime
+was increasing - they included, of course, those who advocated
+sterner measures; they also included those who thought that a law
+that was more restrained in its use of violence would be more
+effective, less liable to retreat before its own consequences (cf., for
+example, Dupaty, 247); and they included the magistrates who
+claimed to be swamped by the number of trials: "the misery of the
+people and the corruption of morals have increased the number of
+crimes and convicted criminals' (one of the judges of the Chambre
+de la Tournelle in an address to the king, 2 August 1768, quoted
+in Farge, 66); in any case, that crime was on the increase was shown
+by the real practice of the courts. "The revolutionary and imperial
+era could already be sensed in the last years of the Ancien Régime.
+One is struck, in the trials of 1782-2, by the increase in tension.
+There is a new severity towards the poor, a concerted rejection of
+evidence, a rise in mutual mistrust, hatred and fear' (Chaunu, 1966,
+108).
+In fact, the shift from a criminality of blood to a criminality of
+fraud forms part of a whole complex mechanism, embracing the
+development of production, the increase of wealth, a higher juridical
+and moral value placed on property relations, stricter methods of
+surveillance, a tighter partitioning of the population, more efficient
+techniques of locating and obtaining information: the shift in illegal
+practices is correlative with an extension and a refinement of punitive practices.
+Was this a general change of attitude, a 'change that belongs to
+the domain of the spirit and the subconscious' (the expression is
+Mogensen's)? Perhaps, but more certainly and more immediately
+it was an effort to adjust the mechanisms of power that frame the
+everyday lives of individuals; an adaptation and a refinement of the
+machinery that assumes responsibility for and places under surveillance their everyday behaviour, their identity, their activity, their
+apparently unimportant gestures; another policy for that multiplicity
+77
+
+of bodies and forces that constitutes a population. What was emerging no doubt was not so much a new respect for the humanity of
+the condemned - torture was still frequent in the execution of even
+minor criminals - as a tendency towards a more finely tuned justice,
+towards a closer penal mapping of the social body. Following a
+circular process, the threshold of the passage to violent crimes rises,
+intolerance to economic offences increases, controls become more
+thorough, penal interventions at once more premature and more
+numerous.
+If one compares this process with the critical discourse of the
+reformers, a remarkable strategic coincidence emerges. What they
+were attacking in traditional justice, before they set out the principles of a new penality, was certainly the excessive nature of the
+punishments; but an excess that was bound up with an irregularity
+even more than with an abuse of the power to punish. On 24 March
+1790, Thouret opened the debate in the Constituent Assembly on
+the new organization of the judicial power. In his view, this power
+had become 'denatured' in France in three ways. By private appropriation: the offices of judge were sold; they were hereditary; they
+had a commercial value and, for that reason, the justice that was
+handed out was onerous. By a confusion between two types of
+power: that which dispenses justice and formulates a sentence by
+applying the law and that which creates the law itself. Lastly, by the
+existence of a whole series of privileges that made the implementation of the law inconsistent: there were courts, procedures, litigants,
+even offences that were 'privileged' and fell outside common law
+(Archives parlementaires, XII, 344). This was only one of the many
+criticisms that had been levied at the legal system for the past fifty
+years at least, all of which denounced in this denaturation the
+principle of an irregular justice. Penal justice was irregular first of
+all by virtue of the multiplicity of courts responsible for assuring it,
+without ever forming a single and continuous pyramid (cf. Linguet
+or Boucher d'Argis, 1789). Quite apart from the ecclesiastical jurisdictions, we must take into account the discontinuities, overlappings
+and conflicts between the different legal systems: those of the
+nobility, which still played an important role in judging petty
+offences; those of the king, which were themselves numerous and
+badly coordinated (the sovereign courts were often in conflict with
+78
+
+the bailiffs' courts and above all with the presidial courts, which had
+recently been created as intermediary instances); those which, de jure
+or de facto, were administered by governmental authorities (such as
+the intendants, or provincial administrators) or police authorities
+(such as the provosts and police magistrates); to these should also
+be added the right possessed by the king or his representatives to
+take decisions on internment or exile quite outside any regular
+procedure. By their very plethora these innumerable authorities
+cancelled each other out and were incapable of covering the socia!
+body in its entirety. Paradoxically, their overlapping left penal
+justice with innumerable loopholes. This incompleteness was a result
+of differences of custom and procedure, despite the Urdonnance
+Générale of 1670; of internal conflicts of responsibility; of private
+interests - political or economic - which each authority found itself
+defending; and, lastly, of the interventions of the royal power, which
+could prevent, by means of pardons, commuted sentences, the evocation of a case before the royal council or direct pressure exerted
+on magistrates, the regular, austere course of justice.
+The criticism of the reformers was directed not so much at the
+weakness or cruelty of those in authority, as at a bad economy of
+power. There was too much power in the lower jurisdictions, which
+could - aided by the ignorance and poverty of those convicted -
+ignore appeal procedure and carry out arbitrary sentences without
+adequate supervision; there was too much power on the side of the
+prosecution, which possessed almost unlimited means of pursuing
+its investigations, while the accused opposed it virtually unarmed -
+this led judges to be sumetimes over-severe and sometimes, by way
+of reaction, too lenient; there was too much power in the hands of
+the judges who were able to content themselves with futile evidence,
+providing it was 'legal' evidence, and who were allowed too great
+a freedom in the choice of penalty; there was too much power in
+the hands of the "gens du roi", or royal magistrates, in relation to the
+accused, but also in relation to other magistrates; lastly, there was
+too much power exercised by the king, who could suspend courts
+of justice, alter their decisions, remove magistrates from office, or
+exile them, and replace them by judges acting under royal commission. The paralysis of justice was due not so much to a weakening
+as to a badly regulated distribution of power, to its concentration
+79
+
+at a certain number of points and to the conflicts and discontinuities
+that resulted.
+This dysfunction of power was related to a central excess: what
+might be called the monarchical 'super-power', which identified the
+right to punish with the personal power of the sovereign. This
+theoretical identification made the king the fons justitiae; but the
+practical consequences of this were to be found even in that which
+appeared to oppose him and to limit his absolutism. It was because
+the king, in order to raise money, had appropriated the right to sell
+legal offices, which 'belonged' to him, that he was confronted by
+magistrates who owned their offices and who were not only intractable, but ignorant, self-interested and frequently compromised. It
+was because he was constantly creating new offices that he multiplied
+the conflicts of power and authority. It was because he exercised too
+close a power over his 'gens' and conferred on them almost discretionary powers that he intensified the conflicts within the magistrature. It was because he had brought the law into conflict with too
+many summary acts of justice (the jurisdictions of the provosts or
+police magistrates) or with administrative measures, that he paralysed normal justice, rendered it sometimes lenient and inconsistent,
+but sometimes over-hasty and severe.?
+It was not so much, or not only, the privileges of justice, its
+arbitrariness, its archaic arrogance, its uncontrolled rights that were
+criticized; but rather the mixture of its weaknesses and excesses, its
+exaggerations and its loopholes, and above all the very principle of
+this mixture, the 'super-power' of the monarch. The true objective
+of the reform movement, even in its most general formulations, was
+not so much to establish a new right to punish based on more
+equitable principles, as to set up a new 'economy' of the power to
+punish, to assure its better distribution, so that it should be neither
+too concentrated at certain privileged points, nor too divided between opposing authorities; so that it should be distributed in
+homogeneous circuits capable of operating everywhere, in a continuous way, down to the finest grain of the social body.' The
+reform of criminal law must be read as a strategy for the rearrangement of the power to punish, according to modalities that render
+it more regular, more effective, more constant and more detailed in
+its effects; in short, which increase its effects while diminishing its
+80
+
+economic cost (that is to say, by dissociating it from the system of
+property, of buying and selling, of corruption in obtaining not only
+offices, but the decisions themselves) and its political cost (by dissociating it from the arbitrariness of monarchical power). The new
+juridical theory of penality corresponds in fact to a new 'political
+economy' of the power to punish. This explains why the 'reform'
+did not have a single origin. It was not the more enlightened members of the public, nor the philosophes, who regarded themselves as
+enemies of despotism and friends of mankind; it was not even the
+social groups opposed to the parlementaires who instigated the
+reform. Or rather it was not they alone; in this same overall project
+of a new distribution of the power to punish, and of a new distribution of its effects, many different interests came together. The reform
+was not prepared outside the legal machinery and against all its
+representatives; it was prepared, for the most part, from within, by
+a large number of magistrates and on the basis of shared objectives
+and the power conflicts that divided them. Certainly the reformers
+did not form a majority of the magistrates; but it was a body of
+lawyers who outlined its general principles: a power to judge that
+would not be affected by the immediate exercise of the prince's
+sovereignty; that would be relieved of any claim to legislate; that
+would be detached from property relations; and which, having no
+other functions but to judge, would exercise that power to the full.
+In short, the power to judge should no longer depend on the
+innumerable, discontinuous, sometimes contradictory privileges of
+sovereignty, but on the continuously distributed effects of public
+power. This general principle defined an overall strategy that
+covered many different struggles. Those of philosophers like
+Voltaire and of publicists like Brissot or Marat; but also those of
+magistrates whose interests were nevertheless very diverse: Le
+Trosne, a judge at the presidial court of Orléans, and Lacretelle, the
+advocate-general at the parlement; Target, who with the parlements
+was opposed to Maupeou's reform; but also J. N. Moreau, who
+supported the royal power against the parlementaires; Servan and
+Dupaty, both magistrates, but in conflict with their colleagues, etc.
+Throughout the eighteenth century, inside and outside the legal
+apparatus, in both everyday penal practice and the criticism of
+institutions, one sees the emergence of a new strategy for the
+81
+
+exercise of the power to punish. And 'reform', in the strict sense, as
+it was formulated in the theories of law or as it was outlined in the
+various projects, was the political or philosophical resumption of
+thiş strategy, with its primary objectives: to make of the punishment
+and repression of illegalities a regular function, coextensive with
+society; not to punish less, but to punish better; to punish with an
+attenuated severity perhaps, but in order to punish with more
+universality and necessity; to insert the power to punish more deeply
+into the social body.
+The conjuncture that saw the birth of reform is not, therefore,
+that of a new sensibility, but that of another policy with regard to
+illegalities.
+Roughly speaking, one might say that, under the Ancien Régime
+each of the different social strata had its margin of tolerated illegality: the non-application of the rule, the non-observance of the
+innumerable edicts or ordinances were a condition of the political
+and economic functioning of society. This feature may not have
+been peculiar to the Ancien Régime. But illegality was so deeply
+rooted and so necessary to the life of each social stratum, that it had
+in a sense its own coherence and economy. Sometimes it took on an
+absolutely statutory form - as with the privileges accorded certain
+individuals and groups - which made it not so much an illegality
+as a regular exemption. Sometimes it took the form of a massive
+general non-observance, which meant that for decades, sometimes
+for centuries, ordinances could be published and constantly renewed
+without ever being implemented. Sometimes it was a matter of laws
+gradually falling into abeyance, then suddenly being reactivated;
+sometimes of silent consent on the part of the authorities, neglect, or
+quite simply the actual impossibility of imposing the law and apprehending offenders. The least-favoured strata of the population did
+not have, in principle, any privileges: but they benefited, within the
+margins of what was imposed on them by law and custom, from a
+space of tolerance, gained by force or obstinacy; and this space was
+for them so indispensable a condition of existence that they were
+often ready to rise up to defend it; the attempts that were made
+periodically to reduce it, by reviving old laws or by improving the
+methods of apprehending, provoked popular disturbances, just as
+82
+
+attempts to reduce certain privileges disturbed the nobility, the
+clergy and the bourgeoisie.
+This necessary illegality, of which every social stratum bore
+within itself specific forms, was caught up in a series of paradoxes.
+In its lower regions, it was identified with criminality, from which
+it was difficult to distinguish it juridically, if not morally: from fiscal
+illegality to customs illegality, to smuggling, to looting, to the
+armed struggle against the government's taxation agents, then
+against the soldiers themselves and, finally, to rebellion, there was
+a continuity, in which it was difficult to mark the frontiers; or, again,
+vagabondage (severely punished according to the terms of ordinances that were never implemented) with the pillage, aggravated
+theft, even murder that went with it, provided a welcome environment to the unemployed, to workers who had left their employers
+in irregular circumstances, to domestic servants who had some
+reason to flee their masters, to ill-treated apprentices, to deserting
+soldiers, to all those who wished to escape the press-gang. So
+criminality merged into a wider illegality, to which the lower strata
+were attached as to conditions of existence; and, conversely, this
+illegality was a perpetual factor in the increase of crime. Hence an
+ambiguity in popular attitudes: on the one hand, the criminal -
+especially when he happened to be a smuggler or a peasant who had
+fled from the exactions of a master - benefited from a spontaneous
+wave of sympathy: his acts of violence were seen as descending
+directly from old struggles. On the other hand, a man who, under
+cover of an illegality accepted by the population, committed crimes
+at the expense of this population, the vagrant beggar, for example,
+who robbed and murdered, easily became the object of a special hate:
+he had redirected upon the least favoured illegality that was integral
+to their conditions of existence. Thus there grew up around crimes
+a network of glorification and blame; effective help and fear alternated with regard to this shifting population, which one knew was
+very near, but from which one felt that crime could emerge.
+Popular illegality enveloped a whole nucleus of criminality that was
+both its extreme form and its internal danger.
+Between this illegality of the depths and those of the other social
+castes, there was neither an exact convergence nor a prof ound opposition. Generally speaking, the different illegalities proper to each
+83
+
+graup maintained relations with one another that involved not only
+rivalry, competition and conflicts of interest, but also mutual help
+and complicity: the peasants' refusal to pay certain state or ecclesiastical rents was not necessarily disapproved of by the landowners;
+the non-application by artisans of manufacturing regulations was
+often encouraged by the new entrepreneurs; smuggling - the story
+of Mandrin, welcomed by the entire population, received in castles
+and protected by parlementares proves this - was very widely
+supported. At most, one had seen in the seventeenth century the
+different fiscal refusals coalesce in serious revolts among widely
+separated social strata. In short, the reciprocal interplay of illegalities formed part of the political and economic life of society. Or
+rather, a number of transformations (the abeyance into which
+Colbert's regulations had fallen, for example, the non-observance
+of customs barriers within the kingdom, the breakdown of guild
+practices) had operated in the breach that was being widened every
+day by popular illegality; the bourgeoisie had needed these transformations; and economic growth was due, in part, to them.
+Tolerance then became encouragement.
+In the second half of the eighteenth century, the process tended to
+be reversed. First, with the general increase in wealth, but also with
+the sudden demographic expansion, the principal target of popular
+illegality tended to be not so much rights, as goods: pilfering
+and theft tended to replace smuggling and the armed struggle
+against the tax agents. And, in this respect, the peasants, farmers
+and artisans were often its principal victims. Le Trosne was no
+doubt exaggerating a real tendency when he described the peasants'
+suffering under the exactions of vagabonds, even more than they
+had suffered under feudal demands: thieves now attacked them like
+a cloud of maleficent insects, devouring crops and depleting the
+granaries (Le Trosne, 1764, 4). It might be said that gradually in
+the eighteenth century a crisis of popular illegality had occurred;
+and neither the movements at the beginning of the Revolution
+(around the refusal of seigniorial rights), nor those later movements,
+in which the struggle against property rights, political and religious
+protests and the refusal of conscription came together, recombined
+illegality in its old, welcoming form. Furthermore, although a large
+part of the bourgeoisie had accepted, without too much trouble,
+
+the illegality of rights, it found it difficult to support illegality when
+it was a question of its own property rights. Nothing could be more
+typical of this than the problem of peasant delinquency at the end
+of the eighteenth century and especially after the Revolution
+(Bercé, 16I). The transition to an intensive agriculture exercised,
+over the rights to use common lands, over various tolerated practices, over small accepted illegalities, a more and more restrictive
+pressure. Furthermore, as it was acquired in part by the bourgeoisie,
+now free of the feudal burdens that once weighed upon it, landed
+property became absolute property: all the tolerated 'rights' that
+the peasantry had acquired or preserved (the abandonment of old
+obligations or the consolidation of irregular practices: the right of
+free pasture, wood-collecting, etc.) were now rejected by the new
+owners who regarded them quite simply as theft (thus leading,
+among the people, to a series of chain reactions of an increasingly
+illegal, or, if one prefers the term, criminal kind: breaches of close,
+the theft or killing of cattle, fires, assaults, murders (cf. Festy
+and Agulhon). The illegality of rights, which often meant
+the survival of the most deprived, tended, with the new status of
+property, to become an illegality of property. It then had to be
+punished.
+And this illegality, while resented by the bourgeoisie where the
+ownership of land was concerned, was intolerable in commercial and
+industrial ownership: the development of the ports, the appearance
+of great warehouses in which merchandise was stored, the organization of huge workshops (with considerable quantities of raw
+materials, tools and manufactured articles, which belonged to the
+entrepreneurs and which were difficult to supervise) also necessitated
+a severe repression of illegality. The way in which wealth tended to
+be invested, on a much larger scale than ever before, in commodities
+and machines presupposed a systematic, armed intolerance of
+illegality. The phenomenon was obviously very evident where
+economic development was most intense. Colquhoun set out to
+give proof, supported by figures, of the urgent need to check the
+innumerable illegal practices that had grown up: according to the
+estimates of the entrepreneurs and insurance companies, the theft
+of produce imported from America and warehoused along the banks
+of the Thames had risen, on average, to £250,000 per annum; in
+85
+
+all, approximately £500,000 worth of goods was stolen each year
+in the Port of London itself (and this did not include the arsenals
+and warehouses outside the port proper); to this should be added
+£700,000 for the town itself. In this situation of permanent pilfering,
+three phenomena, says Colquhoun, should be taken into consideration: first, the complicity and often the active participation of the
+clerks, overseers, foremen and workers: 'Whenever a large number
+of workers are gathered together in one place, there are bound to be
+a lot of bad characters among them'; second, the existence of a whole
+organization of illicit commerce, which began in the workshops or
+docks, then passed on to the receivers - wholesale receivers,
+specializing in certain kinds of commodity, and retail receivers
+whose stalls offered a wretched display of old iron, rags and worn
+clothes, whereas at the back of the shop were hidden naval munitions
+of great value, copper bolts and nails, pieces of cast iron and precious
+metals, produce from the West Indies, furniture and all kinds of
+goods bought from the labourers' - then on to dealers and pedlars
+who distributed the stolen goods far into the countryside (Colquhoun. 1797; in chapters VII, VIII and XV, he gives a very detailed
+account of this process); third, counterfeiting (it seems that there
+were between forty and fifty mints producing counterfeit money
+throughout England, in permanent operation). But what facilitated
+the work of this huge undertaking, involving both depredation and
+competition, was a whole set of tolerances: some amounted almost
+to acquired right (the right, for example, to collect bits of iron or
+rope around ships or to resell the sugar sweepings); others were of
+the nature of a moral acceptance; the pilferers themselves regarded
+their work as a kind of smuggling, which 'they did not regard as a
+serious offence'.
+It proved necessary, therefore, to control these illicit practices
+and introduce new legislation to cover them. The offences had to be
+properly defined and more surely punished; out of this mass of
+irregularities, sometimes tolerated and sometimes punished with a
+severity out of all proportion to the offence, one had to determine
+what was an intolerable offence, and the offenders had to be apprehended and punished. With the new forms of capital accumulation,
+new relations of production and the new legal status of property,
+all the popular practices that belonged, either in a silent, everyday,
+86
+
+tolerated form, or in a violent form, to the illegality of rights were
+reduced by force to an illegality of property. In that movement
+which transformed a society of juridico-political levies into a society
+of the appropriation of the means and products of labour, theft
+rended to become the first of the great loopholes in legality. Or, to
+put it another way, the economy of illegalities was restructured
+with the development of capitalist society. The illegality of property
+was separated from the illegality of rights. This distinction represents a class opposition because, on the one hand, the illegality
+that was to be most accessible to the lower classes was that of
+property - the violent transfer of ownership - and because, on the
+other, the bourgeoisie was to reserve to itself the illegality of rights:
+the possibility of getting round its own regulations and its own laws,
+of ensuring for itself an immense sector of economic circulation by
+a skilful manipulation of gaps in the law - gaps that were foreseen
+by its silences, or opened up by de facto tolerance. And this great
+redistribution of illegalities was even to be expressed through a
+specialization of the legal circuits: for illegalities of property - for
+theft - there were the ordinary courts and punishments; for the
+illegalities of rights - fraud, tax evasion, irregular commercial
+operations - special legal institutions applied with transactions,
+accommodations, reduced fines, etc. The bourgeoisie reserved to
+itself the fruitful domain of the illegality of rights. And at the same
+time as this split was taking place, there emerged the need for
+a constant policing concerned essentially with this illegality of
+property. It became necessary to get rid of the old economy of the
+power to punish, based on the principles of the confused and inadequate multiplicity of authorities, the distribution and concentration of the power correlative with actual inertia and inevitable
+tolerance, punishments that were spectacular in their manifestations
+and haphazard in their application. It became necessary to define a
+strategy and techniques of punishment in which an economy of
+continuity and permanence would replace that of expenditure and
+excess. In short, penal reform was born at the point of junction
+between the struggle against the super-power of the sovereign and
+that against the infra-power of acquired and tolerated illegalities.
+And if penal reform was anything more than the temporary result
+of a purely circumstantial encounter, it was because, between this
+87
+
+super-power and this infra-power, a whole network of relations
+was being formed. By placing on the side of the sovereign the
+additional burden of a spectacular, unlimited, personal, irregular
+and discontinuous power, the form of monarchical sovereignty left
+the subjects free to practise a constant illegality; this illegality was
+like the correlative of this type of power. So much so that in attacking the various prerogatives of the sovereign one was also attacking
+the functioning of the illegalities. The two objectives were in continuity. And, according to particular circumstances or tactics, the
+reformers laid more stress on one or the other. Le Trosne, the
+physiocrat who was a judge at the presidial court of Orléans, may
+serve as an example. In 1764, he published a memorandum on vagabondage: that hot-bed of thieves and murderers 'who live in the
+midst of society without being members of it', who wage 'a veritable
+war on all citizens', and who are in the midst of us "in that state that
+one supposes existed before the establishment of civil society'.
+Against them, he demanded the most severe penalties (characteristically, he expressed surprise that one should be more indulgent
+towaros them than to smugglers); he wanted the police to be reinforced, the mounted constabulary to hunt them down with the help
+of the population that suffered from their depredations; he demanded
+that these useless and dangerous people should be 'acquired by the
+state and that they should belong to it as slaves to their masters';
+and if necessary one should organize collective round-ups in the
+woods to drive them out, and anyone making a capture should be
+paid: "A reward of ten pounds is given for anyone who kills a wolf.
+A vagabond is infinitely more dangerous for society' (Le Trosne,
+1764, 8, 50, 54, 61-2). In 1777 in Vues sur la justice criminelle, the
+same Le Trosne demanded that the prerogatives of the Crown be
+reduced, that the accused be regarded as innocent until proved
+guilty, that the judge be a just arbiter between them and society,
+that laws be "fixed, constant, determined in the most precise way,
+so that subjects know 'to what they are exposed' and that magistrates be nothing more than the 'organ of the law' (Le Trosne, 1777,
+31,37, 103-6). For Le Trosne, as for so many others at that time,
+the struggle for the delimitation of the power to punish was articulated directly on the need to subject popular illegality to a stricter
+and more constant control. It is understandable that the criticism
+88
+
+of the public execution should have assumed such importance in
+penal reform: for it was the form in which, in the most visible way,
+the unlimited power of the sovereign and the ever-active illegality
+of the people came together. Humanity in the sentences was the
+rule given to a system of punishment that must fix their limits on
+both. The 'man' that must be respected in the sentence was the
+juridical and moral form given to this double delimitation.
+But, although it is true that reform, as a penal theory and as a
+strategy of the power to punish, took shape at the point of coincidence of these two objectives, its stability in the future was due to
+the fact that, for a long time, priority was given to the second. It was
+because the pressure on popular illegalities had become, at the period
+of the Revolution, then under the Empire, and finally throughout
+the nineteenth century, an essential imperative, that reform was able
+to pass from the project stage to that of an institution and set of
+practices. That is to say, although the new criminal legislation
+appears to be characterized by less severe penalties, a clearer codification, a marked diminution of the arbitrary, a more generally
+accepted consensus concerning the power to punish (in the absence
+of a more real division in its exercise), it is sustained in reality by an
+upheaval in the traditional economy of illegalities and a rigorous
+application of force to maintain their new adjustment. A penal system must be conceived as a mechanism intended to administer
+illegalities differentially, not to eliminate them all.
+Shift the object and change the scale. Define new tactics in order
+to reach a target that is now more subtle but also more widely spread
+in the social body. Find new techniques for adjusting punishment to
+it and for adapting its effects. Lay down new principles for regularizing, refining, universalizing the art of punishing. Homogenize its
+application. Reduce its economic and political cost by increasing its
+effectiveness and by multiplying its circuits. In short, constitute a
+new economy and a new technology of the power to punish: these
+are no doubt the essential raisons d'érre of penal reform in the
+eighteenth century.
+At the level of principles, this new strategy falls easily into the
+general theory of the contract. The citizen is presumed to have
+accepted once and for all, with the laws of society, the very law by
+
+which he may be punished. Thus the criminal appears as a juridically
+paradoxical being. He has broken the pact, he is therefore the enemy
+of society as a whole, but he participates in the punishment that is
+practised upon him. The least crime attacks the whole of society;
+and the whole of society - including the criminal - is present in the
+least punishment. Penal punishment is therefore a generalized
+function, coextensive with the function of the social body and with
+each of its elements. This gives rise to the problem of the degree of
+punishment, the economy of the power to punish.
+In effect the offence opposes an individual to the entire social
+body; in order to punish him, society has the right to oppose him
+in its entirety. It is an unequal struggle: on one side are all the forces,
+all the power, all the rights. And this is how it should be, since the
+defence of each individual is involved. Thus a formidable right to
+punish is established, since the offender becomes the common
+enemy. Indeed, he is worse than an enemy, for it is from within
+society that he delivers his blows - he is nothing less than a traitor,
+a 'monster'. How could society not have an absolute right over him.
+How could it not demand, quite simply, his elimination? And,
+although it is true that the principle of punishment must be subscribed to in the pact, must not each citizen, logically, accept the
+extreme penalty for those of them who attack them as a body.
+'Every malefactor, by attacking the social rights, becomes, by his
+crimes, a rebel and a traitor to his country; by violating its laws he
+ceases to be a member of it; he even makes war upon it. In such a
+case the preservation of the state is inconsistent with his own, and
+one or the other must perish; in putting the guilty to death we slay
+not so much the citizen as the enemy.'' The right to punish has been
+shifted from the vengeance of the sovereign to the defence of
+society. But it now finds itself recombined with elements so strong
+that it becomes almost more to be feared. The malefactor has been
+saved from a threat that is by its very nature excessive, but he is
+exposed to a penalty that seems to be without bounds. It is a return
+to a terrible "super-power'. It brings with it the need to establish a
+principle of moderation for the power of punishment.
+'Who does not shudder with horror when reading in history of so
+many terrible and useless torments, invented and coldly applied by
+monsters who took upon themselves the name of sage!" (Beccaria,
+
+87). Or again: "The laws summon me to the greatest punishment
+of crimes. I go with all the fury that it has inspired in me. But
+what is this? They even go beyond it... God, who has imprinted
+in our hearts an aversion to pain for ourselves and for our fellow
+men, are they then those same beings, whom thou hast created so
+weak and so sensible, who have invented such barbarous, such
+refined tortures.' (Lacretelle, 129). The principle of moderation in
+punishment, even when it is a question of punishing the enemy of
+the social body, is articulated first as a discourse of the heart. Or
+rather, it leaps forth like a cry from the body, which is revolted at
+thesight or at the imagination of too much cruelty. The formulation
+of the principle that penality must remain 'humane' is expressed by
+the reformers in the first person. It is as if the sensibility of the
+speaker were being expressed directly; as if the body of the philosopher or theoretician had come, between executioner and victim, to
+affirm his own law and to impose it finally on the entire economy
+of punishment. Does this lyricism express an inability to find a
+rational foundation for a penal arithmetic? Between the contractual
+principle that expels the criminal from society and the image of the
+monster 'vomited' by nature, where is one to find a limit, if not in a
+human nature that is manifested - not in the rigour of the law,
+not in the ferocity of the delinquent - but in the sensibility
+of the reasonable man who makes the law and does not commit
+crime!
+But this recourse to 'sensibility' does not exactly express a
+theoretical impossibility. In fact, it bears within it a principle of
+calculation. The body, the imagination, pain, the heart to be respected are not, in effect, those of the criminal that is to be punished,
+but those of the men who, having subscribed to the pact, have the
+right of exercising against him the power of assembly. The pain that
+must exclude any reduction in punishment is that felt by the judges
+or spectators with all the hardness of heart that it may bring with it,
+all the ferocity induced by familiarity, or on the contrary, illfounded feelings of pity and indulgence: "Thank God for those
+gentle, sensitive souls on whom those horrible executions exert a
+kind of torture' (Lacretelle, 131). What has to be arranged and
+calculated are the return effects of punishment on the punishing
+authority and the power that it claims to exercise.
+
+Here the principle takes root that one should never apply "inhumane' punishments to a criminal; who, nevertheless, may well be
+a traitor and a monster. If the law must now treat in a 'humane' way
+an individual who is 'outside nature' (whereas the old justice treated
+the 'outlaw' inhumanely), it is not on account of some profound
+humanity that the criminal conceals within him, but because of a
+necessary regulation of the effects of power. It is this 'economic'
+rationality that must calculate the penalty and prescribe the appropriate techniques. 'Humanity' is the respectable name given to this
+economy and to its meticulous calculations. 'Where punishment is
+concerned, the minimum is ordered by humanity and counselled by
+policy."
+So, in order to understand this techno-politics of punishment, let
+us take the extreme case, the ultimate crime: a deed of such enormity
+that it violates all the most respected laws. It is produced in circumstances so extraordinary, in such profound secrecy, with such lack
+of restraint, as if at the very limit of possibility, that it could not
+be other than unique, in any case the last of its kind: no one could
+ever imitate it; no one could take it as an example, or even feel
+scandalized that it should have been committed. It is doomed to
+disappear without trace. This fable' of the 'ultimate crime' is, to the
+new penality, what original sin was to the old: the pure form in
+which the reason for punishment appears.
+Ought such a crime to be punished! According to what calculation? Of what use could its punishment be in the economy of the
+power to punish! It would be useful to the extent that it could make
+reparation for 'the harm done to society' (Pastoret, II, 21). Now,
+if one sets aside the strictly material damage - which even when it is
+irreparable as in the case of a murder is of little account in relation
+to society as a whole - the injury that a crime inflicts upon the
+social body is the disorder that it introduces into it: the scandal that
+it gives rise to, the example that it gives, the incitement to repeat it
+if it is not punished, the possibility of becoming widespread that it
+bears within it. In order to be useful, punishment must have as its
+objective the consequences of the crime, that is to say, the series of
+disorders that it is capable of initiating: "The proportion between
+the penalty and the quality of the offence is determined by the
+influence that the violation of the pact has on the social order'
+
+(Filangieri, 214). But this influence of a crime is not necessarily in
+direct proportion to its horror; a crime that horrifies the conscience
+is often of less effect than an offence that everyone tolerates and feels
+quite ready to imitate. There is a scarcity of great crimes; on the
+other hand, there is the danger that everyday offences may multiply.
+So one must not seek a qualitative relation between the crime and
+its punishment, an equivalence of horror: 'Can the cries of a wretch
+in torment bring back from the depths of a past that cannot return
+an action that has already been committed!' (Beccaria, 87). One
+must calculate a penalty in terms not of the crime, but of its possible
+repetition. One must take into account not the past offence, but the
+future disorder. Things must be so arranged that the malefactor can
+have neither any desire to repeat his offence, nor any possibility of
+having imitators. ® Punishment, then, will be an art of effects; rather
+than opposing the enormity of the penalty to the enormity of the
+crime, one must adjust to one another the two series that follow
+from the crime: its own effects and those of the penalty. A crime
+without a dynasty does not call for punishment; any more than,
+according to another version of the same fable, a society on the
+verge of dissolution and disappearance would have the right to erect
+scaffolds. The last crime cannot but remain unpunished.
+This was an old view. The function of punishment as example
+was to be found long before the eighteenth-century reform. That
+punishment looks towards the future, and that at least one of its
+major functions is to prevent crime had, for centuries, been one of
+the current justifications of the right to punish. But the difference
+was that the prevention that was expected as an effect of the punishment and its spectacle - and therefore of its excess - tended now to
+become the principle of its economy and the measure of its just
+proportions. One must punish exactly enough to prevent repetition.
+There is, then, a shift in the mechanics of example: in a penality
+employing public torture and execution, example was the answer
+to the crime; it had, by a sort of twin manifestation, to show the
+crime and at the same time to show the sovereign power that
+mastered it; in a penality calculated according to its own effects,
+example must refer back to the crime, but in the most discreet way
+possible and with the greatest possible economy indicate the intervention of power; ideally, too, it should prevent any subsequent
+93
+
+reappearance of either. The example is no longer a ritual that manifests; it is a sign that serves as an obstacle. Through this technique of
+punitive signs, which tends to reverse the whole temporal field of
+penal action, the reformers thought they were giving to the power
+to punish an economic, effective instrument that could be made
+general throughout the entire social body, capable of coding all its
+behaviour and consequently of reducing the whole diffuse domain
+of illegalities. The semio-technique with which one tried to arm the
+power to punish rested on five or six major rules.
+The rule of minimum quantity. A crime is committed because it
+procures certain advantages. If one linked, to the idea of crime, the
+idea of a slightly greater disadvantage, it would cease to be desirable. 'For punishment to produce the effect that must be expected of
+it, it is enough that the harm that it causes exceed the good that the
+criminal has derived from the crime' (Beccaria, 89). A proximity
+between penalty and crime can, indeed must, be accepted; but no
+longer in its old form, where the public execution had to be equivalent in intensity to the crime, with an additional factor that
+marked the 'surplus power' of the sovereign carrying out his legitimate vengeance; it is a quasi-equivalence at the level of interests: a
+little more interest in avoiding the penalty than in risking the crime.
+The rule of sufficient idealicy. If the motive of a crime is the
+advantage expected of it, the effectiveness of the penalty is the disadvantage expected of it. This means that the
+'pain' at the heart of
+punishment is not the actual sensation of pain, but the idea of pain,
+displeasure, inconvenience - the 'pain' of the idea of 'pain'. Punishment has to make use not of the body, but of representation. Or
+rather, if it does make use of the body, it is not so much as the subject of a pain as the object of a representation: the memory of pain
+must prevent a repetition of the crime, just as the spectacle, however artificial it may be, of a physical punishment may prevent the
+contagion of a crime. But it is not pain in itself that will be the
+instrument of the technique of punishment. Therefore, as long as
+possible, and except in cases requiring an effective representation,
+one should avoid recourse to the great panoply of the scaffold.
+There is an elision of the body as the subject of the punishment, but
+not necessarily as an element in a spectacle. The rejection of the
+public execution which, at the threshold of the theory, had found
+24
+
+no more than a lyrical expression, was now offered the possibility
+of a rational articulation: what must be maximized is the representation of the penalty, not its corporal reality.
+The rule of lateral effects. The penalty must have its most intense
+effects on those who have not committed the crime; to carry the
+argument to its limit, if one could be sure that the criminal could not
+repeat the crime, it would be enough to make others believe that he
+had been punished. There is a centrifugal intensification of effects,
+which leads to the paradox that in the calculation of penalties the
+least important element is still the criminal (unless he is likely to
+repeat the offence). Beccaria illustrated this paradox in the punishment that he proposed to replace the death sentence - perpetual
+slavery. Is this not a physically more cruel punishment than death?
+Not at all, he says: because the pain of slavery, for the condemned
+man, is divided into as many portions as he has moments left to live;
+it is an infinitely divisible penalty, an Eleatic penalty, much less
+severe than capital punishment, which is only one step away from
+the public execution. On the other hand, for those who see these
+slaves, or represent them to themselves, the pains they bear are
+concentrated into a single idea; all the moments of slavery are
+contracted into a representation that then becomes more terrifying
+than the idea of death. It is the economically ideal punishment: it
+is minimal for him who undergoes it (and who, reduced to slavery,
+cannot repeat his crime) and it is maximal for him who represents it
+to himself. 'Among the penalties, and in the way of applying them
+in proportion to the offences, one must choose the means that will
+leave the most lasting impression on the minds of the people, and
+the least cruel on the body of the criminal' (Beccaria, 87).
+The rule of perfect certainty. With the idea of each crime and the
+advantages to be expected of it must be associated the idea of a
+particular punishment with the precise inconveniences that result
+from it; the link from one to the other must be regarded as necessary
+and unbreakable. This general element of certainty that must give
+the system of punishment its effectiveness involves a number of
+precise measures. The laws that define the crime and lay down the
+penalties must be perfectly clear, 'so that each member of society
+may distinguish criminal actions from virtuous actions' (Brissot,
+24). These laws must be published, so that everyone has access to
+
+them; what is needed is not oral traditions and customs, but a written
+legislation which can be 'the stable monument of the social pact',
+printed texts available to all: 'Only printing can make the public as
+a whole and not just a few persons depositories of the sacred code of
+the laws' (Beccaria, 26). The monarch must renounce his right of
+pardon so that the force that is present in the idea of punishment
+is not attenuated by the hope of intervention: 'If one allows men to
+see that the crime may be pardoned and that punishment is not a
+necessary consequence of it, one nourishes in them the hope of
+going unpunished... The laws must be inexorable, those who
+execute them inflexible.' Above all, no crime committed must
+escape the gaze of those whose task it is to dispense justice. Nothing
+so weakens the machinery of the law than the hope of going unpunished; how could one establish in the minds of the public a strict
+link between the offence and a penalty if it were affected by a certain
+coefficient of improbability? Would it not be necessary to make the
+penalty the more to be feared in its violence as it is less to be feared
+in its uncertainty! Rather than imitate the old system in this way
+and be 'more severe, one must be more vigilant. 1° Hence the idea
+that the machinery of justice must be duplicated by an organ of
+surveillance that would work side by side with it, and which would
+make it possible either to prevent crimes, or, if committed, to arrest
+their authors; police and justice must work together as two complementary actions of the same process - the police assuring 'the action
+of society on each individual', justice 'the rights of individuals
+against society' (Duport, Archives parlementaires, XXI, 45). Thus
+every crime will come to the light of day and be punished in all
+certainty. But it is also necessary that the legal procedures should
+not remain secret, that the reasons why a defendant is condemned or
+acquitted should be known to all, and each individual must be able
+to recognize the reasons for a penalty: 'Let the magistrate speak his
+opinion aloud, let him be obliged to read in his judgement the text
+of the law that condemns the defendant... Let the procedures that
+are buried mysteriously in the obscurity of the records office be
+opened to all citizens who are concerned at the fate of the condemned' (Mably, 348).
+The rule of common truth. Beneath this ordinary-seeming principle
+is hidden an important transformation. The old system of legal
+д6
+
+proofs, the use of torture, the extraction of confessions, the use of
+the public execution, the body and spectacle for the reproduction
+of truth had long isolated penal practice from the common forms of
+demonstration: semi-proofs produced semi-truths and semi-guilty
+persons, words extracted by pain had greater authenticity, presumption involved a degree of punishment. The heterogeneity of this
+system with the ordinary system of proof really constituted a scandal
+only when the power to punish needed, for its own economy, a
+climate of irrefutable certainty. How can one link absolutely in the
+minds of men the idea of crime and the idea of punishment, if the
+reality of the punishment does not follow, in all cases, the reality
+of the offence? To establish the offence, in all evidence, and according to' the means valid for all, becomes a task of first importance.
+The verification of the crime must obey the general criteria for all
+truth. In the arguments it employs, in the proofs it provides, legal
+judgement must be homogeneous with judgement in general. There
+is, therefore, an abandonment of legal proof, a rejection of torture,
+the need for a complete demonstration of the truth, an effacement
+of all correlation between degrees of suspicion and degrees of
+punishment. Like a mathematical truth, the truth of the crime will
+be accepted only when it is completely proven. It follows that, up
+to the final demonstration of his crime, the defendant must be
+regarded as innocent; and that, in order to carry out this demonstration, the judge must use not ritual forms, but common instruments,
+that reason possessed by everyone, which is also that of philosophers and scientists: 'In theory, I regard the magistrate as a philosopher who sets out to discover an interesting truth... His sagacity
+will enable him to grasp all the circumstances and all the relations,
+bring together or separate whatever needs to be brought together
+or separated in order to arrive at a sane judgement' (Seigneux de
+Correvon, 49). The investigation, the exercise of common reason,
+lays aside the old inquisitorial model and adopts the much more
+subtle model (doubly validated by science and common sense) of
+empirical research. The judge will be like a 'pilot steering between
+the rocks': What proofs or what clues will be considered to be
+sufficient neither I nor anyone else has dared to determine in general;
+since circumstances are subject to infinite variations, since proofs
+and clues must be deduced from these circumstances, the clearest
+97
+
+clues and proofs must necessarily vary in proportion' (Risi, 53).
+Henceforth, penal practice was to be subject to a common rule of
+truth, or rather to a complex rule in which heterogeneous elements
+of scientific demonstration, the evidence of the senses and common
+sense come together to form the judge's 'deep-seated conviction'.
+Although penal justice preserves the forms that guarantee its equity,
+it may now be opened up to all manner of truths, providing they
+are evident, well founded, acceptable to all. The legal ritual in itself
+no longer generates a divided truth. It is resituated in the field of
+reference of common proofs. With the multiplicity of scientific
+discourses, a difficult, infinite relation was then forged that penal
+justice is still unable to control. The master of justice is no longer
+the master of its truth.
+The rule of optimal specification. For penal semiotics to cover the
+whole field of illegalities that one wishes to eliminate, all offences
+must be defined; they must be classified and collected into species
+from which none of them can escape. A code is therefore necessary
+and this code must be sufficiently precise for each type of offence to
+be clearly present in it. The silence of the law must not harbour the
+hope of impunity. An exhaustive, explicit code is required, defining
+crimes and fixing penalties. (On this theme, cf., among others,
+Linguet, 8) But the same imperative need for a total coincidence
+between all possible offences and the effects-signs of punishment
+forces one to go further. The idea of the same punishment does not
+have the same effect on everyone: the rich do not fear fines nor the
+notorious infamy. The injury caused by an offence and its value as
+example differ according to the status of the offender; a crime
+committed by a noble is more injurious to society than one committed by a man of the people (Lacretelle, 144). Lastly, since punishment must prevent a repetition of the offence, it must take into
+account the profound nature of the criminal himself, the presumable
+degree of his wickedness, the intrinsic quality of his will: 'Of two
+men who have committed the same theft, how much less guilty is he
+who scarcely had the necessities of life than he who overflowed with
+excess? Of two perjurers, how much more criminal is he on whom
+one has striven from his childhood to impress feelings of honour
+than he who, abandoned to nature, never received the benefit of
+education' (Marat, 34). One sees the emergence at the same time of
+
+the need for a parallel classification of crimes and punishments, the
+need for an individualization of sentences, in accordance with the
+particular characteristics of each criminal. This individualization was
+to weigh very heavily throughout the history of modern penal law;
+it is rooted precisely here: in terms of the theory of law and according to the requirements of everyday practice, it is no doubt in
+radical opposition to the principle of codification; but from the
+standpoint of the economy of the power to punish, and of the
+techniques by which one wishes to circulate throughout the social
+body precisely calibrated signs of punishment, with neither excesses
+nor loopholes, with neither a useless 'expenditure' of power nor with
+timidity, it becomes evident that the codification of the offencespunishments system and the modulation of the criminal-punishment dyad go side by side, each requiring the other. Individualization appears as the ultimate aim of a precisely adapted code.
+But this individualization is very different in its nature from the
+modulations of punishment to be found in the old jurisprudence.
+The old system - and on this point it followed Christian penitentiary practice - used two series of variables to adjust the punishment,
+those of "circumstances' and those of 'intention'; elements, that is to
+say, that made it possible to qualify the act itself. The modulation
+of the penalty belonged to 'casuistry' in the broad sense. (On the
+non-individualizing character of casuistry, cf. Cariou.) But what
+was now beginning to emerge was a modulation that referred to the
+defendant himself, to his nature, to his way of life and his attitude of
+mind, to his past, to the 'quality' and not to the intention of his will.
+One perceives, but as a place as yet unfilled, the locus in which, in
+penal practice, psychological knowledge will take over the role of
+casuistic jurisprudence. Of course, at the end of the eighteenth
+century, that moment was still far off. The code-individualization
+link was sought in the scientific models of the period. Natural
+history no doubt offered the most adequate schema: the taxonomy
+of species according to an uninterrupted gradation. One sought to
+constitute a Linnaeus of crimes and punishments, so that each
+particular offence and each punishable individual might come, without the slightest risk of any arbitrary action, within the provisions
+of a general law. 'A table must be drawn up of all the genera of
+crimes to be observed in different countries. According to the
+29
+
+enumeration of crimes, a division into species must be carried out.
+The best rule of this division is, it seems to me, to separate the
+crimes according to their objects. This division must be such that
+each species is quite distinct from another, and that each particular
+crime, considered in all its relations may be placed between that
+which must precede it and that which must follow it, in the strictest
+gradation; lastly, this table must be such that it may be compared
+with another table that will be drawn up for penalties, in such a way
+that they may correspond exactly to one another' (Lacretelle, 351-
+352). In theory, or rather in dream, the double taxonomy of
+punishments and crimes will solve the problem: but how is one to
+apply fixed laws to particular individuals?
+Far removed from this speculative model, forms of anthropological individualization were being constituted at the same period in
+what was still a very rough and ready way. Let us take first the
+notion of the repetition of crime. Not that this was unknown to the
+old criminal laws.' But it was tending to become a description
+of the defendant himself capable of altering the sentence passed:
+according to the legislation of 1791, recidivists were liable in almost
+all cases to a doubling of the penalty; according to the law of Floréal
+Year X, they had to be branded with the letter R; and the penal code
+of 1810 inflicted on them either the maximum possible of the normal
+penalty, or the penalty immediately above it. Now, through the
+repetition of the crime, what one was aiming at was not the author
+of an act defined by law, but the delinquent subject himself, a certain
+will that manifested his intrinsically criminal character. Gradually,
+as criminality, rather than crime, became the object of penal intervention, the opposition between first offender and recidivist tended
+to become more important. And on the basis of this opposition,
+reinforcing it on several points, one sees at the same period the
+formation of the notion of the "crime passionel' - an involuntary,
+unpremeditated crime, bound up with extraordinary circumstances,
+which, while not offering the same excuse as madness, nevertheless
+prevented it from being regarded as an ordinary crime. As early as
+1781, Le Peletier remarked that the subtle gradation of penalties
+that he had presented to the Constituent Assembly might dissuade
+from crime 'the evil-doer who plans a wicked action in cold blood',
+and who may be restrained by thoughts of the penalty; but, on the
+I00
+
+other hand, it was powerless against crimes due to 'violent passions
+that have no regard to consequences; this, however, was unimportant, since such crimes revealed in their authors 'no reasoned wickedness. '12
+Beneath the humanization of the penalties, what one finds are all
+those rules that authorize, or rather demand, 'leniency', as a calculated economy of the power to punish. But they also provoke a
+shift in the point of application of this power: it is no longer the
+body, with the ritual play of excessive pains, spectacular brandings
+in the ritual of the public execution; it is the mind or rather a play
+of representations and signs circulating discreetly but necessarily
+and evidently in the minds of all. It is no longer the body, but the
+soul, said Mably. And we see very clearly what he meant by this
+term: the correlative of a technique of power. Old 'anatomies' of
+punishment are abandoned. But have we really entered the age of
+non-corporal punishment?
+At the point of departure, then, one may place the political
+project of rooting out illegalities, generalizing the punitive function
+and delimiting, in order to control it, the power to punish. From
+this there emerge two lines of objectification of crime and of the
+criminal. On the one hand, the criminal designated as the enemy of
+all, whom it is in the interest of all to track down, falls outside the
+pact, disqualifies himself as a citizen and emerges, bearing within
+him as it were, a wild fragment of nature; he appears as a villain,
+a monster, a madman, perhaps, a sick and, before long, 'abnormal'
+individual. It is as such that, one day, he will belong to a scientific
+objectification and to the 'treatment' that is correlative to it. On the
+other hand, the need to measure, from within, the effects of the
+punitive power prescribes tactics of intervention over all criminals,
+actual or potential: the organization of a field of prevention, the
+calculation of interests, the circulation of representations and signs,
+the constitution of a horizon of certainty and proof, the adjustment
+of penalties to ever more subtle variables; all this also leads to an
+objectification of criminals and crimes. In either case, one sees that
+the power relation that underlies the exercise of punishment begins
+to be duplicated by an object relation in which are caught up not
+only the crime as a fact to be established according to common
+IO1
+
+norms, but the criminal as an individual to be known according
+to specific criteria. One also sees that this object relation is not
+superimposed, from the outside, on the punitive practice, as would
+be a prohibition laid on the fury of the public execution by the
+limits of the sensibility, or as would be a rational or 'scientific'
+interrogation as to what this man that one is punishing really is. The
+processes of objectification originate in the very tactics of power and
+of the arrangement of its exercise.
+However, the two types of objectification that emerge with the
+project of penal reform are very different from one another: both in
+their chronology and in their effects. The objectification of the
+criminal as outside the law, as natural man, is still only a potentiality,
+a vanishing trace, in which are entangled the themes of political
+criticism and the figures of the imagination. One will have to wait a
+long time before homo criminalis becomes a definite object in the
+field of knowledge. The other, on the contrary, has had much more
+rapid and decisive effects in so far as it was linked more directly
+to the reorganization of the power to punish: codification, definition
+of offences, the fixing of a scale of penalties, rules of procedure,
+definition of the role of magistrates. And also because it made use
+of the discourse already constituted by the Idéologues. This discourse
+provided, in effect, by means of the theory of interests, representations and signs, by the series and geneses that it reconstituted, a sort
+of general recipe for the exercise of power over men: the 'mind' as
+a surface of inscription for power, with semiology as its tool; the
+submission of bodies through the control of ideas; the analysis of
+representations as a principle in a politics of bodies that was much
+more effective than the ritual anatomy of torture and execution. The
+thought of the Idéologues was not only a theory of the individual
+and society; it developed as a technology of subtle, effective,
+economic powers, in opposition to the sumptuous expenditure of
+the power of the sovereign. Let us hear once more what Servan has
+to say: the ideas of crime and punishment must be strongly linked
+and 'follow one another without interruption... When you have
+thus formed the chain of ideas in the heads of your citizens, you will
+then be able to pride yourselves on guiding them and being their
+masters. A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains;
+but a true politician binds them even more strongly by the chain of
+I02
+
+their own ideas; it is at the stable point of reason that he secures the
+end of the chain; this link is all the stronger in that we do not know
+of what it is made and we believe it to be our own work; despair
+and time eat away the bonds of iron and steel, but they are powerless against the habitual union of ideas, they can only tighten it still
+more; and on the soft fibres of the brain is founded the unshakable
+base of the soundest of Empires' (Servan, 35).
+It is this semio-technique of punishments, this "ideological
+power' which, partly at least, will remain in suspense and will be
+superseded by a new political anatomy, in which the body, once
+again, but in a new form, will be the principal character. And this
+new political anatomy will permit the intersection of the two
+divergent lines of objectification that are to be seen emerging in the
+eighteenth century: that which rejects the criminal 'from the other
+side' - from the side of a nature against nature; and that which seeks
+to control delinquency by a calculated economy of punishments. A
+glance at the new art of punishing clearly reveals the supersession
+of the punitive semio-technique by a new politics of the body.
+
+2.
+The art of punishing, then, must rest on a whole technology of
+representation. The undertaking can succeed only if it forms part of
+a natural mechanics. 'Like the gravitation of bodies, a secret force
+compels us ever towards our well-being. This impulsion is affected
+only by the obstacles that laws oppose to it. All the diverse actions
+of man are the effects of this interior tendency! To find the suitable
+punishment for a crime is to find the disadvantage whose idea is
+such that it robs for ever the idea of a crime of any attraction. It
+is an art of conflicting energies, an art of images linked by association, the forging of stable connections that defy time: it is a matter
+of establishing the representation of pairs of opposing values, of
+establishing quantitative differences between the opposing forces,
+of setting up a complex of obstacle-signs that may subject the
+movement of the forces to a power relation. 'Let the idea of torture
+and execution be ever present in the heart of the weak man and
+dominate the feeling that drives him to crime' (Beccaria, 119). These
+obstacle-signs must constitute the new arsenal of penalties, just as the
+old public executions were organized around a system of retaliatory
+marks. But in order to function, they must obey several conditions.
+I. They must be as unarbitrary as possible. It is true that it is
+society that defines, in terms of its own interests, what must be
+regarded as a crime: it is not therefore natural. But, if punishment
+is to present itself to the mind as soon as one thinks of committing a
+crime, as immediate a link as possible must be made between the
+two: a link of resemblance, analogy, proximity. 'The penalty must
+be made to conform as closely as possible to the nature of the
+offence, so that fear of punishment diverts the mind from the road
+along which the prospect of an advantageous crime was leading it'
+(Beccaria, 119). The ideal punishment would be transparent to the
+104
+
+crime that it punishes; thus, for him who contemplates it, it will be
+infallibly the sign of the crime that it punishes; and for him who
+dreams of the crime, the idea of the offence will be enough to arouse
+the sign of the punishment. This is an advantage for the stability of
+the link, an advantage for the calculation of the proportions between
+crime and punishment and the quantitative reading of interests; it
+also has the advantage that, by assuming the form of a natural
+sequence, punishment does not appear as the arbitrary effect of a
+human power: "To derive the offence from the punishment is the
+best means of proportioning punishment to crime. If this is the
+triumph of justice, it is also the triumph of liberty, for then penalties
+no longer proceed from the will of the legislator, but from the nature
+of things; one no longer sees man committing violence on man'
+(Marat, 33). In analogical punishment, the power that punishes is
+hidden.
+The reformers proposed a whole panoply of penalties that were
+natural by institution and which represented in their form the
+content of the crime. Take Vermeil, for example: those who abuse
+public liberty will be deprived of their own; those who abuse the
+benefits of law and the privileges of public office will be deprived of
+their civil rights; speculation and usury will be punished by fines;
+theft will be punished by confiscation; 'vainglory' by humiliation;
+murder by death; fire-raising by the stake. In the case of the poisoner, 'the executioner will present him with a goblet the contents
+of which will be thrown into his face; thus he will be made to feel
+the horror of his crime by being offered an image of it; he will then
+be thrown into a cauldron of boiling water' (Vermeil, 68-145; cf.
+also Dufriche de Valazé, 349) Mere day-dreaming? Perhaps. But
+the principle of a symbolic communication was clearly formulated
+by Le Peletier, when in 1791 he presented the new criminal legislation: Exact relations are required between the nature of the offence
+and the nature of the punishment; he who has used violence in his
+crime must be subjected to physical pain; he who has been lazy
+must be sentenced to hard labour; he who has acted despicably will
+be subjected to infamy (Le Peletier, 321-2).
+Despite cruelties that are strongly reminiscent of the tortures of
+the Ancien Régime, a quite different mechanism is at work in these
+analogical penalties. Horror is not opposed to horror in a joust of
+IO5
+
+power; it is no longer the symmetry of vengeance, but the transparency of the sign to that which it signifies; what is required is to
+establish, in the theatre of punishments, a relation that is immediately intelligible to the senses and on which a simple calculation may
+be based: a sort of reasonable aesthetic of punishment. It is not only
+in the fine arts that one must follow nature faithfully; political
+institutions, at least those that display wisdom and permanence, are
+founded on nature' (Beccaria, 114). The punishment must proceed
+from the crime; the law must appear to be a necessity of things, and
+power must act while concealing itself beneath the gentle force of
+nature.
+2. This complex of signs must engage with the mechanics of
+forces: reduce the desire that makes the crime attractive; increase
+the interest that makes the penalty be feared; reverse the relation of
+intensities, so that the representation of the penalty and its disadvantages is more lively than that of the crime and its pleasures.
+There is a whole mechanics, therefore, of interest, of its movement,
+of the way that one represents it to oneself and of the liveliness of
+this representation. 'The legislator must be a skilful architect who
+knows how to employ all the forces that may contribute to the
+solidity of the building and reduce all those that might ruin it'
+(Beccaria, 135).
+Theie are several ways of achieving this. 'Go straight to the
+source of evil' (Mably, 246). Smash the mainspring that animates the
+representation of the crime. Weaken the interest that brought it to
+birth. Behind the offences of the vagabond, there is laziness; that
+is what one must fight against. 'One will not succeed by locking
+beggars up in filthy prisons that are more like cesspools'; they will
+have to be forced to work. 'The best way of punishing them is to
+employ them' (Brissot, 258). Against a bad passion, a good habit;
+against a force, another force, but it must be the force of sensibility
+and passion, not that of armed power. 'Must one not deduce all
+penalties from this principle, which is so simple, so appropriate and
+already well known, namely, to choose them in that which is most
+subduing for the passion that led to the crime committed!' (Lacretelle, 361).
+Set the force that drove the criminal to the crime against itself.
+Divide interest, use it to make the penalty something to be feared.
+IO6
+
+Let the punishment irritate it and stimulate it more than the crime
+was able to flatter it. If pride led to the committing of a crime, let
+it be hurt, let the punishment disgust it. Shameful punishments are
+effective because they are based on the vanity that was at the root
+of the crime. Fanatics glory both in their opinions and in the tortures that they endure for them. Let us, therefore, set against
+fanaticism the proud obstinacy that sustains it: 'Reduce it with
+ridicule and shame; if one humiliates the proud vanity of fanatics
+before a great crowd of spectators, one may expect happy effects
+from this punishment. It would be quite useless, on the other hand,
+to impose physical pain on them. (Beccaria, 113).
+Reanimate the useful, virtuous interest that has been so weakened
+by the crime. The feeling of respect for property - for wealth, but
+also for honour, liberty, life - this the criminal loses when he robs,
+calumniates, abducts or kills. So he must be taught this feeling
+once again. And one will begin by teaching it to him for his own
+benefit; one will show him what it is to lose the freedom to dispose
+as one wishes of one's own wealth, honour, time and body, so that
+he may respect it in others (Pastoret, I, 49). The penalty that forms
+stable and easily legible signs must also recompose the economy of
+interests and the dynamics of passions.
+3. Consequently, one must use a temporal modulation. The
+penalty transforms, modifies, establishes signs, arranges obstacles.
+What use would it be if it had to be permanent? A penalty that had
+no end would be contradictory: all the constraints that it imposes on
+the convict and of which, having become virtuous once more, he
+would never be able to take advantage, would be little better than
+torture; and the effort made to reform him would be so much
+trouble and expense lost by society. If incorrigibles there be, one
+must be determined to eliminate them. But, for all the others,
+punishment can function only if it comes to an end. This analysis
+was accepted by the Constituent Assembly: the code of 1791 lays
+down the death penalty for traitors and murderers; all other penalties
+must have an end (the maximum is twenty years).
+But above all the role of duration must be integrated into the
+economy of the penalty. In its very violence, the public execution
+tended to have the following result: the more serious the crime, the
+shorter the punishment. Duration certainly intervened in the old
+107
+
+system of penalties; days at the pillory, years of banishment, hours
+spent dying on the wheel. But it was a time of ordeal, not of concerted transformation. Duration must now facilitate the proper
+action of the punishment: "A prolonged succession of painful privations, sparing mankind the horror of torture, has much more effect
+on the guilty party than a passing moment of pain... It constantly
+renews in the eyes of the people that witness it the memory of
+vengeful laws and revives in all the moments of a salutary terror."
+Time, operator of punishment.
+But the delicate mechanism of the passions must not be constrained in the same way or with the same insistence when they
+begin to improve; the punishment should diminish as it produces its
+effects. It may well be fixed, in the sense that it is determined for all,
+in the same way, by law, but its internal mechanism must be variable.
+In the bill put before the Constituent Assembly, Le Peletier proposed a system of diminishing penalties: a convict condemned to
+the most serious penalty would be subjected to the "cachor' (manacles
+on hands and feet, darkness, solitude, bread and water) only during
+the first stage of his imprisonment; he would be allowed to work
+first two then three days a week. After two thirds of his sentence
+had been served, he could pass to the 'gêne' (a cell with light, chain
+around the waist, solitary work for five hours a day, but with other
+prisoners on the other two days; this work would be paid and would
+enable him to improve his daily fare). Lastly, when he approached
+the end of his sentence, he could pass to the normal prison régime:
+'He will be allowed every day to meet other prisoners for work in
+common. If he prefers, he will be able to work alone. He will pay
+for his food from what he earns from his work' (Le Peletier, 329-30).
+4. For the convict, the penalty is a mechanics of signs, interests
+and duration. But the guilty person is only one of the targets of
+punishment. For punishment is directed above all at others, at all
+the potentially guilty. So these obstacle-signs that are gradually
+engraved in the representation of the condemned man must therefore circulate rapidly and widely; they must be accepted and redistributed by all; they must shape the discourse that each individual
+has with others and by which crime is forbidden to all by all - the
+true coin that is substituted in people's minds for the false profits of
+crime.
+108
+
+For this, everyone must see punishment not only as natural, but
+in his own interest; everyone must be able to read in it his own
+advantage. There must be no more spectacular, but useless penalties.
+There must be no secret penalties either; but punishment must be
+regarded as a retribution that the guilty man makes to each of his
+fellow citizens, for the crime that has wronged them all - penalties
+that are constantly placed before citizens' eyes, and which 'bring out
+the public utility of common and particular movements' (Dufriche
+de Valazé, 346). The ideal would be for the convict to appear as a
+sort of rentable property: a slave at the service of all. Why would
+society eliminate a life and a body that it could appropriate? It
+would be more useful to make him 'serve the state in a slavery
+that would be more or less extended according to the nature of his
+crime; France has all too many impracticable roads that impede
+trade; thieves who also obstruct the free circulation of goods could
+be put to rebuilding the highways. Far more telling than death
+would be 'the example of a man who is ever before one's eyes, whom
+one has deprived of liberty and who is forced to spend the rest of
+his days repairing the loss that he has caused society' (Boucher
+d'Argis, 1781, 139).
+In the old system, the body of the condemned man became the
+king's property, on which the sovereign left his mark and brought
+down the effects of his power. Now he will be rather the property
+of society, the object of a collective and useful appropriation. This
+explains why the reformers almost always proposed public works
+as one of the best possible penalties; in this, they were supported by
+the Cahiers de doléances: 'Let those condemned to penalties short of
+death be put to the public works of the country for a time proportionate to their crime.'" Public works meant two things: the collective interest in the punishment of the condemend man and the
+visible, verifable character of the punishment. Thus the convict
+pays twice; by the labour he provides and by the signs that he
+produces. At the heart of society, on the public squares or highways,
+the convict is a focus of profit and signification. Visibly, he is
+serving everyone; but, at the same time, he lets slip into the minds
+of all the crime-punishment sign: a secondary, purely moral, but
+much more real utility.
+5. Hence a whole learned economy of publicity. In physical
+109
+
+torture, the example was based on terror: physical fear, collective
+horror, images that must be engraved on the memories of the spectators, like the brand on the cheek or shoulder of the condemned man.
+The example is now based on the lesson, the discourse, the decipherable sign, the representation of public morality. It is no longer the
+terrifying restoration of sovereignty that will sustain the ceremony
+of punishment, but the reactivation of the code, the collective reinforcements of the link between the idea of crime and the idea of
+punishment. In the penalty, rather than seeing the presence of the
+sovereign, one will read the laws themselves. The laws associated
+a particular crime with a particular punishment. As soon as the
+crime is committed, the punishment will follow at once, enacting the
+discourse of the law and showing that the code, which links ideas,
+also links realities. The junction, immediate in the text, must be
+immediate in acts. 'Consider those first movements in which the
+news of some horrible act spreads through our towns and countryside; the citizens are like men who see lightning falling about them;
+everyone is moved by indignation and horror... That is the
+momept to punish the crime: do not let it slip by; hasten to prove
+it and judge it. Set up scaffolds, stakes, drag out the guilty man to
+the public squares, summon the people with great cries; you will
+then hear them applaud the proclamation of your judgements, as the
+proclamation of peace and liberty; you will see them run to these
+terrible spectacles as to the triumph of the laws' (Servan, 35-6).
+Public punishment is the ceremony of immediate recoding.
+The law is re-formed: it takes up its place on the side of the crime
+that violated it. The criminal, on the other hand, is detached from
+society, he leaves it. But not in those ambiguous festivals of the
+Ancien Régime in which the people inevitably took part, either in
+the crime or in the execution, but in a ceremony of mourning. The
+society that has rediscovered its laws has lost the citizen who violated them. Public punishment must manifest this double affiction:
+that a citizen should have been capable of ignoring the law and that
+one should have been obliged to separate oneself from a citizen.
+"Associate the scaffold with the most lugubrious and most moving
+ceremonies; let this terrible day be a day of mourning for the nation;
+let the general sorrow be painted everywhere in bold letters... Let
+the magistrate, wearing black, funereal crêpe, announce the crime
+IIO
+
+and the sad necessity of a legal vengeance to the people. Let the
+different scenes of this tragedy strike all the senses, stir all gentle,
+honest affections' (Dufau, 688).
+The meaning of this mourning must be clear to all; each element
+of its ritual must speak, repeat the crime, recall the law, show the
+need for punishment and justify its degree. Posters, placards, signs,
+symbols must be distributed, so that everyone may learn their
+significations. The publicity of punishment must not have the
+physical effect of terror; it must open up a book to be read. Le
+Peletier suggested that, once a month, the people should be allowed
+to visit convicts, 'in their mournful cells: they will read, written in
+bold letters above the door, the name of the convict, his crime and
+his sentence' (Le Peletier, 329-30). And in the simple, military style
+of the imperial ceremonies, Bexon was to imagine some years later a
+whole tableau of penal heraldry: "The prisoner condemned to death
+will be taken to the scaffold in a cart "hung or painted in black and
+red"; if he is a traitor, he will wear a red coat on which will be
+inscribed, in front and behind, the word "traitor"; if he is a parricide, his head will be covered with a black veil and on his shirt will
+be embroidered daggers or whatever instruments of death he used;
+if he is a poisoner, his red shirt will be decorated with snakes and
+other venomous animals' (Bexon, 24-5 - this project was presented
+to the King of Bavaria).
+This legible lesson, this ritual recoding, must be repeated as often
+as possible; the punishments must be a school rather than a festival;
+an ever-open book rather than a ceremony. The duration that makes
+the punishment effective for the guilty is also useful for the spectators. They must be able to consult at each moment the permanent
+lexicon of crime and punishment. A secret punishment is a punishment half wasted. Children should be allowed to come to the places
+where the penalty is being carried out; there they will attend their
+classes in civics. And grown men will periodically relearn the laws.
+Let us conceive of places of punishment as a Garden of the Laws
+that families would visit on Sundays. 'I propose that, from time to
+time, after preparing people's minds with a reasoned discourse on
+the preservation of the social order, on the utility of punishment,
+men as well as boys should be taken to the mines and to the work
+camps and contemplate the frightful fate of these outlaws. Such
+III
+
+pilgrimages would be more useful than the pilgrimages made by the
+Turks to Mecca' (Brissot). And Le Peletier considered that this
+visibility of punishment was one of the fundamental principles of the
+new penal code: 'Often, at certain special times, the presence of
+the people must bring down shame upon the heads of the guilty; and
+the presence of the guilty person in the pitiful state to which his crime
+has reduced him must bring useful instruction to the souls of the
+people' (Le Peletier, 322). Long before he was regarded as an object
+of science, the criminal was imagined as a source of instruction.
+Once one made charitable visits to prisoners to share in their sufferings (the seventeenth century had invented or revived this practice);
+now it was being suggested that children should come and learn how
+the benefits of the law are applied to crime - a living lesson in the
+museum of order.
+6. This will make possible in society an inversion of the traditional discourse of crime. How can one extinguish the dubious glory
+of the criminal. This was a matter of grave concern to the lawmakers of the eighteenth century. How can one silence the adventures of the great criminals celebrated in the almanacs, broadsheets
+and popular tales. If the recoding of punishment is well done, if the
+ceremony of mourning takes place as it should, the crime can no
+longer appear as anything but a misfortune and the criminal as an
+enemy who must be re-educated into social life. Instead of those
+songs of praise that turn the criminal into a hero, only those
+obstacle-signs that arrest the desire to commit the crime by the
+calculated fear of punishment will circulate in men's discourse. The
+positive mechanics will operate to the full in the language of every
+day, which will constantly reinforce it with new accounts. Discourse
+will become the vehicle of the law: the constant principle of universal recoding. The poets of the people will at last join those who
+call themselves the 'missionaries of eternal reason; they will become
+moralists. Filled with these terrible images and salutary ideas, each
+citizen will spread them through his family and there, by long
+accounts delivered with as much fervour as they are avidly listened
+to, his children gathered around him, will open up their young
+memories to receive, in imperishable lineaments, the notion of
+crime and punishment, the love of law and country, the respect and
+trust of the magistrature. Country people, too, will be witnesses of
+I IZ
+
+these examples and will sow them around their huts, the taste of
+virtue will take root in these coarse souls, while the evil-doer, dismayed at the public joy, fearful at the sight of so many enemies,
+may abandon plans whose outcome will be as prompt as it is
+gloomy' (Servan, 37).
+This, then, is how one must imagine the punitive city. At the
+crossroads, in the gardens, at the side of roads being repaired or
+bridges built, in workshops open to all, in the depths of mines that
+may be visited, will be hundreds of tiny theatres of punishment.
+Each crime will have its law; each criminal his punishment. It will
+be a visible punishment, a punishment that tells all, that explains,
+justifies itself, convicts: placards, different-coloured caps bearing
+inscriptions, posters, symbols, texts read or printed, tirelessly repeat
+the code. Scenery, perspectives, optical effects, trompe-l'œil sometimes magnify the scene, making it more fearful than it is, but also
+clearer. From where the public is sitting, it is possible to believe in
+the existence of certain cruelties which, in fact, do not take place.
+But the essential point, in all these real or magnified severities, is
+that they should all, according to a strict economy, teach a lesson:
+that each punishment should be a fable. And that, in counterpoint
+with all the direct examples of virtue, one may at each moment
+encounter, as a living spectacle, the misfortunes of vice. Around
+each of these moral 'representations', schoolchildren will gather
+with their masters and adults will learn what lessons to teach their
+offspring. The great terrifying ritual of the public execution gives
+way, day after day, street after street, to this serious theatre, with its
+multifarious and persuasive scenes. And popular memory will
+reproduce in rumour the austere discourse of the law. But perhaps
+it will be necessary, above these innumerable spectacles and narratives, to place the major sign of punishment for the most terrible
+of crimes: the keystone of the penal edifice. In any case, Vermeil had
+imagined the scene of absolute punishment that should dominate all
+the theatres of everyday punishment: the only case in which one
+had to seek to reach an infinity of punishment, something equivalent
+in the new penal system to what regicide had been in the old. The
+man found guilty of this crime would have his eyes put out; he
+would be put into an iron cage, suspended in the air, above a public
+square; he would be completely naked; he would be attached to the
+
+bars of the cage by an iron belt around his waist; to the end of his
+days, he would be fed on bread and water. "Thus he would be
+exposed to all the rigours of the seasons, sometimes his head would
+be covered with snow, sometimes burnt by a scorching sun. It is
+in this energetic torture, presenting rather the extension of a painful
+death than that of a painful life, that one would truly recognize a
+villain deserving of the horror of nature in its entirety, condemned
+to see no longer the heaven that he has outraged and to live no
+longer on the earth that he has sullied' (Vermeil, 148-8). Above the
+punitive city hangs this iron spider; and the criminal who is to be
+thus crucified by the new law is the parricide.
+There is a whole new arsenal of picturesque punishments. 'Avoid
+inflicting the same punishments,' said Mably. The idea of a uniform
+penalty, modulated only according to the gravity of the crime is
+banished. To be more precise: the use of imprisonment as a general
+form of punishment is never presented in these projects for specific,
+visible and 'telling' penalties. Imprisonment is envisaged, but as one
+among other penalties; it is the specific punishment for certain
+offences, those that infringe the liberty of individuals (such as
+abduction) or those that result from an abuse of liberty (disorder,
+violence). It is also envisaged as a condition to enable certain
+punishments to be carried out (forced labour, for example). But it
+does not cover the whole field of penality with its duration as the
+sole principle of variation. Or rather, the idea of penal imprisonment is explicitly criticized by many reformers. Because it is
+incapable of corresponding to the specificity of crimes. Because it
+has no effect on the public. Because it is useless, even harmful, to
+society: it is costly, it maintains convicts in idleness, it multiplies
+their vices (cf. Archives parlementaires, XXVI, 712). Because the
+execution of such a penalty is difficult to supervise and because there
+is a risk of exposing prisoners to the arbitrary will of their guards.
+Because the job of depriving a man of his liberty and of supervising
+him is an exercise of tyranny. 'You are demanding that there should
+be monsters among you; and if these odious men existed, the legislator ought perhaps to treat them as murderers' (Mably, 338). Prison
+as the universal penalty is incompatible with this whole technique
+of penalty-effect, penalty-representation, penalty-general function,
+1I4
+
+penalty-sign and discourse. It is obscurity, violence and suspicion.
+'It is a place of darkness in which the citizen's eye cannot count the
+victims, in which consequently their number is lost as an example.
+... Whereas if, without multiplying crimes, one could multiply the
+example of punishments, one would succeed at last in rendering
+them less necessary; indeed, the obscurity of the prisons becomes
+a subject of defiance for the citizens; they, easily suppose that great
+injustices are committed there... There is certainly something
+wrong when the law, which is made for the good of the multitude,
+instead of arousing its gratitude, continually arouses its discontent'
+(Dufriche de Valazé, 344-5).
+The idea that imprisonment might as it does today cover the
+whole middle ground of punishment, between death and light
+penalties, was one that the reformers could not arrive at immediately.
+The problem is the following: within a short space of time,
+detention became the essential form of punishment. In the penal
+code of 1810, between death and fines, it occupies, in a number of
+forms, almost the whole field of possible punishments. 'What is the
+system of penality accepted by the new law. It is incarceration in all
+its forms. Indeed, compare the four principal penalties that remain
+in the penal code. Forced labour is a form of incarceration. The
+convict-ship is an open-air prison. Detention, reclusion, imprisonment for a minor offence are in a sense merely different names for
+one and the same punishment' (Rémusat, 185). And the Empire
+decided at once to translate this imprisonment, envisaged by the
+law, into reality, according to a whole penal, administrative, geographical hierarchy; at the lowest degree, associated with each
+justice of the peace, municipal maisons de police; in each arrondissement, maisons d'arrér; in each département, a maison de correction;
+at the summit, several maisons centrales for convicted criminals or
+correctionels serving sentences of over one year; lastly, in a few ports,
+convict-ships. A great prison structure was planned, whose different
+levels would correspond exactly to the levels of the centralized
+administration. The scaffold, where the body of the tortured
+criminal had been exposed to the ritually manifested force of the
+sovereign, the punitive theatre in which the representation of
+punishment was permanently available to the social body, was
+replaced by a great enclosed, complex and hierarchized structure
+IIS
+
+thar was integrated into the very body of the state apparatus. A
+quite different materiality, a quite different physics of power, a quite
+different way of investing men's bodies had emerged. During the
+Restoration and the July monarchy, there were, apart from a few
+exceptional moments, between 40,000 and 43,000 prisoners in
+French gaols (approximately one prisoner per 6oo inhabitants).
+The high wall, no longer the wall that surrounds and protects, no
+longer the wall that stands for power and wealth, but the meticulously sealed wall, uncrossable in either direction, closed in upon the
+now mysterious work of punishment, will become, near at hand,
+sometimes even at the very centre of the cities of the nineteenth
+century, the monotonous figure, at once material and symbolic, of
+the power to punish. Already under the Consulate, the Minister of
+the Interior had been appointed to investigate the different 'places
+of safety' that were already functioning and which could be used in
+different towns. A few years later, sums had been allocated for the
+construction, in keeping with the power that they were to represent
+and serve, of these new castles of the new civil order. The empire
+used them in fact, for another war (cf. Decazes). A less extravagant,
+but more obstinate economy continued to build them throughout
+the nineteenth century.
+In under twenty years, in any case, the principle so clearly
+formulated in the Constituent Assembly, of specific, appropriate,
+effective penalties, constituting, in each case, a lesson for all, became
+the law of detention for every offence of any importance, except
+those requiring the death penalty. The theatre of punishment of
+which the eighteenth century dreamed and which would have acted
+essentially on the minds of the general public was replaced by the
+great uniform machinery of the prisons, whose network of immense
+buildings was to extend across France and Europe. But twenty years
+is perhaps too long a chronology for this conjuring trick. It may
+be argued that it occurred almost instantaneously. One has only to
+look at the bill for the criminal code presented in the Constituent
+Assembly by Le Peletier. The principle stated at the outset is the
+need for 'exact relations between the nature of the offence and the
+nature of the punishment': physical pain should be inflicted on those
+who commit crimes of violence, hard labour on the idle, shame on
+those with degraded souls. But the severe penalties actually
+
+proposed are three forms of detention: the "cachor, in which the
+penalty of imprisonment is augmented by various measures (solitude,
+a deprivation of light, restrictions on food); the' gêne', in which these
+ancillary measures are attenuated, and lastly imprisonment proper,
+which is reduced to simple confinement. The diversity, so solemnly
+promised, is reduced in the end to this grey, uniform penalty.
+Indeed, at the time, there were deputies who expressed surprise that,
+instead of establishing a natural relation between offences and
+penalties, a quite different plan had been adopted: 'So that if I have
+betrayed my country, - go to prison; if I have killed my father, - go
+to prison; every imaginable off ence is punished in the same uniform
+way. One might as well see a physician who has the same remedy
+for all ills' (Chabroud, 618).
+This prompt substitution was not confined to France. It was to be
+found, to a greater or lesser degree, in other countries. When
+Catherine II, in the years immediately following the treatise Des
+délits et des peines, gave instructions to the commission entrusted
+with the task of drawing up a 'new code of laws', Beccaria's lesson
+on the specificity and variety of penalties was not forgotten; it was
+repeated almost word for word: 'It is a triumph of civil liberty when
+the criminal laws derive each penalty from the particular nature of
+each crime. In this way all arbitrariness ceases; the penalty does not
+depend on the caprice of the legislator, but on the nature of the
+thing; it is not man who does violence to man, but the man's own
+action' (article 67). A few years later, Beccaria's general principle
+served as a foundation for the new Tuscan Code and for the new
+code given by Joseph II to Austria; and yet both legislations made
+imprisonment - modulated according to its duration and augmented in certain cases by branding or the use of irons - an almost
+uniform penalty: at least thirty years' detention for an attempt on
+the sovereign's life, for counterfeiting and for murder with robbery;
+fifteen to thirty years for voluntary homicide or armed robbery; one
+month to five years for simple theft, etc.?
+But if this colonization of the penalty by the prison is surprising,
+it is because imprisonment was not, as one might imagine, a punishment that was already securely established in the penal system, just
+below the death penalty, and which naturally occupied the place left
+vacant by the disappearance of public torture. In fact, imprisonment
+1I7
+
+- and on this point many countries were in the same situation as
+France - had only a limited and marginal position in the system of
+penalties. This is shown by the texts themselves. The ordinance of
+1670 does not include detention among the peines afflictives, or
+serious penalties. Perpetual or temporary imprisonment was no
+doubt included among certain local customs and practices (cf., for
+example, Coquille). But contemporary writers maintained that it was
+falling into disuse together with other forms of torture: "There were
+formerly penalties that are no longer practised in France, such as
+writing a condemned man's penalty on his face or forehead and
+perpetual imprisonment, just as one no longer condemns a criminal
+to be exposed to wild beasts or sent down the mines' (Rousseaud de
+la Combe, 3). In fact, it is certain that imprisonment had survived
+tenaciously as a punishment for less serious offences, according to
+local customs and practices. In this sense, Soulatges spoke of the
+'light penalties' that the ordinance of 1670 had not mentioned:
+reprimand, admonition, banishment from a certain place, satisfaction
+to the injured party and a term of imprisonment. In certain regions,
+especially those that had most preserved their legal peculiarities, the
+penalty of imprisonment was still widespread, but this had its
+difficulties, as in the recently annexed province of Roussillon.
+Yet, despite these divergencies, jurists held firmly to the principle
+that 'imprisonment is not to be regarded as a penalty in our civil
+law' (Serpillon, 1095 - however, one does find in Serpillon the idea
+that the rigour of imprisonment is the beginning of a penalty). Its
+role is rather that of holding the person and his body as security:
+ad continendos homines, non ad puriendos, as the tag has it; in this
+sense, the imprisonment of a suspect has a role similar to that of a
+debtor. Through imprisonment, one has security for someone, one
+does not punish him." This was the general principle. And although
+imprisonment sometimes served as a penalty, even in important
+cases, it did so essentially as a substitute: it replaced the galleys for
+those - women, children, invalids - who could not serve there: "The
+sentence of imprisonment for a term or for life is equivalent to being
+sent to the galleys.'" In this equivalence, one can see clearly enough
+the emergence of a possible connection. But, for this to take place,
+the prison had to change its juridical status.
+It was also necessary to overcome a second obstacle, which, for
+118
+
+France at least, was a considerable one. Imprisonment was especially
+disqualified for this role by the fact that it was, in practice, directly
+bound up with arbitrary royal decision and the excesses of the
+sovereign power. The 'maisons de force, the general hospitals, the
+'king's orders' or the orders of the police magistrates, letters under
+the king's private seal obtained by notables or by families, constituted a whole repressive practice, juxtaposed with 'regular justice'
+and more usually opposed to it. And this extra-judicial imprisonment came to be rejected by both classical jurists and reformers.
+Prisons are made by princes, said a traditionalist like Serpillon, who
+sheltered behind the authority of Judge Bouhier: "Although, for
+reasons of state, princes are sometimes inclined to inflict this penalty,
+ordinary justice makes no use of this kind of sentence' (Serpillon,
+1095). Detention was described by the reformers in innumerable
+statements as a figure and privileged instrument of despotism: 'What
+is one to say of those secret prisons conjured up by the fatal spirit of
+monarchism, reserved in the main either for philosophers, in whose
+hands nature has placed her torch and who dared to enlighten their
+century, or for those proud independent souls who lack the cowardice to keep silent on the ills of their country; prisons whose gloomy
+doors are opened by mysterious letters and swallow up forever its
+unfortunate victims? What is to be said even of those letters, those
+masterpieces of ingenious tyranny, which overthrow the privilege
+of every citizen to be heard before he is judged, and which are a
+thousand times more dangerous for men than the invention of
+Phalaris ...' (Brissot, 173).
+No doubt these protests, coming from such diverse sources, are
+directed not at imprisonment as a legal penalty, but at the "illegal'
+use of arbitrary, indeterminate detention. Nevertheless, imprisonment was seen, generally speaking, as branded by the abuses of
+power. And many cahiers de doléances rejected it as incompatible
+with good justice. Sometimes in the name of classical juridical
+principles: 'Prisons were intended by the law not to punish but to
+secure the persons of the offenders ... (Desjardin, 477). Sometimes
+in the name of the effects of imprisonment, which punishes those
+who have not yet been convicted, which communicates and generalizes the evil that it ought to prevent, and which runs counter to the
+principle of the individuality of penalties by punishing a whole
+
+family; it was said that 'imprisonment is not a penalty. Humanity
+rises up against the frightful thought that it is not a punishment to
+deprive a citizen of his most precious possession, to plunge him
+ignominiously into the den of crime, to snatch him from everything
+that is dear to him, to bring him perhaps to ruin and to deprive not
+only him but his unfortunate family of all means of subsistence'
+(Desjardin, 483). And, on several occasions, the cahiers demanded
+the abolition of those 'houses of internment': "We believe that the
+maisons de force must be razed to the ground..." And the decree
+of 13 March 1790 ordered the freeing of 'all persons detained in
+castles, religious houses, maisons de force, maisons de police or any
+other prisons, by orders under the king's private seal or by orders
+of the agents of the executive power'.
+How then could detention, so evidently bound up with an
+illegality that was denounced even in the power of the prince,
+become in so short a time one of the most general forms of legal
+punishment?
+The explanation most usually given is the formation, during the
+classical age, of a number of great models of punitive imprisonment.
+Their prestige, which was all the greater in that the most recent
+examples came from England and above all from America, appears
+to have made it possible to overcome the double obstacle constituted
+by the age-old rules of law and the despotic functioning of imprisonment. Very soon, it seems, these obstacles were swept away
+by the punitive marvels thought up by the reformers, and detention
+became a serious reality. There can be no doubt about the importance
+of these models. But it is precisely these models that, before providing a solution, themselves pose problems: the problem of their
+existence and the problem of their diffusion. How were they able
+to come into being and, above all, how did they become so generally
+accepted! For it is easy to show that, although they correspond on a
+number of points with the general principles of penal reform, they
+fail to do so on an even greater number; sometimes they are even
+quite incompatible.
+The oldest of these models, the one that is generally regarded as
+having more or less inspired all the others, was the Rasphuis of
+Amsterdam, opened in 1596.° Originally, it was intended for
+I20
+
+beggars or young malefactors. Its functioning obeyed three great
+principles: the duration of the penalties could, at least within
+certain limits, be determined by the administration itself, according
+to the prisoner's conduct (indeed this latitude could be given in the
+sentence itself: in 1597 a prisoner was condemned to twelve years'
+imprisonment, which could be reduced to eight, if his behaviour
+proved satisfactory). Work was obligatory; it was performed in
+common (indeed the individual cell was used only as an additional
+punishment; prisoners slept two or three to a bed, in cells containing
+between four and twelve persons; and, for the work done, the
+prisoners received wages. A strict time-table, a system of prohibitions and obligations, continual supervision, exhortations, religious
+readings, a whole complex of methods "to draw towards good' and
+"to turn away from evil' held the prisoners in its grip from day to
+day. One may take the Rasphuis of Amsterdam as a basic figure.
+Historically, it forms the link between the theory, so characteristic
+of the sixteenth century, of a pedagogical and spiritual transformation of individuals brought about by continuous exercise, and the
+penitentiary techniques conceived in the second half of the eighteenth
+century. And it provided the three institutions that were then set up
+with the fundamental principles that each was to develop in its own
+particular direction.
+The maison de force at Ghent organized penal labour above all
+around economic imperatives. The reason given was that idleness
+was the general cause of most crimes. An investigation - no doubt
+one of the first - carried out among those sentenced under the
+jurisdiction of Alost, in 1749, showed that malefactors were not
+'artisans or labourers' (workers think only of the work that feeds
+them), but "idlers given up to begging'.° Hence the idea of a house
+that would in a sense provide a universal pedagogy of work for
+those who had proved to be resistant to it. This had four advantages:
+it reduced the number of criminal prosecutions, which were costly
+to the state (it was estimated that this would save over 100,000
+pounds in Flanders); this would make it unnecessary to return
+money paid in taxes to the owners of woods ruined by vagabonds;
+it would create a mass of new workers, which would help 'by competition to bring down the cost of labour'; lastly, it would enable the
+true poor to benefit, to the full, from necessary charity (Vilan, 68).
+I2I
+
+This useful pedagogy would revive for the lazy individual a liking
+for work, force him back into a system of interests in which labour
+would be more advantageous than laziness, form around him a
+small, miniature, simplified, coercive society in which the maxim,
+'he who wants to live must work', would be clearly revealed. Work
+would be compulsory, but so too would be remuneration, which
+enables the prisoner to improve his lot during and after detention.
+"The man who does not find his subsistence must be made to desire
+to procure it for himself by work; he is offered it by supervision and
+discipline; in a sense, he is forced to acquire it; he is then tempted
+by the bait of gain; corrected in his morals, accustomed to work,
+his anxiety aroused by the little money he has kept for his release,'
+he has learned a trade that will guarantee a subsistence without
+danger' (Vilan, 107). This reconstruction of homo economicus excluded the use of penalties that were too short - this would prevent
+the acquisition of habits and skills of work - or too long - which
+would make any apprenticeship useless. "The term of six months
+is too short to correct criminals, and to bring them to the spirit of
+work'; on the other hand, 'a life sentence throws them into despair;
+they become indifferent to the correction of their morals and to the
+spirit of work; they become concerned only with plans to escape
+and to rebel; and since the judgements that were passed on them
+did not deprive them of life, why should one seek to render it
+unbearable for them." (Vilan, 102-3). The duration of the penalty
+has meaning only in relation to possible correction, and to an
+economic use of the corrected criminal.
+To the principle of work, the English models added, as an
+essential addition to correction, isolation. The outlines had been
+provided in 1775, by Hanway, who justified it first with negative
+reasons: promiscuity in the prison provided bad examples and possibilities of escape in the short term and of blackmail or complicity in
+the long term. The prison would be too much like a factory if one
+left the prisoners to work together. The positive reasons followed:
+isolation provides a terrible shock' which, while protecting the
+prisoner from bad influences, enables him to go into himself and
+rediscover in the depths of his conscience the voice of good; solitary
+work would then become not only an apprenticeship, butalso an exercise in spiritual conversion; it would rearrange not only the complex
+122
+
+of interests proper to homo economicus, but also the imperatives of
+the moral subject. The cell, that technique of Christian monachism,
+which had survived only in Catholic countries, becomes in this
+protestant society the instrument by which one may reconstitute
+both homo economicus and the religious conscience. Between the
+crime and the return to right and virtue, the prison would constitute
+the 'space between two worlds' the place for the individual transf ormation that would restore to the state the subject it had lost. Hanway
+called this apparatus for modifying individuals a 'reformatory' (cf.
+Hanway). These were the general principles that Howard and
+Blackstone put into operation in 1779 when the independence of the
+United States put an end to deportation and when a law was being
+drawn up to modify the system of penalties. Imprisonment, with the
+purpose of transforming the soul and conduct, made its entry into
+the system of civil laws. The preamble of the bill, written by Blackstone and Howard, describes individual imprisonment in terms of
+its triple function as example to be feared, instrument of conversion
+and condition for an apprenticeship: subjected "to isolated detention,
+regular work and the influence of religious instruction', certain
+criminals might not only inspire terror in those who would be
+tempted to imitate them, 'but also to correct themselves and to
+acquire the habit of work' (Preamble of the bill of 1779). Hence the
+decision to build two penitentiaries, one for men, one for women,
+in which the isolated prisoners would be put "to the most servile
+labours, most compatible with the ignorance, negligence and
+obstinacy of the criminals': walking in a wheel to move a machine,
+fixing a winch, polishing marble, beating hemp, rasping logwood,
+cutting up rags, rope-making and sewing sacks. In fact, only one
+penitentiary was built, at Gloucester, and it corresponded only
+partially to the initial plan: total confinement for the most dangerous
+criminals; for the others, day work in common and separation at
+night.
+Then came the Philadelphia model. This was no doubt the most
+famous because it was associated in people's minds with the political
+innovations of the American system and also because it was not,
+like the others, doomed to immediate failure and abandonment; it
+was continuously re-examined and transformed right up to the
+great debates of the 18zos on penitentiary reform. In many respects
+123
+
+the, Walnut Street Prison, opened in 1790, under the direct influence
+of the Quakers, was modelled on those of Ghent and Gloucester.1°
+There was compulsory work in workshops; the prisoners were kept
+constantly occupied; the prison was financed by this work, but the
+prisoners were also rewarded individually as a way of reinserting
+them morally and materially into the strict world of the economy;
+by keeping the prisoners 'constantly employed on productive
+works, they were able to defray the expenses of the prison, they
+were not left idle and they were able to save a little money for the
+time when their captivity would cease' (La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, 9). Life was partitioned, therefore, according to an absolutely
+strict time-table, under constant supervision; each moment of the
+day was devoted to a particular type of activity, and brought with it
+its own obligations and prohibitions: "All prisoners rise at daybreak,
+so that, after making their beds, cleaning and washing themselves
+and attending to other needs, they generally begin their work at
+sunrise. From that moment, no one may go into the rooms or other
+places except to the workshops and places assigned for their work.
+••. At nightfall, a bell rings to mark the end of their work... They
+are given half an hour to arrange their beds, after which they are not
+allowed to converse aloud or to make the least noise' (Turnbull, 15-
+16). As at Gloucester, solitary confinement was not total; it was used
+for certain prisoners who would in former times have incurred the
+death penalty, and for those inside the prison who deserved special
+punishment: "There, without occupation, without anything to distract him, waiting in uncertainty for the moment when he would be
+delivered', the prisoner spent 'long anxious hours, with nothing but
+the reflections that are present to the minds of all guilty persons'
+(Teeters, 1935, 49). Lastly, as at Ghent, the length of the imprisonment could vary with the behaviour of the prisoner: after consulting
+the files, the prison inspectors obtained from the authorities - without much difficulty up to the 182os - pardons for prisoners who had
+shown good behaviour.
+Furthermore, Walnut Street had a number of characteristics that
+were specific to it, or which at least developed what was potentially
+present in the other models. First, the principle of not publicizing
+the penalty. Though the sentence and the reasons for it should be
+known to all, the penalty should be carried out in secret; the public
+124
+
+was to intervene neither as a witness, nor as a guarantor of punishment; the certainty that, behind the walls, the prisoner was serving
+his sentence must suffice as an example: there were to be no more
+of those street spectacles which the law of 1786 has given rise to by
+imposing on certain prisoners public works to be carried out in
+towns and on the highways." The punishment and correction that
+it must operate are processes that unfold between the prisoner and
+those who supervise him. They are processes that effect a transformation of the individual as a whole - of his body and of his habits by
+the daily work that he is forced to perform, of his mind and his will
+by the spiritual attentions that are paid to him: 'Bibles and other
+books of religious practice are provided; the clergy of the different
+obediences to be found in the town and suburbs perf orm the services
+once a week and any other edifying person may have access to the
+prisoners at any time' (Teeters, 1935, 53-4). But this transformation
+is entrusted to the administration itself. Solitude and self-examination are not enough; nor are purely religious exhortations. Work on
+the prisoner's soul must be carried out as often as possible. The
+prison, though an administrative apparatus, will at the same time be
+a machine for altering minds. On first entering the prison, the
+prisoner will be read the regulations; 'at the same time, the inspectors
+seek to strengthen in him the moral obligations that he now has;
+they represent to him the offence that he has committed with regard
+to them, the evil that has consequently resulted for the society that
+protected him and the need to make compensation by his example
+and his amendment. They then make him promise to do his duty
+gladly, to behave decently, promising him or allowing him to hope
+that, before the expiration of the term of the sentence, he will be
+able to obtain his discharge if he behaves well... From time to
+time the inspectors make it their duty to converse with the criminals
+one after the other, concerning their duties as men and as members
+of society' (Tumbull, 27).
+But no doubt the most important thing was that this control and
+transformation of behaviour were accompanied - both as a condition
+and as a consequence - by the development of a knowledge of the
+individuals. When the new prisoner arrived, the Walnut Street
+administration received a report concerning his crime, the circumstances in which it was committed, a summary of the examinations
+I2S
+
+of the defendant, notes on his behaviour before and after sentence:
+indispensable elements if one wished to 'decide what steps will have
+to be taken to destroy his old habits'
+' 12 And throughout his detention he would be observed; his conduct would be noted daily and
+the inspectors - twelve local worthies appointed in 1795 - who, too
+by two, visited the prison each week, would be kept informed of
+events, follow the conduct of each prisoner and decide which of
+them deserved a shortening of his term. This ever-growing knowledge of the individuals made it possible to divide them up in the
+prison not so much according to their crimes as according to the
+dispositions that they revealed. The prison became a sort of permanent
+observatory that made it possible to distribute the varieties of vice
+or weakness. From 1797, the prisoners were divided into four classes:
+the first for those who were explicitly condemned to solitary confinement or who had committed serious offences in the prison; the
+second for those who were well known as old offenders... whose
+depraved morality, dangerous character, irregular dispositions, or
+disorderly conduct' became apparent during the time they were in
+prison; the third for those whose character and circumstances,
+before and after conviction, led one to believe that they were not
+habitual offenders'; the fourth and last was a special section, a
+probationary class for those whose character was still not known,
+or who, if they were better known, did not deserve to be put in the
+preceding category (Teeters, 1935, 59). A whole corpus of individualizing knowledge was being organized that took as its held of
+reference not so much the crime committed (at least in isolation),
+but the potentiality of danger that lies hidden in an individual and
+which is manifested in his observed everyday conduct. The prison
+functions in this as an apparatus of knowledge.
+Between this apparatus of punishment proposed by the Flemish,
+English and American models, between these "reformatories' and
+all the punishments imagined by the reformers, one may establish
+the points of convergence and the disparities.
+Points of convergence. In the first instance, there is a difference
+in the temporal direction of punishment. The 'reformatories' were
+mechanisms directed towards the future; they too were intended not
+to efface a crime, but to prevent its repetition. "As to the end, or
+I26
+
+final cause of human punishments. This is not by way of atonement
+or expiation for the crime committed; for that must be left to the just
+determination of the supreme being ...' (Blackstone, 1I). And in
+Pennsylvania, Buxton declared, the principles of Montesquieu and
+Beccaria should now have the "force of axioms', that 'the prevention
+of crimes is the sole end of punishment' (Bradford, 3). So one
+punishes not to efface the crime, but to transform a criminal (actual
+or potential); punishment must bring with it a certain corrective
+technique. Here, too, Rush is close to the reforming jurists - were
+it not, perhaps, for the metaphor he uses when he says: we have
+invented machines that facilitate labour; how much more one should
+praise the inventor of 'the most speedy and effectual methods of
+restoring the vicious part of mankind to virtue and happiness, and of
+extirpating a portion of vice from the world' 18 Lastly, the English
+and the American models, like the projects of the legislators and
+theoreticians, require methods to individualize the penalty: in its
+duration, its nature, its intensity, the way in which it is carried out,
+the punishment must be adjusted to the individual character and to
+the danger that he bears within him for others. The system of
+penalties must be open to individual variables. In their general outline, the models more or less inspired by the Rasphuis of Amsterdam
+were not in contradiction with the proposals of the reformers. It
+might even be thought at first glance that they were merely a development of them - or a sketch - at the level of concrete institutions.
+Yet the disparity emerges clearly enough when one defines the
+techniques of this individualizing correction. The difference is
+to be found in the procedure of access to the individual, the way in
+which the punishing power gets control over him, the instruments
+that it uses in order to achieve this transformation; it is in the
+technology of the penalty, not in its theoretical foundation; in the
+relation that it establishes with the body and with the soul, and not
+in the way that it is inserted within the legal system.
+That was the method of the reformers. Where exactly did the
+penalty apply its pressure, gain control of the individual! Representations: the representations of his interests, the representation of his
+advantages and disadvantages, pleasure and displeasure; and, if the
+punishment happens to seize the body, to apply techniques to it that
+are little short of torture, it is because it is - for the condemned man
+127
+
+and for the spectators - an object of representation. By what instrument did one act on the representations? Other representations, or
+rather couplings of ideas (crime-punishment, the imagined advantage of crime-disadvantage perceived in the punishments); these
+pairings could function only in the element of publicity: punitive
+scenes that established them or reinforced them in the eyes of all, a
+discourse that circulated, brought back into currency at each
+moment the complex of signs. The role of the criminal in punishment was to reintroduce, in the face of crime and the criminal code,
+the real presence of the signified - that is to say, of the penalty
+which, according to the terms of the code, must be infallibly associated with the offence. By producing this signified abundantly and
+visibly, and therefore reactivating the signifying system of the code,
+the idea of crime functioning as a sign of punishment, it is with this
+coin that the offender pays his debt to society. Individual correction
+must, therefore, assure the process of redefining the individual as
+subject of law, through the reinforcement of the systems of signs
+and representations that they circulate.
+The apparatus of corrective penality acts in a quite different way.
+The point of application of the penalty is not the representation, but
+the body, time, everyday gestures and activities; the soul, too, but
+in so far as it is the seat of habits. The body and the soul, as principles of behaviour, form the element that is now proposed for
+punitive intervention. Rather than on an art of representations, this
+punitive intervention must rest on a studied manipulation of the
+individual: 'I have no more doubt of every crime having its cure in
+moral and physical influence ...; so, in order to decide on punishments, one will require some knowledge of the principles of sensation, and of the sympathies which occur in the nervous system'
+(Rush, 13). As for the instruments used, these are no longer complexes of representation, reinforced and circulated, but forms of
+coercion, schemata of constraint, applied and repeated. Exercises,
+not signs: time-tables, compulsory movements, regular activities,
+solitary meditation, work in common, silence, application, respect,
+good habits. And, ultimately, what one is trying to restore in this
+technique of correction is not so much the juridical subject, who is
+caught up in the fundamental interests of the social pact, but the
+obedient subject, the individual subjected to habits, rules, orders,
+128
+
+an authority that is exercised continually around him and upon
+him, and which he must allow to function automatically in him.
+There are two quite distinct ways, therefore, of reacting to the
+offence: one may restore the juridical subject of the social pact, or
+shape an obedient subject, according to the general and detailed
+form of some power.
+All this would no doubt amount to little more than a speculative
+difference - for in each case it is a question of forming obedient
+individuals - if the penality of 'coercion' did not bring with it
+certain crucial consequences. The training of behaviour by a full
+time-table, the acquisition of habits, the constraints of the body
+imply a very special relation between the individual who is punished
+and the individual who punishes him. It is a relation that not only
+renders the dimension of the spectacle useless: it excludes it. 14 The
+agent of punishment must exercise a total power, which no third
+party can disturb; the individual to be corrected must be entirely
+enveloped in the power that is being exercised over him. Secrecy is
+imperative, and so too is autonomy, at least in relation to this
+technique of punishment: it must have its own functioning, its own
+rules, its own techniques, its own knowledge; it must fix its own
+norms, decide its own results. There is a discontinuity, or in any
+case a specificity, in relation to the legal power that declares guilt
+and fixes the general limits of punishment. These two consequences
+- secrecy and autonomy in the exercise of the power to punish - are
+unacceptable for a theory and a policy of penality that has two aims
+in view: to get all citizens to participate in the punishment of the
+social enemy and to render the exercise of the power to punish
+entirely adequate and transparent to the laws that publicly define it.
+Secret punishments and punishments not specified in the legal code,
+a power to punish exercised in the shadows according to criteria and
+with instruments that elude control - this was enough to compromise the whole strategy of the reform. After the sentence, a power
+was constituted that was reminiscent of the power exercised in the
+old system. The power that applied the penalties now threatened
+to be as arbitrary, as despotic, as the power that once decided them.
+In short, the divergence is the following: punitive city or coercive
+institution? On the one hand, a functioning of penal power, distributed throughout the social space; present everywhere as scene,
+129
+
+spęctacle, sign, discourse; legible like an open book; operating by a
+permanent recodification of the mind of the citizens; eliminating
+crime by those obstacles placed before the idea of crime; acting
+invisibly and uselessly on the 'soft fibres of the brain', as Servan put
+it. A power to punish that ran the whole length of the social network
+would act at each of its points, and in the end would no longer be
+perceived as a power of certain individuals over others, but as an
+immediate reaction of all in relation to the individual. On the other
+hand, a compact functioning of the power to punish: a meticulous
+assumption of responsibility for the body and the time of the convict, a regulation of his movements and behaviour by a system of
+authority and knowledge; a concerted orthopaedy applied to convicts in order to reclaim them individually; an autonomous administration of this power that is isolated both from the social body and
+from the judicial power in the strict sense. The emergence of the
+prison marks the institutionalization of the power to punish, or, to be
+more precise: will the power to punish (with the strategic aim adopted in the late eighteenth century, the reduction of popular illegality)
+be better served by concealing itself beneath a general social function, in the 'punitive city, or by investing itself in a coercive
+institution, in the enclosed space of the "reformatory"?
+In any case, it can be said that, in the late eighteenth century, one
+is confronted by three ways of organizing the power to punish. The
+first is the one that was still functioning and which was based on the
+old monarchical law. The other two both refer to a preventive,
+utilitarian, corrective conception of a right to punish that belongs
+to society as a whole; but they are very different from one another
+at the level of the mechanisms they envisage. Broadly speaking, one
+might say that, in monarchical law, punishment is a ceremonial of
+sovereignty; it uses the ritual marks of the vengeance that it applies
+to the body of the condemned man; and it deploys before the eyes
+of the spectators an effect of terror as intense as it is discontinuous,
+irregular and always above its own laws, the physical presence of the
+sovereign and of his power. The reforming jurists, on the other
+hand, saw punishment as a procedure for requalifying individuals
+as subjects, as juridical subjects; it uses not marks, but signs, coded
+sets of representations, which would be given the most rapid
+circulation and the most general acceptance possible by citizens
+
+witnessing the scene of punishment. Lastly, in the project for a
+prison institution that was then developing, punishment was seen
+as a technique for the coercion of individuals; it operated methods
+of training the body - not signs - by the traces it leaves, in the form
+of habits, in behaviour; and it presupposed the setting up of a
+specific power for the administration of the penalty. We have, then,
+the sovereign and his force, the social body and the administrative
+apparatus; mark, sign, trace; ceremony, representation, exercise;
+the vanquished enemy, the juridical subject in the process of requalification, the individual subjected to immediate coercion; the
+tortured body, the soul with its manipulated representations, the
+body subjected to training. We have here the three series of elements
+that characterize the three mechanisms that face one another in the
+second half of the eighteenth century. They cannot be reduced to
+theories of law (though they overlap with such theories), nor can
+they be identified with apparatuses or institutions (though they are
+based on them), nor can they be derived from moral choices (though
+they find their justification in morality). They are modalities according to which the power to punish is exercised: three technologies of
+power.
+The problem, then, is the following: how is it that, in the end,
+it was the third that was adopted! How did the coercive, corporal,
+solitary, secret model of the power to punish replace the representative, scenic, signifying, public, collective model? Why did the
+physical exercise of punishment (which is not torture) replace, with
+the prison that is its institutional support, the social play of the signs
+of punishment and the prolix festival that circulated them?
+I31
+
+PART THREE
+
+1. Docile bodies
+Let us take the ideal figure of the soldier as it was still seen in the
+early seventeenth century. To begin with, the soldier was someone
+who could be recognized from afar; he bore certain signs: the natural
+signs of his strength and his courage, the marks, too, of his pride;
+his body was the blazon of his strength and valour; and although it
+is true that he had to learn the profession of arms little by little -
+generally in actual fighting - movements like marching and attitudes
+like the bearing of the head belonged for the most part to a bodily
+rhetoric of honour; "The signs for recognizing those most suited to
+this profession are a lively, alert manner, an erect head, a taut
+stomach, broad shoulders, long arms, strong fingers, a small belly,
+thick thighs, slender legs and dry feet, because a man of such a
+figure could not fail to be agile and strong; when he becomes a pikebearer, the soldier will have to march in step in order to have as
+much grace and gravity as possible, for the pike is an honourable
+weapon, worthy to be borne with gravity and boldness' (Montgommery, 6 and 7). By the late eighteenth century, the soldier has
+become something that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inapt
+body, the machine required can be constructed; posture is gradually
+corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of
+the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning
+silently into the automatism of habit; in short, one has 'got rid of
+the peasant' and given him 'the air of a soldier' (ordinance of z0
+March 1704). Recruits become accustomed to 'holding their heads
+high and erect; to standing upright, without bending the back, to
+sticking out the belly, throwing out the chest and throwing back the
+shoulders; and, to help them acquire the habit, they are given this
+position while standing against a wall in such a way that the heels,
+the thighs, the waist and the shoulders touch it, as also do the backs
+135
+
+of the hands, as one turns the arms outwards, without moving them
+away from the body... Likewise, they will be taught never to fix
+their eyes on the ground, but to look straight at those they pass ...
+to remain motionless until the order is given, without moving the
+head, the hands or the feet... lastly to march with a bold step, with
+knee and ham taut, on the points of the feet, which should face
+outwards' (ordinance of 20 March 1764).
+The classical age discovered the body as object and target of
+power. It is easy enough to find signs of the attention then paid to
+the body - to the body that is manipulated, shaped, trained, which
+obeys, responds, becomes skilful and increases its forces. The great
+book of Man-the-Machine was written simultaneously on two
+registers: the anatomico-metaphysical register, of which Descartes
+wrote the first pages and which the physicians and philosophers
+continued, and the technico-political register, which was constituted
+by a whole set of regulations and by empirical and calculated
+methods relating to the army, the school and the hospital, for controlling or correcting the operations of the body. These two registers are quite distinct, since it was a question, on the one hand, of
+submission and use and, on the other, of functioning and explanation: there was a useful body and an intelligible body. And yet there
+are points of overlap from one to the other. La Mettrie's L'Hommemachine is both a materialist reduction of the soul and a general
+theory of dressage, at the centre of which reigns the notion of
+"docility', which joins the analysable body to the manipulable body.
+A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and
+improved. The celebrated automata, on the other hand, were not
+only a way of illustrating an organism, they were also political
+puppets, small-scale models of power: Frederick II, the meticulous
+king of small machines, well-trained regiments and long exercises,
+. was obsessed with them.
+What was so new in these projects of docility that interested the
+eighteenth century so much? It was certainly not the first time that
+the body had become the object of such imperious and pressing
+investments; in every society, the body was in the grip of very
+strict powers, which imposed on it constraints, prohibitions or
+obligations. However, there were several new things in these techniques. To begin with, there was the scale of the control: it was a
+136
+
+question not of treating the body, en masse, 'wholesale', as if it were
+an indissociable unity, but of working it 'retail, individually; of
+exercising upon it a subtle coercion, of obtaining holds upon it at the
+level of the mechanism itself - movements, gestures, attitudes,
+rapidity: an infinitesimal power over the active body. Then there
+was the object of the control: it was not or was no longer the signifying elements of behaviour or the language of the body, but the
+economy, the efficiency of movements, their internal organization;
+constraint bears upon the forces rather than upon the signs; the only
+truly important ceremony is that of exercise. Lastly, there is the
+modality: it implies an uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising the processes of the activity rather than its result and it is
+exercised according to a codification that partitions as closely as
+possible time, space, movement. These methods, which made
+possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body,
+which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed
+upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called 'disciplines'.
+Many disciplinary methods had long been in existence - in monasteries, armies, workshops. But in the course of the seventeenth and
+eighteenth centuries the disciplines became general formulas of
+domination. They were different from slavery because they were
+not based on a relation of appropriation of bodies; indeed, the
+elegance of the discipline lay in the fact that it could dispense with
+this costly and violent relation by obtaining effects of utility at least
+as great. They were different, too, from 'service', which was a
+constant, total, massive, non-analytical, unlimited relation of
+domination, established in the form of the individual will of the
+master, his 'caprice'. They were different from vassalage, which was
+a highly coded, but distant relation of submission, which bore less
+on the operations of the body than on the products of labour and
+the ritual marks of allegiance. Again, they were different from
+asceticism and from 'disciplines' of a monastic type, whose function
+was to obtain renunciations rather than increases of utility and
+which, although they involved obedience to others, had as their
+principal aim an increase of the mastery of each individual over his
+own body. The historical moment of the disciplines was the moment
+when an art of the human body was born, which was directed not
+only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its
+137
+
+subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism
+itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely. What was then being formed was a policy of coercions
+that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements,
+its gestures, its behaviour. The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A
+'political anatomy', which was also a 'mechanics of power', was
+being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others' bodies,
+not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may
+operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines. Thus discipline produces subjected and
+practised bodies, 'docile' bodies. Discipline increases the forces of
+the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same
+forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates power
+from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an 'aptitude, a
+'capacity', which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses
+the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and
+turns it into a relation of strict subjection. If economic exploitation separates the force and the product of labour, let us say
+that disciplinary coercion establishes in the body the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased
+domination.
+The "invention' of this new political anatomy must not be seen
+as a sudden discovery. It is rather a multiplicity of often minor
+processes, of different origin and scattered location, which overlap,
+repeat, or imitate one another, support one another, distinguish
+themselves from one another according to their domain of application, converge and gradually produce the blueprint of a general
+method. They were at work in secondary education at a very early
+date, later in primary schools; they slowly invested the space of the
+hospital; and, in a few decades, they restructured the military
+organization. They sometimes circulated very rapidly from one
+point to another (between the army and the technical schools or
+secondary schools), sometimes, slowly and discreetly (the insidious
+militarization of the large workshops). On almost every occasion,
+they were adopted in response to particular needs: an industrial
+innovation, a renewed outbreak of certain epidemic diseases, the
+invention of the rifle or the victories of Prussia. This did not prevent
+ı38
+
+them being totally inscribed in general and essential transformations, which we must now try to delineate.
+There can be no question here of writing the history of the
+different disciplinary institutions, with all their individual differences. I simply intend to map on a series of examples some of the
+essential techniques that most easily spread from one to another.
+These were always meticulous, often minute, techniques, but they
+had their importance: because they defined a certain mode of
+detailed political investment of the body, a 'new micro-physics' of
+power; and because, since the seventeenth century, they had constantly reached out to ever broader domains, as if they tended to
+cover the entire social body. Small acts of cunning endowed with a
+great power of diffusion, subtle arrangements, apparently innocent,
+but profoundly suspicious, mechanisms that obeyed economies too
+shameful to be acknowledged, or pursued petty forms of coercion -
+it was nevertheless they that brought about the mutation of the
+punitive system, at the threshold of the contemporary period. De-
+scribing them will require great attention to detail: beneath every set
+of figures, we must seek not a meaning, but a precaution; we must
+situate them not only in the inextricability of a functioning, but in
+the coherence of a tactic. They are the acts of cunning, not so much
+of the greater reason that works even in its sleep and gives meaning
+to the insignificant, as of the attentive 'malevolence' that turns
+everything to account. Discipline is a political anatomy of detail.
+Before we lose patience we would do well to recall the words of
+Marshal de Saxe: 'Although those who concern themselves with
+details are regarded as folk of limited intelligence, it seems to me
+that this part is essential, because it is the foundation, and it is
+impossible to erect any building or establish any method without
+understanding its principles. It is not enough to have a liking for
+architecture. One must also know stone-cutting' (Saxe, 5). There is
+a whole history to be written about such 'stone-cutting' - a history
+of the utilitarian rationalization of detail in moral accountability and
+political control. The classical age did not initiate it; rather it
+accelerated it, changed its scale, gave it precise instruments, and
+perhaps found some echoes for it in the calculation of the infinitely
+small or in the description of the most detailed characteristics of
+natural beings. In any case, 'detail' had long been a category of
+138
+
+theology and asceticism: every detail is important since, in the sight
+of God, no immensity is greater than a detail, nor is anything so
+small that it was not willed by one of his individual wishes. In this
+great tradition of the eminence of detail, all the minutiae of Christian education, of scholastic or military pedagogy, all forms of
+'training' found their place easily enough. For the disciplined man,
+as for the true believer, no detail is unimportant, but not so much
+for the meaning that it conceals within it as for the hold it provides
+for the power that wishes to seize it. Characteristic is the great hymn
+to the 'little things' and to their eternal importance, sung by Jean-
+Baptiste de La Salle, in his Traité sur les obligations des frères des
+Ecoles chrétiennes. The mystique of the everyday is joined here with
+the discipline of the minute. 'How dangerous it is to neglect little
+things. It is a very consoling reflection for a soul like mine, little
+disposed to great actions, to think that fidelity to little things may,
+by an imperceptible progress, raise us to the most eminent sanctity:
+because little things lead to greater ... Little things; it will be said,
+alas, my God, what can we do that is great for you, weak and mortal
+creatures that we are. Little things; if great things presented themselves would we perform them? Would we not think them beyond
+our strength! Little things; and if God accepts them and wishes to
+receive them as great things! Little things; has one ever felt this?
+Does one judge according to experience? Little things; one is certainly guilty, therefore, if seeing them as such, one refuses them?
+Little things; yet it is they that in the end have made great saints!
+Yes, little things; but great motives, great feelings, great fervour,
+great ardour, and consequently great merits, great treasures, great
+rewards' (La Salle, Traité ..., 238-8). The meticulousness of
+the regulations, the fussiness of the inspections, the supervision of
+the smallest fragment of life and of the body will soon provide, in the
+context of the school, the barracks, the hospital or the workshop,
+a laicized content, an economic or technical rationality for this
+mystical calculus of the infinitesimal and the infinite. And a History
+of Detail in the eighteenth century, presided over by Jean-Baptiste
+de La Salle, touching on Leibniz and Buffon, via Frederick II,
+covering pedagogy, medicine, military tactics and economics,
+should bring us, at the end of the century, to the man who dreamt
+of being another Newton, not the Newton of the immensities of
+140
+
+the heavens and the planetary masses, but a Newton of 'small
+bodies, small movements, small actions; to the man who replied
+to Monge's remark, 'there was only one world to discover: What
+do I hear? But the world of details, who has never dreamt of that
+other world, what of that world! I have believed in it ever since 1
+was fifteen. I was concerned with it then, and this memory lives
+within me, as an obsession never to be abandoned... That other
+world is the most important of all that I flatter myself I have discovered: when I think of it, my. heart aches' (these words are
+attributed to Bonaparte in the Introduction to Saint-Hilaire's
+Notions synthétiques et historiques de philosophie naturelle). Napoleon
+did not discover this world; but we know that he set out to organize
+it; and he wished to arrange around him a mechanism of power that
+would enable him to see the smallest event that occurred in the state
+he governed; he intended, by means of the rigorous discipline that he
+imposed, 'to embrace the whole of this vast machine without the
+slightest detail escaping his attention' (Treilhard, 14).
+A meticulous observation of detail, and at the same time a
+political awareness of these small things, for the control and use of
+men, emerge through the classical age bearing with them a whole
+set of techniques, a whole corpus of methods and knowledge,
+descriptions, plans and data. And from such trifles, no doubt, the
+man of modern humanism was born.'
+The art of distriburions
+In the first instance, discipline proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space. To achieve this end, it employs several techniques.
+I. Discipline sometimes requires enclosure, the specification of a
+place heterogeneous to all others and closed in upon itself. It is the
+protected place of disciplinary monotony. There was the great
+'confinement' of vagabonds and paupers; there were other more
+discreet, but insidious and effective ones. There were the collèges,
+or secondary schools: the monastic model was gradually imposed;
+boarding appeared as the most perfect, if not the most frequent,
+educational régime; it became obligatory at Louis-le-Grand when,
+after the departure of the Jesuits, it was turned into a model school
+(cf. Ariès, 308-13 and Snyders, 35-41). There were the military
+I4I
+
+barracks: the army, that vagabond mass, has to be held in place;
+looting and violence must be prevented; the fears of local inhabitants, who do not case for troops passing through their towns,
+must be calmed; conflicts with the civil authorities must be avoided;
+desertion must be stopped, expenditure controlled. The ordinance
+of 1719 envisaged the construction of several hundred barracks,
+on the model of those already set up in the south of the country;
+there would be strict confinements: "The whole will be enclosed by
+an outer wall ten feet high, which will surround the said houses, at
+a distance of thirty feet from all the sides; this will have the effect
+of maintaining the troops in 'order and discipline, so that an officer
+will be in a position to answer for them' (L'Ordonrarce militaire,
+IXI, 25 September 1719). In 1745, there were barracks in about
+320 towns; and it was estimated that the total capacity of the barracks in 1775 was approximately 200,000 men (Daisy, 201-8; an
+anonymous memoir of 1775, in Dépôt de la guerre, 3682, f. I56;
+Navereau, 132-8). Side by side with the spread of workshops, there
+also developed great manufacturing spaces, both homogeneous and
+well defined: first, the combined manufactories, then, in the second
+half of the eighteenth century, the works or factories proper (the
+Chaussade ironworks occupied almost the whole of the Médine
+peninsula, between Nièvre and Loire; in order to set up the Indret
+factory in 1777, Wilkinson, by means of embankments and dikes,
+constructed an island on the Loire; Toufait built Le Creusot in the
+valley of the Charbonnière, which he transformed, and he had
+workers' accommodation built in the factory itself); it was a change
+of scale, but it was also a new type of control. The factory was
+explicitly compared with the monastery, the fortress, a walled town;
+the guardian "will open the gates only on the return of the workers,
+and after the bell that announces the resumption of work has been
+rung'; a quarter of an hour later no one will be admitted; at the end
+of the day, the workshops' heads will hand back the keys to the Swiss
+guard of the factory, who will then open the gates (Amboise, f.
+12,1301). The aim is to derive the maximum advantages and to
+neutralize the inconveniences (thefts, interruptions of work, disturbances and 'cabals'), as the forces of production become more
+concentrated; to protect materials and tools and to master the labour
+force: "The order and inspection that must be maintained require
+142
+
+that all workers be assembled under the same roof, so that the partner who is entrusted with the management of the manufactory may
+prevent and remedy abuses that may arise among the workets and
+arrest their progress at the outset' (Dauphin, 199).
+2. But the principle of 'enclosure' is neither constant, nor indispensable, nor sufficient in disciplinary machinery. This machinery
+works space in a much more flexible and detailed way. It does this
+first of all on the principle of elementary location or partitioning.
+Each individual has his own place; and each place its individual.
+Avoid distributions in groups; break up collective dispositions;
+analyse conf used, massive or transient pluralities. Disciplinary space
+tends to be divided into as many sections as there are bodies or
+elements to be distributed. One must eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of individuals,
+their diffuse circulation, their unusable and dangerous coagulation;
+it was a tactic of anti-desertion, anti-vagabondage, anti-concentration. Its aim was to establish presences and absences, to know where
+and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications, to
+interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct
+of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its qualities
+or merits. It was a procedure, therefore, aimed at knowing, mastering and using. Discipline organizes an analytical space.
+And there, too, it encountered an old architectural and religious
+method: the monastic cell. Even if the compartments it assigns
+become purely ideal, the disciplinary space is always, basically,
+cellular. Solitude was necessary to both body and soul, according to
+a certain asceticism: they must, at certain moments at least, confront
+temptation and perhaps the severity of God alone. "Sleep is the
+image of death, the dormitory is the image of the sepulchre...
+although the dormitories are shared, the beds are nevertheless
+arranged in such a way and closed so exactly by means of curtains
+that the girls may rise and retire without being seen' (Reglement pour
+la communauré des filles du Bon Pasteur, in Delamare, 507). But this
+is still a very crude form.
+3. The rule of functional sites would gradually, in the disciplinary
+institutions, code a space that architecture generally left at the disposal of several different uses. Particular places were defined to
+correspond not only to the need to supervise, to break dangerous
+143
+
+corpmunications, but also to create a useful space. The process
+appeared clearly in the hospitals, especially in the military and naval
+hospitals. In France, it seems that Rochefort served both as experiment and model. A port, and a military port is - with its circulation
+of goods, men signed up willingly or by force, sailors embarking
+and disembarking, diseases and epidemics - a place of desertion,
+smuggling, contagion: it is a crossroads for dangerous mixtures, a
+meeting-place for forbidden circulations. The naval hospital must
+therefore treat, but in order to do this it must be a filter, a mechanism
+that pins down and partitions; it must provide a hold over this whole
+mobile, swarming mass, by dissipating the confusion of illegality
+and evil. The medical supervision of diseases and contagions is
+inseparable from a whole series of other controls: the military control
+over deserters, fiscal control over commodities, administrative control over remedies, rations, disappearances, cures, deaths, simulations. Hence the need to distribute and partition off space in a
+rigorous manner. The first steps taken at Rochefort concerned
+things rather than men, precious commodities, rather than patients.
+The arrangements of fiscal and economic supervision preceded the
+techniques of medical observation: placing of medicines under lock
+and key, recording their use; a little later, a system was worked out
+to verify the real number of patients, their identity, the units to
+which they belonged; then one began to regulate their comings and
+goings; they were forced to remain in their wards; to each bed was
+attached the name of its occupant; each individual treated was
+entered in a register that the doctor had to consult during the visit;
+later came the isolation of contagious patients and separate beds.
+Gradually, an administrative and political space was articulated upon
+a therapeutic space; it tended to individualize bodies, diseases,
+symptoms, lives and deaths; it constituted a real table of juxtaposed
+and carefully distinct singularities. Out of discipline, a medically
+useful space was born.
+In the factories that appeared at the end of the eighteenth century,
+the principle of individualizing partitioning became more complicated. It was a question of distributing individuals in a space in
+which one might isolate them and map them; but also of articulating
+this distribution on a production machinery that had its own requirements. The distribution of bodies, the spatial arrangement of
+144
+
+production machinery and the different forms of activity in the
+distribution of 'posts' had to be linked together. The Oberkampf
+manufactory at Jouy obeyed this principle. It was made up of a
+series of workshops specified according to each broad type of operation: for the printers, the handlers, the colourists, the women who
+touched up the design, the engravers, the dyers. The largest of the
+buildings, built in 1791, by Toussaint Barré, was 110 metres long
+and had three storeys. The ground floor was devoted mainly to
+block printing; it contained 132 tables arranged in two rows, the
+length of the workshop, which had eighty-eight windows; each
+printer worked at a table with his "puller', who prepared and spread
+the colours. There were 264 persons in all. At the end of each table
+was a sort of rack on which the material that had just been printed
+was left to dry (Saint-Maur). By walking up and down the central
+aisle of the workshop, it was possible to carry out a supervision that
+was both general and individual: to observe the worker's presence
+and application, and the quality of his work; to compare workers
+with one another, to classify them according to skill and speed;
+to follow the successive stages of the production process. All these
+serializations formed a permanent grid: confusion was eliminated?:
+that is to say, production was divided up and the labour process
+was articulated, on the one hand, according to its stages or elementary operations, and, on the other hand, according to the individuals,
+the particular bodies, that carried it out: each variable of this force -
+strength, promptness, skill, constancy - would be observed, and
+therefore characterized, assessed, computed and related to the
+individual who was its particular agent. Thus, spread out in a perfectly legible way over the whole series of individual bodies, the
+work force may be analysed in individual units. At the emergence
+of large-scale industry, one finds, beneath the division of the production process, the individualizing fragmentation of labour power;
+the distributions of the disciplinary space often assured both.
+4. In discipline, the elements are interchangeable, since each is
+defined by the place it occupies in a series, and by the gap that
+separates it from the others. The unit is, therefore, neither the
+territory (unit of domination), nor the place (unit of residence), but
+the rank: the place one occupies in a classification, the point at which
+a line and a column intersect, the interval in a series of intervals that
+145
+
+one, may traverse one after the other. Discipline is an art of rank,
+a technique for the transformation of arrangements. It individualizes
+bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but
+distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations.
+Take the example of the 'class'. In the Jesuit colleges, one still
+found an organization that was at once binary and unified; the
+classes, which might comprise up to two or three hundred pupils,
+were subdivided into groups of ten; each of these groups, with its
+'decurion', was placed in a camp, Roman or Carthaginian; each
+'decury' had its counterpart in the opposing camp. The general
+form was that of war and rivalry; work, apprenticeship and classification were carried out in the form of the joust, through the confrontation of two armies; the contribution of each pupil was inscribed in this general duel; it contributed to the victory or the
+defeat of a whole camp; and the pupils were assigned a place that
+corresponded to the function of each individual and to his value as
+a combatant in the unitary group of his 'decury' (Rochemonteix,
+siff). It should be observed moreover that this Roman comedy
+made it possible to link, to the binary exercises of rivalry, a spatial
+disposition inspired by the legion, with rank, hierarchy, pyramidal
+supervision. One should not forget that, generally speaking, the
+Roman model, at the Enlightenment, played a dual role: in its
+republican aspect, it was the very embodiment of liberty; in its
+military aspect, it was the ideal schema of discipline. The Rome of
+the eighteenth century and of the Revolution was the Rome of the
+Senate, but it was also that of the legion; it was the Rome of the
+Forum, but it was also that of the camps. Up to the empire, the
+Roman reference transmitted, somewhat ambiguously, the juridical
+ideal of citizenship and the technique of disciplinary methods. In
+any case, the strictly disciplinary element in the ancient fable used by
+the Jesuit colleges came to dominate the element of joust and mock
+warfare. Gradually - but especially after 1762 - the educational
+space unfolds; the class becomes homogeneous, it is no longer made
+up of individual elements arranged side by side under the master's
+eye. In the eighteenth century, 'rank' begins to define the great form
+of distribution of individuals in the educational order: rows or ranks
+of pupils in the class, corridors, courtyards; rank attributed to each
+pupil at the end of each task and each examination; the rank he
+I40
+
+obtains from week to week, month to month, year to year; an
+alignment of age groups, one after another; a succession of subjects
+taught and questions treated, according to an order of increasing
+difficulty. And, in this ensemble of compulsory alignments, each
+pupil, according to his age, his performance, his behaviour, occupies
+sometimes one rank, sometimes another; he moves constantly over
+a series of compartments - some of these are ideal' compartments,
+marking a hierarchy of knowledge or ability, others express the
+distribution of values or merits in material terms in the space of the
+college or classroom. It is a perpetual movement in which individuals
+replace one another in a space marked off by aligned intervals.
+The organization of a serial space was one of the great technical
+mutations of elementary education. It made it possible to supersede
+the traditional system (a pupil working for a few minutes with the
+master, while the rest of the heterogeneous group remained idle and
+unattended). By assigning individual places it made possible the
+supervision of each individual and the simultaneous work of all. It
+organized a new economy of the time of apprenticeship. It made the
+educational space function like a learning machine, but also as a
+machine for supervising, hierarchizing, rewarding. Jean-Baptiste de
+La Salle dreamt of a classroom in which the spatial distribution
+might provide a whole series of distinctions at once: according to
+the pupils' progress, worth, character, application, cleanliness and
+parents' fortune. Thus, the classroom would form a single great
+table, with many different entries, under the scrupulously "classificatory' eye of the master: In every class there will be places
+assigned for all the pupils of all the lessons, so that all those attending
+the same lesson will always occupy the same place. Pupils attending
+the highest lessons will be placed in the benches closest to the wall,
+followed by the others according to the order of the lessons moving
+towards the middle of the classroom... Each of the pupils will
+have his place assigned to him and none of them will leave it or
+change it except on the order or with the consent of the school
+inspector' Things must be so arranged that 'those whose parents
+are neglectful and verminous must be separated from those who are
+careful and clean; that an unruly and frivolous pupil should be
+placed between two who are well behaved and serious, a libertine
+either alone or between two pious pupils'.3
+147
+
+In organizing 'cells', 'places' and "ranks', the disciplines create
+complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierarchical. It is spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out individual segments and establish operational
+links; they mark places and indicate values; they guarantee the
+obedience of individuals, but also a better economy of time and
+gesture. They are mixed spaces: real because they govern the disposition of buildings, rooms, furniture, but also ideal, because they
+are projected over this arrangement of characterizations, assessments,
+hierarchies. The first of the great operations of discipline is, therefore, the constitution of 'tableaux vivants'.
+, which transform the
+confused, useless or dangerous multitudes into ordered multiplicities. The drawing up of 'tables' was one of the great problems of the
+scientific, political and economic technology of the eighteenth
+century: how one was to arrange botanical and zoological gardens,
+and construct at the same time rational classifications of living beings;
+how one was to observe, supervise, regularize the circulation of
+commodities and money and thus build up an economic table that
+might serve as the principle of the increase of wealth; how one was
+to inspect men, observe their presence and absence and constitute
+a general and permanent register of the armed forces; how one was
+to distribute patients, separate them from one another, divide up
+the hospital space and make a systematic classification of diseases:
+these were all twin operations in which the two elements - distribution and analysis, supervision and intelligibility - are inextricably
+bound up. In the eighteenth century, the table was both a technique
+of power and a procedure of knowledge. It was a question of
+organizing the multiple, of providing oneself with an instrument to
+cover it and to master it; it was a question of imposing upon it an
+'order'. Like the army general of whom Guibert spoke, the naturalist, the physician, the economist was 'blinded by the immensity,
+dazed by the multitude... the innumerable combinations that result
+from the multiplicity of objects, so many concerns together form a
+burden above his strength. In perfecting itself, in approaching true
+principles, the science of modern warfare might become simpler and
+less difficult; armies 'with simple, similar tactics, capable of being
+adapted to every movement... would be easier to move and lead
+(Guibert, xxxvi). Tactics, the spatial ordering of men; taxonomy,
+148
+
+the disciplinary space of natural beings; the economic table, the
+regulated movement of wealth.
+But the table does not have the same function in these different
+registers. In the order of the economy, it makes possible the
+measurement of quantities and the analysis of movements. In the
+form of taxonomy, it has the function of characterizing (and consequently reducing individual singularities) and constituting classes
+(and therefore of excluding considerations of number). But in the
+form of the disciplinary distribution, on the other hand, the table
+has the function of treating multiplicity itself, distributing it and
+deriving from it as many effects as possible. Whereas natural
+taxonomy is situated on the axis that links character and category,
+disciplinary tactics is situated on the axis that links the singular and
+the multiple. It allows both the characterization of the individual
+as individual and the ordering of a given multiplicity. It is the first
+condition for the control and use of an ensemble of distinct elements:
+the base for a micro-physics of what might be called a 'cellular'
+power.
+The control of activicy
+1. The time-table is an old inheritance. The strict model was no
+doubt suggested by the monastic communities. It soon spread. Its
+three great methods - establish rhythms, impose particular occupations, regulate the cycles of repetition - were soon to be found in
+schools, workshops and hospitals. The new disciplines had no difficulty in taking up their place in the old forms; the schools and poorhouses extended the life and the regularity of the monastic communities to which they were often attached. The rigours of the
+industrial period long retained a religious air; in the seventeenth
+century, the regulations of the great manufactories laid down the
+exercises that would divide up the working day: 'On arrival in the
+morning, before beginning their work, all persons shall wash their
+hands, offer up their work to God and make the sign of the cross'
+(Saint-Maur, article 1); but even in the nineteenth century, when the
+rural populations were needed in industry, they were sometimes
+formed into 'congregations, in an attempt to inure them to work
+in the workshops; the framework of the "factory-monastery' was
+149
+
+imposed upon the workers. In the Protestant armies of Maurice of
+Orange and Gustavus Adolphus, military discipline was achieved
+through a rhythmics of time punctuated by pious exercises; army
+life, Boussanelle was later to say, should have some of the perfections of the cloister itself' (Boussanelle, 2; on the religious character
+of discipline in the Swedish army, cf. The Swedish Discipline,
+London, 1632). For centuries, the religious orders had been masters
+of discipline: they were the specialists of time, the great technicians
+of rhythm and regular activities. But the disciplines altered these
+methods of temporal regulation from which they derived. They
+altered them first by refining them. One began to count in quarter
+hours, in minutes, in seconds. This happened in the army, of course:
+Guibert systematically implemented the chronometric measurement
+of shooting that had been suggested earlier by Vauban. In the elementary schools, the division of time became increasingly minute;
+activities were governed in detail by orders that had to be obeyed
+immediately: "At the last stroke of the hour, a pupil will ring the
+bell, and at the first sound of the bell all the pupils will kneel, with
+their arms crossed and their eyes lowered. When the prayer has been
+said, the teacher will strike the signal once to indicate that the pupils
+should get up, a second time as a sign that they should salute Christ,
+and a third that they should sit down' (La Salle, Conduite..., 27-8).
+In the early nineteenth century, the following time-table was suggested for the Ecoles mucuelles, or "mutual improvement schools:
+8.45 entrance of the monitor, 8.52 the monitor's summons, 8.56
+entrance of the children and prayer, 2.00 the children go to their
+benches, 2.04 first slate, 2.08 end of dictation, g.12 second slate, etc.
+(Tronchot, 221). The gradual extension of the wage-earning class
+brought with it a more detailed partitioning of time: If workers
+arrive later than a quarter of an hour after the ringing of the bell..
+(Amboise, article 2); 'if any one of the companions is asked for
+during work and loses more than five minutes ..?, 'anyone who is
+not at his work at the correct time... (Oppenheim, article 7-8).
+But an attempt is also made to assure the quality of the time used:
+constant supervision, the pressure of supervisors, the elimination of
+anything that might disturb or distract; it is a question of constituting a totally useful time: 'It is expressly forbidden during work to
+amuse one's companions by gestures or in any other way, to play
+
+at any game whatsoever, to eat, to sleep, to tell stories and comedies'
+(Oppenheim, article 16); and even during the meal-break, 'there will
+be no telling of stories, adventures or other such talk that distracts
+the workers from their work'; "it is expressly forbidden for any
+worker, under any pretext, to bring wine into the manufactory and
+to drink in the workshops' (Amboise, article 4). Time measured and
+paid must also be a time without impurities or defects; a time of
+good quality, throughout which the body is constantly applied to
+its exercise. Precision and application are, with regularity, the fundamental virtues of disciplinary time. But this is not the newest thing
+about it. Other methods are more characteristic of the disciplines.
+2. The temporal elaboration of the act. There are, for example, two
+ways of controlling marching troops. In the early seventeenth
+century, we have: "Accustomed soldiers marching in file or in
+battalion to march to the rhythm of the drum. And to do this, one
+must begin with the right foot so that the whole troop raises the
+same foot at the same time' (Montgommery, 86). In the mideighteenth century, there are four sorts of steps: "The length of the
+the short step will be a foot, that of the ordinary step, the double
+step and the marching step will be two feet, the whole measured from
+one heel to the next; as for the duration, that of the small step and
+the ordinary step will last one second, during which two double
+steps would be performed; the duration of the marching step will be
+a little longer than one second. The oblique step will take one
+second; it will be at most eighteen inches from one heel to the next.
+... The ordinary step will be executed forwards, holding the head
+up high and the body erect, holding oneself in balance successively
+on a single leg, and bringing the other forwards, the ham taut, the
+point of the foot a little turned outwards and low, so that one may
+without affectation brush the ground on which one must walk and
+place one's foot, in such a way that each part may come to rest there
+at the same time without striking the ground' ('Ordonnance du Jer
+janvier 1766, pour régler l'exercise de l'infanterie'). Between these
+two instructions, a new set of restraints had been brought into play,
+another degree of precision in the breakdown of gestures and movements, another way of adjusting the body to temporal imperatives.
+What the ordinance of 1766 defines is not a time-table - the
+general framework for an activity; it is rather a collective and
+ISI
+
+obligatory rhythm, imposed from the outside; it is a 'programme';
+it assures the elaboration of the act itself; it controls its development
+and its stages from the inside. We have passed from a form of
+injunction that measured or punctuated gestures to a web that constrains them or sustains them throughout their entire succession. A
+sort of anatomo-chronological schema of behaviour is defined. The
+act is broken down into its elements; the position of the body, limbs,
+articulations is defined; to each movement are assigned a direction,
+an aptitude, a duration; their order of succession is prescribed. Time
+penetrates the body and with it all the meticulous controls of power.
+3. Hence the correlation of the body and the gesture. Disciplinary
+control does not consist simply in teaching or imposing a series of
+particular gestures; it imposes the best relation between a gesture
+and the overall position of the body, which is its condition of efficiency and speed. In the correct use of the body, which makes
+possible a correct use of time, nothing must remain idle or useless:
+everything must be called upon to form the support of the act
+required. A well-disciplined body forms the operational context of
+the slightest gesture. Good handwriting, for example, presupposes
+a gymnastics - a whole routine whose rigorous code invests the body
+in its entirety, from the points of the feet to the tip of the index
+finger. The pupils must always 'hold their bodies erect, somewhat
+turned and free on the left side, slightly inclined, so that, with the
+elbow placed on the table, the chin can be rested upon the hand,
+unless this were to interfere with the view; the left leg must be somewhat more forward under the table than the right. A distance of two
+fingers must be left between the body and the table; for not only
+does one write with more alertness, but nothing is more harmful
+to the health than to acquire the habit of pressing one's stomach
+against the table; the part of the left arm from the elbow to the hand
+must be placed on the table. The right arm must be at a distance
+from the body of about three fingers and be about five fingers from
+the table, on which it must rest lightly. The teacher will place the
+pupils in the posture that they should maintain when writing, and
+will correct it either by sign or otherwise, when they change this
+position' (La Salle, Conduite ..., 63-4). A disciplined body is the
+prerequisite of an efficient gesture.
+4. The body-object articulation. Discipline defines each of the
+15z
+
+relations that the body must have with the object that it manipulates.
+Between them, it outlines a meticulous meshing. 'Bring the weapon
+forward. In threestages. Raise the rifle with the right hand, bringing
+it close to the body so as to hold it perpendicular with the right
+knee, the end of the barrel at eye level, grasping it by striking it with
+the right hand, the arm held close to the body at waist height. At the
+second stage, bring the rifle in front of you with the left hand, the
+barrel in the middle between the two eyes, vertical, the right hand
+grasping it at the small of the butt, the arm outstretched, the triggerguard resting on the first finger, the left hand at the height of the
+notch, the thumb lying along the barrel against the moulding. At
+the third stage, let go of the rifle with the left hand, which falls along
+the thigh, raising the rifle with the right hand, the lock outwards
+and opposite the chest, the right arm half flexed, the elbow close to
+the body, the thumb lying against the lock, resting against the first
+screw, the hammer resting on the first finger, the barrel perpendicular' ('Ordonnance du jer janvier 1766 ..., titre XI, article 2'). This
+is an example of what might be called the instrumental coding of the
+body. It consists of a breakdown of the total gesture into two parallel
+series: that of the parts of the body to be used (right hand, left hand,
+different fingers of the hand, knee, eye, elbow, etc.) and that of the
+parts of the object manipulated (barrel, notch, hammer, screw, etc.);
+then the two sets of parts are correlated together according to a
+number of simple gestures (rest, bend); lastly, it fixes the canonical
+succession in which each of these correlations occupies a particular
+place. This obligatory syntax is what the military theoreticians of
+the eighteenth century called 'manoeuvre'. The traditional recipe
+gives place to explicit and obligatory prescriptions. Over the whole
+surface of contact between the body and the object it handles, power
+is introduced, fastening them to one another. It constitutes a bodyweapon, body-tool, body-machine complex. One is as far as possible
+from those forms of subjection that demanded of the body only
+signs or products, forms of expression or the result of labour.
+The regulation imposed by power is at the same time the law of
+construction of the operation. Thus disciplinary power appears to
+have the function not so much of deduction as of synthesis, not so
+much of exploitation of the product as of coercive link with the
+apparatus of production.
+153
+
+y. Exhaustive use. The principle that underlay the time-table in
+its traditional form was essentially negative; it was the principle of
+non-idleness: it was forbidden to waste time, which was counted by
+Godand paid for by men; the time-table was to eliminate the danger
+of wasting it - a moral offence and economic dishonesty. Discipline,
+on the other hand, arranges a positive economy; it poses the principle of a theoretically ever-growing use of time: exhaustion rather
+than use; it is a question of extracting, from time, ever more available
+moments and, from each moment, ever more useful forces. This
+means that one must seek to intensify the use of the slightest
+moment, as if time, in its very fragmentation, were inexhaustible or
+as if, at least by an ever more detailed internal arrangement, one
+could tend towards an ideal point at which one maintained maximum
+speed and maximum efficiency. It was precisely this that was implemented in the celebrated regulations of the Prussian infantry that
+the whole of Europe imitated after the victories of Frederick II:* the
+more time is broken down, the more its subdivisions multiply,
+the better one disarticulates it by deploying its internal elements
+under a gaze that supervises them, the more one can accelerate an
+operation, or at least regulate it according to an optimum speed;
+hence this regulation of the time of an action that was so important
+in the army and which was to be so throughout the entire technology
+of human activity: the Prussian regulations of 1743 laid down six
+stages to bring the weapon to one's foot, four to extend it, thirteen
+to raise it to the shoulder, etc. By other means, the "mutual improvement school' was also arranged as a machine to intensify the use of
+time; its organization made it possible to obviate the linear, successive character of the master's teaching: it regulated the counterpoint
+of operations performed, at the same moment, by different groups
+of pupils under the direction of monitors and assistants, so that each
+passing moment was filled with many different, but ordered activities; and, on the other hand, the rhythm imposed by signals, whistles,
+orders imposed on everyone temporal norms that were intended both
+to accelerate the process of learning and to teach speed as a virtue;
+'the sole aim of these commands... is to accustom the children to
+executing well and quickly the same operations, to diminish as far as
+possible by speed the loss of time caused by moving from one operation to another' (Bernard).
+154
+
+Through this technique of subjection a new object was being
+formed; slowly, it superseded the mechanical body - the body composed of solids and assigned movements, the image of which had
+for so long haunted those who dreamt of disciplinary perfection.
+This new object is the natural body, the bearer of forces and the seat
+of duration; it is the body susceptible to specified operations, which
+have their order, their stages, their internal conditions, their constituent elements. In becoming the target for new mechanisms
+of power, the body is offered up to new forms of knowledge. It is
+the body of exercise, rather than of speculative physics; a body
+manipulated by authority, rather than imbued with animal spirits;
+a body of useful training and not of rational mechanics, but one in
+which, by virtue of that very fact, a number of natural requirements
+and functional constraints are beginning to emerge. This is the body
+that Guibert discovered in his critique of excessively artificial movements. In the exercise that is imposed upon it and which it resists,
+the body brings out its essential correlations and spontaneously
+rejects the incompatible: 'On entering most of our training schools,
+one sees all those unfortunate soldiers in constricting and forced
+attitudes, one sees all their muscles contracted, the circulation of their
+blood interrupted... If we studied the intention of nature and the
+construction of the human body, we would find the position and
+the bearing that nature clearly prescribes for the soldier. The head
+must be erect, standing out from the shoulders, sitting perpendicularly between them. It must be turned neither to left nor to right,
+because, in view of the correspondence between the vertebrae of the
+neck and the shoulder-blade to which they are attached, none of them
+may move in a circular manner without slightly bringing with it
+from the same side that it moves one of the shoulders and because,
+the body no longer being placed squarely, the soldier can no longer
+walk straight in front of him or serve as a point of alignment...
+Since the hip-bone, which the ordinance indicates as the point
+against which the butt end should rest, is not situated the same in all
+men, the rifle must be placed more to the right for some, and more
+to the left for others. For the same reason of inequality of structure,
+the trigger-guard is more or less pressed against the body, depending
+on whether the outer parts of a man's shoulder is more or less
+fleshy' (Guibert, 21-2).
+
+We have seen how the procedures of disciplinary distribution had
+their place among the contemporary techniques of classification and
+tabulation; but also how they introduced into them the specific
+problem of individuals and multiplicity. Similarly, the disciplinary
+controls of activity belonged to a whole series of researches, theoretical or practical, into the natural machinery of bodies; but they
+began to discover in them specific processes; behaviour and its
+organized requirements gradually replaced the simple physics of
+movement. The body, required to be docile in its minutest operations, opposes and shows the conditions of functioning proper to an
+organism. Disciplinary power has as its correlative an individuality
+that is not only analytical and "cellular', but also natural and
+'organic'.
+The organization of geneses
+In 1667, the edict that set up the manufactory of the Gobelins
+envisaged the organization of a school. Sixty scholarship children
+were to be chosen by the superintendent of royal buildings, entrusted for a time to a master whose task it would be to provide them
+with 'upbringing and instruction',
+', then apprenticed to the various
+master tapestry makers of the manufactory (who by virtue of this
+fact received compensation deducted from the pupils' scholarships);
+after six years' apprenticeship, four years of service and a qualifying
+examination, they were given the right to 'set up and run a shop'
+in any town of the kingdom. We find here the characteristics of
+guild apprenticeship: the relation of dependence on the master that
+is both individual and total; the statutory duration of the training,
+which is concluded by a qualifying examination, but which is not
+broken down according to a precise programme; an overall exchange
+between the master who must give his knowledge and the apprentice who must offer his services, his assistance and often some payment. The form of domestic service is mixed with a transference of
+knowledge. ® In 1737, an edict organized a school of drawing for
+the apprentices of the Gobelins; it was not intended to replace the
+training given by the master workers, but to complement it. It
+involved a quite different arrangement of time. Two hours a day,
+except on Sundays and feast days, the pupils met in the school. A
+156
+
+roll-call was taken, from a list on the wall; the absentees were noted
+down in a register. The school was divided into three classes, The
+first for those who had no notion of drawing; they were made to
+copy models, which were more or less difficult according to the
+abilities of each pupil. The second 'for those who already have some
+principles, or who had passed through the first class; they had to
+reproduce pictures 'at sight, without tracing', but considering only
+the drawing. In the third class, they learnt colouring and pastel
+drawing, and were introduced to the theory and practice of dyeing.
+The pupils performed individual tasks at regular intervals; each of
+these exercises, signed with the name of its author and date of
+execution, was handed in to the teacher; the best were rewarded;
+assembled together at the end of the year and compared, they made
+it possible to establish the progress, the present ability and the
+relative place of each pupil; it was then decided which of them could
+pass into the next class. A general book, kept by the teachers and
+their assistants, recorded from day to day the behaviour of the
+pupils and everything that happened in the school; it was periodically
+shown to an inspector (Gerspach, 1892).
+The Gobelins school is only one example of an important phenomenon: the development, in the classical period, of a new technique
+for taking charge of the time of individual existences; for regulating
+the relations of time, bodies and forces; for assuring an accumulation of duration; and for turning to ever-increased profit or use the
+movement of passing time. How can one capitalize the time of
+individuals, accumulate it in each of them, in their bodies, in their
+forces or in their abilities, in a way that is susceptible of use and
+control! How can one organize profitable durations. The disciplines,
+which analyse space, break up and rearrange activities, must also be
+understood as machinery for adding up and capitalizing time. This
+was done in four ways, which emerge most clearly in military
+organization.
+1. Divide duration into successive or parallel segments, each of
+which must end at a specific time. For example, isolate the period
+of training and the period of practice; do not mix the instruction of
+recruits and the exercise of veterans; open separate military schools
+for the armed service (in 1764, the creation of the Ecole Militaire in
+Paris, in 1776 the creation of twelve schools in the provinces);
+157
+
+recruit professional soldiers at the youngest possible age, take
+children, 'have them adopted by the nation, and brought up in
+special schools' (Servan, J., 450); teach in turn posture, marching,
+the handling of weapons, shooting, and do not pass to another
+activity until the first has been completely mastered: 'One of the
+principal mistakes is to show a soldier every exercise at once'
+('Règlement de 1743 ...'); in short, break down time into separate
+and adjusted threads. 2. Organize these threads according to an
+analytical plan - successions of elements as simple as possible,
+combining according to increasing complexity. This presupposes
+that instruction should abandon the principle of analogical repetition. In the sixteenth century, military exercise consisted above all
+in copying all or part of the action, and of generally increasing the
+soldier's skill or strength;' in the eighteenth century, the instruction
+of the 'manual' followed the principle of the 'elementary' and not of
+the 'exemplary': simple gestures - the position of the fingers, the
+bend of the leg, the movement of the arms - basic elements for useful
+actions that also provide a general training in strength, skill,
+docility. 3. Finalize these temporal segments, decide on how long
+each will last and conclude it with an examination, which will have
+the triple function of showing whether the subject has reached the
+level required, of guaranteeing that each subject undergoes the same
+apprenticeship and of differentiating the abilities of each individual.
+When the sergeants, corporals, etc. 'entrusted with the task of
+instructing the others, are of the opinion that a particular soldier is
+ready to pass into the first class, they will present him first to the
+officers of their company, who will carefully examine him; if they
+do not find him sufficiently practised, they will refuse to admit him;
+if, on the other hand, the man presented seems to them to be ready,
+the said officers will themselves propose him to the commanding
+officer of the regiment, who will see him if he thinks it necessary,
+and will have him examined by the senior officers. The slightest
+mistakes will be enough to have him rejected, and no one will be
+able to pass from the second class to the first until he has undergone
+this first examination' (Instruction par l'exercise de l'infanterie, 14
+mai 1754). 4. Draw up series of series; lay down for each individual,
+according to his level, his seniority, his rank, the exercises that are
+suited to him; common exercises have a differing role and each
+158
+
+difference involves specific exercises. At the end of each series,
+others begin, branch off and subdivide in turn. Thus each individual
+is caught up in a temporal series which specifically defines his level
+or his rank. It is a disciplinary polyphony of exercises: 'Soldiers of
+the second class will be exercised every morning by sergeants,
+corporals, anspessades, lance-corporals... The lance-corporals will
+be exercised every Sunday by the head of the section...; the corporals and anspessades will be exercised every Tuesday afternoon
+by the sergeants and their company and these in turn on the afternoons of every second, twelfth and twenty-second day of each
+month by senior officers' (Instruction...).
+It is this disciplinary time that was gradually imposed on pedagogical practice - specializing the time of training and detaching it
+from the adult time, from the time of mastery; arranging different
+stages, separated from one another by graded examinations; drawing
+up programmes, each of which must take place during a particular
+stage and which involves exercises of increasing difficulty; qualifying
+individuals according to the way in which they progress through
+these series. For the 'initiatory' time of traditional training (an overall time, supervised by the master alone, authorized by a single
+examination), disciplinary time had substituted its multiple and
+progressive series. A whole analytical pedagogy was being formed,
+meticulous in its detail (it broke down the subject being taught into
+its simplest elements, it hierarchized each stage of development into
+small steps) and also very precocious in its history (it largely anticipated the genetic analyses of the idéologues, whose technical model
+it appears to have been). At the beginning of the eighteenth century,
+Demia suggested a division of the process of learning to read into
+seven levels: the first for those who are beginning to learn the letters,
+the second for those who are learning to spell, the third for those
+who are learning to join syllables together to make words, the
+fourth for those who are reading Latin in sentences or from punctuation to punctuation, the fifth for those who are beginning to read
+French, the sixth for the best readers, the seventh for those who can
+read manuscripts. But, where there are a great many pupils, further
+subdivisions would have to be introduced; the first class would
+comprise four streams: one for those who are learning the 'simple
+letters"; a second for those who are learning the 'mixed' letters; a
+I S8
+
+third for those who are learning the abbreviated letters (â, é ...);
+a fourth for those who are learning the double letters (ff, ss, it, st).
+The second class would be divided into three streams: for those who
+'count each letter aloud before spelling the syllable, D.O., DO'; for
+those "who spell the most difficult syllables, such as bant, brand,
+spinx, etc (Demia, 19-20). Each stage in the combinatory of elements must be inscribed within a great temporal series, which is both
+a natural progress of the mind and a code for educative procedures.
+The "seriation' of successive activities makes possible a whole
+investment of duration by power: the possibility of a detailed control and a regular intervention (of differentiation, correction,
+punishment, elimination) in each moment of time; the possibility of
+characterizing, and therefore of using individuals according to the
+level in the series that they are moving through; the possibility of
+accumulating time and activity, of rediscovering them, totalized and
+usable in a final result, which is the ultimate capacity of an individual.
+Temporal dispersal is brought together to produce a profit, thus
+mastering a duration that would otherwise elude one's grasp. Power
+is articulated directly onto time; it assures its control and guarantees
+its use.
+The disciplinary methods reveal a linear time whose moments are
+integrated, one upon another, and which is orientated towards a
+terminal, stable point; in short, an 'evolutive' time. But it must be
+recalled that, at the same moment, the administrative and economic
+techniques of control reveal a social time of a serial, orientated,
+cumulative type: the discovery of an evolution in terms of 'progress'.
+The disciplinary techniques reveal individual series: the discovery of
+an evolution in terms of 'genesis'. These two great "discoveries'
+of the eighteenth century - the progress of societies and the geneses
+of individuals - were perhaps correlative with the new techniques of
+power, and more specifically, with a new way of administering
+time and making it useful, by segmentation, seriation, synthesis and
+totalization. A macro- and a micro-physics of power made possible,
+not the invention of history (it had long had no need of that), but
+the integration of a temporal, unitary, continuous, cumulative
+dimension in the exercise of controls and the practice of dominations.
+'Evolutive' historicity, as it was then constituted - and so profoundly
+that it is still self-evident for many today - is bound up with a mode
+I6o
+
+of functioning of power. No doubt it is as if the 'history-remembering' of the chronicles, genealogies, exploits, reigns and deeds had
+long been linked to a modality of power. With the new techniques
+of subjection, the 'dynamics' of continuous evolutions tends to replace the 'dynastics' of solemn events.
+In any case, the small temporal continuum of individualitygenesis certainly seems to be, like the individuality-cell or the
+individuality-organism, an effect and an object of discipline. And, at
+the centre of this seriation of time, one finds a procedure that is, for
+it, what the drawing up of "tables' was for the distribution of
+individuals and cellular segmentation, or, again, what 'manoeuvre'
+was for the economy of activities and organic control. This procedure is 'exercise'. Exercise is that technique by which one imposes
+on the body tasks that are both repetitive and different, but always
+graduated. By bending behaviour towards a terminal state, exercise
+makes possible a perpetual characterization of the individual either
+in relation to this term, in relation to other individuals, or in relation
+to a type of itinerary. It thus assures, in the form of continuity and
+constraint, a growth, an observation, a qualification. Before adopting this strictly disciplinary form, exercise had a long history: it is
+to be found in military, religious and university practices either as
+initiation ritual, preparatory ceremony, theatrical rehearsal or
+examination. Its linear, continuously progressive organization, its
+genetic development in time were, at least in the army and the
+school, introduced at a later date - and were no doubt of religious
+origin. In any case, the idea of an educational 'programme' that
+would follow the child to the end of his schooling and which would
+involve from year to year, month to month, exercises of increasing
+complexity, first appeared, it seems, in a religious group, the
+Brothers of the Common Life (cf. Meir, 160 ff). Strongly inspired
+by Ruysbroek and Rhenish mysticism, they transposed certain of
+the spiritual techniques to education - and to the education not only
+of clerks, but also of magistrates and merchants: the theme of a perfection towards which the exemplary master guides the pupil became
+with them that of an authoritarian perfection of the pupils by the
+teacher; the ever-increasing rigorous exercises that the ascetic life
+proposed became tasks of increasing complexity that marked the
+gradual acquisition of knowledge and good behaviour; the striving
+
+of the whole community towards salvation became the collective,
+permanent competition of individuals being classified in relation to
+one another. Perhaps it was these procedures of community life and
+salvation that were the first nucleus of methods intended to produce
+individually characterized, but collectively useful aptitudes. ® In its
+mystical or ascetic form, exercise was a way of ordering earthly time
+for the conquest of salvation. It was gradually, in the history of the
+West, to change direction while preserving certain of its characteristics; it served to economize the time of life, to accumulate it in a
+useful form and to exercise power over men through the mediation
+of time arranged in this way. Exercise, having become an element
+in the political technology of the body and of duration, does not
+culminate in a beyond, but tends towards a subjection that has never
+reached its limit.
+The composition of forces
+'Let us begin by destroying the old prejudice, according to which
+one believed one was increasing the strength of a troop by increasing
+its depth. All the physical laws of movement become chimeras when
+one wishes to adapt them to tactics.' From the end of the seventeenth century, the technical problem of infantry had been freed
+from the physical model of mass. In an army of pikes and muskets -
+slow, imprecise, practically incapable of selecting a target and taking
+aim - troops were used as a projectile, a wall or a fortress: "the
+formidable infantry of the army of Spain'; the distribution of soldiers
+in this mass was carried out above all according to their seniority
+and their bravery; at the centre, with the task of providing weight
+and volume, of giving density to the body, were the least experienced; in front, at the angles and on the flanks, were the bravest or
+reputedly most skilful soldiers. In the course of the classical period,
+one passed over to a whole set of delicate articulations. The unit -
+regiment, battalion, section and, later, "division'1° — became a sort
+of machine with many parts, moving in relation to one another, in
+order to arrive at a configuration and to obtain a specific result.
+What were the reasons for this mutation? Some were economic: to
+make each individual useful and the training, maintenance, and
+arming of troops profitable; to give to each soldier, a precious unit,
+162
+
+maximum efficiency. But these economic reasons could become
+determinant only with a technical transformation: the invention of
+the rifle:" more accurate, more rapid than the musket, it gave
+greater value to the soldier's skill; more capable of reaching a particular target, it made it possible to exploit fire-power at an individual level; and, conversely, it turned every soldier into a possible
+target, requiring by the same token greater mobility; it involved
+therefore the disappearance of a technique of masses in favour of an
+art that distributed units and men along extended, relatively flexible,
+mobile lines. Hence the need to find a whole calculated practice of
+individual and collective dispositions, movements of groups or
+isolated elements, changes of position, of movement trom one disposition to another; in short, the need to invent a machinery whose
+principle would no longer be the mobile or immobile mass, but a
+geometry of divisible segments whose basic unity was the mobile
+soldier with his rifle; 1? and, no doubt, below the soldier himself, the
+minimal gestures, the elementary stages of actions, the fragments of
+spaces occupied or traversed.
+The same problems arose when it was a question of constituting
+a productive force whose effect had to be superior to the sum of
+elementary forces that composed it: "The combined working-day
+produces, relatively to an equal sum of working-days, a greater
+quantity of use-values, and, consequently, diminishes the labourtime necessary for the production of a given useful effect. Whether
+the combined working-day, in a given case, acquires this increased
+productive power, because it heightens the mechanical force of
+labour, or extends its sphere of action over a greater space, or contracts the field of production relatively to the scale of production,
+or at the critical moment sets large masses of labour to work... the
+special productive power of the combined working-day is, under
+all circumstances, the social productive power of labour, or the
+productive power of social labour. This power is due to cooperation
+itself' (Marx, Capital, vol. I, 311-12). On several occasions, Marx
+stresses the analogy between the problems of the division of labour
+and those of military tactics. For example: 'Just as the offensive
+power of a squadron of cavalry, or the defensive power of a regiment of infantry, is essentially different from the sum of the offensive or defensive powers of the individual cavalry or infantry
+163
+
+soldiers taken separately, so the sum total of the mechanical forces
+exerted by isolated workmen differs from the social force that is
+developed, when many hands take part simultaneously in one and
+the same undivided operation' (Marx, Capital, vol. I, 308).
+Thus a new demand appears to which discipline must respond: to
+construct a machine whose effect will be maximized by the concerted
+articulation of the elementary parts of which it is composed. Discipline is no longer simply an art of distributing bodies, of extracting
+time from them and accumulating it, but of composing forces in
+order to obtain an efficient machine. This demand is expressed in
+several ways.
+1. The individual body becomes an element that may be placed,
+moved, articulated on others. Its bravery or its strength are no
+longer the principal variables that define it; but the place it occupies,
+the interval it covers, the regularity, the good order according to
+which it operates its movements. The soldier is above all a fragment
+of mobile space, before he is courage or honour. Guibert describes
+the soldier in the following way: When he is under arms, he occupies itro feet along his greatest diameter, that is to say, taking him
+from one end to the other, and about one foot in his greatest thickness taken from the chest to the shoulders, to which one must add an
+interval of a foot between him and the next man; this gives two feet
+in all directions per soldier and indicates that a troop of infantry in
+battle occupies, either in its front or in its depth, as many steps as it
+has ranks' (Guibert, 27). This is a functional reduction of the body.
+But it is also an insertion of this body-segment in a whole ensemble
+over which it is articulated. The soldier whose body has been trained
+to function part by part for particular operations must in turn form
+an element in a mechanism at another level. The soldiers will be
+instructed first 'one by one, then two by two, then in greater
+numbers... For the handling of weapons, one will ascertain that,
+when the soldiers have been separately instructed, they will carry it
+out two by two, and then change places alternately, so that the one
+on the left may learn to adapt himself to the one on the right'
+('Ordonnance ...'). The body is constituted as a part of a multisegmentary machine.
+2. The various chronological series that discipline must combine
+to form a composite time are also pieces of machinery. The time of
+164
+
+each must be adjusted to the time of the others in such a way that the
+maximum quantity of forces may be extracted from each and combined with the optimum result. Thus Servan dreamt of a military
+machine that would cover the whole territory of the nation and in
+which each individual would be occupied without interruption but
+in a different way according to the evolutive segment, the genetic
+sequence in which he finds himself. Military life would begin in
+childhood, when young children would be taught the profession of
+arms in 'military manors'; it would end in these same manors when
+the veterans, right up to their last day, would teach the children,
+exercise the recruits, preside over the soldiers' exercises, supervise
+them when they were carrying out works in the public interest, and
+finally make order reign in the country, when the troops were fighting at the frontiers. There is not a single moment of life from which
+one cannot extract forces, providing one knows how to differentiate
+it and combine it with others. Similarly, one uses the labour of
+children and of old people in the great workshops; this is because
+they have certain elementary capacities for which it is not necessary
+to use workers who have many other aptitudes; furthermore, they
+constitute a cheap labour force; lastly, if they work, they are no
+longer at anyone's charge: 'Labouring mankind', said a tax collector
+of an enterprise at Angers, 'may find in this manufactory, from the
+age of ten to old age, resources against idleness and the penury that
+follows from it' (Marchegay, 300). But it was probably in primary
+education that this adjustment of different chronologies was to be
+carried out with most subtlety. From the seventeenth century to the
+introduction, at the beginning of the nineteenth, of the Lancaster
+method, the complex clockwork of the mutual improvement school
+was built up cog by cog: first the oldest pupils were entrusted with
+tasks involving simple supervision, then of checking work, then of
+teaching; in the end, all the time of all the pupils was occupied either
+with teaching or with being taught. The school became a machine
+for learning, in which each pupil, each level and each moment, if
+correctly combined, were permanently utilized in the general process of teaching. One of the great advocates of the mutual improvement schools gives us some idea of this progress: In a school of 360
+children, the master who would like to instruct each pupil in turn
+for a session of three hours would not be able to give half a minute
+
+to'each. By the new method, each of the 360 pupils writes, reads or
+counts for two and a half hours' (cf. Bernard).
+3. This carefully measured combination of forces requires a
+precise system of command. All the activity of the disciplined
+individual must be punctuated and sustained by injunctions whose
+efficacity rests on brevity and clarity; the order does not need to be
+explained or formulated; it must trigger off the required behaviour
+and that is enough. From the master of discipline to him who is
+subjected to it the relation is one of signalization: it is a question not
+of understanding the injunction but of perceiving the signal and
+reacting to it immediately, according to a more or less artificial,
+prearranged code. Place the bodies in a little world of signals to each
+of which is attached a single, obligatory response: it is a technique
+of training, of dressage, that 'despotically excludes in everything
+the least representation, and the smallest murmur'; the disciplined soldier 'begins to obey whatever he is ordered to do; his
+obedience is prompt and blind; an appearance of indocility, the least
+delay would be a crime' (Boussanelle, 2). The training of schoolchildren was to be carried out in the same way: few words, no
+explanation, a total silence interrupted only by signals - bells, clapping of hands, gestures, a mere glance from the teacher, or that little
+wooden apparatus used by the Brothers of the Christian Schools; it
+was called par excellence the 'Signal' and it contained in its mechanical
+brevity both the technique of command and the morality of obedience. "The first and principal use of the signal is to attract at once
+the attention of all the pupils to the teacher and to make them
+attentive to what he wishes to impart to them. Thus, whenever he
+wishes to attract the attention of the children, and to bring the
+exercise to an end, he will strike the signal once. Whenever a good
+pupil hears the noise of the signal, he will imagine that he is hearing
+the voice of the teacher or rather the voice of God himself calling
+him by his name. He will then partake of the feelings of the young
+Samuel, saying with him in the depths of his soul: "Lord, I am
+here."' The pupil will have to have learnt the code of the signals
+and respond automatically to them. When prayer has been said,
+the teacher will strike the signal at once and, turning to the child
+whom he wishes to read, he will make the sign to begin. To make a
+sign to stop to a pupil who is reading, he will strike the signal
+ı66
+
+once... To make a sign to a pupil to repeat when he has read
+badly or mispronounced a letter, a syllable or a word, he will strike
+the signal twice in rapid succession. If, after the sign had been made
+two or three times, the pupil who is reading does not find and repeat
+the word that he has badly read or mispronounced - because he has
+read several words beyond it before being called to order - the
+teacher will strike three times in rapid succession, as a sign to him to
+begın to read tarther back; and he will continue to make the sign
+till the pupil finds the word which he has said incorrectly' (La Salle,
+Conduite... 137-8; cf. also Demia, 21). The mutual improvement
+school was to exploit still further this control of behaviour by the
+system of signals to which one had to react immediately. Even
+verbal orders were to function as elements of signalization: 'Enter
+your benches. At the word enter, the children bring their right
+hands down on the table with a resounding thud and at the same
+time put one leg into the bench; at the words your benches they put
+the other leg in and sit down opposite their slates... Take your
+slates. At the word take, the children, with their right hands, take
+hold of the string by which the slate is suspended from the nail
+before them, and, with their left hands, they grasp the slate in the
+middle; at the word slates, they unhook it and place it on the table'! 13
+To sum up, it might be said that discipline creates out of the
+bodies it controls four types of individuality, or rather an individuality that is endowed with four characteristics: it is cellular (by the
+play of spatial distribution), it is organic (by the coding of activities),
+it is genetic (by the accumulation of time), it is combinatory (by the
+composition of forces). And, in doing so, it operates four great
+techniques: it draws up tables; it prescribes movements; it imposes
+exercises; lastly, in order to obtain the combination of forces, it
+arranges 'tactics'. Tactics, the art of constructing, with located
+bodies, coded activities and trained aptitudes, mechanisms in which
+the product of the various forces is increased by their calculated
+combination are no doubt the highest form of disciplinary practice.
+In this knowledge, the eighteenth-century theoreticians saw the
+general foundation of all military practice, from the control and
+exercise of individual bodies to the use of forces specific to the most
+complex multiplicities. The architecture, anatomy, mechanics,
+economy of the disciplinary body: In the eyes of most soldiers,
+167
+
+tactics are only a branch of the vast science of war; for me, they are
+the base of this science; they are this science itself, because they
+teach how to constitute troops, order them, move them, get them to
+fight; because tactics alone may make up for numbers, and handle
+the multitude; lastly, it will include knowledge of men, weapons,
+tensions, circumstances, because it is all these kinds of knowledge
+brought together that must determine those movements' (Guibert,
+4). Or again: "The term tactics... gives some idea of the respective
+position of the men who make up a particular troop in relation to that of the different troops that make up an army, their
+movements and their actions, their relations with one another' (Joly
+de Maizeroy, 2).
+It may be that war as strategy is a continuation of politics. But it
+must not be forgotten that 'politics' has been conceived as a continuation, if not exactly and directly of war, at least of the military
+model as a fundamental means of preventing civil disorder. Politics,
+as a technique of internal peace and order, sought to implement the
+mechanism of the perfect army, of the disciplined mass, of the docile,
+useful, troop, of the regiment in camp and in the field, on manoeuvres and on exercises. In the great eighteenth-century states, the
+army guaranteed civil peace no doubt because it was a real force,
+an ever-threatening sword, but also because it was a technique and a
+body of knowledge that could project their schema over the social
+body. If there is a politics-war series that passes through strategy,
+there is an army-politics series that passes through tactics. It is
+strategy that makes it possible to understand warfare as a way of
+conducting politics between states; it is tactics that makes it possible
+to understand the army as a principle for maintaining the absence of
+warfare in civil society. The classical age saw the birth of the great
+political and military strategy by which nations confronted each
+other's economic and demographic forces; but it also saw the birth
+of meticulous military and political tactics by which the control of
+bodies and individual forces was exercised within states. The
+"militaire' - the military institution, military science, the militaire
+himself, so different from what was formerly characterized by the
+term 'homme de guerre' - was specified, during this period, at the
+point of junction between war and the noise of battle on the one
+hand, and order and silence, subservient to peace, on the other.
+I68
+
+Historians of ideas usually attribute the dream of a perfect society to
+the philosophers and jurists of the eighteenth century; but there was
+also a military dream of society; its fundamental reference was not to
+the state of nature, but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a
+machine, not to the primal social contract, but to permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights, but to indefinitely progressive
+forms of training, not to the general will but to automatic docility.
+'Discipline must be made national,' said Guibert. "The state that
+I depict will have a simple, reliable, easily controlled administration.
+It will resemble those huge machines, which by quite uncomplicated
+means produce great effects; the strength of this state will spring
+from its own strength, its prosperity from its own prosperity. Time,
+which destroys all, will increase its power. It will disprove that
+vulgar prejudice by which we are made to imagine that empires are
+subjected to an imperious law of decline and ruin' (Guibert, xxiiixxiv; cf. what Marx says about the army and forms of bourgeois
+society in his letter to Engels, 25 September 1857). The Napoleonic
+régime was not far off and with it the form of state that was to
+survive it and, we must not forget, the foundations of which were
+laid not only by jurists, but also by soldiers, not only councillors of
+state, but also junior officers, not only the men of the courts, but also
+the men of the camps. The Roman reference that accompanied this
+formation certainly bears with it this double index: citizens and
+legionaries, law and manoeuvres. While jurists or philosophers
+were seeking in the pact a primal model for the construction or
+reconstruction of the social body, the soldiers and with them the
+technicians of discipline were elaborating procedures for the individual and collective coercion of bodies.
+169
+
+1 Medal commemorating Louis XIV"s hrst military
+revue in 1668 (B.N. Cabinetdes médailles).
+Cf.p. 188.
+2 Handwriting model (Collections historiques de
+l'I.N.R.D.P.). Cf. p. 152.
+
+(iNanialsNae= PANITNI TLIRS MerOPTIiAN,a d- lampran Me aadi dolei
+garl/aparAnd Mast
+da ranga parnano de troa Steradaa Yalina (Gr Atati aprrd lo
+EXPLANATION.
+10 I+M
+J. Bentham. Plan of the Panopticon (The Works ol Jeremy Bentham, ed. Bowring
+VOl. IV. 1843. 172-31. C1. 0. 201.
+
+4 N Harou-Romain. Plan for a penitentiary, 1840 A prisoner, in his cell, kneeling at
+prayer before the central inspection tower. Cf. p 250.
+
+5 The Maison centrale at Rennes in 1877. Cf. p. 260.
+6 Interior of the penitentiary at Stateville, United States, iwentieth century. Cf. p. 25c
+
+Bedtime at the reformatory of Mettray. Cf. p. 294.
+
+8
+Lecture on the evils of alcoholism in the auditorium of Fresnes prison
+
+MACHINE
+A CORRECTION
+Steam machine for the 'celeriferous' correction of young boys and girls "Fathers
+and Mothers. Uncles and Aunts, Guardian Masters and Mistresses of boarding
+schools and all those who have lazy, greedy, disobedient, rebellious insolent.
+quarrelsome, tale-bearing, chattering, irreligious children, or children having any
+other defect, are hereby informed that Mr Bogeyman and Mrs Bricabrac have just set
+up in every marrie of the city of Paris a machine similar to the one represented in this
+engraving and are ready to accept all naughty children in need of correction in
+their establishments each day, from midday to two o'clock Mr Werewolf, Coalman
+Scarecrow, Eat-without-Hunger and Mrs Wildcat, Spiteful Slag and Drink-without-
+Thirst, friends and relations of Mr Bogeyman and Mrs Bricabrac, will, for a small sum,
+set up similar machines to be sent into provincial towns and will themselves supervise
+their operation The cheapness of correction given by the steam machine and the
+surprising effects that it produces will persuade parents to avail themselves of it as
+often as the bad behaviour of their children will require 11 We alsotake incorrigible
+children as boarders, they are fed on bread and water ' Engraving of the late
+eighteenth century (Collections historiquesde lI.N R.D P.).
+
+10 N Andry, L'orthopédie oul art de prévenir et de comigerdans
+les enfants /es difformites du corps (Orthopaedics or the art
+of preventing and correcting deformities of the body in
+children). 1749.
+
+2. The means of correct training
+At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Walhausen spoke of
+"strict discipline' as an art of correct training. The chief function of
+the disciplinary power is to 'train', rather than to select and to levy;
+or, no doubt, to train in order to levy and select all the more. It does
+not link forces together in order to reduce them; it seeks to bind them
+together in such a way as to multiply and use them. Instead of bending all its subjects into a single uniform mass, it separates, analyses,
+differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of
+necessary and sufficient single units. It 'trains' the moving, confused,
+useless multitudes of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements -. small, separate cells, organic autonomies, genetic
+identities and continuities, combinatory segments. Discipline
+'makes' individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that
+regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise.
+It is not a triumphant power, which because of its own excess can
+pride itself on its omnipotence; it is a modest, suspicious power,
+which functions as a calculated, but permanent economy. These
+are humble modalities, minor procedures, as compared with the
+majestic rituals of sovereignty or the great apparatuses of the state.
+And it is precisely they that were gradually to invade the major
+forms, altering their mechanisms and imposing their procedures. The
+legal apparatus was not to escape this scarcely secret invasion. The
+success of disciplinary power derives no doubt from the use of simple
+instruments; hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and
+theircombination in a procedure that is specific to it, theexamination.
+Hierarchical observation
+The exercise of discipline presupposes a mechanism that coerces by
+means of observation; an apparatus in which the techniques that
+170
+
+make it possible to see induce effects of power, and in which,
+conversely, the means of coercion make those on whom they are
+applied clearly visible. Slowly, in the course of the classical age, we
+see the construction of those "observatories' of human multiplicity
+for which the history of the sciences has so little good to say. Side
+by side with the major technology of the telescope, the lens and the
+light beam, which were an integral part of the new physics and cosmology, there were the minor techniques of multiple and intersecting observations, of eyes that must see without being seen; using
+techniques of subjection and methods of exploitation, an obscure
+art of light and the visible was secretly preparing a new knowledge
+of man.
+These 'observatories' had an almost ideal model: the military
+camp - the short-lived, artificial city, built and reshaped almost at
+will; the seat of a power that must be all the stronger, but also all
+the more discreet, all the more effective and on the alert in that it is
+exercised over armed men. In the perfect camp, all power would be
+exercised solely through exact observation; each gaze would form a
+part of the overall functioning of power. The old, traditional square
+plan was considerably refined in innumerable new projects. The
+geometry of the paths, the number and distribution of the tents,
+the orientation of their entrances, the disposition of files and ranks
+were exactly defined; the network of gazes that supervised one
+another was laid down: 'In the parade ground, five lines are drawn
+up, the first is sixteen feet from the second; the others are eight feet
+from one another; and the last is eight feet from the arms dépôts.
+The arms dépôts are ten feet from the tents of the junior officers,
+immediately opposite the first tentpole. A company street is fifty-one
+feet wide... All tents are two feet from one another. The tents of
+the subalterns are opposite the alleys of their companies. The rear
+tentpole is eight feet from the last soldiers' tent and the gate is
+opposite the captains' tent... The captains' tents are erected
+opposite the streets of their companies. The entrance is opposite the
+companies themselves.
+" The camp is the diagram of a power that
+acts by means of general visibility. For a long time this model of the
+camp or at least its underlying principle was found in urban development, in the construction of working-class housing estates, hospitals,
+asylums, prisons, schools: the spatial 'nesting' of hierarchized
+171
+
+surveillance. The principle was one of 'embedding' ('encastrement").
+The camp was to the rather shameful art of surveillance what the
+dark room was to the great science of optics.
+A whole problematic then develops: that of an architecture that
+is no longer built simply to be seen (as with the ostentation of
+palaces), or to observe the external space (cf. the geometry of fortresses), but to permit an internal, articulated and detailed control -
+to render visible those who are inside it; in more general terms, an
+architecture that would operate to transform individuals: to act on
+those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the
+effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to
+alter them. Stones can make people docile and knowable. The old
+simple schema of confinement and enclosure - thick walls, a heavy
+gate that prevents entering or leaving - began to be replaced by the
+calculation of openings, of filled and empty spaces, passages and
+transparencies. In this way the hospital building was gradually
+organized as an instrument of medical action: it was to allow a better
+observation of patients, and therefore a better calibration of their
+treatment; the form of the buildings, by the careful separation of the
+patients, was to prevent contagions; lastly, the ventilation and the
+air that circulated around each bed was to prevent the deleterious
+vapours from stagnating around the patient, breaking down his
+humours and spreading the disease by their immediate effects. The
+hospital - which was to be built in the second half of the century
+and for which so many plans were drawn up after the Hôtel-Dieu
+was burnt down for the second time - was no longer simply the
+roof under which penury and imminent death took shelter; it was,
+in its very materiality, a therapeutic operator.
+Similarly, the school building was to be a mechanism for training.
+It was as a pedagogical machine that Pâris-Duverney conceived the
+Ecole Militaire, right down to the minute details that he had imposed
+on the architect, Gabriel. Train vigorous bodies, the imperative of
+health; obtain competent officers, the imperative of qualification;
+create obedient soldiers, the imperative of politics; prevent debauchery and homosexuality, the imperative of morality. A fourfold
+reason for establishing sealed compartments between individuals,
+but also apertures for continuous surveillance. The very building
+of the Ecole was to be an apparafus for observation; the rooms were
+172
+
+distributed along a corridor like a series of small cells; at regular
+intervals, an officer's quarters were situated, so that 'every ten pupils
+had an officer on each side; the pupils were confined to their cells
+throughout the night; and Pâris had insisted that 'a window be
+placed on the corridor wall of each room from chest-level to within
+one or two feet of the ceiling. Not only is it pleasant to have such
+windows, but one would venture to say that it is useful, in several
+respects, not to mention the disciplinary reasons that may determine this arrangement' (quoted in Laulan, 117-18). In the diningrooms was 'a slightly raised platform for the tables of the inspectors
+of studies, so that they may see all the tables of the pupils of their
+divisions during meals; latrines had been installed with half-doors,
+so that the supervisor on duty could see the head and legs of the
+pupils, and also with side walls sufficiently high 'that those inside
+cannot see one another'.? This infinitely scrupulous concern with
+surveillance is expressed in the architecture by innumerable petty
+mechanisms. These mechanisms can only be seen as unimportant
+if one forgets the role of this instrumentation, minor but flawless,
+in the progressive objectification and the ever more subtle partitioning of individual behaviour. The disciplinary institutions secreted
+a machinery of control that functioned like a microscope of conduct;
+the fine, analytical divisions that they created formed around men
+an apparatus of observation, recording and training. How was one
+to subdivide the gaze in these observation machines? How was one
+to establish a network of communications between them! How was
+one so to arrange things that a homogeneous, continuous power
+would result from their calculated multiplicity!
+The perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a
+single gaze to see everything constantly. A central point would be
+both the source of light illuminating everything, and a locus of
+convergence for everything that must be known: a perfect eye that
+nothing would escape and a centre towards which all gazes would be
+turned. This is what Ledoux had imagined when he built Arc-et-
+Senans; all the buildings were to be arranged in a circle, opening on
+the inside, at the centre of which a high construction was to house
+the administrative functions of management, the policing functions
+of surveillance, the economic functions of control and checking, the
+religious functions of encouraging obedience and work; from here
+173
+
+all orders would come, all activities would be recorded, all offences
+perceived and judged; and this would be done immediately with no
+other aid than an exact geometry. Among all the reasons for the
+prestige that was accorded in the second half of the eighteenth
+century, to circular architecture, one must no doubt include the fact
+that it expressed a certain political utopia.
+But, the disciplinary gaze dia, in fact, need relays. The pyramid
+was able to fulfil, more efficiently than the circle, two requirements:
+to be complete enough to form an uninterrupted network - consequently the possibility of multiplying its levels, and of distributing
+them over the entire surface to be supervised; and yet to be discreet
+enough not to weigh down with an inert mass on the activity to be
+disciplined, and not to act as a brake or an obstacle to it; to be
+integrated into the disciplinary mechanism as a function that increases its possible effects. It had to be broken down into smaller
+elements, but in order to increase its productive function: specify
+the surveillance and make it functional.
+This was the problem of the great workshops and factories, in
+which, a new type of surveillance was organized. It was different
+from the one practised in the régimes of the manufactories, which
+had been carried out from the outside by inspectors, entrusted with
+the task of applying the regulations; what was now needed was an
+intense, continuous supervision; it ran right through the labour
+process; it did not bear - or not only - on production (the nature
+and quantity of raw materials, the type of instruments used, the
+dimensions and quality of the products); it also took into account
+the activity of the men, their skill, the way they set about their tasks,
+their promptness, their zeal, their behaviour. But it was also different
+from the domestic supervision of the master present beside his
+workers and apprentices; for it was carried out by clerks, supervisors
+and foremen. As the machinery of production became larger and
+more complex, as the number of workers and the division of labour
+increased, supervision became ever more necessary and more difficult. It became a special function, which had nevertheless to form
+an integral part of the production process, to run parallel to it
+throughout its entire length. A specialized personnel became indispensable, constantly present and distinct from the workers: 'In the
+large factory, everything is regulated by the clock. The workers are
+174
+
+treated strictly and harshly. The clerks, who are used to treating
+them with an air of superiority and command, which is really
+necessary with the multitude, treat them with severity or contempt;
+hence these workers either cost more or leave the factory soon after
+arrival' (Encyclopédie, article on 'Manufacture'). But, although the
+workers preferred a framework of a guild type to this new régime
+of surveillance, the employers saw that it was indissociable from the
+system of industrial production, private property and profit. At the
+scale of a factory, a great iron-works or a mine, 'the objects of
+expenditure are so multiplied, that the slightest dishonesty on each
+object would add up to an immense fraud, which would not only
+absorb the profits, but would lead to a loss of capital... the slightest
+incompetence, if left unnoticed and therefore repeated each day, may
+prove fatal to the enterprise to the extent of destroying it in a very
+short time'; hence the fact that only agents, directly dependent on
+the owner, and entrusted with this task alone would be able to see
+'that not a sou is spent uselessly, that not a moment of the day is
+lost'; their role would be "to supervise the workers, to inspect all the
+places of work, to inform the directors of everything that takes
+place' (Cournol). Surveillance thus becomes a decisive economic
+operator both as an internal part of the production machinery and
+as a specific mechanism in the disciplinary power. "The work of
+directing, superintending and adjusting becomes one of the functions
+of capital, from the moment that the labour under the control of
+capital, becomes cooperative. Once a function of capital, it requires
+special characteristics' (Marx, Capital, vol. I, 313).
+The same movement was to be found in the reorganization of
+elementary teaching: the details of surveillance were specified and
+it was integrated into the teaching relationship. The development
+of the parish schools, the increase in the number of their pupils, the
+absence of methods for regulating simultaneously the activity of a
+whole class, and the disorder and confusion that followed from this
+made it necessary to work out a system of supervision. In order to
+help the teacher, Batencour selected from among the best pupils a
+whole series of 'officers' - intendants, observers, monitors, tutors,
+reciters of prayers, writing officers, receivers of ink, almoners and
+visitors. The roles thus defined were of two kinds: the first involved
+material tasks (distributing ink and paper, giving alms to the poor,
+175
+
+reading spiritual texts on feast days, etc.); the second involved surveillance: the 'observers must record who left his bench, who was
+talking, who did not have his rosary, or Book of Hours, who did not
+comport himself properly at mass, who committed an impure act,
+who indulged in idle talk or was unruly in the street'; the 'admonitors' were placed in charge of those who talk or hum when studying
+their lessons and those who will not write and who waste their time
+in play'; the 'visitors' called on the families of pupils who had been
+absent or who had committed serious offences. The 'intendants'
+supervised all the other officers. Only the "tutors' had a pedagogical
+role: their task was to teach the pupils reading, two by two, in low
+tones (M.I.D.B., 68-83). A few decades later, Demia favoured a
+hierarchy of the same type but almost all the functions of surveillance
+were duplicated by a pedagogical role: an assistant teacher taught the
+holding of the pen, guided the pupil's hand, corrected mistakes and
+at the same time 'marked down trouble-makers'; another assistant
+teacher had the same tasks in the reading class; the intendant who
+supervised the other officers and was in charge of behaviour in
+general also had the task of initiating newcomers into the customs
+of the school'; the decurions got the pupils to recite their lessons and
+'marked down' those who did not know them." We have here a
+sketch of an institution of the 'mutual' type in which three procedures are integrated into a single mechanism: teaching proper, the
+acquisition of knowledge by the very practice of the pedagogical
+activity and a reciprocal, hierarchized observation. A relation of
+surveillance, defined and regulated, is inscribed at the heart of the
+practice of teaching, not as an additional or adjacent part, but as a
+mechanism that is inherent to it and which increases its efficiency.
+Hierarchized, continuous and functional surveillance may not be
+one of the great technical 'inventions' of the eighteenth century, but
+its insidious extension owed its importance to the mechanisms of
+power that it brought with it. By means of such surveillance, disciplinary power became an 'integrated' system, linked from the
+inside to the economy and to the aims of the mechanism in which it
+was practised. It was also organized as a multiple, automatic and
+anonymous power; for although surveillance rests on individuals,
+its functioning is that of a network of relations from top to bottom,
+but also to a certain extent from bottom to top and laterally; this
+176
+
+network 'holds' the whole together and traverses it in its entirety
+with effects of power that derive from one another: supervisors,
+perpetually supervised. The power in the hierarchized surveillance
+of the disciplines is not possessed as a thing, or transferred as a
+property; it functions like a piece of machinery. And, although it is
+true that its pyramidal organization gives it a 'head', it is the apparatus as a whole that produces 'power' and distributes individuals in
+this permanent and continuous field. This enables the disciplinary
+power to be both absolutely indiscreet, since it is everywhere and
+always alert, since by its very principle it leaves no zone of shade and
+constantly supervises the very individuals who are entrusted with
+the task of supervising; and absolutely "discreet, for it functions
+permanently and largely in silence. Discipline makes possible the
+operation of a relational power that sustains itself by its own
+mechanism and which, for the spectacle of public events, substitutes
+the uninterrupted play of calculated gazes. Thanks to the techniques
+of surveillance, the 'physics' of power, the hold over the body,
+operate according to the laws of optics and mechanics, according
+to a whole play of spaces, lines, screens, beams, degrees and without
+recourse, in principle at least, to excess, force or violence. It is a
+power that seems all the less 'corporal' in that it is more subtly
+'physical.
+Normalizing judgement
+1. At the orphanage of the Chevalier Paulet, the sessions of the
+tribunal that met each morning gave rise to a whole ceremonial:
+•We found all the pupils drawn up as if for battle, in perfect alignment, immobility and silence. The major, a young gentleman of
+sixteen years, stood outside the ranks, sword in hand; at his command, the troop broke ranks at the double and formed a circle. The
+council met in the centre; each officer made a report of his troop
+for the preceding twenty-four hours. The accused were allowed to
+defend themselves; witnesses were heard; the council deliberated
+and, when agreement was reached, the major announced the number
+of guilty, the nature of the offences and the punishments ordered.
+The troop then marched off in the greatest order' (Pictet). At the
+heart of all disciplinary systems functions a small penal mechanism.
+177
+
+It enjoys a kind of judicial privilege with its own laws, its specific
+offences, its particular forms of judgement. The disciplines established an "infra-penality'; they partitioned an area that the laws had
+left empty; they defined and repressed a mass of behaviour that the
+relative indifference of the great systems of punishment had allowed
+to escape. 'On entering, the companions will greet one another ...
+on leaving, they must lock up the materials and tools that they have
+been using and also make sure that their lamps are extinguished';
+*it is expressly forbidden to amuse companions by gestures or in any
+other way'; they must "comport themselves honestly and decently;
+anyone who is absent for more than five minutes without warning
+M. Oppenheim will be 'marked down for a half-day'; and in order
+to be sure that nothing is forgotten in this meticulous criminal
+justice, it is forbidden to do 'anything that may harm M. Oppenheim
+and his companions' (Oppenheim, 29 September 1809). The workshop, the school, the army were subject to a whole micro-penality
+of time (latenesses, absences, interruptions of tasks), of activity
+(inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of behaviour (impoliteness,
+disobedience), of speech (idle chatter, insolence), of the body
+('incorrect' attitudes, irregular gestures, lack of cleanliness), of
+sexuality (impurity, indecency). At the same time, by way of punishment, a whole series of subtle procedures was used, from light
+physical punishment to minor deprivations and petty humiliations.
+It was a question both of making the slightest departures from correct behaviour subject to punishment, and of giving a punitive
+function to the apparently indifferent elements of the disciplinary
+apparatus: so that, if necessary, everything might serve to punish
+the slightest thing; each subject find himself caught in a punishable,
+punishing universality. 'By the word punishment, one must understand everything that is capable of making children feel the offence
+they have committed, everything that is capable of humiliating them,
+of confusing them: ... a certain coldness, a certain indifference, a
+question, a humiliation, a removal from office' (La Salle, Conduire
+• .., 204-5).
+2. But discipline brought with it a specific way of punishing that
+was not only a small-scale model of the court. What is specific to
+the disciplinary penality is non-observance, that which does not
+measure up to the rule, that departs from it. The whole indefinite
+178
+
+domain of the non-conforming is punishable: the soldier commits
+an 'offence' whenever he does not reach the level required; a pupil's
+'offence' is not only a minor infraction, but also an inability to carry
+out his tasks. The regulations for the Prussian infantry ordered that
+a soldier who had not correctly learnt to handle his rifle should be
+treated with the 'greatest severity'. Similarly, when a pupil has not
+retained the catechism from the previous day, he must be forced to
+learn it, without making any mistake, and repeat it the following
+day; either he will be forced to hear it standing or kneeling, his
+hands joined, or he will be given some other penance'.
+'The order that the disciplinary punishments must enforce is of a
+mixed nature: it is an 'artificial' order, explicitly laid down by a law,
+a programme, a set of regulations. But it is also an order defined by
+natural and observable processes: the duration of an apprenticeship,
+the time taken to perform an exercise, the level of aptitude refer to
+a regularity that is also a rule. The children of the Christian Schools
+must never be placed in a 'lesson' of which they are not yet capable,
+for this would expose them to the danger of being unable to learn
+anything; yet the duration of each stage is fixed by regulation and a
+pupil who at the end of three examinations has been unable to pass
+into the higher order must be placed, well in evidence, on the bench
+of the ignorant'. In a disciplinary régime punishment involves a
+double juridico-natural reference.
+3. Disciplinary punishment has the function of reducing gaps.
+It must therefore be essentially corrective. In addition to punishments borrowed directly from the judicial model (fines, fogging,
+solitary confinement), the disciplinary systems favour punishments
+that are exercise - intensified, multiplied forms of training, several
+times repeated: the regulations of 1766 for the infantry laid down
+that lance-corporals 'who show some negligence or lack of willingness will be reduced to the rank of private', and they will be able
+to rise to their former rank only after new exercises and a new
+examination. As Jean-Baptiste de La Salle put it: "Of all penances,
+impositions are the most honest for a teacher, the most advantageous
+for the parents'; they make it possible to 'derive, from the very
+offences of the children, means of advancing their progress by
+correcting their defects'; to those, for example, who have not written
+all that they were supposed to write or who have not applied
+179
+
+themselves to doing it well, one can give some impositions to write
+out or to learn by heart' (La Salle, Conduite ..., 205). Disciplinary
+punishment is, in the main, isomorphic with obligation itself; it is
+not so much the vengeance of an outraged law as its repetition, its
+reduplicated insistence. So much so that the corrective effect expected of it involves only incidentally expiation and repentance; it is
+obtained directly through the mechanics of a training. To punish
+is to exercise.
+4. In discipline, punishment is only one element of a double
+system: gratification-punishment. And it is this system that operates
+in the process of training and correction. The teacher 'must avoid,
+as far as possible, the use of punishment; on the contrary, he must
+endeavour to make rewards more frequent than penalties, the lazy
+being more encouraged by the desire to be rewarded in the same
+way as the diligent than by the fear of punishment; that is why it
+will be very beneficial, when the teacher is obliged to use punishment, to win the heart of the child if he can before doing so' (Demia,
+17). This mechanism with two elements makes possible a number
+of operations characteristic of disciplinary penality. First, the
+definition of behaviour and performance on the basis of the two
+opposed values of good and evil; instead of the simple division of
+the prohibition, as practised in penal justice, we have a distribution between a positive pole and a negative pole; all behaviour falls
+in the field between good and bad marks, good and bad points.
+Moreover, it is possible to quantify this field and work out an
+arithmetical economy based on it. A penal accountancy, constantly
+brought up to date, makes it possible to obtain the punitive balancesheet of each individual. School "justice',
+; rudiments of which are to
+be found in the army and the workshops, carried this system very
+far. The Brothers of the Christian Schools organized a whole microeconomy of privileges and impositions: 'Privileges may be used by
+pupils to gain exemption from penances which have been imposed
+on them... For example, a pupil may have been given four or six
+catechism questions to copy out as an imposition; he will be able to
+gain exemption from this penance by accumulating a certain number
+of privilege points; the teacher will assign the number for each
+question... Since privileges are worth a certain number of points,
+the teacher also has others of less value, which serve as small change
+180
+
+for the first. For example, a child has an imposition from which he
+can redeem himself with six points; he earns a privilege of ten;
+he presents it to the teacher who gives him back four points, and so
+on' (La Salle, Conduite ..., I56ff). What we have here is a transposition of the system of indulgences. And by the play of this quantification, this circulation of awards and debits, thanks to the continuous
+calculation of plus and minus points, the disciplinary apparatuses
+hierarchized the 'good' and the 'bad" subjects in relation to one
+another. Through this micro-economy of a perpetual penality
+operates a differentiation that is not one of acts, but of individuals
+themselves, of their nature, their potentialities, their level or their
+value. By assessing acts with precision, discipline judges individuals
+"in truth'; the penality that it implements is integrated into the cycle
+of knowledge of individuals.
+5. The distribution according to ranks or grade has a double role:
+it marks the gaps, hierarchizes qualities, skills and aptitudes; but it
+also punishes and rewards. It is the penal functioning of setting in
+order and the ordinal character of judging. Discipline rewards
+simply by the play of awards, thus making it possible to attain
+higher ranks and places; it punishes by reversing this process. Rank
+in itself serves as a reward or punishment. At the Ecole Militaire, a
+complex system of 'honorary' classification was developed; this
+classification was visible to all in the form of slight variations in
+uniform and more or less noble or ignoble punishments were
+associated, as a mark of privilege or infamy, with the ranks thus
+distributed. This classificatory, penal distribution was carried out
+at short intervals by the reports that the officers, teachers and their
+assistants made, without consideration of age or grade, on 'the
+moral qualities of the pupils' and on their universally recognized
+behaviour'. The first class, known as the 'very good, were distinguished by a silver epaulette; they enjoyed the honour of being
+treated as 'purely military troops'; they therefore had a right to
+military punishment (arrests and, in serious cases, imprisonment).
+The second class, 'the good', wore an epaulette of red silk and silver;
+they could be arrested and condemned to prison, but also to the cage
+and to kneeling. The class of'médiocres', had the right to an epaulette
+of red wool; to the preceding penalties was added, if necessary, the
+wearing of sackcloth. The last class, that of the 'bad", was marked by
+
+an epaulette of brown wool; "the pupils of this class will be subjected
+to all the punishments used in the Hôtel or all those that are thought
+necessary, even solitary confinement in a dark dungeon. To this
+was added, for a time, the 'shameful' class, for which special regulations were drawn up 'so that those who belonged to it would always
+be separated from the others and would be dressed in sackcloth'.
+Since merit and behaviour alone must decide the place of the pupil,
+'those of the last two classes would be able to flatter themselves that
+they would be able to rise to the first two and bear its marks, when,
+by universal agreement, they will be recognized as having made
+themselves worthy of it by the change in their conduct and by their
+progress; and those of the top classes will similarly descend into the
+others if they become slack and if the various reports taken together
+are to their disadvantage and show that they no longer deserve the
+rewards and prerogatives of the higher classes... The penal
+classification should tend to disappear. The 'shameful' class existed
+only to disappear: 'In order to judge the kind of conversion
+undergone by pupils of the shameful class who behave well, they
+were feintroduced into the other classes, and given back their
+uniforms; but they would remain with their comrades in infamy
+during meals and recreation; they would remain there if they did not
+continue to behave well; they would leave it absolutely, if their
+conduct was considered satisfactory both in this class and in this
+division' (Archives nationales, MM 658, 3o March 1758 and MM 666,
+15 September 1763). This hierarchizing penality had, therefore, a
+double effect: it distributed pupils according to their aptitudes and
+their conduct, that is, according to the use that could be made of
+them when they left the school; it exercised over them a constant
+pressure to conform to the same model, so that they might all be
+subjected to 'subordination, docility, attention in studies and
+exercises, and to the correct practice of duties and all the parts of
+discipline'. So that they might all be like one another.
+In short, the art of punishing, in the régime of disciplinary power,
+is aimed neither at expiation, nor even precisely at repression. It
+brings five quite distinct operations into play: it refers individual
+actions to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of
+differentiation and the principle of a rule to be followed. It differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of the following overall
+182
+
+rule: that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as
+an average to be respected or as an optimum towards which one
+must move. It measures in quantitative terms and hierarchizes in
+terms of value the abilities, the level, the "nature' of individuals. It
+introduces, through this 'value-giving' measure, the constraint of
+a conformity that must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit
+that will define difference in relation to all other differences, the
+external frontier of the abnormal (the "shameful' class of the Ecole
+Militaire). The perpetual penality that traverses all points and
+supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares,
+differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it
+normalizes.
+It is opposed, therefore, term by term, to a judicial penality
+whose essential function is to refer, not to a set of observable
+phenomena, but to a corpus of laws and texts that must be remembered; that operates not by differentiating individuals, but by
+specifying acts according to a number of general categories; not by
+hierarchizing, but quite simply by bringing into play the binary
+opposition of the permitted and the forbidden; not by homogenizing, but by operating the division, acquired once and for all, of
+condemnation. The disciplinary mechanisms secreted a 'penality of
+the norm',
+', which is irreducible in its principles and functioning to
+the traditional penality of the law. The minor court that seems to sit
+permanently in the buildings of discipline, and which sometimes
+assumes the theatrical form of the great legal apparatus, must not
+mislead us: it does not bring, except for a few formal remnants, the
+mechanisms of criminal justice to the web of everyday existence; or
+at least that is not its essential role; the disciplines created - drawing
+on a whole series of very ancient procedures - a new functioning
+of punishment, and it was this that gradually invested the great
+external apparatus that it seemed to reproduce in either a modest or
+an ironic way. The juridico-anthropological functioning revealed in
+the whole history of modern penality did not originate in the superimposition of the human sciences on criminal justice and in the
+requirements proper to this new rationality or to the humanism that
+it appeared to bring with it; it originated in the disciplinary technique that operated these new mechanisms of normalizing
+judgement.
+183,
+
+The power of the Norm appears through the disciplines. Is this
+the new law of modern society. Let us say rather that, since the
+eighteenth century, it has joined other powers - the Law, the Word
+(Parole) and the Text, Tradition - imposing new delimitations upon
+them. The Normal is established as a principle of coercion in teaching with the introduction of a standardized education and the
+establishment of the écoles normales (teachers' training colleges); it
+is established in the effort to organize a national medical profession
+and a hospital system capable of operating general norms of health;
+it is established in the standardization of industrial processes and
+products (on this topic, one should refer to the important contribution of Canguilhem, 171-21). Like surveillance and with it, normalization becomes one of the great instruments of power at the end of
+the classical age. For the marks that once indicated status, privilege
+and affiliation were increasingly replaced - or at least supplemented
+- by a whole range of degrees of normality indicating membership
+of a homogeneous social body but also playing a part in classification, hierarchization and the distribution of rank. In a sense, the
+power, of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes
+by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix
+specialities and to render the differences useful by fitting them one
+to another. It is easy to understand how the power of the norm
+functions within a system of formal equality, since within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm introduces, as a useful imperative
+and as a result of measurement, all the shading of individual
+differences.
+The examination
+The examination combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy
+and those of a normalizing judgement. It is a normalizing gaze, a
+surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to
+punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through which
+one differentiates them and judges them. That is why, in all the
+mechanisms of discipline, the examination is highly ritualized. In it
+are combined the ceremony of power and the form of the experiment, the deployment of force and the establishment of truth. At the
+heart of the procedures of discipline, it manifests the subjection of
+184
+
+those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those
+who are subjected. The superimposition of the power relations and
+knowledge relations assumes in the examination all its visible
+brilliance. It is yet another innovation of the classical age that the
+historians of science have left unexplored. People write the history
+of experiments on those born blind, on wolf-children or under
+hypnosis. But who will write the more general, more fluid, but also
+more determinant history of the 'examination' - its rituals, its
+methods, its characters and their roles, its play of questions and
+answers, its systems of marking and classification? For in this
+slender technique are to be found a whole domain of knowledge, a
+whole type of power. One often speaks of the ideology that the
+human 'sciences' bring with them, in either discreet or prolix manner.
+But does their very technology, this tiny operational schema that
+has become so widespread (from psychiatry to pedagogy, from the
+diagnosis of diseases to the hiring of labour), this familiar method
+of the examination, implement, within a single mechanism, power
+relations that make it possible to extract and constitute knowledge!
+It is not simply at the level of consciousness, of representations and
+in what one thinks one knows, but at the level of what makes possible
+the knowledge that is transformed into political investment.
+One of the essential conditions for the epistemological 'thaw' of
+medicine at the end of the eighteenth century was the organization
+of the hospital as an 'examining' apparatus. The ritual of the visit
+was its most obvious form. In the seventeenth century, the physician, coming from the outside, added his inspection to many other
+controls - religious, administrative, etc.; he hardly participated in
+the everyday administration of the hospital. Gradually, the visit
+became more regular, more rigorous, above all more extended: it
+became an ever more important part of the functioning of the
+hospital. In 166I, the physician of the Hôtel-Dieu of Paris was
+called upon to make a daily visit; in 1687, an 'expectant' physician
+was to examine, in the afternoon, certain seriously sick patients.
+The eighteenth-century regulations laid down the hours of the visit
+and its duration (at least two hours); they insisted on a rotation of
+physicians, which would guarantee visits every day 'even on Easter
+Sunday'; at last, in 1771, a resident physician was appointed, charged
+with 'providing all the services of his state, at night as well as in the
+185
+
+day, in the intervals between visits by an outside physician' (Registre
+des déliberations du bureau de l'Hôtel-Dieu). The old form of inspection, irregular and rapid, was transformed into a regular observation
+that placed the patient in a situation of almost perpetual examination. This had two consequences: in the internal hierarchy, the
+physician, hitherto an external element, begins to gain over the
+religious staff and to relegate them to a clearly specified, but subordinate role in the technique of the examination; the category of the
+'nurse' then appears; while the hospital itself, which was once little
+more than a poorhouse, was to become a place of training and of
+the correlation of knowledge; it represented a reversal therefore of
+the power relations and the constitution of a corpus of knowledge.
+The "well-disciplined' hospital became the physical counterpart of
+the medical 'discipline'; this discipline could now abandon its textual
+character and take its references not so much from the tradition of
+author-authorities as from a domain of objects perpetually offered
+for examination.
+Similarly, the school became a sort of apparatus of uninterrupted
+examination that duplicated along its entire length the operation of
+teaching. It became less and less a question of jousts in which pupils
+pitched their forces against one another and increasingly a perpetual
+comparison of each and all that made it possible both to measure and
+to judge. The Brothers of the Christian Schools wanted their pupils
+to be examined every day of the week: on the first for spelling, on
+the second for arithmetic, on the third for catechism in the morning
+and for handwriting in the afternoon, etc. Moreover, there was to be
+an examination each month in order to pick out those who deserved
+to be submitted for examination by the inspector (La Salle, Conduise..., 160). From 1775, there existed at the Ecole des Ponts et
+Chaussées sixteen examinations a year: three in mathematics, three
+in architecture, three in drawing, two in writing, one in stonecutting, one in style, one in surveying, one in levelling, one in
+quantity surveying. The examination did not simply mark the end of
+an apprenticeship; it was one of its permanent factors; it was woven
+into it through a constantly repeated ritual of power. The examination enabled the teacher, while transmitting his knowledge, to
+transform his pupils into a whole field of knowledge. Whereas the
+examination with which an apprenticeship ended in the guild
+i86
+
+tradition validated an acquired aptitude - the 'master-work'
+authenticated a transmission of knowledge that had already been
+accomplished - the examination in the school was a constant
+exchanger of knowledge; it guaranteed the movement of knowledge
+from the teacher to the pupil, but it extracted from the pupil a
+knowledge destined and reserved for the teacher. The school became
+the place of elaboration for pedagogy. And just as the procedure of
+the hospital examination made possible the epistemological 'thaw' of
+medicine, the age of the 'examining' school marked the beginnings
+of a pedagogy that functions as a science. The age of inspections and
+endlessly repeated movements in the army also marked the development of an immense tactical knowledge that had its effect in the
+period of the Napoleonic wars.
+The examination introduced a whole mechanism that linked to a
+certain type of the formation of knowledge a certain form of the
+exercise of power.
+1. The examination transformed the economy of visibiliey into the
+exercise of power. Traditionally, power was what was seen, what was
+shown and what was manifested and, paradoxically, found the
+principle of its force in the movement by which it deployed that
+force. Those on whom it was exercised could remain in the shade;
+they received light only from that portion of power that was
+conceded to them, or from the reflection of it that for a moment they
+carried. Disciplinary power, on the other hand, is exercised through
+its invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom it subjects
+a principle of compulsory visibility. In discipline, it is the subjects
+who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power
+that is exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen,
+of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined
+individual in his subjection. And the examination is the technique
+by which power, instead of emitting the signs of its potency, instead
+of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds them in a mechanism of
+objectification. In this space of domination, disciplinary power
+manifests its potency, essentially, by arranging objects. The
+examination is, as it were, the ceremony of this objectification.
+Hitherto the role of the political ceremony had been to give rise
+to the excessive, yet regulated manifestation of power; it was a
+spectacular expression of potency, an 'expenditure', exaggerated and
+187
+
+coded, in which power renewed its vigour. It was always more or
+less related to the triumph. The solemn appearance of the sovereign
+brought with it something of the consecration, the coronation, the
+return from victory; even the funeral ceremony took place with all
+the spectacle of power deployed. Discipline, however, had its own
+type of ceremony. It was not the triumph, but the review, the
+'parade', an ostentatious form of the examination. In it the 'subjects'
+were presented as 'objects' to the observation of a power that was
+manifested only by its gaze. They did not receive directly the image
+of the sovereign power; they only felt its effects - in replica, as it
+were - on their bodies, which had become precisely legible and
+docile. On 15 March 1666, Louis XIV took his first military review:
+18,000 men, 'one of the most spectacular actions of the reign', which
+was supposed to have 'kept all Europe in disquiet'. Several years
+later, a medal was struck to commemorate the event (cf. Jucquiot,
+50-54). It bears the exergue, 'Disciplina militaris restitua' and the
+legend 'Prolusio ad victorias. On the right, the king, right foot
+forward, commands the exercise itself with a stick. On the left,
+several ranks of soldiers are shown full face and aligned in depth;
+they have raised their right arms to shoulder height and are holding
+their rifles exactly vertical, their right legs are slightly forward and
+their left feet turned outwards. On the ground, lines intersect at
+right angles, to form, beneath the soldiers' feet, broad rectangles
+that serve as references for different phases and positions of the
+exercise. In the background is a piece of classical architecture. The
+columns of the palace extend those formed by the ranks of men and
+the erect rifles, just as the paving no doubt extends the lines of the
+exercise. But above the balustrade that crowns the building are
+statues representing dancing figures: sinuous lines, rounded gestures, draperies. The marble is covered with movements whose
+principle of unity is harmonic. The men, on the other hand, are
+frozen into a uniformly repeated attitude of ranks and lines: a
+tactical unity. The order of the architecture, which frees at its summit the figures of the dance, imposes its rules and its geometry on the
+disciplined men on the ground. The columns of power. 'Very good,
+Grand Duke Mikhail once remarked of a regiment, after having
+kept it for one hour presenting arms, 'only they breathe' (Kropotkin,
+8; I owe this reference to G. Canguilhem).
+i88
+
+Let us take this medal as evidence of the moment when, paradoxically but significantly, the most brilliant figure of sovereign
+power is joined to the emergence of the rituals proper to disciplinary
+power. The scarcely sustainable visibility of the monarch is turned
+into the unavoidable visibility of the subjects. And it is this inversion
+of visibility in the functioning of the disciplines that was to assure the
+exercise of power even in its lowest manifestations. We are entering
+the age of the infinite examination and of compulsory objectification.
+2. The examination also introduces individuality into the field of
+documentation. The examination leaves behind it a whole meticulous
+archive constituted in terms of bodies and days. The examination
+that places individuals in a field of surveillance also situates them in
+a network of writing; it engages them in a whole mass of documents
+that capture and fix them. The procedures of examination were
+accompanied at the same time by a system of intense registration
+and of documentary accumulation. A 'power of writing' was constituted as an essential part in the mechanisms of discipline. On many
+points, it was modelled on the traditional methods of administrative
+documentation, though with particular techniques and important
+innovations. Some concerned methods of identification, signalling
+or description. This was the problem in the army, where it was
+necessary to track down deserters, avoid repeating enrolments,
+correct fictitious 'information' presented by officers, know the services and value of each individual, establish with certainty
+the balance-sheet of those who had disappeared or died. It was the
+problem of the hospitals, where it was necessary to recognize
+the patients, expel shammers, follow the evolution of diseases, study
+the effectiveness of treatments, map similar cases and the beginnings
+of epidemics. It was the problem of the teaching establishments,
+where one had to define the aptitude of each individual, situate his
+level and his abilities, indicate the possible use that might be made
+of them: "The register enables one, by being available in time and
+place, to know the habits of the children, their progress in piety,
+in catechism, in the letters, during the time they have been at the
+School' (M.I.D.B., 64).
+Hence the formation of a whole series of codes of disciplinary
+individuality that made it possible to transcribe, by means of homogenization the individual features established by the examination:
+189
+
+the, physical code of signalling, the medical code of symptoms, the
+educational or military code of conduct or performance. These
+codes were still very crude, both in quality and quantity, but they
+marked a first stage in the formalization' of the individual within
+power relations.
+The other innovations of disciplinary writing concerned the
+correlation of these elements, the accumulation of documents, their
+seriation, the organization of comparative fields making it possible
+to classify, to form categories, to determine averages, to fix norms.
+The hospitals of the eighteenth century, in particular, were great
+laboratories for scriptuary and documentary methods. The keeping
+of registers, their specification, the modes of transcription from one
+to the other, their circulation during visits, their comparison during
+regular meetings of doctors and administrators, the transmission of
+their data to centralizing bodies (either at the hospital or at the
+central office of the poorhouses), the accountancy of diseases, cures,
+deaths, at the level of a hospital, a town and even of the nation as a
+whole formed an integral part of the process by which hospitals
+were subjected to the disciplinary régime. Among the fundamental
+conditions of a good medical 'discipline', in both senses of the word,
+one must include the procedures of writing that made it possible to
+integrate individual data into cumulative systems in such a way that
+they were not lost; so to arrange things that an individual could be
+located in the general register and that, conversely, each datum of
+the individual examination might affect overall calculations.
+Thanks to the whole apparatus of writing that accompanied it, the
+examination opened up two correlative possibilities: firstly, the
+constitution of the individual as a describable, analysable object, not
+in order to reduce him to 'specific' features, as did the naturalists in
+relation to living beings, but in order to maintain him in his individual features, in his particular evolution, in his own aptitudes or
+abilities, under the gaze of a permanent corpus of knowledge; and,
+secondly, the constitution of a comparative system that made
+possible the measurement of overall phenomena, the description of
+groups, the characterization of collective facts, the calculation of the
+gaps between individuals, their distribution in a given "population'.
+These small techniques of notation, of registration, of constituting
+files, of arranging facts in columns and tables that are so familiar
+180
+
+to us now, were of decisive importance in the epistemological 'thaw'
+of the sciences of the individual. One is no doubt right to pose the
+Aristotelean problem: is a science of the individual possible and
+legitimate? A great problem needs great solutions perhaps. But
+there is the small historical problem of the emergence, towards the
+end of the eighteenth century, of what might generally be termed
+the 'clinical sciences; the problem of the entry of the individual (and
+no longer the species) into the field of knowledge; the problem of
+the entry of the individual description, of the cross-examination, of
+anamnesis, of the 'file' into the general functioning of scientific discourse. To this simple question of fact, one must no doubt give an
+answer lacking in 'nobility: one should look into these procedures
+of writing and registration, one should look into the mechanisms of
+examination, into the formation of the mechanisms of discipline, and
+of a new type of power over bodies. Is this the birth of the sciences
+of man! It is probably to be found in these 'ignoble' archives, where
+the modern play of coercion over bodies, gestures and behaviour
+has its beginnings.
+3. The examination, surrounded by all its documentary techniques,
+makes each individual a 'case': a case which at one and the same time
+constitutes an object for a branch of knowledge and a hold for a
+branch of power. The case is no longer, as in casuistry or jurisprudence, a set of circumstances defining an act and capable of
+modifying the application of a rule; it is the individual as he may be
+described, judged, measured, compared with others, in his very
+individuality; and it is also the individual who has to be trained or
+corrected, classified, normalized, excluded, etc.
+For a long time ordinary individuality - the everyday individuality of everybody - remained below the threshold of description.
+To be looked at, observed, described in detail, followed from day
+to day by an uninterrupted writing was a privilege. The chronicle of
+a man, the account of his life, his historiography, written as he lived
+out his life formed part of the rituals of his power. The disciplinary
+methods reversed this relation, lowered the threshold of describable
+individuality and made of this description a means of control and a
+method of domination. It is no longer a monument for future
+memory, but a document for possible use. And this new describability is all the more marked in that the disciplinary framework is
+
+a strict one: the child, the patient, the madman, the prisoner, were
+to become, with increasing ease from the eighteenth century and
+according to a curve which is that of the mechanisms of discipline,
+the object of individual descriptions and biographical accounts.
+This turning of real lives into writing is no longer a procedure of
+heroization; it functions as a procedure of objectification and subjection. The carefully collated life of mental patients or delinquents
+belongs, as did the chronicle of kings or the adventures of the great
+popular bandits, to a certain political function of writing; but in a
+quite different technique of power.
+The examination as the fixing, at once ritual and 'scientific', of
+individual differences, as the pinning down of each individual in his
+own particularity (in contrast with the ceremony in which status,
+birth, privilege, function are manifested with all the spectacle of
+their marks) clearly indicates the appearance of a new modality of
+power in which each individual receives as his status his own individuality, and in which he is linked by his status to the features, the
+measurements, the gaps, the 'marks' that characterize him and make
+him a 'case'.
+Finally, the examination is at the centre of the procedures that
+constitute the individual as effect and object of power, as effect and
+object of knowledge. It is the examination which, by combining
+hierarchical surveillance and normalizing judgement, assures the
+great disciplinary functions of distribution and classification, maximum extraction of forces and time, continuous genetic accumulation, optimum combination of aptitudes and, thereby, the fabrication
+of cellular, organic, genetic and combinatory individuality. With it
+are ritualized those disciplines that may be characterized in a word
+by saying that they are a modality of power for which individual
+difference is relevant.
+The disciplines mark the moment when the reversal of the political
+axis of individualization - as one might call it - takes place. In
+certain societies, of which the feudal régime is only one example,
+it may be said that individualization is greatest where sovereignty
+is exercised and in the higher echelons of power. The more one
+possesses power or privilege, the more one is marked as an individual, by rituals, written accounts or visual reproductions. The 'name'
+182
+
+and the genealogy that situate one within a kinship group, the
+performance of deeds that demonstrate superior strength and which
+are immortalized in literary accounts, the ceremonies that mark the
+power relations in their very ordering, the monuments or donations
+that bring survival after death, the ostentation and excess of expenditure, the multiple, intersecting links of allegiance and suzerainty,
+all these are procedures of an 'ascending' individualization. In a
+disciplinary régime, on the other hand, individualization is 'descending: as power becomes more anonymous and more functional,
+those on whom it is exercised tend to be more strongly individualized; it is exercised by surveillance rather than ceremonies, by observation rather than commemorative accounts, by comparative
+measures that have the 'norm' as reference rather than genealogies
+giving ancestors as points of reference; by 'gaps' rather than by
+deeds. In a system of discipline, the child is more individualized
+than the adult, the patient more than the healthy man, the madman
+and the delinquent more than the normal and the non-delinquent.
+In each case, it is towards the first of these pairs that all the individualizing mechanisms are turned in our civilization; and when one
+wishes to individualize the healthy, normal and law-abiding adult,
+it is always by asking him how much of the child he has in him,
+what secret madness lies within him, what fundamental crime he
+has dreamt of committing. All the sciences, analyses or practices
+employing the root 'psycho-' have their origin in this historical
+reversal of the procedures of individualization. The moment that
+saw the transition from historico-ritual mechanisms for the formation of individuality to the scientifico-disciplinary mechanisms,
+when the normal took over from the ancestral, and measurement
+from status, thus substituting for the individuality of the memorable
+man that of the calculable man, that moment when the sciences of
+man became possible is the moment when a new technology of
+power and a new political anatomy of the body were implemented.
+And if from the early Middle Ages to the present day the 'adventure'
+is an account of individuality, the passage from the epic to the
+novel, from the noble deed to the secret singularity, from long
+exiles to the internal search for childhood, from combats to phantasies, it is also inscribed in the formation of a disciplinary society.
+The adventure of our childhood no longer finds expression in le
+193
+
+bor perit Henri, but in the misfortunes of 'little Hans'. The Romance
+of the Rose is written today by Mary Barnes; in the place of Lancelot,
+we have Judge Schreber.
+It is often said that the model of a society that has individuals
+as its constituent elements is borrowed from the abstract juridical
+forms of contract and exchange. Mercantile society, according to
+this view, is represented as a contractual association of isolated
+juridical subjects. Perhaps. Indeed, the political theory of the
+seventeenth and eighteenth centuries often seems to follow this
+schema. But it should not be forgotten that there existed at the same
+period a technique for constituting individuals as correlative elements of power and knowledge. The individual is no doubt the
+fictitious atom of an "ideological' representation of society; but he is
+also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I
+have called 'discipline'. We must cease once and for all to describe
+the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes, it "represses',
+it "censors', it 'abstracts", it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact, power
+produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and
+rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be
+gained of him belong to this production.
+Is it not somewhat excessive to derive such power from the petty
+machinations of discipline? How could they achieve effects of such
+scope?
+194
+
+3. Panopticism
+The following, according to an order published at the end of the
+seventeenth century, were the measures to be taken when the plague
+appeared in a town.'
+First, a strict spatial partitioning: the closing of the town and its
+outlying districts, a prohibition to leave the town on pain of death,
+the killing of all stray animals; the division of the town into distinct
+quarters, each governed by an intendant. Each street is placed under
+the authority of a syndic, who keeps it under surveillance; if he
+leaves the street, he will be condemned to death. On the appointed
+day, everyone is ordered to stay indoors: it is forbidden to leave
+on pain of death. The syndic himself comes to lock the door of
+each house from the outside; he takes the key with him and hands
+it over to the intendant of the quarter; the intendant keeps it until
+the end of the quarantine. Each family will have made its own
+provisions; but, for bread and wine, small wooden canals are set up
+between the street and the interior of the houses, thus allowing each
+person to receive his ration without communicating with the suppliers and other residents; meat, fish and herbs will be hoisted up
+into the houses with pulleys and baskets. If it is absolutely necessary
+to leave the house, it will be done in turn, avoiding any meeting.
+Only the intendants, syndics and guards will move about the
+streets and also, between the infected houses, from one corpse to
+another, the 'crows', who can be left to die: these are 'people of little
+substance who carry the sick, bury the dead, clean and do many vile
+and abject offices'. It is a segmented, immobile, frozen space. Each
+individual is fixed in his place. And, if he moves, he does so at the
+risk of his life, contagion or punishment.
+Inspection functions ceaselessly. The gaze is alert everywhere: 'A
+considerable body of militia, commanded by good officers and men
+195
+
+of substance', guards at the gates, at the town hall and in every
+quarter to ensure the prompt obedience of the people and the most
+absolute authority of the magistrates, 'as also to observe all disorder,
+theft and extortion'. At each of the town gates there will be an
+observation post; at the end of each street sentinels. Every day, the
+intendant visits the quarter in his charge, inquires whether the
+syndics have carried out their tasks, whether the inhabitants have
+anything to complain of; they 'observe their actions'. Every day,
+too, the syndic goes into the street for which he is responsible;
+stops before each house: gets all the inhabitants to appear at the
+windows (those who live overlooking the courtyard will be allocated a window looking onto the street at which no one but they
+may show themselves); he calls each of them by name; informs
+himself as to the state of each and every one of them - in which
+respect the inhabitants will be compelled to speak the truth under
+pain of death'; if someone does not appear at the window, the syndic
+must ask why: 'In this way he will find out easily enough whether
+dead or sick are being concealed.' Everyone locked up in his
+cage, everyone at his window, answering to his name and showing
+himself when asked - it is the great review of the living and the
+dead.
+This surveillance is based on a system of permanent registration:
+reports from the syndics to the intendants, from the intendants to
+the magistrates or mayor. At the beginning of the 'lock up', the role
+of each of the inhabitants present in the town is laid down, one by
+one; this document bears 'the name, age, sex of everyone, notwithstanding his condition': a copy is sent to the intendant of the quarter,
+another to the office of the town hall, another to enable the syndic
+to make his daily roll call. Everything that may be observed during
+the course of the visits - deaths, illnesses, complaints, irregularities -
+is noted down and transmitted to the intendants and magistrates.
+The magistrates have complete control over medical treatment; they
+have appointed a physician in charge; no other practitioner may
+treat, no apothecary prepare medicine, no confessor visit a sick
+person without having received from him a written note "to prevent
+anyone from concealing and dealing with those sick of the contagion,
+unknown to the magistrates'. The registration of the pathological
+must be constantly centralized. The relation of each individual to his
+
+disease and to his death passes through the representatives of power,
+the registration they make of it, the decisions they take on it.
+Five or six days after the beginning of the quarantine, the process
+of purifying the houses one by one is begun. All the inhabitants are
+made to leave; in each room 'the furniture and goods' are raised
+from the ground or suspended from the air; perfume is poured
+around the room; after carefully sealing the windows, doors and
+even the keyholes with wax, the perfume is set alight. Finally, the
+entire house is closed while the perfume is consumed; those who
+have carried out the work are searched, as they were on entry, 'in
+the presence of the residents of the house, to see that they did not
+have something on their persons as they left that they did not have
+on entering'. Four hours later, the residents are allowed to re-enter
+their homes.
+This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in
+which the individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the
+slightest movements are supervised, in which all events are recorded,
+in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and
+periphery, in which power is exercised without division, according
+to a continuous hierarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly located, examined and distributed among the living beings,
+the sick and the dead - all this constitutes a compact model of the
+disciplinary mechanism. The plague is met by order; its function is
+to sort out every possible confusion: that of the disease, which is
+transmitted when bodies are mixed together; that of the evil, which
+is increased when fear and death overcome prohibitions. It lays
+down for each individual his place, his body, his disease and his
+death, his well-being, by means of an omnipresent and omniscient
+power that subdivides itself in a regular, uninterrupted way even
+to the ultimate determination of the individual, of what characterizes
+him, of what belongs to him, of what happens to him. Against the
+plague, which is a mixture, discipline brings into play its power,
+which is one of analysis. A whole literary fiction of the festival grew
+up around the plague: suspended laws, lifted prohibitions, the
+frenzy of passing time, bodies mingling together without respect,
+individuals unmasked, abandoning their statutory identity and the
+figure under which they had been recognized, allowing a quite
+different truth to appear. But there was also a political dream of the
+197
+
+plague, which was exactly its reverse: not the collective festival,
+but strict divisions; not laws transgressed, but the penetration of
+regulation into even the smallest details of everyday life through the
+mediation of the complete hierarchy that assured the capillary functioning of power; not masks that were put on and taken off, but the
+assignment to each individual of his 'true' name, his true' place, his
+'true' body, his 'true' disease. The plague as a form, at once real
+and imaginary, of disorder had as its medical and political correlative
+discipline. Behind the disciplinary mechanisms can be read the
+haunting memory of 'contagions', of the plague, of rebellions,
+crimes, vagabondage, desertions, people who appear and disappear,
+live and die in disorder.
+If it is true that the leper gave rise to rituals of exclusion, which to
+a certain extent provided the model for and general form of the
+great Confinement, then the plague gave rise to disciplinary projects. Rather than the massive, binary division between one set of
+people and another, it called for multiple separations, individualizing
+distributions, an organization in depth of surveillance and control,
+an intensification and a ramification of power. The leper was caught
+up in a practice of rejection, of exile-enclosure; he was left to his
+doom in a mass among which it was useless to differentiate; those
+sick of the plague were caught up in a meticulous tactical partitioning in which individual differentiations were the constricting effects
+of a power that multiplied, articulated and subdivided itself; the great
+confinement on the one hand; the correct training on the other.
+The leper and his separation; the plague and its segmentations. The
+first is marked; the second analysed and distributed. The exile of
+the leper and the arrest of the plague do not bring with them the
+same political dream. The first is that of a pure community, the
+second that of a disciplined society. Two ways of exercising power
+over men, of controlling their relations, of separating out their
+dangerous mixtures. The plague-stricken town, traversed throughout with hierarchy, surveillance, observation, writing; the town
+immobilized by the functioning of an extensive power that bears in
+a distinct way over all individual bodies - this is the utopia of the
+perfectly governed city. The plague (envisaged as a possibility at
+least) is the trial in the course of which one may define ideally the
+exercise of disciplinary power. In order to make rights and laws
+198
+
+function according to pure theory, the jurists place themselves in
+imagination in the state of nature; in order to see perfect disciplines
+functioning, rulers dreamt of the state of plague. Underlying disciplinary projects the image of the plague stands for all forms of
+confusion and disorder; just as the image of the leper, cut off from
+all human contact, underlies projects of exclusion.
+They are different projects, then, but not incompatible ones. We
+see them coming slowly together, and it is the peculiarity of the
+nineteenth century that it applied to the space of exclusion of which
+the leper was the symbolic inhabitant (beggars, vagabonds, madmen
+and the disorderly formed the real population) the technique of
+power proper to disciplinary partitioning. Treat 'lepers' as 'plague
+victims, project the subtle segmentations of discipline onto the
+confused space of internment, combine it with the methods of analytical distribution proper to power, individualize the excluded, but
+use procedures of individualization to mark exclusion - this is what
+was operated regularly by disciplinary power from the beginning
+of the nineteenth century in the psychiatric asylum, the penitentiary,
+the reformatory, the approved school and, to some extent, the
+hospital. Generally speaking, all the authorities exercising individual
+control function according to a double mode; that of binary division
+and branding (mad/sane; dangerous/harmless; normal/abnormal);
+and that of coercive assignment, of differential distribution (who he
+is; where he must be; how he is to be characterized; how he is to be
+recognized; how a constant surveillance is to be exercised over him
+in an individual way, etc.). On the one hand, the lepers are treated as
+plague victims; the tactics of individualizing disciplines are imposed
+on the excluded; and, on the other hand, the universality of disciplinary controls makes it possible to brand the 'leper' and to bring
+into play against him the dualistic mechanisms of exclusion. The
+constant division between the normal and the abnormal, to which
+every individual is subjected, brings us back to our own time, by
+applying the binary branding and exile of the leper to quite different
+objects; the existence of a whole set of techniques and institutions
+for measuring, supervising and correcting the abnormal brings into
+play the disciplinary mechanisms to which the fear of the plague
+gave rise. All the mechanisms of power which, even today, are
+disposed around the abnormal individual, to brand him and to alter
+199
+
+him, are composed of those two forms from which they distantly
+derive.
+Bentham's Panopticon is the architectural figure of this composition. We know the principle on which it was based: at the periphery,
+an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with
+wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole
+width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside,
+corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other.
+All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower
+and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man,
+a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can
+observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light,
+the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are
+like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is
+alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible. The panoptic
+mechanism arranges spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately. In short, it reverses the principle of the dungeon; or rather of its three functions - to enclose, to
+deprive of light and to hide - it preserves only the first and eliminates the other two. Full lighting and the eye of a supervisor capture
+better than darkness, which ultimately protected. Visibility is a trap.
+To begin with, this made it possible - as a negative effect - to
+avoid those compact, swarming, howling masses that were to be
+found in places of confinement, those painted by Goya or described
+by Howard. Each individual, in his place, is securely confined to a
+cell from which he is seen from the front by the supervisor; but the
+side walls prevent him from coming into contact with his companions. He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information,
+never a subject in communication. The arrangement of his room,
+opposite the central tower, imposes on him an axial visibility; but
+the divisions of the ring, those separated cells, imply a lateral
+invisibility. And this invisibility is a guarantee of order. If the inmates are convicts, there is no danger of a plot, an attempt at
+collective escape, the planning of new crimes for the future, bad
+reciprocal influences; if they are patients, there is no danger of
+200
+
+contagion; if they are madmen theie is no risk of their committing
+violence upon one another; if they are schoolchildren, there is no
+copying, no noise, no chatter, no waste of time; if they are workers,
+there are no disorders, no theft, no coalitions, none of those distractions that slow down the rate of work, make it less perfect or
+cause accidents. The crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple
+exchanges, individualities merging together, a collective effect, is
+abolished and replaced by a collection of separated individualities.
+From the point of view of the guardian, it is replaced by a multiplicity that can be numbered and supervised; from the point of view of
+the inmates, by a sequestered and observed solitude (Bentham,
+60-64).
+Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate
+a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its
+action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual
+exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a
+machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent
+of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be
+caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the
+bearers. To achieve this, it is at once too much and too little that the
+prisoner should be constantly observed by an inspector: too little,
+for what matters is that he knows himself to be observed; too much,
+because he has no need in fact of being so. In view of this, Bentham
+laid down the principle that power should be visible and unverifiable. Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the
+tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon.
+Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being
+looked at at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always
+be so. In order to make the presence or absence of the inspector
+unverifiable, so that the prisoners, in their cells, cannot even see a
+shadow, Bentham envisaged not only venetian blinds on the
+windows of the central observation hall, but, on the inside, partitions
+that intersected the hall at right angles and, in order to pass from
+one quarter to the other, not doors but zig-zag openings; for the
+slightest noise, a gleam of light, a brightness in a half-opened door
+would betray the presence of the guardian.? The Panopticon is a
+201
+
+machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central
+tower, one sees everything without ever being seen. S
+It is an important mechanism, for it automatizes and disindividualizes power. Power has its principle not so much in a person as
+in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes;
+in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation
+in which individuals are caught up. The ceremonies, the rituals, the
+marks by which the sovereign's surplus power was manifested are
+useless. There is a machinery that assures dissymmetry, disequilibrium, difference. Consequently, it does not matter who exercises
+power. Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate the
+machine: in the absence of the director, his family, his friends, his
+visitors, even his servants (Bentham, 45). Similarly, it does not
+matter what motive animates him: the curiosity of the indiscreet, the
+malice of a child, the thirst for knowledge of a philosopher who
+wishes to visit this museum of human nature, or the perversity of
+those who take pleasure in spying and punishing. The more
+numerous those anonymous and temporary observersare, the greater
+the risk for the inmate of being surprised and the greater his anxious
+awareness of being observed. The Panopticon is a marvellous
+machine which, whatever use one may wish to put it to, produces
+homogeneous effects of power.
+A real subjection is born mechanically from a fictitious relation.
+So it is not necessary to use force to constrain the convict to good
+behaviour, the madman to calm, the worker to work, the schoolboy
+to application, the patient to the observation of the regulations.
+Bentham was surprised that panoptic institutions could be so light:
+there were no more bars, no more chains, no more heavy locks; all
+that was needed was that the separations should be clear and the
+openings well arranged. The heaviness of the old 'houses of security',
+with their fortress-like architecture, could be replaced by the simple,
+economic geometry of a 'house of certainty'. The efficiency of
+power, its constraining force have, in a sense, passed over to the
+other side - to the side of its surface of application. He who is
+subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in
+202
+
+which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle
+of his own subjection. By this very fact, the external power may
+throw off its physical weight; it tends to the non-corporal; and, the
+more it approaches this limit, the more constant, profound and
+permanent are its effects: it is a perpetual victory that avoids any
+physical confrontation and which is always decided in advance.
+Bentham does not say whether he was inspired, in his project, by
+Le Vaux's menagerie at Versailles: the first menagerie in which the
+different elements are not, as they traditionally were, distributed in
+a park (Loisel, 104-7). At the centre was an octagonal pavilion
+which, on the first floor, consisted of only a single room, the king's
+salon; on every side large windows looked out onto seven cages
+(the eighth side was reserved for the entrance), containing different
+species of animals. By Bentham's time, this menagerie had disappeared. But one finds in the programme of the Panopticon a
+similar concern with individualizing observation, with characterization and classification, with the analytical arrangement of space. The
+Panopticon is a royal menagerie; the animal is replaced by man,
+individual distribution by specific grouping and the king by the
+machinery of a furtive power. With this exception, the Panopticon
+also does the work of a naturalist. It makes it possible to draw up
+differences: among patients, to observe the symptoms of each individual, without the proximity of beds, the circulation of miasmas, the
+effects of contagion confusing the clinical tables; among schoolchildren, it makes it possible to observe performances (without
+there being any imitation or copying), to map aptitudes, to assess
+characters, to draw up rigorous classifications and, in relation to
+normal development, to distinguish 'laziness and stubbornness' from
+"incurable imbecility'; among workers, it makes it possible to note
+the aptitudes of each worker, compare the time he takes to perform
+a task, and if they are paid by the day, to calculate their wages
+(Bentham, 60-64).
+So much for the question of observation. But the Panopticon was
+also a laboratory; it could be used as a machine to carry out experiments, to alter behaviour, to train or correct individuals. To experiment with medicines and monitor their effects. To try out different
+punishments on prisoners, according to their crimes and character,
+and to seek the most effective ones. To teach different techniques
+z03
+
+simultaneously to the workers, to decide which is the best. To try
+out pedagogical experiments - and in particular to take up once
+again the well-debated problem of secluded education, by using
+orphans. One would see what would happen when, in their sixteenth or eighteenth year, they were presented with other boys or
+girls; one could verify whether, as Helvetius thought, anyone could
+learn anything; one would follow 'the genealogy of every observable
+idea; one could bring up different children according to different
+systems of thought, making certain children believe that two and
+two do not make four or that the moon is a cheese, then put them
+together when they are twenty or twenty-five years old; one would
+then have discussions that would be worth a great deal more than
+the sermons or lectures on which so much money is spent; one
+would have at least an opportunity of making discoveries in the
+domain of metaphysics. The Panopticon is a privileged place for
+experiments on men, and for analysing with complete certainty the
+transformations that may be obtained from them. The Panopticon
+may even provide an apparatus for supervising its own mechanisms.
+In this central tower, the director may spy on all the employees that
+he has under his orders: nurses, doctors, foremen, teachers, warders; he will be able to judge them continuously, alter their behaviour, impose upon them the methods he thinks best; and it will
+even be possible to observe the director himself. An inspector
+arriving unexpectedly at the centre of the Panopticon will be able to
+judge at a glance, without anything being concealed from him, how
+the entire establishment is functioning. And, in any case, enclosed
+as he is in the middle of this architectural mechanism, is not the
+director's own fate entirely bound up with it? The incompetent
+physician who has allowed contagion to spread, the incompetent
+prison governor or workshop manager will be the first victims of an
+epidemic or a revolt. ' "By every tie I could devise"
+', said the master
+of the Panopticon, "my own fate had been bound up by me with
+theirs"' (Bentham, 177). The Panopticon functions as a kind of
+laboratory of power. Thanks to its mechanisms of observation, it
+gains in efficiency and in the ability to penetrate into men's behaviour; knowledge follows the advances of power, discovering new
+objects of knowledge over all the surfaces on which power is
+exercised.
+204
+
+The plague-stricken town, the panoptic establishment - the
+differences are important. They mark, at a distance of a century and
+a half, the transformations of the disciplinary programme. In the
+first case, there is an exceptional situation: against an extraordinary
+evil, power is mobilized; it makes itself everywhere present and
+visible; it invents new mechanisms; it separates, it immobilizes, it
+partitions; it constructs for a time what is both a counter-city and
+the perfect society; it imposes an ideal functioning, but one that is
+reduced, in the final analysis, like the evil that it combats, to a simple
+dualism of life and death: that which moves brings death, and one
+kills that which moves. The Panopticon, on the other hand, must
+be understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of
+defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men. No
+doubt Bentham presents it as a particular institution, closed in upon
+itself. Utopias, perfectly closed in upon themselves, are common
+enough. As opposed to the ruined prisons, littered with mechanisms
+of torture, to be seen in Piranese's engravings, the Panopticon
+presents a cruel, ingenious cage. The fact that it should have given
+rise, even in our own time, to so many variations, projected or
+realized, is evidence of the imaginary intensity that it has possessed
+for almost two hundred years. But the Panopticon must not be
+understood as a dream building: it is the diagram of a mechanism of
+power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning, abstracted from any
+obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a pure archirectural and optical system: it is in fact a figure of political technology
+that may and must be detached from any specific use.
+It is polyvalent in its applications; it serves to reform prisoners,
+but also to treat patients, to instruct schoolchildren, to confine the
+insane, to supervise workers, to put beggars and idlers to work. It is
+a type of location of bodies in space, of distribution of individuals
+in relation to one another, of hierarchical organization, of disposition of centres and channels of power, of definition of the instruments and modes of intervention of power, which can be implemented in hospitals, workshops, schools, prisons. Whenever one is
+dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a
+particular form of behaviour must be imposed, the panoptic schema
+may be used. It is - necessary modifications apart - applicable to
+all establishments whatsoever, in which, within a space not too large
+
+to be covered or commanded by buildings, a number of persons are
+meant to be kept under inspection' (Bentham, 40; although Bentham
+takes the penitentiary house as his prime example, it is because it has
+many different functions to fulfil - safe custody, confinement,
+solitude, forced labour and instruction).
+In each of its applications, it makes it possible to perfect the exercise of power. It does this in several ways: because it can reduce the
+number of those who exercise it, while increasing the number of
+those on whom it is exercised. Because it is possible to intervene at
+any moment and because the constant pressure acts even before the
+offences, mistakes or crimes have been committed. Because, in these
+conditions, its strength is that it never intervenes, it is exercised
+spontaneously and without noise, it constitutes a mechanism whose
+effects follow from one another. Because, without any physical
+instrument other than architecture and geometry, it acts directly on
+individuals; it gives 'power of mind over mind'. The panoptic
+schema makes any apparatus of power more intense: it assures its
+economy (in material, in personnel, in time); it assures its efficacity
+by its preventative character, its continuous functioning and its
+automatic mechanisms. It is a way of obtaining from power "in
+hitherto unexampled quantity, 'a great and new instrument of
+government...; its great excellence consists in the great strength
+it is capable of giving to any institution it may be thought proper to
+apply it to' (Bentham, 66).
+It's a case of 'it's easy once you've thought of it' in the political
+sphere. It can in fact be integrated into any function (education,
+medical treatment, production, punishment); it can increase the
+effect of this function, by being linked closely with it; it can constitute a mixed mechanism in which relations of power (and of knowledge) may be precisely adjusted, in the smallest detail, to the processes that are to be supervised; it can establish a direct proportion
+between 'surplus power' and 'surplus production'. In short, it
+arranges things in such a way that the exercise of power is not
+added on from the outside, like a rigid, heavy constraint, to the
+functions it invests, but is so subtly present in them as to increase
+their efficiency by itself increasing its own points of contact. The
+panoptic mechanism is not simply a hinge, a point of exchange
+between a mechanism of power and a function; it is a way of making
+206
+
+power relations function in a function, and of making a function
+function through these power relations. Bentham's Preface to
+Panopticon opens with a list of the benefits to be obtained from his
+"inspection-house': 'Morals reformed - health preserved - industry
+invigorated- instruction diffused - public burthens lightened- Economy
+seated, as it were, upon a rock - the gordian knot of the Poor-Laws
+not cut, but untied - all by a simple idea in architecture!' (Bentham,
+39).
+Furthermore, the arrangement of this machine is such that its
+enclosed nature does not preclude a permanent presence from the
+outside: we have seen that anyone may come and exercise in the central tower the functions of surveillance, and that, this being the case,
+he can gain a clear idea of the way in which the surveillance is practised.
+In fact, any panoptic institution, even if it is as rigorously closed
+as a penitentiary, may without difficulty be subjected to such irregular and constant inspections: and not only by the appointed inspectors, but also by the public; any member of society will have the
+right to come and see with his own eyes how the schools, hospitals,
+factories, prisons function. There is no risk, therefore, that the
+increase of power created by the panoptic machine may degenerate
+into tyranny; the disciplinary mechanism will be democratically
+controlled, since it will be constantly accessible "to the great tribunal
+committee of the world'.* This Panopticon, subtly arranged so that
+an observer may observe, at a glance, so many different individuals,
+also enables everyone to come and observe any of the observers.
+The seeing machine was once a sort of dark room into which
+individuals spied; it has become a transparent building in which the
+exercise of power may be supervised by society as a whole.
+The panoptic schema, without disappearing as such or losing any
+of its properties, was destined to spread throughout the social body;
+its vocation was to become a generalized function. The plaguestricken town provided an exceptional disciplinary model: perfect,
+but absolutely violent; to the disease that brought death, power
+opposed its perpetual threat of death; life inside it was reduced to
+its simplest expression; it was, against the power of death, the meticulous exercise of the right of the sword. The Panopticon, on the
+other hand, has a role of amplification; although it arranges power,
+although it is intended to make it more economic and more effective,
+207
+
+it does so not for power itself, nor for the immediate salvation of a
+threatened society: its aim is to strengthen the social forces - to
+increase production, to develop the economy, spread education,
+raise the level of public morality; to increase and multiply.
+How is power to be strengthened in such a way that, far from
+impeding progress, far from weighing upon it with its rules and
+regulations, it actually facilitates such progress! What intensificator
+of power will be able at the same time to be a multiplicator of production? How will power, by increasing its forces, be able to increase
+those of society instead of confiscating them or impeding them? The
+Panopticon's solution to this problem is that the productive increase
+ot power can be assured only it, on the one hand, it can be exercised
+continuously in the very foundations of society, in the subtlest
+possible way, and if, on the other hand, it functions outside these
+sudden, violent, discontinuous forms that are bound up with the
+exercise of sovereignty. The body of the king, with its strange
+material and physical presence, with the force that he himself deploys
+or transmits to some few others, is at the opposite extreme of this
+new physics of power represented by panopticism; the domain of
+panopticism is, on the contrary, that whole lower region, that region
+of irregular bodies, with their details, their multiple movements,
+their heterogeneous forces, their spatial relations; what are required
+are mechanisms that analyse distributions, gaps, series, combinations, and which use instruments that render visible, record,
+differentiate and compare: a physics of a relational and multiple
+power, which has its maximum intensity not in the person of the
+king, but in the bodies that can be individualized by these relations.
+At the theoretical level, Bentham defines another way of analysing
+the social body and the power relations that traverse it; in terms of
+practice, he defines a procedure of subordination of bodies and forces
+that must increase the utility of power while practising the economy
+of the prince. Panopticism is the general principle of a new 'political
+anatomy' whose object and end are not the relations of sovereignty
+but the relations of discipline.
+The celebrated, transparent, circular cage, with its high tower,
+powerful and knowing, may have been for Bentham a project of a
+perfect disciplinary institution; but he also set out to show how one
+may 'unlock' the disciplines and get them to function in a diffused,
+208
+
+multiple, polyvalent way throughout the whole social body. These
+disciplines, which the classical age had elaborated in specific,
+relatively enclosed places - barracks, schools, workshops - and
+whose total implementation had been imagined only at the limited
+and temporary scale of a plague-stricken town, Bentham dreamt of
+transforming into a network of mechanisms that would be everywhere and always alert, running through society without interruption in space or in time. The panoptic arrangement provides the
+formula for this generalization. It programmes, at the level of an
+elementary and easily transferable mechanism, the basic functioning
+of a society penetrated through and through with disciplinary
+mechanisms.
+There are two images, then, of discipline. At one extreme, the
+discipline-blockade, the enclosed institution, established on the
+edges of society, turned inwards towards negative functions:
+arresting evil, breaking communications, suspending time. At the
+other extreme, with panopticism, is the discipline-mechanism: a
+functional mechanism that must improve the exercise of power by
+making it lighter, more rapid, more effective, a design of subtle
+coercion for a society to come. The movement from one project
+to the other, from a schema of exceptional discipline to one of
+a generalized surveillance, rests on a historical transformation:
+the gradual extension of the mechanisms of discipline throughout
+the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their spread throughout the
+whole social body, the formation of what might be called in general
+the disciplinary society.
+A whole disciplinary generalization - the Benthamite physics of
+power represents an acknowledgement of this - had operated
+throughout the classical age. The spread of disciplinary institutions,
+whose network was beginning to cover an ever larger surface and
+occupying above all a less and less marginal position, testifies to
+this: what was an islet, a privileged place, a circumstantial measure,
+or a singular model, became a general formula; the regulations
+characteristic of the Protestant and pious armies of William of
+Orange or of Gustavus Adolphus were transformed into regulations
+for all the armies of Europe; the model colleges of the Jesuits, or the
+schools of Batencour or Demia, following the example set by Sturm,
+209
+
+provided the outlines for the general forms of educational discipline; the ordering of the naval and military hospitals provided
+the model for the entire reorganization of hospitals in the eighteenth
+century.
+But this extension of the disciplinary institutions was no doubt
+only the most visible aspect of various, more profound processes.
+I. The functional inversion of the disciplines. At first, they were
+expected to neutralize dangers, to fix useless or disturbed populations, to avoid the inconveniences of over-large assemblies; now
+they were being asked to play a positive role, for they were becoming able to do so, to increase the possible utility of individuals.
+Military discipline is no longer a mere means of preventing looting,
+desertion or failure to obey orders among the troops; it has become
+a basic technique to enable the army to exist, not as an assembled
+crowd, but as a unity that derives from this very unity an increase
+in its forces; discipline increases the skill of each individual, coordinates these skills, accelerates movements, increases fire power,
+broadens the fronts of attack without reducing their vigour, increases the capacity for resistance, etc. The discipline of the workshop, while remaining a way of enforcing respect for the regulations
+and authorities, of preventing thefts or losses, tends to increase
+aptitudes, speeds, output and therefore profits; it still exerts a moral
+influence over behaviour, but more and more it treats actions in
+terms of their results, introduces bodies into a machinery, forces into
+an economy. When, in the seventeenth century, the provincial
+schools or the Christian elementary schools were founded, the
+justifications given for them were above all negative: those poor
+who were unable to bring up their children left them 'in ignorance
+of their obligations: given the difficulties they have in earning a
+living, and themselves having been badly brought up, they are
+unable to communicate a sound upbringing that they themselves
+never had'; this involves three major inconveniences: ignorance of
+God, idleness (with its consequent drunkenness, impurity, larceny,
+brigandage); and the formation of those gangs of beggars, always
+ready to stir up public disorder and 'virtually to exhaust the funds
+of the Hôtel-Dieu' (Demia, 60 61). Now, at the beginning of the
+Revolution, the end laid down for primary education was to be,
+among other things, to 'fortify', to 'develop the body', to prepare
+210
+
+the child 'for a future in some mechanical work', to give him 'an
+observant eye, a sure hand and prompt habits' (Talleyrand's Report
+to the Constituent Assembly, 10 September 1791, quoted by Léon,
+106). The disciplines function increasingly as techniques for making
+useful individuals. Hence their emergence from a marginal position
+on the confines of society, and detachment from the forms of
+exclusion or expiation, confinement or retreat. Hence the slow
+loosening of their kinship with religious regularities and enclosures.
+Hence also their rooting in the most important, most central and
+most productive sectors of society. They become attached to some
+of the great essential functions: factory production, the transmission
+ofknowledge, the diffusion of aptitudes and skills, the war-machine.
+Hence, too, the double tendency one sees developing throughout
+the eighteenth century to increase the number of disciplinary institutions and to discipline the existing apparatuses.
+2. The swarming of disciplinary mechanisms. While, on the one
+hand, the disciplinary establishments increase, their mechanisms
+have a certain tendency to become 'de-institutionalized", to emerge
+from the closed fortresses in which they once functioned and to
+circulate in a 'free' state; the massive, compact disciplines are broken
+down into flexible methods of control, which may be transferred
+and adapted. Sometimes the closed apparatuses add to their internal
+and specific function a role of external surveillance, developing
+around themselves a whole margin of lateral controls. Thus the
+Christian School must not simply train docile children; it must also
+make it possible to supervise the parents, to gain information as to
+their way of life, their resources, their piety, their morals. The
+school tends to constitute minute social observatories that penetrate
+even to the adults and exercise regular supervision over them: the
+bad behaviour of the child, or his absence, is a legitimate pretext,
+according to Demia, for one to go and question the neighbours,
+especially if there is any reason to believe that the family will not
+tell the truth; one can then go and question the parents themselves,
+to find out whether they know their catechism and the prayers,
+whether they are determined to root out the vices of their children,
+how many beds there are in the house and what the sleeping arrangements are; the visit may end with the giving of alms, the present of a
+religious picture, or the provision of additional beds (Demia, 39-40).
+2II
+
+Similarly, the hospital is increasingly conceived of as a base for
+the medical observation of the population outside; after the burning
+down of the Hôtel-Dieu in 1772, there were several demands that
+the large buildings, so heavy and so disordered, should be replaced
+by a series of smaller hospitals; their function would be to take in
+the sick of the quarter, but also to gather information, to be alert
+to any endemic or epidemic phenomena, to open dispensaries, to
+give advice to the inhabitants and to keep the authorities informed
+of the sanitary state of the region.
+One also sees the spread of disciplinary procedures, not in the
+form of enclosed institutions, but as centres of observation disseminated throughout society. Religious groups and charity
+organizations had long played this role of 'disciplining' the population. From the Counter-Reformation to the philanthropy of the
+July monarchy, initiatives of this type continued to increase; their
+aims were religious (conversion and moralization), economic (aid
+and encouragement to work) or political (the struggle against discontent or agitation). One has only to cite by way of example the
+regulations for the charity associations in the Paris parishes. The
+territory to be covered was divided into quarters and cantons and
+the members of the associations divided themselves up along the
+same lines. These members had to visit their respective areas
+regularly. 'They will strive to eradicate places of ill-repute, tobacco
+shops, life-classes, gaming house, public scandals, blasphemy, impiety, and any other disorders that may come to their knowledge.'
+They will also have to make individual visits to the poor; and the
+information to be obtained is laid down in regulations: the stability
+of the lodging, knowledge of prayers, attendance at the sacraments,
+knowledge of a trade, morality (and 'whether they have not fallen
+into poverty through their own fault'); lastly, 'one must learn by
+skilful questioning in what way they behave at home. Whether there
+is peace between them and their neighbours, whether they are careful to bring up their children in the fear of God ... whether they do
+not have their older children of different sexes sleeping together and
+with them, whether they do not allow licentiousness and cajolery
+in their families, especially in their older daughters. If one has any
+doubts as to whether they are married, one must ask to see their
+marriage certificate'. S
+212
+
+3. The stare-control of the mechanisms of discipline. In England, it
+was private religious groups that carried out, for a long time, the
+functions of social discipline (cf. Radzinovitz, 203-14); in France,
+although a part of this role remained in the hands of parish guilds
+or charity associations, another - and no doubt the most important
+part - was very soon taken over by the police apparatus.
+The organization of a centralized police had long been regarded,
+even by contemporaries, as the most direct expression of royal
+absolutism; the sovereign had wished to have 'his own magistrate to
+whom he might directly entrust his orders, his commissions, intentions, and who was entrusted with the execution of orders and
+orders under the King's private seal' (a note by Duval, first secretary
+at the police magistrature, quoted in Funck-Brentano, I). In effect,
+in taking over a number of pre-existing functions - the search for
+criminals, urban surveillance, economic and political supervision -
+the police magistratures and the magistrature-general that presided
+over them in Paris transposed them into a single, strict, administrative machine: 'All the radiations of force and information that
+spread from the circumference culminate in the magistrate-general.
+•.. It is he who operates all the wheels that together produce order
+and harmony. The effects of his administration cannot be better
+compared than to the movement of the celestial bodies? (Des
+Essarts, 344 and 528).
+But, although the police as an institution were certainly organized
+in the form of a state apparatus, and although this was certainly
+linked directly to the centre of political sovereignty, the type of
+power that it exercises, the mechanisms it operates and the elements
+to which it applies them are specific. It is an apparatus that must be
+coextensive with the entire social body and not only by the extreme
+limits that it embraces, but by the minuteness of the details it is
+concerned with. Police power must bear 'over everything': it is not
+however the totality of the state nor of the kingdom as visible and
+invisible body of the monarch; it is the dust of events, actions,
+behaviour, opinions - 'everything that happens';? the police are
+concerned with 'those things of every moment', those 'unimportant
+things', of which Catherine II spoke in her Great Instruction
+(Supplement to the Instruction for the drawing up of a new code, 1762,
+article 535). With the police, one is in the indefinite world of a
+213
+
+supervision that seeks ideally to reach the most elementary particle,
+the most passing phenomenon of the social body: "The ministry of
+the magistrates and police officers is of the greatest importance; the
+objects that it embraces are in a sense definite, one may perceive
+them only by a sufficiently detailed examination' (Delamare, unnumbered Preface): the infinitely small of political power.
+And, in order to be exercised, this power had to be given the
+instrument of permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance,
+capable of making all visible, as long as it could itself remain invisible. It had to be like a faceless gaze that transformed the whole
+social body into a field of perceptión: thousands of eyes posted
+everywhere, mobile attentions ever on the alert, a long, hierarchized
+network which, according to Le Maire, comprised for Paris the
+forty-eight commissaires, the twenty inspecteurs, then the 'observers',
+who were paid regularly, the "basses mouches', or secret agents, who
+were paid by the day, then the informers, paid according to the job
+done, and finally the prostitutes. And this unceasing observation
+had to be accumulated in aseries of reports and registers; throughout
+the eighteenth century, an immense police text increasingly covered
+society by means of a complex documentary organization (on the
+police registers in the eighteenth century, cf. Chassaigne). And,
+unlike the methods of judicial or administrative writing, what was
+registered in this way were forms of behaviour, attitudes, possibilities, suspicions - a permanent account of individuals' behaviour.
+Now, it should be noted that, although this police supervision
+was entirely "in the hands of the king', it did not function in a single
+direction. It was in fact a double-entry system: it had to correspond,
+by manipulating the machinery of justice, to the immediate wishes
+of the king, but it was also capable of responding to solicitations
+from below; the celebrated lettres de cacher, or orders under the
+king's private seal, which were long the symbol of arbitrary royal
+rule and which brought detention into disrepute on political
+grounds, were in fact demanded by families, masters, local notables,
+neighbours, parish priests; and their function was to punish by
+confinement a whole infra-penality, that of disorder, agitation, disobedience, bad conduct; those things that Ledoux wanted to exclude
+from his architecturally perfect city and which he called 'offences of
+non-surveillance'. In short, the eighteenth-century police added a
+214
+
+disciplinary function to its role as the auxiliary of justice in the
+pursuit of criminals and as an instrument for the political supervision
+of plots, opposition movements or revolts. It was a complex function since it linked the absolute power of the monarch to the lowest
+levels of power disseminated in society; since, between these different, enclosed institutions of discipline (workshops, armies, schools),
+it extended an intermediary network, acting where they could not
+intervene, disciplining the non-disciplinary spaces; but it filled in
+the gaps, linked them together, guaranteed with its armed force an
+interstitial discipline and a meta-discipline. 'By means of a wise
+police, the sovereign accustoms the people to order and obedience'
+(Vattel, 162).
+The organization of the police apparatus in the eighteenth century
+sanctioned a generalization of the disciplines that became co-extensive with the state itself. Although it was linked in the most explicit
+way with everything in the royal power that exceeded the exercise
+of regular justice, it is understandable why the police offered such
+slight resistance to the rearrangement of the judicial power; and why
+it has not ceased to impose its prerogatives upon it, with everincreasing weight, right up to the present day; this is no doubt
+because it is the secular arm of the judiciary; but it is also because,
+to a far greater degree than the judicial institution, it is identified,
+by reason of its extent and mechanisms, with a society of the
+disciplinary type. Yet it would be wrong to believe that the disciplinary functions were confiscated and absorbed once and for all
+by a state apparatus.
+'Discipline' may be identified neither with an institution nor with
+an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of
+application, targets; it is a 'physics' or an 'anatomy' of power, a
+technology. And it may be taken over either by 'specialized' institutions (the penitentiaries or 'houses of correction' of the nineteenth
+century), or by institutions that use it as an essential instrument for a
+particular end (schools, hospitals), or by pre-existing authorities
+that find in it a means of reinforcing or reorganizing their internal
+mechanisms of power (one day we should show how intra-familial
+relations, essentially in the parents-children cell, have become 'disciplined", absorbing since the classical age external schemata, first
+215
+
+educational and military, then medical, psychiatric, psychological,
+which have made the family the privileged locus of emergence for
+the disciplinary question of the normal and the abnormal); or by
+apparatuses that have made discipline their principle of internal
+functioning (the disciplinarization of the administrative apparatus
+from the Napoleonic period), or finally by state apparatuses whose
+major, if not exclusive, function is to assure that discipline reigns
+over society as a whole (the police).
+On the whole, therefore, one can speak of the formation of a
+disciplinary society in this movement that stretches from the
+enclosed disciplines, a sort of social 'quarantine", to an indefinitely
+generalizable mechanism of 'panopticism'. Not because the disciplinary modality of power has replaced all the others; but because
+it has infiltrated the orhers, sometimes undermining them, but
+serving as an intermediary between them, linking them together,
+extending them and above all making it possible to bring the effects
+of power to the most minute and distant elements. It assures an
+infinitesimal distribution of the power relations.
+A few years after Bentham, Julius gave this society its birth
+certificate (Julius, 384-6). Speaking of the panoptic principle, he
+said that there was much more there than architectural ingenuity:
+it was an event in the 'history of the human mind'. In appearance,
+it is merely the solution of a technical problem; but, through it, a
+whole type of society emerges. Antiquity had been a civilization of
+spectacle. "To render accessible to a multitude of men the inspection
+of a small number of objects': this was the problem to which the
+architecture of temples, theatres and circuses responded. With
+spectacle, there was a predominance of public life, the intensity of
+festivals, sensual proximity. In these rituals in which blood flowed,
+society found new vigour and formed for a moment a single great
+body. The modern age poses the opposite problem: "To procure
+for a small number, or even for a single individual, the instantaneous
+view of a great multitude.' In a society in which the principal
+elements are no longer the community and public life, but, on the
+one hand, private individuals and, on the other, the state, relations
+can be regulated only in a form that is the exact reverse of the
+spectacle: It was to the modern age, to the ever-growing influence
+of the state, to its ever more profound intervention in all the details
+z16
+
+and all the relations of social life, that was reserved the task of
+increasing and perfecting its guarantees, by using and directing
+towards that great air the building and distribution of buildings
+intended to observe a great multitude of men at the same time.'
+Julius saw as a fulfilled historical process that which Bentham had
+described as a technical programme. Our society is one not of
+spectacle, but of surveillance; under the surface of images, one
+invests bodies in depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange,
+there continues the meticulous, concrete training of useful forces;
+the circuits of communication are the supports of an accumulation
+and a centralization of knowledge; the play of signs defines the
+anchorages of power; it is not that the beautiful totality of the
+individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is
+rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a
+whole technique of forces and bodies. We are much less Greeks than
+we believe. We are neither in the amphitheatre, nor on the stage,
+but in the panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power, which
+we bring to ourselves since we are part of its mechanism. The
+importance, in historical mythology, of the Napoleonic character
+probably derives from the fact that it is at the point of junction of
+the monarchical, ritual exercise of sovereignty and the hierarchical,
+permanent exercise of indefinite discipline. He is the individual who
+looms over everything with a single gaze which no detail, however
+minute, can escape: 'You may consider that no part of the Empire
+is without surveillance, no crime, no offence, no contravention that
+remains unpunished, and that the eye of the genius who can enlighten all embraces the whole of this vast machine, without, however, the slightest detail escaping his attention' (Treilhard, 14). At
+the moment of its full blossoming, the disciplinary society still
+assumes with the Emperor the old aspect of the power of spectacle.
+As a monarch who is at one and the same time a usurper of the
+ancient throne and the organizer of the new state, he combined
+into a single symbolic, ultimate figure the whole of the long process
+by which the pomp of sovereignty, the necessarily spectacular
+manifestations of power, were extinguished one by one in the daily
+exercise of surveillance, in a panopticism in which the vigilance of
+intersecting gazes was soon to render useless both the eagle and
+the sun.
+217
+
+The formation of the disciplinary society is connected with a
+number of broad historical processes - economic, juridico-political
+and, lastly, scientific - of which it forms part.
+1. Generally speaking, it might be said that the disciplines are
+techniques for assuring the ordering of human multiplicities. It is
+true that there is nothing exceptional or even characteristic in this:
+every system of power is presented with the same problem. But the
+peculiarity of the disciplines is that they try to define in relation to
+the multiplicities a tactics of power that fulfils three criteria: firstly,
+to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost (economically, by the low expenditure it involves; politically, by its discretion,
+its low exteriorization, its relative invisibility, the little resistance it
+arouses); secondly, to bring the effects of this social power to their
+maximum intensity and to extend them as far as possible, without
+either failure or interval; thirdly, to link this 'economic' growth of
+power with the output of the apparatuses (educational, military,
+industrial or medical within which it is exercised; in short, to
+increase both the docility and the utility of all the elements of the
+system. This triple objective of the disciplines corresponds to a
+well-known historical conjuncture. One aspect of this conjuncture
+was the large demographic thrust of the eighteenth century; an
+increase in the floating population (one of the primary objects of
+discipline is to fix; it is an anti-nomadic technique); a change of
+quantitative scale in the groups to be supervised or manipulated
+(from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the eve of the
+French Revolution, the school population had been increasing
+rapidly, as had no doubt the hospital population; by the end of the
+eighteenth century, the peace-time army exceeded 200,000 men).
+The other aspect of the conjuncture was the growth in the apparatus
+of production, which was becoming more and more extended and
+complex; it was also becoming more costly and its profitability had
+to be increased. The development of the disciplinary methods
+corresponded to these two processes, or rather, no doubt, to the new
+need to adjust their correlation. Neither the residual forms of feudal
+power nor the structures of the administrative monarchy, nor the
+local mechanisms of supervision, nor the unstable, tangled mass
+they all formed together could carry out this role: they were
+hindered from doing so by the irregular and inadequate extension of
+218
+
+their network, by their often conflicting functioning, but above all
+by the 'costly' nature of the power that was exercised in them. It
+was costly in several senses: because directly it cost a great deal to
+the Treasury; because the system of corrupt offices and farmed-out
+taxes weighed indirectly, but very heavily, on the population;
+because the resistance it encountered forced it into a cycle of perpetual reinforcement; because it proceeded essentially by levying
+(levying on money or products by royal, seigniorial, ecclesiastical
+taxation; levying on men or time by corvées of press-ganging, by
+locking up or banishing vagabonds). The development of the disciplines marks the appearance of elementary techniques belonging to
+a quite different economy: mechanisms of power which, instead of
+proceeding by deduction, are integrated into the productive efficiency of the apparatuses from within, into the growth of this
+efficiency and into the use of what it produces. For the old principle
+of levying-violence', which governed the economy of power, the
+disciplines substitute the principle of 'mildness-production-profit.
+These are the techniques that make it possible to adjust the multiplicity of men and the multiplication of the apparatuses of production (and this means not only 'production' in the strict sense, but
+also the production of knowledge and skills in the school, the
+production of health in the hospitals, the production of destructive
+force in the army).
+In this task of adjustment, discipline had to solve a number of
+problems for which the old economy of power was not sufficiently
+equipped. It could reduce the inefficiency of mass phenomena:
+reduce what, in a multiplicity, makes it much less manageable than
+a unity; reduce what is opposed to the use of each of its elements
+and of their sum; reduce everything that may counter the advantages
+of number. That is why discipline fixes; it arrests or regulates
+movements; it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings
+of individuals wandering about the country in unpredictable ways;
+it establishes calculated distributions. It must also master all the
+forces that are formed from the very constitution of an organized
+multiplicity; it must neutralize the effects of counter-power that
+spring from them and which form a resistance to the power that
+wishes to dominate it: agitations, revolts, spontaneous organizations,
+coalitions - anything that may establish horizontal conjunctions.
+219
+
+Hehce the fact that the disciplines use procedures of partitioning
+and verticality, that they introduce, between the different elements
+at the same level, as solid separations as possible, that they define
+compact hierarchical networks, in short, that they oppose to the
+intrinsic, adverse force of multiplicity the technique of the continuous, individualizing pyramid. They must also increase the particular
+utility of each element of the multiplicity, but by means that are the
+most rapid and the least costly, that is to say, by using the multiplicity itself as an instrument of this growth. Hence, in order to
+extract from bodies the maximum time and force, the use of those
+overall methods known as time-tables, collective training, exercises,
+total and detailed surveillance. Furthermore, the disciplines must
+increase the effect of utility proper to the multiplicities, so that each
+is made more useful than the simple sum of its elements: it is in
+order to increase the utilizable effects of the multiple that the disciplines define tactics of distribution, reciprocal adjustment of bodies,
+gestures and rhythms, differentiation of capacities, reciprocal coordination in relation to apparatuses or tasks. Lastly, the disciplines
+have to bring into play the power relations, not above but inside
+the very texture of the multiplicity, as discreetly as possible, as well
+articulated on the other functions of these multiplicities and also in
+the least expensive way possible: to this correspond anonymous
+instruments of power, coextensive with the multiplicity that they
+regiment, such as hierarchical surveillance, continuous registration,
+perpetual assessment and classification. In short, to substitute for a
+power that is manifested through the brilliance of those who exercise
+it, a power that insidiously objectifies those on whom it is applied;
+to form a body of knowledge about these individuals, rather than to
+deploy the ostentatious signs of sovereignty. In a word, the disciplines are the ensemble of minute technical inventions that made it
+possible to increase the useful size of multiplicities by decreasing the
+inconveniences of the power which, in order to make them useful,
+must control them. A multiplicity, whether in a workshop or a
+nation, an army or a school, reaches the threshold of a discipline
+when the relation of the one to the other becomes favourable.
+If the economic take-off of the West began with the techniques
+that made possible the accumulation of capital, it might perhaps be
+said that the methods for administering the accumulation of men
+220
+
+made possible a political take-off in relation to the traditional, ritual,
+costly, violent forms of power, which soon fell into disuse and were
+superseded by a subtle, calculated technology of subjection. In fact,
+the two processes - the accumulation of men and the accumulation
+of capital - cannot be separated; it would not have been possible
+to solve the problem of the accumulation of men without the growth
+of an apparatus of production capable of both sustaining them and
+using them; conversely, the techniques that made the cumulative
+multiplicity of men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital.
+At a less general level, the technological mutations of the apparatus
+of production, the division of labour and the elaboration of the
+disciplinary techniques sustained an ensemble of very close relations
+(cf. Marx, Capiral, vol. I, chapter XIII and the very interesting
+analysis in Guerry and Deleule). Each makes the other possible and
+necessary; each provides a model for the other. The disciplinary
+pyramid constituted the small cell of power within which the
+separation, coordination and supervision of tasks was imposed and
+made efficient; and analytical partitioning of time, gestures and
+bodily forces constituted an operational schema that could easily be
+transferred from the groups to be subjected to the mechanisms of
+production; the massive projection of military methods onto industrial organization was an example of this modelling of the division
+of labour following the model laid down by the schemata of power.
+But, on the other hand, the technical analysis of the process of
+production, its 'mechanical' breaking-down, were projected onto
+the labour force whose task it was to implement it: the constitution
+of those disciplinary machines in which the individual forces that
+they bring together are composed into a whole and therefore
+increased is the effect of this projection. Let us say that discipline
+is the unitary technique by which the body is reduced as a "political
+force at the least cost and maximized as a useful force. The growth
+of a capitalist economy gave rise to the specific modality of disciplinary power, whose general formulas, techniques of submitting
+forces and bodies, in short, 'political anatomy', could be operated
+in the most diverse political régimes, apparatuses or institutions.
+2. The panoptic modality of power - at the elementary, technical, merely physical level at which it is situated - is not under
+the immediate dependence or a direct extension of the great
+221
+
+juridico-political structures of a society; it is nonetheless not
+absolutely independent. Historically, the process by which the
+bourgeoisie became in the course of the eighteenth century the politically dominant class was masked by the establishment of an explicit,
+coded and formally egalitarian juridical framework, made possible
+by the organization of a parliamentary, representative régime. But
+the development and generalization of disciplinary mechanisms
+constituted the other, dark side of these processes. The general
+juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that were egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny, everyday, physical
+mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentially
+non-egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines. And
+although, in a formal way, the representative régime makes it possible, directly or indirectly, with or without relays, for the will of
+all to form the fundamental authority of sovereignty, the disciplines
+provide, at the base, a guarantee of the submission of forces and
+bodies. The real, corporal disciplines constituted the foundation of
+the formal, juridical liberties. The contract may have been regarded
+as thę ideal foundation of law and political power; panopticism
+constituted the technique, universally widespread, of coercion.
+It continued to work in depth on the juridical structures of society,
+in order to make the effective mechanisms of power function in
+opposition to the formal framework that it had acquired. The
+'Enlightenment', which discovered the liberties, also invented the
+disciplines.
+In appearance, the disciplines constitute nothing more than an
+infra-law. They seem to extend the general forms defined by law to
+the infinitesimal level of individual lives; or they appear as methods
+of training that enable individuals to become integrated into these
+general demands. They seem to constitute the same type of law on
+a different scale, thereby making it more meticulous and more
+indulgent. The disciplines should be regarded as a sort of counterlaw. They have the precise role of introducing insuperable asymmetries and excluding reciprocities. First, because discipline creates
+between individuals a 'private' link, which is a relation of constraints
+entirely different from contractual obligation; the acceptance of a
+discipline may be underwritten by contract; the way in which itis
+imposed, the mechanisms it brings into play, the non-reversible
+222
+
+subordination of one group of people by another, the "surplus'
+power that is always fixed on the same side, the inequality of position of the different 'partners' in relation to the common regulation,
+all these distinguish the disciplinary link from the contractual link,
+and make it possible to distort the contractual link systematically
+from the moment it has as its content a mechanism of discipline.
+We know, for example, how many real procedures undermine the
+legal fiction of the work contract: workshop discipline is not the
+least important. Moreover, whereas the juridical systems define
+juridical subjects according to universal norms, the disciplines
+characterize, classify, specialize; they distribute along a scale,
+around a norm, hierarchize individuals in relation to one another
+and, if necessary, disqualify and invalidate. In any case, in the space
+and during the time in which they exercise their control and bring
+into play the asymmetries of their power, they effect a suspension
+of the law that is never total, but is never annulled either. Regular
+and institutional as it may be, the discipline, in its mechanism, is a
+'counter-law'. And, although the universal juridicism of modern
+society seems to fix limits on the exercise of power, its universally
+widespread panopticism enables it to operate, on the underside of
+the law, a machinery that is both immense and minute, which supports, reinforces, multiplies the asymmetry of power and undermines the limits that are traced around the law. The minute disciplines, the panopticisms of every day may well be below the level
+of emergence of the great apparatuses and the great political
+struggles. But, in the genealogy of modern society, they have been,
+with the class domination that traverses it, the political counterpart
+of the juridical norms according to which power was redistributed.
+Hence, no doubt, the importance that has been given for so long
+to the small techniques of discipline, to those apparently insignificant
+tricks that it has invented, and even to those 'sciences' that give it a
+respectable face; hence the fear of abandoning them if one cannot
+find any substitute; hence the affirmation that they are at the very
+foundation of society, and an element in its equilibrium, whereas
+they are a series of mechanisms for unbalancing power relations
+definitively and everywhere; hence the persistence in regarding them
+as the humble, but concrete form of every morality, whereas they
+are a set of physico-political techniques.
+22}
+
+To return to the problem of legal punishments, the prison with
+all the corrective technology at its disposal is to be resituated at the
+point where the codified power to punish turns into a disciplinary
+power to observe; at the point where the universal punishments of
+the law are applied selectively to certain individuals and always the
+same ones; at the point where the redefinition of the juridical subject
+by the penalty becomes a useful training of the criminal; at the point
+where the law is inverted and passes outside itself, and where the
+counter-law becomes the effective and institutionalized content of
+the juridical forms. What generalizes the power to punish, then, is
+not the universal consciousness of the law in each juridical subject;
+it is the regular extension, the infinitely minute web of panoptic
+techniques.
+3. Taken one by one, most of these techniques have a long
+history behind them. But what was new, in the eighteenth century,
+was that, by being combined and generalized, they attained a level
+at which the formation of knowledge and the increase of power
+regularly reinforce one another in a circular process. At this point,
+the disciplines crossed the 'technological' threshold. First the
+hospital, then the school, then, later, the workshop were not simply 'reordered' by the disciplines; they became, thanks to them,
+apparatuses such that any mechanism of objectification could be
+used in them as an instrument of subjection, and any growth of
+power could give rise in them to possible branches of knowledge;
+it was this link, proper to the technological systems, that made
+possible within the disciplinary element the formation of clinical
+medicine, psychiatry, child psychology, educational psychology,
+the rationalization of labour. It is a double process, then: an epistemological 'thaw' through a refinement of power relations; a
+multiplication of the effects of power through the formation
+and accumulation of new forms of knowledge.
+The extension of the disciplinary methods is inscribed in a broad
+historical process: the development at about the same time of many
+other technologies - agronomical, industrial, economic. But it must
+be recognized that, compared with the mining industries, the
+emerging chemical industries or methods of national accountancy,
+compared with the blast furnaces or the steam engine, panopticism
+has received little attention. It is regarded as not much more than a
+124
+
+bizarre little utopia, a perverse dream - rather as though Bentham
+had been the Fourier of a police society, and the Phalanstery had
+taken on the form of the Panopticon. And yet this represented the
+abstract formula of a very real technology, that of individuals.
+There were many reasons why it received little praise; the most
+obvious is that the discourses to which it gave rise rarely acquired,
+except in the academic classifications, the status of sciences; but the
+real reason is no doubt that the power that it operates and which it
+augments is a direct, physical power that men exercise upon one
+another. An inglorious culmination had an origin that could be
+only grudgingly acknowledged. But it would be unjust to compare
+the disciplinary techniques with such inventions as the steam engine
+or Amici's microscope. They are much less; and yet, in a way, they
+are much more. If a historical equivalent or at least a point of
+comparison had to be found for them, it would be rather in the
+"inquisitorial' technique.
+The eighteenth century invented the techniques of discipline and
+the examination, rather as the Middle Ages invented the judicial
+investigation. But it did so by quite different means. The investigation procedure, an old fiscal and administrative technique, had
+developed above all with the reorganization of the Church and the
+increase of the princely states in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. At this time it permeated to a very large degree the jurisprudence first of the ecclesiastical courts, then of the lay courts.
+The investigation as an authoritarian search for a truth observed
+or attested was thus opposed to the old procedures of the oath,
+the ordeal, the judicial duel, the judgement of God or even of the
+transaction between private individuals. The investigation was the
+sovereign power arrogating to itself the right to establish the truth
+by a number of regulated techniques. Now, although the investigation has since then been an integral part of western justice (even up
+to our own day), one must not forget either its political origin, its
+link with the birth of the states and of monarchical sovereignty, or
+its later extension and its role in the formation of knowledge. In
+fact, the investigation has been the no doubt crude, but fundamental
+element in the constitution of the empirical sciences; it has been the
+juridico-political matrix of this experimental knowledge, which, as
+we know, was very rapidly released at the end of the Middle Ages.
+225
+
+It is perhaps true to say that, in Greece, mathematics were born
+from techniques of measurement; the sciences of nature, in any case,
+were born, to some extent, at the end of the Middle Ages, from the
+practices of investigation. The great empirical knowledge that
+covered the things of the world and transcribed them into the
+ordering of an indefinite discourse that observes, describes and
+establishes the 'facts' (at a time when the western world was beginning the economic and political conquest of this same world) had
+its operating model no doubt in the Inquisition - that immense
+invention that our recent mildness has placed in the dark recesses
+of our memory. But what this politico-juridical, administrative and
+criminal, religious and lay, investigation was to the sciences of
+nature, disciplinary analysis has been to the sciences of man. These
+sciences, which have so delighted our 'humanity' for over a century,
+have their technical matrix in the petty, malicious minutiae of the
+disciplines and their investigations. These investigations are perhaps
+to psychology, psychiatry, pedagogy, criminology, and so many
+other strange sciences, what the terrible power of investigation was
+to the calm knowledge of the animals, the plants or the earth.
+Another power, another knowledge. On the threshold of the classical age, Bacon, lawyer and statesman, tried to develop a methodology
+of investigation for the empirical sciences. What Great Observer
+will produce the methodology of examination for the human
+sciences! Unless, of course, such a thing is not possible. For,
+although it is true that, in becoming a technique for the empirical
+sciences, the investigation has detached itself from the inquisitorial
+procedure, in which it was historically rooted, the examination has
+remained extremely close to the disciplinary power that shaped it.
+It has always been and still is an intrinsic element of the disciplines..
+Of course it seems to have undergone a speculative purification by
+integrating itself with such sciences as psychology and psychiatry.
+And, in effect, its appearance in the form of tests, interviews,
+interrogations and consultations is apparently in order to rectify
+the mechanisms of discipline: educational psychology is supposed to
+correct the rigours of the school, just as the medical or psychiatric
+interview is supposed to rectify the effects of the discipline of work.
+But we must not be misled; these techniques merely refer individuals
+from one disciplinary authority to another, and they reproduce, in
+226
+
+a concentrated or formalized form, the schema of power-knowledge
+proper to each discipline (on this subject, cf. Tort). The great
+investigation that gave rise to the sciences of nature has become
+detached from its politico-juridical model; the examination, on the
+other hand, is still caught up in disciplinary technology.
+In the Middle Ages, the procedure of investigation gradually
+superseded the old accusatory justice, by a process initiated from
+above; the disciplinary technique, on the other hand, insidiously
+and as if from below, has invaded a penal justice that is still, in
+principle, inquisitorial. All the great movements of extension that
+characterize modern penality - the problematization of the criminal
+behind his crime, the concern with a punishment that is a correction,
+a therapy, a normalization, the division of the act of judgement
+between various authorities that are supposed to measure, assess,
+diagnose, cure, transform individuals - all this betrays the penetration of the disciplinary examination into the judicial inquisition.
+What is now imposed on penal justice as its point of application,
+its 'useful' object, will no longer be the body of the guilty man set
+up against the body of the king; nor will it be the juridical subject
+of an ideal contract; it will be the disciplinary individual. The
+extreme point of penal justice under the Ancien Régime was the
+infinite segmentation of the body of the regicide: a manifestation
+of the strongest power over the body of the greatest criminal,
+whose total destruction made the crime explode into its truth. The
+ideal point of penality today would be an indefinite discipline: an
+interrogation without end, an investigation that would be extended
+without limit to a meticulous and ever more analytical observation,
+a judgement that would at the same time be the constitution of a file
+that was never closed, the calculated leniency of a penalty that would
+be interlaced with the ruthless curiosity of an examination, a procedure that would be at the same time the permanent measure of a
+gap in relation to an inaccessible norm and the asymptotic movement that strives to meet in infinity. The public execution was the
+logical culmination of a procedure governed by the Inquisition. The
+practice of placing individuals under 'observation' is a natural extension of a justice imbued with disciplinary methods and examination
+procedures. Is it surprising that the cellular prison, with its regular
+chronologies, forced labour, its authorities of surveillance and
+227
+
+reglstration, its experts in normality, who continue and multiply the
+functions of the judge, should have become the modern instrument
+of penality? Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools,
+barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?
+228
+
+PART FOUR
+
+1. Complete and austere institutions
+It would not be true to say that the prison was born with the new
+codes. The prison form antedates its systematic use in the penal
+system. It had already been constituted outside the legal apparatus
+when, throughout the social body, procedures were being elaborated
+for distributing individuals, fixing them in space, classifying them,
+extracting from them the maximum in time and forces, training their
+bodies, coding their continuous behaviour, maintaining them in
+perfect visibility, forming around them an apparatus of observation,
+registration and recording, constituting on them a body of knowledge that is accumulated and centralized. The general form of an
+apparatus intended to render individuals docile and useful, by means
+of precise work upon their bodies, indicated the prison institution,
+before the law ever defined it as the penalty par excellence. At the
+turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was, it is true,
+a penality of detention; and it was a new thing. But it was really the
+opening up of penality to mechanisms of coercion already elaborated
+elsewhere. The 'models' of penal detention - Ghent, Gloucester,
+Walnut Street - marked the first visible points of this transition,
+rather than innovations or points of departure. The prison, an
+essential element in the punitive panopoly, certainly marksan important moment in the history of penal justice: its access to 'humanity'.
+But it is also an important moment in the history of those disciplinary mechanisms that the new class power was developing: that
+in which they colonized the legal institution. At the turn of the
+century, a new legislation defined the power to punish as a general
+function of society that was exercised in the same manner over all its
+members, and in which each individual was equally represented: but
+in making detention the penalty par excellence, it introduced procedures of domination characteristic of a particular type of power. A
+231
+
+justice that is supposed to be 'equal', a legal machinery that is
+supposed to be 'autonomous', but which contains all the asymmetries
+of disciplinary subjection, this conjunction marked the birth of the
+prison, "the penalty of civilized societies' (Rossi, 16g).
+One can understand the self-evident character that prison punishment very soon assumed. In the first years of the nineteenth century,
+people were still aware of its novelty; and yet it appeared so bound
+up and at such a deep level with the very functioning of society that it banished into oblivion all the other punishments that
+the eighteenth-century reformers had imagined. It seemed to have
+no alternative, as if carried along by the very movement of history:
+It is not chance, it is not the whim of the legislator that have made
+imprisonment the base and almost the entire edifice of our present
+penal scale: it is the progress of ideas and the improvement in
+morals' (Van Meenan, §29-30). And, although, in a little over a
+century, this self-evident character has become transformed, it has
+not disappeared. We are aware of all the inconveniences of prison,
+and that it is dangerous when it is not useless. And yet one cannot
+'see' how to replace it. It is the detestable solution, which one seems
+unable to do without.
+This 'self-evident' character of the prison, which we find so difficult to abandon, is based first of all on the simple form of 'deprivation of liberty'. How could prison not be the penalty par excellence
+in a society in which liberty is a good that belongs to all in the same
+way and to which each individual is attached, as Duport put it, by
+a 'universal and constant' feeling? Its loss has therefore the same
+value for all; unlike the fine, it is an 'egalitarian' punishment. The
+prison is the clearest, simplest, most equitable of penalties. Moreover, it makes it possible to quantify the penalty exactly according
+to the variable of time. There is a wages-form of imprisonment that
+constitutes, in industrial societies, its economic 'self-evidence' - and
+enables it to appear as a reparation. By levying on the time of the
+prisoner, the prison seems to express in concrete terms the idea that
+the offence has injured, beyond the victim, society as a whole. There
+is an economico-moral self-evidence of a penality that metes out
+punishments in days, months and years and draws up quantitative
+equivalences between offences and durations. Hence the expression, so frequently heard, so consistent with the functioning of
+z3z
+
+punishments, though contrary to the strict theory of penal law,
+that one is in prison in order to 'pay one's debr'. The prison is
+"natural', just as the use of time to measure exchanges is "natural"
+in our society.!
+But the self-evidence of the prison is also based on its role,
+supposed or demanded, as an apparatus for transforming individuals.
+How could the prison not be immediately accepted when, by locking
+up, retraining and rendering docile, it merely reproduces, with a
+little more emphasis, all the mechanisms that are to be found in the
+social body? The prison is like a rather disciplined barracks, a strict
+school, a dark workshop, but not qualitatively different. This double
+foundation - juridico-economic on the one hand, technico-disciplinary on the other - made the prison seem the most immediate and
+civilized form of all penalties. And it is this double functioning that
+immediately gave it its solidity. One thing is clear: the prison was
+not at first a deprivation of liberty to which a technical function of
+correction was later added; it was from the outset a form of legal
+detention' entrusted with an additional corrective task, or an enterprise for reforming individuals that the deprivation of liberty
+allowed to function in the legal system. In short, penal imprisonment, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, covered both
+the deprivation of liberty and the technical transformation of
+individuals.
+Let us remember a number of facts. In the codes of 1808 and 1810,
+and the measures that immediately preceded or followed them,
+imprisonment was never confused with mere deprivation of liberty.
+It was, or in any case had to be, a differentiated and finalized mechanism. Differentiated because it had to have the same form, whether
+the prisoner had been sentenced or was merely accused, whether he
+was a minor offender or a criminal: the various types of prison -
+maison d'arrêr, maison de correction, maison centrale - ought in
+principle to correspond more or less to these differences and provide
+a punishment that would be not only graduated in intensity, but
+diversified in its ends. For the prison has a purpose, which is laid
+down at the outset: "The law inflicting penalties, some of which are
+more serious than others, cannot allow the individual condemned
+to light penalties to be imprisoned in the same place as the criminal
+condemned to more serious penalties... although the penalty fixed
+233
+
+byuhe law has as its principal aim the reparation of the crime, it also
+desires the amendment of the guilty man' (Real, 244). And this
+transformation must be one of the internal effects of imprisonment.
+Prison-punishment, prison-apparatus: "The order that must reign in
+the maison de force may contribute powerfully to the regeneration
+of the convicts; the vices of upbringing, the contagion of bad
+example, idleness... have given birth to crime. Well, let us try to
+close up all these sources of corruption; let the rules of a healthy
+morality be practised in the maisons de force; that, compelled to work,
+convicts may come in the end to like it; when they have reaped the
+reward, they will acquire the habit, the taste, the need for occupation; let them give each other the example of a laborious life; it will
+soon become a pure life; soon they will begin to know regret for the
+past, the first harbinger of a love of duty.' The techniques of correction immediately form part of the institutional framework of
+penal detention.
+One should also recall that the movement for reforming the prisons, for controlling their functioning is not a recent phenomenon.
+It does not even seem to have originated in a recognition of failure.
+Prison 'reform' is virtually contemporary with the prison itself: it
+constitutes, as it were, its programme. From the outset, the prison
+was caught up in a series of accompanying mechanisms, whose
+purpose was apparently to correct it, but which seem to form part
+of its very functioning, so closely have they been bound up with its
+existence throughout its long history. There was, at once, a prolix
+technology of the prison. There were inquiries: that of Chaptal in
+1801 (whose task it was to discover what could be used to introduce
+the modern prison system into France), that of Decazes in 1819,
+Villermé's work published in 1820, the report on the maisons centrales drawn up by Martignac in 1829, the inquiries carried out in
+the United States by Beaumont and Tocqueville in 1831, by Demetz
+and Blouet in 1835, the questionnaires addressed by Montalivet to
+the directors of the maisons centrales and to the general councils of
+the départements during the debate on solitary confinement. There
+were societies for supervising the functioning of the prisons and for
+suggesting improvements: in 1818, the very official Société pour
+l'améliorarion des prisons, a little later the Sociéré des prisons and
+various philanthropic groups. Innumerable measures - orders,
+234
+
+instructions or laws: from the reform that the first Restoration had
+envisaged in September 1814, and which was never implemented, to
+the law of 1844, drawn up by Tocqueville, which ended for a time
+the long debate on the means of making imprisonment effective.
+There were programmes drawn up to improve the functioning of
+the machine-prison: programmes for the treatment of the prisoners,
+models for material improvement, some of these, like those of
+Danjou and Harou-Romain, remaining no more than projects,
+others becoming embodied in instructions (like the circular of y
+August 1841 on the building of maisons d'arrét), others becoming
+actual buildings, such as the Petite Roquette in which cellular
+imprisonment was organized for the first time in France.
+To these should be added the publications that sprang more or
+less directly from the prison and were drawn up either by philanthropists like Appert, or a little later by 'specialists' (such as the
+Annales de la Charité)" or, again, by former prisoners; Pauvre
+Jacques at the end of the Restoration, or the Gazette de Saince-
+Pélagie at the beginning of the July monarchy."
+The prison should not be seen as an inert institution, shaken at
+intervals by reform movements. The 'theory of the prison' was its
+constant set of operational instructions rather than its incidental
+criticism - one of its conditions of functioning. The prison has
+always formed part of an active field in which projects, improvements, experiments, theoretical statements, personal evidence and
+investigations have proliferated. The prison institution has always
+been a focus of concern and debate. Is the prison still, then, a dark,
+abandoned region? Is the fact that one has ceased to say so for
+almost 200 years sufficient proof that it is not? In becoming a legal
+punishment, it weighted the old juridico-political question of the
+right to punish with all the problems, all the agitations that have
+surrounded the corrective technologies of the individual.
+Baltard called them 'complete and austere institutions' (Baltard,
+1829). In several respects, the prison must be an exhaustive disciplinary apparatus: it must assume responsibility for all aspects of the
+individual, his physical training, his aptitude to work, his everyday
+conduct, his moral attitude, his state of mind; the prison, much more
+than the school, the workshop or the army, which always involved a
+235
+
+certain specialization, is 'omni-disciplinary'. Moreover, the prison
+has neither exterior nor gap; it cannot be interrupted, except when
+its task is totally completed; its action on the individual must be
+uninterrupted: an unceasing discipline. Lastly, it gives almost total
+power over the prisoners; it has its internal mechanisms of repression
+and punishment: a despotic discipline. It carries to their greatest
+intensity all the procedures to be found in the other disciplinary
+mechanisms. It must be the most powerful machinery for imposing
+a new form on the perverted individual; its mode of action is the
+constraint of a total education: In prison the government may
+dispose of the liberty of the person and of the time of the prisoner;
+from then on, one can imagine the power of the education which,
+not only in a day, but in the succession of days and even years, may
+regulate for man the time of waking and sleeping, of activity and rest,
+the number and duration of meals, the quality and ration of food,
+the nature and product of labour, the time of prayer, the use of
+speech and even, so to speak, that of thought, that education which,
+in the short, simple journeys from refectory to workshop, from
+workshop to the cell, regulates the movements of the body, and even
+in moments of rest, determines the use of time, the time-table, this
+education, which, in short, takes possession of man as a whole, of
+all the physical and moral faculties that are in him and of the time
+in which he is himself' (Lucas, II, 123-4). This complete 'reformatory' lays down a recoding of existence very different from the mere
+juridical deprivation of liberty and very different, too, from the
+simple mechanism of exempla imagined by the reformers at the time
+of the idéologues.
+I. The first principle was isolation. The isolation of the convict
+from the external world, from everything that motivated the offence,
+from the complicities that facilitated it. The isolation of the prisoners
+from one another. Not only must the penalty be individual, but it
+must also be individualizing - in two ways. First, the prison must be
+designed in such a way as to efface of itself the harmful consequences
+to which it gives rise in gathering together very different convicts
+in the same place: to stifle plots and revolts, to prevent the formation
+of future complicities that may give rise to blackmail (when the
+convicts are once again at liberty), to form an obstacle to the immorality of so many 'mysterious associations'. In short, the prison
+z36
+
+should form from the malefactors that it gathers together a homogeneous and interdependent population: "There exists at this moment
+among us an organized society of criminals... They form a small
+nation within the greater. Almost all these men met or meet again
+in prison. We must now disperse the members of this society'
+(Tocqueville, Rapport à la Chambre des Députés, quoted in Beaumont and Tocqueville, 392-3). Moreover, through the reflection
+that it gives rise to and the remorse that cannot fail to follow,
+solitude must be a positive instrument of reform: "Thrown into
+solitude, the convict reflects. Placed alone in the presence of his
+crime, he learns to hate it, and, if his soul is not yet blunted by evil,
+it is in isolation that remorse will come to assail him' (Beaumont and
+Tocqueville, 109). Through the fact, too, that solitude assures a
+sort of self-regulation of the penalty and makes possible a spontaneous individualization of the punishment: the more the convict is
+capable of reflecting, the more capable he was of committing his
+crime; but, also, the more lively his remorse, the more painful his
+solitude; on the other hand, when he has profoundly repented and
+made amends without the least dissimulation, solitude will no longer
+weigh upon him: "Thus, according to this admirable discipline, each
+intelligence and each morality bears within itself the principle and
+measure of a punishment whose error and human fallibility cannot
+alter the certainty and invariable equity ... Is it not in truth like
+the seal of a divine and providential justice?' (Aylies, 132-3). Lastly,
+and perhaps above all, the isolation of the convicts guarantees that
+it is possible to exercise over them, with maximum intensity, a
+power that will not be overthrown by any other influence; solitude
+is the primary condition of total submission: "Just imagine,' said
+Charles Lucas, referring to the role of the governor, the instructor,
+the chaplain and other 'charitable persons' as regards the isolated
+convict, "just imagine the power of human speech intervening in
+the midst of the terrible discipline of silence to speak to the heart,
+to the soul, to the human person' (Lucas, I, 167). Isolation provides
+an intimate exchange between the convict and the power that is
+exercised over him.
+It is at this point that the debate on the two American systems of
+imprisonment, that of Auburn and that of Philadelphia, was situated.
+In fact, this debate, which was so wide-ranging and long drawn out,'
+237
+
+concerned only the way in which isolation should be used, it being
+accepted by all.
+The Auburn model prescribed the individual cell during the
+night, work and meals in common, but under the rule of absolute
+silence, the convicts being allowed to speak only to the warders,
+with their permission and in a low voice. It was a clear reference to
+the monastic model; a reference, 100, to the discipline of the workshop. The prison must be the microcosm of a perfect society in
+which individuals are isolated in their moral existence, but in which
+they come together in a strict hierarchical framework, with no
+lateral relation, communication being possible only in a vertical
+direction. The advantage of the Auburnian system, according to its
+advocates, was that it formed a duplication of society itself. Constraint was assured by material means, but above all by a rule that
+one had to learn to respect and which was guaranteed by surveillance
+and punishment. Rather than keep the convicts 'under lock and key
+like wild beasts in their cages, they must be brought together,
+'made to join together in useful exercises, forced together to adopt
+good habits, preventing moral contagion by active surveillance,
+maintaining reflection by the rule of silence; this rule accustoms the
+convict "to regard the law as a sacred precept whose violation brings
+just and legitimate harm' (Mittermaier, in Revue française et étrangère
+de législarion, 1830). Thus this operation of isolation, assembly
+without communication and law guaranteed by uninterrupted
+supervision, must rehabilitate the criminal as a social individual: it
+trains him to a 'useful and resigned activity' (Gasparin); it restores
+for him 'habits of sociability' (Beaumont and Tocqueville, 112).
+In absolute isolation - as at Philadelphia - the rehabilitation of
+the criminal is expected not of the application of a common law,
+but of the relation of the individual to his own conscience and to
+what may enlighten him from within.' "Alone in his cell, the convict
+is handed over to himself; in the silence of his passions and of the
+world that surrounds him, he descends into his conscience, he
+questions it and feels awakening within him the moral feeling that
+never entirely perishes in the heart of man' (Journal des économistes,
+II, 1842). It is not, therefore, an external respect for the law or fear
+of punishment alone that will act upon the convict but the workings
+of the conscience itself. A profound submission, rather than a super-
+238
+
+ficial training; a change of 'morality', rather than of attitude. In the
+Pennsylvanian prison, the only operations of correction were the
+conscience and the silent architecture that confronted it. At Cherry
+Hill, 'the walls are the punishment of the crime; the cell confronts
+the convict with himself; he is forced to listen to his conscience'
+Hence work there is more in the nature of a consolation than an
+obligation; supervisors do not have to exert force - this is assured
+by the materiality of things - and consequently, their authority may
+be accepted: 'At each visit, a few benevolent words flow from this
+honest mouth and bring to the heart of the inmate gratitude, hope
+and consolation; he loves his warder; and he loves him because he
+is gentle and sympathetic. Walls are terrible, but man is good'
+(Blouet). In this closed cell, this temporary sepulchre, the myths of
+resurrection arise easily enough. After night and silence, the regenerated life. Auburn was society itself reduced to its bare essentials.
+Cherry Hill was life annihilated and begun again. Catholicism soon
+absorbed this Quaker technique into its discourses. 'I see your cell
+as no more than a frightful sepulchre where, instead of worms,
+remorse and despair come to gnaw at you and to turn your existence
+into a hell in anticipation. But ... what is for an irreligious prisoner
+merely a tomb, a repulsive ossuary, becomes, for the sincerely
+Christian convict, the very cradle of blessed immortality.'
+A whole series of different conflicts stemmed from the opposition
+between these two models: religious (must conversion be the principal element of correction?), medical (does total isolation drive
+convicts insane?), economic (which method costs less.), architectural and administrative (which form guarantees the best surveillance?). This, no doubt, was why the argument lasted so long. But,
+at the heart of the debate, and making it possible, was this primary
+objective of carceral action: coercive individualization, by the
+termination of any relation that is not supervised by authority or
+arranged according to hierarchy.
+2. 'Work alternating with meals accompanies the convict to
+evening prayer; then a new sleep gives him an agreeable rest that is
+not disturbed by the phantoms of an unregulated imagination. Thus
+the six weekdays pass by. They are followed by a day devoted
+exclusively to prayer, instruction and salutary meditations. Thus
+the weeks, the months, the years follow one another; thus the
+239
+
+prisoner who, on entering the establishment, was an inconstant
+man, or one who was single-minded only in his irregularity, seeking
+to destroy his existence by the variety of his vices, gradually becomes
+by dint of a habit that is at first purely external, but is soon transformed into a second nature, so familiar with work and the pleasures
+that derive from it, that, provided wise instruction has opened up
+his soul to repentance, he may be exposed with more confidence to
+temptations, when he finally recovers his liberty' (Julius, 417-18).
+Work is defined, with isolation, as an agent of carceral transformation. This is to be found as early as the code of 1808: "Although the
+penalty inflicted by the law has as its aim the reparation of a crime,
+it is also intended to reform the convict, and this double aim will
+be fulfilled if the malefactor is snatched from that fatal idleness
+which, having brought him to prison, meets him again within its
+walls and, seizing hold of him, brings him to the ultimate degree of
+depravity." Work is neither an addition nor a corrective to the
+régime of detention: whether it is a question of forced labour,
+reclusion or imprisonment, it is conceived, by the legislator himself,
+as necessarily accompanying it. But the necessity involved is precisely not the necessity of which the eighteenth-century reformers
+spoke, when they wished to make imprisonment either an example
+for the public or a useful reparation for society. In the carceral
+régime, the link between work and punishment is of another type.
+Several polemics that took place under the Restoration and the
+July Monarchy throw light on the function attributed to penal
+labour. First, there was the debate on the subject of wages. The
+labour of prisoners was remunerated in France. This posed a problem: if work in prison is remunerated, that work cannot really form
+part of the penalty; and the prisoner may therefore refuse to perform
+it. Moreover, wages reward the skill of the worker and not the
+improvement of the convict: "The worst subjects are almost everywhere the most skilful workers; they are the most highly remunerated, consequently the most intemperate and least ready to repent'
+(Marquet- Wasselot, quoted in Lucas, 324). The debate, which had
+never quite died down, was resumed with great liveliness in the
+early 1840s: it was a period of economic crisis, a period of workers'
+agitation and a period, too, in which the opposition between the
+worker and the delinquent was beginning to crystallize (cf. below,
+240
+
+285). There were strikes against the prison workshops: when a
+Chaumont glove-maker succeeded in organizing a workshop at
+Clairvaux, the workers protested, declared that their labour was
+dishonoured, occupied the manufactory and forced the employer to
+abandon his project (cf. Aguet, 30-31). There was also a widespread
+press campaign in the workers' newspapers: on the theme that the
+government encouraged penal labour in order to reduce 'free' wages;
+on the theme that the inconveniences of these prison workshops
+were even more evident for women, who were thus deprived of their
+labour, driven to prostitution and therefore to prison, where these
+same women, who could no longer work when they were free, then
+competed with those who were still at work (L' Atelier, 3rd year,
+no. 4, December 1842); on the theme that prisoners were given the
+safest jobs - "in warm and sheltered conditions thieves execute the
+work of hat-making and cabinet-making', while the unemployed
+hatter is forced to go 'to the human slaughter-house to make whitelead at two francs a day' (L'Atelier, Oth year, no. 2, November 1845);
+on the theme that philanthropy is more concerned about the working conditions of prisoners than those of free workers: 'We are sure
+that if prisoners worked with mercury, for example, science would
+be a great deal more ready than it is to find ways of protecting the
+workers from the dangers of its fumes: "Those poor convicts!"
+someone would exclaim, who scarcely has a word for the gilders.
+But what can you expect? One has to have killed or robbed to
+arouse compassion or interest.' On the theme above all that, if the
+prison was tending to become a workshop, it would not be long
+before beggars and the unemployed were sent there, thus reconstituting the old hôpitaux généraux of France or the workhouses of
+England. In addition, there were petitions and letters, especially
+after the law of 1844 - one petition, rejected by the Chambre de
+Paris, 'found inhuman that one should propose to apply murderers
+and thieves to work that is today the lot of a few thousand workers';
+'the Chambre preferred Barrabas to us' (L' Arelier, 4th year, no. 9,
+June 1844 and 5th year, no. 7, April 1845; cf. also, of the same
+period, La Démocratie pacifique); typographical workers sent a
+letter to the minister when they learnt that a printing-works was to
+be set up in the prison at Melun: 'You have decided between
+reprobates justly punished by the law and citizens who sacrifice
+24I
+
+their days, in abstinence and probity, to the lives of their families and
+to the wealth of their nation' (L' Atelier, 5th year, no. G, March 1845).
+The answers given by the government and the administration to
+this whole campaign changed very little. Penal labour cannot be
+criticized for any unemployment it may give rise to: with its limited
+extent, and its low output, it cannot have a general effect on the
+economy. It is intrinsically useful, not as an activity of production,
+but by virtue of the effect it has on the human mechanism. It is a
+principle of order and regularity; through the demands that it
+imposes, it conveys, imperceptibly, the forms of a rigorous power;
+it bends bodies to regular movements, it excludes agitation and
+distraction, it imposes a hierarchy and a surveillance that are all the
+more accepted, and which will be inscribed all the more deeply in
+the behaviour of the convicts, in that they form part of its logic:
+with work 'the rule is introduced into a prison, it reigns there without effort, without the use of any repressive and violent means.
+By occupying the convict, one gives him habits of order and obedience; one makes the idler that he was diligent and active... with
+time, he finds in the regular movement of the prison, in the manual
+labours to which he is subjected ... a certain remedy against the
+wanderings of his imagination' (Bérenger). Penal labour must be
+seen as the very machinery that transforms the violent, agitated,
+unreflective convict into a part that plays its role with perfect
+regularity. The prison is not a workshop; it is, it must be of itself,
+a machine whose convict-workers are both the cogs and the products; it 'occupies them continually, with the sole aim of filling their
+moments. When the body is agitated, when the mind applies itself
+to a particular object, importunate ideas depart, calm is born once
+again in the soul' (Danjou, 180). If, in the final analysis, the work of
+the prison has an economic effect, it is by producing individuals
+mechanized according to the general norms of an industrial society:
+'Work is the providence of the modern peoples; it replaces morality,
+fills the gap left by beliefs and is regarded as the principle of all good.
+Work must be the religion of the prisons. For a machine-society,
+purely mechanical means of reform are required' (Faucher, 64; in
+England the "treadmill and the pump provided a disciplinary
+mechanization of the inmates, with no end product). The making
+of machine-men, but also of proletarians; in effect, when one has
+242
+
+only a 'pair of arms for any good work', one can live only from
+the product of one's labour, through the practice of a profession or
+from the product of the labour of others, by thieving'; but, although
+the prison did not force offenders to work, it seems to have reintroduced into its very institution and, obliquely, by means of taxation,
+this levying by some on the labour of others: "The question of
+idleness is the same as in society; it is from the labour of others that
+the convicts live, if they do not exist from their own labour' (Lucas,
+II, 313-14). The labour by which the convict contributes to his
+own needs turns the thief into a docile worker. This is the utility
+of remuneration for penal labour; it imposes on the convict the
+"moral' form of wages as the condition of his existence. Wages
+inculcate the 'love and habit' of work (Lucas, II, 243); they give
+those malefactors who do not know the difference between mine
+and thine a sense of property - of 'what one has earned by the sweat
+of one's brow' (Danjou, 210-11; cf. also L'Arelier, Oth year, no. 2,
+November 1845); they also teach those who have lived in dissipation the virtues of thrift and foresight (Lucas; a third of the prisoner's
+daily wages was set aside for the day when he left the prison); lastly,
+by proposing a quantity of work to be carried out, they make it
+possible to express quantitatively the convict's zeal and the progress
+of his improvement (Ducpétiaux, 30-31). The wages of penal. labour
+do not reward production; they function as a motive and measure
+of individual transformation: it is a legal fiction, since it does not
+represent the 'free' granting of labour power, but an artifice that
+is presumed to be effective in the techniques of correction.
+What, then, is the use of penal labour! Not profit; nor even the
+formation of a useful skill; but the constitution of a power relation,
+an empty economic form, a schema of individual submission and of
+adjustment to a production apparatus.
+The perfect image of prison labour was the women's workshop
+at Clairvaux; the silent precision of the human machinery is reminiscent of the regulated rigour of the convent: 'On a throne, above
+which is a crucifix, a sister is sitting; before her, arranged in two
+rows, the prisoners are carrying out the task imposed on them, and,
+as needlework accounts for almost all the work, the strictest silence
+is constantly maintained... It seems that, in these halls, the very
+air breathes penitence and expiation. One is carried back, as by a
+243
+
+spontaneous movement, to the time of the venerable habits of this
+ancient place, one remembers those voluntary penitents who shut
+themselves up here in order to say farewell to the world. Compare
+this with the following; "Go into a cotton-mill; listen to the conversations of the workers and the whistling of the machines. Is there
+any contrast in the world more afflicting than the regularity and
+predictability of these mechanical movements, compared with the
+disorder of ideas and morals, produced by the contact of so many
+men, women and children' (Faucher 20).
+3. But prison goes beyond the mere privation of liberty in a
+more important way. It becomes increasingly an instrument for the
+modulation of the penalty; an apparatus which, through the execution of the sentence with which it is entrusted, seems to have the
+right, in part at least, to assume its principle. Of course, the prison
+institution was not given this 'right' in the nineteenth century or
+even in the twentieth, except in a fragmentary form (through the
+oblique way of release on licence, semi-release, the organization of
+reformatories). But it should be noted that it was claimed very
+early on by those responsible for prison administration, as the very
+condition of the good functioning of a prison, and of its efficiency
+in the task of reformation that the law itself had given it.
+The same goes for the duration of the punishment; it makes it
+possible to quantify the penalties exactly, to graduate them according to circumstances and to give to legal punishment the more or less
+explicit form of wages; but it also runs the risk of having no corrective value, if it is fixed once and for all in the sentence. The length
+of the penalty must not be a measurement of the 'exchange value'
+of the offence; it must be adjusted to the 'useful' transformation of
+the inmate during his term of imprisonment. It is not a timemeasure, but a time finalized. The form of the operation, rather
+than the form of the wages. 'Just as the prudent physician ends his
+medication or continues it according to whether the patient has
+or has not arrived at a perfect cure, so, in the first of these two
+hypotheses, expiation ought to end with the complete reform of the
+prisoner; for, in this case, all detention has become useless, and from
+then on as inhuman to the reformed individual as it is vainly burdensome for the State.'1° The correct duration of the penalty must be
+calculated, therefore, not only according to the particular crime and
+244
+
+its circumstances, but also according to the penalty itself as it takes
+place in actual fact. This amounts to saying that, although the
+penalty must be individualized, it is so not on the basis of the
+individual-offender, the juridical subject of his act, the responsible
+author of the offence, but on the basis of the individual punished,
+the object of a supervised transformation, the individual in detention
+inserted in the prison apparatus, modified by it or reacting to it. 'It
+is a question only of reforming the evil-doer. Once this reform has
+come about, the criminal must return to society' (C. Lucas, quoted
+in the Gazette des tribunaux, o April 1837).
+The quality and content of detention should no longer be determined by the nature of the offence alone. The juridical gravity of a
+crime does not at all have the value of a univocal sign for the
+character of the convict, whether or not he is capable of reform. In
+particular the crime-offence distinction, which the penal code
+recognized in drawing the corresponding distinction between mere
+imprisonment and imprisonment with hard labour, is not operational in terms of reform. This was the almost universal opinion
+expressed by the directors of the maisons centrales, during an inquiry
+carried out by the ministry in 1836: "The minor offenders are generally the most vicious... Among the criminals, one meets many
+men who have given in to the violence of their passions and to the
+needs of a large family! "The behaviour of criminals is much better
+than that of the minor offenders; the former are more submissive,
+harder-working than the latter, who, in general, are pickpockets,
+debauchees and idlers.'" Hence the idea that punitive rigour must
+not be in direct proportion to the penal importance of the offence -
+nor determined once and for all.
+As an operation of correction, imprisonment has its own requirements and dangers. It is its effects that must determine its stages, its
+temporary increases, its successive reductions, in severity; what
+Charles Lucas called the 'mobile classification of moralities'. The
+progressive system applied at Geneva since 1825 was often advocated in France (Fresnel, 29-31). It took the form, for example, of
+three areas: a trial area for prisoners in general, a punishment area
+and a reward area for those who had embarked on the way of reform
+(Lucas, II, 440). Or it took the form of four phases: a period of
+intimidation (deprivation of work and of any internal or external
+245
+
+relations); a period of work (isolation, but work which, after the
+phase of forced idleness, would be welcomed as a benefit); a régime
+of moralization (more or less frequent lectures' from the directors
+and official visitors); a period of work in common (Duras). Although
+the principle of the penalty was certainly a legal decision, its
+administration, its quality and its rigours must belong to an autonomous mechanism that supervises the effects of punishment within the
+very apparatus that produces them. A whole régime of punishments
+and rewards that is a way not simply of gaining respect for the prison
+regulations, but of making the action of the prison on the inmates
+effective. The legal authority itself came to accept this: 'One should
+not be surprised, said the supreme court of appeal, when consulted
+on the subject of a bill concerning the prisons, at the idea of granting
+rewards, which might consist either for the most part in money, or
+in a better diet, or even in a reduction of the duration of the penalty.
+If anything can awaken in the minds of convicts the notions of good
+and evil, bring them to moral reflections and raise them to some
+extent in their own eyes, it is the possibility of obtaining some
+reward' (Lucas, II, 441-2).
+And it must be admitted that the legal authorities can have no
+immediate control over all these procedures that rectify the penalty
+as it proceeds. It is a question, in effect, of measures that by
+definition can intervene only after the sentence and can bear only on
+something other than the offences. Those who administer detention
+must therefore have an indispensable autonomy, when it comes to
+the question of individualizing and varying the application of the
+penalty: supervisors, a prison governor, a chaplain or an instructor
+are more capable of exercising this corrective function than those
+who hold the penal power. It is their judgement (understood as
+observation, diagnosis, characterization, information, differential
+classification) and not a verdict in the form of an attribution of guilt,
+that must serve as a support for this internal modulation of the
+penalty - for its mitigation or even its interruption. When in 1846,
+Bonneville presented his project of release on licence, he defined it
+as 'the right of the administration, with the previous approval of the
+legal authority, to place in temporary liberty, after a sufficient period
+of expiation, the completely reformed convict, on condition that he
+will be brought back into prison on the slightest well-founded
+246
+
+complaint' (Bonneville, 5). All this 'arbitrariness' which, in the
+old penal system, enabled the judges to modulate the penalty
+and the princes to ignore it if they so wished, all this arbitrariness,
+which the modern codes have withdrawn from the judicial power,
+has been gradually reconstituted on the side of the power that
+administers and supervises punishment. It is the sovereignty of
+knowledge possessed by the warder: 'He is a veritable magistrate
+called upon to reign as sovereign in the prison... who, in order not
+to fall short in his mission, must combine the most eminent virtue
+with a profound knowledge of mankind' (Bérenger).
+And so we arrive at a principle, clearly formulated by Charles
+Lucas, which, although it marks the virtual beginning of modern
+penal functioning, very few jurists would dare to accept today
+without some hesitation; let us call it the Declaration of Carceral
+Independence - in it is claimed the right to be a power that not only
+possesses administrative autonomy, but is also a part of punitive
+sovereignty. This affirmation of the rights of the prison posits as a
+principle: that criminal judgement is an arbitrary unity; that it must
+be broken down; that the writers of the penal codes were correct in
+distinguishing the legislative level (which classifies the acts and attributes penalties to them) and the judicial level (which passes the
+sentences); that the task today is to analyse in turn this later judicial
+level; that one should distinguish in it what is properly judicial
+(assess not so much acts as agents, measure 'the intentionalities that
+give human acts so many different moralities', and therefore rectify
+if it can the assessments of the legislator); and to give autonomy to
+"penitentiary judgement', which is perhaps the most important; in
+relation to it the assessment of the court is merely a way of prejudging', for the morality of the agent can be assessed 'only when
+put to the test. The judge, therefore, requires in turn a compulsory
+and rectifying supervision of his assessments; and this supervision
+is that provided by the penitentiary prison' (Lucas, II, 418-22).
+One may speak, therefore, of an excess or a series of excesses on
+the part of imprisonment in terms of legal detention - of the "carceral' in relation to the "judicial'. Now this excess was observed very
+early on, from the very birth of the prison, either in the form of real
+practices, or in the form of projects. It did not come later, as a
+secondary effect. The great carceral machinery was bound up with
+247
+
+the very functioning of the prison. The sign of this autonomy is
+very apparent in the 'useless' acts of violence perpetrated by warders
+or in the despotism of an administration that has all the privileges of
+an enclosed community. Its roots lie elsewhere: precisely in the fact
+that the prison is required to be 'useful, that the deprivation of
+liberty - that juridical levying on an ideal property - must, from
+the outset, have exercised a positive technical role, operating transformations on individuals. And, for this operation, the carceral
+apparatus has recoursę to three great schemata: the politico-moral
+schema of individual isolation and hierarchy; the economic model
+of force applied to compulsory work; the technico-medical model
+of cure and normalization. The cell, the workshop, the hospital.
+The margin by which the prison exceeds detention is filled in fact
+by techniques of a disciplinary type. And this disciplinary addition
+to the juridical is what, in short, is called the 'penitentiary'.
+This addition was not accepted easily. To begin with, there was
+the question of principle: the penalty must be nothing more than
+the deprivation of liberty; like our present rulers, but with all the
+freshness of his language, Decazes says: "The law must follow the
+convicted man into the prison where it has sent him' (Decazes). But
+very soon - and this is a characteristic fact - these debates were to
+become a battle for appropriating control of this additional penitentiary element; the judges were to demand a right of inspection
+over the carceral mechanisms: "The moral enlightenment of the
+inmates requires innumerable cooperators; it is only by visits of
+inspection, commissions of surveillance and charity associations that
+this may be accomplished. Auxiliaries, then, are needed and it is the
+judges who must provide them' (Ferrus, viii; an ordinance of 1847
+had set up commissions of surveillance). From this period, the
+penitentiary order had become sufficiently well established for there
+to be no question of dismantling it; the question was how to get
+control of it. This gave rise to the figure of the judge obsessed by a
+desire for prison. A century later, this was to give birth to a bastard,
+yet deformed child: the magistrate entrusted with the determination
+of penalties.
+But, if the penitentiary, in so far as it went well beyond mere
+detention, was able not only to establish itself, but to entrap the
+248
+
+whole of penal justice and to imprison the judges themselves, it was
+because it was able to introduce criminal justice into relations of
+knowledge that have since become its infinite labyrinth.
+The prison, the place where the penalty is carried out, is also the
+place of observation of punished individuals. This takes two forms:
+surveillance, of course, but also knowledge of each inmate, of his
+behaviour, his deeper states of mind, his gradual improvement; the
+prisons must be conceived as places for the formation of clinical
+knowledge about the convicts; 'the penitentiary system cannot be
+an a priori conception; it is an induction of the social state. There are
+moral diseases, as well as breakdowns in health, where the treatment
+depends on the site and direction of the illness' (Faucher, 6). This
+nvolves two essential mecnanisms.
+It must be possible to hold th
+prisoner under permanent observation; every report that can be
+made about him must be recorded and computed. The theme of the
+Panopticon - at once surveillance and observation, security and
+knowledge, individualization and totalization, isolation and transparency - found in the prison its privileged locus of realization.
+Although the panoptic procedures, as concrete forms of the exercise
+of power, have become extremely widespread, at least in their less
+concentrated forms, it was really only in the penitentiary institutions that Bentham's utopia could be fully expressed in a material
+form. In the 18zos, the Panopticon became the architectural programme of most prison projects. It was the most direct way of
+expressing 'the intelligence of discipline in stone' (Lucas, I, 62); of
+making architecture transparent to the administration of power;!?
+of making it possible to substitute for force or other violent constraints the gentle efficiency of total surveillance; of ordering space
+according to the recent humanization of the codes and the new
+penitentiary theory: "The authorities, on the one hand, and the
+architect, on the other, must know, therefore, whether the prisons
+are to be based on the principle of milder penalties or on a system
+of reforming convicts, in accordance with legislation which, by
+getting to the root cause of the people's vices, becomes a principle
+that will regenerate the virtues that they must practice' (Baltard, 4-5).
+In short, its task was to constitute a prison-machine' with a cell
+of visibility in which the inmate will find himself caught as in the
+glass house of the Greek philosopher' (Harou-Romain, 8) and a
+249
+
+central point from which a permanent gaze may control prisoners
+and staff. Around these two requirements, several variations were
+possible: the Benthamite Panopticon in its strict form, the semicircle, the cross-plan, the star shape. In the midst of all these discussions, the Minister of the Interior in 1841 sums up the fundamental principles: "The central inspection hall is the pivot of the
+system. Without a central point of inspection, surveillance ceases
+to be guaranteed, continuous and general; for it is impossible to
+have complete trust in the activity, zeal and intelligence of the
+warder who immediately supervises the cells... The architect must
+therefore bring all his attention to bear on this object; it is a question
+both of discipline and economy. The more accurate and easy the
+surveillance, the less need will there be to seek in the strength of the
+building guarantees against attempted escape and communication
+between the inmates. But surveillance will be perfect if from a central
+hall the director or head-warder sees, without moving and without
+being seen, not only the entrances of all the cells and even the inside
+of most of them when the unglazed door is open, but also the
+warders guarding the prisoners on every floor... With the formula
+of circular or semi-circular prisons, it would be possible to see from
+a single centre all the prisoners in their cells and the warders in the
+inspection galleries' (Ducatel, 2).
+But the penitentiary Panopticon was also a system of individualizing and permanent documentation. The same year in which
+variants of the Benthamite schema were recommended for the
+building of prisons, the system of 'moral accounting' was made
+compulsory: an individual report of a uniform kind in every prison,
+on which the governor or head-warder, the chaplain and the
+instructor had to fill in their observations on each inmate: It is in a
+way the vade mecum of prison administration, making it possible to
+assess each case, each circumstance and, consequently, to know
+what treatment to apply to each prisoner individually' (Ducpétiaux,
+56-7). Many other, much more complete, systems of recording were
+planned or tried out (cf., for example, Gregory, Igaff; Grellet-
+Wammy, 23-5 and 199-203). The overall aim was to make the
+prison a place for the constitution of a body of knowledge that
+would regulate the exercise of penitentiary practice. The prison has
+not only to know the decision of the judges and to apply it in terms
+z50
+
+of the established regulations: it has to extract unceasingly from the
+inmate a body of knowledge that will make it possible to transform
+the penal measure into a penitentiary operation; which will make of
+the penalty required by the offence a modification of the inmate that
+will be of use to society. The autonomy of the carceral régime and
+the knowledge that it creates make it possible to increase the utility
+of the penalty, which the code had made the very principle of its
+punitive philosophy: "The governor must not lose sight of a single
+inmate, because in whatever part of the prison the inmate is to be
+found, whether he is entering or leaving, or whether he is staying
+there, the governor must also justify the motives for his staying in
+a particular classification or for his movement from one to another.
+He is a veritable accountant. Each inmate is for him, in the sphere
+of individual education, a capital invested with penitentiary interest'
+(Lucas, 11, 449-50). As a highly efficient technology, penitentiary
+practice produces a return on the capital invested in the penal system
+and in the building of heavy prisons.
+Similarly, the offender becomes an individual to know. This
+demand for knowledge was not, in the first instance, inserted into
+the legislation itself, in order to provide substance for the sentence
+and to determine the true degree of guilt. It is as a convict, as a point
+of application for punitive mechanisms, that the offender is constituted himself as the object of possible knowledge.
+But this implies that the penitentiary apparatus, with the whole
+technological programme that accompanies it, brings about a
+curious substitution: from the hands of justice, it certainly receives
+a convicted person; but what it must apply itself to is not, of course,
+the offence, nor even exactly the offender, but a rather different
+object, one defined by variables which at the outset at least were not
+taken into account in the sentence, for they were relevant only for
+a corrective technology. This other character, whom the penitentiary apparatus substitutes for the convicted offender, is the
+delinquent.
+The delinquent is to be distinguished from the offender by the
+fact that it is not so much his act as his life that is relevant in characterizing him. The penitentiary operation, if it is to be a genuine
+re-education, must become the sum total existence of the delinquent,
+making of the prison a sort of artificial and coercive theatre in which
+25ł
+
+hisalife will be examined from top to bottom. The legal punishment
+bears upon an act; the punitive technique on a life; it falls to this
+punitive technique, therefore, to reconstitute all the sordid detail of
+a life in the form of knowledge, to fill in the gaps of that knowledge
+and to act upon it by a practice of compulsion. It is a biographical
+knowledge and a technique for correcting individual lives. The
+observation of the delinquent 'should go back not only to the
+circumstances, but also to the causes of his crime; they must be
+sought in the story of his life, from the triple point of view of
+psychology, social position and upbringing, in order to discover the
+dangerous proclivities of the first, the harmful predispositions of the
+second and the bad antecedents of the third. This biographical
+investigation is an essential part of the preliminary investigation for
+the classification of penalities before it becomes a condition for the
+classification of moralities in the penitentiary system. It must
+accompany the convict from the court to the prison, where the
+governor's task is not only to receive it, but also to complete, supervise and rectify its various factors during the period of detention'
+(Lucas, II, 440-42). Behind the offender, to whom the investigation
+of the facts may attribute responsibility for an offence, stands the
+delinquent whose slow formation is shown in a biographical
+investigation. The introduction of the 'biographical' is important
+in the history of penality. Because it establishes the "criminal as
+existing before the crime and even outside it. And, for this reason,
+a psychological causality, duplicating the juridical attribution of
+responsibility, confuses its effects. At this point one enters the
+'criminological' labyrinth from which we have certainly not yet
+emerged: any determining cause, because it reduces responsibility,
+marks the author of the offence with a criminality all the more formidable and demands penitentiary measures that are all the more
+strict. As the biography of the criminal duplicates in penal practice
+the analysis of circumstances used in gauging the crime, so one sees
+penal discourse and psychiatric discourse crossing each other's
+frontiers; and there, at their point of junction, is formed the notion
+of the 'dangerous' individual, which makes it possible to draw up a
+network of causality in terms of an entire biography and to present
+a verdict of punishment-correction. 14
+The delinquent is also to be distinguished from the offender in
+252
+
+that he is not only the author of his acts (the author responsible in
+terms of certain criteria of free, conscious will), but is linked to his
+offence by a whole bundle of complex threads (instincts, drives,
+tendencies, character). The penitentiary technique bears not on the
+relation between author and crime, but on the criminal's affinity with
+his crime. The delinquent, the strange manifestation of an overall
+phenomenon of criminality, is to be found in quasi-natural classes,
+each endowed with its own characteristics and requiring a specific
+treatment, what Marquet- Wasselot called in 1841 the 'ethnography
+of the prisons'; "The convicts are ... another people within the
+same people; with its own habits, instincts, morals' (Marquet-
+Wasselot, 2). We are still very close here to the 'picturesque'
+descriptions of the world of the malefactors - an old tradition that
+goes back a long way and gained new vigour in the early nineteenth
+century, at a time when the perception of another form of life was
+being articulated upon that of another class and another human
+species. A zoology of social sub-species and an ethnology of the
+civilizations of malefactors, with their own rites and language, was
+beginning to emerge in a parody form. But an attempt was also
+being made to constitute a new objectivity in which the criminal
+belongs to a typology that is both natural and deviant. Delinquency,
+a pathological gap in the human species, may be analysed as morbid
+syndromes or as great teratological forms. With Ferrus's classification, we probably have one of the first conversions of the old
+'ethnography' of crime into a systematic typology of delinquents.
+The analysis is slender, certainly, but it reveals quite clearly the
+principle that delinquency must be specified in terms not so much
+of the law as of the norm. There are three types of convict; there are
+those who are endowed 'with intellectual resources above the average
+of intelligence that te have established', but who have been perverted
+either by the "tendencies of their organization' and a 'native predisposition', or by "pernicious logic', an "iniquitous morality', a
+"dangerous attitude to social duties'. Those that belong to this category require isolation day and night, solitary exercise, and, when one
+is forced to bring them into contact with the others, they should
+wear 'a light mask made of metal netting, of the kind used for stonecutting or fencing'. Thesecond category is made up of 'vicious, stupid
+or passive convicts, who have been led into evil by indifference to
+253
+
+either shame or honour, through cowardice, that is to say, laziness,
+and because of a lack of resistance to bad incitements'; the régime
+suitable to them is not so much that of punishment as of education, and
+if possible of mutual education: isolation at night, work in common
+during the day, conversations permitted provided they are conducted
+aloud, reading in common, followed by mutual questioning, for which
+rewards may be given. Lastly, there are the 'inept or incapable
+convicts, who are 'rendered incapable, by an incomplete organization, of any occupation requiring considered effort and consistent
+will, and who are therefore incapable of competing in work with
+intelligent workers and who, having neither enough education to
+know their social duties, nor enough intelligence to understand this
+fact or to struggle against their personal instincts, are led to evil by
+their very incapacity. For these, solitude would merely encourage
+their inertia; they must therefore live in common, but in such a way
+as to form small groups, constantly stimulated by collective
+operations, and subjected to rigid surveillance' (ferrus, 18aff and
+278ff). Thus a 'positive' knowledge of the delinquents and their
+species, very different from the juridical definition of offences and
+their circumstances, is gradually established; but this knowledge is
+also distinct from the medical knowledge that makes it possible to
+introduce the insanity of the individual and, consequently, to efface
+the criminal character of the act. Ferrus states the principle quite
+clearly: "Considered as a whole, criminals are nothing less than
+madmen; it would be unjust to the latter to confuse them with
+consciously perverted men.' The task of this new knowledge is to
+define the act 'scientifically' qua offence and above all the individual
+qua delinquent. Criminology is thus made possible.
+The correlative of penal justice may well be the offender, but the
+correlative of the penitentiary apparatus is someone other; this is the
+delinquent, a biographical unity, a kernel of danger, representing a
+type of anomaly. And, although it is true that to a detention that
+deprives of liberty, as defined by law, the prison added the additional element of the penitentiary, this penitentiary element introduced in turn a third character who slipped between the individual
+condemned by the law and the individual who carries out this law.
+At the point that marks the disappearance of the branded, dismembered, burnt, annihilated body of the tortured criminal, there
+254
+
+appeared the body of the prisoner, duplicated by the individuality
+of the 'delinquent', by the little soul of the criminal, which the very
+apparatus of punishment fabricated as a point of application of the
+power to punish and as the object of what is still called today
+penitentiary science. It is said that the prison fabricated delinquents;
+it is true that it brings back, almost inevitably, before the courts those
+who have been sent there. But it also fabricates them in the sense
+that it has introduced into the operation of the law and the offence,
+the judge and the offender, the condemned man and the executioner,
+the non-corporal reality of the delinquency that links them together
+and, for a century and a half, has caught them in the same trap.
+The penitentiary technique and the delinquent are in a sense twin
+brothers. It is not true that it was the discovery of the delinquent
+through a scientific rationality that introduced into our old prisons
+the refinement of penitentiary techniques. Nor is it true that the
+internal elaboration of penitentiary methods has finally brought to
+light the 'objective' existence of a delinquency that the abstraction
+and rigidity of the law were unable to perceive. They appeared
+together, the one extending from the other, as a technological
+ensemble that forms and fragments the object to which it applies its
+instruments. And it is this delinquency, formed in the foundations
+of the judicial apparatus, among the "basses uvres", the servile tasks,
+from which justice averts its gaze, out of the shame it feels in punishing those it condemns, it is this delinquency that now comes to
+haunt the untroubled courts and the majesty of the laws; it is this
+delinquency that must be known, assessed, measured, diagnosed,
+treated when sentences are passed. It is now this delinquency, this
+anomaly, this deviation, this potential danger, this illness, this form
+of existence, that must be taken into account when the codes are
+rewritten. Delinquency is the vengeance of the prison on justice.
+It is a revenge formidable enough to leave the judge speechless.
+It is at this point that the criminologists raise their voices.
+But we must not forget that the prison, that concentrated and
+austere figure of all the disciplines, is not an endogenous element in
+the penal system as defined at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The theme of a punitive society and of a general
+semio-technique of punishment that has sustained the "ideological
+255
+
+codes - Beccarian or Benthamite - did not itself give rise to the
+universal use of the prison. This prison came from elsewhere - from
+the mechanisms proper to a disciplinary power. Now, despite this
+heterogeneity, the mechanisms and effects of the prison have spread
+right through modern criminal justice; delinquency and the delinquents have become parasites on it through and through. One must
+seek the reason for this formidable 'efficiency' of the prison. But one
+thing may be noted at the outset: the penal justice defined in the
+eighteenth century by the reformers traced two possible but divergent lines of objectification of the criminal: the first was the series
+of 'monsters', moral or political, who had fallen outside the social
+pact; the second was that of the juridical subject rehabilitated by
+punishment. Now the "delinquent' makes it possible to join the two
+lines and to constitute under the authority of medicine, psychology
+or criminology, an individual in whom the offender of the law and
+the object of a scientific technique are superimposed - or almost -
+one upon the other. That the grip of the prison on the penal system
+should not have led to a violent reaction of rejection is no doubt
+due to many reasons. One of these is that, in fabricating delinquency,
+it gave to criminal justice a unitary field of objects, authenticated
+by the 'sciences', and thus enabled it to function on a general
+horizon of 'truth'
+The prison, that darkest region in the apparatus of justice, is the
+place where the power to punish, which no longer dares to manifest
+itself openly, silently organizes a field of objectivity in which
+punishment will be able to function openly as treatment and the
+sentence be inscribed among the discourses of knowledge. It is
+understandable that justice should have adopted so easily a prison
+that was not the offspring of its own thoughts. Justice certainly owed
+the prison this recognition.
+256
+
+2.
+From the point of view of the law, detention may be a mere deprivation of liberty. But the imprisonment that performs this function
+has always involved a technical project. The transition from the
+public execution, with its spectacular rituals, its art mingled with the
+ceremony of pain, to the penalties of prisons buried in architectural
+masses and guarded by the secrecy of administrations, is not a
+transition to an undifferentiated, abstract, confused penality; it is the
+transition from one art of punishing to another, no less skilful one.
+It is a technical mutation. From this transition spring a symptom and
+a symbol: the replacement, in 1837, of the chain-gang by the police
+carriage.
+The chain-gang, a tradition that went back to the time of the
+galley slaves, was still surviving under the July monarchy. The
+importance it seems to have assumed as a spectacle at the beginning
+of the nineteenth century may be bound up with the fact that it
+combined in a single manifestation the two modes of punishment:
+the way to detention unfolded as a ceremonial of torture. (Faucher
+remarked that the chain-gang was a popular spectacle 'especially
+since the scaffolds were almost entirely abolished'.) The accounts of
+the 'last chain-gangs' - those that crossed France in the summer of
+1836- and of its scandals allow us to rediscover this functioning, so
+alien to the rules of 'penitentiary science'. It began with a scaffold
+ritual: the fixing of iron collars and chains in the courtyard of
+Bicêtre prison. The convict's neck was thrown back upon a block;
+but this time the art of the executioner was to strike without crushing the head - an inverted skill that knew how not to deliver the
+death blow. "The courtyard of Bicêtre displays its instruments of
+torture: several rows of chains with their iron-collars. The artoupans
+(head-warders), who serve as temporary blacksmiths, arrange the
+257
+
+block and hammer. Around the bars of the wall walk are stuck all
+those heads, wearing a gloomy or bold expression, which the operator is to rivet. Fligher up, at every storey of the prison, one sees legs
+and arms dangling through the bars of the cells, as at some bazaar
+of human flesh; these are the prisoners who have come to assist at
+the toilet of their comrades of the day before... Here they are in
+the attitude of sacrifice. They are stitting on the ground, coupled at
+random by the waist; the chains they must carry, each weighing
+eight pounds, rest heavily on their knees. The operator inspects
+them, measuring heads and adapting the enormous inch-thick
+collars. It takes three men to rivet an iron-collar; the first holds up
+the block, the second holds the two branches of the iron-collar
+together and, with his two outstretched arms, secures the patient's
+head; the third strikes with repeated blows and flattens the bolt
+under his huge hammer. Each blow shakes the head and the body.
+•.. Indeed, one does not think of the danger that the victim might
+face if the hammer missed its mark; this impression is nullified or
+rather defaced before the profound impression of horror one
+experjences in contemplating one of God's creatures in such a state
+of abasement."" It also had the dimension of a public spectacle;
+according to the Gazette des tribunaux, over 100,000 people watched
+the chain-gang leave Paris on 19 July: "The descent from the Courtille to the Mardi Gras... Order and wealth came to watch from a
+distance the passing of the great nomadic tribe that had been put in
+chains, that other species, 'the race apart that has the privilege of
+populating the convict-ships and prisons'. The spectators of the
+lower classes, as at the time of the public executions, kept up their
+ambiguous exchanges with the convicts, alternating insults, threats,
+words of encouragement, blows, signs of hate or complicity. Something violent aroused and accompanied the procession along its
+entire course: anger against a justice that was too severe or too
+indulgent; shouts against the detested criminals; movements in
+favour of prisoners one knew and greeted; confrontations with the
+police: 'During the whole journey from the Fontainebleau barrier,
+groups of enraged spectators hurled insults at Delacollonge: Down
+with the priest, they said, down with that hateful man; he should
+have got his deserts. Without the energy and firmness of the municipal guard, serious disorders could have taken place. At Vaugirard,
+258
+
+it was the women who were the most angry. They cried: Down with
+the wicked priest! Down with the monster Delacollonge!. The
+police inspectors of Montrouge and Vaugirard and several mayors
+and deputy-mayors ran the gauntlet in their attempt to enforce the
+decision of the courts. Shortly before reaching Issy, François,
+recognizing M. Allard and the officers of the brigade, threw his
+wooden bowl at them. It was then remembered that the families of
+some of the former comrades of the convict lived at Ivry. From that
+moment the police inspectors spread out along the route and followed the convicts' cart closely. Those of the Paris gang all threw
+their wooden bowls at the heads of the police, some of whom were
+struck. At that moment, the crowd reacted strongly. They started to
+fight amongst themselves' (Gazette des tribunaux, 20 July 1830).
+Between Bicêtre and Sèvres a considerable number of houses were
+looted as the chain-gang passed by (La Phalange, I August 1836).
+In this festival of the departing convicts, there was something of
+the rites of the scapegoat that is struck as it is chased away, something of the festival of fools, in which the reversal of roles is practised, something of the old ceremonies of the scaffold, in which the
+truth must burst forth in the full light of day, something, too, of
+those popular spectacles, in which famous characters or traditional
+types were recognized: the play of truth and infamy, the procession
+of notoriety and shame, invective against the guilty who have been
+unmasked and, on the other hand, the joyous avowal of crimes. One
+sought to rediscover the face of the criminals who had had their
+glory; broadsheets recalled the crimes of those one saw pass; newspapers provided their names and recounted their lives; sometimes
+they provided a description of their persons and dress, so that their
+identity might not pass unnoticed: like programmes for spectators.?
+People also came to examine different types of criminals, trying to
+decide, according to facial appearance or dress, the 'profession' of
+the convict, whether he was a murderer or thief: it was a game of
+masquerades and marionnettes, which was also, for more educated
+eyes, something of an empirical ethnography of crime. From spectacles on trestles to Gall's phrenology, according to the milieu to
+which one belonged, one practised the semiologies of crime at one's
+disposal: 'Physiognomies are as varied as clothes: here a majestic
+head, a Murillo face; there a vicious face, framed with thick eyebrows,
+259
+
+which convey all the energy of the determined villain... Elsewhere
+the head of a Fagin emerges from the body of an urchin. Here are
+the smooth, feminine features of accomplices; there the glazed,
+debauched faces of teachers."' The convicts themselves responded
+to this game, displaying their crimes and enacting their misdeeds:
+this was one of the functions of tattooing, a vignette of their deeds
+or their fate: "They bear the insignia of their crimes, either a guillotine tattooed on their left arms, or on their chests a dagger plunged
+into a bleeding heart.? As they passed, they mimed the scenes of their
+crimes, mocking the judges or the police, boasting of as yet undiscovered deeds of wickedness. François, Lacenaire's former accomplice, said that he had invented a method for killing a man without
+making him cry out and without spilling a single drop of blood.
+The great travelling fair of crime had its tumblers and its mummers,
+in which the comic affirmation of truth answered curiosity and invective. A whole series of scenes, in this summer of 1836, took place
+around Delacollonge: his crime (he had cut his pregnant mistress
+into pieces) was made much more spectacular by the fact that he
+was a,priest; this fact had also saved him from the scaffold. It seems
+that he aroused considerable hate among the people. Earlier, in the
+cart that had brought him to Paris in June 1836, he had been insulted
+and had been unable to hold back his tears; however, he had
+expressed a wish not to be conveyed in a closed carriage, believing
+that the humiliation formed part of his punishment. As he left
+Paris, 'one cannot imagine the virtuous indignation, the moral anger
+and base actions unleashed by the crowd on this man; he was
+covered with earth and mud; stones and insults rained down upon
+him from the furious bystanders... It was an explosion of unparalleled rage; the women above all, like veritable furies, displayed
+an unbelievable exaltation of hate' (Le Phalange, I August 1836).
+For his protection, his clothes had to be changed. Certain spectators
+were misled by this and thought that François was he. François
+entered into the spirit of the game and accepted the role; but, to the
+comedy of the crime that he did not commit, he added that of the
+priest that he was not; to the account of 'his' crime, he added the
+prayers and broad gestures of blessing directed at the jeering crowd.
+A few stepsaway, the real Delacollonge, 'who seemed like a martyr',
+was undergoing the double affront of the insults that he was not
+260
+
+receiving, but which were addressed to him, and the ridicule that
+brought back, under the appearances of another criminal, the priest
+that he was and would have liked to have concealed. His passion
+was laid out before his eyes, by a buff oon murderer to whom he was
+chained.
+In every town it passed through, the chain-gang brought its
+festival with it; it was a saturnalia of punishment, a penalty turned
+into a privilege. And, by a very curious tradition which seems to
+have escaped the ordinary rites of the public execution, it aroused
+in the convict not so much the compulsory marks of repentance as
+the explosion of a mad joy that denied the punishment. To the
+ornaments of the collar and chain, the convicts themselves added
+ribbons, braided straw, flowers or precious stuffs. The chain was the
+round and the dance; it was also a coupling, a forced marriage in
+forbidden love. Wedding, festival and rite in chains: "They ran in
+front of the chains, bunches of flowers in their hands, ribbons or
+straw tassels decorated their caps and the most skilful made crested
+helmets... Others wore open-work stockings and clogs or a
+fashionable waistcoat, under a workman's smock.* And throughout
+the evening that followed the riveting, the chain-gang formed a
+great merry-go-round, which went round and round the courtyard
+of Bicêtre: 'Woe betide the warders if the chain-gang recognized
+them; they were enveloped and drowned in its rings; the prisoners
+remained masters of the field of battle until nightfall.'" The convicts'
+Sabbath corresponded to the ceremonial of justice through the
+spectacle it invented. It inverted the splendours, the order of power
+and its signs, the forms of pleasure. But something of the political
+Sabbath was not far away. One would have had to be very deaf
+indeed not to hear something of these new accents. The convicts
+sang marching songs, which rapidly became famous and were
+repeated everywhere for a long time after. No doubt an echo was
+to be found in them of the complaints that the broadsheets attributed
+to criminals - an affirmation of the crime, a black heroization, an
+evocation of terrible punishments and of the general hate that
+surrounded them: 'Renown, let the trumpets blow for us...
+Courage, children, let us submit without fear to the terrible fate
+that hangs over our heads... Our chains are heavy, but we will
+bear them. For the convicts, no voice rises to say: relieve them of
+z6ı
+
+their suffering.? Yet there was in those collective songs a totally new
+tonality; the moral code, which most of the old complaints obeyed,
+was reversed. Instead of bringing remorse, torture sharpened pride;
+the justice that brought the sentence was rejected, and the crowd
+that came to witness what it believed to be repentance or humiliation
+was scorned: 'So far from our homes, we sometimes moan. Our
+stern brows will make our judges blench. . . Avid of misfortune
+you turn your eyes upon us, hoping to find a blighted, humiliated,
+tearful race. But there is pride in our eyes. One also finds the
+assertion that the convict's life with its companionship has pleasures
+that liberty cannot know. 'With time let us link our pleasures. Under
+lock and key feast days will be born... Pleasures are turncoats.
+They will flee the executioners; they follow where the song leads.'
+And, above all, the present order will not last forever; not only will
+the convicts be freed and resume their rights, but their accusers will
+take their place. Between the criminals and their judges, the day of
+the great reverse judgement will come: "The contempt of men
+belongs to us convicts. The gold they worship is also ours. One day,
+this gold will pass into our hands. We will buy it with our lives.
+Others will seize these chains that today you make us bear; they will
+become slaves. As we break out of our shackles, the star of liberty
+will shine for us... Farewell, for we brave both your chains and
+your laws."® The pious theatre imagined by the broadsheets, in
+which the convict exhorted the crowd never to imitate him, was
+becoming a threatening scene in which the crowd was asked to
+choose between the barbarity of the executioners, the injustice of the
+judges and the misfortune of convicts who, though defeated today,
+would triumph one day.
+The great spectacle of the chain-gang was linked with the old
+tradition of the public execution; it was also linked with that multiple
+representation of crime that gave rise at the time to newspapers,
+broadsheets, mountebanks and street theatres;' but it was also linked
+with the confrontations and struggles whose first rumblings it conveyed; it gave them a kind of symbolic outlet: though vanquished
+by the law, the army of disorder promised to return; what the
+violence of order had driven away would overthrow that order and
+bring liberty on its return. 'I was horrified to see so many sparks
+reappear in those ashes' (Le Dernier jour d'un condamné). The
+z6z
+
+agitation that had always surrounded the public executions now
+found an echo in precise threats. One can see why the July monarchy
+decided to abolish the chain-gang for the same - but more pressing -
+reasons that brought about, in the eighteenth century, the abolition
+of the public executions: 'It is no part of our morality to treat men
+in this way; one must avoid providing in the towns that the convoy
+passes through so hideous a spectacle, which, in any case, teaches
+the population nothing' (Gazette des tribuneaux, 19 July 1836). It
+was necessary, therefore, to break with these public rites; to subject
+the movements of convicts to the same mutation as the punishments
+themselves; and to bring them, too, under the veil of administrative
+decency.
+But what, in June 1837, was adopted to replace the chain-gang was
+not the simple covered cart, which had been suggested at one time,
+but a machine that had been very meticulously designed: a carriage
+conceived as a moving prison, a mobile equivalent of the Panopticon.
+A central corridor divided it along its entire length: on either side
+were six cells in which the two rows of convicts sat facing one
+another. Their feet were placed in rings that were lined on the inside
+with wool and linked together by chains eighteen inches long; the
+legs were secured in metal knee-guards. The convict sat on a kind
+of 'zinc and oak funnel that emptied onto the public way. The cell
+had no window onto the outside; it was completely lined with sheet
+iron; only a ventilator, also of sheet-iron, with holes pierced in it,
+allowed a 'suitable flow of air. On the corridor side, the door of
+each cell was provided with a hatch, divided into two compartments:
+one for food, the other, covered by a grill, for surveillance. "The
+opening and the oblique direction of the hatches were so arranged
+that the warders had the prisoners constantly in view and heard
+every word they spoke, though the prisoners themselves were
+unable to see or hear one another.' In this way, 'the same carriage
+may, without the slightest inconvenience, contain at one and the
+same time a convict and a simple offender, men and women, children
+and adults. Whatever the length of the journey, all would be
+brought to their destination without having been able to perceive
+one another or to speak to one another.' Lastly, the constant surveillance of the two warders, who were each armed with a small oak
+club, 'with thick nails of crushed diamond' made it possible to
+263
+
+operate a whole system of punishments in conformity with the
+internal regulation of the carriage: a diet of bread and water, thumbscrews, lack of a cushion that would allow one to sleep, chains on
+both arms. "Any reading other than that of books of morality is
+forbidden.'
+If only for its mildness and speed, this machine would have done
+honour to the sensibility of its author; but its merit lay in the fact
+that it was a veritable penitentiary carriage. By its external effects,
+it had a quite Benthamite perfection: 'In the rapid passage of this
+mobile prison which, on its dark, silent flanks, bears no other
+inscription than the following words - Transport of Convicts -
+there is something mysterious and gloomy, which Bentham requires
+in the carrying out of criminal sentences and which leaves in the
+minds of onlookers a more salutary and lasting impression than the
+sight of those cynical and joyous travellers' (Gazette des tribunaux,
+Is June 1837). It also had internal effects; even in a journey lasting
+only a few days (during which the inmates had not been detached
+for a single moment), it functioned as an apparatus of correction.
+One emerged from it astonishingly calm: 'From a moral point of
+view, this transportation, which lasts no more than seventy-two
+hours, is a terrible torture whose effects on the prisoner seem to be
+lasting' The convicts themselves support this view: 'In the cell
+carriage, when you don't sleep, you can only think. And when I
+thought, I came to regret what I had done; in the end, you see, I
+would have been afraid to mend my ways and I don't want to."®
+The panoptic carriage had only a short history. Yet the way in
+which it replaced the chain-gang and the reasons for this replacement
+recapitulated the whole process by which in eighty years penal
+detention replaced public execution as a calculated technique for
+altering individual behaviour. The cell-carriage was an apparatus of
+reform. What replaced the public execution was not a massive
+enclosure, it was a carefully articulated disciplinary mechanism - at
+least in principle.
+For the prison, in its reality and visible effects, was denounced at
+once as the great failure of penal justice. In a very strange way, the
+history of imprisonment does not obey a chronology in which one
+sees, in orderly succession, the establishment of a penality of deten-
+264
+
+tion, then the recognition of its failure; then the slow rise of projects
+of reform, seeming to culminate in the more or less coherent
+definition of penitentiary technique; then the implementation of this
+project; lastly, the recognition of its successes or its failure. There
+was in fact a telescoping or in any case a different distribution of
+these elements. And, just as the project of a corrective technique
+accompanied the principle of punitive detention, the critique of the
+prison and its methods appeared very early on, in those same years
+1820-45; indeed, it was embodied in a number of formulations
+which - figures apart - are today repeated almost unchanged
+- Prisons do not diminish the crime rate: they can be extended,
+multiplied or transformed, the quantity of crime and criminals
+remains stable or, worse, increases: 'In France, one calculates at
+about 108,000 the number of individuals who are in a state of flagrant
+hostility to society. The means of repression at one's disposal are;
+the scaffold, the iron-collar, three convict-ships, 19 maisons centrales,
+86 maisons de justice, 302 maisons d'arrêt, 2,800 cantonal prisons,
+2,238 cells in police stations. Despite all these, vice goes unchecked.
+The number of crimes is not diminishing... the number of recidivists is increasing, rather than declining' (La Fraternité, no. 10,
+February 1842).
+- Detention causes recidivism; those leaving prison have.more
+chance than before of going back to it; convicts are, in a very high
+proportion, former inmates; 38 per cent of those who left the maisons
+centrales were convicted again and 33 per cent of those sent to convict-ships (a figure given by G. de Rochefoucauld during the debate
+on the reform of the penal code, 2 December 1831, Archives parlementaires, LXXII, 209-10); between 1828 and 1834, out of almost
+35,000 convicted of crime, about 7,400 were recidivists (that is,
+I out of 4'7 of those convicted); out of over 200,000 correctionels,
+or petty offenders, almost 35,000 were also recidivists (1 out of 6);
+in all, one recidivist out of 5-8 of those convicted (Ducpétiaux, 1837,
+276ff); in 1831, out of 2,174 of those condemned for recidivism, 350
+had been in convict-ships, 1,682 in maisons centrales, 142 in four
+maisons de correction that followed the same régime as the centrales
+(Ducpétiaux, 1837, 276ff). And the diagnosis became even more
+severe during the July monarchy: in 1835, out of 7,223 convicted
+criminals, 1,486 were recidivists; in 1839, 1,749 Out of 7,858; in 1844,
+265
+
+1,821 out of 7,195. Among the 980 prisoners at Loos, there were $70
+recidivists and, at Melun, 745 out of 1,008 prisoners (Ferrus, 363-7).
+Instead of releasing corrected individuals, then, the prison was
+setting loose a swarm of dangerous delinquents throughout the
+population: "7,000 persons handed back each year to society... they
+are 7,000 principles of crime or corruption spread throughout the
+social body. And, when one thinks that this population is constantly
+increasing, that it lives and moves around us, ready to seize every
+opportunity of disorder, to avail itself of every crisis in society to
+try out its strength, can one remain unmoved by such a spectacle?"
+(Beaumont and Tocqueville, 22-3).
+- The prison cannot fail to produce delinquents. It does so by
+the very type of existence that it imposes on its inmates: whether
+they are isolated in cells or whether they are given useless work,
+for which they will find no employment, it is, in any case, not "to
+think of man in society; it is to create an unnatural, useless and dangerous existence'; the prison should educate its inmates, but can a
+system of education addressed to man reasonably have as its object
+to act against the wishes of nature? (Lucas, 1, 127 and 130). The
+prison also produces delinquents by imposing violent constraints
+on its inmates; it is supposed to apply the law, and to teach respect
+for it; but all its functioning operates in the form of an abuse of
+power. The arbitrary power of administration: "The feeling of injustice that a prisoner has is one of the causes that may make his
+character untamable. When he sees himself exposed in this way to
+suffering, which the law has neither ordered nor envisaged, he
+becomes habitually angry against everything around him; he sees
+every agent of authority as an executioner; he no longer thinks that
+he was guilty: he accuses justice itself' (Bigot Préameneu). Corruption, fear and the inefficiency of the warders: 'Between 1,000 and
+1,500 convicts live under the surveillance of between thirty and
+forty supervisors, who can preserve some kind of security only by
+depending on informers, that is to say, on the corruption that they
+carefully sow themselves. Who are these warders? Retired soldiers,
+men uninstructed in their task, making a trade of guarding malefactors' (La Fraternité, March 1842). Exploitation by penal labour,
+which can in these conditions have no educational character: 'One
+inveighs against the slave-trade. But are not our prisoners sold,
+266
+
+like the slaves, by entrepreneurs and bought by manufacturers..
+Is this how we teach our prisoners honesty? Are they not still more
+demoralized by these examples of abominable exploitation?''
+- The prison makes possible, even encourages, the organization
+of a milieu of delinquents, loyal to one another, hierarchized, ready
+to aid and abet any future criminal act: "Society prohibits associations of more than twenty persons... and it constitutes for itself
+associations of 200, 500, 1,200 convicts in the maisons centrales,
+which are constructed for them ad hoc, and which it divides up for
+their greater convenience into workshops, courtyards, dormitories,
+refectories, where they can all meet together... And it multiplies
+them across France in such a way that, where there is a prison,
+there is an association... and as many anti-social clubs' (Moreau-
+Christophe, 7). And it is in these clubs that the education of the
+young first offender takes place: "The first desire that is born within
+him will be to learn from his cleverer seniors how to escape the
+rigours of the law; the first lesson will be derived from the strict
+logic of thieves who regard society as an enemy; the morality will
+be the informing and spying honoured in our prisons; the first
+passion to be aroused in him will be to frighten the young mind by
+these monsters that must have been born in the dungeon and which
+the pen refuses to name... Henceforth he has broken with everything that has bound him to society' (L' Almanach populaire de
+France, 49-56). Faucher spoke of 'barracks of crime'.
+- The conditions to which the free inmates are subjected necessarily condemn them to recidivism: they are under the surveillance
+of the police; they are assigned to a particular residence, or forbidden
+others; 'they leave prison with a passport that they must show everywhere they go and which mentions the sentence that they have
+served' (Barbé Marbois, 17). Being on the loose, being unable to find
+work, leading the life of a vagabond are the most frequent factors in
+recidivism. The Gazette des tribunaux, but also the workers' newspapers, regularly cited cases like that of the worker convicted of
+theft, placed under surveillance at Rouen, caught again for theft,
+and whom no lawyers would defend; so he took it upon himself to
+speak before the court, told the story of his life, explained how, on
+leaving prison and forced to reside in a particular place, he was
+unable to take up his trade as a gilder, since as an ex-convict he was
+267
+
+turhed down wherever he went; the police refused him the right to
+seek work elsewhere: he found himself unable to leave Rouen, with
+nothing to do but die of hunger and poverty as a result of this
+terrible surveillance. He went to the town hall and asked for work;
+for eight days he was given work in the cemeteries for fourteen sous
+a day: 'But,' he said, 'I am young, I have a good appetite, I eat more
+than two pounds of bread a day at five sous a pound; what can I do
+with fourteen sous to feed myself, wash my clothes and find lodging:
+I was driven to despair, I wanted to become an honest man again;
+the surveillance plunged me back into misfortune. I became disgusted with everything; it was then that I met Lemaître, who was
+also a pauper; we had to live and wicked thoughts of thieving came
+back to us.'1o
+- Lastly, the prison indirectly produces delinquents by throwing
+the inmate's family into destitution: "The same order that sends the
+head of the family to prison reduces each day the mother to destitution, the children to abandonment, the whole family to vagabondage
+and begging. It is in this way that crime can take root' (Lucas, II, 64).
+It should be noted that this monotonous critique of the prison
+always takes one of two directions: either that the prison was insufficiently corrective, and that the penitentiary technique was still
+at the rudimentary stage; or that in attempting to be corrective it
+lost its power as punishment," that the true penitentiary technique
+was rigour, ' and that prison was a double economic error: directly,
+by its intrinsic cost and, indirectly, by the cost of the delinquency
+that it did not abolish. 13 The answer to these criticisms was invariably
+the same: the reintroduction of the invariable principles of penitentiary technique. For a century and a half the prison had always been
+offered as its own remedy: the reactivation of the penitentiary
+techniques as the only means of overcoming their perpetual failure;
+the realization of the corrective project as the only method of overcoming the impossibility of implementing it.
+This is shown conclusively in the fact that the prisoners' revolts
+of recent weeks* have been attributed to the fact that the reforms
+proposed in 1945 never really took effect; that one must therefore
+return to the fundamental principles of the prison. But these
+*A series of uprisings in French prisons, between 1972 and 1974, in
+protest against living conditions.
+268
+
+principles, of which such wonderful results are still expected today,
+are well enough known: for the past 15o years they have constituted
+the seven universal maxims of the good "penitential condition'.
+I. Penal detention must have as its essential function the transformation of the individual's behaviour: "The reform of the convict
+as the principal aim of the penalty is a sacred principle whose formal
+appearance in the domain of science and above all in that of legislation is quite recent' ('Congrès pénitentiaire de Bruxelles', 1847).
+And the Amor commission, of May 1945, faithfully repeats: "The
+penalty that deprives of liberty has as its essential aim the reformation and social rehabilitation of the convict.' The principle of
+correction.
+2. Convicts must be isolated or at least distributed according to
+the penal gravity of their act, but above all according to age, mental
+attitude, the technique of correction to be used, the stages of their
+transformation. 'One must take into account, in using methods for
+altering the great physical and moral differences to be found in the
+characters of convicts, their degree of perversity, the unequal
+opportunities for correction that they may offer' (February, 1850).
+1945: "The distribution in the penitentiary establishments of individuals serving a light sentence of up to one year is based on sex,
+personality and the degree of perversion of the delinquent.' The principle of classification.
+3. It must be possible to alter the penalties according to the
+individuality of the convicts, the results that have been obtained,
+progress or relapses. 'Since the principal aim of the penalty is the
+reform of the convict, it is desirable that any convict whose moral
+regeneration is sufficiently assured should be set free' (Lucas, 1838),
+1945: "A progressive régime is applied ... with a view to adapting
+the treatment of the prisoner to his attitude and to his degree of
+improvement. This régime stretches from solitary confinement to
+semi-liberty... The benefit of parole is extended to all penalties
+involving a term of imprisonment. The principle of the modulation
+of penalties.
+4. Work must be one of the essential elements in the transformation and progressive socialization of convicts. Penal labour 'must
+not be regarded as the complement and as it were an aggravation
+of the penalty, but as a mitigation, of which it is no longer possible
+269
+
+tordeprive the prisoner'. It must enable him to learn or to practise a
+trade, and to provide the prisoner and his family with a source of
+income (Ducpétiaux, 1857). 1945: 'Every common-law prisoner is
+obliged to work... No prisoner may be forced to remain unoccupied.!' The principle of work as obligation and right.
+5. The education of the prisoner is for the authorities both an
+indispensable precaution in the interests of society and an obligation
+to the prisoner. 'Education alone may serve as a penitentiary
+instrument. The question of penitentiary imprisonment is a question
+of education' (Lucas, 1838). 1945: "The treatment meted out to the
+prisoner, outside any corrupting promiscuity... must be directed
+principally to his general and professional instruction and to his
+improvement.' The principle of penicentiary education.
+6. The prison régime must, at least in part, be supervised and
+administered by a specialized stafi possessing the moral qualities and
+technical abilities required of educators. In 185o, on the subject of
+prison medicine, Ferrus remarked: 'It is a useful addition to all
+forms of imprisonment... no one could possess more intimately
+than a physician the trust of the prisoners, know their characters
+better, influence their mental attitudes more effectively, while relieving their physical ills and, by this means, reprimand or encourage
+as he thinks fit.' 1945: 'In every penitentiary establishment, there
+functions a social and medico-psychological service.' The principle
+of the technical supervision of detention.
+7. Imprisonment must be followed by measures of supervision and
+assistance until the rehabilitation of the former prisoner is complete.
+Not only must he be placed under surveillance on leaving prison,
+"but he must be given help and support' (Boulet and Benquot at the
+Chambre de Paris). 1945: "Assistance is given to prisoners during
+and after imprisonment with a view to facilitating their rehabilitation.' The principle of auxiliary institutions.
+Word for word, from one century to the other, the same fundamental propositions are repeated. They reappear in each new, hardwon, finally accepted formulation of a reform that has hitherto
+always been lacking. The same sentences or almost the same could
+have been borrowed from other 'fruitful' periods of reform: the end
+of the nineteenth century and the "movement of social defence'; or
+again, the last few years, with the prisoners' revolts.
+270
+
+One must not, therefore, regard the prison, its "failure' and its
+more or less successful reform as three successive stages. One
+should think rather of a simultaneous system that historically has
+been superimposed on the juridical deprivation of liberty; a fourfold
+system comprising: the additional, disciplinary element of the prison
+- the element of 'super-power'; the production of an objectivity, a
+technique, a penitentiary 'rationality' - the element of auxiliary
+knowledge; the de facto reintroduction, if not actual increase, of a
+criminality that the prison ought to destroy - the element of inverted efficiency; lastly, the repetition of a 'reform' that is isomorphic, despite its "idealism', with the disciplinary functioning of the
+prison - the element of utopian duplication. It is this complex
+ensemble that constitutes the 'carceral system',
+', not only the institution of the prison, with its walls, its staff, its regulations and its
+violence. The carceral system combines in a single figure discourses
+and architectures, coercive regulations and scientific propositions,
+real social effects and invincible utopias, programmes for correcting
+delinquents and mechanisms that reinforce delinquency. Is not the
+supposed failure part of the functioning of the prison. Is it not to
+be included among those effects of power that discipline and the
+auxiliary technology of imprisonment have induced in the apparatus
+of justice, and in society in general, and which may be grouped
+together under the name of 'carceral system"? If the prison-institution has survived for so long, with such immobility, if the principle
+of penal detention has never seriously been questioned, it is no
+doubt because this carceral system was deeply rooted and carried
+out certain very precise functions. As evidence of this strength and
+immobility, let us take a recent fact: the model prison opened at
+Fleury-Mérogis in 1969 simply took over in its overall plan the
+panoptic star-shape that made such a stir in 1836 at the Petite-
+Roquette. It was the same machinery of power that assumed a real
+body and a symbolic form. But what role was it supposed to play?
+If the law is supposed to define offences, if the function of the
+penal apparatus is to reduce them and if the prison is the instrument
+of this repression, then failure has to be admitted. Or rather - for in
+order to establish it in historical terms, one must be able to measure
+the effects of the penality of detention on the overall level of
+27ł
+
+criminality - one should be surprised that for the past 150 years the
+proclamation of the failure of the prison has always been accompanied by its maintenance. The only alternative actually envisaged
+was deportation, which England abandoned at the beginning of the
+nineteenth century and which France took up under the Second
+Empire, but rather as a rigorous and distant form of imprisonment.
+But perhaps one should reverse the problem and ask oneself what
+is served by the failure of the prison; what is the use of these different
+phenomena that are continually being criticized; the maintenance of
+delinquency, the encouragement of recidivism, the transformation of
+the occasional offender into a habitual delinquent, the organization
+of a closed milieu of delinquency. Perhaps one should look for what
+is hidden beneath the apparent cynicism of the penal institution,
+which, after purging the convicts by means of their sentence, continues to follow them by a whole series of'brandings' (a surveillance
+that was once de jure and which is today de facto; the police record
+that has taken the place of the convict's passport) and which thus
+pursues as a "delinquent' someone who has acquitted himself of his
+punishment as an offender? Can we not see here a consequence
+rather than a contradiction? If so, one would be forced to suppose
+that the prison, and no doubt punishment in general, is not intended
+to eliminate offences, but rather to distinguish them, to distribute
+them, to use them; that it is not so much that they render docile
+those who are liable to transgress the law, but that they tend to
+assimilate the transgression of the laws in a general tactics of subjection. Penality would then appear to be a way of handling illegalities,
+of laying down the limits of tolerance, of giving free rein to some,
+of putting pressure on others, of excluding a particular section, of
+making another useful, of neutralizing certain individuals and of
+profiting from others. In short, penality does not simply 'check'
+illegalities; it 'differentiates' them, it provides them with a general
+'economy. And, if one can speak of justice, it is not only because
+the law itself or the way of applying it serves the interests of a class, it
+is also because the differential administration of illegalities through
+the mediation of penality forms part of those mechanisms of domination. Legal punishments are to be resituated in an overall strategy
+of illegalities. The 'failure' of the prison may be understood on this
+basis.
+272
+
+The general schema of penal reform had taken shape at the end of
+the eighteenth century in the struggle against illegalities: a whole
+equilibrium of tolerance, mutual support and interests which, under
+the Ancien Régime, had maintained the illegalities of different social
+strata side by side, was disturbed. There then emerged the utopia of
+a universally and publicly punitive society in which ceaselessly
+active penal mechanisms would function without delay, mediation
+or uncertainty; one law, doubly ideal because perfect in its calculations and engraven on the minds of each citizen would stop, at their
+very origin, all practices of illegality. Now, at the turn of the
+eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and against the new codes, the
+danger of a new popular illegality arose. Or, to be more precise,
+perhaps the popular illegalities began to develop according to new
+dimensions: those that were introduced by the movements which,
+from the 178os to the Revolutions of 1848, linked together social
+conflicts, the struggles against the political régimes, the resistance
+to the movement of industrialization, the effects of the economic
+crises. Broadly speaking, there were three characteristic processes.
+First, the development of the political dimension of the popular
+illegalities. This occurred in two ways: hitherto localized practices,
+limited in some sense to themselves (like the refusal to pay taxes and
+rents or to comply with conscription; the violent confiscation of
+hoarded goods; the looting of shops and the forced selling of products at a 'fair price'; confrontations with the representatives of
+power), were able during the Revolution to lead to directly political
+struggles, whose aim was not simply to extract concessions from the
+state or to rescind some intolerable measure, but to change the
+government and the very structure of power. On the other hand,
+certain political movements were explicitly based on existing forms
+of illegality (for example, the royalist agitation of the west and south
+of France used the peasants' rejection of the new laws on property,
+religion and conscription); this political dimension of illegality was
+to become more complex and more marked in the relations between
+the workers' movement and the republican parties in the nineteenth
+century, in the passage from the workers' struggles (strikes, prohibited coalitions, illegal associations) to political revolution. In any
+case, on the horizon of these illegal practices - which multiplied with
+ever more restrictive legislation - there emerged struggles of a
+273
+
+striotly political kind; the possible overthrow of power was not
+present in all of them, far from it; but a good many were able to turn
+themselves to account in overall political struggles and sometimes
+even to lead directly to them.
+On the other hand, through the rejection of the law or other
+regulations, it is easy enough to recognize the struggles against those
+who set them up in their own interests: people were no longer
+fighting against the tax farmers, financiers, the king's agents, prevaricating magistrates or bad ministers - all the agents of injustice -
+but against the law itself and the justice whose task it was to apply
+it; against local landowners who introduced new rights; against
+employers who worked together, but forbade workers' coalitions;
+against entrepreneurs who introduced more machines, lower wages
+and longer working hours, and made the factory regulations more
+and more strict. It was against the new régime of landed property -
+set up by a bourgeoisie that profited from the Revolution - that a
+whole peasant illegality developed. This no doubt assumed its most
+violent forms between Thermidor and the Consulate, but it did not
+disappear then; it was against the new system of the legal exploitation of labour that workers' illegalities at the beginning of the nineteenth century developed: from the most violent such as machinebreaking, or the most lasting such as the formation of associations,
+to the most everyday, such as absenteeism, abandoning work,
+vagabondage, pilfering raw materials, deception as to the quantity
+and quality of the work completed. A whole series of illegalities
+was inscribed in struggles in which those struggling knew that
+they were confronting both the law and the class that had imposed it.
+Lastly, although it is true that, during the eighteenth century,
+criminality tended towards more specialized forms, inclining more
+and more to the skilful theft, and became, to some extent, the practice of men on the fringes of society, isolated from a population that
+was hostile to them - one sees, in the last years of the eighteenth
+century, the reconstitution of certain links or the establishment of
+new relations; not, as contemporaries said, that the leaders of popular
+agitation had been criminals, but because the new forms of law,
+the rigours of the labour regulations, the demands either of the
+state, or of the landowners, or of the employers, and the mos!
+274
+
+detailed techniques of surveillance, increased the occasions of
+offences, and threw to the other side of the law many individuals, who,
+in other conditions, would not have gone over to specialized
+criminality; it is against the background of the new laws of property,
+against the background, too, of unacceptable conscription that a
+peasant illegality developed in the last years of the Revolution, with
+a consequent increase in violence, acts of aggression, thefts, looting
+and even the greater forms of "political brigandage'; it was also
+against a background of legislation or very heavy regulations (concerning the livrer, or service certificate, rents, hours, absences from
+work) that a workers' vagabondage developed that often crossed
+the boundary into actual delinquency. A whole series of illegal
+practices, which during the previous century had tended to remain
+isolated from one another, now seemed to come together to form a
+new threat.
+There was a threefold diffusion of popular illegalities at the turn
+of the century (quite apart from a quantitative extension that is
+problematic and still uncalculated): their insertion in a general
+political outlook; their explicit articulation on social struggles; a
+communication between different forms and levels of offences.
+These processes may not have reached their full development;
+certainly there did not develop at the beginning of the nineteenth
+century a massive movement of illegality that was both political and
+social. But, in their emerging form and despite their dispersal, they
+were sufficiently marked to serve as a support for the "great fear'
+of a people who were believed to be criminal and seditious as a
+whole, for the myth of a barbaric, immoral and outlaw class which,
+from the empire to the July monarchy, haunted the discourse of
+legislators, philanthropists and investigators into working-class life.
+It is these processes that are to be found behind a whole series of
+affirmations that are quite alien to the penal theory of the eighteenth
+century: that crime is not a potentiality that interests or passions
+have inscribed in the hearts of all men, but that it is almost exclusively committed by a certain social class; that criminals, who were
+once to be met with in every social class, now emerged 'almost all
+from the bottom rank of the social order' (Comte, 49); that 'nine
+tenths of murderers, thieves and idlers come from what we have
+called the social base' (Lauvergne, 337); that it is not crime that
+279
+
+alienates an individual from society, but that crime is itself due rather
+to the fact that one is in society as an alien, that one belongs to that
+"bastardized race', as Target called it, to that 'class degraded by
+misery whose vices stand like an invincible obstacle to the generous
+intentions that wish to combat it' (Buré, 39ł); that, this being the
+case, it would be hypocritical or naïve to believe that the law was
+made for all in the name of all; that it would be more prudent to
+recognize that it was made for the few and that it was brought to
+bear upon others; that in principle it applies to all citizens, but that
+it is addressed principally to the most numerous and least enlightened classes; that, unlike political and civil laws, their application
+does not concern everybody equally (Rossi, I, 3z); that in the courts
+society as a whole does not judge one of its members, but that a
+social category with an interest in order judges another that is
+dedicated to disorder: 'Visit the places where people are judged,
+imprisoned or executed... One thing will strike you everywhere;
+everywhere you see two quite distinct classes of men, one of which
+always meets on the seats of the accusers and judges, the other on
+the bepches of the accused', which is explained by the fact that the
+latter, for lack of resources and education, do not know 'how to
+remain within the limits of legal probity' (Lucas, II, 82); so that the
+language of the law, which is supposed to be universal, is, in this
+respect, inadequate; it must, if it is to be effective, be the discourse
+of one class to another, which has neither the same ideas as it nor
+even the same words: 'How are we, with our prudish, contemptuous
+languages, overloaded with formality, to make ourselves understood
+by those who have never heard anything but the crude, poor,
+irregular, but lively, frank, picturesque dialect of the market, the
+tavern and the fair... What language, what method should we use
+when drawing up laws that will act effectively on the uneducated
+minds of those less capable of resisting the temptations of crime?'
+(Rossi, -, 33). Law and justice do not hesitate to proclaim their
+necessary class dissymmetry.
+If this is the case, the prison, apparently 'failing', does not miss
+its target; on the contrary, it reaches it, in so far as it gives rise to
+one particular form of illegality in the midst of others, which it is
+able to isolate, to place in full light and to organize as a relatively
+enclosed, but penetrable, milieu. It helps to establish an open illegal-
+276
+
+ity, irreducible at a certain level and secretly useful, at once refractory and docile; it isolates, outlines, brings out a form of illegality
+that seems to sum up symbolically all the others, but which makes it
+possible to leave in the shade those that one wishes to - or must -
+tolerate. This form is, strictly speaking, delinquency. One should
+not see in delinquency the most intense, most harmful form of
+illegality, the form that the penal apparatus must try to eliminate
+through imprisonment because of the danger it represents; it is
+rather an effect of penality (and of the penality of detention) that
+makes it possible to differentiate, accommodate and supervise
+illegalities. No doubt delinquency is a form of illegality; certainly
+it has its roots in illegality; but it is an illegality that the "carceral
+system',
+, with all its ramifications, has invested, segmented, isolated,
+penetrated, organized, enclosed in a definite milieu, and to which it
+has given an instrumental role in relation to the other illegalities.
+In short, although the juridical opposition is between legality and
+illegal practice, the strategic opposition is between illegalities and
+delinquency.
+For the observation that prison fails to eliminate crime, one should
+perhaps substitute the hypothesis that prison has succeeded extremely well in producing delinquency, a specific type, a politically
+or economically less dangerous - and, on occasion, usable.- form
+of illegality; in producing delinquents, in an apparently marginal,
+but in fact centrally supervised milieu; in producing the delinquent
+as a pathologized subject. The success of the prison, in the struggles
+around the law and illegalities, has been to specify a "delinquency'.
+We have seen how the carceral system substituted the 'delinquent'
+for the offender, and also superimposed upon juridical practice a
+whole horizon of possible knowledge. Now this process that constitutes delinquency as an object of knowledge is one with the
+political operation that dissociates illegalities and isolates delinquency from them. The prison is the hinge of these two mechanisms;
+it enables them to reinforce one another perpetually, to objectify the
+delinquency behind the offence, to solidify delinquency in the movement of illegalities. So successful has the prison been that, after a
+century and a half of 'failures', the prison still exists, producing the
+same results, and there is the greatest reluctance to dispense
+with it.
+277
+
+The penality of detention seems to fabricate - hence no doubt its
+longevity - an enclosed, separated and useful illegality. The circuit
+of delinquency would seem to be not the sub-product of a prison
+which, while punishing, does not succeed in correcting; it is rather
+the direct effect of a penality which, in order to control illegal
+practices, seems to invest certain of them in a mechanism of "punishment-reproduction', of which imprisonment is one of the main
+parts. But why and how is the prison called upon to participate in
+the fabrication of a delinquency that it is supposed to combat?
+The establishment of a delinquency that constitutes something
+like an enclosed illegality has in fact a number of advantages. To
+begin with, it is possible to supervise it (by locating individuals,
+infiltrating the group, organizing mutual informing): for the vague,
+swarming mass of a population practising occasional illegality, which
+is always likely to spread, or again for those loose bands of vagabonds, recruiting as they move from place to place, and according
+to circumstances, from the unemployed, beggars, "bad characters'
+of all kinds, which sometimes reach such proportions - as we saw at
+the end of the eighteenth century - as to form formidable forces for
+looting and rioting, is substituted a relatively small and enclosed
+group of individuals on whom a constant surveillance may be kept.
+Moreover, it is possible to divert this self-absorbed delinquency to
+forms of illegality that are less dangerous: maintained by the pressure of controls on the fringes of society, reduced to precarious
+conditions of existence, lacking links with the population that would
+be able to sustain it (as was once the case with smugglers or certain
+forms of bandits - cf. Hobsbawm), delinquents inevitably fell back
+on a localized criminality, limited in its power to attract popular
+support, politically harmless and economically negligible. Now this
+concentrated, supervised and disarmed illegality is directly useful.
+It may be useful in relation to other illegalities: isolated from them,
+turned inwards upon its own internal organization, dedicated to a
+violent criminality, of which the poorer classes are often the first
+victims, hemmed in on every side by the police, exposed to long
+prison sentences, followed by a permanently 'specialized' life -
+delinquency - this alien, dangerous and often hostile world obstructs
+or at least maintains at a sufficiently low level everyday illegal
+practices (petty thefts, minor acts of violence, routine acts of law-
+278
+
+breaking); it prevents them from leading to broader, more obvious
+forms, rather as though the exemplary effect once expected of the
+spectacle of the scaffold was now sought not so much in the rigour
+of the punishments, as in the visible, branded existence of delinquency itself: while differentiating itself from other popular illegalities, delinquency serves to keep them in check.
+But delinquency has other direct uses. The example of colonization comes to mind. Yet it is not the most convincing example;
+indeed, although the deportation of criminals was demanded on
+several occasions under the Restoration, either by the Chamber of
+Deputies or by the General Councils, this was essentially in order
+to lighten the financial burdens imposed by the whole apparatus of
+detention; and, despite all the projects that were drawn up under the
+July monarchy for delinquents, undisciplined soldiers, prostitutes
+and orphans to take part in the colonization of Algeria, that colony
+was formally excluded, by the law of 1854, from becoming one of
+the overseas penal colonies; in fact, deportation to Guiana or later
+to New Caledonia had no real economic importance, despite the
+obligation imposed on the convicts to remain in the colony where
+they had served their sentence for a number of years equal to their
+time of detention (in certain cases, they even had to spend the rest
+of their lives there). 1* In fact, the use of delinquency as a milieu
+that was both separate and manipulable took place above all on the
+fringes of legality, that is to say, a sort of subordinate illegality was
+also set up in the nineteenth century whose organization as delinquency, with all the surveillance that this implies, provided a guaranree of docility. Delinquency, controlled illegality, is an agent for the
+illegality of the dominant groups. The setting up of prostitution
+networks in the nineteenth century is characteristic in this respect:!5
+police checks and checks on the prostitutes' health, their regular
+stay in prison, the large-scale organization of the maisons closes, or
+brothels, the strict hierarchy that was maintained in the prostitution
+milieu, its control by delinquent-informers, all this made it possible
+to canalize and to recover by a whole series of intermediaries the
+enormous profits from a sexual pleasure that an ever-more insistent
+everyday moralization condemned to semi-clandestinity and naturally
+made expensive; in setting up a price for pleasure, in creating a
+profit from repressed sexuality and in collecting this profit, the
+279
+
+delinquent milieu was in complicity with a self-interested puritanism: an illicit fiscal agent operating over illegal practices.1° Arms
+trafficking, the illegal sale of alcohol in prohibition countries, or
+more recently drug trafficking show a similar functioning of this
+'useful delinquency: the existence of a legal prohibition creates
+around it a field of illegal practices, which one manages to supervise,
+while extracting from it an illicit profit through elements, themselves
+illegal, but rendered manipulable by their organization in delinquency. This organization is an instrument for administering and
+exploiting illegalities.
+It is also an instrument for the illegality with which the very
+exercise of power surrounds itself. The political use of delinquents -
+as informers and agents provocateurs - was a fact well before the
+nineteenth century.!? But, after the Revolution, this practice
+acquired quite different dimensions: the infiltration of political
+parties and workers' associations, the recruitment of thugs against
+strikers and rioters, the organization of a sub-police - working
+directly with the legal police and capable if necessary of becoming a
+sort of parallel army - a whole extra-legal functioning of power was
+partly assured by the mass of reserve labour constituted by the
+delinquents: a clandestine police force and standby army at the
+disposal of the state. It seems that, in France, it was around the
+Revolution of 1848 and Louis Napoleon's seizure of power that
+these practices reached their height (Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire...,
+63-5). Delinquency, solidified by a penal system centred upon the
+prison, thus represents a diversion of illegality for the illicit circuits
+of profit and power of the dominant class.
+The organization of an isolated illegality, enclosed in delinquency,
+would not have been possible without the development of police
+supervision. General surveillance of the population, 'silent, mysterious, unperceived vigilance ... it is the eye of the government ceaselessly open and watching without distinction over all citizens, yet
+without subjecting them to any measure of coercion whatever... It
+does not need to be written into the law' (Bonneville, 1847, 397-2).
+Surveillance of individuals, envisaged by the code of 1810, of exconvicts and of all those who, having appeared before the courts on
+serious charges, were legally presumed to represent a new threat to
+the peace of society. But surveillance, too, of milieux and groups
+280
+
+regarded as dangerous by informers, almost all of whom were
+former delinquents, supervised as such by the police: delinquency,
+an object among others of police surveillance, is also one of its
+privileged instruments. All these surveillances presuppose the
+organization of a hierarchy, partly official, partly secret (in the Paris
+police, this was essentially the 'security service', which comprised,
+apart from its 'open agents' - inspectors and sergeants - its "secret
+agents' and informers, who were motivated by fear of punishment
+or the prospect of reward: cf. Fregier, I, 142-8). They also presuppose the setting up of a documentary system, the heart of which
+would be the location and identification of criminals: compulsory
+description of the criminal combined with arrest warrants issued by
+the assize courts, a description included in prison committal registers,
+copies of the registers of assize courts and courts of summary
+jurisdiction sent each month to the Ministries of Justice and of
+General Police, the organization a little later at the Ministry of the
+Interior of a criminal records office with an alphabetical index containing summaries of these registers, the use in about 1833, according
+to the method of 'naturalists, librarians, merchants, businessmen' of
+a system of individual cards or reports, which facilitated the integration of new data and, at the same time, together with the name of the
+individual under investigation, all the information that might concern him (Bonneville, 1844, 22-3) - the appearance of the card-index
+and the constitution of the human sciences are another invention
+that historians have taken little note of). Delinquency, with the
+secret agents that it procures, but also with the generalized policing
+that it authorizes, constitutes a means of perpetual surveillance of
+the population: an apparatus that makes it possible to supervise,
+through the delinquents themselves, the whole social field. Delinquency functions as a political observatory. In their turn, the statisticians and the sociologists have made use of it, long after the police.
+But this surveillance has been able to function only in conjunction
+with the prison. Because the prison facilitates the supervision of
+individuals when they are released, because it makes possible the
+recruiting of informers and multiplies mutual denunciations, because
+it brings offenders into contact with one another, it precipitates the
+organization of a delinquent milieu, closed in upon itself, but easily
+supervised: and all the results of non-rehabilitation (unemployment,
+28ł
+
+prohibitions on residence, enforced residences, probation) make it
+all too easy for former prisoners to carry out the tasks assigned
+to them. Prison and police form a twin mechanism; together they
+assure in the whole field of illegalities the differentiation, isolation
+and use of delinquency. In the illegalities, the police-prison system
+segments a manipulable delinquency. This delinquency, with its
+specificity, is a result of the system; but it also becomes a part and
+an instrument of it. So that one should speak of an ensemble whose
+three terms (police-prison-delinquency) support one another and
+form a circuit that is never interrupted. Police surveillance provides
+the prison with offenders, which the prison transforms into delinquents, the targets and auxiliaries of police supervisions, which
+regularly send back a certain number of them to prison.
+There is no penal justice intended to prosecute all illegal practices
+which, to do so, would use the police as an auxiliary and prison as a
+punitive instrument, and not leave in its wake the unassimilable
+residue of 'delinquency'. One should regard this justice as an instrument for the differential supervision of illegalities. In relation to this
+instrument, criminal justice plays the role of legal surety and principle of transmission. It is a relay in a general economy of illegalities,
+whose other elements are (not below it, but beside it) the police, the
+prison and delinquency. Police encroachment on justice and the
+force of inertia that the carceral institution opposes to justice are not
+new, nor are they the result of a sclerosis or of a gradual shift in
+power; it is a structural feature that characterizes punitive mechanisms in modern societies. The magistrates can say what they like;
+penal justice, with all its theatrical apparatus, is intended to respond
+to the daily demand of an apparatus of supervision half submerged
+in the darkness in which police and delinquency are brought together. Judges are the scarcely resisting employees of this apparatus. ' They assist as far as they can in the constitution of delinquency,
+that is to say, in the differentiation of illegalities, in the supervision,
+colonization and use of certain of these illegalities by the illegality
+of the dominant class.
+Two figures stand out as representative of this process, which
+developed in the first thirty or forty years of the nineteenth century.
+First, there was Vidocq (cf. his Mémoires and Histoire de Vidocq
+raconiée par lui-même). He was a man of the old illegalities, a Gil
+282
+
+Blas of the other end of the century, who soon took a turn for the
+worse: disturbances, adventures, swindlings, of which he was
+usually himself the victim, brawls and duels; successive enlistments
+and desertions, contacts with prostitution, gambling, pickpocketing
+and soon large-scale brigandage. But the almost mythical importance
+that he assumed in the eyes of his contemporaries was based not on
+this, perhaps embellished past; it was not even based on the fact that,
+for the first time in history, a former inmate of a convict-ship,
+redeemed or quite simply bought, became a chief of police, but
+rather on the fact that, in him, delinquency visibly assumed its
+ambiguous status as an object and instrument for a police apparatus
+that worked both against it and with it. Vidocq marks the moment
+when deliquency, detached from other illegalities, was invested by
+power and turned inside out. It was then that the direct, institutional
+coupling of police and delinquency took place: the disturbing
+moment when criminality became one of the mechanisms of power.
+A figure had haunted earlier times, that of the monstrous king, the
+source of all justice and yet besmirched with crime; another fear
+now appeared, that of some dark, secret understanding between
+those who enforced the law and those who violated it. The Shakespearian age when sovereignty confronted abomination in a single
+character had gone; the everyday melodrama of police power and of
+the complicities that crime formed with power was soon to begin.
+Opposite Vidocq stood his contemporary, Lacenaire. His presence, assured for ever in the paradise of the aesthetes of crime, is
+surprising enough: despite all his good will, his neophyte's zeal, he
+was only able to commit, and even then with a singular lack of skill,
+no more than a few minor crimes; he was so strongly suspected of
+being a police spy that the administration had to protect him against
+his fellow prisoners, who tried to kill him (the charge was formally
+taken up by Canler, 15), and it was the fashionable society of Louis-
+Philippe's Paris that gave him, before his execution, a feast beside
+which many a later literary resurrection has been little more than
+academic homage. His fame owed nothing either to the extent of his
+crimes or to the art of their conception; it was their ineptitude that
+gave cause for surprise. But it did owe a great deal to the visible
+play, in what he did and what he said, between illegality and delinquency. Swindling, desertion, petty theft, imprisonment, the revival
+283
+
+of friendships made in prison, mutual blackmail, recidivism, up to
+the last, failed attempt at murder - Lacenaire is the typical 'delinquent'. But he brought with him, at least potentially, a horizon of
+illegalities that had, until quite recently, represented a threat: this
+ruined petty bourgeois, of good education, would, a generation
+earlier, have been a revolutionary, a Jacobin, a regicide; 19 had he been
+a contemporary of Robespierre, his rejection of the law would have
+taken a directly political form. Born in 1800, at more or less the
+same time as Stendhal's Julien Sorel, his character bears the trace
+of these possibilities; but they took the form of theft, murder and
+denunciation. All these potentialities became a delinquency of no
+great moment: in this sense, Lacenaire is a reassuring character.
+And if these potentialities reappear, it is in what he says about the
+theory of crime. At the moment of his death, Lacenaire manifested
+the triumph of delinquency over illegality, or rather the figure of an
+illegality, on the one hand, dragged down into delinquency, and,
+on the other, displaced towards an aesthetics of crime, that is to say,
+towards an art of the privileged classes. There is a symmetry between Lacenaire and Vidocq, who in the same period, made it
+possible to turn delinquency in upon itself by constituting it as an
+enclosed, observable milieu and by displacing towards police techniques a whole delinquent practice that was becoming the licit
+illegality of power. That the Parisian bourgeoisie should have
+feasted Lacenaire, that his cell should have been open to famous
+visitors, that he should have been showered with praise during the
+last days of his life, he whose death his plebeian fellow prisoners had
+demanded before his judges had done so, he who had done everything, in court, to bring his accomplice François to the scaffold,
+there was a reason for all this: what was being celebrated was the
+symbolic figure of an illegality kept within the bounds of delinquency and transformed into discourse - that is to say, made doubly
+inoffensive; the bourgeoisie had invented for itself a new pleasure,
+which it has still far from outgrown. It should not be forgotten that
+Lacenaire's celebrated death succeeded in muffling the echoes of
+Fieschi's attempt on the life of Louis-Philippe; Fieschi, one of the
+most recent of the regicides, represented the converse figure of a
+petty criminality leading to political violence. Nor should we forget
+that it took place a few months before the departure of the last
+284
+
+chain-gang and the scandalous demonstrations that accompanied it.
+These two festivals overlapped in history; and, indeed, François,
+Lacenaire's accomplice, was one of the best-known characters in the
+chain-gang of 19 July.2º The one extended the ancient rituals of the
+public execution at the risk of reactivating popular illegalities around
+the criminals. It was to be prohibited, for the criminal was no longer
+to occupy any other space than that appropriate to delinquency.
+The other inaugurated the theoretical play of an illegality of the
+privileged; or rather it marked the moment when the political and
+economic illegalities actually practised by the bourgeoisie were to
+be duplicated in theoretical and aesthetic representation: the 'Metaphysics of crime', a term of ten associated with Lacenaire. The French
+translation of De Quincey's Murder Considered as One of the Fine
+Arts was published in 1849.
+This production of delinquency and its investment by the penal
+apparatus must be taken for what they are: not results acquired once
+and for all, but tactics that shiftaccording to how closely they reach
+their target. The split between delinquency and other illegalities, the
+way in which it is turned back upon them, its colonization by the
+dominant illegality - these all appear clearly in the way in which the
+police-prison system functions; yet they have always met with
+resistance; they have given rise to struggles and provoked reaction.
+Erecting the barrier to separate delinquents from all the lower strata
+of the population from which they sprang and with which they
+remained linked has been a difficult task, especially no doubt in
+urban milieux.21 It has been a long and arduous undertaking. It has
+involved the use of the general principles of the moralization' of the
+poorer classes that elsewhere has had such crucial importance both
+from an economic and a political point of view (the acquisition of
+what might be called a 'basic legalism', which was indispensable
+from the time when custom was replaced by the system of the code;
+learning the elementary rules of property and thrift; training in
+docility at work, in stability of residence and of the family, etc.).
+More specific methods were used to maintain the hostility of the
+poorer classes to delinquents (the use of ex-convicts as informers,
+police spies, strike-breakers or thugs). There has been a systematic
+confusion between offences against common law and those offences
+285
+
+against the severe legislation concerning the livrer (work record),
+strikes, coalitions, associations, " for which the workers demanded
+political status. Workers' action was regularly accused of being
+animated, if not manipulated, by mere criminals (cf., for example,
+Monfalcon, 142). Verdicts were often more severe against workers
+than against thieves (cf. L' Atelier, October 1840, or La Fraternité,
+July-August 1847). The two categories of convict were mixed in
+the prisons and preferential treatment given to common-law
+offenders, while convicted journalists and politicians usually enjoyed
+the right to separate treatment. In short, a whole tactic of confusion
+aimed at maintaining a permanent state of conflict.
+To this was added a patient attempt to impose a highly specific
+grid on the common perception of delinquents: to present them as
+close by, everywhere present and everywhere to be feared. This was
+the function of the fair divers, which invaded a part of the press and
+which began to have its own newspapers, 2 The criminal fair divers,
+by its everyday redundancy, makes acceptable the system of judicial
+and police supervisions that partition society; it recounts from day
+to day a sort of internal battle against the faceless enemy; in this war,
+it constitutes the daily bulletin of alarm or victory. The crime novel,
+which began to develop in the broadsheet and in mass-circulation
+literature, assumed an apparently opposite role. Above all, its function was to show that the delinquent belonged to an entirely different
+world, unrelated to familiar, everyday lite. I his strangeness was hrst
+that of the lower depths of society (Les Mystères de Paris, Rocambole), then that of madness (especially in the latter half of the century) and lastly that of crime in high society (Arsène Lupin). The
+combination of the fait divers and the detective novel has produced
+for the last hundred years or more an enormous mass of crime
+stories' in which delinquency appears both as very close and quite
+alien, a perpetual threat to everyday life, but extremely distant in its
+origin and motives, both everyday and exotic in the milieu in which
+it takes place. Through the importance attributed to it and the
+surfeit of discourse surrounding it, a line is traced round it which,
+while exalting it, sets it apart. In such a formidable delinquency,
+coming from so alien a clime, what illegality could recognize itself? ...
+This multiple tactic had its effect: this is proved by the campaign
+of the workers' newspapers against penal labour;24 against the 'com-
+286
+
+fort of the prisons' and for giving prisoners the hardest and most
+dangerous work; against the excessive interest shown by philanthropists in the delinquents; against the literature that exalts crime;25
+it is also proved by the general mistrust felt throughout the workers'
+movement for former common-law convicts. 'At the dawn of the
+twentieth century, writes Michèle Perrot, 'surrounded by contempt,
+the highest of walls, the prison finally closed in on an unpopular
+people' (Perrot).
+Yet it certainly cannot be said that this tactic triumphed or that
+it brought about a total break between the delinquents and the lower
+classes. The relations between the poorer classes and illegality, the
+reciprocal position of the proletariat and the urban plebs has yet to
+be studied. But one thing is certain: delinquency and repression
+were regarded, in the workers' movements of the years 1830-50,
+as an important issue. There was no doubt hostility towards the
+delinquents; but it was a battle around penality. The workers' newspapers often proposed a political analysis of criminality that contradicted term by term the description familiar to the philanthropists
+(poverty - dissipation - laziness - drunkenness - vice - theft -
+crime). They assigned the origin of delinquency not to the individual criminal (he was merely the occasion or the first victim), but
+to society: "The man who kills you is not free not to kill you. It is
+society or, to be more precise, bad social organization that is
+responsible' (L'Humanitaire, August 1841). This is so either because
+society is incapable of providing its fundamental needs, or because
+it destroys or effaces in him possibilities, aspirations or needs that
+later emerge in crime: 'Bad education, unused aptitudes and forces,
+the intelligence and the heart crushed by forced labour at too tender
+an age' (La Fraternité, November 1845). But this criminality of need
+or of repression masks, by the attention paid to it and the disapprobation surrounding it, another criminality that is sometimes its
+cause and always its extension. This is the delinquency from above,
+a scandalous example, the source of misery and the principle of
+revolt for the poor. 'While misery strews your streets with corpses,
+and fills your prisons with thieves and murderers, where are the
+swindlers of the fashionable world?... The most corrupting
+examples, the most revolting cynicism, the most shameless robbery.
+... Are you not afraid that the poor man put into the dock for
+287
+
+snatching a piece of bread from a baker's stall will not, one day,
+become so enraged that stone by stone he will demolish the Stock
+Exchange, a wild den where the treasure of the state and the fortune
+of families are stolen with impunity!' (La Ruche populaire, November 1842). But this delinquency of wealth is tolerated by the laws,
+and, when it does find its way into the courts, it can depend upon
+the indulgence of the judges and the discretion of the press. 2 Hence
+the idea that criminal trials may become the occasion for a political
+debate, that advantage should be taken of controversial trials or
+proceedings instituted against workers to denounce the general
+functioning of penal justice: "The courts are no longer as they once
+were a place for the exhibition of the miseries and wounds of the
+time, a kind of branding in which the sad victims of our social disorder are displayed side by side; it is an arena that echoes with the
+cry of combatants' (La Fraternité, November 1841). Hence, t00, the
+idea that political prisoners, since they have, like delinquents, a
+direct experience of the penal system, but, unlike them, are in a
+position to be heard, have a duty to be the spokesmen of all prisoners; it is their task to enlighten 'the good bourgeois of France,
+who has never known the penalties inflicted through the pompous
+indictments of a public prosecutor' (Almanach populaire de la
+France, 1839, 50).
+In this reappraisal of penal justice and of the frontier that it
+carefully traces around delinquency, the tactic of what might be
+called the 'counter-fait divers' is characteristic. What the workers'
+newspapers do is to reverse the use that was made of crimes or trials
+in the newspapers which, like the Gazette des tribunaux, 'gorge
+themselves with blood, 'feed on prison' and provide a daily repertoire of melodrama' (Pauvre Jacques, Ist year, no. 3). The counterfait divers systematically stresses the facts of delinquency in the
+bourgeoisie, showing that it is the class affected by 'physical degeneration' and 'moral decay'; for the accounts of crimes committed
+by ordinary people it substitutes descriptions of the misery into
+which their exploiters plunge them and who, literally, starve and
+murder them;" it points out in the criminal trials of workers what
+share of responsibility must be attributed to the employers and to
+society as a whole. In short, a whole effort was being made to
+reverse this monotonous discourse on crime, which sought both to
+288
+
+isolate it as a monstrosity and to depict it as the work of the poorest
+class.
+In the course of this anti-penal polemic, the Fourierists no doubt
+went further than any of the others. They were perhaps the first to
+elaborate a political theory which, at the same time, places a positive
+value on crime. Although, in their view, crime is a result of 'civilization', it is also, and by that very fact, a weapon against it. It bears
+within it a figure and a future. "The social order dominated by
+the fatality of its repressive principle continues to kill through the
+executioner or through the prisons those whose natural robustness
+rejects or disdains its prescriptions, those who, too strong to remain
+enclosed within its tight swaddling-clothes, break from them and
+tear them to pieces, men who do not wish to remain children' (La
+Phalange, 10 January 1837). There is not, therefore, a criminal
+nature, but a play of forces which, according to the class to which
+individuals belong, 2ª will lead them to power or to prison: if born
+poor, today's magistrates would no doubt be in the convict-ships;
+and the convicts, if they had been well born, 'would be presiding
+in the courts and dispensing justice' (La Phalange, i December
+1838). At bottom, the existence of crime manifests a fortunate
+irrepressibility of human nature'; it should be seen not so much as
+a weakness or a disease, as an energy that is reviving, an 'outburst
+of protest in the name of human individuality, which no doubt
+accounts for its strange power of fascination. 'Without crime, which
+awakens in us a mass of torpid feelings and half distinguished
+passions, we would remain still longer in disorder, in weakness'
+(La Phalange, 10 January 1837). It may be, therefore, that crime
+constitutes a political instrument that could prove as precious for
+the liberation of our society as it has been for the emancipation of
+the Negroes; indeed, will such an emancipation take place without
+it? 'Poison, fire-raising and sometimes even revolt are evidence of
+the terrible miseries of the social condition' (La Phalange, 10
+January 1837). And what of the prisoners, 'the most unfortunate
+and most oppressed part of mankind? La Phalange sometimes
+shared the contemporary aesthetic of crime, but in a very different
+cause.
+Hence a use of fait divers that was intended not only to turn the
+reproach of immorality back upon the adversary, but to reveal the
+289
+
+play of opposing forces. La Phalange analyses penal affairs as a
+confrontation coded by 'civilization', the great crimes not as
+monstrosities, but as the fatal return and revolt of what is repressed, 2°
+the minor illegalities not as the necessary margins of society, but as
+a rumbling from the midst of the battle-field.
+After Vidocq and Lacenaire, a third character must be introduced.
+He made only a short appearance; his notoriety lasted hardly more
+than a day. He was merely the passing figure of minor illegalities: a
+child of thirteen, without home or family, charged with vagabondage and whom a two-year sentence had no doubt long placed in the
+circuits of delinquency. He would certainly have passed without
+trace, had he not opposed to the discourse of the law that made him
+delinquent (in the name of the disciplines, even more than in the
+terms of the code) the discourse of an illegality that remained resistant to these coercions and which revealed indiscipline in a systematically ambiguous manner as the disordered order of society and as the
+affirmation of inalienable rights. All the illegalities that the court
+defined as off ences the accused reformulated as the affirmation of a
+living force: the lack of a home as vagabondage, the lack of a master
+as independence, the lack of work as freedom, the lack of a time-table
+as the fullness of days and nights. This confrontation of illegality
+with the discipline-penality-delinquency system was perceived by
+contemporaries or rather by the journalist who happened to be there
+as the comic effect of the criminal law at grips with the petty details
+of indiscipline. And it was true: the affair itself and the verdict that
+followed represented the heart of the problem of legal punishment
+in the nineteenth century. The irony with which the judge tried to
+envelop indiscipline in the majesty of the law and the insolence
+with which the accused reinscribed indiscipline among the fundamental rights represent for penality an exemplary scene.
+This, no doubt, is the value of the account published in the
+Gazette des tribunaux for August 1840: "The judge: One must sleep
+at home. - Béasse: Have I got a home? - You live in perpetual vagabondage. - I work to earn my living. - What is your station in
+life? - My station: to begin with, I'm thirty-six at least; I don't work
+for anybody. I've worked for myself for a long time now. I have my
+day station and my night station. In the day, for instance, I hand out
+leaflets free of charge to all the passers-by; I run after the stage-
+290
+
+coaches when they arrive and carry luggage for the passengers; I
+turn cart-wheels on the avenue de Neuilly; at night there are the
+shows; I open coach doors, I sell pass-out tickets; I've plenty to do.
+- It would be better for you to be put into a good house as an
+apprentice and learn a trade. - Oh, a good house, an apprenticeship,
+it's too much trouble. And anyway the bourgeois... always
+grumbling, no freedom. - Does not your father wish to reclaim you?
+- Haven't got no father. - And your mother? - No mother neither,
+no parents, no friends, free and independent.' Hearing his sentence
+of two years in a reformatory, Béasse 'pulled an ugly face, then,
+recovering his good humour, remarked: "Two years, that's never
+more than twenty-four months. Let's be off, then."'
+It was this scene that La Phalange took up. And the importance
+that the newspaper gave it, the extremely slow, careful analysis,
+shows that the Fourierists saw in such an everyday affair a play of
+fundamental forces. On the one hand, that of 'civilization', represented by the judge, living legality, the spirit and letter of the law.
+It had its own system of coercion, which seemed to be the code,
+but which in fact was discipline. There had to be a place, a location,
+a compulsory insertion: 'One sleeps at home, said the judge, because
+in fact, for him, everything must have a home, some dwelling, however magnificent or mean; his task is not to provide one, but to
+force every individual to live in one.' Moreover, one must have a
+station in life, a recognizable identity, an individuality fixed once
+and for all: 'What is your station? This question is the simplest
+expression of the established order in society; such vagabondage is
+repugnant to it, disturbs it; one must have a stable, continuous longterm station, thoughts of the future, of a secure future, in order to
+reassure it against all attacks.' In short, one should have a master,
+be caught up and situated within a hierarchy; one exists only when
+fixed in definite relations of domination: Who do you work with.
+That is to say, since you are not a master, you must be a servant,
+whatever your station; it is not a question of your satisfactoriness as
+an individual; it is a question of order to be maintained.' Confronted
+with discipline on the face of the law, there is illegality, which puts
+itself forward as a right; it is indiscipline, rather than the criminal
+offence, that causes the rupture. An indiscipline of language:
+incorrect grammar and the tone of the replies 'indicate a violent
+29ł
+
+split between the accused and society, which, through the judge,
+addresses him in correct terms'. An indiscipline that is the indiscipline of native, immediate liberty: 'He is well aware that the apprentice, the worker is a slave and that slavery is sad... This liberty,
+this need of movement that possesses him, he is well aware that he
+would no longer enjoy it in a life of ordinary order... He prefers
+liberty; what does he care if others see it as disorder? It is liberty,
+that is to say, the most spontaneous development of his individuality, a wild development and, consequently, brutal and limited, but a
+natural, instinctive development.' Indiscipline in family relations;
+it does not matter whether this lost child was abandoned or freed
+himself voluntarily, for 'he would have been unable to bear the
+slavery of education either at his parents' or with strangers'. And
+through all these minute disciplines it is ultimately 'civilization' as a
+whole that is rejected and 'wildness' that emerges: 'It is work, it is
+laziness, it is thoughtlessness, it is debauchery: it is everything except
+order; the difference in occupations and debauches aside, it is the
+life of the savage, living from day to day and with no tomorrow'
+(La Phalange, 15 August 1840).
+No' doubt the analyses of La Phalange cannot be regarded as
+representative of the discussions that took place in the workers' press
+at this time on crime and penality. Nevertheless, they are situated in
+the context of this polemic. The lessons of Le Phalange were not
+quite wasted. They found an echo when, in the second half of the
+nineteenth century, taking the penal apparatus as their point of
+attack, the anarchists posed the political problem of delinquency;
+when they thought to recognize in it the most militant rejection of
+the law; when they tried not so much to heroize the revolt of the
+delinquents as to disentangle delinquency from the bourgeois legality
+and illegality that had colonized it; when they wished to re-establish
+or constitute the political unity of popular illegalities.
+282
+
+3. The carceral
+Were I to fix the date of completion of the carceral system, I would
+choose not 18io and the penal code, nor even 1844, when the law
+laying down the principle of cellular internment was passed; I might
+not even choose 1838, when books on prison reform by Charles
+Lucas, Moreau-Christophe and Faucher were published. The date I
+would choose would be 22 January 1840, the date of the official
+opening of Mettray. Or better still, perhaps, that glorious day,
+unremarked and unrecorded, when a child in Mettray remarked as
+he lay dying: "What a pity I left the colony so soon' (Ducpétiaux,
+1852,383). This marked the death of the first penitentiary saint.
+Many of the blessed no doubt went to join him, if the former
+inmates of the penal colonies are to be believed when, in singing
+the praises of the new punitive policies of the body, they remarked:
+'We preferred the blows, but the cell suits us better."
+Why Mettray? Because it is the disciplinary form at its most
+extreme, the model in which are concentrated all the coercive
+technologies of behaviour. In it were to be found 'cloister, prison,
+school, regiment'. The small, highly hierarchized groups, into which
+the inmates were divided, followed simultaneously five models: that
+of the family (each group was a "family' composed of "brothers' and
+two 'elder brothers'); that of the army (each family, commanded by
+a head, was divided into two sections, each of which had a second
+in command; each inmate had a number and was taught basic
+military exercises; there was a cleanliness inspection every day, an
+inspection of clothing every week; a roll-call was taken three times
+a day); that of the workshop, with supervisors and foremen, who
+were responsible for the regularity of the work and for the apprenticeship of the younger inmates; that of the school (an hour or an
+hour and a half of lessons every day; the teaching was given by the
+293
+
+instructor and by the deputy-heads); lastly, the judicial model (each
+day "justice' was meted out in the parlour: "The least act of disobedience is punished and the best way of avoiding serious offences
+is to punish the most minor offences very severely: at Mettray, a useless word is punishable; the principal punishment inflicted was
+confinement to one's cell; for 'isolation is the best means of acting on
+the moral nature of children; it is there above all that the voice of
+religion, even if it has never spoken to their hearts, recovers all its
+emotional power' - Ducpétiaux, 1852, 377); the entire parapenal
+institution, which is created in order not to be a prison, culminates
+in the cell, on the walls of which are written in black letters: 'God
+sees you.'
+This superimposition of different models makes it possible to
+indicate, in its specific features, the function of "training'. The chiefs
+and their deputies at Mettray had to be not exactly judges, or
+teachers, or foremen, or non-commissioned officers, or 'parents",
+but something of all these things in a quite specific mode of intervention. They were in a sense technicians of behaviour: engineers
+of conduct, orthopaedists of individuality. Their task was to produce
+bodies that were both docile and capable; they supervised the nine
+or ten working hours of every day (whether in a workshop or in
+the fields); they directed the orderly movements of groups of inmates, physical exercises, military exercises, rising in the morning,
+going to bed at night, walks to the accompaniment of bugle and
+whistle; they taught gymnastics; they checked cleanliness, supervised bathing. Training was accompanied by permanent observation; a body of knowledge was being constantly built up from the
+everyday behaviour of the inmates; it was organized as an instrument
+of perpetual assessment: 'On entering the colony, the child is subjected to a sort of interrogation as to his origins, the position of his
+family, the offence for which he was brought before the courts and
+all the other offences that make up his short and often very sad
+existence. This information is written down on a board on which
+everything concerning each inmate is noted in turn, his stay at the
+colony and the place to which he is sent when he leaves' (Ducpétiaux, 1851, 61). The modelling of the body produces a knowledge
+of the individual, the apprenticeship of the techniques induces modes
+of behaviour and the acquisition of skills is inextricably linked with
+294
+
+the establishment of power relations; strong, skilled agricultural
+workers are produced; in this very work, provided it is technically
+supervised, submissive subjects are produced and a dependable
+body of knowledge built up about them. This disciplinary technique
+exercised upon the body had a double effect: a 'soul' to be known
+and a subjection to be maintained. One result vindicated this work of
+training: in 1848, at a moment when 'the fever of revolution fired the
+imagination of all, when the schools at Angers, La Flèche, Alfort,
+even the boarding schools, rose up in rebellion, the inmates of
+Mettray were calmer than ever' (Ferrus).
+Where Mettray was especially exemplary was in the specificity
+that it recognized in this operation of training. It was related to
+other forms of supervision, on which it was based: medicine, general
+education, religious direction. But it cannot not be identified absolutely with them. Nor with administration in the strict sense. Heads
+or deputy-heads of 'families', monitors and foremen, had to live in
+close proximity to the inmates; their clothes were 'almost as humble'
+as those of the inmates themselves; they practically never left their
+side, observing them day and night; they constituted among them
+a network of permanent observation. And, in order to train them
+themselves, a specialized school had been organized in the colony.
+The essential element of its programme was to subject the future
+cadres to the same apprenticeships and to the same coercions as the
+inmates themselves: they were 'subjected as pupils to the discipline
+that, later, as instructors, they would themselves impose'. They were
+taught the art of power relations. It was the first training college in
+pure discipline: the 'penitentiary' was not simply a project that
+sought its justification in 'humanity' or its foundations in a 'science',
+but a technique that was learnt, transmitted and which obeyed
+general norms. The practice that normalized by compulsion the
+conduct of the undisciplined or dangerous could, in turn, by
+technical elaboration and rational reflection, be 'normalized'. The
+disciplinary technique became a 'discipline' which also had its
+school.
+It so happens that historians of the human sciences date the birth
+of scientific psychology at this time: during these same years, it
+seems, Weber was manipulating his little compass for the measurement of sensations. What took place at Mettray (and in other
+295
+
+European countries sooner or later) was obviously of a quite different order. It was the emergence or rather the institutional specification, the baptism as it were, of a new type of supervision - both
+knowledge and power - over individuals who resisted disciplinary
+normalization. And yet, in the formation and growth of psychology,
+the appearance of these professionals of discipline, normality and
+subjection surely marks the beginning of a new stage. It will be said
+that the quantitative assessment of sensorial responses could at least
+derive authority from the prestige of the emerging science of
+physiology and that for this alone it deserves to feature in the
+history of the sciences. But the supervision of normality was firmly
+encased in a medicine or a psychiatry that provided it with a sort
+of 'scientificity'; it was supported by a judicial apparatus which,
+directly or indirectly, gave it legal justification. Thus, in the shelter
+of these two considerable protectors, and, indeed, acting as a link
+between them, or a place of exchange, a carefully worked out
+technique for the supervision of norms has continued to develop
+right up to the present day. The specific, institutional supports of
+these methods have proliferated since the founding of the small
+school at Mettray; their apparatuses have increased in quantity and
+scope; their auxiliary services have increased, with hospitals, schools,
+public administrations and private enterprises; their agents have
+proliferated in number, in power, in technical qualification; the
+technicians of indiscipline have founded a family. In the normalization of the power of normalization, in the arrangement of a powerknowledge over individuals, Mettray and its school marked a new
+era.
+But why choose this moment as the point of emergence of the
+formation of an art of punishing that is still more or less our own?
+Precisely because this choice is somewhat 'unjust'. Because it
+situates the 'end' of the process in the lower reaches of criminal law.
+Because Mettray was a prison, but not entirely; a prison in that it
+contained young delinquents condemned by the courts; and yet
+something else, too, because it also contained minors who had been
+charged, but acquitted under article 66 of the code, and boarders
+held, as in the eighteenth century, as an alternative to paternal
+correction. Mettray, a punitive model, is at the limit of strict
+206
+
+penality. It was the most famous of a whole series of institutions
+which, well 'beyond the frontiers of criminal law, constituted what
+one might call the carceral archipelago.
+Yet the general principles, the great codes and subsequent legislation were quite clear on the matter: no imprisonment 'outside the
+law'
+", no detention that had not been decided by a qualified judicial
+institution, no more of those arbitrary and yet widespread confinements. Yet the very principle of extra-penal incarceration was in
+fact never abandoned. (A whole study remains to be done of the
+debates that took place during the Revolution concerning family
+courts, paternal correction and the right of parents to lock up their
+children.) And, i the apparatus of the great classical form of confinement was partly (and only partly) dismantled, it was very soon
+reactivated, rearranged, developed in certain directions. But what is
+still more important is that it was homogenized, through the mediation of the prison, on the one hand with legal punishments and, on
+the other, with disciplinary mechanisms. The frontiers between
+confinement, judicial punishment and institutions of discipline,
+which were already blurred in the classical age, tended to disappear
+and to constitute a great carceral continuum that diffused penitentiary techniques into the most innocent disciplines, transmitting
+disciplinary norms into the very heart of the penal system and
+placing over the slightest illegality, the smallest irregularity, deviation or anomaly, the threat of delinquency. A subtle, graduated
+carceral net, with compact institutions, but also separate and diffused
+methods, assumed responsibility for the arbitrary, widespread,
+badly integrated confinement of the classical age.
+I shall not attempt here to reconstitute the whole network that
+formed first the immediate surroundings of the prison, then spread
+farther and farther outwards. However, a few references and dates
+should give some idea of the breadth and precocity of the phenomenon.
+There were agricultural sections in the maisons centrales (the first
+example of which was Gaillon in 1824, followed later by Fontevrault,
+Les Douaires, Le Boulard); there were colonies for poor, abandoned
+vagrant children (Petit-Bourg in 1840, Ostwald in 1842); there were
+almshouses for young female offenders who 'recoiled before the idea
+of entering a life of disorder, for "poor innocent girls whose
+297
+
+mothers' immorality has exposed to precocious perversity, or for
+poor girls found on the doorsteps of hospitals and lodging houses.
+There were penal colonies envisaged by the law of 18ço: minors,
+acquitted or condemned, were to be sent to these colonies and
+"brought up in common, under strict discipline, and trained in
+agricultural work and in the principal industries related to it; later,
+they were to be joined by minors sentenced to hard labour for life
+and 'vicious and insubordinate wards of the Public Assistance' (on
+all these institutions, cf. Gaillac, 99-107). And, moving still farther
+away from penality in the strict sense, the carceral circles widen and
+the form of the prison slowly diminishes and finally disappears
+altogether: the institutions for abandoned or indigent children, the
+orphanages (like Neuhof or Mesnil-Firmin), the establishments for
+apprentices (like the Bethléem de Reims or the Maison de Nancy);
+still farther away the factory-convents, such as La Sauvagère,
+Tarare and Jujurieu (where the girl workers entered about the age of
+thirteen, lived confined for years and were allowed out only under
+surveillance, received instead of wages pledged payment, which
+could be increased by bonuses for zeal and good behaviour, which
+they could use only on leaving). And then, still farther, there was a
+whole series of mechanisms that did not adopt the 'compact' prison
+model, but used some of the carceral methods: charitable societies,
+moral improvement associations, organizations that handed out
+assistance and also practised surveillance, workers' estates and
+lodging houses - the most primitive of which still bear the all too
+visible marks of the penitentiary system.? And, lastly, this great
+carceral network reaches all the disciplinary mechanisms that function throughout society.
+We have seen that, in penal justice, the prison transformed the
+punitive procedure into a penitentiary technique; the carceral archipelago transported this technique from the penal institution to the
+entire social body. With several important results.
+1. This vast mechanism established a slow, continuous, imperceptible gradation that made it possible to pass naturally from disorder to offence and back from a transgression of the law to a slight
+departure from a rule, an average, a demand, a norm. In the classical
+period, despite a certain common reference to offence in general,
+the order of the crime, the order of sin and the order of bad conduct
+298
+
+remained separate in so far as they related to separate criteria and
+authorities (court, penitence, confinement). Incarceration with its
+mechanisms of surveillance and punishment functioned, on the
+contrary, according to a principle of relative continuity. The continuity of the institutions themselves, which were linked to one
+another (public assistance with the orphanage, the reformitory, the
+penitentiary, the disciplinary battalion, the prison; the school with
+the charitable society, the workshop, the almshouse, the penitentiary convent; the workers' estate with the hospital and the prison).
+A continuity of the punitive criteria and mechanisms, which on the
+basis of a mere deviation gradually strengthened the rules and
+increased the punishment. A continuous gradation of the established,
+specialized and competent authorities (in the order of knowledge
+and in the order of power) which, without resort to arbitrariness,
+but strictly according to the regulations, by means of observation
+and assessment hierarchized, differentiated, judged, punished and
+moved gradually from the correction of irregularities to the punishment of crime. The 'carceral' with its many diffuse or compact
+forms, its institutions of supervision or constraint, of discreet surveillance and insistent coercion, assured the communication of
+punishments according to quality and quantity; it connected in
+series or disposed according to subtle divisions the minor and the
+serious penalties, the mild and the strict forms of treatment, bad
+marks and light sentences. You will end up in the convict-ship, the
+slightest indiscipline seems to say; and the harshest of prisons says
+to the prisoners condemned to life: I shall note the slightest irregularity in your conduct. The generality of the punitive function that
+the eighteenth century sought in the "ideological' technique of
+representations and signs now had as its support the extension, the
+material framework, complex, dispersed, but coherent, of the various
+carceral mechanisms. As a result, a certain significant generality
+moved between the least irregularity and the greatest crime; it was no
+longer the offence, the attack on the common interest, it was the
+departure from the norm, the anomaly; it was this that haunted
+the school, the court, the asylum or the prison. It generalized in
+the sphere of meaning the function that the carceral generalized in the
+sphere of tactics. Replacing the adversary of the sovereign, the
+social enemy was transformed into a deviant, who brought with him
+299
+
+the multiple danger of disorder, crime and madness. The carceral
+network linked, through innumerable relations, the two long,
+multiple series of the punitive and the abnormal.
+2. The carceral, with its far-reaching networks, allows the recruitment of major 'delinquents'. It organizes what might be called
+'disciplinary careers' in which, through various exclusions and
+rejections, a whole process is set in motion. In the classical period,
+there opened up in the confines or interstices of society the confused,
+tolerant and dangerous domain of the 'outlaw' or at least of that
+which eluded the direct hold of power: an uncertain space that was
+for criminality a training ground and a region of refuge; there
+poverty, unemployment, pursued innocençe, cunning, the struggle
+against the powerful, the refusal of obligations and laws, and organized crime all came together as chance and fortune would dictate;
+it was the domain of adventure that Gil Blas, Sheppard or Mandrin,
+each in his own way, inhabited. Through the play of disciplinary
+differentiations and divisions, the nineteenth century constructed
+rigorous channels which, within the system, inculcated docility and
+produced delinquency by the same mechanisms. There was a sort of
+disciplinary 'training', continuous and compelling, that had something of the pedagogical curriculum and something of the professional network. Careers emerged from it, as secure, as predictable,
+as those of public life: assistance associations, residential apprenticeships, penal colonies, disciplinary battalions, prisons, hospitals,
+almshouses. These networks were already well mapped out at the
+beginning of the nineteenth century: 'Our benevolent establishments present an admirably coordinated whole by means of which
+the indigent does not remain a moment without help from the cradle
+to the grave. Follow the course of the unfortunate man: you will
+see him born among foundlings; from there he passes to the nursery,
+then to an orphanage; at the age of six he goes off to primary school
+and later to adult schools. If he cannot work, he is placed on the list
+of the charity offices of his district, and if he falls ill he may choose
+between twelve hospitals. . . Lastly, when the poor Parisian
+reaches the end of his career, seven almshouses await his age and
+often their salubrious régime has prolonged his useless days well
+beyond those of the rich man' (Moreau de Jonnès, quoted in
+Touquet).
+зo0
+
+The carceral network does not cast the unassimilable into a confused hell; there is no outside. It takes back with one hand what it
+seems to exclude with the other. It saves everything, including what
+it punishes. It is unwilling to waste even what it has decided to
+disqualify. In this panoptic society of which incarceration is the
+omnipresent armature, the delinquent is not outside the law; he is,
+from the very outset, in the law, at the very heart of the law, or at
+least in the midst of those mechanisms that transfer the individual
+imperceptibly from discipline to the law, from deviation to off ence.
+Although it is true that prison punishes delinquency, delinquency
+is for the most part produced in and by an incarceration which,
+ultimately, prison perpetuates in its turn. The prison is merely the
+natural consequence, no more than a higher degree, of that hierarchy laid down step by step. The delinquent is an institutional
+product. It is no use being surprised, therefore, that in a considerable proportion of cases the biography of convicts passes through
+all these mechanisms and establishments, whose purpose, it is widely
+believed, is to lead away from prison. That one should find in them
+what one might call the index of an irrepressibly delinquent 'character': the prisoner condemned to hard labour was meticulously produced by a childhood spent in a reformatory, according to the lines
+of force of the generalized carceral system. Conversely, the lyricism
+of marginality may find inspiration in the image of the 'outlaw', the
+great social nomad, who prowls on the confines of a docile, frightened order. But it is not on the fringes of society and through successive exiles that criminality is born, but by means of ever more
+closely placed insertions, under ever more insistent surveillance, by
+an accumulation of disciplinary coercion. In short, the carceral
+archipelago assures, in the depths of the social body, the formation
+of delinquency on the basis of subtle illegalities, the overlapping of the
+latter by the former and the establishment of a specified criminality.
+3. But perhaps the most important effect of the carceral system
+and of its extension well beyond legal imprisonment is that it succeeds in making the power to punish natural and legitimate, in
+lowering at least the threshold of tolerance to penality. It tends to
+efface what may be exorbitant in the exercise of punishment. It does
+this by playing the two registers in which it is deployed - the legal
+register of justice and the extra-legal register of discipline - against
+зo1
+
+one, another. In effect, the great continuity of the carceral system
+throughout the law and its sentences gives a sort of legal sanction
+to the disciplinary mechanisms, to the decisions and judgements
+that they enforce. Throughout this network, which comprises so
+many 'regional' institutions, relatively autonomous and independent,
+is transmitted, with the 'prison-form', the model of justice itself.
+The regulations of the disciplinary establishments may reproduce
+the law, the punishments imitate the verdicts and penalties, the
+surveillance repeat the police model; and, above all these multiple
+establishments, the prison, which in relation to them is a pure form,
+unadulterated and unmitigated, gives them a sort of official sanction.
+The carceral, with its long gradation stretching from the convictship or imprisonment with hard labour to diffuse, slight limitations,
+communicates a type of power that the law validates and that justice
+uses as its favourite weapon. How could the disciplines and the
+power that functions in them appear arbitrary, when they merely
+operate the mechanisms of justice itself, even with a view to mitigating their intensity? When, by generalizing its effects and transmitting it to every level, it makes it possible to avoid its full rigour?
+Carceral continuity and the fusion of the prison-form make it
+possible to legalize, or in any case to legitimate disciplinary power,
+which thus avoids any element of excess or abuse it may entail.
+But, conversely, the carceral pyramid gives to the power to
+inflict legal punishment a context in which it appears to be free of all
+excess and all violence. In the subtle gradation of the apparatuses of
+discipline and of the successive 'embeddings' that they involve, the
+prison does not at all represent the unleashing of a different kind of
+power, but simply an additional degree in the intensity of a mechanism that has continued to operate since the earliest forms of legal
+punishment. Between the latest institution of "rehabilitation', where
+one is taken in order to avoid prison, and the prison where one is
+sent after a definable offence, the difference is (and must be) scarcely
+perceptible. There is a strict economy that has the effect of rendering as discreet as possible the singular power to punish. There is
+nothing in it now that recalls the former excess of sovereign power
+when it revenged its authority on the tortured body of those about
+to be executed. Prison continues, on those who are entrusted to it,
+a work begun elsewhere, which the whole of society pursues on
+
+each individual through innumerable mechanisms of discipline. By
+means of a carceral continuum, the authority that sentences infiltrates all those other authorities that supervise, transform, correct,
+improve. It might even be said that nothing really distinguishes
+them any more except the singularly 'dangerous' character of the
+delinquents, the gravity of their departures from normal behaviour
+and the necessary solemnity of the ritual. But, in its function, the
+power to punish is not essentially different from that of curing or
+educating. It receives from them, and from their lesser, smaller task,
+a sanction from below; but one that is no less important for that,
+since it is the sanction of technique and rationality. The carceral
+'naturalizes' the legal power to punish, as it "legalizes' the technical
+power to discipline. In thus homogenizing them, effacing what may
+be violent in one and arbitrary in the other, attenuating the effects of
+revolt that they may both arouse, thus depriving excess in either of
+any purpose, circulating the same calculated, mechanical and discreet methods from one to the other, the carceral makes it possible
+to carry out that great 'economy' of power whose formula the
+eighteenth century had sought, when the problem of the accumulation and useful administration of men first emerged.
+By operating at every level of the social body and by mingling
+ceaselessly the art of rectifying and the right to punish, the universality of the carceral lowers the level from which it becomes natural
+and acceptable to be punished. The question is often posed as to
+how, before and after the Revolution, a new foundation was given
+to the right to punish. And no doubt the answer is to be found in
+the theory of the contract. But it is perhaps more important to ask
+the reverse question: how were people made to accept the power to
+punish, or quite simply, when punished, tolerate being so. The
+theory of the contract can only answer this question by the fiction
+of a juridical subject giving to others the power to exercise over him
+the right that he himself possesses over them. It is highly probable
+that the great carceral continuum, which provides a communication
+between the power of discipline and the power of the law, and
+extends without interruption from the smallest coercions to the
+longest penal detention, constituted the technical and real, immediately material counterpart of that chimerical granting of the right to
+punish.
+
+4o With this new economy of power, the carceral system, which
+is its basic instrument, permitted the emergence of a new form of
+"law': a mixture of legality and nature, prescription and constitution,
+the norm. This had a whole series of effects: the internal dislocation
+of the judicial power or at least of its functioning; an increasing
+difficulty in judging, as if one were ashamed to pass sentence; a
+furious desire on the part of the judges to judge, assess, diagnose,
+recognize the normal and abnormal and claim the honour of curing
+or rehabilitating. In view of this, it is useless to believe in the good
+or bad consciences of judges, or even of their unconscious. Their
+immense 'appetite for medicine' which is constantly manifested -
+from their appeal to psychiatric experts, to their attention to the
+chatter of criminology - expresses the major fact that the power
+they exercise has been 'denatured'; that it is at a certain level governed
+by laws; that at another, more fundamental level it functions as a
+normative power; it is the economy of power that they exercise,
+and not that of their scruples or their humanism, that makes them
+pass 'therapeutic' sentences and recommend 'rehabilitating' periods
+of imprisonment. But, conversely, if the judges accept ever more
+reluctantly to condemn for the sake of condemning, the activity of
+judging has increased precisely to the extent that the normalizing
+power has spread. Borne along by the omnipresence of the mechanisms of discipline, basing itself on all the carceral apparatuses, it has
+become one of the major functions of our society. The judges of
+normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of the
+teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the 'social
+worker'-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative
+is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects
+to it his body, his gestures, his behaviour, his aptitudes, his achievements. The carceral network, in its compact or disseminated forms,
+with its systems of insertion, distribution, surveillance, observation,
+has been the greatest support, in modern society, of the normalizing
+power.
+5. The carceral texture of society assures both the real capture
+of the body and its perpetual observation; it is, by its very nature,
+the apparatus of punishment that conforms most completely to the
+new economy of power and the instrument for the formation of
+knowledge that this very economy needs. Its panoptic functioning
+304
+
+enables it to play this double role. By virtue of its methods of fixing,
+dividing, recording, it has been one of the simplest, crudest, also
+most concrete, but perhaps most indispensable conditions for the
+development of this immense activity of examination that has objectified human behaviour. If, after the age of "inquisitorial' justice, we
+have entered the age of 'examinatory' justice, if, in an even more
+general way, the method of examination has been able to spread so
+widely throughout society, and to give rise in part to the sciences
+of man, one of the great instruments for this has been the multiplicity
+and close overlapping of the various mechanisms of incarceration.
+I am not saying that the human sciences emerged from the prison.
+But, if they have been able to be formed and to produce so many
+profound changes in the episteme, it is because they have been
+conveyed by a specific and new modality of power: a certain policy
+of the body, a certain way of rendering the group of men docile and
+useful. This policy required the involvement of definite relations of
+knowledge in relations of power; it called for a technique of overlapping subjection and objectification; it brought with it new procedures of individualization. The carceral network constituted one
+of the armatures of this power-knowledge that has made the human
+sciences historically possible. Knowable man (soul, individuality,
+consciousness, conduct, whatever it is called) is the object-effect
+of this analytical investment, of this domination-observation.
+6. This no doubt explains the extreme solidity of the prison, that
+slight invention that was nevertheless decried from the outset. If it
+had been no more than an instrument of rejection or repression in
+the service of a state apparatus, it would have been easier to alter its
+more overt forms or to find a more acceptable substitute for it. But,
+rooted as it was in mechanisms and strategies of power, it could
+meet any attempt to transform it with a great force of inertia. One
+fact is characteristic: when it is a question of altering the system of
+imprisonment, opposition does not come from the judicial institutions alone; resistance is to be found not in the prison as penal sanction, but in the prison with all its determinations, links and extrajudicial results; in the prison as the relay in a general network of
+disciplines and surveillances; in the prison as it functions in a panoptic régime. This does not mean that it cannot be altered, nor that it
+is once and for all indispensable to our kind of society. One may, on
+305
+
+the contrary, site the two processes which, in the very continuity of
+the processes that make the prison function, are capable of exercising
+considerable restraint on its use and of transforming its internal
+functioning. And no doubt these processes have already begun to a
+large degree. The first is that which reduces the utility (or increases
+its inconveniences) of a delinquency accommodated as a specific
+illegality, locked up and supervised; thus the growth of great
+national or international illegalities directly linked to the political
+and economic apparatuses (financial illegalities, information services,
+arms and drugs trafficking, property speculation) makes it clear that
+the somewhat rustic and conspicuous work force of delinquency is
+proving ineffective; or again, on a smaller scale, as soon as the
+economic levy on sexual pleasure is carried out more efficiently by
+the sale of contraceptives, or obliquely through publications, films
+or shows, the archaic hierarchy of prostitution loses much of its
+former usefulness. The second process is the growth of the disciplinary networks, the multiplication of their exchanges with the
+penal apparatus, the ever more important powers that are given
+them, the ever more massive transference to them of judicial functions; now, as medicine, psychology, education, public assistance,
+'social work' assume an ever greater share of the powers of supervision and assessment, the penal apparatus will be able, in turn, to
+become medicalized, psychologized, educationalized; and by the
+same token that turning-point represented by the prison becomes
+less useful when, through the gap between its penitentiary discourse
+and its effect of consolidating delinquency, it articulates the penal
+power and the disciplinary power. In the midst of all these mechanisms of normalization, which are becoming ever more rigorous in
+their application, the specificity of the prison and its role as link are
+losing something of their purpose.
+If there is an overall political issue around the prison, it is not
+therefore whether it is to be corrective or not; whether the judges,
+the psychiatrists or the sociologists are to exercise more power in it
+than the administrators or supervisors; it is not even whether we
+should have prison or something other than prison. At present, the
+problem lies rather in the steep rise in the use of these mechanisms
+of normalization and the wide-ranging powers which, through the
+proliferation of new disciplines, they bring with them.
+306
+
+In 1836, a correspondent wrote to La Phalange: 'Moralists,
+philosophers, legislators, flatterers of civilization, this is the plan of
+your Paris, neatly ordered and arranged, here is the improved plan
+in which all like things are gathered together. At the centre, and
+within a first enclosure: hospitals for all diseases, almshouses for
+all types of poverty, madhouses, prisons, convict-prisons for men,
+women and children. Around the first enclosure, barracks, courtrooms, police stations, houses for prison warders, scaffolds, houses
+for the executioner and his assistants. At the four corners, the
+Chamber of Deputies, the Chamber of Peers, the Institute and the
+Royal Palace. Outside, there are the various services that supply
+the central enclosure, commerce, with its swindlers and its bankruptcies; industry and its furious struggles; the press, with its
+sophisms; the gambling dens; prostitution, the people dying of
+hunger or wallowing in debauchery, always ready to lend an ear
+to the voice of the Genius of Revolutions; the heartless rich. ..
+Lastly the ruthless war of all against all' (La Phalange, 10 August
+1836).
+I shall stop with this anonymous text. We are now far away from
+the country of tortures, dotted with wheels, gibbets, gallows,
+pillories; we are far, too, from that dream of the reformers, less
+than fifty years before: the city of punishments in which a thousand
+small theatres would have provided an endless multicoloured representation of justice in which the punishments, meticulously produced on decorative scaffolds, would have constituted the permanent
+festival of the penal code. The carceral city, with its imaginary
+'geo-politics', is governed by quite different principles. The extract
+from La Phalange reminds us of some of the more important ones:
+that at the centre of this city, and as if to hold it in place, there is,
+not the 'centre of power', not a network of forces, but a multiple
+network of diverse elements - walls, space, institution, rules, discourse; that the model of the carceral city is not, therefore, the body
+of the king, with the powers that emanate from it, nor the contractual meeting of wills from which a body that was both individual
+and collective was born, but a strategic distribution of elements of
+different natures and levels. That the prison is not the daughter of
+laws, codes or the judicial apparatus; that it is not subordinated to
+the court and the docile or clumsy instrument of the sentences that
+307
+
+it hands out and of the results that it would like to achieve; that it is
+the court that is external and subordinate to the prison. That in the
+central position that it occupies, it is not alone, but linked to a whole
+series of "carceral' mechanisms which seem distinct enough - since
+they are intended to alleviate pain, to cure, to comfort - but which
+all tend, like the prison, to exercise a power of normalization. That
+these mechanisms are applied not to transgressions against a 'central'
+law, but to the apparatus of production - 'commerce' and 'industry"
+- to a whole multiplicity of illegalities, in all their diversity of nature
+and origin, their specific role in profit and the different ways in
+which they are dealt with by the punitive mechanisms. And that
+ultimately what presides over all these mechanisms is not the unitary
+functioning of an apparatus or an institution, but the necessity of
+combat and the rules of strategy. That, consequently, the notions of
+institutions of repression, rejection, exclusion, marginalization, are
+not adequate to describe, at the very centre of the carceral city, the
+formation of the insidious leniencies, unavowable petty cruelties,
+small acts of cunning, calculated methods, techniques, 'sciences'
+that permit the fabrication of the disciplinary individual. In this
+central and centralized humanity, the effect and instrument of complex power relations, bodies and forces subjected by multiple
+mechanisms of "incarceration', objects for discourses that are in
+themselves elements for this strategy, we must hear the distant roar
+of battle.
+At this point I end a book that must serve as a historical background to various studies of the power of normalization and the
+formation of knowledge in modern society.
+308
+
+PART ONE TORTURE
+I The body of the condemned
+i The public execution of traitors described by William Blackstone,
+Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 4, 1766 2, 89. Since the
+French translation was intended to bring out the humaneness of
+English legislation, in contrast with the old ordinance of 1760, the
+French translator adds the following note: 'In this form of execution,
+which is so terrifying to see, the guilty man does not suffer much pain,
+or for long'
+2 In any case, I could give no notion by references or quotations what
+this book owes to Gilles Deleuze and the work he is undertaking with
+Félix Guattari. I should also have quoted a number of pages from
+R. Castell's Psychanalysme and say how much I am indebted to
+Pierre Nora.
+3 I shall study the birth of the prison only in the French penal system.
+Differences in historical developments and institutions would make a
+detailed comparative examination too burdensome and any attempt to
+describe the phenomenon as a whole too schematic.
+2 The spectacle of the scaffold
+1 The name given to two fortresses in old Paris, the Grand and the
+Petit Châtelet. The first, demolished in 18o2, was situated on the
+right bank of the Seine. It was the seat of the criminal jurisdiction of
+the viscounty and provostry of Paris. The second, on the left bank,
+near the Hôtel-Dieu, served as a prison (Tr.].
+2 In the catalogues of judicial proofs, the confession appears in about
+the thirteenth or fourteenth century. Bernard of Pavia does not refer
+to it, but it is mentioned by Hostiemis. Crater's definition is characteristic: 'Aut legitime convictus aur sponte confessus.
+300
+
+In medieval law, the confession was valid only when made by an
+adult and before the adversary. Cf. Lévy.
+3 The Gazelle tribunaux, 6 July 1837, reports, from a Gloucester newspaper, the 'atrocious and disgusting' conduct of an executioner who
+after hanging a condemned man 'took the corpse by the shoulders,
+violently turned it round and struck it several times saying: "Are you
+dead enough now!" then, turning towards the crowd, laughing and
+jeering, he made several indecent remarks.
+4 Argenson, 241. Cf. also Barbier, 455. One of the first episodes of this
+affair was very typical of popular agitation concerning penal justice in
+the eighteenth century. The lieutenant-general of police, Berryer, had
+seized 'libertine children without confession'; the guards agreed to
+hand them back to their parents 'only when given money'; it was said
+that the children were intended to provide for the king's pleasure.
+The crowd, having discovered an informer, killed him with an
+inhumanity carried to the farthest excess' and 'dragged him after his
+death, a rope around his neck, to M. Berryer's door'. Now, this
+informer was a thief who would have been broken on the wheel with
+his accomplice Raffat, had he not agreed to act as an informer; he was
+greatly appreciated by the police on account of his knowledge of all
+the intricacies of the plot; and he was 'highly regarded in his new
+trade. We have an example here that is interesting on a number of
+counts: a movement of revolt triggered off by a relatively new means
+of repression, which was not penal justice, but the police; a case of that
+technical collaboration between delinquents and police, which was to
+become normal from the eighteenth century onwards; a riot in which
+people took it upon themselves to torture a condemned man who had
+unjustly escaped the scaffold.
+5 Those whom R. Mandrou calls the two great ones: Cartouche and
+Mandrin, to whom one should add Guilleri (Mandrou, 112). In England, Jonathan Wild, Jack Sheppard and Claude Duval played a somewhat similar role.
+6 This title is to be found not only in the Bibliothèque de Troyes, but
+also in the Bibliothèque de Normandie (cf. Helot).
+7 Cf., for example, Lacretelle: 'In order to satisfy this need for strong
+emotion, in order to deepen the impression of a great example, one
+allows these terrible stories to circulate. The poets of the people take
+them up and spread their fame to every part of the land. One day a
+family hears at its door the story in song of the crime and execution
+of its sons' (Lacretelle, 106).
+310
+
+PART TWO PUNISHMENT
+I Generalized punishment
+1 Mogensen, 326. The author shows that in Auge crimes of violence
+were four times less numerous on the eve of the Revolution than at the
+end of the reign of Louis XIV. Generally speaking, the work directed
+by Pierre Chaunu on criminality in Normandy shows the same rise in
+fraud at the expense of violence. Cf. articles by B. Boutelet, J. C.
+Gégot and V. Boucheron in the Annales de Normandie of 1962, 1966
+and 1971. For Paris, of. Petrovitch. The same phenomenon, it seems,
+took place in England: cf. Hibbert, 72 and Tobias, 37ff.
+2 Le Roy-Ladurie, 1973. Cf. also Farge who confirms this tendency:
+between 1750 and 1755, 5 per cent of those convicted for stealing food
+were sent to the galleys, but 15 per cent between 1775 and 1790: "The
+courts became more severe as time went on... The values useful to il
+society that wished to be ordered and respectful of property were
+under threat' (Farge, 130-42).
+3 On this criticism of 'excessive power' and ofits bad distribution in the
+judicial apparatus, cf. in particular Dupaty, 1788, Lacretelle and
+Target.
+4 Cf. N. Bergasse on the judicial power: 'Deprived of any kind of
+activity against the political régime of the State and having no influence on the wills that come together to form that régime or to maintain
+it, it must have at its disposal, in order to protect all individuals and all
+rights, such a force that, all-powerful in defending and assisting that
+régime, it should become absolutely nil as soon as its destination is
+changed in any attempt to use it to oppress' (Bergasse, I1-12).
+5 Rousseau, 28. It should be noted that these ideas of Rousseau's were
+used in the Constituent Assembly by certain deputies who wished to
+maintain a system of very strict penalties. And, curiously enough, the
+principles of the Social Contrace could be used to support the old
+correspondence of atrocity between crime and punishment. "The protection due to citizens requires that penalties be measured according
+to the atrocity of the crimes and not sacrifice, in the name of humanity,
+humanity itself' (Mougins de Roquefort, who quotes this passage from
+the Social Contracs: cf. Mougins, 637).
+6 Duport, Archives parlemencaires, X, 744. One might also cite in
+support the different competitions proposed at the end of the eighteenth century by learned societies and academies: 'How is the mildness of these investigations and penalties to be reconciled with the
+certainties of a prompt and exemplary punishment, so that civil society
+311
+
+finds the greatest possible security for liberty and humanity!" (Economic Society of Berne, 1777). Marat responded with his Plan de
+Législation criminelle. 'What are the means of alleviating the rigour of
+the penal laws in France without damage to public safety!" (Académie
+de Châlons-sur-Marne, 1780; the winners were Brissot and Bernardi);
+"does the extreme severity of the laws tend to diminish the number and
+enormity of crimes in a depraved nation." (Académie de Marseille,
+1786; the winner was Eymar).
+7 G. Target, Observations sur le projer du Code pénal, in Locré, 7-8. It
+is to be found in an inverted form in Kant.
+8 'Society does not see in the punishments it inflicts the barbarous
+pleasure of making a human being suffer; it sees it as a necessary
+precaution to prevent similar crimes, to protect society from the evils
+with which murder threatens it (Barnave, 9).
+9 Beccaria, 26. Cf. also Brissot: 'If pardon is equitable, the law is bad;
+when legislation is good, pardons are only crimes against the law'
+(Brissot, 200).
+10 Mably, 327. Cf. also Vattel: 'It is not so much the atrocity of the
+penalties as the exactitude with which they are carried out that keeps
+everybody within his duty' (Mably, 163).
+i Contrary to what Carnot or Helie and Chauveau say, recidivism was
+very clearly punished in a number of laws under the Ancien Régime.
+The ordinance of 1549 declares that the malefactor who repeats his
+crime is an 'execrable, infamous being, eminently pernicious to the
+commonwealth'; recidivism for blasphemy, theft, vagabondage, etc.,
+were subject to special penalties.
+12 Le Peletier, 321-2. The following year, Bellart made what may be
+regarded as the first defence of a crime passionel. This was the Gras
+affair. Cf. Annales du barreau moderne, 1823, III, 34.
+= The gensle way in punishment
+• Le Peletier de Saint-Fargeau. The authors who abandoned the death
+penalty envisaged some definite penalties: Brissot, 29-30. Dufriche de
+Valazé, 344: perpetual imprisonment for those who have been judged
+"irremediably wicked'.
+= Masson, 139. Yet the objection made against penal labour was that it
+implied a recourse to violence (Le Peletier) or that it represented a
+profanation of the sacred character of work (Duport). Rabaud Saint-
+Etienne got the term 'forced labour' adopted in contra-distinction to
+"free labour that belongs exclusively to free men' (Archives Parlementaires, XXVI, 710ff).
+312
+
+3 Part of this code was translated in the introduction to the French
+translation of Colquhoun, 1807, 1, 84.
+4 This explains the numerous prison regulations concerning the exactions of the warders, the security of the premises and the inability of
+prisoners to communicate among themselves. For example, the
+judgement of the Dijon Parlement of 21 September 1706. Cf. also
+Serpillon, 601-47.
+s This is repeated exactly in the declaration of 4 March 1724 on recidivist
+thieves or that of 18 July 1724 concerning vagabondage. A boy, who
+was too young to go to the galleys, remained in a prison until he was
+old enough to be sent there, sometimes to serve the whole of his
+sentence. Cf. Crime el criminalisé en France sous l' Ancien Régime, 266ff.
+6 Phalaris, tyrant of the Greek town of Agrigentum in Sicily, reigned
+about s6o B.c. He is said to have roasted men alive in a brazen bull.
+His name is used here to typify tyrants in general [Tr.].
+7 Briey, "Tiers Etar", quoted in Desjardin, 484. Cf. Goubert and Denis,
+203. One also finds in the cahiers demands for the maintenance of
+houses of detention that families might use.
+8 Cf. Thorsten Sellin, Pioneering in Penology, 1944, which gives an
+exhaustive study of the Rasphuis and the Spinhuis of Amsterdam. One
+may leave to one side another 'model', often cited in the eighteenth
+century. This is the one proposed by Mabillon in the Réflexions sur les
+prisons des ordres religieux, republished in 1845. It seems that this work
+was exhumed in the nineteenth century at a time when the Catholics
+were disputing with the Protestants the place they had taken up in the
+philanthropic movement and in certain administrative bodies. Mabillon's work, which seems to have remained relatively unknown and
+uninfluential, sets out to show that 'the first thought of the American
+penitentiary system' is 'a quite monastic and French thought, whatever
+one might say by way of giving it a Genevan or Pennsylvanian
+origin' (L. Faucher).
+• Vilan XIV, 64; this memoir, which is bound up with the foundation of
+the prison at Ghent, remained unpublished until 184I. The frequency
+of the penalty of banishment emphasized still further the relations
+between crime and vagabondage. In 1771, the States of Flanders
+remarked that 'penalties of banishment imposed on beggars remained
+ineffectual, in view of the fact that the States send to one another
+subjects that they find pernicious at home. As a result, a beggar,
+chased in this way from place to place, will finally get himself hanged,
+whereas, if he had been given the habit of work, he would not have
+embarked on his evil path' (Stoobant, 228).
+313
+
+1o The Quakers certainly also knew the Rasphuis and Spinhuis of
+Amsterdam. Cf. Sellin, 109-10. In any case, Walnut Street Prison was
+a continuation of the Almshouse opened in 1767 and of the penal
+legislation that the Quakers had wished to impose despite the English
+administration.
+i On the disorders caused by this law, of. Rush, 5-9 and Vaux, 45. It
+should be noted that in the report by J. L. Siegel, which had inspired
+the Rasphuis of Amsterdam, it was envisaged that penalties would not
+be proclaimed publicly, that prisoners would be brought into the
+prison at night, that warders would swear not to reveal their identity
+and that no visits would be permitted (Sellin, 27-8).
+I2 B. Rush, who was one of the inspectors, notes after a visit to Walnut
+Street: 'Moral cares: preaching, reading of good books, cleanliness of
+clothes and rooms, baths; one does not raise one's voice, little wine,
+as little tobacco as possible, little obscene or profane conversation.
+Constant work: the gardens taken care of; it is beautiful: 1,200 head of
+cabbage' (in Teeters, 1935, 50).
+13 Rush, 14. This idea of an apparatus for transforming human beings
+is already to be found in Hanway's project for a 'reformatory: 'The
+idea of a hospital and that of a malefactor are incompatible; but let us
+tryiro make the prison an authentic and effective reformatory, instead
+of it being like the others a school of vice' (Hanway, s2).
+14 Cf. the criticism made by Rush of punitive spectacles, in particular
+those imagined by Dufriche du Valazé (Rush, 5-9).
+PART THREE DISCIPLINE
+1 Docile bodies
+I - shall choose examples from military, medical, educational and
+industrial institutions. Other examples might have been taken from
+colonization, slavery and child rearing.
+2 Cf. what La Métherie wrote after a visit to Le Creusot: "The buildings
+for so fine an establishment and so large a quantity of different work
+should cover a sufficient area, so that there will be no confusion among
+the workers during working time' (La Métherie, 66).
+3 J.-B. de la Salle, Conduice des écoles chrériennes, B.N. Ms. 11759, 248-2.
+A little earlier Batencour proposed that classrooms should be divided
+into three parts: "The most honourable for those who are learning
+Latin... It should be stressed that there are as many places at the
+tables as there will be writers, in order to avoid the confusion usually
+caused by the lazy.' In another, those who are learning to read: a bench
+314
+
+for the rich and a bench for the poor 'so that vermin will not be passed
+on'. A third section for newcomers: 'When their ability has been
+recognized, they will be given a place' (M.I.D.B., 56-7).
+4 The success of the Prussian troops can only be attributed to the
+'excellence of their discipline and their exercise; the choice of exercise
+is not therefore a matter of indifference; in Prussia the subject has been
+studied for forty years with unremitting application' (Saxe, II,
+249).
+5 Writing exercise: '... g: Hands on the knees. This command is conveyed by one ring on the bell; io: hands on the table, head up; II:
+clean the slates: everyone cleans his slate with a little saliva, or better
+still with a piece of rag; 12: show the slates; 13: monitors, inspect.
+They inspect the slates with their assistants and then those of their
+own bench. The assistants inspect those of their own bench and everyone returns to his own place.'
+6 This mixture appears clearly in certain classes of the apprenticeship
+contract: the master is obliged to give his pupil - in exchange for his
+money and his labour - all his knowledge, without keeping any secret
+from him; otherwise, he is liable to a fine. Cf., for example, Grosrenaud, 6z.
+7 F. de la Noue recommended the creation of military academies at the
+end of the sixteenth century, suggesting that one should leam in them
+'how to handle horses, to practise with the dagger, with and without
+shield, to fence, to perform on horseback, to jump; if swimming and
+wrestling were added, it would be to the good, for all this makes the
+person robust and more subtle' (Noue, 181-2).
+8 Through the schools at Liège, Devenport, Zwolle, Wesel; and thanks
+also to Jean Sturm and his memorandum of I538 for the organization
+of a gymnasium at Strasburg. Cf. Bulletin de la sociéré d'hiscoire du
+prorestancisme, XXV, 499-505.
+It should be noted that the relations between the army, religious
+organization and education are very complex. The 'decury', the unit of
+the Roman army, is to be found in Benedictine monasteries, as the
+unit of work and no doubt of supervision. The Brothers of the Common Life borrowed it and adapted it to their own education organization: the pupils were grouped in. tens. It was this unit that the Jesuits
+took up in the scenography of their schools, thus reintroducing a
+military model. But the decury was replaced in turn by an even more
+military schema, with ranks, columns, lines.
+> Guibert, 18. In fact, this very old problem came into the forefront
+once more in the eighteenth century, for the economic and technical
+315
+
+reasons that we are about to see; and the "prejudice' in question had
+been discussed very often by others besides Guibert himself (followers
+of Folard, Pirch, Mesnil-Durand).
+1o In the sense in which this term was used after 1759.
+11 The movement that brought the rifle into widespread use may be
+roughly dated from the battle of Steinkirk, 1699.
+Iz On this importance of geometry, see J. de Beausobre: "The science of
+war is essentially geometrical... The arrangement of a battalion and
+a squadron on a whole front and at so much height is alone the effect
+of an as yet unknown, but profound geometry' (Beausobre, 307).
+13 Journal pour l'insiruction élémentaire, April 1816. Cf. Tronchor, who
+has calculated that pupils must have been given over 200 commands a
+day (without counting exceptional orders); for the morning alone
+twenty-six commands communicated by the voice, twenty-three by
+signs, thirty-seven by rings of the bell, and twenty-four by whistle,
+which means a blow on the whistle or a ring on the bell every three
+minutes.
+2 The means of correct training
+¡ Règlement pour l'in fencerie prussienne, Fr. trans., Arsenal, MS. 4067, fo.
+144: For older plans see Praissac, 27-8 and Montgommery, 77. For the
+new plans, cf. Beneton de Morange, Histoire de la guerre, 1741, 6I-4
+and Dissertations sur les Tences; cf. also the many regulations such as
+the Instruction sur le service des règlements de Cavalerie dars les camps,
+29 June 1753.
+2 Arch. nat. MM 666-2. Jeremy Bentham recounts that it was while
+visiting the Ecole Militaire that his brother first had the idea of the
+Panopticon.
+3 Demia, 27-2. One might note a phenomenon of the same kind in the
+organization of schools; for a long time 'prefects' were, independently
+of the teachers, entrusted with the moral responsibility for small groups
+of pupils. After 1762, above all, one sees the appearance of a new
+type of supervision, which was more administrative and more integrated into the hierarchy; supervisors, maitres de guarrier, mairres
+subalternes. Cf. Dupont-Ferrier, 254 and 476.
+3 Paropricism
+I Archives militaires de Vincennes, A 1,5I6 g1 sc. Pièce. This regulation is broadly similar to a whole series of others that date from the
+same period and earlier.
+316
+
+2 In the Postscript to the Panopticon, 1791, Bentham adds dark inspection galleries painted in black around the inspector's lodge, each
+making it possible to observe two storeys of cells.
+3 In his first version of the Panopticon, Bentham had also imagined an
+acoustic surveillance, operated by means of pipes leading from the
+cells to the central tower. In the Posescripe he abandoned the idea,
+perhaps because he could not introduce into it the principle of dissymmetry and prevent the prisoners from hearing the inspector as well
+as the inspector hearing them. Julius tried to develop a system of dissymmetrical listening (Julius, 18).
+4 Imagining this continuous flow of visitors entering the central tower
+by an underground passage and then observing the circular landscape
+of the Panopticon, was Bentham aware of the Panoramas that Barker
+was constructing at exactly the same period (the first seems to have
+dated from 1787) and in which the visitors, occupying the central
+place, saw unfolding around them a landscape, a city or a battle. The
+visitors occupied exactly the place of the sovereign gaze.
+5 In the second half of the eighteenth century, it was often suggested
+that the army should be used for the surveillance and general partitioning of the population. The army, as yet to undergo discipline in the
+seventeenth century, was regarded as a force capable of instilling it.
+Cf., for example, Servan, Le Soldar ciroyen, 1780.
+6 Arsenal, MS. 2565. Under this number, one also finds regulations for
+charity associations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
+7 Le Maire in a memorandum written at the request of Sartine, in
+answer to sixteen questions posed by Joseph II on the Parisian police.
+This memorandum was published by Gazier in 1879.
+PART FOUR PRISON
+1 Complere and austere institutions
+¡ The play between the too 'natures' of the prison still continues. A few
+days ago [summer 1974) the head of state recalled the 'principle' that
+detention ought to be no more than a 'deprivation of liberty' - the pure
+essence of imprisonment, freed of the reality of prison; and added that
+the prison could be justified only by its 'corrective' or rehabilitating
+effects.
+2 Treilhard, 8-2. The same theme is often to be found in the years
+immediately prior to this: "The penalty of detention pronounced by
+the law has above all the object of correcting individuals, that is to say,
+of making them better, of preparing them by trials of shorter or longer
+317
+
+duration, to take up their place once more in society without abusing
+it... The surest ways of making individuals better are work and
+education.' Education consists not only in reading and arithmetic, but
+also in reconciling the prisoners with "ideas of order, morality, respect
+for themselves and for others' (Beugnor, prefect of Seine-Inférieure,
+order issued Frimaire, Year X). In the reports that Chaptal demanded
+from the General Councils of the départements, over a dozen asked for
+prisons in which the inmates could be made to work.
+3 The most important were no doubt those proposed by Lucas, Marquet-
+Wasselor, Faucher, Bonneville, and a little later by Ferrus. It should
+be noted that most of them were not philanthropists, criticizing the
+carceral institution from the outside, but were bound up, in one way or
+another, with the administration of the prisons. They were official
+technicians.
+4 In Germany, Julius directed the Jahrbücher fur Strafs-und Besserungs
+Anstalten.
+5 Although these newspapers were above all organs of defence on the
+part of those in prison for debt and had on several occasions dissociated themselves from delinquents as such, one finds the statement that
+'the columns of Pauvre Jacques are not devoted to, an exclusive
+speciality. The terrible law of constraint by body and its disastrous
+application will not be the only target of the journalist prisoner...
+Pauvre Jacques will draw the attention of its readers to places of
+reclusion and detention, prisons and almshouses; it will not keep silent
+on places where the guilty man is handed over to torture when the law
+condemns him only to work ..! (Pauvre Jacques, Ist year, no. 7).
+Similarly, the Gazele de Sainse-Pélagie campaigned for a penitentiary
+system whose aim would be 'the amelioration of the species'
+, any other
+being 'the expression of a still barbarous society' (21 March 1833).
+6 The discussion that began in France about 1830 was still continuing in
+1850; Charles Lucas, the advocate of Auburn, was the inspiration
+behind the order of 1839 on the running of the mai sons centrales (work
+in common and absolute silence). The wave of revolt that followed
+and perhaps the general agitation in the country in the years 1842-3
+resulted in the adoption in 1844 of the Pennsylvanian régime of
+absolute isolation, advocated by Demetz, Blouet and Tocqueville. But
+the second penitentiary congress in 1847 opted against this method.
+7 'Every man', said Fox, 'is illuminated by the divine light and I have
+seen it shine through every man.' It was in the spirit of the Quakers
+and of Walnut Street that the prisons of Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh and
+Cherry Hill were organized from 1820.
+318
+
+8 Abbé Petigny, Allocution adressée aux prisonniers, à l'occasion de
+l'inaugurarion des bâtimenss cellulaires de la prison de Versailles. CF.,
+a few years later, in The Count of Monre Cristo, a very clearly Christological version of resurrection after incarceration; in this case prison
+teaches not docility to the law, but the power, acquired through a
+secret knowledge, to dispense justice beyond the injustice of the
+magistrates.
+• G. A. Real. Before this, several instructions from the Ministry of the
+Interior had stressed the need for providing work for prisoners: s
+Fructidor Year VI, 3 Messidor Year VIII, 8 Pluviôse and 28 Ventôse
+Year IX, 7 Brumaire Year X. Immediately after the codes of 1808 and
+18ro, one still fnds new instructions: 20 October 1811, 8 December
+1812; or again the long order of 1816: 'It is of the greatest importance
+to keep prisoners occupied as much as possible. One must instil in
+them a desire to work, distinguishing between the fate of those who
+are occupied and that of prisoners who wish to remain idle. The frst
+will be better fed and have more comfortable beds than the second.'
+Melun and Clairvaux were very soon organized into great workshops.
+10 Bonneville, 1846, G. Bonneville proposed measures of 'preparatory
+liberty', but also of 'afflictive additions' or an extension of imprisonment if it was shown that 'the penal prescription, fixed approximately
+according to the probable degree of the prisoner's obduracy was not
+enough to produce the effect expected of it'. This extension was not to
+end one tige of the origins penale had bersery ed raid als
+diverses institutions complémentaires, 25 Iff).
+I1 In Gazelle des tribunaux. Cf. also Marquet-Wasselor, 1832, 74-5.
+Lucas notes that minor offenders 'are generally recruited among the
+urban populations' and that 'the majority of those sentenced to hard
+labour come from the agricultural populations' (Lucas, I, 46-50).
+12 'If one treats of the administrative question by abstracting the question
+of buildings, one runs the risk of drawing up principles that are based
+on no reality; whereas, with a sufficient knowledge of administrative
+needs, an architect may accept a particular system of imprisonment
+that theory may have dismissed as Utopian' (Blouet, I).
+13 "The English reveal their genius for mechanics in everything they
+do... and they want their buildings to function as a machine subject
+to the action of a single motor' (Baltard, 18).
+14 One should study how the practice of biography became widespread at
+about the same time as the constitution of the individual delinquent in
+the punitive mechanisms: the biography or autobiography of prisoners
+319
+
+in Appert; the drawing up of biographical files on the psychiatric
+model; the use of biography in the defence of accused persons. On
+the last point one might compare the great justificatory memoirs of
+the late eighteenth century written for the three men condemned to the
+wheel, or for Jeanne Salmon - and the defences of criminals in the
+period of Louis Philippe. Chaix d'Est-Ange pleaded for La Roncière:
+'If long before the crime, long before the charge is laid, you can
+scrutinize the defendant's life, penetrate into his heart, find its most
+hidden corners, lay bare all his thoughts, his entire soul... (Discours
+es plaidoyers, III, 166).
+2 Illegalities and delinquency
+1 Revue de Paris, 7 June 1836. This part of the spectacle, in 1836, was
+no longer public; only a few privileged spectators were admitted to it.
+The account of the riveting of the convicts' chains to be found in the
+Revue de Paris corresponds exactly - to the point even of using the
+same words - with that of the Dernier jour d un condemné, 1822.
+2 The Gazelle des tribunaux regularly published these lists and these
+"criminal notices. From the following description people would be
+able to recognize Delacollonge: "Old cloth trousers over a pair of
+boots, a peaked cap of the same stuff and a grey overall... A coat of
+blue stuff' (6 June 1836). Later, it was decided to disguise Delacollonge
+in order to protect him from the violence of the crowd. The Gazerte
+des tribunaux immediately described the disguise: 'Striped trousers,
+blue linen overalls, a straw hat' (20 July).
+3 Revue de Paris, June 1836. Cf. Claude Gueux: 'Feel all those heads ...
+each of these fallen men has below him his own bestial type... Here
+is the lynx, here the cat, here the monkey, here the vulture, here the
+hyena.'
+4 Revue de Paris, 7 June 1836. According to the Gazerre des tribunaux,
+Thorez, who commanded the chain-gang of 19 July, wished to
+remove these ornaments: 'It is not fitting that, as you go to the convictship to expiate your crimes, you should push effrontery so far as to
+decorate your hair, as if you were going to your wedding.'
+5 Revue de Paris, 7 June 1836. On this date, the chain-gang had been
+shortened in order to prevent this merry-go-round and soldiers had
+been commanded to maintain order up to the departure of the chaingang. The convicts' Sabbath is described in the Dernier jour d'un
+condamné: 'Society was represented thereby the gaolers and the horrified and curious bystanders. The criminal defined the intentions of
+society and made of this horrible punishment a family festival!
+320
+
+6 A song of the same kind is quoted by the Gazette des tribunaux of
+10 April 1836. It was sung to the tune of the 'Marseillaise'. The
+patriotic war song clearly became the song of the social war: What do
+these stupid people want of us, do they come to insult us in our misfortune! They stare at us calmly. Our butchers do not horrify them.'
+7 There is a class of writers who 'have striven to glorify the crimes of
+certain exceptionally skilled malefactors, give them the leading roles
+and expose the agents of authority to their sallies, their jeers and their
+ill-disguised mockery. Whoever has seen a performance of Auberge des
+Adrets or Robert Macaire, a drama celebrated among the people, will
+recognize without difficulty the correctness of my observations. It is
+the triumph, the apotheosis, of audacity and crime. Honest folk and
+the forces of public order are ridiculed from beginning to end' (Fregier,
+II, 187-8).
+8 Gazette des tribunaux, 23 July 1837. On 9 August, the Gazette reported
+that the carriage had overturned on the outskirts of Guingamp:
+instead of mutinying, the prisoners, 'helped their guardians to put
+their common vehicle back on its wheels'. Yet on 3o October, it noted
+an escape at Valence.
+• Text addressed to L'Arelier, October 1842, by a worker imprisoned
+for joining a workers' association. It was able to note this protest at a
+time when the same newspaper was waging a campaign against competition from penal labour. The same issue carried a letter from another
+worker on the same subject. Cf. also La Fraternizé, March 1842,
+Ist year, no. 1o.
+10 Gazette des tribunaux, 3 December 182g. Cf. also Gazette des tribunaux,
+19 July 1839; the Ruche populaire, August 1840; La Fraternité, July-
+August 1847.
+11 This campaign was very vigorous before and after the passing of new
+regulations for the maisons centrales in 1839. The regulations were
+severe (silence, abolition of wine and tobacco, reduction in food) and
+they were followed by revolts. On 3 October 1840, Le Moniteur
+wrote: 'It was scandalous to see prisoners gorging themselves with
+wine, meat, game, delicacies of all kinds and treating prison as a
+convenient hostelry where they could procure all the comforts that
+the state of liberty often refused them.'
+12 In 1826, many of the General Councils demanded that deportation be
+substituted for constant and ineffective incarceration. In 1842, the
+General Council of the Hautes-Alpes demanded that the prisons
+become 'truly expiatory; those of Drôme, Eure-et-Loir, Nièvre,
+Rhône and Seine-et-Oise made similar demands.
+321
+
+13 According to an investigation carried out in 1839 among the directors
+of the maisons centrales. The director of the mai son centrale of Embrun
+remarked: "The excessive comfort in the prisons probably contributes
+a great deal to the terrible increase in the number of recidivists. While
+the director at Eysses remarked: "The present régime is not severe
+enough, and if one thing is certain it is that for many of the inmates
+prison has its attractions and that they find in prison depraved pleasures
+that are entirely to their liking.!' The director at Limoges: "The
+present régime of the maisons centrales which, for the recidivists, are in
+fact little more than boarding houses, is in no way repressive' (Cf.
+Moreau-Christophe, 1840, 86). Compare these remarks with declarations made, in July 1974, by the leaders of the union of prison workers
+concerning the effects of liberalization in prisons.
+14 On the problem of deportation, cf. Barbé-Marbois and the discussion
+between Blosseville and La Pilorgerie (on the subject of Botany Bay).
+Buré, Marengo and L. de Carné, among others, drew up plans for the
+colonization of Algeria with delinquents.
+1s One of the first episodes was the organization under police supervision
+of the maisons de tolerance (1823), which went well beyond the provisions of the law of 14 July 1791, concerning surveillance in brothels.
+Cf., on this subject the manuscripts collected by the Prefecture of
+police (20-26). In particular, the following circular from the Prefect of
+police, dated 14 June 1823: "The establishment of houses of prostitution ought naturally to be regarded with displeasure by any man who
+is concerned with public morality; I am not surprised that the Commissioners of police oppose to the utmost of their powers the establishment of houses in their various quarters... The police believed
+that they had done much towards public order if they had succeeded
+in enclosing prostitution within tolerated houses over which its action
+may be constant and uniform and which would not be able to escape
+surveillance.'
+16 The book by Parent-Duchatelet on Prostituțion à Paris, 1836, may be
+read as evidence of this link, encouraged by the police and penal
+institutions, between the delinquent milieu and prostitution. The case
+of the Italian Mafia transplanted to the United States and used both to
+extract illicit profits and for political ends is a fine example of the
+colonization of an illegality of popular origin.
+17 On this role of delinquents for police and especially political surveillance, cf. the memorandum written by Lemaire: 'Informers' are people
+who 'expect indulgence for themselves'; they are usually 'bad subjects
+who expose others who are worse still. Furthermore, it is enough for
+322
+
+someone to have his name in the police register for him never to be
+lost sight of'
+18 Of the resistance of lawyers to participating in this functioning, there
+is abundant evidence from as early as the Restoration (which proves
+that it is in no way a recent phenomenon). In particular the liquidation
+or rather the re-utilization of the Napoleonic police posed certain
+problems. But the difficulties continued. Cf. Belleyme's first speech
+after his appointment in 1825, in which he sought to differentiate
+himself from his predecessors: 'Legal ways are open to us... Brought
+up in the school of law, educated in the school of so worthy a magistrature ... we are the auxiliaries of justice... (Belleyme); see also the
+very interesting pamphlet by Molène, De la liberté.
+19 For contemporary views of Lacenaire, see the dossier drawn up by
+M. Lebailly in his edition of Lacenaire's Mémoires, 1968, 297-304.
+20 The circle of the years 1835-6: Fieschi, who served the penalty common to parricides and regicides, was one of the reasons why Rivière,
+the parricide, was condemned to death despite a memorandum whose
+astonishing character was no doubt muffied by the brilliance of
+Lacenaire, of his trial, and of his writings, which were, published
+thanks to the head of the Sûreté (censored to some extent), at the
+beginning of 1836, some months before his accomplice François was
+to provide, with the chain-gang of Brest, one of the last great circus
+shows of crime. A circle of illegalities and delinquencies, the circle of
+discourse of crime and on crime.
+21 At the end of the eighteenth century Colquhoun gave some idea of the
+difficulty of the task for a city like London (Colquhoun, 27-2; 293-4).
+22 'No other class is subjected to a surveillance of this kind; it is exercised
+almost in the same way as that of released prisoners; it seems to place
+the workers in the category that we now call the dangerous class of
+society' (L'Arelier, sth year, no. 6, March 1845).
+23 Apart from the Gazelle des tribunaux and the Courrier des tribunaux,
+the Journal des concierges.
+24 Cf. L'Arelier, June 1844, petition to the Chambre de Paris that
+prisoners should be made to do 'unhealthy and dangerous work'; in
+April 1845, the newspapers quoted a case in Brittany where a large
+number of military convicts died of fever while working on canalbuilding. Why were the prisoners not working with mercury or whitelead in November 1845.... Cf. also the Démocratie politique of the
+years 1844-5.
+25 In L'Arelier, of November 1843, there was an attack against the
+Mystères de Paris because they showed the delinquents in too good a
+323
+
+ight, stressing their picturesqueness, their vocabulary, and because
+there was too much emphasis on the fatal character of a proclivity to
+crime. In La Ruche populaire similar attacks on the theatre are to be
+found.
+26 Cf. In La Ruche populaire (December 1839) Vinçard replied to an
+article by Balzac published in Le Siècle. Balzac had said that a charge
+of theft was to be made with prudence and discretion when it concerned
+a rich man whose slightest dishonesty immediately became known:
+Say, Monsieur, with your hand on your conscience, whether the contrary does not occur every day whether, with a great fortune and an
+elevated rank in society, one does not find a thousand solutions, a
+thousand means to hush up some unfortunate affair.'
+27 In La Fraternité, March 1847, there is a discussion of the Drouillard
+affair and reference is made to thefts in the naval administration at
+Rochefort. In June 1847, there was an article on the Boulmy trial and
+on the Cubière-Pellaprat affair; and, in July-August 1847, on the
+Benier-Lagrange-Jussieu affair, which involved misappropriation of
+public funds.
+28 'Licensed prostitution, direct material theft, house-breaking, murder,
+brigandage for the lower classes; while skilful spoliation, indirect,
+refned theft, clever exploitation of human cattle, carefully planned
+and brilliantly executed betrayals, transcendent pieces of sharp practice
+in short, all the truly elegant vices and lucrative crimes which the law
+is far too polite to interrupt remain the monopoly of the upper classes'
+(1 December 1838).
+29 Cf., for example, what La Phalange said of Delacollonge or of Elirabide on 1 August 1836 and z October 1840.
+3 The carceral
+i "Anything that helps to tire the body helps to expel bad thoughts; so
+care is taken that games consist of violent exercise. At night, they fall
+asleep the moment they touch the pillow' (Ducpétiaux, 1854, 375-6).
+= Cf., for example, the following description of workers' accommodation
+built at Lille in the mid-nineteenth century: "Cleanliness is the order
+of the day. It is the heart of the regulations. There are a number of
+severe provisions against noise, drunkenness, disorders of all kinds.
+A serious offence brings expulsion. Brought back to regular habits of
+order and economy, the workers no longer desert the workshops on
+Mondays... The children are better supervised and are no longer a
+cause of scandal... Prizes are given for the upkeep of the dwellings,
+324
+
+for good behaviour, for signs of devotion and each year these prizes
+are competed for by a large number of competitors' (Houzé de
+l'Aulnay, 13-15).
+3 Crime was explicitly defined by certain jurists such as Muyart de
+Vouglans, 1707, 108 and 1780, 3, or Rousseaud de la Combe, 1-2.
+325
+
+Aguet, J. P., Les Grèves sous la monarchie de Juiller, 1954.
+Agulhon, M., La view sociale en Provence, 1970.
+Almanach populaire de la France, L', 1839.
+Amboise, Projer de règlement pour l'aciérie d', Archives nationales, f. 12,
+I301.
+Anchel, R., Crimes et chútiments au XVIIIe siècle, 1933.
+Annales du barreau moderne, III, 1823.
+Archives nationales, MM 658, 30 March 1758 and MM 666, I5 September
+1763.
+Archives militaires de Vincennes, A 1,516 91 sc.
+Archives parlementaires, XII, XXVI, LXXÍI.
+re, 5, Margans di la Jamil es mémoires, VI, 1859-67 edn
+Arelier, L', October 1840; March 1842; October 1842; November 1843;
+June 1844; March 1845.
+Aylies, S., Du système pénitenciaire, 1837.
+Ayrault, P., L'Ordre, formaliré et instruccion judiciaire.
+Baltard, L., Archirectonographie des prisons, 1829.
+Barbé-Marbois, F. de, Rapport sur l'étar des prisons du Calvados, de l'Eure,
+la Manche et la Seine Inférieure, 1823.
+Barbier, E.-J.-F., Journal, IV, ed. 1847-56.
+Barnave, A., 'Discours à la Constituante', Archives parlementaires,
+XXVII, 6 July 1791.
+Batencourt, J. de, Instruction méthodique pour l'école paroissiale, 1669.
+Beaumont, E. de and Tocqueville, A. de, Note sur le système pénitentiaire,
+1831.
+Le Système pénitentiaire aux États-Unis, ed. 1845.
+Beausobre, J. de, Commentaire sur les défenses des places, II, 1757.
+Beccaria, C. de, Traité des délits er des peines, 1764, ed. 185G.
+Belleyme, M. de, Histoire de l'adminiseration.
+326
+
+Beneton de Morange, E. C., Dissertations sur les Tentes, 1735.
+Histoire de la guerre, 1741.
+Bentham, J., Works, ed. Bowring, IV, 1843.
+Bercé, Y.-M., Croquants es nu-pieds, 1974.
+Bérenger, A.., Rappors à l'Académie des sciences morales, June 1836.
+Bergasse, N., Rapport à la Constiruarie sur le pouvoir judiciaire, 1782.
+Bernard, Samuel, Rappore du 30 occobre 18‹6 à la sociéré de l'enseignement
+muruel.
+Bexon, S., Code de séreré publique, part z, 1807.
+Bigot Préameneu, F., Repport au conseil général de la socié ré des prisons, 1819.
+Blackstone, W., Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 4, 1766-7.
+Blouer, Abel, Projes de prisons cellulaires, 1843.
+Bonneville, A., De la récidive, 1844.
+Des libérations prépararoires, 1846.
+Des inscicurions complémentaires du systeme pénitencier, 1847.
+Boucher d'Argis, A., Observations sur les lois criminelles, 1781.
+Cahier d'un magistras, 1789.
+Boussanelle, L. de, Le Bon Militaire, 1770.
+Bradford, W., An inquiry how for the punishment of death is necessary in
+Pennsylvania, 1793.
+Brantôme, Mémoires. La vie des hommes illustres, II, ed. 1722.
+Brissor, J. P., Théorie des lois criminelles, I, 1781.
+Bruneau, A., Observations et maximes sur les matières criminelles, 1715.
+Bullerin de la sociéré d'histoire du prorestantisme, XXV.
+Buré, E.., De la misère des classes laborieuses en Angleterre et en France, II,
+1840.
+Buxton, Thomas Fowell, Perliamentary Debare, 1819, XXXIX.
+Canguilhem, G., Le Normal er le Pathologique, ed. 1966.
+Canler, P. L. A., Mémoires, ed. 1968.
+Cariou, P., Les Idéalirés casuistiques (unpublished thesis).
+Chabroud, C., Archives parlementaires, XXVI.
+Chassaigne, M., La Lieuenance générale de police, 1906.
+Chassanée, B. de, Consuerudo Burgundi, 1$28.
+Chaunu, P., Annales de Normandie.
+Choiseul, Mémoire expositif, B.N. MS. 8129.
+Colquhoun, P., Trearise on the Police of the Metropolis, 1797.
+Comte, C., Traité de législation, 1833.
+Coquille, G., Cousume du Nivernais, ed. 1646.
+Corre, A., Documents de criminologie rétrospective, 1895.
+Documents pour servir à l'histoire de la torture judiciaire en Bretagne, 1896.
+327
+
+Courol, G., Considéracions d'incérte public sur le droir d'exploiter les mines,
+1790, Arch. nat. A XIII
+Crime et criminalité en France sous l' Ancien Régime, 1971 (various authors).
+Daisy, Le royaune de France, 1745.
+Damhoudère, J. de, Pravique judiciaire ès causes civiles, 1572.
+Danjou, E., Des prisons, 1821.
+Dauphin, V., Recherches sur l'industrie texcile en Anjou, 1913.
+Dautricourt, P., La Criminalité er la répression au Parlemens de Flandre,
+1928-8790, 1812.
+Decazes, E., 'Rapport au roi sur les prisons', Le Moniteur, 1I April 1819.
+Delamare, N., Traité de police, 1705.
+Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix, Anci-Oedipe, 1972.
+Demia, C., Réglement pour les écoles de la ville de Lyon, 1718.
+Dépôts de la Guerre, 368g.
+Des Essarts, T. N., Dictionnaire universel de police, 1787.
+Desjardin, A., Les Cahiers des Ecars généraux et la justice criminelle, 1883.
+Ducatel, Instruction pour la construction des maisons d'arrét, 1841.
+Ducpétiaux, E., De la réforme pénitenciaire, III, 1837.
+Des colonses agricoles, 185I.
+De la condition physique er morale des jeures ouvriers, II, 1854.
+Du système de l'emprisonremens cellulaire, 1857.
+Dufau, 'Discours à la Constituante', Arch. parl., XXVI.
+Dufriche de Valazé, C. E., Des lois pénales, 1784.
+Duhamel, L., Les Exécurions capitales à Avignon au XVIIIe siècle, 18go.
+Dupary, C., Mémoire justificarif pour les trois hommes condamnés à la roue,
+1786.
+Lectres sur la procédure criminelle, 1788.
+Dupont-Ferrier, Du collège de Clermont au lycée Louis-le-Grand, I.
+Duport, A., 'Discours à la Constituante', 22 December 178g, Arch, parl.,
+X and XXI.
+Duras, L., article appearing in Le Progressif and quoted by Le Phalange,
+1 December 1838.
+Durkheim, E., 'Deux lois de l'évolution pénale', Année sociologique IV,
+1898-1900.
+Encyclopédie, articles on 'Supplice' and 'Manufacture'.
+Esmein, A., Historie de la procédure criminelle en France, 1882.
+Farge, A., Le Vol d'aliments à Paris au XVIII: siècle, 1974.
+Faucher, L., De la réforme des prisons, 1838.
+328
+
+Ferrière, C., Dierionnaire de pratique, II, 1740.
+Ferrus, G., Des prisonniers, 1850.
+Festy, O., Les Délits ruraux er leur répression sous la Révoluion er le
+Consular, 1956.
+Fielding, Henry, The Causes of the lare increase in Robbers, 175 1, in Works,
+X, ed. 1784.
+Filangieri, G., Le Science de la législation, IV, 1786 (Fr. trans.).
+Fleury, Joly de, B.N. Fonds Joly de Fleury, 258.
+Fraternité, Le, November 1841; February 1842; March 1842; November
+1845; March 1847; July-August 1847.
+Fregier, H. A., Les Classes dangereuses, 1840.
+Fresnel, R., Considérations sur les maisons de refuge, 1829.
+Funck-Brentano, F., Casalogue des manuscrirs de la bibliorhèque de l'Arsenal,
+IX.
+Gaillac, H., Les Maisons de correccion, 1971.
+Gasparin, A. E. de, Rapport au ministre de l'Insérieur sur la réforme des
+prisons, 1837.
+Gazelle d'Amsierdam, 1 April, 1757.
+Gazette des tribunaux, 3 December 1829; 30 August 1832; 10 April 1836;
+• june 1830; 20 July 1830; 6 April 1837; IS June 1837; 23 July 1837;
+9 August 1837; 19 July 1839; August 1840.
+Gerspach, E., La Manufaciure des Gobelins, 1892.
+Goubert, P., and Denis, M., Les Français ont la parole, 1964.
+Grellet-Wammy, Manuel des prisons, II, 1839.
+Grégory, G. de, Projet de Code pénal universal, 1832.
+Grosrenaud, F., La Corporation ouvrière à Besançon, 1907.
+Guerry, F. and Deleule, D., Le Corps productif, 1973.
+Guibert, J. A. de, 'Discours préliminaire', Essai général de raccique, I,
+1772.
+Hanway, J., The Defects of Police, 1775.
+Hardy, S. P., Mes loisirs, B.N. MS. 6680-87, 1778.
+Harou-Romain, N. P., Project de pénitencier, 1840.
+Helor, R., La Bibliothèque bleue en Normandie, 1928.
+Hibbert, C., The Roos of Evil, 1966.
+Hobsbawm, E. J., Bandies, 1969.
+Houzé de l'Aulnay, A., Des logements ouvriers à Lille, 1863.
+Humaniraire, L', August 1841.
+Instruccion par l'exercise de l'infanserie, 14 May 1754.
+328
+
+Inscrucrion sur le service des règlements de Cavalerie dans les camps, 29 June
+1753.
+Joly de Maizeroy, P., Théorie de la guerre, 1777.
+Jousse, D., Traité de la juscice criminelle, 1771.
+Jucquiot, J., Le Club françeis de la médaille, 4th term, 1970.
+Juillard, M., Brigandage er concrebande en hauce Auvergne au XVIIIe
+siècle, 1937.
+Julius, N. H., Leçons sur les prisons, I, 1831 (Fr. trans.).
+Kantorowitz, E., The King's Two Bodies, 1959.
+Kropotkin, P., Memoirs of a Revolutioniss, ed. 1906.
+Lacenaire, Mémoires, ed. 1968.
+Lachèze, 'Discours à la Constituante', 3 June 1791, Arch. parl., XXVI.
+Lacretelle, P. L. de, Discours sur les préjugés des peines infamances, 1784.
+La Métherie, C. de, Journal de physique, XXX, 1787.
+La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, G. de, Des prisons de Philadelphie, 1796.
+La Salle, J.-B. de, Conduire des écoles chréciennes, B.N. MS. 11759.
+Trairé sur les obligarions des frères des écoles chréciennes, ed. 1783.
+Laulau, R., L'Ecole milisaire de Paris, 1950.
+Lauvergne, H., Les Forçais, 1841.
+Lawrence, J., A History of Capical Punishmens, 1932.
+Léon, A., La Révolucion française er l'éducarion rechnique, 1968.
+Le Pelétier de Saint-Fargeau, Arch. parl., XXVI, 3 June 179I.
+Le Roy-Ladurie, E., Concrepoine, 1973.
+'L'histoire immobile', Annales, May-June 1974.
+Le Trosne, G., Mémoires sur les vagabonds, 1764.
+Vues sur la jussice criminelle, 1777.
+Lévy, J. P., La Hierarchie des preuves dans le droir savane du Moyen Age,
+1939.
+Linguer, S., Nécessiré d'une réforme dans l'administrarion de la jussice, 1764.
+Locré, La Législacion de la France, XXIX.
+Loisel, G., Histoire des ménageries, II, 1912.
+Loyseau, C., Cinq livres du droie des offices, ed. 1613.
+Lucas, C., De la réforme des prisons, 1836.
+Mably, G. de, De la législation, Oeuvres complères, IX, 1789.
+Mandrou, R., De la culsure populaire aux XVIIe es XVIIIe siècles, 1964.
+Marat, J.-P., Plan de législarion criminelle, 1780.
+Marchegay, P., Archives d'Anjou, II, 1850.
+330
+
+Marquer-Wasselot, J. J., La Ville du refuge, 1832.
+L'Ethnographie des prisons, 1841.
+Marx, Karl, The Eighteench Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, ed. 1954.
+Capital, vol. I, ed. 1970.
+Masson, L., La Révolution pénale en 1791, 1899.
+Meir, G. Codina, Aux sources de la pédagogie des Jésuires, 1968.
+M.I.D.B. (Batencourt), Instruction méthodique four l'école paroissiale, 1669.
+Mittermaier, K. J., Traisé de la preuve, 1848 (Fr. trans.).
+Mogensen, N. W., Aspects de la société augeronne aux XVIIe er XVIIIe
+siècles, 1971.
+Molène, A. de, De l'humaniré des lois criminelles, 1830.
+Monfalcon, J. B., Histoire des insurreccions à Lyon, 1834.
+Montgommery, J. de, La Milice française, ed. I636.
+Moreau-Christophe, L., De la morcalité er de la folie dans le régime
+pénitentiaire, 1839.
+Polémiques pénitenciaires, 1840.
+Mougins de Roquefort, J. J., 'Discours à la Constituante', Arch. parl.
+XXVI.
+Muyart de Vouglans, P. F., Instirus au droit criminel, 1757.
+Réfutation du Trairé des délies et des peines, 1767.
+Les lois criminelles en France, 1780.
+Nantes, Archives municipales de, F.F. 124.
+Navereau, A., Le Logement et les ustensiles des gens de guerre de 1430 d
+1789, 1824.
+Nicolas, Si la torture est un moyen à verifier les crimes, 1682.
+Noue, F. de la, Discours politiques et milicaires, 1614.
+Ollyffe, G., An Essay 10 Prevent Capiral Crimes, 1731.
+Oppenheim, Règlement provisoire pour la fabrique de M.S., 1809, in Hayem,
+J., Mémoires et documents pour revenir à l'histoire du commerce, 1911.
+'Ordonnace du ret janvier 1766, pour régler l'exercise de l'infanterie.
+Parfouru, P., Mémoires de la société archéologique d'Ille-er-Vilaine, XXV,
+1806.
+Pastoret, C. E. de, Des lois pénales, 1790.
+Pauvre Jacques, Ist year, no. 3.
+Perrot, Michèle, Délinquance er système pénirenciaire de France au XIX•
+siècle (unpublished).
+Petion de Villeneuve, J., 'Discours à la Constituante', Arch. parl., XXVI.
+Petrovitch, P., Crime et criminalité en France XVII-XVIIIe siècles, 1971.
+331
+
+Phalange, La, I August 1836; 10 August 1836; 10 January 1837; 1
+December 1838; 15 August 1840; = October 1840.
+Picret de Rochemont, C., Journal de Genève, 5 January 1788.
+Pièces originales es procédures du procès fair à Robert-François Damiens,
+III, 1757.
+Poullain du Parc, A. M., Principes du droit français selon les courumes de
+Bresagne, XI, 1767-71.
+Praissac, Les Discours militaires, 1623.
+Radzinovitz, L., The English Criminal Law, II, 1956.
+Réal, A., Arch. parl., 2° série, LXXII, 1 December 1831.
+Real, G. A., Morifs du Code d'inscruction criminelle, 1808.
+Registre des déliberations du bureau de l'Hôtel-Dieu.
+'Règlement de 1743 pour l'infanterie prussienne', Arsenal, MS. 4076.
+Rémusat, C. F. M. de, Arch. parl., LXXII, 1 December 1831.
+Revue de Paris, 7 June 1836.
+Richet, D., La France moderne, 1974.
+Risi, P., Observations sur les marières de jurisprudence criminelle, 1768.
+Rochemonteix, C. de, Un collège eu XVIIe siècle, III, 188g.
+Rossi, P., Trairé de drois pénal, III, 1829.
+Rousseau, J.-J., Social Contract, ed. 1913 (Eng. trans.).
+Rousseaud de la Combe, G., Trairé des matières criminelles, 1741.
+Ruche populaire, La, December 1839; August 1840; November 1842.
+Rusche, G. and Kirchheimer, O., Punishment and Social Structures, 1939.
+Rush, B., An Enquiry inco the Effects of Public Punishmenes upon Criminals
+and upon Sociery, 1787.
+Saint-Edme (E. Bourg), Dictionnaire de pénaliré, IV, 1825.
+Saint-Hilaire, E. Geoffroy, Notions synthéri ques et historiques de philosophie
+naturelle, 1838.
+'Saint-Maur, Règlement de la fabrique de', B.N. MS. Coll. Delamare,
+Manufactures III.
+Saxe, Maréchal de, Les Rêveries, 1756.
+Seigneux de Correvon, G., Essai sur l'usage, l'abus er les inconvénienss de
+la corrure, 1768.
+Seligman, E., Le Justice sous la Révolucion, I, I901.
+Sellin, Thorsten, Pioneering in Penology, 1944.
+Serpillon, F., Code criminel, III, 1.767.
+Servan, J., Le Soldar ciroyen, 1780.
+Servan, J. M., Discours sur l'administration de la jussice criminelle, 1767.
+Snyders, G., Le Pédagogie en France aux XVIII er XVIIIe siècles, 1965.
+332
+
+Soulatges, J. A., Traité des crimes, I, 1762.
+Stoobant, L., in Annales de la Sociéré d'hiscoire de Gand, III, 18,8.
+Swedish Discipline, The, London, 1632 (anon.).
+1964.
+Teeters, N. K., The Cradle of the Penicenciary, 1935.
+They were in Prison, 1937.
+Tobias, J., Crime and Industrial Sociery, 1967.
+Tort, Michel, Q.I., 1974.
+Touquet, H. du, De la condirion des classes pauvres, 1846.
+Treilhard, J. B., Morifs du code d'inseruction criminelle, 1808.
+Tronchot,
+R. R., L'Enseignement mucuel en France, I (unpublished
+thesis).
+Turnbull, J., Visite à la prison de Philadelphie, 1797 (Fr. trans.).
+Van Meenen, P., 'Congrès pénitentiaire de Bruxelles"', in Annales de la
+Charité, 1847.
+Vattel, E. de, Le Droit des gens, 1768.
+Vaux, Roberts, Norices, 1826.
+Vermeil, F. M., Essai sur les réformes à faire dans notre législation criminelle,
+1781.
+Vidocq, F.-E., Historie de Vidocq raconeée par lui-même.
+Mémoires.
+Vilan XIV, Mémoire sur les moyens de corriger les malfaireurs, 1773.
+Walhausen, J. J., L'Are militaire pour l'infanterie, 16I5.
+Zevaes, A. L., Damiens le régicide, 1937.
+333
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/fcebdffc867a6bdd23e096f50099eadf293c3206a49cddaecac9a4421ec512b2.receipt.json b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/fcebdffc867a6bdd23e096f50099eadf293c3206a49cddaecac9a4421ec512b2.receipt.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f15dfee0b84c833da98830a270993474ca040960
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vision-fixhub/lit-reocr-01/fcebdffc867a6bdd23e096f50099eadf293c3206a49cddaecac9a4421ec512b2.receipt.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "byte_delta": -7293,
+  "dataset": "marble-joined",
+  "doc_id": "fcebdffc867a6bdd23e096f50099eadf293c3206a49cddaecac9a4421ec512b2",
+  "engine": "marble-apple-vision",
+  "event_count": 1071,
+  "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.dehyphenation.join-soft-wraps\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]",
+  "idempotent": true,
+  "input_sha256": "ce9d8cdda4aba2644239abb6f5d19a9e59fd452f88e27d35713e76d86785fcb1",
+  "output_sha256": "bfe2e99f9ca6c679d4c6cf4636d21fb06c9abdfa504eed218bc5bb9e130260ed",
+  "page_markers": false,
+  "source_id": "epstein-external",
+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}